


Eighteenth-Century Ukraine

*New Perspectives on
Social, Cultural, and
Intellectual History*

Edited by Zenon E. Kohut, Volodymyr Sklokin,
and Frank E. Sysyn, with Larysa Bilous



EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY UKRAINE

The Peter Jacyk Centre
for
Ukrainian Historical Research

Monograph Series
Number thirteen

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY UKRAINE

*New Perspectives on Social, Cultural,
and Intellectual History*

Edited by

*Zenon E. Kohut, Volodymyr Sklokin,
and Frank E. Sysyn, with Larysa Bilous*

McGill-Queen's University Press
Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago
and
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press
Edmonton • Toronto

© Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies 2023

ISBN 978-0-2280-1699-1 (cloth)

ISBN 978-0-2280-1743-1 (ePDF)

Legal deposit second quarter 2023

Bibliothèque nationale du Québec

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free

(100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free



Funded by the
Government
of Canada

Financé par le
gouvernement
du Canada

| Canada



Canada Council
for the Arts

Conseil des arts
du Canada

We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts.

Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Title: Eighteenth-century Ukraine : new perspectives on social, cultural, and intellectual history / edited by Zenon E. Kohut, Volodymyr Sklokin, and Frank E. Sysyn with Larysa Bilous.

Names: Kohut, Zenon E., editor. | Sklokin, Volodymyr, editor. | Sysyn, Frank E., editor. | Bilous, Larysa, editor.

Description: Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20220454159 | Canadiana (ebook) 2022045423X | ISBN 9780228016991 (cloth) | ISBN 9780228017431 (ePDF)

Subjects: LCSH: Ukraine—History—18th century. | LCSH: Ukraine—Social conditions—18th century. | LCSH: Ukraine—Economic conditions—18th century. | LCSH: Ukraine—Intellectual life—18th century. | LCSH: Ukraine—Politics and government—18th century. | LCSH: Ukraine—Relations—Russia. | LCSH: Russia—Relations—Ukraine.

Classification: LCC DK508.759 .E34 2023 | DDC 947.707—dc23

Contents

Figures and Tables ix

Acknowledgments xi

Abbreviations xiii

Maps follow page xiv

Introduction 3

Zenon E. Kohut, Volodymyr Sklokin, and Frank E. Sysyn

PART ONE

COSSACK AUTONOMIES AND THEIR DEMISE

- 1 Ukraine on Seventeenth- And Eighteenth-Century Maps: From the “Wild Field” to the “Country of the Cossacks” 27

Kyrylo Halushko

- 2 In Search of “Ukraine” in the Russian Empire (End of Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries) 57

Volodymyr Kravchenko

- 3 From the “Russian Jerusalem” to the “Slavic Pompeii” 97

Oleksii Tolochko

- 4 Catherine II, Evdokim Shcherbinin, and the Abolition of Sloboda Ukraine’s Autonomy 115

Volodymyr Sklokin

- 5 “A Plague on Your Borders”: Disease Control and Administrative Reforms in Late Eighteenth-Century Ukraine 144
Oksana Mykhed
- 6 Formation of the Imperial Russia Bureaucratic Class in Steppe Ukraine in the Late Eighteenth Century 173
Oleksandr Pankieiev
- 7 Identities of Little Russian Society through the Prism of Napoleon’s Russian Campaign 202
Vadym Adadurov

PART TWO

SOCIETY, ECONOMY, AND DEMOGRAPHICS

- 8 Colonel of the Zaporozhian Host: The Right to Free Elections in Light of Cossack Traditions, Prescribed Regulations, and Political Realities 219
Viktor Horobets'
- 9 Military Reforms during the Hetmancy of Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi, 1750–64 247
Oleksii Sokyрко
- 10 “For Deliveries to Tsargrad and Other Neighboring States” (Kyiv Reiters in the Eighteenth Century) 277
Vadym Nazarenko
- 11 The Cossack *Starshyna* of Sloboda Ukraine in the Seventeenth–Eighteenth Centuries: The “Family Clan” and Attainment of Social Status 298
Volodymyr Masliychuk
- 12 Regimental Cities of the Hetmanate in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century: Governance, Economy, Demography 325
Ihor Serdiuk

- 13 Population Distribution of the City of Poltava in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century by Age, Sex, and Marital Status 361
Iurii Voloshyn

PART THREE

CHURCH, CULTURE, AND EDUCATION

- 14 The Challenges of Unification and Disciplining Facing the Kyiv Orthodox Metropolitanate in the Eighteenth Century: The Case of Book Publishing 395
Maksym Iaremenko
- 15 The Uniate Church in Right-Bank Ukraine in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century: Paradoxes of Regional Adaptation 424
Ihor Skochylas
- 16 The Teaching of Philosophy at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy at the End of the Seventeenth to Eighteenth Century 455
Mykola Symchych
- 17 Orthodox Colleges in the Russian Empire (Second Half of the Eighteenth to the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century): Between Traditions and Innovations 471
Liudmyla Posokhova

PART FOUR

POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL THOUGHT

- 18 “Rulers of the Fatherland”: The Hetmanate’s Cossack and Church Elite’s Concepts of the Nature, Representation, and Obligations of Authority (Up to the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century) 499
Natalia Iakovenko
- 19 Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture 528
Frank E. Sysyn

- 20 The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nation-Building 542
Zenon E. Kohut
- 21 *Constitutio Medievalis*: The Politics of Language and the Language of Politics in the 1710 Constitution 560
Gary Marker
- 22 “In the Name of the Beloved Fatherland”: The Loyalty and Treason of Ivan Mazepa 579
Serhii Plokhyy
- 23 Cossack Historiography: A Vision of the Past and the Construction of Identities in the Hetmanate in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 598
Andrii Bohachuk
- Contributors 629
Index 637

Figures and Tables

Figures

- 12.1 Sex-age pyramid of the population of Pereiaslav 354
- 13.1 The main “ideal” types of age pyramids 371
- 13.2 Sex-age pyramid of Poltava according to the Rumiantsev Census 372
- 13.3 The sex-age pyramid of Poltava according to the confessional lists for 1775 373

Tables

- 5.1 Expenditures of the Kyiv Chancellery on the construction of quarantine facilities, outpost, and custom complexes, 1771–72 156
- 10.1 Social background of the Kyiv Reiters according to the 1772 record of service 283
- 10.2 Duties of Kyiv Reiters in the first half of 1778 according to a report by Unit Commander S. Melnikov 289
- 12.1 Sex ratio of the population of the cities of the Hetmanate according to the General Census of Little Russia of 1766 (percentage) 345
- 12.2 Percentage of widows and widowers of active age in the urban population 352
- 13.1 UN standard for calculating Whipple’s Index 364

- 13.2 Sex-age structure of the population of Poltava in 1765–66 according to the Rumiantsev Census 367
- 13.3 Sex-age structure of the population of Poltava in 1775 according to data contained in the confessional lists 369
- 13.4 Population distribution of Poltava in the second half of the eighteenth century by biological and economic types 374
- 13.5 Population distribution of the city of Poltava by marital status in 1765–66 375
- 13.6 Population distribution of the city of Poltava by marital status in 1775 376
- 13.7 Distribution of the population of Poltava by marital status (percentage) 378
- 13.8 Age difference between husbands and wives 382
- 16.1 Philosophy classes of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy before 1751 459–61

Acknowledgments

The idea of this volume was first conceived on the sidelines of the conference on the imperial identities in Ukraine during the “long” eighteenth century held at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv in September 2017. The goal was to make available to the wider scholarly community the innovative research being conducted in Ukraine on a period and topics that had received relatively little attention. It took more than five years and the efforts of many people and institutions to bring it to fruition.

We are grateful to all editors who permitted our contributors to republish updated versions of the texts originally published in their journals and collective volumes in the present book.

Except for the articles originally published in English, the articles in the volume were translated by the late Marta Skorupsky, a brilliant translator and editor with a delicate feel for language, the meticulousness of a researcher, and the erudition of a scholar. Larysa Bilous edited all content, coordinated editorial consultations, implemented changes and revisions, and compiled the index. Peter Bejger skillfully edited the manuscript. Dmytro Vortman expertly drew the maps.

We thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable and stimulating comments. We are grateful to Richard Ratzlaff of McGill-Queen’s University Press and Marko Stech of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press for their encouragement in completing this project.

For Volodymyr Sklokin, the completion of the work on the volume was made possible by the visiting fellowship at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna provided by *Ukraine in European Dialog* program.

The preparation of this volume was made possible by the generous support of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Ukrainian Studies Fund, Inc., and the editors are pleased that the volume has been included in the Centre's Monograph Series.

Abbreviations

- Arkhiv IuZR *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi Vremennoiu kommissieiu dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, vysochaishe uchrezdennoi pri Kievskom, Podol'skom i Volynskom general-gubernator* (Archive of South-West Russia, historical documents of the Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynian Governatores-General)
- AGAD Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Central Archive of Historical Records; Warsaw)
- APL, ChKGK *Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie, Chełmski Konsystorz Greckokatolicki* (State Archive in Lublin, Greek Catholic Consistory in Chelm)
- Arkhiv SPbII *Arkhiv Sankt-Peterburgskogo instituta istorii Rossiiskoi akademii nauk* (Archive of the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Science, St Petersburg)
- Czart. *Dział rękopisów Biblioteki Czartoryjskich w Krakowie* (Department of Manuscripts of the Czartoryski Library in Cracow)
- DAKO *Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyivs'koï oblasti* (State Archive of Kyiv Region)
- DAPO *Derzhavnyi arkhiv Poltav's'koï oblasti* (State Archive of Poltava Region)
- DAZHO *Derzhavnyi arkhiv Zhytomyrs'koï oblasti* (State Archive of Zhytomyr Region)
- IR NBU *Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukraïny im. V. I. Vernads'koho* (Manuscript Institute of the V. I. Vernads'kyi National Library of Ukraine)
- NIOR RGB *Nauchno-issledovatel'skii otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi*

biblioteki (Scientific Research Department of Manuscripts of the Russian State Library)

NML *Natsional'nyi muzei im. Andreia Sheptyts'koho u L'vovi. Viddil rukopysnyi ta starodrukovanoi knyhy, fond "Rukopysy latyns'ki"* (Andrei Sheptyts'kyi National Museum in Lviv. Department of Manuscripts and old-printed books. "Latin Manuscripts" Collection)

PSZRI *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (Complete Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire)


RA *Russkii arkhiv* (Russian archive; journal)

RGADA *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov* (Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents)

RGIA *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv v Sankt-Peterburge* (Russian State Historical Archive in St Petersburg)

RGVIA *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv* (Russian State Archive of Military History; Moscow)


TS DIAUK *Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv)




Map 1 The Left-Bank Hetmanate in 1667.



Map 2 The Hetmanate in 1751.



Map 3 Sloboda Ukraine in 1764.



EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY UKRAINE

Introduction

ZENON E. KOHUT, VOLODYMYR SKLOKIN,
AND FRANK E. SYSYN

The eighteenth century has long been a marginal and even neglected period in the dominant master narratives of Ukrainian history. In the traditional accounts of national history, it was subsumed into a more than two hundred years long Cossack Age, though it did not have the benefit of being included in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi's master narrative that was accompanied by extensive source publications and research projects by the leading historian's students and coworkers. In the official Soviet narrative, it got completely lost in the multiple layers of the millennial feudal formation. It has fared hardly better in the interpretations developed after 1991, being either absorbed into the broader early modern age or confined into a pale transition period between the pivotal "long" seventeenth and "long" nineteenth centuries.

In spite of this bad luck, eighteenth-century studies have demonstrated a steady quantitative and qualitative growth over the last fifteen years that have turned the period into one of the most dynamic and innovative fields in Ukrainian history writing. The eighteenth century became a testing ground for often methodologically sophisticated studies in the new social and cultural histories, historical demography, women's history and childhood studies, religious studies, and the history of education, as well as intellectual and new imperial histories. The present volume introduces the international academic public to the recent trends in the study of eighteenth-century Ukraine. Articles selected for publication reflect key new developments in this field during the last two decades.



The dissolution of the USSR and the restoration of Ukraine's independence in 1991 ushered in a new era for Ukrainian academic history writing. In Soviet Ukraine from the 1930s to 1980s ideological censorship in the field of historiography was in general strict, and it was especially harsh in the case of research into the second half of the seventeenth and eighteenth century – a period especially politically sensitive for the authorities taking into account such events as the Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654, numerous Cossacks uprisings against the Russian Empire, including Hetman Ivan Mazepa's switch to Swedish protection in 1708–09, and the abolition of the Ukrainian Cossack autonomies during the reign of Catherine II.¹

Methodologically innovative studies in social and economic history conducted by Ukrainian historians in the first decade of the Soviet regime were halted in the 1930s by the mass purges in academia.² The historiographic output of the next fifty years was dominated by two interrelated currents. The first was political history, which, in line with the official ideology, emphasized the inevitability and progressive character of Ukraine's incorporation into Russia. The second was social history, focused primarily on the class struggle of the peasants and Cossacks against the oppressive "feudal regime." Both were politically biased and methodologically dogmatic and produced at best a very one-sided if not completely distorted accounts of eighteenth-century history. With a few notable exceptions, such as source publications, the period from the 1930s to the 1980s had mostly become a squandered time for Ukrainian eighteenth-century studies.³

Repressions, censorship, and political pressure on historians were not the only predicaments of this period. The forced isolation imposed on Ukrainian historiography in the 1930s turned out to be no less consequential. This included both a ban on participation in scholarly life beyond the Soviet Bloc as well as the restriction of access to Western scholarly literature and some segments of Ukrainian pre-Soviet and émigré-historical writing. In this perspective, the development of Ukrainian historiography after 1991 can be considered primarily as an attempt to overcome the ramifications of this isolation by revisiting one's own previously forbidden tradition and reintegrating it into the global historiographic institutional framework and discussions.⁴

In the early 1990s, the attention of Ukrainian scholars who dealt with early modern history was mostly concentrated on the correction of the distorted interpretations of some key events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries like the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising of 1648–57, the Pereiaslav Agreement, or Ivan Mazepa's switch to Swedish protection in 1708–09. This factual revisionism went hand in hand with the total rejection of the previously dominant Russocentric

account of Ukrainian history that was substituted by a modified version of the national paradigm, i.e., the master narrative of Ukrainian history produced in the early twentieth century by Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, and focused on Ukrainian state- and nation-building since the times of the medieval Kyivan Rus' polity.⁵

In line with the basic tenets of the national paradigm, in the 1990s Ukrainian historians invested great effort into the examination of the political and military history of the Ukrainian Cossack autonomies in the Russian Empire during the second half of the seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries. Special attention was paid to the state-building activities of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and his successors, in particular Ivan Mazepa and Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi.⁶ The emergence and transformation of the political, administrative, and military institutions of the Hetmanate, the Zaporozhian Sich, and Sloboda Regiments, the diplomatic relations of the Ukrainian hetmans, as well numerous wars and military campaigns which involved the Cossacks regiments were thoroughly investigated and discussed.⁷

Another important line of inquiry constituted studies of the new social elite – the Cossack *starshyna* – a social stratum which emerged as a result of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising and combined elements of the Ruthenian *szlachta* of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Cossack officers of the Hetmanate and other Ukrainian autonomies. These studies included both biographical accounts of the Cossack hetmans and colonels, and more sociological surveys of the Cossack elite in general or of its separate segments. The initial impulse for this research current came from the studies of state-building. However, starting from the early 2000s the Cossack elite started to be considered in a more diverse context of historical demography and social and cultural histories, as well as the history of everyday life.⁸

During the 1990s Ukrainian historiography also became much more open to the world and began adopting the best practices of international historical writing. As a result, eighteenth-century studies in Ukraine in the early 2000s underwent a noticeable turn to the new social and cultural histories. This shift not only opened up new research perspectives, but also allowed researchers to overcome some limitations inherent in the dominant accounts of the political history of the Ukrainian Cossacks produced in the 1990s. The main challenge here was the present day projection of some modern ideas and beliefs onto the pre-modern past. For instance, in the 1990s many historians treated the “Cossack State” as an axiom instead of something which needed to be proven and explained.⁹ They often took for granted the existence of a full-fledged Ukrainian nation already in the mid-seventeenth century and conceptualized the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising as

the “national revolution.”¹⁰ They also regarded the Russian Empire as an external and exclusively negative phenomenon which always sought to subjugate, exploit, and Russify the Ukrainian “Cossack State” and its population.¹¹

Innovations in the field of new cultural and intellectual histories have helped to challenge these assumptions and provide more adequate interpretations. The US- and Canada-based specialists in Ukrainian eighteenth-century history took the lead here. The problematic nature of the notion of collective identity has become a key innovation which greatly influenced studies in political, social, and cultural histories. A pioneering role here belongs to Zenon Kohut, who back in the 1980s was the first to describe the transformation of the Little Russian identity in the eighteenth-century Hetmanate as the emergence of a modern proto-national identity based on loyalty to a Little Russian fatherland and the political nation of the Cossack estate. The importance of his already classic article “The Development of a Little Russian Identity: A Stage in Ukrainian Nationbuilding,”¹² which is reprinted in the present volume, lies in the fact that he treated collective identity not as an essential (biological) trait of human nature, but instead demonstrated the constructed character of the Little Russian identity by tracing its emergence and transformation in the broader context of early modern European state- and nation-building. This approach was further developed by Frank Sysyn, who emphasized the role of historical writing in the making of the Ruthenian and Little Russian identity and traced the emergence of the idea of the Little Russian fatherland in the early eighteenth-century Hetmanate.¹³

In the 2000s, collective identities became one of the most popular subjects for eighteenth-century scholars. Harvard-based historian Serhii Plokyh has made an especially important contribution to this field. In a number of his monographs, he not only traced the emergence and transformation of the Little Russian identity from the mid-seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries, but also systematically examined the role of the Ukrainian clergy in the making of Russian imperial identity in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.¹⁴ Andrii Bovgyria explored the development of historical writing in the Hetmanate in relation to identity-building,¹⁵ whereas Volodymyr Kravchenko,¹⁶ Volodymyr Maslychuk,¹⁷ and Volodymyr Sklokin¹⁸ analyzed the transformation of collective identities in Sloboda Ukraine. Recently, the topic of imperial identities in the Ukrainian peripheries of the Romanov and Habsburg empires became a subject of a separate collective volume.¹⁹

The studies of symbolic geography have become another important new current that emerged in the 2000s. Here the focus has been both on the representation of Cossack Ukraine on the European maps of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and on the emergence and transformation of such entities as “Ukraine”,

“Little Russia”, “Sloboda Ukraine”, or “Southern Russia” on the mental maps of the educated classes of the Russian Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Western Europe.²⁰ Most of these works emphasized a high level of fluidity and instability characteristic of the representation of Ukraine both on the real and mental maps during the long eighteenth century. Studies of travel writing, mostly concentrated on West European, Russian, or Austrian travelers to Ukraine, have gained increasing popularity and made an important contribution to the exploration of the place of Ukraine on the mental maps of the educated European elites.²¹

The field of church history, which in the last ten to fifteen years has experienced an evident quantitative and qualitative growth, was reconceptualized as a history of religious culture and tradition. The main focus here was on the fate of the tradition of the medieval Kyiv Orthodox metropolitanate, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries found itself divided along political (between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russian Empire) and jurisdictional (between Orthodox and Uniate) borders. The concepts of confessionalization, Synodal governance, and social disciplinization were deployed to examine the transformation of the Christian churches and of religious culture during the long eighteenth century.²²

In the 2000s, the political history of eighteenth-century Ukraine has also been reinvigorated by the innovative impulses stemming from the new cultural history. The key role here is the rise of the new imperial history which treats imperial hegemony not strictly in political and economic categories, but also in cultural ones. This new perspective sees an empire as a composite state whose government deliberately exploits the differences and inequalities between different regions and social and ethnic groups in its policy. This more flexible framework opens substantial opportunities for analyzing issues of discursive power and coercion, symbolic geography, as well as academic and literary narratives pertaining to imperialism and colonialism.²³

The application of this approach to Ukraine allowed the reconsideration of the abovementioned one-sided and simplified image of the Russian Empire and Ukrainian-Russian relations during the long eighteenth century. First steps in this direction were taken already in the 1980s by Zenon Kohut, who examined the abolition of the Ukrainian Cossack autonomies in the Russian Empire primarily in the context of the modernizing policy of Catherine II inspired by the German theories of a well-ordered police state and Enlightenment ideals.²⁴ Studies by Serhii Plokhyy,²⁵ Viktor Horobets',²⁶ Volodymyr Kravchenko,²⁷ Volodymyr Maslychuk,²⁸ and Volodymyr Sklokin²⁹ which appeared already in the 2000s emphasized that the Russian Empire was not something given, but was a polity in

the making, and many Ukrainians made an important contribution to its imagining and functioning. Its policy towards the Ukrainian Cossack autonomies was rather ambivalent and determined by multiple factors and considerations. Finally, during the long eighteenth century the ideals of the nation and the empire were perfectly compatible for the majority of the Ukrainian elite. At the same time, especially in the context of Hetman Mazepa's shift to Swedish protection in 1708–09 and the abolition of Cossack autonomies in the late eighteenth century, the issues of colonial violence and the orientalizing of Cossack Ukraine and Ukrainians by the imperial center were raised and actively discussed.³⁰

Studies in the field of social history, formerly concentrating almost exclusively on the Ukrainian Cossacks and peasant strata, have begun to examine other social groups, and not only the larger estates like the clergy, townspeople, or artisans, but also a number of smaller social and professional groups such as the *kurinchyky*, *proteksianty*, *stril'tsi*, *reitar*, *zhovniry*, and others.³¹ A social history perspective has also been employed to explore broader domains of eighteenth-century education,³² military reform and war,³³ law and justice,³⁴ or urban history.³⁵ The upsurge of interest in Ukrainian historical demography focusing on the analysis of family and household has brought about the revision of a number of stereotypes of social and economic life in the Ukrainian Cossack autonomies of the Russian Empire.³⁶ We have also seen some important progress in the fields of women's history³⁷ and childhood studies.³⁸

Although most of these studies focus on ethnic Ukrainians/Little Russians/Ruthenians, one can observe a growing interest in the history of other ethnic groups, especially of Jews and Poles, on the territory of Right-Bank Ukraine, which until the late eighteenth century belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,³⁹ and of Russians, Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Germans in the Ukrainian Cossack autonomies as well as in the Black Sea region of the Russian Empire.⁴⁰ Interethnic relations, which, with regard to the eighteenth century, have been examined primarily in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Polish encounters, require a more inclusive approach and more systematic attention.⁴¹

This brief overview, which does not pretend to be exhaustive, demonstrates that since the early 1990s Ukrainian history writing has made important progress in overcoming the Soviet legacy of forced isolation and is integrating into the international historiographic institutional framework and discussions. The aforementioned preponderance of new social and cultural histories puts Ukrainian historiography in line with the recent trends in global eighteenth-century studies.⁴² At the same time, Ukrainian historians are still slow in adopting a transnational perspective and putting their studies into the context of the global eigh-

teenth century. The limited progress in research into the Ukrainian Enlightenment, a major eighteenth-century global intellectual movement, is very characteristic in this regard.⁴³ Taking this into account, internationalizing, “globalizing,” and digitalizing eighteenth-century history should become a priority for Ukrainian historians in the nearest future.

Nevertheless, the key challenge for the further development of Ukrainian eighteenth-century studies lies elsewhere. Scholars of eighteenth-century Ukraine still need to determine the appropriateness of the eighteenth century as an organizing concept. Much depends on the scope and meaning we are ready to allocate to the Ukrainian eighteenth century. One possible option is to accept the currently prevailing idea of the “short” eighteenth century as a brief transition period between the “long” seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. This interpretation, advocated mostly by the students of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, looks at the events of political history and point to Mazepa’s shift to Swedish protection in 1708–09 and the abolition of the Ukrainian Cossack autonomies and partitions of Poland of the 1770s–90s as chronological caesuras of the Ukrainian eighteenth century.⁴⁴ Another option would be to adopt the concept that is dominant among the students of Western Europe and the Russian Empire of the “long” eighteenth century, which stretches from the 1660s or 1680s to the 1830s.⁴⁵

Both of these options exist in the shadow of Ukrainian and Polish national historiographies that envisioned the chronological seventeenth century as divided by the epochal events of the 1648 uprising/revolution. In the Ukrainian case 1648 served as a foundation myth for Cossack Ukraine that had differing political, social, and cultural termini at the end of the chronological eighteenth century and even into the early nineteenth century. This periodization has only external similarities with the “long” eighteenth century and offers many quandaries of establishing subperiods. Its basis assumes an early period of creative upswing that is followed by decline and terminations at various points in the eighteenth century. It leaves little space for conceptualizing a Ukrainian Enlightenment. In contrast, Polish historiography has long placed 1648 as the marker of a period of decline, not only because of the revolt and Deluge, but also by a transformation of the Nobles’ republic into the Commonwealth of magnates and oligarchs. This vision leads to the Dark Saxon Age and the Commonwealth as a puppet in international affairs. Only the Polish Enlightenment of the end of the eighteenth century, coterminous with the Partitions, is seen as ending this decline, and in many ways creating a period that is seen as the forerunner of the nineteenth century. For many Ukrainian scholars trained in the Polish tradition or studying the Ukrainian lands of the Commonwealth, this periodization influences their conceptualization of the eighteenth century.

It is well known that periodization in history is always provisional. This is especially true in cases of deep political fragmentation and complex political changes characteristic of eighteenth-century Ukrainian history, where it seems very unlikely to reach any common denominator concerning periodization even if we remain only on the level of political history. That is why, at least in some cases, it might be more productive to see history not as a simple series of chronological epochs that succeed one another but as “an accumulation of layers, some of which already completed at a point when others continue.”⁴⁶ From this perspective, without questioning the importance of political breaks of the early and late eighteenth century, one can still discern considerable continuity in the social structure, patterns of cultural life, and intellectual development of Ukrainian society of the Cossack autonomies of the Russian Empire from the 1680s (if not several decades earlier) to the 1830s.

It is not our ambition to settle the controversy about the limits and meaning of the Ukrainian eighteenth century in this introduction. Nevertheless, for the needs of the present volume we decided to adopt a more inclusive concept of the “long” eighteenth century, which in the Ukrainian case lasts from roughly the 1680s (the completion of the institutionalization of the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine which coincided with the beginning of Mazepa’s hetmanate) to the 1830s (the completion of political, social, and legal integration of the former Cossack autonomies into the Russian Empire as well as the gradual replacement of the Baroque and Enlightenment culture by Romanticism).



The structure of this volume reflects the above-described directional turn toward new cultural and social histories of Ukraine, while concurrently highlighting important recent developments in the field of Ukrainian political, military, and intellectual history as well as religious history and the history of education.

The volume’s first section, “Cossack Autonomies and Their Demise,” opens up with three articles addressing the issue of the place of Ukraine in the symbolic geography of eighteenth-century Europe and the Russian Empire. Kyrilo Halushko explores the emergence of Ukraine as “the country of Cossacks” on maps of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He emphasizes that this was related to the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising of 1648–57 and ensuing state-building activities of the Cossacks. In turn, the abolition of the Ukrainian Cossack autonomies in the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century led to a gradual disappearance of Ukraine from the maps. Volodymyr Kravchenko explores the

transformation of the image of Ukraine in the symbolic geography of the Russian Empire by examining the usage of the terms *Ukraine*, *Little Russia*, and *Russia* in the works on Ukrainian history written between the 1760s and the 1820s. He argues that none of these geographic markers reigned supreme and emphasizes the instability and ambivalence characteristic of both the self-perception of Ukrainians and the place of Ukraine on the mental maps of the educated classes of the Russian Empire during this period. Oleksii Tolochko focuses on the “discovery” of Kyiv by Russian travelers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that reflected a broader fashion for Little Russia among the elites in the empire’s capitals. His analysis demonstrates that the dominant perception of Kyiv in the travelogues oscillated between the image of a “Russian Jerusalem,” i.e., a major center of Orthodox spirituality in the empire, and that of a “Slavic Pompeii” – the place of concentration of the precious archeological antiquities from the medieval Kyivan Rus’ state.

The next four articles in the section deal with the abolition of the Cossack autonomies and its aftermath. Volodymyr Sklokin discusses the abolition of Sloboда Ukraine’s autonomy, which is examined in the context of the unification and centralization policy characteristic of the “enlightened absolutism” of Catherine II. He argues that in order to justify the abolition of the Cossack military-administrative system, the government used anti-elitist populist rhetoric that invoked the protection of the “people” from oppression and abuses of the Cossack *starshyna* and strived to present integrationist changes as a reform initiative and compromise between the interests of the imperial center and key groups of the local population. Oksana Mykhed describes the epidemic of bubonic plague in Kyiv and Right-Bank Ukraine in the late 1760s and early 1770s. She demonstrates that the failure to contain the outbreak of the plague in 1770–71 became an important stimulus for the imperial government to redefine the administrative status of Kyiv and that of the Hetmanate and initiated their “higher subordination to the major imperial political, medical, and military institutions.” Oleksandr Pankiev examines the formation of the imperial bureaucracy in the late eighteenth-century Steppe Ukraine which at that time was also known as *New* or *Southern Russia*. He shows how this complicated process was impacted by both the region’s borderland status and the personality of Grigorii Potemkin, who served as New Russia’s governor-general for most of Catherine II’s reign. The section concludes with a contribution by Vadym Adadurov that reconstructs collective identities in the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire during the Russian campaign of Napoleon. Adadurov emphasizes that during this war both the Ukrainian elites and commoners remained unequivocally

loyal to the Russian Empire. Such remarkable faithfulness can be partly explained by the fear that Napoleon's victory could lead to the restoration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and a renewal of Polish-Ukrainian confrontation.

The first three articles in the next section – “Society, Economy, and Demographics” – explore various aspects of the functioning of the Cossack administration and army. Viktor Horobets' examines the practice of the free election of Cossack colonels in the Hetmanate in the late seventeenth through the early eighteenth century. He stresses that the execution of this traditional Cossack liberty was a part of a complicated power game among rank-and-file Cossacks, Cossack officers, the hetman, and the Russian authorities in Moscow and St Petersburg. In reality, it had already been significantly curtailed by the hetmans, who tried to increase their own power, before it was altogether abolished by Peter I after the Mazepa Uprising. Oleksii Sokyryko highlights Hetman Kyrylo Rozumov's military reforms that sought to increase the fighting efficiency of the Cossack army while simultaneously promoting local particularism and patriotism. Vadym Nazarenko focuses on the cavalry Reiter detachment that performed courier, administrative, police, and intelligence functions, and that was a part of the Russian garrison in Kyiv. Deploying a social history perspective, Nazarenko shows the inconsistent character of the imperial unification in the spheres of administration and army during the eighteenth century. The need to adapt to the local conditions of the Hetmanate forced the Russian imperial government to create and sustain a separate socio-professional corporation of Reitars that contradicted the very logic of unification.

The next three articles in this section address social, demographic, and economic changes in the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine. Volodymyr Maslychuk describes the formation of family clans among Sloboda Ukraine's Cossack officers. He argues that the making of the Cossack officers stratum in Sloboda Ukraine can be seen as an evolution of an extended family – “from a community headed by the ‘father’-colonel to a ramified governance structure.” The emergence of family clans, on the one hand, furthered the corporatization of the officer stratum and its claims to power in the region. However, on the other hand, it facilitated the curtailment and abolition of Sloboda Ukraine's autonomy by the imperial government. Iurii Voloshyn, drawing on the methodology of historical demography, examines the population distribution of mid-eighteenth-century Poltava by age, sex, and marital status. Ihor Serdiuk explores economic development and the demographic structure of the cities in the Hetmanate during the second half of the eighteenth century. Both contributions demonstrate the importance of a demographic perspective for urban history. A focus on such aspects of the “demographic behavior”

of the population as sex-age composition, marital status, birth rate, death rate, and migrations allows us to capture the difference between cities and villages in the Hetmanate, which is less clear when viewed from the more traditional perspectives of self-government, economic development, or administrative functions.

In the penultimate section – “Church, Culture, and Education” – Maksym Iarenko analyzes relations between the Kyiv Orthodox metropolitanate and the Synod during the eighteenth century. He argues that the efforts of the Church authorities in St Petersburg to discipline and unify the Orthodox Church in the Russian Empire were only partly successful. Due to the opposition of the Ukrainian Orthodox laity to a number of directives from St Petersburg and skillful political maneuvering by the Church hierarchs in Kyiv until the end of the eighteenth century, the Kyiv metropolitanate managed to preserve the distinctiveness of its religious culture. Ihor Skochylas discusses the introduction of the Church Union in Right-Bank Ukraine, which until the late eighteenth century remained a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He attempts to go beyond a narrow confessional perspective in the analysis of the Uniate-Orthodox encounter in Right-Bank Ukraine. He focuses instead on the transformation of religious culture that often defied a Uniate/Orthodox dichotomy and was deeply rooted in the imagery of one’s own sacred space.

Articles by Liudmyla Posokhova and Mykola Symchych deal with the developments in the educational sphere. Posokhova explores the phenomenon of Orthodox colleges in the Ukrainian autonomies of the Russian Empire in the context of the transfer and adaptation of the university idea on Ukrainian soil. She argues that Orthodox colleges were hybrid educational institutions that “represented the southeastern vector of the advance of the European medieval university” and which “served as a means of preparation for the reception of the classical university in the Russian Empire.” In turn, Symchych focuses on the changes in the teaching of philosophy at the mid-eighteenth-century Kyiv-Mohyla Academy related to the supplantation of the old Jesuit philosophy by Wolffianism. This particular case exemplifies a broader phenomenon – the growing influence of Protestant Germany and *Frühauflärung* on institutional changes and intellectual life in eighteenth-century Ukraine and Russia.

In the final section – “Political and Historical Thought” – Zenon Kohut examines the emergence of the Little Russian identity in the eighteenth-century Hetmanate in the broader context of early modern European state- and nation-building. He sees this identity as a proto-national one and emphasizes that it was based on loyalty to a Little Russian fatherland and the political nation of the Cossack estate. Frank Sysyn and Serhii Plokhyy elaborate on Kohut’s argument. Sysyn

shows how the shift in the conceptualization of the fatherland from the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Little Russia/Ukraine took place in the Cossack chronicles of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In turn, Plokhyy focuses on Ukrainian church intellectuals like Teofan Prokopovych who, after Hetman Mazepa's switch to Swedish protection, reconceptualized the patria as *Rossia* or an all-Russian fatherland. Natalia Iakovenko explores the ambivalent and contradictory nature of Cossack political culture in the second half of the seventeenth through the early eighteenth century, which on the surface was expressed by the rhetoric of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's gentry democracy but hid inside archaic laws of military democracy and brotherhood. Gary Marker discusses the language of politics and the politics of language in the 1710 Bendery Constitution of Hetman Pylyp Orlyk – an interesting but not implemented attempt to fashion the political life of Cossack Ukraine along the lines of a *Pacta Conventa*, i.e., the formal agreement between the ruler and his political elites. Marker underscores that Orlyk's Constitution, originally written in Latin, employed basic categories of early modern legal and political thought that would be understandable at any European court. It consciously and explicitly drew upon the European legal tradition and orientalized Muscovy as an Asiatic despotism. At the same time, it was a characteristically pre-modern document concerned with “specific liberties granted to specific elements of the population, with no reference to natural law, *a priori* rights, or universality.” The volume concludes with a contribution by Andrii Bovgyria, who examines the link between Cossack historical writing and the transformation of collective identities in the Hetmanate. He concentrates on the Khazar ethnogenetic myth that, similarly to the Sarmatian myth of Polish nobility, provided the Ukrainian Cossacks with a venerable historic pedigree. Its importance lies in the fact that, contrary to the historical tracts written by Ukrainian clerics that emphasized the ethnic unity of the Little and Great Russians, the Khazar myth treated Ukrainians/Little Russians and Muscovites/Great Russians as two fully distinct nations.

NOTES

- 1 On the writing of Ukrainian history during Soviet times and state policy toward academic history writing see: Vitalii Iaremchuk, *Mynule Ukraïny v istorichnii nautsi URSR pisliastalins'koï doby* (Ostroh, 2009); Andrii Portnov, *Istoriï i storykiv. Oblychchia i obrazy ukraïns'koï istoriohrafii XX stolittia* (Kyiv, 2011); *Svitlo i tini ukraïns'koho radians'koho istoriopysannia*, ed. Valerii Smolii (Kyiv, 2013).
- 2 Nevertheless, this tradition was continued abroad by Oleksander Ohloblyn,

- Lev Okinshevich, and several other Ukrainian historians who seized on the occasion to emigrate in the early 1920s or during the Second World War: Oleksander Ohloblyn, *Liudy staroi Ukraïny* (Munich, 1959); Oleksandr Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa i ioho doba* (New York-Paris-Toronto, 1960); Lev Okinshevich, *Lektsiï z istoriï ukrains'koho prava. Pravo derzhavne. Doba stanovoho suspil'stva* (Munich, 1945); Lev Okinshevich, *Ukrainian Society and Government, 1648–1781* (Munich, 1978).
- 3 The most valuable source publications dealt with the history of the *Koliivshchyna* and Haidamak uprisings as well as the social unrest in Left-Bank Ukraine during the second half of the eighteenth century: *Haidamats'kyi rukh na Ukraïni u XVIII st.: zbirnyk dokumentiv* (Kyiv, 1970); *Selians'kyi rukh na Ukraïni (seredyna XVIII – persha polovyna XIX st.): zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kyiv, 1978). On late Soviet source publications in the field of early modern Ukrainian history see, in particular: Andrii Portnov, Tetiana Portnova, “Soviet Ukrainian Historiography in Brezhnev’s Closed City: Mykola/ Nikolai Kovalsky and His ‘School’ at the Dnipropetrovsk University,” *Ab Imperio* 4 (2017): 265–91.
 - 4 On the general transformation of the Ukrainian history writing since 1991 see: Serhy Yekelchuk, “Bridging the Past and the Future: Ukrainian History Writing Since Independence,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 53, no. 2/4 (2011): 559–73; Tomasz Stryjek, *Jakiej przeszłości potrzebuje przyszłość?: interpretacje dziejów narodowych w historiografii i debacie publicznej na Ukrainie, 1991–2004* (Warsaw, 2007).
 - 5 On Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi and the national paradigm see: Serhii Plokhyy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, 2005). The English edition of Hrushevs'kyi's opus magnum ten-volume “History of Ukraine-Rus” has recently been published by the CIUS Press. However, Hrushevs'kyi did not reach the eighteenth century in his magnum opus and in general the national paradigm vision was presented by Dmytro Doroshenko and returned to Ukraine in the reprinting of this work and even more generally in the translation of Orest Subtelny's *Ukraine: A History*: Dmytro Doroshenko, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny*, vol. 1–2 (Warsaw: 1932–1933); Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: 1988).
 - 6 Zenon E. Kohut, “In Search of Early Modern Ukrainian Statehood: Post-Soviet Studies of the Cossack Hetmanate,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 2 (1999): 101–12.
 - 7 See for instance: Valerii Smolii, Valerii Stepankov, *Pravoberezhna Ukraïna v druhii polovyni XVII–XVIII st.: problema derzhavotvorennia* (Kyiv, 1993); Oleksandr Hurzhii, *Ukrains'ka kozats'ka derzhava v druhii polovyni XVII–XVIII st.:*

- kordony, naselennia, pravo* (Kyiv, 1996); Leonid Melnyk, *Het'manshchyna pershoï chverti XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1997); Viktor Horobets', *Politychnyi ustrii ukrains'kykh zemel druhoï polovyny XVII–XVIII st.: Het'manshchyna, Zaporizhzhia, Slobozhanshchyna, Pravoberezhna Ukraïna (sproba strukturno-funktionalnogo analizu)* (Kyiv, 2000); Viktor Horobets', *Prysmerek Het'manshchyny: Ukraïna v roky reform Petra I* (Kyiv, 1998); Taras Chukhlib, *Kozats'kyi ustrii Pravoberezhnoï Ukraïny ostann'oï chverti XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1996); Taras Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy. Ukraïns'ka derzhava v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh, 1648–1714* (Kyiv, 2003); Viktor Zaruba, *Ukraïns'ke kozats'ke viisko v rosiiskoturetskikh viinakh ostann'oï cherti XVII st.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 2003); Olena Apanovych, *Chortomlyts'ka Zaporoz'ka Sich* (Kyiv, 1998); Roman Shyian, *Kozatstvo Pivdennoï Ukraïny v ostannii chverti XVIII st.* (Zaporizhzhia, 1998); Valerii Smolii, ed., *Ukraïns'ke suspil'stvo na zlami seredn'ovichchia i novoho chasu: narysy z istorii mental'nosti i national'noi svidomosti* (Kyiv, 2001).
- 8 Historiographic overview of these studies devoted to the Hetmanate provided by Zenon Kohut: Zenon E. Kohut, “Post-Soviet Studies of the Cossack Elite: The Present State of Research and Future Tasks,” in *The Future of the Past: New Perspectives on Ukrainian History*, ed. Serhii Plokhyy, 363–74 (Cambridge, MA: 2016). On the Cossack *starshyna* of Sloboda Ukraine see: Volodymyr Masliichuk, *Kozats'ka starshyna Slobids'kykh polkiv druhoï polovyny XVII – pershoï tretyny XVIII st.* (Kharkiv, 2009); Volodymyr Masliichuk, *Provintsiia na perekhresti kul'tur (doslidzhennia z istorii Slobids'koï Ukraïny XVII–XIX st.)* (Kharkiv, 2007); Svitlana Potapenko, “Cossack Officials in Sloboda Ukraine: From Local Elite to Imperial Nobility?” in P. Marczewski and S. Eich, eds, *Dimensions of Modernity. The Enlightenment and its Contested Legacies. IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences*, vol. 34 (Vienna, 2015). On the history of everyday life see: Olena Dziuba, *Pryvatne zhyttia kozats'koï starshyny XVIII st. (na materialakh epistoliarnoï spadshyny)* (Kyiv, 2012); Tetiana Tairova-Iakovleva, *Povsiakdennia, dozvillia i tradytsii kozats'koï elity Het'manshchyny* (Kyiv, 2017).
 - 9 Post-Soviet Ukrainian historians mostly did not pay heed to the astute conclusions of Orest Subtelny who back in the 1980s pointed to the lack of a clear separation between private and public spheres and questioned the possibility of the application of the concept of the (modern) state to the Cossack Hetmanate, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and a number of other East European societies who in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were disproportionately dominated by the noble estate and retreated into agriculturalism and traditionalism: Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1981); Orest Subtelny,

- Domination of Eastern Europe: Native Nobilities and Foreign Absolutism, 1500–1715* (Kingston and Montreal, 1986).
- 10 Critical overview of this current provided by Natalia Iakovenko: Natalia Iakovenko, “U kol'orakh proletars'koï revoliutsii,” *Ukrains'kyi humanitarnyi ohliad* 3 (2000): 58–78; Natalia Iakovenko, “Skil'ky oblych u viiny: Khmel'nychchyna ochyma suchasnykiv,” in Natalia Iakovenko, *Paralel'nyi svit: doslidzhennia z istorii uiavlennia ta idei v Ukraïni XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002), 189–229.
 - 11 Georgii Kasianov, “‘Piknik na obochine’: osmyslenie imperskogo proshlogo v sovremennoi ukrainskoi istoriografii,” in *Novaia imperskaia istoriia postsovet-skogo prostranstva*, ed. I. Gerasimov, S. Glebov, A. Kaplunovskii, M. Mogilner, A. Semenov (Kazan, 2004), 81–108; Volodymyr Kravchenko, “Ukraïna, imperiia, Rosiia. Ohliad suchasnoi istoriografii,” in Volodymyr Kravchenko, *Ukraïna, imperiia, Rosiia. Vybrani staty z modernoi istorii ta istoriografii* (Kyiv, 2011), 391–454.
 - 12 Zenon E. Kohut, “The Development of a Little Russian Identity: A Stage in Ukrainian Nationbuilding,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3–4 (1986): 559–76.
 - 13 Frank E. Sysyn, “Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3–4 (1986): 393–423; Frank E. Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture,” in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, cultura, società*, ed. G. Siedlina (Alessandria, 2004); Frank E. Sysyn, “The Persistence of the Little-Russian Fatherland in the Russian Empire: The Evidence from *The History of the Rus' or of Little Russia* (*Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*),” in *Imperienvergleich. Beispiele und Ansätze aus osteuropäischer Perspektive. Festschrift für Andreas Kappeler*, ed. G. Hausmann and A. Rustermeier (Wiesbaden, 2009), 39–49; Frank E. Sysyn, “Ukrainian Nation-Building in the Early Modern Period: New Research Findings,” in *Theatrum Humanae Vitae. Studii na poshanu Natali Iakovenko*, ed. Maksym Iaremenko (Kyiv, 2012), 358–70.
 - 14 Serhii Plokhyy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, MA, 2006); Serhii Plokhyy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto, 2008): 19–48; Serhii Plokhyy, *The Cossack Myth: History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires* (Cambridge, MA, 2012).
 - 15 Andrii Bovgyria, *Kozats'ke istoriopysannia v rukopysnii tradytsii XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2010).
 - 16 Volodymyr Kravchenko, *Kharkov/Kharkiv: stolitsa pogranich'ia* (Vilnius, 2010).
 - 17 Masliichuk, *Provintsiiia na perekhresty kul'tur*.

- 18 Volodymyr Sklokin, *Rosiis'ka imperiia i Slobids'ka Ukraïna u druhii polovyni XVIII st.: prosvichenyi absoliutyzm, impers'ka intehratsiia, lokal'ne suspil'stvo* (Lviv, 2019).
- 19 Vadym Adadurov and Volodymyr Sklokin, eds, *Impers'ki identychnosti v ukraïns'kii istoriï XVIII – pershoï polovyny XIX st.* (Lviv, 2020).
- 20 Steven Seegel, *Ukraine under Western Eyes: The Bohdan and Neonila Krawciw Ucrainica Map Collection* (Cambridge, MA, 2013); Kyrylo Halushko, “Ukraïna na kartakh XVII-XVIII st.: vid ‘Dykoho Polia’ do ‘Kraïny Kozakiv,’” in *Ukraïns'ka derzhava druhoï polovyny XVII-XVIII st.: polityka, suspil'stvo, kul'tura*, ed. Valerii Smolii (Kyiv, 2014), 530–55; Natalia Yakovenko, “Choice of Name versus Choice of Path: The Names of Ukrainian Territories from the Late Sixteenth to the Late Seventeenth Century,” in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, ed. Georgii Kasianov, Philipp Ther (Budapest, 2009), 117–48; Volodymyr Kravchenko, “Im'ia dlia Ukraïny,” in Volodymyr Kravchenko, *Ukraïna, imperiia, Rosiia: vybrani staty z modernoi istorii ta istoriohrafii* (Kyiv, 2011), 11–45; Volodymyr Kravchenko, *Kharkov/Kharkiv: stolitsa pogranichia* (Vilnius, 2010); Volodymyr Sklokin, “Slobids'ka Ukraïna u symvolichnii heohrafii Rosiis'koï imperii (60-90-ti roky XVIII stolittia),” *Naukovi Zapysky Ukraïns'koho Katolyts'koho Univer-sytetu: Seriia Istorii* 3 (2019): 13–28; Vadym Adadurov, “Ot mental'noi kartografii k voennoi topografii: predstavleniia frantsuzov o vostochno-evropeiskom prostranstve nakanune 1812 goda (na primere iugo-zapadnykh okrain Rossiiskoi imperii),” in *Napoleonovskii voïny na mental'nykh kartakh Evropy: istoricheskoe soznanie i literaturnye mify*, ed. N.M. Velikaia and E.D. Gal'tsova (Moscow, 2011), 23–43.
- 21 See in particular: Vadym Adadurov, “Der orientalistische Diskurs in der europäischen Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts: die Ägyptenreisen von Constantin-François Volney (1787) und Jan Potocki (1788),” in *Jan Potocki (1761–1815): Grenzgänger zwischen Disziplinen und Kulturen*, ed. Erik Martin, Lena Seauve, Klaus Weber (Berlin, 2019), 157–68; Iryna Papa, “(Ne)povsiakdenne zhyttia dans'koho dyplomata v Rosiï (za materialamy podorozhniioho shodennyka Iusta Iulia, 1709–1711),” *Naukovi Zapysky NUKMA: Istorychni Nauky* 1 (2018): 3–11; Iryna Papa, “‘En by i Rusland’: uivlenniia dans'kykh mandrivnykiv pro tereny ranniomodernoï Rosiï (za materialamy podorozhn'oho shchodennyka Iusta Iulia, 1709–1711),” *Mist: misto, kul'tura, suspil'stvo. E-zhurnal urbanistichnykh studii* 1 (2019): 83–95; Nelli Kholtobina, “Polietnichna struktura Rossiis'koï imperii na mental'nykh mapakh brytantsiv XVIII st.,” *Naukovi Zapysky NUKMA: Istorychni Nauky* 1 (2018): 11–17; Kateryna Dysa, “Bil'she, nizh putivnyk: emotsiinyi vidhuk i osobysti vrazhennia vid mandrivok do Kyieva v

- podorozhnikh zapyskakh zlamu XVIII-XIX st.," *Naukovi Zapysky NUKMA: Istorychni Nauky* 1 (2018): 18–25; Natalia Voloshkova, "On Terrains of the Other Empire: Mary Holderness's Account of Her Residence in Early 19th Century Crimea," in *British Women Travelers: Empire and Beyond, 1770–1870*, ed. Sutapa Dutta (New York and London, 2020), 70–85; Denys Shatalov, "Ukraïns'ki zemli, impers'ka istoriia: kozats'ki pam'iatky u spryiniatti rosiis'kykh mandrivnykiv kintsia XVIII – pershoi polovyny XIX st.," *Kharkivs'kyi istoriohrafichnyi zbirnyk* 15 (2016): 252–61; chapters "Russia 'discovers' Ukraine" and "From 'Russian Jerusalem' to 'Slavic Pompeii,'" in Aleksei Tolochko, *Kievskaiia Rus' i Malorossiiia v XIX veke* (Kyiv, 2012).
- 22 Borys Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Serhii Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford, 2001); Frank E. Sysyn, "The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine*, ed. Frank E. Sysyn and Serhii Plokhyy (Edmonton-Toronto, 2003), 1–22; Maksym Iaremenko, *Kyivs'ke chernetstvo XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2007); Barbara Skinner, *The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in Eighteenth-century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia* (DeKalb, 2009); Andrzej Gil, Ihor Skoczylas, *Kościół wschodnie w państwie polsko-litewskim w procesie przemian i adaptacji: metropolia kijowska w latach 1458–1795* (Lublin–Lviv, 2014); Larry Wolff, *Disunion within the Union: The Uniate Church and the Partitions of Poland* (Cambridge, MA, 2019); Ihor Lyman, *Rosiis'ka pravoslavna tserkva na pivdni Ukraïny ostann'oï chverti XVIII – seredyny XIX st.* (Zaporizhzhia, 2004). The collective research project "Kyivan Christianity and the Uniate Tradition" initiated by Ihor Skochylas and affiliated with the Ukrainian Catholic University has been particularly important in this regard. The project has been publishing the multivolume book series "Kyivan Christianity" which focuses on early modern religious history. See in particular: Maksym Iaremenko, *Pered vyklykamy unifikatsii i dysyplinuvannia: Kyivs'ka pravoslavna mytropoliiia u XVIII st.* (Lviv, 2017); Viktoriia Bilyk, Oksana Karlina, *Zhyva spil'nota v impers'komu sviti: Luts'ka hreko-uniina eparkhiia kintsia XVIII – pershoi tretyny XIX st.* (Lviv, 2018); *Na perekhresty kul'tur: monastyr i khram Presviatoi Triitsi u Vil'niusi*, ed. Alfredas Bumblauskas, Salvijus Kulevičius, and Ihor Skochylas (Lviv, 2019).
- 23 For a good introduction to the field of "empire studies" in modern historiography and social sciences, see the following: S. Howe, "Introduction: New Imperial Histories," in *The New Imperial Histories Reader*, ed. Stephen Howe, 1–20 (London and New York, 2010); J. Burbank and F. Cooper, eds, *Empires in*

- World History: Power and Politics of Difference* (Princeton and Oxford, 2010); Alexander Motyl, *Imperial Ends. The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* (New York, 2001).
- 24 Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s*. (Cambridge, MA, 1988). Kohut's monograph was translated into Ukrainian in 1996 and exerted significant impact on the new generation of students of the eighteenth-century history of Cossackdom in Ukraine.
 - 25 Serhii Plokhyy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto, 2008); Serhii Plokhyy, *The Cossack Myth: History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires* (Cambridge, MA, 2012).
 - 26 Viktor Horobets', 'Volymo tsaria skhidnoho': Ukraïns'kyi Het'manat i rosiis'ka dynastiia do i pislia Pereiaslava (Kyiv, 2007).
 - 27 Kravchenko, *Kharkov/Kharkiv: stolitsa pograničchia*; Kravchenko, *Ukraïna, imperiia, Rosiia*.
 - 28 Masliichuk, *Provintsiia na perekhresty kul'tur*.
 - 29 Sklokin, *Rosiis'ka imperiia i Slobids'ka Ukraïna u druhii polovyni XVIII st.*
 - 30 Debates on Mazepa's legacy summarized in: *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, cultura, società*, ed. G. Siedlina (Alessandria, 2004); *Ivan Mazepa i mazepyntsi: istoriia ta kul'tura Ukraïny ostannioï tretyni XVII – pochatku XVIII st.*, ed. Ihor Skochylias (Lviv, 2011); *Poltava 1709: The Battle and the Myth*, ed. Serhii Plokhyy (Cambridge, MA, 2012); Vladyslav Iatsenko, "Osoblyvosti zobrazhen-nia Het'mana Ivana Mazepy v suchasni rosiis'kii istoriohrafii: holovni tendentsii," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zbirnyk* 17(2014): 257–78; Tatiana Tairova-Iakovleva, *Ivan Mazepa i Rossis'ka imperiia: istoriia "zrady"* (Kyiv, 2017). On the orientalizing of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire see: Vitalii Kiselev, Tattiana Vasil'eva, "'Strannoe politicheskoe somnishe' ili 'narod, poiushii i pliashushii': konstruirovaniie obraza Ukrainy v russkoi slovesnosti kontsa XVIII – nachala XIX veka," in *Tam vnutri: praktiki vnutrennei kolonizatsii v kul'turnoi istorii Rossii*, ed. Aleksandr Etkind, Dirk Uffelman, Illia Kukulin (Moscow, 2012), 478–517.
 - 31 Volodymyr Mil'chev, *Sotsial'na istoriia zaporoz'koho kozatstva kintsia XVII-XVIII st.* (Zaporizhzhia, 2008); Volodymyr Mil'chev, *Narysy z istorii zaporiz'-koho kozatstva XVIII stolittia* (Zaporizhzhia, 2009); Viktor Horobets', *Vlada ta sotsium Het'manatu. Doslidzhennia z politychnoi ta sotsial'noi istorii ran'o-modernoï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2009). The journal *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii*, founded by the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences in 2002, has played an important role in this regard. The journal's focus is on a broadly conceived social history of the early modern era, including the

- eighteenth century. See in particular: Viktor Horobets', "Naskil'ky novoiu ie 'nova sotsial'na istoriia' v ukrains'komu prochyttanni?" *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 5 (2005): 7–9; Viktor Horobets', "Mali sotsial'ni ta sotsio-profesiini hrupy Het'manatu: 'kurinchyky,' 'stril'tsi,' 'proteksiianty,' 'dvoriany,' etc." *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 8 (2008): 184–201; Oksana Karlina, "Sotsial'na struktura naselennia mist i mistechok Volyns'koï hubernii naprykintsi XVIII st." *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 10 (2013): 97–114.
- 32 Maksym Iaremenko, "Akademiky" ta "akademiia": sotsial'na istoriia osvity i osvichennosti v Ukraïni XVIII st. (Kharkiv, 2014); Liudmyla Posokhova, *Na perekhresti kul'tur, tradytsii, epokh: pravoslavni kolehiumy Ukraïny naprykintsi XVII – na pochatku XIX st.* (Kharkiv, 2011); Volodymyr Masliichuk, *Zdobutky ta iliuzii: osviti initsiatyvy na Livoberezhnii ta Slobids'kii Ukraïni druhoï polovyny XVIII – pochatku XIX st.* (Kharkiv, 2018). The history of eighteenth-century and more broadly – early modern – education is actively discussed on the pages of the journal *Kyivs'ka Akademiia* published by the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy since 2004.
- 33 Oleksii Sokyrko, *Lytsari druhoï sortu: naimane viis'ko Livoberezhnoi Het'-manshchyny, 1669–1726 rr.* (Kyiv, 2006); Vadym Nazarenko, "Dlia posylok v Tsar'grad i drugie okrestnye gosudarstva': kyivski reitary XVIII st." *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 13–14 (2017): 41–58; Vadym Adadurov, "Napoleonida" na skhodi Ievropy: uiavlennia, proekty ta dial'nist' uriadu Frantsii shchodo pivdenno-zakhidnykh okraïn Rossis'koï imperii na pochatku XIX stolittia (Lviv, 2018); Vadim Adadurov, *Voïna tsivilizatsii: sotsio-kul'turnaia istoriia russkogo pokhoda Napoleona*, vol. 1: Religiiia-lazyk (Kyiv, 2017).
- 34 Kateryna Dysa, "Rol'rody ny v ukrains'kykh sudakh pro chary," *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 5 (2005): 185–95; Viktor Horobets', "Prybutkove suddivs'ke remeslo: 'vyna pans'ka' i 'vyna vradova' u sudochynstvi Het'manatu," *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 7 (2007): 175–93; Oleksii Sokyrko, "Skil'ky koshtuie porozuminnia: 'poklony' i 'naklady' v ukrains'kykh sudakh pershoï cherti XVIII st." *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 7 (2007): 125–209.
- 35 Orest Zaiats', *Hromadiany L'vova XIV–XVIII st.: pravovyi status, sklad, pokhodzhennia* (Lviv, 2012); Myron Kapral', "Modernizatsiia chy transformatsiia? Sotsial'ne zhyttia ukrains'koho mista na prykladi hromady lvivs'kykh shevtsiv XVII–XVIII st.," *Kyivs'ka Akademiia* 12 (2014–2015): 241–56; Mykola Krykun, "Iak obyraly i skydaly viitiv u pryvatnykh mistechkakh Podil's'koho voevodstva v pershii chverti XVIII st.," *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 7 (2007): 212–22; Oksana Karlina, "Konflikt mizh tradytsiieiu mis'koho samovriaduvannia i systemoiu mis'koho upravlinnia na Volyni naprykintsi

- XVIII – v pershykh desiatylittiakh XIX st.,” *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 7 (2007): 280–9; Ihor Serdiuk, *Polkovykh horodov obyvateli: istoryko-demohrafichna kharakterystyka mis'koho naseleennia Het'manshyny druhoi polovyny XVIII st.* (Poltava, 2011); Iurii Voloshyn, *Kozaky i pospolyti: mis'ka spil'nota Poltavy druhoi polovyny XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2016).
- 36 For a historiographic overview of the developments in this field see: Igor Serdiuk, Yuriy Voloshyn, “Historical Demography in Ukraine: From ‘Political Arithmetic’ to Non-political History,” *Poland’s Demographic Past* 41 (2019): 9–32.
- 37 Volodymyr Masliichuk, “Deviantna povedinka zhinky na Slobozhanshchyni u 80-kh rokakh XVIII st.,” *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 5 (2005): 197–215; Volodymyr Masliichuk, “Pro ‘bat’kivstvo’ i ‘materynstvo’ na Livoberezhnii Ukraini druhoi polovyny XVIII st.,” *Narodna tvorchist' ta etnografia* 5 (2008): 21–26; Natalia Bilous, “Nasyl'stvo nad zhinkamy: siuzhety z mishans'koho i selians'koho povsiakdennia Volyni XVI – pochatku XVIII st.,” *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 11 (2015): 135–47; Olha Posunko, “V rassuzhdenii zhenskago polu mne neudobno ...’: zakhyst mainovykh interesiv zhinok v sudakh Katerynoslavs'koho namisnytstva u 80-90-h rokakh XVIII st.,” *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 13–14 (2017): 21–32.
- 38 Ihor Serdiuk, *Malen'kyi doroslyi: dytyna i dytynstvo v Het'manshchyni XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2018); Volodymyr Masliichuk, *Ditozhubnytstvo na Livoberezhnii i Slobids'kii Ukraini u druhi polovyny XVIII st.* (Kharkiv, 2008); Volodymyr Masliichuk, “Stavлення до дітей та підлітків у другій половині XVIII ст. (Лівобережна та Слобідська Україна)” *Kyivs'ka starovyna* 1–2 (2009): 64–73; Volodymyr Masliichuk, *Nepovnolitni zlochyntsi v Kharkivs'komu namisnytsvi, 1780–1796* (Kharkiv, 2011).
- 39 Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, *The Golden Age Shtetl: A New History of Jewish Life in East Europe* (Princeton and Oxford, 2015); Myron Kapral', “Antyiev-ereis'ki zavorushennia i pohromy u L'vovi XVII-XVIII st.,” *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 2 (2003): 89–100; Daniel Beavois, *Pouvoir russe et noblesse polonaise en Ukraine 1793–1830* (Paris, 2003); Myron Kapral', “Istori-ko-pravova superechka ukrains'koi i pol'skoi hromad L'vova v pershii polovyni XVIII st.,” *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii* 7 (2007): 223–30; Volodymyr Mil'chev, *Bolhars'ki pereselentsi na pivdni Ukrainy, 1724–1800* (Kyiv-Zaporizhzhia, 2001); Vladyslav Hrybovs'kyi, “Nohais'ki Ordy v politychnii systemi Kryms'koho Hanstva,” *Ukraina v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi* 8 (2008): 139–71; Dmytro Mieshkov, *Zhyttievyi svit pry chornomorskykh nimtsiv (1781–1871)* (Kyiv, 2017); Julia Malitska, *Negotiating Imperial Rule: Colonists and Marriage in the Nineteenth-Century Black Sea Steppe* (Stockholm, 2017);

- Volodymyr Masliichuk, Philip Dykan, Maksym Rosenfeld, *Deutsche Kharkov/Nemetskii Kharkov* (Kharkov, 2015).
- 40 Volodymyr Masliichuk, "Rosii's'ko-ukraïns'ki vidnosyny na Slobids'kii Ukraïni druhoï polovyny XVII st.," in Masliichuk, *Provintsiiia na perekhrestii kul'tur*, 12–26; Nazarenko, "Dlia posylok v Tsar'grad i drugie okrestnye gosudarstva': Kyïvski reitary XVIII st.," 41–58; Volodymyr Masliichuk, "Tsikava zvistka pro hrekiv u Kharkovi 60-kh rr. XVIII st.," in Masliichuk, *Provintsiiia na perekhrestii kul'tur*, 42–7.
 - 41 *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, and Gleb N. Zekulin (Edmonton, 1992); *Culture, Nation, Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)*, ed. Mark von Hagen, Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut, and Frank Sysyn (Edmonton, 2003); Peter J. Potichnyj, *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton, 1980). Numerous studies by Myron Kapral devoted to early modern Lviv might serve as a good example of such an inclusive approach sensitive to the multi-ethnic character of eighteenth-century Ukrainian history: Myron Kapral', *Natsional'ni hromady L'vova XVI-XVIII st. (sotsial'no-pravovi vzaiemyny)* (Lviv, 2003); Myron Kapral', "Natsional'nyi' L'viv XVI-XVIII st. v istoriohrafii," in *L'viv: misto, suspil'stvo, kul'tura*, ed. Olena Arkusha and Mar'ian Mudryi (Lviv, 2007), 17–34; Myron Kapral', *Liudy korporatsii: l'vivs'kyi shevs'kyi tsekh u XVII-XVIII st.* (Lviv, 2012).
 - 42 On the developments in global eighteenth-century studies see the special issue "The State of the Discipline" of the *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies*, vol. 34, no. 4 (2011): M.O. Grenby, "Introduction," *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 34, no. 4 (2011): 425–34.
 - 43 For historiographic discussions on the Ukrainian Enlightenment see: Volodymyr Sklokin, "U poshukakh ukraïns'koho Prosvitnytstva," in Sklokin, *Rosiis'ka imperiia i Slobids'ka Ukraïna u druhiï polovyny XVIII st.*, 224–40. Many more efforts have been invested into the study of the Ukrainian Baroque from the perspective of literary studies and architecture, see in particular: Anatolii Makarov, *Svitlo ukraïns'koho Baroko* (Kyiv, 1994); *Ukraïns'ke Baroko*, ed. Dmytro Nalyvaiko and Leonid Uskalov (Kharkiv, 2004); Leonid Ushkalov, *Eseï pro ukraïns'ke Baroko* (Kharkiv, 2006); Ihor Isychenko, *Dukhovni vymiry barokovoho tekstu: literaturoznachni doslidzhennia* (Kharkiv, 2016).
 - 44 This approach has been among others adopted by Natalia Iakovenko and Iaroslav Hrytsak, authors of the most influential accounts of Ukrainian history written in the post-Soviet period: Natalia Iakovenko, *Narys istorii seredn'ovichnoi i rann'omodernoï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2005); Iaroslav Hrytsak, *Narys*

istoriï Ukraïny: formuvannia modernoi Ukraïns'koï natsii XIX-XX st. (Kyiv, 2019).

- 45 The concept of the “long” eighteenth century was first introduced and discussed in the 1980s by the historians of the British Empire, see in particular: J.C.D. Clark, *English Society, 1688–1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice During the Ancien Regime* (Cambridge, 1985); Theodore K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford, 1975); Steve Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven-London, 2009). On the application of this concept to the history of the Russian Empire, see: Anna Anan'eva, “‘Dolgii XVIII vek’: kharakternye cherty periodizatsii vne kalendarnoi khronologii i primenenie kontsepta k rossiiskoi istorii,” in *Izobretenie veka: problemy i modeli vremeni v Rossii i Evrope XIX stoletiiia*, ed. Elena Vishlenkova and Denis Sdvizkov (Moscow, 2013), 319–28. Even though most students of the Russian Empire accept the concept of the “long” eighteenth century, which stretches from the beginning of Peter I's till the end of Alexander I's reigns, this period is often seen as a “seemingly meaningless past.” The main reason is that the eighteenth century is overshadowed by the next prerevolutionary epoch, which pushed Russia in a different direction: Luba Golburt, *The First Epoch: The Eighteenth Century and the Russian Cultural Imagination* (Madison, WI, 2014), 4; Andrey V. Ivanov, *A Spiritual Revolution: The Impact of Reformation and Enlightenment in Orthodox Russia* (Madison, WI, 2020), 12–13.
- 46 Herman Paul, *Key Issues in Historical Theory* (New York, 2015), 22.

PART ONE

Cossack Autonomies and Their Demise

Ukraine on Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Maps: From the “Wild Field” to the “Country of the Cossacks”

KYRYLO HALUSHKO

Until the middle of the seventeenth century, the vision that European cartographers had of the Ukrainian territories was very vague and amorphous. Their respect for the ancient classics had for centuries designated these lands as “Sarmatia” or “European Sarmatia,” still populated by ancient tribes who had long since left the historical arena, or by mysterious mythical creatures. The episodic appearance of Rus' and several of its cities on maps in the thirteenth century did not begin a new tradition. Significant changes did not take place until the second half of the fifteenth to sixteenth century, when the desire to know the unknown, a characteristic of the Renaissance, and the emergence of printing caused a “cartographic revolution.”

New studies of ancient geography (in particular, the printing of Ptolemy's atlas, the maps for which were created during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) and the desire to supplement it regarding places that were most certainly unknown to the ancient classics – in particular, northern and eastern Europe – intensified the efforts of the geographers and cartographers of the time to portray the contemporary realities on the map.

One of the obvious components of this painstaking work was forming the image of “new” countries and regions, such as England, Poland, Bohemia, Austria, Hungary, Prussia, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. While earlier the idea of Europe “beyond Rome” was limited to Germania and Sarmatia, knowledge of which dated back to ancient authors, now the nomenclature of countries and peoples was expanding.

We will not dwell on the initial stage of mapping Ukrainian lands, because it is expounded in such a fundamental publication as *Ukraine on Ancient Maps* (part one),¹ and the general description of this process – in the generalizing work of Rostyslav Sossa.² We did this retrospectively in our study *Ukraine on the Map of Europe*.³ In the context of the present article, we are primarily interested in the period when the name “Ukraine” first appeared on maps, which coincided chronologically with the emergence of the Cossack polity, and also the future fate of this toponym. Both phenomena (the appearance of the name on the map and Cossack statehood) were interrelated, inasmuch as the reason for inclusion in the number of “established countries” on the map and the continuing re-creation of the image of the country and its name usually resulted from powerful political perturbations. Furthermore, the existence of a country/state on the map (in particular, the integrity of its color and the preservation of its territorial outline) depended on its contemporaneous political stability. In this sense, the depiction of the Cossack Hetmanate, or, more precisely, “Ukraine – land of the Cossacks,” is an obvious example.

As Europe’s geographical interests drew nearer to these territories through the “prism” of Dutch, German, and Polish cartography, they sooner or later had to run up against Europe’s border with the Islamic world in the Black Sea and Dnipro regions (*Prychornomor’ia* and *Podniprovia*), which was of great interest to the West. The expansion of the Ottomans in Europe, which reached its apogee in the seventeenth century, posed the main threat to the Christian world at its very heart, despite all the latter’s achievements in the New World. Therefore, the growing activity of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, their sea and land campaigns against the Turks during the hetmanacy of Petro Sahaidachnyi (especially the Battle of Khotyn in 1621), the fierce Kamianets and Chyhyryn campaigns in the 1670s, and the brilliant victory at Vienna in 1683 would make the Ukrainian Wild Field (*Dyke Pole*) one of the permanent strategic frontiers of Europe. Information about these chivalrous and romantic events would become very widespread. The Wild Field itself would introduce into wide circulation its second name – “Ukraine” – and during the seventeenth century its meaning would change from “borderland” (*okraïna*, *kordon*) to the name of the country. Describing Western information about Ukrainians, the Italian scholar Arturo Cronia wrote: “[Western] literature about wars, mostly anonymous, [is] full of enthusiasm for the indefatigable people in the struggle, which was the discovery of the century.”⁴

We will begin our account about the appearance of “Ukraine” (*Ukraïna*) on the map by rejecting a certain analogy – *okraïna* (borderland). Disputes about how similar *Ukraïna* is to *okraïna* have been going on for a long time, but there was also a geographical localization of the latter.

The *Newest Map of Russia* (Novissima Russiæ Tabula) by the Dutch merchant and cartographer Isaac Massa (1586–1643), published in 1633,⁵ was engraved by a master from a famous printmaking family, Willem Hondius, who later engraved Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan's *General Map of Ukraine* (*Delineatio generalis Camporum Desertorum vulgo Ukraina: cum adjacentibus provinciis*) and the portrait of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Massa's map contains the name *Okraïna*, which depicts the vague territories of the Wild Field on the southern borders of the Muscovite state and is located quite far to the east of the Ukrainian Siversk region (*Sivershchyna*). Since Massa based his map on Moscow sources, he managed to reflect in it the origins of the later popular ideological stereotype that connected *Ukraïna* with *okraïna Rossiï* (Russia's borderland). Although we actually do see the Muscovite *okraïna* (borderland) on Massa's map, it has nothing to do with the *Ukraïna* that is farther away. The latter is located somewhere in the lands of the upper Oka, Don, or the Riazan Region.

Clearly, the etymology of the names *Ukraïna* and *okraïna* is identical, indicating the borderland. However, in our context, the career of *Ukraïna* proved to be impressive in comparison with the Russian *okraïna*, which, as the steppe was colonized, did not acquire independent significance and a clear localization. The unwitting promoters of "Ukraine" were, of course, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who created in this "borderland" (*Ukraïna*) a very distinctive military community, the historical mission and activity of which expanded Ukraine from an actual borderland on the territory of medieval Rus' into the entirety of the central Dnipro region (*Naddniprianshchyna*). From the time of Khmel'nyts'kyi, Rus' and Ukraine became synonymous. The name Rus', perfectly historical, "time-honored," and traditional, was used in political rhetoric; Ukraine, hard-set because of the Cossacks' serious confrontation with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Moscow, and the Ottoman Empire, became an "emotional Fatherland" during the Ruin. This process of "superimposing names" is well reflected in Hetman Petro Doroshenko's expression: "Our Rus' Ukraine (*Ukraïna nasha Rus'ka*)."

Russian researcher Tatiana Tairova-Iakovleva, analyzing the documents of the embassy to Moscow from Hetman Ivan Samoilovych in 1685, quotes from the "historical note" supplied by the Cossack chancellery: "Description of the palatinates of Kyiv, Pereiaslav, and Chernihiv, of which the entire Zaporozhian Host consists ... All of Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Host consists of those three palatinates ..." ⁶ The instruction to the ambassadors also reminded them of the lost land to the west of the Dnipro:

when this Little Russia [*Rosiia*] with the Zaporozhian Host and the common people committed themselves to the gracious protection of this most

gracious monarch [the Muscovite tsar – K. H.], then this Little Russian country was found in its perfect completeness, [extending] not only from the Polish land along the Sluch River to the city of Kamianets, and its width stretched from the Wallachian land to the Dnister River, but also had its wide borders from Lithuania inland. [...] And now with great and unquenchable remorse we, the hetman with the Zaporozhian Host, and with all the Little Russian people, because of our sins, must undergo the diminishment, allowed by God, of our Little Russian country by internal wars and oaths taken by criminals or by hostile invasions and various disturbances, since the aforesaid side of the Dnipro remains excluded.⁷

This description shows quite clearly where “our Rus' Ukraine” was located.

However, it is worth mentioning another localization of Rus', characteristic of the view “from the West,” especially of those who traveled or lived in the lands of central Europe. Since the conquest of the domains of the former “king of Rus'” Danylo Romanovych of Galicia (1253) by Casimir III the Great (1349), and especially since the creation of the Ruthenian palatinate centered in Lviv (1434), *Rus'* had a well-defined administrative localization in Subcarpathia (*Prykarpattia*), while the rest of former Rus' in its broadest meaning (Belarusian, Novgorodian, and Muscovite territories) was a conglomerate of various states and principalities with different names, and none of them were called Rus' – except for the third, often forgotten part of the name of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Samogitia, and Rus'. Therefore, the presence of this name in Subcarpathia on maps beginning from the fifteenth century was quite natural.

If we refer to Bernard Wapowski's *New Map of Poland and Hungary (Polonia et Vngaria XV Nova Tabvla)* of 1540⁸ (on which there are no political or administrative borders), we will find that on it *Russia* meanders from just plain *Russia* in Galicia to *Russia Alba* [White] near Muscovy. However, starting from various editions of the works of Waław Grodziecki,⁹ where the administrative borders of palatinates were already being delineated, it logically became a coordinate name with such other regional names as Volhynia and Podilia. Although from a historical perspective, or of the countries named *Rus'*, all these Ukrainian palatinates were together, and the Kyiv region, and later, the Chernihiv region, even more so. But overall, if the name *Rus'* is taken in its broadest sense, Polish, Upper German, and southern European cartographers usually placed it in Subcarpathia, while the north German, Dutch, and English mapmakers located it on the territories of the northern Novgorod region, which was closer to them, next to the corresponding *Novgardia*.

After 1569, when the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania came under the rule of the Kingdom of Poland, the name of the Polish Rus' was sometimes replaced by the synonymous name *Ukraina*, as was the case in one of the universals issued by King Stefan Batory (1580), quoted by Petro Sas: "to the starostas, vice-starostas, leaseholders, princelings, lords, and people of knightly status living in Rus', Kyiv, Volhynia, Pidliashshia (Podlachia), and Bratslav Ukraine."¹⁰ Accordingly, here Ukraine includes the Rus', Volhynia, Kyiv, Pidliashshia, and Bratslav palatinates. This is a fairly early and significantly wide use of the name *Ukraina*, and therefore this quotation anticipates its future career.

Given the presence of Subcarpathian Rus' in central Europe, it becomes clear why from this southern perspective, the attempts of the Muscovite state to call itself *Rus'*, and the persistent use in the West of the word Muscovite, were not accepted for a very long time. After all, the known Rus' was found in the eastern part of the lands of the Kingdom of Poland (eventually, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) since the fourteenth century, and it was inhabited by the Ruthenians (*rusyny*) (from the Latin *rutheni*, and different from the *moscovites*). The belated attempts of the Muscovite princes and tsars¹¹ to develop Rus' titlature were perceived as purely politically ambitious steps, and not a manifestation of identity with the population of the territories of modern Ukraine and Belarus. However, from the perspective of northern, Baltic Europe, Rus' was usually located in the northern domains of Novgorod, near the White Sea. In the north, Novgorod with its surrounding territories of Novgardia, just as Galicia in the south, was long a well-known partner and traditional entryway to the distant, unknown semi-Asian lands of eastern Europe. Therefore, from both, in fact, European "views" of Rus', the Grand Duchy of Moscow, and later the tsardom, was the most distant borderland of Tartary, and given its long political subordination to the Horde (in contrast to Novgorod or the Galician-Volhynian principalities), also with an unclear "civilizational affiliation." It was included in Rus' in its "broad sense" in images from the end of the sixteenth to the beginning of the seventeenth century, but this was already on maps that contained parts of Siberia and Central Asia. An example of this are the images of *Russia* in Mercator's *Atlas of Europe* (1595, Duisburg) and the aforementioned map by Isaac Massa (1638).

Russia on the maps of the time in its "broad interpretation" did not have well-defined (obvious to subsequent researchers) criteria for its expanses: it was not an integral state or a single region with this name. Perhaps this was how the entire Orthodox space of eastern Europe and Moscow's acquisitions beyond the Urals were seen. It is also possible that this is how the territory of the former ancient

Rus' with the domains of its motley heirs was represented because these maps spatially encompassed Lithuanian, Polish, Novgorodian, and Muscovite lands, where this name was used. Consequently, we cannot draw any evidential conclusions or generalizations in this respect.

Early Western use of the adjective "Rus'/Russian" in connection with Moscow is found in the work of Giles Fletcher, *Of the Russe Common Wealth* (1591). As Dmytro Nalyvaiko notes, "Fletcher had been an English ambassador to Moscow, so he knew the official name of the state, which he put on the title page of his book, but, symptomatically, he included a clarification in the title that was important for the orientation of his readers, who knew this country and its ruler by another name ('Or, Maner of gouvernement of the Russe emperour, commonly called the Emperour of Moskouia')." ¹² Finally, western Europeans acknowledged the fact that the Rus' and Muscovite languages were different. Thus, the Austrian ambassador to Moscow, John Henckel von Donnersmarck, pointed out that the language of Ukraine was *rus'ka* (Ruthenian), and the Polish diplomat Hans Grytyna "was very familiar with the Ruthenian and Muscovite languages." ¹³

In modern terms, Rus' was a "brand name," which nobody wanted to relinquish. The aforementioned Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, when he later defined his political claims, called himself "sole ruler and autocrat of Rus'," asserting his rights to, respectively, "Lviv, Kholm, and Halych." In other words, for the great hetman, the power of Rus' derived from Kyiv and encompassed both Dnipro Rus' and Subcarpathian Rus' – the de facto ethnic habitat of the Ruthenians-Ukrainians. However, it proved impossible at the time to unite the two parts of the future Ukraine, and this would be one of the reasons that Subcarpathia retained the name Rus' for a long time yet, while the Dnipro region would continue, with varying degrees of success, to be "Cossackized" (*pokozachuvatysia*) and, accordingly, "Ukrainized."

Now let us turn to two accounts by two Frenchmen about the Cossacks and their country Ukraine. Pierre Chevalier in his *A Discourse of the Original, Country, Manners, Government and Religion of the Cossacks with Another of the Precopian Tartars: and the History of the Wars of the Cossacks Against Poland* (*Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne: avec un discours de leur origine, pais, moeurs, gouvernement et religion. Et un autre des Tartares Précopites*; 1663) writes that "the Cossacks ... were volunteers from the frontiers of Russia, Volhynia, Podolia, and other provinces of Poland." ¹⁴ He connects their appearance with the activities of Stefan Batory: "King Stefan Bathory, to whom Poland is beholden for many good rules, considered the service which he might draw from these Rovers, towards the defence of the frontiers of *Russia* and Podolia, which lay always exposed to the incursions of the *Tartars*, formed a Militia out of them and gave them the Town of *Trethymirow* upon the *Boristhenes* for a Garrison." ¹⁵ What

is significant for us is Chevalier's remark that "from all this discourse we may at present infer, that the Cossacks are rather a Militia than a Nation, as most have thought."¹⁶ The Italian Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato wrote contemporaneously that "neither their origin nor their way of life differ in any way from the Rus'."¹⁷

Regarding Ukraine, Chevalier provides the following geographical information: "The Countrey inhabited by the *Cossacks* is called *Ukrain*, which signifies the Frontier, it extends itself beyond Volhinia and Podolia, and maketh a part of the palatinates of Kiovia and Braclaw ... Ukraine is very fruitful, and so is *Russia* and *Podolia*."¹⁸ He continues:

The principal Rivers are the Nieper or Boristhenes, the Bog, the Niester or Tyros, which bounds Walachia, the Dezna, the Ros, the Horin, the Slucz, the Ster, and many other lesser Rivers and Streams, by the number of which we may judge of the goodness of the Soil.

The most considerable Towns and Fortresses possessed by the Cossacks are Kiovia, where there is a palatinate and a metropolitan Greek Church, Bialacerkiew, Korsun, Constantinow, Bar, Czarkassi, Czehrin, Kudak, Jampol, at a passage over the Niester, Baraclaw upon the Bog, a palatinacy, Winnicza, Human, Czernihow, Pereaslaw, Lubnie, Pawoloiz, Chwastow.¹⁹

When he speaks of Rus', he means Subcarpathia and the Rus'/Ruthenian palatinate. Thus, for Chevalier, Ukraine is the Dnipro region, which the Zaporozhian Host captured under the mace of Khmel'nyts'kyi. For another Frenchman, Gaspard de Tende de Hauteville, in his general description of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ukraine is also only the Dnipro region, but it is listed among the "Rus' provinces," along with Podilia, Volhynia, and Galicia.²⁰

Ukraine's "narrow localization" by the French would remain approximately the same even thirty years later, after the period of the Ruin, in particular, in the *Memoires du Chevalier de Beaujeu*, written on the basis of the observations of King John Sobieski's agent, François-Paulin Dalairac (published in 1698). According to them, until recently Ukraine "in terms of size of territory and population could have been called a great kingdom ... Today this country is completely destroyed; war, like gangrene, little by little eats up everything that it meets in its path, turning the best corner of Europe into deserted fields, where the grass hides the abandoned cities."²¹ But this sad quote, as we will see below, did not mark the end of the career of the "people – the discovery of the century."

However, let us return to the "visualization of Ukraine" by another son of France, an older contemporary of Chevalier and one of his sources of information. Undoubtedly, the milestone author for the cartography and historiography of Ukraine is Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan (1600–73). This figure is well

known to generations of historians who have referred to his *Description of Ukraine, several provinces of the Kingdom of Poland that stretch from the borders of Muscovy to the borders of Transylvania, together with their customs, way of life, and warfare* (*Description d'Ukraine, qui sont plusieurs provinces du Royaume de Pologne, contenues depuis les confins de la Moscovie, jusques aux limites de la Transylvanie; ensemble leurs mœurs, façons de vivre et de faire la guerre*; 1651). We are not going to dwell on the historiography of “Beauplania,” since this has already been done in other contexts by Ukrainian scholars.²² This French artilleryman, military engineer, and cartographer, who saw a lot of the world (he took part in an expedition to the Indian Ocean), served in the Polish army in 1630–47. In the 1630s, he built fortifications in Bar, Brody, Kremenchuk, Novhorod-Siverskyi, and Kodak, conducted topographic surveying, and drew maps of Ukrainian territories. Geographers most respect his achievements in hydrography: for example, it is now believed that it was he who correctly “bent” the Dnipro on the map, which earlier had usually been depicted with a straight channel or with only one bend.

In the English edition, Beauplan’s map, which had previously faced south, acquired a more familiar northern orientation. British interest in Beauplan continued as evidenced by the fact that the translation of the *Description of Ukraine* was published in 1704, 1752, and 1764.²³ Thanks to Beauplan, the contemporary encyclopedic collection *The New Theater of the World* (*Le nouveau Theatre du monde, ou l’abrege des etats et empires de l’Univers*; Paris, 1666) by Adam Boussingault noted: “Ukraine lies between Muscovy and Transylvania. Kyiv, the main city of this vast country, belongs among the ancient cities of Europe.”²⁴

In Beauplan’s description, “Ukraine” is also the collective name of the Dnipro provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where a bloody Cossack war raged at the very time of the printing of his work. For Beauplan, the right bank of the Dnipro is “Ruthenian” or “Ukrainian,” and the left bank is “Muscovite” (not in the sense of belonging, but of proximity); he uses “Ruthenians” or “Cossacks” as synonyms.

Essentially Beauplan was the first to position “Ukraine” (at least, as a name of a separate map of the country) in the geography of Europe, where it occupied its place until the end of the eighteenth century, and after that appeared sporadically until 1917, when a new stage of its “cartographic biography” began. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Ukrainian Hetmanate, the Zaporozhian Cossacks themselves, Poland, Lithuania, and the Crimean Tatars had all lost their relevance as a result of conquest, partition, and dismemberment by empires – Russian and Austrian. In Beauplan’s time, however, all these processes were only beginning.

Characteristic and important for us was the meaningful change, during the first years of existence of the Beauplan map, in the explanation of the toponym *Ukraine*. At first, it appeared as an alternate name for the Wild Field, but after a few years it began to be quite consistent with the title of Beauplan's map – that is, *Map of Ukraine with Many of Its Provinces*, inasmuch as the formation of the state of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and his followers amidst revolutionary struggle was taking place at the same time. As a result, Ukraine was being transformed from a kind of border region of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into a politonym, whose boundaries were determined by the actual borders of the Cossack state. According to Beauplan, Ukraine, obviously, included “more credibly” the more westerly, closer to Poland, bank of the Dnipro (see, in particular, his *New Map of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Nova totius Regni Polonie Magniq Ducatus Lithuania cum fuis Palatinatibus Ac confiniis Exacta Delineatio per G. le Vasseur de Beauplan s.r.mtis architectum militarem et capitaneum, anno 1651; 1652)*,²⁵ that is, the Wild Field and the Bratslav and Kyiv palatinates (the latter encompassed both banks of the Dnipro), but it is not clear if it also included the Chernihiv region (according to Beauplan's version), which at that time had been part of the Polish domains for only thirty years.²⁶ However, it was included in Beauplan's initial placement of Ukraine “between Transylvania and Muscovy.”

In terms of its general “coverage of the territory,” Ukraine on Beauplan's map is literally the eastern part of the domain of the Kingdom of Poland within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lying east of *Russiae Pars* (Galicia), south of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, north of the Turkish-Tatar lands, and up to the Muscovite border. Incidentally, approximately the same borders of Khmel'nyts'kyi's state also figure in the Treaty of Zboriv of 1649, or as the boundaries of the Grand Duchy of Rus' in Ivan Vyhovs'kyi's Treaty of Hadiach of 1658. The dividing line between the Cossack domains and the western Ukrainian lands that had not been acquired by the Cossacks was the Horyn River. As to the western boundaries of the spatial coverage (position) of the “map of Ukraine” (we cannot be certain that these were the boundaries of Ukraine itself, as imagined by Beauplan, because his map was “narrower”), on the first map (*General Plan*), these boundaries reached Lviv and the Western Buh (Boh) River, but on the more detailed, “special” map – as far as Przemyśl (Peremyshl) and the Vistula. On the first map there is *Rus'*, the second has *Black Rus' (Russie Noire)*.

Beauplan's maps, in particular, the outlines of the Ukrainian palatinates or maps of the Dnipro, were reprinted until the 1720s. His works were also actively used and reprinted by his fellow Frenchmen – Nicolas Sanson (1665, 1678 with

Giovanni Rossi) and Pierre Duval (1667), Guillaume Sanson and Alexis-Hubert Jaillot (1672); the Dutchmen Joan Blaeu (1667, 1670), Johannes Janssonius (1686), and Frederick de Wit (1690); the German Jacob Sandrart (1687); and others. On the map of Nicolas Sanson and Giovanni Rossi of 1678,²⁷ the name *Ukraine or the Land of the Cossacks* (Vcraina o Paese de Cosacchi) passes through Upper Volhynia (the authentic Volhynia) and Lower Volhynia (the Dnipro region). The latter covers both sides of the Dnipro River. The location of the inscription allows one to arbitrarily assign it also to Upper and Lower Podilia (this assumption is possible based on a later map of Hungary, where the inscription “Ukraine” takes in Podilia).²⁸ There is no dividing line along the Dnipro between Poland and Muscovy.

An interesting change in Beauplan’s map was made by the Dutchman Johannes Janssonius in 1686. His *General Map of Ukraine* (*Typus Generalis VKRAINÆ sive PALATINATUM PODOLIÆ, KIOVIENSIS et Braczlaviensis terras nova delineatione exhibens*)²⁹ (with the old Beauplan cartouche) contains many explanatory captions in Latin, in particular, at the places of Cossack battles – at Loyew and Liubech: “In this place, on 31 July 1649, near the town of Loyew, Lithuanian hetman Janusz Radziwiłł defeated 36,000 rebellious Cossacks, and their [leader] Mykhailo Krychevs'kyi died”; Berestechko: “Near Berestechko [...] Polish king John Casimir [John II Casimir Vasa] beat and forced to flee 30,000 Tatars and rebellious Cossacks in the year 1651, on the 30th day of June.”

The division of Ukraine between Poland and Muscovy along the Dnipro River probably occurs for the first time in the work of Dutch cartographer Frederick de Wit (1690),³⁰ who in all else relied on Nicolas Sanson and Beauplan as his topographical basis. However, the name *VKRANIA* covers the Left-Bank Hetmanate and Right-Bank Ukraine (*Pravoberezhzia*), which together are identified traditionally as “Lower Volhynia.” This division was slow to become established. It next appeared on the schematic map of the Frenchman Nicolas de Fer (published in 1731) but disappeared from his map published in 1737.³¹ It was marked on the highly schematic map of the roads of Poland by Johann Schreiber (Leipzig, 1740),³² and in the same year, by the Dutchman Isaac Tirion.³³ On the latter’s map, *Ukraine* is located only on the Left Bank. The map of another Dutchman, Tobias Maier (1750), shows the opposite – Ukraine is placed on the Right Bank. In Tirion’s work Ukraine is on the map of Muscovy while in Maier’s it is on the map of Poland.³⁴ Perhaps this explains the localization of the toponym: each country contained its own part of Ukraine, and thus their “own” part was identified accordingly. Gabriel Bodenehr of Augsburg, on the other hand, showed an undivided territory under the general name: *Volhynia. Ukraine or the Cossack Lands* (1740).³⁵

Thus, on the 1710 map of the Kingdom of Poland by the Dutchmen Gerard and Leonard Valk, Red Rus' (*Russia Rubra*) is set off in a separate yellow color

and, essentially, encompasses the entire ethnic Ukraine of that time.³⁶ The central part of the Right- and Left-Bank regions is called Ukraine (*Ukrania*). This map is an interesting precedent of the whole of ethnic Ukraine being shown in a single outline and color. Subsequently, the Valks were imitated in this by the Nuremburg native Johann Homann (more about him later) and Matthäus Seutter of Augsburg (1731). The division between Red Rus' and Ukraine remained in various editions of the maps by the French royal cartographers Gilles and Didier Robert de Vaugondy from the 1750s and other subsequent maps. We will not dwell on them in detail, because the only significant difference between them consists in whether Ukraine is shown on them or not. Mainly it is shown encompassing either both banks of the Dnipro, or only the Right Bank (on part of the maps of Poland). Along with the relatively stable localizations of Ukraine, at times Red Rus' again appears as the identification of the entire ethnic Ukrainian space from Subcarpathia to sub-Russian Left-Bank Ukraine. In the 1772 Paris edition of his map, the Italian Giovanni Rizzi Zannoni showed Polish Ukraine and Muscovite Ukraine. The inscriptions on the map are in Polish, since this map was the culminating elaboration of the work of Polish cartographers sponsored by their patron Józef Jabłonowski in 1740–62.

We should note that in fact there was no rush to color Ukraine on maps in two parts in different state colors after the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667 and the Eternal Peace of 1686. We suspect this was not mainly due to the professional “inertia” of cartographers, but to the constant changes in the political and military levers, which did not allow establishing any kind of “final state” of the territory. This was especially the case as such a radical change of borders required advertising and promotion.

Whereas Beauplan was in military service in Poland and reflected the position (spatial coverage) of the southern part of the eastern borderlands of the Polish Commonwealth on his map, painting Left-Bank Ukraine in the colors of Muscovy on Western European maps required a “Muscovite edition” of maps of Eastern Europe that would reach the leading cartographic publishers, workshops, and editorial offices of the East: Paris, Amsterdam, London, Nuremberg, and Gdańsk.

“Cartographic propaganda” was an important matter at a time when few saw the “big world” but wanted to have an idea of it. This was even more true of people in power who were engaged on a practical level in “geopolitics.” As the historian Larry Wolff writes, “Maps provided a basic geographical framework for organizing other forms of knowledge, from natural history to national history ... and made geography essential to accounts of contemporary international politics.”³⁷

It was only since the reign of Peter I that such a politically important objective of “cartographic propaganda” was purposefully pursued in Russia. His large-scale projects of the geographical study of Russia called for the creation of an *Atlas of*

Russia through the efforts of the St Petersburg Imperial Academy of Sciences, which could serve as a reliable source of information for the West. Before this, Muscovy appeared on maps as a mysterious, cold country at the very edge of Europe and in Asia; its affiliation with the European or Asian world was confused (the same dilemma existed on Italian and Spanish sea maps – portolans of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries).³⁸ The Christian faith of the Muscovites ostensibly included them in Europe, but since the ancient era, Russia was divided in half by the famous border of Europe along the Don (Tanais) River, at least since the conquest of Siberia. In the middle of the sixteenth century, the diplomat and traveler Sigismund Herberstein believed that if one drew a line from the Tanais, Muscovy would be in Asia. This brought to mind a similar situation with “European Sarmatia” and “Asian Sarmatia,” inasmuch as the border of Europe was for Europeans a self-sufficiently significant and symbolic manner of determining what we today would call “civilizational affiliation.”

A similar concept is present on the map created in Lithuania by Ivan Liatskii, a fugitive from Moscow, voivode and *okol'nichii*, and the artist Antonii Vid (1542): “Muscovy, which is also White Russia, is not part of European Sarmatia. But it belongs to greater Asia or Scythia ...”³⁹ In Joan Blaeu’s Amsterdam atlas of 1665, the Muscovites are depicted on the map of Asia among the miniatures of Asian peoples.⁴⁰

This age-old border with Asia became the focus of Peter I during the Azov campaigns of 1695–96. The success of these wars had to be advertised by appropriate “declarative” maps. A draft of one was made in 1699 by two foreigners serving in Muscovy, Major General Mengden and Field Marshal Jacob Bruce, and it was engraved by the Dutchman Jan Tessing. The map was published in Russian and Latin and contained a flattering cartouche and a portrait of the Muscovite monarch. Interestingly, this was perhaps the first time that Ukraine was labelled “Little Russia” (*Pars Russiae Minoris*) within the boundaries of the Dnipro region and without the then Polish-Russian division along the Dnipro, as pointed out by such an authoritative author as Rostyslav Sossa.⁴¹ However, there is now every reason to believe that the map of Mengden and Bruce (1699) was not an original work but a Latin-language copy of the 1697 *Map of the Kingdom of Poland, containing the state of Poland and Lithuania divided into provinces* (*Le Royaume de Pologne comprenant les états de Polognes et de Lithuanie, divisez en provinces*) by the French cartographer Jean-Baptiste Nolin. This becomes immediately evident from the inscription of *Petite Russie* extending from eastern Volhynia to almost Smolensk, since such coverage by this toponym does not appear in other known cartographic sources – only in Jean-Baptiste Nolin and Mengden-Bruce. Accordingly, therefore, we should now regard the first mention

of the toponym “Little Russia” on a map as appearing at least in 1697 and not 1699, and that doubtless this was not a Russian product. Consequently, there is a need for a separate study of the works of this French cartographer, who is not among the very well-known mapmakers.

At the same time, however, the initial dependence of Petrine Russian cartography on Western European (primarily French) examples affected the fact that on the cusp of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for the first time (but very briefly – except for once), the name “Ukraine Cossack Country” (*Ukraina Kozatskaia Strana*) (in exactly this form) appeared on the Russian map of Europe.⁴² Co-existing on this map are the “Muscovite or Russian Tsardom” (*Tsarstvo Moskovskoe ili Rossiiskoe*) and “Black Russia” (*Rossiia Chernaia*) in Galicia and the Kholm (Chelm) region. Thereafter, “Ukraine” would not appear again, having been replaced by “Little Russia” (*Mala Rus'*), which was more acceptable to the state that had recently begun calling itself Russia (*Rossiia*). The existence of the name “Ukraine” here was connected with the French original of this map – the work of Guillaume Sanson (1670s).

Of course, the term “Little Rus'” (*Mala Rus'*), which was transformed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into “Little Russia” (*Malorosiia*), was known to us for a long time – since the fourteenth century (an episode related to the formation of the Halych metropolitanate while the metropolitan of Kyiv had his residence in Vladimir and later in Moscow). But “Little Russia” acquired a certain geographical and political-legal meaning only in the context of relations between the Ukrainian hetmans and Church hierarchs with Moscow institutions after 1654. This name was used as a synonym for the lands of the Zaporozhian Host (Hetmanate) and the Ukraine-Dnipro region in official correspondence but was not in common use. This was not by accident, since the word *Rosiia* was a solemn Hellenized (Greek) synonym for *Rus'* (or the wide expanse of Rus' Orthodoxy) and, accordingly, was widespread in religious scholarly circles. Until the second half of the seventeenth century, it did not apply specifically to the lands of the Muscovite state (on the use of names for Ukrainian territories, it is worth referring to Volodymyr Kravchenko's study⁴³).

However, later, in the 1660s–70s, the terms “Little Russian people,” “Little Russian cities,” and “Little Russian hetmans” began to be used in sources. This name, of course, did not have any disparaging meaning (as imagined by the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) at the time. It was obviously convenient for the Moscow administration, because the more familiar to them name of the Ukrainian Cossacks, *cherkasy*, turned out to be somewhat narrow in meaning. A cartographic example of terminology is also the title *Drawings for Ukrainian and Cherkasian Cities from Moscow to Crimea*

(Chertezha ukrainskim i cherkaskim gorodam ot Moskvvy do Kryma) (1670–71?), which served as a road map (from city to city, with distances) for those who traveled the most popular military route of the Muscovite army during the Ukrainian Ruin.

The name of the relevant administrative institution in charge of relations with the Hetmanate (the Little Russian Department (*prikaz*), which functioned in 1662–1722 before Peter I created the First Little Russian Collegium) also determined terminology. It is also clear that the toponym “Little Russia” (*Malorosiia*) appeared in European geography and cartography only sporadically, and only through remakes of Russian maps of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; it would later become established there in translation (namely, “Little Russia” – *Petite Russie*, *Kleine Russland*, *Little Russia*), and not as a transliteration from Russian (*Malorossiia*). Moreover, this would happen in the nineteenth century, much later than the term “Russia” (*Rosiia*) would finally replace “Muscovy” (*Moskoviia*) (in the middle of the eighteenth century).

Therefore, the cartographic historian faces a significant problem: how to translate the same word in French, German, and English, which denotes both Rus' and Russia-Muscovy (in the sense of the Russian state/empire). Since this leaves too much room for arbitrary interpretations, or the passing off of an author's own hypothesis as reality, our approach in this article (as the reader can see) is to try to provide only the transliteration of the name (*Russiia*) up to the seventeenth-eighteenth century, and thereafter be guided by the nomenclatural context of the map: if the map contains Muscovy (*Moskoviia*) in any of its forms in parallel with *Russiia*, we translate *Russiia* as *Rus'*, without necessarily connecting it to the Muscovite state. However, if *Moskoviia* disappears and only *Russiia* remains with a connection to the Russian Empire, then we translate it as *Russia* and, accordingly, we have *Malorosiia* (*Little Russia*) rather than *Mala Rus'* (*Little Rus'*).

Let us return to the Petrine era. Peter's military-political and cartographic ambitions gradually grew, and he invited Joseph-Nicolas Delisle, brother of the chief geographer of the French Royal Academy of Sciences, Guillaume Delisle, to create the desired atlas of Russia. Work on the atlas was painstaking and lasted for a long time (it appeared twenty years after the death of Peter – in 1745), but competing Western editions cast doubt on its accuracy. Although this was rather dictated by envy since this atlas (which may in fact have not been very accurate) was a serious twenty-year state project.

At that time, the leading events in European life were two wars: in the West – for the Spanish succession (1701–14) and in the East – the Great Northern War (1700–21). The latter had a tragic significance for Ukrainian history, dashing Ivan Mazepa's attempt to restore the independence of the Hetmanate. Clearly, his

action was a forced risky step, but it was one of those cases of a historical choice, the idea of which alone lives on much longer than the participants of the event. The war was, as we know, “northern,” for the domination of the Baltic, but capricious military luck led the troops of the young, ambitious Swedish king Charles XII to the Ukrainian lands. Hetman Mazepa was faced with a difficult and unexpected choice – to remain loyal to the equally ambitious Peter I, who liked the hetman personally, but was the obvious destroyer of Ukrainian liberties, or venture over with his adherents to the Swedish camp, looking for a possible foreign policy alternative.

For European cartographers, the Northern War was a successful business project. It was a serious continental conflict that lasted for two decades, which could be conveniently followed by having the theater of operations before one’s eyes. As the Swedish geographer Philip Johan von Strahlenberg rightly wrote soon after, in 1730, “the most Arts are generally brought to decay by the fate of war, yet the Science of Geography is often increased and improved thereby.”⁴⁴ We do not know whether contemporary fans of political news were wont to move flags on the map to indicate the movement of “fronts,” but maps of the Baltic region after 1700 began to enjoy significant demand.

In 1702, the Amsterdam engraver Daniel de La Feuille (1640–1709) published the *Portable Atlas, or, the New Theater of War in Europe* (*Atlas Portatif, ou, le Nouveau Theatre de la Guerre en Europe*), in which to depict the eastern theater he applied a version of the map of the Frenchman Antoine Phérotée de la Croix (1640–1715), *The Kingdom of Poland with its Borders* (*Le Royavme de Pologne avec ses confins*), created in 1693.⁴⁵ It features twelve shields with the coats of arms of the palatinates and territories that were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; included among them is the coat of arms of Ukraine (*Ukraine* – on the shield, *Ukraine* – on the map) with the Galician lion rampant, and the map itself bears the inscription “Ukraine, the Land of the Cossacks” (*Ukraine pays des Cosaques*). The inscription runs along Volhynia, the Kyiv region, and Podilia. The Galicia and Berestia (*Beresteishchyna*) regions are identified as Black Rus’ (*Rvssie Noire*), separate from Ukraine, although the latter, as we can see, obviously has Galician symbols.

Then, after 1708, when Charles XII, who was popular in Europe, set off for the exotic Cossack lands, it was necessary to quickly recall the work of Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan and show interested politicians and citizens what resources Charles’s ally “Prince Mazepa” (as of 1707, the hetman had the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire) possesses or lays claim to, namely: what is Ukraine (and let us emphasize, not Little Russia). For the situation in those parts was confused: despite the Poltava victory, Peter I was faced with the entry of the Ottoman Empire

into the conflict, and he had conducted the unsuccessful Prut campaign and lost Azov, located on the boundary of Europe and Asia.

The quite “ordinary” Baltic war turned into a series of exotic expeditions along the borders of the Islamic East. The interested public needed a map of the theater of operations, and this purpose was served by the map of Ukraine or the Cossack land with the surrounding provinces of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Little Tartary (*Vkrania quæ et terra Cosaccorum cum vicinis Walachia, Moldavia, Minorisq[ue] Tartaria provinciis*; 1712) by the Nuremberg cartographer Johann Baptist Homann (1664–1724). Homann, the founder of the German atlas publishing school (it was in his atlas that this map appeared), tried to see to it that current political and military realities, changes in borders, and the international situation were reflected on the maps.⁴⁶ He was a highly respected man, and soon, in 1715, he was appointed Imperial Geographer to the Holy Roman Emperor.⁴⁷

On Homann’s map, which was based on Beauplan’s map (it was the “primary source” of most French and central European maps of Ukrainian lands at the time), Hetman Mazepa and his supporters were featured in the cartouche, and the site of the Battle of Poltava was marked. But of importance to us, in addition to this updating for Western Europeans of events in the struggle for Ukraine, is the identification in the cartouche: “Ukraine – land [country] of the Cossacks” (*Vkrania que et Terra Cosaccorum*), which once again raised this name from the regional level to that of a country-state. Let us recall that for Beauplan, the “self-sufficiency” of Ukraine as a country (despite the existence of internal provinces) was “inconclusive,” inasmuch as its political formation was “underway” in his own time. In other words, because it was “emerging,” because essentially it was only the Dnipro region, without western Subcarpathian Rus’, and the fact that it was a “country,” did not make it a “state” separate from Poland.

However, in Homann’s work, fifty years after Beauplan, we already see that as a result of the long struggle of the Cossack hetmans between Warsaw and Moscow, despite the divisions along the Dnipro between the two external forces, Ukraine was no longer displayed on the map in the usual “Polish” colors, but at the same time was not colored in “Muscovite” hues. We see on the Homann map a “Ukraine” that among the maps of that time is as close as possible to its ethnic boundaries – from Sloboda Ukraine (*Slobozhanshchyna*) to Przemyśl. It is difficult to say why Beauplan’s image of Ukraine was expanded by Homann (in particular, westward to the Carpathians), since he obviously did not have any maps of Ukrainian ethnic lands, which only appeared in the nineteenth century. However, even to Beauplan, it seemed appropriate and logical to have the “Ukrainian space” border on, for example, the Black Sea – after all, it is impossible to show the sense and dynamics of life of the Wild Field and the Zaporozhians without including Tatar territories on

the map of Ukraine. That is why he included Crimea in the second edition of his “map of Ukraine.” It is impossible to draw a map of Europe without the adjacent seas, and a specific state, without showing who it borders on; the image of the territory must be sufficiently informative, coherent, and logical.

In general, Homann was clearly trying to show the widest possible “theater of war,” since his map was, in fact, a map of southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region. In addition to Ukraine, it includes not only Moldavia, Wallachia, and Little Tartary (all Crimean domains), which are shown in the cartouche, but also Transylvania, Bulgaria, Istanbul, the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, and from the side of Muscovy – the Smolensk and Riazan regions, and the relevant part of the Wild Field. Clearly, the strategic antics of Charles and Peter could take the “front” of what was no longer simply a “northern” war to even more distant unknown lands. However, what is of interest to us is to see Homann’s Ukraine in such a broad setting.

Since administrative divisions are distinguished by colors on this map, it is interesting to see the use of one color for the whole of Ukraine, from “Pokuttia” to the “Tatar Route to Muscovy” (Muravskiy Trail), alongside the existing Polish palatinates to the west of the Dnipro and the Polish-Muscovy border along the Dnipro. It is unlikely that Homann was impressed by the fact that in 1704–06 Mazepa imposed his hetmanship on both banks of the Dnipro and his army reached Zamość (Zamostia), because *de jure* the power of his mace obviously did not extend to Przemyśl anyway. Poland is clearly simply ignored on this map. The usual difference between the Ukraine-Dnipro region and Rus'-Subcarpathia is dealt with quite easily: the inscriptions “Red Rus’” (*Russia Rubra*) and “Ukraine” (*Ukraina*) stretch in parallel through the entire yellow “Ukrainian space.” The synonymy of Rus' and Ukraine was clearly obvious. However, Homann was not the only inventor of the latter “compromise.” In 1714, on the map in the atlas of the Leiden publisher Pieter van der Aa (1659–1733), which was a different version of Beauplan’s, the cartouche contains the inscription “Ukraine, land of Red Rus’” (*Ukraine, grand pays de la Russie Rouge: avec une partie de la Pologne, Moscovie, Bulgarie, Valachie, Podolie et Volhynie*). It will be recalled that on the Dutchmen Gerard and Leonard Valk’s map, this filling in with the same solid yellow color took place a little earlier – in 1710. But, taken together, it suggests a flash of ideas of Ukrainian “sovereignty” in the military circumstances of the time.

Thereafter, Homann’s map was reissued numerous times by his company and others (in particular, by Christoph Weigel of Nuremberg in 1719); the last surge of interest in it occurred during the Russo-Turkish wars of the 1730s.

Homann’s vision of the southern theater of the Northern War was not the only one, however. At the same time, mapping eastern Europe “to reflect the war,”

the English master cartographer Herman Moll (d. 1732) in 1708 printed in London *A Map of Muscovy, Poland, Little Tartary, and the Black Sea*, which was obviously based (judging by the name) on the criteria of “official” state entities. In 1712, he made a similar map for the leading military commander of the “parallel” War of the Spanish Succession, the Duke of Marlborough. According to Larry Wolff, it was this map that Voltaire described in his *History of Charles XII* (1731).⁴⁸ Ukraine clearly did not occupy a key position on it, and, even though it occupied both banks of the Dnipro, it was designated as a domain of Muscovy. At that time, the Muscovite state was an ally of England, and this loyalty was reflected on “political maps.”

The famous French cartographer Guillaume Delisle (1675–1726), the older brother of Joseph-Nicolas who served in Russia, issued his *Map of Muscovy* (*Carte de Moscovie*) in 1706 that was convenient for use by interested readers. On it, the inscription “Ukraine – Land of the Cossacks” (*Ukraine pays des Cosaques*) passes through the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine, and the map contains a separate inscription – “Zaporozhian Cossacks” (*Cosaques Zaporoski*). It is on the “observations” of Guillaume Delisle that the Amsterdam geographers of French origin Jean Covens and Corneille Mortier, publishers of the map *Theater of War in Little Tartary, Crimea, and the Black Sea*, rely.⁴⁹ In the archival description of the map at the library of the University of Alberta (Canada), it is not clearly dated, but given its view (southern Ukraine, northern Black Sea region, and Crimea), it shows the most important strategic places from the time of the Azov campaigns and the Northern War (Azov, Poltava, Bendery) and was obviously created “to reflect the southern theater of the Northern War.” Of interest to us is that it already locates the Zaporozhian Sich in the lower reaches of the Dnipro, at the same time leaving the Old Sich on the Chortomlyk River.

Equally interesting is the identification of Ukraine on the map of *The Kingdom of Poland including the States of Poland and Lithuania, divided into provinces, or Map of the States of Poland based on the Latest Observations and Newest Memories* by the French cartographer Jean-Baptiste Nolin (1743).⁵⁰ Since this map is not included in the fundamental work, *Ukraina na starodavnikh kartakh* (*Ukraine on Old Maps*), this may be the first time that it is being introduced into scholarly circulation in Ukraine. On it, we see three versions of Rus'. One is “Polish or Red Rus'” (*Russie Polonoise, ou Rouge*; modern Ukraine), the second is southeastern Belarus (*Russie Lithuanique ou Blanche*; the rest of Belarus is “Lithuania”), and the third is “Muscovy or Great Rus'” (*Moscovie ou la Grande Russie*). “Ukraine” on the map is Podilia (*Podolie*) and the Dnipro region (Dnipro-Ukraine). The adjective “Small” (*Petite*) also appears, but it is unclear what it refers to, because

“Little Poland” (*Petite ou Haute Pologne*) is already shown in the area of Cracow and Lublin; this is probably Little Rus' (*Mala Rus'*). An extensive commentary for each land on the map explains the names used:

Polish Rus', which is also known as Little Rus', is divided into Lithuanian Rus' and Red Rus'. Then we say (specify) that Lithuanian Rus' belongs to the state of Lithuania.

Red Rus' is a part of the Polish state and is divided into Separate Rus' (*Russie particuliere*) and Ukraine (*Ukraine*).

Separate Rus' consists of the palatinates of Kholm, Belz, and Rus'.

Ukraine is the land of the Cossacks, encompassing the provinces of Volhynia and Podilia, or Polish Cossacks, Muscovite Cossacks, and Turkish Cossacks.⁵¹

The province of Volhynia, which is divided into Upper and Lower Volhynia, contains the palatinates of Lutsk and Kyiv, with the addition of a large part that belongs to the Muscovites.

The province of Podilia, which is divided into Upper and Lower Podilia, contains the palatinates of Kamianets and Bratslav, with the addition of a large part of Kamianets from the Turks since 1672.⁵²

An interesting Russian vision of the end of the Northern War is represented by the *Map of the Great Russian State with Part of the Christian and Muslim Border [Regions]* (*Karta Velikogo Rossiiskogo Gosudarstva s chastiami pograniichnykh khristianskikh i musul'manskikh; St Petersburg* [?], end of the 1720s).⁵³ This map is important for the geography of Russia, in that it shows the results of the work of Petrine surveyors in mapping the central gubernias of Russia. For us, it represents reliance on outdated data from French cartography and sheer anachronisms: it completely disregards existing political borders, in particular, the western border of the Muscovite state, which is dated back to the time of Ivan the Terrible. It contains the borders of fifteenth-century Russian principalities; the Russian domains in Ukraine, acquired by Moscow in the seventeenth century, are shown extremely arbitrarily and obviously “with a reserve” by including a large part of the then still Polish-dominated Right Bank and Podilia. In some sense, these contours clearly resemble the Right-Bank Cossack domains of Khmel'nyts'kyi's time, which, moreover, are identified as “Kyivan,” “Little Russian,” and “Chernihivian.” However, the meaning of this remains unknown, since at the time only the Kyiv gubernia existed administratively on this territory (as of 1708), and it was only later that its parts of Belgorod, Orlov, and Sevsk provinces were formed into the

Belgorod gubernia (in 1728). In Kyiv itself, a full-fledged gubernia administration was not established until 1765. At the time that this map was created, the Hetmanate (Little Russia) as well as the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions were administered by the First Little Russian Collegium.

This map is a good illustration of the view of the Russian historian of cartography V. Batalov that “Peter I completely rejected the (Russian) cartographic heritage and started surveying the country from scratch. The reform in the field of cartography was so abrupt that among the scholars who specialize in the study of the nineteenth century the idea took root that Russia did not have its own cartography before Peter, and our old maps were nothing more than primitive copies of western European ones. The cost of modernization proved high: along with outdated methods, important geographical information was lost.”⁵⁴ Therefore, the final work of Petrine geographers from the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences *Atlas of the Russian [Empire]* (*Atlas Rossiiskoi*, 1745) drew criticism not only from Western colleagues, but also from influential Russian authors, in particular, Vasilii Tatishchev.

It is noteworthy that like Beauplan’s or Homann’s “vision,” the maps of their British contemporary, Herman Moll, also had a long life. Thus, the corresponding part of the map of Europe on the much later (by ninety years) English *General Atlas* (London, 1797) was very similar to the Moll map.

Herman Moll’s political “flexibility” in naming territories and states is absurdly demonstrated in the luxurious *A Catalogue of a New and Compleat Atlas, or Set of Twenty-Two Sheet Maps* (London, 1719), where almost every map is dedicated to some important leader – from the English Queen Anne and the Duke of Marlborough to Russian Tsar Peter I. The standard map bears the traditional name *The Dominions of Muscovy in Europe*. On it, “Russia,” as was customary for northern European cartography, is located near the White Sea. However, in the same edition of this atlas, on the map of Muscovy dedicated to “Peter Aleksovitz,” the name of the country changes to “Russia or Muscovy.” An equally interesting inscription appears on the territory of the Hetmanate, which suggests melancholy reflections: “Lands of the old Ukraine (*Urkrain*)” or “Old lands of the Cossacks” – depending on how one reads it ... Ukraine itself encompasses not only the Left-Bank Hetmanate, but also a strip of the Right Bank from Kyiv to the Black Forest and the Dnipro rapids, which are indicated separately, and the Sich (the Chorotmyk Sich, which by then had not existed for ten years).

“The glorious [exactly so! – K.H.] land of Ukraine” is depicted in the *New Atlas* (*Atlas novus*) of 1735 by Matthaus Seutter (1678–1756), who was then working in Augsburg, and this map was reissued there in 1777 by his pupil Tobias Lotter.⁵⁵ Seutter’s practice was to extend “Red Rus” from the Carpathians to Sloboda

Ukraine alongside “Ukraine.” His “Cossacks” were found from Volhynia to Left-Bank Ukraine along the border. For Lotter, “Ukraine” consisted of the Bratslav and Kyiv regions.

While attempts to remove Ukraine from Russian maps began as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, soon the vital importance of “cartographic propaganda” was most perceptibly felt by the Poles. At first it was the private interest of the last king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Stanisław August Poniatowski (reigned in 1764–95), who was a great admirer of cartography. However, it was during his reign that the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1772, 1793, and 1795) occurred, from which time the very fact of the presence of the name “Poland” on the map was becoming a significant political step. Like Peter I, Stanisław hired French specialists, and the irony of the day was that “while French cartography worked to keep up with Russian political expansion, it could also preserve the picture of Poland in defiance of Polish political extinction.”⁵⁶ The fact that Catherine II was already on Peter’s throne, and that other Frenchmen and new Germans were now engaged in the Russian geographical service, did not change anything. The inertia of Russian great power was rampant in the eighteenth century, and the enlightened Empress’s interest in mapping her achievements was equal to that of the founder of the empire. They were indeed enlightened rulers.

As the Russian researcher of the history of cartography V. Batalov points out, in eighteenth-century Russia, the “administrative approach” to geography and cartography began to dominate: “geography was the science of tsarist officials and ministers that enabled them to plan troop movements and various administrative measures ... Maps were often used for propaganda purposes, demonstrating the monarch’s success in promoting the arts and sciences and expanding borders.”⁵⁷

An illustration of the above is the *General Map of the Russian Empire*⁵⁸ from the *Russian Atlas*, which consists of nineteen special maps representing “The All-Russian Empire with Borderlands, created according to geographical rules and the latest observations, with the added General Map of this great empire, through the efforts and work of the Imperial Academy of Sciences” (1745). Despite the fact that this first Russian official atlas was never reissued (separate additional printings were made later), it would remain “in force” until the next atlases of similar “status” appeared in 1792 and 1876. Parts of Ukraine are shown here as the Kyiv and Belgorod gubernias. Ethnographic and historical names (in particular, “Ukraine” or “Little Russia”) are not used.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, after the resolution of the “Ukrainian question” by Poltava, it seemed that the maps of Ukraine based on Beauplan were

forgotten and taken out of circulation by cartographic services and editorial offices. These lands once again found themselves on the margins of attention and by the 1770s seemed to have lost their geographical details. In a sense, Ukraine was there to be discovered anew. In 1769 the Briton Joseph Marshall wrote: "the country's being so extremely out of the way of all travellers, that not a person in a century goes to it, who takes notes of his observations with intention to lay them before the world."⁵⁹ First of all, we must admit that he obviously exaggerated, because to him far-away Poland was only a cartographic reality. Then let us point out that French cartographers still kept in mind the achievements of Beauplan, but the political names of various Ukrainian territories were still a confused jumble for them. The visions of the French who worked for the Russians and the French who worked for Polish emigrants in France intersected in the same field. An illustration of the French "pro-Polish vision" is the map *The Kingdom of Poland, divided into separate parts between Russia, Austria, and Prussia in 1772, 1793, and 1795* from the teaching atlas by Didier Robert de Vaugondy (Paris, 1797).⁶⁰ On it, Ukraine occupies the territory from the Dnister to the Dnipro, without taking in the "Russian" side of the latter. This was typical of the Polish cartographic tradition, where "Ukraine" was located on the right bank of the Dnipro, and "Little Russia" on the left bank.

Discovering us "anew," Marshall wrote: "It has been supposed that the hemp and flax, coming to us from so northern a place as Petersburg, would grow in the midst of perpetual frosts and snows; but though we import it from latitude 60, yet it all grows in the Ukraine, which lies between latitude 47 and 52, and is besides as fine, mild a climate as any in Europe: this is the latitude of the south of France."⁶¹ This Briton illustrates the extent to which cartography could confuse a person of the eighteenth century. Russian interference in Polish affairs during the Bar Confederation (1769) introduced contradictions between what was written on the map and what the newspapers carried in their reports: "a province once Polish, and which all the maps I have lay down as a part of Poland," became *de facto* Russian. How are we to take this? To believe the map that this is Poland, or to believe the news that this is now Russia? He concluded that "the greatest changes happen in such remote parts of the world, without any thing of the matter being known."⁶²

However, we must not be in such a hurry to bury the stubborn Guillaume Le Vasseur's map of Ukraine so quickly. This map still managed to be included in the *Universal Atlas (Atlas Universel)* by the father and son Robert de Vaugondy (Paris, 1757). However, we here also find a stubborn "Polish trail." After all, Didier Robert de Vaugondy had been a pupil and employee of the Nancy Academy, which was maintained by the former Polish king, a supporter of the Enlightenment (and

let us remember, at one time, a correspondent of Ivan Mazepa), Stanisław Leszczyński (ruled in 1704–09, 1733–34), in his life as the Duke of Lorraine (1738–66). Thus, cartographic issues related to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had certain priorities. After all, “Ukraine” was a cartographic nuance on the maps of Poland, in particular.

If we take a larger perspective – for example, a map of Europe – in Robert de Vaugondy we will see only the border between Poland and European Russia along the Dnipro. Therefore, at the end of the eighteenth century, in light of the “contraction” and disappearance of Poland itself, the “Ukrainian story” fell to a level below it in the ranking of probable political-cartographic problems. Poland became a “former state,” but remained a “country”; Ukraine, owing to much less, or completely absent, political relevance, began to disappear as a name on the map, being mentioned less and less often.

It depended on the good will of cartographers and, more likely, the institutions for which they worked, whether to leave Poland on the map (with its usual Ukraine on the Right Bank) after its final partition in 1795, or not. Given the already customary presence from the middle of the sixteenth century of state and administrative borders on maps, there existed an obvious right to choose: to show only states (then there would no longer be a Poland, let alone a Ukraine, as administrative entities), or to also pay attention to “countries” and “peoples.” As for the latter, in the post-medieval period, the “peoples” were left out of Europe, as the barbarian stateless world rapidly receded to the periphery – the New World, Africa, distant Asia, and Oceania. The “peoples” were identified with barbarian stateless tribes that were no longer there. Europe was a continent of nation-states. In Europe, to get on the map as a “non-state,” it was necessary to represent a certain exclusive community – like the Ukrainian Cossacks, who lasted on the maps of Eastern Europe for quite a long time in the eighteenth century as “Cossacks.” However, since ethnographic maps only came into existence in the middle of the “nationalized” nineteenth century, it was difficult for the “Poles without Poland” to find a legitimate place. Although “Poles” were not featured on maps until the appearance of ethnographic maps, Poland itself remained stubbornly on Western European maps – as a separate object, albeit *de jure* irrelevant. It was necessary to somehow represent Poland on the map as a country, not a state. The exception, of course, was on the maps of those who divided it – Russia, Austria, and Prussia. There Poland was absent.

The significance of this contradiction was not yet very evident to people on the cusp of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they saw it rather as a then-current political dispute between the anti- and pro-Polish great powers, even

though it signaled the coming division of the continent between “peoples in countries” and “peoples without states,” which did not coincide with “states” and “empires.” However, this issue arose widely on the agenda of European politics only during the First World War, when they began to seek to rebuild the political geography of Europe on the basis of ethnographic maps.

In a secret agreement in 1797, the states-parties to the third partition of Poland determined that the name of Poland itself must “disappear once and for all.” Something in this wording recalls the late Catherine II’s famous demand: “so that the very names of the hetmans are forgotten.” In a broad context, the Russian cartographic historian Vladimir Bulatov’s quote is quite fitting: “If Peter could have seen the state of Russian cartography at the end of the reign of Catherine II, he would have said that exactly what he had wanted in this area had been achieved.”⁶³ This can be said about both cartography and the state and influence of the Russian Empire.

The fact that Poland, in the words of the American Thomas Jefferson, became “a country erased from the map of the world by the dissensions of its own citizens”⁶⁴ gave rise to a clear precedent: is it enough to erase a country from the map in order for the “question” to be resolved? And does presence on a map necessarily mean existence?

Having appeared in the “Ptolemaic” editions of the fifteenth century as a “country” or a “state” (this difference was not of great interest to anyone), it was somewhat difficult for Poland to just disappear from the map after 350 years of “existence.” It was therefore left to roam under the cover of imperial borders, for which it did not exist. A similar thing happened to Ukraine: despite its shorter life on political maps and less visible statehood of unclear sovereignty (barely sixty years – from the uprising of Khmel’nyts’kyi to Mazepa’s opponency), it also appeared on maps.

Thus, it is difficult to determine why and to whom exactly we should be obliged. In the middle and second half of the eighteenth century, there was no external champion of the “Ukrainian question” to commit such “cartographic sabotage.” Or did this “bifurcation” between Poland and Russia along the Dnipro of what was regarded as a certain whole maintain a certain intrigue? (Although a border along a major river was extremely convenient for delineation.) Or did the long Russo-Turkish wars over the Northern Black Sea region keep attention on the usual mission of the Cossacks in these lands, the exoticism of which confused their state affiliation (which changed many times)? Should we deride the “professional inertia” and conservatism of cartographers in the spirit of: let’s wait a little longer so as not to have to redraw?

Thus, for example, the Venetian *Map of Europe* of 1781, created by the aforementioned Rizzi Zannoni, shows Red Rus', Volhynia, and Podilia as Polish palatinates, although at that time Galicia had already belonged to Austria for nine years. Or the British map of 1799, which is called *Russia in Europe: with its dismemberments from Poland in 1773, 1793, and 1795*. The western borders of the Russian Empire did not appear "final" yet – Napoleon's intervention in the "Polish question" made them relevant again. The aforementioned English *General Atlas* of 1797 (it still contains Ukraine, in contrast to Cary's *New Universal Atlas* of 1808, which is close in time), nothing doubting, showed the map of Poland divided between three neighbors as a separate country and a separate map. As did Lucas Fielding's 1823 *General Atlas*, published in overseas Baltimore.⁶⁵

Summing up the journey of Cossack Ukraine across the maps of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we can say that after the introduction of its name in European toponymy by Beauplan, it remained fixed in the minds of Western Europeans for a long time as the "country of the Cossacks." The Cossacks were generally considered to be part of the "Ruthenian people" (*rus'koho narodu*).

Most frequently, a narrower localization of Ukraine was found in the Dnipro region and Podilia, or a wider localization, when all the Ruthenian palatinates of the Kingdom of Poland were thus identified (but along with the parallel name of "Red Rus'"). During the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising, the Ruin, numerous anti-Turkish campaigns, and the events of the Northern War, Ukraine became a familiar geographical feature on the map of Europe, despite the fact that it failed to consolidate its sovereignty and was ultimately divided along the Dnipro between Poland and Russia. However, this division became firmly established on Western maps only after a major delay in the 1750s. Sometimes, beginning from the 1710s, Ukraine was designated in a separate color and outline within the actual ethnic borders of Ukraine, avoiding Russian or Polish colors.

Until the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was a fairly clear distinction between Ukraine (or Red Rus') and Muscovy, but after Poltava, as St Petersburg's expansion to the west and south unfolded, the importance of the Hetmanate in European politics waned. Interest in Ukraine was occasionally revived during the Russo-Turkish wars, but the development of the Russian cartographic industry and the promotion of the official name of Russia in Western literature, in turn, introduced the toponym "Little Russia" (with respect to the Russian Left Bank) into cartographic circulation, and the Polish-French tradition left Ukraine only on the "formerly Polish" Right Bank. This, ultimately, signaled the final incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian state, which during the eighteenth century ceased to be called Muscovy in the West. In circumstances where *Rus'* and *Rosiia*

were designated with the same word in the leading European languages, this would continue to be a problem for the terminological positioning of the Dnipro-Subcarpathian (Ukrainian, Little Russian, South Russian) national movement, which would ultimately lean toward the general name “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians,” despite indisputable grounds for calling themselves the “authentic Rus” and “Ruthenians.”

With the partitioning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth among Russia, Austria, and Prussia and the emergence of the “Polish question” as the most important in Eastern Europe, any Ukrainian issues in cartography were only of an episodic and marginal nature for the next hundred years. Ukraine’s gradual disappearance from the map marked a transitional stage from the time of the Cossack identity of the early modern era to the formulation of the modern Ukrainian national project on a new basis. However, it would now rely in its territorial self-designations on the innovations of previously unknown thematic (special) maps – ethnographic ones. A leading role on them would be played not by state or administrative borders, but by the area of distribution of a vernacular language and thereby a certain ethnic group. Furthermore, certain “predictions” in this context on European maps of the early eighteenth century would now acquire scientific confirmation.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as: Kyrylo Halushko, “Ukraïna na kartakh XVII–XVIII st.: vid ‘Dykoho Polia’ do ‘Kraïny Kozakiv,’” in *Ukraïns'ka derzhava druhoï polovyny XVII-XVIII st.: polityka, suspil'stvo, kul'tura*, ed. Valerii Smolii (Kyiv, 2014), 530–55. Copyright 2014 by NASU Institute of History of Ukraine.

Translated and reprinted with permission. For clarity, Ukrainian forms in the original are frequently retained in parentheses.

- 1 M. Vavrychyn, Ia. Dashkevych, and U. Kryshchalovych, *Ukraïna na staro-davnikh kartakh. Kinets' XV – persha polovyna XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2004).
- 2 R. Sossa, *Istoriia kartohrafovannia terytorii Ukraïny: pidruchnyk dlia studentiv VNZ* (Kyiv, 2007).
- 3 K. Halushko, *Ukraïna na karti Ievropy* (Kyiv, 2014).
- 4 Quoted from D. Nalyvaiko, *Ochyma Zakhodu: retseptsii Ukraïny v Zakhidnii Ievropi XI-XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1998), 352.
- 5 See its publication in the atlas by Joan Blaeu: *Geographia quae est Cosmographiae Blavianaë... Amsterdami, Lahore et Subtibus Ioannis Blaeu*, MD-CLXV. Facsimile edition: Blaeu Joan, *Atlas Mayor of 1665* (Cologne, 2005), 107.

- 6 Tatiana Tairova-Iakovleva, "Do pytannia pro istorychni i terytorial'ni uiavennia kozats'koï starshyny naprykintsi XVII st.," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 4 (2012): 71.
- 7 Ibid., 72.
- 8 Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshchalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 28–9.
- 9 Ibid., 46–7, 62–3.
- 10 Quoted from P. Sas, *Politychna kul'tura ukraïns'koho suspil'stva (kinets' 16 – persha polovyna 17 st.)* (Kyiv, 1998), 100.
- 11 From 1485, Ivan III Vasilievich began using the title "grand prince of all Rus'," and his son Vasiliï III Ivanovich (1505–1533) called himself "tsar and lord of all Rus'; in 1547, at the coronation of Ivan IV the Terrible, he was titled "tsar and grand prince of all Rus'."
- 12 Nalyvaiko, *Ochyma Zakhodu*, 362.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Pierre Chevalier, *A Discourse of the Original, Countrey, Manners, Government and Religion of the Cossacks, with Another of the Precopian Tartars and the History of the Wars of Cossacks against Poland* (London, 1672), 2. In the French edition: "des volontaires des frontieres de Russie, Wolhinie & Podolie, & autres Prouvinces de Pologne," see Pierre Chevalier, *Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne* (Paris, 1668), 2.
- 15 Chevalier, *A Discourse of the Original, Countrey, Manners*, 3. In the French edition: "Le Roy stienne Batory auquel la Pologne est redeuable de plusieurs beaux reglemens, considerant le seruice qu'il pourroit tirer de ces coueurs, pour la garde de la frontiere de Russie & de Podolie, tousiours exposéc aux incursions des Tartares, en forma vn corps de Milice, en luy donnant la Ville & le Territoire de Trethymirow sur le Borysthène, pour leur seruir de place d'armes." See Chevalier, *Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne*, 3. Of course, the Cossacks themselves appeared earlier, but Stefan Batory left his mark by doubling the number of registered Cossacks begun by Sigismund II Augustus in 1572.
- 16 Chevalier, *A Discourse of the Original, Countrey, Manners*, 9. In the French edition: "On peut à present inferer de tout de diseours des Cosaques que ce n'eſt qu'une Milice & non pas vne Nation comme plusieurs ont creu." See Chevalier, *Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne*, 14.
- 17 Nalyvaiko, *Ochyma Zakhodu*, 361.
- 18 Chevalier, *A Discourse of the Original, Countrey, Manners*, 17–18.
- 19 Ibid., 17–20.
- 20 Nalyvaiko, *Ochyma Zakhodu: retsepsiia Ukraïny v Zakhidnii levropi XI-XVIII st.*, 359.

- 21 Nalyvaiko, *Ochyma Zakhodu: retseptsiiia Ukraïny v Zakhidnii Ievropi XI-XVIII st.*, 353.
- 22 Ia. Dashkevych, "Ukraïns'ka boplaniana," in *Hiiom Levasser de Boplan. Opys Ukraïny*, transl. Ia. I. Kravets and Z. Borysiuk (Kyiv, 1990); M. Vavrychyn, "Hiiom Levasser de Boplan – kartohraf Ukraïny," in *Spetsial'nyi i dokladnyi plan Ukraïny z nalezhnymy do neï voievodstvamy, okruhamy i provintsiiamy* (Kyiv–Lviv, 2000), 5–13.
- 23 Adam Boussingault, *Le nouveau Theatre du monde, ou l'abrege des etats et empires de l'Univers. Ouvrage tres utile aux voyageurs* (Paris, 1681), 380; Nalyvaiko, *Ochyma Zakhodu*, 378.
- 24 Nalyvaiko, *Ochyma Zakhodu*, 357.
- 25 University of Alberta Archives (Canada).
- 26 The Chernihiv-Siversk region was acquired by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Truce of Deulino with Muscovy of 1618.
- 27 "Karta koronnykh pol's'kykh zemel z podilom na holovni zemli i voievodstva..." in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 66–7.
- 28 "Karta korolivstva Uhorshchyny ta kraïn, iaki vkhodyly do n'oho," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 74–5.
- 29 "Heneral'na karta Ukraïny abo Podil's'ke, Kyïvs'ke ta Bratslavs'ke voievodstva nanovo nakresleni," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 76–7.
- 30 "Nova karta Rechi Pospolytoï i zahal'nyi ohliad Pol'shchi, shcho vkluchaie Velyku i Malu Pol'shchi, Velyke kniazivstvo Lytovs'ke, Pruss'ke kniazivstvo, Kurliandiiu, Rus', Ukraïnu, Mazoviiu, Volyn' i Podilia," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 86–7.
- 31 "Koronni pol's'ki zemli," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 144–5; "Karta suchasnoho svitu," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 152.
- 32 "Karta shliakhiv korolivstva Pol'shcha z usima ioho zemliamy," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 152.
- 33 "Nova karta Moskovii, abo Rosii," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 158–9.
- 34 "Heohrafichna karta Pol's'koho korolivstva," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 176–7.
- 35 "Azof," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 154–5.

- 36 "Pol's'ke korolivstvo, rozpodilene na Velyke kniazivstvo Lytovs'ke ta bil'shu chastynu – Pol'shchu, Prussiiu, Bilu i Chervonu Rus', Volyn', Podilia, Ukraïnu," in Vavrychyn, Dashkevych, and Kryshtalovych, *Ukraïna na starodavnikh kartakh*, 112–13.
- 37 Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, 1994), 145–6.
- 38 I. Fomenko, *Obraz mira na starinnykh portolanakh. Prichernomor'e, konets XIII–XVII v.* (Moscow, 2011), 174–6.
- 39 Quoted from I.K. Fomenko, *Itogovaia karta Moskovii 16 veka iz sobraniia GIM* (Moscow, 2010), 8–9. For more detailed information about the maps of Muscovy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see B.A. Rybakov, *Russkie karty Moskovii XV–nachala XVI veka* (Moscow, 1974).
- 40 *Geographia quae est Cosmographiae Blavianaee ... Amsterdami, Lahore et Subtibus Ioannis Blaeu, MDCLXV*. Facsimile edition: Blaeu Joan, *Atlas Mayor of 1665* (Cologne, 2005).
- 41 Sossa, *Istoriia kartohrafovannia terytorii Ukraïny*, 89.
- 42 "Evropa, propisaniia Velikomu Tsariu Moskovskomu Petru Alekseevichu prisnomu prirostiteliu i Slavneishemu pobediteliu Azovskoi kreposti," in *Karty galantnogo veka. Shedevry kartograficheskogo iskusstva iz sobraniia Gosudarstvennogo Istoricheskogo Muzeia*, DVD edition (Moscow, 2011).
- 43 V. Kravchenko, "Im'ia dlia Ukraïny," in V. Kravchenko, *Ukraïna, imperiia, Rosiia: vybrani staty z modernoi istorii ta istoriografii* (Kyiv, 2011), 11–44. See also Volodymyr Kravchenko's contribution to this volume.
- 44 Philipp Johann von Strahlenberg, *An Historico-Geographical Description of the North and Eastern Parts of Europe and Asia, but More Particularly of Russia, Siberia, and Great Tartary* (London, 1738), 5.
- 45 *The Mapping of Ukraine. European Cartography and Maps of Early Modern Ukraine, 1550–1799. An exhibition from the archives of the Ukrainian Museum and private collections*. Guest Curator Bohdan S. Kordan (New York, 2008), 66–7.
- 46 L. Bagrov, *Istoriia kartografii* (Moscow, 2004), 218.
- 47 *The Mapping of Ukraine*, 82.
- 48 Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 157.
- 49 Guillaume Delisie, "Theatre de la guerre dans La Petite Tartarie, La Crimée, La Mer Noire" (Amsterdam, circ. 1740), accessed 23 July 2020, <https://polona.pl/item/theatre-de-la-guerre-dans-la-petite-tartarie-la-crimée-la-mer-noire-c,NjYzMTU3MDg/o/#info:metadata>.
- 50 Jean-Baptiste Nolin, "Le Royaume de Pologne Comprenant Les États de Pologne et de Lithuanie, Divisez En Provinces et Subdivisez En Palatinats," 1697, accessed 23 July 2020, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b59051988>.

- 51 This refers to the different political subordinations of the Ukrainian Cossacks.
- 52 Jean-Baptiste Nolin, "Le Royaume de Pologne Comprenant Les États de Pologne et de Lithuanie, Divisez En Provinces et Subdivisez En Palatinats," 1697, accessed 23 July 2020, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b59051988>.
- 53 *Karty galantnogo veka. Shdevry kartograficheskogo iskusstva iz sobraniia Gosudarstvennogo Istoricheskogo Muzeia*. DVD edition (Moscow, 2011).
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Matthaus Seutter, *Atlas Novus Sive Tabulae Geographicae: Totius Orbis Faciem, Partes, Imperia, Regna Et Provincias Exhibentes* (Augsburg, 1735).
- 56 Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 147.
- 57 *Karty galantnogo veka. Shdevry kartograficheskogo iskusstva iz sobraniia Gosudarstvennogo Istoricheskogo Muzeia*. DVD edition (Moscow, 2011).
- 58 *Atlas Rossiiskoi, sostoiashchei iz deviatnatsati spetsial'nykh kart, predstavli-aiushchikh Vserossiiskuiu Imperiiu s pogranichnymi zemliami* (St Petersburg, 1745), accessed 23 July 2020, <https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003340081#?page=1>.
- 59 Quoted in Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 147.
- 60 Didier Robert de Vaugondy, *Royaume de Pologne divisé et corrigé selon les partages faits en 1772, 1793 et 1795 entre la Russie, la Prusse et l'Autriche* (Paris, 1797), accessed 23 July 2020, <https://polona.pl/item/royaume-de-pologne-divise-et-corrige-selon-les-partages-faits-en-1772-1793-et-1795-entre,MTczMTk5MzA/o/#info:metadata>.
- 61 Quoted in Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 148.
- 62 Ibid., 148.
- 63 V.E. Bulatov, "Opisanie eksponatov vystavki "Iskusstva radi i nauki..." Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Muzei, Moscow, 11.07–31.08.2011" in *Karty galantnogo veka. Shdevry kartograficheskogo iskusstva iz sobraniia Gosudarstvennogo Istoricheskogo Muzeia*. DVD edition (Moscow, 2011).
- 64 Quoted in Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 151.
- 65 Lucas Fielding, *A General Atlas Containing Distinct Maps of All the Known Countries in the World* (Baltimore, 1823).

In Search of “Ukraine” in the Russian Empire (End of Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries)

VOLODYMYR KRAVCHENKO

Introduction

“Nomen est omen” or “The name is a sign,” as the Roman proverb goes. What exactly does the “sign” mean: destiny, identity, or “occupation”? And what if a person or a thing is known under many names? This is exactly what Ukrainian history presents. Every historian who deals with Ukraine encounters a terminological hodgepodge. The position of Ukraine at the crossroads of various cultural, civilizational, and political influences has led to a multiplicity of nomenclature used to describe its territory and people. Some of these denominators were produced by dominant imperial discourses. Others were used by the local inhabitants themselves as part of their adaptation and survival strategy in this unstable area. Since the regional dimension of Ukrainian history, as a rule, prevailed over the national one, there were several relevant names and self-names in parallel circulation, which did not always have common roots. They reflected different levels of (self-) identification – geographical, religious, ethnocultural, political, and social.

In the “long” nineteenth century, which is considered an epoch of Ukrainian national revival, a diverse nomenclature was used to describe Ukraine and its inhabitants: “qualitative” (“Great” and “Little” Russia), “colored” (“Red,” “Black,” and “White” Russia), and geographic (“South,” “North,” “West,” and “East”). All of them, with addition to “Rus’,” “Ukrainian,” and “Cossack” terminology, applied in various contexts – ethnic, political, geographic, and social. At times, different

names were used for one and the same region, and by no means did the authors of pertinent texts always bother to explain to readers why they had used one historical and geographic term or another.

There are hundreds of articles devoted to the problem of historical terminology of Ukraine. Many of their authors tried to approach the issue from a linear perspective by tracing the gradual replacement of the initial medieval *Rus'* by early modern *Malorossiiia*, which in turn supposedly gave way to modern *Ukraine*. However, almost all these studies have been taking place in the context of nation-building, with the active involvement of many Ukrainian and Russian scholars dealing with a shared historical legacy and geography and often identifying themselves in opposition to each other. Therefore, it is not surprisingly that many attempts to comprehend and describe the peculiar East-Slavic terminological labyrinth from the modern nation-building perspective foundered in a sea of epistemological uncertainty.

Alexsei Miller observes that “In the nineteenth century, the space and population of the western province [of the Russian Empire – K.V.] became targets of a raging war of words in which, it seems, there was no place name or ethnic group name that would be ideologically neutral. Each one of them either reaffirmed or rejected a particular nation-building project.”¹ In fact, the terminological struggle between the ancestors of present-day Ukrainians and Russians goes back to the times when they established a direct dialogue between themselves during the Cossack wars of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The latter triggered a process that fundamentally changed the geopolitical landscape of the territory, which became a battlefield between the competing multi-ethnic states of Muscovy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, and Sweden. This was accompanied with symbolic battles over the contested territory with Ukrainian lands in its center.

Since then, Ukrainian-Russian polemics over the “proper” names for the same territory and its people were conducted during the “long” nineteenth century with no interruption. It is known in different forms, mostly as a dialogue between: *Little Russia* and *Great Russia* (according to Semen Divovych and the author of *History of the Rus' People*); the “two Rus'ian nationalities” (“Southerners” vs “Northerners”), according to Iurii Venelin, or “Malorossians” vs “Velikorossians” according to Mykhailo Maksymovych or Mykola (Nikolai) Kostomarov); the defenders of the Cossacks and their opponents.² However, the polemics did not establish a stable national nomenclature for the Ukrainians and their ethnic lands.

The polemics between Russian and Ukrainian intellectuals continued all the way through the “short” twentieth century. They exploded during and after the First World War and the dissolution of the Russian Empire, which was accom-

panied by new geopolitical and administrative re-arrangements of the Ukrainian lands.³ The *Ukrainian* nomenclature ostensibly prevailed. In the Soviet Union, discussion over historical national terminology became taboo. However, it was conducted beyond the Soviet borders, mostly by émigrés and a few Western scholars.⁴ In many cases, it was initiated by Ukrainian rather than Russian intellectuals. The former used to point out the phenomenon of "Russian" heterogeneity and different meanings of "Russianness," while the latter preferred to focus on the difference between *Malorossiiia* and *Ukraine*.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian imperial legacy became an object of intensive study, which had undergone several methodological changes or "turns": imperial, national, geographical, and linguistic. Since Ukraine belonged to the historical Slavic-Orthodox core of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire, Ukrainian topics have been actively involved in the process of rethinking and rewriting of the imperial phenomenon. No wonder it was accompanied with the explosion of the scholarly debates over the Russian and Ukrainian historical terminology, which now returned to the public space and obtained a vivid political dimension.⁵

The very fact that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the apparently obsolete *Little Russian* rhetoric made its effective comeback in the socio-political life of both post-Soviet countries tells us something important about Ukrainian modern nation-building. It might suggest that the "Little Russian" discourse of identity either survived the official prohibition of "Little Russian" rhetoric during Soviet times or has been re-discovered recently.⁶ The disintegration of the Soviet Union revived the old legacy of Ukrainian-Russian debates over national identity(-ies).⁷ Simultaneously, it revealed the uneasy and quarrelsome marriage between *Ukraine* and *Little Russia*, which defined the nature of modern Ukrainian nation-state building in the twentieth century.

It should be noted that both Russian and Ukrainian historians are deeply involved in the nation-state building of their respective countries, which has been unfolding on the symbolic basis of shared history and nested geography. For them, words like *Russia*, *Ukraine*, and their derivatives are not just scholarly abstractions. This became clear when a "raging war of words" flared up with renewed vigour after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁸ It turned into a real war in 2014, when the current Russian regime annexed Crimea and stirred up separatist movements on Ukrainian eastern and southern border territories. Naturally, that kind of politics turned to history for legitimization and affected the community of scholars directly. It also should be noted that neither Western scholars nor the author of this text are immune to the sentiments inflamed by the ongoing post-Soviet re-identification.

In what follows, I shall attempt to describe and analyze the use of toponymic and ethnonymic terminology in various texts produced in the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, an epoch that remains under represented in modern imperial studies. The intellectual “domestication” of the Ukrainian lands recently incorporated into the empire proceeded most often by way of discourses involving the terms *Russia*, *Great Russia*, *Little Russia*, *Ukraine*, and *South Russia*. What interests me first and foremost is the meaning attributed to such terms, which might be seen as markers of identity.

Was there any logic and consistency in their usage? How should one explain today the multiplicity of terminology which has been used to describe the Ukrainian people? What were their national, cultural, political, and regional aspects? Did they reflect various identities or different stages in the development of modern Ukrainian national identity? Finally, how can one choose proper denominations to describe ethnic Ukrainians from different regions at the initial stage of their modern national re-identification and avoid at the same time their retrospective “nationalization”?

Initially, I intended to limit my source base to works dealing with the history of Ukraine. However, in the end I decided to broaden the scope of my sources for several reasons. First, because there are many substantial gaps in this set of texts. Important works on Ukrainian history by Arkhyp Khudorba, Opanas Lobysevych, Hryhorii Poletyka, Maksym Berlyns'kyi, Oleksii Martos, and some of their contemporaries are still considered lost. Others, including works by Iakiv Markovych, Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamenskii, Mykola (Nikolai) Markevych, and even the famous *Istoriia Rusov* (*History of the Rus' People*) have yet to appear in critical editions. The latter example is telling indeed. The *Istoriia Rusov* is often compared to the *Kobzar* of Taras Shevchenko as one of the first manifestations of Ukrainian modern nationalism yet we do not know by whom, when, and where this text was created and for what particular reasons.

Second, it took almost eighty years for the main components of the Little Russian historiographical legacy to travel from the manuscript to the printed world after the dissolution of the Cossack semi-autonomous polity, the Hetmanate, in the 1760s. During the 1840s, the principal historical texts of the previous epoch became available for a broad audience due to Osyp Bodians'kyi, a secretary of the Moscow Society of History and Antiquities.⁹ Before that, the development of Ukrainian historical writing remained half-hidden from the observer.¹⁰ Retrospectively, it is not easy to trace its intellectual evolution and public reception. Many of the manuscripts retained their compilation character when any anonymous reader could add his own interpolations to the initial text whose real author, as well as his motives and sources of information, cannot be identified.

Third, many of the new texts on Ukrainian topics published in the Russian Empire between the 1760s and the 1840s are marked by generic syncretism, which makes it difficult to separate historiography from geography, ethnography, or even travelogues and belles-lettres. They instead became combinations of various genres. From any standpoint, practically every historical narrative resembles a kaleidoscope in which ever-new combinations of the geographic and ethnic mosaic emerge. It changes shape whenever the observer shifts his or her own point of view.



Before addressing terminology, it is necessary to give at least a general description of the broad imperial context in which the search for new collective identities among the Russian subjects took place. In the second half of the eighteenth century, significant changes in the political geography of the empire were witnessed by a single generation. Suffice it to say that during the reign of Catherine II its external borders were reconfigured no fewer than six times.¹¹ Ongoing imperial expansion to the south and west was accompanied by constant redrawing of administrative boundaries and intellectual re-imagining of the entire territory of the empire according to Enlightenment principles of cultural unification.

The newly incorporated regions had to be located within the imperial cultural and national symbolic space. They included: *Sloboda Ukraine*, formed on the basis of the local Cossack social stratum; *New Russia*, formed as a result of Russia's annexation of the southern steppe borderland, where the Zaporozhian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars operated – a territory that eventually became one of the most polyethnic and urbanized regions of the Russian Empire;¹² and the Right Bank of the Dnipro River (historical Volhynia, Podilia, and Ukraine, which remained under the control of the local Polish nobility until the early nineteenth century, that is, until the Polish Uprising of 1830.¹³ This in turn obliged contemporaries to keep correcting the traditional nomenclature of the historical regions of Rus'/Russia and their respective toponyms and ethnonyms by using the new, secular language for their description.

The development of secular language, scholarship, and education in Russia was accompanied by the massive intrusion of Western terminology into the empire's public space.¹⁴ By adopting it, contemporaries sought to describe and comprehend both the unity and the ethnocultural diversity of the Russian Empire.¹⁵ However, the new, modern ideas and respective terminology were subjected to substantial modification during their transmission from Europe to the east. Very often, the adoption of Western ideas and terminology "were fraught with

complications and internal contradictions.”¹⁶ The transformation of the Latin *natio* into Polish *naród* and Ukrainian *narod* and Russian *narod* through Polish mediation is a good example.¹⁷

The rapid influx of the Western borrowings into the Russian cultural space provoked a response. It was met with the growing interest in the native historical and cultural legacy, including both written (Church Slavonic) and oral (folkloric) cultural traditions.¹⁸ Associated with this was the practice of compiling universal dictionaries and encyclopedias. Little Russian intellectuals actively participated in this process. They made a substantial contribution to the development of modern literary Russian by compiling concise dictionaries of the Ukrainian language to help Russian readers understand Ukrainian history and contemporary life.

During the process of cultural translation and adaptation, the old symbols of identity sometimes acquired a new, additional meaning in the new intellectual and linguistic environment. However, the language in use at the time had not yet worked out a common standard for the description of the Ukrainian and Russian lands and their inhabitants. Contemporaries used a variety of historical toponyms and ethnonyms that did not always distinguish the ethnocultural and administrative criteria for delineating various regions of the empire and its inhabitants.

“*Rus'*-Russia”

Few literary languages of the period under discussion managed to convey all the requisite nuances of the term *rus'kost* (Rus'ness), mainly because they did not clearly distinguish its religious, political, geographic, historical, and cultural components. The problem of *Russian* terminology and its different meanings in different imperial and national contexts remained obscured for a long time. It became an object of growing scholarly attention after the break-up of the Soviet Union, when the idea of the historical, cultural, and ethnic heterogeneity of the former “one and indivisible Russia” appeared to be more acceptable to the international community of scholars (including Russian) than before.¹⁹ Usually, this is discussed in terms of national/imperial dichotomy. I believe that a religious or semi-religious dimension of the “Russian” adjective was of no less importance, as the Slavophile intellectual heritage vividly demonstrates.²⁰

In the early nineteenth century, the term *Russia* (*Rossiiia*) was still considered relatively new or, as Ivan Orlai put it, newfangled compared to the name *Rus'*, from which it originated.²¹ The latter was usually associated with the more traditional designation of the “Slavic-Rus” (*slavenorusskii narod*) or “Slavic-Russian” (*slavenorossiiskii*) nation, as the author(s) of *Kyivan Synopsis* (1674) insisted. The *Synopsis* is a historical overview composed by Orthodox monks on the basis of

the Kyivan Rus' chronicles under the influence of Polish Renaissance historiography.²² It established the new, overarching discourse of "Slavic-Rus'/Russian" identity for the ambitious Muscovite Tsardom, which dreamt of becoming the center of an imagined "Slavic" world.²³ The *Synopsis* discourse of identity survived until the first third of the nineteenth century, and updated with the modern secular *triad* of Count Sergei Uvarov.²⁴

Uvarov's formulae of *Russian* identity had established itself as another way of imperial/religious identification in parallel to the *Slavic-Rus'* one. As a combination of confessional and secular components, it might be presented differently as a "pan-Russian" or "all-Russian" discourse of identity, which would also be named as the "Slavic-Rus' Commonwealth" or an "Eastern Slavic Orthodox" imperial community. Serhii Bilenky aptly described the imperial "all-Russian" idea as a "scholarly abstraction" similar to the Soviet one.²⁵ In all these cases, one can find a combination of (semi-)religious and secular markers of identification, which continued its spiritual life well into the modern epoch.

The *Rus'/Russian* discourse in its both (confessional and secular) versions retained its composite, multi-layer character, which covered a great variety of local communities known under different ethnonyms and toponyms. Searches for and "discoveries" of these communities in the imagined space of "Slavdom" were accompanied by historico-etymological flights of fancy, which became a favorite pastime of many educated amateurs. The anonymous author of *History of the Rus' People*, and especially his admirer Iurii Venelin, demonstrated the attractiveness of that sort of enterprise. They were followed by many other "Columbuses" into the uncharted waters of the Slavic-Rus' ocean, which extended well beyond the Russian imperial borders.

Geoffrey Hosking distinguished "two Russias," ethnic *Rus'* and imperial *Russia*.²⁶ However, his interpretation cannot be accepted without substantial reservations. *Rus'* was usually associated with the old Kyivan Rus' while *Russia* with the modern Russian Empire. The adjective *ruskii*, a derivative from the *Rus'* name, cannot be reduced to ethnicity. It was used interchangeably in ethnic, linguistic, political, and confessional meanings. Even those Little Russian intellectuals who openly contrasted ethnic *Little Russians* and *Great Russians* adopted the word *ruskii* both as an ethnonym and a politonym for self-description. In other words, the *ruskii* adjective in the Russian Empire retained the same overarching and composite meaning as the old *Rus'* borrowed from the medieval Kyivan chronicles.

In terms of geography, historical *Russia* looks like an entity only at first glance, from a distance of several centuries, and even then, it takes considerable predisposition to see it that way. When we draw closer, it fragments like a kaleidoscopic

image whose interconnected pieces are not fused together. The official historiographer of the Russian Empire, the academician Gerhard Müller, noted that historical Russia was comprised of Great, Little, White, and Red Rus', whose inhabitants were distinguished from one another by various ethnographic features and dialects.²⁷ This classification of *Russia* was well established in the imperial and Western historical and geographic literature of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.²⁸ However, the hierarchy of historical regions and the borders, periphery, and center of Rus'/Russia remained undetermined, inasmuch as none of the criteria for defining the Russian national heartland were used consistently enough at the time to give the historic "nucleus" of the Russian Empire the appearance of wholeness.

"Great Russia/*Velikorossia*"

The process of the rebranding and re-imagining of the "Slavic-Rus'" intellectual legacy was in its initial stage during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It proceeded in various ways. The *Velikorossian* discourse and its respective terminology, which I consider fundamental for the purposes of Russian modern re-identification, was one of them. It only recently became an object of special studies, being often confused previously with the "all-Russian" ("pan-Russian") category and lost somewhere between the imperial and national contexts.²⁹ *Velikorossia* resurfaced in public space only sporadically, mostly in times of geopolitical and cultural "times of trouble" only to be sacrificed again on the altar of the following empire-building project.

Velikorossia was included as a separate article in the *Leksikon (Lexicon)* of Vasilii Tatishchev written in 1745, where it was presented as the Russian historical and national heartland, as well as the core of the Russian Empire.³⁰ However, neither Fedor Polunin's *Geograficheskii leksikon (Geographical Lexicon)* issued in 1773,³¹ nor the multivolume *Novyi i polnyi geograficheskii slovar' Rossiiskogo Gosudarstva (The New and Completed Geographic Lexicon)* compiled by Lev Maksimovich in 1788,³² nor the *Survey of the Russian Empire* by Sergei Pleshcheev (English edition, 1792),³³ or even *Opisanie vseh, obitaiushchikh v Rossiiskom Gosudarstve narodov (Description of the Peoples of the Russian Empire)* compiled by Johann Georgi (1799)³⁴ contains a special article devoted to *Velikorossia*. It resurfaced only in the *Entsiklopedicheskii leksikon (Encyclopedic Lexicon)* of Adolphe Pluchart in 1837, thanks to Nikolai Nadezhdin.³⁵

Nadezhdin came to the conclusion that *Velikorossia* was a term introduced by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi in order to distinguish it from Little Russia.³⁶ Although Nadezhdin admitted that *Velikaia Rossiia* has no strictly defined borders, he as-

sociated it geographically with the former Grand Duchy of Moscow, which should be considered the "heart of the empire."³⁷ Moscow, thus, was endowed with the status of the true national capital of ethnic Russians (*russkie*) contrary to cosmopolitan St Petersburg, the official capital of imperial *Russia*, on the one hand, and Kyiv, the ancient historical capital of Orthodox *Slavic-Rus'*, on the other. According to the author, the main factors that distinguished *Velikorossiiia* from all other historical regions of the empire were not historical or geographic, but ethnocultural, which gave *Velikorossians* the advantage over Little Russians and White Russians.³⁸

Nadezhdin was not alone. His ideas were shared, in one way or another, by his contemporaries Nikolai Polevoi and Mikhail Pogodin, as well by some other Moscow-based intellectuals who could no longer ignore the ethno-cultural differences between the "children of Rus'" (Faith Hillis). However, all attempts of their intellectual heirs and followers to transform the imperial Russia into a national state gave no results. Beyond the elite intellectual circles, people continued to use the *Velikorossian* and *Russian* ethnonyms interchangeably. *Velikorossiiia* lost its battle for the "all-Russian" legacy and never fully developed as a modern national designation of the Russian people.

The intellectual misadventure of *Velikorossiiia* continued after the dissolution of the Russian Empire. Its Soviet incarnation, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, was the only Soviet republic deprived of its own capital and the local branch of the Communist Party. Although the idea of the *Velikorossiiian* heartland of the Russian Empire never disappeared completely, it appears *Velikorossiiia* remained to be jammed from both sides by the Orthodox *Rus'* and imperial, secular *Rossiiia*. Today's growing attention to the *Velikorossiiian* discourse, facilitated by the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian/Soviet "divorce," also has obvious limitations. It is hardly considered an alternative scenario for Russian nation-state building, other than for the imperial one.

"South Russia"

The "South Russian" discourse and its corresponding terminology may be considered the most widespread and least controversial means of identifying the Ukrainian lands not only within the Russian Empire but also beyond its borders. It was deeply rooted in the historical and geographical imagination of the Enlightenment, in which "Russia" was usually associated with the "North." However, in the second half of the eighteenth century, with the expansion to the south, the symbolic geography of the Russian Empire started acquiring a new dimension. Catherine II's *southern* geopolitical project appeared to be at once an alternative

to Peter I's *northern* project and its continuation.³⁹ To that end, the latest contemporary perceptions of territory, based on climatic and ethnocultural features, were implemented.

Catherine II's symbolic division of the empire into three climatic zones is noteworthy in that regard: the northern zone, with its centre in St Petersburg; the middle zone, centred in Moscow; and the southern zone.⁴⁰ This geographical model became a standard description in Sergei Pleshcheev's *Survey of the Russian Empire* created in 1787.⁴¹ It was most probably associated with Montesquieu's well-known theory of three climatic zones – northern, central, and southern – each of which had a particular and substantial impact on people and the laws by which they were governed.⁴² The three climatic zones of the Russian Empire, as outlined by Catherine II, symbolically underpinned the new design of uniforms worn by the Russian nobility and were featured in gubernia emblems.⁴³ Accordingly, Ukrainian lands were divided between the middle and the southern zones: the Kharkiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi administrative units were put in the former, while Kyiv and Katerynoslav were assigned to the latter.

The newly acquired lands were incorporated into the new Russian imperial narrative under the *southern* name. Thus, in Russian historiography of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Russian Empire was presented as a fusion of Southern and Northern *Rus'*.⁴⁴ The symbolism of Greek antiquity and the Slavic-*Rus'* legacy was used to legitimise the new acquisitions. The Greek element was particularly apparent in the names of the new cities in the Black Sea region and in the titulature of the Russian empress, to which the names *Kherson* and *Taurida* were added. The *Slavic-Rus'* reference was borrowed from the ancient *Rus'* chronicle tradition, as well as from sensational and very convenient discoveries such as the "Stone of Tmutarakan" or the *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (The Tale of Ihor's Campaign), which were designed to bolster the claim that this land had belonged to *Rus'* since time immemorial.

The newly incorporated southern lands were renamed "New Russia" (*Novorossiiia*). The new appellation envisioned in fact the invention of a new regional identity capable of overcoming the old historical regionalism of that part of the empire. No wonder that the *New Russian* civilizational discourse acquired a *southern* geographic dimension. However, the newly invented *New Russia* came to be regarded as part of *Southern Russia*, and not its territorial equivalent. The latter was much older and broader than the former. At the same time, the southward direction of Russian expansion included a newer "southwestern" vector articulated by Catherine II during the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.⁴⁵ The new geographical optic allowed for an intellectual re-discovering of the western Ukrainian lands on the ethnic basis with the help of *south-Russian* rhetoric.

The topograficheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskogo namestnichestva (*Topographic Description of the Kharkiv Vicegerency*; 1788) may serve as an example.⁴⁶ The Russian author of this work, Ivan Pereverzev, created an original, innovative, and comprehensive image of *Southern Russia* on a new ethnocultural basis that included western Ukrainian territory, even though it was divided at the time by administrative, political, and religious barriers.⁴⁷ According to the author, "The inhabitants of Southern Russia, separated from one another by the distance of places, foreign rule, variety of bureaucratic administrations, civic customs, language, [and] some even by religion (the Union), [...] look at one another not as someone foreign-speaking but as though at a fellow natives; [...] to this day, all these scattered fellow countrymen preserve filial respect for the mother of their ancient cities, the city of Kyiv."⁴⁸

That observation in turn paved the way for the merging of the "Little Russian" and "South Russian" nomenclature. The author of *Topograficheskoe opisanie* was followed by some of his contemporaries, including Afanasii Shafonsky and Ivan Stritter: both used the terms *Kyivan Rus'*, *Little Russia*, and *Southern Russia* as synonyms.⁴⁹ A similar orientation is apparent in the *Istoriia Rusov*, whose anonymous author identified as "southern" not only New Russia but even western-located Halychyna (Galicia), calling the latter a bit awkwardly the "southern part of Rus', or Little Russia."⁵⁰

South Russian terminology as a main marker of historical *Rus'* identity was accepted by two Transcarpathian intellectuals, Ivan Orlai and Iurii Venelin (Hutsa), who immigrated to Russia. Orlai gave concrete expression to the southwestern dimension of *South Russia* in his article "Istoriia o Karpato-Rossakh" (A Story about the Carpathian Russes), published in 1804. It was most probably written as a reply to the Austrian historian Johann Christian von Engel, the author of *Geschichte der Ukraine u. der ukrainischen Kosaken* (*The History of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Cossacks*; 1796).⁵¹ In another article published in 1826 under the title "O Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii" (About Southwestern Russia), the author focused on the territory on both sides of the Carpathian Mountains in order to prove that it belonged to old *Rus'*, not to any other historical and geographical area. Although Orlai did not venture beyond the framework of *Slavic-Rus'* discourse, he substantiated the ethnic and linguistic kinship between the local Carpathian population and the ethnic Little Russians, not the Great Russians.⁵²

Venelin, an ardent Slavophile, also had recourse to the *South-North* system of symbolic coordinates in order to demonstrate, on the one hand, the commonality of *South Rus'* from the Carpathians to the Don and, on the other, to convince his readers that the differences between *South* and *North* were not significant enough to warrant dividing their common *Rus'* historical legacy. It is telling that Venelin

sought to replace *Little Russian* terminology with *South Russian* designations. Ironically, in ridiculing those who sought to establish the difference between Great and Little Russians on the basis of ostensibly secondary details, Venelin himself contributed to the deepening of those differences when comparing the folk songs and different daily habits of the “northerners” and “southerners.”

The use of the *South-North* paradigm and the identification of Little Russia with South Russia in ethnocultural terms was already well established by the early 1830s. The second edition of Bantysh-Kamenskii's *Istoriia Maloi Rossii* (*History of Little Russia*; 1830) demonstrates the close reciprocal association between the toponym *South Russia* (sometimes *Southwestern Russia*) and the ethnonyms *Little Russians* and *Ukrainians*.⁵³ The same is apparent in Nikolai Gogol's (Mykola Hohol's) sketches for a history of Little Russia;⁵⁴ Mykhailo Maksymovych's respective texts; Mykola Markevych's *Istoriia Malorossii* (*History of Little Russia*);⁵⁵ as well as in the linguistic works of Pavlo Bilets'kyi-Nosenko⁵⁶ and Osyp Bodians'kyi.⁵⁷ The Kharkiv Romantics not only did not renounce the tradition of identifying *Little Russia* with *Southern Russia* but actually popularized it: at least, this can be said of Izmail Sreznevskii, Mykola Kostomarov, and Amvrosii Metlyn's'kyi.⁵⁸

The domination of *South-Russian* terminology in the mid-nineteenth century may be possibly understood as a consequence of the censorship policy adopted after the affair of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood.⁵⁹ Panteleimon Kulish described Ukraine by using the *South Russian* designation.⁶⁰ It is telling that he included the cities of Kharkiv and Odesa in its symbolic space.⁶¹ The same can be said on the editors of the St Petersburg-based Ukrainian journal *Osnova* (Foundation), published in 1861–62, and other texts where the “southern” denomination is used as a toponym in a description of what was also known as “Little Russia,” “Ukraine,” and its native people.⁶² It suggests that, *South-Russian* terminology had already acquired an ethnic meaning.

As an ethnonym, the term “South-Russian” (*iuzhnorusskii*) was adopted by leading Ukrainian intellectuals to describe the Ukrainian language. Taras Shevchenko published in 1861 the Ukrainian primer under a “southern” title.⁶³ The “dispute between the southerners and northerners about their Russianness,” first described by Iurii Venelin, continued well into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁶⁴ However, the “southern” designation of the territory and its people remained in official usage mostly. It did not replace the *Little Russian* and *Ukrainian* terminology altogether but was used with them interchangeably.

"Little Russia/Malorossiiia"

In the second half of the seventeenth and for most of the eighteenth centuries the Cossack elite elaborated an idea of the Little Russian fatherland and its specific identity formed on the basis of territorial autonomy, the Cossack social and legal system, and the Orthodox religion.⁶⁵ After the Cossack military administrative system was replaced by the imperial one during the reign of Catherine II, the territory of Little Russia consisted of the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi vicereencies.⁶⁶ As a result of the administrative reform of 1796, historical Little Russia became the Little Russian gubernia.⁶⁷ After its division in 1802 into the Poltava and Chernihiv gubernias, the historical name of *Little Russia* was transferred to them.⁶⁸

The *Little Russian* terminology of the first half of the nineteenth century was inherited from previous centuries as the basic marker of the main part of Ukrainian ethnic territory that entered the Russian/Muscovite state with particular rights in 1654 and was associated with the Cossack state formation – the Hetmanate.⁶⁹ It was not imposed on Ukrainians by the Russian imperial authorities in order to diminish their political autonomy and erase their ethnic-cultural distinctiveness from "proper" Russians.⁷⁰ It was used instead by the Ukrainian secular elites to protect their rights and privileges under the "all-Russian" tsar. The "Little Russian" designation was the only one associated with the term "nation" represented by the former Cossack officers, now landed gentry, on the former Hetmanate territory.⁷¹ While gradually losing its official politico-administrative, social, and legal meaning, *Little Russia* retained its integrity in historical and ethnocultural discourse. The process of the ethnic and historical re-branding of historical "Little Russia" did not stop with the *Istoriia Rusov*, as it usually has been assumed. Instead, it continued to its climax in the grand-narrative created by the "Little Russian historiographer," Mykola Markevych in 1830s–50s. In the historical sense, *Little Russia* reached far back into the past, to the times of Kyivan Rus', and in geographic terms its reference exceeded the boundaries of the former Hetmanate. It was described in administrative and political, geographic, historical, and ethnocultural terms interchangeably, with *Rus' / Russian*, *South Russian*, and *Ukrainian* references often serving as equivalents.

Bearers of Little Russian identity were concerned not with emancipating themselves from the "Rus' / Russia" but with their search for proof of the primacy of "their" region in the historical, cultural, religious, and political space of *Rus' / Russia*. At the same time, the main counterpart of Little Russia was not the all-Russian Empire but another historical region, Great Russia, which also laid claim

to the status of Russian heartland. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the “two Rus’es” contended for their place under the sun of imperial *Russia*. Up to that point, the fate of the dispute remained in doubt. “I know that you are Russia, and that is my name, too,” replies Little Russia to Great Russia in Semen Divovysh’s famous historic-political dialogue of 1762.⁷²

The “two Russias” cohabited peacefully under the “Russian” or better “all-Russian” overarching discourse. Hryhorii Poletyka, the distinguished champion of the Hetmanate’s political rights, called his fatherland “Russia,”⁷³ as did his contemporary and fellow thinker Petro Symonovs'kyi (Petr Simonovskii).⁷⁴ The idea of “two Russias” was publicly substantiated in the *Brief Annals of Little Russia*, published by Vasyl Ruban in 1777.⁷⁵ It was fully accepted by Lev Maksimovich (Maksymovych), the author and editor of the *Novyi i polnyi geograficheskii slovar' Rossiiskogo gosudarstva* (*New and Complete Geographic Dictionary of the Russian State*) published in 1788.⁷⁶ Andrian Chepa, an ardent Little Russian patriot and collector of Cossack historical documents, proudly called the history of his homeland “a glorious branch of Russian [*rosiiskoi*] history.”⁷⁷ Mykola Markevych followed this tradition as well.

Some of Chepa’s contemporaries associated the emergence of the term *Little Russia* with the so-called transfer of the grand-princely throne from Kyiv to Vladimir in the twelfth century, which they believed Andrei Bogoliubskii to have done.⁷⁸ Most writers, however, maintained that the term had appeared later, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.⁷⁹ In the footnotes to the fourth volume of Nikolai Karamzin’s twelve-volume *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo* (*History of the Russian State*, 1818), written on the basis of primary sources, including the charter of Iurii, prince of Volodymyr-Volynskyi, the Russian historian opined that the term *Little Russia* had first appeared in 1335. Bantysh-Kamenskii, the author of *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, was inclined to agree with him.

Other historians associated the emergence of the term *Little Russia* with a later period. For example, Afanasii Shafons'kyi surmised that it had appeared only in the times of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the annexation of the Hetman state to Muscovy Russia, that is, in the mid-seventeenth century.⁸⁰ His opinion was shared to one degree or another by Berlyns'kyi, Gavriil Uspenskii, and the unknown author of the *Novyi slovotolkovatel'* (*New Dictionary*), published by Mykola (Nikolai) Ianovs'kyi in 1803–04.⁸¹

Mikhail Markov, an early nineteenth-century historian from Chernihiv, maintained that the name of “Little Russia” became established in historiographic tradition thanks to Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, who was the first to introduce it. It is worth noting that even the author of the *Istoriia Rusov*, whose views on Ukrainian history were conspicuously eccentric, concurred with all these au-

thors in stressing that the term *Little Russia* had emerged simultaneously with *Russia* and *Great Russia* after 1654 and had been included thereafter in the tsar's official titulature.⁸²

Perceptions of the territory of Little Russia changed with successive historical periods. Little Russia usually was associated with the Pereiaslav⁸³ or Kyivan principalities, the latter sometimes believed to have included the lands of the Chernihiv⁸⁴ and Siversk regions⁸⁵ or Volhynia and Podilia.⁸⁶ A similar narrower conception of Little Russian territory limited it to the lands that had been transferred from Kyivan Rus' to Poland between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries and annexed to the Muscovite state in the mid-seventeenth century, owing to Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Despite the tendency to contract the extent of Little Russia in the works of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writers, perceptions of its territorial nucleus remained relatively stable. That nucleus was the Little Russian fatherland along both banks of the Dnipro River and the Middle Dnipro region.⁸⁷ As such, it remained to be seen in a broad territorial framework, as the heart of a more extensive Little Russia.

Such a broad territorial definition of Little Russia was accepted by Russian authors. According to the historian Aleksei Musin-Pushkin, the borders of Little Russia were defined by the upper reaches of the Oka and Donets rivers in the east, the Horyn River in the west, Chersonesos in the south, and the Ugra River in the north.⁸⁸ This is in fact the main territory of contemporary Ukraine, excluding the western oblasts and including Russian border regions. We find a similar perception in Afanasii Shchekatov's seven-volume *Geograficheskii slovar' rossiiskogo gosudarstva* (*Geographical Dictionary of the Russian State*), published in 1801–09. Khariton Chebotarev, a professor at Moscow University, included in Little Russia not only Hetmanate Ukraine but also the Sloboda region, New Russia, and part of the Belgorod gubernia.⁸⁹ Similarly, a broad definition of Little Russian territory based on ethnicity is to be found in the works of the Russian geographers and statisticians, Karl German and Konstantin Arseniev.⁹⁰

Historical texts allow us to gain an impression of their authors' gradual reorientation from social and legal criteria to ethnographic ones in defining the territory of Little Russia. Thus, for Vasyl Ruban, who wrote in the second half of the eighteenth century, Little Russia was defined on the basis of contemporary administrative divisions as the territory located between Sloboda Ukraine, the gubernias of Belgorod and New Russia, and Poland and Lithuania.⁹¹ The author of the *Istoriia Rusov* somewhere in the early nineteenth century, included in historical Little Russia not only the Left and Right Banks of the Dnipro but also the southern and western parts of present-day Ukraine, and even of Belarus.⁹² In doing so, he employed the Cossack, Rus', and South Rus' markers.

The contemporary of the author of the *Istoriia Rusov*, Iakiv Markovych, generally operated with the geographic terms *South* and *steppe*. Mykhailo Antonovs'kyi hesitated over the selection of criteria to be used in defining the territory of Little Russia, whether historical, administrative, or ethnic: "considering the Little Russian people inhabiting the gubernias of Sloboda Ukraine, New Russia, and almost all of the gubernias of Kyiv, Volhynia, and Podilia, one might think that these lands should be called Little Russia as well, but that would be at variance with historical truth."⁹³ The next generation of Little Russian intellectuals would no longer entertain such doubts.

The *Little Russian* designation would become the established term for denoting all that pertained to the ethnic sphere, primarily language and folklore. The border between the new *Little Russia* and *Great Russia* was re-conceptualized on the basis of ethnocultural criteria. Besides the aforementioned Ivan Pereverzev, Russian travelers passing through the Ukrainian lands from north to south contributed to this conceptualization. Practically all nineteenth-century Russian and foreign travellers defined the symbolic border between Little Russia and Great Russia as lying somewhere between Kursk and Belgorod, which indicates that they did not differentiate inhabitants of historic Little Russia of the Hetmanate from those of Sloboda Ukraine.⁹⁴

Ethnocultural criteria were also the basis for the growth of what became an established notion that the lands on both sides of the Austro-Russian border were inhabited by "Little Russians." A dictionary of foreign words published in 1803–06 by a contemporary of Pereverzev's, Ianovs'kyi, includes an article about "Rusyns" (*rusyny*) living in Hungary and Austria and maintains that they were in fact Little Russians (Malorossians) who spoke the Little Russian language, which was close to Russian.⁹⁵ Mikhail Kachenovskii, the editor of *Vestnik Evropy* (European Herald), introducing a "Little Russian Ballad" to his readers in 1827, pointed out that "in our western provinces beyond the Dnipro, in Galicia, in Bukovyna, in part of the northern counties of Hungary, the great mass of the people and the most numerous class of inhabitants is made up of Rusyns, Rusniaks, a people closer than any other in origin, language, and customs to our Little Russians or, to put it more precisely, one and the same."⁹⁶

Mykola Markevych did likewise when introducing his poetic collection of *Ukrainian Melodies* to a broad audience in 1831: "Judging by customs, clothing, and speech, Little Russia may be defined as the whole territory extending from the borders of Hungarian Galicia, including only the Kamianets-Podilskyi and Kyiv gubernia on that side of the Dnipro, to the borders of the Voronezh gubernia, counting on this side of the Dnipro, the Poltava, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv guber-

nias, with some localities in the Kursk gubernia. In the south it ends beyond the Dnipro Rapids, where the possessions of the Turkish Sultan once began."⁹⁷ In his other works as well, Markevych was consistent in his view of Ukrainian ethnic territory past and present.⁹⁸ "Little Russia," he wrote, "is where the Little Russian language is spoken."⁹⁹

If Orlai and Venelin preferred *South Russian* to *Little Russian* nomenclature, their fellow Habsburg subject Denys Zubryts'kyi, a Galician, who studied the Galician-Volhynian principality in which Little Rus' terminology had been used, favoured the latter in arguing that Little Russians on both sides of the Russo-Austrian border were the same people.¹⁰⁰ *Little Russia* now came to include not only the lands close to Russia but also the western Ukrainian lands. *Little Russian* terminology was used to denote this territory in parallel with *Rus'* and *South Russian* designations not only by subjects of the Russian Empire but also by natives of the Habsburg Monarchy before and during the 1848 revolution.¹⁰¹

From the 1840s to the early twentieth century, the ethnonym *maloros* or *malorossianin* (Little Russian) became the self-designation of choice among educated "Ukrainians" in the Russian Empire; it also took on supra-regional connotations.¹⁰² At the individual level, practically all educated representatives of Ukrainian society identified themselves as Little Russians, their fatherland as Little Russia, and their mother tongue as Little Russian. It was possible to combine *Malorossian* and *Russian* identities but a hybrid of *Malorossian/Velikorossian* was unthinkable.

The "Malorossian" terminology was not imposed from outside by the tsarist censorship. It carried no suggestion of inferiority and simply reflected the historic and cultural belonging of the local population to the broader symbolic space of the "Slavic-Rus' world." This terminology gave the right to the ancient Slavic-Rus' heritage, which in turn served as a visiting card of a historical and ethnic Little Russian (Malorossian) nation with a glorious past. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, *Malaia Rus'*, *malorusskii*, and *malorossiiskii* (Little Russian) became established terms of ethnic self-identification in the Russian Empire and to a degree in western Ukrainian land, though here the ancient term Ruthenian (*rusyn*) long held sway.¹⁰³

Not until the late nineteenth century did *Little Russian* terminology begin to yield to its *Ukrainian* counterpart. At that time, the term *malorosy* (Little Russians) "became a negative designation by nationally conscious Ukrainians for those compatriots who were loyal to the Tsarist state and integrated themselves into the all-Russian culture and language."¹⁰⁴ It was only the Soviet project that dealt the hardest blow to *Little Russian* terminology as a marker of identity. And yet

that project merely preserved the Little Russian identity intact under the “Soviet Ukrainian” designation, as would become apparent at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

“Ukraine”

The tradition of consistent use of “Ukrainian” terminology originated in the times of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and was appropriated by the Cossack polity in the seventeenth century. In international circles, the term was popularized by the seventeenth-century *Description d’Ukraine* compiled by Guillaume Levasseur de Beauplan, a French engineer in Polish service. Beauplan’s maps as well as those of many cartographers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century such as Johann Baptiste Homann, who called Ukraine “terra Cossacorum,” had influenced European usage. The traditional use of the term “Ukraine” as a Cossack territory had a notable influence on Western and Russian authors in the Age of Enlightenment. The Austro-German scholar Johann Christian von Engel used it in the title of his synthetic work on Ukrainian history.¹⁰⁵ Some Russian and Ukrainian historians of the late eighteenth century (Müller, Shafons'kyi, Rigel'man) found no problem in accepting the Polish origins of the word.¹⁰⁶ In the early nineteenth century it was used not only by Polish authors but by some Russian ones as well.¹⁰⁷ One of the first Russian historians to challenge the Polish origin of the term *Ukraine* was Mikhail Markov.¹⁰⁸

The use of “Ukraine” to designate the Right Bank of the Dnipro River may be regarded as an echo of the aforementioned Polish tradition, while “Little Russia” appears as a designation of the Left Bank.¹⁰⁹ This approach is maintained more consistently in Stanislav Zarul'skii’s *Opisanie o Maloi Rosii i Ukraine* (*A Description of Little Russia and Ukraine*), written in the late eighteenth century, and in the work of his contemporary Tadeusz Czacki. For some time, Russian authors also found no difficulty in referring to “Polish Ukraine” in order to denote the territory of the Right Bank.¹¹⁰ However, it should be stressed that the “Ukraine-Little Russia” territorial division was never fixed.

The Cossack elite used it both officially and unofficially during and after the Cossack revolution of 1648.¹¹¹ The usage of the term *Ukraine* was never confined to the folkloric tradition, and it long remained a wandering term localized in various regions and fragmented into discrete parts. Approximately until the mid-nineteenth century it was used almost exclusively in the sense of “borderland” (*okraïna*). Markevych noted that the term *Ukraine* initially denoted a borderland and specified several historical “ukraines”: those of Kyiv, Moscow, Riazan, and Galicia, as well as Polish and Russian “ukraines.”¹¹² Besides geographic meanings,

socio-political ones could also accrue to this term, which had previously been used to refer to the Cossack lands. While *Ukraine* could be "Polish," "Lithuanian," or "Russian," it could also refer to a specific part of historical *Little Russia*, namely its "steppe" territory, as Afanasii Shafons'kyi and Iakiv Markovych suggested.¹¹³

There is a dominant view in the scholarly literature that in the early nineteenth century the anonymous author of the *Istoriia Rusov* rejected the term *Ukraina* in favour of *Little Russia*.¹¹⁴ In the introduction to that work, the author rails against "shameless and spiteful Polish and Lithuanian storytellers," whom he does not identify by name, and who deftly introduced all kinds of "nonsense and slander" into the Little Russian chronicles.¹¹⁵ For example, the anonymous author alludes to an "instructive anecdote" in which some kind of new land near the Dnipro River, here called *Ukraine*, was brought onto the scene from ancient Rus' or contemporary Little Russia; new settlements were established there by Polish kings, and Ukrainian Cossackdom was founded.¹¹⁶ He mocks the esteemed "author of such a timid, pretty story," who "never set foot anywhere but his school and did not see Rus' cities in the country that he calls Ukraine."¹¹⁷

The target of the author's criticism is not known. Perhaps it was the Kyivan historian Maksym Berlyn's'kyi, a teacher at the Main Public School (later gymnasium), who wrote a brief history of Russia for young people titled *Kratkaia Rossiiskaia istoriia dlia upotrebleniia iunoshestvu*, published in St Petersburg in 1800. At the time, this was arguably the only such textbook with content related to Ukraine. Berlyn's'kyi often called Little Russia "Ukraine," but so did his contemporaries and many of his predecessors. Even the author of the *Istoriia Rusov* reveals that he was not hostile in principle to the term "Ukraine" as such.

The term appears in the main body of his manuscript many times, most often in documents or quotations, sometimes wilfully edited or quoted from memory. For example, the author of the *Istoriia Rusov* included in his manuscript the text of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's apocryphal Bila Tserkva proclamation of 1648, where "Ukraine" is usually paired with "Malorossiiia" (Little Russia) as "Ukraina nasha Malorossiiskaia" (Our Little Russian Ukraine).¹¹⁸ In another case, he refers to Voltaire's description of the Russian-Swedish war of 1709 where "Ukraine" is presented as the land of Cossacks.¹¹⁹

In parallel with this, the anonymous author himself uses the term "Ukraine." For example, when he describes Ivan Sirko's military actions in Moldavia, he writes that the Cossack chieftain, retreating from the enemy, crossed the Dnister River and "returned to his Ukraine."¹²⁰ Elsewhere in the book, the author recounts how Turkish armies advanced toward the fortress of Kamianets-Podil'skyi in 1672, passing "through Ukraine, loyal to Khanenko, all the way to the Sluch River."¹²¹ All these examples actually refer to the Right Bank of the Dnipro River, that is,

to the same contested territory whose *Ukrainian* name the author held to have been invented by “shameless” Polish and Lithuanian authors.

At the same time, it was highly unusual and hardly explicable that the author would not apply the name of *Ukraine* to the territory of the Sloboda Cossack regiments, which during his lifetime was known officially as the “Sloboda Ukraine gubernia” (1765–80; 1797–1835). It was the only region whose official name included the *Ukrainian* denomination.¹²² It looks like the author of *Istoriia Rusov* decided to challenge the obvious fact when he coined for the Sloboda historical region the adjective *bulavyns'kyi* (“of the mace”) so as to emphasize its subjection to the “mace” (possessions) of the Little Russian hetman. In this, the author of *Istoriia Rusov* was indeed unique. Most other authors, presumably his contemporaries, tended to assign the name of “Ukraine” to the Sloboda Ukraine (later Kharkiv) gubernia exclusively.

The *Statistical Description of the Russian Empire*, compiled by Evdokim Ziblovskii in the early nineteenth century, says of the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia that “the land constituting this gubernia is called Ukraine to this day, and this because it lay on the very borders, limits, or edge of Russia.”¹²³ In the strictly geographic sense, the Kharkiv region is called *ukraina* in the works of the philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda and in the programmatic documents of the Russian Decembrists.¹²⁴ We encounter it in the same sense in the notes of the nineteenth-century German travel writer Johann Georg Kohl.¹²⁵ It was no accident that their contemporaries bestowed on Kharkiv the title of “capital of Ukraine.”

Curiously, Vasyli' Karazin, the founder of Kharkiv University who is considered by some enthusiasts an “architect of the Ukrainian Renaissance,” dreamed of the time when his native Sloboda Ukraine would get rid of its “Ukrainian” designation and became just the “Kharkovian” gubernia. It seems like both the author of *History of the Rus' People* and his contemporary Karazin considered the “Ukrainian” adjective as undesirable for their respective little fatherland, although for the opposite reasons. Contrary to both of them, Hryhorii Kvitka continued to use the Ukrainian name for the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia and its dwellers even after it was renamed the Kharkiv gubernia. Eventually, the *Ukrainian* nomenclature did not become a monopoly of the Kharkiv or any other historical region.

In the absolute majority of historical texts produced during this period, the term *Ukraine* was a synonym of *Little Russia*, its second name denoting the territorial nucleus on both sides of the Dnipro River discussed earlier.¹²⁶ For evidence of this, it suffices to refer to the works of such reputable Russian historians as Gerhard Müller, Ivan Boltin, Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamenskii, Aleksandr Rigel'man, and the Ukrainian authors Petro Symonovs'kyi, Opanas Shafons'kyi, and Oleksandr Bezborodko.¹²⁷ In the Cossack memorial literature of the eighteenth cen-

tury, *Ukraine* was used primarily in the private sphere as a synonym of the more official *Little Russia*: both of these names identified the authors' common fatherland (*vitchyzna*).¹²⁸

In the early nineteenth century, the aforementioned Russian geographer Evdokim Ziablovskii extended the name *Ukraine* to the entire Left Bank of the Dnipro, that is, the former Hetmanate and the Sloboda region regiments, once again in the geographic sense.¹²⁹ His contemporary Karl German went even further, applying the name *Ukraine* to the whole territory embracing Little Russia, the Sloboda Ukraine region, parts of the Katerynoslav and Kursk gubernias, and the land of the Don Cossacks on the grounds that it bordered on the Tatars and Turks.¹³⁰ Pavlo Bilets'kyi-Nosenko, an ardent Little Russian patriot, wrote to the editorial board of the Kharkiv-based *Ukrainskii zhurnal* in the early 1820s about a "Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Don, inhabited by a Ukrainian population of many millions."¹³¹ A similar view was expressed in 1827 by Mykhailo Kachenov's'kyi of Kharkiv, professor and rector of Moscow University.

Historians concur that in the era of Romanticism both *Little Russian* and *Ukrainian* designations became imbued with an ethnocultural content, with a notable rise in the intensity with which *Ukrainian* terminology was used. But does this mean that *Little Russia* was being "forced out" by *Ukraine* as Brian Boeck suggests? He associates the beginning of that process with the publication of a Russian translation of Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan's seventeenth-century description of Ukraine in St Petersburg in 1832, which "may have contributed more to the revival of the term *ukraïnets'* than any other single event."¹³²

In Boeck's words, "After the translation of Beauplan, intellectuals inherited a term that was associated with a glorious period in the national past, but whose contents could still be actively shaped by contemporaries."¹³³ Indeed, on turning to the text of that publication, we see that the introduction by the Russian translator, probably Fedor Ustrialov, contains rousing words about "Ukrainian Cossacks" and "Ukraine, native to us by faith, and by language, and by the origin of its inhabitants."¹³⁴ However, for some reason Boeck did not mention that by then "Ukrainian" ethnic terminology, as noted earlier, was already commonly accepted as synonymous with "Little Russian."

Thus, Andrei Aleinikov, a deputy to the Catherinian Committee for the compilation of a new law code in 1767, spoke of one "Little Russian people in Little Russia and the Sloboda regiments."¹³⁵ His contemporary Hryhorii Kalynov's'kyi described "Ukrainian marriage rituals of the common people" as common to inhabitants of Little Russia and the Sloboda region.¹³⁶ Ivan Pereverzev, the author of the *Topographic Description of the Kharkiv Vicegerency*, uses "Ukrainian" terminology when discussing the Kharkiv region not only in the geographic but also

in the ethnic sense, especially with reference to the “Ukrainian dialect” of the local Little Russians. The second edition of Bantysh-Kamenskii’s *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, which appeared in 1830, contains *Ukrainian* terminology, used in parallel to *South Russian* and *Little Russian* terminology, inter alia for describing the Ukrainian population (“sons of Ukraine,” “Ukrainians”).¹³⁷

It might seem that Hryhorii Kvitka, who also used *Ukraine* and *Ukrainians* in the ethnic sense, intended to narrow the reference of *Ukrainians* to inhabitants of the Kharkiv region when he sought to substantiate the cultural differences between Ukrainians of the Sloboda region and those of neighbouring Little Russia.¹³⁸ Elsewhere he identified *Ukrainians* with the inhabitants of historical Little Russia, but in the final analysis he limited the reference of that ethnonym to the Zaporozhian Cossacks alone who were described as “pure Ukrainians.”¹³⁹ In general, even the regional Sloboda-Ukrainian patriot Hryhorii Kvitka clearly understood that all his compatriots, even those who had moved to Siberia or the Caucasus, to say nothing of those in the Carpathian Mountains, shared a common origin and ethnic particularities.

