THE ABOLITION OF UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY (1763-1786): A CASE STUDY IN THE INTEGRATION OF A NON-RUSSIAN AREA INTO THE EMPIRE

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES

Annals of UAAS		Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and
Autors or one		Sciences in the United States
ChGY		Chernigovskija gubernskija vedomosti
ChIONL	-	Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora
CHIONE		Letopistsa
ChOIDR	-	Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiskikh pri Moskovskom univer-
		site
KSt	-	Kievskaia Starina
PSZ	-	Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii
RA	-	Russkii Arkhiv
RSt	-	Russkaia Starina
SA	-	Senatskii Arkhiv
SIRIO	•	Sbornik Imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva
Trudy KDA	-	Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii
ZIFV [V] UAN	•	Zapysky istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu [Vse]ukrains'koi Akademii Nauk

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PREFACE

During the mineteenth century, the concept of Russia as a unitary state was so deeply rooted in the ruling elite that a policy of compromise with its awakening nationalities was never given serious consideration. This failure to come to grips with the nationalities problem contributed to the eventual fall of the Empire. The almost unquestioned acceptance of the state as unitary and centralized can be attributed to centuries of historical conditioning. The pattern followed by Muscovy in annexing and absorbing non-Russian areas was, to a large extent, an extension of the gathering of "Russian lands." First, an area was conquered or voluntarily recognized the suzerainty of the tsar; then, as part of the tsar's patrimony, Muscovite governmental institutions were introduced; finally, the native elite was at least partially assimilated. This process was the natural outgrowth of the highly centralized Muscovite political system. Until the reign of Catherine II, however, a unitary state as a theoretical and practical goal was never clearly articulated. By abolishing the administrative structure of the territories which remained self-governing, Catherine gave final shape to both the multinational yet unitary character of the Empire, and to the imperial "nationality" policy consistently pursued by her heirs.

This work deals with the integration into the Empire of one of its autonomous non-Russian borderlands--the Ukrainian Hetmanate. Its focus is upon three principle problems. The first is an analysis of

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the formation, theoretical justification, and execution of Russian policies towards the Hetmanate and other autonomous regions. The second is an assessment of the Ukrainian reaction to imperial integration--a question which requires an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian institutions and their importance to Ukrainian society. The third problem is an evaluation of the success of imperial integration, its effect on Ukrainian society, and the Hetmanate's role in the development of modern Ukrainian national consciousness.

Although Catherine abolished the autonomy of three Ukrainian regions -- Sloboda-Ukraine, Zaporozhzhia, and the Hetmanate -- the scope of this work is confined to the Hetmanate. By the time Catherine came to the throne, the autonomy of Sloboda-Ukraine, whose institutions of self-government had never been well-developed, was already quite limited. As a Cossack republic with great symbolic importance for Ukrainian traditions, Zaporizhzhia and its destruction must be viewed in the context of the Empire's larger policy vis-a-vis Cossack hosts. The Hetmanate was much larger than either of these two autonomous regions and was in addition : equipped with a well-developed administration and social structure. The region boasted its own army as well as its own legal, judicial, administrative and financial systems. Its Ukrainian elite developed a distinctive political ideology and retained a separate historical consciousness. As a major unassimilated border area of the Empire, the Hetmanate is well-suited for a case study of imperial integration under Catherine.

The politics of integration analyses how the army, the administration, the judicial and financial systems, the Church, and even the

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social structure were recast along imperial patterns. However, no attempt has been made to deal with the complex process of cultural assimilation and "Russification." Study of the latter phenomenon would entail extensive research on Ukrainian-Russian linguistic and literary relations as well as the education, social life, and careers of the Ukrainian nobility and clergy. Acculturation and "Russification" are, therefore, mentioned only as they relate to an understanding of institutional integration and imperial policy towards the Hetmanate.

This is the first work to attempt a comprehensive study of the integration of the Hetmanate into the Russian Empire. While some aspects of the abolition of its autonomy have been examined, most historians who have dealt with the Hetmanate were, for the most part, interested in other periods and problems than those of its integration. This is hardly surprising, for the final stages of dissolution are rarely popular topics in a national historiography. Nevertheless, the various nineteenth- and twentieth-century historical schools have made major contributions in basic research and interpretation which must be considered in any study of this topic.

One problem to which historians have devoted considerable attention is the juridical nature of the Hetmanate's union with Muscovy. The center of controversy has revolved around the precise definition of the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement by which Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Ukrainian elite recognized the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsar. The various interpretations which have been advanced include personal union, real union, protectorate, vassalage, military alliance, autonomy.

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incorporation, and reunion.¹ This topic continues to be highly controversial, exacerbated by current political considerations. In the Soviet Union, for example, the Treaty of Pereiaslav has been officially defined by the Central Committee of the Communist Party as a permanent, voluntary "reunion" of two "fraternal peoples."² While the arguments over the judicial natile of the Hetmanate's relationship with Russia have added considerably to our knowledge of the Hetmanate's early stages, they have contributed little to an understanding of the abolition of autonomy.

The social struggles of the Hetmanate have been thoroughly studied by the populist historians who dominated Ukrainian historiography from the 1850's to the twentieth century. They viewed the Cossack era as a time when the masses struggled for freedom and social justice against the exploitative and parasitical Ukrainian elite. The populists collected and published some of the basic archival materials and contributed a number of monographs on the Hetmanate's social structure and institutions. Most notable among them are the over 400 works of Oleksander Lazarevs'kyi on virtually every aspect of Hetmanate society.³ In

¹The best summary of the various interpretations is found in A. Iakovliv's (Jakovliv), Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory v XVII-XVIII vikakh (Vol. XIX of Pratsi Ukrains'koho naukovoho instytutu, Warsaw: 1934), pp. 45-52.

²Tezy pro 300-richchia vozz"iednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu (1648-1654 rr), skhvaleni Tsentralnym komitetom Komunistychnoi partii Radians'koho soiuza (Kiev: 1954).

Mykola Tkachenko compiled a definitive bibliography of Lazarevs'kyi's works. See, "Spysok prats' O. N. Lazarevs'koho i prats' pro n'oho," Ukrains'kyi arkheohrafichnyi zbirnyk, Vol. II (1927), pp. 1ilxxx. dealing with the abolition, the populists naturally concentrated on social issues: For instance, the Cossacks' fate was treated by Mykola Storozhenko,⁴ the transformation of the Cossack officer class into the Russian nobility was traced by Dmytro Miller,⁵ and the enserfment of the peasantry was studied by O. Lazarevs'kyi and V. Miakotin.⁶

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a new generation of Ukrainian historians revolted against populism and followed a new "statist" orientation. They viewed the Hetmanate as a virtually independent state and concentrated their research on such indicators of this status as foreign relations, internal administration, and the Ukrainian legal system. These historians were, for the most part, preoccupied with the earlier period when the Hetmanate was indeed virtually independent. Their main contribution to the period of the abolition lies in their study of various instances of opposition to imperial integration. In fact, the greatest debate of the statist school concerns the authorship of Istoriia Rusov, an anti-integrationist and even anti-

⁵D. Miller, "Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskago byta staroi Malorossii. Prevrashchenie kozatskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo," <u>KSt</u>, 1897, No. 1, pp. 1-31; No. 2, pp. 188-220; No. 3, pp. 351-374; No. 4, pp. 1-47.

6A. Lazarevskii, Malorossiiskie pospolitye krest'iane (1648-1783 gg.) (Kiev: 1908); V. Miakotin, Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy v XVII-XVIII vv. (3 parts in separate books; Prague: 1926); V. Miakotin, Prikreplenie krest'ianstva Ukrainy v XVII-XVIII vv (Book 28 of Godishnik na Sofiiskiia Universitet; Sofia: 1932).

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⁴N. Storozhenko, "K istorii Malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale XIX veka," <u>Kievskaia Starina</u> (henceforth <u>KSt</u>), 1897, No. 4, pp. 124-156; No. 6, pp. 460-483; No. 10, pp. 115-131; No. 11, pp. 143-156; No. 12, pp. 332-350.

Russian political tract which had an important impact on the development of modern Ukrainian national consciousness.⁷ Special mention must be made of the work in this area by Oleksander Ohloblyn, who has done much to identify various oppositionist circles at the time of the abolition.⁸

Finally, Soviet historians, in practice, consider the abolition of the Hetmanate's autonomy a politically sensitive topic which is best ignored.⁹ Their contribution is limited to two topics: the class struggle and the "friendship" of the Ukrainian and Russian people. Soviet historians researched various manifestations of social discontent and have expanded our knowledge of Cossack and peasant uprisings, especially in the village of Turbaiv.¹⁰ Under the rubric of the "mutual

7The varied interpretations as to the authorship and philosophy of <u>Istoriia Rusov</u> has been discussed by O. Ohloblyn in the introduction of a new Ukrianian translation of the work, see <u>Istoriia Rusiv</u> (New York: 1956), pp. V-XXIX.

80. Ohloblyn, Liudy Staroi Ukrainy (Munich: 1959); "Ukrainian Autonomists of the 1780's and 1790's and Count P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky," <u>Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in</u> the United States (henceforth <u>Annals of UAAS</u>), Vol. VI, No. 3-4 (1958), pp. 1313-1326; Opanas Lobysevych (1732-1805) (Munich: 1966).

⁹The historians who published in the Soviet Ukraine in the 1920's are not considered by me as "Soviet" but as representatives of various schools. Only with the establishment of an official historical interpretation in the 1930's can one accurately use "Soviet" to define a historical school.

10I. O. Hurzhii, Borot'ba selian i robitnykiv Ukrainy proty feodal'no-kriposnyts'koho knitu (z 80-kh rokiv XVIII-st. do 1861 r) (Kiev: 1958); Istoriia selianstva Ukrains'koi RSR (2 vols.; Kiev: 1967); K. Huslystyi, Turbaivs'ke povstannia (Kiev: 1947); I. Hurzhii, Povstannia selian v Turbaiakh (1789-1793) (Kiev: 1950). friendship" between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, the Soviets have produced many works on the common struggle against Napoleon, which included the re-establishment of several traditional Cossack units.¹¹

Denial of access to Soviet archives has limited this study to published sources. However, most of the basic sources dealing with the abolition have been published, including Catherine's correspondence, the petitions to the Legislative Commission of 1767, the papers of 0. Bezborod'ko, and the reports of foreign emissaries all of which are in the Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva (St. Petersburg: 1867-1916). Governor-General Rumiantsev's military archives, Catherine's papers, the Cossack chronicles, and official documents dealing with the Hetmanate are found in the Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete (Moscow: 1846-1918). Virtually all the laws bearing upon the abolition have been published in the Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii (St. Petersburg: 1830) and the Senatskii Arkhiv (St. Petersburg: 1888-1913). Nineteenth-century journals such as Kievskaia Starina (Kiev: 1882-1906) and newspapers such as Chernigovskiia gubernskiia vedomosti (Chernihiv: 1838-1917) contain pertinent documentation in virtually every issue. These are but a few outstanding examples of the wealth of published documents on the abolition.

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¹¹G. Gerbil'skyi, Ukrainskie kozachie polki i ukrainskoe opolchenie v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda (Kiev: 1943); V. I. Strel'skii, Uchastie ukrainskogo naroda v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda (Kiev: 1953); B. S. Abolikhin, Ukrainskoe opolchenie 1812 g. (No. 72 of Istoricheskie zapiski; Moscow: 1962).

Much of this material has never been incorporated into the general body of historical knowledge. This study seeks at least partially to rectify this neglect. Undoubtedly, lacunae in knowledge and documentation will continue to exist. It is hoped, however, that this contribution will stimulate further study, especially that based on archival research, which can fill the remaining gaps.

A few words are necessary on problems of terminology in the present work. During the eighteenth century the territory under study was known as "Little Russia." Prior to the eighteenth century and again in the nineteenth century the term "Little Russia" was synonymous with "Ukraine" and thus can be associated with territories not part of the Hetmanate. Nineteenth century historians introduced a more precise name, "the Hetmanate," which denotes the area governed by the hetman and referred to the populace as "Ukrainians." Similarly, this study uses the terms "Little Russia" and "Little Russian" only in direct quotations and when they are part of an official title (e.g. The Little Russian College).

Ukrainian names are given in accordance with Ukrainian spelling, while Russian ones are rendered in Russian form. In citing articles, the author's name is given exactly as it appears in the publication. This, of course, creates occasional inconsistencies, since an author's name might appear in one form within the text and in another in a footnote. Moreover a number of historians wrote in several languages and their names may have several variants. The bibliography and index list all names according to alphabetical order, with cross references if more than one version of a particular name has appeared.: All Ukrainian and Russian names have been transliterated

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according to the Library of Congress system.

All dates, except in citations of Western diplomats, are given according to the Julian calendar then in use in the Hetmanate and Russia (in the eighteenth century, the Julian calendar was eleven days behind the Gregorian one followed in most countries of Europe). When a date appears according to the Gregorian calendar, it is designated as "new style" (N.S.).

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Based on a map published in: Akademiia nauk URSR, <u>Istoriia</u> <u>ukrains'koi RSR</u>. 2 vols., Kiev, 1967; Vol. 1, p. 311.



Based on: <u>General'naia karta Rossiiskoi Imperii na piatdesiat</u> gubernii razdelennoi s pokazaniem sosedstvennykh vladenii i bol'shikh dorog. Izdana i gravirovana tituliarnym sovetnikom Al. Savinkovym, St. Petersburg, 1809.

CHAPTER I

THE HETMANATE PRIOR TO 1762

1. The Origins of the Hetmanate

The origins of the Hetmanate go back to the 1648 Cossack revolution, one of the most cataclysmic events in Ukrainian history. During that time, the Polish administration and ruling elites were swept from the Ukraine and entire segments of the population--magnates, Poles, Catholics, Uniates (adherents of Eastern Christianity who recognize papal supremacy), Jews were slaughtered or driven from the territory. The ferocity of the revolution was due to the convergence of social, religious, and--to some extent--national grievances which briefly united the greater part of the Orthodox population of the Ukraine, including the petty nobility, clergy, Cossacks, and peasants. It was the Cossacks, however, who provided the military strength which made the uprising possible and who replaced the Polish administration with their own institutions.

The Cossacks were a military caste living in the no-man's-land between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They were free men recruited from all strata of the population; most, however, were runaway serfs. The borderland, with its freedom and wealth attracted bold men, who risked the constant danger of Tatar

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attacks while venturing into the steppe to hunt, fish, and farm. For self-protection, the Cossacks began organizing themselves into armed bands which, by the sixteenth century, were consolidated into a Cossack host. Having become firmly entrenched on an island fortress, the <u>Sich</u>, located in an area beyond the Dnieper cataracts, called <u>Zaporizhzhia</u> (hence the name Zaporozhian Cossacks), the Cossacks became an army of mercenaries and freebooters.¹

The Polish government soon began enlisting the Cossacks in the defence of the southern frontier against the Tatars and Turks and as auxiliary troops in its numerous wars. As a reward for their services to the Polish crown, the Cossacks demanded the recognition of certain "Cossack rights and privileges." These included self-government, the right to own land, to hunt, fish, and trade, to produce alcoholic beverages, and to be exempt from taxation. But Poland's ruling class, the <u>szlachta</u>, who claimed these prerogatives as their sole preserve, refused to recognize the pretensions of the Cossacks, viewing them simply as rebellious peasants. In a society divided into lord, serf, and burgher, no special place could be made for the Cossacks, despite their military services.

As long as the Cossacks lived on the frontier between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Tatars, these social tensions remained

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^IThe history of the Cossacks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is well summarized in V. A. Golobutskii, <u>Zaporozhskoe</u> <u>kazachestvo</u> (Kiev: 1957), pp. 1-108 and treated in much greater detail in M. Hrushevs'kyi's <u>Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy</u> (10 vols.; 2ed; New York: 1954-1958), Vol. VI and Vol. VII.

under control. In the sixteenth century, however, the Polish and PolonizedUkrainian magnates began an intensive colonization of the Ukraine. They established latifundia for the large-scale production and exportation of grain. Sometimes they received title to lands containing Cossack homesteads, and the nobles would attempt to force the Cossacks to perform labor obligations, evicting them from the land if they refused. The Cossacks resisted, leading to altercations and law suits which in the eyes of the nobility set a poor example for the landlord's serfs. Attracted by temporary exemptions from labor obligations, the peasants flocked to the newly-colonized lands. But when the exemption period elapsed, the peasants frequently fled, revolted, or joined the Cossacks. It was the existence of the Cossack alternative, which became a constant source of social friction.

In dealing with the Cossacks, the Polish government found itself in a dilemma. As long as the Polish Commonwealth was involved in a war against Tatars, Turks, or Muscovy, the government needed a large number of Cossacks. But at the conclusion of hostilities, this large number was a hazard to the Commonwealth and to the nobility. The government attempted to limit and control the number of Cossacks by establishing a register of officially recognized Cossacks who were paid by the crown. During peacetime, the government tried to keep the register as low as possible, while the Cossacks always strove to enlarge it. The register fluctuated depending on the political circumstance--there were 1300 Cossacks in 1568, 6000 in 1625, and 8000 in 1638.² This represented a

21. Kholms'kyi, Istoriia Ukrainy (New York: 1949), pp. 184-194.

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brotherhoods, composed mostly of burghers, and by many of the nobles who remained Orthodox.⁵ Intense religious strife developed. Although unpopular with the Orthodox masses, the Uniate Church, backed by the Polish government, was, for a time, the only legal Eastern Church in the Commonwealth.

Until the 1620's the Cossacks strove only for the recognition of their corporate identity; then, under the particularly skillful chieftan or hetman, Petro Sahaidachnyi (1614-1622), the Cossack Army intervened on behalf of the Orthodox in their struggle against the Uniates and Roman Catholics. Under Cossack protection an Orthodox hierarchy was re-established in 1620 and the entire Zaporozhian Host joined the Kiev Orthodox Brotherhood. From 1621 Cossack demands consistently included the official recognition of the Orthodox Church and the repeal of the Union of Brest.

The religious issue was closely related to the rebirth of interest in the history of Rus' and the Church-Slavonic and "Ruthenian" languages. Through their involvement in the religious question, the Cossacks became the protectors of "national" traditions and supporters of the Ukrainian cultural revival. The fusion of the Cossack corporate issue with religious, national, and social questions sparked a national uprising led by the Cossacks. Beginning with an attempt by Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi to rectify personal and corporate grievances the uprising escalated

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⁵The Church union, the religious strife, and Cossack intervention are best treated in M. Hrushevs'kyi's <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. V and VI, and are briefly described in Dmytro Doroshenko's <u>Narys istorii</u> Ukrainy (2 vols.; 2 ed.; Munich: 1966), Vol. I, pp. 178-194.

into a Ukrainian-Polish civil war. Suddenly, Khmel'nyts'kyi and his Cossacks found themselves at the head of a coalition of Cossacks, Orthodox nobles, burghers, churchmen, and peasants. With the collapse of the Polish authorities, the Zaporozhian Army assumed the functions of a civilian administration, and, in fact, a new Cossack state emerged.⁶

Mhen a compromise with the Commonwealth (the Zboriv Treaty of 1649) failed and the struggle had become protracted, Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Ukrainian elite (Cossack officers and a number of nobles who had joined the uprising) decided to seek assistance from Muscovy. In 1654 at Pereiaslav, Khmel'nyts'kyi and the representatives of the Zaporozhian Army recognized the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsar. In return the tsar promised to assure the continuance of Ukrainian autonomy and proposed a military alliance against Poland.

Initially, the joint Cossack-Muscovite campaign against Poland enjoyed some successes--especially in Belorussia--but soon the military operations bogged down and a truce was negotiated. Strained relations between Muscovy and the Cossacks were partially responsible for the military failures. The two allies, the Cossacks and Muscovy, were each pursuing an independent foreign policy with Muscovy oriented toward Lithuanian and the Baltic area, while the Cossack state sought to secure the West Ukrainian lands with the aid of Moldavia and Transylvania. Tensions mounted when the Cossacks were excluded from the 1656 Muscovite-

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⁶For the Khmel'nyts'kyi period, see M. Hrushevs'kyi, <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. VIII-IX; V. Lipinski (Lypyns'kyi), <u>Z dziejów Ukrajiny</u> (Cracow: 1912); V. Lypyns'kyi, <u>Ukraina na perelomi 1657-59</u> (Vienna: 1920); I. Krypiakevych, <u>Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi</u> (Kiev: 1954).

Polish peace negotiations in Vilnius. Khmel'nyts'kyi even began to seek other potential protectors for his state, including Sweden.

The tensions between Ukrainian and Muscovite cultural milieus and systems of government led Khmel'nyts'kyi's successor, Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, to break with Muscovy and attempt an accomodation with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The resulting Treaty of Hadiach (1658) brought the Cossack state, as the Princedom of Rus', into an equal tripartite federation with Poland and Lithuania. Neither Muscovy nor part of the Cossack rank-and-file would accept this solution, and hostilities were resumed.⁷

While the war over the Ukraine continued, factions within the Zaporozhian Army vacillated between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania. The struggle so polarized the Ukraine that two separate hetmans, administrations, and armies emerged; those in the Right-Bank Ukraine were pro-Polish, while those on the Left Bank were pro-Muscovite. Each hetman with his allies attempted to eliminate his counterpart and obtain sole control of the Ukraine, but neither side had sufficient strength to achieve supremacy. Exhausted by nearly a decade of war, Poland and Muscovy finally agreed to a thirteen-year armistice in Andrusiv (1667).⁸ Muscovy retained control over the Left-Bank Ukraine and the city of Kiev; Poland kept the Right-Bank. The greatest fear of the Ukrainian

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⁷⁰n Vyhovs'kyi and the Hadiach Union, see M. Hrushevs'kyi, Istoriia, Vol. X, pp. 292-359.

⁸The complicated web of events from 1658 until the "eternal peace" of 1681 are best summarized in D. Doroshenko, Vol. II, pp. 51-93.

elite had, indeed, come to pass: the problem of the Ukraine was settled without their participation.

The Cossacks refused to accept this partition of the Ukraine. The Right-Bank hetman, Petro Doroshenko (ruled 1665-1676), attempted a third alternative -- uniting Ukraine with the aid of a Cossack-Ottoman-Tatar alliance. After scoring some initial victories, Doroshenko succeeded only in plunging the Ukraine into further warfare involving Poland, Crimea, the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy. Foreign troops, several warring Cossack armies, and the class antagonisms of the peasants and the Cossack rank-and-file against the elite reduced the Ukraine to anarchy -- a period known in Ukrainian historiography as "The Ruin." The Ukrainian elite was slaughtered; the Right-Bank, the arena for most of the military operations, was devastated and depopulated; even Right-Bank Cossack formations dissolved or crossed the Dnieper.⁹ Their energies and resources spent, all the participants sought peace. By 1681 a series of agreements stabilized the situation. A treaty of "eternal peace" between Poland and Muscovy assured that Moscow finally secured international recognition of her control over the Left-Bank Ukraine.

After three decades of conflict, the state established by Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi was left considerably reduced in territory. Not only had the Right Bank been lost, but the Zaporozhian Cossacks, so instrumental in the 1648 uprising, had also broken away and continued to maintain their own semi-independent republic, centered on the Sich.

⁹Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 73-93.

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The truncated Left-Bank successor to Khmel'nyts'kyi's state became known as the Hetmanate. Despite the losses incurred during "the Ruin," it retained substantial territory (including the entire present-day Chernihiv and Poltava provinces, as well as part of the Kiev, Sumy and Cherkasy provinces and several towns now located in Russia) and a population of 700,000 male inhabitants.¹⁰ From the Hetmanate's turbulent origins, a new society and system of government had emerged which differentiated this territory from both Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy. The complex political relationship between the Hetmanate and Russian authority rested upon the peculiar social structure, institutions and administration of the Hetmanate as well as the myths and political ideology which had developed among its elite.

2. The Social Structure

Throughout the eighteenth century East Central European societies were still divided into legal, corporate estates. In the Hetmanate, the constant warfare and social strife prevented the crystalization of fully developed estates. Nevertheless, the social structure was similar to East Central Europe, for it was arranged in a vertical hierarchy, and one's political power, legal privileges, and social status were determined by membership in a particular social group.

At the apex of Ukrainian society, the Ukrainian aristocracy combined elements of the old nobility or <u>szlachta</u> (Ukr. <u>shliakhta</u>) of Polish times with a newer Cossack officer elite. Considerable numbers of

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¹⁰The population figure is based on the first more or less reliable census (1719); see V. M. Kabuzan, Izmeneniia v razmeshchenii naseleniia Rossii v XVIII-pervoi polovine XIX v. (Moscow: 1971), p. 67.

shliakhta who joined the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, insisted on recognition of their previous political and social position.¹¹ During the Pereiaslav negotiations the shliakhta demanded and obtained special guarantees of their rights from the tsar. But their old position was shaken by the social revolution of 1648 and many of the shliakhta were killed, driven out of the Ukraine, or, if they were able to retain their estates, they lost the free labor of the peasantry. In some areas--those least touched by the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising--the shliakhta held on to most of their former prerogatives. For example, in the Starodub polk, the northernmost part of the Hetmanate, the shliakhta recognized the new Cossack state, served it in the same capacity it once served Poland, and continued to obtain some peasant services.

Yet even recognition of shliakhta prerogatives failed to secure for the estate its traditional leading position in society. In the first place, the new polity was the creation of the Cossack Army and the Cossack estate. Only in becoming Cossacks could the shliakhta exercise its former authority, but within the Cossack Army there already existed a new non-shliakhta elite, as well as elements antithetical to the shliakhta. Secondly, the shliakhta loyal to Khmel'nyts'kyi was too small to man the new military and administrative apparatus. Unable to control the political levers of society it could hardly maintain itself as an exclusive elite. At best, the old shliakhta could fuse with the social group performing these functions, the Cossack officer class or starshyna.

The formation of a new unified aristocracy, however, was a slow

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IIThe shliakhta who joined Khmel'nyts'kyi has been studied by Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi in <u>Ukraina na perelomi, 1657-1659</u> (Vienna: 1920) and in (W. Lipinski) <u>Z dziejów Ukrajiny</u> (Cracow: 1912).

and painful process. Constant warfare and civil strife resulted in the virtual annihilation of the elite, both shiakhta and non-shliakhta, which first emerged during the Khmel'nyts'kyi era. The next generation of Cossack officers, who had risen through the ranks during those turbulent years, laid the foundation for a more stable aristocracy. During the rule of Hetmans Ivan Samoilovych (1672-1687) and Ivan Mazepa (1687-1709), a social group appeared which possessed sufficient wealth, education, and talent to form a steady reservoir for Ukrainian military and civilian offices. Called the Znachne viis'kove tovarystvo (Distinguished Military Comrades), this new aristocracy consisted of descendants of the Ukrainian shliakhta, descendants of Cossack officers registered during Polish times, and deserving new recruits. 12 By the eighteenth century it was divided into three social categories: highest were the comrades of the standard (bunchukovi tovaryshi), those who were under the standard or bunchuk of the hetman; then came the military comrades (viis'kovi tovaryshi), those designated by the General Military Chancellery, the Hetmanate's central administration; and finally the comrades of the emblem (znachkovi tovaryshi), who were under the emblem or jurisdiction of one of the Hetmanate's regiments. Mhile not holding any office, these aristocrats were obliged to perform military and administrative duties when requested by the Ukrainian authorities. In return, they received the right to own estates, to demand labor obligations from the peasants, and to participate in affairs of state by being present at

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¹²The formation of the new aristocracy has been described by Lev Okinshevych, Zanchne viis'kove tovarystvo v Ukraini-Het'manshchyni XVII-XVIII st. (Vol. CLVII of Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeny Shevchenka; Munich: 1948).

councils. The aristocracy was also under special judicial jurisdiction: comrades of the standard could be tried only by the hetman, military comrades by the General Military Chancellery, and the comrades of the emblem by the polkovnyk.

In the eighteenth century the Znachne viis'kove tovarystvo became increasingly a closed hereditary social group. Its members began calling itself shliakhta and demanded but did not receive from the Russian authorities the same privileges as the nobility possessed under the Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth. The charter granted at the time of Khmel'nyts'kyi applied only to those who could substantiate their pre-1654 noble lineage. Ukrainians were denied admittance to cadet school, and, consequently, to imperial military and civilian eareers, because in the opinion of Russian officialdom, in "Little Russia there are no dvoriane."¹³ Most annoying for the Ukrainian aristocracy was the fact that Russians as of 1722 received automatic ennoblements upon reaching a certain grade in the Table of Ranks. However, even the highest Ukrainian offices did not bring automatic imperial ennoblement. Thus, throughout the eighteenth century the Ukrainian

¹⁵D. Miller, "Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskago byta staroi Malorossii; Prevr shchenie malorusskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo," KSt., (1897), No. 1, p. 26. Miller provides the best survey of the struggle of the starshyna to obtain Russian titles, see KSt., No. 1, pp. 1-31; No. 2, pp. 188-220; No. 3, pp. 351-357; No. 4, pp. 1-47. A valuable survey of the development of the nobility can be found in A. Efimenko, "Malorusskoe dvorianstvo i ego sud'ba," <u>Iuzhnaia Rus'</u> (St. Petersburg: 1905), Vol. I, pp. 145-200. The genealogy of most of the Ukrainian nobility has been traced in a monumental study by V. L. Modzalevskii; Malorossiskii rodoslovnik (4 volumes; St. Petersburg: 1905-1915).

nobility struggled for the equalization of Ukrainian offices and ranks with Russian ones and for imperial recognition and confirmation of their noble status. Within the Hetmanate, however, the Ukrainian nobility possessed power, wealth, and special legal and social status.

Sandwiched between the nobility and the peasantry, the Cossacks were required to provide military service in exchange for special privileges. Sharing a common origin, Cossack privileges were similar to those enjoyed by the nobility: exemption from taxation, right to land ownership, self-government, the right to produce alcoholic beverages, and the right to trade certain commodities. The Cossacks were denied only the right to require peasant labor obligations. Despite these advantages, from the end of the seventeenth century, the position of the Cossacks steadily deteriorated. Under the pressure of the starshyna they lost all their political prerogatives. They no longer elected their officers and they no longer participated in the various state councils. Even more crucial was the Cossacks' economic decline. While juridically the Cossacks were close to the nobility, economically, they resembled the peasantry.¹⁴

Undercutting the Cossack's economic position was his dual role as soldier and free farmer. Under Poland, the Cossacks were either paid or managed to obtain booty. Now they were still expected to fully equip

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¹⁴This process is best described by V. A. Miakotin, Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy v XVII-XVIII vv (Prague: 1926), Vol. 1, Vyp. 3. A. Lazarevskii's Opisanie staroi Malorossii (3 volumes; Kiev: 1888-1902), is a vast reservoir of information about the Cossack estate. See also O. Apanovych, Zbroini syly Ukrainy pershoi polovyny XVIII st. (Kiev: 1960) and V. A. Diadychenko, Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoi Ukrainy kintsia XVII- pochatku XVIII st (Kiev: 1959), pp. 411-466.

themselves for battle but without pay. Occasionally, on long campaigns, some remumeration was given, but each lengthy absence from the Cossack's farm had a catastrophic effect on his economic position. Impoverished and wishing to avoid further campaigns, the Cossack sold his land and hired himself out to the landlord. This process was accelerated and exacerbated by the rapacity and greed of the aristocracy, which frequently used extralegal means to obtain Cossack land and services. On the other hand, some Cossacks enriched themselves and eventually joined the Znachne viis'kove tovarystvo, thus entering the Ukrainian nobility. A trickle of upward mobility and a steady stream of downward mobility reduced the number of battle-ready Cossacks from 60,000 in 1650 to 30,000 in 1669 and to 20,000 in 1730.¹⁵

Alarmed by the dwindling number of battle-ready Cossacks, the Russian authorities attempted to arrest this process. They were particularly concerned in utilizing the maximum number of Cossacks in a series of wars with the Ottoman Empire. An ukaz first issued in 1723 and repeated in 1728 forbade the Cossacks to become peasants while in 1739 an ukaz limited the Ukrainian starshyna in their purchases of Cossack farms.¹⁶ But these measures failed to tackle the basic problem, the Cossacks' connection with land. The nobility were able to serve because they had sufficient land and the free labor of the peasantry. Logically, the rank-and-file had to be supported either by the state

150. M. Apanovych, <u>Zbroini</u>, pp. 21-22.
16v. Miakotin, <u>Ocherki</u>, Vyp. 3, pp. 128-132, 162.

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apparatus or by some other social group.

To some extent, the latter course was attempted by a major tsarist reform in 1735.¹⁷ All the Cossacks were divided into two groups, rank-and-file (<u>vyborni</u>) and helpers (<u>pidpomichnyks</u>). The rank-and-file Cossacks were to perform military service while the impoverished helpers were to prepare the food, gather and deliver supplies, horses, and cattle, act as messengers, and even till the soil in the long absence of a rank-and-file Cossack. The rationalebehind the reform was that those Cossacks that were too poor to fight should support that segment of Cossacks still capable of fighting.

While the reform of 1735 revitalized the Cossack Army sufficiently to carry it through the Ottoman wars, it failed to resolve the basic problem. The services the Cossack helpers provided were designed to increase the Empire's immediate war capabilities and not to alleviate the Cossacks' economic crisis. Besides these duties, the Cossack helpers became liable for half the taxes paid by the burghers and peasants and many were impressed into virtual serfdom by the landlord. Having several claimants for their services, the Cossack helpers could provide less and less assistance to the regular Cossacks. Consequently, the number of battle-ready Cossacks continued to drop from 20,000 in 1735 to 10,000 in 1764.¹⁸ Simultaneously, the number of independent Cossack farms steadily declined from 20,000 in 1730 to 11,000 in 1745, to only 1,000

17Treated by O. M. Apanovych, Zbroini, pp. 20-29.

18"Proshenie malorossiiskago shliakhetstva i starshyn vmeste s getmanom," <u>Kievskaia Starina</u>, No. 6 (1883), pp. 317-345.

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in 1764.¹⁹ According to the 1764 census, however, there were 176,886 regular Cossacks and 198,295 Cossack helpers.²⁰ Obviously, the vast majority of Cossacks no longer owned their own farms but were dependent on a landlord. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the Cossacks were no longer viable as a military formation. As a separate estate, the Cossacks still possessed broad juridical rights, at least in theory, but economically they were barely differentiated from the peasantry.

The artisans and merchants of the cities and the numerous peasantry occupied a lower social position than the nobility and Cossacks, but providing the chief economic base for both the Ukrainian and Russian authorities in the Hetmanate. Although both burghers and peasants were equally liable to pay state taxes, the burghers possessed greater rights, wealth and status. Those who lived in cities enjoying the Magdeburg Law were entitled to self-government, while other burghers had more limited autonomy. Under the dual levelling of the Ukrainian and Russian administration municipal autonomy was seriously curtailed. Living in the countryside and not understanding the economic value of cities, the Cossack authorities--with the exception of Hetmanas Samoilovych and Mazepa--excluded the burghers from any political role in the Hetmanate. Municipal offices were progressively taken over by the Cossack administration, and some smaller towns became the property

¹⁹Kholms'kyi, <u>Istoriia Ukrainy</u> (Munich: 1949), p. 283.
20A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskago, p. 85.

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of the Ukrainian nobility.21

Besides the erosion of their political prerogatives, the burghers threatened economically. Ukrainian cities were small, some were virtually blending into the countryside. Because the manorial economy was largely self-sufficient, the needs for specialized burgher services were limited. Many burghers were equally dependent for their livelihood on the fields and meadows beyond the city as on the production of goods or trade. Nevertheless, guilds of artisans and a prosperous merchant patriciate evolved in most cities. But they were undercut by competition from non-burghers--nobles, Cossacks, and even clergy who produced various products and traded without paying any municipal or state taxes. Better financed Russian and Greek merchants were able to conduct business more efficiently and on a larger scale than their Ukrainian counterparts. A poorly developed money economy, heavy taxation, the hostility of civil authority, and domestic and foreign competition prevented the maturation of the burghers as a separate estate or social group and resulted in their gradual decline.

At the base of the social pyramid were the peasants, who, for the greater part, were liberated from serfdom by the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. The majority of villages formerly owned by the Polish landlords or by the Crown now became "free military villages." The peasants were under the sole authority of the Cossack administration and were taxed by it.

²¹v. Diadychenko in <u>Narysy</u> (pp. 281-312) provides a general description of town life.

Not all the villages were freed, however. Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi issued charters permitting monasteries to extract labor obligations from the peasantry. In the northern part of the Hetmanate, members of the former Polish shliakhta, now serving the Cossack state, retained their estates with peasants. Also some of the municipalities continued to obtain peasant services. These landlords received charters from the Cossack administration confirming the peasants' "normal submission" to them.

With the large scale distribution of rank lands, the free villages became the property, or at least temporary property, of the new landlords, who also obtained charters ordering the peasants' "submission." At first, this formula required the peasant to perform on occasion specific duties for the landlord. Gradually these duties increased and the peasant found himself in a position analogous to a serf.²²

But the peasant was not yet a serf. He still could move from one landlord to another, or to one of the few remaining free villages, or beyond the Hetmanate into the steppe. In fact, Ukrainian landlords

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²²For the gradual enserfment of the peasantry see the following works: A. Lazarevskii, Malorossiiskie pospolitye krest'iane (1648-1783 gg) (Kiev: 1908); V. Miakotin, Ocherki, Vyp. 1-3, and Prikreplenie krest'ianstva Ukrainy v XVII-XVIII vv., a French translation is available "La fixation des paysans ukrainiens á la glébe aux XVIFe et XVIII -e siécles," Le Monde Slave (1932), No. 11-12; V. Barvinskii, Kresti'iane v Levoberezhnoi Ukraine v XVII-XVIII vv. (Vol. I of Zapiski Khar'kovskago Universiteta: 1909). An outstanding Marxist study is Mykola Tkachenko's "Narysy z istorii selian na Livoberezhnii Ukraini v XVII-XVIII vv." Zapysky istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu Vseukianskoi [or Ukrainskoi] Akademii Nauk (henceforth ZIFV [V]UAN), Vol. XXVI (1931), pp. 33-179. Unfortunately, Tkachenko's account goes only up to the eighteenth century, but he provides an excellent historiographical essay on the peasant question, pp. 33-74.

colonizing empty lands enticed peasants to settle on their new estates by giving them special exemptions for a specific time period. Juridically, however, the peasants' right to land and mobility was gradually curtailed. In 1727, the General Military Chancellery decreed that in moving to another landlord, the peasant lost all rights to his former property and could only take with him his personal belongings. 23 Peasant mobility between Sloboda-Ukraine, the Hetmanate, and Russia was forbidden by a 1738 order of the Russian Cabinet of Ministers.²⁴ After the Ukrainian General Starshyna expressed concern about the number of peasant flights, Hetman Eczumovs'kyi issued a special decree in 1760 regulating peasant mobility. 25 The peasant was permitted to take only his personal property in exchanging landlords; no landlord was permitted to accept peasants without a written receipt from the peasant's former landlord; and landlords were instructed to issue such receipts on request. This regulation made the peasant's mobility difficult, if not impossible. The landlord simply could refuse to issue a receipt and the peasant's only real recourse was illegal flight. A century after liberation, the Ukrainian peasant found himself again legally and economically dependent on the landlord.

The clergy stood outside this social pyramid and did not really form an estate or a closed group. It was legally separated from

24v. Miakotin, Prikreplenie, pp. 46-56.

25The decree was published in KSt., No. 7 (1885), pp. 477-483; for analysis see V. Miakotin, Prikreplenie, pp. 71-80.

²³v. Miakotin, Prikreplenie, p. 18. A general account on limitation of peasant mobility A. Lazarevskii, Malorossiiskie, pp. 75-83.
the rest of the populace by having an autonomous administration and judiciary. The clergy enjoyed exemption from taxation, military duty, and various labor obligations. Yet, as a group, the clergy were quite heterogenous in social origin, wealth, and political influence.

Frequently connected with the aristocracy, the higher clergy, especially the Kievan metropolitan, vied with the hetman for power and prestige. After the subordination of the Kievan metropolitan to the patriarch of Moscow (1686), the political power and influence of the higher clergy declined. Yet, as alumni of the venerable Kievan Academy, the well-educated Ukrainian clergy were able to fill most of the bishoprics of the Russian Empire. With the subordination of the Orthodox Church to imperial civilian authority, the Ukrainian higher clergy, on the whole, became loyal imperial servitors.²⁶

Monks--whose ranks were constantly replenished by the starshynanobility, Cossacks, and burghers--were of particular importance in the economic and cultural life of the Hetmanate. Monasteries owned huge estates supported by the forced labor of the peasantry. In the middle of the eighteenth century monasteries possessed 10,000 estates forming 17 per cent of all landholding in the Hetmanate.²⁷ Monks also virtually monopolized higher culture by controlling institutions of higher learn-

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²⁶Documented in K. V. Kharlampovich, <u>Malorossiiskoe vliianie na</u> velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn (Kazan: 1914), Vol. I.

²⁷I. Kholms'kyi, <u>Istoriia Ukrainy</u>, p. 285. For an interesting specialized study of monastery economy see P. Fedorenko, "Z istorii manastyrs'koho hospodarstva Petropavlivs'koho monastyria bilia Hlukhova," <u>ZIFV [V]UAN</u>, Vol. XI (1927), pp. 102-170.

ing and the press.

The regular Orthodox clergy were married, and parishes frequently passed from father to son.²⁸ But because priests were selected by the community and because they enjoyed full rights of private property, their ranks were constantly supplemented by aristocrats, Cossacks, and burghers. This flow was in both directions since children of clergymen entered Ukrainian civilian posts. The most notable example was Hetman Ivan Samoilovych, who was the son of a priest. In 1757 Hetman Rozumovs'kyi designated specific civilian ranks for the sons of clergy. Sons of <u>protopops</u>--priests who administered a protopopia, a subdivision of a diocese--were to enter the lowest level of the <u>Znachne viis'kove tovary-</u> stvo and sons of priests were to become Cossacks.²⁹

In the century following the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, the clergy and burghers experienced less change than the rest of Ukrainian society. The clergy were politically subordinated to imperial authority, but their composition, wealth, and position in society remained the same. The burghers declined slightly under political and economic pressure. Other social groups underwent major transformations. The old shliakhta disappeared as their remnants had to merge with the new aristocracy. Most significantly, this new aristocracy accumulated estates, /labor obligations from the peasantry, and later, even assumed the old term for

²⁸Life of the regular or "white" clergy can be gleaned from V. Parkhomenko, Ocherk istorii Pereiaslavsko-Borispol'skoi eparkhii (1733-1785) v sviazi s obshchim khodom malorossiiskoi zhizni togo vremeni (Poltava: 1910).

29L. Okinshevych (Okynshevych), Lektsii z istorii ukrains'koho prava (Munich: 1947), pp. 75-82.

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nobility, "shliakhta." Conversely, the peasantry, having been freed from serfdom by the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, was again tied to the landlord. Occupying an intermediate position, large numbers of Cossacks were still legally privileged but economically impoverished, and they were being squeezed into the virtually enserfed peasantry. As "lord and peasant" was quickly becoming the basic social relationship of the Hetmanate, the Ukrainian social structure was gradually evolving in the direction of Russian society.

3. Ukrainian Institutions

A. Administration

The Ukrainian system of government evolved from the military organization of the Zaporozhian Army. Khmel'nyts'kyi's victories swept away the Commonwealth's administration, leaving the Zaporozhian Army as the sole central civil authority. The primitive institutions of Cossack self-government were now applied outside the Cossack estate as the organizing principles of the land. Cossack officers were called upon to command military units, to adjudicate, to collect taxes, to maintain order, and to enforce various decrees of tsar and hetman. They imitated those officials with whom they were familiar--the Commonwealth's <u>starosty</u>--and gradually these Cossack officers ceased to be merely military men or notables of the Cossack estate, but became the civil service of the "land of the Zaporozhian Army."

Created spontaneously over a short period of time, the Cossack administration lacked precise delineation of authority and function.

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The linking of military, judicial and administrative duties mitigated against the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. While such a separation of powers was not yet the norm, most European states had already achieved fairly sophisticated governmental specialization. Since it was a new administration, much of the Hetmanate's governmental activities were improvised. Various organs of government assumed authority over certain areas often in competition with other bodies, duplicating services. The lack of a written or a well-established customary constitution made the limits in the distribution of power vague. Direct Russian interference in Ukrainian institutions and the internal struggle for power and wealth among Ukrainians prevented further constitutional delincation and development. Only in the eighteenth century did the Hetmanate evolve a rudimentary bureaucracy and codify its laws. While this failed to resolve most of the problems of constitutional arrangement, it facilitated more normal governmental operations.

By mid-eighteenth century the central institutions of the Hetmanate included the hetman, the central staff (<u>heneral'na starshyna</u>), several councils (<u>rada</u>), and the Cossack colonels (<u>polkovnyky</u>). The hetman and his staff conducted everyday affairs, while important decisions were reached at councils. At the top of the Ukrainian administrative pyramid was the hetman.³⁰ Formerly the chief military commander

30 The office of hetman is discussed in L. Okinshevych, Lektsii z istorii ukrains'koho prava (Munich: 1947), pp. 85-92; Vadym A. Daidychenko, Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoi Ukrainy kintsia XVII - pochatku XVIII st. (Kiev: 1959), pp. 126-173.

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of the Zaporozhian Army, the hetman also became a chief executive and important legislator. He commanded the army, conducted foreign relations, issued decrees (universaly), appointed officials, granted land for service, and, occasionally, served as a final court of appeals. The limits of the hetman's authority were not constitutionally defined and depended upon the skill, fortune, and daring of the various hetmans. Some were able to rule as virtual monarchs, while others were elected chieftains. In fact, tension between monarchical and republican tendencies in this office remained throughout the existence of the Hetmanate. Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, Ivan Samoilovych, and Ivan Mazepa viewed themselves not only as elected monarchs, but also groomed relatives for succession. They were moving in the direction of a hereditary monarchy. Pavlo Teteria (Right-Bank Hetman, 1663-1665), and Petro Doroshenko (1665-1676), on the other hand, were more representative of the republican tradition. They ruled, or were forced to rule, with the aid of a General Council, and they recognized its superiority over the hetman. All hetmans were elected by a General Council for life, but they could resign or be removed by this Council. Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, P. Teteria, and P. Doroshenko all either resigned or were removed by the General Council.

Once the main decision making body of the Zaporozhian Host when all the Cossacks, their officers, and, on occasion townsmen and clergy gathered in a circle in a field to decide important questions, the General Council (<u>heneral'na rada</u>) declined in importance until by the eighteenth century it had only the ceremonial function of formally

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electing a hetman.³¹ During its existence, the General Council had never established clear procedures as to when it was to be called, who was to participate, and under what circumstances it could remove a hetman from office.

A much more flexible central body was the Council of Officers (rada starshyn).³² It included the hetman, his central staff (heneral"na starshyna), the polkovnyks (colonels) and polk officers (a polk was a military, territorial, and administrative unit), sotnyks (a sotnia was a subdivision of a polk), and beginning in 1672, representatives of the Znachne viis'kove tovarystvo. Up to the eighteenth century mayors of towns and on occasion the higher clergy also participated. The Council of Officers then included all officials and notables, virtually everyone with a political stake in society. Meeting between Christmas and Epiphany and during the Easter holidays, it discussed all important pending matters, especially foreign affairs, finance, taxation, and judicial reforms. It also formed a vital link between the central administration and provincial and local government. But the Council's competence was vague because it could not initiate legislation or in any way negate

³¹The General Council has been the subject of a special study by L. Okinshevych (Okynshevych), "Tsentral'ni ustanovy Ukrainy Het'manshchyny XVII-XVIII vv. Chastyna 1, Heneral'na Rada." <u>Pratsi Komisii</u> <u>dlia vyuchuvannia istorii zakhidn'orus'koho ta ukrains'koho prava.</u> (Kiev: 1929), Vyp. VI, pp. 253-425, and separately (Kiev: 1929). It is also described briefly in L. Okinshevych, Lektsii, pp. 92-99.

32This institution is treared in a detailed monograph by L. Okinshevych (Okynshevych) Tsentral'ni ustanovy Ukrainy-Het'manshchyny XVII-XVIII st. Ch. II. Rada starshyn (Vyp. VIII, Pratsi Komisii dlia yyuchuvannia istorii zakhidn'o-rus'koho ta ukrains'koho prava (Kiev: 1930), pp. 1-352.

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the will of the hetman; it was only a semi-formal advisory body. Since the participants of these councils considered themselves to be the elite of the Hetmanate, these Councils tended to develop--especially in the reign of Hetman Rozumovs'kyi (1750-1764)--into meetings of the starshynanobility or shliakhta.

The actual management of the central administration was in the hands of the General Starshyna (heneral'na starshyna), a body that combined elements of a military staff and a cabinet.³³ Its function and method of selection varied. Sometimes members of the General Starshyna were elected either at General or Officer Councils, sometimes they were appointed by the hetman, and on other occasions, especially in the eighteenth century, the Russian government selected them from a list of candidates submitted by the hetman. Although members of the General Starshyna performed a great variety of duties assigned by the hetman, there also existed within this body a definite hierarchy and a degree of specialization. Second in command was the quartermaster-general (heneral'nyi oboznyi) in charge of artillery, then came other officers: the general chancellor (heneral'nyi pysar), two chief justices (heneral'ni suddi), two chief treasurers (heneral'ni pidskarbni) after 1728. A group of lower officials--two general aides-de-camp (heneral'ni osauly),

³³The main works dealing with the General Starshyna and the central administrative institutions are L. Okynshevych (Okinshevych), "Heneral'na starshyna na Livoberezhnii Ukraini XVI-XVII-XVIII st," (Vyp. II of <u>Pratsi Komisii dlia vyuchuvannia istorii zakhidn'o-rus'koho ta</u> ukrains'koho prava; Kiev: 1926), pp. 84-171; also separately (Kiev: 1926), L. Okinshevych, Lektsii, pp. 109-117; V. A. Diadychenko, <u>Narysy</u>, pp. 173-194; O. Putro, "Vlada heneral'noi viis'kovoi starshyny na Livoberezhnii Ukrainy u druhii polovyni XVIII st.," <u>Arkhivy Ukrainy</u>, No. 5 (1969), pp. 11-20.

a general standard bearer (heneral'nyi bunchuzhnyi), and a general flag bearer (heneral'nyi khorunzhyi)--had the largely ceremonial positions of carrying the hetman's standards and insignia. Besides this, they performed a variety of administrative and judicial tasks assigned to them by the hetman.

The hetman and the General Starshyna acted through several central administrative institutions, most important of which was the General Military Chancellery. Because of dissatisfaction with the performance of the hetman's chancellery, Peter I ordered its reorganization.³⁴ Headed by the general chancellor, this bureaucratic body recorded and promulgated all the decrees of the tsar and hetman, oversaw their execution, and investigated all complaints against officials. Subordinated to this chancellery was the General Military Court and, on occasion, the General Military Treasury. Gradually these institutions required a greater number of administrators, secretaries, and by the middle of the eighteenth century, a rudimentary Ukrainian bureaucracy emerged.

Provincial and local government reproduced, on a lesser scale, the central administration. The polk, the basic provincial unit, referred to a military regiment and a territorial-administrative

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³⁴The late Petrine and post-Petrine administrative and financial reorganization in the Hetmanate is analyzed in Ivan Dzhydzhora, <u>Ukraina</u> <u>v pershii polovyni XVIII viku</u> (Kiev: 1930) and Borys Krupnyts'kyi's <u>Het'man Danylo Apostol i ioho doba</u> (Augsburg: 1948). See also P. Nechyporenko, "Storinka z diial'nosty Heneral'noi Viis'kovoi Kantseliarii seredyny XVIII-stolittia," <u>Ukraina</u>, Bk. 1-2 (1927), pp. 130-133.

unit.³⁵ The polk was located on and administered over a specific territory. After the loss of the Right-Bank Ukraine, the Hetmanate was divided into ten polks, which varied greatly as to the extent of their territory and population. A polk was led by a polkovnyk (colonel) who was its military commander, its chief administrator, and also its chief judge--a miniature hetman. In earlier times, he was elected by the Cossacks of the polk, but later he was appointed by the hetman and still later by Russian authorities, usually from lists submitted by the hetman. Only Hetman Rozumovs'kyi was able to again make direct appointments of polkovnyks without Russian review--for which he was severely reprimanded by the Empress. Frequently independent of the hetman, a polkovnyk wielded considerable power and enjoyed substantial land holdings.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century several councils which had aided the polkovnyk had virtually disappeared. A Cossack Polk Council (polkova rada) reflected the earlier period of direct democracy when the polk members met to elect their leaders and to decide common problems. Another type of council--the Polk's Officer Council (rada polkovoi starshyny)--was limited to the polkovnyk, his staff, sotnyks and all the notables of the polk (<u>znachne</u> viis'kove tovarystvo). In the eighteenth century the actual administra-

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³⁵The major synthesis dealing with the polk structure is M. Slabchenko's <u>Malorusskii polk v administrativnom otnoshenii</u> (Odessa: 1909); V. Diadychenko's <u>Narysy</u>, pp. 196-248, and L. Okinshevych's <u>Lektsii</u>, pp. 117-122 give a good general description of polk administration. A monumental study of three specific polks was made by A. Lazarevskii in <u>Opisanie staroi Malorossii</u>, Vol. 1. <u>Polk Starodubskii</u> (Kiev: 1888); Vol. 2. <u>Polk Nezhinskii</u> (Kiev: 1893), and Vol. 3 <u>Polk Prilutskii</u> (Kiev: 1902).

tion was in the hands of the polkovnyk and the polk starshyna. The latter included a quartermaster (<u>polkovnyi oboznyi</u>)--second in command; a judge (<u>polkovnyi suddia</u>), a chancellor (<u>polkovnyi pysar</u>) and the lower ranks of aide-de-camp (<u>polkovnyi osaul</u>) and flag bearer (<u>polkovnyi</u> <u>khorunzhyi</u>). These officials held periodical meetings with the polkovnyk and decided on administrative and judicial matters, investigated landholding disputes, collected taxes, and conducted censuses. With the formation of polk chancelleries in the eighteenth century, the whole polk administration became part of a permanent bureaucratic apparatus.

At the bottom of the Hetmanate's territorial administrative structure was the sotnia.³⁶ The number of sotni in a polk varied from eleven to twenty-three.³⁷ A sotnia was headed by a sotnyk or captain--who also combined military, administrative, and judicial functions. His competence was much narrower in scope than the polkovnyk's. With his staff, the sotnyk made initial investigations, arrests, kept order, and adjudicated minor disputes. He was aided by an otaman, second in command, a secretary, and an aide-de-camp. Initially sotnyks were elected at sotnia councils, but these gradually disappeared and sotnyks

37A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskago, pp. 73-85.

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³⁶The best general description of the sotnia can be found in V. Diadychenko, <u>Narysy</u>, pp. 249-280. Since the sotnia was the major subdivision of the polk, all the literature cited for the polk is also pertinent. The Kiev sotnia has been specifically studied by S. Shamrai, "Borot'ba kozakiv Kyivs'koi sotni z kyivs'kymy manastyriamy ta mahistratom v XVII-XVIII v." <u>Ukraina</u>, Bk 1-2 (1930), pp. 32-63, and "Do istorii Kyivs'koi sotni Kyivs'koho polku," <u>Istorychno-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk</u>, Vol. 11 (1928), pp. 134-140.

were appointed by the polkovnyk. By the eighteenth century, regular sotnia chancelleries coordinated the activities of the sotnia administration.

Connected with the Cossack administration was an older, technically self-governing unit, the city. There were two types of cities: those which enjoyed considerable autonomy under Magdeburg Law and those under less autonomous statutes.³⁸ Only twelve cities in the Hetmanate were granted the Magdeburg Law, either by Polish kings. Russian tsars, or Ukrainian hetmans. With the exception of Poltava, the cities enjoying the Magdeburg Law were in the more settled, traditionally urban north.³⁹ They had highly developed trade and crafts organized into various guilds, and city officials had jurisdiction over all city inhabitants, including visitors and non-burghers. Such officials supervised craft and trade guilds, collected taxes, provided police and fire protection, and adjudicated. Cities not granted the Magdeburg Law were generally smaller, less complex, and lacked broad legal autonomy.

39 Buzhynskyi, "Z istorii poltavs'koho mahistratu za pershi roky ioho isnuvannia (1752-1767 rr.)," ZIFV [V]UAN, Vol. XI (1927), pp. 171-184. H. Shamrai, "Z pryluts'koho ratushnoho zhyttia XVIII v., Istorychnoheohrafichnyi zbirnyk, Vol. III (1929), pp. 149-157.

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³⁸For a general description of city administration, see Diadychenko, Narysy, pp. 281-312. See also D. Bagalei's, "Magdeburskoe pravo v gorodakh Levoberezhnoi Malorossii," <u>Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnago</u> <u>prosveshcheniia</u>, No. 3 (1892), pp. 1-56, and D. Bagalei, "Sud'ba magistratskago samoupravleniia v malorossiiskykh gorodakh," <u>Sbornik statei v</u> <u>chest' M. K. Liubavskago</u> (St. Petersburg: 1917), pp. 627-636. S. <u>Shamrai, "Do istorii Livoberezhnykh mist u polovyni XVIII v." Istorychnoheohrafichnyi zbirnyk</u>, Vol. II (1928), pp. 159-168. A seminal article dealing with the conflict between town and county is P. Klymenko's "Misto i terytoriia na Ukraini za chasiv Het'manshchyny," <u>ZIFV [V]UAN</u>, Vol. VII-VIII (1926), pp. 308-357. For studies dealing with specific cities see D. Klymenko, "Do istorii m. Nizhena," <u>ZIFV [V]UAN</u>, Vol. XV (1927), pp. 215-221.

Cossack officials supervised municipal court proceedings and administration. Here the municipal government blended into the Cossack administration. Over time even the privileged Magdeburg cities lost some of their autonomy to the polk and sotnia chancelleries located in cities. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the degree of municipal selfrule depended on the extent to which a particular city was able to resist the pressure of Cossack authority with most of them subordinated to the Cossack administration.

B. Army

The Cossack authorities also retained their original military role. The same officers who administered, judged, and collected taxes, also led the Hetmanate's Army into battle, and the same governing structure--from hetman to sotnyk--formed the military chain of command with the Cossacks filling the Army's rank and file. Cossacks and their officers were expected to provide themselves with all the equipment necessary for battle--horses, arms, ammunition, food supplies, and clothing.⁴⁰ While the system still functioned in the seventeenth century, by the eighteenth century it had become outdated. Modern armies, including the Russian imperial army after the reforms of Peter I, were uniformly equipped, supplied, trained, and disciplined. Simultaneously, the impoverishment of the Cossacks caused a drastic decline in the number of battle-ready soldiers from over 60,000 in Khmel'nyts'kyi's time

400. M. Apanovych's Zbroini syly Ukrainy is the best available description of the Cossack army.

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to 20,000 in 1735,⁴¹ to about 10,000 in 1764.⁴² Some Cossack units were still a credible fighting force, especially against the Tatars. But as the Tatar threat declined and Russian forces gradually isolated Crimea, the Cossacks' historical role as defenders of the steppe frontier was coming to an end. More and more, the Cossack Army was relegated to perform only auxilliary duties, such as the construction of fortresses, patrolling of borders, scouting missions, and building of roads and canals. The Ukrainian Cossack Army became less effective as a fighting force.

C. Judicial System

The Cossack administrative structure also formed the judicial system.⁴³ At the very bottom were separate village courts for Cossacks and non-Cossacks. The village elder with several assistants manned the non-Cossack court while the Cossack otaman with several Cossacks dealt with Cossack affairs. A combined court decided on cases involving both Cossacks and non-Cossacks. The next two judicial levels were the sotnia and the polk courts. The General Military Court was, at first, the highest in the Hetmanate, whose decisions could be appealed

41 Ibid., pp. 21-22.

42"Proshenie malorossiiskago shliakhetstva i starshyn vmesto s getmanom," KSt., No. 6 (1883), pp. 317-345.

43Standard works on the Ukrainian judicial system are M. Slabchenko. Sudivnytstvo na Ukraini XVII-XVIII vv. (Kharkiv: 1919), A. Pashuk, Sud i sudochynstvo na Livoberezhnii Ukraini v XVII-XVIII st. (L'viv: 1967).

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only to the hetman. In the eighteenth century this court was subordinated to the General Military Chancellery and its decision could be appealed to the Chancellery. Consequently, a hierarchy of three central courts--General Military Court, General Military Chancellery, hetman--unnecessarily increased the number of appellate courts and caused great delays in reaching judicial decision. The final arbiter was the hetman who exercised broad rights of pardon and final appeal.

The owner of a large estate who maintained a landlord's court or court of domain for his peasants, shared civil judicial authority.⁴⁴ After the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, most of the Polish landlords were evicted or, at least, lost much of their authority over the peasants. With the development of a Cossack officer aristocracy and with the increased enserfment of the peasants, the lord's court was reconstituted. During the eighteenth century, Ukrainian landlords received greater and greater judicial authority over the inhabitants of their estates dealing with all civil and minor criminal matters, although the landlord's action could still be reviewed and reversed by the polk or any central court.

Cities and the Church also maintained courts of domain. Many municipalities owned surrounding estates and villages. The town as a whole was considered the landlord and the peasants were under the jurisdiction of town officials. The Orthodox Church was the largest landed proprietor in the Hetmanate. During the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, the

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⁴⁴I. Cherkaskyi, "Slidy dominial'noho sudu na Livoberezhnii Ukraini," Pratsi Komisii dlia vyuchuvannia istorii zakhidn'o-rus'koho ta ukrains'koho prava, Vyp. II (1926), pp. 176-197.

Church came under the hetman's protection and, consequently retained its huge estates and privileges, including peasant labor services. Various monasteries and diocese had special civilian courts for their subjects. Major criminal offenders, however, were usually turned over to the civilian courts. At times the civilian authorities curbed the clerical courts, especially when the Cossack landlords were competing with the Church for land and peasant services.

The Church also kept a system of ecclesiastical courts. On the whole the jurisdiction of these courts was limited to clerics, but also included monastery helpers, church servants, cantors, and others directly associated with the Church. Proceedings were conducted in accordance with Orthodox ecclesiastical law. Ecclesiastical courts exorted some influence on the populace in deciding the legality of marriages and divorces, and problems of faith and morals.

D. Law

Laws operative in the Hetmanate were based on a variety of sources, including decrees of the Ukrainian and Russian administration, previous legal codes and common law. The Russian legal sources consisted of charters (gramoty) and decrees (ukazy) issued by the tsar and occasional judicial decisions made by the Senate. On the whole these confirmed already existing Ukrainian norms. A fundamental source for the Hetmanate's laws and legal structure was the agreements (statti) reached between the tsar and hetman. Decrees (universaly) and orders issued by the hetman and the General Military Chancellery formed the basic legislation of the Ukrainian administration. Besides these sources of

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legislation, the Hetmanate utilized such older pre-Khmel'nyts'kyi codes as the Lithuanian Statute of 1588 and the Chelmno variant of the Magdeburg Law. But the most important and widespread source of law was customary law. Many aspects of the written codes were inapplicable after the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. Consequently, Cossack and other customary practices served as substitutes. Customary practices and written codes existed side-by-side and frequently were in conflict with each other. The overlapping and contradiction of laws and customs made judicial proceedings lengthy and confusing.

The lack of a unified legal code and the archaic codes written in Middle Ukrainian, Polish, and Latin made imperative the translation and codification of Ukrainian laws.⁴⁵ At first both the Ukrainian and Russian authorities were interested in such a codification. For the Ukrainian administration it was necessary to bolster its position in its struggle with the Little Russian College in the 1720's. The Russian administrators in the Hetmanate also needed a legal code, for they were not familiar with Ukrainian practices and could not obtain any guides written in Russian. The first translations were undertaken under Hetman Skoropads'kyi (1721) but the project proceeded slowly and was eventually curtailed. Hetman Danylo Apostol decided in 1728 to organize

45The most thorough study of the/ is A. Iakovliv (Jakovliv), Ukrains'kyi kodeks 1743 roku; 'Prava, po kotorym suditsia malorossiiskii narod', (Vol. CLIX of Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka; Munich: 1949). See also M. Vasylenko, "Prava po kotorym suditsia Malorossiiskii narod', iak dzherelo derzhavnoho prava Ukrainy XVIII st.," <u>Iuvileinyi</u> Zbirnyk VUAN na poshanu akad. Hrushevs'koho (Kiev: 1928), Pt. 1, pp. 245-253.

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a commission of Ukrainian jurists and lawyers which was to translate the old collections and to compile a new code. This commission worked intermittently until 1743, when it finished its task. In 1744 Lieutenant General Bibikov, the Russian administrator of the Hetmanate (at this : time there was no hetman), submitted the collection--Laws by Which the Little Russian People are Judged--to the Senate for approval. The Senate shelved the code for twelve years until it was again taken up by Hetman Rozumovs'kyi. From 1756 until 1761 the collection was again reviewed by Ukrainian jurists in order to update it, but this project was never completed.

Although the <u>Laws by Which the Little Russian People are Judged</u> was never officially approved by Russian authorities, it was used extensively by the Ukrainian courts in the eighteenth century. The official reason for Russian disapproval was the code's alleged archaism and its incomprehensible chancellery language. A more basic reason for Russian disapproval was probably the fact that the tsarist authorities were less than eager to sanction officially a whole system of Ukrainian law, for it would have seriously hindered the introduction of imperial practices into the Hetmanate.

E. Finance

Besides military, administrative, and judicial functions, the Ukrainian authorities assumed various fiscal responsibilities. The Pereiaslav Treaty exempted Cossacks, the nobility, and clergy from taxation, placing the burden on townsmen and peasants. Taxes were to have been collected by Muscovite authorities, who, in turn, were to have

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paid the "Zaporozhian Army" of the Hetmanate for its military services. This duplicated the tax system in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, except that Polish authorities were replaced by the Muscovites. As the Ukrainians were unwilling to relinquish so much power to Muscovy, such a tax system proved to be unfeasible. A Muscovite attempt to conduct a comprehensive census and survey and then to collect taxes in 1668 resulted in a general uprising. Moscow settled for a practical accomodation: it received no Ukrainian revenues while the Cossack Army received no pay. As a consequence, the Hetmanate developed an indigenous, virtually spontaneous system of state finance.

Ukrainian officers and officials were rewarded for their services with land. After the 1648 Revolution, the Cossacks took over all the former crown lands as well as estates abandoned by the nobility and Roman Catholic elergy. This provided the Ukrainian administration with a considerable land fund called rank lands (<u>rangovi maetnosti</u>).⁴⁶ Although these lands were to have reverted to the land fund at the death or dismissal of the holder, many were incorporated illegally into private family estates. In 1729 Hetman Danylo Apostol attempted to reverse this trend, but managed to secure only 6,173 estates. The rank lands continued to pass into private ownership--during Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's reign, only 2,661 estates remained⁴⁷ seriously affecting the Ukrainian administration's ability to reward its officials and prominent men.

⁴⁶Land distribution, including rank land, is described in detail by V. A. Miakotin, <u>Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy v XVII-XVIII vv</u>. (Prague: 1926), Vol. 1, Pt. 2, pp. 5-263.

47Miakotin, Ocherki, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, pp. 244-245.

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Although the land fund met the most basic cost of the Ukrainian government, other financial resources were necessary in order to pay the hetman's mercenary troops, to procure arms, munitions, and supplies, and to meet general administrative expenses. The Hetmanate's chief sources of additional revenues were taxes on certain industries--mills and foundries; a tax on exports and imports, and government monopolies on spirits, tobacco, and tar.⁴⁸ While Cossacks, burghers, and nobles produced monopoly products, they were required to sell them wholesale to licensed government merchants, who then sold them at a fixed rate to the populace realizing a profit for the state.⁴⁹ Various other taxes were employed in support of specific offices and institutions.

The Hetmanate's fiscal system was poorly developed. Certain taxes were assigned specific purposes: the hetman's office, the hetman's kitchen, maintenance of mercenary troops, maintenance of polk and sotnia starshyna, support of churches and monasteries. Much of the revenue went directly to the receiving institutions or persons, hindering the

49M. Tyshchenko, "Hural'ne pravo ta pravo shynkuvaty horilku na Livoberezhnii Ukraini do kintsia XVIII st.," <u>Pratsi Komisii dlia vyu-</u> <u>chuvannia istorii zakhidn'o-rus'koho ta ukrains'koho prava</u>, Vol. III (1927), pp. 150-202.

⁴⁸One of the most neglected areas of study is the Hetmanate's financial system. The only general description can be found in M. Slabchenko, <u>Khoziaistvo Getmanshchiny v XVII-XVIII st.</u>, Vol. IV (Odessa: 1925) See also Ivan Telichenko, "K istorii finansov v Malorossii i Slobodskoi Ukraine," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 4 (1888), pp. 10-15 in the document section. A more specialized study is V. Barvins'skyi's "Do pytannia pro induktu ta evektu v Het'manshchyni," <u>Naukovi Zapysky Naukovo-Doslidchoi</u> <u>Katedry istorii ukrains'koi kul'tury</u>, Vol. VI (Kharkiv: 1927), pp. 241-244; V. Barvins'kyi, "Zametki po istorii finansovago upravleniia v Getmanshchine," <u>Sbornik statei v chest' prof. V. Buzeskula</u> (Kharkiv: 1914), pp. 816-831.

development of a central financial system. The major problem was that the state treasury was indistinguishable from the hetman's personal wealth and from income connected with his office. The position of general military treasurer which existed at various times in the seventeenth century resembled more a private accountant or steward than a state minister. Any revenues that came into the central administration were controlled by the hetman.

A reform of the financial system was attempted by Hetman D. Apostol in 1727. He planned to renew the position of general treasurer, to clarify the question of a state treasury, and to streamline the tax system. The reforms were included in the Ukrainian treaty proposition to the tsar in 1728, but the Russian administration insisted that two general treasurers be appointed, a Ukrainian and a Russian.⁵⁰ The Hetmanate's treasury was separated from the office and person of hetman and put under the auspices of the two treasurers. They supervised a whole bureaucratic machine including a General Treasury Chancellery (Heneral'na Skarbova Kantseliariia) and an accounting office (General'maia Schetnaia Kommissia). This fiscal apparatus was responsible directly to the College of Foreign Affairs, bypassing the hetman. In manipulating a needed reform, the Russian administration obtained complete supervision and considerable control over the Hetmanate's financial system.

Viewing the Hetmanate as a possible source of revenue, the

50These reforms are treated by Borys Krupnyts'kyi, Het'man Danylo Apostol ta ioho doba (Augsburg: 1948), pp. 126-134 and M. Slabchenko, Khoziaistvo, Vol. IV, pp. 260-272.

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Russian administration sought to tax its inhabitants directly. Due to Ukrainian opposition and constant warfare, this goal was not achieved in the seventeenth century. Peter I, however, initiated many imperial taxes which were also applied in the Hetmanate. For a brief period, the Little Russian College actually took over the Hetmanate's taxes and directed them into the imperial treasury. This policy was accompanied with a sharp drop in revenues and was abandoned. The Hetmanate's finances continued to be kept separately from the Empire's, and little revenue went directly into the imperial treasury. But by stationing an increasing number of Russian troops in the Hetmanate -- the burden of support of which was placed on the Ukrainian populace -- the Russian authorities were able to gain a substantial indirect fiscal contribution. In order to determine better the fiscal possibilities of the Hetmanate, the Russian authorities undertook a comprehensive census in 1730-31. Yet, the imperial administration greatly overestimated the revenue realizable in the Hetmanate. From 1729 until 1740, the Ukrainian administration was not able once to meet the tax goals necessary to support all the Russian troops and officials in the Hetmanate and more than 256,000 rubles in arrears were finally cancelled by Elizabeth. 51

The subordination of the General Treasury to the College of Foreign Affairs caused a continued struggle between the College and the

51The financial support of the Russian army and officials in the Hetmanate is described by Prokip Nechyporenko in "Pro 'portsii' ta 'ratsii' na Het'manshchyni 1725-1750 rr.," ZIFV [V]UAN, Vol. XX (1928), pp. 175-198 and in "Do kharakterystyky podatkovoi polityky uriadu Elisavety," Zapysky Ukrains'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyivi, Vol. XXVI (1927), pp. 44-47. The figure on arrears is given on p. 47.

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hetman over the control of Ukrainian finances. The General Treasury Chancellery was not entirely independent of the hetman. Ordinary expenses were met routinely but extraordinary ones were decided by the hetman and the Ukrainian administration. The hetman ordered the issuance of money for various tasks and the treasury either complied or waited for a decision from the College. This struggle reached its most bitter level during Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's reign.⁵² Receiving 50,000 rubles in compensation for revenue lost due to the cancellation of the tariff border between the Hetmanate and Russia, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi categorically refused to give the College of Foreign Affairs any accounting as to the sum's disposition.

F. The Church

By the time of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, the Orthodox Church in Poland-Lithuania had made a dramatic recovery from its decline of the sixteenth century. Due to pressures from the Ukrainian nobility and the Cossacks, the Orthodox Church was again granted legal recognition by the Polish-Lithuanian government. Many of the important dioceses were won back from the Uniates, while the Orthodox lay brotherhoods continued to promote education and publishing. With Khmel'nyts'kyi's victories, the Church grew in stature and position. The Cossack administration handed over the Uniate and Roman Catholic church property they occupied

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⁵²An account of this conflict can be found in V. O. Romanovs'kyi, "Do istorii biudzhetovoho prava Het'manshchyny za Kyryla Rozumovs'koho," Iubileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akademika Dmytra Ivanovycha Bahaliia, Vol. I (Kiev: 1927), pp. 779-785.

to the Orthodox clergy, and in areas under Cossack control the Orthodox Church became the state religion. 53

The symbol of the unity of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine and Belorussia was its head, the metropolitan of "Kiev, Halych and all Rus" who, in turn was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople. After the restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy (1620) several outstanding metropolitans revived the prestige of the office. Perhaps the most eminent among them was Metropolitan Petro Mohyla (1632-1647), who regained considerable property from the Uniate Church, founded the Kievan Academy, authored scores of sermons, and commissioned the compilation and publication of the first Orthodox catechism.⁵⁴ His successor, Sylvester Kosiv (1647-57) continued Mohyla's programs while becoming an important political figure during the turbulent Khmel'nyts'kyi era.

As the political situation deteriorated and the Ukraine was partitioned among several powers, the Kievan metropolitan had great difficulty in maintaining the unity of the Orthodox Church. Kosiv's successor, Dionysii Balaban (1657-63), a supporter of Hetman Vyhovs'kyi's break with Muscovy, was unable to assert his authority on the Left-Bank or even in the city of Kiev--both of which were controlled by Muscovy. The succeeding metropolitan, Iosyf Tukals'kyi (1666-75), who supported

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⁵³The period is summarized in I. Vlasovs'kyi, <u>Narys istorii</u> Ukrains'koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy (4 vols.; New York: 1955-66), Vol. II, pp. 5-64.

⁵⁴For a definitive work on the Mohyla and Khmel'nyts'kyl period see S. Golubev's <u>Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki</u> (2 vols.; Kiev: 1883-98).

Hetman Doroshenko, exercised jurisdiction over an even more limited territory. Meanwhile, the Muscovite authorities appointed various "administrators" for the Kiev eparchy on the Left-Bank, but lacked the canonical authority to replace the duly-elected metropolitan of Kiev.⁵⁵

It became imperative for Muscovy to gain control over the Kievan metropolitan and the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine and Belorussia. The Kievan metropolitans had not only proven to be political unreliable, for instance metropolitan Kosiv opposed the Treaty of Pereiaslav,⁵⁶ but the Church in the Ukraine, exposed to Western theological thinking and liturgical practices, came to be viewed as semi-heretical in Muscovite ecclesiastical circles. Most of the ecclesiastical works from the Ukraine, including the famous Mohyla catechism, were banned in Muscovy.⁵⁷ Therefore, from the time of the Pereiaslav treaty, the Muscovite authorities had tried to subordinate the Kievan metropolitan to the Moscow patriarch. Their initial efforts were firmly rebuffed by Metropolitan Kosiv. Attempts to influence the 1657 and 1665 elections of the metropolitan misfired. Only in 1684, under relentless pressure from Muscovite

55For a concise description of the Church during "the Ruin" see I. Vlasovs'kyi, Narys, Vol. II, pp. 299-343.

56For the views of Metropolitan Kosiv see Metropolitan Makarii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi (12 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1889-1903), Vol. XII, pp. 55-90 and K. Kharlampovich, <u>Malorossiiskoe vliianie</u>, p. 228; his opposition to the Pereiaslav Treaty is dealt with by I. Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, p. 469.

57The banning in Moscow of liturgical books from the Ukraine is dealt with by K. Kharlampovich, <u>Malorossiiskoe vliianie</u>, pp. 108-115. Metropolitan Makarii notes what a sensation the Mohyla catechism created in Muscovy, see Istoriia, Vol. XI, pp. 608-609.

