

SUBCONTRACTOR'S MONOGRAPH

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UKRAINE



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SUBCONTRACTOR'S MONOGRAPH
ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE

Prepared at the University of Chicago

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UKRAINE

P R E F A C E

The present volume is the product of research performed in the Division of the Social Sciences of the University of Chicago, under contract with Human Relations Area Files, Incorporated, New Haven, Connecticut.

This volume consists of a number of chapters on various aspects of Ukrainian life and culture written by several research specialists. It is not a highly specialized topical monograph, but rather a broad presentation of materials useful for understanding modern Ukraine.

The data used have been drawn almost entirely from secondary works. A few personal interviews and regular files of several Ukrainian newspapers have served as primary sources of information. It has been impossible to undertake a full-scale program either of interviews of escapees or of content analysis of the press, because of time and budget limitations.

Among secondary sources, the two main categories have been Soviet books and periodicals on the one hand, and Ukrainian emigre publications on the other. Quite apart from their respective political biases, both categories of sources suffer from a tendency to present their data within very specialized frames of reference, which decreases their pertinence and reliability for more general objective accounts. Thus, the Soviets treat all social science material within a framework of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, not respecting the divisions observed in Western scholarship among sociology, politics, economics, etc. The use of quantitative data in Soviet works is on a different basis from that used in the West, and makes it difficult to approach problems through quantitative methods.

Emigre Ukrainian writings are largely preoccupied with questions of the justice and validity of Ukrainian claims to linguistic, historical and cultural distinctiveness, and of Ukrainian aspirations to national independence. These matters are of interest to the outside observer, of course, but they are discussed in the Ukrainian emigre press almost to the exclusion of other topics of equal importance and interest.

Recent American books and articles on Soviet affairs have been a third category of secondary sources.

Mr. Abraham A. Hurwicz, director of the project, has provided general guidance to the research, as well as detailed information on specific points.

Mr. Zarko Bilbija, economist, participated in the preparation of the sections of economics. Mr. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, political scientist, contributed several important sections of the book which deal with cultural and social matters. Mr. A. Gunder Frank prepared the section on economics. Mrs. Lucja Gliksman served as consultant and correspondent in Washington, D.C. Mr. Alec Lipson carried on research for papers involving use of the Russian and Ukrainian languages. Dr. Benjamin Nimer wrote the sections on political life. Mr. Leon Novar, political scientist, wrote the section on demography, as well as several shorter pieces. Mrs. Frances Fox Piven, as secretary of the project, has not only managed the clerical aspects of the work, but has contributed research to several papers. Mr. Donald E. Starsinic performed both the research and the cartography for the maps. Mr. George Tomashevich, anthropologist, prepared several papers for the sociological section as well as sections on folklore and the arts, in collaboration with other workers. Dr. Philip L. Wagner, geographer, wrote a few short sections, and acted as assistant director and editor.

All sections have been edited for style and content, but an effort has been made to respect the mode of expression and the opinions of authors as far as possible.

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Bert F. Hoselitz

UKRAINE

Name

The name Ukraine is applied to a large country in the southwestern part of the U.S.S.R. The inhabitants of the country are called Ukrainians.

The word "Ukraine" (sometimes used in the form, "the Ukraine"), is equivalent to the Russian "Україна" and the Ukrainian "Україна".

The Ukrainian term differs from the Russian in accenting the penultimate syllable, which the Russian assimilates in a stressed diphthong; i. e., "U-kra-i-na" as against Russian "Ukrai-na".

There exists some controversy over the meaning of the name of the country. The most generally accepted derivation connects it in some way with the Slavic word "krai", ("edge"), and with specialized meanings of this term meaning division or border. In medieval Russian documents the names "Ukraina" and "Okraina" were applied to the borderlands, not only in the area of the present Ukraine, but also in the east. However, the term as employed today is used exclusively as the designation of the large and distinctive Slavic-speaking community of the southwestern U.S.S.R., and of its territory.

Other names for the nation and the territory were used until the Revolution of 1917. The name "Ukraine" became official only at that time. Previously, under the Russian Empire, this area and nation were referred to as "Malorus" (Малорусь), "Malorossia" (Малороссия), etc. The English equivalent of these terms, often used in the literature, was "Little Russia",

Usage in the territories outside of the Russian empire favored the words "Ruthenia", "Ruthenian", etc., for designating this entity. This was the official name under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to which belonged a sizeable part of the ethnically Ukrainian lands. The name Ruthenia corresponds to medieval transcriptions of the local native name "Rus'", "Rus'ki", etc., which has the same source ultimately as "Russia" and "Russian". This word had been applied first, as far as is known, to the whole East Slavic region under the Kievan state, and has been preserved

in most of the East Slavic dialects as a designation of their speakers.

The name Malorus', Malorossia, and its English translation, Little Russia, are highly unpalatable to present-day Ukrainians, and should be regarded as obsolete. In the case especially of inhabitants of former Austrian territories, the term Ruthenian is acceptable in English usage, but Ukraine is the preferable word in general, because of its universal acceptance by the people of the country.

The areas of East Slavic speech lying on the southern slopes of the Carpathian mountains present a special case. The people here had referred to themselves, before the annexation to the U.S.S.R. during and following World War II, as "Russkie" ("Russians"), and to their country as "Zakarpatska Rus'" (Trans-Carpathian Rus'). There exists no tradition of the use of the name "Ukraine" or of similar names for these territories before annexation. However, the trans-Carpathian area has been made part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and is now known sometimes as Carpatho-Ukraine or Trans-Carpathian Ukraine.

It is frequently asserted that the folk dialects of the trans-Carpathian East Slavs are closer to Great Russian dialects than to Ukrainian ones. A precise determination here is impossible. But the fact that the people seem to have considered themselves as Russians, rather than Ukrainians, would indicate the use of some other term than trans-Carpathian Ukraine. Conceivably, Carpathian Ruthenia would be suitable as a term for this area.

Situation

Ukraine, third in size of the Soviet Republics, lies in the southwestern part of the U.S.S.R. It occupies a geographical grid segment bounded approximately by the parallels of $44^{\circ}30'$ and $52^{\circ}15'$ North latitude, and the meridians of 22° and $40^{\circ}15'$ East longitude. This position is similar to that of the southern half of the Province of Quebec in Canada, with respect to Equator and Pole.

The Crimean peninsula, recently attached to the Ukrainian S.S.R.,

is geographically a separate unit. Without it, most of the Ukraine lies north of latitude 46° North.

The area of the Ukrainian S.S.R., including Crimea, is 602,600 square kilometers, or about 243,200 square miles. This is slightly less than the area of the State of Texas; the latter, with 267,000 square miles, is about 10% larger than Ukraine.

It is about 500 miles from the South of the Crimean peninsula (cities of Sevastopol' and Yalta) to the northernmost city of Ukraine, Chernigov. From Uzhorod, chief city of the Carpathian region in the far west of the Republic, to Voroshilovgrad, in the Donets Basin at the extreme east, is a distance of almost 900 miles.

The Ukrainian S.S.R. is shaped like a large rhomboid ("diamond"), with two sides parallel to the Equator, the other two trending northwest-southeast, and each almost 500 miles long. The Crimean peninsula dangles from this rhomboid in the center of the southern side, and is itself shaped like a much smaller square, placed diagonal to the geographical grid.

The borders of the Ukrainian S.S.R. are as follows:


(a) on the north, Belorussian S.S.R. and the oblast' of Briansk, belonging to the Russian S.F.S.R. ;

(b) on the northeast, Kursk, Voronezh and Rostov oblasti of the Russian S.F.S.R. ;

(c) on the south, the Sea of Azov in the east, and the Black Sea;

(d) on the southwest, the Ukrainian border runs from the Danube River (across which lies Romania), along the Moldavian S.S.R., and up northward to Hungary and Czechoslovakia;

(e) the "rhomboid" shape of the country is slightly modified in the west, where Ukraine meets Czechoslovakia and Poland.



Administrative Divisions

Ukraine is a constituent republic of the U.S.S.R. and is subdivided into oblast' and raion units like other territory of the Soviet Union. A constitutional article established the Ukraine as a member state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The administrative unit next in rank below the republic is the oblast' (approximately, "province" or "region"). This is a territorial division which is governed by a local soviet, or council, which is in effect the agent of higher echelons of political administration. There is a council of ministers for the republic, and many of the ministries have representatives at oblast' level. The oblast' government has considerable authority in such matters as education, public health, social welfare, agriculture, etc.

Each oblast' is divided into several raion units. These may be compared to the counties of American States. Raions, too, have their councils and administrative agencies.

Within the various administrative levels are urban, as well as rural territories. The urban units, depending on their size and the activities which characterize them economically, are subordinated to territorial units of various ranks--directly to oblast' or to raion.

In the Ukrainian S. S. R. there is one city directly under the administration of the republic government(Kiev), and 74 under oblast' control, while 186 towns are administered under raion governments. There are in all 261 cities (as defined by the U. S. S. R. government) and 474 "settlements of urban type".

There are no longer any subordinate units of administration other than oblast' and raion (such as the krai, okrug, and autonomous republic found elsewhere in the U. S. S. R.), within Ukraine. The former Moldavian A. S. S. R. (autonomous republic) has become a full constituent republic (S. S. R.) since World War II.

Relief

Ukraine is a country of extensive plains, formerly covered mostly with grassland, but in the north with deciduous woods. Some of the richest soils known are found here, and are the basis for a highly productive agriculture. There are several large cities, and much industry, especially ferrous metallurgy, is found in the Ukraine.

Structurally, Ukraine is formed by a series of nearly flat monoclinal plateaus overlying an ancient crystalline base (the Azov-Podolian shield). These monoclines tilt gently upward toward the northeast, and occupy most of the country. There are zones of hills and mountains in the west and south (Carpathians and Crimean mountains), and an area of glacially modified topography in the north.

The larger part of Ukraine is formed by great tilted slabs of land which comprise a nearly level plain, broken here and there by scarps where a large stream has cut back the edges of the monocline. Within the plain are gulleys and streams tributary to the main rivers, but there is no outstanding elevation above the general surface.

The streams that flow through this plain are, from east to west, the Don, the Donets, the Dnepr, the Dnestr, the Bug and the Prut. They have relatively few tributaries, and most of their volume is water which originates outside Ukraine. Each stream has a high right (west) bank

and a low left bank. The direction of the monoclinal tilt, toward the southwest, exposes the rock underlying the plain to erosive attrition which has produced high scarps on one side (cut-bank) and a flat marshy lowland on the other side of the stream (slip-off slope). This feature is typical of all rivers in the area.

A few areas of rougher land exist where older hard rock masses have been exposed. These are notably in the area around Krivoi Rog and in the Donbas, and again on the northeast Ukrainian border, near the Kursk-Voronezh region. In the west, along the foothills of the Carpathians, there is another area of higher lands around Tarnopol' This is a country of medium relief but rather rough topography (Volhynian-Podolian upland).

The Carpathian mountains lie partly within the Ukrainian S. S. R. There are peaks over 6000 feet high, but most of the range is much lower. The Carpathians are much less rugged and steep than the Alps, and their typical form is rounded, wooded hills of mild slope.

South of the Carpathians a small area of the Hungarian plain belongs to the Ukrainian S. S. R.

The Crimea, now annexed to Ukraine, has mountains over a mile high immediately overlooking its south shores, and a series of lesser limestone ranges and plateaus descend in step-like regularity to the Isthmus of Perekop, where it joins the mainland. The northern part of Crimea, which is made up of plains, is topographically similar to most parts of Ukraine.

The northern parts of the country show the effects of Pleistocene glaciation. A large mantle of loess covers about one third of Ukraine, in the northern sector. This is a fine dust deposit associated in some way with periglacial events. Similarly, in the district of Polesie, on the extreme north, there are such forms as ground moraine and outwash plains, rudimentary drainage and other marks of former glaciation. Polesie has much in common with the Belorussian S. S. R.

Climate

The country has a markedly continental climate with strong seasonal temperature contrasts and moderate to slight precipitation, distributed in all seasons, but with summer maxima. There is considerable diversity of climatic types within Ukraine.

In almost all of the country the annual march of temperature follows a single pattern: The winter is cold, the summer hot. The coldest period is in January and February, the warmest in July and August. The spring and fall seasons of moderate temperature are extremely short.

Temperatures vary according to distance from the sea, but the influence of the Atlantic is far more important than that of the Black Sea, because of wind directions. The isotherms (lines of equal temperature values) run from northwest to southeast in all seasons. This is also influenced by the pressure situation, which is expressed in prevalent wind directions from north to southeast during most of the year; the air which reaches the Ukraine is therefore low in humidity and extreme in temperature, being of continental origin for the most part.

It should be remarked that one small region, the Crimean coast, possesses a distinctive climate. Here the climate is maritime, being strongly influenced by the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Temperatures are much less extreme, the winter is relatively warm and the summer warm but not so hot as in the rest of the country. Precipitation is concentrated in winter, and the months from July through September are without rainfall.

Precipitation is derived from the westerlies and from convection occurring in summer air masses. The cyclonic precipitation occurs at all seasons, but mostly in winter, while the convective rains, which contribute the greatest part of the total precipitation, occur in the hot months of summer. Rainfall is greatest in the northwest and in the Carpathians, decreasing southeastward.

The precipitation of the winter months is in the form of snow. The snow blanket remains for about four to five months in Polesie, and is

sporadic and short-lived in the south. Snow falls everywhere in the country (including Crimea) at least a few times in most years.

Sleet storms occur in late winter and early spring, and some of the convectional storms of summer produce hail, which often does great damage to standing crops.

Winds are of great significance in Ukrainian weather. This is best understood in terms of pressure distributions. In winter, Ukraine lies at the southwestern edge of a great continental high pressure cell, from which winds blow outward and reach the country from a northerly to easterly direction, bringing very dry and cold continental air. Summer winds are controlled by the presence of a large center of low pressure in Western Asia, which sets up a wind system producing northerly winds in Ukraine in summer.

The strong winds of winter make snowdrifts a common element in the Ukrainian winter landscape, and so impede traffic and work. Often a northeasterly wind blows which, because of its very low humidity, causes the snow to sublimate, and so robs the fields of needed moisture. Such dry, "snow-eating" winds, known as "sukhovei", are a serious handicap for agriculture in this land of critical moisture supply.

In summer, hot desert air, often loaded with dust, reaches Ukraine from time to time, drying out the growing crops and the soil.

The rivers of Ukraine are blocked by ice for about three months at their mouths, and longer in their upper courses, so that navigation is halted. The ports of the Sea of Azov, and even of the Black Sea, freeze over for a month or more every year.

Ukrainian agriculture is highly developed, and enjoys great advantages in rich soils and favorable topography, but is somewhat handicapped by weather factors. (It should be borne in mind that all of Ukraine, as noted above, lies poleward of latitude 44° N). The growing season is rather short; precipitation is barely sufficient in most places; evaporation is high; precipitation shows a high index of annual variability; dry winds remove some of the moisture gained from

precipitation; the precipitation maxima occur in the months of field work and harvest. The freezing of rivers and ports hinders all aspects of the economy by interfering with water transport. However, the Ukraine enjoys in general the most favorable climatic conditions for agriculture of any of the large regions of the U.S.S.R.

Vegetation

Ukraine includes within its borders a great range of vegetation types, which form an orderly series, with gradual transitions, from sphagnum swamps and coniferous forests in Polesie, in the extreme northwest of the country, to arid steppe grasslands and semi-desert in the southeast. There is a complementary gradation from broadleaf deciduous woods in the west and southwest toward coniferous forest and insular pine-thickets (in the steppe) in the east.

The forests of northern Ukraine--the Pripiat' region-- are composed of dense stands of coniferous forest, fir, pine and spruce alternating with expanses of wet swamp, in which sedges, mosses and bush plants predominate. The westerly parts of this region are notable for the presence of groves of broadleaf deciduous trees--maple, ash, alder, birch, beech, linden, oak, hornbeam--on the better drained soils. Alder and willow are also found growing in the swamplands.

Waterlogged lands become less common southward, the swamp vegetation disappears, and conifers give way to deciduous woods of oak, maple, beech, etc. The broadleaf deciduous woodland is best developed in the western parts of the country, where it fills the area from the slopes of the Carpathians north and east to about Kiev. In its eastern section this vegetation region is not so fully represented, for here it narrows, disappearing entirely near the Volga. Between the area of Polesie and a line running through Kiev and Kharkov (about latitude 50° N), the vegetation may be considered as a transition between the forests of the north and west (coniferous and deciduous, respectively) on the one hand, and the grasslands of the steppe on the other.

This area, in which the forest is represented by discontinuous patches mixed with grasslands, is known as the forest-steppe ("lesostep").

The forest-steppe has been very much altered by human occupance, and it is difficult to say whether or not forest at one time covered the entire area. Today, at any rate, most of the land is in plowlands and pasture, and the patches of woods are small and scattered.

The steppe begins south of Kiev and Kharkov. It is a "sea of grass", in which a few species of the grass family, dicot and monocot herbs compose the whole cover; the species represented vary somewhat locally, but are not very numerous in any one place. The steppe vegetation forms a continuous cover of thick sod, whose aspect varies greatly with the season; it is a solid expanse of bloom when the herbs flower in spring and early summer; later it is seen as a tawny carpet of dry grass; in winter the steppe is a smooth surface covered with a blanket of snow. With the level or gently undulating topography of the country, this vegetation produces an impression of immense open space, which has often been commented on by writers who saw it. Today, however, almost all of the steppe is plowed and planted to grain and industrial crops, and while the cultivated fields preserve much of the look of the wild steppe, some of the picturesqueness of spring flowering and trackless space are lost.

Southeastward, the steppe becomes drier, the grasses and herbs become shorter and more sparse, and the sod less dense. Along the Black Sea coasts and near the lower Don, where the climate is increasingly more arid, the steppe vegetation of tall grass is replaced by short grass prairies.

The Crimean peninsula is covered on its northern slopes--by far the largest part of its area--with steppe and short grass prairie. On the high mountains overlooking the sea, a very sparse vegetation of pines, succulent herbs and grasses occurs. The south and west coastal lowlands, with the adjacent steep slopes, have a vegetation of the Mediterranean type, that is, open park-like groves of large deciduous or evergreen broadleaf trees with grassy patches intermingled, as well as chaparral--complexes of many species of drought resistant woody

shrubs, growing to a height of three to six feet, densely spaced and with no ground cover between them. The chaparral forms a solid growth, especially on the lower hills. In addition to the wild vegetation, the Crimea possesses a semi-naturalized vegetation of ornamental plants and escapes brought in from other mediterranean and even tropical lands -- groves of acacia, eucalyptus, myrtle, cactus, etc.

The western forests, above all those of the Carpathian mountains, are rich in broadleaf deciduous species, including oak, maple, hornbeam, ash, beech, alder, birch, etc., as well as tall stands of fir, spruce and pine at higher elevations, and low-growing juniper and meadows in the highest parts.

These forests are best preserved in the rough country of the Carpathian foothills, the mountains themselves, and the Volhynian-Podolian upland. The typical species of the western forest disappear one by one toward the east, and the areal expression of this type of forest decreases rapidly in that direction.

The forests of Ukraine are in general best preserved in the northern swampy region of Polesie, and in the Carpathians. The country as a whole is largely devoted to agriculture; Ukraine has the largest percentage of its total area in cultivation among all Soviet republics (nearly 80%). Only where rough topography or poor drainage impede agricultural development has natural vegetation survived. The steppe and prairie regions, as well as the forest-steppe, have been occupied almost completely by agriculture. (There are a few large natural preserves of steppe vegetation as it existed in former times, which have been maintained intact since long before the Revolution of 1917.)

Soils

The soils of Ukraine vary in a regular series from acid marsh soils and podzolized forest soils in the northwest (Polesie) on the one extreme to prairie and semi-desert soils in the southeast on the other.

The marshes of the Pripiat' region and Polesie contain black, acid soils rich in undecomposed organic matter and very low in exchangeable bases. The "soil" material of the swamps is often not a true soil, but only an accumulation of peaty deposits, which are waterlogged and totally useless for agriculture. Where there is a true soil, it is acid and infertile, with a dense clay layer, filled with iron concretions beneath the raw humic materials.

The northern forest regions of Ukraine have podzols and podzolized forest soils, in which all of the minerals except silica have been washed out of the upper layers, and a compact, impermeable layer of clay, with iron concretions, is found beneath. These soils are poor for agriculture, being acid in reaction and poor in mineral nutrients, as well as possessing poor drainage. The degree of podzolization (leaching of minerals from the soil) decreases southward, and the brown podzolized forest soils which extend into the forest-steppe and also take up the main area of the forested Western Ukraine are more suited to agriculture than the podzols proper.

The brown forest soils give way to the rich, fertile chernozem (Russian: "black earth") soil south of latitude 50° N. This is probably the best of all soils for most kinds of field agriculture. It is rich in minerals, neutral to slightly basic in reaction, and provided with abundant humus at the same time. The chemical and mechanical composition produces an easily worked, moisture conserving, fertile agricultural soil. On the chernozem in Ukraine, as well as in other countries -- Canada, U.S.A., Argentina, Manchuria -- have developed the great productive areas for commercial grains. The largest continuous area of chernozem in the world occurs in the U.S.S.R., and Ukraine includes the greatest part of it.

South and east of the area of the chernozem lies the area of chestnut-colored prairie soils, which are less rich in humus than the chernozem, but very rich in calcium (which gives them a structure favorable to cultivation), and rich in nutrient minerals. These soils are also the basis of very successful grain agriculture.

Beyond the chestnut soils are some soil types belonging to

more arid lands, with an increasing percentage of salinity, and very low content of organic matter. This area is also mostly under cultivation, but because of soil and weather conditions is a country of marginal agriculture, like the western Plains of the United States, in which there is always great risk involved in agricultural operations.

The soils of the Carpathians and of the Crimean mountains are of the many specialized sorts peculiar to mountain regions, and are not utilized to any great degree for agricultural purposes.

On the southern and western coasts of Crimea there are soils of the subtropical red and yellow earth group, which are rather poor in organic matter, and composed mostly of dense, iron-bearing clays. These are supposed by some writers to be produced by loss of a more fertile former superior layer which has been washed away. The red and yellow soils alternate with light brown forest soils with a high content of lime, for much of the rock material in Crimea is limestone.

The chernozem and prairie soils of Ukraine are one of the most valuable natural resources possessed by the U.S.S.R. It was in large part the grain surplus produced in this area of rich soils which was used to finance the capital expansion of the Soviet economy in its first two decades of existence.

Agriculture

Agriculture in Ukraine is favored by level topography and rich soils. Mechanization is extensive, and agricultural techniques in Ukraine are probably on the whole the most advanced in the U.S.S.R. The chief crops are wheat, rye, maize, sugar beets, cotton, hemp, potatoes, sunflower, poppy, legumes, and dairy products.

The most important agricultural region is the "Old Ukraine" (on both sides of the Dnepr, around Kiev and Kharkov), together with the southern part of the country, once known as "New Russia". Around the edges of Ukraine are found areas of specialization in agriculture. The more humid areas of Polesie and Volhynia produce rye, potatoes, flax, hemp and dairy products. Galicia and Podolia, in the southwest,

produce especially potatoes and grains. The Carpathian mountains are a center of livestock raising, while the trans-Carpathian region produces wheat, maize, grapes, and fruit, and even tea plantations are being established there. Bessarabia is known for fruits, grapes, tobacco, maize and wheat. The Crimean coast has a well established intensive horticulture, with tobacco, sub-tropical fruit, and wine grapes; while the Crimean mountains and steppes are livestock areas. Cotton production is centered in the southeast of the republic, where there are large irrigation projects, but much cotton is grown without irrigation.

By far the main crop of the country is wheat. Ukraine is one of the most important grain producing countries of the world, and forms with the nearby Kuban, Russian chernozem and Volga regions, the largest grain area of the Soviet Union. The wheat land of Ukraine is one of the most precious resources of the U.S.S.R.

Ukrainian wheat is mostly of the winter type, sown in fall to lie under the snow and germinate in spring. Most of the grain is of bread varieties, often locally developed. It is consumed almost entirely within the U.S.S.R.

Barley and rye, hardier than wheat, are also produced in large quantities. These grains are grown mostly where conditions are not suitable for wheat--rye in the humid and cool region of the north, barley in the arid southeast, the Carpathians, etc. They are used for baking, brewing, alcohol production, and also as fodder crops.

A certain amount of rice is now being produced in the south of the Ukraine, and there are ambitious plans for increasing rice production. Maize is produced, especially in the southwest, for fodder, meal and industrial uses.

Potatoes, a very major crop, are grown especially on heavier soils and in cooler climates. They form a large part of agricultural production in Polesie and Podolia especially. Potatoes are used directly as food and in the distillation of alcohol.

Such oil and fiber crops as hemp, flax, sunflower, and poppy are prominent among Ukrainian products.

There is a very large development of sugar beet growing, and Ukraine furnishes most of the Soviet sugar supply. This is the sort of industrial crop whose development is strongly favored by Soviet policy.

Soy beans are another major industrial crop, widely grown in Ukraine. Cotton acreage has been increasing very rapidly, especially in connection with irrigation, for both oil and fiber. Another important class of industrial crops is the latex group, of which kok-sagyz and guayule are the most important. There are also plantations of such things as tung trees (for oil), medicinals, and spice plants. Practically all of these industrial crops are processed within Ukraine, and support a considerable industry.

Fruit and vegetable production occupies two sorts of situations--specialized horticultural districts, producing grapes, figs, citrus fruits, deciduous fruits (apples, plums, cherries, etc.), and truck garden belts near the large cities. The chief truck crops are cabbages, tomatoes, cucumbers, melons, beans and peas, beets, carrots, onions. In addition there are field plantings of beans and peas for drying.

There are several kinds of livestock raising. Dairy farming, with sown pastures and cultivated winter fodder (alfalfa, clover, grasses) is found in the north and near the large cities. Beef production is carried on in the mountains of the Carpathians and Crimea under a semi-migratory pattern with utilization of seasonal pastures, and on large livestock "ranch" kolkhozes (collective farms), especially in the dry southeast.

Pig raising is characteristic in the western and northern parts of the country. In most of Ukraine, pigs are raised on maize, other grains, and potatoes, but in places in the southwest they are fed partly on acorns.

Sheep are raised especially by semi-migrant herders in the Carpathian and Crimean mountains, chiefly for wool. There are also some sheep "ranches" in the southeast.

Poultry are kept in all of the Ukrainian villages, and numerous collective farms have specialized poultry production units.

About seventy percent of the total land surface of Ukraine is tillable, and another 10% more or less is used for meadows and pastures. These are the highest percentages in any Soviet republic. Of this 70% of surface, some 80% is actually used for cropland.

Ukrainian agriculture follows in part the traditional three-field system, with one field fallow, one in a winter grain crop (mostly wheat), and one in a spring crop. Fallowing usually involves some cultivation. It is used to conserve moisture supply and to reduce weed infestation. About a quarter of the agricultural land is fallow at any one time.

Ukrainian agriculture is carried on in large kolkhoz (collective farm) and sovkhos (state farm) units, and is highly mechanized. These two features--large scale operations and advanced technology--repeat characteristics of Ukrainian agriculture of pre-Revolutionary times, but have been greatly extended under Soviet rule.

The collectivization is very nearly 100% in the country, but this was achieved at great cost in lives and capital. Political and social unrest were associated with the collectivization drive, which began in the early thirties, and many hundreds of thousands of persons were liquidated or deported in connection with it. There was a catastrophic decline in numbers of livestock, a drop in grain production, and destruction of much valuable equipment.

Gasoline, diesel and even electric power are used to run tractors, harvesters, and other machinery. Much of the equipment for farming is furnished by special machine and tractor stations (MTS) and operated by their personnel. The mechanization of agriculture was fostered by very large state farm units, experimental and demonstration stations, and is now supported by the MTS.

Better agricultural technique is a chief concern of the Soviets. There are many research and demonstration centers which develop new crop varieties, insecticides, fertilizers, etc., and experiment with seed preparation, weed control, harvest and storage techniques. One of the chief ideological positions of Soviet Communism is of special application to agriculture: the concept of "the transformation of nature" by man. State policy is based on a belief that man's control

of nature can increase productivity to a measure yet undreamed of, that there is virtually no limit of the capacity of the earth to support human population increase, and that the proper meaning of science lies in its application to achieving ever greater "triumphs in the struggle with nature".

Great attention is being directed recently to artificial adjustment of water supply and soil moisture. Irrigation projects are built or under construction in several places in Ukraine. In Polesie there is a program for drainage of waterlogged lands. Many measures are being applied also to halt loss of moisture from soils: planting of shelter belts of trees to cut down losses of moisture from the dry "sukhovei" winds and to protect snow cover; arresting and filling in of gullies to halt lateral moisture loss; various new rotational crop and cover plantings; soil conditioning by new techniques of cultivation; etc.

The standard of living of the agricultural population in many regards is below that of the urban workers, and agriculture is in effect exploited for the benefit of industrialization and urbanization. The announced aim of the Soviets is to erase the social and technological differences between city and country, by "urbanizing" agriculture.

Forests cover only a small part of the surface of Ukraine, but despite their insignificance compared to the total forested area of the U.S.S.R., the Ukrainian forests furnish a sizable volume of lumber and other forest products. Exploitation is centered in Polesie and parts of Volhynia, for softwoods and pulp, and in the Carpathians and Bukovina for hardwoods of high quality. Several of the towns of these regions have important saw mills, pulp factories, and chemical plants processing wood products. A considerable amount of lumber is floated down some of the rivers from cutting areas.

Industry

The country's great mineral riches are on a scale of world significance. Chief among them are coal, iron, manganese, nickel, natural gas, phosphates, sulfur, salt, limestone and building stone.

The Donbas (Donets River Basin), at the eastern extremity of Ukraine, is the largest single coal producing area of the U.S.S.R., and second in terms of known reserves. Donbas coal has been exploited since early in the nineteenth century, and today forms a basis for heavy metallurgy in Ukraine and even in other regions of the U.S.S.R., being also the primary source of fuel used on railroads of the European part of the Soviet Union, and in much medium and light industry, thermo-electric plants, chemical industries, etc.

The coal of the Donbas is of moderate to very good coking qualities, relatively low in sulfur and phosphorus, so that it is an excellent metallurgical coal. It is used in local metallurgical plants with iron ore from Krivoi Rog and Kerch (in Crimea), and also in plants at those points, allowing two way exchange of raw material. There is associated a good supply of limestone, and manganese is available at Nikopol' nearby.

Ukrainian iron comes from two principal areas: the Krivoi Rog region, on the Dnepr, and Kerch, at the eastern end of the Crimean peninsula. The mines of Krivoi Rog were the first to be worked on a large scale in the Russian Empire (from about 1830), and are still the largest single supplier of ore. The Krivoi Rog ore is among the highest in iron and freest of impurities in the U.S.S.R. Kerch has large amounts of ore, in convenient coastal location, but it is sulfurous and of lower grade than Krivoi Rog ore.

Some of the largest manganese deposits in the world, and the main Soviet supply of this metal, occur around Nikopol', just south of Krivoi Rog. The metal is critical for many special steels and other alloys.

Limestone, which is vital for the smelting of iron and in other metallurgical operations, as well as in sugar-refining, is plentiful and of good quality in the middle Don region, near the coal deposits. There are also clays here especially suitable for lining metallurgical furnaces.

Nickel is produced around Mariupol' in small amounts. There is some antimony produced near Dnepropetrovsk, and phosphates are mined in the southwest.

Natural gas is present in good quantities, along with much smaller amounts of liquid hydrocarbons, around Stanislav and Dashava in southern Galicia. A pipeline has been completed recently to bring gas for industrial use as far as Kiev from these fields.

Salt is mined in Galicia and Podolia, and recovered by evaporation around the Sea of Azov. Sulfur is exploited in the latter area.

Granite for building stone is quarried in Podolia, from exposures of the pre-Cambrian system. Some choice limestones for building are obtained from the Crimean mountains. On the whole, Ukraine is poorly supplied with building stone, like most of the European U.S.S.R. and western Siberia. There are earths of ceramic properties, however, for brick, tile, and pottery.

Ukrainian heavy industry includes some of the most important industrial complexes in the Soviet Union. It is centered in two places: the Donets Basin or Donbas, and the middle Dnepr region (Zaporozh'e, Krivoi Rog). There is a group of lesser centers--Kerch, Nikopol', etc.--in connection with particular mineral deposits.

The Donbas is the largest center of heavy metallurgy in the U.S.S.R. With local coking coals, iron ore from Krivoi Rog, Kerch, and Magnitogorsk in the Urals, manganese from Nikopol', alloy metals from the Caucasus and the Urals, and local limestone, this concentration of many large blast furnaces, rolling mills, etc., produces a large part of the total iron and steel of the U.S.S.R. (around 20%). The main producing centers are Voroshilovgrad, Stalino, Makeevka, Gorlovka, Knostantinovka. Associated with the mills are fabricating plants for machine tools, railroad equipment, pipe, etc.

Around Krivoi Rog is another heavy metallurgical center, which produces its own iron ore and imports other raw materials. An exchange system exists in raw material shipments between Krivoi Rog and the Donbas.

Along the Dnepr, the large hydroelectric projects have favored the development of diversified industries in which electric power is important. Here are located aluminum factories, copper smelters, machine-building plants, electrical equipment factories, chemical plants,

etc.

The larger cities of the Ukraine have industrial plants of many kinds. Kiev and Kharkov are important for machine tools, agricultural equipment, clothing and textiles, food products, building materials, chemicals, etc.

Many of the second rank cities, like L'vov, Tarnopol', Vinnitsa, Kirovgrad, Nikolaev, Kherson, Kremenchug, Lutsk, Sumy and Zhdanov have specialized industries based on local resources. The western cities--chief among them Vinnitsa--produce sugar from beets grown nearby. Throughout Ukraine, smaller centers have flour mills, elevators, distilleries, etc., using locally grown grains. Textile mills are found especially in the west and north of the country, and chemical and light metal plants in the south and east.

Transport

Ukraine has the best railroad net in the U.S.S.R. in proportion to its total area, and good ports on the Black Sea.

There are eight major east-west routes, and nine north-south systems serving the country, apart from short local lines. Feeder lines and branches connect the main lines one with another, making a single unified network.

Roads are not nearly so well developed as railroads. Kiev is connected with Moscow by an all-weather road which runs through Gomel', and which extends southward through Ukraine to Zhitomir-Vinnitsa, and Mogilev-Podol'skii to Kishinev and Odessa, another branch runs through Uman and Pervomaisk to Nikolaev. Another good motor road runs through Kharkov and Zaporozh'e into Crimea, terminating at Simferopol'.

Other highways are unpaved outside of the towns, and often intransitable for part of the year.

The Dnepr is the only river of Ukraine navigable by large vessels for any distance. Kiev lies at the upstream terminus of navigation. The Dnestr and the Don are navigable for short distances.

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Ukraine is thus a lowland country with much of its area formerly in grassland, possessing great mineral wealth, and a highly developed industry, rich agricultural resources, and good communications.

Distribution of Population

"A"-1c

The great variations in population density throughout Ukraine¹ reflect the unevenness of population distribution.² In general, the most highly industrialized areas and those with the most extensive agricultural development contain the highest concentration of population. Such regions exist at the foot of the Carpathian mountains in the Chernovtsy, Stanislav, and Drogobych oblasts, and in the rich agricultural oblasts of Tarnopol, L'vov³, Khmel'nits'ky (formerly Kamenets-Podolskii), Vinnitsa, Kiev, and Cherkassy (formerly part of Kiev oblast). The latter four oblasts comprise the original area of settlement of the Ukrainian people and are the agricultural heartland of the Republic. The Donbas (Stalino and Voroshilovgrad oblasts) has greater local concentrations of people but fluctuates more widely than the western agricultural oblasts.

Resembling the Donbas in composition and location of population are the northern part of Zaporozh'e oblast and Dnepropetrovsk oblast. Here very high local concentrations characterize the industrial sections

1. -Shabad, Geography of the U.S.S.R., pp. 204-07, 434-463, is the basis for this section. See also Bolshaia Sovet. Entsik., S.S.R., (1948), col. 1809; Baranskii, op. cit., p. 272

2. - Balzak et. al., Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R., pp. 167-173, discuss the distribution of population under capitalism and under communism and concludes that while the former leads to great unevenness of distribution the latter makes for a more or less uniform distribution of both productive forces and people.

3. - These five oblasts are part of the eight formed from the annexed Polish, Czech, and Rumanian territories--the Western Ukraine, Although predominantly agricultural they still had a higher average population density than the Ukrainian S.S.R. had in 1939. Lorimer, The Population of the U.S.S.R., p. 187.

with rather abrupt declines in areas somewhat farther from the urban industrial districts.

Somewhat less thickly settled are the more easterly Sumy, Poltava, and Kharkov oblasts, a transition region between the Central Black Earth Region of the R.S.F.S.R. and the central agricultural region of Ukraine. The more northerly sections of Sumy and Kiev oblasts blend into the Ukrainian Polesie which includes also Zhitomir and Chernigov oblasts of the pre-1939 Ukraine and the northern part of Western Ukraine with the oblasts of Volyn and Rovno. This is the most sparsely settled area of Ukraine with poorly developed industry, podzolic soils, and extensive marshy areas (especially the Pripiat Marshes in the western oblasts).

The southern steppes, while rather more populous than Polesie, show a sharp decline from the high density of the industrial and richer agricultural oblasts. This relatively thinly inhabited region includes lowlands extending north from the Black and Azov Seas and is drained by the lower courses of the Dnepr, the Southern Bug, and the Dnestr. In general it includes all or portions of Odessa (including the former Izmail oblast), Nikolaev, Kherson, Kirovgrad, Zaporozh'e, and Stalino oblasts. The steppe area likewise extends into Krim (Crimea) oblast where it comprises about two-thirds of the area of the peninsula. The southern coastal area of the Crimea is very densely populated due to its character as a health and vacation resort region.

Finally, the Zakarpatskaia (Transcarpathian) oblast, the former Podkarpatska Rus (Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia) province of Czechoslovakia transferred to the U.S.S.R. in 1945, is, together with part of Chernovtsy oblast, the mountainous part of Ukraine. It has a relatively low population density, though not as low as the Polesie.

Geographic Regions

The patterns of settlement in Ukraine reflect both natural possibilities and historical conditions. The natural regions of Ukraine are approximately defined by the distribution of soil and vegetation types. They may be summarized as follows.

1) Trans-Carpathian region: a small area consisting of the southern foothills of the Carpathians and a section of the Hungarian plain, in the basin of the Tisa (Hungarian, Tisza). The vegetation in the foothills is mostly deciduous broadleaf forest, in which oak and beech are prominent. The foothills are an area of thin brown forest soils, with vineyards and orchards, as well as some rye, barley, and maize. The plains region has chestnut soils, and is given over chiefly to grain cultivation. Hot summers, mild winters, and precipitation the year round to a total of about 20" in the lowlands, and higher above, characterize the climate.

