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THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT MOVEMENT 1919 to 1926

A Dissertation
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

By

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Washington, District of Columbia

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GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
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The dissertation of George Peter Kulchycky, M.A. entitled
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submitted to the department of Russian Area Studies in partial
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in the Graduate School of Georgetown University has been read and approved by the
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Doctoral Dissertation Abstract

THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT MOVEMENT 1919 TO 1926

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The Ukrainian Insurgent movement, born in an outpouring of a reawakened Ukrainian national spirit, organized and activated in a period of revolutionary chaos, grew into a military force which had the potential to destroy the Bolshevik revolution. This dissertation examines the social and political factors which moulded and sustained that movement.

As the Tsarist Empire dissolved in the wildfire of the Russian Revolution, Ukraine, through a series of Manifestos, separated from Russia and prepared to chart its own nationally oriented course. Disputes with the Petrograd Provisional Government, and later the Bolshevik leaders, led to the First Russian-Ukrainian War at the end of 1917. With the complicity of the German victors at Brest-Litovsk, the Russian armies were expelled from Ukraine.

The new government of Ukraine, the Central Rada, was almost immediately overthrown by Pavlo Skoropadsky, the German favorite. Skoropadsky, a Ukrainian aristocrat and land magnate, assuming the title of "Hetman" of Ukraine, quickly alienated both the masses and that sector of the nobility which had rapport with the masses. The chaos and demoralization which followed his declaration of "Federation with Russia" saw the

rise of yet another government, the Directorate. When Russian armies again invaded Ukraine the disaffected people did little to aid the Directorate; many partisan leaders (Otamans) at first actively aided the Russians. Later, as they became convinced that Bolshevik slogans were only tactical diversions, they turned to the Directorate as their best hope. Many Otamans incorporated their units directly into the Ukrainian Army, others coordinated their military operations with it.

August of 1919 saw the Bolsheviks driven from Kiev. A new enemy appeared, General Denikin's Volunteer Army. Pressed on two fronts the UNR Army retreated, reformed, and began its "Winter Campaign." It became a partisan army, resuming conventional tactics only after the defeat of the Volunteer Army. Exhausted, the UNR Army was forced to leave Ukraine and intern its troops in Poland. The continuing prosecution of the War of Liberation was left to the insurgents, now coordinated and controlled by Insurgent Centers and couriers from the exiled UNR Army Headquarters.

Final defeat for the Partisan Army came at the battle of Bazar, in November of 1921. The Bolsheviks' systemized terror, repression, and man-made famine continued to sap the remaining strength of the insurgency until its dissolution in 1926.

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Preface

This dissertation deals with Ukrainian Insurgency from 1919 to 1926. The very nature of this topic underlines the difficulty of coping with a period that very little is known or written about.

In order to deal with some of the seemingly insurmountable problems, the writer asked for, and received, the assistance of many persons from every walk of life.

I should like to express my gratitude to all those who have helped to make this study possible. The staffs of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences Library in New York, the Lypynsky Historical Institute in Philadelphia, the Ukrainian National Organization Library in Toronto, the Congressional Library in Washington, D. C., the New York Public Library, and the Cleveland Public Library.

I am especially indebted to Professors Panas Fedenko and Lev Shankovsky, for their kind assistance, as well as to former officers of the Ukrainian National Republic Generals D. Kuzminsky and V. Samutin, Colonels M. Czebotariv and M. Lypovecky, Otaman Ivan Luty-Lutenko, Captains I. Ostrovershenko and A. Didkovsky, and Mr. V. Symyancev, who have shared their experiences, manuscripts, and libraries with me.

I should also like to express my gratitude to my mentor Dr. Joseph Schiebel for his kind assistance and constructive criticism which contributed to my understanding of the period with which I am dealing.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

a. The Fall of Imperial Russia

The Russo-Japanese War underlined the fact that the "Giant on Clay Feet", as Russia was called during the Crimean War, had undergone little significant change in her ability to wage war. The defeat at the hands of the Japanese and the outbreak of Revolution at home left the Empire and its rulers in a state of insecurity. Striking workers and peasants aroused by the agitation of the revolutionary intelligentsia demanded freedom and rights that had been denied them by the backward Imperial Government.

To all these developments the Russian government reacted with concessions and promises of reform. In March of 1905 a representative body, the Duma, was called into existence by an Imperial Manifesto. Elections to this body took place in March of the following year. The Duma was a forum where the oppositionists were given an opportunity to give vent to their feelings and to propose concrete reform measures. However, once the immediate danger of revolution had passed, less attention was given to this representative body. Punitive expeditions began reimposing the will of the "autocrat". On two occasions the Tsar dissolved the Duma because it refused to act in accordance with his dictates. This inability on the part of the Imperial Government to adjust to the changing times, precipitated the end of the Romanov Dynasty and Imperial Russia.

On the eve of the Great War, Russians constituted only 43.30 percent of the population of the Russian Empire.¹ Most of the Empire was at

¹ Michael S. Pap, "Ukraine's Struggle for Sovereignty", Papers, No. 17, (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1961), p. 4.

[this time made up of non-Russian nationalities that were in one form or another annexed to the Empire. The Russo-Japanese War was instrumental in awakening these nationalities and reviving the desire of these former proud states to assert, if not their previous sovereignty, at least a semblance of cultural autonomy and national identity. This awakening of national pride rejected the views of Great Russian statesmen such as Count Valuiev, the Russian Minister of Interior, who when confronted by the question of a Ukrainian nation and language on June 21, 1863 issued a decree that stated: "There never was, there is not, and there never can be a Little Russian (Ukrainian - G.K.) language and nationality".² By 1905, however, even the Russian Academy of Arts and Sciences rejected this view. It concluded that the Ukrainian Nation and language does exist.

By 1905 the Ukrainian subjects of Russia became more and more conscious of their cultural heritage. A revival of the language and national identity began to take organized forms. The "Prosvita" (Enlightenment), founded in 1869, an organization interested in educating the Ukrainian masses, mushroomed throughout the country. Ukrainian co-operatives strove for economic independence and facilitated the growth of Ukrainian consciousness by financing the work of "Prosvita" and other cultural organizations. Yet in spite of the work of these agencies the Ukrainian peasant was still not thoroughly conscious of his identity on the eve of the Revolution. True, he was aware of the fact that he,

² Ibid., p. 3.

as a "Khakhol", was different from the "katsap",³ and that the latter was his enemy, but not to the extent that he had a well formulated ideology. This is not to say that such an ideology did not exist, on the contrary, it was already well formulated but at this point had not reached the masses. The real education of the peasant was achieved slowly through a process of evolution aided by the turbulence that was ushered in by the Russian Revolution.

The Russian Revolution was begun by the Volinskoi, Semyonovskoi, and Izmailskoi regiments which initiated the events that led to the overthrow of the Romanovs. By refusing, on March 8, 1917, to fire upon Petrograd demonstrators, the 4,000 soldiers made known their sympathy and were instrumental in enveloping the Empire with the flames of Revolution.⁴

After Petrograd the flag of Revolution found its way to every corner of the Empire, including Ukraine. But here the Revolution had its own distinct national character. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, later Premier of Ukraine, characterized the events in this manner:

"In reality the conscious strength of Ukraine was small..... But those who loved each other, without consciousness felt a tenderness toward the events that gave them life and were conducive to their development, who not under the laws of logic but under a clear natural feeling began to sense their

³ The terms "Kakhol" and "Katsap" are derogatory names that Russians and Ukrainians use in reference to each other. The Ukrainian term for a Muscovite is "Katsap" and stems from the word "tsap" meaning goat. Reasons for this equivalent are the goatees worn by the Russians at a time when Ukrainian peasants were clean shaven.

⁴ Semen Zbarazky, Kruty, (Munich: Schlakh Molodi, 1958), p. 49.

national kinship, there were hundreds of thousands and millions. In most cases they (the Ukrainians G.K.) manifested this (consciousness G.K.) in Petrograd, Kiev, Odesa, Rostov, in Ukraine and outside of Ukraine, but everywhere with awakened warmth and tenderness. Now suddenly it (Ukrainian consciousness G.K.) acquired the right of citizenship, it even had a beautiful gold and blue sky and sun flag on which this tenderness and sentimentality had a lawful, beautiful formula: "Long Live Free Ukraine."⁵

At one outset this spontaneous Ukrainian movement had no uniform set standards of expression. Arkadiy Zhyvotko in his memoirs writes that the Ukrainian national anthem *Shche ne Vmerla Ukraina* (Ukraine Lives) was sung to the melody of a light opera "Oy ne Khody Hrycyu", which was allowed by the tsarist regime and with which everyone was familiar. Concluding his statement Zhyvotko observes:

"Meetings as well as demonstrations took place under three flags of which one was red with the words: "Land and Freedom", the second yellow and blue with the slogan: "Long Live Free Ukraine", the third black "To the memory of those who died in our struggle".....⁶

Perhaps unaware of the symbolic nature of his observation the author took an unconscious glance at the future. In the name of these flags many soldiers were soon to lay down their lives. Only one flag, the blue and yellow, was to remain true to its slogan, the other two were later in use by the Bolsheviks and Anarchists and had nothing to do with the slogans that Zhyvotko mentioned.

What began with meetings and demonstrations ended with the formation of a Ukrainian Provisional Government. The Ukrainian National

⁵ Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennya Natsiyi (The Rebirth of a Nation) Vol. I, (Vienna: "Dzvin" Pub. Co. 1920) p. 75.

⁶ Zbarazky, op-cit., p. 14.

[Rada (Council) was elected by the Ukrainian National Congress in April] of 1917. Headed by Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the government was recognized as the representative body of Ukraine by the Congress of Ukrainian Soldiers in Kiev on May 18, 1917, the Peasants' Congress of Ukraine on July 12, 1917, and by the Workers Congress of Ukraine on July 12, 1917. In a surprisingly short span of time, the Rada included all the political parties of Ukraine and was recognized as the de facto Provisional Government of Ukraine.⁷ The Central Rada was in effect the unquestionable representative of the will of the Ukrainian people and the minorities. The composition of this consisted of the following groups:

	Delegates
The All Ukrainian Council of Peasant Deputies....	212
The All Ukrainian Council of Soldiers' Deputies..	158
The All Ukrainian Council of Workers Deputies....	100
Representatives of general (non-Ukrainian) Councils of Workers & Peasants Deputies.....	50
Representatives of Ukrainian Socialist Parties...	20
Representatives of Russian Socialist Parties.....	40
Representatives of Jewish Socialist Parties.....	35

⁷ Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923, (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 120.

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Representatives of professional, educational, and civic organizations and from national organi- zations of Moldavians, Germans, Tartars, Byelor- ussians and others.....	108 ⁸

Although the Ukrainian Rada was recognized by the populace of Ukraine, there was much opposition within the Petrograd Provisional Government to the proposal that Ukraine be allowed to run its own internal affairs while still an integral part of the Russian Empire. The Ukrainian masses, however, would not be mollified. At the Second All-Ukrainian Soldiers' Conference of June 18-23, 1917, the 2,300 delegates claiming to represent 1,600,000 soldiers, demanded that the Central Rada "immediately realize Ukrainian national - territorial autonomy as the first rung on the ladder of evolution in the process leading to the rebirth of Ukrainian statehood."⁹

This and the reluctance of the Petrograd Provisional Government to accede to Ukrainian demands forced the Central Rada to declare its First Universal (Manifesto) of June 10, 1917, inviting the people "to fortify their independence and become the masters of their own land". It further

⁸ M. Kapustyansky, "Volya Narodu" (The Freedom of a Nation), Visti, No. 1-2, (January-February 1954), p. 1.

⁹ Ibid., p. 1.

proclaimed that "from this day you (the people of Ukraine G.K.) will have to create your own destiny".¹⁰ A General Secretariat was promptly established with Volodymur Vynnychenko at its head.

The Petrograd Provisional Government, in the meantime, in an attempt to conciliate the Ukrainians and to avoid losing control over events in Ukraine, finally gave in to the Rada's demands and on July 11, 1917 recognized the authority of Ukraine, and the General Secretariat "as the governing body of Ukrainian affairs."¹¹ The result of this compromise was issued to the Ukrainian public in a Second Universal (Manifesto) on July 16, 1917. On this same day the Petrograd Provisional Government saw the resignation of Prince Lvov and his ministers. They could not, among other reasons, agree with the concession made to the Ukrainians and were still under the illusion that the Empire could weather the revolution without loss of territory or major concessions to the non-Russian nations.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks, in preparation for their overthrow of the Petrograd Provisional Government, with their ability to maneuver and exploit slogans and ideas, played upon the sentiments of the non-Russian nations by espousing the idea of "self-determination of nations". Not being in power, and thus not having anything to lose, they immediately recognized the Central Rada with the General Secretariat at its head, as the only legal representative of the Ukrainian people. They stated that:

¹⁰Zbarazky, op-cit., p. 49.

¹¹Pap, op-cit., p. 5.

"Nobody has the right to forcibly interfere in the internal life of nations and to correct their errors by force. Nations are sovereign in their internal affairs and have the right to arrange their lives as they wish."¹²

These Bolshevik tactics proved very effective. By the time of the coup d'etat of the Communists on November 7, 1917, Bolshevik propaganda had effectively neutralized opposition from the non-Russian nations and the Petrograd Provisional Government fell without offering any serious resistance.

Since Ukraine by its second Universal declared its autonomy and that it would remain a part of the Russian Federation, the Bolsheviks, upon seizing power, assumed that Ukraine would agree to remain within a Soviet Federation and promptly extended an invitation to this effect to the Rada. Before this the Bolsheviks recognized the Rada as the Government of Ukraine. While these events were taking place the formerly disciplined Russian armies, under the powerful propaganda of the Bolsheviks became completely disorganized and demoralized. Soldiers deserted by the thousands, tens of thousands, and straggled home where the "land was being divided." On their way home the armies contributed to the already widespread chaos brought on by the Revolution. Faced with this problem, the Central Rada ordered its military formations to disarm the armies crossing its territories.

Meeting in Kiev, between October 20 and November 12, the Third Conference of the All-Ukrainian Council of Soldiers' Deputies, with 3,000 delegates representing the Ukrainian soldiers on the front, forced

¹² Ibid., p. 5.

[the Central Rada to issue the Third Universal. The Soldiers' Deputies] resolved that:

"To cope with the anarchy that threatens Ukraine....The Ukrainian Conference of Soldiers' Deputies demands that the Central Rada and General Secretariat, relying upon the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army, take full sovereignty over all territories of Ukraine into its hands".¹³

Acting upon these demands the Central Rada proclaimed the Third Universal of November 20, 1917 which established that "From today Ukraine is declared the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR)". After this, the delegates to the Third Conference of the All-Ukrainian Council of Soldiers Deputies disarmed Bolshevik as well as the Petrograd Provisional Government military formations in Kiev.

Faced with the new developments in Ukraine and Ukraine's unwillingness to enter into the Soviet Federation, the Bolsheviks looked for a pretext to attack Ukraine. Earlier, on December 4, 1917, the Sovnarkom of Russia recognized the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) and its right to secede from Russia without any qualifications. On December 17, 1917 the Sovnarkom issued an ultimatum to the UNR making demands which would place Ukraine into its orbit. Convinced of its rejection, the Bolsheviks called an All-Ukrainian Conference of Workers, Peasant, and Soldiers' Deputies for December 17,

¹³ Kapustyansky, op. cit., p. 13. It must be noted that the Ukrainian Central Rada Government received strong support from the Ukrainian soldiers who, at the time, were still at the front. The Ukrainian soldiers began the Ukrainization of their formations in spite of the protests of Kerensky and the Petrograd Provisional Government. At this point Ukrainization affected 1,600,000 of the 5,000,000 soldiers of Ukrainian origin in the Russian army.

[

1917. This conference, which was being prepared by the Bolsheviks in an attempt to legally take over power from the Rada, was not opposed but encouraged by the latter. On December 17, therefore, 2500 delegates took part in the conference. When news of the Bolshevik ultimatum was read to the delegates of the Conference, the representatives almost unanimously condemned Bolshevik action and resolved: "1) The Conference feels that new elections to the Central Rada are not necessary and untimely. 2) The Conference expresses its complete confidence in the Central Rada and promises its determined support."¹⁴

Having received a vote of confidence from the Conference the Central Rada rejected the Bolshevik ultimatum, and on December 19 began preparations for war. The Bolsheviks, having lost their bid for power in Ukraine, gathered the few delegates who supported them at the Conference, left for Kharkiv and on December 21, 1917 established the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, a Central Executive Committee, and the National Secretariat of Ukraine. After creating a Ukrainian Soviet Government, Lenin prepared to launch the first Bolshevik campaign against the Ukrainian National Republic.

The overall situation in Ukraine proved favorable to the Bolsheviks. Although the Rada had many politicians, it had few statesmen. The men leading the Central Rada were men of little vision. Having taken power they allowed events to dictate to them rather than seizing the initiative. The reason for this was that their views were formulated while they were

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 1.

still members of the Russian political parties. Both Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko were socialists first and Ukrainians second. Loyal to socialist concepts they were unable to comprehend the demands of the masses that were pushing them from one radical situation into another. The Ukrainian Socialists were more concerned with saving the All-Russian Revolution. Vynnychenko thought in terms of a "united front with the Russian Democracy", and opposed the views of the delegates of the Soldiers Conference relating to the creation of a National Ukrainian Army. At the time that the "Russian Democracy" was arming itself against Ukraine he, in his utopian way, maintained that "War and armies are the invention of the bourgeoisie, soon there will be no wars because all nations will unite into one federation of nations".¹⁵ This attitude in the ruling circles split the Ukrainian political intelligentsia into two opposing camps. Because of this state of affairs, when the Bolsheviks took power in Petrograd, the Ukrainian military formations were all but disorganized. Soldiers who could have been incorporated into one of the most powerful armies in Europe were dispersed, others who militantly tried to reverse the policy of the Rada were sent to the front. On the eve of the Bolshevik invasion the Ukrainian borders were defended only by a small army of loyal determined men who believed in the rise of a new strong, independent Ukraine.

b. From Brest Litovsk to Chaos

Six days before the Bolshevik ultimatum, on December 9, 1917, the

¹⁵ Zbarazky, op-cit., p. 31.

[Russians began negotiations with the Central Powers. As early as Nov-]ember there already existed a truce between the Russians and the Germans on the Eastern front. After the truce of November 14, 1917 the Central Rada began discussing the possibility of peace with the Central Powers. They were concerned with the question of representation at Brest Litovsk.¹⁶ As long as the Petrograd Provisional Government remained in power, the Central Rada was content to be a part of the Russian Federation. With the emergence of the Bolsheviks, however, the Rada became aware of its de facto position as the legal government of Ukraine. It realized that by not joining the peace talks the Bolsheviks would claim representation of all of the former Russian Empire including the newly independent non-Russian entities. The Germans, well aware of the separatist trend of Ukraine sent a note to the Rada asking it whether it would be represented by the Bolsheviks or whether it would send its own delegation.¹⁷ On January 4, 1918 the Central Rada dispatched its delegation to Brest Litovsk with instructions to conclude peace with the Central Powers and to block any attempts of the Sovnarkom to sign a compact in the name of all the nations of the former Russian Empire. It was obvious to the Central Rada, in spite of its sympathies with the Entente cause, that a cessation of hostilities was necessary because the Ukrainian Government could not carry on a war on two fronts, that is, against the Central Powers and against the advancing armies of Soviet Russia.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ivan Kedryn (ed.), Beresteysky Myr (the Brest Peace), (Lviv: Chervona Kalyna, 1928), p. 145.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 144.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 20.

Before continuing, it is important to note the main objectives of the negotiating parties. The demands of the Central Powers can be summarized in four major points; first, the Germans wanted to negotiate a peace that would free their armies in the East, and enable them to pursue a more vigorous military campaign in the West; second, they wished to retain the conquered areas and territories; third, they hoped to replenish their dwindling food supplies; and finally, they planned to break up the Russian Empire so that it could not be put together again readily. Believing that the Bolsheviks were in power temporarily they hoped to profit from the situation.¹⁹ The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, advanced a formula "vsem-vsem" which propagated a "universal peace" with no annexations or indemnities. Of the negotiating parties, only Austria was anxious to sign a treaty of peace because it would, according to Count Czernin, the Austrian delegate, "be the first step toward peace in the world."²⁰ It seemed to react favorably to the "vsem-vsem" formula. General Hoffman of the German High Command, however, shattered the illusions of the Russian delegation when he declared that many nations within the former Russian Empire took advantage of the much propagandized slogan of the Bolsheviks, "Self-determination of all nations", and have declared their independence. Concerning the conquered areas, it became clear to the Bolsheviks that these areas were vital to the

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 174.

²⁰ Ottokar Czernin, In the World War, (London: Cassel and Co. Ltd., 1919), p. 216.

German war effort and that the latter was reluctant to hand them back to the Russians.

On January 4, 1918 the Ukrainian delegation under Holubovich, during the discussion of legal representation, requested that it be noted in the protocol that the Ukrainians and Bolsheviks present were separate delegations and that the Bolshevik claim to representation of all the nations of the former Russian Empire was "direct interference in Ukrainian internal affairs."²¹ The right of Holubovich and his delegation to represent Ukraine, as well as the recognition of Ukraine as an independent state, was recognized by the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks on January 12, 1918.

It was evident to the Ukrainian representatives that the Germans hoped to use their delegation to their advantage. As negotiations continued however, and more and more confrontations took place between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers, they came out more clearly for Ukrainian independence. Seeing that the Ukrainian delegation was becoming a threat to the interests of the Bolsheviks, Trotsky retreated from the declaration of January 12 and maintained that the Rada was not the real representative of Ukraine and that the true government is in Kharkiv. In his maneuver to deprive the Ukrainian delegates of their vote Trotsky asked that a recess be granted, and left for Petrograd where he invoked the Sovnarkom to attack Kiev.

Cognizant of the preliminary discussions, and hoping to strengthen

²¹ Kedryn, op.cit., p. 15.

[their delegates' hand at the peace conference, the Central Rada now re-
nounced any form of federation with Russia as proclaimed by the Third
Universal, and on January 22, 1918 proclaimed its Fourth Universal
which read:

"From this day the Ukrainian National Republic becomes an
independent, free, and sovereign state of the Ukrainian
people."²²

This did not, however, prevent Trotsky from bringing with him, upon re-
sumption of the Conference, the "legal" representatives of Ukraine;
that is, the Soviet Government in Kharkiv. This and his other efforts,
such as producing a false telegram as well as attempting to capture the
Ukrainian delegates, proved unsuccessful and the negotiations continued.

It was clear to the Ukrainians that both Austria and Germany needed
peace very badly. In Austria food supplies were at a very low level and
a catastrophe could be avoided only by prompt shipments of food from
Ukraine.²³ The Rada delegation, realizing that it could obtain very
favorable terms from the Central Powers, proceeded to make demands that
touched even lands still under the Austrian Empire. They demanded Uk-
rainian territories that were Ukrainian but secretly promised to Poland
by Austria. Finally, unable to force the Ukrainian delegation from its
position, which he attempted to do by threats, Count Czernin wrote that:
"The Ukrainians are no longer discussing peace, they are dictating it."²⁴

²² Kapustyansky, op-cit., p. 3.

²³ Czernin, op-cit., p. 240.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 326.

Shortly thereafter, on February 9, 1918, the Central Powers signed a Treaty of Peace with Ukraine. The "Bread Peace", as it is popularly known, outlined the economic relationship of the Central Powers and Ukraine. In additional secret talks, the Ukrainian delegates asked the Central Powers to assist the Rada in its fight against Russian aggression. On March 1, 1918, therefore, the armies of the Central Powers and Ukraine recaptured Kiev. The Russians, who were reluctant to sign a treaty with the Central Powers, declared a condition of "no peace - no war". The Germans, sensitive to world opinion, began an offensive against Russia which was to continue until the Bolsheviks signed the treaty dictated to them. On March 3, the Bolsheviks finally signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in which they agreed to clear all Ukrainian lands of their troops and sign a peace treaty with the Rada.

Thus the Rada Government received a new lease on life. But with the Treaty of Brest Litovsk there came a new factor into the politics of Ukraine. Once the Germans realized how weak the Rada Government was they asked General Skoropadsky, a conservative Ukrainian land owner and nobleman, to take power into his hands. This act was to precipitate a peasant revolution in Ukraine, which in the end, was responsible for driving the Germans, Skoropadsky, Entente, Denikin, and for a short time, the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine.

c. Problems, Clarifications and Objectives

The chief objective of this work is to examine the insurgent-partisan war that began with the overthrow of the Central Rada Government

and the Ukrainian National Republic. It will deal with the military formations of the insurgents, their goals and aspirations, their activity, their ideology and psychology, as well as the methods used by the enemy to destroy them. The paper will not go into a detailed presentation of the economic programs offered by the contending powers but will in a general way, cover the main objections of the peasants to the economic plans of these powers.

The insurgents may be placed into two categories. One group of insurgents was consciously aware of its national identity and was mostly concerned with the independence of Ukraine. Usually, it was this group of "kadrovky" (cadres) who were partisans and from them emanated the leadership which, in favorable circumstances, utilized the overall spontaneous risings of the peasants and channelled them into an all-Ukrainian Insurgent movement. In spite of the desire of these insurgents to see Ukraine free, their one shortcoming was that their organizations were local in nature and were primarily concerned with the protection of their villages and their areas.

The second group of insurgents could be called "products of the Revolution". They had no moral or patriotic convictions. At the head of these groups stood adventurers and opportunists who would exploit the situation to their advantage and who would one day help the UNR while the next serve the Bolsheviks. The goals of these groups were primarily to plunder, destroy the intelligentsia, kill Jews by initiating pogroms and spread chaos over the land.

The Insurgent Movement in Ukraine can be divided into three distinct periods. The first period embraces the time from the Ukrainian Revolution in 1917 to the middle of 1919. The second period embraces the time between the middle of 1919 to the defeat of the Ukrainian armies in November 1920. The third period encompasses the time span from November 1920 to 1926.²⁵ The first period is characterized by revolutionary chaos. This chaos was even more pronounced when one considers the process of disorganization and demoralization of the Imperial Russian Army. During this phase the national consciousness of the Ukrainians was not yet thoroughly aroused. Each village was an armed camp that had within its arsenals not only rifles but in many cases artillery which was brought home by the soldiers or dragged from the battlefield by the peasantry. Almost every region in Ukraine had an insurgent unit which had achieved some form of combat experience during the chaotic times of the Revolution. Not nationally conscious these groups would easily fall prey to radical agitation and propaganda as well as demagogues who would use them to their advantage. This was the period of anarchy - a period of absence of any political convictions and a period during which many villages recognized no authority except their own.

²⁵ A. Valivsky. "Povstansky Rukh v Ukrayini v rokakh 1917 - 1922" Visti Kombatanta, Vol. IV, (1961), p. 13. This breakdown of the periods is provided by General Valivsky. The first two sections are accepted by me while the third grouping which was originally dated 1920 to 1922 I have extended to 1926.

The second period actually began in the middle of 1918. This period saw a breakthrough in the mentality of the peasant. One is able to observe the crystallization of political concepts which for the most part advocated and supported the Ukrainian Independence Movement. This period saw the insurgents in a war against the occupation forces of the Bolsheviks and the White Armies. What led to this "crystallization" of political views will be examined in the next chapter. At this point it is sufficient to say that the masses, having lived under the occupation forces, developed an immunity to the propaganda of these powers and, in effect, became politically educated.

The third period of insurgency, embracing the span of time from November 1920 to 1926, seems to be most fruitful from the standpoint of national consciousness. It is a period of constructive and planned action. Centers of the insurgent movement arose and attempted to coordinate their military activities with the army of the Ukrainian National Republic. During this period new insurgent groups formed and new methods of fighting the Bolsheviks were introduced.

In our work we will cover the last two periods of insurgency, that is, 1919 to 1926. As a terminating date I have chosen the beginning of 1926 because it is evident that by this time active insurgency proved antiquated and gave way to new forms of resistance. These new forms of resistance are evident from the given testimonies at trials held in 1929 against members of the Spilka Vyzvolennya Ukrainy (SVU - Union for the Liberation of Ukraine), an organization that seems to have emerged in 1926.

[To date the Insurgent movement has been played down and almost]
totally ignored by Ukrainian historians, yet, from all the evidence that
exists, one can agree with some Bolshevik historians that the insurgent
movement which was controlled by the UNR was much more dangerous to the
Bolsheviks than the regular army of the Ukrainian National Republic. 26
One can venture to say that this is one of the prime reasons why the
Polish Government signed a treaty of alliance with the Ukrainian Na-
tional Republic.

Although many students of the insurgent movement contend that this
movement was not controlled by the UNR, I submit that in the chaos
brought on by the war, the Ukrainian National Republic had an admirable
control of the situation. The period of time needed for the Rada to
finally declare its independence is also reflected in the slow evolu-
tionary process of the Ukrainian peasant who had to be educated through
experience. An insurgent or partisan movement, in my opinion, does not
have to be controlled by one "center" or coordinating body. True, such
a situation is desirable but in the absence of such a "center" there are
other means of control. It is through these means, which will be elab-
orated upon in the succeeding chapters, that the UNR controlled this
Ukrainian insurgent movement.

To properly assess the insurgent movement and its strength it is

²⁶ B. W. Kozelsky, Schlakh Zradnyctva i Avantur, (The way of Traitors
and Adventurers). Trans. K. Senyk, (Derzhavne Vydavnyctvo Ukrayiny,
1927), p. 9.

important to point out that, according to Soviet sources there were as an "organized active power", at the time of the catastrophe of the Ukrainian National Republican Army in November 1920, no less than 40,000 active insurgents who fought against the Russian invaders.²⁷ In the ensuing war between the insurgents and the Bolsheviks, military materials taken from the insurgents between 1920-1921 included 43 pieces of artillery, 1,812 machine guns, 31,788 swords, and 3,902 revolvers.²⁸ During 1921, organs of the Bolshevik government liquidated 6,000 insurgent organizations according to the newspaper Komunist of 11 February 1923. A factor that has to be underlined is that most of these weapons were originally in the possession of the Red Army and were taken from them by the peasants. It must further be emphasized that this insurgent movement, although organized by peasants, was not primitive in its nature. In many respects this movement made a significant impact on, and contribution to, the sophisticated modern guerilla warfare. The Communists, after destroying it, studied both the techniques and tactics of the insurgents and applied them very effectively during World War II against the Germans.²⁹

d. A Critical Review of Sources and Documents.

The problems encountered in writing about this topic are many.

²⁷ Zbirnyk Spravozdan (a collection of reports) (Khariv: 1921), n.p. cited by Panas Fedenko, Ukrayinsky Rukh u 20 stolittiyi, (London: Mono Press Co., 1959), p. 214.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 214.

²⁹ F. Petrovych, "Zistoriyi partyzanskoho rukhu v Ukrayini i w sumezhnykh krainakh" (From the history of the partisan movement in Ukraine and bordering countries), Visti No. 97, (March, 1960, p. 11.

[Virtually untouched by Western scholars the field offers many satisfy-
ing as well as many frustrating moments. The satisfying moments are
when the writer finds that out of the immense amount of research he has
done there begins to appear an orderly picture of related events. But
how does one develop this kind of understanding out of such a chaotic
period as existed in Ukraine during the Civil War? One can agree that
in such a work there exist many complex questions that refuse to be
answered. Adams, in his book Bolsheviks in the Ukraine found that,

"The variety of opinions, the confluence of idealism, self
interest, and hooliganism, the elemental violence of the forces
behind this peasant upheaval -- defy accurate analysis. All
too frequently partisan bands formed, acted, and later dis-
solved or joined some greater body without leaving reliable
records of their existence, their motives or their deeds."³⁰

Sad but quite true, working behind the lines of the front a partisan
or insurgent could not carry documents which might compromise his posi-
tion. Conspiracy required the destruction of even the most innocent
orders. Added to conspiracy was the factor which demanded destruction
of documents if operations were to be successful. Thus for a historian
who is interested in clear cut facts and precision the field of insur-
gency will prove to be a pathway of frustrations. One can never be sure
if he is correct. In this field one is lucky to have a precise date,
but must, in most cases, be satisfied with dates that place the acti-
vity within a certain month or even within a certain season of the year.

³⁰ Arthur E. Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign
1918 - 1919, (New Haven - London: Yale University Press 1963), p. 91.

The curse of the vanquished is that they have no records to verify their deeds. It is usually the victor who knows the facts and has the documents but in many cases he, as is true with the Soviet Union, refuses to publish documents that would take away from his glory or the justice of his cause. A good example of this is the virtual silence that the communist publications maintain about the UNR and about Petlyura. As years pass by, the Soviet historians continue to blacken certain periods of non-Russian history. Thus what is known to us as insurgency, in the 1920s was known to the Bolsheviks as "political banditism", and today on the eve of the seventies, is known just as "banditism". Yet, in contrast to this, the minutest acts of Soviet workers, that history would normally pass by as unimportant, are recorded by communist historians as acts of great magnitude and significance.

Another problem encountered is in the memoirs of many of the participants of the insurgent movement. We find that in many cases the town or village where a group of insurgents operated would only be mentioned by the use of the first letter. Thus the memoir would name the leader of the insurgents, who operated under an assumed name, in the village of D, and was aided in this operation by R, and P. Here again in the name of conspiracy this type of identification is good, but it certainly contributes little to the understanding of the historian.

Also, most memoirs are written many years after the events and tend to attribute a shining role to the author. Without documents and other materials which can be compared to the claims of the memoir, it is hard

To verify the truthfulness of many statements.

But in spite of the criticisms against Soviet sources there are some worthwhile collections of documents that proved very useful. One such collection edited by S. M. Korolivsky is the four volume Grazhdanskaya Voyna na Ukraine.³¹ The documents in this compilation deal primarily with the military situation on the front and occasionally include materials that touch upon the problem of insurgency. Names of such insurgent leaders as Anhel, Zeleny, Makhno, Hryhoriyev, Tyutyunnyk and others appear quite frequently and indicate that insurgency was no small thorn in the side of the Red Army. Another collection edited by I. K. Rybalka, Komitety nezamozhnykh selyan Ukrayiny (1920-1933),³² is a good compilation of documents which discloses the really important contribution of the Committees of Poor Peasants in strengthening the rule of the Bolshevik regime. One of the short-comings of this compilation is that the editor cuts certain parts of documents out of the texts and thus deprives one of materials that I am sure would prove interesting.

The period up to the late 1920s has seen a number of good Soviet publications. Prior to the late twenties censorship was not as strictly imposed and as a result more truthful accounts of events were presented

³¹ S. M. Korolivsky, et al. (ed) Grazhdanskaya Voyna na Ukraine, (The Civil War in Ukraine) 4 vols. (Kiev: Yzdatelstvo "Naukova Dumka" 1967).

³² I. K. Rybalka (ed.) Komitety nezamozhnykh selyan Ukrayiny (1920 - 1933) (Committees of Poor Peasants (1920 - 1933), Kiev: "Naukova Dumka", 1968).

[For the readers. An invaluable work is authored by V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapysky O grazhdanskoy voyny.³³ As commander of the Red Armies during the second Bolshevik campaign in Ukraine, he is in a position to observe and draw interesting conclusions about the insurgent movement. More aware, because of his Ukrainian background, of the problems of Bolshevism in Ukraine, he is able to make a clear cut analysis of the events surrounding him. His work is valuable, interesting and precise. Perhaps the best book published about insurgency in Ukraine is B. V. Kozelsky's Slakh Zradnyctva i Avantur.³⁴ It's weakness lies in the absence of precise citations and in the lack of information regarding the source of information. One of the strong points of this work is that it includes many copies of documents. Since this book, published in 1927, the absence of tirades and name calling is noteworthy. Another book that appeared during this period was M. Yavorsky's Revolucia na Ukrayini v yiyi holovnishykh etapakh.³⁵ It is a scholarly attempt to present facts as they occurred. His later editions of the same book succumb to the party line and are not as well executed. A more recent publication is A. W. Lykholat's Rozgrom natsionalysticheskoy

³³ W. A. Antonov - Ovseenko, Zapisky o grazhdanskoy voyny (Notes on the Civil War), 4 Vols., (Moscow - Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo 1932).

³⁴ Kozelsky, op-cit.,

³⁵ M. Yavorsky, Revolucia na Ukraini v yiyi holovnishykh etapakh (Revolution in Ukraine in its more important periods), (Kharkiv: Derzhvydav Ukrayiny; 1923).

[kontrrevolucii na Ukraine.³⁶ While shedding much light on insurgency,]
to which the author refers as "banditism", the writer takes time to
attack leaders of the Ukrainian National Republic and refers to them,
and other groups of opposition to the Bolsheviks, as being bought by
"Allied Capital".

Regarding the non-communist sources, first place must be given to
O. Docenko, a former colonel in the Army of the UNR and close friend of
the Commander-in-Chief Symon Petlyura, for his collection of documents
under the title of Zymovyi Pokhid Armiyi Ukrainskoyi Narodnoyi Res-
publiki.³⁷ Chiefly devoted to the Armies of the UNR which in a desperate
struggle to survive, turned partisan or insurgent, the work includes
many valuable documents that shed much light on the activity of insur-
gent groups between December 1919 and May 1920. Of special interest is
his preface which treats the insurgent movement in a scholarly manner.
The author is also known for his Litopys Ukrayinskoyi Revoluciyi,³⁸ a
documentary account of the events, his "Geneza Zymovoho Pokhodu" and
his "Chotyry Reydy" published in Kalendar Chervonoyi Kalyny, and Litopys
Chervonoyi Kalyny respectively.

³⁶ A. W. Lykolat, Rozgrom natsionalisticheskoy-kontrrevolucii na
Ukraine, (Annihilation of the nationalist counter-revolution in
Ukraine), (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Polytycheskoy Literaturi, 1954).

³⁷ O. Docenko, Zymovyi Pokhid Armiyi Ukrainskoyi Narodnoyi Respubliki,
(The Winter Campaign of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic)

³⁸ O. Docenko, Litopys Ukrayinskoyi Revoluciyi. (Chronicle of the Uk-
rainian Revolution), 2 Vols., (Lviv 1923).

Another scholarly work is the compilation of documents edited by General V. Salsky, Ukrayinsko-Moskovska Viyna 1920 roku v dokumentakh.³⁹ While not as helpful as Docenko's work on matters of insurgency, it does disclose certain phases of partisan activity during the period of the Polish-Ukrainian military alliance. General Salsky was Minister of War of the UNR during this period. Two other excellent sources are authored by Yuri Tyutyunnyk who was Otaman Hryhoriyev's Chief-of-Staff, Commander of the Kiev partisan division during the First Winter Campaign, and Commander-in-Chief during the Second Winter Campaign in 1921. His first book, Revolutsiyna Stykhia,⁴⁰ is valuable from the standpoint of understanding the mass psychology of the insurgents. This work primarily re-lays events as they occurred. His second book, Zymovyi Pokhid,⁴¹ is a must for anyone who studies the period of Ukrainian uprisings. Many documents and interesting factors are brought into the picture of the overall Ukrainian situation. The author is an outspoken critic of the UNR government when it comes to the question of insurgency. But as is usually true of many memoirs, we find that Tyutyunnyk tries to elevate his position by attempting to convey to the reader the idea that he had all the answers but nobody wanted to listen. Other very important sources written in a scholarly manner are: the memoirs of General M.

³⁹W. Salsky General, Ukrayinsko - Moskovska Viyna 1920 roku v dokumentakh, (The Ukrainian-Muscovite War of 1920 in documents), (Warsaw: Ukrainski Naukovy Instytut, 1933).

⁴⁰Yurko Tyutyunnyk, Revolutsiyna Stykhia, (Revolutionary Elemental Force), (Lviv: Pub. by Medycky-Tyktor 1937).

⁴¹Yurko Tyutyunnyk, (3rd ed.), Zymovyi Pokhid (The Winter Campaign), (New York: Pub. by Chartorysky, 1966).

[Kapustyansky, a member of the operations staff of the UNR Army, Pokhid na Kyev i Odesu v 1919 rotsi,⁴² General A. Udovychenko, also a member of the operations staff of the UNR, Ukrayina u Viyni za Derzhavnist,⁴³ I. Mazepa, Premier of Ukraine during the First Winter Campaign, Ukrayina v Ohni i Buryi Revolutsiyi,⁴⁴ General A. E. Denikin, Commander of the Russian White Armies in Ukraine, Ocherki O. Russkoy Smuti.⁴⁵

Ukrainian books which deal specifically with the insurgent movement, although not very precise in dates, yet indispensable for students of this movement, are: "Yuri Horlis-Horsky's Kholodny Yar and Spohady, Y. Khomychiv's V. Stepakh Ukrayiny, Vitali Yurchenko's Shlakhamy na Solovky, and Antin Krezub's Partyzany. Non-Ukrainian sources are: Arthur E. Adams Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, and V. Mayevsky's Povstantsy Ukrainy.

Other very important documents and sources are to be found in periodicals such as Kalendar Chervonoyi Kalyny, Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny, Visti Kombatanta, Visti, and others.

⁴² M. Kapustyansky, General (2nd ed.), Pokhid na Kyev i Odesu v 1919 rotsi. 2 vols., (The Campaigns against Kiev and Odessa in 1919), (Munich: "Khvylovy" Pub. Co., 1946).

⁴³ A. Udovychenko General Ukrayina u viyni za Derzhavnist, (Ukraine in it's War for Independence), (Winnipeg: The New Pathway Pub. Co., 1954).

⁴⁴ I. Mazepa, Ukrayina v Ohni i Buryi Revolutsiyi, 3 Vols., (Ukraine in the Fire and Turmoil of Revolution), (Germany: "Prometey" Pub. Co., 1951).

⁴⁵ A. E. Denikin, General, Ocherki o Russkoy Smuti, 5 Vols. (Sketches of the Russian Troubles). (Berlin: Knygozdatelstvo "Medny Vsadnyk", 1926).

Some unpublished materials include the works of General D. Kuzminsky, Chief of Staff of General Tyutyunnyk prior to the Second Winter Campaign, Povstanchy Rukh na Ukrayini vid 1918 roku, Artymon Hryshyn, secretary of the Kozack Rada of the 1st Insurgent Dniپر Division, Zhyttya i Smart Otamana, K. Zelenoho, and Ivan Ostrovershenko, special courier to the insurgent units of Otaman Volynets appointed by General Salsky, at that time the UNR Minister of War, Spomyny.

Interviews are also used in writing this work. Interviewed were General B. Samutin, General D. Kuzminsky, Otaman Ivan Luty-Lutenko, and others. Due to the fact that many of the active members of the movement reside outside of the United States the correspondence method was widely utilized. Thus, to mention a few, letters were received from Professor Panas Fedenko, Information Minister of the UNR and member of the All-Ukrainian Insurgent Committee (CUPKOM) in 1919, and Colonel M. Czebotariv who was appointed to head the insurgent movement in Ukraine by the Commander-in-Chief of the UNR, Symon Petlura, after the Second Winter Campaign.

II THE BIRTH OF INSURGENCY

A. "The Village Attacks the City"

While the Ukrainian delegates were busy negotiating peace terms with the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk, the Central Rada was conducting a defensive war against the invading Red Army of General Muraviev. Due to relative unpreparedness for war, the Central Rada retreated from Kiev to Zhytomyr. Its military might was strengthened by the arrival from the front of the Ukrainianized units as well as insurgent groups that emerged with the opening of the Russian offensive.¹ In addition to these units, the "Ukrainian Free Kossacks" (Ukrayinske Vilne Kozatstvo), a para-military formation, were vigorously pursuing a partisan war against the Bolshevik Armies. Because the Free Kossacks were to play such an important role in the coming insurgent movement it is important to take a closer look at the organization and activity of this para-military group.

The Ukrainians are a nation of proud Kossack traditions. While agrarian in their economic pursuit, they have a proud heritage of resistance that goes all the way back to the period of the "migration of

¹ D. Kuzminsky General, Povstanchy rukh na Ukrayini vid 1918 r. (The Ukrainian Insurgent Movement in Ukraine from 1918), (Unpublished memoirs of Gen-Kuzminsky, former Chief-of-Staff of the Partisan Army of Gen. Y. Tyutyunnyk). p. 2.

"nations." Being situated on the very crossroads of Europe, Ukraine had to fight, since time immemorial, invading Asiatic groups and their conquering hordes. Because of this fight against Pechenigs, Avars, Magyars, Huns, Mongols, Tartars, and Turks, the Ukrainian peasant developed into a agrarian warrior. By the 16th century, due to continuous attacks of the Moslem Turks and Crimean Tartars, a "Brotherhood of Kossacks" was founded on the island of Khortytsya on the Dnieper. Even after its destruction the traditions of, and legends about, the heroic deeds of the "Zaperozhian Kossacks" remained.

It is no wonder then, that when the Central Rada proclaimed its First Universal (Manifesto), that the Ukrainian peasant who had no political preparation would fall back upon tradition and attempt to emulate his forefathers. The peasants began to organize their para-military Free Kossack formations on the basis of the past experience of the "Zaporozhian Kossacks". The basic scheme used by the Free Kossacks was to organize villages into "hundreds"; the "hundreds" of one wolost (county) would make up a "Kurin" (regiment), and the "Kureni" would form into the "Kish" (division) at the head of which would stand the elected or "nakazny" (nominated) "Koshevy".²

² B. Zadoyanny Colo., "Ukrayinske Vilne Kozactvo i Borotba z. Moskova-koyu Navaloyu", (The Ukrainian Free Kossacks and the Fight against the Muscovite Invasion) Tryzub, (New York). Vol. VIII (August-September 1967), p. 6. The "Otaman" is the elected or appointed chieftain of a Kossack formation.

┌ The Free Kossack movement began in the Zvenyhorod county of the ┐
Kiev Gubernia (Province) in the summer of 1917. Its first appearance
was at the Second All-Ukrainian Soldiers Conference which was held in
Kiev. Here the delegates from the Zvenyhorod county Hryzlo, Shapoval
and Serhienko and the delegates from the Tarashcha county in the person
of Botvynivsky and Kozyaruk, rejected the views of the Petrograd Pro-
visional Government about their organization. "Did" (grandfather)
Shapoval rose up to the occasion with the following defense:

"The Free Kossacks did not ask for permission to organize
themselves. We do not need it. We are surprised that Kerensky
forbade this gathering; but we knew that no one would pay heed
to him because this order impressed us as much as would an
order from Turkey or Germany. When gentlemen like Oberuchov
and Leparsky say that Ukrainians want to take power in Kiev it
is nothing strange because we will only take what belongs to us.
If the Free Kossacks receive orders to come to Kiev to protect
our institutions, then we will do so not asking for permission
from Oberuchov."³

The enthusiastic ovation that Shapoval received at the end of his speech
was indicative of the sentiment of the Ukrainian soldiers. But Shapoval's
words were not just threats made during a heated debate. In the first
days of July 1917, having heard of a military confrontation between

³ Ibid., p. 9.

┌ ┐

Ukrainian and Russian forces in Kiev, the Free Kossacks requisitioned four trains, as well as artillery in the Cvitkovo terminal, and disembarked at the Motylivka terminal. Finding that the Central Rada was able to crush the opposition, the Free Kossacks returned to their homes. In passing it is important to note that this first "attack of the village against the city" was coordinated by the Zvenyhorod "Kish" military staff under Hryzlo who was later to become prominent in the insurgent movement.⁴

The Free Kossacks were especially vocal on the "national question". They demanded radical changes and quick "Ukrainization" of all aspects of life. The village leaned upon the Free Kossacks in its demands for social change. This social factor was tightly intertwined with the national question because the Ukrainian peasant demanded justice against the large land owners who, in most cases, were Russian, Polish or Jewish. It was therefore understandable that the still powerful Russian group in Kiev demanded that the Free Kossacks be disbanded.

The Ukrainian political parties hoped to channel this Kossack energy into a more formidable power which would do its bidding. But the Free Kossack movement wanted little to do with parties that were socialist. They wanted to see the consolidation and centralization of power in Kiev. Only one party, the Socialist Samostiynyky (Socialists who demanded sovereignty), was willing to cater to the Free Kossack demands. This Party, however, was not strong enough to counteract the

⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

[right-conservative elements which were making inroads into the organi-] cation and affecting the developing ideology of the Free Kossacks. These conservative elements, in effect, attempted to create a class organization out of the Kossacks. The conservatives were eventually able to achieve great control of the Kossacks at the "First All-Ukrainian Congress of the Free Kossacks" where General P. Skoropadsky was elected "Otaman". In addition to the "Otaman" the Congress elected a "Kossack General Rada". After this Congress, which was held in Chernihiv from October 3 to 10, the Ukrainian Government approved the proposed constitution of the Free Kossacks organization, legalizing it as a recognized force in national affairs and allowing it to assist the Government in case of a national emergency.⁵

At the opening of the First Bolshevik campaign against Ukraine, the Free Kossacks, disagreeing with the policies of the Central Rada and its attempts to please everyone, hoped to force the Rada to their views. The area of Zvenyhorod had 20,000 Free Kossacks who were disgusted with the policies of the Rada and decided to fight in defense of their own local areas. The Regular Army of the UNR, in an attempt to strengthen the military quality of the Free Kossacks, dispatched UNR officers who originally were from the Zvenyhorod area, in the persons of Y. Tyutyynnyk,

⁵ Ivan Tsapko, "Partyzany na Skhidniy Ukrayini", Visti (Munich), Vol. XIV (March, 1963), p. 6. General Pavlo Skoropadsky originated from a famous Kossack family. His lineage stems from the brother of Ivan Skorapadsky who became Hetman of Ukraine in 1709 after Mazepa's defeat at Poltava.

[Khalabudenko, Papyk, and Sokyrka. The Commander-in-Chief of the UNR Armies, M. Shynkar and the Ukrainian forces under a vigorous attack of the Bolsheviks, retreated into the territories of the Free Kossacks. Seeing the desperate situation of the Rada Army, the Free Kossacks began operations against the Bolsheviks. In an energetic attack against the Russian formations they negated Bolshevik attempts to establish an administrative apparatus in the surrounding counties, captured an area extending close to 100 verstvs, the railroad line Khrystianivka - Cvitkove, and destroyed the staff of the 18th Russian Army at Bobrynsk.⁶

Zvenyhorodka (main city in the county of Zvenyhorod), became the center of operations of the Free Kossacks. From here orders and aid were dispatched to other counties. Commanders representing other Kossack units; Vodyanny from Cherkasy, Kulchycky from Elysavet, Botwynsky from Tarashcha, Bezukhly from Uman, and others, gathered here for military consultations with Otaman Yuri Tyutyunnyk who was elected "Kos-hovyi Otaman" of Zvenyhorod. Thus the military staff of the Zvenyhorod "Kish" became the central military staff of the southern areas of the Kiev and northern Kherson Gubernias.

The role played by the Free Kossacks in the first campaign of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine can not be underestimated.