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envoys and Hetman Samoilovych, did a Church synod in Kiev elect a pro-Muscovite candidate, Prince Gedeon Sviatopolk-Chertvertyns'kyi, a descendent of the Rurik dynasty. Despite this electoral victory, the pro-Muscovite party at the Synod still faced strong opposition against any changes in the subordination of the Kievan metropolitan. 58 They capitulated only after the tsar issued a special charter affirming the following as the privileges of the Kievan metropolitan: maintenance of an independent court system, not subject to review by the Patriarch; free election of the metropolitan (the Patriarch's role was limited to the bestowal of his blessing); continued jurisdiction over all eparchies, bishops, hegumens and monasteries; maintenance of an independent educational system and press; the preservation of local ecclesiastical practices; the confirmation of all wealth and property held by the Orthodox hierarchy; the superiority of the Kievan metropolitan to all others under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch; and the requirement that the metropolitan consult with the hetman in dealing with eparchies in Poland-Lithuania.

In order to obtain Orthodox canonical recognition, the transfer of jurisdiction still required approval by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Through diplomatic pressures and bribery, the Muscovites secured the cooperation of the Porte, who in 1686 forced the Patriarch of Constantinople to accede to the transfer. Even before the completion of

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⁵⁸The subordination of the Kievan metropolitan to the Moscow patriarch has been exhaustively treated by S. A. Ternovskii, <u>Izsledovanie</u> o podchinenii Kievskoi metropolii Moskovskomu patriarckhatu (Kiev: 1912) and K. Kharlampovych, <u>Malorossiiskoe</u>, pp. 149-233.

the transfer (1685), Chertvertyns'kyi was forced by the Muscovite Patriarch to limit his title to metropolitan of "Kiev, Halych and all of Little Russia."⁵⁹

At the time of the subordination, the Kievan metropolitan had six eparchies under his jurisdiction: two in the Hetmanate (Kiev and Chernihiv) and four in Poland-Lithuania (L'viv, Lutsk, Peremyshl, Mohyliv-Mstyslav). By the 1720s the Kiev metropolitan had lost all the dioeceses except his own Kiev eparchy. First to bolt was the bishop of Chernihiv, Lazar Baranovych, who in 1688 successfully petitioned the tsar for exclusion from the jurisdiction of the Kievan metropolitan and for direct subordination to the Moscow patriarch. In the early eighteenth century, the L'viv, Luts'k and Peremyshl sees became Uniate. The Mohyliv-Mstyslav diocese in Belorussia remained Orthodox but fell under the direct jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarch. The Kiev metropolitan was also unsuccessful in obtaining control over the newlyestablished Pereiaslav eparchy (1700) within the Hetmanate. While the metropolitan continued to use the title of "Kiev, Halych, and all of Little Russia," his jurisdiction was in fact limited to the Kiev eparchy and the remaining Orthodox parishes on the Right-Bank. 60

Although a separate Ukrainian-Belorussian Church ceased to exist by the 1720's, it was still remembered by the Kievan metropolitans. Despite their being mere appointees of the Synod (since 1721) rather

59K. Kharlampovich, Malorossiiskoe, p. 228.

60 The period from 1686 until the 1780's is discussed by I. Vlasovs'kyi, Narys, Vol. III, pp. 5-30.

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than the elected representatives from the clergy, such Kievan metropolitans as Timofii Shcherbats'kyi (1747-57) and Arsenii Mohylians'kyi (1757-1770) continued to demand the restoration of the metropolitan's former prerogatives.⁶¹ The Church in the Hetmanate, moreover, continued to retain its local peculiarities in language and liturgical practices, as well as a whole complex of personal, property, and customary rights deeply ingrained in the Ukrainian legal and social structures.

During the eighteenth century, the Hetmanate was able to maintain a separate military, administrative, judicial and financial system and, for a brief period, a separate Church. But these forms of self-government were being continuously threatened and eroded. First, under pressures from foreign powers and internal disunity, the Church disintegrated and its remaining Orthodox eparchies became directly subordinate to the Moscow patriarch. Gradually, the Cossack Army declined in numbers and became obsolete as a fighting force. A struggle for power by various Ukrainian offices and the continual levelling of Ukrainian institutions by Russian authorities mitigated against the Hetmanate's acquiring clearly-defined constitutional norms. Administration was largely improvised and, in the eighteenth century, bureaucratized. Despite its patriotism to the Hetmanate, this new Ukrainian bureaucracy became strongly influenced by Russian administrative procedures. By the middle

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^{611.} Vlasovs'kyi, <u>Narys</u>, Vol. III, pp. 29-37. The efforts of Metropolitan Arsenii Mohylians'kyi to restore the rights of the "Little Russian" Church will be discussed in the third chapter.

of the eighteenth century, even the language of administration changed from chancellery Ukrainian to Russian. Only the judicial system was able to withstand Russian penetration more successfully, probably due to the codification of its laws. Yet, this code was never approved by Russian authorities and the legal system remained in need of reform. The conflicting layers of courts, especially the numerous appellate courts, and the continued association of administration with jurisprudence caused prolonged delays in reaching final verdicts. Concurrently, the Ukrainian fiscal system underwent a basic transformation, from one meeting the Hetmanate's immediate financial requirements to a system serving imperial needs in the Hetmanate. Thus, the institutions of Ukrainian self-government became intertwined in many, Sometimes subtle ways with the Russian imperial administration.

4. Ukrainian Political Concepts and Historical Literature

The Khmel'nyts'kyi Revolution brought together two traditions and political orientations which, subsequently, competed for primacy until the early eighteenth century. The first was the concept of the Zaporozhian Army which was in service of a monarch, who would in return guarantee Cossack corporate rights, self-government, and provide regular pay. In addition, the Army would assume the role of protector of Eastern Orthodoxy. That this view dominated the early stages of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising is evidenced by the short-lived peace agreement with Poland at Zboriv (1649). It later played an important role

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in the Pereiaslav agreement with Muscovy, ⁶² according to which the tsar was acknowledged as a sovereign, and guarantor of Cossack rights and the privileges of other estates. He was to collect taxes in the Ukraine and pay the Zaporozhian Army. That Cossackdom viewed itself as a subsystem within a monarchy is revealed in its very title. Both the Army and the territory it held were called the Zaporozhian Army. Significantly, however, this title had a prefix which changed according to political circumstances, from His Majesty the King's to His Majesty the Tsar's Zaporozhian Army.

When, on the one hand, a considerable number of nobles joined the Zaporozhian Army, and on the other the Orthodox higher clergy began to play a role in Cossack affairs, another conflicting tradition and political orientation developed. These non-Cossacks sought inspiration in the pre-Cossack past, in the period of Kievan Rus'. The higher Orthodox clergy and nobility held that the Kievan state was voluntarily incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and, as a result of the Lublin Union, was voluntarily included into the Polish crownlands. The

62For the Zboriv Treaty see M. Hrushevs'kyi, <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. VIII, Pt. III, pp. 193-288. Analysis of texts, pp. 203-219. The varied interpretations of the Pereiaslav Treaty have been already mentioned, the points discussed here are not in dispute.

63This change in title use is encountered in documentation and seals issued by the Zaporozhian Army. For a random example see <u>Akty</u> <u>Zapadnoi Rossii</u>, Vol. V (St. Petersburg: 1853), p. 108, where document No. 62 uses tsar in the title and p. 109, where document No. 63 uses the king in the title. When Hetman Petro Doroshenko recognized the Ottoman Porte, the title remained without any prefix but just "Zaporozhian Army," see <u>Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii</u>, Vol. IX (1877), pp. 836-37, document No. 156, and pp. 103, 431-434.

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Union allowed the retention in Rus' (Central and Eastern Ukraine) of the Ruthenian chancellery language and the Lithuanian Statute. Thus, they felt that Rus' remained an entity apart from the other crownlands.64 The Orthodox-Catholic religious polemics served to heighten further the area's self-consciousness and revitalized the Ukrainian Orthodox elite's interest in its pre-Commonwealth heritage. For example, in conjunction with the visit of the Jerusalem Patriarch Theophanes, who ordained the new Orthodox hierarchy in 1620, Prince Sviatopolk-Chertvertyns'kyi commissioned a copy of the Hypation chronicle, the major historical source for the Kievan period. 65 The Orthodox higher clergy and nobility, however, never demanded a "restoration" of Kievan Rus' since there existed in the seventeenth century no legitimate dynasty. By the time of Khmel'nyts'kyi, they had concluded that the best solution to the political and religious crisis was a triune structure: Poland, Lithuania and Rus'; which would maintain both allegiance to the Polish crown and

⁶⁴The instructions to the Sejm delegates from the local diets of the Volynia and East Ukrainian palatinates emphasized their peculiar rights and communal interests <u>vis-a-vis</u> other crownlands. These instructions were published in <u>Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii</u>, Pt. II, Vol. I (1861).

⁶⁵For a discussion of the Hypatian Chronicle, see Omeljan Pritsak, "The 'External History' of the Texts of the Hypatian Chronicle," <u>Minutes of the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies Held at Harvard University</u> <u>During the Academic Year 1972-1973</u>, No. 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1973), pp. 14-20. In order to counter Roman Catholic attacks, Sylvestr Kosiv, later metropolitan of Kiev, published a Polish translation of the lives of the Orthodox saints, <u>Paterikon</u> (Kiev: 1635), which emphasized Kievan traditions. recognize political and religious distinctiveness. 66

Mhile from the very outbreak of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Revolt various commentators mentioned that Khmel'nyts'kyi wished to create a Rus' Principality, the first attempt to fuse the two ideologies occurred in 1649 when Khmel'nyts'kyi entered Kiev. The metropolitan, clergy, and students of the Kievan Academy greeted him as "Moses, a Saviour of his people from Polish bondage."⁶⁷ During negotiations with the Commonwealth, Khmel'nyts'kyi is reported to have said that, though he was born a humble person, "God has raised me up to be the Rus' autocrat."⁶⁸ This title was often used to describe Volodymyr the Great and thus linked the Cossack chieftan with the most outstanding ruler of the Kievan state.

The first practical application of the later Rus' Principality concept occurred during Khmel'nyts'kyi's nggotiations with the Swedes, and can be seen in the subsequent Ukrainian-Swedish alliance of 1657.⁶⁹ The Ukrainian negotiators demanded the revival of a Rus' principality encompassing those areas of Poland in which the Ukrainian language and Orthodox faith were dominant.

66"Dyaryusz podrózy do PereasJawia i traktowania tamtejszego z Chmielnickim Panow Komissarzow Polskich, przez Wojciecha Miakowskiego Podkomorzego Lwowskiego Komissarza, - spisany," Jakuba MichaJowskiego, Księga Pamiętnicza (Cracow: 1864), pp. 374-375.

67 Ibid., pp. 374-375.

68Ibid., p. 375.

69v. Lypyns'kyi, Ukraina na perelomi, pp. 48-49; 270-273, fn. 113a; Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, Pt. III, Vol. VI (1898), pp. 153-195, 221-222, 332-337; M. Hrushevs'kyi, Istoriia, Vol. IX, Pt. II, pp. 392-397; Vol. X, pp. 64-69.

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The fruition of their efforts was achieved in the negotiations with Poland, prior to the Hadiach Union (1658).⁷⁰ Again the Ukrainian side proposed that areas of Ukrainian speech and Orthodox faith in Poland be united into a Great Principality of Rus'. They demanded that the Principality join the Commonwealth on an equal basis with Poland and Lithuania. It should have its own administrative and judicial system (conducted in chancellery Ruthenian), finances, currency, and army (30,000 Cossacks and 10,000 mercenaries). The three equal partners would have a common king and Diet. Each year 100 Cossacks from each regiment were to be recommended for ennoblement. The negotiators asked that the Church Union be abolished, and Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy both be recognized in Rus'. An unlimited number of primary and secondary schools, and full freedom of press, even in religious matters (as long as the king's name would not be abused) was assured.

A comparison of Hadiach with previous treaties reveals a radical difference between the two orientations. Unlike the previous treaties, Hadiach called for the re-establishment of a separate, legitimate political entity--Rus'--which would be an equal part of a tripartite Commonwealth. Mhile the Zaporozhian Army concept was vague as to internal organization, the Hadiach treaty clearly defined the administrative and judicial systems and social structure of the future Rus' Principality. Finally, the territorial vistas of the proponents of the Rus' Principality included some areas of Western Ukraine which had no

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⁷⁰For details of the Hadiach Union see M. Hrushevs'kyi, Istoriia, Vol. X, pp. 292-359.

Cossack population. Their unity was based on political, historic, linguistic, and religious considerations, while the Zaporozhian Army proponents shared a corporate and religious unity.

Internal disruption and foreign intervention prevented the realization of the Rus' Principality concept. The presumed cooperation among the nobility, Cossacks, and clergy failed. Instead, increased hostility between the starshyna-nobility and the Cossacks, and the insubordination of the Zaporozhian Army led to the continuous civil war known as "the Ruin" (1663-1674).

"The Ruin" forced the Ukrainians to abandon the idea of a Rus' Principality. The main bearers of the Rus' tradition, the Orthodox nobles, were slaughtered by the peasants and rank-and-file Cossacks. A part of the Orthodox clergy in search of stability and protection reacted by associating the Rus' tradition with the most powerful Orthodox ruler, the Muscovite tsar. As early as 1674, the <u>Synopsis</u>, a history of the Ukraine, espoused the theory of the "transfer of princely seats": Kiev to Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma to Moscow.⁷¹ It was written by Inokentii Gizel, archmandrite of the Caves monastery. He sought to find convincing justification for the Orthodox tsar's military intervention to achieve a victory for Orthodoxy over Roman Catholicism and the Union, and to end the chaos in the Ukraine. Whatever Gizel's motivation, the theory advanced in the <u>Synopsis</u> made the Orthodox Muscovite tsar the only legitimate dynastic successor to Kievan Rus' and deprived

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⁷¹For a recent study of the <u>Synopsis</u> see "Sinopsis kak istoricheskoe proizvedenie," <u>Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury</u>, Vol. XV (1958), pp. 284-298.

the Cossack Army of any state-oriented ideology. Parts of the Zaporozhian Army served several warring protectors and Cossack units fought each other.

Despite these developments, the concept of a Rus' principality within the Commonwealth system still lingered; it was revived at the beginning of the eighteenth century by the new Cossack aristocracy. A group of Cossack officers, having studied the Treaty of Hadiach,⁷² engaged in secret talks with Lithuanian magnates.⁷³ Both sides agreed that the Ukraine should become an equal part in a tripartrite Commonwealth. This orientation appealed to a section of the starshyna-nobility since it assured the political and social dominance of this group and automatically solved the most burdensome problem of the Hetmanate--the loss of the Right Bank.

Ultimately, Mazepa's defeat marked the demise of the Rus' principality concept. Since many Zaporozhian Cossacks had joined Mazepa and emigrated with him, a strong representation for the Zaporozhian Army concept was assured in emigration. This was reflected in the Constitution of the émigré hetman, Pylyp Orlyk.⁷⁴ In the Hetmanate, in the wake of Mazepa's "betrayal" political speculation was both dangerous

72Letter of the émigré Hetman Pylyp Orlyk to Metropolitan Stefan Iavors'kyi in Osnova, No. 11 (1862), pp. 1-29; ChMOID, Vol. I (1859), p. 102; and M. Hrushevs'kyi, "Vyhovs'kyi i Mazepa," Literaturno-naukovyi Visnyk, 1909.

730. Ohloblyn (Ohloblin), "Do istorii ukrains'koi politychnoi dunky na pochatku XVIII viku," ZIFV [V]UAN, Vol. XIX (1929), pp. 231-241.

74M. Vasylenko, "The Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk," AUAAS in the US, Vol. VI (1958), No. 3-4, pp. 21-22; pp. 1260-1295.

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and unrealistic. Moreover, the anathemization of Mazepa by the Orthodox Church marked the final break between the Ukrainian clerical intelligentsia and Cossack Ukraine. By then a separate Church in the Ukraine had ceased to exist and the clergy was in service to Russian Orthodoxy. A steady stream of educated clergy such as Teofan Prokopovych, Stefan Iavors'kyi and St. Dmytro Tuptalo-Rostovs'kyi left the Hetmanate and took the lead in spreading education and Western learning in Muscovy.⁷⁵

Responding to the abandonment of Cossack Ukraine by the clerical intellectuals, a new group of Cossack intellectuals, the chancellerists, produced a number of works glorifying Cossack Ukraine.⁷⁶ These chancellerists derived from the Cossack administration and satisfied the starshyna-nobility's need for recorded accounts of the Polish-Cossack wars of the seventeenth century and, in particular, of the heroic revolution of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Stefan Savyts'kyi, a chancellerist in the Lubny polk, explained his reasons for writing <u>Povesti o kozatskoi voine s Poliakami</u> (1718) in the following manner: he had heard oral accounts of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising but they were not very satisfying and he had read Samuil Twardowski's Wojna

⁷⁵The best summation of this "brain drain" is still K. Kharlampovich, <u>Malorossiiskoe Vliianie</u>.

⁷⁶For an analysis of the change in intellectual elites see M. Grushevskii, "Ob ukrainskoi istoriografii XVIII veka. Neskol'ko soobrazhenii," Bulletin de l'Academie des Sciences de l'URSS. Classe des Sciences Sociales, 1934, pp. 215-233 and in English, Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, "Some Reflections on Ukrainian Historiography of the XVIII Century," The Eyewitness Chronicle (Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies; Munich: 1972), pp. 9-16.

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<u>domowa</u> (1681) which described the events from the Polish point of view. Savyts'kyi expressed surprise and disappointment that none of his countrymen, "particularly from the spiritual ranks who since the time of emancipation from Poland lacked neither people capable of the task nor the necessary typographical means," had not written a work about the more immediate past.⁷⁷ A host of chronicles and histories, including such famous works as that by Hryhorii Hrabianka (1710) and Samuil Velychko (1720), attempted to fill this gap and, in fact, created a Cossack historical mythology.⁷⁸

While the Cossack chronicles and historical works served to heighten a separate historical consciousness, they did not contribute

77M. Hruševs'kyi (Hrushevs'kyi), "Some Reflections," p. 12.

78Hrabianka was published under the title, Deistviia prezel'noi i ot' nachala poliakov krvavshoi nebuvaloi brani Bogdana Khmelnitskogo... Roku 1710 (Kiev: 1854); Vylychko under the title, Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII-m veke. Sostavil Samoil Velichko byvshii kantseliarist kantseliarii Voiska Zaporozhskago, 1720, Kiev, Vol. I (1848); Vol. II (1851); Vol. III (1855); Vol. IV (1864). For a brief description see Ia. I Dzyra, "Samiilo Velychko ta ioho litopys," Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukrains'kii RSR (Kiev: 1971), Vol. IV, pp. 223-235. In addition to these, there were many histories and chronicles written near the middle of the eighteenth century. The most outstanding were: "Letopisets ili opisanie kratkoe znatneishikh deistv i sluchaev..." published in Sbornik letopisei, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusy (Kiev: 1888), pp. 1-69; another version in Iuzhno-russkiia letopisi, Vol. I, pp. 51-106; "Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii" first published by V. Ruban in 1777 as part of Kratkaia letopis' Malyia Rossii 1506 po 1776 god. (St. Petersburg: 1777), and as a supplement to Letopis' Samovidtsa po novo-otkrytym spiskam (Kiev: 1878); P. Simonovskii, Kratkoe opisanie o kozatskom malorossiiskom narode... (Moscow: 1847), and in ChOIDR, No. 2 (1847).
to the development of a political orientation. Since they glorify Cossack explaits, they can be considered as extensions of the Zaporozhian Army concept. But these panegyrics were necessarily modified, to conform with new social and political realities. As early as 1710, Hrabianka attempted to portray the starshyna-nobility's role in the emancipation from Polish suppression as decisive and tried to legitimize the starshyna's leading role in society. Other chronicles followed (Velychko, Simonovs'kyi, Ruban) all of which implicitly asserted that the impoverished archaic, unsophisticated lower rank Cossacks should not serve as the sole object of a historical mythology held by the nobility.

As for political ideology, the Cossack chronicles completely accepted the status quo. Although Samuil Velychko still lamented the loss of the Right Bank, the starshyna-nobility accepted this loss as a political reality and began to identify themselves with the Left-Bank or the Hetmanate. They not only abandoned all hope of unifying Cossack Ukraine with Galicia and Volhynia into a Rus' Principality, but they lost interest in the former Cossack lands of the Right-Bank. Their only remaining political goal was to maintain "Little Russia" or the Hetmanate as an autonomous part of the newly created Russian Empire.

Semen Divovych, a translator in the General Military Chancellery, best elucidated the "Little Russian" concept in a poem entitled, "A Dialogue Between Great Russia and Little Russia."⁷⁹ Written in 1762

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⁷⁹Published by N. Petrov, "Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei (literaturnyi pamiatnik vtoroi poloviny XVIII veka)," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 2 (1882), pp. 313-365 and "Dopolneniia Razgovora Velikorossii s Malorossiei," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 7 (1882), p. 137. A slightly abridged version was published in O. I. Bilets'kyi, ed., <u>Khrestomatiia davnoi ukrains'koi literatury</u> (Kiev: 1967), pp. 465-483.

for the "honor, glory, and defence of all Little Russia," the poem espouses the theory that Little Russia swore allegiance to the tsar and not to Great Russia, and that Little Russia and Great Russia are separate lands sharing the same monarch. Thus they are equal to each other. Divovych complained that while Great Russian offices and ranks were honored, Little Russian ones were often questioned and scorned. Since the tsar himself approved the Little Russian ranks when Little Russia pledged allegiance to him, such injustices should be corrected by treating the two systems as equals. Divovych, therefore, identified Ukrainian autonomy with the rights and prerogatives of the starshyna-nobility.

In a long struggle between the concept of a Rus' Principality and that of the Zaporozhian Army neither emerged victorious. The Rus" Principality concept, which proved impossible to realize, was abandoned; the ideal of the Zaporozhian Army in service of a monarch was inappropriate to the complex social and political system which evolved in the Hetmanate. By the mid-eighteenth century a third theory replaced these two: Little Russia, loyal to the all-Russian tsar yet separate and equal to Great Russia. While such a concept may seem to echo the Rus' Principality theory, it differs in that the territory considered was limited to the Hetmanate. Despite the theory of equality of Great and LIttle Russia, it proposed no fixed constitutional arrangement for a dual or federal state, but rather was dependent upon the monarch's sense of justice. In fact, the only desire shown by the starshyna-nobility in the mid-eighteenth century was to gain imperial recognition of their autonomous institutions and social status. While this was only a pale reflection of the bold plans once advocated, the

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Ukrainian elite, nevertheless maintained a strong sense of historical awareness, active local patriotism, and a distinctive political philosophy--all of which offered resistance to imperial integration and assimilation.

5. Russian Policies Towards the Hetmanate

The legal relationship between the Cossack Host and the Russian tsars was first defined by the Treaty of Pereiaslav. There, a general council of the Zaporozhian Army decided to accept the protection of the Muscovite tsar and pledged allegiance to him. The written agreements had been worked out earlier. They consisted of two basic parts: the articles of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi that were the Ukrainian propositions to the tsar, and the charters issued by the tsar to the Zaporozhian Army, the nobility, and the towns. Agreed upon after intensive negotiations in Moscow, the articles of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi contained the following main points: retention of Cossack rights and privileges, provision to maintain the Host at 60,000 Cossacks paid by the tsar, free elections of a hetman, right to conduct independent foreign relations (except with Crimean, the Ottoman Empire, and Poland), confirmation of the rights of the nobility and burghers, direct tsarist administration over Ukrainian cities, provisions for ths tsar's taxation, and Muscovy's assurance of military aid in the impending struggle against Poland. 80

⁸⁰For the best analysis of the treaty see Andrii Iakovliv (Jakovliv), Dohovir Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z moskovs'kym tsarem Oleksiiem Mykhailovychem 1654 r. (New York: 1954).

At Pereiaslav both sides misunderstood the other's intentions and institutions. The Ukrainians wanted a binding bilateral treaty and military alliance in the form of a quasi-protectorate. By this alliance, the tsar would guarantee security while the Cossack Army maintained virtual independence, obtained legitimate recognition of its role in the Ukraine, and secured an outside source of funds. In essence, the demands at Pereiaslav duplicated those of the treaty concluded with the Poles at Zboriv in 1649 and the Cossacks believed that they were merely replacing the Polish king with the Muscovite tsar. But Muscovite intentions and traditions were quite different. By the mid-seventeenth century. Muscovy recognized no contractual relationships between the tsar and his subjects, only unilateral submission. This concept was apparent when the Muscovite envoy refused to swear oaths on behalf of the tsar, for it was unthinkable that a subject could demand an oath from the autocrat. Dumbfounded and enraged, Khmel'nyts'kyi and his staff walked out in the middle of the submission ceremony, and returned later only after entreaties and assurances by the Muscovite envoy.⁸¹

From the outset, the Pereiaslav Treaty contained ambiguities and self-contradictions. Political expediency had only temporarily muted the clash of two antagonistic political systems. The Muscovites were eager to assert political control over the Ukraine, weaken Poland, and gain the services of the Zaporozhian Army, while the Zaporozhian

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⁸¹ Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei, dokumenty i materiialy v 3kh tomakh (Moscow: 1954), Vol. III, p. 464.

Army needed military support in its protracted struggle against Poland. Rather than jeopardize an understanding, both sides "did not say what they thought and did what they did not wish to do."82 Thus the tsar considered the articles of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi as a favor bestowed on the Cossacks while the latter viewed them as a specific agreement between the tsar and his new subjects.⁸³ For the time being, the tsar was quite satisfied to obtain an oath of allegiance from his new subjects and change his title to autocrat of Great and Little Russia. By doing so, the tsar implicitly recognized Little Russia as a separate political entity, i.e. a distinct domain or tsardom of which he was also autocrat. Without understanding or considering the legal implications of this act, the Cossacks were quite willing to exchange theoretical pledges for military assistance. In practice, the Cossack state did function as a virtually independent political unit. For example, Khmel'nyts'kyi apparently saw no contradiction between his oath to the Muscovite tsar and his acceptance of the Swedish king's protection at a time when Muscovy and Sweden were in conflict. In fact, the Cossack state was simultaneously under the protection of Muscovy, Sweden, and the Ottoman Porte. When it became established, the internal administration of the Cossack state permitted no interference from Muscovy, not even in instances allowed by the Pereiaslav Treaty, such as the

⁸²v. O. Kliuchevskii, Kurs russkoi istorii, Pt. III, in Sochineniia (Moscow: 1957), Vol. III, pp. 118-119.

⁸³B. E. Nol'de dealt with this contradiction in Ocherki russkago gosudarstvennago prava (St. Petersburg: 1911). The part dealing with the Ukraine has been translated into English: "Essays in Russian State Law," The Annals of UAAS, No. 3 (Winter-Spring, 1955), pp. 873-903.

tsar's collection of municipal taxes. Tariffs were levied at clearly demarcated borders between Muscovy and the new Cossack State, and Muscovite troops stationed on Ukrainian territory were treated as foreign allied forces.⁸⁴

The ambiguities of the Pereiaslav Treaty have made it difficult to define or assess the juridical relationship which it established between Muscovy and the Hetmanate, and this topic remains a controversial one. But whatever juridical definition is accepted, it is clear that the functional link between the Hetmanate and Muscovy was--at least up to 1709--the fluctuating personal relationship between the hetman and the tsar. Whenever a new hetman assumed power, the tsar reconfirmed the so-called articles of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and approved new articles submitted by the hetman. Thus, the Pereiaslav agreement was in effect renegotiated every time a new hetman assumed office--1657, 1659, 1663 and 1665, 1669, 1672 and 1674, 1687.⁸⁵

In order to secure a firm foothold in the Ukraine, Muscovy first sought control over the two major centers of power: the offices of the hetman and the metropolitan of Kiev. Soon after Pereiaslav, the Muscovite authorities attempted to curb the hetman's foreign policy initiatives. According to the Pereiaslav Treaty, the hetman was permitted to receive and dispatch foreign ambassadors and to make agreements with foreign powers. He was required, however, to notify the tsar about the

⁸⁴This period is well covered by M. Hrushevs'kyi, <u>Istoriia</u> <u>Ukrainy-Rusy</u>, Vol. IX (Kiev: 1931), and Ivan Krypiakevych, <u>Bohdan</u> <u>Khmel'nyts'kyi</u> (Kiev: 1954).

85por a detailed analysis of these agreemenets see A. Iakovliv, Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory.

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content of all discussions and agreements and was prohibited from negotiating independently with Poland, Crimea, or the Ottoman Porte. Having failed to control the foreign policy of either Khmel'nyts'kyi or Hetman Vyhovs'kyi, the Muscovites used the latter's "betrayal" to falsify the original agreement articles. In 1659, at the election of lurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, the Muscovite authorities presented a text which was allegedly an exact duplicate of the 1654 articles. In fact, this substitute contained many changes and additions, including the prohibition of any foreign relations by the hetman without the direct consent of the tsar.⁸⁶ Subsequently, any Ukrainian diplomacy conducted independently was equated with treason, although controlled foreign relations were permitted until 1708.

Muscovy followed a similar policy in dealing with the Kievan metropolitan, head of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine and Belorussia. After exerting extreme pressure on the Ukrainian clergy and conducting lengthy negotiations with the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Ottoman Porte, the Muscovite authorities finally succeeded in subordina-

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⁸⁶Since no original text of the 1654 agreement has been found, the forgery charge is difficult to prove. However, ' a detailed textual study of the pertinent documents by A. Iakovliv convincingly reconstructs the original agreement and identifies the additions and deletions made in 1659; see his Dohovir. Moreover, one need not rely solely on Iakovliv's study to prove the restriction of the hetman's original right to conduct foreign relations: A simple comparison between the 1654 and 1659 charters issued by the tsar confirms the change. The former permits foreign relations while the latter prohibits them. See PSZ, No. 119 (March 27, 1654), Vol. 1, pp. 322-327, and No. 262 (October 17, 1659), Vol. 1, pp. 491-495.

ting the Kievan metropolitan to the Moscow patriarch in 1686.⁸⁷ With this achievement, Muscovy attained control over the two major centers of authority in the Ukraine.

By stationing Muscovite military governors (voevody) in major Ukrainian cities, Muscovy sought also to exert its influence over Ukrainian domestic affairs. The 1654 agreement stipulated that <u>voevody</u> were to be in Kiev and Chernihiv, but Khmel'nyts'kyi allowed only the Kiev one to assume his post.⁸⁸ In spite of repeated protestations from Moscow, neither Khmel'nyts'kyi nor his successor Vyhovs'kyi permitted the stationing of more voevody. The 1659 articles, however, provided for the placement of voevody in five cities. Under Hetman Briukhovets'kyi, the Muscovites were able to obtain the unrestricted stationing of voevody (1665). A general uprising in 1668 forced the voevody to flee these towns and then they were again limited to five cities.-Kiev, Pereiaslav, Nizhyn, Chernihiv, and Oster. But Moscow's right to maintain voevody in major Ukrainian cities was henceforth recognized.

The rationale advanced by Moscow for the stationing of voevodys in the Hetmanate was, at first, as protection against foreign invasion, and they were forbidden to interfere in local city affairs. Later, the voevody sought to shield the burghers from abuses of the Cossack administration by encouraging the burghers to petition Russian officials

⁸⁷The subordination of the Kievan metropolitan is discussed in Section 3.

88 The question of Russian voevody in the Hetmanate is discussed by I. Rozenfel'd, <u>Prisoedinenie Malorossii k Rossii</u> (St. Petersburg: 1915), pp. 100-105, and by A. Iakovliv in <u>Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory</u>, pp. 75-77, pp. 81-92. directly, Moscovy became the frequent arbiter of Ukrainian internal disputes. In this manner, Moscow isolated various segments of Ukrainian society and prevented the coalescing of a Ukrainian central authority.

Both the Ukrainians themselves and the Russian administration took initial steps to integrate the Ukrainian elite into the Russian social system. Hetman Briukhovets'kyi received the title of <u>boyar</u> and his proteges became <u>dvoriane</u>. Rewarding those who served Moscow with offices, titles, and estates later became a fairly successful technique for promoting an "all-Russian" feeling and orientation, for some members of the starshyna had already shown a keen interest in obtaining titles, honor, status and wealth from Muscovy. Automatic Russian ennoblement of Cossack officers was provided for in the 1669 and 1687 article agreements, but these provisions were never implemented.⁸⁹ The 1687 agreement articles, however, went much further, even suggesting the desirability of intermarriage between Russians and Ukrainians, intermixture of populations, and ultimate assimilation.⁹⁰

Faced by the increased influence of Muscovy in Ukrainian military, political, and religious institutions, the Hetmanate's authorities resisted complete incorporation. During the reign of Hetman Samoilovych (1672-1686) and especially that of Hetman Mazepa (1686-1709), the rebirth of a Ukrainian elite, a strong more efficient administration, a vigorous cultural life, distinctive political thought, independent economic ties, and renewed interest in reuniting the Right-Bank Ukraine

89A. Iakovliv, Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory, p. 99, p. 124.90Ibid., pp. 126-127.

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attested to the possibility of a viable Ukrainian Cossack state. But this development was cut short by Mazepa's break with Muscovy, his alliance with Sweden, and the subsequent defeat at Poltava (1709). The latter resulted in the final sanctioning of the Treaty of Andrusiv (1666) and the "Eternal Peace" (1686). After 1709, Moscow exercised unquestioned control over the Left-Bank Ukraine, or the Hetmanate.

After his victory at Poltava, Peter I followed a policy of severe repressions in the Hetmanate. Yet, although those suspected of supporting Mazepa were arrested and deported to Siberia, the Hetmanate's institutions were, for the time being, left intact. Preoccupied with the Northern War, Peter limited himself to only a close supervision of the Hetmanate's main administrative and judicial positions.⁹¹ A Russian minister at the hetman's court was instructed to read all the hetman's correspondence, review his appointments, and supervise the Hetmanate's financial and judicial systems. For the first time, Russians were appointed polkovnyks directly by the tsar. Candidates for the highest offices--the general staff--were selected by the College of Foreign Affairs and approved by the monarch. The chancelleries of the hetman, the general staff, and the general military court were all placed under the review of Russian officials.

This was only the first step in a policy aimed at the complete abolition of Ukrainian autonomy. Citing England's absorption of Scotland,

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⁹¹The Petrine era is treated by I. Rozenfel'd, Prisoedinenie, pp. 118-129 and in detail by O. Ohloblyn, Het'man Mazepa ta ioho doba (New York: 1960); see also V. Diadychenko, Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoi Ukrainy kintsia XVII - pochatku XVII st. (Kiev: 1959), and Doroshenko, Narys, Vol. II, pp. 136-182.

Wales, and Ireland as an example to be emulated, a 1714 governmental decree declared the desirability of intermingling the Ukrainian and Russian peoples and of bringing Russian officials into the Hetmanate. 92 To set an example, Peter ordered in 1718 that Hetman Skoropads "kyi's daughter marry a Russian.⁹³ But only after the Nystad peace (1721) did Peter finally have the opportunity to "take Little Russia in hand."94 It was then that he created a Little Russian College, composed of six Russian officers, whose responsibility was to adjudicate all complaints concerning abuses in the Ukrainian administration. Simultaneously, the affairs of the Hetmanate were transferred from the College of Foreign Affairs to the Senate, symbolizing Peter's desire to treat the Hetmanate as an integral part of the Empire. With the death of Hetman Skoropads'kyi, the Russian authorities forbade the election of a successor. In a power struggle between the Little Russian College and the General Military Chancellery headed by acting hetman Pavlo Polubotok, the College wrested control of the Hetmanate's finances and justice. But St. Petersburg lacked the trained personnel to administer the area directly and could not obtain the complete cooperation of the lower levels of the Ukrainian administration. Revenues fell and chaos reigned in the court system. Shortly after Peter's death when a war with the Turks was imminent, the Secret Council decided to abandon Peter's Ukrainian policy. In 1727 Peter II issued a decree that "there be a hetman

92N. Riasanovsky, <u>A History of Russia</u> (New York: 1963), p. 257.
93S. Solovev, Vol. VIII, pp. 593-594.

94The works of Count P. Tolstoi, member of the Secret Council of Catherine as quoted in D. Doroshenko, <u>Narysy</u>, Vol. II, p. 179.

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and officers in Little Russia and that they be maintained in accordance with the treaty of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi."95

From 1727 to the 1760's, while the local administration and judicial organs of the Hetmanate functioned without interference from St. Petersburg, the imperial authorities vacillated in dealing with the Hetmanate's central administration. At times St. Petersburg merely supervised its central organs; at others, imperial officers were created which assumed some of their functions. Under Hetman Danylo Apostol (1728-1734) one Russian was assigned to supervise all Ukrainian affairs, and three others were appointed the General Military Court. 96 The hetman was again denied the authority to select the General Military Staff and the polkovnyks. The latter were to be chosen by the Ukrainian starshyna, subject to approval by St. Petersburg. After Hetman Apostol's death (1734), the imperial government once more forbade the election of a new hetman, and created another collective body -- "Rule of the Hetman's Office" -- to administer the Ukraine. That office nominally consisted of six persons -- three Ukrainians and three Russians -- but was in fact presided over and dominated by a Russian general. For over ten years, this body ruled the Ukraine while acquiring a reputation for caprice and brutality.97

The most significant centralizing event during the 1727-1750 period was the Russian takeover of Ukrainian finances. In 1728 the

95B. Nol'de, "Essays in Russian State Law," p. 885.

96For a study of this period see B. Kupnyts'kyi, Het'man Danylo Apostol i ioho doba (Augsburg: 1948).

97D. Doroshenko, Vol. II, p. 191.

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Ukrainian treasury came under the jurisdiction of the College of Foreign Affairs and was staffed by two chief treasurers, one a Ukrainian and the other a Russian.⁹⁸

The continuous levelling of Ukrainian institutions was halted for a brief period during Elizabeth's reign, when the Hetmanate enjoyed the golden autumn of its autonomy. Elizabeth's morganatic marraige to Oleksii Rozumovs'kyi--a Cossack from the Hetmanate--disposed her favorably to the reestablishment of the hetmancy. While carefully grooming Oleksii's brother, Kyrylo, for the post of hetman, Elizabeth waited to announce her decision. In 1750, the then twenty-two year-old Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi was duly elected hetman at Hlukhiv.⁹⁹

In contrast to his predecessors, Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi originated from rank-and-file Cossacks and not from an aristocratic starshyna family. His formative years were spent at the St. Petersburg court and in Western Europe. He was the first hetman to hold imperial offices simultaneously with his hetmancy--he served as president of the Academy of Sciences and was commander of the Izmailovskii Guards. Rozumovs'kyi was closely related to the imperial family and to the Russian aristocracy not only through his brother, but also through his marriage to Ekaterina Ivanovna Naryshkin. Consequently, the hetman became embroiled in court intrigues and was frequently absent from the Hetmanate, leaving the Hetmanate's local administration to his General

98Discussed in section 3.

99Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's rule is treated in A. A. Vasil'chikov, Semeistvo Rozumovskikh (4 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1880-1887), Vol. 1.

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Staff and the starshyna.

The Hetman restituted Ukrainian autonomy at least to the extent exercised by Hetman Skoropads'kyi in 1709. In addition, he succeeded in extending the jurisdiction of the Hetmanate to include again the city of Kiev and the Zaporozhian Sich. In the late 1750's and early 1760's, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi and the Ukrainian administration also attempted to reform and revitalize the institutions of the Hetmanate. Standard arms and uniforms were issued to Cossack regiments and training programs were begum. Hlukhiv and Baturyn--Mazepa's old capital--were renovated. Baturyn was again designated as the future capital of the Hetmanate, and a new university in the city was planned. A major judicial reform of the Hetmanate's judicial system was also being prepared.¹⁰⁰

Yet, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi also had great difficulty maintaining the Hetmanate's autonomy. In 1754 he was personally reprimanded by the Empress for appointing officers and distributing land without her approval.¹⁰¹ Later, a protracted and bitter struggle over finances developed. The abolition in 1754 of imperial internal tariffs (including the Hetmanate's) and in 1755 of the border tariff between the Hetmanate and Russia deprived the Hetman of revenue. Rozumovs'kyi's

100A. Vasil'chikov, <u>Semeistvo</u>, Vol. I, pp. 310-318; P. Nechyporenko, "Umovy robitnychoi ptratsi na baturyns'kykh ta khlukhivs'kykh 'natsional'nykh stroeniiakh'," <u>Istorychno-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk</u>, Vol. I (1927), pp. 121-134; I. Cherkas'kyi, Sudovi reformy het'mana Gr. K. H. Rozumovskoho, <u>Iubileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akademika Dmytra</u> Ivanovycha Bahalia (2 vols.; Kiev: 1927), Vol. I, pp. 770-772.

101A. Vasil'chikov, Semeistvo, Vol. I, p. 158 and p. 187.

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vigorous protests led the Empress to allow the Hetman 50,000 rubles a year in compensation from the imperial treasury. When the College of Foreign Affairs, headed by Rozumovs'kyi's enemy, A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin, demanded an accounting for these funds, the Hetman refused to comply. This refusal touched off a bitter struggle and resulted in the administrative subordination of the Hetmanate to the Senate.¹⁰² These developments weakened the Hetmanate's position radically: its border with Russia was eliminated and the territory was placed under the jurisdiction of a body for internal affairs.

The relationship between the Hetmanate and Russia changed dramatically from the time of Khmel'nyts'kyi. The virtually independent state of 1654 underwent a series of political transformations: by 1722, a concentrated attack on the Hetmanate's central institutions had reduced it to a special, autonomous province destined for eventual incorporation into the Empire. However, an attempt at the direct takeover of its administration proved premature and was abandoned. Between 1727 and 1750, the Russian authorities assumed control over the Hetmanate's central institutions but left the lower administration intact.

Although the Hetmanate still possessed its own army, government, legal and financial system, it was in a precarious position. The Cossack Army, once viewed as the Hetmanate's major contribution to the Empire, was no longer a viable military force. The Orthodox Church of

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^{1020.} Romanovs'kyi, "Do istorii biudzhetovoho prava Het'manshchyny za Kyryla Rozumovs'koho," <u>Iubileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akademika Dmytra</u> <u>Ivanovycha Bahaliia</u> (Kiev: 1927), Vol. 1, pp. 779-785; Rozenfel'd, Prisoedinenie, pp. 150-155.

Ukraine and Belorussia had disintegrated and its remaining eparchies had been merged with imperial Orthodoxy. Simultaneously, changes in the Ukrainian social structure made the Hetmanate similar to the Empire as a whole: as in Russia itself, government and society in the Hetmanate were based more and more on the bureaucracy of the nobility and serfdom of the peasantry.

But the complete integration of the Hetmanate with the Empire was by no means a foregone conclusion. A major impediment was that the Ukrainian elite still considered itself totally distinct from its Russian counterparts. Although Ukrainian political ideas had narrowed considerably from the Rus' Principality or the larger Cossack state once envisioned, the Ukrainian elite still viewed the Hetmanate as separate from Russia, linked only by a common monarch. A proud historical tradition cultivated by the writers of chronicles constantly reminded the Ukrainians of their heroic ancestors and their ancient rights and liberties. The Russian authorities contributed to this feeling of separateness by refusing to recognize the nobility of the Ukrainian elite and withholding imperial position and status from them. This policy strengthened the elite's commitment to autonomy, for only selfrule could assure the starshyna their power, wealth and social status. Under Hetman Rozumovs'kyi, the Ukrainian elite attempted to strengthen the autonomous position of the Hetmanate and to forestall further imperial integration. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the degree of Ukrainian autonomy depended to a large degree on the caprice of the monarch and Ukrainian influence at court. Under these conditions, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi was well-placed to defend the Hetmanate's position

within the Empire. But linking the destiny of the hetmancy to the fate of an imperial courtier made this office and, to an extent, Ukrainian autonomy an appanage of court politics.

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CHAPTER II

THE ABOLITION OF THE HETMANCY AND RULE OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL PETR RUMIANTSEV

1. Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's Position at Catherine's Court.

Few events seemed to bode so well for the continuation and revitalization of the Hetmanate as Catherine's 1762 seizure of power. During the reign of Elizabeth, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi, maintained a long-standing personal friendship with Catherine; perhaps, he was even infatuated with her.¹ When Catherine feared the total collapse of her position in the eventuality of Elizabeth's death, she received secret assurances of support from Rozumovs'kyi.² Although he was unable to be of any real assistance to Catherine during the months of Peter III's reign, he subsequently played an important role in the coup that placed Catherine on the imperial throne. It was Hetman Rozumovs'kyi who commanded the Izmail regiment which provided the military basis

Memoirs of Catherine the Great, translated by Katherine Anthony (New York: 1927), p. 180; S. M. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii (15 volumes; Moscow: 1960-66), Vol. XIII, p. 184; A. A. Vasil'chikov, Semeistvo Razumovskikh (4 volumes; St. Petersburg: 1880-1887), Vol. I, p. 292.

²Solov'ev, Vol. XII, p. 353; V. A. Bil'basov, <u>Istoriia Ekateriny</u> Vtoroi (Vols. I, II, XII; Berlin: 1900), Vol. I, p. 263. for the successful coup.³ It was the Hetman who remained at Catherine's side during the actual revolt. And it was the Hetman who as president of the Academy of Sciences utilized its press for the immediate publication of Catherine's manifesto⁴--a manifesto drafted by the Hetman's aide, G. N. Teplov.⁵

Not only personal friendship but also pique, fear, and ambition prompted the usually cautious Hetman into such a dangerous undertaking. Like most of Elizabeth's commanders, he was constantly humiliated by Peter III, who forced him to conduct in public the new Prussian drills-an activity for which Rozumovs'kyi showed rather limited aptitude.⁶ Yet, during Peter's short reign, the Hetman's power and position were undiminished. He remained general-fieldmarshal, commander of the Izmail regiment, and president of the Academy of Sciences. In the Hetmanate he was even able to extend his authority by again bringing the city of Kiev under his jurisdiction and by directly appointing polkovnyks. All of the Hetman's recommendations regarding promotions, retirements.

⁴P. P. Pekarskii, <u>Istoriia Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk v</u> <u>Peterburge</u> (2 volumes; St. Petersburg: 1870-1873), Vol. II, p. 658; Vasil'chikov, Vol. I, p. 298; Bil'basov, <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. II, p. 21.

Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, p. 39.

6Vasil'chikov, Vol. I, p. 290.

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³The Izmail regiment played a crucial role by initiating the revolt and by providing headquarters for Catherine and her advisors. See Bil'basov, Istoriia, Vol. II, pp. 22-37; Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, pp. 79-102; Vasil'chikov, Vol. I, pp. 291-300. Vasil'chikov claimed that Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi prepared the coup by removing from the Izmail regiment German officers favorably disposed to Peter III. A check of the officer register by Bil'basov revealed that Vasil'chikov was incorrect. See Bil'basov, Istoriia, Vol. II, pp. 11-12.

and pensions for Ukrainian officials were routinely approved in St. Petersburg.⁷ But the spectacular rise of another Ukrianian, Andrii Hudovych, made the Hetman apprehensive. Budovych, who served Peter III when he was heir-apparent in Holstein, now became his adjutant-general.⁸ He was sent to Prussia with offers of peace and alliance. As Hudovych clearly emerged as the Emperor's favorite, the court was rife with rumors that Hudovych would replace Rozumovs'kyi as hetman.⁹ Apprehension, combined with visions of an ever greater imperial role in the event of a successful coup, drew the ambitious Hetman further and further into the conspiratorial camp.

Having participated on the victorious side of the revolt, K. Rozumovs'kyi reaped rewards in status, wealth and power. On the day of the coup, June 28, 1762, Catherine appointed him Senator.¹⁰ A few days later, on July 3, he was named Catherine's adjutant-general. In that capacity the Hetman took command of all the infantry troops in the vicinity of the imperial capital, St. Petersburg.¹¹ Catherine went out

⁸A brief biographical sketch of Andrii Hudovych may be found in O. Ohloblyn's Liudy staroi Ukrainy (Munich: 1959), pp. 7-13.

⁹Hudovych's mission to Prussia is described in Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, pp. 28-30. For court rumors, see Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, p. 84 and Jean Castera, The Life of Catherine II, Empress of Russia, translated by William Took (3rd ed.; London: 1799), Vol. I, p. 183.

10Senatskii arkhiv (henceforth SA) (June 28, 1762), Vol. XI, p. 194. 11SA (July 3, 1762), Vol. XI, p. 196.

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⁷D. Bantysh-Kamenskii, <u>Istoriia Maloi Rossii</u> (3 volumes, 3rd ed.; Moscow: 1842), Vol. III, pp. 189-192; N. Markevich, <u>Istoriia Malorossii</u> (5 volumes; Moscow: 1842-43), Vol. II, pp. 648-654; A. Rigel'man, <u>Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii</u> (4 parts in 1 volume; Moscow: 1847), Pt. IV, pp. 19-21.

of her way to express special consideration and favor for the Hetman. On July 25, at a dinner in honor of K. Rozumovs'kyi, the Empress presented him with the Order of St. Elizabeth.¹² Prior to her coronation, Catherine stayed at the Hetman's Noscow suburban village of Petrovsk,¹³ and he assisted her during the coronation ceremonies.¹⁴ Catherine granted him large estates in the Hetmanate, a pension of 5,000 rubles annually, and permitted him frequent drafts on the state treasury.¹⁵ More importantly, K. Rozumovs'kyi began participating on the highest levels in affairs of state. In addition to his Senatorial duties, he was also a member of a commission dealing with the status of the nobility,¹⁶ and chairman of a commission for the reorganization of the Russian military structure.¹⁷ The Hetman was even entrusted by Catherine with a secret investigation of the Khrushchev and Gur'ev affair--an alleged plot against the Empress.¹⁸ Clearly, the Hetman was emerging

12Vasil'chikov, Vol. I, p. 299.

13Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, p. 127.

14Bil'basov, Istoriia, Vol. II, p. 171.

15Catherine divided the people to be rewarded into four categories, the Hetman, N. I. Panin and Prince M. N. Volkonskii making up the most important category. See Bil'basov, <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. II, p. 93. Rozumovs'kyi's frequent drafts on the state treasury can be gleaned from Catherine's notes to A. V. Olsuf'ev, "Bumagi Imperatritsy Ekateriny II," <u>Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva</u> (henceforth <u>SIRIO</u>), Vol. VII (1871), pp. 109, 121, 125, 176. For land grants to Rozumovs'kyi see <u>SA</u> (August 8, 1762), Vol. XI, pp. 217-220.

16polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii (henceforth PSZ), No. 11,751 (February 11, 1763), Vol. XVII, p. 157. Workings of the commission are described in Bil'basov, <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. II, pp. 242-247.

17Vasil'chikov, Vol. I, pp. 301-302.

¹⁸The plot is described in Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, pp. 132-136; Bil'basov, <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. II, pp. 189-203; Catherine's appointment of K. as one of the leading figures in the Empire.

Courtiers, nevertheless, always risk competition from powerful rivals. Soon after the coup, Catherine pardoned and reinstated into the inner circles of government the Hetman's most inveterate enemy, Count A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin.¹⁹ Rozumovs'kyi's position at court was jeopardized by his repeated clashes with G. G. Orlov, Catherine's current lover.²⁰ Gradually there emerged two major court factions: one led by Rozumovs'kyi's friend, N. I. Panin, and the other by his enemy, A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin. Rozumovs'kyi's support for Panin was reinforced on the one hand by Orlov's alliance with Bestuzhev-Riumin and on the other by the close relationship between Panin and G. Teplov, the Hetman's former tutor, client, and friend.²¹

At the height of the factional struggle, the Hetman asked Catherine for permission to leave Moscow and return to the Hetmanate.²² His

Rozumovs'kyi is published in SIRIO, Vol. VII (1871), p. 172.

¹⁹In the 1750's, when A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin presided over the College of Foreign Affairs, he had a bitter battle with Rozumovs'kyi over the Hetman's finances. As a consequence of a major scandal in 1758, Bestushev-Riumin was removed from office and banished to a small estate where he lived until his recall by Catherine in 1762. For a brief biography see A. Presniakov, "Bestuzhev-Riumin, graf Aleksei Petrovich," <u>Russkii biograficheskii slovar</u> (St. Petersburg: 1890), Vol. II (Aleksinskii-Bestuzhev-Riumin), pp. 783-787.

20vasil'chikov, Vol. I, pp. 304-305.

21For the best account of court politics see David L. Ransel's <u>Nikita Panin's Role in Russian Court Politics of the Seventeen Sixties:</u> <u>A Critique of the Gentry Opposition Thesis</u> (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation; Yale University: 1968), pp. 159-203. Ransel summarizes his thesis in "Nikita Panin's Imperial Council Project and the Struggle of Hierarchy Groups at the Court of Catherine II," <u>Canadian Slavic Studies</u>, Vol. IV, No. 3 (1970), pp. 443-463.

22The court was in Moscow from the time of Catherine'scoronation (September 1762) until June 1763. reasons were twofold: Rozumovs'kyi was greatly annoyed by the presence at court of his two enemies and the Hetman was eager to resume a number of reforms in the Hetmanate which had been interrupted by the death of Elizabeth.²³ Catherine readily granted Rozumovs'kyi a two-year leave of absence from the court beginning with the summer of 1763.²⁴

Before his departure, however, Hetman Rozumovs'kyl became entangled in another episode in the factional conflict at court. In May 1763 a plan for G. Orlov to marry Catherine was advanced by Orlov and Bestuzhev-Riumin. Alarmed by this, Panin and Rozumovs'kyl began rallying opposition to the marriage scheme.²⁵ As it turned out, this was unnecessary, for Catherine had no intention of marrying Orlov. The anti-Orlov campaign, however, led to unpleasant consequences. A young officer, Fedor Khitrov, concocted a plot to prevent the marriage at any cost, including, if need be, the assassination of the Orlov brothers. The plot was uncovered, and although the investigation failed to prove that either Panin or the Hetman was involved directly, the incident considerably weakened the Panin faction. By June, Panin's influence at court was at a low ebb²⁶ and Rozumovs'kyi's reputation had been tarnished. In a dispatch to England, the Earl of Buckingham aptly

23while in Moscow the Hetman had been planning judicial reforms in the Hetmanate. This will be discussed in the next section.

24"Doneseniia grafa sol'msa Fridrikhu II," Report No. 19 (March 17 [28 0.S.], 1764), SIRIO, Vol. XXII (1878), pp. 42-44.

25The marriage scheme and the <u>Khitrov</u> plot are best described in Bil'basov, <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. II, pp. 275-296.

26 Ransel, Nikita Panin's Role, p. 170.

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described Rozumovs'kyi's position:

I cannot find that the Empress suspects the Hetman's having any concern in the late tumult, though some of the persons, who were leaders in it, used to be almost constantly with him; I know, however, that he is extremely dissatisfied at the distinction paid to the favorite [G. G. Orlov]....²⁷

Mhen Hetman Rozumovs'kyi left Moscow in June of 1763 he had good reasons to be dissatisfied. His enemies stood high in the Empress' favor, ______ and he himself was no longer above suspicion. Under such circumstances, the Hetman was, for the time being, content to abandon court politics and to devote himself entirely to the implementation of much-needed reforms in the Hetmanate.

2. Political Plans and Reforms in the Hetmanate.

During his extended stay in St. Petersburg and Moscow, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi utilized his imperial position to obtain certain concessions for the Hetmanate.²⁸ He and his staff, led by two recently promoted members of the Ukrainian General Chancellery--General Chancellor Vasyl' Tumans'kyi and General Aide-de-Camp Ivan Skoropads'kyi--were in constant touch with the other members of the General Chancellery in the Hetmanate.²⁹ Even in St. Petersburg or Moscow, Rozumovs'kyi was well

27The Earl of Buckingham to the Right Honorable Earl of Halifax. No. 74 (August 22, 1763; N.S.), SIRIO, Vol. XII (1873), p. 126.

²⁸The Hetman was able to win various tax and economic concessions for the Ukrainian populace. See <u>PSZ</u>, No. 11,650 (August 21, 1762), Vol. XVI, pp. 57-58; No. 11,736 (January 20, 1763), Vol. XVI, pp. 137-138; No. 11,695 (January 25, 1762), Vol. XVI, p. 93; No. 11,685 (October 16, 1762), Vol. XVI, p. 82.

²⁹Iakov Markovich, <u>Dnevnye zapiski malorossiiskago podskarbija</u> <u>Iakova Markovicha</u>, edited by Aleksandr Markovich (2 volumes; Moscow: 1859), Vol. II, p. 375.

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informed as to the Hetmanate's needs, and he carried out, in absentia, all the functions of hetman.

Mhile still in Moscow, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi ordered a new census for the Hetmanate³⁰ and showed increased interest in restoring at least partially the judicial system of seventeenth-century Poland-Lithuania which had been in use prior to the Hetmanate's recognition of Muscovite authority. As early as 1760, when he enlarged and strengthened the General Military Court, the Hetman indicated a desire for a thorough judicial reform.³¹ Then, on February 17, 1763, Rozumovs'kyi issued a decree eliminating the judicial functions of the General Military Chancollery, thereby reducing the number of appellate courts.³²

An opportunity for judicial reorganization presented itself as the result of a complex and drawn-out court case of the Pereiaslav-Mykhailivs'ky Monastery over its property boundaries. After a series of appeals the case was finally heard by the Senate, which managed only to obfuscate it even further. But during the proceedings, it was discovered that, according to the Lithuanian Statute, this case should have been first decided by an estates' boundary court (pidkomors'kyi

30Pylyp Klymenko, "Komputy ta revizii XVII stol.," Ukrains'kyi arkheohrafichnyi zbirnyk, Vol. III (1930), p. 184.

³¹Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's order was published by M. F. Vladimirskii-Budanov, "Akty po upravleniiu Malorossieiu gr. P. A. Rumaintseva za 1767 g.," <u>Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora Letopistsa</u> (henceforth <u>ChIONL</u>), Bk. V (1891), Pt. III, pp. 121-126. In this order, the Hetman indicated his wish to further reform the court system, reinstating the estates' court, property court, and civil courts (p. 122).

32Irynarkh Cherkas'kyi, "Sudovi reformy het'mana gr. K. H. Rozumovs'koho," <u>Iubileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akademyka Dmytra Ivanovycha</u> Bahaliia (Kiev: 1927), Ch. 1, p. 771.

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<u>sud</u>). In a letter to the Senate, the Hetman explained that these courts ceased to exist at the time of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, but recommended their reinstatement.³³ After some deliberation, this recommendation was approved by both the Senate and the Empress.³⁴

The ukaz which promulgated the reconstituted estates' boundary court also stated that the Hetmanate's government was "to be conducted in accordance with Little Russian rights."³⁵ This was interpreted by the Hetman and the Ukrainian elite as an approval for reorganizing Ukrainian institutions in order to bring them into conformity with the Lithuanian Statute. In September 1763, Rozumovs'kyi called a General Council at Hlukhiv to discuss a wide range of reforms. In attendance were two high ranking officers (polk starshyna) and two low ranking officers (sotnyks) from each polk. The rest of the Council, in imitation of the Polish-Lithuanian Sojm, were drawn from the new elite-the znachne viis'kove tovarystvo (fifty-six Comrades-of-the-Standard and thirty-eight Military Comrades).³⁶ The Council first considered the problem of the judiciary. The mere creation of the boundary courts necessitated further changes. In accordance with the Lithuanian Statute, the boundary court was to function in conjunction with a property court

33 Ibid., p. 773.

34<u>PSZ</u>, No. 11,812 (May 10, 1763), Vol. XVI, pp. 237-246. 35Ibid., p. 246.

36p. Miller, "Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskago byta staroi Malorossii. Sudy zemskie, grodskie i podkomorskie v XVIII stoletii," <u>Sbornik Khar'kovskago Istoriko-filologicheskago Obshchestva</u>, Vol. VIII (1896), p. 103.

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(zems'kyi sud) which was no longer in existence. The Council decided to restore fully the court system as designated in the Lithuanian Statute and guaranteed by the tsar in the Statutes of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyl, but which never really functioned in the Hetmanate.

Formally promulgated by the Hetman's decree of November 19, 1763, the restored court system consisted of three types of courts: a property court (<u>zems'kyi sud</u>), a boundary claims court (<u>pidkomors'kyi</u> <u>sud</u>) and a criminal court (<u>grods'kyi sud</u>).³⁷ Cases originating in any of the three courts could be appealed to the General Military Court, while the hetman still retained his rights of pardon. Although simply restoring the older system, this reform considerably facilitated court practices. It also matched more closely the Lithuanian Statute, the law code used in modified form throughout the Hetmanate. The reform also streamlined the court system, simplified appeals, and differentiated civil and criminal proceedings. By no longer permitting members of the new aristocracy, the znachne viis'kove tovarystvo, to be tried by the General Military Court as the court of first instance, this reform made the Cossacks, Cossack officers, and aristocracy all equal before the law.

But this change also had some serious drawbacks. Contrary to the assertion of some scholars, it did not really separate justice from administration.³⁸ In practice, the polk court became the criminal court

37The decree was published by Miller, "Ocherki....Sudy...," pp. 236-243; Miller's monograph (pp. 63-244) remains the definitive study on the 1763-64 judicial reforms.

³⁸Such scholars as Vasil'chikov (Vol. I, p. 312) and P. Maikov ("Rozumovskii, graf Kirill Grigor'evich," <u>Russkii Biograficheskii slovar</u>, Vol. XV, p. 460) believed that the reform separated military and administrative functions. This was correct only insofar as non-military men

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and the same polk officers who administered the polk and led it in battle still adjudicated in the courts. Only civil matters were now in the hands of elected judges. Furthermore, the courts of the municipalities, the Church, and the landlords were not affected by these changes. The reforms remained silent on the status of the peasantry, thus excluding it from the reinstated court system and placing it under the sole jurisdiction of the landlord's justice. Even a modified return to the court system of Poland-Lithuania implied a return to its social system and this reform gave the Ukrainian aristocracy further legal assurances for the preservation of noble landholding and for the utilization of free labor of the peasantry.

In addition to judicial matters, the Council also discussed the problem of Ukrainian autonomy. This was somewhat surprising for, according to the Hetman's order, the Council was summoned only for the consideration of judicial reforms.³⁹ As the agenda of the Council sessions had been prepared by Rozumovs'kyi's staff,⁴⁰ it is likely that the Hetman himself decided to extend the scope of the deliberations. Once the Council was in session, both the Hetman and the starshynanobility saw the assembly as an opportunity to enact wide-ranging

39The Hetman's decree was published in Miller's "Ocherki....Sudy zemskie...," p. 235.

40 Ibid., pp. 112-114.

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could theoretically be elected to the property and boundary estates courts. J. Padoch in "The Judicial System," <u>Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia</u> (2 vols.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963-71), Vol. II, p. 43, incorrectly states that the 1763 reforms separated judicial power from administrative.

reforms.

The Council also debated the Hetmanate's decline and possible measures for its revitalization. One orator lamented that from the time the Hetmanate came under Russian protection, Ukrainian rights and privileges have been curtailed. 41 He painted a bleak picture of the current situation and lamented the passing of the age of famous Cossack warriors, who had once brought fear to so many enemies. He blamed the demise of these freedoms on the Ukrainians for misgovernment, for placing personal interests above those of the public good, and, especially, for abandoning the prerogatives which Ukrainians possessed when they came under Russian protection. To rectify this situation, the speaker recommended the following reforms: in order to guarantee freedom and proper legislation, to reinstitute General Radas or Sejms; in order to maintain proper judicial proceedings, to establish property, boundary, and criminal courts, with a Tribunal for appeals; and, in order to improve the position of the Cossacks, to guarantee their ownership of land and exempt them from taxes in support of the Russian troops. Other requests were for the reinstitution of unspecified rights of the clergy, the compensation for losses suffered by the populace in

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⁴¹The speech was published under the title, "Rech' o popravlenii sostoianiia Malorossii," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 10 (1882), pp. 119-125. In the introduction an editor of <u>KSt.</u> claims that the speech by the unknown orator was given in the 1750's. This, however, is impossible, for the ukaz renewing the estates' boundary court is cited in the speech. Since the speaker recommends the reinstitution of the other courts which were promulgated by the Hetman's decree on November 19, 1763, the speech was delivered between May 10, 1763 (the date of Catherine's ukaz approving the estates' boundary court) and November 19, 1763, and could have been made only at the Hlukhiv Assembly.

the last Turkish War, and the establishment of secular schools and universities. The speaker also complained sharply that peasant mobility was a source of impoverishment of the nobility and non-payment of taxes.

The general thrust of these views was . that the Hetmanate's decline could be reversed by a renewal of its political autonomy and by a restitution of traditional prerogatives held by the shliakhta, clergy, and Cossacks. Concerned primarily with the recognition of wide-ranging political, personal, and economic rights for the shliakhta, the speech represented the views of the new Ukrainian aristocracy. The Hetmanate it envisaged was patterned on the Polish "golden liberties."

The program outlined by the anonymous orator became the basis for a petition drafted near the conclusion of the Council. Originating from the "Hetman, shliakhta, Little Russian army and people," the petition contained the most autonomist views publicly expressed since the time of Mazepa.⁴² In the petition's introduction, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi gave the official Ukrainian interpretation of the Treaty of Pereiaslav. According to the Hetman, his predecessor, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, accepted the protection of the Russian tsar because of their common Orthodox faith. This was done, however, on the basis of treaties which were reaffirmed

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⁴²The petition was published under the title "Proshenie malorossiiskago shliakhetstva i starshyn, vmeste s getmanom, o vozstanovlenii raznykh starinnykh prav Malorossii, podannoe Ekaterine II-i v 1764 godu," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 6 (1883), pp. 317-345. Some points are listed as coming from the hetman and others as from the Assembly, resulting in some duplication. Also, the numbering of petition points is not always in order. It is possible that this is not the final copy but a preliminary draft. Thus far, however, it is the only copy known to scholars.

whenever a new tsar or hetman assumed office. The petitioners (including the Hetman) proposed to renew the custom of confirming the Statutes of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi by the tsar at the election of each hetman. The petitioners also sought a guarantee of an immediate election of another hetman in case of Rozumovs'kyi's death. They cited previous interregnums in the Hetmanate as detrimental to the country's welfare and as a violation of Ukrainian rights. They also requested approval for establishing a Rada or <u>Sejm</u>, as the Hetmanate's permanent legislative body, without, however, specifying its functions or its constitutional relationship to the office of hetman. Presumably, these problems were to be worked out in subsequent meetings. The petition's only other article dealing with the Hetmanate's governmental structure was a routine request for the confirmation of the newly reinstituted court system.

The economic program of the Hlukhiv Council was also autonomist, if not separatist. The petitioners sought the abolition of state licensed monopolies and were particularly incensed by a Petrine decree permitting trade with foreign countries only through Russian ports. Many Ukrainian merchants who traditionally utilized direct land routes had been forced to redirect their trade to Baltic ports. Since this proved to be quite costly, Ukrainian commercial interests urged the re-establishment of direct land trade routes from the Hetmanate to Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, they called for the abolition of the imperial border tariffs and the reintroduction of the Hetmanate's import and export tax (abolished in 1754). Internal tariffs were not to be restored, but institutions that once derived their income from

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internal tariffs were to be compensated from the Hetmanate's importexport tax revenues. Finally, Jews--although not permitted to cross the frontier into Russia--were to be allowed to trade in the Hetmanate.

If this economic program had been implemented, the same tariffs would have applied for trade between the Hetmanate and Russia as between the Hetmanate and foreign countries--Poland-Lithuania, Crimea, and the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Ukrainian merchants would have had the right to trade anywhere in the world without regard to imperial state monopolies, official trade routes, or tariffs.

Turning to social issues, the petition requested the same privileges for the Ukrainian shliakhta as the Russian dvorianstvo enjoyed, a guarantee of landholdings, and payments from the Ukrainian treasury to those officers who owned small unprofitable estates. Conversely, the petition sought to curtail peasant mobility, prohibit peasants from becoming Cossacks, and obtain repatriation of peasants who escaped from the Hetmanate. The Council paid little attention to the status of the clergy and townsmen. In accordance with Ukrainian church traditions, the clergy were to possess all the privileges of the shliakhta, and were to elect their own hierarchy. The petition contained only standard cliches about the townsmen's rights and privileges, including the Magdeburg Law, but did not explicitly discuss these. Apparently, the demands for tariff-free foreign trade was made more in behalf of the shliakhta, which controlled the Council, than for an independent merchant class. There is no indication that any merchants were present at the Council.

Of particular concern to the Hlukhiv Council was the steady decline in the number of battle-ready Cossacks. Estimating that only

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about 10,000 men were prepared for war, the petitioners recommended the following steps to bolster the Cossack estate: a strict adherence to Cossack rights and privileges; an exemption of Cossacks from all types of duties, except military; an exemption from all taxes, including the tax in support of Russian troops; a guarantee of Cossack property rights; imperial payment for and delivery of supplies during foreign campaigns; the combining of several Cossack households to support financially a fully equipped Cossack; and a special registry so that Cossacks would not change units.

In other ways too, the petition reflected an anti-Russian hias. there is a saing themselves on the Petrine guarantee that "not a penny would be collected" from the Hetnanate, the petitioners wanted to abolish the taxes supporting Russian troops. They further proposed the creation of a joint Ukrainian-Russian Commission to investigate and adjudicate complaints against Russians stationed in the Hetaanate. Russian troops, therefore, were considered as allied but foreign troops who were not to be financed by the Ukrianian populace and whose actions were to be examined by the joint Commission. In fact, the Ukrainian elite so feared foreign penetration that it requested a limitation of the rights of non-Ukrainians to own estates in the Hetnanate, unless especially rewarded by the Empress or approved by the hetnan and starshyna.

In sum, the Hlukhiv Council considered the Hetmanate as a separate land, with its own borders, its own head-of-state, its own government, and its own economic policy. It was connected to the Russian Empire in a special way, through a common monarch, the Russian tsar. But even

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The Hlukhiv program reflected an accomodation reached between the Hetman and the Ukrainian elite. In addition to a powerful emotional attachment to the Hetmanate, each side was interested in increasing its own power. The Hlukhiv Council gave the starshyna-nobility the opportunity to entrench themselves further as the Hetmanate's political, social, and economic elite. For the Hetman, any broadening of autonomy made his position a little less dependent on the capriciousness of court politics. Rozumovs'kyi was quite willing to accede to the nobility's socio-economic demands in return for their support in his political struggle at court. The Hetman attempted to use the Hlukhiv Council to establish for himself a firm regional power base.

Mhile the Hetman and the nobility were in agreement on most issues, some differences emerged on the question of the hetmancy. The Hlukhiv orator, who represented the views of the nobility, failed to mention two important points contained in the petition: the request that the tsar confirm the Statutes of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi at the election of each hetman and that in the case of the Hetman's death a successor be elected immediately. Judging from his later attempt to make the hetmancy hereditary, Rozumovs'kyi probably initiated these

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⁴³The popularity of this view among Ukrainians can be gleaned from the contemporary literary work, "A Discussion Between Great Russia and Little Russia," written by Semen Divovych in 1762. In this poetic dialogue, the personification of Little Russia bluntly states that she did not pledge allegiance to Great Russia but to her tsar and complains bitterly that Great Russia scorns Ukrainian institutions, offices, and ranks.

requests. At the Hlukhiv Council, however, any conflict was avoided and the Hetman succeeded in establishing an amicable relationship with the starshyna-nobility.

Suddenly in late October, when the Council had been concluded and the members were departing, the Hetman received news of a dramatic change at the imperial court. His foe A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin had been defeated and his friend Nikita Panin had emerged as the unchallenged first minister at court. 44 Confident of support at the imperial court and at home, the Hetman launched the most daring project of his career. His staff began agitating among the officers who were still in Hlukhiv for a hereditary hetmancy for the Rozumovs'kyi family. A new petition, drafted by some of the Hetman's closest supporters, attempted to prove that the elected hetmancy caused confusion, disorder, and civil strife and proposed that this office remain permanently within one family. 45 Citing the example of Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, 46 the memorandum requested that one of the sons of Hetman Rozumovs'kyi be elected heir to the hetmancy. Fedir Tumans'kyi, the brother of the General Chancellor, secretly took this petition to Kiev and discussed it with the ranking Ukrainian prelates, the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, Zosima Val'kevych

44Ransel, "Nikita Panin's Imperial....," p. 461.

⁴⁵The petition was never published in full. Most of the petition may be found in Vasil'chikov, Vol. I, pp. 313-317, Bilbasov, <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. II, p. 455, and in a more condensed form in Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, pp. 241-242.

⁴⁶This was not the most fortunate example, for although Khmel'nyts'kyi designated Iurii as his successor and he was elected as hetman, the position proved to be too taxing for the sixtcen-year-old lad and he resigned.

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(the Hetman's relative) and Metropolitan Arsenii Mohylians'kyi (in fact an old enemy of the Rozumovs'kyi family). Neither prelate signed the petition.⁴⁷ Undaunted by this initial failure, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi called a meeting of the General Starshyna and polkovnyks at which he presented the petition. With the exception of the General Chancellor Vasyl' Tumans'kyi (a client of the Hetman), General Treasurer Vasyl' A. Hudovych and General Judge Oleksander P. Dublians'kyi, most of the General Starshyna opposed the petition and refused to sign it.⁴⁸ Under some pressure it was signed by all the polkovnyks--except Petro S. Myloradovych of the Chernihiv polk--and by most of the polk starshyna.⁴⁹

Although the hereditary hetmancy concept found its strongest support among relatives and clients of the Hetman and was opposed by the more aristocratic families (Apostol, Skoropads'kyi)--who themselves had claims to the hetmancy--the debate was not limited merely to personal and family squabbles, but also dealt with matters of principle. The idea of a hereditary monarchy, although frequently expressed, was, in reality, only a weak undercurrent in Ukrainian thought. The whole Cossack tradition, bolstered by the Polish experience, was based on an elective hetmancy. In addition, the starshyna-nobility was striving for full political control in the Hetmanate and was wary of any changes which might strengthen the position of the chief executive. Consequently,

47vasil'chikov, Vol. I, p. 315; Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, p. 242.

⁴⁸Vasil'chikov, Vol. I, p. 315. Solov'ev mentions only Tumans'kyi and not the others (Vol. XIII, p. 242). There are no other major discrepancies between the two accounts.

49 Vasil'chikov, Vol. I, p. 315; Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, p. 242.

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even close relatives and friends of the Hetman, such as General Judge Il'ia V. Zhurman, Quartermaster-General Semen V. Kochubei refused to sign the petition.⁵⁰ More than a century after Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi first attempted to introduce monarchical practice in the hetmancy, the Ukrainian ruling elite was still bitterly divided over this issue.

Catherine became alarmed when she received news of the Hlukhiv events in reports from the Russian governor-general in Kiev, F. M. Volikov, the Hlukhiv army commander de-Latur, and a denunciation by a Ukrainian participant, Military Comrade Pavlovskyi,⁵¹ and she immediately mecalled the Hetman to St. Petersburg. Having entrusted the affairs of state to three members of the General Staff (Semen V. Kochubei, Vasyl' H. Tumans'kyi, and Danylo P. Apostol), the Hetman, still unaware of any royal displeasure, left Hlukhiv on January 9, 1764.⁵²

3. The Abolition of the Hetmancy.

In his bold attempt to strengthen his autonomous position, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi had badly miscalculated the mood of the imperial government and his position at court. While the Hlukhiv Council and Rozumovs'kyi were advancing a program for expanded autonomy, the imperial government was considering a tightening of controls over the Hetmanate. The architect of this imperial

50vasil'chikov, Vol. I, p. 315.

51 Ibid., p. 317; Bantysh-Kamenskii, Istoriia Malorossii, Vol. III, p. 209.

52Iakov Markovich, Vol. II, pp. 388-389.

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policy was G. N. Teplov, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's former aide. Teplov was a Russian who had served as Rozumovs'kyi's tutor and estate manager. Through his association with the Hetman, Teplov came into frequent contact with Catherine. He became one of her most fervent supporters, and, after the coup, Teplov left the Hetman's service and assumed the position of the Empress' secretary.⁵³ Soon after Rozumovs'kyi's departure for the Hetmanate in June, 1763, Teplov turned against his former benefactor and penned the well-known memorandum "A Note on the Disorders in Little Russia."⁵⁴

While it is possible that Teplov wrote the note out of a desire to correct abuses, it is more likely that his prime motive was the advancement of his career. By exposing Rozumovs'kyi, Teplov could assert his independence and show his concern for the Empire's welfare. More

⁵⁴The memorandum itself is not dated. When P. Kulish published it in <u>Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi</u> (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1857), Vol. II, pp. 169-196, he ascribed it to the reign of Elizabeth. M. Vasylenko in the above-mentioned article (footnote 53) argued persuasively that this is incorrect and that the note was composed during Catherine's reign. It was certainly known by Catherine in September of 1763. Since Hetman Rozumovs'kyi was present continuously at the court from the time of Catherine's coup, a critical re-evaluation of conditions in the Hetmanate would be too much of an embarrassment. Consequently, it is my opinion that Teplov presented this memorandum after the Hetman's departure in June.