2) Carpathian mountains: the mountain region, with forests of broadleaf deciduous trees, succeeded at higher altitudes by dense coniferous forests, and finally by alpine forest and meadows, has a wide variety of soil types, but offers limited possibilities for agriculture. Animal husbandry is important. The summers are mild and winters moderately cold. Precipitation is locally from 20-35".

3) Western forests: in the lowlands and moderately hilly regions of Galicia, Volhynia and Podolia are deciduous woods with a great variety of species. The brown forest soils resemble those of Central Europe. This area supports a dense agricultural population, growing many kinds of grain and field crops like potatoes and sugar beets. It has moderate summers and cool winters, with precipitation around 20-25".

4) Northern marshes and forests: The area of Polesie and the Pripiat' is occupied largely by swamps and coniferous forests, and is so poorly drained that little agriculture is practiced. The peaty soils are unfavorable to most crops, but some potatoes, flax and rye are grown. Dairying is of some importance. The climate is one of cold winters, moderately hot summers, and precipitation of around 20".

5) Forest-steppe: most of the northern half of Ukraine, as far south as latitude 50°N, belongs to the forest-steppe. In this region, patches of deciduous broadleaf woods, often with low and open growth, stand amid expanses of meadowland. The topography is level, and the

soils range from brown forest types to podzolized chernozems. A wide variety of grains and field crops is grown. The summers are colder and the winters colder than further south, and precipitation amounts to 18-20".

6) Steppe: The southern grasslands, with chernozem and chestnut soils, are largely occupied by grain agriculture. The climate has hot summers and cold winters, medium precipitation (10-15") and violent dry winds.

7) Dry steppe and prairie: On the drier margin of the steppe are short grass lands with more calcareous but less rich soils, again occupied by grain agriculture. The climate is severe, with cold winters and hot summers, low precipitation and violent dry winds.

8) Crimean coast: The southern and western coasts of the Crimea, consisting of the seaward slopes of the hills and the immediately adjacent coastal plain, has vegetation and soils resembling those of the Mediterranean. The climate is mild and rather dry, with no precipitation for several months in summer. Most land use is horticultural.

The historical regions of Ukraine reflect changing political control. The core of the country lay always on the River Dnepr, around the city of Kiev, center of the earliest known Slavic state in the area. This core lay in forest-steppe country.

The "core" Ukraine around Kiev was divided historically into the Left Bank and Right Bank sections, the former falling under control of the Muscovite state, while the latter was under Polish domination until late in the seventeenth century. Only when these two halves of the core were united did the Ukrainian nationality find a single territorial expression.

The Western Ukraine, once subject to the Kievan state, was early separated from the other East Slavic lands. The Kingdom of Poland controlled these lands (Galicia, Podolia, Volhynia, and part of Polesie) in the middle ages, and introduced new political and religious forms which somewhat estranged this area from the rest of Ukraine. Later Galicia, with the Carpathians, the trans-Carpathian area and Bukovina, became part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, while Volhynia and portions of

Podolia and Polesie, as part of Poland, were incorporated into the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century. Most of Galicia, the Carpathian and trans-Carpathian regions, and Bukovina, never formed part of a Russian state until after World War II. In these areas, religious distinctiveness was preserved, and a particular sort of Ukrainian national tradition was developed, apart from the tradition in Russian held lands.

Within the Russian Empire, the southern steppe and the Black Sea coasts remained until about 1800 unsettled, and the area was colonized as "New Russia" by people brought from many parts of the Empire, as well as from other European countries (chiefly Germany and the Balkans.) The predominant elements among the settlers, however, were Ukrainian. Much of the development of this country coincided with the growth of the trade in commercial grain.

The lands of Bessarabia and the region of the Danube mouth, peopled by Romanians (Moldavians), Bulgars, Turks, Jews, Germans, Gypsies and others as well as Ukrainians and Great Russians, were intermittently a part of the Russian possessions. These lands were formerly under nominal Turkish control, passing into Russian hands in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. After World War I, Romania claimed and occupied most of this mixed region, which returned to Russian control only during the Second World War. (Bukovina also passed through a period within the Romanian state, after being an Austro-Hungarian possession. It became part of the Soviet Ukraine after World War II). Bessarabia is another country important for its grain crops, including a great deal of corn (maize).

The industrial Ukraine, including some of the earliest, and now the largest, centers of heavy industry in the East Slavic lands, grew up around the coal, iron and manganese of Ukraine. The Donbas region, and the section around Zaporozh'e and Krivoi Rog, have become great industrial concentrations. Here the population is very mixed, consisting of elements from all parts of the Soviet Union. The economy is almost entirely dominated by heavy industry.

Crimea, until late subject to Turkey (1800), and settled principally by Turkic-speaking Moslems, was added to the Ukraine only in 1954.

There is apparently hardly a trace of the former Moslem population, which was removed during World War II because of alleged collaboration with the Germans. The population is now a very mixed one in which Ukrainians have a slight majority.

The Kuban' area, the plains just northwest of the Caucasus, across the Don River from Ukraine proper, has been colonized by many different stocks since the first intensive settlement began in the nineteenth century, but a large proportion of the settlers are Ukrainian, and this region, though not part of the present Ukrainian S.S.R., is claimed by some Ukrainian leaders as rightfully a part of their country. The Kuban', a rich grain producing area, was once occupied by Circassians and Ossetians, as well as nomadic groups; but agricultural settlements of Slavs now predominate.

History

"A"-1b

Ukraine is one of the largest European nations, with a population very nearly as large as those of France, Great Britain and Italy; only Germany and Russia far exceed Ukraine in population. Ukrainian culture has a European, Christian tradition which has very much the same origins as other European cultures, and is in no way "inferior" or "backward". Ukraine possesses all of the conventional attributes of a "nation"--a distinct language, unique cultural tradition, a large and nearly homogeneous ethnic territory, a sense of distinctiveness among its people, and a separate social system with its own native leadership.

Yet this major European nation has never developed a successful and enduring state of its own. The reasons for this do not lie in any incapacity of the Ukrainians to govern themselves, nor in a lack of desire for independent statehood, but rather in particular historical circumstances which have affected the country. Throughout most of its history Ukraine has formed a part of other large states, built up by powerful neighbors or by invaders from afar. It is not unlikely that the geographic position of the country has had an influence here. The exposed steppe and the forest-steppe offer little protection from military attack, and there is no well-guarded "core" land, safe from assault, into which a Ukrainian state might withdraw its forces when the steppe and forest-steppe were temporarily lost. An overwhelming assault on the steppe and its borders by mobile and maneuverable cavalry armies could always overcome the sedentary agricultural population. But it was not so much attacks from the steppe that prevented the development of a Ukrainian state, as the superior position of neighboring peoples, who did have states with "cores" in the hilly or forested lands in the north and west which were virtually invulnerable to the steppe warriors. The advantage of the position of the Polish, Lithuanian, Muscovite and German states in various periods allowed them a security of growth

and organization which Ukraine lacked, and made it possible for these states to conduct military operations in the steppe and forest-steppe without risking their national survival. Ukraine was a battleground for these states.

The expansionist ambitions of her neighbors caused Ukraine to be fought over and dominated by other nations, but there was a measure of necessity in this, for without the protection of strong armies securely based, the Ukrainians could not have continued to occupy their land, but would always have remained at the mercy of raids from every quarter. Whether or not the Ukrainian nation could have produced a state and an army strong enough to guarantee the security of settlement from attack is an academic question. It did not, in fact, produce such a state and army, and was left subject to and dependent upon those powers who occupied and protected the country. The Ukrainian people itself was not a passive element in the history of the steppe. The powerful military force of the Cossacks was mostly Ukrainian in origin. But the Cossack state which was founded in the 1640s was unable to maintain its independence and the Cossacks were themselves absorbed into the armies of neighboring states.

Under the occupation by neighboring states there came inevitably a tendency toward forced or voluntary assimilation into the society of the occupying state. It is perhaps only because the country has been held by several different powers at different periods, each contributing its share of influence on Ukrainian society and culture, but never completely assimilating the Ukrainian nation, that Ukraine has preserved its national distinctiveness. Had not various powers contended throughout the centuries for possession of Ukraine, there might be no Ukrainian nation today; an enduring occupation by a single state might have led in time to complete absorption of the Ukrainians into another and larger nation.

The steppe and forest-steppe lands of the present Ukraine have been settled and seized, raided and ruled by many different peoples since long before the beginning of our era. Archaeology discloses the passage of numerous cultures and peoples throughout the area, and classical

accounts describe several successive occupations of the country. The wanderings of peoples and the rise, flourishing and fall of political and military powers have affected the Ukrainian territory since very early times.

The first certain evidence of the presence of peoples directly ancestral to the modern Ukrainians belongs to the middle of the first millennium AD, when tribes speaking Slavic dialects were living in the forest-steppe and even the steppe lands. They shared the country with sedentary Iranian-speaking peoples (Alani) and probably other agriculturists, as well as with various pastoral groups. From the earliest times, there is indication of the perennial contest between the nomadic pastoral peoples of the steppe and the sedentary farmers.

The earliest recorded political organizations in the area were those of the nomadic Scythians and the Sarmatians, both sedentary and nomadic, who had established small kingdoms and city-states, which came under Greek influence. Later there were repeated incursions of steppe peoples -- Goths, Avars, Huns, Bulgars, Magyars, and Turkic tribes -- who swept through Ukraine and moved westward.

The settled peoples of what is now Ukraine were carrying on a thriving trade with Byzantium by the later part of the first millennium AD, and there was a continual conflict between the traders who followed the waterways through the steppe to the Black Sea, and the nomadic hordes who moved over the open country. The earliest known Slavic states in this area arose some time around the ninth century AD, at least partly on the initiative of foreigners who participated in commercial expeditions to Byzantium, and who organized military groups which resisted the nomads. These foreigners were most probably the Vikings, or Varangians, who, coming from northern and western Europe, fought and traded up and down the waterways between the Baltic and Black Seas (the "road from the Varangians to the Greeks", the Slavic chronicles call it.) As elsewhere in their wanderings, the Vikings were relatively few in numbers, and were soon absorbed in the Slavic population.

The East Slavic tribes -- the Severiane on the Dnepr, the Dereviane on the Desna, the Radimichi on the Sozh', the Ulichy, Duleby, Krivichi,

Slaviane, Poliane, and others --became grouped, under Viking influence, into small principalities of which, in the later Ukrainian territory, Chernigov, Liubech, Pereiaslavl' and Kiev were the most important. Meanwhile, the strong states of the Bulgars and the Khazars arose nearby to the East, and a relatively settled period ensued, during which the incursions from the steppe peoples (Pechenegs) were weak, and there was rapid cultural evolution. At the end of the tenth century, the Kievan Slavs accepted Christianity from Byzantium (988 AD), and Byzantine influence in religion, art and political life became permanently established among the eastern Slavs.

Kiev grew into a powerful principality, the leader of the East Slavic states, and developed strong cultural traditions which have remained until today the basis of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian cultures. The land was occupied by a large agricultural population, trade flourished, the arts were highly developed, and relations were maintained with the main centers of European civilization. The East Slavic countries, the lands of Rus', had their religious and cultural capital in Kiev, the seat of the senior line of princes. The Kievan state was the ancestor of Ukraine, but also of Moscow (Russia) and of Belorussia. Rus' was composed of local principalities growing out of the older tribal units, and the separate nationhood of the three eastern Slavic peoples was yet to come, though undoubtedly local differences were already present.

In the twelfth century, a stronger nomadic group, the Polovtsy, moved into the Ukrainian steppe, dispersing the Pechenegs and forcing back the sedentary farmers. But the defeats and withdrawals of the Slavs before the Polovtsy only presaged a greater disaster to come.

In the year 1240 the armies of Baty Khan, composed of many steppe and desert tribes organized under Mongol leadership, fell upon the lands of Rus'. They destroyed Kiev and annihilated or drove out much of the Slavic population. Most of Rus', along with lands as distant as Persia, Hungary, and China became incorporated into the greatest land empire in history.

Under the Mongol-Tatar empire ("the Tatar yoke"), the Slavic principalities became vassals of the Great Khan. The steppe lands were appropriated by the nomads, and travelers of this period report that they were empty of people, turned into barren wastes. In the forest and the hilly regions beyond Ukraine to the north and west, however, there was little change in settlement, and local princes were able to consolidate small political units into larger holdings and to provide new nuclei of cultural and national growth.

Among the political units that developed during the Mongol-Tatar period, those which lay in the forest-steppe region sheltered some of the population and traditions of the old Kievan state, but never attained significant military or political growth, and later became absorbed by the newer political units which grew up around three centers-- Galicia-Volhynia in the far west, Suzdal'-Vladimir (later Moscow) in the north, and Lithuania in the northwest. Much of the Kievan population seems to have taken refuge in the west and north, and to have contributed to the growth of the newer principalities.

Galicia-Volhynia, in the west, was an old principality of Kievan times, which successfully established its autonomy after the Mongol-Tatar invasion, and became a separate dynastic state. It was, however, early absorbed into the growing Polish kingdom, through dynastic marriages. Thereafter Galicia-Volhynia, though inhabited by East Slavs, became a springboard for Polish penetration eastward.

Lithuania, inhabited by non-Slavs, became a military power under the stress of invasion by German orders of knights, who came to the East Baltic to convert the local peoples to Christianity, and stayed to build cities and to found feudal estates. The Lithuanian military power gained control over Slavic as well as Baltic lands, and the Belorussian area long formed the bigger part (both in term of territory and population) of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Lithuania became joined with Poland in a personal dynastic union (1386), and later in a single federal state (1569). Although the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for a time included lands in the present territory of Ukraine, under the union with Poland these lands came under direct Polish control.

The Moscow state grew out of the consolidation of several small principalities during the Mongol-Tatar period, under a line of shrewd and enterprising princes. It was under Muscovite leadership that the first great defeat was inflicted on the Tatars in 1380, and Moscow thereafter led in the reconquest of lands from the Tatars and the addition of new regions to the East Slavic domains. The only one of the successors to the Kievan state which preserved its purely East Slavic and Orthodox character, Moscow assumed for itself the leadership of all the East Slavic lands and developed into the later Russian Empire by annexation of other East Slavic lands and of other regions, especially to the east and south of them.

There were thus four powers established in the East Slavic lands. The Tatars, who became divided into several large "ulus" or autonomous territorial units within their old empire, were nomadic pastoralists, and had accepted the Moslem religion. Culturally they were quite alien to the Slavs. Their influence on the social and economic life of the Slavic lands subject to them was slight, for they appeared mostly as tax collectors; but they had made the steppe a range for the herds of animals upon which they lived, and excluded settlement from it. The leadership of the Moslem, Turkic-speaking peoples passed later into the hands of the powerful Otoman Turks, who strongly influence the Tatar states after their decline began in the fifteenth century.

Lithuania was ruled by a powerful aristocracy, rapidly becoming polonized, and Catholic in religion. The large Orthodox Slavic population in the Grand Duchy lived for the most part in serfdom and poverty, while the Slavic elite was amalgamated to the Polish-Lithuanian nobility.

The Polish kingdom, aristocratic, feudal and Catholic, ruled over a large part of the former Kievan Rus'. The economic and social position of the common people was miserable, while the East Slavic nobility had been mostly absorbed into the Polish nobility. There were strong efforts to convert the East Slavs to Catholicism.

In the Polish lands, Roman Catholicism had not succeeded in imposing itself on the Orthodox population, but a large part of the people

accepted union of their church with Rome (1596), preserving their own rites, customs and traditions. The Poles continued to seek assimilation of this Uniate church to the Latin rite, but it has remained a vigorous and distinctive national church down to the present. The Ukrainian nation was therefore divided from the beginning into a larger, Orthodox element, and a smaller Uniate element.

The condition of the peasants under Polish rule worsened progressively. They were forced into complete serfdom, attached to the soil of the estates, and loaded with taxes and obligations. The merchants of the towns--mostly Poles and foreigners--as well as the clergy and the nobility paid virtually no taxes, and the peasants contributed almost all of the tax. As Polish control extended eastward, the institutions of serfdom, an "estate" society and Catholicism were carried along, as far as the Dnepr river. Polish nobles established large estates on which the local people became serfs.

Moscow was a centralizing, rather despotic state, interested in territorial expansion, but it was also a successor to the Kievan state as an East Slavic and Orthodox realm. Its rulers derived from Byzantium and Kievan Rus' a doctrine of their right and duty to rule the East Slavic Orthodox lands.

In the Moscow state, there was also a harsh serfdom, and the lot of the peasants was dreary. There was no such strongly entrenched feudal order as in Poland, however. Moscow was always a military power, pressing back the Tatars and claiming new lands.

Amid these four contending powers the Ukrainian nation crystallized as a distinct entity. It grew up out of a social movement, as well as on the basis of pre-existing settlements from Kievan times.

The "core" of Ukraine was the forest-steppe section of the former Kievan Rus', which continued to be occupied by descendants of the older inhabitants. Around this core were accumulated people of closely related speech and customs immigrating from the north and west. Some of this immigration was connected with the establishment of Polish feudal estates in the lands west of the Dnepr, on which the enserfed peasants were of Ukrainian stock, and with the founding of agricultural

and military settlements by people from the domains of Moscow. But a very large part of this population consisted of peasants, townsmen, and even nobles who had found conditions intolerable in the Polish or Moscow lands, and who escaped eastward and southward to establish themselves as a free society of warriors, the Cossacks.

The Cossacks, a genuinely democratic society, included men from many regions, but were overwhelmingly Orthodox Slavs. They were a military force, established in strong fortified settlements, from which they set out to raid the Tatars or the Poles, to harrass the Muscovites, or even to plunder distant Turkish cities. The Cossacks formed a military screen behind which agricultural settlers moved into Ukraine, but the Cossacks themselves lived chiefly by fishing, hunting and plundering.

The Cossacks were active in the defense of two principles: Orthodoxy in religion, and their own independence. For a long time the Cossacks succeeded in preserving their independent position, by judiciously playing off the Poles, Muscovites and Turks one against the other. During the seventeenth century, under Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, a sovereign Cossack state existed for a brief time.

Moscow, as another champion of Orthodoxy, regarded the Cossacks as more than allies, and worked to assimilate them into its state. The Moscow state was systematically extending colonization, fortifications and military roads southward, while Poland was declining as a military power because of internal political and economic weakness, and the Turks and their Tatar proteges were becoming rapidly weaker. The Ukrainian Cossacks lost their strong bargaining position among their several formerly equally powerful neighbors, and shortly were subjected to Moscow. Their strong taste for independence remained, however, and there were several Cossack rebellions and attempts to create a separate state.

The Ukrainian lands, except for the western parts, fell under Moscow's control during the struggles among Russians, Poles, and Turks in the seventeenth century. But in the time of Peter the Great, during the wars with Sweden, the Cossacks under their hetman (leader)

Mazepa were still strong enough to challenge Russian power (1708) and indeed to bring the Russian cause close to disaster. In 1775, after a continuous series of rebellions, the Russian government destroyed the chief stronghold of the Cossacks in Zaporozh'e, to weaken their power. Thereafter there was no serious national revolution in Ukraine until 1917.

At the end of the eighteenth century the Polish state was destroyed and its territories were divided among Prussia, Austria, and Russia. While the Russian part included the bulk of Poland proper, Lithuania, Belorussia and the eastern Ukraine, Austria inherited from Poland considerable territory inhabited by Ukrainians, mostly Uniate in religion.

The policies of the Russians and the Austrians in their Ukrainian holdings were vastly different. Early in the nineteenth century, the Russian government began a policy of gradual suppression of distinctive Ukrainian institutions in political, social, religious and intellectual life. The Uniate church was banned, the Ukrainian language officially labeled a "dialect" (narechie) and excluded from the press, and the leading social institutions and personalities began to be absorbed into Russian society. The towns and cities, always islands of non-Ukrainian population, with large Polish, German, Jewish and Russian elements, became more and more Russian in character.

In Austrian territory, however (Galicia and Bukovina), where Ukrainians occupied the countryside and Poles and Jews the cities, the rulers played one group against another, and in the process furthered the growth of a Ukrainian intelligentsia, the regeneration of the Uniate church, and the development of strong Ukrainian cultural and economic institutions.

During the nineteenth century, the steppe lands were almost completely settled. The Russian government encouraged the movement of peasants into the southern steppe and even brought colonists from abroad, mostly from Germany and the Balkans. The evolution of a modern commercial grain agriculture began at this time. There was a rapid increase in population, especially in Austrian Galicia.

Railroads were built in the middle of the century and after, and the exploitation of Ukrainian iron, coal and other resources, as well as the establishment of textile mills and other enterprises, gave rise to major industrial centers.

Ukrainians in the Russian Empire had begun to develop an intellectual tradition of their own, but from the early nineteenth century were prevented from carrying on their efforts by Tsarist policy. In the Austrian areas, on the other hand, Ukrainian national consciousness became highly developed, and it was Galician Ukrainians who furnished much of the leadership in later movements for Ukrainian independence.

At the time of the Russian Revolution of 1917, there were several different movements active in the effort to build a new state in Ukraine. The Galicians set up a provisional state of their own; the Ukrainian moderates formed a government in Kiev; the Bolsheviks had a Ukrainian military force and government of their own; the former Tsarist armies continued to operate in Ukraine, and claimed it as part of the "indivisible" fatherland; and peasant ("green") bands, under anarchist or merely opportunist leaders, roved and plundered. The German and Austrian troops who had occupied much of the country remained for a time after cessation of hostilities. After several years of chaotic interaction of these groups, and after a war with the nascent Poland, which proposed to annex Ukrainian lands as far as the Dnepr, the Ukrainian separatist elements were defeated, and the larger part of the country became a Soviet republic, which in 1923 federated with the Russian and Belorussian republics to form the U.S.S.R. Poland held large areas of Ukrainian territory in Galicia, Podolia and Volhynia; Romania had occupied Bessarabia, formerly part of the Russian Empire, as well as several formerly Austrian districts; and the East Slavs of the Carpathians, never included in the Russian Empire, were allotted to Czechoslovakia.

There ensued a period of relative national cultural freedom under the Soviet regime of the early 1920s, and it appeared for a time as if the Ukrainian nation had at last achieved the creation of its own state. But the collectivization and industrialization campaign which began in

the late 1920s brought tragic consequences for the Ukrainian people, and the illusory feeling of cultural autonomy was soon dispelled by the realities of sovietization.

During the 1920s and 1930s there grew up in the Polish Ukraine a vigorous national movement, expressed in the Uniate church, the Ukrainian-language schools, the Ukrainian press, the cooperative movement, the Ukrainian section of L'vov University, the Shevchenko Scientific Society and other institutions. But there was considerable hostility toward the Ukrainian movement on the part of Polish governments through the whole interwar period, and often there were violent clashes and forcible repressions of Ukrainian activities.

In Romania, the Ukrainian lands suffered from the same poverty, ignorance and corruption that afflicted the rest of that country, but except for some resettlement of Ukrainians and immigration of Romanians into Ukrainian territories, there was no systematic oppression. The Czechoslovak administration in the Carpathian region was on the whole just and democratic, but there was some resentment among the people over the lack of full local sovereignty.

During the second World War, the Ukrainian lands were occupied by the Germans and their allies. At first the population received the Germans as liberators, but Nazi terrorism soon alienated the Ukrainians, and many joined Ukrainian separatist partisan groups or the Soviet partisans. Some Ukrainian elements collaborated with the Germans, but there was no general identification with the German cause.

There were large demographic movements during the war. Great numbers of people fled or were evacuated eastward beyond the German zone. Most of the numerous Jews of Ukraine were exterminated by the Nazis.

After the war the Soviets returned and were able to unite in the Ukrainian S.S.R. all of the major areas of Ukrainian speech in Europe, for the first time in history forming a single political unit. However, the unification of Ukraine did not lead to a rebirth of national traditions, for the Soviets liquidated as much of nationalist and other "deviations" as they could, and reimposed the centralized rule of the Communists.

Ukraine has lived thus ever at the mercy of its powerful neighbors and foreign invaders--the Varangians, the Mongol-Tatars, the Lithuanians, Poles, Muscovites, Austrians and Germans, and despite its inability to maintain a lasting state, has developed and preserved a national culture of its own. Today that culture itself is challenged by the new Soviet model of culture and society, which is being imposed on Ukrainians as on other peoples of the U.S.S.R. This new model of the Soviets is a product of the doctrines of speculative thinkers of the Victorian age, applied mainly in a context developed in the large cities of Russia, and by daring, practical and ambitious conspirators drawn from many different social and cultural backgrounds. It offers a hard, matter-of-fact life, hemmed in with the barbed wire of police regulation and arbitrary violence, but it proclaims that it will make man free and sovereign over all of nature. Whether or not the Ukrainian people or any other can embrace the purposes and accept the harsh conditions of the Soviet model of society and culture, and so abandon their own traditional culture, is for history to decide. But it is clear that the foundation of a national state is no longer the only issue for Ukrainians; the more urgent question is the preservation of their national tradition itself.

THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE

"A"-1e

A continuous area of related speech forms belonging to the so-called East Slavic group occupies most of the European part of the U.S.S.R. and extends far beyond into Siberia, Transcaucasia and Turkestan, with outliers beyond the main area. Within this continuous area, there is great variation in linguistic features among different widely separated points; that is, the respective speech patterns of people from places that are far apart will differ greatly. But there are few cases in which sharp discontinuities in the total speech pattern can be discovered. For the speech of the common people varies gradually from settlement to settlement. Single traits will differ from one village to the next, but the boundaries between different usages in regard to a single word, sound or grammatical feature (isoglosses) are individual, and do not as a rule coincide for any two features for more than a very short distance.

The whole East Slavic speech continuum is crisscrossed by a multitude of individual isoglosses; between almost any two settlements there will be some differences of usage, while the farther apart two settlements are, the more isoglosses will lie between them, and the greater the total difference between their respective overall speech patterns will be.

There are of course some zones in which a large number of isoglosses run close together, and these zones of more numerous divisions in usage mark off the limits of dialect areas. A dialect is thus a group of local usage traditions which are somewhat more similar among themselves than they are to speech patterns of other areas. The boundaries of dialect areas can never be completely precise within the East Slavic continuum, since they consist of bundles of non-coincident isoglosses.

A large grouping of dialect areas themselves may be distinguished, which embraces a number of local variants, and which usually covers a large unitary geographical area. Thus, in the southwestern part of

the East Slavic continuum, the local speech forms are grouped into several dialects, on the basis of characteristic speech sounds, vocabulary and grammar, and are considered together as Ukrainian dialects.

The dialects of Ukraine are classified into a northern, a Carpathian, a southeastern and a southwestern group. The first two are much more limited in extent than the two southern groups, which are centered on Kiev and L'vov respectively. The literary language has arisen on the basis of dialects of the latter two groups.

These remarks relate primarily to the speech of the peasants, who have been on the whole the most stable element of the population over a period of time. The peasant speech in its various local forms belongs to what may be called the Ukrainian language, a section of the East Slavic linguistic continuum.

But a language in modern usage may also mean something quite different. The linguistic usage which is standardized by literary and scholarly writers and speakers, and becomes a medium of expression for elite and urban elements, is different from the peasant speech patterns. This is the so-called literary language, which is developed as a special kind of dialect which is not bound to any given locality, but becomes current throughout the national territory, at least among certain elements of society. It is based ultimately on some one local peasant dialect, with the addition of new words and forms, and the development of explicit rules of usage. The Ukrainian language in which most literate Ukrainians write and speak, and which in our times of almost universal literacy is known to practically every Ukrainian, is such a standardized literary language. It is quite distinct from Russian, and depending on administrative or social frontiers, shows abrupt and absolute discontinuities with Russian, Belorussian and other literary languages.

In contrast, the transitions between Ukrainian, Belorussian and Russian peasant dialects are not sharp, and the use of one or the other designation for peasant dialects becomes in some intermediate areas virtually meaningless.

The peasant dialects have in no sense descended from the literary languages, although they have often borrowed words and forms therefrom.

On the other hand, some special dialects or dialect-like usages may be true offspring of the literary language. The speech of the city streets, the club, the school, the office and factory, may be derived from the literary language rather than directly from peasant dialects. This is the "colloquial language" --a dialect, one may say, of literary Ukrainian.

The remarks which follow, concerning the Ukrainian language, refer to literary Ukrainian.

Ukrainian belongs to the Slavic group of languages, being thus a member of the Indo-European linguistic family, which, in addition to Slavic, Germanic and Romance tongues, embraces also Lithuanian, Albanian, Greek, Celtic, Armenian, the Indo-Iranian linguistic group in Asia, and other less well known branches now extinct. Together with Russian and Belorussian, Ukrainian forms the eastern Slavic group of languages. The relation of Ukrainian to other Slavic languages can be characterized as follows: 1) Genetic --to East Slavic which as a whole is most closely related to South Slavic; and 2) Diffusional -- to Czech (by proximity) and to Polish and Church-Slavic by close cultural interaction.

Being the language of the second largest Slavic nation, Ukrainian is spoken by approximately 39 million people. Of this number, approximately 26 million persons are in the Ukrainian S.S.R.; about 11 million, outside the Ukrainian U.S.S.R., but within the Soviet Union (in particular Kuban, Kursk and Voronezh regions, Central Asia and Vladivostok-Khabarovsk regions); and over 2 million Ukrainians in North and South America, Western Europe and Australia.¹

The geographical neighbors of Ukrainian are: Russian, Belorussian, Polish, Slovak, Hungarian, North-Caucasian and Kalmyk.

1 - Encyclopedia of Ukraine.

History

According to the prevalent and almost universally accepted theory, the origin of Ukrainian can be seen in the unitary Old-Russian (Old-Ruthenian),² a common ancient tongue of the Eastern Slavs from which the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian languages later developed. This theory has been officially adopted by Soviet linguistics. There exists also another theory (developed by S. Smal-Stotskyj, Gartner, and others), which rejects the theory of the Old-Russian language of the Eastern Slavs, and deduces Ukrainian from the Old-Slavic spoken by the Slavs in their common territory, from which their migration started in the sixth and seventh centuries. This theory, therefore, dates the beginnings of separate Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian earlier--in the sixth to ninth centuries.

With the establishment of Kievan Rus' in the ninth century, a state which united the three groups of East Slavic tribes and, in particular, with the introduction of Christianity in the tenth century, the Church-Slavic or, rather, Old Slavic was accepted as a common literary language of the Kievan State. At that time Old Slavic had already ceased to be a living tongue, having become rather a canonized written language that had separated from its old base, and developed under local influences, thus forming different versions. Thus, in Kievan Rus' it absorbed many local features and developed in time different Ukrainian, Russian and Belorussian pronunciations.

The folk language of the pre-Christian period and Kievan Rus' has survived in some ritual songs: (pagan and Christianized koladky and shchedrivky--carols), folk-songs and folk-tales, showing striking similarities with modern Ukrainian.

2 - The Old Russian (Old-Ruthenian) should not be confused with the modern Russian, which occupies a position analogous with that of the Ukrainian and Belorussian languages.

With the fall of the Kievan State under the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, Galicia and Volhynia became the centers of Ukrainian cultural life. Church-Slavonic, while remaining the language of literature and of the elite, underwent further Ukrainization.

From the sixteenth century onward, literary usage in Ukraine developed along three lines: (1) Church-Slavonic was frequently used, especially in religious and scholarly writings. (2) There was a tendency to substitute the folk-language spoken by the common people for the Church-Slavonic, particularly in the dramatic and poetic works of that time. The first translations of the Scriptures in popular Ukrainian (Perosopnytske Evanhelie, 1556-61) are reflections of this tendency. (3) The strongest tendency, however, appears to have been to overlay the spoken Ukrainian with forms borrowed from Old-Church-Slavonic and from Polish, Latin, and other languages. This kind of style was used in the Kievan Mohyla Academy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in the literary and historical works of sixteenth to eighteenth century Ukraine.

From the end of the seventeenth century, when Ukraine gradually fell into the orbit of Muscovy, the Tsars and the Orthodox Church began to enforce a Russian pronunciation of the Church-Slavonic. Peter the Great, in his ukase of 1721, ordered all books published in Ukraine to be sent to the censor in the Synod "in order to be corrected and to agree with Russian texts."

The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the development out of popular Ukrainian of a literary language in Ukraine. Starting with the publication of Kotlarevsky's travesty of the Aeneid (1798), Ukrainian gradually became the most productive medium of literary expression in the Ukraine, with Taras Shevchenko, the greatest of Ukrainian poets (1814-1861) and Panko Kulish, a distinguished writer and scholar of that time, standardizing the Ukrainian literary language on the basis of the East Ukrainian dialect (particularly that of the Kiev region). Parallel with them, Shashkevych in the West Ukraine, and Fedkovych in Bukovina, introduced into the literature the popular West Ukrainian of their home regions (then annexed to Austria).

The development of the modern Ukrainian literary language was hampered by the Russian government, which banned Ukrainian in 1863 and 1876, this ban being lifted only after the revolution of 1905. For the time being, Western Ukraine (Galicia and Bukovina) became the centers of Ukrainian literary and scientific life, with West Ukrainian dialects influencing the further development of literary Ukrainian. Many writers from East Ukraine (Myrnyy, Nechuy-Levytskyy, Kotsiubynskyy, Lesia Ukrainka and others) published their works there, while the Shevchenko Scientific Society in L'vov (est. in 1873) contributed to the systematic study of the Ukrainian language and to the development of a scientific and technological terminology.

When in 1918 the Ukrainian National Republic came into being, Ukrainian could take its place as the official language of the Ukrainian State, and later of the Ukrainian S.S.R. The standardization and systematic study of Ukrainian was continued after the war by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, and the Shevchenko Society in L'vov with many new Ukrainian writers (Kobylanska, Lepkyy, Oles', Tychyna, Rylskyy, Khvylovyy, Janovskyy, Susiura, Kulish, Malaniuk, Antonych, etc.), helping to enhance the reputation of Ukrainian as a literary tongue.

Studies of Ukrainian philology first originated in the seventeenth century with Smotrytsky's Grammar of 1618, but it was only in the nineteenth century that systematic study of the Ukrainian language was undertaken by scholars (Pavlovskyy, Ohonovskyy, Smal-Stotskyy). The most prominent was Alexander Potebnia. The most important dictionary of the Ukrainian language was compiled by Boria Hrinchenko (1907-09). Another important achievement of Ukrainian philologists was the Russian-Ukrainian Dictionary by Krymskyy and Iefremov published in Kiev in 1924-28. During the first half of this century a number of professional and technological foreign language dictionaries were compiled by Ukrainian scholars.

Phonology

Among the sounds of the Ukrainian language the following categories may be distinguished: (1) vowels and consonants; (2) vowels stressed and unstressed; (3) consonants voiceless and sonant; (4) consonants hard and soft (palatalized).

The position of the stress in a Ukrainian word cannot be predicted on the basis of the occurrence of other sounds. Correlation of voiceless and voiced (sonant) consonants is common to Ukrainian and other Indo-European languages. М, Н, Р, Л, Ї, (m, n, r, l, short i) however, are always voiced. A common feature of Ukrainian is the substitution by unsophisticated speakers of ХВ, ХФ for Ф (khv, khf for f).

Ukrainian, in contrast to other languages, particularly Russian, does not have the "weakening" of voiced consonants, or their assimilation to voiceless consonants.

Unlike Russian, Ukrainian preserves basically the entire system of consonants in all positions, and does not change the system of vowels according to the stress (unlike the Russian "akanie"); unstressed vowels, however, acquire a somewhat less clear coloring.

Accent (Stress)

Ukrainian has a stress accent, which is free (cannot be predicted on the basis of occurrence of other sounds) and shifting (changes place with respect to a base as different affixes are added to inflect a word). The accent in Ukrainian is distinctive; it differentiates meaning.

Morphological System

The majority of Ukrainian words have both a basic (lexical) and an additional (grammatical) meaning. Such words are called major. The grammatical categories include: gender, quantity, case, mood, and person. However, there are some Ukrainian words which have only grammatical meaning, like: до, і, же, (do, i, zhe). They are used only in certain grammatical functions with major words.

Grammatical meanings of Ukrainian words are characterized by their recurrence in many words of the same sentence, transcending

the lexical composition of the sentence and binding it into a grammatical unity.

Ukrainian has the following means of creating grammatical forms: (1) affixes (prefix, suffix, ending); (2) auxiliary words (preposition, particle, auxiliary verbs); (3) combinations of auxiliary words and affixes; (4) accent (stress); (5) concord (matching of affixes in two or more forms); (6) sequence (order of words). By its morphological structure, Ukrainian may be classed as an analytic-synthetic language, with the prevalence of synthetic word formation. The mode of word formation and the inflection system of Ukrainian do not differ in any important way from those of other Slavic languages.

Morphonology*

The main features of the variation of sounds within the words in Ukrainian are:

(1) Alternation of vowels I - O, I - E (stil-stola; bereza-beriz); less frequent is O - B (o -v, as in ochi-vich; odibraty-vidibraty). Other variations: in verbs - E:И ; O:I; O:A (e - y; o - i; o - a). Typical for Ukrainian is the change of E into И (khrest-khrystyty).

(2) Alternation of consonants Г, Ж, З (h, zh, z, as in Boh, Bozhe, v Bozi); К, Ч, Ц (k, ch, ts, as in rik, roche, v rotsi), Х, Ш, С (kh, sh, s, as in kozhukh, kozhushe, v kozhuse). Particularly typical for Ukrainian verbs is their paradigmatical alternation В:Л - (v-l, as pysav, pysala). There is almost a complete absence in Ukrainian of the typical Russian alternation of groups: ОРО, ОЛ О, ЕРЕ, ЕЛ Е, ПА, Л А, РЕ, Л Е, (oro, olo, etc.). A smaller number of words shows the alternation of Ы:Нб, Ы:Н (y-n--ioho, nioho), Ш:Ц (ts, sh-- sertse, serdeshnyj), К:Ц (k, ts-- lyk, lytse).

In contrast to Russian, Ukrainian has few alternations of palatalized with non-palatalized consonants.

*Morphonology means systematic alternation of sounds in related morphological elements.

(3) Disappearance of vowels, particularly of I in prefixes (vidibraty; vidrizaty).

(4) Loss of consonants in consonant groups.

(5) Particularly typical for Ukrainian is the alternation of the vowels and consonants Ї : I and В : Y (y-l and v-u, as in Їvan: Ivan; Vkraina, Ukraina).

By contrast with Russian, with its predominant alternation of correlative elements, in Ukrainian, disjunctive morphonological correlation prevails.

Lexicon

Ukrainian contains the following basic categories of words:

(1) The native Slavic linguistic heritage; (2) historical "innovations"; and (3) borrowed words. There are about 2,000 inherited Slavic forms that have been preserved without great changes in word formation and meaning. The total number of words derived from native stock, borrowed words, and derivatives of both is estimated at around 150,000. The borrowed vocabulary is from the following sources: Church-Slavonic, Germanic, Turkic, Polish, Russian, etc.; another group is made up of so-called international words, many of them translated or modified in popular use.