"In February 1918, the Zvenyhorod Kish began its operations against the Bolsheviks. At the outset it disarmed the artillery

⁶ Zadoyanny, "Ukrayinske Vilne Kozactvo i Boroibba z Moskovskoyu Navaloyu" op-cit., p. 9.

units of the II muscovite Guard Corps and captured two thousand horses from the 6th and 7th dragon regiments. In the area of the railroad terminal of Birzula, after a day of operations, it completely routed, with great losses, units of the Bolshevik 18th Army. In night operations, the best units of the Free Kossacks under otamans Bondyar, Vodyanny, and Kulchycky, together with artillery, took part.

By the return of the Central Rada to Kiev the Free Kossacks firmly held territories that encompassed the area of the Dni-per river and the railroad junctures of Znamenka-Pomishna-Khrystynivka-Kaniv".⁷

Of the abilities of the Free Kossacks Muraviov, the commander of the first Bolshevik Campaign, in an interview with Izvestiya said:

"The Revolutionary Russian Army marched across Ukraine, sweeping from its path everything that had a tinge of bourgeois-chauvinist separatism. Only the appearance of our armies forced the povity (counties G.K.), and sometimes whole gubernias, to recognize our authority. In Ukraine we were confronted with an original organization of bourgeois self-defense units. Especially annoying was the Zvenyhorod county where Ukrainian chauvinist-nationalism created a fortress in the form of the so called

⁷ M. Levytsky (2nd ed.), Istoriya Ukrainskoho Viyska (History of the Ukrainian Armed Forces), (Winnipeg: Stovell Advocate Press Co. Inc., 1953) pp. 380-381. The first edition was edited by Ivan Krypyakevych et.al., in Ukraine in 1936.

"Free Kosseck" (formations G.K.). This organization not only prevented us from entering their county but, quite the contrary, it attacked our units and inflicted much damage to our armies. I am very unhappy that I was unable to destroy this nest, to drown in blood these who dared to raise their hand against the Red Army".⁸

b. The Hetmanate: Reaction and Revolution.

Having withdrawn its forces from Kiev, the Central Rada, as was already mentioned earlier, became stronger with the arrival of regular and partisan military units. Added to this was the reorganization of its forces and the growth of the resistance of Ukrainian peasantry on the flanks of the Red Army. Shortly the German and Austrian forces arrived as stipulated by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Originally the Rada asked for Ukrainian units which were in the Austrian and German Armies, specifically, the Sichovi Striltsi (Sich Riflemen) and the Synozhupannyky (Blue Coats). Since this involved a long procedure, the Rada finally agreed to have the Austrians and Germans come into Ukraine. By March 1, 1918 the Ukrainian army liberated Kiev. By the end of April, all of Ukraine was cleared of the Bolsheviks.

With the arrival of the Austrian and German Armies a new situation developed in Ukraine. The Central Powers bound themselves not to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine, and probably never intended to do so, but the disorganized state that prevailed after this first Russo-

⁸ Zadoyanny, "Ukrainske Vilne Kozactvo". op-cit., p. 9.

Ukrainian War led the Germans to take steps that were contrary to their original intentions. Their unfriendliness to official Ukrainian circles and close relations with the bourgeoisie and aristocratic circles further strained relations and widened the gap between the two allies. The German army needed grain and doubted that the Ukrainian Government could fulfill its obligations. On April 6, 1918, Field Marshall H. Eichorn issued an order, without proper authorization from the Rada, which compelled the peasants to cultivate all the available land. By this order land Committees were bound to supply the great landowners with needed labor, and punishment was to be imposed on the peasantry in the event that these orders were disobeyed. On April 25, Eichorn issued another order which made Ukrainians subject to military courts for offenses against German interests. Thus it was becoming more apparent that the "friendly" foreign forces were becoming an army of occupation.

Regarding the military formations of the Ukrainian Republic, upon arrival in Kiev, Field Marshal Eichorn demanded the dispersal of the Ukrainian Free Kossack organization. The Central Rada did not oppose this demand since in the Free Kossack organization it saw a dangerous potential enemy. Upon receiving orders to disperse, the Free Kossacks did so without any opposition out of respect to the Central Rada. But German desire to see the dispersal of Ukrainian military units did not abate. On April 26-27, 1918, they dispersed the First Division of the "Blue Coats", and finally on April 28, while a number of speakers were

strongly criticizing the behavior of the Germans at a session of the Central Rada, a detachment of German soldiers marched into the building and arrested two ministers. News of these acts of high-handed behavior roused the indignation of the people of Ukraine. The Rada, in spite of its weaknesses, was put into power by the people and manifested their will.

But the Germans went further. Careful plans were laid for the overthrow of the Rada by General Wilhelm Groener of the German Army. The Germans were much more favorably disposed toward General Pavlo Skoropadsky, a rich land owner and representatives of the conservative elements in Ukraine, than to the Central Rada which reflected the spirit of the Ukrainian peasantry and attempted to satisfy their demands. On April 29, 1918 a Farmers Congress arranged by the Alliance of Landowners in Ukraine proclaimed General Skoropadsky "Hetman" of Ukraine. The coup was almost bloodless because the German army stood by to support it. Only the Sich Riflemen made a futile attempt to defend the Rada. All other formations in the area were disarmed earlier.⁹

The newly established government of Skoropadsky almost immediately began to counteract the laws established by the Rada. The Hetman and his government attempted to form a state based on the Tsarist administrative pattern. Due to these and other laws promulgated, the Hetmanate alienated most of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the socialist parties. As a result, Skoropadsky had to rely more and more upon

⁹ B. Zadoyanny Colo., "Povstanska Stykhiya", (Insurgent Elemental Force), Tryzub (New York) Vol. VIII. (October - November 1967), p. 11.

[Russians, who fled from the Bolsheviks, in his government. With his regime there began the restoration of large land holdings at the expense of the peasantry. It must be said that at this point many of the large farms were already broken up and divided between the peasantry. The peasants, having divided this land, were reluctant to give it back to the landholders who began pouring into Ukraine after the formation of the Skoropadsky regime. The disorganized Russian Army released thousands of soldiers who came to their villages armed and educated in warfare. Thus they were in a position to resist the encroachments of landowners who were not Ukrainian by nationality.]

Inevitably the regime of Skoropadsky made many enemies. Clandestine congresses of the Ukrainian socialists, peasants and workers met and condemned the work of the Hetman. To this the regime responded with punitive expeditions of the "state guard" which was founded on the same principle and in effect, was a continuation of the tsarist police. The peasantry, in turn, replied with arms. Numerous partisan bands were already operating the day after the overthrow of the Rada but the majority of the populace observed and waited. Once their interests were threatened they began digging out the hidden pieces of artillery and cleaning their weapons. The resistance movement grew until it enveloped much of Ukraine. Of the mood of the peasantry, Professor A. Adams writes:

"Yet the most salient and general motives for the partisan activities are inescapable. Ukrainian peasants and cossacks

[

believe that the land and its produce should belong to them, and they wanted to manage their affairs."¹⁰

There were in effect two factors that agitated the peasantry and both of them were so intertwined that they could not be separated. The first factor included questions of a social nature. The second was the national question which was inseparable from the first. The Ukrainian Socialist parties were able to wrest the Ukrainian peasant from the Russian Socialist parties primarily because they relayed to them the socialist doctrine in the Ukrainian language or language of the peasantry (Muzhycky yazyk). Thus speaking of one factor we can not of necessity ignore the other. When the peasant spoke of the "achievements of the Revolution", he inevitably had more than just the social question in mind.

The Hetman's regime and his decrees denied the peasant the "achievements of the Revolution" by pushing into the background reforms of the Rada and initiating a period of reaction. With this came also the negation of laws and decrees that had already made the Ukrainian conscious and proud of his nationality.

After the Germans disarmed the Blue Coat, Gray Coat, and Sich Rifleman formations, the Ukrainian Army all but ceased to exist. Only units guarding the northern borders could be really called Ukrainian. In Kiev and other areas of Ukraine, which now became a "haven" or "Mecca" for Tsarist officers and landowners, the Army began losing its

¹⁰ Arthur E. Adams, op-cit., p. 91.

[Ukrainian character. All the top positions were filled by Russians who] in turn, appointed other Russians to minor posts on the pretext that there were no professionally trained Ukrainian officers. Russian "unofficially" became the official language in the army and in governmental circles. Hetman Skoropadsky soon noticed that power was slipping out of his hands. In an effort to rectify the situation he therefore proclaimed, in his decree of October 16, 1918, the restoration of the "Free Kossack" formation on the principle of a "class" organization. Now, in contrast to its previous character, this organization was to be selective in that only richer peasants were to belong to it. The restoration really meant little because the Free Kossacks were not allowed to form their units as they did during the Rada Government.¹¹ Although this was a step in the right direction, it was initiated in the twilight days of his regime. The Russians who participated in the Government of Skoropadsky were all sons of "one and indivisible" Mother Russia. But even they were suspected by "true Russians" of "Ukrainian separatism". The cadres that were so carefully prepared by Russians in Ukraine and which awaited the restoration of the Empire, by a twist of fate, were never exploited by the Volunteer Army. After Skoropadsky's overthrow the eight corps of officers formed under his regime attempted to join General Denikin and the White Armies and awaited a reply from him.

¹¹ Y. Tamarsky, "Ukrayinske Vilne Kozactvo" (Ukrainian Free Kossacks), Visti Kombatanta, No. 1, Vol. 5 (1962), p. 31.

"The Chief-of-Staff, General Romanovsky, writes A. Bittenbinder, a former member of Denikin's staff, replied as follows: "'No! Ukrainian separatists are not needed; we can do without them'". "Thousands of Russian officers, just like Romanovsky, were terribly discouraged by this reply. These cadres remained in the Ukraine, fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks, and later became excellent instructors in numerous Red military schools and supplemented the cadres of the Red Army."¹²

This statement of a former Russian officer further underlines the hostile nature of the military cadres that were formed during the Skoropadsky regime and underlines the fact that they were for Russia "one and indivisible" regardless of ideology.

As a reaction to the policies of the Hetmanate the peasantry began to arm itself. Former members of the Free Kossacks, administrators of the Rada Government, and other groups began to organize peasant uprisings. In most cases, however, the uprisings were spontaneous and were not organized nor led by any political party or group.¹³

Partisan units numbering 20, 50 or 100 men were mushrooming throughout the country. Unable to handle them, the Skoropadsky Government turned to the Germans for aid.

¹² A. Bittenbinder, "Ocherki smutnogo vremeni na Kubani", (Sketches of the Times of Troubles in the Kuban), Novoe Russkoe Slovo, No. 19633, (October 12, 1966).

¹³ B. Zadoyanny, "Khronika Ukrainskoyi Vyzvolnoyi Borotby Doby 1917 - 21 rokiv" (The Chronicle of the Ukrainian War of Liberation during the 1917-21 period), Tryzub (New York), Vol. VI, (March-April, 1965), p. 10.

[German assistance to the punitive forces of the regime further agitated] the peasants. Throughout June, July, and August more and more revolts broke out. The largest uprising took place in the areas of Zvenyhorod under Pavlovsky, Tarashcha under Hrebenko, and Skvyrschyna under Zybenko.¹⁴ The strength of this partisan activity can be determined from the strength of the opposing forces of the Hetman and the Austrian and German Armies which numbered approximately half a million men.¹⁵ Opposing this military power the peasants, with their sometimes primitive weapons, were in the end victorious.

But "victory" over the Germans can not mainly be ascribed to the peasant. One must take into account the beginning of the disorganization and demoralization of the German Army which succumbed to socialist and Bolshevik agitation, the effect of the assassination of Field Marshall Eichorn on July 30, 1918, and most important, the outbreak of revolution in Germany and the end of Hapsburg rule in Austria. The approximate losses of the Germans during this period were estimated at 19,000.¹⁶

c. An Introduction to Insurgency: Revolts

in Zvenyhorodka and Tarashcha

With the end of May and beginning of June, 1918, peasant revolts

¹⁴ S. Paladiychuk, "Spohady pro "Hrebenkivschynu," (Memoirs of "Hrebenkivschyna") Tryzub (New York), Vol. VIII, (January, 1967), p.12.

¹⁵ B. Zadoyanny, "Khronika....", op-cit., p. 11.

¹⁶ Adams, op-cit., p. 12.

grew in number and strength. Clandestine organizations were trying to coordinate these uprisings and were able to achieve mild successes. In this manner Tarasivka became the center of sixteen counties that were on the verge of revolt against the Hetman.¹⁷ Tarasivka was an exception rather than the rule. Other areas could not be controlled and their energy could not be channelled into an all-Ukrainian revolt. Their uprisings were local in nature and in the end had to, in spite of initial successes, discontinue their activities. Two areas that fell into this category were Zvenyhorod and Tarashcha.

In the area of Zvenyhorod, where the traditions of the Free Kossacks were very much alive, lived such Free Kossack officers as Khalabudenko, Papyk, Kryvda, Bayko, Sokyrka, Tyutyunnyk and others. Here the Ukrainian newspaper Zvenyhorodska Dumka actively attacked the policies of the Hetman. The peasants were armed and led by former Free Kossacks. In this area Yuri Tyutyunnyk was in charge of the arsenal which held 10,000 rifles, 43 machine guns, 2 pieces of artillery, and one armored car. This arsenal soon fell into the hands of "robbers" who "attacked" it and distributed the weapons among the peasants.¹⁸ On the eve of the revolt

¹⁷ Y. Khomychiv, V. Stepakh Ukrainy, Vol. II, (Buenos Aires: Pub. by the author, 1958), p. 81.

¹⁸ Yurko Tyutyunnyk, Revoluciyna Stykhiya (Revolutionary Elemental Force), (Lviv: Medycky - Tyktor Pub. Co., 1937), p. 75. The author was very active in the Insurgent movement. He was elected "Otaman" of the Free Kossacks in Zvenyhorodka, served as Chief of Staff with Otaman Hryhoriv, was second in command during the "First Winter Campaign" of the Army of the UNR and was Commander-in-Chief of the UNR Army during the "Second Winter Campaign".

[in Zvenyhorod, Tyutyunnyk wrote:

"Conscience dictated that we could not agree with oppression, even if instead of the five hundred thousand Germans in Ukraine there were to be stationed ten times that amount. A war paid for in blood, even if unsuccessful, is a positive factor; it creates legends, raises the faith in success among the masses, and mobilizes new people into the effort."¹⁹

The peasants of Zvenyhorod turned to Tyutyunnyk to lead them but he knew well the costliness of leading an unorganized insurgent group against a well armed and disciplined army. But in vain, the peasants were determined to revolt to avenge their grievances. "Here was a determination to be killed or to kill ones enemy."²⁰

Although Tyutyunnyk consented to lead the revolt in Zvenynorod, he wanted to be sure that the time was ripe for such an uprising. He left for Kiev and there found out that the peasants revolt had already broken out. Initially, the peasants destroyed a punitive expedition near the city of Lysyanka. After that, they proceeded to clear the countryside of the "kadets". "Did" Shapoval took up his position near the city of Knyazhna so as to protect the flanks of the insurgents. It was he who defeated a German detachment near the village of Topolna. Near Bohdanivka the insurgents were joined by 3,000 more peasants with rifles and machine guns. The staff of the insurgents was located at the village

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 76.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 77.

[of Gudziivka and headed by Levko Shevchenko. The insurgents actually]
believed that the whole country, like they, had risen against the Hetman
and the Germans. The battle near Lysyanka was the match that set fire
to the whole area of Zvenyhorod. Almost all of the agents and members
of the Hetmanate were cleared from the area in one day. Although pri-
marily interested in destroying the punitive expeditions of the Hetman,
the insurgents were forced to encounter the Germans who attempted to
protect them from the peasantry. The members of one punitive expedi-
tion, sensing the strength of German arms behind them, attacked the
rebellious village of Ozirna, were defeated and retreated into the city
of Zvenyhorod. The insurgents surrounded the city and demanded that the
Germans hand over the "kadets" (Hetman's men and conservative elements.)
Writing of the "siege" of Zvenyhorod, Tyutyunnyk reflected:

"The peasants felt elevated. Under Zvenyhorod were gathered
around fifteen thousand armed persons; in case of need, twice
this amount could still be called out; with them was artillery.
Each village was an armed camp. Women cooked in large kettles
near the churches; they managed all the administrative, medi-
cal and even the liaison services. The men armed themselves
with everything available."²¹

The German garrison at Zvenyhorod numbered 1,000 men and the 200
soldiers from the punitive formation that sought refuge there after its
defeat at Ozirna. The insurgents agreed to let the Germans pass if the

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[Ibid., pp. 83 - 84.]

"kadets" were handed over to them and the Germans stopped interfering in Ukrainian affairs.²² The Germans refused to accede to these peasant demands and the siege continued. German reinforcements coming with aid to the besieged were to arrive from the area of Cvitkove but were intercepted by "Did" Shapoval and destroyed. Another group of Germans was ambushed near the village of Husakova under the direction of Khvedot. Here 300 soldiers were taken prisoner. Turning their cannon, which he captured from the Germans, Khvedot began bombarding the German positions in Zvenyhorod. The Germans still hoped to receive reinforcements from Uman, but finally sent out their "soldiers deputies" to negotiate. When agreement was reached the Germans handed over the "kadets" who were promptly executed. The German prisoners were put to work on the surrounding beet farms.²³

In the meantime news arrived that other areas also arose against the Germans. Lev Shevchenko and his staff issued directives and urged all of the insurgents to keep in touch with the staff at Zvenyhorod. Weeks went by and no contacts arrived from other purported areas of revolt. Shevchenko assumed that the other regions needed reinforcements and dispatched small bands of men to Uman and Tarashcha. But his aid was not on time. The fires of revolt slowly burned out and Shevchenko's forces dwindled to 4,000. Seeing that resistance against the Germans was futile, he told the remnant of his forces to break up into smaller

²² Ibid., p. 84.

²³ Ibid., p. 89.

units, break through the German encirclement, bury their weapons and wait for a more opportune time. In an attempt to turn the wrath of the Germans from the peasants, Shevchenko gave himself up to the German military authorities.²⁴

After the liquidation of the revolt in Zvenyhorod, the center of insurgency shifted to the region of Tarashcha. Here the resistance against the Germans was stubborn and cruel in nature. The period and the area which the revolt encompassed are known as "Hrebenkivschyna" after its leader Hrebenko.²⁵ The insurgent movement in the Tarashcha area began in May of 1918 and swept most of the punitive forces (karatilni otryadi) out of the countryside. The Hetman, as in the case of Zvenyhorodschyna, once again appealed for German aid. This revolt, like the previous one, was not controlled by any one political group.

By this time the clandestine Ukrainian National Union (Ukrainskyi Natsionalnyi Soyuz) was already in existence. The Soyuz was interested in preserving national strength and advised Hrebenko to calm the peasants.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 91. Lev Shevchenko was a former officer of the Tsarist Army. He was a victim of the Revolt in Zvenyhorodschyna rather than in command of the situation. After the self-liquidation of the revolt Schevchenko gave up to the Germans but later escaped. When the Directory took power he was arrested and shot while trying to flee.

²⁵ Paladiychuk, op-cit., p. 12. Hrebenko was a former Tsarist officer from middle class peasant stock. Upon his return from the war he was chosen "Otaman" of the counties of Zhazhkyv, Pyatyhorsk, Stavysche, Zhydivko-Hrehlivsk, Buzivsk, Kishovacka and other counties in the region of Tsrashcha. Because he was very active for a very long time against the Hetman the period of his revolt is called "Hrebenkivschyna". Hrebenko, forced to retreat into the "neutral zone", was murdered by the Bolsheviks.

Although he agreed with the members of the Soyuz, who by channeling peasant unrest into one powerful uprising hoped to overthrow the Hetman, he could not control the peasants whose wrath could not be quelled.

Although Hrebenko was the main organizer of the revolt, once it achieved greater proportions, he lost control. He therefore, had no choice but to lead it to its destruction. The peasants armed with sickles, hoes, and other farm implements were hardly a match for the well-equipped Germans. But with time, the insurgents armed themselves as well as they could and developed tactics which depended upon swift attacks and maneuvers. Hrebenko, having molded this force, made swift attacks against the punitive as well as German units. With his band of insurgents he cleared the area of former large land owners (pomishchyky) who returned after the Hetman came to power. His quick, bold attacks brought him popularity among the masses to the extent that the peasants began to form legends about him. At this early stage of his partisan activity he attacked, on several occasions, Tarashcha (the main city of the area) and many villages that were quartering enemy forces. His main units were peasants from the areas around the towns against which he led attacks. During the day the peasants were loyal, honest-working "muzhyky" with no interest in politics or war. By night, they joined Hrebenko's cadres and after an operation would return to their farms. As a result of this type of warfare Hrebenko had the sympathies and help of the population. His operations did not take place only in Tarashcha but crossed the boundaries of other counties. These operations were well thought out and coordinated by the military headquarters

[of the insurgents in Zvenyhorodshchyna.²⁶]

The Germans began to intensify their attacks against the insurgents. Hrybenko was now faced with three infantry and four cavalry brigades. Additional forces were also arriving from Zvenyhorodshchyna. The first stiff resistance to the Germans was in the area of Stavysk and Kryvecky forests. Here Hrebenko, having received new recruits, formed an artillery, and machine gun unit. His forces numbered 10 to 12 thousand infantrymen and 120 cavalry.²⁷ At the outset, in a swift attack, they pushed the German formations back to Cherepyna and Zrayok (about 30 verstvs). Having received reinforcements from Tetyiv, the Germans counterattacked and pushed Hrebenko back to the village of Krivchunsky. By the middle of June the German cavalry attempted to encircle Hrebenko's forces which were now retreating to the north. The retreat continued to the Dnieper River. Operations and maneuverability were now hindered by the families of the insurgents and their belongings. Upon reaching the Dnieper the insurgents were encircled. The only thing to do was to attack. On June 26, 1918 Hrebenko's groups, maneuvering to the west, suddenly attacked the main German group near the village of Stepantsi, forcing it to retreat. The next night the German units encamped around the village of Mezhyrichcha which was in the hands of the insurgents. Military operations began between three

²⁶ B. Zadoyanny, "Povstanska Stykhiya" (Insurgent Elemental Force) Tryzub, Vol. IX, (January-February 1968), p. 9.

²⁷ B. Zadoyanny, "Povstanska Stykhiya" Tryzub, Vol. IX, (March-April 1968), p. 14.

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and four in the morning and lasted until 8:00 A.M. By nine the insurgents were forced to retreat to the center of the village and all, even women, took up their positions. But Hrebenko, who had disappeared with his cavalry at night, suddenly reappeared on the flank of the Germans. His sudden attack confused the enemy and at the same time, revived the insurgents' will to resist. The attack evoked a rapid retreat of the German units which stopped at the crossing of the Ros River. Here the main German unit was destroyed by Hrebenko's cavalry.²⁸ Having defeated the Germans at the Ros River, Hrebenko broke up his units into three sections and had them attack all enemies in the surrounding villages and cities.

From here the insurgents marched into the area of "Trypilska Respublyka" of otaman Zeleny and a day later attacked and took the city of Kaniv.²⁹ Then the forces crossed the Dnieper River and proceeded to Poltava where they hoped to disperse among the units of the Zaporozhian Division which was guarding the northern border. But the Zaporozhian Division, under new commanders, was no longer a safe place for these who were against the Hetman.

Unable to disperse as planned, Hrebenko and his followers again crossed the Dnieper River and into Bolshevik territory. Here the units were reorganized and formed into the "Taraschanska Division", under Bolshevik command. Hrebenko, who was not a communist, was soon disposed

²⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

[of by the Bolsheviks and most of the men from Tarashcha, losing their leader, dispersed. The name "Tarashchanska Dyvisia", however, was kept by the Bolsheviks as a facade. This and other so-called "Ukrainian" units were soon to be used against the new Ukrainian government after the overthrow of the Hetman.

Other revolts also took place during this period. In the region of Chernihiv and surrounding areas, large units of insurgents successfully resisted the "city's encroachment upon the village". The revolts were only a warning of what was to come. In many ways the rule of the Hetman and the Germans psychologically prepared the peasantry for the coming of the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian peasants, who were not so easily fooled by Bolshevik slogans during the "First Bolshevik Campaign", became more susceptible to Bolshevik slogans after the rule of the Hetman. Lenin, commenting on events in Ukraine in his speech at the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party in March 1919 noted with great satisfaction that the Germans "destroyed" the national consciousness of Ukrainians by their policies in 1918.³⁰

d. The Overthrow of the Hetman and the Beginning of
the Second Ukrainian-Bolshevik War.

The revolutionary situation in Ukraine became more acute. Uprisings were an everyday occurrence. Many areas, while defending their rights against the Hetman, also had to maintain self-defense units that would

³⁰ Letter, dated December 7, 1968, from Panas Fedenko, former minister of the UNR, member of the "All-Ukrainian Insurgent Committee". Professor Fedenko now resides in Munich.

defend them against marauders and brigands. Some areas became almost completely independent of tax collectors and governmental administrators. Such areas, in effect, became "republics". In the Kiev region, for example, between the Dnieper and Horin Rivers and west of Kiev 22 large well organized insurgent units operated.³¹

Many such units, however, encountered German military formations and were forced to flee into the "neutral zone", which was in reality a no man's land, established by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. The Bolsheviks were quick to see the opportunity of having these insurgents in the "neutral zone". Cognizant of peasant unrest in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks hoped to turn the situation to their advantage. They saw the possibility of the overthrow of the Hetman and hoped to have "Ukrainian" units ready to do their bidding. Besides forming units out of the fleeing peasants, they now began to take active steps to bring about the fall of the Hetman. The credit for the coup would, of course, go to the Bolsheviks and thus the fate of Ukraine would be decided in their favor. But Bolshevik hopes and illusions were shattered when their call to revolution was ignored by the peasantry in Ukraine. The Bolshevik "All-Ukrainian" Peasant Uprising was a fiasco.

Before examining the Bolshevik attempt to seize control in Ukraine, it is important to note that up till the Revolution of 1917 there were

³¹ A. E. Denikin General, Ocherki o Russkoy Smuti: Vooruzhebya sili Yuga Rossii (Sketches of the Russian Troubles: The Arming of South Russia), Vol. V, (Berlin: Knygozdatelstvo "Myedni Vsadnik", 1926), p. 130.

[no Bolsheviks in Ukraine.³² Through the first period of the Revolution] the Ukrainians were able to withdraw their strength from Russian Socialist Parties and form their own. The strength of the Ukrainian parties was small due to a limited amount of finances. All branches of cultural, political, and economic life were in the hands of non-Ukrainians. A good example is the Province of Katerynoslavschyna where 80 per-cent of the population (3.5 million) was Ukrainian and where only two newspapers were published - both in Russian.³³ Of the Ukrainian political parties the Socialist Revolutionaries, who advocated socialization of land, were strongest. The Bolshevik party in Ukraine at the time of the Rada and Hetmanate was weak and disunited. Ukrainian Bolsheviks differed from Russian Bolsheviks in two respects; 1) they were favorable to Ukrainian nationalism and; 2) they based their hopes on the peasants rather than on the proletariat.³⁴

The situation in Ukraine was extremely favorable to an all out insurrection. Meeting at their First Congress in Moscow, the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (KP(b)U) created a Revolutionary Committee (Revkom) headed by Avseyem, Bubnov and Pyatakov, with instructions to bring about an insurrection in Ukraine. The Revolutionary Committee immediately set to work and scheduled an "All-Ukrainian" uprising for

³² Isaak Mazepa. Ukrayina v Ohni i Buri Revolutsiyi 1917-1922, (Ukraine in the Fire and Turmoil of Revolution 1917-1922), Vol. I, 2d. ed. (Munich: "Prometey" Pub. Co., 1950), p. 10.

³³ Ibid., p. 24.

³⁴ Adams, op-cit., p. 14.

[August 8, 1918. A special "Instruction from the Workers - Peasant Government" was dispatched to all corners of Ukraine urging the peasant to rise against the Hetman. The call to insurgency was a fiasco.

"Members of the K P (b.) U exaggerated their influence on partisans in Ukraine. Available evidence shows that their influence was relatively small."³⁵

Thus the Bolsheviks had to reexamine their "insurgency" policy in Ukraine. They had to admit that communism would not be brought into Ukraine by Ukrainians but by Russian bayonets. Summing up the situation in Ukraine shortly after the attempted coup, Elansky, a member of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U wrote:

"In Ukraine, after our last failure in Kiev and Odessa, we do not command any kind of strength.... Not taking into account the fact that the workers and many peasants are on our side, especially in the area of Chernihiv, it is futile to count on the success of the revolutionary movement in Ukraine and even its birth, without the use of the Red Army." ³⁶

Elansky's summation succinctly describes the Bolshevik situation in Ukraine. For all practical purposes the communist ideology did not find any support among the peasants who initiated an insurgent war against all foreigners. Only during the period of Denikin's invasion,

³⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

³⁶ Mykhailo Stakhiv, Druha Sovyetska Respublyka (The Second Soviet Republic), (Scranton, Pa. - Pub. by "Narodna Volya", 1957), p. 27.]

[of Ukraine did the insurgents cease to fight the Bolsheviks whose "komuniya" (commune) was abhorrent to the peasant. But this was only a truce and insurgency against them resumed as soon as Denikin was defeated.]

The Bolsheviks, failing miserably in their planned "All-Ukrainian Uprising", came to the conclusion that communism was not popular in Ukraine and that the red flag would have to be carried into Ukraine by Russian Armies and bayonettes. They organized red units from among the partisans who escaped into the "neutral zone" in the hope that these groups would be used in another invasion during a more opportune time. The organization of these units had to be secret. The possibility of resumption of hostilities was very real. The Germans, upon finding that the Russians were not living up to the Brest Litovsk Treaty, could readily send their troops into Russia.

In the meantime the revolutionary fervor in Ukraine did not abate. The National Union, upon learning of Hetman Skoropadsky's Manifesto of November 14, 1918, proclaiming a federative union with Russia, immediately took steps to initiate an uprising that would rid Ukraine of this pro-Russian regime. The Union created the Directory with the following membership: V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlyura, F. Shvec, O. Andriyevsky and A. Makarenko. The revolutionary center was moved to the city of Bila Cerkva, and here the Revolutionary Military Headquarters were established under the leadership of Symon Petlyura.³⁷ On November

³⁷ Kuzminsky, op-cit., p. 5.

[16 Vynnychenko, the head of the Directory, gave orders to begin the Revolt against the Hetmanate. Initially only the "Special Unit of the Sich Riflemen" amounting to 300 men was at the Directory's disposal.³⁸ But the masses, while rejecting the Bolshevik call to Revolution in August, accepted the call of the Directory. Within two weeks the Revolutionary Army of the Directory had 300,000 peasants and soldiers on its side.³⁹ The Directory had many factors to its advantage. Socialist agitation began to affect the ranks of the Germans who were now becoming sympathetic to the Ukrainians and in many cases mutinied. Added to this was the outbreak of Revolution in Germany which further undermined discipline in the German Army. In its bid for power the Directory advanced to Kiev. The leaders of the revolt were fearful of what might happen if the 400,000 German and Hetmanate troops, concentrated in the area under General Count Keller, chose to act. The Revolutionary Army of the Directorate advanced against Kiev on December 13 with orders to disarm the opposition. The insurgents disarmed about 90,000 Germans on the first, and an approximately similar number on the second day of operations.⁴⁰ After this, the Germans proclaimed their neutrality and the Directory permitted them to withdraw from Ukraine. Thus on December 14, Kiev fell to the Directory and the Hetman, after abdicating, left Ukraine together with German formations.

³⁸ Antin Krezub, "Grupa polkovnyka Rogulskoho" (The unit of Colonel Rogulsky), Kalendar Chervonoyi Kalyny, 1929. p. 57.

³⁹ Kuzminsky, op-cit., p. 6.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

But having overthrown the Hetmanate the Directory faced new problems. The "peasant character of the Ukrainian nation" began to become evident. The peasants in the Revolutionary Army, thinking that their task was accomplished, began to disperse. True, many insurgent groups stayed and were incorporated into the restored Republican Army. The majority, however, went home to their farms taking with them stores of ammunition, weapons, uniforms and other military equipment. Of the Hetman's armies only a handful crossed over to the Directory while many, being hostile to the Ukrainians, crossed over to the Bolsheviks or the White Armies.⁴¹ The Directory thus was deprived of military cadres as well as a governmental apparatus. This situation proved extremely dangerous since the Don Kossack Army of General Krasnov and the Volunteer Army of Denikin were preparing operations which would restore "one and indivisible Russia" while the Bolshevik Armies had already begun operations against the Directory.

The Bolsheviks were not sure of the type of government which would be in power in Ukraine after the overthrow of the Hetman. To be sure, the uprising caught them by surprise and they "did not know what to do".⁴² The Bolsheviks were undoubtedly aware of the fact that this revolt was national in character with strong social overtones, and that if given a chance to organize, it would most certainly be opposed to them. With this in mind, the Bolsheviks began the second war against Ukraine. The

⁴¹ Tsapko., op-cit., p. 7.

⁴² Stakhiv, op-cit., p. 36.

["Second Campaign", as it is known by the Russians, began with operations against the northern borders of Ukraine under the leadership of Antonov-Ovseenko.

III ANARCHY - OPPORTUNISM - ADVENTURISM

a. The Psychology of "Otamanshchyna"

Many diverse contributing factors affected the restless situation in Ukraine. The people of Ukraine, composed mostly of peasants, were not prepared to cope with the forces which were released by the Revolution. The rapid shift of governments and armies brought new complicated ideologies that confused the unsophisticated and politically uneducated peasant. Within a short span of time Ukraine, or parts of it, was ruled by the Central Rada, the Bolsheviks, Skoropadsky and the Germans, the White Armies of General Wrangel. Each change of regime brought with it worthless money, taxes and requisitions, new slogans, reforms, and decrees. Added to this was the opening of prisons which released elements that were in many cases destructive to society.² With the rapid changes of government people lost respect for all types of authority. They learned to adjust to the prevailing situation. One could find within one hovel a number of ideologies and within a village

¹ "Otamanshchyna" derives from the word "Otamen" and, perhaps wrongly, is applied to the period when there were many "Otamans" who were jealous of their power and as a result hard to control. The birth of the insurgent leaders - "Otamans" brings to life internal strife. This period of internal strife and anarchy is therefore encompassed by the word "Otamanshchyna". Here it is important to note that the writer is handling this problem from the vantage point of the government of the Ukrainian National Republic. This strife or period of "Otamanshchyna" within the insurgent movement was, in some respects, to the advantage of the Bolsheviks as well as the Whites. In most cases however, while using these groups and leaders to their advantage the Bolsheviks and Whites have also labeled them "destructive".

² William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, Vol. II (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1935, p. 222.

[a number of ready made governments that would set themselves up with a] change of regime.³ Theirs, above all, was a task of survival.

Added to the above was the disorganization that took place after the fall of the Tsar. Bolshevik slogans completely demoralized the soldiers who deserted from the front; they went home and spread these slogans in the village. Slogans prevalent were "dance you spirit of revolution", "kill the bourgeois", "rob the rich", "Land!....land and freedom", "Quickly to the land...it belongs to us, it was won by our blood", "Away bad times, away with war, away with the Tsar and all types of government!", "Long live those who give the rights to land, factories, palaces!", and finally, "Everything is ours.... but more likely will be mine, because.... I have weapons, here is strength!".⁴ In addition to these disorganizing slogans there were brigands who kept the countryside in terror. Soldiers returning from the front affected by Bolshevik slogans, "first robbed the landowners, then the more wealthy peasants, and later the poor peasant."⁵

³ An example of the political split within families is indicated by a song popular during this period.

I sit on a barrell,
Underneath's a duck.
My man is a Bolshevik,
I'm a Haydamak! (Transl. G.K.)

Haydamak referred to the supporters of Petlyura and the Directorate of the U.N.R. The word originates from a revolt that took place in 1768 against the rule of the Poles.

⁴ Y. Khomychiv, V. Stepakh Ukrayiny (On the Steppes of Ukraine), Vol. I, (Buenos Aires: Pub. by author, 1958), p. 14.

⁵ Ibid., p. 27.

For its defense, the peasantry began forming militias and other units that would resist the bandits and anarchists. These units became the protectors of the village against all forms of oppression. It is because of them that banditism and anarchy was weakened and their place was taken by units who were more orderly and conscious of their national aspirations. The peasant, seeing that Bolshevik agitation was really not to his advantage, became educated through the learning process and thus immune to Bolshevik slogans and gravitated into the camp of the Directory. There was, in effect, a shift from disorderly to a more ordered insurgency movement that fought in the name of social progress and the national question. Analysing the situation I. Mazepa writes:

"True, the peasant revolts in Ukraine, especially on the Right Bank, erupted almost everywhere under the flag of the independent Ukrainian Republic. But actually the Ukrainian workers and peasants, who made up the majority of the insurgents, revolted against these forces which destroyed their well being, severed their access to land, took their bread and other wealth and schemed to take away their personal liberty. Therefore in its basic foundation the movement was social. National motives, especially at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, played a secondary role."⁶

In spite of the fact that after 1918 the insurgents fought under

⁶ Mazepa Opaciti, Vol. III, p. 43.

[the national flag, it was hard to control them because there were no]
cadres that could take events into their hands. The tragedy of the
Ukrainian liberation movement lay in the very character of the nation.
Not having its own intelligentsia or political cadres, the movement had
to depend on elements that were foreign and hostile to the idea of lib-
eration. Only with time did Ukrainian cadres emerge, but by then it
was too late. The UNR government could not initiate a vigorous policy
because it reflected, too much, the disorganized masses who were look-
ing to it for directives. As a result of this many groups, in disagree-
ment with the Directorate and clamoring for vigorous action against the
Whites and the French, left the UNR and either joined the Bolsheviks or
operated by themselves against every contending power. Not able to
take firm control the UNR contributed to the formation of such inde-
pendent units as "Trypilska Respublika" and the "Pashkovetska
Respublika". The peasantry with strong local ties, protected its own
counties, villages and hovels. This "localism" eventually lead to the
destruction of the insurgents. The lesson was learned too late.

This period of strife and disorganization saw the appearance of
many independent units that did not coordinate their activity with the
UNR or even with other local units. Most of these units, while dedicated
to the idea of national independence, were not nationally mature. Their
support of the National Liberation Movement was not founded on rational
postulates but on dim memories of the past and traditions that were still
alive among the peasantry. Many insurgent units in their behavior re-
flected their ancestors, the Zaporozhian Kossacks. The stories about]

The rights of the Kossacks before their liquidation by Katherine the Great were still vivid in the minds of the peasants. Keeping alive the memory of the past were the "Kobzari" (troubadors) who sang of the great deeds of "otamans" Honta, Zaliznyak and others. They fired the imagination of young romantics who began to emulate the Kossacks in dress, deeds and battle tactics. The motives for joining the insurgents were many. Some came to find fulfillment of their dreams of adventure, others to save their skins.

"In this type of voluntary unit emerged a discipline and friendly, one could say, brotherly order where all stood for one and one for all. Because of this it was worthwhile for, let's say a colonel, to have a dedicated armed group in this time of strife, a time when officers, especially officers, were often victims of quick "justice".⁷

Many of the "otamans" were quite successful and were referred to by the insurgents as "Batko".⁸

⁷ Dmytro Honta "Otamanshchyna", Kyiv, Vol. VIII (January-February 1957), p. 17.

⁸ L. Moroz, "Taktyka Maloyi Viyny" (The Tactics of Little Wars), Visti (Munich), No. 3-4 (March-April, 1955), p. 12. According to Ukrainian sociologists: "The highest manifestation of rule is the otaman; if he is also the ruler of the soul then he is a batko. Batko is one who assures those subject to him that they are part of the family. (or group, G.K.). In the relations between the leader and his follower there is no despotism or slavish submission. Instead, there exists a certain consciousness that all are together serving some higher ideal".

"Usually these partisan leaders were men of the village who had received a better than average education. Enjoying the respect of their followers, sympathizing with peasant ambitions, sensitive to the temper of their own locale, they combined demagoguery and the ability to lead where their men most wanted to go with genuine talent for fighting. The greater figures drew some of their glory from deep rooted Cossack traditions, which had long since made the proud defiance of all authority a virtue; in their own and in their followers eyes they were endowed with the heroic stature of the legendary heroes who had fought Russian and Pole and Turk alike for the right to govern themselves. Such men were successful leaders because they were trusted by their followers; and they were trusted above all, because they were "flesh of the flesh and blood of the blood of the village"". ⁹

Indeed, it was hard to control elements who, although in most cases idealistic, had no contact with a strong directing center. Generally the "otamans" did as they pleased during the beginning phases of insurgency. They were jealous of their power and refused to combine their insurgent units with other groups when the situation demanded it. They would often fight among themselves and thus indirectly weaken the UNR forces.

⁹ Adams, op-cit., p. 141.

[There were cases where one leader would kill another. A good example of this is the killing of Hryhoriyiv by Makhno. Many "otamans" grew in strength and refused to submit to the center. Discipline in the insurgent units "depended upon moral rather than physical" stimuli. If an "otaman" was a degenerate then this would be reflected in the whole group whose pleasure and motive for existence would be to kill Jews, intelligentsia, rob, rape and plunder.]

b. "Batko" Makhno

An old Ukrainian proverb says: "An evil spark will set fire to the field and then disappear". Such an evil spark that set fire to the Ukrainian stepes was Nestor Makhno, better known as "Batko Makhno".

Makhno's background was envied by few. "Makhnovtsi" (the family of Makhno), in the opinion of the general public of Sicheslav, were ordinary bandits."¹⁰ Nestor, while working in the "Kreger" factory, was arrested in 1912 for stealing. Condemned to serve two and one half years in prison, he escaped and joined Semenyuta, a well known bandit from Katerynoslav. Here, he continued his profession of banditry until 1917 when he organized a group of workers from the "Kreger" factory and began operating under the black flag of anarchy.¹¹ During the reign of the Hetman, Makhno and his followers were dispersed near Hulay Pole.

¹⁰ Ivan Hnopy, "Chy Batko Makhno Ukrainsky Natsionalny Heroy?", (Is "Batko" Makhno a Ukrainian National Hero?), Tryzub, Vol. VII, April, 1966), p. 12.

¹¹ M. S. "Makhno ta yoho Viysko", (Makhno and his Army) Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny, Vol. VII, (June 1935), p. 16.

After this dispersal Makhno once again gathered his men and resumed fighting the Germans. By the end of October 1918, his group cleared the Germans from the Oleksandrivsky and part of the Mariupilsky regions.¹²

He became very popular in his area because:

".....he was a partisan chieftain of rare daring, shrewdness and resourcefulness, who was never captured during three years of uninterrupted campaigning. He was a master not of formal strategy, but of the tricks which are effective in a time of general turmoil and guerilla warfare."¹³

Yet in spite of his popularity Makhno was not trusted by Ukrainians who belonged to the intelligentsia. His future wife, Halyna Kuzmenko, a teacher of Ukrainian language and history at the village of Hulay Pole, wrote of Makhno:

"In our area appeared the bandit Makhno. He attacks the wealthy, priests and intelligentsia. He robs and kills. We are very afraid of him. As soon as it gets dark we do not dare walk the streets. We close our doors and cover our windows so that light can not be seen."¹⁴

¹² M. Irchan, "Makhno i Makhnivtsi", (Makhno and the Makhovites) Istorychny Kalendar-Almanakh Chervonoyi Kalyny, (1936) p. 118.

¹³ Chamberlin, op-cit., p. 237.

¹⁴ F. Maleshko, "Nestor Makhno ta yoho Anarkhia" (Nestor Makhno and his Anarchy) Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny, Vol. VII, No. 1 (January 1935), p. 11.

According to many observers Makhno was not psychologically well. He loved to speak about himself and to evoke fear in the listener. Physically he was small and ugly. He seems to have harbored a feeling of grandeur which revolved around the idea of "Anarchy-Makhnovachyna". Having this feeling Makhno could not stand people around him that would lower his prestige. However, Makhno was not a coward.

"Weak in his word, weak physically, unfit psychologically, Makhno, to the amazement of all, had an iron will. At the same time his anger and severity were inhuman, while he was extremely kind to all who believed in and followed him."¹⁵

Although Makhno regarded himself as an anarchist, he had no one ideology to which he could tenaciously adhere. Documents point out that:

"Makhno has no hard line goal. Also he does not have one political direction. In his actions he is guided strictly by the tactics and social slogans which give him an opportunity to surround himself with a large armed group."¹⁶

Makhno, in reality, operated against every group starting with the UNR and ending with the Bolsheviks. General O. Pavlenko summarizes the ideology of Makhno in this manner:

"Revenge, revenge without end, on everyone, all who re-

¹⁵ Ibid., Vol.VII, No. 4, (April 1935), p. 17.

¹⁶ M. S. "Makhno ta yoho Viysko", op-cit., p. 16.

strain his freedom. Black flags and armbands gave testimony to the Makhnovite stand".¹⁷

Roaming the country, his bands stopped trains and searched the travelers. These with soft, pampered hands were herded together and shot. Just in the summer of 1918 Makhno sacked hundreds of farms and shot thousands of "enemies of the revolution".¹⁸

After the Bolsheviks crushed the anarchist movement in Russia on April 12, 1918, many of its members moved south into Ukraine.¹⁹ Such men as Arshinov, Popov, and Volin attempted to channel Makhno's movement into forms that were more in keeping with the ideas of Kropotkin. But Makhno gave these men little power and used them only as "orators" on official occasions. The rule of the band was in the hands of a body known as the "Revolutionary Military Committee" which consisted of twelve members (sometimes referred to as the "committee of the twelve apostles of Batko Makhno"). The real power in this body, however, belonged to Makhno, or as one of the twelve once said:

"Makhno says that he submits to the will of the "Revolutionary Military Committee", but let someone disagree with what he says, he will execute him immediately".²⁰

¹⁷ Hnopyov, op-cit., p. 10.

¹⁸ P. O. Arshinov, Istoria Makhnovskogo Dvizheniya 1918-1921 (History of the Makhno Movement 1918-1921) (Berlin: Izdaniia Grupa Russkig Anarchistov Germanii, 1923), p. 55.

¹⁹ Essad Bey, Znova Protiv Svitu (The Conspiracy Against the World), Vol. I (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Kooperatyvy "Khortycya", 1936), p. 103.

²⁰ Meleshko, op-cit., Vol. VII, (January 1935) p. 14.

Makhno's strength lay chiefly in his ability to be realistic and to exploit the social question. At every meeting he stressed ideas which peasants wanted to hear. As the temper of the masses changed so did many of Makhno's slogans. An opportunist, he even used the slogan "Free Ukraine" in order to keep the masses from abandoning him. Forced to accept the slogans of the masses, Makhno began to dream of a "Ukrainian Anarchist State". This "Makhnovite" state would be independent of Russia, that is unless Russia accepts the "Makhnovite" system and federates with Ukraine.²¹

As was pointed out, the ideas of the Makhno unit slowly evolved from a bandit stage to a more conscious stage. Soon there were actually two political camps, the nationalist, or Ukrainian, and an independent party that was not concerned with the question of nationality. Thus at this late stage of the Makhnovite movement many members of Makhno's formations were:

"National-Ukrainian elements who fought the Bolsheviks and Volunteers on the Right Bank joined the Army of the UNR; these same elements on the Left Bank had to find a channel, - and this was, to all who saw reaction in Denikin - to go to Makhno. This changed the character of the organization because they (these elements G.K.) were in most cases nationally conscious Ukrainians."²²

²¹ Ibid., (March 1935), p. 10

²² Hnocyovy, op-cit., p. 13.

Since the Makhnovite Movement initially had a strong bandit streak to it, it attracted many adventurers, professional bandits, and those who were demoralized by the war. The army of Makhno and the elements that made it up varied at different periods of time. Membership of this group changed constantly, and Makhno, in order to keep his men, instituted a system of terror by which a member of the organization could not leave the "brotherhood". In the event that this occurred, Makhno dispatched his special agents after the escapees with orders to kill them.

The number of men that Makhno had fluctuated. His army has been credited with a membership of 50 - 75 and even 100 thousand men. The more accurate figure is 8,000, including infantry and cavalry.²³ Dressed in different uniforms and civilian clothes Makhno's band gave no indication of any type of cohesiveness and discipline. Yet in spite of this the tactics used were indicative of the ability of Makhno and his military staff. The secret of Makhno's success was his use of the element of surprise and his ability to move his units rapidly. Even his infantry rode on horseback or on the "tachanka" (light wagons taken from rich landowners). Added to this was the tremendous fire power which was achieved by mounting machine guns on each of the "tachankas".

Due to the fact that Makhno's existence depended upon the peasantry, he avoided any confrontations by robbing only large landowners, rich peasants and Jews. Makhno realized that in fighting a guerrilla war he

²³ M. S., op-cit., p. 17.

had to have the friendship of the peasants. The peasants, on their part, did little to harass Makhno. In many cases the peasantry suffered because of Makhno but still did not betray him. Thus in the village of Volodymyrivka, forty-nine peasants were shot for refusing to give any information relating to the death and disappearance of the bodies of eighty Hungarian soldiers. After this, one peasant in a discussion said:

"May he die that Makhno, he brings so much sorrow and trouble, but at the same time he protects us from robbers, Bolsheviks and other malcontents.²⁴

Makhno's support by the peasantry was in many cases advantageous to them for he sometimes shared his military trophies with them and paid generously for fodder and other supplies. But in the final analysis, his support came from peasants who lived on the Left Bank of Ukraine where national consciousness was not yet very strong. Thus from his original area of operations, Lozova - Berdyanka - Mariupol - Tahanrilt - Katerynoslav, he was able to begin operations in all of southern Ukraine.

Before leaving Makhno and his band it is important to note that during his career Makhno fought every contending power in Ukraine. It is worthwhile, therefore, to briefly examine his activity against the UNR, the Bolsheviks, and the Whites.

With the overthrow of the Hetman, Makhno began operations against the Directory. He appeared in the Kherson Province and captured the city of

²⁴ Pavlo Dubas, "Z Rayonu Makhna" (From the Region of Makhno), Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny Vol. IV (March 1932); p. 8.

[Bobrynec. Shortly, a special expeditionary force of the UNR dislodged] him from the city. In November he attacked Katerynoslav and again encountered and inflicted great losses on the Republican Army. On December 26-29, he attacked the city of Sicheslav which was protected by a UNR garrison. In two encounters near Synelnyky and Katerynoslav Makhno defeated two Directorate units. During this time he operated with Bolshevik units which were advancing against the Ukrainian National Republic. With the advance of the Volunteers of Denikin, Makhno broke with the Bolsheviks because he did not share their centralist policies, and threw his units to the rear of the advancing Whites. The Armies of the UNR, even before Makhno's move against the Volunteers, had made an analysis of the Makhno movement and came to the conclusion that one way of eliminating Makhno would be to force him into the rear of Denikin.²⁵ This did not require any effort on the part of the Directorate because Makhno, breaking with the Bolsheviks, decided to make this move independently of any outside force.

The UNR, aware of the danger in the Makhno movement, dispatched agents K. and R. in the hope of neutralizing the anarchist forces. Although not successful, they were allowed to return, unlike the Volunteer agents who were thrown into the Dnieper River from the Kichkasi bridge. In the end, however, the UNR was successful in stationing its men in the Makhnovite camp. Thus, near the end, Ukrainian nationalists were able to place their men in the "cultural-educational" center of Makhno's group.²⁶

²⁵ M. S., op-cit., p. 17.