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⁵³Biographical information on G. Teplov is rather scanty and scattered, limited to a few brief articles and passing references in several monographs. The most complete biographies can be found in M. Vasylenko, "H. N. Teplov i ioho 'Zapiska o neporiadkakh v Malorossii'," <u>Zapysky</u> <u>Ukrains'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyivi</u>, Vol. IX (1912), pp. 13-23, and in G. A. Maksimovich, <u>Deiatel'nost Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskago po</u> <u>upravleniiu Malorossiei</u> (Nizhyn: 1913), pp. 31-45. Other useful references are I. Kamanin, "K biografii Teplova," KSt., No. 11 (1888), pp. 84-86; P. N. Semenov, "Biograficheskie ocherki senatorov po materialam, sobrannym P. I. Baranovym," <u>ChOIDR</u>, Vol. I, pp. 15, 24-28, 55; V. G. [sic], "Spravka o Teplove," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 4 (1887), pp. 169-172.

importantly, the memorandum could serve Teplov well in the court battle. While closely allied with Panin, Teplov probably used the note as a hedge in case of Bestuzhev's victory.⁵⁵

Mhatever Teplov's motivation, he voiced views which were in direct opposition to those expressed at the Hlukhiv Assembly and in Ukrainian political literature. For Teplov, the Hetmanate was not a separate land which recognized the suzerainty of the tsar on the basis of special treaties. Rather, it was an ancient Russian land lost to Poland-Lithuania. Teplov believed that "Little Russia, not only the land but the very people, are Russian from ancient times, and consequently belong under Your Majesty's suzerainty as the possessor of the All-Russian throne even before it [Little Russia] came under the Russian state."⁵⁶ Discounting the fact that Ukrainian-Russian constitutional relations were based on treaty obligations, Teplov concluded that between 1657 and 1708 all hetmans were traitors or were inclined to treason. He admitted that due to long periods of Polish rule the populace of the Hetmanate had acquired specific customs and liberties. To Teplov, however, these

⁵⁵Ransel identifies Teplov as a prime ally of Panin. See <u>Nikita</u> <u>Panin's Role...</u>, p. 142. One indication of possible contacts between Teplov and Bestuzhev in this matter is that the Teplov note was found among Bestuzhev's papers. See footnote 56.

⁵⁶Vasylenko, "H. N. Teplov...," p. 32. Three variants of the memorandum have been published. The first by P. Kulish, <u>Zapiski</u>, Vol. II, pp. 169-196, for some unexplained reasons deleted the whole first section, the historical introduction. A fuller edition was appended to the writings of Graf A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin in <u>Arkhiv kniaza Vorontsova</u>, Vol. XXV (1882), pp. 350-379. It differs only in several minor phrases from the version published by M. Vasylenko in the appendix to above-mentioned article (pp. 29-54). In this work I have followed Vasylenko's version as the most scholarly and authoritative.

"liberties" resulted only in exploitation and confusion, and more significantly, some were even at variance with the principle of autocracy.

Teplov viewed the shrinking number of Cossacks, the reduction of crown lands, and the confused Ukrainian legal system as detrimental to imperial state interests. He blamed the starshyna for expropriating the Cossacks' lands and bluntly accused the Ukrainian authorities of cheating on their censuses so as not to provide the required taxes and manpower. Teplov claimed that the only reliable census was conducted by Russian officers during the rule of the first Little Russian College (1729). Moreover, more and more crown lands and estates had gradually passed into private ownership without the knowledge or consent of the tsar. Ukrainian legal procedures, according to Teplov, were in complete disarray, since they lacked any real system and depended on a hodgepodge of the Lithuanian Statute and customary practices. This confusion caused numerous delays and endless appeals and gave the starshyna ample opportunities to manipulate the laws for private gain. Most important, in Teplov's view, was the fact that the republican Polish-Lithuanian laws and customs practiced in the Hetmanate clashed with the principle of autocracy, and were therefore totally unsuited for the "Little Russian" nation, which was, after all, under autocratic rule.

Taking up social and economic problems, Teplov painted a bleak picture of starshyna exploitation of the peasantry and Cossacks. Nevertheless, Teplov considered the chief economic problem of the Hetmanate to be the decline in productivity due to peasant mobility. He chimed the herger,

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richer landlords were in a position to entice peasants by giving them more favorable conditions, while the smaller marginal landlords were forced into bankruptcy. After expressing concern for the peasantry's exploitation by the starshyna, Teplov recommended their enserfment. On this issue, at least, he was in accord with sentiments expressed at the Hlukhiv Assembly.

The impact of the Teplov memorandum on actual governmental policy first became evident in a decree issued on September 10, 1763. Catherine, undoubtedly alarmed by Teplov's revelations of massive Ukrainian usurpation of crownlands, strictly prohibited their passing into private ownership.⁵⁷ Then, in November 1763, the government advised the Senate to prepare legislation for a new census in the Hetmanate. The main proponent of the census was Teplov, who attended the Senate hearings and helped write the final decree. This law entrusted the actual census taking to Russian officers and even subordinated the Hetman to them.⁵⁸ Since, at this very time, the Ukrainian authorities were conducting a census ordered by the Hetman in March of 1763, the actions of the imperial government demonstrated that Teplov's deep mistrust of Ukrainian censuses, the Hetman, and the Ukrainian administration had become official policy.

In line with Teplow's policy, the Senate rejected several of Hetman Rozumovs&kyi's pending appeals including a request for the continuation of Ukrainian gunpowder production. Denying that its action rights

57PSZ, No. 11,915 (September 10, 1763), Vol. XVI, p. 368.

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58SA (November 4 and 14, 1763), Vol. XII, pp. 241-250; SA (February 6, 1764), Vol. XIV, p. 6.

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violated Ukrainian rights, the Senate claimed that the Ukrainian production of gunpowder began under special circumstances in the eighteenth century and that it had become uneconomical and of poor quality. Citing previous instances of ammunition purchase from Russia, the /ukaz ordered the Ukrainian authorities to allow only standardized and imperial state produced gunpowder from Moscow.⁵⁹ Then, at the time of Rozumovs'kyi's recall to St. Petersburg, the Senate questioned the Hetman's jurisdiction over Kiev. It settled for a compromise. The inhabitants of Kiev would appeal to the Russian authorities in administrative and judicial matters, but the Hetman retained his rights of taxation.⁶⁰

The imperial government, by limiting the Hetmanate's autonomy worked in opposition to both the views expressed at the Hlukhiv Council and Rozumovs'kyi's plans for a hereditary hetmancy. A clash was now inevitable. When Rozumovs'kyi arrived in the capital he was received very coolly.⁶¹ Catherine barred the Hetman from the Court and squelched rumors that this was due to the intrigue of Rozumovs'kyi's old enemy, G. G. Orlov by stating that her displeasure was entirely due to the Hetman's "behavior in Little Russia."⁶² According to the dispatch of the Prussian envoy, Victor Friedrich von Solms, the two Ukrainian petitions

59_{SA} (January 9, 1764), Vol. XIII, pp. 482-487; PSZ, No. 12,018 (January 20, 1764), Vol. XVI, pp. 501-505.

60SA (January 31, 1764), Vol. XIII, pp. 527-533.

⁶¹Report No. 93 (12 February 1764 NS) of the Earl of Buckingham to the Right Honorable Earl of Sandwich, <u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. XII (1873), p. 160.

62"pis'ma Ekateriny II k A. V. Olsuf'evu," Letter LXIX, February 17, 1764, <u>Russkii Arkhiv</u> (henceforth <u>RA</u>), Bk. II (1863), pp. 427-429.

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so incensed Catherine that she wanted to put the Hetman on trial for disloyalty. N. I. Panin tried to protect his friend and former political ally and convinced Catherine that the Hetman never had entertained any treasonous intentions and had "sinned against reason and not against the heart."⁶³ Catherine called a special committee attended by I. I. Nepliuev, Prince Ia. P. Shakhovskoi, Prince A. M. Golitsyn, Graf P. 1. Panin, and A. V. Olsuf'ev, at which it was decided that Panin and Golitsyn were to go to the Hetman, explain his misconduct, and advise him that the only honorable course of action was to resign as hetman.⁶⁴

At first, Rozumovs'kyi refused, and this led to further negotiations and even to a personal audience with Catherine at which the second the adience, the Hetman finally requested that he be relieved of his difficult post. In accepting his resignation, Catherine told Rozumovs'kyi that she no longer doubted his faithfulness. She instructed N. I. Panin to obtain the Hetman's resignation in writing.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, it was necessary for Catherine to pen many reminders to Panin to settle the affair.⁶⁶

63"Doneseniia grafa Sol'msa Fridrikhu II," Report No. 134 (April 17 [280. S], 1764), SIRIO, Vol. XXII (1878), pp. 247-248.

64"Pis'ma Ekateriny II k A. V. Olsuf'evu," Letter LXIX (February 17,1764), p. 427.

65"Pis'ma Ekateriny II k Gr. N. I. Paninu," Letter No. 157, no date, <u>ChOIDR</u>, no volume (1863), Pt. II, April-June, p. 68. Also in <u>SIRIQ</u>, Vol. VII (1871), p. 375.

⁶⁶Ibid., Letter No. 158 (no date), and 168 (no date), p. 68 and 70, and in <u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. VII (1871), p. 375 and 379. Most likely, Panin delayed for personal reasons. The Hetman had been his friend and political ally, and Panin must have been embarrassed by Teplov's role in the Only in May did Panin report to Catherine that the project had been drafted, and, if approved by the Empress, it could be issued as a Senata ukaz. Remaining unresolved, however, was the fate of the lands and incomes attached to the office of hetman,⁶⁷

Gradually the former Hetman began making occasional public appearances. By mid-March (1764), as a Senator he attended some meetings of the Senate.⁶⁸ But his return to favor was not complete until he was permitted to accompany Catherine on her tour through the Baltic provinces.⁶⁹ Welcomed again at Catherine's table, Rozumovs'kyi, and especially his sons, became frequent visitors at court.⁷⁰ Catherine also confirmed Rozumovs'kyi's title to all Ukrainian state property granted to him by Elizabeth.⁷¹

affair. Panin, moreover, probably did not want to give Orlov, whom he detested, the pleasure of seeing Rozumovs'kyi vanquished. Therefore, he delayed until tempers would cool so that the Hetman could retain at least some of his imperial prerogatives. If one were to subscribe to the theory that Panin was attempting to place limits on the autocracy then his defence of the Hetman could have been motivated by his opposition to the arbitrary abolition of a century-long constitutional arrangement. Panin's alleged constitutionalism has been ably refuted by David Ransel, Nikita Panin's Role.... and "Nikita Panin's Imperial...."

67Letter of N. Panin to Catherine, <u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. VII (1871), pp. 359-360. Not dated, but mentions the audience of Graf Ostkerko from the Lithuanian Confederation who stayed in St. Petersburg between May 10 and 26, 1764.

68The first signature of Rozumovs'kyi in Senate documents appeared on March 1, 1764. SA, Vol. XIV, p. 98.

69Petr Kolotov, Deianiia Ekateriny II, Imperatritsy i samoderzhitsy vserossiiskiia (St. Petersburg: 1811), p. 127.

70Semen A. Poroshin, Zapiski sluzhashchiia k istorii Ego Imperatorskago Vysochestva, Blagovernago Kniazia Pavla Petrovicha, naslednika prestola Rossiiskago (St. Petersburg: 1844), pp. 52, 81, 121, 148, 154-155.

⁷¹Senate ukaz confirmed by Catherine, <u>SA</u> (June 26, 1764), Vol.

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But Rozumovs'kyi's position was further weakened by new intrigues which involved him, if only indirectly. In July, Vasyl' Myrovych (Vasilii Mirovich), son of the General Aide-de-Camp in the administration of the emigre hetman, Pylyp Orlyk, attempted a coup which was to depose Catherine and place the imprisoned Ivan VI on the throne. 72 The attempt failed, Ivan VI was killed by his guards, and Myrovych was tried and executed. The affair unwittingly involved Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi. The aristocratic Myrovych family had backed Hetman Mazepa in his break with Muscovy. After Mazepa's defeat the Myrovych wealth was confiscated and those family members who failed to escape the Hetmanate were deported to Russia and Siberia. Costant petitions for a return of the family wealth and permission to live in the Hetmanate were denied. 73 Consequently, the Myrovyches eked out a livelihood by holding petty Russian military posts. It was in the capacity of a minor officer stationed at the Schlüsselburg fortress -- where Ivan was being held -that Vasyl' Myrovych attempted his coup. At the trial, Myrovych claimed that the Hetman gave him the idea for the coup. When Myrovych previously had appealed to the Hetman for support at court, Rozumovs'kyi told him that this was beyond his power and advised the young Myrovych to

XIV, pp. 355-359.

72 Ivan VI succeeded Anna Ivanovna to the throne in 1740 at the age of two months. A year later Elizabeth deposed Ivan VI, who then spent his entire life as a prisoner. The Myrovych affair is described in great detail by Bil'basov, Istoriia, Vol. II, pp. 349-405, and Solov'ev, Vol. XIII, pp. 315-325.

73As late as April 13, 1764, the Senate denied a petition to the Myrovych family to have their property returned. <u>SA</u>, Vol. XIV, pp. 187-191.

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find his own way to position and fortune. Myrovych simply acted upon the Hetman's advice. 74

More important than just an embarrassment to Rozumovs'kyi, the affair sheds light on Catherine's attitudes on the Hetmanate and on Ukrainians. In her manifesto on Myrovych, Catherine specifically mentioned that the culprit was a Ukrainian, the son of a close collaborator of the "traitor" Mazepa.⁷⁵ Teplov's note, the Hlukhiv Council, the hereditary hetmancy project, and now the Myrovych affair produced a ' heavy anti-Ukrainian atmosphere at court.

Meanwhile, the resignation procedures were again bogged down. Not until the end of October did Catherine ask her secretary Olus'ev to draw up instructions--on the basis of Catherine's own notes--for the future governor-general of the Hetmanate.⁷⁶ When everything was in readiness, four decrees were issued on November 10, 1764. The first one announced the Hetman's resignation, again confirmed Rozumovs'kyi's right to all property he amassed during Elizabeth's reign, and provided compensation for the loss of the Hetman's income--a pension of 10,000 rubles a year and various properties previously attached to the office of hetman: the city of Hadiach, and the whole Bykovs'kyi region, including all the towns, villages, and estates.⁷⁷ The second ukaz proclaimed the abolition of the hetmancy, the formation of the Little Russian College

74RA, Bk. II (1863), p. 478.

75psz, No. 12,228 (August 17, 1764), Vol. XVI, pp. 890-892.
76"pis'ma Ekateriny k A. V. Olusuf'evu," p. 189.
77<u>SA</u>, No. 401 (November 10, 1764), Vol. XIV, pp. 323-324.

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(enumerating its personnel), and, ironically, approved the court reforms of the Hlukhiv Assembly.⁷⁸ Catherine also issued a manifesto to the Ukrainian people and an order to publish all the ukazes pertaining to changes in the Hetmanate.⁷⁹

Although the former Hetman retained all his imperial positions and titles and possessed even greater wealth than previously, the long humiliating battle over the hetmancy and the growing anti-Ukrainian sentiments fed by the Mykovych affair ended Rozumovs'kyi's Ukrainian ambitions. At first, Rozumovs'kyi asked to be relieved of his duties so he could settle various affairs in Moscow.⁸⁰ Then, in the spring of 1765, he left the Empire for an extended tour of Western Europe. After his return in late summer of 1767, he never again played any role in Ukrainian political life.⁸¹

4. The Hetmanate and Catherine II's Policy Towards Autonomous Areas.

The abolition of the office of hetman was only one aspect of Catherine's overall policy towards regional autonomy. In February 1764,

78pSZ, No. 12,277 (November 10, 1764), Vol. XVI, pp. 961-962.

79_{SA}, No. 403 and 404 (November 10, 1764), Vol. XIV, pp. 324-325.

80SA, No. 453 (December 20, 1764), Vol. XIV, p. 577.

81Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi continued his imperial career as Senator, president of the Academy of Sciences (in name only), and from 1768 a member of the newly formed Imperial Council, a group of Catherine's closest advisors. His later career is described in Vasil'chikov, Vol. I. Some interesting details of Rozumovs'kyi's stay in France and French reaction to his resignation as hetman can be found in a brochure of 11'ko Borshchak, Slidamy Hetmana Rozumovs'koho v Frantsii (Munich: 1957). at the very time she forced Rozumovs'kyi's resignation as hetman, she made it clear in a letter to the newly appointed attorney-general, Prince Viazemskii that administrative centralization and russification should serve as guiding principles throughout the Western borderlands.

Little Russia, Livonia, and Finland (Karelia) are provinces which are governed by confirmed privileges and it would be improper to violate them by abolishing them all at once. However, to call them foreign and to deal with them on that basis is more than a mistake; it would be sheer stupidity. These provinces as well as Smolensk should be Russified in the easiest way possible, so that they should cease looking like wolves in the forest. The approach is easy if wise men are chosen as governors of the provinces. When the hetmans are gone from Little Russia every effort should be made to eradicate from memory the period and the hetmans, let alone promote anyone to that office.⁸²

This policy decision was undoubtedly precipitated by the Ukrainian autonomist demands. Up to this time, Catherine showed no special interest in the problem of autonomy. When the question of a Ukrainian court organization was raised she routinely approved it, recognizing that this was "in accordance with Little Russian rights."⁸³ As late as September 23, 1763, in response to a petition from Estland and Livonia, Catherine again confirmed their traditional rights.⁸⁴ But by February, 1764, the events in Hlukhiv and the hereditary hetmancy project unquestionably stimulated Catherine to take a firmly negative view of regional autonomy.

While Catherine's policy may have been sparked by the Ukrainian autonomist sentiments, it also reflected Catherine's developing views

82The instructions to Viazemskii were published in ChOIDR, No. 1 (1858), p. 104, and in SIRIO, Vol. VII (1871), p. 348. The English translation quoted here is from Boris Nod'de's, "Essays in Russian State Laws," The Annals of UAAS, No. 3 (Winter-Spring, 1955), pp. 889-890.

83<u>PSZ</u>, No. 11,812 (May 10, 1763), Vol. XVI, p. 246.
 84<u>SA</u> (September 23, 1763), Vol. XIII, pp. 288-289.

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on the role of government and the need for imperial reforms. These were antithetical to any regional autonomy and made a clash with the Ukrainian autonomists inevitable. Catherine was interested in making government more rational and in developing the Empire's resources. Although much eighteenth century France, the has been made of her cultural debt to the "lumieres" of/ ine's claims to being an "enlightened despot" have been generally dispolitical field, counted. In the a Professor Raeff suggests, Catherine drew more

Somere was a long-standing debate on whether Catherine's reign was really "enlightened." Aleksandr S. Lappo-Danilevski, a populist historian -- "The Serf Question in an Age of Enlightenment," Catherine the Great: A Profile, pp. 267-289, originally published in Russian as "Ekaterina II i krest'ianskii vopros" in Velikaia Reforma: Russkoe obshchestvo i krest'ianskii vopros v proshlom i nastoiashchem, edited by A. K. Dzhivelegov, et al. (Moscow: 1911), Vol. I, pp. 163-190-emphasized that despite Catherine's liberal intention and rhetoric, serfdom was extended into Ukraine and other areas. The emigre historian, Aleksandr A. Kizevetter -- "The Legislator in Her Debut," Catherine the Great: A Profile, pp. 246-266, originally published in Russian as "Pervoe piatiletic pravleniia Ekateriny II," Istoricheskie silucty -- Liudi i sobytila (Berlin: Parabola, 1931), pp. 29-54 -- shows how Catherine followed the policies of her predecessors and denies any innovation due to the Enlightenment. P. Ivanov, "K voprosu o 'Prosveshchennom Absolutizme' v Rossii 60-kh godov XVIII veka," Voprosy istorii, No. 5 (1950), pp. 85-99, attempts to prove that Enlightenment rhetoric was demagogy on the part of Catherine. Pavel N. Miliukov, on the other hand -- "Educational Reforms," pp. 93-112 and "Voices of the Land and the Autocrat," pp. 113-155, Catherine the Great: A Profile, originally published in Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury (3 volumes; Paris: 1931), Vol. II, pt. 2, pp. 75-765; Vol. III, pp. 293-328--while showing its limitations in terms of Catherine's shallow perception of the "enlightened thought," and an unresponsive backward society, argues persuasively that the concepts of the Enlightenment had a real impact on policy. Current historians, working with a more narrowed view of enlightened despotism and recognizing Catherine's vague adherence to Enlightened concepts, the backwardness of Russian society, and the strong role of traditional policy, still discern in Catherine's program and method of implementation, an attempt to pursue some of the traditional policies of enlightened despots. See N. M. Druzhinin, "Prosveshchennyi absoliutizm v Rossii," Absoliutizm v Rossii (Moscow: 1964), pp. 428-459; I. A. Fedosov, "Prosveshchennyi absoliutizm v Rossii," Voprosy istorii, No. 9 (1970), pp. 34-55; Marc Raeff, "In the Imperial Manner," Catherine the Great: A Profile, pp. 197-246 and his "The Enlightenment in Russia," The Eighteenth Century in Russia, ed. by J. G. Garrard (London: 1973), pp. 25-47.

heavily from the German cameralists than from the French philosophes.⁸⁶ Cameralist thought was attractive to Catherine because of its immediate utility. Unlike the French philosophes, who attempted to discover the nature of man and government, the cameralists wanted to establish principles of sound public finance and rational administration (Kameralund Polizeiwissenschaften).

In planning governmental reform, Catherine first studied various programs for the replacement of provincial military administration with a professional bureaucracy, the reduction of the size of administrative units, and the participation of the local nobility in provincial government.⁸⁷ On December 15, 1763, she issued the Staff Regulations which doubled the number of officials, created new posts and standardized salaries.⁸⁸ The Instructions to the Governors-Generals of April 21, 1764, further defined the functioning of provincial administration and recommended a variety of "enlightened programs," which the governorgeneral, as the personal representative of Catherine, was to introduce into the province.⁸⁹

During the early period of Catherine's reign, administrative

86Raeff, "The Enlightenment in Russia," p. 36.

87Robert E. Jones, "Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775: A Question of Motivation," <u>Canadian Slavic Studies</u>, Vol. IV, No. 3 (Fall, 1970), pp. 499-500; Iu. U. Got'e, <u>Istoriia oblasnago upravleniia v Rossii ot Petra I do Ekateriny II</u> (2 volumes; Moscow: 1913), Vol. II, p. 166.

88pSZ, No. 11,989 (December 15, 1763), Vol. XVI, pp. 462-468; Jones, p. 500; James Edward Hassell, <u>The Vicissitudes of Russian Administrative Reform 1762-1801</u> (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University; Ithaca: 1967), pp. 35-36.

89psz, No. 12,137 (April 21, 1764), Vol. XVI, pp. 716-720.

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reform was closely connected with the introduction of the rule of law. Catherine professed that laws form "the foundation of the state... through which the power of the government is poured out and diffused," and that "the equality of citizens consisted in that they should all be subject to the same laws."⁹⁰ Catherine wished to introduce a new uniform law code which would not only result in more rational and humane legal procedures but which would also define the competence of administration "so that each government office will have its own limits and laws." Subsequently, Catherine summoned the famed Legislative Commission of 1767-1769, which was to establish these "fundamental laws" and to forward administrative reform.

Efficient organs of power were also to be utilized in exploiting the natural resources of the Empire. Endeavoring to break down economic barriers, to stimulate trade and agriculture, and to increase state revenues, the government initiated a variety of programs--some of which were patterned on the projects of other "enlightened despots." In order to prevent endless property boundary disputes and to better assess the country's resources, the government began an extensive surveying and measuring program. It encouraged the introduction of new crops and better methods of agriculture, the colonization of new lands, immigration from abroad, and a return of emigrants living outside of the Empire. Secularization of Church lands brought the state additional revenue and made the Church economically dependent upon the State ⁹¹

90w. F. Reddaway (ed.), Documents of Catherine the Great (Cambridge: 1931), pp. 216-217.

⁹¹In addition to general works such as Bil'basov, <u>Istoriia</u>, Vol. II, and Solov'ev, Vols. XIII-XIV, Catherine's initial policies are

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Combined with the rationalization of law and government, these programs aimed at eliminating waste, and at tapping the Empire's human and economic potential in order to enhance the wealth and power of the state, while at the same time contributing to the increased welfare of the people.

Underlying this program was the goal of a unitary state. Since the principles of government were based on reason or on universal precepts, the same laws and institutions should serve Catherine's subjects equally well whether they lived in Moscow, Siberia, or the Hetmanate. National differences, although recognized, were not considered significant. According to Marc Raeff, "the government's goal was a uniform pattern of administration throughout the Empire, a uniformity which, it was believed, required a single way of life, but not necessarily one language, one religion, or even a single culture on the part of all subjects of the emperor."⁹² In this respect, Catherine--like her younger contemporary, Joseph II--counterposed the new rational order against ancient "feudal" privileges of separate historical regions. To Catherine, these were antediluvian relics which could only block rational development.

The Hetmanate was an obstacle in the implementation of one of Catherine's major projects, the colonization of the Southern Ukraine.

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succinctly summarized by Aleksandr Kizevetter in "The Legislator in Her Debut," <u>Catherine the Great: A Profile</u>, pp. 247-266, originally published in Russian as "Pervoe Piatiletie pravleniia Ekateriny II," <u>Istoricheskie Siluety--Liudy i sobytiia</u> (Berlin: Parabola, 1931), pp. 29-54.

⁹²Marc Raeff, Imperial Russia 1682-1825, Vol. IV of the Borzoi History of Russia, ed. Michael Cherniavsky (New York: Alfred A. Knopff, Inc., 1971), pp. 43-44.

Under Elizabeth, Serbian military colonists settled in Southern Ukraine and appropriated some of the Hetmanate's territory. In 1762 the Hetman, seconded a year later by the Hlukhiv Council, demanded its return.⁹³ The imperial administration, on the other hand, was planning to unite all the foreign colonies as well as extensive territories belonging to the Hetmanate into a new province, called New Russia (Novorossiia).⁹⁴

The transfer of authority in the southern regions of the Hetmanate, supposedly on a voluntary basis, was far from smooth.⁹⁵ The officer in charge of New Russia, Mel'gunov, collected signatures of those willing to pass under the new authority and join the newly formed Lancer (<u>Pikineriia</u>) regiments. Those who did not wish to comply had the right to emigrate to territories remaining in the Hetmanate, but this meant a loss of land. The implementation of the transfer through a combination of threats and promises of reward caused great dissatisfaction. Since neither the local nor central Ukrainian administration were even notified of these changes, clashes of authority occurred. The Hetman was inundated with queries and complaints which in late summer 1764 K. Rozumovs'kyi passed on to the Senate. No further action was taken and the border between New Russia and the Hetmanate remained

93N. D. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, The Settlement of the Southern Ukraine (1750-1755) (Vol. IV, No. 1--Vol. V, No. 2 of Annals of UAAS in U.S.; New York: 1955), p. 173.

94<u>PSZ</u>, No. 12,099 (March 22, 1764), Vol. XVI, pp. 657-667; <u>PSZ</u>, No. 12,180 (June 11, 1764), Vol. XVI, pp. 795-799; <u>PSZ</u>, No. 12,211 (July 22, 1764), Vol. XVI, pp. 842-843.

95The transfer is described briefly by N. D. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, The Settlement..., pp. 181-186, and in greater detail by D. P. Miller, "Pikineriia," KSt., No. 12 (1899), pp. 301-322.

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somewhat indefinite until 1766, when the majority of the disputed territory was assigned to New Russia.

Thus, the Ukrainian autonomist sentiments, and the continued existence of an autonomous Hetmanate ran counter to Catherine's general views and plans. While Catherine aspired to eliminate separate historical regions, the Ukrainians wanted to reconstruct a virtually separate state. While Catherine wished to break down economic barriers, the Hlukhiv Council attempted to have foreigners excluded. And while Catherine sought new revenues, the Hlukhiv Council objected to providing any funds for the imperial treasury, even the traditional taxes in support of Russian troops stationed in the Hetmanate.

5. <u>Catherine's Plans for the Hetmanate and the Rule of Governor-General</u> Rumiantsev.

Having replaced the office of hetman with the Little Russian College, Catherine moved quickly to dispel any discontent in the Ukrainian administration. She divided the membership in the College equally between four Russian officers--Major-General Iakov Brant (Jacob von-Brandt), Colonel Prince Platon Meshcherskii, Colonel Osip Khvostov, and College Advisor Dmitrii Natalin--and four Ukrainian officers--Quartermaster-General Semen Kochubei, General Chancellor Vasyl' Tumans'kyi, General Aide-de-Camp Ivan Zhuravka, and General Flag Bearer Danylo Apostol. The president of the College was, of course, a Russian, the newly named Governor-General of the Ukraine, Petr Rumiantsev. But by appointing officials from the Hetman's administration including the main proponents of the hereditary hetmancy, General-Chancellor Vasyl' Tumans'kyi,

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Catherine stressed a policy of administrative continuity and no reprisals. Tumans'kyi, in particular, as the former general-chancellor, had a most detailed knowledge of the Hetmanate and thus would be invaluable for the new administration. In order to reduce tension between the Ukrainian and Russian members of the College, Catherine gave them equal rank promoting General-Chancellor Tumans'kyi to major-general and the others to colonel. In the same ukaz, she pleaded for mutual cooperation among the College members.⁹⁶ Catherine wanted to avoid the errors of the first Little Russian College under Peter, which was still remembered for its brutal power struggle with local Ukrainian authorities.

Mhile Catherine made conciliatory gestures to some of the Hetmanate's administrators, she did not abandon her general policy of integrating the Hetmanate into the Empire. In fact, she issued a set of secret directives on how this could be accomplished.⁹⁷ Written under the influence of the Teplov note, Catherine's instructions to Governor-General Rumiantsev repeat many of Teplov's criticism of Ukrainian practices. For instance, Catherine attacked the confusion between military and civilian rule, the cumbersome legal system with its endless litigations, and the peasants' mobility. Her prime concern, however, was that the Hetmanate belonged to the Empire "in name only." She deplored the Ukrainian "self willed" appropriation of various special rights and privileges

96psz, No. 12,277 (November 10, 1764), Vol. XVI, pp. 961-962; SA, No. 445 (December 16, 1764), Vol. XIV, p. 566; SA, No. 449 (December 20, 1764), p. 576.

97The Instructions have been published in SIRIO, Vol. VII (1871), PP. 376-391.

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and the "Polonized" liturgical and customary practices of the Church in the Hetmanate.

Catherine was especially disturbed by the local population's hatred of Russians--a hatred which she thought was fomented by the starshyna due to their fear of losing their secure position of graft and victimization of the populace. Rumiantsev was to observe closely the activities of the starshyna and gradually introduce reform. In this way, when "the best of all orders will be established" the populace, relieved from the starshyna's oppression, would express gratitude to Catherine and the imperial government.

Beyond the delicate political question of Ukrainian-Russian relations, Catherine also stressed fiscal matters, removal of the Dnieper cataracts for the improvement of river commerce, and the foresting of the steppe. While many of these points reflect only dreams, for they were beyond the capabilities of the imperial authorities, they do indicate an optimistic belief in the efficacy of enlightened rule in legislating "the best of all orders" and in greatly stimulating economic growth.

In sum, Catherine's program for the Hetmanate called for its gradual integration into the Empire, maximum increase in imperial revenues, stimulation of economic growth, and at the same time, reduction of friction between Ukrainians and Russians. These seemingly contradictory tasks were entrusted to a highly gifted imperial officer, Governor-General Petr Rumiantsev.

The newly appointed Governor-General continued a family tradition

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of serving the central government in administrating the Ukraine. His father or step-father (he may have been illegitimate), Ivan Rumiantsev, was the Russian military administrator of the Hetmanate between 1738 and 1740--a period without a hetman. At that time, Petr lived in the Hetmanate and was taught by a Ukrainian, Tymofii Seniutovych.⁹⁸ He continued his education abroad and on his return began a military career. At the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, Rumiantsev, as a major in charge of a regiment, proved to be an ambitious, brave, capable and at times even brilliant, military commander. With the death of Elizabeth and the subsequent reversal of alliances, the new Emperor, Peter III, showered Rumiantsev with favors and called upon him to execute the tsar's favorite project, an attack on Denmark on behalf of his native Holstein. Rumiantsev had already assembled an army of 50,000 men and begun the campaign when Catherine's coup brought another rever-

98A. Lazarevskii, "Uchitel' gr. P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskago T. M. Seniutovich," KSt., No. 1 (1889), pp. 223-224. Although there exists voluminous published material on Petr Rumiantsev, a biography is still lacking. The best overview is still P. Maikov's "Rumiantsev, Petr Aleksandrovich," Russkii biograficheskii slovar' (Petersburg, 1918), Vol. XVII, pp. 521-573. An idealized picture is presented in I. Sazanovich, Zhizn' kharakter i voennye deianiia general-fel'd marshala grafa Petra Aleksandrovicha Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskago (St. Petersburg: 1803). D. Bantysh-Kamenskii, Slovar dostopamiatnikh liudei russkoi zemli (5 volumes; Moscow: 1836), Vol. IV, pp. 352-374, is rather superficial. The wast majority of articles and monographs deal with Rumiantsev's military exploits, the latest example being Iu. R. Klokman, Fel'dmarshal Rumiantsev v period russko-turetskoi voiny 1768-1774 gg. (Moscow: 1951). Most neglected is Rumiantsev's activities as Ukrainian governor-general. 6. Maksimovich, Deiatel'nost', focuses in great detail on only several reforms. Besides the above-mentioned article, A. Lazarevskii published "Po povodu sta let ot smerti gr. P. A. Rumiantseva," KSt., No. 12 (1896), pp. 374-394. N. V. Storozhenko, "Reformy v Malorossii pri gr. Rumiantseve," KSt., No. 3 (1891), pp. 478-493, No. 9 (1891), pp. 455-465.

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sal in foreign policy. On the day of the coup, Rumiantsev was relieved of his command and ordered back to St. Petersburg. Instead of complying, he submitted his resignation and remained in Western Europe. Catherine dissuaded him, however, from resigning and gave him a minor appointment in Estland, but Rumiantsev was still dissatisfied and soon received a year's leave of absence.

The recall of Count Petr Rumiantsey in 1763 caused puzzlement at court.⁹⁹ Still not quite secure on the throne, Catherine was suspicicus not only of Rumiantsey's former association with Peter III and his expressed hostility to the Empress, but also of his extensive military, personal, and family connections. It was believed in court circles that Count Petr Rumiantsey was, in fact, the illegitimate son of Peter I, and this endowed him with an appeal lacking in the 'German' Empress.¹⁰⁰ Although it was quite improbable that Rumiantsey himself could have challenged Catherine for the throne, he easily could have become a focal point in any plot to depose the Empress in favor of her son, Paul. Rumiantsey's military and family ties--his wife was the Princess Ekaterina Golitsyn--coupled with his ambition made his continued stay at court a possible threat to Catherine.

But Catherine solved the problem brilliantly. By giving Rumiantsev a major appointment as the Ukrainian governor-general, she removed

99"Doneseniia grafa Sol'msa Fridrikhu," Report No. 145 (June 1 [12-0.S.], 1764), SIRIO, Vol. XXII (1878), p. 259.

100"Zapiski Nikolaia Ivanovicha Grecha," RA, Bk. I, No. 3 (1873), p. 250; A Barsukov in the introduction to "Pis'ma k gr. P. A. Rumiantsevu ot ego roditelei," <u>Starina i Novina</u>, Vol. III (1900), pp. 129 and 131.

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him from court and, at the same time, channeled his considerable abilities into solving a delicate and serious state problem. SMOuld Rumiantsev be successful in this endeavor, Catherine would have made excellent use of a potential political rival. If he failed, a distinct possibility considering the mood of the Ukrainian elite, Rumiantsev would be discredited. In any case, Catherine would emerge as the final victor.

To Rumaintsev, on the other hand, out of favor since the coup, this major appointment provided an opportunity to further his military career. The Ukrainian situation involved risks, but Rumiantsev, as in the past, accepted them enthusiastically. Barring another coup, the only possibility for his advancement was in pleasing Catherine, and the Ukrainian governorship-general was a crucial test for him.

On April 8, 1965 Governor-General Rumiantsev arrived in the Hetmanate and settled in Hlukhiv. His assumption of command entailed only a few changes in the Hetmanate's administrative and judicial structure. At the top, the Governor-General and president of the Little Russian College replaced the Hetman. Like Rozumovs'kyi, Rumiantsev was also in charge of the Zaporozhian Sich, but unlike the Hetman, the Governor-General also commanded all the Russian troops stationed in the Hetmanate. The Little Russian College became the chief central administrative institution and assumed the functions of the former General Military Chancellery. Special departments within the College were responsible for military affairs, the General Court, and the General Treasury. The Little Russian College took orders from Rumiantsev and the Senate, while the Governor-General reported directly to Catherine and dealt with the

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Senate only on occasion.¹⁰¹ The lower administration (polk, sotnia, kurin') and all its offices remained intact.

Forty days after his arrival, on May 18, 1764, Rumiantsev presented Catherine with a comprehensive program of reform, which, after an exchange of letters, Catherine partially approved. 102 A program so quickly formulated was obviously conceived prior to Rumiantsev's arrival. It drew its inspiration from three major elements -- Catherine's instructions, the ideas of Teplov, and Rumiantsev's own concepts. As the expert on the Hetmanate, Teplov gave Rumiantsev a briefing immediately after the count's appointment as Governor-General¹⁰³ and, undoubtedly presented him with the official government position paper on the Hetmanate, the Teplov note. In his reform memorandum and in the subsequent reply to Catherine, Rumiantsev reiterated many of Teplov's charges pertaining to administrative incompetence, starshyna abuse, and corruption, particularly in their anassing of state lands and even towns. Rumiantsev proposed the verification of landholdings and restitution to the state of all former crown lands. Catherine, in her reply, urged caution and ordered the Governor-General not to tamper with any land grant approved by a tsar.

101Shafonskii, Chernigovskago, p. 99.

102Rumiantsev's initial program, Catherine's response, and Rumiantsev's subsequent reply were published together in SIRIO, Vol. X (1872), pp. 9-21. Catherine's letter of reply was published in Aleksandr-Smirdin, ed., Sochineniia Imperatritsy Ekateriny II (3 volumes; St. Petersburg: 1850), Vol. III, p. 188.

103In a letter dated November 15, 1764, Catherine informed Rumiantsev that she is sending him Teplov for an "extended conversation on Little Russia," Smirdin, ed., Vol. III, p. 187.

Many points of the program were taken verbatim from Catherine's Instructions. Consequently, urban reconstruction, the development of town crafts and industry, the establishment of town police, the encour-. agement of trade, the improvement of agriculture and forestry, and the rationalization and increase in state revenues were, of course, approved by the monarch. But Rumiantsev also added a list of his own suggestions: the formation of a postal service; the reorganization of the Ukrainian artillery; the resumption of gunpowder production; the payment of salaries for officials in lieu of land grants; the establishment of a military academy, a school for noble girls, and two universities; the founding of a state hospital; the reorganization of the judicial system; and the secularization of Ukrainian Church property. Of these, Catherine only approved the establishment of the postal service; the other propositions were passed on to various special commissions or not acted upon. Clearly, Catherine opposed any sudden and drastic changes. Furthermore, she wanted to be assured that these programs could be financed locally without a drain on the imperial treasury. The points approved by Catherine, however, combined with her "Instructions" gave Rumiantsev a mandate to initiate a number of long-range reforms.

Considering that Catherine's original instructions, Rumiantsev's program, and Catherine's reply to Rumiantsev all called for the improvement of agriculture and commerce, it may seem somewhat surprising that the Governor-General made few efforts to stimulate economic growth. The few meager attempts were inspired by the central authorities. Thus, in following Catherine's favorite project, Rumiantsev settled approximately a hundred German families in Bila Vezha and a small number of

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Wallachian and Bulgarian colonists in the Pereiaslav polk.¹⁰⁴ The Senate initiated an unsuccessful experiment to introduce a new crop, potatoes, into the Hetmanate. Most of the potato plants froze in storage and only a small number were eventually distributed to cultivators.¹⁰⁵ Despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, neither the central authorities nor Rumiantsev was prepared to pursue economic development on a large scale. Not only did they lack the necessary planning, personnel, and funds for such endeavors, but at least in the Hetmanate, political issues overshadowed all other problems.

Rumiantsev, therefore, concentrated on such traditional areas of reform as the administration, the military, and the judicial system. In judicial matters, the Governor-General was empowered to introduce only minor modifications, since Catherine did not approve a major change. The General Military Court, the highest court in the Hetmanate, was staffed by twelve judges elected annually--one from each polk--and supervised by the two general justices. Rumiantsev changed the composition of the Court, making it a permanent paid body including the two general justices and three to five additional members. To facilitate the rumning of the central court, Rumiantsev also appointed state lawyers to assist the plaintiffs. Also the implementation of the 1763 judicial reforms brought forth various unforeseen problems, which the

104PSZ, No. 12,655 (May 22, 1766), Vol. XVII, p. 702; "Perepiska grafa Rumiantseva otnositel'no kolonistov poselennykh v Malorossii,"--Arkhiv voennopokhodnoi kantseliarii gr. P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskago--ChOIDR, Bk. I, Pt. 1 (1865), pp. 253-270.

105Maikov, "Rumiantsev...," p. 533.

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Governor-General strove to clarify. 106

The greatest change in governmental structure approved by Catherine was the founding of a regular postal service. Previously there were several local haphazard municipal postal agencies and official couriers. An ukaz issued by the Empress would be delivered by messenger to the General Military Chancellery, which would distribute it, again by courier, down the chain of command. Rumiantsev pointed to the dire need for both government and private individuals to have a more systematic and regular service. In 1765 he established nine postal routes extending over 2,358 versts with seventy-two postal stations, fifteen regional postmasters, 165 postmen and 300 horses. 107 Postage was to be picked up and delivered at a prescribed time twice a week in each locality. The postal service became a sub-branch of the Ukrainian administration under the supervision of a postal director. The Ukrainian treasury paid all the salaries and the expenses of the postal service and received all its revenues. In 1768, 1770, and 1774 the postal service was expanded to facilitate communications with the Crimea and the New Russia gubernia. With minor adjustments, this system was incorporated into the Russian administration after the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy.

106Documents pertaining to judicial changes were published by Vladimirskii-Budanov, "Akty...," pp. 121-136, and by M. Sudienko, "Bumagi do upravleniia Malorossieiu grafa P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskago otnosiashchiiasia," ChOIDR, Bk. 1, Pt. V (1861), p. 149.

107G. Maksimovich, Deiatel'nost', p. 76. Maksimovich treats the establishment of the postal service in great detail, <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 67-87.

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For Rumiantsev, however, the main priority was to increase state revenues. Catherine's Instructions, Rumiantsev's reply, and a subsequent secret directive by Catherine¹⁰⁸--all expressed this aim. While maintaining the old sources of revenue--liquor and mill taxes, percentage of the border tariff--the Governor-General made several innovations. He consolidated the various types of crown land, rank lands, undeeded properties, and lands utilized by a special group of Cossacks who previously hunted for the Hetman (<u>bobrovnyky</u>, <u>stril'tsi</u>, <u>ptashnyky</u>) into one category of state lands. Eleven supervisors were chosen to look after the state lands, all inhabitants of which were taxed.¹⁰⁹ This brought an additional income of 10,000 rubles a year, while applying the tax to the servants of the former Hetman netted another 1,200.¹¹⁰

But the largest revenue-producing reform was the introduction of the ruble tax, a money levy in support of Russian troops stationed in the Hetmanate. Up to this time, the Ukrainian authorities collected a combination of taxes, mostly in kind. Since this was frequently insufficient, and the delivery of supplies late, the Russian troops took by force from the local populace whatever was necessary to sustain themselves. Thus the burden was unevenly distributed falling heavily on regions where troops were stationed. Having witnessed these problems during his tour of the Hetmanate, Rumiantsev ordered a new basis for

108<u>SA</u> (July 13 and 14, 1765), Vol. XIII, p. 81.
109Shafonskii, pp. 101-102.

110M. Slabchenko, Khoziaistvo Getmanshchiny v XVII-XVIII st. (Vol. I of Organizatsiia khoziaistva Ukrainy ot Khmelnichchiny do mirovoi voiny, Pt. 1-4 in separate books; Odessa: 1923-25), Pt. IV, P. 290.

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taxation, one tuble a year from each household collected in quarterly installments.¹¹¹ All peasants, townsmen, Cossack helpers (<u>pidpomichnyky</u>), hired hands (<u>pidsusidky</u>) were liable for the new tax. In 1767, the Governor-General divided the Hetmanate into twenty equal tax districts in each of which a commission was responsible for gathering the levy. The estimated income came to approximately 250,000 rubles a year, and, despite major arrears in payments, the Ukrainian treasury received a surplus that, at times, reached 150,000 rubles.¹¹² As the income provided exceeded the tax purpose, it was utilized for a variety of governmental activities, including salaries for Ukrainian officials and the subsidization of the Kievan Academy.¹¹³ The ruble tax which was supposedly only an elaboration of an existing troop support tax was, in fact, becoming a general levy.

In addition to paying the ruble tax, the Ukrainian populace was also obliged to quarter Russian troops, and, since there were no army bases or barracks, soldiers were assigned to private homes. Because of the unsettled international situation, especially problems with Poland and the Ottoman Empire, this obligation increased during Rumaintsev's tenure, for an additional regiment was stationed in the Hetmanate. According to the Governor-General's official figures, in 1763 there were six rifle, one dragoon, and eight infantry regiments, numbering 19,981

IIIG. Maksimovich, Deiatel'nost', pp. 88-119 provides a fairly detailed account of the introduction of the ruble tax.

112Vassilii Ruban, <u>Kratkaia letopis' Malyia Rossii s 1506 po</u> 1776 god (St. Petersburg: 1777), p. 233.

113M. Slabchenko, Khoziaistvo, Pt. IV, p. 269.

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men and requiring 902 officers' and 10,556 soldiers' quarters. Although Rumiantsev attempted to distribute these troops as widely as possible, they still posed a serious hardship. Considering that there were only 29,025 households in the towns and villages where they were stationed, the distribution would fall to two Russian soldiers for every three households or two official quarters for every five households.¹¹⁴ This system provided further government savings, for the troops were able on more than one occasion to obtain food and firewood from the host household.

The Ukrainian treasury, greatly enlarged by Rumiantsev's additional incomes, was further subordinated to imperial needs. In 1771, the imperial attorney-general ordered the Little Russian College to provide an exact accounting of all incomes and expenditures. This was done retroactively for 1768-1770 and then continued on a yearly basis.¹¹⁵ Although the Ukrainian treasury was still a separate entity, it was now treated as a provincial branch of the imperial treasury.

Another consistent aim of the Governor-General was to improve the Hetmanate's military capabilities. This entailed the rejuvenation of the Cossack estate (<u>soslovie</u>). Since many Cossacks lost their land and either voluntarily or under pressure became landlords' subjects, the number of Cossacks capable of real military service was constantly shrinking. In a report to Catherine, Rumiantsev blamed both the

115M. Slabchenko, Khoziaistvo, Pt. IV, pp. 268-271.

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¹¹⁴Figures on troops distribution in G. Maksimovich, Deiatel'nost', pp. 104-105.

landlords and the Cossacks for this condition; the former for impressing Cossacks into submission and the latter for frequently willingly surrendering their status to avoid military obligations. 116 The Governor-General added his prohibition to the decrees already issued by the tsars and the Senate, and he forbade the Cossacks from becoming either peasants or burghers. Quoting a 1746 Senate ukaz ordering landlords to give up any Cossack subjects, Rumiantsev permitted these former Cossacks to appeal directly to the General Court for reinstatement. 117 He also introduced state lawyers at the Court to facilitate suits brought by Cossacks and burghers. At this time, however, the Governor-General was ungilling to tackle such a complex social and economic problem directly. He postponed this until after the completion of the general census, when he hoped the various social groups would be precisely differentiated and permanently fixed. Those recognized as Cossacks would in return for some of their traditional privileges -- personal freedom, right to property, trade, and the production of alcohol -- serve as a permanent military class or caste.

Being a professional soldier, Rumiantsev attempted to transform the Cossacks into a more disciplined, better trained professional fighting force. Using the Russian army as his model, the Governor-General demanded similar discipline from the Cossacks. He formed a special unit, appropriately armed and uniformed, to guard the Little Russian College

116vladimirskii-Budanov, ed., "Akty...," p. 109.

117V. Ia. Miakotin, Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy v XVII-XVIII vv. (1 volume; Vypusk 1-3 in separate books; Prague: 1924-26), Vypusk III, pp. 200-201.

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archive, the General Court, and the Treasury. When some Cossacks objected to performing such regular service, Rumiantsev ordered them beaten "without mercy." Similarly, in 1768, he decreed that Cossacks who did not obey their commanders be whipped and the most obstinate deprived of their Cossack status and registered as peasants.¹¹⁸ The most drastic change, however, occurred in December 1768 at the beginning of the Turkish War. In response to Rumiantsev's request the Senate placed the mobilized Cossack units under the jurisdiction of Russian military law.¹¹⁹ This gave the Governor-General a virtually free hand as far as discipline was concerned, but it deprived the Cossacks of a most ancient right, the right to be judged by themselves in accordance with their own laws. Then in 1775 the three hired Cossack units which once had formed the Hetman's guard were reorganized into regular army regiments. Thus another step was taken towards the introduction of Russian military practices into the Hetmanate's forces.¹²⁰

A key precondition for further military and fiscal reforms was an accurate census. Since the Teplov note had completely discredited all Ukrainian data, the Russian authorities were determined to conduct their own census. The project prepared by the Senate was not implemented because of Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's removal from office. Catherine in her

118 These orders were published in "Dva dokumenta o sostoianii malorossiiskago kozachestva v polovine XVIII st.," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 10 (1882), pp. 126-133.

119<u>PSZ</u>, No. 13,217 (December 20, 1768), Vol. XVIII, p. 786.
120<u>PSZ</u>, No. 14,385 (October 24, 1775), Vol. XX, pp. 225-226.

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Instructions pointed to the need of a new census, and by September 1765, conditions were sufficiently settled in the Hetmanate for such an undertaking. But unlike the Senate project, primarily concerned with the number of peasants and Cossacks and their domiciles, Rumiantsev had a much more ambitious goal. He wished to register all persons, their age, social position, occupation, marital status, state of health, income, and payment of taxes. Moreover Rumiantsev's program, with the exception of personal belongings, called for detailed descriptions of all movable and inmovable property.¹²¹

Separate census forms were prepared for inhabitants of towns, crown and monastery lands, private estates and Cossacks. Besides the already mentioned information, Rumiantsev inquired into the state of trade and industry, municipal buildings, condition and income of crown lands, and, most importantly. into the basis of landholdings for both private individuals and officials utilizing state lands. For crown and monastery lands, the peasants' work obligations were noted but not in the case of private landowners--a concession to their sensibilities. Indeed, the Rumiantsev census was the most comprehensive ever attempted in the Hetmanate up to that time.

Officially, the purpose of the census was announced as the

121 There has been a plethora of works on the Rumiantsev census. For a fairly thorough treatment of the census as a historical source and for a listing of the major works based on the census see M. Tkachenko, "Naukove rozroblennia Rumiantsevs'koi revizii," Ukraina, No. 3 (1924), Pp. 39-52 and M. A. Lytvynenko, Dzherela istorii Ukrainy XVIII st. (Kharkiv: 1970), pp. 95-114. For an account of the census taking see D. Bagalei, <u>General'naia opis' Malorossii</u> (Kiev: 1883), and for a most detailed analysis G. Maksimovich, Deiatel'nost', pp. 190-357.

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eathering of information so that better order and justice could be established. In reality, Rumiantsev aimed at resolving many specific problems. 122 He hoped to differentiate the populace into official categories of landlords, Cossacks, clergy, and peasants. Having everyone registered and all the households recorded would aid in reducing peasant mobility and would determine the exact number of Cossacks. setter knowledge of the overall Cossack economic condition would facilitate the forging of a permanent self-supporting military force and indicate the feasibility of a projected 30% Cossack property tax. 123 The census would ascertain which lands were genuinely privately owned and which in actuality belonged to the state. Rumiantsev was especially interested in inventories of crown and monastery lands. He wished to repossess the crown lands from their current holders and substitute regular salaries instead of landholdings as compensation for officials. Finally, the census was to provide data on the extent and intensity of trade as well as the vitality of guilds, industry and handicrafts -information necessary for town improvements.

In each polk a special commission was created to conduct the census. Headed by a Russian officer, the commission had a staff composed of lower rank Russian officers and members of the local Ukrainian authorities. Due to the immensity of the task and the Russians'

122G. Maksimovich published Rumiantsev's official aims in Deiatel'nost' (pp. 200-201), and proved that he had other less openly expressed goals (pp. 201-217).

123This was proposed by Rumiantsev in his original project submitted to Catherine.

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unfamiliarity with local conditions, the work proceeded slowly. A further hindrance was the passive resistance of the populace. With the possible exception of the burghers, all segments of the population feared the census. The peasants dreaded being bound to their current place of domicile and an increase in taxes. The Cossacks were apprehensive about fulfilling their military obligations and taxes; and the landlords were worried that their property rights would be questioned. Many landowners refused to give the required information claiming that they were not acquainted with surveying and geometry.¹²⁴ Ukrainian members of the various commissions feigned illness and refused to participate. The head of the Poltava Commission complained that in 1767 hardly any Ukrainian members were actually present and working.¹²⁵

The census gathering continued until 1769, when, with the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war, it was suspended. It is difficult to assess what part of the census was completed, since many of the documents have not survived. Yet, extensive work was accomplished, for at present the Ukrainian archives house completed census forms for over 3,500 settlements.¹²⁶

Beyond the introduction of reforms, Rumiantsev's key task was to ease tensions between Ukrainians and Russians. In evaluating the Governor-General's impact on Ukrainian-Russian relations, one has to consider not only his policies but also his temperament and style of

¹²⁴Lytvynenko, p. 98.
¹²⁵G. Maksimovich, <u>Deiatel'nost'</u>, pp. 230-231.
¹²⁶Lytvynenko, p. 100.

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government. He was a strict military man, a martinet who would not tolerate even the slightest hint of disobedience. When the Hlukhiv Cossacks objected to more regular duty, he had them beaten; and when seventy-seven Cossacks, who were tired of the vacillation and inaction of their commander, went home for the harvest without permission, Rumiantsev had them arrested and punished.¹²⁷ He was especially strict in stamping out any expressions of autonomist spirit. When during the elections for the Legislative Commission a group of Nizhyn nobles insisted on writing a petition demanding the election of a hetman, Rumiantsev had them arrested and although they were subsequently pardoned by the Empress, he sentenced thirty-three men to death and condemned eighteen to perpetual banishment.¹²⁸ Rumiantsev made it perfectly clear to the Ukrainian elite that under his rule there were limits of propriety and to step outside them would result in swift and severe punishment.

On the other hand, Rumiantsev attempted to win over the Ukrainian elite by drawing them into imperial service. In a report to Catherine, he recommended that rank (chin) and governmental service (dela) should be granted to those "who have not been infected by the disease of self-willfulness and independence." In setting such an example, Rumiantsev believed that even those who held strong autonomist sentiments would eventually change their opinions and become governmental

127_{Lazarevskii}, "Po povodu...," pp. 385-386.
128This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

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employees.¹²⁹ Catherine fully approved Rumiantsey's proposals and requested to be informed of "those worthy of favor" so they could be promoted.¹³⁰

Rumiantsev placed special emphasis on influencing the young. He recommended the creation of an imperial cadet school in the Hetmanate because it would inculcate in the Ukrainian shliakhta a love for regular military service and would make them forget "outdated and idle thoughts of self-willed Cossackdom."¹³¹ While an imperial cadet school in the Hetmanate proved to be unfeasible, Rumiantsev was able to gain admittance for the starshyna's children into the Imperial Cadet School and the Imperial School for Noble Girls in St. Petersburg.¹³² The Governor-General's motives were clear. The Ukrainian elite would be trained together with Russian nobles, develop friendships and connections, and therefore, would become loyal imperial servitors. The starshyna, on the other hand, was quite pleased with Rumiantsev's intervention, since Ukrainians had long been denied admission into the imperial academies because "there are no dvoriane" in the Hetmanate.¹³³

The Governor-General also defended Ukrainian claims to nobility

129_{Report No. 5} [February 5, 1768] in Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, p. 331.
130Letter of April 16, 1768 in Smirdin, Vol. III, p. 196.
131In Rumiantsev's initial project, <u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. X (1872), p. 19.
132_{M.} Sudienko, ed., "Bumagi...," pp. 150-151.

133D. Miller, "Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskago byta staroi Malorossii. Prevrashchenie kozatskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 1 (1897), p. 26. based on governmental service. In a note to the Little Russian College, Rumiantsev suggested that all Ukrainian officials should automatically have titles equal to Russian ones; for non-officials, however, some noble ancestry would have to be proven.¹³⁴ In 1774 Rumiantsev again wrote to the attorney general, A. A. Viazemskii on behalf of the Ukrainian starshyna and shliakhta, requesting that appropriate titles be granted to Ukrainian officials.¹³⁵ Finally, as the supreme military commander, Rumiantsev had the authority to commission the <u>koronets</u>, the lowest officer rank (warrant officer). This rank carried with it Russian noble privileges, and Rumiantsev distributed it liberally to Ukrainian landlords unable to obtain any other title.¹³⁶

Rumiantsev also attempted to placate the Ukrainian elite by permitting the Little Russian College to take another step towards the full enserfment of the peasantry. His predecessor, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi, limited the mobility of the peasants by requiring them to obtain a written release from their landlords. With the introduction of the ruble tax, peasant mobility became an even greater problem. Increasing tax arrears--79,703 rubles 52 3/4 kopeks in 1768; 135,658 rubles 14 kopeks in 1769; and 177,142 rubles 25 1/2 kopeks in 1770--were blamed primarily

134vladimirskii-Budanov, ed., "Akty ...," p. 108.

135N. V. Storozhenko, ed., "Pis'mo grafa P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadumaiskago k general prokuroru kniaziu A. A. Viazemskomu, o nagrazhdenii malorossiian chinam," KSt., No. 1 (1891), pp. 176-177.

1360. Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Autonomists of the 1780's and 1790's and Count P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky," <u>Annals of UAAS in U. S.</u>, Vol. VI, No. 3-4 [21-22] (1958), p. 315. on the peasants' mobility.¹³⁷ Although a part of these arrears were eventually paid, the Little Russian College decided to act. In 1770 it ordered that "runaway peasants" be brought back to their former masters and be forced to pay their tax arrears.¹³⁸ For the first time an official category of "runaway peasant" appeared. The Ukrainian landowners realized that the Russian government might accomplish what they were unable to do, the total enserfment of the peasantry.

The rule of Governor-General Rumiantsev was interrupted by international tension and war. In 1768 all military forces in the Hetmanate were on the alert because of the Polish civil strife and the bloody Ukrainian uprising in the Right Bank (Koliivshchyna). Then, from 1769 to 1774 Rumiantsev achieved fame as the commander-in-chief of the forces which defeated the Ottoman Empire, and he personally negotiated the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. The Cossacks of the Hetmanate were quite active in the war. One regiment of 3,000 men operated as part of the forces of Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Golitsyn, while a larger army of 6,000 men and the three hired units of the former Hetman's guard were part of Rumiantsev's forces.¹³⁹ Because the majority of Ukrainian officers participated in the campaign, only a caretaker government remained in the Hetmanate. All military affairs were under the supervision of Prince Platon Meshcherskii, while the Ukrainian

137v. Miakotin, Prikreplenie krest'ianstva levoberezhnoi Ukrainy v XVII-XVIII v. (Vol. XXVIII, 1 of Godishnik na Sofiiskiia Universitet; Sofia: 1932), p. 126.

138 Ibid., p. 125.

139Ruban, p. 237; Rigelman, Pt. IV, pp. 26-27.

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General Justice Il'ia Vasyl'evych Zhurman was in charge of civilian administration.¹⁴⁰ During their tenure few changes were initiated, and the Hetmanate passed a rather sommolent five years.

Yet, this period was marked by the closest cooperation between the Ukrainian elite and Governor-General Rumiantsev. In the face of a common enemy, conradeship and mutual friendships developed. More importantly, Rumiantsev provided the Ukrainians with excellent opportunities for political advancement. His staff -- whether in the Little Russian College, or in his extensive Ukrainian domains, or even in the wartime Russian Military Chancellery -- was made up predominantly of Ukrainians. Such famous imperial figures as Oleksander Bezborod'ko and Petro V. Zavadovs'kyi began their careers as members of Rumiantsev's staff. It also included a whole host of lesser figures -- V. V. Hudovych, P. H. Dubovnyk, A. H. Ivanenko, P. I. Myklashevs'kyi, M. K. Mostsipanov, M. R. Polytkovs'kyi, V. I. Skoropads'kyi, M. M. Storozhenko, I. M. Khanenko, O. H. Podluz'kyi, I. I. Selets'kyi, O. H. Tumans'kyi, A. I. Chepa--representing many of the important families of the Hetmanate. 141 By the end of the Turkish War, the Ukrainian elite had been shown that it could retain and, perhaps, even enhance their social-economic position while gaining further advancement and status within the imperial mold.

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140Rigelman, Pt. IV, p. 27; Maikov, "Rumiantsev...," pp. 534-535.
1410. Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Autonomist...," pp. 1316-1317.

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Despite more than a century of Russian assimilation, in 1762 the Hetmanate still possessed its hetman, its own administration, army and treasury. At the time of Catherine's coup, the Ukrainian elite thought the time had come to regain lost rights and further expand their autonomy. Ukrainian political thinkers envisioned an autonomous state joined to the Empire solely through the person of a common monarch. Instead of broadening Ukrainian rights, however, Catherine abolished the hetmancy and established the rule of Governor-General Rumiantsev. Although the lower administration remained intact, between 1764 and 1775 the Governor-General initiated many reforms which integrated the Hetmanate into the Empire's core area. At the expense of their traditional rights, the Cossacks were molded into a more efficient fighting force. By surreptitiously introducing an imperial general levy and by totally subordinating the Ukrainian treasury to an imperial agency, the fiscal contribution of the Hetmanate to the Empire was greatly increased. Moreover, Rumiantsev attempted to stamp out any manifestations of articulated autonomism and to direct the energies of the Ukrainian elite towards social-economic concerns and imperial careers. However, the very success of his efforts sparked a reaction in Ukrainian society which manifested itself in the Legislative Commission.

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CHAPTER 111

UKRAINIAN REACTIONS AND ASPIRATIONS: THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION OF 1767-1769

1. The Issue of Ukrainian Participation

When Catherine summoned a Legislative Commission in 1767, representatives of the Ukrainian population took the opportunity to express their reactions to Governor-General Rumiantsev's policies and propose their own resolutions to a number of problems. At the outset, however, the question was raised whether Ukrainian participation in an imperial legislative commission was appropriate. The aim of Catherine's Legislative Commission was to recodify Russia's laws and to consider administrative and other reforms. The Hetmanate, however, had its own laws and its own administration. Why should Ukrainians take part in the codification of Russian laws? Moreover, there were no precedents of Ukrainians participating in previous legislative commissions. Although several representatives from the Hetmanate had been requested to attend the Commission (1761) called by Elizabeth, they never -134-

came.1

Before issuing her manifesto, Catherine had to decide whether autonomous regions, which possessed their own laws and administration, were to participate in the Legislative Commission. Initially she ignored this problem and the first two drafts of the manifesto calling the Legislative Commission into being--mostly Catherine's own work--contain no mention of the autonomous regions.² In the third draft, Catherine gave the Hetmanate, Livonia, and Estland an option either to participate or to retain native laws until such time as these regions might petition for the adoption of the imperial code.³ One member of the committee preparing the manifesto objected and insisted that the new law code be applicable both in border areas and in Russia.⁴ Subsequently, Catherine still offered the option of sending delegates but limited the duration of continued native judicial practices to ten years.⁵ The final

²The first two drafts are discussed in detail in A. V. Florovskii, <u>Sostav zakonodatel'noi komissii</u> (Odessa: 1915), pp. 8-15, and touched upon in Paul Dukes, <u>Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility</u> (Cambridge, England: 1967), pp. 57-58.

³Florovskii, Sostav, p. 29.

4M. A. Lipinskii, "Novye dannye dlia istorii ekaterinskoi komissii o sochinenii proekta novago ulozhenia," <u>Zhurnal ministerstva narodnago</u> prosveshcheniia, Vol. CCCI (1895), pp. 290-293.

SFlorovskii, Sostav, p. 46.

¹In 1761 the Commission requested that delegates be sent from border areas including the Hetmanate and Baltic regions. See <u>PSZ</u>, No. 11,378 (December 8, 1761), Vol. XV, pp. 862-863. V. N. Latkin recorded all the sessions of Elizabeth's Commission and does not mention the presence of any Ukrainian or Baltic delegates; see his <u>Zakonodatel'nyia</u> <u>Komissii v Rossii</u> (3 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1887), Vol. 1, pp. 80-184. Also, Zutis in <u>Ostzeiskii vopros</u>, p. 361, states that no Baltic representatives participated in this Commission.

manifesto, however, contains no mention of a special status for the sutonomous regions and presumes that the Commission participants would come from all parts of the Empire.⁶

Thus, Catherine's policy towards the participation of autonomous areas in the Commission evolved gradually. At first, she believed that the inhabitants of the autonomous regions should themselves decide both the question of participation and the applicability of the new law to their regions. But from the beginning, Catherine's ultimate goal was a unified Empire under one law -- a policy she endorsed prior to the Commission. To be sure, Catherine recognized the need for tact and moderation in dealing with the borderlands. At this time she still hoped that these regions would choose to participate in the Commission, or if they declined, that they would voluntarily petition for integration in the future. Whatever her initial considerations, Catherine gradually came to realize that it would be a mistake to leave the choice up to the populace of the autonomous regions. Not only was there a danger that this could be interpreted as another guarantee of autonomy, but it took a basic decision out of the hands of the autocrat. At best, Catherine was willing to give these regions ten years to adjust to the imperial norm. Since the new law was to be applied in a short time to all parts of the Empire, the participation of all regions became imperative, and, consequently, Catherine's manifesto permitted no exception.

In the Hetmanate, Governor-General Rumiantsev attempted to defuse any potential discontent over Ukrainian participation by issuing a

6pSZ, No. 12,801 (December 14, 1766), Vol. XVII, pp. 1092-1110.

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circular appealing to Ukrainian civic mindedness and pointed out the real need for reform.⁷ Despite this effort, the manifesto was met with hostility in the Hetmanate.⁸ The need for reform was questioned, since in 1743 a fifteen-year project of recodification of Ukrainian laws had been completed,⁹ and the 1763 court reforms were just beginning to be implemented. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Ukrainians did not wish to participate in the Commission. A satisfactory recodification of Ukrainian laws had been completed and needed only confirmation from the Empress. Governor-General Rumiantsev in a report to Catherine summarized the Ukrainian reaction to the manifesto:

Many began acting willfully, claiming that any law or ukaz of the monarch is a violation of their rights and liberties. They all have the same attitudes. Why do we have to be there (i.e. at the Commission)? Our laws are all good. If it becomes necessary to be deputies, however, then only in order to obtain a confirmation of our rights and privileges.¹⁰

Rumiantsev brushed aside Ukrainian complaints and scheduled

⁷The circular was published in <u>Nakazy malorossiiskim deputatam</u> <u>1767 g. i akty o vyborakh deputatov v Komissiiu sochineniia Ulozheniia</u> (Kiev: 1890), p. 186, and is quoted extensively in G. A. Maksimovich, <u>Vybory i nakazy v Malorossii v Zakonodatel'nuiu Komissiiu 1767 g.</u>; Ch. 1, <u>Vybory i sostavlenie nakazov</u> (Nizhyn: 1917), pp. 6-8.

⁸I. Telichenko, "Soslanyia nuzhdy i zhelaniia malorossiian v epokhu Ekaterinskoi Komissii," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 7 (1890), pp. 166-167; Florovskii, <u>Sostav</u>, p. 494. Only V. G. Avseenko maintained that Catherine's manifesto was greeted "by all segments of society with genuine joy," in <u>Malorossiia v 1767 g.</u> (Kiev: 1864), pp. 3-4. Avseenko did not provide any evidence for his statement, and this view was discarded by later scholars.

⁹See A. Iakovliv, Ukrains'kyi kodeks 1743 roku: Prava, po kotorym suditsia malorossiiskii narod (Vol. CLIX of Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka; Munich: 1949). The code, although used, was never confirmed by the tsar.

10S. M. Solov'ev, Vol. XIV, p. 39.

elections for March 1767.¹¹ The nobility, townsmen, and Cossacks were to gather separately in various localities, elect deputies and compose the nakazy or instructions which the deputies were to present the Assembly meeting in Moscow. The Little Russian College, as a central governmental institution, was also empowered to send a deputy with a nakaz. The Ukrainian dioceses were to submit written reports enumerating Church needs to the Holy Synod, which was to represent the Russian Church at the Assembly. Finally, Russian Old Believers living in the Hetmanate were also permitted to send one deputy with a nakaz. Consequently, the greater part of the free and non-peasant population of the Hetmanate had the opportunity to participate in some way in the Legislative Commission of 1767.

2. The Elections and the Nakazy of the Nobility

6.

The attitude of the nobility was crucial to Governor-General Rumiantsey's success in supervising the elections to the Legislative Commission. The nobles were the most politically conscious and active element of the populace, the bearers of the old historical traditions, as demonstrated by the adamantly autonomist Hlukhiv Council. By denounoing Rumiantsey's reforms and demanding their traditional rights, the nobility could make a fiasco of Catherine's aims in convoking a Legislative Commission. Its cooperation, on the other hand, would be a

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¹¹The schedule was published in <u>Nakazy</u>, pp. 187-188, as well as in <u>Maksimovich</u>, <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 8-9; it is <u>misleading</u>, for many of the elections were not held on schedule.

significant step towards integrating the Hetmanate into the imperial mold. The influence of the nobility on the Legislative Commission was increased by its multiple participation. Besides participating in elections of their own estate, the nobles who lived in towns took part in municipal elections, and, as Cossack officers, noble: frequently directed Cossack elections.

As outlined in Catherine's manifesto, the election procedures appeared designed to protect the nobility from bureaucratic interference.¹² First a marshal of the elections was chosen in the presence of an official governmental supervisor. Then the supervisor delegated all further responsibilities for the elections to the marshal, who was to designate a date and place for the election of a deputy. This second election was to take place within a week after the marshal assumed his position. The noble elected as deputy could be from any electoral district and could be elected in absentia. The nakazy or instructions were to have been composed by a committee of no more than five persons, who were to follow the instructions of the assembly. Then all of the noblemen were to sign the nakaz.

Despite these procedures and the urgings of Catherine's manifesto for a free discussion of all problems, the degree of freedom allowed the Ukrainian nobility was severely circumscribed. Governmental pressure was first exerted at the Chernihiv assembly. Governor-General Rumiantsev attended the opening procedures. As the deliberations began Rumiantsev intervened directly in the composition of the nakaz in violation of

¹²The electoral procedures are discussed in Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 103-104. electoral procedures. Rumiantsev reported to Catherine: "I did not restrain myself from telling them the full truth, which certainly was not pleasant for them," He began with a blistering attack against a wide range of proposals raised by the nobles: the guarantee of all Ukrainian rights and privileges, the abolition of taxes in support of Russian troops stationed in the Ukraine, and the right of tax-free trade for the nobility. Then he accused the nobles of coveting the complete enserfment of the peasants under their jurisdiction.¹³

Rumiantsev's views prevailed. His close advisor Oleksander Bezborod'ko, son of the election marshal, was mainly responsible for the final draft of the nakaz and together with his father, General Judge Andrii Bezborod'ko, rammed through its acceptance. Their activity, according to Rumiantsev, earned them the enmity of their colleagues: "Bezborod'ko and his son became hated because of this nakaz, and they [the nobility]....called him names to his face and complained that he wished ill for the Fatherland."¹⁴

Catherine approved Rumiantsev's hard line, informing him that "the tone of authority which you had to take was completely appropriate,"15 and that the Chernihiv nakaz "contained many parts which honored its compilers."¹⁶ For Catherine the most satisfactory part of the Chernihiv

13Solov'ev, Vol. XIV, p. 41.

¹⁴The full report is published in Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, Appendix, pp. 326-329, and excerpts in Solov'ev, Vol. XIV, p. 47.

¹⁵Letter of Catherine to Rumiantsev, May 3, 1767, in <u>Severnyi</u> arkhiv, Vol. I, p. 35, and in A. Smirdin, ed., <u>Sochineniia Imperatritsy</u> <u>11</u> (St. Petersburg: 1850), Vol. III, pp. 192-195.

16Solov'ev, Vol. XIV, p. 44. This is an excerpt from the same letter of May 3, 1767, but the phrase was not included in the other two published versions.

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nakaz and accompanying petition was undoubtedly the criticism that "current circumstances require improvement in all areas."¹⁷ The entire first part of the nakaz discussed various abuses and disorders in the Ukrainian judicial system. Yet the nakaz still made a mild plea for autonomy:

Permit us to retain forever all the distinct advantages and freedoms which we inviolably held and still hold up to now in accordance with our former laws and privileges. Include them in the proper place of the newly formulated laws for exact observance and execution.¹⁸

The struggle between Rumiantsev's administration and the Ukrainian nobility continued in Starodub. The assembly of the nobility elected a local judicial official (zems'kyi suddia), Petro Istryts'kyi, as marshal. Rumiantsev's report to Catherine indicates that the debate was taking a hostile turn against current governmental policies.

All started screaming loudly and began with the rights, freedoms and property that they obtained and which should not be changed but ratified, and all requisitions should be eliminated, troops withdrawn, and the nobility freed from taxation. Some, especially those who had been in the administration of the Hetmanate, spoke up insistently and persistently to petition for a hetman as before.¹⁹

Mhen Rumiantsev left Starodub to supervise the Chernihiv elections, the marshal kept the Governor-General informed on the discussions at the meeting. Istryts'kyi was not satisfied with the course of the assembly and, after receiving the "model" Chernihiv nakaz attempted to change the already written Starodub nakaz. The marshal aimed at "correcting the former nakaz as much as possible and cleansing it at least from such requests which in our time no longer concur with the needs of society."²⁰

17<u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. LXVIII (1899), p. 248. ¹⁸<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 235.
19_{Maksimovich}, <u>Vybory</u>, p. 108.
20_{Ibid.} Such a "cleansing" required some additional pressure upon the nobility, which was exerted by the Starodub polkovnyk, Prince Khovanskii. He urged most strongly that the nobility accede to a newly written nakaz,² Apparently Khovanskii failed to gain the assent of all the nobility, for the revised nakaz lacks thirty-six signatures of nobles who attended the gathering.²²

A comparison of the two drafts reveals that the sections dealing primarily with Ukrainian autonomy were deleted, including those which demanded a guarantee for the Ukrainian legal system and the Lithuanian Statute, a request that all local administrative positions be filled by the local nobility, and the abrogation of the ruble tax. Sections dealing with the establishment of higher educational facilities, land surveying to end boundary disputes, the production and distribution of alcoholic beverages, and a bank for the nobility were copied verbatim from the Chernihiv nakaz.²³

In the Nizhyn and Baturyn regional elections, the Ukrainian nobility and Rumiantsev's "tone of authority" finally provoked an open clash. Rumiantsev presided at the meeting which elected polkovnyk Terniviot as marshal and a local judicial official (<u>zems'kyi suddia</u>), Lavrentii Selets'kyi, as deputy. After a postponement for the Easter holidays, the reconvened assembly produced a nakaz which deputy

21 Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 110; Noblemen living at some distance might have departed for their estates, but it seems more likely that the failure to sign indicated a lack of support for the ideas expressed in the makaz.

²³SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII (1899), pp. 233-250; Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 116-118.

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selets'kyi refused to accept. In fact, he had prepared another draft which closely followed the Chernihiv nakaz. Two of Rumiantsev's closest collaborators, Oleksander Bezborod'ko [Aleksandr Bezborodko] and Petro Zavadovs'kyi [Petr Zavadovskii] arrived at Nizhyn to drum up support for the Selets'kyi nakaz. Despite this pressure only six persons voted for the Selets'kyi draft while fifty-five were opposed. 24 Faced by Selets'kyi's refusal to accept the assembly's nakaz, the Nizhyn nobility insisted on electing another deputy and prevailed upon Marshal Ternaviot to allow the election. The new deputy, Hryhorii Dolyns'kyi, received the assembly's nakaz, which requested the confirmation of all rights and privileges, especially the administration of justice according to the Lithuanian Statute, the election of a hetman for Little Russia and the Zaporozhian Sich, the equalization of Ukrainian offices and titles with Russian ones, a reduction in the ruble tax and the cancellation of tax arrears, the alleviation of hardships caused by Russian troop garrisons, the creation of a commission to settle disputes between Russians and Ukrainians, and permission to purchase Cossack lands. 25

Infuriated by what had occurred in Nizhyn, Rumiantsev abrogated Dolyns'kyi's election and fined all the nobles ten rubles for violation of procedure. He then ordered the nobility to reconvene on May 15 and sign what he considered the legal nakaz, the one drafted by Selets'kyi. Of the fifty-five noblemen only sixteen gathered and not one signed. Such defiance taxed Rumiantsev's patience and he ordered all the nobles

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²⁴ Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 164.