Syntax

Ukrainian syntax is determined by the personal sentence, i.e., a sentence that is both single-centered (one subject) and composed of two elements (subject and predicate). There is one exception to this general tendency toward a single-centered character of the sentence that is more frequent than in other Slavic languages: the use of the neuter gender form without the usual sequence, and independently of the grammatical form of the subject. The passive voice is used comparatively seldom in Ukrainian, while the possessive constructions are even less frequent. Ukrainian in most cases dispenses with the copula verb in the present tense.

A characteristic feature of Ukrainian is its broad use of the infinitive,

a use that gives this form an adverbial character, in contrast to the nominal character of Russian and Polish. The infinitive in Ukrainian may appear in the role of subject and predicate, and can substitute for a noun in the role of object.

The Ukrainian Language Under The Soviet Regime

Soviet policy in respect to the Ukrainian language has varied in accordance with the general Soviet policy on Ukraine. Two stages can be distinguished in the Soviet linguistic policy: one, coinciding with the NEP in the 1920's; the other, initiated in the early 1930's and continued and developed until the present time.

In the first period, Soviet linguistic policy was based on the theory of "the struggle of two cultures" developed by A. Lebed, which may be restated in the following terms: The cities and the greater part of the urban proletariat in Ukraine had become substantially russified, while Ukrainian survived primarily in villages and small towns. The more "progressive" urban Russian culture of the proletariat would necessarily assimilate the "backward" Ukrainian culture into a "proletarian" Soviet culture.

These expectations did not materialize. This policy met with strong resistance in Ukraine, with the Ukrainian Communists ranging themselves on the side of the Ukrainian language and culture. The victory of the latter was reflected in the introduction of the policy of "Ukrainization," whose outstanding advocate was M. Skrypnyk, the Commissar of People's Education in Ukraine. Even in that period there was no full freedom for Ukrainian cultural development, which had to conform to "Socialist content;" nevertheless, considerable work in the field of Ukrainian philology was done in the Ukraine prior to 1930, under the aegis of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN).

Since 1930, a systematic "de-Ukrainization" has been attempted in Ukraine. The All-Ukrainian Academy was ravaged by mass arrests and liquidations to which many Ukrainian philologists fell victim (Syniavskyy, Kurylo, Hantsov, Holoskevych, Nimchynov, Iohansen, Smerechynskyy, Hladkyy, and others). The publication of the Academy's

dictionary has been discontinued and many of its previous publications condemned. The new Soviet linguistic policy in the Ukraine proceeded under the slogan "Uproot and defeat nationalist influences in linguistics." The essence of the charges against the "saboteurs" in the Ukrainian Academy was that they advanced the theory that "the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian culture, are European and should orient themselves to Europe," and that the "process of developing Ukrainian scientific terminology . . . has been directed along the line of artificial separation from the common (sic!) brotherly Russian language."

Since the 1930's, steps toward Russification of Ukrainian (also of Belorussian and, to a lesser extent, other languages of the U.S.S.R.) has been reflected in the "unification" of terminology, and the "revision" of orthography and lexicons of these languages. The so-called Japhetic theory of N. Y. Marr has been employed as a means of Russification of other languages of the U.S.S.R., of inoculation of non-Russian peoples with an inferiority complex in respect to their languages, and of identification of the Russian language with "progress" and "proletarian culture."

In today's Ukraine, the Ukrainian language does not enjoy the same protection of the Soviet government as Russian, and the official tendency appears to be towards its progressive reduction. The attempted Russification of the Ukrainian and Belorussian languages meets continuing resistance within Ukraine, particularly among Ukrainian writers, scholars and cultural workers.

THE POPULATION OF THE UKRAINE

Present Population and Density

The population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1954 was over 42 million and its average density was 71.3 persons per square kilometer (186 persons per square mile). Soviet sources claim that between 1950 and 1952 the Ukraine had a natural increase of 2.6 million.

The population density varies considerably and is heaviest along the foothills of the Carpathians and in the Donbas. The lowest density is seen in the Polesie in Western Ukraine.

Population Development in the Ukraine 1897-1926

Extensive boundary shifts create difficulties in estimating population growth over the years. In 1897 the Ukraine (within the boundaries of 1921-1939) had an estimated 21.2 million population and was before World War I one of the most densely populated regions of the Russian Empire.

The First World War, and the Civil War halted all population growth in Ukraine until 1923. Not until 1924 did the population attain the level of 1914, and only in the last two years before the 1926 Census did the population increase beyond the 1914 mark.

Table

Population Growth in Ukraine* 1897-1926

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>
1897 (Census)	21,200,000
1914 (Jan. 1 est.)	27,700,000
1924 (" ")	27,250,000
1925 (" ")	27,866,000
1926 (" ")	28,482,000
1926 (Census of 12/17/26)	29,020,300
<u>*1921-1929 boundaries</u>	

About 23.2 million of Ukraine's 1926 population of 29 million were ethnic Ukrainians (about 80 per cent). Of the 31,195,000 Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. 74 per cent resided in Ukraine in 1926. Both the total number of Ukrainians and the population of Ukraine were about one-fifth of the U.S.S.R.'s total population.

Population Growth 1926-1939

Between 1926 and 1939 the population of Ukraine increased from 29 to 31 million, an increase of two million. This was far less than the average for the U.S.S.R. and constituted a notable deficiency in the light of the growth anticipated in the late 1920's. This deficiency was probably due to a series of factors. Excess mortality resulting from famine and repressive measures of the regime; migratory losses both from normal heavy movements eastward and large-scale deportations of "kulaks;" a general decline in the birth rate due to the effects of rapid urbanization, abortion, the spread of birth control information and facilities, and the decline of the rural population; a slackening in the rapid drop of the death rate in the later 1930's, and, finally, a change in the national affiliation of some urbanized Ukrainians from Ukrainian to Russian by the time of the 1939 Census.

As a result of all these factors not only did Ukraine's population fail to increase at the anticipated rate, but the number of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union showed an absolute drop from 31.2 million to 28 million, a decline of 3.2 million in the inter-census period. It is possible that a considerable portion of this decline may be explained by a movement of ethnic Ukrainians into the Russian nationality group, both voluntarily and under various pressures. A large part of the decline, however, may without doubt be attributed to excess mortality from various causes.

Ukraine after the Territorial Changes of 1939-1940

As a result of the incorporation of Polish and Rumanian territory with a population of more than nine million, Ukraine increased to over 40 millions. By June 1941, taking into account both migratory losses and natural increase, this had reached almost 41.2 million.

The large numbers of Ukrainians in the annexed territories raised the total number of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. to over 35 million. The number of Ukrainians in the Republic increased, largely from territorial additions, to over 30 million by the eve of the German invasion.

Population Changes during World War II and its Aftermath

Two major streams of population movement characterized the Ukraine's wartime experience. The first of these involved anywhere between 7.5 million to 20 million Soviet citizens (although leading authorities have accepted 12 million) evacuated eastward from the western border regions to escape the German invader. Ukraine contributed the bulk of this eastward flow. The second great movement of peoples resulted from the operation of the German "Ostarbeiter" program in which many hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian workers and peasants were taken from Ukraine to the Reich to supply needed labor. At the end of the war there were 1.5 million Ukrainian forced laborers in Germany. In addition there were several hundred thousand prisoners of war, about a quarter of a million auxiliary Ukrainian troops under the German army, and thousands of refugees--altogether there were two million or more Ukrainians in Germany and Western Europe in the fall of 1944 by which time the Soviet reconquest of Ukraine was substantially complete and precluded further movement westward. In the south the approach of the Red Army toward the Odessa-Bessarabia region caused a mass flight of Rumanians, both the old inhabitants of the area and the newly settled officials and others, from Rumania, involving the outward movement of about 700,000 people.

After the end of the war another major population movement was initiated under the terms of a series of treaties signed by the Soviet Union (or several of its component Republics, including Ukraine) with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Under these agreements approximately 810,000 Poles and Jews left the Ukraine for Poland and some 33,000 Czechs and Slovaks returned to Czechoslovakia from Volhynia. From Poland there came about a half million persons who were moved to the U.S.S.R., mostly to Ukraine. As far as can be determined no movement

from Czechoslovakia eastward took place. All these exchanges were completed by 1947.

The net result of the deportations, evacuations, military operations, refugee movements, et cetera of the war years was a sharp loss of population in Ukraine. It has been estimated that by 1950 over 3.6 million Ukrainians had been lost as a result of war. We may assume that at least three million of this number was from Ukraine. Likewise almost 3.5 million Jews were lost to the Soviet Union of which at least 1.5 million were from Ukraine. The loss by 1950 from wartime causes of over 11 million Russians and over two million Poles also contributed to the general decline of population in the Ukraine from wartime pressures. Exact figures are not available for the war losses suffered by Ukraine but these cannot have been less than five million and may well have been much higher, by a million or more.

Rural-Urban Distribution of Population

The present rural-urban population distribution in Ukraine is unknown. While it may be conjectured that the wartime experiences were generally more detrimental to the urban than the rural population, no firm conclusions can be drawn from this conjecture in view of the rapid recovery of population by the cities of Ukraine even during the war. It can further be assumed that the steady and rapid movement of population to the cities which were a consistent feature of the pre-war period has continued. It may therefore be concluded that the present urban population of Ukraine does not fall below the figure of 36.2 per cent disclosed by the 1939 Census, and is probably in excess of 40 per cent at the present time.

The steady rise in the urban population of Ukraine, both absolutely and proportionally, has been noticeable since the turn of the century. Between 1897 and 1926 Kiev and Kharkov more than doubled their numbers. A number of other cities showed similar or only slightly smaller gains. Until the First World War, and even during the war until the Revolution and Civil War, the proportion of the population in Ukraine which lived

in cities and other urban places continuously increased. The 1918-1921 period saw a sharp decrease in urban population which may have fallen by a third or more in Ukraine.

The inter-census period 1926-1939 saw the initiation of most of the major Soviet industrial developments and witnessed literally an explosion of population into the cities. The magnitude of this urbanizing trend may be judged when it is realized that Ukraine, although more than doubling its urban population (from 5.4 million to 11.2 million), an increase percentagewise from 18.6 to 36.2, did not attain the U.S.S.R. average for the growth of urbanization between 1926 and 1939. Ukraine grew by 108 per cent over 1926 while the U.S.S.R. average growth was 112.5 per cent. On the other hand, the rural population not only failed to hold its own but suffered an absolute decline of over 3.9 million or a loss of 16 per cent as compared with 1926.

A notable feature of urban growth during the inter-census period was the development of new urban centers in Ukraine. The Donbas was the example par excellence of this phenomenon. Such cities as Makeevka, Gorlovka, Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk, Yenakievo, Voroshilovsk, Kadievka, Krasny Luch, Krasnodon, and others did not even exist at the time of the 1897 Census. By 1926 they were already sizable towns of 12,000 and up; many were even then over 50,000. By 1939 there were eight cities of over 50,000 in the Donbas as compared with only two before 1917. Twenty of the 34 Ukrainian cities of 50,000 or more population in 1939 are located in the industrial oblasts. It has been estimated that the Donbas, comprising only one-twelfth the area of Ukraine, contains almost one-third of the Republic's population.

A second aspect of urbanization in Ukraine has been the large and increasingly significant proportion of Ukrainians which went to make up the new urban population. Stalin had commented as early as 1926 that "there is no doubt that the composition of the Ukrainian proletariat will change with the industrial development of the Ukraine, with the influx of Ukrainian workers from surrounding villages into industry. . . ." and had noted approvingly that "this process is a long, spontaneous and natural one." At about the same time he had looked forward to the time

when the Ukrainian cities where Russian elements still predominated would "inevitably be Ukrainianized."

Data presented at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in November 1933 indicated that this process had already brought about significant changes in the ethnic composition of many Ukrainian cities. This was reflected also in the increasingly large percentage of Ukrainians who entered the ranks of industrial labor. In 1926 43 per cent of all workers in industry and construction in Ukraine were Ukrainian; by 1932 it was 50 per cent.

Involved in this process, however, was a danger of "Russianization" for the Ukrainian peasant who became subject to the pressures of urban life. This was particularly true because the language ordinarily used in industry was Russian.

Age and Sex Composition

No data are available on the age and sex composition of the population of Ukraine. Some information is known about U.S.S.R. age-sex structure in general and conclusions based on such data may have at least limited applicability to the Ukraine.

Between 1926 and 1939 the U.S.S.R. population showed two outstanding features in age-sex structure. In the first place there was a slight over-all aging of the population. Secondly, the number of males declined by 1939 as compared with 1926. This latter was surprising in view of the nearly equal number of males and females under fifteen in 1926 which would lead one to expect that as they matured between 1926 and 1939 the numbers of men and women would be more rather than less equal in 1939. That this did not take place suggests, therefore, that the male population suffered exceptionally heavy mortality in the inter-census period.

With the annexation of territory from Poland and Rumania the added population exerted a generally equalizing tendency on the unbalanced sex ratio of the U.S.S.R. As this new population was generally somewhat older than the U.S.S.R. average a slight aging must have

taken place.

The effect of the war on age and sex structure was marked. It appears particularly in the great excess of women over men for all ages above 20 but especially in the ages which were subject to military service between 1941 and 1945; i. e., age groups 25-54 in 1950 (these would have been 16-45 in 1941). For each five year age group beginning with ages 25-29 and extending to ages 55-59 females exceeded males by at least a million, and in some cases by almost three million. The total excess of females over males for these specified ages was 14.2 million in 1950. Since the total excess of females over males for the whole U.S.S.R. population was 15.9 million this means that almost 90 per cent of the female excess was concentrated in the prime military ages in 1941.

In the younger ages, under 20, there was a slight excess of males over females. Nevertheless, the general female preponderance in the total population revealed itself in a ratio of 100 women for every 85 men (or 118 women per 100 men). In the working ages 15-54 the discrepancy is even more pronounced--127 females per 100 males.

By 1950 the total U.S.S.R. population was on the average somewhat older than the 1939 population. In 1939 53.4 per cent of the population was under 24 years of age; by 1950 only 52.5 per cent were younger than 24 and the median age had moved slightly upward.

National Composition

The 1926-1939 period saw a decline in the proportion of Ukrainians in Ukraine from 80 per cent to about 75 per cent of the Republic's population. This had been brought about by the reduction of this group due to a number of factors which we have previously mentioned. In general, down to the German invasion in June 1941 the three largest nationality groups in Ukraine in order of size were Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews. Fourth place fluctuated. In 1926 Poles were fourth and then came Germans, Moldavians, Greeks, Bulgars, Belorussians, and others. By 1939 Germans had overtaken Poles who were now fifth. The proportion of the minor nationalities held the same.

With the addition of over nine million people after the annexations of 1939 and 1940 the nationality picture underwent some changes. Although the number of Ukrainians increased markedly their proportion of the total population of Ukraine declined to 73.36 per cent. Russians still remained the second largest group but also showed a percentage decline from 1939--from 15.15 per cent to 12.44 per cent. Jews increased in both numbers and proportionately. Poles, however, showed the largest jump, almost quintupling their numbers. Their proportion of Ukraine's population increased from 1.22 to 4.35 per cent. A new nationality group temporarily assumed moderate importance in the Ukraine as a result of the annexations of Rumanian territory. Rumanians to the number of almost half a million were fifth in size of all national groups in Ukraine. Germans with about 473,000 were sixth and then came the other nationalities in the same order as in earlier years.

This mosaic of nationalities in Ukraine was rudely shattered by the German invasion in June 1941. Practically all Jews who were not able to escape eastward and were trapped by the German occupation were exterminated. This probably amounted to at least a million and a half in Ukraine alone. All Germans disappeared as a result of deportations eastward or through having fled with the retreating German armies in 1943 and 1944. War losses hit the Poles heavily. In addition, over 800,000 were repatriated from Ukraine to Poland after the war. Not more than 200,000 can be assumed to remain in Ukraine. Many Greeks were deported to Soviet Central Asia during the war. Almost all Bulgarians in Ukraine were repatriated to Bulgaria during the war. While some were reportedly brought back after the war their numbers are probably only a fraction of prewar size. Czechs and Slovaks vanished completely as a result of population exchange agreements with Czechoslovakia. Most of the Rumanians also fled during the war and nothing has been heard of any sizable number returning. The Russian minority can be assumed to have suffered in proportion to total Russian losses. Especially large numbers of Russians were evacuated eastward but many probably returned.

War therefore performed for Ukraine much the same function it did for the other countries of Eastern and Central Europe. It eliminated most of the national minorities. In Ukraine there remained, however, one major national minority--the Russians.

The present national composition of Ukraine cannot, on the basis of available data, be known with any precision. The major outlines are clear nevertheless. Ukrainians still form the overwhelming majority of all national groups and are credited by the most recent Soviet publications with comprising from 75-80 per cent of the total population. Russians are next in size. Uncertain numbers of Jews, Poles, and Belorussians are also present as the only other national groups whose size may reach 100,000 or more. Small numbers of such groups as Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks, Moldavians, et cetera probably remain but, all told, could not amount to much more than 100,000.

If there are as many as three-quarters of a million Jews left in Ukraine, together with approximately three to four hundred thousand Poles and Belorussians, and perhaps 100,000 "others," there could not exist in Ukraine over one and a quarter million persons of nationalities other than Ukrainian and Russian. We may then estimate the number of Ukrainians in the Republic as around 34 million and the Russian possibly between six and seven million.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE

"A"-1f

Introduction

The problem of social stratification and social mobility in the Soviet Ukraine has not yet been given sufficient attention in the sociological literature. Perhaps the greatest obstacle facing a student of the post-revolutionary Ukrainian social structure is the scarcity of reliable statistical data pertaining to this problem. Consequently we are forced to rely on the available sociological studies on the whole of the U.S.S.R., and shall apply critically their findings and generalizations to the Soviet Ukraine, modifying them in accordance with data which we have on the pre-revolutionary Ukraine and some direct and indirect information which is accessible on the social processes in the Soviet Ukraine.

The concept of the social class will be used in this paper as combining Max Weber's criteria of "economic class" characterized by its common "economic interest," and of "social status group" determined by a "specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor" and a specific "style of life."

In the case of the Soviet Ukraine, another important factor enters into the social stratification, namely that of ethnic belongingness. As Talcott Parsons points out, ethnicity may modify the system of stratification in two ways: (1) The value-system of an ethnic group may vary from that paramount in the dominant society. "In these respects the actions of an ethnic group should be interpreted in terms of its own distinctive culture, including its own internal stratification and the ways in which it can, according to its values, appropriately articulate with the main class system." (2) An ethnic group "with regard to its value patterns and to any other aspect of its status in the larger society, constitutes an entity somewhat apart, to which non-members react in patterned ways which in turn help to determine reactions of the members of the group."¹

1 - Talcott Parsons. "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of

In discussing the social stratification of the Soviet Ukraine we shall first attempt to sketch briefly the social structure of the Ukraine before the Bolshevik Revolution, in order to show later how, in what directions, and to what extent that structure has been modified under the impact of the Soviet regime, industrialization and collectivisation, and the Second World War.

Pre-Revolutionary Ukraine

Ukraine at the beginning of the twentieth century was characterized by a semi-developed class structure largely determined by inherited status. The peasantry, representing close to 90% of the population, and a small working class were at the base of the social pyramid, with a small urban middle class and an even smaller upper class of nobility, higher administrative and military officers, capitalists, and higher clergy. Ethnic Ukrainians comprised an overwhelming majority of the rural population and about 20% of the urban population, being under-represented among the working class and little represented at the apex of the social pyramid, where Russians and Russianized members of the Ukrainian nobility predominated.

During the twentieth century, after an almost complete Russification or Polonization of the upper social strata, the Ukrainian intelligentsia came into being. It was predominantly of clergy and burgher origin, but included people from all social strata. Its membership was based on education (at least secondary education) and, to some extent, the place of its members in the administration. The intelligentsia became an intermediate stratum tempering social conflicts, a link between the older classes and the newly born capitalist and working classes. Education, raising the economic and social level of the peasantry, propagation of the spirit of Ukrainian nationalism, and promoting political activism were objectives of the young Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Social Stratification", in Class Status and Power . . ., ed. by R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953) p. 73.

It was primarily this social group that assumed the leadership of the Ukrainian national movement, in particular in the fields of culture, education, political parties and the cooperative movement. In the years 1917-21 the intelligentsia furnished leadership to the short-lived Ukrainian National Republic.

In Ukraine before the First World War there was little movement from the villages to the towns, out of the peasantry into the middle and industrial working classes, because of the absence of educational opportunities for the peasants, and the influx of the non-Ukrainian administrative, military, and managerial personnel from Russia (in the Eastern Ukraine), or from Polish and other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (in Galicia, Bukovyna and Carpathian Ukraine). A similar influx of skilled workers from the Ukrainian towns and from outside of the Ukraine limited the movement of Ukrainians from agriculture to industry (where they were more likely to become non-skilled or semi-skilled workers). The population pressure in the villages was relieved to some extent by peasant migration into the Kuban and Volga regions and into Asiatic Russia from the Russian Ukraine, and migration to the Americas from the Austrian Ukraine.

Impact of the Soviet Revolution

The establishment of the Soviet regime in the Eastern Ukraine led to the elimination (economic, social, and in many cases, physical) of the old upper stratum consisting of the nobility, capitalists, higher administrative and military officers, and clergy, as well as of a part of the middle class. Some part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was destroyed in the first years of the regime; a considerable number of the intelligentsia migrated to the West.

The new regime, having abolished private ownership of the means of production, officially recognized only two classes: workers and peasants, with the intelligentsia only later gaining recognition as a special "stratum". The surviving part of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia was gradually submerged in the new Soviet intelligentsia which was mostly of worker and peasant origin. While theoretically the

"dictatorship of the proletariat" placed the working class at the apex of the Soviet society, the social processes were moving in a different direction: leadership had to be institutionalized; administrative, technical and managerial positions recently vacated had to be filled; production had to be increased and personal incentives provided, if the regime was to survive politically and economically. This meant the expansion and institutionalization of a huge party and administrative apparatus, use of the remaining pre-revolutionary technical intelligentsia, rapid development of a corps of technical specialists for various branches of the nationalized economy, and reorganization of industrial production. As a result, in the first and particularly in the second decade of the Soviet regime, when industrialization and collectivisation were undertaken in Ukraine, there was a high degree of social mobility, both horizontal (from the villages to the cities) and vertical (from peasant and non-skilled workers' groups into the skilled worker, administrative and technical-engineering groups, cultural and educational workers, etc.).

The amount of the social change in the Soviet Ukraine is shown in the comparison of 1926 and 1939 census data: the 1926 urban population of Ukraine was five million or 18.6% of the total population; in 1939 it was 11 million (36.2% in 1939). The rural population was 81.4% in 1926 (24 million) and 62.8% (or 19.8 million) in 1939.² But while the number of Ukrainians among the workers rose from 60% in 1926 to 78% in 1931, their percentage among the salaried employees fell from 40% in 1926 to 22% in 1931.³

2 - A. Popliuiko, "Migratsiia Naseleniia i urbanizatsiia SSSR" (Migration of population and urbanization of the U.S.S.R.), Vestnik Instituta po Izucheniiu Istorii i Kultury SSSR, Munich, 1952, no 2, p. 79.

3 - Zinger, - , "Natsional'nyi Sostav Proletariata SSSR" (National composition of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R.) Moscow, 1934, p. 11. Cited in Vasyl I. Hryshko, Dvi Rosiys'ki aktsii-odna ukrains'ka vidrich (Two Russian actions --- one Ukrainian reaction), New York, 1951, pp. 24-25.

During the 1920's Ukrainian peasantry was officially differentiated by the regime into three major groups: the "kurkuli" (kulaks, large peasants), using hired help; middle-peasants (seredniaky), working with their families on the land; and poor peasants ("bidniaky") with little or no land. The last and the smallest group was favored by the Soviet regime and relied upon to sharpen "the class struggle in the village." It also formed the primary base for the organization of the kolkhozes.

Collectivisation was bitterly opposed by the peasantry of Ukraine, and was accompanied by mass liquidations, deportations and famine. With the land distributed among the kolkhozes, while remaining the property of the State, the peasants were transformed into a semi-proletarian group, with a new class of kolkhoz and MTS administrative, agricultural specialists and technicians forming an upper stratum of the rural population.

Another aspect of the impact of the Soviet revolution on Ukrainian society concerned nationality. As we have already pointed out, pre-revolutionary Ukraine was characterized by an almost entirely Ukrainian peasantry and predominantly non-Ukrainian working and ruling classes. The Soviet regime imposed upon Ukraine was based on the dictatorship of the proletariat (industrial workers), who were predominantly Russian. Ethnic Ukrainians were chronically under-represented in the Communist party of the Ukraine, the government and the administration. In his book, "Marxism and the National-Colonial Question," Stalin wrote in 1938:

It is clear that the political bases of the proletarian dictatorship are first of all and primarily the central regions of Russia, and not border-lands which are peasant countries.⁴

The Resolutions of the 12th Party Congress of the VKP(b) in 1923 noted that "a series of republics and peoples are not in a position fully to benefit from the rights and possibilities given them by national equality, not able to raise themselves to the higher level of development. The situation in a series of the national republics (Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaidjan, Turkestan and others) is complicated by the fact that the

4. - J. Stalin, Marksizm i Natsional'nyi Vopros (Marxism and the national question), (Moscow, 1938,) p. 12.

major part of the proletariat, which forms the foundation of the Soviet authority, belongs to the Great-Russian nationality."⁵

These factors tended to decrease the opportunities for vertical mobility of Ukrainians within the Ukrainian S.S.R. Social and national factors may explain the relatively small percentage of Ukrainians in the Communist Party (4.7% in 1922, 11.62% in 1927, against 21.2% of Ukrainians in the total Soviet population), and the small membership of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (676,190 members in 1952 as against a total membership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 6,013,259; or 16.68 per 1,000 population in the Ukraine as against the all-Union ratio of 29.91).⁶

The Social Structure of the Western Ukraine

In the Ukrainian territories included in inter-war Poland agriculture was the occupational category of 74.6% of the population, 15.6% engaged in industry, transport and commerce, and 9.8 were listed in other occupations.⁷ The occupational structure of the three largest ethnic groups; Ukrainians, Poles and Jews, representing respectively 63.1%, 26.0%, and 10.0%, of the total population can be illustrated by the following table⁸ showing occupation per 100 persons for each of the above national groups: as of December 9, 1931:

Occupation	Ukrainians	Poles	Jews
Agriculture	88.1	69.9	12.1
Industry	5.8	11.0	21.9
Commerce	1.5	5.8	47.9
Employees	1.2	6.6	5.6
Other	3.5	7.7	12.5

5 - Cited in Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, (Cambridge, 1953) pp. 218-219.

6 - Ibid., p. 234 and note, p.235.

7 - V. Kubyovych and H. Selehen', "Chyslo i budova ludnosity Ukrainy" (The Size and Structure of the Population of Ukraine), Encyclopedia Ukrainoznavstva, vol. I, part I, p. 137.

8 - Ibid., p. 138.

Thus while the larger cities of Western Ukraine usually had a majority of Polish and Jewish population, the rural population was overwhelmingly Ukrainian. Similarly the Ukrainians formed the base of the social pyramid, being underrepresented in the middle class and little represented in the upper class, composed of predominantly Polish higher administrative and military officers, large land-owners, professionals and intellectuals.

This social structure of the Western Ukraine was the result of a long historical process. Under Polish rule, since the middle of the fourteenth century, Galicia gradually lost its old Ukrainian ruling class and the Polish, German and Jewish immigration made Ukrainians a minority in the cities. When Austria annexed Galicia at the end of the eighteenth century, the only non-peasant Ukrainian population were the (Uniate) clergy and some artisans and small merchants in the towns. It was under Austrian rule that, due to the better educational facilities, the improved status of the Uniate church and new opportunities in administration, military service and a slowly developing industry, the new West Ukrainian intelligentsia, predominantly developing out of clergy families,⁹ and a small working class came into being. Secondary sources of the new intelligentsia were the formerly polonized Ukrainian nobility and townsmen, as well as sons of peasants, particularly those of the poor rural szlachta (impoverished small nobility). A secondary education, non-manual occupation and family origin became the main criteria for admission into the ranks of the intelligentsia, which, however, was closely connected with the life of peasantry and imbued with a strong sense of social duty to lift its educational level, economic conditions and national consciousness. Although relatively small, the West Ukrainian intelligentsia became a vigorous leading force in the social, political, cultural and economic life of West Ukrainians. The intense nationalism that characterized both Ukrainian and Polish ethnic groups in Western Ukraine, strengthened by the identification of Ukrainian nationality with

9 - Allowed to marry before being ordained, Ukrainian Uniate (Greek-Catholic) clergy had usually large families which supplied substantial portion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia.

the Uniate or Orthodox church and of the Poles with the Roman Catholic faith, actually made for separate Ukrainian and Polish societies. The West Ukrainians regarded themselves as a forcibly separated part of a greater Ukrainian people and identified with the ideals and aspirations of the Ukrainian peasantry, while the Poles looked upon themselves as a culture-bearing Eastern bulwark of the West, identifying with the traditions and ideals of the Polish nobility. The continuing Ukrainian-Polish tension, both national and social, tended to suppress social conflicts within the individual national groups.

The interwar period showed a small degree of vertical mobility due to the slow development of industries and limited educational opportunities. Population pressure and land hunger in the villages were relieved somewhat by emigration to the American continent and development of a large network of cooperatives which absorbed some percentage of rural population. A small number of private Ukrainian schools, and limited admission of Ukrainians to the only (Polish) university in Western Ukraine (L'vov), together with the scarcity of opportunities for non-agricultural employment and the preference given by the Polish authorities and employers to Polish applicants for non-manual jobs, impeded vertical social mobility and the growth of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. This led Ukrainians to rely considerably on their own resources in establishing private Ukrainian secondary and specialized schools and an underground Ukrainian University in L'vov (1920-4), receiving higher education abroad¹⁰, and providing jobs for the new intelligentsia in Ukrainian cooperative, educational, cultural and other institutions.

World War II brought significant changes in the West Ukrainian social structure. During the first Soviet occupation of 1939-41 a considerable number of Polish colonists and intelligentsia, as well as some part of Ukrainian and Jewish intelligentsia were deported to the East.

10. Primarily in Czechoslovakia, in the Ukrainian Free University in Prague and the Ukrainian Economic Academy in Podebrady, established by the Ukrainian emigrees after World War I.

This, together with a considerable expansion of the administrative apparatus, educational facilities, and more jobs in nationalized economic institutions, accelerated the influx of rural population to the urban centers, into factories, schools, and services. At the same time a large number of administrative, political, educational and industrial personnel arrived from the Ukrainian S.S.R. and other parts of the U.S.S.R.¹¹ The German occupation (1941-4) wrought further changes in the social picture in Western Ukraine, by the mass liquidation of the Jewish population, previously associated primarily with commerce, professions and the retail trade, a large-scale deportation of youth (primarily rural) to the labor camps in Germany for work in industrial enterprises or large land estates. With the German retreat in 1944 a large emigration, in particular many members of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia, left for the West.

During the period 1944-1954 rapid social changes took place in Western Ukraine, creating there conditions similar to those established earlier in the Eastern Ukraine. In 1945-6 most of the remaining Polish population was transferred to Poland while most of the Ukrainians west of the new border was transferred to West Ukraine. According to V. Holub¹²; West Ukrainian industry increased by nearly three times, absorbing thus a considerable number of rural workers. Over 90% of the farms were collectivized. The number of institutions of higher learning increased five-fold and the student body seven-fold, although reportedly only 60% of the students in L'vov are natives of Western Ukraine. The influx of population from the other parts of the U.S.S.R. (as well as the policy of russification) were perhaps responsible for introducing Russian in these institutions as the language of instruction. The strong nationalist sentiments of the West Ukrainian population and the activities of an anti-Soviet underground in this territory led the Soviet authorities to apply large scale arrests and deportations, particularly of intelligentsia and clergy, in whose place

11. Almost all of them evacuated with the retreating Soviet troops in 1941.

12. V. Holub, "Zminy v Zakhidniv Ukraini za 1944-1954 rr." (Changes in the Western Ukraine during 1944-1955), A Summary of a Paper Read at the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in the U.S., New York, October, 1954.

there was brought in population from other parts of the U.S.S.R. Continuous distrust of West Ukrainians is reflected in their composing only about 27% of the Communist Party in West Ukraine, and in the preference given to outsiders in appointments to responsible positions in the state administration.¹³ Thus, local Ukrainians while continuing to form a majority of the peasant and the expanding working classes, are apparently under-represented in the ranks of intelligentsia and little represented in the ruling stratum in West Ukraine. Otherwise the present social structure in Western Ukraine appears to be the same as in the rest of the Ukrainian S.S.R., with the reservation made for a stronger social and national antagonism between the local population in the lower social-economic strata, and the predominantly imported upper strata.

The Status System

The 1930's witnessed a definite trend toward an elaborately stratified status system in the Soviet Union. This tendency was inherent in the process of industrialization of the country. In the 1920's the policy of wage-equalization, diffusion of responsibility between the enterprise management, party and trade union committees and the, failings of the "vydvyzhentsy" in the leading positions of Soviet economy impeded economic growth. Stalin, addressing a conference of industrial executives in 1931, gave recognition to these problems by ascribing the "motley picture" of the Soviet industry to a spontaneity of labor influx, large turnover of labor, "equality-mongering" and "the Leftist practice of wage-equalization," lack of personal responsibility, and insufficient engineering, technical and administrative staff. To raise the productivity of industry he called for the following program: organized recruitment of labor; mechanization; personal incentives to the workers and technical-managerial staff based on differential rewards; concentration of responsibility in the hands of managers; creation of a new Soviet technical intelligentsia and strengthening of its authority and prestige; and business

13 - Pravda, June 13, 1953

accounting.¹⁴ Stalin's speech heralded a series of reforms which led, in the succeeding years, to the establishment of new institutions for differential economic reward, and to the strengthening of the older ones; and to the work day (trudoden') system and the piecework system of payments in the kolkhozes. In industry it produced more precise grading between various skill categories; extension of the progressive piece-rate system; separate pay-scales for technical and managerial personnel; special "personal salaries" and bonuses, etc.¹⁵

By the end of the 1930's, as a result of these and other economic and political measures, a distinctly stratified status system emerged in the Soviet Ukraine. In terms of occupation, purchasing power and such cultural factors as the higher status of intellectual work over physical labor, the following social pyramid may be constructed:¹⁶

(1) The Ruling group, composed of the higher Party, government, police, administrative, military and economic officials, and selected writers, artists, scientists and technicians. This group includes both persons exercising actual power delegated from the Kremlin and men of little actual power selected for such reasons as ascribed status, family names commanding respect among the Ukrainian population, specialized knowledge, etc. In this group Ukrainians, and in the former group, Russians tend to predominate.

(2) The general intelligentsia comprising the intermediate ranks of the above categories, most of the technical specialists, professional groups, the middle ranks of the bureaucracy, managers and directors of enterprises, junior officers, students of universities and higher technical schools, etc.

14 - J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, (New York: International Publishers, 1941) pp.

15 - Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification in the Soviet Union," in Class Status and Power, ed. by R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953) p. 610.

16 - Based with some modifications, on A. Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 610-611.

(3) The working class "aristocracy," that is, the most productive and highly skilled industrial workers, primarily the "Stakhanovites," "Udarniks," trade-union leaders, brigadiers, foremen, and party members among the workers.

(4) The kolkhoz "aristocracy," comprising the collective farm chairmen and the MTS directors and their assistants, agricultural technicians and machinists, rural party members, the most productive collective farm workers, etc.

(5) White-collar group - the lower strata of the Soviet bureaucracy in cities and in the rural and kolkhoz administration.

(6) Workers in general with some percentage shading off into the least productive group close to the minimum wage level.¹⁷

(7) The peasantry in general with some peasants enjoying advantages due to favorable location, fertility of the soil or particular crop raised, and other peasants at the subsistence level.¹⁸

(8) The Disadvantaged group, embracing persons of various occupational groups previously subjected to administrative or police repressions, persons of disapproved social origin, those officially deprived of civil rights, etc.¹⁹

(9) Forced labor (actually outside the formal class structure): inmates of concentration camps, penal colonies, prisons, etc.²⁰ Forced labor camps are reported to have a social structure of their own determined by such factors as the type of charge (counter-revolutionaries being discriminated against), former status, occupation and skills,

17 - Nearly 40% of post-war Soviet labor consists of youngsters between 12 and 19 years of age. cf. Popliuiko, op. cit., p. 85.

18 - According to Popliuiko, (ibid., p. 82), in 1939 women represented over 60% of the rural labor force.

19 - V. Yaniv, "Suspil'ni Verstvy" (Social Strata), Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva, v. I, part 3, p. 1144.

20 - Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 611-613.

function in the internal camp organization and production, connections with influential people outside the camps, etc.

Obviously, the above scheme is a very rough approximation and contains many overlappings. While the major income and power groups tend to develop their own styles of life, patterns of association and group consciousness, there is a considerable degree of instability in the membership of the upper groups due to such factors as purges, shifts in policies, transfers of populations, etc.

In terms of numbers, the majority of the Ukrainian population (as in any other ethnic group of the U.S.S.R.) falls in groups (6) and (7) (general workers and peasants). In terms of nationality the largest percentage of Ukrainians is likely to be found in groups (6), (7), (8) and (9). Many of the forced labor group (9) live in camps outside Ukraine. A smaller percentage of Ukrainians is likely to be in groups (1), (2), and (3).

Social Mobility

During the first two Five Year Plans (1928-1937), Soviet Ukrainian society was characterized by a high degree of social mobility occasioned by the increased rate of industrialization in Ukraine and collectivisation of agriculture, which opened many opportunities for advancement into the ranks of the technical intelligentsia, managerial personnel, collective farm administration, semi-professional and skilled workers group, and farm machinery operators. Hundreds of thousands of workers and collective farmers were put through industrial and mechanic training courses. Particularly significant was a rapid increase in the number of women in industry, among the technical and professional groups, and in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy.²¹

21 - According to Izvestiia (8 March 1949), women constituted in 1949 44% of all specialists in the Soviet Union. Although such data are lacking for the Ukrainian S.S.R., there are indications of an increased percentage of women in industry, technical professions and bureaucracy. It must be remembered that due to the last war and the transfer of a considerable number of male workers to other parts of the U.S.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R. had in the post-war years a marked shortage of men.