²⁶ Meleshko, op-cit., Vol. VII. (January, 1935), pp. 9-13.

Only once did Makhno operate with the UNR, but this was for an extremely short time. He and his units were conducting continuous raids against the Volunteers. In the course of his maneuvers Makhno was forced into the area of Uman where Ukrainian military units were deployed. Here Makhno came in contact with the military Headquarters of the UNR and even negotiated a treaty by which he would aid the UNR. During this period he supported the Sich Riflemen in operations against the Whites. Not being used to this type of warfare, on September 25, 1919, he left four thousand of his wounded to be cared for by the UNR, broke through the Denikin front, and continued the partisan warfare at which he was so adept.

But the major thought that prevailed in Makhno's attitude was "with the weak against the strong." There was no change of heart in Makhno; as a matter of fact, he planned to do to Petlyura what he did to "otaman" Hryhoriyiv, that is, kill him, absorb the latter's army and declare himself Dictator.²⁷ Nothing came of Makhno's plans, however, and with his "synky" (sons) he once again began operations in the rear of Denikin.

Makhno also, as mentioned previously, operated with the Bolsheviks against the forces of the UNR. Dissatisfied with Bolshevik centralism, he left them and thus opened the road for the Whites against the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks then abandoned their front against Denikin and pursued Makhno. In the process, two Bolshevik regiments mutinied and crossed over to Makhno. Near the railroad terminal Sofivka a bat-

²⁷ M. S., op-cit., p. 10.

the battle between the former allies led to the defeat of the Bolsheviks and Makhno's seizing the city of Elysavet, destroying the Red garrison. After replenishing his supplies, he proceeded to the city of Kompaniyivka where his and Otaman Hryhoriviv's units were to unite under one command. The result of this meeting is known. Makhno killed Hryhoriviv and the latter's units either dispersed or joined Makhno. In July, he defeated units of the 14th Soviet Division near the village of Hlodos, seizing much equipment and the treasury. (Here the Bolshevik losses were 500 killed and 900 captured.) Having defeated the Bolsheviks by using his lightning attack, he frustrated their plans to surround and destroy him. In August, he encountered and gave battle to the 58th Soviet Division. The Reds began to panic at this point as is indicated in reports to Moscow.²⁸ In addition to the revolts of Hryhoriviv and Makhno against the Bolsheviks, there began a "united front" of the partisans against the Bolsheviks. Operating against the Bolsheviks were such "otamans" as Zeleny (who had earlier contributed to the Directory's troubles), Anhel, Chuchupaka and many, many others. At the time of his break with the Bolsheviks Makhno, in a telegram of 9 June, 1919, to the Chief of Staff of the 14th Soviet Army, Voroshilov, warned the latter of Bolshevik abuses and foresaw the "United Internal Partisan Front" that was mounting against the Bolsheviks.²⁹

The "United Internal Partisan Front" mentioned by Makhno was quite

²⁸ Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 107.

²⁹ Meleshko, op-cit., Vol. VII (February 1935), p. 13.

real. This front, made up of many insurgent bands, was responsible for destroying Denikin's Army and then turned against the other foreign power - the Bolsheviks.

But the Whites were not ready to give up the struggle. General Dinikin resigned and his place was taken by General Wrangel who was more sensitive to Ukrainian demands. On June 18, 1920, he had a letter written to Makhno offering him aid, arms, specialists and everything necessary to fight the Bolsheviks in league with the Volunteers.³⁰ Makhno responded by hanging Wrangel's courier. Baron Wrangel, during the initial stages of operations, was able to seize Alexandrivsk, Synelnikiv and Katerynoslav, parts of Makhno's territory. This forced Makhno to once again join the Bolsheviks for a short period during October-November 1920, but this time as an independent unit. After Wrangel's defeat, pretexts were found by the Bolsheviks to discard their agreement with Makhno and an active campaign was initiated against him. In an effort to rouse the countryside against the Bolsheviks, Makhno raided throughout Ukraine. In the end, in August 1921, he and his army, which had dwindled to 250, crossed the Romanian frontier and settled in France. Chamberlin writes this of Makhno's activity:

"He saw in the landlords and "gold epaulettes" the standard-bearers of an old servitude; in the communist commissars and food collectors the heralds of a new slavery for the peasants with whom he was connected by the closest ties of blood and

³⁰ Denikin, op-cit., Vol. V, p. 135.

race; and he fought in wild, merciless, truly peasant guerilla fashion, with all the stormy energy of his nature. He wrote his name large in the grim chronicle of Ukraine's bloodstained chaos." ³¹

Thus, "bloodstained chaos" was the child of Makhno. At his funeral there were no Ukrainian "Anarchists" or friends to mourn him. Left behind him was the memory similar to that which is left behind on a field after an "evil spark ignites it".

c. Otaman Hryhoriyiv.

Another "otaman" who can not be ignored when examining the negative aspects of the "Ukrainian Insurgent Movement" is Hryhoriyiv. Many have referred to Hryhoriyiv as a drunk and an opportunist. Perhaps this is true, yet when comparing him to Makhno, one may conclude that he was motivated by more than just personal ambition. Like Volokh, who followed in his footsteps, Hryhoriyiv was a political gambler, who was genuinely motivated by his national consciousness, and who lost primarily because he did not know the nature of his enemies - the Bolsheviks.

Hryhoriyiv, a former Tsarist officer, was an able organizer. During the revolt against the Hetman, Hryhoriyiv was able to unite 117 insurgent groups under his command. By December of 1918, he led some 4,000 cavalrymen, 200 grenadiers, and several infantry contingents amounting from 6,000 to 8,000 men.³² Considering himself a descendant of the Zaporozhian Kossacks, he was fond of signing his name with the

³¹ Chamberlin, op-cit., p. 239.

³² Antonov - Ovseenko, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 89.

title "Otaman of the Zaporazha", a position granted him by Petlyura, the head of the Directory. In addition to this title, he liked also to include on his documents the fact that he was "Otaman of Aleksandriya, Kherson and Taurida". His pretenses and independence of action made a split between him and the UNR inevitable. Reminded by Colonel Osmaliv, member of the UNR General Staff, that discipline demands that he restrain his regiments from looting, Hryhoriyiv answered in a way that was indicative of what his future actions would entail. After praising his well-disciplined units and the valor that they displayed against the enemies (Volunteers and Germans), he made a threat to the effect:

"You, especially, do not command, because we are the army upon whose bayonets all is supported. No one mobilized us, no one hired us....We are partisans..... volunteers. I am not an invalid; if you(act this way in the future).... I shall go home and disperse all the sections. Then you can command yourself as much as you wish."³³

His main objection to Petlyura and the Directorate was a valid one. Hryhoriyiv, a man of action, saw no future in the discussions and negotiations with the French and other foreigners in Ukraine. He believed that the Ukrainian forces had control of Ukraine and that no negotiations were necessary. Intruders should be thrown into the sea and not mollified by concessions that they did not deserve. The Directorate was of a

³³ Adams, op-cit., p. 154.

[different opinion, however. Hoping to win the sympathy and recognition] of the French, they pursued a policy which was repulsive to many of the most stout nationalists. The French, in their behavior and inability to distinguish the shades of political thought in Ukraine, almost commanded the Directorate and Bolsheviks to stay out of Odessa. Thus, Henno the French representative, behaving as a conquerer, began dictating to all concerned. Observers maintain that:

"The only real force in the Ukraine capable of military action at this time was the Directorate and its troops under Petlyura and Henno had chosen to denounce it".³⁴

Because of the French, and his respect for the Allies, Petlyura stopped short of victory in Odessa. The consequences of this soft policy relating to "foreigners" were grave. Hryhoriyiv, who was anxious to throw the Allies "into the Black Sea", abandoned the Directory and turned to the Bolsheviks. Striking at the right flank of the UNR in the area of Znamenka - Elysavet, he forced them to yield all of Kherson and Katerinoslav to him. Only after heavy losses was the UNR able to finally halt his advance. Furthermore, other partisan units also left the Directory. In many cases a unit, such as that of Otaman Kozyr-Zirka, would split in half. One half of the unit would remain with the Directory while the other went over to the Bolsheviks.

The crossing of Hryhoriyiv to the Bolsheviks was for them a great

³⁴ George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and the Allied Intervention in South Russia 1917 - 1921, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 87.

moral victory. At the same time, however, his independence would soon awaken the wrath of the Bolsheviks who were unable to discipline or control him. Hryhoriyiv did not plunge into the Bolshevik camp without any previous calculation. One can suspect upon examining his background, that there were possibly two very important reasons why he joined them. The first reason was probably his loyalty to the Ukrainian separatist cause regardless of the ideology or color of the flag. More than likely he saw the cause failing under the guidance of Petlyura and decided to cross over to the Borotbisty who were trying to establish a Ukrainian Soviet Government and a Ukrainian Red Army. Creation of a Soviet state, according to the Borotbisty (Ukrainian Left Social Revolutionaries), would place the Russians before an accomplished fact and thus force them to stop interfering in Ukrainian internal affairs. The second prevailing motive for Hryhoriyiv's betrayal of Petlyura was, assuming that Professor Adams is correct in his description of Hryhoriyiv as an ego-centric who compared himself to a Ukrainian Lenin or Napoleon, the possibility of being the "Hlavkoverkh" (Commander-in-Chief) of the Ukrainian Red Army.

The Russians, however, were not disposed to give the Ukrainians, whatever their name, "Petlyurists" or "Borotbists", a chance to organize any system that would take away from their centralist government in Moscow. In the end, Hryhoriyiv had to agree to submit to Antonov-Ovsenko, Commander of the "Ukrainian" Front. Hryhoriyiv, while still under the Directorate, issued an ultimatum to the German units (15,000)

to leave Nikolaev, Dolinska and Znamenka. The Germans, stationed there under the aegis of the Entente, were forced to garrison these areas until French and Greek reinforcements arrived. Once under Antonov, Hryhoriyiv again repeated the ultimatum which in effect threatened to push the Germans into action. To divert his attention Antonov told him to concentrate on the city of Kherson. He feared that any activity on the Otaman's part may disrupt the negotiations that were in progress between the Bolsheviks and Germans at Nikolayev.³⁵ The Germans prepared for all eventualities. Prior to these events, and Hryhoriyiv's betrayal, at a meeting between the German and Directorate representatives, the Ukrainians made it understood that Hryhoriyiv was hard to control and that his ultimatums were proclaimed without Petlyura's consent or knowledge. As a precautionary measure the Germans began to fortify Nikolayev.³⁶ On March 5, 1919, Hryhoriyiv attacked the city. The Germans sent out parliamentarians and the Otaman stopped the attack on the pretense that he does not fight the Germans but the "imperialist" French and English.³⁷

While ceasing to attack Nikolayev, he diverted his troops to the city of Kherson, began his attacks on March 8, and took the city the

³⁵ Anotonov - Ovseenko, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 225.

³⁶ Vasyl Zadoyanny, "Otaman Hryhoriyiv u Svitli Nimeckoho Admirala Hopmana" (Otaman Hryhoriyiv in the light of the German Admiral Hopman), Tryzub (New York), No. 34 (May-June-August 1965), pp.20-21.

³⁷ Ibid., No. 35 (September-October 1965), p. 140.

next day. The Entente forces were compelled to flee to the waiting ships. On March 15, Hryhoriyiv took Nikolayev. The Germans left prior to that, apparently in accordance with secret orders from Rear Admiral von Kessler.³⁸ On March 20, Hryhoriyiv began to attack Odessa where a strong garrison (35-40,000) made up of French and Greek units was deployed. The value of these units as fighting entities was small. The Otaman took the port-city on April 7, 1919.

With the fall of Nikolayev, the Bolsheviks came into possession of great military supply depots. Had Petlyura pursued his campaigns more vigorously rather than wasting time on negotiations, he would have retained the allegiance of Hryhoriyiv and with the military stores could have equipped the masses who were ready to assist him.

In the final analysis, Hryhoriyiv's victories contributed to Bolshevik wealth and prestige but;

"The Red Army" that took Odessa was not a Communist Army.

"Red Odessa" was not "Bolshevik" but "Partisan Odessa".

The victory was more of a triumph for "Grigorev (Hryhoriyiv G.K.) the Unruly" than for Bolshevism".³⁹

Hryhoriyiv, seeing that the Russians would not allow the formation of a Ukrainian Red Army, after his victories against the Entente, abandoned the front and left for his native territory of Aleksandriya and Verblyuzhka, in spite of orders to move to Crimea and join the

³⁸ Adams, op-cit., p. 176.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 201.

[forces of Dybenko. Antonov still needed Hryhoriyiv to attack Romania.] Plans were set in motion which were to envelop the world in revolution. The revolts in Germany and Hungary strengthened the Communist belief that world revolution was just around the corner. To realize his plans Antonov, who already suspected Hryhoriyiv, needed his help. The Bolsheviks could do nothing but suspect the loyalty of one who refused to allow Communist agitators into his ranks. Antonov felt that the invasion of Romania was imperative if the "Soviet Hungarian" government was to survive.

But Hryhoriyiv was not interested in the "Romanian Campaign". On May 2, 1919, a telegram was intercepted which confirmed Hryhoriyiv's betrayal. The telegram read:

"Inform us immediately to whom you owe allegiance - to the Communist Khudyakov (commander of the third Soviet army, G.K.) or to an honest socialist of Ukraine, otaman Hryhoriyiv, who does not believe people who came from the north".⁴⁰

Shortly, thereafter, Hryhoriyiv announced his "Manifesto to the People of Ukraine". In this document Hryhoriyiv reviewed Ukraine's struggle for freedom in exchange for which the nation received the "kommune" (komuny - Communism), the CHEKA (Extraordinary Commission - secret police), and Jewish Communists. He pointed out how bread is taken

⁴⁰ Mykhailo Kucher, "Manifest Otomana Hrykoryiwa" (The Manifesto of Otaman Hryhoriyiv), Tryzub (New York), No. 27 (January-February 1964), p. 12. See also Mazepa, Vol. III, op-cit., p. 182-183.

away from Ukrainians for their own "good". His views as to the type of government that should rule Ukraine were summarized in the following:

"Ukrainian Nation take power into your hands. Away with political speculators! Away with the cruelty of the left! All power to the rada's, (equivalent to soviets, which means councils G.K.) but without parties. The Rada's should represent all nationalities. Ukrainians should have 80% of the seats, Jews 5% and the remaining nationalities 15%. Long live freedom of speech, press, assembly, the right to strike and freedom of religion."⁴¹

In the "Manifesto" Hryhoriyiv also asked the Bolshevik "Adventurer" Rakovsky, and his ally, Moscow, to leave Ukraine. In a discussion with Antonov, Hryhoriyiv explained succinctly his views which very closely synthesized the views held by the majority of Ukrainians. In a discussion over the telephone, Antonov tried to convince the Otaman of the "legality" of Rakovsky's Soviet government.

Antonov: I repeat - the present government was created by the will of the peasants and workers.

Grigorev: With the assistance of machine guns.

Antonov: And you do not have them? With what will you act?

Grigorev: They will not be used at elections. ⁴²

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 13.

⁴² Adams, op-cit., p. 304. The author uses Russian transliteration.

[This ended the alliance of Hryhoriyiv and the Bolsheviks. It also]
disrupted the "Romanian Campaign" planned by Antonov. Added to the
loss of Hryhoriyiv the Bolsheviks also felt very uneasy about Makhno
who, although allied with the Bolsheviks, arrested all Communist
"politruks" (political workers) in his brigade and was suspected of
collusion with Hryhoriyiv.

Hryhoriyiv, outlawed by the Soviet Government, began making pre-
parations for an "All-Ukrainian Uprising" against the Bolsheviks. He
dispatched Tyutyunnyk to Kiev to contact the proper authorities. In
Kiev at this time there already existed the "All-Ukrainian Revolutionary
Committee" formed by the Ukrainian Social Democrats and Social Revol-
utionaries.⁴³ Plans were drawn up but Hryhoriyiv did not agree to
them.⁴⁴ Initiating his own insurgent operation, he contacted Makhno in
July, and the "Dniprovska Dyviziya" (Dnieper Division) of Otaman
Zeleny of Trypillya. His plan emphasized the capture of Kharkiv and
the Left Bank of Ukraine. He placed the "Khersonsky" and "Hryhoriyi-
vsky" regiments at the disposal of Tyutyunnyk and directed him to move
into the Katerynoslav region. With the rest of his forces Hryhoriyiv
marched towards the Poltava region. On July 27, 1919, in the village
of Sentovo, the Province of Kherson, many partisans gathered from the
regions of Tavria, Katerynoslav and Kherson. Upon the arrival of
Hryhoriyiv's units the conclave, of which Makhno was host, had 20,000
partisans. In a speech to the insurgents, Hryhoriyiv called on them

⁴³ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 27.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

to overthrow the Bolshevik rule and not to hesitate to accept all possible allies. After his speech Semen Koretnyk leaped up and shot Hryhoriyiv. Makhno also ran up to the victim shouting "death to the otaman"⁴⁵

d. The "Elemental Force" in the National Camp.

A variety of personalities were thrown onto the public stage by the Revolution. The Ukrainian Republican Army, in addition to the insurmountable problems facing it, had to cope with adventurers and opportunists who threatened the very idea for which the Army was fighting. Writing about these unruly, colorful individuals Colonel Sereda said:

"Only the devil knows where they borrowed their military knowledge, obtained financial resources; nevertheless they gathered around themselves legions of insurgents, with whose support they initiated a war between themselves and forgot about the idealistic slogans that were propagated by Chief-Otaman Symon Petlyura".⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Meleshko, op-cit., Vol.VII, (February 1935) p.13. The motives for Makhno's attack on Hryhoriyiv, according to many writers, were 1) Hryhoriyiv's anti-semitism, 2) Hryhoriyiv's decision to cross over to Denikin, and 3) Makhno's desire to seize Hryhoriyiv's territory and men. The first and second reasons are not plausible. Since when did Makhno, himself an antisemite, become the protector of Jews? The second motive does not satisfy me. Hryhoriyiv was never a friend of the Whites and it was the Whites and the French he regarded as foreigners and wanted to "throw into the sea". The third motive could be applicable. However, one question that is overlooked is: How close was Makhno to the Bolsheviks at this time? True, he purported to have broken with them. Hnopyov op-cit., p. 11, mentions that there was an order signed by Kamenev and Lurye which ordered Makhno to move to Elysavethrad and kill Hryhoriyiv the "traitor of the Revolution".

⁴⁶ Mykhailo Sereda, "Otamanshchyna", Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny Vol. I (December 1929) p. 22.

Although the majority of the "otamans" were well meaning, limited in education and not controlled by an iron hand, they took the easy road to success. Only with time did they learn to submit to a higher authority but the damage was done.

One "otaman", about whom more will be said in the subsequent chapters in conjunction with his aid to the UNR, but who at the outset was "his own man", was Otaman Zeleny (Danylo Terpylo) from Tarashcha in the area of Kiev. He extended aid to the Directorate during the campaign against Kiev, but at the beginning of 1919, he proclaimed "soviet" slogans and operated either independently or in league with the Bolsheviks in the area of Kiev. Only in the autumn did he and his 7,000 men recognize the authority of the Directorate of the UNR. His submission came too late for the Directorate and too late for Zeleny. Shortly, the White Armies of Denikin destroyed the Ukrainian Front and Zeleny died while fighting the Whites in his native Kiev area.

There were, of course, other late renitents. Otaman Khymenko who attacked the UNR in the region of Hrebinka, Otaman Dyachyshyn who disarmed UNR units in the region of Kherson, Otaman Tuz who like Otaman Kotsur robbed the retreating UNR forces, and others.

Otaman Kotsur operated near the River Tyasmyn east of the village of Ivkivci in the region of Chyhyryn. His "Chyhyrynska Respublika", as it was known encompassed the cities and villages of Chyhyryn, Novoselycia and Subotiv. In 1919, these villages and cities organized the "Chyhyrynsky Regiment" and supported the Bolshevik cause. As such

they attacked UNR units and carried on a war with the "Kholodny Yar Respublika" whose sympathies lay with the UNR and was headed by Otaman Chuchupaka, a fervent nationalist. As was characteristic of this period of chaos, the villages formed into independent "Republics" and fought among themselves while the units of both "Republics" (Kholodny Yar had a formation within the UNR Army) fought against each other on the battlefield.⁴⁷ The "Chyhyrynska Respublika" had its "Revolutionary Committee" headed by "Batko" Kotsur with Ilchenko, Satana, Ehveschuk and others as members. The Bolsheviks, believing that Kotsur was their man, decided to advance to the city of Chyhyryn and establish a real Soviet administration and a real Soviet "Revolutionary Committee". After a meeting of the two "Revcoms", Kotsur had the Bolsheviks drowned and unfurled the black flag of anarchy. By this time the masses of the "Chyhyrynska Respublika" became aware of the type of government which the Bolsheviks were promising Ukrainians. Ilchenko, Satana and others made the proposal that the two "Republics" unite under the nationalist flag. This proposal, of course, was secret and made the elimination of Kotsur imperative.⁴⁸ But the conspirators were spared the task of liquidating the "Batko" by a group of Bolsheviks who caught and shot him. The two "Republics" then began to plan and execute common operations. The units of Kotsur renamed themselves "Brotherhood of the Kossacks of the Wolves Point" (Tovarystvo Kozakiv Vovchoho Shpylya).

⁴⁷ Yuri Horlis-Horsky, "Kholodny Yar", Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny, Vol. IV, (October 1932) p. 6.

⁴⁸ Horsky, Kholodny Yar, op-cit., Vol. I, p. 46.

There were also other groups which had significant strength and were anarchist in nature. In the area of Oleksandrivsk operated Marusia Nikiforova, a woman whose group sometimes numbered 1500 insurgents.⁴⁹ In many cases she joined forces with Makhno in his bigger operations. Only 20 years old, she was known for her bravery and pomp.

With the disorders that prevailed during this chaotic period in Ukraine, there were also unjust persecutions of people by unruly otamans. Jewish pogroms were common but could not be attributed to any one group. The Whites, Reds, Petlyurists as well as anarchists could not, in many cases, control the pogroms. Slogans like "Death to the landlords, Jews, and communists" were widespread.⁵⁰ No one can justify the execution of innocent people but such pogroms emanated out of the chaotic period and the generalizations of uneducated people. The massive support given the Bolsheviks by the Jews caused many of the otamans to attack them. A reason for animosity to the Jews is the testimony of B. Z. Rabinovitch, a Jewish student at Uman:

"The young Jews of Uman took an active part in the Communist movement in general and in the establishment of the organizations of the Soviet regime in particular. At the head of the executive organs was the Jew Buhl; Jews occupied a decided majority of the Commissariat and other higher offices....From the very beginning of the

⁴⁹ Docenko, Zymovy Pokhid, op-cit., p. 209, Document No. CCVI.

⁵⁰ Denikin, op-cit., Vol. V, p. 132.

establishment of the Soviet regime in Uman the preponderance of Jews everywhere struck one forcibly. And from various quarters began to spread criticism and expressions of extreme disapproval of the "Jewish oppression"....The peasants in the neighborhood became violently dissatisfied with and antagonistic to the Soviet rule. This secret dissatisfaction soon began to appear on the surface, and they gradually poured into the rebel detachments with the object of moving on Uman and overthrowing the Soviet regime. Not infrequently a pogrom was preceded by some acts of terrorism by the local Cheka which were rightly or wrongly attributed to Jewish Communists and which irritated the population without really cowing it".⁵¹

Sometimes the otamans were wrongly accused of anti semitism. Thus "otaman" Lakhovytych, was arrested by the Commander of the personal guard of Petlyura, Colonel Chebotariv, and imprisoned. In July of 1919, two Bolshevik groups under the leadership of Kozakov and Sokolov broke through from Odessa where Denikin was advancing. They asked otaman Lakhovytych to allow them to join his group. These two with their Bolsheviks then initiated a pogrom in the village of Pechora. They then proceeded to initiate pogroms in Braclav and Nemyriv. Lakhovytych had Kozakov seized and shot, but Sokolov escaped with his own and Kozakov's

⁵¹ Chamberlin, op-cit., p. 240.

men.⁵² The Directory had Lakhovytch arrested for these pogroms. The White armies advanced against Zhmerynka and in the confusion Lakhovytch escaped. Hearing of this, the Jews placed a reward of 260,000 tsarist "karbovanci" (gold coins) for his head. A doctor, Zhytkevych, from Tulchyn promptly reported for the reward, having shot the otaman.⁵³

Another unfortunate, otaman Palienko, was blamed for a pogrom that was carried out by the "Soviet Revolutionary Committee" of Zhytomyr. The city revolted against the rule of the Directorate in December 1918, and Palienko was dispatched to quell this revolt. The local "Bolshevized" peasants, blaming the Jews for their troubles began to attack them even before Palienko's arrival in Zhytomyr. Thus, Palienko was saddled with the responsibility for the pogrom.⁵⁴ Palienko, feeling that he liberated Zhytomyr, began treating it as his territory from which it was hard to dislodge him. At this time Otaman Oskilko, who commanded the northwestern part of the UNR Front, ordered Palienko to advance to the front. Palienko ignored the command and only on Oskilko's "invitation" agreed to liberate the railroad terminal of Sarny from the Bolsheviks. But on his way he encountered another authoritarian, otaman Hryshko, who refused to allow him to pass through "his territory". "Has he gone mad", cried Palienko as he prepared to subdue Hryshko. Hryshko, seeing that Palienko was in a bad state of mind, apologized. Yet, both

⁵² Sereda, op-cit., Vol. II (December 1930), p. 18-19.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 20

⁵⁴ Ibid., Vol. I (December 1929) p. 22.

[groups sat eying each other afraid to send their men to the front out] of fear of being arrested by the other. Oskilko had Palienko arrested.⁵⁵ Released, Palienko was later again arrested at the command of Chief Otaman Petlyura.

As many other unruly "otamans" so also Semesenko finally found his way into the hands of Colonel Chebotariv. Semesenko was the initiator of the pogrom in Proskuriv. An independent "otaman", he felt that no one could order him about. Of his imprisonment he said:

"I am the nerve of the Ukrainian organism. Because of this, like no one else, I can feel its desires, aspirations, needs and goals. My will is the will of the nation and only the Ukrainian nation, without any intermediary, has the right to try me." ⁵⁶

For his "pogrom" in February 1919, for which Chief-Otaman Petlura is still being blamed, Semesenko was tried by a military tribunal and shot.

Another interesting Otaman is Bidenko. He was instrumental in organizing the overthrow of the Hetman, and was with Petlyura at Bila Cerkva when the "All-Ukrainian Uprising" began. After the successful revolt Bidenko moved into the Volyn area where Otaman Oskilko considered himself master. From the railroad terminal of Shepetivka Otaman Bidenko sent couriers to all parts of Volyn with decrees which made him commander of all the "insurgent" units. This led to confusion and conflicting appointments of officers into similar posts by both Oskilko

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 23.

⁵⁶ Ibid., Vol. II (April 1930), p. 12.

and Bidenko. To clear "his" area of hostile groups he attacked and destroyed the units of Potocka, a woman, leader of anarchists who continuously attacked the city of Proskuriv. At this point, UNR began retreating and was in dire need of assistance. The commander of the "Northern Front", Ahaphyiv, asked Bidenko to incorporate his units into the "Nalyvayko" formation. The latter refused. In the meantime, things were going from bad to worse. The Chief-of-Staff of the UNR, Colonel A. Melnyk delegated Lt. Shevchuk to speak with Bidenko. Finally Lt. Shevchuk was "granted" an audience but left with nothing. The UNR then arrested Bidenko but by a stroke of luck, the latter escaped during the disorder when the White Armies attacked. He then joined the Bolshevik "Tarashchanska" Division. Again arrested, but this time by the Cheka, he managed to escape shortly before he was to be shot.⁵⁷

As was previously mentioned, the Army of the UNR after the overthrow of the Hetman incorporated very many partisan groups that were difficult to manage. One such group was the colorful regiment "Zaporazhska Sich" which was organized by Otaman Yuchym Bozhko. In its dress and behavior this unit emulated the Zaporozhian Kossacks. Bozhko, a former officer of the Tsarist army, gathered around himself a group of romantics who wanted to live by the laws of the Zaporozhian Kossacks and to settle beyond the Dnieper cataracts. The fall of the Hetman was followed by the attack of the Bolsheviks. Aided by Makhno, the Bolsheviks attacked Katerynoslav where the combined strength of Otamans

⁵⁷ Ibid., Vol. II (June 1930), p. 18 to 20.

Huly-Hulenko, Samokysh and Bozhko defended the area with "Zaporozhian courage". The Zaporazhian Sich" was, in effect, a seventeenth century military formation fighting in the twentieth century. Every morning the unit would be awakened by a "surmach" (bugler) and the Otaman, accompanied by his officers, would read the orders of the day. In compliance with the Zaporazhian traditions no women were allowed into the camp and drinking and gambling was punishable by a liberal number of "shampoly" (ramrods). Visiting officers were bound by these rules notwithstanding their ignorance of the Kossack traditions. Thus, on one occasion, a visiting colonel was punished for having liquor under his bed, and then after his punishment, was punished again for not thanking the "Kossack Brotherhood" for the lesson.⁵⁸ The "Zaporozhian Sich" was a voluntary organization. Its officers were elected and its activities were usually discussed at general meetings. This gave birth to a feeling of closeness and mutual understanding. The "Zaporozhians" according to them were not just Kossacks, they were in effect, to be an exemplary unit in every respect.⁵⁹ The unit was anything but that and in many cases interfered with the plans of the General-Staff of the UNR. In Kremenchug Bozhko was arrested but released at the command of Petlyura. From here, he headed for Balta to replen-

⁵⁸ Ibid., Vol. II (January 1930), p. 10.

⁵⁹ Dmytro Honta, "Otamanshchyna", Kyiv Vol. VIII (March-April-May-June 1957), p. 11. The Author was Chief-of-Staff of Otaman Bozhko.

ish his supplies and recruit new men. On the way he was harassed by the units of Otaman Hryhoriyiv but no major battle was fought. Because of the very nature of its character the "Zaparozhian Sich" was mistrusted by many staff officers. Bozhko became even more suspicious when he united with Otaman Kozyr - Zirka after the southern part of the Ukrainian Front was cut off, and the Ukrainian Southern Army was forced to cross into Romanian territory. Bozhko, at this point, told Kozyr-Zirka that he would gather the "Sich" banner, his men, and cross over into the territory that was once Zaporozhian.⁶⁰ But perhaps this was only a "romantic's" dream. He brought his unit back from Romania, reunited it with the UNR, and in a vigorous campaign freed Volochysk, Proskuriv, Zhmerynka and Kozyatyn from the Bolsheviks.

While submitting to the Chief, Otaman Petlyura, Bozhko at the same time refused to listen to officers of the General Staff. Eventually, the latter convinced Petlyura that Bozhko should be replaced. Bozhko was to be given command of the Second Infantry Division while his unit was to be transferred to Otaman Dobryansky. Bozhko, angered at this turn of events, upon Dobryansky's attempt to take command told him: "Return with what you came; I do not recognize the orders of Otaman Osecky or of Otaman Tyutyunnyk".⁶¹

⁶⁰ Sereda, op-cit., Vol. II (November 1930), p. 12.

⁶¹ Kapustyansky, Pokhid Ukrainskykh.... op-cit., Vol. I & II p. 109. Vasyl Tyutyunnyk should not be confused with Yurko Tyutyunnyk. The former was the commander of the army of the UNR in 1919, and died in that year of typhoid fever.

Bozhko was then arrested. The "Zaporozhian Kossacks" replied to his arrest with an "Open Letter of the Kossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich to Chief-Otaman Petlyura". They expressed their concern and attacked the General Staff claiming that it was misinformed about the activities of the "Sich". Furthermore, they said that their officers are not appointed but elected by the Kossacks. Failure to release Bozhko could lead to "serious consequences".⁶²

But while under arrest, the Chief of Staff, Colonel W. Tyutyunnyk gave Bozhko two alternatives - resign or be placed before a military tribunal. Bozhko, who was still armed, reached for his revolver. Tyutyunnyk shot Bozhko in the eye. The Otaman lived, but later, still active in the army of the UNR, he allied himself with the "Borotbisty" through Otaman Volokh and shortly thereafter was killed by the latter.

The events related in this chapter were only one sad page of the Insurgent Movement. Born in chaos, the Ukrainian Republic had to fight everyone, even those who were formally on its side. The masses were not ready for the task ahead. It took them and their "otamans" a long period of time before they became politically ready to cope with the tasks put upon them by the Revolution.

⁶² Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 190 - 191.

IV. THE GROWTH AND MATURATION OF THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT MOVEMENT

a. A United Ukrainian Front.

After the overthrow of the Hetman the Insurgent Army of the Directorate became an insignificant force. The peasants, believing that their task was fulfilled, went home - taking with them the military equipment that was issued on the eve of the revolt. The Regular Republican Army which dwindled to 40-50,000 men was given the herculean task of defending Ukraine, a country that was not yet completely aware of what Communism meant, against the invading Russian Army.

Directing the "Second Bolshevik Campaign" into Ukraine was Antonov-Ovseenko with an army of 86,000 soldiers, 170 cannon, 424 machine guns, 15 airplanes, and 6 armored trains. The plan used by Antonov was developed by General Klembovsky, the former Chief of Staff of General Brusilov, who was now working for the Bolsheviks. The attack proceeded along two directions. The first direction was concentrated in the area of Vorozhba - Sumy - Kharkiv. The second line of attack was aimed at the area of Homel - Chernihiv - Kiev.

As of January 1, 1919, the Ukrainian Republic was faced with a situation that almost precluded its fate. In the north, as was mentioned, the Red Armies began their offensive against the UNR. In the west, the Poles were fighting the Ukrainian Galician Army.¹ In the adjacent area,

¹ The Ukrainian Galician Army (U.H.A.- Ukrainska Halycka Armiya) and the Western Ukrainian Republic (3-UNR) was formed after the Austrians left the area. At the same time, the Polish State emerged and ancient quarrels over territories, specifically the city of Lviv, once again emerged. Conflicts over territories with Romania and Hungary also came to the fore.

the Romanians maintained an "armed neutrality" and occasionally fired upon Ukrainian border guards with their artillery. In the south the Entente, specifically Greek and French Units, disembarked and threatened to reestablish a regime that was abhorrent to all Ukrainians. Here the White Armies began to form with the intention of launching an attack against the Bolsheviks and all those who stood in the way of the restoration of Russia "one and indivisible".

The 50,000 Ukrainian soldiers deployed along a front that extended over 1,000 kilometers with 140-150 cannon, 1,500 cavalry, and poor technical units were hardly in the position to conduct any type of war. In addition to this, the hopes that the Directorate and Petlyura placed on negotiations with the French were unfounded. The French refused to talk with any group and whenever they did, they did so with arrogance as if they had conquered the country. In an effort to win the sympathies of the French, the Ukrainian Army left, at the "request" of the French, the port city of Odessa where the French were busy equipping the Volunteers. The result of this step had far reaching consequences for the UNR. The Ukrainian fleet, rather than submit to the French, Germans and Whites, left Sevastopol and crossed over to the Bolsheviks. Hryhoriyiv and other military units dissatisfied with Petlyura's decision to talk with, rather than throw the Entente into the Black Sea, turned against the Directorate. Added to these problems was the isolation of Ukraine from the west where the Directorate hoped to buy medical supplies and other badly needed materials.

With many enemies and no friends the UNR Army began retreating to the west. On February 5, 1919, Kiev, the capital, fell to the advancing Bolsheviks. By March, the Ukrainian Armies were pushed back and left the road open for a Bolshevik advance against Odessa. Hryhoriyiv, who mutinied from the UNR and joined the Bolsheviks, attacked the cities of Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa and threw the Entente forces "into the sea". This act was a moral victory for the Communists who began an even more vigorous push against the Ukrainian Army. The Southern Front of the UNR was cut off from the remaining units and its forces either crossed to the Bolsheviks or to Romania where they were disarmed.

But the fortunes of the Army of the UNR began to change. In the first days of April, in the area of Mozyr, a whole Bolshevik Division with 35 cannons commanded by Strengirovy, crossed over to the Directorate.² The units which broke through to Romania and were disarmed were allowed to return to Ukraine and thus strengthened the Army. Added to this were numerous revolts that took place in the Bolshevik occupied territories. Thus Tarashcha and its Otaman Zeleny, who in January welcomed the Bolsheviks, now vigorously attacked them. So also the units of Otaman Kozyr - Zirka also began to attack the Bolshevik Army in the area of Tulchyn, Nemyriv and Braclav. Other otamans harassed the Red Army too. The peasants having tasted Bolshevik rule very quickly became disillusioned and hostile.

The Ukrainian successes, the insurgent movement, and Hryhoriyiv's

² Kapustyansky, op-cit., Vol. I - II, p. 34.

abandonment of the Bolsheviks, led the latter to give up their grand plan of achieving a "world Revolution" by marching into Hungary through Romania.³ On March 25, Antonov received orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Armies, Vatsetis, to halt operations against Romania and begin operations against Petlyura whose forces were again near Kiev.⁴

The Ukrainian Army initiated the "Proskuriv Offensive" which at first was favorable to them. The city of Proskuriv fell on June 7, 1919. The Bolsheviks situation began growing worse. As of July 1, the units of Otaman Hryhoriyiv attacked the Reds on the seacoast and in the region of Katerynaslav. Otaman Anhel captured the city of Pryluky and threatened the railroad junction of Bakhmach. In the Volyn area, the insurgents of Otaman Sokolovsky harassed the Red Army while in Tarashcha otaman Zeleny with his 7,000 partisans attacked their rear and supply lines. Added to this was the advance of General Denikin and his Volunteer Army against Kharkiv.

But as bad as things looked, having eliminated their Romanian aspirations the Red Army, with the arrival of reinforcements, proceeded to push the UNR out of Proskuriv with the intent of destroying the Ukrainian Army. As much as the insurgents were able they aided the UNR. During the operations they took the city of Lityn and captured four cannons. Others operated in the rear of the Bolsheviks. But these

³ Ibid., p. 34.

⁴ Antonov - Ovseenko, op-cit., Vol. III, pp. 323-324.

skirmishes gave the tired army only limited respite. The Red Army was able to force the UNR against the Zbruch River. By July 7, the situation became critical.

In these trying days many began losing faith. The Commander of the Army, V. Tvutyunnyk, informed his staff that all would be lost if help did not arrive from the Ukrainian Galician Army. Reflecting upon his statement, it is important at this stage to glance at the developments in Western Ukraine.

Prior to the retreat from Kiev, the Ukrainian National Republic and the Western Ukrainian Republic were in agreement that both would, upon resumption of peace, unite into one national state. This agreement was proclaimed in the Declaration of Union on January 22, 1919. Although spiritually one, the two areas had their own governments and armies. The Directory aided the Galicians with money, grain, ammunition, war materials, and all other type of necessary equipment. In the Polish-Ukrainian (Galician) conflict the UNR aided the UHA with troops from the Dniprovsk Division.⁵ But the situation became more acute with the retreat of the UNR. The Bolsheviks had a large territory and industry from which they could replenish their supplies and manpower. Unlike the Reds and Whites, the UNR had no way of replenishing the dwindling supplies and medicine. This state of poverty of the UNR contributed to the unfavorable situation in the UHA.

The Galician Army (UHA) was made up of Ukrainians who served in the

⁵ Kapustyansky, op-cit., Vol. I-III, p. 38.

[Austrian Army. While fighting the Poles, the Galicians were also nego-
tiating with them. As was the case in international affairs of the
period, the Entente representatives were also involved and held out the
prospect of recognizing Ukraine in return for the city of Lviv which
was to be given to the Poles.⁶ The Poles, however, were adamant and
hoped to obtain the 1772 boundaries. The UHA had the advantage over the
Polish armies and vigorously drove the Polish armies before them. On
June 25, 1919, the situation radically changed. The Poles received aid
from the army of General Haller which was formed in France. The Entente
authorized the Polish army to take over territories up to the Zbruch
River and to protect the wealth and lives from "Bolshevik Bands" in
Eastern Galicia.⁷ The Galician Army, faced by an enemy that was rein-
forced and reequipped, not having any ammunition, retreated to the
Zbruch River. But on June 7 the UHA recovered from the push of General
Haller and began the "Chortkiv Offensive". The successes were tremendous
but in the end achieved nothing. The Army while enthusiastically sup-
ported by the people and the appearance of 90,000 volunteers, because of
lack of supplies, could only take 15,000.⁸ The Poles were able to recu-
perate and attacked the small Galician Army (45,000) with fresh forces
(110,000) and forced them to the Zbruch River.

⁶ George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia: A Chronicle of Counter
Revolution and Allied Intervention, (New York, MacMillan Co. 1933),
p. 177.

⁷ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 13.

⁸ Anon. "Ukrayinska Zbroyna Sylu 20 Rokiv", Kalendar Prosvity Vol.
59, (1939.), p. 16.

In July both Ukrainian Armies, the UNR pushed by the Bolsheviks, and the UHA forced to retreat by the Poles, stood facing each other. To break out of this "Quadrangle of Death" the UHA crossed the Zbruch River and united with the UNR Army.⁹ In addition to this, on July 14, a surprising message was received by the Commander of the UNR Army from Otaman Yuri Tyutyunnyk, Chief-of-Staff of Otaman Hryhoriyiv.

"I arrived in the region of Konayhorod with a unit of insurgents numbering 3,500 men. This unit has crossed 1,000 verstvs (660 miles G.K.) in enemy territory."¹⁰

The Commander of the UNR expressed his gratitude and promised supplies. On July 16, at a meeting in Kamyanka, where the Headquarters of the UNR was located, upon examining the situation and underlining the allegiance of the peasants, the Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Shamaneck was pleased by the arrival from the Kherson region of the whole insurgent "Kish" of Yuri Tyutyunnyk. "To cross over thousands of verstvs in enemy held territory, with a supply convoy and 3,500 people on foot, was possible only with the support of the people and their enmity towards the Reds."¹¹

⁹ D. Dolynsky, Borba Ukrainskoho Narodu Za Volyu i Nezalezhnist, (Win-nipid: Pub. by "Ruska Knyharnya", n.d.), p. 181. The Quadrangle of Death (Chotyrokutnyk Smerty) referred to the position in which the Ukrainian Armies found themselves. East Ukraine with Kiev was in the Bolshevik hands, in the south the Volunteer Armies were massing, in the West the Poles were attacking, and in the south-west Bessarabia and Bukovina were under the hostile Romanians.

¹⁰ Karustyansky, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 181.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 61.

Indeed, the population was at last behind the Ukrainian Army. The time of anarchy and opportunism had passed. The insurgents of the areas of Chernihiv, Kiev, and other areas as well as their Otamans Tyutyunnyk, Anhel, Zeleny and others submitted to the Directory and sought advice and directives.¹² Thus a Ukrainian United Front was forged which in twenty days recaptured Kiev, and for the second time, drove the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine.

The arrival of Tyutyunnyk in the area of Yarmolynsi, to the rear of the lines of the Bolsheviks, who were conducting operations against the UNR, forced the Reds to abandon their positions. At this time the Army of the Galicians was still crossing the River Zbruch. To give them ample room the UNR pushed into the area of Proskuriv. In those operations the "Insurgent Kish" of Yuri Tyutyunnyk, in league with the "Zaporozhian Sich" of Otaman Bozhko, received orders to strike in the area of Eltushkiv-Bar and force the Reds to retreat from Nova Ushytsya. The attack was also designed to aid the operations of Colonel Udovychenko who was advancing against the 45th Soviet Division. By capturing Nova Ushytsya the insurgents proved themselves capable of operating as an integral part of the Regular Army.

Having crossed the Zbruch River the UHA and UNR began to formulate their operations. Many General Staff officers were for an attack against Kiev. Motivating this direction were sentimental reasons, "Kiev - the Mother of all Rus Cities", as well as the fact that in

¹² Ibid., n. 198.

[this area there were many sugar refineries, industries, and military stores. The second direction, an attack against Odessa, was supported mostly by Galician officers and motivated by the opening of a "window to Europe" where through trade assistance, medicine, and military equipment could be obtained. Although the first plan was favored by most, both directions of attack became necessary. The Kiev-Odessa operations were, in the end, agreed upon because by pursuing both the Ukrainian Armies could cut off the XIV Soviet Army from its base of operations. On July 22 the Armies began their offensive. Two days of operations forced the Russians to retreat along the whole front. In the operations, the insurgents of Otamans Tyutyunnyk and Bozhko were ordered to take the railroad terminal of Zhmerynka. Bozhko with his "Zaporozhska Sich" forced the Reds out of Matyukovo, while Tyutyunnyk cut them off from the railroad terminal Derazhnaya-Zhmerynka along the line Komarivci-Serbynivci, and occupied the surrounding villages. The successful operations of the insurgents thus contributed to the offensive of the armies against Proskuriv and eased the situation in the Vapnyarka region.¹³ On July 27, the insurgent unit "Podilska Dyviziya" from the Letychiv area joined Tyutyunnyk in operations against Zhmerynka. The operations against Zhmerynka continued for three days but without success. The losses of the "Zaporozhian Sich" somewhat weakened the vigorous attack. New insurgent groups began to arrive to the aid of Tyutyunnyk. Otaman Shepel from Letychiv came with his men and

¹³ Ibid., p. 66.

incorporated them into the 5th and 12th Insurgent Divisions. These divisions were formed so as to provide capable leadership to the insurgents who were not used to regular warfare. Of these divisions Lieutenant Colonel Udovychenko said:

"the fighting spirit of this group (insurgent G.K.) was great but it was evident that there was a lack of professional officers, established staff apparatus, General Staff Officers and artillery."¹⁴

But Zhmerynka was heavily defended by 7,000 Bolshevik troops and seven armored trains. This city with its railroad junction was vital to the Ukrainians because it endangered the Vapnyarka Junction which was opened to Bolshevik attack from Zhmerynka. Vapnyarka was extremely important because if it fell into UNR hands it could affect the whole Southern Soviet Army. The 5th and 12th Insurgent Divisions, unable to occupy Zhmerynka, were joined by the I and III Corps of the UHA. Finally on August 8, it fell into Ukrainian hands.

The Offensive was going as planned, and operations against Kiev were to begin on August 12, 1919. At this point, the combined armies had 85,000 men and 15,000 organized insurgents. Many insurgent groups were incorporated into the regular units particularly into the 5th and 12th Insurgent Divisions. Other units although not directly incorporated, "operated on orders of the Staff of the Operating Army" (Shtab Dievoyi

¹⁴ Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 99.

[Armiyi)¹⁵ Many units of the insurgents were quite formidable in size and equipment. With their incorporation the regular army became strengthened. As examples, one can cite the group of Otaman Sokolov-sky who joined the I Ukrainian Galician Corps with his 300 infantrymen, 120 cavalry, 10 machine guns and one cannon.¹⁶ Another insurgent unit was that of Otaman Mordalevych which was incorporated into the Galician Groups of Otaman Vimetal and had 300 infantry, 60 cavalry, and 5 machine guns.¹⁷

Other groups of insurgents although not directly incorporated into the Ukrainian Army followed the directives of Colonel V. Tyutyunnyk and his Chief-of-Staff Otaman Sinkler. The whole Bolshevik controlled area extending from Bila Cerkva up to Zhytomyr was under continuous harassment by the insurgents. The partisans attacked and destroyed Red convoys, railroads, kept the armored trains from going to the front, prevented supply trains and wagons from reaching the Bolsheviks. Their lightning attacks had a demoralizing effect on the Red Army. Small enemy units feared to wander away from the main force. Most of the Communist administration established in the villages was destroyed, and the enemy found itself in possession only of the large cities where their garrisons were very strong.¹⁸

¹⁵ Kapustyansky, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 37.

¹⁶ Decenko, Litopys....op-cit., Vol. II, No. 4, p. 34.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁸ Khomychiv, op-cit., Vol. I, p. 283.

In the meantime operations of the regular units continued. In an effort to cut off the enemy retreat and destroy his trapped army, two groups were dispatched from the main force into the area of Birzula and Khrystynivka. The direction of Khrystynivka was to be attacked by the 5th and 12th Insurgent Divisions under the command of Otaman Yuri Tyutyunnyk. On August 15, the Insurgent Divisions, now referred to as the "Kievan Group" in a forced march to Khrystynivka, took the cities of Haysyn and Braclav. Upon arrival at their destination, it was discovered that Khrystynivka and Uman had already fallen into the hands of the local insurgent units. Many insurgent units began to mass their forces in this area. Otaman Yuri Tyutyunnyk hoped to incorporate them into the Kievan Group and began by demanding that they submit to his command. Only Otaman Zeleny refused to do so and proceeded to operate independently in the rear of the enemy.¹⁹ The capture of Khrystynivka was important because with its fall it proved instrumental in cutting off the XIV Soviet Army from its main force, and also because the railroad junction of Khrystynivka-Kozyatyn was important in the overall operation against Kiev. The enemy forced out of Khrystynivka, retreated into the area of Pohrebyshche and there was intercepted by the insurgents of the "Zaporozhaka Sich".²⁰

In the interim, the White Volunteer Army under General Denikin was also making headway against the Bolsheviks. The XII Soviet Army met defeat at the hands of the Whites who proceeded to destroy them in

¹⁹ Kapustyansky, op-cit., Vol. III. p. 153.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 154.

the Donbas area pursuing their retreating units into the region of Kharkiv and Kursk. By August 16 the Whites were already in the region of Cherkassy-Zolotonosha, and their cavalry crossed the Dnieper River in the region of Katerynoslav-Oleksandrivsk. From here, the Whites moved to Kamenka and on August 21, the Ter-sko-Kuban Division had reached Khrystynivka where it came in contact with the "Kievan Group" of the UNR.

The situation was critical for the Reds. Characteristic of the mood of the Bolsheviks at this time is a captured communique of August 12, 1919. It states:

"The Army is in retreat, the commanding staff is moving out, we are rolling like apples and don't know where we'll stop".²¹

The situation was indeed critical. The Bolsheviks began to evacuate Kiev. The evacuation was endangered by Otaman Anhel whose insurgents captured one of the railroad lines of escape in the area of Kiev-Nizhyn.²² This left only one avenue of escape for the Reds. All of the Red eschellons began their retreat along the railroad line Kiev-Korosten-Mozyr. Soon the Bolsheviks having destroyed the White Armies of Kolchak began a vigorous drive against the left flank of the UNR. The Red Commanders were convinced that if the Armies of the UNR and the Whites were given the chance to contact each other a war between the

²¹ Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 106.

²² Ibid., p. 107.

two would ensue. The UNR was also cognizant of this and informed the Entente of this possibility through the allied observer Major Segene.