²⁵A synopsis of this nakaz was published in Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, p. 168.

arrested.²⁶ Especially alarming to Rumlantsev in the nullified makaz was the request for the election of a hetman with the participation of the Isporozhian Sich. He reported to Catherine:

I abrogated the election of the deputy [Dolyns'kyi] and demanded a report from the marshal [Ternaviot] about who was first guilty of bringing forth the stupid suggestion concerning the election of a hetman with the participation of the Sich, and if there was any correspondence about this with the Sich. As to the latter, they appear to me as simply disobedient, and as to the former, they always answer that they thought it up together.²⁷

Sich and Ternaviot denied any possibility "that under my marshalship anyone offered to write to the Zaporozhian Sich or that there was even any thought about this."²⁸ But Rumiantsev, bolstered by an authorization from the Senate, proceeded with the trials.²⁹

Those defenders who held military positions were tried in a military court while the rest were tried by a civilian court. Marshal Ternaviot was spared a trial because of his "simplicity."³⁰ The Ukrainians showed little enthusiasm for the proceedings. Some appointed judges claimed to be ill, five others resigned or failed to appear at the court sessions.³¹ The military tribunal which finally assembled tried thirty-six Ukrainian officers and nobles under article 27 of the

26 Maksimovich, Vybory, pp. 173-174.

27solov'ev, Vol. XIV, p. 44.

28v. A. Miakotin, "Rozbor Sochineniia A. M. Lazarevskago: Opisanie staroi Malorossii, T. II, Polk 'Nezhinskii'." Otchet o tridtsat' sed'mom prisuzhdenii nagrad grafa Uvarova (St. Petersburg: 1897), p. 54 (footnote).

29The authorization was published in Vladimirskii-Budanov, "Akty...," pp. 114-116.

30 Ibid., p. 116. 31 Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 177.

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Military Code and article 9 of the Naval Code, found them all guilty of wilfully disobeying an order, sentenced thirty-three to death and three to loss of titles and rank.³² In reviewing the cases, the Little Russian College sentenced twenty people to death, and the rest to loss of title and rank, with a proviso that they be registered as common Cossacks.³³

The eighteen persons tried under civil law by the Ukrainian General Court fared better. Unlike their military counterparts, they were not jailed during the entire proceedings. The trial focused on two questions: the participation in the second and, in the official opinion, illegal election; secondly, the refusal to recognize Rumiantsev's cancellation of the second election and the refusal to sign the Selets'kyi nakaz. In essence they were being tried for disobedience of higher authorities. Fourteen nobles were sentenced to perpetual banishment and four to loss of title and rank. These sentences were subsequently changed by the Little Russian College to only ten banishments, four losses of rank and the rest undecided.³⁴ All cases were passed to the Senate for final adjudication.

The central imperial authorities proved to be much more lenient. In July 1768, the Senate changed all the sentences merely to loss of title, rank, and right of obtaining any official position.³⁵ Two years later, after the Legislative Commission had been disbanded, four of the

32Miakotin, Otchet, p. 63.

33_{Maksimovich}, Vybory, p. 185. 34<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 191.

³⁵Miakotin, Otchet, p. 62; Maksimovich in <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 193-197, quotes the decision. convicted noblemen petitioned directly to the Empress. Catherine decided to pardon all the participants of the Nizhyn incident, and on January 25, 1770, the Senate reinstated all their former ranks and titles.³⁶

Meanwhile, the Selets'kyi nakaz was officially recognized by Rumiantsev and submitted to the Legislative Commission. It differed from the Chernihiv nakaz only in the deletion of a section pertaining to the quartering of Russian troops and in the addition of two sections: one concerned with the equalization of Ukrainian and Russian ranks and titles, the other dealing with the establishment of grain storage bins.³⁷ Sixteen nobles signed the official version and then only after the arrest of the recalcitrants.³⁸ In contrast, fifty-five nobles signed the Dolyns'kyi nakaz, which clearly expressed the real wishes of the Nizhyn and Baturyn nobility.

In other elections opposition was muted. In Hlukhiv, the administrative center of the Hetmanate, some of the highest-ranking Ukrainian officers under the direct jurisdiction of Rumiantsev might have been expected to carry out the program favored by the government. Yet, according to Rumiantsev's report to Catherine, they feigned illness in order to avoid taking a stand.

At both assemblies [those of the nobility and of the townsmen] only Kochubei and one simple old man, General Justice Dublians'kyi, were present from the elite. Because some of their rights and customs were defamed...General Justice Zhurman, General

³⁶Miakotin, <u>Otchet</u>, pp. 62-63.
³⁷<u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. LXVIII (1889), pp. 133-146 and pp. 233-250.
³⁸Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, p. 171.

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Chancellor Tumans'kyi, and General Aide-de-Camp Skoropads'kyi... were absent. In order to show the populace that they are not responsible for anything, they pleaded illness and asked permission to leave the city for better air. 39

The Hlukhiv assembly displayed its independence, however, by electing as deputy Skoropads'kyi, who, though absent, accepted. He was known for his autonomist views and was even rumored to be a candidate for hetman.⁴⁰ Further evidence of an oppositionist frame of mind comes from an anonymous circular which asserted that in the light of the completely satisfactory conditions of Ukrainian laws, privileges, and freedom, the need for Ukrainian participation in the Legislative Assembly was open to doubt. The group also repeated the argument made elsewhere:

Concerning Your Imperial Excellency's decree of December 14, 1766 about one law, published in all our counties (povety): We do not understand why for some reason or other this decree is applied to the Little Russian country...for the Little Russian nation on the basis of confirmed charters is judged not by imperial statutes (ulozheniia) but by their own laws.⁴¹

Elections in Pohara, Pereiaslav, the Kiev polk, and Lubny were held without incident, but a minor protest erupted in Pryluky. Three officers serving in the Russian regiments stationed in the area protested the makaz and refused to sign it, asserting that the Pryluky makaz was not in the spirit of Catherine's manifesto. They did not, however, specify their reasons.⁴²

39Ibid., p. 211.

40KSt., No. 3 (1882), pp. 602-603; Maksimovich, Vybory, pp. 214-216. Skoropads'kyi was also elected deputy from two other noble assemblies (Chernihiv and Pryluky) and from the Hlukhiv municipality.

⁴¹Maksimovicy, Vybory, pp. 131-132.

42Avscenko, p. 10; also in Nakazy, pp. 229-230.

Considering that approximately 950 nobles in the Hetmanate were involved in the elections to the assemblies and in the formulation of the nakazy, ⁴³ the resistance to government pressure eloquently testifies to the widespread support for autonomy among the Ukrainian elite. In order to define the political aspirations of the Ukrainian nobility, it is necessary to examine the nakazy themselves which, government interference notwithstanding, still are the best source for contemporary public opinion.

In seven of the ten nakazy the first point expressed a desire to maintain the Ukrainian nobility's autonomous rights, citing the privileges of Sigismund Augustus (1569) and the treaty of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Of the remaining three, only Starodub omits such a request, while Chernihiv and Nizhyn petitioned that these rights be included in an all-encompassing imperial law.⁴⁴ In Nizhyn and Starodub the original makazy, which stressed Ukrainian autonomy, gained much greater support than the official ones and only Rumiantsev's "tone of authority" softened the Chernihiv autonomist demands. Consequently, the Ukrainian nobility closed ranks on the preservation of Ukrainian autonomy.

The mobility stood firmly behind their property rights. Only the Lubny and the suppressed Nizhyn nakaz do not request confirmation of property ownership. The demand for the right of the mobility to purchase

43This sum has been determined by adding the signatures of all the official nakazy, the second Nizhyn nakaz, and the thirty-six noblemen who failed to sign the official Starodub nakaz.
44See the accompanying chart for specific points of the nakazy.

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Cossack lands finds expression in all but three petitions (Poltava, Hlukhiv, and Pohara), including both the suppressed and official nakazy in Nizhyn and Starodub.

All the nakazy, official and suppressed, contain some criticism of the method and cost of stationing Russian troops in the Ukraine. Eight out of the ten official nakazy requested either a repeal or reduction of the ruble tax which was supposed to pay for Russian garrisons in the Ukraine. Among the suppressed nakazy that of Starodub sharply criticized the ruble tax. Finally, the Hlukhiv, Kiev polk, Lubny, and suppressed Nizhyn nakazy also petitioned for the cancellation of tax arrears.

The Ukrainian nobility also expressed various commercial interests. Seven nakazy wanted a guarantee of unlimited production and sale of alcoholic beverages; six requested the right to export livestock and other products, while four called for tax-free importation of salt, especially from Crimea. None of these commercial concerns were mentioned in the two suppressed nakazy.

Seven nakazy favored the establishment of a university, a cadet school and a women's lyceum in the Ukraine. Three nakazy called for the discontinuation of the census being taken at the time. Taking the Chernihiv nakaz as an example, three others discussed the rights of the nobility and the desirability of a nobles' bank. Three petitioned for permanent marshals of the nobility and surveys to determine boundary disputes between estates. Others expressed local concerns.⁴⁵

45For these, see Appendix.

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NOBILITY nakazy	Ukrainian autonomy confirmation of all rights and privileges	Equalization of titles & ranks with Russian	noble registers	confirmation of all current landholdings	right to purchase land from Cossacks	surveys to determine boundary disputes		limitations in the stationing of Russian troops and quartering of Russian officers	
Chernihiv	As part of Imperial Law	x	11	x	x	x	x	x	
Nizhyn Starodub	As part	х	X	x	x	x	x	x	
Starodub H	As part fof Impe- orial Law	x		x	x	x	x	x	
Poltava	x	x		x			x	x	
Hlukhiv	x	х		x			x	x	
Pryluky	x	х		х	x		x	x	
Pohara	x	x		x			1	Indirect high cost	
Kiev Polk	x	x		х	x		x	x	
Lubny	x				x		x	x	
Pereiaslav	x	x	1	x	x		x	x	
irst Staro-	X	x		x	x		-x-	x	
irst Nizhyn akaz	Election hetman	x			x		x	x	

Chart 1

(Continued on next page)

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NOBILITY	Production and sale of alcoholic beverages	tariff-free importation of salt	exportation of livestock and other products	nobles' bank	university and other schools	census criticism	rights of nobility to travel, education and service abroad	continuation of elections of marshals of the nobility after commission	abolition of tax arrears
Chernihiv	x		x	x	x		x	x	
Nizhyn to	x			x	x		x	x	
Nizhyn Starodub	x		x	x	x		x		
Poltava	1.23.27"	x	x		1.00		a signa	Long Line of	
Hlukhiv	х -	x	-		x		ploant's a	1. Cal.	x
Pryluky	x	10001150	x		x	x	10, 10	Same II	
Pohara									
Kiev Polk	x	x			x	x			
Lubny						x			x
Pereiaslav	x	x	x	x	x		x	х	x
irst Staro- iub nakaz	0.00	- 415				1			
irst Nizhyn akaz	Jidana	TRAL.					above ky	alle tiere	x

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Chart 2

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Clearly, the nakazy indicate an oppositionist frame of mind among the Ukrainian nobles. They showed considerable resistance to the policy of imperial integration and standardization. They reminded the imperial government of the voluntary union of the Hetmanate with Muscovy, of the "confirmed privileges" this union entailed, and of the necessity of maintaining the Ukrainian legal and administrative system. Universal complaints against abuses in the quartering of Russian troops and persistent requests for the equalization of Ukrainian ranks and titles with the Russian denote dissatisfaction with these aspects of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Finally, the Ukrainian nobles expressed strong dissatisfaction with such key reforms initiated by Governor-General Rumiantsey as the ruble tax and the general census.

The nobility's opposition was not based solely on tradition or sentiment but also involved concrete problems of power, status, and wealth. Controlling administration, justice, and finance in the Hetmanate, the starshyna-nobility, at least on the local level, wielded considerable power. The steady erosion of Ukrainian autonomy raised fears that their offices would be taken over by Russian bureaucrats.

In spite of their local power, the Ukrainian nobility suffered discrimination on the imperial level. Because their offices were not granted equal status with corresponding Russian ones, misunderstanding and confusion often occurred when Ukrainians had to deal with their Russian counterparts, so that nobles complained of abuse by even minor Russian officials.⁴⁶ While Russians were ennobled automatically after

⁴⁶The Poltava nakaz proposed establishing a special commission composed of Russian and Ukrainian officers to arbitrate disputes. SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, p. 221.

reaching a certain grade in the Table of Ranks, even the highest Ukrainian offices did not bring with them Russian titles. Moreover, the Ukrainian nobles called themselves "shliakhta" but were not recognized as such by the imperial authorities. For the most part their nobility was of recent origin and very few possessed patents or charters of nobility issued by a Polish king or by the Russian tsar. The nakazy, therefore, repeated the legend that their charters and heraldry books had been destroyed during the many wars that engulfed the Hetmanate and chaimed that other proofs of nobility should be used. These included service in a military or civilian post or descent from an important official and ownership of estates, forests, or other property usually held by the nobility.⁴⁷

But land ownership could hardly serve as an indicator of nobility, since many starshyna-nobles possessed land under dubious legal claims. Frequently they occupied rank lands which their ancestors once held in connection with an office--lands which should have reverted to the Ukrainian treasury. Even property given by a hetman or a title confirmed by a hetman was not indisputable proof of ownership, for after Peter I the hetman could no longer make such grants without the tsar's approval.⁴⁸ Similarly, a 1739 ukaz forbade the sale of Cossack lands and homesteads. Both decrees were ignored, and, consequently, titles to many properties could be challenged. This together with increased taxation helps explain the

⁴⁷See the official Starodub nakaz, <u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 191-192.
 ⁴⁸A. Iakovliv, <u>Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory v XVII-XVIII vikakh</u>,
 p. 142.

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nobles' objections to the Rumiantsev census.

Although the nobility was exempt from the ruble tax, the peasants living on the noble's estate were not. In some areas the landlords were forced to pay for the impoverished peasants. 49 Occasionally peasants would flee to avoid the tax or move to estates of landlords who would pay the tax for them. 50 For part of the Ukrainian nobility the tax meant economic dislocation and ever-increasing demands by the Russian state on the peasants under nobility control. Hence, the nobility reminded the Russian authorities that according to the privileges of Sigismund Augustus, various treaties with Muscovy, and, especially, an ukaz given by Peter I in 1708 and 1709, "not a penny was to be taken from the Little Russian people."51

More acute was the issue of continued abuses in the stationing of Russian troops, abuses which should have been at least partially alleviated by the ruble tax. The nobles' exemption from troop quarterings were usually ignored, and they were forced to put up soldiers and officials, who demanded food, firewood, candles and forage. 52 Troops quartered in peasants' houses on noble estates placed the peasants under a dual hardship; the peasants were required to quarter and, in fact, supply the soldiers assigned to their houses while also paying the ruble

49See the Pryluky nakaz, SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, p. 226. 501. Telichenko, "Soslovnyia...," KSt., No. 10 (1890), p. 96. 51Pohara nakaz, SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, p. 207, and others. 52SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, Starodub nakaz, p. 197; Pohara nakaz,

P. 208; Poltava nakaz, p. 220, and others.

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tax. Thus, the Russian authorities and the nobles were in competition for the services of the peasantry. As a result, the Ukrainian nobility tried not only to free themselves from quarterings, but requested that peasants under their jurisdiction also be exempted, even suggesting that troops be garrisoned only in the towns.⁵³

The most striking characteristic that emerges from the Ukrainian nobility's nakazy is insecurity. On the imperial scale, the nobleman performed all the functions of nobility without a title, owned estates without having them legally acknowledged, competed with the imperial treasury and military for the services of the peasants, and occasionally was forced to have Russian troops in his very home. Consequently, the nobility asked for the equalization of offices, for titles of nobility, for the recognition of all land holdings, for a reduction of the ruble tax and for exemption from quartering troops on their estates. But until these requests were granted, the starshyna-nobility's only legal basis for power, status, and wealth lay in the special rights and privileges of the Hetmanate. Their confirmation maintained the Ukrainian nobility's prerogatives and any threat to these rights was, of course, vigorously opposed.

Apart from these tangible concerns in defense of autonomy the Ukrainian starshyna-nobility exhibited a locally oriented, even parochial outlook. They were emotionally attached to their native land, to native ways, to native history. Despite encouragement and even

53SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, Chernihiv nakaz, pp. 241-243; official Nizhyn nakaz, p. 142.

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considerable official pressure, they were loath to admit any fault in their system of government.⁵⁴ While Catherine and her advisors were considering a more rational organization of government and while many Russian nobles were trying to define their roles in a new age,⁵⁵ the Ukrainian nobility saw the solution of all problems in the reconfirmation of the privileges of Sigismund Augustus (1569) and the treaty concluded by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi (1654).

J. Cossack Elections and Nakazy

Because Catherine's manifesto did not provide any guidelines for the conduct of Cossack elections, Rumiantsev decided to apply the same procedures for the Cossacks as were outlined for the <u>odnodvortsi</u>.⁵⁶ In this manner he assured the participation only of rank-and-file Cossacks, for the Cossack officers would never permit themselves to be equated with the lowly odnodvortsi. This decision, however, antagonized some Cossacks who considered themselves as being much higher on the social scale than the odnodvortsi--in fact, as being equal to the mobility.⁵⁷

As adapted to Ukrainian conditions, the electoral procedures

54The government-controlled nakazy of Chernihiy, Nizhyn and Starodub contain a relatively mild form of criticism.

55see P. Dukes, Catherine, pp. 145-153.

⁵⁶These were state peasants, descendants of minor state officials, and had a special position between the peasantry and petty gentry.

57Hadiach nakaz, Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 269.

provided for a Cossack delegate from a cluster of villages, most likely a <u>kurin'</u>, or part of one. All the kurin's and villages were to send delegates to the sotnia headquarters for the elections of sotnia representative, and the composition of a sotnia nakaz. Finally, representatives from all the sotnias of the polk were to elect a deputy for the Commission, and all the nakazy were to be combined into one nakaz for the whole polk.

The regulations were too complex to be carried out precisely in every case. Rumiantsev himself contributed to the chaos by confusing the second for the first stage in one of his election orders.⁵⁸ Hardly any elections were held on the first level and most began at the sotnia level. In some polks the nakazy remained at this level with no effort to amalgate them into a common nakaz for the entire polk. In other polks at least a common summary was made of the sotnia nakazy, sometimes called extracts (<u>abstrakty</u>). For still others, no nakazy were written at the sotnia level and only one nakaz was composed at the polk level. As a result, each of the ten polks of the Hetmanate prepared anywhere from one to twenty-seven nakazy.

Rumiantsev's electoral procedures also failed to achieve his original goal that the Cossack nakazy reflect the views of the rank and file rather than the starshyna. Since the second and third stages of the elections were held in administrative centers, the Cossack officials were afforded the opportunity to manipulate the final versions of the nakazy. So successful was the starshyna in influencing the

58 Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 229.

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Cossack nakazy that all complaints against themselves were virtually eliminated. Only the Chernihiv nakaz and two Pereiaslav sotnia nakazy discuss the abuses perpetrated by the Cossack starshyna or nobility. In the Chernihiv polk all the electors came from the villages directly to Chernihiv, where they elected a deputy and composed the nakaz. Having bypassed the sotnia stage, the whole procedure was conducted by local representatives--rank-and-file Cossacks--and gave little opportunity for interference by either sotnia or polk officials. Rumiantsev negated an attempt to prepare a new nakaz under the supervision of the starshyna although this would have conformed to the regulations.⁵⁹ In the Pereiaslav polk, eighteen sotnia nakazy were written, fourteen of them virtually identical. From the four nakazy which escaped the polk editor, only two broached the problem of extensive expropriation of Cossack property by large landowners, the starshyna or mobility.

The Starodub polk nakaz best illustrates the manner in which the starshyna manipulated the outcome. Polkovnyk Khovanskii, the government supervisor, indicated in his report to Rumiantsev that the Cossacks strongly resisted any suggestions for changing the sotnia nakazy.⁶⁰ The amalgamation of eleven sotnia nakazy into one polk nakaz, however, resulted in the deletion of complaints about the seizure of Cossack properties by the starshyna and about the landlords' attempts

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 231-234. ⁶⁰Nakazy, p. 217. -157-

to force the Cossacks to perform various peasant labor obligations.⁶¹ In view of Cossack opposition to any changes, these alterations were accomplished most likely without their knowledge.

Despite the incomplete documentary evidence,⁶² there are many indications of similar starshyna pressures in the other polks. In the Poltava polk, Rumiantsev himself placed the nakazy into the hands of the starshyna by ordering the Poltava polkovnyk to review the elections for possible irregularities.⁶³ The final nakaz in Pryluky was written by chancellor Petro Piatyhors'kyi under the supervision of the nobility.⁶⁴ In the Myrhorod polk the starshyna attempted to change the representative of the Sorochyntsi sotnia, which resulted in the

61These changes were repeated in seven out of eleven sotnia nakazy. Other deletions included a complaint of heavy taxation by the clergy (one nakaz), an accusation of abuse by Russian soldiers (one nakaz), and a request for repayment for horses and forage taken in previous campaigns. Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, p. 237.

62Not only is there a scarcity of documents about the electoral procedures but not even all the nakazy are available. While all the nakazy of the nobility and townsmen were published, only four Cossack nakazy were ever published in full--Chernihiv, Starodub, Pryluky and Myrhorod. On the basis of the materials provided by Maksimovich, it is possible to reconstruct fully the contents, if not the wording, of the nakazy of three more polks -- Perciaslav, Poltava, and Lubny. Finally, for the Kiev, Nizhyn and Hadiach polks certain points of the nakazy are mentioned by Maksimovich, but a full elucidation of them is impossible without the original nakazy, probably located in Soviet archives. Since the Revolution no one has worked with this material. The Soviet historian O. I. Putro in a recent article dealing specifically with the Cossack nakazy utilized only published materials. See 0. 1. Putro, "Do pytannia pro antyfeodal'nu borot'bu ukrains'koho kozatstva v druhii polovyni XVIII st.," Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, No. 8 (1971), pp. 99-103.

63Nakazy, p. 291.

64Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 244.

sotnia boycotting the polk level elections.⁶⁵ Similarly, for Kiev, Nizhyn, and Hadiach polks the influence of the starshyna is evident.⁶⁶ Starshyna control reached its highest point in Lubny, where the Cossack nakaz, with a few minor alterations, was an exact copy of the nakaz submitted by the Lubny nobility.⁶⁷ Consequently, the Cossack nakazy have to be utilized with caution, for with the exception of the Chernihiv and, partially, the Pereiaslav polks, all the nakazy were probably scrutinized by members of the starshyna and reflect the wishes of the rank and file Cossacks only to the extent that they are not in conflict with interests of the starshyna.

The Cossack nakazy strongly defended the autonomy of the Hetmanate. The nakazy from nine out of ten polks requested the confirmation of all Little Russian rights and privileges, and three called for the election of a hetman. The Cossacks of eight polks supported the traditional election of officers and in five polks reminded the authorities that as privileged warriors they should be equally honored with the nobility.⁶⁸

65Nakazy, p. 285.

66Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 242-250, 255-256, 266-270.

67For a comparison of the two see Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 258.

⁶⁸For the most frequent Cossack requests see chart No. 3. Other demands made by the Cossacks are listed in the Appendix.

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Ľ		Nishun In	1	5 sotaí nakazy composite	Myrhorod abstract	Pryluky	Starodub	Pereiaslav (composite 18 nakazy)	Chernihiv	COSSA CK naka sy
F	T×			-	-	×		lo		election of a hetman
×	×	t	×	nakazy	×	×	×	×	x	of all rights and privileges
×	T	T	×	nakazy	×	×	×	×	×	free election of Cossack officers
-	T	T	T	x nakary	×	×	×		×	Cossacks to be equal in honor to nobility
×	×	×	ATTEAX)	Anakazy 4, no tax	ho tax	×	×	ho tax	×	abolition or reduction of ruble tax
×			×		×	×	××	×		no quartering of Russian troops or officials by Cossacks
-		-	T	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	×	×	×	×	×	Cossacks not to be used for public works
×	×	×	×	4 na kasy	×	×		×		termination of the census
-		×			×	×	×	×		right to purchase and sell land
×		-			×	×		×		tariff-free salt trade
×	×			X 2 nakaz	×			×		freedom to trade for Cossacks generally
×				X 1 nakas				×	×	right to produce and trade in alco- holic beverages
				and e also	200			×	×	stop the distri- bution and sale of Cossack lands, esp to nobility

Chart 3

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the Cossacks as being used and abused by the starshyna.

Many Cossacks, because of the above mentioned purchases and seizures of Cossack lands by all sorts of landlords, sotnyks, and starshyna, and other Cossacks because of great pressure and fear, leave their Cossack lands to the landlords, unwillingly become <u>pidsusidky</u> [class of landless laborers], or go abroad or to other places.⁶⁹

Although the Chernihiv nakaz diverges sharply from the others in its attitude toward the starshyna, it concurs in the espousal of autonomy. This indicates that the autonomist wishes were not merely inserted by the nobility into the Cossack nakazy. In fact, the starshyna-nobility's role took the form of censoring rather than composing the nakazy for the Cossacks. It is possible, however, that such outright political demands as the election of a hetman were strongly encouraged by some noblemen who were unable to include them in their own nakazy. But there is no indication that the defense of Ukrainian autonomy was antithetical to Cossack wishes or interests. On the contrary, the rights and privileges that the Cossacks possessed and wanted to maintain or restore were based on the same privileges of Sigismund Augustus and the treaty points of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi as that of the starshyna, for the starshyna-nobility, in reality, was no more than the upper stratum of Cossacks.

Because the Cossacks and the newly formed nobility were not juridically sharply differentiated, the Cossacks had similar rights-exemption from taxation, rights to ownership of land, various commercial privileges, and a similar duty--to provide military service. This

69Nakazy, p. 145.

close connection with the starshyna-nobility was not forgotten by the Cossacks. In Pryluky they claimed that Cossack status was "from ancient times based on the same laws legislated for the shliakhta and...therefore they utilized shliakhta privileges,"⁷⁰ while in Chernihiv Cossacks believed that they "ought to utilize Cossack freedoms and <u>dvorianin</u> honor."⁷¹ Thus, for many Cossacks Ukrainian autonomy meant equality with the nobility.

Another request--the continued free election of officers--would not only give Cossacks greater influence in regulating the Cossack army and in administering the region, but it would also provide an opportunity for upward social mobility. Although Cossack officers had been at one time indeed elected, this practice now became a mere formality--if practiced at all.⁷² A renewed practice of electing officers would again give Cossacks the possibility of entering the inachne tovarystvo and into the Ukrainian shliakhta. Not that the path of upward mobility was entirely closed; a wealthy Cossack, serving in the administration, with connections to the hetman or now to the Little Russian College, could still enter into the Ukrainian aristocracy. But by then fewer such possibilities existed for the Ukrainian nobility was becoming a closed estate limited to members of the more outstanding families.⁷³

70 Pryluky nakaz, in Nakazy, p. 153.

71_{Nakazy}, p. 142.

72v. A. Diadychenko in <u>Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu</u> <u>Livoberezhnoi Ukrainy kintsia XVII-pochatku XVIII st.</u> (Kiev: 1959), pp. 252-256, describes how fictitious these elections were by the beginning of the eighteenth century.

73L. Okinshevych, Znachne, pp. 120-171.

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Mhile juridically the Cossacks were close to the nobility, economically and socially they frequently resembled the peasantry. Cossack impoverishment constantly reduced the number of battle-ready Cossacks and efforts to reverse this trend by prohibiting the sale of Cossack lands failed. Apparently, Cossack lands were still being sold or even seized by the nobles and clergy. The Chernihiv and two Pereiaslav nakazy pleaded for the continuation of this prohibition, while others petitioned for the right to sell and purchase Cossack lands. Undoubtedly this was included at the urging of the starshyna.

As the Cossacks were unable to perform fully their main task of fighting, they assumed more and more auxilliary functions, such as the construction of fortresses, the patrolling of borders, even the building of roads and canals. The Cossacks objected to being used for such "common" non-military labor as not befitting their rank and denigrating to their rights.⁷⁴ These duties also contributed to Cossack economic decline, for they frequently entailed long absences from their homes, resulting in neglect of crops and other domestic duties.⁷⁵ Like the nobles, the Cossacks resented quarterings which frequently necessitated absorbing the cost of the soldiers' or officials' upkeep, even providing him with horses.⁷⁶

In addition to this hardship, more than half the Cossacks

74 Chernihiv nakaz in Nakazy, p. 147.

⁷⁵See the following nakazy: Chernihiv, <u>Nakazy</u>, p. 147; Starodub, <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 155; Myrhorod, <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 164.

76 Myrhorod nakaz, Ibid.

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(198,295)⁷⁷ became liable for the full ruble tax. Until then, the pidpomichnyky (Cossack helpers), performing only auxilliary functions in lieu of military service, were assessed half the tax rate required of peasants and burghers. No issue provoked such unanimous hostility as the newly introduced tax. First, it substantially increased the tax burden of the pidpomichnyky. Second, since the pidpomichnyky lived with and assisted the starshyna or regular Cossacks, some of this tax burden was passed on to the latter. Third, it produced a large group of Cossacks who were indistinguishable from the peasants as far as taxation was concerned. In fact, many of these Cossacks were already forced to perform peasant obligations to the landlords, and there was a real danger of completely merging with the peasantry. Under such circumstances the Cossacks were especially anxious to regain their ancient privileges--guaranteed by custom and treaties--of being honored warriors exempt from all taxation.

Another innovation of Rumiantsev which caused great concern among the Cossacks was the census. Cossacks of eight polks wished the census then under way to be terminated. The reason given was that it did not follow Ukrainian census taking procedures and thus violated their rights and privileges.⁷⁸ Perhaps the real reason for this opposition was that many of the regular Cossacks.⁷⁹ were hardly in a better position than the pidpomichnyky and the Cossacks feared that they too would lose their

⁷⁷According to the 1764 census, Shafonskii, p. 85.
⁷⁸Pryluky nakaz, <u>Nakazy</u>, pp. 159-160.

⁷⁹According to the 1764 census there were 174,886 regular Cossacks, Shafonskii, p. 85.

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tax exemption as well as their social status.

Thus, the fate of the Cossacks depended on the continuation of special Ukrainian rights and privileges. The unattractive alternative was either merger with the peasantry or entrance into Russian military units. ⁸⁰ The Cossacks, therefore, viewed Ukrainian autonomy as a means of social and economic survival, as a way of regaining lost rights and status, and even as a possibility for obtaining a foothold in the aristocracy.

The extent of Cossack attachment to native ways and native administrative systems is best demonstrated by the Cossacks who were excluded from the Hetmanate just prior to Legislative Commission. The Kremenchuk and Ulasiv sotnias were part of the Myrhorod polk until 1764, when they were attached to the newly formed New Russia gubernia. The Cossacks refused to participate in their gubernia elections, and in violation of government prohibitions, wrote a nakaz, elected a deputy, and sent him to the Commission Assembly. In the petition--signed by many Cossacks, some starshyna and even five peasants--the members of these sotnias lamented that:

...customs sacredly and perpetually guaranteed by the laws of your Imperial Highness's ancestors have been greatly altered by newly-introduced practices; for example, the reorganization of our sotnia towns, calling them rotas or pikineria polks; the naming of our former sotnyks and sotnia starshyna as rotmistry and other rota officers; the naming and describing our sotnia chancellery as a rota government. We signed below do not wish at all to be excluded from Little Russia and do not want to register for pikineria service...⁸¹

80D. Miller in "Pikineriia," KSt. (1899), No. 12, describes the recruitment of Ukrainian Cossacks for Russian units and the unpopularity of this kind of service among Cossacks.

81 Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 287.

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4. Town Elections and Nakazy

the sending of

In accordance with Catherine's manifesto /representatives to the Legislative Commission from towns with fewer than fifty houses was optional. S2 This implied that all towns with over fifty houses would participate automatically. In the Hetmanate there were over a hundred such towns. 83 The literal application of Catherine's guidelines would have resulted in a greater number of deputies from towns than of all other participants combined (i.e. over 100 town deputies to twenty for the Cossacks and noblemen). The supervision of so many elections would have constituted a formidable problem. Furthermore, some of the towns in question were populated primarily by Cossacks and peasants and contained very few burghers. Thus, Governor-General Rumiantsev decided that the following fourteen towns had the right to elect deputies for the Commission: Novhorod-Sivers'kyi, Starodub, Chernihiv, Lubny, Nizhyn, Pohary, Kozelets', Pereiaslav, Oster, Hlukhiv, Hadiach, Sorochyntsi, Poltava, and Pryluky.⁸⁴ The disenfranchised towns, however, were permitted to send directly to Rumiantsev petitions dealing with municipal needs. 85 It is not known how many towns took advantage of this right, for though several references to such petitions can be found, the actual

⁸²<u>PSZ</u>, No. 12,801 (December 14, 1766), Vol. XVII, p. 1,101.
⁸³According to G. Maksimovich there were 113--<u>Vybory</u>, p. 94.
⁸⁴<u>Ibid</u>., p. 11.

85The order was published by Vladimirskii-Budanov, "Akty," p. 99.

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texts are unavailable.86

The towns selected by Rumiantsev to send delegates shared the common distinction of being historic, administrative and economic centers where elections could be conveniently supervised. Apparently mere size was not the deciding factor, for it varied from 1,113 houses in Nithyn to 231 houses in Pohary, and many of the excluded towns were larger than those included in Rumiantsev's list.⁸⁷ The disenfranchisement of such important towns as Baturyn, Pochep, and Berezno indicates a certain arbitrariness on the part of Rumiantsev in making his selections.

The election procedures were of two kinds. In the larger cities and towns all eligible townsmen were to elect an assembly of one hundred men, who in turn elected a chairman in the presence of a government representative. The chairman then supervised the assembly in the election of a deputy and the writing of the nakaz. In the smaller towns the election of the chairman and deputy was to have been direct, without any intermediary assembly.

According to Catherine's manifesto, the main criterion for the participation in town elections was the ownership of a house.⁸⁸ In the

87 Maksimovich, Vybory, pp. 12-14.

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⁸⁸Point five of the city election rules, <u>PSZ</u>, No. 12,801 (December 14, 1766), Vol. XVII, p. 1,101.

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⁸⁶ Ivan Telychenko (Telichenko) in "Soslovyia, nuzhdy i zhelaniia..." KSt. (1890), No. 8, p. 182, mentions such small towns as Mrin, Boryspol', Hoholiv, Olyshivka, Nosivka, Kobyshcha, Bobrovytsia, Murovs'k, and Krolovets'. G. Maksimovich was unable to locate these petitions either in the <u>funds</u> cited by Telychenko or anywhere else in the Kharkiv archive (Vybory, p. 19). A. A. Vasil'chikov had access to the Boryspol' petition which he quoted in Semeistvo Rozumovskikh, Vol. I, p. 157 (footnote).

Hetmanate householders included not only the burghers but also nobles, Cossacks, and clergymen. While the clergy technically qualified for municipal elections, no clergymen took part, except in Lubny.

In the town elections social strife overshadowed the problem of autonomy. Although virtually all the elections and nakazy reflect the town dwellers' keen interest in the rights and prerogatives of each municipality, they show little concern for the autonomy of the Hetmanate as a whole. Only in Hlukhiv were autonomist views sufficiently evident. Rumiantsev reported to Catherine:

The nakazy from Hlukhiv [both from the nobility and from the nobility and from the townsmen--Z. K.] were concluded with difficulty...they did not want any municipal district, or any other new establishments, but at all times were substantiating their former rights and freedoms and no matter how hard the municipal chairman, Land Judge Derhun, [tried to change their opinion--Z. K.], many living in the city maintained their former ideas.⁸⁹

Since hardly any burghers signed the Hlukhiv nakaz--eleven out of fifty participants⁹⁰--one may presume that the nakaz represented the nobility, Cossacks, and especially the many petty officials and clerks who lived in the administrative capital of the Hetmanate. In the end, the views of Rumiantsev and Derhun prevailed, for the Hlukhiv makaz contains no autonomist requests. The only other mention of Ukrainian autonomy occurred in the Lubny nakaz, which was subsequently declared mull and void.⁹¹

89 Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 77.

90SIRIO, Vol. CXLIV, pp. 128-129. Hlukhiv also elected in absentia Ivan Skoropads'kyi, a well-known autonomist, as deputy.

91_{Nakazy}, p. 138.

Confusion concerning participation, procedure, and eligibility resulted in the cancellation of several elections. In Hadiach and Sorochyntsi, according to the government representative, Quartermaster-General Kochubei, there were no burghers, only Cossacks, mobles and peasants. Also, the towns were under the jurisdiction of Cossack administration and did not have any self-government. 92 Since the Cossacks and nobles already participated in elections of their own, Rumiantsev decided that holding town elections would be mere duplication and cancelled them. 93 In Hadiach the elections were in the initial stage of registering the inhabitants, while in Sorochyntsi a chairman and deputy had already been elected; in neither case was a nakaz written.94 Kochubei's report on the lack of burghers may well have been inaccurate. According to Shafons'kyi's calculations in 1785-86, there were 846 burghers in Hadiach and thirty Ukrainian merchants. 95 It is unlikely that all the burghers came after 1767. Hadiach had formerly been attached to the office of hetman. With the abolition of that office in 1764, the town was granted to Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi. 96 Consequently, burghers were probably not counted as such but as servitors of a landlord. In both cases, it was in the interests of the landlords to disenfranchise the burghers.

92<u>Nakazy</u>, p. 283.
93<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 288.
94Maksimovich, p. 283.
95Shafonskii, p. 629.
96<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 630.

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The elections in Pryluky and Lubny were also nullified. In Pryluky the pre-election register of citizens contained only burghers.⁹⁷ In spite of Rumiantsev's coaxing, the higher nobility did not participate. On the other hand, the chairman and deputy were elected from the ranks of the nobility.⁹⁸ Rumiantsev decided to nullify this election for reasons which were at variance with each other: first, that all the city homeowners (i.e., the higher nobility) did not participate; second, that the election of a noble chairman and deputy deprived the burghers of their rights. Catherine and the Senate eventually agreed to this nullification.⁹⁹ No nakaz was ever written and the town did not send a deputy to the Commission.

The extent of confusion prevailing in these elections is best exemplified in Lubny. First an election took place, under the supervision of a government official, with almost exclusively burgher participation, and the mayor--a nobleman--was elected as chairman. Then, acting on an order from Rumiantsev, the government representative annulled the election. A new election, with fewer burghers participating, resulted in the nobility and Cossacks controlling the choices for chairman and deputy, as well as the composition of the nakaz. Rumiantsev noted that so few burghers--39 out of 191--signed the nakaz that he decided to abrogate the election. ¹⁰⁰ Finally, Rumiantsev asked the inhabitants to

97_{Maksimovich}, <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 86-87.
98_{Nakazy}, p. 231.
99_{Maksimovich}, <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 89-91.
100_{Nakazy}, pp. 136-137.

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forward a petition to him instead of the normal nakaz.¹⁰¹ The fate of the petition is unknown; if it ever was drawn up, it has not been found by researchers. What has remained is the voided Lubny nakaz representing the interests of the nobility and Cossacks, with some burgher points appended.¹⁰²

The most balanced compromise was reached in the largest city of the Hetmanate, Nizhyn.¹⁰³ Here the various segments of the population wrote separate nakazy, signed them, and then combined them into one makaz. Consequently, the Nizhyn nakaz has separate points from the nobles and Cossacks, the burghers, the Greek brotherhood, and the Russian merchants. The Greek brotherhood was a long-established privileged trading company which controlled the activities of Greek merchants not only for the Hetmanate but Russia as well. As there were only eleven Russian merchants registered in Nizhyn,¹⁰⁴ it was somewhat unusual that they were permitted to have their own separate nakaz. The Nizhyn electoral procedures, however, resulted in inconsistencies and contradictions in the makaz inasmuch as the requests of various interest groups conflicted.¹⁰⁵

Elsewhere either the gentry and Cossacks or the burghers controlled

101The elections are described in Maksimovich, Vybory, pp. 45-55.

102 Published in Nakazy, pp. 124-141.

103 Kiev was larger but, in this period, lay outside the administrative jurisdiction of the Hetmanate. Nizhyn in 1765 had 1,113 houses. G. Maksimovich, Deiatelnost', pp. 95-98 and <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 12-14.

104 Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 62.

105See charts and Appendix for details.

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the election and the composition of the nakaz. In Poltava, the government supervisor, Semen Kochubei, reported to Rumiantsev on the difficulties in bringing together these two groups to write a nakaz.

I have noticed that the interests of the burghers are completely in opposition to the interests of people in the military realm [Cossacks and their officers--Z. K.] and because of this, it is difficult to hope that they can forward identical nakazy to the deputy. 106

Apparently a real struggle developed, for two nakazy were written, one of them, unsigned, representing the burghers,¹⁰⁷ and another, the official signed nakaz.¹⁰⁸ The latter lacks burgher complaints against the Cossack administration, the nobility and starshyna.¹⁰⁹

In Kozelets', Oster, Pereiaslav, Hlukhiv and Lubny, the nakazy were expurgated by the nobility and Cossacks.¹¹⁰ The influence of the burghers in the composition of these nakazy probably depended upon their strength and vehemence. Two of the nakazy--Pereiaslav and Poltava--go further in placating the burghers than others, but none can be considered as the free expression of their wishes.

The burghers, on the other hand, won control in Pohary, Novhorod-Sivers'kyi, Starodub and Chernihiv. In Pohary, the mayor, ten noblemen, four Cossacks and two merchants denounced the chairman and the nakaz.¹¹¹

106_{Nakazy}, p. 286.

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107Published in Nakazy, pp. 113-123.

108published in SIRIO, Vol. CLXIV, pp. 13-21.

109 See charts for comparison.

110Shown by Maksimovich, Vybory, pp. 64-79, 45-51.

¹¹¹Published in <u>Nakazy</u>, pp. 222-223.

the chairman in turn wrote a letter to Rumiantsey accusing the mayor of corruption and the nobles of abusing the burghers and obstructing the election.¹¹² The subsequent investigation proved the chairman correct; the mayor, in order to cover up his own illegal activities, joined some nobles in an attempt to disenfranchise the burghers.¹¹³ This resulted in a complete burgher victory: of 117 signatures on the Pohary nakaz, not one is that of a nobleman or a Cossack.¹¹⁴ In the remaining towns the burgher victory was not as complete, but in all of them the interests of the nobility and Cossacks were represented only to the extent permitted by the burghers.¹¹⁵

As a consequence, some striking differences emerged between the two groups of municipal nakazy. All the burgher-controlled nakazy requested that foreigners, visitors, Cossacks and nobles living in the towns be subject to municipal authorities. None of the other nakazy made such a request for the nobility or Cossacks. One nakaz reflecting the nobility's views, however, agreed that foreigners should be under municipal control, but the Greeks and Russians in Nizhyn, of course, wanted to maintain their own judicial procedures.

Another area of conflict centered on the right of trade and manufacturing. Six nakazy, five burgher-controlled and one nobility-controlled, objected to the nobles', Cossacks', foreigners' and

112Letter published in Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 64-66. 113<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 69-71 114<u>SIRIO</u>, Vol.', CXLIV (1914), p. 75. 115This was shown by Maksimovich, <u>Vybory</u>, pp. 23-38.

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rainochintsy's trading or manufacturing without performing any municipal duties or paying any municipal taxes. Two of the nobles' nakazy requested the confirmation of the rights of all townsmen to engage in manufacturing and trade, but three others allowed that this right should be curbed for foreigners and Russians. The Greeks and Russians in Nizhyn, however, wanted their privileged position continued. Finally, the Oster nakaz contained a request for both the confirmation and the curtailment of noble rights to manufacture.

Both types of nakazy asked for guarantees of various previous municipal rights and privileges, including the Magdeburg Law. The burghers, however, showed a much keener interest in the restoration of town autonomy, and the reversion of land, villages, mills once under its jurisdiction but now controlled by the Cossack administration or private individuals.

The stationing of Russian troops and the quartering of various officers and officials was a serious problem for Ukrainian towns. Many of the nakazy called for a more equitable system of quartering officials; three nakazy asked that Cossack officers--who were exempt by law--also provide quarters for troops and officials. The nakazy also complained of having to provide the quartered officials with candles, firewood, and forage for their horses. Finally, five nakazy requested the removal of at least some military personnel stationed in their town.

Taxation was another vital concern of townsmen. A split developed over the ruble tax. In three nakazy the burghers wanted a slight reduction while the nobility and Cossacks strongly opposed the ruble tax in their nakazy. All groups favored the cancellation of tax arrears, while

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Chart 4

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Lant	Kozelete	Purciaslav	Hukhiv	Poluva	voided nakas	Nizhyn-noble & Cossack points	CONTROLLED	burg. wishes	Sivers "kyl	Techorod	Starodub	Chernihiv	(Lough	lat burg, nakas	Nishyn burgher points	BURCHER
×	×	×	1.	-					×	,			×	×	×	Guarantee of previous municipal rights and privileges & Magdeburg Law shere applicable
			1	(×			×	×	×			×	×	×	freedom from interference by the Cossack administration
Π	I	1111	Nu con					×	×	×	×		×	×	×	Foreigners, visitors, Cosaseks nobles & Russians living in city to be under city judicial authority
X						×				1		Г				hobies & Cossacks to remain under current authority
××							ŀ	×	×	×		1	×	×	×	land, villages, nulls once belonging to town & now under private or Cossack admin. /ownership. to be returned
X×						×	T		×	×	×	1	<		×	townsmen to produce alcoholic
X	1	and the		on 2 true		-			×		×	,	•	×	×	curb nobles'. Cossacks'. razno- chininy and foreigners to trade and manufacture without paying city taxes & duties
	I			×		×							T			maintain all rights & privileges of Cossacks & nobles, incl. manufac- turing & trade
		T	×		Γ			1	×			×		×		All, including nobles and Cossacks, to quarter Russian troops and officials
××	L	I		×		×					×		T		×	All except nobles & Cossacks to quarter Russian troops & officials
××				×							×			T		Burghers not to be responsible for cost of wood, candles, & forage for quartered officers
×		>	<	×						×	×		T			comove part of stationed Russians
	-	4	1	-		13.1	1	-	-	-	+	×	13	<		for ruble tax want some relief from ruble tax
222	x	X		×			-	-		~	-		+	+	×	lax arrears cancelled
	-	×		<u></u>	-	-		-		×	-+	×	t	×1	×	lower tarills, esp. salt to Crimea
	-	-	T	1	-		×	1	1	×			T	1	×	not to use burghers or city peasants for state works without compensation

There is a discount of the P. S. strands of the second

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the nobles requested the reduction of tariffs on salt imported from

Crimea. The town inhabitants also asked for the right to produce alcoholic beverages and wanted payment when drafted to work on state projects. Other requests were either of a local nature or else did not jects frequently enough to warrant consideration;¹²⁶

The nakazy clearly demonstrate the inability of Ukrainian towns to maintain their autonomy, their municipal rights. The Cossacks and their administration penetrated the towns, even those which possessed the Magdeburg Law.¹²⁷ This is not surprising, considering that the towns also served as administrative centers for polks and sotnias (e.g., Chernihiv, Starodub, Poltava, and Lubny were polk administrative centers). The Cossack administration in the town dominated the municipal government, and in some cases assumed some of its functions.¹²⁸ Consequently, the surrounding villages, meadows, and mills which once helped support the towns were easily appropriated by either the Cossack administration or even private individuals.

Such administrative penetration contributed to the influx of nonburghers into towns, especially of starshyna-nobility and Cossacks. Being liable only to the Cossack administration, they were outside the jurisdiction of the municipality and its court system. This gave the

126For all other town requests see Appendix.

128 See chart No. 4 for examples.

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¹²⁷This is discussed in P. Klymenko, "Misto i terytoria na Ukraini za Het'manshchyny (1654-1767 rr.)," <u>ZIFV [V]UAN</u>, Ek. VII-VIII (1926), pp. 309-357.

starshyna and Cossacks a distinct legal advantage over the burghers. Furthermore, the starshyna and Cossacks paid no municipal taxes and performed no municipal duties, though they engaged in trade and industry. Burghers became Cossacks or servitors of the noblemen in order to escape town taxes and responsibilities. This and continued trading and manufacturing by the noblemen's peasant subjects created disarray in the guild systems of the towns,¹²⁹ and contributed to the decline of the burghers. Considering that the clergy and foreigners were also exempt from town obligations, the town contained an ever growing number of people who took advantage of town facilities but contributed nothing to the governance or upkeep of the town. In their own towns, the burghers found themselves at a distinct legal, economic, and administrative disadvantage.

The burghers believed that the remedy for this situation was to obtain new recognition of their ancient rights and privileges, including the Magdeburg Law, which was to be translated from Polish into Russian. Not only would this assist the burghers, most of whom no longer knew Polish, but it would also facilitate appeals to the Russian government. In fact, recognition of Ukrainian town rights by the Russian authorities was the only way to offset the pressure exerted by the Cossack administration. Yet the burghers themselves were not clear about what town autonomy and Magdeburg Law entailed, though implicit in the nakazy is the belief that it would free them from the Cossack administration, put all town inhabitants under municipal jurisdiction, permit only burghers

129 Pohary nakaz, SIRIO, Vol. CXLIV, pp. 81-82.

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to engage in trade and industry, and restore former municipal property. In any case the burghers specifically requested that these points be granted by the Empress. Furthermore, the burghers of Pohary even quoted a 1752 ukaz issued by Empress Elizabeth forbidding trade in towns for non-native merchants and non-burghers.¹³⁰ This had nothing to do with the ancient rights of Ukrainian towns and indicates that at least some burghers were willing not only to rely on special rights, but also to obtain redress directly from the tsar.

Any reliance on Russian authority to offset the encroachment of the nobles and Cossacks proved illusory. In reality the Russian administration was equally disruptive for Ukrainian towns. The vast majority of the Russian troops in the Hetmanate were stationed in towns.¹³¹ while the starshyna and Cossacks frequently avoided the much resented obligation of quartering troops by claiming special rights, the burghers were constrained to accept the full burden. The makazy abound with requests for the equalization of this burden, for protection against appropriation by Russian soldiers and officials, for the establishment of special commissions for the adjudication of disputes (see chart No. 4). In addition to quartering Russian troops, the burghers also paid the ruble tax and were frequently recruited for various state labors, especially during wars. Thus, the burghers incurred a heavy financial obligation in support of the military needs of the Empire.

The position of towns also seriously declined because of a 1755

130SIRIO, Vol. CXLIV, p. 82.

131 Maksimovich, Deiatel'nost', pp. 45-101, contains the official list of places in which troops were stationed.

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ukaz issued by Empress Elizabeth prohibiting internal tariffs, by which the towns had taxed various produce brought by merchants and sold within the municipality. While the Cossack administration was compensated for the loss of revenue due to the abolition of the frontier tariff between the Hetmanate and Russia, the towns received no such compensation. The scope of their loss can be measured by the request of the Nithyn burghers for 1638 rubles, 40 kopeks a year in compensation. ¹³² Moreover, this reduction and simplification of tariffs resulted in greater competition from Russian, Greek, and other foreign merchants, as shown in the universal requests to curb the trading privileges of non-native merchants.

Caught between the steady levelling of their rights by the Cossack administration and the imperial fiscal demands, the burghers sought some measure of autonomy as a means of protection and survival. Consequently, they enumerated half-forgotten rights and privileges stemming from Polish times and petitioned for their approbation to the Russian monarch. The burghers' desiderata were: control over their own towns, autonomy for their estate, relief from fiscal exploitation, and special rights and monopolies in trade and manufacture. Beyond this they is showed little interest and hardly seemed aware of the political crises which the Hetmanate faced.

5. The Clergy Petitions

Although the clergy did not participate in the Legislative Commission, the Holy Synod, as a government institution, presented a nakaz

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¹³² SIRIO, Vol. CXLIV, pp. 30-31.

summarizing the general needs of the Church. In order to assess the contemporary conditions, the Synod turned to various bishops for written reports on the problems of their eparchies. In the Hetmanate such instructions were sent by the bishops of all three eparchies--Kiev, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav--as well as by the two <u>stavropigia</u> monasteries under the jurisdiction of the Synod--the Kiev Pechers'ka Lavra and the Kiev Mezhyhirs'kyi monastery.

Little is known about the procedure by which the clerical nakazy were composed. There is some evidence that local councils discussed what was to be included in the nakaz.¹³³ Judging from both the type of requests made and the signatures affixed to the nakazy, one may presume that there was considerable participation by the local clergy. The extant documents give no indication of any government pressure or interference.

The makazy differ considerably in size, organization and scope. The Kiev makaz, comprising 74 points in 127 pages of small print, contains a rather detailed history, a political program, and a myriad of practical complaints and requests. It is representative of all the clergy of the eparchy and does not distinguish sharply between the meeds of the regular clergy and those of monastic communities. On the other hand, the makazy from Chernihiv and Pereiaslav eparchies are shorter, less historically oriented, and contain separate sections for the regular clergy and for the monks. Finally, the makazy of the two independent

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¹³³A. Dianin, "Malorossiiskoe dukhovenstvo vo vtoroi polovine XVIII veka," <u>Trudy Kievskoi Dukhovnoi Akademii</u> (hereafter <u>Trudy KDA</u>), Vol. VIII (1904), p. 590.

monasteries are strictly limited to the activities and conditions of those monasteries.

The clerical nakazy reveal several strongly autonomist orientations. The Kievan metropolitan Arsenil Mohylians'kyi wanted an autonomous Orthodox Church for the Hetmanate under the leadership of the Kiev metropolia. Consequently, the Kiev nakaz contains a complete program for Church autonomy: the recognition of the metropolitan's title as 'metropolitan of Kiev, Halych and all Little Russia"; the renewal of the custom of freely electing the Kievan metropolitan exclusively from among native Ukrainians; the transfer of the Kievan metropolia from the direct authority of the Synod to the College of Foreign Affairs; a reminder that Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and other eparchies were once under the jurisdiction of the Kiev metropolitan; a reminder that the <u>stavropigia</u> monasteries were also once under the jurisdiction of the Kiev metropolitan; and finally, a stipulation that hegumens were to be confirmed by the Kievan metropolitan or eparchial bishop and not directly by the Holy Synod. ¹³⁴

The tradition of an autonomous Ukrainian Church remained strong, despite Muscovite efforts dating from the late seventeenth century to obtain complete control. Soon after the subordination of the Kievan metropolitan to the Moscow patriarch in 1686, various eparchies and monasteries began to deal directly with Moscow, relegating the authority of the Kievan metropolitan to that of a mere diocesan bishop. There

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¹³⁴ SIRIO, Vol. XLIII (1885), pp. 504-508, articles 36, 37; p. 550, article 66; pp. 508-510, articles 38, 39, 40; pp. 510-511, articles 41, 42; p. 513, article 44.

is no indication that the bishops of Pereiaslav or Chernihiv or the independent monasteries had any desire to return to the jurisdiction of the Kievan metropolitan. In fact, the requests of the Kiev Pechers'ka Lavra and the Kiev Mezhyhirs'kyi monastery to guarantee their independence or <u>stavropigia</u>¹³⁵ clearly indicate that they were opposed to any such consolidation of Ukrainian Church authority. Consequently, the desire to resurrect an autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church was limited to the Kievan metropolitan and his followers.

Going beyond the concept of a separate autonomous Church, the clergy sought to secure a whole complex of personal, property and customary rights deeply ingrained in the Ukrainian legal and social structure. The regular clergy regarded their status as equal to that of the nobility, citing the Lithuanian Statute and various charters as evidence for their claim, and complained of Cossacks, noblemen, Russian officers and others who did not show clerics the proper respect. Property rights were of particular concern to the Ukrainian monasteries, since Russian monasteries had recently lost much of their wealth through state secularization. All the instructions pressed for the reaffirmation under Ukrainian law of the monasterics' unlimited right to own, sell, buy, and inherit property. They also called for the eviction of all those who had illegally seized monastery lands. The regular clergy petitioned for the abolition of a 1728 decree prohibiting them to buy Cossack property and for the re-establishment of their traditional right to produce and sell alcoholic beverages which had been abrogated by Hetman

135 Ibid., p. 583, article 7; pp. 589-591.

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CHURCH .	Confirmation of rights	and privileges	· judicial · judicial c present proceedir	confirmation of monaste- ries' right to property	to buy at	to pre holic b	Church subjects freed from quartering troops & other officials	financial support & aca- demic upgrading of Kiev Academy & Cher- nihiv Collegium	Frles heir han ban ban	Church subjects to be freed from ruble tax
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Rozumovs'kyi in 1761.

All the nakazy protested any interference with the Church's judicial system, and demanded the presence of a cleric in civilian courts in cases involving anyone under Church jurisdiction. The clergy considered that they and the people under their authority should be exempt from quartering troops and officials and from paying the ruble tax. ¹³⁶ The Kiev eparchy and the Kiev Mezhyhirs'kyi monastery wanted an exemption from all taxes.

Other problems discussed at length were the financial support for and the academic upgrading of the Kiev Academy and the Chernihiv Collegium and a separate press for the Kiev metropolitan. Finally, the priests urged that financial support be based upon individual contracts mutually agreeable to the priest and community rather than following an official price list for spiritual services.¹³⁷

The clerical nakazy from the Hetmanate produced some consternation in the Synod. There was much confusion about which points should be incorporated in the Synodal nakaz. After several meetings devoted to this issue, by December 8, 1768 the Synod divided the articles of the Kiev nakaz into three groups: those to be included in the Synodal nakaz, those to be excluded entirely, and those to be passed separately to the Synodal deputy, Bishop Gabriel of Tver.¹³⁸ None of the articles

136Although the clergy themselves were exempt, all those working and living on Church lands were required to pay this tax.

¹³⁷For all other requests, see Appendix.
¹³⁸<u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. XLIII (1885), p. 111.

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which urged the re-establishment of an autonomous Church were included in the Synodal nakaz,¹³⁹ while the question of the metropolitan's title was to be passed on to the deputy.¹⁴⁰ Many other questions--not concerned with Church autonomy--were dropped not only from the Kiev, but all the other nakazy. The protocol of the Synod gives no explanation of the criteria adopted for the exclusion of requests from the Hetmanate.¹⁴¹ This, however, is a moot point, since the Synod's nakaz was not discussed, or even considered, at the meetings of the Legislative Commission.

6. The Little Russian College Nakaz

In addition to the nakazy of the Ukrainian populace, the Little Russian College, as the chief administrative body for the Hetmanate, also elected a deputy, D. Natalin, and issued a nakaz. Governor-General Rumiantsev presented the College with a memorandum of twenty articles for its consideration in drawing up the nakaz, a memorandum which followed closely the program he submitted to Catherine after assuming the duties of governor-general in 1765.¹⁴² Since this program was in turn based on Teplov's criticisms and Catherine's own views, the new

139See the nakaz of the Holy Synod, Little Russian additions, SIRIO, Vol. XLIII, pp. 63-113.

140SIRIO, Vol. XLIII, p. III.

141 Ibid., p. V.

142The memorandum was published by Vladimirskii-Budanov, "Akty...," pp. 100-111; cf. Rumiantsev's initial program published in SIRIO, Vol. X (1872), pp. 9-10. Rumiantsev memorandum reflected the continuous policy towards the Hetmanate by Russian officialdom; the Little Russian College nakaz virtually duplicated, both in wording and in sequence of articles, the Rumiantsev memorandum.¹⁴³

According to the makaz, the fundamental administrative problem in the Hetmanate was that its laws and customs stemmed from Polish times and, therefore, were not suitable for an autocratic state. Sec. 3 Changed conditions necessitated reforms in administration, social organization, economics, education. The administration was to be improved and simplified by the division of the Little Russian College into three departments -- military affairs, taxation and finance, and justice (article 1), by the establishment of provinces on the basis of population (article 2), and by the organization of a staff of paid officials approximating Russian practice (article 3). Taxes were to be collected systematically and in full and, perhaps, a soul tax should be introduced (article 4). The nakaz, furthermore, proposed the reorganization of the Cossack host into standardized units with a regular army command, proper equipment, and only able-bodied soldiers (article 14). The remaining Cossacks were to be integrated with townsmen and peasants, and noone could be admitted into Cossackdom from these social groups (article 16).

Most importantly, the nakaz failed to recognize the collective mobility of the starshyna. Instead, two categories of landowners were

143Compare the memorandum with the Little Russian College nakaz published in <u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. XLIII (1885), pp. 218-237.

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proposed: dvoriane and <u>zemstvo</u>. Those who could prove noble descent or who served in adequately high positions in the Ukrainian administration were to receive patents for Russian dvorianstvo. All other landlords were to be included into a special category of <u>zemstvo</u>, and they would not be entitled to ennoblement on the basis of property owned (article 10). The nakaz also contained a reminder of starshyna appropriation of state lands, the confirmation of which still awaited the decision of the monarch (article 18). It did allow, however, for the purchase of Cossack lands by the nobility (article 20).

For the rest of the population--clergy, townsmen, and peasants-the nakaz outlined the following programs: state secularization of monastery lands and the conversion of some monasteries into schools for the nobility (article 2), with, however, exemption for the clergy from troop quarterings (article 18). Towns should be divided into two types, first and second class; in the former, town citizenship would be restricted to town officials, merchants and craftsmen, while in the latter landowners, Cossacks and other non-burghers could also become town citizens (article 5). The Greeks of Nizhyn were to be under municipal jurisdiction (article 17). Finally, the common people, peasants and <u>pidsusidki</u> were to be further restricted in moving from one estate to another, and new lands were to be colonized only under governmental supervision (article 18).

Otherwise the nakaz merely repeated points contained in the original Rumiantsev program: the necessity for legal council in higher judicial proceedings (article 3), the establishment of state industries, the diversification of crops with the aid of state agriculturalists

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(article 6), the need for a state forestry service (article 7), the regulation of trade in alcoholic beverages by the State (article 8), and the transfer of command of the Ukrainian artillery to the imperial general <u>fel'dsekhmester</u> (article 15).¹⁴⁴

This nakaz could hardly have won the plaudits of the Ukrainian elite. Aware of this, Governor-General Rumiantsev was on guard for any signs of opposition. It must have been clear to him that the most acute sutonomist issues were the election of a hetman and the preservation of the Ukrainian legal and administrative self-rule. These claims testified to a strong pro-hetman grouping whose program was a return, with some modifications, to the Cossack administrative system in existence at the time of Catherine's coup. Consequently Rumiantsev paid particular attention to this political orientation, and expressed concern to Catherine about the activities of Skoropads'kyi.¹⁴⁵ More than this he could not do without engaging in a direct confrontation with the Ukrainian nobility and Cossacks. Following Rumiantsev's failure to suppress completely the autonomist views, the scene of the struggle between the Russian authorities and Ukrainian autonomists now shifted from the Hetmanate to Moscow and the meetings of the Legislative Assembly.

7. Ukrainian Participation in the Legislative Assembly

For the most part, Ukrainian deputies took active part in the

144An additional request was to prohibit all tariffs and tolls collected on roads and at mills by private individuals (article 9).

145See above, p. 191.

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Assembly debates only when their particular economic, social, or regional rights were threatened. Hence, at the mention of further limitations of foreign trade across the borders of the Hetmanate, Ivan Kostevych's defense of direct trade was supported by Ukrainian delegates from all social groups.¹⁴⁶ When challenged, Ukrainian noble deputies explained that nobles had the right to purchase estates with peasants, but that it was possible for peasants to move from one estate to another.¹⁴⁷

Although some of these issues touched on the problem of Ukrainian autonomy, a direct confrontation was avoided until near the end of the Convention. This was somewhat surprising, since a debate on the autonomy of the Baltic provinces developed rather early.¹⁴⁸ N. Tolmachev of the Liubin nobility proposed to avoid confusion and to increase the general welfare by having only one law applicable to all the peoples of the Empire.¹⁴⁹ Aimed at the Baltic provinces, this speech prompted a vigorous response from the Baltic delegates. The implication of the debate for Ukrainian autonomy was clear, yet the Ukrainian delegates remained silent.¹⁵⁰ Only the delegate from Kiev, Josyf Hudima, maintained that

146<u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. VIII, pp. 53-54. Kostevych was a town delegate from Nizhyn.

147SIRIO, Vol. XXXII, p. 100, excerpts; speech in full in Addendum, document no. 67, pp. 519-520, Vol. VIII, pp. 214-216.

148 The Assembly opened on July 30, 1767, and the debate on the status of the Baltic lands began in November, 1767.

149 Dukes, Catherine, p. 156.

150All the Ukrainian delegates had arrived by this time and presumably, were attending the sessions. M. Longinov (ed. and intro.), "Materialy dlia komissii o sochinenii proekta novago ulozheniia spisok gospodam deputatam," Russkii vestnik, Vol. XXXVI (1861), pp. 42-44.

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the Magdeburg Law was essential for his constituency. 151

In the early stage of the Assembly meetings, the Ukrainian delesation was suffering from a crisis in leadership. At first it was led by Ivan Mykhailovych Skoropods'kyi, a member of the most distinguished ukrainian families which was connected with the highest positions in the Hetmanate. His great-uncle Ivan Skoropads'kyi was hetman (1708-1722); his mother was the daughter of Hetman Danylo Apostol (1727-1734); and his father was the Chernihiv polkovnyk and, later, the general insignia bearer.¹⁵² Ivan Mykhailovych Skoropads'kyi received his education at the Kievan Academy and then at Breslau University.¹⁵³ On his return to the Hetmanate from Western Europe, Ivan Mykhailovych took am active interest in civic affairs, becoming a member of the <u>znachne</u> <u>viis'kove tovarystvo</u>--a bunchuk comrade--in 1752 and the general aidede-camp in 1762.¹⁵⁴

Suspicious of Ivan Skoropads'kyi, Governor-General Rumiantsev complained about him in his official reports to Catherine. In his second report on the elections, Rumiantsev worried whether Skoropads'kyi, as the elected deputy from Chernihiv, would accept the pro-governmental

¹⁵¹SIRIO, Vol. VIII (1871), pp. 338-339; Kiev was at that time outside the administration of the Hetmanate.

152For the Skoropads'kyi family, see V. Modzalevskii, Vol. IV, pp. 661-665; A. Lazarevskii, "Sem'ia Skoropadskikh (1674-1758) - Liudy Staroi Malorossii," Istoricheskii vestnik, Vol. II (1880), pp. 710-725; O. Pritsak, "Rid Skoropads'kykh," Za velych natsii (L'viv: 1938), pp. 64-90.

1530. Ohloblyn, Opanas Lobysevych, 1732-1805 (Munich: 1966), p. 47.

154 Modzalevskii, Vol. IV, p. 666; Pritsak, "Rid...," p. 73.

nakaz.

I doubt only now that the deputy from Chernihiv polk, the General Aide-de-Camp Skoropads'kyi, would accept this nakaz and would agree to act according to it, considering his sentiments which are known to me; for with all his learning and travels in foreign lands, the Cossack has remained in him in his true nature. 155

In his next report Rumiantsev described how the starshyna of Hlukhiv feigned illness so as not to participate in the drafting of the pro-governmental nakaz. Again Rumiantsev singled out Skoropads'kyl as "an acknowledged patriot and lover of freedom and ancient rights" and stated that Skoropads'kyl described the expurgated Chernihiv nakaz as "so obscure for him that it can barely be understood."¹⁵⁶ But Skoropads'kyl's role as the leader of the Ukrainian opposition, and his plans to coordinate activities with the Baltic nobility was indicated in Rumiantsev's final report on the elections written after the deputies had already departed for the Assembly in Moscow.

Skoropads'kyi, the leader of all the others..., after his manifold elections as deputy and because of his marked abilities, dreams of being elected hetman, and, of course, he strives more than before to defend and get confirmed their Cossack freedoms and rights... They [the Ukrainian elite] did much boasting that they voted as the Livonians at the reading of the nakaz, who seemingly were the only ones with the same intentions as they, to maintain their rights and freedoms, and they [Ukrainians] expect from them [the Livonians] mutual co-operation... He, Skoropads'kyi, is now preparing (as he himself announced) the presentation of a protest nullifying all the articles of the Little Russian College nakaz. The consequence of this will justify my report about him made to Your Imperial Majesty, and will reveal those who are supporting him in this...¹⁵⁷

155_{Report No. 2; April 13, 1767, published in full in Maksimovich, 156_{Report No. 3}; June 7, 1767, <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 326-329. 157_{Report No. 5, February 28, 1768, <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 330-332.}} Catherine confirmed Rumiantsev's charges. In a letter from Moscow, she informed the Governor-General that "what you have written about skoropads'kyi is completely justified; here he behaves like a wolf and does not want to have anything to do with our people."¹⁵⁸ Another incident investigated by the Little Russian College indicates that skoropads'kyi was indeed regarded by the populace as the likely candidate for hetman. In June, 1768, a Cossack from the Hetmanate named Matvii Novyk was reported to have said:

Little Russia is deprived of its former freedoms and the Zaporozhians are under duress. And if lord Skoropads'kyi will be hetman, but the former freedoms will not be renewed, then the Little Russian Cossacks with the Zaporothians--and, perhaps, they will call the Tatars for assistance--will attack the moskals (Russians) and firstly take the head of Rumiantsev. 159

During the investigation Novyk claimed that a woman told him and many other people that everyone in Hlukhiv was "awaiting the arrival of Skoropads'kyi--who will come as hetman."¹⁶⁰

Indeed, Skoropads'kyi was returning to the Hetmanate, but not as hetman. Without explanation he passed his post as deputy to Pavlo Rymsha on June 7, 1768¹⁶¹ without delivering the promised attack on the Little Russian College nakaz. Instead the Ukrainian leadership position at the Assembly was taken over by Hryhorii Poletyka, who held

158Letter of April 16, 1768 in A. Smirdin, ed., Vol. III, p. 193.

159p. Efimenko, "Odin iz protestovavshikh," KSt., No. 3 (1882), PP. 605-606.

160 Ibid., p. 606.

161Longinov, ed., "Materialy," p. 42.

different views from Skoropads'kyi and his followers. This switch was probably due to Skoropads'kyi's untenable political position. Most likely it became more and more apparent to Skoropads'kyi that the suthorities looked with disdain and alarm at any suggestion of electing a hetman. Many of the Nizhyn nobles who had spoken out for such an election received death sentences which were at that time being appealed to the Senate (the Senate decision came on July 7, 1768). Skoropads'kyi must also have realized that he was under surveillance and that any move would have been very dangerous for him and his followers. Finally, his private inquiries in Moscow probably convinced him of the hopelessness of the situation. Hence he resigned his post and left the Assembly.

The emergence of Hryhorii Poletyka as the leader of the Ukrainian delegation was somewhat surprising for, until the Legislative Commission, he did not actively participate in Ukrainian civic affairs. Poletyka, who traced his ancestry back to the shliakhta of Poland-Lithuania prior to Khmel'nyts'kyi, was graduated from the Kievan Academy and continued his education at the Academic Gymnasium of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences.¹⁶² He secured a position as translator from Latin and German at the Academy of Sciences and at the Holy Synod and,

¹⁶²For biographical information on H. Poletyka, see V. Modzalevskii, "Poletika, Grigorii Andreevich," <u>Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar</u> (St. Petersburg: 1905), Vol. Plavil'shchikov-Primo, pp. 321-324; <u>Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar' Brokgauza i Efrona, Vol. XXIV, pp. 277-278.</u> The genealogy of H. Poletyka may be found in V. Modzalevskii, <u>Malorossiiskii Rodoslovnik</u>, Vol. IV, pp. 115-121; G. A. Miloradovich, <u>Rodoslovnaia Kniga Chernigovskago dvorianstva (6 parts in 2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1901), Vol. II, Part IV, pp. 161-164; Vasyl' Omel'chenko, "Rid Poletyk," <u>Ukrains'kyi Istoryk</u>, No. 1-2 (1967), pp. 59-63. These genealogies express some doubt as to whether H. Poletyka's ancestor was really a member of the Polish shliakhta.</u>

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Poletyka first answered the Little Russian College nakaz point by point. In a memorandum presented at the Legislative Assembly, entitled <u>Objections of Deputy Hryhorii Poletyka to Directions Given to</u> <u>Deputy Dmitri Natal'in by the Little Russian College</u>,¹⁶³ Poletyka described the treaties by which Little Russia came under the protectorship of the tsar and listed ten benefits to Russia resulting from this union. In return for such benefits, Little Russian rights and privileges were always guaranteed by the tsar. Now the nakaz of the Little Russian College attempted "to introduce into Little Russia such establishments BS are in complete opposition to its rights and freedoms, and in this

¹⁶³Vozrazhenie Deputata Grigoriia Poletiki na Nastavleniia Malo-Tossiiskoi Kollegii gospodinu zh deputatu Dmitriiu Natal'inu," <u>ChOIDR</u>, Vol. III (1858), pp. 71-102.

sammer violate the sanctity of treaties."¹⁶⁴ Poletyka also asserted that a hundred and thirty years of experience had proven that Ukrainian practices were in accord with autocracy. Nevertheless he admitted that there are imperfect laws and that some abuses, especially by hetmans, might have occurred, but he contended that all reforms should be initiated by the Little Russian people and not by the College.

Poletyka, consequently, allowed a few modifications of current practices, specifically the organization of standard Cossack units and the equating of Ukrainian offices with Russian ones, but he insisted that all Cossack rights be preserved and that native offices be maintained. As to monastery lands, Poletyka opposed secularization but admitted that monasteries should shoulder a greater burden of state taxes. He consistently objected to any increase in taxation and was especially opposed to the introduction of a soul tax, fearing that combined with further restrictions on peasant mobility this tax would result in serfdom in the Ukraine. Poletyka, in his spirited defense of the nobility's rights, presented a comprehensive program for the recognition of the nobility's status based on local norms.

Poletyka not only attacked the Little Russian College nakaz for violating local. rights, but he also attempted to prove that its proposals were unnecessary. Why introduce some foreign model for Ukrainian cities when they could be revitalized by the reinstatement of the Magdeburg Law and town autonomy? In this way, the separation of military and civilian offices could also be achieved. And why replace

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164 Ibid., p. 73.

Cossack officers with regular army officers when all that was necessary was to elect worthy officers with military experience? Thus Poletyka was adamantly opposed to the introduction of Russian imperial practices into the Hetmanate. In the end he was a strong defender of historical legitimacy and advocated only such changes as could be justified by former native traditions--a position systematically presented in his other speeches and writings at the Assembly meetings.

The question of Ukrainian autonomy re-emerged at the Assembly with the debate over the "Project of the Nobility." Of particular concern to the Ukrainians was article 43 of this project which stated that "No one but Russian nobles can utilize these rights in Russia."¹⁶⁵ The implication of this article was rather unclear. Did it pertain to the Empire as a whole or only to the core area? Would all the foreign mobles in Russia be excluded from noble rights? When the debate over this article began on August 21, 1768, most nobles merely wished to expand article 43 to include foreigners, special groups and the nobility of other nationalities. The nobles of the Hetmanate, on the other hand, were even willing to have the "Project of the Nobility" restricted to only Russia proper as long as it also confirmed "forever" the rights of Little Russia. Thus, Volodymyr Zolonyts'kyi from Kiev polk suggested that the project pertain only to the Russian nobility while the nobility of Little Russia, Livonia and Estland retain their former rights; ¹⁶⁶

165<u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. XXXII (1881), p. 585. The whole project is published on pp. 571-585.

166_{SIRIO}, Vol. XXXII, pp. 304-307, published in full in Vol. (1882), Addendum, Document No. 33, pp. 332-339.

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this received widespread support from his countrymen.¹⁶⁷ The main defense of Ukrainian rights, however, was again prepared by Hryhorii Poletyka.

In his speech, Poletyka first presented a thorough critique of the project as a whole and then centered on Ukrainian autonomy in particular. According to Poletyka, if the project did not pertain to the Hetmanate, then only the confirmation of traditional Ukrainian autonomy was necessary. But if applicable to the Hetmanate, Poletyka insisted that the following rights of the Ukrainian shliakhta be incorporated into the project: 1) All governance in the Hetmanate, apart from the Emperor's authority, was to be determined by the shliakhta. 2) The shliakhta had the exclusive right to legislate the country's laws subject only to the Emperor's confirmation. 3) All internal arrangements, including taxation and requisitions, was to be directed by the shliakhta. 4) Ukrainian civil and military officials were to be elected freely from "native Little Russian shliakhta." 5) A nobleman was not to be imprisoned except for the most severe violations, and even then he was to be summoned to court in accordance with prescribed laws and procedures. 6) the shliakhta had full judicial authority over all subjects on its estates. 7) Nobles could travel to foreign lands without requiring permission. 8) A nobleman could freely dispose of his movable and immovable property, even denying it to his closest relatives and granting it to strangers. 9) Nobles could fully exploit their estates, for example, mine mineral and ore deposits. 10) The shliakhta

167 Ibid., Vol. XXXII, p. 307.

was to be exempt from all taxes except a small tax on land. 11) Nobles had the right to trade domestically and in foreign lands without paying say tariffs or taxes. 12) In the case of the death of a foreigner, who had been living on a shliakhta estate and left no heirs, all his wealth was to be inherited by the landlord and not by the state treasury. 13) No troops were to be quartered on shliakhta properties. 14) The homes of the shliakhta were protected from all searches and seizures and even criminals could not be removed from the estate of a nobleman without the owner's permission. 15) The shliakhta could collect wood, hunt, and fish on all state property.¹⁶⁸

In order to further buttress the claims of the Ukrainian shliakhts, Poletyka presented the Assembly another memorandum.¹⁶⁹ It contained excerpts from the Lithuanian Statute specifying the rights of the nobility and summaries of treaties concluded between hetmans and tsars and of other documents which confirmed these rights. Poletyka's efforts received the overwhelming support of the Ukrainian delegates.¹⁷⁰

The following session of the Assembly--August 28, 1768--heard Maksym Tymofeev, the only speech made by a rank-and-file Cossack from the Hetmanate. Tymofeev agreed that nobles from border areas should retain their native rights and privileges. He reminded the Assembly, however, that Ukrainian rights were guaranteed by various tsars not only to the nobility but also to "all of Little Russian society and the

168<u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. XXXVI (1882), p. 355. Poletyka's speech in full, PP. 340-356.