It may be concluded, in accordance with Prof. Inkeles' observations regarding the whole of the S. U.,²² that during the first two Five Year Plans the Soviet Ukraine came close to an open class system with a high degree of horizontal and vertical mobility. Important reservations must be made concerning persons of "non-proletarian social origin," particularly the Kulaks, who were quite numerous in the Ukraine. Such factors as a high rate of attrition, loss of position by the "non-toiling" strata, deportations and liquidations of the kulaks, the "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists," deviationists, wreckers and others eliminated a considerable number of the more prosperous Ukrainian peasantry and the most nationally conscious part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

The war period and the post-war years showed an increasing tendency toward a decreased social mobility and toward a sharpening of the class stratification. Various official measures accompanied and strengthened this trend:

(1) In October, 1940, the Soviet government simultaneously introduced two new measures: a labor draft for youths between ages 14 and 17 (extended in 1947 to boys up to 19 years inclusive and girls in the age group 15-18), under which young people were sent to the FZU (factory and trade schools); and tuition fees for the last three grades of the secondary schools (desiatylitka) and in higher educational institutions. These measures meant restriction in the choice of education, occupation and residence for the majority of the youth in the Soviet Ukraine, and perpetuation of status for a minority which was composed of the upper strata of Soviet Society: the actual ruling group, the intelligentsia and the industrial and kolkhoz aristocracy, in which groups ethnic Ukrainians tended to be under-represented.

(2) Changes in the inheritance taxes and modification of the income tax rates to the benefit of high-salaried strata of the population, and an equivalent removal of several economic restrictions which formerly exerted an equalizing influence.²³

²² - Inkeles, op. cit., p. 613.

²³ - See Vladimir Gsovsky, "Family and Inheritance in Soviet Law," The Russian Review, vol. VII, no. 1, Autumn 1947, pp. 71-87, and Inkeles, op. cit., p. 615.

(3) Making access to certain desirable statuses dependent at least in part on birth (e.g., admission to the military cadet schools, railroad technical schools, etc.)²⁴

(4) Filling important managerial positions primarily with those trained in the higher technical schools.

(5) Introduction of a series of civilian and military awards, orders, honorific titles and prizes (e.g., Stalin Prizes) accompanied by status and material benefits and based, in some cases, not only on the extent of a person's contribution, but also on his status held at the time of his contribution.²⁵

(6) Extension of civilian uniforms and special insignia dependent on the status of the bearer.

(7) Formalization of the status of the army officer stratum, and lessening of the opportunities for the rise from the ranks to officer status.

(8) Strengthening of the family not only as a means of increasing the birth rate, but also to stabilize status and to transmit the "authoritarian norms of the total society."²⁶

(9) Placing of the technical intelligentsia on an equal status with the workers in admissions into the Party, and extension of actual preference to this group for admission into the party.²⁷

24 - Inkeles, op. cit., p. 619.

25 - See Philomena Guillebaud, "The Role of Honorary Awards in the Soviet Economic System," American Slavic and East European Review, vol. XII, 1953, pp. 486-505.

26 - Lewis A. Caser, "Some Aspects of Soviet Family Policy," American Journal of Sociology, vol. LVI, no. 5, Mar. 1951, p. 424.

27 - Since the 1930's members of the technical intelligentsia, army officers, and white collar workers apparently represented a majority of the newly admitted party members. This tendency was interrupted during the war years, but resumed and intensified in the post war period. See M. Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 225-233.

(10) Revival of the paternalistic school system and abolition of co-education in urban schools (now reintroduced), revealing a tendency toward the inculcation of more authoritarian norms and toward more clearly defined and differentiated sex roles.

Another development of the war-years was a rapid expansion of the Party membership (not as rapid in Ukraine as in the remaining parts of the U.S.S.R.) which tended to obliterate the boundary between the rank-and-file Party membership and non-members, as well as to increase internal stratification within the Party.

The above mentioned measures served to reinforce further the process of differentiation in social statuses and classes, to increase the social distance between some social groups, to increase the opportunities for perpetuation of superior social and economic status and its transmission to descendants of the upper strata of the society, and consequently to decrease chances for upward social mobility (especially within one generation) in the lower social strata, such as the collective peasants and workers in general.

However, some war-time developments in the Ukraine tended, at least temporarily, to modify these factors working toward a more stratified society. These were: high war time losses in the ranks of the intelligentsia and other upper strata, evacuation of a considerable number of specialists, technicians and highly skilled workers from the Ukraine at the time of the German invasion, part of whom were not allowed to return to the Ukraine, drafting into the army of a large number of specialists and skilled workers, deportation by the returning Soviet authorities of persons suspected of disloyalty to the Soviet regime, etc.²⁸ A high percentage of Ukrainian Jews were exterminated. Recent tendencies seem to point to a greater degree of social stratification and decreased social mobility.

28 - About 200,000 Ukrainians fled to the west during the war and immediately after, among them a large number of intellectuals and members of the intelligentsia.

N.S. Timasheff's observation about the present Soviet Union may well be applied to Ukraine. He points out that visitors to the U.S.S.R. "emphasize the crystallization of differentiated behavior in relations between subordinates and their superiors, and the symbolization of social differences in the size of offices and office desks, as well as in different clothes worn by members of various groups."²⁹

The leading strata of Soviet Ukrainian society -- the Party and State Functionaries, and the intelligentsia -- are in general already formed. "The most important problem at present is not the creation of (the) new positions, but the maintenance of the positions attained and their transmission to the new generation."³⁰

The technical intelligentsia -- according to Herman Achminov -- forms at present the most numerous and most important class in the leading stratum of the Soviet State. It is characterized by a strong self-consciousness and a sense of personal responsibility, which it tends to carry out even if it has to resort to extra-legal means (in order, for example, to fulfill the production plans).³¹ Speaking of this social group, the London Economist stated in 1952 that "we have to deal with a hard and self-conscious type, closely related to the early capitalist European industrial pioneer of the nineteenth century."³²

The sociological analysis of the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R.³³ clearly reveals the predominance in that allegedly representative body of exactly those strata of the Soviet Ukrainian population which we have earlier defined as the ruling group:

29 - N. S. Timasheff, "Post-War Trends in the U.S.S.R.," Russian Review, vol. VIII, no. 3, July 1949, p. 190.

30 - Herman Achminov, "Die Oberschicht in der Sowjetunion," Ost-Europa, vol. III, no. 4, August 1953, p. 249.

31 - Ibid., no. 5, October 1953, p. 339.

32 - "The Soviet Regime," Economist, Nov. 15-22, 1952.

33 - Based on B. Levyts'ky, "Nova Verkhovna Rada U.S.S.R.," (The New Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R.), Vpered, no. 4, April 1953, p. 3.

Social Groups	No. of deputies		Percentage of total	
	breakdown	total	breakdown	total
All-Union Soviet leaders		13		2.99
Soviet Ukrainian Government		35		8.04
Administration and Government officials		42		9.65
Communist Party functionaries		68		15.64
Central Committee members	14		3.22	
Obkom secretaries	36		8.28	
Raykom secretaries	18		4.14	
Armed Forces		12		2.76
Industry		59		13.57
Directors and managers	16		3.68	
Workers' "aristocracy"	34		7.82	
Workers	9		2.07	
Agriculture		75		25.74
Kolkhose Chairmen	22		5.07	
Highly-skilled peasants	44		10.11	
Peasants	9		2.07	
MTS		37		8.50
Directors	5		1.15	
Highly-skilled MTS workers	32		7.35	
Intelligentsia		66		15.17
Komsomol		1		0.23
Trade Unions		4		0.92
Miscellaneous		9		2.07
Unknown		14		3.22
TOTAL		435 members		100.00

As Lewis A. Caser has observed, "Soviet society exhibits a continual shift toward more rigid stratification and the solidification of a ruling class which disposes collectively of the means of production and tends increasingly to erect social barriers between itself and the underlying population; vertical social mobility decreases and ascent into the ruling class becomes more and more difficult."³⁴

This process in the Soviet Union can be explained in terms of Marxist theory, which sees the basis of class differentiation in the different relations of individuals to the productive process and the control of the means of production. It may be added, as Alex Inkeles³⁵ has shown, that

34 - L. A. Caser, op. cit., p. 424.

35 - A. Inkeles, op. cit., p. 620.

the tendency toward social stratification inheres in the organization of modern industry and mechanized agriculture, which call for an elaborate division of labor, precise differentiation of function, technical competence and elaborate hierarchies of authority and responsibility. (One can find the illustration of this tendency in the organization of any large industrial corporation in our society.) Differential positions of certain persons (e.g., highly specialized and indispensable managers, technicians and administrators) in the labor market tends to produce inequalities in economic reward and ascribed status.

While the most favored social strata with preferential income, status and power are the ones on which the Soviet regime relies most heavily, there is an inherent danger in these favored strata: they tend to develop a distinctive group consciousness, which in turn may lead them to challenge the authority of the Communist Party. Indeed, many of the anti-equalitarian measures taken by the Communist party in the last two decades may be interpreted as concessions to the growing social class of technical intelligentsia. But, while making concessions to that group, the Party attempts to absorb into its ranks the more important part of the group, while at the same time subjecting it to what Inkeles aptly calls "an almost calculated degree of relatively constant instability," by means of rapid and sudden turnover in personnel, by intensive criticism, political supervision, purges, police action and by a consistent build up of the lower strata of society.³⁶

36 - A. Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 621-622.

Age and Sex Composition of the Population

Data on the age and sex composition of population in Ukraine must be based on a study of the general Soviet age-sex structure and its development. In general it can be said that the Soviet population underwent a slight over-all aging process during the inter-census period (1926-1939). This is not surprising as a gradual maturing of the population, with an increasing proportion of older persons, is as typical of Soviet experience as it is of most other countries.

There was besides a decline by 1939 in the proportion of males as compared with the male-female ratio of 1926. This suggests that during the difficult years of forced collectivization, famine, deportation, forced industrialization, and purge the male population was subject to special hazards and suffered particularly heavy losses.¹

The numbers of children aged 3, 4, and 5-9 years in January, 1939, born during 1929-1935, appear relatively small-reduced by the widespread resort to the abortion clinics during that period² and by the difficult conditions that prevailed at the time of their birth. On the other hand the cohort aged 10-14 years of age in January, 1939, was exceptionally large. It may be assumed that this is also true of those aged 15-16 years at the time of the census (born 1923-1924), who reached their eighteenth birthdays in 1941 and 1942 respectively. This means that all through the second World War the Soviet Union was being constantly strengthened by the large number of youths which reached military age during the war years.³

1 - Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), p. 141. (Lorimer has a discussion of age and sex changes of the U.S.S.R. population in the inter-census period, pp. 140-144.) The operation of these male depletion tendencies was, as we have noted, particularly heavy in Ukraine which might, therefore, be expected to show an even greater disparity in sex ratio than is indicated by the U.S.S.R. averages.

2 - This might apply less to the Ukrainian element of the population than to the groups in Ukraine since so many Ukrainians were peasants among whom contraceptive information and facilities did not obtain.

3 - Lorimer, op. cit., p. 144.

The U.S.S.R. Population Pyramid

While the two and a half year period from 1939 to the German invasion involved no untoward change in the trend of age and sex development in the old territory of the Soviet Union, the picture was modified to some degree by the addition of some 22 million persons to the 1939-40 Soviet population.


The Ukraine's over-all median age rose slightly in comparison to the 1939 U.S.S.R. average.⁴ The newly added population was also more nearly balanced in sex structure which, again, might be expected to close slightly the gap between male and female ratios in Ukraine. The sex ratio in Ukraine could be expected to be even more biased toward female preponderance than the U.S.S.R. average because of the more severe impact of male depletion factors in that region. But while the influx of a more "normally" balanced population in terms of sex ratios had a corrective influence in this situation, it is doubtful if it did more than bring it up to the general U.S.S.R. sex ratio average.

Age and sex structure in 1950⁵ -- The terrific wastage of life during and as a consequence of World War II had a profound effect on the age-sex structure of the U.S.S.R.'s population; it may be reasonably assumed that this also holds true for Ukraine. The loss of 26.7 million persons as reflected in the total 1950 Soviet population shows up particularly in the great excess of women for all ages above 20 but especially in the ages which were particularly subject to military service between 1941 and 1945; i. e., age groups 25-54 (in 1950; these would have been in ages 16 to 45 in 1941).

4 - By 1941, after the addition of the annexed populations, the whole U.S.S.R. median age would have been slightly higher than it was in 1939 both through normal aging and due to the addition of older populations. However, this would have had an even stronger impact on Ukraine because so much of the total annexed population was joined to it. Therefore, the general age level in Ukraine would have been even higher if no other factors are taken into account. Other factors did exist; e. g., oldsters died off to a greater extent in Ukraine during 1926-39 due to more severe conditions there.

5 - This section is based largely on Kulischer, Aspects of U.S.S.R. Population, pp. 5-6 and Diagram III, "1950 Estimated U.S.S.R. Population Pyramid," next page.

1950 ESTIMATED U.S.S.R. POPULATION PYRAMID
"Actual" in comparison with the "Hypothetical" (In millions)



From Kulischer, "Certain Aspects of the Development of U.S.S.R. Population."

For each five year age group beginning with ages 25-29 and extending to ages 55-59 females exceeded males by at least a million, and in some cases by almost three million. The total excess of females over males for these specified ages was 14.2 million in 1950. Since the total excess of females over males for the total U.S.S.R. population was 15.9 million this means that almost 90 per cent (89.31 per cent to be exact) of the female excess was concentrated in the 1941 prime military ages.

Another characteristic of the age-sex structure of the U.S.S.R. in 1950 was the slight excess of males over females in the under 20 age groups. For ages 5-9 and 15-19 the numbers of the sexes were about equal. In ages 0-4 and 10-14 there was a male excess of 200,000 in each five year group. For ages 20-24 there were about 600,000 more women than men. The number of older male members of this age cohort had probably been decreased by military service during World War II.

The preponderance of females revealed itself in a ratio of 85 males per 100 females (or 118 females to 100 males).⁶ Percentagewise there were 46 per cent males and 54 per cent females. In the working ages 15-54, the discrepancy is even more pronounced; 127 females per 100 males.

The total U.S.S.R. population in 1950 was somewhat older than the 1939 population. In 1939 the median age was between 20-24. About 53.42 per cent of the population was under 24 years of age. In 1950 only 52.5 per cent were under 24 and the median age moved up somewhat.

6 - Halyna Selehn asserts that World War II destroyed a large part of the male population of Ukraine. "In Ukraine instead of the usual and not very high surplus of women, overwed in time of peace (1080-1100 women to every thousand men), the latest statistics show an average of 1300-1400 women to every thousand men. The surplus is still greater in the working age: 1,500 women to a thousand men. In some age groups, such as 18-20 years, only 25-30% are men." Some of this disproportion is due, however, to the temporary absence of men in military service who were expected to return. "Decline of Population in the Soviet Ukraine," The Ukrainian Quarterly, vol. IV, no. 3 (Summer 1948), 244.

National Composition

Prewar National Composition, 1926-1939

The 1926 census furnished the first reliable data on ethnic (national) composition of Ukraine. It may be assumed, however, that even at the time of the 1897 census and earlier Ukrainians formed the overwhelming majority of the population. This is supported by the fact that before the development of coal and iron mining in Ukraine in the Middle 1880's the number of Russians was much less than it became later when a large influx came in as industrial workers and miners in the new manufacturing establishments and mines. The preponderance of Ukrainians thereafter was steadily eaten away by the Russian migratory movement but never fell below 75-80 per cent of the total before the First World War.

The loss of the Western Ukraine (to Poland by the treaty of Riga, 1921) with its large Polish and Jewish population probably operated to enhance the Ukrainian proportion in the Soviet Ukraine within its 1921-39 boundaries. Nevertheless, the Russian migratory tide continued its steady southern drift, particularly after the expansion of industry in the Donets Basin in the early years of the Soviet regime.¹

According to the 1926 census Ukrainians constituted about 80 per cent of the total population of 29,018,000 in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Russians constituted the second largest group with 2,677,166 (9.23 per cent), Jews third with 1.57 million (5.42 per cent), and then in order of importance Poles, Germans, Moldavians, Greeks, Bulgars, and Belorussians. These groups each numbered 50,000 or more and together constituted 99.49 per cent of the population. The remainder, which included a number of Armenians, Tartars and Gypsies, numbered less than 150,000 and amounted to about half of one per cent of the total.²

1 - Lorimer, op. cit., Chapter IV, especially pp. 48-49 and Plate VI, secs. A and B.

2 - Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, S.S.S.R. Otdel Perepisi, Vsesoiuznaia Perepis' Naseleniia 1926 goda Tom XI, Ukrainskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Sovetskaia Respublika Otdel I (Moscow: Ts.S.U., 1929) Table VI, 8-11 (Central Statistical Board, U.S.S.R., Census Division, The All-Union Census of Population 1926 Vol. XI. Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic Part I (Moscow: Central Statistical Board, 1929))

Changes during the intercensus period are difficult to define and document. The 1939 census data released to date give only total U. S. S. R. population figures for the different nationalities and, significantly no breakdown or distribution by political-administrative unit has been made public. In order to calculate the ethnic composition of Ukraine in 1939 we are forced to make a number of assumptions.

A major assumption is that the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians declined between 1926 and 1939 from 80 per cent of the total population of the Republic to about 75 per cent. A number of other nationalities which were represented in the ethnic structure of Ukraine in 1936 either declined or increased in numbers throughout the U. S. S. R. (such as the Poles, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, etc.)³ and we have assumed that they underwent a proportionate decline or increase in Ukraine. Others, such as the Jews migrated in large numbers from Ukraine and were fewer in 1939 than in 1926.⁴ As for the half of one per cent of "Others" representing the minor national elements in Ukraine, we have assumed that their proportion of the total remained the same although their numbers increased somewhat. On this basis we derive the ethnic composition of Ukraine in 1939 compared with 1926 as shown in the following table.

Table
Estimated Changes in the National Composition of the Ukraine 1926-1939

	<u>1926</u>		<u>1939</u>	
	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Ukrainians	23, 31 8, 860	80. 01	23, 220, 000	75. 00
Russians	2, 677, 166	9. 23	4 690, 926	15. 15
Jews	1 574, 428	5. 42	1, 533, 000	4. 95
Poles	476, 435	1. 64	376, 860	1. 22
Germans	393, 924	1. 36	449, 961	1. 45
Moldavians	257, 794	. 89	240, 264	. 78
Greeks	104, 666	. 36	115, 239	. 37
Bulgars	92, 078	. 32	91, 618	. 30
Belorussians	75, 842	. 26	84, 336	. 27
Others	<u>146, 807</u>	<u>. 51</u>	<u>157, 896</u>	<u>. 51</u>
Total	29, 018. 000	100. 00	30, 960, 000	100. 00

3 - Lorimer, op. cit. pp. 138-139.

4 - Jews increased by about 13 per cent throughout the U. S. S. R. between 1926-1939 but migration in large numbers from Ukraine during this period reduced their absolute numbers there by about 41, 000 in 1939 as compared with 1926. Kulischer, Europe on the Move, p. 109.

Changes in the National Composition of Ukraine January 1939 - June 1941

Of the eight million population of Western Ukraine the great majority were Ukrainian. About one-third of the 1.6 million inhabitants of those portions of former Rumanian territory added to Ukraine were Ukrainian. In the Western Ukraine there were about five million Ukrainians, 1.85 million Poles, a million Jews, and about 150,000 Czechs, Germans, and others. In Northern Bukovina, Khotin, and Izmail there were 510,400 Ukrainians, the remainder comprising sizable numbers of Rumanians, Russians, Jews, Germans, Bulgarians, Poles, etc. A very rough estimate would apportion the population of the annexed territories somewhat as follows.⁵

Table
Ethnic Composition of Polish and Rumanian Territory
Annexed to Ukraine as of 1 January 1939

Ukrainians	5,510,400
Poles	1,877,680 ⁶
Jews	1,135,200 ⁶
Rumanians	455,360
Russians	205,280
Germans	215,360
Bulgarians	127,840
Others	72,880
Total	9,600,000

From this number there must be deducted a considerable portion representing Germans, Poles, and Jews subjected to special treatment. All the Germans were repatriated according to the agreements signed between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in 1939 and 1940.⁷ Over 900,000 Poles and Jews were deported from Ukraine to the interior.

5 - Based on data in the following sources: The Population of Poland, Tables 39 & 40, pp. 150-151; Charles Upson Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania's Case (1941), Table 1, pp. 26-27. (Table I corresponds exactly to Table A of Vol. II of the official Rumanian census of 1940). It has been assumed that the proportion of the various ethnic groups in the total population of the Rumanian territories annexed to Ukraine was the same in 1939 as it was at the time of the Rumanian Census of 1930.

6 - The figures for Poles and Jews include about 200,000 who fled to Western Ukraine from German occupied Poland in 1939, Kulischer, Displacement, p. 58; Lorimer, op. cit. p. 195.

7 - About 136,000 German Volksdeutsche were transferred to Germany from Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia under the terms of a Soviet-German treaty signed September 5, 1950. About 42,500 came from Northern Bukovina and

of the U. S. S. R. between 1939 and June 1941. Adjusting our totals to take these events into account we find that the revised ethnic composition of the annexed territories may have been about as follows:

Ukrainians	5,510,400
Poles	1,324,180
Jews	766,200
Rumanians	455,280
Russians	205,280
Bulgarians	127,840
Others	72,880
Total	8,462,140

This represents the adjusted net total of all ethnic groups in the annexed territory as of 1 January 1939. Added to their respective ethnic cohorts in the 1939 population of Ukraine, adjusted for the loss of 310,000 in territory assigned to the new Moldavian S. S. R.,⁸ we estimate the ethnic composition of the 1939 population residing on the 1941 territory of Ukraine as follows:

Table

Estimated National Composition of Ukraine: Population of 1939 on 1941 Area

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Ukrainians	28,690,400	73.36
Russians	4,866,206	12.44
Jews	2,299,200	5.88
Poles	1,701,040	4.35
Rumanians	455,280	1.16
Germans	449,861	1.15
Greeks	115,239	.29
Bulgars	219,458	.56
Belorussians	84,336	.22
Others	230,776	.59
Total	39,111,796	100.00

In order to calculate the changes which occurred during the two and

93,500 from Bessarabis. Schechtman, European Population Transfers..., pp.180-186. Similarly, a total of 128,000 Volksdeutsche were transferred from Soviet occupied Poland to German control, 120,000 from Western Ukraine. Ibid., pp. 150-151. I estimate that a total of 215,000 Germans left areas which were incorporated in Ukraine.

8 - All the 240,000 Moldavians in the Ukraine plus 40,000 Ukrainians and 30,000 Russians.

a half year period down to the German invasion in June, 1941, we shall assume that the relative proportion of each ethnic group in the total population of Ukraine remained unchanged. We shall further assume that Ukraine experienced growth at the same rate as did the U.S.S.R. as a whole, and that migratory gains and losses, except as already taken into account, were in balance. Applying these assumptions to the above estimates we derive the following figures for ethnic composition of the Ukraine in June 1941.

Table

Estimated National Composition of Ukraine, June 1941

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Ukrainians	30,187,139	73.36
Russians	5,118,975	12.44
Jews	2,419,580	5.88
Poles	1,789,995	4.35
Rumanians	477,332	1.16
Germans	473,217	1.15
Greeks	119,333	.29
Bulgars	230,436	.56
Belorussians	90,528	.22
Others	<u>242,781</u>	<u>.59</u>
Total	41,149,316	100.00

War and Postwar Changes in National Composition

As we have already discussed the general population changes that occurred in Ukraine during and immediately after World War II a brief outline of the effect of these alterations on the ethnic structure of Ukraine will suffice here.

Although it appears that the Soviet authorities evacuated many Jews, along with officials and skilled workers, in order to save them from German atrocities,⁹ there were many hundred of thousands who remained in the western borderlands of the Soviet Union occupied by the Germans. Three and a half million Jews perished on the territory of the Soviet Union during World War II. How many of these were from Ukraine cannot be accurately judged; certainly not less than a million and a half or more. Since the war

9 - Kulischer, Europe on the Move, p. 260.

too the Jews of Ukraine, as seems to be the case throughout the western borderlands of the Soviet Union, have been subjected to an eastward movement. As a part of its program of securing militarily the areas along its western and northwestern frontiers the Soviet Government instituted a policy of deporting from these areas the non-Slavic elements.¹⁰ Even before the mass deportation of Jews from Western Ukraine got under way some 20,000 had been shifted "by command" to the Far East.¹¹ Additional large numbers quickly followed in 1948 and 1949 among them 35,000 from Lvov alone.¹² Most of these evacuees were resettled in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Birobijan). Reports of the abandonment of attempts by the Soviet Government to create a Jewish "homeland" in this region persist, however, and many of the Jews from the west have apparently been resettled in Krasnoyarsk and other parts of Siberia.¹³

Practically all the Germans disappeared from Ukraine during the war: a large number were deported from the Black Sea region to the interior by Soviet authorities early in the war, and the remainder, about 350,000, were evacuated from the region between 1943 and 1944 when the German retreat threatened them with Soviet vengeance.¹⁴ It can be assumed that if any Germans remain in Ukraine they form a statistically insignificant group.

Some 810,500 Poles and Jews were repatriated to Poland from the Ukraine during 1945 and 1946.¹⁵ An additional undetermined number of Poles were involved in the return of the Przemyśl area to Poland.¹⁶ War

10 - C. L. Sulzberger, New York Times, September 12, 1949.

11 - Ibid.

12 - Eugene M. Kulischer, "Population Changes Behind the Iron Curtain" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 271 (September 1950) p. 109.

13 - Sulzberger, op. cit.; Harry Schwartz, New York Times, April 22, 1951.

14 - Kulischer, Europe on the Move, p. 267; Schechtman, op. cit., pp. 209-210.

15 - United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, The Population of Poland by W. Parker Mauldin and Donald S. Akers, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, no. 4, (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 117.

16 - For the treaty of August 15, 1945, between the U.S.S.R. and Poland affecting boundary adjustments see The American Review of the Soviet Union, vol. 7, no. 2 (February 1946) p. 62-63. Also Balsak, op. cit., pp. 5, 545.

losses hit the Poles of the Soviet Union severely. Of almost five million in the Soviet Union when war began it is estimated that some two million died.¹⁷ If the Poles of Ukraine suffered losses in proportion to their rank among the Poles of the Soviet Union another three-quarters of a million or more should be deducted from the remaining number of Poles in Ukraine. Thus, of a prewar Polish minority numbering about 1, 790, 000, over 1.6 million were either transferred away or were war losses. Excluding natural increase, Poles in Ukraine by the end of 1947 probably numbered less than 200, 000.

The Soviet Greeks, about half of them in Ukraine, seem to have proved unreliable during the war and many were deported by the Soviet authorities, most probably to Soviet Central Asia. Almost all the Bulgarians in Ukraine were repatriated to Bulgaria during the war. After the war at least a part of these were brought back. No data on their numbers are available.¹⁸ The total number of Czechs and Slovaks in the Soviet Union according to the 1939 census was only about 27, 000.¹⁹ About 34, 000 more were in Carpatho-Ukraine (according to the 1930 Czech census).²⁰ Two agreements, the first in 1945 as part of the treaty ceding Carpatho-Ukraine to the Soviet Union, and the second in July 1946, provided for transfer of Czechs and Slovaks from Carpatho-Ukraine and the Volhynia area of Ukraine to return to Czechoslovakia. Apparently the Czechs and Slovaks in Carpatho-Ukraine had already left that province during the Hungarian occupation after 1939. However, some 33, 000 Czechs and Slovaks were returned to Czechoslovakia from Ukraine by the middle of 1947.²¹ There are no Czechs and Slovaks left in Ukraine at present. Almost

17 - See diagram of "Differential War-Produced Losses of U.S.S.R. Ethnic Groups 1940-1950" infra, Appendix I, "The Population of Ukraine", p.

18 - Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies, pp. 145-148.

19 - Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 138-139.

20 - Jean Mousset, Les Villes de la Russie Subcarpatique (1919-1938) (Paris: Librairie Droz, 1938), p. 36.

20 - The difference of 6, 000 from the 1939 Soviet census figure suggest either that that figure was too low or that some non-Czechs and Slovaks managed to pass themselves off as such and so succeeded in escaping from the U.S.S.R. Natural increase in the 1939-1947 period would not account for the difference.

all the Rumanians fled toward the end of the war.²²

It can be seen that the war and postwar population movements acted for Ukraine much the same as it did for other countries of eastern Europe. It eliminated most of its national minorities. There was, however, one major exception in Ukraine. The Russian minority--the largest of all--was relatively unchanged. It too suffered war losses but apparently only in proportion to its size in the total population.

Present National Composition of Ukraine

Most Soviet publications give the proportion of Ukrainians in Ukraine today as either "three-quarters" or "four-fifths" of the total population. No percentage or numerical figure on other national groups in Ukraine have been available since the war. In order of rank the other nationalities are Russian, Jewish, and others. Presumably "others" include Poles and Belorussians as the only minorities other than Russians and Jews which may number as many as 100,000 or more in Ukraine today. There may be small numbers of other nationalities such as Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks Moldavians, and Rumanians. If so they probably amount to less than one hundred thousand all told.

If as many as three-quarters of a million Jews are left in Ukraine, together with approximately 300,000 - 400,000 Poles and Belorussians, and perhaps a hundred thousand "others", there could not remain in Ukraine over one and half million persons of nationalities other than Ukrainian and Russian. Accepting 42 million as the present (1954) population of Ukraine, and 80 per cent as the correct proportion of Ukrainians, this would indicate that the population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. includes about 34 million Ukrainians, 6.5 million Russians, and perhaps a million and a half of all other nationalities.

22 - Kulischer, Europe on the Move, p. 292.

THE UKRAINIAN KINSHIP SYSTEM

"A"- lg

The Ukrainian kinship system shows the following characteristics:¹

1. Descent is bilateral, and bilateral kindreds are present.
2. Cousin terms are of the Eskimo type, which means that father's sister's daughter (FaSiDa) and mother's brother's daughter (MoBrDa) are called by the same terms as parallel cousins (that is, children of two siblings of the same sex) but terminologically differentiated from sisters; the terms for the two cross-cousins (that is, children of two siblings of different sex) are usually but not always the same.
3. Residence of newly married couples is neolocal, with survivals of patrilocal traits. "The occasional appearance of bifurcate collateral terminology in normal or neolocal Eskimo societies presumably reflecting former polygyny and patrilocal residence, is attested for the Ruthenians by actual historical evidence."²
4. Exogamy and other extensions of incest taboos are bilateral.
5. Marriage is now characterized by exclusive monogamy.
6. Family is usually of the independent nuclear type, consisting in most cases of parents and their unmarried children.
7. The so-called Aunt terms are a combination of bifurcate collateral and lineal principles. In the bifurcate collateral type there are distinct terms for mother (Mo), and mother's sister (MoSi), and father's sister (FaSi). The recognition of both bifurcation and collaterality in distinguishing parents from their siblings produces the so-called bifurcate collateral terminology, in which paternal and maternal uncles and aunts are terminologically differentiated from parents as well as from one another. The emphasis on collaterality alone results in the so-called lineal terminology, in which, as in the Anglo-American system, father's brother (FaBr) and mother's brother (MoBr) are grouped under one classificatory term, and father's sister (FaSi)

1 - G. P. Murdock, Social Structure, The MacMillan Co., New York 1949

2 - Ibid. p. 227

and mother's sister (MoSi) under another, with separate denotative terms for each of the parents.

In the Ukrainian kinship system the principle of collaterality applies to both paternal and maternal siblings of both sexes. In other words, mother's sister and father's brother are terminologically distinguished from mother and father. But the principle of bifurcation embraces only the male siblings of both parents. Thus, while both mother's sister and father's sister are called by the same term, Titka, mother's brother is called Vuiko, and father's brother Stryiko.

This limitation of bifurcation to male parental siblings alone is characteristic primarily of Western Ukraine. In the Eastern parts of the country, bifurcation is completely neglected, and both father's brother and mother's brother are grouped under one and the same classificatory term, Diad'ko, which corresponds to the undifferentiated and unspecified English "Uncle".

Unlike the Anglo-Americans, whose classificatory kinship terminology refers to both male and female children of parental siblings as cousins, the Ukrainians, whose terminology is much more particularizing, distinguish between father's brother's children (Striechnyi brat, Striechna sestra), father's sister's children (Dvoeridnyi brat, Dvoeridna sestra) and mother's sister's children (Titochnyi brat, Titochna sestra). Mother's brother's children are called by the same name as father's sister's.

Similarly, while the Anglo-Americans refer to both husband's parents and wife's parents simply as parents-in-law, Eastern Ukrainians distinguish wife's parents from husband's parents. The first ones are called Test' and Teshcha, the second Svekora and Svekrukha.

Likewise, while the Anglo-Americans refer to mother's brother's wife, father's brother's wife, mother's sister and father's sister by one and the same classificatory term, Aunt, the Ukrainians distinguish between father's brother's wife (Stryina) and mother's brother's wife (Vuina). This distinction is greater in Western Ukraine than in the European provinces, where, possibly under Russian influence, mother's brother's wife as well as father's brother's wife are called Diadyna.

In the same way, while the Anglo-Americans apply the classifica-

tory terms nephew and niece to both brother's children and sister's children, in Western Ukraine, the people use, in addition to Nebizh and Neboha, particularizing names, Bratanych and Bratanytsa for brother's offspring, and Sestrinok and Sestrinka for sister's.

An important feature of the Ukrainian kinship system are the formalized interpersonal obligations and expectations extended beyond the actual kinship, both consanguine and affinal. Particularly significant is the institution of Godparenthood which, according to refugees from Soviet Ukraine, still persists in rural areas, despite all attempts by the Party and Government to eradicate it.

In many other cultures godparenthood is little more than an honorary relationship whose material obligations do not exceed the buying of a moderately prided birthday present. In Ukraine this institution is taken more seriously. If the biological parents die, the godparents are socially expected to take care of their godchildren (Pokhresnik, Pokhresnitsa), morally, legally and economically. Failure to do so arouses criticism and condemnation. For this reason the Ukrainians tend to establish the relationship of godparenthood with persons of substance and in good health who are likely to live at least as long as the child's parents themselves. Very old people and those who are sick or without adequate means usually avoid the honors and duties implied in the relationship, even if explicitly asked to accept them.

Another important reciprocal relationship in the Ukrainian kinship was, at least until the Revolution, that of sworn brotherhood and sworn sisterhood. Characteristic of many societies ravaged by wars, invasions, and instability, these two relationships were especially strong among the Cossack warriors of the so-called Zaporozhian Sich. Based on mutual aid and loyalty, these ties functioned to increase one's feeling of security in a generally hostile and strife-ridden environment. The pobratyms (sworn brothers) and posestras (sworn sisters), like godparents in other cases, took care of the orphans of their sworn brothers and sisters, as if these were close blood relatives.

It is impossible to ascertain whether and to what extent the relationships still exist, but it is highly improbable that such interpersonal ties could be cultivated for a long time after the dissolution of the Cossacks

as a military establishment and in an increasingly anonymous, urbanized environment. Besides, it is well known that the Soviet regime looks with strong disapproval and suspicion on all close relations not controlled by the Party.

In the process of collectivization and mechanization of Ukrainian villages, the kinship relations had to undergo a serious change. The shift from living in traditionally independent households, consisting of the family of procreation, to the system of the kolkhoz and sovkhos, and the deportation and displacement of millions of Ukrainian peasants during the forced collectivization in the nineteen-thirties, and the extermination of many others by the N.K.V.D. and the Nazis, must have shaken the very foundations of the traditional village life based upon, and organized around, the expectations and obligations of kinship reciprocals.

One might assume that under new living conditions, particularly in the kolkhozes, many old kinship relationships are rapidly losing their former function and significance, and that some of them survive today only as terms, empty shells without content. Actually, according to many Ukrainian refugees, as well as in the light of general historical and sociological evidence, it is reasonable to believe that, instead of weakening the ties of kinship, the Soviet dictatorship has strengthened them. Under a regime of cultivated suspicion, where no one can quite safely confide in anyone, the immediate family, as well as the extended kinship group, provide the least dubious island of security. Although denunciations of parents by children are known from several totalitarian states, the family, as a natural biological foundation of human society and the ultimate refuge in all great crises, is, on the whole, much more trustworthy and reliable than the world of strangers.

Traditionally deprived of an honest and benevolent administration of their own, and exposed to decades of sovietization and russification, the Ukrainians, particularly in rural areas, find in their kinship an important source of personal security, social cohesion, and, ultimately, national consciousness.

At any rate, even if some less important kinship terms, referring to peripheral relatives, should fall into disuse and oblivion, those applying to members of the immediate household are likely to survive for a

long time, especially in view of the fact that the overall Soviet policy is not aimed at the destruction of the nuclear family.

For all these reasons, knowledge of the Ukrainian kinship terms and their social significance may be of great importance to a stranger trying to understand the main dimensions of the intricate interpersonal relations among these people, particularly in the countryside.³ Besides, there is additional evidence that kinship is still regarded as important by the Soviets themselves: it has become notorious that in punishing the so-called enemies of the people the Bolsheviki often extend the burden of responsibility from an accused individual to his remotest relatives.

3 - See table of Ukrainian kinship terms, appendix .

UKRAINIAN FAMILY

"A" - 1g

The typical Ukrainian family is a small independent household consisting of parents and their unmarried children. Newly married couples usually establish a home of their own on a separate piece of land. According to numerous itineraries and comments of foreign travelers who passed through Ukrain from the sixth to the twentieth century, the individualistic tradition in Ukrainian villiages seems to be long and powerful. All of these travelers are impressed by the differences between the countryside of Russia proper and that of the Ukraine. A nineteenth-century German writer, Johann Heinrich Blasius, compares in his book, Reise durch Ukraine, (1844), among other things, a Ukrainian village with a Muscovite settlement near Tula, "where all the houses were alike and built on one side of the road, and what is more, under one roof."¹ Speaking of the Ukrainian homes, the author points out the following: "Ever since we left Northern Russia, we have not seen such neatly-kept houses as those of the Kozaks. The walls, which are of wooden planks in all Ukrainian houses, are covered with clay inside and outside and nicely whitened...."²

In their appeals to the American system of values, many Ukrainian exiles are prone to emphasize the antiquity and strength of those features of the Ukrainian family which tend to sharpen its difference from the more collectivist Russian tradition. Trying to document their claims as thoroughly as possible, many of them resort to archaeological evidence. For example: the otherwise valuable and informative article on the Ukrainian family in the Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva³ includes a detailed account of all archaeological materials found in the Ukraine and dating from the Upper Paleolithic, through the so-called Azilian era

¹ Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions, pp. 202, 203

² Ibid

³ Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva, pp. 1134-1136

(approx. 10,000 B.C.), to the Trypillian culture which flourished north of the Black Sea three to four thousand years ago. In all these assemblages, the characteristic type of dwelling is a one-family hut with a separate fireplace. According to Dr. Volodymyr Yaniv, a small family unit was also characteristic of the Trypillian culture, many of whose outstanding traits are supposed to have lasted into Kievan Rus'. There is no doubt that, despite countless invasions and migrations which swept through the Ukraine in the course of millenia, some continuity in the identity of population must have persisted. But it is almost certain that the ethnobiological features of those who survived an invasion were always more or less profoundly affected by the conquerors. In view of the fact that this territory happens to be one of the most frequently disturbed crossroads of the world, it is quite safe to assert that the process of ethnobiological alteration of its inhabitants has been going on in Ukraine since time immemorial. This is why it is difficult to accept the evidence of archaeology, as well as of the history of Kievan Rus', as pertaining to the Ukrainians in the modern sense of the word. Besides, many Ukrainian scholars themselves do not insist that the original Slavic settlement, in what is today the Ukraine, began before the fifth century A.D.