Operations against Kiev continued. The Bolsheviks were further disorganized when "Batko" Makhno abandoned and attacked them. Mass desertions began in the Red Army. Soldiers killed their commanders and political commissars. A telegram from the 58th Soviet Division, of August 15, 1919, states the following:

"Parts of the 3d Brigade joined Makhno. Kocherhyn and the political commissar (Politkom) were killed. The whole region north of Nikolayev is in the hands of the insurgents and Makhno's bands. A part of the 2nd Brigade is retreating in the direction of....(not deciphered G.K.) Fedotov's Brigade is retreating from Kherson to Nikolayev..."²³

Makhno himself, after breaking with the Russians, decided to unite with Otaman Hryhoriyiv. A union of forces was agreed upon and Hryhoriyiv was to become Commander-in-Chief while Makhno was to be head of the "Revolutionary Military Committee".²⁴ But the agreement lasted only two weeks and, as was already mentioned, Makhno killed Hryhoriyiv on August 27, 1919. Uniting the remnants of Hryhoriyiv's forces under his command, Makhno moved west into the region of UNR operations. Here, at the end of August, he came in contact with the "Sich Riflemen" in Uman and signed a treaty of alliance with them.²⁵ He agreed to extend

²³ Kapustyansky, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 156.

²⁴ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 112.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 112.

the right wing of the Ukrainian Units but in his own "partisan way". He took up his position south of the Ukrainian units by establishing a front which was circular in nature and very reminiscent of tactics used by the Zaporozhian Kossacks.²⁶

As the operations against Kiev proceeded, Otaman Tyutyunnyk with his "Kievan Group" came in contact with thereconnaissance units of Denikin; Tyutyunnyk promptly wired Headquarters for instructions. The directives received from the Commander of the Ukrainian Armies were:

"Until you receive my orders avoid any military confrontation with the Volunteer Army. Dispatch parliamentarians to them with the task of determining the attitude of the Volunteers in regard to Ukraine and its Armies."²⁷

In the interim the "Vapnyarka Operation" began to take shape. The railroad line Vapnyarka - Khrystynivka - Cvitkovo was firmly in Ukrainian hands. Thus the 45th and 47th Soviet Divisions were cut off. The Bolsheviks made a futile attempt to break through but were dispersed with great losses and 1,000 prisoners. The way to Odessa was now open.

In the final days of operations against Kiev, the insurgents were instrumental in clearing the path for the Ukrainian as well as the White Army. Bila Cerkva had fallen to the 6th Zaporozhian Division but was threatened by three Bolshevik regiments that were supported by armored trains. At this point Otaman Zeleny agreed to submit to the

²⁶ E. Yakymiv, "Hostyny Makhna v Umani" (Makhno's visit in Uman), Istorychny-Kalendar-Almanakh Chervonoyi Kalyny(1931), p. 79.

²⁷ Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 108.

military staff of the Zaporozhians. On August 25, the Red units were almost annihilated by the combined Ukrainian forces.²⁸ From here Otaman Zeleny, reequipped with materials captured from the Reds, moved toward the city of Kaniv. These and subsequent operations of the insurgents guaranteed the fall of Kiev. On August 25, Otaman Sokolovsky's units helped to free Zhytomyr. On August 27, his group together with the 1st Corps of the UHA established itself in the city of Brusyliv. At the same time, the insurgents of Otaman Mardalevych and the III Corps of the UHA occupied the region of Kaplytsya-Zapadyncl, thirty kilometers from Kiev.²⁹ Between August 27 - 30, the Insurgent "Kiev Group" was operating in the following areas: The 5th Insurgent Division was in Uman, the 12th Insurgent Division in Talne and its armored trains were in Shpola facing the Denikin forces. The 5th Insurgent Division was expecting reinforcements from Otaman Volynets who promised to arrive with his partisans.³⁰

The "Kievan Group" confronted the 58th Soviet Division which was trying to aid the Soviet "Vapnyarka Group" in its attempt to break out of the Ukrainian encirclement. This Bolshevik attempt was abortive. As a result, the whole Soviet "Vapnyarka Group", consisting of 10,000 Red troops, was destroyed. Taken were 3,000 prisoners and all of the military equipment and depots.³¹

²⁸ Kapustyansky, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 164.

²⁹ Docenko, Litopys..., op-cit., Vol. II, No. 4, p. 34.

³⁰ Kapustyansky, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 170.

³¹ Ibid., p. 171.

The Central Group of the Ukrainian Armies broke through in the area of Bilohorodky and entered Kiev at 8:00 P.M. on August 30, 1919. On August 30, Commanders of the Ukrainian Armies received warm congratulatory notes from Chief Otaman Petlyura and other members of the Government.

But the jubilation was short lived. As was mentioned earlier, the Ukrainian Units, having contacted the first reconnaissance groups of General Denikin, sent a parliamentary group with the task of determining the position of the Whites and also to propose a line of demarcation between the two armies. The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armies at this point emphasized the need for common operations against the Bolsheviks. The Whites, however, were cold to any proposal that the "separatists" made. Denikin was not disposed to negotiate. He was not aware that he was near Kiev only because the Ukrainian peasants were more hostile to the Reds than to the Whites. His armies marched quickly through Ukraine because the insurgents cleared the path for them.³² Through an act of betrayal, the Whites were able to wrest Kiev from Ukrainian hands. This meant the beginning of the end of both armies. The taking of Kiev by Denikin meant the end of his army. Never before and never again was the wrath of the insurgents to be expressed as strongly as against the White Armies of Denikin.

b. Insurgency from January to August, 1919.

When the revolt against the Hetman took place there were many insur-

³² Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 110.

gent units that joined the UNR Army which now had to fight the invading Red Army. As previously mentioned, the peasants dispersed and only a small army remained to cope with the "Second Soviet Campaign". Some insurgent groups remained, however, and either aided or harassed the UNR. The "Dniprovska Dyviziya", organized in the area of Trypillya, by Otaman Zeleny, in its earlier stages belonged to the latter category.

Zeleny was an Independent Social Revolutionary and a strong advocate of the Central Rada. During the World War he fought in the Tsarist army and left with the rank of captain. During the Ukrainization period in the army, Zeleny (Danylo Terpylo) agitated for the nationalization of all non-Russian soldiers.³³ After returning from the army, Zeleny, during the Hetman's regime, attended a secret meeting where the idea of a "Dniprovska Dyviziya" was born. Having military experience Zeleny was elected Otaman. In addition to his election to head this formation, a Revolutionary Committee known as the "Kozacha Rada" (The Kossack Assembly) was created and headed by Colonel Ovdienko. This body was to be the General Staff of the Division and its members were

³³ Artymon Hryshyn "Zhyttya i Smert Otamana K. Zelenoho" (The life and death of Otaman K. Zeleny). Unpublished manuscript, p. 1. Otaman Zeleny was born Danylo Ivanovych Terpylo in Trypillya about 1885. He took the name of his friend Zeleny who was killed on the barricades in the 1905 revolt in Kiev. The author was second in command of the "Patynochna Sotnya" in Zeleny's 1st "Dniprovska Dyvizia" and secretary of the Kossack Assembly. (Kozacha Rada).

[Pymon Sulyma, Artymon Hryshyn, Puhach - Puhachenko, and Vasyl Cyukalo.³⁴ Prior to the All-Ukrainian Revolt against the Hetman, the Otaman was visited by Symon Petlyura who was preparing the coup. Zeleny made contacts with the secret organizations of Podillya, Kherson and Chernihiv. When the call to revolt came from Bila Cerkva, where the Directorate established its base of operation, Zeleny, who was at the same time a member of the Revolutionary Committee of Trypillya consisting of Proc, Gontarenko, and Suponya, called for the immediate support of the UNR.³⁵

The All-Ukrainian Uprising began. Trypillya became a hub of activity. Insurgent groups began to arrive into the area under such Otamans as Anhel, and Karmaluk. The latter being a good organizer was saddled with the task of organizing the Second "Dniprovska Dyviziya". From Yanivka and Horokhivka arrived a large cavalry unit which took the city of Darnytsya and great stores of military supplies from the Germans. As the revolt spread across Ukraine, the new Ukrainian Government felt that reliance must be put more upon regular units and less upon the insurgents who tended to be unruly. With this in mind, the Directorate told the two Dnieper Divisions of Otaman Zeleny, whose strength was now 36,000 men, that they need not enter Kiev.³⁶ The Directorate feared that the insurgents would try to revenge themselves upon the former members of the already vanquished Hetman administration.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

³⁵ Klym Polischuk, Otaman Zeleny, (Lviv-Kiev: "Rusalka" Publishing Co., 1922), p. 67.

³⁶ Hryshyn, op-cit., p. 8.

[Otaman Zeleny and the "Kozacha Rada" regarded this as an affront.]

Added to this was the Directory's demand that Zeleny give up his command to Colonel Dancenکو. Zeleny meant to comply but his insurgents refused.

Problems emerged between the Zeleny forces and the Directorate when the former demanded wheat from a UNR administrator in Kaharlyk. Hordienko the administrator wired Kiev and a UNR "Makarenko" Regiment set out to Trypillya. The regiment was destroyed and soon Zeleny began operating under the Red flag. Thus in search of an ideology Zeleny and his insurgents gravitated from one camp into another. Shortly, however, Zeleny abandoned the Bolsheviks and submitted to the "Central Revolutionary Committee" which was formed in March by the Independent Social Revolutionary and Social Democratic Parties. After this Zeleny went further. He patched up his differences with the UNR and in April received a letter from Chief-Otaman Petlyura, who forgave him his transgressions. Zeleny and the "Kozacha Rada" then decided to mend their ways and submit to the Directorate.³⁷

Zeleny began organizing new insurgent units around himself. He received delegates from the insurgents of Khersonschyna and Barochitiv and together with them worked out plans of operation against the Bolsheviks. An attack into the area of the Hlyvakhy was forced back by three armored trains and Zeleny's units were pushed back into Trypillya. The pursuers were destroyed but the Tarashchanska and Bohunska Bolshevik

³⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

Divisions soon reinforced the Reds. These divisions were also turned back with great losses. In the meantime the villages that had tasted Bolshevik rule began to revolt. The city of Kaharlyk sent 1,000 of its partisans into Otaman Zeleny's army.

Chief-Otaman Petlyura observing the activities of Zeleny delegated the members of the "All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee" to the camp of Zeleny. The delegation consisting of Colonel Siry, Drahemirecky, Kolitva and Midny joined Zeleny's General Staff and named him "Otaman of all the Insurgents in Ukraine".³⁸ Zeleny accepted the appointment and called a meeting of all the Otamans operating in the area. The meeting took place in Hermanivka with the participation of Otamans Lykho, Anhel, Holub, Karmaluk and Marusiya Sokolevska. At this meeting the Otamans resolved to support the UNR.³⁹

The activities of Zeleny caused the Bolsheviks to concentrate on the insurgents. For a while, due to the intensive concentration of Red troops, Zeleny decided to halt operations and told his partisans to go home and await his call.

In the meantime other insurgent units were operating against the Bolsheviks and "Batko" Makhno, their ally. Otaman Chorna Khmara and his unit twice defeated the units of Makhno and drove them out of the city of Katerynoslav.⁴⁰ Otamans Huly-Hulenko, Bozhko and others also operated in this area and were defending it from the Red invasion.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁰ U. Docenko, Zymovy Pokhid, op-cit., p. 205

The "Starobil'sky Partisan Unit", a regiment headed by Colonel Tsapko and operating in the area of Starobil, on January 4, 1919, near Rubizhno captured four Bolshevik supply eschelons killing 26 and capturing 10 Reds. On that same day, in the area of Iysachansk they killed 370 and captured 28 of the enemy; on January 13 they captured 5 machine guns, 41 soldiers and killed 250 of the enemy.⁴¹

In December of 1918, Otaman Volynets was ordered by General Yaroshevych to move into the Zhmerynka - Letychiv - Medzhybor region with the order to free the area. Returning to his unit - "The National Guard" of Haysyn, he asked for volunteers. All but two refused to join Volynets. The Otaman, a well spoken former teacher started his carrier as an insurgent almost as soon as the Central Rada was overthrown. He took part in the overthrow of the Hetman and the fight against the Bolsheviks. In the area of Haysyn Volynets organized three regiments with 30 machine guns, 200 cavalry and one cannon. At the orders of General Yaroshevych, as was mentioned, he went to Lityn, an area where the Bolsheviks were strong and had the support of a formidable group of convinced local Communists. Shortly thereafter Volynets took the city of Lityn. The Communists then organized nearly twenty villages against Volynets. In the end Volynets was able to carry out his orders and the area was cleared of the Reds and the Bolshevik "Medzhybozhska Respublika", as it was known, fell into Ukrainian hands. ⁴²

⁴¹ I. Tsapko "Partyzany Na Skhidniy Ukrayini", Visti (Munich), Vol. XIV (November 1963), p. 87.

⁴² Sereda, op.cit., Vol. II (July-August, 1930), p. 22.

There were many other otamans who operated in January of 1919 against the Red invaders. Many of them like Zeleny and Hryhoriyiv were confused, accepted the Bolshevik slogans and in the early part of the conflict even joined them. This, however, lasted a very short time. The Bolsheviks with their policy of repression and forcible collection of foodstuffs disenchanted even the most devout Ukrainian Communists. In the process of their "education" the peasants suffered and became embittered. They formed into small and large units. In many cases they made an armed camp of their village and thus prevented the Reds from establishing their rule. Bolshevik food collectors (Prodzahony) were obliged to carry arms and had to be supported by regular Red army units. This was to the advantage of the UNR because the Red army had to keep many of its units in the rear rather than on the front. The peasants, sometimes armed crudely, were able to destroy and terrorize the Communists, their supplies, their military and troop trains. The factor to the advantage of the partisan was the village which would always hide the insurgent and make him look like a peaceful agrarian. Thus, even large units such as those of Otaman Zeleny and Hryhoriyiv could disappear one day and reappear the next. No doubt the nature of the insurgent movement and the way of fighting it proved frustrating to the Red commanders. The Bolsheviks, in their attempt to quell insurgency, would at times indiscriminately shell a village. Villages were often put to the torch, hostages killed, punitive attacks initiated. But rather than quell the uprisings, the Bolsheviks managed only to build up animosity which took the form of

armed resistance.

Because of the work of the insurgents and peasants the army of the UNR was able to reorganize itself and continue a war that seemed to have been lost. But the UNR did more than just reorganize its units. Cognizant of the fact that the insurgents needed directives and professional aid, the Directorate dispatched specialists, agitators, and officers to the partisans. Added to this were the Revolutionary Committees whose task it was to coordinate the activity and strength of the peasants. Such insurgent centers were established in larger areas and were, in turn, coordinated by the All-Ukrainian Central Revolutionary Committee (VU-CUPKOM). Thus, the insurgent movement began to assume a more organized form.

By March of 1919, at a critical point in the life of the UNR, Otaman Tykhokhod in the area of Hayvoron aided the retreating Zaporozhian Division across the River Buh by blowing up the bridge after the Division crossed it. This act, as it may be recalled, saved the unit which, upon returning from Romania, became prominent in the campaign against Kiev. In that same month and the beginning of April, Otaman Zeleny attacked the Bolsheviks near Kiev. Sokolovsky attacked them at Radomyshl, Anhel attacked Bakhmach, Mordalevytch near Brusilov, Dotsenko and Holub near Tarascha and Struk near Chornobil.⁴³

On April 10, Kiev itself was attacked by a united insurgent force under the command of Otaman Klymenko.⁴⁴ As a result of this and other

⁴³ Adams, op-cit., p. 23e.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 236.

insurgent raids Antonov was forced to divert his forces from the front. From April 11 to 22, the "Red Dnieper Fleet" led an expedition against Zeleny, on May 2 against Struk, and on May 11 to 19 against Hryhoriyiv.⁴⁵ Soviet units were also busy trying to eliminate Anhel or, as he called himself, the "otaman of the Left Bank Insurgents". Anhel attacked Pryluky in the area of Chernihiv and caused the Reds to flee into the Poltava area. Because of his capture of Pryluky the Bolsheviks vigorously pursued him. Control of Pryluky endangered the Bakhmach supply route to the front. The Bolsheviks unable to catch Anhel, instituted a system of terror. As their documents disclose, for every communist shot ten peasants were executed. Thus in the village of Ivanivci 46 peasants were shot.⁴⁶

Otaman Anhel was a well-educated son of a wealthy peasant from Chernihiv. A former officer and good organizer, he formed a unit known as the "Regiment of Death" and led it against the regime of the Hetman and later the Bolsheviks. His base of operations was the Bakhmach Forest. He worked closely with the peasants and usually informed them when he planned to attack a "Prodzahon" (Food collecting unit). The peasants knowing full well the meaning of such information would wait in an area close to the "Prodzahon" and after Anhel's attack would liberate the products from the Reds.

Otaman Volynets was also busy attacking the Bolsheviks. On April

⁴⁵ Korolyvsky, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 413 Document No. 466.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 60. Document No. 66.

22-23 he left the Regular Army of the UNR and proceeded to Radomyshel where Otaman Sokolovsky was harassing the Reds. On April 25 he reached the area of Chaikivtsi-Harbuliv. The appearance of his unit consisting of 230 infantrymen, 100 cavalry and 70 machine guns was timely. Prior to this Sokolovsky was forced to retreat before the Bolshevik 21st and 22nd infantry regiments, the 5th "Trótsky" cavalry unit and other formations. Uniting, Otaman Volnets and Sokolovsky, with his 200 men, attacked the Bolshevik forces at night and almost annihilated them.⁴⁷ On May 6 Volynets appeared near Haysyn. Here the Bolsheviks gathered all their surrounding forces and with 2,000 soldiers encircled him. The Otaman and his unit were able to break out at night and left the closing Bolshevik units to fight among themselves. To avoid any future problems, Volynets mobilized 4,500 peasants and took the city of Haysyn. Not far away at this same time Otaman Klymenko captured the railroad juncture Uman - Khrystynivka. The Bolsheviks in an effort to destroy the two Otamans threw the 7th Soviet Regiment against Volynets and the 8th Odessa Regiment against Klymenko. The 8th Regiment was enticed into the surrounding swamps and destroyed.⁴⁸ Volynets who was away raiding the countryside discovered that Haysyn was in Red hands. He again mobilized about 10,000 peasants near the village of Tyshivka and attacked the 7th Regiment. Although great in number, the insurgent

⁴⁷ Sereda op-cit., Vol. II (July-August 1930). p. 22.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 23-25.

Group only had 600 rifles. The Reds, on the other hand, had 1,200 armed infantrymen, 250 cavalry, 4 cannon and 100 machine guns. At this time Otaman Chorna Khmara came close to Haysyn with his armored train and began shelling it. The Red unit immediately evacuated the city and left for Uman. The Bolsheviks once again attempted to destroy Volynets. They threw against him the reserve units of the "Tarashchanska Dyviziya" which numbered 2,000 cavalry and 800 infantry. Volynets escaped with his unit to the Kuslyakovsky Forest. A few days later, he attacked the food convoy of the "Tarashchanska Dyviziya" and recaptured Haysyn. Thereafter, the Bolsheviks left him alone. Volynets organized a regional meeting, and created an "Executive Committee", headed by Ivan Mykolaychuk, whose task it was to administer the region. In this "Haysynska Respublyka" Volynets became the "Minister of War", and as such edited a newspaper Povstanets (the Insurgent) which informed the partisans of the progress of the UNR.

Faced with the problem of insurgency the Bolsheviks were forced to take steps to destroy it. In the same month of April, the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was held. The plenary meeting named K. E. Voroshilov in charge of the battle against the "bandits" and authorized him to create special units to combat the partisans.⁴⁹

⁴⁹I. Dubynsky and H. Shevchuk Chervone Kozatstvo (The Red Kossacks), (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Politychnoyi Literatury Ukrayiny, 1963), p. 76.

At about the same time that the meeting was taking place 3,000 insurgents with their 8 cannons were attacking the Bolshevik units only 19 miles away from Kiev.⁵⁰

May was no different from April. In the area of Lityn - Lyatychiv - Vynnycia Otaman Shepel was busy destroying Bolshevik convoys and disorganizing their rear. Shepel came from the village of Vonyachyna in the Lityn region. Here the villagers themselves began organizing an insurgent unit and turned to Shepel, a former officer, to lead them. With his 4,000 partisans he took the city of Lityn and then attacked Khmelnyk. The Reds took advantage of his absence and retook Lityn. Shepel then again took Lityn and it remained in his hands for a longer period of time.⁵¹ Soon he and his insurgents joined the UNR in its operations against Kiev.

On May 5 the Bolsheviks dispatched three armored ships against Zeleny. The idea was to cut him off and keep him from crossing the Dnieper River.⁵² In this they were not successful, however, because when they approached the area between the Pluty Forest and Trypillya they encountered artillery fire from Zeleny's units. Zeleny and Anhel who was with him at the time crossed the river safely.⁵³

By this time Hryhoriyiv broke with the Bolsheviks and began operating against them. On May 10, 1919 at an Extraordinary Session of the

⁵⁰ Antonov-Ovseenko, op-cit., Vol. IV, p. 66-67.

⁵¹ Sereda, op-cit., Vol. II (February 1930), p. 7.

⁵² Korolyvsky, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 15. Document No. 16.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 30, Document No. 27.

[Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, as reported in its protocol, Hryhoriyiv]
was proclaimed to be outside the law. The protocol underlined the bitterness felt against Hryhoriyiv who betrayed the Bolsheviks when they were "straining" to give a friendly hand to Bukovina and Bessarabia. The duty of every citizen of Soviet Ukraine after this meeting was to kill Hryhoriyiv on the spot.⁵⁴

The Bolsheviks then mobilized all possible forces and threw them against Hryhoriyiv. The "moment is serious" wrote Pyatak and Zaton-sky in their circular of May 12, 1919.⁵⁵

The moment was indeed serious for the Bolsheviks. The UNR and UHA united their forces and began their offensive. Denikin was pushing north. The insurgents disorganized and demoralized the Red Army. On May 21, 500 Red Army men crossed over to Otaman Struk at Chornobil. That same day the president of the local CHEKA of Nikaloyev was shot by Red soldiers.⁵⁶

Before his meeting with Makhno Hryhoriyiv dispatched raiding units through all of Ukraine. One such unit was that of Otaman Uvarov. This Otaman with his force of 1,000 men, after fighting many successful battles against the Russians, reached the area of the Kholodny Yar at the beginning of May 1919. They began an attack against the city of Cherkassy on May 15 which was garrisoned by the 1st and 2nd Soviet Regiments. In the process of the engagement the 2nd Soviet Regiment mutinied and

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 33 Document No. 30.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 43-44 Document No. 44.

⁵⁶ Chamberlin, op-cit., pp 225-226.

releases all prisoners from the dungeons of the CHEKA.⁵⁷ After this, the 2nd Regiment took the railroad terminal and refused to let the Bolsheviks evacuate their troops or stores of food which were collected in the countryside. On that day the cavalry of Uvarov, numbering 200 insurgents, struck the 1st Regiment from the rear. The surprise attack evoked panic in the ranks and the soldiers began to flee to the nearby forest in an attempt to save themselves. The result was almost the complete annihilation of the 1st Regiment and its 400 troops. The mutineers of the Soviet Regiment dispersed while others joined Uvarov. As a result his unit grew to 1,500 insurgents. With his men Uvarov held the city of Cherkassy for about one week. The Bolsheviks tried to recapture the city by bringing fresh troops from beyond the Dnieper but were forced to retreat in the face of Uvarov's 24 machine guns and artillery. When stronger Red forces were finally brought in, Uvarov retreated, leaving behind former sailors of the Black Sea Fleet to guard the rear. All of them died in carrying out their orders and thus facilitated Uvarov's escape to Bobrynsk. Moving into the region of Smila, the group was warned by the "Smila Partisan Unit" that the village had fallen to the Bolsheviks. The advance was then continued but toward the city of Chyhyryn instead which was protected by the "Chyhyryn Soviet Regiment" under Kotsur. Uvarov's attack was unexpected and Kotsur was

⁵⁷ Serhiy Poliksha, "Kubanets Uvarov" Litopys Chervonoziyi Kalyny, Vol. V, (May 1933), p. 16. The author was one of the prisoners released by Uvarov and joined the insurgents.

forced to leave the city. Uvarov held the city for two weeks. During this time the "Kotsurovtsi" (members of Kotsur's group) were planning to throw Uvarov out but abandoned this plan when news arrived that the insurgents of "Kholodny Yar" under Otaman Chuchupaka were planning to attack Kotsur from the rear to aid Uvarov. When the Bolsheviks started concentrating their strength, Uvarov retreated into the safety of "Kholodny Yar" (the Gold Valley). Chuchupaka and Uvarov agreed that in military matters the latter would, because of his experience, command the united forces while the former was to remain Otaman of Kholodny Yar with the duty of mobilizing greater forces in case of need. It may be mentioned that Chuchupaka enjoyed great popularity among the masses. His "kadrovky" (permanent nucleus of his force) numbered 400 men, but in the event of a crisis a force of up to 8,000 men could easily be mobilized. The permanent force of both Otamans amounted to between 2 to 3 thousand men. The operations of both units were worked out by the "General Staff of Kholodny Yar" headed by a former officer of the General Staff, Colonel Pakin. In addition to a cultural section whose task it was to educate the insurgents, Kholodny Yar had its own printing plant which published a newspaper, agitation literature, and other materials in the Ukrainian language.⁵⁸

United, the two Otamans began operations against the Reds and pushed

⁵⁸ Stepan Bozhyk. "Deshcho pro Ukrayinskykh partyzan w 1919 roci" (a few things about Ukrainian partisans in 1919). Kalendar Chervonoiyi Kalyny (1924), p. 143.

them back to the city of Oleksandrivka and, by the end of May, even captured that Bolshevik outpost. The Red Army units were not very happy about the "Kholodny Yar Republic" but were not disposed to attack the mountainous areas with which only the partisans were acquainted. The few expeditions that were initiated against "Kholodny Yar" were usually morally defeated, by peasant stories about the strength of the partisans, long before they began operations. Red operations did not stop the insurgents from harassing the Reds at their convenience. In the middle of June in a night raid on the village of Pleskachivka the insurgents destroyed a whole company of Bolsheviks. Here they took 150 prisoners, 6 machine guns and 40 boxes of artillery shells. In addition to these types of confrontations there were smaller skirmishes and continuous raids against the railroad line which was situated about 9 miles away from the base. By the end of June Kotsur and his group, aided by large contingents of Bolsheviks attacked "Kholodny Yar". They were pushed back and in this battle 80 Bolsheviks and 11 insurgents were killed.⁵⁹

The insurgent "Republic" kept contact with the UNR and the advancing Ukrainian Army. At about the end of June two UNR couriers arrived in Kholodny Yar. They held a conference and:

"....at the Staff meeting it was decided that Uvarov, his men, and volunteers from Kholodny Yar, were to break through the surrounding Red occupied areas with the task of diverting them and then unite with Otaman Tyutyunnyk. Chuchupaka with the remaining Kholodnoyartsi were to remain and protect the area".⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Poliksha, op-cit., p. 17-18.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

Uvarov left Kholodny Yar with 200 cavalry and 400 infantry. In an effort to cross the railroad line Uvarov's group was forced to engage the 5th and 6th Soviet Regiments at the station terminal of Rayhorod. After four hours the insurgents were defeated and surrounded. Many were executed while the rest were loaded into trains and sent to Kiev. On the way many escaped. Among the escapees was Uvarov. He organized another group of insurgents and continued operations in his native area of Cherkassy.

Otaman Hryhoriyiv, as was mentioned once before, had united over 117 insurgent groups under his command. After his break with the Bolsheviks, not able to conduct a regular positional war, he dispatched many of his closest associates to make rapid raids across Ukraine. These raids had propaganda value and were meant to agitate the masses into action against the Reds. A few of the most important partisan raids were those of Otamans Tyutyunnyk, Sahaydachny, Zaliznyak and Miroschnychenko.

Otaman Sahaydachny, a former teacher and officer made his raid from "Kholodny Yar" to the Kherson area. After the battle for the railroad terminal Znamenka on May 29-30 Sahaydachny with his 250 men went into the area of Kholodny Yar. Here he reorganized his unit which was poorly equipped and dressed. The insurgents had to rely upon the graces and good will of the peasants. The Reds had this unit under continuous surveillance due primarily to the fact that the officers were well trained in guerilla warfare and the unit, reorganized, could become a great threat. Against them, therefore, the Bolsheviks dispatched the 6th Soviet Regiment with

two cannons. Faced with this situation the insurgents decided to move away from the "Kholodny Yar" region into the area of Prusy. Before reaching their destination the partisans destroyed a platoon of the 6th Regiment (a platoon differed in size from 50 to 180 men or more). From Prusy they marched into the region of Kherson where a unit of partisans was commanded by Otaman Shakhyn, a former commander of the Kherson Region under the rule of the Directory. The decision to march to Kherson entailed a difficult operation. At this time, the Bolsheviks were especially concerned with the insurgents in this area and used all available troops to pursue and destroy them. On Sahaydachny's route lay the city of Fedvar. Here, according to peasant information, the 3rd International Regiment was quartered which in addition to infantry had a cavalry unit of 350 soldiers. Sahaydachny decided to attack and in this way obtain horses for the long journey ahead. Hoping to launch a surprise attack they approached the city by night. On the way they were delayed for one hour by an armed unit which seemed to have accidentally bumped into them. A few rounds were fired but no attack came. This too was probably an insurgent unit. When the insurgents arrived in Fedvar the Bolsheviks were already leaving. An attack did yield 18 horses, one machine gun, a few rifles and ammunition, but this victory was insignificant since the whole Red regiment was able to escape.⁶¹

On the night of June 9-10, the unit crossed to the city of Adzhanka

⁶¹ Aleksander Docenko, "Reyd Otamana Sahaydachnoho", Litopys Chervonoii Kalyny, Vol. IV, (November, 1932), p. 5.

and on the 10th continued its movement. On the way, however, the insurgents were attacked by a large Bolshevik unit with a cannon and cavalry. Sahaydachny was wounded, but the group was able to escape under cover of night and reached the village of Klynci by next day. Another day of marching found them resting in Bratolubci. During their rest the reconnaissance unit of the insurgents halted the supply train of the 47th Soviet Division. The Bolsheviks lost 128 soldiers, among them three commissars, while the insurgents had three dead and seven wounded. The supplies that were not needed were burned together with the train.⁶²

By June 13 the insurgent formation had grown to 400 infantrymen and 67 cavalry. The march continued with minor skirmishes and operations against railroad and telegraphic lines of communication. By June 15, Sahaydachny found out that the city of Kherson had fallen to the Reds. The insurgents continued their march in an effort to unite with otaman Shokhyn. The exhausted unit stopped at the village of Seydynmynukha to rest. Next morning in a surprise attack the Bolsheviks routed the partisans. Many of the insurgents escaped. Sahaydachny and his officers, 27 in all, locked themselves in a school building and continued to resist. As a last act, Sahaydachny ordered his officers to break through the lines and then shot himself. Of the 27 during the attempted escape, only seven made it. These insurgents who escaped (134) were again organized by Lt. Smal. Finding that Otaman Shokhyn's unit was

⁶² Ibid., p. 5.

also destroyed they marched northeast. On the way they met Makhno and joined him.

Another of Otaman Hryoriyiv's lieutenants was Otaman Zaliznyak, a former administrator of the Directory. In the middle of May he organized and led insurgents in the area of the city of Horodysche. After capturing the city he united his forces with Otaman Masyk and moved into the area of Znamenka. Zaliznyak was popular among the partisans and had a good knowledge of their psychology. Extremely brave, he was always in the front lines. The idea of national liberation permeated all of his activities.⁶³ After the battle near Znamenka he was ordered by Hryhoriyiv to move to the village of Sentiv. He reorganized his group which numbered 400 men with four machine guns. Both Sahaydachny's and Zaliznyak's units were fed and supported by the population. By June 3 the insurgents ran into the 6th Soviet Regiment, in the area of Zhabotyn, whose task it was to destroy the partisans of "Kholodny Yar". The Bolsheviks mistaking Zaliznyak's unit for their own allowed it to approach. The surprising attack of the insurgents led to the death of 187 Reds. The sudden attack completely disorganized the 6th Regiment and its officers. By their panicky retreat into the confines of the city of Cherkassy they opened the Bolshevik ring which had been meticulously prepared by the Red command in an effort to crush the insurgents of "Kholodny

⁶³ Aleksander Docenko, "Reyd Otamans Zaliznyaka", Litopys Chervonciyi Kalyny, Vol. IV, (December 1932) p. 2.

Yar".⁶⁴ From here Zaliznyak proceeded to the city of Horodyshe.

On the way, they discovered that the 7th Soviet Regiment was to move into the city which was in the hands of 300 Red Army men. This Red garrison was informed of the arrival of the 7th Regiment but not of the date on which this would happen. On June 6, Zaliznyak and his unit rode in under the red flag. The Reds came out to welcome the insurgents, mistaking them for their own, with an orchestra and open arms. The insurgents attacked and when they left the next day the streets were strewn with the bodies of the communists.⁶⁵ In the meantime, after Zaliznyak left, a part of the 7th Soviet Regiment arrived in Horodyshe and the remaining part was ordered to march into Zvenyhorodka where Otaman Tyutyunnyk was concentrating his insurgents. This latter group marched in the direction of Vilshan and on the way discovered that Zaliznyak and his unit was resting in the village of Svynarka. Their strength of 900 men, 8 machine guns and 3 cannons, with the element of surprise on their side, encouraged them to attack the insurgents who had 450 men and 7 machine guns. Because of their negligence the insurgents were routed and only 284 escaped. The rest were either killed or dispersed. With these remnants Zaliznyak began his trek west. On June 14 he defeated a large unit of Bolsheviks near Ryznyci. On that same day he made contacts with the coordinating center of the insurgents. He continued operations against the Bolsheviks in the area of Skvyrschyna

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

in cooperation and close contact with other partisans. His unit again increased to 400 men and eventually joined the UNR with Otaman Tyutyunnyk's group. In autumn, after the UNR declared war on Denikin, Zaliznyak broke through into the area of Cherkassy and led insurgent operations against both Whites and Reds. He died in December 1919 of typhoid.

Of all the raids that began in May, Otaman Tyutyunnyk's is most important. After the battle near Znamenka and Bolshevik takeover of Aleksandriya, Tyutyunnyk, like the previously mentioned Otamans, began his raid. Destroying his armored trains and other equipment on the railroad terminal Zelena, he and his 1,000 men, half of whom were unarmed, moved toward Verblyuzhka. Only about 119 men were really partisans, the rest joined Tyutyunnyk during the fight for Katerynoslav and could not be relied on in time of a crisis. Near Verblyuzhka he reorganized his unit and out of the thousand men retained only 156. Altogether Tyutyunnyk had 13 officers and his Chief-of-Staff was Oleksa Serbyn. The unit, unlike the other insurgent groups, was fortunate in having an ample supply of ammunition and three million "karbovanci" (gold coins) taken from the French during the campaign against Odessa. In addition to this there were 4 machine guns. By May 29, the group covered over 52 miles trying to break away from the pursuing Reds. Going north, after defending Elysavet with Papov, another of Hryhoriyiv's otamans, Tyutyunnyk's group began to grow. Near the terminal Trepivka his unit grew to 204 men with one cannon,

and two additional machine guns. From here, he marched to the city of Fedvar and there made the momentous decision to unite with the Ukrainian Army. In Sentovo his insurgents met Zaliznysk's group. Both Otamans decided to operate in close contact while in the Kiev area. On June 1, a Bolshevik armored train was derailed near Novomyrhorod and its equipment given to the local insurgents. On June 3, they destroyed another armored train on the railroad terminal of Lebedyn.⁶⁶ On that same day, the unit of Otaman Miroshnychenko visited Tyutyunnyk in Lebedyn and promised cooperation. Together with Miroshnychenko Tyutyunnyk, while crossing the city of Shpola, took the supply base of the 7th Soviet Regiment. On June 5, the two groups split up with the intention of broadening their base of operations. Miroshnychenko went to Topolna and Tyutyunnyk to Kozatska. The Bolsheviks noticed the latter's movement and sent the 7th Soviet Regiment, with its 1800 infantrymen, 40 cavalry, 14 machine guns and 6 cannon, to destroy him. As will be recalled, half of this Regiment, in search of Tyutyunnyk, surprised Zaliznyak and his unit. On June 7, part of this regiment went to Zvenyhorodka. Here they were attacked by Tyutyunnyk and dispersed. On the next day, the Bolsheviks attacked the village of Kozatska where Tyutyunnyk's main forces were deployed. The insurgents were able to force back the Reds who retreated towards Topolna. Here Miroshnychenko completed the work begun by Tyutyunnyk. After this the 7th Soviet

⁶⁶ Aleksander Docenko, "Reyd Otamans Tyutyunnyka", Litopys Chervonoiyi Kalyny, Vol. V, (February 1933), p. 7.

[Regiment refrained from any other action.⁶⁷ On June 8, both insurgent units were combined. The fighting spirit was high because of the victories. Having obtained additional machine guns and 23 horses, the unit increased its fire power and improved its reconnaissance section. Both units at this point had 450 partisans. While in the village of Boyarka, Tyutyunnyk came in contact with the insurgent center under Yuri Mazurenko. After this, he attacked the city of Zvenhyhorodka which, for a while, he decided to make his base of operations. He organized a civil apparatus under Kuzmenko - Tytarenko and called a regional conference. The Bolsheviks seeing the virtual takeover of the area by insurgents evacuated even the nearby village of Shpol'e. In the surrounding areas all vestige of soviet authority disappeared.]

Leaving a garrison in Zhmerynka, Tyutyunnyk decided to go to the aid of Otaman Klymenko who captured the city of Uman but was again forced out by the 5th and 8th Soviet Regiments. Assuming that the "3rd Peasant Insurgent Division" operated north of him and to the east were Zaliznyaks men (he had no information of his defeat), Tyutyunnyk set out to join Klymenko with the hope of recapturing the city of Uman. Setting out with 350 men he soon found out that the Bolsheviks were planning to attack Zvenyhorodka. He attacked Zvenyhorodka where the Reds began massing their troops, forced them into the city of Kalynboloto, and then, after a half day of fighting, forced them to retreat east. The insurgents, as planned, continued to the city of Tsalne where

⁶⁷ Ibid., Vol. V, (March 1933), p. 19.

they met the small unit of Otaman Sokol. On June 17, they received a courier from Otaman Klymenko and made plans to attack Uman on June 19. Advancing to their destination, the units encountered a platoon of the 5th Soviet Regiment in the village of Dobrovody and defeating it, settled here for the night. While the insurgents rested the Bolsheviks hastily brought in the whole 8th and parts of the 5th Soviet Regiments (1700 soldiers and 4 cannon). Tyutyunnyk's units were forced to retreat. News were also received of Otaman Klymenko who failed to await the arrival of Tyutyunnyk and attacked Uman with his 1,000 insurgents and on June 18 was defeated near the city by 2,000 Red Army soldiers.⁶⁸

In the city of Zvenyhorodka, in the meantime, the peasant conference met and reaffirmed the temporary appointment of Kuzmenko-Tytarenko as head of the city. At this time, too, the commander of Zvenyhorodka, left behind by Tyutyunnyk, organized 500 volunteers into an insurgent formation. The remnants of the defeated insurgents of Otaman Klymenko began to arrive (about 100) as well as other partisans and volunteers. By June 22, there were 800 bayonets in the area. Due to the battles at Kalynboloto and Dobrovody the supply of ammunition became critical. Finding himself in this situation, Tyutyunnyk decided to join the UNR Army.

"There was no rational reason that could justify the insurgents stay in Zvenyhorodschna. The enemy was vanquished,

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 20.

furthermore, to defend the area without ammunition was impossible".⁶⁹

On June 22-23 Tyutyunnyk reorganized his unit consisting of 1,734 men, into a division. On June 25 Tyutyunnyk and his division began a raid towards the UNR front. Of his arrival and the impression that Tyutyunnyk made on the Commanders of the UNR, Colonel Sereda writes:

"S. V. Petlyura appointed him to the high post of Commander of the Kievan peasant group, which he (Tyutyunnyk) organized. The high appointment for a person that was unknown in the Ukrainian Army, without any military rank and military honors, emanated from the impression that he made upon S. V. Petlyura and the High Command"⁷⁰

It was Tyutyunnyk who convinced Petlyura that there was a necessity to organize units which would be able to fight a partisan war. The "Kievan Group" as it was previously noted, consisted of the 5th and 12th Insurgent Divisions. Here such prominent Otamans as Shepel and Volynets submitted to a united command and incorporated their units into the Ukrainian Army. After the fiasco at Kiev these units continued their operations during the First Winter Campaign.

The month of June was a busy one for the Bolsheviks in Trypillya. Otaman Zeleny's activity endangered even the city of Kiev. All forces which could be spared had to be sent against Zeleny. Dispatched against him were the Tarshaschansky, Antonovsky and the International Regiments from Obukhiv. Besides these units even students from Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kiev military schools were sent to the front against the

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

⁷⁰ Sereda, op-cit., Vol. II, (October 1930) p. 15.

[Otaman. The Reds did not fare well on June 16. During the engagement] to which they refer as the "Trypillian Tragedy" they lost about 2,000 men. ⁷¹

But the war with Zeleny continued along a front extending 10 miles. The battle lasted for three days; then the Bolsheviks withdrew but renewed operations on June 25. By now the Reds had worked out a detailed plan. However, elusive Zeleny dispersed his men, as was typical of peasant - partisans, and with a small group (cadre) broke through the Bolshevik lines only to reappear in the region of Tarashcha-Bila Cerkva.⁷² The "Trypillian Revolt", according to the Bolsheviks, was crushed. Brought on Red bayonettes were the "Prodzahony" who robbed the population of foodstuffs, and units whose task it was to disarm the peasants.

While operations were under way against Zeleny, other Otamans were busy harassing the enemy. A train laden with war materials, cannons, machine guns, and other goods, en route from Chernihiv to the front, disappeared almost without a trace. The Otaman responsible for this attack which took place on the railroad terminal of Ichnya was Anhel.⁷³

Volynets was quite active in July. In that month, Petlyura sent a special "Iron Regiment" (Zalizny Zahin) to contact him and Zeleny before the offensive against Kiev began. The "Iron Regiment" became insurgent and went deep into enemy territory where it contacted Volynets,

⁷¹ Hryshyn, op-cit., p. 11.

⁷² Korolyvsky, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 263, Document No. 2991.

⁷³ Sereda, op-cit., Vol. II, (September 1930) p. 15.

who agreed to take part in the operations. It was a little more difficult to find Zeleny who was not in Tarascha due to the Whites who moved into the area during their drive north. At one point the "Iron Regiment" was attacked but was saved by Otaman Sokolovsky. After the fiasco in Kiev on September 3, the "Iron Regiment" broke into two groups. One half went over to the UHA and the other half joined Tyutyunnyk.⁷⁴

In August, as was already mentioned in a previous section of this chapter, operations against Kiev were begun. The insurgents were instrumental in the taking of Kiev. Zeleny helped in Bila Cerkva, while Anhel cut off the Bolshevik retreat. Other units were incorporated into the Army of the UNR (Sokolovsky, Tyutyunnyk, Mozdolevych, etc).⁷⁵ Still other groups, although not active on the front, were busy disrupting Bolshevik supply lines as well as their retreat. The "Staro-

⁷⁴ Roman Zubyk, "Okremy Zalizny Zahin na Zadah Bolshevyki" (The Special Iron Regiment in the Rear of the Bolsheviks), Kalendar Chervonoii Kalyny, (1922) pp. 70-73.

⁷⁵ Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 120. The Publisher of this work states that: "With the Ukrainian Army in 1919-1920 operating, in accordance with directives from the Army Staff, were larger and smaller units and groups of Ukrainian insurgents under their Otamans, of which the best known were: Bozhko, Romasko, Tespylo, Chornomor, Pylyavsky, Mardalevych, Shuba, Vovk, Vilynets, Shepel, Holub, Struk, P. Sokolovsky, M. Sokolovska, Syvoshapka, Lykho, Orlyk, Khmara, Chupryna, (poet), Zabolotny, Mohyla, Satana, Pometa, Chorna-Khmara, Orel (Halchevsky, later Voynarovsky), Inty, Klepach, Chuchupaka (from Kholodny Yar), Olo (Oleksandrian Insurgent Division), Sirko, Danchenko, Nestorenko, Dubchak, Pyachalka, Sharuda, Cherkas, Nalyvayko, Khrestovy, Kaliburda, F. Vovk, Sirenko, Vovchura, Hres-Halayda, Zenzera, Ishchenko, Vovk-Nechay, Ivashchenko and many, many more. Operating independently, in most cases, against Red and White Muscovites were Otamans Zeleny, Hryoriyiv, Makhno, Kryvoruchko, Hryschenko and others."

"bilsky Insurgents" attacked the railroad terminal of Barvinovka on August 14, and captured three eschellons, two of which were full of military equipment. Here they captured 119 and killed 350 to 400 of the enemy. During the period from January to August this unit besides captured many supplies and weapons, killed 1,192 Red soldiers and captured 578.⁷⁶ On August 27, this group decided to join the advancing UNR Army. On August 30, the day before it left, a special unit of 100 men under Lt. Honcharenko was dispatched to Otaman Stepovy, of the Kherson area, in order to build up closer contact between those on the front and those in the rear of the enemy. Otaman Stepovy and his fight against the Bolsheviks began about this time and will be touched upon in the next chapter. His unit was known as the "Steppe Division".

Only the enemy can truly assess the importance of the Ukrainian Insurgents during this period. Slikhter, the Bolshevik Commissar in charge of food collections, admits that because of the insurgents there was no Bolshevik administration in the villages of Ukraine during the first half of 1919. He mentions that due to partisan activity it took an official train 7 days to travel from Kiev to Kharkiv. The ministry responsible for food collections (Narkomprod), ends Slikhter, had to work "virtually in the smoke of gunpowder"⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Tsapko op-cit., p. 87.

⁷⁷ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 140.

V. THE WAR AGAINST "RED AND WHITE BOLSHEVIKS."

a. The First Winter Campaign.

On August 30, 1919, the victorious Ukrainian Armies entered Kiev, the "Mother of Rus Cities", and capital of Ukraine. The jubilation of the Ukrainians was of short duration, however. On that same day the Whites also advanced into Kiev and what transpired was to bring eventual death to both Armies.

It will be recalled that the advancing White units were first encountered by Otaman Yuri Tyutyunnyk near Khrystynivka. His message to the UNR High Command was optimistic and he was convinced that both armies would come to an understanding. His optimism was unfounded however. The units that he encountered were not Russian but Terek Cossack units who were favorably disposed to the Ukrainians. These units were shortly withdrawn and replaced by hard core Russian formations. Seeing an imminent conflict between the two armies the UNR proposed a line of demarcation. Nothing came of this proposal. The Whites entering Kiev began disarming Ukrainian formations and occupying strategic positions. The plans of the Bolsheviks were realized. They had specifically retreated from Kiev in haste in the hope that the two armies would collide. The trusting Ukrainians, treating the Whites as "allies" against their primary enemy - the Reds, did not prevent them from entering the city. Thus, the city of Kiev fell to the Russians and the Ukrainian forces had to retreat.

The Directorate, rather than initiate a war against the Whites,

tried to come to an understanding by making another proposal of establishing a demarcation line between the two armies. The Entente observers tried to convince Denikin of the necessity of such a step. The American observer, General Edgar Jadvin urged that a truce between Petlyura and Denikin should be initiated.¹ There was no reaction to these proposals. The Russian delegates were adamant. They declared that they were fighting under the slogan "Russia one and indivisible". Denikin let France and England know that he would not recognize an independent Ukraine and that the Ukrainians could either disperse or join him.² To mislead the Entente, however, Denikin sent his delegates to the September 13 meeting which was held at the railroad terminal of Post Volynsky. His delegation, headed by General Nepyenin, was not serious in its attempts to resolve the conflict. It merely sought to show the Entente that they were supposedly discussing the situation with the Ukrainians. While negotiating, they hoped to weaken the insurgent movement, which was turning against them, by pretending to be friendly to the UNR.³

The Directory acted slowly and cautiously at a time when many considered the national honor at stake. The cause was just. Every soldier demanded that the Directory declare war against the Whites. The insurgents did not understand the niceties of diplomacy. They

¹ Brinkley op-cit., p. 200.

² Denikin, op-cit., Vol. V, p. 257.

³ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 82.

started the war against Denikin almost a month before the Directory declared it. This slowness on the part of the UNR contributed to the disorganization in the army. Petlyura, in a telegram of September 6 to Petrushevich, pointed out that the retreat from Kiev had a negative effect on the soldiers and that if things were allowed to continue there would, in effect, be no army. He also pointed out that under the influence of the retreat many officers have joined the insurgents.⁴ Only on September 23 did the Directorate, after intercepting a hostile order of Denikin, declare war on the Whites.

In conjunction with the beginning of hostilities the UNR issued the Declaration of September 24 and reaffirmed its stand on the agrarian question; that is that all land was to be divided between the peasants. It also promised to call a Constituent Assembly which, on the basis of equal, proportional, and secret ballot, would determine the type of government that would rule Ukraine. In the meantime, it called the peasants to rise against the new invaders, the "lazy masters" (ledache panatvo), who are trying to take from them "the land won by peasant blood".⁵

The war began and grew in proportions as the Whites began to reinstate former land owners and old ideas. The peasantry, however, was not ready to give up the "Achievements of the Revolution". They sent delegations to the UNR and sought directives. Now they understood that

⁴ Ibid., p. 74.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 88-89.

[both the "Red and White Bolsheviks" as they referred to them were out] of the same mold, and that both sought nothing but to reimpose the old bondage under new slogans and banners. The Whites, in their drive to destroy the Ukrainian Army, forgot about the trapped Red Army in the south. The war between Denikin and Petlyura gave these Bolsheviks a chance to break through to their base and thus save themselves.

The Ukrainians were at first successful. Tyutyunnyk's insurgents captured the whole White Simferpol Regiment. The "Iron Division" completely routed the 5th Volunteer Division. Up till October 10, the Volunteer Armies had few successes on the Ukrainian Front. In the rear, they were continuously and effectively harassed by the insurgents and "Batko" Makhno. In the meantime, the Reds began an offensive that drove the Whites, who had all their reserves on the Ukrainian Front, toward Odessa.

In the end, Denikin was successful against the UNR whose initial successes were crossed off by many factors, the most important of which was typhoid fever. It will be recalled that the UHA crossed into the territory of the UNR with the hope of strengthening the latter as well as preserving its own strength. Almost throughout all of this period the Ukrainians tenaciously clung to the idea of preservation of a regular army at any price. To have a regular army meant to strengthen the hand of the Ukrainian diplomats in Paris who were trying to gain recognition of Ukraine. There were many contradictory, complex problems that the Ukrainians had to cope with and solve. Some of these

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Problems were insurmountable dilemmas. There were basic differences between the Galicians and the Naddnipyantsi (Eastern Ukrainians). History seems to have played a trick upon the Ukrainians. By the treaty of Andrusivo in 1667, Ukraine was divided between the Poles and Russians. With the partition of Poland, Western Ukraine fell to Austria but the Poles continued to hold a privileged position. Thus, the Western Ukrainians were oppressed by the Poles and the Eastern Ukrainians by the Russians. Hundreds of years of occupation left a mark upon both groups. The Easterners felt "with the devil against the Russians" while the Westerners felt "with the devil against the Poles". The devil finally had his due. The UNR began negotiating with the Poles and the URA made a pact with the Whites. In the end, one did not blame the other or call the other traitor. Both knew that this was done to preserve a dying army and to allow the nation to be reborn. Even disunited, their spirit remained one and their goal always unbending.