169Published in Nakazy, pp. 167-176.

170_{SIRIO}, Vol. XXXII, pp. 310-314.

Cossacks, and that all Little Russian inhabitants want to retain their rights and privileges."¹⁷¹ This speech was supported by virtually every delegate from the Hetmanate and also by many delegates from 510boda and Southern Ukraine.¹⁷²

Such requests by Ukrainian deputies encouraged similar demands from other privileged areas. The Smolensk nobility also claimed special rights guaranteed to them upon incorporation into the Muscovite state and asked for their retention. 173 But it was the Baltic nobility, still smarting from the earlier attacks upon their autonomous rights, that took up this question. For the next three sessions -- September 4, 8, 9, 1768--the nobility from Livonia, Finland, Karelia, and Estland presented their cases. Then on September 9, 1768, after five sessions devoted almost exclusively to nobility status in autonomous regions, General Bibikov, Marshal of the Assembly, read a terse statement closing the debate. He stated that the deputies from Livonia, Estland, Finland, Karelia, Little Russia and Smolensk went beyond their competence by requesting confirmation of autonomous rights instead of a formulation of the general project for the dvorianstvo. According to Bibikov, the deputies "could not enter into any discussion dealing with government, and even less on matters dependent solely on the authority of the monarch."174 Consequently, the marshal rejected all the requests, submitted by these deputies. It is quite probable that Bibikov

¹⁷¹Ibid., p. 318.
¹⁷²Ibid., p. 319.
¹⁷³Ibid., p. 319.
¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 346.
was acting on direct orders from Catherine, who was angered by the continuous demands for the retention of local privileges.¹⁷⁵

since the rights of the Hetmanate could no longer be discussed at the Assembly, the Ukrainian deputies decided to petition the monarch directly. The petition from "the nobles, Cossacks and townsmen" was apparently composed by Poletyka,¹⁷⁶ and it contained a listing of benefits derived by the Russian Empire from the Hetmanate's voluntary union with Muscovy, a request for the confirmation "forever" of all Ukrainian rights and prerogatives, and an enumeration of some of the wishes expressed in the nakazy.¹⁷⁷ It is not known whether the petition ever reached the Empress, for the Assembly was soon disbanded.

Probably at this time Poletyka also wrote a treatise entitled, <u>Historical Information: On What Basis Little Russia Was Under the</u> <u>Polish Republic and by What Treaties It Came Under Russian Rulers and</u> <u>a Patriotic Opinion as to How It Could Be Ordered, so that It Would Be</u> <u>Useful to the Russian State Without Violations of Its Rights and Free-</u> <u>doms</u>. ("Istoricheskie Izvestie: Na kakom osnovanie Malaia Rossiia byla pod respublikoiu Pol'skoiu, i na kakikh dogovorakh oddalas' Rossiiskim Gdriam [sic], i patrioticheskoe razsuzhdenie, kakim obrazom mozhno by

175Dukes, Catherine, p. 157.

176 The petition is unsigned and has no indication of authorship; but since whole passages are literally taken from Poletyka's challenge to the Little Russian College, it is probable that Poletyka himself composed it. Even if someone else compiled it, the ideas and even the wording are Poletyka's.

177Proshenie Malorossiiskikh deputatov vo vremia sostavleniia Wlozheniia," <u>Nakazy</u>, pp. 177-184.

onuiu nyne uchredit' chtob ona polezna mogla byt' Rossiiskomu Gosudarstvu bez narusheniia prav eia i volnostei").¹⁷⁸ In it, as in his speeches and other writings, Poletyka insisted that Little Russia always possessed certain rights guaranteed by the Muscovite tsar. 179 To poletyka, however, these rights were virtually identical with Polish "golden liberties" for the nobility. Unlike Skoropads'kyi, who with some modifications wanted to reinstitute the administrative system prior to 1764, Poletyka attempted to resurrect the administrative, judicial, and social system of the Polish Commonwealth prior to the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. At that time, according to Poletyka, regular diets of the shliakhta acted/legislative bodies, consulting on important matters with other estates, while courts of the mobility and town magistrates adjudicated civilian cases. Most of these functions were taken over by the hetman and the Cossack administration, and Poletyka believed that all the misfortunes of the Hetmanate arose from this usurpation of power by the military realm. 180

Poletyka did not totally reject the Cossack experience. On the contrary, he vigorously advocated the recognition of the starshyna as the Ukrainian shliakhta and the preservation of the traditional rights of the rank-and-file Cossacks.¹⁸¹ But, in his view, a precarious

178Ukrains'kyi Arkheohrafichnyi Zbirnyk VUAN, Vol. I (1926), pp. 147-161.

179"Vozrazhenie," p. 72; "Proshenie...," p. 178; "Istoriches-

180"Vozrazhenie...," p. 82; "Proshenie...," p. 181.

181 "Vozrazhenie...," p. "Proshenie...," p. 177.

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balance was upset when, after the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, the Cossack system was imposed on all other estates. Instead of any new legilsation or the introduction of Russian imperial laws, Poletyka espoused the faithful execution of ancient rights, which would in itself lead to a differentiation between the military, administrative, and judicial systems, and thus alleviate most of the short-comings in the governance of the Hetmanate.¹⁸² In the end Poletyka envisioned the Hetmanate as a gentry republic, with no hetman and with virtually all executive, legislative, and judicial authority vested in the hands of the nobility. His only concession to autocracy was that legislation enacted at the <u>radas</u> or <u>sejms</u> of the nobility was to be forwarded to the Russian Emperor for final rejection or approval.

Poletyka's ideas represented a second current in Ukrainian political thought--gentry republican as opposed to the more traditional Cossack. The Hlukhiv Council had clearly demonstrated the Ukrainian elite's predilection for the old Polish-Lithuanian court system, for a parliament with exclusive participation by the nobility, and for the "golden liberties" still enjoyed by the shliakhta just across the border in Poland. Yet it had also shown a strong attachment to the traditional Cossack system of administration with some nobles even advocating a hereditary hetmancy. On some points--Ukrainian separateness and the recognition of the Ukrainian shliakhta--they were in agreement. On others--the authority of the hetman and the need for the traditional Cossack administration--they were at variance.

182 "Vozrazhenie...," pp. 79-81; "Prosheniia...," p. 181.

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Being the most outstanding example of the gentry republican view. poletyka's program included two elements towards which Catherine was favorably disposed. First, his attitude towards the office of hetman did not differ greatly from Catherine's wish that "If there is to be no hetman in Little Russia, then one should strive to make disappear the age and term of hetmans."183 Second, Catherine and her advisors on matters Ukrainian believed that the most pressing reform for the Hetmanate was to differentiate "le gouvernement militaire d'avec le civil gouvairnement donfondu dans cette province."184 Poletyka also insisted on such a separation. At a time when Ukrainian noblemen were incarcerated for demanding a hetman, 185 Poletyka offered the Ukrainian elite an attractive alternative -- a program which was clearly autonomistic, which took fully into account the nobility's political, social, and economic interests, and which avoided an open rift with the Russian administration. This enabled Poletyka to become the chief spokesman for Ukrainian rights.

But Catherine's response to the Assembly debates indicates that she was not interested in any form of autonomy, whether gentry republican, or of more traditional Cossack type. If implemented, Poletyka's program would have severely circumscribed the Russian imperial bureaucracy and would have given the Ukrainian nobility much greater privileges than those enjoyed by the Russian dvorianstvo. Moreover, it was

183<u>ChOIDR</u>, Vol. I (1858), p. 104 and <u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. VII (1871), p. 318.

184 Pis'ma Imperatritsy Ekateriny II k Olsuf'evu" Russkii Arkhiv, Vol. II (1863), p. 189.

185 The case of the Nizhyn nobles was still pending in the Senate.

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a serious challenge to autocracy and in its totality could hardly have pleased Catherine. The outbreak of the Turkish war, however, and other internal difficulties postponed further consideration of the question of autonomous regions, which for the time being retained their previous status.

The Legislative Commission revealed a close tie between support for Ukrainian autonomy and the question of estates. The starshynanobility, Cossacks, clergy, and burghers formed separate social groups comparable to estates. Each of these groups possessed distinct autonomous rights and privileges which it sought to protect both from the encroachment of the central imperial authorities and the other estates. The Hetmanate did not have a diet or any representative body which would draw together the various segments of Ukrainian society and unite them on a regional basis vis a vis Russia. To be sure, the hetman and the central Cossack institutions were, at times, able to play a unifying role. But these entities were closely connected with the nobility or Cossackdom and were frequently in conflict with the burghers and higher clergy. The lack of a central integrating body and class antagonisms were percanial weaknesses in Ukraine which precluded a common struggle for autonomy. Each estate, nevertheless, presented to the Legislative Commission its own defence of autonomy.

It is hardly surprising that the starshyna-nobility / as the conscious most politically / estate. for, despite Russian imperial levelling, it

emerged

still maintained political control over the Hetmanate. The starshyna considered the Hetmanate as a separate political entity, with its ancient history and "confirmed privileges." Interlaced with this political tradition were concrete problems of the nobility's power, status, and wealth. The Legislative Commission proved that the Ukrainian starshyna-nobility was determined to maintain its position. It was precisely this entrenched dominant position of the nobility in Ukrainjan society which necessitated a resolution of some of these problems before any successful integration into the Empire was possible. The Ukrainian noblemen had to be reassured that at least their wealth and status in the Hetmanate would be recognized, and that they would have access to honored and rewarding positions in the centralized imperial bureaucracy. In this manner the tradition of political distinctness could also be eroded, especially if all honors and career possibilities were dependent solely upon the center. But until Catherine took some measures to provide the nobility with such reassurance, they remained the most vocal and articulate defender of the Hetmanate's political separateness and their own political, social, and economic prerogatives within the Hetmanate.

Likewise, some of the higher clergy, especially the Kievan metropolitan, viewed the Church in the Hetmanate as a separate entity. Corresponding to the hetman in the secular realm there was a primate for the Hetmanate, the metropolitan of "Kiev and all Little Russia." Yet, while in the secular realm the hetman ruling an autonomous principality was until recently a reality, a separate Church in the Hetmanate Was only a seventeenth-century memory.

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Autonomy had a more limited meaning for the rest of Ukrainian

society. For the regular monks it meant the retention of monastery lands already secularized in Russia and the return of land under Cossack administration; for the two stavrogipia monasteries it meant continued independence from the local hierarchy. All these requests were rooted in Ukrainian traditions, various guarantees, and the Lithuanian statute. But the claims of the monks conflicted with the Cossack administration, and those of stavrogipia monasteries with the desires of the lievan metropolitan to extend his jurisdiction over them.

Despite the abuse the regular Cossacks received from their officers and nobles, they, too, had specific interests in maintaining ukrainian autonomy. The only alternatives for them were service in the regular Russian army or becoming peasants. To the Cossacks, both alternatives were quite unattractive. In the existing system, at least in theory, they were equal to the nobility and could elect their officers. This in certain ways, however, conflicted with the desires of the nobility, who wanted exclusive rights for all offices and separate courts of nobility.

Similarly, the burghers also wanted to maintain the ancient rights and privileges, including the Magdeburg Law. But for them this meant first of all regaining political and administrative control of the towns from the Cossack administration, and subordinating all town inhabitants to town authority. They also derived exclusive control of trade and manufacture which conflicted in some ways with the rights presented by the nobles, Cossacks, and clergy.

In sum, Ukrainian rights and privileges had a multiplicity of

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meanings for various segments of Ukrainian society. At times these rights of various groups complemented and reinforced each other, at other times they conflicted, and occasionally they had hardly any relationship to each other. Each social group, however, did have some tangible stake in autonomy. Furthermore, autonomy represented something familiar, something known, while change was threatening and imminent. New laws were being proposed, new conditions were emerging. In their anxiety for the future, the greater part of articulate Ukrainian society could only look into an idealized or largely mythical past, when the starshyna were the unquestioned highest nobility in control of a virtually independent principality, when the Cossacks were privileged warriors and considered gentlemen, when . burghers controlled bustling towns and cities, and when the clergy dominated much of Eastern Orthodoxy.

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CHAPTER IV

THE ABOLITION OF UKRAINIAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF RUSSIAN IMPERIAL NORMS

1. Borderland Autonomy, Social Unrest and the Provincial Reform of 1775

In 1775, after thirteen years of half-hearted piecemeal efforts, after rejecting numerous projects and proposals of several commissions, Catherine finally undertook a comprehensive administrative reorganization of the Empire which resolved the conflict between regional autonomy and imperial centralization. Catherine took the decisive step towards integration as a response to continuous social and political unrest the borderlands. At a time when the Russian Empire was engaged in in a war against the Ottoman Empire (1769-1774) and entangled in Polish affairs, it was shaken by a series of events that challenged the government's capability to cope with the centrifugal forces pulling the borderlands away from the core of the Empire. There were rebellions all along the southern and eastern frontiers, from Poland to Dzungaria. For the various Cossack hosts and national minorities this was to be the last stand against Russian administrative centralization.

On this long frontier, the imperial administration was faced with two interconnected problems: the vigorous assertion of traditional rights by various Cossack hosts and national groups against the steady

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incursion by Russian imperial authority, and the social discontent of the rank and file Cossacks and peasants against their own starshyna and landowners. The latter problem was much more acute on the borderlands, for the discontented were both frequently armed and relatively free, and could voice their dissatisfaction by recourse to violence. Such outbursts contained the danger of spreading to the more central provinces of the Empire and thus challenging its basic social relationship--that of lord and serf.

Social unrest was rampant throughout much of the Ukraine. On the Right Bank--under Polish rule--a bloody Jacquerie led by Zaporozhian cossacks was finally put down in 1768-69 with the aid of Russian troops.¹ This uprising had repercussions in the Hetmanate, as some of the rebels crossed the border and sparked a series of Cossack and peasant revolts.² These were usually minor incidents, but a major uprising did occur in the village of Klishchyntsi.³ Having registered the Cossacks living in this village as peasants, the local land-owning

²V. A. Golobutskii (Holobuts'kyi), Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo (Kiev: 1957), pp. 398-412.

³The Klishchyntsi uprising is described in detail by A. Lazarevskii, "Istoricheskie ocherki poltavskoi lubenshchiny XVII-XVIII VV," <u>Ch IONL</u>, Bk XI (1896), pp. 158-193.

IThe three principal leaders--Maksym Zalizniak, Mykyta Shvachka, Semen Nezhyvyi--came from Zaporoizhzhia. For the connection of this uprising (Koliivshchyna) with the Zaporozhians see V. Hrekov, "Zaporozhs'kyi Kish ta Koliivshchyna," Ukraina, Bk IV (1928), pp. 14-20; and V. O. Holobuts'kyi, Zaporiz'ka Sich v ostanni chasy svoho isnuvannia (Kiev: 1961), pp. 365-411. The more important works dealing with the Koliivshchyna are: Ia. Shul'gin, Ocherk Koliivshchiny po neizdannym i izdannym dokumentam 1768 i blizhaishikh godov (Kiev: 1890); Kost' Huslystyi, Koliivshchyna (Kiev: 1947); Koliivshchyna 1768; Materialy iuvileinoi naukovoi sesii prysviachenoi 200-richchiu povstannia (Kiev: 1970).

family--the Lysenkos--attempted to exact corresponding labor obligations. The Cossacks appealed this matter to the courts and the central imperial administration, but their efforts were negated through the intercession of General Chancellor Vasyl' Tumans'kyi--Lysenko's brotherin-law. Enraged by this maneuver, the villagers destroyed the Lysenko estate (1767). By this action, loyal governmental authorities were drawn into the dispute. Neither expeditions of Cossack troops nor the entreaties of various Cossack and Russian officers succeeded in subduing the town's inhabitants. Finally, in 1769, government troops crushed the uprising by force, killing seven rebels and capturing fiftythree. Subsequently, 176 insurgents were brought to trial: the leaders of the uprising were banished to Siberia, while the rank-andfile Cossacks were deprived of their Cossack status and enserfed.

South of the Hetmanate, in the Zaporozhian Sich itself, a mutiny by the most impoverished Cossacks took on aspects of class warfare. The <u>koshovyi</u> (commander) Petro Kalnyshevs'kyi and the starshyna were forced to seek the protection of a Russian garrison. After the uprising had been suppressed by Russian troops, an inquiry revealed that the rebels wanted to elect a new starshyna, appropriate all funds, arms, and ammunition and then seek Turkish protection.⁴ Sporadic outbreaks against the starshyna occurred in various Zaporozhian units between 1770-1774.⁵

Soleksander Riabinin-Skliarevs'kyi, "Zaporiz'ki bunty Dunaitsiv 1771-1774 rr. i pochatok Zadunais'koho kosha," <u>Naukovyi zbirnyk Istorych</u>

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⁴Natalia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, "Do istorii povstannia na Zaporizhzhi 1768 roku," <u>Zaporizhzhia XVIII stolittia ta ioho spadshchyna</u> (2 vols.; Munich: 1965), Vol. I, p. 120; Volodymyr Hrekov in "Bunt siromy ma Zaporozhzhi 1768 r," <u>ZIFV [V] UAN</u>. Bk. XI (1927), pp. 209-241.

In 1769 the revolt spread to several Lancer units in the recently created Novorossiia gubernia.⁶ Recruited from the Cossacks of the Hetmanate and the general populace, the Lancers did not wish to submit to regular military discipline. Many of the Zaporozhian Cossacks sent to quell the Lancers joined the rebellion. Finally, in 1770, regular Aussian army troops and Don Cossacks succeeded in suppressing the uprising.

Dependent upon Russian authority and military strength to suppress social conflict, the Zaporozhian elite, nevertheless, vehemently their opposed any Russian limitation of/autonomy. Petro Kalnyshevs'kyi, the same <u>koshovyi</u> who was forced to seek Russian protection from his own subordinates, attempted to regain Zaporozhian territories absorbed by the Russian administration.⁷ While various imperial commissions studied the Zaporozhians' territorial claims, the Host began a policy of harrassing those colonists imported by the imperial government and simultaneously accepting other settlers under Cossack protection.⁸ In his exasperation at the lack of progress in settling Zaporozhian grievances.

noi Sektsii (Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva), Vol. XXVI (1927), pp. 65-83; A. Skal'kovskii, Istoriia Novoi Sechi, ili poslednego Kosha Zaporozhskago (3 Parts in separate volumes; 3rd. ed.; Odessa: 1855), Pt III, pp. 357-388.

⁶Kost' Huslystyi in Z istorii kliasovoi borot'by v Stepovii Ukraini (Kharkiv: 1933), pp. 41-59.

⁷A. Skal'kovskii, <u>Istoriia...</u>, Pt. II, pp. 281-287; <u>Arkhiv Gosu-darstvennago soveta</u>, Vol. I, Pt. II (1869), pp. 219-222; Natalia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, "Do istorii povstannia na Zaporizhzhi 1768 roku," PP. 111-112.

⁸Discussed in detail by Natalia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, <u>The Settle-</u> <u>ment of the Southern Ukraine (1750-1775)</u>, pp. 290-331. Kalnyshevs'kyi even threatened to seek Turkish protection for the Host⁹-the same political alternative advocated by the Cossacks who had revolted against the starshyna. Suspicion of Zaporozhian separatism was heightened by rumors of secret negotiations with Polish confederates.¹⁰

The imperial government viewed the Zaporozhians as fomentors of social unrest, as a serious impediment to imperial colonization of the south, and as dangerous potential separatists. However, while the Laporozhians were part of the imperial forces fighting the Turks, no action against them was possible. On the contrary, the Zaporozhians received imperial honors, decorations, and assurances that their territorial grievances would soon be rectified.¹¹

Separatist tendencies were also in evidence among the Zaporozhians' eastern neighbors, the Don Cossacks. In 1771 the ataman of the Don host, Stefan Efremov, was accused of secret dealings with Tatar and Caucasian rulers--namely, the Kabardinian princes and the Kumyk

⁹S. M. Solov'ev, <u>Istoria...</u>, Vol. XIV, pp. 47-48; A. Skal'kovskii, <u>Istoriia...</u>, Pt. II, pp. 287-98; P. Efemenko, "Kal'nishevskii," <u>Russkaia</u> <u>Starina, Vol. IX (1875)</u>, p. 416; Natalia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, "Z istorii ostannikh chasiv Zaporizhzhia," <u>Zaporizhzhia XVIII stolittia ta ioho</u> spadshchyna, Vol. I, p. 94.

¹⁰John T. Alexander, Autocratic Politics in a National Crisis. The Inperial Russian Government and Pugachev's Revolt, 1773-1775 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), p. 74; Natalia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, "Do istorii povstannia na Zaporizhzhi 1768 roku," p. 124.

IIThe Zaporozhians served well in the campaign against Turkey. Their conduct was praised and rewarded by Catherine, chief commander Petr Rumiantsev, Panin, Potemkin, Prince Dolgorukov. See A. A. Skal'kovskii, Istoriia..., Pt. III, pp. 24, 28, 34-35, 53, 71-73, 91-92, 101-102, 145-146; A. A. Skal'kovskii, "Dunaitsy," KSt, No. 11 (1885), pp. 118-123; "Reliatsiia o pobede nad turetskim flotom v Dneprovskikh girlakh," KSt, No. 10 (1884), pp. 129-31; N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, "Manifest 3 serpnia roku 1775 v svitli tohochasnykh idei," Zaporizhzhia XVIII stolittia ta ioho spadshchyna, Vol. I, p. 139. prince Temir.¹² Supposedly, the ataman did not pursue the military campaign against the Tatars because of this "conspiracy." In any case, Efremov discharged his forces in 1769 and did not move against the Crimean Tatars. Nor did he and the Don Cossacks join the Second Army as ordered by the Military College in 1770-71. In brief, Efremov refused to allow the Russian military to Command the Don Cossacks at will. When summoned to St. Petersburg for an explanation of his actions, Efremov refused to comply and with Cossack aid evaded capture until October, 1772. Once captured, Efremov's original sentence of death for treason was commuted to life imprisonment in 1773. A special imperial commission was created to investigate the affair and proceeded to question fifty of Efremov's Closest Supporters.

Cossack unrest was not confined to Zaporizhzhia or the Don. Indeed, it was particularly strong in the Ural region, where the Iaik Cossacks, like other Cossack hosts, endeavored to prevent the constant erosion of their autonomy.¹³ The Cossacks were subject directly to the governor-general of Orenburg, and even the ataman was appointed by the imperial government. The Iaik starshina was dependent on Russian imperial authority for the maintenance and improvement of its socioeconomic position to a much greater extent than the Zaporizhian. Rank-

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¹²For the Efremov affair see A. A. Karasev, "Ataman Stepan Danilovich Efremov (1754-1772)," <u>Istoricheskii vestnik</u>, Vol. LXXXIX (1902), pp. 870-883; S. G. Svatikov, <u>Rossiia i Don (1549-1917)</u> (Belgrade: 1924), pp. 210-216; N. Dubrovin, <u>Pugachev i ego soobshchniki</u> (3 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1884), Vol. I, pp. 110-118.

¹³General information about the Iaik Cossacks can be found in John T. Alexander, <u>Autocratic Politics...</u>, pp. 45-52; N. Dubrovin, <u>Pugachev i ego soobshchniki</u>, Vol. I, pp. 1-181.

and-file Cossacks, therefore, began viewing the Russian administration as both the suppressor of their Cossack rights and as their class enemy. This hatred was reinforced by religious antagonism: the Iaik Cossacks were nearly all Old Believers, while the local imperial administration was Orthodox. Bypassing their immediate superiors--the governor general of Orenburg and the War College--the Iaiks repeatedly petitioned the Empress for a redress of grievances against the imperial administration and starshina.

Frustrated by their lack of success in 1772 the Iaik Cossacks revolted. They slaughtered the local Russian garrison, killing its commander General Traubenberg, pillaged the homes of the pro-Russian starshina, and, in accordance with ancient custom, attempted to elect new officers.¹⁴ In June 1772 a punitive expedition led by General Freyman crushed the rebellion. Even prior to this revolt, St. Petersburg planned to abolish the remnants of Iaik self-government and to subordinate these Cossacks to regular Russian military authority. This plan was now implemented. Moreover, eighty-six Cossacks were arrested and all others were required to pay a sum total of 36,756 rubles in penalties.¹⁵

In addition to the Iaiks, the Volga region was inhabited by two other groups which resisted assimilation -- the Bashkirs and Kalmyks.

15John T. Alexander, Autocratic Politics..., p. 51.

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¹⁴This revolt and Iaik unrest in general was the subject of several specialized studies: I. G. Rozner, <u>Iaik pered burei</u> (Moscow: 1966); I. G. Rozner, "Iaitskoe kazachestvo nakanune krest'ianskoi voiny 1773-1775 godov," <u>Voprosy istorii</u>, No. 10 (1958), pp. 97-112; A. I. Andrushchenko, "Klassovaia bor'ba iaitskikh kazakov nakanune krest'iantkoi voiny 1773-1775 gg.," <u>Istoriia SSSR</u>, No. 1 (1960), pp. 143-159; N. Bubrovin, <u>Pugachev...</u>, Vol. I, pp. 1-180.

The Bashkirs were a nomadic Turkic people of Islamic faith who gradually drifted under vague Russian protection in the sixteenth century.¹⁶ From this time, Russian settlers began penetrating into their pastoral lands. This process was accelerated by the development of the Ural mining industry in the eighteenth century. Hemmed in on all sides by the Russian authorities, the Bashkirs responded by a series of revolts--1646, 1662, 1680, 1705-20, 1735-40 and 1755. As late as 1772, Governor Reinsdorp reported the existence of a Bashkir conspiracy to the War College, but no action was taken.¹⁷

The Kalmyks were Buddhist Oirat Mongols who wandered from Dzungaria to the Volga area at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. The authority of the Kalmyk khan was severely limited after their acceptance of Russian protection:¹⁸ officials were no longer appointed by the khan but elected by the various clans and confirmed by the Russian administration. Russian colonization of pasture lands, increased interference in Kalmyk affairs, and particularly attempts to extract greater military service contributed to the decision of Khan Ubasha and the Kalmyk notables to return to Mongolia.

In January, 1771, the Kalmyks (30,969 families) left "Russian protection" <u>en masse</u> and began the journey to their ancestral home-

16For general information on the Bashkirs see Ocherki po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR (Ufa: 1956), Vol. I, Pt. I.

17John T. Alexander, Autocratic Politics ..., p. 54.

18 Reliable general studies about the Kalmyks are M. Novoletvov's Kalmyki. Istoricheskii ocherk (St. Petersburg: 1884), and Ocherki Istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR, dooktiabr'skii period (Moscow: 1967).

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¹⁹ Alarmed at the loss of such a large populace, Catherine and the Imperial Council determined to use all possible means to prevent their exodus. Following the failure of regular Russian troops to overtake the Kalmyks, the Russians resorted to the old policy of divide and rule, persuading the Kalmyks' long-term enemy, the Kazakhs, to attack and harrass their fleeing subjects. Despite the mounting death toll wrought by fighting, hunger and the loss of much of their livestock, the Kalmyks reached Dzungaria and pledged allegiance to the Chinese Emperor.

Enraged by these events, Catherine ordered the Kalmyk khanate liquidated and the position of khan abolished. The various clan leaders of the 4706 Kalmyk families who remained in the Volga were now forced to deal directly with the Russian administration²⁰ through a separate Department of Kalmyk Affairs established at the chancellery of the Astrakhan governor.

With the suppression of the Iaik Cossacks and the government's assertion of greater control over the Bashkirs and remaining Kalmyks, the Volga region was outwardly quiet and subdued. However, the imperial government's ascendency over this region was more apparent than real. Soon the area was inflamed by the greatest uprising of eighteenth century Russia--the Pugachev rebellion. Far from being simply a Jacquerie, the uprising actually resulted from the interplay of three factors: the Cossack problem, ethnic heterogeneity, and intense social discontent.

19M. Novoletvov, Kalmyki..., pp. 45-46; Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR..., p. 216.

20Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR..., p. 221.

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Pugachev himself was a Don Cossack and the Iaik Cossacks were among his most ardent supporters. In the initial stages of the revolt, the Orenburg road was guarded by a small detachment of Ukrainian Cossacks who surrendered the Iletsk fortress to Pugachev.²¹ Other Cossack formations proved equally unreliable. In response to Pugachev's "decrees" restoring Cossack privileges, the Volga Host--with its large number of Ukrainians--went over to the rebels.²² Catherine's attempt to stem the revolt by making use of inter-Cossack rivalries also failed. In January, 1774, she ordered Cossacks from the Hetmanate to join military operations against Pugachev because, "they [the Ukrainian Cossacks] have shown a long-standing hatred towards the Iaiks."²³ This detachment, however, "disappeared" by July without having engaged the enemy.²⁴

Posing as Peter III, Pugachev issued manifestos not only to the Cossacks but also to the Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Tatars and Kazakhs (called Kirghiz in the eighteenth century) promising them "all their lands and pastures, money payments, lead, powder and provisions."²⁵ Many responded by joining Pugachev. Without the military expertise provided by the various Cossack formations, the Bashkirs and Kalmyks, Pugachev would

21I. H. Rozner, "Omelian Puhachov i Ukraina," <u>UIZh</u>, No. 9 (1973), p. 70.

22John T. Alexander, Autocratic Politics..., p. 194.

²³Letter of Catherine to the commander-in-chief of the forces fighting Pugachev, A. I. Bibikov, dated January 15, 1774. <u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. XIII (1874), p. 382.

24Arkhiv Gosuderstvennago Soveta, Vol. I (1869), p. 453.

25John T. Alexander, <u>Autocratic Politics...</u>, pp. 59-60. Alexander provides a very useful overview of the Pugachev revolt and the voluminous scholarly literature dealing with it.

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not have been able to sustain his revolt as long as he did. The complexity of this so-called "peasant war" is indicated by the fact that aristocratic Bashkins joined the rebellion, while Bashkir raiding parties attacked all Russian settlers, including those supporting 26 Pugachev.

A thorough governmental investigation followed the suppression of the Pugachev rebellion.²⁷ At the outset, the possibility of foreign conspiracy--including French intrigue and connections with Polish confederates -- was examined. Failing to substantiate this theory, the investigators attempted to link the Old Believers with the rebellion. However, there was no basis for such supposition: although the laik Cossacks were Old Believers, Pugachev and many of his followers adhered to Orthodoxy while other rebels were of Islamic or Buddhist faith. Finally, in their report to Catherine, P. S. Potemkin and Prince Mikhail Nikitich Volkonskii concluded that "if this miscreant had not stumbled upon the aforementioned Iaik Cossacks, whose rebellious souls were living in disarray, he could nowise have brought about such evil by his base fabrications in any part of your Imperial Majesty's empire."28 Thus, Cossack unrest was assessed as a prime factor in making such a large-scale uprising possible.

²⁶Ocherki po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR..., Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 228. 27Discussed in John T. Alexander, <u>Autocratic Politics...</u>, pp. 196-203.

28 Ibid., p. 203; PSZ, No. 14, 235 (January 15, 1775), Vol. XX, Pp. 15-16.

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As a result, the central government decided to make all Cossack formations completely subordinate to imperial needs. In June 1774, p. Potemkin, the vice-president of the War College and governor-general of Novorossiia, assumed command over all irregular troops and Cossack formations.²⁹ Acting on Potemkin's suggestion, Catherine summarily renamed the Iaik territory the Ural, the Iaik Cossacks the Ural Cossacks, and their capital laitsk became Ural'sk. An increased number of Russian garrisons were to assure order in the Urals and the commanders and chancellery of the renamed Cossacks were to be directly appointed by the Russian administration.³⁰ The Volga Cossacks--many of whom also aided Pugachev--were forceably transferred to the Caucasus.³¹

Even the Don Cossacks, who remained loyal throughout the Pugachev revolt, did not escape the new regulations. On the recommendation of Potemkin, Catherine issued an ukaz which regulated the appointment of Cossack officers on par with Russian military ranks and in the non-military realm imposed imperial norms on the conduct of justice and trade.³² With these restrictions, the Don Cossacks were reduced from a self-governing Cossack host to a privileged, but controlled, body of imperial soldiers. In advising this action, Potemkin reminded the Empress that Cossack autonomy had enabled the Don's former ataman,

²⁹S. G. Svatikov, <u>Rossila i Don</u>, p. 225.
³⁰John T. Alexander, <u>Autocratic Politics...</u>, p. 219.
³¹<u>PSZ</u>, No. 14, 464 (May 5, 1776), Vol. XX, pp. 374-375.
³²<u>PSZ</u>, No. 14251 (February 14, 1775), Vol. XX, pp. 53-55.

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stepan Efremov, to carry out his treacherous activities.³³ Hardest hit by Catherine's anti-Cossack policy were the Zapo-

rethians. Despite their restlessness, separatist tendencies, and some pro-Pugachev connections, ³⁴ the Zaporozhians had fought valiantly spainst the Turks in the recently concluded Russian-Ottoman War. Ironically, the Russian victory over the Ottoman Empire and the annexation of Crimea ended the historic role of the Zaporozhians as a buffer between the Empire and Turkey. The Russian government now viewed the zaporozhian lands as an unnecessarily autonomous enclave which impeded imperial colonization, as a center for rebellion and even sedition. Thus, on June 4, 1775, during the Pentecost holidays, Russian armies en route from the Turkish wars suddenly attacked the Zaporozhian Sich.³⁵ The Sich itself was sacked and the Zaporozhians dispersed. Some Cossacks escaped to the protection of the Turkish sultan, others were impressed into Russian military service, still others remained as free farmers. On August 3, 1775, Catherine herself issued a manifesto

33S. G. Svatikov, Rossiia i Don, pp. 231-232.

³⁴Ukrainian Soviet historians have attempted to connect the Zaporothians with the Pugachev rebellion. Until recently, however, they have succeeded only in establishing that a few individual Zaporozhians joined Pugachev. See V. O. Holobuts'kyi, <u>Zaporiz'ka Sich...</u>, pp. 396-407. A new study by the well known Soviet expert on the Pugachev rebellion, I. G. Rozner, "Omelian Puhachov i Ukraina," <u>UIZh</u>, No. 9 (1973), PP. 63-74, substantiated Pugachev's presence in the Right Bank Ukraine at the time of the Koliivshchyna uprising (1768), in Zaporozhzhia, and in the Hetmanate. Apparently, Pugachev had many close ties with Ukrainians both in the Ukraine as well as in the Don and Volga areas, and he spoke Ukrainian.

³⁵Succinctly summarized in Natalia Polons'ka-Vasylenko's, "Zruinuvannia Zaporiz'koi Sichi," Zaporizhzhia XVIII stolittia ta ioho Spadshchyna, Vol. I, pp. 127-137. denouncing the Zaporozhians and justifying her actions. 36

According to Catherine, however, Cossack unrest was only one of two primary causes for the spread and ferocity of the Pugachev rebellion. Equally to blame was the inability of the Russian civil administration to maintain control over vast areas of the Empire. As Catherine wrote to Panin: "I must say in answer to you that I consider the weak conduct of civilian and military government in the various localities to be as injurious to the public welfare as Pugachev and his motley rabble."³⁷ In the unpublished version of her manifesto on Pugachev, Catherine scorned local administration for its weakness, negligence and laziness, and asserted that "everywhere that the scoundrels encountered firmness and resistance, there they obtained no success."³⁸

As a consequence, Catherine and her advisors accelerated their work on provincial reform and produced the most comprehensive program since the time of Peter I. The Fundamental Law of 1775 standardized imperial provinces and districts. Each province was to contain 300,000 to 400,000 souls and to be subdivided into districts not exceeding

37<u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. VI (1871), pp. 162-164, as quoted in Robert E. Jones, "Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775: A Question of Motivation," <u>Canadian Slavic Studies</u>, Vol. IV, No. 3 (1970), p. 506.

38SIRIO, Vol. XXVII (1880), pp. 162-164, as quoted in Robert E. Jones, "Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775," p. 507. These words were deleted from the official manifesto: PSZ, No. 14,230 (December 19, 1774), Vol. XIX, pp. 1064-1067.

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³⁶pSZ, No. 14,354 (August 3, 1775), Vol. XX, pp. 190-193. This manifesto and Ukrainian reaction to the liquidation of the Sich were analyzed by Natalia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, "Manifest 3 serpnia roku 1775 v svitli tohochasnykh idei," Zaporizhzhia XVIII stolittia ta ioho spadshchyma, Vol. I, pp. 138-185.

\$0,000 souls each. 39 The governor-general, or <u>namestnik</u>, was the imperial viceregent in one or several provinces. He represented the autocrat on the provincial level and was empowered with extraordinary executive authority. A governor, vice-governor, procurator, surveyor, tressurer and director of economy presided over several provincial agencies--Treasury Board, Board of Civil Affairs, Board of Criminal Affairs and Department of Public Welfare. These agencies corresponded to the central institutions of the Empire and were designed to assume such of the responsibility and work load of the central bodies while simultaneously coordinating the functions of the district officials -surveyor, treasurer, doctor, druggist, policemen, and judges. In addition, each province was to have several regiments of troops stationed mder the command of the governor-general.

Perhaps the most dramatic innovation was the election of provincial and district judicial officials by nobles, townsmen, Cossacks and state peasants. Also the local nobility chose the majority of the rural police force, including its captain. All officials, whether appointed or elected, were to be paid by the state.

39pSZ, No. 14,392 (November 7, 1775), Vol. XX, pp. 229-304. In the official document, the term dusha (soul) is used to designate the population of provinces and districts (see pp. 231-232). Only male peasants were considered souls. Thus the total population would be somewhat larger: up to 700,000 for each province and 70,000 for each district. Most textbooks, however, give the number of souls as the total population. Even the competent specialist Robert E. Jones makes this error ("Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775," pp. 508-509]. On the matter of Catherine's motivation for this refrom and its Maeral description, this author is in agreement with Jones and has usually followed his English nomenclature for the various Russian lastitutions.

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by concentrating greater authority at the provincial level and rationalizing administrative functions, the law greatly increased the sumber of appointed and elected officials and multiplied the revenues expended at the provincial level. In short, local and provincial governent was supposed to be empowered with sufficient authority and revenue to deal with local problems on its own initiative, without overburdening the central administration.

It would be erroneous to attribute this far-reaching measure solely to border unrest and the Pugachev rebellion. The Empire had changed considerably since the time of Peter I, while its governing institutions had remained the same. The need for a comprehensive reform had been acknowledged for decades, and (from the very beginning of her reign) Catherine had been keenly interested in administrative improvements. Provincial reform was the subject of several tentative projects; it was discussed at the Legislative Commission of 1767-69 and mentioned in the reports of various governors.⁴⁰ After the Empire's victory over the Ottomans and the first partition of Poland, Catherine and her advisors were finally free to concentrate on this long-awaited project.

Nevertheless, border unrest and the Pugachev rebellion had made a decisive impact on Catherine and her advisors. Having just witnessed the Empire's fragility, they no longer considered provincial reform a long-term goal but accorded it top priority. Catherine and her advisors

40Sobranie sochinenii A. D. Gradovskago (9 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1899-1904), Vol. IX, pp. 101-162. prepared the Fundamental Law in less than ten months,⁴¹ and even prior to its public announcement, the Imperial Council strongly urged the reform's immediate implementation in all provinces.⁴² In contrast to previous, half-hearted efforts, the imperial authorities were now clearly committed to a complete and rapid provincial reorganization.

In autonomous regions, this necessitated the replacement of local institutions with a strengthened provincial administration in the imperisl mold. While the various Cossack formations and semi-nomadic peoples of the southeastern frontier could be readily subordinated to imperial provincial authority, some other areas had such a strong tradition of self-rule that prudence dictated a more tactful approach. The Hetmanate and the Baltic area, in particular, had had their rights confirmed by every ruler since coming under tsarist sovereignty. Catherine's goal concerning these regions had been clearly stated as early as 1764: she manted to abolish their autnomy and subordinate them to imperial norms. But this policy was to be implemented gradually, avoiding, as much as possible, any friction with the local populace. Now, Catherine had to decide whether to introduce the provincial reform immediately into these areas or await a more propitious moment. Since the reform had not as yet even been tested in other parts of the Empire, Catherine

⁴¹Catherine wrote Voltaire that she completed this legislation in just five months: <u>SIRIO</u>, Vol. XXVII (1880), p. 57. Perhaps this referred to the period of her most intensive effort, for she actually began work in late January and the law was not ready until November. Thus, about nine months elapsed between the law's initial conception and its promulgation.

⁴²Robert E. Jones, "Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775," P. 508. hesitated again. The first draft of the Fundamental Law exempted all regions whose rights had been confirmed by previous tsars. Not wishing to be circumscribed by her own law, however, Catherine deleted this to be from the final text.⁴³ Instead, in her presentation of the passage from the Senate, Catherine included a separate covering tetter excluding the Hetmanate and Livonia from its provisions.⁴⁴

For the time being, the Hetmanate retained its privileged position. But the recent Cossack and borderland unrest could only reinforce (atherine's determination to abolish Ukrainian autonomy. In any case, the existence of an administrative master plan for the whole Empire did not portend well for the future of the Hetmanate.

2. The Introduction of Catherine's Provincial Reform Act into the Hetmanate

Just four years after the promulgation of the Provincial Reform Act, and its successful implementation in some of the more central regions of the Russian Empire, Catherine decided to extend its provisions to the Hetmanate. On May 24, 1779, she instructed Governor-General Aumiantsev to make preparations for the new administration of the Hetmanate.⁴⁵

Governor-General Rumiantsev came to this task with prior experi-

⁴³V. Grigor'ev, <u>Reforma mestnago upravleniia pri Ekaterine II</u>, 44

44Published in ibid., pp. 382-384.

⁴⁵Letter published in Smirdin, ed., Vol. III, p. 247.

ence. He had recently directed the opening of the Kursk province and was in the midst of organizing the Kharkiv province.⁴⁶ However, Rumiantsev could, at best, act only as overall supervisor. As other governors-general of this time, Rumiantsev was heavily burdened by the sultiplicity of his duties. In addition to being Governor-General of the Hetmanate, he also commanded all imperial cavalry troops, was responsible for guarding the Polish border, was actively involved in the constant squabbling between Russia and the Crimea, and was directed to assume a variety of state functions outside the Hetmanate. 47 Naturally, this left the Governor-General with little time for the day-to-day details of administering the Hetmanate. To aid him in this capacity, on Aumiantsev's recommendation, Catherine appointed Andrii Stepanovych Myloradovych subordinate governor of Little Russia. 48

Myloradovych's appointment was another example of imperial cooption, the use of the Ukrainian elite to destroy Ukrainian institutions. As a member of a highly respected Ukrainian family, Andrii Myloradovych's connections with much of the Ukrainian starshyna were well based in kinship, social status, and friendship. His father served at a sotnyk

47 This included accompanying the Grand Prince on his trip to Berlin in 1780. For a summary of Rumiantsev's varied activities see P. Maikov's "Rumiantsev, graf Petr Aleksandrovich," pp. 549-564.

⁴⁸The appointment was published in "Rasporiazhenie grafa P. A. Rumiantseva po upravleniiu Malorossiei," ChGV, No. 19 (1888), p. 4.

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⁴⁶Rumiantsev's role in establishing the Kursk province is described in A. Tankov's, "K biografii grafa P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskago," Istoricheskii vestnik, Vol. LXXXIX (1902), pp. 930-938. Rumiantsev's reports on the inauguration of both provinces can be found in "Vsepodannyishiia doneseniia i pis'ma grafa P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskago rainykh godov," ChOIDR, Bk XI (1876), Pt II, pp. 245-251; 257.

in the Hadiach polk and his brother was the Chernihiv polkovnyk.⁴⁹ Andrii Myloradovych, however, entered Russian military service, quickly rose to the rank of major-general and distinguished himself in two campaigns of the Russo-Turkish War.⁵⁰ Returning to the Hetmanate a muchdecorated war hero, Myloradovych continued to serve in the military staff of Governor-General Rumiantsev until his appointment as governor.

Governor Myloradovych's first assignment was to conduct a thorough survey and census in the Hetmanate. This was necessitated by the requirement of the Fundamental Lawthat new provinces (<u>namestnichestva</u>) and districts (<u>uezdy</u>) be formed according to the number of inhabitants. For this purpose, Governor Myloradovych called a special commission composed of army officers, starshyna, and chancellerists. Working in several units, the commissioners systematically surveyed the entire Hetmanate completing their task by 1781.⁵¹ Throughout 1781, Governor Myloradovych and five chancellerists collated and systematized the data collected, on the basis of which new administrative boundaries were then delineated. On November 24, 1781, Governor Myloradovych finally forwarded the completed description of the "three projected Little Russian

⁵⁰Graf Grigorii Aleksandrovich Miloradovich gives a brief biography of his ancestor, Andrii Stepanovych, in <u>Skazaniia o rode dvorian</u> <u>i grafov Miloradovichei (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1873), Vol. I, pp.</u> <u>71-75; and a much more detailed account in Miloradovich Andrei Stepanovich, pokoritel' Machina v 1771 g., gubernator Chernigovskago namestnichestva (1791 g.) s prilozheniem 57 pisem k nemu (Chernihiv: 1887).</u>

⁵¹The workings of the commission are discussed by P. Fedorenko in the introduction to the <u>Opys Novhorod-sivers'koho namisnytstva (1779-</u> <u>1781 rr.)</u> (Kiev: 1931), pp. IV-XXI.

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⁴⁹For general information concerning the Myloradovych family see V. L. Modzalevskii, <u>Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik</u>, Vol. III (L-O), pp. 515-522.

provinces" to the Little Russian College. 52

In its total disregard for historical and economic considerations, the new territorial distribution was a tribute to mathematical rationality. The Hetmanate was divided into three provinces (<u>namestni-</u> <u>chestva</u>)--Kiev, Novhorod-Sivers'k and Chernihiv--named after the provinclal capital of each.⁵³ The three provinces were each subdivided into eleven districts named after ten district capitals, with the respective provincial capital also doubling as the eleventh district capital. The boundaries between districts were not, as yet, precisely delineated: this work was continued by the district nobility and state surveyors throughout all of 1782.⁵⁴

The establishment of new territorial boundaries was only one aspect of the preparations preceding the provincial reform. Before new institutions could be established, Governor-General Rumiantsev was faced with a series of problems stemming from the autonomous tradition of the Hetmanate. In an extensive memorandum to Catherine he outlined these questions and suggested some resolutions.⁵⁵

He first concentrated on the Ukrainian nobility and its service in the new administration. The Fundamental Law restricted participation

53A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskago..., p. 128.

⁵⁴Some of the official reports establishing the district boundaries have been published in <u>ChGV</u>, 1886; No. 22, p. 3-4; No. 24, p. 4; No. 26, p. 4; No. 28, p. 4; No. 29, p. 5; No. 30, p. 5.

⁵⁵The memorandum was published as "Doklad grafa P. A. Rumiantseva Imperatritse Ekaterine II 1781 goda," <u>KSt</u>, No. 12 (1884), pp. 693-703.

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⁵² Ibid., p. XI.

in elections to many governmental offices exclusively to the nobility. According to Ukrainian tradition, however, the clergy, Cossacks, and burghers were entitled to elect many of these officials. Rumiantsev inquired whether the imperial norm would nevertheless be applicable in the Hetmanate. He reminded Catherine that the Ukrainian nobility was not as yet fully determined and again petitioned for the equalization of Ukrainian and Russian offices and ranks which would facilitate its delineation. Due to the Hetmanate's peculiar system of government, Rumiantsev stated, virtually all nobles possessed a military rank and, consequently, there were hardly any non-serving provincial nobles to fill the new civilian positions. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Ukrainian administration would also necessitate the complete reorganization of the Ukrainian military.

Rumiantsev then discussed the provincial reform in connection with the traditional privileges of Cossacks, townsmen and foreigners. In addition to reiterating the perennial problem of Cossack land ownership and requesting the re-institution of the Cossack right to sell property, Rumiantsev brought to Catherine's attention the fact that the Fundamental Law failed to indicate which administrative and judicial organs had jurisdiction over the Cossacks. He pointed out that Cossacks in the Hetmanate were always tried in the same courts as the nobility. Similarly, Rumiantsev wanted Catherine to clarify the juridical status of foreign colonists and Russian Old Believers.

Furthermore, the memorandum indicated that the new provincial regulations violated Ukrainian municipal rights. By the provisions of the Magdeburg Law, towns maintained estates and settlements outside their

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territorial limits, and their proceeds were considered a normal source of income for the town treasury. The new imperial regulations forbade such land ownership. Therefore, Rumiantsev requested Catherine's judgment as to the applicability of this imperial rule to the Hetmanate and the possible disposition of such municipally owned estates. Among the matters discussed were the Hetmanate's postal system, and the allocation of the Ukrainian artillery, especially in regard to the crown lands that provided its financial support. Rumiantsev recommended that a special military unit of retired and invalid soldiers be maintained to guard public buildings in Hlukhiv and that those buildings housing the central institutions of the Hetmanate be converted into schools.

In an ukaz issued on October 26, 1781, Catherine answered Aumiantsev point by point.⁵⁶ The question of military reforms, the designation of the nobility, and the integration of the Ukrainian postal system were postponed for future consideration. The problem of Cossack lands, and the equalization of Ukrainian offices and ranks with their Aussian counterparts were ignored. Moreover, Catherine denied permission for the continuation of the special Hlukhiv military unit and the conversion of the public buildings in Hlukhiv into schools. Instead, retired and invalid soldiers were consigned to charity care while the Hlukhiv public buildings were to continue serving as such in the future Nowhorod-Sivers'k province.

On the whole, Catherine adhered to the Fundamental Law rather rigidly. In disregard of Ukrainian tradition, the Cossacks were placed

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⁵⁶pSZ, No. 15,265 (October 26, 1781), Vol. XXI, pp. 295-297; also found in A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskago..., pp. 130-133.

under the jurisdiction of the Higher and Lower Rural Courts--that is, institutions primarily designated for state peasants. Although Catherine permitted those holding military rank to accept civilian posts, she insisted that all governmental elections be held in accordance with imperial norms. Also, Catherine rescinded the right of towns to own property outside their limits: all such possessions were to be appropriated by the state and placed under the Director of Economy. In fact, all lands formerly attached to Ukrainian offices and institutions (including those of the Ukrainian artillery) were designated imperial state lands. Foreign colonists lost their special rights, only the . Nizhyn Greeks maintained their privileges.⁵⁷ Finally, Catherine eppointed a special agent, subordinate to the Treasury Board of the Kiev province, to control the border tariff with Poland.

This exchange of memoranda and ukaz clearly indicates that Catherine and Rumaintsev disagreed on the policy to be pursued in the Hetnanate. Not only did Catherine disregard or deny a series of Rumlantsev's specific recommendations, she also diverged on the basic issue of Ukrainian autonomy. Catherine was committed to a quick implementation of the provincial reform and strict adherence to the Fundamental Law which precluded the consideration of any regional peculiarities. Rumiantsev, on the other hand, favored a more gradual approach-one which would adapt some norms to local conditions. This was the

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⁵⁷At the request of the Greek community, Catherine issued a decree exempting the Nizhyn Greeks from the provincial reform and again confirmed their special commercial and judicial privileges. See K. Kharlampovych, "Narysy z istorii hrets'koi kolonii v Nizheni (XVII-XVIII st.), ZIFV [V] UNN, Vol. XXIV (1929), pp. 183-190.

first indication of a rift between Rumiantsev and Catherine on policy to be followed in the Hetmanate.⁵⁸

Of course, the wishes of the absolute monarch prevailed: the three new provinces--Kiev, Chernihiv and Novhorod-Sivers'k--were officially proclaimed on September 16, 1781 and insugurated in January, 1782.⁵⁹ The inauguration ceremony--virtually identical in all three provinces--extended over seven days and included numerous Church services, military parades, banquets, balls, masquerades, and firework displays. Set at intervals between the ceremonial functions and festivities were the elections for various governmental posts and the inauguration of most new institutions.⁶⁰

As the new provincial and district administration was and introduced, the old Ukrainian central institutions were dismantled. The first to be abolished was the Ukrainian treasury. Since it

58The rift between Catherine and Rumiantsev will be discussed in the next chapter.

⁵⁹For the proclamation establishing the Novhorod-Sivers' province see <u>PSZ</u>, No. 15,227 (September 16, 1781), Vol. XXI, pp. 246-247, and for the confirmation of the province's administrative posts see <u>PSZ</u>, No. 15,234 (September 18, 1781), Vol. XXI, p. 271, and <u>Kniga shtatov</u>; for the proclamation establishing Kiev province see <u>PSZ</u>, No. 15,228 (September 16, 1781), Vol. XXI, pp. 246-247, and for the confirmation of the province's administrative posts, <u>PSZ</u>, No. 15,233 (September 18, 1781), Vol. XXI, p. 271 and <u>Kniga shtatov</u>; for the proclamation establishing the Chernihiv province see <u>PSZ</u>, No. 15,229 (September 16, 1781), Vol. XXI, p. 247, and for the confirmation of the province's administrative posts, <u>PSZ</u>, No. 15,232 (September 18, 1781), Vol. XXI, p. 271 and <u>Kniga shtatov</u>.

⁶⁰These festivities are described in A. Rigel'man, <u>Letopisnoe</u> <u>Povestvovanie</u>, Pt IV, pp. 38-49; Fedor Kitchenko, "Otkrytie Novgorodseverskago Namestnichestva 1782 g. ianvaria 8-17 dnia," <u>ChGV</u>, 1848; No. 1, p. 4; No. 2, p. 4; No. 3, p. 4-5; and in Rumiantsev's report on the inauguration of Kiev province in "Vsepoddannyishiia doneseniia i pis'ma grafa P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskago," pp. 263-264.

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functioned as a regional imperial treasury, it had already lost any justification for separate existence. In fact, Governor-General numiantsev readily drew upon it for imperial expenditures in no way connected with the Hetmanate.⁶¹ Thus, the Treasury, its chancellery (<u>skarbovaia kantselariia</u>) and the General Accounting Commission (<u>general'naia shchetnaia kommissia</u>) were abolished and all financial matters were transferred to the Treasury Boards of the three provinces.⁶²

A similar fate befell the Ukrainian postal service. Founded himself, in 1765 by Governor-General Rumiantsev/ the postal service was hardly a deep-rooted Ukrainian institution. Nevertheless, this one system encompassed the entire Hetmanate--thus serving as a reminder of the country's unity--and its officials held Ukrainian ranks and offices. Once the Hetmanate was divided into three imperial provinces, its postal service had to be integrated into the imperial postal system. This was accomplished in 1782. All postal appointments were entrusted to the newly created Little Russian branch of the imperial Post Office Department. This department was responsible for all postal salaries and collected all postal fees and revenues in the provinces of the former Hetmanate.⁶³

The Little Russian College, however, could not be so readily

62A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskago..., p. 134.

⁶³pSZ, No. 15,419 (June 3, 1782), Vol. XXI, p. 575; <u>PSZ</u>, No. 15,420 (June 3, 1782), Vol. XXI, p. 575.

⁶¹Pylyp Klymenko, "Vidomist' pro skarb ukrains'byi u 1780 rotsi," <u>TIFV MJ INN,Bk XV (1927)</u>, pp. 221-226; "Ekstrennye raskhody iz sum Malorossiiskoi Kollegii," <u>KSt</u>, No. 6 (1882), pp. 312-315; "Rasporiazhenie grafa P. A. Rumiantseva po upravleniiu Malorossiei," <u>ChGV</u>, No. 12 (1888), P. 4, Document No. 8.

dismantled because it served as the highest appeals tribunal in the Hetmanate whose decisions could be overturned only by the imperial Senate in St. Petersburg. Moreover, the General Military Court was, st this time, a sub-department of the College. When the provincial reform was implemented, both judicial bodies had a large backlog of cases. Upon Governor-General Rumiantsev's request, the Senate granted the College a one-year grace-period to complete its judicial work, although all its administrative functions were abolished.⁶⁴ Since some College members and many of its clerks entered the new administration, the Senate even made provisions for the Colelge's restaffing. pespite these measures, the College was unable to complete its work in the allotted time. In 1784, Governor-General Rumiantsev reported that 449 cases had been reviewed in the College and 886 had been adjudicated in the General Court. Still pending were 520 cases in the College and 1285 in the General Court. 65 Consequently, the Senate was forced to once again prolong the College's existence. Only in August, 1786, when all its affairs had finally been settled and all judicial records had been forwarded to the archives of the new courts, was the Little Russian College abolished. 66

On the local level, Cossack administrators lost all civil authority, but, for the time being, Cossack structure and ranks were retained, though strictly in a military capacity. Governmental institutions

⁶⁴PSZ, No. 15,284 (November 22, 1781), Vol. XXI, pp. 311-312.
⁶⁵PSZ, No. 15,893 (December 13, 1784), Vol. XXI, pp. 1071-1072.
⁶⁶PSZ, No. 16,430 (August 20, 1786), Vol. XXII, p. 677.

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dealing with non-military affairs were abolished; their records were turned over to the new provincial and district administration, and any farther dispensing of Ukrainian civilian offices or ranks was strictly forbidden.⁶⁷ Thus the criminal court (grods'kyi sud), the property court (zems'kyi sud), and the estate boundary court (pidkomors'kyi sud) were dissolved and pending cases were assigned, respectively, to the district courts (uerdnye sudy), the Lower Rural Court (nizhnaia rasprava), and the district surveyor.⁶⁸ Police duties were transferred from the sotnia chancelleries to the town sheriffs (gorodnichi) and the rural police (nizhnii zemskii sud). District treasurers (uezdnyi kaznachii) and the Treasury Board (kazennaia palata) assumed tax functions previcusly performed by the Commissariats,⁶⁹ while the Director of Economy (direktor demovodstva) assumed control over all rank and crown lands formerly governed by Crown Land Overseers (smotriteli koronnykh imenii).

The new provincial administration combined the personal rule of the governor-general with a rationalistic bureaucratic system. As the absolute monarch's local representative, or <u>namestnik</u>, Governor-General Rumiantsev could deal directly with Catherine, bypassing the Senate or any other central Russian institution.⁷⁰ Likewise, he could counter

67PSZ, No. 15,478 (July 27, 1782), Vol. XXI, p. 645.

⁶⁸The abolition of Ukrainian institutions, the transfer of their records, and the assumption of their functions by the new administration is briefly outlined in A. Shafonskii, <u>Chernigovskago...</u>, pp. 134-136.

69Governor-General Rumiantsev had established a special office, the Commissariate, responsible for local collection of taxes.

70Aleksander D. Gradovskii, in "Istoricheskii ocherk uchrezhdeniia general'-guvernatorstv v Rossii," <u>Sobranie sochinenii A. D. Gradovskago</u>, Vol. I, p. 308-313, discusses the position of <u>namestnik</u> during Catherine's reign; Marc Raeff's "In the Imperial Manner," <u>Catherine the Great...</u>,

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any decision made by the local administration and could issue mandatory orders to all governmental institutions in the provinces under his authority, with the single exception that his interference in judicial decisions was specifically prohibited. Catherine had recently made Rumiantsev Governor-General of Little Russia for life, and together with Rumiantsev's position as commander-inthis chief of all troops in the province/ made the territory of the former Hetmanate his virtual satrapy.⁷¹

Directly subordinate to the governor-general was the governor of the province. As chief administrator of a province, the governor provided a vital link between the governor-general and the provincial institutions. Appointed to this post were: Andrii S. Myloradovych for Chernihiv province, the former Ukranian General Judge Ilia V. Zhurman for Novhorod-Sivers'k province, and major-general Semen Shirkov for Kiev province.⁷² Again the imperial authorities co-opted two prominent Ukrainians--one of whom was a high official of the Hetmanate--in order to assure the loyalty of the Ukrainian elite and the smooth transition between the old and new administration.

The governor--assisted by a vice governor, procurator, surveyor, treasurer and director of economy--supervised a number of provincial

71See Catherine's letter of appointment in Smirdin, ed., Vol. III, p. 241.

⁷²The appointments were made on October 2, 1781, and published by A. Rigel'man, Letopisnoe povestvovanie..., Pt IV, pp. 43-44.

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pp. 197-246, gives an interesting portrait of a contemporary satrap Prince G. A. Potemkin, ruler of southern Ukraine. Potemkin combined on a grandiose scale his personal authority with imperial bureaucratic procedures.

agencies responsible for the day to day operation of government. 73 These agencies included those having fiscal, police, social, welfare and judicial functions. Among these, finances were of primary concern. The Treasury Board (kazennaia palata) of each province -- consisting of a vice governor, director of economy, three assessors, three advisors, and a provincial treasurer--directed all state incomes and expenditures, conducted censuses, audited the financial records of all governmental institutions, and oversaw the construction of all public buildings. 74 State revenues were collected by a subsidiary agency of the Board--the Expedition for State Incomes (Ekspeditsiia o gosudarstvennykh dokhodakh). For this purpose, the Expedition maintained a treasurer (kaznachii) in each provincial district. Another revenue-gathering branch of the Board -- the Expedition for State Monpolies and Tariffs--was not introduced into the Ukrainian provinces because many imperial monpolies (e.g., the selling of wine) did not as yet exist in this territory. 75

⁷⁴For finances during Catherine's reign see James A. Duran, Jr., "The Reform of Financial Administration in Russia during the Reign of Catherine II," <u>Canadian Slavic Studies</u>, Vol. IV, No. 3 (1970), pp. 485-496; and for the fiscal aspect of the provincial reform see N. D. Chechulin, Ocherki po istorii russkikh finansov v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II (St. Petersburg: 1906), pp. 75-85.

75A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskago..., p. 177.

⁷⁵For a brief but cogent description of the new provincial administration see Robert E. Jones, "Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775: A Question of Motivation," <u>Canadian Slavic Studies</u>, Vol. IV, No. 3 (1970), pp. 497-512; and Aleksandr Gradovskii, "Nachala russkago gosudarstvennago prava, Chast' III, Organy mestnago upravleniia," <u>Sobranie sochinenii A. D. Gradovskago</u>, Vol. IX, pp. 101-162. In <u>Reforma mestnago upravleniia pri Ekaterine II</u>, V. Grigor'ev discusses in great detail the competence and function of the new institutions (pp. 200-310).

The backbone of the Provincial Reform was a highly developed police and judicial system. It was designed not only to quell social and political unrest but also to bring the authority of the monarch into every village. On the provincial level, police functions were administered by a committee consisting of the governor and two councillors. ⁷⁶ This committee acted as an intermediary between the central government and local institutions. It announced all decrees issued by the autocrat, the Senate and other central institutions and saw to their application in the provinces. It was responsible for local adherence to all government regulations and for peace and tranquility in the province. Finally it supervised the selection of local police personnel and directed their activities.

The organization of the local police force was quite simple. It was divided into two basic units--urban and rural. Each district maintained a rural police force (<u>nizhnii zemskii sud</u>) consisting of police chief or captain (<u>zemskii kapitan</u> or <u>zemskii ispravnik</u>) and four assessors. The police chief and two assessors were elected by the mobility, while the other two officers were chosen by Cossacks and state peasants. Estate stewards and village elders assisted these officials in performing their duties. The urban police force that was introduced into the Hetmanate followed the already revised 1782 regulations.⁷⁷ In each town, a police board (<u>uprava blagochiniia</u>) was

⁷⁶The police structure is described by John P. LeDonne, "The Provincial and Local Police under Catherine the Great, 1775-1796," <u>Canadian</u> <u>Slavic Studies</u>, Vol. IV, No. 3 (1970), pp. 513-528.

⁷⁷pSZ, No. 15,379 (April 8, 1782), Vol. XXI, pp. 461-488; for the functioning of the urban police in the Ukraine see "Otkrytie v Kieve Upravy blagochiniia i pervyia proiavleniia eia deiatel'nosti (1786)," KSL., No. 9 (1893), pp. 418-425.

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instituted, composed of a sheriff (gorodnichii), two investigators -one for criminal and one for civil affairs (pristav uglownykh del, pristav grazhdanskikh del) -- and two counselors (ratmany) from the town magistry. The sheriff was appointed by the Senate on the recommendation of the governor, while the investigators rose through the ranks of the provincial administration. Only the two counselors were elected by townsmen, and even they were subject to confirmation by the sheriff. Other minor police officials -- ward inspectors, assistant investigators, fire inspectors, and even chimney sweeps--assisted the police board. In towns where troops were garrisoned, however, the sheriff and police board were either replaced by the military command or subordinated to it. In fact, the police apparatus was reinforced by special military police units (shatnye komandy) stationed in provincial and district capitals. In case of serious disorders, the police could always depend on the support of regular troops dispatched on request by the governor.

Backing the police apparatus was a well defined judiciary. The Fundamental Law provided for separate but parallel court systems for the nobility, townsmen, and rural inhabitants (<u>poseliane</u>).⁷⁸ At the

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⁷⁸The most comprehensive account of the new judicial system is V. Grigor'ev's Reforma mestnago upravleniia pri Ekaterine II, pp. 200-SIO. A succinct summary of the new judicial institutions is contained in A. Gradovskii's, "Nachala russkago gosudarstvennago prava, Chast' III, Organy mestnago upravleniia," pp. 101-162. The functioning of the new judiciary on the territory of the Hetmanate is described in A. Shafonskii's, Chernigovskago..., pp. 176-186, and in "Zamechaniia do Maloi Russii prinadlezhashchia," ChOIDR, Bk I, Pt II (1848), pp. 1-16. Wore detailed information can be gleaned from a 1786 law code, N. P. Vasilenko, ed., Ekstrakt iz ukazov instruktsii i uchrezhdeniis razdeleniem po materialam na deviatnatsat' chastei (2nd vol. of Materialy dlia istorii ekonomicheskago, iuridicheskago i obshchestvennago byta Staroi Malorosii; Chernihiv: 1902), pp. V-IX, 1-296.

local level, the law introduced a District Court (uezdnyi sud) for the nobility and peasants under their jurisdiction, a Town Magistracy (gorodovyi magistrat) for the townsmen, and a Lower Rural Court (nizhnaia rasprava) for rural inhabitants, i.e., state peasants and Cossacks. Nembers of the District Court were elected by the nobility; joined by the nobility's district marshal, they formed a Court of Wards which protected the property rights of widows and orphans. Similarly, the members of the Town Magistracy were chosen by the townsmen; together with the town's mayor (glava) and its elder (starosta) they constituted the town's Orphans' Court. In each district capital an informal, verbal court (slovesnyi sud) settled minor disputes of merchants and craftsmen. Lastly, a judge appointed by the provincial administration presided over the Lower Rural Court, whose other officials were selected by the state peasants and Cossacks who fell under its jurisdiction.

Decisions made at the district level could be appealed to the provincial courts: the Superior Land Court for cases involving the nobility, their peasants, and <u>raznochintsy</u>; the Provincial Magistracy for town inhabitants; and the Superior Rural Court for state peasants and Cossacks. In some cases, all of these could serve as a court of first instance. The Superior Land Court was divided into two separate departments--criminal and civil--and the Provincial Magistracy maintained separate court divisions--one for merchants, the other for craftsmen. The verdicts of these provincial courts could be reviewed by the Board of Criminal Affairs (<u>Palata uglovnago suda</u>) or the Board of Civil Affairs (<u>Palata grazhdanskago suda</u>). The Boards were the highest provincial judicial authority--its decisions could be appealed only to the imperial

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Senate. Chairmen of both the provincial courts and their separate departments were designated by the Senate, while other presiding judges were elected. All Board officials--chairmen, judges, procurators, assessors and advisors--were appointed by the Senate.

In addition to this judicial hierarchy, there was one more court, the Conscience Court (sovestnyi sud) which adjudicated cases for which normal procedures and penalties were inapplicable, particularly those involving minors and the insane. Its members were elected by all segments of society--nobility, townsmen, Cossacks and state peasants-subject to approval by the Governor-General. The Conscience Court was entrusted with the eradication of witchcraft and sorcery, as well as investigation of instances of false arrest or imprisonment without issuance of charges--a weak echo of the principle of habeas corpus. In reality, this judicial body rarely dealt with instances of false arrest, at least, not on the territory of the Hetmanate. It usually adjudicated cases forwarded from other courts involving insanity.⁷⁹ Monther indication that the imperial authorities were not so much interested in personal rights as the well-ordered society.

The Conscience Court also acted as a court of equity--that is, in cases where two contesting parties agreed in advance to abide by the decision of an imperial judge. This rendered the Conscience Court

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⁷⁹The Conscience Courts in the former Hetmanate were studied by A. Andrievskii, "Deiatel'nost' Kievskago sovestnago suda v pervyi god ego sushchestvovaniia (1782)," KSt., No. 7 (1891), pp. 119-129; and Ivan Rybakov, "Sovisnyi sud na Ukraini," <u>Naukovyi zbirnyk Leningrads'koho</u> tovarystva doslidnykiv ukrains'koi istorii, pys'menstva ta movy, Vol. I (1928), pp. 33-45.

comparable to the equity courts provided by the Magdeburg Law and <u>The</u> <u>Laws By Which the Little Russian People Are Judged</u>. Some scholars have held that Catherine derived the idea of a Conscience Court from the Hetmanate's judicial practices, but hardly any evidence has been discovered to substantiate this claim.⁸⁰ In any case, the Conscience Court performed a function already well-known in the Hetmanate.⁸¹

In contrast to the highly developed police and judiciary, the social welfare agencies were primitive. Each province's Department of Public Welfare (<u>Prikaz obshchestvennago prizreniia</u>)--chaired by the governor--was entrusted with the establishment and financial support of schools, orphanages, hospitals, homes for the aged and the insame. Despite the breadth of these responsibilities, this agency's activity was quite limited. In Chernihiv province, for instance, it was confined to maintaining one hospital for the physically and mentally ill and a home for the aged.⁸² Governmental, educational and social welfare services were still quite rare, and if available at all, they

80G. Barats, "Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia i postepennago zatem uprazdneniia v Rossii sovestnikh sudov i suda po sovesti," <u>Zhurnal grazhdanskago i uglovnago prava</u>, No. 3 (1893), pp. 1-40. Barats believed in the Ukrainian origin of Conscience Courts--a view which was disputed by V. Grigor'ev, <u>Reforma mestnago upravleniia</u>, pp. 251-255.

⁸¹Even if Ukrainian practices did influence the imperial legislation, the Conscience Court could not be considered a continuation of an autonomous institution, for it was adapted to the imperial bureaucratic system. The provisions of the Law drew heavily upon the governmental practices of Livonia and Estland. Yet, ironically enough, once they became part of the imperial system, these areas lost their autonomy. For a treatment of this problem see Ia. Zutis, <u>Ostzeiskii vopros</u>, pp. 382-455.

82Shafonskii, Chernigovskago..., pp. 284-285.

were provided by the Church and private benefactors. Catherine was interested in a well-functioning state, not a welfare state.

In theory, the governmental system introduced by the provincial reforms was that of an absolutist state administered through a bureaucratic machinery, aided and supplemented by the self-regulation of three social groups: the nobility, the townsmen, and the rural inhabitants (Cossacks and state peasants). The fact that these social groups elected a variety of administrative, judicial, and police officials would seem to bear out this supposition. A closer examination of the functioning of provincial administration indicates that, in reality, the state shared the task of local government with the nobility--especially in the territory of the former Hetmanate.

On the whole, local rural administration was controlled by the nobility, checked in turn by the state. Nobles enjoyed complete mastery over their own district courts and elected the rural police chiefs and the majority of the police board. Since Cossacks and peasants were not obligated to vote for members of their own social groups, the officials they elected to the police board and Lower Rural Court were usually minor Cossack functionaries⁸³--most of whom also held claims to nobility. Thus, by utilizing the state's judicial and police powers, the nobles-absolute lords on their own estates--achieved dominion over those rural inhabitants technically outside their jurisdiction--Cossacks and state

⁸³The official reports for the 1785 election in Kiev province have been published by A. A. Andrievskii, ed., <u>Istoricheskie materialy</u> it arkhiva Kievskago gubernskago pravlennia (8 vols.; Kiev: 1882-83), Vol. II, pp. 1-30. These prove that the peasants and Cossacks often elected former Cossack functionaries, sometimes even high officials.

peasants.

The towns became the focal point for state control. They were

the centers for various provincial and district administrative agencies and their numerous officials, supported by garrisons of military police. In some towns, military commanders fulfilled police functions. In others, the police force (except for a few minor posts) was part of an appointive system ultimately regulated by the Senate.84

Such concentration of state power completely overshadowed the vestiges of town autonomy remaining in the Hetmanate. Town lands located outside municipal boundaries were expropriated by the state; the magistrate's role was reduced to a purely judicial one; while the newly created position of town mayor (gorodskoi glava) and town elder (gorodskoi starosta) carried hardly any authority. 85 Even these positions were not always filled by townsmen: citing the lack of literacy among merchants and craftsmen, local officials requested that Governor-General Rumaintsev permit the election of non-townsmen to municipal posts. After some deliberation, Rumiantsev agreed and many municipal offices were subsequently assumed by former Cossack officials and Wkrainian nobles. 86

84A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskago..., p. 181.

85The post of town mayor actually had been created earlier, in connection with the 1767 Legislative Commission. In Russia this office was continued and subsequently incorporated into the 1775 reform. In the Hetmanate, however, this position was re-introduced with the implementation of the provincial reform. See I. Ditiatin, Ustroistvo i upravlenie gorodov Rossii (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1875-1877), Vol. I, pp. 384-390; N. P. Vasylinko, ed., Ekstrakt iz ukaziv..., p. 216; A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskago..., p. 182.

86A. Andrievskii, ed., Istoricheskie materialy ..., Vol. II, pp. 12-19.

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The new administration was predominantly staffed by former Cossack officials, clerks, and local Ukrainians.⁸⁷ Not only elective positions but many appointive ones were filled by members of the Ukrainian elite. Moreover, each new institution was provided with a bureaucratic apparatus--clerks, bookkeepers, minor officials--which greatly enhanced the career opportunities of former polk and sotnia chancellerists, young graduates of the Kievan Academy, and even literate rank-andfile Cossacks. Due to the presence of this officialdom, the provincial capitals--Kiev and Novhorod-Sivers'k in particular--became the social and intellectual centers for the Ukrainian elite.⁸⁸

In the span of only four years (1782-1786), Ukrainian selfgovernment--rooted in historical tradition stemming from the Polish-Lithuanian period and bolstered by over a century of practice in the Hetmanate--was summarily replaced by an imperial provincial administration. With no apparent resistance, the former functionaries of the Hetmanate exchanged their heavy swords and colorful Cossack garb for the rapier, the powdered wig, and the imperial uniform.⁸⁹ Such a metamorphasis was hardly surprising. The choice that the Ukrainian elite

87A. Andrievskii lists the number of such officials in Kiev province in "Arkhivnaia spravka o sostave Kievskago 'obshchestva' v 1782-1798 godakh," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 2 (1894), pp. 192-203.

⁸⁸For the cultural and political atmosphere of these two provincial capitals see A. Andrievskii, "Arkhivnaia spravka...," pp. 192-203, and O. Ohloblyn, Liudy Staroi Ukrainy (Munich: 1959), pp. 1-327.

⁸⁹One account of such a transformation is I'lia Tymkovs'kyi's description of how his father, a Cossack official, assumed an imperial Post: "Zapiski Il'i Fedorovicha Timkovskago," <u>Russkii Arkhiv</u>, Bk I (1874), p. 1396.

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faced was between service or retirement. The concept of loyalty to the tsar and service, moreover, was deeply rooted in the Cossack tradition. But by meekly accepting the provincial reform, the Ukrainian elite lost their autochtonous position, based on historical rights and privileges, and assumed the role of mere servitors for the imperial bureaucracy. This was the crucial transformation in the demise of Ukrainian 90 autonomy.

3. The Hetmanate's Integration Into the Imperial Structure

A. The Ukrainian Military

The provincial reform greatly accelerated the pace of the Hetmanate's integration into the imperial system by necessitating changes in the Hetmanate's military organization, Church administration, and the social structure of the Ukraine. The most immediate problem facing Remiantsev and his subordinate governors was the confusion the provincial reform introduced into the Ukrainian military. Drained by losses of personnel to the civilian administration and fragmented by newly instituted territorial divisions, the Ukrainian units were ill-prepared for any kind of military operation. Governor-General Rumiantsev had forseen this situation and had discussed it with Catherine even prior to the introduction of the Fundamental Law.⁹¹ But the hectic

90 The reaction of the Ukrainian elite to the reforms will be examined in the next chapter.

91For this discussion and Catherine's instructions on preparing * plan for the future reorganization of the Ukranian military, see "Doklad grafa P. A. Rumiantseva Imperatritse Ekaterine II, 1781 goda," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 12 (1884), pp. 693-703; <u>PSZ</u>, No. 15,265 (October 26, 1781), Vol. XXI, PP. 295-297

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preparations for the provincial reform precluded the tackling of the military problem at this time, and Catherine instructed Rumiantsev to prepare a plan for the future reorganization of the Ukrainian military.