The present Ukrainian family is characterized by a profound sense of togetherness, a deep feeling of bond and continuity between the dead, the living and the yet unborn. This feeling is clearly reflected in many Ukrainian customs and beliefs. For example, death is not regarded as terminating one's membership in the kinship group.⁴ The function of the ancient cult of the ancestors is to preserve the contact with past generations. The belief that the deceased continue to live after death leads to the separation of family cemeteries. Even in the other world, the Ukrainians are supposed to preserve their individualistic eagerness to dwell on their own piece of land.

There is additional evidence that the Ukrainians are anxious to

⁴Ibid.

emphasize their individual egos . The Ukrainian peasant is preoccupied with preserving the memory of his person after he dies. The remembrance of a man (pamiat' pro ludynu) is best preserved in a family devoted to worship of ancestors. Honoring the memory of his predecessors and developing the cult of family tradition, an individualistically oriented man hopes that some day his own offspring (nashchadky) will remember and honor him. In honoring his progenitors he sets an example for his children. Thus the cult of the ancestors is an expression of the desire for procreation, for the maintenance of generational continuity.⁵

The high respect for the family in the Ukrainian culture makes the selection of prospective spouses a very serious affair. That the predominant type of marriage among the Eastern Slavs during the last 1,000 years was strict monogamy can be documented not only by the early chronicles but also by the folklore. This is undoubtedly true at least of the common people, despite historical assertions that the princes of Kievan Rus' and other early East Slavic states practiced large-scale polygamy. The preference for monogamy is clearly expressed in the so-called "Primary Chronicle" (Pochatkovyj). Describing the monogamous Polyans, the book contrasts them with their polygamous neighbors--of whom it speaks with contempt. It emphasizes the voluntary nature of marriage and criticizes the custom of abduction practiced by the tribes who lived to the north-east of the Polyans. In time, strictly observed monogamy became associated with a complicated marriage ceremony, which, little affected by Christianity, survives until today. Part of that ceremony itself, match-making is supposed to express the bilateral and voluntary character of the contract. As already mentioned in our description of kinship, in the selection of mates the Ukrainians adhere to the principle of strict exogamy.⁶

Sexual morality is rigid and, on the whole, faithfully observed. Particularly valued is the virtue (chesnotlyvist') of women. Unmarried

⁵Dr. Volodymyr Yaniv, Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva, pp. 1134-1136

⁶Ibid.

girls are supposed to preserve their virginity, which is identified with personal honor. Village and neighborhood gossip, often the most malicious expression of the informal public opinion, is merciless in its condemnation of the violators of sex morality.

In addition to its being a small nuclear household, the Ukrainian family is characterized by a number of traits which certain Ukrainian scholars interpret as survivals of the matriarchate. It is true that in the archaeological remains of the Trypillian culture one can discern a clear division of labor between men and women: the woman seems responsible for the procurement and preparation of vegetables; the man, for hunting, fishing and herding. The father, however, does not appear to rule the family. This is inferred from archaeological indications that the mother plays the most important role in family rituals. In this connection it is important to mention that in their references to the so-called trypillian culture, Ukrainian scholars in exile rely in many cases on the works of Soviet archaeologists, whose conclusions to otherwise highly competent studies are often distorted by their anxiety to make the facts conform to the general Marxian interpretation of the history of the family. Thus, for example, Engels' famous work, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, based on the classical Ancient Society, by the American, Lewis H. Morgan (1877), is still regarded by the Soviets as the scientific explanation of the origin and development of the family as a bio-social institution. During the last 50 years, however, Western anthropology has demonstrated that the nineteenth century theory, according to which the so-called matriarchate was a universal stage in mankind's social evolution, is only one of the many intellectual fallacies of the past, an oversimplification which although once fruitful, has definitely outlived its original limited usefulness. This is why it is not wise to characterize the Ukrainian family as a variety of the so-called matriarchal type, although the traditional position of the Ukrainian woman may really be somewhat better than that of the Russian. Besides, as we shall see later, it is undeniable that today the Ukrainian man occupies a somewhat higher status in the family hierarchy than does the woman.

A sedentary people, deeply attached to the soil, the Ukrainians are inclined toward conservatism in general outlook and manners. This conservatism is also expressed in their family tradition and their devotion to their place of birth (rodynnoho mistsia). The Ukrainian peasants pay a great attention to, and take pride in, the state of repair and appearance of their own homes. As was mentioned before, this meticulous cleanliness and conspicuous aesthetic sensitivity have been noticed and described in the course of several centuries by many foreign visitors of various nationalities. One's own home is regarded as a symbol of marriage and family life, and the establishment of a new family is regularly accompanied by the building of a new house, where the family souvenirs (pamytky) and relics (sviatoshchi) are preserved.

The introduction of Christianity, at the end of the tenth century, did not cause any profound changes in the already monogamous family structure. The new religion, however, added to the traditional rules of conduct a new atmosphere. It is possible that the traditional Slavic affection and respect for the mother found among the Ukrainians a new outlet in the Christian worship of the Virgin Mary but it would not be safe to conclude, on the basis of this cult of motherhood, that the Ukrainians are or ever have been a "matriarchal" people, as was attempted by Dr. V. Yaniv in the already mentioned Ukrainian Encyclopedia.

A strong influence on the people's feelings and thoughts was exerted by the family feast (sviato) in which Christmas rituals are combined with pre-Christian cults of the ancestors. Similarly, Christianity affected many other pagan customs and institutions, such as, for example, that of blood vengeance, officially outlawed by Yaroslav the Wise. The solidarity of the family manifests itself occasionally in a negative way. It is important to stress that, although aware of his guilt, kinsmen will often cover up and conceal the crimes and transgressions of a relative.

In general, the Ukrainian family life is based on the equality of both sexes, although, as already indicated, the father's influence is somewhat predominant.

But, irrespective of the merits and limitations of such arguments,

all available evidence seems to indicate that among the Ukrainians the predominance of the husband over his wife is never so great as to upset the fundamental balance between the sexes, and thereby to preclude the possibility of marriages based on mutual respect and approximate equality.

As a rule, decisions in the Ukrainian family are an outcome of a free discussion and exchange of views, between the father and mother as equal partners. The training, discipline, and future of the children are always planned by both parents. The wife has charge of day-to-day detailed training of children, but the husband instructs his sons in masculine tasks and is the final arbiter in all disciplinary matters. The interpersonal relations among the siblings are generally cordian and affectionate, and brothers and sisters expect and receive a great deal of mutual aid and advice. When children are in need of advice or material help, and are unable to solve their own problems, they turn for aid to the mother rather than to the father. According to Ukrainian folklore, the role of conjugal, parental, and filial love in the Ukrainian family is very prominent. As a result, although the family is divided, whenever a child matures and marries, the close bond of solidarity continues.

The primary respect pattern is centered on the mother, although the father is the center of the authority pattern. The mother is held to be the most virtuous and self-sacrificing member of the family, and people consider that they contract an unpayable debt to their mothers through being born and brought up by them. The wishes of the mother--despite the father's authority--are almost always observed when she expresses them strongly and unequivocally.

The women are responsible for keeping the house clean, for preparing meals, for tending the kitchen garden and the family live-stock, for bringing water, fuel, etc. The males care for mechanical equipment, build and repair the dwelling (in cooperation with other villagers), and provide the bulk of the outside income. Within the household, tasks so assigned by sex divisions are broken down further by age categories, so that the younger girls may help the mother with certain tasks, and the boys, similarly, aid in minor household repairs.

Physically grown members of both sexes work in the fields. The outside labor obligation for the kolkhoz member covers both sexes, but the men do the heavier work, and usually put in more hours of work in the work year than do the women, who must carry on household tasks as well.

The administration of funds of the family is nominally the prerogative of the male head of the house, but in practice it is frequently delegated to the wife.

Decisions as to marriage of children are, under Soviet conditions, made in principle by the young people concerned; but they are strongly influenced by respect and other intra-family factors.

The often emphasized internal harmony within the household may be the outcome, among other things, of the conspicuous tendency of the Ukrainians of both sexes to avoid marriages with persons of other nationalities. The main problem in this connection is to find out whom the Ukrainians regard as strangers in general and how, in this respect the Russians compare, for instance, with Jews, Greeks, etc. In the light of the information given in the *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, it appears that in 1927 there were only 3.3 percent mixed marriages in the Ukraine.⁷ Such unions were often troubled by serious problems and conflicts.⁸ According to Geiger and Inkeles, however, there are indications that "marriage among different ethnic and nationality groups has been fairly common. In 1940 it was reported, for example, that the proportion of registered marriages between people of different nationalities had increased from 7.5 percent in 1927 to 19 percent in 1937 for the Ukrainian S.S.R. (*Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 5, 1940, p. 19). Of course, many of these marriages, indeed probably the majority, were between members of closely related nationalities such as Russians and Ukrainians."⁹

⁷ *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, p. 145.

⁸ *Project on the Soviet Social System*, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1954.

⁹ "The Family in the U.S.S.R.," *Marriage and Family Living*, Vol. xvi, No. 4, (November, 1954).

The demographic aspects of the Ukrainian people, discussed in detail in a special section of this manual, can only be touched upon in this description of the Ukrainian family. The natural annual increase in population in Ukraine before World War I and immediately afterwards, was claimed by Ukrainians to be the highest in Europe, despite a very high rate of mortality. It is an open question whether the decline in the rate of natural increase since 1929 is a result of certain sociological changes in the Ukrainian family itself, or a consequence of the general policies of the Soviet regime. With obvious pride and pleasure, the Ukrainian Encyclopedia points out that on the average, the marital age of Ukrainian youth is very early.¹⁰

Another important function of the Ukrainian family is bringing up the offspring in accordance with national tradition. The Soviet regime is obviously trying to transfer as many educational functions of the family circle as possible to schools, clubs and extracurricular youth organizations.¹¹ Overburdened by long working hours and worn out by various types of "socialist competition," the people are also required to participate in numerous and excessively long public meetings and conferences.¹² It is understandable that under such conditions many Ukrainian parents cannot give their children the amount and kind of attention and guidance they would like to.

Besides, the forced separation and splitting of many families through deportation and arbitrary dislocation of the labor force further aggravates the distortion of normal family life. Economic difficulties in many cases keep the mothers in factories and other enterprises, away from their home and children. In 1940 in the general economy of Ukraine 38 percent of the workers were women, and in industry alone, 41 percent.¹³

This weakens the role of the family in the process of upbringing. The Soviet regime offers the Ukrainian youth many outwardly engaging

¹⁰ Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva, p. 145.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 959-960

¹² Ibid., p. 940

¹³ Ibid., p. 1135

and attractive recreational and other activities. But the frequent allegation of certain exiles that the Bolsheviks are trying to destroy the family by advocating "free love," encouraging the so-called "free marriages," and facilitating divorces, abortions, etc., does not correspond to the most recent evidence from various trustworthy sources on the Soviet Union. It is well known to students of Soviet affairs that in the early years after the Revolution there was indeed a great deal of sexual experimentation, promiscuity and chaos, much of which is reflected in Soviet fiction of the period. But it is equally well known in all interested circles that Soviet attitudes toward sexual morality, marital regularity and fertility, are becoming increasingly strict and conservative. In view of the fact that this general trend toward conservatism in family relations and personal morals is apparent not only in current Soviet works, artistic as well as technical, but also in statements and comments obtained from recent refugees, it would be misleading and unscholarly to insist that the early post-revolutionary sexual patterns still prevail.

The assertion in the Ukrainian Encyclopedia that the "Soviet way of life," with its "communal housing," common kitchens for several families, etc., "is directed against Ukrainian individualism"¹⁴ might lead to a misunderstanding of both Soviet intentions and the relationship between family life and housing conditions in general. The official Soviet pronouncements are frankly directed against the so-called "bourgeois individualism," Ukrainian as well as other. It is true that as a result of war destruction, population pressures, as well as shortcomings and conflicts in Soviet construction policies, the housing situation is really serious, with "living space less than half of the minimum sanitary norm."¹⁵ But to put all these factors in their proper perspective it is important to keep in mind that similar housing difficulties were characteristic of several other countries, which after years of war devastation passed through a period of hectic reconstruction and industrialization.

¹⁴ Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva, p. 1135.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 319.

As in other totalitarian regimes, fascist as well as communist, there is a system of spying and denunciation of neighbors by one another. In many cases the thin walls of the apartments greatly reduce the privacy and safety of conversation. For this reason many family problems have to be discussed outside the home. It is not difficult to imagine the influence of such conditions of the process of upbringing and educating the children in the desired spirit.

The celebration of Christmas and other traditional holidays, although not explicitly against the law, is obviously difficult in an atmosphere of fear, suspicion and general supervision. The traditional family ties, particularly those with past generations, are further weakened by the inability of many people to take proper care of tomb-stones and cemeteries.

In the long run, the attempts of the regime to infiltrate and divide the family by opposing children to parents and the reverse have relatively little success. The few exceptions to this statement met with almost unanimous moral condemnation on the part of the non-political public opinion. The homelessness of children caused by the wars, purges, and famines, presented an additional problem in Ukrainian family life. Tragedies arising from the conflict between one's obligation to the family on the one hand and the regime on the other were reflected in such works of literature as M. Khvylovy's Mother and I.

The Ukrainian peasants are usually prudent, thrifty and oriented toward the future. That nihilistic indifference and fatalism which appear in many classical works of Russian literature, and which are expressed in the well-known Russian phrase "vse" ravno," are not characteristic of the Ukrainians, who seem to care a great deal about many things which are of little interest to the Russians. Particularly prominent are their care and sense of responsibility for the family and interest in the advancement of the offspring. Acquired through strenuous effort, one's material resources must not be wasted. They are inseparable from the one who accumulated them as well as from those for whom he lives and works.

The ideal of assiduity and perseverance, a well-known general trait of the peasantry, is particularly high among the Ukrainians. The woman seems to be more attached to private property than her husband, perhaps

because she is more intimately related to the offspring and more directly concerned with its future.

Unlike the Russians, in whose obshchina and mir the land was owned by the community, the Ukrainians emphasize their interest in individual agricultural property in countless little ways. They want to enjoy their land as an unlimited possession. This insistence on material independence used to lead to the partition of family land whenever a son married and established his own household. Inevitably, such rugged individualism results in the course of generations in an utterly uneconomical and unreasonable parcelling of property. Threat of such pauperization of the Ukrainian village in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries contributed to the establishment of many agricultural cooperatives (spilky). In other individualistic cultures, this problem is less acute, because the land passes from the father to the oldest son, while the other children receive either monetary compensation or proper education.

The strong sense of possession and pride in private property became particularly noticeable in the course of the stubborn resistance of Ukrainian peasants to collectivization after 1929. In destroying the traditional agricultural setup of the country, the policy of forced collectivization could not fail to disturb the internal structure and balance of the Ukrainian family.

SOVIET POPULATION AND FAMILY POLICY IN UKRAINE

Current Policies

There can be no doubt that the present policy of the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. is to encourage by every means at their disposal the increase of the Soviet population. Available for this purpose is the entire apparatus of propaganda, legal and social sanction, medical, financial, and social service aid, the weight of tradition and religion, and finally the "normal" physical urges of human beings.

The far-reaching changes in Soviet theory and practice regarding the institution of the family, and particularly problems of marriage, divorce and child-raising, were in part, but only in part, motivated by the belated realization in Soviet policy-making circles that the general question of population increase was closely connected with the role of the family in the Soviet state.

At the present time, therefore, the institution of the family occupies a high place in Soviet ideology and statements of every kind extolling its role in the Soviet state are common in press and literature. A leading Soviet commentator on family law, G. M. Sverdlov, writing about the new laws adopted in 1944 respecting the family, divorce, marriage, etc., stated that the family should be regarded as the very "basis of society . . ."¹ He further affirmed that "the stronger the family becomes, so much stronger will society be as a whole," and without equivocation drove to the real root of the argument by asserting that the state saw in the family a foundation upon which it could depend and consequently took the position that "by strengthening the family it is strengthening itself, increasing its own might."²

1 - G. M. Sverdlov, "Novy Zakon o Materinstve, Brake, i Sem'e," (The new law on motherhood, marriage, and the family), Propagandist, No. 18 (1944), p. 27 quoted in Alex Inkeles, "Family and Church in the Post-war U.S.S.R.," Annals, No. 263, (May 1949), 35.

2 - Sverdlov, "Legal Rights of the Soviet Family," Soviet News, London (n.d.), p. 17, cited in ibid.

In consequence of this attitude the new family laws of 1944 imposed stricter legal forms on marriage and specified that the marriage ceremony should be a "solemn procedure" with "suitable premises properly furnished," and the issuance of "certificates duly drawn up."³

Once marriage has been entered upon the most compelling motive behind the current attitude toward the family becomes evident. It is anticipated that the natural outcome of marriage will be "a strong, many-childrened family," the development of which is regarded as satisfying both individual natural instinct and society's interests, i. e., the State's.⁴

In striving to realize its objective of population increase the Soviet Government has undertaken a number of measures restricting abortion, contraceptive information and facilities, divorce and liberalizing money allowances for children, maternity benefits, etc. The following discussion will briefly summarize current policy on these points.

With respect to abortion current policy is to prohibit it except for operations performed in hospitals or maternity homes on specific medical or eugenic grounds, defined by the Ministry of Public Health. A doctor performing an illegal abortion is liable to imprisonment of one to two years with a longer sentence for a medically unqualified practitioner.⁵

Despite the law of 1936 prohibiting abortion and applying penalties for illegal abortions, the practice of abortion still appears to be widespread, at least in urban areas where housing is at a premium. It has been reliably reported that the average Soviet woman undergoes not less than four or five abortions (including both artificially induced and natural miscarriages), but a substantial proportion of these probably result from the strenuous manual labor in which many Soviet women engage. Illegal surgery seems to be available at least in large cities in view of recent Soviet press accounts of the break up of an illegal abortion gang operating openly in certain cities. Reliable reports claim that legal abortions

3 - Harold J. Berman, Justice in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 244, quoting the relevant Soviet law.

4 - Sverdlov, "Novy Zakon . . .," quoted in Inkeles, op. cit., p. 35.

5 - Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 128-129,

are administered free of charge to mothers having three or more children who can effectively prove their inability to provide for or house an additional child. "The government appears to be well aware of the widespread violation of the law but apparently intends to do nothing about it until substantial improvements have been made in the urban housing situation."⁶

There has, since 1936, been little discussion of contraception in Soviet medical literature. There appears to have been no public effort made, at least before the war, to suppress information or limit availability of contraceptive devices, and they seem then to have been generally available at least in the cities.⁷

Since the war, however, while birth control information is available to those who are able to pay for it, it is no longer disseminated publicly. It also appears that the requisite equipment is generally of an inferior quality, and its price and scarcity put it beyond the reach of the average person.⁸ In effect, this limits planned parenthood to the upper strata of Soviet society who alone have the means to practice contraception.⁹ There have also been reports since the war that the manufacture

6 - U.S. Department of State, Division of Research for Europe, Office of Intelligence Research, The State and Family Life in the U.S.S.R. DRE Information Note EER-62, Oct. 17, 1949 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1949), pp. 15-16.

7 - Lorimer, op. cit., p. 130; Kent Geiger, The Urban Slavic Family and the Soviet System, A Final Report submitted to the Director, Officer Education Research Laboratory, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama (Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Sept. 1954), pp. 46-47, says that contraceptives were almost always available in the cities and were cheap enough to be afforded by the poor. However, Louis Fischer, Men and Politics; An Autobiography, (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1941), p. 347, an observer with unparalleled opportunities for personally investigating the Soviet scene, insisted that contraceptives in Russia were "scarce and often defective and were never sufficiently popularized."

8 - The State and Family Life in the U.S.S.R., p. 10.

9 - Lewis A. Coser, "Some Aspects of Soviet Family Policy," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LVI, No. 5 (March 1951), p. 428.

and sale of contraceptives has been forbidden in the U.S.S.R.¹⁰

Today divorce in the Soviet Union is an expensive, time-consuming process. A recent writer has described these new procedures as "equivalent to the medieval pillory."¹¹ An individual seeking divorce must petition the People's Court for dissolution of the marriage, include in the petition a statement of the reasons for seeking a divorce, and pay a fee of 100 rubles. Although the People's Court has no authority to grant a divorce it is required to ascertain motives and attempt a reconciliation. Notice of the filing of the petition for divorce must be published in the local newspaper at the petitioner's expense. If the People's Court is unable to effect a reconciliation the divorce seeker has the right to file another petition with the next higher court. Only in that court may divorce be granted. On the basis of the court's decision the Bureau of Vital Statistics draws up the certification of divorce, makes a corresponding entry in the internal passports of the parties, and collects from one or both a sum ranging from 500 to 2,000 rubles as directed by the court.¹²

A series of financial inducements exists designed to encourage marriage and large families. Taxes for bachelors, spinsters, and families with less than three children are exceedingly steep.¹³ On the other hand, mothers receive, at present, a non-recurring payment beginning with the birth of the third child and increasing with each additional birth up to the eleventh and each subsequent child. Furthermore, annual grants are given to mothers with four or more children for each child beginning with the fourth one. These payments range from 380 rubles per year for the fourth child to 1,800 for the eleventh and each subsequent child.¹⁴

Maternity leave is aimed at making it possible and easy for working

10 - This has been asserted by A. Sauvy, "Doctrine sovietique en matiere de population," Revista Italiana di Demografia e Statistica, Vol. II, No. 4 (Dec. 1948), p. 475, as cited by Robert C. Cook, "Soviet Population Policy," Population Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 3, (Aug. 1952), p. 21.

11 - Coser, op. cit., p. 429.

12 - Berman, op. cit., p. 244.

13 - Coser, op. cit., p. 425.

14 - The State and Family Life in the U.S.S.R., p. 9.

women to have children. At present the leave period is 77 days, 35 days before and 42 after childbirth. An additional two weeks postnatal absence is permitted in the event of any abnormality (including twins) during childbirth. The law also required employers to grant mothers annual leave immediately upon the conclusion of maternity leave.¹⁵ There seems general recognition that the maternity leave provision is the most satisfactorily applied feature of Soviet maternal welfare, "probably because it involves no material aspects or professional services" and thus makes no demands upon these scarce items.¹⁶

As a symbol of the value which the State places on childbearing there have been established a series of honors and awards for prolific mothers. The Motherhood Medal, second and first class, the Order of the Glory of Motherhood, third, second, and first class, and the honorary title of Mother Heroine are now conferred (with corresponding money allotments) on mothers of five, six, seven, eight, nine and ten or more children.¹⁷

The question of illegitimacy of children born out of wedlock is of recent vintage in the Soviet Union. Until 1944 the concept of illegitimacy was not recognized in Soviet jurisprudence and all children, however born, had the same rights of inheritance, use of the father's name, and equal claim upon both parents for support. The increasing concern of the Soviet leadership for the strengthening and support of the family produced a return to older moral standards, the so-called "new morality."¹⁸ Children of unmarried adults must now carry the mother's name, and as paternity suits and child support actions are no longer entertained by the courts the father is no longer legally liable for the support of his children born out of wedlock. Nor can such a child inherit equally with children born of a registered union. Illegitimate children can be placed by

15 - Ibid., p. 11.

16 - Ibid., p. 12.

17 - Berman, op. cit., pp. 241-242.

18 - Comment by Inkeles in Coser, op. cit., p. 435.

the mother in a state children's institution to be brought up, but the mother retains the right to take back the child whenever she wishes.¹⁹ Above all, this action must be seen as an attempt to discourage unions outside of marriage.²⁰

One aspect of the program of benefits for women with children applies especially to working mothers. We have already discussed the question of maternity leave. In addition to the many other facilities provided for in the law for mothers such as full medical care, admission to a maternity home for confinement with medical aid and care as long as necessary, pediatric care for the child at all times, etc., special creches, nursery schools, and pre-school establishments, in the words of Soviet law, "frees the Soviet woman from the necessity of making the difficult choice between her work and her child and enables her to take advantage of the complete equality with man guaranteed by the Constitution."²¹ But this choice remains to plague women in the Soviet Union, especially in view of the long waiting lists and the difficulties of gaining admission to one of these nurseries in most cities.²² Beyond this there are the difficulties of shopping, cooking, and the many other household tasks which still devolve upon working women, mothers or not.

In other words, the Soviet desire to strengthen the family runs up against the equally strong, if not stronger, need for women in the labor force. It is clear that a woman who works usually cannot maintain a home as well as one who stays at home. Under the difficult conditions of scarcity and overcrowding in the Soviet Union this task is for the average married women difficult enough.²³ For the married working

19 - Ibid, p. 427; The State and Family Life in the USSR, pp. 7-8.

20 - Inkeles has emphasized the concern of the regime that children be born in wedlock as necessary for family stability. See his comments in Coser, op. cit., p. 435.

21 - Quoted in The State and Family Life in the USSR, p. 17.

22 - Ibid.

23 - Geiger, op. cit., has an excellent discussion of this point and its effect on family solidarity and stability.

woman it is much harder; and if she is also trying to raise several children it becomes next to impossible. As Coser points out, "while Kueche, Kinder, Kirche are perfectly compatible ideals, the three K's plus Fabrik are not."²⁴ Even if in the Soviet environment Kirche is omitted the incompatibility persists.

History of Soviet Family Policy

The basic Marxian position on marriage and the family was set forth by Friedrich Engels in his work on The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State.²⁵ Engles did not believe, as some Soviet theoreticians later did, that the family would disappear. On the contrary, he foresaw its renaissance and strengthening in a classless society that would shear away from it the social and economic excrescences inherited from its capitalistic past. However, many prominent Soviet figures went far beyond Engels and developed the theory of the "withering away" of the family. Alexandra Kollantai, onetime member of the Central Committee and head of the Women's Department of the Party declared in 1919 that "the family is ceasing to be a necessity for its members as well as for the state." The chapter headings of her pamphlet on "Communism and the Family" well express the mood of the early years of the Bolshevik Revolution: "Workers Learn to Exist without Family Life," "Individual Housekeeping Doomed," "The Dawn of Collective Housekeeping," "The Child Brought Up by the Communist State."²⁶ Lenin himself opposed this extremism and was bitingly sarcastic in condemning the excesses of sexual freedom committed in the name of Marxism. In a famous quotation he attacked the "the theory that in a Communist society to fulfill sexual desires and love drives is as simple and meaningless as to drink down a glass of water."²⁷

24 - Coser, op. cit., pp. 424-426. The quotation is from the latter page.

25 - Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, (New York: International Publishers, 1942).

26 - Berman, op. cit., p. 234, quoting from Madame Kollantai's pamphlet. See also Inkeles, op. cit., p. 36.

27 - Quoted in Berman, op. cit., p. 234.

Nevertheless, in spite of Lenin's opposition, the belief in the theory of the withering away of the family was officially maintained until the mid 1930's. At that time it was violently assailed as a "left deviation." The attack on the "withering away of the family" theory went hand in hand with the new attitude on the role of the family made explicit in the legislation of 1936 and subsequent years, and brought to a culmination in the 1944 enactments. But before this development occurred a mass of legal embodiments of the radical theories of the early days of the revolution had been promulgated and put into practice.

Within two months of the Bolshevik Revolution, in December 1917, marriage became a civil affair as opposed to the previous requirement of a religious ceremony. Divorce, likewise previously a matter handled by the ecclesiastical courts of the various confessions, now became possible at the mere request of one or both parties.²⁸

In 1918 the Code of Laws Relating to Acts of Civil Status added to these innovations the principle that family relationships, and all related rights, emanated solely from the fact of birth, without regard to the type or status of wedlock. The concept of illegitimacy was thus eliminated from Soviet law. Both parents were made equally responsible for the support and welfare of the child regardless of the fact of marriage or non-marriage.

The enactment of the Code on Domestic Relations on October 22, 1926, completed the revolution of the legal basis of family life. Henceforth civil registration of marriage or divorce became the only legal form of these acts. They imposed no obligations or restrictions on the individuals, either in regard to themselves or their children. Registration at ZAGS, the Bureau of Vital Statistics, of the fact of marriage or divorce was not compulsory and was merely evidence of the existence of a state of marriage or divorce. De facto marriages had exactly the same status with respect to succession and property rights

28 - Ibid, pp. 235-236; The State and Family Life in the USSR, p.1.

as did registered unions and made no difference at all with respect to the rights of children.

The decree of July 8, 1944, repudiated this concept almost entirely. Today only a registered marriage carries with it the rights and obligations of wedlock, particularly with regard to the status of children born out of wedlock. We have touched upon current practice in this matter.²⁹

With regard to divorce, the law of June 27, 1926 revised previous practice by requiring the personal attendance of both parties in the divorce proceedings, the fact of divorce was henceforth entered upon the passports of the divorcees, and the registration fee was raised. Provisions were made to ensure payment of alimony which was fixed at a percentage of the father's pay.³⁰

Abortion had been legalized by an act of Nov. 18, 1920. After a moderate response the impact of this facility on population growth became quite serious in the mid-thirties, particularly in the cities.³¹ By 1934 educational and social measures were taken to counteract the trend toward abortion and reduced natality. Regulations issued in 1935 forbade abortions in certain conditions. In 1936 additional restrictions were placed on the resort to abortion.³² A Russian author defending the new law stated precisely its motivation when he wrote: "Mass abortions resorted to for egoistic reasons are not to be tolerated. The Soviet State cannot countenance the fact that tens of thousands of women ruin their health and delay the growth of a new generation for socialist society."³³

29 - Supra, p. 121; The State and Family Life in the USSR, pp. 1-3.

30 - Lorimer, op.cit., p. 129.

31 - Ibid, pp. 126-128.

32 - Supra, pp. 118-119.

33 - S. Wolfson in an article in Pod Znamenem Marksizma, (Under the Banner of Marxism), quoted by Rudolf Schlesinger (ed.), The Family in the USSR (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1949), p. 130.

With regard to such matters as maternity leave, money allowances for children, etc., there was no departure from the principle of providing these benefits. However, the exact amount has varied from time to time. Until 1936 the length of maternity leave depended upon the type of work one did and varied from 12 to 16 weeks, six to eight before and the same after the birth of the child. In 1936 differences were eliminated and all women were given the higher amount of leave. In 1938 the time was cut to five weeks before and four weeks following childbirth. Women on collective farms were further limited to only one month before and a month after delivery. This was maintained until the decree of July 8, 1944, when leave was lengthened to 77 days. This, and other benefits, remain current practice.³⁴

Financial benefits in the form of substantial money grants to mothers of large families were features of both the 1936 and 1944 laws. In November, 1947, the Soviet Government announced a fifty percent cut in the scale of payments to mothers. This was officially explained as reflecting the increased purchasing power of the ruble. There is good reason to think, however, that the failure of these "baby bonuses" to produce more children, which was one of the major aims, if not the primary motivation, of the program, had much to do with the cutback.³⁵

34 - Supra, p. 120

35 - The State and Family Life in the USSR, p. 15; Geiger, op.cit., pp. 45-46, concludes that "it is likely that the prohibition of abortions has had a greater effect than the fertility premia on actually increasing the birth rate among the urban population." He also notes that it probably had no effect on peasants either since they maintained already a high birth rate. So for them money payments were pretty much an after-the-fact matter rather than an incentive for "extra effort."

COLLECTIVIZATION

Collectivization began in 1929. Although, according to plan, only 20 percent of the peasant farms were to enter collectives by 1933 this moderate pace was very quickly exceeded. In 1930 nearly 25 percent of all peasant households were in kolkhozes, and during the following year over half were included.¹

Along with collectivization went the process of "dekulakization". Theoretically, the kulaks were the rich and middle peasants, those who employed hired hands and were therefore "exploiters". In fact, any peasant who rose above the low level of poverty which prevailed everywhere was termed a kulak. Zinoviev admitted that "sometimes we call kulak any peasant who has something to eat."² Kulak persecution began with increased fiscal exactions, usually in the form of payments in kind. A decree of February 1, 1930, authorized the executive committees of local Soviets to "take all necessary measures in view of the struggle against the Kulaks, including the confiscation of their belongings and their expulsion from the region."³

In Ukraine collectivization had an especially severe impact. Due to a number of reasons, historical, geographical, etc., a very high proportion of peasants in Ukraine were, or could be, classified as Kulaks. Resistance to collectivization, viewed by the regime as a Kulak tendency, was very intense. There was general apathy in plowing and planting; live-stock was very scarce having been greatly reduced in numbers by peasants who slaughtered their draft animals rather than bring them into the kolkhoz; the hoped-for tractors and other mechanical aids which would have reduced dependence upon plough animals never materialized in most places; and, in addition, hot dry winds blighted some of the crop in 1932. These conditions in themselves would have produced difficult conditions though the peasants might have pulled through all right if that were all.⁴ When the local authorities began to impose heavy grain requisitions severe famine

1 - Kulischer, Europe on the Move, p. 89.

2 - Calvin B. Hoover, The Economic Life of Soviet Russia (New York: 1931), p. 76; Kulischer, Europe on the Move; p. 89.

3 - Quoted by Ibid, p. 89.

4 - Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 85.

resulted.

While it can hardly be stated that the regime wanted the famine to take place it was not averse to utilizing it in order to break once and for all the resistance to collectivization; it was, as Chamberlain noted, "the last means of breaking the resistance of the peasantry to the new system..."⁵ The grain requisitions were designed to produce the final capitulation of the peasants. Chamberlain quotes the president of the Poltava Soviet as having said that "to have let the peasants keep their grain would have encouraged them to go on producing little." And there was, it was true, general testimony that the collective farms produced at a higher rate in 1933 than in the preceding years, even though the members were often weakened with hunger.⁶

The "dekulakization" measures of the regime took several forms. Some peasants anticipated their fate and, liquidating their belongings, left to search for new lands or for new walks of life where they would not be persecuted as enemies of society. Some did the same thing only after they had been despoiled of all their belongings; land, tools, livestock, house, grain, even food reserves and clothes were taken. Several thousand were shot for actively opposing or hindering the work of collectivization. Numerous cases of suicide were reported. The great majority, however, were subjected to deportation.⁷

A hitherto secret "Instruction" of the Council of People's Commissars, dated May 8, 1933, discloses many details of the deportation of Kulaks during this period.⁸ Addressed to all Party-Soviet workers and all organs of the OGPU, the Courts, and Public Prosecutor's Office, and bearing the signature of V. Molotov as Chairman of the Sovnarkom, and I. Stalin as Secretary of the Party, it severely criticized the chaotic and much abused system of mass deportations of peasants. Not only were the properly authorized organs of the OGPU and the militia carrying on this

5 - Ibid, p. 88.

6 - Ibid, p. 89.

7 - Ibid, pp. 89-90

8 - This document, originally found by the German army in the Party headquarters in Smolensk and now located in Washington, D.C. under the designation "Smolensk Archives," has been published in an article by S. Volin, "Iz Nedavnego Proshlogo", From the Recent Past / Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik, February-March, 1955, pp. 50-52. (In Russian).

work but also almost any Party functionary including chairmen of village Soviets and the secretaries of Party cells. As a result of their undisciplined interference the deportations had assumed a mass character which was damaging the prestige of the Party.

Too many peasants, this document went on to say, are being deported as kulaks and class enemies although there was too often no evidence of this prior to action being taken against them. It went on to order that henceforth only those heads of households who carried on an active struggle against the kolkhozes and organized opposition to sowing should be deported. It limited the total number of future deportees to 12,000 such households distributed among several regions of the U.S.S.R. Ukraine was limited to 2000 households subject to deportation, still double that from any other area.

The OGPU, the Ministry of Justice, and the Central Militia Administration were instructed to begin "unloading" their places of detention. The number of those held in detention camps of the OGPU and Militia were to be reduced from 800,000 to 400,000 in two months. Finally, it instructed the Commissariats of Justice and the Commissariats of Health of the Union Republics to completely liquidate the typhus epidemics in places of detention in one month.

From this informative Soviet document, as well as from a great mass of less direct but convincing testimony, there can scarcely be any doubt that the deportations during the First Five Year Plan were of such a size as to have a significant adverse effect demographically.⁹ But what the losses actually were for this category of repressive measures remains a matter of speculation yet.¹⁰

9 - Kulischer sums up the testimony from many sources, Europe on the Move, pp. 90-94; Prof. T. S., "Soviet Genocide of the Ukrainian People," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. IV (1948), 331-332, presents the extreme Ukrainian view.

10 - P. Galin, Kak Proizvodilis' Perepisi Naseleniia v SSRR / Census Methods in the U.S.S.R. (Munich: Institute for the Study of the History and Institutions of the U.S.S.R., 1951), p. 41, (In Russian) estimates that from 3-6 million died in the Soviet Union from causes other than famine arising from industrialization, collectivization, and political purges; Kulischer, pp. 93-4, quotes estimates from several sources ranging from one to at least five million deported, ousted, and fugitives (though not all of these died).

Of course, many of those who fled, were despoiled and then fled, or were deported did not perish. Large numbers were settled in Siberia and the Far East. Numerous deported kulaks were subsequently allowed to return or returned. But many of them also died. Physical hardships took a great toll and, as noted above, disease probably added to the mortality.¹¹

Finally, besides the losses occasioned by famine and deportations, there was a steady drain on the Soviet population through the incarceration of large numbers in the OGPU labor camps.¹² The number of those who were at one time or another inmates of forced labor camps, the "normal" population of those institutions, and the number who died as a result of hardships suffered in the camps will probably never be known with any degree of exactness.¹³

What part did Ukraine play in this phenomenon?¹⁴ The vital importance of the region both economically and strategically for the Soviet State combined with the high level of national consciousness attained by some of its inhabitants would seem to have greatly intensified the impact of the "Yezhovshchina" (as well as the earlier operations of the OGPU -NKVD)¹⁵ in Ukraine. Emigre organizations and writers from Ukraine have generally insisted that "a very high proportion of the...inmates of these camps consists of Ukrainians."¹⁶ A former professor of psychiatry

11 - Lorimer, op. cit., note 24, p. 121.

12 - The literature on this subject is immense and growing, it seems, daily. Almost any recent general work on the Soviet Union will include in its bibliography a good sprinkling of this material; e.g.; Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953), pp. 547-558, and Fainsod's discussion of forced labor pp. 362-387. Also Kulischer, note 23, p. 94.

13 - See the source in note 12, p. 129.

14 - Here we deal only with the demographic aspects of the Terror in the Ukraine and its consequences.

15 - OGPU was incorporated into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) in July, 1934. This consolidated the repressive machinery of the Soviet State and, for the first time, placed all institutions of detention under one jurisdiction. Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 365 f.

16 - Text of Pan-American Ukrainian Conference Memorandum to the United Nations, New York, November 21, 1947, in The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol IV (1948), 87; ibid, pp. 331-333.