By October 15, victory was on the side of the Volunteers. The Ukrainian Armies, ill equipped, weak, without ammunition, found themselves in the position from which they started against Kiev. The blockade of Ukraine had its results. Already in September of 1919, three-fourths of the officers and men were sick with typhoid. The conditions under which these soldiers were supposed to recuperate were beyond words.

"A terrible smell, dirt, lice - these were the hospitals. Such a horrible state of "medical treatment" in hospitals led most of the soldiers to prefer to remain in peasant

hovels under the care of peasants. As a result, all of the villages in the area of the front were full of sick soldiers. Quietly, without complaints and reproach, with extraordinary superhuman suffering, the soldiers carried their pain. Each of them that could stand on his feet hurried to find his unit and to join it. By November 1, 1919, out of the total number of sick, 10,000 soldiers had died. During the winter of 1919 - 1920 the total number of dead from typhoid reached 25,000 persons".⁶

The blockade prevented the shipment of stores of medicine bought from the Americans. The Red Cross refused to grant aid to the Ukrainians because the Ukrainian Red Cross was not a member of the International Red Cross Organization.⁷

In November, the UHA in order to save itself went over to Denikin's side. Denikin accepted the UHA under an agreement that their forces would be used only against the Bolsheviks and not the UNR. He was willing to speak to the Galicians whom he did not regard as Russian subjects. His attitude to the UNR (Eastern Ukrainians) was that they were traitors to the Russian Empire. As such, any soldier of the UNR was tried by a military tribunal and shot.⁸ Not being able to come to an understanding with Denikin, the UNR began contemplating an alliance with Poland, and continuation of the war by partisan means if necessary. The army of the UHA, built on the Austrian model, was not psychologically fit for such warfare. Thus the two armies parted. As both separated

⁶ Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 121.

⁷ Victor Yanovsky, "Yak to Bulo" (How it was), Tryzub Vol. V, (May-June 1964) p. 8.

⁸ Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy Pokhid, op-cit., p. 10.

and marched their way, soldiers of the UNR and the UHA exchanged bitter words:

"You are going to the Poles?" asked some....."

"And you to the Russians....." replied the others.⁹

But the enemy was present even within the ranks of the Ukrainian Army. Many lost heart and began to agree with the Borotbisty that the only way to win is to join the Red Russians, create a Ukrainian Red Army, and together fight the whole world. But the Bolsheviks knew that a "Red Ukrainian Army" would be a threat to its centralist tendencies. The Borotbisty were aware of this also and attempted to meet the Russians with an accomplished fact - the existence of the Ukrainian Red Army. At first they talked Hryoriyiv into converting his insurgents into the "Ukrainian Red Army". This, as was noted, failed. Now on the eve of the apparent annihilation of the UNR, the Borotbisty (Left Social Revolutionaries) once again attempted to create a Ukrainian Red Army. In their quest they found eager support from three officers of the UNR. Rising to the occasion, in an effort to "save" the UNR from destruction, Otaman Volokh, Otaman Bozhko and Otaman Danchenko proclaimed themselves the "Triumvirate". They hoped to seize power and force the whole government to recognize the Soviet platform and, in effect, become a communist government. The "Triumvirate" was not able to achieve its ends but only contributed to further disorganization. Strong reaction was felt because all three were important in the Ukrainian Government.

⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

Volokh, previously to this was named by Petlyura to head all the Insurgents in Ukraine, Danchenko was the commander of the insurgents in the region of Volyn, while Bozhko was the commander of a formidable force - the "Zaporozhska Sich". The attempted coup was abortive. Soon an internal struggle began in the "Ttiumvirate" during which Volokh killed Bozhko. Danchenko, not wishing to share a similar fate, left never to return again while Volokh and his "Zaporozhian Corps" crossed over to the Bolsheviks. Once again therefore, the Borotbisty were unsuccessful in creating a Ukrainian Soviet Government and Army. This was their last attempt. After this, they submitted to the Russians and were admitted to the Ukrainian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, a subsidiary of the Russian Communists.

In the face of defeat, the Directorate called a meeting which took place on November 13, 1919 in the city of Kamyanets. Here, the international and internal situations were examined. It was suggested that the whole army turn partisan. Many opposed this plan which was born almost on the same day that the UHA abandoned the UNR. The Minister of War, V. Salsky, was opposed to the proposal and submitted a plan which would, in effect, demobilize the army. The Premier of Ukraine, I. Mazepa, contended that it would be madness to abandon the fight and adopt Salsky's plan which would establish a Revolutionary Center of Insurgency in Ukraine and organize an All-Ukrainian Uprising - a "New Ukrainian Revolution". This "Trickle" theory (Strumochky) rested on the demobilization of the Army and sending the soldiers home where they

would organize local insurgent centers. Mazepa maintained that the Army could not be demobilized on the eve of Denikin's doom, on the threshold of an understanding between the Poles and Ukrainians, and in the face of Allied disenchantment with the Whites. He felt that all this was on the verge of taking place, and that if it did, then a Ukrainian Army had to be active and ready to take advantage of the situation.

The issue was put to a vote and Mazepa's proposal won. The Army would not demobilize but would break through the enemy lines and operate in its rear.¹⁰ This meeting was, in effect, the "Genesis of the Winter Campaign". Regular war, not succeeding, gave way to partisan war where:

"The fight for a sovereign Ukraine passed into the hands of the insurgents who were supported by the whole Ukrainian nation".¹¹

Yuri Tyutyunnyk, who better than anyone understood the Ukrainian masses, on December 6, agreed with Mazepa that the war had to continue in other forms. He maintained that a "recess in the war would demoralize the masses and weaken their activity...."¹²

By December 5, 1919, the Ukrainian Army, weakened by typhoid fever and physically exhausted, was ready to continue the war in the rear of Denikin's Army. The main role of this "Partisan Army" was,

¹⁰ O. Docenko, "Geneza Zymovoho Pokhodu" (The Genesis of the Winter Campaign), Kalendar Chervonoyi Kalyny, (1933) pp. 124 - 125.

¹¹ Udoyychenko, op-cit., p. 120.

¹² Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy Pokhid, op-cit., p. 26.

first of all, to preserve itself as a regular military force. The Commanding General, Omeljanovych Pavlenko in his first order to the UNR "partisans" stated:

"We are advancing into Ukraine as cadres of the regular army which have to revitalize themselves there in order to be ready for another, new, offensive. For a while, however, we must utilize partisan warfare. And now, gentlemen, return to your units, breathe strength into these weak of spirit and with hope of a bright future advance into Ukraine.¹³

Besides self-preservation the army had definite plans relating to the insurgents. The areas that were taken over by these units were kept for short durations and no administrative apparatus of the UNR was established. The "Partisan Army" did establish "self defense" units (Samookhorona) or militia of the local peasantry. Many officers were given the task of organizing such units which were referred to by the historical name of "Sichi" (Stronghold of the Zaporozhian Kossacks). These militias were extremely effective and, according to Tyutyunnyk, "many Russians preferred to fall into the hands of our army rather than into the hands of the "samookhorona".¹⁴

The Partisan Army also had as its task to educate the masses. Besides the military formations there were many agitators and political educators such as P. Fedenko, Y. Chubak, W. Sklyar and many others. Their goal was to arouse the populace first against Denikin and after his demise to use them against the Bolsheviks.¹⁵

¹³ Docenko, Zymovy Pokhid., op-cit., p. X.

¹⁴ Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy Pokhid., op-cit., p. 33.

¹⁵ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 41.

Aware of the dangers of partisan warfare, General Pavlenko split the Partisan Army into four operational groups: the Zaporozhian Group under General Pavlenko, the Kievan Group under Otaman Tyutyunnyk, the Volynian Group under Otaman Zahrodsky and a special group under Colonel Trutenko. At this point the Partisan Army consisted of approximately 10,000 men and 12 cannon. The majority of the men (75%) were sick with typhoid fever and unable to function. Only about 3,000 - 3,500 soldiers were capable of coping with the hardships of the march and were effective soldiers. Once the Partisan Army broke through Denikin's lines, the ballast consisting of sick soldiers was alleviated by placing the convalescents into the care of the peasantry. The soldiers who were well enough to travel faced many hardships. The state of the "Partisan Army" was described in the words of one of the officers:

"The Winter Campaign which began from Lubar found us almost naked, without weapons, ammunition provisions, and horses. In these circumstances we fought all the hardships that came with maneuvering in frost and storm, in continuous battles with the enemy. This was a march of hopelessness and despair; a march unique in the history of war, impossible from the strategic point of view as well as from the point of human sanity. Only the immeasurable love to our country and a deep faith in our victory over the enemy gave us strength and led us to perform heroic deeds."¹⁶

The "Partisan Army", it may be thought by some, was a motley disorganized group with no discipline or order. But the truth is that

¹⁶ Zadoyanny, "Zymovy Pakhid Dievoyi Armiyi UNR w Zapilli Voroha z 6-12-1919 Do 6-5-1920. Yoho Moralni Bazy" Tryzub, Vol. VII, p. 11.

there was no disorganization or fall of the moral values of the soldiers. The partakers of the campaign were only volunteers who were guided by idealistic motives. All the partisans recognized the necessity of self-discipline. An army that fights in the rear of its enemy is doomed to extinction without the aid of the population. In the event that an opportunist did join the "Partisan Army" he was shortly discovered and punished by his brothers at arms.¹⁷ In this way all troublemakers soon disappeared. Witnessing the type of discipline that was characteristic are military orders of officers faced with problems. Thus on December 24, 1919, one officer asked the Commander: "I am asking your approval to execute robbers (members of army G.K.) on the spot of the crime"; another officer issued the order of January 14, 1920, which forbade the use of liquor; perhaps the best order of this type was issued by an officer on February 14, 1920, which stated:

"Officers and Kossacks, observe your behavior and punish, without mercy all these who come into our ranks not because of convictions, but as a thief, who steals our only wealth - our honor."¹⁸

The majority, as was mentioned, came because of their convictions, these who came as "thieves" soon disappeared because there were no punishments that placed one in prison. The only punishment was trial by military tribunal and death.

After some units of the UHA abandoned the Reds and came over to

¹⁷ Personal Interview with Mr. Valentin Simyancev on March 22, 1969.

¹⁸ Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy Pokhid, op-cit., p. 69.

the Partisan Army they had grown used to making decisions by calling together Bolshevik type meetings. On May 8, 1920, the Chief of Staff, Colonel Dolud, reproached these units in this manner, "You are reminded that no meetings of any type are allowed in the Ukrainian Army". The order further demanded the arrest of provocateurs and "swift trial by military tribunal."¹⁹ In this manner the army of the UNR remained an army while the officers of the enemies around it, rather than controlling their soldiers, were controlled by them.

The UHA, it will be recalled, unable to conduct a partisan war and unwilling to leave its sick, joined Denikin with the calculation that by preserving itself it may eventually reunite with the UNR. A secret body known as the "Collegium of the Five" made all the decisions of the UHA and, in effect, was its political body. This Collegium, learning of the plans of the UNR to break through the Denikin lines, sent couriers to all of its units north of Kalynivka to "Let the Ukrainian Army (Prydnipryansku Armiyu) pass and help it in every way possible."²⁰ The UNR, now the Partisan Army, crossed the territories occupied by the UHA between December 7 and 9 and by December 17 had crossed over to the area of Iypovay in the rear of the Whites. By December 21-25 the area of Tetiev - Pyatyhir - Zhyvotova - Lukashivka was reached in accordance with plan. In the region of the city of Holovinske the Partisan Army split into two. General Pavlenko took the first group into the

¹⁹ Docenko, Zymovy Pokhid, op-cit., p. 188, Document CLXXVIII.

²⁰ Dmytro Paliyiv, "Zymovy Pokhid", Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny, Vol. VII (June 1935), p. 8.

area of Torhovytsi and Elysavet. Tyutyunnyk and the other half marched into the area of Zvanyhorod.

Finding the army of the UNR in its rear unnerved the White forces. Otaman Tyutyunnyk, a master of guerilla warfare added to Denikin's apprehensions with his ultimatums which were written in a very direct and concise way and contributed to the psychological insecurity of the Volunteer Army. Thus on December 16, 1919, Tyutyunnyk sent the following telegram to the Denikin administrators and officers:

"At the order of the Chief - Otaman of the Armies of the Ukrainian National Republic, I and a part of the Republican Army have broken through the front and am now in the rear of Denikin's Army with the task of uniting all insurgent groups in fulfilling the goal of liquidating all administrative and military sections that were imposed on Ukraine by Denikin. ~~I order~~ the military formations of the Volunteer Army, within a two day period, to withdraw to the Don or cross over to the Republican Government of Ukraine. I command all administrators of Denikin to leave Ukraine. Noncompliance with my command means death".²¹

This and other similar orders disorganized Denikin's rear and made the Whites believe that the Partisan Army was very mobile. But quite the contrary was true as Tyutyunnyk writes,

"To be truthful, we moved very slowly and very often stayed and rested in one place. But working in our stead were the insurgents and fear."²²

Due to the fact that the enemy knew little about the "Partisan Army" and its location, greatly exaggerated stories began to appear.

²¹Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy Pokhid, op-cit., p. 33.

²²Ibid., p. 33.

⌈The truth is that the Partisan Army kept its whereabouts very secret.⌋
Indicative of the tight security is an order issued by General Pavlenko on December 8, 1919.

"After occupying a village all exits must be sealed off, no one is to leave, not even the peasants, because they may disclose the whereabouts of our encampment."²³

Added to this was the order of February 17, 1920, which directed all officers to dispose of orders by giving them to peasants for safe keeping. If such persons could not be found the orders were to be destroyed.²⁴ But the Winter Campaign could not have been possible without the cooperation and support of the peasantry. They aided the Partisan Army by collecting food supplies, providing information, leading the army through unknown terrain, transporting military equipment and even by taking part in operations. Only this support helped the UNR escape from impossible situations. At one point, this aid of the peasantry enabled the Partisan Army to break out of a "pincer" in which it found itself on January 20, 1919, in the area of Tyshkivka. Here the peasants and insurgents were instrumental in helping the UNR to break through the Red front which was facing Den'kin's Army.

As early as December 1919 the Volunteers realized their mistake. At this time they approached individual insurgent leaders and asked for help in return for weapons. The insurgents refused.²⁵ After this they turned to the UNR through their commanders. On January 7, 1920, Colonel Popov, one of the commanders of the Volunteers, sent a letter to the

²³ Docenko, Zymovy Pokhid, op-cit., p. 27, Document V.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 148. Document GXLII.

²⁵ Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 127.

Ukrainian Army in which he called for negotiations between the UNR and Volunteers.²⁶ But by this time it was too late. There was little to be gained by negotiating with a "dead body" such as the Volunteer Army. On January 21, 1920, in the village of Husivka, the Commanders of the UNR seeing no further danger from the Whites decided to renew their war against the Reds. The order of that day dispatched the Partisan Army into the region of Kaniv, Cherkassy and Chyhyryn which were deep in Bolshevik territory.²⁷

While fighting the White Army of Denikin the UNR and the Bolsheviks avoided confrontation. Although battles were fought they had little significance. At this time both the UNR and Bolsheviks began discussing a temporary halt to hostilities. But with the retreat of Denikin the temporary truce with the Bolsheviks, which many insurgent groups did not recognize, ended. In February 1919 the Partisan Army was, as mentioned before, deep in Red territory. Here they captured the cities of Kaniv and Cherkassy and the regions of Smila-Bobrynsk. On February 12 all the Groups of the "Partisan Army" met in Medvedivka where past and future operations were discussed by the Commanders.

After Denikin left, many anarchist bands made up of former White officers appeared and attacked the villages. Fortunately, there were few peasants willing to follow their example. The time of anarchy had passed and order was beginning to appear. The "self-defense" units

²⁷ Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy Pokhid., p. 58.

soon destroyed these anarchists.²⁸ All of the areas not occupied by the retreating Whites and advancing Reds, extending in range over 231 miles (350 verstvs), were in the hands of these "self-defense units" (Samokhorony). Here only the government of the UNR was recognized. A good example of this is the city of Haysyn and it's surrounding area. This city was cleared of Denikin's troops on December 15, 1919, and the Bolsheviks began setting up their rule only in February of 1920.²⁹

The small Partisan Army could not be ignored by the Red Army. The UNR forces were referred to as "bandits". Yet, the Bolsheviks could not discount the fact that the UNR was its greatest enemy. This danger did not emanate from the army itself but from the people supporting it. Cognizant of this, the Red Staff on January 23, 1920, ordered the following:

"...advance to the south into the general direction of Holovanovsk-Olviopol in order to liquidate the band of Tyutyunnyk (Partisan Army G.K.). It is imperative to hide the goal of our movement or else we will be threatened by an uprising in our rear where the population sympathizes with the bands".³⁰

b. The Insurgent War Against the Whites.

Advancing rapidly toward Kiev Denikin encountered little resistance from the Bolsheviks. His path was cleared by insurgents who had risen against the Reds. Not knowing what to expect from the Whites, the insurgents waited while the UNR attempted to come to an agreement. Denikin would not consider any proposals of the UNR. To all proposals he

²⁸ Ibid., p. 69.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 35.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 58 - 59.

gave a counter proposal which consisted of "Russia One and Indivisible" and "either disband your armies or join mine". Since the Ukrainians failed to recognize Denikin's terms, hostilities soon began. The policies that Denikin initiated alienated the Ukrainian peasantry. Arrogant orders such as that of General May-Mayevsky which forbade the use of the "Little Russian" (Ukrainian) language in schools convinced many that even the Bolsheviks were better than the Whites.³¹ The military units of Denikin also contributed to the general dissatisfaction. Of this force, General Wrangel wrote:

"The army, brought up on arbitrary rule, plunder, drunkenness, under the leadership of men who demoralized the rank and file by their example - such an army could not recreate Russia."³²

The attack against the UNR was the signal for an all-out war against the Volunteer Army. Insurgent groups fighting against the Bolsheviks now turned their weapons against the Whites. The call to arms which spread like lightning throughout all of Ukraine was: "To arms against the Bolsheviks in epauletts."³³

With the slogans of "One and Indivisible" Denikin brought old social ideas which threatened to rob the peasantry of the "achievements of the Revolution." Land divided among peasants was to be given back to the land magnates. These owners not only sought to get back their land but also satisfaction and revenge. Thus, in August 1919, Prince Volkonsky,

³¹ Docenko, Litopys Ukrainskoyi Revolucii, op-cit., pp. 173 - 174.

³² Stewart, op-cit., p. 345.

³³ Dolynsky, op-cit., p. 217.

[a large land owner in the Kurks Province, after reclaiming his lands]
ordered the village elders to kneel and beg his forgiveness.³⁴

General Wrangel who was later to take command of the White Army,
and who was more sensitive to social change, wrote the following of
Denikins rule:

"This insane and cruel policy provoked a reaction,
alienated these who had been ready to become our
allies, and turned into enemies these who had
sought our friendship."³⁵

The introduction of terror led to many peasant uprisings and at-
tacks against White units. Hundreds of villages were burned in reprim-
sal. Many peasants fled from Left Bank Ukraine to the Right Bank.
Others stayed behind and fought in any way that was accessible to them.
Farm implements and other objects were placed in the way of the advanc-
ing or retreating Whites. In September in the counties of Kobylack,
Kremenchug, Zolotonish, and Lubensk large revolts broke out. The city
of Kobylack was attacked by 400 peasants who attempted to destroy the
White garrison. Near Zamenka, Piltava, and Ludyanci the insurgents
destroyed all railroad communications. The revolt spread to the Roma-
don - Lykhovycia areas.³⁶ On October 18, in the vicinity of Kiev, 17
villages arose and for a while occupied the cities of Poltava and
Myrhorod.³⁷

The end of 1919, therefore, was the crucial period during which

³⁴ Korolivsky, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 326.

³⁵ Stewart, op-cit., p. 368.

³⁶ Docenko, Litopys..., op-cit., p. 255.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 261.

[the Ukrainian peasant, having tasted both White and Red occupation,] began to wholeheartedly support the UNR and independence. The slogans of both captors no longer held any appeal for the peasants. Even Makhno, sensing the mood of the people, declared that he was for an independent Ukraine. Many new insurgent groups sprang up. Although not always aware of the finer points of any type of ideology, these groups were guided by common sense and their interests. Without previous contact with the UNR they made plans and adopted programs that were similar to the program of the UNR. Thus, Otaman Mudryk operating near the area of Chorny Yar had a program which was referred to as the "Ukrainian System". The program stated, "1) We are fighting for man's (muzhychke or peasant) rights; 2) We do not recognize the government of the city and therefore do not give it bread; 3) We oppose the Whites and are planning to contact the Blues (The flag of the UNR was Blue and Yellow); and 4) Land and freedom to those who fight for it."³⁸

Besides the help of the villages, the UNR also received the support of most of the Ukrainian professional, political, workers and peasants organizations. Letters poured in by the thousand and asked for an immediate war against the Whites. Many militia groups were established and threw the White forces out of their villages and counties.

In this revolutionary atmosphere the government of the UNR continued its work. In its proclamations it underlined the five basic points of its program. The UNR was fighting for: 1) an independent Ukrainian

³⁸ Klym Polischuk, Chervone Marevo (The Red Nightmare), (Lviv. - Novitnya Biblioteka, 1921), p. 41.

[Republic; 2) the transference of lands to the peasants without cost; 3) the complete protection of the worker and an 8 hour working day; 4) the right to elect, by a secret, direct, proportional vote, the representatives to all branches of the National Government; and 5) the achievement of peace and friendly relations with all countries of the world.³⁹

Every day new envoys of the insurgents arrived from their areas of operation. In most cases, these groups demanded an immediate war with Denikin. On September 17, 1919, even Otaman Zeleny arrived for instructions. This is not to say that he needed these instructions. Zeleny was always very independent in his actions and his arrival only underlined the fact that he and others like him had become penitents. Zeleny reflected the will of the insurgents and Ukrainians of that time. Although awaiting instructions, which were slow in coming, he took the initiative into his own hands. He, like most Ukrainians, realized that Petlyura's negotiations with Denikin would bear no fruit. In an interview with a reporter of the newspaper Ukraina Zeleny admitted that the hostilities between Denikin and the insurgents began very soon after the White General began his march into Ukraine. He stated that:

"We are fighting with them and will continue to fight. So far we have engaged them in 7 battles. We do not pay attention to the fact that the Armies of the Directorate are refraining from conflict with Denikin, we are fighting in order to show that the government of Denikin is not to our liking and that the populace will not come to terms with this government."⁴⁰

³⁹ Docenko, Litopys..., op-cit., p. 244.
⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 265.

Thus, while supporting the UNR and printing all the directives of the Ukrainian Government in the Ukrainian Insurgent, the organ of the partisans of Trypillya, he continued to follow the policy that served the cause of the Ukrainian peasantry.

On that same day two other insurgent representatives appeared in the General Staff of the UNR. Speaking for Otaman Anhel, insurgent leader of the areas of Poltava and Chernihiv, the delegates asked for instructions and information.⁴¹ From the Left Bank of Ukraine Petlyura received a letter from Otaman Havrashenko who encouraged the Ukrainian Army to march against the Whites. Of his activity he writes:

"We revolted; the revolt on the Left Bank grows with every minute. But you (soldiers of the UNR, G.K.), kossacks, glorious sons of Petro Daroshenko, Sirko, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Honta and Zaliznyak, should also continue your war with the Denikinovites, write letters to your fathers and brothers, urge them to join the army and help you in all that is possible. Now every peasant and worker should be in the army, no one has the right to sit at home. In my insurgent unit is my 56 year old father and all his gray haired friends, left at home are only the children and sick.

All to arms, all to the defense of your homes and our native Ukraine - Independent Ukraine."⁴²

Arriving also were insurgents from Katerynoslav who informed the Chief - Otaman of their war against the Bolsheviks from whom they captured 2 armored trains and 6 cannon. They also informed him of the fact that when the White Armies arrived they had no enemy to fight because the Bolsheviks were already thrown out by the local insurgents.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 207.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 207 - 208.

[Thus, because of White repressions, the insurgents began a war against] them and the Volunteers advanced only into areas that were clear of the insurgents.⁴³

But declarations, delegates, and letters were not all that the insurgents sent to the Chief Otaman. Arriving also was concrete information about their battles. On September 20, for example, Otaman Shepel took the cities of Zolotonosha and Pereyaslav. From there he advanced, destroying smaller White units, into the area of Bobrynsk where he occupied the railroad line to Znamenka.⁴⁴ Otaman Anhel captured Nizhyn and Brovary, in the Chernihiv area; in Katerynoslav the railroad terminals of Synelnykovo, Pavlohrad, and Lozova were taken by insurgents. Makhno and his group appeared in the area of Luhanovky and Slavyanoserbska; in the area of Kherson the insurgents operated in the region of Elysavet, Oleksandrivsk, and Dolynsk.⁴⁵

Makhno at this time was on the side of the Directorate. Soviet documents disclose that in October:

"Petlyura is active against the Whites in cooperation with Makhno. According to available information, in the middle of October, in the region of Uman-Haysyn the Petlurovite armies together with the Makhnovites fought against the Whites after which Makhno and his unit moved through Oleksandrovsk and occupied Polohy and Melytopol."⁴⁶

As long as Makhno fought on the side of Petlyura he received the full cooperation of the peasantry. His staff was informed of other

⁴³ Ibid., p. 209.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 261.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 209.

⁴⁶ Korolivsky, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 457.

Insurgent units operating in the area of Katerynoslav which numbered about 3,000 men. In return for their cooperation, Makhno attempted to mend the situation by purging his units of all Russian elements.⁴⁷ Revolts were raging through all of Ukraine. The "Starobilsky Insurgent Regiment" battled White units in the areas of Kryukiv and Chyhyryn. Also operating in this area was an insurgent group that numbered 1,500 men and other smaller units.⁴⁸

In the area of Trypillya Otaman Zeleny continued his fight against the Whites. His units were first to engage them after the fiasco in Kiev. At this time his formations were purported to number 30 to 35 thousand men.⁴⁹ This group (2 divisions) he divided into five smaller units under Otamans Suponya, Gontarenko, Proc (Chief-of-Staff) and Pylyp. The fifth group he led himself. He coordinated his army from the Hrekiv forest. During the war against the Bolsheviks he occupied the whole region on the Right Bank of the Dnieper reaching from Cherkassy to Chornobyl, and all of the Kievian area from Zvenyhorod to Radomyshl.⁵⁰ During this fight against the Bolsheviks, just prior to the outbreak of war with the Whites, he controlled and coordinated other groups and the activities of other Otamans. In the operation against the city of Uman Otamans Sokolovsky, Dyachenko, Anhel, and Satana operated in accordance with Zeleny's plans which stipulated that while he

⁴⁷ Irchan, "Makhno": op-cit., p. 121.
⁴⁸ Docenko, *Liropysh*: op-cit., p. 263.

⁴⁹ Karoliivsky, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 446. Document 501; see also Polischuk, *Otaman Zeleny*, op-cit., p. 121. During his attack against Uman he had 18,167 men, *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁵⁰ Polischuk, *Otaman Zeleny*, op-cit., p. 94.

was moving into Uman the others would take Radomyshl, Kaniv, Nizhyn and Lityn respectively.⁵¹

After the fall of Kiev, for which Zeleny has to receive his due, his army was taken out of the city in order to avoid confrontation with the Whites who were negotiating with the UNR. After the fall of Kiev to Denikin Zeleny could not bear the humiliation, attacked the Whites between Khvastiv and Bila Cerkva, defeated and drove them toward Uman. In October, he aided the UNR in its retreat to Kozyatyn and temporarily united with it. He deployed his forces on two fronts. Gontarenko was to fight against the Reds along the Zhytomyr - Berdychiv Front, while he faced the Whites in the area of Okhmatov. At this time the army of the UHA crossed to the Whites while the UNR set out on its Winter Campaign. Denikin hoping to draw Zeleny to his side, extended amnesty to the insurgents and called upon them to join him. He sent parliamentarians to the Otaman but Zeleny refused to see them.⁵² Yet Zeleny's time had come. He attacked the Whites in the area of Kaniv and after this operation encamped in the village of Kalynivka. Here he was attacked by the Whites and died from shots, fired from the rear. After this his units broke up into smaller groups and were never to play the role that they had under Zeleny.

In this period of war against the Whites the factor that must not be overlooked is that many insurgent units, while fighting the Whites,

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 103.

⁵² Denikin, op-cit., p. 132.

[did not stop the war against the Reds. True, their attacks were not as strong as before but they did exist. There were also many unorganized sporadic revolts that took place against both the Reds and Whites. Some of them have gone unnoticed while others left behind them information which helps to fill the gaps in the mosaic of insurgency.⁵³ The situation that the Whites found themselves in is clearly characterized in the report of February 11, 1920, of General Shilling to General Denikin. In his report he explained that on the Right Bank the revolts are growing in the area of Chyhyryn, Kremenchug, Kryvy Rih, Bereznovaty, Vysunsk and Uman. In the light of these revolts, the lines of communication between Kiev and Tavria are threatened. The railroad lines of Dolynska-Kryvy Rih - Aleksandrivsk are in the hands of Makhno and other insurgent units, while the railroad line Bobrynsk - Znamenka - Ekaterynoslav have long ago been surrounded by a "net of insurgents".⁵⁴

⁵³Docenko, Zymov...op-cit., pp. CXXIII and CXXIV and p. 88, Document LXXIV. According to this last document the Commander of the Partisan Army of the UNR on January 30, 1920 issued the following report: "Partisan and insurgent organizations and units of all sizes are at the following points: city of Olviopol, Kostantynivka, Rovno, Kompanivka, region of Aleksandrivka - Drachevka - Shestakova - Natbeka - Klynai. North of Elysavet the region of Fedvar, Sentov, Ivanivka, Myronivka, Osykovyta, Oboznivka, Lelekivka, Subotic, Elysavathrad, Cybuliv; Znamenka with the surrounding region; Mosharyn, region of Fedorka, Ivanivoi, Dmytrivka, Bondurivka, Yaniv, Aleksandria with areas, Novo Starodub with areas, Chechelivka; region cut off in north by villages of Petrovo, Verblyuzhka, to the west - Bratolubivka, Sofiivka, Kryvy Rih; to the east - the river Inhulec - Pyatykhatka, Katerynivka, Dalincevo, Verkhovcevo, to the station Sukhachevka, and just the railroads are occupied by insurgents under Malashko (Malolitko, Satana), south of Katerynoslav deployed is the insurgent Hladchenko. The Chyhyryn area is occupied by the insurgents of Sokura (staff in Chyhyryn)."

⁵⁴ Korolivsky, op-cit., p. 735.

[In these areas, to which General Shilling refers in his report,]
operated the First and Second Aleksandrivsk Insurgent Regiments of the
"Nyzovy" Kossacks. Other insurgents in the area numbered close to 20,000
men. They coordinated their activity and tried to avoid conflict with
the Bolsheviks who were quickly advancing south in the wake of insurgent
victories. A conference of the Otamans of the Kherson and Katerynoslav
areas decided to avoid any battles with the Bolsheviks and regarded the
Reds, in view of Trotsky's declaration that the Red army's "task is to
free, not enslave Ukraine", as a friendly power.⁵⁵

In the Dniprovsky county a revolt overthrew the Whites. Here the
insurgents were led by Pavlowsky. The disorganized Whites in their re-
treat attempted to sell the insurgents equipment for 500,000 karbovanci
(gold coins). The insurgents were unable to take advantage of this
offer due to a lack of funds.⁵⁶

During this turbulence the Partisan Army of the UNR was on its Winter
Campaign. Slowly the soldiers were getting well, and plans were being
made to reopen the regular front once the international situation became
favorable. The Partisan Army was able to survive. The supplies and
other help were given willingly by the peasants. In time of larger en-
counters with the enemy the insurgents combined their forces with that
of General Pavlenko. The Partisan Army in this favorable situation
agitated among the masses and prepared them for the imminent war against
the Reds. Meetings were called in almost every village where executive

⁵⁵ Docenko, Zymovy...op-cit., p. CXXXVIII.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. CXLII.

bodies were elected with the task of organizing, a) an administrative apparatus; b) a "self defense unit"; c) a regional executive body; d) a cultural, educational body; and e) better contact with the UNR and its army.⁵⁷

In addition, the villages also kept contact with the Otamans of the regions where the Partisan Army operated. When Talne and Uman fell to the UNR, the insurgents of the villages of Maydanetsk and Bilanka were on hand to help the "Volynian Group". At this time many Red units joined the Ukrainians.⁵⁸ After the decision of January 23, 1920, to begin the war against the Reds, the Partisan Army broke through the lines and united with Otaman Huly - Hulenko of the Kherson area. His insurgents were incorporated into the Partisan Army while Hulenko was appointed commander of the Zaporozhian Division.⁵⁹

Under the blows of the insurgents Denikins Army fell apart. Soldiers began to desert and sometimes whole units went over to the Bolsheviks or the UNR. The insurgent movement, according to the newspaper

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp 30-31. Document XII.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 47 - 48 Document XXXII.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. CXXXIX. Otaman Huly - Hulenko was a Colonel in the UNR Army. He organized a small group of soldiers and broke through the Red Front before the Winter Campaign began. He commanded all the insurgents of the area of Kherson and Katerynoslav. As a partisan of the UNR, he stands second only to Otaman Tyutyunnyk.

[Pravda of November 2, 1919, forced Denikin to use 25,000 soldiers deployed in the rear rather than the front. The fact remains that the number of troops used in expeditions and battle against the partisans was much greater than the estimate given. Denikin never thought that the insurgents would turn against him, writes Tyutyunnyk.

"The latter thought that the insurgents were fighting their class enemies (the Bolsheviks G.K.) and, as a result, it never occurred to him that he may also be destroyed by the blows of our insurgents, who were fighting against Russia of which Denikin was a representative. It looks like later he became aware of his mistake but a little late."⁶⁰

The White commanders seeing the hopelessness of their situation began to search for ways to mollify the insurgents. White officers approached Otamans Struk, Shepel and later Makhno. The Otamans refused to cooperate while Makhno had the White envoy shot. The Whites, in their letters to the UNR, admitted that they were wrong. The White Commander of the Olviopil area, seeking to turn the tide, wrote to General Pavlenko of the Partisan Army on January 7, 1920: "You have that which we do not - the friendship of the people. We have that, which you are lacking - military equipment. By our friendship we can achieve victory."⁶¹

c. The War Against the Reds.

Only the outbreak of hostilities between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Volunteer Armies of General Denikin prevented the complete annihilation of Bolshevism. The Red Armies retreated in defeat.

⁶⁰ Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy... op-cit., p. 72.

⁶¹ Docenko, Zymovy... op-cit., p. 68 Document LI.

[The peasantry, having tasted the reality of Bolshevism, fought battle after battle in the front with the Army of the UNR, and in the rear in larger and smaller insurgent formations. By now, the peasantry was convinced that it did not want what the Bolsheviks were offering. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were already intimately acquainted with the cellars of the CHEKA and its executioners. The individual nature of the peasants did not allow the Bolsheviks to herd them together into communes and collectives.]

"The Ukrainian peasantry showed itself far more conscious of its interests, far more ready to fight for them effectively than did the peasants in Russia. There was perhaps something of nationalist temperament here; it was in Ukraine that the anarchial Zaporozhian Cossack Republic, which for many decades acknowledged no authority except that of its roughly elected otaman, had existed; serfdom did not have such a long tradition behind it in Ukraine as in European Russia. Moreover, the average standard of living among the peasants was higher in Ukraine than in Northern and Central Russia. There was, consequently, a larger class of peasants with a sense of property, who were ready to form guerrilla bands and fight the Soviet requisitioning detachments to a finish."⁶²

Soviet writers today tend to extoll the virtues of the Red Army and its popularity among the masses. The fact remains that an early Soviet historian saw things different. Thus Kozelsky writes:

"The insurgent movement of 1919, completely weakened the Soviet government and did not give it an opportunity to destroy the Volunteer and Petlurovite Armies."⁶³

But one has to admit that the Bolsheviks were realists. On the

⁶² Chamberlin, op-cit ., p. 222.

⁶³ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 36.

Every day that the Partisan Army of the UNR began its Winter Campaign, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party again reiterated that it supports the self determination of nations and also expressed the need to Ukrainianize the Soviet government in Ukraine.⁶⁴

The methods of the Bolsheviks, therefore, were to be different but the goal was to remain. Trotsky in his "Instructions to the Communist agitators of Ukraine" wrote:

"It is a secret to none that Denikin did not force us out of Ukraine but the grandiose uprising of the wealthy peasants. The commune, the extraordinary commission (CHEKA G.K.), the food collecting units (Prodovolstvennie Otryadi), Jewish Commissars - the peasant learned to hate from the bottom of his heart."⁶⁵

Trotsky preparing the third invasion of Ukraine, told the agitators to obey his "ten commandments" when dealing with Ukrainians. In his commandments he told them to avoid establishing communes, inform the peasants that in Russia there is no Communism, claim that the Bolsheviks, like Petlyura, want a free Ukraine, that bread will be collected only from the "Kulaks" and will be given to poorer Ukrainians - not Russians. His policy of deceit is best characterized in commandment number six where he writes:

"The difficult situation is with Petlyura in whom the Ukrainian peasant is putting his hope. One has to be careful. Only an idiot or provocateur without knowing the situation will everywhere confirm the fact that we

⁶⁴ V. Naddnipryanec, Ukrayinski Natsional-Komunisty (Ukrainian National-Communists), (Munich: Belay Publishing Co., 1956), p. 18.

⁶⁵ Docenko, Zymovy....op-cit., p. 150. Document CXVII.

are at war with Petlyura. Until the time that Denikin is defeated, spread the rumor that the Soviet Government is an ally of Petlyura.⁶⁶

To avoid any future confrontation with the insurgents heavy emphasis was put upon disarming the population. The Trotsky "Instructions" however fell into the hands of the General Staff of the Partisan Army who capitalized upon them.

While the war with Denikin continued, the Bolsheviks and UNR avoided confrontation and even talks were held between the two in Moscow. The insurgents, to a great extent, also avoided open skirmishes with the Reds. Some groups, even these who were very nationalistic, such as the units of Otamans Huly-Hulenko, Meleshko, and Chuchupaka, temporarily recognized the "Soviet" principle and in this way were able to first concentrate on Denikin.⁶⁷ Many insurgents felt that:

"It is necessary to put the Bolsheviks to sleep by accepting the Soviet program, temporarily consolidating the Ukrainian elemental force, organize a Ukrainian (Red G.K.) army which will enable them to take power into their hands.⁶⁸

This was in line with the thinking of the Borotbisty. The Russians were well aware of this trend yet for the time being a "modus-operandi" seemed to prevail.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, were quick to organize a "Ukrainian Government" in the body of the "All-Ukrainian Revolutionary

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 150-151. Document CXVIII.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 91. Document LXXVIII.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. CXLVI.

"Committee" which was headed by Petrovsky, Zatonsky and Manuilsky. On January 20, 1920, they called a conference of all the insurgents of the area of Cherkassy. At the very beginning of the conference more than half of the delegates left in protest to the use of the word "comrade" (tovarish) rather than "dobrodiy" (sir). The remaining insurgents agreed to join the Red Ukrainian Army but with certain stipulations and safeguards. They also demanded that the Bolsheviks remove Nillen, a Russian chauvenist, from the "Revcom".⁶⁹

But the Bolsheviks knew that sooner or later a clash had to come. In his secret order of February 28, 1920, therefore, Trotsky commanded that the "professional partisans" have to be liquidated because "this is the problem that will determine the life or death of Soviet Ukraine."⁷⁰

The new policies of the Bolsheviks and their interpretations sowed new illusions in the Ukrainian masses. The Left Ukrainian political parties that were previously rejected by the Bolsheviks were now allowed, by their decision of December 7, 1919, to join the Russian Communist Party. These illusions which were even permeating the UNR Army were shattered, however, shortly after the cessation of hostilities against the Whites. The order to take away the weapons from the populace and "place them into the hands of the worker-peasant Red Army" brought about a change of attitude towards the "friendly" Bol-

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. CXLVII.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. CXLVII.

sheviks. On February 8, 1920, therefore, the Partisan Army renewed hostilities with the Reds at Cybulivo.

One of the areas of resistance to both Reds and Whites was the region of Kholodny Yar. This area had its center at the village of Melnyky which alone had lost 300 of its best sons in the insurgent struggle. Headed by Chuchupaka this insurgent area had a unique military organization which was divided into "active" and "reserve" hundreds. The active hundreds would always be on the alert while the reserve hundreds were summoned only in emergency by the sounding of the church bell. The General-Staff of the Kholodny Yar was in the historic, unapproachable Motryn Convent. At this time Otaman Chuchupaka, could, in case of emergency, summon as many as 15,000 men.⁷¹ Vasyl Chuchupaka was respected by the partisans. His family lost 5 sons during the struggle.

During the war against the Whites Chuchupaka, like Huly-Hulenko, recognized the "Soviet Program" and even allowed the Reds to pass through his territory. He even provided "volunteers for the Red Army who after receiving military equipment deserted and came back into Kholodny Yar."⁷²

After Chuchupaka, who shot himself in 1920 when surrounded by the Reds, the leader of Kholodny Yar became Ivan Derkach. During this time the insurgents attacked the city of Novo-Myrhorodka, destroyed the military barracks there, freed the prisoners and captured the much

⁷¹ Horlis-Horsky, Kholodny Yar, op-cit., Vol. I, p. 23.

⁷² Ibid., p. 49.

needed weapons.⁷³ For a while the Partisan Army camped in Kholodny Yar where the peasants and insurgents kept watch over it and allowed it to rest. Soon Khanenko, one of Petlyuras courriers arrived and urged the insurgents to preserve their strength until the time that other orders are received. At this time, there was no longer any conflict between the Kholodny Yar and Chyhyryn "Republics". Kotsur was dead and all of the villages were now under the national flag. The area was reorganized into a brigade which was made up of three "Kurins" (Regiments).

At one point the 2nd Bolshevik Brigade numbering 1,000, not knowing the area came into the vicinity of Motryn Convent and lost 200 men. The garrison of the convent consisted of 700 insurgents.⁷⁴

As the war with Denikin drew to a close, new Bolshevik units were drawn to this region with the purpose of destroying the insurgents of Kholodny Yar and the surrounding areas. Other Otamans operating in this area were Kalyberda and Skyrda near the Dnieper, Khmara in the "Chorny Lis" area; Kobchuk near Chyhyryn, Shepel and Luty in the nearby steppe area, Blakytyn and Chorny Voron in the Kherson area, Kvasha and Zahorodny near Rozumievka, and Holy near the area of Tetiev - Horodyshche.⁷⁵

One did not have to be a Von Moltke to realize what weakened the enemy. Common sense guided the activity of the insurgents. One group of partisans, that was made up of the local peasants close to the Kiev-

⁷³Ibid., p. 91.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 160.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 172.

[Zhytomyr railroad line formulated plans which consisted of: a) seizing the food and military transports; b) destroying the "Prodzahony"; c) wrecking the local Communist government apparatus; d) keeping a certain amount of conspiracy and organizing small partisan units; 3) harassing the rear of the enemy during the advance of the UNR Army.⁷⁶

While the smaller groups could plan only modest disruptive attacks, such Otamans as Zeleny, Makhno, Volynets, Shepel, Blakytny, Chuchupaka, Derkach, Luty, Huly-Hulenko and others, who had at their disposal large numbers of men, could execute grandiose operations. After Kiev, Zeleny, it will be recalled, fought both Reds and Whites vigorously. In October of 1919 the Bolsheviks dispatched their cavalry units and nine ships on both sides of the Dnieper in an attempt to destroy Zeleny.⁷⁷ On many occasions Zeleny threatened Kiev. He took the city of Uman and kept it for four days. While on these operations the Bolsheviks, seeking to avenge themselves, attacked Zeleny's native Trypillya, killed his mother and burned the village. The young villagers who were able to escape this "pogrom" organized themselves into a smaller unit under Zeleny's fiancée "Marusia" and destroyed the responsible Red General-Staff.⁷⁸

Zeleny's insurgents were able to carry out many surprise attacks against the Reds. Having the support of the peasants even Zeleny's large group could hide itself without any effort. A good example of

⁷⁶ Khomychiv, op-cit., Vol. I, p. 302.

⁷⁷ Korolivsky, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 416.

⁷⁸ Polischuk, Otaman Zeleny, op-cit., p. 154.

[this is the city of Obukhiv where Zeleny dispersed 2,000 of his partisans with the hope of trapping a Soviet Cavalry Regiment which consisted of 150 cavalry. Most of the partisans hid in the church and when night came attacked the sleeping Bolsheviks, of whom only 8 were able to escape.⁷⁹

After the Kiev incident, many officers of the UHA rather than join Denikin turned partisan. They were able to provide the advice and leadership to many insurgent groups and made their movement fit into a more national framework. The group of Otaman Volynets of Haysyn, which was raising havoc in the Bolshevik rear, welcomed many such officers. After Zeleny's death, his insurgents broke up into smaller units and were led by UNR and UHA officers. The movement, in effect, began to achieve forms which required teamwork and coordination. The directives poured in from the UNR General-Staff and the attacks began to have a general purpose. At this time the insurgents, according to many sources, numbered at 50 - 60 or 100 thousand men.⁸⁰ These figures in my opinion are very conservative.

An interesting Otaman is Marusia Sokolovska. Her father was a wealthy peasant who led an insurgent group and eventually lost his life. Marusia took the place of her father and became an able commander. She

⁷⁹ Antin Krezub, "Grupa Polk. Rogulskoho" Kalendar Chervonoyi Kalyny (1929 p. 55. The author's real name is Dumin. A former colonel in the UNR Army, he became Otaman of one of the Zeleny formations after Otaman Zeleny's death.

⁸⁰ Kuzminsky, op-cit., p. 14.

operated in the area of Velyke Polovecke and Radomyshl. Her strength amounted to 1,000 men, 10 machine guns and three cannon. She attacked the cities of Khvastiv and Motylivka. Here, she encountered both the Reds and Whites and was forced to retreat. She was killed by someone who fired through the window of her headquarters.⁸¹ After her, Shabaturka became Otaman.

Another Otaman that was already mentioned earlier was Shepel. Due to his ability to survive and reappear every time that the Reds loudly claimed his death and the destruction of his insurgents, he began to be called "Vanka Stanka" (a doll sold in the Troicko-Serhiivsky Monastery which had the ability to jump to its feet even when laid down). Upon Bolshevik allegations relating to his death, he would have his insurgents pass leaflets through the cities in his area which stated: "On this date I have returned from my leave and have begun to carry out my duties."⁸² His "duties" consisted of an attack against the cities of Vynnytsia, Zhmerynka and others. His daring was well known in his area. Before his attack on Vynnytsia he came into the city dressed as an old lady and incited a riot in the market place. During the trial of his father by the Bolsheviks, he came into the courtroom dressed as a nurse. His area of concentration:

"Starokonstantyniv, Lityn, Letychiv, Mezhybozh, Khmelnyk, Vynnytsia was the only region where the Bolsheviks did not feel as masters. Chase him out of Mezhybozh he appears in Khmelnyk, - surround Khmelnyk with large forces,

⁸¹ Klym Polischuk, Chervone Marevo op-cit., p. 79.

⁸² Sereda, op-cit., Vol. II (Februry 1930), p. 6.

and he brings order in Letychiv. "Vanka Stanka" - that's all."⁸³

A similar personality in the Haysyn - Bratslav region was Otaman Volynets. In the spring of 1920, when the Partisan Army was on its Winter Campaign he, with the units of Otamans Holub and Lysohor, took the city of Haysyn. He mobilized a force of 1,700 bayonets and 800 cavalry and formed it into the "Haysyn - Bratslav Insurgent Brigade."⁸⁴ Finding out about this formation, the Bolsheviks were forced to divert the reserves of the 60th and 44th Soviet Divisions against Volynets who after a few unseccessful encounters moved his area of operations east.

Honchar, a CHEKA member of the Chernihiv Province and an active member of BB Units (Zahony po Borbe Z Banditismom) whose task it was to destroy "counter revolution and banditism" wrote that: "at this time there were more bands (insurgent units G.K.) than ants."⁸⁵

The Bolsheviks attempted to talk Makhno into joining them on January 8, 1920. The "batko" refused - and attacked the 41st and 45th Soviet Divisions who received orders to liquidate him. After suffering some setbacks, Makhno and his "synky" raided the areas of Hulay Pole, Aleksandrivsk, Polohy, Nikopol, Novomoskovska, Katerynoslav, Pavlohrad and Bakhmut. In all these areas all vestige of Soviet power and administration disappeared.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 7.

⁸⁴ Sereda, op-cit., Vol. II, (July - August 1930), p. 22.

⁸⁵ Honchar, "Front Bez Kardoni" (A Front Without Borders) Molod Ukrainy, (August 2, 1967), p. 3.

During the Winter Campaign of the Partisan Army of the UNR the peasants and insurgents took part in almost every operation against the Bolsheviks. In January 1920 the German colonists of Odessa were favorably disposed to the UNR who later sent Colonel Shramenko into the area to form guerilla bands out of them. In the meantime Otaman Chuchupaka advanced and met the "Volynsky Group" in the area of Kumeyka. General Halkin raised the flag of revolt against the Reds in Tyraspol and joined the Partisan Army with his units. During the march contact was kept with most of the Otamans. At the beginning of February the Partisan Army took Kaniv. On the night of 18 and 19 February, the city of Kamenka fell. The city of Ananiv fell before the insurgents of Otaman Pshonnek, a UNR officer. Cooperating here was also the "Starobilsky Insurgent Regiment". The insurgents of both groups joined the Partisan Army and continued to fight in its ranks after it resumed its duties as a regular army.⁸⁶ The City of Balta also fell to the UNR partisans. On April 27, 1920 the forces achieved a significant victory against the Bolsheviks in the city of Voznesensk. By this victory, where over 400 Bolsheviks were killed, the army replenished its stores of ammunition and supplies that were accumulated here.⁸⁷ A moral victory came when the cavalry Brigade of the UHA under otaman Sheparovich crossed over to the Partisan Army on April 25. In conjunction with the operations of the UNR Otaman Volynets took Bratlav. On May 2, his insurgents and the units of Otamans

⁸⁶ Docenko, Zymovy...op-cit., p. 174 Document CLXXII. See also Tsapko, op-cit., p. 87.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 175. Document CLXXIII.