Within the short space of ten years the traditional Cossack military organization was replaced by a system of regular imperial regiments. This was done in stages. Initially, Rumiantsev recommended the creation of ten regular military regiments which would retain the names of Ukrainian Cossack polks.⁹² They were to be staffed by experienced Cossacks and Ukrainian starshyna, who were to be granted appropriate military rank. Catherine accepted these suggestions but ignored Rumiantsev's copious recommendations as to organization, dress, and discipline.⁹³

The new carbineer (<u>karabinerni</u>) regiments were designed to have a rapid turnover of personnel and thus break down loyalties to the ancient Cossack polks. Each regiment, numbering 828 men, was comprised of six units of 138 soldiers. Annually, forty-eight of each regiment's best soldiers were transferred to another detachment, while 120 were discharged as reservists. Since the term of service was set at six years, a complete changeover in the rank and file would occur every seven years. At the same time, the forty-eight outstanding Cossacks

93Catherine's July 28, 1783 ukaz to the War College was published by A. Rigel'man, <u>Letopisnoe povestvovanie</u>. Pt IV, pp. 52-53; the February 9, 1784 ukaz is included in PSZ, No. 15,928, Vol. XXII, p. 21.

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⁹²The memorandum was published by M. Sudienko, ed., "Bumagi po upravleniiu Malorossieiu gr. P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskago otnosiashchiesia," pp. 153-161. The memorandum is dated August 9, without specification as to year. Since Catherine's request for the proposal came on October 26, 1781, and her ukaz creating the new Ukrainian regiments was issued on July 28, 1783, Rumiantsev's recommendation could have been made only on August 9 of 1782.

from each regiment would systematically enter elite imperial units. The reorganization of the military proceeded slowly, accompanied

by much confusion. The problem encountered prompted Rumiantsev to issue lengthy instructions to the two military commanders, major-general Karl von Kaul'bars and lieutenant-general V. Nashchokin, and to provincial sovernors Shirkov and Myloradovych as to specific procedures to be followed. ⁹⁴ He defined each unit's boundaries, headquarters, and recruitment territory. In addition, he directed that only reliable Cossacks be chosen for military service, and that these live near unit headquarters in order to reduce cost of upkeep. Officers were to be chosen from among the Distinguished Military Comrades (<u>inachne viiskove tovarystvo</u>), with participants in the 1769-1774 Turkish Wars given preference. Uniforms were to be issued for each soldier, but recruit and officer alike had to provide himself with a horse, arms, and ammunition until imperial supplies became available.

The new units were manned at a gradual but steady pace--they were virtually at full strength when the Russo-Ottoman War erupted in 1787. Although now a part of the regular Russian military, the carbineer regiments continued to retain numerous links with their Cossack origins: the very names of half the carbineer regiments--Starodub, Kiev, Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, and Nizhyn--were a reminder of famous Cossack polks; the current units still maintained close affiliation with a specific territory, as did the previous sotnias; and virtually all of

⁹⁴N. V. Storozhenko analyzes these instructions in "Reformy v Malorossii pri gr. Rumiantseve," KSt., No. 3 (1891), pp. 483-492.

the officers were drawn from the Cossack starshyna. Most importantly, the carbineers could be recruited only from among the Cossacks, thus perpetuating the exclusively Cossack character of the Hetmanate's mili-

tary.

However, the uniquely Cossack make-up of the military was shortlived. The first blow came as early as 1786 with the creation of a new dragoon regiment.⁹⁵ Conscripted from peasants living on recently secularized monastery lands, this unit also included a thousand Cossacks transferred from the carbineer regiments.⁹⁶ This action was intended to provide the new regiment with experienced soldiers who could serve as examples for the raw peasant recruits. Cossacks and peasants were now serving in the same regiment under the same military discipline and thus, for the first time, the clear distinction between the two estates was becoming blurred.

More drastic measures were to follow during the Ottoman (1787-1791) and Swedish (1788-1790) Wars. Strained by wars on two fronts, the War College began conscripting at an increasing rate--four new recruits per 500 taxable persons in 1787; five per 500 in 1788; and two per 500 in 1790.⁹⁷ The manpower shortage continued, however, and in July 1789, Catherine resorted to another measure--the extension of the regular imperial draft to the previously exempt Hetmanate.

95pSZ, No. 16, 374 (April 10, 1786), Vol. XXII, pp. 574-575.

96N. V. Storozhenko, "Reformy v Malorossii pri gr. Rumiantseve," <u>No. 3 (1891)</u>, p. 492.

97A. G. Beskrovnyi, <u>Russkaia armiia i flot v XVIII veke</u> (Moscow: 1958), pp. 296-297.

The conscription decrees of 1789, reaffirmed and expanded in 1795, had a profound impact on the character of the military. They gradually reduced and then eradicated any regional peculiarities in the regular military forces. 98 All taxable subjects -- Cossacks, burghers, and peasants--became liable to conscription, thus putting an end to the exclusively Cossack composition of the Hetmanate's armed forces. Recruits were drafted on an imperial basis and then assigned to various units according to need. This not only severed territorial loyalties and the regional tradition of various units but also prevented non-Russian ethnic homogeneity in any imperial formation. Furthermore, the imperial conscript served for twenty-five years and not the six designated for the Hetmanate's carbineer units. 99 The imperial army and system of recruitment, which had created a stratum of professional soldiers drawn from several social groups and various regions of the Empire, now extended to the Hetmanate. Living apart from society, the imperial soldiers' only loyalty was to the military unit in which they spent most of their lives.

Despite depletions in ranks due to the war and the accompanying influx of non-Cossack and non-Ukrainian replacements, the carbineer

⁹⁸psz, No. 16,784 (July 6, 1789), Vol. XXIII, pp. 46-47; No. 16,785 (July 7, 1789), Vol. XXIII, p. 47; No. 17,393 (October 6, 1795), Vol. XXIII, p. 804.

⁹⁹By the 1795 decree, however, military service required of retruits from the territory of the Hetmanate and southern Ukraine was limited to fifteen years. This was a temporary concession made to a Populace not accustomed to lifelong inductions; see <u>PSZ</u>, No. 17,393 (October 6, 1795), Vol. XXIII, p. 804.

regiments still retained some Ukrainian characteristics.¹⁰⁰ They continued to include a hard-core of Ukrainian officers and Cossacks who still remembered soldiering in the Hetmanate. During the reign of Paul 1, however, all imperial carbineer regiments were abolished as part of the military's shift from light to heavy cavalry.¹⁰¹ Thus, the carbineer's role as an intermediate step in the integration of the Hetmanate's military into the imperial system came to an end. The new military formations which followed were organized in strict accordance with standard imperial norms.

A number of attempts were later made to reconstitute special Cossack units on Hetmanate territory. The development of a tense situation in Poland in 1794 prompted the establishment of a regiment of Cossack riflemen, which was then summarily disbanded in 1796.¹⁰² This pattern continued in the nineteenth century: Cossack units were created in times of emergency (1812 and 1831), and served briefly as irregular military forces. Once the crises involved subsided, the units were quickly dissolved. The ephemeral efforts were, at best, mere echos of the Hetmanate's military past. By the end of the eighteenth century, the system of military recruitment and organization in the former Het-

100The war time operations of the carbineers can be gleaned from A. N. Petrov, Vtoraia turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie Imperatritsy Ekateriny II, 1787-1791 g. (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1880), Vol. I, Pp. 133-170; Vol. II, pp. 1-42, and in passim.

101 Vooruzhennyia sily Rossii do tsarstvovaniia Imperatora Aleksandr I (Vol. IV, Introduction to Stoletie Voennago Ministerstva 1802-1902; St. Petersburg: 1902), pp. 231-232.

102_{PSZ}, No. 17,200 (April 24, 1794), Vol. XXIII, p. 511; <u>PSZ</u>, No. 17,566 (November 18, 1796), Vol. XXIV, p. 8-9.

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manate differed in no way from that in the rest of the Empire, and units stationed there no longer retained any connections with the traditions of Cossack Ukraine.

B. Church Reorganization, Secularization, and Russification

As the Ukrainian military was losing its distinct character, the Hetmamate's Church was also losing the last vestiges of autonomy. Pespite their subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church and the Holy Symod in St. Petersburg, Ukrainian eparchies still differed from those of the central provinces in organization and ritual. The Empire's civil and Church authorities continually strove to reduce these differences while the Ukrainian clergy treasured their peculiar rights and even sought to expand them, as shown by the 1767 Legislative Commission.

During the early part of Catherine's reign a bitter dispute developed between the Kievan metropolitan, Arsenii Mohylians'kyi, and the Synod. Mohylians'kyi wished to retain the title "Metropolitan of Kiev and all Little Russia" and espoused the concept of a separate "Little Russian Church" subordinate to the Synod but under the direct authority of the Kievan metropolitan.¹⁰³ These claims were challenged by the Synod, which subsequently excluded "Little Russia" from the

¹⁰³ The conflict over the Kievan metropolitan's title is described by P. Orlovskii, "Iskliuchenie iz titula mitropolitov kievskikh slov, "mitropolit vseia Malyia Rossii'," <u>Kievskie eparkhial'nie vedomosti</u>, No. 18 (1894), pp. 546-552. Arsenii Mohylians'kyi's concept of a "Little Russian Church" is discussed in the previous chapter, dealing with the legislative Commission.

metropolitan's title. Ironically, the antagonism generated by this conflict succeeded in temporarily precluding any other imperial encroachment on Ukrainian church organization or religious practices.

However, with the institution of the provincial reform, the question of Ukrainian Church organization arose once again. The new provincial boundaries completely disregarded the traditional territorial divisions of Church eparchies. As a result, some provinces contained several eparchies and others none; some eparchies were themselves divided by provincial boundaries. The situation was particularly serious in the Hetmanate, for Kiev province incorporated the sees of two eparchies, both Kiev and Pereiaslav, while Novhorod-Sivers'k contained none. The subdivisions of the eparchies, the <u>protopopia</u>, were equally confusing. The Pryluky <u>protopopia</u>, for example, had jurisdiction over parishes located in the Pryluky, Hlyn and Romen districts of Chernihiv province, as well as the Piriatyn district of Kiev province.¹⁰⁴ Each <u>protopopia</u>, therefore, necessarily contended with a great many new and frequently overlapping state agencies.

Catherine decided that the best solution to these territorial discrepancies lay in readjusting eparchial boundaries to provincial ones: in May, 1784 she instructed the Holy Synod and the Senate to provide for such reform.¹⁰⁵ The project which the Synod then initiated

104 Ivan M. Pokrovskii, <u>Russkiia eparkhii v XVI-XIX vv; ikh</u> otkritie, sostav i peredely. Opyt tserkovno-istoricheskago i geograficheskago izsledovaniia (2 vols.; Kazan: 1897-1913), Vol. II, pp. 717-718.

105 The orders were published in Polnoe sobranie postanovlenii i Tazporiazhenii po vedomstvu pravoslavnago ispovedaniia (henceforth PSP)--Tsarstvovanie Gosudaryni Imperatritsy Ekateriny Vtoroi (3 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1910-1915), Vol. II, p. 494.

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xss intended to apply to all eparchies in the Empire; planning proceeded very slowly, however, and on completion, the reform was only partially 106 The section dealing with the Ukrainian eparchies was prepared with singular speed, being proclaimed by Catherine on March 27, 1785.

According to this decree and its subsequent revisions, each province was to contain one eparchy whose boundaries were to correspond exactly to those of the province.¹⁰⁸ The implementation of the decree caused some difficulties. For example, the Fereiaslav-Borespil eparchy was abolished and its bishop transferred to the newly-created Novhorodsivers'k eparchy, but the preparation of the new residency of the bishop-the Spas'kyi monastery--was considerably delayed because its monks continued to send reports to--and expect replies from--the Chernihiv consistory, not the Novhorod-Sivers'k one.¹⁰⁹ Such problems were soon surmounted, and the borders of the Ukrainian eparchies became coterminous with the Kiev, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Sivers'k provinces.¹¹⁰ Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over church monasteries now also corresponded to

106 Ivan M. Pokrovskii, Russkiia eparkhii..., Vol. II, p. 719.

107PSZ, No. 16,174 (March 27, 1785), Vol. XXII, pp. 329-330; PSP, Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi, No. 1210 (March 27, 1785), Vol. III, p. 12.

108In addition to the March 27, 1785 decree, see the following ukazy and directives: PSP, Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi, No. 1213 (March 31, 1785), Vol. III, pp. 15-16; No. 1215 (April 10, 1785), Vol. III, p. 17; No. 1223 (May 16, 1785), Vol. III, pp. 26-27.

109 I. Pokrovskii, Russkiia eparkhii..., Vol. II, p. 719.

110Details of the territorial changes are given in I. Pokrovskii, Russkiia eparkhii..., Vol. II, pp. 719-722. the new eparchial boundaries, with the single exception of the Caves Monastery, which continued to deal directly with the Synod.¹¹¹

In addition to this restructuring, the imperial and church authorities decided to create an episcopal see for Poland. Because of Roman catholic and Uniate pressure, the Orthodox population of the Polish Commonwealth--Right Bank Ukraine and Byelorussia--were without a hiererch. Existing parishes and monasteries were administered through those eparchies in the Russian Empire which were in closest proximity-kiev, Pereiaslav, or Mohyliv. However, increased Russian influence in Polish affairs following the first partition forced Polish authorities to accept an Orthodox primate.¹¹² Since the Kiev metropolia had a long tradition of legitimate Orthodoxy within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it was imperative that the new bishop be in some way connected with Kiev--a requirement filled by naming Viktor Sadovs'kyi hishop of Pereiaslav and coadjutor of the Kievan metropolitan.¹¹³ The

111PSP, Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi, No. 1213 (March 31, 1785), Vol. III, pp. 15-16.

112For the official decrees creating the new eparchy, outlining its administrative structure, and appointing its first bishop, see: MSZ, No. 16,173 (March 27, 1785), Vol. XXII, p. 329 and No. 16,202 (May 15, 1785), Vol. XXII, p. 396; <u>PSP</u>, <u>Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi</u>, No. 1209 (March 27, 1785), Vol. III, p. 12; No. 1212 (March 31, 1785), Vol. III, pp. 13-14; No. 1214 (April 1, 1785), Vol. III, pp. 16-17; No. 1217 (May 2, 1785), vol. III, p. 18; No. 1220 (May 15, 1785), Vol. III, p. 25; No. 1221 (May 15, 1785), Vol. III, pp. 25; No. 1230 (July 4, 1785), Vel. III, pp. 35-38; No. 1240 (October 3, 1785), Vol. III, pp. 65-66; No. 1241 (October 20, 1785), Vol. III, pp. 66-67; No. 1248 (December 15, 1785), Vol. III, pp. 72-73; No. 1262 (March 5, 1786), Vol. III, pp. 83-84.

113 In addition to its appearance in official documents, the event is treated by I. Pokrovskii, <u>Russkiia eparkhii...</u>, Vol. II, pp. 726-734; 0. 1. Titov, <u>Kievskaia eparkhiia-mitropoliia v XVII-XVIII vv</u> (Vol. II of <u>Russkaia pravoslavnnaia Tserkov' v pol'sko-litovskom gosudarstve v</u> <u>WII-XVIII vv.</u>; Kiev: 1905), pp. 16-80; S. G. Runkevich, <u>Istoriia</u>

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orthodox population was thus under the jurisdiction of the Kiev metropolis but administered by a specially appointed bishop, residing not in Pereiaslav--as his title would indicate--but in Poland. When Bishop viktor assumed his pastoral duties, Catherine even permitted him to take an oath of allegiance to the Polish king, thus attempting to minimize friction with the Polish authorities.¹¹⁴

The territorial reform was only the first step in a renewed effort at integrating Ukrainian eparchies into the imperial system. Conditions for the successful implementation of such policy were more favorable now than in previous times. The abolition of the Hetmanate's native administration and military structure made the continued existence of even limited autonomy by the Ukrainian eparchies seem an undesirable anomaly. Moreover, the ground for a policy of integration had been well-prepared by the appointment of a pro-integrationist prelate, Samuil Myslavs'kyi as Kievan metropolitan.¹¹⁵

Metropolitan Samuil's appointment, similar to that of Governor Myloradovych, was another example of imperial co-option. Again a Ukrainian was to introduce imperial norms into the Hetmanate. A graduate of the Kievan Academy and subsequently its rector, Myslavs'kyi pursued a

Istoriia Minskoi arkhiepiskopii (1793-1832 g.) (St. Petersburg: 1893), pp. 73-108; F. Rozhdestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii, mitropolit kievskii," Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii, No. 5 (1877), pp. 325-359.

114I. Pokrovskii, Russkiia eparkhii..., Vol. II, p. 729.

115 The appointment was made on September 22, 1783. See A. Garkas, "Samuil (v mire-Simeon Grigorevich Mislavskii)," Russkii bio-Traficheskii slovar', Vol. Sabaneev-Smyslov (St. Petersburg: 1904), P. 179.

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highly successful ecclesiastical career outside of the Hetmanate.¹¹⁶ We held successive episcopal appointments in several Russian eparchies-pursk, Moscow, and Rostov-- and in 1775 became a member of the Holy Synod. Metropolitan Samuil maintained connections with the court and became a close friend of the Grand Duke. In imperial circles he had a reputation as a scholar, an able administrator, and a progressive cleric open to suggestions for reform. At the promulgation of the Provincial Reforms, the then archbishop Samuil welcomed them by delivering a special bomily "An Oration on the Great Institutions Established by Catherine" (Slovo e velikikh predmetakh uchrezhdenii Ekateriny) which was subsequently published in several languages.

the help Nith/ of an accomodating metropolitan, the imperial authorities proceeded with the next stage in the dismantlement of Ukrainian Church autonomy--the secularization of Church wealth. Because of their privileged position in the then autonomous Hetmanate, the Ukrainian bishoprics and monasteries had escaped imperial Church secularization in 1762. Catherine now wished to rectify this situation. In a decree issued on April 10, 1786, she stated: "Now with the creation of the three Little Russian provinces--Kiev, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Sivers'k-on an equal basis with other provinces in Our Empire, We deem it appro-Priate to also introduce the necessary conformity in regard to the upkeep

116For a summary of Mys'lovs'kyi's career including his publications, see A. Cherkas, "Samuil...," pp. 178-79; for more detailed information see: F. Rozhdestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii, mitrpolit kievskii," <u>Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii</u>, No. 3 (1876), pp. 510-563; No. 11 (1877), pp. 505-536; No. 4 (1877), pp. 3-39; No. 5 (1877), PP. 301-359; No. 6 (1877), pp. 529-577.

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of the bishops' residences and monasteries."117

while conformity might have been the foremost reason for Catherine's espousal of secularization, she must also have been quite mare of the benefits it would bring to the state. In this instance, conformity meant that the provincial Directors of Economy appropriated the property, industries, and other incomes of all monasteries and bishops' residences, while the state financially supported some of these monasteries, schools, churches, and bishops' residences in accordance to a scale established in 1764.¹¹⁸ Peasants living on Church and monastery lands became state serfs, liable to all state taxes and the military draft. In fact, a special grenadier unit was recruited from these former monastery peasants. 119 A census conducted in the 1780's-just prior to secularization -- gives a good indication of the extent of the state's new acquisitions. Of the fifty-four propertied monasteries mentioned, eighteen were only marginal (fifty households or less), twenty-four were self-sufficient (between fifty and 400 households), eleven were wealthy (400 to 2000 households), and the Caves Monastery was deemed immensely welathy (4000-5000 households). 120

The main secularization decree listed the amounts designated for

117psz, No. 16,375 (April 10, 1786), Vol. XXII, pp. 575-576, and PSP, Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi, No. 1271 (April 10, 1786), Vol. III, p. 93.

118 These provisions were outlined in PSZ, No. 16,374 (April 10, 1786), Vol. XXII, pp. 574-575; and in PSP, Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi, No. 1270 (April 10, 1786), Vol. III, pp. 92-93.

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119 Ibid.

120 Pavlo Fedorenko, "Z istorii monastyrs'koho hospodarstva na Livoberezhzhi XVII-XVIII vv,"ZIFV [V] UAN, Bk XI (1927), pp. 167-168.

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the upkeep of each school, episcopal residence and approved monastery, as well as for the salaries of the Ukrainian bishops. 121 Of the three hierarchs, the Kiev metropolitan fared best. He was allotted the same stipend as the archbishop of Moscow (3,744 rubles 40 kopeks annually) and given an additional allowance for the maintenance of his episcopal residence, staff, and eparchial administration (2954 rubles 65 kopeks annually). Moreover, the Kievan metropolitan also held the position of archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, resided there and, as a consequence, received another salary plus the funds marked for the Caves Monastery (10,570 rubles a year). The metropolitan's mansion, however, was appropriated by the state and was to house a provincial school and a part of the Kievan Academy. The rest of the Academy was to be moved to the Caves Monastery while the Academy building was to be converted into a hospital. Fairly large sums were designated for the Kicvan Academy (8,400 rubles), Chernihiv Collegium (2,000 rubles), and a new Novhorod-Sivers'k Seminary (2,000 rubles), but these institutions were to function solely as seminaries. The bishops of Novhorod-Sivers'k and Chernihiv were allocated annual salaries of 5,900 rubles each, from which they were also to maintain episcopal residences and the eparchial administration. Finally, each monastery scheduled for continued operation was allotted funds according to its official status and number of

121psz, No. 16,375 (April 10, 1786), Vol. XII, pp. 575-576; and in <u>PSP</u>, <u>Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi</u>, No. 1270 (April 10, 1786), Vol. III, pp. 93-95, and <u>kniga shatov</u>. In addition to these official versions, several other publications contain this decree copied from contemporary documents. See <u>KSt</u>, No. 6 (1882), pp. 329-332; A. Rigel'man, <u>letopisnoe povestvovanie</u>, Pt IV, pp. 56-62; the latter is especially nelpful, for Rigel'man gives the most detailed itemization of sums (rospisanie) appended to the actual decree (pp. 59-62).

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sembers.

The implementation of these decrees raised new problems. Catherine was willing, however, to make concessions on minor issues as long as the substance of the reform remained intact. For instance, the secuiarization decree was promulgated at spring time, after the fields had already been sown, but it did not specify whether the new harvest was to be collected by the monasteries or by the new landowner--the state. As a result of repeated requests from metropolitan Samuil Myslavs'kyi, all monasteries--even those scheduled for closure--received Catherine's permission to gather the last harvest.¹²² In addition, the Kievan metropolitan protested to Governor-General Rumiantsev that the Lavra and his episcopal residencewere quite inadequate to house the Kievan kcademy:¹²³ due to Rumiantsev's efforts, these directives were later rescinded. The Kievan Academy remained at its previous location, and although the metropolitan obtained new quarters at the Caves Monastery, he also kept his old episcopal residence.¹²⁴

But another problem was not so readily soluble--that is, the fate of the monks and nuns displaced by the reform. According to the April decree, the three eparchies were to maintain the following reli-: gious institutions: three first-class monasteries (each housing thirty-

122F. Rozhdestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii...," No. 4 (1877), pp. 13-14.

123 Metropolitan Myslavs'kyi's complaints to Rumiantsev were published in "Kievskaia perturbatsiia 1786 g.," KSt., No. 4 (1883), pp. 895-98.

¹²⁴PSZ, No. 16,411 (July 13, 1786), Vol. XII, pp. 631-632; and <u>PSP</u>, <u>Tsarstvovanie... Ekateriny Vtoroi</u>, No. 1288 (July 13, 1786), Vol. III, pp. 111-112. three monks); six second-class monasteries (each housing seventeen monks); four third-class monasteries (each housing twelve monks); one first-class convent (housing 72 nuns); one second-class convent (housing seventeen nums); and four third-class convents (each housing seventeen nuns). niscounting the monks of the Caves Monastery--who were recipients of special subsidy--and several monks and nuns serving at episcopal residences, legal provision was made for the livelihood of 249 monks and 151 nuns residing in thirteen monasteries and six convents. ¹²⁵ All other convents and monasteries were to be abolished. This entailed the closing of forty-two institutions dispossessing 466 monks, 510 nuns and nuns result superiors. ¹²⁶

As soon as Catherine realized the magnitude of this dislocation, she outlined several measures designed to alleviate the situation. A July 13, 1786 ukaz granted the dislodged monks and nuns minimal state pensions, while permitting the continued existence of several monasteries originally scheduled for closure. In addition, it forbade the officially recognized monasteries to accept any novices until all displaced nuns and monks found new residences, and strongly recommended that many monks mi mus be transferred outside of the Ukraine.¹²⁷ The state even subsidized several monasteries which previously were scheduled to be abolished.¹²⁸

125See footnote 121.

¹²⁶F. A. Ternovskii, "Izlishie malorossiiskie monakhi kontsa XVIII R.," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 6 (1882), p. 334.

127See footnote 124.

¹²⁸pSP, <u>Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi</u>, No. 1289 (July 13, 1786), ¹dl. III, p. 112; No. 1290 (July 15, 1786), Vol. III, pp. 112-114. Catherine's concessions gave Ukrainian monastics a brief respite

is their struggle for existence and greatly reduced chances of overt resistance. The displaced monks and nuns lived either in officially sesignated monasteries -- which therefore exceeded the number of permitted residents--or in the monasteries not receiving state subsidies but supported by voluntary contributions and those made by the bishop.¹²⁹ An october 17, 1788 decree gave all unsubsidized monasteries third-class status and forbade parish collections for monastery upkeep. 130 However, the temporary nature of such additional state financing was emphasized by the ordering of another census of monasteries. 131 The 1789 census revealed that there were still 264 monks and 390 nuns in excess of the officially approved number. 132 In response to this, on August 3, 1789 an what pointed out the great many vacancies that existed in other parts of the Empire and ordered what was previously only recommended -- the placement of Ukrainian monks and nuns outside the Ukrainian eparchies. 133 As a result, Ukrainian monks were sent to the eparchies of Moscow,

129 The crowded conditions of the subsidized monasteries and metropelitan Myslavs'kyi's efforts to finance the other monasteries are described in F. Rozhdestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii...," No. 4 (1877), pp. 10-16.

130pSZ, No. 16,721 (October 17, 1788), Vol. XXII, p. 1120; PSP, <u>Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi</u>, No. 1414 (October 17, 1788), Vol. III, pp. 263-264, and more detailed instructions in No. 1415 (October 25, 1788), Vol. III, pp. 264-265.

131psp, Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi, No. 1417 (November 29, 1788), Vol. III, pp. 265-270.

¹³²PSP, <u>Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi</u>, No. 1442 (August 3, 1789), Wel. III, p. 295.

133______., pp. 292-297.

Tobol'sk, Riazan', Suzdal' and Vologa.¹³⁴ Due to such transfers and per vacancies, the displaced Ukrainian monks and nuns were gradually sorbed by the numerous officially approved monasteries and convents of the Empire.

Due to Catherine's concessions, secularization evoked only minor protests on the part of the Ukrainian monastics. The most drastic incident of protest occurred during Catherine's scheduled visit to the Wethyhirs'kyi monastery in 1787. On the morning of the visit, a courier informed Catherine that the monastery had been ravaged by fire: the monks themselves had apparently set it ablaze rather than receive the autocrat who had caused their order such distress. 135 However, this was an isolated incident; for the most part, the Ukrainian monks accepted their fate passively -- an attitude fostered by the Ukrainian hierarchy. Metropolitan Samuil Myslavs'kyi, in particular, travelled widely, preaching obedience to the law and the proper authorities and praised the reforms as both useful and necessary. 136 At the same time, the metropolitan did much to improve the conditions of the dispossessed monks and nuns--providing housing, contributing money, and intervening on their behalf in the Senate. 137 Once the gradual absorption of the

134F. Rozhdestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii...," No. 4 (1877), pp. 11-12.

135 Ibid., p. 17; there may have been an additional reason for the dislike of Catherine on the part of the Mezhyhirs'kyi monks. Their traditional and most generous patron had been the Zaporozhian Sich, which Catherine, of course, had destroyed.

136Ibid., p. 17. 137 Ibid., pp. 10-20. -263-

displaced monks and nuns by various monasteries of the Empire had begun, monastic life returned to normal, although greatly reduced in number. Yet, the change effected was indeed profound, for the Ukrainian monks and nuns who remained were, in reality, virtual state employees.

Increased state control and more rigid ecclesiastical regulations were not limited to monastic life but also applied to the regular, or secular clergy. According to a long-standing Ukrainian tradition, local parishes elected their own priests. At the death or dismissal of the parish priest, the community would select the local cantor or a student from the Kievan Academy, who was then ordained by the bishop.¹³⁸ In addition to local aspirants, there were a great number of priests and students of the Kievan or Chernihiv Academy, or Kharkiv Collegium, who travelled from place to place in search of a vacant parish. The various candidates pleaded with local parishes for acceptance, and, once chosen, were totally dependent upon the communities which they served.

This situation changed in the latter part of the eighteenth century. A 1778 edict allocated a fixed amount of land, meadows, orchards and other sources of income to each parish.¹³⁹ Another decree regulated the number of priests, deacons, <u>diaks</u>, and other

138 Ukrainian parish life has been described by E. M. Kryzhanovskii, "Ocherki byta iuzhno-russkago sel'skago dukhovenstva v XVIII v.," <u>Sobranie Sochinenii E. M. Kryzhanovskago</u> (2 vols.; Kiev: 1890), Vol. I, Pp. 391-439. Oleksandr Lotots'kyi, "Suspil'ne stanovyshche biloho (s'vits'kc'o dukhovenstva na Ukraĭni i Rossyï [sic] v XVIII v.," <u>Zapysky</u> Maukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka, Vol. XXI (1898), pp. 1-47; A. Latarevskii, "Ocherki iz byta Malorossii XVIII veka; I. Prikhodskoe dukhovenstvo," <u>Russkii Arkhiv</u>, no volume given (1871), pp. 1884-1905.

139 E. M. Kryzhanovskii, "Ocherki byta...," p. 436.

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Ourch servitors to be maintained by each parish and required that all cierical appointees be approved by the local bishop.¹⁴⁰ These ukazy shifted much of the control over the local clergy from the community to the bishops. Up to this time, the community or local landlord provided the local priest's upkeep and could alter, virtually at will, the conditions of his service. Now the priest and his successor were assured at least a minimal income, without the necessity of beseeching the commulty for funds. It was now more important to the priest that he obtain confirmation of his post from the local bishop. The community still retained the right to suggest an appointee, but its candidate had to have the appropriate educational level, be exempt from the poll tax (thus be a recognized nobleman or clergyman), and had to have a good moral character. 141 On occasion, bishops appointed priests directly. Metropolitan Samuil, in particular, was quite successful in filling parish posts directly with graduates of the Kievan Academy and thus created a precedent for direct episcopal appointments of all clerics. 142

Asseries of educational reforms further weakened local customs. Metropolitan Samuil wished to introduce uniform education for parish priests. He was particularly determined to limit the great number of poorly educated and frequently unemployed wandering priests who virtually

140pSZ, No. 14,807 (October 8, 1778), Vol. XX, pp. 752-753, and in PSP, Tsarstvovanie...Ekateriny Vtoroi, No. 889 (October 8, 1778), Vol. II, pp. 211-212.

141E. M. Kryzhanovskii, "Ocherki byta...," pp. 436-439; F. Rozhestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii...," No. 4 (1877), pp. 32-33.

142F. Rozhestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii...," No. 4 (1877), p. 31.

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purchased their ordination from Moldavian and Greek bishops. Myslavs kyi aimed at supplanting such aspirants with a stable, well-educated, and self-perpetuating local clergy. He therefore encouraged the sons of priests to enter the Academy and prepare for the priesthood. Also, the curriculum of the Academy--which up to this time provided a general education for members of all social groups--was revamped in favor of theological studies.¹⁴³ By Catherine's orders, the once famous Kievan Academy was thus transformed into a local seminary.

In addition to improving the Academy's theological studies, Metropolitan Myslavs'kyi launched a campaign to maintain the purity of the Russian language. He was particularly dismayed that the students and faculty of the Academy used a mixture of Ukrainian, Polish, and latin in both their spoken and written language, thus deviating from the recently standardized literary Russian. He prescribed that instruction be held "in accordance to poetic books published in Moscow and books of oratory adhering to the rules of Master Lomonosov."¹⁴⁴ Myslavs'kyi even sent two of his best students to the university in Moscow, ordering them to learn Great Russian speech and pronunciation. One of these students, Mykyta Sokolovs'kyi, subsequently became instructor of Russian at the Academy.¹⁴⁵ Despite these efforts, some of the Academy staff confessed to the metropolitan that they were "unable to rid themselves of their Little Russian manner of speech."¹⁴⁶

143For a detailed account of these changes see N. Petrov, Kievskaia Akademiia v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II (Kiev: 1906).

144 F. Rhozhestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii...," No. 5 (1877), pp. 303-304.

145 Ibid., p. 304.

146 Ibid., p. 304.

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Thus, by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the Orthodex Church in the Hetmanate lost its last shred of autonomy and become completely integrated into Russian state Orthodoxy. Its eparchies were adjusted by the Synod and secular authorities at will. The Church's wealth was confiscated, and its bishops, hegumens, priests, and monastics became, in fact, state employees. The number of priests, deacons and other church personnel was determined by the state, as were all Church finances. The Ukrainian clergy was required to follow the "Spiritual Regulations" issued by the Holy Synod, and the elite of the clergy, educated at the Kievan Academy, was trained to be proficient in Russian. By the turn of the century, the Church in the provinces of the former Hetmanate had-not only become a pliable servant of the Empire, but also assumed a new role as a Russifier of the Ukrainian populace.

C. The Reshaping of Ukrainian Society on the Imperial Pattern

Imperial absorption of the Ukrainian Church and military was accompanied by the fusion of the Ukrainian and Russian social structures. This process, which had begun in the seventeenth century

was greatly accelerated by the introduction of the provincial reform and the implementation of new imperial charters granted the nobility and townsmen. In the brief period between 1782 and 1786, the change in social organization was dramatic: the Ukrainian nobility became part of the imperial dvorianstvo; town dwellers in the Hetmanate became subject to the same legal, economic, and social regulations as townsmen in the rest of the Empire; and the Ukrainian peasantry became fully and legally enserfed.

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The granting of recognition as dvoriane to a major part of the Ukrainian nobility came as the culmination of a virtually century-long dispute between the Ukrainian elite and the central authorities. As late as 1761, sons of that elite were denied admission into the Imperial cadet Corps because there were "no dvoriane in Little Russia."¹⁴⁷ The imperial government did not, however, consistently adhere to such a position. For example, the Ukrainian shliakhta's participation in the 1767 Legislative Commission indicates that the imperial authorities were certainly aware of the existence of a social group in the Hetmanate which equalled the dvorianstvo in service, honor, education and life style. But until 1782, the central government had made only sporadic efforts to integrate the two elites.

It was the implementation of the provincial reform which finally forced the central authorities to face this question. The Fundamental Law called for exclusive dvorianstvo control of many governmental offices, a separate court system for the nobility, district and provincial organizations for the dvorianstvo, local assemblies of the nobility which elected marshals and dealt with local problems. These rights could hardly be applied without

the Ukrainian elite. As a consequence, the view that there were "no dvoriane in Little Russia" was dropped, and a major part of the Ukrainian elite was quickly brought into the dvorianstvo. As in the rest of

¹⁴⁷ D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie malorusskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo," KSt., No. 1 (1897), p. 18, p. 26; A. V. Romanovich-Slavatinskii, <u>Evorianstvo v Rossii ot nachala XVIII veka do otmeny krepostnago prava</u> (St. Petersburg: 1870), pp. 103-104.

the Empire, "nobility" was derived from services. Administrators of the Hetmanate who continued in service received imperial ranks which provided for automatic ennoblement.¹⁴⁸ Non-serving members of the elite were, however, required to produce evidence of nobility.

Faced by the absence of any imperial regulations governing the entrance of this non-serving elite into the dvorianstvo, Governor-General Rumiantsev requested guidance from Catherine, who responded by sending him a preliminary draft of what later became the 1785 Charter of the Nobility.¹⁴⁹ The Charter, which was intended to apply to the whole Empire, specified that deputies of each district, together with the marshal of the nobility, verify the credentials of an applicant for dvorianstvo.¹⁵⁰ Designed as a procedure for incorporating new members into a recognized body of dvoriane, it was quite inadequate for an area where the composition of the dvorianstvo had not as yet been established. Governor-General Rumiantsev, however, did not seek my further clarifications. Being very favorably disposed towards the

¹⁴⁸For the official list of Ukrainian positions and their imperial equivalents, see "Zapiska iz dela, proizvedannago v Komitete Vysochaishe utverzhdennom pri Pravitel'stvuiushchem Senate; kasatel'no prav na dvorianstva byvshikh malorossiiskikh chinov," <u>ChOIDR</u>, Bk II, ^{Pt} V (1861), pp. 103 and 107.

149Rumiantsev's request is contained in "Doklad grafa P. A. Aumiantseva Imperatritse Ekaterine II za 1781 goda," KSt., No. 12 (1884), Ap. 693-703; for Catherine's answer, see PSZ, No. 15,265 (October 26, 1781), Vol. XXI, pp. 295-296; D. Miller indicates that Catherine did, indeed, in 1781 forward a preliminary draft of the 1785 Charter to the Mobility; "Prevrashchenie malorusskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo," KSt., No. 1 (1897), D. 204.

150 The provisions of the Charter are discussed at length in Robert L. Jones, The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility 1762-1785 (Princeton University Press; Princeton: 1973), pp. 272-299.

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Ukrainian nobility, he interpreted Catherine's response as a blanket authorization to the elite for determining membership in the dvorianstvo. Under Rumiantsev's benevolent authority, the Ukrainian elite

carried out its own transformation. Three to four delegates were elected in each district who, assisted by the provincial marshal, were to register all nobles in residence.¹⁵¹ These functionaries were, of course, soon inumdated with thousands of genealogies, charters, documents and sworm affidavits. Even in the best of circumstances the verification of this material would have been time-consuming and difficult. In fact, there is considerable evidence that wide-spread corruption occurred in the form of bribery, fake genealogies, and forged documents. segular "diploma mills" in Polish Ukraine sold hundreds of fake genealogies and charters to candidates for Russian dvorianstvo.¹⁵² The number of new dvoriane swelled rapidly, reaching 30,000 by the 1790's.¹⁵³

151D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie...," KSt., No. 2 (1897), p. 200.

¹⁵²Aleksandra Efimenko, "Malorusskoe dvorianstvo i ego sud'ba," <u>Juzhnaia Rus'; Ocherki izsledovaniia i zametki</u> (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1905), Vol. I, p. 186; A. V. Romanovich-Slavatinskii, <u>Dvorianstvo...</u>, p. 107.

¹⁵³It is very difficult to determine with any accuracy the number of dvoriane in the provinces of the former Hetmanate. A. Romanovich-Slavatinskii lists 100,000 (<u>Dvorianstvo</u>, p. 108). He unquestionably is following the estimate of the anonymous early nineteenth-century author of <u>Zamechaniia do Maloi Rossii prinadlezhashchia</u> (written approximately in 1803 and published in <u>ChOIDR</u>, Bk I, Pt II (1848), pp. I-55; the number of dvoriane is given on p. 20). This number, however, must be discounted. First, it is not based on any census; secondly, the author includes petty functionaries who had no rights to hereditary nobility and could at best receive only a personal title for life. Furthermore, the mumber is probably highly inflated and used as a literary device. The author is, after all, making fun of all the petty claimants to the nobility. A more productive comparison results from the use of the various censuses. The 1782 census cannot provide any accurate figures, for the composition of the dvorianstvo had not as yet been completed. The first

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up to 1784, when the preliminary draft of the Charter of the

wobility had become generally known, the Ukrainian elite preferred to claim the rights of the old Commonwealth shliakhta rather than join the Russian dvorianstvo. The reason for this was that the shliakhta enjoyed various privileges denied the Russian dvorianstvo.¹⁵⁴ According to the lithuanian Statute, a nobleman could participate in Sejms and local diets and was exempt from any state service or troop quarterings (the latter right was also granted in part to the Russian dvorianstvo). It was virtually impossible for a noble to lose his title, and his estate was protected from confiscation. He could be arrested only if a court

census that could reflect the number of new dvoriane was conducted in 1795: unfortunately it is not available. A report on the number of mobles given in 1800 probably reflects the 1795 census, since the next census after 1795 was conducted in 1811. In any case, two very prominent statisticians -- V. M. Kabuzan and S. M. Troitskii -- use this report from 1800 in giving the 1795 figures for Left-Bank Ukraine ("Izmeneniia v chislennosti, udel'nom vese i razmeshchenii dvorianstva v Rossii v 1782-1858 gg.," Istoriia SSSR, No. 4 (1971), pp. 167-168). According to Kabuzan and Troitskii, there were 18,599 dvoriane in the territories of the former Hetmanate. In addition, 22,702 individuals were admitted into the dvorianstvo and listed as taxable non-nobles. The claims of 10,105 were eventually rejected, while the remaining 12,597 were recogmized and counted as dvoriane in the 1795 census. Chernihiv province proved to be an exception, for it still retained 2616 recognized dvoriane on its tax records (see D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie...," KSt., No. 3 (1897), pp. 367-370). In order to obtain an estimate of 30,000 as the number of dvoriane in the 1780's (before the Ukrainians encountered any difficulties at the Heraldry Office), the 1795 (1800) census figure of 18,599 dvoriane has been accepted as a base to which have been added both the 10,105 persons excluded from the rolls in the 1790's and the 2616 dvoriane not appearing on the 1795 Chernihiv census because they were listed as taxable. This comes to a total of 31,720 dvoriane.

154For a good summary of these, see D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie...," <u>Ast., No. 2 (1897)</u>, pp. 194-196. A detailed listing is contained in the 1786 law code, N. Vasilenko, ed., <u>Ekstrakt iz ukazov...</u>, pp. 216-231.
so ordered; even then, he was to be tried by his peers, but not tortured or put to death. Finally, the shliakhta possessed wide-ranging economic rights: full exploitation of property, including farming and mining; the ownership and establishment of towns and villages; and license to conduct tariff-free trade. Although many of these liberties were, of course, only theoretical, the Ukrainian elite did not want to surrender their claims.

with the gradual emancipation of the Russian dvorianstvo from compulsory state service and its evolution into a semi-corporate entity, the gap between the rights of the shliakhta and that of the dvorianstvo narrowed considerably. The culmination of this process came with the Charter to the Nobility granted by Catherine in 1785.155 The Charter specified that a Russian dvorianin could not be deprived of life, status, or property by the arbitrary action of the state. If accused of a crime, he was to be tried by his peers: no corporal punishment was permitted. If tried for a capital offense, the case had to be reviewed by the Senate and Empress. The nobleman was freed from compulsory state service, except in national emergency. He was exempted from all taxes and from the quartering of troops on his property. He could travel abroad and even enter foreign service, but not in a state unfriendly to the Empire. The noble's economic rights included complete legal ownership of his estate and the full exploitation of all natural resources on his estate, including the labor of his serfs. He could sell

155Discussed in Robert Jones', The Emancipation..., pp. 272-299. The Charter articles were known already in 1784 when the Ukrainian elite began its transformation into the dvorianstvo.

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his produce and own property in town. Nobles who possessed estates could also enroll in cooperative associations: the Association of Nobles (sobranie dvorianstva) elected the various officials as stipulated by the Fundamental Law, provided for orphans and widows, collected monies for various local projects and, in effect, acted as an auxiliary to the local government.

Catherine's 1785 Charter to the Nobility provided a powerful stimulus for the final merger of the Ukrainian and Russian elites. By becoming part of the Russian dvorianstvo, the Ukrainian elite would receive many of the prerogatives that it claimed as shliakhta. The political rights of the Lithuanian Statute--control of governmental policy by participation in the Sejms--were certainly beyond the reach and even the expectations of the Ukrainian nobles. Therefore, they enthusiastically accepted the 1785 Charter. No longer did the nobles petition for the recognition of a separate Ukrainian shliakhta. Instead, they eagerly sought entry into the Russian dvorianstvo.

Even before the Ukrainian elite was accepted into the imperial dvorianstvo, their peasants had become fully enserfed. A May 3, 1783 decree forbadepeasant mobility, ostensibly for government tax purposes.¹⁵⁶ By law, the Hetmanate now had the same basic socio-economic relationship as the rest of the Empire--lord and serf.

Concurrently with the enserfment of the Ukrainian peasant and the admission of the Ukrainian elite into the imperial dvorianstvo, inhabitants of Ukrainian towns became subject to new imperial regulations.

156 PSZ, No. 15,724 (May 3, 1783), Vol. XXI, p. 908.

The Charter of the Cities, issued on May 3, 1785 -- the same day as the Charter of the Nobility -- defined each town as a separate, theoretically sutonomous, corporate entity controlled by its free inhabitants. 157 Town population was divided into six categories: 1) nobles, clergy, and other free men who owned houses or land; 2) merchants organized into three guilds; 3) artisans grouped into various guilds and associations; 4) pon-native merchants and town dwellers; 5) the wealthiest inhabitants and distinguished public servants; 6) inhabitants of long-standing not included in the other categories. All town citizens could participate in a Town Meeting (Sobranie gradskago obshchestva) but only those with property (5,000 rubles of capital) and being over 25 years of age could yote for the municipal officials, as provided in the Fundamental Law and the Charter of the Cities. A General Town Council (Obshchaia gradskaia duna) discussed various common municipal affairs and elected a smaller Town Council (Shestiglasnaia duma). The Town Council was composed of a mayor (golova) and representatives from each category of inhabitants. Its actual competence was rather vaguely defined. It was entrusted with the maintenance of buildings, roads, town and fair grounds, and harbors. It was to assure a sufficient quantity of municipal supplies and, in

¹⁵⁷The Charter is treated in detail by I. Ditiatin, Ustroistvo i upravlenie gorodov Rossii, Vol. I, pp. 415-496; A. A. Kizevetter, Gorodovoe polozhenie Ekateriny II 1785 g.; opyt istoricheskago kommentariia (Moscow: 1909) is, of course, the classic monograph on the subject. A good brief description of the Charter is contained in "Gorod i gorodskaia reforma," Ocherki Istorii SSSR; Period feodalizma; Rossiia vo vtoroi polovine XVIII v. (Moscow: 1956), pp. 151-163; Iu. P. Klokman, Sotsial'noekonomicheskaia istoriia russkago goroda; Vtoraia polovina XVIII veka (Moscow: 1967), also includes much valuable information on the introduction of the 1785 Charter.

general, to deal with problems common to all town inhabitants. Finally, each town retained its magistrate. Once the main organ of municipal administration, the town magistrate's function had been reduced to mainly a judicial one. However, it continued to wield some regulatory power over the town's traditional citizenry--the artisans and merchants.

The Charter of the Cities contained minute regulations on the organization of artisans and merchants, but it also recognized other social groups (nobles, clergy, and <u>raznochintsy</u>) as legitimate municipal citizens. Theoretically, town autonomy and administration were commonly shared by all social groups. In fact, the subordination of municipal government to imperial officials coupled with social antagonism within the citymitigated against any real municipal autonomy.

The provisions of the Charter were immediately introduced into the Hetmanate. By January 1786, Ukrainian towns had elected Town Councils and reorganized the magistrates and guilds.¹⁵⁸ As a result, the magistrate lost many of the remaining administrative functions--namely,

¹⁵⁸For study of the immediate impact of the 1785 Charter on Ukrainian towns, A. Shafonskii's <u>Chernigovskago namestnichestva topografi-</u> <u>cheskoe opisanie</u> is of paramount importance. It describes in detail the conditions existing in every town of the Chernihiv province in 1786. Other important works are by N. Molchanovskii, "Kievskoe gorodskoe upravlenie v 1786 g," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 5-6 (1889), pp. 380-399, No. 7 (1889), pp. 47-63; V. Shcherbyna, "Borot'ba Kyiva za avtonomiiu," <u>Kyiv ta ioho okolytsia</u> v istorii i pam'iatkakh (Vol. XXII of <u>Zapysky Istorychnoi Sektsii Ukra-</u> ins'koi Akademii Nauk; Kiev: 1926), pp. 168-216; V. Ikonnikov, <u>Kiev v</u> 1654-1855 gg., serialized in <u>KSt</u>. The 1785-1800 period is covered in the following issues: No. 9 (1904), pp. 249-272, and No. 10 (1904), Pp. 1-64. For the city of Chernihiv, see also "Chernigovskaia Starina (1765-1810 gg.)," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 6 (1899), pp. 367-407; A. Tishchenskii, "Stoletie Chernigovskoi dumy," <u>ChGV</u>, No. 26 (1887), p. 4; No. 29 (1887), P. 5; No. 35 (1887), p. 4; No. 3 (1888), p. 4.

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control over artisan guilds--and became merely a judicial court for artisans and merchants.¹⁵⁹ The artisan guilds were no longer directly subordinate to the city administration, but organized into an Artisans' soard (<u>Remeslennaia uprava</u>). Artisans were now required to follow detailed imperial regulations on admission to the guilds, its organization, working conditions and selling practices.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, merchants were prouped into three guilds: very few merchants, however, qualified for the first two, which required capital of over 5,000 rubles.¹⁶¹ This fact reflected the lack of large-scale trade on the territory of the Hetmanate.

While the Ukrainian nobility, clergy, merchants, and artisan class could be readily incorporated into corresponding imperial groups, the rank-and-file Cossacks had no such place in the imperial social structure. Viewed as an irregular military force whose primary purpose was to guard the borderlands, the Cossacks were considered an anachronism in the settled and presumably more civilized provinces. Being free farmers, they undermined the serf economy and the basic social arrangement of lord and serfs. But on the territory of the Hetmanate they comprised a significant part of the population--176,886 regular Cossacks

159 In Kiev, however, the magistrate was on occasion able to re-Essert its authority. See N. Molchanovskii, "Kievskoe gorodskoe upravlenie v 1786 g.," KSt., Nos. 5-6 (1889), pp. 380-390.

160For the impact of the 1785 Charter on the artisan guilds see Pylyp Klymenko, <u>Tsekhy na Ukraini</u> (No. 81 of <u>Zbirnyk IFV [V] UAN</u>; Kiev: 1929), pp. 1-11.

161A. Shafonskii, <u>Chernigovskago...</u>, pp. 21-22, and in the listings of merchants for every town.

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and 198,296 Cossack helpers.¹⁶² The imperial authorities, therefore, were forced to recognize the Cossacks as a special social category. At the same time, the imperial administration attempted both to reduce and then to permanently fix the number of Cossacks. In the 1782 census, the regular Cossacks were listed as such, or permitted to become artisans and merchants. Most of the Cossack helpers, however, were counted as peasants. The Cossack estate was declared closed, and claims to Cossackdom by persons officially registered in another category were no longer honored.¹⁶³

The Cossack problem notwithstanding, much of Ukrainian society had been reshaped on the imperial pattern. Members of the elite had become dvoriane; the peasants were fully enserfed; the merchants and artisans were organized under imperial auspices; and the clergy was rapidly becoming a closed social caste in the service of an imperial state Orthodoxy.

4. The End of Ukrainian Autonomy

By the 1790's, virtually no vestige remained of the Hetmanate's autonomy. The civilian administration, the military, the Church, and, to a large extent, the social structure conformed to a standard imperial pattern. The only surviving remnants of a distinct and individual past were the law codes still in use in the Left-Bank Ukraine--Ukrainian

162 Ibid., p. 85.

163N. Storozhenko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale XIX veka," KSt., No. 6 (1897), pp. 460-465. common law, the Lithuanian Statute, and a modified version of the Magde-

burg Law.

The abolished institutions were, nevertheless, remembered and derished by Ukrainian autonomists. Catherine's death and Paul I's ascension to the throne provided them with renewed hope for the restoration of traditional rights. It was common knowledge that the new emperor strongly disapproved of Catherine's policies and that he held a special reverence for his deceased father, Peter III.¹⁶⁴ The Left-Bank Ukraine became rife with rumors that Paul himself would become hetman and spoint his father's favorite advisor, Andrii Hudovych as regent of a reconstituted Hetmanate.¹⁶⁵ While these rumors proved to be unfounded, faul did indeed revive some of the Hetmanate's former prerogatives. He permitted the election of the nobility's district marshals (<u>povetovye</u> <u>marshaly</u>) in accordance with Polish-Lithuanian practice, rather than the werdnye predvoditeli provided for by the Charter to the Nobility.¹⁶⁶

More importantly, Paul abolished the Kiev, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Sivers'k provinces (namestnichestva) and created a single Little

164For a general history of Paul's reign, see M. V. Klochkov, Ocherki pravitel'stvennoi deiatel'nosti vremeni Pavla I (Petrograd: 1916).

1650. Ohloblyn, "Andrii Hudovych," Liudy Staroi Ukrainy, pp. 7-13.

166Aleksandr Kovalevskii, "Nekotoryia podrobnosti, kasaiushchiiasia uchrezhdeniia Malorossiiskoi (Chernigovskoi) gubernii v 1796-1797 godakh," ChGV, No. 1439 (1898), pp. 2-3; the povetovye marshaly are also discussed in "Zamechaniia do Maloi Rossii pridnadlezhashchiia," TP. 7-8.

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Russian province (gubernia).¹⁶⁷ The city of Kiev was excluded from the Little Russian province. It became the capital of a new Kiev province carved out of the territory taken from Poland in the second partition. With the sole exception of the city of Kiev, which even in the best of times was only tenuously connected with the Hetmanate, the new Little Russian province encompassed all the territories of the former Hetmanate, even the area severed in 1764 to form the province of Novorossia.

Paul also restored a major part of the court system that existed in the Hetmanate in 1763 (i.e., incorporating Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's judicial reforms).¹⁶⁸ A reinstituted General Court again acted as the highest tribunal for both civil and criminal cases. Only the Senate and the autocrat could overrule its decisions. The court consisted of two general judges, four advisors, and ten representatives elected by the mobility. Two erudite Ukrainian nobles, Akim Semenovych Sulyma and Hyhorii Petrovych Myloradovych, filled the posts of general judges.¹⁶⁹ The lower civil courts--the land court (zemskii sud) and estates'

167 PSZ, No. 17,634 (December 12, 1796), Vol. XXVI, pp. 229-230; Aleksandr Kovalevskii, "Nekotoryia podrobnosti...," pp. 2-3.

168pSZ, No. 17,594 (November 30, 1796), Vol. XXVI, pp. 212-213; Aleksandr Kovalevskii, "Vozobnovlenie general'nago suda v Malorossiiskoi gubernii v 1797 godu," ChGV, No. 178 (1894), pp. 3-4.

169For a brief biography of Akim Semenovych Sulyma see V. Modzalevskii, "Sulima, Akim Semenovich," <u>Russkii biograficheskii slovar</u>', Vol. IX (Suvorova-Tkachev), pp. 141-142. Two works by Akim Semenovych Sulyma provide much information as to his activities as general judge: "Zapiska General'nago sud'i Akima Semenovicha Sulimy," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 1 (1884), pp. 135-142; "Dnevnik Akima Semenovicha Sulimy, 1772-1817," <u>Sulimovskii arkhiv</u> (Kiev: 1884), pp. 156-164. Information about Hryhorii Petrovych Myloradovych can be found in V. L. Modzalevskii, <u>Malorosiiskii rodoslov-</u> nik, Vol. III, p. 523.

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boundary court (<u>pidkomors'kyi sud</u>) -- were re-established but the imperial court system was retained for criminal cases.

this restoration was, however, only a brief epilogue confined to the reign of Paul I. When Alexander I came to the throne in 1801, the Little Russian gubernia was divided into two provinces: Chernihiv and Poltava. 170 This was soon followed by the abelition of the court 171 Only the estates' boundary court was retained, so as to not further complicate property disputes. The levelling of Ukrainian institutions and traditions continued under Nicholas I. In 1831, the remants of the Magdeburg Law, until then still in use in Ukrainian towns, were abrogated. 172 The imperial authorities, furthermore, ordered that all governmental institutions in the Chernihiv and Poltava province adhere strictly to the provision of the Fundamental Law, 173 In 1834, the boundary estates' court and various Ukrainian traditional offices connected with property and surveying were abolished. 174 Finally, in 1843, the Russian Law Code (Svod zakonov) was made applicable in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces. 175 With the abolition of Ukrainian common law and the Lithuanian Statute, the last vestiges of Ukrainian autonomy had been obliterated.

170<u>PSZ</u>, No. 20,162 (February 27, 1802), Vol. XXVII, pp. 59-60.
171Described in "Dnevnik Akima Semenovicha Sulimy," p. 163.
172<u>PSZ</u>, 2nd ed., No. 4319 (February 3, 1831), Vol. VI, pp. 119-

122.

173<u>PSZ</u>, 2nd ed., No. 4992 (December 6, 1831), Vol. VI, p. 276.
174<u>PSZ</u>, 2nd ed., No. 6718 (January 16, 1834), Vol. IX, p. 42.
175<u>PSZ</u>, 2nd ed., No. 16585 (March 4, 1843), Vol. XVIII, pp. 115-116.

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CHAPTER V

THE FORMER HETMANATE AS RUSSIAN IMPERIAL PROVINCES

1. The End of Autonomy and the Ukrainian Nobility

The attitude of the Ukrainian nobility was crucial to the lasting success of the imperial reforms. As the Hetmanate's ruling elite and the main exponent of autonomy, the Ukrainian nobility represented the only force capable of expressing opposition or attempting to subvert the rapid implementation of the Provincial Reform Act. Indeed, when the subject was first broached at a 1781 meeting of the nobility, the participants showed considerable apprehension and reservation towards the projected reforms. Their disapproval was so pronounced that the newly appointed governor, Andrii Myloradovych, issued a warning to the leader of the autonomists, Hryhorii Poletyka. In a secret unofficial letter Myloradovych advised his personal friend, Poletyka, to consider his "family, wealth, and advanced years and to soften his patriotic fervor," and "let events take their course."¹

The major part of the Ukrainian nobility was willing "to let

Letter of April 13, 1781 in "Chastnaia perepiska Grigoriia Andreevicha Poletiki," KSt., No. 10 (1894), pp. 123-124. The postscript also instructs Poletyka to immediately tear up the letter without taking any notes. Poletyka, obviously, did not do this.

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events take their course" and the actual implementation of the reform elicited little response. This inertia can be ascribed to a variety of factors. First of all, the death of Hryhorii Poletyka (1784) deprived Ukrainian autonomists of a bold leader and skilled polemicist. Nore importantly, as the nobles obtained titles of dvoriane, corporate self-government, and the legalization of serfdom, they became aware of the many benefits that would accrue from the new order. Opposition, in any event, involved considerable risk. Not only was there a possibility of prosecution, as had been hinted by Myloradovych, but any indiscretion at this crucial time could jeopardize the recognition of a title or the attainment of an official post.

The nobility's caution reflected its increased dependence on governmental positions. Although some nobles possessed immense wealth, the wast majority owned small estates which were barely able to provide the necessities of life.² Economic conditions forced the sons of

²Unfortunately there is no study of the Ukrainian nobility's landholdings. An approximation can be made by the use of several sources. E. M. Kabuzan and S. M. Troitskii in their pioneer work "Izmeneniia v chislennosti, udel'nom vese i razmeshchenii dvorianstva v Rossii v 1782-1858 gg." Istoriia SSSR, No. 4 (1971) pp. 153-169 estimate the number of serfs per nobleman in a given territory. For the Left-Bank Ukraine (the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine) the proportion for 1782 was 43.32 serfs for every 1.20 nobleman and for 1795 it was 42.68 serfs for every 1.33 nobleman. This converts to 34.66 serfs per noble-man in 1782 and 32.01 serfs per nobleman in 1795. In comparison the central Russian regions had 66.07 serfs for every 0.70 nobleman in 1782 and 66.64 serfs for every 0.63 nobleman in 1795. This converts to 103.39 serfs per nobleman in 1782 and 105.77 serfs per nobleman in 1795. Thus the nobles of the Hetmanate owned fewer than one-third the number of serfs of their counterparts in the central Russian regions. From Kabuzan and Troitskii's charts it is clear that there were more hobles and fewer serfs in the Hetmanate than most other regions of the Empire. The existence of a numerous but largely impoverished nobility can be confirmed by examining V. Modzalevskii's Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik (4 vols.; Kiev: 1908-1914). Modzalevskii frequently lists landholdings and land grants.

poblemen to seek careers in the government service. The existence of the Kievan Academy, Chernihiv and Pereiaslav Collegia offered the Ukrainis petty gentry better opportunities to obtain an education than its Russian counterpart and, therefore, more ready access to bureaucratic positions. There is some evidence to suggest that while most nobles remained in the Hetmanate, more and more Ukrainians were moving to other provinces, with the more ambitious seeking fame and fortune in the capital. There was already an established tradition of Ukrainians reaching the highest imperial posts, beginning with Feofan Prokopovych and Stefan Iavors'kyi in Peter I's time, then Oleksii and Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi during Elizabeth's reign. Also in the 1770's and 1780's, Oleksander Bezborod'ko, Petro Zavadovs'kyi, the Kochubei and Troshchyns'hyi families -- all had outstanding imperial positions and maintained magnificent houses in St. Petersburg. They were not only examples for others, but also provided the necessary connections for employment. The more prominent Ukrainians secured positions for their relatives, friends, and acquaintances who in turn attempted to find employment for their own relatives and friends. Thus, by the 1790's a fairly large group of Ukrainians from the Hetmanate was domiciled in St. Petersburg. They knew each other both on the professional and social levels, and formed their own cultural subgroup in the imperial capital.

³For Ukrainian <u>chinovniks</u> and Ukrainian life in St. Petersburg, the memoirs of V. N. Getun are the best single source. "Zapiski V. N. Getuna," <u>Istoricheskii vestnik</u>, Vol. I, No. 1 (1880), pp. 26-67. V. N. Getun, as a minor functionary, described how most positions were obtained through a chain of protection culminating with Oleksander Bezborod'ko or Petro Zavadovs'kyi. His account also mentions the close social contacts maintained by the Ukrainian bureaucrats. This is confirmed in the memoirs of H. Vyns'kyi, "Moe vremia; Zapiski Vinskago," <u>RA</u>, Bk 1 (1877), pp. 90-

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In addition to the steady stream of nobles going to St. Petersurg, Ukrainians from the former Hetmanate also made careers in the neighboring provinces. Southern Ukraine, called Novorossiia, was for a long time considered an El Dorado where one could easily make a fortume. Although only a small percentage of nobles emigrated to the South, some did join the administration or become landowners in this still wirgin territory.⁴ It was, however, the enlargement of government due to the provincial reforms which provided the Ukrainian nobility with their greatest opportunity. As early as 1779 Governor-General Rumiantsev, who organized the administration of the Kursk province, summoned Ukrainians from the Hetmanate to staff the new positions.⁵ This movement scelerated by the turn of the century. Many functionaries of the Voronezh, Kursk, Orlov, and Sloboda-Ukraine provinces were originally from the former Hetmanate.⁶ With the annexation of new provinces,

104. Many examples of assistance to Ukrainian office seekers can be found in the biographies of the two principle benefactors, Zavadovs'kyi and Bezborod'ko. See "Graf Petr Vasil'evich Zavadovskii," RA, Vol. XII, No. 2 (1883), pp. 81-174, and N. I. Grigorovich, <u>Kantsler kniaz'</u> <u>Aleksandr Andreevich Bezborodko</u> (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1879-1881) Vol. I, pp. 1-62 and passim, and Vol. II, pp. 377-416 and <u>passim</u>.

⁴N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko in "Pivdenna Ukraina roku 1787," <u>Zapo-</u> <u>rizhzhia XVIII stolittiia ta ioho spadshchyna</u>, Vol. II indicates that the Ukrainian nobility from the Hetmanate formed only 10.5 percent of the nobility and the vast majority of the Ukrainian nobles were in areas that formerly belonged to the Hetmanate (pp. 135-136). However, several prominent Ukrainian figures in imperial politics, e.g., O. Bezborod'ko and K. Rozumovs'kyi, managed to obtain immense estates (pp. 137-138).

⁵Document No. 73; "Rasporiazhenie grafa P. A. Rumiantseva po upravleniiu Malorossiei (1779 z.)," Ch G V, No. 25 (1888), p. 4.

⁶The service patterns of Ukrainian nobles outside of the Hetmanate have not been studied. However, a good indication can be obtained by gleaning V. Modzalevskii's <u>Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik</u>. When in civilian, not military, service the Ukrainian nobles tended to go either to St. Petersburg or to nearby provinces of Kursk, Orlov, or Sloboda-Ukraine.

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particularly the Right-Bank Ukraine, the nobility from the Hetmanate pass again tapped as a source of personnel for the imperial administra-7 Similarly, with the conquest of Georgia, nobles from the Lefttion. The were recruited as experienced administrators. Thus the abolition of Ukrainian institutions did not mean a loss of offices for the Ukrainian nobility. On the contrary, Catherine's provincial reforms offered the Ukrainian petty nobility an unprecedented opportunity for imperial careers, first of all in the new administration in the territory of the former Hetmanate, in the bordering provinces, in the military ranks, and in St. Petersburg itself.

The Ukrainian nobility's cordial relationship with Governor-General Petr Rumiantsev--who introduced the provincial reforms--blunted overt opposition to the new imperial administration. The Ukrainian sobles were very reluctant to create difficulties for the man who permitted them a free hand in determining the composition of the local dvorianstvo and who liberally dispensed the lowest hereditary noble rank,

⁸I. F. Pavlovskii, "O priglashenii na sluzhbu v Gruziiu chinovnikov iz Malorossii," KSt., No. 5 (1904), pp. 58-60.

⁹The majority of the Ukrainian nobles, of course, remained in the territory of the former Hetmanate and joined the local administration. Between the 1780's and 1802 the local administration was largely Ukrainian. See A. Andrevskii, "Arkhivnaia spravka o sostave Kievskago 'obshchestva' v 1782-1797 godakh," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 2 (1894), pp. 192-203 and L. Smolens'kyi, "Biurokratychna verkhivka na Ukraini na prykintsi XVIII i na pochatku XIX st.," pp. 70-80.

^{71.} Smolens'kyi, "Biurokratychna verkhivka na Ukraini na prykintsi XVIII i na pochatku XIX st.," <u>Ukraina</u>, Nos. 7-8 (1930), pp. 70-80. Smolens'kyi lists the first seven classes of administrators for 1798 and 1800 for the Ukrainian provinces of the Empire. Many of the administrators on the Right-Bank can be identified as having originated from the territory of the Hetmanate.

the <u>koronets</u>. The majority of Rumiantsev's military as well as civilian staff were Ukrainians and during the twenty years of his rule a genuine friendship, even camaraderie, developed between the Governor-General and the leading Ukrainian aristocratic families. Rumiantsev cemented of various these relationships by serving as godfather for the children/ 'nobles-s role in Ukrainian society usually reserved for family and very close friends.¹⁰

As Rumiantsev's contacts with the Ukrainian nobility became increasingly more cordial, his relationship with Catherine and the central authorities became more strained. From the outset, when he was first appointed Governor-General, Rumiantsev's support of Peter III and the Grand Duke Paul made him suspect at court. However, Rumiantsev's successful service as Governor-General of the Ukraine, his brilliant victories in the 1769-1774 Ottoman War, and his personal role in negotiating the very favorable Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji brought him closer to the Empress and court. He was highly decorated, awarded the addition of <u>Zadumaiskii</u> (Beyond the Danube) to his name, and richly rewarded (with jeweled swords, money and estates). In fact, Rumiantsev emerged as the Empire's leading military figure.¹¹ But soon he was eclipsed by the spectacular rise of the Empress' favorite, G. A. Potemkin, who

100. Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Autonomists of the 1780's and 1790's and Count P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky," <u>Annals of the UAAS</u>, Vol. VI, Nos. 3-4 (1958), p. 1316.

Ilp. Maikov, "P. A. Rumiantsev," <u>Russkii biograficheskii slovar'</u> (Vol. Romana-Riasovsky; Petrograd: 1918), pp. 535-556; <u>Fel'dmarshal</u> <u>Rumiantsev; Sbornik dokumentov i materialov</u> (Moscow: 1947), pp. 18-23.

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became fieldmarshal and received substantial material resources for the development of the territories under his control. Rumiantsev detested potenkin as an untried military commander, a flatterer, and an upstart. The strain between the two was particularly intense in 1787, when catherine traveled through the Hetmanate on her way south to meet Emperor Joseph II of Austria. The well-informed Count Louis-Philippe de Ségur, who traveled in Catherine's entourage, left a rather subjective but telling account of the Potemkin-Rumiantsev rivalry.

Field Marshal Rumiantsev received the Empress on the border of the governorship. The face of this venerable and distinguished hero was an expression of his soul; but it showed a shade of sadness and dissatisfaction evoked by the preference for and immense power of Potemkin. Competition for power disunited those two military leaders; they went along, fighting for glory and favor and, as usually happens, it was the Empress' favorite who won out. The Field Marshal [Rumiantsev] did not receive any wherewithal for governing the dependency; his work proceeded slowly; his soldiers wore old clothes and his officers persistently demanded promotions. All favors, all encouragement went to the army which the First Minister [Potemkin] commanded.¹²

The conflict between Rumiantsev and Potemkin reached the breaking point during the Second Turkish War. The command was equally divided between Rumiantsev and Potemkin, and Rumiantsev, the hero of the previous Ottoman War, considered this an insult. The two commanders could not agree on a joint policy and in March 1789, Catherine recalled Rumiantsev to St. Petersburg, making Potemkin the commander-in-chief.¹³

12 Zapiski grafa Segiura o prebyvanii ego v Rossii v tsartsvov.mie Ekateriny II (1785-1789) (St. Petersburg: 1865), pp. 152-153 as quoted by 0. Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Autonomists," pp. 1320-1321.

13Documents relating to Rumiantsev's recall to St. Petersburg, his resignation, and subsequent refusal to leave Moldavia because of "illness" are published in Fel'dmarshal Rumiantsev; Sbornik dokumentov..., Pp. 304-315.

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Rumiantsev was ordered to organize another army for possible war with grussia. In the light of Rumiantsev's pro-Prussian sympathies, this appointment served only to further humiliate the old military commander and, as expected, Rumiantsev resigned his commission and asked permission to travel abroad. Although Catherine readily granted him permission for foreign travel, he remained at Jassy in his military headquarters. Repeated demands by Catherine that he leave his military unit in Moldavia were ignored. A year after Rumiantsev's resignation he was still living in Jassy and Catherine wrote Potenkin in blunt terms that "it would be best if you would send for Rumiantsev and tell him that it might easily happen that the Turks will take him away unless he gets away himself first, and if even this does not help, then send him a convoy which would accompany him and take him out."14 Finally in late 1790, Rumiantsev left Moldavia and settled in one of his Ukrainian estates.

Rumiantsev returned to the Hetmanate not as governor-general but as a private citizen. Although Catherine had granted him the Ukrainian governorship for life, in 1789 she dismissed Rumiantsev from this office, which was then entrusted to the Governor-General of Tula and Kaluga, General M. N. Krechetnikov.¹⁵ Rumiantsev's removal was undoubtedly connected with his recall as co-commander of the Ottoman front, although this was only a pretext. It was no secret that in the late 1780's

14p. Maikov, "P. A. Rumiantsev," p. 565 as quoted by O. Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Autonomists...," p. 1324.

150. Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Autonomists...," p. 1321.

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catherine had become disenchanted with Rumiantsev's performance as governor-general, especially when she compared it with Potemkin's. During her 1787 trip through the Hetmanate Catherine complained that, "In the three Little Russian governorships, because nothing had been set in motion, the deficit reaches a million, the cities are drab and nothing is done."¹⁶

The Ukrainian nobility sympathized with their Governor-General17 during Rumiantsev's dispute with Potemkin and the central administration. Not only was he their benefactor in terms of offices and titles of evorianin, but he also had attempted to adjust the provincial reform to local conditions. That Rumiantsev's efforts were unsuccessful served only to increase Catherine's impatience with him. To and the Ukrainian nobles, however, Runiantsev was the defender of their estate's and their homeland's interests before the central authorities. Moreover, he was regarded as a venerable military figure who led them to glory in battle. The Ukrainian nobles resented the preferential treatment accorded Potemkin and his command. Besides, criticism of Amiantsey's civil administration also reflected on them since the local mobles held the majority of offices. Consequently, an atmosphere of opposition to the central authorities developed among the nobles of the former Hetmanate.

Rather than strengthening pro-autonomist sentiments, the nobility's

16G. V. Esipov, "Puteshestvie imper. Ekateriny II v Juzhnuiu Mossiiu v 1787 godu," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 7 (1891), p. 31.

17This is the main thrust of Ohloblyn's article, "Ukrainian Autonomists..."

oppositionist tendencies actually weakened them. While Ukrainian autonomy was the primary issue at the 1768 Legislative Commission, already in the late 1780's--though still an issue--it was becoming secondary to the problems of regional discrimination and the unfair treatment of Rumiantsev. On the whole, the Ukrainian nobles seemed to have accepted the fact that they were no longer in a separate country but, rather, in a region which played a part within an imperial political system. In order to protect their own interests and those of their region, they sought an appropriate share in this system.

While, on the whole, the nobility accepted their incorporation into an imperial system, their views differed on the degree of further

. integration. In the broadest terms, two basic attitudes premiled: the assimilationist and the traditionalist. These were not articulated political factions but rather two different reactions to the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy. The assimilators believed that clinging to autonomist traditions was outmoded and that the future of the Hetmanate was inexorably intertwined with the fate of the Empire as a whole. Only the Empire could offer protection from the Hetmanate's tennies (Poland, Crimea and the Ottoman Empire), and give the nobility opportunities for imperial careers, as well as access to court society and specialized education (cadet corps). The proponents of this view included some of the most illustrious names of the Hetmanate and the Empire: 0. A. Berborod'ko, P. V. Zavadovs'kyi, Count I. V. Hudovych, B. P. Troshchyns'kyi, Count (later Prince) V. D. Kochubei, O. S. Sudienko, and the Myloradovych family, as well as countless less distinguished

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imitators. 18

prince Bezborod'ko well illustrates the attitudes of the assimi-

Istors. He began his career in the Hetmanate, and rose to the rank of Kiev polkovnyk; later he was an assistant to Governor-General Rumiantsev and participated in the Turkish War. In 1774 he became secretary to Catherine II and from that time his career continued in st. Petersburg. 19 Bezborod'ko's outstanding abilities and his willingness to serve the imperial cause were soon recognized. While still in the Hetmanate, Bezborod'ko ranmed through the government makaz in chemihiv, thereby earning, according to Rumiantsev, the enmity of his countrymen.²⁰ In recommending Bezborod'ko to Catherine for a promotion, Remiantsev stressed that Bezborod'ko "is devoid of local sentiments,"21

Berborod'ko's views on the Empire and the Hetmanate emerge most clearly in his correspondence with his father, his mother, and his relatives, the Kochubei family.²² In his letters, Bezborod'ko stresses

180. Ohloblyn identifies this group of Ukrainian aristocrats as centered around Prince Bezborod'ko and favoring close co-operation with Russia in order to achieve some age-old goals of Cossack Ukraine. Liudy Staroi Ukrainy, p. 155.

19Bezborod'ko's career is traced by Grigorovich, Kantsler..., 2 vols.; Bezborod'ko himself traced his various positions in his resignation given to Paul I in 1799, published in Grigorovich, Vol. II, pp. 640-642.

20G. Maksimovich, Vybory i nakazy..., pp. 119-125; Rumiantsev's report on pp. 326-328.

21 Ibid., p. 328.

220. Bezborod'ko's letters to his father have been published by Grigorovich, Kantsler..., Vol. I, pp. 235-287; a brief report on these letters was made by Pavlo Klepats'kyi, "Lystuvannia Oleksandra Andrie-ycha Bezborod'ka z svoim bat'kom, iak istorychne dzherelo," <u>luvileinyi</u> birmyk no od ka z svoim bat'kom, iak istorychne dzherelo," <u>luvileinyi</u> ibirnyk na poshanu Akademyka M. S. Hrushevs'koho (2 vols.; Kiev: 1928), the importance of having Ukrainian youth attend the cadet schools and the School for Noble Girls; he gives advice for advancement in service and describes the honor of achieving an imperial title or decoration. He was always quick to acquire or buy estates, and often hinted to his Ukrainian colleagues that imperial service could also bring wealth. On the whole, Bezborod'ko's letters indicate that he was an enthusiastic supporter of the imperial system, that he was very proud to have achieved a high position, and that he would like his countrymen to emulate his success.