14: U. Chicago S-4, 5(1954-5)1955 RD1 Ukr. RD1

at Kharkov University (until 1943) claims that "in the Siberian camps and concentration points, 90 per cent of the people are Ukrainians."¹⁷ Even more moderate claims insist that at least half the concentration camp population in the U.S.S.R. is Ukrainian, who therefore constitute the single largest nationality group in places of detention.¹⁸

17 - Ibid., Vol. VI (1950), 263.

18 - Vasil I. Hryshko, Dvi rosiys'ki aktsiyi - odna ukrains'ka vidsich [Two Russian Actions - One Ukrainian Reaction] (New York: Democratic Federation of Former Persecuted Ukrainians from the U.S.S.R., 1951), p. 11 [In Ukrainian]

THE UKRAINIAN VILLAGE

The village is one of the several basic settlement units of the Ukrainians. (Other significant settlement units are the city and the small town.)

About 60% of the present population of Ukraine, or 26,000,000 people, live in villages. (1939: Ukrainian S.S.R. 64%, 19,764,000) The proportion of village dwellers has been higher in the past. In the census of 1897, over 85% of the population of Ukraine lived in agricultural villages, which had a total population of almost 17,000,000. The 1926 census showed a lower percentage of the total population residing in villages, but a greater absolute number of people--about 80%, or 23,000,000 persons.

The percentage of village dwellers in the total population of the territory of the present Ukrainian S.S.R. has been declining consistently since the first census figures were published, and the annual decrease in percentage is probably on the order of 2% of the total population at the present time. (1926-1939, average 1.46%)

Almost all rural Ukrainians live in villages. There are only a few small districts in which dispersed farmsteads ("khutory") are found, notably in the formerly Polish sections of Galicia, Volhynia, Polesia and Podolia. Collectivization has eliminated most of these single farmsteads.

Ukrainian agricultural villages range in size from large agglomerations of several thousand persons to small settlements numbering a half-dozen families, with a total population of around 40 persons. The mean size of population of villages is on the order of 500-1,000 persons. Size of villages differs regionally within the Ukraine. The larger villages are found in the western parts of the country, (Right-bank Ukraine, Carpathians) and the least populous in Polesie, in the North.

Differences in size of villages reflect both historical conditions and present economic needs. Thus, the area of large villages in the west is one in which a high net reproduction rate has been observed for a long period. In other cases, certain extensive agricultural operations are performed by a relatively small number of persons organized in a kolk-

hoz with its own village or villages. There are three main sorts of physical patterns of villages. The most prevalent is the ribbon-village (Strassendorf), in which all of the houses are strung out along a single "street", usually with only a dirt surface. There are a few outbuildings close to the house, and perhaps small orchards and gardens. Among the two rows of houses may be located service buildings--a church, kolkhoz headquarters, school, etc. The kolkhoz sometimes has a courtyard at one end of the village, around which are ranged administrative headquarters, barns, stables, storage buildings for mechanical equipment, laboratories, etc.

The second type of village occurs mainly in the west of the country, and is a collection of buildings placed at random, in a form known as "Haufendorf" or irregular pattern. Here there may be several unpaved "streets", wandering among the houses. Kolkhoz buildings are usually situated at the edge of such an agglomeration.

A third type is the grid village, with a rectangular pattern of "streets" along which are ranged the houses and other buildings. The grid village is a late nineteenth and twentieth-century development, and is found mostly where new settlement has taken place in the recent period. Thus the area of frequent occurrence of this kind of village is in the east and south of the republic, where new land has been taken under cultivation.

Finally, there are at places, especially in the west, small areas occupied not by villages, strictly speaking, but by dispersed farm houses, which are served by a center around some crossroad, at which are located church, school, small stores, and administrative buildings.

The physical facilities of the village are simple. There are usually only an unpaved street or streets, which become mires of mud in the wet season, and which are unsuitable for mechanized traffic during a large part of the year.

The village draws its water from individual wells near the houses. The water is still sometimes obtained for all of the families of the village from the common well, and carried several times a day from well to house by the women. (The gathering of women to do laundry or at the

well, as in older times and in many other parts of the world, is an occasion for the formation of an informal social group, which exchanges news and rumor and manifests public opinion in the village.) There are few villages where sanitary facilities of Western European type have been introduced. The disposal of human wastes is usually achieved by adding the collection from a pit-latrine to the animal wastes used on the fields as fertilizer.

There are few provisions for commercial supplies of food and other goods. Each village has a commissary outlet or cooperative store, which is however seldom able to supply any considerable part of the necessary goods of daily life. The villagers produce their own vegetables, fruit and dairy products in small plots reserved to them individually, or through cooperative effort in the kolkhoz, and receive grain in kind-payments from the kolkhoz. Clothing and other necessities are sparingly available through the kolkhoz commissary, or are purchased on trips to the city. Medical service is provided by doctors attached to the larger kolkhozes, or by nurses and medical technicians ("lekpom") attached to the kolkhoz. In case of serious illness, the patient is transported to a town or city for treatment.

The village has a primary (four-year) school which all of the children are able to attend. Secondary and higher education is not usually available to the villagers' children. For education at these levels the young people must go to a town or city. The expense of such an education is prohibitive for most of the village families.

Amusements are available in the village in several forms. First, there are traditional folk festivals and ceremonies, some of which are still observed, despite Soviet hostility to their Christian origin (e.g., Easter). In addition there are activities sponsored by the kolkhoz-- movies, dances, discussion groups, choral singing, drama, etc.--and by "voluntary" groups such as political clubs and women's working groups. The leadership attempts to involve all individuals to a maximum degree in these group activities, which are usually vehicles for the inculcation of approved points of view and means of preventing the growth of autonomous deviant activities in the political and social sphere. The official

and the pseudo-voluntary, sponsored social and recreational groupings monopolize the attention and the energy of the individual, and there is no place for casual or autonomous organization of even recreational groupings. Land is not now owned by individuals--less than 2% of Soviet farms are individual holdings, --but is monopolized by the state. The state in turn concedes use of the land to the kolkhozes, which work it as a joint activity of the villagers (usufruct) under officially appointed (or rather, appointed and then "elected"), kolkhoz officials. The occupancy on the land is thus for use only, but the land belongs ultimately to the state.

A small percentage of the land is worked by sovkhos organizations, which are state-operated "industrial" farm units. All of the workers are here employees of the state, while in the kolkhoz system, they are nominally partners.

The field pattern now reflects the administrative limits of the kolkhozes: first of all, and, within these, the division into different plots of various sizes and shapes is made on the basis of the yearly production plan of the kolkhoz, which is set with agronomic advice from the technicians on the administrative staff.

Small plots are usually reserved for kitchen gardens belonging to individual houses, worked but not owned by each family. They provide the basic livelihood security of the family, augmenting the often stingy shares of grain and other produce allotted to the workers in payment in kind for their labor. The family may produce fruit, vegetables, and even grain on these plots, and also may keep a few cows, pigs, goats, and barnyard poultry.

The former division of land in the Ukraine, in the later days of individual farming, was often on the basis of scattered narrow strips of land located in many different places around the village. The pattern here was very similar to that still found in much of Western Europe. Some of these irregularities ("cherespolositsa"--the farming of non-contiguous, scattered strips) survive even under collectivization.

Communication with places outside the village is by road. The roads are often merely trails or wagon tracks, which are impassable

for a good part of the year. Few villages are served by paved roads. In places, along the rivers or in the marshes of the northwest, water routes are available.

Most villages do not have telephone connections with the outside. There is a regular mail service, but it is slow and deliveries are only occasional. Many of the houses, as well as the social and administrative buildings, are provided with radios, or with outlets (speakers) for a radio possessed by the kolkhoz.

The administrative buildings in the village are usually of frame, brick or concrete construction, while the dwellings are simple huts.

The houses found in the Ukrainian village are of two basic types, corresponding to the regional differences in the nature of the country.

In the open lands, the steppe and prairie, the house is made of wattle wall frames plastered with mud and white-washed. The roof is of straw thatch. There is often no floor but the bare earth in this kind of house. Windows are few, and formerly were covered only with sheepskin or oiled paper, but now often contain glass panes. Within the house, there are only two or three rooms at most, or the house may simply be a single large room with a partition partially separating it into several areas. There is almost always a large stove, built of mud bricks or sometimes made of iron and porcelain. Furniture is simple, consisting of wooden benches and tables, few in number. People sometimes sleep in wooden beds or in cots made with cowhides, or even on heaps of rags and blankets on the floor or up around the stove. The interior of the house is often elaborately decorated with rich traditional designs which are one of the most colorful elements of Ukrainian folk art.

In the west, mainly in hilly and forested areas, the house is of wood. There are wooden floors in many of the houses in this part of the country, and often there is more furniture. The roof here is of shingles. The older public buildings are similar in construction to the houses. In the steppe lands, the churches and small shops surviving from the revolution are of mud brick or wood, or sometimes of other materials, while in the Western Ukrainian lands, there is a distinctive tradition in church architecture which produced very fine wooden churches of designs related to

the high Baroque of Central Europe, and to Gothic style. The churches of Western Ukraine represent one of the highest achievements of the local artistic tradition.

Kolkhoz structures, modern schools, recreational buildings, etc., are constructed in the "modern" style, or in a Soviet utilitarian version thereof. They are mostly frame construction, brick or concrete on the larger kolkhozes. Stucco, sheet-metal, and other auxiliary materials are used freely.

URBANIZATION

No official Soviet data have been released since the 1939 census regarding urbanization or changes in urban-rural population ratios. Most estimates which have appeared since then in Soviet publications go no further than to repeat the 1939 data. For example, the works of Dubrova and Lalikov, both published in 1954, use the 1939 figure of 36 percent urban population in Ukraine.¹ Similarly, Shabad merely states that "about one third of the population lives in urban centers."²

In absolute figures the urban population of Ukraine numbered 11,195,600 persons in 1939 (36.2 percent). The remaining 63.8 percent of the population - the rural segment - numbered 19,764,400.³ In Ukraine as in the rest of the U.S.S.R. urbanization represented largely a movement from the villages to the towns.⁴ For example, while the population of Stalino oblast in the heart of the Donbas increased by 91 percent between 1926 and 1939, the agricultural areas were showing population declines; e.g., Poltava oblast¹ -- 15 percent loss; Vinnitsa oblast¹ -- 7 percent loss. These figures reflect a general movement of rural population to the newly created and expanded industrial centers, especially in the eastern sections of the country.⁵

1 - A.T. Dubrova, Ukrainskaia Sovetskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika (The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (Moscow: Geografiz, 1954), p. 22; N.I. Lalikov, Sovetskaia Ukraina. Ocherk Ekonomicheskoi Geografii (The Soviet Ukraine. Outline of Economic Geography) Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye Izdatelstvo Geograficheskoi Literatury, 1954, p. 91; also Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, S.S.S.R. (Moscow: 1948), cols. 1809-1810, which uses the 1939 figure of 36 percent urban for Ukraine.

2 - Theodore Shabad, Geography of the U.S.S.R. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 440.

3 - Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (Moscow: 1948), cols 1809-1810.

4 - S.S. Balzak, V.E. Vasyutin, and Ia. G. Feigin (eds.), Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R., American Edition, Chauncy D. Harris (ed.) trans. from Russian by R.M. Hankin and O.A. Titelbaum, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 191.

5 - Ibid, pp. 196-197.

The growth of cities in Ukraine, 1897-1926. -⁶ One of the marked results of this unprecedented exodus from the villages to the towns was an impressive increase in the size and number of cities in the Ukraine. Even before the climax of rapid industrialization during the Five Year Plan periods, however, the cities of Ukraine had shown a sustained pattern of growth for over three decades. Between 1897 and 1926 Kiev more than doubled its population. Kharkov increased by even more, from about 175,000 in 1897 to 417,342 by 1926. A number of other cities doubled or nearly doubled their size during these years; e.g., Dnepropetrovsk, Ivanovo, Zhdanov (Mariupol), Poltava, and Vinnitsa. Most of the others also showed increases of variable magnitude and a few such as Kherson, Osipenko, and Kremenchug lost some population or showed no increase at all. Odessa, which in 1897 was the largest city in Ukraine (with 405,041 inhabitants) grew by less than 16,000 between the censuses of 1897 and 1926. But the general trend was upward down to the first world war and even during the war until the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War.⁷ An outstanding feature of this relatively rapid urbanization was that it involved mainly Russians coming into the Ukraine to work in the newly developed industrial enterprises. Ukrainians participated in this process only to a very small extent.⁸

During the 1918-1921 period of internal warfare, industrial disorganization, and administrative chaos there was sharp decrease in the urban population. Many peasants hastily returned to their villages to share in the expropriation of the estates of the nobility.

During the famine period there was a temporary upswing to urban density as many people fled from the barren country-side to the cities

6 - A table showing the growth of cities in Ukraine for the years 1897, 1926, 1939, 1950, and 1954 will be attached as an appendix.

7 - Frank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), p. 31; Kulischer, Europe on the Move, p. 33.

8 - See the discussion of the proportion of Ukrainians in the cities of Ukraine in P. P. Potyshev and S. V. Kossior, Soviet Ukraine Today (New York: Internat'l Pub., 1933). Speech by Kossior before the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Com. Party of Ukraine, Nov., 1933, on "Results and Immediate Tasks of the National Policy in the Ukraine," pp. 42-44.

in search of food, but only to the cities in the grain producing areas.⁹ In general, there was a serious decline in the urban population of all European Russia (including the Ukraine) between 1917-1920. For some 357 towns and cities in this region the decrease amounted to about one third (33.6 per cent).¹⁰ By 1921 another upswing, this time a permanent one, was apparent. For the area of the European U.S.S.R. (1939 boundaries) however, the pre-war level of urbanization was not reached until 1927.¹¹

Urbanization in Ukraine, 1926-1939. -- The spectacular urban developments which came about as a result of the internal migration of people from the villages to the towns during the climactic industrialization era of the first two Five Year Plans had an enormous effect on Ukrainian cities. During this period of intensive industrialization and collectivization almost all the cities in the Soviet Union grew rapidly. The area around Moscow and Ukraine were regions of specially rapid growth. In the Soviet Union in 1926 there were twelve cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants; in 1939 there were 39 such cities. The twelve cities which in 1926 had 200,000 or more population had a combined population in 1939 which was 90 per cent above that in 1926. Forty-nine "boom" cities (cities which had 50,000 or more population according to the 1939 census and had increased threefold or more since 1926) were revealed by the 1939 census. Of these Ukraine had the largest number--15 in the Dnepr-Donets-Don industrial belt--and the Urals-Kuznets-Karaganda triangle the second largest grouping, --13.¹²

9 - Lorimer, op. cit., p. 31; Kulischer, Europe on the Move, p. 57-60.

10 - Ibid, p. 58.

11 - Ibid, pp. 81-82.

12 - Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 145ff has a valuable discussion of the general phenomena of urbanization in the Soviet Union in the intercensus period. See also Kulischer, Europe on the Move, p. 106ff.

Between 1926 and 1939 the urban population of the U.S.S.R. increased by 29.6 million--from 26.3 million in 1926 to 55.9 million in 1939. This represents a jump from 17.9 per cent urban to 32.8 per cent urban in twelve years. The increase was accounted for as follows: movement from country to town--18.5 million; natural increase of the 1926 urban population--5.3 million; and finally 5.8 million were added by reclassification of villages into urban communities.¹³

In Ukraine urban population increased from 5.4 million in 1926 (about 18.6 per cent of the total population) to 11.2 million in 1939 (36.2 per cent of the total). This represented an increase in the urban population of 5,822,000 or 108 per cent over 1926.¹⁴ On the other hand, the rural Ukrainian population showed not only a percentage decline but an absolute drop in numbers as compared with 1926. The countryside lost 3,904,000 people during the twelve year intercensus period. This meant that the experiences of those years had not only taken up the whole natural increase of a virile, highly re-productive rural people, but had eaten into their original structure to the extent of 16 per cent.¹⁵

**URBAN-RURAL CHANGE IN UKRAINE AND THE U.S.S.R.
1926-1939**

	1926		Urban Population		1939	Change 1926-39
	Population	% of total	Population	% of total		
Ukraine	5,400,000	18.6	11,195,600	36.2		108
U.S.S.R.	26,300,000	17.9	55,900,000	32.8		112
			Rural Population			
	Population	% of total	Population	% of total		
Ukraine	23,668,000	81.4	19,764,000	63.8		-16
U.S.S.R.	120,700,000	82.1	114,500,000	67.2		- 5

Some of the factors which contributed to this situation have already been treated. Another element which sheds some light on the extensive growth

13 - Balzak, op. cit., pp. 191-192.

14 - Based on data in Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 153-154 and table 62. See also Bol. Sov. Ent., S.S.S.R. (1948), co. 1810.

15 - Lorimer, op. cit., table 63, p. 158.

of urban as compared with rural population is the fact that almost all of the emigration from the Ukraine was contributed by the rural population (with the exception of about a quarter million Jews¹⁶) while most of the influx of people into Ukraine went to the industrial cities: some were Russian Communist administrative personnel and their families replacing purged Ukrainian officials.¹⁷ But much of this decrease was due to large scale emigration from the western agricultural oblasts to the Donbas and neighboring industrial-mining areas in Eastern Ukraine.¹⁸

By 1939 there were in Ukraine 34 cities which had a population of 50,000 or more; 16 of these had over 100,000 inhabitants.¹⁹ In 1926 there had been only 18 cities with as many as 50,000 people and seven with 100,000 or more.²⁰ The Ukraine had the largest numerical increase of any of the study areas²¹ of the Soviet Union, exceeding the growth even of the Old Industrial Center (the six oblasts of Moscow, Tula, Ryazan, Gorkiy, Ivanovo, and Yaroslav) by over three-quarters of a million persons.²²

Nevertheless, in spite of this achievement Ukraine was below the average for the whole Soviet Union with regard to the growth of cities. The average for all of the U.S.S.R. was 212.5 per cent for this period; in Ukraine the average was 208.3 per cent. Some of the Central Asian Republics attained percentage increases in excess of 300 per cent;

16 - Kulischer, Europe on the Move, table 5, p. 109.

17 - The substantial increase in the Russian population of the Ukraine was most likely the product of a generous in-movement into the Ukraine of Russians as well as their natural growth. Most of the new Russian arrivals went to the cities or other urban communities.

18 - Kulischer, Europe on the Move, p. 108, believes that most of the two million new residents of the Donbas-Krivoi-Rog-Dnepropetrovsk-Kharkov area were peasants from the western oblasts of the Ukraine.

19 - Bol. Sov. Ent., S.S.S.R. (1948), col. 1810.

20 - Balzak, op. cit., Table A-12, pp. 527-531.

21 - Lorimer, op. cit., p. 150.

22 - Ibid., table 62 and map "U.S.S.R. 1939 Administrative Divisions and Study Areas," pp. 152-154.

Kazakh S. S. R. --328.7 per cent, and Turkmen S. S. R. --304 per cent.²³

Two features of the increased urbanization in Ukraine are of particular interest. These are (1) the development of new urban centers, and (2) the "Ukrainianization" of the cities of the Ukraine.

Development of new urban centers:-- As might be expected, the great part of both internal movement within Ukraine into cities and in-movement into the Ukraine of urban-industrial elements moved eastward to the Donbas-Dnepr industrial-mining complex. A tabulation of the change in all Ukrainian cities with 50,000 or more inhabitants in 1939 shows a striking difference between the trends in the mining and industrial districts and in other parts of Ukraine.²⁴

<u>Area Distribution of Cities With 50,000 Population in 1939</u>	<u>Per cent Increase 1926-1939</u>
Don Basin	212
Dnepr Subregion	215
Dnepr Prarie Left Bank Subregion	86
Dnepr Prarie Right Bank Subregion	55
Steppe Subregion	57

We have already referred to the striking growth of Stalino oblast in the heart of the Donets mining region. In this oblast as well as in neighboring Voroshilovgrad oblast there sprang up in the Soviet period a whole network of new cities. Such cities as Makeevka, Gorlovka, Konstatinovka, Kramatorsk, Yenakievo, Voroshilovsk, Kadievka, Krasny Luch, Krasnodon, and others did not even exist at the time of the 1897 census. By 1926 they were already sizable towns of 12,000 or more; many were even then above 50,000 in size (such as Stalino--174,320, Zaporozh'ye--55,744).²⁵ Before the Bolshevik Revolution there were only six cities in the Donbas, of which only two (Voroshilovgrad and

²³ - Prof. A. Popliuko, "Migratsiia Naseleniia i Urbanizatsiia S. S. S. R." (Population, Migration and Urbanization in the U. S. S. R.) Vestnik Instituta Po Izucheniiu Istorii i Kultury S. S. S. R. (Journal of the Institute for the Study of the History and Institutions of the U. S. S. R.), No. 2 (1952), 78-79.

²⁴ - Lorimer, op. cit., p. 153.

²⁵ - Dubrova, op. cit., p. 22; Balzak, op. cit., table A-12, pp. 527-531.

Zhdanov--formerly Lugansk and Mariupol, respectively) had populations above 50,000. By 1939 there were 52 cities with eight having 50,000 or more inhabitants, and five of over 100,000. In the industrial oblasts (Stalino, Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk, and Zaporozh'ye) are located 20 of the 34 Ukrainian cities which had 50,000 or more population in 1939.²⁶ According to one estimate there lives on the territory of the Donbas, which comprises only one twelfth of Ukraine's area, almost one third of the population of the Republic.²⁷

"Ukrainianization" of cities of Ukraine --One of the features of urban development in Ukraine during the years after 1926, and particularly after the increased tempo of industrialization had been initiated under the First Five Year Plan, was the large and increasingly significant proportion of Ukrainians which went to make up the new urban population. This was particularly true of the movement of Ukrainian peasants from the agricultural regions to eastern industrial-mining districts. The consequence was that the composition of cities became increasingly Ukrainian.

In 1926, Stalin, in a letter to the Communist Party of the Ukraine noted approvingly that "there is no doubt that the composition of the Ukrainian proletariat will change with the industrial development of Ukraine, with the influx of Ukrainian workers from surrounding villages into industry . . . this process is a long, spontaneous and natural one." At the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party Stalin said: "It is clear that whereas Russian elements still predominate in the Ukrainian towns, in the course of time these towns will inevitably be Ukrainianized."²⁸

S. V. Kossior, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, reported to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party

26 - Dubrova, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

27 - Popliuko, op. cit., p. 80.

28 - Potyshev and Kossior, op. cit., pp. 42-43, quoting Stalin.

in November 1933 that the proportion of workers in industry and construction that were Ukrainian was steadily rising. In 1926 only 41 per cent of such workers were Ukrainian; it was 53 per cent in 1932. "This process," he asserted, "whereby the percentage of Ukrainians among the workers is increasing, is going on in all branches of industry."²⁹ The natural result of this phenomenon was the increasingly Ukrainian aspect of cities and towns in Ukraine. For example, in 1923 Kharkov had 122,000 Ukrainians who formed 37.9 per cent of the population. By 1926 this had risen to 160,000--38.3 per cent, and by 1933 to over 330,000 Ukrainians or about half the city's number. Stalino in 1923 had 2,200 Ukrainians (seven per cent); in 1926 there were 27,500 (26 per cent); and in 1933 over 36,000 or almost a third of the total. Similar statistics could be quoted for Zaporozh'ye, Lugansk (Voroshilovgrad), Dnepropetrovsk, and other cities.³⁰

In spite of the formal appearance of increased Ukrainianization of the cities a simultaneous process of "de-nationalization" was possibly nullifying what otherwise might have been deemed a step in the direction of national development for Ukraine. The newly urbanized Ukrainian proletariat was generally an unsophisticated peasant. While he may have been thoroughly imbued with his traditional folk culture he was usually uneducated and "uncultured" in the sense of not having an acquaintance with the world of more formal art, music and literature. In this situation he was often open to the impact of urban life which was generally not

29 - Ibid., p. 43. On the other hand a Ukrainian writer quotes Zinger, Natsionalnyi Sostav Proletariata S.S.S.R. (National Composition of the Proletariat of the U.S.S.R.) (V.T.S.K., U.S.S.R., 1934), p. 11, as noting that this process involved a decline in the number of Ukrainians among salaried employees. Whereas in 1926 they had formed 60 per cent of the workers and 40 per cent of the salaried employees, by 1931 they were respectively 78 and 22 per cent. Cited by Vasil I. Hryshko, Dvi Rosiys'ku Aktsiyi - Odna Ukrains'ka Vidsich (Two Russian Actions - One Ukrainian Reaction) (New York: Democratic Federation of Former Persecuted Ukrainians from the U.S.S.R., 1951), pp. 24-25. (In Ukrainian).

30 - Potyshev and Kossior, op. cit., p. 44.

specifically Ukrainian but Soviet and/or Russian. This was particularly true after the early thirties when the initial stress on "Ukrainianization" had died down, as had the Communist Party's coldness to "Great Russian chauvinism." One of the most frequent channels by which this process of "de-nationalization" was initiated was through the adoption of Russian as at least the working language of the Ukrainian industrial worker. Prokopovich noted some years ago that "the business language in factories, works and mines in almost the entire territory of the U.S.S.R. is Russian."³¹

Drainage of labor from the countryside. --There appears to have been a serious depletion of the rural labor force in Ukraine. While in 1939 women performed less than half the amount of work on the kolkhoz the war drastically changed this ratio. By 1943 women were earning almost 80 per cent of labor-days work performed in agriculture.³² This suggests that there was a ratio of three women to every man in agriculture during the war years. Kulischer roughly confirms this estimate

31 - S. N. Prokopovich (ed.), Quarterly Bulletin of Soviet Russian Economics in an article on "Changes in the Location of Population and Industry in the U.S.S.R.," No. 4 (April, 1940), p. 128. However, Ivan Kurganov, "The Problem of Nationality in the Soviet Union" The Russian Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Oct., 1951), while agreeing that the movement of peasants to the city involves the breaking up of traditional modes of life because "history always teaches that the peasantry, and not the urban working class, has always been the guardian of national traditions and has provided the mass basis for every national movement," does not regard this as a process of Russification. He accepts rather Soviet claims that a new national consciousness has arisen which is national only in form, but Communist in content, and he ascribes to the new organization of society, politics, and economics a decisive role in the transformation of nationalities from which is emerging a Soviet nationality. Finally, he believes that even the countryside is fast succumbing to the new innovations; that the old folkways are dying out to be replaced by a general uniformity of official regimentation. "An Udmurt village today is as little distinguished from a Bashkir or Ukrainian village as the Udmurt town of Izhevsk is from the Bashkir Ufa or the Ukrainian Poltava. But whether the final product is "Russian" or "Soviet" is not the point that interests those who oppose the "de-nationalization" process which seems to be taking place.

32 - Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress U.S.S.R. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 88. The exact figures are 47.6 per cent in 1939 and 77.9 per cent in 1943.

with data from Soviet sources showing that in 1943 women constituted 71 per cent of the able-bodied rural population, as compared with 52 per cent in 1939. Kulischer also suggests, on the basis of scattered local data in the Soviet press, that this shortage of men has persisted into the postwar years.³³ The continuing drain appears to be the consequence of a strong tendency to leave the harsh life of the countryside in search of better pay in the cities.³⁴

33 - Kulischer in a letter to Moore, June 23, 1953, cited in ibid., p. 88 and note 48, p. 240. Also Infra, note 1, p. 58.

34 - Kulischer, Certain Aspects of the Development of U.S.S.R. Population, pp. 14-15, briefly mentions this. Moore, op. cit., p. 88 and note 49, p. 240, cites Khrushchev's comments to this effect in Pravda, Sept. 15, 1953.

THE KOLKHOZ AND THE SOVKHOZ

The kolkhoz (collective farm) is a chartered, ostensibly voluntary organization of farmers, who pool their capital and share earnings. But half of the capital is held as indivisible, and earnings are distributed on a complicated allotment basis, not by number of shares or even simply hours of labor. The kolkhoz is run by a chairman and his executive board, accountable to a general assembly of the members. An elected auditing committee reviews the budget, expenditures and membership. The government and the party in practice run the affairs of the kolkhoz.

Managers of kolkhozes are professionals who move around a great deal from job to job. Their effectual power depends on standing with the local party organization.

Decision making in kolkhoz operations is hierarchically organized. The All-union plan is the basis of Republic, oblast', raion and individual kolkhoz production plans (in that order of precedence), which must be followed. A hired staff agronomist in each kolkhoz and in higher echelons advises on methods, but must observe the rather specific policies set by government and even party agencies, and has the function of securing enforcement of such policies and working out their concrete application to agricultural operations.

Each individual worker in the kolkhoz is a single labor unit, earning individual work credits and receiving his remuneration according to them. He is offered incentives of pay--in cash and in kind--status (positions of leadership), honors, prizes, titles, etc., for good work. Negative incentives--reprimands, fines, deprivation of pay, and finally expulsion from the kolkhoz--are used to combat absenteeism, slow work, and disobedience. Both men and women members of the kolkhoz are expected to take part in agricultural work. Men are used for the heavier work, but women too work in the fields. Persons of one or several villages may be organized into a single kolkhoz.

Kolkhoz workers (kolkhozniki) are divided into working units known as brigades--gangs of about 50 persons under a foreman (brigadir) working on one crop or activity. The brigade works as a unit through

several years on the same parcel of land. Intensive hand labor is performed by smaller gangs, the links (zven'ia), again with a foreman supervising. The zveno has lost its formerly important position to the brigade, perhaps because it offers too ample possibilities for small cliques or families to work for private interest.

Specialization of labor is carried to great lengths in the kolkhoz. In addition to brigades assigned to particular fields and crop systems, there are other brigades for the gardens, orchards, dairy farms, poultry yards, etc., as well as large administrative staffs of officials, veterinarians, accountants, technicians, mechanics, drivers, educational workers, and others. Implements, seed, fertilizer, vehicles, draft animals, and other impedimenta are the property of the kolkhoz. They cannot be used for private purposes except with special authorization. The granting of such authorization is of course a further incentive power of the management, allowing kolkhozniki to improve output of household gardens.

Harvested crops are also collective property, but it is common and accepted practice to steal from the harvest. This is one of the serious problems of kolkhoz operation and requires maintaining considerable numbers of guards to combat it. Theft of kolkhoz property carries severe penalties, but is regarded by peasants as permissible and not a cause for censure, unless the property is something destined for the use of all.

Income from kolkhoz operations is distributed among three claimants--the state, the kolkhoz, and the worker (kolkhoznik). The state claims--obligate deliveries of produce at fixed prices, taxes, charges for services (insurance, machinery)--have first priority and represent a very large percentage, over half, of total income. Deliveries to the state must conform to the plans; the other two claimants, the kolkhoz and the individual kolkhoznik, absorb losses. Beyond the plan, individuals and kolkhozes obligate themselves to additional deliveries through public pledges, made voluntarily or under covert compulsion.

The kolkhoz takes for itself some portion of current income as re-

serve capital, current operating expenses, overhead (including education, cultural, and other services) and salaries.

Kolkhozniki are paid by work-day units (trudodni). Different tasks are evaluated at different rates, with managerial and technical work earning the most units per day, and common labor the least. The government determines the norms to be applied in evaluating the work performed. Foremen enter work credits in a record book belonging to each worker in terms of so-called work day (trudoden') units.

The total production of each brigade or other work gang is divided after subtraction of state and kolkhozes obligations by the work-day credits earned by all the members, and payment is made partly in kind and partly in cash. Usually payments in kind involve grain. A larger proportion of cash payment is made in kolkhozes specializing in technical crops (sugar beets, flax, etc.) than in grain producers.

Production below the planned goal results in deduction of work day credits. Workers may also lose the right to use household garden plots because of poor production records in kolkhoz work.

Bonuses in cash or kind are given to persons greatly exceeding the production plan.

The system of payment for labor requires a large bureaucratic structure to maintain records, and is open to many injustices. Sale of private produce or of excess produce from the kolkhoz on the free market provides supplementary income. This may represent up to one third of the total income of a kolkhoz.

The produce from private plots is sold by the kolkhozniki themselves, who often make long journeys on the trains to carry their small stock of goods to market. Such material--for private sale--cannot be shipped separately on state transportation, but must be carried by a passenger.

The actual cash income of a kolkhoz household, in comparative purchasing power, is not over a few hundred U.S. dollars annually on the average. Managerial and technical personnel earn more, as do the few "shock-workers" who are skilled in exceeding worknorms, and whose function is to push production standards upward for the individual worker.

Machine and tractor stations (MTS) are operated as state enter-

prises. They consist of a machinery pool and appropriate operating, maintenance, and administrative personnel, who are hired for wages by the government.

MTS personnel is divided into brigades, which include operators, mechanics, helpers, timekeepers, etc., for each kind of machine. Machinery from the MTS is used by kolkhozes, which contract with the Station for its services, and pay fixed fees to the state for these services out of annual income. MTS crews serve many kolkhozes during the year. Each MTS has assigned to it a service area, which averaged in 1937 30 collective farms or about 45,000 acres.

The MTS furnish tractors and plows, seeding and cultivating equipment, harvesters, etc. Of these machines, most are diesel or gasoline operated, but there is great interest in the development of electrically driven tractors and other large farm machinery.

The MTS include not only tractor brigades, harvester brigades, etc., but also agronomists, dairy specialists, and other trained workers in agricultural fields. They are thus in a position to furnish technical aid and advice to the kolkhozes.

The MTS serves not only as a means of ensuring maximum utilization of costly equipment, but as a social agency. It is a center of experiment and innovation in agricultural technique, serving as demonstration unit as well as source of machinery and skilled operators. Furthermore, the MTS is a proletarian outpost in the peasant countryside. The personnel is paid in wages, rather than in shares of production, and is composed of technically qualified mechanical, technical and administrative specialists. The atmosphere of the MTS social unit is probably more like that of the cities than that of the ordinary peasant village.

The MTS serves to prepare kolkhoz young people for technical jobs, and provides one channel of social mobility from the peasant community toward the proletarian world. Beginning as laborers and helpers in the MTS, youths become skilled in working with the machines, and after undergoing formal training courses, can become fully qualified operators. They are in this way brought nearer to the type of the city worker, and may pass on to jobs in industry.

The Ukraine is the best provided with MTS services of all the Soviet republics. Over 95% of the kolkhozes employ MTS services in their operations. The MTS system lends itself well to the cultivation of such crops as wheat, cotton and sugar beets, which are prominent in the Ukraine. The topography and the hydrographic characteristics of most of the country also favor the use of machinery.

State farms (Sovkhoz) have several functions. They have been used in the past as pilot and demonstration units for the introductions of new crops and techniques, and in the early years of the Soviet regime were developed as large scale grain producers to meet the food crisis. Today these state farms concentrate on specialities--meat animals, dairy products, truck crops ("suburban farms"), seed, industrial crops, etc.

State farms or sovkhozy, with a regular wage scale for workers, cost the government more, and guarantee the worker more sure return for his labor, than do the kolkhozes, in which the workers must bear the operational losses themselves, and have no guaranteed income, though they must make the stipulated deliveries regardless of good or bad harvests. The sovkhoz is also a proletarian stronghold in the country-side because of the different basis of employment. Furthermore, the management is even more closely identified with specific government agencies than is that of the kolkhoz.

Most young men are required to take training in some technical skill and/or serve in the armed forces. A good number of these young men then are absorbed in the industrial working class of the cities, and lost to the kolkhozes. This is a rather informal process, though dependent upon a permissive attitude on the part of the government.

In addition to this osmotic transfer of skilled population to the industries of the cities, there is at times a planned recruitment of workers from the kolkhozes. Regular agreements have been the fashion at times, by which certain kolkhozes undertook to furnish given numbers of workers for factory jobs. Sometimes such transfer is handled by kolkhoz administration, sometimes by local party agencies, youth groups, and the like.

The kolkhozes are often required to furnish laborers for construction

projects undertaken by the state. Many of the great hydroelectric and irrigation dams, afforestation projects, etc., especially during and just after the War, were built mainly by hand labor performed by gangs of impressed kolkhozniki.

Probably the appeal of territorial and social mobility, as well as prestige, which are associated with factory workers--the nominal "owning class" in the U.S.S.R.--attract people from the kolkhozes into industrial jobs. Furthermore, the urban standard of living, which is notoriously supported by the government at the expense of the rural standard, and the prestige of the technique and modernity of the cities, must draw away persons from the countryside. The chance to work for regular wages, rather than depending upon unpredictable shares of kolkhoz production, must also have an appeal to the kolkhoz worker. The values offered by the city life are practically the same as those most explicitly held by the orthodox Soviet citizens, so that in effect propaganda for Soviet ideology is almost equivalent to propaganda in favor of life and work in the manner of the urban industrial worker. The kolkhoznik has good objective reasons to leave the countryside for the city, and the declared position of the Communists endorses these reasons as positive values. But freedom of movement for the kolkhoznik is greatly restricted. Passports, which allow citizens to move about within one country, are not ordinarily issued to kolkhoz rank-and-file, and without these documents they are not permitted to visit the cities.

Ukrainians have in the past been a decidedly rural people, and their traditional preference has been for village life. The cities of Ukraine were in the past inhabited largely by Russians, Jews, Poles, etc., and the "typical" Ukrainian life was found in the villages. How far this traditional preference for the country has survived the rigors of kolkhoz living and the processes of collectivization and "de-kulakization" which brought about the present system, is uncertain. The relative weight of traditional values, as against those favored by the Soviets, in the making of individual decisions by Ukrainian village people, cannot be tested, for the Soviets inhibit any expression of deviant views. But it is likely that some considerable part of the village population, now transformed into kolkhozniki, preserves attitudes which conflict strongly with the officially

14: U. Chicago S-4, 5(1954-5)1955 RD1 Ukr. RD1

approved ones, and which may in part account for the survival of older village traditions--the peasant tradition--despite great discouragements.

POLITICAL LIFE: INTRODUCTION

Every institutionalized activity in Ukraine, as in the U.S.S.R. generally, has an immediately apparent political aspect.

The names by which various phenomena in the Ukrainian S.S.R. will be indicated require some explanation in advance, for they are subject to much confusion. A Soviet ("council") is a particular kind of governmental unit which exists at each territorial-administrative level into which the U.S.S.R. is divided, and its name has become applied also to the doctrines and policies of the Bolshevik wing of Social Democrats (i. e., the Communists) who seized power in 1917, and are now the ruling elite of the U.S.S.R. Communism and communist are often used to designate what is here called Soviet. When the terms, communist and communism, are used in this work the intent will be to refer only to the principles of historic communism. Communist (with an upper case "C") will refer to units or members of the Communist Party in Ukraine and in the U.S.S.R. as a whole.

Bolshevik and Bolshevism refer to the original name of the political party which came into power in October,¹ 1917, and to the initial philosophy and program of that party, respectively. The name Communist Party was adopted by the Bolsheviks in 1919, and in 1952 the decision was taken to omit the "Bolshevik" in parentheses, which had always followed the "Communist" in writing the name of the party.