In 1829 the journal *Moskovskii telegraf* began to publish the poems of a student of Bilets'kyi-Nosenko, Mykola Markevych, which were issued separately in 1831 under the title *Ukrainskie melodii*. This work is literally replete with “Ukrainian” terminology in a variety of contexts, from the lyrical to the grandiose: “a glorious period in the national past.”¹⁴⁰ The same year saw the publication in the imperial capital of a devotedly loyal pamphlet by Orest Somov, written on behalf of “a Ukrainian,”¹⁴¹ and in Kharkiv of a *Ukrainian Almanac* produced by local Romantics.

Would it not be more accurate to attribute the sudden revitalization of “Ukrainian” terminology in the early 1830s not to one of the publications devoted to that subject but to the general situation in the country after the Polish uprising? The Russian government and society responded to it with a mighty wave of imperial nationalism directed toward the lands that had become the arena of a successive Polish-Russian conflict. Until then, those lands had been almost officially named “Polish Ukraine.” From that time forward, they would become “Russian,” at times through a “South Russian” and “Little Russian” mediation.

It is also worth noting that once the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia was renamed the Kharkiv gubernia in 1835, the notion of “Russian Ukraine” lost its narrowly regional character and could “travel” westward and southward along with *South Russian* and *Little Russian* terminology. Indeed, the Kharkiv Romantics took advantage of that fact in their writings.¹⁴² The works of Levko Borovykovs'kyi, Mykola Kostomarov, and Opanas Shpyhots'kyi are replete with “Ukrainian” ter-

minology.¹⁴³ However, these authors also make broadly concomitant use of *Little Russian* nomenclature, whether in the form of a subtitle to a "Ukrainian" title or interchangeably in the texts of their works as a synonym for "Ukrainian."¹⁴⁴

The Kharkiv Romantics were not the only writers to use "Ukrainian" terminology in an ethnocultural sense not unlike that of the present day. Gogol, Maksymovych, and Markevych did likewise. The first two used *Ukraïna* and *rusaskaia zemlia* interchangeably.¹⁴⁵ The latter consistently employed *Ukraine* and *Little Russia* as synonyms,¹⁴⁶ imbuing both with geographic and ethnic content.¹⁴⁷ In Maksymovych's *Skazanie o Koliivshchine* (*An Account of the Koliivshchyna Rebellion*), "Ukraine" is the territory on the Right Bank of the Dnipro, where the rebels known as *haidamaky* were active; they in turn become associated with the Cossacks and were incorporated into the Little Russian historical narrative. Panteleimon Kulish, who played the leading role in the systematic use of the term *Ukraïna*,¹⁴⁸ could draw on the works of his contemporaries and predecessors.

This did not mean, however, that *Ukraïna* became established as a national symbol in the course of the nineteenth century. Along with its broad Little Russian counterpart, it could also be used in a narrower sense to denote particular regions of ethnic territory.¹⁴⁹ It should be noted in this regard that *Ukrainian* terminology, more than *South Russian* and *Little Russian*, was associated with the phenomenon of Cossackdom, both Little Russian and Zaporozhian. *Ukraine* completely eclipses *Little Russia*, for example, in Fr. Ioann's *Heroïchni stykhi o slavnykh voiennykh diistviiakh voisk zaporoz'kykh* (*Heroic Verses about the Military Deeds of the Zaporozhian Armies*), published in 1784.¹⁵⁰ The inclusion of the *haidamak* theme in the national narrative in the mid-nineteenth century not only expanded the territory covered by *Ukraine* but also endowed it with a distinct social dimension.

Ethnonyms

There were several related ethnonyms corresponding to the geographic taxonomies of the period to describe the population of Ukraine.¹⁵¹ Most often, the names *Russes*, *Slavic-Rus'/Russians*, *Ruthenians* (*rusyny*), *Rusnaks*, *South Russians*, *Little Russians*, and *Ukrainians* were used interchangeably. One can find such a mosaic of ethnonyms in practically all the texts described above, as well as in many other sources of both official and private origin. In almost all cases, the difference between ethnonyms and toponyms was not clear.

In not a few instances, the ethnonyms *Ukrainian* and *Little Russian* continued to be understood as regionally limited. Venelin, for instance, considered *Ukrainian*

equal in status to *South Russian*, while ignoring the ethnonym *Little Russian*.¹⁵² In other cases, *Ukrainians* and *Little Russians* served as synonyms. In Boeck's opinion, the symbolic change in relations between the *Little Russian* and *Ukrainian* designations took place in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when in official discourse *maloross* remained neutral but *ukrainets* became negative for political reasons.¹⁵³

Another ethnonym widely used as a designation of Ukrainian inhabitants of the Russian Empire, along with *Little Russian* and *Ukrainian*, was *khokhol*.¹⁵⁴ In the literary Russian of the day, it was perhaps the only general ethnonym applicable to ethnic Ukrainians regardless of their place of residence or even social status; to be sure, it was used most often as an informal designation with different meanings, depending on the context. Contrary to widely held belief, the name and self-designation *khokhol* was less disdainful or condescending than half-joking and folksy. *Khokhol* was the quintessence of ethnicity, the indivisible atom, the basic and universal designation that defined a particular individual's origin by birth, special characteristics, and tastes pertaining to national character. Vasyli' Karazin did not hesitate to call inhabitants of the Sloboda region *khokhly*, with no negative connotation, since he was emphasizing their aptitude for study.¹⁵⁵

The *khokhol* designation was adopted by the ethnic Ukrainians for the purposes of informal self-identification.¹⁵⁶ The minister of internal affairs, Viktor Kochubei, could refer to himself in a letter to the Little Russian governor-general, Prince Nikolai Repnin, as "a *khokhol* by birth." Stepan Burachek, a Russian general and a Little Russian patriot, referred to his landowning countrymen as "pure, original *khokhly*, only without an *oseledets* [a Cossack haircut]." ¹⁵⁷ Gogol's example is especially interesting. In a well-known letter to his friend Aleksandra Smirnova-Rossett in 1844, Gogol, a deeply religious man, even gave an ethnic dimension to the immortal soul and used *khokhol* and *Little Russian* derivatives interchangeably in opposition to the *Russian* adjective.¹⁵⁸ It is worth noting that Gogol's correspondent identified herself as *khokhlachka*. All these examples hardly fit the "prototypes of uncivilized peasants" designation as a reflection of the complex of inferiority, at least for the period under investigation.¹⁵⁹

It was precisely on the basis of the term *khokhol* that Russian stereotypes of Ukrainians ("cunning," "stubborn," "dim-witted") and of the differences between the two peoples were generated and cultivated. Passing through the Sloboda region in 1774, Johann G ldenst dt left the following comment on local Ukrainians and Russians: "one can hardly expect the merger of *moskali* with *khokhly*, as they call each other in jest, that is, of the Russians with the Cherkasians, or Rusnaks." Half a century later, Opanas Shpyhots'kyi would complain

from Moscow in a letter to Izmail Sreznevskii that the local publishers had behaved with him "like *moskali* with a *khokhol*."¹⁶⁰ The list of examples could be extended. *Khokhol* and its derivatives have survived to the present day and even reasserted their place in the Russian ethnographic literature.¹⁶¹

Khokhol was perhaps the only ethnonym that lent itself to the formation of a toponym, albeit an imaginary one – *Khokhlandiia*, that is, a land inhabited by *khokhly*. It was the reverse in all other instances: the toponym gave rise to the ethnonym (Ukrainians, South Russians, Little Russians). Prince Ivan Dolgorukii, a Russian traveller, in 1817 found himself in the *khokhol* region ("oblast' *khokhlov*") somewhere between Hlukhiv and Sevs'k.¹⁶² Later on, another Russian traveller, Ivan Aksakov, identified *Khokhlandiia* as the territory between Kharkiv and Poltava.¹⁶³ As one can see, the geography of this ethnically imagined space was not precise. It is curious that even heavily Russified Kharkiv and its university were perceived by Polish and Russian contemporaries as *khokhliatskie*, a view based, as it seems, on the ethnic composition of the local population.¹⁶⁴

Conclusions

The material cited shows that in the first half of the nineteenth century there were no established rules or norms governing the use of the names *South Russia*, *Little Russia*, and *Ukraine*, just as there was no consensus among historians with regard to the origins of those terms and the way they were understood. Each of these designations had acquired multiple functions, and was used both as toponyms and ethnonyms interchangeably, with no strict rules or order. Under such conditions, almost the whole spectrum of *Ukrainian* designations maintained a certain ambivalence and offered grounds for a variety of interpretations. It may have left some room for the alternative scenarios of modern nation-building. However, it does not imply that local identities were not compatible or even intertwined with the idea of the integrity of the *Ukrainian* land and people.

Some historians, starting perhaps with Oleksander Ohloblyn, tend to exaggerate Ukrainian regional fragmentation. The idea that "Ukraine, Little Russia, and South-Western gubernias till the middle of the [nineteenth] century ... were conceived as different units"¹⁶⁵ begs for limitations. My research suggests that the historical commonality of Ukrainian lands never disappeared from the radar of contemporary observers while their ethnic unity was established long before the nineteenth century. It seems like the profusion of toponyms and ethnonyms for the designation of Ukrainian lands and people presented no particular difficulty to contemporaries of the period under discussion. They realized that while names were changing, the population itself had not changed much.¹⁶⁶

I believe that the phenomenon of the multiplicity and ambiguity of respective designations could be better approached from the perspective of the gradual secularization of the medieval discourse of the “Rus’/Slavic-Rus’ people” established by the Kyivan *Synopsis*. The process of its re-imagination and re-articulation in terms of modern geography and ethnicity led to a gradual erosion and fragmentation of the historical and religious-linguistic community and its territory presented in *Synopsis*. However, a language for the description of that process and the emerging new meanings had yet to be developed.

Of the various names in existence, *Ukrainian* was the least bound up with *Rus’* religious tradition; hence its triumph over the more traditional projects depended on the success of secularization. The formula “Ukraine-Rus’,” adopted by Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, represented a compromise between tradition and innovation.¹⁶⁷ However, it left space for other, more traditional definitions. I have no basis to speak of the gradual displacement of *Little Russian* or *South Russian* terminology by *Ukrainian* terminology or of their differentiation before the middle of the nineteenth century.

The differentiation of Ukraine from Little Russia and the increasing significance of the former term became apparent only in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹⁶⁸ Brian Boeck dates the culmination of that process to the early 1920s.¹⁶⁹ Andreas Kappeler considers it completed only after the Second World War.¹⁷⁰ Nonetheless, the revival of the old *Little Russian* nomenclature at the beginning of the twenty-first century demonstrates that conditions for its preservation survived even the Soviet experiment. For Serhii Plokhyy, “the terms ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Little Russia’ represent very different East Slavic identities.”¹⁷¹ However, it appears the line between the two is often blurred, while their relationship remains situational and motivated by political circumstances rather than cultural differences.

The variety of names (ethnonyms and toponyms) used for the description of Slavic peoples and their lands in the Russian Empire (and beyond) raises a question about the contemporary language of their description. All attempts to find an alternative definition to describe the identity of those people who found themselves somewhere between the *Ukrainian* and *Russian* poles even today remains futile for the obvious reason: they do not constitute a coherent group.¹⁷² How then to identify retrospectively all those people who understood their distinctiveness but instead of articulating it clearly juggled with designations like *Little Russians*, *South Russians*, *Ukrainians*, and the rest?¹⁷³

I would describe all of them as “Ukrainians” from a contemporary perspective and, if need be, clarify their identity orientation more precisely in a certain socio-cultural or political context. In the last case, one cannot help but accept the prac-

tice of using a variety of unstable and arbitrarily articulated definitions (Little Russian, Ukrainian, Ukrainian/Russian, Slavic-Rus', local, etc.) The same approach is relevant, I believe, when it comes to *Russians* who might be identified as *Velikorossy*, *Rossiiane*, *Slavic-Rus'*, *Orthodox*, etc.) However, the process of Ukrainian and Russian re-identification is far from being completed. Its further development may affect our understanding of the past.

NOTES

First published under the title "In Search of 'Ukraine': Words and Meanings," in Volodymyr Kravchenko, *The Ukrainian-Russian Borderland: History versus Geography* (Montreal, 2022), 17–46. Reprinted by permission of McGill-Queen's University Press.

- 1 A.I. Miller, *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research* (Budapest, 2008), 169; A.I. Miller, *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Budapest, 2003), 25–6.
- 2 Semen Divovych, "Razgovor Malorossii s Velikorossiei" (A Conversation between Little Russia and Great Russia, 1762), in *Ukrains'ka literatura XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1983), 384–414; Georgii Konisskii, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii* (Moscow, 1846); Iu. Venelin, "O spore mezhdu iuzhanami i severianami naschet ikh rossizma," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh*, no. 4 (1847): 1–16; Nikolai A. Markevich, *Istoriia Malorossii*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1842); Mikhail Maksimovich, "Ob upotreblenii nazvania Rossiia i Malorossiiia v Zapadnoi Rusi," in Mikhail Maksimovich, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 2, 307–12 (Kyiv, 1877); N.I. Kostomarov, "Davno li Malaia Rus' stala pisat'sia Malorossieiu, a Rus' Rossieiu," in N.I. Kostomarov, *Zemskie sobory. Istoricheskie monografii i issledovania* (Moscow, 1995), 448–55; Mykhailo Drahomanov, "Literatura rosiis'ka, velykorus'ka, ukrains'ka i halyts'ka," in *Literaturno-publitsystychni pratsi*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1970), 179–80.
- 3 L'ongin Tsehel's'kyi, *Rus'-Ukraina a Moskovshchyna-Rosiia* (Tsarhorod, 1916); Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Velyka, Mala i Bila Rus'," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (1991): 77–85; Kyrylo Halushko, *Rus'-Malorosiia-Ukraina: nazva i terytorii* (Kyiv, 2017); Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, *Ukraina chy Malorosiia?* (Kyiv, 2012); A.V. Linnichenko, *Malorusskii vopros i avtonomiia Malorossii (Otkrytoe pis'mo prof. M. S. Grushevskomu)* (Petrograd-Odesa, 1917); A.V. Storozhenko, *Malaia Rossiia ili Ukraina?* (Kyiv, 1918); P.N. Savitskii, "Velikorosiia i Ukraina v russkoi kul'ture," *Rodnoe slovo* 8 (1926): 10–14.
- 4 Serhii Shelukhin, *Ukraina: nazva nashoi zemli z naidavnishykh chasiv* (Prague,

- 1936); Mykola Andrusiak, *Nazva "Ukraïna": "kraïna" chy "okraïna"* (Prague, 1941); Geo. W. Simpson, *The Names "Rus," "Russia," "Ukraine" and Their Historical Background* (Winnipeg, 1951); Omeljan Pritsak and Volodymyr Kubi-jovyč, "The Names for the Ukrainian Territory and People Used by Other Peoples," in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1963); Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar Jr., "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building," *Slavic Review* 22, no. 2 (1963): 224; George Y. Shevelov, "The Name Ukraïna 'Ukraine,'" in *Teasers and Appeasers: Essays and Studies on Themes of Slavic Philology* (Munich, 1971); Andrew Gregorovich, *Ukraine, Rus', Russia and Moscow. A Selected Bibliography of the Names* (Toronto, 1971); Stephan M. Horak, "Periodization and Terminology of the History of Eastern Slavs: Observations and Analyses," *Slavic Review* 31, no. 4 (1972): 853–62; Mykola Andrusiak, "Terminy 'rus'kyi', 'ros'kyi', 'rosiis'kyi', i 'bilorus'kyi' v publikatsiïakh XVI–XIX st.," in *Naukovyi zbirnyk Ukraïns'koho Vil'noho Universytetu. Iuvileine vydannia na poshanu prof. d-ra Ivana Mirchuka (1891–1961)*, ed. Oleksandr Kul'chyts'kyi and Volodymyr Maruniak, vol. 8 (Munich-New-York-Paris-Winnipeg, 1974), 1–13; Liubomyr Wynar, "Comments on Periodization and Terminology in Byeloruthenian and Ukrainian Histories," *Nationalities Papers* 3, no. 2 (1975): 50–9.
- 5 *Narodzhennia kraïny. Vid kraïu do derzhavy. Nazva, symbolika, terytoriia i kordony Ukraïny*, ed. Kyrylo Halushko (Kharkiv, 2016); *Imia naroda: Ukraina i ee naselenie v ofitsial'nykh i nauchnykh terminakh, publitsistike i literature*, ed. E. Iu. Borisenok (Moscow, 2016); Leonid E. Gorizontov, "Podneprov'e i Severnoe Prichernomor'e v mnogotomnykh opisaniakh Rossiiskoi Imperii rubezha XIX–XX vekov: terminologicheskie aspekty," *Slavianovedenie*, no. 3 (2016): 72–7; O.las', "Terminy 'Novorosia' ta 'Pivdenna Ukraïna' v istorychnomu chasi i prostori druhoi polovyny XVIII – pochatku XXI st.: pokhodzhennia i interpretatsii," in *Skhid i Pivden' Ukraïny: chas, prostir, sotsium*, vol.1 (Kyiv, 2014), 85–91; Faith Hillis, *Children of Rus': Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation* (Ithaca, 2013); Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj, review of *Children of Rus': Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation* by Faith Hillis, *H-Net Reviews in the Humanities & Social Sciences* (September 2017): 1–5; "Poniatiiia o Rossii": *k istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda*, ed. A. Miller, D. Sdvizhkov, I. Shirle, 2 vols. (Moscow, 2012); Serhiy Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian Political Imaginations*, Stanford Studies on Central and Eastern Europe (Stanford, 2012); A.P. Tolochko, *Kievskaia Rus' i Malorossia v XIX veke* (Kyiv, 2012); Aneta Pavlenko, "Linguistic Russification in the Russian Empire: Peasants into Rus-

- sians?," *Russian Linguistics* 35, no. 3 (2011): 331–50; Natalia Yakovenko, "Choice of Name versus Choice of Path: The Names of Ukrainian Territories from the Late Sixteenth to the Late Seventeenth Century," in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, ed. H.V. Kas'ianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest, 2009), 117–48; Serhii Plokhyy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, 2006); Zenon E. Kohut, *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity* (Edmonton & Toronto, 2011); Riccardo Vulpius, "Slova i liudi v imperii: k diskussii o 'proekte bol'shoi russkoi natsii', ukraino- i rusofilakh, narechiiakh i narodnostiakh," *Ab Imperio*, no. 1 (2006): 353–8; Mikhail Dolbilov and Darius Staliunas, "Vvedeniye k forumu: alfavit, iazyk i natsional'naia identichnost'v Rossiiskoi imperii," *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2005): 123–34; Mikhail Dolbilov and Darius Staliunas, "Slova, liudi i imperskie konteksty: diskussii'a prodolzhaetsia," *Ab Imperio*, no. 1 (2006): 359–65; Brian J. Boeck, "What's in a Name? Semantic Separation and the Rise of the Ukrainian National Name," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 27, no. 1/4 (2004): 33; Andreas Kappeler, "The Ambiguities of Russification," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5, no. 2 (2004): 291–7; A.I. Miller, *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Budapest, 2003).
- 6 E.E. Levkivskaia, "Semanticheskie varianty toponima 'Malorossia' i ego derivatov v russkoi rechevoi praktike postsovetского perioda," in *Imia naroda: Ukraina i ee naselenie v ofitsial'nykh i nauchnykh terminakh, publitsistike i literature*, ed. E. Iu. Borisenok (Moscow-St Petersburg, 2016), 250–78.
 - 7 Many of them were republished, see *Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii. Ideologiya national'nogo raskola*, ed. M.B. Smolin (Moscow, 1998). See also: Nikolai Ul'ianov, *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma* (Moscow, 1996); Mykola Riabchuk, *Vid Malorosii do Ukraïny: paradoksy zapizniloho natsiietvorennia* (Kyiv, 2000).
 - 8 A.M. Volkonskii, *Ukraina. Istoricheskaia pravda i ukrainofil'skaia propaganda* (Moscow, 2015); *Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii. Ideologia natsional'nogo raskola* (Moscow, 1998).
 - 9 O.V. Todiichuk, *Ukraina XVI-XVIII vv. v trudach Obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskich* (Kyiv, 1989).
 - 10 I am using this word here in its contemporary meaning and include texts written by Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians on topics related to Ukrainian history, geography, and ethnography.
 - 11 Willard Sunderland, "Imperial Space: Territorial Thought and Practice in

- the Eighteenth Century,” in *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930*, ed. Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolii Remnev (Bloomington, 2007), 52.
- 12 In various periods it comprised the lands of today’s Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, Kherson, and Odesa regions, as well as Crimea.
 - 13 Today this geographic area encompasses part of Kyiv oblast as well as Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Khmel’nyts’kyi, Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn regions.
 - 14 *Poniatiiia, idei, konstruktssii. Ocherki sravnitel’noi istoricheskoi semantiki*, ed. Iu. Kagarlitskii, D. Kalugin, B. Maslov (Moscow, 2019); Richard S. Wortman, *The Power of Language and Rhetoric in Russian Political History: Charismatic Words from the 18th to the 21st Centuries* (Bloomsbury, 2017); “*Poniatiiia o Rossii*,” 1:5–47; Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber, and Alexander Semyonov, eds, *Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire* (Leiden-Boston, 2009).
 - 15 Roland Cvetkovski and Alexis Hofmeister, eds, *An Empire of Others: Creating Ethnographic Knowledge in Imperial Russia and the USSR* (Budapest, 2013); Marina Mogilner, *Homo Imperii: A History of Physical Anthropology in Russia* (Lincoln, 2013); Ingrid Shirle, “Uchenie o dukhe i kharaktere narodov v russkoi kul’ture XVIII v.,” in “*Vvodia nravy i obychai Evropeiskie v Evropeiskom narode*.” *K probleme adaptatsii zapadnykh idei i praktik v Rossiiskoi imperii* (Moscow, 2008), 121, 129–32; Aleksei Zagrebin, “I. G. Georgi i pervyi svodnyi trud po etnografii narodov Rossii,” *Voprosy istorii*, no. 6 (2007): 155–9; Yuri Slezkine, “Naturalists Versus Nations: Eighteenth-Century Russian Scholars Confront Ethnic Diversity,” *Representations*, no. 47 (1994): 170–95.
 - 16 Hillis, *Children of Rus’*, 5; Ilnytzkyj, review of *Children of Rus’*, 1–5.
 - 17 A.I. Miller, “‘Narodnost’ i ‘natsiia’ v russkom iazyke XIX veka: Podgotovitel’nye nabroski k istorii poniatii,” *Rossiiskaia istoria*, no. 1 (2009): 151–65.
 - 18 *Russkii iazyk kontsa XVII – nachala XVIII veka (voprosy izucheniia i opisaniia)* (St Petersburg, 1999); *Istoriia russkoi leksikografii* (St Petersburg, 1998).
 - 19 Mariia Leskinen, *Velikoross/velikorus: iz istorii konstruirovaniia etnichnosti. Vek XIX* (Moscow, 2016); Elena Vishlenkova, *Vizual’noe narodovedenie imperii, ili “Uvidet” russkogo dano ne kazhdomu* (Moscow, 2014); Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, 163; B. M. Kloss, *O proiskhozhdenii nazvaniia “Rossiia”* (Moscow, 2012); Austin Jersild, “‘Russia,’ from the Vistula to the Terek to the Amur,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1, no. 3 (2008): 531–46; O.N. Trubachev, *V poiskakh edinstva. Vzgliad filologa na problem istokov Rusi* (Moscow, 2005), 225–36; Iu. S. Stepanov, *Konstanty: slovar’ russkoi kul’tury* (Moscow, 2004), 151–65; Paul Bushkovitch, “What Is Rus-

- sia? Russian National Identity and the State, 1500–1917,” in *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)*, ed. Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen (Edmonton-Toronto, 2003), 144–61; Andreas Kappeler, “Great Russians” and “Little Russians”: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Perceptions in Historical Perspective (Washington, 2003).
- 20 In the words of Ivan Kireevskii, the Orthodox consciousness is a basis of Russian “narodnost,” see E.V. Bobrovskikh, “K istorii izucheniia poniatiia ‘narodnost’ v sotsial’no-politicheskoi mysli Rossii XIX veka,” *Sotsial’no-gumanitarnye znaniia*, no.1 (2015): 193.
 - 21 Ivan Orlai, “O Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii (Pis'mo iz Nezhina k sekretariu obshchestva),” *Trudy i zapiski Obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* 1, no. 3 (1826): 227.
 - 22 M.I. Matushevskaia, “‘Sinopsis Kievskii’ 1674 goda v otsenkakh issledovatelei kontsa XX – nachala XXI veka,” *Kharkivs'kyi istoriografichnyi zbirnyk*, no. 16 (2017): 256–67; A. Iu. Samarin, “Kievskii Sinopsis o vseia Rossii perveishem samoderzhitse,” *Istoriik: zhurnal ob actual'nom proshlom* 6 (2015): 34–7; Zenon E. Kohut, “Origins of the Unity Paradigm: Ukraine and the Construction of Russian National History (1620–1860),” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 35, no. 1 (2002): 70–6.
 - 23 It is worth noting that Russian tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich even considered to transfer the capital of its growing state from Moscow to Kyiv.
 - 24 Lesley Chamberlain, *Ministry of Darkness: How Sergei Uvarov Created Conservative Modern Russia* (London, 2019), 233–53; Miller, *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism*, 13–160.
 - 25 Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, 163.
 - 26 “There are even two Russian words for Russia, *Rus'* and *Rossiia*, with the corresponding adjectives, *ruskoe* and *rossiiskoe*, whose usage conforms quite closely to the distinction I have made between “ethnic” and “imperial” Russianess. *Rus'* is pre-imperial Russia, and is also used to refer to traditional, grassroots Russia, especially as manifested in its villages and churches, while *Rossiia* is multinational imperial Russia, ruled over by an Emperor rather than a Tsar.” See Geoffrey A. Hosking, *Empire and Nation in Russian History* (Waco, 1993).
 - 27 Serhii Plokhyy, *The Lost Kingdom* (New York, 2017), 255–7.
 - 28 *Narodzhennia kraïny. Vid kraïu do derzhavy*, 83; Jane Burbank and Mark von Hagen, “Coming into the Territory: Uncertainty and Empire,” in *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930*, ed. Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolii Remnev (Bloomington, 2007), 5; Mark Bassin, “Geographies of

- Imperial Identity,” in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, ed. Dominic Lieven, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 2006), 45–66.
- 29 See: Leskinen, *Velikoross/velikorus*; Leonid Gorizontov, “The ‘Great Circle’ of Interior Russia: Representations of the Imperial Center in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” in *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930*, ed. Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolii Remnev (Bloomington, 2007), 67–93; Roman Szporluk, “‘Ukrainskii vopros’ v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.) by A. I. Miller (Review),” *The Russian Review* 64, no. 1 (2005): 136–8; Andreas Kappeler, *“Great Russians” and “Little Russians”: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Perceptions in Historical Perspective* (Seattle, 2003); Marina V. Loskoutova, “A Motherland with a Radius of 300 Miles: Regional Identity in Russian Secondary and Post-Elementary Education from the Early Nineteenth Century to the War and Revolution,” *European Review of History* 9, no. 1 (2002): 7–22.
 - 30 Vasilii Tatishchev, *Leksikon rossiiskoi istoricheskii, geograficheskii, politicheskii i grazhdanskii*, part 1 (St Petersburg, 1793), 230–1.
 - 31 Fedor Polunin, *Geograficheskii leksikon Rossiiskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1773).
 - 32 Lev Maksimovich, *Novyi i polnyi geograficheskii slovar' Rossiiskogo gosudarstva ili Leksikon*, 6 parts (Moscow, 1788–89).
 - 33 Sergey Pleschééf, *Survey of the Russian Empire, According to Its Present Newly Regulated State, Divided Into Different Governments* (London, 1792).
 - 34 Johann Gotlib Georgi, *Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v Rossii narodov*, 4 vols (St Petersburg, 1799).
 - 35 N.N. [N.I. Nadezhdin], “Velikaia Rossiia,” in *Entsyklopedicheskii leksikon*, ed. N.I. Grech and O.I. Senkovskii, 17 vols (St Petersburg, 1837), 9: 262–79.
 - 36 *Ibid.*, 9: 262.
 - 37 *Ibid.*, 9: 261.
 - 38 *Ibid.*, 9: 268, 273.
 - 39 Andrei Zorin, *Kormia dvuglavogo orla ... Russkaia literatura i gosudarstvennaia ideologiia v poslednei treti XVIII – pervoi treti XIX veka* (Moscow, 2001).
 - 40 *Sochineniia imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, vol. 8 (St Petersburg, 1901), 64.
 - 41 I used its English edition, see Pleschééf, *Survey of the Russian Empire*, 77.
 - 42 For detailed discussion, see Charles W.J. Withers, *Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking Geographically About the Age of Reason* (Chicago, 2007).
 - 43 Leonid Shepelev, *Chinovnyi mir Rossii XVIII–nachala XX v.* (St Petersburg, 2001), 199, 202.
 - 44 Fedor Emin, *Rossiiskaia istoriia*, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1767), 90; Afanasii Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie s kratkim*

- geograficheskim opisaniem Malyia Rossii, iz chastei koei onoe namestnichestvo sostavleno* (Kyiv, 1851), 44, 46; Ivan Stritter, *Istoriia Rossiiskogo gosudarstva*, vol. 3 (St Petersburg, 1802), 319.
- 45 *Sochineniia imperatritsy Ekateriny II*, 8: 64.
 - 46 For details pertaining to the authorship of this work, see *Opysy Kharkivs'koho namisnytstva kintsia XVIII st.: Opysovo-statystychni dzherela*, ed. V.O. Pirko and O.I. Hurzhii (Kyiv, 1991), 5–8.
 - 47 Roman Szporluk, "Mapping Ukraine: From Identity Space to Decision Space," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies. Special issue: Tentorium Honorum. Essays Presented to Frank E. Sysyn on His Sixtieth Birthday*, no. 33/34 (2008–2009): 441–52.
 - 48 *Opysy Kharkivs'koho namisnytstva*, n. 18.
 - 49 Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie*, 44, 46; Stritter, *Istoriia Rossiiskogo gosudarstva*, 3:319.
 - 50 Georgii Konisskii, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii* (Moscow, 1846), 8.
 - 51 Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process*, XXII. On Engel, see Thomas Prymak, "On the 200th Anniversary of the Publication of Johann Christian von Engel's History of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Cossacks," *Germano-Slavica* 10, no. 2 (1998), 55–61.
 - 52 Orlai, "O Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii," 225.
 - 53 Dmitrii N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, 3 vols (Moscow, 1830), 1: 3, 6, 16, 29, 51, 56, 202–3.
 - 54 [Nikolai Gogol], "Otryvok iz istorii Malorossii," *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia* (1834): 1–15.
 - 55 Nikolai A. Markevich, *Istoriia Malorossii*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1842), 4.
 - 56 Pavlo Bilets'kyi-Nosenko, *Slovnyk ukraïns'koï movy* (Kyiv, 1966).
 - 57 Osip Bodianskii, "Rassmotrenie razlichnykh mnenii o drevnem iazyke Severnykh i Iuzhnykh Russov," *Uchenye zapiski Imperatorskogo Moskovskogo universiteta*, no. 3 (September 1835): 472–91.
 - 58 Marko Pavlyshyn, "For and Against a Ukrainian National Literature: Kostomarov's Sava Chalyi and Its Reviewers," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 92, no. 2 (2014): 226; David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985), 7.
 - 59 According to Mykola Kostomarov, after the dissolution of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood in 1847, the terms 'Ukraine', 'Little Russia', and 'Het'manschyna' came to be regarded as disloyal, see Stephen Velychenko, "Tsarist Censorship and Ukrainian Historiography, 1828–1906," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 23, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 386; Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process*, 230.

- 60 *Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi*, vol. 1, ed. Panteleimon Kulish (St Petersburg, 1856), XXV.
- 61 *Ibid.*, V.
- 62 Miller, *The Ukrainian Question*, 75–95; Anton Kotenko, “Do pytannia pro tvorennia ukrains'koho natsional'noho prostoru v zhurnali ‘Osnova,’” *Ukrain-s'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (2012): 42–57.
- 63 Taras Shevchenko, *Bukvar iuzhnorusskii* (St Petersburg, 1861). Before him, Iakiv Holovats'kyi chose the “southern” designation for the Ukrainian language, see Iakiv Holovats'kyi, *Rozprava o iazytsi luzhno-Rus'kym i ieho narichiakh* (Lviv, 1849).
- 64 A. Malashevych, “Borot'ba za ‘rus'ke pervorodstvo’ (z istorii naukovoï dyskusii ‘iuzhan’ i ‘severian’ u vysvitleni chasopysu ‘Vestnik Evropy,’” *Problemy istorii Ukraïny XXIX–pochatku XXX st.*, no. 6 (2003): 283–94.
- 65 Zenon E. Kohut, “From Commonwealth to Ukraine: The Reconceptualization of ‘Fatherland’ in Cossack Political Culture (1660s–1680s),” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 56, no. 3–4 (2014), 269–89; Zenon E. Kohut, *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity* (Toronto, 2011), 36–57; Frank E. Sysyn, “The Persistence of the Little Russian Fatherland in the Russian Empire: The Evidence from *The History of the Rus' or of Little Russia* (Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii),” in *Imperienvergleich: Beispiele und Ansätze aus osteuropäischer Perspektive. Festschrift für Andreas Kappeler*, ed. Guido Hausmann and Angela Rustemeyer (Wiesbaden, 2009), 39–49; Frank E. Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture,” in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, cultura, società / Mazepa and His Time: History, Culture, Society*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria, 2004), 39–53.
- 66 Mykola Horban', “‘Zapiski o Maloi Rossii’ O. Shafonskogo,” *Naukovyi zbirnyk Vseukraïns'koï akademii nauk. Istorychna sektsiia*, no. 26 (1926): 140; Shafon-skii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie*, 3.
- 67 As exemplified in the works of Iakiv Markovych and Mykhailo Antonovs'kyi.
- 68 Venelin, “O spore mezhdū iuzhanami i severianami naschet ikh rossizma,” 2; A. Levshin, *Pis'ma iz Malorossii* (Kharkiv, 1816).
- 69 Bohdan Hal', “Geokontsept ‘Malorosiia’ na mentalnykh mapakh XVIII – per-shoi polovyny XIX st.,” *Eidos* 7 (2013), 93–109; Anton Kotenko, “Construction of Ukrainian National Space by the Intellectuals of Russian Ukraine, 1860–70s,” in *Mapping Eastern Europe*, ed. J. Happel and Ch. Werdt (Münster, 2010), 37–60.
- 70 Paul Kubicek, *The History of Ukraine* (Connecticut–London, 2008), 45.
- 71 Kohut, *Making Ukraine*, 17, 48.
- 72 *Ukrains'ka literatura XVIII st. Poetychni tvory, dramatychni tvory, prozovi tvory* (Kyiv, 1983), 394.

- 73 "Vozrazhenie deputata Grigoriia Poletiki na 'Nastavlenie Malorossiiskoi kollegii' gospodinu deputatu Dmitriiu Natalinu," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh*, no. 3 (1858): 98.
- 74 P. Simonovskii, *Kratkoe opisanie o kazatskom malorossiiskom narode i o voennykh ego delakh* (Moscow, 1847), 2–3.
- 75 *Kratkaia letopis' Malyya Rossii s 1506 po 1776 god* (St Petersburg, 1777).
- 76 Maksimovich, *Novyi i polnyi geograficheskii slovar'*, 3:74, 112.
- 77 V. Gorlenko, "Iz istorii iuzhno-russkogo obshchestva nachala XIX veka (Pis'ma V.I. Chernysha, A.I. Chepy, V.G. Poletiki i zapiski k nim)," *Kievskaya starina*, no. 1 (1893): 53. See also: Oleh Zhurba, "'Predstav'te vy sebe, kakoi zver' byl getman! Eto byli prenechestivye despoty!': (z lysta svidomoho ukrains'koho patriota, avtonomista ta tradytsionalista pochatku XIX stolittia)," in *Dnipropetrovs'kyi arkhеоhrafichnyi zbirnyk* 3 (2009): 198.
- 78 This idea was shared, in particular, by Markov and the anonymous author of *Korotka istoriia Maloi Rosii*, written sometime in the late 1780s and early 1790s, a copy of which was published in 1926 by Mykola Horban'.
- 79 Gerard Miller, *Istoricheskie sochineniia o Malorossii i malorossiianakh* (Moscow, 1846), 2; Simonovskii, *Kratkoe opisanie o kazatskom malorossiiskom narode i o voennykh ego delakh*, 3; Georgi, *Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov*, 4:235–36; Stanislav Zarul'skii, *Opisanie o Maloi Rossii i Ukraine* (Moscow, 1847), 1; Iakov M. Markovich, *Zapiski o Malorossii, ee zhiteliakh i proizvedeniakh* (St Petersburg, 1798), 29.
- 80 Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie*, 44, 58.
- 81 Nikolai Ianovskii, *Novyi slovotolkovatel', raspolozhennyy po alfavitu*, vol. 2 (St Petersburg, 1803), nos. 1–3.
- 82 Koniskii, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*, 5, 128.
- 83 Zarul'skii, *Opisanie o Maloi Rossii i Ukraine*, 1–2.
- 84 Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie*, 61.
- 85 Markovich, *Zapiski o Malorossii, ee zhiteliakh i proizvedeniakh*, 29.
- 86 "Kratkoe istoricheskoe opisanie o Maloi Rossii do 1765 goda," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh*, no. 6 (1848): 1.
- 87 Mikhail Markov, "Pis'mo k odnomu iz izdatelei (F-mu)," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 8 (1816): 132; Illia Kvitka, "O Maloi Rossii," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 2 (1816): 145–6; Illia Kvitka, "O Maloi Rossii," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 3 (1816): 304–14.
- 88 Aleksei Musin-Pushkin, *Istoricheskoe issledovanie o mestopolozhenii drevnego rossiiskogo Tmutarakanskogo kniazheniia* (St Petersburg, 1794), ix–xi.
- 89 *Geograficheskoe metodicheskoe opisanie Rossiiskoi Imperii s nadlezhashchim vvedeniem k osnovatel'nomu poznaniuu zemnogo shara i Evropy voobshche, dlia nastavleniia obuchaiushchegosia pri Imperatorskom Moskovskom Universitete*

- iunoshestva iz luchshikh noveishikh i dostovernnykh pisatelei*, ed. Khariton Chebotarev (Moscow, 1776), 103–4.
- 90 Karl German, *Statisticheskiia izsledovaniia otnositel'no Rossiiskoi imperii* (St Petersburg, 1819), 37; Konstantin Arsen'ev, *Nachertanie statistiki Rossiiskago gosudarstva*, vol. 1, *Trudy uchenykh ili literatura rossiiskoi statistiki* (St Petersburg, 1818); Konstantin Arsen'ev, *Nachertanie statistiki Rossiiskago gosudarstva*, vol. 2, *O sostoianii pravitel'stva* (St Petersburg, 1819), 107–8.
- 91 Vasilii Ruban, *Kratkie geograficheskie, politicheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia o Maloi Rossii, s priobshcheniem ukrainskikh traktov i izvestii o pochtaikh, takozh spiska dukhovnykh i svetskikh tamo nakhodiashchikhsia nyne chinov, chisle naroda i prochaia* (St Petersburg, 1773), 1–2.
- 92 Koniskii, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*, 8, 16, 177–9, 186.
- 93 Georgi, *Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov*, 4: 338–9.
- 94 *Ukraina i Rosiia v istorychnii retrospektyvi*, vol. 1, *Ukrains'ki proekty v Rosiis'kii imperii*, ed. V.A. Smolii (Kyiv, 2004), 266–310; Oleksii Tolochko, “Fellows and Travelers: Thinking about Ukrainian History in the Early Nineteenth Century,” in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, ed. H.V. Kas'ianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest, 2009), 149–66.
- 95 N. Ianovskii, *Novyi slovotolkovatel', raspolozhennyi po alfavitu*, 3 vols (St Petersburg, 1803–06).
- 96 David B. Saunders, “Historians and Concepts of Nationality in Early Nineteenth-Century Russia,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 60, no. 1 (1982): 50.
- 97 Nikolai Markevich, *Ukrainskie melodii* (Moscow, 1832), V.
- 98 Markevich, *Istoriia Malorossii*, 1: 3.
- 99 *Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukraïny im. V.I. Vernads'koho* (Manuscript Institute of the V.I. Vernads'kyi National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – IR NBU), f. 14, spr. 4978, ark. 17
- 100 Hillis, *Children of Rus'*, 41.
- 101 “Malorusomania” among Galician intellectuals had acquired vivid ethnic-cultural, not historical, meaning, see Oleh Turii, “Ukrains'ka ideia v Halychyni v seredyni XIX stolittia,” *Ukraina Moderna*, nos 2–3 (1999), accessed 18 November 2020, <http://prima.lnu.edu.ua/Subdivisions/um/um2-3/Statti/3-TURIJ%20Oleh.htm>.
- 102 Boeck, “What’s in a Name?” 41.
- 103 O. Ohloblyn, “Problema skhemy istorii Ukraïny XIX–XX stolittia (do 1917 roku),” *Ukrains'kyi istoryk*, no. 1/2 (1971): 11; Aleksei Miller, Anton Kotenko, and Ol'ga Martyniuk, “Neulovimy maloross: istoricheskaia spravka,” *Rossiia v global'noi politike* 16, no. 2/3 (2018): 106–22.

- 104 Kappeler, "Great Russians" and "Little Russians," 14.
- 105 Volodymyr Kravchenko, "I.-Kh. Engel: storinky z istorii prosvitnyts'koi istori-ohrafiï Ukraïny," in I.-Kh. Engel, *Istoriia Ukraïny ta Ukraïns'kykh kozakiv* (Kharkiv, 2014), 7–24.
- 106 Miller, *Istoricheskie sochineniia o Malorossii i malorossiianakh*, 34; Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie*, 49; Aleksandr Rigel'man, *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii i ee narode i kazakakh voobshche* (Moscow, 1847), 12.
- 107 Evgenii Bolkhovitinov, *Opisanie Kievosofiiskogo sobora i Kievskoi eparkhii* (Kyiv, 1825), 204, 214, 247; Tadeusz Chatskii, "O nazvanii Ukrainy i o nachale kozakov," *Ulei*, no. 11 (1811): 118–27.
- 108 Markov, "Pis'mo k odnomu iz izdatelei (F-mu)," 135.
- 109 "Kratkoe istoricheskoe opisanie o Maloi Rossii do 1765 goda," 27, 29–30; Ianovskii, *Novyi slovotolkovatel', raspolozhennyi po alfavitu*, 2:234; Maksym Berlyns'kyi, *Istoriia mista Kyieva* (Kyiv, 1991), 119–20, 126.
- 110 Evdokim Ziablovskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Rossiiskoi imperii v nyneshnem eia sostoianii s predvaritel'nymi poniatiiami o statistike i o Evrope voobshche v statisticheskom vide*, vol. 1/3 (St Petersburg, 1808), 5; Arsen'ev, *Nachertanie statistiki Rossiiskago gosudarstva*, 2:107–8.
- 111 Taras Chuhlib, "Poniattia "Ukraïna" ta "Ukrainnyi" v ofitsiinomu dyskursi Viis'ka Zaporoz'koho (1649–1659)," in *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi*, no. 15 (2015): 13–41.
- 112 IR NBU, f. 14, spr. 4978, ark. 8–9.
- 113 Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie*, 15; V. Gorlenko, *Stanovlenie ukrainskoi etnografii kontsa XVIII–pervoi poloviny XIX st.* (Kyiv, 1988), 72–3.
- 114 Serhii Plokhyy, "Ukraine or Little Russia? Revisiting an Early Nineteenth-Century Debate," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 48, no. 3/4 (2006): 348, 351.
- 115 Koniskii, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*, iii.
- 116 Ibid.
- 117 Ibid., iii–iv.
- 118 Koniskii, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*, 68–73, 179. However, on several occasions it was used separately as "Ukraine" with the same meaning, see Koniskii, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*, 183, 208. See Frank Sysyn's analysis of the text of Bila Tserkva's proclamation in *Istoriia Rusov* in Sysyn, "The Persistence of the Little Russian Fatherland in the Russian Empire."
- 119 Koniskii, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*, 208.
- 120 Ibid., 161.
- 121 Ibid., 172.

- 122 Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850*, 262; Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, 56.
- 123 Ziablovskii, *Statisticheskoe opisanie Rossiiskoi imperii*, 1/3: 128.
- 124 M.V. Nechkina, *Dvizhenie dekabristov*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1955), 389, 423.
- 125 Johann Georg Kohl, *Russia: St Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkoff, Riga, Odessa, the German Provinces on the Baltic, the Steppes, the Crimea, and the Interior of the Empire* (London, 1844), 186, 1842, 505.
- 126 Sergei Beliakov, “Taras Bul'ba' mezhdU Ukrainoi i Rossiei. O national'noi identichnosti geroia Gogolia,” *Voprosy literatury*, no. 6 (2017): 198.
- 127 Elena Apanovich, *Rukopisnaia svetskaia kniga XVIII v. na Ukraine: istoricheskie sborniki* (Kyiv, 1983), 189, 192, 199.
- 128 O. Dziuba, “‘Ukraïna’ i ‘Malorosiia’: slova i poniattia v ukraïns'kii memuaranii literaturi XVIII st.,” *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi*, no. 15 (2015): 45–52.
- 129 Evdokim Ziablovskii, *Zemleopisanie Rossiiskoi imperii dlia vsekh sostoianii*, vol. 3 (St Petersburg, 1810), 339.
- 130 [Karl] German, *Statisticheskiiia izsledovaniia otnositel'no Rossiiskoi imperii*, 37.
- 131 Dmitrii Bagalei, *Opyt istorii Khar'kovskogo universiteta (po neizdannym materialam)*, vol. 2 (Kharkiv, 1904), 773.
- 132 Boeck, “What’s in a Name?,” 33–65.
- 133 *Ibid.*, 37.
- 134 Guillaume de Beauplan, *Opisanie Ukrainy* (St Petersburg, 1832), vi.
- 135 *Sbornik imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, vol. (1871): 375.
- 136 G. Kalinovskii, *Opisanie svadebnykh ukrainskikh prostonarodnykh obriadov* (St Petersburg, 1777).
- 137 Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, 202–3.
- 138 G. Kvitka-Osnovianenko, “Ukraintsy,” in *Sochineniia*, vol. 4, *Statt'i istoricheskie* (Kharkiv, 1890), 461.
- 139 Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnov'ianenko, “Ved'ma,” in *Zibrannia tvoriv*, 7 vols (Kyiv, 1979), 2:430–40.
- 140 Nikolai Markevich, *Ukrainskie melodii* (Moscow, 1831), 102.
- 141 O. Somov, *Golos ukraintsa pri vesti o vziatii Varshavy* (St Petersburg, 1831).
- 142 *Narodzhennia kraïny. Vid kraïu do derzhavy*, 87–8; Volodymyr Masliichuk, “‘Vid Ukraïny do Malorosiï’: Regional'ni nazvy ta natsional'na istoriia,” in *Ukraïna: protsesy natsiotvorennia*, ed. Andreas Kappeler (Kyiv, 2011), 240–1, 243.
- 143 M.L. Honcharuk, ed., *Ukraïns'ki poety-romantyky: poetychni tvory* (Kyiv, 1987), 68, 87, 143, 144, 146.

- 144 O. Shpyhots'kyi, "Malorossiiskaia melodiia (1831)," in *Ukrains'ki poety-romantyky: poetychni tvory*, ed. M.L. Honcharuk (Kyiv, 1987), 87; Hillis, *Children of Rus'*, 45.
- 145 Ilnytzyj, review of *Children of Rus'*; Boeck, "What's in a Name?," 68.
- 146 Markevich, *Istoriia Malorossii*, 1:134–5, 186, 300, 382.
- 147 Ibid., 2:67, 280.
- 148 Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, 56.
- 149 Anton Kotsipinskii, *Pesni, dumki i shumki russkogo naroda na Podole, Ukraine i v Malorossii* (Kyiv, 1861).
- 150 *Ukrains'ka literatura XVIII st.*, 77–9, 82–4.
- 151 M.V. Leskinen, "'Iuzhnorussy', 'malorossiiane', 'malorossy', 'ukraintsy': transformatsiia etnonima v rossiiskom etnogeograficheskom diskurse XIX v.," in *Imia naroda: Ukraina i ee naselenie v ofitsial'nykh i nauchnykh terminakh*, 77–102; K.S. Drozdov, "Ukrainskoe naselenie Rossii/RSFSR v kontse XIX–XX v.: 'malorossy', 'khokhly', 'ukraintsy'," in *Imia naroda: Ukraina i ee naselenie v ofitsial'nykh i nauchnykh terminakh*, 103–25; Sergei Beliaikov, "'Taras Bul'ba' mezhdU Ukrainoi i Rossiei. O natsional'noi identichnosti geroia Gogolia," 39–41; Vulpis, "Slova i liudi v imperii," 353–8; Andreas Kappeler, "Mazepintsy, Malorossy, Khokhly: Ukrainians in the Ethnic Hierarchy of the Russian Empire," in *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600–1945*, ed. Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn, and Mark Von Hagen (Edmonton Toronto, 2003), 162–81.
- 152 Iu. Venelin, *Ob istochnike narodnoi poezii voobshche, i o iuzhnorusskoi v osobennosti* (Moscow, 1834), 9, 17.
- 153 Boeck, "What's in a Name?," 43.
- 154 Mykola Riabchuk, "'Khokhly', 'Malorosy', 'Bandery': stereotyp ukraintsia u rosiis'kii kul'turi ta ioho politychna instrumentalizatsiia," *Naukovi zapysky IPIEND im. V. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy* 81, no. 1 (2016): 179–94.
- 155 Vasilii Karazin, *Sochineniia, pis'ma i bumagi* (Kharkiv, 1910), 484–5, 584, 600.
- 156 One can compare the Ukrainian case to many others all over the world in William Safran, "Names, Labels, and Identities," 437–61. However, the author's interpretation of the "Ukrainian" ethnonym cannot but seem a bit eccentric, see 446–7.
- 157 Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, 153.
- 158 "I have to tell you that I myself do not know which kind of soul I have, the soul of a *khokhol* or of a Russian. I know only that I never would give preference to the 'Little Russian' before the Russian nor to the Russian before the 'Little Russian.'" See Kappeler, "Great Russians" and "Little Russians," 29.

- 159 Kappeler, "Mazepintsy, Malorossy, Khokhly," 168, 174.
- 160 Taras Koznarsky, "Kharkiv Literary Almanacs of the 1830s: The Shaping of Ukrainian Cultural Identity" (PhD Diss., Harvard University, 2001), 82.
- 161 Iurii Petrenko, *Strana Khokhliandiia* (Voronezh, 2000).
- 162 Sergei Beliaikov, *Ukrainskaia natsiia v epokhu Gogolia* (Moscow, 2016), 8.
- 163 Beliaikov, *Ukrainskaia natsiia v epokhu Gogolia*, 10; I.S. Aksakov, *Pis'ma k rodnym, 1844–49*, ed. T.F. Pirozhkova (Moscow, 1988), 401.
- 164 Artur Kijas, *Polacy na Uniwersytecie Charkowskim 1805–1917* (Poznań, 2016), 53; *Perepiska Ia. K. Grota s P. A. Pletnevym*, vol. 1, ed. K. Ia. Grot (St Petersburg, 1896), 242.
- 165 Kotenko, "Construction of Ukrainian National Space," 41.
- 166 Bilenyk, *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, 53–4, 153.
- 167 For Hrushevs'kyi's discussion of the various names for Ukrainian and Ukrainians, see Mykhailo Hruhevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol.1, *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century*, trans. Marta Skorupsky, ed. Frank E. Sysyn and Andrzej Poppe (Edmonton-Toronto, 1997), 1–2.
- 168 Iurii Shevel'ov, "Nazva 'Ukraïna,'" in Iurii Shevel'ov, *Movoznavstvo*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 2008), 421–31; Boeck, "What's in a Name?," 43–6.
- 169 Boeck, "What's in a Name?," 48.
- 170 Kappeler, "Great Russians" and "Little Russians."
- 171 Plokhyy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 302.
- 172 Mikhail Pogrebinskii, "Ukrainorusy: ideologicheskie i politicheskie orientatsii," *Russkii zhurnal*, 7 June (2004), accessed 18 November 2020, <http://www.russ.ru/pole/Ukrainorusy-ideologicheskie-i-politicheskie-orientatsii>; Oleg Nemenskii, "'Nedoukraintsy' ili novyi narod? Al'ternativy samoopredelenia Iugo-Vostoka Ukrainy," *Russkii zhurnal*, 29 December (2004), accessed 18 November 2020, http://old.russ.ru/culture/20041229_nem-pr.html.
- 173 According to Roman Szporluk, "In many ways these intellectuals were simultaneously Ukrainian and Russian," see Roman Szporluk, "Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," *Daedalus* 126, no. 3 (1997), 98; Paul Robert Magocsi noticed that: "it seemed 'perfectly normal for some residents to be simultaneously a Little Russian (Ukrainian) and a Russian,'" see Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* XVI, nos 1–2 (1989): 51.

From the “Russian Jerusalem” to the “Slavic Pompeii”

OLEKSII TOLOCHKO

Looking back at his childhood memories of Kyiv (at the end of the eighteenth century), Baron Filipp Vigel wrote: “In those days, Kyiv was a border city and virtually the capital of Little Russia; troops were stationed around it; to it flocked military officials, Ukrainian landowners for business and litigation purposes, devout Great Russian nobles with their families to worship the holy relics, and, finally, just travelers who visited southern Russia for pleasure then as they visit foreign lands now.”¹

Kyiv was regarded as the culmination of the “Little Russian tour” – without visiting the Old Rus' capital, without worshipping at the Kyiv shrines, it was unlikely that the trip would have been considered even remotely successful.

Russian travelers found two cities in Little Russia where they authentically experienced their own history. The first was Poltava, the site of Peter I's famous victory over Sweden's Charles XII. Russia, as it still believed at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was born “of the genius of Peter.” On the Poltava battlefield, the traveler could feel present at the birth pangs of the great empire.

This, however, was the “new” Russia, European and enlightened. To touch the source of “ancient” Russia, the traveler went to Kyiv.

The trip to Kyiv – without question, part of general fashion – had, however, a deeper meaning as well. As he approached the city, the traveler began to notice a crowd of pilgrims around him, and the closer to Kyiv one got, the larger the crowd. The traveler met pilgrims everywhere: at post houses, in towns and villages, on the roads; along with a throng of worshippers, the traveler crossed the Dniipro

near Kyiv. He became a part of the mass of religious pilgrims and – willingly or not – he began to think of himself as a pilgrim to the holy sites.

Kyiv was just about the largest center of pilgrimage in the Russian Empire. Its Orthodox shrines and relics – the Kyivan Cave Monastery (*Pechers'ka Lavra*) with the relics of saintly monks in caves, Saint Michael's (Golden-Domed) Monastery (*Mykhailivs'kyi monastyr*) with the relics of Saint Barbara – prompted tens of thousands of pilgrims to set out annually from all corners of the empire. Some of the travelers believed that there were up to a hundred thousand worshippers in Kyiv. The peak of the Kyiv pilgrimage fell on the patronal feast day of the Cave Monastery – the Dormition of the Mother of God. Worshippers went on pilgrimage to Kyiv to fulfill a vow they had taken once, in the hope of being healed by the holy relics or to atone for their sins. Kyiv was considered to be a place where a person was able to atone for a crime, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, for some who were guilty before the law, residence in Kyiv was even a substitute for their criminal sentence. Thus, for example, Aleksandr Annenkov, one of the first Kyiv “archaeologists,” found himself in the city, for especially cruel treatment of peasants; later, worshipping in Kyiv replaced imprisonment for the killer of Mikhail Lermontov – Nikolai Martynov.

The significance of Kyiv and the pilgrimage to Kyiv for the collective consciousness of Ukrainians was very accurately conveyed by Ivan Pereverzev, the author of the *Topographical Description of the Kharkiv Vicegerency* (*Topograficheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskogo namestnichestva*) published in 1788:

The inhabitants of southern Russia, separated from one another by distance, by various governing bodies, by social customs, by language, and some by religion (the Union), attract the eye of the spectator, who is not without knowledge of what he is seeing noting. When they gather to worship in Kyiv from the east, from the Volga and the Don, from the west, from Galicia and Lodomeria and places that lie closer to Kyiv, they see one another not as foreign, but as seemingly kindred, albeit considerably distant in words and deeds, which seems a strange phenomenon to both sides; but, in general, all these scattered compatriots still retain filial respect for the mother of their ancient home, the city of Kyiv.²

The usual metaphor for Kyiv in the travel diaries of the nineteenth century, as well as in the memoirs of travelers, was the “Russian Jerusalem.”

Worship at the shrines of Kyiv was almost the main purpose of visits to Kyiv by royal personages, sporadic during the eighteenth century and increasingly frequent in the first half of the nineteenth century. In Kyiv, a standard route, as it were, was worked out for “worshippers born to the purple”: the Kyivan Cave

Monastery with a tour of the Dormition Cathedral, Saint Sophia Cathedral, Saint Michael's (Golden-Domed) Monastery, the caves, and Saint Andrew's Church. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, such "sightseeing tours" by royal personages came to be called "the way of the pilgrim." Catherine II, who during her three-month stay in Kyiv had to have walked the route more than once, stood at numerous liturgies, and listened to more than one homily, could barely contain her irritation at "boring Kyiv," but dutifully performed the appropriate rituals. During the time of Alexander I, and especially of Nicholas I, the imperial family visited Kyiv regularly. How such activity was perceived by contemporaries is apparent from the title of the brochure published on the occasion of the visit to Kyiv in 1837 of the Grand Duke Alexander Nikolaievich – "Report of the Visit to the Holy Sites of Kyiv by the Pious Heir of the Sovereign Tsarevich and Grand Duke Alexander Nikolaievich." Such "descriptions" of pilgrimages were written after each visit (even Metropolitan Evgenii Bolkhovitinov was the author of one of them).

Whatever the traveler's motives for traveling through Little Russia, approaching Kyiv, he began to imagine himself a pilgrim, to feel in his soul religious delight at his imminent visit to the Orthodox shrines of Kyiv. Added to the religious feeling was the experience of a picturesque landscape.

As a rule, travelers approached Kyiv from the Left Bank, and the majestic panorama of the "golden-domed city," which opened before their eyes, set a mystical mood from the start: "In the western part of the sky, above a gray bank of fog, Kyiv opened. The holy city stood as if in the air or in the sky, and the rays of the rising sun, burning on its golden-domed churches, presented a magnificent and new sight on earth!"³

Not a single traveler missed the opportunity to pour out on the pages of his travel journal exalted impressions of contemplating "the eternity-competing stronghold of Russia" (Otto von Gun), "the holy city" (Glagolev). Prince Ivan Dolgorukov entered Kyiv in 1810 from the opposite side, but on the way back he, too, "took a last look at the whole of Kyiv. There is nothing more beautiful than this sight; I was beside myself with it and could not contain my delight."⁴ Nature and the Creator came to the mind of Oleksii Levshin at his first sight of Kyiv: "The sight of the city in which our forefathers first became aware of the idea of the Almighty Creator, the sight of the temples of God, which conceal so much that is sacred, and nature exulting in the rising sun, aroused in me lofty and pleasant feelings."⁵

In 1832, on the way to the "Southwestern Region," where he was to "rebuild" educational institutions after the Polish uprising, Ivan Sbitnev visited Kyiv. His "travel notes" perfectly convey the state of semi-religious ecstasy, semi-antiquarian enthusiasm, that the traveler experienced on his approach to Kyiv:

Is it possible to approach Kyiv with indifference, especially for the first time, as I did then, this once rich city, where the core of Russia's state life developed, where Christianity began, which quickly spread through the Slavic tribes! With a sense of reverence, I visited the Cave Monastery and worshiped the holy relics of the saints in the Near and Far Caves; I also visited the Cathedrals of Saint Sophia, Saint Michael, and Saint Nicholas and the Brotherhood Monastery. With trepidation, with a feeling of awe, I approached the place in the ravine where Prince Volodymyr baptized his people into Christianity.⁶

Meanwhile, more and more travelers from the capital went to Kyiv not with a religious purpose, but with an archaeological one. The end of the eighteenth century was marked by the discovery of the classical antiquities of the Northern Black Sea region. With the addition of the newly annexed Oriental lands of the Ottoman Porte and Crimean Khanate, Russia suddenly became the owner of the remnants of an ancient civilization. The discovery of the ruins of Greek cities intrigued and excited the imagination of antiquarians and scholars. Little Russia seemed a natural road to the classical cities of the Black Sea region. The remains of ancient Olbia were discovered on Illia Bezborod'ko's estate Parutyne (Illinske). Prince Dolgorukov visited there and examined them, and Iulian Nemtsevich saw antique objects obtained there in the possession of the residents of Odesa.⁷ Aleksandr Ermolaev and Konstantin Borozdin examined artifacts brought from Parutyne at another of the count's estates near Chernihiv. Shortly before this, the scholarly world of Russia experienced a kind of first scientific sensation: in 1793, an ancient Rus' inscription was found on Taman Peninsula, where the ancient Phanagoria was believed to have been located. The man who had made the find, Pavel Pustoshkin, was living out his life "in the happy climate of Little Russia" as a retired vice-admiral. In 1816 Oleksii Levshin visited him in Lubny and examined his collection of Italian paintings. The finding of the "Stone of Tmutorokan" was an extraordinary discovery: not only did it finally solve one of the greatest disputes in eighteenth-century historiography (about the location of the old Rus' Tmutorokan), but it also promised similar finds in the future attesting to the Rus' presence in the Black Sea region. The stone, however, aroused a different kind of controversy: some considered it a forgery. It is not surprising that the first archaeological expedition to Ukraine – led by Borozdin and Ermolaev in 1810 – was designed to reach the Taman Peninsula and find there more reliable remnants of the Rus' presence.

The secular opening of Kyiv thus followed in the steps of religious pilgrimage, and the first travelers to the city were as much pious pilgrims to holy places as tourists interested in history and historical rarities. In 1823 Mikhail Speranskii,

about to go to Chernihiv, wrote: "Maybe from there, being in the vicinity, I will take a look at Kyiv and its sacred *antiquities*."⁸ "Antiquities" is emphasized, but its placement next to "sacredness" is not accidental. Fashion, pilgrimage, and archaeological research combined in the early nineteenth century to bring about the "opening of Kyiv" to the Russian public.

The term "opening" in this case is not just a metaphor. Despite the fact that Kyiv (along with the rest of Little Russia) was part of the Russian state since the middle of the seventeenth century, information about it among the Russian public until the beginning of the nineteenth century remained very, shall we say, theoretical, literary. Kyiv occupied an extremely important place in Russian history and, in general, in the public consciousness, but knowledge about the real city of Kyiv was extremely limited. Most well-read travelers considered Kyiv to be as it appeared on the pages of the chronicle – a magnificent capital. When they went to Kyiv, they expected to find visible and obvious traces of ancient greatness: cathedrals and palaces, or at least impressive remnants of these structures, noble ruins like those of Pompeii or Herculaneum.

Catherine II was the first "scholarly" traveler to Kyiv. She considered herself a decent historian, had written her own version of the history of Kyivan Rus' just before the trip, and generally knew as much about Kyiv as could be known in the eighteenth century. The empress prepared for the trip carefully. In 1785 a brief note on Kyivan antiquities was compiled for her, and in 1786 (before the beginning of her travels!) a book was published under the title "The Journey of Her Imperial Majesty to the Southern Land of Russia, Undertaken in 1787," which set out the history of the city and provided a brief description of its antiquities and topography. Unfortunately, nothing is known about Catherine's expectations of the city, but the tone of her letters from Kyiv indicated disappointment: there were no antiquities in Kyiv, just as there was no ancient city itself. In letters to her son Paul, to Friedrich Melchior, Baron von Grimm, and to other recipients, the empress complained repetitiously and in almost the same words that she is "searching for and cannot find" Kyiv: "This is a strange city: it consists entirely of fortifications and suburbs, and I still can't find the city itself; yet, in all probability, it was at least as big as Moscow in the old days."⁹ The empress wrote the same to her son: "Since I have been here, I have been searching for the city, but I have not yet found anything except two fortresses and suburbs; all these scattered parts are called Kyiv, and make one think of the past greatness of this ancient capital."¹⁰

Count Louis Philippe de Ségur, who accompanied the empress on her southern journey along with other envoys, approached Kyiv with similar expectations of finding the remains of the historical city: "Approaching Kyiv, you feel that special sense of respect that the sight of ruins always inspires. In addition, the picturesque

location of this city lends charm to the first impression; looking at it, you remember that here is the cradle of a great state, which was long in ignorance, from which it freed itself no more than a hundred years ago, and now has become so huge and powerful.”¹¹ The count was also deceived in his expectations. After a tour of the city (“when we explored this ancient capital with its surroundings”), when Catherine asked about the impression that Kyiv makes, the count replied: “Kyiv represents the memory and hopes of a great city.”¹² This aphorism very aptly conveys what Kyiv was and how it was seen by travelers: the contemporary city meant nothing; it was presented in its former splendor and power in hope of their restoration. Kyiv existed only in the past and in the future.

The search for ruins was not out of place in Kyiv. The contrast between the impressive image of the city in the annals and chronicles and its actual deplorable state of a small town always accompanied Kyiv. In the literature of the Polish Renaissance, this contributed to the appearance of the topos of ruins as the distinguishing feature of Kyiv. Ruins in a single image explained what Kyiv once was and what happened to it later.

Not everyone who wrote in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries about the ruins of Kyiv had actually visited the city. Those who had been there had seen more than enough ruins. Drawings by Abraham van Westerfeld made in 1651 indicate that there were still many relics of the past left in the city, quite impressive in size. If the fashion for the Little Russian tour had started a century earlier, travelers would have enjoyed plenty of mysterious and melancholy ruins. Visible remains of Old Rus' buildings began to disappear rapidly from the Kyiv landscape at the turn of the seventeenth to eighteenth century. The inhabitants of the city regarded the sites of ancient buildings as quarries from which they obtained building material. The relatively peaceful time and the material consolidation of the Orthodox Church promoted new construction in the city. In the second half of the seventeenth to the early eighteenth century, the walls of Old Rus' churches and cathedrals were dismantled for repair and renovation of other buildings so thoroughly that sometimes stone was removed even from the foundation ditches. The “reconstruction” and “restoration” of Kyiv shrines, begun by Petro Mohyla and continued by his successors, destroyed more remnants of ancient Rus' than during all previous centuries combined. The Golden Gate was relatively more fortunate: it served as the entrance to Kyiv for the entire time, but it gradually fell into disrepair, threatened to collapse, and its remains were covered with earth in 1750.¹³ By the middle of the eighteenth century, nothing in the appearance of Kyiv was reminiscent of antiquity. When in 1760, in compliance with a Senate decree, an order was issued to write a “Description” of the city, its author stated: “In Kyiv, almost no traces of the remaining ruins of the old fortified towns and hill-

forts are visible today, except that, according to popular reports, there was a sizable residence above the Lybid River."¹⁴

As of the second half of the eighteenth century, the traveler could no longer admire the romantic ruins of Kyiv. As he approached the ancient capital, he did not know this yet and expected a revelation from touching deepest antiquity and extraordinary sanctity. Disappointment set in pretty quickly.

In 1804, the famous Metropolitan Platon of Moscow visited Kyiv. He also kept a travel journal, which was published in 1813. The metropolitan, of course, was primarily a pious pilgrim, but – in the spirit of the times – combined pilgrimage with an archaeological tour. He visited all the religious shrines of Kyiv, but being a well-read person who was interested in history, he always wrote down historical information about them, as well as his own impressions and conclusions.

Platon was shown the sites and remains of ancient history. On Askold's Grave, where the first blood of Old Rus' history was spilled and, according to tradition, Princess Olha built the Church of Saint Nicholas, Platon saw "a small stone church, already on the verge of dilapidation, but the structure is not old."¹⁵ The site, however, was picturesque, and the metropolitan allowed himself to be persuaded. In Kyiv itself, he was shown the Golden Gate and the Church of Saint George. He was told about the gate that "atop it stood a gilded angel, which was then and is now the coat of arms of Kyiv."¹⁶ The gate that the learned metropolitan examined was most likely new, built after 1750.¹⁷ At the foot of the hills, Platon was shown the site called "Khreshchatyk," containing a spring, and told that it was precisely here that Volodymyr baptized his sons.¹⁸ The pavilion over the spring was built in 1802 (in 1804, a monument to the Baptism was erected there, about which von Gun remarked dryly: "Architecture and taste in this monument do not captivate the eye").

The metropolitan was disappointed by Kyiv:

It is very remarkable that although the [Saint] Sophia, Cave Monastery [Dormition], Saint Nicholas's Cathedrals, and others, not only in Kyiv but also in Chernihiv [...] are ancient, and others more than 700 years old, and where we would expect to find traces of antiquity, we clearly see that in all those churches, the icons, iconostases, painted walls are all a display of antiquity, but it appears that they were painted and made either recently or in the seventeenth or eighteenth century.¹⁹

The metropolitan's overall conclusion was pessimistic: there were more "antiquities" to be found in Moscow: "It is clear that various enemy depredations destroyed everything ancient and necessitated rebuilding everything."²⁰

Even Kyiv's greatest "antiquity," the Church of the Tithes, inspired doubts. The metropolitan knew from the Chronicle that Volodymyr had erected a splendid building. What Platon saw made him think: is this really what we are talking about? The Church of the Tithes "has no external or internal splendor, and the structure does not seem to be that old. And therefore, whether it is that famous Church of the Tithes, and whether it stood in this place, is something that I leave to other, local scholars to tackle with greater curiosity."²¹

Ironically, the metropolitan recognized the Transfiguration Church in Berestove as the only real antiquity in Kyiv. This he determined by the "al fresco" and the Greek inscriptions.²² The church's appearance, frescoes, and inscriptions all date to the time of Petro Mohyla.

Kyiv made exactly the same impression of "newness" on another pious tourist – Prince Dolgorukov. Six years after Metropolitan Platon, he was led along the same route and shown the same, mostly fictional, evidence of ancient history. Askold's "dilapidated" grave was already demolished, and in its place the prince saw "a round stone church with a dome in the new fashion," and he therefore doubted whether this had really been Askold's burial.²³ The prince also inspected the Church of the Tithes and

he sighed at the sight of its desolation and poverty; there is nothing anymore to attract the eye, everything has fallen into decay; imagination alone gives value to both the site and the church. It is unquestionable that from such remote times, the Tatars, the Poles, and the fires all left their mark on the Church of the Tithes, and from a most magnificent [structure] brought it to its wretched state. But I never thought that it would be as abandoned and despised as I found it.²⁴

From the Church of the Tithes, the Prince went to inspect another building supposedly from the time of Volodymyr – the Church of the Three Holy Hierarchs (*Tr'iokhsviatytel's'ka*), built on a hill where Perun and the rest of the pagan idols used to stand: "The church is old, but not ancient. It is likely that all these historically famous churches have already been restored several times after the destruction of Kyiv, and some have been completely rebuilt: it is enough if, at least, the places where historical events took place have been preserved."²⁵ Metropolitan Platon doubted this: Nestor wrote that Perun stood on a hill, but there is no hill there: "is this compatible with the truth, we cannot say."

While Metropolitan Platon compared the antiquity of Kyiv with Moscow's, Prince Dolgorukov compared it with Novgorod's. But the comparison was also not in favor of the ancient capital of Rus': "Kyiv is old, but its antiquity is not as

visible, not as tangible, as Novgorod's. There the centuries are clearly depicted on every church building, on every bell tower spire, and they testify to the longevity of that city; here everything is something new, more fashion, less age."²⁶

The most prepared of all the early travelers to recognize "antiquities," Ermolaev, was in Kyiv in the same year of 1810 as Prince Dolgorukov. He shared the prince's overall impression of the city. About the Dormition Cathedral the archaeologist noted: "The main church of the Kyivan Cave Monastery no longer has its original appearance. Batu Khan's invasion and the fire of 1718 completely transformed it. It was reconstructed for the last time under Peter I, as can be seen from the exterior decorations." The Saint Sophia Cathedral appeared a little better: "The Cathedral of Saint Sophia, although now also not in the same state as when it was built in 1037 by Grand Prince Iaroslav [the Wise], generally suffered less than the Kyivan Cave Monastery." The Church of the Tithes and the Church of the Three Holy Hierarchs (Saint Basil's) made a very depressing impression on Ermolaev:

The Church of the Tithes would have been even more interesting, but there was only one view left of it. I deduced this from the remains of a Slavic inscription embedded in the wall, which I cannot read because of the loss of many letters and the scrambled state of the rest; moreover, the handwriting style of the letters themselves is not of the age of Volodymyr. As for the Church of Saint Basil, built by Grand Prince Volodymyr I on the site where Perun once stood, it has now been so rebuilt that only a corner of its old walls is visible; and in order to erase its memory more quickly, it has been renamed in honor of the Three Hierarchs.

Prince Dolgorukov expressed himself even more critically in 1817: "In our days it is better to see the beautiful Kazan Cathedral on the Neva, with its splendid narthex, than Volodymyr's Church of the Tithes near the Dnipro, which has not preserved any beauty, [and] near which pigs graze among the weeds and wild herbs."²⁷

In an era when Kyivan archaeology had not even begun yet, churches really were almost the only "antiquities" available for contemplation. The disappointment of Russian travelers by their appearance was understandable: if Kyiv was the old capital of Rus', its antiquity was intuitively expected to resemble that of the old Great Russian cities – Novgorod, Moscow, and Vladimir. In Kyiv, all the main buildings were rebuilt in a style that would later be called "Ukrainian Baroque." This style clearly did not fit in with the image of "Russian" history and "Byzantine" Kyivan Rus'. This sometimes led to curious conclusions. Glagolev,

reflecting in 1823 on what Kyivan churches looked like, would try to “antiquate” them in a fantastical way. This architectural style, he would assert, was neither Gothic nor Byzantine, but probably an imitation of the taste of the Indian pagodas, to which it bore a striking resemblance. It was desirable that archaeologists determine its origin more precisely.²⁸

If the churches did not disappoint, the appearance of modern Kyiv, which for some reason was also expected to present the appropriate age-related grace and nobility, was disappointing. The same Sbitnev, who had left inspired lines about his anticipation of visiting Kyiv in 1832, wrote:

For all that, I must admit that the interior of Kyiv disappointed me. A lot of dilapidated, half-ruined huts in Pechersk, Khreshchatyk and Old Kyiv and crowds of Jews disfigure the city somewhat. If you take away from it the magnificent cathedrals and monasteries, buildings in the fortress, government agencies, high schools, and a score of private houses, Kyiv becomes an insignificant city ... Could I have ever thought that this populous city, visited by the inhabitants of almost all of Russia, standing on such a rich, navigable river, existing for almost fifteen centuries, and being for a long time the capital of the grand princes, had made so little progress in internal improvement?²⁹

The reason was ever the same familiar Kyiv problems – Tatars and Poles: “The reason for Kyiv’s slow march to prosperity, to which it has a full and deserved right, I believe, is the frequent destruction by the Tatars, internecine battles of the princes, and especially the oppression of Poland, under whose rule it has long suffered.”³⁰

Seven years before Sbitnev, Kyiv was visited by Aleksandr Griboedov. In letters from Kyiv, he admired its “antiquities,” imagined historical scenes, but, as he himself confessed, he “barely noticed the present age”:

Here I lived with the dead: the Volodymyrs and Iziaslavs completely captured my imagination; behind them I barely noticed the present age ... The scenery is magnificent; from the high bank of the Dnipro, the views change at every step; add to this the sanctity of the ruins, the gloom of the caves. How reverently you enter the darkness of the Cave Monastery or the Saint Sophia Cathedral, and the sense of spaciousness your soul experiences when you come out into the white light: the greenery, the poplars and vineyards, which we do not have!³¹

In Kyiv, as Prince Dolgorukov rightly noted, "only imagination gives value to both the place and the church." Imagination allowed Griboedov to talk about the "sanctity of the ruins," which, of course, he could not see. The same rich imagination led von Gun in 1806 to write: "Every step here is reminiscent of remote antiquity and every glance rests upon countless treasures. Here you think of having been transported to Italy, into the middle of Rome."³²

If anything, travelers "anticipated" the antiquities of Kyiv; they were ready to emotionally experience touching them, to "recognize" them in any feature of the old city, even if the visible and tangible remains could not be found.³³ This state of mind of antiquities seekers was perfectly conveyed by Count Nikolai Rumiantsev's letter after his first visit to the ancient capital of Rus':

Every state glories more in its antiquities, the more strongly they show the spirit of the people and the greatness of its feeling. Our blessed Fatherland so far excels all known peoples in spirit and in feelings, that it can glory in and be proud of its antiquities the more particularly. I myself experienced recently in Kyiv, the holy city of Olga and Vladimir, how pleasant it is to the heart of a son of the Fatherland to see its celebrated antiquities, treading in the tracks where the great once walked; how pleasant it is even to the most distant descendant to convey himself in thought to their centuries, hidden in the mists of time, bringing to life in his memory their deathless existence.³⁴

Travelers saw ruins only in their imagination, and their absence was compensated by special attention to nature and the landscape, descriptions of which for the most part fill the pages of their journals. If the city, the appearance of its churches, and the language of its inhabitants have changed, then at least nature has remained immutable and witnessed the beginning of history. The same mountains, the same river, were in Kyiv at the time when the Apostle Andrew came there; they saw the arrival of the first Varangian princes, the baptism of the Kyivans in the Pochaina River, the construction of a great city by Yaroslav, and, in a certain sense, it was the natural landscape of Kyiv that became a historical monument, proof that history happened.

Rumiantsev belonged to those people of the turn of the century who in their youth (1770s) made their own "Grand Tour." In St Petersburg, the Rumiantsev brothers met Friedrich Melchior, Baron von Grimm (the same person to whom Catherine complained about the lack of antiquities in Kyiv). Grimm took the trouble to take the brothers to Holland to study at Leiden University. From there, the Rumiantsevs went to Paris, and from France – via Switzerland (where they

met Voltaire in Geneva) – to Italy.³⁵ It can even be assumed that the “Society of the History and Antiquities of Russia,” sponsored by the count, was modeled on the famous “Society of Dilettanti.” Rumiantsev, therefore, had something to compare antiquities with. He saw a “real” reference model and tried to find something similar in Kyiv. The count initiated and paid for large geographical expeditions (such as the one on the eloquently named brig *Riurik* under the command of Captain Otto von Kotzebue, 1815–18), as well as a series of smaller “archaeological” expeditions (led by Pavel Stroeve and Konstantin Kalaidovich). In the last years of his life, despite his poor health, Rumiantsev himself made a number of trips to see antiquities (to the Caucasus and Crimea, 1823; Novgorod, Moscow, and Kyiv; the Resurrection Monastery, Volok, Gorodishche, Staritsa, and Rzhev, 1822). In addition, the count was one of the biggest collectors of historical rarities, which later formed the basis of the Rumiantsev Museum.

Starting from 1815, Rumiantsev corresponded with perhaps the only expert in Kyiv antiquities of the time, Berlyn's'kyi.³⁶ The Kyiv antiquarian sent the count descriptions of documents and materials pertaining to the history of Kyiv “mainly [...] during the period of Polish rule,” but Rumiantsev was interested in something completely different: he asked Berlyn's'kyi “to find something that relates to the times of primeval Kyiv.” In response to the plan of Kyiv sent him by Berlyn's'kyi with “an interesting interpretation of those places, sites, and religious buildings mentioned in our ancient chronicle,” the count outlined a whole program of archaeological research: “Do not lose sight of the fact that the most primitive times in our histories are those that I would like to see explained and supplemented; please look for the tombstone inscriptions around and inside the ruins of the most ancient destroyed and forgotten churches and monasteries, whose memory you restore so successfully in your note.”

Rumiantsev hoped to find ancient manuscripts: perhaps the parchment chronicle of Nestor (for, indeed, where else could it be preserved in its original state, if not in Kyiv?), ancient letters, originals of the *Kyivan Cave Patericon*, possibly *Russkaia Pravda* (*Rus' Law*), old lists of metropolitans, *synodiks*, for example, of the *Kytaïvs'ka Pustyn* (Monastery), where they prayed for their founder, Andrei Bogoliubskii.³⁷ This correspondence demonstrates not only the then rather superficial knowledge of Kyiv's history, but, mainly, how high the expectations of Russian antiquarians were of Kyiv's antiquities. Like every European, Rumiantsev believed that the natives had simply forgotten their history. Their past was much better known to specialists in the capitals, and all that was needed was to push the lazy aborigines to energetic work, and rarities of extraordinary antiquity would be found.

Exaggerated expectations sooner or later turn into disappointment. After another trip to Kyiv in 1821, Rumiantsev wrote to Aleksei Malinovskii about his unpleasant impressions of what he saw: "My heart broke in Kyiv when I saw the neglect of our antiquities that prevails there, no one is concerned about them, and everyone practically runs away from talking about them, afraid to show not only their unconcern but also that they know little of the history of our olden times."³⁸

After the 1820s, ancient ruins began to reappear in Kyiv, but as a result of deliberate attempts to find them. The new discipline of archaeology became indispensable, that is, the study of ancient remains in the Western manner – through excavations. In 1822 Evgenii (Bolkhovitinov), a scholar, historian, and antiquarian, became the metropolitan of Kyiv. A circle of antiquities lovers soon formed around him, and in 1823 they made the first attempt at archaeological excavations in Kyiv – the "digging up" of the Church of the Tithes.³⁹ The site was not chosen by chance. In addition to the fact that the Church of the Tithes was a kind of monument to the baptism of Rus', at this very time discussions were under way regarding its location. Kyiv's antiquities lovers knew that Metropolitan Petro Mohyla had found the relics of Saint Volodymyr there (the head of the prince was one of the important objects of worship at the Dormition Cathedral of the Cave Monastery). The excavations were expected not only to discover definitively and definitely the site and plan of the old church, but also to find new relics of the saintly prince. In 1824 both tasks were accomplished. The plan of the church was found (and it proved that in antiquity the church was much larger than the dimensions visible in the nineteenth century, which obviated the problem of location), also found was a sarcophagus with the remains of a man, which was declared to be Volodymyr's sarcophagus, and another, which was believed to be the "grave" of Iziaslav.⁴⁰

One of the indefatigable participants in the excavation of the Church of the Tithes was Kindrat Lokhvyts'kyi, a "fifth-grade official," as he called himself, a lover of antiquities, an eccentric, and a mystic. He would become the most energetic archaeologist of Kyiv of the next decade. Like all the "first" archaeologists of a particular site, Lokhvyts'kyi was naively convinced that he would find material remains of all the events described in written monuments underground. History, the early archaeologists were confident, lay as if frozen under the ground. Once the layer of earth was removed, the artifacts would match the written history to the very last detail. Lokhvyts'kyi, in fact, found everything he looked for: he found the remnants of the cross of Saint Andrew, the grave of Prince Dyr, the first Christian Church of Saint Elijah, the remains of the city gate of the time of Princess Olha, the Church of Saint Irene, and he excavated the Golden Gate. Most of his

finds were fictitious – flights of imagination, a naive attempt to connect something found underground with the chronicle reports. But in at least two cases – the excavations of Saint Irene's Church (1833) and the Golden Gate (1832–33) – Lohkhyts'kyi “guessed” correctly.⁴¹ Excavations from under the later rubble of the Golden Gate were particularly successful. It so happened that the tsar (who was generally interested in Kyiv and its antiquities) was in Kyiv at the time. Tsar Nicholas I “passed between the open walls” of the gate, and this probably made an impression on him: Lohkhyts'kyi was later awarded a state scholarship, as well as a grant for further excavations.⁴²

The excavations in Kyiv in the 1820s and 1830s, despite all their naivety and amateurism, and despite the fact that Lohkhyts'kyi, for example, destroyed more than he researched, had one important consequence: they showed that there were ruins of an ancient city under the ground, and that these ruins could be “revealed” and exposed to the eyes of the interested.

Archaeology in the first decades of the nineteenth century included many different things. One of its important aspects was to establish the ancient topography of the city and then map it. At the end of the eighteenth century, this was done by the Kyiv native Maksym Berlyns'kyi, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century, special expeditions from St Petersburg were undertaken for the same purpose (Borozdin's and Ermolaev's). Creating “historical plans” and locating antiquities on the map of a modern city became a favorite occupation. Scholars searched for old and forgotten names of localities, rivers, and landmarks known to them from the chronicles and documents. They identified certain localities with them, sometimes even renaming them so as to restore the “more correct” historical names. Specially equipped artists made sketches of any remnants of antiquities – mosaics, frescoes, and archaeological curiosities. Architects drew plans of churches, their cross sections, and sometimes even reconstructions of an ancient type. All this created a body of documentation, which in its totality “revived” ancient history, made it “visible,” tactile.

There were enough old methods, as well. With the arrival in Kyiv of Mykhailo Maksymovych, the city became the scene of constant “archaeological pilgrimages.” Maksymovych led his scholarly acquaintances, visiting celebrities, and writers on tours of the city, pointing out to them with the confidence of an expert the invisible places of great events of antiquity. He identified for them historical landmarks, names of mountains mentioned in the chronicles, and so forth. The main thing retained in the memory of such tourists (and among them were Nikolai Gogol, Mikhail Pogodin, Vasilii Zhukovskii with the crown prince, and Aleksandr Turgenev) was the image of Kyiv's untouched, almost wild nature. Admiring nature replaced the contemplation of ruins and fully satisfied the poetically disposed

personalities' sense of history. Ironically, the place that made an impression on the seekers of Kyiv antiquities was the hill on which Saint Andrew's Church stood. As Maksymovych recalled, it was here that Zhukovskii peered into the distance of the Dnipro, imagining "Olha's city" Vyshhorod in the haze, and Gogol – looking in the opposite direction – visualized the "ancient" sites of Kozhemiaky and Kudriavets.⁴³ The experience of the past near the newly built church was particularly acute and intense: the space that opened from Saint Andrew's Hill provided a unique opportunity to locate historical mirages at will.

While the emotions experienced by the travelers were genuine, the landscape that evoked them could hardly be called authentic or ancient. It had changed significantly over the centuries. We know, for example, that two of the central Kyiv hills – Zamkova and Uzdykhalnytsia – were repeatedly "dug up" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: their level was lowered so that the interior of the existing castle could not be viewed from the surrounding hills. The riverbed of the Dnipro, separated in ancient times from the city by islands, as a result of works carried out at the beginning of the eighteenth century, moved directly to the foot of the Kyiv hills and virtually destroyed the ancient Pochaina River, on which, in fact, Kyiv stood at the time of the chronicle.

The result of the miniature Kyiv pilgrimages – religious, antiquarian, landscape-viewing – was an understanding of history. Old Rus' Kyiv, like Atlantis, began to rise from the ground, eclipsing for many an unsightly, poor, and disordered Polish-Jewish town on the outskirts of the empire, with its churches "in the new style."

The discovery of Kyiv's antiquities obviously led to a new perception of the city and its history. From the "Russian Jerusalem," Kyiv gradually acquired the reputation of the "Slavic Pompeii" (although the metaphor itself would not be articulated until the beginning of the next century).

Whose history, however, were the Kyiv antiquarians reviving from oblivion? For many of them, this question did not even exist. They "lived" completely in the ancient past, with little interest in its ideological connection with modernity. Russian travelers, of course, were uncovering their own Russian history in the city. Contemporary Kyiv – part of Little Russia – carried no weight, everyone tried to ignore it. After all, old Kyiv had nothing in common with Little Russian history. So, it seems, thought those who wrote the history of Ukrainians. For them, the Kyiv ruins were also the remnants of the historical existence of another people, something like the Greek cities of the Black Sea region or the Scythian mounds of the Ukrainian steppe. However, for people like Maksymovych, "local patriots," the combination of Kyivan Rus' antiquities with Little Russian territory suggested some connection between them. Little Russia rested on the remains of

ancient Rus'. Churches in the Ukrainian Baroque style were rebuilt old Rus' churches. Did not all this mean that the Little Russians "came from" Kyivan Rus'? Did this not mean that Russian and Little Russian history have a common beginning and a long joint continuation? Did this not mean, finally, that the history of Ukrainians is inextricably linked with the history of the Great Russians?

Two "discoveries" of the beginning of the nineteenth century – the discovery of Little Russia and Kyiv – would raise a number of questions for consideration in Russian, and not long after that, Ukrainian, thought about the origins, duration, and relationship of the two histories.

Translated from the Russian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as Aleksei Tolochko, "Ot 'rossiiskogo Ierusalima' k 'slavianskim Pompeiam,'" in Aleksei Tolochko, *Kievskaia Rus' i Malorossia v XIX veke* (Kyiv, 2012), 151–76. Copyright 2012 by Laurus Press and Oleksii Tolochko. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 *Zapiski Filippa Filippoviicha Vigelia*, part 1 (Moscow, 1891), 36.
- 2 *Opysy Kharkivs'koho namisnytstva kintsia XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1991), 18. Andrei Glagolev wrote about this in 1823: "Devoutness and piety, in which the Russian people are rich and strong, belong to its distinctive features. A millennium has passed, yet despite Batu Khan's and Polish captivity, it did not forget its Jerusalem, which shone the light of revelation in Russia." *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika A. Glagoleva s 1823 po 1827 god* (St Petersburg, 1837), 53.
- 3 Andrei Glagolev, *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika s 1823 po 1827 god*, part 1, *Rossia, Avstriia* (St Petersburg, 1837), 79–80.
- 4 Ivan Dolgorukov, *Slavny bubny za goramy ili puteshestvie moe koe-kuda 1810 goda* (Moscow, 1870), 302.
- 5 *Pis'ma iz Malorossii, pisannye Alekseem Levshinym* (Kharkiv, 1816), 85–6.
- 6 "Zapiski Ivana Matveevicha Sbitneva," *Kievskaia starina* 2 (1887): 305.
- 7 In addition, Nemtsevich found something like a museum in Mykolaiv, containing sculptures found in Panticapaeum, and the officer who accompanied him claimed that he had taken part in excavations there and even allegedly had opened the tomb of King Mithridates. *Juliana Ursyna Niemcewicza Podróże historyczne po ziemiach polskich między rokiem 1811 a 1828 odbyte* (St Petersburg, 1858), 327.
- 8 Vladimir Ikonnikov, *Kiev v 1654–1855 gg.* (Kyiv, 1904), 127 (a separate reprint from *Kievskaia starina*).

- 9 *Russkii arkhiv* 3 (Moscow, 1878): 131.
- 10 *Russkaia starina* 8 (November 1873): 671–2.
- 11 *Zapiski grafa Segiura o prebyvanii ego v Rossii v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II* (1785–1789) (St Petersburg, 1865), 153.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 D. Sapozhnikov, "K istorii Zolotykh vorot," *Kievskaiia starina* 5 (1886): 163–8.
- 14 "Opisanie Kieva sostavlennoe Kievskoi gubernskoi kantseliariei v 1760 g.," in A. Andrievskii, *Istoricheskie materialy iz arkhiva Kievskogo gubernskogo pravleniia*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1888), 140.
- 15 "Puteshestvie vysokopreosviashchenogo Platona, mitropolita moskovskogo, v Kiev i po drugim rossiiskim gorodam v 1804 g.," in Ivan Snegirev, *Zhizn-moskovskogo mitropolita Platona*, 4th ed., part 1 (Moscow, 1890), 132.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 By the way, this gate was also dismantled in 1799. But it was confused with the old gate. Prince Dolgorukov, for example, was told that "the gate, the so-called Golden Gate, was recently torn down, just as in Vladimir, so that the material could be put to better use in another place." Ivan Dolgorukov, *Slavny bubny za goramy ili puteshestvie moe koe-kuda 1810 goda* (Moscow, 1870), 260.
- 18 The Metropolitan doubted this: "As things stand now, it is almost impossible to immerse oneself here, unless it was larger then, or because water from the font in this place was sprinkled; however, this ancient tradition cannot be ignored. "Puteshestvie vysokopreosviashchenogo Platona," 138.
- 19 Ibid., 134–5.
- 20 Ibid., 135.
- 21 Ibid., 136.
- 22 Ibid., 135.
- 23 "They say that Askold's Grave was on this very spot: there are no living and reliable signs, only a legend or a popular folktale. But who knows the truth? It is true that Askold left his bones in Kyiv, but permit me to doubt whether it was here or where Saint Nicholas's Monastery stands, or maybe half a *verst* higher or lower." Dolgorukov, *Slavny bubny za goramy*, 282.
- 24 Ibid., 283.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid., 262.
- 27 "Puteshestvie v Kiev v 1817 godu, soch. kn. Ivana Mikhailovicha Dolgorukogo," *Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* 2 (1870), 126.
- 28 Glagolev, *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika*, 84.
- 29 "Zapiski Ivana Matveevicha Sbitneva," 305–6.
- 30 Ibid., 306.

- 31 "Pis'mo V.F. Odoevskomy 10 iiunia 1825 g." in A.S. Griboedov, *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1988), 515.
- 32 *Poverkhnostnye zamechania po doroge ot Moskvy do Malorossii O. fon Guna, v trekh chastiakh* (Moscow, 1806), 102.
- 33 In 1817, Prince Dolgorukov expressed his attitude to Kyiv's antiquities in the following words: "in Kyiv, every step is marked by a memorable antiquity, every step can deliver a page to the chronicler, but the remoteness of past centuries, when Kyiv was famous for its glory, likens all the legends about it to a fabulous tale." "Puteshestvie v Kiev v 1817 godu," 126.
- 34 D. Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture. 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985), 205.
- 35 V.S. Ikonnikov, *Opyt russkoi istoriografii*, vol. 1, bk. 1 (Kyiv, 1891), 136.
- 36 Fragments of the correspondents were published by Ikonnikov, see his *Opyt russkoi istoriografii*, vol. 1, bk. 1, 185–91.
- 37 Another misunderstanding, of course. A forged letter from the end of the sixteenth century, allegedly issued by Andrei Iur'evich to the Kyivan Cave Monastery, claimed that its name was "Kytai" (see Iaroslav Zatiuk, "Hramota Andriia Boholiubs'koho Kyievo-Perchers'komu monastyriu," *Ruthenica* 7 [2009]: 215–35). This later gave rise to the belief that the *Ky-taivs'ka Pustyn* belonging to the Cave Monastery was founded by the prince.
- 38 "Perepiska gosudarstvennogo kantslera grafa N.P. Rumiantseva s moskovskimi uchenymi," *Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh* 1 (Moscow, 1882): 191–2.
- 39 Tetiana Anan'eva, "Desiatynna tserkva: kolo vytokiv arkhelohichnykh doslidzhen' (1820–1830-ti rr.), in *Tserkva Bohorodytsi Desiatynna v Kyievi. Do 1000-littia osviachennia* (Kyiv, 1996), 15–23.
- 40 *Ibid.*, 20–1.
- 41 However, in the case of the foundations and remnants of the walls of the church from the Old Rus' period excavated by Lohvyts'kyi, which he proclaimed to have been Saint Irene's Church, discussions are still ongoing.
- 42 On Lohvyts'kyi's excavations see: T. Anan'eva, "'Zhurnaly i dela' Kondrata Lohvytskogo: Testis classicus v mifologicheskome prostranstve," in *Kievskii al'bom* 3 (Kyiv, 2004), 88–9.
- 43 M.A. Maksimovich, *Pis'ma o Kieve* (Moscow, 1869), 56–8.

Catherine II, Evdokim Shcherbinin, and the Abolition of Sloboda Ukraine's Autonomy

VOLODYMYR SKLOKIN

Ivan Ostroz'kyi-Lokhvyts'kyi (1750–1825), the son of the captain of the Slonovka company of the Ostrohozsk regiment Iosyp Ostroz'kyi-Lokhvyts'kyi, left the following account of the events of 1763 in his memoir:

Then a very terrible thunderclap of God's anger crashed over all the Sloboda regiments in 1763, during the reign of Empress Ekaterina Alekseevna, and a special commission was appointed to the city of Ostrohozsk over all the officers, of regimental and company rank. Nor did my father, Captain Iosyp, escape that thundering storm cloud at that time; those under his command rebelled then and began to write false petitions, and especially at the instigation of the Junior Ensign Ivan Korets'kyi (who tried to return evil for good, because that captain often saved him from serious troubles, especially bootlegging, and from death itself). Now [he was] dismissed from command, ordered not to absent himself from the commission, without making any excuses to compensate with many for grievance, even though false, since anything that anyone had given as a gift was regarded as bribery. And thus not waiting for the return of their captain from Ostrohozsk, the common people began to rob horses from his farmstead, chop down forest acquired by first possession (*zaimanshchynnyi*), devastate the orchards, beat peasants in the streets for no reason, [and] curse his wife and children to their faces. There was no end to the abuse and insults that he suffered from those under his command, and especially from the relatives of the Koret'skyis, whom he,

when they were still poor, provided with everything he had, and also supplied with bread, but they all forgot this and returned evil for good, especially in those evil days, and in all these actions they were the ringleaders and instigators of the common people to evil.¹

These events also radically changed the life of Ivan, then a young student at the Kharkiv College. The losses caused by the Cossack looting, as well as the flood that same year, which took the lives of the Slonovka captain's dependent peasants (*piddani seliany*) and a large number of livestock, forced his father to remove Ivan from the college in May 1763 and set him to performing "menial labor, such as hauling hay, straw, and lumber, and grain to the mills, which his poor young boy, unused to such work, performed with great difficulty: having left his studies, he began to forget them and became used to working, suffering the cold and heat with great patience."²

The "very terrible thunderclap of God's anger," which signaled the beginning of the "evil days" for the Ostroz'kyi-Lokhvyts'kyi family, was the activity of the investigative commission under the direction of Second Major Evdokim Shcherbinin, which the new empress, Catherine II (1762–96), sent to the region. The apocalyptic feeling, clearly present in Ivan Ostroz'kyi-Lokhvyts'kyi's account, is not accidental. As a result of the investigations of the commission, the entire Cossack military-administrative system, which had existed in Sloboda Ukraine for over a hundred years, found itself under threat of elimination. In 1765, the empress did in fact abolish the autonomy of the Sloboda regiments, initiating a lengthy process of political, social, and cultural integration of the region into the Russian Empire. The political changes of 1763–65 became one of the turning points in the history of Sloboda Ukraine, which had a profound effect not only on little Slonovka but on hundreds of other cities, towns, and villages (*slobody*) in the region and their inhabitants.

The Abolition of Autonomy (1762–65)

The legal and institutional constructs, which are known in historiography as Sloboda autonomy, were formed during the final decades of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth centuries and were legally formalized in the so-called "charters of privilege" (*zhalovani hramoty*) that the Russian monarchs granted to each of the five Sloboda regiments. This autonomy consisted of two main elements: the Cossack military-administrative system of regiments and companies, or "Cherkasy customs" (*cherkas'ki obyknosti*), and "liberties" (*slobody*)

– a number of mostly economic privileges of the Cossack estate, such as the free use of isolated arable land acquired by first possession (*zaimanshchyni zemli*), free trade and craft activity, and free alcohol distillation. The first to fall “victim” to the reform initiatives of the St Petersburg government was the Cossack military-administrative system, which was eliminated by 1765. On the other hand, Catherine II confirmed most of the estate privileges of the Cossacks, and their gradual abridgement, which took place during the last decades of the eighteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, was primarily an indirect consequence of the political and institutional integration of the region into the empire.

The abolition of the autonomy of Sloboda regiments generally fit in well with the unification and centralization policy characteristic of the “enlightened absolutism” of Catherine II. As Ilya Gerasimov, Sergei Glebov, Marina Mogilner, and Aleksander Semyonov note, it was during the reign of this empress that the most conscious attempt was made to replace the old “technical” task of preserving the unity of conquered or annexed territories with a new and “creative” undertaking – the reduction of these territories to a “common denominator.” In other words, the question of imperial policy was being formulated, which, together with the element of the unification and integration of the state, contained another important component – Enlightenment reforms and development.³

I will now attempt to reconstruct the formation and evolution of imperial policy with regard to Sloboda Ukraine during the first years of the reign of Catherine II and analyze its rhetorical justification. It will be shown that the abolition of the Cossack military-administrative system in the region in the first half of the 1760s was largely the result of a concatenation of circumstances, which the St Petersburg government successfully exploited. To achieve its goal, the government used anti-elitist populist rhetoric, which invoked the protection of the “people” from oppression and abuses and strived to present integrationist changes as a reform initiative and compromise between the interests of the imperial center and key groups of the local population. Contrary to the widespread stereotypes in historiography, during the abolition of autonomy, the government appealed primarily to the common Cossacks, who were rhetorically identified with the “people,” and the co-optation of the local elite – the Cossack *starshyna* (officer class) – played a key role in the later stages of the integrationist transformations. As part of a positive program of reforms, Catherine II offered the rule of law as an alternative to the “tyranny” and abuses of the Cossack elite, the regularization of military service, and economic development, which together were to bring the local population “prosperity and peace.” In practice, however, the specific features of imperial policy in the region depended to a large extent on the decisions and

activity of the first Sloboda governor, Evdokim Shcherbinin, who focused primarily on regularization and vigorously conducted a “despotic modernization” in the spirit of Peter I.⁴



It is worth beginning the discussion of the causes and circumstances of the abolition of Sloboda autonomy by asking why the Sloboda regiments were the first of the “western borderlands” to lose their autonomous status and why this happened as early as in the first years of the new empress’s reign. As authoritative studies of Catherinian policies show, the empress came to power with already formed political views and an overall vision of the desired direction of the development of the Russian Empire, and this vision was largely defined by the ideals of “enlightened absolutism.”⁵

In this case, enlightened absolutism should be understood to mean a new type of governance, focused on reforms in the interests of society as a whole, whose goal was “to provide better government and to improve the material conditions and advance the prosperity of the subjects.”⁶ It is worth noting that the adjective “enlightened” did not mean that all of Catherine II’s reforms were inspired by Enlightenment ideas. All that it meant was that the Enlightenment in the broad sense served as the intellectual context in which her reform programs were formulated.⁷ No less important is the fact that the concept of enlightened absolutism cannot explain all the changes of the period under study. As Hamish Marshall Scott notes, enlightened absolutism in eighteenth-century Europe was like a new “additional layer of statecraft,” which did not cancel the traditional fiscal, military, or geopolitical interests of governments and monarchs.⁸

Thus, upon coming to power, Catherine II had a certain general vision of the direction of the future development of the Russian Empire. However, in 1762–63, she did not yet have a general program of reforms, although she believed that serious transformations in the regions of the empire were possible only after the government had collected enough information about the condition they were in. As Robert Jones observes, during the first years of Catherine II’s rule, “the government’s most pressing concerns would be to stabilize its own position, put its affairs in order, and sort out its problems. During that time it preferred to take only those steps that it considered inescapable, inexpensive, or relatively easy to supervise and control.”⁹

The rapid integration into the empire of the Sloboda regiments – as well as other autonomous regions – was not on the empress’s agenda in 1762. But we can assume that her attention to this region was attracted by the case involving Prokip

Konevyts'kyi, a captain of a company in the Sloboda Ostrohozsk regiment, who came to St Petersburg in October of 1762 with complaints against abuses by the officers of this regiment and against the military command of all the Sloboda regiments. In response to Konevyts'kyi's charges, a commission headed by Evdokim Shcherbinin was dispatched to Sloboda Ukraine to investigate the abuses, and the result of its two-year activity was the abolition of the Cossack military-administrative system and the creation of the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia.

The activity of the Shcherbinin commission has been described in considerable detail by Volodymyr Maslychuk.¹⁰ Next I will briefly review the story of Konevyts'kyi and the work of the Shcherbinin commission, relying primarily on Maslychuk's research, and then I will attempt to place the Sloboda case in the broader context of imperial policy with regard to the "western borderlands."



Prokip Konevyts'kyi began his service as a rank-and-file Cossack in the Kharkiv regiment, eventually obtained the rank of junior ensign, and then, in 1749, that of captain. Owing to a lack of vacant posts in the Kharkiv regiment, he was transferred to the Ostrohozsk regiment and appointed captain of the Kalachiv [*Kalachivs'ka*] company. But he was unable to establish good relations with the Ostrohozsk *starshyna*, became embroiled in disputes and lawsuits, both with the local rank-and-file Cossacks and the officers, and the whole affair culminated in the looting of his estate and his arrest and imprisonment in the Belgorod gubernia chancellery.¹¹ Konevyts'kyi succeeded in escaping from there and in 1762 appeared in St Petersburg and made a complaint to the Senate. The Kalachiv captain insisted that he was innocent of abuses and, instead, accused the officers of the Ostrohozsk regiment of excesses, in particular Captains Petro Pushkovs'kyi, Andrii Tev'iashov, Ivan Kukulevs'kyi, and Colonel Stepan Tev'iashov, as well as the military commander of the Sloboda regiments, Lieutenant-General Prince Kostiantyn Kantemir. Konevyts'kyi exposed what we today call corruption: the imposition of illegal levies on the population and the appropriation of government land, as well as the persecution of those who opposed the abuses of Tev'iashov and Kantemir.¹²

Catherine II, who was present at the review of the Konevyts'kyi case in the Senate on 23 October 1762, ordered that a special investigative commission consisting of four army officers, headed by the Second-Major of the Izmail regiment Evdokim Shcherbinin, be sent to Ostrohozsk. The commission was given unusually great powers: it could investigate abuses by officers not only in Ostrohozsk but also in all the other Sloboda regiments, and it also had the right to remove from

office all officers who were under investigation. In fact, the highest authority in the region ended up in Evdokim Shcherbinin's hands, as evidenced by his activity in 1763–64.¹³

Upon arrival in Ostrohozk, the commission not only began investigating Konevts'kyi's charges but announced that it was collecting information about the abuses by officers in all five regiments. As a result, "the commission was inundated with complaints from [rank-and-file] Cossacks, village communities, low-ranking officers, and Cossack helpers (*pidpomichnyky*) against the captains and regimental officers."¹⁴ The complaints numbered in the hundreds, causing the majority of the officers holding administrative posts, especially in the Ostrohozk, Kharkiv, and Izium regiments, to find themselves under investigation. This gave Shcherbinin the formal basis for removing the majority of officers from office and subsequently stripping the *starshyna* of control over the financial and judicial spheres.¹⁵

Volodymyr Maslychuk underscores that:

the Shcherbinin commission, like all earlier "investigative actions" by the Russian government, did not shy away from social demagoguery, maintaining that its aim was to protect the lower strata of the population [...] The tsarist government played on the social antagonism in the Sloboda regiments, pitting the masses [*nyzy*] against the officers and officers against officers – a method that had been successfully implemented even earlier in Sloboda Ukraine and the Hetmanate.¹⁶

At the same time, to legitimize the transformations in the region, the government had to secure the support of the local elite – that is, the *starshyna*. This gave rise to the idea of writing so-called "petitions of contrition" (*pokaianni cholobytni*) to Catherine II. In these petitions, written at the end of 1763, the Sloboda officers expressed regret for their abuses and asked for the monarch's mercy. For all that, the officers tended not to assume the blame themselves but, rather, to lay it on the ineffective system, that is, on "our ingrained Cherkasy customs," which included the disordered state of the local financial system, the absence of regular service, and legislation that regulated relations between the *starshyna* and the Cossacks, and also the practice of "gifts" in Sloboda courts.¹⁷

The empress "mercifully" forgave the *starshyna*, but the "Cherkasy customs" that constituted an important basis of the local autonomy were abolished.¹⁸ On 16 December 1764, a special Senate commission considered the Shcherbinin commission's report, which dealt with both the abuses of the *starshyna* and the inef-

fectiveness of the Sloboda military-administrative system, and approved the decision to abolish the Sloboda Cossack regiments and instead create five regular hussar regiments and the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia with its center in Kharkiv.¹⁹

Masliychuk places special emphasis on the “demoralization and apathy” of the Sloboda *starshyna*, which was in no hurry to defend either its rule or regional autonomy. The only exception was the Izium Colonel Fedir Krasnokuts'kyi, who, residing in 1762–64 in St Petersburg, wrote letters to the Sloboda *starshyna*, scolding them for its lack of concern and urging it to come to the capital of the empire to defend its rights.²⁰ Masliychuk notes that the officers’ indifference was due to the “lengthy investigations and intimidation, [their] immersion in economic affairs (there was much to lose in case of failure), absence of a suitable political culture, founded on the defense of one’s political rights.”²¹

Although I generally agree with the description of these events offered by Volodymyr Masliychuk, I would like to elaborate on two important elements in this story: the specific features of the policy implemented by the government in the abolition of autonomy, and the role of the Sloboda *starshyna* in these events. This, in turn, requires an examination of the Sloboda case in the broader context of imperial policy with regard to the “western borderlands” in the first half of the 1760s.

Existing sources allow us to assert that at this stage (1762–65), Catherine II and her inner circle did not yet have a coherent program of the political integration of the autonomous regions into the empire. At any rate, however, Catherine was certain of the need for such an integration and imagined its direction in broad outlines: it involved extending uniform laws and administrative institutions throughout the whole empire. Achieving this required the coming to power in the autonomous regions of people prepared to implement the policies of the imperial center, which automatically meant the removal from power of “unreliable” local elites.²² At least such was the vision presented in the empress’s secret instruction to the new procurator general, Prince Aleksandr Viazemskii, in February 1764:

Little Russia, Livonia, and Finland are provinces that are governed by their confirmed privileges, whose violation by their sudden removal would be highly improper; however, calling them foreign countries and dealing with them on that basis is more than a mistake, and can be accurately called an absurdity. These provinces, and also Smolensk, should be brought by easy means to the point that they become Russianized [*obruseli*] and stop being once a wolf always a wolf.²³ This approach is very easy if wise people are

appointed to head those provinces; when there is no longer a hetman in Little Russia, it is necessary to make certain that the period and names of the hetmans also disappear, not only that no person be promoted to that office.²⁴

This instruction also dealt with the need to unify legislation: "Our laws need to be improved: first, to incorporate everything into one system and adhere to it; second, to remove those who repudiate it; third, to separate the temporary and individual from the eternal and indispensable."²⁵

The Sloboda regiments are not mentioned directly here, since in the empress's mind they probably merged with Little Russia. But in later legislation, which we will deal with in this section, the imperial government treated Sloboda Ukraine as being in the same category as Livonia, Estonia, and Finland, that is, the western autonomous regions.²⁶ However it may be, the policy outlined in the instruction, which was aimed at removing the local elite from political power and replacing it with "reliable" imperial officials, was the policy that was implemented in the Sloboda regiments in 1762–65.

To make this policy successful, the government, on the one hand, had to invoke the common good and, on the other hand, use populist rhetoric directed against the local officer elite and promise the rank-and-file Cossacks and Cossack helpers to fight against the "people's overburdening," to protect the "aggrieved," and give satisfaction "[of the demand for] justice." The Senate decree appointing Shcherbinin head of the investigative commission for the Sloboda regiments of 4 November 1762 expressed this as follows:

And if after the arrival of Shcherbinin anyone tells him about those and other similar things resulting in the people's overburdening and devastation, disorder in those Sloboda regiments, accepting the pertinent reports, he will immediately begin an investigation [...] with true justice and without the slightest allowances for anybody, in order to, on the one hand, reveal the disarray existing there and expose the guilty [...] and, on the other hand, protect the aggrieved and give satisfaction with justice.²⁷

As has already been noted, this strategy was successful, and the imperial government obtained powerful compromising materials that ultimately forced the *starshyna* to agree to the changes initiated in St Petersburg.²⁸ However, earlier researchers failed to take note of another important aspect of this story – namely, the fact that the government tried to secure at least symbolic consent for the transformations not only of the *starshyna* but also of the rank-and-file Cossacks and Cossack helpers, who made up the majority of the population of the region. The

consent of the common Cossacks, who were rhetorically identified with the “people,” made it possible to present the integrationist reforms as the demand of society itself.²⁹

However, the situation involving this “consent” is not clear-cut. We learn about it from Shcherbinin’s report to Catherine II of 30 September 1763, in which he informed her that the Cossacks agreed to pay an annual tax of one ruble per each male if the Cossack regiments were transformed into regular regiments, and also if levies for the maintenance of the cuirassier stud farm and the dragoon regiment were abolished. In view of this, he proposed conducting a census that would make it possible to establish the exact number of people and taxpayers, and asked the empress what method was best to use to conduct this census: “by persons, by homesteads and houses, by land holdings, or by estates?”³⁰ Catherine II approved the news and Shcherbinin’s initiative and ordered a census to be conducted “by persons,” on the grounds that a poll tax was the most efficient collection method and offered the fewest opportunities for evading payment.³¹

Other sources, however, allow us to doubt the voluntary nature of this consent, or even that it happened at all. The most informative document from this standpoint is the appeal to Catherine II of the former Izium Colonel Mykhailo Myloradovych, dated 14 May 1764, in which he criticizes the work of the Shcherbinin commission.³² Myloradovych, who earlier had himself proposed transforming the Cossack regiments into regular regiments, opposed Shcherbinin’s initiatives and believed that the latter was misinforming the empress about the real situation in the region and the sentiments of the local population. In the Izium colonel’s interpretation, Shcherbinin’s invoking the protection of the “people” and its interests was just empty talk.

According to Myloradovych, upon arriving in Ostrohozhk, Shcherbinin “published decrees to the people that all who have any grievances” against the *starshyna* should send lists [of these] with authorized representatives from whole cities and villages (*slobodas*). When the first representatives arrived in Ostrohozhk, Shcherbinin began to deliver “redress of grievances” by means of “verbal reviews” and face-to-face confrontations between the representatives and the officers: “And other elders of the people were paid up to a thousand and more rubles, and this major employed great harshness, in that he held other officers chained with shackles in the commission and flogged the common people.”³³

It is not difficult to imagine the effect that this beginning had on both the rank-and-file Cossacks and Cossack helpers and the *starshyna*. It is worth noting that there were cases in which the rank-and-file Cossacks did not wait for the commission’s verdict and began to “repair injustices” at their own discretion, robbing the estates of officers, as happened in Slonovka in the case of Captain Iosyp

Ostroz'kyi-Lokhvyts'kyi.³⁴ In Myloradovych's opinion, Shcherbinin "with this discord, brought to the people ... and the *starshyna* to eternal quarrels and enmity, great despondency and fear."³⁵

But soon the review of cases in Ostrohozsk ended, and it was ordered that the remainder of the complaints be submitted to the regimental chancelleries. Instead, Shcherbinin, together with other officers in the commission, set out to collect complaints in other Sloboda regiments, seeking primarily to exploit the Cossacks' dissatisfaction for support of his program of reforms:

Traveling to all the regiments, he gathered all the aforementioned representatives in the regimental cities and, holding them there for three or four days without letting them leave, brought them around to submitting statements that they wanted to be taxed at one ruble per head annually, regarding which they took statements from some of the authorized representatives, even though they did not have authority for this from the people and did not want it, but seeing strict enforcement and because of their simpleness, [they] could not avoid it, however some did not do it; but to YOUR MAJESTY he reported as if the whole people wanted this, and after that no matter how many objections and reports that [the proposed tax] was unwelcome the people submitted, he rejected them and sent them away.³⁶

Following this, a part of the Cossacks allegedly decided to send an authorized representative to Catherine II with a complaint against Shcherbinin's activity, but the secretary of Balakliia, Lazar Velychko, who was to carry the complaint, was detained and brought to the commission in Ostrohozsk, where he was held for two months under guard, "threatened and starved," and then sent to the Izium regimental chancellery.³⁷

Myloradovych most likely exaggerated the unambiguously repressive nature of Shcherbinin's policy. The latter probably attempted to convince the people's authorized representatives of the need and benefit of these changes, and he may have had some success in this, although the probability of the use of pressure and force remains high, at least in view of the fact that the subsequent introduction of the poll tax and abolition of Cossackdom provoked dissatisfaction and opposition, especially in the Izium regiment.

It is also worth underscoring that both Shcherbinin and Catherine II sought to present the planned transformation as the result of a kind of consensus, and not only within the local "people" but also more broadly – as a compromise between the needs of the imperial center and Sloboda society.³⁸

For example, in the aforementioned report to the empress of 30 September 1763, Shcherbinin noted that the planned changes would be "very good for both

the treasury and the residents.”³⁹ On the other hand, Catherine II in her instruction to the Sloboda governor and in her manifesto of 28 July 1765 “On the Establishment in the Sloboda Regiments of Proper Civilian Order” wrote that “with these instruments the benefit not only to the public but also to the State” must be gained with “the best order and success,” and also that the “insecure” Cossack service will be transformed into regular service, “into a better and more useful for the State” service, which, in turn, will exempt the local population from “taxes and burdens” and “firmly establish the general well-being and peace of all local residents.”⁴⁰

From the government’s standpoint, the main compromise consisted in the fact that despite the abolition of the “Cherkasy customs,” the local society retained the second pillar of its autonomy – its liberties and privileges. This is most clearly expressed in the report of the Senate commission, consisting of Petr Panin, Iakov Shakhovskii, and Adam Olsuf’ev, which was approved by the empress on 16 December 1764:

This Sloboda Ukraine gubernia is to retain, without the slightest violation, the previously confirmed and to this day not revoked privileges and charters of privilege; however, everything that this new institution does not violate in these privileges and charters is to be governed by the Gubernia and Voivodes’ chancelleries in accordance with Your Imperial Excellency’s laws, regulations, instructions, and decrees, just as Estonia, Livonia, and Finland are governed today by their Gubernia Chancelleries without violating their privileges.⁴¹

Thus, from the government’s standpoint, even after the creation of the province (*gubernia*), Sloboda Ukraine continued to retain its special status and was similar in this respect to other “western borderlands.” In Catherine II’s view, this was an undesirable, albeit a necessary, compromise with local conditions.

The second important element that requires elaboration is the thesis about the “demoralization and apathy” of the *starshyna*, which was in no hurry to defend either its own powers or regional autonomy. As we already saw in the example of the Izium Colonel Myloradovych, Fedir Krasnokuts’kyi was not the only one who dared to oppose Shcherbinin’s changes. But a much more important aspect, which researchers have ignored, was that a part of the *starshyna* supported the reforms initiated by Shcherbinin, since these reforms sought to resolve the crisis in the region and to a large extent implemented the plan of transformations formulated by the *starshyna* itself at the end of the 1750s and the beginning of the 1760s.

This was a plan for reforming the Sloboda regiments put forward in 1760 by a group of officers, headed by the Ostrohozk Colonel Stepan Tev’iashov. A detailed

description of this proposed reform program is contained, notably, in a work composed by a group of officers of the Ostrohozsk regiment, headed by Quartermaster Ivan Hozlubin in 1762.⁴²

The Ostrohozsk *starshyna* acknowledged the existence of a crisis in the Sloboda regiments and saw its causes in the unfortunate combination of a number of shortcomings in the “Cherkasy customs” (ineffective legal regulation of relations between the *starshyna* and the Cossacks, the ambiguous status of Cossack lands, and so forth) with the imperial government’s semi-reforms of the 1730s–50s (partial implementation, with the subsequent abolition of regular military squadrons; changes in the military subordination of the Sloboda regiments; appointment of foreigners to top posts) and the excessive obligations and levies attended by violations of Cossackdom’s traditional rights and liberties. All this led, on the one hand, to the impoverishment of the rank-and-file Cossacks, who left service and sometimes also the region, and, on the other hand, undermined the status of the *starshyna*, to whom the offices listed in the Table of Ranks did not extend, and who received neither “rank lands” (*ranhovi zemli*) nor payment for their service.

The Ostrohozsk *starshyna* envisaged the solution to the crisis in a new “institution” – the creation of a regular corps consisting of three dragoon and two infantry regiments to be funded by an annual tax of 55 kopeks. The dragoons and officers were to receive a salary, while the weapons, horses, provisions, and fodder were to be supplied by the government. The new regulations would award ranks to the officers and legislatively define relations between the *starshyna* and their subjects, which would make it possible to avoid abuses in the future.

The text also speaks of a “main chancellery” responsible for collecting and distributing the tax but provides no details, so it remains unclear how the authors envisioned the political future of the region. The only important point in this context was an emphasis on the provision that all foreign officers, including Russian ones, were to be removed from the Sloboda regiments and assigned to military units outside the region. Considering the constant emphasis on local liberties and on the crucial and exclusively positive role of the *starshyna* in the colonization and development of the region, we can assume that the authors of this work presumed that both the military command of the new regular corps and control over the “main chancellery” would remain in the hands of the local Little Russian *starshyna*; this would mean the preservation of Sloboda autonomy, albeit in somewhat modified form.

This reform program, approved by seventy officers mainly from the Ostrohozsk, Sumy, and Okhtyrka regiments, was presented in St Petersburg by Colonel Tev’iashov in 1760 and won support from the generals, especially Field Marshal General Aleksandr Buturlin, who justified the need for these transformations to

Empress Elizabeth. The matter was close to being positively resolved but was brought to a halt by a petition from Brigadier Dmitrii Bancheskul, who opposed the reform, claiming that the Cossack light cavalry troops were better than the regular infantry forces and best suited to this region, and also that the officers did not want regular service. However, in the opinion of the Ostrohozsk officers, the real reason for Bancheskul's opposition was that he, as a Balkan immigrant, feared that the reform would deprive him of his post as brigadier of the Sloboda regiments.⁴³ Whatever the case, the matter was turned over for review to the Military Commission of the Senate, where it lay when the complaints from Konevyts'kyi appeared and the investigatory commission headed by Shcherbinin was dispatched to the region.

Thus, the transformations initiated by Shcherbinin and subsequently approved by the Senate and Catherine II were to a large extent similar to Tev'iashov's program of reforms. At the same time, there were two important differences: in the Shcherbinin plan the tax that was to be collected from the local population was higher and ultimately assumed the form of a poll tax, and key administrative and military posts ended up in the hands of natives of internal Russian gubernias and not the local *starshyna*. However, having compromising material in the form of numerous complaints from rank-and-file Cossacks and commoners, Shcherbinin easily convinced the *starshyna* to accept these changes. That Shcherbinin used Tev'iashov's reform program and relied on the latter's support in the course of his activity in the region is further confirmed by the fact that the Ostrohozsk colonel was cleared of all charges by the commission and after the creation of the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia, at the end of the 1760s through the beginning of the 1770s, held the post of deputy of the newly appointed governor, the very same Evdokim Shcherbinin. In contrast, Bancheskul, Myloradovych, and Krasnokut-s'kyi, who opposed these reforms, were punished in various ways: the first was removed from his post of brigadier of the Sloboda regiments in 1763, the second was demoted to the rank of captain and exiled to Tobolsk, and the third was exiled to Kazan.⁴⁴ The fate of Captain Prokip Konevyts'kyi, whose charges against Tev'iashov and other officers resulted in the creation of Shcherbinin's commission, also proved tragic: for his "false" testimony and escape from prison, he was stripped of his posts and made to serve as a common soldier.⁴⁵

Finally, it is worth noting that although the thrust of the changes envisioned by the plan of the Ostrohozsk officers coincided in large measure with the subsequently implemented government reform program, the sources of inspiration in the two cases were different. While the *starshyna* plan was a typical early-modern-period attempt to "repair" the unsatisfactory state of affairs, precipitated by practical needs and based on common sense, the Catherinian program of the administrative and

legislative universalization of the empire and regularization of military service was inspired by Enlightenment and cameralistic ideals, as well as a comparison of the situation in the empire with the state of affairs in the more “developed” countries of Europe. The abolition of the autonomy of the Sloboda regiments can thus be regarded as an element of the imperial policy of “enlightened absolutism” at the end of the eighteenth century. In view of this, it is worth taking a closer look at the plans for integrationist transformations in Sloboda Ukraine that were being worked out in St Petersburg in 1764–65.

Petersburgian Integrationist Plans (1764–65)

The main vectors of the political and social integration of Sloboda Ukraine into the empire were defined at the end of 1764 through the first half of 1765 by Catherine II on the basis of the recommendations of the Senate’s special commission, which, in turn, were guided by the conclusions of Evdokim Shcherbinin’s commission.

Instead of the “disorders” that were associated with the Cossack military-administrative system,⁴⁶ the empress promised the Sloboda society “order,” that is, regular military service, and universal imperial laws and administrative institutions, which would give protection from oppression and abuse by representatives of the Cossack *starshyna*, and, as a result, ensure “prosperity and peace.” Thusly, the idea of establishing a “legal monarchy” (which was regarded as a safeguard against despotism and tyranny), which was proclaimed to be the key goal of Catherine’s government, was successfully used to legitimize the abolition of the autonomy of Sloboda Ukraine, and subsequently also of the Hetmanate.⁴⁷ But here it was adapted to local conditions and was accompanied by a populist anti-elitist policy, which saw the main threat to tyranny not in a despotic monarch on the throne but in a corrupt *starshyna* that sought to usurp power and use it not for the common good but for personal gain.⁴⁸

The plan of integrationist transformations for Sloboda Ukraine was developed by a Senate commission composed of the representatives of the general officers (*heneralitet*), General-in-Chief Petr Panin, Senator Iakov Shakhovskii, and the former diplomat and Catherine II’s secretary of state Adam Olsufi’ev. In January 1765, the future Sloboda governor Evdokim Shcherbinin joined the commission on orders from the empress.

The Senate commission wrote two reports, dated 16 December 1764 and 20 May 1765, which were approved by Catherine II.⁴⁹ These reports defined the main parameters of reforms in the military, administrative, and social spheres. In particular, they dealt with the creation of the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia, which was to consist of five provinces that corresponded to the five Sloboda reg-

iments. Accordingly, provincial chancelleries headed by voivodes were established in Sumy, Okhtyrka, Ostrohozsk, and Izium, and a gubernial chancellery headed by the governor, in Kharkiv. Former companies were transformed into commissariats (*komisarstva*), which were to be administered by commissariat boards headed by commissioners (*komisary*). Instead of five Cossack and one hussar regiments, five regular hussar regiments were created. The rank-and-file Cossacks (*kozaky-kompaniitsi*) and Cossack helpers (*kozaky-pidpomichnyky*), who constituted nearly 60 per cent of the region's population, were renamed military residents (*viis'kovi obyvately*) and were charged a poll tax of 95 kopeks per year. In addition, they were to supply recruits for the new Sloboda hussar regiments, and universal imperial recruitment did not extend to this region for the time being. Instead, the Sloboda-dependent peasants who lived on *starshyna* landholdings in the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia and the landholdings of Russian landowners in neighboring gubernias were to pay a poll tax of 60 kopeks per year. The former *starshyna* and the clergy were not subject to the poll tax or any other levies.

The newly formed administrative institutions were to function based on universal imperial legislation outside the spheres where this legislation was in contradiction with the charters of privilege of the Sloboda regiments and economic liberties of the former Cossack estate. Another important nuance was that the key posts – governor, voivode, and gubernial prosecutor – were to be filled by “people capable of this kind of governance, first of all Great Russians,” while the posts of the governors’ and voivodes’ deputies could be filled by members of the former *starshyna*.⁵⁰

They tried to adhere to this principle. As shown in the study by Svitlana Potapenko, who analyzed the personnel and structure of the administrative institutions of the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia during the first years of its existence, all the highest levels of the bureaucratic apparatus were in fact filled by natives of internal Russian gubernias: Evdokim Shcherbinin became governor; Luka Mikhailov, gubernial prosecutor; and Marko Losev, Leontii Lvov, Prokhor Bavykin, and Mikhail Kriukov, the voivodes in Sumy, Okhtyrka, Izium, and Ostrohozsk. At the same time, the absolute majority of the posts of voivodes’ deputies and commissioners were assigned to members of the former Sloboda *starshyna*.⁵¹ The case of the governors’ deputies, who after the establishment of viceregencies in 1780 were renamed vice-governors, was less clear-cut. Natives of internal Russian gubernias continued to dominate in this office, even though Shcherbinin did try to appoint former Sloboda colonels to these posts.⁵²

Catherine II did not confine herself to just approving both reports of the Senate commission; she issued two more important documents that cast light on what she saw as the goal of the abolition of autonomy and the key objectives of the

transformations that were to be implemented in the region. These were the empress's instructions to the Sloboda governor of 6 July 1765 and her manifesto "On the Establishment in the Sloboda Regiments of Proper Civilian Order and on the Location of the Gubernial and Provincial Chancelleries" of 28 July 1765.⁵³

It is worth beginning our analysis of these documents with the manifesto, which was meant to explain concisely to Sloboda-Ukrainian society the content and goal of the planned transformations. Speaking of the reasons for the changes, Catherine II briefly mentioned "many problems of a mixed military and civilian rule, the burdensome maintenance and uselessness of Cossack service there, and other forms of oppression of the people stemming from this."⁵⁴ Noting the regularization of "unreliable" Cossack service and the creation of a gubernia, the empress formulated the goal of these transformation as follows:

We are not satisfied with the mere elimination of this harmfulness, and wanting to express Our Motherly mercy to the people there, and taking into account both the common good and their own benefit, we had to resolve ... to institute proper order and thereby not only establish the prosperity and peace of all the inhabitants there, but by this means lead them out of their earlier stagnation and give them a way to obtain, with services to Us and the fatherland, the same enjoyment of the ranks and services graciously assigned by Us to each position as Our other loyal subjects.⁵⁵

At the end of the manifesto, Catherine II repeated that these "new, more useful institutions" were a sign "of Our goodwill to all the people there." She expected that the Sloboda "people," finding "themselves free of taxes and burdens," would demonstrate "appropriate gratitude" and would continue to perform their "loyal duty, since everybody in general and each individually is expressly obligated by duty, oath, honor, and true commitment to Us and the fatherland."⁵⁶

It is worth noting that the abolition of autonomy was presented as a civilizing act that was to bring order and prosperity to Sloboda-Ukrainian society, which, according to Catherine II, was in a state of "stagnancy" (*zakosnenie*), that is, was, at best, closed to development and reforms.

What in the empress's opinion were to be the first steps in establishing "order" and "prosperity and peace" in the region? Help in finding the answer to this question can be found in Catherine II's instruction to Sloboda governor Shcherbinin, published three weeks before the manifesto cited above. The instruction consisted of twenty-eight items, of which six (the most!) were devoted to the introduction of a poll tax and control over the movement of the popula-

tion in order to ensure tax collection. Tax evasion carried serious penalties, including exile to Nerchinsk. The free movement of Cossack helpers, landless peasants who worked for neighbors with land (*pidsusidky*), as well as dependent peasants, which was part of the "Cherkasy customs," was restricted even before the decree: first, by a decision of the Shcherbinin commission, and later, by the report of the Senate commission of 16 December 1764, which Catherine II approved.⁵⁷ The instruction to the Sloboda governor introduced in Sloboda Ukraine the passport system that existed in the internal Russian gubernias, which prescribed that a long-term absence from the place of residence required a passport obtained for a fee from the nearest commissariat.⁵⁸

It is worth noting that in the conditions of the eighteenth-century Russian Empire the poll tax was not only a fiscal instrument but also an important social marker. This tax was not paid individually, but by the community, which potentially hampered individual initiative and strengthened collectivist principles. In addition, to be subject to the poll tax meant that the payer belonged to one of the unprivileged categories of the population; these categories had a number of obligations, but, most importantly, their vertical social mobility, at least at the legislative level, was strictly restricted.⁵⁹ The preservation of the Cossack estate's privileges during the first decades after the abolition of autonomy mitigated the radical nature of these innovations, but in the long term, Catherine II's decision to impose the poll tax on nearly 95 per cent of the region's population had very important far-reaching consequences as it created grounds for treating dependent peasants as serfs of the nobility, and military residents and townspeople, as serfs of the state.

Two items in the instruction dealt with the judicial system, in particular permission to conduct oral, simplified trials in cases involving less than twelve rubles, and also stressed the impermissibility of bribery in courts. Next, the empress ordered the creation of an estate department in the gubernial chancellery that was to carry out preparations for a future general land survey in order to establish order in land matters and put an end to disputes.

The instruction also elaborated populist slogans that had been advanced by the Shcherbinin commission. In particular, it contained a rather declarative item, "On Protecting Commoners from Harm," which dealt with the need to protect military residents from abuses during the billeting of military units. On the other hand, more concrete items in the instruction prohibited military and civilian senior officials from buying land and fixed property from military residents, ordered that land-poor and landless residents be allotted – wherever possible – plots of land from the public regimental land fund, and envisaged the creation

of “public storage facilities,” in which the grain collected from the population would be stored in the event of a poor harvest. The document also envisaged the introduction in cities and towns of “police regulations” based on the Police Chief Instruction; the details of these “regulations” were to be specified in instructions to commissioners, which the Sloboda gubernial chancellery was ordered to prepare.

The only item in the instruction related to the humanitarian sphere dealt with the opening of supplementary classes of mathematics, geometry, painting, “engineering,” artillery science, and geodesy, as well as the French and German languages at Kharkiv College, for which three thousand rubles were allocated from untaxed revenue. This measure was motivated not by the need to spread education among the “people,” as could have been expected, but by the “revival and dissemination of sciences.” This rhetorical justification indicates that for Catherine II this initiative was part of her policy of cultural patronage and yet another step in strengthening her image as an enlightened monarch, who promotes the development of the sciences and arts.⁶⁰

On the other hand, current studies show that the creation of supplementary classes – a de facto independent secular educational institution – became a powerful means of secularization, which initially had a very pragmatic goal: to train specialists for the newly created administrative institutions and educated officers for the imperial army.⁶¹ The emphasis in the educational program on mathematics, as well as on such practical disciplines as geodesy, “engineering,” and artillery science, indicates that Catherine II was continuing the pragmatic policy of Peter I, aimed at “regularizing” and technologizing the society of the empire.⁶²

The manifesto and instruction to the Sloboda governor are important direct items of evidence on the basis of which we can reconstruct the views of the empress on the situation in Sloboda Ukraine and her view of the direction of future changes as of 1765. But if we want to better understand the intentions and expectations of Catherine II, we also need to consider her general “Instruction to the Governors,” which she wrote a year earlier, on 21 April 1764.⁶³

This document placed special emphasis on the empress’s “vigilant care” “to increase the well-being of the subjects ... and bring the whole ... Empire the desired prosperity.”⁶⁴ Accordingly, it was envisaged that the governor as the “head and master of the whole Gubernia placed under his watch” was not only to be in charge of the proper execution of the laws and directives of the imperial government and the effective functioning of administrative and judicial institutions but also to stimulate the development and flourishing of the region. In particular, Catherine II urged the governors to care “about agriculture as the source of all the treasures and wealth of the State and about multiplying by each Gubernia of its particular ... products exported abroad, encouraging the people with wise

counsel.”⁶⁵ This meant that the governors were to be the regional counterparts of the reformer empress and “by their diligent execution of their prescribed duties, and with impartial loyalty, [they should] complement the tireless labors for the happiness of the fatherland” of Catherine II herself.⁶⁶

However, this “Instruction” also reveals to us only the part of the picture that the empress regarded as possible and necessary to be made public. What would help us to see what remained behind the declarations addressed to the general public would be Catherine II’s secret instruction to Governor Shcherbinin, issued most likely in 1765. Unfortunately, so far this document has not been found in either Ukrainian or Russian archives. However, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that it existed, since, at least at the beginning of her reign, the empress actively engaged in the practice of writing secret instructions to governors of both internal Russian gubernias and the “western borderlands.” We know for certain that in 1764 she issued secret instructions to the newly appointed governor of Novgorod Jacob von Sievers and the governor-general of Little Russia Petr Rumiantsev. Based on the contents of these two documents, it is worth attempting to reconstruct the likely content of the secret instruction to Shcherbinin.

The instruction to Sievers detailed and strengthened the image of the reformer governor represented in the “Instruction.” Among other things, the empress stressed that positive changes had to be based on a good knowledge of local conditions and circumstances, and therefore encouraged Sievers to collect detailed statistics regarding all aspects of the life of the local society and to prepare new maps of the gubernia and individual counties.⁶⁷

The secret instruction to Rumiantsev also emphasized the image of a reformer governor, but it is much more interesting to us in that its second main topic was the integration of the society of the Hetmanate into the empire and the role of the Little Russian governor-general in achieving this goal. Here the focus was on relations with the Cossack *starshyna*, which was depicted as the main obstacle both to the integration of the region and to its successful internal development.

As in the case of the Sloboda regiments, the instruction spoke of “countless disorders” caused by the combination of “military and civilian rule,” as well as “the arrogance of those in charge, choosing their own self-interest over the people’s interests and direct service to the fatherland.”⁶⁸ The empress regarded the hatred of the Little Russians for the Great Russians as a “political” problem, regarding which she noted:

And since that hatred is found especially among the local officers, who, fearing to see the limits of their lawless and greedy self-will, impart it more to the common people, warning them with first imperceptible and eventually

complete loss of rights and liberties, so that there is no doubt that they, with the current changes in their rule ... did not make worse their underhanded deceit that the suppression of the previous disorder and the establishment of the best institutions would not be consistent with their whims and self-interest. In this consideration, do not leave off diligently monitoring, but not explicitly and without publicity, the behavior of the officers there.⁶⁹

Catherine II was equally distrustful of the clergy of the Hetmanate, which under the influence of Catholic educational and theological practices ostensibly aspired not only to spiritual but also to secular power:

You must also diligently keep an eye on them ... so that they do not exceed the boundaries of their proper rank with their various wiles of deep-rooted love of power, sometimes extending their spiritual authority over secular matters, and sometimes sowing chaff among the simple and superstitious people that is useful for their purposes but bad for general peace, under the guise of the love of God and piety ... And, besides, it is no secret that students of theology, both in Polish schools abroad and those in Little Russia, who establish themselves here in spiritual offices, according to the depraved rules of Roman clergy, are infected by many principles of insatiable love of power, whose harmful consequences fill European history of past years.⁷⁰

While the *starshyna* and clergy were viewed by the empress as possessing subjectivity, even if negative, the rest of the region's population – rank-and-file Cossacks, townspeople, and dependent peasants, who merged into a single mass of “common people” – seems to have been lacking in political subjectivity altogether. In Catherine II's secret instruction, the “people” were merely the object of the subversive propaganda of the officers and clergy and had no political consciousness and aspirations of their own, and their general image was clearly Orientalist. The empress viewed the movement of peasants from place to place as “the foolhardiness of the people's obduracy ... and the sole dream of liberty.” The “people” were also characterized by “depraved notions,” a proclivity for drunkenness, “indolence,” and “indifference” to agriculture.⁷¹

At the same time, in keeping with the cameralistic attitude, the Orientalization of the “common people” was harmoniously combined with paternalism. In accord with the populist rhetoric already successfully tested in the Sloboda regiments, the imperial government sought to protect the “people” from the abuses of the *starshyna*, who were openly called “little tyrants” in the instruction to Rumiantsev,

and it was the “people” that were ultimately to feel the benevolent influence of the changes planned in St Petersburg:

And although time itself will open the people’s eyes and show them how much they will be unburdened and prosper, when, through the establishment of the best practices, they find themselves suddenly freed from the many little tyrants tormenting them, you can even now, assisted by various means [such as] fairness, unselfishness, leniency, and kindness, destroy their unfounded fears and win their love and trust.⁷²

The ending of the quotation indicates how the empress envisaged that the goals set before Rumiantsev should be achieved. This involved primarily reaching consensus or the agreement of the local population to the planned transformations. Inasmuch as consensus could not be reached exclusively by coercive means, the governor had to combine coercion with persuasion, “leniency and kindness,” and even cunning and hypocrisy:

In the case of many excesses requiring correction and other, better institutions, we can imagine the work that the performance of your job involves, but never more so than in any new undertaking, and [so] given the common people’s sometimes fallacious notions about it, and the passionate and insidious interpretations of the officials, you should be using not always the power of the authority vested in you but [such] diverse means as kindness and leniency, and others, depending on the case, the time, and the person. And thus it can be said that in such cases it is necessary to have wolves’ teeth and a fox’s tail.⁷³

We cannot assert with absolute certainty that all the items listed above in the secret instruction to Rumiantsev appeared in the confidential instructions that the empress gave in oral or written form to the first Sloboda governor. But in view of the similarity of Sloboda and Little Russian societies and the tasks facing both governors, as well as the nature of Shcherbinin’s activity in Sloboda Ukraine in 1765–75, we can assume with a high degree of probability that most of them were included there. We can even risk the claim that the instruction to Rumiantsev was composed under the influence of, *inter alia*, the experience of Shcherbinin as the head of the investigative commission sent to the Sloboda regiments in 1762–64. At the same time, the feasibility of all these integrationist projects had to be tested by a confrontation with Sloboda reality. The key role at this stage no longer belonged to the empress but to the first Sloboda governor Evdokim Shcherbinin,

who was in charge of the integration of the region into the empire during the first decade following the abolition of autonomy.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as Volodymyr Sklokin, “Prosvichenyi absoliutyzm Kateryny II i skasuvannia avtonomii Slobids'kyh polkiv,” in Volodymyr Sklokin, *Rosiis'ka imperiia i Slobids'ka Ukraïna u druhii polovyni XVIII stolittia* (Lviv, 2019), 53–84. Copyright 2019 by Vydavnytstvo Ukraïns'koho katolyts'koho universytetu and Volodymyr Sklokin. Reprinted and translated with permission.

- 1 “Zapiski novo-oskol'skago dvorianina I.O. Ostrozhskago-Lokhvitskago (1771–1846),” *Kievskaia starina* 2 (1886): 360–1.
- 2 Ibid., 361. For greater detail about Ivan and the Ostroz'kyi-Lokhvyts'kyi family, see Svitlana Potapenko, “Slobids'ka sviashchennys'ko-starshyns'ka rodyna Ostroz'ko-Lokhvyts'kykh ta ikhnia khronika (pro heroïv odnieï publikatsii u ‘Kyïvs'kii starovyni’),” *Kyïvs'ka starovyna* 5–6 (2012): 156–66.
- 3 For a more detailed analysis, see Il'ia Gerasimov, Marina Mogil'ner, and Sergei Glebov, “Dolgii XVIII vek i stanovlenie modernisatsionnoi imperii,” in *Novaia imperskaia istoriia Severnoi Evrazii*, ed. Il'ia Gerasimov, vol. 2: *Balansirovanie imperskoi situatsii XVIII–XX vekov* (Kazan, 2017), 13–74.
- 4 See the discussion of the concept of the “reformist tsar” and “despotism” with regard to Peter I in Cynthia H. Whittaker, *Russian Monarchy: Eighteenth-Century Rulers and Writers in Political Dialogue* (Dekalb, 2003), 33–58.
- 5 On the phenomenon of “enlightened absolutism” in Western historiography, see H.M. Scott, “Introduction: The Problem of Enlightened Absolutism,” in *Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe*, ed. H.M. Scott (Houndsmills-London, 1990), 1–36. For a more detailed discussion of the interpretations of the reign of Catherine II as an example of enlightened absolutism, see Isabel de Madariaga, “Catherine the Great,” in *Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe*, ed. H.M. Scott (Houndsmills-London, 1990), 289–311; Robert E. Jones, *Provincial Development in Russia: Catherine II and Jakob Sievers* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1984), 1–44; David M. Griffiths, “Catherine II: The Republican Empress,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 21, no. 3 (1973): 323–44. On the pre-Enlightenment absolutist unification in Ukraine and Eastern Europe during the seventeenth through the early eighteenth centuries, see:

- Orest Subtelny, *Domination of Eastern Europe: Native Nobilities and Foreign Absolutism, 1500–1715* (Kingston and Montreal, 1986).
- 6 Scott, "Introduction: The Problem of Enlightened Absolutism," 20.
 - 7 Moreover, in the case of Catherine II, the sources of inspiration were quite diverse and included German cameralism, theories of natural law, and also select ideas of French, British, and Italian Enlightenment philosophers. The eclectic nature of Catherine II's reform program is a particular focus of Robert Jones in Jones, *Provincial Development in Russia*, 7–24.
 - 8 Scott, "Introduction: The Problem of Enlightened Absolutism," 15–16.
 - 9 Jones, *Provincial Development in Russia*, 24.
 - 10 Volodymyr Masliichuk, "Shcherbinins'ka komisiiia ta skasuvannia slobid-s'kykh polkiv 1762–1764," in idem, *Provintsiiia na perekhrestii kul'tur (doslidzhennia z istorii Slobids'koi Ukraïny XVII-XIX st.)* (Kharkiv, 2007), 141–56.
 - 11 Ibid., 144–5.
 - 12 "Senatskii ukaz o naznachenii leib-gvardii sek. maiora E. Shcherbinina dlia izsledovaniia neporiadkov v ostrogozhskom i drugih slobodskikh polkakh 1762 g.," in *Materialy dlia istorii kolonizatsii i byta stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva (Khar'kovskoi i otchasti Kurskoi i Voronezhskoi gub.) v XVI-XVIII st.*, ed. D.I. Bagalei (Kharkiv, 1886), 325–6.
 - 13 Ibid., 327; *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (hereafter *psz*), vol. 16 (St Petersburg), 113, no. 11711. Little is known about Shcherbinin before his appearance in Sloboda Ukraine. We know only that he was born in 1720 into a noble family of Pskov. After receiving an education at home, at fifteen years old he began service in the Life Guard Izmail regiment. He was married to Princess Aleksandra Bariatinskaia, had two daughters, Elena and Katerina, and also two sons, Sergei and Andrei. Both sons pursued military careers, and the latter was married to the daughter of Princess Ekaterina Dashkova, an important figure in the Catherinian age. Shcherbinin was a wealthy man: he owned close to 2,000 serfs and also a distillery in Viatka gubernia. Shcherbinin's political career began after the coming to power of Catherine II. His promotion was probably due to the active part played by the Izmail regiment in the Catherinian coup d'état. Just a month after the coronation of the new empress, he was appointed head of the investigative commission to the Sloboda regiments, and in 1765, the first Sloboda governor. On Shcherbinin's biography, see "Evdokim Alekseevich Shcherbinin," in *Russkii biograficheskii slovar'* (St Petersburg, 1912) 24: 145; S.I. Posokhov and A.N. Iarmysh, *Gubernatory i general-gubernatory* (Kharkiv, 1997), 31–2; A.N. Akin'shin, "Namestnik Shcherbinin Evdokim Alekseevich, 1779–1782," in

Voronezhskie gubernatory i vitse-gubernatory, 1710–1917. Istoriko-biograficheskie ocherki, ed. A.N. Akin'shin (Voronezh, 2000), 113–15; Mikhail Radin, *Davydovy, Venevskie i drugie*, <http://www.veneva.ru/lib/davidov.html>, accessed 24 September 2021. These encyclopedic entries, especially the entry in the *Russkii biograficheskii slovar'*, contain some inaccurate claims, in particular the claim that Shcherbinin was in charge of the changes in the New Serbia (Novoserbs'kyi) and Slavo-Serbia (Slov'ianoserbs'kyi) regiments, as well as the construction of the Dnipro Line of fortifications. The date of his birth remains open to question: *Russkii biograficheskii slovar'* lists it as 1728, while the Voronezh historian Akin'shin gives it as 1720. Surprisingly, Shcherbinin has so far not attracted the attention of the numerous students of Catherine's reign. One exception is the article by Volodymyr Masliichuk devoted to the activity of Shcherbinin in Sloboda Ukraine in 1762–1764, see Masliichuk, “Shcherbinins'ka komisiia,” 141–56.

- 14 Masliichuk, “Shcherbinins'ka komisiia,” 149.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 147–8.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 146, 149.
- 17 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 938, ll. 119–25.
- 18 *Ibid.*, ll. 283–4.
- 19 PSZRI, 16: 1003–1007, no. 12293.
- 20 On Krasnokuts'kyi, see Volodymyr Masliichuk, “Fedir Khomych Krasnokuts'kyi – predstavnyk starshyns'koho prosharku slobids'kykh polkiv XVIII st.” in Volodymyr Masliichuk, *Provintsiia na perekhresty kul'tur*, 244–56; Ivan Telichenko, “Protest Slobodskoï Ukraïny protiv reform 1765,” *Kievskaia starina* 1–3 (1888): 251–61.
- 21 Masliichuk, “Shcherbinins'ka komisiia,” 151.
- 22 For a more detailed analysis, see Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, MA, 1988), 65–81. Zenon Kohut focuses primarily on the camer-alist dimension of the imperial integrationist policy of the final third of the eighteenth century – the desire to introduce uniform laws and create a well-managed state. Brian Davis, on the other hand, in his recent study, draws attention to the imperial government's military and geopolitical considerations involving the subjugation of the Northern Black Sea region and Crimea, which served as the impetus for the regularization of the Cossack Host and the abolition of the autonomy of the Sloboda regiments and the Hetmanate: Brian L. Davis, *The Russo-Turkish War, 1768–1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire* (London, 2016).

- 23 In this case, the term “Russianization” (*obrusenie*) was understood to mean not forcible assimilation but the “administrative Russification” and acculturation of the local elites into the high imperial culture. On the specific features of using the term “Russification” in the studies of history of the Russian Empire, see Edward Thaden, “Introduction,” in *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland*, ed. Edward Thaden (Princeton, 1981), 8–9; Theodore R. Weeks, “Managing Empire: Tsarist Nationalities Policy,” in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, vol. 2: Imperial Russia, 1689–1917, ed. Dominic Lieven (Cambridge, 2006), 27–44; Aleksei Miller, “Rusifikatsiia ili rusifikatsii?,” in Aleksei Miller, *Imperiia Romanovykh i natsionalizm: esse po metodologii istoricheskogo issledovaniia* (Moscow, 2006), 54–77.
- 24 *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva* (hereinafter – *SIRIO*) 7 (St Petersburg, 1871): 348.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 PSZRI, 16: 1004, no. 12293.
- 27 “Senatskii ukaz o naznachenii leib-gvardii sek. Maiora E. Shcherbinina dlia izsledovaniia neporiadkov v ostrogozhskom i drugih polkakh 1762 g.,” *Materiialy dlia istorii kolonizatsii i byta stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva (Khar'kovskoi i otchasti Kurskoi i Voronezhskoi gub.) v XVI-XVIII st.*, ed. D.I. Bagalei (Kharkiv, 1886), 327.
- 28 Retired Izium colonel Mykhailo Myloradovych stressed that the majority of officers consented to the changes in the region with the expectation of being forgiven for their abuses, which was what Shcherbinin had promised them: RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 938, l. 24.
- 29 Dependent peasants and the clergy were traditionally not taken into account by Catherine’s government, and thus, passed over in silence, as they seemingly existed outside the confines of the empire’s society.
- 30 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 938, ll. 7–8.
- 31 Ibid., ll. 9–10.
- 32 Ibid., f. 16, op. 1, d. 938, ll. 23–8. Mykhailo Myloradovych, an immigrant from the Balkans, was the quartermaster of the Izium Cossack regiment from 1737 to 1758, and from 1759 to 1761, colonel of the same regiment. See *Materiial dlia istorii Iziumskogo Slobodskogo kazach'iago polka: Mikhail Aleksandrovich Miloradovich* (Kharkiv, 1858), 1–2.
- 33 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 938, l. 23ob.
- 34 Masliichuk, “Shcherbinins'ka komissiia,” 151.
- 35 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 938, l. 24.
- 36 Ibid.

- 37 Ibid., l. 24 ob.
- 38 During the first years of her reign, Catherine II, who had come to power as a result of a coup d'état, was concerned about the question of her own legitimacy and, in an attempt to avoid any kind of associations with despotism, put special emphasis on the idea of a "legal monarchy" and a policy aimed at obtaining consensus: Whittaker, *Russian Monarchy*, 99–119.
- 39 RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 938, ll. 7–8.
- 40 PSZRI, 17: 194–95, no. 12440.
- 41 PSZRI, 16: 1004, no. 12293.
- 42 This work of nearly eighty pages, which was signed by quartermaster Ivan Hozlubin, two chancellors, and sixteen captains of the Ostrohozk regiment, has been preserved among the documents of the Shcherbinin commission in fund 16 (Internal Department) of RGADA. The work has no title and no date, but the text allows us to conclude that it was written after the commission had begun its work, but before the decision was approved to abolish the autonomy, most likely in 1763. To the best of my knowledge, this work has not been previously mentioned in historiography and so far has not been put into academic circulation: RGADA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 938, ll. 180–213.
- 43 Tev'iashov's plan was also opposed by another representative of the Balkan emigration, the aforementioned former Izium colonel Mykhailo Myloradovych, who claimed that Tev'iashov had in fact appropriated his idea of transforming the Sloboda regiments into hussar regiments, which he had proposed as early as 1756. See *Material dlia istorii Iziumskogo Slobodskogo kozach'ego polka: Mikhaïl Aleksandrovich Miloradovich* (Kharkiv, 1858), 26–35.
- 44 In Krasnokuts'kyi's case, who, judging from Myloradovych's complaint, enjoyed the favor of Shcherbinin, the sentence did not enter into force. In 1766 Krasnokuts'kyi returned from St Petersburg to Sloboda Ukraine, where he soon died. See Masliichuk, "Fedir Khomych Krasnokuts'kyi," 253–4. Nor can we be certain whether Myloradovych was actually exiled to Tobolsk. In February 1766, the Sloboda gubernia chancellery, which sought to carry out the verdict, was unable to find him: TSDIAUK, f. 1710, op. 2, spr. 93, ark. 1.
- 45 Masliichuk, "Shcherbinins'ka komisiia," 145.
- 46 In response to Shcherbinin's report about the abuses of the *starshyna* of the Sloboda regiments, the empress in her letter of 19 May 1763 wrote him that she "had not counted on seeing such a peculiar kind of disorder and rapacity: because, it seems to me, no one has ever heard before of such illegal requisitions being collected and due payments being in arrears to the treasury." See "Tri pis'ma Ekateriny Velikoi k Evdokimu Alekseevichu Shcherbininu," *Russkii Arkhiv* (hereinafter – RA) 6 (1896): 186.

- 47 On the “legal monarchy” in greater detail, see Whittaker, *Russian Monarchy*, 99–118; Griffiths, “Catherine II: The Republican Empress,” 323–44.
- 48 It is worth emphasizing that what is meant in this case is premodern populism, or “populism before nationalism.” But this populism had a great deal in common with its modern analogue: anti-elitism, an attempt to speak on behalf of the real “people,” and anti-pluralism. At the same time, in Catherine II’s interpretation, populism was clearly combined with Enlightenment paternalism. On populism as an ideology and political practice, see Jan Werner Müller, *What Is Populism?* (Philadelphia, 2016).
- 49 PSZRI, 16: 1003–7, no. 12293; *ibid.*, 17: 133–6, no. 12397.
- 50 PSZRI, 16: 1004, no. 12283.
- 51 Svitlana Potapenko, “Kantseliars'ki ustanovy Slobids'koï Ukraïny druhoï polovyny 60-kh rr. XVIII st.: osoblyvosti funktsionuvannia ta personal'nyi sklad sluzhbovtsiv,” in *Naukovi zapysky. Zbirnyk prats' molodykh molodykh vchenykh ta aspirantiv* 18 (Kyiv, 2009): 8–15.
- 52 Thus, in September 1765, immediately after the creation of the Sloboda Ukraine gubernia, one of the two governors’ deputies was former Okhtyrka colonel Mykhailo Boiars'kyi. But as soon as in October of the same year, Boiars'kyi resigned from this post and continued his service as lieutenant-colonel in the Okhtyrka hussar regiment: Potapenko, “Kantseliars'ki ustanovy Slobids'koï Ukraïny,” 8. Later, in 1769–1771, the post of governor’s deputy was held by the aforementioned former Ostrohozk colonel, Stepan Tev'iashov: TSDIAUK, f. 1710, op. 2, spr. 549, ark. 1; *ibid.*, f. 1710, op. 2, spr. 797, ark. 7. But the next representative of the *starshyna* did not appear in this office until 1791. This person was the collegiate councillor (Ukr. *kolez'kyi radnyk*; Rus. *kollezhskii sovetnik*) Hryhorii Shydlovs'kyi, a member of an influential Kharkiv officer family, who in 1791–96 occupied the post of vice-governor under Kharkiv vicegerent Fedor Kishenskii. After Kishenskii’s dismissal in 1796, Shydlovskii even performed the duties of the head of the Kharkiv viceregency for a period of time: TSDIAUK, f. 1709, op. 2, spr. 1612, ark. 1; *ibid.*, f. 1959, op. 1, spr. 425, ark. 1. The weak interest on the part of the representatives of the most influential Sloboda officer families in the office of vice-governor is likely explained by the traditionally more prestigious occupation of military service, as well as lack of trust in the first Sloboda governor.
- 53 PSZRI, 17: 181–9, no. 12430; *ibid.*, 17: 194–5, no. 12440.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 17: 194, no. 12440.
- 55 *Ibid.*, 194–5.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 195.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 16: 1006, no. 12293. This restriction remained “temporary” until 3 May

1783, at which time free movement was finally prohibited by a decree of Catherine II, which de facto transformed the Sloboda dependent peasants into the serfs of landowners.

58 Ibid., 17: 183, no. 12430.

59 Alison K. Smith, *For the Common Good and Their Own Well-Being: Social Estates in Imperial Russia* (Oxford, 2014), 17–23. At the same time, it is worth noting that military residents were not subject to quitrent (*obrok*), that is, a tax paid in money in the amount of three rubles, similarly to state and economic peasants, and also smallholders (*odnodvitsi*) in internal Russian gubernias. From the time of Peter I, quitrent for these categories of the population was regarded as equivalent to corvée or cash rent from serfs. Thus the government tended to view them as “state serfs.”

60 Whittaker, *Russian Monarchy*, 104.

61 The experiment with the Supplementary Classes proved successful in no small part owing to the personal involvement of Governor Shcherbinin, who, in particular, saw to the supply of books and furniture and attended to engaging teachers from Moscow. For Shcherbinin, the creation of a secular educational institution primarily for the nobility, modeled on the Noble Land Cadet Corps in St Petersburg, became a key element in his program of “regularization” of life in the region. At the same time, as Volodymyr Masliychuk shows, here, too, life made adjustments – the institution ultimately turned out to be oriented primarily to orphan children from various estates (except for dependent peasants and serfs) and was a mixture of various educational models: Volodymyr Masliichuk, “‘Novopribavochnye klassy’: sprobа svit-s'koho navchal'noho zakladu u Kharkovi 1765–1775 rr.,” in *Kyivs'ka Akademiia* 11 (Kyiv, 2013): 137–53; Idem, “Vid ‘dodatkovykh klasiv’ do ‘narodnoho uchylshcha’: svits'kyi osvittii zaklad u Kharkovi 1775–1789 rr.,” *Kyivs'ka Akademiia* 13 (Kyiv, 2016), 228–47; Idem, *Zdobutky ta iliuzii: osvittni initsiatyvy na Livoberezhnii ta Slobids'kii Ukraïni druhoï polovyny XVIII–pochatku XIX st.* (Kharkiv, 2018), 171–95.

62 As Alfred Rieber notes, the reforms of Peter I in the Russian Empire were inspired by a vision of a society “dominated by technique,” that is, a society in which “technology and social organization are combined to maximize production.” See Alfred J. Rieber, *The Imperial Russian Project: Autocratic Politics, Economic Development, and Social Fragmentation* (Toronto-Buffalo-London, 2017), 17, 390.

63 PSZRI, 16: 716–20, no. 12137.

64 Ibid., 716.

65 Ibid., 719–20.

66 Ibid., 717.

67 Jones, *Provincial Development*, 52.

68 “Nastavlenie, dannoe grafu P. Rumiantsevu pri naznachenie ego general-gubernatorom, s sobstvennoruchnymi pravkami Ekateriny II,” in *SIRIO* 7 (St Petersburg, 1871): 381.

69 Ibid., 390.

70 Ibid., 378.

71 Ibid., 381–2. The “people” were “backward” inasmuch as they supposedly lived in accordance with their natural instincts and customs rather than according to rational laws and regulations, created by the enlightened monarch and his officials. Such an Orientalist view of the “people” became established in the Russian Empire when the process of westernization began during the reign of Peter I. Whittaker, *Russian Monarchy*, 42–5.

72 Ibid., 390.

73 Ibid., 382.

“A Plague on Your Borders”: Disease Control
and Administrative Reforms in
Late Eighteenth-Century Ukraine

OKSANA MYKHED

Devastated and unexplored, welcoming and open to a stranger – these were the characteristics a traveler would give to the land and people living in late eighteenth-century Ukraine. Danylo Samoilovych, a Ukrainian surgeon who advanced his medical career in the Russian Empire, left a similar impression of the region in his writings.¹ Exhausted and ill after his prolonged service in the army battling in the Russo-Ottoman war, Samoilovych travelled from Moldavia to St Petersburg in the late spring and early summer of 1770. To reach the imperial capital, the physician crossed Polish and Russian-controlled territories in Ukraine right before a severe outbreak of bubonic plague in Kyiv that occurred in 1770–71. The outbreak that began in Polish Ukraine, spread to Kyiv, and struck many towns and villages in Left-Bank Ukraine was the largest documented epidemic of the pestilence in the region in the eighteenth century. Samoilovych's rare eye-witness traveler's account confirmed that the Kyiv medical tragedy was both predictable and inevitable. The physician witnessed that the plague was already terrorizing small towns and villages in Right-Bank Ukraine several months before the catastrophe in Kyiv and was among the first medical observers who connected the tragedy to unregulated population movement and the lack of special medical precautions organized by the governments in the two banks of Ukraine.²

While epidemics of bubonic plague played a major role in the creation of borders and quarantining complexes that divided off eighteenth-century empires and their people,³ the traveling physician observed that no such well-organized government initiatives existed to protect Kyiv and the two Ukrainian provinces

bearing the city's name. Kyiv was not only a large hub connecting the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian, and Ottoman empires but also the major entry point to the Russian Empire in its western borderlands. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the city was the major locus welcoming diverse newcomers to the empire, energizing its commerce, quartering soldiers dispatched to the battlegrounds of the Russo-Ottoman war, and hosting imperial officials exploring an open borderland region connecting the city to the Polish Kyiv palatinate and the rest of the Commonwealth.

Ambitious and eager to expand the empire through geographic exploration and acquisition of new territories, Catherine II did not expedite the physical and administrative separation of the Kyiv province in the mid-1760s. In fact, early in her reign, Catherine II intervened in Polish-Ukrainian relations and facilitated an influx of Right-Bank Ukraine's political elites, church and religious communities, as well as the peasant and Cossack population into the empire. Kyiv played an important role in these integrative initiatives and became a center welcoming and hosting these newcomers. The city and the Russian Kyiv province enjoyed a semi-autonomous status and relative freedom compared to similar cities in the inner provinces of the empire. The outbreak of the bubonic plague in Kyiv, however, changed these conditions and called for immediate action terminating such open-door policies. This paper argues that the medical disaster of 1770–71 redefined the role of the city and the province in the empire; initiated its higher subordination to the major imperial political, medical, and military institutions; and turned it into the center of the Kyiv vicegerency, an administrative unit created in accordance with the provincial reforms conducted in the empire in the mid-1770s.

Treatment of the Bubonic Plague in Ukraine

The bubonic plague was among the most challenging cataclysms influencing human life in the Ukrainian territories in the late eighteenth century. The population living during this period compared the pestilence in its destructive effect to wars, famines, and fires; and often experienced all of these disasters in their short and dramatic lifetimes.⁴ Indeed, the plague was difficult to diagnose at the early stages, especially for inexperienced medical professionals or people without any medical training. Usually, the rural population began to express alarm when they observed several swift and mysterious deaths with buboes visible on the bodies of the deceased. However, at this progressive stage, it was often too late to stop the pestilence in a town or village. To make matters worse, local medical professionals, if there were any, often confused the plague with other diseases because

some symptoms of the plague, such as high fever or body aches, were similar to influenza or gastroenteritis. The term *chuma* in Russian or *dzuma* in Polish was the first precise name attributed to the plague and used in late eighteenth-century sources.⁵ The term was borrowed from Turkish and was often applied to several contagious diseases including bubonic plague. Originally, it meant a bean or a small bubo, referring to the swollen lymph nodes typical for plague patients. Lymph nodes as large as a walnut or an egg were the most visible sign of the plague used to identify the disease.⁶

The plague is caused by the bacterium *yersinia pestis*, often spread by fleas and their hosts, rodents, such as rats. Since irregular cleaning of the streets and proximity to domestic animals provided opportunities for rat infestation, these factors may have affected the spread of the plague. In addition, poor hygiene and malnutrition made people susceptible to other diseases and weakened their overall health, thus decreasing their chances of surviving a plague epidemic. Townspeople and villagers living in eighteenth-century Ukraine were not aware of these facts. Before the discovery of germs, there were many theories explaining the nature of the bubonic plague, its treatment, and the ways the disease was transmitted from one person to another. The majority of medical professionals supported the *mi-asma* theory that did not define the plague as a separate disease and linked the origins of all contagious diseases to polluted air. The air condition was linked to weather fluctuations, and the likelihood of an epidemic of plague was mistakenly attributed to temperature and precipitation. The assumption of the most prominent physicians that the plague was spread in wet and mild winters or falls, and that hot dry summers or cold snowy winters prevented its spread did nothing but mislead officials responsible for the defense of their towns or villages from the pestilence.⁷ At the recommendation of the mainstream group of medical professionals, the governors of Polish and Russian towns often used cannonades or prolonged church bell ringing to “stress” or “heat” the air. The leading medical professionals in Warsaw, Kyiv, Cracow, Moscow, and St Petersburg believed that these measures would “blow away” the polluted air that could bring the plague to their cities. These methods absorbed the energy and resources of the governments, thus not allowing them to manage quarantine facilities, organize sanitary cordons, and dispatch police units controlling the territory.⁸

Another smaller group of medical professionals supported the *contagion* theory, which argued that the plague was transmitted through physical contact with the sick. This theory was developed based on the century-long observations made by government officials, sailors, and merchants who saw the effectiveness of the practices of isolation and quarantining in preventing the plague. The proponents of this theory, including Samoilovych, advised that the sick be isolated from the

healthy and that sanitary cordons around towns be created. In the mid-eighteenth century, this theory was relatively new. It was based on intuition and the practices traditionally accepted in European ports and towns experiencing high population density and frequent outbreaks of the plague. There was no scientific explanation justifying the practices of isolation and quarantining, and without knowing the true nature and reasons for the disease, state governments and municipal councils used a combination of methods recommended by the followers of these two theories.⁹

The practice of constructing quarantines and sanitary cordons was not followed on a regular basis in Ukraine. The most wealthy and prominent towns strived to maintain the fortification serving as a physical barrier protecting their inhabitants as well as quarantine facilities initiating the isolation of sick and suspicious individuals from the rest of the population. However, these protective measures were often combined with such time- and funds-consuming initiatives as hiring police units to burn large fires on the streets, organize collective prayers, or ring all the bells to "purify" the "foul" air. To make matters worse, the police, medical professionals, and the church often wasted limited manpower to engage in scapegoating; i.e., searching for specific individuals who were believed to "spoil" the air instead of identifying those who were sick and quarantining them.¹⁰

Physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and other professional medical personnel were not available in most Ukrainian towns and villages. Hence, the local population often relied on quacks, priests, and astrologers who replaced these medical professionals but had no relevant training. They were hired by the nobility or the common population and did more harm than good in administering anti-plague precautions on the local level. Some of them explained the epidemics as the wrath of God or linked the plague to the movement of stars and planets, thus supporting ignorance, superstitions, and misconceptions. Fear, the lack of knowledge about the disease, and poorly coordinated government measures made these people very popular and increased demand for their services.¹¹

Some quacks that were lucky enough to survive a plague epidemic became so rich that they were able to obtain noble status in the Commonwealth or be admitted to town councils in Left-Bank Ukraine. They were well respected by the population and enjoyed absolute freedom to administer any anti-plague precautions they conceived. The population did not distinguish them from physicians or other medical professionals. For instance, during his trip to St Petersburg, Samoilovych was able to stay in Vinnytsia for a short period of time and conduct isolationist anti-plague measures that stopped the epidemic in early 1770.¹² However, when the town witnessed another outbreak several months later, the struggle with the pestilence was led by a local quack who ordered the laying of the bodies

of the deceased on the outskirts of the town and conducted magic rituals on them. The plague soon stopped, and the population praised the quack for his actions. In reality, it was not the quack who helped the town to recover from the plague. A prolonged stay of the town dwellers outside of Vinnytsia, which happened during the outbreak, helped to isolate healthy individuals and decreased the spread of the disease. The population, however, ascribed this success to the quack's activity. The Vinnytsia quack became so popular that other towns and villages located on the routes connecting Moldavia and other Ottoman territories with Kyiv and experiencing outbreaks of plague in the spring and summer of 1770 invited him to help stop the pestilence.¹³ It is unclear how smaller outbreaks of the plague were defeated in those towns and villages. However, it is possible that the pestilence abated due to the dispersion of the population and the separation of sick and healthy inhabitants as it happened earlier in Vinnytsia.

The clergy of different denominations believed that they could protect the population from the plague with their prayers and used the outbreaks to attract villagers to church activities. In September 1764, when there was an outbreak of the plague in Balta, a local Orthodox priest required all residents to fast for three or more days and pray in the church. Both Uniate and Roman Catholic priests in Ukraine proclaimed that prayers, fasting, and even donations of money to the church would guarantee protection from the plague. Still, while the deaths continued, the priests believed that the flock did not demonstrate much needed devotion and obedience. Frequent public ceremonies and prayers often led to even more deaths and were followed by a rejection of the church and disbelief.¹⁴

It is not surprising that desperate and panic-driven peasant communities experiencing plague outbreaks often made quacks or priests the victims of mass hysteria and scapegoating. Popular imagination linked them to the dissemination of the foul air that caused the plague. For instance, when several people died from the plague in Voitivka, a village not far from Uman, in the spring of 1770, the peasants accused their Orthodox priest of causing the deaths. The priest, named Vasyl', was believed to be a ghoul who walked at night, opened the windows of peasant homes, and exhaled poisonous air inside to infect the homes with the plague. This story seemed to be so persuasive to the villagers that even the priest's family agreed with the accusation made by the community. The peasants found the priest guilty and executed him. After the execution, the plague did not cause new deaths in the village, which seemed to justify this unlawful act. Even the *szlachta* court that later investigated this murder accepted the peasants' argument and found them not guilty.¹⁵

Such activities distracted the population, government, church, town councils, and courts from the monitoring of neighboring territories, quarantining, border

closure, and isolation. These methods contributed to the creation of sanitary cordons against the plague, an effective but expensive and time-consuming measure often used in disease control and prevention. The creation and closure of sanitary cordons was impossible without a well-developed infrastructure, including one or two major roads with militia outposts guarding the entrances, well-defined city or provincial borders, and fortification or other defensive constructions. A line of outposts could host quarantine facilities with warehouses and hospitals. Outpost guards and militia allowed newcomers to enter the province only after quarantining them and disinfecting all their belongings. The newcomers' clothes, merchandise, and household items were disinfected by sprinkling with alcohol or vinegar, or aired with smoke from burning cedar or herbal powders either outdoors or inside the quarantine houses for several days. All newcomers were required to remain in quarantine, which accommodated them at hotels designated for this purpose or in hospitals for a period of three to six weeks. Travelers paid high fees for the quarantining services, a solid source of income for provincial governments or town councils. Merchants who frequently traveled from one province to another to sell salt, food, textiles, wood, or other commodities considered quarantine stays, disinfection, and preservation of merchandise in rented warehouse space important expense items included in their accounting books.¹⁶

An effective protection from plague outbreaks required the maintenance of highly paid human resources difficult to find and retain in the Ukrainian borderland territories that offered numerous career opportunities and were experiencing vibrant economic migration. Local city and provincial governments often lacked the funding to maintain permanent militia units, large teams of quarantine medical professionals, and outpost guards. Hence, to save funds, they dispatched temporary militia regiments and hired medical professionals or quarantine personnel only during the periods when outbreaks of the disease were believed to be more likely; i.e., from late spring to mid-fall. These limited resources offered protection from some outbreaks of plague, especially during the trade fairs or other merchant activities conducted in late summer and early fall. However, even these temporary protection measures were irregular and depended on the availability of sufficient funding included in the city and provincial budgets. In the late 1760s and early 1770s, these funds were spent on the support of militia and the army participating in the regulation of social turmoil in the Right-Bank Ukraine and the Russo-Ottoman war. During this period, Kyiv as well as other Ukrainian borderland towns and villages remained exposed to different newcomers, including those who skipped quarantining and brought a dangerous disease and devastation to the local population.

Social Turmoil and Lack of Border Security

In his traveler's notes, Danylo Samoilovych, who crossed the two banks of Ukraine on his way to the empire's capital, mentioned unregulated population movement and the overall destruction of towns and villages in Right-Bank Ukraine. The physician observed that local inhabitants left their homes in great panic to find a forest or other safer place to escape the plague. Some of the population did not have stable homes, while others considered their homes unsafe because their towns and villages remained ruined after the civil war that struck the area just a couple years earlier. Many towns and villages remained unprotected from pillagers, bandits, and soldiers who could spread the plague. In the towns that survived the recent social cataclysms, the most revealing sign of the coming plague was the swift departure of the nobility and town councils. Their actions proved their helplessness and confirmed the perceived danger of the epidemics that shook the region in 1770.¹⁷

Just two years earlier, in 1768, the territories of Right-Bank Ukraine and the Russian Kyiv province were exposed to a political conflict and social unrest that destabilized the society of the region, disrupted its economy, and ruined quarantine and defensive complexes that could prevent the outbreaks and protect the population from the plague. Russian interventions in the political life of the Commonwealth conducted since 1764 triggered a conflict between different social and religious groups in the region. Shortly after the Confederation of Bar initiated by local *szlachta*,¹⁸ the Cossack and peasant Koliivshchyna rebellion began.¹⁹ Both movements culminated in a civil war that resulted in the deportation of some Polish nobility from the region, the violent destruction of Jewish communities, and the arrests and executions of large groups of the peasantry and Cossacks. The conflict was orchestrated in Warsaw and St Petersburg to increase Russian political influence in the region, and some tensions between the local nobility and peasants were expected; the civil war had quickly spiraled out of the control of the Russian or Polish authorities. The governments of both states were greatly alarmed and put maximum effort to quash both rebellions in 1768–69. While the Polish side relied on small private militia regiments owned by the *szlachta* and magnates, Russian imperial authorities dispatched a massive army, thus gaining a solid military advantage and centralized control over Right-Bank Ukraine and the Kyiv region.²⁰

Between 1768 and 1774, the Russian army as well as administrative and military officials were constantly present in the area due to the empire's participation in the Russo-Ottoman war. Even though Ukrainian territories were not a zone of conflict directly involved in this war, the continuous presence of the Russian army

turned them into an open space exposed to unregulated population movement.²¹ The major and minor roads in Left- and Right-Bank Ukraine were used by the Russian troops to access the main battlegrounds in the Ottoman Empire. Local nobles, Cossacks, and peasants frequently communicated with the Russian troops, and supplied them with forage, food, clothes, and other essentials. Taverns, guest houses, and churches often served as temporary shelters to quarter Russian soldiers. While these activities revitalized small trade, the region failed to recover from the civil war and suffered from a severe economic decline.²²

Ukrainian towns and villages paid a heavy price for being centers of the social turmoil and hosting the Russian army. Uman, Bila Tserkva, Korsun, and numerous villages were left in ruins with no town councils and militia garrisons to protect them. In the past, these towns had large quarantine facilities and hospitals, and hosted teams of medical professionals who could administer anti-plague precautions. After 1768, however, the quarantines and hospitals were defunct, the medical professionals escaped the rebellions or were hired to assist the Russian soldiers, and militia service was discontinued.²³ City councils and other local government authorities often fled their jurisdictions and there was no one to organize effective work of the quarantines. The townsmen or villagers who observed the beginning of the epidemics fled their homes in great panic, took some food and home essentials, and built ramparts in the fields where they lived in full isolation for several months. These hermits sent scouts to their former villages and towns to check whether the plague had subsided and returned to their homes or resettled in new places.²⁴ Many towns and villages remained unattended, witnessed bandit attacks, and were exposed to travelers unintentionally spreading the plague. Kyiv chancellery as well as small courts and commissions functioning to resolve disputes between Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine's populations were overloaded with banditry, invasions, and pillage cases in the early 1770s. These border courts and commissions were assigned by the Russian and Polish governments as temporary institutions investigating border-related crime and conflicts.²⁵

There was no clearly defined and fortified border between the two banks of Ukraine due to a prolonged political dispute between the Russian Empire and the Commonwealth regarding this issue. The two states planned to demarcate and close the border in 1765–68, but social unrest and the beginning of the Russo-Ottoman war in 1768 interrupted these plans. According to earlier diplomatic agreements, the border was based on the Kyiv line of outposts located in Right-Bank Ukraine following the Dnipro river and marking the triangle of the Irpin and Stuhna rivers.²⁶ The town of Vasylkiv hosted the major outpost and the largest temporary quarantine facility located on the line.²⁷ The five-mile zone surrounding the outpost line was supposed to be depopulated, a policy that both

states were unable to execute due to increased colonization that took place in Right-Bank Ukraine in the mid-1760s. Numerous Russian officials who travelled to the region emphasized the need to demarcate and strengthen the border in order to secure the protection of Kyiv and solve many Russo-Ottoman-Polish borderland disputes. They also argued that well-developed fortifications and other defensive units constructed on the border could allow the empire to use the border infrastructure to temporarily quarter the army and officials engaged in diplomatic negotiations or the Russo-Ottoman war.²⁸

Theoretically, the outpost line was supposed to be regularly maintained and updated by the Cossack Hetmanate and the empire. However, administrative authorities in Left-Bank Ukraine struggled to find sufficient funding and human resources to guarantee uninterrupted work on the outposts. A few small garrisons of land militia quartered in huts or old fortresses were located in remote places, too far to effectively monitor the major roads and entrances to Kyiv.²⁹ Mounted troops which were supposed to guard the line were divided into very small detachments and sometimes forgotten or neglected. Peasants and permanent settlers in the area were expected to provide provision and forage for these detachments without any compensation or payment, which motivated them to avoid this important task. The outpost regiments were not able to compete with peasant and Cossack rebels, as well as with large groups of illegal migrants who could easily quash them while crossing the line.³⁰

In the late 1760s, it was evident to the Russian imperial authorities that the border vaguely defined by the Kyiv outpost line did not have enough capacity to stop unsanctioned population movement and lacked the manpower to guard entrances to the province. However, there was little to no attention to protection from the plague as an important motive to close the border on the Kyiv line and add quarantines to the border security system in the diaries and reports of Russian officials from this period. Sporadic source evidence about customs and quarantines on the Kyiv line confirms their temporary character and ineffectiveness.³¹ Due to the porous nature of the Kyiv outpost line, merchants and other travelers possibly infected with the plague could easily bypass Vasylkiv. Other supplementary quarantine facilities were designed as temporary institutions constructed for short periods of time and dismantled when the fear of the plague in the borderland subsided. The Kyiv line consisted of only three or fewer quarantine surgeons who did not have much experience in treating plague patients.³² Soldiers and outpost guards examined travelers who entered the outposts but lacked sufficient knowledge to identify individuals infected with the plague. Understaffed outposts teams did not have the capacity to dispatch militia or soldiers to monitor neigh-

boring territories, receive news about the outbreaks of the disease happening nearby in time, and close all entries to the province or stop the population movement.³³ In the spring and summer of 1770, the plague broke out in the towns and villages of the Polish Kyiv palatinate. By that time, the pestilence crossed the Kyiv line and entered Kyiv, which, while located on the Right Bank, was the major city of the Left-Bank Hetmanate.

The Outbreak of Plague in Kyiv: 1770–71

In August 1770, sporadic deaths from the plague were documented in Kozelets, Bila Tserkva, Boryspil, Brovary, and Pereiaslav. Even though by that time both the Russian Senate and the Kyiv governor-general's chancellery ordered an increase in security at the outposts, it was difficult to implement this order in Left-Bank Ukraine in the late summer when seasonal trade fairs in Kyiv were opened and the Russo-Ottoman war continued. There were no physicians in the nearby towns and villages who had experience organizing quarantining procedures in the past. A quarantine physician who worked in Vasylkiv was not in the town assisting a large number of Russian soldiers who participated in the war.³⁴

In August 1770, several persons perished from the plague in Vasylkiv. At approximately the same time, in late August, the plague claimed its first documented victims in Kyiv, a Polish merchant and his family. The neighbors of the merchant family who communicated with them and exchanged goods also soon perished. Unfortunately, at first, the city government did not pay attention to this tragic incident and turned a deaf ear to the voices of alarmed neighbors of the family. The police did not investigate the reason for these suspicious deaths, and the local merchant community continued their regular trade operations without any fear or understanding of the danger stemming from this activity.

If the government and the police had paid more attention to suspicious deaths in the merchant community, the city and its environs could have been able to avoid the plague. Unlike St Petersburg, Cracow, or Warsaw, Kyiv lacked an architectural and topographic unity and was effectively divided into several parts that were easy to isolate from one another. While the locals did not like this feature, it could have been a blessing for a medical team organizing anti-plague precautions in the city. Up until the early nineteenth century, the city's three major districts, the Old City, Podil, and Pechersk, were surrounded by high hills and meadows that could have been an ideal barrier dividing and isolating healthy individuals from the sick.³⁵ Travelers to Kyiv highlighted this unique feature of the city and even viewed the districts as three separate towns. For instance, the

author of a diary describing the visit of Empress Elizabeth to Kyiv in 1744 stated that she visited “all three of the towns” and stayed in “one of them called Pechersk.”³⁶ Sparsely scattered buildings and the lack of substantial population movement among the districts could stop the spread of the disease and allow the authorities to close all city walls in a timely manner. Unfortunately, this opportunity was lost due to lack of timely government intervention and anti-plague precautions in the late summer of 1770.

Unlike the architectural planning, the materials used in the construction of Kyiv’s homes and sanitary conditions in the city might have contributed to the swift spread of the plague. Even the houses of the wealthiest residents of Podil were constructed of wood, which was easily infested with rodents spreading bacteria and plague-infected insects. Many people experienced difficulty maintaining good hygiene due to limited access to clean water. Podil was situated in a lower lying area that was very close to the Dnipro River, and part of it was often flooded, leaving the area humid and dirty. There was no regular garbage collection and disposal in Kyiv. Even though the municipal council had employees responsible for these services, the lack of supervision and regular funding for these workers did not allow them to fulfill their duties properly. Up until the early nineteenth century, Kyiv experienced problems with street cleaning and sanitation in public areas.³⁷ The quality of the roads in Kyiv was also a problem often mentioned in travelers’ accounts and other sources. Indeed, heavy rains often made roads in both Kyiv’s suburbs and the city center unusable and caused merchant carriages to be stuck in deep mud.³⁸ Experienced merchants who knew about this problem strived to pass Vasylkiv and other outposts and quarantines before the fall season by secretly negotiating with outpost guards and physicians and offering incentives for shorter inspections. When heavy rains began in September and early October, they would struggle with getting merchandise delivered to Podil or suffer losses due to carriage damage. Despite constant active foreign and domestic migration to Kyiv, the city had no population growth and very high mortality rates triggered by unsatisfactory sanitary conditions and the circulation of numerous diseases, including bubonic plague.³⁹

Podil was the first district where the outbreak of the plague began. As a major business center in Kyiv, Podil traditionally attracted large groups of diverse traders, sellers, and buyers from Crimea, Europe, and the Ottoman and Russian empires. This part of the city hosted large trade fairs and headquartered many businesses. In the late 1760s and early 1770s, Kyiv had about fifteen to twenty thousand inhabitants, most of whom resided in Podil.⁴⁰ Large trade fairs usually took place three times a year and lasted for about fifteen days. However, in Podil, the commerce and the flow of diverse populations never ceased. The vibrant merchant community in Podil conducted trade and rented storehouses and private

residences from the municipal council, in this way supporting the local economy. The municipal council benefited from the commerce and other merchant activities via the collection of high fees granting permissions to trade in this busy and well-known part of the city. The peasant and poor population of Kyiv also welcomed merchants who often recruited them as highly paid assistants. Kyiv municipal authorities worked hard to ease the bureaucratic burden imposed on new merchants wishing to conduct their business operations in Kyiv. Sometimes, these efforts were not fruitful and corruption or negligence occurred. While registration in the city books was required for merchants who rented commercial space and residential houses in Podil, some of them are unknown to historians because their origin and merchandise remained undocumented. Not surprisingly, it was a challenging task to identify specific people and commodities infected with the plague or other diseases brought to the city in 1770.⁴¹

Time is money, and long bureaucratic quarantining and registration procedures led to higher fees, rent payments and taxes for merchants eager to swiftly sell furs, textiles or food items at Podil's markets. Hence, some merchants offered fees or gifts to Vasylykiv guards and medical personnel to "persuade" them that they arrived from safe places without the plague and could skip quarantining. Some merchants presented falsified documents claiming previous quarantining or Catherine's II permission allowing expedited entrance into the city. Earlier investigations of such cases initiated by Kyiv general governors revealed that many police officers, doctors and quarantine administrators in Vasylykiv participated in bribery and corruption.⁴²

Meanwhile, the deaths in Kyiv continued into the early fall of 1770. Several dozen townsfolk perished in a short period of time, but authorities who investigated the reasons for these deaths found no buboes on the bodies of the deceased. Some barbers and pharmacists from this investigative team admitted that they did not know the reasons for the deaths. Others suggested that the deceased suffered from a severe case of influenza. Their reports to the municipal council and the governor-general confirmed the unusual character and potential danger of an unidentified disease but did not call for swift isolationist measures.⁴³ This confusion led to a delay in anti-plague precautions and became the major cause of the spread of the pestilence in all districts of Kyiv. In late September 1770, the population from all districts of the city participated in trade fairs in Podil, where the plague had already begun.⁴⁴

The Senate and the Medical Collegium assigned doctors Sila Mitrofanov, a quarantine physician, and Johann Lerche, one of the leading specialists on plague in the empire, to fight the epidemic.⁴⁵ Both physicians arrived in Kyiv in September-October 1770. While it was already impossible to stop the epidemic, their major task was to decrease the number of plague victims and to stop the pestilence

Table 5.1 Expenditures of the Kyiv Chancellery on the construction of quarantine facilities, outpost, and custom complexes, 1771–72*

<i>Period</i>	<i>Amount spent (in rubles)</i>
14 February–10 October 1771	1,776.00
16 February–11 June 1772	745.00
11 June 11–5 July 1772	545.59
5 July–23 July 1772	1,066.89
23 July–27 September 1772	2,749.00
27 September–15 November 1772	230.00
15 November–31 December 1772	1,060.35
Total	8,172.83

*The table is based on the data collected from RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1605, l. 179.

from moving eastward.⁴⁶ According to Lerche's evaluations, by mid-September, six thousand people had died from the plague in Podil alone. The failure to isolate Kyiv in a timely manner led to the spread of the plague by Russian soldiers, students of the Kyiv Academy, and merchants who fled the city in a great panic. The police estimated that about 1,000 residents were able to leave the city before all roads to and from Kyiv were closed.⁴⁷ In the fall of 1770, the plague reached Kozelets, Chernihiv, Nizhyn, and the villages surrounding them.⁴⁸

After the decline of the epidemic in the winter of 1771, Kyiv authorities decided that the pestilence was over. In May 1771, access to Kyiv and all major roads entering the city were reopened. However, as Dr Lerche predicted, in June 1771, the plague reoccurred in Kyiv and other borderland towns due to the illegal trade of the household items appropriated by garrison soldiers from infected houses. The pestilence started in the village of Pyrohiv and in Pechersk, the places where this trade frequently took place.⁴⁹ In addition, the soldiers failed to prevent the Kyiv poor from settling in the abandoned houses of plague victims or runaways, thus contributing to a further spread of the disease. The situation spiraled out of the control of the Kyiv government and the police were not able to guard or burn infected houses to prevent this practice.⁵⁰ Lerche's reports accused the Kyiv garrison commandants of the lack of subordination to him and the governor-general and sabotaging anti-plague measures in the city.

The two major institutions of government in Kyiv, the governor-general and the municipal council, lacked coordination to organize effective anti-plague measures. The city legislature, police, and a part of medical services were subordinated

to the municipal council that was also the major city government institution recognized by the merchant community in Podil.⁵¹ The governor-general was a person designated by the Russian empress and representing the empire in the province and was required to control the city garrison and the outpost guards in Vasylykiv. In 1770, the Kyiv governor-general experienced conflicts with the municipal council. The centuries-old institution and the empire's representatives competed for the right to collect taxes and the distribution of funds in the city. Their relations lacked trust, and initiatives offered by an opposite party were often rejected as unnecessary or too expensive.⁵² In addition, there were multiple problems not addressed by either of these two parties. Such initiatives as a renovation of old fortification structures and roads, and the construction and maintenance of quarantines, hospitals, and shelters were possible only when sufficient funding was allocated. However, the governor-general and the municipal council's members refused to take the initiative. As might be expected, both parties governing the city were unprepared for the great challenges brought by the plague. The plague outbreaks of 1770–71 were the turning point for this conflicting duumvirate. Soon it became a subject of thorough investigation and imperial administrative reforms in the province.

Russian Reforms in Quarantining and Border Security

In the winter of 1771, imperial officials began to actively intervene in anti-plague measures in Kyiv and investigate ineffectual border security in the province. In addition to Drs Lerche and Mitrofanov, Catherine II dispatched her assistant, Major of the Life Guards Mikhail Shipov, to help Fedor Voeikov in reforming the border infrastructure and the quarantine system on the Kyiv line.⁵³ Shipov's first reports to the Medical and Military Collegiums in St Petersburg called for a reconsideration of abandoned construction projects designed to enhance old and building new quarantine facilities on the line. The project began in 1771 and lasted until the early 1780s. Originally, this construction project was first introduced in the mid-1760s. However, due to the lack of funding, the beginning of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768–74, and non-recognition of the bubonic plague as a serious problem challenging the security of the empire's borders, this plan was discontinued. There was no progress on the project after 1766. The reports and complaints of medical professionals, Fedor Voeikov, Petr Rumiantsev and other officials from Left-Bank Ukraine contributed to the decision to relaunch it in the early 1770s.⁵⁴

The project originated in May 1764 when the Senate and the Medical Collegium issued instructions to the governor-generals of the Kyiv and New Russia provinces

to create and collect plans of existing quarantine houses, suggest locations for new ones, and provide budget estimates. A preliminary investigation demonstrated that besides the quarantine facilities in Vasytkiv and Kremenchuk, there were no permanent quarantine houses on the Kyiv line of outposts. The plans for future quarantine facilities and information about their desired locations required by the Senate were prepared and sent to St Petersburg in 1770–71, shortly before the plague outbreaks in the Kyiv province occurred. In January 1771, the Senate considered some of these plans. However, the construction of new quarantine houses only began in 1772.⁵⁵

Substantial funding allocated for the construction of quarantine facilities, outpost and custom complexes in the early 1770s confirmed the great interest of the empire in the project. The investigative commission chaired by Shipov as well as the chancellery of the Kyiv governor-general were generously funded by the Medical Collegium and the Senate to support the project. In addition to this funding, Kyiv Governor-General Voeikov and Mikhail Shipov received high personal salaries of five hundred rubles each. Such funding was offered to the highest paid officials of this rank in the Russian Empire. The large expenditures of the Kyiv chancellery excluding the salaries of the project leaders are summarized in table 5.1.