This does not mean that Bezborod'ko lacked all sentiment toward the Hetmanate. On the contrary, he loved his native land and particularly encouraged the study of its history. Due to Bezborod'ko's patronege, V. Ruban was able to publish <u>A Short Chronicle of Little Russia</u> in 1777. Bezborod'ko was directly involved in the project, brought the chronicle up to date and compiled the appendices. Sending the work to his father, Bezborod'ko wrote,

I present it to you, in all fairness it belongs to you, for you have proven in many instances your love for that country, Our Beloved Fatherland, in the behalf of which sincere efforts will always be made so as to preserve from oblivion the events and circumstances which indicate the fame and glory of our ancestors.... This little work is a guide to a more detailed history of Little Russia, which has been planned.... My satisfaction will be complete when I finish this work and particularly when its completion is followed by other instances which allow me to express my sincere feelings towards my fellow citizens.²³

Vol. I, pp. 280-285. Grigorovich also published the letters to Bezborod'ko's mother (Vol. I, pp. 470-502), and the Kochubei family (Vol. I, PP. 480-502).

23N. Grigorovich, Kantsler..., Vol. I, p. 262.

However, this reverence was for the Hetmanate's past. At no time did Bezborod'ko express desire for the renewal of the Hetmanate's sutonomous institutions.²⁴ In fact, he either hampered or opposed projects for organizing traditional Cossack units, 25 and his commentary in Ruban's chronicle fully approved the abolition of the hetmancy.26 For Bezborod'ko the Hetmanate was an entity of the past which could be cherished and written about in history books. His present loyalties were not to a moribund entity, but to its former citizens. He showed genuine concern for his fellow Ukrainians. Rather than regain traditional rights and privileges for them, Bezborod'ko wanted to integrate them into imperial society. He became their main protector in St. Petersburg. Despite his preoccupation with governmental affairs, Berborod'ko usually found time to meet his Ukrainian petitioners and attempted to obtain a position for them. 27 He considered doing so a duty to his homeland and countrymen. In 1779, before the final abolition of autonomy, Bezborod'ko proudly reported to his father that he was

²⁴Bezborod'ko has been credited for the renewal of Ukrainian judicial institutions in 1797. This claim was made in a contemporary (c.1802) polemical work <u>Zamechanija do Maloi Rossii prinadlezhashija</u>, p. 7 and p. 12, and then repeated in many textbooks. Indeed, in 1797 Paul I renewed the civil court system not only for the Hetmanate but also for the Baltic region. It is true that Bezborod'ko was able to place his relatives and cronies as administrators of the renewed court system, but this does not prove that he played any role in its establishment.

25Discussed later in this chapter.

26γ. Ruban, <u>Kratkaia letopis' Malyia Rossii s 150 po 1776 god</u>. (St. Petersburg: 1777), pp. 231-238.

27N. Grigorovich, Kantsler..., Vol. I, p. 342.

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able to obtain Russian titles for approximately twenty Ukrainian officials. 28

Bezborod'ko apparently considered the Hetmanate to be his home-1and, although he saw it as part of a larger country, Imperial Russia. Implicit in Bezborod'ko's works is the idea that Ukrainians are but a subgroup of an all-Russian nation and that imperial integration is, therefore, merely part of a re-unification process.²⁹ In Bezborod'ko's view, the benefits of such a re-unification were considerably more than just imperial positions, titles, land and wealth, for, cs part of the Empire, the Hetmanate would be able to cope with its traditional enemies. The constance and intensity of Bezborod'ko's anti-Polish, anti-Tatar, and anti-Turkish policies were an outgrowth of his Ukrainian heritage. In his 1776 memorandum and historical tract on the Tatar problem, Bezborod'ko listed every raid and deplored the immeasurable harm done to "Russia, particularly Little Russia."30 He recommended the same course of action that Ivan IV took at Kazan and Astrakhan -- conquest and incorporation into the Empire. 31 Similarly, Bezborod'ko argued that Poland had for centuries persecuted the Orthodox and "Russian" population of the Right-Bank Ukraine and Belorussia. 32 With the destruction

28Ibid., pp. 270-272.

²⁹This view is particularly evident in a long memorandum-history that Bezborod'ko authored: "Kartina ili kratkoe izvestie o Rossiiskikh s Tatarami voinakh i delakh, nachenshikhsia v polovine desiatago veka i pochti bezpreryvno chrez vosem'sot let prodolzhaiushchikhsia," published by Grigorovich, Vol. I, pp. 339-369.

31 Ibid., pp. 369-370. 30Ibid., p. 369. 32N. Grigorovich, Kantsler..., Vol. II, p. 633.

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of Crimea and the partition of Poland, the two oldest enemies of Cossack ukraine were finally vanquished. For Bezborod'ko and his followers this was yet another justification for close co-operation with Russia and for imperial integration. Bezborod'ko along with many other Ukrainian nobles were simultaneously able, on the one hand, to love the Hetmanate of the past and to identify with their Ukrainian countrymen and, on the other hand, to eagerly assimilate into an imperial, mainly Russian, society.

The strongest expression of the assimilators' point of view can be found in a pamphlet written in 1802 or 1803, the Zamechaniia do Maloi <u>Rossii prinadlezhashchiia</u>. Little is known about its author. From the text one could surmise that he was a Ukrainian nobleman, probably from the Chernihiv province, who apparently spent most of his life in Russian service.³³ His detailed description of the status (1802) of Little Russia, frequently interjected with Russian comparisons, included a sharp criticism of the re-establishment of the General Court (1797), the more outlandish Ukrainian claims for ennoblements, and the haughty autitude in some Ukrainian circles towards Russians. He found incomprehensible the Ukrainian penchant for clinging to outdated institutions steming from Polish times:

The views of many people...filled with the Cossack Zaporothian spirit...have become so ossified that they don't

³³These are the hypotheses of O. Bodianskii, who published the work. It is also possible that the author was a Russian who had lived for a long time in the Hetmanate, but one would then have to discount the author's frequent use of "we" which could refer only to "Little Russians." For Bodianskii's preface and the work itself see "Zamechaniia do Maloi Rossii prinadlezhashchiia," ChOIDR, Bk 1, Pt II (1848), pp. 1-55. think about their own benefits nor of the common good and keep repeating only that we do not want to be Russians [Muscovites, moskali]. It is quite obvious that among those holding such a view are those who had received their upbringing, good manners, enlightenment, wealth, and honors from the Russians [Muscovites], and they are so ungrateful for all of this that they want to force Polish customs and maintain Polish courts... Can one wish [to emulate] the laws and arrangements of a people--having 16 million inhabitants-but who because of their own willfulness have lost their Kingdom? Whoever wishes such a rule betrays his Tsar and himself, and as it is said, emits the spirit of Mazepa. 34

According to the author, the tenacity of the Polish institutions is even more puzzling in the light of the shabby treatment which the Little Russians had received from the Poles. Mhile the Russians recognized the Cossacks and the Ukrainian nobles, "the Poles had said that the Little Russian officials and the Little Russian shliakhta are all our peasants ... 35

The author clearly identified Ukrainians with Russians, and believed that the Ukrainians were to be governed by the all-Russian imperial administration and laws. According to him: "We are not Poles, but Russian people, and should have the same arrangement as the whole state, even more so, since it is clearly to our benefit and convenience."36 He attacked a traditionalist who wanted to restore some aspects of Ukrainian autonomy in the following way:

This self-imagined patriot, following the French example, gave an oration. He demanded that Little Russia and her former army be renewed37 just as it was under the hetmans,

34Ibid., p. 3. 35 Ibid., p. 21. 36 Ibid., p. 12.

37 Probably refers to the Kapnist Cossack project or a similar Project which will be discussed below, p. 298-299.

and that the whole New Russia province be abolished and the bordering lands be united to Little Russia.³⁸ It is obvious that following Mazepa's example he wanted to have an Appanage [udel'noe] Little Russian Kingdom; in a word, he wanted such things for which one is sent--and that is with mercy--to the Maksakov monastery.³⁹

The assimilators, therefore, readily integrated into imperial society. Some had shown genuine affection for the Hetmanate's past, its traditions, and for their own fellow Ukrainians. But they all enthusiastically supported the new imperial administration and showed no interest in maintaining or re-establishing any aspect of Ukrainian autonomy. Some like V. P. Kochubei even expressed contempt for his own ethnic origins, when as Chairman of the Imperial Council in the 1830's he blocked all efforts at re-establishing Cossack military formations, he explained his position to the Ukrainian Governor-General, Prince N. 6. Repnin:

Although I was born a <u>khokhol</u> [derogatory term for Ukrainian], I am more Russian than anybody else.... My calling and the position I hold put me above all sorts of petty considerations. I look at the affairs of your province from the point of view of the common interest of our country. Microscopic views are not my concern.⁴⁰

By contrast, the traditionalists, who also accepted the new imperial administration and joined the dvorianstvo

³⁸Parts of the Hetmanate were included into Novorossiia in 1764 and 1789. It is possible that the writer may have been referring to this. But these lands had been returned to Malorossiiskaia gubernia (1798). If the speech was given in 1801, then it is likely that the author was indeed proposing some union between the Hetmanate and the south.

39"Zamechaniia do Maloi Rossii...," p. 31.

⁴⁰N. Storozhenko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale XIX v.," Pt. VI, <u>KSt</u>., No. 11 (1897), p. 145. whithing a critical attitude towards the provincial reforms and towards imperial assimilation. Traditionalism was not an organized average and therefore reflected various opinions and heterogeneous spals. Nost broadly, it included a large number of non-political nobles who in 1801 and in 1834 petitioned the Emperor to retain the lithuanian Statute.⁴¹ Within this broad spectrum there were several more readily definable groups. Some traditionalists called for the renewal of Cossack military formations. Others expressed their dissatisfaction with the loss of autonomy by writing and circulating works that were anti-imperial and anti-Russian, while a daring few toyed with the idea of appealing te a foreign power for aid in order to overthrow imperial rule.

The first project for the renewal of Cossack military formations was presented in 1788 by the famous literary figure and leading Ukrainim traditionalist, Vasyl' Kapnist.⁴² Both as Kiev's Provincial Marshal of the Nobility and as a fervent Little Russian patriot, Kapnist took a very active part in Ukrainian political affairs and had already gained a reputation as a defender of Ukrainians against abuse by the imperial administration.⁴³ Kapnist realized that this was the appropriate time

41"Zapiska 1801 g. o nuzhdakh malorossiiskago dvorianstva," KSt., No. 8 (1890), pp. 310-316; "Polozhenie obshchestva dvorianskago poveta starodubskago...," KSt., No. 1 (1884), pp. 174-177.

⁴²The project has been discussed by M. Antonovych, "Kozats'kyi proekt Vasylia Kapnista," <u>S'ohochasne i Mynule</u>, No. 2 (1939), pp. 16-22, and by O. Ohloblyn, Liudy Staroi Ukrainy, pp. 85-90.

⁴³A most interesting eyewitness account of Kapnist's civic life and constant concern with affairs of "Little Russia" is provided by his daughter, Sofia Vasylivna Skalon, "Vospominania S. V. Skalon (urozhd. Lapnist," <u>Istoricheskii vestnik</u>, Vol. XLIV, No. 5 (1891), pp. 338-367 and No. 6 (1891), pp. 599-625. It was reprinted by Iu. G. Oksman and

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for such a project. The Empire was engaged in a two-front war with Turkey and Sweden and was in desperate need of additional troops. Only six years had elapsed since the abolition of the traditional Cossack regiments, and Kapnist believed that it would be possible to organize quickly a rather large fighting force. Taking the initiative, he formulated a modest project which he -- given the advantage of his court connections--presented directly to Catherine. The project called for the formation of a separate Cossack army, commanded by the Cossack starshyna elected at the lowest levels. Catherine forwarded the project to O. A. Bezborod'ko, who approved it with some reservations. Bezborod'ko wanted to be certain that the new units would not resemble "the structure of the former Hetmanate."44 The project was then passed on to Prince Potemkin, the commander of all Cossack and irregular forces.

Meanwhile, Catherine had adopted a policy of increasing the number of Cossack troops, to which were admitted excapees from Poland who could in the future be useful in dealing with the Orthodox population beyond the Empire's borders. 45 At this propitious moment for the the second s Ukrainian autonomists. Potemkin

S. N. Chernov, eds., Vospominaniia i rasskazy deiatelei tainykh obshchestv 1820-kh godov (2 vols.; Moscow: 1931-33), Vol. I, pp. 296-399. O. Ohloblyn in Liudy Staroi Ukrainy discusses Kapnist's career in detail (pp. 49-110).

44For Bezborod'ko's memorandum on the Kapnist project see "Mnenie grafa A. A. Bezborodki na proekt Kapnista: Polozhenie na kakom mozhet byt' nabrano i soderzhano voisko okhochikh kazakov, v nachale 1788 goda," Grigorovich, Kantsler..., Vol. II, pp. 516-517.

45pSZ, No. 16,605 (June 14, 1788), Vol. XXII, pp. 1009-1010; Theresia Adamczyk, Prolegomena zur Geschichte Potemkins (Berlin: 1936), Pp. 76-78.

recruited two Cossack Hosts from among former Zaporozhian Cossacks and assumed the title of "Great Hetman of the Ekaterinoslav and Black Sea cossacks."⁴⁶ These units were carefully regulated by the government and settled in rather remote areas. They did not possess the traditional rights and privileges of the Hetmanate's Cossacks, nor those of Zaporothrhiz. The Kapnist project, however, was never implemented because

sond sond traditional Cossack formations.

The imperial policy towards the Cossacks was strictly one of expediency. Whenever the Empire was in need of irregular troops, the imperial government was willing to consider re-establishing traditional Cossack units; but once the danger had passed, the fear emerged that this might lead to other concessions. In rejecting a 1794 project for organizing Cossacks in the newly-acquired Right-Bank Ukraine, Frince Bezborod'ko--without doubt the leading expert on the Hetmanate's Cossacks--succinctly summarized the imperial position:

If in 1790 we favored similar extreme measures [the reinstitution of traditional Cossack troops - 2K] it was because of the extreme precariousness of our position. We were at war with Sweden and Turkey and on the verge of war with England and Prussia. The Poles at that time were quite strong and preparing to move against us. It was necessary, therefore, to seek a way to deal with this independently from our operations... Now we are no longer in such a dire position. Ukraine, Podolia, Vohymia are ours. It would be possible to reawaken our separate people, who remember the time of Khmel'nyts'kyi and are inclined towards Cossackdom. A military nation would be readily formed and this is even more dangerous for Little Russia, and his gubernia [Potemkin's,

⁴⁶Theresia Adamczyk, Prolegomena..., p. 75.

i.e., Southern Ukraine] would be infected with this spirit. The result would be a new type of revolution, and, as an extreme measure, we would be forced to re-establish the hetmancy, and permit many unfortunate freedoms and, in a word, destroy what we could peacefully and quietly rule forever.

The same sequence of events was repeated several times. When the Empire was strained by war, the Ukrainian nobles offered various Cossack projects. In their eagerness to increase the Empire's military potential, the imperial authorities gave the project a hearing, but they were - wary of relinquishing any special prerogatives and rescinded any concessions as soon as the danger

was over.

The next opportunity for the renewal of Cossack formations came when Napoleon invaded Russia. Alarmed at the unpreparedness of the imperial forces, Alexander I ordered an immediate general mobilization which also included Cossacks from the former Hetmanate. Mykhailo Wyklashevs'kyi, the former administrative governor of Little Russia, presented the imperial authorities with another Cossack project patterned after Kapnist's.⁴⁸ Myklashevs'kyi, however, went much further than Kapnist, for he proposed that a large number of peasants be drafted into the newly-organized Cossack army. Although the imperial authorities rejected such drastic measures, Emperor Alexander indicated a willingness to have separate military units manned exclusively by

47N. Grigorovich, <u>Kantsler...</u>, Vol. II, p. 261.
 ⁴⁸For Myklashevs'kyi's project see O. Ohloblyn, <u>Liudy...</u>, pp. 150-164.

cossacks from the former Hetmanate.⁴⁹ The Governor-General, Prince Is. Lobanov-Rostovskii, and the local nobility began organizing the cossacks.⁵⁰ Soon a conflict developed between the Governor-General and the nobility over the structure of the units. Lobanov-Rostovskii favored an imperial cavalry pattern while the nobles demanded the traditional Cossack organization. Again, Vasyl' Kapnist took up the nobility's cause and successfully appealed to St. Petersburg.⁵¹ The imperial authorities agreed to the wishes of the nobility for they did not want to antagonize them at a critical time. Moreover, the Cossack troops were locally financed, mostly by the nobility, and speed was of the essence. Fifteen regiments of 1,000 Cossacks each were formed but never saw combat and, as soon as the Napoleonic Wars had ended, those regiments were disbanded.

The idea of re-establishing Cossack units remained dormant until 1830 when the Empire was again threatened, this time by the Polish uprising. The Ukrainian Governor-General, Prince M. G. Repnin, who was

49A. L. [Lazarevskii], "Mysl' imp. Aleksandra I ob uchrezhdenii v Malorossii kozach'ikh polkov," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 1 (1890), pp. 119-120.

SOThe organization, activities, and disbandment of the 1812-1816 Cossack formations have been studied in numerous works. The most important are: I. Pavlovskii, "Malorossiiskoe kozach'e opolchenie v 1812 godu," KSt., No. 9 (1906), pp. 1-20 and No. 10 (1906), pp. 137-154; 1812 godu," KSt., No. 9 (1906), pp. 1-20 and No. 10 (1906), pp. 137-154; N. Storozhenko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakev v kontse XVIII i v Machale XIX veka," Pt. IV, KSt., No. 6 (1897), pp. 472-483; P. Klepsats'hyi, "Dvorians'ke zems'ke opolchennia (kozaky)," Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva, Vol. XXXI (1930), pp. 6-21; V. I. Strel'skii, Uchastie ukrainskogo naroda v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda (Kiev: 1953); B. S. Abolikhin, Ukrainskoe opolchenie 1812 g. (No. 72, Istoricheskie Zapiski; Woscow: 1962).

510. Ohloblyn, Liudy..., p. 104.

rather close to the Ukrainian traditionalists and who was even accused of Ukrainian separatist tendencies, formulated another plan for the renewal of Cossack formations.⁵² Also, it was patterned after the original Kapnist project and was ardently promoted by his son, Ivan Wasyl'ovych Kapnist. Nothing came of these plans, however, and the imperial authorities did not permit any re-establishment of the former Hetmanate's Cossack formations.

While some traditionalists openly attempted to bring back one of the most important elements of Cossack Ukraine--the Cossack army-most of the others eschewed any active role. Only in private would they criticize imperial assimilation and decry the loss of autonomous privileges. The political orientation and mood of this segment of traditionalists was best captured in several, mostly anonymous, political tracts which were secretly circulated among the Ukrainian nobles. One work, a history of the Hetmanate by Arkhup Khudobra, which, according to the Decembrist O. F. von der Briggen, was written "very freely and sgainst our government," has not survived.⁵³ Two other works, however, became widely known at the end of the eighteenth century and remained popular during the first half of the nineteenth. Both were in the form

⁵²The initial inquiry as to the possibility of having Ukrainian Cossacks put down the 1830-31 uprising came from Tsar Nicholas I. Governor-General Repnin responded enthusiastically and the initial stages of organization had been accomplished. But the imperial authorities were unwilling to grant any Cossack privileges and the Repnin project was tabled. For a detailed discussion of the 1831 Cossack project see N. Storozhenko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v machale XIX veka," Pt. V in <u>KSt.</u>, No. 10 (1897), pp. 115-131.

530. Ohloblyn, Liudy ..., p. 288.

of spocryphal speeches by Ukrainian hetmans, subsequently reworked and incorporated into Istoriia Rusov, the most comprehensive autonomist .

tract.

The first speech was attributed to Appointed Hetman Pavlo Polubotok. After the death of Hetman Skoropads'kyi, Peter I had greatly curtailed the Hetmanate's autonomy and forbade the election of a new hetman. Polubotok was then appointed acting hetman. Polubotok and his staff demanded the restitution of full autonomy. Peter had Polubotok and his staff recalled to St. Petersburg, where Polubotok died in prison. According to the apocryphal story, Polubotok gave a formal speech at a dramatic confrontation with the tsar. He chastised Peter for his cruel treatment of the Hetmanate and pleaded for the just restitution of Ukrainian rights. Polubotok's concluding words were:

To enslave nations and to rule over serfs and slaves is the role of Asiatic tyrants and not of a Christian monarch.... I know that shackles and bleak dungeons await us where we will be subjected to hunger and oppression as is the Russian [Muscovite] custom, but as long as I am still alive, I will tell you the truth, O tsar [Gosudar'], that without fail, you will have to account before the King of Kings, Almighty God, for our demise and that of our entire people.⁵⁴

Unlike Polubotok's speech--with its sharpness and emphasis on righteousness--the other apocryphal oration, by Hetman Mazepa, focused more on historical and legal arguments. It treated the Hetmanate as an independent state and accused the Muscovites of having usurped the have Rus'. In this speech, Mazepa explains the treaty with Sweden as

⁵⁴Istoriia Rusiv, ed. O. Ohloblyn (New York: 1956), p. 309. Reaceforth, Istoriia Rusiv will be cited by page number in the body of the text. an exercise of the Hetmanate's right to foreign relations, as the continuation of the policies of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, and as a necessity in order to maintain "all the privileges of a free nation" (pp. 272-275).

Little is known about the authors and the milieu from which these works originated. They were apparently circulated in secret among a small group of nobles, most likely centered at Novhorod-Sivers'k. A Ukrainian version of the Mazepa speech existed prior to the early nineteenth century Russian version found in Istoria Rusov. The existence of three versions of Polutotok's oration has been established. 55 The first was published in J. B. Scherer's Annales de la Petite Russie (1788). This led O. Ohloblyn to speculate that Ukrainian autonomists (those espousing the restitution of Ukrainian autonomy) stationed in st. Petersburg passed materials to Scherer so that the plight of the Hetmanate would become known outside the Russian Empire. While there is no direct evidence to substantiate this claim, Ohloblyn has proved that Scherer, both in his Annales and a subsequent six-volume work, Anecdotes particulières aux differons peuples de cet Empire (1792), had at his disposal copies of authentic Ukrainian sources, including some especially patriotic towards the Hetmanate. 56

Both orations were included in the most comprehensive, the most important, and the last political tract of Cossack Ukraine, Istoriia

⁵⁵O. Ohloblyn, "'Annales de la Petite-Russie' Sherera i 'Istoriia husoy'," <u>Naukovyi Zbirnyk Ukrains'koho Vil'noho Universitetu</u>, Vol. V (1948), pp. 88-91.

and the sea well reported to all these

56 Ibid., pp. 90-94.

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mission. This early nineteenth-century work presents a long, elaborate, and, to a great extent, fictitious history dealing with the period from tievan times until the 1769 Turkish war. While recognizing Ukrainian history as a special branch of a greater "all-Russian" entity, the work at the same time stresses Ukrainian separateness and is the last ploquent apology for the Hetmanate and Cossack rights and privileges. It describes in a romanticized fashion the heroic struggle for the preservation of Cossack liberties against the Poles, Tatars, and Muscovites. Istoriia Rusov is vituperatively anti-Polish and, at times, quite anti-Russian.

Istoriia Rusov, however, departs from previous political works by fusing traditional sentiments--pride in the Hetmanate and emphasis on the rights and privileges of estates--with liberalism and rationalism of the age of Enlightenment. The fundamental principles underlying this work are truth and justice.⁵⁷ All the positive characters strive for justice while the negative ones subvert such principles. The anonymous author of <u>Istoriia Rusov</u> believes that, "every creature has the right to defend his right to life, freedom, and property" (p. 4), and that "all peoples that live on earth have defended and will always defend their life [existence], freedom and property" (p. 88). The author is ¹gainst all tyranny of any kind and places the monarch within the law, for "laws are the exact mirrors for the position and behavior of tsars ¹ga uonarchs, and they should be their first enforcers and defenders" (b. 308).

570. Ohloblyn, "The Ethnical and Political Principles of 'Istoriya Musoy'," Annals of UAAS, No. 4 (1952), p. 391. The thinking of the author is clear. The Hetmanate and the

ukrainian nobility have both rights and privileges guaranteed by the tsar and certain inalienable rights. The tsar's duty is to recognize and uphold these rights while the Ukrainians have an obligation to defend them. Respect for both inalienable and guaranteed rights results in harmony and good order, while their abrogation produces tyranny. The author warns that Ukrainians have always resisted tyranny and that they were "ever ready to give their lives to the last man for the sake of freedom. This is their inborn trait and they do not bear enslavement willingly" (p. 121).

The author of <u>Istoriia Rusov</u> has never been identified. The book appeared under the alleged authorship of Archbishop Hryhorii Konys'kyi but the work's rationalism, anti-clericalism, and differences in style from Konys'kyi's known writings have led scholars to reject his authorship. Recently, Ohloblyn has shown that <u>Istoriia Rusov</u> was written after Konys'kyi's death (1795), sometime between 1801 and 1804.⁵⁸ Undoubtedly the name of Konys'kyi was used to give the appearance of clerical approval and to create a smokescreen which would hide the actual author and the milieu in which the book originated. For over a century scholars have attempted to identify the author, but the many hypotheses and debates proved fruitless.⁵⁹ This scholarly spade work,

58 Introduction to Istoriia Rusov, p. viii.

⁵⁹Much ink has been spilled on the question of the authorship. In the nineteenth century V. Ikonnikov and L. Lazarevs'kyi believed that the author was Hryhorii Poletyka. V. Ikonnikov, <u>Opyt russkoi is-</u> <u>toriografii</u> (Kiev: 1908), Vol. II, Pt. II, pp. 1621-1623; A. Lazarevskii, "Otryvki iz semeinago arkhiva Poletik," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 4 (1891), pp. 97-116. This was supported by D. Doroshenko, M. Hrushevs'kyi and many other

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however, has produced some results. There is strong evidence that the suthor originated from Novhorod-Sivers'k,⁶⁰ and was, perhaps, strangely enough, in the services of Prince Bezborod'ko in St. Petersburg.⁶¹

Istoriia Rusov was enormously popular among the nobility of the former Hetmanate. After about 1825 it was circulated widely in manuscript form.⁶² The German traveler, Johann Georg Kohl, passing through "Little Russia" in 1841, noted the popularity of the work. He reported that <u>Istoriia Rusov</u> was written in such a virulent anti-Russian and oppositionist tone that it could never be published. But there were, nevertheless, whole districts where it could be found in almost every estate.⁶³ In 1846, <u>Istoriia Rusov</u> finally passed censorship and was published. Thus it became available not only to the Left-Bank nobility but also the modern Ukrainian national movement.

Although anonymous political works were frequently strident in

schelars. V. Horlenko and E. Borschak viewed Hryhorii Poletyka's son, Vasyl', as the author: V. Gorlenko, "K istorii iuzhno-russkago obshchestva nachala XIX st.," KSt., No. 1 (1893), pp. 41-76; E. Borschak, La legende historique de l'Ukraine. Istorija Rusiv (Paris: 1949). Finally, M. Slabchenko, P. Klepats'kyi, and A. Iakovliv have settled on O. Bezbord'ko: see M. Slabchenko, Materiialy do ekonomichno-sotsial'no? istori? UkraTny XIX stolittia (Odessa: 1925), Vol. I, pp. 103-105; P. Klepats'kyi, "Lystuvannia Oleksandra Bezborod'ka...," p. 284; I. A. lakovliv, "Istoriya Lystuvannia Oleksandra Bezborod'ka...," p. 284; I. A. lakovliv, "Istoriya Rusov and its Author," Annals of UAAS, No. 2 (1953), pp. 620-669.

600. Ohloblyn, "Where was Istoriya Rusov Written," Annals of UAAS, No. 2 (1953), pp. 670-695.

611. A. lakovliv, "Istoriya Rusov and Its Author," pp. 620-669.

620. Ohloblyn, Introduction to Istoriya Rusiv, pp. x-xv.

63J. G. Kohl, <u>Russia:</u> St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkoff, Riga, Odessa, the German Provinces of the Baltic, the Steppes, the Crimea, and the Interior of the Empire (London: 1844), p. 528. the and sometimes attacked the tsar and the imperial administration, they never questioned the tsar's claim of sovereignty over the Hetmanate. The anonymous authors pointed, at times rather bitterly, at the tsar's failure to uphold the privileges guaranteed to the Hetmanate in perpetuity. The implication of this argument was that the tsar should rectify the injustice suffered by the Hetmanate by restoring these rights. Thus, the political literature, written anonymously and presumably without fear of reprisals, came to the same conclusion as the petitioners for the continuation of the Lithuanian Statute or of the re-establishment of Cossack formations. For virtually all the traditionalists, the only conceivable action was continued loyal service to the tsar in the hope that he would maintain the last remnants of autonomy, or even restore their traditional rights.

While the overwhelming majority of traditionalists were loyal to tsar and Empire, there are indications that a small group had considered the possiblity of resolving the Hetmanate's plight by appealing to an outside power. On April 24, 1791 [N.S.], Vasyl' Kapnist--the same person who had formulated the first Cossack project--held secret talks in Berlin with the Prussian Cabinet Minister, Graf Ewald Friedrich Hertzberg. According to Herzberg's report to King Friedrich Wilhelm III, Kapnist claimed that he was sent by his countrymen to inquire whether in the even of a Russian-Prussian war, the Ukrainians could count on Prussian protection if they attempted to throw off the imperial yoke.⁶⁴

64 The memorandum was discovered by a Polish historian, BornisJaw Dembifiski, "Tajna misja ukraifica w Berlinie w r. 1791," Przegląd Polski, Vol. III (1896), pp. 511-23. M. Hrushevs'kyi identified the Kapnist mentioned in the memorandum as Vasyl' Kapnist, "Sekretna misiia ukraIntsia V Berlini v 1791," Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka, Vol. IX

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supmist complained particularly of Potemkin's tyranny. The Prussian minister was noncommittal. In his memorandum to the King, Hertzberg indicated his belief that Kapnist was sincere, but warned of the possibility of a Russian provocation. The King's reaction was negative and he approved Hertzberg's polite refusal. Although the parties agreed to keep in touch, it was obvious for all that the Kapnist mission ended

is failure.

Shrouded in secrecy, Kapnist's Berlin mission was never discovered by the imperial authorities. So successful was the cover-up that only a few clues as to the identity of the conspirators and their aims remain. Vasyl' Kapnist's own participation in the conspiracy has been questioned. Some scholars even advanced the hypotheses that it was another member of the Kapnist family who went to Prussia.⁶⁵ However, this was highly

(1896); "Miscellanea," pp. 7-9; the memorandum was published by Georg Sacke, "V. V. Kapnist und seine Ode 'Na rabstvo'," Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie, Vol. XVII (1941), pp. 291-301.

65Scholars who hold this point of view refuse to accept the possibility that Vasyl' Kapnist, the "loyal" Russian writer, would have ever been involved in such an undertaking. Since Hertzberg's memorandum never indicated the full name of the Kapnist that visited Berlin, it is certainly possible that some other family member visited Berlin. The candidacy of Vasyl's brother, Petro, was first advanced by V. L. Modzalevskii, Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik, Vol. II, pp. 284-285. It has become the official Soviet interpretation; see Iu. G. Oksman and S. N. Chernov, eds., Vospominaniia i rasskazy deiatelei tainykh obshchestv 1820-kh godov (2 vols.; Moscow: 1931-33), Vol. I, pp. 407-408; A. Matsai, "labeda" V. V. Kapnista (Kiev: 1958), p. 78; L. A. Kovalenko, Velyka frantsuz'ka burzhuazna revoliutsiia i hromads'ko-politychni rukhy na Ukraini v kintsi XVIII st. (Kiev: 1973), pp. 101-102. Despite such Aunerous adherents, the theory that Petro went to Prussia is unconvincing. It is based largely on Petro's reputed liberalism--calling his estate a "republic" and changing the form of peasant obligations on his estate to a small money payment. While these actions may have been tramples of "free thinking," they were probably more connected with the French Revolution and had nothing specifically to do with Ukrainian autonomy. Moreover, while Hertzberg's memorandum does not give the full

mlikely. Vasy1' Kapnist was the only family member who was an active

proponent of autonomy; he had personally lobbied for the renewal of

cossack formations and for the rights of the Cossacks. His daughter

described Vasyl' Kapnist in these words:

Wy father passionately loved his native land and was ready to sacrifice everything he owned for the welfare of Little Russia; upon the slightest oppression or injustice on the part of government officials he would fly to St. Petersburg, leave his family, create debts, and after struggling often with illustrious personages would almost always come back the victor.

In general he took a lively interest in everything that concerned Little Russia, and suffered, one might say, along with her, as a result of which he was for the most part melancholy

name of Kapnist, it does specify his rank (court councilor) and position (state factory manager), both of which correspond to Vasyl' and neither to Petro. Recently, William B. Edgerton in "Laying a Legend to Rest. The Poet Kapnist and Ukraino-German Intrigue," Slavic Review, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (1971), pp. 551-560, advanced another hypothesis that Vasyl's other brother Mykola went to Prussia. His evidence is that Mykola was the only Kapnist other than Vasyl' to hold the rank specified in Hertzberg's memorandum (court councilor), and that in 1812 he stated that he would welcome Napoleon. But one may counter this argument by the fact that Mykola did not have a position in the state factories -- at least there is no evidence for this -- and again while a statement favorable to Napoleon in 1812 may have been considered an act bordering on disloyalty, it has no connection with Cossack rights. Edgerton's methodology, to say the least, is questionable. He sets himself the goal of defending the Russian poet Vasilii Kapnist from "the charge of high treason." He then proceeds to discredit those historians who had held that Vasyl' Kapnist had visited Prussia on the charge of Ukrainian nationalism and/or German anti-Russian intrigue. In his enthusiasm, Edgerton even implies that the ground breaking article by Georg Sacke was part of a Nazi anti-Russian campaign. In a subsequent issue of <u>Slavic Review</u>, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (1973), p. 218+, Edgerton apologized for this implication. A German historian had informed Edgerton that Sacke, far from being a Nazi hack writer, in fact died in a Nazi concentration camp. All of this is, of course, irrelevant as to whether Vasyl' Kapnist Teally went to Prussia in 1791. Most recently, Professor Oleksander Ohloblyn published a refutation of Edgerton's hypothesis: "Berlinska Mislia Kapnista 1791 roku; Istoriohrafila i metodolohila pytannia," Ukrains'kyi istoryk, No. 1-3 (1974), pp. 85-103. Ohloblyn pointed out strious shortcomings in Edgerton's methodology.

and in a bad humor. 66

If myone from the Kapnist family were to undertake such a mission, it seems that Vasyl' Kapnist is still the most logical candidate. while there is substantial evidence that Vasyl' Kapnist was

the secret emissary to Prussia, his co-conspirators have never been identified. Kapnist had claimed that he was delegated by his countrymen to investigate the possibility of Prussian protection. If this is true, it implies that there was an organized conspiratorial group. Of course, Kapnist may have acted on his own. But if others were involved, Kapnist was again a most logical candidate to coordinate any plan of action. His connections were immense. 67 Kapnist was related to some of the most important families in the Hetmanate and Sloboda-Ukraine. As Marshal of the Nobility, he knew almost all the important nobles of the Hetmanate; as director of a Kiev silk factory, he was well acquainted with the Russian bureaucracy. Finally, through his literary efforts, his acquaintances, and Masonic circles, he was in touch with the court and the Russian opposition led by the Grand Duke, Paul, In such a milieu, Kapnist could move about without detection and discuss politics with a great number of people, while revealing his true feelings only to a small group of trusted friends. These wide-ranging connections made Kapnist best suited to carry on a conspiratorial mission. But because of this wide circle of acquaintances, identification of Kapnist's

66s. V. Skalon-Kapnist, Vospominaniia (Oksman and Chernov edition), Vol. I, p. 304, 311 as quoted by Edgerton, p. 555.

67 The Kapnist mission and the problem of Vasyl' Kapnist's goals and connections have been most comprehensively treated by O. Ohloblyn, "Vasyl' Kapnist," Liudy Staroi Ukrainy, pp. 49-114.

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closest collaborators, if there were any, is virtually impossible. Similarly, the aim of the conspirators is open to speculation.

At the time, Russia was at war both with Turkey and with Sweden. Furtherpore, Prussia, with England's support, was openly preparing to strike st the Russian Empire. Perhaps the Ukrainian autonomists believed that the Russian Empire would not survive the combined attack of so many enemies, and that it would, therefore, be best to secure a position for the Hetmanate in the new international order. Kapnist's Cossack project may have been part of a larger plan, according to which these units were to serve as a focal point for the recruitment of all the traditional cossack polks. These could then be used as a bargaining position in the increasingly complex international situation. In his discussion with Hertzberg, Kapnist emphasized that twenty-eight military units (the carabineer units of the former Hetmanate and Sloboda-Ukraine) were serving the Russian Empire, and that they would prefer the renewal of their mcient cossack constitution (l'ancienne Constitution des Cosaques). From the available pieces of evidence it seems that Kapnist and his associates were attempting to use the international situation to bring about the type of "revolution" which Prince Bezborod'ko feared so much. Once the Left-Bank Ukraine (the Hetmanate and Sloboda-Ukraine) possessed an autonomous army, then the pressure for restoring "the hetmancy and other privileges" would be difficult to resist, especially if a major Power were willing to recognize the autonomists claim.

The conclusion of the Turkish and the Swedish wars, in addition to Prussia's co-operation with Russia in the partitions of Poland, trushed any hopes of Prussian support in the regaining of Ukrainian

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sutonomous rights. The Empire was in a stronger position than ever, and even Kapnist and his supporters must have realized that any restitution of autonomy would have to come from the tsar.

From the time of the Kapnist mission until the Napoleonic wars there is no indication of conspiratorial activity in the Left-Bank Ukraine. Napoleon's invasion, however, elicited some pro-French and mti-Russian sentiments in the Hetmanate. The French had spies in the territory of the Hetmanate and were generally well-informed as to the mood of the Ukrainian nobility.⁶⁸ The Russian imperial government was so concerned about the nobility's pro-French sympathies that it directed special Committee Dealing With Treason (Osobyi Komitet dlia del zakliushaiushchikh izmeny) to investigate in the Hetmanate. After vigorous investigations, the Committee failed to find any evidence of treason. but it did report on some questionable behavior. One nobleman was alleged to have said with great joy, "Napoleon will rip Russia apart." A soldier from Pereiaslav, Fedir Hutsan, refused to obey an order and remarked that the situation would soon be reversed and "the Russians [Muscovites] will be butchered to a man." 69 A well-known Ukrainian mobleman, V. L. Lukashevych, proposed a toast for Napoleon at dinner. 70 In addition to these officially investigated incidents, S. B. Skalon

681. Borshchak [E. Borschak] in Napoleon i Ukraina (L'viv: 1937), concentrates on French plans towards "Little Russia."

⁶⁹Ivan Rybakov, "Do kharakterystyky doby kryzy 'ancienne régime' Ma Ukraīni," <u>Naukovyi zbirnyk Leninhrads'koho tovarystva doslidnykiv</u> <u>ukraīns'kož istoriž pys'menstva ta movy</u>, Vol. II (1929), p. 60.

70 Ibid., p. 60.

in her memoirs describes that her uncle, Mykola Kapnist, was ready to welcome Napoleon "with bread and salt."⁷¹

These, however, were only isolated instances. They catalogue

indiscretions or bravado in speech and cannot be taken seriously as a remant of the autonomist movement. Moreover, it is unclear whether these noblemen were showing pro-French sentiments because of a hope to regain Ukrainian autonomy or whether they simply were enchanted with french liberal ideas. Lukashevych, most likely, was genuinely concerned for the Hetmanate. In any case, these incidents posed neither a threat to the Empire nor did they contribute to a strengthened traditionalist or even autonomist viewpoint. During the Napoleonic era, the vast majority of Ukrainian nobles, including almost all of the traditionalists, not only remained loyal but were busily organizing Ukrainian Cossack forces in order to defend the Empire against the French.

There are a few indications, however, that some conspiratorial circles concerned with the traditional rights of the Hetmanate might have existed. In 1825, while investigating the Decembrist movement, the imperial authorities uncovered a secret Little Russian Society.⁷² It was allegedly founded by the same V. L. Lukashevych who had previously toasted Napoleon and who was peripherally connected with the Decembrists. The official inquiry concluded that Lukashevych desired "the independence

71S. V. Skalon-Kapnist, <u>Vospominaniia...</u> (Oksman and Chernov edition), Vol. I, p. 320.

72T. Slabchenko, "Do istorii 'Malorossiiskago Obshchestva'," Ukraina, No. 6 (1925), pp. 46-49. of Little Russia."⁷³ The Society, however, was at best only in the planning stages when Lukashevych was apprehended. Some scholars believe that the frequent references to it at the inquest may, in reality, have been only to a Masonic lodge which was seeking members from "the Little Russian gentry."⁷⁴

The existence of a circle of autonomists in Novhorod-Sivers'k has been confirmed by O. Ohloblyn. In his works, Ohloblyn has proved that a great many patriotic activists and writers lived in Novhorodsivers'k and that much of the traditionalist literature originated . there.⁷⁵ Undoubtedly, these patriots met frequently and discussed pelitics. But there is no direct evidence that they formed any special organization which had as its goal the restitution of Ukrainian autonomous rights.

In sum, the traditionalists, first and foremost, disapproved of total imperial assimilation and wanted to maintain various aspects of their traditional life and institutions. Some pursued active goals of re-establishing Cossack units, others only wanted to retain the lithuanian Statute, while still others wrote and circulated patriotic literature. While the vast majority of traditionalists were completely loyal to tsar and Empire, a daring few initiated foreign contacts or spoke favorably of the Empire's enemies. The

73"Zapiska Borovkova," <u>Russkaia Starina</u>, No. 11 (1898), p. 345; Ivan Rybakov, "Do kharakterystyky...," p. 62.

⁷⁴Ivan Rybakov, "1825-i rik na Ukraini," <u>Ukraina</u>, No. 6 (1925), PP. 14-15.

⁷⁵Liudy Staroi Ukrainy; Opanas Lobasevych; The Introduction to Istoriia Rusov; "Where Was 'Istoriia Rusov" Written"; and many others.

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traditionalists' dissatisfaction grew out of their historical memories of the Hetmanate and their lost privileges. They compared their bleak present with a largely idealized free and glorious past. Although Russians and foreign travelers perceived this dissatisfaction, they also exaggerated it. General Aleksandr Mikhailovskii-Danilevski reported in exaggerated fashion:

I did not find one person in Little Russia with whom I was able to talk in a manner friendly towards Russia; there reigned an open spirit of opposition in all of them. Such a hatred is caused by the violation of Little Russia's rights, by the decline of credit and industry, by the increase of taxes, which have reduced all of Little Russia to poverty, and by a poor arrangement of the judicial system, where conscience is for sale. 76

In his travels through the Hetmanate and Sloboda-Ukraine in 1841,

Johann Georg Kohl wrote in the same vein:

Such is the aversion of the people of Little Russia to those of Great Russia that it may fairly be described as a national hatred, and the feeling has rather strengthened than diminished since the seventeenth century, when the country was annexed to the Moscovite empire. The Malorossian, to this day, sympathizes more with the Pole than he does with the Moscovite.

Before their subjection, all Malorossians were freemen, and serfdom, they maintain, had never been known among them. It was the Russians, they say, that reduced one-half of the people to slavery. During the first century after the union, Little Russia continued to have her own hetmans, and retained much of her ancient constitution and privileges, but all these have been swept away by the retrograde reforms of the last and present century. Even the name of Malo-Rossiya has, since 1837, been abolished, and occurs no longer in any official document. Till that year, there had been a governor-general of Little Russia but the office has been done away with, and the former inscription over the government hotel at Poltava has been effaced. This has given great offense to the nobles of the land, and a stranger will not be long among them without hearing bitter complaints on the subject....

76"Iz vospominanii Mikhailovskago-Danilevskago," <u>Russkaia Starina</u>, No. 10 (1900), p. 212. Little Russia was formerly a republic under the protection of Poland and the nobles preserve still many tokens of their golden age of independence. In many houses will be found portraits of all the Khmelnitzkis [sic], Mazeppas [sic], skoropatzkis [sic], and Rasumoffskis [sic], who, at various times have held the dignity of hetman, and manuscripts relating to those days are carefully treasured up...

Should the colossal empire of Russia one day fall to pieces, there is little doubt but the Malorossians will form a separate state. They have their own language, their own historical recollections, seldom mingle or intermarry with the Moscovite rulers, and are in number already more than 10,000,000. Their national sinews may be said to lie among the rural nobility living in the villages, from among whom every great political movement has hitherto emanated.⁷⁷

To be sure the traditionalists could never have cherished illusions about a separate state as Kohl speculated. They felt that they were epigones, the last remnant of a society and country which would soon disappear. This attitude is captured by the young historian Oleksa Martos who in 1811, while visiting Mazepa's gravesite in Moldavia, jetted the following in his diary:

Mazepa died far away from his country whose independence he defended. He was a friend of liberty and therefore deserves to be honored by posterity. After his expulsion from Little Russia, its inhabitants lost their sacred rights which Mazepa had defended for so long with great enthusiasm and patriotic ardor. He is no more, and the names of Little Russia and its brave Cossacks have disappeared from the list of peoples who, although small in numbers, are yet famous for their way of life and constitution.... Now rich Little Russia is reduced to two or three provinces. That such is the common destiny of states and republics, we can see from the history of other mations...78

77J. G. Kohl, Russia: St. Petersburg..., pp. 527-529.

⁷⁸mZapiski inzhenernago ofitsera Martosa o Turetskoi voine v tsarstvovanie Aleksandra Pavlovvcha 1806-1812," <u>Russkii Arkhiv</u>, No. 7 (1893), p. 345, as quoted in D. Doroshenko, <u>A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography</u> (Special Issue of the <u>Annals of UAAS</u>, No. 4 (1956), and Nos. 1 and 2 (1957), p. 112. For the traditionalists, only the memories of the Hetmanate remained. Nostalgia for the past without any hopes for the future was the dominant mood of the traditionalists well into the 1840's.

2. The Struggle for the Ennoblement of Former Ukrainian Office Holders.

Although the assimilators were eager to participate in the new imperial order and the traditionalists had become resigned to it, the imperial government did not permit the Ukrainian nobles to forget their autonomous past. By questioning the right of many Ukrainian nobles to membership in the dvorianstvo, the government created a new issue and also a new rallying point.

The legality of their imperial titles was first challenged by Amiantsev's successor, Governor-General N. N. Krechetnikov. In order to discredit his predecessor, Krechetnikov reported to the Senate on massive irregularities in admitting claimants into the local dvorianstvo. He cited that 22,702 taxed persons, hitherto unrecognized as nobles, had been included into the register of nobility.⁷⁹ Krechetnikov's report alarmed the Senate. As a result, a decree was issued stating that no a single person was to enter the dvoriantsvo without sufficient proof of nobility; furthermore, it was necessary to diminish the number of pretenders to the dvorianstvo from among the taxed estates (sosloviie).⁸⁰

79D. Miller, "Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskago byta staroi Malorossii; Prevrashchenie kozatskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo," Pt. III, KSt., No. 3 (1897), p. 354.

⁸⁰The ukaz was quoted in "Zapiska iz dela, proizvedennago v komitete vysochaishe utverzhdennom pri pravitel'stvuiushchem Senate kasateľno Prav dvorianstva byvshikh chinov malorossiiskikh," <u>ChOIDR</u>, Bk. II, Pt. V (1861), pp. 128-131.

Armed with such an authorization, Krechetnikov began a vigorous investigation of the nobles registered in the tax rolls. By 1795 only 12,597 individuals were recognized as "nobles without any doubt." The claims of the remaining 10,105 taxed nobles were either totally rejected or additional proof of nobility was required whereby most of them were never recognized. 81 The 12,597 "nobles without any doubt" also had difficulties. In the Novhorod-Sivers'k and Kiev provinces they were dropped from the tax registers (1795 census), but not in the Chernihiv province and 2,616 proven nobles were still taxed. 82 In 1803 many of the nobles previously excluded from the tax registers were again included due to the Senate's ruling that the local administration was not authorized to change tax registers. 83 Thus, in the early nineteenth century 12,000 "mobles without any doubt" were still engaged in litigations in order to be exempted from the imperial tax rolls, the imperial draft, and mjoy the full rights of nobility. Although most of these nobles finally obtained recognition, the imperial bureaucracy made the process a protracted and excruciating one.

In addition to substantially reducing the number of taxed individuals who had been admitted into the dvorianstvo, the imperial authorities devised an exceedingly difficult procedure for new candidates to

⁸²A. Markovych, "Istoricheskaia...," pp. 8-9.

⁸³The fate of these nobles is described by D. Miller, "Prevrashchemie...," Pt. III, pp. 368-374.

⁸¹A. Markovich, "Istoricheskaia i statisticheskaia zapiska o dvorianskom soslovii i dvorianskikh imushchestvakh v Chernigovskoi gubernii," <u>Materialy dlia statistiki Rossiiskoi imperii</u> (St. Petersburg: 1842), Vol. II, Pt. IV, pp. 8-9; D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie...," Pt. III, pp. 367-368.

obtain the status of dvoriane. In a decree issued on January 9, 1792, trechetnikov imposed fines on unsuccessful candidates for the dvorianstvo as well as on the local Commission of the Dvorianstvo which honored dubious claims.⁸⁴ Those individuals who risked the consequences of an unsuccessful claim to prove their nobility were also penalized. trechetnikov argued that, as nobles, such individuals were not allowed to hold Cossack lands, and if they possessed any, they were to be confiscated by the state. The latter ruling was of such dubious legality that Krechetnikov was forced to rescind it.⁸⁵ However, the Governor-General's message to the Ukrainian nobility was clear. New seekers of imperial titles faced considerable risks.

Krechetnikov's removal in 1795 and the accession of Paul I to the throne gave the Ukrainian nobles renewed hope that their claims would be honored. In January 1797 a decree ordered the compilation of a new Imperial Heraldry Book and all dvorianstvo families were to submit evidence of ennoblement.⁸⁶ This decree greatly centralized control over the granting of titles. Both new candidates for the dvorianstvo and recognized nobles had to deal with the Heraldic Office, which was the final arbiter in all cases. In effect, local commissions of the dvorianstvo could now only recommend or support candidates for the

84 Krechetnikov's stern measures are treated by D. Miller, "Pre-Wrashchenie...," Pt. III, pp. 363-368.

⁸⁶PSZ, No. 17,749 (January 20, 1797), Vol. XXIV, pp. 298-299; PSZ, No. 178881 (March 19, 1797), Vol. XXIV, pp. 513-514.

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⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 366.

dvorianstvo. 87 At first, the Ukrainian nobles benefitted, since they could again attempt to obtain titles of dvorianstvo without any risk. The Heraldic Office recognized all Polish titles and coats-of-arms. Service in Ukrainian institutions was sufficient evidence to obtain dvorianstvo, but no coat-of-arms was permitted.⁸⁸ It seemed that the only impediment in obtaining titles for the majority of Ukrainian sobles was the excruciatingly slow procedure of the Heraldic Office. By the turn of the century, however, there was a basic shift

in the policy of the Heraldic Office, and claims to dvorianstvo based solely on service in the abolished Ukrainian institutions were no longer recognized. Since each case was decided individually, the new policy became apparent only after several Ukrainian candidates had already lost their cases. The Ukrainian nobles thus discovered that the Heraldic Office had taken a strict constructionist interpretation of the Ukrainis offices. Neither the Table of Ranks nor the Charter of Nobility recognized that service in Ukrainian institutions gave an automatic right to dvorianstvo. Since there was no official table which equated Ukrainian offices with corresponding ones in the Table of Ranks, the Heraldic Office had no legal basis for honoring Ukrainian claims. 89

Had it been fully implemented, the ruling of the Heraldic Office

87M. V. Klochkov, Ocherki pravitel'stvennoi deiatel'nosti vremeni Pavla I (Petrograd: 1916), p. 445.

88D. Miller, "Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskago byta staroi Malorossii. Prevrashchenie kozatskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo," Pt. IV, ISt., No. 4 (1897), pp. 2-3.

⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 4-5, 8.

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would have had a catastrophic effect on many Ukrainian noble families. It meant that those nobles who had joined the imperial administration were eligible for dvorianstvo if their position were sufficiently high in the Table of Ranks. But all those who had retired without ever holding any imperial office were in jeopardy. They themselves could be taxed, their children were barred from cadet schools, subjected to the draft, and disqualified from many military and administrative positions. It was quite possible for a Ukrainian noble of superior rank to become ineligible for dvorianstvo, while one of much lower rank, having transferred to the imperial administration at the time of the abolition of Ukrainian institutions, was readily recognized as a dvorianin.

'The ruling of the Heraldic Office caused a storm of protest and indignation among the Ukrainian nobility. It violated a twenty-year local practice which recognized Ukrainian service as indisputable evidence for dvorianstvo. The incensed nobles began a struggle to obtain full recognition of Ukrainian ranks and titles. They were led by a smaller group of nobles, who called themselves "patriots."⁹⁰ These patriots began collecting charters of Polish kings, all the treaties concluded between the tsars and hetmans, tsarist <u>ukary</u> and land grants, the decrees of hetmans, documents issued by the College of Foreign Affairs and the Senate. On the basis of this material, they prepared various petitions, position papers, and memoranda to defend their right

90 The correspondence of some such nobles, collected in the "Books of the Nobility," was entitled "Correspondence Between Patriots of this Land for the Common Good" (Perepiska mezhdu patriotami sego kraia dlia obshchei pol'zy); see D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie...," Pt. W, P. 13.

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to nobility. Vague historical memories were now reenforced with histori-

cal documentation polemical works on the issue of the Ukrainian nobility

sppeared in Chernihiv province. The General Judge in the reconstructed ukrainian court system (1796-1801), Roman Markovych, wrote a <u>Commentary</u> on the <u>Rights of the Little Russian Nobility</u> ("Zamechaniia o pravakh malorossiiskago dvorianstva").⁹¹ He argued that Ukrainian ranks were always accepted by the Russian authorities. As proof he cited the following documents: the "articles of 1728" (Hetman Danylo Apostol's election), a 1735 opinion of the Foreign College indicating Russian equivalents for Ukrainian ranks, and most importantly, the imperial ranks given to those who transferred in 1782 from the abolished Ukrainian institutions to the new imperial administration.

Writing virtually at the same time as Markovych was another, more erudite polemicist, Timofii Kalyns'kyi.⁹² His work was entitled, <u>Thoughts About Little Russian Ranks, Their Advantages, the Evidence</u> <u>Necessary for Proving Nobility on the Basis of Service and in What Sec-</u> <u>tions of the Nobility's Book of Heraldry These Ranks Should be Recorded</u> ("Mhenie o malorossiiskikh chinakh i o ikh preimushchestve, a ravno i o razbore ikh dokazatel'stv o dvorianstve po sluzhbe i chinam ikh dlia meseniia v Rodoslovnuiu dvorianskuiu knigu i v kakuiu imenno onoi chast'").⁹³ Kalyns'kyi claimed that the Ukrainian starshyna was already

91 Discussed by D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie...," Pt. IV, pp. 14-17. 92For a brief biography of T. Kalyns'kyi see O. Ohloblyn, Liudy Starof Ukrafny, pp. 33-48.

⁹³The work was never published, but there is a detailed summary of its contents, D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie...," Pt. IV, pp. 17-22. recognized as shliakhta at the end of the sixteenth century. As shliahts, they had greater rights than the Russian dvorianstvo, since not only the starshyna but the whole Cossack estate was "a knightly order with shliakhta status" and thus readily qualified as Russian dvorianstvo. He equated the Ukrainian sotnyks (a rather low rank) with the Russian voevoda, the General Starshyna as <u>dummie boiare</u>. The hetman, in Kalyns'kyi's opinion, could hardly be equated to a general fieldmarshal (the rank held by Rozumovs'kyi) but was a virtual sovereign.

Both works were discussed at an 1805 meeting of the Chernihiv dverianstvo and resulted in a petition to the imperial authorities, followed by at least two other petitions. All of these were shelved in the office of Governor-General Prince Kurakin,⁹⁴ and only in 1809 these petitions were passed on to the Council of Ministers.

Simultaneously, the nobles of Poltava, the other province which had once been part of the Hetmanate, were also preparing to counter the nuling of the Heraldic Office. The Poltava nobles were familiar with petitions presented by the Chernihiv nobility, but felt that these omitted the most important and fundamental points.⁹⁵ They decided to draw up new petitions, but in consultation with their counterparts in Chernihiv. Mykhailo Myloradovych, the Poltava Provincial Marshal, discussed the matter with R. I. Markovych, who in turn recommended Timofii Kalyns'kyi as the most knowledgeable person on the subject.

94 For the 1805 meeting and the petitions see D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie....," Pt. IV. p. 30.

95D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie...," Pt. IV, p. 31;

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sustriantly, Myloradovych entered into a lively correspondence which served to clearly define the issues and to co-ordinate the activities served to clearly in both provinces. With this "correspondence between of the poblicity in both provinces. With this "correspondence between the patriots of the country for the common good," the nobility's struggle becomes an organized movement.⁹⁶

On commission by the Poltava nobility, Kalyns'kyi produced in 1858 a new polemical work, <u>Notes on the Little Russian Nobility</u> ("Primedaniia o malorossiiskom dvorianstve").⁹⁷ It was indeed the fundamental splogy of the rights of the Ukrainian nobility desired by the Poltava sples. It enumerated all the grants given by monarchs from the time of Sigismund Augustus to Catherine II and cited all the pertinent articles of the Lithuanian Statute as well as treaties of various hetmans. Reparting from his previous stance, Kalyns'kyi no longer proposed that each Ukrainian title be equated with a specific Russian one, but rather that all Ukrainian title bearers simply be ennobled, with the General Starshyma and polkovnyks entered into the sixth part of the Heraldry bok, the polk starshyma into the third, and the sotnia starshyma into the second.

When in 1809 the Poltava nobles elected a new provincial marshal, V. I. Charnysh, they specifically instructed him to obtain recognition for the Ukrainian nobility. On the basis of all previous works Charnysh prepared a draft of a new petition which was circulated locally. It

96 For Kalyns'kyi's activities see Ohloblyn, Liudy ..., pp. 33-48.

97 This work was also never published but again, D. Miller provides a detailed summary, "Prevrashchenie...," Pt. IV, pp. 34-36.

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was amended by Adrian Chepa and V. H. Poletyka, son of Hryhorii, who in addition wrote an independent work, <u>Notes on the Little Russian</u> <u>Nobility</u> (1809) ("Zapiska o malorossiskom dvorianstve"). Vasyl' Poletyka argued that during Polish times all shliakhta were legally equal in status and rights, and this equality had been guaranteed when the Hetmanate came under the protection of the tsar. It was unthinkable, therefore, that some nobles were to be recognized as dvoriane and others not.⁹⁸

The polemics on the Ukrainian nobility continued throughout 1809. Adrian Chepa wrote his <u>Notes on Little Russian Ranks</u> ("Zapiska o malorossiskikh chinakh") in which he gave a detailed historical explanation of all Ukrainian offices and attempted to prove that these ranks were always recognized by the Russian authorities.⁹⁹ Adrian Chepa and V. H. Poletyka co-ordinated their activities by mutual exchange of historical materials and advice.¹⁰⁰ Finally, Fedir Tumans'kyi wrote his <u>Notes</u> in defense of the rights of the nobility.¹⁰¹ Tumans'kyi's accession to the "patriotic" camp gave it a great stimulus. He was a leading

98v. H. Poletyka's notes were published in "Zapiska o malorossiiskom dvorianstve (1809)," KSt., No. 1 (1893), Appendix, pp. 1-8.

99"Zapiska o malorossiiskikh chinakh Adriana Ivanovicha Chepy," KSt., No. 4 (1897), Appendix, pp. 23-32; Nos. 5, Appendix, pp. 33-39.

100The correspondence between A. Chepa and V. H. Poletyka was published by V. Gorlenko (Horlenko), "K istorii iuzhno-russkago obshchestva nachala XIX st.," KSt., No. 1 (1893), pp. 41-76, and also in "Dokumenty, izvestiia i zametki," KSt., No. 5 (1890), pp. 364-369.

101Unfortunately Tumans'kyi's Notes were never published. The manuscript has been seen by O. Ohloblyn (cf. Liudy..., p. 258) and A. Lazarevskii (cf. Zamechaniia na istoricheskiia monografii D. Millera a malorusskom dvorianstve i statutovykh sudakh [Kharkiv: 1898], p. 26).

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intellectual of the Hetmanate and the planner of an academic library 102 More important, as a literary figure and the former editor of St. Petersburg's <u>Rossilskil Magazin</u>, Tumans'kyl enjoyed a. national literary reputation.¹⁰³ This was a further indication to the imperial authorities that the movement was not limited to a few malcontents, but included some of the most illustrious figures of the Hetmanate.

By the end of 1809 the discussion had terminated, and the Poltava mobility presented its petition. The local and central authorities considered the petition in conjunction with those received from Chernihiv province. The Committee of Ministers decided that "in the case of the little Russian dvorianstvo the same rules should be utilized as were made by the General-Feld'marshal graf Rumiantsev-Zadunaiskii."¹⁰⁴ The Napoleonic Wars, however, prevented the implementation of this ruling and subsequently, the Ukrainian nobles were forced again and again to petition the central authorities. In 1819 and again in 1827 these petitions were vigorously supported by the Governor-General Prince Repnin.¹⁰⁵ While the Council of Ministers acted favorably, the measures were

1020. Ohloblyn, "Fedir Tumans'kyi i ioho proekt akademichno? hnyharni v Hlukhovi kintsia 1770-kh rr.," <u>Naukovyi Zbirnyk Ukra?ns'ka</u> Vil'na Akademiia Nauk u SShA, Vol. II (1953), pp. 106-114.

103For a bibliography of Tumans'kyi's works see M. N. Longinov, "Russkie pisateli v XVIII stoletie," Chapter XIX, Fedor Osipovich Tumanskyi," Russkaia Starina, Vol. IX (1873), pp. 335-336. O. Ohloblyn provides a brief biography in Liudy..., pp. 248-258 and in "Fedir Tumans'kyi i ioho proekt..."

46-49. Gorlenko, "K istorii iuzho-russkago obshchestva...," pp.

105 D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie...," Pt. IV, KSt., No. 4 (1897), Pp. 40-44.

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usually blocked or tabled in some special commission of the Senate.

The reason for the Senatorial opposition was that the senate supported bureaucratic rank (chin) and opposed an entirely hereditary estate nobility. In a meticulous study of every imperial decree on ukrainian ranks, the Senate Commission attempted to prove that only the higher ones bought hereditary nobility while the lower ranks qualified for personal nobility.¹⁰⁶ The descendants of those in the lower ranks, therefore, were not to be considered as nobles, but could become nobles, even hereditary ones, by achieving the appropriate level in the Table of Ranks. The Senate did not want to exclude the non-Russian dvoriane from the dvorianstvo, it merely wanted them to enter the dvorianstvo through appropriate advancement in imperial service rather than by claiming illustrious ancestors.

The issue was finally brought up at the Imperial Council and settled by imperial decree in 1835. All Ukrainian military and civilian ranks except for the lowest--Comrades of the Standard and voznyi--were recognized as automatically bestowing hereditary dvorianstvo on its holders and their descendants.¹⁰⁷ This decision finally settled what was for the nobility the last remaining issue stemming from the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy.

While the movement to obtain imperial recognition of Ukrainian

106The reports of the Senate Commission dealing with Ukrainian ranks has been published, "Zapiska iz dela, proizvedennago v komitete Vysochaishe utverzhdennom pri pravitel'stvuiushchem Senate, kasatel'no prav na dvorianstvo byvshikh chinov malorosiiskikh," <u>ChOIDR</u>, Bk. 2 (1861), Pt. V, pp. 80-139.

107 PSZ, 2nd ed., No. 7976 (March 20, 1835), Vol. X, Pt. 1, pp. 254-255

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titles was, without doubt, motivated by class interest; it had broader implications for the/ national consciousness. Not all nobles would realize gains from the success of the movement. In fact, many already possessed titles to the imperial dvorianstvo. All the leaders of the movement -- Roman Markovych, Tymofii Kalyns'kyi, Mykailo Myloradovych, Vasyl' Poletyka, Adrian Chepa, Vasyl' Charnysh, and Fedir Tumans'kyi-vere recognized as dvoriane without any question, all except Kalyns & yi and Markovych were prosperous and held a rank in the Table of Ranks, 108 As the struggle became protracted, many of the descendants of the unrecognized nobles had already gained dvorianstvo on the basis of imperial service, which occurred on a large scale during the Napoleonic wars. The best evidence for this is that the recognition of most Ukrainian titles in 1835, brought no increase in the number of nobles in Poltava and Chernihiv provinces; in fact, the number continued to decline. 109 In purely socio-economic terms, the lack of recognition of Ukrainian titles had dire consequences for only a part of the nobility, and the

108v. Modzalevs'kyi provides information as to rank and wealth for the following individuals; Roman Markovych reached rank 6 (kollemskii sovetnik), Malorossiiskii Radoslovnik, Vol. III, p. 430; Mykhailo Myloradovych, rank 3 (tainyi sovetnik), ibid., Vol. III, pp. 490-491. Vasyl' H. Poletyka, rank 5 (statskii sovetnik), ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 126-127. Tymofii Kalyns'kyi only reached rank 9 (titulairnoi sovetnik); see 0. Ohloblyn, Liudy..., pp. 33-48. Fedir Tumans'kyi had rank 5 (statskii sovetnik); see graf Grigorii Miloradovich, Rodoslovnaia kniga (mermigovskago dvorianstva (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1901), Vol. II, 7t. VI, p. 203 and O. Ohloblyn, Liudy..., pp. 248-258 and "Fedir Tumans'hyi...," pp. 106-114. I have been unable to establish the precise rank held by A. Chepa and Vasyl' Charnysh, but since Charnysh was also the Marshal of the Nobility for the whole Poltava province, he must have held an appropriate rank.

109 her of nobles dropped from 12,006 in 1834 to 10,551 in 1850. In Poltava province there is a slight decrease from 10,988 in 1834 to 10,875 in 1850; V. M. Kabuzan and S. M. Troitskii, "Izmeneniia v chislenosti, udel'nom vese i razmeshchenii dvorianstva v Rossii v 1782-1858 gg.,"

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problem had diminished considerably by the 1820's.

Beyond the bread-and-butter issue, the movement for the recognition of Ukrainian titles was reinforced by the nobility's strong local patriotism. This patriotism reflected two main concepts: the nation and the Fatherland. A long-standing tradition stemming from Polish times had equated the nation with the nobility. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the nobles made up the nation which ruled the state. Thus, in defending the nobility, "the patriots" were also defending the rights of the nation and their Fatherland--the Hetmanate. The writings of "the patriots" contain a telling gradation of loyalty and identification. The first loyalty was to the tsar, then to the imperial state, but they still reserved the term "fatherland" for the territory of the Hetmanate.

Such concepts, typical for the large multinational empires of the eighteenth century, had already been challenged by the nation-state of revolutionary France. But in the territory of the Hetmanate, the old views were still firmly entrenched. Although the Hetmanate no longer existed, the values it embodied remained strong. The ruling of the Heraldic Office infuriated the Ukrainian "patriots" because it questioned the status of their heroic ancestors and the traditions of their Fatherland. This was the reason for a highly emotional patriotic outcry. For example, T. Kalyns'kyi wrote to M. Myloradovych, "A passionless concern for the Fatherland, and, moreover, the degradation of our native [otechestvennie] titles, would cause even the dumb to become 'Vocal and with an apostolic and prophetic voice speak out the truth."

Istoriia SSSR, No. 4 (1971), p. 164.

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(alyns'kyi added that, "I am ready to die in defense of our common advantages and freedoms."¹¹⁰ R. Markovych wrote his work out of "a real for my countrymen," and A. Chepa pursued the struggle because of his "real and love for the nation."¹¹¹ When in 1809-1810 it seemed that the Ukrainian nobility had triumphed, V. H. Poletyka wrote to A. Chepa, "How pleasant it is to work for the glory and utility of the fatherland. Our own feelings, the feeling that in troubled times, we, nevertheless, did not live in vain, rewards us and comforts us in death and gives us the right to call ourselves 'sons of the Fatherland'."¹¹²

The sudden decision of the Heraldic Office not to recognize ukrainian titles slowed somewhat the imperial assimilation and Russification of the nobility. Although only part of the Ukrainian nobility was faced with the possible loss of position, wealth, and way of life, the nobility as a whole, at least in official petitions, closed ranks and fought the Heraldic Office. While, for the most part, the nobles were ultimately successful, the long and sometimes bitter struggle produced an outburst of local patriotism. The Ukrainian nobles viewed the action of the Heraldic Office not only as a socio-economic threat, but uso as an insult to their Fatherland and a belittlement of their ancestors. Their emotional outcry strongly reinforced the traditionallists' preoccupation with a largely romanticized past.

The struggle over the recognition of Ukrainian offices and titles

110D. Miller, "Prevrashćhenie...," Pt. IV, p. 44.
111<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 14.
112V. Gorlenko, "K istori¶ iuzhno-russkago obshchestva...," p. 56.

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in the imperial dvorianstvo was the last action of the nobility as a fairly cohesive Ukrainian independent political factor. The subsequent fate of the nobility was varied. Most became Russified and faithfully served the Empire. The more politically inclined joined all-Russian movements covering the full spectrum of opinion from the extreme right to the left. Others vegetated on their estates and adhered to a "Little Russian" localism. They continued their antiquarianist historical interests and supported local educational and cultural institutions. But the struggle preserved the idea of a Ukrainian fatherland well beyond the demise of the last institutions of the Hetmanate. To this extent it served as a link between the traditional autonomy of the past and Ukrainian nationalism of the future.

The Heritage of the Nobility: Political and Historical Works and the Beginnings of a Ukrainian Vernacular Literature.

The struggle over the recognition of Ukrainian titles generated a search for evidence to bolster traditional claims and this laid the foundations for the systematic collection of historical materials. This limited goal was soon expanded to the preparation of a scholarly history of Little Russia. The nobles believed that such a work would greatly facilitate the recognition of the Ukrainian contribution to the imperial all-Russian history and culture. On May 6, 1809, the "patriot" Adrian Chepa wrote to his colleague Vasyl' H. Poletyka:

If you will undertake the great labour of writing a famous branch of Russian history--a history of Little Russia, you will accomplish a task worthy of you. Posterity will give its due to the achievements of your late father, will never

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forget you among other outstanding men of our fatherland. I expect you have many materials necessary for such a worthwhile edition... I can assist you with those documents I have.

At the time of Chepa's call, the history of the Hetmanate was still poorly represented. Only three major works existed: Vasyl Ruban's Tratkaia letopis' Malyia Rossii (St. Petersburg: 1777) which was an up-dated early eighteenth century Cossack chronicle; Opanas Shafons'kyi's Chernigovskago namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie (1786) which contained a 136 page preface describing the origins, development, and decline of the Hetmanate; and Oleksander Rigel'man's, Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii i eia narode i kozakakh voobshche (1787), which was on the borderline between a chronicle and a critical history. 114 Shafons'kyi's and Rigel'man's works, moreover, were available only in manuscript form, for they were published only in mid-nineteenth centre. tury. 115 With the exception of several documents and articles published by Vasyl' Tumans'kyi in his Rossiiskii Magazin (1792-1794) the only other history was written by a young nobleman, Iakiv Markovych, Zapiski o Malorossii, eia zhiteliakh i proizvedeniiakh (Notes on Little Russia, Its Inhabitants and Products). Published in 1798 in St.

113v. Gorlenko, "Iz istorii iuzhnorusskago obshchestva...," p. 53. Translated by G. S. N. Luckyj, <u>Between Gogol' and Ševčenko</u>, p. 20.

114 V. Ikonnikov, Opyt russkoi istoriografii (Kiev: 1908), Vol. II, Pt. 7, p. 1953.

115_A. Rigel'man, <u>Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii i eia</u> Marode i kozakakh voobshche (Moscow: 1847); Afanasii Shafonskii, <u>Chernigovskago namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie s kratkim</u> <u>Reograficheskim i istoricheskim opisaniem Malyia Rossii</u> (Kiev: 1851). Petersburg and dedicated to Markovych's protector, D. T. Troshchyns'kyi (who was also from the Hetmanate), the work was full of enthusiasm and patriotism, but made no new contribution to historical knowledge. As Ia. Markovych himself admitted, "Up to now Little Russia has not been described in detail by anyone. I have attempted to portray it not as a historian or scholar, but as a young son who devotes his first record of feeling and understanding to his mother country."¹¹⁶

while Iakiv Markovych's attitude would be applauded by the "patriots," even they realized that the fledgling study of Ukrainian history needed a more solid foundation. It was provided in the nineteenth century by numerous local studies--best exemplified by Mykhailo Markov's work on Chernihiv and Maksym Berlinskyi's on Kiev.¹¹⁷ But the need for a comprehensive, systematic general history was also recognized. Vasyl' H. Poletyka and Adrian Chepa had unsuccessfully attempted to write such a history.¹¹⁸ Oleksa Martos, the son of the sculptor Ivan Martos, actually produced a three-volume manuscript which passed the censor, but was never published and subsequently lost.¹¹⁹ It was a nobleman, Dmytro Bantysh-Kamens'kyi, connected peripherally with the Hetmanate, who succeeded in publishing the first comprehensive,

116D. Doroshenko, <u>A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography</u>, p. 100.
117Ibid., p. 107.

II8. V. Gorlenko, "Iz istorii iuzhnorusskago obshchestva...," Pp. 50-53.

119_{A.} Lazarevskii, "Prezhnie izyskateli Malorusskoi stariny; II. Aleksei Ivanovich Martos," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 2 (1895), pp. 170-194; only two Chapters from the third volume survived and were published in <u>Severnyi</u> <u>Arkhiv</u>, Nos. 13-14 (1822) and Nos. 6, 12, 13 (1823). professional history, <u>Istoriia Maloi Rossii so vremen prisoedineniia</u> <u>onoi k rossiiskomu gosudarstvu pri tsare Aleksee Mikhailoviche, s</u> <u>tratkim obozreniem pervobytnago sostoianiia ego kraia</u> (Moscow: 1822).¹²⁰ This four-volume work outlined in a detached manner the history of Ukraine from Kievan times to the beginning of the nineteenth century. It became established as the basic textbook for Ukrainian history until the beginning of the twentieth century by which time four editions had appeared.

With the appearance of Bantysh-Kamens'kyi's history, the scholarly study of the Ukraine and the Hetmanate had become established. The nobility's avocation for Ukrainian history continued unabated throughout the nineteenth century. They published new monographs--most notably Nykola Markovych's five volume <u>Istoriia Malorossii</u> (The History of little Russia)¹²¹--family papers, genealogies, and local studies. By the 1830's, however, historical studies ceased to be the preserve of nobles who traced their origins to the Hetmanate, and began to attract scholars from other Ukrainian regions and social strata. But it was the nobles of the Hetmanate who provided the foundation for a Ukrainian mational historiography. Whatever their varied motivations--to record the end of the Hetmanate, to glorify the Cossack past, to justify their claim to dvorianstvo, or merely to write a scholarly history--the nobles'

120 Dmytro Bantysh-Kamens'kyi's father, the learned archivist M. Bantysh-Kamens'kyi, was born in Nizhyn, studied in the Kiev Academy and eventually made a career in Moscow, where Dmytro was born. Dmytro eventually became an aide to the Ukrainian Governor-General, Prince Repain, and lived in the Hetmanate where he wrote his history.

121N. Markovich, Istoriia Malorossii (5 vols.; Moscow: 1842-43).

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writings clearly revealed that the Ukraine had a distinct and colorful past from which lessons could be drawn in discussing the present and in planning for the future.

Equally significant for the Ukrainian revival was the nobility's experimentation with a literature written in the Ukrainian vernacular. Up to the end of the eighteenth century the vernacular was rarely used. For religious writings and belles lettres and even personal papers, Church Slavonic and Latin were utilized while a special chancellery language was used for official business. In the second half of the eighteenth century these languages were replaced by Russian, which for Ukrainians was just another artificial literary language. Gradually Russian took hold, and all writings, official business and politics, were conducted in Russian while Ukrainian, as in previous times, was reserved for the home and immediate family. Clearly, Ukrainian was viewed as a language unsuited for high culture.

It was the fascination of late classicism with vernacular as a rich, coarse, and intrinsically humorous peasant dialect which permitted the first experimentation with Ukrainian.¹²² The theory of literature of the classicists required the adherence to a high, middle and low style. Low style burlesques and travesties were written in various Russian dialects, notably N. Osipov's parody of the <u>Aeneid</u> (1791), and, thus prepared the way for the use of Ukrainian. The nobles of the Hetmanate, therefore, with a variety of motives--patriotism, literary

¹²² For the impact of classicism on Ukrainian literature see D. Chyzhevs'kyi, Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury (New York: 1965), pp. 325-334

interests, or self-amusement--began experimenting with a literature

written in Ukrainian.