Nestorenko and Trutenko took part in the UNR operations against Vapnyarka.⁸⁸

The aid extended to the Partisan Army was a risk that the insurgents were willing to take. Thus, the battle for Ananiyiv and Balta which was initiated by the unarmed peasants, cost them the villages of Pasicely, Baytale, Selivanivka, Kipetske and Onufriivka which were burned by the Reds.⁸⁹

Most of the soldiers of the UHA were dissatisfied with the decision to aid Denikin. Many, as was mentioned, joined the insurgents while the rest of the UHA was recuperating from typhoid fever. As the year drew to a close, officers of the UHA signed a secret agreement of 24 December 1919, by which they would again rejoin the UNR. This plan was never realized however. Denikin fell and the UHA forces deployed in the area of Balta - Olviopil - Birzula remained stationary. English observers asked the still recuperating army to move to Rumania and thus save itself. England would extend all the help it could. The UHA refused to leave its sick, however, and in order to preserve itself it now signed an agreement with the Bolsheviks.⁹⁰ The UHA planned to join the Partisan Army of the UNR but without success. Only small units and the Cavalry Brigade of Otaman Sheparovych were able to achieve union with General Pavlenko.

Many officers of the UHA managed to escape from the Bolsheviks

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 193. Document CXC.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 199. Document CXCVIII.

⁹⁰ Dolynsky, op-cit., p. 229.

While the army was being prepared to march against the Whites. One whole brigade of Red UHA, as it was now called, (Chervona UHA) was stopped by the insurgents in the area of Skybnytsi Velyki in late April. The insurgents were led by Otaman Sadovsky and their unit was known as the "Kashpirivsky Regiment" which encompassed a territory of 75 villages.⁹¹ In the attack against this UHA Brigade, only 13 villages took part, and captured 2,000 soldiers. After killing all Communists and commissars, the soldiers were released. The same happened to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Red Regiments of the UHA who were captured near the village of Cherephy. Regarding the Galicians as Ukrainians the insurgents released them after clearing the UHA units of Communists.⁹²

⁹¹ M. Irchan, Tragedia Pershoho Travnnya (The Tragedy of the First of May) Vol. I, (New York: "Molot" Publishers 1923), p. 88. The author was in the UHA at the time of the incorporation of that body into the Red Army. He was in charge of the office of information.

⁹² Ibid., p. 114.

CHAPTER VI - ON THE ROAD TO GOLOGOTHA

a. The End of the Winter Campaign and the Resumption of a Regular Front.

Prior to the military setbacks in November of 1919 the Directorate and its diplomats continued to seek aid and understanding in the West. Negotiations were proceeding at a satisfactory pace with Poland when one disaster after another struck the Army of the UNR. To preserve the army the Winter Campaign was agreed upon.

While the Army of the UNR was making its five month sojourn in the rear of the enemy the negotiations began to bear fruit. The Poles under General Pilsudski saw the inevitability of a military conflict with the Bolsheviks. Seeking allies:

"Pilsudski had in fact become convinced that, on the one hand, Denikin's troops "were not worth much" and would soon fall back; and, on the other hand, no satisfactory agreement on a territorial settlement could be negotiated with Denikin because of the latter's claim of "Russia One and Indivisible" and the predominance of reactionary elements at the Volunteer headquarters."¹

The only other ally with whom the Poles could achieve a "satisfactory" agreement was the Government of the UNR which was willing to make any reasonable concessions in an effort to keep what it had achieved during the previous years of conflict and strife.

On December 2, 1919, in preliminary negotiations the "Vapnyarka Declaration" was signed between the two Governments. The negotiations were not favorable to the Ukrainians but the general consensus among the

¹ Brinkley, op-cit., pp. 207 - 208.

[diplomats was "what have we got to lose?" The prevailing attitude seemed to be one of optimism and faith in a brighter future. On April 22, 1920, a final treaty of alliance between Ukraine and Poland was signed. Poland achieved her "dream of the past" by getting the boundaries of 1772. In return for this painful concession the Ukrainians received promises of military as well as economic aid. The Western Ukrainians protested vigorously to such an agreement which placed them under Polish sovereignty. Yet the UNR had little choice. In its efforts to survive it had used every channel open to it to obtain aid and moral support from the Entente countries. When this failed the most drastic and painful methods had to be used. The obvious calculations of the Ukrainian diplomats was to strive to at least create a "Piedmont" from which the idea of Ukrainian Liberation could be initiated and eventually achieved.]

Pilsudski undoubtedly knew that the boundaries of 1772 could never be maintained if Ukraine was allowed to gain its independence. He was not impressed with the Army of the UNR but could not ignore its potential strength and the insurgent movement at its command. A successful war with Russia necessitated the signing of peace with the UNR which would keep the Poles from repeating Denikin's mistakes. He was aware that the Ukrainian insurgents were more annoying to the Reds and Whites than Petlyura's Regular Army.²

The Partisan Army left for its Winter Campaign with the prevailing

² Chamberlin, op-cit., p. 223.

[idea that the regular front would resume once the international situa-
tion became more favorable to the UNR. Not all of the soldiers went
with General Pavlenko. About 3,500 to 4,000 remained due to the typhoid
epidemic and other reasons. These soldiers and diplomats continued to
use every means available to continue the fight. The Polish camps in
which about 10 to 15 thousand UNR soldiers were interned after the Novem-
ber crisis were being readied by the UNR agitators to continue the war.
Efforts were also being made to free the Ukrainians who were interned
in prisoners-of-war camps in Germany and Italy. General Udovychenko
who, sick with typhoid fever, was taken into the area of Odessa by the
Whites, after recuperating began to organize military formations out of
the Ukrainian prisoners of war. At this point the Whites, convinced that
they had lost, no longer protested to the organization of the 20,000
Ukrainian soldiers in the area.³ As early as January 18, 1920, Major
Yolsh of the British Military Mission spoke to General Udovychenko and
other Ukrainian officers. He pointed out that Odessa had to be protected
because the "honor of England demanded it."

"The Volunteer Army has lost its meaning. All the mili-
tary equipment is at your disposal. Our fleet will help
you with our mighty artillery."⁴

The Ukrainian officers agreed providing that: the overall command
in the region of Odessa would be placed in the hands of the Ukrainian
General Staff; and, that the Volunteers would leave the territory of
Ukraine.

³ Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 129.

⁴ Ibid., p. 129.

These counter-proposals were strenuously apposed by General Shil-ling of the Volunteers. The Whites finally agreed to the terms on January 23, when the Reds were only 60 kilometers from Odessa. On January 25, 1920, the Bolsheviks captured Odessa. Thus, once again, the Whites and Ukrainians had lost because of a lack of agreement. But the Entente was unable to see the error of its policies and once again in 1920 gambled on the Whites who were now commanded by General Wrangel.

General Udovychenko shifted his organizing activities into the region of the Mohylivsky and Yampil'sky counties. Here many soldiers joined the UNR, and within a short time his force had 400 officers, 1,000 soldiers, 10 cannon, 40 machine guns, one cavalry regiment of Don Kossacks and one cavalry company of Kuban Kossacks.⁵ On February 17, 1920, the troops of Udovychenko began operations against the Bolsheviks. His units began to move west with the idea of uniting with the forces of the UNR which were preparing to attack the Bolsheviks in league with the Poles. On April 25, the Polish and Ukrainian Armies began a vigorous attack against the Reds. On May 2, 1920, General Pavlenko and his Partisan Army returned and was deployed along the line Hrushka-Oknytsia-Trybushivka-Verbky-Dzygivka-Yampil, next to the VI Polish Army.

The Partisan Army during its Winter Campaign, had achieved most of the plans, directives, and hopes put upon it. First the Army, threatened by total annihilation, was able to preserve its military capability. Secondly, it quickened the process of the destruction of the White Army.

⁵ Mazepa. op-cit., Vol. II, p. 212.

Thirdly, because of it there was no break in the sovereignty of Ukraine between 1919 and 1920. All elements of sovereignty, government, population, and territory - through the whole 5 months, were in the hands of the Ukrainian National Republic - at different times, in different areas, but always on the territory of Ukraine. Four, the existence of the Ukrainian Army, even if on enemy territory, placed the Ukrainian diplomats in Warsaw into a stronger negotiating position. Five, it left a strong imprint upon the consciousness of the Ukrainian masses. The slogans and army of the UNR was supported by the peasantry as "its" Army. Six, it forced the Bolsheviks to adopt a new policy which had to accept the fact that without the Ukrainian language or declaration of the sovereignty of Ukraine the Reds could never achieve their goals. Finally, the Winter Campaign left a lasting imprint upon future Ukrainian military endeavors and gave birth to traditions which were reflected in later acts of the insurgents in Ukraine.⁶

Examining the military achievements of the Partisan Army during the month of April, just prior to rejoining the Regular Army, one can see in it a serious threat for the Bolsheviks. In that month, the Partisan Army captured the cities of Olviopol, Uman, Haysyn, Rivno, Bobrynets, Voznesensk, Ananiyiv, and the station of Balta where all the Bolshevik reserves from the region of Odessa were deployed. Besides these cities, there were many railroad centers as well as villages captured and Bolshevik garrisons and governments dispersed or destroyed. In all en-

⁶ Zadoyanny, "Zymovy...", op-cit., p. 13.

counters peasant units were on hand to aid the UNR. In his report

General Pavlenko writes:

"14. Everywhere the attitude of the peasants to the Army is sympathetic and just the opposite - very hostile to Communists, but especially in these places where they conducted requisitions.

15. Every place where the Army (UNR G.K.) marched revolts are spreading. The peasants see the opportunity to overthrow the Communist regime and now a great number of small partisan units are annihilating smaller enemy formations everywhere."

⁷ Docenko, Zymovy..., op-cit., pp. 201-202. In the Kievian Military Region the Bolsheviks, in Document CCIV pp. 202-203, dated March 25, 1920, categorized the insurgents into two types and enumerated them as follows: a) "Maneuverable Bands" consist of the units of Tyutyunnyk 2,200 men encompassing parts of three Provinces; units of Pavlenko encompass an area of 100 villages; the units of Huly-Hulenko encompass 70 villages. The second grouping, according to the report, consists of "bands of local character" and include Otamans Tereshko, Rukoyid and Struk encompassing about 50 villages; units of Otaman Yuris encompassing 10 villages; units of Otamans Zhyro, Mordalevych, and Kovalchuk - 20 villages; units of Alanda, Mojolevsky, and Demchenko - 40 villages; units of Snyatnenko - 10 villages; units of Kobenko and Kovalenko - 15 villages; units of Ulyana, Syurupa, Chuchupaka, Huzenko and Trepeta - 40 villages; units of Romashko - 20 villages.

The report also includes areas where the Petlyurovite "spirit" permeates and the villages energetically support the UNR. Included here are the area of Haysyn; the Kievian Region - 30 villages; the Chyhyryn Region - 60 villages; the Yahotynsky Region with its 2,000 armed men who control the villages of Popivka, Oblonovka, Lozovy Yar, Tomarovka, Sloboda, Hodnovka and others.

"The overall situation in the Region (Kievian G.K.) is as follows: the government, where it exists, takes the forms of Revcomy and Kombedy (Revolutionary Committees and Committees of Poor peasants G.K.), is separated from the people and is not always authoritative..."

A UNR document CCV, p. 205, for the same month enumerates twenty Otamans of larger formations. Exact figures as to the number of men in the units are given only for seven of them which total 11,100 insurgents.

The prestige of the "Partisan Army" spread through all of Ukraine. The raid to the Left Bank of Ukraine was stopped after four days of operations and the Army was ordered to join the Polish-Ukrainian Armies in the west. This raid into territory where the masses were much more ignorant and subdued elicited a great chaos in the Bolshevik lines, and caused the Red commanders to bring in new units from the front deploying them in the Partisan Army area of operations.

Upon the appearance of the UNR forces in the Left Bank, the peasants began to oppose the "Prodnaohy" units and refused to give up their harvest. Insurgent envoys came from the regions of Poltava, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Melytopol, Luhansk and other areas. Receiving instructions to prepare for an All-Ukrainian uprising from the General Staff, they went back to their areas of operations laden with pamphlets and other materials about the UNR and its goals.⁸

The Partisan Army in its campaign to educate the masses initiated lectures, meetings, and patriotic demonstrations in every city and village on their way. In every larger city captured the "Political Educators" were busy utilizing the local press to print leaflets, directives and other materials that were passed from hand to hand. Thus, upon taking the city of Uman they printed 200,000 pamphlets, in the city of Kaniv - 200,000 leaflets, and in the city of Cherkassy 250,000 leaflets.⁹

Below are a few excerpts from leaflets written by Otaman Tyutyunnyk:

⁸ Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy...op-cit., p. 60.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 36 and 59.

In his declaration to the peasants he wrote:

"We don't have to tell you who we are or what we are fighting for-we are not calling you to us. We are not going to teach you. You will be taught by the landlords under the command of Denikin.

You will be taught by the Bolsheviks under the command of Bronshtein-Trotsky. And you yourself, when there is no place to go - will follow us."

Admonishing the peasants for their inactivity Tyutyunnyk stated:

"We fought our enemies with rage, every step was sprinkled with our blood and covered by bodies. What were you doing - peasants? You threw flowers in our path, welcomed us, but did not grasp arms and did not stand up for your rights and liberty. You were not our enemy, because, you and we are one - the Ukrainian People; more than that, you loved us, but not as much as yourselves. You did not face the enemy as the Ukrainian Army did. Step by step we retreated, and step by step we fought the enemy and in the end prevailed."¹⁰

In another declaration Tyutyunnyk told the peasants to clean and oil their weapons. In this document in ten points he gave the peasants directives, information about the UNR and its land policies, and most important, hope in an "All-Ukrainian Uprising" against all foreigners.¹¹

An interesting declaration in a similar vein was written by Otaman Huly-Hulenko. In it he told the peasants, "burdened by toil," to look around at the advancing: "Muscovite - hungry, unemployed band which again is establishing the commune and enriching parasites and thieves". He called upon them to take a look at the trains that bring them "Chinese, Hungarians, Latvians, hungry Katsaps, and together with this the commune, chrezvychaika (CHEKA G.K.), kombedy (Committees of Poor Peasants), train-

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 93.

¹¹ Ibid., pp 95-96 and Sereda, op-cit., Vol.II (October 1930), p. 11.

[loads of soviet money, which is worthless". In return for these "goods" the peasant is to provide "hungry-tattered Muscovy" with food products and other goods. "What do you see now?" he asks of the peasants. "Is this government yours - is it in your hands?" His call to arms begins with, "Enough! Patience has ended. It is necessary to once and for all finish with these tyrants. Take (your) rifle, pitchfork, shovel and drive the parasites from our native land. You will expell them as you did Denikin, and as you expelled (them) twice before."¹²

But the Bolsheviks continued to carry out their designs against Ukraine. Having twice suffered defeat at the hands of the peasantry they attempted to come into power through deceit. The device used was the "Trotsky Instructions" by which agitators received "ten commandments" of behavior in Ukraine. But the peasant had learned his lesson quickly. As early as February 1920, when Soviet agitators urged the local partisans of Moshyn to attack the Partisan Army which, according to the information given the partisans, were Whites, the insurgents quickly assembled their units and began to advance. Upon discovering that the purported "Whites" were UNR units they turned back without firing one shot.¹³ The peasants and insurgents had gone far, much too far, in their education to the great discomfort of the Bolsheviks.

On May 6, 1920 the First Winter Campaign ended. The Partisan Army broke through the Bolshevik front in the area of Yampoly-Vapnyarka. In

¹² Docenko, Zymovy....op-cit., p. 153, Document CXLIV.

¹³ Ibid., p. 76 Document LXIV.

[the village of Kedros the bodies of the officers who died in this raid,¹⁴ and which were taken along by loyal soldiers, were laid to rest. These were the last casualties incurred during the Partisan War of the Regular Army of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The same day that the Polish-Ukrainian Armies advanced unexpected aid arrived from the UHA which had broken with the Bolsheviks and declared its allegiance to the UNR. Hating the Poles and at the same time looking askance at the UNR who gave their homeland to their allies, they nevertheless were determined to fight for a free Ukraine.¹⁴

With the arrival of the Partisan Army its 1,005 officers, 8,737 kossacks, 14 cannons and 114 machine guns, the Ukrainian Regular Army became a formidable force.¹⁵ Initially, the Polish-Ukrainian allies were successful against the Bolsheviks. They drove the Reds back and captured Kiev. The White Armies of General Wrangel in the meantime also began operations against the Bolsheviks. Wrangel's units again marched into Ukraine and again little heed was paid to the Ukrainian question. On August 14, 1920 Wrangel's army and his administration was recognized by France as the "Government of South Russia".¹⁶

The Polish-Ukrainian front at this time began rolling back. The Bolshevik cavalry under Budenny began a vigorous attack against the Poles. About the retreat of the Polish Army, George Stewart writes as follows:

¹⁴ Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy...., op-cit., p. 6.

¹⁵ Docenko, Zymovy, op-cit., p. 203 Document CCIII.

¹⁶ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 47.

"Budenny and his Red cavalry followed the fleeing army into Galicia until Petlyura's troops stopped them before Lublin"....."In consequence of the collapse of the right wing of the Polish Army, the left wing in White Russia was compelled to retreat rapidly to Poland. The advance of Pilsudski's forces to Kiev was in large part due to Polish lack of moderation and the bad behavior of the troops of General Haller and General Shepicky."¹⁷

Budenny's forces were stopped near Warsaw by Polish units and the 6th Ukrainian Division. After this "Miracle on the Vistula", as it is known, the Ukrainian Army whose front was not disorganized or penetrated, attacked the Russians on August 14-15 destroying the 41st and 60th Soviet Infantry Division.¹⁸ After the "Miracle" for which General Bezruchko, Chief-of-Staff of the UNR, should receive part of the credit, the UNR Army victoriously advanced to Zbruch, Proskuriv, Bar, Zhmerynka, and Polske. At this point, when everything was going well the Poles signed an armistice with the Bolsheviks on October 11, 1920.

Breaking their word, the Poles abandoned the Ukrainian Army to its own resources. The Polish-Ukrainian Agreement stipulating the equipping and enlarging of the UNR Army was abrogated. Left without powerful Allies, on the eve of the Wrangel's defeat in the south, the UNR decided to continue the fight. In view of the fact that the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance did not accomplish the desired objectives and the Ukrainian Army, although carrying much of the war on its back, was not reequipped or allowed to expand, its military potential was small. Searching for a

¹⁷ Stewart, op-cit., p. 367.

¹⁸ V. P. Savchenko, "Vtracheni Mozhlyvosti dla Peremohy v lystopadi 1920r." "Lost Opportunities that could have meant victory in November 1920), Tabor, No. 2 (July 1924), p. 105.

Way to strengthen itself the UNR agreed to negotiations with the Russian Political Committee in Warsaw. Borys Savinkov, the Committees head, agreed to incorporate into the UNR Army the troops that were at his disposal. These forces consisted of the Third Russian Army, made up of 3,500 Bolshevik Prisoners of war under General Peremkin and the cavalry Division of Yakovlev. The latter's units took up their positions on the left wing of the UNR under its command. The troops of General Peremkin were deployed next to the Army of the UNR but were obliged to obey only orders of an operative character. On October 5, the UNR signed a convention with the Russian Political Committee. The Committee recognized the independence of the Ukrainian National Republic.¹⁹

On November 8, 1920, in the city of Yaltushkiv the General Staff of the UNR approved an all-out offensive against the Bolsheviks. The attack was to begin on November 12. On the eve of the offensive the Ukrainian Army had 20,000 soldiers half of whom were without arms. The ammunition situation was extremely poor. Peasant boys searched the fields for bullets, while special units even searched the bottom of the Dniester River where an ammunition barge was to have sunk during World War I.²⁰ But all this counted for little. On November 11, the Bolsheviks began their offensive and the Ukrainian Army was forced to cross into the Polish held territory and was interned by their former ally. Some chose to continue to fight, refusing to give up their arms, broke through the Bolshevik

¹⁹ Mazepa, op-cit., Vpl. III. p. 61.

²⁰ Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 156.

lines and became partisans.

b. Insurgency: May to November 1920.

The year 1920 saw the emergence of large organized units in many areas of Ukraine. Previously we have mentioned the beginnings of the "Kholodny Yar Republic" and some of its activities. By 1920, the "Republic" embraced an area which absorbed the former "Republic" of the anarchist Kotsur and much of the region of Chyhyryn.

"Kholodny Yar with its Motryn convent became the General Staff not only of local insurgents, but even of these along the Dnieper, beyond Chyhyryn to Cherkassy and Znamenka. It became the center of attraction for smaller independent groups of insurgents and in the event an otamanchyk (minor otaman G.K.) was pursued by Red formations - he found refuge in Kholodny Yar."²¹

Here the main factor that moved the insurgents into action was not that of a social nature but one that was deeply connected with the past and deep traditionalism. According to Colonel Artyushenko, the social question was a variable while tradition and national feeling seemed to play the main role. He states that:

"On the foundation of heroic kossack spirit grew the national-social individualism that awakened all of the revolts which took place on the Left Bank".²²

Others also agree that in the area of Kholodny Yar the tradition of

²¹ Yuri-Horlis - Horsky, "Kholodny Yar", Litopys Chervonoiyi Kalyny, Vol. IV, (October 1932) p. 7.

²² Yuri Artyushenko, Podiyyi i Lyudy na Movemu Slakhu Borotby za Derzhavnist 1917 - 1966 (Events and People on my Path of Struggle for Sovereignty 1917-1966) (Chicago: Ukrainian-American Publishing Co. 1966), p. 71. The author was very active in partisan activity and on many occasions served as courier from the UNR Government and Military Staff to the insurgents.

individualism and freedom forced the peasants to take up arms. But perhaps it is erroneous to call them peasants. Most of them were former kossacks as their names indicate. Nurtured on heroic tales and deeds the populace of Kholodny Yar did not forget its place in history. Kozelsky, a Communist, and one of the first to write about Ukrainian insurgency states:

"Kholodny Yar - a historical place. It is the cradle of the haydamachchyna of the period of Doroshenko, Honta and Zali,nyak....at one time Kholodny Yar was the revolutionary center of the peasantry and where their dissatisfaction with Polish oppression was forged into a bold haydamachchyna.....It (Kholodny Yar G.K.) daydreams of legends of heroic battles and about the reasonance of free haydamachchyna...Out of this population, which was excellent material for bandit (insurgent G.K.) formations, the Petlyurovite Otamans began to form units and dispatched them far beyond the borders of Kholodny Yar...The authority of Kholodny Yar was very great, and was recognized by many Otamans who were not directly under it. Behind the walls of the Motryn Convent the conspirators often met and wove a net which spread hate and betrayal among brothers. Due to its geographic location and a type of romanticism intertwined with the experiences of the Middle Ages, Kholodny Yar became an unapproachable fortress for the Soviet Government."²³

While on its Winter Campaign the Partisan Army of General Pavlenko stopped in the area of Kholodny Yar, rested, and left many of its wounded and sick in the care of the insurgents.²⁴ During the five month period of

²³ Kozelsky, op-cit., pp. 74-75.

²⁴ It may be pointed out here that much of the information about Kholodny Yar is that of Yuri Horlis-Horsky. The author was in the Partisan Army when it visited this area. Because he became sick he was left behind and stayed there from 1920 to 1921. His pseudonym while in Kholodny Yar was Zaliznyak.

operations, the Partisan Army on many occasions worked with Otaman Chuchupaka who conveyed the wishes and directives of General Pavlenko to Otamans operating in the region of Kholodny Yar.

After the Ukrainian-Polish Treaty of Alliance was signed, the insurgents of Kholodny Yar, on August 29, 1920, upon hearing of Bolshevik mobilization in the area of Cherkassy and Kamyantsi, called upon the peasants to ignore the mobilization orders and to appear in "Kholodny Yar". Answering this call were the "Lubenska Company" (sotnya) with 450 infantry and 19 cavalry, the "Matiyivska Company" with 530 infantry and 12 cavalry, the "Melnychanska Company", the "Regiment of Bily Yar" with 220 infantry, the insurgents of Zhabotynya with between 500 - 600 men. A large number of "draftees" who were mobilized by the Bolsheviks in Kamyanka tied up their military escort and also came to Kholodny Yar. Together these who answered the call of Kholodny Yar numbered 7,000 men.²⁵

The insurgents were organized into a Brigade which was split up into three regiments and were commanded by Otamans Petrenko, Mamay, and Kvasha respectively. The commander of the Brigade was Otaman Derkach from Kholodny Yar and his Chief-of-Staff, Captain Hrytsayenko. Included in the formation was the Reconnaissance Collegium consisting of Otamanenko, Chornota and Zaliznyak.²⁶ Taking 2,000 of the best armed men the insurgents attacked the city of Chyhyryn in an effort to divert Red units from the village of Stecivka where the insurgents of that village were fight-

²⁵ Horsky, op-cit., Vol. II, pp. 12 to 14.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

ing off a Red Brigade which after burning their village pursued them into the area of Semyhirya. Here, an unknown group of insurgents attacked the "Brigade" and drew it into the Steppe area where Otaman Shtyl's units attacked and destroyed it.²⁷

The Red units dispatched into the Kholodny Yar area, with the task of destroying this "bandit nest" were usually demoralized or defeated by the time of their arrival into the region. Smaller units were harassing them without respite. The special unit of CHEKA troops dispatched from Znamenka was destroyed at night by Otaman Kvasha killing 142 of the Bolsheviks. In the meantime the insurgents of the village of Stecivka, having broken away from the Red Brigade that burned its village, were joined by the insurgents from the villages of Semyhirya and Chernecha. They advanced toward Chyhyryn. Their strength was not that great, however, and they began to retreat when the Bolsheviks made a vigorous attack. Aid arrived from the Kholodny Yar insurgents who strengthened the left wing of the retreating insurgents of Stecivka. The attack was renewed. Hearing of the battle near Chyhyryn, approximately three thousand peasants also readied the battlefield with every type of weapon imaginable. The Bolsheviks were forced to retreat and give up the city of Chyhyryn.²⁸

The pressure of the Bolsheviks against Kholodny Yar was somewhat relaxed when revolts broke out in nearby Khersonschyna (Kherson Province).

²⁷ Ibid., p. 44.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 48 to 50.

Here the insurgents became masters of an area extending from the Dnieper to Elizavethrad. Parts of the Red Divisions around Kholodny Yar were moved from Bobrynsk-Zhabotyn and sent to Cherkassy. The remnants of the troops found themselves in an uncomfortable position, especially since this was the period during which the Bolsheviks were forced to retreat along the whole Polish-Ukrainian Front.

The revolts in the Kherson region continued and spread to the villages of Mliev, Petiev, Moshny, Horodyshche, and other villages along the river Rossa in the direction of the city of Kaniv.

A captured Bolshevik telegram told that the Aleksandrian insurgents had attacked a division and their supply train, taking its artillery and automobiles, three of which were armored.²⁹ It was later ascertained that the attack was carried out by the Kherson "Steppe Division" under Otaman Blakytny and his 20,000 insurgents.³⁰ Because of lack of fuel the automobiles were buried in the forests.

In August courriers from Blakytny arrived and informed Otaman Derkach that the "Steppe Division" was moving toward the Kholodny Yar area. Upon Blakytny's arrival all the Otamans and staff officers met in the village of Medvedivka. Here Blakytny was elected to head the united

²⁹ Ibid., p. 62.

³⁰ Stepevy, op-cit., p. 77. Otaman Blakytny was a former officer who operated in the area of Aleksandria. Prior to assuming the name Blakytny he was known as Otaman Stepovy. After being wounded he took the name Blakytny. His real name was Konstantyn Yurovych Pestushko. The name of his formation was the "Steppe Division" and not the "Aleksandrovska Division". See also p. 73. The author, Yuri Stepovy, is Blakytny's brother.

Insurgent groups. Combined there were approximately 30,000 insurgents.³¹ But the weakness of the insurgents, in spite of their numbers, was very evident. Some units were well armed;

"On the other hand the reserve regiment, which had in its formations four thousand men, did not have even one rifle. These who were able to get a rifle were transferred into the active units. The substitutes for weapons were spears made by blacksmiths, scythes tied to handles, wooden picks, poles that were sharp on the edges which were used in the Kherson area to load hay stacks, and also iron pitchforks and sharpened shovels. Half of the unit of Otaman Shtyl, parts of the 2nd Regiment, as well as infantry, were also armed in a similar manner. Of the 15,000 men in the division this type of "home made" weaponry was carried by at least 6,000 men. About one and a half thousand men had rifles "obrizy" (sawed off G.K.), that is, a weapon that could be used at close quarters but, even then not very effectively".³²

The best units consisted of cavalry under Otamans Chorny Voron and Kobchyk.

After the meeting in Medvydivka the Otamans decided to operate in a large united front. Some were for breaking through the Bolshevik Front and uniting with the UNR Army; others for an attack against Kiev. Blakytny felt that taking Kiev or joining the UNR was not opportune. In a meeting at the village of Moshyn he suggested a plan by which the insurgents would wait for the Bolsheviks, who were in full retreat from Warsaw, to approach the Dnieper area and then attack cutting off their retreat. The retreat was also to be cut off in the areas of Kryukiv - Kremenchug as well as the area of Kiev - Katerynoslav. In this way a

³¹ Ibid., p. 77.

³² Ibid., p. 78.

whole section of the Bolshevik Front would be destroyed.³³ All Otamans agreed to this plan which suggested waiting for an opportune time while harassing the Bolshevik rear.

Soon the insurgents of Otaman Blakytny were joined by Otaman Huly with his 6,000 partisans. In the meantime the nearby city of Cherkassy was reinforced by Red units who were pursuing Blakytny before his arrival in Kholodny Yar and Red units from Bobrynsk. Hastily the insurgents prepared an attack. Two tragic circumstances crossed off Blakytny's plans. First, an attempt was made against the life of Otaman Derkach of Kholodny Yar, who then had to be hospitalized. Second and most important, news arrived that the area of Kherson was being plundered and burned by Bolshevik punitive expeditions who were taking advantage of the absence of the "Steppe Division". The insurgents of this Division hearing of this decided to return to their native area. Blakytny, although opposed to this gave up his command of the united forces of the insurgents and led his Division back to Kherson. Thus the weakness of the insurgents became once again evident. Prior to this Blakytny characterized the psychology of the insurgents in these words:

"The most important weakness of the Ukrainian insurgent is that he is tied to his native home (roof-Strikha) and prefers to circle around it until he is shot."³⁴

At a time when:

..."All of Ukraine is made up of numberless minute "fronts" of insurgents against the Reds. The Bolsheviks are obliged to keep on these "fronts" in a

³³ Ibid., p. 78.

³⁴ Horsky, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 80.

dispersed state, more soldiers than on the Polish and Wrangel (fronts G.K.). But due to this dispersal of insurgent action - the partisans do not have a determining influence on the events".³⁵

His observation was poignantly true and underlined by the fact that his own units decided to return home to defend their areas at a time when the situation was becoming critical for the Bolsheviks.

As Blakytny left the area, the remaining insurgents, now under Otaman Petrenko, advanced against the city of Cherkassy and captured it. In the meantime, the "Steppe Division", on its way home ran into the danger of complete annihilation by large units of Budenny's cavalry. Blakytny turned to Otaman Khmara, operating in the area, to provide the necessary diversion. In the end, the Division was saved by Otaman Chorna Khmara who attacked Budenny's forces, numbering about 2,000 cavalry, forcing them to follow him and his 300 horsemen into the Lebedynsk Forest. The Division escaped but Chorna Khmara and his unit was completely destroyed by the artillery fire of 8 cannons. The total dead on both sides reached 800.³⁶

As winter approached the insurgents increased their activities. They led a successful operation against the city of Aleksandrivka, defeated a Red Brigade on the way to Elysavethrad, wrecked the railroad

³⁵Ibid., p. 79.

³⁶ Interview of January 19, 1969 with former Otaman Gonta-Luty, real name Ivan Luty-Lutenko from the area of Zvenyhorodahchyna. He was a Captain in the UNR and in 1919 was left in the Uman area after succumbing to typhoid. After his illness he organized an insurgent unit which at its height reached 6,000 men. See also Horsky, op-cit., Vol. II, pp. 112 to 114.

line Bobrynsk - Znamenka during which time they destroyed one armored train, killed 70 CHEKA soldiers and freed 32 peasants.³⁷ The other Otamans of the area were also busy, Mamay with his insurgents sank a troup ship headed for the Wrangel Front, Kvasha derailed and burned a train full of supplies, Khmara destroyed an eschellon laden with armored cars and also wrecked one of the two armored trains that daily protected the railroad line Znamenka-Kamenka.³⁸

In the area of Kiev-Kherson, Zabolotny, Hryzlo, and Gonta (Luty) defeated a Soviet division, which was not acquainted with the territory, killing about 200 Reds.³⁹ After this with the coming of winter, as well as the return of Budenny from the Wrangel Front, many insurgents units went into Kholodny Yar. Present there were such Otamans as Yablochko, Hryzlo, Puhach, Gonta (Luty) with their 6,000 men.⁴⁰

Since we have touched upon the "Steppe Division" and its advance into the Kholodny Yar area it is worthwhile to examine this organization more closely. Of this division Kozelsky writes:

"Banditism (insurgency G.K.) in 1920 was extremely fierce in the western part of the Kremenchug Gubernia; in the Aleksandrian, Chyhyryn and Cherkassy counties. This region was in reality a real nest of a large bandit movement. In August of 1920 due to stubborn provocative work of the Petlyurovite agents the organizations of this area (Zapilni), created a whole chain of insurgent bands. These units were

³⁷ Horsky op-cit., Vol. II, p. 145.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 189.

³⁹ Luty - Lutenko, op-cit.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

united into the so called Aleksandrian Division (Steppe Division G.K.). The Aleksandrian Division is of special interest because it represents almost a unique example when the Otamans were able to unite and create for a longer period of time a serious military strength.

The strength of the Division reached to 15 - 20 thousand men. In the region of operations of the Aleksandrian Division it was almost impossible to conduct Soviet work. The bands here struck out (rubaly i sikly) in all directions - out of some counties they made a boiling caldron."⁴¹

The insurgents operated in conjunction with the General Staff of the Revolutionary Committee of Kherson as well as the directives of Petlyura who had close contact with the Division through his couriers, most important of whom was Vira Babenko.⁴² A few of the Otamans participating in the Division were Luty, Fedarchenko, Ivaniv, Hnybida, Mozhovy, Chorna Khmara, Khmara, Tyshanin, Kolyada and others. In March of 1920 a conference of fifteen of the Otamans was held in the village of Syni-Hory. Here it was decided to attack Kryvy Rih from where the Red units under Zhytovsky were raiding the countryside, imposing confiscations, and killing hostages for non-fulfilment of quotas. On May 10, the "Steppe Division" set out against the city, and on the 12th took it and freed many prisoners.⁴³ After this, the Division moved to Varvarivka where close contact with other insurgents was kept, and where delegates from other units as well as the surrounding villages brought information

⁴¹ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 69.

⁴² Stepovy, op-cit.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 28-29.

and volunteers. From these temporary headquarters small groups of insurgents (20 to 30 men) were sent out in all directions for the purpose of reconnaissance. One of the duties of these groups was to capture Red soldiers and then turn them over to Zhytkevych, chief of the intelligence unit in the Division.

From here they attacked and dispersed a Bolshevik CHEKA unit from Kryvy Rih. While this was taking place, large Bolshevik formations under the command of the head of the Katerynoslav "Hubcheka" (Gubernial Cheka) Leplevsky, whose specific task was to clear the areas of Katsynoslav and Kherson of all "bandits", approached into the region of Varvarivka. This and other Bolshevik formations attacked the Division while it was deployed in the village of Verblyuzhka. After a fierce eight hour engagement the Bolsheviks fled leaving behind 3 mountain cannons, 15 machine guns, 50 rifles and much ammunition.⁴⁴

After this a larger operation against the city of Aleksandriya was begun. By the second half of June, the Division was conveniently deployed 20 - 25 kilometers from the city in the villages of Pishchani, Brody, Shamivoi, Hlynsky, and Nova Praha. The attack began on June 29. By midnight, all communication lines with the outside were cut off and all roads leading to Aleksandria were in the hands of the insurgents. Diversionary units within the city created a great amount of confusion by setting fire to the food warehouses as well as the Red military headquarters. Most of the newly mobilized Red Army units refused to fight

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 49.

and many crossed over to the Division. By morning, the city fell to the insurgents. That same day the units, after executing all members of the CHEKA left the city.⁴⁵

Leaving the city the Division broke up into three groups and was to reunite in three days in the village of Bratolubivka. On the way they were to destroy Soviet administrations, and "Prodzahony". From there the Division began its march against the capital city of the Kherson Province. Here Bolshevik units were much more significant and it was necessary to conduct operations in a more secret manner. The insurgents traveled at night through forests and avoided battles. The city was attacked at night at the end of July. Resistance was strong but the city finally fell to the insurgents.⁴⁶

From here the insurgents marched against the railroad terminal of Pyatykhatky which was important because it tied together the western and southern fronts. An armored train was destroyed and the enemy was forced to abandon this strategic location. In August the Division moved against the city of Elysavethrad. After taking the city, the "Steppe Division", on orders from Petlyura marched into Kholodny Yar with the intention of conducting united operations.⁴⁷ The mutual operations were of short duration and, as was noted, at the end of October the Division marched to its native area. During this march it will be remembered the Division lost its finest cavalry detachment under Otaman

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 64-65.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 74.

[Chorna-Khmara. The main reason for this defeat as well as surprise was] the fact that the Poles had signed a separate peace with the Bolsheviks. Now Budenny's units while going south to engage Wrangel were ordered to attack and destroy insurgent formations. This change of policy as well as strengthening of the Reds necessitated a reorganization of the "Steppe Division". All reserves were sent home and the Division had to become more mobile in order to survive in the prevailing situation. But every day the situation became more dangerous. The insurgents ran into Red units almost continually. An attack was made on the reserves of the Second Soviet Cavalry Army. The reserves, being only partly armed, and numbering 3,000 were dispersed.⁴⁸ Soon an attempt on Blakytny's life was made but without success. In the same week orders arrived from Petlyura which told the insurgents to disband, hide their weapons, and wait for the call to revolt which was to be given in 1921.

In ~~other~~ regions insurgency was also thriving. The mobilization orders of the Bolsheviks were ignored by whole villages and counties. These who were mobilized by the Reds deserted in droves. Kozelsky writes:

"As an answer to the mobilization orders (of the Bolsheviks G.K.) desertions became widespread. The state of desertion had a character similar to the insurgency of 1919. Whole villages and counties ignored mobilization orders, and when attempts were made to put pressure upon them a great number of the deserters went into the forests and fields. This state of desertion, of course, became an epidemic which spread into all the Ukrainian villages".⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 94.

⁴⁹ Kozelsky op-cit., p. 80.

Out of such deserters the Otamans formed large insurgent units which attacked the Reds. Otaman Tsvitkovsky, for example, was able to surround himself with 15,000 of them and forged a powerful threat to the Bolsheviks.⁵⁰

During the Polish-Ukrainian alliance there were many Otamans who actively supported the advancing units.⁵¹ Others incorporated their units into the UNR Regular Army. During the attack against Kiev, Otaman Fylonenko joined the army with his insurgents.⁵² The "Starobilsky Insurgent Regiment" joined the UNR in Mohyliv at the end of May.⁵³ Soldiers of the UHA mutinied against the Bolsheviks and created the "Braclavsky Insurgent Unit" under Otaman Holub and joined the UNR in Vynnytsia.⁵⁴

With the advance against Kiev in May insurgency spread like wildfire. The city of Barshypol organized 400 insurgents of whom 100 were students.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 80.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 81. During the period of war with the Poles the author enumerates the following "Petlyurovite" Otamans: Holy, Hryzlo, Tsvitkovsky, Mordalevych, Dorosh, Yaremenko, Bohatyrenko, Cerberyuk, Struk (Kiev area), Kykta, Levchenko, Derkach, Khmara, Klepach, Yabluchko, Mamay, Zaliznyak, Zahorodny, Stepovy, Matvienko, Voyak, Shtepa (Poltava area), Shepel, Skladny, Zabolotny, Morhul, Hromovy, Saltys (Podillya area). See p. 81.

⁵² O. Vyshnivsky, "Polkovnyk Petro Fylonenko" (Colonel Petro Fylonenko), Tryzub, (November - December, 1960), p. 16.

⁵³ Tsapko, op-cit., Vol. XIV, p. 86.

⁵⁴ Vasyl Bachynsky, "Povstanchy viddil braclavskoho povitu" (The Insurgent formation of the Braclav Region), Litopys Chervonoii Kalyny, Vol. II, (March, 1930), p. 6.

⁵⁵ Mykhailo Berezhnycky, "Ostanny rik na Velykiy Ukrayini" (The last year in Greater Ukraine), Kalendar Chervonoii Kalyny, (1934) p. 135.

The Vapnyarka railroad station fell into insurgent hands. Two villages Letky and Zezyna, about 17 miles from Kiev revolted. Bolshevik units from the areas of Krolovets and Kozelets attempting to crush the revolt were beaten back. Additional aid was sent here numbering 115 men of the VCK (Vserosiskaya Cheka - the All-Russian Cheka). This latter group was enticed into the village of Letky and all but two were killed.⁵⁶ Not far away a retreating Bolshevik unit of approximately 1,000 men was ambushed crossing the Irpen River by Otaman Svyatchenko's men and almost annihilated.⁵⁷ While many insurgent units had a long history of activity, others emerged with the advance of the armies against Kiev. Thus, the insurgent unit of the village of Hordashivka with its 80 partisans, although a latecomer to the scene, had an admirable record of activity. As their activities increased and encompassed the area of southwest Kiev and part of Podollya, so also their group grew to 290 men.⁵⁸ This unit was destroyed sometime in July near the village of Yurkivka by the cavalry units of Kotovsky. The overall activities of the insurgents in May led, according to Polish reports, the Bolsheviks into a retreat along the whole front.⁵⁹

June, in spite of the retreat of the Ukrainian - Polish Armies, was no different from May. Insurgency continued and grew. A large revolt

⁵⁶ Krezub, "Grupa.....", op-cit., p. 56.

⁵⁷ Lev Stefanovych, "U Otamana Tarass Svyatchenka" (With Otaman Taras Svyatchenko), Litopys Chervonoiy Kalyny, Vol. V, (October 1933), p.20.

⁵⁸ Vitaliy Yurchenko, Slakhamy na Solovky (The Road to Solovky), (Lviv: Chervona Kalyna, 1931), pp. 20 - 22.

⁵⁹ Salsky, op-cit., p. 27.

broke out about June 14 in the area of Odessa. The spark that ignited this revolt was the Bolshevik attempt to mobilize the peasants of Voronizh. In the end the uprising spread to twelve counties. To reinforce this area the 41st Soviet Division was sent here to pacify the peasants.⁶⁰ A revolt also broke out in the area of the villages of Osinovci - Antonivka under Lt. Isakevych, the Didenko brothers and Bauer, a UNR officer. Here they disrupted Bolshevik mobilization plans and with 40 men joined the Ukrainian Army.⁶¹ Because of these revolts near Odessa Red units were kept from the front. To quell the area, the Reds had to use the 317th Regiment of "Internal Security" which had 2,800 men, a cavalry unit of 400 men, a CHEKA unit numbering 1,800 men, 70 Chinese soldiers and 11 cannons.⁶²

In the Kiev area of Radomyshl, after the UNR and Poles retreated, Otaman Mordalevych became very active. He headed the Kievan Revolutionary Committee and in his secret printing plant printed countless numbers of pamphlets. One such pamphlet had a very unique character. It was printed on Soviet paper money and was called "A Letter of a Ukrainian Insurgent to the Bolshevik Communists". As a result of this proclamation, Soviet money lost its value in many areas and peasants refused to accept it.⁶³ In another of his declarations, "Order No. 8", he gave directions to the peasants relating to methods of resisting the Reds. In his Revolutionary

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 55 Document 23.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 55 Document 23.

⁶² Ibid., p. 56 Document 23.

⁶³ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 62.

Committee he had a "political branch" whose task it was to provide intelligence reports as well as to keep track of spies and traitors. As point seven in this order Mordalevych called upon the peasants to "arrest and send to the Insurgent Staff these bandits who robbed the people, covering themselves with the honorable and respectable name of insurgency".⁶⁴ In the middle of June Mordalevych took his 300 insurgents and 5 machine guns, attacked Korostyshiv and raided a number of counties. Due to the general sympathy of the populace, his group grew to almost 3,000 men. He continued his attacks throughout August from the Korostyshiv forest in which he established his base. Here he was joined by Otamans Bohatyrenko and Bondarenko.⁶⁵ By the end of November, the size of his group dwindled to 200 - 300 men. Kozelsky explains this decrease in number as due to "the participation of unreliable and chance elements" in the group.⁶⁶ This view, of course, can not be accepted or substantiated. The nature of insurgency in Ukraine was such that during certain seasons demobilization of units was required. Only some insurgent "cadres" were active during the winter. The forest could not keep and feed thousands of partisans.

By July, the Bolsheviks dispatched these that they were able to mobilize to the front. These units refused to fight and, as a result, were sent into the heart of Russia and from there other units were brought into

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 61.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 64.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 64.

Ukraine.⁶⁷ At the beginning of the month, in the Poltava area, the Bolsheviks conducted a campaign against Otaman Masyuta who with his 400 - 500 men united with Otaman Khrestovy and his 1,500 - 2,000 men in the Luten Forest. Other Otamans operating in the area were Kundiyy with 20 - 30 men, Stepenko (Dorosh) of Kuzemany with 400 to 500 men, Mandyk of Birak with 700 to 1,000 men. These Otamans usually planned operations together. Their units were defeated during a two day battle near the village of Lutenky.⁶⁸

At the end of the month large revolts broke out in Tarashcha, Vynnytsia, and Balta. Operating in Konotop was Petrenko, in Bryansk-Marusia, and Makhno in the Elysavethrad area.⁶⁹

In August, as the Bolsheviks suffered setbacks along the front, Red parliamentarians seeking to keep the UNR soldiers from attacking, and establishing peaceful "coexistence", informed the Ukrainians that "insurgency has enveloped all of the Kherson, Katerynoslav and Kiev regions".⁷⁰ The situation became critical for the Reds and demoralized them. The insurgents prevented the "Prodzahony" from taking their bread out of Ukraine.⁷¹

Earlier in the month a large revolt broke out in the village of Medvyn where Bolsheviks attempted to mobilize men for the "Kolchak

⁶⁷ Salsky, op-cit., p. 68 Document 153.

⁶⁸ R.L. Suslyk, Kryvavi Storinky z Nepysanykh Litopysiv (The Bloody Pages From an Unwritten Chronicle), (Derby: Harper and Sons Ltd., 1955) pp. 59 - 65.

⁶⁹ Salsky, op-cit., p. 122 Document 244.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 150 Document 315.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 181 Document 376.

Front". Commissars dispatched to the village were arrested and on August 6 the village declared a revolt against "Soviet Authority". Additional towns joined and organized under Captain Lepid and other officers. The Bolsheviks replied by mobilizing all their strength from Tarascha, Bohuslav, and Korsun. The Reds made seven attempts to take the town and on August 9 broke into the village, burning the priest's house and other property. But the revolt continued and units being transferred from the Polish to the Wrangel Front were diverted against Medvyn. On August 21, a whole division surrounded the village. The defenders numbered 300 - 400 rifles and 3 machine guns. The village fell before the Red artillery but the defenders were able to escape to the nearby forest. About 2,000 of the houses were burned down and great demands for food made upon the peasants. On the 30th of August the town was again attacked by the Reds and about 80 young men were herded together and shot one mile away from the town.⁷²

In September, as was noted earlier, the "Steppe Division" took Aleksandria deep in Soviet territory. On September 16 the Bolsheviks took the village of Fedvar after four days of fighting. On the 22nd of September, Otaman Khmara attacked the Bolsheviks in Medvydivka. Otaman Holy took the region of Mliyiv, Orlovec, Orlovecka Buda and others near the city of Cherkassy. His band of 1,000 men was joined by the Medvyn insurgents. The city of Cherkassy, in the meantime, was surrounded by 2,500 insurgents.⁷³

⁷² Y. D. "Yak Katovano Selo" (How a Village was Tortured), Ukrayinsky
⁷³ Kombatant, No. 1, 1947. pp. 23-24.
Kozelsky, op-cit., pp 71-72.

The danger that the insurgents posed for the Bolsheviks can not be underestimated. Prior to the Polish-Bolshevik armistice many military formations were withdrawn from the front to quell the insurgents. The 47th Soviet Division pursued Mardalevych in the area of Radomyshl-Zhytomyr. The 60th Infantry Division had to be thrown against Otaman Zabolotny who operated in the region of the city of Vapnyarka. Cavalry units had to be diverted against Otamans Struk and Sokil while the IV Soviet Army had to be thrown against Makhno.⁷⁴

Armored trains had to be used to keep the railroad lines open. This did not help much and all railroad movement took place only by day, even then escorted by armored trains. From Fastiv to Kozhatyn no trains moved at all. All defense units from Vapnyarka - Zhmerynka - Kiev were evacuated. This was also true of the railroad line Kremenchug - Cherkassy and parts of the line Kiev - Darnyia.⁷⁵

To properly assess the threat of insurgents it is worthwhile to point out that the Poltava area was not one of the best developed regions of insurgency yet it had 98 large and small partisan units that operated against the Bolsheviks.⁷⁶ One can, therefore, imagine how many insurgent units operated in areas of greater partisan activity.

October was a month of great insurgent activity yet, at the same time, it was a month during which they suffered great losses. During

⁷⁴ Savchenko, op-cit., p. 108.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 108.

⁷⁶ Korolivsky, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 536 Document 513.

[this time of Bolshevik-Polish armistice the Reds were able to divert their forces from the rear and use them against the partisans. While the front was still, the Soldiers of the Polish and Ukrainian Armies in the front lines could hear cannons firing and fighting behind the Red lines which lasted from October 24 to November 6. On the 24th of October the staff reports of the UNR read:

"According to information received by the Commander of the 1st Division, the Bolsheviks are conducting battles with insurgents that number 4,000 men in the region east of Lityn." 77

During the armistice period the insurgents lost many groups and Otamans. At this most inopportune time, when victory could still be gained, Makhno chose to join the Bolsheviks. The Reds threw his units behind the lines of General Wrangel.⁷⁸ This was a great victory for the Bolsheviks. In return for this Makhno and his men received full amnesty which was forgotten once the Bolsheviks got rid of their other enemies. On November 26, the Soviet Army of the Southern Front was ordered to disarm Makhno.

c. The Bolshevik War Against Insurgency

The Russian Revolution bears testimony to the ingenious methods used by the Bolsheviks to achieve and consolidate power. Thriving upon strife and mistrust, the Bolsheviks destroyed their enemies by allying themselves with "lesser" enemies and in the end, when formidable opposi-

⁷⁷ Saychenko, op-cit., p. 110. See also Salsky, op-cit., p. 309 Document 665.
⁷⁸ Korolivsky, op-cit., Vol. III., p. 572 Document 546.

tion had ceased, these former "allies" were also destroyed. Alliances of convenience as well as methods of convenience run like a white thread through the master plan of Bolshevik conquest.