The Senate, Medical, and Military Collegiums in St Petersburg required Shipov and Voeikov to supervise the construction of new quarantine facilities and the advancement of the existing complex in Vasytkiv with new buildings, hospitals, and warehouses. According to Shipov's inspection submitted to the Senate before the project began, Vasytkiv was the strongest quarantine and outpost complex on the Kyiv line. Nonetheless, the outbreaks of the plague in Kyiv proved that quarantining and border security in Vasytkiv were ineffective. One of the problems experienced by the complex was the inability to accommodate an ever-growing flow of travelers and merchants in the small number of buildings belonging to it. To solve this problem, quarantine officers used the yard and the buildings of the Mezhyhiria monastery to quarter travelers and to conduct some of the quarantining procedures. As the monastery was close to the city and did not have the capacity to fully isolate visitors, they were able to exit it and communicate freely with city residents eager to sell them food and other items improving their stays. Voeikov and Shipov were right to request an extension of the Vasytkiv complex so that it became the only institution to control visitor stays, the sale of food and other items, as well as the collection of high fees for the services. Similar to Vasytkiv, the quarantine complex in Kremenchuk was extended and additional smaller quarantine facilities were built. Overall, the Kyiv line of outposts included large quarantine facilities in Vasytkiv, Kremenchuk, and Pereiaslav as well as smaller quarantine houses in Sorokoshychi, Dobrianka, and Perevolochna.⁵⁶

A leading role in the quarantine construction project, generous funding, and recommendations of the imperial representatives in Kyiv strengthened the power of the governor-general of Kyiv. He became the major imperial representative leading the official demarcation of the border with the Commonwealth and overseeing reforms in border security and public health in Kyiv and the province.⁵⁷ The governor-general and his assistants became the major officials who received and reviewed all financial documentation of the complexes. From the early 1770s, they were also responsible for managing all operations of the border complexes, recruitment and retention of employees, and the collection of all merchant and visitor taxes and fees. Some of these funds supplied the city and provincial budget, but the major part was directed to the imperial treasury. While operational expenses of the complexes were covered mostly by the Kyiv government, the empire took responsibility for continuous wages as well as food and forage supply in case of economic turmoil, crop failure, or famine to guarantee their uninterrupted work.⁵⁸

The empire strived to build diverse teams of outpost and quarantine employees consisting of local peasantry and Cossacks, as well as workers transferred from other provinces. Their jobs were considered highly paid and prestigious and could be compared to the status of officers in the imperial army. To supply the quarantine complexes with highly-qualified full-time medical personnel, the Medical Collegium and the Senate issued the decrees of 1771–72 which opened new vacancies, regulated salaries, and offered subsidized housing for quarantine physicians, nurses, and pharmacists. An additional two thousand rubles were allocated by the Medical and Military Collegiums to build this housing in close proximity to the Kyiv line.⁵⁹ To uncover any illegal activities among customs and quarantine personnel and increase their loyalty to the empire, the imperial government encouraged the personnel to report any abuses of power or any suspicious activities of their colleagues. Informants received up to 50 per cent of uncovered bribes if any corruption was confirmed. All personnel were required to openly demonstrate loyalty to the empire and swear an oath of allegiance to Catherine II.⁶⁰

Another reform contributing to the transformation of the quarantine and outpost complexes into provincial institutions belonging to the empire was a merger of these complexes with existing customs units. Several years before the social turmoil and economic decline of 1768, the empire abolished the practice of leasing the customs to merchant representatives and transferred them to state ownership.⁶¹ Combined with the quarantines, customs operating on the Kyiv line were a solid source of revenues for the empire and the provincial government. There is no data for 1771–72, but in 1766 the custom house in Vasylykiv collected 40,000 rubles from imported merchandise only.⁶² In total, Vasylykiv and all other

custom houses on the Kyiv line collected over 305,000 rubles annually in 1764–65. Back in the mid-1760s, this amount was equal to 35 to 40 per cent of all customs revenues collected by the empire excluding the port customs in St Petersburg.⁶³ Thus, the imperial officials expected that the new permanent quarantine, outpost, and custom complexes built on the Kyiv line would not only protect the province but provide substantial revenues that quickly compensated an initial investment of 8,172.83 rubles and reimbursed other expenses made in 1771–72.⁶⁴ On the one hand, these changes greatly improved the customs and quarantine services and procedures, and increased the safety and profitability of the complexes. On the other hand, the Kyiv province and the city of Kyiv lost control of the revenues generated by customs and quarantines. As noted earlier, they received only a small part of these revenues. Even Kyiv governor-generals, who were the major representatives of the empire, eager to secure more cash for the province, were not able to change the distribution of funds without the submission of numerous requests and justifications to the Senate in St Petersburg.

Advanced quarantine and customs complexes operating on the Kyiv line not only became a rich source of cash filling the empire's coffers. They contributed to the development of the Kyiv province by changing the geographic, social, and economic landscapes of the region. While their construction erased numerous gaps in the defensive fortifications and facilitated the demarcation of borders, Kyiv and smaller towns and villages surrounding them experienced an economic revival and the influx of new population. The population benefited from new jobs and the high demand for temporary housing and participated in economic activities supplying food, forage, and other essentials needed for an increased inflow of visitors using the complexes.

In the mid-1770s, foreign and domestic visitors considered Vasylkiv the major entrance to the empire located on its western border. Following their entrance to the border outposts, travelers were required to document all their personal items and merchandise. These items were kept separately from visitors, and documents submitted by the owners served as inventories to redeem them upon completion of the sanitation process.⁶⁵ Because merchants and travelers were not allowed to have any contact with their merchandise and baggage after entering quarantine buildings, special employees were charged with the guarding and disinfection of these items.⁶⁶ Quarantine workers prevented any access of the local population to the merchandise and baggage, especially if it contained textiles, clothes, or fur. The clothes of all guests were disinfected in the quarantine facility's airing rooms. Money, papers, or mail of quarantine customers were taken from them for disinfection through a sprinkling with vinegar. Even though all buildings were usually located close to each other, the sick, suspicious, and healthy

travelers were carefully separated.⁶⁷ The supervisors of hospitals and residences swore an oath to follow this rule. Quarantine employees regularly observed the health status of quarantined travelers and recorded it in their books. Quarantine employees daily aired the hospitals and residences. While they used incense to air the residences of the richest travelers and cedar smoke for middle class housing, wood resin served to air the quarters of poor travelers. Both the hospitals and residential quarters provided a full supply of food, clothes, and other household items.⁶⁸

Based on the example of the Moscow and St Petersburg quarantine facilities, quarantine houses and hospitals on the Kyiv line imposed a monopoly on the sales of food and forage on their premises. The fees and prices for these services were regulated by the empire and did not always follow local standards. The Senate forbade changing customs and quarantine fees in the Kyiv province even when visitors complained that they were too high. The Senate decree allowed the poor or foreign travelers to borrow money, food, and forage from the provincial budgets to cover the expenses of their quarantine stays. However, servants, soldiers, and clergy were required to request funding from their supervisors or the church.⁶⁹ No one was allowed to leave quarantine buildings without a certificate of safety and good health. After quarantining, medical exams and disinfection, travelers received special passports that served as official permission to enter all provinces of the empire. All passports were signed by the Kyiv governor-general or his assistants, and the names of their owners were listed in the chancellery documentation. These new regulations allowed for information gathering and enabled the imperial authorities to trace who, when, and why entered the Kyiv province. The provincial reforms that continued in the late 1770s and the early 1780s redefined the administrative status of Left-Bank Ukraine in the empire and institutionalized the medical services existing in the region in accordance with the imperial standards established in St Petersburg.

Administrative and Medical Reforms

The construction of large customs and quarantine complexes, the closure of the border with the Commonwealth, the accumulation of substantial monetary and human resources, and increased control over government actions in Kyiv allowed Catherine II to integrate the province into the empire based on general provincial reforms conducted in 1775.⁷⁰ The administrative reform and the creation of the Kyiv vicegerency (*namisnytstvo*) in Left-Bank Ukraine was finalized in 1781. Beginning in 1771, it took the empire's governors of the province about a decade to prepare for the reform. This preparation began from the creation and closure of

a border equipped with strong outposts, quarantine, and custom complexes. It continued with the introduction of public hospitals and other medical institutions subordinated to the Medical Collegium in St Petersburg. Catherine's II instructions given to such Left- and Right-Bank Ukrainian provincial leaders as Petr Rumiantsev or Mikhail Krechetnikov demonstrated an attention to gradual changes and preoccupation with the attitude to the empire among the local population. In one of her secret instructions toward the provincial governors, the empress required officials to avoid introducing any drastic changes that could provoke discontent or ambiguous reactions from the nobility, soldiers, merchants, and peasantry. Military actions, coercion, or conflicts were considered strategies to avoid. The instructions also suggested the governors maintain old institutions and traditions but make gradual changes that would adjust them to the imperial standards. It became a common practice for the governors to call provincial assemblies and seek the opinion of the provincial nobility and their subjects about certain problems in the province to secure their support. The governors were also instructed to improve the medical services available to the population as well as demonstrate to them the progressive and innovative character of the new imperial institutions.⁷¹

The Kyiv vicegerency system increased the power of imperial representatives (vicegerents) appointed by St Petersburg and confirmed Kyiv as the capital and the center of the new province.⁷² The system abolished the traditional for Left-Bank Ukraine old regiment (*polk*) system and introduced a standard for the empire division into eleven counties (*uezdy*). The territory of Left-Bank Ukraine included Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi vicegerencies and formed the Little Russian general-governorate (*general-gubernatorstvo*) headed by Petr Rumiantsev.⁷³ The vicegerency had a complex network of administrators assigned by the empress and approved by Rumiantsev, and by Krechetnikov who temporarily replaced the former in the early 1790s. These government officials were required to report all outbreaks of the plague and other contagious diseases and report about the quarantining and other measures they administered to protect the population. They were also required to demarcate all town and village borders and send detailed descriptions, atlases, and maps to the Senate, Medical, and Military Collegiums for final approval.⁷⁴ In 1783, the chancellery of the Kyiv vicegerency initiated a review of all government institutions and town councils in the vicegerency. All local officers and administrators received an order to prepare for the review and demonstrate the effectiveness of their work.⁷⁵

Among other changes, the vicegerency system increased the centralization of medical institutions by subordinating them to the provincial government chancelleries. This system made provincial governments responsible for a number of

medical needs in the provinces, including the distribution of medical offices, requests for additional medical professionals from the Medical Collegium in St Petersburg, and the provision of guidance for medical teams during plague outbreaks. Regional medical councils introduced in the mid- and late-1780s partially released the provincial governments from the supervision of all medical professionals in the provinces and increased the standardization of medical services. The councils were subordinated to the Little Russian Medical Board, the institution that represented the Medical Collegium in Left- and Right-Bank Ukraine. These innovations greatly centralized the public health system in the Ukrainian territories and allowed the medical institutions of the empire to regulate this system. Private medical practitioners, pharmacies, and hospitals sponsored by the landlords or town councils became subject to audit and certification. While before the reforms of the 1780s these medical professionals and facilities were funded from private sources or patrons and fully depended on their support, the empire turned them into semi-autonomous government institutions receiving continuous financial support. Medical professionals who worked without much supervision in towns and villages in Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine were required to send quarterly progress reports to the Medical Board. After the reforms, the work and experience requirements for these medical professionals were standardized, so they could have better career prospects in the empire and abroad.⁷⁶

The reforms in public health and the introduction of medical councils advanced public health services received by the local population. Prior experience with the anti-plague precautions in Kyiv in 1770–71 proved the importance of uninterrupted quarantine services and cooperation between medical and government institutions to increase plague awareness and organize prompt preventive measures. Thus, medical reforms in the provinces forbade physicians or related professionals to travel long distances and assist soldiers in remote garrisons or serve patients who were not included in their districts. During outbreaks of plague or other contagious diseases, local physicians continued serving their patients without interruption and were required to participate in anti-plague measures. The Medical Collegium assigned additional medical professionals to attend to patients in border quarantine facilities, so there was no need for local physicians to interrupt their work.⁷⁷

The creation of centralized medical services and the joint work of medical institutions with the provincial governors greatly reduced difficulties in the organization of anti-plague measures during plague outbreaks in 1795–1800. All neighboring provinces were swiftly informed about the epidemic, the population movement was halted, and the provincial governors received numerous resources to fight the plague outbreaks much more effectively than had happened in Kyiv

in 1771. The cooperation between provincial authorities, the control of the border and quarantines by these authorities, and the presence of highly qualified medical personnel allowed the reduction of plague-related mortality among the population and stopped the spread of the disease to other provinces. For instance, this cooperation took place during a plague outbreak in Podilia, when the governor of Kamianets-Podilskyi A. Bekleshov requested additional soldiers and quarantine personnel to assist with a border closure. The governors of other provinces swiftly sent the soldiers to Podilia as well as helped Bekleshov to swiftly recruit additional quarantine personnel.⁷⁸

Imperial reforms provoked by the epidemics of plague greatly increased the role of provincial medical institutions in promoting awareness about the disease and advocacy for the contagion theory. Good hygiene and cleanliness became subjects frequently discussed in popular newsletters and during church services or other gatherings. The new provincial government strived to promote the education of the population and organize public campaigns that discouraged the consumption of contaminated water and unprocessed food. The campaigns were oriented against malnutrition and poverty, which were believed to contribute to the spread of plague and other diseases. The influence of town or village physicians on the local population greatly increased by the end of the century. With the support of government institutions, medical professionals were finally able to compete with quacks and conjurers whose services were still popular among the peasantry.⁷⁹ Using medical teams to reach the local population, the imperial government supplied grain, food, or other essentials in case of a crop failure, famine, or outbreaks of epidemic diseases.⁸⁰

The responsibilities of the Medical Board went beyond the regulation of the work of regional medical institutions. The board empowered its members to strategically collect diverse information about the local population. For instance, it produced annual reports about the climate and weather conditions as well as described the most common seasonal medical problems experienced by the peasantry and discussed methods to solve these problems. These reports were addressed to higher imperial medical authorities and sometimes exaggerated the effectiveness of the Medical Board and the local physicians. They nonetheless offered useful insights about the lives of the population and confirmed the increased attention of the imperial authorities to their subjects. Connecting the province to the empire, the reports called for government actions and funding to support local inhabitants. The Medical Board proposed that physicians assist the poor in struggling with human or cattle diseases via cooperation with local priests. Collaboration with the church became an important tool in fighting peasant super-

stitutions and ignorance and solidified the partnership between church authorities and the empire. The reports often concluded on an optimistic note and praised the empire for implementing progressive laws that made cooperation between provincial governments, physicians, priests, and police possible and productive.⁸¹ Even if exaggerated, the results of the work of numerous medical professionals in the Ukrainian territories contributed to the integration of the provincial population into the empire in the late eighteenth century.

Conclusion

While the outbreaks of the bubonic plague that began in Right-Bank Ukraine in 1770 continued for several months before the disease reached Kyiv, the city met the challenge totally unprepared and suffered tremendous human losses. The Russian imperial authorities suppressing the noble-peasant rebellions in Right-Bank Ukraine were fully aware of the destruction of roads, defensive fortifications, and quarantines in the region. Still, the empire failed to stop the plague and reduce the number of its victims in Kyiv and Left-Bank Ukraine. This unpreparedness was partially linked to the empire's participation in the Russo-Ottoman war that consumed significant human and financial resources as well as the inability to close the border between the two banks of Ukraine due to a lack of effective infrastructure and unregulated population movement. In the late 1760s, the creation of a strong system of quarantines and border security on the Kyiv outpost line was not the top priority for either the local administration or the imperial authorities in St Petersburg. However, the outbreak of plague in Kyiv and the spread of the disease in major towns in Left-Bank Ukraine in 1770–71 alarmed the empire and prompted consideration about the need to change this approach, secure the border defense complexes, and organize more effective measures to prevent new outbreaks. The reports of the governor-general, the alarming complaints of physicians fighting the plague in Kyiv, and observations by imperial officials investigating the quarantines called for immediate action and reforms. As a result, the construction of large quarantine and custom complexes merged with customs was initiated in 1772. Highly profitable, the complexes not only strengthened the border but also generated substantial revenues collected by the empire.

This construction project contributed to the imperial reforms in Left-Bank Ukraine that continued for about a decade and culminated in the creation of the Kyiv vicegerency in 1781. Cities, towns, and villages in this new administrative unit appeared on maps and experienced a new life as places with well demarcated borders and active anti-plague precautions conducted by large teams of new

governors and physicians. Most of them were assigned personally by the empress and carefully monitored by the Military and Medical Collegiums in St Petersburg. These reforms allowed for swift and centralized government action during the outbreaks of the plague and facilitated the administrative and economic integration of Ukrainian territories into the empire in 1781–93. A highly centralized medical system, the swift reporting of emergencies, and effective support by the neighboring provinces made the outbreaks of the plague much less severe and more preventable. Medical and administrative institutions created in the Ukrainian provinces after the partitions of Poland followed the standards introduced in the Kyiv vicegerency and were often administered by the same imperial authorities entrusted by Catherine II. Thus, the provincial reforms introduced in Left-Bank Ukraine and replicated in other Ukrainian territories later in the century became a powerful instrument helping the empire integrate new territories and people into its orbit.

NOTES

- 1 The work and life of Danylo Samoilovych [or Danila Samoilovich in some sources] has not attracted much scholarly attention. For more information about this physician of Ukrainian origin, see Danilo Samoilovich, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniia*, (Moscow, 1952) and Mykola Borodii, *Danylo Samoilovych* (Kyiv, 1987).
- 2 Samoilovych praised the population of Right-Bank Ukraine for their hospitality and willingness to assist numerous foreign travelers. Ironically, these values exposed them to the dangers of unwanted gifts of contagious diseases brought by these guests. In many cases, the plague was transmitted to local inhabitants by soldiers, merchants, or other travelers whom they hosted in their homes.
- 3 For a discussion of this topic in the broader context of European and Mediterranean histories, see James D. Tracy, ed., *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 1990); Mark Harrison, *Contagion: How Commerce Has Spread Disease* (New Haven and London, 2012); and Nukhet Varlik, ed., *Plague and Contagion in the Islamic Mediterranean: New Histories of Disease in Ottoman Society* (Arc Humanities, 2017). The role of epidemics of plague in the making of Russo-Ottoman borders is explored in Andrew Robarts, *Migration and Disease in the Black Sea Region: Ottoman-Russian Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (London, 2017).

- 4 Olena Zamura, "Velykyi Shalenets": *Smert' i smertnist' v Het'manshchyni XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2014), 64–71; Jarosław Burchardt and Dorota Burchardt, "Morowe powiertrze – krótki szkic do historii zarazy na ziemiach polskich w pierwszej połowie XVIII wieku," *Nowiny Lekarskie* 77, no. 4 (2008): 334–8.
- 5 Bubonic plague was also mentioned as *morowe powiertrze* in Polish and Ukrainian sources and literature.
- 6 Mykola Borodii, *Danylo Samoilovych* (Kyiv, 1987), 23–4; M.K. Borodii, "Do istorii borot'by z chumoiu na Ukraïni," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 5 (1984): 82–90.
- 7 Fr. Giedroyć, "Obrona od zarazy morowej w Polsce (profilaktyka moru) w wiekach ubiegłych," *Krytyka Lekarska*, 2 (1899), rok III; Burchardt and Burchardt, "Morowe powiertrze."
- 8 Burchardt and Burchardt, "Morowe powiertrze."
- 9 For Samoilovych's exposition of this theory, see his *Izbrannye proizvedeniia*, 13; Numerous examples of the usage of the two methods in anti-plague precautions by the Russian imperial government may be found in: Afanasii Shafonskii, *Opisanie morovoi iazvy, byvshei v stolichnom gorode Moskve s 1770 po 1772 god s prilozeniem vsekhn dlia prekrashcheniia onoi togda ustanovlennykh uchrezhdenii* (St Petersburg, 1787).
- 10 Giedroyć, "Obrona od zarazy morowej," rok III.
- 11 M.K. Borodii, "Do istorii borot'by z chumoiu na Ukraïni," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 5 (1984): 82–90.
- 12 V. Otamanovs'kyi, "Do istorii medytsyny ta aptechnoi spravy u Vinnytsi i Vinnytskomu poviti druhoi polovyny XVIII st.," *Zbirnyk pam'iaty akademika Teofila Havrylovycha Ianovs'koho* (Kyiv, 1930), 323–4.
- 13 Otamanovs'kyi, "Do istorii medytsyny ta aptechnoi spravy," 323.
- 14 Giedroyć, "Obrona od zarazy morowej," rok III; *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov* (Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents; hereinafter – RGADA), f. 248, op. 113, d. 505 (Ob opasnoi bolezni i karantinakh 1765–1766 g.), 1–34.
- 15 Ia. Sh. [Iakov Shulgin], "Ubiistvo upyria v Kievshchine vo vremia chumy 1770 goda," *Kievskaiia starina*, no. 2 (1890): 338–41. This case was considered in Kodnia court in 1770–71. The author of this short article providing the court record (p. 341) argues that the decision of the Polish *szlachta* jurors was also motivated by their anti-Orthodox bias and a lack of interest in executing the peasants for the murder of an Orthodox priest.
- 16 John T. Alexander, *Bubonic Plague in Early Modern Russia: Public Health and Urban Disaster* (Baltimore and London, 1980), 29–35; M. Tyshchenko,

- "Forposty, mytnytsi ta karantyny na zakhidnomu pohranychchi u zv'iazku z zovnishnioiu torhivleiu Ukraïny v XVIII st.," in Mykola Tyshchenko, *Narysy z istorii zovnishnioï torhivli Ukraïny v XVIII st.* (Bila Tserkva, 2010), 5–76.
- 17 "Litopys monastyria Vasyliian: rik 1770," *Dilo* 43, no. 11 (1890).
 - 18 More information about the Confederation of Bar may be found in the following studies: Władysław Konopczyński, *Kazimierz Pulaski: życiorys* (Cracow, 1931); Also, see his *Konfederacya Barska: korespondencya między Stanisławem Augustem a Ksawerym Branickim, łowczym koronnym, w roku 1768* (Cracow, 1872); S.F. Ivanitskii, "Znachenie barskoi konfederatsii v istorii krestianskogo vosstaniia na Ukraine 1768 g.," *Uchenye zapiski Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta*, no. 19 (Leningrad, 1939): 211–53.
 - 19 For a review of the literature about the uprising, see Zenon Kohut, "Myths Old and New: The Haidamak Movement and the Koliivshchyna (1768) in Recent Historiography," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 3 (1977): 359–78. Religious motives for the uprising are discussed in Barbara Skinner, "Borderlands of Faith: Reconsidering the Origins of a Ukrainian Tragedy," *Slavic Review* 64, no. 1 (2005): 88–116.
 - 20 Ivanitskii, "Znachenie barskoi konfederatsii," 245.
 - 21 Samoilovich, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia*, 34–5.
 - 22 K. I. T-ii, "Kratkii ocherk istorii goroda Umami," *Kievskaiia starina*, no. 8 (1888): 381–94.
 - 23 RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, d. 505, l. 4–15; "Litopys monastyria Vasyliian: rik 1770," *Dilo* 43, no. 11 (1890).
 - 24 "Litopys monastyria Vasyliian: rik 1770," *Dilo* 43, no. 11 (1890).
 - 25 *Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych* (Central Archives of Historical Records; hereinafter – AGAD), Archiwum Zamoyskich, sygn. 3031, 217/349, Memorial do Komisyyi i rewidowania duktu granicznego między państwem Rossyiskim a Nayiasn. Rzeczpospolitą (Warszawa, 5/7/1766).
 - 26 The following document based on an inspection of the outposts in the mid-1760s provides important details about the Kyiv or Vasylikiv outpost line: RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1499 (Raznye bumagi, kasaiushchiesia do morovoi bolezni i karantinnykh domov, 1754–1778), l. 32. The length of the Kyiv line was about 393–395 miles. The outposts were located one to four miles apart. The ability to timely pass fire or other signals from one outpost to another was a key factor defining their effectiveness. Vast forested territories, limited manpower, and long distances between the outposts made the line open to illegal border crossings. More details about the outpost line are also provided in M. Tyshchenko, "Forposty, mytnytsi ta karantyny na zakhidnomu

- pohranychchi u zv'iazku z zovnishn'oiu torhivleiu Ukraïny v XVIII st." In Idem, *Narysy z istorii zovnishn'oi torhivli Ukraïny v XVIII st.* (Bila Tserkva, 2010), 5–76. For a discussion of the Russo-Polish border demarcation problem, see O. Mykhed, "Not by Force Alone: Public Health and the Establishment of Russian Rule in the Russo-Polish Borderland, 1762–85," in *Borderlands in World History*, ed. Paul Readman, Cynthia Radding, and Chad Bryant (London, 2014), 134.
- 27 Serhii Shamrai, "Misto Vasyl'kiv," *Istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, no. 3 (1929): 40.
 - 28 *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva*, no. 57 (1887): 251.
 - 29 A.A. Bibikov, *Zapiski o zhizni i sluzhbe Aleksandra Il'icha Bibikova* (Moscow, 1865), 62.
 - 30 V. Antonovich, *Issledovanie o Gaidamachestve po aktam 1700–1768 g.* (Kyiv, 1876), 41–2.
 - 31 M. Tyshchenko, "Forposty, mytnytsi ta karantyny na zakhidnomu pohranychchi u zv'iazku z zovnishn'oiu torhivleiu Ukraïny v XVIII st," in idem, *Narysy z istorii zovnishnioi torhivli Ukraïny v XVIII st.* (Bila Tserkva, 2010), 5–76.
 - 32 Franz Doerbeek, *Istoriia chumnykh epidemii v Rossii s osnovaniia gosudarstva do nastoiashchego vremeni* (St Petersburg, 1905), 115.
 - 33 RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, d. 430, l. 39.
 - 34 Nikolai Zakrevskii, *Letopisi opisanie goroda Kieva, chast' 1* (Moscow, 1858), 86; Doerbeek, *Istoriia chumnykh epidemii v Rossii*, 115.
 - 35 In the 1770s, Kyiv had a plan that many foreigners called very unusual and inconvenient. The Old City, Pechersk, and Podil were linked by roads; however, they were located about one to two miles apart. Podil and Pechersk were surrounded by high hills and fortress walls that isolated them from the remaining city territory. See Zakrevskii, *Letopisi opisanie goroda Kieva*, 84. I. Pantiukhov, *Opyt sanitarnoi topografii i statistiki Kieva* (Kyiv, 1877), 98. The division of Kyiv into the three districts was preserved after the plague outbreak in 1770–71, see "Statisticheskoe opisanie g. Kieva, sostavlennoe v 1775 godu," *Kievskie gubernskie vedomosti: chast' neofitsial'naia*, no. 12 (23 March 1857): 73–4.
 - 36 Pantiukhov, *Opyt sanitarnoi topografii i statistiki Kieva*, 102.
 - 37 Pantiukhov, *Opyt sanitarnoi topografii i statistiki Kieva*, 78.
 - 38 Zakrevskii, *Letopisi opisanie goroda Kieva*, 85–6.
 - 39 Pantiukhov, *Opyt sanitarnoi topografii i statistiki Kieva*, 97.
 - 40 Ibid., 104.
 - 41 Alexander, *Bubonic Plague in Early Modern Russia*, 110–15.

- 42 RGADA, f. 248, op.113, d. 1605 (O morovoi iazve v Moskve, ob opasnoi bolezni v raznykh mestakh Rossiiskoi Imperii i zagranitse, a takzhe o padzhe skota i stroenii karantinnykh domov, 1770–1796), l. 168–9.
- 43 Zakrevskii, *Letopisi opisanie goroda Kieva*, 86.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Doerbeck, *Istoriia chumnykh epidemii v Rossii*, 115.
- 46 RGADA, f. 248, op.113, d. 160, l. 91–2.
- 47 Doerbeck, *Istoriia chumnykh epidemii v Rossii*, 115–16.
- 48 Serhii Tokerev, “Borot'ba z proiavamy epidemii chumy v Nizhyns'komu polku v druhii polovyni XVIII st.,” *Nizhyns'ka starovyna*, 5, no. 6(9) (2008): 21–6.
- 49 Borodii, *Danylo Samoilovych*, 33.
- 50 S.A. Verkh ratskyi, “Chuma v Kieve v 1770–1771 godakh,” *Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii posviashchennoi 225-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia vy-daiushchegosia otechestvennogo epidemiologa Danily Samoilovicha* (Nikolaev, 1969), 53–4.
- 51 As a city with Magdeburg Law, Kyiv had the municipal council as the major government institution. Later in the century, Catherine II realized the inconsistency between the legal rights and freedoms given by this law to some cities, and the office of governor-general. After the introduction of the Kyiv vicegerency, part of the rights and freedoms granted to Kyiv by Magdeburg Law were abolished. However, the empress hesitated to liquidate it in full. Kyiv lost its remaining Magdeburg Law privileges much later, in 1835.
- 52 For instance, in 1766, only a few years before the major outbreak of the plague, the governor-general Fedor Voeikov had a conflict with the Kyiv municipal council. When Voeikov requested an additional physician from the Medical Collegium in St Petersburg, the municipal council refused to accept this physician and defined his qualifications as unsatisfactory. Since the municipal council was responsible for funding and housing the new physician, this new medical professional was forced to leave Kyiv. For more details, see “Predstavlenie gener.-gub. Voeikova o naznachenii doktorov v Kievskuiu guberniiu (1766 g.),” *Kievskaiia starina*, no. 12 (1903): 139–41.
- 53 Zakrevskii, *Letopisi opisanie goroda Kieva*, 88–90.
- 54 RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1499, l. 32.
- 55 RGADA, f. 248. op. 113, d. 1535 (Ob opasnykh bolezniakh, 1770–78), l. 230–1, 512.
- 56 RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1605, l. 168–9. For a brief discussion of the extension of the outpost line, see Mykhed, “Not by Force Alone,” 134.
- 57 Mykhed, “Not by Force Alone,” 134–5.

- 58 *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (hereinafter – PSZRI), vol. 19 (St Petersburg, 1830–35), 246 (13588, April 2, 1771, Senatskii [ukaz] "O proizvozhdenii provianta krestianam, nakhodiashchimsia na forpostakh dlia soderzhaniia karaulov").
- 59 RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, dd. 430, l. 31, 154–5 and 1499, l. 149.
- 60 PSZRI, 11829, 15:261 (Maia 23, 1771, Senatskii [ukaz] "Ob opredelenii shtab-ili ober-ofitserov v nekotorye tamozhni dlia prismotra i o proizvodhdenii im zhalovania iz tamozhennykh dokhodov").
- 61 Compared to earlier years when customs were administered by leaseholders, custom revenues in 1764–5 were 1.5 times or about 55,000 rubles higher.
- 62 S. Shamrai, "Misto Vasyli'kiv, IX–XVIII vv.," *Istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, no. 2 (1928): 95.
- 63 E.V. Litsoeva, "Dinamika tamozhennykh tarifov na Ukraine-Getmanshchine v XVIII v." In *Torgovlia, kupechestvo i tamozhennoe delo v Rossii v XVI-XIX v.* (Kursk, 2009), 203.
- 64 RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, d. 1605, l. 178–9.
- 65 RGADA, f. 248, op. 113, delo 1499, l. 149.
- 66 *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv v Sankt-Peterburge* (Russian State Historical Archive in St Petersburg; hereinafter – RGIAP), f. 1374, op. 1, d. 90 (Donesenie Slobodsko Ukrainского gubernatora A. Teplova o merakh predostorozhnosti priniatykh vo vverenoj emu gubernii protiv rasprostraneniia morovoi iazvy), l. 1–11.
- 67 RGIAP, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 90, l. 5–8.
- 68 RGIAP, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 90, l. 1–9.
- 69 PSZRI, 19, 13599, (April' 27, 1771, Senatskii [ukaz] "O vydavanii deneg na propitanie soderzhashchimsia v karantinakh nedostatochnym liudiam").
- 70 Major provincial reforms initiated by the empire were drafted and approved by the Senate in 1775. These reforms were based on the exploration and reports submitted by numerous governors and administrators, including Petr Rumiantsev, Grigorii Teplov, Jacob Sievers, Zakhar Chernyshev, and Mikhail Krechetnikov, who knew the Ukrainian territories well. The reports described general conditions of the provinces and borders, economy, as well as the level of medical services needed for the population. While a general reform plan of provincial development was created based on the evidence provided by specific provincial authorities, the governors received some freedom to introduce the changes specific for each province, aiming to modernize them and improve their administration. The reports of Rumiantsev and Teplov were the major source of information about Left- and Right-Bank Ukraine. They described it as an autonomous region ruled by the nobility who regulated

local trade, tax collection, and subordinated major groups of society. Regulation of the fiscal system and transformation of the elites were the major steps encouraged by the empress.

- 71 "Reskript imperatritsy Ekateriny II na imia Generala Krechetnikova," in *Materialy dlia istorii Podol'skoi gubernii. Pribavlenie k Podol'skim Gubernskim Vedomostiam* (b.m.: 1885), 6–16.
- 72 PSZRI, 20, 14392 (Noiabr' 7, 1775, "Uchrezhdeniia dlia upravleniia gubernii Vserossiiskii Imperii, chast' pervaiia").
- 73 Petr Rumiantsev was the governor of the Little Russia governorate since 1765. His rule was interrupted by the Russo-Ottoman war when he served as a commander in the Russian army. Rumiantsev was well received by the local nobility and offered Catherine II different approaches to gradually attach the peasantry to specific locations and landlords. Some of these reform projects were supported by the empress. On the one hand, the process of enserfment of the peasantry was perceived as a very unpopular step among the local population. On the other hand, depriving the peasantry of the freedom of geographic mobility greatly reduced population migration, thus making the government plague prevention initiatives more effective.
- 74 Kyiv received such a plan in 1784. The work on it was initiated by Fedor Voeikov in the mid-1770s.
- 75 *Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyivs'koï oblasti* (State Archive of Kyiv Region; hereinafter – ДАКО), f. 1, op. 316, spr. 1864 (Tsirkuliar Kievskogo namestnicheskogo pravleniia, 1 noiabria, 1783), ark. 7.
- 76 RGIAP, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 86 (Donesenie Kamenets-Podol'skogo gubernatora A.A. Bekleshova, minskogo gubernatora Z. Karneeva, kurskogo S. Burkesheva, orlovskogo V. Voeikova i smolenskogo I. Mezentsova o merakh, prinyatiakh vo vverenykh im guberniiakh protiv rasprostraneniia chumy), l. 1–2.
- 77 RGIAP, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 86, l. 1.
- 78 RGIAP, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 86, l. 1–2.
- 79 *Dvadsatipiatiletie Obshchestva Kievskikh Vrachei, (1840–1865)* (Kyiv, 1865), 5–6.
- 80 RGIAP, f. 1374, op. 1, d. 88 (Perepiska po povodu poiavivsheisia v Litovskoi gubernii morovoi iazvy i padezhe skota, 1797), l. 1.
- 81 RGIAP, f. 1294, op. 1 (internal op. 9), d. 22 (Raport v gosudarstvennuuiu meditsinskuiu kollegiiu iz Malorossiiskoi vrachebnoi upravly), l. 1–9.

Formation of the Imperial Russia Bureaucratic Class in Steppe Ukraine in the Late Eighteenth Century

OLEKSANDR PANKIEIEV

The late eighteenth century in the history of the Russian Empire is characterised by the adoption of numerous reforms that introduced new norms for the governance of the vast territories. Some historians argue that this period catalyzed the formation of a *local bureaucracy* as a separate social group with a distinct identity from that of the typical imperial *bureaucracy of noble peerage*. Legislative changes needed to be implemented in both the governing centre and the borderland territories of the Russian Empire, which was a challenging process that faced many obstacles.¹ Some problems in the formation of the bureaucratic class were similar to those elsewhere in the Russian Empire, including the shortage of qualified cadres and the predominance of army officers, but the borderland territories also had unique specificities of their own. One such specific issue was the necessary reliance on local elites and educated commoners to fill many of the bureaucratic positions.

This article aims to survey the process of formation of an imperial bureaucratic class in Steppe Ukraine in the late eighteenth century. The importance of the bureaucracy to the process of incorporating Steppe Ukraine into the Russian Empire is undisputable. A series of successful military campaigns as well as the signing of inter-state treaties brought about the forced expansion of the Russian Empire's state borders. As a result, an imperial bureaucracy was installed as a new social class in Steppe Ukraine. In the accessioned territories, the government considered its primary objective to be establishing a networked system of agencies, including adequate staff that would promote and strengthen the authority of the Russian Empire. The local official was the main transmitter and implementer of imperial state policy on the ground.²

The term *bureaucracy* is used in this article to identify those who are involved in performing administrative duties, but as Marc Raeff points out in his study of the origins of the intelligentsia in the Russian Empire during the eighteenth century, “it is perhaps inaccurate to speak of the group of Russian career officials as a bureaucracy in Max Weber’s sense.”³

Historical Background and the Military Factor

The irreversible deprivation of autonomy in Steppe Ukraine was begun by Empress Catherine II as soon as she was crowned in 1762. Her policy regarding the region and the institutions on its territory – particularly the *Zaporiz'ki Vol'nosti* (Liberties of the [Cossack] Host Beyond the Rapids) – was a component of a larger-scale strategic plan that was applied to Ukrainian and other ethnic territories with historical autonomous leanings; one after another, they lost their privileges during her reign and became fully subordinated to the Russian Empire. The Ukrainian territories to be reformed were the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine; these were replaced with the Little Russia and Sloboda Ukraine gubernias in 1764–65.⁴

In Steppe Ukraine the transformations began with the disbanding of three military formations – New Serbia, Sloviano-Serbia, and the Sloboda Regiment – created in the early 1750s on the border of the Zaporozhian Host.⁵ In 1764 these entities were reformed into the New Russia gubernia, heralding the start of important political, social, cultural, and administrative transformations in Steppe Ukraine. The New Russia gubernia also included the so-called Ukrainian Line, lancer regiments, and some companies of the Poltava and Myrhorod regiments that had previously been under the jurisdiction of the Hetmanate.

The creation of a separate New Russia gubernia did not sever the existing traditional administrative ties in the region with the Kyiv gubernia and the newly created Little Russian Collegium (or College). We can observe a certain logic in the appointments of chief commanders of the New Russia gubernia.⁶ For example, in 1765–66 the position of commander-in-chief of the New Russia gubernia was taken by a former member of the Little Russian Collegium, Lieutenant-Colonel Iakov von Brandt; he was succeeded by Fedor Voieikov, as simultaneously chief commander of the New Russia gubernia and governor-general of the Kyiv gubernia.⁷ In order to stay up-to-date on matters in the New Russia gubernia, the Kyiv gubernia governor established a New Russia expedition, which handled all the documents relating to urgent matters of governance in the gubernia – especially those pertaining to government officials.⁸

It may be assumed that in the beginning, the imperial authorities did not consider New Russia to be a proper gubernia, but only an extension of the traditional

military settlements in the region. Essentially, that is how it was, for the facts mostly indicate that New Russia gubernia was administered according to military regulations, while civilian concerns were secondary.

In 1768–74 the military presence in the region increased substantially due to the Russo-Turkish war.⁹ During this time, civilian agencies were mostly occupied with billeting and provisioning the imperial army, while gubernial administrative matters were not a priority. After the war the large officers' corps, which had steered the successful combat operations, formed the backbone of imperial government agencies that were installed not only in the newly established gubernias in Steppe Ukraine but in other regions of the Russian Empire as well. With a serious lack of civilian government officials, the military represented practically the only source for replenishing their ranks.¹⁰

The Russo-Turkish war ended with the signing in 1774 of the Peace Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which was beneficial to the Russian side. It stipulated that huge tracts of land previously belonging to the Ottoman Porte and its vassal, the Crimean Khanate, would be ceded to the Russian Empire. As a result, the Zaporozhian Sich lost its geographical advantage and became surrounded by territories belonging to the Russian Empire. The Zaporozhian Cossacks who had guarded its frontier were no longer needed and even became a hindrance to the imposition of order in the region. Thus, at the start of June 1775, pursuant to a decree by Catherine II, the Zaporozhian Sich was surrounded and destroyed.

Potemkin: The Kingpin and His Adjutants

The main task imposed by the central imperial authority on the local administration at that time was to organize and unify the conjoined lands and former Liberties of the Zaporozhian Host in conformance with current Russian laws. The task of implementing imperial policy in this region was placed on Grigorii Potemkin.¹¹ He was first appointed supreme commander of New Russia, and later also governor-general of the newly created Azov and New Russia gubernias.

Creating the Azov gubernia was necessary because adding the newly acquired territories to the existing New Russia gubernia would have made it too large and governing difficult. Thus, the Azov gubernia was established on 14 February 1775, with Vasilii Chertkov appointed governor. Although Potemkin's order to this effect was only promulgated on 4 August 1775, Chertkov was acting in the governor's capacity since the very start of the gubernia's existence; this is shown from Potemkin's constant orders addressed to Chertkov and from Chertkov's reports back to the governor-general.

Chertkov was an unusual figure. He was a competent and experienced official, knowledgeable about the situation in the region. Prior to his appointment as

governor of Azov gubernia, he served a lengthy term as head of the New Russia gubernia chancellery.¹² Potemkin trusted Chertkov to resolve important state issues that concerned not only the Azov gubernia but also Steppe Ukraine overall. In the first few years after the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, Chertkov initiated almost all the changes that took place in the region. Then, in 1783 he was promoted to governor-general of Kharkiv and Voronezh gubernias. This meteoric career rise is easily explained by the fact that Chertkov's productivity in Steppe Ukraine was noticed in St Petersburg. It is probable that Potemkin himself initiated Chertkov's promotion, for having such an experienced figure in the region would not have helped his own authority. Potemkin simultaneously moved to Steppe Ukraine and began controlling all events in the region himself.

He had previously governed the region from St Petersburg, but decided to leave because of his cooling relationship with the empress and a growing unfavourable atmosphere in the court. By doing so Potemkin likely wished to improve his situation in the court and win back Catherine's favour, for unifying the rule in Steppe Ukraine was a high-priority objective of imperial policy. Success would ensure the fulfillment of his desire to solidify his status in the state and in the court, as well as to be in Catherine's good graces.¹³ And that is what happened.

Another important person in the region was Matvei Muromtsev, the governor of New Russia gubernia (1775–78). However, despite the equivalency of their positions, Chertkov was granted greater authority than Muromtsev, which is apparent from the content of Potemkin's orders to the governors. Chertkov's orders from Potemkin usually contained directives that applied not only to the administration of Azov gubernia but also to that of New Russia gubernia.

Potemkin's order dated 18 July 1775 required Chertkov to submit proposed subdivisions of the Azov and New Russia gubernial lands, particularly those acquired as a result of the imperial victory in the Russo-Turkish War, as well as of territories that were part of the Zaporozhian Liberties prior to the destruction of the Cossack Sich.¹⁴ The governor-general advised dividing the gubernias into provinces and those, in turn, into city-centred counties (*uezdy*), while leaving the free parcels of land for future settlement. For an efficient distribution in the gubernias, Chertkov and Muromtsev were required to compile staffing lists for positions in the gubernias that included information on the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the region's population.¹⁵ The instructions stated that this was an urgent matter, and on 31 August Potemkin sent another order to Chertkov with more specific details on how the staffing lists should be compiled.¹⁶

The work to compile the staffing lists lasted until September 1775. That same month, Potemkin petitioned the Senate to adopt his proposal regarding the territorial organization and staffing of the two gubernias, but the Senate did not ap-

prove them as such. Thus, most of the changes Potemkin ordered to the administrative-territorial organization and staff in gubernial agencies were implemented without senatorial approval.¹⁷ His special status in the imperial court did allow for most of his decisions to be adopted unilaterally. In fact, the staff in Azov gubernia functioned only as personally authorized by the governor-general, resulting in some difficulty governing the territory. For example, when the officials did not receive the salaries that were stipulated by legislation, Potemkin used his discretionary funds. He arrived presently in Steppe Ukraine carrying over one million rubles.¹⁸ This is also the time when the incorporation of Steppe Ukraine territories on the Black Sea was outlined in the secret "Greek Project," the bold geopolitical plan of Catherine's inner circle, with Potemkin as chief implementer given the unlimited trust of his empress.¹⁹ This provided Potemkin not only with a solid foundation to further transform Steppe Ukraine into an integral and prosperous territory of Russian Empire but also created a situation wherein he enjoyed sole and supreme rule over the region. Many contemporaries regarded this arrangement as unprecedented but nobody dared to criticize him openly.²⁰

The "Gubernial Institutions" Decree, the Zaporozhian Cossack Factor, and Crimea

The central imperial authority demanded the fastest possible implementation of the 1775 administrative reforms in the region too, but it was impossible to carry out this order instantaneously. By any measure, the region was not ready for such fundamental and pivotal changes. This was primarily due to its Zaporozhian legacy, which prompted caution in approaching the administration of territories that had been previously part of the Liberties of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host. Another important argument in favour of postponing the implementation of gubernial reforms was the region's small population. According to the "Gubernial Institutions" decree, there should have been about 400,000 males in the gubernia, including at least 30,000 in each county.²¹ Population growth was the cornerstone of the cameralistic ideas on which Catherine built her "enlightened" rule, with high population numbers equating to "well-being, power, and happiness of the state."²²

Therefore, the model introduced by Potemkin in Steppe Ukraine during the first years of his term as governor-general was rather transitional in nature – taking existing local historical development trends into consideration while planning in the future to fully eliminate all differences in regional management.

The New Russia gubernia had some staff positions in place, but the Azov gubernia did not. Equally notable is the fact that for a long time the Azov gubernia did not even have government premises. This prevented Chertkov from fully car-

rying out his gubernatorial functions, which he repeatedly brought to Potemkin's attention in his reports.²³

Upon the liquidation of the Zaporozhian Sich, the "Liberties of the [Cossack] Host Beyond the Rapids" were brought wholly under the New Russia gubernia, and subsequently it was decided to divide them evenly between the Azov and New Russia gubernias along the Dnipro River. However, the government could not permit these territories of the former Liberties to remain uncontrolled while the problems surrounding the new administration were being resolved. Thus, immediately after the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich a new position of supreme commander was introduced, and in August 1775 Lieutenant-Colonel Petr Norov was appointed to govern the former Liberties. Norov also assigned retired officers of the imperial Russian army to oversee the wintering quarters of the former Zaporozhian Host.²⁴

The deconstruction of the old order went at a slow and deliberate pace, without any hasty destruction of traditional channels. The government assessed the situation and public sentiments in the region before deciding on a course of action. The old Cossack *palankas* formed the basis of newly created counties, which remained within the boundaries of the liquidated *palankas* and retained their names. Thus, the Samara, Protovch, Barvinkove, Kalmiius, and other counties were established.²⁵ In the counties created out of the former Zaporozhian Liberties, administration by commissar was imposed instead of county administrations, and land management became the purview of land commissars. Other territories were governed by county or voivodeship chancelleries headed by voivodes. However, in territories that were not formerly part of the Zaporozhian Liberties there were also cases of commissar rule being imposed in the counties, or of land commissars heading the county administrations. For example, land commissars were appointed in the Dymytriievo and Kerch-Yenikale counties of Azov gubernia.²⁶

In the immediate years after the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, land administrations and land commissars were introduced in the territories of Steppe Ukraine not only with the intention of establishing control over the local Cossack population but also as a means of mitigating the extreme shortage of cadres. The land commissar system was introduced as a temporary measure that should have operated only until staffing was finalized for the new gubernias. From time to time, in their reports submitted to Potemkin the governors would request the establishment of county chancelleries instead of the commissar administrations.²⁷ Nevertheless, in certain counties of the Azov and New Russia gubernias they remained until the very last. There were also instances of a single land commissar ruling over two counties simultaneously.²⁸ In counties whose seat was a fortress,

there were no county chancelleries or land administrations, and the existing commandant chancelleries were used. Such counties had a special status, according to their strategic situation. The counties were not subordinated to provincial administrations; for matters of land management, they turned to the governor, while military issues were brought to the governor-general, Potemkin.

Another important argument for postponing the implementation of the "Gubernial Institutions" in the region was that the gubernias of Steppe Ukraine still lacked a noble social class. According to the provisions of the decree, the nobility should participate actively in local government, forming a collective that should select candidates from among themselves for positions in the county and gubernial agencies. Indeed, the local self-government was intended to be comprised of a significant proportion of elected bureaucrats. In reality, the nobility was very reluctant and did not want to participate in such activities. Many of them, although owning estates in Steppe Ukraine, never even visited the region.

Other classes were also supposed to elect representatives from among the gentry to represent their interests in county and gubernial agencies. Here we note, however, Chertkov's recommendation that foreign settlers and former Cossacks not be included in the elections to these positions. Even though the reform stipulated the election of members of the land court, Chertkov proposed that they be appointed:

To lay on them in all instances the proceedings of the court is quite without benefit, and for them the new domestic matters are burden enough, in consideration whereof we believe that all judges in all counties, also assessors of the superior land court, who pursuant to the general regulation on vicegerencies should be elected from the nobility, as well as all *ispravniks* in the vicegerency, should not be replaced by election but appointed by the vicegerency authority, accordingly with subsequent ratification pursuant to the regulation, not by election.²⁹

Regardless, throughout the latter 1770s and early 1780s the region gradually lost its traditional features. More and more often the matter was raised of implementing the provisions of the "Gubernial Institutions" decree, as evidenced by a series of orders received by the officials to submit suggestions in this regard. Another factor prompting this development was that by the start of the 1780s the decree had already been implemented in Left-Bank Ukraine, establishing the Chernihiv, Novhorod-Siverskyi, and Kyiv vicegerencies. As already noted, however, the main problem with the Steppe Ukraine gubernias was that none of them had sufficient population numbers to sustain the implementation of the provisions

of the "Gubernial Institutions." The reforms also required even greater numbers of qualified officials for all the positions in the newly created institutions. The lack of a bureaucracy was moreover affected by the cancellation in 1774 of a resolution that landlords were allowed to take possession of properties only if they engaged in military or civil service in the Steppe reaches of the Russian Empire, which was a significant disincentive for the gentry to take up such service.³⁰ The problem of a lack of bureaucrats was partially solved by engaging retired officers from local regiments, who had no means of making a living except in government service, or the Cossack *starshyna*, which was being ennobled at the time and approached the Russian nobility in terms of equivalency of rights. The shortage of chancellery staff was also a significant problem. Officials gradually began to stream in from other regions, facilitated by the attitude throughout the empire that Steppe Ukraine was a place where it was easy to have a good career, obtain a high position, and increase one's wealth. Mostly this was attributed to rumours about Potemkin's group and the wealth that its members could easily earn. At that time, Potemkin was unusually generous in granting land to almost everyone, and later he regretted it. The members of Potemkin's group were also seen to obtain promotions faster than their counterparts in other gubernias.

At the start of 1783 Potemkin informed Catherine about the population numbers in the region; at the time, the gubernias of Steppe Ukraine had 370,000 males.³¹ A decision was made to abolish the Azov and New Russia gubernias and combine them within the boundaries of a single administrative entity. It was then, on 30 March 1783, that the decree was issued on implementing the "Institutions for Governing the Gubernias" in Steppe Ukraine, establishing the Katerynoslav vicegerency and approving its staff appointments.³² According to the order, the Katerynoslav vicegerency should be divided into twelve counties, with the possibility of increasing this number if needed. Given the specificity of the region, Potemkin as governor-general was authorized to create the province.

Final staffing arrangements and the administrative organization of the Katerynoslav vicegerency took until the end of 1783. The newly appointed governor, Timofei Ivanovich Tutolmin,³³ participated actively in this work, but the plan he developed to create a separate Kherson province was never adopted. Thus, following Potemkin's submission, on 22 January 1784, the Imperial Senate issued a decree to divide the Katerynoslav vicegerency into fifteen counties.³⁴

Potemkin noticed that the number of counties depended on population numbers as well as on the fact that "due to the insufficient population numbers in some of the vast counties, it is quite unnecessary at this time to establish county representative offices in them, rather only the ones that are absolutely necessary."³⁵ Pursuant to the "Gubernial Institutions" decree, local authority was divided

according to function, with separate administrative, financial-economic, and court agencies. Their operations also needed a large staff of bureaucrats, which prompted Potemkin to decide not to open all the agencies at once, only those needed for the early stages. Many of the agencies were opened with authority over two counties or cities together. Furthermore, in order to fill many of the elected positions from the gentry in the vicegerency, it was necessary to organize assemblies of the nobility.

The large expanses of the counties of Katerynoslav vicegerency made the work of the imperial government officials significantly more difficult, especially the court system. A report dated 18 March 1786, from the governor of Katerynoslav vicegerency, Ivan Sinel'nikov, to governor-general Potemkin states:

The expanse of the counties in Katerynoslav vicegerency is a considerable obstacle, as we have learned from our experience with managing urgent matters, particularly the work of the lower land courts carrying out investigations on location and fulfilling orders sent from the vicegerent's and other legal offices – especially concerning criminal cases that brook not the least delay, as required for order and strict enforcement of the law, inasmuch as the *ispravniki* in the lands have only two assessors, they cannot keep up with handling all the corrections required of them, and given the too few numbers of judges in those courts.³⁶

Therefore, to improve the efficiency of land courts in the counties of the vicegerency, based on the provisions of the “Gubernial Institutions” Sinel'nikov proposed designating an additional assessor for each county.

According to an imperial manifesto dated 8 April 1783, the Crimean Khanate was included as a part of Russia,³⁷ and the government hastened to impose a comprehensive administrative-territorial structure on the peninsula. The case of Crimea deserves a separate study, and therefore we will not go into the details here. Some of aspects of the formation of the bureaucratic class in the Russian Empire are well described by Kelly Ann O'Neill.³⁸

Thus, in February 1784 Potemkin submitted a draft administrative structure to the empress for her approval, along with a list of agencies he was planning to establish there as soon as possible.³⁹ The draft was approved by Catherine's decree, and the “Gubernial Institutions” were implemented in Crimea with the establishment of Tavriia oblast.⁴⁰

In order to take Crimea into its legal possession, the Russian Empire leaned on the local Muslim elites, involving them in government and giving them equal rights with the Russian nobility.⁴¹ The governing bodies of Tavriia oblast were

not completely formed until 1787, when all the positions were filled and the same procedures were established that obtained in the rest of the territory of the Russian Empire,⁴² including elections held for judges and assessors. But the period leading up to 1787 was difficult. Before the agencies were finally opened, the administrative, financial, and economic functions were carried out by the Tavriia oblast authority by means of its general and advisory entities as well as by the chancellery.⁴³

The overall process of establishing an imperial officialdom in Steppe Ukraine was affected by further administrative transformations in the region resulting from the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–91. The Russian Empire acquired the lands bounded by the Buh River, the Polish border, and the Dnister. In 1792 these territories were divided into counties and added to the Katerynoslav vicegerency.

In the Wake of Potemkin's Death

However, 1791 marked a new stage in the history of the institutionalization of not only Steppe Ukraine but the region as a whole. That is because the supreme leader of the land – Potemkin – died that year, and until Platon Zubov was appointed governor-general the region was in a strange situation concerning the subordination of the Steppe Ukrainian gubernias. This three-year period highlights and illustrates the specificity on the whole of the institutionalization and functioning of the bureaucratic class in the region and demonstrates the actual weight of the region in the Russian Empire. Namely, after the death of Potemkin it was Catherine II herself who was the supreme leader; she even declared herself the governor-general of the territory. Executive and supervisory authority with regard to government policy in Steppe Ukraine was assigned to Mikhail Kakhovskii, but real control was exercised by Vasilii Popov, who formerly managed Potemkin's field office. Major-General Popov issued orders to those who ranked above him, including General-in-Chief Kakhovskii. Given the legislation of the time and the prevailing tradition concerning imperial military ranks and subordination, this fact seems quite strange. For example, right after Potemkin's death the governor-generalship of the region was sought by Mikhail Kamenskii, who reasoned that he was entitled to it by rights of seniority. He could not comprehend what it was that tied together people in Potemkin's team like Popov, Bezborod'ko, Golitsyn, Faleev, and others. In truth, Potemkin had successfully gathered a team in which each member carried out a specific function, and one could only be a part of it if one comprehended and aligned his own desires with those of Potemkin and the needs of the state. Popov was chiefly in charge of maintaining and dispensing funds from a discretionary spending account, which meant that everyone in the region was dependent on him. He moved to St Petersburg and took up the posi-

tion of state secretary, and later was promoted to chair of the Cabinet of Catherine II; he carefully followed all the affairs of the region. Regarding his rule over the Steppe Ukraine gubernias, Popov appealed to Potemkin's memory and his will. Virtually every document submitted for the empress's signature included a formulaic phrase like "as the late prince suggested" or "appointed by the late prince G.A. Potemkin."⁴⁴

A contemporary chronicler, Adrian Gribovskii, opined that Popov did not possess any particular talents to distinguish him within the bureaucratic cadres.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, Potemkin had respected Popov above all for his loyalty and willingness to carry out any kind of errand around the clock. Gribovskii described the relations between Popov and Potemkin as follows: "He was in a practically hopeless situation at the chancellery, stuck in the same suite as the prince, available at any time of night, which the prince often spent without sleeping due to insomnia, fully prepared to appear as soon as he was called. By this means, and by quick and accurate fulfillment of the tasks, he gained the prince's practically unlimited trust, which he exploited up until his very death."⁴⁶

Those who were close to Popov enjoyed a great advantage in obtaining titles and promotions. To gain access to his circle, it was sufficient to be recommended by his current mistress or to introduce him to an attractive woman who might become his next one, so Gribovskii claimed.⁴⁷ Neither did the writer fail to note Popov's connection to the discretionary spending account,⁴⁸ calculating that Popov would certainly not be able to cover the excessive costs of all the luxuries he so enjoyed with only the income granted to the estate in Reshetylivka; it would have been enough for only a month of the lifestyle he led. However, Popov had unrestricted access to the discretionary military funds, and he also held the purse strings to the revenues from Katerynoslav vicegerency and Tavriia oblast, which added up to two million roubles per annum, while the provincial chancelleries also brought in twelve million roubles in silver. Thus, if Popov personally suffered a lack of finances, he could help himself, unhindered, to this money at any time. Gribovskii cites an example when Popov lost another large sum at cards, then went to his office and soon returned with a full cap of *chervontsi*.⁴⁹ After Potemkin died, Popov tried in any way possible to prevent an audit of the discretionary spending account and to hide the shortfall in funds.

Finally, in 1800 Popov was ordered to compile a detailed report on the accounts of the late Prince Potemkin.⁵⁰ According to the memorandum submitted by Popov, expenditures of the discretionary funds were governed by the following procedure. The paymasters were to issue moneys pursuant to Potemkin's written or verbal orders. The moneys could also be dispensed based on orders from other persons who had obtained the governor-general's permission; in such cases the

moneys were issued without any objection or receipt given. Therefore, wrote Popov, reports on the expenditures had never been required or submitted.⁵¹

The era of influence wielded by Potemkin and his team ended in 1793, when an old adversary of Potemkin – Zubov – was appointed governor-general. His term as governor was marked mainly by his efforts to eclipse the legacy of his predecessor. In 1795, despite the unjustifiability on economic or any other terms, Zubov created his own vicegerency. To satisfy only his own ambition, the Voznesensk vicegerency was cobbled together in the south from parts of Bratslav vicegerency, lands obtained from the Treaty of Iași, and the Kherson, Ielyzavethrad, and Novomyrhorod counties of the Katerynoslav vicegerency.

Frank opinions about Potemkin's camp were shared in correspondence between Fedor Rostopchin⁵² and Semen Vorontsov, an imperial envoy in London whom the former had met on a trip to Britain in 1788. Vorontsov also had a personal grudge against Potemkin, as during the Russo-Turkish War all his combat successes had failed to be recognized, neither by Potemkin nor by Catherine II. For his part, Vorontsov had adamantly opposed the policy of the empress from the very beginning: back in 1762, Vorontsov did not accept the coup d'état that had brought down Peter III and installed Catherine as empress, placing himself in a dangerous predicament in the imperial court. In personal recollections compiled at Rostopchin's request after Catherine's death, Vorontsov provides clear reasons for his dissatisfaction with the ruling elites of the Russian Empire, and of Steppe Ukraine in particular.⁵³

The period of Potemkin's reign is eloquently illustrated in this excerpt from one of Rostopchin's letters to Vorontsov in England in early October 1791, after the prince's death:

His demise was as uncommon as indeed was his life. Everyone here is pretending to be grief-stricken, and no one is thinking about the consequences. By seniority G. Kamenskii has taken over as leader. It would be fair to say that the day of Potemkin's death is a day of rebirth for honest people, and that none of the military is sad about it; but many are thinking that they have lost their chance for new promotions, awards, etc.⁵⁴

Rostopchin states that anyone who took advantage of the prince's favour and made his career on it deserves to be called his flunkey. He further says that one could find twenty examples of former sergeants of the guard being promoted within two years, or even less, to the rank of lieutenant-colonel.⁵⁵

There is valuable information to be found about governance in the region during the three-year period between Potemkin's death and the appointment of

Zubov as the new governor-general. In the history of the imperial bureaucracy in Steppe Ukraine during the latter eighteenth century, 1791–93 is one of the least studied periods. Rostopchin tells us that Popov's influence increased during this time, and that he appointed all the officials in the Katerynoslav vicegerency.⁵⁶ As alluded to above, Popov promulgated all his decisions in the region by referencing Potemkin's wishes: "Such was the will of the late prince."⁵⁷

Meanwhile, Rostopchin is extremely critical of Zubov's rule. Copying Tutolmin, he calls him a "good-for-nothing boyo," and he is particularly indignant about the young Zubov's incompetence and lack of leadership ability. In Rostopchin's opinion, all the administrative deeds of the new leader of the Steppe Ukraine region were motivated only by his attempt to aggrandize himself and nothing more. A fair share of criticism is also directed at Tutolmin, former governor of the Katerynoslav vicegerency. As Rostopchin wrote to Vorontsov, "He is junior to you in service years, but he passed you a long time ago."⁵⁸ He also held that everyone with a connection to Potemkin had a tainted reputation, and that included Tutolmin.

Potemkin's inner circle had been formed by what David L. Ransel describes as an exceptional patron-client relationship for that time.⁵⁹ Those closest to him and those whose loyalties were verified enjoyed enormous social and economic advantages. Their commitment needed to be shown not to the state but personally to Potemkin and his inner circle, despite their frequent overt abuses of power. For their part, opposing camps watched Potemkin and his entourage closely, in order to catch them out in wrongdoing, if possible. But Potemkin would personally take charge of any matters that could discredit him, denigrate his achievements, or, worst of all, be disclosed to the public. His opponents repeatedly accused him of embezzling funds from the state treasury and of underhanded spending, but Potemkin was able to avoid any scandalous publicity.

As his successor, Zubov initiated several audits of Potemkin's cash reserves and business affairs. Zubov called into question many of Potemkin's directives concerning land distribution, and everything he did was motivated by his wish to wipe Potemkin's name from the annals of history. However, Zubov's own approach to forming his inner circle hardly differed from that of his predecessor.

Neither did the lower rungs of the bureaucracy fail to secure their own interests or take advantage of favourable moments that frequently came their way. None of these affairs were disclosed, however, as the informal "corporate" network was structured so as to protect all of its members, and any documentation of illegal schemes that could be traced was swiftly dealt with or disappeared.

The affair involving a gubernial officer from Azov gubernia, Georgii Gersenvanov, is a typical example. In a brief report dated 1782, another gubernial officer,

L. Alekseev, informs Potemkin about the appointment of one Titov as a collegium assessor instead of Gersevanov, who was being investigated for illegally exporting salt and travelling abroad.⁶⁰ This affair was swiftly covered up from public scrutiny. Then, in 1783 Gersevanov submitted a kowtowing memo requesting a promotion and to be pensioned off imperial service for health reasons – but he simultaneously failed to mention the investigation and instead noted that his service as gubernial officer had never been interrupted,⁶¹ although, as documentary evidence shows, the investigation was still ongoing, albeit in relative obscurity.⁶²

The gubernial officer Alekseev was himself also found out, in schemes connected to illegal land acquisitions. In 1781 the collegium secretary K. Bystrys'kyi, in a memo addressed to Potemkin, accused Alekseev of illegally acquiring 1,500 desiatins of his land, which he had received in 1776 upon obtaining a staff position in the Azov gubernial chancellery.⁶³ Interestingly, the land bonus was apparently his main motivation for pursuing the chancellery position in the first place.

In 1782 Potemkin received yet another denunciation accusing Alekseev of illegal acquisition of land on the Kalchyk River.⁶⁴ This time, the case against Alekseev backfired on the accuser, Lt I. Skryzhenskii. The denunciation revealed that this matter was not new and had been dragging on for some time. The Azov governor Chertkov ordered the illegally acquired lands to be returned to Skryzhenskii, but Alekseev not only disobeyed, but also threw Skryzhenskii in jail for fifteen days in retaliation for having the temerity to submit a denunciation against him.

The abuse of official status in order to obtain tracts of land was a widespread practice during that time. As early as 1777, Chertkov mentions numerous cases of illegal land acquisition by military officers and local civil servants.⁶⁵ Officials could not resist the temptation to engage in financial fraud – particularly when they had direct access to cash that was easy to conceal by simply not recording its existence. A vivid example of such a scheme flourished at the Taganrog customs port, where collected duties swiftly disappeared into the pockets of local officials.⁶⁶

Director Burbas of the Taganrog port and other customs workers recorded smaller volumes of goods being imported – or they would altogether allow the ships belonging to certain merchants to unload without any controls or logging of goods that would normally be subject to import duty. These were indeed extremely serious violations, which were difficult to conceal. Thus, in an effort to demonstrate that such things were supposedly exceptions to the rule rather than a widespread practice, not only Director Burbas but all his subordinates involved in the scheme were dismissed.

Notably, however, only a few of these schemes became widely publicized, and according to official documents, only a few bureaucrats were punished by being

dismissed. The system was set up in such a manner that problematic officials were quietly transferred to other positions, often without any mention of investigations or accusations against them in their previous position.

To be sure, local agencies received many complaints from the public concerning the failure of bureaucrats to fulfill their primary responsibilities or delays in resolving various issues. However, only a small number of such complaints resulted in officials being charged.

The top leaders such as Potemkin and Zubov certainly closed their eyes to a multitude of violations on the part of local officials. First of all, they needed to retain the loyalty of the bureaucrats, who also expected to obtain social and economic privileges. Secondly, there was a real lack of professional bureaucrats in the region. Therefore, there was an unofficial social contract, which often superseded the official legislation in the Russian Empire.

Staffing Numbers in the Imperial Russian Bureaucracy, and Again the Military Factor

Given that the staff structure of agencies of the Russian Empire in Steppe Ukraine was in constant flux during the entire second half of the eighteenth century, the number of officials hired on staff were also constantly changing, making it difficult to establish clear statistics during this period.

We can speak of more-or-less exact numbers of officials in the region for only a few specific years. The most exact information on the approximate numbers of bureaucrats is available for 1787 in the Katerynoslav vicegerency. According to the corresponding official register there were approximately 1,352 persons in the vicegerency's civil service;⁶⁷ almost half of the bureaucrats worked in the chancellery. By comparison, the entire vicegerency that year had a population of over 389,000 male persons, of whom 1,590 were from the nobility.

If these numbers are compared with the mandatory number of officials stipulated in contemporary legislation for the effective functioning of gubernial and county institutions, we see that certain elected positions remained vacant, while the number of officials in appointed positions was nearly in line with the legislative norms concerning staff in those times. Consideration must also be given to the fact that the borderland situation of the region necessitated the functioning of a series of additional agencies and positions that did not exist in other regions – namely, a network of customs and quarantine facilities. In addition, the ongoing land distribution greatly increased the importance of surveyors.

There is some uncertainty with regard to the number of chancellery officials, because it was not specified in any legislative act. Generally, the numbers were

determined by the needs and capacities of the government budget. For our example, based on the above-mentioned table, in 1787 in the Katerynoslav vicegerency there were approximately 700 chancellery employees.⁶⁸

As also repeatedly mentioned above, in the initial years of forming gubernial and county agencies in the region, a significant part of the officials comprised former military officers of the Imperial Russian Army, who simultaneously fulfilled military as well as civilian duties. This is not unusual, given that Steppe Ukraine at the time maintained a constant military readiness, justifying the high concentration of military personnel that was engaged in governing the region at the first opportunity. Given further that the supreme leader in the region was concurrently the vice-president, and subsequently president, of the War Collegium, the fact that military personnel dominated in governing the region is even more logical. It is also worth remembering that among the nobility it was a long-held opinion that military positions were much more prestigious than civilian positions.

During that period, the usual reason for a military man's full transfer to civilian service would be disability due to war wounds – which would often lead to subsequent discharge from civilian service as well. Furthermore, many of the older military men were attracted by the possibility of a settled lifestyle. And not least of the benefits perceived by many in transferring to the civilian bureaucracy was the possibility of obtaining a promotion in rank.

Nevertheless, by the end of the eighteenth century the number of officials who had begun their career in the ranks of the military had decreased noticeably. For example, of ninety-eight studied biographies of officials in the main agencies of the New Russia gubernia⁶⁹ in 1798, sixty-eight of them had begun their career as civilians and had never served in any military capacity whatsoever.⁷⁰

Those who had commenced their career serving the state in army ranks were generally very familiar with the region, having participated actively in the Russian Empire's military operations in these territories that ultimately resulted in its increased authority and aggrandized territory. There were, however, instances of military service taking place in other locations. For example, the collegium assessor in the judicial chambers of the first department of New Russia gubernia, Fedor Marchenko, had previously participated in military campaigns against the Swedish fleet on the Baltic Sea.⁷¹ In 1794 he was discharged at the rank of first lieutenant, at the age of 27, and in 1797 he was appointed collegium assessor in the new gubernia; there are many other such examples.

Social Standing in the Steppe Ukraine Imperial Bureaucracy

Concerning the social status of the higher-ranked officials at the end of the eighteenth century, most of them did come from the nobility, while the rest were from the clergy, *raznochintsy* ("people of various ranks"), and military officer and infantry families. A sizable proportion of the bureaucrats were of Cossack *starshyna* lineage, while nearly ten per cent were from foreign countries. The most numerous of these were Greeks, Georgians, and Poles, but there were other nationalities as well. For example, the collegium assessor K. Lambros, in charge of security at the Kozlov quarantine facility, came from Moldavian nobility.⁷² The head of the Odesa Port quarantine facility, court adviser M. Karpov, is indicated in an official list as being "from the nobility of the Moldavian-Wallachian principality."⁷³

There were also representatives of Ragusan nobility – for example, the titular counsellor Marko Stuli, in charge of security at the Kaffa quarantine facility.⁷⁴ The titular counsellor Petr Monasterli, *polizeimeister* of Novomyrhorod, was descended from Hungarian Serb nobility.⁷⁵

Analyzing the positions held by representatives of foreign nobility, we can see that they were mostly assigned to imperial agencies that anticipated frequent contacts with other foreigners and required knowledge of foreign languages. Therefore, it is no surprise that the greatest numbers of the foreign nobility worked in the Russian Empire's customs and quarantine facilities.

According to the studied official personnel records of over three hundred officials, at the end of the eighteenth century only around eleven per cent of them originated from Ukrainian territories. In the personnel record field "comes from which rank," those originally from Ukrainian territories were recorded as "from Cossack rank," "Little Russian," or "Little Russian nobility." Nevertheless, it may be assumed without a doubt that the percentage of Ukrainian-origin officials was actually much higher. This assumption is based on the probability that by the end of the eighteenth century many of the bureaucrats had already changed to a different employee category and were thus not recorded in the above-mentioned categories.

For example, in the New Russia gubernia lists for 1798 the court adviser Stepan Myronenko is recorded as "from the nobility."⁷⁶ He had begun his service in 1775 in the Donetsk regiment as a company quartermaster. After an assignment as a bookkeeper in Azov gubernia, he was appointed secretary of an accounting team touring the new Katerynoslav vicegerency. Myronenko also participated on several occasions in the Russian Empire's military campaigns in Crimea. According to the official personnel record, among his possessions were also "Little Russian subjects in Bakhmut county, 150 souls."

This was a typical career for the nobility in the Russian Empire. But if this information is compared to the official 1785 personnel record for Stepan Myronenko, the first thing that we note is that he is listed there as “self-determined Little Russian.”⁷⁷

Looking at the official personnel records of the 1770s and 1780s, we see that the proportion of Ukrainian-origin officials was approximately forty-five per cent. However, if only the chancellery officials are considered, the Ukrainians among them were definitely in the majority.

For example, the high percentage of Ukrainian officials in the chancellery is clearly illustrated in a report dated June 1785, written by Ivan Sinel'nikov about the awarding of promotions in rank to four chancellery officials in the Katerynoslav vicegerency:

The vicegerencial management, having observed the labours, efforts, and care in keeping written records on the part of the following chief clerks found in our staff – sub-lieutenant Ivan Rozsoshnyk and gubernial registrars Tymofei Komar, Grigorii Kitsenko, and Ivan Soloshych, who have exercised their authorities from the former Azov and New Russia gubernial chancelleries according to the mandates granted to them – to be commendable and their behaviour respectable, wherefore from the local gubernial chancelleries they merited being awarded the following ranks.⁷⁸

In the official group list accompanying the above-mentioned report, the origin of all four officials recommended for promotion in rank is indicated as “Little Russian.”

In August of that same year, 1785, Sinel'nikov submitted another report about promoting three more bureaucrats from the Katerynoslav Criminal Court – the archivist Iakov Malakhnenko and chief clerks Maksym Kliushnyk and Ivan Kushch – to the rank of provincial secretary;⁷⁹ in the official group list, these three are also recorded as “Little Russians.”⁸⁰

During this period, the Zaporozhian Cossack *starshyna* was also being intensively recruited to the Russian nobility by way of recognizing an equivalency with, or direct granting of, imperial Russian military rank. For example, in Potemkin's application alone to the War Collegium dated 7 August 1779, it is recommended to award military ranks to sixty-nine representatives of the Zaporozhian Cossack *starshyna*.⁸¹ According to the scholar Natalia Sureva, after Potemkin was appointed president of the War Collegium, he initiated the award of military ranks to over one hundred fifty former members of the Cossack *starshyna*.⁸² Having a military rank allowed them to easily continue working and to delay transferring to the

civilian service, which many former members of the Cossack *starshyna* indeed did. Meanwhile, for Potemkin this was an ideal scheme with which to replenish the staff of his agencies with bureaucrats of the required rank while obviating the centralized system of granting ranks that was governed by heraldry standards.

The decrease in the number of Cossack *starshyna* descendants among the bureaucrats at the end of the eighteenth century is also partly related to Zubov's appointment as regional governor and the death of Catherine II, which ushered in a period of turbulence and redistribution of powers in the region specifically and in the Russian Empire overall. The exclusion of a large portion of the former Poltava regiment from the administrative jurisdiction of the Katerynoslav vicegerency in 1802 prompted a significant exodus of Ukrainian-origin officials to the newly created Poltava gubernia, where they joined the already established Zolotnyts'kyi, Ostrohrads'kyi, Bystryts'kyi, Bunyts'kyi, and Kapnist dynasties.⁸³

Demographics in the Imperial Bureaucracy: Age and Health

The average age of officials working in the Russian Empire's agencies in Steppe Ukraine at that time was 30–40 years. Two factors are primarily responsible for partially influencing the prevalence of this age range of the public servants. First of all, most of the young ones arrived from other regions, presumably attracted by the idea of rapid upward mobility in their careers and increased financial wealth. Where they came from was not seen as offering any prospects, due to competition and other factors of no benefit to them.

Secondly, if truth be told, the conditions the officials had to work in were far from the ideal or what was expected, and often unfavourable, forcing many of them to retire on a disability pension. Many of them were forced to work in conditions that were even not conducive to survival. It took time to build the premises for the Russian Empire's new agencies in the region; therefore, in their first years of operations, while hiring ever-increasing numbers of staff they had to function in premises that were not suitable for long-term use.⁸⁴ Conditions for the bureaucrats were dank, dark, and cold.

There were instances of newly hired officials who were not even able to commence their duties due to a sudden worsening of their health. For example, Captain Pryma, just appointed as land commissar in Kriukiv county, had to step aside due to ill health and allow the secretary of the New Russia chancellery, P. Vasyl'iak, to take over.⁸⁵ There are many such examples.

Similarly, in 1781 the registrar of the Slovianske provincial chancellery of New Russia gubernia, thirty-six-year old I. Vyshnevets'kyi, began a kowtowing petition to be discharged from service due to health problems. According to his staff

record, Vyshnevets'kyi was “Little Russian.”⁸⁶ But in the petition he specifies that he was “born in a Little Russian city but by nature [is] from Polish nobility.” Vyshnevets'kyi commenced his government service in 1765 at the Poltava magistrate's office as a clerk, and later also worked as a clerk in the Azov gubernia chancellery and as registrar at the Poltava provincial chancellery. He had a brief term of military service in Crimea in 1774 before the Peace Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and participated in suppressing the Pugachev Rebellion that year.⁸⁷

Vyshnevets'kyi wrote: “But I felt in myself, from the work I was burdened with through all the past years of service, a weakness in my health and eyes, so that in this, my current position I have not the strength to continue any further, nor in military service.”⁸⁸

In turn, the Senate was often suspicious of the large number of petitions from this region for discharge due to ill health, and sometimes the Senate would express its misgivings directly. For example, in the case of discharging the recording secretary Lukianovych for reasons of illness, the Senate was in doubt as to whether he really had any health problem. In the Senate's opinion, he was motivated only by the mercantile desire to obtain a higher rank upon retirement. In the Senate's ruling on this case, it is written: “We suggest that the reason is not illness but the lack of disposition of Secretary Lukianovych to serve. He shall not be discharged from his position so as to obtain a promotion until he makes an effort to earn it, otherwise he shall be discharged from staff service and not be engaged in any business matters afterwards.”⁸⁹

However, in his report on this matter Sinel'nikov insisted that according to the memos received from the state treasury, Lukianovych was truly unable to fulfill his duties for a lengthy period due to his poor health; for this reason he was laid off but retained his seniority, and another registrar, one Fedotov – who had often carried out the work of the sick man previously – was designated to replace him.⁹⁰ If an official was unable to exercise his authority only temporarily due to illness, efforts were made to find a replacement for his position until he was able to again take up his duties.⁹¹

Payroll Problems and Compensatory Perks

Despite the perception of Steppe Ukraine as a fantasy paradise for elevating one's social and economic status, throughout the second half of the eighteenth century the local officials had to face chronic non-payment of salaries. As a result, many employees had no means of existence – which, in turn, caused their health to deteriorate and prompted them to leave for other gubernias.

The failure to pay imperial government officials is vividly illustrated in a report addressed to Potemkin from the New Russia gubernial chancellery, which includes

the following testimony: "From the report sent from this chancellery to Your Highness dated the 25th day of February in this year 1781, Your Highness already has been informed about the drastic shortage in this gubernia of treasury funds, and what privations because of it the staff assigned here are suffering from not receiving the moneys owed to them."⁹²

Frequently, the payment of insufficient funds, or non-payment altogether, would occur due to various bureaucratic problems or misunderstandings between different agencies and staff. The documents we analyzed abound with complaints and requests to resolve non-payment issues. For example, in 1784 even Sinel'nikov himself complained to Potemkin that he had been fulfilling the duties of governor of the Katerynoslav vicegerency for almost a year as well as simultaneously continuing to command the Kherson regiment, but that he had been refused payment for the latter because he was now receiving a governor's salary.⁹³ Considering this to be unacceptable and unfair, Sinel'nikov wrote that "during all of last year I never received it and am suffering privations. And for this reason I dare to humbly request that Your Highness grant it to me from wherever it should be issued, and make it happen immediately."⁹⁴

In 1786 Sinel'nikov again penned a letter about the need to issue the back pay that was owed to various officials throughout the Katerynoslav vicegerency. Indeed, the problem of back pay or wages too low to survive on lasted through the end of the century, and it remained unresolved even in the first few years of the nineteenth century. Many imperial government employees depended on their salaries, having no other means of survival. However, there was a group whose financial standing was relatively strong – namely, officials who possessed land and peasants. Toward the end of the eighteenth century this group represented approximately thirty-five per cent of the bureaucracy. As was also mentioned above, Potemkin found ways to compensate some officials from other revenue streams under his control.

Notably, most of the tracts of land and peasants belonging to imperial government officials working in Steppe Ukraine at this time were not actually located in the gubernias of Steppe Ukraine. Many officials owned peasants in Little Russia gubernia. Among them, for example, were H. Brazol,⁹⁵ an advisor to the trustees of New Russia gubernia; Petr Neverovskii, deputy governor and a collegium advisor who owned an impressive 190 souls in Zolotonosha county;⁹⁶ and D. Shmakov, an advisor in the first department of the judicial chambers of New Russia gubernia and a collegium advisor, possessed 40 souls in Kremenchuk county, Little Russia gubernia, and 23 souls in New Russia county, New Russia gubernia.⁹⁷

The head of the above-mentioned first department of the judicial chambers of New Russia gubernia, state councillor S. Shchukin, maintained an estate staff in Tver gubernia.⁹⁸ Meanwhile, the head of the second department in the same

gubernial agency owned a surplus forty peasants in Dorohobuzh *okruha*, Smolensk gubernia.⁹⁹ Available information indicates that imperial Russian bureaucrats in Steppe Ukraine maintained possessions in Tula,¹⁰⁰ Tambov,¹⁰¹ Kostroma,¹⁰² and Sloboda Ukraine¹⁰³ gubernias.

Apparently, few officials of Ukrainian origin owned land or people. Information exists about the surveyor of Mariupol county, land secretary V. Medovnikov, who owned 28 male persons;¹⁰⁴ the above-mentioned S. Myronenko, who owned “150 Little Russian subjects”;¹⁰⁵ and the secretary of the Bakhmut county court, M. Babenko, who owned six peasants.¹⁰⁶

Conclusions

The forcible expansion of the Russian Empire’s borders mandated the formation of an imperial bureaucracy in Steppe Ukraine, as elsewhere in imperial Russia during the second half of the eighteenth century. After having for many centuries existed with their own specific systems of order, adding these territories to the political corpus of the Russian state required that the authorities develop management models that would facilitate the quickest possible conformity of administrative affairs in these lands with the legislative norms of the Russian Empire, while taking into consideration the specificity of prior historical development in the region.

The lack of qualified officials presented an especially acute problem, as the implementation of the empire’s centralizing policies in Steppe Ukraine demanded the engagement of a significant number of human resources. The imperial government in Steppe Ukraine had to compete for personnel with other territories of the Russian Empire, which were also experiencing shortages of officials to fill the number of vacant positions. While the proportion of military officials was much greater in Steppe Ukraine, due to the situation of the borderland gubernias and Potemkin’s status as the President of the War Collegium, it was still not sufficient to resolve the problem. As time passed, it became easier to hire representatives of loyal local elites, and there was also an unmistakable influx of cadres from other gubernias of the Russian Empire.

It certainly is necessary to mention in conclusion that a significant albeit subjective role in the bureaucratization process in Steppe Ukraine was played by the highest authority in the region – namely, Potemkin and his inner circle. Potemkin’s special status in the imperial court and the limitless trust of the Empress which he enjoyed allowed him to use his own judgement on many matters in steering the region. As a result, a number of the appointments to bureaucratic positions took place in violation of the regulations and of legislation concerning the imperial bureaucracy.

Another point worthy of note is the large number of Ukrainians among the newly hired contingent of officials – especially the clerks, where nearly every second official was of Ukrainian background. However, by the end of the eighteenth century it became more difficult to identify which officials were Ukrainian, for once they ascended to the imperial nobility, information about their origin was often left out of the official records.

In any case, representatives of the Russian nobility constituted an indisputable majority of management positions in the county and gubernial administrations, and most of them were the former military officers who had been engaged to control the region in the first stages of its incorporation into the political and administrative sphere of the Russian Empire. Others – including members of foreign nobility – arrived in Steppe Ukraine with the intention of improving their economic situation as well as social station by means of obtaining promotions to higher rank. But in fact, the reality of the situation in the region failed to live up to the rosy and hopeful picture that was portrayed of it.

NOTES

- 1 John P. Le Donne, “The Territorial Reform of the Russian Empire, 1775–1796 [I. Central Russia, 1775–1784],” *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 23, no. 2 (1982): 147–85; John P. Le Donne, “The Territorial Reform of the Russian Empire, 1775–96 [II. The Borderlands, 1777–96],” *Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique* 24, no. 4 (1983): 411–57.
- 2 Don Karl Rowney and Walter M. Pintner, “Officialdom and Bureaucratization: An Introduction,” in *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill, 1980), 7.
- 3 Mark Raeff, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility* (New York and London, 1966), 107.
- 4 Zenon Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, MA, 1988); Svitlana Potapenko, “Cossack Officials in Sloboda Ukraine: from Local Elite to Imperial Nobility?” in *Dimensions of Modernity: The Enlightenment and its Contested Legacies*. Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conferences, vol. 34 (Vienna, 2015), accessed 1 September 2020, <https://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxxiv/cossack-officials-in-sloboda-ukraine/>; Volodymyr Sklokin, *Rosiis'ka imperiia i Slobids'ka Ukraïna u druhii polovyni XVIII st.* (Lviv, 2019).
- 5 S. Didyk, “Dolia naselennia Novoslobids'koho kozats'koho polku pislia zasnuvannia 1-i Novorsiis'koï hubernii,” in *Sicheslavs'kyi al'manakh: zb. nauk.*

- pr. z istoriï kozatstva*, vol. 6 (Dnipropetrovsk, 2011), 66–74; O. Posun'ko, *Istoriia Novoi Serbii ta Slov'ianoserbii* (Zaporizhzhia, 1998).
- 6 B. Hal', "Osoblyvosti administratyvnoho raionuvannia Mezhyrichchia Orili i Suly (druha polovyna XVIII st. – XIX st.)," in *Istoriia i kul'tura Prydniprov'ia: Nevidomi ta malovidomi storinky*, vol. 8 (Dnipropetrovsk, 2008), 12.
 - 7 A.V. Makedonov, *K svetskoï i tserkovnoi istorii Novorossii (XVIII–XIX vv.)* (Zaporizhzhia, 2006), 10.
 - 8 I. Savchenko, "Mistsevi orhany upravlinnia Novorosiis'koï ta Azovs'koï gubernii," in *Zapysky nauково-doslidnoi laboratorii istorii Pivdennoi Ukraïny Zaporiz'koho derzhavnoho universytetu*. Vol. 6, *Pivdenna Ukraïna XVIII–XIX st.* (Zaporizhzhia, 2001), 244.
 - 9 Brian L. Davies, *Russo-Turkish Wars, 1768–1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire* (London, 2016).
 - 10 *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, ed. Walter McKenzie Pintner, Don Karl Rowney, and Helju Aulik Bennett (Chapel Hill, 1980), 117.
 - 11 A special role in administering the region was played by Potemkin's assigned staff. Immediately after being appointed to his new position, Potemkin demanded that his chancellery be given the same authorities and number of staff as the governor-general of Little Russia, Petr Rumiantsev. According to the records, Potemkin's office had twenty-five staff in 1783, which by 1791 had increased to fifty-one; eighteen of those fifty-one officials were civilians. This office, located in and overseeing the territory of the Steppe Ukrainian gubernias, partially took on the functions of the central government bodies of the Russian Empire. Catherine II was actually grateful for this turn of events, for neither the Senate – constantly undergoing reforms – nor the empress's Cabinet were capable of reacting in a timely manner to the dynamic changes happening in the region. But at that time even Catherine could not imagine that Potemkin's chancellery would concentrate authority over the region fully in his hands – although perhaps it was predictable. An important reason for this is that the powers of the governor-general were not clearly defined by law; another was that Potemkin's favour with the empress increased his boldness. He was able to take advantage of virtually limitless trust and conduct his policies in the region unfettered. Almost equally important was his role as president of the War Collegium, which cannot be considered a coincidence.
 - 12 O. Pankieiev and A. Olenenko, *Azovs'ke namisnytstvo: nerealizovanyi proekt* (Zaporizhzhia, 2011), 5.
 - 13 N. Bolotina, *Deiatel'nost' G.A. Potemkina, 1739–1791 gg., v oblasti vnutrennei*

- politiki Rossii* (Moscow, 2010); O. Eliseeva, *Geopoliticheskie proekty G.A. Potemkina* (Moscow, 2000).
- 14 A. Olenenko, "Istoriia formuvannia kordoniv Azovs'koï hubernii (1775–1776 rr.): za materialamy opublikovanykh dzherel," in *Volyns'ki istorychni zapysky*, vol. 2 (Zhytomyr, 1999), 173–4.
 - 15 V. Kozryiev, *Materialy do istorii administratyvnoho ustroiu Pivdennoi Ukraïny (druha polovyna XVIII – persha polovyna XIX st.)* (Zaporizhzhia, 1999), 173.
 - 16 *Ibid.*, 178.
 - 17 Savchenko, "Mistsevi orhany pravlinnia," 245.
 - 18 A. Shmidt, *Materialy dlia istorii i statistiki Rossii, sobrannye ofitserami general'nogo shtaba. Khersonskaia guberniia*, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1863), 49.
 - 19 Hugh Ragsdale, "Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 66, no. 1 (1988): 91–111; Isabel de Madariaga, "The Secret Austro-Russian Treaty of 1781," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 38, no. 90 (1959): 114–45.
 - 20 James A. Duran, "Catherine II, Potemkin, and Colonization Policy in Southern Russia," *The Russian Review* 28, no. 1 (1969): 24.
 - 21 Decree "On institutions for the administration of gubernias of the All-Russian Empire" dated 7(18) November 1775.
 - 22 Roger Bartlett, "Cameratism in Russia: Empress Catherine II and Population Policy," in *Cameratism in Practice: State Administration and Economy in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Marten Seppel and Keith Tribe (Woodbridge/Rochester, 2017), 68.
 - 23 *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv* (Russian State Archive of Military History; hereafter RGVA) f. 52, d. 92.
 - 24 "Bumagi kniazia Grigoriia Aleksandrovicha Potemkina-Tavrisheskogo 1774–1788 gg.," *Sbornik voenno-istoricheskikh materialov*, ed. N.F. Dubrovin, vol. 6 (St Petersburg, 1893), 36–7.
 - 25 Kozryiev, *Materialy do istorii*, 185.
 - 26 O. Olenenko, "Osoblyvosti administratyvno-terytorial'noho ustroiu Azovs'koï hubernii," *Muzeinyi visnyk: naukovo-teoretychnyi shchorichnyk* 12 (2012): 97.
 - 27 *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov* (Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents, hereinafter – RGADA), f. 16, d. 588, ch. 6, l. 196v.
 - 28 RGADA, f. 16, d. 588, ch. 10, l. 386.
 - 29 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 10, l. 509–10v.
 - 30 A. Boiko, *Pivdenna Ukraïna ostann'oï chverti XVIII stolittia: analiz dzherel* (Kyiv, 2000), 67.
 - 31 RGADA, f. 16, d. 797, ch. 12, l. 171.

- 32 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (hereafter PSZRI), *Sobranie pervoe*, vol. 21 (St Petersburg, 1830), 889.
- 33 Potemkin was annoyed that there were almost no free territories remaining in the region for him to gift to people from his camp, so he ordered Tutolmin, the newly appointed governor of Katerynoslav vicegerency, to annul all the land gifts that he had not personally approved. For his part, Tutolmin perceived the illegality of this way of handling matters and attempted to solve the problem by legal means. He sent an order to the local authorities to compile memoranda concerning whether those who received land allocations were fulfilling their usage. These actions likely did not conform to Potemkin's ideas of regional governance and as a result, Tutolmin did not stay for long and was reappointed to a different gubernia.
- 34 PSZRI, 22: 10–11.
- 35 N. Bolotina, *Deiatel'nost' G.A. Potemkina (1739–1791 gg.) v oblasti vnutrennei politiki Rossii* (Moscow, 2010), 81; RGADA, f. 16, d. 799, ch. 1, ll. 164.
- 36 RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 5, ll. 146.
- 37 RGADA, f. 16, d. 797, ch. 12, ll. 68–9.
- 38 Kelly Ann O'Neill, *Claiming Crimea: A History of Catherine the Great's Steppe Empire* (New Haven, 2017), 84–123.
- 39 "Proekt administrativnogo ustroistva Tavricheskoi oblasti, podannyi G.A. Potemkinym Ekaterine II v fevrale 1784 g.," *Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii*, no. 19 (1893): 71–5.
- 40 *Administrativno-territorial'nye preobrazovaniia v Krymu 1783–1998 gg.* (Simferopol, 1999), 118.
- 41 O'Neill, *Claiming Crimea*, 84–123.
- 42 Bolotina, *Deiatel'nost' G.A. Potemkina*, 89.
- 43 D. Prokhorov, "Organy upravleniia Tavricheskoi oblasti posle prisoedineniia Kryma k Rossii: 1783–1787 gg.," *Materialy po arkheologii, istorii i etnografii Tavrii* 5 (1996): 220.
- 44 A. Boiko, "Diial'nist' V. S. Popova po upravlinniu Pivdennoi Ukraïnoi na pochatku 90-kh rr. XVIII st.," in *Naukovi pratsi istorichnoho fakul'tetu Zaporiz'koho national'noho universytetu* 7 (1999): 98.
- 45 Gribovskii served in Prince Potemkin's military expedition chancellery starting in 1787, and after the latter's death the chancellery was managed by Platon Zubov. In 1795 he obtained the position of state secretary in the court of Catherine II. After her son Paul I ascended to the throne, Gribovskii was sentenced and imprisoned for illegal land schemes, resettling peasants, and stealing paintings from the Tauride Palace in St Petersburg.

- 46 A. Gribovskii, *Zapiski o imperatritse Ekaterine Velikoi: reprintnoe vosproizvedenie izdaniia 1864 goda* (Moscow, 1989), 20.
- 47 Ibid., 22.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Boiko, *Pivdenna Ukraïna*, 65.
- 51 "Kratkaia zapiska o prikhode i raskhode ekstraordinarnykh sum v rasporiazhenii pokoinogo kniazia Potemkina byvshikh," *ZOOID* 8 (1872): 225–7.
- 52 Rostopchin took active part in the assault on Ochakiv and in the signing of the Treaty of Iași in 1791. He was not in Potemkin's camp, but he was well acquainted with his activity by observing members of his team. Rostopchin felt a personal enmity toward the governor-general and everything connected to him. Most probably his negative attitude to Potemkin and his milieu was based on his anger at not belonging to the select cohort of those who participated in the important affairs of state and also enjoyed all kinds of privileges in their career advancement. Meanwhile, it is well known that Rostopchin himself was blocked from being promoted.
- 53 "Avtobiografiia grafa Semena Romanovicha Vorontsova," *Russkii Arkhiv* 1 (1876): 54.
- 54 "Izvestiia iz Rossii v Angliiu: pis'ma grafa F. Rostopchina k grafu S. Vorontsovu," *Russkii Arkhiv* 1 (1876): 82.
- 55 Ibid., 84.
- 56 Ibid., 95.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 David Ransel, "Character and Style of Patron-Client Relations in Russia," in *Klientelsysteme im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Antoni Mączak (Munich, 1988), 217–18.
- 60 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 9, l. 670.
- 61 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 10, ll. 49–50.
- 62 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 10, ll. 141.
- 63 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 9, ll. 79.
- 64 RGADA, f. 16, d. 558, ch. 9, ll. 305.
- 65 RGADA, f. 16, d. 797, ch. 9, ll. 348–9.
- 66 RGADA, f. 16, d. 797, ch. 9, ll. 205–8.
- 67 RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 2, ll. 336–8.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 *Administrativno-territorial'nye preobrazovaniia v Krymu*, 122–3.

- 70 The reign of Paul I, who ascended to the throne after the death of Catherine II in November 1796, was marked by policies contradicting those of his mother. They impacted the Steppe Ukraine most of all, where by his decree the Katerynoslav vicegerency was not only replaced, and its central city was even renamed (albeit briefly, 1797–1802), from Katerynoslav to Novorosiisk. The new New Russia gubernia was decreed in December 1796, combining the former Katerynoslav and Voznesensk vicegerencies along with Tavriia oblast.
- 71 O. Pankieiev, ed., *Hrupovi formuliarни spysky Novorosiis'koï hubernii za 1798 r.* (Zaporizhzhia, 2011), 36.
- 72 Ibid., 86.
- 73 Ibid., 76.
- 74 Ibid., 86.
- 75 Ibid., 63.
- 76 RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 1, ll. 100–3.
- 77 Ibid.
- 78 RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 3, l. 187;
- 79 RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 2, l. 166.
- 80 RGADA, f. 16, d. ch. 2, ll. 168–9.
- 81 D. Evarnitskii, *Sbornik materialov dlia istorii zaporozhskikh kazakov* (St Petersburg, 1888), 208–9.
- 82 Natalia Sureva, “Kooptatsiia zaporoz'koï starshyny do dvorianstva u zakonodavchii praktytsi Rosiis'koï imperii,” *Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho fakul'tetu Zaporiz'koho natsional'noho universytetu* 26 (2009): 91.
- 83 A. Boiko, “‘Pereiaslavs'ka metafora’ u suspil'nomu butti Stepovoï Ukraïny ostann'oï chverti XVIII – pochatku XIX st.,” *Skhid–Zakhid: Istorychno-kul'turolohichnyi zbirnyk* 9/10 (2008): 74.
- 84 RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 5, l. 65.
- 85 RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 9, l. 192.
- 86 RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 6, ll. 185–6.
- 87 RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 6, l. 188.
- 88 Ibid.
- 89 RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 1, l. 96.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 9, ll. 269–269v.
- 92 RGADA, f. 16, d. 796, ch. 6, ll. 265–265v.
- 93 RGADA, f. 16, d. 693, ch. 1, l. 32.
- 94 Ibid.
- 95 Pankieiev ed., *Hrupovi formuliarни spysky*, 18.
- 96 Ibid., 23.

- 97 Ibid., 34.
- 98 Ibid., 32.
- 99 Ibid., 41.
- 100 Ibid., 52.
- 101 Ibid., 48.
- 102 Ibid., 79.
- 103 Ibid., 80.
- 104 Ibid., 110.
- 105 Ibid., 98.
- 106 Ibid., 58.

Identities of Little Russian Society through the Prism of Napoleon's Russian Campaign

VADYM ADADUROV

War has always been an extremely sensitive indicator of the state of affairs in a society; like no other event, it accentuated its horrors, moods, and identities. Identifying with one side in a military conflict had as a consequence not only participation in battles, but also unusual discursive activity, ultimately not only written and oral, but iconographic as well. For example, how are we to interpret the replacement on the icon of the Passion from the church in the village of Bilozerka, populated by the descendants of erstwhile Cossacks, of ancient Jews, sorrowfully honoring the redemptive suffering of the crucified Christ, and his tormentors – the Roman legionnaires – by, respectively, the Zaporozhians and ... (one so much wants to write *moskali* [Muscovites], which would fit so well into the framework of the statist grand narrative of Ukrainian history) French soldiers of the 1812 period?¹ Was this an effective example of religious propaganda, which was being spread through the parish network of the Synodal Church, or, on the contrary, a unique voice from below, as if from the very depths of Ukrainian society, ostensibly oppressed but at the same time already imperial in its main worldview parameters?

I think the truth lies somewhere in the middle between these two extreme versions. The artistic image created in 1812 by the unsophisticated imagination of an anonymous provincial icon painter symbolically combined sorrow for the crucified Cossack liberties and fear of any kind of change. In this essay I will systematically lay out the whole wealth of arguments in favor of this hypothesis, and, at the same time, show the schematic nature and poverty of the opposing historiographic tradition of representing the attitude of the descendants of Cossacks.

During the six-year period of the French presence on the borders of the Russian Empire (1806–12), not a single figure in the social system of Little Russia and its adjoining South managed to arouse the interest of Emperor Napoleon or his allies in these territories, so far removed from Paris, then the metropolis of Western civilization. To obtain at least a superficial understanding of the provinces on the left bank of the Dnipro, in 1812 the French leaders had to content themselves with the works of geographers and historians, as well as the tendentious accounts of its Polish informers.² The fact that none of the sources of the French policy makers' notions of Little Russia had been compiled by a native inhabitant of the latter serves as a perfect marker of the context: in the period of the Napoleonic wars, the Little Russian nobility served tsarist Russia loyally, without so much as a thought of independence from this empire. On the contrary, the general mass of its population hated and feared Napoleon, seeing him as the incarnation (*ischadie*) of the French Revolution, which terrified the landowners with its slogans of "liberty, equality, and fraternity." A researcher of the epistolary legacy of the son of the last Ukrainian hetman, Andrii Rozumovs'kyi, wrote that "hatred of Napoleon" "had long been the chief lever of his political activity."³ Taking to heart the idea of saving the Russian Empire from the French invasion in 1812, the marshal of the nobility (*predvoditel' dvorianstva*) of Poltava gubernia, Count Dmytro Troshchyns'kyi, proclaimed himself "son of the Fatherland" and in his letters to the commander of the Russian army Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov exhorted the latter to an "act of patriotism."⁴ Another courtier, Count Viktor Kochubei, a descendant of a Cossack *starshyna* family, wrote in his correspondence with the military governor of New Russia (*Novorosiia*) Armand Emmanuel duc de Richelieu that Bonaparte was a "devil spawned by hell" and warned this administrator about "machinations and provocations from the Poles."⁵

The stereotypical and far from true notion that all Poles who lived in Russia's western domains were secret supporters of Napoleon played an extremely important role in forming a negative attitude among the Little Russian nobility toward France as an international power that could lead to the restoration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within its old borders. Recollections of the bloody conflicts between Ukrainian Cossacks and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, ingrained in the depths of ethnic memory at the level of collective consciousness, aroused fears concerning the possible return of the Kyiv region and Left-Bank Ukraine under the rule of the arrogant Polish nobility. Owing to this psychological barrier, the emergence among the Little Russian nobility of any significant number of sincere sympathizers of Napoleon was impossible: those who diverged from the usual model of conduct (which can be described

by the dichotomy “Little Russian – a good subject of Russia / Pole – a bad subject of Russia”) were viewed as traitors who lost their right to belong to their circle. What is more, in respectable company, which the Little Russians undoubtedly saw themselves as being, the word “Pole” often served as a synonym for the word “revolutionary.” Small wonder that in 1812 the Russian administration’s level of trust in Little Russians was much higher than in Poles. At the moment in the war when the threat arose of Napoleon’s army advancing toward Kyiv, the local civilian governor, Aleksandr de Santi, wrote to the commander of the Third Reserve Army of Observation Aleksandr Tormasov:

the surveyors of this gubernia are all Little Russians, and I have no doubt about their loyalty, except in the case of one, and only because he studied in Kremenets [in a lyceum founded by the Polish statesman Tadeusz Czacki – V.A.], which is why I am keeping him in Kyiv. Although the maps of all the counties, including those that concern post roads, are kept in the archive of the city of Kyiv, during the retreat of the troops, some of the local [Polish] nobles will not miss the opportunity to give the enemy accurate maps, which they have had since the times of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.⁶

The juxtaposition of the patriotic disposition of the nobles of Great and Little Russian descent with “the old noble families of Polish origin, which included quite a few who rejoiced or thought that the final hour had struck for Russia,” was also typical of the memoirs of the Kharkiv University professor Dietrich Christoph von Rommel.⁷

Reflecting the position of the “Ukrainian intelligentsia” (which in terms of the concepts of the period under study should be regarded as the Little Russian nobility) regarding the war of 1812, first Dmytro Doroshenko, and then Oleksander Ohloblyn and Nataliia Polonska-Vasylenko allowed for the formation of a deep ideological split in this stratum, which went so far as to create two political camps: one that had a pro-Russian orientation, and the other that seemed to be waiting if not to cast off the tsarist yoke with the help of Napoleon, then, at least, to gain a certain degree of autonomy. They based their support for the existence of a second camp on several pieces of evidence – first and foremost, praise of Napoleon from certain Little Russian nobles and the oath of loyalty to the emperor of the French that the Orthodox archbishop of Mahilioŭ Varlaam (Shyshats'kyi), a native of the Chernihiv region, swore in the capital of his ecclesiastical province.⁸ Two years after the publication in 1933 of Doroshenko’s book, this hypothesis was supported, though less explicitly and very superficially, by Ilko Borshchak, citing the

archival documents of the Russian administration on tracking sentiments in Right-Bank and Left-Bank Ukraine published by Isaak Trotskii at the beginning of 1930 (their content was first published thirty years earlier by Ivan Pavlovs'kyi).⁹ Even the contemporary historian Volodymyr Kravchenko was inclined to support the thesis regarding the “split” of Ukrainian society in its attitude to the conflict between Russia and France. Using the example of the Kapnist brothers, he argued that the same social milieu was home to staunch supporters of imperial integration as essential for overcoming Ukraine’s economic, educational, and infrastructural backwardness (Vasyl', in the event of a French occupation of Little Russia, planned to begin a guerilla war) and the romantic supporters of Napoleon (Mykola intended to welcome the newcomers with bread and salt). However, in contrast to the statist approach, Kravchenko rightly noted that “needless to say there was no activity by an organized anti-Russian opposition in Ukraine.”¹⁰

However, a more careful examination of the evidence on which the hypothesis of the ideological split in the social strata of the Little Russian gubernia is based makes obvious the dubiousness of the arguments underlying it. It should be noted that the instances of praise of Napoleon expressed by representatives of Little Russian society were recorded in documents of the Special Committee for the Investigation of Cases Involving Treason or Violations of Public Peace, which had been especially created to uncover sedition, and do not date to 1812 but to the period of the war of 1806–07.¹¹ Despite the persistent efforts of the aforementioned committee, the total number of cases that it found was relatively small. Historians mainly refer to toasts that Vasyl' Lukashevych, a landowner in the Pereiaslav county of Poltava gubernia and retired employee of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs of Russia, raised to the health of Napoleon; a speech by a drunk Iakiv Mochuhovs'kyi; and Fedir Hutsan's threat to turn his weapons against the *moskali*. Only one of the figures mentioned above, Lukashevych, belonged to the Little Russian nobility. Mochuhovs'kyi, contrary to the assertions of the statist historians, was a wealthy peasant in Poltava gubernia, and Hutsan was a retired soldier.¹² Therefore it is not only unwarranted but profoundly wrong to regard the latter two people as representatives of the upper strata.

The figures named above be considered to be ideologically disposed against Russia? The tsarist administration itself did not view such talks by inebriated individuals as proof of their untrustworthiness – either in 1812, or, even more so, in 1807. With respect to the custom (linked most closely with excessive imbibing of alcoholic beverages) of criticizing the realities of “abject Russian daily life” by praising Napoleon as the main external threat to it, Governor-General of Moscow Fedor Rostopchin wrote to Minister of Police Aleksandr Balashov: “The word

'liberty' on which Napoleon based his plan to conquer Russia is not working in his favor. There are no Russian advocates of liberty, because I am not taking into consideration either madmen, or drunkards, whose words are not accompanied by actions."¹³

The toasting culture of the time allowed successive mentions not only of one's own or allied statesmen, but also of worthy opponents – that is, a toast in honor of Emperor Alexander could be followed by a toast in honor of Napoleon as a brave general, and the proposers of such toasts from among the nobility were usually not punished.¹⁴ A huge ideological chasm existed between praise of Napoleon expressed in a state of inebriation and actual anti-Russian activity, which in 1812 not a single representative of the Little Russian nobility crossed of his own volition. It is generally known that in 1812, the aforementioned Lukashevych, at the time the elected marshal of the county nobility, was one of the organizers of Cossack units serving Russia and also donated a large sum of money for the fight against Napoleon. Actually, it is not difficult to understand the striking disparity between the words and deeds of the Boryspil landowner: it is one thing when Napoleon is elsewhere and is seen as a romantic example of the successful life for every educated young person (Lukashevych would later testify that "living in freedom and comfort, I abandoned myself to the fermentation of mind, which, without a guide, is common for youth") and another when he is alongside and poses a threat to the sociopolitical system that ensures the prosperity of the nobiliary estate.¹⁵

The circumstances surrounding the oath sworn by Archbishop Varlaam Shyshats'kyi to Napoleon is very vividly recreated in a source that has so far not been utilized by historians – the memoir of the French staff officer Raymond Emery de Montesquiou-Fezensac. Upon arriving in Mahilioŭ on Sunday, 26 July 1812, Fezensac witnessed an interesting dialogue between Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout and the Orthodox archbishop. Hearing during the celebration of the Holy Liturgy that Varlaam continued to pray for the Russian tsar, the French military leader

recommended that he recognize Emperor Napoleon as his ruler and replace the mention of Emperor Alexander by the former's name in public celebrations of the Liturgy. In this connection, he reminded him of the words from the Gospel that it was necessary "to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's," adding that the one who is stronger must be regarded as Caesar. The archbishop promised to comply with this recommendation, but did so in a tone of voice that indicated that he did not agree with it.¹⁶

This unique testimony of an eyewitness allows us to reject the hypothesis that by swearing an oath to Napoleon, the hierarch Varlaam was acting as a politically conscious Ukrainian autonomist.¹⁷ It is quite obvious that the motives of his action were rooted in the need created by circumstances to find a *modus vivendi* with the new authorities, and not in opposition to Russia, as attributed to the Orthodox hierarch of the beginning of the nineteenth century by nationally minded historians of the twentieth century. Neither in substance, nor in its influence on the sentiments in society can the “case of Shyshats'kyi” be regarded as the antithesis to the general behavioral strategies of the Little Russian elite, which were reflected in anti-Napoleonic speeches and, especially, in the actions of hundreds of representatives of this social stratum (for example, a significant part of the personnel of the Russian army’s officer corps descended from the nobility of this region).¹⁸ The statist historiographical model makes sense only if we include 99 per cent of the nobiliary and clerical estates in the first political camp, and one per cent in the second, completing it with a certain number of examples in Right-Bank Ukraine, where a few Polish landowners revealed themselves in the 1812 war to be open supporters of France (including the old Volhynian hereditary landowner Michał Głębocki, who, “even though Napoleon’s troops had already left Russia, was constantly preparing to go to war to help the Great Napoleon, but was hardly able to move his legs”).¹⁹ But French sources yielded a mention of the participation in the war of 1812 on the side of Napoleon of one (!) Ukrainian Cossack (most probably, a former Zaporozhian). On the eve of the campaign, Marshal Nicolas Oudinot hired “le cosaque ukrainien” in Paris (!) as a courier and translator, who accompanied him in the battles of Polatsk, in Smolensk, and during the crossing of the Berezina. However, on 7 December, near Vilnius, the Cossack, who, according to grenadier François Pils, had frostbitten feet, refused to continue retreating with the French marshal’s troops, obviously preferring to die closer to his native land than in a distant foreign country.²⁰

Inasmuch as there is no documentary evidence of contacts between representatives of the “Ukrainian elite” and the French or their allies, sooner or later it had to be “discovered” by the ultrazealous advocates of a mythological view of history. As should have been expected, Pavlo Shtepa, a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), declared, without citing any supporting source of information, that the descendant of an old Cossack family, the authorized representative of the Little Russian nobility General Viktor Zakrevs'kyi, traveled on the eve of the 1812 war to Warsaw, where he tried to find support for a plan of a campaign by Napoleon’s army into Ukraine. Betrayed by the treacherous Poles, who did not want to allow the creation of an independent Ukraine,

Zakrevs'kyi was allegedly exiled by the tsarist administration to Siberia.²¹ This claim began to circulate in the historiographic field despite valid doubts among its recipients regarding Zakrevs'kyi's rank of general.²² Apparently, this retired hussar captain (*rotmistr*), the drunkard and rowdy Zakrevs'kyi, who in the 1840s came up with the idea to found the so-called Society of Boozers (*Mochymordy*) (its members were not exiled because the society's activities did not cross the bounds of the typical fantasies and whims of Russian landowners, such as the freethinking toasts raised among intimates described above), was quite a schemer and diplomatic genius. Given that at the time of the negotiations in Warsaw attributed to him by Shtepa, he had just turned ... all of five years old! Clearly, we have here an attempt, typical of the national grand narrative, to construct an uninterrupted continuity of the pursuit of independence by the Ukrainian people and their elite, for the purposes of which the period after the abolishing of the Hetmanate is artificially combined with the later period of cultural revival.²³

The hypothesis about the split of the so-called Ukrainian elite into two camps – pro-Russian and pro-French – finds no evidence whatsoever in narrative sources. Describing the sentiments of wealthy merchants at the Romny fair (Poltava gubernia) in July 1812, the Rostov merchant Ivan Marakuev wrote that upon hearing the news about the victory of the army corps of Peter Wittgenstein over the enemy, “the public rejoiced greatly.” In August, while attending the fair in Kharkiv, the merchant noted an “increase of general dismay” at the news of Napoleon's advance on Smolensk: “The Little Russian populace received the successes of the French with internal satisfaction; the seditious Polish spirit had not yet faded among them; but the nobility did not separate themselves from us [Russians] and thought and acted as the true children of a single Fatherland.”²⁴

The existence of social tensions between the lower classes and the new (self-proclaimed and recognized by Russia) nobility was of greater concern to the latter than the fact that “the people do not like the Russians, from whom they differ in speech, customs, and habits.” This class anxiety permeates the memorandum of Lieutenant Colonel Petr Chuikov to the commander of the First Western Army Michael Barclay de Tolly, which was prepared on the eve of the 1812 campaign. The descendant of a Cossack *starshyna* family, Chuikov noted that “this land, in which the people's hatred of the nobility is palpable, can be incited to insurrection. This problem could occur if our troops were forced to retreat to the left bank of the Dnipro in the face of the enemy's armed force. In present circumstances, the government must not weaken its monitoring of Little Russia.”²⁵ Chuikov urged the government to rely on the Little Russian nobility, ensuring its loyalty with new privileges, such as granting them the right to build distilleries and prohibiting peasants from moving to other gubernias, especially to the Caucasus.²⁶

The loyal sentiments of the Little Russian nobility gave the Russian command hope of repelling the potential advance of the enemy on the southern front. On 10 (22) August, the head of the General Headquarters of the First Western Army Major-General Aleksei Ermolov advised Emperor Alexander I: “look to Little Russia, where there are thousands of ready Cossacks, the best cavalry in those lands [...] a large number of officers, who have retired but are prepared to spill their blood for the Sovereign, under whose rule they thrive.”²⁷

That these hopes proved not to be in vain is attested by the assessment that the Russian emperor himself gave the Little Russian nobility on 23 October (4 November) 1812. He was very pleased that while the nobility of other parts of the empire provided, in accordance with the provisions of the imperial decree, one serf for every fifty souls for conscription and one of every ten, to the militia (*opolchennia*), the Little Russian nobility, wishing to demonstrate that they were more loyal to Russia than others, “just out of zealously alone, provided the army the same number of horsemen on their own horses instead of recruits.”²⁸

If the unwritten rules of class solidarity of the nobiliary elite regarding recognizing Napoleon as the aggressor were not in effect (as in the case of the lower strata of society), the question regarding whose side to take was often decided by religious identity and the perception of a single motherland headed by the Orthodox tsar founded on it. The last words of a soldier in the Russian army, who spoke in a “Little Russian dialect [*en dialecte petit russe*],” made a deep impression on Heinrich von Brandt, an officer in Napoleon’s army: “You are a brave people, but your tsar must be a bad man. What did our tsar do to him? What is he looking for in our motherland? Rise up, holy Rus', defend yourself, protect our religion, our tsar!”²⁹

Upon hearing these words, the scales fell from Brandt’s eyes and showed him how naïve were the hopes of the participants in the campaign against Russia that its peoples would rebel and complete the destruction of this empire that his side had begun. The worst foreboding of Napoleon’s soldier is confirmed by the account of Ivan Kotliarevs'kyi. Assembling the Cossack units in Poltava, the author of the famous *Eneida* (Aeneid) testified that “for the most part, [the men] are enlisting into the ranks of the Cossacks gladly, willingly, and without the least signs of sadness.”³⁰ The reason for such enthusiasm was the expectation of the descendants of the Cossacks to earn emancipation from serfdom with their service to the tsar. To be exact, to earn favor, not to gain freedom, by seizing the opportunity. After the war, the enthusiasm was replaced by general disappointment, pure and simple.

In studying Russian military reports about the conduct of the Cossack regiments mustered in Little Russia, we find complaints about the inadequate preparation of this “bunch of clodhoppers [*muzhiks*],” their poor military equipment,

and the extreme youth of many “irregulars [*okhochekomonni*],” but not about their unreliability or desire to cross over to the side of the enemy.³¹ What is more, seeing the enthusiasm of twelve- and thirteen-year old Cossacks, Lieutenant General Fedor Ertel ordered that they be taught the arts of soldiery.³² Overseeing the progress of this undertaking, Ertel probably felt like Alexander the Great, who formed a guard loyal to him consisting of children of the conquered Persians, or the sultan who created the Janissary caste.

The famous political figure and scholar Serhii Iefremov once called attention to the fact that there are only a few mentions of the war of 1812 in Ukraine's vast and rich folklore, and that even in those four or five works of poetry (which he recorded during his ethnographic expeditions in the Kyiv region), it is impossible to find any positive comments about the French. The scholar therefore concluded that the common people remained completely indifferent to this war, which “did not touch them in any way,” “did not become near and dear” to them, in contrast to, for example, the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising (*Khmel'nychchyna*), which was “enfolded in extraordinary veneration.”³³ This argument, which is close to the methodological approach of modern cultural-anthropological history, makes it possible to understand, even more clearly than the documents of the tsarist police, why the French government could not count on assistance from the indigenous inhabitants of the Little Russian gubernias, in whose imaginations Napoleon was not the “Great Hero” and “Liberator” (despite the honey-tongued assurances of the leaders of the Polish patriotic movement), and therefore, unlike Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, did not become a leading figure in folk dumas.

In contrast to the “silence” of the lower classes, we see a real “roar” of nobiliary poetic creativity, which bears clear witness to the pro-imperial identity of this social stratum. Written in both Russian and Ukrainian, these published works often deliberately imitated the speech of the common people, creating the illusion of broad popular support of the tsarist regime: “We have a father, the tsar the most luminous [...] we swore to him [...] when needed to defend / our Russian tsar.”³⁴

As in Petro Danylevs'kyi's “Oda malorossiiskogo prostoliudina na sluchai voen-nykh deistvii pri nashestvii frantsuzov v predely Rossiiskoi imperii v 1812 godu” (Ode of a Little Russian commoners in the event of armed hostilities during the French invasion of the Russian Empire in 1812), which is quoted above, so also in Hryhorii Koshyts'-Kvitnyts'kyi's “Oda, sochinennoi na malorossiiskom narechii po sluchaiu vremennogo opolcheniia” (Ode composed in the Little Russian dialect on the occasion of a temporary militia), Petro Kalaidovych's and Ivan Kovan'ko's “Pesni” (Songs), Vasyl' Kapnist's odes and poems, and the anonymous “Mysli ukrainskogo zhitelia o nashestvii frantsuzov (malorossiiskaia oda)” (Thoughts of a Ukrainian inhabitant about the Invasion of the French. Little Rus-

sian Ode), the authors mocked Napoleon and his allies, the Poles, and countered them with arguments attesting to the religious, social, and political unity of the Russian Empire.³⁵

In researching the collection of Russian brochures captured by the French during the 1812 campaign, which are held in the Archives Nationales (Paris), it is difficult to ignore a Ukrainian-language document, whose content reflects perfectly the context described above of the rejection by Ukrainian society of a political orientation toward Napoleon.³⁶ We are talking about a pamphlet entitled *Stikhi Tverdovskogo* (Tverdovskii's Verses), which is an integral part of a larger collection.³⁷ The plot of the work, from which Napoleon's entourage could learn of the hostility of Little Russians to France, turns on the battle of Pułtusk on 27 December (New Style), 1806, represented by Russian propaganda as a brilliant victory of army commander Levin August von Bennigsen over the emperor of the French (although, in reality, it was the Russians who were defeated and who retreated, leaving the battlefield to the enemy).³⁸ Thus the level of familiarity of the author, who relates in satirical form how "the braggart, brigand, and derelict" Bonaparte lost (in reality, Bennigsen fought against Marshal Jean Lannes), was of a general nature, based on official reports and rumors. As regards the author, in view of his colorful Ukrainian language, there is no reason to doubt his Little Russian origin. The *Stikhi Tverdovskogo*, published with the permission of the committee on censorship, and the little glossary accompanying them, are evidence of the use of the Ukrainian language in general, and of the term *zaporozhets'* in particular, in the literature of the Russian Empire. The text contains many demotic metaphors (for example, the portrayal of Bonaparte as a cattle thief); such verbal crudity was commonplace for the poetry of the period and copied the style of Kotliarevs'kyi's *Eneïda*.

As for the motives for writing the pamphlet, various hypotheses are possible. The most likely, in my view, are: (1) the author's desire to feel involved in important events by expressing his civic stance, and (2) his attempt to find favor with the authorities, on whose part there was obviously a demand for this kind of show of public support. Attesting to the latter is the publication in the same edition of two works of similar content, ostensibly written on behalf of citizens belonging to different social classes from the empire's borderlands. The author of the verse work was probably not a Cossack; most likely, he was a Little Russian nobleman, who lived in St Petersburg and wrote under a pseudonym.³⁹ His pamphlet depicts quite clearly the opinions and sentiments of the nobiliary estate. Notably, in the view of the author, the romantic image of the Zaporozhian Cossack remains relevant as a metaphor for the defender of the Orthodox Fatherland, but no longer as concerns Ukraine, but as defender of the whole empire. There is no trace left

of the Zaporozhian Sich rebel; his place has been taken by the loyal defender of the tsarist throne, ready to become the stronghold of the human spirit and victory (thence the pseudonym)⁴⁰ against the French threat. Moreover, the author of the *Stikhi Tverdovskogo* does not hide his animus toward the Polish rebels, describing the uprising under the leadership of Tadeusz Kościuszko as adventuristic. He obviously views the latter as the exact opposite, deserving of absolute condemnation, to the loyal stance of the Black Sea (formerly Zaporozhian) Cossacks, led by Otaman Kulish (Zakharii Chepiha), who fought Kościuszko's rebels as part of the Russian army.⁴¹ It is difficult to doubt the sincerity of the pamphlet author's feelings on the occasion of the victory (even if only fictional) over Bonaparte: the reading of the text leaves a slight aftertaste of the author's mood, which reflects the firm convictions of a person who, from the height of his ideals, is mocking the "pathetic" – in his view – figure of Napoleon.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as: Vadym Adadurov, "Identychnosti malorosii's'koho suspil'stva cherez pryzmu rosiis'koho pokhodu Napoleona," in idem, *"Napoleonida" na Skhodi Ievropy. Uiavlennia, proekty ta diial'nist uriadu Frantsii shchodo pivdenno-zakhidnykh okrain Rosiis'koi imperii na pochatku XIX st.* (Lviv, 2018), 197–210. Copyright 2018 by the Ukrainian Catholic University Press and Vadym Adadurov. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 See the report on this icon in the paper of local historian Georgii Skadovskii in *Iug: Nauchno-literaturnaia, politicheskaia, sel'skokhoziaistvennaia i kommercheskaia gazeta* (Kherson), 23 December 1898, no. 231, 3.
- 2 See my monograph: V. Adadurov, *"Napoleonida" na Skhodi Ievropy: Uiavlennia, proekty ta diial'nist uriadu Frantsii shchodo pivdenno-zakhidnykh okraïn Rosiis'koi imperii na pochatku XIX stolittia*, 2nd ed. (Lviv, 2018), 176–97.
- 3 A.A. Vasil'chikov, *Semeistvo Razumovskikh*, vol. 4/2, *Svetleishii kniaz Andrei Kirillovich* (St Petersburg, 1887), 308.
- 4 *Narodnoe opolchenie v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 g.: Sbornik dokumentov*, ed. L.G. Beskrovnyi (Moscow, 1962), 432–4.
- 5 *Sbornik Russkogo imperatorskogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 54, *Gertsog Armand-Emmanuil Rishel'e. Dokumenty i bumagi o ego zhizni i deiatel'nosti 1766–1822*, ed. A.A. Polovtsov (St Petersburg, 1886), 72.
- 6 O. Levitskii, "Trevozhnye gody: Ocherki iz obshchestvennoi i politicheskoi istorii g. Kieva i Iugo-Zapadnogo kraia v 1811–1812 gg.," *Kievskaiia starina* 39, no. 11 (1892): 211.

- 7 [Kh. Rommel'], *Piat' let iz istorii Khar'kovskogo universiteta. Vospominaniia Professora Rommelia o svoem vremeni, o Khar'kove i Khar'kovskom universitete (1785–1815)*, ed. Ia. Baliasnyi (Kharkiv, 1868), 83.
- 8 See D. Doroshenko, *Narys istorii Ukraïny*, vol. 2, *Vid polovyny XVII stolittia* (Munich, 1956), 288; O. Ohloblyn, “Varlaam Shyshats'kyi,” in idem, *Liudy staroi Ukraïny* (Munich, 1959), 306–7; N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Istoriia Ukraïny*, vol. 2, *Vid polovyny XVII storichchia do 1923 roku* (Munich, 1976), 280–1; see also an ideologically close work by D. Dontsov, “Chy Rosiia ie nepoborna?” in idem, *Vybrani tvory*, vol. 9, *Ideolohichna i kul'turolohichna eseïstyka (1948–1957 rr.)* (Drohobych-Lviv, 2015), 152.
- 9 E. Borschak, “Napoléon et l’Ukraine,” *Revue des Études Napoléoniennes* 41 (Paris, June–December 1935), 13–14; I. V. Pavlovskii, “Dela ob gosudarstvennoi izmene i narushenii obshchego spokoistviia, proizvodivshiiesia v Malorossii v 1807 g.,” *Kievskaiia starina* 83, no. 12 (1903): 136–8.
- 10 V.V. Kravchenko, “Ukraïna naperedodni rosiis'ko-frantsuz'koi viiny 1812 r. ochyma suchasnyka,” in *Skhid–Zakhid: Istoryko-kul'turolohichniy zbirnyk* (Kharkiv) 2 (1999): 199–200.
- 11 V. Shandra, *Malorosiis'ke heneral-hubernatorstvo 1802–1856: Funktsii, struktura, arkhiv* (Kyiv, 2001), 82.
- 12 I. Trots'kyi, “Do istorii revoliutsiinoho rukhu na Ukraïni na pochatku XIX st.,” *Prapor marksyzmu* (Kharkiv) 2 (1930): 157.
- 13 *Otechestvennaia voina v pis'makh sovremennikov (1812–1815 gg.)*, comp. N.F. Dubrovin (St Petersburg, 1882), 69 [Rostopchin to Balashov, 30 July 1812].
- 14 F.L. Lindenmann, “Volynskaia guberniia v 1812 g. v memuarakh saksonskogo kapitana,” trans. N.S. Khomchenko, *Mynule i suchasne Volyni i Polissia*, issue 41, *Ukraïna ta Volyn' u napoleonivs'kykh viinakh*, ed. A. Saliuk and O. Zlatohors'kyi (Lutsk, 2012), 248.
- 15 I.F. Pavlovskii, *Poltava: Istoricheskii ocherk ee kak gubernskogo goroda v epokhu upravleniia general-gubernatorami (1802–1856)* (Poltava, 1910), 198, 204.
- 16 R.E. de Montesquiou-Fézensac, *Journal de la campagne de Russie en 1812* (Tours, 1849), 22.
- 17 As far back as at the end of the nineteenth century, Church historian Andrii Khoïnats'kyi, writing from the position of local Volhynian patriotism, introduced elements of martyrdom and heroism into the historiographic image of Shyshats'kyi: A.F. Khoïnatskii, “Pravda ob archiepiskope Varlaame, byvshim pervym episkopom Volynskim, a potom arkhiepiskopom Mogilevskim, skonchavshemsia v zvanii prostogo monakha, i drugie nekotorye svedeniia, neobkhodimye dlia istorii Volynskoi seminarii,” *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (Kremenets) 8 (1879) (unofficial part): 323–9. In our time, Varlaam (Shyshats'kyi) is viewed in this role by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

- Historians connected to this Church are popularizing the mythical image of the Mahilioŭ hierarch: V. Rozhko, *Arkhiepiyskop Varlaam Syshats'kyi: Shliakh do avtokefalii* (Lutsk, 2014), 125–32.
- 18 S.V. Potrashkov, “Ukraina v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda: vnutrennii aspekt,” in *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda: Istochniki. Pamiatniki. Problemy. Materialy VIII Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi konferentsii. Borodino, 6–7 sentiabria 1999 g.* (Mozhaisk, 2000), 210–12.
 - 19 M. Chaikovskii (Sadyk-Pasha), “Zapiski,” *Kievskaia starina* 32, no. 1 (1891): 47.
 - 20 F. Pils, *Journal de marche du grenadier (1804–1814)*, ed. R. de Casaternes (Paris, 1895), 158.
 - 21 P. Shtepa, *Moskovstvo, ioho pokhodzhennia, zmist, formy i istorychna tiahlist'*, 4th ed. (Drohobych, 2003), 3.
 - 22 See A.E. Taras, “1812 god – tragediia Belarusi,” chapter 5, “Nastuplenie velikoi armii: boi i zhertvy (iun'–avgust 1812 g.),” part 3, *Voenno-politicheskoe obozrenie*, accessed 17 September 2021, <https://www.belvpo.com/20106.html/>.
 - 23 For greater detail, see V. Adadurov, “‘Vpysuvannia' ukrains'koï istorii v ievropeis'kyi kontekst i ioho metodolohichni zasady (Lviv, 2013), 30–1; S. Plokhii, *Kozats'kyi mif. Istorii ta natsiietvorennia v epokhu imperii*, transl. from English by M. Klymchuk (Kyiv, 2013), 268, 392.
 - 24 M.I. Marakuev, “Zapiski rostovtsa,” *Russkii arkhiv* (Moscow) 45, no. 5 (1907): 113–15.
 - 25 P.A. Chuikevich, “Primechaniia o Malorossii,” in *Skhid–Zakhid. Istoryko-kul'turolohychnyi zbirnyk 2* (1999): 205, 209.
 - 26 Ibid.
 - 27 *Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov, izvlechennykh iz Arkhiva sobstvennoi Ego imperatorskogo Velichestva kantseliarii*, ed. N.F. Dubrovin, 2 (St Petersburg, 1889): 416.
 - 28 Ibid., doc. no. 238, p. 112.
 - 29 H. von Brandt, *Souvenirs d'un officier polonais: Scènes de la vie militaire en Espagne et en Russie (1808–1812)* (Paris, 1877), 258.
 - 30 *Ukrains'kyi narod u Vitchyzniani viini 1812 roku: Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, eds. V.I. Strel's'kyi and H. Iu. Herbil's'kyi (Kyiv, 1948), doc. no. 5, p. 11.
 - 31 *Dvenadtsiatyi god. Istoricheskie dokumenty sobstvennoi kantseliarii glavnokomanduiushchego Tret'ei zapadnoi armiei generala ot kavalerii A.P. Tormasova*, ed. D.P. Akhlestyshchev (St Petersburg, 1912), doc. 238, p. 248 [Ertel to Chichagov, 4 (16) October 1812]; doc. 245, p. 257 [Klenovskii to Ertel', 30 September (11 October), 1812].
 - 32 Ibid., doc. 254, p. 267 [Ertel to Chichagov, 18 (30) October 1812].
 - 33 S. Iefremov, “1812-i rik na Ukraïni,” in *Za rik 1912-i* (Kyiv, 1913), 268.

- 34 V.S. Kiselev and T.A. Vasil'eva, "Evoliutsiia obraza Ukrainy v imperskoi slovesnosti pervoi chetverti XIX v.: Regionalizm, etnografizm, politizatsiia," *Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filologiiia* 27, no. 1 (2014): 110.
- 35 Iu. Ladyntsev and L. Shchavinskaia, *Ukrainskaia literatura protiv Napoleona* (Moscow, 2012), 53.
- 36 Archives Nationales (Paris), série AF IV, carton 1650, f. 321 (8) – 325 (12). First published in V.V. Adadurov, "Zaporoz'kyi kozak Tverdovs'kyi proty Napoleona: Vidobrazhennia virnopiddanykh nastroiv malorosiis'koho dvorianstva v ukraïnomovnomu pamfleti 1807 r. z Natsional'noho arkhivu Frantsii," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 5 (2012): 177–86.
- 37 *Dukh Rossiian, ili Serdechnye chustva sibirskogo мастера Userdova i zaporozhskogo kozaka Tverdovskogo, isobrazhennye stikhami po sluchaiu pobedy nad Bonapartiem 14 dekabria 1806 goda* (St Petersburg, 1807).
- 38 L.L. Bennigsen, *Zapiski o voine s Napoleonom 1807 goda*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 2012), 97–9.
- 39 According to my conjecture, the author of the work could have been the descendant of a Cossack *starshyna* family, the mining engineer Ivan Kovan'ko, who introduced a melter foreman from the Urals into his narrative.
- 40 The surname Tverdovskii apparently refers to Ukrainian and Russian words "tverdynia" (stronghold) and "tverdyi" (strong) and emphasizes his persistence in the struggle against Napoleon.
- 41 For this historical figure, see B.E. Frolov, "Diskussionnye voprosy biografii atamana Z.A. Chepegi," in *Chetvertye kubanskie literaturno-istoricheskie chteniia: Sbornik nauchnykh statei* (Krasnodar, 2003), 96.

PART TWO

Society, Economy, and Demographics

Colonel of the Zaporozhian Host: The Right to Free Elections in Light of Cossack Traditions, Prescribed Regulations, and Political Realities

VIKTOR HOROBETS¹

“Senior officers appointed by decree, in the expectation that they will not be removed without a decree, cause sufferings to those under their command, impose very heavy burdens [on them] ... whereas if someone is placed in authority by a free vote, he, fearing the loss of this authority, will conduct himself well and without causing harm, and, satisfied with his own settled way of life, will not burden in any way those under his command,” wrote Hetman Danylo Apostol in the “List of Articles” (*Stateini punkty*) that he submitted in 1728 to Russian Emperor Peter II to make the case for the obvious advantages of electing the members of the General Officer Staff (*Heneral'na starshyna*), colonels, and captains of the Zaporozhian Host by a free vote over the appointment of officers by fiat from Moscow or St Petersburg.¹

However, despite these arguments, the hetman succeeded in defending the autonomy of the Zaporozhian Host in this matter only to a certain degree. Moreover, the tactical victories he won were not long-lived and were cancelled by the imperial government a few years after Apostol's death. But was the imperial government's interference the only thing that stood in the way of the full-fledged development of the principles of free election in Cossack Ukraine?² To what extent did the political practices of the Hetmanate differ from the norms prescribed in legislative acts and hallowed by tradition? How were the election preferences of the Cossack military fellows (*tovarystvo*) coordinated with the right and will of the hetman to command the Zaporozhian Host? What were the mechanisms used to coordinate these interests?

These and other related questions that provide insight into the declaration and realization of the right of the Cossack military fellows of a regiment to elect their own officers by a free vote will be the subject of this article.³

Legal Regulations and Political Pronouncements: Regarding the Free Election of Colonels of the Zaporozhian Host

The right to freely elect colonels – as well as the hetman, as a matter of fact – was one of the few cornerstones of the sociopolitical lexeme “ancient Cossack rights and liberties” that marked the concept of Cossack liberties and privileges, which the Cossacks defended so staunchly starting from the beginning of the sixteenth century.⁴ Accordingly, the stripping of Cossackdom of this right by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth government in accordance with the 1638 “Regulation on the Zaporozhian Host” (*Ordynatsiia Viis'ka Zaporoz'koho*) served as one of the main causes of the eruption of the Cossack uprising at the beginning of 1648. The successful progress of the uprising *de facto* removed all of the royal authority's restrictions in this sphere. However, the increased difficulty of the Zaporozhian Host's state functions, as well as a substantial strengthening of the hetman's authority during the years of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's hetmancy, objectively resulted in transforming even this, as underscored earlier, cornerstone of military democracy. The changes included the assumption by the hetman of the prerogatives of appointing and dismissing officers from their posts, primarily the office of colonel.⁵

During the hetmancy of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, opposition among the Cossack military fellows was not clearly articulated in the documents currently known to researchers. However, there unquestionably was opposition to these actions, as evidenced, for example, by the support enjoyed in their regiments by Matvii Hladkyi and Stepan Khmelets'kyi, who had been dismissed from their colonelcies by the hetman.⁶ In the face of an unfolding civil war in Ukraine during the hetmancy of his successor Ivan Vyhovs'kyi – when not only the fully legitimate in the eyes of the Hetmanate authorities Poltava Colonel Martyn Pushkar but also the Myrhorod Colonel Stepan Dovhal', elected in opposition to the hetman's protégé, and a number of other officers, whose legitimacy was questioned by the Hetmanate authorities (quite justifiably, it should be noted, given their failure to comply with the then existing election procedure), joined the opposition against the hetman – the problem of the legal authority to elect or dismiss colonels became exceptionally important. Moreover, it became one of perhaps the most painful and urgent issues in the internal political life of the Hetmanate at the time.

Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi's so-called New Articles of 1659, drafted in Pereiaslav in the course of restoring the Ukrainian-Russian alliance (broken by the Treaty of Hadiach that Ivan Vyhovs'kyi's government concluded with the Commonwealth), included the norm that colonels, as well as other officers, had to be elected not at the direction of the hetman but by the will of the Cossack military fellows: "and to elect colonels in the Host at the council from among those among them whom they preferred."⁷

It is worth noting that the Pereiaslav Articles of 1659 contained an array of prohibitions and regulations concerning the procedures of appointing and dismissing colonels of the Zaporozhian Host. In particular, they prohibited the election of candidates from other regiments to the post of colonel; henceforth a regiment could elect to the colonelcy only "whomever they prefer from their own regiment, and not elect [candidates] from other regiments as colonels."⁸ It was also forbidden to elect people of other faiths to the colonelcy (as well as to other *starshyna* offices): "In the Zaporozhian Host, henceforth, only Orthodox Christians may be high-ranking people, people of other faiths may not [hold such posts]."⁹

Newly baptized foreigners were also not permitted to hold *starshyna* posts. The justification for the first, as well as the second, requirement apparently stemmed from recent memories of the role of the former Socinian Iurii Nemyrych in the rupture of relations between the Zaporozhian Host and Moscow and the conclusion of the Treaty of Hadiach in 1658. However, the text of the treaty dealt with this in a more generalized way and, no less important, in a socially acceptable way: "because much chaos and infighting in the Host is initiated by the newly baptized, [and] the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Host are subjected to exactions and exploitation."¹⁰

In establishing the fact that important changes were made in the procedure of electing officers, particularly colonels, we cannot ignore who it was that initiated these changes and whom they benefited. In the assessment of the Ukrainian-Russian treaty of 1659, there is broad agreement in historiography regarding this document, which was forced on the government of Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi by the Russian side.¹¹ Aimed, first and foremost, at ensuring favorable conditions for controlling political processes in Ukraine, the Russian government sought to create a system of counterbalances to the authority of the hetman by strengthening the position of the colonels. The task of protecting colonels from the hetman's absolute power in the event of their dismissal appeared to be a matter of top priority. Under the articles of the 1659 agreement, a large number of officers who had a good track record of loyalty to the tsar were *de facto* removed from the jurisdiction of the hetman and, in addition, given immunity against being stripped of their powers without appropriate permission from Moscow. The hetman was

also prohibited from dismissing any colonel without approval for this of the council [General Military Council]: "the hetman may not dismiss colonels without the council."¹²

Having devoted so much attention to the procedure of electing colonels in the 1659 articles, subsequent agreements mention this prerogative very cursorily, mainly in the context of rewarding the colonels for their service with privileges and gifts of money and property.¹³

An interesting interpretation of the meaning of the "free election" of officers, including to regimental offices, is found in the instruction given by Hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine Pavlo Teteria to his envoys to the Warsaw Diet of 1664.¹⁴ The hetman's instruction did not explicitly deny the right of free elections of regimental and company officers. But to ensure that candidates for the senior officer posts "were people who were experienced in knightly matters," permission for electing a new colonel had to be given by the hetman, and for a captain by a colonel, respectively.¹⁵ Incidentally, even more interesting were Pavlo Teteria's proposals regarding the procedure of conducting the election of the hetman. With respect to this, the instruction stressed that "revolts break out regularly" in the Zaporozhian Host because of free elections, therefore, to avoid this problem in the future, the document proposed making the election of the hetman subject to a set standard, defining its limits by "general law [*pospolyte pravo*]." In particular, henceforth the hetman was to be elected not for "as long as the army likes him," as in the past, but to a fixed, legally defined term – until the next general Diet.¹⁶

In the years and decades that followed, the election of colonels did not become subject to legal regulation. At any rate, no sources attesting an interest in this matter on the part of the Hetmanate's political elite have survived. It was only at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in the course of drafting the articles of the Constitution of 1710, that the problem became the subject of public discussion and received a fairly clear and comprehensive legal determination.¹⁷

How important this issue was in the political life of the Hetmanate is evident from the fact that the authors of the 1710 Constitution dealt with it by including an article about the nature and procedure of appointing officers, and also about ways to prevent corrupt actions by the hetman in the exercise of his powers: "Because all the burdens, abuses, and extortions weighing down on the miserable people mostly have their origin in the greed for power of office buyers, who, without relying on their own merits but prompted by an insatiable appetite to secure military and civil offices for their private gain, corrupt and ensnare the Hetman's heart and thereby thrust their way, without a free vote and against law and equity, into the office of colonel and into other offices."¹⁸

In order to eliminate irregularities and prevent “office buyers” from holding *starshyna* offices, the drafters of the constitution resolved: “that His Excellency the Hetman must not be guided by any, even the largest, gifts and favors, and must not appoint anyone to the office of colonel or other military or civil office in return for a bribe, nor assign anyone arbitrarily to these positions, but that both military and civil officers, especially colonels, must always be elected by a free vote.”¹⁹

While securing the right of free election for the Cossack military fellows, the authors of the Constitution at the same time placed the process of the election/re-election process under the hetman’s control, reserving for the latter the right to sanction the appropriate actions: “but the election of these officers should not take place without the Hetman’s consent.”²⁰ In addition, the hetman retained the right to confirm the results of the elections (“and after the election, be confirmed by the Hetman’s authority”).²¹

As we know, however, the political development of the Hetmanate after the events of 1708–09 took a completely different turn than the one that the authors of the 1710 Constitution had hoped for. During the years of fundamental reforms launched in Ukraine by the government of Peter I, there were also fundamental changes in the sphere of personnel policy. In particular, the Russian government succeeded in limiting the hetman’s influence on the election of colonels and their removal from office, and also with respect to the accountability in general of the latter to their military commander, the hetman. To what extent this policy contradicted the interests of the Cossack *starshyna* and the broad Cossack masses of the Hetmanate, and in what the latter saw the advantages of freely elected officers over those that were “appointed by decree” is clear from the appeal of Hetman Apostol to Emperor Peter II in 1728 that we cited in the opening of this article.²² However, the question of the Russian government’s participation in the election of colonels in the Hetmanate includes a whole series of both legal actions and conscious violations of the law, which together fundamentally changed the basis of free elections. Therefore, I believe that this subject merits a separate discussion, not only in the sphere of legal declarations but also in the realm of real politics. I will return to it later.²³ In the meantime, I will concentrate on examining the practices that existed in the history of the Hetmanate in the second half of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth centuries.

The Will of the Community and the “Supreme Right” of the Hetman in the Election of Colonels: Balance of Interests in Political Practices

One of the typical models of the procedure for electing colonels that emerged at the beginning of the last quarter of the seventeenth century, and which clearly remained in force in subsequent decades, can be reconstructed on the basis of the universal issued on 22 July 1676 by Hetman Ivan Samoilovych to the volunteer Colonel Illia Novyts'kyi.

According to this document, the request for conducting elections of the colonel was made by a delegation from the Starodub regimental *starshyna*, which came especially for this reason to the hetman's residence. Responding to the request, Samoilovych not only gave permission to conduct the election but also selected and sent “a notable person from our side” (not named in the document) home with the Starodubites to monitor the entire procedure. In addition, the hetman ordered the volunteer colonel not to hurry leaving the Starodub regiment in accordance with the instruction received earlier, but to remain in Kister during the election in Starodub, until the Starodubites “elect a leader from amongst themselves and return to original order.”²⁴

Not wanting to show his disregard for Cossack rights and liberties in any way, the hetman undertook a whole series of symbolic actions. Thus while Novyts'kyi was the hetman government's officially authorized officer to the election of the Starodub colonel and would travel to Starodub through Kister, Samoilovych ordered that he should not appoint any of his people to accompany him and not allow any volunteers to go to Starodub, but only monitor the progress of the election from a distance and be prepared to intervene if an urgent need arose: “watch what is happening, what kind of order emerges among them, and what they do next.”²⁵

The role of the hetman was much more active in the election of the colonel of the Pryluky regiment, which, significantly, took place at the hetman's residence in April 1678. In accordance with the hetman's universal, the electors who arrived in Baturyn – the regimental officers and “several fellows” – with the hetman's “permission ... with their consenting votes proclaimed Fedir Movchan the colonel and placed him above themselves,” and, for his part, the hetman confirmed the election of Movchan “in all respects in that office ... knowing of the existence in the Zaporozhian Host of this deserving and capable man, suited to knightly matters.”²⁶ Although, considering where the election was held, it is logical to assume that the role of the hetman's government in approving the decision was actually much more important than attested by the document quoted above.

The important role of the hetman in the election of colonels on an alternative basis is indicated in the materials dealing with the election of a colonel in the Pereiaslav regiment in 1690, during Ivan Mazepa's first years in the office of hetman. It so happened that the historical sources on the Pereiaslav election in 1690 have preserved perhaps the greatest amount of information on this event in the entire history of the Hetmanate. An analysis of this information allows us to shed light on the actual procedure of electing colonels, or at any rate, in the version that existed at the initial stage of the hetmancy of Ivan Mazepa. The American historian George Gajecy, who is well-known in Ukraine, generally views the document about the 1690 election as one that "demonstrated unequivocally that in the seventeenth century at least, the Cossacks themselves elected their colonels," and, on the other hand, "rejects to some extent the views of several researchers who claimed that the authority was transferred in an atmosphere of chaos, bribery, and corruption."²⁷

It is difficult to say how appropriate it is to extrapolate the characteristics of the 1690 Pereiaslav election to the realities of the Hetmanate as a whole, even if we confine them to the second half of the seventeenth century. Most likely, this was in a sense a model case, which was made possible by a concatenation of a whole series of circumstances. Under different circumstances, this exemplary model was obviously subject to deformation.

Thus Ivan Mazepa, having removed Leontii Polubotok from power for the second and last time in 1690, rather than single-handedly appointing his successor, appointed a temporary senior officer to administer the regiment "to maintain order and implement various precautions,"²⁸ and issued an order to organize the election "in accordance with the ancient rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host."

First, a candidate was nominated for the vacant office at the general meeting of the military fellows of the regiment. From indirect accounts about this stage in the election process, we can assume that the overwhelming majority, and perhaps even all of those who took part in this preliminary procedure, expressed themselves in favor of having the colonel's baton (*pernach*) go to the notable military fellow Ivan Lysenko. He had already served as the Pereiaslav colonel from the second half of 1677 to the middle of 1679, and, as the materials on the vote of the representatives of Pereiaslav city community suggest, was remembered, at least by the townspeople of the regimental center, in a positive light, inasmuch as it was during his tenure that "the city grew, and after him was brought to ruin by later colonels."²⁹

Apparently, it was this circumstance that was decisive in the choice of both the residents of the regimental center and the rest of the regiment members. The

results of the preliminary election are not reflected in the source to the full extent; there are only individual mentions of them. In particular, the representatives of Voronkiv, Helmiativ, Kropyvna, Bubnove, Baryshivka, and Berezan companies, as well as the notable military fellow Ivan Momot, mention their choice during this stage of the election. Interestingly, they all point to the candidacy of Ivan Lysenko as having the support of the Host: "they gave their vote to *pan* Lysenko: thus, we all being in the Host, the whole Host spoke."³⁰

Although the document contains nothing about any other candidate in the preliminary election, at the next stage of the election, now in the presence of the representatives of the hetman's government and the authorized representatives of the companies and regimental authorities, an alternative candidate appears. This candidate is Kostiantyn Mokiievs'kyi, a nobleman from Right-Bank Ukraine and, notably, a relative of Hetman Mazepa, who apparently had not previously held any *starshyna* posts in the Zaporozhian Host. Thus, for example, when Hetman Mazepa later had to present his protégé to official Moscow, the most he could say about the merits of this notable military fellow was to mention the heroic service in the Cossack Host of Kostiantyn Mokiievs'kyi's father and grandfather.³¹

Given Mokiievs'kyi's kinship with the hetman and the lack of any mention of him at the preliminary stage of the election, we can assume that his appearance among the candidates was initiated by the hetman himself. The only thing that remains a mystery in this story is the motivation behind his nomination. If Mazepa sincerely sought to have Mokiievs'kyi elected to the Pereiaslav colonelcy, why did he temporarily hand the levers of power over the regiment to Lysenko? The only explanation can be the assumption that the candidate demonstrated a belated desire to contend for the colonel's baton, which the hetman's government supported in this dilatory manner.

The final election took place in Pereiaslav on 25 June 1690 with the participation of the representatives of the hetman's government – military fellows Zakharii Shyikevych (former general chancellor in Ivan Briukhovets'kyi's government, sentenced to exile in Siberia at the end of 1665³²), Iakiv Zhurakivs'kyi (former colonel of the Nizhyn regiment in 1678–85), and Nizhyn Captain Vasyl' Humens'kyi (Ihumens'kyi).

The electors consisted of officers of the Pereiaslav regiment, notable military of the regiment fellows (*znachni viis'kovi tovaryshi polku*), captains and representatives of the Cossack fellows from every company in the Pereiaslav regiment, and also the authorized representatives of the local city government.³³ But while all the companies of the regiment had their representatives at the election, this right was granted only to the community of the regimental center from among

all the city communities. The companies were represented by captains (or their substitutes) and elect Cossacks (*vyborni kozaky*), usually twenty men from each company. The exceptions were the regimental companies, represented by forty or thirty Cossacks, and for some reason also the Baryshivka company, whose delegation to Pereiaslav numbered as many as seventy persons. As we can see from the document, some companies were represented by only eight to ten Cossacks. But regardless of the difference in size of the representations of the various companies, in the final count, each company had the right to cast only one vote for one candidate or another.³⁴

After the reading of the “hetman’s important proclamation” to the electors, the captains consulted with the electors from their companies in the street, and after that, the electors, “sitting in the middle of the courtyard,” proceeded to vote. The count of the votes was entrusted to the regimental aide-de-camp (*osavul*; the aides-de-camp usually served as managers at military councils: general aides-de-camp served in this capacity at the general councils, and regimental aides-de-camp did so at regimental councils).³⁵

According to the results of the Pereiaslav vote, those who voted in favor of Lysenko’s candidacy included the regimental quartermaster and the regimental judge, three notable fellows, the representatives of fifteen companies, and the authorized elector from the Pereiaslav city administration. Mokiievs'kyi received the vote of three regimental officers – regimental chancellor Sava Stefanovych, the regimental aide-de-camp and the regimental flag-bearer (both not identified by name), and also the town *otaman* of Pereiaslav. The hetman government’s nominee was also supported by Ias' Hulachenko (obviously a native, like Mokiievs'kyi, of Right-Bank Ukraine, he was the son of the general quartermaster in the government of Petro Doroshenko, Ivan Hulak, who by then had moved to Left-Bank Ukraine).

The electors of Mokiievs'kyi, who represented the military fellows of the regiment’s companies, also present a very interesting picture. Mokiievs'kyi received the votes of the representatives of two companies (of the seventeen in the regiment), namely, the Kropyvna and Baryshpil [Boryspil] companies, even though, as the document pointed out, at the preliminary stage of the election, “in the Host,” both the captain and the whole Baryshpil’ company, “had cast their vote for *pan* Lysenko.”³⁶

If we apply a purely mathematical approach, Lysenko won twenty-one to seven. His victory was especially impressive in the regiment’s companies. However, among the regimental *starshyna*, his standing proved weaker than that of his competitor. Mokiievs'kyi received the votes of four representatives of the regimental *starshyna*, while Lysenko succeeded in winning the support of only two of them.

It is not difficult to guess on whose side Hetman Mazepa was. But the victory of the former Pereiaslav colonel was fairly decisive, and this time Mazepa did not oppose the will of the community, and so he issued Lysenko the decree for his colonelcy, and handed him the regimental banner, baton, seal, and kettledrums.

The Pereiaslav election described above obviously represented an exemplary model of the election of a colonel, in which the will of the regiment's military fellows was taken maximally into consideration, and all the necessary conditions were created for expressing this will. In practice, however, the procedure for electing colonels was not infrequently breached, primarily by the hetmans, who wanted to play a more active role in the elections and not be hostage to the sympathies of the local *starshyna* and local military fellows. In particular, the earlier rotation of the colonel's office in Pereiaslav, which had taken place two years earlier, at the end of 1688, had not come anywhere close to this kind of exemplarity in the functioning of military democracy. At that time, in December 1688, after dismissing the opposition-minded Rodion Dmytrashko-Raicha, Ivan Mazepa exercised his authority to appoint to the colonelcy Iakym Holovchenko – a native of Right-Bank Ukraine and the former Cherkasy colonel and general aide-de-camp in the government of the Right-Bank Hetman Petro Doroshenko. In the report sent to Moscow, Hetman Mazepa described the change of leadership in the Pereiaslav regiment as follows: "summoning to Baturyn the members of the Pereiaslav regiment and announcing to them the decree of Your Imperial Majesty, I confirmed Colonel Iakym Holovchenko, an old-time Pereiaslav Cossack, who this past summer served as the acting colonel on my orders, as their full colonel."³⁷ In other words, after removing Dmytrashko-Raicha from the colonel's office in the regiment, the hetman in the summer of 1688 exercised his authority to appoint as acting colonel of the Pereiaslav regiment a former Right-Bank officer, whom he knew well from his service in the entourage of Hetman Doroshenko. Half a year later, he confirmed him as full colonel, summoning for this purpose the "Pereiaslav regiment members" (most likely, the regimental *starshyna*, captains, and notable military fellows) to the hetman's residence, but, as we see from the text of the letter, not to elect a colonel, but only to present to them their new leader, who had already been confirmed by the tsar's decree.

Traditionally, the role of the local *starshyna*, military fellows, and commoners in the process of electing a colonel was more active in the southern regiments, above all, in the Poltava regiment. A collective complaint submitted to Hetman Ivan Skoropads'kyi in September 1714 by the *starshyna*, military fellows, and townspeople of the Poltava regiment offers a description of the 1710 election in Poltava, when Ivan Levenets', who had discredited himself by his irresolute actions

during the siege of Poltava by Swedish forces, was replaced by the captain of the Poltava town company Ivan Cherniak.

With the permission of Hetman Skoropads'kyi, a council was convened in Poltava – “having assembled the *starshyna* and notable military fellows from the whole regiment, the Poltava townspeople, and people from the *volost*” – and was attended by the general standard-bearer, Iakiv Lyzohub, as the representative of the hetman’s government. At this council, “universally and amicably by consenting votes ... [they] elected their colonel *pan* Ivan Cherniak to this post.”³⁸ The next important stage in the election of the colonel was the legitimization of his authority, which was realized by means of “the presentation of the regalia to the colonel by your noble self, our gracious lord,” and therefore, “all of us, those who agreed to be with him, with a single hand swore loyalty to His Holy Majesty the tsar.”³⁹

The rotation in the office of colonel in Nizhyn in 1695 could also have been affected only by means of a direct appointment by the hetman, when Ivan Mazepa appointed his above-mentioned nephew Ivan Obydovs'kyi “at a young age” to the vacant colonelcy after the death of Stepan Zabyla.⁴⁰ According to Oleksander Ohloblyn, Obydovs'kyi was born in 1676, making him only nineteen years old when he took office. He had not performed any “services” in the Nizhyn regiment that could have allowed him to recommend himself in any way to the regiment. The candidate’s only service distinction at the time was that he had been awarded the title of master of the table (*stol'nyk*) by the tsarist government in 1689, when he was only ... thirteen years old, so that his merits, except for his birth in the family of the hetman’s sister, were quite dubious.⁴¹

However, the letter that Hetman Mazepa wrote to Tsar Peter I in May 1698, which was found by Mykola Petrovs'kyi in the collections of the Little Russian Department (*Malorossiiskii prikaz*), speaks of the election of Obydovs'kyi “at a young age” to full colonel in Nizhyn at exactly the time when this letter was written – the spring of 1698.⁴² In other words, Mazepa may have used the following technology of installing his candidate in the colonelcy at the end of the 1690s: first, the master of the table was appointed acting colonel by the hetman’s authority, and then, a few years later, his “election” to the office of colonel was organized.

Thus, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, no one in the Hetmanate had any illusions about who in fact had the decisive voice in elections to regimental offices. Although, for example, the *Eyewitness Chronicle*, in describing the causes of the anti-hetman uprising that broke out in mid-July of 1666 in the Pereiaslav regiment, as a result of which the first to lose his life at the hands of the rebels was Pereiaslav Colonel Danylo Iermolaenko, notes that the “Pereiaslav

Cossacks did not like [him], because he had been imposed on them,”⁴³ that is, he had not been elected by the Cossack military fellows but had been sent to them by Hetman Briukhovets'kyi. Now, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, there is information from an anonymous author about a banquet held by the senior Cossack *starshyna* with boyar Boris Sheremetev on the occasion of the Cossack army's release from the Baltic campaign of 1700–01. In response to the tsarist nobleman's half-joking comment to the Poltava colonel about his desire to ask the tsar to be appointed to the colonelcy in the Poltava regiment, while the Poltava colonel transferred to the Nizhyn colonelcy left vacant after the death of Obydovs'kyi (the colonelcy in Poltava at the time was still held by Ivan Iskra⁴⁴), the latter said the following: “We have a sovereign (*vlastitel'*) in Baturyn, he will give it to whomever he wants.”⁴⁵

Ivan Iskra's remark is interesting in that, as has already been noted, the military fellows and *starshyna* of the Poltava regiment maintained the privilege of electing their regimental leaders longer than any other regiment in the Hetmanate. Yet another of the first students of the history of the Poltava region in the early modern period, Oleksandr Lazarevs'kyi, observed that the Poltava regiment, by virtue of a number of factors – proximity to the Zaporozhian Sich (“And the Zaporozhians and the Poltavites live together amicably, like husband and wife”⁴⁶), the special aspects of a steppe economy, and so forth – “was an exception to the rest of Little Russia, where, starting from the end of the seventeenth century, not only the peasants but also the Cossacks became almost fully dependent on the *starshyna*, which, even though it was regarded as elective, *de facto* represented the hetman's officials.”⁴⁷ In the Poltava region, on the other hand, at least until the end of the seventeenth century, the election of the colonel actually did depend on the will of the military fellows, who, as the historian claimed, were always led by a small group of wealthy Cossacks, who knew how to hold their sway over the rest of the regiment members.⁴⁸

To be sure, the Poltava regiment also experienced some exceptions to the tradition of freely electing their colonel in the second half of the seventeenth century. In particular, in the second half of 1663, Hetman Briukhovets'kyi, who had only recently acquired the hetman's mace at the famous “black” council (*chorna rada*, council of common Cossacks) in Nizhyn, appointed the Zaporozhian Sava Fedorovych Omelnyts'kyi as a replacement for Poltava Colonel Demian Hudzhol. And only two years later, the latter was replaced by Hryhorii Vytiazenko, who had previously served as general standard-bearer in the Briukhovets'kyi administration. Notably, in both Omelnyts'kyi and Vytiazenko's cases, it is safe to say that we are not talking about the election of the colonel by the Poltava *starshyna* and military fellows but about an appointment by the hetman's authority. While we

can perhaps attribute the exceptional circumstances of the appointment in 1663 to the force-majeure nature of the black-council perturbations,⁴⁹ it is much more difficult to understand the passivity of the Poltavites two years later with respect to the appointment of the general standard-bearer to the Poltava colonelcy. The fact that the 1665 rotation in office was indeed affected by the hetman's appointment of the colonel is confirmed by the collective complaint submitted the very next year by the Poltavites to Hetman Briukhovets'kyi on account of the "intolerable wrongs and abuses" to which the tsarist voivode Bohdan Khytrovo subjected them. In this complaint, the authors, recalling the voivode's insults to their colonel, noted that the latter had been given them "by your kindness and grace."⁵⁰

However, after the tragic end of the Briukhovets'kyi hetmancy, the Poltavites regained their regiment's exceptional status, whereby the change of government took place by the authority of the local *starshyna* and military fellows. Or it occurred through the manipulation of the will of the latter – not by Baturyn but by Poltava. At the same time, however, the tendency of the center of decision-making regarding personnel changes in the regiment to shift from Poltava to Baturyn was increasingly evident.

Thus, for example, when news reached Poltava at the beginning of June 1668 about the killing of Hetman Briukhovets'kyi on Serbyn field, near Dykanka, the Poltava military fellows not only stripped Vytiazenko of his colonel's baton, but he and the regimental aide-de-camp Obidenko were "chained to cannons and soon brutally beaten to death, and their houses were sacked."⁵¹ In place of the murdered Hryhorii Vytiazenko, the Poltavites again elected themselves a colonel "with free votes" (their choice fell on the "good, humble, pious, and simple-hearted" Demian Hudzhol).⁵² The will of the military fellows was also decisive in Poltava regimental elections in 1669, 1670, and probably 1672, 1674, 1675, 1676, and 1679.

When Prokop Levenets' ousted Pavlo Hertsyk from the colonelcy in 1677 and assumed the colonel's office in the Poltava regiment for the second time, the Ukrainian historian Oleksandr Lazarevs'kyi saw in this rotation the hand of, first and foremost, Samoilovych, for whom it was important to have an experienced commander heading the regiment, especially during the Chyhyryn campaigns of 1677–78.⁵³ When two years later, despite the valor of Levenets' in the Chyhyryn campaigns, the Poltava *starshyna* (headed by the former Colonels Fedir Zhuchenko and Pavlo Hertsyk) yet again organized a conspiracy against the acting colonel and arranged for a collective complaint to be submitted to Samoilovych accusing their leader of "threatening the life of notable persons and defaming them," the hetman publicly took the side of Levenets', and in his letter to the Poltavites reminded them of the colonel's heroic deeds, including

during the recent war with the Turks. However, it is interesting to note that Samoilovych's arguments failed to make the appropriate impression on the Poltava *starshyna* and military fellows, and in June 1679 Levenets' was forced to give up the colonelcy in favor of Fedir Zhuchenko.⁵⁴

The incident in 1679 was apparently the last example of such disregard by the regiment members for the opinion of their hetman. At least, General Judge Vasyl' Kochubei, commenting on Hertsyk's return to the office of colonel four years later (during the hetmancy of Ivan Samoilovych, Hertsyk was twice elected colonel – in 1675 and 1683 – but from the context of Kochubei's report, “after Cherniak ... [he] became the colonel,” suggests that he was referring to 1684⁵⁵), drew attention to the fact that the candidate was less concerned about the opinion of the regiment than about paving a path to power for himself by bribing Hetman Samoilovych, one of his influential sons, and his nephew, Hadiach Colonel Mykhailo Samoilovych: “That *pan* Hertsyk became the colonel for the second time after Cherniak by making large payments to the former hetman himself and to his son, and with the help of the Hadiach colonel.”⁵⁶

Naturally, this information needs to be taken with a grain of salt, because Kochubei's comments are in essence a denunciation, with all the exaggerations and manipulations inherent in the genre. Consequently, the arguments cited by Kochubei were meant primarily to cast a shadow on the father-in-law of his opponent, Pavlo Hertsyk. But, aside from that, “large payments” as a compelling argument in the election of a colonel were apparently a rather commonplace part of this political event.

If he did not agree with the will of the regiment regarding the election of a new colonel, the hetman could refuse to give permission for a new election, at least until additional circumstances in the matter were established. In the case of the attempts of the opponents of Prokop Levenets' to remove him from the colonelcy, Samoilovych acted in the following manner: the hetman called on the Poltava opposition to wait until the Holy Resurrection of Christ and then come together with Levenets' to Baturyn and present their arguments, assuring them that if the presented proof of guilt was convincing, he was prepared to punish his own father, let alone the Poltava colonel or anyone else.⁵⁷

However, when the Poltava regimental *starshyna* complained again in 1702 to Hetman Mazepa about the actions of their colonel, Ivan Levenets', who allegedly did not pay heed to the opinions of the *starshyna* and even secretly communicated with the Tatars, the latter was removed from the colonelcy by order of the hetman, and leadership of the regiment was temporarily entrusted to the General Standard-Bearer Mykhailo Hamaliia, who, incidentally, held the Poltava colonelcy for almost two years.⁵⁸

The Role of the Regimental *Starshyna* in Electing Colonels and Stripping Them of the Colonel's Baton

Approximately ten years after the incident in the Poltava regiment described above, in 1714, a part of the Poltava regimental *starshyna* again attempted to topple the serving colonel, Ivan Cherniak, and replace him with Vasyl' Vasyl'ovych Kochubei, the grandson of the former Poltava Colonel Fedir Zhuchenko and son of the General Judge Vasyl' Kochubei, who had been executed by Hetman Mazepa.

The conspiracy in 1714 was headed by the Poltava regimental Judge Petro Kovan'ka, who brought into this plot the regimental chancellor Ivan Zalies'kyi, who, like Vasyl' Vasyl'ovych Kochubei, was the grandson of Fedir Zhuchenko, and thus would have had the opportunity to substantially strengthen his position under the colonelcy of his close relative, who, moreover, would be beholden to him for his rise to this office. If there is truth to the words of Petro Kovan'ka's opponents (who sided with the serving colonel and on 9 September 1714 submitted a collective appeal to Hetman Ivan Skoropads'kyi), in seeking to change the leadership of the Poltava regiment, the Poltava regimental judge was pursuing, first and foremost, his own interests – to save his daughter, whom he was obliged to sentence to death in accordance with the norms of the Lithuanian Statute for giving birth outside of marriage to three children with her cousin and murdering them, thus being “impure,” who, living in sin, “became pregnant and then deliberately killed the fetus.”⁵⁹

The technology of changing leaders that Kovan'ka tried to apply consisted in the following approach. In Poltava, the conspirators “secretly” drafted a “petition or report” about Colonel Cherniak's abuse of power, under which “the names of some military fellows ... were signed without their knowledge.” Kovan'ka and Zalies'kyi traveled with this petition to the hetman in Hlukhiv “to ask that their petition be sent to the monarch's court in an effort to obtain the Poltava colonelcy for Kochubei.” At the same time, the candidate for this regimental office himself left for Kyiv, presumably to meet with representatives of the Russian government in Ukraine, most likely with the Kyiv Governor-General Prince Dmitrii Golitsyn.⁶⁰

Given the reputation of the candidate's father and the tsar's affection for this senior Cossack officer who died opposing Hetman Mazepa and attempted in vain to inform the Russian authorities of the latter's true intentions, the younger Kochubei had a good chance of obtaining the desired result from the Russian government. Therefore, the Poltava regimental *starshyna*, and, above all, Colonel Cherniak himself, were quite worried by this prospect and tried to convince the hetman that the accusations against the Poltava leader were unfounded and, even

more important, that the Poltava community did not want the young Kochubei as their colonel not only because of his age – “who is still a young child” and “above all, very arrogant.” The Poltavites were also outraged by the fact that “the two of them, against our will, want ... to enslave all the people, which we, the regimental *starshyna*, as well the captains and the military fellows, the townspeople, and all the common people find objectionable.”⁶¹

The defenders of Ivan Cherniak did not know the contents of the charges brought against him. So, in their response they denied the possibility of any illegal actions by their leader and asserted that their colonel was in no sense suspicious, inasmuch as the Cherniak family had not disgraced itself by participation in any kind of “vile betrayal” since ancient times. And Kovan'ka and Zalties'kyi were unable to accuse the colonel of something that could be interpreted as oppressing the people.⁶² The only thing they could think of in that context was the colonel's request for “assistance” during the construction of his own building “from regiment members of some towns in bringing in wood from the forest.” This, however, in the opinion of the authors of the petition did not in any way cast a shadow on the reputation of the officer, since “we all already know that no one in authority does without this obligation whereby they get help in construction from the regiment.”⁶³ Therefore, the Poltavites asked the hetman not to believe the words of the regimental judge and the regimental chancellor, take into account the uniform support for Ivan Cherniak from the whole *starshyna*, military fellows, and commoners of the regiment, and not send the complaint against the head of the regiment to the imperial court until they, together with the colonel, sorted out things in a face-to-face meeting with the petitioners. In conclusion, the petition posed the rhetorical question: “If the two of them, plotters, are believed, despite all our information, then are we unfortunates unworthy of earning for ourselves and the whole regiment your gracious lordship's favor so that the two of them were believed and we were not.”⁶⁴

The appeal, which was undoubtedly initiated by Cherniak, does not bear his signature, of course; instead, we see under it the signatures of all the regimental officers loyal to the regimental authorities: Quartermaster Klym Nashchyn's'kyi, Aides-de-Camp Vasyl' Sukhyi and Hryhorii Buts'kyi, acting Judge Stefan Mizin, Flag-Bearer Pavlo Harasymovych, as well as the artillery aide-de-camp and the regimental flag-bearer, the Poltava town *otaman* (lieutenant) with his military fellows, the *kurin'* (detachment) *otamans* of the Poltava regiment companies with their military fellows, or specifically with a particular military fellow, and the captains of the Stari Sanzhary, Reshetylivka, Bilyky, Novi Sanzhary, and Kobeliaky companies with their respective military fellows. The regiment's commoners (*pospil'stvo*) were represented by the Poltava reeve (*viit*) and city mayors (*burm-*

istry), and also by the master craftsmen of the tailors', butchers', shoemakers', iron-smiths', weavers', potters', and coopers' guilds. What strikes the eye is the absence from the appeal of the voices of the representatives of a number of companies of the Poltava regiment. However, as we see from the document, this was not due to a show of their attitude to the action or their support for the actions of Kovan'ka and Zalies'kyi, but only to the fact that the signatories were trying to submit their petition to Hlukhiv as quickly as possible, and that meant that "others had not arrived in time."⁶⁵ At least, that is what the authors of the petition told the hetman government.

Owing to a lack of the necessary evidence in sources, it is difficult to determine what had prevented Kovan'ka and his allies from realizing their plan – whether it was active opposition from the Poltava *starshyna*, or the position of the hetman, or something else – but Kochubei had to wait another decade and a half to be elected colonel. It is significant, however, that even though at the time that this complaint was submitted, Stefan Mizin was already listed as the "acting Poltava judge," Petro Kovan'ka, despite the failure of his plan, remained the judge in Poltava until 1718, perhaps even up to his death, since in 1719 the Poltava regimental roster (*komput*) listed the post as vacant, meaning that there had been no new election. Whereas after Vasyl' Kochubei ascended to the Poltava colonelcy, in the 1732 roster we see the descendants of the regimental judge among the Poltava *starshyna*, namely: Herasym Kovan'ka is listed as the captain of the Poltava regiment's company that controls a part of the village of Rybtsi and Anton Kovan'ka appears as "artillery flag-bearer."⁶⁶ We do not know the fate of the other conspirator, Ivan Zalies'kyi (characterized in the collective appeal as "completely unsuited to chancellery work").⁶⁷ But he ultimately lost the office of chancellor in Poltava. At any rate, under 1715, Mykhailo Slabchenko lists someone named Levko Levkovich as the chancellor of the Poltava regiment, and the 1719 roster names Hryhorii Bohaievs'kyi as the regimental chancellor.⁶⁸ This document also mentions Ivan Zalies'kyi, but as without an office, calling him a "noted fellow" and owner of 42 "tax-paying" (*tiahli*) and "pedestrian" (*pishi*) peasants in the village of Ivashky, 17 and 15, respectively, in the village of Tiahamyk, and 8 and 20 of each in the village of Fedorovtsi.⁶⁹ The former regimental chancellor did not live long enough to realize his plan to pass the colonel's baton to his close relative; in 1732 census records, Zalies'kyi's properties are listed as having passed to Colonel Kochubei "by inheritance from Ivan Zalies'kyi," or as having become the property of the city administration.⁷⁰

The efforts of the Lubny regimental *starshyna* aimed at the re-election of Colonel Andrii Markovych a few years later, in 1718, ended just as unsuccessfully. A close relative of Hetman Skoropads'kyi, Markovych, having obtained the office

in Lubny "by the grace of the monarch" and having the support of the hetman, acted as the absolute master of the regiment, ousting the regimental *starshyna* in short order from participation in the administration of the regiment, arbitrarily disposing of land resources, and so forth. When the *starshyna* decided to protest against this, Markovych, learning of their intention, "reported the above-mentioned *starshyna* to the hetman, accusing them of being rebels; [they were] called back from service in the campaign and placed under strong guard by Fedir Protasiev, then mercilessly beaten with wooden bats, their properties confiscated, their estates ravaged."⁷¹

Under the year 1719, sources record an attempt by the Pryluky regimental *starshyna* to topple the authority of their Colonel Hnat Halahan. As is evident from the complaint that he himself submitted to Hetman Skoropads'kyi, the conspiracy was headed by the Pryluky regiment's Aides-de-Camp Mykhailo Movchan and Hryhorii Panchenko, who were joined by Captain Hryhorii Storozhenko of the Ichnia company and Captain Ivan Storozhenko of the Ivanytsia company. As we can see from the materials of the case, the underlying cause of the conflict was the rivalry between the local Pryluky *starshyna* clans and the Zaporizhzhia native Hnat Halahan, who had been appointed by order of Peter I.⁷² It bears remembering that Ivan Storozhenko, obviously the father of the captains of the Ichnia and Ivanytsia companies, held the office of the Pryluky colonel from the end of the 1680s to the beginning of the 1690s, and the father of the first aide-de-camp, Mykhailo Movchan, also served in the administration of the predecessor of Ivan Storozhenko, Lazar Horlenko, as the regimental aide-de-camp, and for a time even held the Pryluky regimental office (possibly as acting colonel).⁷³ The name of the second aide-de-camp, Hryhorii Panchenko, was sometimes written as "Pankevych," under which name there are mentions of Mykhailo, the Chornobyl colonel who died in the battle of Loiev in July 1649, and Matvii, colonel of the Irkliiv regiment in 1658–63 who was exiled to Siberia in the fall of 1663 by Hetman Briukhovets'kyi for supporting Iakym Somko and brought back to his native land by his successor in 1670.⁷⁴

The abovenamed officers were outraged by the lack of respect shown them by Halahan. In particular, in July 1719, they complained to the hetman that the colonel "unjustly defamed them, his petitioners," calling them "traitors, peasants, and unfit for office." "He beat [the regimental aide-de-camp Hryhorii Panchenko] with the butt end of his gun last year near Tsaritsyn." "He ordered Captains Hryhorii and Ivan Storozhenko to be violently driven out in disgrace from his house," and in so doing, the colonel's servants "robbed them of their coats (*kuntushi*)." On another occasion, "they pulled [the Ivanytsia company

captain, Ivan Storozhenko] by his hair in his own house, and splashed his face with soup.” The colonel illegally “took possession” of Hryhorii Panchenko’s hay meadow, located beyond the Ruda River, and as to “the steppe belonging from long time ago to all the Pryluky residents, which he had taken away from the deceased colonel of Nizhyn, Zhurakovs'kyi,” Halahan “seized all of it, not allowing people to mow hay there.”⁷⁵

In addition, as is evidenced by the appeal, the authors were concerned that by calling them “traitors, peasants, and unfit for office,” the colonel was trying to force them with his abuse “to abandon their offices of their own volition, and to replace them . . . with his relatives and Zaporozhians.”⁷⁶ By mentioning the Zaporozhians, the petitioners moved the matter of Hnat Halahan out of the category of private insults to the regimental and company *starshyna* and into the realm of treason, inasmuch as after the Zaporozhian Sich took the side of Charles XII in the spring of 1709, the Zaporozhians were prohibited by order of Peter I from returning to the territory of the Hetmanate without the permission of the tsarist government. The tsar’s resident in the hetman’s administration had a special directive regarding this.⁷⁷ Aware of this, the authors of the appeal accused the Pryluky colonel of allegedly deliberately ignoring the orders of the tsarist government and “committing various violations, receiving and keeping with him Cossacks from the Zaporozhian Sich and not reporting them to Your Excellency.” What is more, the petitioners alleged that Halahan had placed these same Zaporozhians “by his own will as otamans in towns and villages of his regiment, and some he kept with him, getting their hopes up waiting for offices at some future time.” Specifically, the regimental and company officers were afraid that Halahan, having forced them to resign, would appoint Zaporozhians to the offices of regimental aides-de-camp and captains.⁷⁸

The Pryluky colonel, in his response addressed to Hetman Skoropads'kyi, complained that owing to “their unjust denunciations and verbal defamation, considerable trouble has been created and substantial dishonor”; he strongly denied all the accusations brought against him, claiming that the reason the regimental *starshyna* was slandering his good name lay in nothing more than attempts “to bring down your anger as the military commander on me and remove me from the office of colonel, and all because at the time of Mazepa’s treason, I demonstrated loyalty to Your Imperial Majesty unlike other Pryluky regiment members.”⁷⁹ In addition, Halahan asked that after completing the investigation of the case involving the false accusations against him, the hetman punish his opponents not only by removing them from their offices but also with actions that would result in injury to their health.⁸⁰

Broadly speaking, it is worth noting that dismissal from office in the political culture of the Hetmanate was perceived as more than just the loss of a certain amount of an official's credibility among the military fellows or a higher authority vested with the appropriate powers. In the court case of the Novhorod-Siversk captain, Fedir Lisov's'kyi, we come across an interesting passage about him stripping one of the company's *kurin'* otamans, named Terekh, of power. The latter, in appealing this action to the Starodub colonel, qualified it as nothing short of "the obliteration of his long-standing military service."⁸¹ Thus it is logical to assume that precisely this perception of the stripping of office also existed on the much higher level of colonel.

Bribery as an Argument in the Election Process

There have already been several mentions above of "large payments" and of attempts to "curry favor with and pay off Cossacks" as decisive arguments in the election of colonels. How widespread the practice of paying bribes to the hetman for a regimental office in the last third of the seventeenth century can be seen from the denunciation of Hetman Ivan Samoilovych by the *starshyna* in 1687 (although, of course, the specifics of the genre of such documents needs to be taken into account). In particular, the *starshyna* accused the military commander of the fact that it was precisely "for the office of colonel" that he demanded "large bribes, thereby causing people suffering."⁸² Admittedly, we learn from the following lines in the denunciation that the office of the general judge had also been vacant for a long period of time ("for four years now"), because Samoilovych "wants that judgeship to be bought for a large amount of money."⁸³

That bribery in the appointments to regimental offices also flourished during the hetmancy of Ivan Mazepa was spelled out by General Judge Vasyl' Kochubei in his denunciation of the hetman in 1708:

In past years, whenever there was a change of colonels for any reason, or the colonel died, they elected a person of their choice to that office with free votes, informing the hetman; it was announced in articles at councils that colonels should be elected with free votes by amicable agreement, and expert and disgraceful bribery was unheard of; whereas now he takes large bribes for the office of colonel, regardless of the fitness of a fellow for that office; and if he does not have enough money, he will not merit acceptance, but those will merit it who have the devil knows how much money and have enough to give him plenty [of it].⁸⁴

Historians cite as perhaps the most telling example of a colonelcy being obtained specifically through bribery rather than because of distinguished service in the Cossack Host and the respect of the military fellowship the case of the Lubny regimental Aide-de-Camp Leontii Svichka. Svichka obtained the regimental office of colonel in 1688, even though, in the historians' opinion, "he had no qualifications for this other than great wealth."⁸⁵ Admittedly, Oleksandr Lazarevs'kyi, although he was the first to introduce the subject of bribery as probably the way in which Svichka obtained his office – "Svichka was a moneyed man, and Mazepa loved money"⁸⁶ – provided no evidence of bribes being paid owing to a lack of relevant documents.

Whereas the testament of the widow of Hadiach Colonel Mykhailo Borukhovych records a similar case of a candidate using monetary enticements for the hetman to obtain a regimental office. In her will, the colonel's widow mentions an attempt by one of her sons, after the death of his father in 1704, to take up the vacant office and his request to be granted "a thousand ducats and as many hundred minted (*byti*) thalers from the total undistributed treasury" to be paid to Hetman Mazepa. Although on this occasion the bribery did not have the desired result and the colonelcy in Hadiach was not taken up by her son but by a close relative of Mazepa, Stepan Troshchyns'kyi (the hetman's nephew), Borukhovych Junior at least succeeded in getting confirmation from the hetman of his right to possess all the estates that had belonged to his father.⁸⁷ In the decree of protection (*oboronnyi universal*) issued on 10 November 1704 to the family of the deceased colonel, the hetman noted:

as during the life of the deceased *pan* Mykhailo Borukhovych, the Hadiach colonel, his whole house was covered by our protection ... so now after his death, we place this same house and Mykhailo Borukhovych's widowed wife *pani* (lady) Elena Ivanovna, with her sons, son-in-law and all their relatives under our special protection ... protecting all their possessions from people, [holding them] esteemed and respected and protecting them from trials, regimental and others, because even if anybody has any claims against them, nobody may take them to regimental or any other court.⁸⁸

There is also a reference to a gift of a thousand thalers to the hetman in the case concerning the retention of the estates of the deceased Starodub Colonel Mykhailo Myklashevs'kyi by Anna Myklashevs'ka-Samoilovych-Shvaikovs'ka in 1706. Immediately after burying her husband, who had died on a battlefield in the Northern War, Anna Myklashevs'ka, together with her stepchildren, rushed

to Hetman Mazepa to ask for his protection. She offered the hetman a “silver credenza” that cost a thousand thalers. In response, the hetman, “taking into account that Anna Shvaikovs'ka was the widow of Myklashevs'kyi,” confirmed her and her stepsons’ property rights to the estates of their deceased husband and father.⁸⁹

A rather high price for the appointment to a post in the *starshyna* was also described by Pelahiiia Boldakovs'ka-Tomara, the daughter of the Belarusian Captain Vasyl' Boldakovs'kyi and widow of Vasyl' Tomara. She stated that having arrived in the Chernihiv region with only one horse and several pieces of woollen cloth, without any military service credentials or contacts among the local *starshyna*, Vasyl' Tomara spent nearly 400 rubles from his wife’s dowry to obtain, first, the office of the captain of Vybli company and eventually that of the Chernihiv regimental judge.⁹⁰ It goes without saying that the colonelcy cost more.

Indirect evidence of the hetman’s abuse of power in the sphere of personnel policy is contained in the already mentioned article of the 1710 Constitution, which concerns the nature and procedure of *starshyna* appointments, above all, appointments to the colonelcy, as well as ways of preventing corruption in the exercise by the hetman of his powers, especially his power to prevent this office being occupied by “greedy for power office buyers.”⁹¹

Summarizing the material presented above, it can be asserted with confidence that the actual practices in the political life of the Hetmanate followed in the election of colonels and removal of officers from power in the regiments differed fundamentally from the models that were prescribed in legislation or sanctified by traditional notions of Cossack rights and liberties.

The desire of a given territorial group of Cossack military fellows to elect a leader by a free vote was usually in conflict, to one degree or another, with the wishes of the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, who took advantage of his “supreme power as the military commander” either to modify the will of the community somewhat or impose his own candidate on the latter. There were apparently not enough existing legal regulators or mandatory norms of customary law in early modern Ukraine to make it possible to firmly control the situation.

At the same time, it is worth noting however that there did exist a certain model in the political culture of the Cossacks that to a significant extent made it possible to reconcile the interests of the military fellows and the hetman in this matter, while respecting the will of local voters to elect the candidate of their choice and respecting the right of the military commander to give permission to hold elections, send his authorized representative to this event, and approve its results. Such an exemplary model, as a rule, was implemented at times of weakened authority on the part of the hetman. With the accumulation of power in the hands

of the military commander, his participation in the election of colonels grew substantially, and then only some elements of the “full” procedure of the election by a free vote were implemented. In certain cases, the hetmans openly disregarded even these elements.

A distinct tendency to harmonize the interests of the military fellows and the hetman can be seen in the articles of the 1710 Constitution. These, however, had no chance of being realized in practice, and therefore can be viewed only as a political declaration, even though it was based on the real wishes of the military fellowship and was aimed at offering the Cossacks an acceptable model for harmonizing the relations between the government and subjects of the Hetmanate.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as: Viktor Horobets', "Polkovnyk Viis'ka Zaporoz'koho: pravo vil'noï eleksii v svitli kozats'kykh tradytsii, rozporiadchykh prypysiv i politychnykh realii," in *Ukrains'ka derzhava druhoi polovyny XVII-XVIII st.: polityka, suspil'stvo, kul'tura*, ed. Valerii Smolii, 88–125 (Kyiv, 2014). Copyright 2014 by NASU Institute of History of Ukraine. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 Quoted from B. Krupnyts'kyi, *Het'man Danylo Apostol i ioho doba* (Kyiv, 2004), 115.
- 2 On the nature and scale of this interference, see V. Horobets', "Pravo vil'noï eleksii polkovnyka Viis'ka Zaporoz'koho: kozats'ki tradytsii u vyprobuванні impers'komy novatsiiamy," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 5 (2015): 70–91.
- 3 On the office of colonel of the Zaporozhian Host, see V. Horobets', "Polkovnyk Viis'ka Zaporoz'koho ta ioho vlada," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 4 (2014): 50–70.
- 4 For example, see S. Lepiavko, *Kozats'ki viiny kintsia XVI st. v Ukraïni* (Chernihiv, 1996); V.A. Smolii and V.S. Stepankov, *Ukrains'ka derzhavna ideia: problema formuvannia, evoliutsii, realizatsii* (Kyiv, 1997); V.A. Smolii and V.S. Stepankov, *Ukrains'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia XVII st. (1648–1676 rr.)* (Kyiv, 1999).
- 5 For the author's understanding of the trends in the development of the political system of the Hetmanate, see V. Horobets', *Vlada ta sotsium Het'manatu: doslidzhennia z politychnoi i sotsial'noi istorii rann'omodernoï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2009); V. Horobets', "Derzhava i suspil'stvo v Ukraïni v rannii Novyi chas:

- praktyky Het'manatu,” in ed. V. Smolii, *Vlada i suspil'stvo v Ukraïni: istorychnyi kontekst* (Kyiv, 2013), 120–236.
- 6 See V.A. Smolii and V.S. Stepankov, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi: sotsialno-politychnyi portret* (Kyiv, 1995), 303–7.
 - 7 *Universaly ukraïns'kykh het'maniv vid Ivana Vyhovs'koho do Ivan Samoilovycha (1657–1687)*, ed. Ivan Butych et al. (Kyiv–Lviv, 2004), 119.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, 119.
 - 9 *Ibid.*
 - 10 *Ibid.*
 - 11 For example, see A. Iakovliv, “‘Statti Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho’ v redaktsiï 1659 r.,” in *Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akademika M. S. Hrushevs'koho* (Kyiv, 1928), 1: 220–34; A. Iakovliv, *Ukraïns'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory v XVII–XVIII vikhakh* (Warsaw, 1934); V. Horobets', “*Volymo tsaria skhidnoho*”: *ukraïns'kyi Het'manat ta rosiï's'ka dynastiia do i pislia Pereiaslava* (Kyiv, 2007), and others.
 - 12 *Universaly ukraïns'kykh het'maniv*, 119.
 - 13 See, for example, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, comp. D.N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, 2 vols (Moscow, 1858–1859) 1:144, 145, 218, 256.
 - 14 On the document itself, see V. Horobets', “Kozats'kyi Het'manat u sociopolitychnii strukturi Rechi Pospolytoi: proekt ustroievoï modeli het'mana Pavla Teteri z roku 1664,” in *Moloda natsiia. Al'manakh*, no. 1 (2000), 40–61; V. Horobets', *Elita kozats'koï Ukraïny v poshukakh politychnoi lehitymatsiï: stosunky z Moskvou ta Varshavoiu, 1654–1665* (Kyiv, 2001).
 - 15 *Dział rękopisów Biblioteki Książąt Czartoryskich w Krakowie* (Department of Manuscripts of the Princes Czartoryski Library in Cracow; hereinafter – Czart.), sygn. 402, no. 22: 547–63.
 - 16 *Ibid.*
 - 17 For the author's view of the matter, see V. Horobets', “Ustroieva model Het'manatu za Konstytutsiieiu 1710 roku: chy isnuvaly vnutrishni pidstavy dlia realizatsiï proektu?” in *Pylyp Orlyk: zhyttia, polityka, teksty*, ed. Natalia Iakovenko (Kyiv, 2011), 234–48.
 - 18 *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 2: 251–2.
 - 19 *Ibid.*, 251.
 - 20 *Ibid.*
 - 21 *Ibid.*
 - 22 Krupnyts'kyi, *Het'man Danylo Apostol i ioho doba*, 115.
 - 23 V. Horobets', “Pravo vil'noi elektsiï polkovnyka Viis'ka Zaporoz'koho: kozats'ki tradytsiï u vyprobuvanni impers'kymy novatsiiamy,” *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 5 (2015): 70–91.
 - 24 *Universaly ukraïns'kykh het'maniv*, 705.

- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid., 734.
- 27 Iu. Haiets'kyi, "Storinky z pobutu Het'manshchyny: vybir polkovnyka," in *Siverians'kyi litopys*, no. 1-2 (1997): 48.
- 28 *Lysty Ivana Mazepy, 1687–1691*, comp. and introduction by V. Stanislavs'kyi, 2 vols (Kyiv, 2002), 1: no. 182: 393.
- 29 *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoi komissiei* (hereinafter – Akty IuZR), 15 vols (St Petersburg, 1861–1892), 13: 367, 454, 471; M. Petrovs'kyi, *Do istorii polkovoho ustroiu Het'manshchyny* (Nizhyn, 1929), Addendum, 73.
- 30 Petrovs'kyi, *Do istorii polkovoho ustroiu Het'manshchyny*, Addendum, 73.
- 31 Nikolai I. Kostomarov, *Istoricheskie monografii i issledovaniia*, vol. 16 *Mazepa i mazepintsy* (St Petersburg, 1885), 141–2.
- 32 G. Gajecky erroneously asserts that Shyikevych was the general chancellor in the governments of Ivan Briukhovets'kyi and Demian Ihnatovych, holding that post in 1665–69, but in reality, after the signing of the Moscow agreement of 1665, Briukhovets'kyi's officer entourage, above all the party of the Kyiv colonel Vasyl' Dvoret's'kyi, succeeded in having "Zakharko" arrested and exiled to Siberia. See Akty IuZR, 6: 13–14. See also V. Horobets', *Het'man Briukhovets'kyi: zhyttia u slavi, vladi ta han'bi* (Kyiv, 2019), 327–32.
- 33 Analyzing these elections on the basis of Mykola Petrovs'kyi's work, Vira Panashenko speaks of the access to the election of "fellows of the banner" (*znachkovi tovaryshi*, distinguished individuals in each regiment, lowest group of Cossack officer hierarchy), but the document published by Petrovs'kyi refers to the notable fellowship: "old fellow and notable of the Pereiaslav regiment." See V.V. Panashenko, *Polkove upravlinnia v Ukraïni (seredyna XVII-XVIII st.)* (Kyiv, 1997), 8; Petrovs'kyi, *Do istorii polkovoho ustroiu Het'manshchyny*, 72–3.
- 34 Petrovs'kyi, *Do istorii polkovoho ustroiu Het'manshchyny*, 72–3.
- 35 Ibid. See L. Okynshevych, "Heneral'na rada na Ukraïni-Het'manshchyni XVII-XVIII st." in *Pratsi komisii dlia vyuchuvannia istorii zakhidno-rus'koho ta ukraïns'koho prava*, ed. N.P. Vasylenko (Kyiv, 1929), 6:253–425; Idem, "Heneral'na starshyna na Livoberezhnii Ukraïni XVII-XVIII st." in *ibid.*, 2:84–171; V. Horobets', *Vlada ta sotsium Het'manatu: doslidzhennia z politychnoi i sotsial'noi istorii rann'omodernoï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2009).
- 36 Petrovs'kyi, *Do istorii polkovoho ustroiu Het'manshchyny*, 72–3.
- 37 V.V. Kryvosheia and V.M. Orel, *Ukraïns'ka shliakheta naperedodni vyzvol'noi viiny seredyny XVII stolittia* (Kyiv, 2000), 98.
- 38 See *Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central

- State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter – TSDIAUK), f. 51, op. 3, spr. 122. Suplika polkovoï i ratushnoï starshyny, kozakiv i mishchan Poltavs'koho polku. 1714. 4 ark.; V. Modzalevs'kyi, "Poltavskaia intriga 1714 goda," in *Kievskaia starina* 91, nos. 11/12 (1905): 173–85.
- 39 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, vol. 1, spr. 122, 4 ark.; Modzalevs'kyi, "Poltavskaia intriga," 173–85.
- 40 O. Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba*, 2nd ed. (New York Kyiv Lviv Paris Toronto, 2001), 91.
- 41 Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba*, 68; D.N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii ot vodvoreniia slavian v sei strane do unichtozheniia getmanstva* (Kyiv, 1993), 560.
- 42 M. Petrovs'kyi, *Narysy istorii Ukraïny XVII – pochatku XVIII stolit'* (*Doslidy nad Litopysom Samovydsia*) (Kharkiv, 1930), 106, fn. 8.
- 43 *Litopys Samovydsia*, ed. Ia. I. Dzyra (Kyiv, 1971), 100.
- 44 A. Lazarevskii, "Poltavshchina v XVII v.," *Kievskaia starina* 34 (1891), 373–4; G. Gajecy, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA, 1978), 2:519.
- 45 *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 2:29.
- 46 Akty IuZR, 6: 99.
- 47 Lazarevskii, "Poltavshchina v XVII v.," 360.
- 48 Ibid., 361.
- 49 For more about this, see V. Horobets', "Chorna rada" 1663 roku: *peredumovy, rezul'taty, naslidky* (Kyiv, 2013).
- 50 Akty IuZR, 6:195.
- 51 S. Velychko, *Litopys*, ed. V. Shevchuk (Kyiv, 1991), 2:161.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Lazarevskii, "Poltavshchina v XVII v.," 371; V. L. Modzalevskii, *Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik*, vol. 3 (L–O) (Kyiv, 1912): 48; Gajecy, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2:518.
- 54 See Velychko, *Litopys*, 464; Lazarevskii, "Poltavshchina v XVII v.," 372.
- 55 Leontii Cherniak held the colonelcy in Poltava (for the second time) in 1680–82, and it was he who was replaced by Pavlo Hertsyk. See Gajecy, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2:518.
- 56 *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 2: 148.
- 57 *Universalnyi ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 744.
- 58 V.A. Diadychenko, *Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoi Ukraïny kintsia XVII–pochatku XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1959), 201.
- 59 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, t. 1, spr. 122, ark. 2–4. The complaint of the regimental

and city administration *starshyna*, Cossacks, and townspeople of the Poltava regiment regarding the unfounded attempts of the regimental judge Petro Kovan'ka and the regimental chancellor Ivan Zaliess'kyi to remove from office the Poltava colonel Ivan Cherniak and make Vasyl' Kochubei colonel. 1714. The document was put into scholarly circulation by Vadym Modzalevs'kyi, who used the copy of the case made by Mykola Vasylenko, which at that time was held in the Kharkiv Historical Archive. See Modzalevs'kyi, "Poltavskaia intriga 1714 goda," 173–85.

60 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, t. 1, spr. 122, ark. 2–4.

61 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, t. 1, spr. 122, ark. 2zv.

62 Ibid., ark. 3.

63 Ibid., ark. 3 zv.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., ark. 4 zv.

66 "Komput vsego polku Poltavskogo ... 1719" in *Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukraïny im. V. I. Vernads'koho* (Manuscript Institute of the V.I. Vernads'kyi National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – IR NBU), f. 1, spr. 1 54480, ark. 2; "Videnie polkovogo goroda Poltavi, skol'ko v onoi obretaetsia polkovoi starshiny, bunchukovikh tovarishchei i znatnikh vdov ... 1732" in IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 54335, ark. 1, 348 zv.

67 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, t. 1, spr. 122, ark. 3.

68 M.E. Slabchenko, *Malorusskii polk v administrativnom otnoshenii (istoriko-iuridicheskii ocherk)* (Odesa, 1909), 343; "Komput vsego polku Poltavskogo," IR NBU, f. 1, spr. I 54480, ark. 2.

69 IR NBU, f. 1, spr. I 54480, ark. 44, 65, 121. The peasants were divided by economic status into categories, and this division determined their taxation assessment and the nature and extent of their labor obligations to their landowners and the state. See Viktor Horobets', *Vlada ta sotsium Het'manatu: doslidzhennia politychnoi i sotsial'noi istorii rann'omodernoï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2009).

70 "Videnie polkovogo goroda Poltavi, skol'ko v onoi obretaetsia polkovoi starshini, bunchukovikh tovarishchei i znatnikh vdov ... 1732," IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 54335, ark. 349 zv., 351, 385.

71 A. Lazarevskii, "Liudy staroi Malorossii: Markovichy," *Kievskaia starina* 8, no. 1 (1884): 55–6; Idem, "Istoricheskie ocherki poltavskoi Lubenshchiny XVII–XVIII st.," *Chteniia v Istoricheskoi obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* (hereinafter – *ChIONL*), no. 11 (1896): 54.

72 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, t. 1, spr. 373, ark. 2–3 zv.

- 73 L. Okynshevych, *Tsentral'ni ustanovy Ukraïny-Het'manshchyny XVII–XVIII st.* part 2: *Rada starshyn* (Kyiv, 1930), 85; Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 1:251–7.
- 74 V. Lypyn's'kyi, “Uchast shliakhty u Velykomu ukraïns'komu povstanni pid provodom het'mana Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,” in Idem., *Tvory*, ed. Lev Bilas, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1980), 271; Akty IuZR, 7: 377; M.S. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 10 (Kyiv, 1998): 144; *Dopolnenie k aktam istoricheskim* 6 (St Petersburg, 1857): 75; Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2:635.
- 75 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, t. 1, spr. 373, ark. 2.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 See V. Horobets', *Prysmerek Het'manshchyny: Ukraïna v roky reform Petra I* (Kyiv, 1998).
- 78 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, t. 1, spr. 373, ark. 2.
- 79 Ibid., ark. 2zv., 3.
- 80 Ibid., ark. 3.
- 81 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, spr. 153, ark. 47.
- 82 *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 1: 302.
- 83 Ibid.
- 84 Ibid., 2: 109.
- 85 Diadychenko, *Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoi Ukraïny*, 201; See also Lazarevskii, “Istoricheskie ocherki Poltavskoi Lubenshchiny,” 48.
- 86 Lazarevskii, “Istoricheskie ocherki Poltavskoi Lubenshchiny,” 48.
- 87 Akty IuZR, 5: 244; S. Pavlenko, *Otochennia het'mana Mazepy: soratnyky ta prybychnyky* (Kyiv, 2004), 88; Diadychenko, *Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoi Ukraïny*, 201.
- 88 *Universal'nyy Ivana Mazepy, 1687–1709*, ed. I. Butych (Kyiv-Lviv, 2002), 446.
- 89 A. Lazarevskii, “Liudy staroi Malorossii: Miklashevskie,” *Kievskaia starina* 3, no. 8 (1882): 248.
- 90 A. Lazarevskii, “Liudy staroi Malorossii: Goluby, Kryzhanovskie; Tomary,” *Kievskaia starina* 12, no. 5 (1885): 17–18.
- 91 *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 2:251–2.

Military Reforms during the Hetmancy of Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi, 1750–64

OLEKSII SOKYRKO

The middle of the eighteenth century marked the beginning for Ukraine of the second and last restoration of the institution of the hetmancy. The imperial decree “On there being a hetman in Little Russia in Accordance with Former Rights and Customs,” initiated by the *starshyna* aristocracy with the support of Oleksii Rozumovs'kyi, was signed in May 1747, but the *starshyna* council in Hlukhiv proclaimed the brother of the empress's favorite Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi the new hetman only in February 1750. At first, the newly fledged hetman did not want to go to Ukraine for anything, citing the bad climate of the hetman's capital or his preoccupation with other matters as grounds for refusing. On 22 June 1750, he issued a proclamation (*universal*) addressed to the *starshyna*, Cossacks, and commoners appointing General Judge Fedir Lysenko, General Treasurer Mykhailo Skoropads'kyi, and General Aide-de-Camp (*osavul*) Petro Valkevych “for the honest administration of Little Russia under the local rights in force there.”¹ Rozumovs'kyi's reluctance was explained not so much by his disinterest in the provincial life of the Hetmanate as by the fear of losing control of the situation at the court and, consequently, of becoming marginalized as a politician. The first few years of his rule resembled a “shuttle hetmancy,” in which his illustrious highness occasionally visited Ukraine to establish order regarding rank properties (*ranhovi maietnosti*), sign decrees, and visit relatives. In turn, the absence of any political program regarding the Hetmanate's future of well-thought-out principles of its governance, and so forth made itself felt.

By contrast, the second part of his hetmancy was marked by a much higher degree of activity, which has been rightfully named in the literature “the era of

Rozumovs'kyi's reforms." Perhaps the best researched of them to this day is his judicial reform, which established a branch court system in the Hetmanate, modeled on the practices of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Much less studied are the hetman's military reorganization measures, especially in view of the fact that any changes in the military sphere of the Hetmanate had a strategically important status given the military nature of its statehood, the genetic fusion of its political leadership and administration with its military structures, and the rights of its dominant military stratum – the Cossacks – which formed the basis of the army.²

It is quite difficult to judge Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi's military talents, or at least his aptitude for military affairs. One of his first official biographers, Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamenskii, in his essay dedicated to General Field Marshal Rozumovs'kyi, was forced to confine himself mainly to sweeping descriptions of the mild and indulgent temperament of his protagonist and to retelling numerous worldly anecdotes.³ In fact, Rozumovs'kyi began to receive his military ranks subsequent to his court and academic titles. In 1748 he was awarded the ranks of lieutenant colonel of the Izmail Life Guard regiment and of adjutant general, and that of field marshal, after his resignation from the hetmancy, as a form of compensation.⁴ Reports left by contemporaries did not show any special interest in military matters on the hetman's part, but this is not surprising. As commander of one of the guard regiments, Rozumovs'kyi served more as a patron, as it were, to his subordinates than as an actual commander of a military unit, which was a generally accepted and normal practice at that time.

However, from the point of view of contemporaries, the lack of military talent was not a shameful flaw in the noblemen of the time, even those of them who sought to distinguish themselves in the military field.⁵ Zealous service to the throne could be embodied not only in literal service in the military, on battlefields, and in the storming of fortresses, but also in participation in numerous meetings, commissions, and the development of reform projects. The latter, which were in keeping with the Enlightenment spirit of the era, were increasingly valued, enveloping the government official in an aura of learning and at the same time military valor worthy of ancient heroes. The significance of this symbolic capital is clearly seen in the example of the reformist activities of Rozumovs'kyi's contemporary and to a certain extent antagonist Count Petr Shuvalov.⁶ Immediately after the Seven Years' War ended, Peter III convened a "Military Commission," tasked with reorganizing the empire's entire military system, considering what came to light during the hostilities. After a short period of activity, the commission returned to its usual affairs at the end of 1762, during the reign of the new empress, Catherine II, who renewed its composition, including in it, in addition to well-

known experts and practitioners of military affairs (Petr Rumiantsev, Petr Saltykov, Aleksandr Vilboa [Alexander Guillemot de Villebois], Petr Panin, and others), also Hetman Rozumovs'kyi. Over the next two years, the commission adopted a number of important changes in the staffing structure of the army, the organization of field troops, billeting and free quarter obligations, and training of officers; it developed new regulations, and so forth.⁷ Unfortunately, we do not know for certain what Rozumovs'kyi's participation in the work of the commission was, but it is symptomatic that his membership in it coincided with the most significant changes in the Hetmanate's army.

Naturally, the upstart hetman, unlike his predecessors, did not have reliable and stable support among the Cossack aristocracy: the "notable" people of the Hetmanate fawned on him rather than providing real support for his rule. A significant problem was the hetman's basic lack of familiarity with the "rulers of the Fatherland": Rozumovs'kyi left Ukraine at too young an age and at a social level that precluded communication with *starshyna* circles. In November 1750, Hlukhiv was ordered to send complete lists of general, regimental, and company officers, and fellows of the standard and fellows of the banner, "indicating their rank and the year in which each rank was assigned, and of these, who is where and doing what, who is in a unit and who is at home. Also requested were vacancies and who is in command in those places and on what assignment, especially when it comes to the mercenary regiments (*kompaneiskikh*), who the colonels and regimental and company officers in them are, indicating who of them was awarded what rank and in what year, and concerning ordinary Cossacks – *podvoinykh* (had a helper) and *poedinkovykh* (without a helper), – how many of them are available today, also how many commoners are in the whole Little Russia and in each regiment separately, according to the last census of the populace."⁸

The hetman's defense of his sovereignty as a ruler was fully consistent with the intentions of the general *starshyna*. Already in December 1751, at the request of General Chancellor Andrii Bezborod'ko, the hetman issued a decree forbidding colonels to carry out the orders of Russian generals and officers.⁹

However, the successful personnel appointments of his relatives and expanding his circle of supporters was not enough to implement changes. Rozumovs'kyi should have seen to winning the sympathy of wide circles of the *starshyna*, which would have guaranteed him the support not only of the Cossack aristocracy, but also of the rest of the less notable officials, and would have shown him in the impressive role of defender and protector of the "rights and liberties" of the Cossack estate and his "beloved Fatherland." A convenient opportunity to show concern for the public good was the issue of equating the officer ranks and offices with the imperial equivalents, which involved not only the military hierarchy, but also

the political supremacy of the Cossack elite. After the efforts of *starshyna* deputations to decide the matter in their favor stalled hopelessly, the question of the equalization of ranks, which had become overgrown with accompanying letters, explanatory notes, and extracts (*ekstrakty*), was shuttled back and forth between the Imperial Cabinet and the Senate for almost five years, until in 1750 it finally returned to the latter. Sending the relevant documents to Procurator General Demidov, the Cabinet noted that since the restoration of the hetmancy, all Little Russian matters, including those pertaining to offices and rank estates, were within the jurisdiction of the Senate, and therefore decisions with respect to them now rested with the Senate. The Ukrainian officers at Rozumovs'kyi's court were in a hurry to resolve this problem, hoping to settle it before the departure of His Illustrious Highness to Ukraine. In the "Extract ... on the liberties, rights, and privileges of Little Russia, the hetman, and other listed ranks," the Cossack *starshyna* explained at length the nature of Cossack statehood, tracing its origin back to the times of Kyivan Rus', to the time when the Little Russian lands were "newly annexed" by the Lithuanian and Polish Crown, and their privileges were confirmed by royal and princely charters and set down in legal statutes.¹⁰ It is interesting that the Cossack officers attempted to link their own status and place in the government hierarchy to the hetman's majesty, whose essence and content were the main focus in the "Extract." As justification of the "honors and privileges of hetmans," the authors cited treaty articles, royal privileges and tsarist charters, as well as the testimony of members of the General Officer Staff and other notable Little Russians, whom "the leaders undoubtedly know."¹¹ Without delving into historical arguments, the authors of the document presented their case in the form of precedents, which, in their opinion, were sufficient grounds for treating the hetman if not as a sovereign ruler, then at least as the highest official, subject only to the monarch's will. Thus, during his hetmancy, Skoropads'kyi always had a Russian army honor guard, who saluted the military commander as they would salute field marshals and generals. In 1720, during Prince Menshikov's visit to Ukraine, company guarded the hetman. "And after guarding the hetman at the sounding of Reveille before, [we] later [guarded] the general field marshal (Menshikov – O.S.)," noted the officers, emphasizing the superiority of the hetman's status.¹² A winning argument in favor of this was the hetman's place during receptions and conferences in which the emperor participated: "the Hetman was told to take his place near His Imperial Majesty, higher than the General Admiral," and when visiting the monarch, he was allowed to drive all the way up to the porch in a carriage. When meeting the hetman at official celebrations, court, state, and military officials were ordered to be present with their wives, which underscored the importance of his person; when he drove through garrisons, military

camps, and billets, the regiments had to salute him with weapons, music, and flags.¹³ An especially important comment appeared at the end of the "Extract," stating that as a rule, during wars and campaigns in which hetmans and great voivodes, and later general field marshals, took part, "all military operations were carried out with general consultations and communication ... and the hetmans were bound only by the monarch's command."¹⁴

The impetus for a positive decision in the matter was the imperial decree of 24 July 1750, according to which "at all celebrations and public ceremonies the Little Russian hetman is to have a place with our general field marshals, regarded by them according to rank seniority."¹⁵ Simultaneously, another report about Little Russian ranks was submitted by the Senate and the Ukrainian ruler for the empress's consideration, to which on 27 October, Elizabeth "deigned to command that the hetman be informed that she was pleased to grant the above-mentioned ranks to Little Russians officers, but no one could be granted the abovenamed ranks before informing Her Imperial Majesty of those persons and their merits."¹⁶ The imperial decree was more a declaration of intent than a full-fledged law, but the hetman's court was already preparing to leave for Hlukhiv and the Christmas holidays were approaching, which gave the Senate grounds to consider the case quite settled and to transfer it to the archive.¹⁷

The Seven Years' War of 1756–63 brought the dust covered case to light once again. The Senate and the Military Collegium were trying to determine how much to pay in salary to the ranks of irregular troops, and what the penalties for "dishonor ... for those personnel" should be.¹⁸ In response to a Senate inquiry, Rozumovs'kyi's field chancellery (*pokhidna kantseliariia*) in October 1756 sent a "Report on the Little Russian *starshyna*, colonels, fellows of the standard, and regimental and company officers and other ranks and ordinary soldiers, indicating the sequence of ranks according to Little Russian custom" and the "Excerpt from the list of the gentleman and chevalier which represents as to which Great Russian ranks the Little Russian officials should be considered to be, as well as to which class he, the lord hetman and chevalier, should assign them."¹⁹

Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine exactly whether this "Little Russian Table of Ranks" received imperial approval or was once again shelved. All that can be said with certainty is that the convertibility of the status of the Cossack *starshyna* and officials within the framework of the bureaucratic hierarchy and nobility remained elusive. In 1761, in particular, it was confirmed that the children of the *starshyna* could not be accepted to the Land Noble Cadet Corps because they were not of noble birth. In January 1762, Count Roman Vorontsov reported to the Senate that in the process of enrolling Little Russians for military and civil service, many commoners claimed noble descent, which could not be verified

for lack of heraldry and lists of nobles in the Hetmanate, which he recommended to compile.²⁰

The publication by Peter III of the Manifesto on Noble Freedoms, which significantly reduced the gap in privileges between the imperial nobility and the *starshyna*, also prompted the regulation of the hierarchy of Cossack ranks and the clarification of the noble rights that the Hetmanate granted to its bearers. The document produced a notable emancipation of the Russian nobility, previously virtually powerless and extremely dependent on the supreme power, freeing nobles from mandatory civil and military service and granting them the right to freely retire and to freely travel outside the empire. The manifesto was a further step in the development and strengthening of the nobility as a social stratum and political force, which finally consolidated its superiority and advantages over the other estates.

On 22 September 1762, the newly proclaimed Empress Catherine II issued a decree, addressed to the hetman, in which she finally granted the Cossack *starshyna* "classes corresponding to the ranks of Little Russians." This document is of particular interest to us because it introduced the conversion of ranks specifically in the military sphere, using a slightly different nomenclature in comparison with previous "tables."²¹ The ranks of the General Military Chancellery did not appear in the decree, but a separate note stipulated that they should be "regarded as equal to regimental officers by their classes." The decree declared that the main basis for elevation in rank was conscientious and steadfast service "with unequivocal merits." The hetman, as equal in rank to a general field marshal, was permitted to promote up to the rank of major independently, while the rest had to be submitted to the monarch for review and approval. Left out of the new table was the rank of fellow of the standard, whose number, unlike that of regimental officers, was not clearly defined. The hetman was to create a separate organizational structure for them, according to which they would later be granted equality "in classes," so that the Little Russian ranks in the staff-(senior) and ober-(lower) officer cadre did not have any advantages over the Russians.²² It was also up to the hetman to monitor the consistent promotions in rank, without bypassing any intermediate stages between the highest and lowest, "since up to this time, these ranks, which did not have Great Russian classes equal to our regular military, were elected by the free votes of the lower officers, bypassing the intermediary ranks, and moved to the higher ones. This [method] no longer corresponds to regular ranks and is abandoned, especially as this is not consistent with Little Russian rights; but we command that elections be conducted by free votes, as before, but so that no one from proximate ranks be bypassed without a show of

proper reasons, for that was the custom in the irregular military, and this is already provided for by law in ranks equalized by regular advantages.”²³

In early 1763, Catherine convened a special Commission on the Freedoms of the Nobility, which was to regulate the class status of the nobles, taking into account the provisions of Peter III’s manifesto and legislative developments of the Legislative Commission, which was working toward the same end. The commission, which consisted mainly of the empress’s closest supporters (Chancellor Count Mikhail Vorontsov, Grand Master of the Court [*Ober Hofmeister*] Nikita Panin, General-in-Chief Count Zakhar Chernyshev, Prince Mikhail Volkonskii, and Adjutant-General Grigorii Orlov), and several old nobles from Elizabeth’s reign (ex-Chancellor and General Field Marshal Aleksei Bestuzhev-Riumin, Senator Prince Iakov Shakhovskoi), also included Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi.²⁴ It is obvious that this opportunity was a suitable occasion for once more raising the question of not so much the conversion and mutual coordination of the ranks of the Cossack *starshyna* and the Russian officer corps as about the much more important issues of the status of the Little Russian nobility in relation to the Russian nobles. On 20 February 1763, the hetman appeared at a hearing quoting from an “extract on the freedoms of nobility from the laws of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, known as the statute, according to which Little Russia is governed.”²⁵

Apparently, the imperial decree of 22 July 1762 caused a considerable stir among the members of the commission and the Senate, especially in the anti-hetman party, which was headed by Chancellor Aleksei Bestuzhev-Riumin. On 15 April 1763, a decree was issued on conducting another hearing in the commission “on the classes of Little Russian ranks,” for which Rozumovs'kyi’s office prepared a report with a justification and a new Table of Little Russian Ranks with equivalents in the Russian Table of Ranks.²⁶ The majority of the commission sided with Rozumovs'kyi. The decision approved at the meeting was generally in line with the imperial decree, making only technical clarifications and additions to it. Thus, the hetman was given the right to grant ranks up to and including that of lieutenant colonel, to award ranks only if there were vacancies, to “reward with classes” upon retirement, and to determine the number of fellows of the standard “in proportion to the regiments.” The General Military Chancellery had to maintain all personnel records and “maintain adherence to the waiting list in those ranks,” both in the case of promotions and of the assignments to military campaigns, business trips, and the like.²⁷

The commission’s positive decision was largely due to the absence of Rozumovs'kyi’s opponents at its meeting and Nikita Panin’s support for the project plan. However, this course of events further upset the anti-hetman party, which

saw the decision as another boost for the positions of its opponents. On 10 June 1763, Aleksei Bestuzhev-Riumin submitted to the empress an "Opinion on the Classes of Little Russian Ranks," in which he tried to rebut Rozumovs'kyi and present the essence of the case as one that harms the foundations of Russian statehood.²⁸ Bestuzhev began his opinion by refuting the traditional preamble to all the hetman's statements regarding the sovereignty of Ukraine's choice of Russian suzerainty and its voluntary acceptance. Indeed, according to the former chancellor, "the Little Russian people have been Russian subjects from time immemorial," who had been taken away at one time by Poland but returned to the Russian crown by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. The absence of a system of ranks and grades in the Hetmanate, Bestuzhev wrote, could actually present certain obstacles and difficulties in governance, but granting them was fraught with the danger that an opportunity might arise in which Little Russians would command Great Russians, which is absolutely inadmissible. Citing the precedents of the Livonian nobility and the Cossack officials of the Don Cossack Host, who had ranks corresponding to the Table, the count pointed out that those ranks had been "granted to them only for their persons," that is, they were isolated cases, exceptional incidents. They had rightly resorted to this practice during the reign of Elizabeth, when the desire of the officers for equalization in ranks was not satisfied and, instead, they were promised that they would be given Russian ranks and grades in accordance with their merits, without creating precedents for the aforementioned Don Cossack Host. Complaining about the large number of officials in Ukraine, especially fellows of the standard, Bestuzhev stressed that, according to local traditions, officials there were awarded ranks and retired voluntarily, and that if they are equated with Russian ranks, who move up the service ladder "by degrees from lower to higher," there may be a "diminution."

Whatever the decision in this matter, the author of the note advised that Russians be given priority over Ukrainians, like the guard regiments had seniority in ranks over the army, and the army, in turn, over the garrison and land militia ranks. Finally, Bestuzhev also offered specific observations on the *starshyna* "classes" and their analogues: thus, the rank of lieutenant general was too high for the general quartermaster, so they could be "satisfied" with the rank of major general, since even former hetmans had the rank of general-in-chief, and the current one has the rank of general field marshal ("out of great personal favor and trust in him ... for based on old examples, among whom was Mazepa, should such trust and excessive privileges be really allowed to future hetmans").²⁹ It is also possible that Bestuzhev feared a large influx of Ukrainian *starshyna* to the ranks of the imperial officers and bureaucracy which could eventually devalue the entire system of ranks.

It is difficult to say what direction further discussions about *starshyna* ranks and nobility would have taken, if Catherine II, dissatisfied with the work of the commission, which sought to establish the rights of the “first” estate at the level of the law, binding on both subjects and the monarch, had not dissolved it in October 1763.³⁰ It is quite possible that after this the hetman returned to Ukraine with a firmer and more mature belief in the need for more decisive actions to confirm the separateness of Cossack autonomy and the superiority of its *starshyna*-nobility stratum.

Actually, the measures that directly concerned the army of the Hetmanate can hypothetically be divided into two stages – the reorganization of the court troops (*nadvirne viis'ko*) which became a proving ground for testing new ideas and models, and later changes that affected the registered Cossack regiments and the artillery corps.

Appearing in Hlukhiv no sooner than a year after his election, Rozumovs'kyi first turned his attention to outfitting his residence, which, however, he did not regard as his permanent residence: the time spent in the imperial capital counted for him more. Therefore, of all the more or less notable military innovations of the newly fledged hetman, one can single out his concern for the court guard. Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's court, which is still awaiting its researcher, was undoubtedly an extraordinary phenomenon in Ukrainian culture. For the first time, Western influences and models, borrowed both directly from European counterparts and a completely modern imperial court, clearly dominated. Rozumovs'kyi's court, at least in its ceremonial and external aspects, rather quickly ceased to resemble the old-world models of its predecessors. Saturated with innovations, consistent with the refined court fashions of the era of absolutism, it was, according to the apt observation of the historians, a miniature copy of the imperial court.

By a separate order issued in the summer of 1752, Rozumovs'kyi created the institution of the adjutant: it consisted of ten fellows of the standard, “appointed by order” at the hetman's court.³¹ The court's armed retinue was also to be expanded and reorganized, not so much in accordance with tradition as in the spirit of the newly fledged hetman's tastes. The hetman's frequent travels resulted in a division of the court troops (*nadvirne viis'ko*) into two unequal parts: a smaller part (a kind of life guard unit), which accompanied His Illustrious Highness in St Petersburg and Moscow, on trips, balls, hunts, court celebrations and travels, and performed guard duties at his residences in both imperial capitals, and a larger part that, as before, guarded the hetman's residences in Hlukhiv and the institutions of the General Military Chancellery. The administration of the two components was transformed accordingly: the Life Guard units were mainly in

the charge of the hetman's Household Office, and the rest, as earlier, the General Military Chancellery.

Naturally, the life guard unit received priority attention: more money was spent on it and the guards were the first to receive new uniforms and be provided with everything needed to make them a worthy calling card of the ruler of the Hetmanate in the imperial capitals. This unit consisted of bodyguards and guardsmen, as well as liveried servants (*haiduks*, footmen, and musicians). The military component was represented by cavalry and infantry units: a mounted court unit, *zholdak* unit (Hetman's personal guard), a Zaporozhian Cossack unit (*kurin'*), *pandury*, and military musicians. Judging from everything, the first Life Guard units appeared in 1751, when Rozumovs'kyi first visited Hlukhiv and, when leaving, wanted to take some exotically dressed Little Russian Cossacks with him to the capital. Then, four officers and six members of the court *kompaniitsi* unit (cavalry guard hired regiment) started out on the long journey as part of the hetman's entourage.³² During the late 1750s to early 1760s, the cavalry unit increased in size and became firmly established. By 1763 it consisted of eight mounted and two infantry court *kompaniitsi*, and thirteen mounted *kompaniitsi*, "who had been re-outfitted as hussars and are used to ride by the carriage of His Illustrious Highness,"³³ and ten foot soldiers, dressed "as *pandury*," commanded by the *kompaniitsi* regimental aide-de-camp (*osavul*) Petro Kanevs'kyi.³⁴ Ten *kompaniitsi* soldiers, dressed in hussar uniforms, led by the regimental flag-bearer Vasyli Septukhov, accompanied Hetman Rozumovs'kyi on his last journey to St Petersburg, when he was forced to renounce the mace.³⁵

In addition, the hetman's Household Office include a *zholdak* unit, composed of twelve soldiers, headed by a lieutenant, a corporal, and a drummer dressed "in German clothing."³⁶ A separate unit was made up of musicians, assigned to serve the hetman by General Military Musicians. As of 1755, it consisted of four trumpeters and one kettledrum player (*lytavryst* or *dovbysh*).³⁷ Smartly uniformed elected Cossacks of the Hlukhiv Company were included on the trips to St Petersburg and Moscow as an auxiliary unit.³⁸

An innovation and a kind of highlight of the hetman's Life Guard was the newly created Zaporozhian *Kurin*. The decision to form it was obviously made sometime in late 1751 or early 1752. The "Zaporozhian unit, which is to be part of His Grace's retinue in the train to Moscow," consisted of ten Cossacks and three officers, recruited from among the experienced *kompaniitsi* and Zaporozhian Cossacks.³⁹ It was led by the *kompaniitsi* aide-de-camp Petro Cherniavs'kyi and Captain (*sotnyk*) Iarema Cherkes, who personally selected soldiers for service in this unit. In March 1752, when recruitment to the unit ended, its personnel were included "as part"

of Chasnyk's *kompaniitsi* regiment.⁴⁰ At the end of 1752, funds were allocated to the unit for sewing clothing which was to be different from all existing analogues. Although the sum disbursed from the treasury for uniforms was huge – 595 rubles (for comparison – the annual salary of the entire court company [*khoruhva*] in 1759 amounted to only 459 rubles!), the production of these uniforms lasted several years.⁴¹

The ambitious demands of the new hetman also required a numerical increase and further development of those court military formations that remained in the Hetmanate. In particular, the court company, which had been separated out at the start from the Second *Kompaniitsi* Regiment, to which Hnat Chasnyk's company from the Third *Kompaniitsi* Regiment was later added, was increased numerically. Thus, while in 1751–53, there were only 108 fellows in the unit, in 1755, there were already 214.⁴²

An order issued by the hetman on 16 January 1752 ordered general aides-de-camp Iakiv Iakubovych and Petro Valkevych “to have them in command and supervision, so that they are in good order.” The same order “directed these commanders to keep a decent number of people at our court in the great hall as the guard with banner and kettle drums, with which to sound Reveille and post and put in place a guard detail in the appropriate places in this court,” which were to change weekly. In addition, the hetman allowed the use of court *kompaniitsi* to guard prisoners and as couriers to serve the needs of the General Military Chancellery.⁴³ Subsequently, however, repeated conflicts arose between the general aides-de-camp and the chancellery over jurisdictional spheres and powers. The chancellery insisted on its exclusive right to enlist recruits to the company, to see to its ongoing replenishment and maintenance, to submit reports to the hetman regarding vacancies and appointments, and assigned inspection and administrative functions to the aides-de-camp.⁴⁴

In May 1752, Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi, accompanied by General Chancellor Andrii Bezborod'ko, General Aide-de-Camp Iakiv Iakubovych, and his indispensable adviser Grigorii Teplov, spent two months visiting the regiments of Left-Bank Ukraine. For the young hetman, this trip was in the nature of a first close acquaintance with his new domains, but, in any event, the impression it left formed an overall picture of the state of the Cossack regiments, their administration and management.⁴⁵ On the other hand, for the general officers, and especially Iakubovych, the hetman's visit became an opportunity to check the serviceability of the Cossack troops, and especially, the corps of the rank-and-file Cossacks (*vyborni kozaky*), which suffered from a traditionally unstable system of rotation and replenishment. Indicative in this regard is the inspection report of the Chernihiv

regiment, which revealed all the shortcomings of the maintenance and combat readiness of the elect Cossacks and Cossack helpers (*pidpomichnyky*). The hetman's directive based on its results ordered, in particular, "that the required proper twenty-thousand strong number set for rank-and-file ... Cossacks by former ... decrees be recruited and supplemented, and that the full complement be always in complete combat readiness; and such rank-and-file Cossacks for further service be organized in companies of such who from a single household can independently outfit themselves with all military needs for horses and acceptable clothing." At the same time, the service and duties of the regimental Cossack helpers were to be streamlined, who were treated not only as providers of economic support for household rank-and-file Cossacks, as had been the case earlier, but also as an independent auxiliary force and recruitment reserve: "Cossack helpers (who need to be maintained along the Dnipro line, at outposts, which are now being manned by the elect Cossacks alone), could supply themselves with at least one horse and be combat ready, to be used instead of the elect Cossacks, because these elect Cossacks must remain for command and more essential tasks."⁴⁶

After the Russian Empire was drawn into the Seven Years' War in 1756, the army of the Hetmanate, the effectiveness of which was in great doubt, was expected to take an active part in it. The Assembly at the Highest Court – the highest institution of the military and political administration of the empire – decided to initially "outfit for the upcoming campaign" five thousand Ukrainian Cossacks, in addition to which "a sufficient number of horses" were to be assembled to replenish losses to artillery and in military supply wagons. Additionally, regular units from the Volga provinces were transferred to Left-Bank and Sloboda Ukraine, which were eventually to form a separate corps, to be joined by local garrison and land militia regiments.

Judging by everything, the army command did not rely too much on either the combat readiness of the Cossacks or the diligence of the hetman, given that in September 1756, the Assembly at the Highest Court ordered that before the arrival of Rozumovs'kyi in Hlukhiv, the "local Military Chancellery, in accordance with the request sent directly from His Excellency General Field Marshal and Chevalier (Stepan Apraksin – O. S.) that everything be expeditiously and urgently fulfilled,"⁴⁷ and by October 5th of that year the hetman was to "expeditiously and urgently fulfill everything and satisfy all requirements."⁴⁸ On the last day of 1756, Rozumovs'kyi ordered that the Cossacks of the five thousand-strong unit be kept in full combat readiness, awaiting his orders.⁴⁹

It should be noted that in the mid-eighteenth century, Russian military art had not yet developed established practices in the organization and operation of irregular formations in wars with European armies. While the experience of using

Cossacks and hussars, who made up the light cavalry, was well developed in the defense of borders and the wars with Tatars and Turks from as far back as the second half of the seventeenth century, large-scale clashes with regular troops were limited to the campaigns of the Northern War of 1700–21.⁵⁰ In the middle of the eighteenth century, the government and army command had no clear plan for the use of light irregular cavalry, nor accurate data on its strength and combat potential. As early as in 1753, “Her Imperial Majesty deigned to order to check the status of old affairs and thoroughly specify how many cavalry mounted troops there were in Little Russia from the beginning of its annexation to the Russian state, and how they, Little Russians, defended themselves against ... the Turks and Tatar attacks without the addition of Great Russian troops, and how many of their own troops there were in the campaigns in such cases?”⁵¹ The instruction on managing of the army, which Apraksin received in October 1756, was confined in the case of the Cossacks to two main guidelines: to monitor them so that they not loot and not “mount raids into Prussian lands and alarm his troops (the king’s – O.S.) and exhaust them with anxiety.” The regular units were to be added to the irregular ones mainly so that “if all sorts of disorders and arbitrariness were not completely avoided, then at least significantly reduced and prevented.”⁵²

Rozumovs'kyi's second trip to Ukraine, necessitated by preparations for war, was very different from his first visit. This time the hetman had to deal as intimately as possible with the “military state of affairs,” all the time reporting about them to St Petersburg.⁵³

The preparations for sending the corps of elect Cossacks to the front, in particular, pointedly raised the question of the quality of their combat training. The mobilization of the Cossacks and other preparations, due to the slowness of the administration and the reluctance of the *starshyna* to go on campaign, stretched for almost six months. The departure of the corps for the front was therefore postponed until the autumn of 1756. General Aide-de-Camp Iakiv Iakubovych was appointed commander of the corps, and he was to report directly to the commander of the Russian army in Prussia, Field Marshal Apraksin.⁵⁴ The decrees of the Senate required the “enlisting” to the corps of only elect horse-mounted Cossacks in decent attire and with serviceable weapons, ammunition, and equipment, and supplies of gunpowder, provisions, and fodder. In early December 1756, the General Military Chancellery sent an order to the regimental governing bodies, according to which all the Cossacks were to gather in Hlukhiv for training.⁵⁵ Later, their number was reduced to 120 men from each regiment, headed by a captain.⁵⁶

On 29 November, the Chancellery asked Iakubovych for a resolution regarding “how to drill the Cossacks detailed ... to go on campaign, and what to teach them in training.”⁵⁷ In response to this request, two special instructions were issued,

which together represented the first drill regulations of the Cossack army: "Form, how to begin a review of troops in Little Russian regiments" and "Military training of light troops."⁵⁸ The "form" was a standard instruction for conducting a troop review, nine points of which contained guidelines for checking the appearance of the Cossacks, their weapons, ammunition, clothing, food supplies, how they saluted, how to write or submit reports, and so forth. The document encompassed the most typical elements of troop reviews that were used in the Hetmanate during the first half of the eighteenth century. The "Military training" was a typical training regulation, which specified military techniques, the formation of units, the order of their movement and actions in various conditions.

The semantic and textual basis of the regulations contained many borrowings from Russian analogues of the time. However, borrowing some external elements of the military training of the Russian army, the hetman's regulations were largely based on the experience and needs of the Cossack army and became the first drill regulations in the Cossack formations of the Russian Empire.

The preparation of the corps of elect Cossacks to be sent to the fronts of the Seven Years' War, in addition to the problem of training, once again raised the question of their armament. Reviews of the Cossacks showed that some of them had only half of the required set of weapons, while its firearms consisted of different types and different caliber rifles and pistols. Cossack units inspected in the summer of 1756 before departing for the Ukrainian line, showed evidence of having very low quality weapons and an almost complete unwillingness to use them, "because in that unit there are many Cossacks and, for the most part, are supplied with such defective weapons, that in some the cartridges are empty, and in some, even though with bullets, they are not the size needed for the weapon, so that they do not fit the weapon. In some, the cartridges were very small as against the caliber, and especially that in the case of some Cossacks, the powder in the shells and powder horns is old and has been ground into dust from that old age, so that it is extremely unfit for firing."⁵⁹

The rearmament of rank-and-file Cossacks with carbines (*ruchnytsi*) in the 1730s–40s, initiated by Hetman Danylo Apostol, gave only a temporary effect: without a proper production and repair base, many weapons failed, and those lost in campaigns and on the battlefields were not replaced with new supplies.⁶⁰ Despite this, the center immediately hastened to secure control over the distribution and production of weapons for the hetman's army. On 4 July 1751, the Military Collegium issued an order "On not producing in the irregular forces of guns and other weapons outside and without the knowledge of the Tula Armaments Chancellery."⁶¹ Henceforth, all "arms" needs had to be addressed to the Collegium

of Foreign Affairs, after which, through the agency of the Armaments Chancellery, contracts could be concluded with merchants and factories armaments plants.

The "Form" and "Military Training" of 1756 that we discussed above put the armament and fire training of rank-and-file Cossacks on a qualitatively new level. Now the combat readiness of the regiment and company were made directly dependent not only on the availability of the necessary weapons, but also on the ability of the Cossacks to use them, care for them, and maintain them in good condition. However, the ongoing supply of both firearms and cold weapons continued to be decentralized and multifaceted. Despite St Petersburg's directives, the colonels, with the approval of the hetman or the General Military Chancellery, independently concluded contracts with manufacturers and re-equipped or additionally equipped their regiments at their own discretion. In December 1760, Rozumovs'kyi issued an order confirming the right of regimental administrations to conclude contracts to ensure "military serviceability," reserving only their approval for himself.⁶² The process of re-armament, therefore, was not instantaneous and took into consideration the different types of weapons and the state of the regimental treasuries.

Thus, in January 1756, the Hadiach Colonel Vasyl' Rozumovs'kyi ordered 1,500 single-caliber carbines from Tula, which were scheduled to replace the outdated and heavy Cossack carbines. The following year, the old models of the Tula carbines were also deemed unfit for use by the general officers who reviewed the five-thousand-strong Cossack corps before it was sent to the front.⁶³ At the same time, the regimental administrations also turned their attention to the state of cold weapons: in 1759, the Lubny and Myrhorod regiments simultaneously, and a little later, the Hadiach regiment, began to conclude contracts for the supply of a uniform model of sabers. The reasons for and process of the rearmament itself can be clearly seen from the materials of the Hadiach regimental chancellery. In October 1759, the Hadiach regimental Aide-de-Camp Iosyf Sytens'kyi sent a report to the General Military Chancellery, in which he noted that "the sabers of all those elect Cossacks are hardly fit for military use: namely, first, they are of various models, such as those remakes from old Russian swords, old Polish, hussar, Don Cossack, and for the most part, Cossack swords of local Little Russian manufacture, simple without a handle and any other good setting, which have already been thrown out as useless; second, some are too short; third, some are too narrow; fourth, some curved and other completely straight sabres are made of simple and twisted iron by local craftsmen, are blunt, and many are broken and repaired, and providing no protection on the hilt."⁶⁴ Meanwhile, according to the aide-de-camp, a Cossack needs a saber both in cavalry and infantry ranks

that is “good, long, sharp, broad, and with sufficient swing.” “Without it,” wrote the aide-de-camp, “it is extremely hopeless for the Cossack to withstand the enemy for the following reasons: in battle with the enemy, it sometimes happens that often the gun misfires, or the sling or wind deflects volley of fire, or the wet weather creates obstacles in that the gun does not fire, or even if it fires, because of the enemy’s bold attack, there is no time to recharge [the rifles], and the lance is sometimes knocked out of [the Cossack’s] hand, or broken, or owing to the closeness of a rapid turn, he does not hit the target, or for some reason the Cossack experiences failure, as he loses his horse, gun, and lance, all that is left to the Cossack in such situations is to act with his sabre, which should always be in his sabre-knot.”⁶⁵ Citing the practice of the neighboring Lubny and Myrhorod regiments, Sytens'kyi asked that the new saber be “long, broad with a strong setting ... comparable in length and stoutness to hussar sabers on Cossack belts.”⁶⁶

The choice of the final design of the saber, which was to serve as a model for all regiments, was made by the General Military Chancellery, which sent out the relevant samples in December 1759. However, there is every reason to believe that the desired uniformity was still not achieved. While the first batches of sabers, which were ordered at the beginning of the war, were modeled on hussar sabers, the later ones copied those of the dragoons. Thus, the sabers for the Chernihiv regiment ordered in Tula in 1763 had copper hilts and wooden grip, covered with leather and wrapped with copper wire. At the beginning of the 1760s, the regimental staffs were already concluding orders for the supply of carbines, sabers, and ammunition together. Thus, in December 1763, the Chernihiv regiment, following the practice of the Nizhyn, Lubny, and Myrhorod regiments, concluded a contract with the Tula armorer Ivan Oslopov for the production of 1,706 carbines, 32 pairs of pistols, 1,738 sabers, and 1,738 cartridge boxes. The cartridge boxes had a uniform appearance: a box for 22 cartridges with a lid made of a copper plate with the regimental coat of arms engraved on it and the inscription “Chernihiv Regiment.” The cartridge box (*ladivnytsia*) was worn on a red leather shoulder belt two fingers wide.⁶⁷

As in previous periods, the Cossacks had to rearm themselves at their own expense, which immediately cooled the reformist fervor of the regimental authorities. First of all, the price of weapons had increased significantly since the first half of the century. In addition, the Cossacks now had to buy not only guns, but also sabers and ammunition, and simultaneously have new uniforms sewn. In 1763, such a set cost the Chernihiv Cossacks 6 rubles, 60 kopecks, but could also cost much more. Thus, for example, a hussar saber for the Myrhorod-elect Cossacks cost alone 3 rubles.⁶⁸ The supply of necessary weapons was therefore slowed down by the collection of money from Cossack households and debts to con-

tractors. The latter, in turn, after concluding lucrative contracts, were often unable to deliver the necessary equipment on schedule because of its absence at the plants, which, judging by everything, worked on such orders by the job with long breaks in between. The result of all this was that the rearmament of the Cossack regiments with uniform firearms and cold weapons once again stretched out in time, outliving the abolition of the Hetmanate and lasting until the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–74.

In addition to weapons and equipment, the next attempt at uniformity involved Cossack clothing and military symbols, which became the most visible results of the reforms of the 1750s and early 1760s for contemporaries. The famous chronicler of old-world life in the Hetmanate, Ivan Kotliarevs'kyi, wrote enthusiastically in his *Eneida* (Aeneid):

Each unit was known by its city name,
The kozaks – by their headgear frame,
Each man, according to his height,
Received an overcoat in blue,
As well, a jacket, white and new;
To make him look a kozak-knight.⁶⁹

The importance of external changes also appealed to historians, overshadowing other, more significant aspects of the military reforms.

The time that passed after Cossack attire was “settled” by the reform of 1735 did not make any particular changes in the appearance of elect Cossacks. Their need to pay for their own clothing and ammunition, which depended directly on the financial capabilities of the Cossacks and their helpers, and the tedious and burdensome service at the outposts and the Ukrainian line, left concerns about clothing perhaps last on the list of worries of the registered Cossacks. Reviews of the units, which were conducted in the early 1750s, invariably showed that for real or made-up reasons, most of the Cossacks were unable to provide themselves with the necessary clothing because of “indigence and extreme poverty.” The hetman’s orders from the first years of Rozumovs'kyi’s reign did not particularly insist on perfection in the appearance of Cossacks, reminding them only to start out on campaigns in “acceptable clothing,” “the same one-color blue uniform as those other uniforms were.”⁷⁰

With the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, the hetman’s government once again had to make sure that the Cossacks setting out to the European theater of operations wore decent clothes and did not shock the local inhabitants with their appearance. The review of the five thousand-strong corps conducted in January

1757 by General Aide-de-Camp Iakubovych, however, showed that the situation was far from comforting. The hetman ordered that all elect Cossacks must have a uniform, and the old and worn ones were to be re-sewn and re-faced. It is noteworthy that the effort to regulate Cossack uniforms enjoyed the special attention of those colonels who proved themselves to be zealous supporters of the “regularization” that was being implemented by Rozumovs'kyi. Thus, in 1759, Lubny Colonel Kuliabko ordered the rank-and-file Cossacks of his regiment to have, in addition to the drill uniform (*stroiovyi mundyr*) of cornflower blue cloth, also an everyday uniform, sewn from gray homespun cloth for duty travel and outpost service. Justifying his innovation, Kuliabko wrote that the elect fellows, “being in places beyond the Dnipro (*zadniprskikh*) [their uniforms] are used not so much as specified by decree, as in an improper and even more so in contraindicated manner, not only by Serbian officers, but by the rank and file, particularly in manual labor, such as for heating pipes in winter, cleaning horse stables, milling flour, pasturing livestock, and transporting firewood,” they wear out their combat uniform “for futile and useless purposes.”⁷¹ Having weighed the correctness of these arguments, the General Military Chancellery ordered that all the other regiments also have a working uniform. When sending the separate Thousand squad to Prussia in 1760, all the Cossacks were ordered to have, in addition to their usual uniform, also a “Circassian gray, sewn in the Don [Cossack] style.”⁷²

More systematic changes with respect to the Cossack uniform came at the end of the war, when former court quartermaster (*Hoffurier*) of the imperial court Petro Myloradovych, an expert on the capital's court and guard fashions, was appointed to the Chernihiv colonelcy. In August 1762, the newly fledged colonel submitted to Rozumovs'kyi a design of a Cossack officer's uniform (before this, the dress of *starshyna* was never regulated, which was a manifestation of the separateness and superiority of the social status of the Cossack elite). According to the proposal, which was approved by the hetman, uniforms were now to be worn by regimental *starshyna*, captains, and also court secretaries (*sudovi pysari*) and Cossack city chieftains (*horodovi otamany*). In general contours and colors, it resembled the Cossack uniform: a cornflower blue outer caftan with a red collar and lapels (velvet for the regimental *starshyna* and woolen cloth for the rest), decorated with three pairs of gold stripes in the middle of the sides and one pair under the collar; the caftan worn underneath was made of white cloth. This ensemble was supplemented by a red sash, with ends decorated with gold embroidery, hats with blue cloth tops and black lamb fur margins, as well as boots – black for “everyday” and red dress boots (“for church and solemn days”). Each officer had a cartridge box on a shoulder strap of gold braid (*tas'ma*) and a saber

with a saber knot of gold and black silk threads.⁷³ The uniform of the fellows of the banner was to be similar to that of the *starshyna*, with the exception of four pairs of double-row stripes of gold braid instead of collar patches.

In August 1762, the Chernihiv regimental authorities ordered the rest of the company (*sotnia*) officers to have a uniform that was different from that of ordinary Cossacks: the top coat (*kuntush*) of dark blue cloth (*karun*), with a collar like those on the uniform of a fellow of the banner, with a stripe of “a single gold braid,” an under caftan of white cloth, hats with tops of red cloth “in the Don Cossack style,” red woolen belts and black boots, and cartridge boxes with brass buckles engraved with the regimental coat of arms on a red silk braid. Ordinary Cossacks had to reverse and mend old uniforms, and if necessary, sew new ones from the same dark-blue cloth as the officers’ uniform.

In addition to clothing, the Cossacks’ and *starshyna*’s ammunition and equipment was also regulated,⁷⁴ including the general appearance and material of saddle girth, bridles, reins, and stirrups. Lances were made according to uniform models. A separate directive pertained to Cossack horses, which were supposed to be “kept in cleanliness, with good hay as feed and not pasture, and not be overworked, and try as hard as possible to train them to be calm and not afraid of gunfire.”⁷⁵ It is interesting that these measures were aimed not only at polishing the Cossacks’ appearance, but also at drill training, because the order was “to train those Cossacks drill, as prescribed by His Illustrious Highness, and especially to load and fire respectably and quickly, and also to salute correctly, that is to present arms. And however many rank-and-file Cossacks live in the same household, train them all sufficiently ... so that those on foot, in particular, can fire correctly and swiftly, as whole companies or as the companies divided into two, three, or four.”⁷⁶

The culmination in the process of unification came at the *starshyna*’s general assembly in 1763, which required each regiment to send tall Cossacks to Hlukhiv, for whom model uniforms were sewn and ammunition was produced that in general appearance and colors copied the ensembles described above, which had been approved on Myloradovych’s initiative. The innovation was the introduction of the regimental color for the crowns of hats: red for Kyiv, Lubny, Poltava, and Chernihiv; blue for Pryluky; and green for the Nizhyn and Starodub regiments.⁷⁷

The next reform of clothing, again carried out at the expense of the Cossacks, progressed slowly. As evidenced by the materials from company chancelleries, the Cossacks often avoided sewing new things and buying ammunition, citing poverty or losses caused by recent crop failures. The hetman’s orders to purchase white cloth for under caftans at the Novi Mlyn and Baturyn factories, which

were owned by Rozumovs'kyi, were often ignored. Both the *starshyna* and the ordinary Cossacks bought cheaper and more affordable fabrics instead of the “regulation” ones, which ultimately negated the original intentions to uniformize the Cossack uniform in cut, color, and fabrics. The lack of centralized funding was exacerbated by the abuses of local authorities: captains, concerned about their own profits, concluded contracts for the production of caftans, coats (*svyty*), and hats without the consent of the Cossacks, almost forcibly charging them the cost of uniforms at clearly inflated prices.⁷⁸ It is worth noting here that the Cossacks, owing to their social psychology and habits, were themselves slow and reluctant to accept the introduction of new clothes. Thus, in July 1763, many Chernihiv Cossacks, who were the first and best uniformed in new attire of the other regiments of the Hetmanate, went on duty at outposts “without any uniforms, in simple coats.”⁷⁹ New clothes were saved for other occasions – general reviews and distant military campaign.

On the other hand, it is difficult to overestimate the symbolic significance of uniform reform in the context of Rozumovs'kyi's introduction and establishment of the “national style.” The basis of the Ukrainian army – the Cossack regiments – continued to maintain their traditional costume, which was organically connected to local traditions and way of life. At the same time, this style was subject to the new trends of the era – certain standards and unification, which, however, did not deprive it of its authenticity. It is significant that like the reformers of the Crown (Polish) and Lithuanian troops of the Commonwealth, Rozumovs'kyi did not introduce Western European uniforms for the Cossacks, dressing only his own guard in them, and opted for the traditional costume of the Cossack estate, making it uniform and adding rank symbols and insignia, as required by the needs of contemporary military practice.

Of particular significance in the context of the changes initiated under Rozumovs'kyi's hetmancy was “small flag reform” (*mala praporova reforma*). The well-known Ukrainian vexillologist Iurii Savchuk, who introduced the term, interprets it as a series of systematic uniformizations of regimental and company flags of a nationwide character (regulation by orders of the hetman and the centralized financing [at the expense of the Little Russian Treasury] of the production of regimental and company regalia) and scale (the preserved archival documents and museum exhibits serve as convincing evidence that the replacement of old flags with new models flags took place in at least a third of the companies in nine of the ten registered regiments).⁸⁰ According to his observations, the first harbingers that set a sort of standard for images that later spread throughout the Hetmanate were the company flags of the Nizhyn regiment. In March 1754, the Bakhmach company command applied to the hetman for permission to have a new company

flag made. In response, an authorization came from Moscow, ordering the allocation of the necessary funds from the treasury, “and on that Bakhmach company flag there should be the coat of arms of the Little Russian Nation on the right side, and on the other side, that of the Bakhmach company that the company uses as a seal.”⁸¹ We have before us perhaps the first mention of the traditional coat of arms of the Zaporozhian Host – a Cossack with a musket – as the coat of arms not only of the Hetmanate, but also of the Ukrainian nation. From then on, the national style began to establish itself rapidly in virtually all segments of the material life of the Hetmanate – from military symbols to architecture, included.

Researchers have yet to adequately appreciate and analyze this symbolic accompaniment of the outburst of Ukrainian autonomism, which in a dialogue with its imperial counterpart sought to assert the self-sufficiency and rootedness of its own particular, regional variety of autonomism. For us at this point it is significant and important that the symbolic separation of the national from the imperial began with the holy of holies of Cossack statehood, the core – its troops. A year later, on 8 March 1755, the hetman’s new decree for the first time established uniform symbols for all company flags: “the company flags, if any company needs one, will be updated spending the necessary amount from the military treasury, laying out money for those flags without excess and transfer, and order that those flags bear the coat of arms of the Nation on the right side of the flag, and that of the company for whom the flag is being updated on the reverse side.”⁸² From 1754 to 1761, eight new company flags were sewn for the Nizhyn regiment, which had blue panels of standard size depicting the “decreed” images (in the companies that did not have their own seals, letters were drawn to indicate their names on the back of the panels instead of the coat of arms).⁸³

Concerns about the appearance of the rank-and-file Cossack corps at the beginning of the Seven Years’ War accelerated the production of uniform flags in other regiments, as well. In May 1757, the General Military Chancellery gave permission to produce a new flag for the Syniavka company of the Chernihiv regiment, which was to be “constructed” according to the hetman’s order of March 1755, featuring the company symbols on one side, and the “national coat of arms,” on the other. By 1762, a single design of new regalia was produced for at least five companies of the Chernihiv regiment.⁸⁴ We get an idea of the complete set of regimental flags (that is, the regimental flag and the company colors) from the correspondence with the General Military Chancellery of the Lubny regimental administration and the individual flags preserved in museum collections. In the spring of 1758, the newly appointed Lubny colonel Ivan Kuliabko asked for permission to make flags for the Kurinka and Zhovnyn companies, sending an “outline” (drawing) to Hlukhiv for approval, “so that the same flags could be designed

for the other companies.”⁸⁵ The obverse image with the “national coat of arms” was the coat of arms of the Zaporozhian Host – a Cossack with a musket and a saber, surrounded by a magnificent baroque cartouche, superimposed on a framework of flags, cannon, muskets, maces, and musical instruments; the reverse featured the image of the regimental coat of arms – a hand outstretched from a cloud, holding a mace (*pernach*), framed by an identical cartouche and armature. A comparative analysis of two preserved flags (from the collection of the National Historical Museum of Ukraine), as well as descriptions of lost flags from the museum catalogues of the Kremlin Armory and the Kyiv Museum of Church Antiquities, conducted by Iurii Savchuk, showed that all of them have significant differences in the character of the drawings, and especially in the inscriptions on the panels. Thus, for example, the flag attributed to the Sencha company of the Lubny regiment featured on the reverse side, in addition to the image of the alleged company emblem in the form of a hand with a cross, supported by two angels, also verses (“Where Jesus suffers for the people, in the preservation of the mystery is our salvation. Look out before sinning, if someone is performing his duty”).⁸⁶ After restorers cleaned the image, they found that this drawing had concealed an earlier image of the regimental coat of arms – a hand with a mace. Obviously, numerous variations and deviations were also characteristic of the obverse images with the “national coat of arms.” Thus, for example, the flag of the Domontov company of the Pereiaslav regiment of 1762, sketched at the beginning of the nineteenth century by the amateur historian Dominique Pierre de la Flise, had two equally sized images of a Cossack with a sword (apparently, de la Flise confused it with a musket) and the Russian double-headed eagle on the front side; the inscription indicating the flag’s ownership was placed not on the reverse side, as the hetman’s orders usually prescribed, but along the perimeter of the front side.⁸⁷

Unfortunately, the materials of company and regimental administrations from the middle of the eighteenth century have been preserved extremely unevenly, so that in the absence of the relevant documents, it is difficult to say how full-scale and comprehensive the unification of Cossack flags was. The replacement of old flags with new ones proceeded as they naturally wore out and accelerated considerably during the Seven Years’ War. At the same time, the lack of money in the treasury, the slowness of concluding contracts in the regiments, multiplied by the long search for the necessary consumable materials, made the production of new regalia anything but quick. It is safe to say that the Cossack regiments did not have time to renew all their regalia even after the end of the war, and this process lasted almost until the end of the 1760s.

Perhaps the most successful and systemic reforms were those of the artillery corps. During Rozumovs'kyi's reign, an attempt was made to concentrate the management of the general and regimental artilleries in the hands of the general quartermaster. In November 1751, the then general quartermaster Semen Kochubei submitted a report to the hetman, in which he described all the disadvantages of a decentralized artillery department. Citing the fact that from the time of Hetman Apostol's reign, the General Artillery was supplying the regimental artilleries with gunpowder, munitions, and horses, and allocating funds for the repair of cannon, for transport, and for training of personnel, yet had no control over them or assistance in return, Kochubei asked that all the income of the regimental artilleries be transferred under his control, and "all those found in the regiments serving in the regimental and company artilleries as gunners ... cannoneers, craftsmen ... be ordered to be at my complete disposal and obey my orders in everything."⁸⁸ Although this proposal ("in order to bring the regimental and company artilleries to the best possible level of serviceability") was approved by the hetman's order of 21 November 1751, it failed to result in the ultimate centralization of the administration and supply of the artillery.⁸⁹ At the same time, the organization of artillery personnel was streamlined (cannoneers and gunners), who were formed into companies with a permanent staff, and the foundry yards in Hlukhiv were renovated, which began manufacturing uniform cannon for the regimental artillery.

Strategically important for the development of the artillery and the hetman's armed forces in general was the resumption of gunpowder production, which had been prohibited by the imperial government in 1742. The order to restore gunpowder production signed by Rozumovs'kyi on 29 March 1751 was apparently issued without prior permission, without the traditional "highest" approval. However, the confrontation over the gunpowder monopoly did not end there, having received a new impetus after the coming to power of Catherine II. In January 1763, General Chief of the Artillery (*Generalfeldzeugmeister*) Alexander de Villebois wrote to Rozumovs'kyi to ask on what grounds "the Little Russians have permission in the matter of gunpowder," and in response received a rather vague explanation that the Hetmanate has from the emperors "special affirmations, rights, and privileges by virtue of which it is permitted to use all domestic products ... freely and without encumbrance." In January 1764, when circumstances tended to point to the abdication of the hetmancy by Rozumovs'kyi, the Senate sent the empress a request to resolve the "Little Russian gunpowder case," which received an unequivocal resolution: "the Senate can solve this matter without me, by virtue of existing laws."⁹⁰ On 30 January 1764, a decree was issued "on the

destruction of the existing gunpowder factories in Little Russia and henceforth on the non-existence thereof, and on the delivery of gunpowder made in Moscow to the Little Russian troops.”⁹¹ This order was the final word in the empire’s affirmation of its monopoly on the production of strategically important ammunition munitions and control over their distribution, forever depriving the hetman’s armed forces of an independent material base, and therefore prospects for development.

Meanwhile, the conditions for Rozumovs'kyi’s turbulent reformist activity had changed. The ascension to the Russian throne of the new Empress Catherine II did not initially affect Ukrainian affairs – Rozumovs'kyi had been her friend for a long time. The situation was changed by the assembly of the *starshyna*, which gathered in Hlukhiv in the fall of 1763 to begin the tradition of “Cossack Diets.” The newly formed *starshyna* parliament approved a petition that reminded St Petersburg of the contractual nature of its relations with Ukraine and asked to secure the right to inherit the hetman’s mace by the Rozumovs'kyi family, which constituted an open challenge to imperial centralism. The matter was settled without much fanfare – the Russian troops in the Hetmanate were put on alert, and the uncrowned Cossack “monarch” was summoned to the capital, where he was persuaded to voluntarily renounce the hetmancy. This position remained vacant for some time, until in November 1764 Catherine II signed a decree that eliminated it forever. Many historians interpreted the abolition of the hetmancy as a consequence of Catherine II’s irritation with the Rozumovs'kyi family’s dynastic claims. In fact, this was a pretext, while the true reasons were hidden in fears of the strengthening of the Hetmanate as a result of reforms, with the prospect of turning it into a separate Little Russian Principality under the rule of the Rozumovs'kyis.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as Oleksii Sokyрко, “Viis'kovi reformy za het'manuvania Kyryla Rozumovs'koho, 1750–1764 rr.,” in *Ukraïns'ka derzhava druhoï polovyny XVII-XVIII st.: polityka, suspil'stvo, kul'tura*, ed. Valerii Smolii (Kyiv, 2014), 359–84. Copyright 2014 by NASU Institute of History of Ukraine.

Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 *Tsentrāl'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter TSDIAUK), f. 269, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 2–2 zv. Needless to say, a fierce struggle for influence and future grants

was underway among the *starshyna* leadership in anticipation of the hetman's arrival in the capital. Thus, Val'kevych and Skoropads'kyi tried to remove General Judge Iakym Horlenko from the General Military Court, accusing him of negligence, and to replace him with a temporary Collegium of Governors from among their confidants (Ibid., ark. 30–30 zv., 37–8).

- 2 A more or less integral study of the Cossack military of the Rozumovs'kyi period is Oleksii Putro's, "Ukraïns'ke kozats'ke viis'ko," *Kyïvs'ka starovyna* 6 (1997): 3–33; 7 (1998): 3–25.
- 3 D.N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Biografiï rossiiskikh generalissimusov i general-fel'dmarshalov* (St Petersburg, 1840), 1:240–54.
- 4 The control by the Rozumovs'kyi brothers, Oleksii and Kyrylo, simultaneously of two units of the Imperial guard opened another channel for Ukrainians to enter imperial service and at the same time launched the formation of one more network of their clients. In the middle of the eighteenth century, as a result of two palace coups, the imperial guard finally turned into a Praetorian corps, all the ranks of which were linked not only by official but also by personal ties with various high government officials and court parties. Researchers rightly point out that in the coup of 1741, the guards were not just extras and executors of the will of the nobles, but also full-fledged actors in it. This was facilitated by the behavior of Elizabeth, who for many years paid a lot of attention to the guard regiments. Not only was the empress friendly with officers, but she also did not disdain the company of non-commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers, to whom she generously gave money, attended their weddings, and christened their children. This played a significant role in the events of the November revolution: the guard did not follow abstract slogans, but "their" empress, the daughter of the legendary Peter I. The appointment of Rozumovs'kyi as the commander of the regiment (the real colonels and chiefs were traditionally members of the imperial family, as was Elizabeth Petrovna herself at that time) can be considered indicative and symptomatic. Founded in 1730, the Izmailovskii Lifeguard Regiment was a unit formed by a decree issued by Anna Ioannovna that was supposed to become a kind of counterweight to the "old" imperial guard, which was characterized by hostility to the Empress and her minions. However, from the beginning of its existence, the regiment had a significant number of "Little Russians" and "Ukrainians" in its ranks – homesteaders (*odnodvirtsy*) and soldiers from the Kyiv gubernia and the regiments of the Ukrainian Land Militia (*landmilitsiia*) (A.V. Viskovatov, *Istoricheskoe obozrenie leib-gvardii Izmailovskogo polka. 1730–1850* [St Petersburg, 1851], 2–5; N.A. Znosko-Borovskii, *Istoriia leib-gvardii Izmailovskogo polka: 1730–1880* [St Petersburg, 1882], 5–6). This factor, of course,

may have played an additional role in the nomination of Rozumovs'kyi, but Elizabeth's desire to put the supporters of the former empress and the German court party under the close control of her "own" person clearly weighed no less. Judging from everything, a traditional model of patron-client relations, typical for the army milieu of the time, had emerged in the regiment during Rozumovs'kyi's time (1748–96).

The commander was a high-level patron of the officer corporation, a father-protector and defender of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, who at the same time took little part in the daily life of the regiment, which was actually run by his trusted representatives, not necessarily from the military establishment. Thus, denunciations from the beginning of the 1750s accused the hetman's close advisor and assistant Grigorii Teplov of monopolizing all promotions and appointments to positions in the regiment (A. Vasil'chikov, *Semeistvo Razumovskikh v 5 tomakh* [St Petersburg, 1880–94], 1: 107).

- 5 The Saxon diplomat Pezold wrote about Chancellor Vorontsov and the older Rozumovs'kyi brother, Oleksii, as people who "have no idea of military matters" ("Doneseniia sekretaria posol'stva Petsol'da s ianvaria 1742 po mart 1744 g.," in *Sbornik imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*; hereafter *SIRIO* [Moscow, 1873], 6: 396).
- 6 S.V. Andriainen, *Imperiia proektov: gosudarstvennaia deiatel'nost' P.I. Shuvalova* (St Petersburg, 2001), 149–70.
- 7 L.G. Beskrovnyi, *Russkaia armiia i flot v XVIII veke* (Moscow, 1958), 304–9; V.A. Zolotarev, M.N. Mezhevich, and D.E. Skorodumov, *Vo slavu otechestva rossiiskogo (Razvitie voennoi mysli i voennogo iskusstva Rossii vo vtoroi polovine 18 v.)* (Moscow, 1984), 106–7.
- 8 ТSDIAUK, f. 269, op. 1, spr. 70, ark. 3.
- 9 Ibid., f. 269, op. 1, spr. 115, ark. 2; spr. 275, ark. 2–2 zv., 4.
- 10 *Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukraïny im. V.I. Vernads'koho* (Manuscript Institute of V.I. Vernads'kyi National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – IR NBU), f. 8, spr. 538, ark. 1–7.
- 11 Ibid., art. 8–8 zv.
- 12 Ibid., ark. 10–10 zv.
- 13 Ibid., ark. 11 zv.–12.
- 14 Ibid., ark. 12 zv.
- 15 Ibid., f. 8, spr. 2267, ark. 52; f. 61, spr. 1084, ark. 11–11 zv.
- 16 IR NBU, f. 61, spr. 1084, ark. 10 zv.; *Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova* (Moscow, 1875), 7: 285, 290–1.
- 17 IR NBU, f. 61, spr. 1084, ark. 10 zv.

- 18 Rozumovs'kyi had tried to raise this matter as far back as in March 1756, but his report was scheduled “to be presented at a general meeting” no sooner than in July, when military preparations were in full swing, and the matter had to wait its turn until the fall, when an urgent need arose in this respect (IR NBU, f. 61, spr. 1084, ark. 15).
- 19 Both documents, borrowed by O. Lazarevs'kyi from the *Sulimovskii arkhiv. Famil'nye bumagi Sulim, Skorup i Voitsekhovichei. XVII–XVIII v.*, were published in 1884 in *Kievskaiia starina* (the excerpt was cited even earlier by O. Shafons'kyi in his *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisaniie s kratkim geograficheskim i istoricheskim opisaniem Maloi Rossii* [Kyiv, 1851]), but omitting some important details, in particular, the division of ranks into classes (See “Malorossiiskie chiny i dolzhnosti i oklad ikh soderzhaniia,” *Kievskaiia starina* 6 [1883]: 381–5). Another “Report on the Little Russian *starshyna*,” which is in the Kharkiv Archive of Ancient Documents, was cited by D. Miller (*Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskogo byta staroi Malorossii. Prevrashchenie kazatskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo* [Kyiv, 1897], 17–18). They all contain differences and variant readings, which is why we cite the text from yet another report from the middle of the eighteenth century, found in O. Kistiakovs'kyi's collection (IR NBU, f. 61, spr. 1084, ark. 13 zv.–15).
- 20 Miller, *Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskogo byta staroi Malorossii*, 18–20.
- 21 *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov* (Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents, hereinafter – RGADA), f. 13, op. 1, d. 55, ll. 1–2 zv.
- 22 *Ibid.*, ark. 3 zv.
- 23 *Ibid.*, ark. 3.
- 24 S. Troitskii, “Komissiia o vol'nosti dvorianstva 1763 g.,” in S.M. Troitskii, *Rossiiia v XVIII veke: Sbornik statei i publikatsii* (Moscow, 1982), 145–6.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 145–7.
- 26 RGADA, f. 13, op. 1, d. 55, ll. 15–20. The commission's researcher S. Troitskii lost sight of this page in the history of the commission's activity, because the materials from the hearings on the “Little Russian” matter were removed from the funds of Catherine II's Cabinet and the Sixteenth *Razriad* (fund) of the State Archive of the Russian Empire, where most of the commission's paperwork was held, and were included in the funds-collection “Dela ob Ukraine” (f. 13) of RGADA.
- 27 *Ibid.*, ark. 9–11 zv.
- 28 *Ibid.*, ark. 21–2 zv.
- 29 *Ibid.*, ark. 22.
- 30 Troitskii, “Komissiia o vol'nosti dvorianstva 1763 g.,” 189–92.

- 31 TS DIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, spr. 11304, ark. 4.
- 32 Ibid., spr. 12519, ark. 2.
- 33 Ibid., spr. 17664, ark. 2.
- 34 Ibid., f. 269, op. 1, spr. 4543, ark. 2.
- 35 Ibid., f. 54, op. 3, spr. 527, ark. 1.
- 36 Ibid., f. 269, op. 1, spr. 3997, ark. 2.
- 37 Ibid., spr. 4543, ark. 2 zv.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Ibid., f. 51, op. 3, spr. 11389, ark. 1–9, 11.
- 40 Ibid., f. 269, op. 1, spr. 1039, ark. 2–2 zv., 3–4.
- 41 Ibid., ark. 13–13 zv.
- 42 Ibid., f. 51, op. 3, spr. 10762, ark. 2; spr. 11702, ark. 15–17; spr. 12906, ark. 10 zv.
- 43 Ibid., spr. 11641, ark. 3–4.
- 44 Ibid., ark. 5–5 zv.
- 45 Vasil'chikov, *Semeistvo Razumovskikh*, 1: 161. It is noteworthy that Rozumovs'kyi was accompanied by the officers who were most familiar with the state of governance of the country; it is also known that the hetman inspected the fortifications.
- 46 TS DIAUK, f. 108, op. 2, spr. 236, ark. 1a–1a zv.
- 47 *Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova*, 3: 493.
- 48 Ibid., 511.
- 49 TS DIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, spr. 14411, ark. 2–2 zv.
- 50 This trend applied not only to Ukrainian and Sloboda Cossacks but also to other irregular military formations. It was not until the mid-1770s that a course was set for the massive use of Cossack corps and coordination of their actions with the field army, the provision of artillery, and so forth (Zolotarev, Mezhevich, and Skorodumov, *Vo slavu otechestva rossiiskogo*, 58).
- 51 *Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova*, 7: 326.
- 52 Ibid., 3: 515, 524–5.
- 53 Vasil'chikov, *Semeistvo Razumovskikh*, 1: 207.
- 54 TS DIAUK, f. 269, op. 1, spr. 1971, ark. 54, 63, 76.
- 55 Ibid., ark. 156.
- 56 Ibid., f. 108, op. 2, spr. 498, ark. 1a.
- 57 Ibid., ark. 2.
- 58 The originals of the instruction are held in TS DIAUK, f. 108, op. 2, spr. 498, ark. 3–3 zv., 4–4 zv.; for the publication and analysis of the texts see O. Sokyрко, "Mushtrovi statuty het'mans'koho viis'ka 1756 roku," *Kyivs'ka starovyna* 5 (2005): 67–81.

- 59 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, spr. 14141, ark. 2, 5.
- 60 For greater detail about this, see O. Sokyрко, “‘Malorosiis'ka ruchnytsia’ i pereozbroiennia kozats'koho viis'ka 1728–1750 rr.,” *Kyivs'ka starovyna* 6 (2005): 3–12.
- 61 S. Slavutych, “Ozbroiennia kozats'koho viis'ka Het'manshchyny u XVIII st.,” in *Viis'kovo-istorychnyi al'manakh* 1 (16) (Kyiv, 2008), 140.
- 62 Ibid., 144.
- 63 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, spr. 14054, ark. 43, 44.
- 64 Ibid., spr. 15839, ark. 2–2 zv.
- 65 Ibid., ark. 2 zv.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Slavutych, “Ozbroiennia kozats'koho viis'ka Het'manshchyny u 18 st.,” 146.
- 68 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, spr. 15839, ark. 7.
- 69 Ivan P. Kotliarev's'kyi, *Eneida*, trans. Bohdan Melnyk, 1st ed. (Toronto, 2004), 146.
- 70 S. Slavutych, “Do istorii kozats'koho mundyru v Het'manshchyni,” in *Viis'kovo-istorychnyi al'manakh* 2 (19) (2009): 90–1. The Military Collegium sent all the irregular troops special regulations that prescribed a uniform color of cloth from which the uniforms were to be sewn.
- 71 Ibid., 72–3.
- 72 Ibid.,
- 73 TSDIAUK, f. 108, op. 2, spr. 658, ark. 1a–2; Slavutych, “Do istorii kozats'koho mundyru v Het'manshchyni,” 1 (20), 73–4.
- 74 TSDIAUK, f. 108, op. 2, spr. 658, ark. 2 zv.
- 75 Ibid., ark. 3.
- 76 Ibid., ark. 2.
- 77 Slavutych, “Do istorii kozats'koho mundyru v Het'manshchyni,” 1 (20), 75.
- 78 Ibid., 74–5, 79.
- 79 TSDIAUK, f. 108, op. 2, spr. 732, ark. 15.
- 80 Iu. Savchuk, “K voprosu o znamennoi reforme K. Razumovskogo 1755–1764 gg.,” in *Vos'maia Vserossiiskaia numizmaticheskaia konferentsiia, Moskva, 17-21 aprelia 2000 g.: Tezisy dokladov i soobshchenii* (Moscow, 2000), 217–19.
- 81 Iu. Savchuk, “Z istorii formuvannia praporovykh tradytsii Nizhyns'koho polku (druha polovyna XVIII st.),” in *Spetsial'ni istorychni dystsypliny: pytannia teorii ta metodyky* (Kyiv, 2004), 11:56–7.
- 82 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, spr. 12121, ark. 25.
- 83 Savchuk, “Z istorii formuvannia praporovykh tradytsii Nizhyns'koho polku,” 81.

- 84 Іу. Savchuk, “Sotenni prapory Chernihivs'koho polku druhoї polovyny XVIII st.” in *Spetsial'ni istorychni dystsypliny: pytannia teorii ta metodyky* (Kyiv, 2005), 12:6–25.
- 85 Іу. Savchuk, “Natsional'nyi herb ta formuvannia prapornychoї tradytsii v Ukraїni-Het'manshchyni (na materialakh Lubens'koho polku XVIII st.),” in *Ukraїna kriz viky: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu akademika NAN Ukraїny profesora Valeriia Smoliia* (Kyiv, 2010), 1075–6.
- 86 Ibid., 1084.
- 87 D.P. delia Fliz [Dominique Pierre de la Flise], *Al'bomy* (Kyiv, 1996) 1:127.
- 88 TSDIAUK, f. 51, op. 3, spr. 10108, ark. 99–99 zv.
- 89 Ibid., ark. 100.
- 90 *Ekstrakt iz ukazov, instruksii i uchrezhdenii s razdeleniem po materiiam na deviatnadsiat' chastei ... 1786 goda* (Chernihiv, 1902), 276–7.
- 91 TSDIAUK, f. 269, op. 1, spr. 4147, ark. 2.

“For Deliveries to Tsargrad and Other Neighboring States”
(Kyiv Reiters in the Eighteenth Century)

VADYM NAZARENKO

Scholars investigating the history of the Hetmanate usually ignore the fact that large enclaves of Russian troops – garrisons – were stationed in the largest cities of the Cossack polity. Objectively, they were part of the city community, but, at the same time, they constituted a separate world, with distinct ethnocultural and social characteristics. This microcosm had its own laws, mechanisms of development, and structure, all the while intensively interacting with the urban world of the Hetmanate. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the garrisons in the cities of the Russian Empire were multifunctional entities that performed not only military but also administrative and economic roles. Each Russian military contingent had its own special features, which were determined by the geopolitical status of the city. The garrisons of the Russian state in the cities of the Hetmanate from the second half of the seventeenth through the eighteenth century were no exception, although each of them (the garrisons of Kyiv, Hlukhiv, Nizhyn, Pereiaslav, etc.) had its own specific character. Kyiv’s special status as an important administrative, religious, and political center, and simultaneously a border city, left an impression on every aspect of the Russian military presence in it. One example of this regional particularity, which reflects the entire array of other important characteristics of a “garrison city,” is the history of the Kyiv Reiter detachment – a small unit of cavalry couriers, who provided a communication link for the Kyiv governors and the Russian envoys in Istanbul with the highest government bodies of the Russian Empire. Over the course of a century, this small group of garrison troops became a socio-professional corporation, whose memory is preserved in

the toponymy of the Ukrainian capital. One of the streets in central Kyiv is called Reitarska, where the embassies of France, Hungary, and Estonia are located.

In contrast to other structural elements of the Kyiv garrison, the Kyiv Reiter detachment, because of its atypicality and regular mentions in various sources, drew the attention of scholars from the very start, and one of the first to make reference to them was their contemporary Opanas Shafons'kyi. Oleksandr Andriievs'kyi and Volodymyr Shcherbyna devoted small studies to the Reiters.¹ In his reference work on the administrative apparatus of Southern Ukraine, historian Andrii Makidonov compiled a list of Kyiv Reiters who are mentioned in eighteenth-century sources.²

The Reiter detachment³ was a special part of the Kyiv garrison. Its duties differed substantially from the duties of the other structural units of the garrison, in that the Reiters served as couriers and did not perform any garrison functions as such. The Reiters were under the authority of the Kyiv governor, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, and the Senate. This special subordination ensured them a more favorable status than that of the personnel of the rest of the garrison's units and subunits. The Reiters were the "governor's men" and therefore felt much more secure than most of the officers and soldiers of the Kyiv garrison. The Reiters' privileged status prompted them to establish their sons in the detachment. Therefore "outsiders" – the soldiers and officers of the garrison and army regiments, Cossacks, and others – also attempted to find a place for themselves in the detachment. Not infrequently, those aspiring to a place in the unit agreed to serve "above the specified number [*sverkh komplekta*]" and waited for a vacancy for several years, receiving no salary during this time.

The Reiter detachment was a semi-closed socioprofessional group within the Kyiv garrison, a social phenomenon of sorts. There is plenty of evidence to confirm this. The Reiters were bound by collective responsibility for the expenditure of the funds that were disbursed to them for duty assignments.⁴ The Kyiv Reiters had their own church (St George's), which formed a separate parish.⁵ They married within their own group.

A requirement for candidates for service in the unit was elementary literacy ("ability to read and write Russian"). In addition, many Reiters knew (if only at the conversational level) the Turkish and Tatar languages.⁶

In the Russian army of the seventeenth century, the Reiter regiments were recruited mostly from among nobles serving in the "company service [*sotennaia sluzhba*]" (poor children of boyars, who upon their enlistment in the Reiters received not only a salary, but also a plot of land) of the Belgorod and Sevsk territorial units (*razriady*).⁷ The first Reiter regiment in the Russian army was formed in 1632.⁸ The number of such units gradually increased, especially during wars.

However, under the Petrovian reforms, the Reiter regiments were disbanded and their personnel were either transferred to dragoon units, or they became the basis for the formation of land militia regiments.

Unlike in the rest of the lands of the empire, the Kyiv Reiters survived, becoming an eloquent fragment of the internal mosaic of the Kyiv garrison throughout the eighteenth century. The first Reiter regiments are recorded in Kyiv in 1658.⁹ From 1672 to 1719, one Reiter regiment, named the Kyiv regiment, was stationed in Kyiv. During the period of 1672–1718, it numbered from 91 to 174 men.¹⁰ The last commander of the regiment was Ivan Pozdeev, who is first mentioned in Patrick Gordon's diary in the 1680s, and later in the inventory of 1695. In 1700 he figures as one of the regiment's officers (with the rank of major), and in 1718, as its commander.¹¹ According to the Soviet historian Moisei Rabinovich, the Reiter regiment under the command of Ivan Pozdeev was disbanded in 1719, and was replaced by the Kyiv Reiter detachment (*komanda*).¹² Most of the documents pertaining to its formation contain references to tsarist edicts from 1725 ("ordered there to be 50 Reiters in Kyiv").¹³ In contrast to Rabinovich, the Russian-Ukrainian historian Oleksii Andriievs'kyi (1845–1902) insists that that was the year in which the Reiter regiment was disbanded and the detachment was formed.¹⁴ In spite of these differences, it is quite obvious that after the regiment's dissolution, a Reiter unit or subunit continued to serve in Kyiv. Apparently, what took place in 1725 was a reorganization: the command staff of the unit was approved, and the main duties of the Reiters were specified, some of which they had performed earlier. This is confirmed by a mention in 1723 about the Reiters who were to travel to Istanbul with letters, as well as the autobiographical testimony of Kyiv Reiter Grigorii Bershov regarding the extension of his "Reiter service" after the regiment had been disbanded.¹⁵ The Senate decree of 1 April 1726 already acknowledged the existence of the Kyiv Reiters as couriers.¹⁶ One of the last mentions of this detachment dates to 1796.¹⁷

The Kyiv Reiter detachment was subordinated to several higher central state institutions: the Senate, the War Collegium, and the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. The latter department was the one most responsible for the Kyiv Reiters, inasmuch as they provided the means of communication with Russian residents in Istanbul. The size of the detachment and the costs of maintaining it were determined by decrees of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs and the Senate. Promotions in rank also required approval by the Collegium of Foreign Affairs.¹⁸

The detachment was administered directly by the Kyiv governor, and hence all documentation regarding assignment and relief from duty, the dispatch of Reiters on missions, payment of their salaries, and the issuance of their travel documents and travelling allowances were handled by the Kyiv governor's chancellery.

The authorized strength of the detachment in 1725–66 was determined by decrees of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, dated 25 March 1725, and of the Senate, dated 4 April of the same year, and totaled fifty men.¹⁹ This number is confirmed by information about the salaries paid to Reiters and reports about their enlistment and discharge from service.²⁰ In 1765 the strength of the detachment was increased to 62 men (captain, ensign, wachtmeister (*vakhtmistr*), corporal, and 58 Reiters).²¹ In 1772 the personnel of the detachment numbered 64 men.²² According to chancellery documents, as of 1765, the courier unit was treated as equal to a gubernial company (*gubernskaia rota*).²³

Recruitment into the Reiter detachment had its own specific character. Service in the unit was expressly heritable, enshrined in the law as of 1726. An imperial decree of 11 May 1726 “ordered that the children of Kyiv Reiters be recruited and assigned to the Kyiv Reiter detachment as Reiters.”²⁴ This resulted in the creation of something like Reiter dynasties. For example, in 1733 such Reiter “minors” as Aleksii Lisitsin, Stepan Zhukov, and Artemii Gorenskii were listed as members of the unit.²⁵ In 1761 the son of Reiter Stepan Babin, Tymofei, joined the detachment, and in 1763, the son of Reiter Roshchepkin, Vasilii.²⁶ This is only a short list of examples of the sons of Reiters included in the detachment.

Service records from 1769 and 1772 clearly identify the parentage of Reiters. According to them, the “children of Reiters” made up more than 60 per cent of the unit’s personnel.²⁷ The gubernial chancellery kept a register of the minor sons of Reiters, the “Reiter minors.”²⁸ The reports written by the chancellery listed their ages and also information about their ability to read and write. Thus, in 1770, according to the Kyiv gubernial chancellery, there were 45 “Reiter minors” aged from six months to seventeen years in Kyiv.²⁹

The lists of personnel of the Reiter detachment contain a number of surnames that are repeated many times: in 1748 there were five each of Babins and Kozlovs, four Zhukovs, and three each of Lisitsins and Kharlamovs.³⁰ The service records of 1772 list three Zhukovs and two representatives each of the Babin, Kharlamov, and Lisitsin families.³¹ Members of the Babin family served as Reiters in Kyiv from as far back as the end of the seventeenth century. In particular, in 1674, there is mention of one Babin (Zakhar) among the officers of the Kyiv Reiter regiment, and in 1695, there are already four Babins (Zakhar, Iarmola, Andrei, and Vasilii).³² The heritability of service in the Babin family in the Reiter detachment can be traced throughout the eighteenth century.³³

It would be wrong, however, to believe that most of the Kyiv Reiters in the eighteenth century were descendants of those who served in the final quarter of the seventeenth century. We know that of the 174 Reiters in Ivan Pozdeev’s regiment in 1718, 135 had been recruited into the service in 1713.³⁴ Reiter Grygorii Bershov

reported in 1733 that he was a native of Putyvl county.³⁵ In 1728, five Reiters were given leave to travel home – supposedly the territory of Putyvl county.³⁶ It was this category of “people from the old services” (until 1699, “noblemen of company service,” of whom, as a rule, the Reiter regiments were formed in the second half of the seventeenth century) that were recruited into Ivan Pozdeev’s regiment. Most of them were natives of the Putyvl region. Therefore, the formation of what could be called Reiter dynasties should be dated to the second quarter of the eighteenth century, after the heritability of service in this unit was officially approved. In addition, there was an indigenization of Reiters: they bought houses, married, and their children grew up in Kyiv rather than somewhere in Putyvl county.

Reiter families were closely bound by family ties. Thus in 1772, Kyiv Reiter Ievstafii Renshkeev noted that, being one of the “Reiter children,” he was once married to the daughter of another Kyiv Reiter.³⁷ In addition, Renshkeev had a son-in-law, a Kyiv Reiter who was already retired.³⁸

Another way of manning the Reiter detachment was by transferring soldiers and officers of the Kyiv garrison or field regiments into its ranks, as well as by enlisting the children of company-grade and non-commissioned officers into the unit. The majority of these recruits were the children of soldiers and officers of the Kyiv garrison. For example, the (incomplete) service record of 1769 lists thirteen persons who had been transferred to the detachment from the battalions of the Kyiv garrison and other units.³⁹ In 1772 there were already seventeen such Reiters.⁴⁰ As a rule, soldiers and non-commissioned officers of garrison and army regiments, after serving many years, were promoted to officer rank and transferred to the Reiter detachment. Not infrequently, recently transferred former soldiers and officers from garrison and army regiments to the detachment tried to find a place in the units of their sons or relatives.⁴¹

Family ties with Reiter families facilitated transfer to the unit. Apparently, that is how K. Shevyryn, who came from the “soldiers’ children,” got into the detachment.⁴²

Not infrequently, former Reiters served in the garrison regiments and battalions or worked as secretaries in the governor chancellery. For example, in 1766, of the 24 captains of Kyiv garrison battalions, two (7.6 per cent) had a “Reiter” origin,⁴³ and in 1771, of 72 lieutenants (*poruchyky*) and ensigns (*praporshchyky*), they accounted for four such men (5.5 per cent).⁴⁴

Often, in the absence of vacancies, acceptance into the Reiter detachment took place “above the specified number.” We know from petitions that many candidates agreed to serve in the unit while waiting for personnel vacancies, which attests to the prestige associated with service in the Reiters. Thus in 1765, Petro Levenets', the son of a Cossack in the Kyiv regiment, petitioned to be accepted for service

in the Reiter detachment, and if there were no vacancies, to include him “above the specified number.”⁴⁵ Levenets’ was fortunate in that at the time of his petition, there were 49 Reiters in the unit – that is, there was one vacancy. Timofei Babin, son of a Reiter, had to serve two years “above the specified number,”⁴⁶ and Iefrem Sahaidakov, a year and a half.⁴⁷

To be accepted into the detachment, the children of Reiters had to receive some training (other candidates, as a rule, already had experience of service at the time of joining the unit). Although the candidate usually noted that “[he had been] taught to read and write Russian at his aforementioned father’s expense,” it is quite likely that applicants were also required to be able to handle weapons and to be at home in the saddle (the specific tasks assigned to the Reiter detachment).⁴⁸

It was desirable for the candidate to know how to read and write: according to the 1772 service record, every sixth Reiter was illiterate (the entry stated that he had not been certified “because of inability to read and write”).⁴⁹ The “uncertified” included both the children of soldiers and peasants and the children of Reiters. Based on their backgrounds, all noblemen, children of officers, and “Little Russians” knew how to read and write. At the same time, the greatest number of illiterates were found among those of peasant origin (two out of three) and the children of soldiers (four out of eleven). Among the “indigenous” Reiters, every thirteenth did not know how to read and write. It is worth noting that although it was desirable for candidates for acceptance into the detachment to be literate, this was not a determinative factor. Illiterate new recruits, either on their own or because they were forced to do so by their commanders, mastered reading and writing while serving in the unit. Thus in 1772, the Kyiv Reiter Aleksandr Kyprianov was illiterate, but by 1783, he was already able read and write.⁵⁰

Reiters had to be sufficiently proficient in the Tatar and Turkish languages. Thus in 1744, a report of the Kyiv governor chancellery noted that a number of Reiters had a good command of Turkish.⁵¹ Stepan Melnikov, who headed the detachment in 1772–81, was also an interpreter from Turkish.⁵²

Discharge from the Reiter detachment occurred as a result of old age or illness, transfer to another service, or, as punishment, transfer to the regular garrison regiments or battalions. In the first instance, Reiters most often cited old age and illness associated with the particular aspects of cavalry service; for example, the documents contain such reasons as “from horse blows that caused complete exhaustion and weakness of my health” and “exhaustion from horse blows.”⁵³ Another reason was transfer to another unit. That is what happened to Reiter Grigorii Kolpakov, who was discharged from the detachment “for drunkenness and indecent acts” and transferred to serve as an ordinary soldier in the Kyiv garrison,

which yet again attests to the higher status of Reiter service as compared with service in the garrison battalions.⁵⁴

A more detailed analysis of Reiters as a socioprofessional group can be conducted based on the service records of the personnel of the Kyiv Reiter detachment for 1769 and 1772, which list the name and surname of each Reiter, his age, social background, ownership of serfs, information about the beginning of service, and promotions in rank. The records of service also contain information about the participation of Reiters in military operations or period spent in captivity and ability to serve.

According to the record of service for 1772, the social backgrounds of Reiters were as follows:

Table 10.1 Social background of the Kyiv Reiters according to the 1772 record of service

<i>Social background</i>	<i>Number of people</i>	<i>%</i>
Children of Reiters	39	60.8
Children of soldiers and officers	14	21.9
Peasants (who were recruited)	3	4.7
"Little Russians"	3	4.7
Noblemen	2	3.1
"of chancellery personnel" (<i>prikaznogo china</i>)	1	1.6
Children of clergy	1	1.6
Children of interpreters	1	1.6
Total	64	100

Source: TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.-17.

Thus, the sons of Reiters made up over half the personnel of the detachment. As to other groups (estate and socioprofessional), second place was held by Reiters who were "children of soldiers," "children of noncommissioned officers," and "children of company-grade officers." In 1769, the unit included eight "children of soldiers," two "children of non-commissioned officers," and three "children of company-grade officers."⁵⁵ The 1772 service record also listed two noblemen. Thus, Ivan Sukovin at the time of his transfer to the detachment was twenty-eight years old and had taken part in several wars.⁵⁶ Another nobleman, Ivan Sukhochov, began serving in the Reiter detachment (as of 1756) and in 1772 was forty-six years

old. Listed among other “non-Reiter children” were the sons of a cantor, an interpreter, and of “chancellery personnel” background.

The category of “Little Russians” consisted of three Reiters who were native Ukrainians. One of them was the aforementioned Petro Levenets' – a Cossack in the Kyiv regiment, who at the age of twenty-three joined the unit (in 1765).⁵⁷ The other two (Vasyl' Fedoriv and Vasyl' Kryshtalevs'kyi) are identified only as “Little Russian” without any indication of their social background.

In 1769, Iefrem Sahaidakov left the unit, reporting that he was “of native Polish nobility.”⁵⁸ A damaged list from 1769 includes the Serb Petro Voinovych (native of Belgrade) in the detachment, stating that he began his service in the unit in 1768 (with the rank of *wachtmeister*).⁵⁹ He no longer appears in the 1772 service record.

From the service record for 1772, we learn the age of the Kyiv Reiters. The majority of them were from twenty to forty years old (nearly 60 per cent). Reiters who were “soldiers' children” and peasants that had been recruited into the military comprised the older members of the unit.⁶⁰ Unfortunately, owing to a lack of a source base, we cannot compare the ages of the Reiters with the corresponding indicators for soldiers of the garrison. At the same time, we know that after 1764, the garrison battalions were formed, as a rule, of soldiers and officers who were unable to perform field service because of the state of their health (as a result of old age, wounds, or illnesses). Very little information has been preserved about the mortality rate and its causes among the Kyiv Reiters. We know that the prime major (*prem'ier-maior*) of the detachment died in 1781 at the age of fifty.⁶¹ Reiters also died during the performance of their duties. Thus in 1743, Ivan Shydlovskii died under unknown circumstances,⁶² and in 1771, the interpreter Ivan Maniunin died in Turkish captivity.⁶³

Let us also turn our attention to the subject of promotions in rank of Reiters, the special aspects of climbing the career ladder by the representatives of various social groups, and the manner of and reasons for promotions, and so forth. Let us begin at the very top of the Reiter detachment. The first known commander, Fedor Nakovalnin, began his service in the unit as an ensign (*praporshchik*). In 1738, he was already a major.⁶⁴ Later he obtained the rank of colonel and became head of the Starodub garrison regiment of the Kyiv garrison, and additionally served as the town major (*komendant*) of Nizhyn.⁶⁵ Fedor's son, Aleksii Nakovalnin, who also began his service in the Reiter detachment in 1735, eventually became Kyiv's chief of police (1752–62).⁶⁶ Artemii Solovkov, who headed the detachment in 1752–69, was the son of a Reiter. He began his career in the unit in 1738 as secretary.⁶⁷

Reiter commander Stepan Melnikov in 1772–81 came from the "chancery personnel"⁶⁸ and was given the office of commander as a reward for his service as secretary of the Russian embassy in Istanbul.⁶⁹ The interpreter of the governor chancellery, Matvei Melnikov, may have been his relative.⁷⁰ We know that Stepan was the godfather of a child of the commander Kyiv garrison (*ober-komendant*) Iakov Ielchaninov.⁷¹ After the death of Stepan Melnikov, the unit was headed by Vasilii Klimovskii, who was the chief of police of Kyiv before his transfer to the Reiter detachment.⁷²

Much less information has survived about other officers. We know that Captain Ivan Sukovkin was of noble birth and was appointed during his service in the Reiter detachment "to oversee alcohol sales and revenue collection of taverns in Kyiv (*piteinoi v Kieve prodazhi i sboru otkupnoi summy*)."⁷³ Before his transfer to the unit, I. Sukovkin served in an army regiment and took part in the Seven Years' and Russo-Turkish wars (1768–74). Of the four ensigns listed in the 1772 service record, two were from among the "Reiters' children" and had served in the Reiter detachment from very beginning of their military service and the other two were "soldiers' children" and had been transferred to the unit after serving in garrison or field regiments.⁷⁴ The percentage of "Reiters' children" with higher military ranks was lower than the percentage of their total number in the detachment. Obviously, being transferred to top posts in the unit was a reward for officers of garrison or army regiments. In addition, it is likely that the educational factor played no small part: Prime Major S. Melnikov had a good education, and Ensign K. Shevyrin began his career as company secretary.⁷⁵

It was normal for the Reiter detachment to have a large number of non-commissioned officers "above the specified number." Thus the 1772 service record lists 32 *wachtmeisters*, although the prescribed strength allowed for only two. We also need to consider that, regardless of service promotions, the number of position salaries for higher and lower ranks was specified. The sub-unit was prescribed only one position salary for an ensign, one for a *wachtmeister*, and two for corporals. Thus, as a rule, a promotion in rank did not carry with it an increase in the Reiter's salary.

Most often promotions were based on years of service. However, being close to the garrison command and connections could accelerate the process of career growth. Thus David Chunpalov, after serving a year in the unit, was awarded the rank of *wachmeister* at the age of nineteen. Another Reiter, Kiprian Tulenkov, became a *wachtmeister* immediately upon his transfer to the unit in 1772, at the age of seventeen (most likely his service as copyist in the gubernial chancellery played no small part in this).⁷⁶

The financial situation of the Kyiv Reiters deserves special attention. We know that during the period of 1725–65, the annual salary of a Reiter was fifteen rubles, which was higher than the pay of soldiers in the garrison regiments.⁷⁷ In the 1720s, a dragoon in a garrison regiment earned close to six rubles in a yearly salary, while a soldier earned five (those in army regiments earned double that amount).⁷⁸ Apparently, some Kyiv Reiters received additional pay for service in state-owned taverns. In 1734 eight Reiters who worked in Kyiv taverns were paid 7 rubles and 50 kopeks in salary, and the soldiers and corporals of garrison regiments, 5 and 6 rubles, respectively.⁷⁹ But we do not know exactly if those 7.5 rubles were in addition to the basic salary of 15 rubles, or part of that salary.

We do not know if the costs of provisions, uniforms, and such were part of the salary amount. It was only in 1765 that salary rates were approved, in which these costs were definitely included. According to estimates based on an analysis of spent funds, the annual cost to maintain an ordinary Reiter exceeded 30 rubles, and a *wachtmeister*, more than 45 rubles.⁸⁰ As of the end of the 1760s, the number of ensigns and *wachtmeisters* in the Reiter detachment was significantly higher than the manning chart specified, and therefore a part of the officers had to accept being paid the salaries of lower ranks for their service (“Ensign Bershov on a *wachtmeister*’s salary” and so forth).⁸¹

However, the Reiters’ main source of income was contraband trade and combining their military service with jobs that enabled them to bring in “shadow” earnings. Making regular visits to the lands of the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Austrian Empire, Reiters not only performed their immediate tasks but also sought to earn money on trade in various goods. They also delivered various letters or transported certain goods in exchange for suitable payment, using their official position to do so.⁸²

Unfortunately, the majority of official documents do not contain information about this aspect of the Reiters’ income. Perhaps the only document regarding this is the resolution adopted by the Senate in 1760, which noted that “Reiters sent from the Kyiv governor chancellor to Moscow, St Petersburg, and other places transport heavy baggage by mail, so that there is no room for others on the wagon, and therefore they order the postmen to tie themselves with a rope to the wagon. Thus, on 8 March 1759, the traveling Reiter Vasilii Neliakaev had two sacks of nuts and a third containing various things, and a small barrel (*antal*) of some kind of drink, and it is safe to say that these Reiters take such parcels from monasteries and people of other professions in exchange for considerable compensation, thereby bringing the mail horses to extreme emaciation and untimely death.”⁸³ We know that the Kyiv Reiters held fairly profitable posts. The aforementioned I. Sukovkin monitored the sale of alcohol in Kyiv. In addition,

Reiters occupied such posts as "supervision of state salt," "supervision of the treasury" (in the gubernial chancellery), "supervision of vineyards," and so forth.⁸⁴

Understandably, it is unlikely that sources can provide the amounts of the bribes received by Reiters, or what property they had appropriated illegally. The only thing that can cast light on this is their wealth. Most Reiters had their own residences and lived in a separate quarter (*sloboda*).⁸⁵ Some of them lived in the Podil (which was off-limits to soldiers and officers of the garrison) and Pechersk districts. We know that the Kyiv Reiter, Captain Ivan Sukovkin, purchased a house in Kyiv for five hundred rubles.⁸⁶ As of 1755, two Reiters lived on the territory of the Pechersk fortress in their own residences.⁸⁷ As we can see, Reiters, who were paid not that large a salary, were able to buy themselves pretty decent properties in Kyiv. We also know that Reiters owned horses and cattle.⁸⁸ Their possessions included pastures and hayfields in Kyiv's Obolon district.⁸⁹ There were also other factors that improved the financial situation of Reiters, such as, for example, a good match: thus, in 1772 Ensign Vasilii Roshchepkin reported that he was married to a "merchant's widow."⁹⁰

Notably, most Reiters educated their sons at their own expense,⁹¹ something that was not affordable for many Kyiv residents.⁹² According to the 1770 list of "Reiter minors," 28 out of 45 were being taught to read and write; all ranged in age from six to seventeen years old.⁹³ Of the Reiters' sons who were not literate, fourteen were under six years old, two were more than six years old, and one was eight.⁹⁴

The main task of the Reiter detachment was to provide a communication link between the Collegium of Foreign Affairs and the Russian resident in Istanbul. Courier missions to the capital of the Ottoman Empire were the most frequently reported Reiter tasks. It is worth noting that the Reiters had performed such assignments even earlier (before the creation of the detachment): the Reiter regiment headed by Ivan Pozdeev in 1718 was used to make "special deliveries."⁹⁵ In 1723 interpreters from the Turkish and Tatar languages were recruited to accompany Reiters on their trips to the capital of the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁶

Usually, several Reiters were sent to the capital of the Ottoman Empire, accompanied by an interpreter.⁹⁷ The report on the personnel of the detachments in 1728 notes that on 20 March seven Reiters were in Istanbul (*Tsargrad*).⁹⁸ In 1748 four Reiters (a *wachtmeister* and three regular soldiers) were dispatched to the Ottoman capital.⁹⁹ Couriers constantly travelled to Istanbul. Communications with the resident were interrupted only during the Russo-Turkish wars.

During their trips to Istanbul, the Reiters were escorted by Cossacks up to the border with the Ottoman Empire. Thus in 1753, two Cossacks traveled to the border together with Reiter Fedor Ozerov and an interpreter, and earlier the same

number escorted Wachtmeister Petr Foteev and an interpreter to Bendery.¹⁰⁰ As of 1764, an escort of two Cossacks was mandatory.¹⁰¹ Often the Reiters were accompanied by a sort of mini train (2–4 wagons), so that waggoners were sent along with the couriers and so forth. Thus, the aforementioned Fedor Ozerov in 1753 set out for Istanbul with several wagons, an interpreter, and waggoners (a total of nine people), including the serfs of Aleksei Obreskov, the Russian resident in Istanbul. Petr Fateev, who travelled along this route slightly earlier, was accompanied by the waggoners till the town of Bendery.¹⁰²

Not all Reiters traveled to Istanbul. In 1744 the governor chancellery determined that only thirty Reiters were needed for assignments to the capital of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰³ The rest delivered “state parcels” to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Austrian Empire, and the Zaporozhian Sich.¹⁰⁴ The countries and cities to which Reiters were sent were recorded in service reports. Thus in 1733 Grygorii Bershov noted that he had traveled on assignment to Moscow, St Petersburg, and “Little Russian, Great Russian, Polish, [and] Lithuanian” cities.¹⁰⁵ Wachtmeister Efrem Sagaidakov also reported that, in addition to Istanbul, he had traveled to “Poland, St Petersburg, Moscow, and other Great and Little Russian cities.”¹⁰⁶

The Reiters’ other important tasks included escorting officials (sometimes church hierarchs) or important guests and convoying prisoners of war and criminals. For example, in 1754 Kyiv Reiters escorted from the territory of the Crimean Khanate to Hlukhiv three groups of *argats* (laborers, workers) and *rendjipers* (day laborers) – inhabitants of the Hetmanate and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth who worked as hired laborers for the Tatars.¹⁰⁷ Reiters who were setting out on assignment were given “travel” allowances (for the purchase or rental of horses, wagons, purchase of fodder, and other expenses). The amount depended on the distance of the trip and the task assigned to the Reiter. For example, the usual amount for travel to St Petersburg was 17 rubles and 72 kopeks.¹⁰⁸ Depending on the cargo or the person whom the Reiter was escorting, the amount could be greater. Thus, Reiter Ivan Shydlovskii, who escorted a captive Turkish *serasker* to St Petersburg, was issued 28 rubles and 65 kopeks.¹⁰⁹ The Reiters bore collective responsibility for the embezzlement of travel allowances.¹¹⁰

Reiters were also used for intelligence work. Thus in 1743 Reiter Grebenkin was sent with this task to Bendery, and Shydlovskii to Mohyliv-Podilskyi.¹¹¹ In 1753 Kyiv Reiters Afanasii Roshchepkin and Amvrosii Babin, who were traveling to Istanbul, were ordered to “gather intelligence along the way.”¹¹²

In addition to the listed tasks, the Reiters also served in various “posts” in Kyiv. In 1778, S. Melnikov, commander of the subunit, compiled a list of official duties that Kyiv Reiters performed.

Table 10.2 Duties of Kyiv Reiters in the first half of 1778 according to a report by Unit Commander S. Melnikov

<i>Type of service</i>	<i>Assignment destination/post</i>	<i>Number</i>
Mission	St Petersburg	1 man
	Istanbul	8 men
	Couriers for Governor-General P. Rumiantsev	10 men
	Couriers of the Vasylkiv Quarantine House	1 man
	Obukhiv	1 man
“On duty assignments in Kyiv”	Duty officer at governor chancellery	1 man
	Accounting clerks in treasury of governor chancellery	6 men
“for deliveries”	1 man	
	“for supervision of treasury”	1 man
	Courier for Border Commission	1 man
	“supervision of state salt”	1 man
	“supervision of vineyards”	1 man
	Ordinaries of commander of the garrison (<i>ober-komendant</i>), collegial adviser, and commander of the [Reiter] detachment	3 men
	“for the sale of books”	1 man
	Duty officer in the [Reiter] detachment office	1 man
	Medical officer of the [Reiter] detachment office	1 man
	Total	40 men

Source: TS DIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 8624, ark. 2–3.

In addition, another sixteen Reiters in the detachment had no specified duties and were obviously “reserved” for various other assignments.¹¹³ At the time, two were sick.¹¹⁴

The list above does not reflect all the tasks that the Kyiv Reiters performed. Not infrequently, they had to execute fairly specific assignments. For example,

the job described in the list as “for the sale of books” attests to the existence of some sort of bookstore at the gubernial chancellery. In 1777 the Kyiv Reiters T. Seleznev and E. Zhukov delivered four mail wagons of jam from Kyiv to the imperial court in St Petersburg.¹¹⁵ Reiters also figured among the members of the special mission that was in charge of the production of Tokaj wine for the imperial court in the domains of the Habsburgs (the mission included Hryhorii Skovoroda and Irynei Fal'kovs'kyi at one time).¹¹⁶ Reiters were also used to search for serfs who had fled from their owners – generals or colonels of the Russian army. Part of the Reiters’ duties were of a semi-official nature: documents may have specified one mission, but in reality, they may have been carrying out the personal errands of the garrison’s top command or gubernia authorities. The performance of “special” assignments also had an effect on their careers and material status. Aleksandr Radishchev, in his famous work *A Journey from St Petersburg to Moscow* (1790), tells a story about a great nobleman and a courier.¹¹⁷ Here is the story in brief: a nobleman was very fond of oysters and sent a courier at government expense to bring him his favorite delicacy. For performing this special assignment, the courier was promoted (“sergeant N.N. to be an ensign”). It is quite possible that it was the service of the Kyiv Reiters that served as the prototype for Radishchev’s story (literary scholars identify Prince Grigorii Potemkin as the lover of oysters).

But it was a mistake to regard the Reiter service as a sinecure. Reiters often faced dangers on the road – both from criminals and, not infrequently, from those whom they were escorting. For example, in 1750 the hegumen of the Hustyn Monastery, Melkhisidek Bohdanovych, who was traveling at the behest of the metropolitan of Kyiv to the Diet in Warsaw, beat Reiter Mizikov who was escorting him.¹¹⁸ In 1763 Reiter Fedor Ozerov complained that the interpreter Ivan Krasnikov had almost killed him during their trip. In 1768 all the Reiters who were in Istanbul were arrested by the Turks and held prisoner until 1771 in Yedikule Fortress. This is a far from complete list of the dangerous situations and events that awaited the Reiters during their service.

Unfortunately, owing to lacunae in historical sources, we cannot compile a complete picture of the weaponry, uniforms, and flags of the Kyiv Reiters in the eighteenth century. Considering the Russian army’s rearming rates in those times, we can assume that their weapons and protective gear were the same as at the end of the seventeenth century (carbine, two pistols, sword, helmet, and cuirass), which accords with the information about the inventory of weapons in the garrison’s armory in 1695 and 1700. In 1765 the cost of maintaining a Reiter was the same as the cost of maintaining a dragoon (including the cost of weapons and uniform). We can therefore assume that the Reiters’ weapons, and perhaps their clothing, were analogous to those of the dragoons.

Opanas Shafons'kyi (1740–1811) noted in the *Description of the Chernihiv Viceregency* (1851) that before the establishment of regular postal service in the Hetmanate by Petr Rumiantsev-Zadunaiskii in 1765, only Kyiv Reiters provided regular postal communication between Kyiv, Moscow, St Petersburg, and inside the Hetmanate. Although Shafons'kyi stated that the postal services were notoriously unreliable, Reuters served as a quite reliable link between the Kyiv governor, the central authorities, the Russian resident in Constantinople, and the Zaporozhian Sich. The Cossack *starshyna* mostly used their messengers to deliver letters, and there were attempts to introduce a regular postal service before Rumiantsev's initiatives. The issue of regular mail services was resolved after the abolition of the Hetmanate when a new stage in the incorporation of Cossack autonomy began. Reiter continued to serve as special couriers and constituted a separate professional group until 1765.

Thus, over several generations in the eighteenth century, a service corporation of Kyiv Reiters developed under the protection of the Kyiv governor. The military function of this subunit of the Kyiv garrison was practically reduced to naught. The Reiters performed courier, administrative, police, and intelligence functions. The existence of the Reiter detachment in Kyiv is evidence of the fact that the Russian government's unificatory measures were not always systematic in nature, even in the case of the army. The need to adapt to local conditions necessitated creating separate service corporations, which performed specific tasks (in addition to the Reiter detachment in Kyiv, a few other special units charged with carrying out different tasks such as the protection of strategic objects existed in the center and on the peripheries of the Russian Empire. Therefore, the Russian Empire, which sought to "swallow" the state and social body of the Hetmanate and to unify Russian society, had itself created a socioprofessional corporation of Reiters in Kyiv which contradicted the very logic of unification.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as: Vadym Nazarenko. "'Dlia posylok v Tsar'grad i druhie okrestnye gosudarstva': kyivs'ki reitary XVIII st.," *Sotsium: al'manakh sotsial'noi istorii*, no. 13–14 (2017): 41–58. Copyright 2017 by Vadym Nazarenko. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 A. Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie* (Kyiv, 1851), 161; A. Andrievskii, "Ukaz 1725 g. o raskasovanii reiterskoi komandy v Kieve," in *Istoricheskie materialy iz arkhiva Kievskogo gubernskogo pravleniia*

- (Kyiv, 1885), 8: 123; V. Shcherbyna, "Strilets'ka ta Reitars'ka vulytsi u Kyievi," in *Novi studii z istorii Kyieva* (Kyiv, 1926), 62–4.
- 2 A.V. Makidonov, *Personal'nyi sostav administrativnogo apparata Novorossii XVIII veka* (Zaporizhzhia, 2011), 11–12.
 - 3 Reiters, as a type of heavy cavalry, appeared in Europe in the sixteenth century. They were a heavy cavalry that used firearms in battle. The Reiters first appeared in the Russian army at the end of the sixteenth century, but the first regiments were formed only in the 1630s. The Reiters were armed with a carbine, two pistols, and a smallsword or broadsword (later saber). Their protective gear consisted of a helmet and a cuirass.
 - 4 A. Andrievskii, "Kievskie tolmachi," *Kievskaia starina* 25, nos 5–6 (1889): 588.
 - 5 *Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukraïny im. V.I. Vernads'koho* (Manuscript Institute of the V.I. Vernads'kyi National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – IR NBU), f. 312, spr. 408 (169), ark. 1–6.
 - 6 Andrievskii, "Kievskie tolmachi," 587–8.
 - 7 H. Shpytal'ov, "Stvorennia Ukraïns'koï landmilsitsi (1713–1729)," *Visnyk Zaporiz'koho instytutu Dnipropetrovs'koho derzhavnoho universytetu vnutrishnikh sprav* 1 (2008): 33–7.
 - 8 For greater detail on Reiter regiments in the Russian army, see A.V. Malov, "Konnitsa 'novogo stroia' v russkoi armii v 1630–1680-e gody," in *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 1 (2006): 118–31.
 - 9 I. Babulin, "Sostav russkoi armii v Chudnovskoi kampanii 1660 goda," *Reitar* 4 (2006): 33.
 - 10 See G.B. Alferova and V.A. Kharlamov, *Kiev vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka* (Kyiv, 1982), 108, 135; Patrik Gordon [Patrick Gordon], *Dnevnik (1648–1689)*, trans. and notes by D.G. Fedosov [ed. M.R. Ryzhenkov] (Moscow, 2009), 20; P.G. Lebedintsev, "Rospisnoi spisok g. Kieva 1700 g.," *Chteniiia v Istoricheskoi obshchestve Nestora-Letopistsa [ChIONL]* 6, part 3 (1892): 4; A. Myshlaevskii, *Kreposti i garnizony iuzhnoi Rossii 1718 goda* (St Petersburg, 1897), 16.
 - 11 Gordon, *Dnevnik (1648–1689)*, 32; Alferova and Kharlamov, *Kiev vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka*, 108; Lebedintsev, "Rospisnoi spisok g. Kieva 1700 g.," 4; Myshlaevskii, *Kreposti i garnizony iuzhnoi Rossii 1718 goda*, 16.
 - 12 M.D. Rabinovich, *Polki petrovskoi armii* (Moscow, 1977), 81–2.
 - 13 *Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter – TSDIAUK), f. 59, op. 1, spr. 169, ark. 1 zv.; spr. 1592, ark. 1–2; spr. 2324, ark. 1–2.
 - 14 Rabinovich, *Polki petrovskoi armii*, 81–2; Andrievskii, "Ukaz 1725 g. o raskasovanii reiterskoi komandy v Kieve," 123.
 - 15 Andrievskii, *Kievskie tolmachi*, 586. Andriievs'kyi reports that in 1723 ten

- Reiters and ten Cossacks were selected to carry letters to Istanbul. Obviously, an increase in the personnel of the Reiter-couriers had taken place in 1725; TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 377, ark. 4.
- 16 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii* (hereinafter – PSZR1). *Sobranie pervoe. 1649–1825 gg.* (St Petersburg, 1830), vol. 7 (1723–1727), No. 4865, p. 599.
 - 17 IR NBU, f. 160, spr. 106, ark. 3.
 - 18 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 2160, ark. 1.
 - 19 Ibid., spr. 170, ark. 1 zv.; spr. 556, ark. 9.
 - 20 Ibid., spr. 170, ark. 1 zv.; spr. 2324, ark. 3; spr. 3658, ark. 1; spr. 4557, ark. 1–2.
 - 21 Ibid., spr. 5189, ark. 4.
 - 22 Ibid., spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.–17.
 - 23 Ibid., spr. 4576, ark. 1–1 zv.; spr. 5189, ark. 1. The gubernial companies were used mainly for internal service, especially police work.
 - 24 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 3658, ark. 3.
 - 25 Ibid., spr. 378, art. 2.
 - 26 Ibid., spr. 3658, ark. 1; spr. 4171, ark. 1–2.
 - 27 Ibid., spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.–17.
 - 28 In this way, the Russian administration kept "Reiter children" separate from "soldiers' children." The "soldiers' children" made up a special social group in the eighteenth century. These were the sons of soldiers in garrison regiments, who attended garrison schools and, upon reaching the age of sixteen or seventeen, were transferred to garrison or army regiments. There was a garrison school in Kyiv, where the children of the soldiers and officers of garrison regiments, and of the artillery and engineering units, studied. It proved impossible to separate out the children of Reiters in the garrison school in Kyiv. Apparently, they were getting an education somewhere else. For more information about the Kyiv garrison school, see V. Nazarenko, "Kyivs'ka harnizonna shkola u XVIII st.," in *Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho fakul'tetu Zaporiz'koho natsional'noho universytetu* 41 (2014): 36–42.
 - 29 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6167, art. 1–2.
 - 30 Ibid., spr. 1592, ark. 1–3.
 - 31 Ibid., spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.–17.
 - 32 Alferova and Kharlamov, *Kiev vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka*, 108, 135, 153.
 - 33 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 378, ark. 2; spr. 3658, ark. 1–2.
 - 34 Myshlaevskii, *Kreposti i garnizony iuzhnoi Rossii 1718 goda*, 16–17.
 - 35 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 377, ark. 4.
 - 36 Ibid., spr. 170, ark. 1 zv.
 - 37 Ibid., spr. 6756, ark. 1.
 - 38 Ibid., f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6756, ark. 1.

- 39 Ibid., spr. 5830, ark. 2–8.
- 40 Ibid., spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.–17.
- 41 Thus Reiter Andrii Kuznetsov (one of the “soldiers’ children”), who had been transferred to the detachment in 1763, as of 1772 had two sons, one of whom served together with him in the unit, and the other, in one of the battalions of the Kyiv garrison (TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6983, ark. 12 zv.–13).
- 42 Ibid., ark. 10 zv.–11.
- 43 Ibid., spr. 4944, ark. 1–11.
- 44 Ibid., spr. 6212, ark. 1–11.
- 45 Ibid., f. 59, op. 1, spr. 4577, ark. 3.
- 46 Ibid., spr. 3658, ark. 1–2; spr. 4171, ark. 4.
- 47 Ibid., spr. 5828, ark. 3.
- 48 Ibid., spr. 3658, ark. 1; spr. 4170, ark. 1.
- 49 The interpreters, who accompanied the Reiters on assignments to foreign countries, were also required not only to know languages but also be able to read and write. Thus, we know that the interpreter of the gubernial chancellery in 1750s, Ivan Iur'ev, who was fluent in Turkish (and had a poor command of Greek and Romanian), studied how to read and write at the school attached to St Feodosii's Church. See Andrievskii, *Kievskie tolmachii*, 590–1. TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.–17.
- 50 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6756, ark. 15 zv.–16; f. 246, op. 3, spr. 150, ark. 13 zv. In some documents, the same Reiters were described as literate and as illiterate within the span of half a year. Obviously, this was due to errors in compiling service records, because it would be odd for a Reiter to be able to read and write in a year.
- 51 Andrievskii, “Kievskie tolmachii,” 587–8.
- 52 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.
- 53 Ibid., spr. 9791, ark. 3 zv.; spr. 5828, ark. 1, 3, 6.
- 54 Ibid., spr. 4171, ark. 3–4.
- 55 Ibid. spr. 5830, ark. 2–8.
- 56 Ibid., spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.–10.
- 57 Ibid., spr. 4757, ark. 3–3 zv., 6, 8; spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.–17.
- 58 Ibid., spr. 5828, ark. 3.
- 59 Ibid., spr. 5830, ark. 2–8.
- 60 Ibid., spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.–17.
- 61 Ibid., spr. 9792, ark. 1.
- 62 A. Andrievskii, “K istorii pogranichnykh otnoshenii,” in *Istoricheskie materialy iz arkhiva Kievskogo gubernskogo pravleniia* 9 (1885): 155–64. The cause of the

- Reiter's death was a drinking spree: the Reiter got drunk in a tavern and disappeared. After some time, his body was found showing signs of murder.
- 63 A. Andrievskii, "Perepiska s tainym sovetnikom Obreskovym vo vremia sledstviia ego s pervoi armii v Sankt-Peterburg," in *Istoricheskie materialy iz arkhiva Kievskogo gubernskogo pravleniia*, 9 (1885): 239.
 - 64 Andrievskii, "Ukaz 1725 g. o raskasovanii reiterskoi komandy v Kieve," 123.
 - 65 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 1844, ark. 6 zv.-7.
 - 66 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 640, ark. 3 zv.; Makidonov, *Personal'nyi sostav administrativnogo apparata Novorossii XVIII veka*, 12.
 - 67 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 640, ark. 4.
 - 68 Ibid., spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.-10.
 - 69 Ibid., spr. 6848, ark. 1-10.
 - 70 Matvei Melnikov was born in Nizhyn and worked in his childhood and youth as a helper of Nizhyn's Greek merchants. While abroad, he learned six languages (two at the "proficient" level, four at "not yet perfect") and was recruited into government service as an interpreter in the Kyiv gubernial chancellery in 1747. Considering that at the time that he was taken on as an interpreter, Matvei had a family and was no less than thirty-five years old, it is quite possible that he was the father of Stepan Melnikov.
 - 71 IR NBU, f. 160, spr. 1092, ark. 3.
 - 72 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 9792, ark. 1-3; Makidonov, *Personal'nyi sostav administrativnogo apparata Novorossii XVIII veka*, 12.
 - 73 A. Andrievskii, "Tseny na krepkie napitki v Kieve v 1776 g." in *Istoricheskie materialy iz arkhiva Kievskogo gubernskogo pravleniia* 8 (1885): 214-15.
 - 74 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.-17.
 - 75 S. Melnikov's service record states that in 1747-54 he was a student (the educational institution is not named), then he worked as an interpreter, and from 1763 to 1772 he was secretary of the Russian embassy in the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Clearly, he could not have obtained this post without the necessary education. TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6756, ark. 9 zv.-10.
 - 76 Ibid., ark. 14 zv.-15. The Reiter's father served as interpreter in the Kyiv gubernial chancellery.
 - 77 Ibid., spr. 2324, ark. 15. The salary was paid out of the revenues of the Kyiv gubernia, particularly from taxes that were collected from the Old Believers (*raskol' niki*), who lived in Kyiv gubernia. See PSZRI, vol. 13, no. 9773, p. 319. In 1723 it was planned to pay Reiters 30 rubles per year. After the increase in the number of couriers (from 10 to 50), changes were obviously introduced into the unit's budget.

- 78 Ibid., vol. 43, bk. 1, no. 3511, pp. 20–1.
- 79 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 441, ark. 1, 11.
- 80 Ibid., spr. 5189, ark. 4.
- 81 Ibid., ark. 5. This can be explained by the specific nature of retirement from the Russian army: many officers wanted to retire with a high officer rank and therefore agreed to serve for lower pay. Nor should we ignore the profitability of Reiter service, inasmuch as salaries were not the only source of income for the Kyiv Reiters.
- 82 The Reiters were considered to be diplomatic couriers, and thus they were not searched on the borders, were not required to pay customs duties, and so forth. In view of the fact that during their trips the Reiters had an opportunity to become familiar with market conditions, they knew what to carry and where.
- 83 PSZRI, vol. 15, no. 11057, pp. 471–2.
- 84 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 8624, ark. 2–3.
- 85 The Reiter quarter (*sloboda*) appeared in 1666 and existed throughout the second half of the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the territory of this settlement began to be called Reitars'ka Street, which exists to our time.
- 86 TSDIAUK, f. 54, op. 1, spr. 3405, ark. 24; f. 59, op. 1, spr. 8527, ark. 1–35.
- 87 Ibid., f. 128, op. 4, spr. 122, ark. 32–3. Both Reiter families each had two free people “as servants.”
- 88 Ibid., spr. 6973, ark. 1–5. Judging from the information in the source, the Reiters hired pasturers to graze their horses; A. Andrievskii, “Sveden'ia o skotskom padezhe v Kieve (1752 g.),” in *Istoricheskie materialy iz arkhiva Kievskogo gubernskogo pravleniia*, 8 (1885): 151.
- 89 R. Delimars'kyi, *Magdeburz'ke pravo v Kyievi* (Kyiv, 1996), 86–7.
- 90 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6756, ark. 2.
- 91 The children of soldiers and officers of the garrison regiments/battalions received a free education at the garrison school. Most of the “Reiter minors” who applied to enlist in the detachment stated that they had studied at the expense of their fathers and not at the garrison school.
- 92 See M. Iaremenko, “Tsina diakivs'koï nauky,” *Kyïvs'ka Akademiia* 8 (2010): 122–38.
- 93 In Reiter Demian Zhukov's family, three sons, aged six, eight, and sixteen, were in school.
- 94 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 6167, ark. 1–2.
- 95 Myshlaevskii, *Kreposti i garnizony iuzhnoi Rossii 1718 goda*, 6–7. Sources from

- the end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth century contain many mentions of Reiters as couriers.
- 96 Andrievskii, "Kievskie tolmachi," 586.
 - 97 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 265, ark. 1–5.
 - 98 Ibid., spr. 170, ark. 1 zv.
 - 99 Ibid., spr. 798, ark. 160, 187, 267; spr. 1592, ark. 38.
 - 100 Ibid., spr. 798, ark. 187 zv., 267.
 - 101 A. Andriievskii, "Materialy po istorii Zaporozh'ia i pogranychnykh otnoshenii (1743–1767 g.)" in *Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* 16, part 2 (1893): 264.
 - 102 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 798, ark. 187–187 zv.
 - 103 Andrievskii, "Kievskie tolmachi," 588.
 - 104 TSDIAUK, f. 9, op. 1, spr. 1592, ark. 1, 2, 38.
 - 105 Ibid., spr. 377, ark. 4, 7.
 - 106 Ibid., f. 59, op. 1, spr. 5828, ark. 2.
 - 107 M. Horban', "Arhaty i rendzhypery 1753 roku," *Skhidnyi svit* (Kharkiv) 3–4 (1928): 312.
 - 108 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 3657, ark. 2.
 - 109 Ibid., spr. 687, ark. 3–5.
 - 110 Andrievskii, "Kievskie tolmachi," 588.
 - 111 Andrievskii, "Materialy po istorii Zaporozh'ia i pogranychnykh otnoshenii," 117, 122–3.
 - 112 TSDIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 798, ark. 238.
 - 113 Ibid.
 - 114 Ibid.
 - 115 A. Andrievskii, "K istorii kievskogo varen'ia," in *Istoricheskie materialy iz arkhiva Kievskogo gubernskogo pravleniia*, 1 (1882): 61–6.
 - 116 L. Makhnovets', *Hryhorii Skovoroda* (Kyiv, 1971), 30–2.
 - 117 A.N. Radishchev, *Puteshestvie iz Peterburga v Moskvu* (St Petersburg, 1992), 17–18.
 - 118 A. Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, vol. 3, *Polk Pryluts'kyi* (Kyiv, 1893): 402–3. Mel'khisedek threatened to kill the Reiter ("I'll cut you into pieces, you Jew, you bastard, you moskal'") but confined himself to merely beating Mizikov.

The Cossack *Starshyna* of Sloboda Ukraine in the
Seventeenth–Eighteenth Centuries: The “Family Clan”
and Attainment of Social Status

VOLODYMYR MASLIYCHUK

The prominent Austrian social anthropologist Michael Mitterauer wrote: “No other form of human community reflects the possibilities and boundaries of a historical epoch as directly as the family.”¹ The well-known French historian Fernand Braudel, quoting Jean-Louis Frandrin, calls the family “the basic cell that is the *mater dolorosa* of every society.”² Family relationships are relationships in a microstructure – above all, they depict the problems of the whole society, its changes and transformations. The explosion of interest in the “preindustrial” family and the rise of social (cultural) anthropology that occurred in the scholarly world in the 1970s–80s barely touched Ukrainian historians.³ However, modern trends in historical sciences, as evidenced by the congresses of historians in Montreal (1995) and Oslo (2000), clearly show that the study of the family and family relationships is an up-and-coming, even dominant, field of research.⁴ Taking a somewhat lyrical approach (without which, I am convinced, the work of a historian is simply impossible), the history of the family, of relations between people, stretches before the researcher of Ukrainian history as a modestly but still largely neglected field of knowledge, with patches of virgin land discernible here and there.⁵ Regrettably, the same can be said about the history of the Cossack officer family of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries.

The process of transforming the Cossack *starshyna* (officer class) into a separate estate was best reflected at the everyday family level. Many of the most important functions of a family were transferred to society and to social groups. By the first third of the eighteenth century, the officer stratum of the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine had been transformed into a fairly unique, albeit weak, “caste.” Cossack officers passed on their posts to their children. They helped their

brothers, sons-in-law, brothers-in-law, nephews, in-laws (*svoiaky*), and in the case of Ukrainians, also the godfathers of their children (*kumy*), fathers of sons-in-law and daughters-in-law (*svaty*), blood brothers (*pobratymy*), and friends. This endogamic society strived to insulate itself from the democratic circles from which the enterprising ancestors of the Cossack officer class once emerged. Members of this community expanded the number of occasions for gatherings. Recall the endless descriptions of dinners, invitations, christenings, birthdays, weddings, and get-togethers to play cards or dice in the diaries of Iakiv Markovych and Mykola Khanenko, this daily concern of the Cossack *starshyna* in the eighteenth century. All these celebrations, banquets, balls, and other social events were pretexts to meet, arrange matters, support one another, and create a basis for establishing ties and coming together.⁶

Moving family relations onto a larger canvas and viewing relations inside the state, class, estate, or any social group in the Middle Ages and early modern era in terms of family relations is a highly productive approach. It helps us to understand a number of the ties and stereotypes that united people in communities in the past, which are often incomprehensible to us.⁷

In other words, we perceive the officer stratum as a "family" or rather, a family clan, relations within this stratum as a matter of social stratification, and the attainment by the children of the social status of their fathers as a direct part of family functions. The formation of the officer stratum in the Sloboda Ukraine's Cossack regiments represents a direct evolution of the "family" – from its creation headed by the colonel as "father" to its ramified governance structure. Is it appropriate to compare the officer stratum to a "family"? Absolutely. From the very beginning of Cossack statehood, a family "clan" formed around Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi.⁸ Quarrels within this clan played a significant role in subsequent Ukrainian history. In other words, the history of the Ukrainian Cossack elite is the history of a "family" that initially united around a colonel, or in the case of the Hetmanate, around the hetman, and then basically itself took over the function of governance. Given the rule of numerous clan survivals and traditions of the frontier, this "family" was not exclusively blood related; membership in it was also determined by social, economic, and everyday relations. It is impossible to explain the issues associated with the transformation of the Cossack elite into a landed aristocracy, the "new gentry [*nova shliakhta*]" (according to Zenon Kohut's definition), without explaining the function of the family to help the children attain a certain social status, the special aspects of inheriting "notability," political power, and landed property.⁹

The right of inheritance is one of the most important indicators not only of internal family relations but also of the political legitimization of the status of the Cossack elite, and its identification as a separate estate.

The problem of the heritability of rank in the *starshyna* also emerged by virtue of the existence in a frontier society (in my view, a “marginal society”) – which the Ukrainian communities of the Hetmanate, Sloboda Ukraine, and Zaporizhzhia were in the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries – of the democratic egalitarian traditions of electing and removing officers from their posts. The German historian Andreas Kappeler noted that the key element in the early modern history of Ukraine was the clash of two principles: the spread to Ukraine of European trends (in particular, the “second serfdom”) and the Cossack traditions of a democratic frontier society.¹⁰ This clash can undoubtedly characterize certain aspects of the entire social history of “Ukrainian Cossack statehood.” Therefore, the inheritance of officer ranks and the legitimization of the status of a hereditary Cossack elite was in contradiction with the principles of the democratic appointment to offices in Cossack forces – that is, a complex dialogue was taking place that resulted in the distinct nature of the Ukrainian Cossack elite.

Family, ancestry, and a ramified genealogical tree played virtually a fundamental role for Cossack officers in the eighteenth century in both their careers and their acquisition of wealth. The legitimization of the inheritance of rank in the *starshyna* was the direct basis for proving the right to “noble status,” as separate from the commoners. The study of officer family ties in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries will help solve a number of questions regarding the transformation of Cossack officers into hereditary landowners and the co-optation of Ukrainian “nobles” into the nobility of Russia as a whole. The hereditability of officer ranks also had a more prosaic side. In a landowner system, the officers held estates and land given them officially for their services. When these were passed down to heirs, to own them legally and lawfully the latter also had to serve. In other words, officers required political power and services bequeathed by inheritance in order to preserve and accumulate numerous estates.

We will attempt to study the problem of heritability of officer status in relation to the officer stratum of the regiments of Sloboda Ukraine. The formation of these Cossack entities on the territory of the Wild Fields (*Dyke Pole*), and the social processes inside these Sloboda regiments, are quite poorly researched as compared with those in the Hetmanate. The Sloboda regiments, which were subject to Russia, were very similar to the regiments of the Hetmanate. However, two other neighbors had an influence on their development: the Zaporozhian Sich and the Don Cossack Host. Thus, the social structure of the Sloboda regiments, despite their “frontierness,” depended to a significant degree on the social processes in the Hetmanate and the southern Russian frontier, and its democratism and insecurity were constantly reinforced by the anarchic elements of Zaporizhzhia and the Don. From this standpoint, the genesis and transformations of

the local elite were fairly determinative for both the neighboring Hetmanate and "the Cossack republics in the lower reaches of the Dnipro and the Don." The Sloboda Ukrainian Cossack elite was under the strong influence of the Muscovite system of service tenure of land (*pomistia*) and of local Russian senior officials; it was the first to fall under the modernization reforms of the tsarist government, which were aimed at abolishing the Cossack autonomies in order to create a "well-regulated" state. All these factors had an effect on both the problems of political power and its inheritance (according to Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, Sloboda Ukraine was the "acid test" for abolishing the autonomy of the Hetmanate, "and usually the government's reforms in the Hetmanate were preceded by several decades of reforms in Sloboda Ukraine").¹¹ In other words, an understanding of the rather complicated and contradictory dialogue between the Russian government's modernization measures and the traditional concepts of the Cossack elites, as well as the problems of the incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Russian Empire, depends directly on the study of changes in the "family relations" of the Sloboda Ukrainian Cossack *starshyna*. In addition, the formation of the officer stratum in the Sloboda regiments was quite distinctive, because it took place under the strong influence of the rule of colonels, of the individual Sloboda colonel. That is to say, the officers of the Sloboda regiments initially did not have a higher local Cossack authority than a colonel (such as the hetman in the Hetmanate).¹² The intertwining of the general and the particular, effectively the "frontierness" of the Sloboda Ukraine relative to the Russian center and Cossack political entities, are of special interest in studying the social history of the region.

The Father Looks After the Interests of the Son or the Father's Concern for the Son

Under existing Cossack democratic customs, the passing on of an officer's post from father to son took place while the father was still alive. This process was characteristic of the second half of the seventeenth century, when Cossack elections carried at least some illusory weight. With the curtailment of democratism at the beginning of the eighteenth century, these trends became less determinative.

The attitude of fathers to their sons in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cossack Ukraine was of a traditional nature. They were seen as the continuation of the family, and as support in old age. Begetting, raising, and giving the child a start in life also had a religious aspect (numerous mentions of fathers and sons in the Holy Scriptures) and was often mentioned by the Ukrainian writers of the time.

For bringing up a good person the father deserved an honored place in society, as the well-known poet of the time, Klymentii Zynoviiiv, wrote: "For which you

will earn fame among people / And the personal praise of God.”¹³ In fact, in Ukrainian tradition, the concern of parents for their children was probably considered more important than the concern of children for their parents.¹⁴

The officer families of both Sloboda Ukraine and the Hetmanate owed their status “to one or two people who as a result of their own energy, abilities, or an accident rose from the depths of the popular masses to the top and pulled behind them their relatives and in-laws.”¹⁵ The inheritance of political power in the second half of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth century was dealt with in accordance with custom: the son assumed an officer’s post while his father was still alive, with the father’s assistance. Because of the formidable power of colonels, it is possible to trace examples of this process in the formation of dynasties of colonels in Sloboda regiments in the second half of the seventeenth century.

During his service, a father included his son from childhood in his duties. Thus, according to Jan Ornowski’s panegyric, the son of Kharkiv colonel Hryhorii Donets’, Fedir, was “in the camp with his father” from the time he was seven years old.¹⁶ After the son reached adulthood, the officer father shared his duties with his son, with the son being his father’s helper. The transfer of the “office” took place while the father was still alive and was then confirmed by tsarist officials. The father’s achievements during his lifetime were determinative for the son’s assumption of his father’s social niche.

This kind of colonelcy was most vividly exemplified in the Sumy regiment, which from 1659 to 1727, aside from a few twists (like Cossack Leont’iev’s “black council” in 1661), was governed by the dynasty of the Kondrat’ievs.¹⁷ The first Sumy colonel was the founder (*osadchyi*) of the city of Sumy Herasym Kondrat’iev.¹⁸ However, as early as 1 August 1664, mention is made of another Sumy colonel, Ivan Herasymov (a Muscovite form of ‘Ivan Herasymovych Kondrat’iev’ in official correspondence), that is, the son of the founder.¹⁹ In 1678, according to a later mention, the aide to his father Ivan Kondrat’iev “died of his wounds.”²⁰ In 1680, after the death of his son, Colonel Herasym Kondrat’iev petitioned the tsarist government that “he has grown old and lame from wounds and sick and cannot walk or sit on a horse,” and therefore asked that his son Hryhorii be appointed colonel jointly with him.²¹ The tsarist government satisfied his request, and that year the Sumy regiment was divided between Kondrat’iev father and son.²²

However, Hryhorii Kondrat’iev also died in 1683 while his father was still alive. To please Colonel Herasym Kondrat’iev, the Sumy Cossacks and officers sent a petition to the tsarist government asking that Herasym’s third son, Andrii, be appointed Sumy colonel jointly with his father.²³ In 1684, a tsarist charter confirmed Andrii Kondrat’iev as Sumy colonel, and he continued to serve as colonel after his father’s death in 1701 until his own death in 1708.²⁴ The main thing is that An-

drii Kondrat'iev received the colonelcy not for his own abilities but for his father's services. This aspect is quite interesting, because the post of colonel in a Sloboda regiment was not only an expression of political power, but also a means of "making a living," inasmuch as the costs of maintaining the regiment and artillery were assumed by the colonel.

In 1689–93, Sumy Colonel Herasym Kondrat'iev also tried to help his fourth son, Roman, to take up the colonel's post in neighboring Okhtyrka, but Roman's colonelcy (among officers who were "strangers" to him) was unsuccessful and short.²⁵

What is notable is that after the death of his father, as the Sumy colonel ("head of the family"), Andrii Kondrat'iev tried at the beginning of the eighteenth century to restrict the rights of his large family (widows of brothers, nephews, relatives of his father's last wife) to his father's legacy. This colonel concentrated in his own hands the main part of the Sumy regiment's land holdings, which, undoubtedly, served in part as grounds for the assumption of the colonelcy after Andrii Kondrat'iev's sudden death by his son, Ivan.²⁶

Heritable colonelcy developed in similar fashion in the Kharkiv regiment in the 1670s–80s. Kharkiv Colonel Hryhorii Donets's older son, Kostiantyn, accompanied his father during the latter's visit to Moscow in 1678, but only a year later, he himself represented the Kharkiv regiment in the Muscovite capital.²⁷ In accordance with the tsar's decree of 1682, the Kharkiv regiment was divided into two entities between father and son: Hryhorii led the Cossacks in the Iziium section, and Kostiantyn Donets' governed in Kharkiv and its environs.²⁸ In this case, as well as in that of the Sumy regiment, there is an interesting correspondence between the Cossack leadership and tsarist officials. In its petition regarding the colonelcy of Kostiantyn Donets', the Cossack officers wrote that if Hryhorii Donets' left to live in Iziium, they "could not exist" in Kharkiv without a colonel, and asked the tsar to reward "their Colonel Hryhorii Donets' for his many services and order Hryhorii's son, Kostiantyn, to be their colonel in one regiment in Kharkiv."²⁹ Colonel Hryhorii Donets' also sent his own petition: "order me, tsar, to live in Iziium and order my son, Kostiantyn, to serve in Kharkiv."³⁰ On 25 January 1685, "testimony" that had been submitted by the acting Kharkiv Colonel, Kostiantyn Donets', regarding the fact that he "[was] in charge jointly with [his] father" of the officers and Cossacks in the Kharkiv regiment was considered in Moscow.³¹ That same year, Kostiantyn Donets' received a charter of privilege that he "would be colonel in that regiment jointly with his father Hryhorii," only not in Kharkiv, but in Iziium; a similar charter, only with certain differences, was granted to his father Hryhorii Donets'.³² This division of authorities was what caused the division of the Kharkiv regiment, splitting off the Cossacks in the Iziium section into a separate Iziium regiment under the leadership of Kostiantyn

Donets'. However, father and son, Hryhorii and Kostiantyn Donets', also served together at the end of the 1680s in the city of Novobohorodysk.³³

It should also be noted that the tsarist government itself seemed to assist the children of colonels to assume high offices. During the crisis in the Okhtyrka regiment in connection with the struggle among the parties of officers over the colonelcy in 1691 (turmoil inside the "family," attempts to control the "father" – Colonel Ivan Perekhrest (or Perechrestov), the regiment *starshyna* was "ordered that the Okhtyrka regiment's quartermaster and his comrades choose a colonel from among the children of Sumy Colonel Herasym Kondrat'iev's son Roman, or Kharkiv Colonel Hryhorii Donets's son, Kostiantyn, as colonel of the Okhtyrka regiment."³⁴ Ultimately, Roman Herasymovych Kondrat'iev was elected colonel by tsarist officials in 1691.³⁵

The division of the regiment between father and son, which served as grounds for the son to inherit his father's colonelcy, was becoming an unwritten law, a part of the "liberties," and the hallmark of regimental rule in the Sloboda regiments. In 1693, after the death of the colonel of the Ostrohozk regiment, Ivan Sas, the colonelcy passed to his stepson Petro Bulart.³⁶ In 1702, at the request of the officers of the Okhtyrka regiment, Danylo, the son of Okhtyrka Colonel Ivan Perekhrest, obtained a charter attesting that he was "similar to other Cherkasian (*cherkasskich*) regiments to be the colonel jointly with his father in that regiment."³⁷

The examples cited above apply to hereditary colonelcy, a feature that most vividly characterizes the regiments of Sloboda Ukraine as compared with those of the Hetmanate in the second half of the seventeenth century. At the same time, albeit less markedly, a similar heritability aspect can be observed with respect to the rank of captain. In the 1690s, in the Boromlia company of the Okhtyrka regiment, Captain Ian Hrek and his son, acting Captain Petro Hrek, administered the company jointly.³⁸ "After the father," the captains were Ivan Perekhrest (future colonel) in the Okhtyrka regiment and Ivan Sybirs'kyi in the Ostrohozk regiment.³⁹

The transposing of family relations into the realm of political power, of governance, is undoubtedly connected with the formation of a separate stratum within Cossackdom as a whole – the Cossack *starshyna*. Bound by a number of ties, ranging from blood relationships to a sense of social solidarity, the officer "clan-family" began to control the "father" – colonel, dissatisfied with his patriarchal role. The evolution of the heritability of officer ranks resembles the evolution of the patriarchal family, in which the father initially has total control over the life of the son (in this case, the son's career depends completely on the father), but gradually his rights are circumscribed by numerous relatives, the "family

council" (the family proper: uncles, brothers-in-law, sons-in-law), which begins to take charge of the son's fate.⁴⁰ The rather archaic system of inheritance, based on blood relationships and customary law, then entered the next phase, in which the heritability of political power was based largely on the existence of hereditary land ownership. Having concentrated in its hands the bulk of land holdings, the Cossack *starshyna* had by the end of the seventeenth century created the economic foundation for a leading political role and was becoming dissatisfied with the authoritarian rule of the colonel ("father" in the Sloboda regiments), and, in turn, the hetman ("father" in the Hetmanate).⁴¹ In other words, socioeconomic processes exercised a powerful influence on the relations between the "father" and the "children."

Along with these internal factors, it is hard not to see the interference of the Russian government in the process of the formation of the "family." On the one hand, the tsarist government was interested in creating officer corporations – these made the "clan" easier to control, because all the members of the "family" were interrelated. On the other hand, and this was much more important, it was undesirable for the "clan" and its political role to grow stronger where the empire was not firmly established, and where there were strong autonomous sentiments. In other words, the central government's policy regarding "clans" was not unambiguous. One thing is certain, however, and that is that the tsarist government sought to control the "shoots of heritability." The officer "family" that had begun to form around the Okhtyrka Colonel Ivan Perekhrest was seriously shaken by the arrest and exile of the latter and the change in the administration of the regiment in 1704.⁴² This was the tsarist government's way of seeming to make concessions to the regimental officers' several decades of demands to limit the authoritarian rule of their colonel. The powerful Colonel and Brigadier Fedir Volodymyrovych Shydlovs'kyi, who in 1706 at the request of the *starshyna* served as the colonel of both the Izium and Kharkiv regiments and passed on these offices to his nephews Mykhailo Kostiantynovych Donets'-Zakharzhevs'kyi and Lavrentii Shydlovs'kyi, was arrested in 1711.⁴³ In 1712, a foreigner, the Moldavian political émigré Prokip Kulykovs'kyi, was appointed the Kharkiv colonel, and in the 1720s, another "foreigner", the Russian Second Major T. Goriaistov, was named colonel of the Izium regiment.⁴⁴ An unpleasant situation also occurred with respect to the Kondrat'iev "clan" in the Sumy regiment: after the death of Colonel Ivan Andriiovych Kondrat'iev in 1728, the commander of the Sloboda regiments Mikhail Golitsyn gave the post of colonel to Vasyl' Danylovych Perekhrestov-Osypov (grandson of the Okhtyrka colonel), bypassing the members of the Sumy colonel's family.⁴⁵ The colonel's undermined authority strengthened the role of the "officer council." Although it should be noted that the old patriarchal system of passing

on political power to the son while the father was still alive continued to play an important role in the eighteenth century. Okhtyrka Colonel and Brigadier Fedir Osypov passed on his post while he was still alive to his son Maksym in 1711.⁴⁶ In that regiment, an entire Lesevets'kyi dynasty emerged after the death of Fedir Osypov in the 1720s. After the father, Colonel Oleksii Lesevets'kyi, his children governed in turn during the 1740s–50s.⁴⁷

Of equal interest was the passing on of the post of captain, as vividly illustrated by the captaincies in the Kharkiv regiment. In 1707, after Mykola Zhuchenko, the post of captain of the Sokolov company was assumed by his son Ivan (Zhukov), the grandson of Captain Demian Zhuchenko in the Kharkiv regiment.⁴⁸ During the “attestations” in the 1730s, Hryhorii Petrovs'kyi, captain of the Liubotyn company, made a request in 1738 to replace him in the post of captain with his son Andrii.⁴⁹ Retired Captain Oleksii Protopopov requested a captaincy for his son in 1737.⁵⁰

Thus, initially the key feature of the heritability of officer ranks and posts was the transfer of political power from father to son during the father's lifetime. Political power was closely tied to the acquisition of “goods” and estates by officers. The heritability of this power was a kind of legitimization of the transfer of numerous landholdings through inheritance. Actually, while the history of the Cossack officer stratum lasted more than a hundred years, and the inheritance principle stretched across three to four generations, the powerful influence of the first-generation talented father, who acquired the office owing to his “services,” extended only to the second generation; subsequent generations looked for favor and support among a wider circle of relatives.

Looking After the Children of the “Family”

The main basis for reaching the top rungs of the social ladder in the Sloboda regiments at that time was the service of the ancestor and father, which was unequivocally deemed by society part of tradition and custom.⁵¹ With respect to the Hetmanate, the beginning of this system of inheritance was very appropriately described by the Ukrainian historian Oleksandr Hrushevs'kyi: “Slowly, during the hetmanacies of Samoilovych and Mazepa, the generation that was beginning its service could already confidently cite the services to the Host of their fathers [...] At the beginning of service, when they had no important services of their own, a mention of the father's services warranted a larger grant or confirmation of the father's estates.”⁵² In speaking of the father's diminishing direct influence on the career of his son, it should be noted that it was not the father

or the grandfather himself but the prestige of the father and grandfather that played an important role in obtaining an officer post at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Listing the services of an ancestor in the absence of one's own was a typical feature of many petitions, reports, requests, and appeals for offices. This is especially evident in the proof of the right of Ivan Ivanovych Kondrat'iev to the colonelcy during his attempts to obtain the post of colonel of the Sumy regiment.⁵³ The point is that in 1728, after the death of Colonel Ivan Andriiovych Kondrat'iev, the commander of Russian forces in southern Russia, Mikhail Golitsyn, faced the problem of whom to appoint colonel in the Sumy regiment. The most important among the candidates was the former colonel's son, Mykhailo Andriiovych Kondrat'iev. Golitsyn was perfectly aware that this claimant had the most rights to the colonelcy: "the former Colonel Kondrat'iev's son, Mikhail, should be [the colonel], *inasmuch as both his grandfather and father had been colonels in that regiment*, but this Mykhailo is a drunkard and stupid."⁵⁴ In July 1728, after the death of Mykhailo Kondrat'iev (2 May 1728), Golitsyn appointed as Captain (*rotmistr*) Vasyl' Osypov (Perekhrest), an outsider to the Sumy officers, although he was aware of the significance of his action, "because the new colonel should have been promoted from the ranks of deserving regimental officers or from the families of former colonels."⁵⁵ Throughout the course of Vasyl' Osypov's colonelcy from 1728 to 1736, a fight was under way to have Captain Ivan Ivanovych Kondrat'iev appointed colonel of the Sumy regiment. The Kondrat'iev clan's rights were championed not only by the "family," the regimental *starshyna*, but also by the Okhtyrka Colonel Oleksii Lesevets'kyi, to whom the Kondrat'ievs had once shown great favor, and Ivan Kondrat'iev's uncle, Hetman Danylo Apostol. Regimental officers, in their attempts to help the member of the "family" gain his rightful place, stressed that this place was deserved "by virtue of the loyalty and blood and wounds of his great grandfather, grandfather, and father."⁵⁶

Equally interesting is the "report" of Ivan Iakovych Kovalevs'kyi, an underage "theology student" (probably of the Kharkiv College), to the Kharkiv regimental office in 1737. The petitioner writes that his grandfather and father (deceased) served "Her Imperial Highness" in the Kharkiv regiment "as regimental and company officers loyally and irreproachably for many years," and his uncles and brothers serve today as officers, and he, after the death of his father, "because of [his] minority is designated for Latin schools." This is followed by the most important appeal in "reports" of this kind: "I ask that for the services of my father and relatives I be assigned to one of the regimental chancelleries to [work with] regimental written records."⁵⁷ We should note that the petitioner was around

seventeen years old,⁵⁸ and a year later he was appointed captain of the Vilshana company.⁵⁹ In other words, he owed his officer status mainly to his relatives, although to some degree also to his education, which can be seen from the document, if only cursorily.

Such examples of obtaining officer posts for the services of the family are fairly typical for Ukrainian traditional culture, where the basis for recognizing officership could be “fertility” (*rodovytist*) in other words, having many relatives. In the Ukrainian worldview a man without kin is an unfortunate man.⁶⁰ Recall, for example, the well-known *duma* *Fedir bezrodnyi, bezdol'nyi* (Fedir the man without kin, the unfortunate).

A characteristic feature of occupying *starshyna* posts during the rule of the “family” was the “child’s” rise up the officer ladder. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, this ladder was not yet clearly regulated. The son of Kharkiv regimental Judge Semen Kvitka, Hryhorii, became regimental chancellor around 1706, regimental aide-de-camp in 1711, and in 1713, the officers (“family”) promoted him to colonel.⁶¹ A similar career was followed by the son of the regimental judge, and later Okhtyrka colonel, Oleksii Lesevyts'kyi.⁶² Even the son of the Ostrohozk Colonel Ivan Tev'iashov first became the regiment's flag-bearer in 1719, then aide-de-camp, and after the death of his father in 1725, colonel.⁶³ Thus the tradition of the son serving jointly with his father as his closest assistant and deputy had fundamentally changed.

To legally establish the heritability of officer ranks, a new category was created at the beginning of the eighteenth century – a stratum of “junior ensigns” (*pidpraporni*) made up mainly of officers' children with no other rank.⁶⁴ At the same time, the rank of “junior ensign” was the lowest officer rank, the first rung in the career of an officer. Almost all the children of officers received this rank, without having any services of their own. The acquisition of the rank of junior ensign is best seen in the later attestations of officers of the Kharkiv regiment. Most of these ranks were given to the children of officers by Colonel Hryhorii Kvitka during his colonelcy.⁶⁵ The natural growth and ramification of the “family” required a way for people who were unable to obtain one of the clearly designated officer posts to acquire status, and it was for them that the rank of junior ensign existed.

Increased interference by the Russian government and attempts to turn the Sloboda regiments into well-controlled units had a direct effect on the relations between “fathers” and “children.”⁶⁶ To reach the summit of social status, the child had to climb all the rungs of the career ladder. Evidence of this can be found starting from the 1720s. The son of the aforementioned Colonel Hryhorii Kvitka, Ivan, despite his father's apparent support, began his service as a junior ensign, then became captain of the Valky company. He finally obtained the closest post to a

colonelcy, that of the quartermaster, and was attested by the Russian government in 1737 for the post of colonel, but assumed this office only in 1744, and even then in the Iziium regiment, far from his own estates.⁶⁷

Cossack officers sought to send their children to serve as junior ensigns while they were still children. In his memoir, Ivan Osypovych Ostroz'kyi-Lokhvyts'kyi recalled that he was registered to serve as a junior ensign in the Ostrohozhk regiment at the age of ten, but while he was serving as such, his father sent him to study at the Kharkiv College.⁶⁸ The 1759 census of the Kharkiv regiment provides data about the age of induction into service: on the average, officers began to serve at thirteen to seventeen years old, but there were interesting exceptions. Iakiv Kovalevs'kyi, the captain of the Derkachivka company, began his service at the age of six, Captain Iakiv Kvitka at three (!!!), as did Pavlo Cherniak, and Captain Protopopov began serving at two.⁶⁹ The census states that "many junior ensigns, being minors, are still in school and do not appear in the regiment."⁷⁰ The register of the junior ensigns in this report of the Kharkiv regiment clearly shows that the principal basis for holding the post of junior ensign was the designation "from the family of officers," "from the family of captains," and by then, even "from the family of junior ensigns." Of sixty-six junior ensigns, only twenty-four were from "Cossack" and "priestly" families.⁷¹

The recognition of the services of the father or grandfather and belonging to the "family" served as an indicator of social and political status. The circle of officers, the "family," looked after not only the interests of the heir while the father was still alive but also those of widows and orphans. The Cossack administration not only safeguarded his estates but also made provision for his service. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was a stratum of widows and orphans of landowners, which meant that to occupy a certain place in society it was necessary to have a notable ancestor and belong to the "family," but not necessarily hold a leading post.⁷² A large percentage of the estates in the Sloboda regiments, as evidenced by the 1713, 1722, and 1723 censuses of the Kharkiv regiment, was owned by widows and orphans.⁷³ The recognized "services of the father" were the basis for belonging to the privileged class but not for occupying the same, especially high, office after his death. It is here that the power of the "family" and the interference of the Russian government made themselves felt. Increased pressure by the Russian government and the reforms of the 1730s that introduced the attestation of officers in order to obtain posts significantly weakened the influence of the *starshyna* on appointments to various posts.⁷⁴ Although the tsarist government still adhered to tradition, it perceptibly sought to control the situation. Evidence of this was the rotation of colonels in 1730s–40s, when a "regimental son" from one Sloboda regiment was appointed colonel into another regiment, further

away from his estates and “family.” In 1734, a representative of the Ostrohozhk colonel’s family, Stepan Tev’iashov, became colonel of the Kharkiv regiment; in 1743, the Kharkiv colonel’s son, Ivan Hryhorovych Kvitka, became colonel of the Izium regiment; and in 1748, the Izium colonel’s son, Mykhailo Mykhailovych Donets'-Zakharzhevs'kyi, was appointed colonel of the Sumy regiment.⁷⁵

In the eighteenth century, the recognition of individual merits of the children was a more decisive factor in obtaining *starshyna* posts than the backing of father’s authority. In 1713, the officers of the Kharkiv regiment refused to hand back the post of colonel to Lavrentii Ivanovych Shydlovs'kyi, which he had occupied while his uncle held the post.⁷⁶ The peripeties in the Sumy regiment in the 1740s were even more interesting. In 1737, Dmytro Kondrat'iev, who had been appointed colonel of Sumy regiment, immediately decided, quite naturally, to look after the interests of his son, and in 1740, the officers of the Sumy regiment certified his son Heorhii “to the post of his father ... while he is alive.” But it was not until 1743, when Dmytro Kondrat'iev died, that “the regimental *starshyna* in [1]743 chose as colonel” not the attested son, but Andrii Vasylovych Kondrat'iev, the regimental judge.⁷⁷ What is more, they even refused the colonel’s son the post of the regimental judge (“unreliable,” “doesn’t know the job,” “does not write well,” “was never in this administration”).⁷⁸

Attempts to bypass the “family” and the local Russian command were unsuccessful. The Okhtyrka regiment’s Aide-de-Camp Vasyli Smakovs'kyi directed his request to be appointed quartermaster, and his son Hryhorii to be appointed to his post of aide-de-camp, not through the command but through the Russian Senate. His petition was returned “so that he ask for that position for himself and his children through the command.”⁷⁹

Thus, the third and fourth generation of Sloboda officers inherited their rank with the help of the “family,” the signatures on the petitions and attestations of almost all members of the “family.” This already signaled the existence of a ramified estate of the “new gentry.”

“The Bad Aspects of the Old Cossack Way of Life”⁸⁰

A defining aspect of the officer “families” of the Sloboda regiments was their weakness, that is, their weak clan solidarity.

Above all, this weakness was due to the way that the officer families were formed. Democratic access to the “family” was still open in the eighteenth century, when the *starshyna* corporation was seemingly fully formed. For example, in the Ostrohozhk regiment, judging from the attestations of officers, it was not at all difficult to attain “notable” rank; it was easily gained by wealthy Cossacks and im-

portant foreigners.⁸¹ In the Iziium regiment, after climbing all the rungs of the officer career ladder, starting from common Cossack, Fedir Khomych Krasnokut-s'kyi became colonel in 1751.⁸² We know of several officers in the Kharkiv regiment in the 1760s who rose from the "masses" (Judge Andrii Holovashych,⁸³ Aide-de-Camp Ivan Nesterov,⁸⁴ Captain Hryhorii Rovnenko [Rovnev]).⁸⁵

The formation of the estate of the Cossack *starshyna* was significantly influenced by the Russian social structure, which was undergoing important changes in the eighteenth century. "Familial" and "clan" interests among eighteenth-century Russian nobility (which, incidentally, was only taking shape) were not long-lasting. To gain a certain status, a nobleman looked for support among patrons and clients and not in family ties.⁸⁶ This was clearly reflected in the structure of the officer clans in the Sloboda regiments, which constantly clashed with the Russian authorities.

The *starshyna* corporation was also prevented from strengthening by the personnel policy of the tsarist government, which ostensibly permitted the "clan" to form in accordance with its own laws, but, at the same time, confronted it with great difficulties. The government often appointed foreigners as officers to the Sloboda regiments. As of 1711, representatives of the Moldavian political emigration were given estates in the Sloboda Ukraine and a bitter power struggle broke out in 1712, when the Moldavian Prokip Kulykovs'kyi was appointed colonel of the Kharkiv regiment.⁸⁷ The officer "clan" of the Kharkiv regiment reacted very adversely to anything foreign, to the "Wallachian outrage." The Moldavian foreigners who settled in the Sloboda regiments were united, had a much greater sense of "clan identity" than the Cossack officers, greater cooperativeness, and, finally, the support of the tsarist government. Despite Prokip Kulykovs'kyi's sudden death in 1735, the Moldavian immigrants remained in the Sloboda regiments as a foreign irritant in the *starshyna* corporation. In addition, according to a decree of 1735, the Moldavians had to be awarded officer ranks.⁸⁸

The tsarist government often appointed Russians, who were outsiders with respect to the *starshyna* "family," as officers in the Sloboda regiments: the Tev'iashovs in the Ostrohozhk regiment, the Chornohlazovs and Kartavis in the Kharkiv regiment.⁸⁹ After several decades, these individuals usually became "Ukrainianized," and their families became part of the "family." In fact, a diverse ethnic background is characteristic of most representatives of the elite of any country, but the constant "infusion" of foreign elements could not be conducive to a more or less regulated corporatization and served as grounds for numerous quarrels between "insider" and "outsider" officers.

These quarrels were effectively used by the tsarist government to destroy the Cossack social order, and to co-opt the local elite into imperial structures. By the

1750s, long-lasting conflicts were flaring up in each Sloboda regiment (except the Okhtyrka regiment), both inside the “family” and with officers who were outsiders with respect to the “family.”

Numerous appeals to the tsarist government from the officers of the Sumy regiment in the 1750s not to appoint the son of Romanov, a convert to Christianity, as their colonel ended in the appointment of precisely that odious figure as colonel.⁹⁰

At the end of the 1740s, the “families” experienced a severe crisis in internal relations. It was due in no small measure to the interference of the tsarist government into the cases of attestation for officer posts. In 1745, the quartermaster of the Okhtyrka regiment, T. Boiars'kyi, decided to retire and leave his post to his son. However, Colonel Ivan Lesevyts'kyi contested the attestation of the younger Boiars'kyi on the grounds that not only had Junior Ensign Boiars'kyi not served in any post but he was not even registered as a common Cossack and is a self-proclaimed junior ensign, who illegally produced his attestation “through the diligence of his father.”⁹¹ The government settled the scandal involving the attestation and the “internal family” quarrels in its own best interests, increasing its control over the appointment of officers and inheritance of offices (the main functions of the “family”), “so that henceforth they not use trickery to produce attestations.”⁹²

The conflicts over attestations extended to the Kharkiv regiment. After the retirement of Colonel Stepan Tev'iashov in 1756, the officers sought to make the regimental Judge Ivan Hryhorovych Kovalevs'kyi (a “classic” representative of the “family,” because his father, grandfather, and great grandfather had been officers in the regiment) their colonel. But the tsarist government did not support his candidacy and even tried to punish the officers for this attestation.⁹³ In addition, at the end of the 1750s, conflicts over the “officership” flared up in the Kharkiv regiment between Captain (*rotmistr*) Ivan Nesterov and the Aides-de-Camp Maksym Horlyns'kyi and Ivan Zembors'kyi.⁹⁴ Against this backdrop, the tsarist government appointed as the colonel of the Kharkiv regiment Matvii Prokopovych Kulykovs'kyi, the son of the notorious “Wallachian” Prokip Kulykovs'kyi, who had served as colonel in 1712–13. Notably, the new colonel did not immediately find common ground with the officers, especially captains Kostiantyn Protopopov, Hryhorii Rovenko, and Hryhorii Kvitka, and was notorious for his abuses and violence. However, at the beginning of the 1760s, the majority of officers came to terms with this individual, and only the company Chancellor Petro Nepyshnyi remained staunchly opposed to him.⁹⁵ Nepyshnyi's complaints about the abuses of Matvii Kulykovs'kyi were one of the reasons for a lengthy investi-

gation by the Russian government of irregularities in the Sloboda regiments, which ended with the abolishment of the Cossack social order.

Even more alarming trends were seen in the "family" of the Izium regiment. Izium Colonel Fedir Krasnokuts'kyi quarreled with the brigadier of the Sloboda regiments Vasyl' P. Kapnist (representative of the Moldavian emigration of 1711), who had himself begun his career in the Izium regiment.⁹⁶ The brigadier made every effort to drive a wedge between the officers and the colonel, exploiting officers Mykhailo Myloradovych and Stepan Fedorov as "foreigners," as well as the *starshyna's* old quarrels with the colonel.⁹⁷ It is interesting to note that the in fact "legitimate" colonel was opposed by representatives of the "family," members of old officer clans: Judge Ivan Kapustians'kyi, Quartermaster Andrii Sambors'kyi, and even the colonel's son-in-law, Captain Hryhorii Tymoshenko.⁹⁸ At the beginning of the 1760s, eight officers of the Izium regiment (all members of the "family") were under arrest in connection with the conflict (including Colonel Fedir Krasnokuts'kyi).⁹⁹ The regiment was governed by other *starshyna* members and Russian officers.¹⁰⁰

It is in the Izium regiment that we come across an important fact in the life of the "family" – the recognition of seniority, a principle similar to the old Muscovite "order of precedence" (*mestnichestvo*). Thus, the officers of the Izium regiment complained in 1758 that Colonel Krasnokuts'kyi had sent the aide-de-camp Ivan Soshals'kyi to deliver money to the capital, bypassing more deserving officers; moreover, to resolve this matter, he had gathered the officers at his home ("he prefers his home despite [the existence of] the regimental chancellery"). The notable officers regarded all of this as degrading.¹⁰¹

Problems in the "family" were also brought to the fore in the Ostrohozk regiment at the end of the 1750s and the beginning of the 1760s. In fact, they served as grounds for a government investigation of abuses in the Sloboda regiments. We have in mind the famous case of Prokip Konevyts'kyi.¹⁰²

Prokip Konevyts'kyi, a native of the city of Zolochiv of the Kharkiv regiment, was attested in 1749 as captain,¹⁰³ but since there were no vacancies in the companies of the Kharkiv regiment, he was transferred in 1754 to the Ostrohozk regiment.¹⁰⁴ This officer, even though he was given the Kalach [*Kalachivs'ka*] company, was an outsider to the "family" of the Ostrohozk regiment and was immediately sent on the Prussian campaign. Upon his return from the campaign, Prokip Konevyts'kyi failed to give a bribe to Colonel Stepan Tev'iashov and quarreled with Quartermaster Ivan Hozlubyn. The captain attempted to lodge a complaint about "family" relations, charging that the colonel and officers in *starshyna* posts were appointed "not on the basis of sworn qualifications but only on the

basis of cronyism,” “in the interests of that cronyism.”¹⁰⁵ The lengthy excesses in the case of Prokip Konevyts'kyi are quite interesting and instructive, but they ended with an investigatory commission from St Petersburg, whose conclusions proved fatal for the existence of the Sloboda regiments.

The facts cited above clearly demonstrate the assertion about the unformed nature and weakness of the *starshyna* “family.” Despite the fact that “clanship,” collective responsibility, and heritability of officer posts were fairly characteristic of officers in the Sloboda regiments, the officer stratum did not unite to defend their rights and liberties in the face of the threat of the abolition of their ambiguous status quo. The special features and weakness of the “family” were ably exploited by the Russian government to subjugate the autonomous borderland, and to fit it into the imperial model.

Conclusions

Our study does not in any way exhaust the problem of “clanship”; rather, it raises this problem in early modern Ukraine. It stands to reason that a number of questions that still require study (the size of a Cossack officer’s family, the “nuclearization” of families, the role of the younger son with respect to the inheritance and division of property and power) have been left outside our purview, but we need to take into consideration those specific characteristics of the “familial clan” that are reflected in some ways in our own time. The evolution of the family of the Cossack *starshyna* largely replicated the evolution of the patriarchal family, with the initial role of the “father” and the subsequent significant limitation of his powers. Officer posts were obtained “based on cronyism” and “based on kinship.”

The formation of the officer stratum, the officer family-clans, in the Sloboda regiments was closely linked with the formation of the Russian nobility. Neither the *starshyna* family nor the Russian nobility were “organizations” of the communal (directly familial) type. However, these structures did bear certain features of a community: the equalizing distribution of service duties among its members, collective responsibility, the election of officials whom the members of the family vouched for to the state.¹⁰⁶ Tsarism, of course, was not interested in the strength of the *starshyna* family, or in the corporatization of the frontier elite. Through clever maneuvering, the tsarist government used the family to subordinate Cossack autonomy to the empire. Nonetheless, the officer clan existed, and family relationships in achieving one’s social niche during the decline of “Cossack statehood” significantly outweighed those of clientelism.

The history of Ukraine until the end of the eighteenth century is the history of a moving frontier. If we accept Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis re-

garding the United States, a similar theory can be applied to Ukraine.¹⁰⁷ Entrepreneurship, democratically egalitarian social relations, small families, and individualism developed on the frontier. In one way or another, this also applies to Ukrainian history, but this movable frontier was fought over by various countries, in fact, various civilizations. In the case of Ukraine, the winner was not a democratic but an integrated system, which subjugated the democratic movable frontier with a "carrot and stick" approach, initially recognizing all the special features and liberties of the frontier and only gradually subjugating the local elite and subordinating its functioning to imperial norms. That system was Russia.¹⁰⁸ In other words, the "democratism of the familial clan" played a negative role in the political aspirations of the Cossack elite.

The weakness of the family was due not only to the interference of the tsarist government but undoubtedly to the quite strongly manifested traditions of the frontier. The system of ordered heritability on the frontier vied with the special features of the transfer of power among nomadic peoples, where "whatever power the ruler had, his successor, even if he obtained his office on a legal basis, most often was forced to start everything anew."¹⁰⁹ The extensive room for action in a "marginal society" contributed to the division of families and elimination of respect for relatives. Moral factors of mutual assistance within the family circle played a weak role. Could this not have been the source of the "Little Russian" propensity for "litigation," and constant quarrels over details among close relatives? The files of local courts in the second half of the eighteenth to beginning of the nineteenth century are replete with such cases. Could this not be the reason why the Ukrainian clanship of the frontier did not survive the test and yielded its political rights and liberties in order to preserve its altered social status? Sociology distinguishes two types of social interaction: *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society). In the first type (community), social ties that are based on neighborliness, family, friendship, and respect reign; in the community, there is a reliance on tradition and moral factors play a role. At the same time, in a society, social relations, based on the rational exchange of services and goods, dominate. The modernization of Russia, which was intensively under way in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, in one way or another undermined the annals of the community, gradually forming new relations among people (society). The modern Russian historian Boris Mironov described the process of the modernization of Russia in the eighteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth centuries as a transition "from community to society."¹¹⁰ The Ukrainian frontier lands were part of this general process, and the yet-not-fully-formed estate of the Ukrainian nobility fell under the influence of new forms of mutual assistance and unity, which were based not on the classic models of the Cossack

family with the recognition of the services of relatives but on the principle of *quid pro quo*. Assertions about the estate order of the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine require certain clarifications and explanations of their distinctive features. The ambiguousness of the evolution of social microstructures on the frontier – the combining, synthesis, of various forms of family and clan relations – are, in fact, the challenges in the treatments of Ukrainian history and of relations in the frontier society of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as: V. Masliichuk, “Kozats'ka starshyna slobids'kykh polkiv XVII–XVIII st.: ‘rodyynnyi klan’ ta dosiahnennia sotsial'noho statusu,” *Kyivs'ka starovyna*, 1 (2003): 42–58. Copyright 2003 by Volodymyr Masliichuk. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 M. Mitterauer, “Vorindustrielle Familienformen. Zur Funktionsentslastung des ‘ganzen Hauses’ im 17 und 18 Jahrhundert,” in ed. F. Engel-Janosi et al., *Fürst, Bürger, Mensch: Untersuchungen zu politischen und soziokulturellen Wandlungsprozessen im vorrevolutionären Europa (Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit)* 2 (Vienna, 1975): 123.
- 2 Fernand Braudel, *The Identity of France*, trans. Siân Reynolds, vol. 1 (London: Collins, 1988), 103.
- 3 In this context, the following works are the exceptions: A.L. Perkovs'kyi, “Evoliutsiia sim'i i hospodarstva na Ukraïni v XVII—pershii polovyni XIX st.,” *Demohrafichni doslidzhennia* 4 (Kyiv, 1979): 37–46; Iu. H. Hoshko, *Nase-lennia ukraïns'kykh Karpat XV–XVIII st. Zaselelnia. Mihratsiï. Pobut* (Kyiv, 1976). At the same time there appeared in Ukraine a critical review of the views of Western anthropologists and ethnographers: V. Iu. Kelembetov, *Suchasna burzhuazna sotsiokul'turna antropolohiia: Krytyko-etnohrafichne doslidzhennia* (Kyiv, 1980). The last work by the abovementioned Iu. H. Hoshko is very interesting: *Zvychaïeve pravo naselelnia ukraïns'kykh Karpat i Prykarpattia XIV–XIX st.* (Lviv, 1999), 227–42, on family law, see 243–325. Most recent interesting publications: R. Chmelyk, *Mala ukraïns'ka sim'ia druhoï polovyny XIX – pochatku XX st. (struktura i funktsiï)* (Lviv, 1999); V.P. Marochkin, “Ukraïns'ka mishchans'ka rodyna v svitli pravnychkykh, moral'no-etychnykh i zvychaïevykh norm zhyttia,” in idem, *Ukraïns'ke misto vid XV do ser. XVII st. Zvychaïevo-pravova atrybutyka iak istorychne dzherelo* (Toronto, 1999), 36–41; N. Starchenko, “Shliubna stratehiia vdïv i kil'ka problem navkolo nei,” *Kyivs'ka starovyna* 1 (2001): 42–62.

- 4 Iu. A. Poliakov, “Chelovek v povsednevnosti (Istoricheskie aspekty),” *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 3 (2000): 126.
- 5 Above all, we have in mind the studies in the history of family relations in Ukraine by Orest Levyts'kyi (see this scholar’s bibliography: “Bibliohrafiia prats' O. Levyts'koho,” *Zapysky sotsial'no-ekonomichnoho viddilu Vseukraïns'koï Akademii Nauk* 1 (1923), XCIX–CVI [nos. 117, 119, 126, 148, 168, 172, 175, 190, 196, 198, 204].
- 6 Compare Jean Sigmann’s description of the elite of Burgundy. See Jean Sigmann, *La Revolution de Maupeon en Bourgogne 1771–1775* (Dijon, 1935), 30. Quoted from Braudel, *The Identity of France*, 1:82–3.
- 7 It should be noted that in the majority of medieval communities, the role of the “family” was much broader; it was viewed more as a symbol to designate a macrostructure: state, community, city, etc. (for example, the Father Tsar [*Tsar Batiushka*] in Russia). Old Rus' was perceived as the Riuryk family. See O.P. Tolochko, *Rus': derzhava i obraz derzhavy* (Kyiv, 1994), 4. In the case of a frontier society, a frontier estate, which the Cossacks were, this was even more perceptible. The Cossacks clearly regarded themselves as a large family headed by a “father” (captain, otaman, hetman), whence the instances of blood brotherhood, mutual assistance, and Cossack rhetoric about “brotherhood.” For their part, the hetmans addressed the Cossacks as their “children.” Incidentally, this is clearly seen in Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi’s relations with the Cossacks: “And the hetman came to the Cossacks, bowed three times to the ground before them, ordered that they be given a barrel of mead, and said to them: my children, drink, and serve me some.” T.H. Iakovleva, “Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i riadove kozatstvo,” *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 4 [1995]: 60. We believe that this matter requires separate study.
- 8 A rather interesting definition of the “Khmel'nyts'kyi clan” is given by Iaroslav Dashkevych: “a union of the representatives of the family, related by blood; second, indirectly related representatives of other families, [...] third (this is an exclusively Ukrainian feature), united by ritual relations (in Ukraine, especially Eastern Ukraine, relations through godparents, godfathers, godmothers, children), plus, fourth [...] united by heraldic ties: Iaroslav Dashkevych, “Klan Khmel'nyts'koho – lehenda chy diisnist’,” in *Ukraïna v mynulomu* 2 (Kyiv–Lviv, 1992): 80. However, the definition of “clan” as it applies to the Cossack *starshyna* in the regiments of both the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine can be substantially broadened to include, in addition to godparents, ordinary friends (sometimes former hired hands and servants), members of the clergy with ties to officers, and others.
- 9 Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

- Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988), 8–9; O.A. Gant-skaia, “Sem'ia: struktura, funktsii, tipy,” *Sovetskaia etnografiia* 6 (1984): 23.
- 10 A. Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine* (Munich, 1994), 80.
 - 11 M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1992), 389.
 - 12 The colonel's great power in Sloboda regiments was noticed in the Hetmanate. Later, in the early nineteenth century, the talented author of *Istoriia Rusiv* (*History of the Rus' People*), in trying to demonstrate the oneness of the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine noted incorrectly, but interestingly, that up to 1668 the Sloboda regiments were under the command of the Hetman and Little Russian authorities, but “the colonels there, each wanting to be a little self-proclaimed hetman,” succeeded in obtaining a special system of governance from the Russian government (*Istoriia Rusiv*, trans. I. Drach [Kyiv, 1991], 154). In other words, the patriot stressed the great power of the colonels in the Sloboda regiments. Equally interesting is that this feature of the Sloboda regiments appealed to the Hetmanate's colonels; thus, in 1676, Colonel Petro Roslavets' of the Starodub regiment tried to separate his regiment from the Hetmanate and govern it in the manner of the Sloboda regiments. See A.M. Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, vol. 1. Polk Starodubskii (Kyiv, 1888), 17.
 - 13 K. Zynoviïv, *Virshi. Prypovisti pospolyti* (Kyiv, 1971), 126.
 - 14 Mykhailo Maksymovych, in examining the question of family relations among Ukrainians, cites an interesting folk tale: “A crow was flying from the south and was carrying his young under his wings. Along the way, he asked one of his young: will he carry his father when he grows old; receiving a positive answer, the crow cast the young bird to earth. He received the same answer from the second chick and did with him as he had with the first. The third answered: ‘I will, father, but only my own children.’ The father carried this chick where necessary, because he saw truth in him.” (M. Maksymovych, *Ukrainets* [Kyiv, 1864], 12. Quoted from S.I. Siavavko, *Ukraïns'ka etnopedahohika v ïi istorychnomu rozvytku* [Kyiv, 1974], 63.)
 - 15 V.H. (Vasyl' Horlenko), “Z rodynnykh vidnosyn na Het'manshchyni v druhii polovyni XVIII stolittia,” in *Ukraïns'kyi naukovi zbirnyk* 2 (Moscow, 1916): 88.
 - 16 Jan Ornowski, *Bogaty w parantele, sławę y honory wirydarz herbownemi Ich Mościov Panow P. Zacharzewskich pozornie po swych kwaterach zasadzony różami [...]* W S. cudotworney wielkiey Lawrze Kijowo Pieczarskiey (Kyiv, 1705), ark. 59.
 - 17 *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (hereinafter – *AMG*), vol. 3 (St Petersburg, 1901), 436.
 - 18 V. Iurkevych, *Emigratsiia na skhid i zaliudnennia Slobozhanshchyny za B. Khmel'nyts'koho* (Kyiv, 1932), 133; V.E. Danilevich, “Vremia obrazovaniia

- sloboskikh cherkaskikh polkov,” in *Sbornik statei posviashchennykh V.O. Kliuchevskomu* (Moscow, 1909), 637.
- 19 AMG, 3: 578.
- 20 Filaret, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisaniie Khar'kovskoi eparkhii* (hereinafter – Filaret), vol. 3 (Moscow, 1857), 321.
- 21 *Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukrainy* (Manuscript Institute of the National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – IR NBU), f. 29, spr. 151, ark. 280 zv.
- 22 *Opisaniie dokumentov i bumag, khraniashchikhsia v moskovskom otdelenii arkhiva ministerstva iustitsii* (hereinafter – *Opisaniie v AMIu*), vol. 13 (Moscow, 1903), 345; IR NBU, f. XXIX, spr. 151, ark. 277.
- 23 Ibid., ark. 304.
- 24 Filaret, 3: 325; “Krest'ianskie i natsional'nye dvizheniia nakanune obrazovaniia Rossiskoi imperii. Bulavinskoe vosstanie,” *Trudy istoriko-arkheologicheskogo instytuta* 12 (Moscow, 1935): 262.
- 25 E. Al'bovskii, *Khar'kovskie kazaki (vtoraia polovina XVII v.)* (St Petersburg, 1914), 180.
- 26 *Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorichnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter – TSDIAUK), f. 1717, spr. 334, 337–40, 348.
- 27 Al'bovskii, *Khar'kovskie kazaki*, 198; D.I. Bagalei, *Materialy dlia istorii goroda Khar'kova v XVII v.* (Kharkiv, 1905), 80.
- 28 Ibid., 83.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid., 85.
- 31 Ibid., 89.
- 32 Filaret, 5: 18.
- 33 *Opisaniie v AMIu*, 14: 10.
- 34 IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 152, copy 434.
- 35 Ibid.; TSDIAUK, f. 1721, spr. 1H.
- 36 V. Danilevich, *Iz istorii upravleniia Slobodskoi Ukrainy v XVII st. (K biografii ostrogozhskogo cherkaskogo polkovnika I.S. Sasa)*, (n.d.), 3, 9.
- 37 Filaret, 3: 80. Cherkasian (*cherkasskie*) regiments was a name of the Sloboda regiments used in the Muscovite formal correspondence.
- 38 IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 151, ark. 15 zv.–16.
- 39 Ibid., spr. 152, ark. 3; spr. 151, ark. 147 zv.
- 40 On this, see M. Kovalevskii, *Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia i razvitiia sem'i i sobstvennosti. Lektsii chitannye v Stokhol'mskom universitete*, trans. from the French by M. Iolshin (St Petersburg, 1895), 90–1.

- 41 O. Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba* (New York–Paris–Toronto, 1960), 85.
- 42 On this, see Filaret, 3: 45–6; *Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo* (hereinafter – *Pis'ma Petra Velikogo*) 8, no. 2 (Moscow, 1951): 759; TSDIAUK, f. 1638, op. 2, spr. 34.
- 43 D.I. Bagalei, *Materialy dlia istorii kolonizatsii i byta stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva (Khar'kovskoi i otchasti Kurskoi i Voronezhskoi gubernii) v XVI–XVIII st., sobrannye v raznykh arkhivakh i redaktirovannye D.I. Bagaleem* (Kharkiv, 1886), 1:179; TSDIAUK, f. 1722, spr. 1, ark. 55; *Materialy dlia ocherka sluzhebnoi deiatel'nosti Shidlovskikh v Slobodskoi Ukraine 1696–1727 gg., sobrannye i izdannye S. I. Shidlovskim* (St Petersburg, 1896) (hereinafter – *Materialy Shidlovskikh*), 246. On the arrest of Shydlovskii and the reason for it, see *Materialy Shidlovskikh*, 131; *Pis'ma i bumagi Petra Velikogo*, vol. 10 (Moscow, 1956), 748; vol. 11 (Moscow, 1962), 193.
- 44 *Materialy Shidlovskikh*, 219; “Protokoly, zhurnaly i ukazy Verkhovnego Tainogo soveta 1726–1730 gg., no. 8 (June 1729 – March 1730)” (hereinafter – “Protokoly”), in *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva* (hereinafter – *SIRIO*) 101 (St Petersburg, 1898): 61.
- 45 “Protokoly, no. 6 (July–December 1728),” in *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva* 84 (St Petersburg, 1893): 33. Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn described the representatives of this clan in very harsh terms.
- 46 *Materialy Shidlovskikh*, 127 (signed by Okhtyrka colonel Maksym Osypov, while his father was regarded as Sloboda regiment’s brigadier. *Ibid.*, 126).
- 47 The Lesevyts'kyi family inherited the colonel’s office while Oleksii Leseveyts'kyi, the colonel of the Okhtyrka regiment in 1724–34, was still alive. In 1735, he was appointed brigadier of the Sloboda regiments, and his post of colonel was assumed by his son Ivan (Filaret, 3:52), who remained in this post until his death in 1751. He was replaced by his brother Kostiantyn, and after the latter’s death in 1756, the Military Collegium appointed Oleksii Leseveyts'kyi’s third son, Iurii, to the office of Okhtyrka colonel. (IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 8, ark. 108 zv. and 109).
- 48 See the report about the Zhukov-Zhuchenko family tree in 1760 in TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 507, ark. 9. In 1739, I.M. Zhukov himself asked the government to appoint his son Iosyp captain of the Sokolov company (TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 29, ark. 122 and 122 zv.). The request was granted. Hence, the Zhukovs were captains of the Sokolov company from 1707 to 1764.
- 49 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 29, ark. 83–84. The hereditary captaincy of the Petrovs'kyi’s was confirmed in 1738. (ark. 77).
- 50 *Ibid.*, ark. 55. Oleksiy Protopopov asked that his son be appointed to any vacant position, but his request was refused.

- 51 This “tradition” of assuming officer posts was depicted satirically by Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnov'ianenko, himself a descendant of a notable officer family, in his novel *Konotops'ka vid'ma* (*The Witch of Konotop*): “Captain Ulasovych was from an honest and important family. Was there anyone who did not know that the Zabr'iokhas had always been company officers; and Mykyta's grandfathers and great grandfathers were always captains in the company's town of Konotop; the captaincy was passed down from father to son. And so when old Ulas Zabriokha, the captain of Konotop, died [...] he was very much mourned by the Cossacks! When they had marked the fortieth day [after death], and the community gathered at a conference to decide whom to appoint captain, all shouted in unison: “Who else? Ulasovych, Zabr'oshchenko, who better can we find?” (H.F. Kvitka-Osnov'ianenko, *Zibrannia tvoriv u semy tomakh*, vol. 3 [Kyiv, 1970], 131–2.)
- 52 O. Hrushevs'kyi, “Z pobutu starshyny XVIII v.,” in *Zapysky Ukrain's'koho naukovoho tovarystva u Ky'ivi. Naukovyi zbirnyk* 21 (Kyiv, 1926): 125, 126.
- 53 For greater detail on this, see A. Tverdokhlebov, “Nasledstvennoe polkovnichestvo,” *Kievskaia starina* 5 (1887): 152–70.
- 54 “Protokoly, no. 5 (January–June 1728),” in *SIRIO* 79 (St Petersburg, 1891): 286.
- 55 “Protokoly, no. 6,” in *SIRIO* 84 (St Petersburg, 1893): 33.
- 56 Tverdokhlebov, “Nasledstvennoe polkovnichestvo,” 166.
- 57 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 29, ark. 106.
- 58 *The Genealogical Table of the Nobility of the Kharkiv Vicegerency*, which was compiled in 1785–88, notes that Ivan Iakovych Kovalevs'kyi was 66 years old, see *Rukopysnyi viddil Kharkivs'koï tsentral'noi naukovoï biblioteky* (Manuscript Department of the Kharkiv Central Scientific Library), *Rodoslovnaiia dvorianstva knyha Khar'kovskogo namestnichestva*, part 6, ark. 66, 135.
- 59 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 29, ark. 114.
- 60 Al. Markevich, *Istoriia mestnichestva v Moskovskom gosudarstve v XV-XVII veke* (Odesa, 1888), 109.
- 61 Bagalei, *Materialy*, 1:179; *Materialy Shydlovskikh*, 178, 180, 197, 216; Filaret, 1:50.
- 62 Filaret, 3:52.
- 63 IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 2, ark. 63.
- 64 The formation of the stratum of junior ensigns is examined in detail in my monograph “Kozats'ka starshyna slobids'kykh polkiv druhoï polovyny XVII-pershoï tretyny XVIII st.” (Kharkiv, 2009) which we expect to appear as a monograph in 2002.
- 65 TSDIAUK, f., 1725, spr. 126, ark. 19, 23, 40, 46, 47, 54.
- 66 Rapid reforms in the Ukrainian autonomies were connected with the creation of a “well-regulated state,” with Russian reforms. Zenon Kohut has

expressed interesting views regarding this, see Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy*, 20–1.

- 67 A. Metlinskii, "Materialy k istorii Malorossii," in *Pribavlenie k Khar'kovskim gubernskim vedomostiam* 9 (1840): 94; D.I. Bagalei and D.P. Miller, *Istoriia goroda Khar'kova za 250 let ego sushchestvovaniia* (Kharkiv, 1905), 65; IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 8, ark. 66, 66 zv.
- 68 "Zapiski novooskol'skogo dvorianina I.O. Ostrozhskogo-Lokhvitskogo," *Kievskaiia starina* 2 (1886): 356.
- 69 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 467, ark. 53.
- 70 Ibid., ark. 67.
- 71 Ibid., ark. 3 zv – 7 (addenda on ark. 13).
- 72 The first such "landowners" without service that we know of were the children of the Izium colonel Kostiantyn Donets' in 1693 (Bagalei, *Materialy*, 1:170).
- 73 *Doklady i prigovory sostoiavshiesia v pravitelestvuiushchem Senate v tsarstvo-vanie Petra Velikogo, izdanie imperatorskoiu Akademiei nauk*, vol. 4, no. 2 (July–December 1714): 919, 920; TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 12, ark. 259–76; spr. 22, ark. 880 zv., 916, 1398, and others.
- 74 On attestation, see *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, vol. 9 (St Petersburg, 1830), no. 6430, 159; no. 6619, 404; IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 8, ark. 35–7, and others.
- 75 E. Al'bovskii, *Istoriia khar'kovskogo slobodskogo kozach'ego polka* (Kharkiv, 1895), 183; IR NBU, f. xxix, spr. 8, ark. 66. I. H. Kvitka complained that they had no estates in the Izium regiment, not even a "residence." TSDIAUK, f. 1717, spr. 786, ark. 1–2. The Sumy officers wanted the quartermaster T. Krasovs'kyi to be colonel.
- 76 *Materialy Shydlovskikh*, 219.
- 77 IR NBU, f. XXIX, spr. 8, ark. 47 zv.–98; see also TSDIAUK, f. 1717, spr. 1221, ark. 1.
- 78 IR NBU, f. XXIX, spr. 8, ark. 57.
- 79 "Zhurnaly i opredeleniia pravitel'stvuiushchego Senata za iun', avgust i sentiabr 1741," *Senatskii Arkhiv* 4 (St Petersburg, 1891): 37.
- 80 That is how the historian of the Sloboda regiments Petro Holovyns'kyi characterized the quarrels between the officers of the Izium regiment in the 1750s. P. Holovinskii, *Slobodskie kazach'i polka* (St Petersburg, 1864), 180.
- 81 TSDIAUK, f. 1723, spr. 3, 6, 7, 10, 23, 31, 34, 36, 47.
- 82 IR NBU, f. xxix, spr. 8, ark. 67 zv.–68.
- 83 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 22, ark. 279; spr. 29, ark. 95; spr. 188, ark. 1 zv.
- 84 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 188, ark. 1 and zv., 7.
- 85 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 467, ark. 3 zv.