These fundamental definitions out of the way, we must ask next, what exactly is meant by the political face of life in any community to which one might point. One can, of course, give a definition of political life which is universally applicable. Thus, for the purposes of this monograph, let it be said that political life embraces that part of the life of a community consisting of the interaction between those who, with or without the benefit of law, have the power to dispose regularly of life, liberty and property and those for whom such disposition is made. This is not to postulate any necessary dichotomy between "rulers" and "ruled." A crossing back and forth from one category to the other takes place to some extent in every country and varies over the world from very much to very little. However, at any given

1 - Old style; November 7, new style.

time some people only, acting in an institutional medium, are able to make authoritative decisions. At the same time, in the light of the sovietization motif which will characterize this study, the selection and ordering of topics for a work on the political life of Ukraine will have to be both radically different from and very similar to the way in which a perceptive work on the political life of, say, an American community would be organized.

The radical difference between two such works arises from the above-mentioned inseparability of any other kind of institutional activity in Ukraine from politics. The carrying on of agriculture and of manufacturing, the determination of the content and the administration of formal education, the dissemination of news, etc, are quite as much political activities as they are anything else. The difference between the Ukrainian and any American community in this respect is one of degree, to be sure. Nevertheless, in an American community the scope of political activity is both in law and in fact limited. The limits are not constant, but thus far they have existed. In Ukraine there are no limits either in law or in fact. The difference in degree, therefore, is precisely the difference between totalitarian and non-totalitarian government.

On the other hand, as one would expect of a study of an American state, this study of contemporary Ukrainian political life is concerned with: (1) the political institutions by which the territorial subdivision may be characterized; (2) the major policies which are being pursued in the territory and the assumptions from which they derive; (3) the extent to which these policies are consistent with the apparent desires of the local population; (4) the identity of the leadership which operates in the territory and the association of leaders with particular policies; and, finally, (5) in the light of the foregoing, the advantages and disadvantages for the people of Ukraine of membership in the Soviet Union, and the value of Ukraine to the Soviet Union.

In discussing contemporary Ukrainian political life an additional topic must be considered. In many parts of the world there is a Ukrainian emigration, many of whose members aspire to return to the historical Ukrainian lands under a leadership different from that which now governs there. Other members of this emigration do not aspire to return personally, but

they wish, too, to see the replacement of the present leadership of Ukraine, which involves, for all practical purposes, the replacement of the present leadership of the U.S.S.R. as a whole. For most of the articulate members of this emigration, the distaste for the present position of Ukraine within the U.S.S.R. is so strong as to impel them to favor not only the overthrow of the present leadership of the U.S.S.R., or of the entire Soviet system, which is, of course, more than the present leadership, but the creation of an independent Ukraine regardless of any change which may occur in the U.S.S.R. as a whole.

The Ukrainian emigration numbers roughly two million, and is distributed among a dozen countries, but is most numerous in the United States and Canada. This figure includes ordinary emigrants, who on an individual and family basis sought to improve their lot by going to a country which seemed to offer opportunity and who began to leave long before the Bolshevik Revolution; and political emigrants, who are a product of the Revolution or subsequent developments in the U.S.S.R. It is the latter which, in the main, can be expected to wish a return to a Ukraine more to their liking. So far as activity on behalf of such a Ukraine is concerned, however, it is difficult to distinguish the two classes of the emigration, for they do not work separately.

What is important for the student of contemporary Ukraine is the fact that this emigration, through the leaders who claim to speak for it and who invoke its voting power, are striving to influence the policy of the United States and other Western powers toward the U.S.S.R. in terms of this special interest. Much of this effort to influence consists of providing information about Ukraine. Conversely, the inability of interested foreigners to observe Ukraine at first hand, or indeed, to learn as much as they would like from publications within Ukraine and the U.S.S.R., endows these informants who do speak and write from personal observation and experience with an unusual importance. The Ukrainian emigration, therefore, --its doctrine and its diverse activities in support of that doctrine--will also be dealt with.

UKRAINIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The Basic Social Goals of the U.S.S.R.

Although possessed of highly distinctive features which reach back for centuries, the society of Ukraine is intimately involved in the larger society of the U.S.S.R. It is necessary, therefore, to begin with some statement about the basic social goals of the Soviet system under which life in Ukraine is currently proceeding.

The top leadership of the U.S.S.R. is striving today, as it has since November, 1917, to create as rapidly as possible a highly industrialized society in the U.S.S.R. as a whole. While an industrial society is now an aim of much of the world, the particular form which it has thus far taken in the U.S.S.R. and in Ukraine is the result of an interaction of two sets of factors. These are (1) the kinds of social relations which existed in the U.S.S.R. and in Ukraine at the time the policy of industrialization was inaugurated, and (2) the particular assumptions as to how, by whom, and for what ends this kind of economy should be created, which the Bolshevik leaders brought to their task when they assumed power. Inextricably intertwined with this socio-economic goal has been the determination of the top leadership of the U.S.S.R. to remain the top leadership, in part, it would seem, because the taste of power turned out to be too sweet to relinquish. However, the determination to remain in power probably also derives from the belief--nourished both by Bolshevik doctrine and natural human inclination--that only thus can the right kind of highly industrialized society be attained. From this standpoint both foreign and domestic policies have been means of retaining power. This combination of very rapid industrialization with undisturbed Communist leadership is the essence of sovietism.²

2. - The term sovietism as used here encompasses all of the deliberately established patterns of state ownership, control and administration of virtually all industry, all of the deliberately established patterns of state ownership of all land, and state control and administration of by far the greatest portion of agricultural production, state control and administration of the overwhelming portion of commerce and of all the facilities by means of which commerce is carried on; and state control and administration of all banking activities. Sovietism includes, in addition, the deliberately established patterns by means of which the top leadership secures support for and/or obedience to all its policies. What it has been thought necessary to do to secure support for and/or obedience to these policies has been far-reaching indeed. Scarcely a facet of group life has been left untouched in the great endeavor, and all of this forced-march reshaping and innovating, too, is part of sovietism.

The top leadership has thus far been able to maintain itself as a unity against the actual or feared threat of an anti-sovietist attack upon its position. However, there has been from the beginning of the Bolshevik era, a many faceted competition for power among individuals and factions within the Communist Party itself, with the consequence that decisions to ease and decisions to intensify sovietization have sometimes been in response to exigencies of the power struggle within the Party.

Sources of the Ukrainian Political Structure

The totalitarian character of government under sovietism leads to a highly centralized system. At the same time, centralization in the U.S. S.R. has had to cloak itself in federal garb,

Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution most Ukrainian political nationalists were content to speak out for an undefined measure of autonomy within a democratic, moderately socialistic federation of the former Imperial lands, although the increasingly bitter quarrel over how much autonomy, which the Ukrainian Central Rada carried on with the pre-Bolshevik Provisional Government in the summer and early autumn of 1917, augured ill for an easy solution. Nor was this federal solution to the national problem dropped with the victory of the Bolsheviks. Until mid-December, 1917, neither the Rada nor the Bolsheviks in control in Petrograd (changed from St. Petersburg by the Tsarist government) wished a separation. But the break soon came, for, as under the Provisional Government, what the new rulers in Petrograd regarded as separatism the Ukrainian nationalists regarded as Ukrainian political autonomy. In mid-December a rival Ukrainian government was established by the Bolsheviks for the first time, in Kharkov, whose Bolsheviks had from the beginning been hostile to cooperation with the Rada, which sat in Kiev. Shortly thereafter a Red Army began to move from Kharkov westward. On January 22, 1918, the Rada proclaimed the independence of Ukraine, but two weeks later its leaders and their few remaining troops fled, as Bolshevik troops entered Kiev. The Bolsheviks themselves were forced to flee when the Germans moved into Ukraine about a month later and established a Ukrainian government which, under the Tsarist general Skoropadskii, was nationalist but not at all sympathetic to the moderate socialism of the Rada nationalists. When the Bolsheviks returned in March 1919 there was no longer any possibility of their sharing power with the men of the Rada.

The extent to which the nationalism of the Central Rada, or of its two successor anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian governments during the next three years, extended to the Ukrainian people as a whole is difficult to gauge.³ In any event, the Bolshevik leadership did not deny either to itself or to the world that political nationalism was a fact in Ukraine, and in varying degree in all of the non-Russian parts of the erstwhile Empire. On Lenin's insistence, the avowed policy was to compromise with this nationalism, even as every effort was made by Moscow (to which the capital had been moved from Petrograd) to reabsorb the peripheral lands by what was essentially a series of military campaigns. In Ukraine the German-sponsored Skoropadskii regime was driven out by the same group which, in the main, had been in command of the Central Rada, although the group now styled itself the Directory. War between the Bolsheviks and the Directory began virtually coincidentally with the latter's installation in Kiev, and continued until February 1919, when the Bolsheviks again captured the historic city. Subsequently, the Directory carried on a sporadic fight from across the

3 - The Rada, at best, shared its power with the Bolsheviks, and in most of the towns of Ukraine, in which ethnic Ukrainians were a minority, could not compete successfully with them. The Rada did control the city of Kiev and the adjoining rural areas on the Kiev, or right, side of the Dnieper. During the course of the Rada-Bolshevik skirmishing for position in November and December, 1919, the city soviets of Ekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk), Odessa, and Nikolaev also recognized the authority of the Rada and its administrative arm, the General Secretariat. This, however, had only a transitory effect on the Rada's actual authority. See Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). Pp. 114, 116-17.

The Skoropadskii, or Hetman's, regime, which the Germans installed in place of the Bolsheviks in March, 1918, following their occupation of Ukraine, was commonly regarded both by Ukrainians and Russians as a tool of the Germans, and was easily dispossessed in December, 1918, by the Rada nationalists after German evacuation of Ukraine. (See Pipes, op. cit., pp. 137-38.)

Friends of the Directory, which was the former Rada with a somewhat different leadership composition, have attributed a wide popular support to it. However, the same friends, in trying to absolve this government from blame for pogroms committed by Ukrainian troops and other armed groups purporting to act in its name, insist that such acts were contrary to the orders of the Directory. Kiev protested such actions, it is argued, but was really unable to control the situation. There is evidence that Kiev protested such actions; it is also clear that the pogroms continued.

Polish border in Eastern Galicia, with which, as a matter of fact, a united Ukraine had been proclaimed the preceding November. Simultaneously, the Bolsheviki were at war with various independent Ukrainian bands as well as with the unequivocally anti-federalist restorationist White armies of General Denikin, from the early autumn until the end of 1919.

On December 28, 1920, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic were formally joined in a federal union. The instrument of union was a treaty, as between independent states. Indeed, that characteristic attribute of sovereignty, control of foreign relations, was retained by the Ukrainian S.S.R., as it was by each of the other borderland Soviet Republics which at about this time also entered into a federal relationship with R.S.F.S.R. The impression was therefore given that not even as close a relationship between the center and the provinces as that customarily defined by federalism had been erected. Part of the explanation for this unusual reservation of the foreign relations power on behalf of the constituent republics is that each of them had, during its short period of independence, maintained diplomatic missions abroad and had been given at least de facto recognition by the major Western powers. In order to replace with a minimum of difficulty the diplomatic representatives of the borderland republics, and to take over their foreign commitments, it was necessary to create the impression that the incorporated lands retained their independence even after the Soviet annexation.⁴ Also involved was the belief on the part of the central rulers that the appearance of independence for the non-Russian republics would help the Communist International in representing itself as the instrument of a truly supranational rather than Russian-national system, to which other nations, once they had achieved their proletarian revolution, could adhere.⁵

Through stipulations of the treaty of union concerning powers reserved to various levels of government, a sort of federalism had been established. Still, it was a truly curious sort, the federal relationship itself being not among all of the constituent republics, including the R.S.F.S.R., but between the R.S.F.S.R. and each of the other Soviet Republics bilaterally.

4 - Pipes, op. cit., p. 249.

5 - Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 309.

Even more, the organs and commissariats of the R.S.F.S.R. were also the organs and commissariats of the new federal government.

Virtually all important positions in this governmental structure were occupied by members of the highly centralized and disciplined Bolshevik Party.⁶

In Ukraine, too, most of the Bolsheviks were centralists, some favoring Lenin's position of comparative tolerance, some favoring thoroughgoing centralization. But a minority went so far as to advocate genuine federalism, meaning federalism within the Bolshevik party itself, as well as within the administrative structure. Here was reflected a fusion of Bolshevism and Ukrainian nationalism, but also involved was the belief that intra-party democracy, a cardinal tenet of Bolshevism, would be more secure if each of the Union Republics had a party organization which was not merely a provincial branch of the Russian party. Actually the Ukrainian Bolshevik organization was rapidly transformed into just such a provincial branch of the Russian organization, and, as a result, the administration of Ukrainian affairs had become willy-nilly a field operation of the Bolshevik dominated government of the R.S.F.S.R. before the Treaty of December, 1920, purportedly established a federal union.

There have been two constitutions⁷ since 1920-21 which have defined the federal relationship between Ukraine, the R.S.F.S.R. and other constituent Republics of what is now the U.S.S.R.: that of 1924, which created the U.S.S.R., so far as the name of the country is concerned, and that of 1936. The patently unfederal fusion of authority of both the federal and republican governments in the government of the R.S.F.S.R. stipulated by the treaties of 1920 and 1921 has been eliminated. The R.S.F.S.R. is,

6. - It was his awareness of this condition which made it possible for Lenin to fight within the Bolshevik party for a policy of tolerance toward the federalists. It is noteworthy, however, that Lenin was in the minority on this issue among the top Bolsheviks in Moscow, and that while his great prestige prevented the centralists from staging a full, open assault upon the federal arrangements, even his prestige did not prevent the centralists, who dominated the day-to-day activities, from having their way in fact.

7. - The R.S.F.S.R. Constitution of 1918 was, legally speaking, a constitution for the R.S.F.S.R. alone, the basis of union between this and the Ukrainian and the other Soviet Socialist Republics from 1920 to January, 1924, being the above-mentioned treaties.

in constitutional terminology at least, a republic like all of the other constituent republics.

During the early twenties there was an important attempt on the part of some of the Party leaders, both locally and in Moscow, with the leaders of the Party in Ukraine taking the leading parts, to secure a measure of genuine federalism. Opposition to Stalin, who was using the Commissariat of Nationalities as a means of extending his personal power within the Party, was perhaps the most important motivation for this attitude within the Party. But Stalin's triumph over his adversaries was also the triumph of the centralists, and the Communist Party (which dropped the qualifying "Bolshevik" from its name in 1952) is today more than ever the vehicle for the centralization of policy and administration throughout the U.S.S.R.

Federalism, as between the U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R., then, is a very special kind of federalism, the key to which is not the particular distribution of powers between Moscow and Kiev which happens to prevail under the present constitution, but the attitude of the top leadership of the Communist Party and the completeness of control which this leadership exercises over party and government leaders in the Ukrainian capital and regions.

The Communist Party

Policy making in Ukraine is the prerogative solely of the Communist Party, units of which exist in every segment of Ukrainian society. This all-pervasive role of the party is anything but tacit; it is at the heart of the doctrine which the Bolsheviks brought with them when they took power in 1917 and is detailed in the published Statutes of the Party, although barely more than suggested in the Ukrainian and U.S.S.R. constitutions.

Nevertheless, the Party's position is not equally secure in every area of activity. In industry, and in the government offices, the Party is well entrenched. The area least susceptible to party control has always been agriculture, and in this fact lies much of the explanation for the bitter determination with which the Bolshevik leadership set out to collectivize the hitherto privately cultivated farms at the end of the twenties.⁸

8 - The ownership of all lands had passed to the state under one of the first acts of the Bolshevik government, in November, 1917. However, much the greatest part of this land was left to private cultivation until 1928.

The structure of the Party parallels that of the government,⁹ the chief Party organs in Ukraine being the republican Bureau and Secretariat. According to the Party Statutes, the Bureau and Secretariat are arms of the republican Central Committee which chooses their members and which is itself elected by periodic republican Party Congresses. But the real power is exercised by the Bureau and the Secretariat, while the actual control over the appointment of their members rests with the All-Union Party Presidium and Secretariat.

Within the Bureau and the Secretariat, the most important figures, in order of importance, are the first, second, and third secretaries, who are both members of the Bureau and in charge of the day-to-day work of the Secretariat. Other members of the Bureau usually are the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the Minister of Internal Affairs for Ukraine and the first secretaries of the more important regional (oblast) party organizations, which make up the next lower rung of the Party ladder. The work of the republican Secretariat is both operational and supervisory, the Secretariat itself being supervised by a representative of the All-Union Central Committee and a party Collegium which is responsible to the Party Control Committee in Moscow. Operationally, the republican Secretariat, on general orders from the Bureau, selects and places key party, Kom-somol, trade-union and governmental personnel in all high but not "leading" posts. Appointments to "leading" Party and governmental posts in Ukraine are reserved for the central Party authorities. The republican Secretariat is also responsible for the publication of republic-wide party newspapers and agitators' handbooks, the operation of courses and schools for the political indoctrination and training of party and governmental personnel, the organization of party lectures, and the preparation of propagandists. In its supervisory capacity, the Secretariat, through a staff of inspectors, studies and reports on the operations and deficiencies of the lower party and governmental units, and can, in consequence, order changes consistent

9. - The author has made extensive use in the following exposition and interpretation of current Ukrainian political institutions of Professor Fainsod's excellent How Russia is Ruled. However, citation of specific statements in that work is given only for direct quotation and paraphrasing.

and raion administrators in the several government offices, for obkom is the great dispenser of the more important jobs in the region. Included are the district first secretaryships, which, however, must have the approval of the All-Union Secretariat. Appointments to ordinary membership in district Party Bureaus are subject only to the obkom first secretary.

The raikom and gorkom first secretaries, in turn, fill the important positions in local administration, chairmanships of collective farms, and trade-union and Komsomol posts in their jurisdictions. They also ratify, and thereby control, the election of primary Party secretaries, which is nominally the function of the primary Party committee.

It is to raikom and gorkom, in addition to his own primary organization, that the rank and file Party member looks in the routine of his Party activities. Approval of his application for membership in the Party, which is first submitted to the primary Party Bureau or secretary,¹⁰ comes from either of these authorities, and it is they who can expel him. These powers may not, according to party rules, be exercised arbitrarily. Refusal of admission to membership must be accompanied by a statement of reasons. Both on the notion of a primary Party organization and on their own initiative, raikom and gorkom may censure and exclude party members, but a decision to expel must be endorsed by obkom.

From the standpoint of setting examples for and overseeing the accomplishment of specific jobs in the furtherance of the regime's economic and social objectives, the most important Party organization is the primary. There are thousands of these in Ukraine, located in factories, collective farms and machine tractor stations, trading establishments, trade unions, schools, institutes and universities, mass communications agencies, and writers and artists associations, as well as in all government departments. A primary organization may vary in size from three to three hundred, the large ones being found in large factories and offices. Sometimes, where there are more than a hundred members in a primary organization, sub-units within the primary, each with its own Bureau, are formed.

The rank and file Party member is supposed to participate actively

10. - Primary organizations of fewer than 15 members have only a secretary.

with its own directives from Moscow and remove lower party officers. The Secretariat also is supposed to supervise the various facets of social and economic life in Ukraine in order to guard against nationalist or other kinds of ideological deviation and in order to secure the fulfilment of Ukraine's part of the national plan. To facilitate supervision over economic activities, the Secretariat is organized into sections which parallel the several branches of economic administration.

The division of functions thus noted for the republican Party organization makes evident exactly what role the Communist Party is supposed to have in Ukrainian life. It is for the Party to determine who will ever have an opportunity to exercise power, and thus the Party is the immediate boss of personnel and of what should be done by way of indoctrination to produce reliable personnel. It is not for the Party, on the other hand, to be the immediate operator of the economy or of other social institutions. In these areas the Party is supposed to be the pointer of the way, the gadfly, and the stern judge.

The Party committees are supposed to execute, at regional (obkom), district (raikom), and city (gorkom) levels of jurisdiction, the tasks, operational and supervisory, set them by the republican Party committee. As in the republican organization, each of these lesser organizations has a Bureau consisting of three secretaries and the chairman of the executive committee of the Soviet, the chief MVD officer, the editor of the general newspaper, and certain other important officials for each territorial jurisdiction. On these levels, too, each Bureau is nominally elected by the pertinent Party committee. Each organization also has its staff of full-time Party functionaries. Beyond this basic similarity of Party organization from the republican to the district levels, there is variation according to the socio-economic character of the area over which an organization has jurisdiction. Thus, a large city has several district organizations subordinate to the gorkom, and the Bureau of an urban raikom is likely to have as a member the manager of an important factory in the district. Similarly, the chief of a rural district's agricultural administration is likely to be in that district's Party Bureau.

What obkom thinks is the main day-to-day concern of raikom officials

in some party work, in addition to whatever regular occupation he may have. He is supposed to be an example to his non-Party colleagues on the job, but also a critic--the link between the Party and the masses, and somehow the representative of the needs and views of both. His life is busy but circumscribed by Party demands and Party discipline, and there is ample evidence that the dedicated Party man of pre-Revolutionary days is more often an ideal than a reality in the routine of Ukrainian life.

During the first decade of the Bolshevik regime economic decisions of great importance were frequently taken by non-Party members, because there were not enough Party members qualified to take them. In the fields of internal trade and agriculture, which were in private hands during most of the twenties, this was the typical situation. But even in industry, the control of which the Bolsheviks took as soon as they came into power and never relinquished, important decisions by non-party managers, engineers and other technicians were common. All that the Party leadership could do to control the situation was to assign party men to each enterprise to act as political watchdogs, who, if they thought it necessary, could overrule the decisions of the non-party officials. Eventually--by the mid-thirties the new trend was already pronounced--enough technically qualified Communists became available to make it politically safe to adopt the principle of one-man control. The principle, however, does not operate unerringly. A very high percentage of managers and engineers are members of the Party today, and some of them are uncommonly influential. But as highly skilled persons in such strategic positions, they are suspect as a potential source of independent and therefore oppositional action. Consequently, while their emoluments are lavish, in comparison with those of ordinary citizens, and their political importance high, they are watched closely.

According to the principle of democratic centralism, decisions are to be arrived at by free discussion within the Party; once taken, however, the decision and all sub-decisions stemming from the basic one must be observed without deviation by all Party members. In practice, it is centralism rather than democracy which is observed. So far as all Party members and Party officials below the level of the All-Union Party Presidium are concerned, a statement from the top that such-and-such is not policy, is

authoritative, even though no prior discussion below the top level has taken place and even though Party subordinates have no knowledge of the nature of the prior discussion which presumably has taken place at the top. This general state of affairs, however, does not prevent a multitude of decisions being made by subordinate Party officials down to the smallest village. In day-to-day activity, then, the subordinate Party official is a substantial center of power. His great concern is that his decisions continue to be regarded by his Party superior as consistent with the relatively general directives which the latter has passed down, and, what is more difficult, that he not fail to sense change of policy in a new directive, even though he has not yet been told that its predecessor has been revoked.

The elite relationship of the Communist Party to the people of the Ukraine is complemented by the work of its three youth auxiliaries. Any child who wishes to may join the Little Octobrists, consisting of children from about 6 to 9 years of age, or the Young Pioneers, consisting of children from about 9 to 15 years of age; and membership in the latter is virtually universal for the age group. Even the Young Communist League, or Komsomol, whose members range in age from about 14 to 26 and more and which began as an elite group, has become much more like a "mass" organization. The Young Pioneers and the Komsomol together tie directly to the Party about 1/6 of the entire population of the Ukraine, and, of course, a much larger proportion of the youth. Komsomol members alone make up about 8 per cent of the total population of the Ukraine.

The three youth organizations constitute well-defined stages of progress toward eventual Party membership, with the overwhelming majority of new Party members coming from the Komsomol. However, by no means all Komsomol members are able to make the final step, just as only some Young Pioneers are able to enter the Komsomol. All three organizations are institutions of indoctrination, as well; indeed, they are the most important ones in the view of the Party leadership, for they are concerned with the young. The Komsomol is, in addition, an important aid to the Party in the latter's work of directing, checking and setting examples.

The Komsomol structure in Ukraine parallels that of the Party, with a first secretary in charge at each territorial level. Taking no chances that

the youth organization will escape the eye of the Party, the leadership has decreed that all secretaries at the republican and regional levels must be Party members, and below these levels all first secretaries must be either Party members or candidates for membership. As of 1949, virtually all first secretaries of town and district Komsomol committees in Ukraine were Party members.¹¹

Komsomol members frequently serve in lieu of Party members on, for example, collective farms and machine tractor stations, and in the secondary schools and institutions of higher learning. In industry and agriculture they must stand ready to serve as shock workers on new and difficult undertakings, as spark plugs of socialist competition, and as agitators among young non-member workers and farmers.

Weakness at the Republican Level

The Ukrainian S.S.R., like each of the other fifteen constituent republics, has republican status because of two qualities which it possesses. It is the homeland of an officially recognized non-Russian people which constitutes a majority of the population of the republic, and it is a border republic. It is the latter attribute which qualifies it for a constitutionally different position from that accorded the autonomous national republics contained within the R.S.F.S.R. From its border status arises also the nominal constitutional right of Ukraine to secede from the U.S.S.R.

As a constituent republic, Ukraine has the right to its own Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. With Belorussia, however, it stands apart from the other constituent republics in also having membership in the United Nations. The Ukrainian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense are segments of larger Union-Republican Ministries which reach the apex of their organizational ladders in Moscow. Possession of them therefore gives Ukraine even in principle neither more nor less control over foreign and defense affairs than over the many other activities of a domestic nature which are administered by Union-Republican Ministries. In practice the two Ministries are almost completely centralized.

11. - Fainsod, op. cit., p. 253.

The significance of Ukrainian membership in the United Nations is not so easily settled. No individual state which is itself recognized under international law has accorded recognition to Ukraine, although a few years ago Great Britain proposed without success that diplomatic representatives be exchanged between itself and the republic.

If membership is defined in terms of the opportunity of Ukrainian delegates to represent Ukrainian interests in the forum of the United Nations independently of the interests of the U.S.S.R., then it has no significance. Of course, other members of the United Nations which have no constitutional tie with the U.S.S.R., such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, have been in virtually the same position since they have had Communist governments.

All industry, all commercial and public transportation, and by far most commercial enterprises are subject to state control and management. In agriculture the position of the government is somewhat more complex, but in that area, too, the government controls and manages. The development of heavy industry has from the beginning occupied a particularly exalted place in the plans of the Communist leadership. It is significant, therefore, that the administrative departments concerned with heavy industry completely by-pass the government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in Kiev. These are designated All-Union Ministries, their chiefs coming together in the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Even constitutionally the lines of control of these Ministries are directly between the appropriate territorial-production division of the Ministry in Moscow and the particular operating enterprise.

Ministries concerned with light industry, agriculture, trade, and with the more conventional activities of government, such as defense, foreign relations, health, and justice are designated Union-Republican. Each Union-Republican Ministry has a Minister in Moscow, at the Union end, and a Minister in Kiev, at the Republic end. Here there is some delegation of authority by Moscow to Kiev, from Kiev to the several regions (oblasti) of the Ukraine, and from each region to a number of districts (raion). There is no federalism here, but only delegation by the superior office to its local offices.

There are, in addition, some solely Republican Ministries, the heads

of which join with the Union-Republican Ministers at the Kiev level to form the Ukrainian Council of Ministers. It is the existence of these Republican Ministries which permits one to speak of federalism in the U.S.S.R. at all. The functions of the Republican Ministries are comparatively few. However, the number of functions for which the Republican Ministries are independently responsible under the constitutions of the U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. is a secondary criterion of the existence of genuine federalism in the U.S.S.R. Republican Ministries do, after all, appear to concern themselves with the not inconsequential matters of elementary and secondary education and social insurance. Theirs seems to be the last word, also, with regard to industry of a purely local nature and with the regulation of communal economy. Automobile transport, furniture and carpentry shops, and local fuel industry have also been under Republican Ministries since 1947, although civilian housing construction has more recently been reorganized and transferred to Union-Republican status. What is crucial to the power of these Ministries, taking the problem solely on the constitutional level and thus leaving aside the fact that the leading officials of the Republican Ministries are also subject to Party orders from the top, is the obligation of all administrative offices at all levels to conform to a centrally-determined national plan which embraces all organized economic activity.

All operating enterprises and subordinate governmental units make proposals concerning their contributions to the national plan. The Ukrainian S.S.R. has its own State Planning Commission, organized on a Union-Republican basis. However, the Ukrainian State Planning Commission is, even in formal structure, more immediately subordinated to the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission than are the Kiev divisions of most Union-Republican Ministries. Such deviation from the typical Union-Republican chain of command is authorized in both the U.S.S.R. and Ukrainian S.S.R. constitutions, it being left to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers to decide which Union-Republican Ministries shall so deviate. In any case, the final plan is the work of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, which must approve the work of the State Planning Commission. Behind both are basic decisions with respect to the nature of the plan which will have been taken by the Party high command.

There has existed in Ukraine since 1947 a greater measure of decentralized planning in certain selected areas than previously. Due to concern over the consequences of over-centralization in this sphere, there has been the tendency to decentralize planning for small plants producing handicrafts or other consumer goods out of locally available material for local consumption. In numerous cases, larger plants which have acquired a high degree of production experience have been permitted considerable initiative in working out their own programs. Since March, 1947, quarterly and monthly plans need no longer be submitted to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for approval. But this scarcely amounts to decentralization, let alone federalism. As Professor Fainsod concludes, "the existence of the plan... constitutes a control from which no Soviet administrator can wholly escape."¹²

The budgetary process of the U.S.S.R., which contributes to the financial side of the plan, also militates seriously against genuine federalism. It is understandable that this should be so, since the supreme function of the budget is to control the execution of a plan which is itself unfederal in spirit. Paralleling the physical planning structure, a Finance Ministry exists on a Union-Republican basis, with branches extending down to the oblast', raion and city, and all the budgetary authority in the U.S.S.R. is concentrated in it. None of the levels of government from the Republic down has any independent revenue raising authority. True, the Republic government may levy local taxes or authorize such levies on the part of the oblasts, raions and cities subordinate to it. But the kind and volume of such taxation is also subject to control from Moscow, being specified in the Ukrainian section of the centrally determined overall U.S.S.R. budget. Similarly, the particular expenditures which the Republican ministry and its local subdivisions may make are determined for them by the Union-Republican Minister of Finance in Moscow. His work, like that of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission, must have the approval of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.

The governmental system under which the people of Ukraine live, then, is essentially unitary, both in fact and in law. The system does manifest some decentralization, but this is only a rather complicated variant of

¹² - Fainsod, op. cit., p. 342.

the type of decentralization which is found in other and more openly unitary countries.

Executive Domination at all Levels

If the constitutional proviso that the Ukrainian Council of Ministers be appointed by and responsible to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine means what it seems to mean, then it is not honored in practice. Even in law, no power to remove ministers or to vote no-confidence in them is provided.¹³ But, in addition, the Supreme Soviet of about 450 members, designated as the sole legislative organ of the Ukrainian S.S.R., meets for only a few days twice a year. Between these sessions its duties are performed by a Presidium of nineteen, including a President, two Vice-Presidents and a Secretary. Now, the presidium is and is not an organ of the Supreme Soviet. Although the Ukrainian constitution provides that the Supreme Soviet elects the Presidium, presumably from among its own members (Art. 29) the constitution also stipulates that the Supreme Soviet may not exercise those powers which come within the jurisdiction of the Presidium, or of the Republic's Council of Ministers and of the individual Ministries. (Art. 22).

The relationship between the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium is actually very much like that between the rank and file memberships and the executive committees of many large private organizations and political parties in non-totalitarian countries. The executive committee is selected by the top leadership but is formally elected by the general membership. The committee then acts until the next general meeting as the organization for all practical purposes, taking all of the crucial steps deemed necessary to implement the organization's policies. Once the steps are taken, they can hardly be recalled by the general membership, notwithstanding the proviso of accountability. A big difference between the Soviet-Presidium case and that of the large private organization or political party is that in the former there is little likelihood that the executive unit will be taken to task by the formally enabling group on the basis of a free selection of subjects for criticism. Criticism there may be but it will arise under the present dispensation from decisions taken by the Communist Party leadership, if

13 - See, however, the discussion of the authority of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. which follows.

not always in Moscow, then in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, to which all of the members of the Presidium, but only a few members of the Supreme Soviet, belong.

But if the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is not subject to the will of the Soviet, no more than the latter does it really hold the Ukrainian Council of Ministers responsible for the work of its Ministries. This, despite the explicit constitutional authority of the Presidium--an authority not given to the Supreme Soviet--to "Annul decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R...." (Art. 30, 3), and "in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R., (to) release... Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R...." (Art. 30, f).¹⁴ All appointments to the council of Ministers are in fact determined by the Party leadership, to which the Ministers belong. Characteristically, the Ministers outrank within the Party, or are the proteges of others who outrank, the members of the Presidium.

Interestingly, the sideline role of the Supreme Soviet and Presidium of Ukraine is not repeated in the lesser Soviets of Working People's Deputies. On the oblast', raion, city and settlement level, each soviet has an Executive Committee which serves as a combined Presidium and Council of Ministers. In the one capacity the executive committee is accountable to the general soviet membership, as the Presidium of the Republic is to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. In the other capacity it is accountable to the next higher executive committee, or, in the case of the oblast' executive committee, to the several Ministries in Kiev.

An executive committee of an oblast' soviet in Ukraine is divided into departments of cultural and educational work, art, municipal economy, local industry, public education, public health, social maintenance, trade, finance, roads, cinemas, light industry administration, local fuel industry administration, agricultural administration, food industry administration, a planning commission, a cadres section, and a general department. Such departments are found in every oblast' executive committee in Ukraine.

14 - The appointment of the Republican Council of Ministers by the Republican Supreme Soviet is not dependent on the recommendation of anyone outside of the Supreme Soviet, according to the Constitution. This appointment power covers the position of the Chairman of the Council, too.

Oblast' Soviets are authorized, in addition, to set up departments of the timber industry, the meat and dairy industry, the building materials industry, the fish industry, and the textile industry, those which will actually be set up, if any, depending upon the specific features of the economy of the region. (Art. 69.)

Raion soviet executive committees are similarly departmentalized, although not all of the oblast' departments are repeated at this level. Prescribed in the Ukrainian constitution are departments of roads, public health, public education, agriculture, social maintenance, trade, finance, a planning commission, a cadres section, and a general department. The executive committees of city soviets have all of the departments which the raion committees have, except for roads. A city executive committee may also have a department of local industry or of agriculture, depending on specific features of its industry, and municipal and suburban economy. The chairman of a city executive committee is the closest thing to a mayor in Ukraine. The soviets of settlements, villages and small localities are not departmentalized, although at each level these soviets have their executive committees.

The executive committee hierarchy from the oblast' level down shares its administrative functions with a parallel system of Ministerial field offices. It is difficult to differentiate the work of the two systems, since over the years what they have taken for their spheres has varied considerably. In general, however, it can be said that the Ministry field office at, say, the oblast' level, represents a U.S.S.R. -wide interest in an oblast' if it is Union-Republican, or a republic-wide interest, if it is Republican; whereas the oblast' executive committee is concerned with the matters particular to that oblast'. At the same time, the oblast' executive committee is expected to check the work of the several Ministerial branches in the oblast'. One can give no really precise indication of what is meant by checking; it is one of those inherently ambiguous terms, and practice has by no means sharpened its meaning. The executive committee of the oblast' is not supposed to direct or interfere in the operations of a Ministry; yet it is supposed to know what the Ministry people are doing and be prepared to report delinquencies to higher authority. As a checker of Ministerial oblast' offices, then, the oblast' executive committee is supposed to perform the same kind of function as the oblast' Party committee.

As between the two checkers, there is no doubt that the Party's actions are of greater concern to the Ministry than the executive committee's. Nonetheless, the checking function of the executive committee is an important instance of how at least formally the citizenry, which the executive committee by way of the oblast' soviet "represents," protects itself against bureaucratic irresponsibility.

The relationship between Ministerial field offices and soviet executive committees just described is repeated at the raion and city levels.

It is evident that the line of authority in Ukrainian government runs along the executive-administrative axis only. As in the case of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, the oblast' and raion soviets meet only a few times a year and only for a very short period each time. The soviets of cities, raions of large cities (whose status is comparable to that of the rural raions), settlements, villages and small localities meet as frequently as once a month, but also very briefly. None of the soviets, therefore, have any time in which to deliberate upon and truly pass legislation. At best they can only criticize and refuse to approve actions already taken by their executive committees. But this criticism and denial of approval may not extend to acts taken in pursuance of Party instructions to the executive committees, which are themselves the nuclei of the Party membership of the soviets. Criticism which does not contradict Party decisions is frequently made. It is encouraged by the Party line. Sometimes there will be unusually vigorous and penetrating criticism, but this will denote serious Party concern over some problem or perhaps even a change in the Party line. The lead in the voicing of criticism will be taken by a Party activist. In the same vein, it is the Party element in the soviet which determines the membership of the executive committee in advance of the formal election of the committee by the members of the soviet.

An order from the next higher administrative level, on the other hand, is simultaneously an order stemming from or sanctioned by the corresponding Party organization. Here, moreover, the constitutional superior is in continuous operation and can more easily prevent the constitutional inferior from presenting him with a *fait accompli*. Finally, whereas a horizontal-type check upon an executive body by a putatively legislative one smacks of that separation of powers which from the beginning the Bolsheviks said it

was precisely the function of government by Soviets to avoid, the vertical check along the administrative axis is supported both by Bolshevik doctrine and the obvious determination of Moscow to keep the reins of control as much as possible in its hands.

Local Government

There is little initiative in Ukrainian public administration from the district level down, apart from the choices that must be made in applying a generally-phrased directive from above to a specific situation. Even such choices are often avoided. Thus, at the Nineteenth Party Congress, in October, 1952, G. M. Malenkov, then one of the foremost members of the All-Union Party Secretariat, complained that "Party, Soviet and agricultural leaders not infrequently disregard local, concrete conditions and issue the same instructions for all districts... such instructions, correct and necessary for certain districts and farms are often useless, and, at times, even harmful for other districts and farms." But, for local officials, whether Party or government, such bureaucratic uniformity is a survival mechanism. A brilliant local success, even if secured by unorthodox or even illegal means will be well-rewarded, but it involves great risks for the local official. It usually seems better to play it safe.

On the other hand, there is much activity on the raion, city, town and village levels. That is where most of the actual physical contact between the citizen and those who enforce the policy that has been adopted at higher levels takes place. At the oblast and republican level the paper work of receiving, issuing and sending up reports, issuing directives, and maintaining extensive records becomes the major part of the work routine, and physical contacts tend to be limited to those with officials at the next lower level. Moreover, guided by the Party, a continuing and often frenzied effort is made to draw the ordinary citizen into what official jargon calls mass participation. Led by the executive committee of a soviet, ordinary members of the soviet and non-members recruited into special sections of the soviet are persuaded and cajoled into helping carry out various tasks and in arousing general public enthusiasm with regard to them. This kind of activity does not make the local activist a decision maker, but it apparently does give some activists a genuine feeling of involvement in worthwhile things. As one student observes, "Since a substantial part of the work plans of local Soviets is concerned with the

maintenance and expansion of communal services and involves such everyday needs of the electorate as housing, sanitation, transportation and recreation, interest in the activities of local Soviets is not too difficult to arouse. Party-directed participation at this level of government builds on a genuine concern with common requirements."¹⁵

In the life of the town or city dweller there is a distinction between being a worker and a member of the local socio-political community. The separateness is less for the urban factory worker, whose place of residence is sometimes as much a part of the factory complex as the operational buildings. It is greatest for the department store clerk or for the school teacher whose homes are not physically joined to their places of work. Industrial settlements, located in otherwise rural areas are in gross structure analogous to American company towns, except that the latter are privately owned.