The Bolshevik regime was established by what was known as the "Red Terror" and could not maintain itself without it. A permanent fixture of terror was established very early in the Revolutionary period and was known as the CHEKA (Chrezvychaynaya Komisiya - The Extraordinary Commission). This body was organized in Petrograd on December 7, 1917, and was headed by Feliks Dzerzhinski. With its transference to Moscow it became known as VCK (Vserosiyskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komisiya - The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission). On this prototype the Ukrainian VUCK (Vseukrainskaya Chrezvychaynaiya Komisiya - The All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission) was founded and signed into law in December of 1918 by the Provisional Soviet Ukrainian Government under Artam, Zatonsky and Kviring. The Collegium heading the VUCK consisted of Nikolayenko, Karchsev and Schwartz. On April 2, 1919, the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic appointed Martin Latsis (Sudrabs) to head the VUCK. The task of this body was to provide internal security and to conduct a war against counter-revolution, banditism, espionage, and other forces that opposed the Soviet system.⁷⁹ The VUCK executed the orders of the central government, directed and checked the work of all the local CHEKA's. Each Gubernia (Province) had a "Hubcheka" (Huber-

⁷⁹ "Litopys Muzhnosty" (The Chronicle of Manhood) Molod Ukrayiny, August 2, 1967, p. 3.

nialna Chrezvychnaya Komisiya) which was headed by Collegium of Five members.

On May 6, 1919, the Soviet of National Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic increased the powers of the CHEKA and a military arm in the form of the "Special Units" was created. Additional powers were given to the VUCK during the period of the Ukrainian-Polish Alliance. On May 12, 1920, a state of war and martial law was proclaimed in Ukraine and Dzerzhinski himself was ordered to take over as temporary head of the Southwestern Front area with the task of:

"...organizing the destruction of banditism (insurgency G.K.) and kurkul revolts, protecting the transportation on rail, all the major highways, mobilization and collection of food resources."⁸⁰

At the end of 1920 Ukraine had, as a result, 125 territorial organs of the VUCK, 13 "Hubchekas", 5 secret sub-units, 91 CHEKA politbureaus, and 6 "Special Units".⁸¹

The CHEKA was subdivided into five groups; 1) the "Procurator Judges" - whose task was to examine the suspect guided by "proletariat feeling" not law, and submit their findings and verdict to the VUCK Collegium for approval; 2) the "Special Unit" whose task it was to organize "political espionage" and destroy "hostile elements"; 3) the "Operational Unit" - a purely military organization - the arm of the CHEKA; 4) the "Economic Section" which was obliged to provide and fulfill all the needs and desires of the CHEKA men. Here the CHEKA organ,

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 3.

The Red Sword was published; and finally, the "Commanders Section" which consisted of guard units, a personal staff, executioners, and others.⁸²

As its subsidiaries the VUCK had the "Hubcheka", the "Okr-Cheka" in charge of a military region, the "Professional Cheka", made up of military units that protected transportation, pursued deserters, etc., and the "Regional Cheka" which was mainly in larger cities. Thus, in 1921 Kiev could "proudly" boast that it had all five subservient organizations in 16 separate CHEKA administrations, each having its own "execution cellars", prisons, executioners and units. In spite of this their role was the same - destruction of all "class enemies".⁸³

Latsis the head of VUCK characterised the work of his organization in the following statement:

"We do not conduct a war against individuals, we are destroying a class. Don't look for proof in the motifs of the verdict, in which the suspect is charged with words or deeds that oppose the Soviet government. The first questions that we give to suspects are; to what class does he belong, what is his profession, and what is his background. These questions preclude his fate. Here is the substance of the "red terror".⁸⁴

On such "evidence" hundreds of thousands of persons were convicted, sent to the concentration camps, or killed in CHEKA cellars. Thus, in Kiev ten persons with the same name were killed because one was suspected to be a class enemy. In Odessa the CHEKA killed eleven persons with the name Khusyo, one of which was supposed to be an enemy of the people.⁸⁵

⁸² Essad Bey, Zmova Protiv Svity (The Conspiracy Against the World), Vol. I. (Lviv. "Khortycia" Pub. Co., 1936), pp. 55 to 61.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 63.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 116 - 117.

In their fight against "counterrevolution" and "banditism" the CHEKA used all available units regardless of whether these units were an integral part of the organization. They used the VOKHRA (Units of Internal Security of the Operational Region of the Army), the militia, the Komnezamy (Committees of Poor Peasants), B B units (KPB3PB - Committees to Combat Political Banditism), and Red Army Units.

Areas in which insurgency was extremely strong were put under martial law.

"Workers and peasants received the right to detain and arrest persons who opposed the Soviet government and to bring them to the Extraordinary Commission".⁸⁶

It is no wonder then that members of the CHEKA became number one enemy of the insurgents. During the two years of activity of the CHEKA 2,000 of their hard core members were singled out and killed by the partisans.⁸⁷

The main postulates of the "Red Terror", which was brought into life and carried out by the CHEKA, are formulated in Christian Rakovsky's eight point program. In this order the President of the Red Ukrainian states that; 1) all these opposing the Soviet system should be shot on the spot; 2) immediate members of the families of the insurgents should be put into concentration camps; 3) villages that support insurgents should be punished by: a) confiscation of all life sustaining goods; b) fines; c) confiscation of property; d) shelling of villages; and

⁸⁶ M.K.Kolisnyk, Vidnovlennya i Zmichennya Radyanskoyi Vlady na Ukraini - 1920. (The Renewal and Strengthening of Soviet Power in Ukraine. 1919 - 1920), (Kharkiv; Pub. by Kharkiv University, 1958), p. 178.

⁸⁷ "Litopys Muzhnosty, op-cit., p. 3.

4) complete annihilation; 4) all Soviet workers are to submit lists of villages supporting the insurgents; 5) all villages must be disarmed; 6) in all areas where insurgent revolts are foreseen immediately take hostages; 7) hostages are to be turned over to the CHEKA for trial; and 8) in the event that a revolt occurs the hostages are to be executed.⁸⁸

But the CHEKA needed few instructions. The demands from the top were always conscientiously carried out and the executioners of the CHEKA cellars worked overtime to keep up with the wholesale arrests that were being made throughout all of Ukraine. To fight insurgency the CHEKA units had to strike at its heart - the village. Because the great majority of Ukrainians were peasants the Reds in effect had to declare war on every village in Ukraine. The fact that the peasants were not in support of the Soviet System caused Richynsky, a leading Ukrainian Communist, to characterize the situation in the following words:

"The Communists of Ukraine demonstrated their complete inability in approaching the Ukrainian masses, specifically the peasants, in regard to the latter they had shown themselves in such a light that they could not show their noses in the villages without a capable armed strength."⁸⁹

And this is the manner in which the villages finally fell into Soviet hands. Only strong military formations and a merciless terror was able to break their will to resist. The village of Medvyn, mentioned earlier in the chapter, suffered greatly because of its revolt against

⁸⁸ Ivan Herasymovych, Holod na Ukrayini (Famine in Ukraine) (Berlin: Pub. by "Ukrainske Slovo", 1922), pp. 78-79.

⁸⁹ Isaak Mazepa, "Ukrayina Pid Bolshevyckoyu Vladoyu" (Ukraine Under Bolshevik Rule), Kalendar Dniro, (1935), p. 84.

the Reds. In addition to initial executions, a Regiment of cavalry and a Regiment of Infantry was quartered in the town at the expense of the villagers. Shortly the CHEKA arrested an additional 100 persons who were tried by the "Revolutionary Tribunal" and were never heard from again. The terror imposed on the village of Medvyn continued throughout the winter. Every so often groups of from 20 to 40 men were routed and chased in the direction of Bohuslav. After this the "Prodzahony" (Bolshevik requisition units) came, took their "Zalyshky" ("remnant" food products) and left the town in abject misery. As a result of all these repressive methods the population of Medvyn declined from 12,000 to 5-6 thousand.⁹⁰

The infamous "Order No. 2" was perhaps one of the main worries of the insurgents. This order required from 30 to 80 peasants to be taken as hostages. As a result even the most devoted supporters of the insurgents refused to help them. This reflected upon the spirit of the insurgents who began to feel abandoned, and lose faith in victory. Every village was garrisoned and even these peasants who would risk the wrath of the Reds thought twice before, as was usually the case prior to this, going into the forest to feed and inform the insurgents. Long lists of hostages prepared by special commissars included the most venerated villagers. One could, of course, sometimes escape the fate of being a hostage by bribing the Commissars.⁹¹

⁹⁰ I. D. op-cit., p. 24.

⁹¹ Yuri Horlis-Horsky, Spohady (Memoirs), (Lviv: Pub. by N.T.S., 1935), p. 40.

The "Institute of Hostages" as it was called did not stop the Bolsheviks from making punitive expeditions against the villages. In many cases the Bolsheviks seeking to destroy hostages of non-communist leanings, would provoke a revolt or make allegations that revolt was being planned. Countless cases testify to this type of provocation which led to the destruction of many of the towns' most honored citizens.⁹² There were also many cases where provocateurs were sent into a village to pretend that they were insurgents. These "partisans" would then talk freely about the negative aspects of the Soviet regime. These who were careless enough to agree with them were singled out by subsequent expeditions and destroyed.

Perhaps one of the most formidable weapons used by the Bolsheviks to subdue Ukrainian peasantry were the "Komnezamy" (KNS - Komitety Nezamo-hnyh Selyan - Committees of Poor Peasants). The chief motif for creating the KNS was to split the village into two warring camps. The conflict that was to break out between the village poor and rich or the "haves" and "have nots" precluded the fate of effective insurgency and brought mistrust into the village. Bolshevik calculations were not correct in their assumption, that the poor Ukrainian peasant would fight the rich. In effect, there were not that many cases of rich peasants and the majority of peasants belonged to the "middle" peasantry, which the Bolsheviks were eventually to incorporate into the KNS because without

⁹² Dmytro Solovey, Golgotha of Ukraine, (New York: Ukrainian Congressional Committee of America, 1953), pp. 8 - 9.

them the KNS remained an ineffective organization. By the time that the KNS began to work in earnest the rich peasantry was a thing of the past. In many cases the "rich" peasant became poor long ago due to the "food collection" policies of the Bolsheviks.⁹³ The role of the KNS was not to take away from the rich in order to give to the poor. Its purpose was to physically destroy the "kulak" or "kurkul" as a class.

The KNS was organized in June of 1918. Its tasks consisted of taking land from the rich, confiscate cattle and other food, supply the city, create collectives, mobilize men for the Red Army, fight "bandits", help the Soviet Administration, reapportion land, help in the collection of food stuffs, keep a list of the "kurkuli", and propagate Soviet ideas. At the outset no one with more than three desyatyns of land could join the KNS. Up until the middle of 1920 the KNS was an ineffective organization in Ukraine. Only at the end of 1920 it began its work in earnest and by November there were 9,599 KNS members. At the outset the KNS had the "scum of society" in its ranks. Here the town drunks, the depraved, and the lazy found a way of living off the thrifty, hard-working Ukrainian peasant.⁹⁴ The members of the KNS, as was noted, had the right to take land, reapportion it and their decisions were backed up by the Red Army. As 1920 ended many other, poorer peasants joined the KNS because in it they saw salvation from the "Prodzahony" which were depriving them of food necessary for the sustenance of life.⁹⁵

⁹³ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. III, pp. 84-85.

⁹⁴ Khomychiv, op-cit., Vol. I, p. 281.

⁹⁵ Horlis-Horsky, Spohady, op-cit., p. 30.

The division that finally appeared in the village was thus a "synthetic" division not based on any historical animosity between the rich and poor peasants. The Bolsheviks, sensing that there was actually little difference between the poor and "wealthy" Ukrainian peasant, began to observe that many elements they considered undesirable joined the KNS organization. To rectify this situation they initiated three purges within the KNS in 1921, 1922, and 1923. The total number of members who were "unreliable", according to Red standards, were 461,032 peasants who were promptly thrown out.⁹⁶

Among the many tasks of the KNS was the organization of units that were to fight the insurgents. According to incomplete information, by March 1, 1922, the KNS had created 730 military formations with 56,017 men who fought the insurgents. Forty-nine of these KNS organizations received the "Red Flag" award for their exemplary fight against the insurgents.⁹⁷ In its fight against the partisans the First Conference of the KNS in October of 1920 resolved:

"To urge all poor peasants of all of Ukraine to join the Armies of Internal Security. Each county should provide one cavalry company on Kurkul horses and Kurkul saddles into the armies of the Internal Security against the bandits (insurgents G.K.)".⁹⁸

Used as a pawn, the KNS was exploited in the Bolshevik fight against the nationally conscious peasants. Due to the fact that ignorant, sometime degenerate, peasants were given extraordinary powers over the whole

⁹⁶ Rybalka, op-cit., pp 309 to 315. Document 173.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 22. Document 12.

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 73 - 83. Document 34.

Village the healthy, industrious peasantry became apathetic. Their will to resist was weakened, and with it also weakened their support of the insurgent who was, in effect, wholly dependent upon them. The KNS played a sad yet a very important role in the Ukrainian village. Without it the Bolsheviki with their "Red Terror" and CHEKA could never have taken control of the village.

There were, of course, other methods used in destroying the insurgent movement. Of these, assassination was very popular. The Otaman of a group would be sought out and killed. We have mentioned the attempted assassinations of Otamans Blakytny and Dereshchuk. Others were not that fortunate. Otaman Avramenko of the village of Dukanka was assassinated. His son took over the unit but the next day he also met the fate of his father. Knowing the psychology of the peasant insurgents who depended upon the Otaman, the Reds were quick to utilize methods that would leave the insurgent units without a viable leadership. In an official communique the Reds characterized the role and importance of the Otamans in the following paragraph:

"With the coming of spring the bands as a rule disperse to their homes to perform their farm work, burying their weapons in the ground. The Otaman and ten or twenty of his closest associates remain in the forest. At the call of their Otaman the whole band in full armament again begins its black work. The person of the Otaman has momentous meaning for the existence of the band. In most cases, as experience has shown, the band disperses after the death of the Otaman. Here then is the main method of fighting against the anarchist-bandits in the village; finding the hiding place of the Otaman, encirclement of the region and merciless battle until his destruction. This method has been proven most

effective in liquidating the bands in Kiev, Volyn and other areas".⁹⁹

This method of finding and destroying the Otaman, therefore, proved effective in future operations of the Red Army against the insurgents.

It was pointed out in earlier chapters that every village was an "armed camp" due to the tremendous accumulation of weapons left by defeated or retreating armies. The task of the Bolsheviks in view of this was to disarm the village. This was not an easy task and demanded great sacrifices on the part of the Reds. In the area of Odessa where about 2,700 insurgents operated the Bolsheviks were able to confiscate about 10,000 rifles and 700 revolvers.¹⁰⁰ During the span of 1920 - 1921 the Reds in battles with the insurgents confiscated 43 cannon, 1,812 machine guns, 31,788 rifles, 2,312 swords and 3,902 revolvers.¹⁰¹

With the collection of weapons there were, of course, excesses that were committed by Red troops. Sometimes even these who voluntarily surrendered their weapons were shot on the assumption that they were insurgents.

Every now and then the Bolsheviks in an attempt to demoralize the partisans proclaimed amnesty to all "offenders" against the Soviet Government. At first this method had moderate successes but with time the insurgents grew wise and refused to be goaded into giving up.

⁹⁹ "Vony Buly Pershi" (They Were First), Molod Ukrayiny, August 2, 1967, p.3.

¹⁰⁰ Korolivsky, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 536. Document 513.

¹⁰¹ Dmytro Solovey, Holhota Ukrayiny (Golgotha of Ukraine) Vol. I (Winnipeg: Publ by "Ukrhinsky Holos", 1953), p. 23.

Amnesty was usually announced before each May Day and October 25. But these days were extremely "busy" for the CHEKA executioners. After every amnesty the terror of the CHEKA subsided for a few months only to begin with a new vigor. It is estimated that approximately 1,700,000 or one out of 80 persons were killed by the CHEKA.¹⁰² These insurgents who availed themselves of the amnesty were, in most cases, quickly disposed of or used for the purpose of enticing or destroying other insurgents. Otaman Kundi, for example, gave up with 12 of his men and was shot in Kharkiv.¹⁰³ Otaman Mandyka also gave up at the village of Zinkivska but after seeing what would happen to him escaped and continued his battle against the Reds.¹⁰⁴ These insurgents who were spared were used by the Reds to destroy or demoralize other insurgents. They would send them as messengers to the Otaman requesting that he accept amnesty, and in the event that he refused the former insurgent was to assassinate him. The better known Otamans who did give up the fight were used by the Reds in their propaganda and news media. Thus, news of the submission of such Otamans as Chaly, Batrak, and Marurenko demoralized the partisans and weakened their will to resist.¹⁰⁵ These Otamans were usually disposed of when their usefulness was exhausted. How the Otamans were disposed of is illustrated by the case of Otaman Artem who,

¹⁰² Bay, op-cit., Vol. I, p. 89.

¹⁰³ Suslyk, op-cit., p. 95.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁰⁵ Yurchenko, Slakhany...op-cit., p. 85.

together with other members of his unit, was shot during a banquet shortly after they took advantage of the amnesty.¹⁰⁶

Added to the demoralizing influence of the amnesty upon the insurgents one can not ignore the show trials which began long before the era of Zinoviev and Kamenev. The Otamans who were unfortunate enough to become defendants at such trials were forced to submit to all types of ridiculous allegations and false witnesses. Otaman Khmara, for example, was forced to confess his crimes but at his trial rejected all of the statements that were made under duress.¹⁰⁷ On May 28, 1921 during such a trial the prosecutor Manuilsky in a pseudo patriotic conclusion stated:

"We try you, so that all of Ukraine can hear, because you took that grayhaired mother Ukraine onto the international market, bartered her, turned her into a hideout for bandits, into an old prostitute, which you sold; because you behaved badly towards her --- let all of Ukraine hear, all the citizens who regarded you as heroes -- not as sons but bastards. Let Ukrainian patriots cry looking at this national shame."¹⁰⁸

In their efforts to discredit the Ukrainian Liberation movement no words, no matter how foul, were spared. But this also applied to other methods used. These who regarded the insurgents as "bastards" did not reflect upon the method known as "Ukrainization". Manuilsky and others speaking of patriotism did not hesitate to use it in the name of "international" communism.

¹⁰⁶ Horlis - Horsky, Spohady, op-cit., p. 114.

¹⁰⁷ Yuri Horlis - Horsky, Otaman Khmara, (Lviv: Biblioteka Studentskoho Shlaku, 1934), p. 74.

¹⁰⁸ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 3.

Seeing that the peasants and intelligentsia of Ukraine were no longer to be satisfied by meaningless slogans in the vein of "self determination of nations" and others, the Bolsheviks in their official policies accepted the idea of Ukrainization of the Soviet Government in Ukraine. The Ukrainization period was used by the Reds to unmask the "bourgeoisie nationalists" and the most able Ukrainians. Many uncritically accepted Bolshevik slogans and were convinced of their sincerity.

"The Ukrainian intelligentsia accepted the policies of the Government with trust. Not having experience in the sincerity and truthfulness of Bolshevik ways they enthusiastically began to work with the feeling that in this type of situation they will be able to exploit the opportunity and with their labor make a noticeable contribution into the treasury of Ukrainian scholarship, culture, and the national cause in general." 109

But the purpose of the Bolsheviks was not to give the Ukrainians an opportunity to revive their culture, but to single out the leaders of this movement, destroy them and thus leave the masses headless. During the so called period of Ukrainization the Ukrainian Orthodox Church declared its independence from the Patriarch of Moscow. Even the slogan of many hard-core Communists became "Away from Moscow."¹¹⁰ The Ukrainization period became a threat to the Russians within Ukraine. The people were not to be mollified by half-measures and there began to exist the real danger of Ukrainians taking over and squeezing the Russians out of Ukraine. The reversal of this policy had to be initiated if Bolshevism was to survive in Ukraine. Having served its purpose, the

¹⁰⁹ K.T.Turkalo, *Tortury*, (New York: Prometheus Press, 1963), p. 23.
¹¹⁰ Y.Step, "borotba proty okupanta na Skhidnih Zemlyah Ukrainy" (The War Against the Conqueror in Eastern Ukraine), *Za Samostiynist* (March - April 1948) p. 28.

Ukrainization period was ended by a blood bath.

Another method of weakening and destroying the resistance of the people and at the same time the insurgents who depended upon these people for support was to deprive them of their labor. During 1921 - 1922, Ukraine as well as areas in the Volga region suffered from a poor harvest. The Bolsheviks saw a new ally in this situation. Aware that few think of revolt when hungry, they created a situation which led to the death of 2 million Ukrainians out of the total 10 million who were involved in the famine.¹¹¹ The situation in Ukraine was made worse because at a time when the people were starving the Bolsheviks confiscated all available foodstuffs and sent them into areas near the Volga. Thus, during this crisis at home Ukraine was forced to send out 409,035 puds of grain and 52,923 puds of other food products.¹¹² This "organized robbery" was strengthened when orders were received to the effect that all Ukrainian "kurkuls" were to house and feed drifters from the Volga area.¹¹³ Migrants known as "mishochnyky" moved into Ukraine from all of Russia. About 100,000 children between the ages of 9 and 14 were brought from central Russia and placed into the care of the peasants who were obliged to feed them without cost.¹¹⁴ Just in Kiev alone there were 20,000 migrants during the month of July 1921. These migrants were used by the Red

¹¹¹ Solgyey, Holhota...op-cit., p. 173. See also Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. III

¹¹² Rybalka, op-cit., p. XXII.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 226. Document 109.

¹¹⁴ Suslyk, op-cit., p. 105.

Army to "roll out" the food remnants from the Ukrainian peasantry.¹¹⁵ Added to this was the Red Army which was quartered throughout all of Ukraine at the expense of the peasantry. During this crisis the Bolsheviks while emphasizing the famine in the Volga area kept silent about it in Ukraine. All relief from western countries was diverted into the former area. The famine with all its implications deprived the insurgents of peasant aid. Everyone was busy trying to survive and the little food that was left after the "vykachka" (Bolshevik "rolling out of food") was not enough to feed the peasantry, let alone the insurgents.

But the Bolshevik policies had broken the endurance of the peasantry. Throughout all of the Soviet Union an explosive situation prevailed. Peasants began to resist by sabotaging Soviet plans, burning and destroying their crops. The Kronstadt Rebellion further underlined the necessity of moderation and concessions. In March 1921, therefore, with an eye to survival the Bolsheviks adopted the new Economic Policy which, in effect, was a retreat from the high handed methods of War Communism. But the NEP did not affect the Ukrainians until 1922. During this time the Bolsheviks admitted that the Ukrainian peasantry could not be subjugated without the aid of the "middle" peasant who made up 64% of all the peasants. By the decision of December 1925, the Communist Party admitted that without the incorporation of the "middle" peasantry the building of socialism was not possible.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. III, pp. 86 - 87.

¹¹⁶ Rybalka, op-cit., p. 235.

┌ All the concessions and methods mentioned had an eroding effect ┐
upon the Ukrainian Insurgent Movement. Many insurgents lost hope in
victory and gave up the struggle. These Otamans who remained alive,
having escaped from death, in many cases migrated East into an area
where they were not known and in this way saved themselves. Others were
less fortunate, hounded by the CHEKA they finally fell in battle. Still
others continued the struggle with a few devoted followers. On the
whole, however, by 1926 the time for insurgency had passed; new, more
sophisticated methods of fighting the Bolsheviks were born and new
organizational forms, more clandestine in nature, developed.

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CHAPTER VII. THE COORDINATION, CONSOLIDATION AND
CONTINUATION OF THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT

a. Control and Coordination of the Insurgents.

Insurgency is a phenomenon that one has to put into a class all by itself. There are many standards that could be applied to the movement but in general, in view of the chaos and strife, one has to be careful when making final conclusions about it. When one speaks of control, therefore, of any military organization, one immediately thinks of a General Staff, a chain of command as well as a disciplined military machine. Such standards are not applicable in insurgency. One can speak of control of the movement but in reality one would be more correct in saying "controls". Upon examining these "controls" and putting them together one can conclude that the insurgent movement was controlled by many methods which when combined, gave a result similar to a single, over-all control. The movement was not one that could be regarded anarchial and without any purpose. Tyutyunnyk writes:

"Unfortunately many collected documents that relate to the insurgents of this period I can not utilize at this time. They are in hiding and when the opportune time arrives they will shed a bright light on the movement that even some of our cabinet politicians regard as anarchist. From these documents one can find out how really desirous of a strong control they were and not having it, tried to establish a permanent form, and tried to create and establish definite legal norms which would reflect the interests of the Ukrainian nation".¹

Polemics about "did the UNR have control of the insurgents" are unnecessary. The fact is that it did. This fact is underlined by many

¹ Tyutyunnyk, Zymovy... op-cit., p. 75.

Occurrences that can not be refuted. No one can dispute the fact that the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky was overthrown by the Directorate who called the Ukrainian peasant to revolt. It will be recalled that the Bolsheviks attempted this earlier but failed miserably. This and other factors underline the authoritativeness and popularity of the Directorate of the UNR among the masses. To compare Ukrainian insurgency to "banditism" as the Russian Bolsheviks did, or "anarchists" as many of these who do not understand the movement continue to do, is to perform a great disservice to those who died believing in a cause and also to future students of this movement.

As could be expected after the great upheaval of the peasantry against the Hetman, there followed a period of great confusion and frantic organization. Adding to this confusion was the Second Bolshevik War against Ukraine under the command of Antonov - Ovseenko.

Since the Bolshevik slogans had universal appeal, many Ukrainian politicians began to entertain the idea of establishing a Soviet Ukrainian Government and in this way to meet the Bolsheviks with a "fait accompli". This, according to their calculations, would force the Bolsheviks from continuing their campaign against Ukraine. To face the Reds they had to have the support of the peasants and insurgents. To accomplish this the Social Democrats (Independents) and Social Revolutionaries created the All Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee which was to coordinate and direct Gubernial Revolutionary Committees. The "Revcom", as it was known, was headed by Drahomirsky. It was divided into two sections -

the military and political. The military section was headed by Y. Mazurenko and heading the General Staff was Malolitko "Satana". The political section was headed by Yavorsky.² Two of the better known Otamans who supported the "Revcom" were Zeleny and Hryhoriyiv. The "Revcom", although adopting the "Soviet Program" in reality fought the Bolsheviks. Thus in June 1919, it issued the following to the Ukrainians in the Red Army:

"Join us and clear Ukraina of all these Trotskys, Rakovskys and other speculators of the Revolution. Don't obey them when they send you to the Petrograd or Volga front; instead of you they will bring Chinese and Letts against your fathers and brothers. Your front is in Ukraina, your front is in Kiev. All the scoundrels who are sitting in the Commissariats and the Soviets must be destroyed; you must immediately reestablish the genuine rule of the Soviets. So don't go anywhere from here and don't give up your arms to anyone. Rise quickly and help your brothers, who rebelled with pitchforks and rakes, and fight for land and liberty, for the genuine power of the working people. Down with the age-long enemies and bloodsuckers of the people. Rise up, time does not wait. Down with the Communists, Chekas, commissar-tyrants. Long live the Ukrainian independent Soviet Republic." ³

While fighting the Bolsheviks Ukrainian insurgents and left political parties hoped to convince the UNR of the necessity of adopting "Soviet" slogans. Thus, the insurgents of Podillya sent a delegation to Chief-Otaman Petlyura under Hryshchenko, Mukoid, and Shevchenko who were to convey to the Chief-Otaman the idea that the only way that the Ukrainian struggle could come to fruition was through the adoption of the Soviet

² Kozelsky op-cit., pp. 27-28.

³ Chamberlin, op-cit., p. 225

program.⁴ The peasantry demanded a radical, aggressive policy against everything that would limit Ukrainian revolutionary achievements. It was because of this that Otaman Hryhoriyiv, as was earlier noted, left the UNR and joined the Bolsheviks.

The UNR in its answer of May 20, 1919, to the left elements of the Social Revolutionaries and Democrats (Independents) offered a counter proposal by which the left groups were urged to enter into the UNR government because "Only under this type of platform (of the UNR) is it possible to unite the masses and thus sustain the achievements of the revolution".⁵ If this was not accepted the Directory maintained..."the Ukrainian Republic is threatened by reaction and partition by imperialist neighbors."⁶

Soon the representatives of the All-Ukrainian "Revcom" in the person of Odryna, Cherkasky, Chasnyk and Pisocky arrived for the purpose of establishing an understanding relating to the "resistance against the Russian Bolsheviks".⁷ Odryna informed the UNR of Bolshevik policies which, according to him, opened the eyes of the masses who had already begun revolts against them. He informed the UNR that the Left Bank of Ukraine was in revolt. He stated that "...in the interest of the general cause it is necessary, if possible, to unite all Ukrainian socialist and democratic strength into one political and military front".⁸

⁴ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. I, p. 201.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 201 - 202.

⁶ Ibid., p. 202.

⁷ Ibid., p. 202.

⁸ Ibid., p. 203.

But the efforts of the left parties to continue operating on Soviet slogans did not cease. The situation was complicated in that while fighting the Reds they also attempted to talk with them. This brought much confusion into the Ukrainian camp because the left parties or "Berotbisty", as they were known, in an attempt to build a Red Ukrainian Army diverted strength from the UNR. Hryhoriyiv, formerly a supporter of the UNR, crossed over to the Bolsheviks and pretended to meet them with the accomplished fact that he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Red Army and that his army was following the directives of a Ukrainian Soviet Government. When this failed, Hryhoriyiv again decided to join the UNR and on many occasions began to consult the Directorate in reference to future military operations.⁹

Having declared his "Universal", Hryhoriyiv appointed Y. Tyutyunnyk, his Chief of Staff, to conduct and direct the partisan activity in the whole region of Kiev.¹⁰ Hryhoriyiv divided Ukraine into partisan military regions and appointed Gubernial Otamans. Local Otamans were to be elected by the partisans and approved by the Gubernial Otamans.¹¹ During his raid West on June 20, 1919, Otaman Tyutyunnyk was approached by a courier from the "Revkom" in the area of Ryzhanivka. Mazurenko in his attempt to unite all the insurgents aroused the "Revkom" proposing that Tyutyunnyk accept the job of Commander of the Insurgent Corps. The Corps now consisted of 2 divisions, one headed by Colonel Diyachenko

⁹ Antonov - Ovseenko, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 28. See also Kozelsky op-cit., p. 16.

¹⁰ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 19.

¹¹ Docenko, "Revd..." op-cit., Vol. V., p. 6.

with 3,000 men and the other under Tyutyunnyk with 1,200 men.¹²

The "Revcom" under the general influence of the masses on June 25, 1919, dispatched an ultimatum to Rakovsky and the Bolsheviks. The ultimatum gave the Russians 24 hours to leave Ukraine and read:

"The workers and peasants of Ukraine have revolted against you because you are the government of Russian conquerors, that has been hiding behind slogans that for us are sacred - the government of the workers and peasants, the self-determination of nations including secession, war against imperialists, conquerors and oppressors of the working masses; (your government G.K.) destroys not only all these sacred slogans and destroys the real government of the workers and poor peasants of a neighboring state, but also takes advantage of its aims, which are far from any type of socialist form".¹³

Soon thereafter Colonel Diyachenko left the "Revkom" and joined Petlyura. Tyutyunnyk also joined the army of the UNR in its march toward Kiev. Seeing that the period of Soviet sympathy was over, the "Revkom" went over to the UNR in the city of Kamenets Podilsky.¹⁴ This arrival of the "Revkom" was, in effect, an admission of the fact that the "Ukrainian Sovietophiles" had given up the fight for a Soviet Ukrainian Government. This change of attitude was later to be reflected upon by Y. Mazurenko at the trial of the members of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Social Revolutionaries in Kiev in 1921. During his testimony he said:

"In regard to every "Otaman one has to know what time period one is talking about. If the period is April

¹² Kozelsky op-cit., p. 28

¹³ Mezepa op-cit., Vol. II, pp. 9-10.

¹⁴ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 29. See also Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 38.

1919 then the otamans are for the soviets ("rady" - committees G.K.), if one speaks of the period June - July, the otamans are with Petlyura." ¹⁵

The whole process as is here shown and will be subsequently noted, indicates that Ukrainian thought went through a period of education and evolution. As ideas crystallized so also more concrete forms of fighting the enemy were employed.

It is often said that the UNR could not take advantage of the situation and as a result, lost much energy which was "wasted" by the peasantry and could have been channelled into the Ukrainian Liberation movement. One can not generalize in this manner however. In the prevailing chaos the UNR did make attempts to control the insurgents, as a matter of fact, it was extremely conscious of this force. There were other characteristics that prevented the UNR from controlling the situation completely. It must be agreed that partisan warfare is effective if it works well with a regular army. Unfortunately the army of the UNR was weak due to the unsympathetic attitude of the West as well as other reasons such as typhoid fever, and the fact that it could not mobilize due to a lack of equipment for the draftees. One can conclude from all available materials that the insurgent movement was national in nature, and that it was guided by basic ideas which had at their center the goal of destroying all enemies of the Republic.

Surely even the most simple of military minds could grasp the importance of creating a central insurgent center which would coordinate

¹⁵ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 45.

[the activity of the partisans. Prior to 1919 there existed precedents] that support this. Thus, the revolts in Tarashcha and Zvenynorod had a General Insurgent Staff in June and July of 1918. The second precedent, was of course, the General Staff under the Directorate which called an All-Ukrainian Uprising against the Hetman.

When the "Revkom" joined the Directorate the UNR, in an effort to continue the organizational work of that body, dispatched its member Malolitko (Satana) into the area of Tarashcha where he was to coordinate the work of the insurgents.¹⁶ In August of 1919, in the city of Kemenets-Podilsky the VUCUPKOM (Vseukrainsky Centralny Povstanchy Kamitet - The All-Ukrainian Insurgent Committee) was created under the leadership of N. Petrenko, O. Schadyliv and P. Fedenko.¹⁷ Also created as a subsidiary body of the VUCUPKOM was a military branch with a General Staff under Otaman Volokh. The financing of the VUCUPKOM was handled by the UNR.¹⁸

"The activity of the CUPKOM was expressed in a permanent contact that was made between the Ukrainian National Republic and the insurgent organizations of Ukraine".¹⁹

During this time continuous contact by courriers was maintained. Even Makhno on August 21, 1919, kept contact with the VUCUPKOM through Shpota.²⁰ It can, therefore, be assumed that shortly after Makhno broke through the Denikin lines and captured Kryvy Rih, Nikopol, Aleksandrivsk, Berdyansk, Melitopol, Mariupil and Katerynoslav, he was doing

¹⁶ Zubyk, op-cit., p. 71. See also Kozelsky op-cit., p. 29.

¹⁷ Panas Fedenko letter of December 12, 1968. p. 2.

¹⁸ Tyutyunnyk, Zvmovy..., op-cit., p. 73.

¹⁹ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. II, p. 47.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 113.

so under the direction and with the understanding of the VUCUPKOM. 7

In conjunction with the VUCUPKOM there were also local insurgent centers that were created throughout all of Ukraine. Thus, during the advance of the UNR, as previously mentioned, Otaman Zeleny was appointed head of the insurgent organizations in the area of Kiev and Uman.²¹ Active at this time were also the Insurgent-Revolutionary - Committees of the Kholodny Yar and Kherson area.²² On November 13, 1919, the UNR Minister of War appointed Otaman Danchenko Commander of all the insurgents in the area of Volyn. Danchenko had as his duty, together with the existing "Volyn Revolutionary Committee", to prepare a peasant uprising in the area.²³ About a month later in December, another organization, the "General Staff of the Zaporozhian Regiment" in the Kievian region of Tarashcha, was created with an eye towards bringing about an uprising on April 15, 1920.²⁴ These and similar organizations received monetary subsidies from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the UNR.²⁵

Of great importance was also the Revolutionary Committee of the Left Bank. This organization encompassed the areas of Poltava and Katerynoslav. It had at its disposal 20,000 strongly organized peasants with 29 machine guns, and 4 cannon.²⁶ This Committee during the

²¹ Hryshyn, op-cit., p. 10.

²² Valivsky, op-cit., p. 15.

²³ Docenko, Litopys...op-cit., Vol. II, p. 340.

²⁴ Vasyl Zadoyanny, "Kharakterystyka Povstannya" (The Characteristics of Revolt), Tryzub, Vol. IX (August-September 1968), p. 11.

²⁵ Docenko, Litopys...op-cit., Vol. II, p. 338.

²⁶ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. II, pp. 78-79.

period of UNR indecisiveness called upon the Directorate to begin a war against Denikin. In its declaration to the people of Ukraine, the Committee stated that:

"...at present Ukraine is being invaded by red and white communists who have, as their main goal, determined to destroy the Ukrainian culture, enslave the Ukrainian nation and take out its wealth and bread to Moscow."²⁷

On November 19, 1919, the Chief-Otaman Petlyura, seeing that discussions with Denikin would bring no results, declared to the people of Ukraine:

"I and the Government have dispatched men over all of Ukraine for the purpose of organizing insurgency. It will quickly, like a fire, envelop all of Ukraine, but it can give positive results only if all as one listen to only one command."²⁸

The insurgency mentioned by Petlyura did envelop all of Ukraine and within two months destroyed Denikin's Army. This was not seen enough, however, and the UNR Army was forced to go into its Winter Campaign.

By this time insurgent coordinating centers had been created in Kiev, Fastiv, Ludny, Poltava, Bila Tserkva and Myrhorod.²⁹

b. Control and Coordination of the Insurgents After 1919.

Forced into the Winter Campaign, the Partisan Army of the UNR divided

²⁷ Do cenko, Litopys...op-cit., Vol. II, p. 261.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 322.

²⁹ Y.J.Bilan, Heroichna Borotba Trudyashchych Ukrayiny proty Vnutrishnoyi Kontrrevolutsii ta inozemnyh Interventiv u 1919-1920 rokah. (The Heroic Struggle of the Workers of Ukraine against Internal Counterrevolution and Foreign Interventors in 1919 - 1920), (Kiev: Pub. by "Radyanska Ukraina", 1957), p. 32.

Ukraine into two insurgent regions with the demarcation line being established along the line Bakhmach - Bobrynsk - Odessa. The areas, according to UNR documents, were to be assigned to specific UNR groups with the task of:

"Widely expanding organizational work with an eye to the future uprising, utilizing local organizers, which are to be confirmed as Commanders of each county, will tie them closer to the (General - G.K.) Staff.

When the High Command feels that the moment for the general uprising is favorable, the county Commanders will be ordered to seize the county seats and destroy the communist apparatus in the area."³⁰

On January 30, 1920, the Commander of the Partisan Army established "liaison points" in Elysavet, under Otaman Huly-Hulenko, and Uman under Otaman Dereschuk. Other "liaison points" were to be in Sablino and the Motryn Convent in Kholodny Yar. In this scheme the Commander foresaw expansion of contacts on the Right Bank of Ukraine.³¹ Shortly, on February 12, 1919, the question of liaison was discussed in a conference at Medvydivka, and here it was decided to "dispatch a part of the Army to the Left Bank of the Dnieper with the task of propagating and organizing the uprising."³²

The task put upon the agitators and organizers was carried out conscientiously and quickly. The purposes and successes are well reflected in the report of March 21, 1920, by Colonel Dereschuk:

"Having returned from the General Staff of the High

³⁰ Docenko, Zymovy...op-cit., p. 213. Document CCX.

³¹ Ibid., p. 88. Document LXXIV.

³² Udovychenko, op-cit., p. 127.

Command on January 28, I began to carry out the tasks that were put upon me - that is; first of all finding suitable persons who could carry out the job of organizing insurgent formations. ...On the whole I have been able to find these people and the situation is going well for us. In Uman we have founded an insurgent center which has already assumed its duties: Instructions have been formulated on how the samookhorony are to be constructed. Every agent having these instructions is visiting villages and bringing all points of the instructions to life. I have to confirm that our working base in the villages is very good; as it is known, the whole population, not paying attention to any provocative statements about our Government and especially Otaman Petlyura, is completely on the side of the idea of creation of an independent Ukraine and Petlyura".³³

Continuing his report, Dereschuk mentioned that he had in mind to create insurgent groups not only in the Uman area but already sent agents into the counties of Zvenyhorod, Tarashcha, and Kaniv. He suggested that all these areas be subjected to a CUPKOM which he also proposed to organize.³⁴

The organizational work was going extremely well, and these groups which were already in existence began to consolidate under the VUCUPKOM, regional, as well as local Insurgent Committees. Most of the consolidation took place in March 1920.³⁵ Huly - Hulenکو became commander of all the insurgents in the area of Kherson and Katerynoslav. Otaman Mordalevych and his Radomyshky CUPKOM, on April 28, 1920, issued instructions and information about its organizational work. His Committee had 150 agents and representatives throughout the area and encompassed about 100 villages.

³³ Docenko, Zymovy, op-cit., p. 146. Document CXXXVIII.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 146, Document CXXXVIII.

³⁵ Kolisnyk, op-cit., p. 172.

"The Committee has united and made subservient to it all insurgent organizations in the territory between the railroad line Kiev - Korosten and Kiev - Kozyatyn....It had the following subdivisions: 1) operational, 2) intelligence, 3) economic, 4) administrative - political, and 5) agitation - informative.

By spring there were already in existence a couple of local insurgent committees (povstankom) and four insurgent formations that made up the Insurgent Peasant Division".³⁶

There were of course other insurgent organizations which were busy preparing the peasantry and insurgents for a massive uprising. The forms of organization as well as the means may have been different but the goal was the same. In the Kherson area the CUPKOM was headed by Rabakivsky and subsidized directly by the UNR.³⁷ In the Poltava area was the "Poltava Gubernial Insurgent Committee" headed by S. Nelhovsky.³⁸

There were also many other local insurgent coordinating centers. The Winter Campaign had prepared the ground for an All Ukrainian Uprising.³⁹ Writing of this period General Kapustyansky states:

"In general the second half of 1919 and 1920 sees the rapid and determined advance of the creation, under one command, and synthesis of harmony between the military operations of the Ukrainian military - revolutionary forces on the front and the enemy's rear."⁴⁰

³⁶ Kozelsky, op-cit., pp. 57 - 58.

³⁷ Docenko, Zymovy...op-cit., p. 209, Document CCVII.

³⁸ Ibid., p. CXXXII.

³⁹ The following persons, officers of the UNR, were engaged in organizing military insurgent centers: Babiy, Ku₂menko - Tytarenko, Shakhin, Levchenko, Luty, Dereschuk, Maleshko, Ashinov, Andrukh and Opoka (later a member of the VUCUPKOM in Kiev), Chaykivsky, Yucherishka, Hryceniuk, Greh, Rogulsky, Indyshevsky, Turak, Neroslyk, Borys, Domarycky, Kychun, Solovchuk, Rabakivsky, Huly - Hulenko and many, many others.

⁴⁰ Stepovy op-cit., p. 3.

After the Winter Campaign and resumption of the Regular Front contact with the insurgents was maintained through special couriers. In June 1920, shortly after the Ukrainian-Polish Armies took Kiev, Mordalevych and other Otamans saw Petlyura and were briefed on their duties in the ensuing campaign. On June 14, 1920, a conference of Otamans was held in Korostyshiv where it was decided to create a single front against the Bolsheviks.⁴¹

During this time Otaman Tsvitkovsky, a UNR officer who was sent to organize insurgents in 1919, was shortly able to achieve prominence. He worked closely with Dereschuk and the Rendo brothers in the Uman area and was soon given command over a group of insurgents (85,men), organized by the Uman CUPKOM. From here he moved to the region of Zvenyhorod. During the Bolshevik mobilization he was able to organize 15,000 deserters into the "Boyarsky" and "Vynohradsky" Regiments.⁴² Otaman Sydorenko who also organized the deserters of the Medvyn region, combined his insurgents with Tsvitkovsky and as a result the regions of Zvenhorod, Tarashbha and Kaniv were in their hands. With the closing of the war these groups sustained defeats at the hands of the cavalry of Budenny and Kotovsky.⁴³

Of special importance are the efforts of Dr. Helev who coordinated insurgent activity in the Katerynaslav area. He was given the task of contacting General Wrangel's army and to coordinate the activity of the

⁴¹ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 60.

⁴² Ibid., p. 64.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 65.

insurgents with him. Wrangel agreed to provide 75 officers, 400 rifles, 15 machine guns, 1,000 grenades and 1,000,000 bullets. This group of Volunteer officers was to unite with Otaman Fedorchenko but was destroyed while crossing the Dnieper.⁴⁴ After this, Helev and Otaman Zirka-Rybalka who was appointed the Otaman of the "Republican Insurgent Army" of the Chernihiv region, traveled to see Otaman Petlyura for instructions. Here Helev, after seeing the General Staff, was appointed to head all the insurgents of Katerynoslav, Tavria and Kherson.⁴⁵

Forseeing the possibility of defeat on the regular front Petlyura, as early as May 1920, created a Partisan-Insurgent Section in the General Staff under Colonel Kuzminsky. By June 1920, a plan of action was submitted to and approved by the Chief - Otaman. Almost every group of insurgents was contacted and informed of its tasks. The problem of liaison was made easier by the insurgents themselves who sent their delegates to Petlyura.⁴⁶ The Chief - Otaman in Order No. 1 to the insurgents assumed command over the Partisan-Insurgent Armies of Ukraine.⁴⁷ According to this Order Ukraine was divided into four insurgent regions: 1) The Volyn Region, 2) Podillya - Kherson Region, 3) Katerynoslav - Poltava Region, and 4) Kharkiv - Chernihiv Region. Commanders of the regions were Tyutyunnyk, Huly-Hulenko, General Halkyn and Otaman Anhel respectively. Commanders of smaller regions were

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 106.

⁴⁵ Mykhailo Kanyuka, "Kinets "karyery" doktora Helea", (The end of the "career" of Dr. Helev), Molod Ukrainy, April 29, 1967 - p. 3.

⁴⁶ Kuzminsky, op-cit., p. 14. The author was in charge of the new reorganization plan relating to insurgency.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

also appointed. All plans were accepted but spade work only began when the Poles decided to stop hostilities against the Reds. The very inopportune cessation of hostilities, at a time when, according to Kozelsky, the Reds had to fight on two fronts one of which was "a sea of insurgency" in their rear, wreaked havoc to Petlyura's plans.⁴⁸ General Kapustyansky characterizes the situation as follows:

"The overall tight military cooperation of the Ukrainian Army with the insurgents resulted in our successes. The united anti-Bolshevik strategic front which came into existence in 1920 (Ukraine, Poland and Wrangel) gave the allies full victory which unfortunately was destroyed by the Polish separate peace".⁴⁹

The Russo-Polish agreement did not shatter Ukrainian hopes for an All-Ukrainian Uprising. The Army of the UNR having lost on the front retreated into Poland and its soldiers were interned in prisoner of war camps. But the will to resist did not subside. Insurgency in Ukraine continued and raised the hopes of the interned troops who awaited new developments. Many, "Hundreds of officers, who were left without duties were sent into Ukraine for the purpose of organizing revolutionary work."⁵⁰

The situation in Ukraine at the beginning of 1921 was reflected in a flurry of insurgent delegations that began arriving in February of that year. Of the better known couriers was Vira Babenko who first served as a liaison officer with Otaman Blakytny and later with the VUCUPKOM. The consolidation of insurgents as can be seen came from

⁴⁸ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 54.

⁴⁹ Stepovy, op-cit., pp. 3 - 4.

⁵⁰ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 88.

the insurgents themselves. In the spring of 1921, for example, a Regional Insurgent Conference" was held in Kholodny Yar where the areas of Poltava, Kherson and Katerynoslav were represented.⁵¹

The situation became more acute as the Bolsheviks began establishing their government. With this Red effort hundreds of villages were sacked and destroyed. The "Prodzahony" collected foodstuffs and eventually created a catastrophic food shortage that resulted in a famine. A new wave of revolts swept over the country. Just in March of 1921, according to Soviet sources, there were 40,000 insurgents.⁵²

The UNR Government now in Tarnov, and its General Staff in Chenstakova, began renewed efforts to strengthen and coordinate the movement. Petlyura and the UNR Government decided, therefore, to create an Insurgent Staff under General Tyutyunnyk, which was to begin work immediately. The Poles did not object to the activity of the UNR and even cooperated with Petlyura promising to help him organize four military divisions.⁵³ The newly created Insurgent Staff was divided into four sections; the Operational Section under Colonel Otmarshtein; Organization Section under Captain Stupnycky; Intelligence Section under Colonel Kuzminsky and the Administrative-Political Section under Lt. Colonel Dobrotvorsky. Included in the organization was Captain Kowalewski, a Polish military liaison officer. The Insurgent Staff worked out an organizational scheme

⁵¹ R. Vodyanny, "V. Kholodnim Yaru" (In Kholodny Yar), Kalendar Chervonoiyi Kalyny. (1930), p. 98.

⁵² I. Dubynsky and H. Shevchuk, Chervone Kozatstvo (The Red Kossacks) (Kiev: Vydavnytvo Politychnoyi Literatury Ukrainy, 1965), p. 150.

⁵³ Mazepa op-cit., Vol. III, p. 101.

[which divided Ukraine into five Insurgent Areas. Each area was divided into 4-5 regions, and the regions into sub-regions. Each commander of a region was appointed by the Insurgent Staff and held continuous contact with it and General Tyutyunnyk. The Commander of each region had direct control of all insurgent groups operating in his region.⁵⁴ The organization concentration was first put into effect on the Right Bank of Ukraine. This involved the Insurgent Areas of South Ukraine which encompassed the regions of Odessa, Kherson, and Tavria. The area was put under the command of Otaman Huly-Hulenko. The second Area of concentration was Kiev and Volyn under Otaman Mordalevych. The latter area encompassed the regions from the Prypyat and Dniipro Rivers, the railroad lines Cherkassy-Vapnyarka and further to Yampol, and the Dniester River up to the Polish Border.⁵⁵

The Insurgent Area of South Ukraine under Huly-Hulenko was broken up into five regions, four of which were under the command of Otamans Sklar, Pshonnyk, Petrenko and Zabolotny. The third region had no commander because this was where Otaman Makhno conducted his operations. Attempts to contact Makhno were made by Hulenko's couriers. Otaman Zabolotny of the fifth region had, as his primary duty, to establish contact with Knolodny Yar and prepare the area for the advance of Tyutyunnyk who was to establish his headquarters there.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Kazelsky, op-cit., p. 91. See also Kuzminsky, op-cit., p. 16.

⁵⁵ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 55. Document No. 838147.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 120.

Eventually Commanders of other areas were appointed and received instructions relating to the Uprising which was to take place on September 1. To characterize the duties of the area commanders it is worthwhile to examine the orders received by Otaman Levchenko of the Third Area:

I

"By September 1, 1921 all preparations for the All-National Uprising are to be completed.