- 86 B.N. Mironov, *Sotsialnaia istoriia Rossii* (St Petersburg, 1999), 1:512.
- 87 *Materialy Shidlovskikh*, 216–19. For greater details, see V.L. Masliichuk, "Materialy do slovnyka 'Kozats'ka starshyna Kharkivs'koho slobids'koho polku' (polkovnyky 1706–1713 rr. Shydlov's'ki, P. Kulykov's'kyi)," in *Henealohichni zapysky Ukraïns'koho heral'dychnoho tovarystva* 2 (Bila Tserkva, 2001): 69–75.
- 88 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, vol. 9 (St Petersburg), no. 6729, 514.
- 89 IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 2, ark. 64–5; TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 126, ark. 50; *Bumagi kabineta ministrov imperatritsy Anny Ioanovny 1731–1740*, ed. A.N. Filippov, vol. 11 (1740 ianvar'–mai), in *SIRIO*, 138 (Iur'ev [Tartu], 1912): 238–30. 1723. Russian Second Major Tymofii Goriaistov was appointed in the same way to the Izium regiment, where for several years he "oppressed" the officers. "Protokoly, vol. 8," in *SIRIO* 101 (St Petersburg, 1898): 61.
- 90 TSDIAUK, f. 1717, spr. 1221, ark. 1 zv.–3.
- 91 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 174, ark. 42.
- 92 Ibid., ark. 42 zv.–46.
- 93 Al'bovskii, *Istoriia khar'kovskogo slobodskogo kozach'ego polka*, 183.
- 94 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 188.
- 95 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 514; spr. 518, ark. 1–3, 59 zv., 126–28 and zv.; spr. 451; f. 1819, op. 1, spr. 150, ark. 4–9, 48; Al'bovskii, *Istoriia khar'kovskogo slobodskogo kozach'ego polka*, 196–203. See also IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 8, ark. 144.
- 96 IR NBU, f. 2, spr. 1840.
- 97 Holovinskii, *Slobodskie kazach'i polka*, 181–82; TSDIAUK, f. 1710, spr. 94, ark. 4 zv.–30; spr. 95, ark. 63–74; IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 8, ark. 3 and zv., 86–90.
- 98 "Ukazy i poveleniia imperatritsy Ekateriny II za 1765 g.," in *Senatskii arkhiv* 15 (St Petersburg, 1913), 942–8.
- 99 TSDIAUK, f. 1817, op. 1, spr. 144, ark. 1 and zv.
- 100 IR NBU, f. 29, spr. 8, art. 7; TSDIAUK, f. 1710, op. 2, spr. 95, ark. 69 zv.–70.
- 101 TSDIAUK, f. 1710, op. 2, spr. 94, ark. 30.
- 102 S.M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen* (Moscow, 1965), 25–6: 141.
- 103 Prokip Konevyts'kyi's father was a Cossack in the Okhtyrka regiment, and Prokip Konevyts'kyi himself was given the rank of junior ensign in 1745 for his services (TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 205, ark. 6). After becoming a captain in 1749, Konevyts'kyi began quarreling with the regimental administration of the Kharkiv regiment. See "Opisistoricheskogo arkhiva," in *Sbornik Khar'kovskogo istoriko-filologicheskogo obshchestva* (Kharkiv, 1999), 12:140–2.
- 104 TSDIAUK, f. 1725, spr. 483, ark. 25.
- 105 TSDIAUK, f. 1723, spr. 29, ark. 30–6; f. 1725, spr. 483, ark. 24–5; *Senatskii Arkhiv*, 15 (St Petersburg, 1913), no. 195, 399.
- 106 B.N. Mironov, *Sotsialnaia istoriia Rossii* (St Petersburg, 1999), 1:150.

- 107 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987), 4–5.
- 108 For important thoughts on this see B. Krupnyts'kyi, *Federalizm na Skhodi Evropy (Rozdumuvannia z pryvodu pratsi H.F. Ravkha “Rosii, derzhavna iednisti natsional'na svoieridnist’”)* (Paris, 1956), 7.
- 109 N.N. Kradin, “Struktura vlasti v gosudarstvennykh obrazovaniakh kochevnikov,” in *Fenomen vostochnogo despotizma* (Moscow, 1993), 208. Quoted from M.N. Afanas'ev, “Klientalizm: istoriko-sotsiologicheskii ocherk,” *Politicheskie issledovaniia* 6 (1996): 103.
- 110 Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii*, 1:423.

Regimental Cities of the Hetmanate in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century: Governance, Economy, Demography

I H O R S E R D I U K

The frontier location of the Hetmanate resulted in a distinctive course of urbanization processes in the region, different from those in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, much of this territory was still part of the so-called Wild Field (*Dyke Pole*) and was devoid of cities, the resettlement of which, in the form of an intensive “reconquest” of the sites of the former outposts of Kyivan Rus', only began at the end of the sixteenth century. Due to this late start, the cities of the Hetmanate had practically no stone buildings or narrow streets with two- and three-story buildings, clustered around a central square. Instead of the austere wall of the medieval castle, the Hetmanate city protected itself with an earthen fortress, around which were scattered peasant clay-walled cottages and gardens. These characteristics of “urban landscapes” unquestionably affected the worldview of their inhabitants (just as these inhabitants themselves shaped the environment in which they lived), so that a Poltava townsman had a different view of the city than a resident of Lviv. To these differences in landscape we can also add the availability of timber, building stone, and, most important, access to good drinking water, whose shortage had a marked effect on the life of large European cities of the early modern period.¹

Then again, the number of inhabitants of Cossack cities was also small; thus in the eighteenth century, the largest of the region's 137 cities and towns numbered five to eight thousand residents. These settlements were highly diverse in terms of legal status, organization of self-government, and economic development, but they all functioned on the basis of a combination of the traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (with respect to urban legislation), the Hetmanate

(which still retained a certain degree of autonomy), and the modernizing initiatives of the Russian Empire.

The authors of fairly numerous urban studies and general research have not made up their minds to this day regarding the appropriateness of the use of the term *city*, even with respect to the largest regimental centers of the Hetmanate. Different criteria for defining their status urge regarding such settlements as *large villages*, or, conversely, practically classic European cities. These approaches are based on the study of the functioning of self-government, economic development, administrative functions, and the city's residents and their daily life. In view of the experience of Western European historical urban studies, the number of residents in the settlement is not a determinative criterion of urban status. More indicative are a specific worldview and an "urban" lifestyle, which we can try to trace, in particular, in the demographic behavior of the population. Thus, the latter can serve as a marker in the assessment of a settlement. In this respect, questions like "Were there cities in the Hetmanate?" smack of rhetoricalness. It is definitely not to be examined from the standpoint of present-day criteria; it is better to "ask" the people of the period for the answer. As Mariana Dolynska has noted, "the space of a city is inextricably linked with a human being who lived somewhere – in a specific building inside the 'walls' of the city or in a suburb, with a human being who had a workshop or garden somewhere in this space, who walked along the city streets and roads of the suburb."²

On the other hand, the space of a city exists in the mind of its residents or guests: they are the ones who see it as either magnificent or shabby, rich or poor, and so forth. Only they can explain to us what made the urban (including regimental) center different from other settlements in the Hetmanate, but the majority of these people remain a mute, anonymous mass. However, slips of the tongue are sometimes very revealing, as, for example, the following verse written by the monk and poet Iakiv (1764):

Enough lying around in the village, go to the cities!
 Don't be shy, even if you don't find a brother
 If anyone asks you: "What has driven you to the city?"
 Tell him: there is little to benefit me in the village.³

The Regimental City as the Seat of the Local Administration

Scholars refute the universality of the definition of a city for all periods of its existence; at the same time, there is a search under way for a complex criterion for defining the role of the urban settlement through an examination of its relations

with its surroundings. The Ukrainian researcher Tetiana Portnova distinguishes two basic views of the problem of the interaction between a city and its surroundings. The first emphasizes the parasitical nature of urban settlements, asserting that the city oppresses the village, swallows up its resources, and underscores its privileged status in relation to the latter, giving almost nothing in return. The second view is becoming increasingly popular and places emphasis on the existence of reciprocal influences. According to the advocates of this latter point of view, the city performs certain functions – economic, military, political, and social – which the village cannot fulfill, and in return enjoys certain privileges. In Tetiana Portnova's opinion, this description best fits the cities of the Dnipro Region (*Naddniprianshchyna*) up until the Industrial Revolution.⁴

The scholar regards the administrative function as one of the main functions of the premodern city. That is to say that in the period under study, the dialogue, or interaction, between the city and a given territory was carried out through its administration. The city, as the center of the company (*sotnia*) administration, performed administrative functions on the territory of the regimental company, and as the center of the regimental administration, on the territory of the regiment. Among the Left-Bank cities, Hlukhiv stood out in this respect. It was the seat of the hetman and the General Military Chancellery. The Hlukhiv company was not under the jurisdiction of the regimental city of Nizhyn, and the Cossacks of five more companies, which protected the hetman and performed guard duty, were also not under the authority of the colonel.⁵

The main military and administrative-territorial unit of the Hetmanate in the middle of the eighteenth century was the regiment. Accordingly, the regimental city was the local seat of military and administrative authority on the territory of the regiment, and also the center of the bureaucracy of the day. The localization of government bodies in the regimental city distinguished it from the rest of the settlements with the status of city or town. Colonels and the *starshyna* had a considerable number of Cossacks to perform various services, as well as permanent “staff” members, who lived in the city. For example, mention is made on the regimental quartermaster's staff of a regimental artillery aide-de-camp (*osaul, osavul*), a flag-bearer (*khорunzhyi*), otamans of the regimental artillery, and cannoneers (*harmashi*), and gunners (*pushkari*).⁶ For example, in 1734, the Pryluky regimental artillery had two cannon, and included on its staff a regimental aide-de-camp, a regimental flag-bearer, two gunners, four cannoneers, a blacksmith, two loaders (*pyzhovshchyks*), four buglers, and a kettledrummer.⁷ The staffs of the regimental chancelleries were even larger. According to Opanas Shafons'kyi, they could number as many as ten to sixteen people,⁸ while the personnel of the Poltava chancellery in 1734 totaled forty-seven people.⁹ There were

even more such staffers in Starodub: the list of “employees and others” in the General Census of 1765–69, contained fifty-nine people, of whom eighteen were regimental clerks.¹⁰

The chancellery was responsible for all paperwork, so the city was the center of recordkeeping on the territory of the regiment. Documents that concerned the justice system, economic issues, or administration passed through its bureaucracy and part of them ended up in the archive. The regiment’s landowners, who needed copies or extracts from documents, traveled to the city with numerous “gifts.” The fact is that gifts from pleaders and widespread bribery were the main source of income for the clerks, even though a fixed fee for these employees had been set in 1732 by Hetman Danylo Apostol’s universal.¹¹

The regimental city was the center for all court proceedings on the territory of the regiment, with the administrative and judicial functions not yet fully separated. The administration of justice was in the hands of the *starshyna*, which served as the recruiting ground for members of the court and its head. The regimental court was under the jurisdiction of the General Court and turned to it for clarifications and instructions. The former was simultaneously the city court, inasmuch as cases were heard by regimental and municipal officials jointly. It was composed of the judge, quartermaster, aides-de-camp, and secretary from the *starshyna*; as well as the otaman, town reeve (*viit*), and mayor (*burmistr*) from the city administration. Named in the case documents as participants in the proceedings were so-called “notable persons,” who were representatives of the city’s nobility.¹² Among such persons in the Poltava court, Viktor Horobets’ found city and regimental officials, who had previously served as judges.¹³

The sessions of the regimental court most often took place in the city hall. This was because complicated cases required seeking guidance from the laws and citing references from various documents, and the legal codes and collections were found in the city hall. This is where the clerical staff and the city hall jail (it could have been called a *koloda*, *ostroh*, or *sekvestr*) were located. Less frequently, the courts sat in the colonel’s house or in the houses of the regimental *starshyna*. For example, in Starodub, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the court held its sessions in the house of General Standard-Bearer Borozna.¹⁴ Finally, courts could sit in a tavern or inn, as indicated by surviving reports from the first half of the eighteenth century.

As a result of Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovs’kyi’s reform of the judicial system, after 1763 the regimental courts were replaced by courts that were more customary for the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Castle courts (*hrods’ki*) in ten regimental cities examined criminal cases. Land courts in twenty counties heard cases on a variety of matters, and subchamberlains’ courts (*pidkomors’ki*) settled

disputes concerning land ownership. The city courts were headed by colonels, while the judges, deputy judges, secretaries, and subchamberlains of land courts were elected by the nobles of the respective districts.¹⁵

People suspected of serious crimes were brought to the regimental city, so the city needed a jail. According to the General Census, the Pereiaslav regimental jail (*ostrokh*) was on the territory of the fortress next to the Kyiv tower.¹⁶ The source has nothing to say about the appearance of this jail, but at the time the Poltava jail was described as follows: “surrounded by a rickety fence, inside of which there are two wooden houses, and one earthen hut to hold important offenders sentenced to the pillory (*kolodnyky*).”¹⁷

The existence of a jail (*sekrestr*) and the number of prisoners in it can serve as one of the indicators of a city’s “status.” For example, in 1751, Hetmanate jails held 347 prisoners (*kolodnyky*), and the highest number of them – 85 – were in the “capital” Hlukhiv (this was more than in each of the ten Hetmanate regiments individually). The distribution of prisoners on the territory of the regiment is indicative. Thus, thirty prisoners “sat” in the Lubny regiment jail at the time, of whom nineteen were held in the regimental capital of Lubny, and the rest were distributed among the company centers as follows: six in Romny, three in Pyriatyn, and one each in Sencha and Lukoml. It must be noted that the *sekrestr* facilities of the time were analogous to today’s pre-trial detention centers, and their contingents waited a long time (often three to five years) for their case to be tried.¹⁸

The procedure of punishment was public: it was administered in the town square. This practice was typical of most of the cities of the Hetmanate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One form was the pillory. Thus, in Poltava, the post traditionally stood in the market square – on Cathedral Square in front of the cathedral, across from the city hall. The public nature of the punishment was meant to warn others against committing crimes, and it also made spectatorship at such events a typical form of urban entertainment. For example, in 1753, the residents of Poltava had the opportunity to witness the execution of Ievdokiia Shcherbanivna, who was tortured in the city’s market square before that.¹⁹ The publicity of the punishment allowed the crowd to participate in the process, and large gatherings of people are prone to impulsive decisions and their immediate realization. Thus, in 1713 in Poltava, a dragoon and a local widow, Hanna Nazarova, were to be punished. The man was executed, but when the executioner turned to deal with the woman, whose nose he was to cut off, “the people shouted and took her out of the hands of the executioner.”²⁰

The regimental court got involved in judicial proceedings across the entire territory of the regiment and eagerly adjudicated numerous cases from which it could derive financial gains. This was facilitated by the legalized mechanism of

imposing charges on criminals, a mechanism whose functioning in the form of monetary fines (*vyna, vina*) has been traced in materials from the end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth century by Viktor Horobets'. The courts had in their arsenal fines for all occasions: the wergild (*holovshchyna*), a fine for robbery, a fine similar to the wergild (*naviazka*), the appeal (*peresudy*), sureties (*zaruky*), and the settlement (*zmyrshchyna*), and they accepted "gifts and expenses" (*poklony i naklady*) – in other words, legalized bribes.²¹

The last, in Oleksii Sokyрко's opinion, was the result of the low pay of court officials, and so the plaintiffs' financial resources were directed at them. A landowner who decided to seek justice would have had to incur considerable travel expenses, rent a place to live, pay for the services of secretaries, couriers, guards, court officers, investigators, land surveyors, convoys, and so forth. He would have had to bribe the clerks, "make friends" with the judges, and secure the support of the regimental *starshyna*. Finally, the road home after triumphantly winning the case also lay through the households of the colonel and local captain.²²

A generalized (and exaggerated) image of such a captain was portrayed in the poem "Satirical Carol" (*Satyrychna koliada*). The author joked that the captain welcomed every crime, because it would be possible to get money from every perpetrator:

The lord captain rejoices, like a guardian angel,
Whenever a thief or rapist appears. [...]
But this does not require a large fee:
Let each bring ten rubles.
Then ask them if there's anything worse?
Because then you can charge them even more.²³

From this perspective, the regimental city did look like a "parasite" that swallowed up resources, sucking them out of the inhabitants of the subordinate territory. However, administration was not only a privilege; it was also a relatively burdensome duty. Thus, in Pryluky, up to thirty guards were needed to guard the prisoners (*kolodnyky*, who were brought in from the entire regiment) and to maintain order in the city. The city produced hay for the regimental artillery's horses, postmen, and officials. These same people and the city institutions had to be provided with firewood, housing, and so forth. Regimental recordkeeping required paper, wax, and inks. These expenditures were partly paid for by levies imposed on guilds and revenues from the city council's villages and city mills. These was also the source of financing for the gifts "to notable Great Russian persons," without whom "it is quite impossible to manage in a regimental city."²⁴

Billeting was especially burdensome for the townspeople. Decrees issued by Empress Anna Ioannovna set the standards for dividing up living space assigned for billeting – approximately one square *sazhen* per person, and one quarter of a *sazhen* for a soldier's child under thirteen years old.²⁵ Even the highest city officials (reeves, mayors, councilors) were exempted from billeting only in 1785, and until then they had to endure the presence of soldiers in their households.²⁶ The troops caused the population material losses and created problems. Infectious and venereal diseases spread, there was violence, and cases of rape. At the same time, billeting stimulated city trade and crafts, especially in the case of sparsely populated settlements.²⁷

The townspeople had to provide lodging for various officials who were traveling through regimental cities or were staying there on business. This obligation was even used as a means of revenge or to settle personal scores. In 1756, the Pereiaslav regimental secretary Kanevs'kyi, taking advantage of reeve Savonov's official mission in Hlukhiv, lodged Prince Shcherbatov in his house, thereby evicting the Savonov family from the property. After Savonov complained, the secretary was ordered not to do so. However, during the reeve's next absence, another Russian officer was lodged in his house, and his family was evicted once again.²⁸

The regimental city was the intermediary between the territory it administered and the central government. A decree issued by Petr Rumiantsev on 31 May 1765 introduced a postal service. In accordance with a relevant table, each regimental city had a few postmen: Myrhorod – two; Hadiach, Kyiv, Pereiaslav, and Starodub – three each; Lubny, Nizhyn, and Pryluky – four each. In the largest cities, the postal service was run by postmasters. In total, only fifteen such jobs were established on the territory of the Hetmanate, nine of which were in regimental cities.²⁹

Among a regimental city's important attributes were its roads, over which population migrations took place. Merchants, travelers, officials, and Russian officers traveled along these thoroughfares. These roads were also used by soldiers, who brought with them, in addition to the usual urban problems, diseases and epidemics. Combating the latter and preventing them was also the responsibility of the regimental authorities. This job was performed by the regimental physician, and not only on the territory of the regiment. For example, when rumors of the plague at the Zaporozhian Sich spread in 1766, two regimental doctors were sent to verify them; significantly, one was from the Starodub regiment, which was the farthest away territorially from Zaporizhzhia.³⁰ Nor must we forget about the barbers, who, among other things, treated wounds, syphilis, boils, and the like.³¹ A regimental city could also have a pharmacy; for example, a pharmacy in Poltava was owned by a retired former regimental doctor.³²

The above review of the special features of a regimental city as the seat of local administration shows that the performance of the administrative role was very

important for the functioning of a city. In fact, some of the regimental cities stood out from the rest precisely because of the presence in them of the regimental administration.

The geographical description of Little Russia by Gerhard Müller, in which the court historian named cities “worthy of notice,” is telling in this regard. Accordingly, in the Pryluky, Hadiach, and Poltava regiments, only their “capitals” merited mention, and that was precisely because that is where their regimental administrations were located. Nearly analogous was the case of Myrhorod – “known only for the fact that the name of the regiment is derived from it.” In the Kyiv regiment, in addition to Kyiv, mention was made of two cities with Magdeburg Law – Oster and Kozelets (the latter as the place where the regimental administrative center was located). In the Nizhyn regiment, Müller listed Nizhyn, followed by Hlukhiv and Baturyn, as the former seats of the hetman. Economic considerations dictated the naming of Krolevets, Borzna, Novi Mlyn, and Konotop (as the top towns in the regiment). The Starodub regiment stood out to some extent among the regiments described by Müller, in that five cities at once were deemed worthy of mention: Starodub, Mlyn, Pohar, Novhorod-Siverskyi, and Pochep.³³

The performance of administrative functions by a city influenced its evolution, and its economic and demographic potential. In the words of Olena Kompan, the higher the level of the government body, the larger and richer was the city in which the body was located.³⁴ In the opinion of French researchers, justice and administration in the early modern period was a sphere that had no unemployment. The cities of the province of Dauphiné are cited as an example: Valence had a university, Grenoble – “its *parlement*, its *chamber des comptes*, its *intendance*, and the seat of government of the province”; Vienne – “its archbishopric and *cour des aides*.”³⁵ They attracted large numbers of those who were in litigation, lodging appeals, or studying, while their neighbor, the city of Romans-sur-Isère, made futile efforts to develop its industry. The city of Nancy became poor because it was abandoned by its wealthy residents when the system of *bailiage* was abolished.³⁶

The loss of administrative status had a negative effect on a city. A telling example was the fate of Poltava, from which thirteen southern companies were taken away in 1765 and made part of the New Russia gubernia. In addition, the city was no longer a frontier outpost, which is why in 1774, Academician Johann Güldenstädt saw Poltava as a dying regimental city, which no longer had artillery, a commander, or a garrison. The following year, the city finally lost its regimental status.³⁷ On 20 October 1775, Poltava regiment’s last five companies, along with Poltava, were transferred to the New Russia gubernia.³⁸ From 1784 to 1796, the city served as a county center of the Katerynoslav vicegerency (*namistnytstvo*), and from 1796 to 1802, of the Little Russia gubernia.

The fateful day for the remaining nine regiments was 16 September 1781, when the formation of the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi vicegerencies was announced. Of the Hetmanate's regimental cities, one became the center of the vicegerency (not counting Kyiv), while the rest continued to function as county centers. Eleven counties were created on the territory of each of the newly established vicegerencies, and all county centers automatically became cities. This placed the regimental centers of Pereiaslav, Nizhyn, and Lubny on an equal level with nearly thirty towns (which now had to be "renamed cities") and the villages of Zasukha and Surazhychi.³⁹

The loss of regimental status had a marked effect on cities: they lost population, revenues, and authority. As subsequent events showed, only Poltava and Chernihiv were favored by chance: in the nineteenth century, they obtained administrative status and even expanded their influence at the level of the vicegerency, gubernia, and the governor-generalship. In contrast, Lubny, Myrhorod, Nizhyn, Pereiaslav, Hadiach, and Starodub remained insignificant provincial county towns.

Thus, the regimental city as the center of local administration had a number of advantages over other urban settlements. The performance of administrative functions required a considerable number of government officials and office workers, who were fairly well-to-do people. They built houses and enlarged their households, had many servants, workers, and hirelings. An administrative center needed office workers, aides, secretaries, barbers, painters, guards, investigators, judges, couriers, and postmen. A regimental city had to build and maintain the premises of a chancellery, jail, court, storage facilities, postal stations, an artillery yard, forge, and apothecary. Such cities attracted money and material and human resources from the territory under their control. In 1782 they lost their regimental status and became county centers, which meant a drastic reduction of the boundaries of the administered territory and of the scope of administrative powers.

Municipal Self-Governance

"Municipal self-governance in medieval Europe was one of the means of biting off and taking away powers from the state by self-governing entities." This thesis, proposed by Natalia Iakovenko in the documentary film *European Traditions of Municipal Self-Governance in Ukraine*, vividly conveys the essence of municipal self-governance in general and its Magdeburg version in particular. All that remains is to explain the small range of self-governing rights, even in the largest cities of the Hetmanate, in comparison with their counterparts in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

One of the reasons for this was the relatively late arrival of Magdeburg Law on the territories of the Dnipro Left-Bank. In fact, municipal self-governance

appeared in the region only in the 1620s, when it was granted to Nizhyn, Starodub, and Chernihiv. The inviolability of the self-governance privileges granted by the Polish kings and Lithuanian grand princes was confirmed in the March articles of 1654. The subsequent development of Magdeburg Law was determined by the hetmans' universals, which granted Magdeburg Law to more than thirty cities on the territory of the Hetmanate in the second half of the seventeenth century.⁴⁰ By the middle of the eighteenth century, these privileges had been confirmed for Kyiv, Pereiaslav, Nizhyn, Kaniv, Chernihiv, Pochep, Hadiach, Starodub, Kozelets, and Oster.⁴¹ In addition, in 1752, Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi issued a universal granting Magdeburg Law to Poltava, and in 1758, to Novhorod-Siverskyi.⁴² The abovenamed cities were privileged, while the rest were under municipal administration (*ratushni*).⁴³ This division was also recorded in the "Laws by Which the Little Russian People are Judged."⁴⁴ Thus, in the second half of the eighteenth century, of the 137 cities and towns of the Hetmanate, nearly the absolute majority were governed by municipal administrations.

Of the regimental cities of the Hetmanate, six had Magdeburg Law. The levels of their self-government differed and depended on their economic development and traditions. The highest level was found in Nizhyn, Starodub, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav. These cities were headed by elected reeves, mayors, and councillors (*raitsi*), and the judicial functions were performed by members of the *municipal* court (*lavnyky*).⁴⁵ Structurally, the city council (*magistrat*) was composed of two collegiums: administrative and the collegium of assessors (*lavnyky*) headed by the reeve (*viit*); government by the city council also required so-called "municipal servants." In Poltava there were twelve officials, although attendance was mandatory only for the reeve, mayor, two councillors, two assessors, and a secretary, or the reeve, mayor, two councilors, one assessor, and the secretary. In addition, there were three "municipal servants: artillery guard, castle gatekeeper, and aide (*os-aulets*) in the town council."⁴⁶

Obviously, the maintenance of the abovenamed officials was the city council's main item of expenditure. The General Census of Starodub indicated that the revenues received by the city council from two mills, households, and the weigh station (*vazhnytsia*) were spent on various needs, and "especially on the salary of the city council's secretary, officials, and employees," and also to pay for the purchase of sealing wax, paper, and ink.⁴⁷ The city councils of even large cities found it difficult to find all the necessary funds. After the fire in Pereiaslav in 1748, in which most of the administrative premises were destroyed, the city council was housed for at least another ten years in a rented house. A portion of the money and city property could be used by officials for their own needs; in Pereiaslav, when shortages in municipal property occurred, they were blamed on the fire.⁴⁸

The governing bodies of cities under municipal administrations (*ratushni*) consisted of a reeve and three mayors (*burmistry*). The regimental cities with this type of municipal government in the second half of the eighteenth century were Hadiach, Lubny, Myrhorod, and Pryluky. Obviously, the range of the rights of self-governance in cities governed by municipal administrations also depended on their economic development, demographic potential, and status. For example, according to Oksana Kovalenko's research, Poltava in the seventeenth to the first half of the eighteenth century did not have the legal right to be governed by a municipal administration. Yet, in reality, after the city was no longer privately owned and had gained the status of a regimental city, it acquired the attributes of a municipally administered city.⁴⁹

The powers of the heads of the bodies of municipal self-government were defined in collections of Magdeburg Law, as well as in chapter 26 of the "Laws by Which the Little Russian People are Judged." The reeve's responsibilities included administrative and judicial authority. He, along with other municipal officials, had to resolve the city's most important matters: deal with quarrels, fights, regulate prices, monitor the accuracy of weights and measures, clamp down on games of chance, arrest vagrants, maintain the city walls, roads, and bridges, and prevent fires. For the purposes of the latter, fire brigades were formed, and the guilds had to provide barrels, buckets, hooks, ladders, and so forth.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, the wooden buildings were often damaged by fires, and therefore a "police office" was created in the cities to prevent them.⁵¹

All the officials of the city council took part in performing judicial functions – reeve, mayor, and members of the collegium of assessors. The most important criminal cases were heard by the regimental court with the participation of city officials. The jurisdiction of the city council court encompassed all the residents of the city who were governed by the city council, and peasants; other city residents were subject to Cossack and Church courts. A separate court for the Greek community existed in Nizhyn. The appellate institution for the city council courts was determined by the degree of privilege possessed by the city council: if it was under the jurisdiction of the regimental chancellery, appeals were sent to the regimental court. Following the judicial reforms instituted by Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi in 1760–63, the decisions of the city council court could be appealed to the General Military Court. After the creation of the second Little Russian Collegium, from 1768 to 1771, the city councils of the Left-Bank cities were subject to it. The extension in 1785 of the "Statute on the Provinces" (*Uchrezhdenie o guberniakh*) to the Ukrainian lands was instrumental in establishing the Russian judicial system in the cities as well, but there was a partial restoration of municipal self-governance in keeping with Magdeburg Law during the reign of Paul I.⁵²

The individual features of the functioning of self-governance in regimental cities were determined by the character of the relations between the city councils (*magistraty*) and municipal administrations (*ratushi*) with the Cossack administration. In general, the latter did not treat municipal self-governance with due respect. In numerous conflicts with the *starshyna*, the townspeople looked to the hetmans and the tsarist administration for protection, but these confrontations were conducted with mixed success. The objects of confrontation differed: for example, these could be villages and lands belonging to the city council, which the *starshyna* sought to seize. For instance, at the end of the seventeenth century, there were thirty-six villages under the control of the Starodub city council, eighteen in 1730, and only seven in the 1750s.⁵³ This phenomenon was typical not only for Starodub: reports from fifteen city councils and municipal administrations to the General Military Chancellery in 1751 testified that city assets had been reduced by the seizure of city lands, hayfields, and other property by private persons.⁵⁴

In Pereiaslav, starting from the 1740s, there was an ongoing conflict between Colonel Sulyma and the city council over the suburb of Zamostianski Pidvarky, which the colonel used as rank estates (*ranhovi maietnosti*), while the town council regarded it as its property. In 1752 the dispute was decided in the latter's favor by a special order issued by Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi. However, Sulyma was in no hurry to carry out the order, and the legal foot-dragging over the suburban land continued until at least 1766.⁵⁵

There was also a struggle for control over guilds, city trade, and alcohol distillation. Both sides tried to bring order to the transition from townspeople to Cossack status and vice versa. Each city had its own traditions of relations between townspeople and other (above all, Cossack) estates and the company or regimental administration. The southern cities of the Hetmanate, except for Pereiaslav, by virtue of the special aspects of their development, were, in fact, under the authority of the Cossack-*starshyna* administration.⁵⁶ The situation in other cities is illustrated by the instructions to the Legislative Commission of 1767. For example, the townspeople of Starodub (the city's largest social class) requested confirmation of the old liberties, which benefited only them, including the privilege of Sigismund III, thanks to which only members of the townspeople estate were permitted to reside in Starodub. At the same time, they complained that their reeve Petro Hrozyns'kyi, being a military fellow (*viis'kovyyi tovarysh*), served as the reeve not "as [someone] elected by the townspeople and a trueborn town dweller." They asked that a reeve be elected from among them, a person worthy of the office.⁵⁷

The residents of Chernihiv had privileges exempting them from labor and in-kind obligations but complained in their instruction about constant violations of their rights. They were recruited as drivers, forced to cart ice, supply the troops with various materials and tools; their oxen, wagons, provisions, and fodder were taken away. The transition of many townspeople families into the Cossack estate was viewed as a violation. Such transitions reduced the city's economic potential, since those leaving the townspeople estate stopped paying taxes and performing their obligations. These were then redistributed among the remaining townspeople, while at the same time the newly fledged Cossacks continued to engage in trade and crafts, although no longer paying taxes and thereby causing losses. Consequently, all the city instructions contained the demand that all the old townspeople families that had moved into the Cossack estate be returned under the jurisdiction of the city council. The townspeople also requested that Hetman Rozumov'skyi's 1761 universal prohibiting them from engaging in distilling alcohol and keeping taverns be cancelled. This prohibition was seen as perhaps the greatest violation of Magdeburg Law and the old privileges. They also asked that the billeting obligation be regularized.⁵⁸

In Pryluky the nobility and the Cossacks considered it beneath their dignity to work together with the townspeople on a joint instruction, and in Lubny the townspeople were barred outright from participating in drafting the instruction. And in Hadiach, when instructed by the general quartermaster Kochubei to prepare lists for the election of deputies to the commission, the townspeople responded that Hadiach had no municipal administration, no city council, and no townspeople. The people living there, they said, were subject peasants of Kyrylo Rozumov'skyi and members of the military.⁵⁹

The instructions were not implemented, and the urban life of the Hetmanate was not reformed until later, in the 1780s. In 1780 the urban settlements of the nine⁶⁰ regiments of the Hetmanate included: ten cities governed by city councils, twenty-seven Crown towns, seventeen archdiocesan towns, and sixty-seven privately owned.⁶¹ One of the first decrees that changed their status was issued on 26 October 1781. It abolished the right of cities to own property outside their boundaries, and all foreign colonists lost their special rights. Finally, on 15 April 1785, Empress Catherine II granted the "Charter on the Rights and Benefits for the Towns of the Russian Empire" (*Gramota na prava i vygody gorodam Rossiiskoi imperii*). It uniformized the status of urban settlements, contained articles aimed at protecting the townspeople estate, specified the circle of people who could engage in urban crafts, and regulated trade. The document established the electivity of municipal officials and specified who their electors were, and it created new

bodies, such as: the orphans' court and the six-man council (*shestiglasnaia duma*). By then the former regimental cities on the Left Bank, except for Chernihiv, were already county centers.

Economic Development

The traditional view is that the economy (primarily trade) is an important component of city life and that, in fact, it is what gives a settlement its urban aspect. As the Ukrainian historian Andrii Zaiats' notes about city life in Volhynia in the seventeenth century, market days and fairs were then the most important instruments of economic life, its indicator.⁶² We cannot be as categorical about Left-Bank cities. Nonetheless, Gerhard Müller defined the specific character of some of them precisely through the prism of economic criteria. Thus, Poltava was known for its "notable bull trade"; Pohar, for trade in hemp and flaxseed oil; Romny, Krolevets, and Horodyshche, for their fairs; while Mglin, conversely, for its inconvenient location and the "poverty" of its people.⁶³

Fairs in seventeenth-eighteenth-century Poltava were held in the city's central Soborna (Cathedral) Square four times a year: the first, in February; the second began on the feast of the Translation of the Relics of St Nicholas on May 9th; the third began on the Feast of St Illia on July 20th; and the fourth, on the Feast of the Elevation of the Holy Cross on September 14th.⁶⁴ In Starodub there were two fairs according to the General Census. In contrast to Poltava, the dates when they were held were tied to religious feasts: the first fair was conducted in the second week of Lent, and the second, "on the tenth week after the Resurrection of Christ." The fairs lasted two weeks each.⁶⁵ In Nizhyn, according to 1756 data, there were three fairs a year.⁶⁶

Such fairs were centers of periodic trade and were geared primarily to an exchange of goods with foreign markets. Somewhat later, Academician Güldenstädt came across European, Turkish, Crimean, Russian, and Siberian goods in the shops of Nizhyn, since this was the transshipping point of trade between Russia, on the one hand, and Crimea, Moldavia, Wallachia, Turkey, Gdańsk, and Leipzig, on the other.⁶⁷

In the opinion of Fernand Braudel, the city exists only by providing the surrounding region with the services of its market, its shops, weights and measures, moneylenders, and so forth. This interaction produced a "surrounding countryside" – a territory concentrated around the city, which represented a certain economic whole, as well as a cultural reality.⁶⁸ It can be assumed that the territories over which regimental cities had economic and administrative influence did not coincide. In particular, Poltava played the role of an economic and trade center

of a microregion that reached somewhat beyond the boundaries of the regimental territory.⁶⁹ Exchanges with the surrounding territory occurred not only through fairs, but also through city trade. In Nizhyn, in 1756, market days were held twice a week.⁷⁰ To conduct them, cities had appropriate commercial structures: taverns, shops, merchants' rows, and stalls.⁷¹ The city needed permanent trade, since a large part of city residents did not have the ability to buy products for several days in advance and store them in the warm weather. On this basis, Vitalii Kulakovs'kyi deduced a diverse assortment of goods and a large number of permanent structures for conducting trade that belonged to private owners, city councils, or monasteries. Regular trade stimulated the leasing of premises and the construction of new ones, goods turnover between individual cities and towns and their districts, and an increase in the number of peasants who sold their produce in the market.⁷²

Fernand Braudel built the model of economic interaction between the early modern city and its surrounding area on French materials. It consisted of several concentric circles – zones of supply and influence: dairy and vegetables, grain, grapes, livestock, forest products, and a zone of distant trade relations. These circles included intermediary markets and, accordingly, intermediary cities. Thus, the city was surrounded by an area of dependent towns, each of which connected it with the rural microcosmos. At the same time, the concentric model also provided for "city to city" relations.⁷³ Such relations were characteristic of regimental cities as well, but in different degrees, depending on their economic development and specialization. Thus, while Güldenstädt regarded Nizhyn as a significant trade center – the intermediary between the northern and southern regiments of the Hetmanate, in Lubny he noted only the monastery, which owned vineyards, fruit orchards, and several forests, which sold their wood in the city.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, a regular trade in textiles (*krasnyi tovar*) from Nizhyn, Kyiv, and Poltava was conducted in the shops of Pereiaslav.⁷⁵

The regimental cities were also centers of artisanal production, but this was mostly restricted to the activity of guilds and artisans working outside the guilds, and to the distilling of spirits; it was concentrated in guild buildings, artisans' workshops, kilns, brickworks, smithies, copper works, bell-casting factories, wax refineries, slaughterhouses, mills, distilleries, malt houses, and breweries.⁷⁶ Manufacture was poorly represented in the cities. Even in Nizhyn, in the 1770s, there were only two manufacturing enterprises: a "hattery" operated by a German colonist and his wife, and a weaving factory. Moreover, the latter was located in the village of Filovka, two versts from the regimental city.⁷⁷ In the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries, in the opinion of Western European scholars, there was an outflow of urban manufacturing in various regions, including Russia, to rural

localities in search of cheap labor and a place beyond the control of guilds.⁷⁸ Obviously, similar processes were also taking place in the Hetmanate, where salt-peter works, cloth manufacture, and the only canvas producer were located in villages.⁷⁹ A similar situation existed regarding the paper manufacturies in the Chernihiv region. Of the ten that are definitely known to have operated there up to 1782, only two were located in towns, while eight were found in villages and outlying homesteads. In addition, some of these manufacturies had a relatively large number of workers: for example, in 1782, the Pakul manufactory employed 63 workers.⁸⁰

Thus, the main form of production in regimental cities was artisanal rather than manufactural. It was typically centered on guilds. The number of guilds and artisans in a given one of them reflected the state of the city's craft industry and depended on the level of the city's economic development and the region's special features. For example, in 1766, there were 195 artisans in Poltava; the most numerous was the shoemakers' guild, which numbered 53 craftsmen, followed by the blacksmiths' guild, with 38 craftsmen, and the tailors' guild, with 37 craftsmen. There were also 67 merchants in the city.⁸¹

The artisans needed protection from the arbitrariness of the *starshyna*, as evidenced by a large category of universals issued by hetmans prohibiting Cossack officers from compelling guild craftsmen to perform work for the regimental and company *starshyna*. The hetmans extended its protection to artisans who left the guilds.⁸² The milling and distilling industries were also a bone of contention in the cities. With the exception of the peasants, all the estates proclaimed their overwhelming or exclusive right to engage in these forms of production. Exercising this right came into conflict with tradition (this was an old right of the townspeople estate), actual authority (taking advantage of it, the Cossack *starshyna* appropriated this right for itself), and the objective need to provide oneself with the means of subsistence.⁸³ In the eighteenth century, the guilds had problems created by incompetent craftsmen who lured away apprentices (*pidmaistry*), causing several depopulated guilds to unite into one.⁸⁴

However, artisanal production outside the guilds and unsanctioned trade increased the number of people who did not earn a living by agriculture. For example, in 1766 in Nizhyn, there were 480 craftsmen (together with members of their families, 2,045 people). They employed 207 workers and servants and had 105 students. People engaged in trade numbered 285 individuals (794 together with the members of their families). The tradesmen had 360 employees and servants. On the basis of these calculations, Vitalii Kulakovs'kyi concluded that 64.8% of the population of Nizhyn were engaged in artisanal production and trade.⁸⁵ However, these numbers should not be regarded as absolute, because a part of

the city's population was simultaneously engaged in artisanal production, trade, and agriculture.

In the eighteenth century, large Western European cities also preserved various kinds of agricultural activity. According to Fernand Braudel, the crack of the cattle driver's whip could be heard outside the city council and pigs wandered free in the dirty streets. Thus in 1747 it was necessary to ban raising pigs in the city and in monasteries even in Venice.⁸⁶ There were no such bans in Left-Bank cities, and cattle freely roamed the streets in the very center of gubernial Poltava as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Crafts, trade, construction, and the market of early modern cities attracted the residents of rural areas. Even a poor city was richer than the surrounding villages and thus made it possible to earn money.⁸⁷ In 1766, in Pereiaslav, only 12.3 per cent of all newcomers came from other cities, while 87.7 per cent came from villages and towns (the absolute majority were from the Pereiaslav regiment). The migrants from the villages were primarily engaged in the lowest-paying jobs: 67 per cent of them worked as hired laborers, 16 per cent were involved in artisanal production (mostly fur dressing, tailoring, and weaving), 8 per cent in trade, and only 2 per cent in grain cultivation.⁸⁸

However, hired workers were not the only once to migrate to regimental cities. The richest people in Nizhyn were Greek merchants, of whom at least fifteen had from 10,000 to 100,000 rubles in capital.⁸⁹ Merchants from Russia, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Turkish and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lands also migrated to this and other cities. Retired Russian officers and soldiers from the garrisons, and former hussars from Serbian regiments acquired city residences.⁹⁰ An Italian merchant and his family settled in Nizhyn in 1762.⁹¹ Lukian Stashevs'kyi, the son of the Chernihiv cantor, settled in Starodub and lived there on the salary that he received "from various Starodub residents for teaching their children Russian and foreign languages."⁹² Such people moved to the city because there were more potential clients there, and thus, greater opportunity to earn a living.

City life created a demand for rather specific services and, indeed, made them possible. Thus, in the spring of 1768, charges were brought in Hlukhiv against the city resident Tkachenchykha, who treated venereal diseases illegally. These diseases (especially syphilis) were the inseparable companions of the troops quartered in the cities, and therefore motivated charlatans to make money on treating them.⁹³ The specific character of the urban population with its large share of unmarried men (or such who had left their wives at home) was responsible for the prevalence of sex for money. This phenomenon also reduced the tension connected with the presence of soldiers, who were quartered in the cities. The traditional place where women "of easy virtue" were found was in taverns, which were generally regarded

as dens of sin and depravity. During the reign of Empress Anna Ioannova, special orders were even issued demanding that innkeepers not keep girls in the inns. Obviously, this practice was so widespread that it inspired Klymentii Zinoviiv to write a poem "About women in taverns in the cities, and especially where in the fields in the taverns they fornicate." The poem states that prostitutes live in taverns in the cities; the author calls their activity "bread" – in other words, this was not simply fornication, but a means of livelihood; and that "others" come to the tavern not so much to drink as for the sake of that "business," and there is rarely a tavern without this.⁹⁴

In summary, I should note that the urban settlements in Left-Bank Ukraine in the second half of the eighteenth century had different legal statuses. Researchers separate them into cities governed by town councils (*magistrats'ki*) or municipal administrations (*ratushni*), and those that were Crown, archdiocesan, and privately owned. In a way this division is hypothetical, and Magdeburg Law in each of the "privileged" cities was defined by a specific set of privileges. These normative legal acts regulated relations between the municipal authorities and the Cossack company and regimental administrations and divided up the spheres of influence of their powers. Two tendencies can be observed in this period: on the one hand, the territory of the city grew owing to the expansion of its surrounding areas, and, on the other hand, the number of villages under the jurisdiction of cities governed by town councils or municipal administrations decreased. Sources from the second half of the eighteenth century portray the city as the arena of confrontation between the Cossack and townspeople estates, with the latter's economic and political positions losing ground.

From the standpoint of the economic development of the Hetmanate's cities in the eighteenth century, these settlements were primarily centers of trade and not production. The main forms of periodic trade were fairs and market days, which could be viewed as city privileges. Periodic trade was oriented toward ties with the outside market and provided the city with foreign-made goods, large shipments of grain, and so forth. Permanent trade, on the other hand, attracted the residents of surrounding villages. Municipal production existed in the form of artisanal output; the few existing manufactories were not the prerogative of the city, and, on the contrary, were mostly located in the villages, outside the control of the guilds. The economy of regimental cities was of an agrarian nature, a common characteristic of all cities of early modern Europe. I believe that the described features demonstrate that the administrative function was the most important factor in the evolution of the Hetmanate's cities. It promoted the utilization of economic and human resources, which were recruited mostly from

among the residents of surrounding villages. In the city, they performed the role of hired workers and servants, and they worked on the staffs of regimental and city services. The migrants were predominantly active-age unmarried men, which, accordingly, shaped the specific features of the sex and age structure of a city's population. The regimental city also attracted a considerable contingent of temporary residents, people who had dealings with the regimental administration, participants in legal proceedings, tradesmen, hired workers, travelers, vagabonds, thieves, beggars, and so forth.

The above portrayal of the functioning of cities in the Hetmanate is somewhat idealized, inasmuch as the traditional society of the time had not yet created the classic (in the European sense) urban milieu. However, we must not forget about the social changes that were gradually taking shape in the second half of the eighteenth century. Under the influence of modernizing transformations (the introduction of the passport system, increased mobility of the population and interethnic relations, expansion of church control over family life), the patriarchal social culture was showing cracks. Such breaks with tradition appeared first in the cities, to which the modernizing initiatives of the capital were transported by the main postal roads. Consequently, in this mixture of control and freedom, the corridors of the individual's behavior (including demographic) were becoming blurred, and its variations much more diverse. This had to be reflected in the population's demographic characteristics, which are briefly described below.

Aspects of the Demographic Portrait of the Urban Population of the Hetmanate in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century

As stated above, as an important urban criterion, the specific (urban) way of life and world view of its residents, in other words, the city, has to change the behavior of a person who becomes a resident in it. Moreover, the behavior not only of the individual but also of the majority of the members of the society in question is changed.

Needless to say, the concepts of "majority" and "minority" have to be based on more concrete and serial data, and, from this standpoint, historical demography, which uses well-established methods and speaks about the behavior of the population in the uniform language of "demographics and other changeable numbers" understood by the historians of various countries, can help.⁹⁵ Operating with established definitions and numbers has a number of advantages; in particular, it makes it possible to concentrate on an analysis of recurring events and "stable social structures," and it offers opportunities for making comparisons.⁹⁶

So let us look at the cities of the Hetmanate through the prism of the demographic behavior of their residents, especially such aspects of it as sex-age composition, nuptiality, birth rate, death rate, and migrations. The majority of coefficients are given on the basis of the data from the General Census of Little Russia of 1765–69, in which, in contrast to earlier surveys, the population of both sexes, indicating age, social background, and state of health, were registered. The 969 volumes of the census (300–1,200 folios each) encompass more than 3,500 population settlements of the Hetmanate. Our main focus will be on the largest regimental centers – Nizhyn, Pereiaslav, and Starodub.⁹⁷

The study of the demographic characteristics of a given society traditionally begins with an analysis of the sex-age composition of the population, which in historical demography means the division of the population into men and women. Usually, three key indicators are determined in this context:

- 1) absolute numbers of men and women,
- 2) age distribution,
- 3) correlation of the sexes, both in the population as a whole and in individual age groups.

A slim lead in numbers for women is typical of a traditionally closed agrarian society and is the result of the action of natural mechanisms. Thus, the sex ratio of newborns is a biological constant (it is called the “secondary sex ratio”) and equals 106 boys for every 100 girls. But as they mature, females begin to predominate by virtue of a higher death rate and shorter life span of males.⁹⁸ This theory also applies to some degree to the urban population of the Hetmanate (table 12.1). In 1766, the populations of Pereiaslav and Starodub numbered more women than men: 52.3 per cent and 51.2 per cent, respectively. However, in the then existing population of the large cities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth men predominated. Thus in Warsaw, at the end of the eighteenth century, they accounted for 55.6 per cent. Polish researchers explain this disproportion of sexes in the population as the result of the migration of people to the cities, in particular, the inflow of noblemen, workers, merchants, physicians, fortune tellers, charlatans, hypnotists, artists, and so forth.⁹⁹

The sex ratio of the population is not a bad indicator of the openness of a society to migration. Of course, representatives of both sexes could migrate to the cities, but traditionally the most mobile in this respect were men of active age (which is why there were so many of them in Warsaw). That being said, in Starodub there were relatively fewer men, probably because the city was the center of a non-agricultural regiment, where seasonal work was widespread, and also

Table 12.1 Sex ratio of the population of the cities of the Hetmanate according to the General Census of Little Russia of 1766 (percentage)

	0–14		15–59		60 and older		Total population	
City	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Pereiaslav	47.5%	52.5%	50%	50%	43.2%	56.8%	48.8%	51.2%
Nizhyn	51.9%	48.1%	50.4%	49.6%	50.8%	49.2%	50.9%	49.1%
Starodub	49.1%	50.9%	48%	52%	41.2%	58.5%	47.9%	52.3%

Source: TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 39, 148a, 278, 341.

there were such alternative cities to the regimental center as Novhorodka, Mglin, Pohar, and Pochep, as well as numerous Old Believers' villages (*slobody*), which may have drawn off a part of active-age men. In Pereiaslav, on the other hand, their share was higher, because there were no relatively sizeable cities around the regimental center, and, moreover, the regiment was regarded as one of the principal agricultural regiments in the Hetmanate. In Nizhyn, in contrast to Pereiaslav and Starodub, men predominated (table 12.1), and the "uniqueness" of this regimental city was the presence of a large Greek community, which in the eighteenth century was being actively replenished by migrants (primarily men) and had a substantial influence on the city's demographic image, in which men predominated even among the elderly, contrary to the rules of mortality.

To confirm that it was the incomers who could change the wavering balance between the sexes, let us look at the residents of Pereiaslav once again (table 12.1). Boys made up 47.5 per cent of the children in this city, with the presence of the "strong sex" among the adults increasing to 50 per cent, precisely because of migration processes.

The next important parameter is the age structure of the population, the analysis of which in historical demography is based on large age groups: children, people of active age, and the elderly. This division makes it possible to determine the proportion of the active, able-bodied population. According to the data of the General Census, the major portion of young people in the cities of the Hetmanate began active and permanent work at 14–16 years of age. A large part of hired workers, natives of villages and towns in the Pereiaslav and other regiments, were of the same age. Indications that the age of 13–14 years was the boundary between childhood and the active age also appeared in the legislation of the time.¹⁰⁰ People of sixty and above were regarded as old. Accompanying the records of the absolute majority of the elderly were comments such as "of advanced age,"

“doddering,” “weak because of old age.” In the opinion of Iurii Voloshyn, the best reflection of the source and notions of the day about childhood and old age was the following division: children (0–14 years), active population (15–59 years), and the elderly (60 and older).¹⁰¹

In accordance with this division, the major portion of the urban population was represented by people of active age, who accounted for 61–63.5 per cent, the second age group by size was that of children – 31.3–34.1 per cent, and the smallest group consisted of the elderly – 5–7 per cent. The difference in the age structure of the population between the city and the village lay in the correlation between adults and children. The rural population of the Hetmanate contained substantially more children – 42 per cent and, respectively, fewer adults – nearly 52 per cent, while the number of old people was the same in villages and cities. That is to say, a certain portion of the active population moved to regimental centers, and, at the same time (and this is very important), there were significantly fewer children in the urban population, but a larger number of people who could father children (table 12.1).

This brings us to the birth rate, whose level is usually presented in the form of a special coefficient (per mil). According to my calculations, the total coefficient of births in 1757–66 was: 40.7‰ in Pereiaslav, 41.5‰ in Starodub, and 45.9‰ in Nizhyn. These indicators correspond to an ultrahigh birth rate,¹⁰² but they are significantly lower than the coefficient established by Iurii Voloshyn for the rural population of the Starodub region in 1758–67 – 60‰.¹⁰³ The general coefficient calculated by Boris Mironov for the cities of European Russia in the eighteenth century equaled the same level – 60‰.¹⁰⁴ According to the calculations of the Soviet historian Iaroslav Kis', the birth rate in Lviv was 46‰.¹⁰⁵ A much lower birth rate was characteristic for Western European cities in this period, measuring 39‰.¹⁰⁶

According to the research of Kazimierz Górny, the birth rate coefficient in Toruń¹⁰⁷ in the 1760s was 35.7‰. The Polish historian concluded that the indicator depended on the size of a city's population. For example, for the small town of Daleszyce, with a population of 1,109, it measured 47.9‰, while for Warsaw, Cracow, and Poznań, it ranged from 35‰ to 38‰. In his view, the larger cities had a larger percentage of poor people, for whom it was difficult to contract a marriage, and this was reflected in the total birth rate.¹⁰⁸ Making up a significant share of the population of a large city were migrant workers, who came in search of work and not to father children. It is likely that this category of population had a more conscientious attitude toward the birth of a child. In Boris Mironov's opinion, the 50‰ birth rate coefficient attests to the appearance of control over

it.¹⁰⁹ The question arises whether any control existed in the cities under study, where the birth rate coefficient measured 40‰–46‰.

According to demographers, contraception methods were quite widespread in eighteenth-century England and France. For example, from 1765 to 1789, one-quarter of all married couples in Melun, a small town located 47 km from Paris, used birth control.¹¹⁰ Methods of preventing pregnancy (for example, prolonging the period of lactation) or terminating it were also known in Ukraine in the early modern period. To abort the fetus, women lifted heavy objects, used various kinds of herbs, or turned to magic. However, women turned to sorcery not only to terminate pregnancy but also for the opposite reason – in an attempt to cure infertility.¹¹¹ Such practices show that demographic behavior was subjective and was determined by individual needs. As to the data cited above, I believe that by no means can contraception be regarded as the main reason for a reduced birth rate, because it is difficult to imagine that there existed a difference in the way sex was practiced between the cities and villages of the day. But the marriage strategies of the residents of urban and rural settlements could differ significantly, and this indirectly affected the number of newborns. To understand this effect, let us examine marital behavior.

The act of marriage was the most important conscious event in the life of a person in the early modern age and occupied an important place in his strategies of behavior. According to the General Census of 1766, married couples made up the largest share of the active urban population. Thus, married individuals comprised the majority of this cohort of population of Pereiaslav – 48.8 per cent men and 51.3 per cent women. But these were much lower indicators than analogous figures for the rural population of the Starodub region – 70.3 per cent men and 80.7 per cent women. Accordingly, the number of single men in the city was twice as high, totaling 48.4%, with single women numbering 30.6 per cent (as against 27.4 per cent and 12.8 per cent of village residents of both sexes).¹¹² In Kazimierz Górny's view, this is a feature of an urban population and causes a reduction in the birth rate coefficient in cities, compared with towns and villages.

The absolute majority of the single men of Pereiaslav (83.6 per cent) were in the 15 to 24 age category, and thus were very likely to marry, as were single women, whose share in this age group reached 90 per cent. In Nizhyn, this correlation measured 77.8 per cent for men to 94.5 per cent for women, and in Starodub – 85.5 and 94.4 per cent, respectively. Thus, the percentage of the unmarried population was much higher in cities than villages, but the major portion of it consisted of single men (77–85 per cent) and single women (90–94 per cent), who were very likely to marry.

Women had much better chances of marrying than men, given the fact that in Pereiaslav, for every 145 young women aged 15 to 24 years, there were 214 single young men of the same age. In Starodub, for every 305 young women there were 395 young men; and in Nizhyn, 307 young women for 467 young men. The single men of Nizhyn and Pereiaslav had a harder time finding a wife, because in these cities there were 66–67 unmarried young women for every 100 unmarried young men. In Starodub this ratio was 100:77.

Needless to say, a part of the young people in the cities were migrant workers from rural localities who, after working a few years in the cities, could return home and get married there. In Pereiaslav, of 1,708 people registered in the General Census of 1766, 524 had been born outside the city. Of those, 251 people were from the villages of the Pereiaslav regiment, and approximately another 80 people, from the towns of this same regiment. Migrants, inasmuch as they accounted for 68 per cent of the men and 37 per cent of the women in Pereiaslav, had a substantial impact on the situation in the city's marriage market due to different levels of sexual mobility. The marriage structure generally corresponded to the above correlation. The Pereiaslav census reported 45 couples that consisted of a migrant husband from the village and a wife who was a resident of Pereiaslav. There were 24 married couples in which the husband was a city resident and the wife came from the countryside. The ratio of these marriages (45:24) is generally consistent with the sex composition of migrants.¹¹³

Sometimes this kind of marriage was financially advantageous to one of the partners. For example, by marrying a Pereiaslav girl, the husband, together with his wife, could acquire property and a house in the city. Although cases in which both spouses were hired workers and, lacking sufficient means, lived in the households of others were more frequent.¹¹⁴

However, returning to the situation in the marriage market that existed in the cities in general and Pereiaslav in particular, I found that marriage to girls from the villages could not balance the ratio. To some degree, the problem was resolved by looking for a marriage partner in other age groups, which leads us to the need to determine the average marriage age.

According to my calculations, the median age at first marriage for the male population of Pereiaslav in 1766 was 25.7 years, and for females, 22.5 years. For the population of Poltava, according to the General Census, the average marriage age was 28.1 years for men and 22.3 years for women.¹¹⁵ For the rural population of the Starodub region, the respective indicators were 23.7 and 19.1 years.¹¹⁶ According to Boris Mironov's research, at the end of the eighteenth century in Central Russia, the average age of the bride was 15–16 years, and that of the groom, 16–18 years. The Russian scholar noted that people were married a year

or two later in the cities than in the villages.¹¹⁷ However, the median marriage age of the population of Pereiaslav, even with this correction, significantly exceeded the latter indicators and differed markedly from analogous indicators for the rural population.

In this respect, the population of Pereiaslav was closer to the “European type of nuptiality” as conceptualized by the Hungarian-British scholar John Hajnal. It was characterized by marriage at a later age and a larger proportion of unmarried people. The typical marriage age of women in the non-European type of nuptiality was considered to be under 21 years, while in the case of the European type, it was over 23 years. For example, in the Bavarian town of Durlach in 1751–80, the average marriage age of men was 27.6 years and of women, 25.6 years. According to the research of the French scholar Jean Bourgeois-Pichat, the median marriage age for women at first marriage in Paris in the eighteenth century was 24.7 years.¹¹⁸ The average marriage age of the population of Pereiaslav was close to the indicators for Lviv, where men most often married at the age of 26–30 years (40 per cent) and women, at the age of 21–25 (42 per cent).¹¹⁹

The proportion of people who were not married was significantly higher in Pereiaslav than in the villages, which was also a feature of the European type of nuptiality. People with physical disabilities could have had difficulties in contracting marriages, such as the unmarried, blind-in one-eye Mariia, who was a thirty-year-old hired worker.¹²⁰ Two unmarried women were listed in the Starodub census (the source identified each of them as *devka* [unmarried]), aged 50 years. One of them was blind,¹²¹ the other a beggar, lame in one leg.¹²² There were usually more such people – cripples, beggars, homeless, mentally deficient – in cities than in villages.

In general, the share of persons outside marriage in the population of the regimental cities of the Hetmanate was higher, and marriage occurred at an older age than in the rural population or compared with the indicators for the Russian Empire as a whole. The urban marriage rate could decline due to the specific conditions of urban life. This was facilitated by non-agricultural work, a gender balance in favor of men, a larger number of military men and peasants who came to the city to work temporarily, paupers, and, finally, the growth of prostitution.¹²³

Returning to the median marriage age, we must note that the average age difference between spouses amounted to 3.2 years. Obviously, these are generalized data; in specific instances, the difference was different, sometimes even considerable. For example, the Starodub census lists a couple, in which the husband Stepan Pashkevych was 71 years old, and his wife Melanka was 40 years old. In this case, the age difference was 31 years. Their oldest child, son Illia, was 20 years old. Thus, the Pashkevyches married when Stepan was nearly 50 years old, and Melanka, no

more than 20.¹²⁴ Marriage at fifty with a young girl may have been considered an exception, but, as the source shows, it happened often in the society of the day.

Stepan was not a member of the *starshyna* and was not rich. In 1715 (at the age of 20), he came to Starodub from the “Polish realm” (probably from Right-Bank Ukraine). At first he may have worked as a hired hand, and then he married the daughter of the town dweller Mykola Zhuravel. Stepan did not have his own house, nor was he given one upon marriage. The house in which they lived was bought by Stepan in 1751, approximately five years after he married Melanka. At the time of the census, he sold tar and woodenware at the market, and had no great income. The only thing that distinguished him from other townspeople of the same age was that he was listed as “healthy” at his age, which was rare at the time.¹²⁵

The city censuses contain cases in which the wife was significantly older than her husband. An example of such a couple was the forty-year-old cantor of the Starodub Church of the Nativity of the Mother of God, Hryhorii Karpov, and his sixty-year-old wife Ievdokiia.¹²⁶ However, marriages with such large age differences, in which the wife was the older one, were rare.

The largest difference in age between partners was recorded in Starodub and amounted to forty-seven years. Thus the city census contains information about seventy-year-old Mykyta Petrachonov, who at the time of the census married for a second time, and his second wife was only twenty-three years old.¹²⁷ An interesting detail in this case was that Mykyta's sixty-year-old son-in-law, Iakiv, who was married to Feodosiia, aged twenty-five years, lived together with Mykyta.¹²⁸ It is possible that this coincidence of two considerable age differences was not accidental (given the family ties and the shared living arrangements of the two men), but it is difficult to make any assumptions. The main thing is that marriages with a substantial age difference between the spouses to some extent balanced the marriage market, as did marriages with widowers and widows.

The participation of this group in the marital behavior of the population was studied by Polish demographers. Thus, according to the research of Kazimierz Górny, during 1746–93, 767 marriages were registered in the parish of Saint Jacob in the city of Toruń. Of them, 406 (53 per cent) were between a never-married man and a never-married girl, 155 (20 per cent) between a never married man and a widow, 120 (15.6 per cent) between a widower and a never married girl, and 86 (11.4 per cent) between a widow and a widower.¹²⁹ These data indicate that second marriages were quite widespread and also point to the important role of widows and widowers in the marriage market of Toruń. As for the Russian Empire, according to the research of Boris Mironov, widowhood in early modern society was a common phenomenon due to the high death rate of the population.¹³⁰

I performed a similar study of the structure of nuptiality in the parish of the Church of the Nativity of Christ in the company town of Iaresky (Myrhorod regiment) from 1755 to 1774. Over those twenty years, 248 marriages were recorded in the parish, of which 165 (66.8 per cent) were between a never-married young man and a never-married young woman, 24 (9.8 per cent) between a widower and a never married young woman (moreover, four were twice-widowed, that is, they were marrying for the third time), only 4 (1.6 per cent) marriages between a never-married young man and a widow, and 54 (21.8%) between a widower and a widow (in 16 of these marriages, one of the partners was marrying for the third time, and in one instance, the marriage was the third for both partners). It is notable that, given such a diversity of possible combinations in the composition of married pairs, over the period of twenty years, the only kind of marriage that was not recorded in Iaresky was that between a never-married young man and a twice-widowed woman. In sum, one of the spouses in every third marriage was a widow or widower.¹³¹

If we compare the city (table 12.2) with the villages in the Hetmanate in terms of widowhood, we will see that there were fewer widowers in the city, where they accounted for 1 per cent–1.5 per cent, as against the villages, where they made up 2–3 per cent; on the other hand, widows in the villages comprised 6 per cent and from 11 to 16 per cent of women of active age in the cities.

While the share of urban widowers correlated with their rural counterparts within the boundaries of statistical error, the number of widows in the city was substantially higher than in the villages. Obviously, some of the women who were widowed could not provide for themselves without male hands and therefore went to the city, mainly in the role of workers hired for clothes, food, and sometimes also money. Such women were forced to earn a living in any way they could: one such widow, who was charged with prostitution, stated at her interrogation in the Lokhvytsia company chancellery (1729) that she had chosen sexual intercourse, tempted by the promise of support. At the same time, the widow feared that she would “lose her livestock and would have to send her young children [five children – I. S.] out for hire.”¹³²

A more acceptable solution was remarriage, but it was extremely difficult for a widow with children to marry for a second time. The General Census of as large a regimental city as Starodub, among more than 4,500 residents, listed only two such instances, and in both of them the “new” husbands were Greek merchants, who may have not been able to find a “better” wife because of their ethnicity and relatively small (for a merchant) net worth.¹³³

The Pereiaslav census recorded only one such case: among the townspeople we meet the town dweller Iakiv Kozoriz and his wife Ievdokiia (both thirty years

Table 12.2 Percentage of widows and widowers of active age in the urban population

City	Men			Women		
	Total	Widowers	%	Total	Widows	%
Pereiaslav	540	6	1.1%	541	95	17.6%
Nizhyn	1,563	32	2%	1,541	182	11.8%
Starodub	1,247	21	1.7%	1,350	220	16.3%

Source: TS DIAUK, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 39, 148a, 278, 341.

old), who had five children aged from one to nine years old. The following entry concerns the children: “her children born with her deceased husband ... Iarema Kryvosnyi.” Thus, left with five children after the death of her husband, Ievokiia was able to marry again. She was young, healthy, and had her own household and house. The census entry indicates that the property was bought by her late husband Iarema on 22 October 1764, and that he paid 25 rubles for it, a fairly high price at the time.¹³⁴ Putting that information together with the time that the Pereiaslav census was conducted (end of October 1765 to March 1766¹³⁵), we can assume that Ievdokiia remarried no later than a year and a half after the death of her first husband. In other words, she waited for the year of mourning to end and then immediately got married. Her second husband, Iakiv Kozoriz, was a shoemaker, a member of a guild, and earned nine rubles per year, which provided the family with a livelihood. Most probably, having inherited a place in the guild, the widow could not engage in shoemaking herself, whereas Iakiv could. Thus, the marriage was mutually advantageous. Ievdokiia was the only widow with children in Pereiaslav (according to the census), who was able to marry for a second time, while 28 other such widows remained on their own – that is, the probability of such a marriage was 1/28, or 3.6 per cent.

In summary, I will note that from the standpoint of historical demography, the main shared characteristics of the populations of the Hetmanate’s regimental cities were the existence of a significant proportion of active population, a lower birth rate, and a higher marriage age. Finding themselves in an urban environment, the “incomers” were in no hurry to marry and start a family, since they lacked the funds for this, or had other priorities (for example, learning a craft).

Characteristic of cities, compared with villages, was a low marriage rate and, accordingly, a large number of unmarried population of active age. Moreover,

young women had better chances of getting married than young men. This demographic situation explains the bachelor lifestyle as a regulator of the behavior of single men and premarital relations between the sexes. In urban conditions with a high concentration of unmarried men, quartered soldiers, and men who were in the city without their wives temporarily, the phenomenon of prostitution was also demographically determined. The marriage behavior of the residents of cities in the Hetmanate could be materialistic, circumventing established social norms and customs. The control of the community was weaker in the city and easier to ignore. The way of life of the urban population itself and the large proportion of migrants in it had a significant effect on the demographic behavior of the population.

At the same time, each city was unique, and the special aspects of the organization of life in each imposed its own features on the demographic image of its population. Thus, from the standpoint of the marriage rate, regimental Nizhyn was exceptionally interesting: in it, of the more than 5,000 residents recorded in the General Census of 1766, only two were unmarried women over thirty – two sisters, the “old maids” Irina and Iefrosynia, aged 42 and 45 years, respectively.¹³⁶ Meanwhile, unmarried men, primarily members of the Greek community, made up a large share of the city’s population. Apparently, the active migration of Greeks to the city upset the balance in Nizhyn’s marriage market and created a high demand for wives: single men first “picked up” all the single women and then turned to the widows, as indirectly evidenced by the relatively low percentage of widows of active age (10 per cent), while it was half again as high (16–17 per cent) in other cities.

The most characteristic feature of the demographic image of Pereiaslav is well represented by the sex-age pyramid of this city.

As we see, Pereiaslav’s population was distinguished by an anomalously large number of males aged 15 to 19 years; females of this age were also the largest age group in the city. The reason for this was labor migration, which brings to mind an observation by Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Masliychuk: “If we look carefully at the Left-Bank or Sloboda Ukraine city, we will see that the main labor contingent, the main hired worker, was a person under 22 years old.”¹³⁷ My verification of this statement regarding Pereiaslav has been fully confirmed: among the migrant hirelings in this city, men aged 15 to 19 years accounted for 29.2 per cent, and women, for 24.3 per cent.¹³⁸

Only the most characteristic features are discussed above. It is possible to single out less significant ones as well, which are no less telling, but taken as a whole they demonstrate that the city in the Hetmanate dominated the district: it had advantages that attracted migrants, who came to the city to realize some of their




Figure 12.1 Sex-age pyramid of the population of Pereiaslav

Source: TS DIAUK, f. 57 op. 1, kn. 278.

own aspirations. The main special aspects of the city consisted in its ability to attract the incoming population, with its specific features in terms of personality (not everyone was able to abandon their familiar village life), economic situation, and status, as well as in its ability to instill in these people its customs in marriage behavior, family life, and behavioral strategies. These aspects, even if vaguely, manifest themselves in the details of demographic coefficients and values, which, despite all their “changeability,” nevertheless make possible an attempt at painting collective portraits of the urban population of the Hetmanate.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as: Ihor Serdiuk. “Polkovi mista Het'manschyny v druhii polovyni XVIII st.: ekonomika i demohrafiia,” in *Ukraïns'ka derzhava druhoi polovyny XVII-XVIII st.: polityka, suspil'stvo, kul'tura*, ed. Valerii Smolii (Kyiv, 2014), 231–71. Copyright 2014 by NASU Institute of History of Ukraine. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 U. Sowina, *Woda i ludzie w mieście późnośredniowiecznym i wczesnonowożytnym. Ziemia polskie z Europą w tle* (Warsaw, 2009), 488.
- 2 M. Dolyn's'ka, *L'viv: prostir na tli meshkantsiv XIII–XIX st.* (Lviv, 2014), 8.

- 3 Iakiv the Monk, "Satyrychna koliada," in *Slovo mnohotsinne. Khrestomatiia ukrains'koï literatury, stvorenoï riznymi movamy v epokhu Renesansu*, book 4 (Kyiv, 2006), 767.
- 4 T. Portnova, *Mis'ke seredovyshe i modernizatsiia: Katerynoslav seredyny XIX stolittia* (Dnipropetrovsk, 2008), 29.
- 5 A. Putro, *Levoberezhnaia Ukraina v sostave Rossiiskogo gosudarstva vo vtoroi polovine XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1988), 78.
- 6 V. Diadychenko, *Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny kintsia XVII – pochatku XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1959), 206–21.
- 7 A. Lazarevskii, "Opisanie Staroi Malorossii. Materialy dlia istorii zaseleniia, zemlevladieniia i upravleniia. Vol. 3. Prilutskii polk," *Kievskaiia starina* (hereinafter – *KS*) 10 (1900): 92.
- 8 A. Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie s kratkim geograficheskim i istoricheskim opisaniem Malyia Rossii, iz chastei koei onoe namestnichestvo sostavleno* (Kyiv, 1851), 120.
- 9 O. Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII-XVIII st.: rozvytok mis'koï terytorii, prostorova struktura ta mis'ka zabudova" (PhD diss., National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2009), 122.
- 10 *Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter – *TS DIAUK*), f. 57, op. 1, kn. 148a, ark. 2–4.
- 11 Diadychenko, *Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny*, 228.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 340–1.
- 13 V. Horobets', "Prybutkove suddivs'ke remeslo: 'vyna pans'ka' i 'vyna vriadova' u sudochnystvi Het'manatu," *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noï istorii*, no. 7 (2007): 191.
- 14 S. Taranushenko, "Uriadovi budivli na Het'manschyni XVIII stolittia," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (1971): 103–7.
- 15 G. Miller [Gerhard Müller], "Sokrashchennoe uvedomlenie o Maloi Rossii," *Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh*, book 4 (Moscow, 1846): 63–4.
- 16 *TS DIAUK*, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 278, ark. 44zv.
- 17 Quoted in Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII-XVIII st.," 124.
- 18 *TS DIAUK*, f. 51, op. 3, spr. 10899, ark. 26–30zv., 93zv.
- 19 Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII-XVIII st.," 123–4.
- 20 *Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noï biblioteky Ukraïny im. V.I. Vernads'koho* (Manuscript Institute of the National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – *IR NBU*), f. 61, spr. 879, ark. 13zv.

- 21 Horobets', "Prybutkove suddivs'ke remeslo," 176.
- 22 O. Sokyрко, "Skil'ky koshtuie porozuminnia? 'Poklony' ta 'naklady' v Ukraїn-s'kykh sudakh pershoї chverti XVIII st.," *Sotsium* 7 (2007): 195–209.
- 23 Iakiv the Monk, "Satyrychna koliada," 760–7.
- 24 Lazarevskii, "Opisanie Staroi Malorossii," 191–2.
- 25 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii* (hereinafter – PSZRI), vol.10 (St Peterburg, 1830), 649–53. A *sazhen* equaled 2.1336 meters, thus the space for an adult measured close to 4.5m², and 1.1 m² for a child.
- 26 Ibid., 22:384–8.
- 27 V. Lapin, "Postoinaia povinnostv Rossii," in *Angliiskaia naberezhnaia*, 4. *Ezhegodnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo nauchnogo obshchestva istorikov i arkhivistov* (St Petersburg, 2000), 135–64; I. Ben'kovskii, "Utesnenie kievskikh meshchan voennym postoem v 1763–64 gg.," *кs* 5 (1895): 65–76.
- 28 A. Andrievskii, "Stranychka iz proshlogo g. Pereiaslava," *кs* 8 (1889): 488–9.
- 29 O. Prokop'iuk, "'Uchrezhdenie o konnoi pochte v Maloi Rossii ...' (do istorii funktsionuvannia kyїvs'koї dukhovnoї konsystorii u XVIII st.,)" *Kyїvs'ka starovyna* 4 (2007): 129–38.
- 30 TS DIAUK, f. 59, op. 1, spr. 3555, ark. 11.
- 31 P.M., "Ustav kievskogo tsiriulnicheskogo tsekha 1761 goda," *кs* 11 (1883): 470–6.
- 32 Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII-XVIII st.," 126.
- 33 Miller, "Sokrashchennoe uvedomlenie o Maloi Rossii," 58–9.
- 34 O. Kompan, *Mista Ukraїny v druhii polovyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1963), 141.
- 35 Fernand Braudel, *The Identity of France*, trans. Siân Reynolds, vol. 1: *History and Environment* (London, 1988), 183.
- 36 Braudel, *The Identity of France*, 1:184.
- 37 L. Sinitskii, "Puteshestviia v Malorossiiu Akademika Gil'denshteda i kniazia Dolgorukago," *кs* 3 (1893): 417–8.
- 38 PSZRI, 21: 244–5.
- 39 Ibid., 246–7.
- 40 M. Kobylets'kyi, *Mahdeburz'ke pravo v Ukraїni (XIV — persha polovyna XIX st.): istoryko-pravove doslidzhennia* (Lviv, 2008), 245.
- 41 *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei. Dokumenty i materialy* (Moscow, 1954), 3:568.
- 42 Kobylets'kyi, *Mahdeburz'ke pravo v Ukraїni*, 245.
- 43 Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie*, 36.
- 44 *Prava po kotorym suditsia malorossiskii narod ...* Izdannye pod redaktsiei i s prilozhenim issledovaniia o sem svode i o zakonakh, deistvovavshykh v Malorossii, prof. A. F. Kistiakovskogo (Kyiv, 1879), 754–70.
- 45 Kobylets'kyi, *Mahdeburz'ke pravo v Ukraїni*, 353.

- 46 Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII-XVIII st.," 120.
- 47 ТSДІАУК, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 148a, ark. 9.
- 48 Andrievskii, "Stranychka iz proshlogo g. Pereiaslava," 473.
- 49 Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII-XVIII st.," 121.
- 50 Kobylets'kyi, *Mahdeburz'ke pravo v Ukraïni*, 355.
- 51 ТSДІАУК, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 148a, ark. 5.
- 52 Kobylets'kyi, *Mahdeburz'ke pravo v Ukraïni*, 359–61.
- 53 Ibid., 352.
- 54 H. Shvyd'ko, *Dilovodchi akty kozats'kykh orhaniv vlady iak dzherelo do istorii mist Het'manshchyny XVII-XVIII stolit'*, accessed 15 September 2021, http://www.ukrterra.com.ua/researches/23/svidko_akty.htm.
- 55 Andrievskii, "Stranychka iz proshlogo g. Pereiaslava," 486–8.
- 56 H. Shvyd'ko, "Universaly het'maniv, iak istorychne dzherelo z istorii ukraïn-s'kykh mist," in *Dnipropetrovs'kyi istoryko-arkheohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, no. 1 (Dnipropetrovsk, 1991): 171.
- 57 V. Avseenko, *Malorossiiia v 1767 godu. Epizod iz istorii XVIII stoletia. Po neizdannym istochnikam* (Kyiv, 1864), 14–66.
- 58 Ibid., 69–193.
- 59 Ibid., 25–6.
- 60 Not counting the disbanded Poltava regiment.
- 61 Putro, *Levoberezhnaia Ukraina*, 5.
- 62 A. Zaiats', *Urbanizatsiinyi protses na Volyni v XVI – pershii polovyni XVII st.* (Lviv, 2003), 99.
- 63 Miller, "Sokrashchennoe uvedomlenie o Maloi Rossii," 38.
- 64 Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII-XVIII st.," 152.
- 65 ТSДІАУК, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 148a, ark. 8.
- 66 Shvyd'ko, *Dilovodchi akty kozats'kykh orhaniv vlady*.
- 67 Sinitskii, "Puteshestviia v Malorossiiu Akademika Gil'denshteda i kniazia Dolgorukago," 433–8.
- 68 Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*, vol. 1: The Structure of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible (Berkeley, 1992), 482.
- 69 Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII-XVIII st.," 153.
- 70 Shvyd'ko, *Dilovodchi akty kozats'kykh orhaniv vlady*.
- 71 Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII-XVIII st.," 153.
- 72 V. Kulakovs'kyi, "Statsionarna torhivlia v mistakh Livoberezhnoi Ukraïny u XVIII st." in *Istoriia narodnoho hospodarstva ta ekonomichnoi nauky Ukraïn-s'koï RSR*, 13 (Kyiv, 1979), 72.
- 73 F. Brodel', *Chto takoe Frantsiia?*, vol. 1, *Prostranstvo i istoriia* (Moscow, 1995), 140–52.

- 74 Sinitskii, "Puteshestviia v Malorossiiu Akademika Gil'denshtedta i kniazia Dolgorukago," 428–41.
- 75 Putro, *Levoberezhnaia Ukraina* 59–62.
- 76 Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII–XVIII st.," 133.
- 77 Sinitskii, "Puteshestviia v Malorossiiu Akademika Gil'denshtedta i kniazia Dolgorukago," 433–8.
- 78 Brodel', *Material'na tsyvilizatsiia*, 420.
- 79 Sinitskii, "Puteshestviia v Malorossiiu Akademika Gil'denshtedta i kniazia Dolgorukago," 416–39.
- 80 V. Studyn's'kyi, "Papirni Chernihivshchyna u XVII – pershii polovyni XIX stolittia," *Siverians'kyi litopys*, no. 2 (2002): 52–5.
- 81 Kovalenko, "Poltava XVII–XVIII st.," 135, 167, 172.
- 82 Shvyd'ko, "Universal'nyy het'maniv," 174.
- 83 Shvyd'ko, *Dilovodchi akty kozats'kykh orhaniv vlady*.
- 84 Kompan, *Mista Ukraïny v druhii polovyni XVII st.*, 190–8.
- 85 V. Kulakovs'kyi, "Klasove rozsharuvannia mis'koho naselennia Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny u XVIII st.," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 9 (1980): 94.
- 86 Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, 1:487.
- 87 Braudel, *The Identity of France*, 1:180–8.
- 88 I. Serdiuk, "Vykhidtsi z sela sered naselennia Pereiaslava 60-ykh rr. XVIII st.," *Ukraïns'kyi selianyn*, no. 11 (Cherkasy, 2008): 213–15.
- 89 Kulakovs'kyi, "Klasove rozsharuvannia," 93.
- 90 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 39, 148a, 278, 341.
- 91 Ibid., kn. 341, ark. 95zv.
- 92 Ibid., kn. 148a, ark. 64zv.–65.
- 93 Ibid., f. 763, op. 1, spr. 332.
- 94 K. Zinoviiv, *Virshi. Prypovisti pospolyti* (Kyiv, 1971), 103–4.
- 95 A. Kamenskii, *Povsednevnost' russkikh gorodskikh obyvatelei: istoricheskie anekdoty iz provintsial'noi zhizni XVIII veka* (Moscow, 2006), 62.
- 96 N. Iakovenko, *Vstup do istorii* (Kyiv, 2007), 246.
- 97 The objects of analysis of this study are the records of 1,708 residents of Pereiaslav, 5,086 residents of Nizhyn, and 4,210 residents of Starodub, which are located in the fair-copy books of the censuses of these cities. See TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 39, 148a, 278, 341.
- 98 Iu. Muromtseva, *Demohrafiia: navchal'nyi posibnyk* (Kyiv, 2006), 62.
- 99 Maria Bogucka, *Warszawa w latach 1526–1795* (Warsaw, 1984), 272–3.
- 100 *Sobranie Malorosiiskikh prav 1807 goda* (Kyiv, 1993), 21.
- 101 Iu. Voloshyn, *Rozkol'nyts'ki slobody na terytorii Pivnichnoï Het'manshchyny y XVIII st. (istoryko-demohrafichnyi aspekt)* (Poltava, 2005), 112.

- 102 According to the scale proposed by Borys Uralnis, general coefficients below 16% are regarded as low, from 16 to 24% – average, from 25 to 29% – higher than average, from 30 to 39% – high, and 40% and over – ultrahigh. See *Demograficheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (Moscow, 1985), 209–10.
- 103 Voloshyn, *Rozkol'nyts'ki slobody*, 129.
- 104 B. Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii perioda imperii. (XVIII – nach. XIX v.v.)*, 3rd ed. corrected and supplemented (St Petersburg, 2003), 1:159.
- 105 Ia. Kis', "Naselenie i sotsial'naia struktura L'vova v period feodalizma," in *Goroda feodal'noi Rossii* (Moscow, 1966), 365–6.
- 106 The average birth rate coefficient in Western Europe in 1750–75 was 39‰. See B. Uralnis, *Rost naseleniia v Evrope (opyt ischisleniia)* (Moscow, 1941), 231.
- 107 Until 1793, Toruń was a free city under the administration of the Polish Crown, and now it is the administrative center of the Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship in Poland.
- 108 K. Górny, "Ze studiów nad stosunkami ludnościowymi Torunia w XVIII w." in *Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne. Historia*, no. 11 (Toruń, 1977): 80.
- 109 Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii*, 1: 187.
- 110 Brodel', *Chto takoe Frantsiia?* vol. 2, part 1, 170–5.
- 111 K. Dysa, *Istoriia z vid'mamy. Sudy pro chary v ukrains'kykh voievodstvakh Rechi Pospolytoi XVII-XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 2008), 239–40.
- 112 Voloshyn, *Rozkol'nyts'ki slobody*, 115.
- 113 I. Serdiuk, *Polkovykh horodov obyvateli: istoryko-demohrafichna kharakterystyka mis'koho naseleennia Het'manshchyny druhoi polovyny VIII st.* (Poltava, 2011), 144–50.
- 114 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 278, ark. 245zv., 264zv.–65.
- 115 Iu. Voloshyn, "Statevo-vikova struktura naseleenna mista Poltavy v druhii polovyny XVIII st." *Istorychna pam'iat' 1* (2011): 5–24.
- 116 Voloshyn, *Rozkol'nyts'ki slobody*, 194.
- 117 Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii*, 1: 167.
- 118 G. Khadzhnal, "Evropeiskii tip brachnosti v retrospective," in *Brachnost', rozhdaemost', sem'ia za tri veka* (Moscow, 1979), 14–30.
- 119 Kis', "Naselenie i sotsial'naia struktura L'vova," 366.
- 120 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 148a, ark. 9zv.
- 121 Ibid., ark. 127zv.
- 122 Ibid., ark. 128zv.
- 123 B. Mironov, *Russkii gorod v 1740–1860-e gody: demograficheskoe, sotsial'noe i ekonomicheskoe razvitie* (Leningrad, 1990), 54.
- 124 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 148a, ark. 68zv.

- 125 Ibid., ark. 69.
- 126 Ibid., ark. 231zv.
- 127 Ibid., ark. 462zv.
- 128 Ibid.
- 129 Górny, “Ze studiów nad stosunkami ludnościowymi Torunia w XVIII w.,” 93.
- 130 Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii*, 1:172.
- 131 I. Serdiuk, “Povtorni shliuby v Het'manshchyni u druhii polovyni XVIII st.,” *Kraieznavstvo*, no. 3–4 (2010): 47–55.
- 132 See *Dilova i narodno-rozmovna mova XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1976), no. 79, 214–16.
- 133 Ibid., kn. 148a, ark. 23zv., ark. 308zv.
- 134 Ibid., kn. 278, ark. 205zv.–06.
- 135 I. Koval's'kyi, “Provedennia Heneral'noho opysu v Pereiaslavs'komu polku,” *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 6 (1960): 132–4.
- 136 TSdIAUK, f. 57, op. 1, kn. 39, 341.
- 137 Made in his lecture “Child and Empire [Rebenok i imperiia]” (as part of the project “Publichnye lektsii. Polit.ua”). For the text of the lecture, see accessed 15 September 2021, <http://polit.ua/lec/402-rebenok-i-imperija.html>
- 138 I. Serdiuk, “Vykhidtsi z sela sered naselennia Pereiaslava 60-kh rr. XVIII st.,” *Ukrains'kyi selianyn*, no. 11 (Cherkasy, 2008): 213–15.

Population Distribution of the City of Poltava
in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century by Age,
Sex, and Marital Status

IURII VOLOSHYN

The study of any local community calls for an analysis of its main demographic characteristics, which include the sex, age, and marital structure of the population. By sex structure is meant the division of the population into male and female; by age structure, the distribution of the population by age groups; and by marital structure, the breakdown of the population by marital status.¹

Sources

Researchers consider the most representative sources for establishing the above indicators in a premodern society to be documents of a record-keeping nature, which include materials consisting of fiscal and ecclesiastical registers of the population.² Since so far scholars have not found the ideal source that would allow us to study the demographic parameters of the population of Poltava in the second half of the eighteenth century, I will use both types of record-keeping sources in my study. For the necessary information, I will turn to the city's census book for the years 1765–66, which was compiled in the course of a fiscal survey – the General (Rumiantsev) Census of Little Russia (1765–69)³ – and the confessional lists of Poltava churches for 1775,⁴ which were church registers.

The idea to conduct a general census in the Hetmanate was closely connected with the ideas of cameralism, the Enlightenment, and the concept of a well-ordered state, which Catherine II sought to implement. This idea was realized during the rule of the Second Little Russian Collegium in 1765–69. The census

became the most ambitious fiscal document among a large number of population enumerations conducted in the Hetmanate in the eighteenth century. The name “Rumiantsev” came from the fact that the implementation of this idea had been entrusted to the then president of the Collegium of Little Russia, Count Petr Rumiantsev.

The survey contains detailed information about the Hetmanate’s cities, towns, villages, and homesteads (*khutirs*), segmenting their populations according to age, sex, marital status, state of health, and amount of taxes paid; describing church, Cossack, artisanal, and peasant households, and yardless houses (*bezdvirni khaty*), manorial estates (*pidvarky*), cultivated land, forests, hayfields, pastures, mills, distilleries, maltheuses, and livestock.

In the regimental city of Poltava, the census began on 1 November 1765 and was completed on 3 February 1766.⁵ The book containing this data is in the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv. It is a relatively thick volume, consisting of 390 sheets in folio format. It numbers some 388 pages, most of which are covered on both sides with the cursive script of the eighteenth century.

The text is written in different hands typical of the second half of the eighteenth century, which indicates that several people participated in compiling it. Most likely these people were Vasyl' Boiko, Ivan Drotenko, Ivan Shtepenko, and Artem Tetervak, clerks (*kantseliarysty*) whom the city administration had assigned to do this job.⁶ The legibility of the handwriting and the small number of corrections, markings, and notes in the margins indicate that we most probably have before us one of the clean copies of the city census. It is likely that it was among the materials of the survey of the Poltava regiment that the military clerk (*viis'-kovyi kantseliaryst*) Vasyl' Marchenko submitted to the Little Russia Collegium in June 1770.⁷

A few important features need to be noted regarding the informational content of the census. First, in view of the announced topic of this article, we obviously have to include among its “flaws” the fact that it did not call for the collection of information about the so-called “new nobility” (Cossack officers; *kozats'ka starshyna*) and clergy. Consequently, the representatives of these two social groups appear only very indirectly, if at all, in the document. Second, there is no information about newborns, who, because of their high death rate in traditional society, were not deemed to warrant counting. And the third important flaw, in my opinion, is the inexact representation of age. This conclusion is prompted by the large number of persons, the so-called “jubilee celebrants,” (*iuviliary*) whose ages ended with the number 5 or 0. My preliminary calculations indicate that they made up the majority of Poltava widows.⁸

The main reason for this was the population's low level of statistical culture and knowledge of the number of years lived, which was characteristic of early modern society in general,⁹ and Poltava society in particular. As a result, the Poltavites of the time described their age in approximate terms, usually ending with the number 0 or 5. The result was, as already noted, a large concentration in the structure of the population under study of people whose age ended with precisely such indicators. According to my calculations, 72 per cent of the city residents in the 25–60 years age group (it numbered a total of 3,311 persons, of whom 2,388 turned out to be “jubilee celebrants”) reported their age in this way during the census of the city in 1765–66.¹⁰

One of the most used methods in historical demography that is employed in studying the intensiveness of age heaping by rounding ages to end in 0 or 5 is Whipple's Index.¹¹ The index score is obtained by multiplying by 100 the ratio of the number of persons ranging in age from 25 to 60 years who report ages ending in 0 and 5 to one-fifth of the total population between 23 and 62 years inclusive. This index is calculated using the following formula:

$$I_{wh} = \frac{\sum_{23}^{62} P_{a \text{ end in } 0 \text{ or } 5}}{1/5 \sum_{23}^{62} P_a} \times 100, \text{ where } P_a - \text{size of population.}$$

If we apply the formula to the data in the Rumiantsev census, Whipple's Index will be:

$$I_{wh} = \frac{2388}{1/5(2211)} \times 100 = 360$$

The result is extremely high and indicates that the quality of the data collected by the census takers during the Rumiantsev survey is *very poor*, with a deviation from the standard recommended by the UN (table 13.1) of more than 75 per cent.

Confessional lists were parish documents that recorded the names of parishioners receiving confession. The first steps to introduce these registers on the territory of the metropolitanate of Kyiv were made in the late seventeenth century, but they did not come into active use until the 1720s, as part of the confessionalization process that was under way in the Russian Orthodox Church at the time. They were maintained more or less regularly in the 1730s–40s, when the form of the lists became uniform. The church authorities designated Lent as the time that priests should compile the confessional lists.¹²

In my study, I will use the confessional lists of the churches of Poltava for 1775. They are part of the confessional lists of the Poltava archpriests (*protopopy*), which are held in the collection of the Pereiaslav-Boryspil eparchy in the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv. The book is a large volume, numbering more than 1,200 sheets in folio format, filled with the cursive script of the eighteenth century.

Table 13.1 UN standard for calculating Whipple’s Index

<i>Whipple’s Index</i>	<i>Data quality</i>	<i>Deviation from ideal</i>
<105	Very accurate	<5%
105–110	Relatively accurate	5–9.99%
110–125	Good	10–24.99%
125–175	Poor	25–74.99%
>175	Very poor	

Source: *Human Longevity, Individual Life Duration, and the Growth of the Oldest-Old Population*, ed. Jean-Marie Robine, Eileen M. Crimmins, Shiro Horiuchi, and Zeng Yi (Dordrecht, 2007), 89.

The confessional lists of six city parishes – the Dormition, Saint Nicholas, Resurrection, Transfiguration, Presentation of Jesus at the Temple, and Nativity of the Mother of God parishes – are found at the beginning of the book: 1 to 119 sheets. The poor conditions in which the document was kept, most likely before it ended up in the archive, caused partial damage and, in some instances, complete destruction of the top pages of the book. As a result, the list of the Dormition parish is almost completely lost, and that of the Saint Nicholas parish, in part. Only the lists of the four other parishes – Resurrection, Transfiguration, Presentation at the Temple, and the Nativity of the Mother of God – are well preserved, and I am using them in this study. The first two parishes were on the territory of the central part of the city, in the fortress, and the other two were located on the outskirts.

In comparison with the Rumiantsev census, the confessional lists appear more representative, primarily because they contain data about all parishioners, regardless of their social standing. Granted, they also lack information about infants. Some caveats can also be expressed concerning the information they provide about children under seven years old, who, though present in the source, were not obligated to go to confession. These lists are also better at recording age. Most likely this is because they were compiled annually, and the priests were more or less familiar with the ages of their parishioners. At any rate, they contain markedly fewer persons with ages reported in round numbers. Although, according to Volodymyr Dmytrenko, there were plenty of cases where age was reported incorrectly even in the families of clergy.¹³

Just as in the case of the Rumiantsev census, we will use Whipple’s Index to check the accuracy of these lists’ descriptions. Applying the formula to the data from the confessional lists, we get: $I_{wh} = \frac{587}{1/5(2077)} \times 100 = 141$.

The quality of these data proved to be far from ideal as well, but they were more accurate than those in the Rumiantsev census. As we can see from the table, the quality of the data has to be classified as *poor*. That is to say, both the confessional lists, despite the control of the church authorities over their compilation, and the Rumiantsev census, are rather primitive sources from the standpoint of demographic statistics.

The accuracy of the data in the confessional lists also depended to a large extent on the meticulousness of those who compiled them. However, it is rather difficult to establish the identity of the compilers of the confessional lists of the Poltava parishes. As we know, this duty fell to the priests.¹⁴ It is clear that the lists I used were created by members of the Poltava clergy. Inasmuch as the registers of the Resurrection and Transfiguration churches are signed by the entire clergy of the parish, including the deacons, it is quite difficult to establish exactly who recorded them. The situation is better in the case of the Presentation at the Temple and the Nativity of the Mother of God parishes. However, despite the fact that the list of the Presentation at the Temple parish, which, according to my calculations, was the largest – numbering 1,586 parishioners (768 men and 818 women) – has only the signature of Father Iosyp Leontiiev, two different hands are easily discernible. Only the author of the confessional list of the parish of the Church of the Nativity of the Mother of God can be identified with the greatest degree of certainty: he was the priest Mykola Liubych. All we know about him is that he was 62 years old in 1775 and the oldest of the parish priests of Poltava's churches and, as such, he would have known his parishioners well. However, experience and age clearly helped Father Mykola little in compiling the list, because the Whipple's Index for his parish was 170.

The most conscientious priest in the city of Poltava was, clearly, Father Matvii Kolosovs'kyi, the pastor of the parish of the Church of the Resurrection. At any rate, Whipple's Index, calculated on the basis of the data collected under his direction, stands at 107, which is considered to be, as is evident from table 13.1, a *relatively accurate* indicator.

Despite the reservations I have expressed here, both types of sources are fairly representative. They can be employed with certain caveats, keeping in mind that they were created in the so-called "pre-statistical" era. The data they contain are partly complementary, which allows us to analyze the sex, age, and marital structure of the population of the city of Poltava in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Sex-Age Composition of the Population

Let us begin with an analysis of the data in the Rumiantsev census. According to the customary methodology employed in historical demography,¹⁵ we will generalize the data about the age and sex of all the residents of Poltava specified in this source in table 13.2, which envisages dividing the population into age groups with an interval of five years. Usually in such tables, children under one year old are placed into a separate group, but, as we have noted above, there is no information about infants in either source.

Table 13.2 has columns showing both absolute indices (the number of men and women in each age group) and relative indices (proportion of men and women in percentages), as well; as the *feminization coefficient*, which is determined according to the formula:

$$K_{fem} = \frac{W_i}{M_i} \times 100;$$

where K_{fem} – is the feminization coefficient for the age group, W_i – is the number of women in the group, and M_i – is the number of men in it.

The *masculinization coefficient* is the reverse to it and is described as:

$$K_{mas} = \frac{M_i}{W_i} \times 100.$$

Which of the two coefficients to employ is, in the opinion of the Polish scholar Cezary Kuklo, up to the researcher.¹⁶ Because of the preponderance of women in the population, the feminization coefficient is usually used, and I have done so in my study as well.

According to my calculations based on the data in this source, Poltava's residents totaled (not counting the Cossack officers and clergy) 6,913 people, of whom 3,576 were women and 3,337 were men. Residents of the city proper numbered 1,555 persons (679 men and 876 women), and the remaining 5,358 people (2,658 men and 2,700 women) lived in the suburbs.¹⁷ If we add to them the Cossack officers and the clergy (by my calculations based on the confessional lists, the Cossack officers' microgroup alone totaled 600 people), we can safely conclude that the total population of Poltava exceeded 7,500 people.

Women predominated in the sex structure: the overall feminization coefficient was 107; women also prevailed in most of the age groups. In this respect, Poltava was not different from other cities. The preponderance of women in early-modern cities was a common phenomenon both in the Hetmanate and in other European regions. More specifically, according to the Rumiantsev census data, in the regimental city of Starodub the feminization coefficient was 109, in Nizhyn, 101, and in Pereiaslav, 105.¹⁸ In Poland's Cracow, in 1792, this coeffi-

Table 13.2 Sex-age structure of the population of Poltava in 1765–66 according to the Rumiantsev Census

Age groups	Total number	Including		Proportion %			Feminization coefficient
		Men	Women	Age group	Men	Women	
0–4	904	426	478	13.1	47.1	52.9	112
5–9	861	419	442	12.5	48.7	51.3	105
10–14	816	387	429	11.8	47.4	52.6	111
0–14 total	2,581	1,232	1,349	37.3	47.7	52.3	110
15–19	816	390	426	11.8	47.8	52.2	109
20–24	509	287	222	7.4	56.4	43.6	77
25–29	462	180	282	6.7	39.0	61.0	157
30–34	502	243	259	7.2	48.4	51.6	107
35–39	403	178	225	5.8	44.2	55.8	126
40–44	488	278	210	7.1	57.0	43.0	76
45–49	325	140	185	4.7	43.1	56.1	132
50–54	378	207	171	5.5	54.8	45.2	83
55–59	191	63	56	1.7	52.9	47.1	89
60–64	125	46	79	1.8	36.8	63.2	184
65+	171	74	97	2.5	43.3	56.7	131
Age not recorded	34	19	15	0.5	55.9	44.1	79
Total	6,913	3,337	3,576	100	48.3	51.7	107

cient measured 104, in imperial Vienna, 109, in France's Marseille, 103, in Russia's Riazan, 105,¹⁹ and in England's Southampton, 108.²⁰ This feature was noted even then. For example, Klymentii Zinoviiv wrote: "It seems often two women are left unmarried / While only the third one perhaps may hope to have a husband." In the poet's opinion, the gender balance was violated, because: "men die on military campaigns"²¹

According to the data in the confessional lists for 1775 (table 13.3), the sex-age structure of the population of Poltava was similar to what we just described above. Four of six local parishes – those of the Resurrection, Transfiguration, Presentation at the Temple, and Nativity of the Mother of Good churches – had a total population of 3,973 faithful (1,936 men and 2,037 women).²² To them we can add

the total number of members of the Saint Nicholas parish, which we know from another source: 2,247 people (1,122 men and 1,125 women).²³ The list of the sixth city parish – Dormition Church – has come down to us in poor physical condition, which makes it impossible to determine the exact number of parishioners. However, the data from the surviving pages give us grounds to state that they numbered no fewer than 1,303 people (643 men and 660 women).²⁴ Thus the total number of the residents of Poltava added up to at least 7,523 people (3,701 men and 3,822 women).

It appears that the population of the city grew slightly as compared with 1766, but it is doubtful that this increase was substantial, because there were no grounds for an acceleration in the urbanization of the region at that time. There were also small changes in the sex structure: the share of men increased a bit (the general feminization coefficient dropped from 107 to 103). At the same time, in four parishes this coefficient was somewhat higher, measuring 105.

As we can see, both sources show that the population of Poltava in the period under study totaled over 7,500 people.

Due to the described features of the documents that served as the basis for our calculations, the specified count of the population is not exact. Obviously, the number of residents of Poltava could not have remained unchanged over the ten years that passed between the conduct of the two surveys. On the one hand, there was natural growth (as both tables show, the proportion of children under 14 was fairly high in the total population – 37.7 per cent and 32.4 per cent, respectively). However, we should not forget that not all years of the period under study were favorable for the city. In particular, in 1766, 1773, and 1774, the Hetmanate suffered droughts that resulted in low crop yields, increases in grain prices, and also a rise in the death rate. For example, in 1766, the price of rye flour in the Poltava regiment increased by a factor of 3.7, and the price of oats rose by a factor of 1.8.²⁵ In addition, there was a great fire in Poltava in 1771,²⁶ which would have also affected the count of residents.

Today historical demography holds the widely accepted view that in most populations, regardless of historical era, boys accounted for a larger number of births (105–107 to 100 girls), but they were less biologically resistant to disease. Therefore, the death rate among boys during the first year of life was markedly higher. As a result, in the age group under four years old, the number of girls exceeded the number of boys.²⁷ In Poltava, this ratio in 1766 was 112 girls to 100 boys, and in 1775, 105 to 100.

The study of the proportion of children (age groups from 0 to 14 years) and the elderly (over 65) in the general structure of the population provides some information about the extent of population under-recording. The accepted view is that the proportion of children usually approaches 40 per cent and the proportion

Table 13.3 Sex-age structure of the population of Poltava in 1775 according to data contained in confessional lists

Age groups	Total number	Including		Proportion %			Feminization coefficient
		Men	Women	Age group	Men	Women	
0–4	446	218	228	11.2	11.3	1.2	105
5–9	400	188	212	10.1	9.7	0.4	113
10–14	441	192	212	11.1	9.9	2.2	130
0–14 total	1,287	598	689	32.39	30.9	3.8	115
15–19	547	259	288	13.8	13.8	4.1	111
20–24	435	222	213	10.9	11.5	0.5	95
25–29	436	211	225	11.0	10.9	1.0	107
30–34	271	140	131	6.8	7.2	0.4	94
35–39	243	113	130	6.1	5.8	0.4	115
40–44	214	97	171	5.4	5.0	0.7	121
45–49	238	140	98	6.0	7.2	0.8	70
50–54	112	65	47	2.8	3.4	2.3	72
55–59	67	33	34	1.7	1.7	0.7	103
60–64	57	25	32	1.4	1.3	0.6	128
65–	62	31	31	1.6	1.6	0.5	100
Age not given	4	2	2	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
Total	3,973	1,936	2,037	100.0	100.0	100.0	105

of the elderly should not exceed 3–3.5 per cent.²⁸ In Poltava, both these population groups met these criteria. Thus, according to the Rumiantsev census, children accounted for 37.3 per cent and the elderly, for 2.5 per cent of the population. According to the confessional lists, children made up 32.4 per cent and the elderly, 1.6 per cent of the total number of people. This can be regarded as further corroboration of the fact that the sources used for this analysis are representative.

The sex structure of working-age groups of the population (15 to 65 years) was greatly affected by external factors, above all, seasonal and regular migrations (for example, the inflow of female hired workers into the city, which had an effect on the feminization of the city's population), natural disasters (droughts, locust attacks, fires), as well as wars, in which the Cossacks in the Hetmanate were engaged virtually permanently in the second half of the eighteenth century.

In the older age groups (over 40 years), men had a numerical advantage (see, for example, the 40–44 age group in table 13.2, and the 45–49 age group in table 13.3), which may have been because of the high mortality rate among women in childbirth. Cezary Kuklo writes: “aging, the number of previous deliveries and born children, in combination with exhaustion from daily hard work, lowered the natural biological resistance of the female organism and made it more vulnerable to various infections and postnatal complications, which often caused the death of the mother.”²⁹

A study of the age structure of the population of Poltava allows us to trace the process of so-called demographic aging. That is what the growth of the proportion of the elderly (over 60 or 65 years) in the overall structure of the population is called.³⁰ To assess the rate of aging, a special coefficient W is calculated using the following formula:

$$W_{60+} = \frac{S_{60+}}{S} \times 100 \text{ or } W_{65+} = \frac{S_{65+}}{S} \times 100,$$

where S_{60+} and S_{65+} are the number of people over 60 years old and over 65 years, respectively, and S is the total number of people.

In Poltava, according to the Rumiantsev census, the demographic aging coefficient for people over 60 years old was:

$$W_{60+} = \frac{296}{6913} \times 100 = 4.3;$$

and for the group of over 65 years, it was:

$$W_{65+} = \frac{171}{6913} \times 100 = 2.5.$$

At the same time, the confessional lists for 1775 showed respective aging coefficients at:

$$W_{60+} = \frac{119}{3979} \times 100 = 3, \text{ and } W_{65+} = \frac{62}{3973} \times 100 = 1.6$$

If we compare these values of aging coefficients with the special scales used in demography to calculate this phenomenon, we will see that according to the J. Beaujeu-Garnier – E. Rosset scale, which is applied when the threshold age is 60 years, the population of Poltava was experiencing “demographic youth.” This is deemed to apply to a population in which the proportion of people over 60 years old does not exceed 8 per cent.

If, however, 65 years is taken as the threshold value, the UN scale of demographic aging is usually employed, according to which a population, whose aging coefficient does not exceed 4 per cent of all population, is considered to be demographically young.³¹ It is to this category that the population of Poltava belonged in the second half of the eighteenth century, according to our calculations.

Contemporary demography holds the widespread view that the age structure of a population has a significant influence on the development of social processes. This is most clearly manifested in the indicators of the population's natural dynamics: birthrate, death rate, and marital status. The larger the proportion of the younger age groups in the overall structure of the population, the higher the marriage and birth rates. Conversely, the higher the proportion of the elderly, the higher the death rate.³²

The most widespread method of analyzing the structure of a population is by building sex-age pyramids, which enable us to visualize the age structure type. Such pyramids are represented by a mirror bar graph depicting the distribution of the population by age and sex (left side – men, right side – women). The vertical axis indicates the age, and the horizontal one, the number of people.³³ Each age group is indicated on the graph by two bars, whose lengths are proportional to the number of men and women in each given group (see figures 13.2 and 13.3).

Since the age interval assigned to the last group (over 65 years) is much greater than the five-year intervals for all the other groups (theoretically speaking, it encompasses six 5-year intervals, from 65 to 95 years), for the sake of proportionality in the graphic representation, it is customary in demography to divide the number in this group by six.³⁴ Thus for the demographic pyramid built in accordance with data from the Rumiantsev census, the conventional (specified here) number of people in the oldest group will add up to $171 \div 6 = 28.5$, and for the pyramid built based on the confessional lists, it will equal $62 \div 6 = 10.3$.

Demographic pyramids are most often compared to three “ideal types” of the age structure of the population, which were introduced at the end of the nineteenth century by the Swedish demographer Gustav Sundbärg. He introduced the concept of progressive, stationary, and regressive types of age structures (see figure 13.1).




Figure 13.1 The main “ideal” types of age pyramids




Figure 13.2 Sex-age pyramid of Poltava according to the Rumiantsev Census

In the progressive type of age structure, the population number constantly increases; in the stagnant type, the number does not change significantly; in the regressive type, it decreases.³⁵

Although on the whole, as we have already established, the population of Poltava was young, both the pyramids I have created lack the “ideal” geometric form. They clearly show the ups and downs that, I believe, attest to the effect of the described disasters, the natural and military calamities, on the structure of Poltava’s population in the second half of the eighteenth century. These forms of demographic pyramids also provide evidence of a significant age rounding in the sources we used and their primitive nature from the standpoint of contemporary historical demography. Even so, the pyramids have the typical appearance of the sex-age structure of a traditional society. The broad base of the first pyramid indicates a high proportion of children.

On the pyramid based on data from the confessional lists (see figure 13.3), children are somewhat outnumbered by the young representatives of the working-age groups. I believe that this is the result of at least two factors: first, that this pyramid was built on the records of only four parishes, and thus the smaller size of the group weakens the effect of the “law of large numbers”; second, that the confessional lists did a better job of recording the migrants coming to the




Figure 13.3 The sex-age pyramid of Poltava according to the confessional lists for 1775

city – that is, clients of local landlords (*piddani*), hired workers, craftsmen's apprentices, and so forth. These categories usually belonged to the young age groups.³⁶ The steady tapering off of the pyramid upwards, and the small number of the elderly, indicates that the residents of Poltava constituted a traditional (agrarian) society.³⁷

However, there is no ideally regular tapering off on either pyramid, which is due to the higher death rates in the older age groups. In addition, people of various ages were variously affected by illnesses and other potentially lethal factors.

The age structure is also studied by dividing the population into large age groups, as proposed by the founder of historical demography Louis Henry (table 13.4). He introduced two types of division: biological and economic. Under the biological type, the population is divided into young people (0–19 years), adults (20–59), and the elderly (60 and over). Under the economic type, the population is divided into groups of pre-productive age (0–14), productive age (15–64), and post-productive age (over 65 years).³⁸

It should be noted that the Rumiantsev census actually employed its own distribution, which essentially corresponded to the economic type of division, the only difference being that the last group began from 60 years of age rather than 65.³⁹

Table 13.4 Population distribution of Poltava in the second half of the eighteenth century by biological and economic types

<i>Age groups</i>	<i>According to the 1766 Rumiantsev census</i>		<i>According to Confessional Lists for 1775</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
<i>Biological distribution</i>				
0–19	3,397	49.1	1,834	46.2
20–59	3,186	46.1	2,016	50.7
60 and over	330	4.8	123	3.1
Total	6,913	100	3,973	100
<i>Economic distribution</i>				
0–14	2,581	37.3	1,287	32.4
15–64	4,127	59.7	2,620	65.9
65 and over	205	3.0	66	1.7
Total	6,913	100	3,973	100

Table 13.4 shows that in both types of distribution, adults or people of productive age accounted for the largest segments of the population. Young people were in second place, and the smallest group consisted of representatives of the older age groups, which is a characteristic feature of a traditional, pre-industrial society.

Thus, our analysis allows us to conclude that the total population of the city of Poltava in the second half of the eighteenth century numbered nearly 7,500 people, with women having the advantage in numbers. Poltava even outnumbered some other regimental cities in terms of residents. For example, according to the Rumiantsev census, Nizhyn then had 5,469 inhabitants,⁴⁰ and Starodub had 4,286.⁴¹ The obvious numerical preponderance of the young and adult over the elderly indicates that the city population in the period under study was experiencing demographic youth.

Population distribution by marital status. Demography defines the marriage structure of the population as the distribution of the population by marital status, that is, the personal status of each individual in relation to the marriage institution.⁴² Based on this, I will try to provide answers to the following questions:

Table 13.5 Population distribution of the city of Poltava by marital status in 1765–66

Age groups	Men				Women			
	Total	Marital status			Total	Marital status		
		Single	Married	Widower		Single	Married	Widow
15–19	390	385	5	–	426	405	21	–
20–24	287	256	31	–	222	93	113	16
25–29	180	94	86	–	282	29	216	37
30–34	243	61	181	1	259	10	213	36
35–39	178	19	156	3	225	4	193	28
40–44	278	24	251	3	210	4	162	44
45–49	140	11	126	3	185	2	164	19
50–54	207	12	187	8	171	4	85	82
55–59	63	2	58	3	56	1	26	29
60–64	46	6	36	4	79	–	20	59
65–	74	8	39	27	97	5	15	77
Age not given	19	16	2	1	15	7	3	5
Total	2,105	894	1158	53	2227	564	1231	432

- How many Poltavites were married at the time that the documents were created?
- What share of city residents was made up of those who used to be married (widows and widowers)?
- How many people had never been married?
- What was the difference in age between husband and wife?
- What was the situation in the marriage market?

With this in mind, the male and female populations have been entered in a special table of unprocessed statistical data reflecting the distribution of the population by marital status (tables 13.5 and 13.6).

Although the lowest marriage age at the time was 13 for girls and 18 for boys,⁴³ I will take the age category of 15–19 years as the starting point, since no younger married persons of either sex were found in either source.

My calculations show that married individuals accounted for the largest share of the city's population in the period under study. In 1765–66, married men totaled

Table 13.6 Population distribution of the city of Poltava by marital status in 1775

<i>Age groups</i>	<i>Men</i>				<i>Women</i>			
	Total	Marital status			Total	Marital status		
		<i>Single</i>	<i>Married</i>	<i>Widower</i>		<i>Single</i>	<i>Married</i>	<i>Widow</i>
15–19	259	256	3	–	288	247	41	–
20–24	222	180	42	–	213	99	111	3
25–29	211	92	118	1	225	38	183	4
30–34	140	36	104	–	131	27	91	13
35–39	113	8	102	3	130	10	110	10
40–44	97	9	87	1	117	27	63	27
45–49	140	15	121	4	98	16	52	30
50–54	65	7	55	3	47	9	17	21
55–59	33	5	26	2	34	5	13	16
60–64	25	5	13	7	32	4	3	25
65–	33	–	18	15	33	–	5	28
Total	1338	613	689	36	1348	482	689	177

1,158 (55 per cent) and married women numbered 1,231 (55.3 per cent). In 1775, in four parishes, there were 689 (51.5 per cent) married men and exactly the same number of married women, whose share of the population was not much smaller (51.1 per cent).

Single men were in second place. According to the Rumiantsev census, there were 894 (42.5 per cent) of them, while single women numbered 564 (25.3 per cent). According to the confessional lists, there were 613 bachelors (45.8 per cent) and 482 single women (35.7 per cent). The largest proportion of those that were not married at the time that the source was compiled was made up of persons that belonged to relatively young age groups and potentially still had every chance of getting married (table 13.7). Among men, according to the Rumiantsev census, 735 (82.2 per cent) of the total 894 bachelors were in the groups ranging from 15 to 29 years, while, according to the confessional lists, these groups accounted for 528 (86.1 per cent) of 613 bachelors. Among single women, according to the first source, there were 527 females of that age (93.4 per cent) of the total number of 564, and, according to the second source, 384 (79.7 per cent) of 482, respectively.

The data obtained from our calculations allow us to establish the level of ultimate singlehood, which is understood to mean the share of persons who never married throughout their entire life. According to the methodology of the French

scholars Louis Henry and Alain Blum, it is generally held that the opportunity to marry for the first time decreases as the age level increases and becomes minimal at 50 years of age. Thus, the level of ultimate singlehood equals the rate of singlehood at 50 years.⁴⁴ The indicator of ultimate singlehood S_{50} is obtained by calculating the average values of bachelors in the 45–49 and 50–54 age groups (table 13.7).

Thus, for men in 1765–66, this rate was:

$$S_{50} = \frac{7.9+5.8}{2 \times 100} = 6.85 \text{ per } 100;$$

and in 1775 it was:

$$S_{50} = \frac{10.7+10.8}{2 \times 100} = 10.75 \text{ per } 100.$$

For women in 1765–66, the rate of the never married was:

$$S_{50} = \frac{1.1+2.3}{2 \times 100} = 1.7 \text{ per } 100;$$

and in 1775 it was:

$$S_{50} = \frac{1.3+19.1}{2 \times 100} = 17.7 \text{ per } 100.$$

In the first case, the indicator of never married women is legitimately lower than for men, but in the second instance, it is too high. In my opinion, this phenomenon is closely related to the specific character of confessional lists as a source for the study of marital status. Of the four registers that I studied in my research, only one, compiled by the clergy of the Church of the Transfiguration,⁴⁵ recorded the marital status of all hired workers. In the other three registers, hired workers of both genders were listed as single.

A comparison of the result with the rates of ultimate singlehood in the villages of the Topal company (*sotnia*) of the Starodub regiment (among the men, only one man in the company remained single, and there were no single women), leads us to conclude that the number of people in the city of Poltava who never married was much higher. The overall percentage of single persons among both men and women also appears greater.⁴⁶ This seems hardly surprising for Poltava, because, despite all its special aspects and caveats, it was a city, and the percentage of unmarried men and women in the cities of the time was fairly high.⁴⁷ Their number rose due to the concentration of hired workers, students, craftsmen's apprentices, and so forth.

The smallest share in the distribution of population by marital status consisted of people that had been married earlier. Thus, in 1765–66, there were 53 widowers (2.5 per cent) in the city, and in 1775, 36 (2.7 per cent). Widows usually comprised a several-fold larger number: in 1765–66, they numbered 432 widows (19.4 per

Table 13.7 Distribution of the population of Poltava by marital status (percentage)

Age groups	Men				Women			
	Total	Marital status			Total	Marital status		
		Single	Married	Widower		Single	Married	Widow
<i>According to the Rumiantsev census of 1765–66</i>								
15–19	100	98,7	1,3	–	100	95,1	4,9	–
20–24	100	89,2	10,8	–	100	41,9	50,9	7,2
25–29	100	52,2	47,8	–	100	10,3	76,6	13,1
30–34	100	25,1	74,5	0,4	100	3,9	82,2	13,9
35–39	100	10,7	87,6	1,7	100	1,8	85,8	12,4
40–44	100	8,6	90,3	1,1	100	1,9	77,1	21
45–49	100	7,9	90	2,1	100	1,1	88,6	10,3
50–54	100	5,8	90,3	3,9	100	2,3	49,7	48
55–59	100	3,2	92,1	4,7	100	1,8	46,4	51,8
60–64	100	13	78,7	8,7	100	–	25,3	74,7
65–	100	10,8	52,7	36,5	100	5,1	15,5	79,4
Age not given	100	84,2	10,5	5,3	100	46,7	20	33,3
<i>According to the confessional lists for 1775</i>								
15–19	100	98,8	1,2	–	100	85,8	14,2	–
20–24	100	81,1	18,9	–	100	46,5	52,1	1,4
25–29	100	43,6	55,9	0,5	100	16,9	81,3	1,8
30–34	100	25,7	74,3	–	100	20,6	69,5	9,9
35–39	100	7,1	90,3	2,6	100	7,7	84,6	7,7
40–44	100	9,3	89,7	1	100	23,1	53,8	23,1
45–49	100	10,7	86,4	2,9	100	16,3	53,1	30,6
50–54	100	10,8	86,4	4,6	100	19,1	36,2	44,7
55–59	100	15,2	78,7	6,1	100	14,7	38,2	47,1
60–64	100	20	52	28	100	12,5	9,4	78,1
65–	100	–	54,5	45,5	100	–	15,2	84,8

cent), and in 1775, 177 (13.1 per cent). As we can see, widows predominated over widowers eight-fold in the first instance, and five-fold in the second. I should note that the preponderance of widows over widowers was a typical phenomenon in early modern society not only in the Hetmanate, but across most of the territory of Europe. For example, widows accounted for 12.7 per cent and

widowers for 0.7 per cent of the population of Pereiaslav.⁴⁸ A similar situation existed in many Polish cities of the time: in Cracow there were 1.2 per cent widowers as against 6.9 per cent widows, and in Warsaw, 2.2 per cent widowers as against 9.9 per cent widows.⁴⁹ In western European cities there were also more widows than widowers, but no such large numerical advantage was observed. For example, in Southampton, the share of widowers was 4.2 per cent and that of widows, 9.5 per cent.⁵⁰

The reason for this numerical advantage of widows is obviously related to the overall preponderance of women in the population structure, the traditionally higher death rate among men, and fewer opportunities for widows to remarry. As Sherri Klassen, a researcher in this field, observes, in the eighteenth century, half of all widowers married a second time as against only one-third of widows who remarried.⁵¹

The data presented in table 13.7 also allow us to calculate the average age at which Poltava residents married for the first time. Because the accuracy of the indices of population distribution by marital status in the confessional lists is somewhat questionable, I will limit myself to the data in the Rumiantsev census. Knowing the proportion in each age group below fifty years of those that never married, I will attempt to calculate this indicator (*i*) using the following formula:

$$i = 10 + \frac{5(c_{10-14} + c_{15-19} \dots + c_{45-49}) - 40c_{50}}{1 - c_{50}}$$

Thus, according to the Rumiantsev census, the average age of Poltava men when they married was:

$$I = 10 + \frac{5(3.924) - 40(0.0685)}{1 - 0.0685} = 10 + \frac{16.88}{0.9316} = 28.1 \text{ years}$$

and women:

$$I = 10 + \frac{5(2.56) - 40(0.017)}{1 - 0.017} = 10 + \frac{12.12}{0.983} = 22.3 \text{ years}$$

These results are somewhat higher than the indices I obtained for the Old Believers' and Ukrainian villages of the Starodub regiment. There, according to the same source, the average age at first marriage among the Russian Old Believers was 22.5 years for men and 19.3 for women. Ukrainian men married later: at 23.7 years, whereas women slightly earlier: at 19.1 years.⁵²

The indicators for Poltava are closer to those obtained by Ihor Serdiuk for Pereiaslav: 25.7 years for men and 22.5 years for women.⁵³

The accuracy of these indices was most likely affected by various factors, for example, the special aspects of the source and a high percentage of single individuals in the urban population as against their share in the villages. However, the marriage age of Poltava residents matches exactly the analogous indicators

reported by the abovenamed Cezary Kuklo for the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In particular, he states that “at the end of the existence of the Republic of Nobles, men married at an average age of 25 to 29 years, and women married at 20 to 24 years.”⁵⁴ In the countries of western Europe, particularly in large urban centers, the age at first marriage also ranged within these parameters.⁵⁵ For example, according to Roger Bellingham’s calculations, in the town of Selby in Yorkshire (England), the age at first marriage for men was 25.1 years, and for women, 22.8 years.⁵⁶

In summing up my analysis of population distribution by marital status of the city of Poltava in the second half of the eighteenth century, I must note that more than half of Poltavites aged fifteen and older were married. A significant proportion of the population was made up of single individuals, the majority of whom had every prospect of marrying. Contrary to the widespread view that in a traditional society only the odd individual never married, in the population of Poltava, 7 men and 2 women per every 100 persons never entered the institution of marriage. It is likely that the urban factor played a certain role since the ultimate singlehood coefficient was usually higher in the city than in the villages. The laws in effect in the Hetmanate allowed Poltavites to marry fairly early: according to the Lithuanian Statute, the legal marriage age for females was 13 and 18 years for males;⁵⁷ the decree issued by Peter I on 23 March 1714 set the minimum marriage age at 17 years for women and 20 years for men.⁵⁸ Despite this, the average age at first marriage in Poltava was significantly higher: 28.1 years for men and 22.3 years for women.⁵⁹

If one is to believe the sources, early marriages occurred very rarely in the city. The Rumiantsev census records only one pair, where both were 20 years old: the Taras and Uliana Bilychenko couple.⁶⁰ The confessional lists record equally few – just four young couples. The youngest lived in the household of Cossack Onysym Bahrii and belonged to the parish of the Church of the Nativity of the Mother of God. Unfortunately, this page of the register survived in very poor condition, making it impossible to establish the names of the pair; however, it makes it clear that one of Onysym’s brothers was nineteen years old and his wife was sixteen.⁶¹ Terentii, the son of the Cossack widow Frosyna Havrylykha, married at a relatively young age (19 years). And his wife, Stepanyda, had just turned 18 years old at the time.⁶² There were two other young married couples among the Cossacks who were parishioners of the Transfiguration Church: Iosyp (20 years) and Ievheniia (19 years) Hnitko and Ivan (20 years) and Ahafia (17 years) Zasiadko.⁶³

Age Difference

It is difficult to say which of our two most used sources recorded the age parameters of Poltavites more accurately. Quite often they simply contradict each other. For example, according to the Rumiantsev census, Pavlo Rudenko, who is mentioned in this source more than once, was forty years old, and his wife, Uliana, was only twenty.⁶⁴ On the other hand, if one believes the confessional list of the Resurrection Church, compiled ten years later, Pavlo was then forty-five years old, and Uliana was thirty-six.⁶⁵ Thus our sources report different ages of our protagonists and different age differences between them. In my opinion, this is yet another illustration not only of the “rigor” with which statistical documentation was compiled in those days but also of the characteristic attitude to age and the specific nature of its perception by the Poltava residents of the day.

Despite the fact that both sources contain data that are not always accurate, we have no better and more accurate indicators today. From the Rumiantsev census, I selected only couples who were household owners whose ages were listed. There were 578 such families. The married couples of their subjects and servants are not included in this study. From the confessional lists, I considered the data for only four parishes: Resurrection, Transfiguration, Nativity of the Mother of God, and Presentation at the Temple. The main reason for this choice, as already noted above, was the significant damage to documents. Nonetheless, I was able to identify 640 married couples in this source (table 13.8).

The table created on the basis of these data clearly illustrates the fact that in both sources married couples in which the husbands were one to five years older than their wives made up the largest share. It should be noted that according to the Rumiantsev census, 258 examples (67 per cent) consisted of couples where the difference was five years. The confessional lists contained only 68 (23.9 per cent) such couples, but they, too, made up the largest category in their subgroup. The way in which the documents are formulated give us grounds to assume that these were first marriages, concluded between a single man and a single woman. This was generally a typical situation in Poltava at the time, as well as in other cities in the Hetmanate⁶⁶ and neighboring regions, especially the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.⁶⁷

According to both sources, couples with an age difference of six to ten years were in second place. The confessional lists report significantly more such couples than the Rumiantsev census. In my opinion, this is explained by the greater precision of recording the ages of married couples in the different parishes. Whatever the case may be, this yet again indicates that the age difference between husband and wife usually ranged between one to ten years.

Table 13.8 Age difference between husbands and wives

Difference	Rumiantsev census		Confessional lists	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Same age	43	7.4	9	1.4
1–5	384	66.5	285	44.5
6–10	105	18.2	201	31.4
11–19	27	4.7	98	15.3
>20	7	1.2	21	3.3
Older wives	12	2	26	4.1
Total	578	100	640	100

There were couples where the difference was 10 to 19 years, sometimes it was 20 years, or even more. According to the Rumiantsev census, seven persons – merchants Ivan Mospan, Pavlo Rudenko, and Ivan Sulyma; city councilor Omelian Malikhovs'kyi; shoemaker Hryhorii Khomych; blacksmith Andrii Dubyna; and Cossack Nestor Halaburdenko – were twenty years older than their wives. Notably, in this source, this significant age difference was indicated exclusively by this figure. Whereas the confessional lists are not that uniform: they show that the age difference in this group ranged from 20 to 32 years. Thus, the manorless (*bez-dvirnyi*) parishioner of the Church of the Transfiguration Havrylo Kravchenko was 32 years older than his wife, Ahafia.⁶⁸ It is likely that she was his second, or even third, wife.

Such unequal marriages, as well as those in which the wives were older than their husbands, were not very common in the society of the day. As we see in table 13.8, the Rumiantsev census recorded 12 (2 per cent) couples in Poltava where the wife was older, while the confessional registers listed 26 (4.1 per cent) such cases.⁶⁹

The wandering poet Klymentii Zinoviiv, who formulated moral values and at the same time largely expressed public opinion regarding various phenomena, in one of his poems condemned both examples of inequality. He wrote that, “it is not good when the husband is old and the wife is young, there is much discord between such [partners],” and a marriage where the wife was older than the husband, in his opinion, was wholly void of God’s blessing and there would be no good in it ever. Summing up, Klymentii notes:

Therefore protect Christians from such marriages, God:
Because this is very indecent and unseemly.

And grant us to make marriages of equal years:
And have your blessing.⁷⁰

However, concrete circumstances sometimes forced people to ignore public opinion and conclude such marriages. In an agrarian society, the numerical advantage in age of wives is usually explained by manpower needs.⁷¹ In the case of Poltava, at least three additional, exclusively “urban,” factors need to be considered: the ability to gain through marriage city citizenship, Cossack status, or a place in a craftsman’s workshop.

Characteristics of the “Marriage Market”⁷²

The study of how and where Poltavites chose their marriage partners, as well as matters concerning the marriage rate in general, is made more difficult by the weakness of the source base. Unfortunately, no church registers of births, marriages, and deaths, compiled during the period under study, have been preserved, or perhaps have not been found yet. The Rumiantsev census casts little light on this matter. The compilers of the Poltava book, in contrast to their colleagues who described other localities, for some reason very rarely recorded the parentage of the marriage partners. Therefore, I will base my data only on chance observations that occasionally occur in the sources I have analyzed.

The Poltava census book and two other documents compiled in the course of the conduct of the Rumiantsev census – “Inventory of the Property of the Cossacks of the Poltava Company” (*Opys maina kozakiv Poltavs'koï sotni*) and the “Register of those who joined the Cossacks,” (*Imenna vidomist' pro zapysavshkhsia v kozaky*) – offered information about 87 married couples, thus enabling us to research this question to some degree.⁷³

We must first note, however, that the choice of a marriage partner in early modern Ukrainian society was not only a matter of love, but, first and foremost, a family strategy. The legal norms in effect on the territory of the Hetmanate, both secular (Lithuanian Statute of 1588) and religious (Synod decree of 5 January 1724), admonished parents against forcibly marrying their children.⁷⁴ However, children had to obtain their parents’ permission to marry. Thus, although young people had to be governed by family interests, some freedom of choice existed nonetheless. In his day, this circumstance served as grounds for the prominent Ukrainian historian Orest Levyts'kyi to characterize family relations in Ukrainian society as “excellent.”⁷⁵

Another important condition for concluding a marriage was the absence of blood kinship.⁷⁶ Also, marriages between people of different faiths were not en-

couraged: “there is no better life in marriage in the world than having a wife of the same faith.”⁷⁷ There were no such cases in Poltava during the period that I studied. But there were marriages between members of different ethnic groups – as a rule, between Ukrainians and Russians. We know for a fact that the wife of the Russian merchant Petro Bobrov, Iavdokha, was Ukrainian, the widow of the Poltava town dweller Vasyl' Pavlenko.⁷⁸ Merchant Mykhailo Antonov was Russian and his wife Ahafiia was Ukrainian.⁷⁹ There is no exact information about the ethnicity of the wife of the Tatar convert to Christianity Mykola Bashkyr, Paraska, but it is likely that she too was Ukrainian.⁸⁰ We also do not know the ethnic identity of the wife of the “nonservice” Georgian Otar Kuchuina, who rented a dwelling in the manor of Cossack Mykhailo Kalynychenko.⁸¹

An analysis of the origins of the marriage partners in the selected couples indicates that in 51 cases (58.6 per cent) both were native Poltavites. Although my selection does not pretend to be fully representative, I would venture that the marriage market in Poltava was confined, for the most part, to the territory of the city and surrounding villages.

At the same time, there were also people who came from outside the boundaries of this territory. There were 25 (28.7 per cent) such individuals among the men. The largest number of them (12) came from the villages and towns of the Poltava regiment, seven came from other regions of the Hetmanate, three from the Slobooda regiments, one from the Saint Elizabeth Fortress, one from Russia, and one (Stepan Zhornii) from the Don.⁸²

In addition, Poltava was quite often chosen as the place to marry and settle by natives of Zaporizhzhia, which is easily explained by the relatively close location of the city to its free lands. There are countless such examples, but let us consider just a few. For instance, Iakiv Rudyi (the grandfather of the famous Poltava *burmister* and fellow of the standard (*bunchukovyi tovarysh*) Pavlo Rudenko), who came to the Zaporozhian Sich from Chyhyryn and for some time “*dostatochnoe vremia*” was in the Pashkivskyi *kurin'* (infantry unit). Later, “*after marriage in Poltava*” (emphasis mine – Iu. V.), he bought townspeople-estate (*meshchanskogo stanu*) land and had the status of a town dweller (*meshchanin*).⁸³ A similar journey was made by the grandfather of the city company's aide-de-camp Semen Kutyts'kyi, who “after arriving from the Polish domain, stayed at the Zaporozhian Sich and the company regiments.” After some time, he came to Poltava and married.⁸⁴ The Poltava town dweller Semen Mymria was also “a son of the Polish nation” and came from the town of Turiia, near Lysianka. At thirteen, after the death of his parents, he made his way to the Sich and lived there for seven years with his cousin, Cossack Danylo Bezchesnyi. Then Danylo gave Semen a herd of 85 horses to drive to Poltava and sell them there. But Semen's brother instructed

him: “after selling them, remain here and, *if possible, get married* (emphasis mine – Iu. V.). Which is what Semen did: “he married Paraskoviia, the daughter of Poltava resident Nestor Pavlovs'kyi, a subject of His Excellency the Lord General Field Marshall, senator, and bearer of various orders Count Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi.”⁸⁵ Notably, Semen’s father-in-law was also “a son of the Polish nation,”⁸⁶ a compatriot, that is “one of his own.”

As the selection shows, only in thirteen couples were the wives from outside Poltava. And almost all of them came from surrounding villages: Ivashky, Vaku-lyntsi, Luhove, Patlaivka, Semenivka, Machukhy, Hozhuly, Budky, Pavlenky, Tiu-tiunnyky, and Nyzhni Mlyn. The exceptions were the wives of the Cossacks: Danylo Skorokhod’s Feodosiia, who came from the town of Kotelva of the Okhtyrka regiment in Sloboda Ukraine, and Herasym Lebid’s Tetiana “taken from the Pryluky regiment,⁸⁷ the village of Khmeliv.”⁸⁸ This village was probably one of the most distant places from which a bride came.

Thus, we can assume that the search for marriage partners for the residents of early modern Poltava was confined to the territory of the city and surrounding villages. Instances in which partners were chosen from outside this area were the exception.

If we examine the social origin of marriage partners (we were able to identify the status groups of both partners in 48 cases), we will find that they appear relatively homogenous, with only a few exceptions. People usually married members of their status group, or members of social groups close to their own. Thus in 22 cases (45.8 per cent), the social group of both marriage partners was recorded as identical. Ten other marriages (21.3 per cent) were concluded between Cossacks and commoners (*pospolyti*) and five marriages (10.6 per cent), between Cossacks and craftsmen. In five cases (10.6 per cent), the brides came from clerical families. Two of them, the wives of Cossacks Mykola Andrushchenko, Ievdokiia, and Hryhorii Rohachevs'kyi, Iefymiia, were the daughters of priests.⁸⁹ In four cases (8.5 per cent), one of the partners represented the merchant class. Clearly, ordinary Poltavites did not marry their daughters and sons to the members of the Cossack elite, wealthy merchant class, or the highest town dweller and clerical ranks. An advantageous marriage in Poltava at that time served as a kind of social elevator, which ensured a small rise in status or the opportunity to become part of the city community. As an example, we can cite the story of the merchant Ivan Kyslomed, a native of “the village of Machukhy, from where he came to Poltava while still a minor, but does not remember in what year, and here he married the daughter of a native Poltava merchant, Vasyl' Bondarenko.”⁹⁰ In addition, at least nine Cossacks from the regimental company – Mykhailo Kalenychenko, Ivan Tkachenko, Illia Klymenko, Herasym Halaburda, Oleksii Kononenko, Sava Bahrii,

Hnat and Danylo Beznosenko, and Fedir Sinnychenko – claimed privileged status on the basis of marriage to the daughters of Cossacks.⁹¹ Obviously, the most advantageous mésalliance was entered into by Sava Bahrii, who married the daughter of retired regimental judge Vasyl' Artiukh.⁹² Equally profitable was the marriage of the aforementioned Russian merchant Mykhailo Antonov to the widow of fellow of the banner (*znachkovyi tovarysh*) Ivan Nashchyns'kyi.⁹³ This marriage most likely not only enabled the merchant to find common ground with the local merchant community but also bound him with family ties to a fairly influential officer clan.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as: Iurii Voloshyn, “Statevo-vikovyi sklad naselennia” and “Shliubna struktura naselennia” in Iurii Voloshyn, *Kozaky i pospolyti: mis'ka spil'nota Poltavy druhoi polovyny XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 2016), 81–91, 160–74. Copyright 2016 by Iurii Voloshyn. Copyright 2016 by Iurii Voloshyn. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 Iu. I. Muromtseva, *Demohrafiia: navchal'nyi posibnyk dlia studentiv vyshchych navchal'nykh zakladiv* (Kyiv, 2006), 61–75.
- 2 C. Kuklo, *Demografia Rzeczypospolitej przedrozbiorowej* (Warsaw, 2009), 51–195.
- 3 *Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter – TSDIAUK), f. 57, op. 2, spr. 1, ark. 1–388.
- 4 TSDIAUK, f. 990, op. 2, spr. 34, ark. bzv. 7–119.
- 5 Iu. V. Voloshyn, “‘Dlia tochnago ischyleniia i svedeniia vsego malorossiiskago naroda’: provedennia Rumiantsevs'koho opysu v polkovomu misti Poltavi (1765–1766 rr.),” *Kraieznavstvo* 1 (2011): 57–71.
- 6 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 2, spr. 8.
- 7 G.A. Maksimovich, *Deiatel'nost' Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskogo po upravleniiu Malorossiei* (Nizhyn, 1913), 247.
- 8 Iu. V. Voloshyn, “Zhinka-vdova v polkovomu misti Poltavi druhoi polovyny XVIII st. (za materialamy Rumiantsevs'koho opysu Malorosii),” *Kyïvs'ka starovyna* 1 (2010): 18–25.
- 9 Kuklo, *Demografia Rzeczypospolitej*, 136.
- 10 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 2, spr. 1.
- 11 Henry S. Shryok and Jakob S. Sigel, *The Methods and Materials of Demography* (New York, 1976), 295.

- 12 V.A. Dmytrenko, "Materialy tserkovnoho obliku naselennia Kyivs'koï ta Pereiaslavs'koï-Boryspil's'koï ieparkhii iak dzherelo z sotsial'noi istorii Het'manshchyny XVIII st." (PhD diss., M.S. Hrushevs'kyi Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies, Kyiv, 2011), 50–60.
- 13 Ibid., 99–101.
- 14 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii* (hereafter PSZRI) (St Petersburg, 1830), 10: 116–18.
- 15 Kuklo, *Demografia Rzeczypospolitej*, 130–1.
- 16 Ibid., 133.
- 17 *Misto Poltava v Rumiantsevs'komu opysi Malorosii (1765–1769 rr.)*, ed. Iu. Voloshyn (Kyiv, 2012), 576.
- 18 Calculated as in I.O. Serdiuk, "Polkovi mista Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny seredyny XVIII st.: istoryko-demohrafichni vymir (na prykladi Nizhyna, Pereiaslava i Staroduba)" (PhD diss., National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, 2010), 197–9.
- 19 C. Kuklo, *Kobieta samotna w społeczeństwie miejskim u schyłku Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej* (Białystok, 1998), 51–4.
- 20 A.M. Froide, "Hidden Women: Rediscovering the Single Women of Early Modern England," *Local Population Studies* 68 (Spring 2002): 29.
- 21 Klymentii Zinoviiv, *Virshi. Prypovisti pospolyti*, ed. I.P. Chepiha (Kyiv, 1971), 97.
- 22 TSDIAUK, f. 990, op. 2, spr. 34, ark. 51–119.
- 23 Ibid., ark. 7–50.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 E.S. Ostras', *Vrozhainist' zernovykh kul'tur, khlibni tsyny ta zabezpechennia naselennia khlibom u Livoberezhnii Ukraïni v druhii polovyni XVIII st.* (Donetsk, 2003), 11, 46.
- 26 *Derzhavnyi arkhiv Poltavs'koi oblasti* (State Archive of Poltava Region; hereinafter – ДАРО), f. 8831, op. 9, spr. 7, ark. 91.
- 27 Kuklo, *Demografia Rzeczypospolitej*, 133.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid., 134.
- 30 V.G. Glushkova and Iu. A. Simagin, eds, *Demografiia: uchebnoe posobie*, 4th ed. (Moscow, 2010), 55.
- 31 V.M. Medkov, *Demografiia: uchebnoe posobie* (Rostov-on-Don, 2002), 128.
- 32 Glushkova and Simagin, *Demografiia: uchebnoe posobie*, 56.
- 33 *Demograficheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, ed. D.I. Valentei (Moscow, 1985), 65.
- 34 Louis Henry and Alain Blum, *Metodika analiza v istoricheskoi demografii* (Moscow, 1997), 26.

- 35 It should be noted that these types of age structures also differ as to the proportion of children and the elderly in the overall structure of the population. Under the “progressive” type, children account for up to 40% and the elderly, up to 10%; under the “stagnant” type, children make up less than 30% and the elderly more than 20%; under the “regressive” type, children account for up to 20% and the elderly for more than 30%. See, Muromtseva, *Demohrafiia: navchal'nyi posibnyk*, 68.
- 36 At least such was the situation in Pereiaslav according to I. Serdiuk's observations. See, Serdiuk, *Polkovi mista Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny seredyny XVIII st.*, 106.
- 37 Henri and Blum, *Metodika analiza*, 25.
- 38 Ibid., 23.
- 39 TS DIAUK, f. 57, op. 1, spr. 117, ark. 112zv.
- 40 V.M. Kulakovs'kyi, “Klasove rozsharuvannia mis'koho naselennia u XVIII st.,” *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 9 (1980): 93.
- 41 I.O. Serdiuk, “Demohrafichni kharakterystyky dytiachoho naselennia Staroduba za danymy Heneral'noho opysu Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny 1765–1769 r.r.,” in *Naukovi zapysky: zbirnyk prats' molodykh vchenykh ta aspirantiv* 17 (Kyiv-Khmel'nyts'kyi, 2008), 86.
- 42 Muromtseva, *Demohrafiia: navchal'nyi posibnyk*, 74–5.
- 43 I.M. Petrenko, *Shliubno-simeini vidnosyny v povsiakdennomu zhytti myrian Rosiis'koï derzhavy XVIII st.* 2 parts (Poltava, 2010), 1: 195.
- 44 Henri and Blum, *Metodika analiza*, 48.
- 45 TS DIAUK, f. 990, op. 2, spr. 34, ark. 71–86.
- 46 Iu. V. Voloshyn, *Rozkol'nyts'ki slobody na teritorii Pivnichnoï Het'manshchyny u XVIII st. (istoryko-demohrafichniy aspekt)* (Poltava, 2005), 186–90.
- 47 Kuklo, *Kobieta samotna*, 60.
- 48 I. Serdiuk, “Vdivtsi i vdovy u Rumiantsevs'komu opysi Pereiaslava (istoryko-demohrafichniy analiz),” *Kraieznavstvo* 1–4 (2008): 175.
- 49 Kuklo, *Kobieta samotna*, 58.
- 50 Froide, “Hidden Women,” 30.
- 51 S. Klassen, “Widows and Widowers,” in *Encyclopedia of European Social History from 1350 to 2000*, ed. Peter N. Stearns, vol. 4 (Detroit, 2001), 207–8.
- 52 Voloshyn, *Rozkol'nyts'ki slobody*, 194–5.
- 53 Serdiuk, *Polkovi mista Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny*, 113–14.
- 54 Kuklo, *Demografija Rzeczypospolitej*, 278–9.
- 55 Petrenko, *Shliubno-simeini vidnosyny*, 202.
- 56 R. Bellingham, “Age at Marriage in the Late-Eighteenth Century,” *Local Population Studies* 61 (Autumn 1998): 56.

- 57 *Statuty Velykoho kniazivstva Lytovs'koho*, 3 vols. (Odesa, 2004), vol. 3, bk. 2, *Statut Velykoho kniazivstva Lytovs'koho 1588 roku*, 209.
- 58 PSZRI, vol. 5 (1713–1719): 92.
- 59 In 1965, the British scholar John Hajnal divided Europe by marriage rates along a line from St Petersburg to Trieste. According to him, to the west of this line, low marriage rates predominated with a high age of first marriage, at over 24 years for women, and 26 years for men. The level of the never married was also relatively high – more than 10%. To the east of this line, the marriage rate was high, while the marriage age was lower: below 22 for women, and below 24 for men. The level of ultimate singlehood was below 5%. (Massimo L. Bacci, *Demograficheskaia istoriia Evropy* [St Petersburg, 2010], 149.). The results I obtained do not accord with this theory in everything, because the average marriage age of men appears too high. However, it was less than 24 years for women, as it should be. The level of ultimate singlehood was also not high – 1.6%, different from the pattern of marriage east of the Hajnal line. It is possible that this error is connected to the specific nature of the urban environment.
- 60 *Misto Poltava*, 450.
- 61 TSDIAUK, f. 990, op. 2, spr. 34, ark. 111.
- 62 Ibid., ark. 57.
- 63 Ibid., ark. 75, 76.
- 64 *Misto Poltava*, 146.
- 65 TSDIAUK, f. 990, op. 2, spr. 34, ark. 52.
- 66 I. Serdiuk, *Polkovykh horodov obyvateli: istoryko-demografichna kharakterystyka mis'koho naselennia Het'manshchyny druhoi polovyny XVIII st.* (Poltava, 2011), 149.
- 67 Kuklo, *Demografija Rzeczypospolitej*, 284.
- 68 TSDIAUK, f. 990, op. 2, spr. 34, ark. 85zv.
- 69 The aforementioned Cesary Kuklo contends that in the society that he studied the number of such marriages ranged between 10 and 20 per cent, see Kuklo, *Demografija Rzeczypospolitej*, 284.
- 70 Zinoviiv, *Virshi. Prypovisti pospolyti*, 115–16.
- 71 Voloshyn, *Rozkol'nyts'ki slobody*, 196.
- 72 *Marriage market* – a term often used in scholarly literature to characterize the totality of potential suitors and marriageable girls in the whole population, as well as the entire system of their expectations and requirements with respect to their future marriage. Characteristic of the marriage market, as of the regular market, are the concepts of supply and demand. The situation on the

“marriage market,” the likelihood of entering into marriage, depends on the number of potential marriage partners in the whole population, and on its sex-age structure. See, *Demograficheskii poniatiinyi slovar'*, ed. L.L. Rybakovskii (Moscow, 2003), 33–4.

- 73 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 2, spr. 60, 166.
- 74 *Statuty Velykoho kniazivstva Lytovs'koho*, vol. 3, bk. 2: 28; PSZRI, vol. 7 (1723–1727): 197–8.
- 75 O. Levitskii, “O semeinykh otnosheniakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v XVI–XVII vekakh,” *Russkaia starina* 11 (1880): 558.
- 76 *Statuty Velykoho kniazivstva Lytovs'koho*, vol. 3, bk. 2: 207–8.
- 77 Zinoviiv, *Virshi. Prypovisti i pospolyti*, 116.
- 78 *Misto Poltava*, 72–3. Petro Bobrov was from the city of Pereiaslavl-Zalesskii and came to Poltava from the Saint Elizabeth Fortress. Both places were centers of compact settlement of Russian Old Believers, allowing us to assume that he may have also been an Old Believer. However, there is no direct evidence of this.
- 79 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 2, spr. 60, ark. 142.
- 80 *Ibid.*, 286.
- 81 *Misto Poltava*, 176.
- 82 *Ibid.*, 480.
- 83 “Atestat Viis'ka Zaporoz'koho Nyzovoho tovaryshevi Korsuns'koho kurenia Pavlovi Rudenky: al'bom,” in *Skarby Dnipropetrovs'koho istorychnoho muzeiu im. D.I. Iavornyts'koho* (Dnipropetrovsk, 2005), 133–4.
- 84 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 2, spr. 60, ark. 175.
- 85 *Ibid.*, f. 1726, op. 1, spr. 22, ark. 102zv–03.
- 86 *Misto Poltava*, 355.
- 87 Clearly an error in the document, because the village of Khmeliv was part of the Romny company of the Lubny regiment, and from 1742 to 1782 it was the center of the Khmeliv company.
- 88 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 2, spr. 166, ark. 44, 74zv.
- 89 *Misto Poltava*, 197; TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 2, spr. 60, ark. 147.
- 90 *Misto Poltava*, 48.
- 91 TSDIAUK, f. 57, op. 2, spr. 60, ark. 152–75.
- 92 *Ibid.*, ark. 178. This probably refers to Vasyl' Artemovych, who, according to Volodymyr Kryvosheia, was the regimental judge in 1717–18. See, V.V. Kryvosheia, *Kozats'ka starshyna Het'manshchyny. Entsyklopediia* (Kyiv, 2010), 190.
- 93 Ivan Andriiovych Nashchyns'kyi (1727?–52?), fellow of the banner of the Poltava regiment, member of a fairly influential Cossack officer family. His

father was probably Andrii Nashchyns'kyi, captain of the Poltava city company (1691–1700). One of his relatives, Klym Nashchyns'kyi, was the Poltava regimental quartermaster (1709–22) and acting colonel several times. Other members of this clan included the rector of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1758–61 and the well-known church figure, archimandrite Danylo Nashchyns'kyi (31 January 1721–5 May 1793). See, Kryvosheia, *Kozats'ka starshyna Het'manshchyny*, 536; V.O. Mokliak, *Poltavs'kyi polk: naukovo-populiarnyi narys istorii polku z chasu ioho vynyknennia do kintsia XVII stolittia* (Poltava, 2008), 68; *Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia v imenakh, XVII-XVIII st. Entsyklopedychno vydannia*, comp. Z.I. Khyzhniak, ed. V.S. Briukhovets'kyi (Kyiv, 2001), 387.

PART THREE

Church, Culture, and Education

The Challenges of Unification and Disciplining Facing the Kyiv Orthodox Metropolitanate in the Eighteenth Century: The Case of Book Publishing

MAKSYM IAREMENKO

The idea that after 1686, when the subordination of the Kyiv metropolitanate changed, church life on its territory was restructured in accordance with the Russian model, and distinctive national features were destroyed, remains widespread among historians to this day. It is through the lens of this approach that the history of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine is most often presented conceptually. However, these narratives require greater elaboration or even fundamental revision.

First of all, not everything that happened in this church-administrative entity (just like in other Ukrainian Orthodox eparchies in the Hetmanate that were no longer dependent on Kyiv) was the result of synodal innovations. On the contrary, part of the St Petersburg regulations mandated what Metropolitan Petro Mohyla and his like-minded associates had sought even earlier to impose as norms of church life. Also, it is not clear whether it was Ukrainian-born and Kyiv Academy-educated hierarchs in the supreme governing body of the Orthodox Church in the Russian Empire who had brought regulations that were regarded as the norm of religious life at the doctrinal level in Kyiv to Russia and then retransmitted them through synodal decrees and directives. However, the state machine then joined in to implement various directives from the ecclesiastical sphere. On the other hand, even a cursory comparison of the processes of disciplining clergy and laity on the two sides of the Dnipro River indicates that the Uniate Church (which dominated in the Ukrainian palatinates of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) and the Orthodox hierarchy in the Hetmanate faced very similar challenges and proposed much the same ways of meeting them (the proper organization of the flock and education of parish priests, unification of liturgical books, and so forth).

The overwhelming majority of eighteenth-century efforts to discipline the clergy and laity were no longer Kyiv's own policies since they emanated from St Petersburg and applied to all the eparchies of the synodal Orthodox Church. What was happening to the Church in the Russian Empire accords perfectly well with a general blueprint for the building of a well-ordered state, in which there is social disciplining directed from the top (according to Gerhard Oestreich) in various spheres, and in the ecclesiastical sphere is expressed in religious disciplining. Just as the empire had to "weld together" diverse territories in the political, social, and economic spheres, so the creation of a single synodal Church was on the agenda in the ecclesiastical sphere, and the state had a direct interest in this. To realize this goal, it was necessary to reduce to a common denominator disparate Orthodox religious cultures on territories that had become part of the empire, but not necessarily on the basis of one of them (the Russian one is usually meant), because church life also had to be fundamentally modernized.¹ Thus in the eighteenth century the Kyiv metropolitanate felt the full effect of the process of establishing a synodal Church as it faced the challenges of the unification and disciplining of religious and church life on various levels.²

The question that elicits the fewest answers from historians concerns the success of the processes of the qualitative transformation of Ukrainian eparchies into being a part of the synodal Church. Hence was the proclamation of declarations and directives tantamount to their realization, or was there a gap between the two? My investigations of, for example, the advancement of educational disciplining of the white clergy – attempts to compel its members to obtain training at the Kyiv Academy dated as far back as the middle of the seventeenth century (and in the eighteenth century the emphasis was on the need for the sons of priests to study a course on discipline, including theology) – attest to extremely modest progress (compared with the desired situation portrayed in the rules). Thus, in the 1770s, according to data found about approximately a quarter of the priests in the metropolitanate, only 37 per cent of priests and deacons had completed educational institutions, and only a quarter of them had attended or completed theological studies. Approximately a third had mastered philosophy and rhetoric. This group also included those (less than 6 per cent) who had completed their "universities" at the primary stage, not getting as far as even the middle level (poetics).³

It is extremely important when analyzing the unification of liturgical practices (and, more broadly, the religious culture of the Kyiv metropolitanate) to trace the unification of local book publishing – the systematization and reduction to a single empire-wide model of liturgical books, which were monopolistically published for a long time by the Kyivan Cave Monastery Press of the stauropegion Kyivan

Cave Monastery. It was on correcting the Kyivan texts, which were the primary influence in forming local traditions of religious culture, that the Muscovite ecclesiastical authorities, and then the main governing body of the Orthodox Church in the Russian Empire – the Most Holy Synod – focused their attention on immediately after placing the Kyiv metropolitanate under their jurisdiction.



The conventional version of the history of Ukrainian book publishing from the end of the seventeenth through the eighteenth century invariably points to the repressions directed against it, first by the Muscovite patriarchal and then by the synodal authorities. Attempts to put pressure on the Kyivan Cave Monastery and Chernihiv printers are recorded immediately after their subordination to the Kyiv metropolitanate of the Moscow patriarchate. However, a consistent policy of control over the production of books dates to the decree of 1720, which permitted Ukrainian Orthodox printing houses to publish only traditional reprints of Church Slavonic texts and required old copies to be checked against the Russian originals to ensure that there were no differences between them as well as no special “dialect.” After that, similar directives, which regulated both the language and the repertory of publications, appeared regularly (for example, in 1721, 1726, 1766, and 1775).⁴ In addition to suspicions that Ukrainian publications were deviating from the purity of Orthodox teaching that were of immediate interest at the end of the seventeenth through the beginning of the eighteenth century, which are most often mentioned by historians, there were also other important reasons throughout the eighteenth century that prompted the Synod to exercise control. Church services, and therefore also the corresponding books with their liturgical texts, also performed the role of an important political or ideological means of mass information sharing with often illiterate church members, and of consolidating their political allegiance. It was from the litanies and services of supplication (*molebeni*) that the faithful regularly learned of the existing authority, changes in it, and so forth. The forewords and title pages also contained mentions of the then reigning monarch. It was not because of language or religious teaching that this information required careful monitoring.

Another important detail: in the eighteenth century, not only the Kyiv and Chernihiv publications were checked but also those published in Moscow. It was the corrected Russian books that the Ukrainian printers were to use as a guide in their publications. Sometimes errors in the Russian texts were found in Kyiv, making it necessary to correct them at the Moscow printing house. In 1769, owing to the need to make Russian books uniform, the Synod even issued a special decree

requiring Ukrainian presses to report errors in Russian examples not just occasionally, as they had done before, but as a matter of routine. If mistakes in Moscow books ("the meaning of which is doubtful," except for wrong letters) were discovered in Kyiv or Chernihiv, St Petersburg had to be informed of this.⁵ There was also influence in reverse, of Ukrainian liturgical books on Russian publications, although, understandably, on a much more modest scale. This applied not only to individual typographical errors and such. There were also more substantial matters. For example, in 1796, after receiving a request from Metropolitan Samuïl of Kyiv, the Synod gave permission to print the life of Saint Michael, the purported first metropolitan of Kyiv, in the relevant liturgical books. The right to mention his name and a respective service had been strongly championed by the Cave Monastery Press in preceding decades.⁶ This time, the Synod instructed on 17 January 1796 that the liturgical Moscow *Psalter* was to include under 30 September a short list of lives that had been compiled for Kyiv books, and under the same date include a mention of "Saint Michael, the first metropolitan of Kyiv and all Russia, miracle worker" in the *Menology* (*misiatseslov*).⁷

In general, neither within the framework of the dominant presentation in Ukrainian historiography of the past of domestic book printing in gloomy colors ("russification" of the Ukrainian book in the eighteenth century), nor in the more restrained academic excursions, can we talk about the success of the unification efforts of St Petersburg. The gloomy narratives are based on an analysis of strict legal norms rather than on a special study of their implementation. Yet quite a few facts in the history of Kyiv book printing attest to a rather obvious postulate: the proclamation of legal norms is one thing, but their realization is another. Back in 1727, the Synod had made a concession and permitted the Kyivan Cave Monastery to sell books printed as exact copies of Russian models "without any hindrance, not having to wait for a special certificate that they were exact copies without any additions, of books published by the Most Holy Synod, to save the Most Holy Synod needless trouble, and the monastery needless losses and delays because of red tape." Now the archimandrite had to "strictly" monitor the fidelity of the Cave Monastery's books to their Russian models and send a copy of each book to the synodal archive. At the same time, the Synod had to check new forewords even to identical books. In 1728, permission was also granted to print books that were traditionally published in Kyiv but had no Russian equivalents. Two Cave Monastery monks, specially trained in "theological science," were to "strictly supervise to ensure that they contained nothing contrary to the Holy Church or any inaccuracies."⁸ As we can see, the control was weakened somewhat, inasmuch as the monitoring was transferred to the producer.

As it turned out, the liberalization at the end of the 1720s did not promote the establishment at the Cave Monastery Press of the kind of publishing discipline of which St Petersburg dreamed. In 1766, the Synod noted that the Kyiv and Chernihiv printing houses had not sent their books for review since 1728, that is, from the time that the Cave Monastery was given permission to print liturgical books that had no Russian equivalents without synodal approval. In 1744, the Synod reminded the Cave Monastery of its failure to submit newly printed books for nearly two decades and about the need to fulfill the relevant decrees and submit for inspection two copies of each batch of books that had been published since 1727.⁹ The following year, the Cave Monastery sent “some kind of excuses” but did not submit any books for review or proof of receiving permission to print, either then or subsequently, except for requests in 1762 and 1764 to permit the publication of services to Cave Monastery miracle workers and Latin and Polish grammars.¹⁰ The Synod claimed that because of this failure to follow the directives in Kyiv and Chernihiv “some of them [liturgical books] again contain many discrepancies between them and the same books published by Moscow printing houses.” Historians also pointed to deviations from Moscow publications during the nearly four decades of “freedom.” According to Fedor Titov, the Cave Monastery took advantage of the 1728 decree to return to its earlier practices of book publishing.¹¹

In November 1766, the Synod ordered the Cave Monastery Press to send a list of its printing products and a copy of each book that had appeared at the monastery press since 1728, including information about who had given permission for its publication, and an indication of deviations from the Moscow models. In December of the same year, the head of the Cave Monastery Press, Isaak, gave the monastery’s leadership a list of more than forty titles published as of 1722. In the hieromonk’s opinion, on the whole the Kyiv products corresponded to Moscow’s, or as, for example, the 1746 altar *Gospel*, differed [in the use of] “some words, infrequently.” The additions to the Cave Monastery’s books had obvious distinctive characteristics. For example, the *Apostolos* of 1752 and 1757 contained a menology, which, in turn, included commemorations of the Cave Monastery saints who were missing from the Moscow books. Added from old Cave Monastery copies to the various-format *Service Book* (Liturgicons) of 1735, 1736, 1737, 1746, and 1762 were Holy Communion rules, “beneficial supplications,” and even individual prayers. To the Moscow model of the *Monthly Menaion*¹² of 1750 they added the All-night Vigil or the service with the *Polyeleos* (instead of the Moscow Doxology) to Saint Michael of Kyiv (30 September), Saint Barbara (4 December), the Conception by Saint Anna (9 December), Saint Stefan

(27 December), Saint Mark the Evangelist (25 April), the Twelve Apostles (30 June), the Placing of the Robe of the Holy Mother of God (2 July), the Dormition of Saint Anna (25 July), the Holy Martyr Panteleimon (27 July), the Translation of the Relics of Saint Feodosii (14 November, this included a service with the *Polyeleos*,¹³ while the Moscow version did not even mention it), and the Placing of the Holy Sash of the Holy Mother of God (31 August). This publication also included additions from the Moscow *Octoechos*¹⁴ and “in some places words and phrases were changed, but without changing the original sense and meaning.” As in the *Menaion*, so in the *Trefologion*,¹⁵ which appeared twice, they added the *Polyeleos*, All-Night Vigil, and services to certain saints. On the other hand, “some” services contained in the Moscow model were not included in the *General Menaion* of 1757. The 1739 *Octoechos* “sinned” against the model only by changing the order of the structure of the liturgical ordo, while the liturgical Psalter changed its composition and included additions from other Moscow and Cave Monastery books. These included: among the prayers before sleep, “a prayer to the Mother of God and devotions taken from old Cave Monastery copies”; two prayers from the earlier Cave Monastery *Akathist* were included in the *Akathist* in honor of the Mother of God; and the canon of repentance, also “from the old Cave Monastery copy.” From the older Kyiv *Akathist*, they included the prayers for Holy Communion, and printed them “according to the old version”¹⁶ in the menology of Cave Monastery saints.

When printing the *Horologion* (*Chasoslov*) in 1742, 1752, and the *Akathists* with canons in 1765, the Cave Monastery Press used old editions as its models: in the first instance, the similar publications of 1682 and 1713, and in the second, their own products of 1693 and 1709. However, according to Isaak, even though they used the old publications as the basis, they prepared the *Horologion* “using the pronunciation of words contained in the Moscow liturgical *Psalter*,” and the *Akathist* had “corrected stresses as against Moscow speech,” as did, incidentally, the *Breviary* with *Psalter* of 1742, which used the Cave Monastery version of 1691 as its model (“with the pertinent stresses corrected”).¹⁷

The Cave Monastery Press published an entire series of books that it composed in full or in part based on its own earlier copies, such as the Service with *Akathist* to the Dormition of the Mother of God of 1757, 1761, and 1764; the *Akathist* to Saint Nicholas with his life and miracles of 1751, 1754, and 1761; *Prayer Rule in Preparation for Holy Communion* (published four times); the *Irmologion* of 1753 that differed from its Moscow equivalent; the *Spiritual Alphabet* of 1755, 1760, and 1766; a teaching primer (published six times; but the primer with interpretations of 1741 and 1753 was modeled on its Moscow equivalent); *Prayer Book*

(*Molytvoslov*) (seven editions), the *Collection of Canons* (*Kanonik*) (twelve editions); and a collection of canons selected from the *Kanonik* (eight editions). All in all, in the nearly four decades that the Cave Monastery did not comply with the instruction to send its products for approval, the Cave Monastery Press, according to its head, published nineteen books “consistent” with their Moscow equivalents (they had not received the necessary permission for eleven of them), and nine “not consistent” with their Moscow counterparts (two of them, the *Irmologion*¹⁸ and *Trefologion* appeared without the permission decree). Seventeen other publications did not have a Russian equivalent, and of them, nine were printed without synodal authorization: *Akathist* to the Dormition of the Mother of God, *Akathist* to Saint Nicholas, Services to Saints Antonii and Feodosii, the Monastic Rule (*Pravyl'nyk*), *Synopsis*, a teaching primer, *Collection of Canons*, a collection of canons from the *Collection of Canons*, and the *Horologion*.¹⁹

As we can see, the discrepancies in the Cave Monastery publications precisely involved those elements that form a distinctive religious culture, its unique memories that are different from those of its neighbors, and, consequently, its local identity. Given the repertory of the press' books, it can be assumed that Ukrainians heard church services that differed somewhat from those of the Russians and honored different saints.

A check of the Cave Monastery books in Moscow showed that the assurances of the head of the press were overly optimistic. The monastery's monk-agent, who “held his hand on the pulse” in Moscow by consulting informally with various hierarchs and obtaining information before it was officially announced, wrote in one of his reports to Kyiv (February or March of 1767): “The prayer to Amvrosii recently included in the *Liturgicon* (*Sluzhebnyk*) is extremely repugnant to the Holy Church, as the Reverend [Archbishop] of Novgorod says.”²⁰ A short time later, the monk found out and wrote to Kyiv on 12 March that

Cave Monastery books are checked at the Moscow printing house in such a way that every last letter is read and discrepancies are noted in notebooks designed especially for that purpose, and, what's more, I observed that in addition to the divergences from the Moscow exemplars of which the Cave Monastery is aware, there are countless omissions and obvious inaccuracies found. Although the benefactors also gave reason to hope that after the review they would throw out the superfluous, correct the errors, and permit the rest to be printed, and not to impose penalties on the Cave Monastery, but because of the many errors and inaccuracies found in the monastery's books, I fear lest some harm be the consequence ultimately. God willing,

that this passes, and in the future the printing house must better monitor its books, [for] even though they are not berating [us], my eyes are burning [with shame] owing to the decent treatment for [our] failings.²¹

The following day, in a letter to the archimandrite of the Cave Monastery, the monastery's representative again confirmed that the administrator of their printing house could not even assess the volume of their discrepancies.

The Cave Monastery copies are checked against their Moscow equivalents at the printing house and they are finding not only discrepancies between the two but also many plain errors, and the errors for which the Cave Monastery Press is highly praised cannot be tolerated, and they cannot be justified – the text offends the eye. The only thing to do is to beg for forgiveness and promise to do better in the future. These mistakes in spacing and inaccuracies have resulted in the fact that permission to print books as before has not been given. Our benefactors advise us to monitor the press better, warning us that a review will not be easily arranged in the future.²²

The last phrase of this letter confirms once again that up to then the Cave Monastery managed to avoid quite easily complying with the requirements of St Petersburg regarding the publication of books. This time also everything turned out well. In accordance with the Synod's decree of 10 May 1767, books published by the Cave Monastery Press that were at variance with Moscow products, which had been printed before December 1766 but which did not contradict the teachings of the Church, could continue to be sold, so that the Cave Monastery did not suffer losses. In the future, however, only copies that corresponded to their Russian equivalents could be printed and distributed.²³

It is significant that the person reproaching the Cave Monastery's representative during the big review of 1766 that the monastery was completely disregarding the Synod's directives was Synod member Platon Malynovs'kyi, formerly a monk at the Cave Monastery.²⁴ He was a long-time champion of the monastery and successfully helped it lobby its interests during the battle in 1752–53 against attempts by the Kyiv metropolitan to establish a separate printing house of the metropolitan see.²⁵

In the ensuing years, from the end of the 1760s through the 1780s, Ukrainian and Russian publications also failed to achieve complete homogeneity. Furthermore, the Moscow printers continued to find discrepancies between the monastery's books that had been checked by several specially assigned learned monks and that were being sold and their Russian models.²⁶

In February 1770, the Cave Monastery's agent informed the monastery from St Petersburg about a conversation between the hierarchs, which indicates how the press was managing to publish books that had been corrected to correspond to Moscow publications:

This 14th day of February, during Cheesefare Week, Father Platon²⁷ said publicly at the table, in the presence of the bishops of Pskov and Tver, the following: "I will tell you a curious and amazing thing. This morning, when I came to His Eminence, I casually asked what day of which week this was and what Gospel should be read at the Divine Service. He answered: "Cheesefare Week" and then finding the Gospel, he opened the Bible published by the Cave Monastery Press, saying that he had read this Bible twice already and found four hundred and sixty-eight errors in it, which he had marked with his own hand, wherein there were not only errors but also great discrepancies in meaning with the Moscow Bible." "I could," said Father Platon, "ask for this Bible from His Eminence, and it would be a good idea to send it to the Cave Monastery attached to the synodal decree with a solid reprimand. One ought give the monastery a good finfa²⁸ and teach them a lesson" [...]. And when another man said regarding this matter: "It would be a good idea to reinforce this with a decree to ensure that they print accurately henceforth," he received the answer: "This has been reiterated not once and not twice, but they don't obey us and I don't know what they are hoping for when they seemingly deliberately print [books] that differ from Moscow exemplars. We have to take other measures."²⁹

The government measures, however, did not result in the desired homogeneity of Ukrainian and Russian books even in the 1780s. Thus, for example, Synod member Metropolitan Gavriil of Novgorod and St Petersburg informed his Kyiv colleague, by then the archimandrite of the Cave Monastery, that the Cave Monastery's canon for Holy Communion "contains absurd verses" and recommended, as had his colleagues in earlier decades, to adhere to the Moscow model.³⁰

In addition to the discrepancies between Kyiv and Moscow books that were the result of deliberate or accidental violations of the relevant decrees, there were also sanctioned differences. From time to time, the Synod made dosed concessions to the Cave Monastery Press. Here are just a few examples. In 1762, the press received permission to publish services to the monastery's saints, composed from their lives.³¹ In 1775, the monastery succeeded in obtaining the Synod's confirmation for permission to print in its books not only the names of the Cave Monastery saints and the "first" Metropolitan of Kyiv Mykhail, which did not appear in the

Moscow examples, but also to name them in the Dismissal (*vidpust*), in prayers, and in the Liturgy of Preparation (*Proskomedia*). As soon as the necessary decree was received, the spiritual council and the archimandrite issued instructions to mention Antonii, Feodosii, and the rest of the Cave Monastery miracle workers in the Dismissal and other parts of services in the Cave Monastery, the Near and Far Caves, attached monasteries, and hermitages.³²



A separate issue is how new publications became part of parish practice. A number of specific examples and the efforts made by Kyiv hierarchs to introduce texts that had been approved by the Synod attest to the fact that the corrected liturgical books were not immediately brought into use in churches. Directives regarding this were issued by Rafail (Zaborovs'kyi) in the 1730s–40s.³³ Among the reasons for establishing a separate printing house under the auspices of the metropolitan see listed in the proposal to the Synod in 1753, Tymofii (Shcherbats'kyi) wrote that many parish churches did not have corrected liturgical books.³⁴ Attempting yet again at the end of the 1760s to set up a press in the metropolitanate separate from the Cave Monastery press, its representatives included the following argument in their draft of the order for the Legislative Commission: “many churches in the Kyiv eparchy do not have the newly corrected books.”³⁵

An interesting example of the attitude of parish priests to such directives occurred in 1737, on the bishop's doorstep – at Saint Nicholas's Prytyska Church (*Prytys'ko-Mykolaivs'ka*, *Prytys'ko-Mykil'ska*), in the Podil district of Kyiv. Vicar Ioan Prokopovych accused the church's parish priest Iakiv Zhurakhovs'kyi, of, among other things, forbidding the celebration of the Divine Liturgy according to the new *Liturgicon*. Ioan testified that when he was using the new book, Iakiv “spat many times during the liturgy in malice and sometimes, owing to his furious spitting, couldn't stand still.” After one Divine Liturgy he even said: “don't perform services like that here; they celebrate the liturgy this way only in Saint Sophia, and don't put on airs here, you scoundrel.”³⁶ These documented remarks suggest that Zhurakhovs'kyi continued to use the service of the Divine Liturgy of Saint John Chrysostom, which contained the recitations found in the old *Liturgicon* of Petro (Mohyla) of 1629, which were later changed somewhat.

There is documented evidence of the use by parish priests of old *Liturgicons* (even those published in 1629) in subsequent decades as well. In the 1770s and 1780s, in 46 per cent of the churches in the Kyiv metropolitanate, about whose liturgical books we have information, nearly 6 per cent of the books were of Lviv origin (mostly seventeenth century, although occasional eighteenth-century Uni-

ate products were also found), and in certain churches, they comprised up to one-third of all existing copies. The output of the Cave Monastery press, which it was possible to date, consisted mainly of books issued after 1720 (357 units), even though the number of earlier publications was not all that modest either – 82 exemplars.³⁷ In the 1770s–80s, several identical old and new unified books were found side by side on the altars of monasteries and parish churches,³⁸ and so it is likely that in practice priests used the old publications. As we can see, old publications were not removed from the churches and sent back to the metropolitan see, as required by the special instructions.

Despite considerable efforts by the Kyivan Cave Monastery to maintain its monopoly on the production of books in the metropolitanate and applicable imperial legislation aimed at controlling the publishing of books pertaining to the Church and religious teaching, not to be forgotten is the spread, even in the 1770s, of liturgical books from the neighboring Commonwealth, especially in Kyiv.³⁹ Besides, in the eighteenth century, in the era of the printed book, manuscript collections had not disappeared from liturgical practice, even though it is unlikely that they were widespread. Manuscripts might have also been found in priests' private collections. For example, at the beginning of 1771, a priest from the Church of the Nativity of Christ in the village of Bobruiky of the Kyiv regiment's Oster company acquired at the expense of a local resident a manuscript collection composed of excerpts of widely used offices and prayers from the 1708 *Euchologion* (*trebnyk*) (rituals for the blessing of water, a new house, a well, a cross, administering Holy Communion to the sick, the blessing of icons, artos, baptizing infants, and so forth). The manuscript also contained explanations for the sacraments, recording, obviously, the Kyivan interpretations that prevailed at the beginning of the eighteenth century and had not been affected yet by later uniformizations. As the traces of wax on the sheets and their worn lower corners indicate, the book was used in priestly practice.⁴⁰



Thus, even in the second half of the eighteenth century, Kyiv books, as demonstrated above, did not become fully identical with Moscow's, as was the aim of the Synod, and did not enter fully into use in the parishes. The discrepancy between the Cave Monastery's books and their Moscow models can be explained by several reasons. I will begin with the economic factor. The Kyivan Cave Monastery repeatedly informed the Synod that the local population, especially the elite, did not want to buy the corrected copies, and gave this as justification for the need to print the old versions.⁴¹ For example, in their report to the Synod

in 1775, the Kyiv monks wrote that the monastery “does not dare [to fail mention the local saints in its books] so as to avoid any kind of strong complaints from the public that would follow.”⁴²

Another impediment hampering the successful unification of Ukrainian and Russian publications was the deliberate violation of decrees by individual monks responsible for the printing of new editions, which was also based on economic interests, albeit private ones. Individual “high-ranking” monks at the Cave Monastery, abusing their positions for the sake of gain, were not above composing books for the sake of profit. Thus, at the beginning of January 1771, one of the stewards (*shafar*) sent three hundred newly printed Synod-approved “Collections” to be bound at the monastery’s expense, “and in fifty-four of them, in addition to the approved text, he included prayers at the Divine Liturgy, and calendars in one hundred and fifty of them.” The steward did not inform anyone about these books, but a check revealed that these collections “contained prayers in the liturgy taken by him from heaven knows where.”⁴³ It was also discovered that the monk had repeatedly ordered the printing of more books than the number set by leadership. The administrator of the press, who informed the Cave Monastery’s leadership about the violator’s actions, feared lest these additions should cause the monastery to be punished by the Synod, since as a result these books differed from their Moscow equivalents.⁴⁴

Another group of factors that caused the Cave Monastery’s books to differ from their Russian equivalents even as late as in the second half of the eighteenth century may be described as “intellectual”: it was objectively impossible at that time to release identical products in Kyiv, even if the printers had wanted to adhere to synodal directives. Perhaps the main reason for this should be sought in the ability of the Kyivans to reproduce Russian printed books.

In the above-mentioned report from 1770 about the several hundred “errors” and “discrepancies” found in the Cave Monastery’s Bible that were referred to in a private conversation at table, the reporter gave the following explanation: “They themselves don’t know orthography but don’t want to hire a knowledgeable outsider.”⁴⁵ The fact that the Kyivans did not know the Russian language (and, consequently, presumably the “Russian variant” of Church Slavonic) is also pointed out by one of the monastery’s St Petersburg lobbyists – Ostolopov.⁴⁶ He advised that the documents sent by the monastery to the Synod, “be written using correct orthography, because the [Synod] members often ask how the printing of books in the Cave Monastery can be faultless and accurate, if even the reports to the Synod, even those written by the archimandrite himself, are always written with errors.”⁴⁷

Problems with the Russian language were obviously also the reason that the Synod did not allow Ukrainian printing houses to independently correct errors

that had been found in the Moscow models. In accordance with a 1769 decree, these errors had to be reported by the Kyiv and Chernihiv printers to St Petersburg to preclude these printing houses from changing through their independent correcting what had been accurately printed, thereby introducing “differences” into the Ukrainian products.⁴⁸ The Synod’s doubts about the Ukrainian monks’ proficiency in the language of the Russian books were hardly unfounded. The Kyivans themselves said that they were not completely comfortable with the language of the books that were given them as models.⁴⁹ The lack of knowledge of the Russian language is also demonstrated by evidence offered by internal checks. Despite the work of specially assigned monks to find discrepancies at the Cave Monastery, the proofreaders at the Moscow printing house were left with plenty of work, finding as many as hundreds of additional differences.⁵⁰

The Ukrainians’ unfamiliarity of the Russian language – both written and spoken – is recorded in various sources from the end of the eighteenth century.⁵¹ Even highly educated “Little Russians” who ended up in Russia could be distinguished there by their language. In the second half of the eighteenth century, a contemporary wrote of instructors at the Kostroma seminary: “teachers like the Little Russians spoke the Little Russian language in class, which the poor students of the seminary did not understand, because they spoke Russian, which the teachers did not understand and whose forms they were unashamed to mock publicly in classes; they even made their students speak as they spoke themselves, and if they failed to do so, punished them severely.”⁵²

A Ukrainian accent also distinguished Ukrainian hierarchs who served for a long time in Russia, such as Arsenii (Matsiievych). Upon his arrival in Russia in 1730, he spoke no Russian at all. Fifteen years later, he still retained his Ukrainian pronunciation, and even as late as the 1750s–60s he inserted Ukrainian words into his now fluent Russian. Contributing to this was the fact that the hierarch was surrounded by his fellow Ukrainians.⁵³ Eyewitnesses recalled that Archbishop Amvrosii (Kelembet) of Tobolsk and Siberia (1806–22), who had been educated at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (completed his studies in 1777),

when officiating at services, or on any other occasion, Amvrosii Kelembet never delivered sermons, never made speeches; he did not do so because his pronunciation was a bit too Little Russian, such that sometimes in private conversations, among people close to the speaker, he made them laugh, and the archbishop also laughed at himself, saying that his love for Little Russia was on his lips.⁵⁴

A poor knowledge of Russian also characterized the parish clergy, even in areas neighboring Russia. At the end of the eighteenth century, Archbishop Feoktyst

Mochuls'kyi of Belgorod (1787–99) required churchmen and priests to master the Russian language, because

many candidates for holy orders from surrounding villages of the Kursk vicariate pronounce *e* as *ia*, and *ia* as *e*; those from the Kharkiv vicariate and its surrounding villages pronounce *y* as *i*, and *i* as *y*, and *i* in a way that is inconsistent with Great Russian pronunciation, as well as fail to observe the correct stresses, which causes the read text to be less pleasing, and thus these priests, themselves unable to read properly, teach their children to do the same.⁵⁵

The incomprehension by even educated Ukrainians of the Russian language in the eighteenth century was quite understandable, because it had not been especially taught for a long time. If someone somewhere (usually after a stay in Great Russia) could speak “Great Russian” or “almost Great Russian,” he had an important attribute, which was always listed when, for example, posting such a person as wanted by the authorities.⁵⁶ Not until 1783 did the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy begin purposefully including the Russian language into its curriculum as a separate subject (this was a purely local initiative, originating with Metropolitan Samuil of Kyiv). This fact, and how this initiative was actually implemented, are the best proof that Ukrainians in the mid-1780s did not speak Russian. What is more, half a year after the relevant directive, at the end of October 1784, the metropolitan noted:

not only do students and pupils at the Kyiv Academy fail to observe the rules of orthography of the Russian language, but the teachers themselves, whose duty to do so in all languages and sciences, throughout out the whole educated world, is regarded as fundamental, do not adhere to it; that many students who had studied theology and philosophy are completely incompetent when it comes to reading liturgical books, thereby bringing shame on themselves and condemnation of the Academy and its teachers.⁵⁷

The metropolitan's words confirm the accuracy of the assumption that the presence in the parishes of unified books and priests who did not know the Russian language meant that the faithful in Ukraine did not hear church services performed with the same pronunciation as the Great Russian parishioners. The metropolitan instructed the rector and prefect

to take unremitting charge over the mandatory and absolute observance by both teachers and participants of the rules of Russian orthography, equal

to that involved in other languages taught at the Academy, so that if they see any of the teachers fail in this duty, they immediately inform His Eminence of this departure from their duty as teachers, but to exempt teachers who are foreigners from this requirement. And that all students and pupils, especially those wanting to become priests, in their time free from study, should most assiduously practice reading various kinds of liturgical books, especially the Bible, using correct and pure pronunciation, especially observing the stresses and strength in published books, that is, *oxias*, which is most necessary.⁵⁸

The metropolitan demanded that henceforth the students' character references, that were sent when necessary by the Academy to the theological consistory, indicate, among other things, "whether the graduate correctly reads liturgical and civil books, observes the rules of orthography of written Russian." Those who continued to violate the directive were to be let go from the spiritual department into the secular "team."⁵⁹

Samuil's efforts and the character references given by him are good illustrations of the fact that the linguistic Russification of Ukrainians in the eighteenth century (at least until the middle of the 1780s), even of those who were educated at the Kyiv Academy, was still far off. It was natural that ignorance of the Russian language by the Kyivan Cave Monastery printers resulted in differences between the Cave Monastery's and Moscow's books even when the Kyivans tried their utmost to avoid them.



Several factors can explain how the Kyivan Cave Monastery Press was able for decades to publish books containing discrepancies with texts checked against the Russian exemplars. The monastery always tried "to keep its finger on the pulse" of events in St Petersburg and Moscow in order to learn in advance about approaching problems and to resolve them informally. In the eighteenth century, the monastery received its information from Great Russia, especially "insider" information, from its official alternating permanent "solicitors" and its friends there. The Cave Monastery won the support of the highest officials in various ways, resorting to both the Kyiv churchmen's customary intellectually styled reminders of their importance⁶⁰ and the more prosaic means of building a circle of well-wishers.

The Cave Monastery successfully established a network of benefactors, and its friends at various times consisted of the empire's influential secular persons and churchmen. Various problems were resolved with their help. Thus, in 1727, the

monastery was assisted by Dmitrii Golitsyn. Presumably the monastery established friendly relations with the prince back when he was governor-general of Kyiv. This member of the Supreme Privy Council informed the archimandrite of the Cave Monastery in a letter dated 22 August that at the latter's request he had succeeded in preventing the monastery's indispensable chancellor from being transferred to the cathedral chapter of the Saint Alexander Nevskii Monastery. Golitsyn also suggested what the monastery should do next:

I advise you to send a monk with greetings to the tsar, and with him an icon each of the Dormition of the Mother of Good for the tsar, his sister, the grand princess, and his wife, the tsarina, and have them depict, as those painted when I was there, the Dormition of the Mother of God in the center and Antonii and Feodosii and other Cave Monastery saints on the sides, and for each a wooden cross containing relics, a few books, and also some of your fruits and tidbits.⁶¹

The problems that the Cave Monastery's well-wishers helped it to resolve included issues involving the publication of books. An example of the effectiveness of this means of solving publishing matters in their favor was the monastery's successful resistance to Metropolitan Tymofii (Shcherbats'kyi) of Kyiv, who in 1752 attempted to create a separate printing house of the metropolitan see. The Cave Monastery's spies successfully tracked all the steps that the metropolitan took, and the support of influential patrons helped to prevent potential competition.⁶² Similar methods were used when it came to printing certain editions.

The monks representing the Cave Monastery initially made flying visits to the capital, but with time they stayed there permanently. When the monastery's archimandrite had some matter to deal with and was applying to the Synod, he simultaneously instructed his "diplomat" in Russia, telling him what informal steps he should take. For example, in 1775, on the same day that he sent a formal request to the Synod for permission to mention the Cave Monastery's saints in the Dismissal and in prayers, the archimandrite asked the monastery's representative, Hegumen Faddei of its attached Zmiiv Monastery, to step up his efforts to obtain a decision in favor of the monastery.⁶³

The Cave Monastery sometimes turned to its patrons even before it submitted an official appeal to the Synod. When the question of printing the *Akathist* to Saint Barbara, which was popular among churchmen, came up, the monastery's representative was instructed to first give the information, together with the appropriate appeal, to the bishops of Novgorod and Moscow, and only then submit it to the Synod "and try to get a favorable decision." In addition, the archimandrite

sent similar personal requests to the Synod's chief prosecutor and chief secretary, as well as to the archpriest Andrii (judging from the appeal, he was "a reliable patron," most likely the archpriest of the Preobrazhenskii Lifeguard Regiment).⁶⁴ The efforts were not in vain: permission to print the *Akathist* was received that same year.⁶⁵

In looking for patrons, the Cave Monastery weighed in advance the potential assistance it could expect from each and discussed its affairs with them ahead of time. Thus, the monastery's representative in Moscow – who found out about everything, kept in contact with the appropriate people, and informed Kyiv – reported in February 1767 that he had learned of the presence of the Krutitsy bishop in the Synod (this body was then in the process of following the court to Moscow). The preliminary conversation with the bishop, through whose intermediacy the Cave Monastery hoped to obtain permission to print books "as before," also helped to uncover the possible conditions for resolving the matter and make sure of future support, and to receive consultation regarding what needed to be done: "The Krutitsy bishop doubts that the Cave Monastery will get permission to publish books as before but said that he would notify [us] if the Synod expresses an inclination to give assent [to our request], and at the same time advises [us] to distinguish that the larger year-round books would be printed as checked against the Moscow equivalents, and ask permission to print as before only the small cell and pocket books."⁶⁶

Bishop Dimitrii (Sechenov) of Novgorod also lent the Cave Monastery his support in this matter. The same representative reported in April 1767: "Don't insist on printing books as before, they don't want to hear about it; in addition to valid superfluities, they contain very many errors, which cannot be justified in any way; one hierarch, a patron of the Cave Monastery and the bishop of Novgorod, is defending [us] from even worse consequences and allowing us to hope cautiously."⁶⁷ So the monastery did not forget to thank the bishop, making much of his help, saying that "you, in contrast to others, deign to regard with favor this holy Cave Monastery."⁶⁸

By informing the Cave Monastery of decisions pertaining to its affairs before they were officially published, the monastery's benefactors allowed its leaders to get an idea of the lay of the land in advance and even take preventive steps. Just how accurate the "insider" information was is evidenced by the above-mentioned great review of Kyiv publications in 1767. As early as 13 March, its representative assured the monastery from Moscow that there was no reason to fear the review of the books that contained numerous errors, "and nothing will happen after the review except that they will correct the mistakes, throw out the additions, and then direct you to print in accordance with the Moscow examples."⁶⁹ On 12 April,

before the review of the books ended, he already knew the content of the future Synod decree to the archimandrite of the Kyivan Cave Monastery, which only appeared on 10 May.⁷⁰

As in other similar cases, the Cave Monastery printers tried to resolve printing issues quickly and efficiently, and to act preventatively if necessary. For example, when in 1725 discrepancies between the Cave Monastery's and Moscow's editions of the Lenten *Triodion* were found for a second time (the first time, the Kyiv archimandrite was fined one thousand rubles for the differences between them, but this sum was later reduced), the archimandrite of the Trinity Monastery of Saint Sergius, Havryil Buzhyns'kyi (a graduate of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and a native of Right-Bank Ukraine⁷¹), after reporting "many [...] discrepancies and errors in orthography," recommended that his Kyiv colleague be the first to write to the Synod asking it to assign them a corrector from the Moscow printing house to ensure uniformity of the two books.⁷² This would mean approximately the following: we want to act in accordance with the decrees but are ourselves unable to remove the "faults," so we ask for a Russian expert to help us.

In 1769, the Cave Monastery sent the Synod for review a printed quarter-sheet *Euchologion*, checked against, according to the monastery's assurances, its Moscow counterpart. However, as became known in Kyiv even before the official announcement, a review of the book revealed discrepancies, and copies of the book had been sent to Moscow for approval. Not waiting for a decision from St Petersburg, the archimandrite of the Cave Monastery wrote on 2 January 1770 to the archimandrite of Moscow's Chrysostom Monastery [*Zlatoustovskii monastery*], Iosyf, asking him to find out whether there really were mistakes in the Cave Monastery's book, whether they were important, and also to obtain and send him a copy of the decree that dealt with this matter. Iosyf had come to Russia from Kyiv together with Metropolitan Tymofii (Shcherbats'kyi), who had been transferred to the Moscow metropolitan see in 1757, and the latter had appointed him a member of the local consistory, vicar of the metropolitan's home monastery of Chudov, and later, archimandrite of Chrysostom Monastery.⁷³ His response to his Kyiv colleagues was relatively quick. Iosyf's letter of 31 January 1770 makes it clear how the Cave Monastery operated, and what kind of radical steps it was sometimes prepared to take. The Moscow archimandrite wrote:

I have exhausted all available means, but because of the importance of this matter, it is impossible to help in any way or put an end to this matter and make away with the wealth of errors that have already been recorded on paper, which are very important in and of themselves, and are being kept in the office under strong guard; neither the director, nor the officials can do so, having no power in this regard.⁷⁴

Iosyf was unable to so much as obtain copies of the errors from the “officials,” among whom were some of his friends. This time the archimandrite was only able to familiarize himself with the synodal decree under which the almost completed investigation was being conducted and to establish “that in its importance, this involves not only the Cave Monastery as a whole but also certain persons for failing to monitor [the project].” Instead, Iosyf “obtained with great effort and secrecy” a record of the discrepancies between the Kyiv half-sheet edition of the 1769 *Shestodnev* [*Hexameron*] and its Moscow equivalent. At that time, the Cave Monastery was also active in St Petersburg. Its representative there sought the support of Ostolopov and received his assurance that he would defend the Cave Monastery.⁷⁵

The monastery’s friends also included authoritative secular patrons. In June 1782, the Cave Monastery representative reported from St Petersburg, where he was successfully arranging for the printing of *akathists* with explanations of the canons, that the members of the Synod were proposing that the *akathists* not be printed under one cover but individually. Inasmuch as this method was unprofitable for the Cave Monastery, the monk turned for assistance to Stepan Ivanovich Sheshkovskii. The latter convinced the Synod that its decisions had been unreasonable, and this ended the attempt to impose separate publications on the monastery.⁷⁶ Sheshkovskii was virtually the top official in the secret service of Catherine II (Secret Expedition of the First Department of the Senate), the imperial investigator in high-profile political cases (in particular, Arsenii Matsiievich), Vasilii Mirovich, Emelian Pugachev), and enjoyed the empress’s personal favor. Incidentally, he was a native of Hrodna [Grodno] and apparently of noble birth.⁷⁷

In creating and maintaining its circle of support, the Cave Monastery was assisted by “diplomatic gifts”: above all, Ukrainian alcoholic drinks (“vodkas”), famous and popular in Russian noble circles “sweets,” Hungarian wine, and books. Thus, in 1766, a diverse repertory of printed works worth one hundred rubles (a total of more than seven hundred copies), ten poods of dried plums, six poods each of dried pears and cherries, seventeen barrels (*bochonkiv*) and more than forty buckets (*vedra*) of Hungarian and Wallachian red liturgical wines and Wallachian white wine, two buckets and eight quarts each of sweet orange “vodka” and “blue pimpernel vodka,” and three buckets and eight quarts of plum brandy were shipped to the Synod in Moscow “as a gift”. This inventory was to help the council elder Antonii, who was traveling to Russia, show “appropriate regard for the members of the Synod and other benefactors of the Cave Monastery.” For instance, the bishops of Moscow and Krutitsy were each to receive a barrel of Hungarian wine, and the bishop of Novgorod, a whole antal. Once he arrived at his destination, Antonii was to assess which of the most distinguished benefactors should also receive barrels of wine. In order to successfully handle the Cave

Monastery's affairs, the hieromonk was also given six hundred rubles, two hundred foreign gold coins (*chervintsi*), and seven imperials.⁷⁸

Despite such supplies of gifts, only a few months later Antonii reported to Kyiv that "the loyal persons" were asking for "sweets," and some of them were asking for designated amounts of walnuts, peaches, apricots, cherries, figs, and such. In response, the spiritual council⁷⁹ decided to pack the necessary items from its own supplies into jars, and if these were not enough, to buy more to make up at least two poods, and sent these goods to Russia to be given as gifts to the appropriate people. In March 1767, these "sweet desserts" were quickly and efficiently packed and shipped to Moscow, after supplementing the order with cherries, plums, red gooseberries, barberries, raspberries, grapes, blueberries, and red roses.⁸⁰

In addition to Ukrainian delicacies ("candy, prunes, walnuts, and other things"), books printed by the Cave Monastery Press were also customarily given as gifts to Russian officials. As the Cave Monastery informed the metropolitan of Kyiv in November 1786, its press had been sending the monarch and his courtiers the Paschal canons for the Feast of the Resurrection "since long ago." Whenever anyone from the monastery traveled to St Petersburg or Moscow, similar gifts were presented to the members and officials of the Synod and its office. "And since the time that the Cave Monastery's representatives began living in St Petersburg permanently," this practice had become annual. Sometimes presents were delivered by Reiters.⁸¹

It was not always easy to present the gifts that the benefactors in Moscow and St Petersburg hinted at or openly asked for. Therefore the monastery looked for various opportunities, demonstrating time and time again its ability to find successful methods of securing its interests. For instance, in February 1770, the archimandrite of the Kyivan Cave Monastery was informed from St Petersburg that nothing had been presented to their loyal lobbyists,

because the members received no written notice about this from your holy site (and without that nobody will accept anything), and also because shortly before this, I had presented them with delicacies sent from the Cave Monastery, which some also did not want to accept, even though they had been written about them, and I assured them that all these fruits were from the monastery's own gardens. Believe me, they are very careful about bribes here, not only in clerical but also in secular circles.⁸²

In order not to expose their benefactors to accusations of bribe-taking, the representative of the Cave Monastery asked the archimandrite to write again to them to inform them of the gifts, and proposed giving them at Easter, ob-

viously in the form of a greeting with the holiday rather than as payment for their assistance.⁸³

The Cave Monastery's diplomatic skill in Great Russia is depicted in the satirical poem *Lament of the Kyiv Monks* (*Plach kyivs'kykh monakhiv*), which, most likely, was written by a monk seeking to criticize the monastery,⁸⁴ or at any rate, an unquestionably well-informed individual. The subject of the work purports to be a conference of the spiritual council of the Cave Monastery in 1786 occasioned by the alarming situation held in store by the implementation of the provisions of the secularization reform. One of the monks, the representative Orest, gives the following justification for his proposal to seek protection in the capital:

I had the opportunity to be in St Petersburg, and know the way,
Where I had some success in managing affairs,
And if this definitely happens,
I could travel there again,
Where I am bound to have success,
Not for myself alone, but to everyone's joy.
Only a lot of money is needed for this,
But sacred relics are not very expensive here.
By giving relics as gifts, we succeeded in our affairs,
But we supplemented these gifts with gold,
Without which we cannot do now either,
And, brothers, I tell you this truly.⁸⁵

However, criticism of the Cave Monastery's methods and means of attaining its goals, especially avoiding punishment for violating directives about the unification of book publishing, hardly alarmed the monastery much. After all, its representatives acted and helped the monastery stay "afloat" in the office of the Synod all the way through the ongoing procedure of reviewing the printed products, regardless of unfavorable decrees and directives. The stauropegian monastery had to steer between incompatible forces: the Synod with its stern decrees and the pressure of the local buyers of its printed books. In the eighteenth century the second factor was no less potent for the monastery than the threats from St Petersburg, especially as those could be avoided, while resources were insufficient to carry them out. We should note that the patronage of influential benefactors in the capital was a means to which other church structures and individual clerics also successfully resorted in the eighteenth century.