The first known attempt to utilize the vernacular in modern

literature was by Opanas Lobysevych, a literary figure and former adjutant of Hetman Rozumovs'kyi.¹²³ ~ He wrote "Virgil's Shepherds...Dressed up in Little Russian Coats" a travesty of Virgil. Unfortunately, Lobysevych's work has been lost. Lobysevych's intentions, however, were far more serious than just producing humor and local color. In a letter of September 30, 1794 to another literary figure, Archbishop Hryhorii Konys'kyi, Lobysevych outlined a conscious desire for the development of literature in Ukrainian:

As in all fashions of clothes so in all languages there is a beauty of its own. Especially, when the smoke of the fatherland is sweet, the fragrance of native thoughts is sweetest. For the honor of our nation, our mother who was always distinguished for great scholars and produced so many luminaries, for the sake of those who love their fatherland and know how to discover precious thoughts under the layer of common speech, I ask your Grace to oblige me exceedingly by preparing copies of Tans'kyi or your own interludia¹²⁴ and sending them to me by mail to St. Petersburg. Let them appear in print, let our Plautus, our Wolière, if nothing more, add greatness to the fatherland. For I myself remember some verses depicting Easter, the flight of the devil, Judas' death--all beautiful descriptions.¹²⁵

Several years later, Ivan Kotliarevs'kyi, a petty nobleman from

123For a biography of Lobysevych, see O. Ohloblyn, Opanas Lobyseych (1732-1805) (Munich: 1966).

124 Interludia or intermedia were short comic scenes staged in Ukrainian between the acts of a serious play (usually in Church Slavonic or Latin).

¹²⁵O. Ohloblyn, Opanas Lobysevych, pp. 81-82. Passage translated by G. S. N. Luckyj, Between Gogol' and Sevcenko, pp. 40-41.

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poltava, wrote a travesty of Virgil's <u>Aeneid</u>. The appearance of fotliarevs'kyi's <u>Eneida</u> in 1798 was an epoch-making event.¹²⁶ Kotliarevs'kyi succeeded in producing a work of genuine artistic merit. The travesty was so complete that it has hardly anything to do with the original <u>Aeneid</u>. Instead, the reader is provided with hilarious adventure story which has a readily recognizable set of characters: Zaporothian Cossacks, landlords and their wives. Most importantly, Kotliarevs'kyi found the appropriate linguistic medium--based on the Poltava dialect--which was understood and appreciated by most Ukrainians.

Kotliarevs'kyi was not at first aware of the importance of his pioneering achievement. Unlike Lobysevych he had never considered the creation of independent literature written in Ukrainian. But the immense success of <u>Eneida</u> was an indication that the Ukrainian language had much greater potential in art than just as a medium for comic effect, and that there was a ready market for Ukrainian literature. This was recognized by Kotliarevs'kyi himself, who subsequently wrote two dramatic works. One of these, <u>Moskal'-charivnyk</u> (1819), was still a vaudeville, full of slapstick; but the other, <u>Natalka Poltavka</u>, written in the same year, was a tender dramatic play.

After Kotliarevs'kyi, Ukrainian literature expanded in genre subject matter, the social origins of authors, and their geographical location. There were the hapless imitators of Kotliarevs'kyi, such as Pavlo Bilets'kyi-Nosenko (1774-1856), a nobleman who traced his origins

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¹²⁶For a good Soviet study of the life and artistry of Kotliarevs'kyi, see P. K. Volyns'kyi, <u>Ivan Kotliarevskyi</u> (Kiev: 1955); for a recent edition of <u>Eneida</u>, see M. V. Sydorenko, ed., <u>Eneida</u> (Kiev: 1968).

to an aide of Mazepa, and Vasyl' Hohol'-Janovs'kyi, the father of 127 More successful was the first author of non-noble (priestly) origins, Petro Hulak-Artemovs'kyi (1790-1865) who wrote fables and several travesties. However, with Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko, the first prose writer of merit, literature in Ukrainian had transcended the stage of mere novelty.

These initial strides in the development of Ukrainian literature were made in a milicu dominated by the Ukrainian nobility. Most of the authors and reading public were drawn from the nobility or, rather, petty gentry of the Hetmanate and Sloboda-Ukraine. For them, the new Ukrainian literature was not a national literature. It had intrinsic beauty and satisfied some of their aesthetic needs, but it was still intended as a peculiar local supplement to Russian literature, not as a substitute. In all other endeavors--scholarly and publicistic works-the first Ukrainian authors still used Russian. Moreover, the literature in Ukrainian was completely loyal to tsar and Empire and did not reflect the traditionalists' political concerns. But the experimentation with the vernacular was of great importance. It legitimized Ukrainian, at least in several genres, and it showed the possibilities for further development.

It was a serf from the Right-Bank Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko, who drew from the various trends of the nobility's heritage and fused them with Christian Pan-Slavism and romanticism to produce a modern Ukrainian

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¹²⁷ D. Chyzhevs'kyi in Istoriia ukrains-koi literatury still provides the best survey of this period in Ukrainian literary development (pp. 349-372).

national message. In his poetry, Shevchenko was able to express the full range of human emotions and experiences in a language which had versatility, depth, and fine shades of meaning. This was a giant step from the slapstick and humor of Kotliarevs'kyi, although Shevchenko recognized Kotliarevs'kyi's pioneering contribution in a special poem, "To the Eternal Memory of Kotliarevs'kyi." Shevchenko had finally proved that Ukrainian literature could exist and develop as an independent literature.

In addition to creating an independent literature written in Ukrainian, Shevchenko, for the first time, gave it a political content. Although he originated from Right-Bank Ukraine and his views were shaped by stories of anti-Polish <u>haidamak</u> rebellions, Shevchenko was also influenced by the concept of the Hetmanate's historical and political traditions. He had studied the major Cossack and Rus' chronicles in manuscript form and had read virtually all the major works dealing with Ukrainian history.¹²⁸ This made Shevchenko aware of Ukraine as a political entity separate from both Poland and Russia, which Shevchenko expanded into the idea of Ukrainian national separateness. Shevchenko took the moralistic tone of the Hetmanate's political literature, especially <u>Istoriia Rusov</u>, and transformed it into an outcry of national

128Ia. I. Dzyra in "Taras Shevchenko i ukrains'ki litopysy XVII-XVIII st.," Istorychni pohliadi T. H. Shevchenka, ed., I. O. Hurzhii (Kiev: 1964), pp. 61-89 convincingly demonstrates which chronicles and published sources were studied by Shevchenko. For a summary of the various influences that shaped Shevchenko's historical views see the other essays in Istorychni pohliady T. H. Shevchenka and G. S. N. Luckyj, Between Gogol' and Sevcenko, pp. 128-161.

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¹²⁹ In most of his historical poems, Shevchenko contrasted the free and glorious past with the bleakness and enslavement of the present. Although he wrote many romantic poems about the Cossacks' struggle against the Poles, escapades against Tatars and Turks and the <u>heidanak</u> uprisings in the Right-Bank Ukraine, Shevchenko concentrated especially on three turning points in the Ukraine's relationships with Bussia: the treaty of Pereiaslav and thu reigns of Peter I and Cather-

ine II.

For Shevchenko, just as for the eighteenth-century autonomists and traditionalists, the Treaty of Pereiaslav was the most significant event in early modern Ukrainian history. Unlike the traditionalists, however, Shevchenko did not see the treaty as a guarantee of Ukrainian rights and privileges, but as a most tragic mistake:

Yes, indeed, [Ukraine] ruled... O Bohdan 0 my foolish son! Look you well, now, on your mother On Ukraine, your own, Mho, as she rocked you, sang about Her unhappy fortune, And singing, wept a mother's tear Looking out for freedon! ... Bohdan, O my little Bohdan! Had I known, in the cradle I'd have choked you, in my sleep I'd have overlain you. Now my steppes have all been sold, ... My brother, Dnipro, now runs dry And is deserting me. And my dear graves the Muscovite

129 For the influence of Istoriia Rusov on Shevchenko, see G. S. N. Luckyj, Between..., p. 136, 181; L. Koshov, "Shevchenko ta 'Istoriia Lucky', Between..., p. 136, 181; L. Koshov, "Shevchenko ta 'Istoriia Musov'," Shevchenko (Kharkiv: 1928), Vol. I, pp. 161-162; M. Drahomanov, Shevchenko, ukrainofily i sotsiializm (L'viv: 1906), pp. 57-58. O. Chloblyn, Introduction to Istoriia Rusov, p. XV. Is plundering utterly. 130

Similarly, he condemned both Peter I and Catherine II for having sholished Ukrainian autonomy. This theme was reiterated in several poens, most notably, <u>Velykyi l'okh</u> (The Great Vault) and <u>Son</u> (The pream). In <u>Son</u>, Shevchenko mused on Peter I's statue which was commissioned by Catherine II. His reaction was quite different from Pushkin's bronze horseman, for it reminded Shevchenko not of greatness but the enslavement of his country and the death in a St. Petersburg dungeon of Acting Hetman Polubotok. Shevchenko took the latter story from <u>Istoriia Rusov</u> and without even mentioning Polubotok's name skillfully

incorporated it into his poem:

What is forged on to the rock This miracle, indeed "The Second to the First" erected Now at once I see! It is that First who crucified Our poor Ukraine, and the Second gave the death-stroke To the prostrate widow Executioners, cannibals! They ate their fill, that pair Stole to their hearts' content! And what With them did they bear To the next world? My heart grew heavy, Heavy, as if I were reading The history of Ukraine, I stand there Stock-still, without moving. And meanwhile softly, very softly Something unseen and grieving, Invisible was signing there: From the city, out from Hlukhiv, Went the regiments With their spades to man the earthworks. And I, too, was sent

130 Vera Rich, translator; Song Out of Darkness; Poems by Taras Stevchenko (London: 1961), p. 21. From the poem "The Plundered Grave" (Marryta Mohyla).
To the capital as proxy Hetman to command The Cossack troops. O God of mercy! O thou evil tsar! Accursed tsar, insatiate, Perfidious serpent, what Have you done, then, with the Cossacks? You have filled the swamps With their noble bones! And then Built the capital On their tortured corpses, and In a dark dungeon cell You slew me, too, me, a free Hetman In chains, with hunger matyred!...131

Shevchenko was not a product of the nobility's tradition but rather drew upon it and combined it with a strong sense of social justice and ethical norms and, thus, produced a revolutionary message--Ukrainians of all social classes make up one nation which is politically, culturally, and, for the vast majority, socially oppressed. He pleaded that all his countrymen would ask themselves the question:

Mho are we? Whose sons? Of what sires? By whom and why enchained? And then, indeed, you'll see for what Are your Bruti famed!... Come, my brothers, and embrace Each your humblest brother, "take our mother smile again Our poor, tear-stained mother! 132

The ground for this revolutionary message had been unwittingly prepared by the literary, political, and historical works written by the nobles of the Hetmanate. These not only had a major impact on Shevchenko but on many writers and political thinkers, especially Shevchenko's compatriots in the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood (1845-

131 Ibid., p. 36.

132 Ibid., pp. 77-78, 80. From the poem "To My Fellow-Countrymen, in Ukraine and Not in Ukraine, Living, Dead and As Yet Unborn." -345-

1947), the first modern political organization. One of the founders

of the Brotherhood, Vasyl Bilgers'kyi--a nobleman from Chernihiv pro-

vince--demonstrated convincingly the influence of the nobility's

heritage in the following note:

Our dear Ukraine, a country which through bitter sufferings in the cause of truth has earned everlasting esteem, has found herself in terrible circumstances. Annexed [to Russia] on the basis of her own laws, she is suffering a great injustice. Her rights are forgotten, and now, not as a sister nation of the same faith but as a slave, she must endure the most grievous lot of all peoples. Her fate and her future are on the scale of God. But if the present conditions continue for a long time, when nothing Ukrainian will be esteemed, when a foreign yoke is thrown on us, when we, o God, feel like foreigners in our forefathers' land in our own fatherland, then the Ukraine will lose her ancient national dignity...133

In modified form, Bilozers'kyi echoes the whole gamma of the Hetmanate's political literature from <u>Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei</u> (1762) to <u>Istoriia Rusov</u> (1802-1805)--the love of fatherland, the martyrdom of the nation, the resignation of the defeated.

The Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, however, had a resolution to the Ukraine's suffering. It proposed the creation of a federated Fan-Slavic state with the Ukraine as its "cornerstone," the liberation of all serfs, and the mass education of the populace conducted in Ukrainian.¹³⁴ This program went far beyond the philosophical and political

133p. Zaionchkovskii, Kirillo-Nefodievskoe obshchestvo (Moscow: 1959), p. 8. Passage translated by G. S. N. Luckyj, Between Gogol' and Sevcenko, p. 180.

134M. Vozniak, <u>Psevdo-Konys'kyi i Psevdo-Poletyka ("Istorija</u> <u>Amsoy" u literaturi i nautsi) (L'viv: 1939)</u>, pp. 135-159; M. Drahomanov, <u>Shewchenko, ukrainofily i sotsializm</u> (L'viv: 1906), pp. 57-58. O. <u>Ghloblyn, Introduction to Istorija Rusiv</u>, p. xv. M. Vozniak, <u>Kyrylo-</u> <u>Metodiivs'ke bratstvo</u> (L'viv: 1929); B. Yanivs'kyi [V. Mijakovs'kyi -<u>UK], ed., Kostomarov's "Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People" (New</u> <u>Vork: 1954)</u>. views of traditionalists. It was shaped by Polish revolutionary ideology--especially Adam Mickiewicz's, Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstva polskiego (Books of the Polish People and the Polish pilgrimage), the Czech national revival (I. Kollar, V. Hanka, P. J. Safarik), the French socialists (Saint Simon, Louis Blanc, Fourier), ethnographic research (especially the folksongs and dumy collected by the faculty and students of Kharkiv University) and literary romanticisa. Moreover, the Brotherhood included members from various social groups and different regions of the Ukraine. For example, Vasyl' Bilozers'kyi and Opanas Markovych were nobles from the Hetmanate; the writer Panteleimon Kulish was a Cossack from the Hetmanate, the historian Mykola Kostomarov, whose mother was a Ukrainian peasant and father was a Russian nobleman, came from Sloboda-Ukraine, and Shevchenko was an ex-serf from the Right-Bank. Cutting across regional and social barriers, the Brotherhood formulated a modern national program based on the principle of ethnicity. Yet, the concept of the Ukraine as a separate political and cultural entity had been prepared by the political literature and the Ukrainian literary experimentations of the nobility.

In addition to the influence of the nobility's collective heritage on Ukrainian national development, individual noble families from the Hetmanate continued to play an important direct role in Ukrainian political, scholarly and cultural life. Vasyl' Bilozers'kyi and Opanas Warkowych were among the founders of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. Whailo Drahomanov, the major nineteenth-century Ukrainian political thinker, who influenced a whole generation of Ukrainians, including Ivan

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franko, and who published the first Ukrainian émigré newspaper in Geneva, was a descendent of a noble family from the Hetmanate.¹³⁵ In literature, Oleksandra Bilozer's'ka, a noblewoman, became the first noted Ukrainian woman writer under the pseudonym Hanna Barvinok. finally, Lesia Ukrainka, recognized after Shevchenko and Franko as the Ukraine's greatest writer, was really named Larysa Kosach and originated from the noble family of Kosach-Drahomanov.¹³⁶

while in relation to other social groups only a small number of pobles from the former Hetmanate were active creators of Ukrainian literature, political thought and scholarship, many more supported such endeavors financially. In the nineteenth century there was hardly a Ukrainian scholarly institution or a significant publication which was not subsidized by a nobleman from the Hetmanate. The first edition of Shevchenko's <u>Kobzar</u> was published at the expense of P. Martos, a wealthy sobleman from the Poltava region.¹³⁷ Vasyl' Bilozers'kyi published the first Ukrainian scholarly journal, <u>Osnova</u> (1861-1862).¹³⁸ The most prominent of such journals in Russian Ukraine, <u>Kievskaia Starina</u> (1882-

135Volodymyr Doroshenko, "The Life of Mykhaylo Drahomanov," Mykhaylo Drahomanov; A Symposium and Selected Writings (Vol. II, No. 1 of Annals of UAAS; New York: 1952), p. 6.

136 Although Lesia Ukrainka spent her childhood in Vohlynia her parents originated from the Hetmanate, see C. Bida, "Life and Work," Lesya Ukrainka (Toronto: 1968).

137G. S. N. Luckyj, Between..., p. 37.

138Unless otherwise noted, all examples of nobles participating in, as well as funding, Ukrainian political, scholarly, educational, and cultural endeavors are from O. Pritsak's "U stolittia narodyn M. Hrushevs'koho," Lysty do Pryiateliv, Bks. 5-6-7, Nos. 157-158-159 (1966), 79. 1-18. 1907) was subsidized through the quarter century of its existence by two noblemen from the Hetmanate, Oleksander Lashkevych and Vasyl' Tarnovs'kyi (as well as by an ex-peasant industrialist, Vasyl' Symerenko).

The nobility's contribution to Ukrainian scholarship, both as researchers and philanthropists, was great. Two institutions which formed the basis for the documentary historical school of V. Antonovych and M. Hrushevs'kyi, the Temporary Commission for the Study of Ancient pocuments and the Southwestern Section of the Imperial Geographical society, were founded through the efforts and philanthropy of two noblegen from the Hetmanate, Mykhailo Sudienko and Hryhorii Halahan. promically, the populist historian par excellance, O. Lazarevs'kyi, who dedicated his entire life to the study of the Hetmanate and the condemnation of its nobility, was an independently wealthy nobleman and a descendant of the Hetmanate's starshyna. The most far-reaching contribution to Ukrainian scholarship was probably made by Elyzaveta Skoropads'ka-Myloradovych, who traced her origins to a most distinguished family in the Hetmanate. She, with various industrialists who were not mobles funded the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Galicia. The Society successfully circumvented the Ems ukaz--which forbade all publications in Ukrainian -- and in its sanctuary in Austria-Hungary firmly established Ukrainian scholarship written in Ukrainian.

While the traditions of the nobility can hardly be credited with sparking a modern Ukrainian consciousness, they did, nevertheless provide the basis for the development of a national movement. The nobility's political and historical traditions and their experimentation with a vermacular Ukrainian literature gave the movement a starting point.

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while only a part of the nobility became its active proponents, a much larger part financially supported various scholarly, cultural, and educational endeavors which made the national movement possible. Although they did not necessarily join the new national movement, many of the nobles continued to feel a strong attachment to the Ukraine. The fact that in 1918, some 154 years after the resignation of the last hetman, Pavlo Skoropads'kyi was declared Hetman of the Ukraine and was supported by part of the conservative landed gentry testifies to the endurance of the traditions of the Hetmanate among the nobility.

4. The End of Autonomy and the Other Strata of Ukrainian Society.

Imperial integration of the other strata of Ukrainian society proceeded quietly, with relatively few polemics and little opposition. This was to be expected since the Cossacks, burghers, clergy, and peasmtry constituted more politically passive elements of Ukrainian society. They identified less with the traditions of an autonomous Hetmnate and were unable to exert any significant political influence. To be sure, the Cossacks and burghers still remembered their guaranteed privileges; but these, if mentioned at all, were used primarily to buttress their group's social position, rather than to voice displeasure with the abolition of autonomy.

Despite the lack of opposition, integration of these social groups into corresponding imperial strata was not immediate. The same social groups that had existed for centuries continued to exist, irrespective of any imperial standardization. Gradually, the Ukrainian Social structure was brought into conformity with the imperial pattern.

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But, in the short run, the imperial authorities were forced to make allowances for local peculiarities.

Of all the social groups, the position of the Cossacks was the most ambiguous. No comparable group existed in the central lands of the Empire, so even a determination of who belonged to the Cossack class was a difficult task. Those who had some claim to Cossack status but were registered in 1782 as peasants were automatically enserfed. Many Cossacks, especially those in the category of Cossack-helpers, were economically and for tax purposes indistinguishable from peasants, and their claims to Cossack status were highly dubious. Landowners, moreover, would, at times, treat even recognized Cossacks as their subjects. The boundary between peasant and Cossack was murky yet vital, for now it separated the free man from the serf.

Imperial legalization of serfdom resulted in a sharp increase in the number of "seekers of Cossackdom." In dealing with this problem, the imperial authorities had to consider the demands of the landlords, while at the same time forestalling any large-scale social unrest. On the whole, the authorities attempted to register the number of Cossacks accurately, and dubious cases, when not contested by a landlord, were generally decided in favor of the applicants. The best evidence for this is the census of 1782, which lists 428,442 male Cossacks.¹³⁹ Since in 1764 there were 176,886 rank and file Cossacks and 198,296 Cossack helpers, ¹⁴⁰ it is obvious that most of the Cossack helpers-whose claims

139_N. Storozhenko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov...," KSt., No. 4 (1897), p. 155.

140 Shafonskii, p. 85.

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did not necessarily have to be recognized--were included in the "Cossack" cstegory. Yet many whose claims were questionable and whose landlords were powerful were registered as peasants.

The registration of Cossack claimants as peasants led to a major civil disturbance in the village of Turbaiv. 141 The status of the villagers was disputed from the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1783 all the villagers were registered as serfs of the local owner, the satylevs'kyi family. The villagers, however, refused to perform any serf obligations and through intermediaries continued to petition the senate for a reclassification of their status. These efforts proved to be successful, and in 1788 the Senate decided that 76 individuals registered as Cossacks in 1738 and their descendants could not be considered as serfs. The local authorities, under the influence of the Barylevs'kyis, were slow in implementing the order and demanded that the villagers provide additional evidence of their 1738 Cossack registration. When the procedures bogged down and the villagers were unable to obtain their freedom, they revolted. The rebels stormed the landlord's mansion and killed three members of the Bazylevs'kyi family. They expelled all local authorities and took over Turbaiv and several nearby villages.

The imperial authorities immediately surrounded the rebels but

141 The Turbaiv revolt has been the subject of several studies: A. Efimenko, "Turbaevskaia katastrofa," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 3 (1891), pp. 373-401; K. Huslystyi, ed., <u>Povstannia selian v seli Turbaiakh 1789-1793 rr.</u> (Kharkiv: 1932); K. Huslystyi, <u>Turbaivs'ke povstannia</u> (Kiev: 1947); I. Hurzhii, <u>Povstannia selian v Turbaiakh (1789-1793)</u> (Kiev: 1950). Soviet studies rarely differentiate between Cossacks and peasants and treat the Turbaiv revolt as part of general peasant unrest. Undoubtedly, peasants participated in the revolt but it was sparked by the question of Cossack status. did not have sufficient strength to attack them. The international situation was rather uncertain, and the imperial authorities did not want to provoke a major uprising. Instead of dispatching additional troops to Turbaiv, the government sent a representative who worked out s compromise which proved to be short-lived. The villagers refused to surrender any additional suspects involved in the Bazylevs'kyi murders, nor would they give up the Bazylevs'kyis' valuables and records. In 1793 regular troops and Don Cossacks were brought to Turbaiv and the villagers were forced to surrender. Turbaiv had defied the government for four years, and the imperial authorities decided to make it an example. Stiff penalties were meted out to the villagers. Fifteen were tortured to death in prison; thirteen were physically mutilated and sentenced to a lifetime of hard labor in Tobolsk; 155 were subjected to beatings; and 2,300 villagers were resettled in Tauridia and beyond the Dniester River. 142

After the suppression of the Turbaiv uprising, the government treated the "seekers of Cossackdom" with more circumspection. It wanted meither to spark more unrest by denying just claims nor, on the other hand, to encourage any en masse petitions. This delicate balance was broken at the beginning of the nineteenth century. During the reign of Paul, the Ukrainian judicial system was partially restored, thereby strengthening claims based on the Lithuanian Statute (never abolished ts an acting code). In accordance with imperial law there was a statute of limitation on initiating such cases as the recognition of Cossack status; the Lithuanian Statute, however, contained no such provision.

142K. Huslystyi, Turbaivs'ke..., pp. 25-29.

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in July 1803, the Senate confirmed that in accordance with local law "seekers of Cossackdom" were not subject to the statute of limitation.¹⁴³ Marmed by this decision, Governor A. B. Kurakin reported that, "whole villages have petitioned for the restitution of their Cossack status and many have expressed the opinion that having petitioned the government, they no longer have to obey the landlord."¹⁴⁴

The Senate acted immediately and issued clear instructions about the "seekers of Cossackdom." According to a December 1803 decree elipibility for registration was limited to those who could prove that in 1782 they were rank-and-file Cossacks (Cossack-helpers were now considered as peasants.¹⁴⁵ Thus, only those who for some reason lost their Cossack status after the aboliton of autonomy could attempt to regain it. This simplified the procedure and greatly reduced the number of possible applicants. Now only a limited number of individuals could become Cossacks and for all practical purposes, the Cossack estate was closed.

Although the imperial authorities had settled the question of who belonged to the Cossack estate, they had much greater difficulty in determining the Cossacks' role in the imperial order. Traditionally, the Cossacks functioned as irregular troops who protected borderlands. The Hetmanate, however, was no longer a borderland but part of the settled interior of the Empire. Thus, large numbers of irregular troops had little military value and posed the danger of social upheaval.

143_N. Storozhenko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov...," KSt., No. 6 (1897), p. 462.

144 Ibid. 145 Ibid., pp. 463-464.

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Integration of the Cossacks into a non-military imperial structure was impeded by the lack of a corresponding imperial social group. In most of the Empire, rural society consisted of lord, serf, and state peasant. neviations from this pattern only created difficulties and confusion, and were to be avoided whenever possible.

One step that the government did take toward alleviating the Cossack problem was to encourage emigration to border areas where the cossacks could still fulfill their traditional role. A June 28, 1803 decree permitted the Cossacks to resettle in the South and other sparselypopulated regions. 146 Spurred by the promise of land and the "Cossack way of life," a steady stream of settlers left the Hetmanate and joined the Black Sea Cossack Host in the Kuban. In 1808 and 1809, the total number of males who migrated to the Kuban was 22,206; between 1820-1825, it had risen to 25,627; and between 1845-1850, it was 8,500.147 Taking into account that only adult males were included in these statistics, emigration in the first half of the nineteenth century was probably much greater -- well in excess of 100,000 persons. But this was a mere palliative at best. While emigration probably succeeded in relocating some of the more adventuresome, dissatisfied, and land-hungry Cossacks, it failed to deal with the majority who had remained in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces.

From the time of the abolition of autonomy until the 1830's, the imperial government vacillated in its aims and policies towards the

146pSZ, No. 20,823 (June 28, 1803), Vol. XXVII, p. 714.

147F. Shcherbyna, "Kolonizatsiia Kubanskoi oblasti," KSt., No. 7 (1883), pp. 529-545.

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Cossacks of the Hetmanate. On the one hand, the government wanted to reduce the number of Cossacks and convert them into docile state peasants. On the other hand, there was an attitude that any further weakening of the Cossack estate was premature because the Cossacks' "martial spirit" could still be of use to the Empire. Furthermore, there were frequent clashes between the central and local administrations as to Cossack policy. The local authorities usually defended the remaining Cossack rights and advanced or supported various schemes to re-establish cossack military units. The central administration, on the other hand, eften strove to curtail Cossack rights and was cautious about the formation of Cossack military units.

The Cossacks retained their right to own land and to the unrestricted sale of alcoholic beverages.¹⁴⁸ With the Napoleonic invasion and the re-establishment of fifteen Cossack regiments,¹⁴⁹ the position of the Cossacks improved considerably. Since the Cossacks supplied the manpower and provided for the upkeep of the fifteen regiments, they were exempted from the draft and various taxes.¹⁵⁰ But in August 1818, the Cossacks were again subjected to the regular army draft and in December 1819 their tax exemption was terminated.¹⁵¹ By the 1820's the Cossacks'

148 The right to produce and sell alcoholic beverages was reconfirmed in 1791 and in 1811. PSZ, No. 16,981 (August 7, 1791), Vol. XXIII, pp. 246-247; No. 24,832 (October 26, 1811), Vol. XXXI, pp. 880-881.

149 For the 1812 mobilization, see above.

150_N. Storozherko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov...," <u>KSt.</u>, No. 6 (1897), pp. 470-480.

151pSZ, No. 27,505 (August 25, 1818), Vol. XXXV, p. 544; No. 28,021 (December 10, 1819), Vol. XXXVI, p. 410.

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position deteriorated even further, for even their right to own and was questioned.

pespite a Senate confirmation of 1803, in the 1820's the Ministry of Finance challenged the Cossacks full ownership of their land. The matter was submitted to the State Council which ruled on April 14, 1823 that the Cossacks' land was owned personally. as was the land of the nobility, and that Cossack landownership had nothing in common with the land tenure of the state peasants. 152 This decision was disputed by the Finance Minister, Graf Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Gur'ev, who argued that the Cossack lands were originally common or state lands. As evidence, Gur'ev pointed to past laws prohibiting Cossacks from selling lands, and to the fact that Cossacks, like state peasants, had to pay an obrok. Thus, argued Gur'ev, the Finance Ministry should assume full control over Cossack lands, 153

152Kratkala zapiska o malorossilskikh kozakakh," ChOIDR, Bk. II (1864), p. 114.

153 Gur'ev's views were summarized and refuted in Governor-General Repnin's official memorandum to the Senate, "Kratkaia-Lapiska o malorossiiskikh kozakakh," pp. 85-135.

Gur'ev's efforts were blocked by the champion of Cossack

rights, the Little Russian Governor-General, Prince Nikolai Gri-

gorevich Repnin. 154 In a memorandum to the Senate, Repnin presented a comprehensive history of Cossack rights and refuted all of Gur'ev's charges. The Government-General indicated that the Cossacks had always owned their land and that the obrok they paid were state taxes, not rent for the use of state lands. Repnin explained further that past prohibitions against the sale of Cossack land was enacted in order to prevent Cossack impoverishment, especially, from sales forced by the starshyna. While arguing that a class of free farmers would greatly benefit the Empire, Repain pleaded that all restrictions on Cossack landholdings, mobility, and rights to trade and industry be lifted.

The Polish uprising of 1830 gave Governor-General Repnin the opportunity to demonstrate the Cossacks' continued military utility to

154 Repnin was noted as a liberal governor-general sympathetic to Ukrainian autonomy and was even charged with advocating "Ukrainian Separatism." See Doroshenko, Narysy, Vol. II, p. 283.

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the Empire. As the campaign against the Poles faltered, Repnin sugpested that Ukrainian Cossack units be reactivated as in 1812. In a memorandum to Tsar Nicholas, the Governor-General cited the Cossacks' mtipathy towards the Poles, their loyalty to tsar and Empire, and their ality to mobilize quickly as chief considerations for such a move.¹⁵⁵ Tsar Nicholas, annoyed by the incompetence of his military staff, suthorized the Cossack mobilization. Eight Cossack cavalry regiments of 1200 men each were organized.¹⁵⁶ Again the Ukrainian nobles contributed toward the arming of the regiments. But by the time the Cossacks were ready for the campaign, the Polish uprising was crushed and the Cossack units, no longer needed, were disbanded.

Having proved the Cossacks' loyalty and continued utility, Govemor-General Repnin now pressed for some fundamental review of the Cossacks' status. He proposed to Tsar Nicholas that Cossacks should return to their "former military status."¹⁵⁷ He prepared a project which would not only re-establish Cossack military formations but permit a limited form of Cossack self-government. In subsequent letters to the Isar, Repnin attempted to gain support for his project by extolling the Cossacks' service over centuries for "the faith, tsar and Rus'."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵Governor-General Repnin's 1831 memorandum to Tsar Nicholas vas published in <u>ChOIDR</u>, Bk. I (1863), pp. 176-177.

156I. Pavlovskii, "Malorossiiskie kozach'i polki v bor'be s Poliakami v 1831 g.," <u>Trudy Poltavskoi gubernskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi</u> Malosii, Vol. VII (1910), pp. 108-114.

157 This memorandum was published in ChOIDR, Bk. I (1863), pp.

No. 10 (1897), p. 128. KSt.,

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The forwarded Rephin's plans to a special committee which was to study the Cossack problem. On April 13, 1832, the Committee reported that "the division of the Empire into independent parts, or more correctly stated, into a federal union of provinces which have their own rights, cannot be reconciled with the preservation of the unity and might of the Empire, under the benevolent rule of autocracy."

While the reinstitution of Cossack autonomy was unfeasible, Tsar Nicholas, pleased with the performance of the Cossacks, was willing to make some socio-economic concessions. On June 25, 1832 he issued a decree dealing with Cossack lands, taxes, and recruits.¹⁶⁰ The Cossack lands were to be held in perpetuity by the Cossacks and their descendants. This meant that Cossacks could sell their property only to other Cossacks. However, they were permitted to buy estates from nobles and <u>ramochintsi</u> and this land could be sold to whomever they pleased. The uka: also guaranteed a number of local judicial practices and the Cossack right to sell spirits. The tax it imposed on the Cossacks was approximately equal to that of the state peasants (except for land rents), whereas the draft quota was set at five per thousand, with service limited to a period of fifteen years.

Prince Repnin, however, believed that these measures were insufficient and repeatedly petitioned for the creation of a separate department for Cossack affairs. His efforts were successful: on January 17,

159Ibid., p. 128.

160 PZS. Second Series, No. 5,458 (July 25, 1832), Vol. VII, PP-

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1834 a Chief Economic Department for Little Russian Cossacks (Glavnaja <u>horaistvennaia kontora dlia malorossiiskikh kozakov</u>) was created.¹⁶¹ It regulated the disposition of all Cossack landholdings, taxation, recruiting, and emigration. At the local level, the Cossacks could even elect some of the Department's officials. Thus, a special bureaucracy was to have protected the Cossacks from abuse by landlords and the local administration controlled by the nobility. But the Department survived enly a short time. Soon after the establishment of the Ministry of State Properties (<u>Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennykh Imushchestv</u>) in 1837, the Cossacks were placed under its jurisdiction and remained under its authority until the 1860's.¹⁶²

Neither the meager concessions granted by Nicholas nor the administrative reshuffling could slow the economic decline being experienced by the Cossacks. The decline was due to two interlocking problems: an increase in population and shrinking Cossack landholdings. Despite constant emigration, the Cossack population of Chernihiv and Poltava province was steadily increasing. Census figures record 428,442 males in 1782; 450,365 in 1819; 533,778 in 1837-39; 549,198 in 1851; and 595,989 in 1860.¹⁶³ Landholdings, however, did not increase, so the

161PSZ, Second Series, No. 6,727 (January 17, 1834), Vol. IX, PP. 46-52.

162Istoricheskoe obozrenie piatidesiatiletnei deiatel'nosti Ministerstva Gosudarstvennykh Imushchestv 1837-1887, Pt. II (St. Petersburg: 1888), p. 18.

163 The 1782 figure appears in N. Storozhenko, "K istorii malo-Tossiiskikh kozakov...," KSt., No. 4 (1897), p. 155. The 1819 figure comes from Governor-General Repnin's report, "Kratkaia zapiska o malo-Tossiiskikh kozakakh," p. 128. The 1837-39 figure is from Istoricheskoe

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Cossacks were forced to subdivide their land into smaller and smaller Many Cossacks were left with no land whatsoever: in 1839 when plots. Many Cossacks came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry, 39,000 famithe Cossacks came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry, 39,000 famities (105,000 male Cossacks) were landless.¹⁶⁴ The latter went to work on the estates of nobles or other Cossacks and many emigrated to New mussia, the Don, the Caucuses, and the Crimea.

The transfer of jurisdiction over the Cossacks to the Ministry of State Properties did, however, have one lasting effect. It ended all questions as to Cossack status. Although the Cossacks retained all the privileges obtained in 1832 and 1834, they were still under the jurisdiction of an agency intended primarily for state peasants. To the imperial authorities the Cossacks were nothing more than a special proup of state peasants. This attitude was not new, for it had been pronounced in a Senate ukaz as early as 1803.¹⁶⁵ But the formation of Cossack regiments in 1812 and in 1831, as well as Governor-General Repnin's espousal of the Cossacks' cause put their status in doubt. Any plan to revitalize the Cossacks as free warriors of old-Ukraine was

obozrenie piatidesiatiletnei deiatel'nosti Ministerstva Gosudarstvennykh Imushchestv 1837-1887, Pt. II, p. 18. Finally, both the 1851 and 1860 figures are taken from Materialy dlia statistiki Rossii, Sobiraemye po vedomstvu Ministerstva gosudarstvennykh imushchestv. Vol. III (St. Petersburg: 1861), pp. 188-189.

164v. P. Teplyts'kyi, <u>Reforma 1861 roku i ahrarni vidnosyny na</u> Ukraini (Kiev: 1959), p. 25.

165psz, No. 20,823 (June 28, 1803), Vol. XXVII, pp. 712-715.

forestalled by imperial opposition (except in temporary military emergencies) and the Cossacks' economic decline. Having become marginal farmers, the Cossacks had long since ceased to train or equip themselves for battle. Both in administrative supervision and in wealth the Cossacks hardly differed from the state peasants. With emancipation--which resulted in state peasants' receiving some land--this distinction was blurred even further. Eighty years after the abolition of the Hetmanate, the transformation of the Cossacks into peasants and their integration into the imperial social structure had been accomplished.

The assimilation of the burghers proceeded much more quickly than that of the Cossacks, and with fewer legal and administrative complications. First, there was no ambiguity in the legal and social status of the Ukrainian burghers. Unlike the nobles or Cossacks, the burghers obtained immediate imperial recognition of their status. Their position was clearly defined by the 1785 Municipal Regulations and was similar to that of burghers in all other parts of the Empire.

Second, the autonomous traditions of the burghers had become so weak that imperial norms were introduced without encountering opposition. The symbol of town autonomy had been the Magdeburg Law, which guaranteed town self-government and prevented the intrusion of any outside authority into town affairs. In reality, the Magdeburg Law and independent city administration had never been in full force in the Hetmanate. Nevertheless, it retained great symbolic importance to the titles of the eighteenth-century Hetmanate as evidenced by the burgher Hequests at the 1767 Legislative Commission. By the 1780's, however, twom this symbolic role had been lost, except in Kiev. All other cities

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were governed by a combination of Russian urban law and the Lithuanian 166 Statute.

while the 1785 Town Charter did not abolish the Magdeburg Law por any other code, it did carefully redefine the structure of town administration and justice. It created new administrative positions and procedures which were clearly in violation of those required by the Magdeburg code. The burghers' memory of the Magdeburg Law was so yeak, however, that, except in Kiev, this contradiction was not even perceived. It was, in fact, the imperial government which was to remind the burghers of the Magdeburg Law. In 1824 the Senate overruled a case dealing with trade in Poltava because it had been decided on the basis of the Lithuanian Statute rather than the Magdeburg Law. The Senate instructed the municipal courts to continue using Magdeburg Law whenever it was applicable. The directive could not be followed because the courts did not even have copies of the Magdeburg code. In consequence, the Committee of Ministers suggested that a new edition and a Russian translation be prepared. (the Magdeburg code was available only in German, Latin, and Polish). The matter was passed on to Speransky, who, in a special memorandum, indicated that the Magdeburg Law had long since been supplanted by the Lithuanian Statute and Russian Law, and recommended the continuation of current practices. 167 In 1831, the Magdeburg

166N. Vasilenko, "Pravo magderburgskve," Entsiklopedicheskii slovar": F. A. Brokgauz i I. A. Efron, Vol. XXIV (1899), pp. 894-896.

167The 1824 Senate ruling, the proposal for a Russian translation of the Magdeburg Law, and Speransky's opinion are summarized in N. Vasilenko, "Pravo magdeburgskoe," pp. 894-896.

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Law was officially abolished in the Left-Bank Ukraine.¹⁶⁸ It was retained and used in Kiev until 1834.¹⁶⁹

The third factor which facilitated imperial integration was the weak political and financial position of the Ukrainian merchants. In the 1780's Shafons'kyi noted that international trade was conducted primarily by Greeks and other foreigners, while internal trade particularly at fairs, was increasingly being controlled by Russians. In 1782 out of 1483 merchants registered in the Chernihiv province 896 were Russians and 587 Ukrainians (exclusive of Greeks and other foreigners).¹⁷⁰ Shafons'kyi attributed the small percentage of Ukrainian merchants to the lack of capital in the Hetmanate. "In all of Little Russia there is not one merchant of Little Russian stock who has capital of 1,030 rubles."¹⁷¹ Even had they wished to oppose the Town Charter, the Ukrainim merchants possessed neither the wealth nor power to do so.

In sharp contrast to the Ukrainians, the Greek merchants of the Hotmanate were successful in gaining exemptions from the Town Charter provisions. In response to requests from the Nizhyn Greek Brotherhood, Catherine issued an ukaz which continued the Greeks' economic privileges, exempted them from taxation and troop quarterings, and provided for a separate Greek magistracy and judicial system in Nizhyn.¹⁷² These

168PSZ, Second Series, No. 4319 (February 3, 1831), Vol. VI, pp. 119-122.

169Istoriia Kieva (2 vols; Kiev: 1960), Vol. I, pp. 294-295; V. Schcherbyna, "Borot'ba Kyiva za avtonomiiu," p. 214.

170A. Shafonskii, p. 187.

171 Ibid., p. 22.

172 PSZ, No. 16,250 (October 1, 1785), Vol. XXII, p. 447.

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concessions were made to the fewer than 500 Greek families who controlled trade with the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷³ The Greeks demonstrate that the Town Charter could have been successfully circumvented.

Finally, the 1785 Town Charter was widely accepted because it hardly affected the largest group of town inhabitants, the burghers (meshchane). Unlike the merchants, the burghers were overwhelmingly Ukrainian. In Chernihiv province, for instance, out of 19,139 registered meshchane only 654 were Russians, the rest were Ukrainians. 174 artisan The Town Charter left the hub of town life--the/guild structure--essentially intact, regulating only the term of apprenticeship and placing some restrictions on prices. Several studies have shown that even after the introduction of the more elaborate Guild Regulations of 1799, the Ukrainian guild structure charged only gradually.¹⁷⁵ By the 1820's, artisan however, the/guilds became organs of state administration and thus lost the major characteristic of the old-Ukrainian guilds: corporate selfregulation of production quality and prices and control over the selec-

173A. Shafonskii, pp. 468-476.

174Ibid., p. 187.

175 Pylyp Klymenko, Tsekhy na Ukraini (Kiev: 1929), pp. 1-120; 140-166; Kateryna Lazarevs'ka, "Materialy do istorii tsekhiv na Livoberezhnii Ukraini XVII-XIX vv," ZIFV N] UAN, Vol. VI (1925), pp. 20-33; Kateryna Lazarevs'ka, "Kyivs'ki tskekhy v druhii polovyni XVIII ta na Pochatku XIX viku," Kyiv ta ioho okolytsia v istorii i pam'iatkakh (Vol. XXII of Zapysky Ukrains'koho naukovoho tovarystva; Kiev: 1926), PP. 275-308; Mykhailo Karachivs'kyi, "Arkhivna spadshchyna Kyivs'kykh tsekhiv," ZIFV [V] UAN, Vol. XI (1927), pp. 262-286. tion and training of future guild members. 176

Although there was no overt opposition to the Town Charter, it was not universally accepted. In Kiev, with its strong autonomist traditions, the Charter's provisions were skillfully blended with local traditions. Magdeburg Law remained in force and the Kievan patriciate maintained control over government and finances, even re-instituting a traditional part of Kievan administration, the militia.¹⁷⁷ In 1796 Kiev's administrative connection with the Hetmanate was severed, and it became the capital of the newly created Right-Bank province of Kiev. Since the Right-Bank Ukraine was incorporated into the Empire by the second partition of Poland, the imperial authorities were somewhat more tolerant in regard to regional differences. It was probably for this reason that Kiev was permitted to retain pecularities in its administration longer than any of the Left-Bank cuties. In fact, in 1797 and 1802 Kiev received a re-confirmation of its ancient privileges.¹⁷⁸

Citing their ancient rights, the Kievans attempted to restrict trade and manufacturing by foreigners, especially Russians and Jews.

176 Pylyp Klymenko, Tsekhy na Ukraini, pp. 160-166.

177"Kievskoe predstavitel'stvo prezhniago vremeni," KSt., No. 5 (1882), pp. 177-183; Volodymyr Shcherbyna, "Borot'ba Kyiva za avtonomiiu," Kyiv ta ioho okolytsia v istorii i pam'iatkakh (Vol. XXII of Zapysky Ukrains'koho naukovoho tovarystva; Kiev: 1926), p. 210.

178pSZ, No. 18,142 (October 16, 1797), Vol. XXIV, p. 736. The September 15, 1802 ukaz confirming all privileges was not included in the Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov. L. Matseevich in "Iz zhizni Kieva v nachale iskhodiashchago stoletiia," KSt., No. 11 (1896), pp. 65-67 described the ceremonies in Kiev associated with the reception and official pronouncement of the decree.

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Although the city's inhabitants did everything possible to prevent Jewish settlement, by 1797 there were already 1,411 Jews from the Right-Bank in the city, and their number kept increasing.¹⁷⁹ Often, participation in Kiev's fairs served as a pretext for entry into the city; after a stay of several months, many Jews were able to purchase a house and become permanent residents. The Kievan burghers repeatedly requested the imperial authorities to remove these illegal settlers.¹⁸⁰ Finally in the 1830's, action was taken and the city's Jews were forced to move outside the city limits.¹⁸¹

The Jews' departure was a Pyrrhic victory, for it was accompanied by the final abolition of municipal autonomy and the loss of the Kievan patriciate's privileged position to other competitors--the Russians. Until the mid-eighteenth century, the Russians, like the Jews, were restricted from settling permanently in Kiev. By that time, however, the Russians had succeeded in penetrating the clanish Kievan burgher class by becoming assistants or even partners in established Kievan

1791. Semenov, ed., <u>Geografichesko-statisticheskii slovar'</u> <u>Rossiiskoi imperii</u> (St. Petersburg: 1863-1885), Vol. II, p. 622. Officially, Jews were excluded from the Russian Empire until the partition of Poland and there were few Jews in the Hetmanate.

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180One such petition has been published. "Melochi iz arkhivov iugo-zapadnago kraia; khodataistvo kievskikh grazhdan o vyselenii iz Kieva evreev (1830 g)," KSt., No. 10 (1901), pp. 12-13.

1811. I. Funduklei, Statisticheskoe opisanie Kievskoi gubernii (3 vols. in 4; St. Petersburg: 1855), Pt. 1, p. 261. The decree was issued on December 2, 1827 but it provided up to two years for Jews to sell their property and leave the city. Thus many Jews did not leave the city until the early 1830's. firms. Gradually, more and more Russians came to Kiev, and by the 1830's, they were in the city in sufficient numbers to challenge the control of municipal administration.¹⁸² The struggle between the city's ukrainian and Russian factions was ultimately decided by the imperial authorities. In 1821, the Senate discovered that Kiev's Ukrainian administration had embezzled millions of rubles from the city. Investigation of the scandal continued until October, 1834 when the implicated officials were dismissed.¹⁸³ A month later, all vestiges of autonomy, including the Magdeburg Law, were abolished.

The scandal was merely a convenient pretext for a change in imperial policy. Faced with the Polish uprising which had a substantial following in the Right-Bank Ukraine, Nicholas I decided to abolish all remnants of self-governing institutions and local peculiarities. Governor-General Bibikov pursued a policy of "assimilating this land [Right-Bank Ukraine including Kiev, Z.K.]...with Great Russia."¹⁸⁴ Thus, the Russian faction won control of the city's administration; the next mayor as well as the three following were Russian merchants. Nicholas was so determined to break Kievan burgher exclusiveness that he granted

182The best description of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Kiev is V. Prokopovych, Pid zolotoiu korohvoiu (Paris: 1943), pp. 63-72.

183The scandal is discussed in detail by I. Kamanin, "Poslednie gody samoupravleniia Kieva po Magdeburgskomu pravu," <u>KSt.</u>, 1888, No. 5, PP. 140-168; No. 8, pp. 157-195; No. 9, pp. 597-622.

184v. I. Shcherbyna, "Narysy z istorii Kyiva, vidkoly pryednano ioho do Moskovs'koi derzhavy do pochatku svitovoi viiny i revoliutsii (1654-1914)," Novi Studii V. I. Shcherbyny z istorii Kyeva (Kiev: 1926), P. 19.

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a special three-year tax exemption for any merchant or artisan of the spire who settled in Kiev.¹⁸⁶ As expected, newcomers flocked to the city, and, by 1845, out of 6,048 masters registered in the artisan guilds only 3,959 were natives, while 2,089 had come from other cities.¹⁸⁷ wost of the newcomers were Russians who assumed complete control of the building trades (2,848 masters, journeymen, and helpers).¹⁸⁸ Having lost their autonomy, the merchants and artisans became part of an ethnically heterogeneous social estate of the Empire.

The Kievan struggle elicited the only known protest literature emanating from the burgher class of the former Hetmanate, "The Lament of the Kievans on the Loss of the Magdeburg Law."¹⁸⁹ This protest was a long poem written in Ukrainian which had a virulently anti-Russian tone. It decries that the "bearded ones," the <u>katsapy</u>, are coming from Tuls, Kaluga, Dubrov and other cities and have taken over the city. The anonymous author ponders whether the native Kievan's only recourse is to leave his wife and house and flee the city. He condemns the previous city administration for having lost Ukrainian rights through corruption and gambling, and concludes that now "the Muscovite will rule."

186<u>PSZ</u>, Second Series, No. 7931 (March 8, 1835), Vol. X, p. 211.
187I. I. Funduklei, Pt. 1, p. 380.

188 Ibid. Since census figures from 1782 to 1897 did not differentiate between Ukrainians and Russians, it is necessary to rely on such impresisonistic information as a whole guild or profession being controlled by one nationality.

189mO skorbe kievlian o potere magdeburgskago prava," KSt., No. 5 (1882), pp. 352-357.

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Elsewhere in the former Hetmanate, imperial integration of the cities occurred much more quickly and without local resistance. Strong traditions of self-government did not exist in the cities of the Left-Bank nor were the authorities as tolerant as in the Right-Bank Ukraine. In Chernihiv, for instance, the introduction of the Town Charter evoked no protest. The consequences of imperial integration, however, were similar to those in Kiev. First came a large influx of Jews: while in 1786, there was only one Jew living outside the city limits, by 1796 Jews made an unsuccessful bid to obtain the municipal monopoly in spirits, and by 1802 Jews in Chernihiv were numerous enough to have a synagogue, school, and cemetery. 190 At mid-century Jewish burghers outnumbered Christians: 2741 Jews, 2012 Orthodox, and 7 Old-Believers. 191

Concurrently, the Chernihiv burghers had to face a much smaller but steady influx of Russians. In 1787 and 1797 the Chernihiv duma dealt with complaints that Russians were illegally trading within the city.¹⁹² The conflict between Ukrainian and Russian burghers reached a climax in 1815, when Russian burghers (mostly in the building industry) attempted to form their own guild. In a petition to the provincial government, 151 Russian burghers complained that they were disproportion-

190v. Khizhniakov, "Chernigovskaia starina (1765-1810); po arkhivnym bumagam gorodskoi dumy," KSt., No. 6 (1899), pp. 373-375.

191N. Markevich, "Chernigov; istoricheskoe i statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigova," ChGV, No. 10 (1852), p. 4.

192A. Tishchinskii, "K istorii kraia: Stoletie Chernigovskoi dumy," ChGV, No. 3 (1888), p. 4; V. Khizhniakov, "Chernigovskaia starina," P. 375

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stely taxed and that too many Russians were being selected as conscripts to the army.¹⁹³ The Chernihiv duma replied that the Russians were not fulfilling their financial obligations towards the city and that many mussians being drafted were vagrants. The Chernihiv duma, however, had no objections to the Russian guild as long as the guild members fulfilled all their municipal obligations. But as soon as Governor-General Repnin discovered the existence of an exclusively Russian guild, he ordered its immediate dissolution (1818) and the registering of members into guilds according to profession, not nationality. Apparently, this was not an isolated incident since the Governor-General sent a circular abolishing all ethnic guilds in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces. Thus, once again imperial authorities fostered the creation of a united, but ethnically heterogeneous burgher class.

The same pattern prevailed throughout all the towns of the Hetmanate, with the exception of Nizhyn. Largely due to the presence of the Greek Brotherhood, Nizhyn was a more cosmopolitan city than others in the Hetmanate. At the time of the abolition, there were 163 Ukrainian, 90 Russian, and approximately 700 Greek, Bulgarian, and Wallachian merchants. The artisans were still overwhelmingly Ukrainian--4,817 Ukrainians to 88 Russians.¹⁹⁴ Then Jews began arriving in the city. In

193 The whole incident is recounted in Governor-General Repnin's circular abolishing all ethnic guilds in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces. The circular was published by I. F. Pavlovskii, "Ob unichtozhenii plotnitskago tskekha russkoi porody," <u>Trudy Poltavs'koi</u> <u>Arkhivnoi Kommissii</u>, Vol. VI (1909), pp. 317-318.

194A. Shafonskii, pp. 475-476.

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1797, the Nizhyn burghers petitioned the imperial authorities to prevent Jews from settling in Nizhyn.¹⁹⁵ The petitions were not successful and by mid-century the city was even more cosmopolitan due to the addition of over two thousand Jewish merchants and artisans.¹⁹⁶

Since the Greek Brotherhood retained its privileges, Nizhyn, as under Ukrainian administration, had two governments and two judicial systems. During the first half of the nineteenth century the two administrations were at odds over taxation, fire-fighting, passports, and numerous other municipal problems.¹⁹⁷ This struggle overshadowed any Ukrainian-Russian friction in the merchant and artisan guilds.

By the middle of the nineteenth century the Ukrainian merchants had become a minority in the territory of the former Hetmanate. According to the 1851 census, in Poltava province there were 1,381 Jewish merchants (6 in the first guild, 22 in the second, 1,353 in the third) and 1,229 Orthodox Christians (4 in the first guild, 30 in the second, 1,095 in the third).¹⁹⁸ In the Chernihiv province Christian merchants

195v. S. Ikonnikov, publisher, "Proshenie 'grazhdon' goroda Nezhina o zapreshchenii evreiam roznichnoi torgovli," KSt., No. 6 (1898), pp. 86-89; A. Lazarevskii, publisher, "Proshenie nezhinskikh kuptsov i meshchian o vospreshchenii pol'skim i avstriiskim evreiam roznichnoi torgovli na iarmarkakh v Malorossii 1797 g.," KSt., No. 7-8 (1902), pp. 12-15.

1961. Semenov, ed., <u>Geografichesko-statisticheskii slovar' Rossii-</u> <u>skoi imperii, Vol. III, p. 569; "Gorod Nezhin," Zhurnal Ministerstva</u> <u>Vnutrennykh del, Vol. XIII (1846), pp. 261-298.</u>

197K. Kharlampovych, "Narysy z istorii hrets'koi koloni v Nizheni," <u>ZIFV [V] UAN</u>, Vol. XXIV (1929), pp. 109-205.

198Keppen (Köppen), Petr, Deviataia reviziia (St. Petersburg: 1857), pp. 184-185.

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eutnumbered the Jews 2,848 to 767, but even in this case, large-scale trade was controlled by Jews. No Christians had sufficient capital for the first guild, while 59 Jewish merchants were so registered (second guild 82 Christians to 15 Jews; third guild 2,766 Christians to 693 Jews).¹⁹⁹ To these figures one must add the 900 Greeks, Wallachians, Persians and Moldavians belonging to the Greek Brotherhood who were not required to join Russian merchant guilds.²⁰⁰ Unfortunately, it is impossible to calculate the number of Russian merchants in the Hetmante. Contemporary literature and some scholarly wroks indicate that Russians and Jews dominated internal trade, especially at fairs.²⁰¹ M. Domontovich, who gathered statistical information for the military estimated that two-thirds of the merchants of Chernihiv province were Russians and Jews and only one-third "is made up of the native population, the Little Russians."²⁰²

Ukrainian artisans fared only somewhat better under the dual pressure of incoming Russians and Jews. In Poltava province, Jews numbered about one-third of all artisans registered in the guilds (9,448 Jews to 18,358 Christians), while in Chernihiv province the ratio was

199 Ibid.

200"Gorod Nezhin," p. 291.

2011. Aksakov, Issledovanie o torgovle na ukrainskikh iarmarkakh (St. Petersburg: 1858), pp. 12-15, 47 and passim; O. Nikolaichuk, "Il'inskaia iarmarka v period eia sushchestvovaniia v g Romnakh," Trudy Poltavskoi Arkhivnoi Kommissii, Vol. III (1906), pp. 54-59.

202_M. Domontovich, <u>Materialy dlia geografii i statistiki Rossii;</u> Chernigovskaia guberniia (St. Petersburg: 1865), p. 156.

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approximately one-fifth (12,378 Jews to 47,955 Christians).²⁰³ Unfortunately, since the statistics did not differentiate between Ukrainians and Russians, it is impossible to even estimate the extent of Russian penetration into artisan guilds. Judging by the struggle in Kiev and Chernihiv, the number must have been substantial, especially in the building trades.

The long-term effect of the introduction of the Town Charter was to integrate the Ukrainian merchants and artisans into an ethnically mixed imperial burgher class. This, more than any other factor, broke the burghers' ties with the Hetmanate's past. The Ukrainian town assumed a more and more ethnically heterogeneous and linguistically Russian character. Russian was not only the language of trade and industry but also of government. The numerous imperial officials who flocked to the provincial and district capitals added to the towns' Russification.

Imperial integration of the Hetmanate brought about the Russification of another social group, the clergy. In the nineteenth century, the clergy became a separate closed social group numbering 8,073 in Poltava province and 7,097 in Chernihiv province.²⁰⁴ Up to this time, it had been possible for a nobleman, Cossack, or even peasant to become a priest or monk,²⁰⁵ for the clerical status had been considered a

203 Keppen, pp. 186-187.

204Ibid., p. 209.

205A. Lazarevskii, "Ocherki iz byta Malorossii XVIII veka; I. Prikhodskoe dukhovenstvo, II Monakhi," <u>Russkii arkhiv</u>, no vol. given (1871), pp. 1884-1905; E. M. Kryzhanovskii, "Ocherki byta iuzhno-russkago sel'skago dukhovenstva v XVIII v.," <u>Sobranie Sochinenii E. M.</u> <u>Kryzhanovskago</u> (Kiev: 1890), Vol. I, pp. 391-439.

vocation, a profession, and not a separate social category or estate. But the introduction of the poll tax, state regulation of the number of clerics, and compulsory seminary education contributed to the clergy's becoming a closed caste. Since persons liable to the poll tax and the draft could not be accepted into the clergy, 206 the candidates for the priesthood had to belong to the two estates exempted from the poll tax: the mobility and clergy. Church service carried little social prestige or financial reward, and, therefore, was unattractive to the nobility. Compulsorary seminary training further narrowed the possibility of any outsider entering the priesthood, since the seminaries in practice accepted only sons of priests. 207 Finally, the state strictly regulated the number of priests and monks for each parish. Competition was keen, for only those who held officially recognized positions were exempted from the poll tax. Clerical families made certain that no vacancy in the eparchy would go to a stranger if there were any applicant from among the sons of the local clergy. 208

207 In the former Hetmanate this policy had been initiated by Wetropolitan Samuil Myslavs'kyi-- see F. Rhozhestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii...," No. 4 (1877), p. 31--and was continued by Metropolitan Gavriil Banulesko-Bondoni. See "Kievskii mitropolit Gavriil Banulesko-Bondoni (1799-1803)," <u>Trudy Kievskoi Dukhovnoi Akademii</u>, No. 10 (1904), p. 274. The restriction of seminary applicants to sons of clergy had apparently become common throughout the Empire. See G. Freeze, p. 653.

208 Metropolitan Bondini made an unsuccessful attempt to reverse the process of priestly families' controlling appointments to certain parishes. See "Kievskii mitropolit Gavriil Bonulesko-Bondini," No. 8 (1904), pp. 105-108.

²⁰⁶ In the 1770's and 80's, the Senate and the Synod demanded the exclusion from the clergy of anyone listed on the poll tax. See Gregory L. Freeze, "Social Mobility and the Russian Parish Clergy in the Eighteenth Century," <u>Slavic Review</u>, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 (1974), pp. 655-656.

By the nineteenth century, therefore, it had become impossible for the community to elect as priest a local resident, who would then receive some theological training and be ordained. Nor could a community invite a foreign priest, ordained in Moldavia or the Ottoman Empire, or even one from another part of the Russian Empire. Those few communities which attempted to continue the tradition of elections were in practice limited in choice to one of the sons of the former local priest.

Surprisingly, the strong local roots of the clergy did not prevent their Russification. Having become a class apart, they studied in Russian, wrote to each other in Russian, spoke Russian in the home, and even preached village sermons in Russian.²⁰⁹ Hrushevs'kyi provides a perceptive capsule description of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian parish clergy:

The right of the village communities to elect their clergy had been abolished. More educated people were assigned to the parishes but were foreign to the community and were unwilling to have much to do with it. Having gone through a Russified school system, the candidates for the priesthood, even those whose origins were from the Ukrainian village,

2090. Fedir Kistiakovskii, "Vospominaniia (1808-185 g.)," KSt., 1895, No. 1, pp. 44-63; No. 2, pp. 218-233; No. 4, pp. 114-130; No. 7-8, pp. 185-210; No. 9, pp. 346-366; No. 10, pp. 113-118; No. 11, pp. 244-258; No. 12, pp. 380-396; I. Vlasovs'kyi, <u>Narys istorii</u> <u>ukrains'koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy</u>, Vol. III, pp. 251-262. The best <u>description of the contrast between the old-fashioned clergy and the</u> <u>more educated but Russified younger generation can be found in a work</u> of fiction by Ivan Nechui-Levyts'kyi, <u>Starosvits'ki batiushky ta</u> <u>matiushki</u> (many editions). Levyts'kyi himself was of clerical origins and graduated from the Kievan seminary. rejected the language of their own people and viewed the culture, language and traditions of their people with derision.... The Ukrainian language was banished from the pulpit and school.... In social relations the clergy was friendly with the petty gentry, the police officials, and various merchants. From the village community they only demanded payments....210

Finally, the abolition of Usrainian autonomy meant the full enserfment of the peasantry, the culmination of a process that had begun in the late seventeenth century. Unlike the destruction of the Zaporothian Sich, which was lamented in folk songs, there is no indication that the peasants had any sentimental attachment to the Hetmanate and its institutions. One response to the abolition of autonomy and their complete enserfment was flight from their masters. Between 1782-1791 approximately 35,000 peasants from the Kiev and Chernihiv provinces escaped their masters and, for the most part, went to the southern Ukraine and the Don. Considering that the total peasant population of these provinces was approximately 700,000, this meant that in the short duration of nine years five percent of all peasants had fled. 211 With the settling of the south and vigorous imperial prosecution of runaways, peasant escapes became more difficult. Nevertheless, they continued: between 1822 and 1833, for instance, 1349 peasants from Poltava and 1824 peasants from Chernihiv were sent to Siberia because of repeated

210_M. Hrushevs'kyi, <u>Z istorii religiinoi dumky na Ukraini</u> (2nd ed.; Winnipeg: 1962), p. 135.

211Vasyl' Dubrovs'kyi, "Selians'ki vtechi na Livoberezhnii Ukraini Maprykintsi XVIII st. (1782-1791 rr.)," <u>Chernihiv i Pivnichne Livobere-</u> <u>Thrhia</u> (Vol. XXIII of <u>Zapysky Ukrains'koho Naukovoho Tovarystva</u>; Kiev: 1928), pp. 394-396. escapes from their masters. 212

Petitions to the government and violence were the only other means for the peasant to indicate his dissatisfaction. Hundreds of petitions were presented by the peasants to the local and, at times, central authorities.²¹³ Many who were registered as peasants wanted to prove that they were, in reality, Cossacks. Peasants who were enserfed by the landlord wanted to have their status changed to state peasants. When petitions failed, the peasants occasionally resorted to violence. In the village of Morozivka the peasants protested their registration in 1782 census as privately owned serfs instead of state peasants. They "arrested" the landlord, expelled the local authorities. and sent a delegation to the Kiev provincial administration. The investigation proved the charges of Morozivka peasants to be accurate and they were registered as state peasants. 214 While there were many individual instances of violence perpetrated by the peasants, 215 there were few massive uprisings involving villages. In those cases where uprisings did occur, they usually involved Cossacks, who had lost their

2121. O. Hurzhii, Borot'ba selian i robitnykiv Ukrainy proty feodal'no-kriposnyts'koho knitu (z 80-kh rokiv XVIII st. do 1861 r.) (Kiev: 1958), p. 79. Hurzhii devotes a whole section of his book to peasant flights, pp. 69-82.

213Ibid., pp. 53-59.

214Ibid., pp. 83-84.

215These are enumerated in I. I. Ignatovich, <u>Krest'ianskoe</u> <u>dvizhenie v Rossii v pervoi chetverti XIX veka</u> (Moscow: 1963), pp. 294-321; and I. O. Hurzhii, <u>Borot'ba selian...</u>, pp. 53-68; 83-105; <u>Istoriia</u> <u>selianstva Ukrains'koi RSR</u> (2 vols.; Kiev: 1967), Vol. I, pp. 327-335.

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land, meadow, or forest. 216

The long-term impact of the abolition of autonomy on Ukrainian society was immense: the Cossacks were gradually reduced to virtual state peasants; the merchants and artisans were absorbed into an ethnically heterogeneous but linguistically Russian imperial estate, the clergy became a Russified closed caste, and the peasants were ful'y enserfed.

216While Hurzhii lists a number of larger uprisings in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a closer examination reveals that virtually in all cases Cossacks were involved. See Hurzhii, Borot'ba selian..., pp. 83-105. Soviet historians treat Cossacks as part of the peasantry and thus can talk about the growing peasant movement from the end of the eighteenth century until emancipation.

CONCLUSIONS

Once there was the Hetmanate It passed beyond recall Once, it was, we ruled ourselves But we shall rule no more... Yet we never shall forget The Cossack fame of yore!

T. Shevchenko²¹⁷

Between 1764 and the early nineteenth century, the autonomous institutions of the Hetmanate were abolished and the region was integrated into the Russian Empire. The abolition occurred in two stages: an initial preparatory one, followed by the actual introduction of imperial administration and institutions. The first stage began in 1764 with the forced resignation of Hetman Rozumovs'kyi and Catherine's formulation of a clear policy aimed at gradually integrating all autonomous areas. From 1764 until 1782, the major Ukrainian institutions remained intact, but Governor-General Rumiantsev successfully intermeshed them with the imperial bureaucracy and made them dependent upon imperial institutions. By the time this process was completed, the Hetmanate was well prepared for the final abolition. The consternation caused by the abolition of the office of hetman had subsided, and the hestility between the Ukrainian elite and Governor-General Rumiantsev

217"The Night of Taras," Song Out of Darkness; Shevchenko's Poens, p. 11. had been superseded by co-operation and even friendship. When Catherine, spurred by social and political unrest, developed a master plan for the Empire's governance, the fate of the Hetmanate was sealed. The introduction of Catherine's provincial reforms into the Hetmanate in 1782 initiated the second, decisive stage of the abolition. The Ukrainian administrative, fiscal, and judial systems were abolished, the Church lost its wealth and was divested of any remaining local peculiarities, and, finally, the Cossack military formations were phased out and the populace subjected to the Empire's military draft. By the early nineteenth century the Hetmanate was, with only a few exceptions, governed by an imperial bureaucracy according to imperial norms.

The Ukrainian social structure, however, did not correspond to the imperial order so readily. While the burghers soon became part of an ethnically heterogeneous, Russified estate and the clergy were transformed into a Russified closed caste, the Ukrainian elite and the Cossacks proved more difficult to integrate. The imperial authorities, wereover, wavered in their policies towards the latter two groups. Initially, in 1783-85, virtually the whole Ukrainian elite was admitted into the dvorianstvo. Then, at the turn of the century, the Office of Heraldry rescinded thousands of titles and advanced strict regulations for those who claimed rights to imperial dvorianstvo on the basis of Ukrainian titles. This resulted in twenty-five years of struggle by the Ukrainian nobility against the Office of Heraldry and the Senate. Although most Ukrainian titles were eventually recognized (except for the two lowest ranks) this long, drawn-out battle slowed delayed the "minilation of the Ukrainian elite.

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Similarly, the imperial authorities vacillated in dealing with the Cossacks--a group which did not readily fit any standard category of imperial society. On the one hand, there was a strong tendency to reduce the Cossacks' status to that of state peasants; on the other, in times of military emergency, the imperial authorities sought to mobilize them as irregular troops, thus reviving their Cossack status. Finally, in the 1830's the Cossacks were definitively accorded the status of special state peasants. It was only at the end of the 1830's, therefore, that Ukrainian society at last conformed to the imperial social structure.

The initial reaction of Ukrainian society to imperial integration and assimilation was an entirely negative one. Rumiantsev was forced to use repression and arrests to counter the autonomist demands made by the Ukrainian elite. Despite these measures, fiery leaders such as Hryhorii Poletyka from the nobility and the Kievan metropolitan, Arsenii Mohylians'kyi, called not only for the continuation of autonomy, but also for the restitution of rights long lost. The Legislative Commission of 1767-69 had shown that all segments of Ukrainian society -with the exception of the peasantry who did not participate -- cherished their autonomous rights. But the Commission had also revealed a fragmented society with politics controlled entirely by the nobility and higher clergy. The other segments of society (Cossacks, burghers, lower clergy) were concerned only with their estate rights and were hardly ware of the political crisis which threatened to end the existence of the Hetmanate .

All Ukrainian institutions were abolished only two decades later,

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yet the reaction of the Ukrainian populace was nothing more than mild. Had there been an opportunity to register an opinion, such as in the 1767 Legislative Commission, much of Ukrainian society would still, perhaps, have preferred the continuation of local institutions. Even with the tack of a public forum, the nobility, the chief proponents of Ukrainian autonomy in the past, might have expressed greater dissatisfaction. Their placidity stemmed from Rumiantsev's well-planned policy of drawing the Ukrainian nobility into imperial service. Imperial co-option of the Ukrainian, and his largely Ukrainian staff actually prepared the introduction of imperial institutions into the Hetmanate. Another Ukrainian, the Kievan metropolitan, Samuil Myslavs'kyi, supervised the imperial secularization of Church wealth and attempted to abliterate any remaining peculiarities which still differentiated the Durch in the Hetmanate from the rest of the Empire.

Yet the co-operation which the imperial government obtained from the Ukrainian elite cannot be interpreted as universal acceptance of imperial integration. A portion of the Ukrainian nobility openly topoused assimilation, a much larger number probably became Russified and were assimilated without ever being conscious of the process, but a third part strove to retain or even renew various aspects of the Hetmanate's heritage. The latter group, the traditionalists, were not united in any cohesive movement but were heterogeneous in make-up and goals. Some morely espoused the continuation of the Lithuanian Statute and the Ukrainian judicial system; others utilized propitious political moments to propose the reestablishment of Cossack military formations;

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still others clandestinely wrote and distributed anti-assimilationist and anti-Russian political literature (<u>Istoriia Rusov</u>); and a daring few even plotted against the imperial government. Oppositionist tendencies were further reinforced by the long struggle to gain recognition of Ukrainian ranks as bestowing automatic membership in the imperial dvorianstvo. In sum, while most of the Ukrainian nobility had become assimilated and Russified, the process was not as automatic as hitherto presumed and had to overcome pockets of resistence among the Ukrainian elite. A small part of the nobility never fully accepted integration and assimilation, and it was they who helped promote the Ukrainian national revival in the nineteenth century.

The only protest against imperial assimilation not made by the nobility was, "The Lament of the Kievans on the Loss of the Magdeburg Law"--a passionately anti-Russian poem. Kiev, with its strong traditions of self-rule and an articulate burgher class, was the exception to the rule. For the most part, the burghers, the Cossacks, the lower clergy, and peasants were the politically passive elements of Ukrainian society. And if they were dissatisfied, they simply lacked the forum and the articulateness to express their opinions.

Catherine and her heirs seemed successful in forging a unitary. Russian Empire. Not only were the institutions of the Hetmanate replaced by imperial ones, but much of Ukrainian society was assimilated and Russified. A basic polarization resulted: the town, with its ethnically mixed population and numerous officials became Russified, while the countryside, inhabited by Cossacks, peasants, and nobles, remained, on the whole, Ukrainian. Later, even most of the provincial

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pobles became Russified and the Cossacks were merged into the peasantry. Being Ukrainian was virtually synonomous with being a peasant. Except for purposes of taxation and the draft, and as fomentors of social unrest, the peasants were considered of little consequence to the Empire. Yet, they retained their language, customs and traditions which became the the national movement. focus of/ Neither Catherine nor the imperial government could have foreseen that the unitary, well-integrated Empire would soon be confronted by "the revolution of national consciousness."²¹⁸

Once under way, the Ukrainian national movement drew much of its inspiration from the legacy of the Hetmanate. Its poets and writers took the civic and patriotic political literature of the Hetmanate and infused it with a new romantic and nationalist message. The Cossack chronicles and the historical works of the nobility formed the basis for the later development of a national history and a national myth. The nobility's experimentation with a vernacular Ukrainian literature eventually blossomed into a national literature. Moreover, the Hetmanate served as an example of self-rule while retaining loyalty to the dynasty and Empire. By 1840, the Hetmanate was indeed "lost," as Shevchenko wrote, but it was not beyond recall. The Hetmanate and the memory of its traditions provided a major link between Cossack and modern Ukraine.

218Marc Raeff, "Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy Towards the Nationalities," <u>Soviet Nationality Problems</u>, Edward Allworth, ed. (New York: 1971), p. 22.

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APPENDIX

Supplementary Information on the Nakazy

I. Nakazy of the Nobility

CHERNIHIV NAKAZ

Comments:

- 1. government-controlled;
- 2. 135 signatures.

Additional points (not on chart):

- 1. criticism of the Ukrainian administration;
- 2. 2. petition for creation of nobility courts;
 - 3. request for stationing of Russian troops in towns only;
 - demand for exemption of peasants under nobility jurisdiction from performance of public works.

Published in: SIRIO, Vol. LXVII (1889), pp. 233-250

NIZHYN OFFICIAL NAKAZ

Comments:

- 1. government-dictated;
- 2. 16 signatures.

Additional points:

- 1. criticism of Ukrainian administration;
- 2. demand for creation of nobility courts;
- request for exemption from state services of peasants under the jurisdiction of the nobility;
- 4. proposal for the construction of storage bins for grain.

Published in: SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 133-146

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STARODUB OFFICIAL NAKAZ

Comments:

1. 118 signatures.

Additional points:

none

Published in: SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 211-222

HLUKHIV NAKAZ

Comments:

1. 48 signatures.

Additional points:

none

Published in: SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 127-132

PRYLUKY NAKAZ

Comments:

1. 100 signatures.

Additional points:

 petition for the confirmation of the Ukrainian legal system.

Published in: SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 223-232

POHARA NAKAZ

Comments:

1. 39 signatures.

Additional points:

 request that <u>raskolniki</u> living in the polk territory either be removed or subjected to local jurisdiction.

Published in: SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 203-210

KIEV POLK NAKAZ

Comments:

1. 111 signatures.

Additional points:

- request reimbursement for various border obligations (maintenance of fortifications, border buildings, bridges, etc.);
- demand for registration of all Cossacks and the prohibition for peasants to enter Cossack ranks;
- 3. proposal for a reform of the Ukrainian General Court.

Published in: SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 173-188

WBNY NAKAZ

Comments:

1. 117 signatures.

Additional points:

- petition for free elections of all military and civilian officials and for the confirmation of the nobility's rights to manufacture;
- request the prohibition of a Russian military unit to have its quarters in Lubny.

Published in: SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 158-172

STARODUB SUPPRESSED NAKAZ

Comments:

- 1. suppressed by Rumiantsev;
- 2. no signatures, but 87 nobles were present;
- 3. not published in full.

Additional points:

 petition for a guarantee of the Ukrainian legal system and that government posts be held by the local nobility.

Synopsis published in: Maksimovich, Vybory, pp. 111-117

NITHIN SUPPRESSED NAKAZ

Comments:

- 1. suppressed by Rumiantsev;
- 2. 55 signatures;
- 3. not published in full.

Additional points:

none

Synopsis published in: Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 168.

PEREIASLAV NAKAZ

Comments:

1. 116 signatures.

Additional points:

none

Published in: SIRIO, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 147-157.

II. Cossack Nakazy

CHERNIHIV NAKAZ

Comments:

1. first page of manuscript missing, first point unknown; 2. 90 signatures, all Cossacks, no nobles.

Additional points:

none

Published in: Nakazy, pp. 142-150.

PEREIASLAV NAKAZ

Comments:

1. composite of 18 nakazy;

2. no signatures available.

Additional points:

- 1. general praise of the sovereign for the manifesto;
- 2. proposal for abolition of tariff in Little Russia; 3. complaint against requirement to provision passing Russian

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4. request for retention of own sotnia court system.

Published in: Maksimovich, Vybory, pp. 251-254

STARODUB NAKAZ

Comments:

1. no signatures.

Additional points:

none

Published in: Nakazy, pp. 151-152.

PRYLUKY NAKAZ

Comments:

1. 22 signatures.

Additional points:

none

Published in: Nakazy, pp. 157-163

MYRHOROD NAKAZ

Comments:

1. a synopsis of various sotnia nakazy;

no signatures available.

Additional points:

- 1. petition for the confirmation of title to Cossack lands and exemption from taxation of Cossacks and Cossack widows;
- 2. demand payment for livestock taken from the Cossacks during the Prussian campaign;
- 3. request the return of property in New Serbia and repayment for supplies appropriated by the Moldavian Hussar polk;
- 4. proposal for rotating stationed Russian troops among