Your area is to execute the following tasks:

1. Completely destroy the railroads along the lines: a) Homel-Bakhmach, b) Yampil-Konotop, c) Varozhba-Lviv. All demolitions are to be carried out in such a way that repairs will not be carried out within 2-4 weeks.
2. Seize Poltava; in the event that this is impossible, localize it from the side of Kharkiv and attack Kharkiv with the goal of ruining the Soviet center in Ukraine.
3. Demolish the railroad bridge near the city of Kremenchug. If this proves impossible, localize the Kremenchug railroad terminal.
4. Cut off all contact between the Red army units and the Kiev and Kharkiv Military Regions.
5. Assure yourself of communications of all types but especially during the proclamation of the Uprising in your whole area. Utilize the radio, telephone, telegraph, surreys, railroads, automobiles, bells in all villages and special torches that are to be made of tar and straw and placed on high ground.
6. All captured depots and goods are to be immediately put under guard and destroyed only in extreme instances, when there is a real threat of the Bolsheviks recapturing it.
7. All Cheka members and communists are to be shot. Regular mobilized Red Army men are to be demobilized, taking away their goods and arms, and sent home.
8. The Partisan-Insurgent Staff of the Armies of the UNR

will be in Ukraine at the moment of the beginning of the Uprising. Orders will be sent to you through Tykhevenko. Information is to be sent to the address that will be given to you by the courier of this order

II

All preparatory work is to be conducted in strict secrecy so that beginning on September 1, activities may commence any minute after receiving a special order to that effect.

III

After seizing every region, form out of the insurgent organizations and units permanent companies, regiments, and brigades, in compliance with former directives.

Lt. General Tyutyunnyk
Assistant of Military Operations
of the General Staff

Colonel Otmarshtein." 57

Along with the division of Ukraine into Operational Areas, the Insurgent Staff also established Insurgent Committees consisting of the VUCUPKOM, Area, Gubernial, County, and Regional CUPKOMs. A "committee of two" (dviyka) was organized in each village. One of these village committees the "committee of three" (triya) was created in the region. From the "committees of three" was created the county CUPKOM made up of five persons.⁵⁸

The VUCUPKOM had its headquarters at Kiev and Odessa. The head of the VUCUPKOM in Kiev was Colonel Ivan Andrukh. Little is known about the VUCUPKOM. In spite of this, the Committee was quite active in preparing the ground for the All-Ukrainian Uprising. Throughout its

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 144.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 92.

existence the VUCUPKOM had contact with the UNR and the Insurgent Staff of General Tyutyunnyk.⁵⁹ It was through Nakonechny, a member of the VUCUPKOM, who visited the UNR in Tarnov, that Otaman Mardalevych who worked with the VUCUPKOM, was appointed commander of the Second Insurgent Area.⁶⁰ Colonel Halkin, a UNR officer, was appointed to head the military section of the VUCUPKOM in Kiev. His job consisted of organizational activity of the insurgents, direct the operational activity of all insurgent units, appoint and remove regional commanders.⁶¹

The VUCUPKOM had many sympathizers among the highest Red military circles in Kiev. As a base and reserve for its organizers the Committee utilized the School of Red Officers and dispatched some of them to organize insurgent units in the region of Katerynoslavschyna.⁶² The activities of the Kiev VUCUPKOM were cut short when the Odessa VUCUPKOM was discovered and its members arrested. Documents found there led to Kiev where Andrukh and Chuprynka were arrested in June of 1921. During the hearings in July, the Bolsheviks were able to gain important data which gave them further information about other insurgent organizations. On August 28, 1921, 39 members of the VUCUPKOM were ordered shot and 25 were sent to concentration camps. Unofficially, the number shot was much greater.⁶³ After Andrukh's arrest and execution

⁵⁹ Aleksander Vyshnivsky, "Rozhrom Vseukrainskoho Povstanchoko Komitetu i Samohubchy Reyd". (The Destruction of the All-Ukrainian Insurgent Committee and the Suicidal Raid), Visti (Munich) Vol. XIII, (June 1962), p. 51.

⁶⁰ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 101.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 99.

⁶² Antin Krezub, Partyzany Vol. I, (Lviv: Vydavnycha Kooperatyva "Chervona Kalyna", 1930), p. 6.

⁶³ Vyshnivsky, op-cit., p. 52.

the head of the VUCUPKOM was Captain Mykola Opoka.

Another organization which existed in Kiev in 1921 was the Kozacha Rada (the Kossack Council). Little is known about this organization which may, from all available information, have been the continuation of the VUCUPKOM. This organization had close contact with General Tyutyunnyk and continued to operate in Kiev almost to the very beginning of Tyutyunnyk's advance into Ukraine. Once General Tyutyunnyk began to advance across the Polish border this organization was destroyed by the Bolsheviks who seemed to have known of its existence.⁶⁴

Due to the timely destruction of the insurgent centers the Bolsheviks were able to make many arrests throughout the country on the eve of General Tyutyunnyk's advance. This is not to say that the insurgent movement was destroyed; this did not happen until much later. The arrest of the centers merely disorganized the still strong insurgent units by depriving them of a coordinating body that could synchronize the movement of General Tyutyunnyk's ~~army~~ and the partisans. When the army of General Tyutyunnyk finally did cross into Ukraine there was no center which could call the insurgents to an All-Ukrainian Uprising.

c. Bazar: The Beginning of the End of Insurgency.

Due to the fact that few materials about insurgency have been allowed to see the light of day, one can not really determine the strength

⁶⁴ Prof. Koval, "Ta odno ne harazd" (But one thing is not all right), Kalendar Chervonoiiyi Kalyny, (1936) n.p. (in front under April). See also Mazepa op-cit., Vol. III, p. 102.

[of the movement after 1921. From the few documents that are available] one can conclude, however, that it was quite powerful. From these documents we can obtain only a fragmentary picture of the situation and even then the material is not always accurate. One document relating to the fight against insurgents names 58 otamans and groups as well as a partial report of their activities.⁶⁵ In another source Soviet writers indicate that between January and March 1921 they conducted 87 operations against the insurgents and in the process, captured or killed 97 otamans and 9,000 "rank bandits".⁶⁶ The threat to insurgency was real and forced the Bolsheviks to mobilize all available manpower to cope

⁶⁵ N.P. "Protybolshevytski Povstannya na Ukrayini V 1921 r." (Anti-Bolshevik Revolts in Ukraine in 1921) Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny Vol. IV (June 1932) p.p. 20-22 and Vol. IV, (September, 1932) pp. 6-7. This report deals with the insurgents during the very beginning of 1921. Of the 58 groups mentioned, the total number of insurgents are only given for 37 groups. Thus, these groups have approximately 22,500 men and their numbers increase by 23,700 in larger battles, that is, a total of 46,250 men. Computing their armaments one comes up with a partial total of 34 cannons, a conservative number of 180 machine guns and 2 armored cars. Their activities during the first two-three months equal to: 27 quick attacks against Soviet bases and cities; 20 occupations of cities and railroad terminals; 99 destructive raids against military garrisons, prodzahony and punitive formations; 72 raids of destruction against railroad lines, lines of communication and bridges and destruction of two armored trains. The attacks did not merely involve skirmishes. One group fought and destroyed 2 Red Regiments and a Red Officer Candidates Unit. Otaman Podolyaka's group successfully fought the 41st and 25th divisions and forced the General Staff of the XIV Soviet Army to retreat into Uman. Otaman Struk engaged three Soviet Divisions of the XII and XIV Soviet Armies. Zelenchuk captured and held the city of Cherkassy for 5 days while Matvienko took and held the city of Chyhyryn for 3 days.

⁶⁶ Dubynsky, op-cit., p. 151.

with the movement. From May to August 1921, they were forced to take 1,110 hard core Communist party members and throw them into organizational activities against the insurgents. About 300 Komsomrol groups created military formations. The Komnezamy provided 56,000 men in the fight against insurgency. Altogether the insurgents were confronted by 730 of such military formations.⁶⁷

In the fight the Bolsheviks lost many of their most devoted cadres. Sometimes even the highest Red officials did not escape death. Thus "Order No. 81" to the Special Military Units of the VU-CHEKA reported the death of the Commander of the Special Units, F. H. Nikolayenko who was killed by "bandits" in the village of Vyshorod.⁶⁸ Reporting about the overall situation the newspaper Visti of February 6, 1921, stated that: "The social protection organs of Ukraine up to February 1921 had to support about 50,000 orphans whose parents were killed by bandits.⁶⁹ (insurgents G.K.)"

Many new insurgent groups began operating when the Bolsheviks attempted to impose their rule through the Komnezamy (KNS). Thus Halako, a peaceful peasant, organized a group of men, attacked the city of Ripky and killed 72 Reds. To subdue him the CHEKA unit from Chernihiv numbering 100 men was sent. But Halako's group already numbered 600 men and

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 151.

⁶⁸ "Vony Buly Pershymy" (They were First), Molod Ukrainy, (August 2, 1967), p. 3. Document No. 81.

⁶⁹ Y. I. Rymarenko, "Z Istoriyi Barotby Trudovoho Selyanstva Ukrayiny Proty Kurkul'skoho Bandytyzmu (1921 - 1922 rr)" From the History of the War of the Working Peasants of Ukraine Against Kurkul Banditism (1921-1922). Ukrainsky Istorychny Zhurnal, Vol. IV, (January, 1965), p. 110.

some of the CHEKA men under their commander Ryaby crossed over to the insurgents. Not being able to defeat him in battle the Reds sent an assassin against Halako. When Halako was killed, Ryaby became Otaman but was soon also assassinated by the Bolsheviki. After this the group weakened but still operated under Otaman Yuschenko.⁷⁰

Other otamans who had for years carried on a war against the Bolsheviki and for a while had to leave Ukraine, began to return and renewed their work. Thus in the summer of 1921, on orders of Tyutyunnyk, Otaman Shepel crossed the Zbruch River and came into Lityn, his former area of operation. Here on July 2, he announced:

"On this date I have returned from my leave and have again assumed my duties. All these who were given temporary leave of absence by me, I order to appear in the Trybukhivsky forest for registration.

Otaman Shepel." ⁷¹

He, like others, was ordered by Tyutyunnyk to prepare the ground for the "Uprising" and by November 1, all was in readiness. After Bazar Shepel decided to go west but was like Halako, assassinated.

A similar fate awaited Otaman Blakytny who in April of 1921, surrounded by the Reds killed himself. After his death the "Steppe Division" was led by Otaman Khmara.⁷²

The war against the insurgents was merciless and bloody. There were very few groups or their otamans who accepted the amnesty extended by

⁷⁰ Honchar, "Front Bez Kordoniv" (The Front Without Borders), Molod Ukrayiny, (August 2, 1967), p. 3.

⁷¹ Sereda, op-cit., Vol. II, (February 1930), p. 8.

⁷² Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 69.

the Bolsheviks or tried to come to an understanding. Hope of an All-Ukrainian Uprising strengthened even the weakest. These who did attempt to talk with the Bolsheviks were not spared. Otaman Samozvanec of the Hoschiv Forest Insurgents (also known as the "Unit of Otaman Zeleny"), for example, attempted to arrive at an agreement with the Bolsheviks, and was killed by his own men.⁷³ Eventually this unit united, at the orders of the VUCUPKOM with the insurgents of Otaman Chorny.

As autumn drew near, the insurgents prepared for the All-Ukrainian Uprising. In July, it will be recalled, the VUCUPKOM was destroyed and the insurgents were little informed of further developments. All knew that the moment for revolt would come after September 1, but few knew of the exact date. Much of the insurgent apparatus was pretty well demolished on the eve of Tyutyunnyk's advance into Ukraine. Parts of the apparatus remained however. The Eighth Insurgent Region under Otaman Nevidomy for example, was almost untouched and continued operations until the summer of 1922.⁷⁴ Orders still arrived from the Insurgent Staff of General Tyutyunnyk but affected only the insurgent groups whose CUPKOMs were still operating. In other areas the Insurgent Staff, through otaman Zabolotny, as late as August 10, 1921 was attempting to appoint men to vacant positions.⁷⁵ But the damage done was irreparable

⁷³ Antin Krezub, "Partyzansky Zahin imeny Otamana Zelenoho" (The Partisan Unit of Otaman Zeleny), Kalendar Chervonoii Kalyny, (1925), p. 111.

⁷⁴ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 113.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 120.

and the net of organizations so carefully prepared could not be mended in time to coordinate its activities with General Tyutyunnyk.

The Bolsheviks were aware of the fact that preparations for an invasion were under way. After the ratification of the Treaty of Riga representatives between the signatories were exchanged. Arriving in Warsaw, the Soviet Russian and Ukrainian emissaries, Karaghan and Shumsky, demanded the expulsion from Polish territories of all emigre groups, who were a threat to the establishment of peaceful relations between the two powers. Poland complied to these demands and by October of 1921 most of the emigrees were forced to leave their territory. Petlyura was reported to have left Poland and all Ukrainian organizations officially "ceased" to exist.⁷⁶ Unofficially, however, the Insurgent Staff continued its preparations. From all indications the Bolsheviks, after destroying the VUCUPKOM and other organizations in Ukraine, were aware of these preparations. As late as September 28, 1921, Khrystian Rakovsky, President of the National Commissariat of Ukraine, lodged a note of protest with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The note emphasized that Polish authorities had been informed of the existence of Ukrainian groups on its territories who are preparing to launch a military attack on the Ukrainian SSR. Such an act would, according to Rakowsky, be against the 5th article of the Treaty of Riga. He emphasized the fact that the VUCUPKOM had been destroyed and yielded information related to the planned attack. In his note he

⁷⁶ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 103.

enumerated the arrested members of the VUCUPKOM but, at the same time, perhaps unwittingly, indicated that not all organizations were destroyed. One such organization that remained was the CUPKOM of Volyn and Podillya under Pavlyuk. Ending his note, Rakowsky urged the Poles to rid themselves of all organizations that operate and reflect a contradiction of the Treaty of Riga.⁷⁷

At the time when this note was written the Soviet regime was on very thin ground. It is no wonder then that the preparations in Poland were of great concern to Rakowsky.

The original attack against Soviet Ukraine was to begin from two areas where 25,000 interned Ukrainian soldiers were to be equipped. One group was to leave Rivno under General Bezruchko and advance against Kiev. The second group was to leave Tyraspol under General Udovychenko and proceed to Odessa. The third group consisting of cavalry was to be commanded by General Tyutyunnyk who, with the Insurgent Staff, would proceed to Kholodny Yar and establish it as the center of insurgency.⁷⁸ Poland, as agreed, would supply and equip Tyutyunnyk's forces while Romania would give the same to Otaman Huly-Hulenko.⁷⁹

The situation changed radically however. From all indications the Poles were merely hoping to use the Ukrainian forces as a diversionary force. They were convinced that a Russo-Polish war was imminent in the

⁷⁷ Khrystian Rakowsky, "Ministrovi Sprav Zakordonnykh Polskoyi Republiki Panu Skyruntu" (To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic Mr. Skyrunt) Visti (Munich) Vol. XII (June 1962), pp. 53-54.

⁷⁸ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 92.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 93.

near future and that any diversion within the Russian sphere would be welcome and adventitious.⁸⁰ In Ukraine itself the situation was very timely for an Uprising. The interned UNR soldiers were also impatient and awaited orders which would take them home. On October 23, 1921, General Tyutyunnyk issued his "Order No. 1 to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army". This organizational order named the commanders of the Army as well as members of the General Staff. Tyutyunnyk, according to this order, became Commander-in-Chief and made all military units as well as insurgent groups answerable only to him.⁸¹

A month prior to this the insurgent delegates and couriers demanded that the Uprising take place no later than September 1. The harvest was over and the time was most opportune. During the summer many new insurgent organizations were created and in August of 1921 more than 200 of these were extremely active. These organizations were new, had as yet not been contacted, and were merely an additional reason for the beginning of the campaign.⁸²

By June the Bolsheviks were able to destroy or disrupt the work of many insurgent units in Ukraine. In the Katerynoslav area, they destroyed the insurgent organization of railroad workers and in July uncovered many more groups including the VUCUPKOM. With repressions many began to flee Ukraine and request Tyutyunnyk to move the date of

⁸⁰ Interview of May 15, 1968 with General V. Samutin.

⁸¹ Mazepa, op cit., Vol. III, pp. 219 - 220.

⁸² Osyp Dobrotvorsky, "Lystopad 1921 roku na Velykiy Ukraini" (November 1921 in Greater Ukraine), Kalendar Chervonoyi Kalyny, (1923), p. 143. The author was a member of the Insurgent Staff.

revolt up to August. General Halkin, Commander of the Kievan Region, requested that the "Insurgent Staff" supply him with weapons, while Mordalevych dispatched notes that the overall situation demanded immediate action.⁸³ Soon the latter fell into Bolshevik hands. Thus, by the time that Order No. 1 was issued the moment for the "Uprising" had passed.

Tyutyunnyk's delay was due, among other reasons, to the sudden change in the Polish policy. The Poles went back on their promise of supplying 4 divisions and agreed to allow only 1,000 men to take part in operations. In view of this, Tyutyunnyk probably decided to postpone the All Ukrainian Uprising until the summer of 1922; however, to reinforce the hopes of the insurgents, he decided to make raids into Ukraine and strengthen Ukrainian resistance until a more opportune time.⁸⁴

Before his attack at the end of August, Tyutyunnyk dispatched a special unit into Ukraine under General V. Nelhovsky. This group had 30 officers and was assigned to contact the insurgent groups in the area of Volyn, more specifically, prepare the ground for the "Uprising". Nelhovsky's regions of operation were the Zvyahel, Zhytomyr, Radomyshel, Mozyrsky and Ovrucky counties. In the region of Olevsky the peasants raised the flag of revolt against the Reds but were not successful against

⁸³ Petro Vaschenko, "Do Reydu 1921 roku" (About the Raid in 1921) Bazar, (Kalish: "Chornomor" Publishers, 1932), p. 47. The author took part in the "Second Winter Campaign". He was a captain in the UNR Army.

⁸⁴ Dobrotvorsky, op-cit., p. 144.

them. General Nelhovsky hearing of the nearby battle attacked the Reds forcing them to retreat. Further operations were conducted here in league with the 150 insurgents.⁸⁵

After Order No. 1 the "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" was divided into three Operational Groups: The Volynska (Northern), Podilska (Southern) and Bessarabska. As its main goal the Insurgent Army was hoping to take advantage of the general ill feeling against the Bolsheviks, proclaim an All-Ukraining Uprising and give it an organized character. The uprising was to be carried out in such a way as to cut off the Bolsheviks and prevent them from taking foodstuff and other wealth out of the country.⁸⁶ After capturing Red military stores and depots the insurgents were to be organized into the Regular Army.

The Bessarabska Group under Otaman Huly-Hulenko was to attack the Bolsheviks from Romania. Its assignment was to divert the attention of the Reds from the Northern Group. Due to the fact that the Bessarabska Group was very small it was unable to carry out its task. Soon after crossing the Romanian border it was attacked by large Red Army units and forced to return to Romania. The task of this group was then transferred to the Southern Group under Colonel Paliy. This Group had 380 soldiers and was sent into Ukraine on October 25. Within the first few days Paliy and his men, who only had 140 rifles and 2,000 bullets between them, after engaging the enemy became a cavalry unit.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Vaschenko, op-cit., p. 51.

⁸⁶ O. Shpilinsky, "Bazar", Bazar, (Kalish: "Chornomor" Publishers, 1932), p. 8. The author was a captain in the invading Insurgent Army.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

During the second half of October the Volynska or Northern Group was formed in the Volynian forests and was made up of 900 interned UNR soldiers. The Poles brought them here to work in the lumber yards. Out of these soldiers Tyutyunnyk formed the I Unit under Colonel Stypnycky, and the II Kievan Division under General Yanchenko which was made up of two brigades, the Kievan under Lt. Colonel Shramchenko and the II Brigade under Colonel Sushko. Command of the Northern Group was given to Lt. General Yanchenko.

Due to the fact that both the Romanians and Poles began to have second thoughts about the expedition, Tyutyunnyk's and Paliy's formations had to work in great secrecy. Because of this sudden change of attitude, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army on the eve of its "Second Winter Campaign" was almost naked and unarmed. About 60% of the Army was dressed in peasant clothing, 45% almost barefoot and 30% without overcoats. The armaments consisted of 400 rifles, 48 machine guns (36 of which were without spare parts), 120,000 rounds of ammunition, 500 swords, 300 cavalry spears, 100 grenades and some explosives.⁸⁸

On November 4 the "Second Winter Campaign" began. After crossing the border three special formations were created: the first under Hopanchuk consisting of 16 men who were to contact General Nelhovsky; the second unit under Ruzhytsky with 12 men was to reach the Olevska area and contact the local insurgent organization; and the third unit, under Slychenko with 25 men was to contact Otaman Orlyk near the

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

Teteriv River.⁸⁹

From the beginning the small Insurgent Army had little to look forward to. Facing it were three fourths of the Red Army consisting of 13 Red infantry divisions, two special border divisions, one cavalry corps, the cavalry division under Kotowsky and other formations.⁹⁰ Added to this formidable military strength it is important to note that shortly after the Insurgent Army began its march the weather changed drastically. First came the rains and then the snow. This more than anything else, weakened and undermined the will of the soldiers.

Of the two operational UNR units the Southern Group was made successful. Early in its operations it armed itself and became a cavalry unit. It was able to divert the attention of the Bolsheviki from the main group under Tyutyunnyk. On its way to Yanchynets it was joined by Captain Antonchyk and a small detachment of Otaman Khmara. Later the men of Otamans Struk and Orlyk also joined them. Not being able to unite with the main group of Tyutyunnyk the Southern Group was finally forced to close operations and cross the border. Here the men were again disarmed and interned by the Poles. During their operations in

⁸⁹ Yuri V. Otmarshtein "Do istoriyi povstanchoho reydu gen. khorunahoho Y. Tyutyunnyka v lystopadi 1921 r" (To the History of the Insurgent Raid of Lt. Gen. Y. Tyutyunnyk in November of 1921), Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny, Vol. II, (June 1930), p. 13. This is the official report of Colonel Yuri V. Otmarshtein, Chief-of-Staff of the Insurgent Army, to Chief - Otaman Petlyura about the events from the beginning of the "Winter Campaign" to its end. Colonel Otmarshtein was murdered in 1922 while on his way to have all the relating documents published. All his documents disappeared.

⁹⁰ Shpilinsky, op-cit., p. 8.

Ukraine many skirmishes and battles were fought. The group covered a territory of 1500 kilometers behind enemy lines from October 26 to November 19, 1921.⁹¹

The Northern Group, in the meantime had as its task to take the cities of Korosten and Radomyshl, advance to the region of Teteriv, unite with the Southern Group, and from there continue united operations. The city of Korosten was of extreme importance and upon its capture depended the success of all future operations. Here great stores of equipment and clothing could change the miserable situation of the almost naked Army. Most important, however, was the fact that seizing the city would mean also seizing the communications media by which the All-Ukrainian Uprising could be proclaimed. On November 7, at 5:00 A.M., the attack against the city began. Although the city was strongly defended by the 132nd Soviet Brigade and two Battalions of infantry, a lightning attack from the south by the units of Stypnycky, Rembalovych and Khmara forced the Reds to give up the city.⁹² But the city was held too briefly to utilize its media or take away the accumulated stores of food and ammunition. Fresh Red troops

⁹¹ Serhiy Chorny, "Storinky Druhoho Zymovoho Pekhodu" (Pages from the Second Winter Campaign), Bazar, (Kalish: "Chornomor" Publishers, 1932), p. 126. The author, a Colonel in the UNR Army, commanded the Podilsky or Southern Group after its commander, Colonel Paliy, was wounded.

⁹² Ivan Rembalovych, "Reyd 1921 roku" (The Raid in 1921), Bazar, (Kalish: "Chornomor" Publishers 1932), p. 72. The author was a Lt. Colonel in the UNR Army and commanded one of the smaller units during the Second Winter Campaign. He was partly responsible for seizing the city of Korosten. Captured at Mali Minky he managed to escape.

arrived from Kiev and pushed the Insurgent Army back. Tyutyunnyk did not pursue the attack regarding future operations would entail a waste of men. He, therefore, ordered the Northern Group to move into the area of Radomyshel - Zhytomyr and there unite with the other operational units.⁹³ But on arrival in the village of Voytyshivka, Tyutyunnyk was not able to achieve union with the groups of General Nelhovsky and Colonel Paliy. The general situation did not foreshadow any significant successes. The Northern Group was not very maneuverable having mostly infantry. The weather was unbearable, snows fell heavily and about 50% of the men who had no boots became useless because of frostbite. Ammunition was almost down to nothing and was replenished only by taking it from the dead enemy.⁹⁴ Added to this was the continuous harassing activity of the enemy cavalry.

Unable to unite with Tyutyunnyk, Paliy's Group, now commanded by Colonel Chorny, decided to retreat to the border. Tyutyunnyk's group also seeing the futility of any further action decided to quit operations. But the Reds were determined to destroy the Northern Group. On November 17, they threw 1,500 infantrymen and 3,000 cavalry against the Insurgents. The Group was finally encircled and the Reds under Kotovsky were able to cut the insurgent formations in two. Tyutyunnyk and his Staff gave the order to retreat into the Zhytomyr forests. Due

⁹³ R. Sushko, "Bazar", Kalender Chervonoyi Kalyny, (1930), p. 115. A Colonel, the author commanded the 2nd Brigade at the battle of Mali Minky. After 1921 he was quite prominent in nationalist circles and especially the UVO (Ukrainian Soldiers Organization.)

⁹⁴ Otmarshtein, op-cit., Vol. II, (July-August, 1930), p. 18.

to the fact that the Red cavalry had cut the UNR forces in two, the Insurgent Staff and General Tyutyunnyk together with the critically wounded was pushed away from the main force and had to leave the field of battle. The end of the "Second Winter Campaign" was tragic. The soldiers fought until their ammunition gave out. Some seeing the inevitable and committed suicide. The rest, however, were either cut down or captured after a two hour battle. According to the report of November 20, 1921, of the Kievan Military Region, over 400 men of the UNR were cut down and 537 taken prisoner. After the Battle of Mali Minky, the prisoners were herded into the village of Bazar and locked up in a church. By November 22, of the 537 men only 443 were alive to be put before the "pyatorka" (Cheka Commission of five). Of the last figure 84 were detained for further questioning while 359 were sentenced to death.⁹⁵ As the soldiers were brought before the firing squad, the Bolsheviks offered clemency to these who would agree to serve them. Only one man stepped out of the ranks that were awaiting their fate. Replying to the offer of clemency he said:

"I, Scherbak, kossack of the 6th Division, from myself and on behalf of kossacks that I know, tell you: we know what awaits us and we are not afraid of death. We will not serve you. When you execute us - know that we will be avenged by the whole Ukrainian nation. When the Ukrainian soldiers learn of your ugly work then for our blood they will destroy everything that has even the

⁹⁵ M. Chyzhevsky, "15 Dni na Okupovaniy Moskvoyu Ukrayini" (Fifteen Days in Muscovy - Occupied Ukraine.) Bazar, (Kalish: "Chornomor" Publishers, 1932), pp 67 - 68. The author took part in the campaign. He was a Lt. Colonel in the UNR Army.

smallest connection with you - tyrants."⁹⁶

His words seemed to be shared by all who awaited their fate. A powerful cry broke out of hundreds of throats - "Slava" (Glory). As the executioners began their work only their machine guns were able to drown out the Ukrainian National Anthem which the condemned began but never finished.

The "Second Winter Campaign" ended tragically. Yet the movement for which these men gave their lives continued. The campaign was most inopportune and had few things on its side. One can assume therefore, that the tragic end of the "Insurgent Army" was due to the lack of its support among the masses. This was not so however. We have already mentioned the general situation of this period in Ukraine. Many insurgent groups were already destroyed while others went into hiding. Colonel Paliy in his report stated that:

"The unit (Southern Group G.K.) confirmed that the population is coerced by mass red terror, (there is a - G.K.) complete lack of weapons among local insurgents and there exists no possibility of replenishing them with (our G.K.) own supplies."⁹⁷

The area of operations was as mentioned before, an armed camp. Small units did operate here, and the UNR formations received aid from the insurgents of Otamans Khmara, Lytvynchuk, Svyatenko, and Orlyk. The UNR could have mobilized many men but its tragic state of armaments would not allow this and would only end in a waste of manpower. When Tyutyunnyk's group took Korosten, 600 prisoners were freed 300 of whom

⁹⁶ Shpilinsky, op-cit., p. 32.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

participated in fighting the Reds. As the situation became unbearable, even the hard core insurgents were ordered to return to their area of operations and not to involve themselves in the campaign. The "All-Ukrainian Uprising" could have been a success if instead of a handful of ill-equipped men, the Poles and Romanians had kept their word and allowed the original number of 25,000 men to make the march.⁹⁸ The peasantry did not regard the "Insurgent Army" as that "reliable force" upon which they put so much hope.⁹⁹ The weakness of the army dampened the enthusiasm of many would-be insurgents.

In areas where there was no massing of Red troops the revolts against the Soviet regime continued. The Bolshevik press viewed apprehensively the large revolts in the Podillya, Kiev, and Poltava areas.¹⁰⁰ Other successful revolts left Skvyrachyna, Zvenyhorodka, Uman, and Kremenchug in the hands of insurgents.¹⁰¹ Of the better known Otamans and their activity in November of 1921, Colonel Dobrotvorsky writes:

"At the same time it is generally well known that simultaneously with the raiding groups (Insurgent Army G.K.) supporting operations were conducted by Otaman Zabolotny in the region of Balta-Olhopil, Otaman Shepel in the region of Braclav - Vynnytsia, Otaman Lykho in the region of Lypovti, Otaman Brova in the region of Kremenchug, Otaman Orlyk near Kiev and many others".¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Mazepa, op-cit., Vol. III, p. 105.

⁹⁹ Vyshnivsky, op-cit., p. 53.

¹⁰⁰ Wol. Zaricky, "Neskinchena Sprava" (The Unfinished Case), Kalender Chervonoyi Kalyny, (1931), p. 121.

¹⁰¹ Dobrotvorsky, op-cit., p. 149.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 150.

Makhno also continued his activity through most of 1921. The "Batko" who, it seems, was mostly interested in spreading chaos during the whole period of the War now again saw the need to unite with pro-UNR insurgents. This he did near Bila Tserkva with the units of Otamans Chorny Voron, Petrenko, Foma, and Udovychenko. Together the units had 3,000 men, 138 machine guns and a battery of artillery.¹⁰³ The Reds threw against them the "Red Kossacks" under Prymakov and the 17th Cavalry Division under Kotovsky. Operations began on December 31, stretching along a front from 3 to 4 kilometers. The battle lasted from January 2, until the middle of that month. The insurgents finally withdrew pursued by the cavalry of Kotovsky.¹⁰⁴ Soon in 1922 Makhno was forced to the border and crossed into Romania.

After Bazar, the UNR continued to keep contact with the insurgents but advised them to change some of their forms of resistance. In Mala Vysta in the Kherson area, where a meeting of Otamans was held, UNR officers advised them to preserve their strength. These who were too well known could either continue to fight or flee to Romania. Others were to return to peaceful work and continue their efforts in a more cautious manner.¹⁰⁵ Some revolutionary agencies such as the CUPKOM of Podillya continued to operate for a long period of time. The remnants of the Kozacha Rada, destroyed in Kiev in August of 1921, fled to the

¹⁰³ Dubchynsky, op-cit., p. 153.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 153. Kotovsky was well known for his operations against the insurgents. For his efforts he received the "Order of the Red Flag."

¹⁰⁵ Interview of Jan. 19, 1969 with former Otaman Luty-Lutenko.

Polissia region and continued its former activity.¹⁰⁶

Of particular significance is the activity of Otaman Orel (Halchevsky-Voynarovsky). He began his career as an insurgent in May of 1919, at the orders of Chief Otaman Petlyura. His exceptional work was highly commended and on February 15, 1922, he was given the following task:

"To Colonel Y. Orel:

I order you to take command of all insurgent units on the Right Bank of Ukraine. Contact similar insurgent units on the Left Bank of Ukraine in order to coordinate activity.

Always be guided by the interests of the Fatherland and the laws of the UNR.

Chief Otaman of the Armies
of the UNR,

S. Petlyura."¹⁰⁷

Otaman Orel wasted little time. He crossed into Ukraine, made contacts with the General Staff of the Volyn Division (VPA-Volynska Povstanka Armia) and its Otaman Petryk, Otaman Kostyushko and Captain Bidkovsky. He also got in touch with Otamans Kary, Lavchenko, Bayda, Polista, Holyuk, Lykho, Puhach and others. Shortly thereafter, he called a conference of all Otamans of the Right Bank and received their support. To coordinate insurgent activities he created the General Staff of the Podilsky Insurgent Group.¹⁰⁸ Orel's name became a byword in

¹⁰⁶ Hryc Rohozny, Bazar. (Chernivtsi: Published by "Samostiyna Dumka" 1934), p. 74. The author was a UNR Captain, took part in the "Second Winter Campaign" and after Bazar joined the insurgents. He took part at the Conference of the Insurgents in Kharkiv in 1923.

¹⁰⁷ "W 20-littya smerty sl. p. Polk. Halchewskoho" (On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Colonel Halchevsky's death) Visti (Munich), Vol. XIV, (March, 1963), p. 26.

¹⁰⁸ Mykola Chebotariv, "Lycar bez reklyamy" (A Hero without advertisement), Vilne Slovo, (December 14, 1968), p. 9.

many Ukrainian villages. To dispose of him the Bolsheviks sent numerous units to pursue him. After months of heavy fighting he and his insurgents, burdened by about 300 wounded, crossed the Polish border on September 2, 1922. Upon his arrival in Poland, the Bolsheviks began bombarding the Polish government with notes that implied that it was harboring "bandits" and behaved in a manner unbecoming a friendly country. Otaman Orel, however, reacted vigorously. For example, relating to the note of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR Shumsky, he replied with well written and documented articles that shed a light on the insurgent movement and the type of people involved in it. In his note of August 30, 1922, he pointed out that his men were fighting for an idea and were not bandits. Fifteen of his men, he said, had a college education and would not stoop to the type of activity ascribed to them by Shumsky.¹⁰⁹

Orel stayed in Poland a few months, and then again gathered his men and after crossing the border, resumed operations. At the end of 1925 he finally left Ukraine for good, leaving behind him a legacy of uncompromising warfare against every vestige of the Soviet regime.

Not mentioning the smaller units and their Otamans one has to at least glance at the "Volynian Insurgent Army" (VPA) which was founded shortly after Bazar. The initiator of the VPA was Panas Pestyk who escaped after Tyutyunnyk's defeat. Upon contacting Lukash Kostiuszko

¹⁰⁹ Y. Halchevsky, "Vidpovid na notu povno-Vazhanoho predstavnyka USSR u Polschi" (An Answer to the Plenipotentiary of the Ukr. SSR in Poland), Visti (Munich), Vol. XV, (November 1964), p. 101.

they resolved to create a preparatory committee which would organize the VPA. Within half a year the VPA could boast of having its organizations in the area of Kievan Polissia, Teteriv - Usha, Chornobil-Dymer, Khabno-Teteriv, Malyn-Radomyshel, Korosten-Zhytomyr and Zvyahel-Polonne.¹¹⁰ An elaborate plan was prepared for conducting operations against the Rads. But in October of 1922 the organization was discovered and its General Staff was forced to flee into Poland where it was interned. Petryk returned in 1923, was arrested, tried, and sentenced to ten years in concentration camps. His Chief-of-Staff, Kostiuszko, was shot crossing the border. Other members of the VPA continued their war until 1924 when they were finally destroyed.¹¹¹

The insurgent forces continued to operate, and attempted to coordinate their operations as 1922 drew to a close. During the final months a secret conference of otamans was held in Kharkiv and most of the regions of Ukraine were represented. Here in view of the fact that Poland and Russia were at odds with each other and the possibility of war was quite real, the insurgents made necessary plans for any such eventualities. The conference for a while strengthened the movement. Soon however, many of the representatives to this conclave were arrested and the insurgent movement once again suffered a setback.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ T. Erem, Zemlya Drevlyanska, (Published by A Didkovsky, 1961), p. 20. The author was a member of the VPA.

¹¹¹ Andriy Didkovsky, Spohady: Korotky Ohlyad Orhanizatsiyi Volynskoyi Armii v 1921 - 1922r. (Memoirs: A Short Examination of the Volyn Insurgent Army 1921 - 1922), (Philadelphia: Published by author, 1961), p. 29. The author was a member of the VPA, a former Captain of the UNR Army, and in charge of military preparadness.

¹¹² Rohozny, op-cit., p. 75.

In view of these setbacks, less and less emphasis was put upon insurgent units and more on small clandestine organizations which could perform the same type of work within a "legal" framework. Thus, with the beginning of 1923, emphasis was put on legal seizure of the Soviet apparatus and the use of small "attack groups" which would perform the work that was previously done by large, unwieldy insurgent units.¹¹³

In spite of the adoption of new forms of resistance many insurgent units continued to fight on. The Kherson area continued to resist the Reds while the nearby Kholodny Yar area remained a "fortress" through 1923 and until 1924.¹¹⁴ In 1923 besides the insurgent groups mentioned, there were the Ivanov Organization, also known as the "Sons of Insulted Fathers", groups of Otamans Halako, Gonta, Marusia Tarasenko and many more.¹¹⁵

In 1924 the activity in Kholodny Yar continued. Of special interest were the operations of the insurgents of Otamans Neskuy, Dereshchuk, Drabovy, Fylonenko and others.¹¹⁶ In spite of few documents about this and subsequent years of insurgent activity the available material indicates that insurgency did not die and in many cases even grew. Writing to the Chief-Otaman in September of 1924, Colonel Kodrovsky the Inspector General of the UNR forces, noted with satisfaction that the organizations were getting stronger.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 76. See also Horlis-Horsky's Spohady, op-cit., p. 15.

¹¹⁴ Step, op-cit., p. 26.

¹¹⁵ Solovey, Holhota, op-cit., pp. 134-135. See also Interview with Luty-Lutenko, op-cit.

¹¹⁶ Solovey, Ibid., p. 136.

¹¹⁷ A. Vyshnivsky et al., (eds.) Symon Petlyura: Statti, lysty, dokumenty (Symon Petlyura: Articles, Letters and Documents.) (New York: Pub. by "Svoboda", 1956), pp. 425 to 430.

By 1925, however, the insurgent movement was almost dead. During that year, Otaman Orel and others discontinued their activities. After that, sporadic revolts occurred but due to lack of coordination hardly deserve mention. Operating still were Otaman Klitka, Tyabykin and others.

In 1926 insurgency died and in its place stood hundreds of organizations that were more sophisticated in nature and better equipped to deal with the Soviet regime. Clandestine organizations became the rule rather than the exception.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ For a list of clandestine organizations and their activities see Solovey, Holhota.... op-cit., pages 112 to 129.

VIII - CONCLUSION

Having examined insurgency in Ukraine during the 1919 - 1926 period one can hastily conclude that the insurgents were unimportant and had played but a minor role in the overall Ukrainian Liberation Movement. Before making such a conclusion, however, one should be aware of the internal and external forces as well as the undercurrents that made the insurgent movement what it was. One can not, as many Ukrainian historians have a tendency to do, treat the army of the UNR as the only important force during this period. Furthermore, it is essential to underline the fact that without the insurgent-partisan movement the UNR army was of little consequence. Of course, one can not deny the fact that the soldiers of the UNR were unquestionably valiant, courageous men. The forgotten valiants of the War of Liberation, due to a lack of proper documentation, seem to be the insurgents. They enabled the UNR "Partisan Army" to survive during the First Winter Campaign, to continue the fight in league with the Poles. It is, according to evidence given earlier, because of this movement that the Poles signed a treaty of alliance with the Ukrainians.

Examining the internal forces which molded the insurgent movement it is important to note at the outset the fact that politically the Ukrainians were not politically prepared for the construction of an independent Ukrainian State. The long years of subjugation by Russia were reflected in the methods used by Ukrainians in their fight for independence. The majority or 85% of all Ukrainians were uneducated.

Some, but not enough, work was done to strengthen the consciousness of the people by the "Prosvita" organization. Most large cities and industrial centers were in foreign hands. The city was always the focal point of new ideas, ideas which did not take the peasantry into consideration. The Ukrainian intelligentsia, as was true in almost all Russian-subjugated countries, was either Russified or so small as to be of little consequence. As a result, when statehood was proclaimed, the Ukrainian government had to place foreigners, who in many cases were hostile to the idea of independence, into high governmental positions. In addition to the lack of national awareness, one must also take into account the Ukrainian political parties which began to emerge only after 1905. Having broken away from Russian political parties, the newly formed parties were not able to consolidate their strength by the time of the Revolution. This became increasingly difficult as the whole of the former Russian Empire, and especially Ukraine in which most military operations were being conducted, was thrown into unimaginable chaos and turmoil. It is in the context of this chaos, that the Ukrainian political parties had to build and strengthen their organizations and cadres. It is doubtful that in such circumstances even the most politically conscious nations would be able to consolidate or preserve their strength. Also few concise, sophisticated ideologies existed which answered the needs of the masses; those which did emerge relied on a conglomeration of programs. For lack of better programs, the peasants themselves began forming platforms that answered their needs.

desires, and aspirations. If an otaman, for example, recognized the "Soviet Program", he did not of necessity recognize that government or all of that program. Thus, one notes that at the earlier stage of insurgency, "almost all Otamans hotheadedly (horyache) attacked the Soviet rule under "Soviet" slogans.¹

Of necessity the elemental forces that were unleashed by the Revolution also brought with them a period of needless strife, and anarchy. In the earlier periods many otamans were avanturists and adventurers. They fought among themselves, staged pogroms, and were hostile to all who would curb their powers. After a short time the peasants themselves destroyed such opportunists. The one exception, of course, is "Batko" Makhno who was able to survive but this was due chiefly to his ability to place himself on the side of the peasantry. Negative otamans who caused havoc were usually dealt with by the peasants. The otamans in most cases operated in their native areas and were careful not to antagonize the villagers.

As weak as the political parties were they did influence the masses and even, to an extent, disorganized them. The parties competed for the control and influence among the masses in such a way that they alienated many persons and gave birth to mistrust. This "politicking" was also carried into the UNR Army and tended to erode the discipline within the formations.² A nation in the throes of revolution and

¹ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 25.

² Kapustyansky, op-cit., Vols. I & II, p. 41.

desperately needing unity is not a fit object for political feuds. In the parties fight for an independent Ukraine, the means became more important than the end. Utopian radical ideas wreaked havoc upon the young army. The Socialists were suspect of military formations and regarded them as a threat capable of "crushing the revolutionary demands of the nation".³ Unlike the Polish Socialist parties, the Ukrainian parties, rather than striving for a strong state, hoped to keep it weak and thus assure themselves of great influence in the government.

The peasants, noting this "dragging of feet" on basic questions, took the initiative and created insurgent units which gave them the protection that was usually assigned to the duties of a national army. Thus, at a critical period, when the UHA and UNR were advancing against Kiev, these units numbered 200,000 men. If one considers these units as part of the Armed Forces of the UNR, together with the Regular Army they numbered 300,000 men.⁴

Finally, while pointing out the internal weaknesses of the Ukrainians it is also important to note that in spite of their number the insurgents shared common weaknesses. Each village had a military force which fought only in its own locale. This reinforced localism and prevented the insurgents from large scale operations of the type that were conducted later by Otamans Blakytny, Tsvitkovsky, and others. Because

³ Omelyan Terlecky, Vyzvolna Borotba Ukrainskoho Narodu (The War of Liberation of the Ukrainian Nation), (Lviv: Ukrainiske Vydavnytstvo, 1941), p. 83.

⁴ Valivsky, op-cit., p. 17.

[of this localism and sporadic activity the insurgent units were eventu-
ally singled out and destroyed.

The external forces played an important role in the movement, greatly weakened Ukraine, and added to the already existing chaos. The overthrow of the Central Rada by the Germans and its replacement by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky destroyed a young governmental administration which was growing stronger with each day. Perhaps the overthrow would not have made such an impact if in the place of the Central Rada a progressive rather than a reactionary regime were put into effect. The placing of the Hetman into power brought reaction at a time when slow brakes and careful controls to the "revolutionary achievements" should have been applied. Because the Hetman was regarded as the leader of a Ukrainian Sovereign State many peasants began to equate the Ukrainian "System" as one of reaction.⁵ This factor was later carefully and fully exploited in the Bolshevik propaganda during their first invasion under the command of Antonov-Ovssenko.

Throughout the whole period of Ukraine's struggle for independence there was little sympathy or understanding for this cause in the West. The Entente did not recognize the Directorate and was hostile to its goals. In addition to the hostility of the Entente the neighboring countries which laid territorial claims upon Ukraine and sought to profit from the chaotic situation created a virtual blockage of Ukraine

⁵ Solovey, Holhota..., op-cit., p. 19.

and prevented it from buying much needed supplies. But with blockade came attack and annexation. Romania invaded Bukovina, Poland attacked Galicia, Transcarpathia was appended to the newly created state of Czechoslovakia, and Kuban was taken by the Whites. All this took place at a time when the Ukrainian forces were conducting a war against the Whites and Reds.⁶ In this situation Independent Ukraine could not possibly survive in spite of the fact that the masses firmly supported the idea.

Prior to the overthrow of the Central Rada the Bolsheviks had little influence in Ukraine. There existed no native cadres of communists that could bring the Bolsheviks into power. Today's Soviet historians falsely depict the peasants and workers of Ukraine as solidly supporting the Bolsheviks, and that the insurgents, or "bandits" as they prefer to call them, were "Kulaks" and rich peasants. Conclusions drawn from materials available to us show the dissaffection of the peasants and workers with the Bolsheviks. The real strength of the Reds is reflected in their abortive attempt to overthrow the Hetman. When the Bolsheviks finally did invade Ukraine under Antonov-Ovseenko it was with Russian troops and not the aid of the Ukrainian peasantry. Although many peasants adopted a "wait and see" attitude and in this way facilitated the Bolshevik advances, even in their political naivete the peasants quickly understood the nature of the Bolshevik regime. In the three and a half summer months of 1919, 328 revolts broke out against

⁶ Ibid., p. 16.

⁷ Ibid., p. 22.

the Reds. "Of this number", according to Rakovsky,

"from 1. IV to 1. V 1919 - 93 revolts
from 1. V to 15. V 1919 - 28 revolts
from 1. VI to 19. VI 1919 - 207 revolts"⁷

These statistics indicate that opposition to the Reds grew rapidly. Insurgency against them weakened with the advance of the Whites under General Denikin. This is not to say that the insurgents began to cooperate with the Bolsheviks, but quite to the contrary - they fought the "Red and White Bolsheviks".

A secret Bolshevik publication of 1921 indicates that:

"Throughout the year 1919 - 20, at different times and different places, about a million insurgents with weapons in their hands operated against us. During this time the insurgents and partisans killed one hundred forty thousand Red Army men, cheka men, communists and workers of the collection (prodovolchi) agencies and units. During this time the Cheka organs and Special Units of the military formations, only according to official statistics, executed four hundred thousand insurgents and their supporters, but in spite of this, in the summer of 1921 we have a new outburst of insurgency."⁸

If the "official statistics" place the number of dead by the summer of 1921 at 400,000, one can imagine the grand total of deaths during the so-called period of the "Red Terror", and the period after the summer of 1921.

The second fallacy, that the insurgent movement was conducted by well-to-do peasants, can be dispelled quickly by stating that:

⁸ Horsky, op-cit., pp. 11-12. The author cites an official secret publication of the OOKVU in 1921 which was titled "Ukrainsky - politychysky banditism" - (Eho prychiny, formy i borba s nim). (The Ukrainian Political-Banditism" Its basis, forms and struggle against it).

"Contrary to a popular Bolshevik myth, this twentieth-century haidamak-and-cossack uprising was not provoked primarily by well-to-do cossacks, nor by the last of the rich peasants, the kulak, for more land. Peasants who had always been landless dreamed now of obtaining some land; peasants who owned a little dreamed of getting more. The desire to come out of this "Times of Troubles" with a private plot and a system of self government appears to have been virtually universal."⁹

The Ukrainian peasant, as indicated above, was much too individualistic to accept the Bolshevik economic program in toto. This program did not promise the peasant land but, on the contrary, took away land which had been taken by the peasant during the period of the Central Rada. Also this program did not plan any form of "self-government for Ukraine, rather it sought a central government in Moscow - a self evident precondition for Bolshevik rule over a vast empire.

The Government of the Ukrainian National Republic, on the other hand, having the same aspirations as the peasantry, in spite of it's military weakness, had the support of the people. This support grew at such a rapid pace that had the war continued, according to General M. Kapustyansky, the Ukrainians would have emerged victorious.¹⁰ One must stress that the insurgent movement could not have survived without the sympathy of the peasantry. Control of the insurgents, as was mentioned in previous chapters, was achieved in many ways. During the "First Winter Campaign", it will be recalled, the "Partisan Army" left behind great numbers of its convalescents in the villages. After recuperating many of them stayed behind as organizers, educators, and chiefs of staff

⁹ Adams, op-cit., p. 91.

¹⁰ Stepovy op-cit., p. 3. Foreword of General M. Kapustyansky.

of the insurgent groups. As the war dragged on "localism" began to slowly disappear. Now in many cases the otamans were appointed and removed by the Chief-of-Staff of the General Staff of the Army of the UNR. Kozelsky is, therefore, correct when he states: "The great majority of the otamans and leaders of the movement were convinced Petlurovites".¹¹ In addition to these methods of control, there were the VUCUPKOM, CUPKOMs, and liaison between the UNR and insurgent units. Added to these factors were common traditions and ideas that gave the peasants a feeling of solidarity with the UNR. It is this solidarity that caused them to supply the UNR and insurgent units with ammunition, food and means of transportation.

This last period seems to be indicative of the tremendous change that took place in the attitude of the masses. It is evident, from the few available documents, that historians of this period seem to be convinced that this was the most productive period of insurgency.¹² The masses, having tasted foreign rule of every color, had profited from bitter experience. Of this enlightenment, Professor Adams wrote the following:

"Failing to prevail in the political climate of early 1919, the Bolsheviks were never again to have the chance to win friends among a politically primitive and innocent Ukraine. When they returned later to establish the third Soviet government, they came back to a country which had reflected on its agonies and which under fierce compulsion had thought long on its aspirations. The Ukrainian people had heard the siren songs of nationalism.

¹¹ Kozelsky, op-cit., p. 26.

¹² Valivsky, op-cit., pp. 15 - 16.

They had experienced the keen pleasures of feeling superior, of being Ukrainian, and they had debated with guns about the kind of political and economic systems they preferred. To the extent that the nationalist parties and the partisans helped to rouse and educate the nation, theirs was a lasting victory. Its consequences were to be seen in the growing nationalism of Ukrainian thought after 1919, in the changes wrought in the attitudes and ideas of important members of the K P (b) U, even in such recent phenomena as the nationalist oppositionist movements of the Second World War."¹³

Insurgency, therefore, continued as a traditional method of resistance against all foreign enemies. In the period of 1919 - 1926, the Ukrainian Nation, a peasant nation, fought in a peasant way. By 1941, the Ukrainian Nationalist movement reflected upon the resistance of the insurgents and continued to fight all invaders in a way not unlike that of their predecessors. The striking difference between the Insurgents of the 1919 - 1920 and the "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) of 1941: the latter movement was coordinated by one revolutionary center - the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR).

¹³ Adams, op-cit., p. 401.

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