Another important reason for the resistibility of the Kyiv metropolitanate to the unification policy, which can be observed not only in book publishing but

also in other spheres (for example, the celebration of the Holy Sacraments differently than the Synod prescribed), was the pressure of the laity on the clergy. The influence of lay people on the clerics was strong even at the parish level, since they regarded parish priests as dependent on them (the owner-patrons), or as employees (ordinary worshipers), because they were directly involved in electing the future pastor of the church. In dealing with the issue of nominating a priest to a parish, modern historiography repeats and, at best, supplements the work done by nineteenth-century scholars with some additional facts. Historians continue to speak of the coexistence/battle of two principles (electoral and hereditary), arguing about their spread. As an analysis of the data for one-quarter of the clerics of the Kyiv metropolitanate in the first half of the 1770s shows (it proved possible to find complete statistical data about them), the ratio of inheritance to election was almost equal – 50 per cent to 50 per cent, varying in different arch-priest jurisdictions.⁸⁶

The division of the methods of appointing parish priests into heritable and elective is actually wrong. Regardless of whether the person who became parish priest had no family ties to his predecessor, or, to the contrary, was a relative of his, the approval of the parishioners was mandatory. In other words, inheritance also required the consent of the parishioners, expressed in the usual manner (as in the case of the election of an “outsider”). That the procedure was perceived as obligatory in all cases is attested by both the practice of nominating clergy in the eighteenth century and the legal norms of the time.⁸⁷ Even if a candidate for a parish had an influential lobbyist of his interests and had secured the support of the church authorities, an application from the community (“presenter”) (even if fake) had to be presented, be it only as a formality, when the metropolitan see was conducting the procedure of nominating him to serve as a parish priest.⁸⁸

How the parishioners understood their right to select the candidate for their parish priest is evidenced by the words ostensibly spoken by one of the Iaroslav Cossack parishioners, Fedir Dubyna. According to Kyiv bishop Tymofii, when he brought papers from the colonel of Kyiv (correspondence conducted in 1755, including specifically about the transfer of a priest whom the Cossacks found objectionable and the approval of another) and threatened violence against the bishop, he said: “If the bishop does not remove this priest and give us another, we will petition the empress in the capital.”⁸⁹

Often in emphasizing the right of parishioners to elect their pastors, scholars forget about the owners of the villages. The landholder (where one existed) was a mandatory participant in the election in all the eparchies of the Hetmanate. For example, in approving the candidacy for parish priest for the church in the

village of Sulymivka, the Pereiaslav colonel wrote to the local bishop that the church on his estate had been built by his deceased parents and was secured as his “heritage” and that he was dissatisfied with the vicar there.⁹⁰ We see here the typical patron, with the Commonwealth’s well-known right to present candidates for clerical office. Other cases show that the will of the landholder was supreme, and the right of the parishioners to vote was a mere formality⁹¹ (yet, albeit formally, the procedure of “election” by the parishioners had to be adhered to).

In summary, let me emphasize once again the important, often decisive, role of the laity in electing the parish priest, and hence their influence on the organization of life on the basic parish level. It is important that these relations hampered the implementation of the unification measures of the highest church authorities. In choosing between complying with the instructions handed down from above and the opinion of his congregation, the priest did not always pick the first.



The overall result of the process whereby the Orthodox Church in the Hetmanate underwent the transformation of becoming a part of a unified and disciplined imperial synodal Church is generally much more “optimistic” than suggested by those who approach the exploration of religious life only through the prism of analysis of resolutions and decrees. The Kyiv Orthodox metropolitanate, despite the change in subordination at the end of the seventeenth century, remained for at least another century the bearer of a different religious culture than the one that the Synod sought to create.

In the eighteenth century, an entire array of reasons hampered the successful realization of the transformation of the Kyiv metropolitanate into an ordinary component of the synodal Church. In various segments of the struggle of the local against imposition from above, various factors played a role, but it is possible to distinguish among them some universal features as well. These include the fairly strong influence of the lay “sheep” and the clerical “pastors.” Thus, Ukrainian clerics, from parish priests to the bishop, often found themselves caught between two fires: the directives from St Petersburg and the dissatisfaction of local lay members with their implementation. In choosing between the two sides, the clergy often considered the laity, on whom their livelihood depended. What is more, pressure from the secular element, which was directly tied to economic well-being, was felt not only at the level of the “parish civilization.” The Kyivan Cave Monastery Press, whose books were expected to ensure the uniformity of

liturgical practices, and in part also religious teaching, also took into consideration the demands of the market, which did not always accept a new product that had been published according to the Moscow template.

It was also easier for the clergy to accommodate the wishes of the laity, rather than comply with the synodal decrees, because in the eighteenth century punishment for violating them was not inevitable. On the contrary, Ukrainians (both laypeople and clergy) increasingly took their affairs or conflicts to St Petersburg to be dealt with there through the intermediacy of their patrons, friends, and such. Natives of Kyiv were sitting in session in the Synod, which produced disciplinary directives, and Ukrainians already had many influential friends in Russia, and not only their fellow countrymen. Among those in the Kyiv metropolitanate who cultivated the favor of Russian officials were not only individuals but also church structures (the metropolitan see, and monasteries). Thus, we can see situations, paradoxical at first glance, in which the Synod, as the supreme governing body of the Church, issued strict decrees, and then owing to the support of members of the Synod, the representatives of the Kyiv metropolitanate sought to avoid (and did avoid) punishment for violating them.

When then did the Kyiv eparchy become an ordinary part of the imperial "Russian Orthodox Church"? Without conducting a special study, I can only suggest that the process of the slow unification was interrupted at the end of the eighteenth century. At that time, it was hampered by the incorporation by the synodal Church of new believers, the former Uniates. In the nineteenth century, the episcopate of the Belarusian and Right-Bank Ukrainian eparchies (in particular, the Kyiv eparchy, whose boundaries now coincided with the borders of the gubernia of the same name) had to make an effort to combat what were regarded as Uniate survivals. At the parish level, it was necessary to start all over again conducting the unification and disciplining of religious practices. Historians need to answer the question whether this process was completed before the Ukrainianization movements in the Church began in the modern era.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

This text is a substantially shortened version of part of the conclusions presented in the monograph: Maksym Iaremenko, *Pered vyklykamy unifikatsii ta dystsyplynuvannia: Kyivs'ka pravoslavna mytropoliia u XVIII stolitti* (Lviv, 2017). Translated from the Ukrainian with author's permission.

- 1 See, for example, indications of specific features that attested to the absence in the Russian Church of important components of a modern institution (a rudimentary, de facto weakly centralized organization lacking a rational bureaucratic structure; a lack of “professional,” well-trained servants; Russian Orthodoxy which was actually “Russian heterodoxy” – an assemblage of diverse local religious practices, which could differ even from parish to parish): G.I. Freeze, “Institutionalizing Piety: The Church and Popular Religions, 1750–1850,” in *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*, ed. Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1998), 211–21. It goes without saying that such a Church had itself to undergo changes rather than become an example for the Kyiv metropolitanate to follow.
- 2 The unification of the Kyiv metropolitanate “with other Orthodox eparchies on the territory of the Russian Empire” in the eighteenth century is also discussed by Oksana Prokopiuk. However, the scholar asserts that the process of unification of the metropolitanate was officially completed by the 1780s (see Prokopiuk’s chapter in the encyclopedic entry on the Kyiv eparchy: O.B. Prokopiuk, “Kievskaiia eparkhiia. Kievskaiia eparkhiia v 1686–1786 gg. (na territorii Rossiiskogo gosudarstva),” in *Pravoslavnaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 33 (Moscow, 2013), 174. To my mind, this dating of the upper limit is not fully justified; on the contrary, in certain spheres at the level of “parish civilization,” real unification was only beginning then.
- 3 M. Iaremenko, “Akademiiky” ta Akademiia. *Sotsial'na istoriia osvity y osvichenosti v Ukraïni XVIII st.* (Kharkiv, 2014), 381.
- 4 See, for example, Ia. Isaievych, *Ukraïns'ke knyhovydannia: vytoky, rozvytok, problemy* (Lviv, 2002), 249–63.
- 5 *Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter – TSDIAUK), f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 145, ark. 5.
- 6 The purported first metropolitan of Kyiv, Michael, who together with Prince Volodymyr baptized Rus', was an important memory for the Kyiv metropolitanate as evidenced by, among other things, the inclusion of his name (or even a more detailed presentation) in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century commemoration books (synodicons). Sometimes, Michael’s name was one of two names of Old Rus' hierarchs, followed by early modern metropolitans. See, for example, the commemoration books of the Saint Michael’s Golden-Domed Monastery (1R NBu, f. 307, spr. 538/1744 P, ark. 17), Saint Sophia Cathedral (*Pomennyk Sofiï Kyïvs'koï. Publikatsiia rukopysnoï pam'iatky druhoï polovyny XVIII – pershoï chervti XIX st.*, comp. and introductions O.

Prokopiuk (Kyiv, 2004), 33), and the Mezhyhiria Monastery (O. Kuz'muk, "Pomennyk Mezhyhirs'koho monastyria: sprobа systemnoho analizy," *Proseminarii* 4 [2000]: 88).

- 7 A book containing the Psalms specially divided for services and other parts of the Liturgy of the Hours; TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 275, art. 5a–7.
- 8 *Opisanie dokumentov i del, khraniashchikhsia v archive Sviateishego Pravitel'stvuiushchago Sinoda*, vol. 7: 1727 (St Petersburg, 1885): stb. 336–37, no. 327; TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 2, ark. 19, 23–4 zv., 27–8, 30–2.
- 9 TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 2, ark. 60.
- 10 Ibid., spr. 105, ark. 2–2 zv. Incidentally, the described fact of a lengthy absence of strict control refutes the claim that strict censorship very quickly returned after the publication in 1730 of the *Kamenvery* (Rock of Faith) by Stefan (Iavors'kyi). See, S.R. Kahamlyk, "Kul'turno-prosvitnyts'ka diial'nist' Kyievo-Pechers'koi Lavry v druhii polovyni XVII-XVIII st." (PhD diss., Institute of History of Ukraine NANU, Kyiv, 2000), 127.
- 11 Pr. [Archpriest] F. Titov, "K istorii Kievskoi dukhovnoi Akademii v XVII-XVIII v. III. Vospitanniki Akademii na sluzhbe v Kievo-Pecherkoi Lavre, v sviazi s biografiei Sofroniia Ternaviota," *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (hereinafter – *TKDA*) 2 (1911): 205.
- 12 A book containing services for feasts on each day of the month.
- 13 The festive portion of the orthros or All-Night Vigil.
- 14 A liturgical book containing many of the propers (variable parts) for the services of the daily cycle, and some for the Divine Liturgy, divided into eight tones in which they are to be sung.
- 15 A book containing several liturgical services of the Divine Office for feasts of the Lord, the Mother of God, and certain saints.
- 16 TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 105, ark. 9 zv.–11.
- 17 Ibid., ark. 11 zv., 14–14 zv.
- 18 A collection of chants for various services.
- 19 TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 105, ark. 14–16 zv.
- 20 Ibid., ark. 107 zv.
- 21 Ibid., ark. 115–115 zv.
- 22 Ibid., ark. 116–116 zv.
- 23 Ibid., ark. 126–126 zv.
- 24 Kahamlyk, "Kul'turno-prosvitnyts'ka diial'nist' Kyievo-Pechers'koi Lavry v druhii polovyni XVII-XVIII st.," 128.
- 25 Titov, "K istorii Kievskoi dukhovnoi Akademii v XVII-XVIII v. III. Vospitanniki Akademii na sluzhbe v Kievo-Pecherkoi Lavre, v sviazi s biografiei Sofroniia Ternaviota," *TKDA* 12 (1911): 642–3.

- 26 ТSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 108, ark. 6 zv.–7, 14–15; spr. 109, ark. 4–4 zv., 12 zv., 14–15 zv., 17, 19–19 zv.; spr. 137, ark. 63–64 zv., 68–68 zv.; spr. 161, ark. 4–4 zv.
- 27 Undoubtedly, this refers to Platon Levshin, then a member of the Holy Synod and the archimandrite of the Trinity Monastery of Saint Sergius (*Troitse-Sergieva Lavra*).
- 28 Something along the lines of “scold”; from the Polish *finfa* – a nasty trick.
- 29 ТSDIAUK, f. 128, op.1 druk., spr. 161, ark. 9 zv.–10.
- 30 Ibid., spr. 219, ark. 152.
- 31 Ibid., spr. 110, ark. 3–3 zv.
- 32 Ibid., spr. 195, ark. 4, 5; Evgenii Bolkhovitinov, “Opisanie Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavry,” in idem, *Vybrani pratsi z istorii Kyieva*, comp., introduction, and addenda by T. Anan'ieva (Kyiv, 1995), 343.
- 33 *Institut Rukopysy Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukrainy* (Manuscript Institute of the National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – IR NBU), f. 301, spr. 605 l., t. II, ark. 539 zv.–540; spr. 606 l., ark. 61, 72 zv.–73, 81 zv.–82, 260 zv.; f. 2, spr. 6828, ark. 1–1 zv.
- 34 Titov, “K istorii Kievskoi dukhovnoi Akademii v XVII-XVIII,” 661.
- 35 “Punkty ot Kievskoi eparkhii,” *Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* (hereinafter – SIRIO) 43 (1885, St Petersburg): 517–18.
- 36 IR NBU, f. 232, spr. 139, ark. 1–2 zv.
- 37 O. Prokop'iuk, “Knyhy v parafial'nykh khramakh Kyivs'koï mytropoliï (70–80-i rr. XVIII st.): funktsii, kil'kist', repertuar, shliakhy nadkhodzhennia,” *Kievskaiia starina* 3 (2010): 99–101.
- 38 IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 5534, ark. 61 zv.–62; ТSDIAUK f. 127, op. 1020, spr. 3876, ark. 2 zv.–3, 11–12; DAK, f. 313, op. 1, spr. 247, ark. 2–2zv.
- 39 IR NBU, f. 301, spr. 605 l, t. 1, ark. 631–31 zv.; P.M. Popov, “Oseredky knyho-drukuvannia na Skhidnii Ukraïni (XVII–XVIII st.),” in idem, ed., *Knyha i drukarstvo na Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 1964), 101.
- 40 IR NBU, f. 160, spr. 425, ark. 1–147. A similar manuscript: ibid., spr. 2401, ark. 1–122 zv.
- 41 For example, ТSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 105; spr. 204, ark. 105–06 zv., 117; *Opisanie dokumentov i del, khraniashchikhsia v arkhive Sviatishnego Pravitel'stvuiushchego Sinoda* (hereinafter – ODD), vol. 15 (St Petersburg, 1907), stb. 492, no. 350.
- 42 ТSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 195, ark. 2–2 zv.
- 43 Ibid., spr. 165, ark. 1–1 zv.
- 44 Ibid., ark. 1 zv., 4.
- 45 Ibid., spr. 161, ark. 10.

- 46 Undoubtedly, a reference to Mikhail Konstantinovich Ostolopov, then the chief secretary of the Synod.
- 47 ТSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 161, ark. 11–11 zv.
- 48 Ibid., spr. 145, ark. 5.
- 49 For example, ibid., ark. 10 zv.
- 50 See, for example, data for the 1760s–1770s: ibid., spr. 136, ark. 109, 119, 143, 144–46, 158–61 zv., 184–85 zv.; spr. 193, ark. 76–6 zv., 82–3, 126–29 zv., 143–43 zv.; spr. 204, ark. 105–06 zv.
- 51 H.M. Hnatiuk, *Rosiis'ko-ukraïns'ki literaturno-movni zv'iazky v druhii polovyni XVIII – pershii chverti XIX st.* (Kyiv, 1957), 9–10.
- 52 “150-letie Kostromskoi dukhovnoi seminarii (1747–1897 g.g.). II. Seminarii v proshlom i v nachale nyneshnego stoletii (do 1814 g.) (Ocherk, sostavlennyi k 150-letiiu i chitannyi na akte 25 sentiabria 1897 g.),” *Kostromskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* 20 (1897): 571.
- 53 M.S. Popov, *Arsenii Matseevich i ego delo* (St Petersburg, 1912), 258, 262–3.
- 54 Quoted from O.A. Fefelova, “Vypuskniki Kievskoi akademii v Sibiri: Amvrosii (Kelembet), arkhiepiscope Tobolskii i Sibirskii (1806–22 gg.),” *Vestnik Tom-skogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta* 3 (118) (2012): 21.
- 55 A.S. Lebedev, “Feoktist Mochulskii, arkhiepiscope Belgorodskii (1787–1799 g.) i Kurskii (1799–1818),” in *Sbornik Kharkovskogo istoriko-filologicheskogo obshchestva* 9 (1897): 25.
- 56 See examples of the listed attributes of Kyiv fugitive monks: ТSDIAUK, f. 127, op. 168, spr. 86, ark. 2 zv.; op. 1020, spr. 4430, ark. 3, spr. 4697, ark. 23–23 zv. Incidentally, mentions of monks who knew Russian were rare (M. Iaremenko, *Kyïvs'ke chernetstvo XVIII st.* [Kyiv, 2007], 110–11).
- 57 *Akty i dokumenty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Kievskoi akademii*. Otdelenie II (1721–95 gg.), introduction and annotations by N. I. Petrov, vol. 5 (Kyiv, 1908), 81, no. 17.
- 58 Ibid., 81–2, no. 17.
- 59 Ibid., 82, no. 17.
- 60 See, for example, Gary Marker’s analysis of the text and visual accompaniment to the introduction to the Cave Monastery’s 1702 *Patericon* authored by Ioasaf Krokovs'kyi, see G. Marker, “Love One’s Enemies: Ioasaf Krokovs'kyi’s Advice to Peter in 1702,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 29, no. 1–4 (2007): 208–15.
- 61 OR RGB, f. 1000, op. 1, d. 598, l. 1–1 ob. (n/a in the original).
- 62 Titov, “K istorii Kievskoi dukhovnoi Akademii v XVII–XVIII v.,” 661.
- 63 ТSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 195, ark. 3.
- 64 Ibid., spr. 204, ark. 87.
- 65 Ibid., spr. 193, ark. 62–4a, 65–6, 67.

- 66 Ibid., spr. 105, ark. 82, 86.
- 67 Ibid., ark. 124.
- 68 Ibid., ark. 143.
- 69 Ibid., ark. 117.
- 70 Ibid., ark. 119.
- 71 Z.I. Khyzhniak, "Buzhyns'kyi, po bat'kovi Fedorovych, chernече imia Havryil," in *Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia v imenakh, XVII-XVIII st.: Entsiklopedychne vydannia*, comp. Z.I. Khyzhnia (Kyiv, 2001), 90.
- 72 TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 5, ark. 12.
- 73 K.V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn* (Kazan, 1914), 1: 527, 569, 578.
- 74 TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 161, ark. 4.
- 75 Ibid., ark. 4-4 zv., 11-13.
- 76 Ibid., spr. 204, ark. 454-54 zv.
- 77 For more in greater detail, see A.N. Korsakov, "Stepan Ivanovich Sheshkovskii (1721-94). Biograficheskii ocherk," *Istoricheskii vestnik* 22, no. 12 (1885): 656-87.
- 78 TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 105, ark. 52-3, 56, 57, 62, 63-63 zv.
- 79 A group of monks who performed the most important assignments, dealt with monastery affairs, and advised the hegumen what to do.
- 80 TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 105, ark. 86-87, 90, 190.
- 81 IR NBU, f. 301, spr. 690 l, no. 650, ark. 754-54 zv.
- 82 TSDIAUK, f. 128, op. 1 druk., spr. 161, ark. 9.
- 83 Ibid.
- 84 I. Kamanin, "Plach Kievskogo lavrskogo Ieremii kontsa XVIII veka," *CHIONL* 22, no. 1, otd. 2 (1907): 16.
- 85 "Plach kyivs'kykh monakhiv," in *Ukrains'ka literature XVIII st.*, intro., comp., and notes by O.V. Myshanych (Kyiv, 1983), 217.
- 86 TSDIAUK, f. 127, op. 1009, spr. 3, ark. 1-50 (Hlukhiv archpriest jurisdiction); ark. 5-12 (Reshetylivka archpriest jurisdiction); ark. 19-32 (Kobeliaky archpriest jurisdiction); op. 1024, spr. 2042, ark. 1-37 zv. (Romny archpriest jurisdiction); spr. 2132, ark. 1-23 (Pyriatyn archpriest jurisdiction); spr. 2133, ark. 1-34 zv. (for the Sorochyntsi archpriest jurisdiction); ДАК, f. 314, spr. 326, ark. 1-1- zv. (Kyiv-Pechersk archpriest jurisdiction).
- 87 For example, TSDIAUK, f. 127, op. 1020, spr. 361, ark. 9, 11.
- 88 For example, ДАК, f. 313, op. 1, spr. 91, ark. 11 zv.
- 89 TSDIAUK, f. 127, op. 1020, spr. 2481, ark. 24-26 zv., quoted from ark. 26.
- 90 Ibid., f. 990, op. 2, spr. 5, ark. 2-2zv.
- 91 Ibid., f. 127, op. 1020, spr. 2403, ark. 14-20.

The Uniate Church in Right-Bank Ukraine in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century: Paradoxes of Regional Adaptation

IHOR SKOCHYLIA S

Historiographical Observations: The Uniate Church as a Cocreator of the Ukrainian Eighteenth Century

Previous and present-day scholars usually considered and continue to consider the period from the end of the seventeenth to the first half of the eighteenth century primarily as the “Mazepa era,” the “Cossack baroque period” and the autonomy of the Hetmanate (together with the Zaporozhian Sich and Sloboda Ukraine). On the other hand, much less attention in the national metanarrative of the “short” eighteenth century is devoted to Right-Bank Ukraine and those territories that were part of the Polish-Lithuanian state until 1772 (the exception here are the works on the Haidamak movement and the Koliivshchyna rebellion). The limitations of this approach are more than obvious, especially when considering the past of the Ukrainian lands in categories of cultural and religious history¹ and the broader context of the social and political model of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the “Saxon Era”² and the institutional development of the Kyiv metropolitanate (of both its Orthodox and Uniate components), which in the pre-modern era actually performed the functions of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian-Belarusian) culture of the time.³ Biconfessional Kyivan Christianity was in many ways congruent with the then existing trends in the religious life of Latin and Protestant Europe. Here the period of late baroque and the Enlightenment were marked by the modernization of spiritual life, the activation of the lay movement, the gradual laicization of culture, with the simultaneous deepening of the piety of the faithful (which was based not so much on rites as on the daily

invocation of the Holy Scriptures and the patristic heritage), the appearance of religious literature in the homes of townspeople and the nobility, and the gradual spread of literacy as an important sign of the renewal of society.⁴

This article is intended to draw attention to the role of the Uniate Church in the processes of the cultural and social adaptation of Right-Bank Ukraine (within the borders of the Bratslav and Kyiv palatinates) to the new realities of the “short” eighteenth century. In relation to the region under study, this period is chronologically confined to the “New Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising” (Semen Palii’s uprising), the forced resettlement of the local population to Left-Bank Ukraine in 1711–12, and the return of the Polish administration (lower limit) and the incorporation of these lands by the Russian Empire as a result of the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (upper limit). From the cultural-religious perspective, the appearance of the organizational structures of the Uniate Church in Right-Bank Ukraine was caused not only by political factors – the Ruin, Ivan Mazepa’s defeat in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, and the emergence of the Russian Empire as reformed by Peter I – but also by the phenomenon of the Ruthenian Uniate revival in the Ukrainian-Belarusian lands. In spatial terms, this renewal resulted in a “new union” and an unprecedented territorial expansion of the Kyiv (in communion with Rome) metropolitanate. Specifically, this involved the eparchies of Peremyshl (Przemyśl) (1691–93), Lviv (1700), and Luts'k (1702) becoming part of the Uniate Church. De facto, this meant the end of a lengthy, more than century-long period of the disorganization of the structures of the Kyiv metropolitanate and the beginning of its “golden age” within the framework of the Polish-Lithuanian state. In the eighteenth century, it was this Church that became the largest ethno-confessional community in the Commonwealth (in 1772, it numbered 10,035 parishes, while the Roman Catholic parishes numbered only 8,499).⁵ Thus at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the only Ukrainian lands within the Kingdom of Poland, where the local parishes and monasteries of the Eastern rite did not recognize the supremacy of the Holy See were the territories of the Bratslav, Kyiv, and partly Podilia palatinates.

Scholars usually consider the changes that took place in the jurisdictional status of the Ruthenian parishes of Right-Bank Ukraine in the eighteenth century in denominational categories – as a switch by the faithful and clergy from Orthodoxy to the Union.⁶ An example of this traditional approach is an extensive article by Sophia Senyk, which describes religious conflicts in Dnipro Ukraine (which, in her interpretation, demonstrates an “extreme case in religious coercion” typical of Europe at the time) in the categories of “enforce the Union” on the local population.⁷ Relying mainly on long-outdated literature and the corpus of sources, tendentially selected by official Russian historiography during the nineteenth

to early twentieth century (mostly from the history of the Orthodox Church), Senyk presents a complex range of social and religious processes in the region as a sequential chain of events that initially threatened Orthodoxy and subsequently grew into overt enforcement of the union (especially since the 1740s) and the brutal persecution of Orthodox believers. Adhering to this discourse, she is sincerely outraged that the Uniate Metropolitan Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi (1729–46) considered all the parishes of the Eastern rite in the Bratslav and Kyiv palatinates as belonging to his jurisdiction. According to her logic, the priests, in order to keep their parishes, were “forced” to make a Catholic profession of faith (*Professio fidei*), and “forced to swear insincerely to the Union by threats and maltreatment, such priests only hated it all the more,” to swear allegiance to the union. Such “situational” Uniate priests should do their best to resist the Latinization of the Eastern rite and the introduction of new liturgical books into liturgical practice and hold services “in churches according to Orthodox rites, ignoring the decisions of the Synod of Zamostia (Zamość) and the bishop’s orders.”⁸

The limitations of this denominational scheme of the history of religious life in eighteenth-century Right-Bank Ukraine becomes obvious when we turn to a much wider range of sources, including those from the internal life of the Uniate Church in the region. They show that the self-identification of the clergy and laity of the time was articulated not so much in the denominationally exclusive concepts of “Orthodox/Uniate,” as in the categories of a “mental mapping”⁹ territoriality (that is, belonging to one’s “own” sacred geographical space), and regional identity. The application of the concept of a “cognitive map” to the territory of the Kyiv metropolitanate makes it possible to “materialize” narratives that have been unnoticed in written sources and little noticed in traditional historiography – the construction of space in people’s minds, the perception by the community of the surrounding space, the imaginary divisions of societal territories, and so forth.

Thus, the boundaries and the church-administrative affiliation of the Kyiv metropolitanate were determined not by geographical criteria but by the durability of the forms of subordination of local Ruthenians to the hierarch. This model of the organization of sacred space, which is genetically related to the Eucharistic ecclesiology of the Eastern Church,¹⁰ as a rule determined the choice (usually unconscious) of “their” pastor, who was represented at the parish level by priests and deans (*namisnyky-protopopy*). We assume that the Ruthenians of that time (Orthodox and Uniates) imagined the surrounding geographical space not as a compact territorial block, but as the totality of sacred facilities and the ministers of the religious denomination to which they belonged. This is what ultimately determined the jurisdictional subordination of a given church-

administrative district of a given eparchy/metropolitanate.¹¹ However, it was of little importance to the laity and the majority of the clergy whether this was under Orthodox or Uniate rule and was perceived by them as an everyday given.

Trends in the religious life of the Ruthenians of Right-Bank Ukraine in the eighteenth century are presented in innovative research categories in a monograph by the American scholar at the University of Illinois, Barbara Skinner,¹² as well as by Larry Wolff.¹³ Using the paradigms of conflictology and confessionalization, Skinner traces the formation of the Ruthenian-Catholic identity and draws attention to the liturgical practices of the Uniates. The scholar rightly notes that historians have usually interpreted Orthodox-Uniate conflicts too simplistically, unjustifiably dramatizing them, and failing to see the decisiveness of the religious factor in the events of the Bar Confederation, the Koliivshchyna uprising, and the Haidamak movement. Describing the parish structure of the daily way of life of Ruthenians, she emphasizes that the victims of religious persecution were not only Orthodox believers but also Eastern-rite Catholics, and that both sides in the conflict resorted to violence. The researcher draws attention to the border status of the region and the presence of a natural barrier – the Dnipro waterway – which significantly affected the formation of different political loyalties among the Orthodox and the Uniates.¹⁴

The Zhytomyr Union of 1715: Ecclesiastical Status of Right-Bank Ukraine and the Establishment of the Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Lev Kyshka in the Kyiv Region

After the *de facto* subordination of the Kyiv metropolitanate to the Moscow patriarchate in 1685–86, the organizational structures of the Ukrainian-Belarusian Orthodox Church, which remained within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, experienced a deep institutional crisis. Installed in Moscow, Metropolitan Hedeon Sviatopolk-Chetvertyns'kyi (1685–90) and his successors were not recognized by the Warsaw royal court. For their part, the Orthodox hierarchs with seats in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth remained loyal to Constantinople. The pastoral vacuum formed in the vast expanses of Right-Bank Ukraine was immediately filled by other Ruthenian hierarchs. First, the Orthodox bishops of Peremyshl, and then of Lviv, and finally of Lutsk joined in the division of spheres of control over the churches and monasteries of the Bratslav and Kyiv palatinates. During this jurisdictional confrontation of the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the Kyiv metropolitans, subordinated to the Moscow patriarchate, actually lost most of their parishes in Right-Bank Ukraine. At least surviving archival sources contain no record of examples of their direct exercise

of spiritual jurisdiction in the Ukrainian part of the metropolitan archeparchy during this period.¹⁵

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the pastoral and administrative authority in Right-Bank Ukraine of Bishop Iosyf Shumlians'kyi of Lviv (1668–1708), who had served as administrator of the Kyiv Orthodox metropolitanate here from 1694, was terminated as a result of the uprising of Semen Palii in 1702–04. The “second Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising” not only stopped the spread of the union in the region for a few years, but also created the preconditions for the temporary restoration, after a quarter-century-long break, of the jurisdiction of the Kyiv Orthodox metropolitans over most of the territory of the Bratslav and Kyiv palatinates.¹⁶ The suppression of the uprising by Polish troops resulted in bloody massacres of both the rebels themselves and the civilian population. The entry of Russian troops into Right-Bank Ukraine in May 1704, who came to the aid of their ally in the Great Northern War, King August II of Poland, doomed the Palii uprising.¹⁷ At the same time, Mazepa's troops, who were advancing into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with the Muscovite army, succeeded in regaining control of a significant part of Right-Bank Ukraine.¹⁸

Records of pastoral visitations of churches in the Bratslav region in the first third of the eighteenth century clearly show that during the period from 1700 to 1715, the local clergy perceived this region, both in formal canonical terms and in fact, as a component of the Kyiv Orthodox Archeparchy.¹⁹ The control of the Orthodox Church over the Bratslav region during this period is also indirectly confirmed by the fact that the Bratslav clergy received ordination (usually in Kyiv) from Metropolitans Varlaam Iasyns'kyi (1690–1707), Ioasaf Krokovs'kyi (1708–18), and Varlaam (Vonatovych, 1722–30).²⁰

Subsequent events that unfolded across the expanse of the Uniate Kyiv metropolitan archeparchy in the 1710s initially slowed the expansion of the Orthodox jurisdiction of the Saint Sophia see in Kyiv, and then caused the Orthodox Church to lose direct influence over the Ruthenian parishes of the Bratslav and Kyiv palatinates for almost a century. We are referring primarily to the infamous forced resettlement of the population in 1711–12, the abolition of the Cossack regimental system in Right-Bank Ukraine, and the return of the region to the Commonwealth in 1714. The largest-scale of the forced resettlement of the population in the region's history was the result of radical political changes in the region following the defeat of the Swedes and Hetman Mazepa at Poltava in 1709 and was a response to Pylyp Orlyk's unsuccessful campaign in Right-Bank Ukraine at the end of January and through February to April 1711. According to Mykola Krykun, the resettlement involved all the inhabitants of Right-Bank Ukraine (at least 200,000 people), including residents of the Southern Kyiv region and the territory

of the Bratslav palatinate on the left bank of the Buh (Southern) River (approximately 18,000 sq. km.). As a result of this deportation operation, which encompassed most of the local population, the lands of the Bratslav region east of the Boh were depopulated.²¹ Therefore, it took many years to restore the demographic potential of the region.

The forced resettlement of the local population from the Right Bank coincided with the death of the bishop of Lviv Iosyf Shumlians'kyi in July 1708 and the ascent to the Uniate metropolitan throne in 1714 of the energetic Lev Kyshka (1714–28). All these factors ultimately made possible the establishment in the next few years of the Union in Right-Bank Ukraine and the return of parishes in the Kyiv (Zhytomyr and Ovruch counties) and, in part, Bratslav palatinates to the metropolitan archeparchy, no longer Orthodox, but Uniate. The first step in instituting the pastoral jurisdiction of the Uniate metropolitan Lev Kyshka on the territory of Right-Bank Ukraine was the appointment of Ovruch archimandrite Fr. Klementii Domarads'kyi as the vicar general (*ofitsial*) of the Ukrainian part of the archeparchy.²² The transition of the clergy living in the Kyiv palatinate under the jurisdiction of Kyshka, which automatically meant the recognition of the supremacy of the Holy See, took place rather quickly and without apparent excesses, beginning in 1714 and ending the following year. Not later than December 1714, Metropolitan Lev Kyshka also established control over the town of Radomyshl, the administrative center of the eparchial properties the Kyiv metropolitanate in Polisia.²³ The year 1715 is named as the date of the proclamation of the Union in the Kyiv region in the “Life of Kyshka.” His biographer drew special attention to the fact that the metropolitan personally received local vicars-archpriests into the bosom of the Ruthenian Catholic Church.²⁴ Thus began the regional tradition of the Zhytomyr Union of 1715, which became the basis of the ecclesiastical and sociocultural identity of the Kyiv Uniate archeparchy in Right-Bank Ukraine.²⁵

The administrative center of the Uniate Church in the Kyiv region was originally the Ovruch Archimandry, whose archimandrite secretly entered into communion with the Holy See as far back as in March 1681. All Ovruch archimandrites in the first quarter of the eighteenth century simultaneously became vicars general of the Uniate metropolitan in the Kyiv palatinate. In August 1722, this office was assumed “according to the custom and rules of the Holy Eastern Church” by the Basilian priest, Andrii Benets'kyi, the Economos of the properties of the Volodymyr-Brest eparchy.²⁶ Benets'kyi was soon appointed (no later than 1727) also the vicar general of the Kyiv archiepharchy (“official metropolii Kijowskiei”) – and court records of the Kyiv castle court mention him as a strong defender of the rights of the Ruthenian clergy from the oppression of the local nobility.²⁷

The final institutional approval of the Union in the Kyiv palatinate is associated with the synod of the clergy of the Kyiv archeparchy in Zhytomyr on 14–16 September 1727 – probably the first such assembly of priests in Right-Bank Ukraine in the eighteenth century.²⁸ The acts of the synod (“Synodus Zyto-mirensis”) attest that its main purpose was the reception at the local level of the decrees of the Zamostia (Zamość) provincial synod of 1720 by the “omnes decanatus” of “soboru Kijowskiego” (Kyiv council), as well as the cultivation of a new Uniate identity among the vicars and parish clergy (all the participants in the synod made the Catholic profession of faith).²⁹ It is noteworthy that only priests of the Kyiv chapter-officialate (in the terminology of the time – the *sobor* [church council]) attended the Zhytomyr synod – no clergymen from the neighboring Bratslav cathedral chapter-officialate were present. Needless to say, this proves that the Bratslav region in the late twenties of the eighteenth century was not directly subject to the jurisdiction of Lev Kyshka as an ordinary of the Kyiv metropolitan archeparchy but was under the pastoral care of Lviv Uniate bishop Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi.

The 23rd decree of the Zhytomyr Synod of 1727 warned priests “that [none of them] should dare turn to ineligible pastors for ordination as presbyter.”³⁰ This may indicate attempts by the Uniate hierarchy not only to eliminate competition from the Orthodox, but also to minimize the vigorous pastoral activity in the region under the jurisdiction of Sheptyts'kyi, who ordained dozens of new priests here, thus taking control over more and more parishes that previously belonged to Kyiv’s Saint Sophia see. Some sources describe the difficulties faced by Metropolitan Lev Kyshka in extending his spiritual jurisdiction to the Kyiv palatinate. For example, one of the court acts of the Radomyshl consistory from 1739 deals with Fr Avraam Skoruta, who failed to comply with the “decree of Metropolitan Kyshka from 1728.”³¹

The Institutional Confessionalization of the Region and the Formation of the Right-Bank Model of *Slavia Unita*

An important means of forming a new Uniate identity in Right-Bank Ukraine was the institutional confessionalization³² of the Ruthenian community in the region, which called for, first and foremost, close cooperation between the Church and local secular authorities – namely, palatinate and county administrations, dietines, town councils, parish patrons (primarily the nobility), and the military administration. No less important were religious instruction and the codification of the experience of faith, the disciplining of ritual practices, the existence of a relatively hermetic territorial space (“geographical isolate”) designed to prevent

contacts between Ruthenian Catholics and Orthodox, and the use of effective tools of administrative and pastoral control over the life of the local Christianity community and the activity of Church organizations. Among the most successful methods of social disciplining in Right-Bank Ukraine in the 1730s–50s were general visitations, eparchial councils of the clergy, the metropolitan consistory, and the ecclesiastical court.

In their efforts to consolidate the union in Right-Bank Ukraine, Kyiv metropolitans usually relied on the support of the local nobility. A striking example of the confessionalization of their regional policy is the order of Teofila Jabłonowska, née Sieniawska, dated 14 May 1733, concerning the founding of a “chapel or church” (most likely of the Latin rite) in her “Ukrainian hereditary estate” Lysianka. The document demonstrates the clearly denominational basis of Jabłonowska’s initiative, which discursively echoed the then exclusivist policy of the Roman Church. The noblewoman gives as her motive for founding a Catholic church not only “the proliferation of the praise of God” among the local nobility and Polish garrisons, but also “the education of the Ruthenian clergy, which is very ignorant,” and the conversion of the Ruthenian clergy to “holy union, the eradication of errors and schismatic opposition.”³³

Under Lev Kyshka’s successor on the metropolitan throne, Atanasii Sheptyts’kyi (1729–46), there was, on the one hand, further integration of the parishes and vicariates in the Bratslav and Kyiv palatinates into the metropolitan archeparchy and the Uniate Church in general, and, on the other, their closer institutional and spiritual connection with the organizational structures of the Lviv eparchy. This was greatly facilitated by two large-scale general visitations by the Kyiv cathedral chapter-officialate, conducted in 1738–42 and 1746–47, and the creation circa 1730 of a shared consistory and ecclesiastical court for the Lviv and Kyiv eparchies. Despite the administrative registration in the late 1720s to early 1730s of Uniate parishes in Right-Bank Ukraine as part of the Kyiv cathedral chapter-officialate, they continued to be dependent on the Lviv episcopal see. In the period from 1730 to 1746, priests from the Kyiv region, together with the clergy of Bratslav region, attended yearly eparchial councils of the Lviv eparchy, which were held in the Univ archimandry³⁴ at that time (their decisions were also binding on the territory of the metropolitan archeparchy³⁵), litigated cases in the Lviv ecclesiastical court, and received various orders from the Lviv general consistory.³⁶

The first pastoral inspection by Atanasii Sheptyts’kyi in Right-Bank Ukraine was taking place from November 1739 to January 1742. At that time, the Uniate churches in Polisia were inspected.³⁷ The next stage of this large-scale operation was the visitation in 1740–41 of the Kyiv vicar general Hedeon Kozubs’kyi and the Zhytomyr vicar Fr. Ivan Sledkevych of ten more Uniate vicariates.³⁸ This time,

however, the inspection of the Uniate churches was not completed, because, according to the visitators, “the haidamaks appeared” in Terekhtemyriv, and there was “only danger in the wild fields all the way beyond the Smila [River], in the direction of Chyhyryn” in the Moshny vicariate.³⁹ Five years later, in the period from November 1746 to February 1747, an inspection of “Ukrainian vicariates” was led by the vicar general of the Kyiv archeparchy, Fr. Iustyn Iliashevych. This visitation covered most of the Kyiv cathedral chapter-officialate and ended after the death of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi. Interestingly, it was conducted at the “request of the hereditary landlords of Ukrainian estates and the founders and patrons of churches, as well as pious people from the communities.”⁴⁰

The earliest information about the vicarial structure of the Kyiv Uniate archeparchy in Right-Bank Ukraine dates back to 1722, when the *Register of Priests of the Kyiv Metropolitan Diocese* (Komput Kapłanów w Dyecezyi Metropol[italney] Kijowsk[iey]) was compiled. According to this register, 227 Uniate parishes were under the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Lev Kyshka at the time (of which 31 were vacant), covering the territory of Barashiv (23 parishes), Bilyliv (16), Bila Tserkva (35), Dymer (22), Korostyshiv (23), Lysianka-Korsun-Moshny (29), Ovruch (32), Pavoloch (former Fastiv) (44), and Chudniv (53) deanaries.⁴¹ As this list shows, they were all located in the Kyiv palatinate. A similar administrative-territorial structure of the Kyiv cathedral chapter-officialate also existed in August 1728, that is, shortly before the death of Kyshka and the transfer of the metropolitan throne to the bishop of Lviv Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi. The *Clergy Register of the Kyiv Archieparchy* (*Elenchus Parochorum Diaecesis Kijovien[sis]*), discovered in the last volume of Lev Kyshka's *Diary*, records 15 Uniate vicariates in the Kyiv region, numbering a total of 403 Uniate parishes, which is one and a half times more than there had been only six years earlier.⁴² As in the previous document, this register also makes no mention of any church from the territory of the Bratslav palatinate within the boundaries of the Kyiv Uniate eparchy.

The vicarial structure of the Kyiv cathedral chapter-officialate was reformed at the Univ Synod of 1738 on the initiative of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi. At that time, the network of Uniate vicariates in Right-Bank Ukraine (excluding the Bratslav region) was determined to consist of 21 vicariates.⁴³ On the eve of his death, Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi sent the Holy See a report, dated 15 August 1746, on the canonical status of the Kyiv archeparchy. According to this account, at that time the Uniate Church on the territory of Right-Bank Ukraine comprised 17 Uniate vicariates with 580 parishes located in the Kyiv palatinate.⁴⁴ As in the Bratslav region, intensive development of the parish network was underway on the territory of the Kyiv palatinate in the first half of the eighteenth century. An example of the successful establishment of new Ukrainian churches is the history of the

founding of the Church of St Michael the Archangel in the village of Dorohynka in the Fastiv vicariate, which is currently an exhibit in the Museum of Folk Architecture and Life of Ukraine in Kyiv.⁴⁵

The pastoral and administrative activities of Kyiv metropolitans Lev Kyshka and Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi in Right-Bank Ukraine were aimed at modernizing and confessionalizing local Ruthenian society, which made possible the formation of the regional Kyiv-Bratslav model of the *Slavia Unita*⁴⁶ – a new cultural and religious identity of Ruthenian Uniates in Right-Bank Ukraine. This model envisaged, first of all, a search for an elastic balance between the Catholic “face” of the Kyiv archeparchy and its Slavic-Byzantine heritage. This allowed the Uniate Church, on the one hand, to remain part of the region’s Ukrainian society, and, on the other, to recognize its belonging to universal Christianity.

The political result of this ecclesiastical model was the identification (occidentalization) of the Uniate Church with the culture and social structure of the Sarmatian Commonwealth (figuratively speaking, the borders of the Kyiv metropolitanate coincided with the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian confederation). On the other hand, this involved legislative and actual restrictions for both Orthodox and Uniates of their religious, cultural, and economic contacts with the Muscovite (Russian) state (above all, with Left-Bank Ukraine) and the southern territories, which were within the sphere of influence of the Ottoman Porte (in particular, Wallachia and Moldavia). “Technically,” the confessionalization of the Uniate Church was modeled on the reformation experience of post-Tridentine Latin Christianity, while mentally it was rooted in the then ongoing discourse of the Kyivan Christian tradition in its Catholic reading.

The institutional and spiritual basis of the Ruthenian Uniate revival was the Basilian order.⁴⁷ The Uniate monks managed to codify their almost century-old experience of living in communion with Rome and to define a new ideal of monastic piety. It was the Basilians who in the period under study formed the Uniate identity, playing a major role in the development by the spiritual elite of the “strategy of absorption” of the codes of the culture of the time. One of the most striking examples of the success of this ecclesiastical model was the appearance in Right-Bank Ukraine of a large network of almost forty Basilian monasteries (including in Kaniv, Liubar, Ovruch, and Uman) and collegiums and seminaries that they maintained, where the children of poor nobility and townspeople and the sons of priests studied.⁴⁸

In the first half of the eighteenth century, the model of the *Slavia Unita* in the Kyiv and Bratslav regions was generally focused on preserving its Eastern Christian identity (“Ruthenian antiquity”) and developing its role as a representative of the local Ruthenian ethno-denominational community. Another

source that nurtured the Uniate identity of the Kyiv archeparchy consisted of the Latin “innovations” that were gradually and almost imperceptibly to one generation introduced at various institutional levels. The appearance of “innovations” was due not only to the need to codify the new experience of existence in communion with the Holy See and the pressure of the Latin-rite adherents, but also the historical development of Christian culture at that time. A striking example of the Radomyshl Consistory’s use of new means of evangelization, borrowed from the Latin tradition, was the introduction by Metropolitan Lev Sheptyts'kyi in the Kyiv archeparchy in 1777 of the Christian greeting of “Praised be Jesus Christ!” (“Laudetur Jesus Christus!”) as an effective practice of social disciplining the faithful.⁴⁹

In contrast to the Belarusian-Lithuanian territories, Volhynia, and the Kholm (Chełm) region, the structure of the Uniate identity of the Ruthenians of Right-Bank Ukraine was not dominated by elements of Latin denominational emblems (Eucharistic adoration, papal indulgences, way of the cross, low masses, and so forth). This regional model of *Slavia Unita* was markedly dominated by “Ruthenian antiquity,” which had very blurred boundaries with the Orthodox subculture of the time and demonstrated opposition to the “cultural imperialism” of the Roman Catholic Church. The Kyiv-Bratslav *Slavia Unita* evinced limited acceptance of the “codes” of Polish Latin culture, although it underwent in-depth occidentalization in the late Baroque period,⁵⁰ including through the mediation of Rome, where a large part of the spiritual elite of the Uniate Church received its theological education and had its worldview shaped in papal colleges.

Intercultural Communication and the Problem of the Common Sociocultural Space of “Divided Rus”

The sources of the time (I mean primarily official documents of the Kyiv and Pereiaslav Orthodox and Radomyshl Uniate consistories) clearly indicate the limited nature of the measures taken by the Kyiv archeparchy to confessionalize the Ruthenian society of Right-Bank Ukraine. Despite the persistence of the Church administration, there is an absence of clear jurisdictional and denominational barriers in private and even institutional contacts between representatives of the Orthodox and Uniate clergy. To understand this phenomenon, let us turn to the paradigm popularized by the German scholar Thomas Kaufmann.⁵¹ He emphasizes the importance of shifting the emphasis in the study of the phenomenon of confessionalization to such ecclesiastical concepts as transconfessionalism, interconfessionalism, and intraconfessional pluralism (in the original: *Interkonfessionalität – Transkonfessionalität – binnenkonfessionelle Pluralität*). This approach, applied to the Kyiv archeparchy, opens up prospects for the inclusion in scholarly

discourse of “invisible” to traditional history processes, which include interconfessional education and the mutual adaptation (inclusion) of different church communities in cultural exchange and interdenominational communication.⁵²

If we critically examine the concept of the “conflictology” of Orthodox-Uniate relations that has dominated for more than a century,⁵³ we will actually see the absence of distinct clear confessional barriers between the Ruthenians of the Orthodox and Uniate faiths in the “confessional” eighteenth century. We see evidence of this in the diary of Vasyl' Hryhorovych-Bars'kyi,⁵⁴ a student of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, who visited Lviv in 1723 on his way to the holy places of the Middle East. In July 1723, together with his friend, student Iustyn Lennyts'kyi, Bars'kyi suddenly left the academy without completing his studies and entered Lviv's Jesuit college. In Lviv, the Jesuits treated both travelers as “Orthodox schismatics” from the “Kyiv forests”⁵⁵ and expelled them from this educational institution. However, in their meetings with local Ruthenians Vasyl' Bars'kyi and his companion demonstrated flexibility in social behavior and ecclesiastical practice.

Both students were well-disposed toward not only ordinary Ruthenians in Lviv, but also toward the highest representatives of the Uniate clergy. Sincere human gratitude and warmth flow from Bars'kyi's description of his visit to St George's Cathedral and personal meetings with Bishop Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi and senior Church officials of the Lviv Uniate eparchy.⁵⁶ Bars'kyi's accounts of his participation in Uniate divine services, confession by the superior of the Basilian monastery, visits to the relics of Saint Ioann Sochavs'kyi in Zhovkva, the Basilian monastery in Krekhiv, and a joint pilgrimage with a “widowed Uniate priest” to Rome do not fit into the modern denominational paradigm of “Uniate-Orthodox confrontation” in the eighteenth century. Moreover, they eloquently testify to the universality of the Kyiv Christian tradition and openness to dialogue between representatives of different ecclesiastical jurisdictions, which in the recent past had formed a single metropolitanate.

Recent studies⁵⁷ about the territorial origins of students of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in the second quarter of the eighteenth century attest that it has not been possible, at least at this time, to turn the Kyiv archeparchy into a denominationally hermetic isolate of the Uniate hierarchy. Thus, a quarter of all students of the Mohyla Academy were natives of the Commonwealth, among whom the inhabitants of the Bratslav, Podilia, and Ruthenian palatinates predominated. Moreover, students from these regions far outnumbered the students of the Zamość Academy. Interestingly, some of these “emigrants” were lay people and came from priestly families or belonged to the nobility.⁵⁸

The mutual inclusion of different Church communities in cultural exchange and interdenominational communication in Right-Bank Ukraine was facilitated by the activities of the Kyiv and Pereiaslav Orthodox consistories, which exerted

significant influence on the spiritual life of the local Christian community (both laity and clergy). This influence is very clearly reflected in the legal cases of the Kyiv archeparchy's consistory deposited in this consistory's oldest record book for 1737–41. Contributing to the quite intensive contacts between the priests who were under the jurisdiction of the Uniate metropolitan and the Kyiv Orthodox see was the absence among the majority of the parish clergy in Right-Bank Ukraine (at least in the first half of the eighteenth century) of a clear confessional identity. This made it possible to maintain, and often nurture, personal and institutional ties between the Uniate clergy and the Orthodox on the other side of the Dnipro River. Pilgrimages to Kyiv (in particular to the Cave Monastery) were especially popular among the laity and parish clergy.⁵⁹

A striking example of such contacts and ideas is the case of a priest from the Church of St Nicholas the Wonderworker in Chudniv, Fr. Avraam Skoruta (Skoruta), which was litigated in the metropolitan's court in January 1739. As it turned out, Fr. Skoruta publicly ignored the religious and administrative prerogatives of the primate of the Uniate Church, Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi. He did not take part in the vicarial councils (*soborhyky*) of the Uniate clergy of the Chudniv deanery; did not obtain the Holy Myrrh blessed by the Uniate metropolitan; threatened his immediate superior, the vicar of Chudniv; "schismatized by looking for a parish in Kyiv for himself"; ignored fulfilling pastoral instructions and the consistory's summons to appear in the ecclesiastical court; urged local priests to transfer under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv; and, finally, left his parish for a long time and "pastored the Muscovites."⁶⁰

Court records also document manifestations of denominational Orthodox consciousness in some Right-Bank parishes, which were part of the Kyiv Uniate archeparchy. For example, in 1737, Fr. Iosyf Vakulenko, a parish priest from Ostroh, reviled another priest with "obscene words, calling [him] a cursed Uniate," and publicly denied the Catholic dogma of *Filioque*.⁶¹ That same year, another priest, Fr. Vasyli Andriievs'kyi, accused the founder of one of the churches that "[he] took in a Uniate dog [to the parish]."⁶² According to another court case, part of the clergy refused to include "Uniate innovations" in religious services. Thus Fr. Moisei Leontovych, a parish priest of Slobidka (Sloboda), was summoned to the spiritual court

for conducting church services not in the manner required, for not praying to God for his archpastor during the Divine Liturgy but for a foreign one instead; for keeping a foreign antimins and conducting services on it and hiding away the antimins of his own [Uniate] archpastor; for calling his

archpastor a cursed Uniate,” as well as for the practice of the “closing of the Royal Doors” during the Divine Liturgy, causing “the Romans discomfort.”⁶³

Another priest, Fr Ivan Iosyfenko, parish priest of Husachivka, was accused by the court of refusing to obtain the Holy Myrrh from the Uniate dean, of ignoring calls to attend *soborhyky* (minor councils) of the clergy, and of welcoming Orthodox clergy in his parish.⁶⁴

In the second half of the 1730s, even the mid-level clergy of the administrative office of the Uniate Church in Right-Bank Ukraine avoided close institutional ties with their primate – Metropolitan Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi. In particular, the Horodyshche parish priest and Smila archpriest, Fr. Ivan, was suspected by the consistory of allegedly “calling union with the Roman Church cursed” and that “[he] made a list of parishioners who would move beyond the Muscovite border.”⁶⁵

The above examples of opposition to the cultural-religious model of *Slavia Unita* and open-type interdenominational pluralism require a deeper analysis of the internal processes of differentiation in the Ruthenian society of Right-Bank Ukraine, where the development of exclusivist tendencies was limited by a geographical factor – the presence of the Great Frontier.⁶⁶ These factors directly influenced the emergence of local confessional identities tied to a territory that did not always coincide in the historical context of Bratslav and Kyiv regions with ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Instead, the particular nature of the formation of the regional version of *Slavia Unita* during the eighteenth century was due to the incompleteness of the confessionalization of “parish civilization,” which did not allow the Uniate spiritual elite to build a closed confessional community with a distinct Ruthenian Catholic identity. In the end, this made it possible to preserve the unity of Kyivan Christianity, at least at the level of the laity and the parish clergy.

From the Eucharistic Model to Territorial Administration: Sacred Space of the Bratslav and Southern Kyiv Regions and Territorial Patriotism

In the first half of the eighteenth century, there was an attempt by the then Uniate hierarchy to implement a broader program of the “civilizational development” of the vast expanses of “Ukraine” – the Bratslav and Southern Kyiv regions, which were being intensively colonized at that time⁶⁷ – as well as in-depth Christianization of the local, mostly Ukrainian in origin, population, in accordance with

the *Slavia Unita* confessional model. Given the political realities of the time, until the beginning of the 1760s, the Uniate Church in Right-Bank Ukraine did not actually experience significant competition from Orthodox Church structures, usually enjoying the support of the royal court and the magnate class in its missionary plans. Thus, the only competitors for control over the local Eastern-Christian communities in these areas were the Uniate hierarchs – the Lviv bishops and Kyiv metropolitans.

Regardless of the personal initiative and pastoral efforts of the bishops, the organized measures taken by their consistories to discipline the Ruthenians, and the support of the founders of Uniate parishes, the territory of the Bratslav and Southern Kyiv regions during the first half of the eighteenth century was quickly covered by a dense network of new churches and settlements. During this period, no other Latin, Orthodox, or Uniate eparchy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth underwent such dynamic development of the parish network and growth of the size of its flock. Both the Saint George see of Lviv and the Radomyshl metropolitan consistory were equally eager to take control of this impressive process of “spontaneous evangelization” of Right-Bank Ukraine, because it made it possible to radically increase the number of their subordinate congregations and clergy and significantly replenish their church treasuries, whose main source of cash revenue was the cathedra⁶⁸ (*katedratyk*) paid annually by parish priests.

The institutional consolidation of the Uniate Church in Right-Bank Ukraine in the 1710s–30s was accompanied by the “return” of the Lviv eparchy to the Southern Kyiv and Bratslav regions. The Saint George’s see established itself in the Bratslav region after a pastoral visitation in 1723–24, and this large-scale “absorption” of the region was legitimized by the Synod of Zamostia (Zamość) in 1720. At this assembly, Metropolitan Kyshka placed the Bratslav and some Kyiv vicariates under the temporary jurisdiction of Bishop Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi of Lviv, primarily because of the practical pastoral needs of the Uniate Church in Right-Bank Ukraine, where an intensive spontaneous colonization was taking place with the participation of the population of the predominantly Slavic-Byzantine rite.

After the death in December 1746 of Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi, the bishop of Lviv and metropolitan of Kyiv, the temporary administrator of the Lviv eparchy, Bishop Onufrii Shumlians'kyi of Peremyshl, at the request of the Roman Curia, took a number of practical measures to return the Bratslav region to the metropolitan see.⁶⁸ In his practical activity, Shumlians'kyi had to take into account the sentiments of Saint George’s see, because the Lviv spiritual elite did not want to hear about the loss of part of what they considered to be their sacred (canonical) space. On 4 June 1750, the new bishop of Lviv, Lev Sheptyts'kyi, succeeded in obtaining a declaration from the Tribunal of the Apostolic Nunciature

in Warsaw prohibiting the metropolitan “to perform any jurisdictional acts in future concerning these decanates.” The Nunciature Tribunal indirectly sided with the bishop of Lviv by issuing a decree in his favor on 27 February 1751, temporarily removing the primate of the Ruthenian Church from administering the Bratslav region.⁶⁹

In seeking the return of the Bratslav region to the Lviv eparchy, Lev Sheptyts'kyi did not miss the opportunity to point out the geographical realities of Right-Bank Ukraine, which, in his opinion, made it difficult for the metropolitan of Kyiv to take pastoral care of local Uniate communities: “the [Bratslav] decanates in question are located at a distance of almost three hundred Polish miles from the residence of the current metropolitan.”⁷⁰ According to Church statistics, this involved about five hundred churches, which formed the parish network of the Kyiv archeparchy in the middle of the eighteenth century.⁷¹

To confirm his rights to the Bratslav region, the bishop of Lviv somewhat unexpectedly turned to the text of the then famous Prince Lev Danylovych's founding charter of the Dormition Cathedral in Halych in 1301.⁷² The arguments of the canonists of the metropolitanate curia, sent to the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, are unique evidence of the legal consciousness of the Uniate elite of the day and their various “techniques” of articulating their Church-historical memory of the Princely Era to achieve quite pragmatic goals.⁷³

Lev Sheptyts'kyi began to take practical administrative measures to retain the disputed territory. The first such step was Sheptyts'kyi's invitation of the vicars of the Bratslav region to his first post-enthronement eparchial synod, which took place in Perehynsk on 6–15 May 1750. Five of the then ten Bratslav region's vicars took part in it.⁷⁴ In addition to coercive measures, Sheptyts'kyi used his broad ordination privileges to influence the clergy of the Bratslav region. The bishop took any opportunity to confer the Sacrament of Holy Orders on candidates from this region, without documenting these prelatric acts in the records of the Lviv consistory because of the prohibition of the Holy See.⁷⁵

Despite the mobilization of all his resources in Podilia and Right-Bank Ukraine, Lev Sheptyts'kyi gradually lost his influence among the clergy of the Bratslav vicariate (*krylos*). This is clearly evidenced by the content of his pastoral letter of 10 January 1752. As we learn from the letter, at that time, all thirteen vicars of the Bratslav cathedral chapter had already transferred under the metropolitan's jurisdiction and ignored Sheptyts'kyi's order to come to Nemyriv to swear obedience to Bishop Lev.⁷⁶ Thus the pastoral and administrative efforts and lawsuits of Lev (Sheptyts'kyi) were unrewarded by success. He was forced to recognize the loss of the Bratslav *krylos* both in fact and canonically. At the beginning of January 1754, the bishop of Lviv sent his Bratslav-Bar vicar general, Tymofii Matkovs'kyi,

the decree of the Roman Curia that the “decanates of the Bratslav palatinate” belonged to the Kyivan metropolitanate to be publicly announced to the local clergy and laity. Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter of 8 January 1754 emphasized the recognition of the decision of the Holy See, to integrate the Bratslav region into the Kyivan metropolitanate.⁷⁷

Another contender for the Bratslav region was the metropolitan see, which substantiated its rights to the region with both canonical and historical arguments, as well as by practical administrative measures to take control of this region.⁷⁸ The official transfer of the metropolitan's residence from the distant town of Vilnius to Radomyshl in Kyivan Polisia, where the administration of the extensive estates of the primate of the Ruthenian Church were located, helped to strengthen the position of the Kyiv metropolitan as the ruling ordinary of his eparchy in Right-Bank Ukraine.⁷⁹ The metropolitan consistory, and the office of the Kyiv vicar general were also transferred to Radomyshl.⁸⁰

The record-books of the metropolitan consistory in Radomyshl (*Acta Consistorialia*), in which the administrative orders and other pastoral activities of the primate of the Uniate Church, Florian Hrebnyts'kyi (1747–62) were recorded, reveal the great attention devoted to the Bratslav region by the metropolitan's officials. Among the several hundred acts issued by Hrebnyts'kyi during the first four years of his pastorate, almost a third relate to the vicariates of the Bratslav officialate.⁸¹ In the years 1747–48 Hrebnyts'kyi, in order to enlist the support of the middle level of the administrative office of the Uniate Church in the Bratslav region, carried out a real “personnel revolution” in the region, removing most of the vicars appointed there at various times by Lviv prelates.⁸² Not trusting them, the metropolitan tried to install his personally devoted minions in the Bratslav region. A striking example of this new policy of the Radomyshl consistory was the high-profile case of the Rashkiv vicar Oleksii Nalyvaiko (Nalyvaichenko), who was deliberately removed from office by metropolitan officials, groundlessly accusing him of “various excesses.”⁸³

The decisive role in the assumption of control over the Bratslav region by the Kyiv metropolitan was played by the then bishop of Kholm, Pylyp Felitsian Volodkovych, whom Florian Hrebnyts'kyi appointed as his vicar general for Right-Bank Ukraine on 1 March 1751.⁸⁴ Volodkovych's activity shows that, like his opponent, the Lviv bishopric, the metropolitan curia used “pastoral coercion” and outright violence to take complete control of the Bratslav region. In particular, the real “fights without rules” were revealed at a meeting of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in May 1753, as a result of a petition from the Lviv bishop. Sheptyts'kyi, among other things, complained about Volodkovych's brutal actions against his Bar-Bratslav vicar general Tymofii Matkovs'kyi.⁸⁵ Despite the accusa-

tions of violence made against his officials, Metropolitan Hrebnyts'kyi insisted to the Roman Curia that "with respect to the [Bratslav] decanates, he did everything properly and correctly, in accordance with the law and the norms of justice."⁸⁶ The largest-scale action to establish the real pastoral authority of the new metropolitan, Florian Hrebnyts'kyi, in Right-Bank Ukraine was the general visitation of 1750–53. The inspection of the Uniate churches was announced by the metropolitan on 2 January 1750, and the consistory charged Fr Mykhailo Prymovych with conducting it.⁸⁷

The success of the Kyiv metropolitan in taking control of the Bratslav region and its real support by the local clergy and, most likely, by the laity, is evidenced by the opening, no later than the beginning of June 1753, of the Bratslav Uniate consistory (*Consistor[ia] Metropolitan[ana] Braclav[iensia]*), directly subordinate to Florian Hrebnyts'kyi. Throughout the second half of 1753 to the beginning of 1754, sources consistently record the appearance in Church usage of "*akt metropolitalnych braclawskich*,"⁸⁸ which laid the legal basis for the re-subordination of the local clergy and faithful to the Bratslav vicar general. An analysis of entries in the record-book of the ecclesiastical court of the Radomyshl Uniate consistory for 1754–56 provide convincing evidence that at that time the parish clergy of the Bratslav cathedral chapter were completely controlled by the metropolitan's officials, headed by Felitsian Volodkovych. It was in the consistory books of Radomyshl, and not Lviv, that the priests of the Bratslav region entered their ordination references, erection charters, ordination certificates, acts of assignment to a parish (*stavleni hramoty*), and other documents.⁸⁹

Evidence of the fact that the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Florian Hrebnyts'kyi extended over the whole territory of the Bratslav region was the participation of all thirteen vicars of the Bratslav cathedral chapter-officialate in the eparchial synod of the clergy of the Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates in Radomyshl on 5 June 1754.⁹⁰ Public support for the idea of the jurisdictional resubordination of the Bratslav region is attested to by the statement of the clergy of the Bratslav cathedral chapter-officialate in 1755, bearing the signatures of parish priests and vicars, about their desire to remain under the omophorion of the Kyiv archpastors, and not the Lviv bishops. The de facto refusal of the Uniate clergy to obey the bishop of Lviv⁹¹ opened the way to the ultimate transition of the Bratslav region under the control of the Radomyshl consistory. This territory remained part of the metropolitan archeparchy until the official liquidation of the Union in Right-Bank Ukraine at the end of the eighteenth century.

The territorial confrontation between the Lviv eparchy and the metropolitan throne in 1747–54 did not mean the creation of a visible dividing line between the two ecclesiastical jurisdictions in the Bratslav region that changed its configuration

depending on an increase in influence of one or the other of the parties to the conflict in the region. In fact, as an analysis of sources shows, the dividing line ran between individual parishes, vicars, priests, founders, and even lay persons. Therefore, the assumption of control of a microregion by Hrebnyts'kyi or Sheptyts'kyi depended on a number of subjective factors – the position of the local nobility and the activity of the townspeople and Church brotherhoods. However, probably the major role was played by the personal relations of the parish clergy with their pastor, which were manifested in their receiving from him ordination to the priesthood, nomination and installation charters, antimins for the altar of a given church, and so forth.

Also important were the support of the parish founder for the parish priest's choice of "his" hierarchy, as well as the jurisdictional orientation of the vicars-archpriests, on whom the village pastors depended administratively, inasmuch as the vicars provided them with the Holy Myrrh, informed them of the instructions of the supreme ecclesiastical authority, and provided the means of internal communication and consolidation of the local priesthood. Ultimately, these were the factors that created the ambivalence of hierarchical control over the Bratslav region, wherein the same clergymen were simultaneously subject to different Uniate bishops. Until the final decision of the Roman Curia in 1754, this made it impossible to resolve the territorial conflict solely by means of "pastoral coercion."

To support Metropolitan Hrebnyts'kyi, some hereditary landlords (founders) of parishes provided ordination references for candidates loyal to the metropolitan.⁹² Sheptyts'kyi's supporters did the same, providing ordination references for him for clerics loyal to the Lviv bishop. It is in such letters of recommendation ("formats") that we come across rare, but extremely intriguing public declarations by the nobility of Right-Bank Ukraine of a kind of regional patriotism.⁹³ Thus, Felitsian of Bezhyn Bezhynski, the steward of Ovruch, in sending ordination reference to Lev Sheptyts'kyi in 1750 for a candidate for the vacant church of Saint Michael the Archangel in the town of Shavulykha of the Uman vicariate, treats the territory on which the parish he founded is located as land that "from long ago has been part of the Bratslav eparchy of the Greek-Roman-Uniate rite." At the same time, identifying the same territory in the categories of the state administrative system, the nobleman Bezhyns'kyi denies its inclusion in the Bratslav palatinate, locating Shavulykha "in the palatinate and county of Kyiv."⁹⁴

The confrontation during the period from 1747 to 1754 was a good opportunity for the local nobility and clergy to "recall" their particular historical tradition, and in the event of its absence, to construct a new narrative about the region's past. This ecclesiastical-historical memory not only served the intellectual needs of the "official" version of the status of the Bratslav region – confirming the rights

of Lviv or Radomyshl to disputed vicariates – but also, regardless of the intention of its authors, fueled local territorial patriotism.

Thanks to the acts of the Roman Curia, we know much more about the position of the part of the Bratslav nobility that supported Lev Sheptyts'kyi. It was with the help of the local nobility that the bishop of Lviv gained a favorable attitude toward his territorial claims among the magnates, at the royal court, and, in part, in the Warsaw nunciature.⁹⁵

At first, the Bratslav conflict did not arouse much interest in the Holy See, which hoped that its participants would come to a mutual understanding on their own. When this did not happen, the case was referred to the Tribunal of the Warsaw Nunciature. On 27 February 1751, the auditor-general of the Holy See and its ordinary judge, Flavius Chisius, publicly announced for the first time that “Metropolitan of Rus' Florian Hrebnyts'kyi presented his claims to the Bratslav decanate in the Kamianets eparchy, which is rightfully governed by the Bishop of Lviv and Kamianets Lev Sheptyts'kyi.”⁹⁶ The trial of the “Bratslav case” in the Tribunal of the Warsaw Nunciature began with the fact that Metropolitan Hrebnyts'kyi was forbidden to independently assume jurisdiction over the disputed Bratslav cathedral chapter. However, in the course of the trial, the court came to a preliminary conclusion that Sheptyts'kyi did not have “valid legal or factual proof” of his right to administer this region, since “the current metropolitan and his predecessors had for many centuries – either themselves or through someone else of their choice – controlled [these] decanates and churches.”⁹⁷ On the basis of the decision of the Apostolic Nunciature in Warsaw, in early December 1751, all the vicariates of the Bratslav region were transferred “to the true, obvious, and actual possession of our Kyiv metropolitan see, to which they have belonged for centuries.”⁹⁸

Not satisfied with this, the metropolitan consistory in Radomyshl sought to transfer the “case of the Bratslav decanates” out of the hands of the Tribunal of the Apostolic Nunciature directly to the Roman Curia.⁹⁹ The Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith first pronounced its verdict in September 1751.¹⁰⁰ After a lengthy clarification of the circumstances of the conflict, the Roman cardinals held a meeting on 7 May 1753, specifically dedicated to the subject of “Kyiv jurisdiction.” At this meeting, it was decided to award the Bratslav region to the Kyiv metropolitan.¹⁰¹ The minutes of the meeting and its decrees, which were published in the 1950s by Fr. Atanasii (Velykyi), contain unique evidence of the ecclesiastical, historical, and cultural-civilizational arguments offered by the parties to the conflict to prove their rights to the Bratslav region. In addition to the then popular discourse about the genesis of Christianity in Rus “around 990,” the document also presents a historical version of the appearance of the

organizational structure of the Eastern Church in Right-Bank Ukraine.¹⁰² In a letter to the papal nuncio in Warsaw, Alberico Archinto (1746–54), the Roman cardinals drew attention to the “appeal of the Bratslav people,” warning against possible “disorders between these people, resulting in disturbing confusion and disorder [*del tumulto frà quelle genti, e derivarne moleste confusioni, e discordini*].” The congregation instructed the nuncio to take practical measures to ensure the legal transfer of the “Bratslav decanates” under the administration of the Kyiv metropolitan.¹⁰³

Basically, the papal throne played a leading role in resolving the Bratslav territorial conflict. Despite some doubts and vacillation, it was the institutions of the See of Rome – the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith and the Warsaw Nunciature – that acted as the arbiters, whose legal and practical arguments proved acceptable to both sides. In the end, this made it possible to stabilize the situation in the region and establish cooperation between the largest Uniate eparchies in Ukraine at that time.

The struggle for the Bratslav region between the Lviv eparchy and the Radomyshl Uniate consistory and their transition to the jurisdiction of the Kyiv metropolitan in the middle of the eighteenth century attest to fairly radical changes in the then existing notions of geographical space, linear boundaries, and the role of the local hierarch, his court, and office in the organization of the territory. The traditional Eucharistic model emphasized the key role of the ruling hierarch in organizing the territory of the diocese. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, this model had to compete with modern and simultaneously denominational approaches and concepts. They were based on purely administrative approaches, and one of their main goals was to create confessionally hermetic “geographical isolates.” By the middle of the eighteenth century, as the course of the Bratslav conflict showed, these new ecclesiastical techniques of “organizing the territory” began to prevail. Now the eparchy to which a parish belonged was determined not so much by the inscription on the lintel of the church door about its consecration by the ruling hierarch, as by the presence of a local priest or parish church in some office register.

The ambivalent jurisdictional status of the Bratslav cathedral chapter, which was underscored by the territorial conflict of 1747–54, weakened the local clergy’s consciousness of their spiritual and sacramental unity with competing pastors – the metropolitan of Kyiv and the bishop of Lviv. The conflict also weakened the institutional ties of the Bratslav clergy with both the Saint George’s eparchy and the metropolitan see in Radomyshl. Both factors partly explain the fairly rapid spread of the Orthodox movement in Right-Bank Ukraine since the early

1760s and the transition of most Uniate parishes under the control of the Pereiaslav bishop.



On the whole, the Uniate hierarchy failed to realize the large-scale confessionalization process of Right-Bank Ukraine. During the eighteenth century, it was limited by the frontier status of the region and the dominance at the parish level of a common religious cultural code ("Kyiv-Christian tradition"), and in the second half of the century, it became impossible in light of the intensification of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire and Orthodox proselytism ("missionary action"). This did not allow the Uniate spiritual elite to build a closed denominational community with a distinct Ruthenian Catholic identity *Slavia Unita*. This circumstance obviously contributed to the preservation of the unity of Ruthenian Christian culture, at least at the level of the laity and the parish clergy.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

- 1 Drawing on the theories of Western scholars, who emphasized the need for a cultural interpretation of the history of world civilization, the concept of "religious culture" with regard to the history of Ukraine was popularized by Frank Sysyn (Frank E. Sysyn, "The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine* (Edmonton-Toronto, 2003), 1–22). In the apt words of Professor Iaroslav Isaievych, Ruthenian pre-modern culture presupposed "the coexistence and interaction of the remnants of the medieval heritage (Byzantine-Slavic and Western Neo-Scholasticism) and baroque learning (which retained much from the Renaissance), and finally the emergence of pre-Enlightenment ideology and the Enlightenment." See Iaroslav Isaievych, "Osnovy relihiinoho zhyttia i kul'tury na Ukraïni (do kintsia XVIII st.)," in *Belarus, Lithuania, Polonia, Ukraine: International Conference, Rome, 28 April – 6 May 1990* (Lublin-Rome, 1994), 171.
- 2 As shown by the pioneering studies of Professor Jacek Staszewski, the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising, the "Swedish Deluge," and the "Saxon period" did not represent only decline and regression. (We have in mind primarily such fundamental monographs as Jacek Staszewski, *August II Mocny* [Wrocław,

- 1998]; Idem, *August III Sas* [Wrocław 1989]; Idem, *Jak Polskę przemienić w kraj kwitnący... Studia i szkice z czasów saskich* [Olsztyn, 1997]; Idem, *O miejsce w Europie: Stosunki Polski i Saksonii z Francją na przełomie XVII i XVIII wieku* [Warsaw, 1973]).
- 3 The role of the Kyiv metropolitanate as the representative of the “Ruthenian nation” in the Polish-Lithuanian state is emphasized by Andrzej Gil and Ihor Skoczylas, *Kościół Wschodnie w państwie polsko-litewskim w procesie przemian i adaptacji: metropolia kijowska w latach 1458–1795* (Lublin-Lviv, 2014), 36–46, 49–56.
 - 4 One of the best synthetic surveys of the trends of the day in the religious life of Christian Europe was the collective work *Die Geschichte des Christentums: Religion–Politik–Kultur*, bd. 10 (Freiburg-Basel-Vienna, 2000), 233–86.
 - 5 This conclusion is based on the results of a large-scale research project initiated by the Institute for the Historical Geography of the Catholic Church in Poland of the Catholic University of Lublin that were presented at the International Conference of the Commission Internationale d’Histoire et d’Étude du Christianisme (CIEHC) in Lviv and Lublin in September 2007, see “Działalność naukowa IEŚW,” Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, accessed 6 November 2020, <http://www.iesw.lublin.pl/dzialalnosc.php#konau>. In the lands of the Polish Crown, Catholic churches of the Eastern rite also made up the majority, see statistical calculations in Bogumił Szady, *Geografia struktur religijnych i wyznaniowych w Koronie w II połowie XVIII wieku* (Lublin, 2010), 206.
 - 6 The latest summary of current scientific scholarly knowledge about the phenomenon of the union in Right-Bank Ukraine is the comprehensive essay by Mykhailo Dovbyshchenko, “Unii v Kyivs'komu ta Bratslavs'komu voievodstvakh Rechi Pospolytoï XVIII st. (zahal'nyi ohliad),” in *Arkhiv Ukraïns'koï Tserkvy*, series 1, *Doslidzhennia*, no. 1, *Istoriia Unii na Kyïvshchyni 1596–1839 rr.* (Lviv, 2011), 102–202.
 - 7 Sophia Senyk, “Religious Conflict in Dnepr Ukraine in the 18th Century,” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 73 (1) (2007): 19, 58.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, 20. In support of her reasoning, the author cites numerous examples of persecution of parish clergy by officials of Uniate bishops in Right-Bank Ukraine (*ibid.*, 21–3), which, however, are taken mainly from Orthodox sources and are very rarely compared with similar testimony of the Uniates (*ibid.*, 58–9).
 - 9 Mental cartography is defined as an abstract concept that encompasses the mental and spiritual abilities that enable us to collect, organize, recall, and process information about the surrounding space. See, for example, Roger M. Downs and David Stea, *Maps in Minds: Reflections on Cognitive Mapping*

- (New York, 1977); Edward C. Tolman, "Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men," *Psychological Review* 55 (1948): 189–208. According to one of the modern definitions, this paradigm should be interpreted as a person's subjective internal idea of a part of the surrounding space, which, however, may be inaccurate and distorted, see Juval Portugali, ed., *The Construction of Cognitive Maps* (Dordrecht, 1996).
- 10 The concept of Eucharistic ecclesiology has been best articulated by the modern Orthodox theologian: Kallistos (Ware), "The Church of God: Our Shared Vision," *Logos* 34, nos 1–2 (1993): 10–29.
 - 11 According to the ideas of the time, all the spiritual and administrative functions performed by the bishop were a manifestation of the communion and unity of the local Christian community, headed by the ruling local hierarchy. For more detail on this, see Ihor Skochyliias, "From Sacred Space to Administrative Model of Church Governing: The Organization of the Territory of the Halych (Lviv) Eparchy in the Medieval and Early Modern Period," in Andrzej Gil and Witold Bobryk, eds., *On the Border of the Worlds: Essays about the Orthodox and Uniate Churches in Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages and the Modern Period* (Siedlce-Lublin, 2010), 11–43. That such a model of the "organization" of sacred space also existed in Bratslav and Kyiv regions is evidenced by the church sources of the time used in the article. Charters of ordination for new priests, charters of appointment (installation) of priests in parishes, blessed antimins (altar cloths) for the altars of Uniate churches, and the Holy Myrrh received from the episcopal see were the external public sacred signs that determined the jurisdictional status of a particular parish and marked its geographical location within the organizational structure of the Kyiv Archeparchy.
 - 12 Barbara Skinner, *The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in Eighteenth-century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia* (DeKalb, Ill. 2009), 42–87. See also Idem, "Borderlands of Faith: Reconsidering the Origins of a Ukrainian Tragedy," *Slavic Review* 64, no. 1 (2005): 88–116.
 - 13 Larry Wolff, "The Uniate Church and the Partitions of Poland: Religious Survival in an Age of Enlightened Absolutism," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 26, nos 1–4 (2002–2003): 153–244.
 - 14 Skinner, *The Western Front of the Eastern Church*, 226–34.
 - 15 For greater detail on this, see Ihor Skochyliias, "Nychia terytorii': iurysdyktsiinyi status i suspil'no-pravove stanovyshche Kyivs'koï pravoslavnoi mytropoliï na Pravoberezhnii Ukraïni (1675–1715 roky)," in Ivan Mazepa i mazedpyntsi: istoriia ta kul'tura Ukraïny ostann'oï tretyny XVII–pochatku XVIII stolit'. *Naukovi zbirnyk* (Lviv, 2011), 167–82.
 - 16 *Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukraïny im. V. I. Vernads'koho*

(Manuscript Institute of the National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – IR NBU), f. XVIII, no. 143, ark. 1. The prelude to the rebellion was the constitution of the Diet of June 1699 on abolishing the “Cossack militia” in Right-Bank Ukraine. Without waiting for the reaction of the Cossacks, the army of the Polish Crown soon captured a number of cities in the region. See Taras Chukhlib, *Kozats'kyi ustrii Pravoberezhnoi Ukraïny (ostannia chvert' XVII st.)* (Kyiv, 1996), 23–4, 64.

- 17 Tat'iana G. Tairova-Iakovleva, ed., *Getman Ivan Mazepa: Dokumenty iz arkhivnykh sobranii Sankt-Peterburga* (St Petersburg, 2007), 1: 33, no. 55; Mykola Krykun, “Zhin naselennia z Pravoberezhnoi Ukraïny v Livoberezhnu 1711–1712 rokiv (do pytannia pro polityku Petra I stosovno Ukraïny,” in *Mizh viinoiu i radoiu. Kozatstvo Pravoberezhnoi Ukraïny v druhii polovyni XVII – na pochatku XVIII stolittia: Statti i materialy* (Kyiv, 2006), 393–5; Jan Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec sprawy Ukraïny na przełomie XVII–XVIII w.* (Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow, 1963), 84, 107–90.
- 18 Tairova-Iakovleva, *Getman Ivan Mazepa*, 155–60.
- 19 *Natsional'nyi muzei im. Andreia Sheptyts'koho u L'vovi. Viddil rukopysnyi ta starodrukovanoi knyhy, fond “Rukopysy latyns'ki”* (Andrei Sheptyts'kyi National Museum in Lviv. Department of Manuscripts and Old-Printed Books. “Latin manuscripts” Collection; hereinafter – NML), Rkl-11, ark. 332 zv., 336 zv., 354, 355, 360.
- 20 NML, Rkl-11, ark. 327–27 zv., 330, 336, 362 zv., 364, 365.
- 21 Krykun, “Zhin naselennia,” 395–403, 419–20, 422, 435, 439–40.
- 22 *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi Vremennoiu komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, vysochaishe uchrezdennoiu pri Kievskom, Podol'skom i Volynskom general-gubernatore* (hereinafter – Arkhiv IuZR), part 1, vol. 4 (Kyiv, 1871), 373–4, no. CLXVII.
- 23 Leonid Tymoshenko, *Z istorii Uniats'koi Tserkvy na Kyïvshchyni (XVI–XIX st.)* (Kyiv, 1997), 26.
- 24 “Przyczynił P[an] Bog Jego X[iędza] Leona szczęściem y aestymacyą, którą miał etiam u disunitow diecaesiey Kijowskiey, bo z wo[iewo]dztwa Kijowskie[g]o powiatu Owruckiego, Zytomirskiego etc. etc. około roku 1715 tego kapłani przez swoich dziekanow posłuszenstwo jemu, jako metropoliecie kijowskiemu, ultro oddali, y jedność się krzewiła przez promocyie y fundacye nowe od szlachty collatorow tak, że w roku 1723cim d[ie] 21 febr[uarii] s[więtey] p[amięci] x[iędza] Leon m[e]tr[o]p[o]l[i]ta mnie praesentuiąc regestr diecesiey Kijowskiey noviter erigowaney, liczył cerkwi, alias parochij, n[umero] 273, ut plurimum de nova radice od szlachty fundowanych za przyięciem jedności kościelney,” in *Arkhiv Sankt-Peterburgskogo instytutu istorii*

- Rossiiskoi akademii nauk* (Archive of the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Science, St Petersburg; hereinafter – Arkhiv SPbII), kol. 52 (Pavel Dobrokhoto), op. 1, no. 207, l. 13.
- 25 The concept of the “Zhytomyr Union” was first articulated during the Conference “Right-Bank Ukraine at the Turn of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” [Pravoberezhna Ukraïna na perelomi XVII–XVIII stolit’], which took place 3–4 June 2016 in Kyiv and Radomyshl on the initiative of the Ukrainian Catholic University and the National University of the “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.” See “Naukova konferentsiia ‘Pravoberezhna Ukraïna na perelomi XVII–XVIII stolit’,” accessed 6 November 2020, <https://ucu.edu.ua/events/naukova-konferentsiya-pravoberezhna-ukrayina-na-perelomi-xvii-xviii-stolit-do-300-littya-zhytomyrskoyi-unii-1715-roku/>; “U Radomyshli pidsumuvaly naukovu konferentsiiu,” accessed 6 November 2020, <http://kyiv-christ.ucu.edu.ua/v-radomyshli-pidsumovaly-naukovu-konferentsiyu-pravoberezhna-ukrayina-na-perelomi-xvii-xviii-stolit/>.
 - 26 Arkhiv IuZR, 1/ 4: 410–12, no. CLXXXV.
 - 27 Ibid., 423–5, no. CXC–CXCI.
 - 28 The Zhytomyr eparchial synod is also mentioned in one of the cases tried in the metropolitan’s court in 1740 concerning the failure of the archpriest Iosyf Rudenko to attend the meeting. See IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2460, ark. 56–56 zv.
 - 29 We found the actions and constitutions of the synod of the Kyiv archeparchy in 1727 in the final volume of Metropolitan Lev Kyshka’s *Diary* (*Shchoden-nyk*), see NML, Rkl–113, ark. 15 zv.–18 zv.
 - 30 NML, Rkl–113, ark. 17 zv.
 - 31 IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2460, ark. 47–47 zv.
 - 32 For a kind of summary of previous studies of these processes, see Wolfgang Reinhard and Heinz Schilling, ed., *Die Katolische Konfessionalisierung. Wissenschaftliches Symposion der Gesellschaft zur Herausgabe des Corpus Catholicorum und des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 1993* (Gütersloh, 1995). An original concept of the confessionalization of early-modern society in the Ukrainian context has been proposed by Serhiy Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (New York, 2001). The processes of confessionalization in the broader context of Central and Eastern Europe are examined in *Churches and Confessions in East Central Europe*, ed. H. Laszkiewicz (Lublin, 1999); Alfons Brüning, “Confessionalization in the *Slavia Orthodoxa* (Belorussia, Ukraine, Russia)? – Potential and Limits of a Western Historiographical Concept,” in Thomas Bremer, ed., *Religion and the Conceptual Boundary in Central and Eastern Europe: Encounters of Faiths* (New York, 2008), 66–97; Joachim Bahicke and Arno Strohmeier, eds, *Konfessionalisierung*

in Ostmitteleuropa: Wirkungen des religiösen Wandels im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert im Staat, Gesellschaft und Kultur (Stuttgart, 1999).

- 33 Archiwum diecezjalne w Siedlcach, sygn. D 153, k. 138–138 v. The settlement of Lysianka, noted in the document is the city (town) of the same name near Zvenyhorodka in the Kyiv palatinate.
- 34 NML, Rkl–11, ark. 332.
- 35 IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2460, ark. 45 zv.
- 36 This institutional connection of the Uniate clergy of the Kyiv palatinate to the Lviv see is revealed, in particular, by the autographs of the Dymier dean, Fr. Hryhorii Kyselivs'kyi, and the Chudniv dean, Avraam Sochii, in the record book of the Lviv consistory from 1733 (NML, Rkl–83, ark. 104–5).
- 37 IR NBU, f. 233, additional inventory, spr. 19, pp. 1–906.
- 38 *Derzhavnyi arkhiv Zhytomyrs'koï oblasti* (State Archive of Zhytomyr Region; hereinafter – DAZHO), f. 178, op. 53, spr. 4, ark. 1–447 zv.
- 39 *Ibid.*, f. 178, op. 53, spr. 4, ark. 130, 162.
- 40 “Na proszenie W[ielmożnych] dóbr ukraińskich dziedziców y cerkwiey fundatorów y kollatorów, oraz pobożnych gromadowych ludzi,” in DAZHO, f. 178, op. 53, spr. 8, ark. 1–2.
- 41 *Tsentrāl'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter – TS DIAUK), f. 491, op. 1, spr. 29, ark. 63.
- 42 NML, Rkl–113, ark. 111 zv.–114.
- 43 NML, Rkl–199, ark. 6 zv.–7; Rkl–658, ark. 3 zv.–4. These materials are published in Ihor Skochylas, ed., *Sobory L'vivs'koï eparkhii XVII–XVIII stolit': dokumenty ta materialy* (Lviv, 2006), 261.
- 44 “Relatio informativa de statu Ecclesiae et Archidiaecesis Metropolitanae Kijoviensis Anno 1746 die 15 Augusti Leopoli compillata ab Athanasio Szeptycki,” in TS DIAL, f. 684, op. 1, spr. 3160, ark. 1–2 zv.; *Congregationes Particulares Ecclesiam Catholicam Ucrainae et Bielorusssjae epectantes*, ed. A.G. Welykyj and E. Kaminskyj (hereinafter – *Congregationes Particulares*) (Rome, 1957), 2: 283.
- 45 Roman Zakharchenko, “Tserkva z Dorohynky: zapiznili vysnovky na tli novykh znakhidok,” *Pam'iatky Ukraïny* 2 (2004): 59–69.
- 46 For an elaboration of the concept, see Ihor Skochylas, “Slavia Unita – the Cultural and Religious Model of the Archdiocese of Kiev in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (the Discussion on Christian Heritage of the Nations of Eastern Europe),” in *East-Central Europe in European History: Themes and Debates* (Lublin, 2009), 243–54.
- 47 A general overview of the history of this order, and in particular its activity

- in Ukrainian lands, is provided by the following works: Mykhailo M. Vavryk, *Narys rozvytku i stanu Vasyliians'koho chyna XVII–XX st. Typohrafichno-statystychna rozvidka* (Rome, 1979); Porfyrrii V. Pidruchnyi, “Vasyliians'kyi Chyn vid Beresteis'koho Z'iednannia (1596) do 1743 roku,” in *Narys istorii Vasyliians'koho chynu Sviatoho Iosafata* (Rome, 1992), 96–182; Idem, *Istorychnyi narys zakonodavstva Vasyliians'koho Chynu sv. Iosafata (1617–2018)* (Rome–Lviv, 2018); Beata Lorens, *Bazylianie prowincji koronnej w latach 1743–1780* (Rzeszów, 2014).
- 48 See the assessment of the religious and cultural involvement of the Basilians in the internal life of the Ruthenian Church in Isydor Patrylo, “Vklad Vasyliians'koho chynu v zhyttia z'iednanoï Kyïvs'koï mytropoliï (1617–1839),” in Belarus, Lithuania, Polonia, Ukraine. International Conference, Rome, 28 April – 6 May 1990 (Lublin–Rome, 1994), 282–9; Ihor Harasym, “Geneza i rola monastycyzmu bazyliiańskiego w historii Cerkwi Greckokatolickiej od XVI do XX wieku,” *Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze* 4–5 (1997): 225–39.
- 49 TsDIAL, f. 201, op. 46, spr. 3055, ark. 27. For greater detail, see Ihor Skochyliias, “‘Slava Isusu Khrystu!’ – ‘Na viky, amin!’” (Do istorii vprovadzhennia khrystians'koho pryvitannia v Ukraïni,” *Patriiarkhat* 5 (2012): 5–7.
- 50 See the innovative article on this subject by Iaroslav Isaievych, “Do kharakterystyky kul'tury doby Baroko: Vasyliians'ki osvitni osередky,” in *Ukraïna: kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'. Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu chlena-korespondenta NAN Ukraïny Mykoly Il'nyts'koho*, 12 (Lviv, 2004): 105–206.
- 51 This is dealt with in the author's methodological introductory article: Thomas Kaufmann, “Einleitung: Transkonfessionalität, Interkonfessionalität, binnenkonfessionelle Pluralität – Neue Forschungen zur Konfessionalisierungsthese,” in Kaspar von Greyerz, Manfred Jakubowski-Tiessen, Thomas Kaufmann, Hartmut Lehmann, eds, *Interkonfessionalität – Transkonfessionalität – binnenkonfessionelle Pluralität: Neue Forschungen zur Konfessionalisierungsthese* (Götersloh, 2003), 9–15.
- 52 The definition of these concepts was given by: Kaufmann, “Einleitung: Transkonfessionalität, Interkonfessionalität, binnenkonfessionelle Pluralität,” 14–15.
- 53 The positive aspects of this “confrontation” are emphasized by Serhii Plokhii, *Nalyvaikova vira: Kozatstvo ta relihiia v rann'omodernii Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 2005), 134–5.
- 54 Vasylii Hryhorovych-Bars'kyi, *Mandry po Sviatykh Mistiakh Skhodu z 1723 po 1747 rik*, transl. from Old Ukrainian by Pavlo Bilous, ed. Mykhailo Moskalenko (Kyiv, 2000). Bars'kyi's “wanderings,” including in Italian cities

(Bari, Venice, Rome, and Florence), are examined in Alexander Grishin, "Vasyl Hryhorovyč Bars'kyj: An Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Pilgrim in Italy," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* XVII (1/2) (1993): 7–26.

- 55 Bars'kyi, *Mandry po Sviatykh Mistsiaxh Skhodu*, 16.
- 56 Ibid., 16, 18–20.
- 57 Maksym Iaremenko, "Kyïvs'ki studenty 1738 roku: sproba kolektyvnoï fotohrafii," *Zapysky NTSh* 256 (2008): 201–4, 208–9, 212–25.
- 58 *Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia kin. XVII – poch. XIX st. Povsiakdenna istoriia: Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, comp. Oksana F. Zadorozhna, Tetiana L. Kuzyk, Zoia I. Khyzhniak, and Maksym V. Iaremenko (Kyiv, 2004), 50–2, 67–8, nos. 23, 31, 33.
- 59 For example, in 1737, a Uniate priest from Bila Tserkva was accused of contacts with the monks of the Kyivan Cave Monastery (IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2460, ark. 7 zv.)
- 60 Upon receiving this information, Metropolitan Atanasii Sheptyts'kyi removed Skoruta from the Chudniv parish "for eternity" and sentenced him to "imprisonment in a cell at the Tryhir'ia Monastery," in IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2460, ark. 41 zv.–42 zv.
- 61 IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2460, ark. 3 zv.–4.
- 62 "Kytora S[wię]to Mikolskiego besztanie, wymawiając, ze wy uniata sobakę przyieli" in IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2460, ark. 5 zv.
- 63 IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2460, ark. 9 zv.–10.
- 64 Ibid., ark. 14.
- 65 "Jedność z Kościołem Rzymskim nazywał przekłątą [...], ludzi parochian swoich spisanie y za granice Moskiewską aby się przenosili" in IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2460, ark. 11 zv.
- 66 Among Ukrainian researchers, the first to draw attention to the phenomenon of the Great Border was Professor Iaroslav Dashkevych. He saw the Great Border as a fairly wide, moving strip of steppe in the southern part of modern Ukraine, which separated the settled Christian (agricultural) population from the nomadic Muslims. During the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries, not only Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians, on the one hand, and Tatars, Nogais and Turks, on the other, but also smaller communities – the Crimean Tatars, Jews, Karaites, Armenians, Circassians, and so forth – took part in this spiritual, economic, cultural, and political exchange. See Iaroslav Dashkevych, "Konfesiini vidnosyny obabich ukrains'koho Velykoho Kordonu (XIV–XVIII st.)," in *Ukraina na perekhrestii svitiv: Relihiieznavchi ta sotsiokul'turni studii* (Lviv, 2016), 37–42. Articulating the concept of the Ukrainian border, Ia. Dashkevych drew on the theory of the well-known American scholar Frederick Jackson Turner about the frontier as a zone of interaction and con-

frontation of multicultural pre-modern communities, where dynamic communication takes place, resulting in the borrowing, adapting, and rejecting of certain cultural and social practices. See Fredrick J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1935).

- 67 According to the calculations of the Polish scholar Stanisław Nabywaniec, whereas there were 479–98 Uniate parishes in 1747–49 on the territory of the Bratslav palatinate, in 1764 there were already 783 of them, in 1773, 902, and on the eve of the region's annexation by Russia (1788), the parish network of the Kyiv archeparchy in this region had grown to an incredible size, numbering as many as 984 churches! See Stanisław Nabywaniec, *Unicka archidiecezja kijowska v okresie rządów arcybiskupa metropolity Felicjana Filipa Wołodkowicza 1762–1778* (Rzeszów, 1998), 234.
- 68 NML, Rkl–86, ark. 740–52 zv.; *Congregationes Particulares*, 2:264.
- 69 *Congregationes Particulares*, 2:257, 280–1.
- 70 Ibid., 2: 270.
- 71 “Regestr 1748,” in Arkhiv SPbII, kol. 52, op. 2, karton 9, no. 1, l. 247 ob.–255 ob.; “Relatio 1746,” in TSDIAL, f. 684, p. 1, spr. 3160, ark. 1–2 zv.; “Relatio 1752,” in *Monumenta Ucrainae historica*, ed. Andreas Šeptyckyj (Rome, 1968), 6: 250; “Summaryusz 1748 r.” in Arkhiv SPbII, kol. 52, op. 2, karton 9, no. 1, l. 213–13 ob.
- 72 *Congregationes Particulares*, 2: 264–65, no. 90.
- 73 Ibid., 2: 265–7.
- 74 Arkhiv SPbII, kol. 52, op. 2, karton 9, no. 1, l. 425; NML, Rkl–199, ark. 18 zv.–19; Rkl–658, ark. 10 zv.–11.
- 75 DAZHO, f. 178, op. 53, spr. 2, ark. 111 zv.; spr. 37, ark. 148.
- 76 Arkhiv SPbII, kol. 52, op. 2, karton 9, no. 1, l. 71–71 ob.
- 77 NML, Rkl–75, ark. 33 zv.–34; TSDIAL, f. 1040, p. 1, spr. 3, ark. 93–96.
- 78 *Congregationes Particulares*, 2: 255, 261.
- 79 Tymoshenko, *Z istorii Uniats'koï Tserkvy na Kyïvshchyni*, 21–5.
- 80 Leonid Tymoshenko, “Misto Radomyshlv istorii Ukraïns'koï Tserkvy,” in *Na sluzhbi Klio: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats na poshanu L. Vynara* (Kyiv-New York-Toronto-Paris-Lviv, 2000), 484–92; Nabywaniec, *Unicka archidiecezja kijowska*, 40–1.
- 81 Arkhiv SPbII, kol. 52, op. 2, karton 9, no. 1, l. 247 ob.–252 ob.; IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2459, ark. 288 zv.–351 zv.; *Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter – TSDIAUK), f. 1040, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 487–564.
- 82 IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2459, ark. 298 zv.–301 zv., 312, 320, 322; TSDIAUK, f. 1040, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 503.

- 83 IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2459, ark. 312, 315 zv.–317 zv.; TSDIAUK, f. 1040, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 11 zv.–12 zv. 77 zv./–80, 83, 84.
- 84 *Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie, Chełmski Konsystorz Greckokatolicki* (State Archive in Lubline, Greek Catholic Consistory in Chelm; hereinafter – APL, чхкґк), sygn. 30, s. 28–31, 461–63. See also *Congregationes Particulares*, 2: 258.
- 85 *Congregationes Particulares*, 2: 288–9.
- 86 *Ibid.*, 2: 286.
- 87 IR NBU, f. 1, spr. 2462, ark. 1–549 zv.; spr. 2463, ark. 1–394; ark. 1–548; TSDIAUK, f. 1040, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 224–28, 517–18 zv.
- 88 DAZHO, f. 178, op. 53, spr. 2, ark. 86, spr. 37, ark. 73.
- 89 TSDIAUK, f. 1040, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 1–236.
- 90 TSDIAUK, f. 1040, op. 1, spr. 3, ark. 243 zv.–244, 892 zv.
- 91 *Ibid.*, f. 201, op. 4, spr. 82.
- 92 *Ibid.*, f. 1040, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 11 zv.–12 zv.
- 93 NML, Rkl–86, ark. 698 ff.
- 94 “Z dawnych czasow do diecezji Braclawskiej ritus Graeci Romano Uniti przyłączona, w dobrach moich starostwie y miasteczku Szawulisie w woiewodztwie y powiecie Kijowskim leżącym,” in NML, Rkl–86, ark. 728–728 zv.
- 95 *Congregationes Particulares*, 2:270, 280–1, 285–7.
- 96 TSDIAUK, f. 201, op. 46, spr. 305, ark. 1.
- 97 *Congregationes Particulares*, 2: 257–58.
- 98 TSDIAUK, f. 1040, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 561 zv.–562.
- 99 *Congregationes Particulares*, 2:259.
- 100 *Ibid.*, 2: 273.
- 101 “De iurisdictione Metropolitae Kioviensis in Decanatu Braclaviensi, praetensa ab Episcopo Leopoliensi. Roma, 7.V.1753,” in *Congregationes Particulares*, 2:253–95, no. 90.
- 102 *Congregationes Particulares*, 2:254.
- 103 *Litterae S. C. de Propaganda Fide Ecclesiam Catholicam Ucrainae et Bielarusjae spectantes*, ed. A.G. Welykyj (Rome, 1957), 4:270, no. 1877.

The Teaching of Philosophy at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy at the End of the Seventeenth to Eighteenth Century

MYKOLA SYMCHYCH

The question of how strongly various factors influenced the teaching of philosophy at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (*Kyievo-Mohylians'ka Akademiia*) has repeatedly drawn the attention of researchers.¹ However, the hypotheses they proposed were based for the most part on a general impression of the content of the philosophy courses and not on a textual comparison with the probable influencing texts. By contrast, in this article, I will try to trace these influences textually, as well as the turning point that clearly occurred in the middle of the eighteenth century.

It is worth to begin with the singular discussion that took place in Kyiv in 1755. The discussion started with the decree issued on 31 August 1755 by Metropolitan Tymofii Shcherbats'kyi, in which the prefect of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Davyd Nashchyns'kyi was forbidden to read philosophy according to Johann Heinrich Winkler's textbook *Institutiones philosophiae universae*² (which he had been doing for the preceding two years), "inasmuch, as attested by the reverend prefect Davyd himself, conducting a dispute appropriately based on this author is in no way possible."³ To improve the situation, the metropolitan "pastorally ordered" him to teach philosophy according to the textbook by Edmund Purchotius,⁴ "who, upon our examination, is understandable with respect to all his precepts, as well as suited to exercises."⁵ However, the prefect did not accept this "recommendation" and in his message of 2 September 1755 addressed to the metropolitan asked that he be permitted not to teach philosophy according to Purchotius, "which to be sure is more worthwhile than the *old Jesuit* ones (*italics mine* – *M.S.*), except that today Wolffian philosophy, which is accepted and interpreted throughout Europe,

is much more useful, because [it is] more fundamental, comprehensible, and sound than that of Purchotius.”⁶ As examples of Wolffian philosophy, the prefect cited the textbooks of Winkler and Friedrich C. Baumeister. And the fact that no disputations had been held at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in recent years was, in his opinion, not the fault of Wolffian philosophy but his own: “because I had not familiarized myself with the new philosophy, and did not comprehensively examine what, where, and when.”⁷ Therefore, Davyd Nashchyns'kyi proposed to continue lecturing according to Baumeister’s textbook, “who wrote philosophy of his teacher (Wolff – M.S.) concisely and very intelligently.”⁸ And in order to convince the metropolitan, the author of the report brought in as his ally the former rector [of the Academy] Heorhii Konys'kyi, then the Belarusian archbishop, who would recommend this philosophy.

For his part, Konys'kyi, responding to a question from Tymofii Shcherbats'kyi, wrote:

Both authors, whose superiority one over the other your excellency is discussing, Purchotius and Baumeister, I have not read comprehensively, because I did not have them when I myself practiced philosophy by virtue of my former position, which I personally regard as my misfortune, because then I would not have wasted my time on the rubbish of Aristotle’s interpreters. And for that reason, I cannot fully and completely judge between the two named authors.⁹

However, continued Konys'kyi, after analyzing some chapters of Baumeister’s textbook, he nonetheless recommended that it be used at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and the parts that were not sufficiently elaborated in that work should be taken from the Winkler, whom metropolitan did not like. Despite the fact that both authors employ the *methodo mathematica* (method of mathematics), in Konys'kyi’s opinion, this should not affect the conduct of disputations adversely.

Most likely the archbishop’s arguments made the appropriate impression on Shcherbats'kyi because beginning in 1755, the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy entered into the “Baumeister era,” which lasted until the reform of the school in 1817. Christian Baumeister’s textbook became popular not only at the Academy. It was repeatedly republished and translated into Russian,¹⁰ and was used in teaching philosophy in virtually all religious educational institutions of the empire.

This discussion is important for us not only because it marked the establishment of Wolffianism in the Russian Empire but also because it cast light on the teaching of philosophy at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy up to 1755. In particular, the ideas expressed by the “discussants” enable us to formulate four research questions:

1. Did the metropolitan propose teaching philosophy according to Purchotius' textbook only because of its "understandable precepts" and its "suitability for exercises," or were there any other reasons?
2. Was the dictation of texts, which the metropolitan refers to, a characteristic feature only of Nashchyns'kyi's lectures, or did such precedents exist earlier?
3. How should we understand Nashchyns'kyi's words that Purchotius' philosophy was much more useful than "old Jesuit philosophies"? Why Jesuit in particular?
4. How should we take Archbishop Heorhii Konys'kyi's statement about the years wasted on the "rubbish of Aristotle's interpreters"?

With regard to the first question, precedents of teaching according to the textbook of Edmund Purchotius were recorded even earlier. Thus, Davyd Nashchyns'kyi, who taught philosophy starting from the 1753/54 academic year, was preceded by Heorhii Shcherbats'kyi (the metropolitan's nephew, as it happens) as the prefect and professor of philosophy at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Two transcriptions of his course from the 1751/52/53 academic years have survived to our time.¹¹ A comparison of the first transcription with the text in the section on logic in the published textbook by Edmundus Purchotius *Institutiones philosophiae*¹² shows that both texts are exactly the same, except that a part of a sentence has been omitted in one of the transcriptions of Heorhii Shcherbats'kyi's course, and a paragraph is missing in the other transcription. Thus, the metropolitan's recommendation to Davyd Nashchyns'kyi to teach according to Purchotius' textbook was merely a desire to return to the old, time-tested, textbook.

As regards the second question, the *reading* of philosophy courses, as the above examples of Heorhii Shcherbats'kyi's course show, such an amazingly exact match of texts cannot be explained by anything other than that the students either wrote the course from dictation, or that they were given copies of the textbook and they copied it at lectures or at home. When we compare the transcriptions of the courses of Shcherbats'kyi's predecessors, which have survived in several variants, we can see that the differences attest that they were usually written from dictation.¹³ In addition to the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, this practice was widely employed in the Jesuit colleges of the Commonwealth. According to Ludwig Piechnik, the method whereby instructors dictated their own lectures was originally introduced by the Dominican Francisco de Victoria in Salamanca. This method, spreading from there to universities throughout Europe, except Italy, was also used in Jesuit colleges. However, the *Ratio Studiorum* plan of 1586 proposed the requirement to abandon this method, as not in conformity with

the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus.¹⁴ But in discussing this proposal, the majority of provinces expressed their support for keeping the dictation method, with the Polish province, in particular, taking an active position.¹⁵ Therefore, the final version of the *Ratio Studiorum* in 1599 recommended that lectures be read in a way that allowed students to record only what they regarded as necessary, but, at the same time, permitted dictation if the students were unable to make notes on their own.¹⁶

In another of his works, Ludwig Piechnik traces in greater detail the technique of instruction in Jesuit educational institutions, including the Vilnius Academy, where the professor dictated the material and the students wrote it down, with the professor leaving the final fifteen minutes for explaining the most difficult passages in what he had dictated.¹⁷

It is quite likely that the methods of instruction at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy were modeled on those used in Jesuit educational institutions. If so, then the main role of the professor was not so much to deliver a lecture as to comment on the text that the students had already written down. This is where his authorial “creativity” and “originality” were manifested, which is especially important in cases where we know for certain that the professor used someone else’s text in his lectures.

The resemblance between the Jesuit methods of instruction and the practices of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy leads us to the third problem: how much influence did the philosophy taught at Jesuit colleges and academies exert on the philosophy courses at the Academy before 1751? Much has been written about the influence of the Jesuits on the Academy’s scholarship, beginning with such “classic” researchers of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy as Mykola Petrov, Kostiantyn Kharlampovych, Dmytro Vyshnevs'kyi, Mykhailo Lynchevs'kyi, and Aleksander Jabłonowski.¹⁸ Yet there is still no clear definition of how this manifested itself in the field of philosophy. An indirect proof of the scale of Jesuit influence on the Academy is the extraordinary density of Jesuit educational institutions in areas neighboring on Kyiv in the eighteenth century.¹⁹ A more direct proof is the fact that part of the instructors at the Academy had obtained their education in Jesuit schools,²⁰ so it is quite likely that they used the philosophical knowledge gained there in teaching their own courses.

Aside from tracing proof of personal contacts with Jesuit professors of philosophy, there is also evidence of their influence on philosophy courses at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in a comparison of the extant transcriptions of the courses themselves.

After establishing the attribution of all currently known transcriptions²¹ of lectures in the philosophy classes of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy before 1751, I identified thirty courses.²² The results of our attribution are as follows:

Table 16.1 Philosophy classes of the Kyiv–Mohyla Academy before 1751

<i>Instructor</i>	<i>Academic years</i>	<i>Manuscript identification codes*</i>
1. Iosyf Kononovych Horbats'kyi	1639/40	f. 303, od. zb. 126
2. Inokentii Gizel'	1645/46–1646/47	f. 303, od. zb. 128
3. Probably Ioasaf Krokovs'kyi	1684/85–1685/86	f. 306, od. zb. 88 TSDIAUK, f. 222, op. 2, spr. 18a RNB, f. Nov. DS 6739
4. Probably Ioasaf Krokovs'kyi	1686/87–1687/88	f. 312, od. zb. 617 TSDIAUK, f. 222, op. 2, spr. 18a
5. Stefan Iavors'kyi	1691/92–1692/93	f. 305, od. zb. 152 f. 312, od. zb. 619 f. 312, od. zb. 618 f. VIII, od. zb. 60 RNB, f. SPbDA BII/9 RNB, f. Nov. DS 6745
6. Probably Prokopii Kalachyns'kyi	1693/94–1694/95	f. 312, od. zb. 620 RNB, f. Arkh. DS 289
7. Unidentified professor	ca. 1700	f. 301, od. zb. p42
8. Inokentii Popovs'kyi	1688/1700–1700/ 1701/02	f. 307, od. zb. 442 f. 307, od. zb. 443 f. 312, od. zb. 622 f. 306, od. zb. 150 BAN, F. Ark. DS 271
9. Khrystofof Charnuts'kyi	1702/03–1703/04	f. 306, od. zb. 97 f. 306, od. zb. 98 f. 312, od. zb. 624 f. 312, od. zb. 625 f. 305, od. zb. 156 BAN, Q 140
10. Ilarion Iaroshevytskyi and Khrystofof Charnuts'kyi	1704/05–1705/06	f. 306, od. zb. 99 f. 301, od. zb. p564 f. 306, od. zb. 444 f. 312, od. zb. 626 f. 306, od. zb. 100 f. 312, od. zb. 627 f. 312, od. zb. 628 f. 305, od. zb. 156 f. 307, od. zb. 445 f. 307, od. zb. 157 f. 307, od. zb. 158 f. 307, od. zb. 159

Table 16.1 continued

<i>Instructor</i>	<i>Academic years</i>	<i>Manuscript identification codes*</i>
11. Teofan (Feofan) Prokopovych	1706/07–1707/08	f. 301, od. zb. p43 RNB, F. SPb DS 64
12. Sylvestr Pinovs'kyi	1711/12–1712/13	f. 307, od. zb. 446
13. Most likely Sylvestr Pinovs'kyi	1713/14–1714/15	f. 306, od. zb. 103 f. 307, od. zb. 446
14. Iosyf Volchans'kyi	1715/16–1716/17	f. 306, od. zb. 108 f. 301, od. zb. p44
15. Iosyf Volchans'kyi	1717/18–1718/19	f. 307, od. zb. 450, vol. II f. 307, od. zb. 447 f. 305, od. zb. 164 f. 305, od. zb. 165
16. Ilarion Levyts'kyi	1719/20–1720/21	f. 306, od. zb. 110 f. 306, od. zb. 111 f. 307, od. zb. 449 f. 301, od. zb. p45
17. Platon Malynovs'kyi	1721/22–1722/23	f. 305, od. zb. 166 f. 307, od. zb. 450, vol. I f. 307, od. zb. 448 f. 306, od. zb. 115 RGB, f. 205, no. 351
18. Ilarion Levyts'kyi	1723/24–1724/25	f. 305, od. zb. 167 f. 312, od. zb. 631 f. 307, od. zb. 451 f. 306, od. zb. 117 f. 306, od. zb. 116 BAN Q 521
19. Amvrosii Dubnevych	1725/26–1726/27	f. 307, od. zb. 200
20. Amvrosii Dubnevych	1727/28–1728/29	f. 301, od. zb. p49 f. 306, od. zb. 119 f. 307, od. zb. 452 RNB, F. Nov. DS 6735
21. Stefan Kalynovs'kyi	1729/30–1730/31	f. 306, od. zb. 123 f. 307, od. zb. 169 RNB F. Nov. DS 6745
22. Ieronim Mytkevych	1733/34–1734/35	f. 305, od. zb. 170 BAN Q 563
23. Syl'vestr Kuliabka	1735/36–1736/37	f. 306, od. zb. 124 f. 306, od. zb. 125

Table 16.1 continued

<i>Instructor</i>	<i>Academic years</i>	<i>Manuscript identification codes*</i>
24. Syl'vestr Kuliabka	1737/38–1738/39	f. 301, od. zb. p50 f. 305, od. zb. 169
25. Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi	1739/40–1740/41	f. 306, od. zb. 126 f. 306, od. zb. 127
26. Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi	1741/42–1742/43	f. 306, od. zb. 128 f. 301, od. zb. l331 RNB, F. SPb DA, 203
27. Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi	1743/44–1744/45	f. 301, od. zb. p52 f. 305, od. zb. 171 f. 305, od. zb. 173 f. 305, od. zb. 172
28. Hedeon Slomyns'kyi	1745/46–1746/47	NBL, 1579 RGB, f. 183, 1875
29. Heorhii Konys'kyi	1747/48–1748/49	RGB, f. 152, 130
30. Heorhii Konys'kyi	1749/50–1750/51	f. 312, od. zb. 635 f. 301, od. zb. p54 f. 301, od. zb. p565 f. 301, od. zb. p51 RNB F. SPbDA 202

* The identification code in regular font refers to manuscripts in the collection of the National Library of Ukraine (IR NBU). Here and elsewhere, I have used the Ukrainian abbreviations for internal archival identification numbers, such as “od. zb.” which means “odnyntsia zberihannia” translated as “archival unit of preservation.”

As the table shows, only two courses have survived from the first half of the seventeenth century and six courses from the last quarter of the seventeenth century, whereas from the first half of the eighteenth century, we have courses from practically every academic year (the exceptions being 1709–11 and 1731–33). The level of representation of the source base from the end of the seventeenth to the first half of the eighteenth century is sufficient to trace what kind of influence the teaching of philosophy the Academy experienced and the extent to which the philosophical doctrine represented in each course changed during this period.²³ But the totality of the transcriptions (even if we consider each course in only one transcription) constitutes a huge body of approximately 18,000 sheets of handwritten text. Obviously, to make an in-depth study, decipher, and translate this material requires many researchers. In contrast, an attempt to establish the elements of influence can be undertaken employing less time- and labor-intensive methods of research, which I will try to present below.

We know that the program of instruction in the Academy's philosophy class consisted of the following basic sections: 1) *dialectics* (*logica minor* or introduction to logic): usually taught for two months at the beginning of the academic year, and encompassed formal rules of logic, in accordance with Aristotelian syllogistics; 2) *logic* (*logica major*, *philosophia rationalis*): taught for the subsequent six to seven months, contained an examination of some epistemological and metaphysical problems, with a tie-in to Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Aristotle's *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *Prior Analytics*, and *Posterior Analytics* (most often the other books of the *Organon* were not considered);²⁴ 3) *physics* (*philosophia naturalis*): taught for the following eight to nine months, explored certain problems of natural philosophy with a tie-in to Aristotle's *Physics*, *On the Heavens*, *On Generation and Corruption*, *Meteorology*, and *On the Soul*; 4) *metaphysics*: taught no more than one month, examined some metaphysical problems that had not been taught in preceding sections, no particular tie-in with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* was found. In the transcription of Teofan Prokopovych's philosophy course, in addition to the parts mentioned above, which were preserved very fragmentarily, there are sections on mathematics and ethics (of the latter, only four sheets of text are extant). In addition, beginning with Stefan Kalynovs'kyi's course (1729/30/31 academic years), instruction in *ethics* was made compulsory, most often tied in with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.

The best preserved of all the philosophy course transcriptions is the section on logic (*logica major*): it is missing only from the first course of Syl'vestr Pinovs'kyi (1711/12/13 academic years) and is partly damaged in the course that was probably taught by Prokopii Kalachyns'kyi (1693/94/95 academic years). In addition, the lectures in logic are marked by the density and importance of the philosophical problems that were explored in them. In view of this, logic is the most suitable section for a comparative analysis.

As a first step, the structure of each course was identified – that is, sections, subsections, paragraphs, and points that comprised it. A comparison of them revealed great similarity among the courses: almost all the courses examine the same questions; some paragraphs even have identical titles. At the same time, the selected courses have almost an identical structure, which gave us reason to assume a textual similarity of these courses.

A test of this hypothesis showed that there are a number of courses with exactly matching texts. Thus, a large part of Inokentii's Popovs'kyi's course in the 1699/1700/01 academic years is an exact copy of Stefan Iavors'kyi's course. We find the same situation when we compare the texts of Syl'vestr Kuliabka's first and second courses and Amvrosii Dubnevych's first course, and the section on major logic in Ieronim Mytkevych's course differs from Platon Malynovs'kyi's only in

its introduction. There are also extensive identical passages shared by Amvrosii Dubnevych's second course and the first two courses taught by Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi, as well as Teofan Prokopovych's course and Heorhii Konys'kyi's two courses, which I will discuss below. Exactly matching texts were not found among the other courses that I analyzed, but the structure of these courses in the section on major logic is very similar. This suggests that these courses were structured under the influence of one source or a certain internally related group of sources. But to be able to state this with relative certainty, a comparison of their structure alone is not enough: it is necessary to analyze the contents of these courses. This task can be performed quite successfully by considering the characteristic features of the way that the professors at the Academy wrote their philosophy courses.

Until 1753, the teaching of philosophy at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy consistently employed the "method of disputation" (*methodus disputationis*). The distinguishing feature of this method was that the name of each paragraph was constructed in the form of a question, the answer to which was given in the paragraph, and each paragraph, in turn, was constructed according to a well-defined structure. It began with some commentary and definition of terms, which helped to explain the gist of the question. This was followed, most often in a single sentence, by a response to the posed question, which was introduced with one of the following words: *dicendum* (it must be said that), *dico* (I say), *conclusion nostra* (our conclusion), *asserto* (I assert), and so forth. The response is usually called the thesis or conclusion. After the thesis was formulated, there followed citations from the philosophers who supported it and those who rejected it.²⁵ Then the thesis was proven in the form of a syllogism, each premise of which was also proven as a syllogism. After the thesis was proven, the ideas of opponents were refuted. The objection of the opponent was stated in one sentence, and immediately after the word *respondeo* (I respond), there followed proof of the invalidity of the objection. The response to the objection was always expressed in the form of a syllogism. Often the conclusion was followed by more than a dozen objections, usually connected with one another. Not infrequently several theses-conclusions were proposed in one paragraph, each of which was followed by the entire apparatus of proofs and refutations of the ideas of opponents described above.

This method, as already mentioned, was virtually identical in each course. As we can see, the main conceptual emphasis was on the thesis. By identifying the theses, it is possible to obtain a fairly accurate idea of the views held by the author of the given course. Inasmuch as most courses were written following an almost identical structure, comparing the theses from various courses allows us to compare them more or less adequately to one another.²⁶

I tried to perform this kind of comparison using two sections, which, in my opinion, are fairly representative of the philosophical thought of that period: *De distinctionibus* (The distinctions) and *De universalibus in communi* (The universals in common). These two sections are linked and reveal the Academy professors' views on the problem of universals. I found that Stefan Iavors'kyi's course, probably Inokentii Popovs'kyi's course (ca. 1700), as well as his course in the 1699–1702 academic years, Khrystofor Charnuts'kyi's first course, Syl'vestr Pinovs'kyi's course, Iosyf Volchans'kyi's both courses, Platon Malynovs'kyi's course, Amvrosii Dubnevych's both courses, Ieronim Mytkevych's course, and Syl'vestr Kuliabka's both courses contained virtually no significant conceptual differences in the analyzed sections. It is safe to say that all the named authors adhered to one and the same doctrine in resolving the problem of universals, a doctrine that was very close to the views of the well-known Jesuit philosophers Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Rodrigo Arriaga, and Francisco Oviedo.

On the other hand, the solution to the problem of universals proposed in three other courses that I examined (Khrystofor Charnuts'kyi's second course and Ilarion Levyts'kyi's first and second courses), which are greatly similar to the preceding group in their structure and method of instruction, can be found in another noted Jesuit philosopher, Thomas Compton Carleton. Incidentally, a comparison of the two courses taught by Ilarion Levyts'kyi with Khrystofor Charnuts'kyi's second course showed not only their doctrinal similarity but also that sometimes large portions of their texts were exactly identical. At the same time, Ioasaf Krokovs'kyi's first and second courses, Teofan Prokopovych's course, Stefan Kalynovs'kyi's course, Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi's third course, as well as the first and second courses of Heorhii Konys'kyi differ quite markedly in some places from the courses in the two preceding groups.

The fact that the overwhelming majority of philosophy courses taught by the professors of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy are highly similar suggests that the given courses were written under the influence of some one source or group of related sources. To verify this assumption, I used the same procedure to examine several philosophy courses taught in Jesuit colleges in the Commonwealth during the same period as those at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. In particular, I analyzed the course of an unknown instructor at the Lviv Jesuit College taught during the 1700/01/02²⁷ academic years, the course of Tomasz Dunin at the same Lviv College during the 1719/20/21 academic years,²⁸ the course on logic read by Thomas Kruger at the Vilnius Academy in the 1713/14 academic year,²⁹ and the course of an anonymous author from an unidentified Jesuit college taught during the 1709/10/11 academic years.³⁰ A comparison of these courses showed that the *De distinctionibus* and *De universalibus in communi* sections did not differ significantly from identical sec-

tions in the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy courses in our first group above (for example Stefan Iavors'kyi's).

As we can see, the concept that was most widespread in the philosophy courses taught by the Academy's professors was also employed in the Jesuit colleges of the Commonwealth. In our opinion, the only explanation of the phenomenon that most philosophy courses at the КМА for more than forty years (from Iavors'kyi to Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi's second course, that is, from 1691 until 1743) taught the same, essentially identical, doctrine was its prevalence in the practice of Jesuit educational institutions. Accordingly, the Academy professors made use of the works of their Jesuit colleagues when preparing their lectures.

An example of the obvious use of Jesuit courses at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is the philosophy course of Khrystofor Charnuts'kyi (1702/1704 academic years). In some of his citations, Charnuts'kyi writes: "Meus in philosophicis professor R[evrendus] P[ater] Georgius Gengel, vir sublimitate ingenii, sollemnitate doctrinae Polonae Pronvinciae theologus non prostremus" (My professor of philosophy [classes], the Reverend Father Georgii Gengell was not the least theologian in the Polish province, the height of talent and pinnacle of learning).³¹ Jerzy (Georgii) Gengell did indeed teach philosophy at the Jesuit colleges in Lviv in 1687–89, Jarosław (1690–91), and Lublin (1691–93),³² and Khrystofor Charnuts'kyi had to have attended his lectures at one of these institutions. Later Jerzy Gengell wrote a number of works of mostly polemical nature (against René Descartes, John Calvin, and Martin Luther) and was famous for being a crusader against atheism in Poland. Unfortunately, the named published works were not philosophy courses, making it difficult to determine what philosophical concept their author taught his students and thus identify what Khrystofor Charnuts'kyi had borrowed from his teacher. However, the Manuscript Institute of the National Library of Ukraine holds two extant manuscripts of fragments of the philosophy course read by Jerzy Gengell at the Jarosław Jesuit college.³³ A comparison of these courses with Khrystofor Charnuts'kyi's course shows that Charnuts'kyi used Gengell's text for the most part verbatim, but rewording, shortening, and changing it in places.

The departure from the Jesuit template at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy proceeded gradually. At the beginning of the 1740s, philosophy was taught at the Academy by Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi.³⁴ He was the only Academy professor to read three philosophy courses. The first two he taught on the basis of his student notes. Amvrosii Dubnevych's course from the 1727–29 academic years has survived to our time in a transcription by Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi. Kozachyns'kyi's third course had absolutely no similarity to Dubnevych's course. But it had great similarity to the course of a not very well-known Swiss Capuchin. A comparison of

the section on logic of Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi's course from the 1743–45 academic years and the *Cursus philosophicus* by Johann Martin Brunk, known under his monastic name of Gervasius Brisacensis, reveals a great similarity.³⁵ The two texts are almost completely identical.

After Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi, the philosophy course was taught by Hedeon Slomyns'kyi, who noted in the title of his course that he would base himself in the section on logic on the work of Bartholomäus Keckermann.³⁶ This course differed even more from all the preceding courses. I was unable to identify which of Keckermann's textbooks he used and in what way,³⁷ but the fact that a Protestant author was utilized as a model attests to the increasingly marked departure from earlier tradition.

Heorhii Konys'kyi, who figured at the beginning of this article, taught two philosophy courses at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. He taught the first course (1747–49) on the basis of Teofan Prokopovych's philosophy course. He made unambiguously clear to whom this text belonged in his dedication to Prokopovych at the beginning of the course.³⁸ In his second course (1749–51), he diverged from Prokopovych's text, although the textual link between the two courses was still quite strong. Prokopovych's course differed significantly from the Jesuit template, but it was still written in accordance with Aristotelian tradition.

Thus, as we can see, the gradual shift away from the Jesuit template for philosophy courses began in the 1740s. At the current state of research, it is difficult to say what caused this departure. Was it the supplantation of Jesuit influence by the authority of German universities, or internal changes in Jesuit philosophizing itself, which was becoming infiltrated by Cartesianism and later also Wolffianism? But there is no doubt that in the middle of the eighteenth-century Jesuit philosophy was already perceived as outdated. This, among other things, can be clearly seen in the correspondence of 1755 regarding the teaching of philosophy, which I discussed at the beginning of this article. It is as a manifestation of this assessment that we should understand Heorhii Konys'kyi's remark about wasted years on the “rubbish of Aristotle's interpreters.”

As we can see, various factors influenced the content of the philosophy courses and the manner in which they were taught at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy: until the mid-eighteenth century, it was the Jesuit school, and after that, Wolffianism. In this article I sought to draw attention not only to the existence of these factors but also to the special aspects of their reception by the Academy professors.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

This article is based on the study by M. Symchych, “Zauvahy do vplyviv na vykladannia filosofii v Kyievo-Mohylians'kii akademii kintsia XVII-XVIII st.,” *Kyivs'ka Akademiia* 2/3 (2006), 74–85. This topic is examined in greater detail in the monograph: M. Symchych, *Philosophia rationalis u Kyievo-Mohylians'kii akademii: komparatyvnyi analiz mohylians'kykh kursiv lohiky kintsia XVII – pershoi polovyny XVIII st.* (Vinnytsia, 2009). But considerable time has passed since the publication of both the article and the monograph, so that some changes have been made in the 2006 article that reflect the current state of my familiarity with this subject.

- 1 See A. Jablonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska* (Cracow, 1899), 100; D. Vishnevskii, *Kievskaiia Akademiia v per. pol. XVIII st. (Novye danye, otnosiashchiesia k istorii etoi Akademii za ukazanie vremia)* (Kyiv, 1903), 206; M. Tkachuk, “Filosofs'ki kursy Kyievo-Mohylians'koï akademii v konteksti ievropeis'koho skholastychnoho dysputu,” in *Relihiina filosof's'ka dumka v Kyievo-Mohylians'kii akademii*, ed. V. S. Hors'kyi et al (Kyiv, 2002), 52–60; V. Kotusenko, “Vykladannia filosofii v iezuits'kykh kolehiumakh XVI–XVII stolittia Kyievo-Mohylians'kii akademii,” in *Ukraina XVII stolittia: suspil'stvo, filosofia, kul'tura. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu pamiaty profesora Valerii Mykhailivny Nichyk* (Kyiv, 2005), 83–107.
- 2 Johann Heinrich Winkler (1703–1770) – German philosopher, adherent of Christian Wolff. I had access to the following edition of his textbook: Io. Henricus Winkler, *Institutiones philosophiae universae usibus academicis accommodatae*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1742).
- 3 *Akty i dokumenty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Kievskoi Akademii* (hereinafter – *ADKA*), part 2, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1905), 174.
- 4 Edmundus Purchotius (Pourchot) (1651–1734), French philosopher-Cartesian, known for his textbook *Institutiones philosophicae ad faciliorem veterum, ac recentiorum philosophorum lectionem comparatae*, the first edition of which appeared in Paris in 1695. It consists of four volumes: I. *Complectens logicam, metaphysicam et elementa geometriae*; II. *Quo physica generalis continetur*; III. *Qui physicam specialem comprehendit*; IV. *Contiens ethicam et exerciones scholasticas in Aristotelis metaphysicam*. More than ten editions of the textbook were published, the last in 1767.
- 5 *ADKA*, 174.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 174.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 176.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 *Ibid.*, 179.

- 10 It was republished in Latin in Moscow in 1798 and 1802, and in St Petersburg in 1818. The parts of his course on logic and metaphysics appeared in Russian translation: Kh. Baumeister, *Logika*, transl. from Latin by A. Pavlov (Moscow, 1760); Kh. Baumeister, *Metafizika* (Moscow, 1764).
- 11 *Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukraïny im. V. I. Vernads'koho* (Manuscript Institute of the V.I. Vernads'kyi National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – IR NBU), f. 307, spr. 454, ark. 1–183 zv. (complete course); f. 305, spr. 174, ark. 1–93 zv. (last page of logic, metaphysics, physics, ethics).
- 12 Edmundus Purchotius, *Institutiones philosophiae ad faciliorem veterum, ac recentiorum philosophorum lectionem comparatae* (Padua, 1751).
- 13 For greater detail, see my article “Vyznachennia dzherel'noi bazy dlia doslidzhennia vykladannia filosofii u Kyievo-Mohylians'kii akademii u XVII–XVIII st.,” *Magisterium*, no. 23 *Istoryko-filosofs'ki studii* (2006), 43–8.
- 14 L. Piechnik, *Powstanie i rozwój jezuickiej Ratio studiorum (1548–1599)* (Cracow, 2003), 67. See also: *Monumenta paedagogica Societatis Jesu: Nova editio penitus retracta*, vol. 5, *Ratio atque institutio studiorum Societatis Jesu (1586, 1591, 1599)*, ed. Ladislaus Lukacs SJ (Rome, 1986), 56–8.
- 15 “De ratione atque institutione per sex patres deputatos Romae anno 1585 conscripta iudicium Congregationis provinciae Poloniae mandato R.P.N. ad eundem finem celebratae Vilnae anno 1586 mensibus octobre, novembre et decembre, et januario sequente,” in Piechnik, *Powstanie i rozwój jezuickiej Ratio studiorum*, 200–9.
- 16 *Idid.*, 68.
- 17 L. Piechnik, *Dzieje Akademii Wilenskiej*, vol. 1, *Początki Akademii Wilenskiej 1570–1599* (Rome, 1984), 145.
- 18 See N. Petrov, *Kievskaiia Akademiia vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka* (Kyiv, 1895), 61; K.V. Kharlampovich, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly XVI i nachala XVII veka, otnoshenie ikh k inoslaviu, religioznoe obuchenie v nykh i zaslugi v dele zashchity pravoslavnoi very i tserkvi* (Kazan, 1898), 359; D. Vishnevskii, *Kievskaiia Akademiia v per. pol. XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1903), 90; Aleksander W. Jabłonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilańska: zarys historyczny na tle rozwoju ogólnego cywilizacji zachodniej na Rusi* (Cracow, 1899–1900), 167–8; Mikhail Z. Linchevskii, “Pedagogiia drevnikh bratskikh shkol i preimushzhestvo drevnei Kievskoi Akademii,” in M.Z. Linchevskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 2 vols (Kyiv, 1906), 1:87.
- 19 Thus, according to Stanisław Bednarski, in the Polish Jesuit Assistentia [province] in 1700 philosophy was taught in 19 colleges, in 1710 – 15 colleges, in 1720 – 23 colleges, in 1730 – 31 colleges, in 1740 – 33 colleges, in 1750 – 36 colleges, and in 1756/57 – in 36 colleges. See S. Bernadski, *Upadek i odrodzenie*

szkół jezuickich w Polsce (Studjum z dziejów kultury i szkolnictwa polskiego) (Cracow, 1933), tables 2–3.

- 20 I know this to be true about Ioasaf Krokovs'kyi, Stefan Iavors'kyi, and Teofan Prokopovych. See M. Symchych, “Mohyliantsi v zakhidnykh universytetakh,” in *Relihiina filosofs'ka dymka v Kyievo-Mohylians'kii akademii*, ed. V.S. Hors'kyi (Kyiv, 2002), 269–86.
- 21 In preparing these attributions, I took into account the manuscripts that are held at the IR NBU, TSDIAUK (Central State Historical Archive in Kyiv), as well as manuscripts from the collections of the RNB (Russian National Library, St Petersburg), BAN (Library of the Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg), RGB (Russian State Library, Moscow), and NBL (N.I. Lobachevskii Scientific Library, Kazan). I thank Kostiantyn Sutorius for information about Kyiv-Mohyla Academy manuscripts in Russian libraries.
- 22 By the term “philosophy course” I mean the text that was dictated by the professor over two years of instruction of philosophy at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Inasmuch as the given text was written down by various students from dictation, the same philosophy course has often come down to us in several transcriptions.
- 23 In light of the time interval of nearly half a century between the courses taught by Iosyf Kononovych-Horbats'kyi and Inokentii Gizel' and all the other philosophy courses given by the Academy professors, I have refrained from analyzing the two early courses in this article, because this would have required including additional sources.
- 24 In his course, Teofan Prokopovych did not treat dialectics as a separate section. What was traditionally taught in dialectics, he examined in the first four books of logic (RNB, f. SPb DS 64, 1–92).
- 25 It often happens that the author of the course is satisfied with an abstract expression along the lines of: ‘Ita multi recentiores contra paucos’ (thus [assert] many newer [philosophers] contrary to a few).
- 26 Naturally, the researcher cannot confine himself to reading and noting only the theses, because the theses taken apart from the earlier objections that explain them are often incomprehensible.
- 27 IR NBU, f. 312, od. zb. 623.
- 28 Ibid., f. 306, od. zb. 112.
- 29 Ibid., f. 305, od. zb. 305.
- 30 Ibid., f. 312, od. zb. 629.
- 31 Ibid., f. 312, od. zb. 625, 97.
- 32 “Gengell Jerzy” in *Encyklopedia wiedzy o jezuitach na ziemiach Polski i Litwy 1564–1995*, oprac. Ludwik Grzebien, SJ (Cracow, 1996), 178.

- 33 IR NBU, f. 1, od. zb. 4406 – dialectics and logic, and f. 3, od. zb. 4408 – dialectics and metaphysics. In addition to these courses, the IR NBU had one more manuscript of Gengell's philosophy course from 1690–92. It is listed in Petrov's catalogue and should be located in f. 306, od. zb. 92. But this manuscript has been lost: its absence was discovered in the course of the 1966 inventory. In view of the fact that after Khrystofor Charnuts'kyi's death his library was transferred to the Kyivan Cave Monastery (see S.R. Kahamlyk, O.V. Matkovs'ka, and Z.I. Khyzhniak, "Charnuts'kyi Khrystofor," in *Kyievo-Mohylians'ka Akademiia v imenakh, XVII–XVIII st. Entsyklopedychne vydannia* (Kyiv, 2001), 582–3), and the manuscripts of the monastery's library constitute fond 306, it appears very likely that the lost manuscript was of Charnuts'kyi's lecture notes of Gengell's course.
- 34 Mykhailo Kozachyns'kyi's secular name was Manuilo.
- 35 Gervasius Brisacensis, *Cursus philosophicus brevi et clare metodo in tres tomulos distributus*, vol. 1: Logica (Cologne, 1734).
- 36 Bartholomäus Keckermann (1572–1608), Protestant philosopher who taught at the universities of Wittenberg, Leipzig, and Heidelberg. He is known for his philosophy textbooks, of which he wrote more than ten.
- 37 Nor can it be ruled out that Slomyns'kyi based his course not on Keckermann himself but on one of his followers.
- 38 RGB, f. 152, od. zb. 130, 4.

Orthodox Colleges in the Russian Empire (Second Half of
the Eighteenth to the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century):
Between Traditions and Innovations

LIUDMYLA POSOKHOVA

The definition of “Orthodox college” (*pravoslavnyi kolehium*) suggests a certain intrigue to the reader, because traditionally college meant, and still means, Catholic (Jesuit) educational institutions. In reality, the “college” became a trans-confessional educational model, including one that reflected the synthesis/clash of Eastern and Western Europe. Needless to say, Orthodox colleges had a genetic connection with their Jesuit counterparts. This was manifested in the similarity of their entire organizational structures, the existence of the same “classes” and the order in which they were taught (grammar, poetics, rhetoric, philosophy, and theology), and their curricula (essentially patterned on the Jesuit *Ratio Studiorum*).¹ An important feature of Orthodox colleges was considered to be the estate-inclusive composition of students, but the Jesuit colleges also knew no class restrictions. In terms of religion, however, they were different educational institutions. Clearly, the Eastern Slavic lands were dominated by the traditions, dogmas, and norms of the Orthodox Church, which influenced the content of education.

The most famous such school was the Kyiv (Mohyla) College, which sought the status of an “academy” from the government of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and later received it from the Muscovite state. As we know, by the middle of the seventeenth century, a leading figure in the Orthodox Church, Metropolitan of Kyiv Petro Mohyla (1596–1647), was able to successfully adapt some Western European educational forms, which resulted in the formation of the Kyiv College.² In the eighteenth century, three more colleges were founded in the Ukrainian lands that were part of the Russian Empire – in Chernihiv,

Kharkiv, and Pereiaslav (in 1700, 1726, and 1738, respectively). Apart from these three colleges, there were no other educational institutions with this designation in the Russian Empire. Moreover, until the reform of religious educational institutions in the Russian Empire in 1808 (aimed at the further professionalization of religious education and, consequently, the uniformization of religious educational establishments), they maintained the distinctiveness of their educational model. Today there is increasing discussion that in a strict sense the Orthodox colleges were underdeveloped universities (they could potentially become universities following the example of a number of Catholic colleges), and that their appearance in the Ukrainian lands should be interpreted as the southeastern vector of the advance of universities in Europe. Thus, Willem Frijhoff came to the conclusion that the curriculum of the Kyiv College was fully comparable to those Western European universities that had philosophy and theology departments.³ A similar conclusion is found in relation to other Orthodox colleges as well.

The syncretic nature of Orthodox colleges was due to several factors. These educational institutions originated in the Ukrainian lands, which were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and after that of the Muscovite state (Russian Empire). Scholars describe the time of the emergence and existence of Orthodox colleges (seventeenth-eighteenth centuries) as an important stage in the “encounter” and interaction of the traditions of West and East in all spheres of culture and at its various levels. This interaction produced the cultural-educational form of the Orthodox college, which, basing itself on “Latin scholarship,” was an amalgam of Western European and Slavic cultures. Petro Mohyla’s choice in favor of the Jesuit college model, based on the principles of combining a humanitarian-philological education with a religio-moral education, meant a turn to European educational standards, while, as scholars note, meeting the needs of society and Church reform.⁴ Thus the Kyiv-Mohyla College (Academy) managed to graft the achievements of a Western European education onto the Orthodox-Russian cultural tradition. His successful experience contributed to the emergence and rapid development of the Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Pereiaslav colleges. It is safe to say that the founders of these Orthodox colleges (Church hierarchs who were educated in the Jesuit academies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Kyiv Academy) were undoubtedly guided by the well-known model. The founders of the Chernihiv College were the prominent Church figures Lazar Baranovych and Ioan Maksymovych, of the Kharkiv College – Epifanii Tykhors'kyi, and of the Pereiaslav College – Arsenii Berlo.⁵

It is noteworthy that they attempted to follow the lead of the Kyiv College in registering and extending the rights of “their” educational institutions. This is most clearly expressed in Epifanii Tykhors'kyi’s request in his petition “to issue

a charter of support for the school.” It is very significant that the charter granted to the college on 16 March 1731⁶ is textually very close to the charter granted to the Kyiv-Mohyla College on 11 January 1694, which was confirmed by Peter I (26 September 1701).⁷ The rights recorded in the documents were very close to the concept of “academic freedom” in its medieval sense. Orthodox colleges also had forms of conducting classes (lectures, debates) and “academic acts” that were similar to those in Jesuit colleges. The same can be said about forms of leisure (for example, recreation), rituals, and symbols. We know about the existence of the theater in Orthodox colleges. Thus, even the model of the college, which was preserved for a long time in the educational structures of the Russian Empire, established the important fact of the presence and development of European educational forms. Many college teachers, who later became bishops, in setting up new seminaries, tried to reproduce the cultural-educational forms that were familiar to them. For example, Mytrofan Slotvyn's'kyi,⁸ a teacher at the Kharkiv College, just after becoming the bishop of Tver (1738), founded a seminary in which the performances in the school theater took place according to all the canons of school recitation.⁹ Of course, the reasons why the process of establishing seminaries in the empire was slow, why it stalled (the history of most seminaries indicates that their activities were interrupted for several years), and why teaching was for a long time limited to grammar classes, require special research.¹⁰ It is not surprising that the authors of synthetic works on the history of religious schools and the Church in the Russian Empire contrasted colleges with other seminaries of the eighteenth century.¹¹

While the first teachers in the provincial colleges were exclusively graduates of the Kyiv Academy, in a short time these colleges were training teachers no longer only for themselves but also for other religious and secular institutions in the empire. Graduates and teachers at colleges were regularly called to teaching positions in the capital's educational establishments, as well as in provincial seminaries and various schools. The number of students in colleges significantly exceeded the indicators for other theological seminaries. If we compare the total number of students in all the seminaries of the empire¹² with the number of students in the three Orthodox colleges (Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Pereiaslav), we will find that in the 1730s, one-third of all students studied in these colleges, and at the end of that century, one-tenth¹³ of all students in all the seminaries of the empire. The problem of significant Ukrainian (Little Russian) cultural influence on Great Russian society during the seventeenth to the first half of the nineteenth centuries has often been the object of close study by scholars, as part of which the authors touched on both educational and ecclesiastical aspects.¹⁴ However, the problem continues to be relevant. Thus in his article, Andreas Kappeler draws attention

to the fact that the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church belonged to the imperial power elite and the dominant Orthodox denomination played a key role as an imperial lynchpin.¹⁵ This view allows us to see another facet of this problem. At the same time, it should be noted that under Catherine II, in 1762–63, a number of measures were taken that restricted the rights of the Little Russian clergy to hold hierarchical posts.¹⁶

Although Orthodox colleges arose at a time when the processes of unification and centralization were already underway in the Russian Empire, they, as already noted, maintained the specific character of their model until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Colleges were included among imperial institutions as a local cultural-educational form, which proved to be competitive by virtue of the weakness of the educational institutions of the “metropolis” itself. Also contributing to this were the preserved features of the administrative-territorial and social structure and other traditions of the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine. However, until the reign of Catherine II, centralization and unification were manifested only in the Synod’s requirements for bishops to establish schools for the clergy in their eparchies and in the collection and systematization of information about seminaries, children of the clergy, and so forth. However, even in Catherine’s time, which was marked by very important events in the history of primary and secondary education,¹⁷ a number of projects to reform education at all levels, aimed at unification, still remained unrealized.¹⁸

To sum up, let us take note of Vasilii Kliuchevskii’s observation that it was precisely “a Western Russian Orthodox monk, educated in a Latin school or a Russian school modeled on it, who was the first bearer of Western scholarship called to Moscow.”¹⁹ Today, it is with good reason that the “polymorphism” of the Ukrainian cultural space is considered to have acted as a founding core (constitutive) element of the cultural code.²⁰ This “polymorphism” manifested itself in this region’s multi-layeredness, changeability, and amenability to external influences, and in its linguistic and confessional pluralism. As Mark von Hagen noted, it is “the fluidity of frontiers, the permeability of cultures, the historically formed multi-ethnicity of society that can make Ukrainian history a very ‘modern’ field of inquiry.”²¹ The history of Orthodox colleges (Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Pereiaslav) reflects fully, and perhaps more than the history of other institutions, the syncretic nature of the culture of eighteenth-century Ukraine; represented in their history are a variety of influences and trends in concentrated form. Although scholars were primarily interested in the rich history of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, in our opinion, provincial colleges can serve historians as important markers of the “internal borders” and cultural diffusions that took place in the Russian Empire as a whole in the eighteenth century.

When analyzing the channels and degree of influence of the European university on the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, it is important to take into account the periodization proposed by Peter Moraw, according to which there were three university “models” (corresponding to three epochs in the history of European universities) – pre-classical, classical and post-classical.²² It bears remembering that the transition from the pre-classical to the classical university actually dates to the eighteenth century. This period was marked by the crisis of the medieval university and the transformation of the main parameters of the pre-classical university. These processes involved not only the universities themselves, but the changes affected the entire field of education, resulting in the establishment in the second half of the eighteenth through the beginning of the nineteenth century of the “classical university,” while other educational institutions acquired new tasks. In the second half of the eighteenth century in the Russian Empire, especially under Catherine II, the search for new principles in the field of education intensified, and some reforms were carried out in this sphere. As of the second half of the eighteenth century, changes can also be seen in the Orthodox collegiums.

The obvious genetic connection between the Orthodox college model and the Jesuit colleges (universities) makes it necessary to search for answers to questions that, in our opinion, are important to the study of the more general problem of the transfer and adaptation of the university idea to Russian soil. How much did the crisis of the European medieval university affect the Orthodox colleges of the Russian Empire? Were the Orthodox colleges looking for answers to the “challenges” of the time and how did this manifest itself? Did this search and changes affect other educational institutions in the Russian Empire?

The crisis of the pre-classical model of the European university in the seventeenth, and especially the eighteenth, century prompted Catholic and Protestant universities to search for a way out of stagnation and for means and forms of modernization. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the Jesuit schools were also undergoing reforms, and the transformations in the West were influencing the philosophy and course of educational reforms in the Russian Empire, which is especially observable during the reign of Catherine II.²³ The role of the West in the “ideological content” of Russian culture in the age of Enlightenment, the problems of the transfer and adaptation of Western European ideas in the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, and the mutual influence of cultures within the pan-European space are being actively studied today.²⁴ The approaches and solutions proposed in the course of these studies give rise to the question of how much the transformations of the medieval university influenced such inherently European institutions as the Orthodox colleges. To answer this question,

it is necessary, first of all, to establish what exactly, and in what direction, was changing in the model of the Orthodox college. Our research allows us to state at the outset that the individual innovations that appeared from time to time in the administration and organization of the educational process in colleges did not change the model in essence.

Among all the components that together formed the college model, significant transformations as of the middle of the eighteenth century occurred only in the content of instruction. The content of the courses in the *Ratio Studiorum* program, the main plan of studies in the first half of the eighteenth century, underwent changes. To elucidate the essence of these changes, we will try to reconstruct the content of the academic disciplines and teaching practices that were followed in the Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Pereiaslav Colleges. Given that Orthodox colleges formed a significant segment of the Russian Empire's educational sphere, we believe that accomplishing this task will shed additional light on similar processes in other educational institutions, primarily religious ones. Although a lot has been written about the history of many seminaries in the Russian Empire, the description of the academic process is limited to a list of academic disciplines with very little information about their content.²⁵ The lack of research on this subject is largely due to the paucity of sources. With regard to the history of the transfer and adaptation of European ideas in the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, Claus Scharf noted that this topic needs special sources, access to data not so much in fundamental works as special studies on the history of books, journals, and libraries; the history of literature, art, and science; the history of personalities, societies, especially authors, translators, publishers, buyers, subscribers, readers, reader communities, and so forth.²⁶ He drew attention to the need for a new reading of the array of paperwork, as well as sources of personal origin (letters, memoirs). Historians of European education are already following this path, although, as shown by Laurence Brockliss, the study of curricula even in Western European universities of the early modern period is still an important but difficult task.²⁷

When undertaking the task of reconstructing the curricula of Orthodox colleges and identifying changes in them, it is impossible not to say a few words about the *Spiritual Regulation* (*Dukhovnyi reglament*), written by Teofan Prokopovych, one of the initiators of the reforms carried out by Peter I. Researchers have repeatedly emphasized the similarity of the theoretical foundations of the *Spiritual Regulation* to the works of Samuel Pufendorf and other representatives of the school of natural law;²⁸ some scholars have called this document the program of the Russian Reformation.²⁹ Historians esteem Prokopovych as an educator and scholar-fighter, who focused his criticism on Jesuit scholasticism,³⁰

having freed himself from the traditions of a Latin-Jesuit education, which was clearly manifested in the *Regulation*.³¹ At the same time, I. I. Kedrov noted long ago that although Teofan Prokopovych had wanted to organize the internal and external setup of the academy on the basis of different principles than those of a Latin-Jesuit education, he was not free of the pedagogical concepts under which he had been educated and which prevailed at the Kyiv College.³² Igor Smolitsch came to the very important conclusion that for the most part the curriculum drawn up by Teofan was patterned on the program of the Kyiv Academy.³³ That is to say, the *Spiritual Regulation* did not actually lead to a change in the content of courses. By the way, the term “academy” is used in the *Regulation* as the name of an educational institution, and “seminary” is understood to mean a student residence (*bursa*) or boarding school (that is, the premises themselves) belonging to it. The term “seminary” began to be applied to theological schools in the Russian Empire as of 1731.³⁴

Changes in the internal content of the educational process in Orthodox colleges and changes in the content of courses and in their status, can be seen starting from the 1750s–70s. The innovations marked the beginning of a reorientation toward other educational paradigms, which were being implemented at the same time in German Protestant universities and gymnasiums. Of course, the search for something new can be observed even earlier: it is no coincidence that researchers specializing in Kyiv-Mohyla Academy’s philosophy courses have taken note of the fact that the rejection of scholastic Aristotelianism in the teaching of philosophy did not happen overnight.³⁵ It must be noted that Jesuit philosophy was itself evolving, and in the eighteenth century, it showed discernible traces of “Cartesian and Wolffian elements.”³⁶

Difficulties in reconstructing the content of the educational process in Orthodox colleges (and seminaries) in the Russian Empire of the eighteenth century are also due to the fact that the scope and depth of courses (teaching aids and textbooks employed by teachers) must be established in each individual case. The organization of the educational process depended on many factors (the school’s finances, the initiatives of the college’s administration, the professors, the availability of various books, and so forth). Attempts to regulate the curriculum throughout the eighteenth century remained at the level of suggestions and recommendations, and uniform courses of study appeared in the Russian Empire only in the course of the reform of religious educational institutions in 1808. This determines the range of sources that can be used to identify and study the educational programs of Orthodox colleges in the second half of the eighteenth century. For the first half of the century, of crucial importance in the reconstruction of the curriculum of these schools were handwritten lecture courses (many of them were

brought in from the Jesuit colleges). But in the second half of the century, teaching in the colleges was based on textbooks printed in a number of European university centers and by the Moscow University Press, as well as on the published works of European scholars. It is quite difficult to establish the range of all the printed textbooks that were used in the colleges. In the absence of syllabuses, the use of a given textbook was determined by the views of the diocesan and collegiate authorities and depended on their efforts to find and purchase books.

It is possible to solve this research problem by referring to several types of paperwork.³⁷ First of all, the instructions to teachers, which came from the bishops and were refined by the rectors. But because few of them have been preserved, it is necessary to supplement them with information from the reports of instructors, which indicated the textbooks used and the scope of the material that had been studied. The real finds among the paperwork were the lists of books purchased by colleges specifically for educational purposes. The memoirs of former students and teachers also sometimes specified the textbooks that they had studied and taught from (although students often reported the names of authors and titles with distortions). It is particularly worth mentioning the problem of including the registers (catalogues) of libraries of Orthodox colleges as sources for reconstructing actual educational practices. In our opinion, these inventories of books should not be automatically included in the lists of textbooks, as is often done by researchers, who cite long columns of titles that found their way into a given library under various circumstances and at various times. In our case, library registers³⁸ were used to confirm the presence of certain books in collegiums and to determine their attribution. We also used the entries at the end of the book registers that recorded what books had been given to students. This was not the case with the lists of some of the college teachers' own books, whose analysis considered the courses taught by the given teacher. Translations of books made by teachers and students at the colleges for teaching purposes were also sources for our study. This article focuses on the "basic" textbooks in various disciplines, based on the fact that they were treated as such by the administrators of the colleges and the teachers.

When we speak about changes in the content of the educational process in Orthodox colleges, we must re-emphasize that the number of classes and the order in which they were taught remained unchanged. Therefore, we will consider changes starting from the lower grammar classes (in which Latin, Church Slavonic, German, French, Polish, and some other disciplines were studied) and all the way up to the upper classes.

While in the first half of the century, the Latin language was studied exclusively according to the textbooks of the Jesuit Emmanuel Alvar, as of the 1760s, they

were abandoned in favor of the textbooks of Christoph Cellarius, philologist and professor of eloquence and history at the University of Halle³⁹ (for example, in his instruction in 1769 to the rector of the Kharkiv College, Samuïl Myslavs'kyi⁴⁰ indicated the need for such a replacement⁴¹). Colleges purchased Christoph Cellarius's book in large quantities (in 1774 the Pereiaslav College bought 140 copies⁴²), and it was regularly listed among the books that students studied.⁴³ They also began to rely on so-called "Langian colloquies"⁴⁴ in performing grammar exercises in the study of Latin. In fact, the textbook was called "School colloquy"; it was created for educational purposes by Johann Joachim Lange,⁴⁵ professor of theology at Halle University.

Great efforts were made in all Orthodox colleges to organize the study of the German language, and the documentation often contains information about the purchase of a large number of German grammars. At the same time, the authorship of the textbooks is not easy to establish, only in some cases are there mentions of authors in the memoirs of former students.⁴⁶ Some of them noted that they had studied using the grammar of Franz Hölterhof, a doctor of theology from Halle,⁴⁷ and also Johann Christoph Gottsched,⁴⁸ a professor at the University of Leipzig, who, in addition to being a famous philosopher, influenced the establishment of the norms of the German literary language. Speaking about the study of languages, it should be noted that some historians mentioned the early (in comparison with other educational institutions of the empire) beginning of the study of German in the colleges, especially at the Kharkiv College (from 1740), and about the engagement of teachers from abroad (their names were not identified).⁴⁹ Our search yielded the names of the first teachers: "Herr Boneberg," "master Gottfried Jungius," "Herr Hertz."⁵⁰ Their engagement was accounted for by the high level of education that they had received. In the early 1780s, German was taught at the Kharkiv College by Karl-Johann Fegen, who later moved to the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.⁵¹ Having considered these examples, we should note that foreign teachers were engaged by the collegiums primarily to teach languages (this also applies to French). Incidentally, in most seminaries of the Russian Empire, the teaching of German and French would become regular only at the end of the eighteenth century.⁵²

The teaching of mathematics in colleges was based on several textbooks of arithmetic, geometry, and trigonometry by D. Anichkov,⁵³ who translated the works of the famous German mathematician, physicist, and astronomer Johann Friedrich Weidler, a professor at the University of Wittenberg. These publications were purchased by the colleges in dozens of copies.⁵⁴ Iakov Tolmachev⁵⁵ recalled that, as a teacher, he prepared classes at the Kharkiv College using Weidler's full course in Latin.⁵⁶ The reliance on these textbooks is important evidence that

arithmetic had gained the status of a discipline in the curriculum of the “new” gymnasium of the beginning of the nineteenth century, evidence of the process of the shifting of elementary mathematics from the philosophy course to the lower classes of the gymnasium.

Although the status of poetics and rhetoric as normative disciplines remained unchanged until the end of the eighteenth century, these courses exhibited new priorities and a departure from traditional definitions.⁵⁷ In the second half of the century, there was a gradual rejection of the traditions and authors who were studied in Jesuit colleges. Johann Friedrich Burg’s *The Fundaments of Rhetoric* was the main textbook.⁵⁸ The author was a famous theologian of the mid-eighteenth century, who had studied at the University of Leipzig. This textbook is mentioned in both instructions and teacher’s reports,⁵⁹ as well as in memoirs.⁶⁰ This textbook, which was reprinted many times, was used in many seminaries of the Russian Empire in the early nineteenth century, through to the end of the 1830s.⁶¹ In colleges, it was the basis for instruction as early as the 1770s, a few years after its first publication. College students recalled that they also studied the “Gesner lexicon” in class.⁶² This lexicon was compiled by Johann Matthias Gesner,⁶³ professor of eloquence at the University of Göttingen and founder of the Philological Seminary, who, as noted by scholars, discarded the old humanistic imitative method and introduced a new humanistic one, according to which the classics were the material for an aesthetic-literary and historical education.⁶⁴ All Orthodox collegiums purchased these lexicons by the dozens,⁶⁵ and a huge number of copies are listed in library catalogues. With regard to the purchase of books by colleges, we should emphasize that we are not talking about centralized purchases (such a system did not yet exist in the Russian Empire), but about the local initiative of rectors, bishops, and teachers. Numerous publications of translations of academic and scholarly books (in the empire or on order from abroad) date back to this time. But these facts cannot be automatically regarded as confirmation of the presence of these books in educational institutions, still less of their use in the educational process (their press runs were miniscule).⁶⁶ Unfortunately, such lists are often the basis for the mistaken practice of mechanically “recording” all the publications as textbooks of colleges or seminaries, which distorts the real picture of the educational process.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, a number of disciplines (primarily history and geography), which were previously studied as part of the rhetoric course, gained independent status. Apropos the history course, it should be emphasized that in the 1770s it became a separate subject of instruction in colleges (initially, together with geography). Although Catherine II noted the need to study history in the empire’s religious schools, which was reflected in the Plan

and Charter of Religious Educational Institutions (1766),⁶⁷ this plan was not implemented, and history began to be taught in some seminaries only from the end of the 1780s, although even in the early nineteenth century, instruction in this subject was far from universal.⁶⁸ In the Kharkiv College, in accordance with the 1769 instruction of Samuïl Myslavs'kyi,⁶⁹ when studying this discipline, it was recommended to refer to the work on world history of Hieronymus Freyer,⁷⁰ a professor of rhetoric at Halle University, who became famous in particular for his work in the field of history. The same instruction included the works of Johann Gottlieb Heineccius and the most famous work of the German professor of poetics and rhetoric, Daniel Georg Morhof.⁷¹ The author of the instruction emphasized that these were the books on which teachers were required to base their instruction. The colleges also used the works on history by Christoph Cellarius, which were published multiple times in various European cities.⁷² Also used were the Russian translations of such works as Samuel Pufendorf's *An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe* (*Einleitung zu der Historie der vornehmsten Reiche und Staaten, so itziger Zeit in Europa sich befinden*), Caesar Baronius's *Ecclesiastical Annals, Introduction to Universal History* (*Einleitung zur Universalhistorie*) by Hilmar Curas, and the work on Russian history by August Ludwig Schlözer. Much has been said in the literature about the significance of Samuel Pufendorf's work, the first textbook on world history in the Russian Empire.⁷³ At the same time, scholars have documented the use of this work in the educational process only in a few educational institutions in Moscow and St Petersburg. Against this background, two catalogues of the personal library of Lavrentii Kordet, a professor at the Kharkiv College, can be considered striking finds.⁷⁴ These lists attest to Kordet's purposeful selection of history textbooks. His library included Samuel Pufendorf's *Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe*,⁷⁵ Hilmar Curas's *Introduction to Universal History*,⁷⁶ Baronius's *Ecclesiastical Annals*, the works of Freyer, Johann Franz Budde, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, and Maturinus Veyssière La Croze. These works had an excellent reputation. It was no accident that the Curas work was reprinted in Europe thirteen times, Freyer's, nine times, and Pufendorf's, four times.⁷⁷ At the same time, Freyer's work, which was used in the curriculum of the Ukrainian colleges,⁷⁸ was very rarely found in the educational institutions of the Russian Empire in the second half of the century, and it was the main textbook in the history course only at Moscow University.⁷⁹ Sacred history was taught in collegiums based on the work of the famous German teacher and writer Johann Hübner.⁸⁰ The main textbook for teaching geography in collegiums was the work of the same Johann Hübner, *Brief Questions from the New and Old Geography: Up to the Present Time* (*Kurze Fragen aus der Neuen und Alten Geographie: bis auf*

gegenwärtige Zeit) (it appeared in the reports of teachers and on the list of books in the library of Kordet, who also taught geography). This book was translated into all the European languages, went through thirty-six editions during the author's lifetime, and was written especially for educational purposes.⁸¹

Colleges often also resorted to publishing their own translations of textbooks by European authors, which were made by students under the guidance of teachers. For example, the Kharkiv College translated from German excerpts of lectures by the professor of literature and ethics Christian Fürchtegott Gellert, which he read at the University of Leipzig.⁸²

These abovenamed textbooks, which were used in the grammar classes and poetics and rhetoric classes of Orthodox colleges, serve as important evidence of significant changes in the content of the curriculum. At this time, the Latin language was losing its former importance everywhere in Europe, becoming just one of the subjects in the "gymnasium course." The processes of the reorientation of the humanistic school to local languages (which are also regarded as an element of the crisis in the medieval model of the university) were also reflected in the Orthodox colleges, in which the Russian language began to take on some of the functions of Latin.⁸³ Accordingly, the process of teaching "new" languages also intensified. The curricula of the classes in Orthodox colleges gradually evolved into the curricula of the modernized gymnasiums that were emerging throughout Europe.

The middle of the eighteenth century was also the boundary that marked the transition in the history of Orthodox colleges from teaching Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy to Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy. From the 1750s on, the teaching of philosophy in all Orthodox colleges was based on the work of the German philosopher Friedrich Christian Baumeister. It is possible (primarily, based on the Myslavs'kyi instruction of 1769) to identify Baumeister's specific philosophy textbook in the Latin language (consisting of logic, metaphysics, and ethics) that they began to use.⁸⁴ To teach the subject of physics, which was missing from the textbook, the author of the instruction directed that teachers rely on the works of Johann Heinrich Winkler, a professor at the University of Leipzig, who was a follower of Leibniz and Wolff, and of Ludwig Philipp Thümmig,⁸⁵ a famous physicist and philosopher. Particularly noteworthy was the work of Thümmig, who translated from German into Latin the three-volume work by Christian Wolff on physics (*Institutiones philosophiae Wolffianae, in usus academicos adornatae*, 1725). This work was translated into Russian by Mikhail Lomonosov,⁸⁶ and it was this work that was studied in the colleges.

A few words about the "ordinary" lecturer of philosophy of the college of the 1760s–1770s, the aforementioned Lavrentii Kordet (he also taught philosophy for

many years).⁸⁷ The “philosophical” section of his personal library was impressive. Kordet collected several versions of Baumeister’s textbooks (in Latin and Russian) and the philosophical works of Johann Gottlieb Heineccius,⁸⁸ professor of philosophy at Halle, in which the latter showed his adherence to the philosophical and legal views of Christian Wolff and Hugo Grotius.⁸⁹ Needless to say, it is difficult to know how Lavrentii Kordet understood and interpreted the ideas contained in the works that made up his extensive library, which he studied in preparation for classes. We can only quote the words of Hryhorii Skovoroda,⁹⁰ his colleague at the college, who, describing Kordet, remarked that his philosophical knowledge is very extensive.⁹¹ Undoubtedly, an important feature of Kordet’s portrait is the fact that he corresponded for many years with Samuïl Myslavs’kyi, discussing issues pertaining to teaching at the colleges, and Myslavs’kyi, in turn, was in correspondence with Baumeister.⁹²

Bishops who drew up instructions for teachers at colleges with instructions on how and what books to teach often purchased these books themselves and passed them on to the colleges. After the death of the bishop of Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi, Kyrylo Liashchevets’kyi (1770), who had always helped the Chernihiv College, an extensive library was left, which he had promised during his lifetime to transfer to the college collection.⁹³ Among the bishop’s books were many that were used in the educational process (the works of Baronius, Pufendorf, Freyer, Wolff, Baumeister, Johannes Andreas Quenstedt, Johann Gerhard, Joseph Bingham, Johann Jakob Brucker, Budde).⁹⁴ The collection shows a purposeful interest in the works of contemporary European scholars: philosophers, Pietist theologians, historians, and jurists.

From the 1770s on, philosophy was taught in Orthodox colleges (and at the end of the century also in other seminaries) based on Friedrich Baumeister’s book, to which were added excerpts from the works of Teofan Prokopovych, Johann Heinrich Winkler, Christian Weisens, and the textbooks by Petrus Canisius and Samuel Christian Hollmann.⁹⁵ It is noteworthy that the Kharkiv College lecturer Iakov Tolmachev, not satisfied with this textbook, translated Baumeister’s logic, philosophy, and moral philosophy from Latin for educational purposes.⁹⁶ Various editions of Baumeister (in Latin and Russian) were purchased by the colleges in such large numbers⁹⁷ that it is safe to say that every student had them. It is not surprising that Baumeister’s textbooks appeared together with students at colleges in remote corners of Ukraine. In his novel *Pan Khaliavskii* (*Master Khaliavskii*), Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnov’ianenko describes an episode in which the son of a landowner, who was taught by a student of the college working as a private tutor (*na konditsiiakh*), drew all over his teacher’s books, which included Baumeister’s logic.⁹⁸

The identification of the range of textbooks that were the basis for the study of philosophy in colleges shows that represented in the course were the main directions of German Enlightenment, the rational philosophy of Leibniz-Wolff.

Incidentally, the teaching of philosophy according to F. Baumeister at the Moscow Academy began only in 1777, but even in the early 1780s, this transition was not easy.⁹⁹ Similar difficulties were recorded by historians of the Kazan Theological Academy.¹⁰⁰ Only at Moscow University were the same textbooks used to teach philosophy as those used in the Orthodox colleges.¹⁰¹

At the end of the eighteenth century, another component appeared in the philosophy course – the history of philosophy, which, according to the reports of teachers,¹⁰² was taught based on the textbook of Johann Jakob Brucker,¹⁰³ who is considered to be one of the founders of critical historico-philosophical scholarship who applied a modified version of historical skepticism.¹⁰⁴

Modern scholars studying the history of education draw conclusions about the significance of textbooks on philosophy as an important element in the transfer of new educational ideas, including those that were developed in Halle, to the East Slavic lands. Thus Günther Mülpfordt has noted that the “representative” of Halle in this region was not Christian Wolff himself, but the textbooks written in accordance with his philosophical system, and it was the textbooks of Baumeister, Thümmig, and Gottsched that circulated in European countries and in Russia.¹⁰⁵ He and other historians regard the “German book” as an independent socio-cultural phenomenon, which during this period was one of the main criteria of the developing process of the interaction of national cultures.¹⁰⁶ The educational institutions of the capital of the Russian Empire were the first to come to the attention of researchers. The stated facts, in our opinion, allow us to make the case that Orthodox colleges also played a role in this process.

The content of the theology course that was taught in Orthodox colleges also underwent changes. In the 1750s, these schools switched from a system influenced by the Jesuit tradition of teaching theology to the system of Teofan Prokopovych, which was the fruit of a synthesis of different theological trends.¹⁰⁷ It is noteworthy that in the instructions to teachers of colleges, the teachers were strongly encouraged to refer, in addition to Teofan Prokopovych’s course, to the works of the “newest teachers of other faiths.”¹⁰⁸ In private correspondence, Bishop Samuïl Myslav's'kyi advised the college’s professor of theology to read and use in preparing his lectures the sermons of the famous Lutheran theologian, professor at the University of Helmstedt and later at Halle, Johann Lorenz Mosheim.¹⁰⁹ The college’s teachers not only implemented these recommendations, but they expanded them. For example, Kharkiv College lecturers Iakynf Karpyn's'kyi¹¹⁰ and Syl'vestr Lebedyn's'kyi¹¹¹ wrote theological textbooks in line with the works of Prokopovych

and the Protestant theologian David Hollatz (Hollatius).¹¹² These textbooks attest to the exposure of Orthodox colleges to the European theological discourse and the adoption of the approaches of so-called “theological rationalism.” This program could easily become the foundation of the theology faculty. Incidentally, the biographies of Iakynf Karpyn's'kyi and Syl'vestr Lebedyn's'kyi are fairly typical examples of the careers of many lecturers at Orthodox colleges, who, after completing this stage of their activity, often went on to head other seminaries, became bishops, and in their new place incorporated their courses in the practice of these seminaries. Karpyn's'kyi was later the rector of several seminaries (Kolomna, Vologda, Novgorod), Lebedyn's'kyi – the rector of the Tambov and Kazan seminaries (under him the latter became an academy), and they taught their theology courses in these educational institutions. There are many similar examples. They allow us to begin answering the question about the impact of the changes that were taking place in the Orthodox colleges themselves in the second half of the eighteenth century on other educational institutions (primarily religious ones) in the Russian Empire. For a more complete answer, we need to study the content of the curricula at other seminaries.

It is interesting to note that under the leadership of Ioan Maksymovych, the lecturers at the Chernihiv College published the book *Bogomyslie v pol'zu pravovernym* (*Pious Thoughts for the Benefit of True Believers*) as early as in 1710, which was a translation of the work *Meditationes Sacrae et exercitium pietatis* by the Lutheran theologian, professor at the University of Jena Johann Gerhard. In 1720 the Senate issued a decree imposing sanctions on the Chernihiv Press on the grounds that the book “contained a lot of Lutheran contrariety.”¹¹³ The ban did not affect the fact that Gerhard's work was found in the personal libraries of teachers at the colleges (for example, in the library of Platon Malynov's'kyi,¹¹⁴ lecturer of theology at the Kharkiv College). This example shows that even as late as the mid-eighteenth century there was an interest among college teachers in the works of German Protestant theology scholars.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the itineraries of educational travel of college students also changed. While in the first half of the century many teachers (and founders) of colleges completed their studies (taking individual courses) in Jesuit colleges and academies, thereafter they were sent to German Protestant universities to continue their education. There were cases when bishops sent the best students to study in Germany at their own expense (on the cusp of the 1760s–70s, Bishop Samuil Myslav's'kyi paid the costs of study in Germany for two students of the Kharkiv College to be educated for the teaching profession¹¹⁵). By tracing the fate of students and teachers, and their academic biographies, we can assert that the effect of these trips was to introduce the educational and scholarly

achievements of the German Protestant universities into the educational practices of the colleges. The first group (of two people) was sent to the “German universities” as early as 1727 from the Kharkiv College. One of them was Kyrylo Floryn-s'kyi,¹¹⁶ who upon his return, taught poetics and philosophy at the college.¹¹⁷ We should note that students did not complete the entire course of study at German universities but studied individual disciplines (that is why they are not recorded in the matriculas of these universities). The great difficulties in analyzing these data stem from the fact that the bishops tried not to report to the Synod about sending students abroad, did not name the universities,¹¹⁸ and did not report on the students’ successes. This was because when this information was revealed, it was impossible to keep the teacher at the college, since he was immediately summoned to the capital’s academies.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, the memoirs of Professor Illia Tymkovs'kyi of Kharkiv University (he studied at the Pereiaslav College and the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy) reveal that he grew up among “heads” who had studied in Königsberg, Leipzig, Leiden, Göttingen, Oxford, and Edinburgh.¹²⁰ At that time, it was quite common for representatives of the local elite of the Hetmanate or Sloboda Ukraine, while visiting Europe on business trips, to attend universities and audit individual courses. Some of them became teachers at colleges. In one of the unrealized projects of creating a “formal university” on the basis of the Kyiv Academy (1766),¹²¹ one of the “main motives” for its appearance was said to be the propensity of the people for education, which “is evidenced by the fact that there are never fewer than 1,000 students in Kyiv, up to 800 in Chernihiv, and up to 300 in Pereiaslav,” that “fathers send them and young people are willing to learn.”¹²² “People with inborn acuity, having experienced ... classes in Little Russian academies ..., sometimes being indigent and poor, undertake voyages and travels to Germany and Italy and farther, from which they return directly as scholars.”¹²³ It is well known that Hryhorii Skovoroda attended lectures at European universities during his business trip, and eventually became a lecturer at the Pereiaslav and Kharkiv Colleges.

Against the background of various contacts with European universities, as well as under the influence of Enlightenment ideas, there was a gradually growing understanding among the collegians and their circle of the failure of the college model as an educational form to meet society’s new needs. An attempt to make some changes in the form (utilitarian orientation) was the opening of so-called “additional classes” at the Kharkiv College in 1768, in which the teaching of languages, mathematics, and geometry was expanded, and a number of subjects such as geodesy, engineering, and artillery appeared. The desire to modernize educational institutions was manifested in requests to the authorities to create a “full-fledged university.” We know of some ten university projects and proposals that

were made by top state officials, local officials, and representatives of local society (1760–1804).¹²⁴ Notable are the instructions from the nobility of the Little Russian and Sloboda Ukraine provinces to Catherine's Commission on Preparing a New Legal Code of 1767, which contained petitions requesting the establishment of universities (in Kyiv, as well as on the basis of converted colleges, in Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Kharkiv).¹²⁵ Incidentally, in the instructions to deputies of other provinces of the Russian Empire, questions even of primary education were raised only in a few cases, and only the deputies of Orel County raised the question of "medical universities."¹²⁶

Historically, Orthodox colleges, created under the influence of Jesuit colleges (universities), represented the southeastern vector of the advance of the European medieval university. The universities created in Russia in the second half of the eighteenth to early nineteenth century represented a different line leading to German universities, which were already largely modernized, and in this sense their appearance can be linked to the northeastern vector. Although from the middle of the eighteenth century on, Orthodox colleges were also actively searching for ways to renew themselves, which prompted them to turn to the experience and achievements of German universities, their educational model was not modernized. Innovations did not reach that "critical mass" that would allow them to overcome traditions and lead to fundamental changes in the model. The path that Orthodox colleges took should be considered when studying all aspects of the transfer and adaptation of the university idea on Ukrainian and Russian soil. It can be said that the Orthodox colleges served as a means of preparation for the reception of the classical university in the Russian Empire. Colleges, retiring from the historical arena as the embodiment of the medieval university, nevertheless were for a long period important channels of interaction of cultures in the European space and left fertile ground for the germination of new educational ideas and the design of new educational forms. The latter gives us reason to assert that the classical university in the Russian Empire did not arise out of "nothing."

Translated from the Russian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

This article is based on a lecture delivered at the conference on "Deutsch-russische Universitätsbeziehungen vom Ende des 18. bis zum Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts im europäischen Kontext: Transfer, Wechselwirkungen, Lebenswelten" (Mainz). The research was prepared within the framework of the international project "Ubi universitas, ibi Europa" (transfer and

adaptation of university education in Russia in the second half of the eighteenth to the first half of the nineteenth century), which is supported by the German Historical Institute (Moscow) and the Gerda Henkel Stiftung. Originally published as: Liudmila Posokhova, "Pravoslavnye kollegiumy Rossiiskoi imperii (vtoraia polovina XVIII – nachalo XIX vv.): mezhdru traditsiiami i novatsiiami," *Ab Imperio*, no. 3 (2010): 85–112. Copyright 2010 by Liudmila Posokhova and *Ab Imperio*. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 On Jesuit colleges see Aldo Scaglione, *The Liberal Arts and the Jesuit College System* (Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1986); John O'Malley, *The First Jesuits* (London, 1993).
- 2 An extensive historiography is dedicated to Petro Mohyla, which also deals with issues related to the Kyiv College: Ihor Ševčenko, "The Many Worlds of Peter Mohyla," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 1–2 (1984): 9–44; A. Zhukovs'kyi, *Petro Mohyla i pytannia iednosti tserkov* (Paris, 1969; republished Kyiv, 1997); Frank Sysyn, "Peter Mohyla and the Kiev Academy in Recent Western Works: Divergent Views on Seventeenth Century Ukrainian Culture," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 1–2 (June 1984): 155–87. On the years of the school's formation, see L. Sharipova, "Eshche o 'Cheloveke mnogikh mirov': Petr Mogila – traditsionalist, reformator, opportunist," *Ab Imperio* 1 (2000), 53–73.
- 3 Hilde de Ridder-Symoens, ed., *A History of the University in Europe*, vol. 2, *Universities in Early Modern Europe (1500–1800)* (Cambridge, 1996), 48.
- 4 Liudmila Charipova, *Latin Books and the Eastern Orthodox Clerical Elite in Kiev, 1632–1780* (Manchester, 2006).
- 5 Lazar Baranovych (1620–1693) was rector of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, later the archbishop of Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi. Ioan Maksymovych (1651–1715) was a lecturer at the Kyiv Academy, later archbishop of Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi, from 1721 – metropolitan of Tobolsk and All Siberia. Epifanii Tykhors'kyi (?–1731) was a teacher at the Kyiv Academy, later the bishop of Belgorod and Oboian'. Arsenii Berlo (?–1744) was a teacher at the Kyiv Academy, later bishop of Pereiaslav and Boryspil.
- 6 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii (Sobranie I)* (St Petersburg, 1830), vol. 8, no. 5716.
- 7 *Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* 2 (Kyiv, 1846): 320–1, 325–34.
- 8 Mytrofan Slotvyns'kyi studied at the Kyiv-Mohyla and Lviv Academies, was rector of the Kharkiv College, rector of the Moscow Academy, and bishop of Tver.
- 9 I.M. Badalich and V.D. Kuz'mina, *Pamiatniki russkoi shkol'noi dramy XVIII veka (po zagrebskim spiskam)* (Moscow, 1968), 56–8.

- 10 So far the only work dealing with this question is still the research of P. Znamenskii (P. Znamenskii, *Dukhovnye shkoly v Rossii do reform 1808 goda* [Kazan, 1881], 189 ff.) Contemporary research in the history of individual seminaries, as a rule, bypass this issue.
- 11 I.K. Smolich, *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvy: 1700–1917* (Moscow, 1996), part 1, pp. 157, 213 (translation of Igor Smolich, *Geschichte der Russischen Kirche* [Leiden, 1964]); B.V. Titlinov, *Dukhovnaia shkola v Rossii v XIX stoletii* (Vilnius, 1908), 1:5.
- 12 Znamenskii, *Dukhovnye shkoly v Rossii*, 185, 578.
- 13 These calculations were made on the basis of the following sources: *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv v Sankt-Peterburge* (Russian State Historical Archive in St Petersburg; hereinafter – RGIAP), f. 796, op. 18, d. 32, t. 2; f. 796, op. 78, d. 983; f. 796, op. 78, d. 970; “Svedeniia o Pereiaslavsko-Poltavskoi seminarii za vremia ot 1798 g. po 1818 g., izvlechennye iz del arkhiva Poltavskoi dukhovnoi konsistorii,” in *Poltavskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti. Chast' neofits.* 21 (1887), 771.
- 14 K.V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnu zhizn'* (Kazan, 1914); David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985).
- 15 See Andreas Kappeler, “Tsentr i elity periferii v Gabsburgskoi, Rossiiskoi i Osmanskoi imperiiakh (1700–1918 gg.),” *Ab Imperio* 2 (2007): 17–58.
- 16 Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnu zhizn'*, 488.
- 17 See Jan Kusher, “Individual, Subject, and Empire. Toward a Discourse on Upbringing, Education, and Schooling in the Time of Catherine II,” *Ab Imperio* 2 (2008), 125–57.
- 18 A. Iu. Andreev, *Rossiiskie universitety XVIII – pervoi poloviny XIX veka v kontekste universitetskoi istorii Evropy* (Moscow, 2009), 302–30.
- 19 V.O. Kliuchevskii, *Sochineniia v 9 tomakh*, vol. 3, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, part 3 (Moscow, 1988), 259.
- 20 Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, “Rus, Ukraine, Ruthenia, Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie, Rzeczpospolita, Moskwa, Rosja, Europa Środkowo Wschodnia: o wielowarstwowości i polifunkcjonalizmie kulturowym,” in *Contributi italiani al XIII congresso internazionale degli slavish*, Alberto Alberti et al., eds. (Pisa, 2003), 325–87; N. Iakovenko, “Vybir imeni versus vybir shliakhu (nazvy ukraïns'koï terytorii mizh kintsem XVI – kintsem XVII st.),” in *Mizhkul'turnyi dialog*, vol. 1, *Identychnist'* (Kyiv, 2009), 58, 95.
- 21 Mark von Hagen, “Does Ukraine Have a History?” *Slavic Review* 54, no. 3 (1995), 670. Although Natalia Iakovenko noted that what exists today are more like declarations of solidarity from the perspective of Ukraine as a territory over which there ran a moving border of interaction between Western

- and Eastern civilizations, than specific studies (N. Iakovenko, *Vstup do istorii* [Kyiv, 2007], 168).
- 22 Peter Moraw, "Aspekte und Dimensionen älterer deutscher Universitäts-geschichte," in *Academia Gissensis* (Marburg, 1982), 1–43; Bjorn Wittrock, "The Modern University: the Three Transformations," in Sh. Rothblatt and B. Wittrock, eds, *The European and American University since 1800* (Cambridge, 1993), 303–61.
 - 23 Kusher, "Individual, Subject, and Empire."
 - 24 "Vvodna nravy i obychai Evropeiskie v Evropeiskom narode": *k probleme adaptatsii zapadnykh idei i praktik v Rossiiskoi imperii* (Moscow, 2008).
 - 25 See, for example, K.F. Nadezhdin, *Istoriia Vladimirskoi dukhovnoi seminarii (s 1750 goda po 1840 god)* (Vladimir on Kliazma, 1875); A.A. Blagoveshchenskii, *Istoriia Kazanskoi dukhovnoi seminarii s vosem'iu nizshimi uchilishchami za XVIII-XIX st.* (Kazan, 1881); I.V. Nikol'skii, *Istoriia Voronezhskoi dukhovnoi seminarii* (Voronezh, 1898–1899); V.I. Kolosov, *Istoriia Tverskoi dukhovnoi seminarii: Ko dnu 150-letnego iubileia Seminarii* (Tver, 1889); D.I. Agntsev, *Istoriia Riazanskoi dukhovnoi seminarii. 1724–1840 g.* (Riazan, 1889); N.V. Malitskii, *Istoriia Vladimirskoi dukhovnoi seminarii* (Moscow, 1900–1902); N.V. Malitskii, *Istoriia Suzdal'skoi dukhovnoi seminarii (1723–1788)* (Vladimir, 1905).
 - 26 Klaus Sharf, "Monarkhiia, osnovannaia na zakone, vmesto despotii. Transfer i adaptatsiia evropeiskikh idei i evoliutsiia vozzrenii na gosudarstvo v Rossii v epokhu Prosveshcheniia," in "Vvodna nravy i obychai Evropeiskie v Evropeiskom narode," 17–18.
 - 27 *A History of the University in Europe*, 2:565–620.
 - 28 P.V. Verkhovskii, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi tserkvi v XVIII i XIX st.* 1 (Warsaw, 1912): 56–7. For examples that served as the basis for Church reform, see Khans Bagger, *Reformy Petra Velikogo: obzor issledovaniia* (Moscow, 1985).
 - 29 G. Florovskii, *Puti russkogo bogosloviia* (Kyiv, 1991), 84.
 - 30 Renata Lakhmani, *Demontazh krasnorechiia. Ritoricheskaiia traditsiia i poniatie poeticheskogo*, trans. from German by E. Akkerman and F. Poliakov (St Petersburg, 2001), 158.
 - 31 James Cracraft, "Feofan Prokopovich," in J.G. Garrard, ed., *The Eighteenth Century in Russia* (Oxford, 1973), 75–105.
 - 32 I.I. Kedrov, *Dukhovnoi reglament v sviazi s preobrazovatel'noi deiatel'nost'iu Petra Velikogo* (Moscow, 1886), 189. Prokopovych studied in Catholic educational institutions in Lviv, Cracow, and Rome.
 - 33 I.K. Smolich, *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi: 1700–1917* (Moscow, 1996), part 1, p. 392. (Translated from Igor Smolitsch, *Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, 1700–1917*, Bd. 1 (Leiden, 1964).

- 34 Ibid., 395, 409.
- 35 M. Tkachuk, "Filosofs'ki kursy Kyievo-Mohylians'koï akademii v konteksti ievropeis'koho skholastychnoho dyskursu," in *Relihiino-filosofs'ka dumka v Kyievo-Mohylians'kii akademii: ievropeis'kyi kontekst* (Kyiv, 2002), 63.
- 36 M. Symchych, *Philosophia rationalis u Kyievo-Mohylians'kii akademii* (Vinnytsia, 2009), 144.
- 37 The paperwork of colleges is deposited in the fonds of colleges, spiritual administrative bodies (consistories), and a number of monasteries at the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv (fonds 133, 961, 990, 1973, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014) and in the fonds of the office of the Synod at the Russian State Historical Archive in St Petersburg (fonds 796). Individual documents were found in the manuscript collections of libraries in Ukraine and Russia.
- 38 In this study, the following catalogues of libraries of Orthodox collegiums were used: *Viddil rukopysiv Tsentral'noi naukovoï biblioteky Kharkivs'koho natsional'noho universytetu im. V.N. Karazina* (the Manuscript Department of the Central Scientific Library of the V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University), No. 1817/c 895; *Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny v m. Kyievi* (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv; hereinafter – TSDIAUK), f. 1973, op. 1, spr. 2145; RGIAP, f. 834, op. 3, dd. 3282, 3325, 3326, 3327, 3328, 3329.
- 39 Kristof Tselarii, *Kratkaia latinskaia grammatika: s nem. na ros. Iazyk perevedena pri Imperatorskom Moskovskom universitete A. Barsovyim* (Moscow, 1762).
- 40 Samuïl Myslavs'kyi (1731–1796) was then the bishop of Belgorod (1768–1771), before that, professor and rector of the Kyiv Academy, and from 1783, metropolitan of Kyiv and Galicia.
- 41 References to this instruction are based on the publication of A.S. Lebedev, *Khar'kovskii kollegium kak prosvetitel'skii tsentr Slobodskoi Ukrainy do uchrezhdeniia v Khar'kove universiteta* (Moscow, 1886), 60–79. In the instruction, many titles of the textbooks are given in abbreviated form (often without specifying the author), so its analysis and the identification of the textbooks was also part of the research task.
- 42 TSDIAUK, f. 990, op. 1, spr. 848, ark. 7, 46.
- 43 Ibid., f. 1973, op. 1, spr. 2154, ark. 1.
- 44 An example of how difficult it is identifying a textbook: in memoirs, it was called "Langievyy razgovory," but in nineteenth century studies, "razgovory Longiia."
- 45 Ioakhim Lange, *Shkol'nye razgovory. Perevod. s lat. na rossiiskii iazyk Martin Shvanvits, gimnazii rektor* (St Petersburg, [1750]).

- 46 V. Litinskii, "Kartinki iz proshlogo Chernigovskoi dukhovnoi akademii," in *Pribavlenie k Chernigovskim eparkhial'nym izvestiiam* 2 (1899), 84.
- 47 Frantsisk Gël'tergof, *Nemetskaia grammatika: v kotoroi ne tokmo vse chasti rechi ili proizvedeniie slov, no i syntaksis ili sochinenie slov, oba nadležhashchimi premeramy ob iasneny* (Moscow, 1784).
- 48 I.M. Grech, *Gotshedova nemetskaia grammatika: sochinennaia v pol'zu i upotreblenie blagorodnago iunoshestva pri Sukhoputnom shliakhetnom kadet-skom korpuse* (St Petersburg, 1760).
- 49 P. Solntsev, *Ocherk istorii Khar'kovskogo kollegiuma* (Kharkiv, 1881), 14.
- 50 Viddil rukopysnykh fondiv i tekstolohii Instytutu literatury im. T.H. Shevchenka Natsional'noi Akademii Nauk (Department of Manuscripts and Textual Studies of the T.H. Shevchenko Institute of Literature of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; hereinafter – *VR IL*), f. 37, spr. 360, ark. 26; "Pis'ma partikuliarne k Ego Preosviashchenstvu ot gubernatora Shcherbinina," in *Kurskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti, Chast' neofits.* 1 (1874), 42.
- 51 O.M. Sandaliuk, "Fegen Karl-Iohann," in *Kyievo-Mohylans'ka akademiia v imenakh, XVII-XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2001), 559.
- 52 Znamenskii, *Dukhovnye shkoly v Rossii*, 458.
- 53 D.S. Anichkov, *Teoreticheskaia i prakticheskaia arifmetika: v pol'zu i upotreblenie iunoshestva* (Moscow, 1764).
- 54 *TSDAUK*, f. 990, op. 1, spr. 848, ark. 46.
- 55 Iakov Tolmachev (1779–1873) would later become a professor at the St Petersburg Seminary, then a professor at the University of St Petersburg, and a professor and director of the St Petersburg Main Pedagogical Institute.
- 56 Ia. V. Tolmachev, "Avtobiograficheskaia zapiska," *Russkaia starina* 75 (1892): 704.
- 57 Lakhmani, *Demontazh krasnorechiia*, 165.
- 58 Bugrii, *Elementa oratoria ex antiquis atque recentioribus facto praeseptorum delectu tironibus eloquentiae ab imis principiis ac fundamentis sensim ad difficiliora et summa justo ordine manuducendis et prudenter insituendis accommodata, antea quidem in usum Gymnasiorum Vratislaviensium nunc vero iuventutis Rossicae revica, aucta et emendate*, ed. Nicolaus Bantisch-Kamenski (Moscow, 1776).
- 59 *TSDAUK*, f. 1973, op. 1, spr. 1265, ark. 7.
- 60 Tolmachev, "Avtobiograficheskaia zapiska," 703.
- 61 I. Ia. Porfir'ev, "Vospominaniia I. Ia. Porfir'eva, professora russkoi slovesnosti Kazanskoi Dukhovnoi Akademii," in *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik* (Kazan) 2(10) (2005): 95.
- 62 Tolmachev, "Avtobiograficheskaia zapiska," 703.

- 63 Iohann Matthias Gesner, *Polnoi latinskoi Gesnerov leksikon s rossiiskim perevodom: s pribavleniem k nemu grecheskikh slov i Rossiiskago reestra* (Moscow, 1796–98), parts 1–3.
- 64 Fridrikh Paul'sen, *Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia obrazovaniia v Germanii* (Moscow, 1908), 134–5.
- 65 ТсДІАУК, f. 990, op. 1, spr. 848, ark. 46.
- 66 E.D. Frolov, *Russkaia nauka ob antichnosti: istoriograficheskie ocherki* (St Petersburg, 1999), 50.
- 67 S.V. Rozhdestvenskii, *Materialy dlia istorii uchebnykh reform v Rossii v XVIII-XIX vekakh* (St Petersburg, 1910), 312–13.
- 68 Znamenskii, *Dukhovnye shkoly v Rossii*, 780, 781.
- 69 Lebedev, *Khar'kovskii kollegium*, 69.
- 70 Ieronim Freier, *Kratkaia vseobshchaia istoriia, s prodolzheniem onoi do samykh nyneshnikh vremen i prisovokkupleniem k nei rossiiskoi istorii: dlia upotrebleniia uchashchaisia iunoshstva, s nem. na ros. iazyk perevedena pri Imp. Mosk. Universitete* (Moscow, 1769).
- 71 Danielis Georgii Morhofii. Polyhistor literarius, philosophicum et practicus. Cum accessionibus virorum clarissimorum Ioannis Frickii et Ioannis Moller (Lübeck, 1732).
- 72 Christophori Cellarius, *Historia universalis breviter ac perspicue exposita, in antiquam, et medii aevi ae novam divisa, cum notis perpetuis* (Jena, 1730).
- 73 See P. Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura v Rossii pri Petre Velikom*, 1 (St Petersburg, 1862): 324–6; N.I. Malysheva, “Politiko-pravovoe nasledie Samuila Pufendorfa,” in *Izvestiia vysshikh uchebnykh zavedenii. Pravovedenie* 1 (1999): 126–7.
- 74 VR IL, f. 20, spr. 953, ark. 230–70; RGIAP, f. 796, op. 67, d. 572, ll. 3–5. More than two hundred books are recorded in the catalogues.
- 75 Samuil Pufendorf, *Vvedenie v istoriiu znatneishikh evropeiskikh gosudarstv: S primechaniiami i politicheskimi razsuzhdeniiami*, trans. from the German by B. Volkov (St Petersburg, 1767).
- 76 Gil'mar Kuras, *Vvedenie v general'nuiu istoriiu, na ros. iazyk perevedeno kantseliarii Akademii nauk sekretarem S. Volchkovym* (St Petersburg, 1747).
- 77 G.I. Smagina, “Nemetskie uchebniki po vseobshchei istorii v rossiiskoi shkole XVIII v.,” in G.I. Smagina, ed., *Nemtsi v Rossii: rossiisko-nemetskii dialog* (St Petersburg, 2001), 185.
- 78 ТсДІАУК, f. 1973, op. 1, spr. 1254, ark. 4.
- 79 E.D. Frolov, *Russkaia nauka ob antichnosti: istoriograficheskie ocherki* (St Petersburg, 1999), 101–2.
- 80 Iohann Giubner, *Sto chetyre sviashchennyia istorii Vetkhago i Novogo zaveta: vybrannyya iz sviashchennago pisaniia i izriadneishimi npravouchenniimi*

snabdennia. Izdannia g. Ioannom Gibnerom. Per. s lat. na ros. iazyk studentom Matveem Sokolovym (Moscow, 1781).

- 81 D.M. Lebedev, *Geografiia v Rossii petrovskogo vremeni* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), 342, 343.
- 82 Khristian Fiurkhtegott Gellert, *Rassuzhdeniia, izvlechenye iz sochinenii Gellerta, per. z nem. v Khar'kovskom kollegiume* (Kharkiv, 1807)
- 83 Textbooks on the Russian language, Russian poetics and rhetoric, which were separate disciplines, were not considered in this article.
- 84 Friedrich Christian Baumeister, *Elementa philosophiae recentioris usibus inventutis scholasticae accommodata*. ed. nova, auctior et emendatio M. Frid. Christiani Baumeisteri (Leipzig, 1755).
- 85 See Lebedev, *Khar'kovskii kollegium*, 64.
- 86 Khristian Vol'f, *Volfianskaia Eksperimental'naia fizika, s nem. podlinnika na lat. iazyke sokrashchennaia, s kotorago na ros. iazyk perevel M. Lomonosov* (St Petersburg, 1760).
- 87 Lavrentii Kordet (1720–1781) taught a number of subjects at the Kharkiv College and was its prefect and rector, and hegumen of several monasteries.
- 88 vR 1L, f. 37, spr. 360, ark. 25.
- 89 Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, *Elementa philosophiae rationalis et moralis ex principiis admodum evidentibus iusto ordine adornata. Accessere historia philosophica et index locupletissimus* (Frankfurt an der Oder, 1761).
- 90 Hryhorii Savych Skovoroda (1722–94), who is regarded as the father of both Ukrainian and Russian philosophy, taught at the Pereislav and Kharkiv Colleges.
- 91 G.S. Skovoroda, “K Iovu [Bazilevichu],” in G.S. Skovoroda, *Sobranie sochinenii*, v 2 tt. (Moscow, 1973), 2: 307.
- 92 V.L. Mykytas' and S.O. Kolesnyk, “Myslavs'kyi Symon Hryhorovych (Samuïl),” in *Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia v imenakh, XVII–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2001), 365, 104.
- 93 *Opisanie dokumentov i del, khраниashchikhsia v archive Sviateishego Sinoda, v 50 tt.*, vol. 50 (1770) (St Petersburg, 1914), 296.
- 94 *Ibid.*, 700–10.
- 95 Friedrich Christian Baumeister, *Elementa philosophiae recentioris, pluribus sentiis exemplisque ex veterum scriptorum romanorum monimentis illustrata: Nunc vero physica, nee non oeconomica, publica et ecclesiastica jurisprudentia, quibus accessit duplex appendix, exhibens regulas disputandi atque distinguendi, aucta: Usibus que juventutis rossicae adornata* (Moscow, 1777).
- 96 Ia. V. Tolmachev, *Logika s latinskago vnovperevedeniia i ispravennaia [per. F. Baumeistera]* (Moscow, 1807).

- 97 TSDIAUK, f. 990, op. 1, spr. 848, ark. 6–7, 46.
- 98 H.F. Kvitka-Osnov'ianenko, *Pan Khaliavskii* (Kyiv, 1977), 71.
- 99 S.K. Smirnov, *Istoriia Moskovskoi slaviano-greko-latinskoi akademii* (Moscow, 1855), 299–301.
- 100 A. Blagoveshchenski, *Istoriia staroi Kazanskoi dukhovnoi akademii. 1797–1818 g.* (Kazan, 1875), 92–3.
- 101 A. Iu. Andreev, *Moskovskii universitet v obshchestvennoi i kul'turnoi zhizni Rossii nachala XIX veka* (Moscow, 2000), 69.
- 102 TSDIAUK, f. 1973, op. 1, spr. 1266, ark. 1.
- 103 Iohann Iakob Brukker, *Sokrashchennaia istoriia filosofii ot nachala mira do nyneshnikh vremen, s frants. iazyka perevel V. Kolokol'nikov* (Moscow, 1785).
- 104 A.S. Kolesnikov, “Sovremennyi filosofskii protsess v nachale XXI veka,” in *Miscellanea humanitaria philosophiae. Ocherki po filosofii i kul'ture. K 60-letiiu professora Iurii Nikiforovicha Solonina* (St Petersburg, 2001), 106.
- 105 G. Miul'pfordt, “Sistema obrazovaniia v Galle i ee znachenie dlia Rossii 1696–1831 gg. (uchenye, uchitelia, uchilishcha, shkoly, reformy, knigi, didaktika),” in *Nemtsi v Rossii: russko-nemetskie nauchnye i kul'turnye svyazi. Sb. stattei*, ed. G.I. Smagina (St Petersburg, 2000), 164.
- 106 V. Ziuss, “Stanovlenie i razvitie sotsiokul'turnykh i obrazovatel'nykh svyazei Rossii i Germanii: epokha Petra I,” in *Nemtsi v Rossii: Rossiisko-nemetskii dialog*, ed. G.I. Smagina (St Petersburg, 2001), 149.
- 107 A. Arkhangel'skii, *Dukhovnoe obrazovanie i dukhovnaia literature v Rossii pri Petre Velikom* (Kazan, 1883), 83.
- 108 Lebedev, *Khar'kovskii kollegium*, 60.
- 109 “Preosviashchennyi Samuil, episkop Belgorodskii. Ego pis'ma k arkhimandritu Lavrentiiu (1770–1774),” in *Kurskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti. Chast' neofits.* 5 (1888), 91.
- 110 Later Iakynf Karpyn'skyi (1723–98) was rector of the Pereiaslavl-Zaleskii, Kolomna, Vologda, and Novgorod seminaries, a member of the Synod, and the translator of the *Ecclesiastical Regulation* into Latin.
- 111 Syl'vestr Lebedyn'skyi (?–1808) was later rector of the Tambov seminary, Kazan seminary (academy), bishop of Poltava and Pereiaslav, and archbishop of Astrakhan and Tersk.
- 112 Syl'vestr [Lebedyn'skyi], “Sacra theologia, seu Doctrina Christiana per theorematata, quaestiones et controversias exposita,” in *Opera et studio Cazanensis Academiae rectoris archimandritae Sylvestris* (St Petersburg, 1799); Iakynf [Karpyn'skyi], *Compendium orthodoxae theologiae doctrinae ab archimandrita Hyacintho Karpiński concinnatum* (Moscow, 1800).
- 113 P. Pekarskii, *Nauka i literatura v Rossii pri Petre Velikom* (St Petersburg, 1862), 2:234.

- 114 *Opisanie dokumentov i del, khraniashchikhsia v arkhive Sviateishego Sinoda*, 34: 617.
- 115 A.S. Lebedev, *Belgorodskie arkhierei i sreda ikh arhipastyrskoi deiatel'nosti* (Kharkiv, 1902), 165.
- 116 RGIAP, f. 796, op. 12, d. 247, l. 128.
- 117 He later became rector of the Moscow Academy (he was a relative of the well-known Russian philosopher Pavel Florinskii).
- 118 The biographies of even such famous Church figures as Kyrylo Frolyns'kyi do not indicate in which German universities they studied.
- 119 This is evidenced by the example of the same Kyrylo Floryns'kyi, whom the Synod and the Moscow Academy urgently summoned to Moscow immediately after his return to Kharkiv.
- 120 I.F. Timkovskii, "Moe opredelenie v sluzhbu," *Moskvitianin* 18 (1852): 30.
- 121 *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov* (Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents, hereinafter – RGADA), f. 18, op. 1, d. 220, l. 5–5 rev.
- 122 RGADA, f. 18, op. 1, d. 220, l. 6.
- 123 Ibid.
- 124 For some of these projects see L. Iu. Posokhova, "Transformatsiia obrazovatel'noi traditsii v Vostochnoi Evrope XVII-XVIII vv.," in *"Byt' russkim po dukhu i evropeitseu po obrazovaniiu": universitety Rossiiskoi imperii v obrazovatel'nom prostranstve Tsentral'noi i Vostochnoi Evropy XVIII-nachala XX v. Sb. st., comp. A. Iu. Andreev and ed. A.V. Doronin* (Moscow, 2009), 48–9.
- 125 "Deputatskie nakazy i vsepoddanneishie chelobit'ia ot shliakhetstva Mal-orossiiskoi gubernii," in *Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* (St Petersburg, 1889), 68: 130, 193; "Deputatskie nakazy i vsepoddanneishie chelobit'ia ot dvorian Slobodskoi Ukrainskoi gubernii," *ibid*, 257.
- 126 "Deputatskie nakazy ot dvorian Belgorodskoi gubernii," *ibid*, 525–6.

PART FOUR

Political and Historical Thought

“Rulers of the Fatherland”: The Hetmanate’s Cossack
and Church Elite’s Concepts of the Nature, Representation,
and Obligations of Authority (Up to the Beginning of the
Eighteenth Century)

NATALIA IAKOVENKO

Until the appearance of the works of Teofan Prokopovych, Ukrainian political thought had produced no texts that provided a basis for a doctrine of governance on a systemic level.¹ This, of course, did not mean that there were no opinions regarding what “just” rule should be like. These judgments and concepts are quite clearly recorded in watered down form – in panegyrics and political treatises on religious subjects, introductions to ecclesiastical publications, school poetry, Diet speeches, works of a historiographical nature, and so forth – starting from the last quarter of the sixteenth century, that is, basically, from the time when the Ukrainian cultural world, which had been closed to outside eyes until then, began its gradual “dehermitization.” What is more, texts from the 1620s–40s already show the presence of three distinct currents in the interpretation of “just.” It is identified either with the traditional authority of princely dynasties of Rus’ descent, or with the supremacy of the Ruthenian Church and its hierarchs, or with the gentry democracy of the Commonwealth variety. It is telling that at the core of the “national” identity of Ukrainians of that period, as convincingly demonstrated by Serhii Plokhyy, there were also three forms of self-identification that closely echoed the above-mentioned priorities in the perception of “just” rule, namely: the concept of a “Ruthenian nation,” based on the princely tradition of Kyivan Rus’; the Orthodox-ecclesiastical view of the “Ruthenian people” as a community of clerics and laity, regardless of their social estate; and, finally, a model of the “Ruthenian gentry nation” as the third, equal component of the “nation” of the Commonwealth of Two Nations.²

Without dwelling on detailed descriptions of each of the above versions of the perception of authority, allow me to note briefly that the first of them – the “princely” version (it is the earliest to appear in sources and is most likely the specifically “Ruthenian” product of the concepts of the nature of authority as such) – was derived from the dominance, traditional in Ukrainian society, of princely families, among which the Ostroz'kyi family held undisputed first place. Accordingly, the representatives of this dynasty were seen as the bearers of divine investiture, entrusted with the protection of Rus'. The right of the Princely House of the Ostroz'kyi family to virtual power “over all of Rus” (in the words of the panegyrists: *potestats potius Russiae*) – from Kyiv to Lviv – was regarded as indisputable, because it stemmed from (1) the sacralised origin of the House (Kyivan Rus' was “sought,” “found,” and “built” as God's promised land by Rus, the founder of the Ostroz'kyi family), (2) the cultural feat of Christianization (Prince Volodymyr, the imagined ancestor of the Ostroz'kyi family, gave Rus' the gift of “light and law”), (3) the allegedly uninterrupted physical continuity of the House – from the “progenitor Rus,” Prince Volodymyr, and King Danylo Romanovych, to the present. It was precisely this kind of authority, associated with the transcendent, that was perceived as the guarantee of a higher justice, harmony, and peace inside the community.³

The second of the abovenamed versions of the perception of authority, which can be provisionally called “theocratic,” is documented in the works of the Kyivan clerical circle only as of the beginning of the 1620s. Its characteristic feature is emphasis on the guiding mission of the Orthodox Church in the life of the Ruthenian community – a Church that commands both rich and poor, the high-placed and the common folk, “the princes of this world” included, because, as Kyiv Metropolitan Petro Mohyla will write in the introduction to a 1637 Didactic Gospel: “the emperor's and king's status is very high, but [...] priestly rank takes precedence over the status of the highest placed of this world.”⁴ In seeking the origin of this assertion, which is rather unexpected from the standpoint of hitherto “submissive” Orthodoxy, I believe it is worth comparing the Kyivan “theocratic” formulations with the doctrine of the post-Trent Catholic Church, especially with the works of Roberto Bellarmino and Cesare Baronio: it is these two authors that are perhaps most frequently mentioned by the clerical intellectuals of the Kyiv-Mohyla circle.

As for the origins of the third version of the perception of “just” authority, which can be described in a generalized sense as the “Commonwealth” version, it was based on the commonplace idea in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's nobiliary ideology of government as a contract between a “free nation” and the

ruler. In light of this idea, any authoritarian rule conducted without the consent and sanction of the "nation" (that is, the nobility) was regarded as "tyranny," which cast the "yoke of slavery" (*jugum servitutis*) on the subjects.⁵ Comments that reflect this type of political culture are scattered throughout a wide variety of texts of Ruthenian origin from the end of the sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth centuries: from religious polemical treatises to dietine instructions, panegyrics, various protests, private letters, Diet speeches, and so forth. One of the most important results of this interpretation of power relations was undoubtedly the formulation of the idea of the supposedly contractual union of the "Ruthenian nation" with the Polish and Lithuanian nations in the 1569 Union of Lublin as the third, equal and self-sufficient member of the Commonwealth of Two Nations (in his Diet speech in 1641, Adam Kysil' said the following regarding this: "Our ancestors, the Ruthenian Sarmatians, voluntarily came to your Graces' ancestors, the Polish Sarmatians [...]; not to a religion, but with a religion, not to titles and honors, but with titles and honors – that is how we came to our common Fatherland."⁶

Not everything from this briefly described legacy of concepts of "just" authority was adopted by the Cossack and Orthodox clerical milieu that after the wars and cataclysms of the mid-seventeenth century began its history from a blank page – with new ideological priorities and new heroes, and, last but not least, in a new state, whose structure and system of governance differed fundamentally from their preceding fatherland.⁷ In particular, the "princely" version of the concept of authority had fallen into decline by the beginning of the Khmel'nyts'kyi period, as a result of both the extinction of the Ostroz'kyi line and the fact that their heirs, the Zaslavs'kyi princes, had become as of the mid-1620s the *de facto* protectors of the Uniate Church – that is, had moved away from the "true Rus'" in the eyes of the Kyiv-Mohyla intellectuals. However, it is worth mentioning that Petro Mohyla's entourage tried to bank on another set of "heirs of Rus" – the Chetvertens'kyi princes,⁸ but this attempt went nowhere as a consequence of Mohyla's death and an overall change in the political situation. As for the "theocratic" version of the perception of authority, it became irrelevant following the subordination of the metropolitan of Kyiv to Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, and subsequently, his successors (this is analyzed in detail in Serhii Plokhyy's monograph).⁹

In contrast to the first two, the third version of the concept of "just" authority, which was based on the political rhetoric of the "gentry nation" of the Commonwealth, demonstrated amazing staying power in lasting, *mutatis mutandis*, from the birth of Cossack intellectual activity at the beginning of the eighteenth century

until the complete demise of the Hetmanate. The final replication of this view of authority was the *Istoriia Rusov* (The History of the Rus' People), an anonymous chronicle from the beginning of the nineteenth century.¹⁰ To a certain extent, this is the model that can serve as a kind of general framework for the reflections that will be examined in greater detail below. However, the Commonwealth nobiliary idea of democracy became overgrown in the Cossack polity by a very characteristic accumulation of details that lead us, as will be shown later, to a more archaic layer of concepts of the nature of authority, its obligations, and expected forms of representation. Thus, we have before us a rather complicated balancing between, on the one hand, a clearly defined continuation of the Commonwealth ideal of political culture and a corresponding rhetoric of “golden liberties,” and, on the other hand, the emerging image of a new, purely Cossack formula of a “just” authority, which will be the subject of our discussion.

My observations are based on the reflections of the residents of the Hetmanate on authority and hetman rule, which are scattered throughout contemporary historiographic works, panegyrics, sermons, verses, letters, and so forth. Inasmuch as the “constructs” of the political thought of the time are recorded in these texts only indirectly, in analyzing them we must often resort to reconstructing the concepts of the *sacrum* that sanctions authority as such and the unwritten but known to the members of the given society limits of expression of the will of the “people” in the contrasting pair of people–rulers. Based on this evidence, I will attempt to show that despite its fragmentary and incomplete nature, it allows us to assume the existence of a certain systemization of the concepts of an “own” – that is, internal – rule in the Hetmanate against the backdrop of a rather amorphous concept of the scope of the powers of the tsar as the supreme ruler. In so doing, I am consciously leaving out of consideration the doctrine of the monarch’s divine right to unlimited absolute power formulated by Prokopovych – not only because this doctrine was only formalized in the post-Mazepa period, which is not under discussion here, but also because in all likelihood it was never organically integrated into Ukrainian political thought.

“Division of powers” between the Anointed Sovereign and the Hetman

It is worthwhile to begin by recalling those unalterable postulates in the concept of authority that were formulated by Christian doctrine on the basis of the famous passage in Paul to the Romans: “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, whoever rebels against

the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves" (Romans 13:1-2). This dictum, as we know, became part of Christian teaching and transformed the obedience of subjects into a duty to God. The precedent from Sacred history, wherein the first Judaic kings Saul and David were chosen by God himself, who then ordered the prophet to anoint them to rule over "His heritage," made the authority of the anointed sovereign an instrument of Providence to protect the God-given order.

The reflections of Ukrainian sermonizers and members of ecclesiastical circles on the nature of the authority of the anointed sovereign are based on these biblical postulates. For example, Ioanykii Galiatovs'kyi defines authority in the words of the Apostle Paul ("there is no authority except from God, and those authorities that exist are ordained of God"); he formulates the virtue of obedience of "lesser people to rulers" and the obligations of the "rulers" before God "for their servitors and subjects" according to the same parameters.¹¹ We encounter the same idea in the sermons of Antonii Radyvyllov's'kyi, wherein the focus of attention is on the divinely ordained submission to the anointed sovereign, inasmuch as he "bears the image of God, bears the person of Christ" (compare, *inter alia*, the use in one of the sermons of the *exemplum* of the "noble Venetian senator" who refused to kneel before his son when the latter was elected prince until he was convinced that his son "bears the person of Christ").¹² According to Lazar Baranovych, the tsar is under the direct supervision of God: "God holds the tsar's heart in his hand, / nor does he relinquish his hold on the apple of the tsar's eye."¹³ Having received authority from God, the anointed sovereign personifies divine presence on earth, and, consequently, is the guarantee of the well-being of his subjects:

When God is with us, what worries can we have?
As God seated you on the tsar's throne,
So he will take care of your crown
And give counsel about everything, and counsel is not the betrayal,
Of God, but rather it is protection and defense.¹⁴

In secular eyes, the anointed ruler is also the bearer of divine sanction and an instrument of higher justice; what is more, these attributes are applied equally to both the former sovereign, the Catholic king, and to the current ruler, the Orthodox tsar. Here is a characteristic example from the *Hrabianka Chronicle*, which (it is worthwhile emphasizing) stands out for its especially harsh anti-Polish and anti-Catholic attacks. According to Hrabianka, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi after the appropriate ceremonies in the act of signing the Treaty of Zboriv in 1649:

will go to the King, sitting on his illustrious throne, and pay his obeisance, saying: "Not in this way, with this assembled Host, did I should have welcomed Your Royal Majesty, which has happened more by chance than through my fault, for which let me be forgiven: but I confess I am not worthy of mercy, but it is characteristic of both God Himself and his vicar of Christ to be merciful toward the submissive: He does not scorn a contrite heart." To this the Lithuanian deputy chancellor replied: "[...] The most illustrious King ... with his mercy heals liked a physician, like the sun enlightens both good and bad, so the Monarch is best when he protects the citizens, forgives the meek and rebellious.¹⁵

In the described model of supreme authority as sanctioned by God through the act of consecration (anointment) in the coronation ritual, or in the Russian case, through the procedure of the crowning of the tsar, there was no place for uncrowned individuals.¹⁶ However, after the emergence of the Cossack state, in which Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi established his autocratic rule, there were recorded attempts (from the beginning of 1649, according to Serhii Plokhy's observations) to give the hetmancy a sacralized substance with the help of rhetorical, ideological, and diplomatic means, which transformed the hetman's rule, secured "by the sword," into authority bestowed by God.¹⁷ In Plokhy's opinion, the main role in this was played by the church hierarchs, who consecrated the hetman's regalia and honored Khmel'nyts'kyi's name in church services, although a number of actions attributed to the higher clergy (for example, the "coronation" of the hetman) can be regarded as most likely the product of rumors.¹⁸ Alongside the ecclesiastical perception of the hetman, we also come across the secular image of the hetman in the concepts of divine election, evidenced by the addition to the hetman's title of the formula "by the grace of God."¹⁹ Finally, we have direct evidence of these processes in the famous celebratory welcome given Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi as he entered Kyiv at the beginning of January 1649, when, according to an eyewitness account described by Wojciech Miaskowski:

Effusus populus, tota plebs witała go w polu i Academia oracjami, akklamacjami, tamquam Moijsem, servatorem, liberatorem populi de servitute Lechica, et bono ominę Bohdan, od Boga dany, nazwany [The whole people, all the commoners came out of the city to greet him, and the Academy welcomed him with orations and exclamations as Moses, deliverer, savior, liberator of the nation from Polish bondage, auspiciously named Bohdan, the God-given one].²⁰

The "good omen" (*bonum omen*) referred to in the above episode was interpreted in verses in the fall of 1649, which were appended to the Register of the Zaporozhian Host, as the blessing of the Holy Spirit ("It is no wonder, because the Holy Spirit makes Bohdan wise"), and the author of the verses explicitly equates the hetman's power with that of the king:

The king is God's anointed one, and Bohdan is given
By God, hence named Bohdan [the God-given one] (...)
Where King Casimir is the ruler in Poland,
In Rus' there is Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi Bohdan.²¹

This "division of authority" between the hetman and the anointed ruler (Serhii Plokhyy calls this a 'duumvirate' or, more precisely, the idea of it), does not disappear even after the death of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi; we find references to most hetmancies as to acts of divine election.²² Thus, according to the apocryphal correspondence of the hetmans with the Zaporozhian Host contained in the *Velychko Chronicle*, even the election to the hetmancy of Velychko's hated Ivan Vyhovs'kyi is attributed to the "all-wise care of God," and Petro Doroshenko, whose assessment by the author is very mixed, defines his post ("condition") as given him by God (obviously, in Velychko's words, because also in an apocryphal letter).²³ "Kish hetman by the grace of God" is the title that Ivan Briukhovets'kyi gives himself even before his election to the hetmancy;²⁴ in the eyes of Lazar Baranovych, Ivan Samoilovych is the God-given hetman: the hierarch wishes that he should long wield the "hetman's mace and [guide] the building of Orthodox Ruthenianism [*pravoslavnorosiiskim*] that has been entrusted to you by God, as by the sunlit sky." Ivan Velychkovs'kyi addresses Samoilovych in his panegyric in similar fashion: "by the grace of God given you / you know how to establish peace in your beloved fatherland / (...) God in one Trinity gave you the one mace."²⁵ The Chernihiv panegyrist Ivan Ornovs'kyi calls Ivan Mazepa a hetman "by the grace of heaven"; Prokopovych writes of Mazepa being entrusted with the "building of this fatherland ... after the tsar from God" in his famous "tragicomedy" *Vladimir*, performed at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in honor of Mazepa's visit to the school in 1705; and in an anonymous verse on the Poltava bell, cast in 1695, we read the following: "During the rule of Russian tsars Peter and John, / During the hetmancy of Mazepa, given by God."²⁶

Finally, from the introduction dedicated to Samoilovych, contained in Ioanykii Galiatovs'kyi's *Skarbnitsa potrebnaiia i pozhit chnaia* (Kyiv, 1676), we can see how his contemporaries imagined the "mechanism of the division" of divine right to

rule between the anointed tsar and the hetman: “from whose [Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich – *N. Ia.*] scepter-bearing hand your Highness received the hetman’s mace, ascending to the office of hetman at God’s call and with God’s elevation, according to the Apostle Paul, who said: “For no one accepts honor, but is named by God.”²⁷

Thus the symbol of authority – the mace – is given to the hetman by the anointed ruler, but, essentially, his function appears to be that of an “intermediary,” because the hetman has already been selected and designated by his “elevation” by God himself. But in that case how are the purely earthly powers divided, and what part of them belongs to the tsar and what part to the hetman? The texts that I have analyzed allow us to assume that there existed a marked difference between the concept of the scope of the tsar’s functions among the Cossack *starshyna* and the views of tsarist authority held by the clerical intellectuals of the Kyiv-Mohyla circle. For the latter, whose knowledge of the tradition of interpreting supreme authority had a Byzantine literary foundation – for example, knowledge of the *Nomocanon*, wherein the emperor is the orderer and patron of the Church (on the eve of the Khmel’nyts’kyi period, the Kyivan Cave Monastery Press published the *Nomocanon* three times: in 1620, 1624, and 1629), or through such reading matter as the famous exhortations of Deacon Agapetus addressed to Emperor Justinian, published for the first time in a Slavic language by this press in 1628 – the person of the tsar was associated primarily with divine authority (“vested with authority, like God”), called upon to mediate between God and the people.²⁸ On the other hand, the figure of the tsar was “brought down to earth,” as it were, by the “cultural” duties with which he was charged: he had to be educated, moral, filled with concern for good customs and the eradication of injustice, and so forth. These subtleties of the anointed sovereign’s ruling functions drew the attention of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical community throughout the seventeenth century. It is impossible not to recall that the first Ukrainian translation of the so-called *Testament* of Emperor Basil I the Macedonian, a Byzantine literary monument from the end of the ninth century, which stresses precisely these aspects of the *ars regnandi* (art of ruling), was made by Damian Nalyvaiko and published by the Ostroh Press in 1607, while the first and second Moscow editions (ca. 1661–63 and 1680) were prepared, with the accuracy of the translation checked, by graduates of the Kyiv-Mohyla College Iepifanii Slavynets’kyi and Symeon Polots’kyi.²⁹ The *Testament* (the Ostroh edition) was used by Petro Mohyla as evidenced by his handwritten notes in the book.³⁰ In the opinion of Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, this same literary monument is quoted by Dymytrii Tuptalo in the introduction to his *Litopisets* (admittedly, from Baronio) as being in accordance with his concept of the ideal ruler.³¹

Both incarnations of the tsar (as a sacred being through whom the heavenly protection of the territory and its subjects is realized and as a person endowed with the highest Christian virtues) are present in the Ukrainian texts of church authors of the second half of the seventeenth century. "Like the sun, his throne shone for God and for our needs," wrote Lazar Baranovych in 1676 in the mournful panegyric on the death of Aleksei Mikhailovich.³² This solar symbol gives rise to characteristics that attest to the anointed ruler's zealotry in serving God and protecting the highest justice on earth: he shines "in truth, like the sun"; he has "built and beautified churches" and has "himself served God excellently"; he is the bearer of "many riches, which he generously lavished on everybody"; he is "wise, good, devout"; he "looks kindly, like a father, upon his subjects"; he is respectful in his attitude toward the clergy and compassionate to the lame and downtrodden; he models his conduct on his Christ-loving ancestors ("being equal to Saint Volodymyr, Tsar Constantine, Princes Hlib and Borys").³³

Baranovych's array of the tsar's virtues encompasses, as we can see, the customary canon of the "professional ethics" of a Christian ruler, established by numerous "mirrors for princes" – from Deacon Agapetus to the relevant seventeenth-century treatises, in which piety, wisdom, magnanimity, kindness, mercy (*pietas, prudentia, magnanimitas, clementia, misericordia*), and so forth appear in various combinations. On the other hand, it is no use looking in texts of the panegyric genre, even if written by church intellectuals, for such an abundance of a tsar's virtues, and especially "cultural" duties: the authors confine themselves to the polite mention of the tsar as "most illustrious and pious." A telling example from this standpoint is the *Kroinika o Rusi* (*Chronicle of Rus'*) by the hegumen of St Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery Feodosii Sofonovych, written at the beginning of the 1670s. Thus, while the author reserves at least some elements of "professional ethics" for the Polish kings (for example, Władysław IV is described as "good-hearted" and John Casimir as "merciful"), he is obviously at a loss about what to do with Aleksei Mikhailovich, confining himself to consistently adding the epithet "Orthodox" to all mentions of the tsar.³⁴

The figure of the tsar is drawn even more schematically in the texts of secular authors. For example, in Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's diplomatic correspondence, he appears as an abstraction of a "pious tsar," who is called upon to protect the threatened Orthodox faith.³⁵ After the Pereiaslav Agreement, the allegory of the "wings of protection" of the Orthodox tsar over the Zaporozhian Host and all of "Little Rus'" entered into circulation. In analyzing the divergent interpretations of the metaphor of the "wings" by the Ukrainian and Russian sides, Serhii Plokhyy calls the metaphor "solemn rhetoric," but does not discuss the rhetorical model that was the foundation of the different nuance in the Ukrainian understanding

of this generality.³⁶ However, there is no doubt that this was a matter of the conventional patron–client topos, that is, a model of the authority–subordination relationships that were ubiquitous in the social practices of the Commonwealth. We find the rhetoric of patronage (“roof” and “wings” of the patron’s protection, the familial metaphor of the “father–children” relationship between the patron and his clients, the antithesis “patronage–allegiance”) in countless texts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When we take this into account, the semantics of the fact that the residents of the Hetmanate usually qualify the act of placing their polity under the suzerainty of the Russian tsar as a move “under the protection,” and not as subordination, become much clearer, even though in personal situations the Cossack *starshyna* call themselves “subjects” of the tsar. The passage in the *Eyewitness Chronicle*, which states that “the Cossacks ... swore an oath of eternal subjugation allegiance [*poddanstvo*] to his tsarist majesty,” is rather an exception, because the concept of subjugation itself was subject to harsh condemnation.³⁷ For example, the loyal Hrabianka often identifies it with a “yoke of labor,” namely slavery, and Samiilo Velychko, in the apocryphal letter that the Zaporozhians allegedly wrote to Hetman Ivan Samoilovych on 4 April 1684, calls the intention attributed to Samoilovych “to make [Ukraine] subject” to the tsar a crime, which will destroy forever: “the glory and dignity of the military ... which every good and virtuous ancestor of Ukrainians and fine fellows of the Zaporozhian Host, and our whole fatherland of Little Russian Ukraine [*Malaia Ukraina Malorosiiskaia*] does not want to allow.”³⁸

On the other hand, protection in contrast to subjugation was perceived as the free choice of ruler – with contractually established mutual obligations of the patron–monarch and Host–servitor.³⁹ Perhaps the best illustration of this are the arguments in Pylyp Orlyk’s famous letter to Stefan Iavors'kyi of 1721: having finally decided to switch to the side of Charles XII, Ivan Mazepa allegedly ordered Orlyk to:

write a letter to His Tsarist Excellency [expressing] gratefulness for his protection [...] In conclusion, to declare that we had acquiesced voluntarily to the sovereignty of His Tsarist Majesty for the sake of the unified Eastern Orthodox faith. Being a free people, we now wish freely to withdraw, expressing gratitude for the Tsar’s protection [...] Under the protection of the Swedish king, we will look forward to our complete liberation.⁴⁰

Mazepa’s motivation (in Orlyk’s interpretation) is the same as the motivation that Samiilo Velychko attributes to the iconic leader Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi: in

1652, the latter supposedly proposed peace to the king, "and if it should be otherwise, he would have to apply to another neighboring monarch for defense and protection."⁴¹ The cautious warning was not heeded: the hetman's envoys returned from the king "with nothing," and that in Velychko's concept of authority-subordination opened the path to a legitimate change of patron.

The most important thing for us in the subjugation-protection antithesis is that the first was associated with the exercise of direct authority over the territory and its population, and the second, with patronage, which did not envisage such authority, inasmuch as it belonged to the "servant" of the patron based on the old feudal tradition of *rex in regno suo imperator est* (the king is emperor in his own realm). In this system of concepts, the ruling function of the anointed sovereign was confined to protection ("wings of protection") and joint defensive operations ("alliance"), and, according to Velychko, it was these two concepts that Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi invoked in explaining his choice in 1654: "to be in alliance with and under the protection of the divinely powerful Orthodox monarch."⁴² It remains to recall that this perception of tsarist authority was fundamentally different from the concepts of it in contemporary Russia, where, according to researchers, it represented not only a higher sacred value (we also see replicas of this, derived from the Christian teaching about "worldly powers," in Ukraine), but also the omnipresent and all-pervading authority of the "earthly god," who has power of life and death over his subjects on the same basis as God."⁴³

The powers of the real ruler of Ukraine, the hetman, in the eyes of his subjects also owed, as already noted, to divine election, but this deification was, as it were, of a "formal" nature: the hetman was regarded as God-given only to the extent that in principle "there is no authority except from God." Nor can it be ruled out that the hetman acquired a certain amount of *sacrum* as the partner of the "God-crowned" tsar. For example, we come across this nuance in Stefan Iavors'kyi's panegyric in honor of Ivan Mazepa: according to the Iavors'kyi formula, Mazepa is enlightened by the "ray of sunlight ... of Russian autocrats" ("*śłoneczny promień ... Jedynowładców Roskich*").⁴⁴ At the same time, the right of the hetman to the fullness of real authority over the territory and population of the Hetmanate was not in any doubt, and in these collisions he was described with the help of definitions of the sovereign ruler. Here are two consonant examples, from panegyrics to Ivan Samoilovych (1687) and his successor, Ivan Mazepa (1688):

Szlachetnej młodzi grono więc wspaniałe,
Bo ma patrona i fundusze całe.
Któż wždy jest JANEM, onego mianuje,

W Rusi panuje?⁴⁵
 A gdy pod mądrym rządem Twej buławy
 Rossijski naród tej się dopnie sławy ...⁴⁶

The circle of noble youth is so great,
 Because it has a patron and all funds.
 Who is JAN by name,
 [He] rules in Rus'?
 And where under the wise rule of Your mace
 the Ruthenian people will gain glory ...

However, sovereign authority was associated not only with rights but also with obligations; they were symbolized by the virtues envisaged by the above-mentioned “professional ethics” of the anointed ruler. We come across combinations of such virtues time after time in the characterizations of hetmans provided by their contemporaries. Setting aside “valor” and “courage” (*virtus* and *fortitudo*) as obvious attributes of every military leader, I will deal with the hetman’s “wisdom” (*prudentia*) and “magnanimity” (*magnanimitas*), traits that closely echo the Commonwealth political tradition of what was expected of royal rule.⁴⁷ Both qualities (the first was identified with “justice” and the second, with “nobility of soul”) anticipated serving the public good as values that the ruler must place higher than his private interests. Accusations against heedless hetmans – not “builders and protectors,” but “monsters of the fatherland,” who take one action or another “for the sake of their own private interests and ambitions, and not for the public good,” “for their private interests,” “with considerable damage to the fatherland ... for their own love of power, private and insatiable desires,” “themselves choosing to live in riches, while not taking care of the Host and of human misery,” “only those private interests lead them astray, so that they chase after the hetmancy,” and so forth – are a semantic cliché repeated so often that it hardly seems possible to doubt that the most widespread view of the hetman was primarily as the protector of the “public good.”⁴⁸ The characteristic nuances in the oath that Ivan Mazepa allegedly swore before Pylyp Orlyk just before switching to Charles XII’s side indicate the same perception of the hetman’s role:

I swear before God that it is not for my own private gain, nor for higher honors, nor for greater wealth, nor for any other reasons that I act. But I do so for all of you who are under my rule and command, for your wives and children, for the common welfare of our fatherland, poor unfortunate Ukraine, for the entire Zaporozhian Host and the Little Russian people, for

the elevation and expansion of the Host's rights and privileges so that, with the aid of God, neither you, nor your wives and children nor the fatherland together with the Zaporozhian Host might perish because of Moscow or the Swedes.⁴⁹

In addition to devotion to the public good, other actions and traits befitting a ruler's "professional ethics" were expected of the hetman. In particular, he had to demonstrate "piety" (*pietas*), that is, he had to respect the men of the Church, build churches, and spread Christian "teachings" among his subjects. It is in this guise that Ivan Samoilovych appears in Ivan Velychkovs'kyi's panegyric:

That [mace – *N. Ia.*] led [you] to build churches
And decorate them with icons.
That [mace] causes you to love scholars,
And be a special patron of the sciences,
From which stem the glory, adornment, and support
Of our beloved fatherland and forthcoming joy.⁵⁰

The ruler had to be "generous": this trait is an element of the already mentioned *magnanimitas* (magnanimity) – in the sense of being open to the difficulties and needs of every subject (we will deal later with "generosity" toward the troops, a virtue of a different order). An example of praise of such "generosity" was the panegyric of the "magister of grammar" of the Kyiv-Mohyla College Pavlo Baranets'kyi's *Tribute to his excellency Mr. Ivan Samoilovych* (*Trybut jaśnie wielmożnemu jmci Panu Janowi Samojłowiczowi*; 1687):

Ile przeszłych wieków, ile przydzie,
Na szczodrocie wždy Ianowej nie zydzie,
Aby złoty wiek i dobroć odmienił,
Sławę przemienił.
Doznali tego nietylko rossyjscy,
Ale mieszkańcy świadomi azyjscy,
Jak dobrotliwy jesteś w łaskawości,
Z własnej miłości.⁵¹

How many centuries in the past, how many in the future,
[he] would not already have lived on great generosity
That to change the golden age and welfare,
To change the glory.

Not only the Ruthenians,
 But Asian residents are aware,
 How great your kindness is,
 Without being forced.

Finally, a good Christian ruler had to have such traits as *liberalitas* and *simplicitas* (“liberality” and “simplicity”) in his way of life and attitude to his subjects, as well as openness to *consilium*, that is, to counsel. And we find these traits in reflections about Ivan Samoilovych, although in a negative sense:

At first you were a good master to all,
 Then you start behaving in a proud way,
 You began to rule single-handedly,
 You forgot that you were elected because of love
 And named our senior lord,
 You no longer needed any counsel,
 And you thought that you had come down from heaven ...
 And you held everybody for nothing
 And they were degraded to footstools.⁵²

A similar example of being “spoiled by power” of the initially “humane” and later “proud” Samoilovych is depicted in the *Eyewitness Chronicle*. It is worth adding that this contrast has a rhetorical derivation: “pride” (*superbia*) is the antithesis of “humility” (*humilitas*) and “generosity” (*liberalitas*):

That priest’s son was at first very humble and kind toward people, but when he grew rich, he became very proud not only toward the Cossacks but also toward the clerical estate. When the Cossack officers came to him, they had to stand, nobody sat ... the clergy, too, no matter how eminent, had to stand with an uncovered head. And in church, he never walked to receive the Gifts, but the priest brought them to him, and his sons did the same.⁵³

I should add in passing that the “standing before the hetman” described in the *Eyewitness Chronicle* is most likely an allusion to the popular work by Suetonius, *The Lives of Twelve Caesars*, which was often used as a literary model: according to Suetonius, one of the cruelest Roman emperors, Caligula, forced the senators to stand in his presence and even wait on him at table (Suetonius, *De Vita*, IV, 26.2). The “imperial” parallel in the depiction of Samoilovych’s crimes here is

rather telling from the standpoint of the perception of the status of the hetman's authority. Closer to reality is the passage about bringing the Holy Gifts to the hetman and his sons. It cannot be ruled out that this was an echo of reports of solemn liturgies celebrated by Eastern hierarchs in which Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and his sons participated. One of them (in Chyhyryn, on 8 November 1650) is mentioned by the Muscovite monk Arsenii Sukhanov. According to him, following a prayer at the pulpit, metropolitans Joasaph of Corinth and Gabriel of Nazareth came away from the altar through the royal doors to the hetman and the hetman's son (Tymish?) and then placing their omophorions on their heads, they read prayers.⁵⁴

On the whole, as we can see from the cited examples, in applying the array of virtues of the "crowned" ruler to the ruling hetman, the inhabitants of the Hetmanate essentially equated the *ars regnandi* of the two. This meant that, on the one hand, they recognized the hetman's right to the fullness of ruling powers, and, on the other hand, they limited these powers with a certain "level of expectations" from government as such. After all, for practically every virtue from the stereotypical canon, it is possible to find not only praise but also a negative parallel, and it is these opposites of "good-bad" hetmans that represent a concentrated cross-section of concepts about "just" rule.

The Hetman and the "People"

Describing the "election" of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi at the Zaporozhian Sich on the eve of the uprising, Samiilo Velychko uses the following expression: "Then immediately, with one voice and one heart, the whole Host named and decreed Khmel'nyts'kyi to be their hetman."⁵⁵

The formula "with one voice and one heart" is a direct analogue of the famous *unanimo consensu* ("by unanimous consent"), the principle that was one of the chief doctrines of the political system of the Commonwealth. "Unanimity" was associated with the concept of the "equality" (*aequalitas*) of the noble nation. Besides symbolic connotations, this also had purely technical parameters – the election of the king *viritim*, that is, with the votes of all the nobles present at the election in person, and the approval of Diet decisions not by a majority of the vote but by means of *zgody spólnej*, that is, unanimously.⁵⁶

Velychko also contains frequent invocations of the "nation" as sovereign, to whom belongs the *summa potestas* in the state, which is also congruent with the Commonwealth doctrine of authority, and in another apocryphal letter from the Zaporozhians to Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, praising his election to the hetmancy "by

the will of the people,” which the Zaporozhians ostensibly approved, although they did not take part in the election, is further reinforced by the trite *topos* of Commonwealth gentry democracy: “The voice of the people is the voice of God” (*vox populi – vox Dei*).⁵⁷

Thus, at first glance, what we have before us is the Cossack version of the nobiliary concepts of the “sovereignty of the people,” where the place of the “noble nation” has been taken by a new political force – Cossackdom. It is telling that there is no single image of the “Cossack nation” as yet: in Velychko, the “core” and “honor” of Cossackdom is the Zaporozhian Sich; in the *Hrabianka* and *Eyewitness Chronicles*, it is the *starshyna* of the town Cossacks; in the *Dvorets'kyi Chronicle*, it is the “full Council” of the Zaporozhian and town Cossacks; and so forth, although this variation in concepts does not change the model of “people’s rule” as such.⁵⁸ However, when we examine this model more closely, we will find that the similarity of Cossack and Commonwealth “democracies” is more the product of a common rhetorical canon for describing these concepts than a similarity in their substance.

It is worth beginning with the above-mentioned “unanimous consent” in the election of the hetman and in deciding other matters, inasmuch as this is precisely what is identified in historiography with the “democratic principles of the military-political system” of Cossackdom, developed at the Zaporozhian Sich, which Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi called the “Ukrainian plebeian republic.”⁵⁹ However, even the first known description of the Sich Council in 1594, written by an eyewitness, the Austrian diplomat Erich Lassota von Steblau, shows not so much “direct democracy” organized on the principles of “unanimous consent,” as the archaic military community, whose “electoral” conduct echoes the customs of ancient Germans described as far back as by Caesar. There, dissenters were regarded as “deserters and traitors” and were killed (Caes. *B.G.*, 6: 23), while here they were threatened with drowning if they failed to show submission to the community.⁶⁰ The same portrayal of the Cossack council appears in much later works: for example, the “black” (that is, general) council (*chorna rada*) of 1663 described in the *Eyewitness Chronicle*, where “many notable Cossacks were killed by the common masses (*chern'*) in a slaughter that lasted three days.”⁶¹

As for the dependence of the “unanimously elected” hetmans on the “nation” that had given them power, it, too, was very far from the democratic practices on the Commonwealth model. In that model, speaking against the king was regarded as a regular feature of public life based on the principle of a nobleman’s “free voice” (*libera vox*), but the person of the king acquired a sacred dimension from the moment of his anointment and coronation and was respected as inviolable.⁶² In contrast, the hetman, although his functions after the creation of the

Hetmanate were virtually identical to the functions of a sovereign ruler, was viewed as a figure whom the "nation," that is, the Zaporozhian Host, had the right to remove from power, and even punish with death for "ruinous rule in our fatherland." In one of Velychko's regular apocryphal letters, the Sich Cossacks expressed their complaints against Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi in literally such terms and threatened him:

in the center of Chyhyryn ... to throw you out as a worthless leech [...] and if you do not leave Chyhyryn, we will soon come to you and not only bring down the walls of your house, for being a rapist and wrecker of our fatherland, but also not leave your soul to live.⁶³

According to Velychko, similar threats were allegedly addressed to Ivan Samoilovych in 1678:

Know for certain that soon there will befall you what you don't expect, because you will pay for the blood of our brothers with your blood or that of your children; for the loss of many of our brothers, ruin will befall your home suddenly; [...] and because through your fault our Little Russian fatherland on this side [*sehobochnaia*; Right-Bank Ukraine] has become empty, your rising house will become empty, and there will be nothing living in your dwellings.⁶⁴

Without Velychko's grandiloquence but with a similar subtext of guilt-deserved punishment, other Cossack chroniclers wrote of the killing of "bad" leaders by the Host. For example, one such notable "bad" figure in the narratives about the beginning of the war in 1648 was Cherkasy colonel Barabash, who, according to legend, kept secret the privilege granted by Władysław IV to the Zaporozhian Host: he was executed in the spring of 1648 together with several other officers who did not support the uprising.⁶⁵ The author of the *Eyewitness Chronicle* describes the death of Barabash with impassive neutrality: "And the troops that were sailing in boats on the Dniro, [...] the [Cossack] officers that were with them, and the German infantry, which was in boats, they killed and threw into the Dniro."⁶⁶ Under Hrabianka's pen, this episode acquires a "patriotic" motivation: Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi allegedly addressed the registered Cossacks, headed by Barabash, through an envoy and reminded them that they, like the rebels, "were born of one mother, Ukraine," and they, "listened and all six thousand of them rose up with one heart and one mind," killed Barabash, "and drowned all the officers and Polish commanders with their banners in the Dniro."⁶⁷ Velychko, for

his part, “legitimized” the event with the will of the “nation”: according to him, Khmel'nyts'kyi, having written Barabash a warning letter in the name of the Zaporozhian Host, accused him of not caring “about our Ukrainian people” and concludes that he should “command sheep or pigs, not people”; a few months later, Barabash met a deserved death: he was “killed” and his allies were “slaughtered and thrown into the bowels of the Dnipro.”⁶⁸

We find similar judgmental overtones in the mentions of yet another death of a “bad” hetman – Ivan Briukhovets'kyi, torn to pieces by a Cossack mob in June 1668. This event gets a brief mention in the *Eyewitness Chronicle*: “The *holota* [common Cossacks] arbitrarily killed and tortured Briukhovets'kyi in the field and they killed many noted Cossacks and Zaporozhians.”⁶⁹ Hrabianka accompanies this episode with a short moral on the inevitability of God’s retribution: “him the common Cossacks (*chern'*) beat to death without mercy. Thus God avenged the innocent blood of Somko and others on Briukhovets'kyi.”⁷⁰ Velychko, too, “put the onus” on God’s vengeance: “began tearing and beating him, and beat him to death ... and leaving his dead and naked body, they returned to their camp. [...] And thus it was measured back again to him, Briukhovets'kyi, for shedding the blood of [Iakym] Somko and Onykii [Sylych] his own blood had to be shed by his people and his life taken.”⁷¹

It seems to be an important detail that not only is there no condemnation in any of the cited descriptions of either the direct threats to the “heedless ruler,” or of his physical destruction, but, on the contrary, they are represented as something completely legitimate – determined either by the requirements of the public good, or the just retribution for innocently shed blood. From this standpoint, the above-mentioned “divine election” of hetmans proves to be a very ambivalent phenomenon. This is because, on the one hand, in electing a hetman, the “nation” (Zaporozhian Host) is merely implementing God’s will, which has already “designated” a candidate, while, on the other hand, this same “nation” has the right to execute the chosen one, and this is perceived as a legitimate action, tantamount to carrying out God’s judgment. It can be cautiously assumed that this ambivalence was rooted in the archaic concept of the nature and functions of authority as the realization of the collective will of a given community of fighting men, under the firm protection of “their” deity (as time went by, a Christian deity, of course). The bearer of authority in this kind of collective had to be perceived, above all, as authorized by the community (thus, also, its deity!) to execute concrete functions, and, if he neglected to do so, as someone who had profaned the will of the deity and had to be expelled from the community. The idea that the tie between the collective (army) and a higher force was imagined as almost lit-

erally direct is suggested by two known statements from the times of the Cossack war, both recorded from the lips of rank-and-file Cossacks and not the *starshyna*, "spoiled" by familiarity with literary convention, which makes these observations especially credible. The first of these statements is the testimony of a captured Cossack, who in his interrogation in July 1648 repeated the rumors spread among the rebels alleging that Władysław IV had not died but had fled to the Cossack Host. In our camp, said the captive, there are three permanently standing tents: one for God, the second for the king, and the third for the hetman.⁷² The second statement is recorded in the testimony of a registered Cossack: describing one of the Cossack "black" councils in 1651, the captive attributes to the common Cossacks (*chern'*) present at the council the telling paired formula "God and the Host want it so":

Co czerń między się rozebrawszy krzyknęli: "Panie Hetmanie! Bóg i Wojsko tak chce, abyśmy się żadnym sposobem z Królem nie jednali, bo na tośmy się odważyli i na tośmy tu przyszli ... tedy my przy dostojeństwie twojem wszyscy ginąć będziemy, i albo wszyscy zginieemy, albo wszystkich Lachów wygubimy."⁷³

That the *chern'*, having worked it out, shouted: "Lord Hetman! God and the Host want it so, that we not unite with the King in any way, because we dared this and decided [...] then we will all die with your grace, and either we will all die, or we will kill all the Poles.

Finally, a characteristic parallel to the concept of the army as an integral unit whose collective will is equal to the highest verdict is a sentence from Jan Poczobut Odlanicki's soldier's diary. He describes the execution in 1662 – in the name of the army – of the Lithuanian field hetman Wincenty Gosiewski: "I tak zatrzymawszy lektykę rozkazali wysiąść z wozu, powiadając krótką a straszną oracyją, że całego wojska jest wola taka, abyś już więcej W.M. nie żył [And so stopping the litter, they ordered him to get off, [and] delivered a brief and terrible declaration that it is the will of the whole army that W.M. no longer should live]."⁷⁴ It is important that the formula used by Poczobut "the will of the whole army" was, apparently, an established cliché, because the author of the diary did not personally witness the scene he described.

Given this kind of perception of authority – as tantamount to the will of the armed collective – it is logical to expect that the forms of its direct, as it were, obvious representation should coincide primarily with purely soldierly values. Their

canon is not difficult to recreate from countless relevant statements, from ancient authors to seventeenth-century texts: the leader has to be willing to fight, just in the distribution of the spoils of war, generous and accessible to his soldiers, and attentive to the “eye appeal” of his army – its weapons, attire, and banners. Before citing examples from works produced within the Cossack milieu, let me underscore a telling detail of a more general nature, namely: the authors depict the virtues of “professional ethics” of the hetmans and the virtues of the military canon asymmetrically – the first are usually only declared, with no specific evidence provided, while the latter are always described as completely specific, emotionally convincing images or “facts.” A good example of this rhetorical technique is Velychko’s visual metaphor, which emotionally emphasizes the “non-combative nature” of Ivan Samoilovych, which is absurd from the standpoint of the expected “bellicosity” of the hetmans: “He loves to rule as hetman but does not want to climb out from his soft feather bed, like a rat, and take up arms in defense of the fatherland from the Crimean wolves; were not our hetmans and leaders of the Zaporozhian Host on this side of the Dnipro such [men] from long ago and up to now?”⁷⁵

Not clearly articulated but decisive in the competition of the contenders for the favor of the Zaporozhian Host was the postulate that a “good” hetman is one “whom the whole Host loves.”⁷⁶ Samiilo Velychko’s emphasis on “evidence” of a just distribution of the spoils of war, gestures of munificence toward the Host and its external splendor, acquired as a result of a “successful” hetmancy, show that this “love” was rooted in the ancient link between the well-being of the military collective and the success (“happiness”) and generosity of the leader.⁷⁷ Given the asymmetrical nature of the above description, it is telling that episodes that reflect this type of concept are always reinforced by Velychko with “exact” figures. For example, the narrative in which Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi is presented as a “good” hetman who distributes the spoils of war taken from the opponent – that is, let me repeat, the inalienable collective property of the whole army, which should be amassed and fairly shared: “He chose for himself from among one and a half thousand Tatars that had been taken alive the best 500 men and eleven princes and other of their leaders, and the rest of the Tatar prisoners he gave to his Host.”⁷⁸

And here are two parallel episodes of the leader’s gestures of “gratitude” to his army: the hero of the first is Khmel’nyts’kyi, and of the second, Mazepa. Allow me to note in passing that the parallelization of these two figures in this context is clearly significant, inasmuch as it identifies “good” hetmans. Thus Velychko includes Mazepa, who was already anathemized at the time of the writing of this chronicle, in this group. After the first victorious engagement with the Crown units, Khmel’nyts’kyi sends the Zaporozhian Sich: “A reciprocal gift: for one ban-

ner [*korohva*], four good banners; for one horse-tail standard, two horse-tail standards; for one mace, two precious [*vyshmeniti*] maces; for one kettledrum, three large kettledrums; for three cannon, six top-quality cannon; for the army's good work, a thousand 'beaten' thalers [*bytyi taler*] for the Host, and 300 thalers for the holy Church and its servants."⁷⁹ Ivan Mazepa does the same, sending the Sich after his election: "A gift for all Sich *kurins* of 100 gold coins each, a pitcher of alcohol and 10 barrels of various kinds of meal for each *kurin'* [...] He also gave each *otaman* personally crimson cloth, and to the *Kish* otaman he gave two and three times as much in woolen cloth and various fabrics, and also his *starshyna*."⁸⁰

A clear illustration of Cossack axiology in Samiilo Velychko's text is the description of the "beautiful" troops after "successful" battles at Zhovti Vody and at Korsun in the spring of 1648:

Khmel'nyts'kyi's whole host, Cossack and Tatar, was able to afford horses, armor for horses [*rondy*], harness and armor, quivers, swords, and other weapons, money [*denhy*] also and simple and rich cloth [...] so that when after the two above-mentioned battles that host mounted their horses and started out on campaign with Khmel'nyts'kyi, when [you] saw what they looked like from the side or from above, you could say that these were fields seeded with Dutch or Italian poppies and in bloom.⁸¹

There is no doubt that we should view Hryhorii Hrabianka's famous elogium for Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi in the context of military expectations that the hetman's authority was that of the "supreme leader." It is worth quoting in its entirety:

A man worthy of the name hetman: boldly he was ready to take on any misfortunes, even more diligent was he amidst these very misfortunes; whereby no toils tired his body, and his good spirit could not be subdued by adversaries. He endured cold and heat equally. He ate and drank what nature demanded and was not overcome by sleep at night or during the day. When he lacked time due to affairs and military matters, he rested only a little, and then not on expensive beds, but on such beddings as a military man ought. Even amid the military din, he slept calmly, in no way concerned. His dress did not stand out at all against the others, only the gear and his horses were somewhat better. He was often seen covered with a military cloak, as he rested among the guards. He went first into battle and was the last to leave it.⁸²

As has already been noted by researchers, Hrabianka's elogium is an almost literal translation of the description of Hannibal in Titus Livy's *History* (*Ab urbe*

condita, 21.4) – with only the passages of praise used, because the praise is followed by a list of the leader’s vices (cruelty, perfidy, blasphemy, etc.), which, according to Livy, were equal to his virtues, and so this section was omitted.⁸³ The introduction by the Cossack historian into his work of this passage from Livy, whose work gives more than ample scope for modeling the image of an ideal ruler, politician, and patriot, is not, in my opinion, accidental. Of all possible models, Hrabianka, a typical product of the Cossack class, with ties from a young age to the Zaporozhian Host, was most drawn to the “leadership” version – the ideal of the chief, the best member of the military collective, who is raised above the “people” only by the weight of his obligations.

In summing up, we can say that the similarity between the two models of “democracy” – gentry and Cossack – is as superficial as the similarities between the Russian and Ukrainian versions of respect for the God-given authority of the anointed ruler described above. In both cases, the two sides use the same rhetorical clichés, but when the contexts are compared more carefully, it becomes obvious that different meanings are hidden behind the customary vocabulary. In light of this duality, the Cossack *politia* emerges as filled with unsolvable contradictions. This is because in it “just” authority means, above all, the collective will of the Host, where God’s laws are inextricably interwoven with the archaic laws of Cossack brotherhood, although this authority is described with ready-made formulas that were developed by very different social practices and social orders. Consequently, each of the two models – Russian or Commonwealth – appears as a two-faced Janus: on the obverse, reverence for the *sacrum* of the anointed tsar; on the reverse, its virtual rejection; on the obverse, slogans of Commonwealth democracy; on the reverse, the military democracy of a closed military collective; on the obverse, invocations to “beloved motherland our Ukraine” as a territorial entity; on the reverse, the Zaporozhian Host, taken out of the spatial-territorial framework. In conclusion it remains to add that each of these “faces of Janus” had, *mutatis mutandis*, its continuation (or second birth?) in the nation-building that was of such concern in the Romantic age.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as: Natalia M. Iakovenko, “‘Hospodari vitchyzny’: uivlennia kozats’koï ta tserkovnoï elity Het’manshchyny pro pryrodu, reprezentatsiiu i obov’iazky vladı (druha polovyna XVII - pochatok XVIII

- st.)," in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, società / Mazepa and his Time. History, Culture, Society*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria: dell'Orso, 2004), 7–37. Copyright 2004 by Edizioni dell'Orso. Reprinted with permission. Natalia M. Iakovenko, "Hospodari vitchyzny': uiavlennia kozats'koi ta tserkovnoi elity Het'manshchyny pro pryrodu, reprezentatsiiu i obov'iazky vladny (druga polovyna XVII – pochatok XVIII st.)," in Natalia M. Iakovenko, *Dzerkala Identychnosti. Doslidzhennia z istorii uiavlenta idei v Ukraïni XVI – pochatku XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv: LAURUS, 2012), 397–426. Copyright 2012 by Laurus and Natalia Iakovenko. Reprinted with permission.
- 1 The works of Teofan Prokopovych, which laid the theoretical foundation of Russian absolutism, include, primarily: *Slovo pokhval'noe v den' rozhdestva blagorodneishago gosudaria tsarevicha i velikogo kniazia Petra Petrovicha* [A Word of Praise on the Birthday of the Most Noble Sovereign Tsarevich and Great Prince Petr Petrovich] (delivered in 1715, published in 1717); *Slovo o vlasti i chesti tsarskoi, iako ot samogo Boga v mire uchinena est* [A Word on Royal Power and Honor, Which Derives in the World from God Himself] (delivered and published in 1718); *Slovo v densviatogo blagovernogo kniazia Aleksandra Nevskogo* [A Word on the Day of the Holy Blessed Prince Alexander Nevskii] (delivered in 1718, published in 1720); the treatise *Pravda voli monarshei* [The Right of the Monarch's Will] (published in 1722); *Slovo na pokhvalu blazhennyia i vechnodostoinyia pamiaty Petra Velikogo* [A Word of Praise on the Blessed and Eternally Memorable Peter the Great] (delivered and printed in 1725). For a republication of the sermons, see Feofan Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, ed. I. P. Eremin (Moscow-Leningrad, 1961).
 - 2 Serhii Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford, 2001), 153–65.
 - 3 For this system of views in greater detail, see: Natalia Iakovenko, *Paralel'nyi svit. Doslidzhennia z istorii uiavlen' ta idei v Ukraïni XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002), 174–88, 231–57, 278–87.
 - 4 The passage from Petro Mohyla's introduction is quoted from Khvedir Titov, *Materiialy dlia istorii knyzhnoi spravy na Ukraïni v XVI–XVIII vv. Vsezbirka peredmov do ukraïnsk'kykh starodrukiv* (Kyiv, 1924), 323. For more about the context and forms of political discourse in the Orthodox Church in the 1620s–1640s, see: I. Ševčenko, "The Many Worlds of Peter Mohyla," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, nos 1–2 (June 1984): 9–44; Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, 162–9, 237–46; Iakovenko, *Paralel'nyi svit*, 311–24.
 - 5 For greater detail, see: Urszula Augustyniak, *Wazowie i "królowie rodacy."* *Studium władzy królewskiej w Rzeczypospolitej XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1999),

- 45–66; E. Opaliński, *Kultura polityczna szlachty polskiej w latach 1597–1652* (Warsaw, 1995).
- 6 “Przodkowie nasi Sarmatae Rossi do W. M., ad Sarmatas Polonos, libere accesserunt (...) non ad religionem, sed cum religione, nie do tytułów i honorów, ale z tytułami i honorami accessimus do tej spolnej Ojczyzny naszej.” Quoted from the publication of the speech in the addendum to the article: Frank E. Sysyn, “Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility’s Grievances at the Diet of 1641,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (1982): 186, 189. For a discussion of the regional consciousness of the Ruthenian nation against the backdrop of a “contract,” see *ibid.*, 171–85. On the consolidation of the idea of a “Ruthenian gentry” as the third equal partner in the Commonwealth of Two Nations, see also Iakovenko, *Paralel'nyi svit*, 256–7, 294–5.
 - 7 On the modification of the concept of the “national” in the new political and social circumstances of this period, see: Frank E. Sysyn, “Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, nos 3–4 (1986): 393–423.
 - 8 This attempt is discussed in Natalia Iakovenko, “Kyiv pid shatrom Sventol'dychiv: mohylians'kyi panehiryk 1646 r. ‘Tentoria venienti,’” in *idem*, *Dzerkala identychnosti. Doslidzhennia z istorii uiavlen' ta idei v Ukraïni XVI–pochatku XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 2012).
 - 9 Especially in the chapter “Hetmans and Metropolitans” in Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, 236–73.
 - 10 On this idea in the views of the eighteenth-century “Little Russian patriots” in greater detail, see Zenon Kohut, “Shliakhets'ka demokratiiia v chasy samoderzhavstva: politychni pohliady Hryhoriia Poletyky,” in *idem*, *Korinnia identychnosti. Studii z rann'omodernoï istorii Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2004), 102–16. Original English version: Zenon E. Kohut, “A Gentry Democracy within an Autocracy: The Politics of Hryhorii Poletyka (1723/25–84),” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3–4 (1979–80): 507–19.
 - 11 From the work “Grikhy rozmaitii, vokrattsi napisannye.” Quoted from Ioanykii Galiatovs'kyi, *Kliuch rozuminnia*, ed. Inna Chepiha (Kyiv, 1985), 380–1.
 - 12 Quoted from V.I. Krekoten', *Opovidannia Antoniiia Radyvylovs'koho. Z istorii ukraïns'koï novelistyky XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1983), 381.
 - 13 Lazar Baranovych, *Truby sloves propovidnykh* (Kyiv, 1674). Quoted from: *Ukraïns'ka poeziia. Seredyna XVII st.*, comp. V.I. Krekoten and M.M. Sulyma (Kyiv, 1992), 220.
 - 14 Lazar Baranovych, “Plach o prestavlenii velikogo gosudaria Alekseia Mikhailovicha” (1676), in *ibid*, 227.

- 15 Hryhorij Hrabjanka's "The Great War of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj," Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature. Texts, vol. 9, with an introduction by Yuri Lutsenko (Cambridge, MA, 1990), 338.
- 16 For the procedural order of the coronation of Polish kings, see Stanisław Kutrzeba, ed. "Ordo coronandi Regis Poloniae," in *Archiwum Komisji Historycznej Akademii Umiejętności*, vol. 11 (Cracow, 1909), 133–216. See Boris A. Uspenskii, "Liturgicheskii status tsaria v Russkoi Tserkvi: priobshchenie Sv. Tainam (Istoriko-liturgicheskii etiud)," in *Kamen' Kraezhg"l'n": Rhetoric of the Medieval Slavic World. Essays Presented to Edward L. Keenan on His Sixtieth Birthday by His Colleagues and Students*, ed. N. Shields Kollman, D. Ostrowski, A. Pliguzov, and D. Rowland. Harvard Ukrainian Studies 19 (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 686–731.
- 17 Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, 220–7.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 227–35.
- 19 For an analysis of such examples, see *ibid.*, 225–7.
- 20 *Jakuba Michałowskiego, wojskiego lubelskiego, a później kasztelana bieckiego, Księga pamiętnicza*, ed. Antoni Z. Helcel (Cracow, 1864), 377. For a commentary on this and other instances of a play on Khmel'nyts'kyi's name Bohdan as "God-given" [*Boha danyi*], see Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, 221–2. English translation of the quotation: *ibid.*, 221.
- 21 *Ukraïns'ka poeziia. Seredyna XVII st.*, 101–2. For commentary on these poems, also see Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, 222–4.
- 22 Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, 224.
- 23 Samoilo Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1848), 310; *ibid.*, 2: 296.
- 24 *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannnye v izdannyye Arkheograficheskoi komissiei* (hereinafter – *Akty IuZR*), vol. 7 (1657–63; 1668–9) (St Petersburg, 1872), 97.
- 25 See an undated letter from Lazar Baranovych to Ivan Samoilovych and Velychkovs'kyi's panegyric in Ivan Velychkovs'kyi, *Tvory*, ed. V.P. Kolosova and V.I. Krekoten' (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1972), 55, 158.
- 26 Feofan Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, ed. I.P. Eremin (Moscow-Leningrad, 1961), 152; Velychkovs'kyi, *Tvory*, 169. For Ornovs'kyi, see *Muza Roxolanska o Tryumfalney slawie y Fortunie, z Herbownych Znakow [...]* P. Iana Mazepy Hetmana, *Woysk Ich Carskiego Przeswietnego Maiestatu, Zaporoskich* (Chernihiv, 1688); quoted in *Roksolański Parnas: polskojęzyczna poezja ukraińska od końca XVI do początku XVIII wieku*, Cz. 2: Antologia, edited by Rostysław Radyszewskyi (Cracow, 1998), 380.
- 27 Galiatovs'kyi, *Kliuch rozuminnia*, 348.
- 28 Iakym Zapasko and Iaroslav Isaievych, *Pam'iatky knyzhkovoho mystetstva:*

- kataloh starodrukiv, vydanykh na Ukraïni*, vol. 1 (1574–1700) (Lviv, 1981), nos. 133, 140, 168, 188. For a detailed analysis of the exhortations of Deacon Agapetus with an overview of literature concerning the Latin-language and Slavic translations, see Ihor Ševčenko, “Ljubomudřejšij Kŷr” Agapit Diakon: On a Kiev Edition of a Byzantine *Mirror of Princes*,” in idem, *Byzantium and the Slavs in Letters and Culture* (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 497–526. This includes a facsimile of the Kyivan literary monument: 527–57.
- 29 In the collection of instructive texts entitled *Likarstvo na ospalyi umysl cholovichyi* under the title “Testament ... Vasylia tsesara kgretskogo ... do syna svoego, iuzh koronovanogo, L'va Filozofa” (for a description of this publication, see Zapasko and Isaievych, *Pam'iatky knyzhkovoho mystetstva*, no. 70). For other Ukrainian translations of the “Testament,” see Vladimir N. Peretts, ““Testament tsaria Vasiliia’ v ukrainskikh perevodakh,” *Sbornik otde-lenii russkogo iazyka i slovestnosti Akademii nauk* 101, no. 2 (1926): 50–72 (contains a copy of the first chapter of the “Testament” from the Ostroh edition, 50–4). Lev N. Pushkarev, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia mysl Rossii. Vtoraia polovina XVII veka* (Moscow, 1982), 172. The author mentions the Kyivan Cave Monastery Press publications of the “Testament” of 1636 and 1648 (p. 171), but this is a misunderstanding, because the Kyivan Cave Monastery Press did not publish these books at that time.
 - 30 This copy is contained in the Department of Manuscripts of the V.I. Vernad-s'kyi National Library of Ukraine, under the identification code Kyr. 795.
 - 31 G. Brogi Bercoff, “The Letopisec of Dimitrij Tuptalo, the Metropolitan of Rostov, in the Context of Western European Culture,” *Ricerche slavistiche* 39–40, no. 1 (1992–93): 298, 325.
 - 32 *Ukraïns'ka poeziia. Seredyna XVII st.*, 225.
 - 33 *Ibid.*, 224–8.
 - 34 Feodosii Sofonovych, *Khronika z litopystsiv starodavnikh*, ed. Iurii Mytsyk and Volodymyr Kravchenko (Kyiv, 1992), 228, 230–1, 236.
 - 35 These nuances are analyzed in Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, 306–18.
 - 36 *Ibid.*, 319–29.
 - 37 *Litopys Samovydsia*, ed. Iaroslav Dzyra (Kyiv, 1971), 67.
 - 38 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1:541.
 - 39 For more on the idea of a contract as a political concept of the Hetmanate, see Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, MA: 1988), 59–64.
 - 40 Quoted from the republished letter in the addenda to Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists. Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1981), 201–2.

- 41 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1: 120.
- 42 Ibid., 172.
- 43 Compare, *inter alia*, the thorough analysis in Pavel V. Lukin, *Narodonye predstavleniia o gosudarstvennoi vlasti v Rossii XVII veka* (Moscow, 2000).
- 44 *Echo głosu wołającego na puszcze* (Kyiv, 1689). Quoted from G. Brogi Berkoff, "Z zagadnień różnic kulturowych na ziemiach wschodniosłowiańskich na przykładzie trójjęzycznych dzieł Stefana Jaworskiego," in *Barok w Polsce i w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Drogi przemian i osnovy kultur*, ed. Janusz Pelc, Krzysztof Mrowcewicz, Marek Prejs (Warsaw, 2000), 72.
- 45 Paweł Baraniecki, "Trybut jaśnie wielmożnemu Jmci Panu Ianowi Samojłowiczowi (Kyiv, 1687)," in *Roksolański Parnas*, 2:321
- 46 Jan Ornowski, "Muza roksolańska o tryjumfalnej sławie i fortunie z herbowych znaków jaśnie wielmożnego Jmci Pana P. Jana Mazepy ... (Chernihiv, 1688)," in *Roksolański Parnas*, 2:380.
- 47 For a survey of political texts, see Augustyniak, *Wazowie i "królowie rodacy"*, 53–5.
- 48 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 2: 225, 296, 469, and others; *Hryhorij Hrabjanka's "The Great War of Bohdan Xmel'nyč'ky,"* 318 *passim*; quoted from Viktor Horobets', *Elita kozats'koï Ukraïny v poshukakh politychnoï lehitymatsiï: stosunki z Moskvoiu ta Varshavoiu* (Kyiv, 2001), 356.
- 49 Quoted from Subtelny, *The Mazepists*, 190–1.
- 50 Velychkovs'kyi, *Tvory*, 55.
- 51 Paweł Baraniecki, "Trybut jaśnie wielmożnemu jmci Panu Janowi Samojłowiczowi," in *Roksolański Parnas*, 2:323.
- 52 Anonymous poem on the occasion of the stripping of Samoilovych of the hetmancy in 1687, cited in Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 3: 16–17.
- 53 *Litopys Samovydtisia*, 144–5.
- 54 *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei. Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1954), 187. In Stepan Velychenko's opinion, what is described here can be identified with the consecration of the hetman, but Serhii Plokhyy, disagreeing with Velychenko, is more careful in judging Sukhanov's testimony; he believes that if there was a consecration, it would have taken place earlier (Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine*, 232).
- 55 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1:51.
- 56 Opaliński, *Kultura polityczna szlachty polskiej w latach 1587–1652*, 93–5.
- 57 Ibid., 30–1, 60, and others; Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1:310.
- 58 This chronicle from the end of the 1670s, most likely authored by Vasyl' and Ivan Dvoret's'kyi, has been published by Iurii Mytsyk, see *idem.*, "Letopisets

- Dvoretskikh – pamiatnik ukrainskogo letopisaniia XVII v.,” in *Letopisi i khroniki. Sbornik statei*, ed. V.I. Buganov (Moscow, 1984), 219–34.
- 59 See P.M. Sas, *Politychna kul'tura ukraïns'koho suspil'stva (kinets' XVI – persha polovyna XVII st.)* (Kyiv, 1998), 109–11; V. Shcherbak, *Ukraïns'ke kozatstvo: formuvannia social'noho stanu. Druha polovyna XV – seredyna XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2000), 57–60; *Istoriia ukraïns'koho kozatstva. Narysy u dvokh tomakh*, ed. V.A. Smolii (Kyiv, 2006), 1:161–63; M. Hrushevs'kyi, “Baida-Vyshnevets'kyi v poezii i istorii,” in *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho Naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi*, bk. 3 (1909): 139.
- 60 See this episode in the published fragments of Lassota’s diary: Erikh Liasota iz Stebleva, “Shchodennyk,” *Zhovten* 10 (1984): 104.
- 61 *Litopys Samovydsia*, 91.
- 62 Augustyniak, *Wazowie i “królowie rodacy,”* 70–1.
- 63 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1:32–5.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 471.
- 65 For a comparison of the testimonies see Valerii A. Smolii and Valerii S. Stepankov, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Sotsial'no-politychnyi portret* (Kyiv, 1993), 80–1.
- 66 *Litopys Samovydsia*, 49–50.
- 67 Hryhorij Hrabjanka’s “*The Great War of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyi*,” 320.
- 68 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1:32–3 (Khmel'nyts'kyi’s letter); *ibid.*, 1:61 (Barabash death).
- 69 *Litopys Samovydsia*, 105.
- 70 Hryhorij Hrabjanka’s “*The Great War of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyi*,” 397.
- 71 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 2:163–4.
- 72 From a letter from Wojciech Miaskowski dated 4 August 1648: Karol Sza-jnocha, *Dwa lata dziejów naszych, 1646, 1648. Opowiadanie i źródła*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1900), no. 35.
- 73 In a letter from the king’s secretary Wojciech Bieczyński sent from the camp outside Sokal dated 8 June 1651 in *Ojczyście spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski*, ed. Ambroży Grabowski, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1845): 72.
- 74 Jan Władysław Poczubut Odlanicki, *Pamiętnik, 1640–1684*, ed. Andrzej Rachuba (Warsaw, 1987), 176.
- 75 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 2:391.
- 76 Compare the use of this topos in political practices: Horobets', *Elita kozats'koï Ukraïny*, 353 *passim*.
- 77 On the topos of military “success” (*fortuna belli*) as a material measure of a successful war in greater detail, see Iakovenko, *Paralel'nyi svit*, 192–208.

- 78 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1:166.
- 79 Ibid., 74.
- 80 Ibid., 3:59.
- 81 Ibid., 1:72.
- 82 Quoted from: Frank E. Sysyn, "'A Man Worthy of the Name Hetman': The Fashioning of Khmel'nyts'kyi as a Hero in the Hrabianka Chronicle," in Amelia M. Glaser, ed., *Stories of Khmel'nyts'kyi: Competing Literary Legacies of the 1648 Ukrainian Cossack Uprising* (Palo Alto, 2015), 45; Hryhorij Hrab-janka's "The Great War of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyi," 375.
- 83 Marko Antonovych, "Kharakterystyka B. Khmel'nyts'koho u Hrabianky i Livii," *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 32 (1995), 165-6; Frank E. Sysyn, "Recovering the Ancient and Recent Past: The Shaping of Memory and Identity in Early Modern Ukraine," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 35, no. 1 (2001): 82-4.

Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture

FRANK E. SYSYN

In describing the resignation of Vasyl' Kochubei as chancellor of the Hetmanate in 1700, the early eighteenth-century historian Samiilo Velychko characterized him as “serving faithfully and diligently God, the great sovereign the Russian tsar, his Little Rossian fatherland, and the Zaporozhian Host” (3: 41, p. 553).¹ We may assume that this list was an approximate ranking of loyalties for the elite of the Hetmanate, in which religion came first and the sovereign second. We might have expected the Zaporozhian Host, a concept embodying the polity, military structure, and dominant social order of the Hetmanate to be third. Instead, we find the Little Rossian fatherland. But the careful reader of the voluminous work (or in reality two historical works) that we conventionally call the *Velychko Chronicle* would merely see one more of numerous mentions of the Ukrainian *otchyzna* as an object of political loyalty.²

There is still no study of early modern Ukrainian political culture that traces the appearance of *otchyzna* (modern Ukrainian *vitchyzna*) referring to Ukrainian territories as the inhabitants' fatherland to which they owed loyalty and in whose interest they should act. Medieval Ukrainian had used the term to designate an ancestral inheritance or estate and a hereditary ruler's state or territories.³ Certainly the new use of the term came from Polish *ojczyzna* as the equivalent of Latin *patria*.⁴ In the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, *ojczyzna* was most frequently used for the entire state and country. It could at times still refer to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or the Kingdom of Poland as well as to narrower fatherlands.⁵ Its use as ancestral lands or estates, patrimony (*ojcowizna*), was rare.

As the term developed from the original meaning of homeland, its use for the state and its territory and the population inhabiting them evolved so that *ojczyzna* occupied the highest emotional register in Polish political discourse.⁶ Appeals to the inhabitants' loyalty and patriotism were made more frequently to the *ojczyzna* than to the *Rzeczpospolita*, the Commonwealth. Although Polish political discourse became more and more limited to the noble citizenry at the end of the sixteenth century, fatherland remained a concept that could at times include townspeople and other non-noble strata. In contrast, *Rzeczpospolita*, a term for the nobles' republic that came to designate the united Polish-Lithuanian state, was more clearly the property of the noble citizenry.⁷ Just as importantly, *ojczyzna* contained the meaning of state, but was not limited to it. Therefore, as David Althoen has shown, the broader meaning of *ojczyzna* permitted it to survive the partitions of the Commonwealth, unlike *Rzeczpospolita*, a designation only for the state.⁸ Both terms were much more frequent as the focus of patriotism in the seventeenth century than *naród* (nation), which was to become dominant as a focus of patriotism in the nineteenth century, or than *Polska* (Poland).

With fatherland's encompassing meaning of state, country, and population, its interests could be espoused by many political actors in the Commonwealth. The king or Diet could call for policies in the interest of the *ojczyzna*, but the nobles could just as frequently resist the monarch or the institutions of state in the name of the *ojczyzna*. This conceptualization as passed on to the Ukrainians placed loyalty to the fatherland as the inhabitants' common inheritance that surpassed any loyalty to a given ruler or government.

Only further research can reveal how and when *patria*, *ojczyzna*, and *otczyzna* were first used to refer to Rus' and the Ukrainian lands in a manner similar to that used for the Commonwealth in the Polish tradition. While instances occurred before 1648 in referring to Ukrainian territories, no Rus' or Ukrainian political entity existed in the early modern period that could serve as a political fatherland until after the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising.⁹ Khmel'nyts'kyi's references to fatherland were still to the Commonwealth or the Kingdom of Poland.¹⁰

By the 1670s, a Ukrainian chronicler advocated in his compilation on Ukrainian history that his readers should know the history of their fatherland, *otczyzna*.¹¹ Paraphrasing a quotation from Joachim Bielski's dedication in 1597 to Sigismund III in publishing the Polish historical work of his father Marcin Bielski, the copyist of the Hustynia Chronicle that covered the history of Ukraine up to the 1590s, Mykhailo Losyts'kyi, declared that every man had an inborn love and attachment to his *otczyzna* similar to that of a lodestone for iron. Because Bielski was originally talking about the *Rzeczpospolita*, Losyts'kyi added a sentence in which he called Rus' the fatherland of the Ruthenian people. Here he used the *Rosia*, *Rossian*

people, the Hellenized terms of that time. Losyts'kyi asserted that this sentiment for the fatherland had motivated the authors of the Rus' chronicle that he copied since they had wished to preserve history for the Rus' nation. The chronicle contained a discussion of the origins of the Cossacks in Ukraine, linking them to the history of the Ruthenian nation and depicting them as the defenders of the Rus' land. By the time Losyts'kyi wrote, the political changes in Ukraine had created a new polity, the Hetmanate, that sought to command the Ukrainian population's loyalty, often in a struggle against the Commonwealth that had formerly been seen as the Ukrainians' fatherland in the broadest sense.

While Losyts'kyi made no connection of his discussion of fatherland to the political events of mid-seventeenth century Ukraine, Feodosii Sofonovych referred to a continuous Ukrainian political history more concretely in writing a chronicle cycle that concluded with the history of the Cossack Hetmanate up to the 1670s. He exhorted his intended readers, the Rus' sons, to know their history because he who does not know the history of his fatherland (*otchyzna*) and tell it to those who ask about it would be considered ignorant. He alluded to the political revival through his statement that he wished to explain how the Rus' state or domain (*panstvo*) had arisen and continued to the present day.¹²

Although the task of tracing the use and development of *otchyzna* in seventeenth-century Ukrainian political discourse remains before us, the term had clearly taken on major significance as a designation for the Ukrainian lands and the Cossack Hetmanate in the Mazepian age and generation. The massive text of the Velychko chronicle, written in the 1710s and 1720s, provides ample evidence of the importance of the concept of fatherland in early eighteenth-century Ukrainian political culture. Yet this text, so replete with observations on Samiilo Velychko's research problems that it makes us feel as if we knew the author, offers many challenges in interpretation and unresolved questions. The most famous, and almost the only examined, is the quandary about the numerous letters attributed to Khmel'nyts'kyi and his contemporaries that Velychko purported to have copied from the diary of the hetman's secretary Samiilo Zorka.¹³ The failure to establish the existence of Zorka and the realization that the language and concepts in the texts do not correspond to those in the undisputed letters of the hetman make the authenticity of these documents, and thereby many others in Velychko, highly questionable. Unresolved is whether Velychko was taken in by falsifications (which may even have been literary reworkings of authentic texts) or whether he composed or reworked texts himself. Certainly, the numerous documents in Velychko's work from the periods after Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's hetmancy need to be authenticated. Therefore, except for Velychko's direct narrative, the numerous documents cited cannot be assumed to have been written in that

form by the purported authors and the terms and phrases may derive from a period later than the dates on the documents. When authors, addressees, and dates are mentioned in this discussion, these attributions only indicate that this is the information given in Velychko's work. But even assuming that we are dealing with texts penned and recast by various hands that may have evolved over a fifty-year period after the revolt, the direct narrative and the documents illustrate how the concept of fatherland functioned in early eighteenth-century Ukraine in the context of the major historical work of the age.

Another mystery of the Velychko text is why a long-time resident of the Hetmanate and member of its general military chancery devoted so much attention to the Zaporozhian Sich or Kish and cast the Lower Dnipro Cossacks and the letters attributed to them as a moral authority and voice of tradition.¹⁴ This preference of the learned scribe of the Hetmanate's chancery and servitor of the Hetmanate's elite poses additional problems for an examination of the uses of "fatherland" in the text because *otchyzna* frequently occurs in letters from the Sich Cossacks to the hetmans, therefore purportedly sent from the frontier outside the hetman's control. Although the hetmans claimed authority over the Sich, the Treaty of Andrusovo between Muscovy-Russia and the Commonwealth in 1667 had divided Ukraine along the Dnipro, but considered the Sich under a joint condominium. Hence the discussions of "fatherland" in missives purported to be from the Sich to the Hetmanate or the reverse must be carefully examined to ascertain what is meant by fatherland.

The Velychko text demonstrates the shift in the conceptualization of the fatherland from the old Commonwealth to Ukraine and its political structures. Of the scores of uses of fatherland, a few refer to the Commonwealth and occur in letters from Polish kings and officials, with the texts either in Polish or in Ukrainian translation.¹⁵ The translations in Velychko are a sign of the increasing cultural estrangement of the Ukrainian elite from the Polish world. In almost all other parts of the text, whether Velychko's direct narrative or the documents, uses of *otchyzna* refer to Ukraine. They often appear in the context of defending it against the Poles and the Commonwealth and are vivid examples of the political alienation of the Ukrainians from the Commonwealth that had occurred during the Khmel'nyts'kyi Revolution.

This shift and new usage can be seen in the earliest part of the text in the letters ascribed to Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. In a letter to the Crown Hetman, Mikołaj Potocki, at the outset of the revolt, Khmel'nyts'kyi criticizes the Polish lords' and officials' (such as Daniel Czapliński's and "other inconstant Poles") depredations as making these good-for-nothings and drunks "traitors to their own fatherland, the Kingdom of Poland" (1:1:5, p. 23).¹⁶ That the Kingdom and

the Commonwealth are no longer the Ukrainians' fatherland is clear in the Bila Tserkva universal, dated June 1648, the purported full explanation by the hetman of the reasons for the revolt. In it, Khmel'nyts'kyi calls for support from whomever holds "dear the integrity of your fatherland. Little Rossian Ukraine" (1:1:17, p. 48). The anachronistic terminology in this phrase for Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's time as in the entire Bila Tserkva universal was one of the reasons that scholars questioned the reliability of Velychko's chronicle as a source to mid seventeenth-century Ukrainian history. But for Velychko and the early eighteenth-century reader, Ukraine was a fatherland and the founder of the Hetmanate would certainly have called for its defense against the Poles, who are so fulsomely excoriated in the universal for their treatment of the Little Rossians (another anachronistic term for the mid seventeenth-century).

We find many elements of the early eighteenth-century Ukrainian conceptualization of fatherland in the statements attributed to Khmel'nyts'kyi in the Bila Tserkva universal. The fatherland had become the land that should serve as the focus of its inhabitants' identity and loyalty. While no polity existed at the time the Bila Tserkva universal was purportedly issued, in writings on or attributed to later periods the fatherland is the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Hetmanate. The fatherland was frequently called Little Rossian Ukraine, which for the eighteenth-century reader meant the territories where Khmel'nyts'kyi had established a new political order. The inhabitants and political elite of that fatherland were to strive to maintain its wholeness, both in terms of unity and well-being. The defense of the interests of the fatherland was a justification for taking up arms. In essence the components of the seventeenth-century Polish conceptualization of the *ojczyzna* had been adapted to the post-Khmel'nyts'kyi Ukrainian political culture. That political culture arose at a time of instability and shifting borders that make it imperative to carefully examine each of these uses of fatherland in the text.

Numerous instances of *otchyzna* in the text illustrate that the fatherland was the focus of its inhabitants' loyalty. Velychko, like the earlier Ukrainian historians, provided an explanation of why he wrote his work and for whom he intended it. He signed his preface as "a true son of Little Russia" who wishes "to you, a reader of that same fatherland" all good blessings (1, p. 4). His history therefore was intended to inform and inspire the other inhabitants of the fatherland, emphasizing its anthropomorphic nature by calling them its sons. That sentiment appears in hetman Ivan Mazepa's universal of 28 July 1692 against Ivan Petryk, in which the hetman maintains that the devastation of the Right Bank would bring tears to the eyes of "every well-wishing son of his fatherland" (3:33, p. 108). The fatherland for which its sons should care was a political entity under the hetman's authority.

In discussing the politics of the Right-Bank hetman Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Left-Bank hetman Iakym Somko, Velychko maintains that Khmel'nyts'kyi could have received a revision of the Pereiaslav articles through negotiation with the Russian tsar to the benefit "of the whole Little Russian fatherland" (2:13, p. 26). "For the general good of our Little Russian fatherland", the Zaporozhian Sich Cossacks claimed they did not wish to question the election of Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, though he, unlike Khmel'nyts'kyi, had been elected without their consent (1:10:12, p. 170).

The fatherland in Velychko's history was referred to as Ukraine, Little Russia, and Little Russian Ukraine. Before Khmel'nyts'kyi's uprising, the geographic name *Ukraïna* had referred to the borderland that was largely encompassed by the Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates.¹⁷ An even greater area, including as well the Chernihiv and Volhynian palatinates, was called the four borderland palatinates.¹⁸ The Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising created a unity for much of the Ukrainian territory and demarcated political and social boundaries. After the revolt, *Ukraïna* came to be associated with the lands of the emerging Cossack Hetmanate.

Little Russia in various forms (*Malaia Rossiia*, *Rosiiia*, *Rus'* or *Rusiiia*) had been revived at the end of the sixteenth century by the Ruthenian Orthodox clergy to refer to Ukrainian and at times Belarusian territories and was used on occasion in the title of the metropolitans of Kyiv.¹⁹ After the Pereiaslav Agreement, the name, along with Great Russia, was adopted for the tsar's title and Little Russia became standard for the title of the metropolitan of Kyiv. It also came to be associated with the Cossack Hetmanate, though as a geographic name and an ethnonym Little Russia-Little Russian was still at times used for Ukrainian and Belarusian territories outside even the territories claimed by the Cossack Hetmanate.²⁰

Although we do not yet have a study of the exact geographic limits for these terms or the reasons for their varied uses in Velychko's chronicle, one finds frequent mentions of both terms used to describe the Cossack Hetmanate, often with the clarification of "on both sides of the Dnipro."²¹ Both terms are used to represent the fatherland and in nominal and adjectival forms are associated with the word *otchyzna*.²² One can see the alternation of both terms as synonyms in a letter by Hetman Doroshenko writing to the Zaporozhians once about "your fatherland Little Russia" and once about "your fatherland Ukraine" (2:12, pp. 296, 299).²³ Velychko combined the two geographic names in "Little Russian Ukraine," which is both frequently used as a name for the fatherland or appears in the adjectival form "Ukraino-Little Russian" before *otchyzna*.²⁴ It would seem that the use of "Little Russian Ukraine" may have been an affirmation of the unity of the Right Bank and the Left Bank at a time when international treaties and rival administration and hetmans were dividing that unity.²⁵ It is possible that "Ukraine"

referred more to the Right Bank and that the term "Little Russia" was taking hold in the Left Bank, though there are many cases that do not correspond to this divide and in which Ukraine and Little Russia are synonyms.²⁶

The major message Velychko addressed to all the sons of the fatherland was that they should care about its integrity. The Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising had provided a political unity for much of the Ukrainian territory that was breaking down throughout the late seventeenth century. Hence the constant appeals by all sides throughout the text are for the unity of the fatherland. The unity of the fatherland is presented as of the highest value, especially as the chronicle reaches the period of multiple hetmancies and the division of Ukraine along the Dnipro, which was internationally sanctioned by the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667. Blaming power hungry hetmans for this situation, Velychko laments: "From such action and such a situation, one Little Russia that lies along both banks of the Dnipro, the unfortunate and fallen Cossack-Rus' fatherland" was divided in 1670 into three hetmancies and three parts, and he quoted the Bible on the consequences of a house divided (2:11, p. 238). The theme of the division of the fatherland and its negative consequences is often repeated. Indeed, Velychko explains having undertaken his history after having carried on military campaigns in the Right Bank and being moved by its devastation to explore how this situation had come about. In his introduction to the first work in the chronicle, he laments that the "once flourishing our Ukraino-Little Russian fatherland" had become deserted (1, p. 3) and how he had collected accounts of the fall and decline of "our that-bank fatherland." A universal attributed to Mazepa against the Right-Bank leader Petryk asserts the hetman's efforts to maintain "the integrity of the whole Little Russian country, the common fatherland of all" (3:33, p. 106).

The sons of the fatherland were to judge their political leaders by whether they acted for the benefit and unity of the fatherland. The Zaporozhians wrote to Vyhovs'kyi that they had not opposed his hetmancy, expecting good for the Little Russian fatherland, but he had brought about the devastation of their Little Russian Mother, "who has raised you from a miserable dung heap, enriched you, and made you worthy to sit next to princes" (1:11:6, pp. 196–7). In the Bila Tserkva universal, Khmel'nyts'kyi charges Ivan Barabash as being an "enemy and ill-disposed to our fatherland" (1:11:17, p. 51). In contrast Khmel'nyts'kyi is praised as being of "good intention for our fatherland" (1:11:6, pp. 195–6) and in a letter from the Zaporozhian Kish to Hetman Petro Doroshenko as "our good hetman, a genuinely well-disposed son of our Little Russian fatherland" (2:7, p. 98). In another letter to Doroshenko, the Zaporozhian Kish otaman asserts that although a son "of our Little Russian fatherland," Doroshenko was not behaving in a filial manner in his treatment of the fatherland (2:10, p. 224). In a letter to Hetman Ivan Samoilovych the Kish otaman Ivan Sirko charges that earlier hetmans had only

ostensibly been honestly benevolent builders and protectors of the fatherland (2:19, p. 469). In writing to Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi on his decision to accept the protection of the Russian tsar, the Sich Cossacks advise to do so for the benefit of “our Little Russian fatherland and all the Zaporozhian Host”, but they call on him to make sure that there would be nothing in the pacts harmful to “our fatherland” or ancient liberties (1:7:2, pp. 93–4).

The interests of the fatherland are seen as worthy of the highest loyalty, above all in rising to their defense. Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, in calling on the Zaporozhians for the support they had given his predecessor Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, asked them to assist in the defense of the Little Russian fatherland, for which they would be rewarded by God and their mother Little Russia (1:10:12, p. 169).

Loyalty to the fatherland could even justify opposing the existing political order. The Bila Tserkva universal contains a call to take up arms in defense of the fatherland. In Khmel'nyts'kyi's explanation for this call, the integrity of the fatherland accompanies religion and Cossack rights as a reason for joining the revolt. This justification purportedly occurred in a period before the Cossack Hetmanate existed and when the Polish king was the legitimate ruler. Ukraine as the fatherland was being read back into the mid-seventeenth century in order to justify revolt against the Polish state, which was in fact viewed by many mid-seventeenth century Ukrainians as their fatherland. In texts about later periods, Khmel'nyts'kyi was held up as an example as the liberator of the fatherland.²⁷ Later in Velychko's work, discussions occur of taking up arms in defense of the new political order that had emerged from the revolt. Hence Velychko describes Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi as calling for all to fight the Poles “for the faith and the fatherland” and then judges his victory in driving King John Casimir and 100,000 Poles “from his fatherland Little Russia” as possibly greater than Khmel'nyts'kyi's (2:5, p. 84). The interests of the fatherland could also be used to justify changing sovereigns. In a letter to the Zaporozhians defending his seeking Turkish protection, Petro Doroshenko insists that when Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi had gone under the tsar's high hand he had not intended that their fatherland Little Russia be divided into two or three, but that at Andrusovo the Russians and the Poles had divided the fatherland Little Russia in two (with that part from Pereiaslav on going to the former and the part from Chyhyryn on and the holy city of Kyiv going to the Poles (2:12, pp. 298–9).

Velychko's chronicle and the numerous documents he cited (or created) illustrate how the Cossack Hetmanate had come to substitute for the Commonwealth as the fatherland for early eighteenth-century Ukrainians. The political divides of late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Ukraine make for other shades of use of the term *otchyzna*. For the Left-Bank Hetmanate, the Right Bank, which contained the historic centers of Khmel'nyts'kyi's revolt and of Cossack history, was more and more cut off. The devastation of the Right Bank had resulted in

resettlement to the Left Bank. Hence one can find in the mentions of “our that-bank fatherland” indication that fatherland is also being used in the sense of homeland or even “old country”. One also sees this in the attention to Chyhyryn as the old capital of the Hetmanate.²⁸

The second divide was the traditional division between the settled territory and the steppe. It also constituted the divide between the Cossack Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Sich or Kish. The importance of the steppe region to Cossack history and mythology is seen in Khmel'nyts'kyi's Bila Tserkva universal. He calls Chyhyryn, Terekhtemyriv, Pereiaslav, Poltava, and other “Ukraino-Little Russian cities and villages lying on both banks of the Dnipro” “our furthest borderland and last half-wild lands,” “our ancient fatherland.” He also calls them a center of staunch Orthodoxy coming from the times of Saint and equal-to-the-apostles Prince Volodymyr (1:1:17, p. 47). While the southern lands of the Hetmanate were connected with the unsettled steppe, the hetmans exerted less and less control over the Zaporozhian Sich after Khmel'nyts'kyi's time. After 1667 it even had a separate international status. Nevertheless, the connection between the Hetmanate and the Sich was not only historical. The Sich Cossacks depended on the settled area for replenishing their ranks. Therefore, when they write about the Ukraino-Little Russian fatherland in the documents attributed to them in Velychko's work, the fatherland at times has the meaning of land of their birth and origin, though also at times simultaneously this usage occurs alongside that of fatherland in the broader sense. The view that the Sich was outside the fatherland emerges most clearly in a letter by Hetman Petro Doroshenko to the Kish otaman and the Lower Dnipro Cossacks, maintaining because they lived in the Lower Dnipro fields “far from their fatherland,” they did not know what was occurring in the world or in their fatherland (2:12, p. 295).²⁹

The fatherland had taken on primary importance as an object of loyalty for the Mazepian generation. For that generation the fatherland was the Cossack Hetmanate and the Ukrainian territory, not the newly forming Russian state and empire.³⁰ The problem that the Ukrainian elite faced in the early eighteenth century was what should happen when the interests of the fatherland and sovereign conflicted. The thorny nature of this problem is clear in the Bila Tserkva universal, where all iniquities that led to Khmel'nyts'kyi's rising up in defense of the fatherland are attributed to the Poles, not the Polish king. Even in the texts that condemn Russian policy in Ukraine and depict attempts to overthrow or change sovereignty, the figure of the sovereign is avoided. Indeed, in the political debate of letters ostensibly between Petryk and the Poltava Cossacks, the Cossacks argue that wrongs could be righted by an appeal to the sovereign. Petrine policies, the division of Ukraine, and the exigencies of war ultimately forced Mazepa to choose

between fatherland and sovereign. Yet as a reading of the Velychko chronicle shows, even after Mazepa's defeat Ukraine continued to be viewed as the fatherland and a major focus for Ukrainians' loyalty.³¹ How long Ukraine continued to be seen as the fatherland remains to be studied. Certainly, a new conceptualization of the Russian Empire as a fatherland contended with the Ukrainian concept in the eighteenth century. Yet the Ukrainian concept of *otchyzna* may well have survived to the very end of the Hetmanate and served as a basis for the Ukrainian national revival of the early nineteenth century. Even if the concept did not remain vital throughout this period, the attention of the leaders of the national revival to the Cossack chronicles and the publishing of the Velychko manuscript in the 1840s to 1860s ensured that the early eighteenth-century view of fatherland shaped modern Ukrainian identity.

NOTES

Originally published as "Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture," in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, società / Mazepa and His Time. History, Culture, Society*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria: dell'Orso, 2004), 39–53. Copyright 2004 by Edizioni dell'Orso. Reprinted with permission.

- 1 The *Skazanie o voine kozackoi z poliakamy* is published in *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 4 vols (Kyiv, 1848–64). The first volume appeared in a new edition, which corrected the Russified orthography of the nineteenth-century edition, in: *Samiila Velychka Skazanie o voine kozatskoi z poliakamy*, ed. Kateryna Lazarevs'ka, Monumenta Litterarum Ucrainicarum 16 (Kyiv, 1926). In the present article, section, chapter and page number are given according to the 1926 edition for volume 1 and chapter and page numbers according to the nineteenth-century edition for volumes 2 and 3. There is a modern Ukrainian translation by Valerii Shevchuk, *Samiilo Velychko, Litopys*, 2 vols (Kyiv, 1991).
- 2 I am opting for the usual translation of *ojczyzna*/*otchyzna* as "fatherland", though I find much of merit in David Althoen's suggestion that the proper translation should be motherland because *ojczyzna* is feminine in gender and frequently referred to as a mother. David Althoen, *That Noble Quest: From True Nobility to Enlightened Society in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 1550–1830*, 2 vols, vol. 1 (PhD diss. University of Michigan, 2000, revised for DMA Printing and Publishing, 2001), 192–9.
- 3 See *Slovnyk staroukraïns'koï movy XIV–XV st.*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1978), 111–12. One can find this use in the *Synopsis* in reference to Iaropolk Monomakhovych

- being driven out of his *otchyzna*. See *Sinopsis, Kiev 1681*. Facsimile mit einer Einleitung, ed. Hans Rothe. Bausteine zur Geschichte der Literatur bei den Slaven 17 (Cologne-Vienna, 1983), 254.
- 4 On Metropolitan Petro Mohyla's use of *otchyzna nasha* in a Church Slavonic work in reference to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, see Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton-Toronto, 1996), 179. The rector of the Collegium, Ihnatii Oksenovych-Starushych, used *otchyzna* in a similar manner in 1641 in his funeral verses for Prince Illia Chetvertyns'kyi. See Mykhailo Hrusevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 2 (New York, 1956), 115.
 - 5 For the use of fatherland in the Grand Duchy for both the Grand Duchy and the Commonwealth as a whole, see Arturas Tereskinas, *The Imperfect Body of the Community: Formulas of Noblesse, Forms of Nationhood in the Seventeenth-Century Grand Duchy of Lithuania* (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2000), 57–8.
 - 6 See Ewa Bem, "Termin 'ojczyzna' w literaturze XVI i XVII wieku. Refleksje o języku," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce*, vol. 34 (1989): 131–57 and Althoen, *That Noble Quest*, 1: 190–215.
 - 7 During the interregnum after the death of King Władysław IV in 1648, Adam Kysil' insisted that it was impossible to negotiate with the Cossacks in the name of the Commonwealth, which meant nothing to them. He maintained the Cossacks only conceived their allegiance as to the king. See Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, MA, 1985), 149.
 - 8 Althoen, *That Noble Quest*, 1: 217.
 - 9 In the mid-sixteenth century Stanislav Orikhovs'kyi (Stanisław Orzechowski), of mixed Ukrainian-Polish parentage, referred to his *patria* as Rus' (*Russia*). This probably referred to Galicia, the Ruthenian palatinate. See Frank E. Sysyn, "Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, no. 3/4 (1986): 397. The first use of *otchyzna* referring to the Ukrainian or Ruthenian territories as fatherlands with seemingly a political context is by Zakhariia Kopystens'kyi in the *Palinodiia* of the 1620s that has the affirmation "in our fatherland, that is in the Rus' land" (*v otchizne nashei, to est' v zemli Ruskoï*), see his "Palinodiia," in *Russkaia Istoricheskaia Biblioteka*, tom 4: Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury v Zapadnoi Rusi (St Petersburg, 1878), col. 1055. If one presumes his use of "Rus' land" is taken from the Old Rus' chronicle tradition, one can see it as based in an appellation of an earlier Ruthenian polity.
 - 10 On the political culture of Khmel'nyts'kyi's hetmancy, see Frank E. Sysyn,

- “The Political Worlds of Bohdan Xmel'nyč'kyj,” *Palaeoslavica* 10, no. 2 (2002): 197–207.
- 11 *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, vol. 2 (St Petersburg, 1908), 233. The attribution of the bulk of the passage to Bielski was pointed out by Oleksii Tolochko in his introduction to *The Hustynja Chronicle*, compiled by Oleksii Tolochko, The Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, Texts, vol. 11 (Cambridge, MA, 2013), lvii. He does not, however, point out the significance of Losyts'kyi's adaptation of the text to describe Rus' and the Rus' people or nation or include these sentences in his comparison with Bielski.
 - 12 Feodosii Sofonovych, *Khronika z litopysiv starodavnikh* (Kyiv, 1992), 56.
 - 13 See Mykola Petrovs'kyi, “Psevdodiariush Samiila Zor'ky,” *Zapysky Istoryko-filohichnoho viddilu* VUAN, no. 17 (1928): 168–204.
 - 14 Velychko's biography is scanty in details outside of what he tells us in the history. He mentions that in 1690, in his teens, he began to serve in the Zaporozhian Host in the home of Kochubei and after fifteen years rose to serve in the General Military Chancellery. After Mazepa's execution of Kochubei and going over to the Swedes, Velychko was imprisoned for some years, but we do not know for what reason and what side he was on in those turbulent years. Freed about 1715, he settled in the villages of Zhuky and Dykanka in the Poltava area, where he wrote his history. One possible explanation for the pro-Sich sentiment is that the chancellor wrote his work while residing in the Poltava regiment, which was closely tied to the steppe and the Zaporozhian Kish. On Velychko, see the introduction in the modern Ukrainian translation by Valerii Shevchuk and Iaroslav Dzyra, “Samiilo Velychko ta ioho litopys,” *Istoriografichni doslidzhennia v URSR*, no. 6 (1971): 198–223.
 - 15 See for example Dominik Stanislaw Polubyns'kyi's (Dominik Stanisław Połubiński's) letter to Hetman Mazepa on his political submission to the Russian tsars and hetman because of his return to his ancestral Orthodox faith. In this letter, the Flag-bearer of Smolensk still calls the Commonwealth, the fatherland (*otchyzna*, 1694, text in Ukrainian, 3:35, p. 214). Also see the Galician castellan Władysław Józef Skarbek's speech in Lviv to the Ruthenians of 1694 (3:35, p. 247). Velychko describes it as given in the Latino-Polish language, but the text is in Ukrainian with Slavonic elements. For uses of *ojczyzna* in the usual Polish way, see the instructions of King August to the pre-Diet dietines (3 July 1698) (3: 38, p. 491).
 - 16 The letter is dated 29 December 1648. However, as some other letters in this section are dated 1648, it belongs to the events of 1647 or early 1648.
 - 17 On the name “Ukraine,” see George Y. Shevelov, “The Name Ukraïna ‘Ukraine,’” in his *Teasers and Appeasers: Essays and Studies on Themes of Slavic Philology* (Munich, 1971), 199–206.

- 18 See this use in Adam Kysil's speech before the Diet in 1641 in Frank E. Sysyn, "Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility's Grievances at the Diet of 1641," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (1982): 167–90.
- 19 See Zenon E. Kohut, "The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, no. 3/4 (1986): 559–76, and Serhii Plokyh, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford, 2001), 279–91.
- 20 For Velychko's limiting "Little Rossian Ukraine" to the Right and Left-Bank Ukraine, excluding Volhynia and Galicia, see 1, p. 3. Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's Bila Tserkva universal was addressed to all Little Rossian Ukraine along both banks of the Dnipro and to more distant Ruthenian towns, but included in the provinces it called Sarmatian Cossack all the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories (1:1:17, pp. 46–7). Velychko refers to Lviv as a "Ruthenian-Little Rossian city" in discussing the late seventeenth century (3:35, p. 246).
- 21 See vol. 2:17, p. 391 for Little Russia with the phrase "on both sides of the Dnipro" and of Ukraine divided into two or three. Also see 2:12, p. 296 and 2:9, p. 169.
- 22 We find the Zaporozhians writing in 1662 about "our Little Rossian fatherland" (2:3, p. 36 II). Velychko refers directly to Briukhovets'kyi's "own fatherland Little Russia" (2:5, p. 84). For uses of Ukraine along with fatherland in nominal and adjectival forms, see, 2:12, pp. 297–8 and 3:34, p. 173. For alternations of Little Russia and Ukraine, see 2:13, pp. 332–3, in which the fatherland is referred to as Little Russia and later the term "all Ukraine" is used.
- 23 One sees similar alternation of "our Little Rossian fatherland" and "Ukraine, our fatherland" in a letter on the Pereiaslav negotiations from the Zaporozhian Sich to Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi (1:7:3, p. 94).
- 24 For "our Ukraino-Little Rossian fatherland" see 1, p. 3; 2:3, p. 34; 2:25, p. 541. The Zaporozhians write to Doroshenko about "our unfortunate Ukraino-Little Rossian fatherland" (2:7, p. 98).
- 25 Brian Boeck has suggested in an internet discussion that "Little Rossian Ukraine" was used to differentiate it from other borderlands, or "Ukraines", of the Muscovite and Russian state. I find no evidence of this in the Velychko text. There is no mention of any other Ukraine in the entire work. In addition, the use of "Little Rossian Ukraine" decreases in the second part of the text on the period after 1658, when contacts with Russia are increasing.
- 26 Mazepa once refers to the Right Bank as "the fatherland Ukraine, the other-bank land" (3:33, p. 108). On the other hand, in writing about his travels on the Right Bank, Velychko referred to it as "our Ukraino-Little Rossian father-

- land” (1, p. 3) and at times refers to the Left Bank as “this-bank Ukraine” (1, p. 4). For use of Ukraine and Little Russia as synonyms, with Left-Bank Lohvytsia as located in Ukraine, see 1:12:1, p. 200.
- 27 A letter from the Zaporozhian Cossacks to Hetman Ivan Samoilovych declared that Khmel'nyts'kyi “liberated all our fatherland, Little Russian Ukraine” (2:25, p. 541). In contrast Vyhovs'kyi is criticized in a letter from the Zaporozhian Cossacks for returning the Little Russian fatherland, which had been freed by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi from the Polish Kingdom only through great shedding of blood of the Cossack brothers, to the Kingdom (1:10:12, p. 170).
 - 28 See it referred to as the “renowned ancient and brave leaders’ and your hetmans’ capital” (2:17, p. 392).
 - 29 In a letter from Otaman Sirko to Hetman Ivan Samoilovych, he writes of something affecting not only the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, but also the entire Great and Little Russian world, thus differentiating the Sich Cossacks from the Little Russian world (2:19, pp. 469–70). Velychko discusses a call by the Crimean Tatars to the Zaporozhians to join them in a campaign against Little Russia and an answer by the Zaporozhians that they would not fight against their Little Russian fatherland (3:33, p. 105).
 - 30 The chronicle has two instances in which “fatherland” appears to mean the Russian state. Dominik Stanisław Połubiński not only called the Commonwealth his *otchyzna*, but asked to be accepted as a citizen (*obyvatel*) of the fatherland (*otchyzna*) of their Tsarist majesties (3:35, p. 214). In a letter in 1695 of Patriarch Adrian to Hetman Ivan Mazepa, the patriarch calls for the need to extend the borders of the “Russian fatherland (*otechestvo*) and autocracy” (3:36, p. 266). Whether the Russian term *otechestvo* was synonymous with Ukrainian *otchyzna* in this period is questionable.
 - 31 Although generally favorable to Peter and negative about Mazepa’s “treason,” Velychko condemned the tsar for not fulfilling his promises during the conflict to the Little Russian nation and the Zaporozhian Host to maintain and expand their liberties and for abolishing the office of hetman and erecting the Little Russian Collegium (2:23, pp. 519–20). On the depiction of Russia in the Velychko chronicle, see Frank E. Sysyn, “The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations in Ukrainian Historiography of the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,” in Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn and Mark von Hagen, eds, *Culture, Nation, and Identity. The Ukrainian- Russian Encounter, 1600–1945* (Edmonton-Toronto, 2003), 133–41.

The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nation-Building

ZENON E. KOHUT

In Western Europe the development of national consciousness is linked so closely with the evolution of the state that the process is usually referred to as the emergence of the nation-state.¹ As traced by Marc Bloch, the first step in the process was the identification of the people and their territory by a distinct name.² This rudimentary sense of identity was accompanied, or soon followed, by the expression of political loyalty, perhaps at first to a dynasty, but leading to patriotism toward a country.³ This patriotism was further reinforced by the awareness of a developing historical tradition.⁴ Finally, a unifying linguistic medium emerged that facilitated the creation of a national language, literature, and culture.⁵ Religion, which held the greatest claim over the loyalties of medieval and early modern man, played an ambiguous role. As a supranational body, the church in some instances hindered emerging national sentiments. However, religious differences, when coupled with ethnic strife, sparked the most intense proto-national feelings in early modern Europe.⁶

The elements of national consciousness coalesced gradually within a state structure which was itself evolving. The usual sequence of European states includes the feudal state, the *Ständestaat*, the absolute monarchy, and the nineteenth-century constitutional monarchy.⁷ As a greater part of the population was drawn into the state structure, national consciousness expanded from a tiny elite to the upper and middle classes and, finally, to the masses.⁸ In early modern Europe, national consciousness reached only the elite and upper classes. However, the slow organic development of the Western nation-state allowed these elites to build political structures, historical traditions, national languages and

literatures, and cultural institutions before the emergence of a mass society, with its problems of political participation, socioeconomic redistribution, and, of course, national feeling.

The model of the Western nation-state presumes that territory, political structure, ethnicity, language, and culture were all more or less coterminous. However, even the most often-cited example of the modern nation-state, France, had and continues to have its ethnic minorities and varied languages and cultures. Despite the numerous exceptions, the model of a Western nation-state does serve a purpose in pointing to a type of modern nation which evolved so gradually that historians have difficulty in pinpointing either its beginning or culmination, and which Hugh Seton-Watson has called "the old continuous nation."⁹

Only a small number of nations experienced this slow process. Most modern nations were not merely the result of an organic development but were also consciously molded by intellectuals and politicians in the modern period. Nations that had undergone some elements of the nation-state formation but were divided among several political units launched movements for political unification. In the German case, this process consisted in consolidating existing native political units into a single nation-state. In the Polish case, national consolidation had to be accompanied by the overthrow of several foreign powers. Another group of nation-builders faced an even more formidable task. Whereas the advocates of political unification of existing nations could rely on present or past native political structures, as well as developed national languages and cultures, the leaders of new nations had to base their movements primarily on ethnicity and spoken language. It was their task to devise a unifying script, create a literature, and, at the same time, convince the populace that it belonged to a nation. In most instances, this intelligentsia had to face suspicious and hostile political authorities that tried to smother any budding national movement.¹⁰

It is almost axiomatic in Western historiography that Ukrainians belong to the category of new nations and that Ukrainian nation-building consisted primarily of transforming "ethnic-linguistic masses into a conscious Ukrainian political and cultural community."¹¹ Although historians acknowledge that the nineteenth-century Ukrainian intelligentsia made use of some symbols and ideas from Cossack Ukraine, they see few direct links to it. My own contention is that any study of modern Ukrainian nation-building must consider the role of the eighteenth-century Ukrainian political unit called "Little Russia" by contemporaries, and subsequently labeled the "Hetmanate" by historians.

The Hetmanate's origins can be traced to 1648, when Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi led the Zaporozhian Host in a successful uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and gained control over most of Ukraine. In 1654,

under the terms of the Pereiaslav Agreement, Khmel'nyts'kyi placed Cossack Ukraine under the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsar. After a prolonged series of wars, the Right-Bank Ukraine was reincorporated into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but the Left Bank (east of the Dnipro) remained a separate political entity under the protection of the tsar. It is this truncated Left-Bank successor to the polity established by Khmel'nyts'kyi that is usually referred to as the Hetmanate. Although its autonomy was seriously curtailed after Hetman Ivan Mazepa's alliance with Sweden (1709), the Hetmanate retained its own institutions until the 1780s, when it became subject to the Russian imperial administration.

During the Hetmanate's long period of autonomy it developed a unique system of government which has close links to the military organization of the Cossack Host. The regiments and companies of the Zaporozhian Host became attached to specific territories, and Cossack officers assumed administrative, judicial, and fiscal duties. The hetman, or leader, of the Cossacks and his staff functioned as a central government, whereas regimental and company officers became provincial and local administrators. The Cossack officials quickly solidified into a social stratum that in many respects resembled a landed nobility.¹² I would argue that this elite underwent some of the stages in organic, pre-modern nation-building that resulted in the formation of a "Little Russian" identity.

According to Marc Bloch, an important factor in Western nation-building was the elite's identification of a specific territory and people by a single name.¹³ In the Ukrainian case establishing such a name was particularly complex: as Mykola Kostomarov pointed out over a century ago, throughout history Ukrainians had used a multiplicity of names for self-identification.¹⁴ Terms used most frequently were *Rus'*, *Little Russia* (*Mala Rus'*, *Mala Rossiia*, *Malorossia*), and *Ukraine* (*Ukraina*). *Rus'* was, of course, the most ancient name originating with the Kyivan realm. It included the concept of *Rus'* territory, dynasty (the Rurikids), and church (the metropolitan of Kyiv and all *Rus'*). After the destruction of Kyiv by the Mongols (1240), Galicia-Volhynia and Suzdalia became the two major claimants to the *Rus'* tradition. Of primary importance in the struggle over the inheritance of legitimacy from *Rus'* was the residence of the metropolitan "of Kyiv and all *Rus'*." In 1301 the metropolitan moved from Kyiv to the Suzdal lands – first to Vladimir and then to Moscow. The Galician princes, insisted, however, that the metropolitan reside on their territory. Perhaps because of fears that the Galician-Volhynian principedom was tainted by close contacts with Catholic states, the ecumenical patriarch and the Greek prelates favored the north, but, under the impact of political events, relented and granted Galicia a *Rus'* metropolitan as well.

In order to distinguish the two metropolitans of *Rus'* the patriarch and the Greek prelates began to use the terms *Major Rus'* and *Minor Rus'*.¹⁵ The reasons

for choosing the terms remain obscure. They might simply have reflected that the Galician metropolitan had fewer eparchies than the Suzdal one, or they might have come about due to an ancient Greek practice of denoting the homeland as *minor* while the colonies were labelled as *major* (e.g., *Megalê Hellas*, or *Magna Graecia* in Latin, for the Greek colonies in Italy). Whatever the conceptual underpinnings, the terms gained acceptance in ecclesiastical circles and entered the political sphere by the 1330s. Whereas the Galician princes utilized a number of variants of *Rus'* in their titles, e.g., "Dux totius terrae Russiae," "Dux et Dominus Russiae," and even "Rex Russiae," the last prince of Galicia, Iurii II Boleslav, on occasion also called himself "Dux totius Russiae Minoris."¹⁶

As a political designation *Little Rus'* faded with the demise of the Galician Principality (1340), but it continued to be important in the expanded battles over the *Rus'* metropolitanate. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Poland, Lithuania, and Muscovy vied for metropolitanates of *Rus'* and, at times, there were three *Rus'* metropolitans at the same time. The ecumenical patriarch attempted to maintain one *Rus'* church with one metropolitan of "Kyiv and all *Rus'*" residing primarily in Muscovy, but the political situation made this impossible. By the second half of the fifteenth century, the *Rus'* church was not only divided into separate branches, but solidified into separate Eastern and Western churches. The Western *Rus'* church under Lithuania was headed by the metropolitan of Kyiv and all *Rus'*, and the eastern *Rus'* church was headed by the metropolitan of Moscow and all *Rus'*. Each church had its own organization and hierarchy, with the western *Rus'* church still closely under the authority of the ecumenical patriarch. Since the Muscovite *Rus'* church was no longer tied to Kyiv (even in the metropolitan's title), the distinction between *Little Rus'* and *Great Rus'* was probably no longer necessary, for the term *Little Rus'* disappeared by the latter part of the fifteenth century.¹⁷

During the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the term *Rus'* underwent some changes in meaning and spelling. Its use was retained in civil affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rus'*, *Russia*, *Rus'ke kniazhestvo*). Thus for both Ukrainians and Poles, *Rus'* meant the people and land of Ukraine and Belorus, although by the early seventeenth century more often specifically of Ukraine. To the east existed *Muscovy* and the *Muscovites*. However, in ecclesiastical circles, under the influence of revived Greek learning, *Rus'* was gradually replaced by *Rossiiia*. In the late sixteenth century, the metropolitan of Kyiv began calling himself metropolitan of all *Rossiiia*. As is clear from the texts, at that time *Rossiiia* referred only to the Orthodox lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and not Muscovy. But under the Uniate challenge, Orthodox prelates began to seek support from the tsar of the other *Rus'* or *Rossiiia* – Muscovy – and reintroduced

the old term *Mala Rus'*, now spelled *Malaia Rossiia*. The term gained greater currency after the restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy in 1620.¹⁸

In addition to the various permutations of the word *Rus'*, the term *Ukraine* was also used to designate the land and people, as is attested in the chronicle literature from the thirteenth century. Usually, it referred to the borderlands of both the Kyiv and Galician principalities. That meaning persisted through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but then the term *Ukraine* was used to refer to the southeastern borderland of Poland-Lithuania. It was this middle Dnipro region which, as the frontier between Islam and Christianity, gave rise to the Cossack phenomenon. Soon *Ukraine* became virtually synonymous with the land of the Cossacks. The Cossacks referred to *Ukraine* as their "fatherland" or their "mother," and as the Cossack movement expanded geographically so the term *Ukraine* began to be applied to a larger and larger territory. The term was accepted by Western cartographers, who designated the land as "*Ukraina que est terra Cossacorum*."¹⁹

The successful Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising not only brought the Cossacks from Ukraine's borderlands to its heartland, but also resulted in the creation of a new polity that needed a name. Officially, Khmel'nyts'kyi's polity was called "the Zaporozhian Host," which hardly resolved the question of what country, territory, or people were under the Host's control. The attempts by contemporaries to deal with this problem reflect the varied political orientations and diffused identities of the period. *Rus'*, *Ukraine*, Little Russia (*Malorossiia*), *Zaporozhian Host*, and *Cossacks* were all used singly or in various combinations to designate the new entity and its inhabitants. Hetman Vyhovs'kyi in negotiations with the Swedes wrote about our "ancient Ukraine or Rus'," and Hetman Doroshenko in a letter referred to our "Orthodox Rossian Ukrainian people."²⁰ Perhaps the chronicler Samiilo Velychko best exemplified the terminological overabundance of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, for he used virtually interchangeably all the following terms: "Cossack Rossian Ukraine," "Cossack Ukraine," "Little Russian Ukraine," "Little Russia," and "Zaporozhian Host."²¹

In the eighteenth century, the term *Malorossiia* (Little Russia) gradually displaced all others, although *Ukraina* was still used on occasion. *Little Russia* received official approbation when after the Pereiaslav Agreement (1654), the tsar changed his title from "tsar of all Rus'" to "tsar of Great and Little Russia."²² After over a half-century of use by Muscovite authorities, it was accepted by Ukrainian society as the usual term for the Hetmanate. Thus, *Little Russia* began to be identified not with all Ukraine but primarily with the Hetmanate of both banks of the Dnipro and then with its truncated Left-Bank successor in the eighteenth century. Yet the elite considered this *Little Russia* to be their fatherland – a special

land that they were bound to cherish and protect. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Ukrainian elite had identified a specific people, territory, and political structure with a distinct name.²³

The development of a specific Little Russian identity was further bolstered by the concept of “Little Russian rights and liberties.” Contemporary sources often repeated the formula that as a “free people” (*vol'nyi narod*) the Little Russians had entered into voluntary agreements with the Polish king and later with the Muscovite tsar while always retaining their “rights and liberties” (*prava i vol'nosti*). The nature of these rights was imprecise, reflecting their diverse origins and the ambiguity of the Pereiaslav Agreement and its subsequent revisions. At Pereiaslav, the hetman had acted as a Cossack commander, as a leader of a country, as a representative of the major social groups, and as a patron of the Orthodox religion. As a result, the tsar had become the protector of the Zaporozhian Host, the Little Russian land, the principal social groups, and the Orthodox faith. “Little Russian rights and liberties,” therefore, included a mixture of sometimes contradictory socioeconomic, political, and religious prerogatives. The Ukrainian populace expected the tsar not only to protect Little Russia from foreign invasion, but also to uphold these same “rights and liberties.”²⁴

While the major segments of Ukrainian society believed that they had some sort of reciprocal agreement with the tsar, none was ever recognized by the tsarist authorities. From the Muscovite point of view, “Little Russian rights and liberties” were gifts of the tsar and could be rescinded at his will. Moreover, the tsar claimed Little Russia not only on the basis of the submission at Pereiaslav in 1654, but as a hereditary land of Kyivan Rus' – a claim facilitated by the theory of the transfer of princely seats advanced by Muscovite and some Ukrainian prelates.²⁵ Nevertheless, the tsar did reconfirm and amend “Little Russian rights and liberties” each time a new hetman assumed office.²⁶ Thus, the tsar may have considered *Little Russia* as his patrimony, but de facto he recognized it as a special patrimony inhabited by privileged subjects.

The practical arrangement between the autocratic tsar and privileged Little Russian society changed significantly during the reign of Peter I. Perhaps the most dramatic innovation was the concept, as yet perceived only dimly, of the state as an entity separate from the tsar's patrimony. Ultimately, this outlook ascribed to the newly emerging Russian Empire a will and purpose of its own, and Peter would create an expanded and reinvigorated government machinery to serve it. This bureaucracy was to regulate the activities of the inhabitants in order to increase revenue, power, and glory for the state, but also to contribute to the common welfare. The inhabitants were no longer merely subjects or slaves (*kholopy*) of the tsar, but also servants of the state. Thus, Peter put Russia on the

road to a goal-oriented, centrally regulated, absolutist monarchy – a type of “well-regulated” state which had emerged in eighteenth-century Central Europe.²⁷

A clash between the concept of a centrally regulated empire and the idea of Little Russian “rights and liberties” was inevitable. Little Russian society had no loyalty to the Russian state, yet believed the tsar to be its protector. Peter’s reforms and centralizing tendencies exasperated the Cossack elite until, finally, Hetman Ivan Mazepa decided to end the tsar’s protection over Little Russia (1709). Peter I, however, saw this change of allegiance not as a personal rebuke or betrayal, but as treason to the Russian state. It was clear that Peter considered the Hetmanate an integral (if not yet integrated) part of the Russian Empire.²⁸

It was the newly emerging imperial concept, coupled with internal developments in the Hetmanate that sparked the crystallization of the Little Russian identity. The social basis for that identity was the new elite that emerged in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, after the Poltava debacle. In essence, this small stratum of Cossack officers had developed into a gentry and saw itself as comparable to the nobility of the Polish times, or *szlachta*. Indeed, many Cossack officers “traced” their origins to the pre-1648 *szlachta*. Thus, the descendants of the rebels against the *szlachta* Commonwealth, after solidifying as a gentry, turned to the political and estate traditions of the *szlachta* estate as a model for the Hetmanate. Such identification received tacit legal recognition in the compendium of laws produced in the 1740s, the “Laws by Which the Little Russian People are Judged,” and in the restoration of *szlachta* judicial courts in 1763 and 1764. But above all, the *szlachta* tendencies contributed to the new gentry’s political outlook. According to the constitutional theory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the *szlachta* was the sole component of the political nation and thus was responsible for the country’s rights, privileges, and current needs (expressed through the Diet). In the Hetmanate, the recently established *szlachta* also began to assume the role of the defender of Little Russia, its constitutional arrangement, and its social structure – in short, to imitate somewhat a *szlachta* political nation.²⁹

The institutional forum for the elite’s political role was the Officers’ Council. Meeting during the Christmas and Easter holidays, it evolved from an informal gathering of officers, expressing holiday felicitations to the hetman, into a more elaborate and formal body with elected regional participants and a prescribed agenda.³⁰ For example, the 1763 council was attended by 100 middle- and high-ranking notables, representing all regions of the Hetmanate. The council adopted a program of administrative and judicial reforms, outlined an economic policy, and requested the tsar to confirm the rights of various social groups, particularly the *szlachta*. The council’s discussions and the resulting petition to the tsar also gave a good indication of the elite’s political views. Clearly, they viewed Little

Russia as a separate country, possessing its own borders, government, and institutions. Admittedly, Little Russia was connected to Russia by a common monarch, but the council reminded the Russian authorities that the submission to the tsar was based on treaties and recommended that the tsar again reconfirm the Pereiaslav Agreement – a custom which had been abolished by Peter I.³¹

The rejection of the centralized Russian state was expressed explicitly in the political poem *Rozgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei* (*A Dialogue Between Great Russia and Little Russia*), written in 1762 by an official in the Hetmanate, Semen Divovych. The poem was dedicated to the “honor, glory, and defense of all Little Russia.”³² Such Little Russian patriotism was further reinforced by a historical consciousness present in a relatively new literary genre – the Cossack chronicle. At a time when most literature was produced by churchmen, the Cossack chronicles were written by the clerks and officials of the Ukrainian civil administration.³³

The emergence of a historical consciousness, the expression of political loyalty to Little Russia and its constitutional and administrative prerogatives, and the clear identification of the people and territory with the term “Little Russia” all indicate that by the mid-eighteenth century the Ukrainian elite had undergone some of the stages of pre-modern nation-building. If a pre-modern Little Russian nation had not as yet matured, then, at the very least, the elite had shown a strong Little Russian identity – an identity with the potential of serving as a focal point in forming a modern “Little Russian” nation. However, the introduction of the Russian imperial concept – which had at first helped crystallize the Little Russian identity – now undermined its base. During the reign of Catherine II, the autonomous institutions of the Hetmanate were gradually abolished, the Ukrainian elite was brought into the Russian nobility, and the peasants were completely enserfed.³⁴ The disappearance of Little Russia as a distinct political and administrative entity deprived the elite of the major symbols of a distinct Little Russian identity.

The Ukrainian elite, of course, protested against the attempts to impose a uniform Russian imperial state. Approximately 950 Ukrainian nobles participating in Catherine II’s Legislative Commission signed petitions for the continuation of the Hetmanate’s autonomy (1767).³⁵ Political theorists such as Hryhorii Poletyka advanced several projects for reform which they hoped would both placate the imperial authorities and retain “Little Russian rights and liberties.”³⁶ But these efforts were to no avail. The leveling of the Hetmanate’s institutions continued unabated. Moreover, the rights to Russian nobility, complete enserfment of the peasantry, and unprecedented opportunities for imperial careers had shown the Ukrainian elite some of the advantages of integration into the imperial system.

While the elimination of the Hetmanate’s institutions was undercutting the basis for a Little Russian identity, a gradual cultural transformation was bringing

the Ukrainian elite into an imperial cultural milieu. Culturally, the Ukrainian gentry was directly or indirectly the product of the Kyiv Academy or its educational satellites – the Chernihiv and Kharkiv Colleges. At the beginning of the eighteenth century a graduate of these schools would have a good knowledge of Latin, Polish, a Ukrainian rendition of Church Slavonic, Slavono-Ukrainian (a mixture of Slavonic and Ukrainian), and, perhaps, a smattering of classical Greek or of German. Latin and Polish were the elite's window to world culture; Slavonic served not only as a sacred language but was considered appropriate for use in high literary genres such as drama. Slavono-Ukrainian – in various combinations and forms – was the most extensively used linguistic medium, prevailing in the world of officialdom, in personal correspondence, and in literary genres such as poetry, drama, sermons, and oratorical works. Colloquial Ukrainian was reserved for *interludia* and *intermedia* – humorous skits performed between the acts of serious drama.³⁷

In Russia, an adaption of Ukrainian Slavonic largely replaced the Muscovite version by the early eighteenth century. This new version of Slavonic was cleansed of Ukrainianisms in vocabulary but retained the Ukrainian version's structure and form of exposition.³⁸ At the same time, the Kyiv Academy was adopted as a model for Russian schools, which were frequently staffed by its graduates. By the mid-eighteenth century, Ukrainian clerics and monks assumed a very influential, if not dominant, position within the imperial Orthodox church.³⁹ The end result was the creation of a fairly unified Slavonic Orthodox cultural milieu.

Outside the religious realm, Russia in the eighteenth century made giant strides in the development of a modern literary Russian language and secular Russian literary culture. At the turn of the century, the Russian literary scene was somewhat analogous to the situation in Ukraine. Literary works were written in an admixture of Slavonic, chancery Muscovite, and colloquial Russian. The "higher" the genre, the closer it came to Slavonic. Mikhail Lomonosov's theory of three styles allowed more genres to be produced in a middle style, in a linguistic medium that was developing into literary Russian.⁴⁰ The process of forming modern literary Russian was facilitated by the publication of grammars and dictionaries. Also, the civil alphabet introduced by Peter I sharpened the distinction between church and civil linguistic forms. The state became the publisher of the printed word and the promoter of secular Russian culture.⁴¹

The imperial development of language, literature, and culture had a profound impact on Ukraine. In 1721 a Petrine decree permitted monasteries in Ukraine to publish only religious works, and then only in linguistic conformity with Russian imperial norms. Because there was no secular typography in the Hetmanate, the decree in effect reduced whole genres of Ukrainian literature to a manuscript tra-

dition.⁴² Moreover, under the impact of daily intercourse, the chancery Slavono-Ukrainian was being gradually replaced by Slavono-Russian (although on the local level a Ukrainian chancery language was in use until the nineteenth century). As more and more literary, scientific, and practical works were becoming available in Russian, the developing literary Russian language replaced Polish as the medium of contact for the Ukrainian elite with the outside world. All these changes signified the gradual demise of literary Slavono-Ukrainian, so much so that by the 1780s, it fell out of use at the Kyiv Academy and was replaced by Russian.⁴³

Much had changed if one compares the cultural world of a typical Ukrainian nobleman at the beginning and at the end of the eighteenth century. Both would still learn a good deal of Church Slavonic, but whereas at the beginning of the century several high genres were written in Slavonic, by the end Slavonic was relegated strictly to the religious realm. Both nobles would have a working knowledge of Latin with a smattering of classical Greek. By 1800, however, the Slavono-Ukrainian used extensively in administration and literature in 1700 had been replaced by Slavono-Russian – a language which was evolving into a standard literary Russian. This language was further reinforced by a vigorous imperial publication program which produced works dealing with all aspects of the secular world, from practical manuals to translations of foreign literature. In fact, the emerging literary Russian language also replaced Polish as the medium for contact with the non-Orthodox world. Contact with the West was further strengthened by an increased knowledge of German and, by the end of the century, of French.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Ukrainian elite fit well into the imperial cultural milieu. Since many Ukrainian nobles still learned their letters from the Slavonic Psalter and other sacred texts, Slavonic or “bookish” Russian sounded both learned and native. For the Ukrainian gentry, the replacement of Slavono-Ukrainian with Slavono-Russian or simply Russian was so gradual that it was barely perceived. It meant the displacement of one unspoken “book language” by another, while the Slavonic component provided continuity. It is true that colloquial Ukrainian could still be used for “low-style” genres, particularly for travesties and humor. This was not insignificant, for it was precisely from such low-style humor that modern Ukrainian literature was born (Ivan Kotliarevskiy, author of the first published modern Ukrainian literary work, was a nobleman from the Hetmanate). But for the Ukrainian gentry this was mere local humor and color. They could not conceive of the language spoken by the people as a medium for high culture. By the end of the eighteenth century, they shared in an imperial high culture that was both cosmopolitan and Russian.

Immersion into a cosmopolitan Russian cultural milieu did not preclude the existence of a very strong Little Russian patriotism. The Little Russian identity

combined Russian imperial culture with an attachment to the Hetmanate and its institutions. Vasyl' Kapnist (Vasilii Kapnist) is a good example of the Little Russian identity at the end of the eighteenth century. A well-known imperial literary figure who wrote in Russian, he also advanced a project to restore the Hetmanate's Cossack formations and was an ardent defender of the few remaining Little Russian prerogatives. It is almost certain that Kapnist held secret talks with the Prussian king, seeking Prussia's support for a reconstituted Little Russia.⁴⁴ While others were not as extreme in their devotion, efforts at either preserving or restoring some of the Hetmanate's institutions persisted through the first half of the nineteenth century. Occasionally, these traditionalists met with limited success. Emperor Paul I partially restored the Hetmanate's judicial system; the Lithuanian Statute survived as the basic law code until 1843; and the Hetmanate's inheritance and property laws were in use until the Russian Revolution.⁴⁵

The few surviving native legal practices, however, were hardly sufficient for the preservation of a strong Little Russian identity. With the possibility of restoring the Hetmanate's major institutions waning, patriots were reduced to bemoaning Little Russia's fate in manuscript tracts. The most influential political work produced in the early nineteenth century was *Istoriia Rusov* (*History of the Rus' People*). Written anonymously in Russian and falsely attributed to a deceased writer, it was a thoroughly modern apology for Little Russia and its rights and liberties. Here Little Russia is portrayed as a major power in Eastern Europe, whose destruction had upset the balance of power. The author was well acquainted with the ideas emanating from the American and French Revolutions, as well as concepts of natural law and the balance of power. Implicit in the work is the hope that Little Russia would be restored to its rightful place in the family of nations. It also shows a new interest in the question of national terminology, arguing that the Russians had stolen the name *Rus'* from the Ukrainians.⁴⁶

In the process of decrying Little Russia's fate, the patriots recorded it. From the time of the Hetmanate's abolition in the 1780s until the 1830s, the Ukrainian gentry compiled and published topographical descriptions, genealogies, local histories, family archives, and several works of synthesis.⁴⁷ But this surge in historical consciousness did not reflect a further development of the Little Russian identity, but rather a belief in its imminent demise. The abolition of the institutions of the Hetmanate convinced many Little Russian patriots that they were epigones of a country and a nation that had ceased to exist. Oleksa Martos captured this mood in his diary while visiting the grave of Hetman Mazepa in Moldavia in 1812:

Mazepa died far away from his country, whose independence he defended. He was a friend of liberty and therefore deserves to be honored by posterity.

After his expulsion from Little Russia, its inhabitants lost their sacred rights, which Mazepa had defended for so long with great enthusiasm and patriotic ardor. He is no more, and the name of Little Russia and its brave Cossacks have disappeared from the list of nations who, although small in numbers, are yet famous for their way of life and their constitution. Now rich Little Russia is reduced to two or three provinces. That this is the common destiny of states and republics, we can see from the history of other nations.⁴⁸

Such was the peculiar fate of the Little Russian identity. Rather than evolve into a modern Little Russian national consciousness, the Little Russian identity was gradually channeled into a peculiar *Landespatriotismus* that lamented the demise of a Little Russian “nation.”

What, then, was the role of the Little Russian identity in the process of Ukrainian nation-building? If viewed in terms of a direct linear development, the emergence of a Little Russian identity was merely a pale and ultimately aborted reflection of the West European nation-building model. However, if one considers national development as a dialectical rather than linear process, then the emergence of a Little Russian identity can be considered an important step in Ukrainian nation-building. With their antiquarian interests and nostalgia, the Ukrainian gentry preserved at least a remnant of the Little Russian identity until the 1830s and 1840s. At the same time, under the influence of Herder and romanticism, a new generation discovered the Ukrainian folk with its vernacular language. Young students came to identify themselves by the term “Ukrainian,” which to them signified a cultural rather than a political affiliation.⁴⁹

For a while, the apolitical researchers of Ukrainian folk language and customs and the nostalgic Little Russian descendants of the elite of the former Hetmanate could pursue their activities without much contact. But after a time, they inevitably clashed. The author of *Istoriia Rusov*, in writing this modernized swan song of the Little Russian identity, already witnessed the re-emergence of the term *Ukraine* and fired a salvo against it.⁵⁰ It was a clash of generations (fathers versus sons) and social groups (gentry versus newly formed intelligentsia) over language (Russian versus Ukrainian) and orientation (restoration of Little Russian institutions versus apolitical Ukrainian cultural work). This clash helped spark modern Ukrainian nation-building because the intelligentsia of the 1840s combined Ukrainian cultural activities with the political outlook and historical consciousness that had been part of the Little Russian identity.⁵¹

However, only a part of the gentry and intelligentsia accepted the new Ukrainian national identity. With its Russian cultural base, the Little Russian identity also prepared its adherents for the All-Russian concept which postulated

that the Little Russians were a branch of a single Russian nation. In fact, D.B. Saunders has argued that the *Little Russians* were the first to raise the question of Russia's own national identity. He claims that these Ukrainians played a substantial part in defining Russian *narodnost'* and prepared the ground for Slavophilism – thus making a major contribution to imperial ideology and Russian nationalism.⁵²

In conclusion, the Little Russian legacy played an ambiguous role in the Ukrainian nation-building process. On the one hand, the ability of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to draw upon the traditions of the Hetmanate meant that the process did not have to begin at a virtual *Naturvolk* stage. Thus, a Ukrainian movement could emerge sooner and with greater vitality than national movements in Belarus or Slovakia, for example. On the other hand, the Russian cultural component of the Little Russian identity made the Ukrainian intelligentsia hesitant and suspicious when incorporating its political and historical traditions into a new Ukrainian outlook. It was even more difficult for the Little Russian gentry to accept the new Ukrainian identity because it was based on the language and culture of their serfs. For many of the gentry and intelligentsia, the competing identities – imperial, all-Russian, Russian, and even Slavic – were ultimately more attractive than the Ukrainian one. In this respect, the lingering Little Russian identity which initially stimulated the Ukrainian national movement hampered its further development once the movement was underway. Yet, despite that contradictory role, the development of a Little Russian identity was a prelude for modern Ukrainian nation-building.

NOTES

Originally published as: Zenon E. Kohut, "The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nation-Building," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, no. 3/4 (1986): 559–76. Copyright 1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted with permission.

- 1 See Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975); and V.G. Kiemon, "State and Nation in Western Europe," *Past and Present*, no. 3 (1965): 20–38. There is a large body of work devoted primarily to the study of nationalism as an ideology, but the development of national consciousness in pre-modern times has received little attention. Hans Kohn in *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York, 1951), Hugh Seton-Watson in *Nations and States* (Boulder, 1977) and, most recently, John Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, 1984), all place greater emphasis on the historical antecedents of nationalism. The emergence of national con-

- sciousness in early modern Europe has been the subject of Orest Ranum, ed., *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, 1975). Several ground-breaking articles have traced the origins of national sentiment from medieval times. See H. Kohn, "The Dawn of Nationalism in Europe," *American Historical Review* 52, no. 2 (January 1947): 265–80; E.H. Kantorowicz, "Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Political Thought," *American Historical Review* 56, no. 3 (April 1951): 472–92; J. Huizinga, "Patriotism and Nationalism in European History," in his *Men and Ideas* (New York, 1959), 97–155; K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, "National Consciousness in Medieval Europe: Some Theoretical Problems," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 8, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 152–66, and his "National Consciousness and Social Theory," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 7, no. 2 (Fall 1980): 386–90; also his "National Consciousness in Poland until the End of the Fourteenth Century: A Sociological Interpretation," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 8, no. 2 (Fall 1981): 249–66.
- 2 M. Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 2 vols (Chicago, 1971), 2:432–7.
- 3 Kohn, "The Dawn of Nationalism in Europe," 265–80.
- 4 Ranum, *National Consciousness*, 3–18.
- 5 For the importance of a common language and culture, see Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe," in Tilly, *Formation of National States*, 562–600; Carlton J.H. Hayes, in his classic *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York, 1931), placed great importance on linguistic and cultural factors.
- 6 The fusion of religious, social, and cultural factors in producing intense proto-national sentiment is described by Frank E. Sysyn, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century: The Role of National Consciousness and National Conflict in the Khmel'nyts'kyi Movement," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. Peter Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto, 1980), 58–82.
- 7 Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Stanford, 1978); Tilly, *Formation of National States*.
- 8 Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation," 562–600. Mass mobilization is the subject of Karl Deutsch's *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953).
- 9 Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, 15–87.
- 10 Ibid., 143–91.
- 11 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Role of the Ukraine in Modern History," in *The Development of the USSR*, ed. Donald W. Treadgold (Seattle, 1964), 214.

- 12 See Chapter IV in my book *Making Ukraine: Studies On Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity* (Toronto, 2011), 78–111; Aleksandra Efimenko, “Malorusskoe dvorianstvo i ego sud’ba,” in *Iuzhnaia Rus’: Ocherki, issledovaniia, i zametki*, 2 vols (St Petersburg, 1905), 1:145–200.
- 13 Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 2:432–7.
- 14 Nikolai (Mykola) Kostomarov, “Dve russkii narodnosti,” *Osnova*, no. 3 (March 1861): 40.
- 15 The best discussion of the terms *Rus’* and *Little Russia* is by A. Solov’ev in “Velikaia, Malaia i Belaia Rus’,” *Voprosy istorii*, no. 7 (1947): 24–38.
- 16 See the collection of essays, *Boleslav-Iurii II: Kniaz vsei Maloi Rusi* (St Petersburg, 1907); see also Ia. Isaievych, “On the Titulature of Rulers in Eastern Europe,” in *Synopsis: A Collection of Essays in Honour of Zenon E. Kohut*, special issue of the Journal of Ukrainian Studies, ed. S. Plokhyy and F. Sysyn (Edmonton and Toronto) 29, nos 1–2 (Summer–Winter 2004): 219–44.
- 17 Solov’ev, “Velikaia, Malaia i Belaia Rus’,” 33.
- 18 The transformation of the term “Rus’” into “Rossiia” and then “Malorossiia” is best summarized by M.A. Maksimovich, “Ob upotreblenii nazvanii Rossiia i Malorossiia v Zapadnoi Rusi,” in *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2 vols (Kyiv, 1877), 2:307–11.
- 19 There is an extensive literature concerning the term “Ukraine.” The best analysis of the historical evolution of the term is provided by Serhii Shelukhin, *Ukraina – nazva nashoi zemli z naidavniishykh chasiv* (Prague, 1936), and V. Sichyns’kyi, *Nazva Ukrainy* (Augsburg, 1948).
- 20 These examples are taken from *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva*, 3 vols (Munich, 1949), 1:15.
- 21 For a listing of Velychko’s varied terminology, see Shelukhin, *Ukraina*, 145–50.
- 22 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1830), doc. 119, 325.
- 23 By the middle of the eighteenth century, official documents (both Russian and Ukrainian), political and historical works, and even correspondence refer to the Hetmanate simply as *Little Russia*.
- 24 A general description of Little Russian “rights and liberties” can be found in my book *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, MA, 1988).
- 25 See Jaroslaw Pelenski, “The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to the ‘Kyivan Inheritance,’” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 1 (March 1977): 29–52. The *Synopsis* is analyzed by I.P. Ieremin, “K istorii obshchestvennoi mysli na Ukraine vtoroi poloviny XVII v,” *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 10 (1954): 212–22, and by S.L. Peshtich, “‘Sinopsis’ kak istoricheskoe proizvedenie,” *ibid.* 15 (1958): 284–98.

- 26 A. Iakovliv, *Ukraïns'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory v XVII–XVIII vikakh*, Pratsi Ukraïns'koho naukovooho instytutu, 19 (Warsaw, 1934).
- 27 The gradual emergence of a state concept in seventeenth-century Muscovy is traced by G. Stökl, “Die Begriffe Reich, Herrschaft und Staat bei den orthodoxen Slaven,” *Saeculum* 5, no. 1 (1954): 104–17; Peter I’s emerging concepts of state are also noted by Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1974), 127–28; Peter’s emulation of the “ordered” or “regulated” state has been proposed by V.I. Syromiantnikov, *‘Reguliarnoe gosudarstvo’ Petra Pervogo i ego ideologiia* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1943). The whole question of the “well-ordered” state has been studied by Marc Raeff in “The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach,” *American Historical Review* 30, no. 5 (December 1975): 1221–43; and in his *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800* (New Haven, 1983).
- 28 See O. Subtelny, “Mazepa, Peter I, and the Question of Treason,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 2 (June 1978): 158–83, and his “Russia and the Ukraine: The Difference that Peter Made,” *Russian Review* 39, no. 1 (January 1980): 1–17.
- 29 Kohut, “Ukrainian Elite,” 65–97.
- 30 On the evolution of the Officers’ Council, see Lev Okinshevych, *Tsentral'ni ustanovy Ukrainy-Het'manschyny XVII–XVIII vv.*, pt. 2: *Rada starshyn*, Pratsi Komisii dlia vyvchannia istorii zakhidno-rus'koho ta ukraïns'koho prava, 8 (Kyiv, 1930).
- 31 Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 86–95.
- 32 A.V. Petrov, ed., “Rozgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei: literaturnyi pamiatnik vtoroi poloviny XVIII veka,” *Kievskaiia starina* (hereinafter – *KS*), no. 2 (1882): 313–65.
- 33 Cossack chronicles are discussed in my article “The Question of Russo-Ukrainian Unity and Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Early Modern Ukrainian Thought and Culture,” see my *Making Ukraine*, 1–35.
- 34 Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 209–58.
- 35 For the Ukrainian elite’s participation in the Legislative Commission, see Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 125–90.
- 36 See my article “A Gentry Democracy within an Autocracy: The Politics of Hryhorii Poletyka (1723/25–84),” *Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak by His Students and Colleagues on His Sixtieth Birthday*, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3/4 (1979–80), 2: 507–19.
- 37 For information on the elite’s education, see Oleksander Hrushevs'kyi, “Zminy shkil'noi systemy na Livoberezhzhi v XVIII v.,” *Ukraïna*, 1924, nos.

- 1–2, 82–7; for changes in literary production, language, and culture in the eighteenth century, see P. Zhitetskii, “*Eneida’ Kotliarevskogo i drevneishii spisok ee v sviazi s obzorom maloruskoi literatury XVIII veka*,” serialized in *КС*, no. 10 (1899): 1–30; no. 11, 127–66; no. 12, 277–300; 1900, no. 1, 16–45; no. 2, 163–91; no. 3, 312–36. For a discussion of the literary language, see George Y. Shevelov, “Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language,” in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. Ivan L. Rydrynsky (Edmonton, 1981), 216–31; M.A. Zhovtobriukh, “Davni tradytsii v novii ukrains’kii literaturnii movi,” *Movoznavstvo*, no. 2 (1970): 24–40; P.P. Pliushch, *Istoriia ukrains’koï literaturnoi movy* (Kyiv, 1971), 215–52; I.K. Bilodid, “Movna kontseptsiiia Kyievo-Mohylians’koï Akademii,” in his *Kyievo-Mohylians’ka akademiia z istorii skhidnoslov’ians’kykh literaturnykh mov* (Kyiv, 1979), 48–84.
- 38 V. Vinogradov, *Ocherki po istorii russkogo literaturnogo iazyka XVII–XIX v.v.* (Leiden, 1949), 17–27.
- 39 K. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn* (Kazan, 1914).
- 40 Vinogradov, *Ocherki*, 95–119.
- 41 Ibid., 72–84; James Cracraft, *The Revolution of Peter the Great* (Cambridge, MA, 2003).
- 42 Zhitetskii, “Eneida,” *КС*, no. 10 (1899): 6–30.
- 43 Ibid., no. 11 (1899): 129–35.
- 44 On V. Kapnist’s activities on behalf of the Hetmanate, see O. Ohloblyn, *Liudy Staroi Ukraïny* (Munich, 1959), 49–114. For the debate over Kapnist’s secret talks with the Prussian king, see William B. Edgerton, “Laying a Legend to Rest: The Poet Kapnist and Ukraino-German Intrigue,” *Slavic Review* 30, no. 3 (September 1971): 551–60; and O. Ohloblyn, “Berlins’ka misiia Kapnista 1791 roku: istoriohrafiiia i metodolohiia pytannia,” *Ukrains’kyi istoryk*, 1974, nos 1–3, 85–103. Bronisław Dembiński, “Tajna misja Ukraïńca w Berlinie w r. 1791,” *Przegląd Polski* 3 (1896): 511–23; Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, “Sekretna misiia ukraïntsia v Berlini v 1791,” *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 9 (1896): Miscellanea, 7–9; Georg Sacke, “V.V. Kapnist und seine Ode ‘Na rabstvo,’” *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 7 (1941): 291–301; Oleksander Ohloblyn, “Berlins’ka misiia Kapnista 1791 roku: istoriohrafiiia i metodolohiia pytannia,” *Ukrains’kyi istoryk*, nos. 1–3 (1974): 85–103; Ia. Dashkevych, “Berlin, kviten 1791 r.: misiia V. V. Kapnista, ii peredistoriia ta istoriia,” *Ukrains’kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* 1 (1992): 220–59.
- 45 Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, 234–7.
- 46 *Istoriia Rusiv*, ed. O. Ohloblyn (New York, 1956).

- 47 Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography (special issue of the Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 5–6 [New York, 1957])*: 92–116.
- 48 Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, 77.
- 49 For an overview of the activities of the early ethnographers, see Boris P. Kirdan, *Sobirатели narodnoi poezii: iz istorii ukrainskoi fol'kloristiki XIX v.* (Moscow, 1974); an anthology of the literature was compiled by Ia. Aizenshtok, *Ukrains'ki poety-romantyky 20–40kh rokiv XIX st.* (Kyiv, 1968).
- 50 *Istoriia Rusiv*, 4–5.
- 51 In my view, N. (M.) Kostomarov, M. Maksymovych, and P. Kulish exemplify such a synthesis. For a study of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the 1830s and 1840s, see Orest Pelech, “Toward a Historical Sociology of the Ukrainian Ideologies in the Russian Empire of the 1830’s and 1840’s” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1976).
- 52 D.B. Saunders, “Contemporary Critics of Gogol’s *Vechera* and the Debate about Russian *narodnost* (1831–1832),” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1981): 66–82; and his *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985).

Constitutio Medievalis: The Politics of Language and the
Language of Politics in the 1710 Constitution

GARY MARKER

One of the most distinguishing features of the political and clerical elites of the Hetmanate during the era of what might be termed the Kyivan High Baroque was their remarkable facility with languages, ancient and modern. Geographically embedded among all varieties of the faiths of the Book, and amidst multiple sources of military might and political authority, these elites were obliged to interact with all of them. Mazepa, of course, was renowned for his ability to speak numerous languages (including, apparently, Turkish and Tatar). But it is the cohorts educated in seminaries, including some laymen, on whom the burden of poly glossia primarily fell. For it was they who produced the primary written or public texts of confessional and political interface. More so even than the educated Polish elites whom they in many ways resembled, the Hetmanate's leaders needed to find the right tongue, or even dialect, appropriate for the specific discursive space(-s) of the moment. Language, in other words, including the choice of language or dialect, was intensely and unavoidably political.

No figure of the era personified this existential fact of life more than Pylyp Orlyk, as complex, engaging, and polychromatic a politician as one is likely to find anywhere in early modern Europe. Trained at academies in both Vilnius and Kyiv and comfortable in several languages, he composed texts in Polish, Latin, French, and various modes of East Slavic, Church Slavonic, and Russian/Ruthenian writing. More to the point, he fashioned himself in starkly different ways in different languages. For example, his letter to Metropolitan Stefan Iavors'kyi of 1721, written largely in Russo-Ukrainian but with a good deal of Latin and French phraseology, was cast as an exercise of pious and unswerving Orthodoxy.¹ His

campaign *Diariusz*, some of which was penned at approximately the same time as the letter, was written mostly in Polish, also with scattered interpolations of official correspondence in Latin and French. But in contrast to the letter to Iavors'kyi, the *Diariusz* made few references to Orthodoxy. Intermingled with his negotiations with diplomats and military figures, Orlyk recounted his ongoing attendance at services in Catholic churches and cathedrals in Wrocław, Cracow, and other Polish towns, and without ever saying so explicitly, he framed himself almost matter-of-factly as a conventionally observant Catholic.² Some of his writings during his *Wanderjahre* (a year spent traveling abroad) characterized him as Mazepa's closest aide and loyal follower, while others conveyed rage and betrayal at Mazepa's headstrong and authoritarian decision making during the fateful years leading up to the break with Peter I.

Enigmatic examples such as these abound in Orlyk's work, leading at least one scholar to characterize his political world as a "theater of shadows," a performative political world in which nothing was ever quite real and no one could ever determine his true sentiments.³ Perhaps this is so, but at the very least one must begin with the assumptions that Orlyk crafted his chameleon-like self-representations carefully, and that he chose his languages with similar deliberation. The point here is not about uncovering what Orlyk "really" thought in his heart of hearts, an enterprise that lies beyond the meager tools of documentary historians who are fated to rely upon textual and physical remnants of a past time to try to reconstruct matters as they appear to us in distant hindsight. Instead, we need to inquire into how Orlyk chose to present himself, his arguments, and his images textually.

What, then, of the Constitution of 1710? Although it has been made available in many languages, Orlyk composed it and circulated it primarily in Latin. In light of the language-as-politics axiom that defines this paper, let us begin by assuming that he chose Latin deliberately. As a work of history this examination focuses on past meanings and shared understanding rather than on the subsequent afterlife of the Orlyk Constitution as a source of inspiration among later Ukrainian thinkers and political movements. This paper is not explicitly interrogating the putative beginnings of modern constitutionalism – although it does so indirectly – even though that is an entirely legitimate inquiry. Thus, the question so often posed about Orlyk's text regarding whether it articulated an early version of the modern idea of separation of powers is not of primary concern here. Rather, the paper dwells on the probable resonance of the text among his contemporaries, what these phrases might have signified at that time and in that context, and why, consequently, Orlyk chose Latin.

The Power of Latin

What were the specificities of language that would have connected the Constitution in Latin to older texts, codes, and linguistic formulae that would have enabled contemporary audiences both within and outside the Hetmanate to situate the manifesto and recognize its signifiers? What were the primary key words that the Constitution of 1710 employed to characterize the political body for which it now lay its claims as a fundamental pact or law, and what did those words mean?

My argument in brief is that Orlyk chose his political language very carefully, gazing backward toward an imagined antiquity of liberty so as to embed his claims for future political arrangements in past understandings, specific antiquities, and historical precedent rather than on appeals to universality. He mobilized this linguistic retrospection in pursuit of a *restoration* of an idealized just order, a shared understanding of sovereignty for and among his Cossacks that had been increasingly abused by multiple parties (first the Poles, then the Muscovites) over several decades. This strategy was neither new to Orlyk nor unique to Ukraine. On the contrary, the notions of precedent, legitimation through ancient lineage or primordial understandings, and inflections of familiarity upon which the Constitution rested dated back several generations, and even centuries, to modes of political argumentation commonplace in Europe since the Renaissance, if not before. All of these mark the text as pre-modern, and, in the eyes of its contemporaries a *constitutio medievalis*.

The use of Latin in this context served several practical, political, and symbolic functions, not the least of which was to draw a sharp linguistic line between the Hetmanate, whose lettered elites knew the language well, and Muscovy, in which Latin was little known and sparingly used, even in formal treaties. In a geopolitical region in which the core populations of Muscovy and the Hetmanate shared a common religion, a mutually comprehensible language, and even Rossiia/Rus', this act of cultural differentiation boldly highlighted something they did not share and cast Muscovy as the outsider. Latin was the universal language of diplomacy. All of Europe used it, as the language of learning and science, and even in the early eighteenth century most treaties and international agreements employed it. Soon to begin his lonely journey in pursuit of supporters from one town to the next, Orlyk knew it was the Latin version that would be scrutinized in the courts of Europe, courts with which he dearly wished to make common cause. He was conveying the thought that they, the lawful civilized peoples of Europe, all spoke the same language, all belonged to the same fraternity of nations. It was the uncivil who did not belong. All this semiology before a single clause had been

read! Beyond the political and cultural symbolism, Latin was the only language which provided an inventory of key terms that would resonate with clarity in European courts. It would have been essential that crowned heads and their diplomatic advisors see words and phrases with which they were familiar and to which they could ascribe clear meaning from their own political heritage. Latin, in short, was Orlyk's best hope, slim as that might have been.

Framing the Charter: *Constitutio, Pacta Conventa,* and *Conventa Pactorum*

All of the key terms with which Orlyk inscribed his document were legal topoi, common places long familiar throughout Europe in his day. These words alone would have evoked understanding, suggesting to trained eyes a familiar range of possible compacts between a ruler and his political elites.⁴ There exists a rich literature on the late medieval and Renaissance understandings of the term *constitutio*, for example, both in the practical exercise of statecraft and in the philosophical speculations of Jean Bodin, Thomas Aquinas, and many other political thinkers. Similarly, *pacta* (agreement) and *conventum* (covenant) had a long history as important key terms in European political discourse, in particular in states such as the Polish Commonwealth where the relationship between the King and the Diet (*Sejm*) had to be negotiated, voted upon, and periodically re-confirmed.⁵ One must assume that these inventories of meaning framed the backdrop for Orlyk's text so as to link his political proclamations with similar compacts in the *longue dureé* of European politics. The fact that he saw no need to define these Latin terms (i.e., to tell the *starshyna* what they meant) anywhere in the Constitution, or to interpolate specific or distinct attributions, implies that he either assumed the Cossacks knew what the terms meant or that he chose to behave as if they knew.

In Polish parlance *Pacta Conventa*, dates back to the Diet of 1573 (although it has a much longer pedigree in the Mediterranean world), and its acceptance of Henry of Valois as the Polish king.⁶ Then, as in 1710, it was meant to convey a sense of formal agreement between ruler and representative bodies, setting forth their mutual consent over both the fact and relations of sovereign authority. Subsequent negotiations over elected Polish kings also employed the term, as did Cossack representations to the Polish Diet in pressing their claims to participate in negotiations as the voice of Rus'.⁷ One suspects, therefore, that Orlyk's use of such a familiar concept constituted a deliberate effort to adapt a Polish formulation of the rights and responsibilities of a sovereign towards his subjects to

Hetman-Cossack relations in the Sich, thereby establishing more legalistically than previously and in a single gesture both the idea of sovereign independence and Cossack rights.

Similar observations apply to *constitutio*. The standard Latin dictionary of Orlyk's day, Du Cange's *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae Latinitatis* (which coincidentally was published in the same year as the Bendery Constitution) offered the following synonyms for *constitutio*: "census, consuetudo, praestatio quae ex instituto exsolvitur."⁸ These definitions carry none of the implications of a fundamental and everlasting law that undergirds the modern notion of constitution, no sense of a universal and inclusive citizenship. In their place it suggests specific and temporally bound arrangements among consenting parties. The language of perpetuity (*in perpetuo*) might be included, but this was common phraseology in treaties, pacts, and formal agreements, and with little concrete meaning. Witness the Eternal Peace of 1686 between Muscovy and Poland. What, then, did Orlyk want his audience to understand by 'constitutio,' i.e., how did he wish to render it familiar?

There is no question that Kyiv's educated and political elites were familiar with the word as Du Cange defined it as a series of pacts between the ruler and specific categories of subjects, since their forebears had employed constitutionalism in just this way to champion the rights of the Orthodox population in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Polish Diet had produced constitutions relevant to Orthodox populations in 1550, 1569, 1627, and 1631, and these had been cited repeatedly by leaders of the Orthodox communities in the Commonwealth in defense of their religion. Petro Mohyla had been particularly effective in making the Orthodox case against the claims of Uniates, pointing out again and again the terms of specific "constitutions of the Diet" guaranteeing freedom of religion, control over Orthodox religious spaces, and protection against violence. For Mohyla, these constitutions, agreements between rulers and ruled, set precedents that ought to have guided the *Sejm* and crown, a position that was accepted more than once in Warsaw. The "Puncta Responsu Dissidentibus de Religione" (Points in Response to Dissenters on Religion) stated clearly in response to protests over recent decrees, "We promise that the tribunal decrees of the Crown and Lithuanian Grand Duchy which bear the sense and force of law, will not be carried out in any way as this [relationship] was clearly spelled out in the constitution of 1627. And if in spite of the constitution such decrees are ruled valid by a court somewhere these rulings should not have the slightest significance."⁹

The title of Orlyk's published text employed *pacta et constitutiones*, i.e., the plural, suggesting a series of agreements or conventions, as in *consuetudo* (custom; usage), rather than a single over-arching characterization of the entire docu-

ment.¹⁰ In the body of the text, *constitutio* (charter), or variants of it, appear relatively infrequently. Somewhat further on, in the middle of the preamble, Orlyk employed the term again, when he wrote about the now-severed agreement with Moscow. He explained that Mazepa had hoped in vain that the “Muscovite absolutist Empire” would respect the liberties contained in the formal agreements of union: “it would abide by the obligations contained in treaties and covenants and confirmed by oath, and would for ever preserve inviolably under its protection the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host and the free Ruthenian [*Rossiacam*] people [confisus ipsi tanquam unionis ritu nobis uniformi, quod obligationes suas *pactis conventis constitutionibusque annexas*] (italics – by G.M.).”¹¹ This was a frequently expressed grievance, transparently alluding to the “rights and liberties” contained in the relevant treaties and in all of the pacts binding Moscow, Baturyn, *starshyna*, and hetman whenever a new hetman was elected. These rights were inscribed both in written law and in oral tradition, dating back to compacts with Poland, and according to some lore, originating at the time of the Khazars. In other words, Orlyk was not suggesting that these *constitutionibus* (again, in the plural) were in any sense innovative. Quite the contrary: their unsailability rested on their heritage, the *constituted agreements* between multiple parties, much like the medieval and Renaissance concept of the ancient constitution, famously analyzed by John G. Pocock over half a century ago, that gained widespread currency throughout Europe during the seventeenth century.¹²

Even a cursory examination of the constitutions of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reveals just how different this is from the language of modernity. Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment constitutions have almost invariably invoked a universal principle, God or nature, as the transcendent basis of rights rather than lineage or past compacts. The American Declaration of Independence, for example, embedded rights in “the Laws of nature and of Nature’s God,” and deemed them universal and inalienable. Similarly, both the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) and the French Constitution of September 1791 spoke of “the natural, inalienable, and sacred rights of man ... in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being.” These rights applied to all men as citizens of the *patrie* (fatherland). Finally, the Haitian Constitution of 1805 echoes this language by proclaiming that “in the presence of the Supreme Being all mankind are equal” and that therefore, “equality in the eyes of the law is incontestably acknowledged.”¹³

By contrast, Orlyk employed *constitutio* consistently as a limited and time-bound set of agreements. Thus, the preamble described the new relationship with Sweden in the following language: “Under the protection of His Royal Majesty the King of Sweden, and now is abiding by it steadfastly [...] to restore

and preserve its suppressed rights and liberties have entered into a pact with the newly elected Hetman, His Excellency Pylyp Orlyk [sub protectionem S-ae R-ae Maiestatis Sueciae confugerit et nunc fortiter in ea perseverat...ac libertates suas, inivimus pactum constitutuimusque cum Domino Domino Philippo Orlik neo-electo Duce].”¹⁴ This language implied a compact about specific liberties granted to specific elements of the population, with no reference to natural law, a priori rights, or universality. Article 9 employed the term in precisely the same way with the expression, “the same arrangement is being made by general agreement and established by an immutable law that, after the longed-for liberation of our fatherland from the Muscovite yoke [ordo communi pacto statuitur et immutabili, lege constituitur, ut libertata utinam Patria nostra de Moscovitico iugo].”¹⁵ Finally, the declaration ended by proclaiming, “This treaty and covenant is entrusted [...] for its effective enactment and His Highness will deign to confirm it not only with his own signature and public seal, but also with a formal oath [Pacta autem illa et Constitutiones efficaci executioni committuntur quas Sua Excellentia subscriptione manus propriae et sigillo public, sed et formali iuramento dignitata est confirmare].”¹⁶ The valoration of “signing in public view” conformed to standard formulae of the time, an essential and universally understood element of surety intended to reassure anxious Cossacks that this set of agreements would be honored. Such a ritual would have been equally familiar in earlier times and in other places, whether it be thirteenth-century Catalonia, fourteenth-century Flanders, or fifteenth-century Piedmont.¹⁷

The Primacy of Ethnicity: *Gens, Patria, Populus*

Ten years ago, the eminent Scottish historian Robert Bartlett posed the following question about the meaning and most faithful translations of pre-modern political language in Europe: “When [...] is it reasonable to employ the word race, the word nation, the word tribe.”¹⁸ More recently and closer to the topic at hand, Serhii Plokhy has dwelled at some length on this terminological terrain in articulating what he terms “the origins of the Slavic nations.”¹⁹ In his nuanced and close reading of numerous important texts, Plokhy has concluded that the idea of nation emerges among the East Slavic peoples over a relatively long span of time, and that for Ukraine the idea of nationhood crystallized in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, more-or-less the time period in question. Although the questions regarding Ukrainian political discourse that Plokhy has raised relate to a very broad body of texts and utterances, his thesis has obvious relevance to Orlyk, especially in assigning particular meanings to *gens* (people) and *patria*, words that Orlyk employed repeatedly in the Constitution.

Bartlett devotes much of his article to exploring the medieval and early modern understandings of those terms, as well as *natio* (nation), a word that Orlyk did not employ, and *populus* (community of people), one that he used only infrequently. Bartlett acknowledges that these terms were every bit as ambiguous and overlapping in premodern times as their modern linguistic counterparts. Nevertheless, he draws some conclusions that are pertinent here. *Gens*, he argues, often denoted something like ethnicity, even race, a sense of shared culture, language, descent, law and heritage, only occasionally situated in nature or biology. Bartlett terms this the “genealogical idiom.”²⁰ Although *gens* as ethnicity typically did not entail political claims of sovereignty or autonomy, “it is highly likely that it would be invoked [politically] when expedient; and it was.”²¹ *Patria*, by contrast often, but not invariably, came to mean something like the spatial or physical realm that we think of as a country – although the realm could at times be quite small, as in the patria of Friuli in late medieval Italy, bounded and ruled in common but not necessarily comprising a single or homogeneous people. Generally speaking, scholars associate the modern usage of *patria* with emerging Enlightenment notions of the nation and *gens* with older ones. Andrzej Walicki put it this way, “The Enlightenment concept of the nation – in Poland and in Europe as a whole – was generally political rather than ethno-linguistic and denoted the whole body of ‘active citizens,’ or the whole population of the state without reference to ethnic or cultural differences.”²²

Walicki’s brief in this argument was to demonstrate (not totally convincingly) that pre-partition Poland conducted and conceived of itself as a nation in precisely these ethnically blind terms. Moreover, as Bartlett has shown, all these terms, including *patria*, had a longer history than have modern nations. Still, he is essentially correct in his view of Enlightenment state ideology, and he alerts us to the necessity of paying close attention to the frequency of use and inscribed meanings of these powerful words in Eastern as well as Western Europe.

Orlyk’s constitution employed these terms repeatedly, and we are obliged to pose the same questions to it as Walicki asked of his Polish philosophers: where do ethnicity, nation, cultural specificity, and citizenship stand in relation to one another?

The word *patria* does not appear in the preamble to the Constitution but it can be found several times in the subsequent articles. Orlyk presumably meant it to be synonymous with *otchizna* or *otechestvo* (fatherland), words that had gained some currency in Ukrainian political language during that time, as Frank Sysyn has admirably demonstrated.²³ Even so, the meaning that Orlyk inscribed onto *patria* remained ambiguous. Its initial use corresponded closely to the idea of one’s country in a geographical sense or political sense, “Since every state exists

and is made stable through the inviolability and integrity of its borders [...] so it is for Little Russia, *our fatherland* (italics added – G.M.) [sicum omne dominum integritate limitum inviolate consistit et stabilitur, ita et Parva Rossia, *patria nostra*, in suis limitibus].”²⁴

This statement constitutes a bold and fundamental claim of autonomy identifying *Mala(ia) Ros(s)ia* (Lat. *Parva Rossia*) as the fatherland, a sovereign space entitled to establish fixed borders. In other places he identifies the *patria* as *Ucraina* and, alternatively, as *Roxolania* (article 14), an indication that he understood these three appellations to be interchangeable. The text goes on to delineate where those borders lay, and only then proclaims that this sovereign territory (*Ucraina*) has voluntarily entered into an agreement to be under the perpetual protection (*perpetuorum protectorum*) of Sweden. In article 6, when discussing public well-being and declarations of war and peace, Orlyk referred to “the common good of the fatherland, both public and private” (de communi patriae commodo private ac publica), apparently suggesting something less spatial and all-inclusive.²⁵

Over the next several sentences in the same paragraph Orlyk returned to *patria* at least three times, but in a far less expansive light. Here the *patria* was bounded not by space or identified with *Parva Rossia* but was instead conflated with the Cossack army, the constituency whose interests Orlyk and the Constitution most explicitly sought to protect. It was they, not the entire population residing in the Hetmanate or in *Ucraina* who were the bearers of rights and liberties, and who held the authority to elect the hetman, to impose limits on his executive power, and to prevent him from engaging in disorder or public violence against the interests of the army, one of the most contentious legacies of Mazepa’s rule within the *starshyna*.²⁶ The generals, colonels and supreme counselors, drawn from among the Cossack elites, simultaneously constituted and defended the *patria*, even against the Hetman himself if necessary. Toward this end they were commanded to reside as ministers at the Hetman’s residence. They were deemed the guardian of the public good, and were explicitly warned against pursuing private interests, “which would be a detriment to the fatherland and could lead even to its ruin.”²⁷ In this usage, the political body, the collective *patria*, was very closely aligned (although not completely synonymous) with the army (*Exercitus*), the military representation of the Cossacks themselves, a usage that is reminiscent of conciliarism of early modern times, what Walicki referred to in the Polish context as “noble republicanism.” In short, Orlyk was not entirely consistent about who or what the fatherland was, land or Cossacks, a reflection perhaps of a more basic tension that ran through the entire discourse of the realm of Ukrainian sovereignty at the time: was it the land and its people or the Cossack Host?

By contrast, *populus* appeared sparingly and with far less emotion or ambiguity than *patria*, usually to mean people in the most prosaic sense. Article 14 described the measures to be taken to alleviate popular suffering as a result of the “Muscovite yoke” (*iugo moscorum*), a particularly acerbic term that Orlyk employed several times that would negatively associate Moscow simultaneously with the days of the Ruina (“the Polish yoke”) and with the Russian idea of “Tatar yoke” (*tatarskoe igo*), the earlier subjugation of the Muscovites themselves, and thus reinforce Moscow’s intertextual alterity from European civilization.²⁸ He used the expression “cum alleviatione populi publica,” meaning flesh-and-blood people, translated into modern French as “avec l’aide du peuple.” Article 16 endowed *populus* with a similarly concrete meaning when it discussed legal protection, but identified them as rural inhabitants rather than the entire mass of people, “No legal activity in the investigation of crimes, but also in that of personal misfortunes, will be carried out to impose undue burdens on the rural populations or upon urban dwellers [Nulla iudicia non tantum in causis criminalibus, sed in accidentibus peragant, neque insolitas extorsiones et gravamina populo et civitatibus inferant].”²⁹

The third of these key words, *gens*, meaning variously something like ethnicity, race, nation, or people of common descent, is the one term on which Bartlett dwelled the longest because of its widespread use in late medieval and early modern European discourse. Orlyk, in fact endowed *gens* with far greater, almost magisterial, importance than either *populus* or *patria*, no small matter especially since recent scholarship has suggested that, in the Ukrainian parlance of the day, *gens* had come to be equated with the modern notion of nation. Bartlett, too, acknowledged the possibility association of *gens* with *nation*, but not necessarily in a modern sense as antecedent to nation state. Thus, *gens Cantuariorum* is rendered as “the Kentish nation,” “gens Anglorum” as the “English nation,” etc.³⁰ Lest there be any doubt of Orlyk’s determination to foreground *gens* over other terms, the text of the constitution began with this thundering inscription: “In the name of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, God glorified in the Holy Trinity. Let it be to the eternal glory and memory of the Zaporozhian Host and Ruthenian people [In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, Dei in Sacrosancta Trinitate Glorificate Fiat ad perpetuam Exercitus Zaporoviensis Gentisque Rossiacae gloriam et memoriam].”³¹

The second stanza suggests that the army, although supreme, was a subset of the larger *gens*, and that the two together occupied the highest rungs of Orlyk’s nominalist hierarchy. Who – or what, then, were the *gens*, and what properties defined them? Orlyk addressed these questions of identity immediately: the *gens*

were the Cossacks (*Cossaticam*). This association is consistent with Plokhy's argument that in the Ruthenian usage of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the idea of nation came to be inscribed specifically onto the Cossacks. Orlyk then embraces and embellishes the myth of the Khazar origins of the Cossacks in order to proclaim their existence as a distinct group dating back many centuries, long before the Hetmanate. It was from the Khazars that the Cossacks inherited their glory, right to the land, and sense of justice, "In the same way, the valiant and ancient Cossack people, formerly called Khazar, was at first exalted by immortal glory, spacious territory, and heroic exploits [Ita et gentem strenuam antiquamque Cosaticam, antea nominatam Cossaricam, prius exaltaverat immoritura Gloria, amplo dominio et factis heroicis]." ³² The Khazar's kahan was, he declared, a Cossack prince, married to the daughter of the Byzantine Emperor. This postulate recurred again in Article 3 when, in averring peaceful intentions toward the Crimean khan, he declares, "the ancient Khazar people, subsequently named Cossacks, derive their genealogy from the valorous and invincible Goths."

Although the scholarship has not determined precisely who originated this mythology (Hryhorii Hrabianka and Samiilo Velychko, both of whom wrote somewhat later than Orlyk, are sometimes mentioned as likely pioneers, as is Ioanykii Galiatovs'kyi), there seems to be a general consensus that it gained particular currency during the Mazepa-Poltava-Bendery events possibly as an alternative to the Polish insistence on deriving Cossacks from the Sarmatians. In Plokhy's words, "the idea of a distinct Cossack nation of Khazar origin was popular among the Ukrainian elites that supported the revolt of Hetman Ivan Mazepa [... and] found expression in the historical preamble to the Constitution of Hetman Pylyp Orlyk."³³

Regardless of its specific origins or of whether Orlyk himself was the first to propose the Khazar myth as official doctrine, he certainly endowed it with considerable and rather specific importance. Having derived the Cossack *gens* ethnically from the Khazars, Orlyk proceeded to articulate the defining characteristics of this group. Based on frequency of terminology, the primary feature was its liberty, a word that he employed constantly throughout the constitution. Expressions such as "pristinum libertatis," "legum et libertatum veterum ertatum Exercitus Zaporoviensis," etc., recur in virtually every paragraph. It was God's punishment that the Cossacks had been compelled to submit to Polish rule and sacrifice their previous liberty. It was as a *gens* that the Sich suffered multiple waves of oppression "to the ultimate ruin of a free people [ac finale ruinam inferre gentisque liberae]." ³⁴ And it was as a *gens* that they pursued the reestablishment of those freedoms now, against the impious Muscovite state. This antinomy of pious/impious emerges as a critical element as Orlyk endeavors – without ever quite saying so

– to draw a distinction between the Muscovites and Ukrainians as separate ethnicities, fundamental to debunking the myth of a single Rus'.

Implicit in this fusion of liberty and the glorious heritage of Khazaria was the centrality of faith, and divine sanction that, in its miraculous and mysterious essence, exalted some royals and peoples (*regna gentesque exaltat*) and rained misery upon others: “Among the three Theological virtues faith occupies the highest place.”³⁵ On this point Orlyk was un-categorical: the faith of the Cossack *gens* was Orthodoxy, and it was as an Orthodox people that Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi had unchained them from the Polish yoke.³⁶ This articulation of the primacy of a specific faith among the *gens* may have been unavoidable, especially in light of the anathema against Mazepa that had been pronounced by local clergy (under orders from Peter I, Menshikov, and Iavors'kyi) throughout the Hetmanate, and the widely circulated accusations that Mazepa and Orlyk had sold out the faithful to the enemies of Orthodoxy, the “ferocious Liakhy.” Orlyk’s counterattack declared the Muscovites themselves to be impious, and purveyor of violence not only against the Cossacks but against God himself. For it was from God, he insisted, that Cossack freedom (albeit not universal or even Ukrainian freedom writ large) ultimately derived. This postulate led him to demand the political exclusion of Catholics, and especially of Jews. The faith of the Cossack army was “solely Orthodox [solum pro Fide sua Orthodoxa]”: “The present newly elected Hetman will be bound by duty and put under obligation to take special care that no alien religion is introduced into our Ruthenian [*Rossiacam*] fatherland.”³⁷ Preaching and proselytizing was forbidden to other confessions, and all measures were to be undertaken to make certain that Orthodoxy will be the only religion of *Parva Rossia*. Here Judaism – ironically the faith of the actual Khazar elites – was singled out for particular condemnation, in language that implied the potential for expulsion, “most of all the adherents of deceitful Judaism [may not] live in Ukraine [praesertim vero praestigioso Iudaismo cohabitationem in Ucraina non concedet et omni virium conatu sollicitam impendet curam].”³⁸

One is obliged at this point to ponder what this strident insistence on a singular politically entitled faith might have meant at the time. It is essential here to underscore the fundamentally pre-modern (and now, perhaps, post-modern) character of these particular expressions of faith-specific identity in articulating political community and ethnicity. Anti-Jewish and anti-Catholic sentiments in this type of text would not have discomfited Orlyk’s confederates or his audiences in other European lands. Numerous charters over many generations and throughout Europe had constituted resident Jews as a separate population, with obligations, tasks, and privileges specific to them. More than once Jews had been formally excluded from parts of Cossack-held territory, including Kyiv. The

Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising, predicated on a similar fusion of Cossack identity and Orthodoxy ("At first I fought for the wrongs done to me personally; now I shall fight for our Orthodox faith"³⁹), profoundly and violently deepened that sense of mutual separateness both from Polish Catholics and from Jews, who were often linked as almost interchangeable objects of enmity.⁴⁰ In light of Orlyk's ease with participating freely in Catholic rites while in Poland, one must conclude that he reprised these statements – indeed he placed them in the very first article! – not out of passion but precisely because of their popular resonance.

Language such as this, repugnant to modern principles of universality and tolerance, was not unusual in pre-modern constitutions, and it formed one basis for momentary expulsions and exclusions of coinhabiting peoples throughout Europe. Edward I's Edict of 1290 expelling the Jews from England, for example, was done as a constitutional act. Similarly, the multiple restrictions and expulsions of Jews from various regions of late medieval France were carried out as parts of constitutional law, nominally as exercises of regalia rights in pursuit of the "common good."⁴¹ However deplorable from a contemporary perspective on the meaning of nations, all these actions conformed to the notion of constitutions prevalent in the pre-modern Europe, as pacts of exclusivity, endowing one people (*gens*) a set of prerogatives between ruler and ruled while explicitly denying those prerogatives to others on religious or more-or-less ethnic basis. Orlyk's text was merely transferring a notion of sovereign authority over Jewish settlement and "dissident" Christian confession from the Polish or Russian crowns, where it had heretofore resided, to the realm of the Hetman.

Reading (or, perhaps, misreading) these clauses through a post-Enlightenment lens leads only to mistakes and unnecessary pain in that it unavoidably associates them with disenfranchisement and eviction, cleansing the land of "strangers" and other disagreeable features of our common modernity. Simply put, whereas modern constitutions have emphasized inclusion, universality, absolute rights, and citizenship, pre-modern constitutions invariably defined lines of exclusion among populations that resided within the physical boundaries of the realm. Neither natural nor primordial, the liberties that these pacts afforded could be revised or annulled. It was with this set of understandings that Orlyk, like so many European political actors before him, made *gens* the paramount basis for constitutional inclusion.

Clearly, Orlyk was walking a very fine line here ideologically. Let us put aside the hypothetically awkward circumstance that the Khazar elites had themselves embraced Judaism, something of which Orlyk would almost certainly have been aware even if he preferred to trace them racially to the Goths. This historic complication could be passed over in silence. However, the insistence upon confes-

sion as an irreducible attribute of ethnicity raised other ambiguities that could not be ignored. On the one hand, he maintained that Orthodoxy was an irreducible element of the ethnicity of *Parva Rossia*, the absence of which ipso facto excluded others (Catholics and Jews) who happened to be residing on the same land from membership in the body politic. On the other hand, Orthodoxy could not become the primary signifier of ethnic identity, because otherwise it would be virtually impossible to delineate on ethnic terms the differences between “*Parva*” and *Magna Rossia*.

Orlyk fully acknowledged the common faith with Muscovy. Moreover, for all of its insistence on visible signifiers of explicit identity, the constitution never made any allusions to a discrete Ukrainian language or dialect as an attribute of identity – in fact it did not mention languages at all – a reflection presumably of the fact that many Uniate Catholics spoke the same language as he did, and that there was no fixed and recognized boundary separating Muscovite from Ukrainian speech. Even *Rossia* was a shared appellation. The only way of differentiating the two on religious grounds was structural, and here Orlyk proclaimed that the metropolitanate under his domain would return to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, with local authority remaining in the hands of the Metropolitan of Kyiv.⁴² Such a resolution lay beyond the power of lay authorities, as Orlyk well knew, as only a synod of eastern patriarchs could ordain such a reorganization. But practically speaking this was the only course open to him, even if it risked alienating Orthodox patriarchates abroad. Autocephaly also represented an effort to win over the Hetmanate’s monastic clergy, which had expressed deep reservations about the shift to Muscovite authority in 1686, but which had failed to provide visible support to Mazepa and Orlyk in the months after October 1708.

Cities and Territoriality: “Urbs” and Magdeburg Law

While under Polish rule, Kyiv, and some other Ukrainian towns were subject to Magdeburg Law. As with all rights and privileges articulated within the Hetmanate, urban self-administration was rooted in tradition and established relationships, in this case dating at least to the fourteenth century for western Ukraine and the late fifteenth century for Kyiv and confirmed again in 1514.⁴³ At least in a formal sense this designation continued even after incorporation into a Russian state.⁴⁴ The Pereiaslav Agreement explicitly confirmed it, as do subsequent legal documents. Of course, practically speaking, urban autonomy clashed with central authority, especially through the agency of the town magistrates. But it is clear that urban self-administration mattered to Kyiv’s merchant elite (and does so again today, judging by the Magdeburg Law Monument in central Kyiv), even if

only as a principle, and it is of interest, therefore, to see how Orlyk's Constitution responded to these sensibilities.

Like *constitutio* and *conventa*, the articulation of Magdeburg rights was explicitly predicated on the principle of special privileges rather than universality, and it was commonly applied in such a way as to ascribe those rights of urban citizenship to some members of the town corporate body while explicitly denying them to other, deeming them guests. Thus, in various times and places confession became a dividing line for inclusion in Magdeburg rights. The Kyivan confirmation of 1514, for example, applied these rights to "townspeople of Roman, Greek, and Armenian faith alike, present and future."⁴⁵ Explicitly excluded were Tatars, but the larger implication was that these rights were reserved to Christians. All of this was consistent with Orlyk's own usage of political language, but his sense of corporate inclusion rested firmly on his derivation of Cossack/military identity. Where, then, did the towns and their residents fit into his quasi-ethnic notions of belonging?

Significantly, Magdeburg Law is entirely absent from Orlyk's text, which in general sought to subordinate cities to the army. Article 5, for example, discussed the town Terekhtemyriv, near Pereiaslav, but only in the context of the rights of the Cossacks to have free passage, storage, and billeting there, a right specifically inscribed in the charter from a Polish king in 1578. Similar references are made elsewhere in the text to Poltava and Samara. Only toward the end of the proclamation, in Article 12, did Orlyk address towns as corporate bodies. But he made no reference in any of these to Magdeburg Law or to town governance. Instead, he speaks of freeing them from the Muscovite yoke without any mention of the restoration of previous rights. On the contrary, he commanded that the General Council of the Hetman will prevail, and then he goes on to criticize the negligence of rich merchants and Cossacks who, he charges, abandoned their responsibilities to the urban poor under the pretext of respecting the rights of towns, "Wealthy merchants now benefiting from their Hetman-secured freedoms, and with the protection of some [Cossack] officers have resisted taking on for themselves the public responsibility of assisting the poor [Mercatores vero opulentiores glorianditum libertationibus Ducalibus, cum et protectrici Colonellorum tutela evitant baiulanda publica onera sibi competentia renitentque praestando subsidio miserae plebe]."⁴⁶ This is an interesting expression in that it seems to take the side of the urban and rural poor against the wealthiest elements of the population. This most certainly is inconsistent with Magdeburg principle, and it can even be seen as contravening them in that it granted the Hetman's Council overall authority and raises suspicions about what the articulation of urban rights was all about. Only in the subsequent Article 13, did he make concessions to urban autonomy,

and then only briefly, “Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine, along with all the other towns will maintain intact and inviolable all their rights and privileges accorded by law.” What these rights and privileges were, and whence they derived, the Constitution failed to elaborate. One suspects, therefore, that Orlyk had little interest in those rights, and cared far more about bringing urban populations under the umbrella authority of Cossack-centered institutions.

Conclusion

The Latin key words that Orlyk employed, *pacta*, *constitutio*, *gens*, *patria*, et al. as well as the meanings he inscribed onto them, were part of a familiar inventory of political language in his day and well before. Many of the basic issues with which his constitution wrestled, in particular the struggle of military or landed elites (*noblesse d’épée* or *noblesse du robe*) to protect what they perceived to be ancient rights and liberties against aggressive incursions on all sides from state power, would have struck a responsive chord continent wide. Frondeurs, parliamentarians, and Junkers, as well as Cossacks, articulated related concerns vis-à-vis rapacious and seemingly irrepressible absolutism, what historians used to term “the crisis of the seventeenth century.” Against those incursions, elites everywhere asserted special or primordial constitutional privileges, based on particular compacts that – or so they believed – spared them and only them, usually with little ultimate success. If none of that sounds particularly modern, it nevertheless was quintessential European.

NOTES

Originally published as: Gary Marker, “Constitutio Medievalis: The Politics of Language and the Language of Politics in the 1710 Constitution,” in *Pylyp Orlyk: zhyttia, polityka, teksty*. Materialy Mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsii “Ad fontes” do 300-richchia Benders'koï Konstytutsii 1710 r. (Kyiv, НАУКМА, 14-16 zhovtnia 2010 roku) (Kyiv, 2011), 248–65. Copyright 2011 by Gary Marker. Reprinted with permission.

- 1 On the letter to Iavors'kyi see my article: Gary Marker, “Casting Mazepa’s Legacy: Pylyp Orlyk and Feofan Prokopovich,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 88, no. 1/2 (2010): 110–33. The version that was published in the Russian-language journal *Osnova* in 1862, from which all subsequent translations have derived, strips the language of its polyglot color, and renders the text in a more-or-less homogenized Russian.
- 2 These comments are based on the portion of the *Diariusz* that was published

in Warsaw in 1936 rather than on the complete facsimile published by Harvard more recently. "Diiarii Het'mana Pylypa Orlyka," *Pratsi ukrains'koho naukovooho instituta* 17 (1936): 1–170. Reference to attending mass in Catholic churches appear frequently in this section, replete with critique of the sermons and officiating priests.

- 3 D. Beavois, "Le Journal de Philippe Orlyk: du mirage de l'exil au mythe identitaire ukrainien," in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, cultura, società*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria, 2004), 153–9.
- 4 A point familiar to most of those reading this essay, but that nevertheless bears mention, is the variation between the manuscript title, the first page of which is now available to all on the internet, and the formal title in subsequent printed versions. The former identifies the text as *Conventa Pactorum inter Ducem et Exercitum Zaporoviensem conventorum* (i.e., without the word *constitutio*), whereas the latter, at least in the redactions I had examined, includes *constitutio: Pacta et Constitutiones Legume Libertatumque Exercitus [...]* *Publico Utriusque Partis Laudo Conventa, ac in Libera Electione*. As I read the text, the presence or absence of *constitutio* is not a crucial issue, since the term would not have had the modern resonance that it had to readers born after the American and French Revolutions.
- 5 See, inter alia, Stefan Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki (opyt istoricheskogo issledovaniia)*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1883), 451.
- 6 P. Skwarczyński, "The Origin of the Name 'Pacta Conventa' in 1573," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 37, no. 89 (1959): 669–72.
- 7 Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki*, 1:438, 452, 457.
- 8 Charles Du Fresne Du Cange, *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis*, vol. 1 (Venetiis, 1710), 130–2.
- 9 Quoted in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki*, 1:479.
- 10 "He voluntarily submitted himself and his people to [this union] in hope that, being of the same religious faith with us, it would abide by the obligations contained in treaties and oaths." All citations and quotes from the Latin text come from the 1916 edition published in Switzerland. *Pacta et Constitutiones Legum Libertatumque Exercitus Zaporoviensis Inter Illustrissimum Dominum Dominum Philippum Orlik, Neoelectum Ducem Exercitus Zaporoviensis, Et Inter Generales, Colonellos, Nec Non Eundem Exercitum Zaporoviensem, Publico Utriusque Partis Laudo Conventa, Ac In Libera Electione Formali Juramento Ab Eodem Illustrissimo Duce Corroborata, Anno Domini 1710, Aprilis 5, Ad Benderam: Texte Original Avec Traduction Française* (Lausanne, 1916); hereinafter *Pacta et Constitutiones*. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations into English are taken from Bohdan Budurowycz, see Ralph

- Lindheim and George Luckyj, eds, "The Bendery Constitution (Abridgment)," in *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 53–64.
- 11 *Pacta et Constitutiones*, 2.
 - 12 John G. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century. A Reissue with a Retrospect* (Cambridge, 1987), 255–387.
 - 13 These texts are widely and freely available on the Internet and often in multiple languages. For an English-language version of the Declaration of Rights of Man see among many possible sites "Declaration of the Rights of Man, 1789," accessed 2 August 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp.
 - 14 *Pacta et Constitutiones*, 4.
 - 15 *Ibid.*, 11–12.
 - 16 *Ibid.*, 18.
 - 17 On the parliamentary and constitutional situation of these other realms see: Antonio Marongiu, *Medieval Parliaments: A Comparative Study* (London, 1968), 223–50. Marongiu also appended a very useful glossary of political terminology, in which most of Orlyk's key terms appear, more-or-less as Orlyk used them.
 - 18 Robert Bartlett, "Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31, no. 1 (1 January 2001): 36.
 - 19 See Serhii Plokhyy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, 2006).
 - 20 *Ibid.*, 44.
 - 21 *Ibid.*, 51.
 - 22 Andrzej Walicki, *The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosciuszko* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1989), 1–2.
 - 23 Frank E. Sysyn, "Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture," in *Mazepa e il Suo tempo: storia, cultura, società*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria, 2004), 39–53.
 - 24 *Pacta et Constitutiones*, 6 (article 12).
 - 25 *Ibid.*, 8–9.
 - 26 *Ibid.*, 9. "Quo despotico iure Ministerio Ducali incompetente introducti sunt in patriam et Exercitum Zaporoviensem multi disordines, legum et libertatum eversiones, publica gravamina, violentae et appetitae officiorum militarium dispositiones, levis Generalium, Colonellorum et insignium

commilitonum aestimatio.” This same use of *patria* recurs a few sentences later when Orlyk details the rights of the army officers.

- 27 *Pacta et Constitutiones*, 10. “cum ulla honoris Ducalis detractio, cum publico patriae gravamine, ruina absit vero et pernicie.” See also the use of *patria* in Article 9 (p. 12) that continues this conflation of Cossackdom and *patria*.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 16.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 17. Translation by author.
- 30 Bartlett, “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity,” 43–5.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 1.
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 Serhii Plokhyy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto, 2008), 5.
- 34 *Ibid.* 2.
- 35 *Ibid.* 4.
- 36 *Ibid.* 2.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 5.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 6.
- 39 This quotation is taken from: Paul R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples* (Toronto, 1996), 204.
- 40 Frank E. Sysyn, “The Jewish Factor in the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising,” in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton, 1988), 43–56.
- 41 William Chester Jordan, “Jews, Regalian Rights, and the Constitution in Medieval France,” *AJS Review* 23, no. 1 (1998): 2–4.
- 42 *Ibid.*, 4–5.
- 43 “The Charter Confirming Magdeburg Law in Kiev,” in George Vernadsky and Sergei Pushkarev, eds., *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917* (New Haven, 1972), 109–10.
- 44 The annulment of Kyiv’s Magdeburg rights took place only in 1835. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii. Sobranie vtoroe*, vol. 10 (St Petersburg, 1836), no. 7694. For more details see I.M. Kamanin, *Poslednie gody samoupravleniia Kiieva po Magdeburgskomu pravu* (Kyiv, 1888). For a fuller discussion of urban communalism and Magdeburg Law in Kyiv see also Christophe von Werdt, *Stadt und Gemeindebildung in Ruthenien: Okzidentalisation der Ukraine und Weißrusslands im Spätmittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit* (Wiesbaden, 2006), 111–24, 207–10.
- 45 Werdt, *Stadt und Gemeindebildung in Ruthenien*, 109.
- 46 *Pacta et Constitutiones*, 14. Translation by author.

“In the Name of the Beloved Fatherland”:
The Loyalty and Treason of Ivan Mazepa

SERHII PLOKHY

On 24 July 1709, shortly after the Battle of Poltava, Teofan Prokopovych (Feofan Prokopovich), then prefect of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, greeted the victorious tsar Peter I with a sermon at St Sophia's Cathedral in Kyiv. In the sermon entitled *Slovo pokhval'noe o preslavnoi nad voiskami sveiskimi pobede* (*A Laudatory Word on the Most Glorious Victory over the Swedish Forces*), Prokopovych congratulated the “all-Russian monarch” on his great victory, praised the “Russian military,” and warned Russia against such traitors to the fatherland (*otechestvo*) as the defeated Hetman Ivan Mazepa.¹ Little remained the same in Kyiv and the Cossack Hetmanate after the Poltava battle – the secular and religious elites rapidly changed their political orientation, their public stand and discourse, abandoning old loyalties and taking on or actualizing new ones. Nowhere was that process more profoundly apparent than in the writings of Prokopovych himself. Four years before the battle, on 3 July 1705, Prokopovych had praised the now condemned Hetman Ivan Mazepa in the introduction to his tragicomedy, *Vladimir*, greeting him in the audience as a successor to Prince Volodymyr of Kyivan Rus', and counting him among the “Russian luminaries resplendent with glory.”² However, immediately after Mazepa sided with King Charles XII of Sweden, the tone of Prokopovych's rhetoric changed dramatically. His concept of such a key element of political and cultural identity as “fatherland” also changed.

In his sermon of 1709, Prokopovych called Peter the “father of the fatherland.” That appellation would acquire official status twelve years later in the Act of 1721, which bestowed the new title of “all-Russian emperor” on the tsar, as well as two

appellations, “Great” and “Father of the Fatherland.”³ Prokopovych’s reference of 1709 to Peter as “father of the fatherland” was directly linked to his numerous references to the concept of the fatherland (*otechestvo*) in the text of the sermon. The term itself was not new to Prokopovych. In his tragicomedy, he used one of its forms, *otchestvo*, to define St Volodymyr’s patrimony (identical to the territory of the Hetmanate) as inherited by Mazepa. In 1709, he used *otechestvo* to render a different concept, defined by the Latin *patria* – the term linked to the development of patriotism and “nationalism” in the lands of early modern Europe. The notion of *fatherland* as an equivalent of *patria* was not entirely new to Muscovite political discourse, but Prokopovych was one of the first writers who stressed loyalty to the fatherland as one of the highest civic virtues. In so doing, he relied heavily, as always, on his Ukrainian tradition and background.⁴

The use of the term *fatherland* in relation to the ethnocultural community and the formation of concepts of loyalty to such a fatherland were important signs of the development of national identity in the European population in the eighteenth century, thereby making it possible to trace the changes in the self-identification of the Cossack elite in the Hetmanate era. Fatherland (*otchyzna*) was an important term in the Ukrainian political vocabulary of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The word corresponded to Polish *ojczyzna*, with which Ukrainian political discourse shared a number of important characteristics.⁵ In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the fatherland (*ojczyzna*) was conceived as quite independent of a ruler, or even of a particular state; the word could be applied to the constituent parts of a state as easily as to the whole. The Commonwealth, the Polish Crown, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania could be considered fatherlands of their inhabitants.⁶ For example, in the Polish verses recited by students at the Kyiv College in May 1648 in honor of Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (Iarema Vyshnevets'kyi), the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania vied for the right to be called the fatherland of the scions of the princely families of the Sanguszkos (Sanhushkos), Czartoryskis (Chartoryis'kyis), and Koreckis (Korets'kyis). It should be noted that Polish-Lithuanian Rus' was not considered in this discourse, even though Wiśniowiecki came from an ancient Rus' family, although he converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism.⁷

All this would change with the outbreak of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising (1648), which was gathering momentum even as the students of the Kyivan College recited their verses in honor of Wiśniowiecki. The new Cossack state produced by the uprising created new loyalties in the region and drew new political, cultural, and geographical boundaries for the new fatherland of the Rus' elites. However, this process was gradual. The pro-Polish hetmans, who advocated reconciliation with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, continued to call

the Polish-Lithuanian state their common fatherland with the Poles.⁸ As far as we can judge, the process of transferring the concept of fatherland from Poland or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Cossack Ukraine began in the sixties of the seventeenth century. Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi was probably the first to introduce the idea of loyalty to Ukraine as the Cossack fatherland into political discourse.⁹ Even before 1663, he called Ukraine his fatherland in his letters. This tendency fully manifested itself after his proclamation as hetman.¹⁰ At the same time, his main rival, Hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine Pavlo Teteria, still regarded the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as the Cossack fatherland and “common mother.”¹¹ Among the Muscovite political elite, an established tradition of using the term *fatherland* that could compete with the Cossack use of this concept simply did not exist. And although the term *otchina*, which was used by Muscovite clerks, was phonetically close to the Polish *ojczyzna* and the Rus' *otchyzna*, its main meaning – the tsar's patrimony – was quite different. Briukhovets'kyi was well aware of this difference, calling Ukraine (including the Right Bank) the tsar's patrimony.¹²

The impetus for the mass application of the term *fatherland* in relation to Cossack Ukraine was, perhaps, the Treaty of Andrusovo, according to which Ukraine was divided along the Dnipro not only *de facto*, but also *de jure*. After that, the Cossack *starshyna* increasingly called the entire territory of their divided country their fatherland. There were also calls to unite and save the fatherland. In 1668, Briukhovets'kyi explained his revolt against the tsar as a desire to prevent the plans of Muscovy and the Commonwealth to destroy the “fatherland of our dear” Ukraine.¹³ Hetman Petro Doroshenko sought support on the Left Bank, also invoking “fatherland, our Ukraine.” This tradition was continued in the 1670s by the sultan's protégé Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi and the pro-Polish hetman Mykhailo Khanenko.¹⁴ And although the fatherland of the Ukrainian elites of this era no longer included Poland or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, its borders were quite unstable. For example, Kyivan intellectuals continued to think in categories formed in 1648, considering Rus' rather than Ukraine as their fatherland. In 1670, such chroniclers of the Hetmanate as Mykhailo Losyts'kyi and Feodosii Sofonovych pledged their loyalty to the new Rus' fatherland.¹⁵ In 1683, St Dymytrii Tuptalo wrote an epitaph for the deceased general judge of the Hetmanate, Ivan Domontovych, characterizing him as a “true son of the fatherland.”¹⁶ Given the Cossack career of the deceased, we can assert that the concept of *fatherland* applied primarily to the Hetmanate. The same can be said about one of the panegyrics to Ivan Samoilovych.¹⁷ As for naming the founder of the Hetmanate in the early 1690s Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi “father of the fatherland,” the invocation of the Cossack state as the fatherland is perfectly obvious.

In the panegyric to Khmel'nyts'kyi, contained in a 1693 textbook of rhetoric, the hetman is depicted as the European Mars, Russian Leonidas and Phoebus, and Ukrainian Tamerlane, the father of the fatherland. This fatherland distinctly differs from (and is even contrasted with) Poland; its sons must be infinitely loyal to it and are obliged to glorify the exploits of the “knight Khmel'nyts'kyi.” His victories over the Poles – the Korsun Thermopylae, the Pyliavtsi Cannae, the battles of Zbarazh, Zboriv, and Batih – became the object of praise. According to the unknown author of the panegyric, in these battles Khmel'nyts'kyi won independence for Rus', and for himself – immortality.¹⁸ It is obvious that the transfer of the concept of *fatherland* to the Hetmanate was influenced by Polish practices. The fact that, according to Polish usage, the term could be applied not only to a state but also to one of its constituent parts and was relatively independent of the person of the monarch probably helped those intellectuals who wanted to define the Cossack Hetmanate as their fatherland. By the turn of the eighteenth century, we see references to the “Little Russian fatherland” (i.e., the Hetmanate) in the official circulars of Hetman Mazepa.¹⁹ Some panegyrists went even so far as to call Mazepa the “father of the fatherland” – the appellation later bestowed on Peter I.²⁰



The concept of the *fatherland* became the cornerstone of attempts to both legitimize and discredit Ivan Mazepa's uprising against the tsar in 1708.²¹ The tsar, who had seldom, if ever, used that term in his official documents prior to Mazepa's defection in the autumn of 1708, now emerged in his manifestos to the Cossacks as the true champion of their fatherland and the Little Russian people.²² In his circular of 28 October 1708, issued immediately after Peter learned about Mazepa's defection to the Swedes,²³ the tsar presented the hetman's actions as a betrayal of his oath of personal loyalty. Apart from accusing the hetman of treason, Peter employed two other political arguments. The first was related to the conditions of the Muscovite protectorate over the Hetmanate established in the days of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. According to those conditions, the tsar took it upon himself to protect Little Russia from the Polish threat to the Orthodox religion. Now that Charles XII was being assisted in his war with Muscovy by King Stanisław Leszczyński of Poland, Peter exploited that motif to the fullest. He accused Mazepa of attempting to subjugate the “Little Russian land [*krai*]” to the Poles and turn the Orthodox churches over to the Union. As the protector of the “Little Russian land,” the tsar declared his determination to prevent the enslavement and destruction of Little Russia and the desecration of God's churches. Another motif that

Peter employed to discredit his opponent was related to the image of the Muscovite tsar as protector of the “Little Russian people” against abuses of power by the Cossack administration. The alleged betrayal of the tsar’s interests and the ill-treatment of the Zaporozhian Host and the “Little Russian people” were among the reasons cited by Moscow for the removal in 1687 of Mazepa’s predecessor in the office of hetman, Ivan Samoilovich.²⁴ Now it was Mazepa’s turn to be accused of imposing unfair and heavy taxes on the “Little Russian people” for his own enrichment. All three motifs were present in one form or another in the numerous manifestos and circulars that Peter issued in late October and early November 1708.²⁵

Peter’s first use of the term *fatherland* probably occurred in his manifesto of 6 November 1708, by far the longest document presenting the tsar’s case against the hetman. It was issued in response to letters to the “Little Russian people” from Charles XII and Mazepa that were intercepted by the tsar’s troops. Peter’s manifesto sought to discredit Charles XII and Mazepa as enemies of the “Little Russian people” who wanted to exploit Ukraine economically and then either deliver it to Poland or establish Mazepa’s autocratic rule, introducing Lutheranism and the Union in order to destroy Orthodoxy. This was allegedly confirmed by the devastation of lands captured by the Swedes and the destruction of Belarusian churches by Swedish troops.²⁶ Peter also contended that the tsar had never violated the ancient rights guaranteed by the articles of Khmel’nyts’kyi, that Muscovy had not taken a penny from Little Russia, and that “no people under the sun can boast of such liberties, privileges, and freedom, as the Little Russian people, by the Grace of Our Tsarist Majesty.” As for Mazepa’s accusations that Great Russian troops were stationed in Ukraine in order to seize all power in it, Peter stated that he would not leave a single detachment there after the end of the campaign. Thus, part of the troops had allegedly already left the cities where they had been stationed, and the perpetrators of riots and looting had already been punished. As we can see, the tsar counted on the support of his subjects – the “Little Russian people” – in his effort to liberate “their fatherland” – the “Little Russian land.”²⁷

In a letter to the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Peter not only promised to increase the yearly stipend for every detachment (*kurin'*) of the Sich by 1,500 rubles, but also expressed his hope that the Cossacks would “stand up for their fatherland and for the Orthodox faith and for us, and not give ear to the blandishments of the apostate traitor Mazepa.”²⁸ In his manifesto of 21 January 1709, Peter set out to undermine Mazepa’s claim that he wanted to establish Ukraine as an independent polity, claiming that the hetman had gone over to the Swedes not “for the benefit of the Little Russian land and for the preservation of liberties and so that they might be neither under Our nor under Polish rule, but remain free and

independent,” but in order to deliver Ukraine into the hands of the Poles. The tsar called upon his Little Russian subjects to pay no heed to Mazepa and the Swedes but to support the Great Russian troops and oppose their enemy, “seeing this open treason on the part of the apostate Mazepa, seeking the betrayal of your fatherland into unbearable Polish bondage.”²⁹

Peter was clearly changing emphasis from qualifying Mazepa’s actions as a betrayal of the tsar – the leitmotif of his first manifesto – to a betrayal of the fatherland. Not surprisingly, in all the manifestos and letters known to us, Peter wrote only about “your,” not “our,” fatherland – a clear indication that *otechestvo* was associated in his mind with the specific character of Ukrainian political discourse and not directly related to the “all-Russian” political discourse and vocabulary.

Those who wrote about “our” fatherland were the Hetmanate’s secular and religious authorities, forced by the swift and resolute actions of Peter’s troops to condemn Mazepa. In his manifesto of 8 December 1708, the new hetman, Ivan Skoropads'kyi, responded to Mazepa’s circular of November 10th, specifically to his claim that “Moscow, that is, the Great Russian people, has always been hateful to our Little Russian people; in its malicious intentions it has long resolved to drive our people to perdition.” Skoropads'kyi wrote that the “Little Russian people [...] with our whole fatherland” should be grateful to the “Great Sovereigns, Our Orthodox Monarchs” for the protection they offered and for the prosperous condition of “Ukraine, our fatherland” (*Ukraina, otchyzna nasha*) after the end of the lengthy wars of the second half of the seventeenth century. He also stated that Mazepa had committed treason not in order to protect “our fatherland” but for his own gain; never having been its true son, “now he has become all the more manifest an enemy and destroyer.” Skoropads'kyi also asserted that “in general, our Little Russian fatherland must beware of that self-styled son, or, one should say, degenerate, the infamous Mazepa” and accused Charles XII of wanting to hand over “our fatherland” to the Polish king. The new hetman called upon his followers to support the Great Russian troops in the name of the Orthodox faith, the true churches, and “their fatherland.”³⁰ The letter of the “Little Russian hierarchs,” distributed in Ukraine at the insistence of the tsar, similarly portrayed Mazepa not only as a traitor who had abandoned the Orthodox tsar for a heretical monarch but also as one who had “alienated himself from his Little Russian fatherland,” sought to subject it to the Polish yoke, and wanted to turn the Orthodox churches into Uniate ones.³¹

It is safe to assume that it was Mazepa’s statements and manifestos that introduced the concept of the fatherland into the ideological battle. Characteristically, Mazepa’s first public act on joining forces with Charles XII was to take an oath in front of the Cossack officers who accompanied him, claiming that he had acted

not for his own sake but for the good of the whole fatherland and the Zaporozhian Host.³² In a letter to Colonel (and future Hetman) Ivan Skoropads'kyi, Mazepa called upon him to attack the Muscovite troops as a "true son of the fatherland."³³ Mazepa also invoked the good of the fatherland in his manifestos to the Ukrainian people. Additional light on the political language and ideological concepts employed by Mazepa in his confrontation with the tsar can be shed by the writings of his followers, especially his successor in exile, Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, who as Mazepa's general chancellor apparently penned many of his manifestos in the autumn and winter of 1708. It was Orlyk who recalled in a letter to Stefan Iavors'kyi in 1721 that when Mazepa confided his intention to rebel against the tsar, he claimed to be doing so "for all of you who are under my rule and command, for your wives and children, for the common welfare of my fatherland, poor unfortunate Ukraine (*matky moiei otchyzny bidnoi Ukraïny*), for the whole Zaporozhian Host and the Little Russian people, for the elevation and expansion of the Host's rights and privileges."³⁴ The author of the *Pacta et constitutiones* also explained Mazepa's actions as a result of his concern for the unity and welfare of the fatherland. In that regard he was presented as continuing the cause of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, who had allied himself with Charles X of Sweden in the mid-seventeenth century in order to liberate his fatherland from the foreign yoke. As Mazepa's successor, Orlyk in turn was to take care of the needs of the fatherland, whose name was given in the Latin text of the *Pacta et constitutiones* as *Ucraina* or *Parva Rossia*.³⁵

The theme of the good of the fatherland as the highest value and object of loyalty, which Mazepa introduced into the propaganda war, clearly sidelined the concept of personal loyalty to the monarch, which had been paramount in Peter's first letter on Mazepa's treason. By invoking the notion of loyalty to the fatherland, Mazepa effectively questioned and rejected the notion that his primary loyalty was owed to the monarch, and Peter's propagandists had little choice but to accept that logic if they wanted to win the hearts and minds of the "Little Russian people." Another significant innovation of Mazepa's was the presentation of the ongoing conflict not as an act of personal treason but as a confrontation between two nations (peoples), Little Russian and Great Russian. Again, Peter's and Skoropads'kyi's responses to Mazepa's accusations demonstrate that they had to accept his logic and adopt the rules of the national discourse imposed on them. They were obliged to write not only about the "Little Russian people," "Little Russian" and "Great Russian" troops, as the Muscovite authorities had been prepared to do all along, but also about the Great Russian subjects of the tsar and the Great Russian people. If these terms were not entirely novel, they were by no means usual in the tsar's manifestos, which normally preferred statist to national

discourse and legitimized the tsar's actions through the notion of the interests of the Russian state (*Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo*).³⁶

The war of manifestos between Peter and Mazepa during the months leading to the Poltava battle constitutes the ideological background against which we can properly assess the meaning of concepts, ideas, and images employed by Prokopovych in his sermon before the tsar on 24 July 1709. The war directly affected the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, as all "foreign" students – that is, those born outside the Hetmanate – were sent back across the Polish-Lithuanian border by the local Muscovite voivode on the orders of the tsar's chancellor.³⁷ Prokopovych could not but have known the content of at least some of Mazepa's manifestos and the responses to them by Peter and Skoropads'kyi: in fact, his sermon contains a reference to Peter's manifesto on the Zaporozhians.³⁸ Prokopovych's rejection of Mazepa's claim to be a true son of the fatherland corresponds almost directly to the analogous passage of Skoropads'kyi's manifesto, and so on. Clearly, Prokopovych developed some of the ideas expressed in Peter's and Skoropads'kyi's manifestos, including the motif of Mazepa's betrayal of both the tsar and the fatherland. And yet, despite clear parallels between Prokopovych's sermon and the circular letters of the tsar and the new hetman, there were some important differences in the treatment of the issue by Prokopovych and his high-ranking predecessors in the propaganda war of 1708–09 against Mazepa.

If Mazepa, Peter, and Skoropads'kyi had in mind the Little Russian fatherland, Prokopovych, as shown earlier, considered that his own fatherland and the one betrayed by Mazepa was not Little Russia, but the entity to which Peter referred in one of his manifestos as the *Russian state* (Prokopovych generally called it *Russia*). The new concept of the Russian fatherland constructed by Prokopovych was a major ideological innovation, for it not only implied a prospective change of loyalty on the part of the "Little Russian people" from the Hetmanate to the "all-Russian" state but also introduced a new object of loyalty for the rest of the population of that state. For Prokopovych, unlike Mazepa, Peter, and Skoropads'kyi, there were no Little Russian and Great Russian troops at Poltava – there were only Russian troops; there were no Little Russian and Great Russian peoples but one united Russian people; no Little Russia and Great Russia as constituents of one "all Russian" state but Little Russia as part of a greater Russia – the new fatherland and the new object of loyalty of the tsar's subjects. That new source of legitimacy was closely linked to the old one – the person of the tsar – but henceforth the tsar had to share his place in the hierarchy of loyalties with the concept of Russia as a fatherland. The appellation "father of the fatherland," earlier applied by Kyivan literati to Mazepa, was now reserved, with the change of the political boundaries of the fatherland, exclusively for the person of the tsar.

Was Prokopovych alone in attempting to turn the Russian state into a nationally defined fatherland called *Russia*? Probably not, but the proof of that is not easy to find. One indication that Prokopovych had a powerful ally and protector in this undertaking – the tsar himself – is to be found in the text of the tsar's order to his troops on the eve of the Poltava battle. There Peter, in an apparent departure from his earlier manifestos, addressed his country as both *Russia* and *fatherland*. "Let the Russian (*rossiiskoi*) army know," reads the text of the order, "that the hour has drawn nigh in which the very existence of the whole fatherland (*otechestvo*) is placed in their hands; either Russia (*Rossiia*) will perish completely or she will be reborn for the better."³⁹ The problem with this order is that its original text has not survived, and the one known today originates with a manuscript entitled *The History of Emperor Peter the Great* whose authorship is attributed to none other than Teofan Prokopovych.⁴⁰ Whether Peter indeed addressed his troops before the battle in the manner indicated above, using the words *Russia* and *fatherland*, cannot be known for certain. Research on the use of the term *fatherland* in Muscovy and the Russian Empire still lies ahead, but it seems highly appropriate to find these terms in the work of one of the original promoters of the concept of Russia as a common fatherland of the peoples that the pre-Poltava propagandists called Little Russian and Great Russian.

The notion of the fatherland was associated in Prokopovych's mind with a particular polity and constituted a natural object of loyalty for its sons from the most ancient times. The Trojans had their own fatherland, as did the Romans and, later, the Poles.⁴¹ The borders of the fatherland could apparently change with those of the state. For example, in Prokopovych's opinion, Alexander Nevskii had "revived Russia and these members of it, Ingria, I say, and Karelia, which were then about to be cut off; he preserved and consolidated them in the body of his fatherland."⁴² Thus, as was often the case in Prokopovych's sermons, the notions of the fatherland and Russia merged into one concept. As noted above, the notion of Russia had a clear national connotation in Prokopovych's sermons, for he considered Russia a "national name" (*obshchenarodnoe imia*), often compared it to other peoples, and occasionally called it a *narod*.⁴³ The concept of Russia as a fatherland linked the concept of the Russian monarch (all-important to Prokopovych) with the concepts of the Russian state (*gosudarstvo*, *derzhava*) and the Russian people.

It is reasonable to assume that the new meaning of such concepts and terms as *Russia* and *fatherland* employed in Prokopovych's sermons and writings of the post-1709 period manifested the arrival of a new type of identity in the Romanovs' realm – one based on loyalty not to the ruler alone or to his state but to a new type of proto-national entity. Prokopovych actively promoted these new terms and concepts in his numerous speeches and sermons. In so doing, he echoed the

Protestant preachers on the Swedish side of the Northern War, as well as their colleagues in other countries of Northern Europe. All of them were busy promoting the notion of the fatherland and the concept of loyalty to it in their own sermons and writings.⁴⁴ Even more than by the genre of the sermon, Prokopovych's *fatherland* project was promoted by an act of the Senate (1721) that bestowed the title of "all-Russian emperor" and the appellations "Great" and "father of the fatherland" on the Muscovite monarch in connection with the victorious conclusion of the Northern War. Some scholars assume that the text of the act originated with the Synod, in particular with its vice-president at the time, Teofan Prokopovych.⁴⁵ Whether that was the case or not, it is quite clear that the concept of Russia as a fatherland and object of loyalty for the subjects of the tsar made spectacular progress in the Muscovite realm during the age of Peter, and in that progress it is difficult not to see the hand of Prokopovych and the influence of concepts originally developed in the Cossack Hetmanate.

Prokopovych's writings demonstrate that the new understanding of the concepts of Russia and the fatherland was an important element in the reconstruction of his own identity, as well as in the construction of the identities of those Ukrainians (mostly representatives of the Kyivan clergy) who followed him in making their careers in the North. The latter were prepared by his writings to make a switch from the *Rossiiia* of Petro Mohyla to the *Rossiiia* of Peter Romanov. The new imperial Russia also became their new fatherland, with Little Russia relegated to the status of a local *patria* or birthplace – the significance attributed to the Hetmanate in Prokopovych's St Petersburg letters.⁴⁶ By the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the Kyiv-educated intellectuals were a long way from imagining their fatherland as part of the Polish Crown or the whole Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as opposed to barbaric Muscovy – the image presented by the Kyivan writer Pavlo Ostropols'kyi in his Polish verses published by the Kyivan Cave Monastery Press in 1636.⁴⁷ Now the selfsame Muscovy was conveniently reintroduced to the Kyivans as "Russia" and depicted as part of their new fatherland. True, for the Kyivans their homeland always remained part of any new fatherland they imagined, but in the process they changed not only the names of those fatherlands but also the word they used to define the concept itself – from Mohyla's *ojczyzna* to Sofonovych's *otchyzna* and Prokopovych's *otechestvo*.

There is good reason to believe that the alumni of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy who worked in the imperial service accepted such changes of identity. But did Prokopovych's redefinition of such terms as *Russia* and *fatherland* affect the broader elite circles of the Hetmanate? It seems particularly important to ask this question in light of the report submitted by the Muscovite voivode of Kyiv on the eve of the Battle of Poltava. He not only informed his superior of the expulsion

from Kyiv of students not born in the Hetmanate, but also listed Prokopovych, the prefect of the academy who was supposed to care for the welfare of those students, as the only representative of the Kyivan clergy who was well-disposed (*sniskhoditelen*) to the Muscovites.⁴⁸ The answer to the above question should be more negative than positive. Relatively few representatives of the Hetmanate's secular elites accepted the institution of the Russian state as their new fatherland. As indicated by a recent analysis of the Cossack chronicles of the period, at least one of their authors, Samiilo Velychko, regarded the Hetmanate (which he usually called either Little Russia or Ukraine) as his sole fatherland.⁴⁹

The historico-political and cultural significance of Velychko's chronicle, and also that of Hryhorii Hrabianka's chronicle, written in the same era, can be fully understood only against the backdrop of the historical, political, and ideological debate launched by the war of manifestos of 1708–09, the echo of which is heard in the above-mentioned works.⁵⁰ Whose side – Peter's or Mazepa's – did the post-Poltava chroniclers take? Judging from what we know to date, the Cossack *starshyna* had no reason to like Mazepa. First, they criticized him for fawning on the tsar, then they refused to join his rebellion. Even those who supported him barely waited for his death to conclude the Bendery Constitution of 1710 and prevent the appearance of another Cossack autocrat like Ivan Mazepa in the office of hetman. Samiilo Velychko, a protégé of Mazepa's enemy, General Judge Vasyl' Kochubei, was also not a supporter of the late hetman. However, it was one thing not to support Mazepa, and quite another to support Peter's offensive against the autonomy of the Hetmanate, which led to the abolition of the hetmancy.

As mentioned above, in the manifestos of 1708–09, Peter accused Mazepa of apostasy from his oath to the tsar, to which Mazepa replied that he was guided by the highest loyalty – to the fatherland, the liberties of the Sich, and the welfare of the Little Russian people. Orlyk developed this position further in exile, but the chroniclers of the Hetmanate did not seem to build on this theme. According to Frank Sysyn, Hrabianka assessed the actions of the hetmans primarily by the criterion of loyalty to the tsar.⁵¹ Velychko, giving the reader an account of the death of his patron Vasyl' Kochubei, noted that he had served God, his ruler, his fatherland, and the Zaporozhian Host.⁵² In this hierarchy of loyalties, the fatherland came after the ruler. And although in his chronicle Velychko emphasized loyalty to the fatherland, in general, he apparently agreed with the tsar's theses of 1708–09: love for the fatherland can lead the Cossacks against the hetman who threatens the fatherland, but it cannot lead them against the Muscovite monarch.⁵³ Velychko could criticize the actions of individual tsars, even Peter's, but he was not ready to put loyalty to Ukraine, his Little Russian fatherland, above loyalty to the tsar. That is why Velychko seems less consistent than Mazepa or Orlyk: he

recognized Khmel'nyts'kyi's right to rebel against the Polish king in the name of the fatherland but denied his followers the right to rebel against the Russian tsar. The fact that the Polish monarchs were Catholics, while the Russian tsars were Orthodox and the defenders of the Orthodox Church, probably also played a role. However, one should not look for only a religious rationale; as Sysyn notes, Velychko's support for the Orthodox tsar could also be the result of the simple recognition of the "political reality, resulting from the late seventeenth-century struggles and the Battle of Poltava."⁵⁴

Although it seems that Velychko and Hrabianka sided with the Orthodox monarch in the discussion between Peter and Mazepa, they leaned toward his opponent in matters concerning the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host and the Little Russian people. Velychko, for example, criticized Peter's decision to transfer Right-Bank Ukraine to Turkey, as well as the establishment of the Little Russian Collegium. He also quoted the tsar's words that no nation on earth had as many liberties as Ukrainians.⁵⁵ And although the criticized decisions were made after the Battle of Poltava, Velychko was clearly continuing his polemic with the assertions of the tsar's manifestos of 1708–09. In his chronicle, we also find echoes of Mazepa's statements that his revolt was caused by a desire to preserve the integrity of the Cossack fatherland. It is no accident that Velychko, as well as Hrabianka, condemned the Truce of Andrusovo, which divided Ukraine, and considered Right-Bank Ukraine to be part of his country.

Important for the views of both chroniclers was their interpretation of the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654 as the Magna Carta of the Hetmanate's liberties. Velychko interpreted Pereiaslav as a mutually binding agreement between equal partners. Of course, this interpretation contradicted the views of the Muscovite boyars, who regarded military rights and privileges as a gift from the tsar, which could be taken away at any moment. The Muscovite side never took seriously the promises made during the Pereiaslav council. As noted above, in the fateful year of 1708, Peter denied that the tsars had violated the articles of 1654. In actual fact, he continued the policy of his predecessors and further reduced Cossack privileges, initially limiting the powers of the newly elected Hetman Ivan Skoropads'kyi, and then, in 1722, completely abolishing the office of the hetman. In their interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement as a mutually binding agreement, the Cossack chroniclers projected on Muscovy the model of the Commonwealth's political relations. To expect that an autocracy would adhere to the traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a striking lack of understanding of political realities, which could still be forgiven, to use David Frick's expression, by such "former Ruthenians" as Sofonovych or Baranovych, but not by the chroniclers of the Hetmanate of the 1720s. But then, they were only victims and hostages of the new political situation.

After the Poltava defeat, even the most profound understanding of the mechanisms of autocratic rule would not have helped them to restore the Cossack rights taken away by Peter and his predecessors. The chroniclers, together with the entire society, were forced to seek solace in the models and hopes of the times of the Polish-Lithuanian state.

Neither of the chroniclers went into the details of Mazepa's revolt. Hrabianka recalled the hetman's "treason," and Velychko ended his chronicle at the end of the seventeenth century. His attitude to the choice made by Mazepa can only be reconstructed based on his attitude to the revolt of Petryk, who defected to Crimea in 1693. In relating Petryk's letter to the Sich, Velychko actually repeats the arguments from Mazepa's manifestos of 1708: the war against Russia is being waged for the sake of restoring Cossack liberties and the welfare of the whole people, with the aim of returning the idealized times of Khmel'nyts'kyi. Petryk's letter is countered in the text of the chronicle with the probable response of Velychko's own Poltava regiment. The Poltava letter denied that the Muscovite authorities did harm to the Cossacks or the Little Russian people, but if something like that happened, the way out of the situation should be sought by wise leaders and not such rebels as Petryk. Velychko clearly did not consider Petryk a wise leader. We can assume that he was no better disposed toward Mazepa. Although he agreed with some of his theses, he did not consider insurrection a good means of achieving political change.⁵⁶

In 1728, twenty-three years after the performance of Prokopovych's *Vladimir*, Kyivans attended another play staged by students of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Entitled *Mylost' Bozhiia* (*The Grace of God*), it celebrated the restoration of the hetman's office, which had effectively been abolished by Peter in 1722. It was clearly influenced by Prokopovych's play, and its epilogue included an appeal to God to bestow his grace on the tsar (now Peter II) and his "faithful chief" (*virnyi vozhd'*), the hetman (now Danylo).

Nevertheless, the ideological messages of these plays showed more differences than similarities. The drama of 1728 made no attempt to link the power of the hetmans to that of the Kyivan princes. It compared the new hetman, Danylo Apostol, not to Volodymyr, as did Prokopovych in the case of Mazepa, but to Khmel'nyts'kyi. The playwright's main interlocutor was not *Russia* but *Ukraine*. He called upon Ukraine to change her sorrow to joy and celebrate Khmel'nyts'kyi's victories: "do not weep, o Ukraine, cease to grieve, / It is time to turn your sorrow into joy."⁵⁷ The confusing sequence of "all-Russian" terms was now abandoned in favor of clearly defined "Ukrainian" ones that promoted local Ukrainian patriotism and identity. The Cossacks were presented as the patriots of Mother Ukraine, while the play's main character, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, was portrayed

as a true patriot of his Ukrainian fatherland: "Having come to love the fatherland above all else, and for its sake having scorned all / Luxuries, peace, advantages, and all private gain."⁵⁸ Everyone who loved his fatherland was encouraged to love Khmel'nyts'kyi as well.⁵⁹ The fatherland in this play is Ukraine, not Russia – an important factor that attests to the endurance of Ivan Mazepa's traditions in the Hetmanate and his view of the essence and the geographical and political boundaries of the Cossack fatherland.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

Originally published as: Serhii Plokhii, "V im'ia myloï vitchyzny': virnist' ta zrada Ivana Mazepy," *Sotsium. Al'manakh sotsial'noï istoriï* no. 6 (2006): 267–81. Copyright 2006 by Serhy Plokhyy. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 For the text of the *Slovo*, see Feofan Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, ed. I.P. Eremin (Moscow, 1961), 23–38.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 152.
- 3 *Ibid.*
- 4 This particular meaning of the term *otechestvo* can be traced back to fifteenth-century texts and is directly linked to Bulgarian cultural influences. See the discussion of the use of the terms *otchina* and *otechestvo* in V.V. Kolesov, *Mir cheloveka v slove Drevnei Rusi* (Leningrad, 1986), 242–6.
- 5 On the use of the term "fatherland" in Polish political discourse, see Ewa Bem, "Termin 'ojczyzna' w literaturze XVI i XVII wieku. Refleksje o języku," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 34 (1989): 131–57. On the use of term *fatherland* in German lands, see Oliver Auge, "Der Fürst als 'pater patriae': Zur Wiederbelebung eines Herrschertitels an der Wende vom Mittelalter zur Frühen Neuzeit," in *Fürsten an der Zeitenwende zwischen Gruppenbild und Individualität. Formen fürstlicher Selbstdarstellung und ihre Rezeption (1450–1550); wissenschaftliche Tagung, Landeskulturzentrum Schloss Salza, 27.-29. März 2008* (2009), ed. Oliver Auge, Ralf-Gunnar Werlich und Gabriel Zeilinger (Ostfildern, 2009), 77–102.
- 6 For the use of "nation," "state," and "fatherland" in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see Arturas Tereskinas, *The Imperfect Body of the Community: Formulas of Noblesse, Forms of Nationhood in the Seventeenth-Century Grand Duchy of Lithuania* (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1999), 47–60.

- 7 “Maiores Illustrissimorum Principum Korybut Wiszniewiecciorum,” in Ros-
tyśław Radyszewskyj, ed., *Rokolański parnas: polskojęzyczna poezja ukraińska
od końca XVI do początku XVIII wieku. Antologia*, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1998), 225–6.
Most likely, the authors of the poems were students of the college, and the
editor was Teodosii Baievs'kyi, who then taught poetics at the school. For
more information, see Natalia Iakovenko, “Koho topchut koni zvytiashnoho
Korybuta: do zahadky kyievo-mohylians'koho panehiryka 1648 r. ‘Majores
Wiszniewiecciorum,’” in *Synopsis: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Zenon
E. Kohut*, ed. Serhii Plokhly and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton, 2005), 191–218.
- 8 See also mentions of the “common fatherland” in the text of the Treaty of
Hadiach (1658), Vyhovs'kyi's universal (1660), and Doroshenko's instructions
to envoys to the Commonwealth (1670) in Ivan Butych, Ihor Teslenko, and
Viacheslav Rynsevych, eds, *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv vid Ivana Vy-
hovs'koho do Ivana Samoilovycha (1657–1687)* (Kyiv-Lviv, 2004), 34, 98, 384.
- 9 Muscovite sources contain even earlier mentions of the Cossack *otchizna*
(fatherland), for example in the record of a conversation between a Russian
merchant and General Chancellor Ivan Vyhovs'kyi in January 1652, see *Vos-
soedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1954), 199. But given the duality
of the concept of *otchizna* in the Muscovite political lexicon, we cannot say
with certainty whether Vyhovs'kyi meant the fatherland or Cossack patri-
monies (*votchyny*) and property in general.
- 10 See Briukhovets'kyi's letter of April 1662 to Bishop Mefodii in *Tysiacha rokiv
ukrains'koï suspil'no-politychnoi dumky*, ed. T. Hunchak et al., vol. 3, part 1
(Kyiv, 2001), 454–5.
- 11 See mentions of the “fatherland” in Pavlo Teteria's letters in *Universaly
ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 232; *Tysiacha rokiv*, 3/1: 281–90.
- 12 *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 318, 330.
- 13 See Briukhovets'kyi's letter of 10 February 1668 in *Tysiacha rokiv*, 3/1: 454–5.
- 14 *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 184–7, 425, 579–81.
- 15 See Frank E. Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Political
Thought,” in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, società*, ed. Giovanna Siedina
(Alessandria, 2004), 39–53.
- 16 For the text of the epitaph, see Pavlo Zholtovs'kyi, *Ukrains'kyi zhyvopys
XVII-XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1978), 220.
- 17 See quotations from the panygeric to Ivan Velychkovs'kyi in Natalia M.
Iakovenko, “Hospodari vitchyzny': uiavlennia kozats'koï ta tserkovnoï elity
Het'manshchyny pro pryrodu, reprezentatsiiu i obov'iazky vlady (druha
polovyna XVII – pochatok XVIII st.),” in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, società*,

- ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria, 2004), 25. See also the references to Ukraine as to the fatherland in Samoilovych's universals: *Universalnyi ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 697, 808, 811, 821.
- 18 *Tysiacha rokiv ukrains'koï suspil'no-politychnoi dumky*, 3/2: 366–72.
 - 19 For references to “Malorossiiskaia nasha otchyzna” and “otchyzna Malorosiiskaia,” see Ivan Butych, ed., *Universalnyi Ivana Mazepy. 1687–1709*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 2002), 344, 433.
 - 20 In the text of one of the engravings produced at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1708, Mazepa was called “munito patri patriae, ecclesiae defensori, belli et pacis atrium cultori et patrono.” See Konstantyn Bida, *Soiuz het'mana Ivana Mazepy z Karlom XII* (Winnipeg, 1959), 38.
 - 21 For Peter I's manifestos, as well as excerpts from the correspondence of Peter, Mazepa, and Aleksandr Menshikov, see *Pis'ma i bumagi Petra Velikogo*, vol. 8, part 1 (Leningrad-Moscow, 1948), 2760–94; Oleksandr Rihel'man, *Litopysna opovid pro Malu Rosiiu ta ii narod i kozakiv uzahali. Reprynt vydannia 1847 r. Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii* (Kyiv, 1994), 531–74; Sergei Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 8 (Moscow, 1962), 240–52. More about the “war of the manifestos” can be found in Bohdan Kentrschynskiy, “Propagandakriket i Ukraina,” in *Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok* (Stockholm, 1958), 195–6.
 - 22 See the discussion of that terminological innovation in Peter's propaganda in Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 195–6.
 - 23 See the text of Peter's circular of 28 October 1708 in Rihel'man, *Litopysna opovid'*, 531–2.
 - 24 See the text of the tsar's letter to Colonel Iakiv Lyzohub of Chernihiv dated 3 December 1690 in Rihel'man, *Litopysna opovid'*, 501–02.
 - 25 See the texts of Peter's letters of that period, Rihel'man, *Litopysna opovid'*, 535–45. The idea of using manifestos to enumerate Mazepa's abuses of his own people in order to secure the support of the “simple folk” and prove that Mazepa was acting in his own interests rather than for the good of Ukraine was suggested to Peter by Menshikov on 26 October in the same letter in which he informed the tsar about Mazepa's “treason.” See Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 8: 244. On Peter's accusing Mazepa of treason and the antagonists' opposing interpretations of the conditions of the Pereiaslav Treaty, see Orest Subtelny, “Mazepa, Peter I, and the Question of Treason,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 2 (1978): 158–83.
 - 26 The tsar and his henchmen not only enlarged on the arguments put forward against Mazepa in the first manifesto, but also refuted the accusations levelled against them by their opponents. For example, Charles and Mazepa in their

manifestos claimed that Peter was negotiating with the Pope in order to introduce Catholicism on the territory of his tsardom. The rest of the charges were directed against the very nature of the war with Sweden, violations of the ancient rights and liberties of the “Little Russian people,” and the plunder of Ukrainian lands by Great Russian troops. In response, Peter listed his reasons for waging war: to reclaim former Muscovite territories, liberate churches that had been forcibly converted to Lutheranism, and defend the tsar’s honor, violated by the Swedish king and his allies. For more information, see: Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 8: 250–2.

- 27 See the text of the manifesto in *Pis'ma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikago*, 8/1: nos. 2816, 276–84; Rihel'man, *Litopysna opovid'*, 539–45. In this manifesto, Peter used the term *fatherland* twice, in both cases referring to the fatherland of his addressees.
- 28 Cited in Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 8:250.
- 29 For the text of Peter’s manifesto, see *Pis'ma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikago*, 8/1: 299, 38–41; Rihel'man, *Litopysna opovid'*, 565–7.
- 30 For the text of Skoropads'kyi’s manifesto, see Rihel'man, *Litopysna opovid'*, 555–62.
- 31 See the excerpt from the letter in Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 8:250.
- 32 Ibid., 8:243–4.
- 33 For the text of the letter, see Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 8:246–7.
- 34 See the English translation of Orlyk’s letter of June 1721 to Stefan Iavors'kyi in Orest Subtelny, “Pylyp Orlyk’s Letter to Stefan Iavorskyi (1721): An Eye-Witness Account of Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s Defection,” in *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century* (Boulder, 1981), 178–205, here p. 190.
- 35 See the Latin original of the *Pacta et constitutiones*, the Ruthenian version, and translations into contemporary Ukrainian and English in *Konstytutsiia ukrains'koï het'mans'koï derzhavy* (Lviv-Kyiv, 1997).
- 36 If Peter’s scribes reserved the term *all-Russian* (*vserossiiskii*) for the tsar’s title (*Vserossiiskii Samoderzhets*), while using *Great Russian* as opposed to *Little Russian* to denote non-Ukrainian troops and subjects of the tsar, the scribes in Skoropads'kyi’s office apparently had a hard time distinguishing between the alleged *all-Russian* character of the tsar’s autocracy and the *Great Russian* nationality of his Muscovite subjects. In the above-mentioned circular of 8 December 1708, Skoropads'kyi wrote about the protection extended to Little Russia by the wings of the “high-flying all-Russian eagle.” See Rihel'man,

- Litopysna opovid'*, 599. But in his letter of 22 June 1709 to Peter, he wrote about the tsar's Great Russian autocratic Orthodox monarchy (*velikorossiiskaia, samoderzhavnaia, pravoslavnaia... monarkhiia*), see *Pis'ma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikago*, vol. 9, part 2 (Leningrad-Moscow, 1950), 967.
- 37 Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 8: 268.
 - 38 In his manifesto of 26 May 1709, the tsar accused the Zaporozhian Cossacks of, among other things, wishing to bring about the "destruction of their fatherland, the Little Russian land" (*razorenii otchizny svoei, Malorossiiskogo kraia*). See the text of the manifesto in *Pis'ma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikago*, 9/2: 907–14, here p. 912.
 - 39 *Pis'ma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikago*, 9/1: 980–3.
 - 40 For a discussion of the textual history of the order, see *Pis'ma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikago*, 9/2: 980–1.
 - 41 For references to the Trojan, Roman, and Polish fatherlands, see Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, 26, 137.
 - 42 See "Slovo v den' Sviatogo Blagovernogo kniazia Aleksandra Nevskogo," in Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, 100.
 - 43 Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, 52, 91, 133, 137.
 - 44 On the development and promotion of the concept of fatherland in Northern Europe, see Pasi Ihalainen, "The Concepts of Fatherland and Nation in Swedish State Sermons from the Late Age of Absolutism to the Accession of Gustavus III," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 28 (2003): 37–58.
 - 45 Elena Pogossian, *Petr I – arkhitektori rossiiskoi istorii* (St Petersburg, 2001), 220–9.
 - 46 See Prokopovych's letters in: F. Prokopovych, *Filosof's'ki tvory* (Kyiv, 1980), 3:187–308.
 - 47 See references to the fatherland and Muscovy in: Ostropols'kyi's (Pawel Holodowicz Ostropolski) *Trigonus Radości*, dedicated to one of the leaders of Ruthenian society – Bohdan Stetskevych, in Radyszewskyj, *Roksolański parnas*, 2:147–54. Ostropols'kyi was the guardian of Stetskevych's son Mykhailo while the latter was a student at the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium.
 - 48 See the quotation from the report and discussion of its meaning in James Cracraft, "Prokopovych's Kiev Period Reconsidered," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 2 (1978): 155.
 - 49 Frank E. Sysyn, "Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture."
 - 50 S. Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 4 vols (Kyiv, 1848–64); Hryhorii Hrabianka, *The Great War of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyi*, ed. Yuri Lutsenko (Cambridge, MA, 1991).
 - 51 Frank E. Sysyn, "The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations

in Ukrainian Historiography of the Late 17th and Early 18th Centuries,” in *Culture, Nation, and Identity. The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)*, ed. Andreas Kappeler et al. (Edmonton-Toronto, 2003), 131.

52 Ibid., 139.

53 On the meaning and importance of the concept of the “fatherland” in Velychko’s chronicle, see Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture.”

54 Sysyn, “The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations,” 138.

55 Ibid., 140.

56 For Petryk’s letter and the Poltava regiment’s response, see: Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 3: 111–16; Sysyn, “The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations,” 138.

57 “Mylist' Bozhiia,” in *Ukrains'ka literatura XVIII st. Poetychni tvory. Dramatychni tvory. Prozovi tvory* (Kyiv, 1983), 314.

58 Ibid., 323.

59 Ibid., 317.

Cossack Historiography: A Vision of the Past and the Construction of Identities in the Hetmanate in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

ANDRII BOVGYRIA

Throughout the existence of the Hetmanate, the historical narratives written on its territories did more than just illuminate its past and the prehistory of its emergence. The authors of these narratives sought, first and foremost, to legitimize the new state entity by creating an ideological foundation for its existence. The cornerstone of this ideology was the construction of a new polity, which was often identified as the “Cossack Little Russian people/nation.” This polity was inseparable from the state, the Hetmanate/Zaporozhian Host, and disappeared after its ultimate incorporation, when it was transformed into “Little Russians” or “the population of the southwestern land.” It is possible to single out several markers in Hetmanate texts by means of which the new identity was constructed. These markers are ethnogenetic concepts, mental geography and the perception of the given territory, an “own” land, the creation of an own pantheon of heroes and anti-heroes, and the construction of an image of the “other.” With their help, the new polity fitted into the framework of a certain standard and acquired criteria that likened it to peoples who already had a long tradition of statehood and their own dynasties. At the same time, these same markers had to serve as a means of maximally distinguishing this people from their neighbors, especially in light of the incorporative influences, and of demonstrating its uniqueness by invoking its distant past or current factors.

Ethnogenesis: The Khazar Myth

In describing the distant past, local authors tried to follow the beaten path of their predecessors – European, and especially, Polish historians. They searched their works not only for facts that could be used in composing a picture of their own past but also certain formulas, and established forms and myths that were popular in Europe at that time. The adapted elements assumed their own original forms in the context of Cossack and ecclesiastical historical writing. One such form was the Khazar ethnogenetic myth that is contained in the texts of the Hetmanate. Its detailed version is found in the *Hrabianka Chronicle*.¹ The Khazars, as the ancestors of the “Little Russian people/nation,” are presented in it as the descendants of the biblical Gomer, the grandson of Noah. They arrived on the shores of Lake Maeotius (Sea of Azov) long ago, and from there they settled westward, along the shores of the Black Sea, and eastward, along the Don and Volga Rivers. According to this narrative, the Khazars once exercised great influence over Kyiv, and even fought with Byzantium with some success. They soon adopted Christianity and became allies with the Byzantines. Under the influence of their stronger neighbors, the Khazars assimilated and eventually gave birth to a new polity: “and the Khazars, called Little Russian warriors, changing little, the Khazars are therefore called Cossacks.”²

What was the derivation of the Khazar myth, and what factors contributed to its appearance? How was it interpreted and adapted in later texts?

It should be noted that the author of this myth was not the first to attempt to “age” the prehistoric origin of his people, thereby giving it greater authority by linking it to an ancient, warlike people. The overwhelming majority of European historical narratives of the medieval and early modern periods begin with similar stories. For example, in the sixteenth century the French developed the theory of Francogallism; its counterpart in the Scandinavian countries was Nordism, while the Dutch espoused Batavism, which traced the origin of the Dutch people to the ancient tribe of the Batavi. A similar tradition was transmitted to the East Slavs through the intellectual mediation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Sarmatian myth.³

The appearance of the Khazars in the ethnogenetic picture created by the Cossack chancelleries of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries became a kind of alternative and, at the same time, an imitation of Sarmatism. Khazarism obviously originated in connection with attempts to find the etymology of the word *kozak* (Cossack; *kozak-kazar-khazar*).⁴ There is little information about the Khazars in the known annalistic and hagiographical literature of the seventeenth

century. We only know that they lived on territories that neighbored on the Slavs and for a certain period of time controlled Rus', which paid them tribute, and that the Rus' prince once had the title of khagan.⁵

The first attempt to identify the Khazars as Cossacks was made as far back as in 1676 by the Chernihiv archimandrite Ioanykii Galiatovs'kyi in the dedicatory foreword to Hetman Ivan Samoilovych in his *Skarbnytsia* (*Treasury*), where he identified the Cossacks with the Khazars – “people of the Rus' nation,” quoting Maciej Strykowski.⁶ Thus Galiatovs'kyi can be regarded as the originator of the “Khazar myth,” which acquired more elaborate interpretations in the Ukrainian texts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁷

Who was the author of the Khazar myth in its most elaborate version as represented in the *Hrabianka Chronicle*? Needless to say, the Hadiach colonel Hryhorii Hrabianka, to whom the authorship of this chronicle is attributed, could not have been the creator of this myth by virtue of various reasons.⁸ Nor could the other texts, mentioned in the *Hrabianka Chronicle*, have been the direct sources of the Khazar myth – the works of Marcin Kromer, Marcin Bielski, Alessandro Guagnini, Maciej Strykowski, and Hieronim Kochowski. But there is one text that repeats this story from the *Hrabianka Chronicle* almost verbatim – the menaion of Dymytrii Tuptalo, the metropolitan of Rostov, *Chet'i Minei* (*Monthly Readings*), or *Zhytiia sviatykh* (*Lives of the Saints*). The lives of Saint Methodius and Saint Constantine contain the story of the brothers' mission to the Khazars, which includes a section titled “O kazarekh” (About the Khazars) in the nature of background information.⁹ A comparison of this text with the corresponding fragment of the *Hrabianka Chronicle* gives us grounds to conclude that Dmytro Tuptalo's text is the original and the fragment from the *Hrabianka Chronicle* is its abbreviated version.

We do not know exactly what the section “About the Khazars” is based on. Obviously Maciej Strykowski's *Chronicle of Poland, Lithuania, Samogitia and all of Rus'* was its main source.¹⁰ Dymytrii Tuptalo took as his basis the fragment in this chronicle about the settlement of the East Slavic peoples and extrapolated the story of the Khazars into his text. The chronicle itself makes no reference to the kinship of the Cossacks with the Khazars. Strykowski mentions the latter only once as the “Rus' people,” to whom other Rus' paid tribute.¹¹

The Khazar myth was further elaborated in later historical narratives. For example, Samiilo Velychko, a graduate of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, senior chancellorist in the General Military Chancellery, who identified himself as “a true son of Little Russia from the Khazar tribe,” combined both myths – Khazar and Sarmatian – in his work, regarding both the Khazars and Sarmatians as the ancestors of the Cossacks.¹² Velychko utilized the Sarmatian myth as evidence of the com-

mon origin of the Poles and the “Cossack-Rus’ people/nation”: “The free noble Sarmatian Cossack-Rus’ people/nation (*vol’nyi shliachetskii savromatiiskii kozakorskii narod*) and the other Sarmatian people/nation, the Poles ... born of and descended from us Sarmatians and Rus’ and themselves being our brothers, Sarmatians and Rus’, at the beginning.”¹³ This kinship was meant to equalize the two peoples and thereby confirm the illegitimacy of Polish claims to Ukrainian lands.

One form of instrumentalizing the Khazar myth was to use it as an additional argument to prove the antiquity of the “Little Russian Cossack people/nation,” who did not yield in this respect to their nearest neighbors, the Poles. The Khazars were even fitted into the context of ancient history as the allies of Alexander the Great, which unquestionably elevated their status in the European ethnogenetic picture.¹⁴ Their martial spirit and courage, in Velychko’s view, were inherited by their descendants, the Cossacks, whom he unreservedly calls “heroic Khazars (*bogatyrsкими kozarami*)” in his narrative of the victory of Hetman Ivan Briukhovets’kyi’s host over the Polish army, which lay siege to Hlukhiv in 1664.¹⁵ Velychko inflated the importance of his own work by invoking the “Khazar chronicles,” which he constantly quoted. This attribution was meant to attest to the authority and accuracy of these texts because of their association with ancient and heroic ancestors.

The existence of the Khazar myth in other historical narratives of the Hetmanate in the eighteenth century was wholly based on its version in the *Hrabianka Chronicle*. This applies, for example, to Pylyp Orlyk’s *Constitution* (1710), where there is mention of “a great warlike ancient Cossack people, known before this as the Khazar people ...”¹⁶ The Khazars, as the ancestors of the Cossacks, are also present in Semen Divovych’s work *The Conversation of Great Russia with Little Russia* (1762), in eighteenth-century verse histories, and also in scores of handwritten copies of Cossack chronicles that were part of the historical collections popular among the readers of the Hetmanate in the eighteenth century.¹⁷

It was the handwritten copies of chronicles that were instrumental in shaping the Hetmanate society’s, and especially the Cossacks’, perceptions of their past and their ethnogenetic roots. Oleksandr Rigel’man (1720–89), a military engineer and the author of the *Chronicle Narrative about Little Russia and Its People and the Cossacks in General* (1787), in dealing with the origins of Cossackdom, complained about the persistence in their midst of the belief in their descent “from the Khazar people.” These “fables,” Rigel’man believed, the Cossacks “took from their own Little Russian history, written by an unknown person.”¹⁸

One of the late manifestations of the reception of the Khazar myth, which attests to its prevalence beyond the textual environment, is recorded at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the story of the former Cossack from the

Zaporozhian Sich Mykyta Korzh (1731–1835), who, citing oral sources, claimed that “in olden times the Zaporozhians were called Khazars.”¹⁹

Thus, the creators of the historical narratives of the Hetmanate incorporated Sarmatism, which was popular in Polish intellectual circles in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and, using it as a model, created a new ethnogenetic concept on its basis – Khazarism. At its core, just as in Sarmatism, lay the identification of the “nation” with a specific social group. In the Ukrainian tradition, this group were the Cossacks. Khazarism was not as clear-cut and articulated as Sarmatism. We cannot speak about the existence of a “Khazar” portrait, a “Khazar” costume, or, in fact, a “Khazar” ideology, in contrast to their presence in Sarmatism. The Khazar myth was an important component in the legitimization of the new Cossack state, whose history was only half a century old at the time. Manifestations of this myth boiled down primarily to a search for the origins of the “Cossack Little Russian people/nation.” Appearing at the end of the seventeenth century, Khazarism emerged full-blown in eighteenth-century texts; not much changed in essence, it “took root” in the public consciousness through the texts. Its last manifestations are recorded in *Istoriia Rusov (History of the Rus' People)* at the beginning of the nineteenth century, that is, after the liquidation of the Hetmanate’s autonomous system of governance.

Perceptions of the Territory: “Our” Land

An important element of identity for the authors of Cossack history writing was territory, which was portrayed as their “own,” where the main events of their “own” history occurred and which was inhabited by people conscious of their ethnic or religious unity. In the historical narratives of the Hetmanate, it is possible to distinguish three theoretical levels of perception of their “own” land: the ancestral home, the ideal territory, and the real-life space. It is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between them; they are interpenetrable. In addition, the same territorial names – Rus', Little Russia, Ukraine – changed their content, and, accordingly, their spatial borders. Each of these three levels was based on a certain layer of knowledge about the past.

The concept of the ancestral home as one of the markers of identity, which is present in the history of many peoples, is closely linked in the Cossack chronicles to the Khazar myth. According to this myth, the territory of the Khazars, the ancestors of the “Little Russian people” in ancient times, was confined to Crimea, the Sea of Azov coast, and the Black Sea coast, from where they later expanded their settlement. The ancestral home from the Khazar myth emerges full-blown in seventeenth-century narratives, where it is modified into an additional instru-

ment for justifying the borders of the Cossacks' "own" land. For example, the author of the *Hrabianka Chronicle* concocts a dialogue that supposedly took place in 1654 between Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and Crimean Khan Islam Giray. Khmel'nyts'kyi reproaches the khan for breaking faith with his ancestors, the "forefathers of our tribe, the Khazars." He puts forward territorial claims to Giray, accusing the Tatars of seizing Crimea, "the land of our ancestors," the Khazars: "on their land to this day you remain in Crimea."²⁰

We see the further development and adaptation of the Khazar myth in the context of Cossack perceptions of their ancestral home in Pylyp Orlyk's *Constitution*, where mention is made of "vast domains" that once belonged to the Khazar people.²¹ In the *Velychko Chronicle*, the land of the Khazar ancestors is identified with Little Russia, which is called the "ancient true Khazar homeland."²² It should be noted that in the *Velychko Chronicle*, the concept of the borders of the "ancestral home" has been expanded by combining the Khazar and Sarmatian myths. This allowed the Cossacks to claim territories that were significantly larger than the imaginary ancestral lands of the Khazars. They now included "our true Sarmatian Cossack-Rus' lands and provinces from ancient times," which essentially unified all the territories of old Rus'.²³

What were the consequences of these attempts to find the ancestral home for the subsequent ideological constructions and territorial perceptions of the authors of the Cossack chronicles? The lower reaches of the Dnipro River, the initial territory of the Khazars, were treated in some Cossack chronicles as the center of Cossackdom, which was regarded as the elite of the "Little Russian people," and "the root and affirmation of its honor and eternal glory."²⁴ The consolidation of these lands in Cossack hands is traditionally associated in the narratives with the reforms of Stefan Batory (1576–86).²⁵ Zaporizhzhia, the Cossack domains that were regarded as a separate territorial and political entity from the Hetmanate, as well as the southern regions of the Hetmanate, appear in the *Velychko Chronicle* as the cradle of Cossackdom, its "ancestral home."²⁶

In dealing with the next level of mental geography – the construction of the ideal borders of their "own" land – it is important to note the influence of the reception of the Kyivan Rus' past.

Describing the circumstances in which the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 was concluded, Samiilo Velychko took special note of the attitude of the Muscovite tsar to this event: "he was joyful that such a large part of the Little Russian land, which remained in Greek-Rus' Orthodoxy, was voluntarily bowing to him, an Orthodox monarch, without any war or bloodshed."²⁷ Thus Velychko represents the lands that accepted the protectorate of the tsar as part of a whole – Little Russia. Citing the so-called Bila Tserkva Universal of 1648, Velychko pointed out that

copies of this document were sent out “to both sides of the Dnipro,” “describing in them the vastness of Rus’ borders,” and went on to refer to them as “Little Russian *oikoumene*.” In the text, this area is bounded approximately by the borders of the Kyiv metropolitanate and the Rus’ lands in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But further on, Velychko reduces Little Russia to the Hetmanate proper, mostly its Left-Bank part, which survived until 1783.

In the *Velychko Chronicle*, the two levels of characterizing the borders of Little Russia – expanded and narrow – are separated chronologically. The expanded treatment of “Little Russian borders” and the “Little Russian *oikoumene*” applies only to the times of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. Nothing of this kind is found in other Cossack narratives. We cannot rule out that Samiilo Velychko, who served in the General Military Chancellery and the General Military Court, had access to mid-seventeenth-century documents, where this spatial concept of Little Russia was reflected. The formation of this concept was influenced by attempts to legitimize the protection of the Muscovite tsar. In the times of Khmel’nyts’kyi, this term was used in official documents and correspondence with Moscow, but practically never “for domestic needs.”²⁸

It is worth citing one example of such use. In 1653 the hetman wrote a letter to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich asking for help in the war with the Poles, who intended “to destroy the Orthodox faith and the Christian people from all Little Russia (*iz Maloi vsei Rossii*).”²⁹ A year later, in a speech by the Nizhyn archpriest (*protopop*) Maksym Fylymonovych addressed to the tsar, Little Russia figured as “the true Rus’ land, the eastern patrimony of the Tsar’s Majesty,” which included the “Lviv, Podilia, Pokutia, Polisia, and Belarus lands.”³⁰ Thus to Khmel’nyts’kyi and his entourage, Little Russia meant the lands whose general borders coincided approximately with the territory of the Kyiv metropolitanate. It is this territory that Velychko designated as the “Little Russian *oikoumene*.”

What was the basis for projecting the territorial image of ancient Rus’ onto the concept of the ideal image of the “own” land in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? What markers were used for this purpose?

The most frequent marker to which the authors of the examined narratives turned when invoking the concept of “Rus’” was Orthodoxy. For them, the territory of the Kyiv metropolitanate was “their” land. This was the Pax Orthodoxa, where their coreligionists lived. Rus’ was also understood to mean a historic space. For the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors, the “Rus’ people” often appear in their narratives as a synonym for “Ukrainian/Little Russian/Cossack people,” the successor to the traditions of Kyivan Rus’. The memory of it was actualized in the narratives through the concept of the “rights and liberties” that

had been established in the early Rus' period and granted by "their" Rus' princes. The recognition of the latter as "theirs" also meant the recognition of ancient Rus' as "theirs," inhabited by "pious" people who professed the same religion.

The vision that the Cossack authors had of their ancestral home and the territory of ancient Rus' as "their" land did not coincide with the real/actual borders of the territory where they lived. That vision, in contrast to the first two levels of mental geography, did not require the underpinning of ethnogenetic myths or remote historical analogies. It was grounded on political reality and formalized in international agreements.

In a series of documents issued by Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and his successors, as well as in the historical narratives of the second half of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, the real-life territory was confined to the jurisdiction of Ukrainian autonomy, which coincided with the pre-war borders of three palatinates – Chernihiv, Bratslav, and Kyiv – that is, the "Rus'" territories that were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.³¹ This happened for the first time within the framework of the Treaty of Zboriv of 1649. This pact was preceded by the demands that the Zaporozhian Host presented to King John Casimir. The Cossacks lay claim to the following lands: "Beginning from the Dnister [River], Berlinski, and Bar, to Staryi Konstantyniv, to the Sluch [River] and beyond the Sluch, which drains into the Prypiat, to the Dnipro, and from the Dnipro, beginning from Liubech to Starodub and all the way to the Muscovite border with Trubetsk."³² The configuration of these frontiers was formalized by the Polish side. It was within these borders that the Cossacks later accepted the protection of the Muscovite tsar.³³

In the political discourse, as well as in the tradition of historical writing of the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, they were known as the "Ukrainian palatinates" or Ukraine. The Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising (*Khmel'nychchyna*), according to Frank Sysyn, consolidated a large part of them, thus drawing new political borders.³⁴ This name dominates in the *Eyewitness Chronicle* (*Litopys Samovydtisia*) and the *Dvorets'kyi Chronicle* (*Litopysets Dvorets'kykh*).³⁵ But in later texts, "Little Russia" also appears as a synonym.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, a large part of the historical fatherland, or ideal territory, remained outside the borders of the Hetmanate's "own" real land. In the documents of the day, claims to it were often revised and actualized in connection with the prospects of concluding treaties or with military plans. This applied primarily to the western territories: Podilia and Galicia, which were part of the Kingdom of Poland. In the narratives, in contrast with the documents of the era, the contours of the "own" real land were fairly vague. Thus, its

western border in three Cossack chronicles – the *Eyewitness*, *Hrabianka*, and *Velychko* accounts – is bounded by the Sluch and Horyn Rivers. In the *Nizhyn Chronicle*, the land's borders are marked emotionally: “Look out, Pole, up to the Sluch is ours; Don't look back, and don't hope to live here.”³⁶ “Our fatherland” has similar borders in Pylyp Orlyk's *Constitution*.³⁷ According to the *Velychko Chronicle*, the far western border of the Hetmanate should lie along the Vistula River. These were the goals of Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi that his envoys announced in Istanbul at their audience with the sultan.³⁸

As has already been noted above, the real territory of “their” land in the Cossack narratives did not match the ideal one. Lands west of the Cossack state were regarded by them as Polish, despite the fact that Lviv, Brody, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Zbarazh, Starokostiantyniv, and others often appear in the texts as part of Rus', populated by the Rus' people. Velychko calls them “Polish, close to Ukraine.” Not infrequently he distinguishes between “his” land (Ukraine) and “foreign” (Polish) territory, in which he includes a number of Podilian cities and lands of the Rus' palatinate. He does although in one instance call Lviv, Brody, and Zhovkva “Little Russian cities.” But he notes that he is doing so “not because he believes this” but because he is quoting the *Skarbnytsia* of the Chernihiv archimandrite Ioanykii Galiatovs'kyi, “where he clearly calls the cities Little Russian (*gde [on] iasno grady narechennye Maloiu nazyvaet Rossieiu*).”³⁹

The same occurs in the *Eyewitness Chronicle*: “Khmel'nyts'kyi advanced from Ukraine to the Polish cities, where he got as far as Pyliavtsi, not reaching Kostiantyniv,” “[he] set out to Ukraine from Kamianets,” and “Bar and other cities of Poland.”⁴⁰

Volhynia and Polisia are presented in a similar context in a number of the Hetmanate's historical narratives. Despite the fact that they were part of the Cossacks' ideal vision of “their” lands, in the real dimension they figured as Polish territory. Most telling in this respect is the episode in the *Velychko Chronicle* that describes the attack of the Tatar Horde, which invaded “all the way to the Polish rivers of Prypiat and Pina and devastated Polisia and Luts’k.”⁴¹

Thus, each of the described levels of perception of the “own” land was based on certain spatial visions that ranged from a small coastal area, the ancestral home of the “Kozars,” to the macro territory of former “great” Rus'. These borders of settlement of the “Little Russian Cossack people” depended, in the final analysis, on which space – historical or real – they legitimized. The Khazar myth not only identified the “historical roots” of the Cossacks but also secured for them the territory they occupied as their ancestral home. The creators of this myth incorporated the “Little Russian people/nation” into the general context of the European national genesis. The Cossack narratives kept silent about Kyivan Rus' history.

But memory of it survived, as validation of the autonomy's territory among other things. In real terms, the borders of the "own" land were determined by actual political configurations. They were what defined the place of the new ethnocultural entity – the "Little Russian Cossack people/nation" – on the historical and mental map of Europe.

Heroes and Antiheroes in Cossack Historiography

In the century between the end of the seventeenth and the end of the eighteenth centuries, Cossack historical writing produced its own pantheon of heroes and, accordingly, antiheroes. This was a complex of impressions, assessments, and characterizations of historical figures. As a rule, these characterizations were not permanent but changed in keeping with the times and the personal attitudes of the authors. Consequently, the lines separating these categories were fairly tentative. The assessment of the activity of one figure or another was often determined by the concept of rights and liberties – that is, did his efforts promote or obstruct their consolidation.

The actions of the first Cossack hetmans-chiefs Przeclaw Lanckoroński, Kryshtof Kosyns'kyi, Severyn Nalyvaiko, Dmytro Hunia, and others were judged in unequivocally positive terms. The chroniclers' vision of them was that of the "founding fathers" of Cossack statehood and the first Cossacks to fight for Cossack liberties. Most of them were portrayed as martyrs who gave their lives to consolidate these liberties. In the opinion of Volodymyr Antonovych, the eighteenth-century authors identified sixteenth-century Cossackdom with the state structure of the Hetmanate. Consequently, in order to tie together two periods of Cossack history – before Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and after – they sought to create a single chronological line of Cossack hetman-rulers like the lines of ruling monarchs in neighboring countries. Inasmuch as there was no real basis for this, they used the murky facts presented by Polish authors to attribute the title of Cossack hetman to anyone about whom they found information of having headed the Cossack forces, to border *starostas*, and others.⁴²

Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi was portrayed in the same context. His glorification already had its tradition, which had begun shortly after his death. This refers, in particular, to Kasiian Sakovych's *Verses on the Sorrowful Obsequy for the Worthy Knight Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi* (*Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb zatsnoho rytsera Petra Konashevycha-Sahaidachnoho*) (1622). In the Cossack chronicles, his activity is characterized not only by his efforts to support the Orthodox Church but also as an example of successful relations between the Cossacks and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The chronicles thus underscored the contrast

between the services of the Cossacks to the Kingdom of Poland and the ingratitude of the Poles. At the same time, the close cooperation between the hetman and the Poles in the military sphere gave grounds to the author of the *Tale About What Happened in Ukraine Since It Was Seized by Lithuania* to treat Sahaidachnyi as “a friend of the Poles,” who marched on Moscow “for profit.”⁴³ A similar assertion that Sahaidachnyi “was very friendly with the Poles” is found in another late work from the 1780s.⁴⁴ A mixed assessment of Sahaidachnyi is also found in a fragment of an unknown chronicle, probably dating from the turn of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries: “Praise to him, Konashevych, named Sahaidachnyi! He was always at peace with the Poles, and so the Cossacks had it good, only the common people suffered greatly . . .”⁴⁵ The unknown author then notes that after the hetman’s death, the Cossacks began suffering unendurable injustices from the Poles, which led to new uprisings.⁴⁶

The greatest amount of attention among all the personalities that figure in the works of Cossack historiography was devoted to the founder of the Cossack state, the “father of the fatherland,” Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. It is with his rule that the authors of the eighteenth century and subsequent periods associate the “golden age” in the history of the Hetmanate. His death led to a decline, internal strife, and the Ruin.

When did the Khmel'nyts'kyi cult emerge? The first signs of it appeared under Samoilovych, when he was associated with the image of the ideal hetman.⁴⁷ On the other hand, no interest in the person of the hetman is found in the narrative works of the period written by the representatives of the Orthodox elite. In the *Eyewitness Chronicle*, Khmel'nyts'kyi is an iconic and outstanding figure but far from being the subject of glorification. The author even harshly criticizes the hetman for his alliance with the Tatars and refusal to seek an understanding with the Polish king. For Roman Rakushka-Romanovs'kyi, the presumed author of the chronicle, the death of Khmel'nyts'kyi is also an ordinary fact, which he simply states, without giving this event any pivotal significance.

During the Mazepa period, the textbook on *Rhetoric* compiled by the professors of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1693 called the hetman the “father of the fatherland,” and the “Ruthenian Leonid,” referring to Leonidas, a king of Sparta.⁴⁸ But it was on the pages of the *Hrabianka Chronicle* that the hetman received his first wholehearted homage. The author of this work saw in Khmel'nyts'kyi the attributes of the ideal leader, which the Hetmanate so greatly lacked. “Owing to him, Ukraine rose to her feet, for she almost died under the Polish yoke,” read the poem entitled “Pokhvala Khmelnitskomu ot naroda malorosiiskogo” (Tribute to Khmel'nyts'kyi from the Little Russian People), which appeared at the beginning of the work along with “Virshi na gerb Malorosiiskii” (Verses on

the Little Russian Coat of Arms).⁴⁹ Thus in the vision of the author of the *Hrabianka Chronicle*, the figure of Khmel'nyts'kyi became one of the symbols of the new state.

In contrast to the *Eyewitness Chronicle*, it is difficult to find in Hryhorii Hrabianka's text so much as a shadow of anything negative concerning Khmel'nyts'kyi. A telling example is the characterization of the hetman in the text. He emerges as "a man worthy of the name hetman ..." ⁵⁰ The emphasis is on his simplicity of dress, unpretentiousness, and military courage: "the first into battle and the last to leave it." ⁵¹ Interestingly, this narrative in its content and structure is essentially a translation from the work of the Roman historian Titus Livy, in which the latter characterizes the Carthage commander Hannibal. ⁵²

The glorification of the hetman is further developed in the *Velychko Chronicle*. Its author also sees him as Moses who led his people out of captivity. ⁵³ For Samiilo Velychko, Khmel'nyts'kyi's death is not just an ordinary event; it is a tragedy that opened a new page in the country's history: "[Khmel'nyts'kyi died] leaving the machine of war to his successors, the Cossack hetmans, and great sorrow to the whole of Ukraine, orphaned by him." ⁵⁴ The apotheosis of the glorification of the hetman in Velychko's text is the eulogy of Samiilo Zorka: "he has died, under whom the ancient rights and liberties of Ukrainians and the whole Zaporozhian Host did not die ... our beloved leader, the ancient Rus' Odoacer, the famous Skanderbeg ..." ⁵⁵

The tradition of glorifying Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi in historical writing continued throughout the eighteenth century. While the authors of the Cossack chronicles in their assessments of his activity gave him credit for accepting the protection of the Muscovite tsar, which was instrumental in the preservation of their rights and liberties, the representative of another camp of Cossack intellectuals, Pylyp Orlyk, saw in him, apart from other things, a supporter of Ukraine's Swedish orientation. ⁵⁶

According to the tradition begun by the Cossack chronicles, Khmel'nyts'kyi continues to be called Moses in later works as well – for example, in the drama *Divine Grace (Mylost' Bozhiiia, 1728)*. ⁵⁷ Or he is associated with ancient heroes: "Famous hero and faithful protector of Rus' our fatherland, true heir of Mars, a renowned Cossack, akin to Achilles," wrote the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy professor Hnat Buzanovs'kyi in his Latin poem in 1729. ⁵⁸ In the post-Poltava period, the Khmel'nyts'kyi cult was of special significance in contrasting him to Mazepa as traitor. He was meant to demonstrate the legitimacy of the Hetmanate as a state entity through the glorification of its founder. ⁵⁹

The assessment of other figures in the works of Cossack historiography often depended on the author's subjective preferences. For example, the negative image

of Mazepa usually associated with his campaign against Peter, was associated with something very different in Velychko's chronicle: Mazepa, "the sly Machiavelli," was the enemy of Kochubei, Velychko's patron and protector. The *Hrabianka* and *Eyewitness* chronicles basically took a neutral stand on Khmel'nyts'kyi. It is interesting to note that in the three classic Cossack chronicles Mazepa is portrayed as a representative of the "ancient Ukrainian nobility," and "an important Cossack-Rus' nobleman."⁶⁰ Later, however, it became the tradition to bill Mazepa as a "native Polish nobleman" in order to dissociate the Little Russian people from his action.⁶¹ This fact, as well as the restriction of information about Mazepa, was part of a conscious construction by the authors of the past, ridding it of all narratives that were "inconvenient" for the new ideology.

We also find subjectivity in the chronicles with respect to other historical figures or social groups. The "Eyewitness", in contrast to, for example, Velychko, who regarded the Zaporozhians as "the source and affirmation of the honor and age-old glory of other Ukrainian-Little Russian town military forces," was more sympathetic toward the elite.⁶² This is evident throughout the whole text of his chronicle. The Zaporozhian Sich is listed among the antiheroes as a destructive element. The elite-oriented position of Rakushka-Romanovs'kyi is especially clear in the narrative of the *Black Council* (*Chorna Rada*), which was later used by Panteleimon Kulish in his famous novel of the same name. In the conflict between the representatives of the elite, Somko and Zolotarenko, and Briukhovets'kyi as the representative of the *holota* (landless peasants), Rakushka-Romanovs'kyi is on the side of the former and condemns the *holota* as guilty of bloodshed.⁶³ Although he does speak with praise about Briukhovets'kyi later, which is explained by the simple fact that during the latter's hetmancy, Rakushka-Romanovs'kyi attained the height of his career in the post of general vice-treasurer. The characterization of the actions of Hetman Demian Mnohohrishnyi, during whose hetmancy Rakushka-Romanovs'kyi's career essentially came to an end, is replete with negative assessments. As Iaroslav Dzyra observes, the author raked up all the hetman's faults and sins and described them in detail.⁶⁴

An equally unfavorable evaluation was meted out to Mnohohrishnyi's successor, Hetman Ivan Samoilovych, who was accused by the author of arrogance, greed, and love of power. In addition, the latter was the "son of a priest," that is, of non-Cossack stock, which automatically nullified his prestige in the eyes of the Cossack chronicler. In the opinion of Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, the author of the *Eyewitness Chronicle* described those historical figures in negative terms who had already left the historical stage and posed no real threat to him.⁶⁵

On the other hand, in Hrabianka's account, hetmans Samoilovych and Mnohohrishnyi, along with Vasyli' Zolotarenko and Iakym Somko, appear as idealized

embodiments of good – in contrast to Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, and Ivan Briukhovets'kyi.

Velychko treats the era of Ivan Vyhovs'kyi as the beginning of the dramatic period of the Ruin and devotes a whole chapter to the hetman, “Iziavlenie o Vyhovskom” (Report about Vyhovs'kyi),⁶⁶ which is basically the hetman's biography, written quite vividly and not without humor. Velychko condemns both Vyhovs'kyi for his reckless policies, which led to bloodshed, and the implacable stand of his enemy, Poltava Colonel Martyn Pushkar. Negativity also dominates in the characterizations of Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, the “two-faced” Ivan Briukhovets'kyi, and Ivan Samoilovych because of his pride and arrogance. As the source for the biography of Samoilovych, Velychko uses an anonymous poem mocking the hetman, which he includes in his work. Ivan Sirko, on the other hand, is presented as a strikingly positive figure in the *Velychko Chronicle*, which can be explained by the author's special affinity for Zaporozhians.

Hetman Petro Doroshenko's figure is usually devoid of sympathy in the texts of the Cossack narratives. The reason for this was his alliance with the *busurmany* (infidels). Also associated with his name were the pillaging campaigns of the Turks in Podilia and the Chyhyryn wars. However, it is worth citing an example that illustrates how a new image of the hetman is constructed under the influence of subjective factors. I have in mind the *Lyzohub Chronicle* (1742).⁶⁷ Its author reworked the basic source texts that contained a negative image of Doroshenko and removed the negative associations with the hetman or significantly softened their tone. For example, the *Lyzohub Chronicle* copied verbatim from a primary text the story of the capture of Kamianets by the Turks, in which Doroshenko had a hand, but omitted the following episode: “where in the presence of Doroshenko dead bodies were cast out of their graves and the streets were paved with icons for the entrance of the sultan.”⁶⁸ The episode about Doroshenko's participation in the reprisals by the Turks against the residents of Uman and others is omitted.⁶⁹ This kind of “whitewashing” of Petro Doroshenko in the *Lyzohub Chronicle* becomes understandable in light of the close family connections of the Lyzohub family with the hetman.⁷⁰

The Cossack chronicles portray monarchs, be they Russian or Polish, in a uniformly positive light, and even Turkish sultans are generally presented in the texts in a neutral light.⁷¹ The Russian tsars and emperors were sovereigns in relation to the Cossacks, so that the latter's loyal attitude to them was perfectly understandable. For their part, the Polish kings, starting with Casimir the Great, were seen by the Cossack authors as the granters and guarantors of their rights and liberties and were always “above the fray.” Thus the Cossacks waged war not against the kings, but against the magnates and nobility, whose activity contravened the will

of the monarchs, who were favorably disposed toward the Cossacks. Many works, including the Hrabianka and “Eyewitness” accounts, include a narrative about the charter of Władysław IV, which dealt notably with Cossack liberties, which, according to the king, the Cossacks “can secure from the Poles with weapons.”⁷² Interestingly, even the king’s presence at the head of the Polish army ranged against the Cossacks was not regarded by their ideologues in negative terms. The king was obliged to do so as the head of state. The *Velychko Chronicle* contains similar stories about two kings from the times of the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising – Władysław IV and John Casimir.⁷³

By the same token, the policies of Russian government officials were not associated by the Cossack authors with the will and intentions of the monarch when it came to the rule of the voivodes or the lawlessness of the Little Russian Collegium.⁷⁴ Instead, they variously underscored the monarchs’ sympathies for the Cossack people. Thus, writing about the death of Tsar Fedor Alekseevich, the *Eyewitness Chronicle* noted that “he had love for our people, [he sanctioned] our melodies for church songs, he revoked [the wearing] of Muscovite attire but permitted us to wear our own style.”⁷⁵ But the “darling” of Cossack historiography was, unquestionably, Elizaveta Petrovna. “Almighty God especially endowed this monarch with moral virtues, enriched her with a fervent love for piety” wrote Hryhorii Pokas.⁷⁶ The empress earned this praise for liquidating the Little Russian Collegium, giving permission to elect the hetman, and also for her sympathy toward the fatherland of her husband, Oleksii Rozumovs’kyi.

On the whole, however, in the second half of the eighteenth century, Cossack intellectuals were inclined to imagine the Russian tsars as joint rulers of a kind of Russian-Ukrainian Commonwealth. This attitude can be seen most clearly in the *Conversation of Great Russia with Little Russia*: “Not to you. To your Tsar I submitted, / Under which [tsars] you were born of your ancestors. / Do not think that you alone are my ruler, / Your Tsar and mine is our joint sovereign. / And the difference between us is in the names we were given. / You are [known as] Great, and I am [known as] Little [Russia].”⁷⁷

The eighteenth-century authors shifted all the responsibility for the consequences of imperial rule from the monarchs to their close associates; it was the latter who were to blame for everything bad. Among the figures that stood out in this group were Aleksandr Menshikov and Burkhard Christoph von Münnich. The first, the “tsar’s courtier” and “our Ukrainian fatherland’s ill-wisher,” was regarded as practically the chief enemy of Cossack rights and privileges, a view offered, in particular, by the authors of the *Brief Description of Little Russia* and the *Chernihiv Chronicle*.⁷⁸ His fall and death were greeted by them with joy. “He was insatiable, but, they say, he ended his life in a hut, in cold Beriozovo, and his body

occupied only a *sazhen* [seven feet] of land. And that, in depth,”⁷⁹ wrote the author of the *Lyzohub Chronicle* sarcastically. Field Marshal Münnich’s negative image was associated with his contempt for the Cossack military units in the Russo-Turkish war, an important event for Cossack authors in creating the heroic past of the Hetmanate. Hryhorii Pokas boiled down his main charge against Münnich to the latter’s “malicious hatred of the Little Russian people.” Because of it, according to the author, Münnich inflicted many wrongs on Ukrainians, and especially the Cossacks that fought under his banners. The field marshal refused altogether to regard the latter as a military force, and forced them to serve his soldiers as bath attendants or cooks, persecuted them in ways “that the captives of the infidels themselves never suffer,” and at the height of military operations sent them into the most dangerous sectors to certain death.⁸⁰

“Others” in the Hetmanate’s Historical Narratives

The authors of Cossack chronicles were aware of their difference from representatives of other ethnic groups; the texts contained an image of each of these groups that probably coincided with the perception of the respective ethnicity in eighteenth-century Ukrainian society. The image of “others” in narrative texts was not confined to a simple reflection of this reception. This construct was one of the most important elements in shaping an own identity. This is because awareness of oneself as a community is based not only on myths and historical memory but also on stereotyping the images of “others,” projecting ideas, values, and concepts of oneself, objectifying one’s own virtues and flaws, and shaping identity by rejecting negative features, which are attributed to “others.”⁸¹ The latter play the role of a factor of unity of the “we-group” – an imaginary community that strives to identify itself by setting itself apart from the “they-group.”⁸²

The texts of the historical narratives created in the Hetmanate distinguish several ethnic groups that are most relevant to the defined authors’ goals: Poles, Russians, and Jews, and also the Turks and Tatars. The order in which these ethnic groups are mentioned coincides approximately with the frequency with which they are mentioned in the texts, as well as with the principle of decreasing tolerance toward their representatives.

Russians. Mentions of Russians as representatives of a separate ethnos appear rarely in the texts. There are several instances of such designations as “people of the Muscovite nation,” “Muscovite” (*moskovytianyn*), “Muscovites” (*moskali*), “Moscow” (*Moskva*) and also derivatives of the latter – “Muscovite clothes,” or even “cursed abusively in the Muscovite manner.”⁸³ They occur mostly in episodes that describe events in the second half of the seventeenth century. Closer to the end

of the century, as well as in stories of the eighteenth century, the ethnonyms “Great Russians” and “Russians” come into use.⁸⁴ The ethnonym *moskali* now loses its neutral meaning and takes on a negative sense or demeaning status. Its use is mainly associated with documents of an anti-imperial bent, for example, the universals of the “Tatar” hetman, Petryk Ivanenko.⁸⁵ Then again, the description of the joint siege of the Turkish fortress of Kazy-Kermen (1695) in the *Velychko Chronicle* is accompanied by the remark that in addition to the Cossacks, “our brothers the *moskali*” took part in the operation.⁸⁶

The insignificant number of examples in Ukrainian texts of a purely ethnic perception of their northeastern neighbor is explained by the preponderance of the concept of them as representatives of the state. It is in this aspect that they most often appear in the narratives – as voivodes, imperial officials, or soldiers in the garrisons and armies that take part in joint campaigns. In the latter case, there is a clear distinction between “we” – the “Cossack/Little Russian host,” “our army,” and “they” – the “Muscovite,” “Great Russian,” and “the tsar’s” forces. However, to set off the Turkish-Tatar threat, designations of “our troops” are also used to distinguish themselves and their allies.⁸⁷ For nonmilitary designations, the chronicle authors used categories based on the principles of subordination. Thence “we” – those who inhabit the territory of the autonomy, the Hetmanate, “people from the hetman’s regiment,” and “they” – “the sovereign’s people,” “the tsar’s people,” who belong to a different system of subordination.

The perception of Moscow and the Muscovite Tsardom as a state ranges from neutral to negative.⁸⁸ The events that take place inside the Muscovite realm – uprisings, change of rulers – are of interest to the Cossack authors primarily in the context of the history of their own fatherland.⁸⁹ The first mentions in the Cossack chronicles of the Muscovite Tsardom are recorded in stories about Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's foreign policy activities. Here the empire is the “ancestral land” of the tsar, to whom the hetman is prepared to swear loyalty. In Pylyp Orlyk's *Constitution* (1710), the monarch himself is inviolable, but his state, Muscovy, is often portrayed in a negative context. It is the state, not its ruler, that is to blame for the oppressed condition of the autonomy: “The Muscovite state attempted by many ingenious means to weaken and utterly destroy the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host that it itself had confirmed and to place the yoke of slavery on the free Cossack people whom it itself had never subdued by force of arms.”⁹⁰ Extremely negative designations are associated with the Muscovite tsardom: “Muscovite yoke,” “Muscovite slavery,” “Muscovite bondage.”⁹¹

The distinguishing feature of the perception of Russians in comparison with other ethnic groups, lies, above all, in a low level of enmity toward them as professors of the same faith and subjects of a joint state. Moreover, the negative char-

acteristics of specific individuals are not extrapolated to the whole. The sketchy familiarity with their neighbors can be explained by the relatively short period of common history and the restriction of contacts between the two peoples. For the residents and authors of the Hetmanate, the image of Russians was mediated by the state – the Muscovite Tsardom, the Russian Empire – which exerted substantial influence on the structures of the autonomy in a short period of time. Consequently, the narratives contain by far more collective images of representatives of this state: voivodes, imperial officials, and courtiers. These images were offset by the monarch, whose reception was based on Orthodoxy and the vision of him as a sovereign and guarantor of rights and liberties. At their core also lay the “Little Russian concept,” based on the idea of Great Russia and Little Russia as equal entities, united by the rule of a common monarch.⁹² For the contemporary Hetmanate elite, this concept was a kind of manifestation of multiple loyalty, impossible in the age of nationalism, which in the eighteenth century combined the struggle for autonomous rights and loyalty to the monarch.

Poles. The Poles are the ethnic group that appears most frequently in the texts of the historical narratives. This is not only a matter of Poland bordering directly on the Hetmanate, or of the coexistence of Ukrainians and Poles within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Poland and the Poles/Liakhys were the most “convenient” “others” for constructing an own Cossack identity.⁹³ The war against the Poles was the main subject of Cossack chronicles. Among its main results, the authors saw the “liberation of the Ukrainian/Little Russian people from under the yoke [of enslavement]” and the birth of a new state. Building on this thesis, it is possible to trace the subsequent efforts of intellectuals to legitimize both the war itself and the new sociopolitical reality in the former southeastern territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that emerged after the war’s end. The authors of the historical narratives recognized that military action against the king and state was nonetheless a crime. Therefore, it was necessary to justify not only the reasons for the war but the right to wage the war itself. This could be done by making use of, among other things, various negative images of Poles as “others,” whom “we,” endowed with positive characteristics, antithetical to the flaws that are attributed to opponents or enemies, opposed.

In the period when the Cossack chronicles were written – from the end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth centuries – the real-life image of the Pole as enemy, as Nataliia Iakovenko has underscored, was already obsolete and had already moved into the realm of memories and symbols. The reflections of immediate postwar generations had not yet turned into myth, and, at the same time, stripped of their personal emotions, they reflected the context of their time.⁹⁴ The genesis of the conflict with the Poles, in the opinion of the Cossack

authors, lay in the distant past. According to the *Velychko Chronicle*, in the ethno-genetic myth, the Poles and the Rus' had a common origin.⁹⁵ The subsequent interpretation of this myth included Biblical connotations that contributed to the emergence of the "Cain image" of Poles.⁹⁶ According to this image, the Poles betrayed their blood brothers and began to enslave and kill them, which was equivalent to Cain's action against Abel.⁹⁷

Thus, in the intellectual tradition of the beginning of the eighteenth century, the myth of the Polish betrayal embedded the Polish-Cossack conflict in the traditional Biblical symbol of fratricide, to which the Cossack chronicles, consciously changing the Biblical connotation, added the prospect of inevitable retribution.⁹⁸ According to the Cossack chronicles, this retribution upon the Poles and their state was the series of wars and civil strife that enveloped the Commonwealth in the second half of the seventeenth century. And the myth of betrayal, of "betrayed brotherhood," after taking on additional elements, became the dominant idea in the perception of the Poles, reinforcing the justification of the right to a just war. It had a dual influence on the construction of the image of the Poles.⁹⁹ On the one hand, the Cossack authors looked for a point of contact with this image in order to demonstrate kinship and equality, and, on the other hand, they fashioned antagonistic positions that proved betrayal.

Most substantially represented in the texts, Poland and the Poles were already regarded as a "foreign land" in the eighteenth century, with a rather limited range of relations with the Hetmanate and its population, and past enmity in this population's everyday consciousness had lost its relevance.¹⁰⁰ But there existed a narrative image that promoted the crystallization of an imaginary polity of a "Cossack Little Russian people." This people, in contrast to the Catholic Poles, defended Orthodoxy and opposed the expansion of the Catholic "schism" and Uniatism. The negative characteristics of the Poles were contrasted with the positive characteristics of the collective "we." At the same time, the texts made a distinction between the concepts of "Poles" and "Poland." Poland as the image of a legitimate state, together with its monarch, was one of the sources and guarantors of Cossack rights and liberties, a category that was either neutral or positive in the value judgments.

Jews. Two factors were at the heart of the negative attitude to the Jews. They were not Christians, which in the mind of a person of the early modern period was in itself a crime. Also, the Jews were most often the leaseholders and owners of taverns and were therefore accused of the financial exploitation of the local population. It should be noted that at the time of the writing of the Cossack chronicles, there were practically no Jews left in the Hetmanate. A large portion of them had perished or immigrated to the Right Bank – territory belonging to the Commonwealth. Those who remained were forced to leave the Cossack au-

tonomies of the Russian Empire pursuant to the decrees of Peter I and Catherine I. Eventually, thanks to hetmans Ivan Skoropads'kyi and Danylo Apostol, the Jews were permitted limited entry into the territory of the Hetmanate in order to attend fairs and engage in wholesale trade. In the eighteenth century, Jewish commercial settlements also existed on the territory of the Zaporozhian Sich.¹⁰¹ It is important to note that by the end of the seventeenth century, during the period of the stabilization of the Ukrainian Cossack state that began to emerge during the hetmanacies of Ivan Samoilovych, and especially Ivan Mazepa, Jews started to occupy a leading place in its hierarchy. The influential *starshyna* clans of the Markovyches and Hertsyks, who were members of the highest administrative elite of the Hetmanate, were of Jewish descent.

The Jewish narrative, as a rule, did not stand alone in the historical texts of the time but always appeared in the context of the causes triggering the beginning of Khmel'nyts'kyi's war. In the version of the Cossack chroniclers, the Poles and Jews united in order to destroy the Orthodox people. Toward this end, the Poles placed them in slavery to the Jews, and the Jews, taking advantage of their power, mercilessly exploited the local population, imposing various levies on it and inventing new forms of imposts for personal gain. "The Jews were always devising new taxes and all the Cossack estates were encumbered," notes the *Hrabianka Chronicle*, for example.¹⁰²

Another popular subject in the texts of the early modern period was the narrative about "church keys," which were allegedly held by the Jews, so that in order to hold a service, the Orthodox community had to ask their permission. In Zenon Kohut's opinion, this story and anti-Jewish rhetoric as a whole found their way into Cossack historical writing from seventeenth-century Polish works.¹⁰³

In the texts of the chronicles, Jews are not only exploiters but also victims. The authors of the Cossack narratives report with detachment the destruction of Jewish communities in Nemyriv, Bar, and other cities. At the same time, they cite examples of fierce resistance by Jews who found themselves in the besieged cities as evidence of the perfidy of the Poles, who often handed over Jews to be massacred in order to save their own lives. Earlier works of Cossack chronicle writing, produced at the end of the seventeenth century, contained elements of condemnation of the actions of the Cossacks and other participants in the war. While applauding the goals of the uprising, the authors of the *Eyewitness*, *Lviv*, and *Dvorets'kyi* Chronicles characterize the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising as a war of "all against all," whose victims were the representatives of all estates and ethnic groups that then inhabited the territory of Ukraine.

In dealing with the sources of the Ukrainian image of Jews, it is worth underscoring that only isolated narratives can be deemed to be eyewitness accounts. Most Ukrainian authors who lived and wrote in the eighteenth century by then

knew about Jews only from rumors. For the most part, the anti-Jewish narratives were adapted by the Ukrainian authors from the Polish historiographic tradition. The Polish authors of the second half of the seventeenth century, in particular the works of Samuel Grondski (*Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, 1670s) and Paweł Ruszel (*Fawor Niebieski*, 1649), trying to make sense of the reasons for such a large-scale civil war, which resulted in such famous events as the Swedish Deluge and the deadly war with the Muscovite Tsardom, lay the blame for this primarily on the Jews, whose economic activity led to an explosion of social and political conflict.¹⁰⁴

Turks and Tatars (*Muslims*) incur the greatest degree of intolerance among the other ethnic groups present in the historical narratives. The Turkish-Tatar world was seen as hostile and at the same time mysterious by the Cossack authors. This was the world into which thousands of captives disappeared and which was the source of permanent danger, a symbol of devastation and suffering. Often, in order to accentuate the negative image of a historical figure (Doroshenko, Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi), it was reported that he had had friendly relations with Muslims, with whom an alliance was regarded as unnatural. As the *Eyewitness Chronicle* noted: "As precarious as the friendship between wolf and ram, so is [the friendship] between Christian and Muslim."¹⁰⁵ An exception was made only for Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, who concluded an alliance with the Tatars for the sake of a holy mission: the consolidation of the rights and liberties of the Cossacks and the Little Russian people. Another characteristic trait of the Tatars in this context was treachery and perfidy, for it was because of the betrayal of the Crimean Tatars that the Cossacks lost many profitable prospects.

The image of the population of the Hetmanate as a European, Christian people, the defender of Christianity was crafted with the help of the chroniclers' representation of the Muslim world. The attitude toward the Turks and Tatars in the historical texts was formed within the framework of a frontier discourse, in which they were the enemies of Christianity, and the Cossack Little Russian people were the obstacle on their path. It served as the basis for constructing binary oppositions, which were divided along the lines of religion and national affiliation. The existence of this discourse left little opportunity for the creation of at least a neutral image in contrast to portraying them as enemies. Only infrequently was this image toned down to justify certain foreign policy actions by the leaders of the Hetmanate.



The described markers in the texts are indivisible and interpenetrable; each of them reveals a certain aspect of the identity that characterizes the polity of the “Cossack Little Russian people/nation.” Thereby confirming its right to be equal to other ethnic groups and states in the region, and, at the same time, endowing this polity with unique characteristics that distinguish it from others. Each marker is a “brick” that together with other bricks create its whole image.

Thus, when speaking of ethnogenetic quests in the narrative texts of the Hetmanate, it is worth asking: What made the Khazar myth appealing to the creators of the Cossack chronicles? The historical narratives of the seventeenth century, particularly church and monastic chronicles, were aimed at constructing a dynastic model of the historical process. This was seen as the sequential change of ruling dynasties – first, Kyivan, then Lithuanian, then Polish, and finally, Muscovite – in the ancestral land. The people moved voluntarily under the rule of various new rulers who in return guaranteed them their rights and liberties. The intellectuals of the end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth centuries did not find an autochthonic history in this process – namely, the history of the Hetmanate. That was the reason for the emergence of Khazarism, which asserted that the Cossacks-Khazars had their own ancient dynasty of khagans, and that they adopted Christianity from Byzantium long before the Lithuanians, Poles, and Muscovites.¹⁰⁶ In light of this, the readers of eighteenth-century chronicles were meant to believe that the “Little Russian Cossack people” had a right to political autonomy – the “rights and liberties” secured in bilateral agreements with the Polish and Russian monarchs.

With the help of the territorial marker, the historical narratives constructed an image of an “own” land, which unified in itself the ancestral home, which was indissolubly linked with the ethnogenetic myth, Rus' as the historical territory, and the Hetmanate proper. This was the space inhabited by the “Cossack Little Russian people/nation” or its ancestors which, ultimately, legitimized the existence of this polity. The categories “own land” or “land of the ancestors” invariably intersect with the characteristics of the ethnic groups that unjustly rule or claim certain territories.

The creation of binary contrasts to characterize “own” and “foreign” is one of the elements in the construction of identity in the historical narratives of the Hetmanate. With the help of the image of “others,” their authors sought to create a positive portrait of their own polity. Its dominant idea is the image of the “people-martyr,” oppressed by the Poles, “the servants of the pharaoh,” “savage” Tatars, and even Jews, “a people that stands lower than all others,” which, in the end, legitimized the war against them. It should also be noted that the subject of war as

such, which dominates in the historical narratives of the Hetmanate, imposes a certain impression on the image of this polity. It is subordinated in much to the frontier discourse, which is embodied in the contrast with “others” – in military, confessional, ethnic, political, and social aspects.

At the same time, the confessional component of identity helped to establish its uniqueness not only with regard to the Catholics and Muslims but also to the Muscovite Orthodox. Despite the shared religious space with the Muscovite Tsardom, the Cossack authors did not consider Orthodoxy as a factor in unity with the Muscovites, and the only unifying factor they recognized was the Orthodox monarch, who was to be the guarantor of their “rights and liberties.” The image of the state, the Russian Empire, embodied in the reception and characterization of certain figures and institutions, whose activity opposed traditional “rights and liberties,” was counterposed by their own polity – the Zaporozhian Host/Hetmanate with all its attributes of statehood.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Skorupsky

NOTES

This an updated version of the article published as: Andrii Bovhyria, “Kozat-s'ke istoriopysannia: viziiia mynuloho i konstruiuvannia identychnosti v Het'manshchyni XVII-XVIII st.,” in *Ukraïns'ka derzhava druhoï polovyny XVII–XVIII st.: polityka, suspil'stvo, kul'tura*, ed. Valerii Smolii (Kyiv, 2014), 586–628. Copyright 2014 by NASU Institute of History of Ukraine. Translated and reprinted with permission.

- 1 The work covers the period from “Khazar” times to 1709. Its main focus of attention is on the description of the Khmel'nyts'kyi era and the events of the second half of the seventeenth century. There are two known redactions of the work (short and long) and more than 60 manuscript copies. The authorship of the long version is traditionally attributed to Hadiach colonel Hryhorii Hrabianka (?–1738). There currently exist five editions of this work. It was first published in 1793. Fedor Tumanskii, “Letopisets Malyia Rossii,” *Rossiiskii Magazin*, no. 2 (1793): 17–108, 209–30, 366–88; no. 3 (1793): 54–73, 75–76, 125–26, 205–36, 280–311, 436–39. In 1990, the Harvard Institute of Ukrainian Studies published a facsimile edition of the work from the manuscript copies of both versions, as well as the printed editions of 1793 and 1854, see Hryhorii Hrabianka, *The Great War of Bohdan Xmel'nyts'kyi*, ed. Yuri Lutsenko (Cambridge, MA, 1991).

- 2 "Historiia" H. Hrabianky. *Litopis kratkii*, comp. Viktor Moisiienko (Zhytomyr, 2001), 45.
- 3 On Sarmatism as an ethnogenetic concept and nobiliary ideology, see Tadeusz Ulewicz, *Sarmacja. Studium z problematyki słowianskiej w XV-XVI w.* (Cracow, 1950), 18–19; Stanisław Cynarski, "Sarmatyzm – ideologia i styl życia," in *Polska XVII w.: państwo, społeczeństwo, kultura* (Warsaw, 1969), 247; Oleksii Kresin, "Ukraïns'kyi sarmatyzm," in *Mala entsyklopediia etn-oderzhavoznavstva*, ed. Iurii Rymarenko (Kyiv, 1996), 136; Janusz Tazbir, "Sarmatyzm a barok," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 4 (1969): 817–18, 826.
- 4 Iryna Zhylenko, "Teoriia: khazary-kozary-kozaky v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafii XVII–pochatku XVIII st.," in *Synopsis Kyivs'kyi. Lavrs'kyi al'manakh*, comp. Iryna Zhylenko (Kyiv, 2002), 170.
- 5 In anticipation of possible objections to the paradox of the Cossacks adopting Khazarism as an ethnogenetic myth, it should be noted that its initiator and adherent was unlikely to have known that the Khazar khagans had converted to Judaism in the seventh century. Moreover, the fact that the Khazars adopted this religion remains open to debate. See, for example, Shaul Stampfer, "Naskol'ko khazary byli iudeiamy," in *Nauchnye trudy po iudaïke. Materialy XVIII Mezhdunarodnoi ezhegodnoi konferentsii po iudaïke*, 2 vols (Moscow, 2011), 2:9–68.
- 6 Ioanykii Haliatovs'kyi, *Kliuch rozuminnia* (Kyiv, 1985), 345.
- 7 Serhii Plokhyy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 341–2; Iaroslav Zatyliuk, "Predky 'kozats'koho malorosii's'koho narodu' i kyievo-rus'ka spadshchyna v uiavlenni elity chasiv Pylypa Orlyka," in *Pylyp Orlyk: zhyttia, polityka, teksty. Materialy Mizhnarodnoi naukovoï konferentsii do 300-richchia Benders'koï konstyuttsii 1710 r.* (Kyiv, 2011), 131.
- 8 Andrii Bovgyria, "'Litopys Hrabianky': pytannia pershoosnovy," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 4 (2003): 75–88.
- 9 [Dmitrii Rostovskii (Tuptalo)], *Kniga zhitii sviatykh vo slavu Sviatyia Zhyvotvoriashchiiia Troitsina tri mesiatsi –mart, april', mai* (Kyiv, 1700), 541.
- 10 Maciej Strykowski, *Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkiej Rusi*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1846), 121.
- 11 Ibid., 121.
- 12 Samoil Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 4 vols (Kyiv, 1848–64), 4:appendix, vi. Samiilo Velychko is the author of a monumental narrative describing the events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The original text is held in St Petersburg (Manuscripts Department

of the National Library of Russia, f. 558 [Manuscript Collection of Mikhail Pogodin], 2020/1–3). There exists a single copy of this work, made in the 1760s–1770s (*Instytut rukopysu Natsional'noi biblioteky Ukraïny im. V.I. Vernads'koho* [Manuscript Institute of the National Library of Ukraine; hereinafter – IR NBU], f. VIII, 154/153). The work has been published three times: Samoil Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 4 vols (Kyiv, 1848–1864); Samuil Velichko, *Skazanie o voine kazatskoi s poliakami* (Kyiv, 1926); and a Ukrainian translation, see Samiilo Velychko, *Litopys*, trans. by Valerii Shevchuk, 2 vols (Kyiv, 1991).

- 13 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:81–2.
- 14 Ibid., 1:291–2.
- 15 Ibid., 2:83.
- 16 *Dohovory i postanovy*, comp. by Oleksandr Alf'orov (Kyiv, 2010), 20–2.
- 17 *Nauchno-issledovatel'skii otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi biblioteki* (Scientific Research Department of Manuscripts of the Russian State Library; hereinafter – NIOR RGB), f. 99, no. 552, l. 144 ob.–147 (“Skazanie o Maloi Rossii o bedstvakh ee byvshikh,” author Maksym Plyska [1763]); IR NBU, f. viii, no. 216/199, l. 108 (“Geroichni virshy o slavykh deistviiakh zaporozhtsev” [1780-e gg.]); Andrii Bovgyria, *Kozats'ke istoriopysannia v rukopysnii tradytsii XVIII st. Spysky ta redaktsii tvoriv* (Kyiv, 2010), 106–21; Nikolai Petrov, “‘Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei’ (Literaturnyi pamiatnik vtoroi poloviny XVIII veka),” *Kievskaiia starina* 1 (1882): 325.
- 18 Aleksandr Rigel'man, *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii i ee narode i kazakakh voobshche* (Moscow, 1847), 1–2, 5–7. By “Little Russian history, written by an unknown person” the author meant the *Hrabianka Chronicle*, the majority of the transcriptions of which are anonymous.
- 19 *Ustnoe povestvovanie byvshego zaporozhtsa Nikity Leont'evicha Korzha* (Odesa, 1842), 10.
- 20 *Letopis' Grigoriia Grabianky* (Kyiv, 1854), 142.
- 21 *Dohovory i postanovy*, 21.
- 22 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 2:348.
- 23 Ibid., 1:82.
- 24 *Letopis' Grigoriia Grabianky*, 18; Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:307.
- 25 Ibid., 1:20–1. See also *Letopis' Grigoriia Grabianky*, 21–2.
- 26 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:83. In documents from the end of the seventeenth century the Sich is sometimes called the “Cossack capital,” “our Zaporozhian capital, from whence our ancestors gained glory,” see *Universalnyi ukrains'kykh het'maniv vid Ivana Vyhovs'koho do*

- Ivan Samoilovycha (1657–1687)*, ed. Ivan Butych et al. (Kyiv-Lviv, 2004), 302; *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, 5:144.
- 27 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:171.
 - 28 Natalia M. Iakovenko, *Dzerkala identychnosti: doslidzhennia z istorii uiaavlennia idei v Ukraïni XVI – pochatku XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 2012), 28.
 - 29 *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1953), 2:365.
 - 30 *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, 14:176–7. In Zenon Kohut's opinion, Khmel'nyts'kyi's concept of the former Rus' in the context of the prospect of expanding the Hetmanate was a component of his "Rus'/Ruthenian plan," which he was forced to abandon after the defeat at Berestechko in 1651, see Zenon E. Kohut, "Mazepa's Ukraine: Understanding Cossack Territorial Vistas," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 31, no. 1/4 (2009–2010): 3–4.
 - 31 Kohut, "Mazepa's Ukraine," 2.
 - 32 See *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, ed. Ivan Kryp'iakevych and Ivan Butych (Kyiv, 1961), 130; *Universal Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho, 1648–1657*, ed. Ivan Kryp'iakevych and Ivan Butych (Kyiv, 1998), 56. The "Zboriv border of Ukraine" is also dealt with in the letter of Hetman Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, see *Istochniki Malorossiiskoi istorii*, ed. D.N. Bantsh-Kamenskii and O. Bodianskii, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1858): 123–4.
 - 33 Tat'iana Tairova-Iakovleva, "Predstavleniia o granitsakh Ukrainskogo Getmanstva u kazatskoi starshiny serediny XVII veka," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 49, no. 1–2 (2015): 295.
 - 34 Frank E. Sysyn, "Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture," in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: storia, cultura, società*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria, 2004), 47.
 - 35 The *Eyewitness Chronicle* covers the period from 1648 to 1702. Written in the 1670s, it is valuable primarily for the author's reception of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising and the subsequent Ruin – the civil war in the Hetmanate. The author is Roman Rakushka-Romanovs'kyi. There exist three publications of the text: *Letopis' Samovidtsa o voynakh Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo i mezhdousobiakh, byvshikh v Maloi Rossii po ego smerti: Dovedena prodolzhateliami do 1734 goda*, ed. P. Kulesh and O. Bodianskii (Moscow, 1846); *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytykh spiskam*, ed. Orest Levyts'kyi and Stepan Lukomskii (Kyiv, 1878); *Litopys Samovydtisia*, ed. Iaroslav Dzyra (Kyiv, 1971). The *Dvoret's'kyi Chronicle* covers the period from 1340 to 1672. It was probably written by the Kyiv colonel Vasyli Dvoret's'kyi (1609–1672?). The text is part of a manuscript collection compiled in the first half of the 1670s that also contains other important materials on the history of Ukraine: *Navity* – a polemical work

created between 1667 and 1671; an unknown version of Afanasii Fylypovych's *Diariush*; a historico-political treatise titled *Warning to Ukraine* (1669); copies of various documents, notes, and maxims in Ukrainian, Polish, and Latin, and so forth. The *Dvoret's'kyi Chronicle* was published by Iurii Mytsyk in 1984. See Iurii Mytsyk, "Letopisets' Dvoret'skikh – pamiatnik ukrainskogo letopisaniia XVII v.," *Letopisi i khroniki. 1984* (Moscow, 1984): 219–34.

36 IR NBU, f. 310, no. 34, ark. 155.

37 *Dohovory i postanovy*, 41.

38 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:127.

39 *Ibid.*, 2:375.

40 Dzyra, ed., *Litopys Samovydsia*, 53, 70, 82.

41 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:164.

42 Vladimir Antonovich, "Neizvestnyi dosele getman i ego prikaz," *Kievskaiia starina* 5 (1883): 141.

43 "Povesto tom chto sluchilos na Ukraine s toia pory, kak ona Litvoiu zavladena," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete*, no. 5 (1848), 10.

44 *Kratkoe istoricheskoe opisanie o Maloi Rossii do 1765 goda, z dopolnieniem o zaporozhskikh kozakakh i prilozheniiami, kasaiushchimisia do sего opisaniiia*, comp. O. Bodianskii (Moscow, 1848), 3.

45 *Nauchno-issledovatel'skii otdel rukopisei Biblioteki Rossiiskoi akademii nauk* (Department of Manuscripts of the Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences; hereinafter – NIOR BRAN), 24.3.96, l. 2 ob.

46 *Ibid.*, l. 3.

47 Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 348.

48 Vladimir Peretts, "K istorii Kievo-Mogilianskoi akademii. Panegiriki i stikhi B. Khmel'nyts'komu, I. Podkove i arkh. Lazariu Baranovichu," *Chteniia v istoricheskome obshchestve Nestora-Letopistsa* 14, no. 1 (1900): 11–16.

49 *Letopis' Grigoriia Grabianky*, 1–2.

50 *Ibid.*, 153.

51 *Ibid.* See also Frank E. Sysyn, "A Man Worthy of the Name 'Hetman': The Fashioning of Khmel'nyts'kyi as a Hero in the Hrabianka Chronicle," in *Stories of Khmel'nyts'kyi: Competing Literary Legacies of the 1648 Ukrainian Cossack Uprising*, ed. Amelia M. Glaser (Stanford, 2015), 110–26.

52 Marko Antonovych, "Kharakterystyka B. Khmel'nyts'koho v Hrabianky ta Liviiia," *Ukrains'kyi istoryk*, nos 1–4 (1995): 164–5.

53 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:33.

54 *Ibid.*, 288.

55 *Ibid.*, 291–2. Velychko associates Khmel'nyts'kyi with the Germanic leader

Odoacer (433–93), who deposed the last Roman emperor, thus formally marking the end of the Western Roman Empire. In another fragment of the *Velychko Chronicle*, we read about the “warlike Rus’ from Rugia from Baltic or German Pomerania, under the leadership of their Prince Odoacer, in the year 470 after the birth of Christ.” (Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:89). This story was obviously borrowed from Strykowski, who, without any geographical reference, cites Długosz, and makes mention of “Odoacer – Rus’ prince,” who captured Rome and ruled there for fourteen years. (Strykowski, *Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkich Rusi*, 111). Skanderbeg (1443–68) was the leader of a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire and a national hero of Albania.

- 56 *Dohovory i postanovy*, 29.
- 57 “Mylost’ Bozhiiia,” in *Ukrains’ka literatura XVIII st. Poetychni tvory, dramatychni tvory, prozovi tvory*, ed. Ihor Dzeverin and Oleksii Myshanych (Kyiv, 1983), 307–11.
- 58 Hnat Buzanovs’kyi, “[Virsh pro Bohdana Khmel’nyts’koho],” in *Ukrains’ka literatura XVIII st.*, 50.
- 59 For more on the Khmel’nyts’kyi cult in the Hetmanate after 1709, see Sysyn, “A Man Worthy of the Name ‘Hetman’”; Serhii Plokhii, *Tsari ta kozaky. Zahadky ukrains’koï ikony* (Kyiv, 2018), 77.
- 60 Dzyra, ed., *Litopys Samovydsia*, 146; Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 2:342.
- 61 Petr Simonovskii, *Kratkoe opisanie o kazatskom malorossiiskom narode i o voennykh ego delakh* (Moscow, 1847), 116.
- 62 The author is referring to the town Cossacks (*horodovi kozaky*), i.e., Cossacks of the Hetmanate who are implicitly contrasted with the Zaporozhian Cossacks.
- 63 Dzyra, ed., *Litopys Samovydsia*, 91.
- 64 Iaroslav Dzyra, “Vstup,” in Iaroslav Dzyra, ed., *Litopys Samovydsia*, 33.
- 65 M. Grushevskii, “Samovidets Ruiny i ego pozdneishie otrazheniia,” in *Trudy Instituta slavianovedeniia Akademii nauk sssr* (Leningrad, 1932), 1:179.
- 66 In detail about the rule of Ivan Vyhovs’kyi in the *Velychko Chronicle*, see Nelia Herasymenko, *Istorychni podii na Ukraïni 1657–1659 (het’manstvo I. Vyhovs’koho) u vysvitleni S. V. Velychka* (Kyiv, 1999).
- 67 The work describes the events of the period of 1506–1742. The author was a member of the Lyzohub *starshyna* family. The text is based on the *Brief Description of Little Russia* (*Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii*) with extrapolated information from family history, and supplemented with extracts from the *Eyewitness Chronicle*. The work was published in 1888 by Volodymyr

Antonovych: "Letopisets', ili opisanie kratkoe znatneishikh deistv i sluchaev," in *Sbornik letopisei, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi* (Kyiv, 1888), 1–69.

68 NIOR RGB, f. 152, no. 26, l. 95.

69 "Letopisets', ili opisanie kratkoe znatneishikh deistv i sluchaev," 25.

70 Vadim Modzolevskii, *Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik*, (Kyiv, 1912), 3:99; Aleksandr Lazarevskii, "Liudi staroi Malorossii. Lizoguby," *Kievskaiia starina* 2 (1897): 108.

71 The only exception was the Crimean khan/khans, who, in addition to his Muslim faith, was also the overlord of the Tatars and thus complicit in their incursions. The negative image was underscored by treachery and perfidy (this refers to Islam Giray's demarche at Berestechko). A similar assessment was earned by the Moldovan Hospodar Vaseli Lupu for his inconsistent policy in dealings with Khmel'nyts'kyi in particular.

72 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:26.

73 Ibid., 97, 213.

74 Although Velychko does allow himself to "criticize" Peter I on one occasion: "[against] the expectations of Little Russia, despite the old rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host and the Little Russian people (*naroda Malorossiskoho*), instead of the hetman, he set up the Little Russian Collegium and various levies that had never existed before, and destroyed and greatly burdened both the Cossack nobility and the common people" (Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 2:519–20).

75 Dzyra, ed., *Litopys Samovydytsia*, 135.

76 *Korotkyi opys Malorosii (1340–1776)*, comp. Andrii Bovgyria (Kyiv, 2012), 128. Hryhorii Pokas, a military chancellorist (?–1789?), was the compiler of one of the copies of the Brief Description of Little Russia, which he supplemented with his own accounts and a chronological continuation (1735–51). The original is held in St Petersburg: *Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi natsional'noi biblioteki* (Manuscript Department of the Russian National Library; hereinafter – OR RNB), f. IV, 812.

77 Nikolai Petrov, "Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei," *Kievskaiia starina* 2 (1882): 342.

78 IR NBU, f. viii, spr. 147m/56, ark. 101 zv.

79 "Letopisets, ili Opisanie kratkoe znatneishikh deistv i sluchaev," 52.

80 *Korotkyi opys Malorosii*, 126.

81 Lorina Repina, "'Natsional'nyi kharakter' i 'obraz drugogo,'" *Dialog so vremenem*, no. 39 (2012): 10, 13.

82 Frit'of Ben'iamin Shenk [Frithjof Benjamin Schenk], *Aleksandr Nevskii v russkoi kul'turnoi pamiaty* (Moscow, 2007), 14–15.

- 83 Dzyra, ed., *Litopys Samovydsia*, 135; Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:375.
- 84 The designation *Velikorošiia* (Great Russia) and its derivative ethnonym *velikorošiiany* (Great Russians) first appear in *Palinodiia* (1622). See Oleg Nemenskii, "Voobrazhaemye soobshchestva v 'Palinodii' Zakharii Kopysten-skogo i 'Oborone unii' L'va Krevzy," in *Belorussiia i Ukraina. Istoriiia i kul'tura. Ezhegodnik 2005/2006* (Moscow, 2008), 52.
- 85 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 3:456.
- 86 *Ibid.*, 3:501.
- 87 Frank E. Sysyn, "The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations in Ukrainian Historiography of the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries," in *Culture, Nation and Identities. The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)* ed. Andreas Kappeler et al. (Edmonton-Toronto, 2003), 139, 140.
- 88 For more on the perception of the Russian state in the historical narratives of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Sysyn, "The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations," 108–43.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 131, 141.
- 90 "Pakty i konstytutsii" *Ukrains'koï kozats'koï derzhavy*, comp. Myroslav Trofymchuk and Taras Chukhlib (Lviv, 2011), 81.
- 91 Vasyli' Kononenko, "Kazatsko-moskovskie otnosheniia v originale teksta 'dogovorov i postanovlenii' 1710 g.," *Istoricheskii vestnik* 16 (2016), 79–80.
- 92 For a more detailed discussion of the concept of the Little Russian identity, see Zenon E. Kohut, "The Question of Russo-Ukrainian Unity and Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Early Modern Ukrainian Thought and Culture," in *Culture, Nation and Identities. The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)* ed. Andreas Kappeler et al. (Edmonton-Toronto, 2003), 70, 72, 79–80, 85.
- 93 Natalia Iakovenko, "Braty/vorohy abo poliaky ochyma ukraïntsia XVII-XVIII st.," *Nezalezhnyi Kul'turolohichni Chasopys 'P'*, no. 10 (1997): 157.
- 94 *Ibid.*, 158–9.
- 95 Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:32, 81–2.
- 96 This description is borrowed from the title of Frank Sysyn's article, see his "The Nation of Cain: Poles in Samiilo Velychko's *Skazannye*," in *Sinopsis. A Collection of Essays in Honor of Zenon E. Kohut*, ed. Serhii Plokhly and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton-Toronto, 2005), 447–54.
- 97 "Later, after many years had passed, in their settlements on the Vistula and beyond the Wisła, on the vast stretches of foreign lands where they spread and multiplied, being displeased by the abovementioned wrongs and plunder of people, they suddenly and unconscionably rose (like at one time Cain rose against Abel) against the Rus', or Sarmatians, their own (as we wrote above)

- natural brothers from long ago.” Velichko, *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke*, 1:81.
- 98 Iakovenko, “Braty/vorohy abo poliaky ochyma ukraïntsia XVII–XVIII st.,” 164.
- 99 *Ibid.*, 159.
- 100 During the period when the Cossack chronicles were written (end of seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth centuries), official documents also contained the term “good-neighborly” as a description of the relations between the Hetmanate and the Commonwealth. One example is the correspondence between the newly elected Hetman Ivan Mazepa and Crown Hetman Stanisław Jabłonowski. In Mazepa’s letters, these relations are guaranteed by “contiguous borders,” the terms of the Eternal Peace, as well as “a common enemy of Christianity – the infidels” (*Lysty Ivana Mazepy*, comp. Viacheslav Stanislavskyi, vol. 1 (1687–1691) (Kyiv, 2002), 88; vol. 2 (1691–1700) (Kyiv, 2010), 625).
- 101 Volodymyr Rybyns'kyi, “Do istoriï zhydiv na Livoberezhnii Ukraïni v polovyni XVIII st.,” in *Zbirnyk prats' zhydivs'koï istoryko-arkheografichnoï komisii*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1928): 1–97; Saul Ia. Borovoi, “Evrei v Zaporozhskoi Sechi,” in *Evreiskie khroniki XVII stoletia (Epokha “khmel'nichiny”)*, ed. Saul Ia. Borovoi (Moscow, Jerusalem, 1997), 233–50.
- 102 *Letopis' Grigoriia Grabianky*, 32.
- 103 Zenon E. Kohut, “Povstannia Khmel'nyts'koho, obraz ievreïv, i formuvannia ukraïns'koï istorychnoi pamiaty,” in *idem. Korinnia identychnosti. Studii z rann'omodernoï ta modernoi istorii Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2004), 258.
- 104 Kohut, “Povstannia Khmel'nyts'koho,” 259–60; Frank E. Sysyn, “A Curse on Both Their Houses: Catholic Attitudes towards Jews and Eastern Orthodox during the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising in Father Ruszel’s *Favor niebieski*,” in *Israel and the Nations: Essays Presented in Honor of Shmuel Ettinger*, ed. Shmuel Almog et al. (Jerusalem, 1987), ix–xxiv.
- 105 *Litopys Samovydtzia*, 60.
- 106 Kresin, “Ukraïns'kyi khozaryzm,” 166–7.

Contributors

VADYM ADADUROV graduated from the École Pratique des Hautes Études (Paris). He holds a PhD in history. He is a doctor habilitatus and an associate professor at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. He is a researcher and publisher of historical documents from the archival collections in Austria, the Vatican, Poland, France, Lithuania, Germany, and Moldova. Among his academic interests are modern historiography, the history of France and its relations with Eastern Europe, religious studies, intellectual history, microhistory, and the history of empire. Among his books are *Napoleonida na Skhodi Ievropy: uiavlennia, proekty ta diial'nist uriadu Frantsiï shchodo pivdenno-zakhidnykh okraïn Rosiis'koï imperii na pochatku XIX stolittia* (Lviv, 2007 and 2018); *Fundatsiia Halyts'koï mytropoliï u svitli dyplomatychnoho lystuvannia mizh Avstriieiu ta Sviatym Prestolom 1807–1808 rokiv* (Lviv, 2011); *Voina tsivilizatsii: sotsiokul'turnaia istoriia russkoho pokhoda Napoleona* (Kyiv, 2017).

ANDRII BOVGYRIA holds a PhD in history. He is a research associate at the Institute of Ukrainian History (National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine). His research is focused on the history of Ukraine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and social and intellectual history. He is the author of *Kozats'ke istoriopysannia v rukopysnii tradytsii XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2010); “Echoes of Poltava: Trials of Mazepists and Mazepism in Eighteenth-Century Ukraine” in *Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies. Poltava 1709: The Battle and the Myth* (Cambridge, 2012), and the editor of *Korotkyi opys Malorosii (1340–1776)* (Kyiv, 2012).

KYRYLO HALUSHKO holds a PhD in history from the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Since 2013, he is a researcher at the Institute of Ukrainian History (National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine). Among his interests are cartography, the history of nationalism, and memory studies. He is the author (or co-author) of more than ten monographs and handbooks, among them are *Etnonatsional'na struktura naseleння Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2003); *Etnosotsiologhiia* (Kyiv, 2008); *Ukrainskii natsionalizm: likbez dlia russkikh* (Kyiv, 2008); *Ukraïna na karti Ievropy* (Kyiv, 2013); *Vid kraiu do kraïny. Nazva, terytoriia, kordony i symvolika Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2015).

VICTOR HOROBETS' is professor and chair of the Department of Social History of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He is interested in the social and political history of early modern Ukraine, diplomacy, and international relations. He is the author of *Prysmerek Het'manshchyny: Ukraïna v roky reform Petra I* (Kyiv, 1998); *Elita kozats'koï Ukraïny v poshukakh politychnoï lehitymatsii: stosunky z Moskovoiu ta Varshavoiu, 1654–1665* (Kyiv, 2001); “*Volymo tsaria skhidnoho*”: *ukraïns'kyi Het'-manat ta rosiis'ka dynastiia do i pislia Pereiaslava* (Kyiv, 2007); *Vlada ta sotsium Het'manatu: doslidzhennia z politychnoï i sotsial'noï istorii rann'omodernoï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2009); *Konflikt i vlada v rann'omodernii Ukraïni. Sotnyk novhorod-sivers'kyi proty het'mana Viis'ka Zaporoz'koho, 1715–1722* (Kyiv, 2016); *Het'man Briukhovets'kyi: zhyttia u slavi, vladi ta han'bi* (Kyiv, 2019); and many others.

NATALIA IAKOVENKO is professor of history at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and a specialist in Latin philology. Her publications include *Ukraïns'ka shliakheta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII stolittia: Volyni Tsentral'na Ukraïna* (Kyiv, 1993); *Narys istorii Ukraïny z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1997); *Paralel'nyi svit: doslidzhennia z istorii uiavlen' ta idei v Ukraïni XVI – XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002); *Dzerkala identychnosti: doslidzhennia z istorii uiavlen' ta idei v Ukraïni XVII – pochatku XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 2012); *U poshukakh novoho neba: zhyttia i teksty Ioanykiiia Galiatovs'koho* (Kyiv, 2016).

MAKSYM IAREMENKO holds a PhD in history. He is associate professor in the Department of History of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. His research is focused on the history of the Orthodox Church, education, and the social history of early modern and modern Ukraine. He is the author of *Kyïvs'ke chernetstvo XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2007); *Akademiky' ta Akademiia*.

Sotsial'na istoriia osvity i osvichenosti v Ukraïni XVIII st. (Kharkiv, 2014); *Pered vyklykamy unifikatsii ta dystsyplinuvannia: kyivs'ka pravoslavna mytropoliiia u XVIII stolitti* (Lviv, 2017). He is also a co-editor of the academic journal *Kyivs'ka Akademiia* (Kyiv Academy; ka.ukma.edu.ua).

ZENON E. KOHUT is professor emeritus of history at the University of Alberta since 2014. Between 1994 and 2012 he was the director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (University of Alberta) and the director of the Kowalsky Program for the Study of Eastern Ukraine (1998–2012). His research is focused on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and political and social history. His publications include *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, 1988); *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity* (Edmonton, 2011); co-editor of *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)* (Edmonton, 2003); *History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine* (Saskatoon, 2002).

VOLODYMYR KRAVCHENKO is professor of history in the Department of History, Classics, and Religious Studies (University of Alberta) and the director of the Contemporary Ukraine Studies Program (CUSP) of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS, University of Alberta). His specialization is history of Ukrainian and Russian historical writing in the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries; Ukrainian studies in North America; and the Ukrainian-Russian borderland in historical perspective. His recent publications include: “Why Didn’t the Antemurale Historical Mythology Develop in Early Nineteenth-century Ukraine?” in *Rampart Nations: Bulwark Myths of East European Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism*, ed. Liliya Berezhnaya and Heidi Hein-Kircher (New York, 2018); *Ukraïna, imperiia, Rosiia: vybrani staty z modernoi istorii ta istoriohrafii* (Kyiv, 2011); *Kharkiv/Khar'kov: stolitsa pogranich'ia* (Vilnius, 2010).

GARY MARKER is professor emeritus of history at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. His research is focused on the early modern period in the history of East Slavic peoples, primarily Russia and Ukraine. He is the author of *Publishing, Printing and the Origins of Intellectual Life in Russia, 1700–1800* (Princeton, 1985); *Days of a Russian Noblewoman: The Memories of Anna Labzina* (DeKalb, 2001); and *Imperial Saint: The Cult of St Catherine and the Dawn of Female Rule in Russia* (DeKalb, 2007). He has also published many articles

on religious discourses within East Slavic Orthodoxy in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as part of an ongoing project entitled “Mazepa and His Preachers.”

VOLODYMYR MASLIYCHUK is a doctor habilitatus and a professor of history at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kyiv. His interests include the history of Sloboda Ukraine, social history, and methodology in humanities. His publications include *Kozats'ka starshyna slobids'kykh polkiv druhoi polovyny XVII – pershoi tretyni XVIII st.* (Kharkiv, 2003); *Provintsiia na perekhresti kul'tur: doslidzhennia z istorii Slobids'koï Ukraïny XVII – XIX st.* (Kharkiv, 2007); *Ditozhubnytstvo na Livoberezhnii ta Slobids'kii Ukraïni v druhii polovyny XVIII st.* (Kharkiv, 2008); *Nepovnolitni zlochyntsi u Kharkivs'komu namisnytstvi 1780–1796 rr.* (Kharkiv, 2012); *Zdobutky ta iliuzii: osvitni initsiatyvy na Livoberezhnii ta u Slobids'kii Ukraïni druhoi polovyny XVIII – pershoi polovyny XIX st.* (Kharkiv, 2018).

OKSANA MYKHED received her BA and MA in history at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and her PhD in history from Harvard University. She was visiting Assistant Professor of Ukrainian Studies at Columbia University for the academic year 2013–14. Her research interests are early modern and modern Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish histories, in particular the disintegration of the Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires, and the formation of imperial boundaries and borderland communities. She is the author of “Not by Force Alone: Public Health and the Establishment of Russian Rule in the Russo-Polish Borderland, 1762–1785,” in *Borderlands in World History, 1700–1914*, ed. P. Readman, C. Radding, C. Bryant (London, 2014).

VADYM NAZARENKO holds a PhD in history. Since 2017, he is a researcher at the National Museum of Architecture and Material Culture of Ukraine. His research interests include military history, social history, historical demography, the history of everyday life, and ethnology. Among his publications are “Kyïvs'kyi harnizon u XVIII st.: struktura ta funktsii,” *Visnyk Kyïvs'koho natsional'noho universytetu im. Tarasa Shevchenka. Seriia: Istoriiia*, no. 4 (2013); “Kyïvs'ka harnizonna shkola u XVIII st.,” *Naukovi pratsi istorichnoho fakul'tetu Zaporiz'koho natsional'noho universytetu*, no. 41 (Zaporizhzhia, 2014); “Reformy harnizonnnykh voisk Rossiiskoi imperii XVIII v. (na primere Kievskogo harnizonu),” *Vesnik Hrodzenskaha dziaržaïnaha ũniversiteta imia Ianki Kupaly. Sieriia 1*, no. 2 (2015).

OLEKSANDR PANKIEIEV is a research coordinator and an editor-in-chief of the Forum for Ukrainian Studies at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. He also serves as the president of the Alberta Society for the Advancement of Ukrainian Studies. His research interests include the history of Steppe Ukraine, Russian-Ukrainian relations, bureaucracy and elites in Ukraine, ethnography, oral history, and digital media. He is an author of three historical sourcebooks: *Azovs'ke namisnytstvo: nerealizovanyi proekt* (co-authored with Anna Olenenko; Zaporizhzhia, 2011); *Hrupovi formuliarni spysky chynovnytstva u Novorosiis'kii hubernii za 1798 rik* (Zaporizhzhia, 2011); *Rozpys sprav Katerynoslavs'koho namisnytstva: dilovodstvo ta kantseliars'ke chynovnytstvo* (Kyiv, 2018); and many articles.

SERHII PLOKHY is the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History and the director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. He has published extensively on Ukrainian, East European, and international history. His books have won numerous awards, including the Lionel Gelber Prize for the best English-language book on international relations (*The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union* [New York, 2014]), the Antonovych Foundation Book Award and Taras Shevchenko National Prize for Non-Fiction (*The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine* [New York, 2017]), and the Ballie Gifford Prize for Non-Fiction (*Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy* [New York, 2018]).

LIUDMYLA POSOKHOVA is a doctor habilitatus and a professor of history at the Department of Ukrainian History of V.N. Karazin Kharkiv State University. She is the author of many academic books and articles. Her research is focused on the history of education in Ukraine at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Her publications include: “‘Im Kiever Partes-Gesang ausgebildet’: Ukrainische Sänger in der Hofkapelle des Zaren in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts,” in *Musik am russischen Hof: Vor, während und nach Peter dem Großen (1650–1750)*, ed. L. Erren (Oldenbourg, 2017); *Pravoslavnye kollegiумы na peresechenii kul'tur, traditsii, epokh (konets XVII – nachalo XVIII v.)* (Moscow, 2016); *Na perekhresti kul'tur, tradytsii, epokh: pravoslavni kolehiumy Ukraïny naprykintsi XVII – na pochatku XIX st.* (Kharkiv, 2011).

IHOR SERDIUK is a doctor habilitatus, professor of history, and a coordinator of the Centre of Historico-Anthropological Research at the Volodymyr Korolenko National Pedagogical University of Poltava. He is a co-editor of the historical portal *Historians.in.ua*. In 2020, he was awarded the Ivan Franko

International Prize for academic achievements. He is the author of *Malen'kyi doroslyi: dytyna i dytynstvo v Het'manshchyni XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2018); and *'Polkovykh horodov obyvateli': istoriko-demohrafichna kharakterystyka mis'koho naselennia Het'manshchyny druhoi polovyny XVIII st.* (Poltava, 2011). His research is focused on the history of childhood, historical demography, the social history of the Hetmanate, and urban studies.

VOLODYMYR SKLOKIN holds a PhD in history from V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University. He is associate professor at the Department of Modern Ukrainian History of the Ukrainian Catholic University. He also serves as chair of the department and director of the Graduate Program in Public History at the same university. His research interests include new imperial history, Enlightenment studies, and the theory and history of historiography. He is the author of *Rosiis'ka imperiia i Slobids'ka Ukraïna u druhiï polovyni XVIII stolit-tia: prosvichenyi absoliutyzm, impers'ka intehratsiia, lokal'ne suspil'stvo* (Lviv, 2019); and co-editor of *Impers'ki identychnosti v ukraiïns'kii istorii XVIII – pershoi polovyny XIX st.* (Lviv, 2020).

IHOR SKOCHYLIAS is professor of history at the Ukrainian Catholic University. His interests include religious studies (especially in the context of early modern history) and the history of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches in Ukraine. His publications include: *Kościół Wschodnie w państwie polsko-litewskim w procesie przemian i adaptacji: metropolia kijowska w latach 1458–1795* (Lublin–Lviv, 2014); *Halyts'ka (L'vivs'ka) ieparkhiia XII–XVIII stolit': orhanizatsiina struktura ta pravovyi status* (Lviv, 2010); *Sobory eparchii chełmskiej XVII wieku. Program religijny Slavia Unita w Rzeczypospolitej* (Lublin, 2008); co-editor of *Przed wielkim podziałem: metropolia kijowska Cerkwi Prawosławnej do 1458 roku* (Lublin–Lviv, 2013).

OLEKSII SOKYRKO holds a PhD in history from the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. He is associate professor at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. His interests include the military history of East Central Europe and Ukraine. Among his publications are: *Lytsari druhoho sortu: naimane viis'ko Livoberezhnoi Het'manshchyny 1669–1726 rr.* (Kyiv, 2006); “Kantseliarii ta arkhiv Heneral'noi artylerii Het'manshchyny seredyny XVII – kintsia XVIII st.,” *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, no. 2 (2012).

MYKOLA SYMCHYCH holds a PhD in history. He is a research associate at the Department of History of Philosophy in Ukraine of the Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He is the author

of *Philosophia rationalis u Kyievo-Mohylians'kii akademii: komparatyvnyi analiz mohylians'kykh kursiv lohiky kintsia XVII – pershoi polovyny XVIII st.* (Vinnytsia, 2009). His fields of interest include philosophy at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), early modern scholasticism, and scholastic and analytic metaphysics.

FRANK E. SYSYN is professor of history at the Department of History, Classics, and Religious Studies at the University of Alberta. He is also director of the Petro Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS). He served as an acting director of the CIUS in 1991–93 and currently serves as the head of the Toronto Office of the CIUS. He is a specialist in the history of early modern Ukraine and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. His interests include social, intellectual, and religious history as well as historiography. He is editor-in-chief of the Hrushevsky Translation Project: Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 10 vols in 12 books (Edmonton-Toronto, 1997–2020). His publications include *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, 1986); *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Historian and National Awakener* (Saskatoon, 2001); and numerous articles on the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising and early modern Ukrainian historiography.

OLEKSII TOLOCHKO is director of the Center for Kyivan Rus studies at the Institute of Ukrainian History (National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine). His research has addressed various problems of the medieval and early modern history of Eastern Europe. Among his latest books are *'Russkaia istoriia' Vasiliia Tatishcheva: istochniki i izvestiia* (Moscow, 2005); *Kratkaia versiia "Pravdy Russkoi": proiskhozhdenie teksta* (Kyiv, 2010); and *Ocherki nachal'noi Rusi* (Kyiv and St Petersburg, 2015). His most recent project was leading a team of Ukrainian scholars in a textological examination of the thirteenth-century Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (forthcoming, 2020).

IURI VOLOSHYN is professor in the Department of Ukrainian History in Poltava National Pedagogical University. His research interests include historical demography, historical anthropology, and the social history of the Hetmanate of the eighteenth century. He is the author of *Rozkol'nyts'ki slobody na terytorii Pivnichnoi Het'manshchyny u XVIII st.: istoryko-demohrafichnyi aspekt* (Poltava, 2005); *Misto Poltava v Rumiantsevs'komu opysi Malorosii 1765–1769 rr.* (Kyiv, 2012); *Kozaky i pospolyti: mis'ka spil'nota Poltavy druhoi polovyny XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2016); and *Kozats'ka femida. Hrods'ke sudochynstvo v Het'manshchyni* (Kyiv, 2019).

Index

- Aleksei Mikhailovich, 254, 506–7, 604
Alexander I, 99, 206, 209
Andrusovo, Treaty of, 37, 531, 534, 581
Apostol, Danylo, 219, 223, 260, 269, 307
Austria, 27, 48–9, 51–2, 72
authority, just, 499–501
Azov: campaigns, 38, 44; fortress, 42, 44;
gubernia, 176–8, 180, 185, 189–90

Bakhmut, 189, 194
Bantysh-Kamenskii, Dmitrii, 60, 68, 70, 76,
78, 248
Bar, 34, 606; Confederation, 48, 150, 427
Barabash, Ivan, 515–16, 534
Baranovych, Lazar, 472, 503, 505, 507, 590
Baronio, Cesare, 481, 483, 500, 506
Baroque, 10, 105, 112, 424, 560
Bartlett, Robert, 566–7, 569
Baryshivka company, 226–7
Basilian monasteries, 433, 435
Baturyn, 224, 228, 230–2, 332, 565
Baumeister, Friedrich, 456, 482–4
Beauplan, Guillaume de, 10, 33–46, 48–9, 51–
2, 77, 204; *General Map of Ukraine*, 29, 34
Belarus, 31, 38, 44, 64, 604
Belgorod, 45, 71–2, 278, 408; gubernia, 46–7,
71, 119

Bendery, 44, 577
Bendery Constitution, 14, 561, 563–4, 570, 572,
574; elections of colonels, 222–3; idea of
autonomy, 567–8; Jews, 571–2; language of,
561–3, 573; and Orthodoxy, 571, 573; termi-
nology of, 563–5
Berestechko, 36, 623, 626
Berlo, Arsenii, 472, 488
Berlyns'kyi, Maksym, 60, 70, 75, 108, 110
Bestuzhev-Riumin, Aleksei, 253–4
Bezborod'ko, Andrii, 249, 257
Bielski, Marcin, 529, 600
Bila Tserkva, 75, 151, 153, 168, 536; universal,
532, 534–6
Blaeu, Joan, 36, 38, 52
Boeck, Brian, 77, 80, 82
Bolkhovitinov, Evgenii, 99, 109
Borozdin, Konstantin, 100, 110
Boryspil, 153, 206
Bratslav, 31, 45, 184, 441, 605; clergy, 428, 430,
438–41, 444; nobility, 443; palatinate, 425–6,
428, 435, 440, 442; region, 31, 428, 430–1,
438–9, 441–4; vicegerency, 184
Braudel, Fernand, 298, 339, 341
Brest, Union of, 98, 582
Briukhovets'kyi, Ivan, 226, 230–1, 236, 243,
610–11

- Brody, 34, 606
 Brotherhood Monastery, 100
 Brucker, Johann Jakob, 483–4
 bubonic plague, 11, 144–59, 161–5, 170, 331;
 anti-plague measures, 145, 147, 149–51, 153,
 155, 163; causes of, 146–7; clergy and, 148;
 and imperial reforms, 164; in Kyiv, 144–5,
 153–8, 163, 165; in Podilia, 164; quarantine,
 147, 149, 152, 155, 157–9
 Budde, Johann Franz, 481, 483
 Byzantine, 106, 506, 599
- cameralism, 128, 137, 361
 cartography, 27–8, 33, 39–41, 47–8, 50, 52; at-
 lases, 38, 40, 42–3, 46–8; cartographic prop-
 aganda, 37, 47; Peter I and, 40, 45–6, 50
 Catherine II, 65–6, 115–25, 127–38, 161–2, 174–
 7, 474–5; enlightened absolutism of, 11, 117–
 18; and *starshyna*, 252
 Caucasus, 43, 78
 Cellarius, Christoph, 479, 481
 Charles XII (king), 41, 43–4, 508, 510, 582–4
 Charnuts'kyi, Khrystofor, 459, 464–5, 470
 Chelm (Kholm), 32, 39, 45, 434, 440
 Cherkasy, 228, 515
 Cherniak, Ivan, 229, 232–4
 Chernihiv, 69–71, 100–3, 334, 337–8, 488; Col-
 lege, 471–2, 476, 483, 485, 550; gubernia, 69,
 72; palatinate, 29, 533; printing houses, 399,
 407, 485; regiment, 240, 262, 265, 267; re-
 gion, 30, 35, 46, 204, 240; vicegerency, 162,
 291, 333
 Chernyshev, Zakhar, 171, 253
 Chertkov, Vasilii, 175–6, 179, 186
 Chevalier, Pierre, 32–3
 Chuikevich, Petr, 208, 214
 Church of the Tithes, 104–5, 109
 Church Slavonic, 62, 397, 406, 550–1
 Chyhyryn, 384, 432, 513, 515, 535–6; cam-
 paigns, 28, 231, 611
 cities, 97–102, 105–11, 115–16, 145–6, 153–9, 277;
 billeting obligation, 331, 337; courts, 329–30;
 demography, 341, 343–7, 351–2, 373; econ-
 omy, 8, 338–42; Magdeburg Law, 332–7, 342,
 573–4; with municipal administration, 328,
 333, 335; regimental, 326–33
 clergy, 134, 364–6, 416–18, 427–31, 436–42, 474;
 appointment of priests, 416–17; confes-
 sional identity of, 426, 434, 436; education
 of, 396; of the Hetmanate, 134; Uniate, 426,
 430, 434–5, 441. *See also* Orthodox Church;
 Uniate Church
 Constantinople, 427. *See also* Istanbul
 Cossack chronicles, 549, 589–90, 601–3, 606–
 7, 613–17; ethnic groups in, 613–18; mon-
 archs in, 611
 Cossack democracy, 514, 520; nation, 13, 33,
 570, 598, 602, 619
 Cossackdom, 124, 126, 514, 601, 603
 Cossack officers. *See* *starshyna*
 Cossacks, 4–5, 7–11, 28–36, 39, 49–50, 53, 69–
 71; etymology of the word, 599–600; and
 Napoleon, 207, 209; origins of, 530; regis-
 tered, 515; rights and liberties, 220, 590, 604,
 607, 609, 612; in Russian military, 123, 252–
 3, 258–61, 263–4; social status of, 117, 120,
 122–3, 126, 129, 258; town, 514; and tsar's
 authority, 508
 Cracow, 45, 153, 346
 Crimea, 39, 43–4, 181, 189, 192, 602–3; annexa-
 tion of, 59. *See also* Crimean Khanate
 Crimean Khanate, 100, 175; incorporation
 into the Russian Empire, 181
 Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, 89
 Czacki, Tadeusz, 74, 204
- Danylo Romanovych of Galicia, 30, 500
 Delisle, Guillaume, 40, 44
 Delisle, Joseph-Nicolas, 40, 44
 Diet, 529, 548, 563
 Dimitrii (Sechenov), bishop of Novgorod, 411
 Divovych, Semen, 58, 549, 601; *A Dialogue
 Between Great Russia and Little Russia*, 549
 Dnipro: region, 28–9, 32–3, 36, 38, 42, 44;
 River, 29–30, 34–8, 42–51, 71–7, 515–16,
 603–5

- Dnister River, 30, 48, 75
 Dolgorukov, Ivan, 81, 99, 104–5, 107, 113–14
 Don, 29, 38, 67, 77, 98; Cossack Host, 254, 264, 300
 Doroshenko, Dmytro, 15, 204
 Doroshenko, Petro, 227–8, 533–6, 540, 546, 611, 618
 Dubnevych, Amvrosii, 460, 462–5
 Dvoret's'kyi, Vasyl', 243; *Dvoret's'kyi Chronicle*, 514, 605
- Enlightenment, 7, 9, 16, 117–18, 565, 567; enlightened absolutism, 128, 136; in Poland, 9; in Ukraine, 9–10, 23
 Ermolaev, Aleksandr, 100, 105, 110
 Estonia, 122, 125
 Eternal Peace, 37, 564, 616n100
 ethnicity, 80, 82, 543, 566, 571, 573; *gens* as, 567, 569
 Europe, 27–8, 33–4, 38–9, 41–3, 46, 48–51; Eastern Europe, 31, 84, 86–7, 93, 95–6, 136–7
Eyewitness Chronicle, 508, 512, 514–16, 605–6, 608–10, 612
- fatherland, 70, 77, 130, 133, 605, 608; in Bender Constitution, 568, 571, 585; in Bila Tserkva universal, 535–6; Cossack chronicles and, 589; Hetmanate as, 533, 535–6, 582; Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and, 531–2, 534–5, 581–2, 609; and Kyivan clergy, 588–9; Adam Kysil' and, 501; Little Russian Ukraine as, 508, 515, 528, 532–5, 582, 586; Losyts'kyi and, 529–30; Mazepa and, 510, 534, 536, 582, 585–6; Muscovy and, 580–1, 587; Orthodox, 211; Peter I and, 579–80, 582–4, 587, 595; Petro Doroshenko and, 533–6; Petryk and, 534; in the Polish tradition, 501, 529, 532, 581; Prokopovych and, 586, 587–8; Rus' as, 529, 581; the Russian Empire as, 208, 537; Samoilovych and, 505, 511; Sich Cossacks and, 515, 534–6; Skoropads'kyi and, 584; Sofonovych and, 530; terminology, 528–33, 535–7, 565, 567, 580–1, 587–8; Ukraine as, 211, 510, 529–33, 535–7, 581; in *Velychko Chronicle*, 530–4, 590; Vyhovs'kyi and, 535
- fellows of the banner, 243
 fellows of the standard, 252, 255
 Finland, 121–2, 125
 France, 33, 48, 203, 205, 207
 Freyer, Hieronymus, 481, 483
 Frick, David, 590
 Fylymonovych, Maksym, 604
- Gajecky, George, 225, 243
 Galiatovs'kyi, Ioanykii, 503, 505, 570, 600, 606
 Galicia, 33, 35, 39, 41, 72, 74
 Galician metropolitan, 545; principality, 545–6
 Galician-Volhynian principality, 31, 73, 544
 General Census of Little Russia, 328–9, 344–5, 347–8, 365–7, 369–74, 378–83
 General Military: Chancellery, 252–3, 255–7, 259, 261–2, 264, 267; Court, 271, 328, 335, 604
 General Officer Staff, 219, 250
 gentry, 148, 150, 548, 550, 552–4; cooptation of, 549; democracy, 14, 499, 502, 520; golden liberties of, 502; new, 299; as political nation, 501, 513–14, 548
 geography, symbolic, 6–7, 10–11, 65
 Gerasimov, Ilya, 86, 117
 Gerhard, Johann, 483, 485
 Germany, 13, 486
 Gersevanov, Georgii, 185–6
 Gizel', Inokentii, 459, 469
 Gogol, Nikolai, 79–80, 110–11
 Golitsyn, Dmitrii, 233, 410
 Gottsched, Johann Christoph, 479, 484
 Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 30–1, 35, 253, 528, 580
 Grand Duchy of Moscow, 31, 65
 Great Northern War, 40, 239, 428, 588
 Great Russia, 58, 60, 64, 69–72, 586; Little Russian influences, 473; term of, 64. *See also* Russia
 Great Russian people, 14, 63, 67, 129, 584–6
 Greeks, 8, 39

- Guagnini, Alessandro, 600
 Güldenstädt, Johann, 80, 332, 338
- Habsburg Monarchy, 6, 73
- Hadiach, 221, 232, 239, 333–5, 337; Treaty of, 35, 221; regiment, 232, 239, 261, 332
- Haidamak movement, 79, 424
- Halych, 32, 439; metropolitanate, 39
- Heineccius, Johann Gottlieb, 481, 483
- Herberstein, Sigismund, 38
- Hertsyk, Pavlo, 231–2
- Hertsyks, 232, 617
- hetman, 219, 226, 532, 547, 552, 609; authority of, 220–1, 223–4, 228–9, 232, 250–1; “bad,” 516; election of, 220, 222, 504–5, 509, 513–14, 516–17; and election of colonels, 224–5; as God-given, 504–6, 509; “good,” 518; as an ideal ruler, 518–19; and public good, 510; virtues of, 510–13, 518
- Hetmanate, 5–6, 13–14, 39–40, 222–3, 536–7, 607–9; abolishing of autonomy, 7–10, 128, 544, 549, 552; administration, 12, 544; appointment of officials, 223, 240; autonomy of, 326, 424, 503–5, 544, 549; corruption in, 238–40; demography, 13, 344, 346; economy of, 269–70, 340; integration into the Russian Empire, 10–12; interethnic relations in, 8; judicial reforms in, 248; languages in, 406–8, 551; military reforms in, 8, 247–8; origins of, 543–4; postal services in, 291, 331; taxes in, 123–6, 129–31, 155, 157, 159; territory of, 46, 602–6; townspeople, 331; urban reforms, 325, 337
- Hillis, Faith, 65, 84
- Hlukhiv, 233, 235, 255–6, 258–9, 269–70, 331–2
- Homann, Johann Baptiste, 37, 42, 46, 74
- Horodyshche, 338, 437
- Hozlubin, Ivan, 126, 140
- Hrabianka, Hryhorii, 503, 514–16, 519–20, 589–91, 609–10; *Hrabianka Chronicle*, 599–601, 603, 606, 608–9, 617
- Hrebnyts'kyi, Florian, 440–3
- Hrushevs'kyi, Mykhailo, 15, 301, 514, 610
- Hryhorovych-Bars'kyi, Vasyl', 435
- Hudzhol, Demian, 230–1
- Hungary, 27, 30, 36, 72
- Hustynia Chronicle*, 529
- Hustyn Monastery, 290
- Iakovenko, Natalia, 14, 23, 499–500, 506, 514
- Iakubovych, Iakiv, 257, 259
- Iași, Treaty of, 184
- Iasyns'kyi, Varlaam, 428
- Iavors'kyi, Stefan, 459, 462, 464–5, 508–9, 560–1
- identity, 11, 60, 62, 67, 69, 73, 588; confessional, 437; Cossack, 5; imperial, 6, 63; language and, 573; Little Russian, 6, 73–4, 542, 544, 548, 554; national, 59–60, 499, 553, 580; religion and, 542; Ruthenian-Catholic, 427; Slavic-Rus', 63; Ukrainian national, 60; Uniate, 430, 433–4
- intelligentsia, 174, 554
- Istanbul, 277, 279, 281, 283, 285, 289
- Istoriia Rusov*, 60, 63, 67, 69–72, 75–6
- Ivan IV the Terrible, 45; title of, 53
- Izium, 121, 123–5, 129, 139–40, 303; regiment, 120, 124, 305, 309–11, 313
- Jesuit colleges, 457, 464–5, 471, 473–5, 478
- Jews, 8, 150, 613, 616–17, 619
- John II Casimir Vasa (king), 36, 507, 535, 605
- John III Sobieski (king), 33
- Jones, Robert, 118, 137
- Kalachyns'kyi, Prokopii, 459, 462
- Kalynovs'kyi, Stefan, 460, 462, 464
- Kamianets-Podilskyi, 28, 30, 45, 75, 164, 606, 611
- Kaniv, 334, 433
- Kapnist, Vasyl', 210, 313, 552
- Kappeler, Andreas, 82, 300, 473
- Karazin, Vasyl', 76, 80
- Karpyns'kyi, Iakynf, 484–5, 495
- Katerynoslav, 66, 77, 188, 193, 200; Criminal Court, 190; vicegerency, 180–2, 184–5, 187–9, 191, 193, 198
- Kerch-Yenikale county, 178
- Khanenko, Mykhailo, 75, 581
- Kharkiv, 66, 68, 76–8, 139, 141–2, 303; College,

- 307, 309, 472–3, 476, 479, 481–6; gubernia, 72, 76, 78, 176; regiment, 119–20, 303, 305–13; region, 76–8; Romantics, 68, 78–9; University, 76, 204, 486; vicariate, 408; viceregency, 67, 141
- Khazars, 565, 570, 599–603; Khazar myth, 570, 599–603, 606, 619
- Kherson, 66, 86, 180, 184, 193
- Khmel'nyts'kyi, Bohdan, 70–1, 507–9, 530–3, 535–44, 590–1, 603–7; authority of, 220, 504, 513; in Cossack chronicles, 508–9, 513, 516, 518–19, 608; cult of, 608–9; as “good” hetman, 518; in Kyiv, 504; and Rus', 32; title of, 32
- Khmel'nyts'kyi, Iurii, 221, 515, 533, 611, 618
- Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising, 4–5, 9–10, 50–1, 529, 533–4, 612; and Orthodoxy, 572
- Kholm. *See* Chełm
- Kingdom of Poland, 31, 34–5, 38, 528–9, 531, 580. *See also* Poland; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
- Kish. *See* Zaporozhian Sich
- Kochubei, Vasyl', 232–5, 238, 528, 589, 610
- Kochubei, Viktor, 80, 203
- Kohut, Zenon, 7, 13, 16, 138
- Koliivshchyna, 150, 424, 427
- Kondrat'ievs, 302, 307
- Konevyts'kyi, Prokip, 119–20, 127, 313
- Konys'kyi, Heorhii, 456, 461, 463–4, 466
- Kordet, Lavrentii, 481–3
- Korets'kyi, Ivan, 115–16
- Korsun, 151, 519
- Kostomarov, Mykola, 58, 78, 83, 89, 544
- Kotliarevs'kyi, Ivan, 209, 211, 263, 551
- Kovan'ka, Petro, 233–5
- Kovan'kas, 210, 235
- Kozachyns'kyi, Mykhailo, 463–6
- Kozelets, 153, 156, 332, 334
- Krasnokuts'kyi, Fedir, 121, 125, 127, 140, 313
- Krechetnikov, Mikhail, 162, 171
- Kremenchuk, 34, 158, 193
- Kremenets, 204, 213
- Krokovs'kyi, Iosaf, 428, 459
- Krolevets, 332, 338
- Küçük Kaynarca, Peace Treaty of, 175, 192
- Kuliabka, Syl'vestr, 460–2, 464
- Kuliabko, Ivan, 264, 267
- Kulish, Panteleimon, 79, 610
- Kursk, 72–3
- Kvitka-Osnov'ianenko, Hryhorii, 76, 78, 308, 483
- Kyiv, 11–19, 21–2, 97–8, 103–8, 144–6, 154–60, 170; antiquities in, 100–3, 107–9, 111, 114; archeparchy, 428–9, 432–3, 435, 439; Askold's Grave, 103–4, 113; cathedral chapter-officialate, 430–2; Catherine II in, 99, 101; clergy, 106, 500, 588–9; eparchy, 404, 418, 431; garrison, 12, 277–9, 281–2, 284, 291; Golden Gate, 102–3, 110, 113; gubernia, 45–7, 157, 174, 291; Khreshchatyk, 103, 106; Magdeburg Law in, 170; metropolitan, 428, 501, 533; metropolitanate, 395–7, 415–18, 424–30, 439–41, 444, 604; Orthodox consistory, 434, 436; palatinate, 29, 31, 35, 425, 427, 431; pilgrims in, 97–9, 101, 436; population of, 406, 409, 591; principality, 546; regiment, 281, 284, 332; region, 30, 203, 210, 427, 431; as Russian Jerusalem, 11, 98, 111; Russian language in, 407; as Slavic Pompeii, 11, 111; topography of, 106, 110, 153, 155–7, 169, 287; trade fairs in, 154; travelers in, 97–103, 105, 107, 111, 153; Uniate archeparchy, 429, 432, 436; vicariate, 438, 440; vicegerency, 145, 161–2, 165–6, 170, 179
- Kyivan Cave Monastery, 98–9, 105–6, 114, 397, 404–5, 407; and book publishing, 396, 398–406, 409–14, 417, 506; diplomatic gifts of, 413–15
- Kyivan Rus', 63, 101, 105, 112; heritage of, 67, 69, 71, 499–501, 603–4, 606
- Kyiv-Mohyla College (Academy), 407–9, 455–8, 463–74, 488, 550–1, 579–80; and Jesuit education, 458, 465; methods of instruction in, 458; reform in, 456; Russian language in, 408–9; students of, 156, 435, 586, 589; teaching of philosophy in, 13, 455–8, 461–6, 477; textbooks in, 456–7, 472
- Kyiv outpost line, 157, 159–60, 165; quarantine complexes at, 160–1
- Kyiv province, 150, 158; administrative reforms

- in, 157; public health, 159; revenue of, 160; status of, 145; travelers in, 160–1
- Kyshka, Lev (metropolitan), 427, 429–33, 438
- Kysil', Adam, 501, 538
- Latin, 399, 528, 551, 562–3
- “Laws by Which the Little Russian People are Judged,” 334–5, 548
- Lazarev's'kyi, Oleksandr, 230–1, 245
- Lebedyn's'kyi, Syl'vestr, 484–5, 495
- Legislative Commission, 253, 336, 404, 549
- Leipzig, 467, 470, 479–80, 482, 486
- Lerche, Johann, 155–7
- Levenets', Prokop, 231–2
- Levshin, Oleksii, 99–100
- Levyts'kyi, Ilarion, 460, 464
- Lithuania, 30–1, 34–5, 38, 44–5, 545, 580. *See also* Grand Duchy of Lithuania; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
- Lithuanian Statute, 233, 380, 383, 552
- Little Russian Ukraine, 532–4
- Little Rus', 40, 45, 545; the term, 39, 73
- Little Russia, 57–60, 67–79, 99–101, 111–12, 547–9, 582–3, 602–3; governorate, 172; gubernia, 174, 332; on the maps, 39, 47; and Napoleon, 203–5, 207–11; the term, 39, 73, 78–9, 81, 89; territory of, 69, 71–4, 604. *See also* Ukraine
- Little Russian, 14, 52, 598; general-governorate, 162; gubernia, 69, 210; identity, 69; intellectuals, 62; *maloros*, 73; Medical Board, 163–4; people, 334–5, 583–6, 589–91, 602–3, 608, 610; Rusyns and, 72
- Little Russian Collegium, 40, 46, 174, 362, 612; Second, 335, 361
- Little Russian Department (*Malorossiiskii prikaz*), 40, 229
- Livonia, 121–2, 125
- Lomonosov, Mikhail, 482, 550
- Losyts'kyi, Mykhailo, 529, 581
- Lublin, 45, 465; Union of, 501
- Lubny, 235–6, 261–2, 264–5, 329, 331, 333; regiment, 267–8, 329
- Lukashevych, Vasyli', 205–6
- Lutsk, 45, 427, 606; eparchy, 425
- Lviv, 30, 32, 427–8, 440–1, 604, 606; bishop of, 441, 443; consistory, 431, 439; ecclesiastical court, 431; eparchy (Uniate), 425, 431, 435, 438–9, 441, 444; Jesuit college, 464–5
- Lysenko, Ivan, 225–8
- Lyzohub Chronicle*, 611, 613
- Maksymovych, Ioan, 472, 485, 488
- Maksymovych, Mykhailo, 58, 79, 110–11
- Malynov's'kyi, Platon, 460, 462, 464, 485
- Manifesto on Noble Freedoms, 252
- maps, 31–3, 35–7, 39–50, 74, 77; Ukraine, on the, 27–8, 34–7, 42–5, 47–9, 51–2. *See also* cartography
- Markevych, Mykola, 72, 78–9
- Markov, Mikhail, 70, 74, 91
- Markovych, Iakiv, 60, 75
- Markovyches, 235, 617
- marriage: birth rate and, 233, 346; demography of, 347–52, 381–4; dowry, 348
- Massa, Isaac, 29, 31
- Matkovs'kyi, Tymofii, 440–1
- Mazepa, Ivan, 40–3, 225–9, 238–40, 508–10, 518–19, 552–3, 579–81; in Cossack chronicles, 610; God-given hetman, 505; as “good” hetman, 518–19; Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, 41; and Volodymyr the Great, 579; war of manifestos, 586, 589, 591
- Medical Collegium, 155, 157–9, 162–3, 166, 170
- medical professionals, 146–7, 149, 151, 154, 157, 163–4
- Menshikov, Aleksandr, 250, 571, 612
- Mglin, 332, 338, 345
- Mhohohrishnyi, Demian (Ihnatovych), 243, 610
- Military Collegium, 157–9, 162, 251, 260
- military democracy, 220, 228, 520
- Mitrofanov, Sila, 155, 157
- Mizin, Stefan, 234–5
- Mohyla, Petro, 102, 104, 109, 471–2, 500–1, 506
- Mokiiiev's'kyi, Kostiantyn, 226–7
- Moldavia, 42–3, 75, 144, 148, 338
- Moll, Herman, 44, 46

- Moraw, Peter, 475, 490
- Moscow: Academy, 484; Agreement of 1665, 243; patriarchate, 397, 427; Society of History and Antiquities, 60; University, 71, 77, 478, 481, 484
- Müller, Gerhard, 64, 74, 76, 332, 338
- Muscovite Tsardom, 29–30, 34–7, 39–40, 43–6, 545, 562, 581–3; in Cossack chronicles, 614; on the maps, 29, 38; as Rus', 31; territory of, 38; and Ukraine, 51. *See also* Russia; Russian Empire
- Muslims, 181, 618, 620
- Mykhail, Saint (metropolitan of Kyiv), 398, 403
- Myloradovych, Mykhailo, 123–5, 127, 139–40, 313
- Myrhorod, 331–3, 335; regiment, 261–2, 351
- Myronenko, Stepan, 189–90
- Myslavs'kyi, Samuil, 479, 481–5, 491
- Mytkevych, Ieronim, 460, 462, 464
- Nadezhdin, Nikolai, 64–5
- Napoleon, 11–12, 203–8, 212
- Nashchyns'kyi, Davyd, 455–7
- nation, 62, 69, 543, 566, 570; in Bendery Constitution, 567, 569; the Enlightenment concept of, 567; modern, 543; nation-building, 5–6, 13, 81, 520, 544; nation-state, 49, 542–3, 569; Rus', 530; Ruthenian, 501, 530; Slavic-Rus', 62
- national consciousness, 542, 553–5
- nationalism, 78, 580, 615
- national movement, 39, 554
- natural law, 137, 476, 552, 566
- New Russia gubernia, 66–7, 71–2, 174–8, 188–9, 193, 332
- New Serbia, 174
- Nicholas I, 99, 110
- Nizhyn, 229–30, 262, 331–41, 344–8, 352–3; Chronicle, 606; regiment, 226, 229, 266–7, 332
- nobility, 150, 179, 187–90, 206–9, 251–3, 430–1; Commission on the Freedoms of the, 253; Little Russian, 203, 208–9. *See also* gentry
- Nolin, Jean-Baptiste, 38, 44
- Novgorod, 30–1, 104–5, 108, 133, 403
- Novhorod-Siverskyi, 66, 69, 332, 334, 483, 488; vicegerency, 162, 333
- Nuremberg, 37, 42–3
- Obydovs'kyi, Ivan, 229–30
- Odesa, 68, 100, 189
- Ohloblyn, Oleksander, 81, 204, 229
- Okhtyrka, 129, 141, 303; regiment, 126, 141, 304, 312, 385
- Olsuf'ev, Adam, 125, 128
- Orel, 45, 243
- Orlai, Ivan, 62, 67, 73
- Orlyk, Pylyp, 508, 510, 560–6, 569–74, 585, 589
- Ornovs'kyi, Ivan, 505
- Orthodox Church, 395–8, 402, 406, 417, 426; and book publishing, 397–403; in Bratslav palatinate, 428; and education, 471; in Kyiv palatinate, 102, 428; liturgical books, 404–5; seminaries, 477, 480–1; Ukrainian-Belarusian, 427; unification of, 415, 417–18
- Orthodox colleges, 472; curriculum of, 478–85; and educational reform, 474, 477–8; and German Protestant universities, 485–6; and Jesuit colleges, 472–3, 475, 478; libraries of, 478; students of, 471, 473, 486; teachers of, 473; teaching practices in, 476, 478, 482; and university models, 475; utilitarian orientation of, 486
- Orthodoxy, 39, 425–6, 561, 615, 620. *See also* Orthodox Church
- Oster, 332, 334
- Ostrohozsk, 115, 119–20, 123–7, 129, 141; regiment, 115, 119–20, 126, 304, 309–11, 313
- Ostropols'kyi, Pavlo, 191, 588
- Ostroz'kyi-Lokhvyts'kyi, Ivan, 115–16, 136, 309
- Ostroz'kyis, 500–1
- Ottoman Empire, 28–9, 41, 138, 145, 151
- Ovruch, 429, 433, 442
- Pacta Conventa*, 14, 563, 576
- Palii, Semen, 425, 428
- Panchenko, Hryhorii, 236–7

- panegyrics, 501–2, 505, 507, 509, 511, 581–2
- Panin, Petr, 125, 128, 249
- Paris, 34, 37, 48, 53–4, 56, 203
- paternalism, 134, 141
- patriotism, 12, 437, 529, 542, 580; Little Russian, 551; regional, 442
- Paul I, 200, 335, 552
- peasants, 134, 148–52, 193–4, 235–7, 282–4, 339–40
- Perehinsk, eparchial synod in, 439
- Pereiaslav, 4, 225–9, 333–6, 344–53, 535–6, 573–4; Agreement of 1654, 4, 533, 544, 546–7, 549, 590, 603; Articles of 1659, 221; College, 472, 476, 479, 486; Orthodox consistory, 434, 436; palatinate, 29; population of, 344, 347, 349, 353–4, 379; regiment, 225–6, 228–9, 243, 341, 348
- Perekhrest, Ivan, 304–5
- Peremyshl. *See* Przemyśl
- Peter I, 37–8, 40–1, 46–7, 142, 557, 594; as an emperor, 579; and Hetmanate, 548; manifestos of, 582–3, 586; and Mazepa, 41; reforms of, 548; and Zaporozhian Sich, 237, 583
- Peter II, 219, 223, 591
- Peter III, 184, 248, 252–3
- Petrovs'kyi, Mykola, 229, 243
- Petryk, Ivan, 532, 534, 536, 591
- Pinovs'kyi, Syl'vestr, 460, 462, 464
- Platon (metropolitan of Moscow), 103–4
- Pleshcheev, Sergei, 64, 66
- Plokhyy, Serhii, 6–7, 13, 499, 501, 504–5, 507
- Pochaina River, 107, 111
- Pochep, 332, 334, 345
- Podilia, 30, 36, 44–5, 51, 71–2, 604–5; palatinate, 425, 435
- Pogodin, Mikhail, 65, 110
- Pohar, 332, 338, 345
- Pokas, Hryhorii, 612–13
- Poland, 30–2, 34–8, 41–2, 44, 48, 50–1, 71; on the maps, 36, 43, 47–51. *See also* Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
- Poletyka, Hryhorii, 60, 549
- Polish Crown. *See* Poland; Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
- Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 7–8, 33–5, 471–2, 499–500, 529–31, 543–5, 580–1, 615–16; partitions of, 9, 47, 49–50, 52, 166; Ukrainian palatinates of, 395
- Polish Uprising of 1830, 78, 99
- Polisia, 429, 431, 440, 604, 606
- Poltava, 192, 213, 228–35, 331–9, 365, 590; age of marriage in, 375–7, 379–82; aging in, 370, 372; artisans in, 340; Battle of, 42, 97, 579, 586–8, 590–1; children in, 368–9; court, 328; demography, 12, 361, 363, 366–9, 374; gubernia, 72, 191, 203, 205, 208; marriage market in, 383–5; municipal administration of, 335; regiment, 228, 232, 230–5, 332, 362, 368; townspeople of, 229; travelers in, 97
- Popovs'kyi, Inokentii, 459, 462, 464
- Potemkin, Grigorii, 11, 175–80, 182–4, 186–7, 192–3, 196; and administrative reforms, 181; chancellery of, 196; and Cossack *starshyna*, 190–1; and land gifts, 198; and patron-client relationship, 185
- Pozdeev, Ivan, 279–81, 287
- Prokopovych, Teofan, 460, 466, 483–4, 579–80, 586–8, 591; sermon of, 586; *Spiritual Regulation*, 476–7; *Vladimir*, 505, 579
- Prussia, 27, 48–9, 52, 264
- Pryluky, 265, 330–1, 335, 337; regiment, 224, 236–7, 327, 332, 385
- Przemyśl (Peremyshl), 43, 427, 438; Uniate eparchy, 425
- Pufendorf, Samuel, 476, 481, 483
- Purchotius, Edmund, 455–7
- Pushkar, Martyn, 220, 611
- Radomyshl, 429, 440, 443–4; consistory, 430, 434, 438, 440–1, 444; synod in (1754), 441
- Rakushka-Romanovs'kyi, Roman, 608, 610
- Reiters, 277, 291, 414; duties of, 279, 287–90; ethnicity of, 284; income of, 286–7; in Kyiv,

- 277–9, 282–3, 291; literacy among, 282; promotion in ranks, 284–5; recruitment of, 280–2; in Russian military, 278; social background of, 281, 283; social status of, 278, 281
- Renaissance, 27, 63, 102, 562–3, 565
- Rigel'man, Oleksandr, 74, 601
- Roman Catholic Church, 431, 434, 437–8, 440–3
- Romanticism, 10, 78
- Rome, 425, 433–5, 444
- Romny, 208, 329, 338
- Rostopchin, Fedor, 184–5, 199, 205
- Rozumovs'kyi, Kyrylo, 247–9, 253–4, 258, 264, 270, 336–7; ammunition and equipment reform, 261–3, 266; court of, 255; and flag reform, 266–7; and gunpowder production, 269; and judicial reforms, 328, 335; military reforms of, 248, 263, 269; and *starshyna*, 249, 251
- Rozumovs'kyi, Oleksii, 247, 612
- Ruin (Ruina), 29, 33, 40, 611
- Rumiantsev, Nikolai, 107–9
- Rumiantsev, Petr, 133–5, 157, 162, 171–2, 196
- Rurikids, 544
- Rus', 29, 60–7, 81–2, 107–9, 544, 605–6; Black, 35, 39, 41; Lithuanian, 45; *Major Rus'*, 544; *Malaia Rossiia*, 546; on the maps, 29–32; *Minor Rus'*, 544; Moscow as, 32; palatinate, 31, 33; in Polish tradition, 31, 45, 545; in the princely titles, 545; Red, 36–7, 43–6, 51, 64; and *Rossiia*, 545; territory of, 32–3; titulary, 31
- Russia, 30, 37–9, 44–5, 48–50, 60–1, 69–71, 205–6, 208–9; national identity of, 554; rus'-ness (*rus'kost'*), 62; South, 7, 11, 60, 66–8, 78, 81; Southwestern, 65, 67–8; the term, 40, 46, 62–3; territory of, 46, 64. *See also* Muscovite Tsardom; Russian Empire
- Russian: government, 221, 223, 305, 308–9, 313–18; language, 72, 406–9, 482, 494, 550–1
- Russian: gubernias, 127, 129, 131, 133, 142; identity, 64
- Russian Empire, 4–11, 13, 24, 57–95, 118, 142–5, 174–5; army of, 150–1, 172, 175–8, 188, 209, 212; education in, 472, 475; imperial bureaucracy, 11, 174, 180–1, 190; and local elites, 121–2; on the maps, 47; modernization of, 118, 315; and the Napoleonic wars, 203; nobility of, 66, 181, 190, 195, 252; reforms in, 117–18, 124, 126, 159, 161, 171; territory and borders of, 51, 61, 121; as well-regulated state, 548
- Russian Orthodox Church, 419, 474
- Russian Table of Ranks, 253
- Ruthenian: nation, 446, 499, 501, 522, 530; palatinate, 30, 33, 51
- Ruthenians, 5, 31–2, 34, 51–2, 426–7, 569–70
- Rzeczpospolita. *See* Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
- Sahaidachnyi, Petro, 28, 607–8
- St Andrew's Church, 99, 111
- St Michael's (Golden-Domed) Monastery, 98–100, 507
- St Sophia's Cathedral, 99–100, 103, 106, 579
- Sakovych, Kasiian, 607
- Samogitia, 30, 600
- Samoilovych, Danylo, 144, 146–7, 150, 166
- Samoilovych, Ivan, 144–7, 231–2, 505, 508–12, 610–11; in panegyrics, 511; in *Velychko Chronicle*, 518
- Samuïl (metropolitan of Kyiv), 398, 408
- Sanson, Guillaume, 36, 39
- Sanson, Nicolas, 35–6
- Sarmatism, 14, 27, 38, 570, 599–603
- Sbitnev, Ivan, 99, 106
- Senyk, Sophia, 425–6
- Seutter, Matthäus, 37, 46
- Sevsk, 45, 81, 278
- Shafons'kyi, Afanasii (Opanas), 74–6, 278, 291, 327
- Shakhovskii, Iakov, 125, 128, 253
- Shcherbats'kyi, Tymofii, 404, 410, 412, 455–6
- Shcherbinin, Evdokim, 118–20, 122–5, 127–30, 133–5, 137–40

- Shcherbinin commission, 116, 119–20, 123, 131, 140
- Sheptyts'kyi, Atanasii, 426, 430–3, 435–9, 442
- Sheptyts'kyi, Lev, 434, 438, 440, 442–3
- Shipov, Mikhail, 157–8
- Shpyhots'kyi, Opanas, 78, 80
- Shtepa, Pavlo, 207–8
- Shumlians'kyi, Iosyf, 428–9
- Shykevyich, Zakharii, 226, 243
- Shyshats'kyi, Varlaam, 204, 206–7, 213
- Siberia, 38, 78, 208, 226
- Sich Cossacks. *See* Zaporozhians
- Sievers, Jacob, 133, 171
- Sigismund III Vasa, 336, 529
- Sinel'nikov, Ivan, 181, 190, 193
- Sirko, Ivan, 75, 534, 611
- Skinner, Barbara, 19, 168, 427, 447
- Skoropads'kyi, Ivan, 228–9, 236–7, 585–6, 590, 617
- Skovoroda, Hryhorii, 76, 483
- Slavynets'kyi, Iepifanii, 506
- Sloboda Cossacks, 76, 121, 274
- Sloboda regiments, 115–19, 122, 126–8, 133–5, 300–1, 305–13; dynasties of colonels in, 302; foreign officers in, 126; hussar, 129; reforms in, 125–7; social antagonism in, 120; *starshyna* of, 12, 16, 119–26, 128–9, 140, 301. *See also* Sloboda Ukraine
- Sloboda Ukraine, 6–7, 12, 16, 71–2, 76, 116–20, 298; abolition of autonomy, 11–12, 116–19, 121, 124–5, 128–9, 131; administrative reform in, 130; autonomy of, 116, 121, 125–6, 128; census in, 123; gubernia, 76, 78, 119, 121, 125, 127–9; judicial system, 131; police services, 132; reforms in, 128–9; taxes, 131
- Slomyns'kyi, Hedeon, 461, 466
- Slonovka, 115–16, 123
- Sluch River, 30, 75, 605–6
- Smila, 432, 437
- Smolensk, 43, 121, 194, 207
- Smolitsch, Igor, 477, 490
- Sofonovych, Feodosii, 524, 530, 581, 588, 590
- Somko, Iakym, 236, 516, 533, 610
- Sossa, Rostyslav, 28, 38
- Soviet Union, 59, 62
- Stanisław I Leszczyński (king), 49, 582
- Starodub, 224, 238–9, 331–4, 344–8, 350–2; regiment, 224, 265, 331–2, 377, 379
- starshyna*, 5, 127, 133–4, 223–4, 226–9, 548; cooptation of, 190, 251–3; elections of, 12, 220–33, 237–8, 240–1; familial clans of, 298–9, 302, 309, 314; heritability of rank, 300, 303–9; in the imperial social hierarchy, 251; junior ensigns, 308–9; Little Russian Ranks and, 252–4; regimental, 236; and Russian government, 305, 309, 311–13; as a social estate, 298, 311; as subjects of the tsar, 508
- Stefan Batory (king), 31–2, 53, 603
- Steppe Ukraine, 11, 175, 178–9, 183–5; abolishing of autonomy, 173–4; administrative-territorial reform in, 174, 176–80, 182; foreign nobility in, 189; imperial bureaucracy in, 173, 178, 180–2, 185, 187–9, 191; Little Russian officials, 189–90, 192; population of, 180
- Storozhenko, Ivan, 236–7
- Sumy regiment, 303, 305, 307, 310, 312
- Sureva, Natalia, 190, 200
- Sviatopolk-Chetvertyns'kyi, Hedeon, 427
- Synopsis*, 62–3, 82, 401
- Sysyn, Frank, 6, 13, 23, 445, 488
- szlachta*. *See* gentry
- Table of Little Russian Ranks, 253–4
- Table of Ranks, 126
- Tatars, 34, 36, 104, 106, 518–19, 618. *See also* Crimea; Crimean Khanate
- Tatishchev, Vasili, 46, 64
- Tavriia oblast, 181–2
- Teplov, Grigorii, 171, 257
- Terekhtemyriv, 32, 432, 536, 574
- Teteria, Pavlo, 222, 581
- Tev'iashov, Stepan, 119, 125–7, 140–1, 313
- Titov, Fedor, 186, 399

- Tolmachev, Iakov, 479, 483
 towns: archdiocesan, 337; councils, 147–51; crown, 337
 townspeople, 131, 134, 225, 228, 331, 336–7; estate, 340; and starshyna, 336–7, 340
 Transylvania, 34, 43
 tsar, 31, 53, 209–10, 221, 229–30; divine authority of, 506–7; Orthodox, 209, 507; as the protector, 507, 547–8; the title of, 546; virtues, 507
 Tsargrad. *See* Istanbul
 Tuptalo, Dymytrii, 506, 581, 600
 Turks, 28, 45. *See also* Muslims
 Tutolmin, Timofei, 180, 185, 198
 Tykhors'kyi, Epifanii, 488
- Ukraine, 5–9, 13–14, 31–2, 67–9, 144–5, 219–21, 608–9; as a borderland, 29, 74; borders between Right- and Left-Bank, 151, 159; and frontier thesis, 314; incorporation into the Russian Empire, 51; Left-Bank, 34, 36–7, 46–8, 151–3, 161–3, 165–6; Little Russia as, 38–9, 59, 75, 82, 534; reforms in Left-Bank, 161–3, 165; resettlement of the population, 428–9; Right-Bank, 36–7, 45–6, 149–53, 165–6, 226–8, 424–5, 427, 534–5; as Rus', 29–30, 43, 58; and symbolic geography, 10–11; the term, 35–6, 74–6, 78–9, 81, 546, 553; territory of, 29, 31, 33–4, 36, 43–5, 48. *See also* Hetmanate; Little Russia; Sloboda Ukraine; Steppe Ukraine
 Ukrainian intelligentsia, 204, 553–4
 Ukrainian Line, 174
 Uman, 148, 151, 433; vicariate, 442
 Uniate Church, 395, 424–7, 431, 434, 501; in Bratslav palatinate, 432; in Kyiv region, 428–30, 432, 438; in Left-Bank Ukraine, 433; in Right-Bank Ukraine, 13, 425, 429–34, 437–41; *Slavia Unita*, 433–4, 437; and transconfessionalism, 433–6
 Univ: archimandry, 431; Synod of 1738, 432
- Valk, Gerard, 36, 43
 Valk, Leonard, 36, 43
 Valkevych, Petro, 247, 257
 Vasylykiv, 151–2, 154–5, 157–60
 Vaugondy, Didier Robert de, 37, 48
 Vaugondy, Robert de, 48–9
 Velychko, Samiilo, 508–9, 513–19, 532–5, 589–91, 600–1, 609–11
Velychko Chronicle, 528, 530, 533, 603–6, 609–12; authenticity of the documents, 530, 532; and Zaporozhian Sich, 531
 Velychkovs'kyi, Ivan, 505, 511
 Venelin, Iurii, 58, 63, 73
 Vilboa, Aleksandr (Alexander de Villebois), 249, 269
 Vilnius, 207, 440
 Vilnius Academy, 458, 464, 560
 Vinnytsia, 147–8
 Vistula, 35, 86, 606
 Vladimir (city), 39, 105, 107, 113, 490
 Voeikov, Fedor, 157–8, 170, 172
 Volchans'kyi, Iosyf, 460, 464
 Volhynia, 30–3, 36, 41, 45, 47, 51; palatinate, 31, 533
 Volodymyr the Great (Saint), 104–5, 109, 500, 507, 536
 Voltaire, 44, 108
 Vyhovs'kyi, Ivan, 220–1, 505, 513, 534–5, 611
 Vytiazenko, Hryhorii, 230–1
- Wallachia, 30, 42–3, 338
 War Collegium, 188, 190, 194, 279
 Warsaw, 146, 150, 153, 207–8, 344, 346
 White Russia. *See* Belarus
 Wild Field, 27–9, 35, 42–3, 300, 325
 Winkler, Johann Heinrich, 455–6, 482–3
 Władysław IV Vasa (king), 507, 515, 517, 612
 Wolff, Christian, 13, 455, 482–4
 Wolff, Larry, 37, 44, 427
- Zakrevs'kyi, Viktor, 207–8
 Zalties'kyi, Ivan, 233–5

- Zamość (Zamostia), 43; Synod, 426, 430, 438
 Zamość Academy, 435
 Zamostia. *See* Zamo
 Zaporizhzhia, 86, 236, 603
 Zaporozhian Host, 29–30, 219–22, 510–11, 518–20, 543–7, 585; autonomy of, 219; coat of arms of, 268; as the nation, 515–16. *See also* Cossacks; Hetmanate
 Zaporozhians, 44, 175–6, 178, 211–12, 230, 237, 513–14, 533–6
 Zaporozhian Sich, 230, 513–14, 518, 531, 533–4, 536; Chortomlyk Sich, 46; in Cossack chronicles, 610; destruction of, 175, 178; Old Sich, 44
 Zbarazh, 582, 606
 Zboriv, Treaty of, 35, 503, 605
 Zhovkva, 435, 606
 Zhuchenko, Fedir, 231–3
 Zhukovskii, Vasiliï, 110–11
 Zhytomyr, 86, 197, 429–31; Synod, 430; Union of 1715, 427, 429
 Zinoviïv, Klymentii, 367, 382
 Zorka, Samiïlo, 530, 609
 Zubov, Platon, 182, 184–5, 187