The collective farmer also lives in a kind of company town, but, unlike his industrial compatriots, he is supposed to be a director in the company and a worker at the same time.

Self-government does not mean independence of the collective farm from the control of the central or even local authorities in organization, production quotas, compensation standards, managerial and specialist personnel, or any other matters which concern the world beyond the farm.¹⁶ There is no significant variation here from the thorough-going centralization which characterizes all Ukrainian political and economic life. The characteristically Soviet de facto concentration of authority in an executive is also repeated in a collective. The general membership, very much like a soviet, formally elects the chairman, the Managing Board and the Control Commission (which is the farm auditor and checks on the efficiency and legality of farm activities). But in practice these organs function without any systematic check by the membership, which ratifies after the fact. Among themselves, particularly between the Chairman and the Managing Board, conflict over jurisdiction is common.¹⁷ All this does not mean that the

15 - Fainsod, op. cit., p. 325.

16 - Gregory Bienstock, Solomon Schwarz and Aaron Yugow, Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 145.

17 - Bienstock, et al., op. cit., p. 146

opinions of members are simply ignored by those who make the decisions. The work, after all, must be done by the members; but the chairman is responsible for the results. And in agriculture more easily than in industry, it is possible for the worker to be uncooperative with disastrous results.

Political Crime

Every political system includes some special instruments for the detection and punishment of criminal activity. In the Ukrainian S.S.R., this function is also under the control of the Communist Party. Partisan domination of the law enforcement machinery of a community is not peculiar to the U.S.S.R. or other Communist countries, of course. The distinctive fact about the system in the U.S.S.R. is that only the Communist Party ever has an opportunity to acquire such domination. For this reason, however, and also because policy tends to be demanding and is designed to be carried forward at such high speed, much of the concern of the law enforcement agencies is with political crimes, as distinguished from ordinary crimes.

Political crimes are acts which the Party leadership has defined as acts against the security of the state, or, more generally, counter-revolutionary. At the same time, according to Bolshevik doctrine, law is not a body of fixed rules; it is an instrument of policy.¹⁸ The definition of political crime, therefore, is highly flexible. There is no easily recognizable line dividing political from ordinary crime. Since policy, moreover, embraces all organized activity in the U.S.S.R., the possibilities of being charged with political crime are great indeed.

The uncertain character of Soviet law has in fact raised a question as to whether there really is any law in the U.S.S.R., for the usual criterion of law in the world as a whole is the existence of a known standard of what is legal and what is illegal. Be that as it may, most charges of crime must be judged by what the U.S.S.R. and Ukrainian S.S.R. constitutions call courts of law. In the case of ordinary crimes this requirement is in fact adhered to, although it must be borne in mind that the judges of the Ukrainian Supreme Court, as well as of the regional and district courts, are not

18 - See, for example, I.P. Trainin, "The Relationship between State and Law," Soviet Legal Philosophy, translated by Hugh W. Babb (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 433-56.

politically independent, being both elected by the corresponding territorial soviets, in accordance with Party wishes, and obliged, in the person of the individual judge, to adhere to declared or intimated Party policy. In the case of political crimes, judgement by a court of law is by no means certain, the history of the U.S.S.R. being replete with cases in which the section of the police apparatus that is concerned with political crimes has arrested, judged and passed sentence all by itself. Such procedure, moreover, is legal, for the MVD is authorized to establish a kind of administrative tribunal for the disposition of charges of political crime. This procedure is quite apart from the strictly legal procedure of committing cases involving treason, espionage, terror and whatever other acts are deemed to fall under the rubric of counter-revolutionary activity to special All-Union military tribunals which operate independently of the regular judicial system.

The Ministry of Justice has only a minor role in the law enforcement process. Its function is merely to train judicial personnel, create the material conditions for the proper functioning of the courts, and prepare elections for the lowest rung in the court ladder, the People's Courts. The Ministry of Justice is organized on a Union-Republican basis, but its regional and district offices, as prescribed by the U.S.S.R. and Ukrainian S.S.R. constitutions, are not subject to the checking activity of the executive committees of the corresponding soviets.

The real guardians of law and policy in Ukraine before a case comes to a court, assuming that it does eventually, are the Procuracy, the Ministry of State Control and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Procuracy is the general law enforcement agency, corresponding roughly to the Department of Justice of the United States. Set up similarly to an All-Union Ministry, its territorial subdivisions, which go down through the raion and city levels, are independent of the soviet executive committees. It is a straightforward hierarchy responsible at the summit to the Procurator General of the U.S.S.R. Its functions are to supervise the strict execution of the laws by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, and by all other public servants and citizens.

Procurators act in two major ways--as public prosecutors and as officials who may challenge and cause the suspension of ordinances passed by the corresponding executive committees of soviets and of orders and decrees

issued by the field offices of the Ministries. When a procurator wishes to challenge a ministerial field order, a protest is lodged with the next higher superior of the field office thought to be at fault.

The Procuracy, then, is concerned with the ordinary crimes of officials and private citizens, and, in addition, has general supervision over all civil proceedings. While the least important in terms of power, of the three great control agencies, the Procuracy does seem to play an important part in attempting to stamp out the abuses of local administration. It is, furthermore, the control agency with which the ordinary citizen, not involved in any politically touchy matters and not an administrator, will be most likely to have contact.

The work of the Ministry of State Control, which is organized on a highly centralized albeit technically Union-Republican basis, is only incidentally that of a legal agency. Although it has offices down through the raion level, in both the raion and oblast' these offices, like those of the Procuracy and Ministry of Justice, are set up independently of executive committees of the corresponding Soviets. The Ministry's local officials, thus, are not even formally subject to local checking, although informally the first Secretary of the Party at the pertinent level may be influential. Working closely with the Ministry of Finance, officials of the Ministry of State Control in Ukraine look particularly to the way in which state funds have been spent. In this sense they are like a comptroller-general's office. State Control officials are interested in embezzlement and other kinds of dishonesty involving state property, but they do not themselves undertake to prosecute. In addition, at each territorial level they have a broad authorization to check on the fulfilment of all decisions from the next higher level. That this check is intended to be close is evidenced by the continued presence of controllers, appointed by the Ukrainian Council of Ministers in agreement with the Ministry officials in Moscow, in all enterprises, warehouses and other agencies subordinate to the government of the republic.

Apparently regarded by the Party as a more important control agency than the Procuracy, the Ministry of State Control is headed by a leading Party figure. For several years the Minister was L. Mekhlis, a member of the Organization Bureau of the All-Union Party Central Committee. In 1950 Mekhlis was replaced by a former head of the security police, V. N.

Merkulov. The ease with which mistakes or misdeeds having no political motivation tend to be made in the U.S.S.R. into acts with political implications makes the appointment of a high official of the secret police to the head of the Ministry of State Control understandable. The importance of the post, on the other hand, makes it one which a man interested in enhancing his power in the system might be expected to want.

Established in December, 1917, as a special instrument for the defense of the Revolution, the security police became over a period of years an instrument which substantially helped Joseph Stalin to emerge as the undisputed boss of the Communist Party and the dictator of the U.S.S.R. It remains arbitrary in its ways and is not in practice subject to the authority of the Procuracy, despite the latter's obligation to see that the laws are strictly obeyed by officials as well as by citizens.¹⁹ With regard to Ukraine, the functions of the security police include protecting high party and government officials, guarding against counter-revolutionary activity in industry and agriculture, investigating and judging the loyalty of those who hold responsible positions in economic administration, guaranteeing the loyalty of the armed forces, and protecting freight movements and the transportation network generally.

19 - The security police began as the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (CHEKA) in 1918. It was then independent of all Government agencies even in the formal table of organization. In an attempt to curb its powers, the CHEKA was re-established in 1922 as the State Political Administration (GPU), under the personal chairmanship of the People's Commissar for Interior, or his deputy. Toward the end of 1923, the GPU became the Special State Political Administration (OGPU), and, under the new Constitution, was attached directly to the All-Union Council of People's Commissars, with its chairman an advisory member of the Council. In mid-1934 the OGPU added to its powers those hitherto exercised by the Commissariat of the Interior, and became united with the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). Early in February, 1941, the security police returned to its original separate administrative status as the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB), but within a few months was reunited with the NKVD. The division of early 1941 was again made in April, 1943, and so it stood, except for a change in name in 1946 (Ministry of State Security (MGB)), until after the death of Stalin. Then the MGB was again merged with the now Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). (Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 360-78.) Since the removal of Beria, who had been the chief of the post-Stalin MVD, a Committee of State Security (KGB) has been in existence as an agency of the Council of Ministers, with, apparently, supervisory authority over the consolidated MVD. Akin to a Union-Republican Ministry, the KGB has a subdivision in the Ukraine.

The Party and the security police are not separate founts of power; yet the police is not simply the obedient arm of the Party. Members of the security police must belong to the Party. Each police unit has a Party organization within it which is supposed to ensure adherence by the policemen to the will of the Party. There is a Special Section in the Secretariat of the All-Union Central Committee of the Party which apparently is concerned with supervision of the political police, and certain groups of another executive agency of the Central Committee, the Party Control Committee, also watch over their powerful agent. Nevertheless, the security police are armed, and, as the mass arrests of Party officials, both high and low, during the late '30's proved so conclusively, this condition gives it a striking advantage in any power contest over those who are not armed. It is in fact a special select army of several divisions. It contributes the international border guards of the USSR, but is at the service of its superiors generally. The only other armed force in the USSR is the Red Army which includes the military navy and air force. The latter is, of course, much larger than the forces at the command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), but it has in every unit a Special Section which consists of MVD personnel and which owes responsibility only to a higher unit in the MVD.

Internal Affairs is another Union-Republican Ministry whose oblast' and raion offices are not subject to check by the executive committees of the corresponding soviets. From the raion and city offices, the state security officers manipulate an intricate network of agent-informers, with no office, enterprise, collective farm, association, or city dwelling unit willingly left uncovered.

The security police are only one part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Ukraine. Additional divisions run the regular police and fire departments in the cities, towns and rural districts, and the regular prisons. The large network of forced labor camps, which have become an important segment of the U.S.S.R.'s economy, is also administered by the MVD, through its Main Administration of Camps (GULAG). Ukraine has had a few such camps in the past, but whether it does still is uncertain. They are few at most, and the great involvement which the people of Ukraine have had with forced labor camps has taken place primarily in other parts of the U.S.S.R.

The Attention to Indoctrination

The top leadership of the Communist Party aims to secure the willing loyalty of the people of Ukraine, as well as to prevent positive acts of disloyalty. Loyalty in this context covers a responsive attitude toward one's work and any special requests of the government and the Party, as well as mere abstention from acts of treason, sabotage, open criticism of the form of government or current policy, or even a lackadaisical attitude toward one's work and role as a citizen.

The successful cultivation of loyalty requires two kinds of performance of any government: satisfying treatment from the standpoint of those whose loyalty is sought, and indoctrination. But since policies of physical or material satisfaction and of indoctrination impinge upon the individual simultaneously, it is impossible to determine loyalty indices with respect to each class of policies separately. If any loyalty index is ever to be constructed--and it will not be done here--it will be an index pointing to a resultant situation, the resultant being the product of two simultaneous forces which are separable in logic but not operationally.

One can infer from the frequent shifts which have occurred in agricultural, industrial, intra-Party, religious, nationality, family and social welfare policies and from the justifications given for these shifts by the leadership that popular dissatisfaction in Ukraine has been a continuing phenomenon. In the Western Ukraine, indeed, it is well established that many of the local citizenry welcomed the arrival of German troops in the early months of the last war; and there is evidence that a similar attitude, but probably not as widespread as in the Western Ukraine, existed at that time in Eastern Ukraine.

The shifts in policy which have just been noted as our chief source of knowledge of dissatisfaction have themselves been attempts to quell the dissatisfaction by appeasement and repression. But alongside of these methods has been the method of indoctrination, the implementation of which takes up a remarkable amount of time and energy. All of the sanctioned indoctrination which in a non-totalitarian society would be shared among many agencies, private as well as public, is in Ukraine, with the exception of indoctrination in the Orthodox religion, the prerogative of the Party. In addition,

the limited capacity of the regime to appease sufficiently in matters of material welfare, due to its disproportionate allocation of resources to the production of non-consumer goods and services, and its unwillingness to appease enough on religious and nationality matters, makes it especially necessary for the leadership to rely upon indoctrination as a means of fostering loyalty. More deliberately than most leadership groups, the rulers of the U.S.S.R. have been trying to train their people to acquire the kind of character which Erich Fromm has said every society must have. It is the kind of character which makes the people "want to act in the way they have to act as members of the society or of a special class within it. They have to desire what objectively is necessary for them to do. Outer force is replaced by inner compulsion, and by the particular kind of human energy which is channelled into character traits."²⁰

Indoctrination has positive and negative facets. It calls both for the presentation of some ideas and the denial of access to others. Presentation and denial, moreover, are not in a dichotomous relationship. The success of the presentation is thought by the Communist leadership to be very much dependent upon the success with which access to contrary ideas is blocked, and this notion is probably correct. The phenomenon is probably common to all societies, but in varying degree, and it is the degree which is important here. A society can be safely exposed to undesirable ideas if there is substantial satisfaction on the part of its members with their existing relationships, although even then there is a risk that exposure to something new will create dissatisfaction where none has previously existed. But in the case of Ukraine, it appears that the satisfaction-intensity index number, if one were to be constructed, would be low. It would be low because the practice of riding roughshod over individuals and their customary social relations, which has characterized the present regime from its inception, evidently continues. The instances, and they have been frequent, in which it has suddenly been announced that a policy of concession here or there would now be pursued, only to have it just as suddenly halted in favor of forced

20 • Fromm, Erich, quoted in Riesman, David, The Lonely Crowd (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955), pp. 19-20.

march once again, are eloquent testimony to the dilemma which the leadership faces. Concessions must be made from time to time because even a tightly ruled area such as Ukraine cannot be run only by threat of punishment. On the other hand, too much of a concession seems, at least to many in the Party leadership, to jeopardize the success of the great goals of sovietism.

Perhaps most of the energy devoted to indoctrination activities is turned toward specific short-run purposes, such as getting workers willingly to work harder for the same real income. But even such limited purposes contribute to the general, longer run purpose of fostering loyalty to the Soviet system as a whole, since overall loyalty is the product of an indeterminate number of specific identifications and satisfactions.

The basic techniques for fostering loyalty through indoctrination, both for specific short-run ends and for the general end of loyalty to sovietism as a whole, are propaganda and agitation. The distinction which countries adhering to the liberal philosophy make between education and propaganda is quite openly repudiated by Soviet philosophy. It is repudiated not only for Soviet countries, but is castigated as either utopian or hypocritical when asserted as a principle by others. The fact of the matter is that Soviet doctrine tends to view thought as a function of existing social patterns and those patterns, in turn, as determined by the existing economic structure.²¹ When one adds to this basic fact the additional one that there is still a social revolution to be completed, it becomes unarguable that all public activity with respect to the formation and development of ideas must be subordinated to goals the general character of which history itself has already ordained. There are, to be sure, degrees of indoctrination, depending upon the subject matter. The natural and biological sciences, removed to some extent from direct encounter with Soviet doctrine concerning the socio-economic order and the state, are recognized more or less as consisting of subject matter which is the same for students everywhere. But the extent to which even these fields of knowledge escape the arms of Soviet indoctrination is

21 - The cause and effect relationship between thought and economic organization constitutes a major ambiguity in Marx's writing and by derivation, in Soviet doctrine. Stalin simply compounded the confusion in 1950 when he singled out language as independent of the economic base.

limited to the extent to which students confine themselves to low-order analysis of problems, that is, analysis which does not approach the level of such far-reaching generalization as to be philosophy. Even below the level of philosophy there are frequent points of contact between things "natural" and things "social" and "humanistic." This is especially true in the biological sciences; and when such contacts occur, sciences must conform to the highest science of all, which is Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and the view of whoever else holds the power which qualifies him as the authoritative proponent of official dogma.

All this is not to say that the traffic in ideas in which the formal educational system, the special Party and adult educational system, books, newspapers and magazines, radio broadcasting and motion pictures engage serve only the purpose of getting people to think like Soviet Men. This traffic has certain additional consequences, which, for many citizens are far more important than, or outweigh the burden of, being constantly bombarded by the official "line." Thus, formal education enables ambitious individuals to acquire the skills and specialized knowledge which are needed to rise occupationally and socially, and very likely politically. Formal and adult education also give many individuals the personal satisfaction which "knowing" what one's world is like provides; and it is beside the point in this matter for the outside observer to contend that such knowledge is false because it must conform to official dogma. So long as the knowledge is taken to be true by the one who possesses it, it will provide this inner satisfaction. Similarly, the music which is so heavily emphasized in radio broadcasting is in its effect primarily recreational, although it has such an important place in broadcasting because the political leadership is determined to have a highly "cultured" people, and in addition are afforded an opportunity to glorify Russian national achievements by demonstrating how rich a musical literature Russians have created.

Propaganda and agitation are distinguished by the kind of audience toward which the indoctrination activity is directed. Soviet doctrine frankly holds that one cannot address himself in the same way to a small number of educated individuals and to a large number of substantially less educated individuals. Propaganda is for those who are able to understand and reflect

upon statements which involve several ideas at one time. It is not directed toward large audiences. Agitation is for the masses, for those to whom appeals must be made in the form of selecting some striking event, characterizing it simply, dramatically, and emotionally.²² Expressed a bit differently, propaganda is addressed to an elite, principally to the Communist Party and the Komsomol, and serves thereby as a basis for the subsequent agitation which Party members and Komsomols carry on among the masses.

According to Soviet doctrine, the great purpose of the Communist Party is not simply to lead the country but to teach it as it leads. This much remains of the original aim--an aim which once seemed eminently practical to many--of having the Party some day turn over its monopoly of power to a people trained to exercise it. It is understandable, then, that the determination of policy with respect to indoctrination, and the administration of such policy, are especially important to the Party. One of the most important duties thrust upon the average Party member and most certainly upon the local Party leader is to carry on agitation among the masses. An equally important duty of higher Party officials is to carry on propaganda among rank and file Party members, lesser Party leaders, and non-Party intellectuals. And to ensure that all this is done as the top leadership wishes, the chief media of communication--newspapers, non-literary and literary magazines, and books--are directly controlled by the Department of Propaganda and Agitation in the Secretariat of the All-Union Central Committee of the Party itself.

The Department of Propaganda and Agitation which is represented in every Party Committee through the city and raion levels is primarily a basic-policy making and supervisory agency. Actual operations in the various fields and on the several territorial levels subject to it are carried on by a multitude of Party, Soviet, trade union and other organizations. But in every one of these organizations the key personnel are members of the Party, responsible to the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.

22 - See Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 38-43.

The sectors into which the Department and its field offices are subdivided cover the whole gamut of intellectual activity insofar as that depends on organized activity and the use of the physical facilities and equipment which only the state makes available. These sectors are: Propaganda, concerned primarily with Party members and non-Party intellectuals; Mass Agitation, which is concerned both with the continuing political education of the masses and the direction of mass agitational activities designed to meet particular tasks which the Party decides to set; Cultural Enlightenment, which supervises the activities of village reading huts, libraries, district 'houses of culture,' and museums; Central Press (newspapers and non-literary journals); Republic, Territorial²³ and Regional (oblast) Press; Local Press; Literature; Radio; Cinematography; Art; Science; and School.²⁴ Radio, cinematography, art, science and schools are assigned for administration to Ministries, or Committees of the U.S.S.R. and Ukrainian Councils of Ministers which have the status of Ministries. Indeed, elementary and secondary schools are administered by Republican Ministries. But Party control over these activities is virtually as close as over those directly within the administrative province of the Party.

All of the media are supposed to indoctrinate and heighten the cultural level of the people, and in the case of schools and scientific institutes to develop skills and carry on research. But the newspaper not only informs, enlightens, propagandizes and agitates; it acts also as a double channel for (1) the dissemination of instructions to Party and government officials and the public at large, and (2) the transmission upward of evidence of poor, illegal, or disloyal performance by local offices, enterprises, and individuals. Part of the reason for assigning this dual function to the newspaper rather than the radio may lie in a belief that the written word is more effective than the word heard fleetingly.²⁵ However, the newspaper is also the less expensive medium for the volume and variety of information and instructions which it can convey. As a matter of fact, the radio tends to be

23. - There are no territories in the Ukraine.

24 - Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 35-6.

25 - Inkeles, op. cit., p. 268.

quite unoriginal in its presentation of the news and borrows very heavily from what the papers have already printed. Rather more than the newspaper, it has the function of providing cultural material--drama, children's programs, and especially classical music.

Censorship in the Soviet System of Indoctrination

Although a censorship agency does exist, it affects only very little the kind of material which citizens of the Ukraine read, hear or see on the motion picture screen. The censorship agency is the Chief Administration for Literary Affairs and Publishing, its short title being Glavlit, and it happens to be attached to the Ministry of Education of the R.S.F.S.R., although its work affects the entire U.S.S.R. A decree of the U.S.S.R. Council of Peoples Commissars of June, 1931 gave Glavlit sweeping powers to "effect political-ideological, military, and economic security or control over press materials, manuscripts, photographs, and similar materials intended for publication and distribution." According to the decree, Glavlit is authorized to censor before and after publication, the latter to verify that the text as printed is the same as the text which had been approved.²⁶ But the same decree also places two far-reaching limitations on Glavlit's power. First, materials published by the Unified State Publishing House, which publishes most Soviet books, are examined before publication by the regular editors of the subsidiary publishing houses which make up the Unified State Publishing House. Second, all Party publications, the government newspaper, Izvestia, and publications of the Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Social Sciences are exempted from political-ideological examination by Glavlit.²⁷ Thus, "the greater and most important part of all printed material in the Soviet Union" is removed from the immediate political control of the official censorship agency. The result is that Glavlit's pre-publication censorship is confined to seeing that material examined does not reveal any military or economic state secrets. Its post-publication censorship is even more perfunctory.²⁸

26 - Inkeles, op. cit. pp. 184-5.

27 - Ibid., p. 185-6.

28 - Ibid., p. 186.

Clearly, the minor role of the formal censorship agency does not signify that the media of communication are free. Rather, it is precisely because they are so utterly a part of the Party-state apparatus, because the publisher and the guardian of the official line are the same, that censorship as it usually is understood is so unimportant.

Local Self Assertion

Within the context of one-Party leadership, executive domination, thorough centralization, a police system effectively outside of the restrictions of law, and government control of the means of communication, Soviet political institutions nevertheless include universal, secret suffrage and the pseudo-guarantee of those rights of the individual which are universally deemed necessary for the working of democratic government. Indeed, as a putatively socialist country, the U.S.S.R. has promulgated a number of social and economic rights, in addition to the better known political rights of free speech, press, assembly, petition, and that group of related rights which together make up what is called due process of law. But these are rights dependent upon the actual ability of the citizen to compel the governmental institutions to cease and desist. It is the effective exercise of political rights which enables citizens together and the citizen as an individual to stand up to government and say, this you may not touch! What happens in Ukraine is that when the government replies--a reply which Russian history and Soviet philosophy supports--we must and shall touch, there is no locus of power outside of the government (which here is meant to include the Party, the army and the police as well as the soviets and their executive committees and the Ministries) which can oppose the violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Thus, the monopoly of power held by the Communist Party is, as for so much of Ukrainian political life, the key to the question of political liberty.

The practical importance of elections for local self-assertion in the Ukraine is of the same order of magnitude as the practical importance of constitutionally guaranteed civil rights. In the case of elections, there is a tremendous mobilization of activity, but this is not for the purpose of electing officials. Rather, campaigning and voting are a means by which

one joins his fellow citizens in applauding what the party and government have been doing or say they intend to do. The resemblance between Ukrainian elections and those held in parliamentary countries is due to the thinnest of veneers. In both only legislatures are elected. But the legislating capacity of Ukrainian legislatures--the republican, oblast', raion, city, settlement and village soviets --is entirely nominal.

The electoral system is territorial, the citizen voting directly for candidates to all soviets from the All-Union through the village level. Thus, a member of a collective farm, in addition to voting for his collective farm chairman, would vote for republican, oblast', raion, and village delegates to the corresponding soviets. However, in the case of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the citizen votes for two kinds of delegates. Each election district in the Ukraine has a delegate in the Soviet of the Union. The Ukraine as a whole, as a national republic, has twenty-five delegates in the Soviet of Nationalities, which legislatively-speaking, is a second chamber.

All candidates are chosen either directly by the Party or by non-Party organizations, subject to Party confirmation. Indeed, the "nomination" process is the closest thing to an election in Ukraine, for at this stage alternate candidates are discussed in meetings especially called for the purpose by trade unions, Komsomol units, collective farms, factories and other functional institutions. These discussions are under Party direction, but at least some discussion of who would make a satisfactory delegate does occur at the "nomination" stage. The final elections, by contrast, consist simply of marking "yes." It is possible, of course to write in "no" or to return an unmarked or deliberately-spoiled ballot. Apparently, however, these latter alternatives are seldom chosen. The slated candidates have been invariably elected by about 98 to 99.5 per cent of the vote cast. Furthermore, almost everyone of voting age is under pressure to, and usually does, vote, and at whatever place he happens to be on election day. Even railroad coaches are outfitted with polling booths, a practice which very clearly points up the unimportance in Soviet elections of the tie which presumably elections are supposed to ensure between Delegate and Constituent.

"Family relations" between local Party officials and local procurators,

on the one hand, and local government officials and managerial personnel, on the other hand, is a far more important means of individual and local assertion against central authority than constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals or elections. A "family relation," as one might guess, is a relation under which the leadership's local representative and gadfly fails to act out this role and instead forms a mutual aid society with those whom he is supposed to watch and check. Family relations were found to be extensive at the end of the last war on the collective farms and in industry.

"Family relations" usually seem to develop from a financial or fear-for-the-job motive. Other motives are conceivable, but it is not easy to isolate them in the contemporary Ukraine. Such a motive might be sympathy for the needs and point of view of the local population on the part of, say, a republican or oblast' first secretary, which may not have existed initially but which develops as times goes on. The top leadership will not tolerate such a situation, but before the situation is discovered a channel for local assertion will have been operative.

Local self-assertion is somewhat more real against local authority in Ukraine than against the central authority. While elections help out no more on the one level than on the other, speech and press tend to be more free against local officeholders or managers. Attacks which are not tolerated against central government figures can be made against the performance of local officials. Such attacks, indeed, are deliberately encouraged by the central leadership as a means by which it can, along with other means, maintain its own centralized supremacy. The local press continuously judges local administrators, some of the criticism being supplied by regular staff and some by worker and peasant correspondents, who write letters from their places of work either in criticism or praise of the way in which the tasks in those places are being carried out.

MAJOR POLICIES IN UKRAINE, I

The Inter-relation of Policies

The basic social goals of rapid industrialization, defense of the U.S. S.R., and continuing Communist Party control of all facets of social life, which the leadership of the U.S.S.R. has been pursuing since 1917, have been noted. To serve these goals the top leadership has over the years devised a multitude of particular policies, the more persistent and comprehensive of which are reflected in the institutional pattern just discussed. Those particular policies which are especially germane to the life of Ukraine will now be considered in greater detail.²⁹

Policy consists of a program of action which is launched in accordance with certain assumptions as to what is required to accomplish a particular set of more or less immediate goals. These assumptions include assumptions as to how the people upon whom the policy will impinge will probably react. Such assumptions are very often proven false, however, or, at any rate, some of any given bundle of assumptions are proven false, when operations are actually under way. It then becomes necessary to modify policy on the basis of modified assumptions. One of the outstanding characteristics of policy in the U.S.S.R. over the years has been a firm determination to proceed with a policy as originally conceived, if at all possible. When modifications of policy have occurred, as they have despite the most intense zeal, they have more often come as a result of a lack of physical means or skill than as a result of public dislike for the initial efforts at implementation. Still, public opinion has never been wholly disregarded in the U.S.S.R. It is policy as originally conceived and as modified, when it has been modified, in response to difficulties which arise after implementation has begun, that will be dealt with in the succeeding pages.

Although the basic social goals are commonly shared by the Communist

29 - In discussing official policies in the U.S.S.R., there is no reality in assuming autonomy in either the purposes, the implementation, or the consequences of the various facets of the total block of policies--industrial, agricultural, cultural, political, religious, communications--that one can point to at any given time. Yet, the convenience of treating a country's total policy as if it were composed of lesser independent policies is so great as to justify doing so here.

Party leadership, important differences of opinion exist as to policies which have far-reaching consequences for the power of individuals, and have been an outstanding feature of the history of the Party. Deviant opinion is easily made into subversive opinion by those who currently have the power to condemn it.

The two basic operational techniques employed by the central leadership in Ukraine, or any leadership anywhere, are (1) to manipulate physical and material conditions, and (2) to manipulate the attitudes of the population. Usually both are used together. This chapter discusses the new physical conditions which the policy makers want to bring about, and actually succeed in bringing about; and the attitudes of the people affected by them, as desired by the leadership and as they actually develop.

Insofar as attitudes result from the experience of physical conditions, they cannot be easily discussed without reference to those conditions. We shall discuss first those attitudes which relate to the Soviet system as a whole, and consider the attitudes of the people of the Ukraine in terms of the ideal which the Soviet leadership has set forth for them--that of the Soviet Man.

The ideal of the "Soviet Man" was envisaged from the very beginning of the Bolshevik era. It is a development--under specific conditions of life and tradition in the U.S.S.R.--of the Marxist contention that the inherent goodness of human nature could be restored to the actual world once the good social order proclaimed by Marxism came into being.

The "Soviet Man," or desired personality type, embodies the values approved by the Soviet leadership as consistent with the official philosophical system, and behaves in ways which serve the ends of official policy. The "Soviet-Man" is at one and the same time the product and the creator of the new society which the Soviets seek to establish, and exhibits approximately the same personality characteristics in whatever part of the Soviet Union he may live.

The desired personality is one which conforms to the norms of belief and behavior established by one state and by its Communist leadership. The "Soviet Man" is unswervingly loyal to the Party and to the Soviet fatherland, and obedient to the authority of the Party and government. For him,

all questions are political questions. He "internalizes" the approved attitudes, and his strong morality is the expression of these attitudes.

The Soviet Man must be an activist; passive acquiescence is insufficient--he must display initiative in pursuing official goals, contribute his own quota of knowledge and skill to accomplish the tasks set for him, and even exceed minimal requirements therein. He must recognize error in himself and others, as pointed out by proper authorities, and must even volunteer criticism of himself and others when he perceives defects of attitude and effort.

This desired personality is group-oriented, and seeks the social meaning and the social means for all work in which he is involved. He is thus an active, informed and loyal participant in carrying out the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet state.

The effort to create the Soviet Man has run into two kinds of inter-lapping difficulties in Ukraine. Sovietization, the master policy, inflicts severe material, moral, and intellectual deprivations on many of the people. In addition, the great majority of the people--the ethnic Ukrainians--possessed a full set of traditional values which has tended to make them think of themselves as different from the other nationality groups within the U. S. S. R. It is true that the process of sovietization tends to destroy traditional values, both by intent and simply because it creates a radically different way of life than the people of the Ukraine have hitherto known. But as the rigors of sovietization have generated hostility to the regime and the system which it represents, they seem also to have augmented rather than reduced that part of the Ukrainian tradition which has regarded Russians as aliens and conquerors. Most of the Soviet leadership is of Russian ethnic background, and it may well be that economic deprivation, the lack of political freedom, and the anguish caused by forced and rapid social change has not only generated hostility to the Soviet system on these counts alone but has driven Ukrainians who were not always nationalists to express their hostility in nationalistic attitudes.

Nor can the acceptance of the new Soviet value system, with its culmination in the Soviet Man, by the other and lesser non-Russian nationalities in the Ukraine be taken for granted.

Unable to transform the people of Ukraine into Soviet Men in short order, the leadership has tended more and more to introduce certain traditional Russian national values as the values which all citizens of Ukraine should accept. But these Russian national values are not the totality out of which the culture and patriotism of the people of Ukraine is being shaped. Conditions of life which have had no connection with Russian national values are at least as important in the shaping process, and it would be a mistake to conclude that the effort to create the Soviet Man has simply degenerated into a revival of the pre-Revolutionary policy of russification.³⁰

Agricultural Policy

The Party leadership has attempted to satisfy three needs in its agricultural policy in Ukraine: (1) to increase greatly the production of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials; (2) to satisfy the workers sufficiently so that they will cooperate in the effort that is necessary to achieve that increase; and (3) to establish and retain Party control of the process. Simultaneous aims, they have not always been mutually compatible, and policy has at times stressed one at the expense of another. It appears that to this day these aims have not been fully reconciled, indeed, that there has been substantial failure on all three counts. The volume of agricultural production in the Ukraine appears to be substantially less than that which the leadership deems necessary for its purposes. Discontent among the Ukrainian peasants is probably greater than among any other socio-economic group in the republic. And Party control in Ukraine is least well established in the countryside.

The motivation for the early collectivization policy, which began in late 1928, seems to have been a combination of the desire to increase production to support the new industrialization program, with the desire to thwart the crystallization of a private property-conscious peasantry which could never be assimilated into a fully socialist society. Thinking first primarily in economic terms, the leadership moved cautiously, planning a degree of collectivization that would correspond to the amount of agricultural machinery which the industrial side of the First Five Year Plan was

30 - See "Nationality Policy:" below.

thought capable of providing. Within a few months, however, the decision was suddenly taken in favor of wholesale collectivization, as the resistance to collectivization which had already shown itself among Ukrainian peasants convinced the leadership that strong measures were necessary to eliminate a bourgeois-minded peasantry.

From the earliest days of the Bolshevik regime the ultimate goal for agriculture was a system of agricultural "factories," as much like industrial and mining enterprises as possible, through which the anomaly of a large peasant population in a socialist society could be removed. The state farms which have existed from the mid-twenties and which increased in number simultaneously with collectivization are thus far the closest Ukrainian agriculture has come to agricultural "factories." The state farms, however, have been of secondary importance, being reserved for specialty crops and livestock raising. The collective farm was established in the early thirties as the characteristic form of agricultural organization. This was as far as the regime felt able to go in provoking the peasantry, and at that it was felt necessary to deport tens of thousands of resistant "kulaks."

During the Second World War a remarkable unofficial abandonment of the collective farm system took place in Ukraine. An important reason for the welcome which many Ukrainian peasants at first gave to the German invader seems to have been the expectation that the Germans would break up the collectives and restore private ownership and private cultivation.³¹ There was evidently great disappointment when the occupier decided to keep the collective farms because of the greater productivity of which they were thought capable.³² By 1943, however, the Germans were in retreat, and in the areas abandoned by them, writes Fainsod,

the kolkhozes usually had been stripped of their cattle and draft animals and only the most primitive farm implements remained. Collective farmers utilized the general confusion and disorder to enlarge their garden plots at the expense of the kolkhoz. In the reoccupied areas farms usually had to be reorganized from the ground up, and

31 - Western Ukrainians, within the U.S.S.R. for less than two years when the German invasion occurred, were much more hostile to the U.S.S.R. and friendly to the invaders than the Eastern Ukrainians, who had been part of the U.S.S.R. since 1920.

32 - See Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism.

the shortage of supervisory personnel, draft animals, and mechanical power heightened tendencies toward individual self-help. In nonoccupied as well as reoccupied areas collective farmers were under a powerful incentive to pour maximum effort into their own garden plots rather than into the communal enterprises of the kolkhoz. With food scarce, prices skyrocketed on the free market. Any surpluses from the garden plots could be readily bartered at advantageous rates for the possessions of the hungry population of the towns. Collective farmers who were in a position to do so used the war emergency to accumulate stores of goods as well as substantial hoards of currency. Within the framework of the collective farm system, a lively revival of individual enterprise found spontaneous expression. While the war still raged, little was done to curb these tendencies. Indeed, rumors were rife in the villages (and were apparently tolerated by the regime) that the end of the war would see a fundamental revision of the kolkhoz system and a new charter of freedom for the peasantry.³³

Any toleration by the Party leadership of hopes for a fundamental revision of the collective farm system was probably purely a wartime concession to public opinion which was not intended to survive the war. The temporary nature of this concession is strongly evidenced by the rapidity with which the Party leadership moved after September, 1946, to renew the collective farm system and to recover and even intensify its prewar position of control over it.

Following the publication of a joint resolution of the All-Union Party Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, "On Measures for the Liquidation of Violations of the Charter of the Agricultural Artel in the Collective Farms," a special Council of Kolkhoz Affairs was established in October, 1946. Indicative of the importance which the Party leadership attached to the work of the Council was the appointment to the chairmanship of A. A. Andreev, the Politburo member who had for some time been especially associated with agricultural matters. While the routine administration of agriculture was left to the Ministry of Agriculture, the inspectorial and disciplinary side of administration was placed in the hands of the Council. The Council's work, significantly, included the disciplining of local party and governmental officials who had used their power to accumulate "'free of charge or at low price, property, cattle, and produce belonging to the collective farms.'" After correcting such abuses, the party leadership,

33 - Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 452-3.

speaking through Andreev, began a campaign to strengthen Party authority in the collective farms and machine tractor stations, and a vigorous effort was made to expand the network of machine tractor station and collective farm party organizations. Between 1939 and 1949 the number of collective farms having a party unit tripled. It is a measure of the comparative thinness of party representation in the collectives, however, that, even with this tripling, 85 per cent of the collectives still lacked primary Party organizations and the agitators associated with the primary organizations.

The preceding remarks should not be construed as suggesting any formal opposition in the countryside. But there more than anywhere else in Ukraine is an opportunity for evasion of Party directives and control.

In 1950 a long step toward the agricultural "factory" was taken. Collective farms were consolidated with the aim of having them emerge in their new form as agro-cities. Villages were to be merged and the opportunity to work private plots greatly reduced. In about a year, one gathers, this ambitious scheme was halted, although the consolidation of many smaller collectives which had already occurred was not reversed. The present First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, was especially associated with this trend. Economic considerations were again probably involved. But the problem of strengthening Party control over agriculture intruded visibly.

Although the agro-cities policy was no longer evident after 1951, the related policy of attempting to limit the attention which the peasant gave to his private plot continued until after the death of Stalin in early 1953. Heavy taxation on the product of private cultivation was the principal weapon employed. It seems, however, that it was the private sector of agriculture which was keeping the livestock situation from sinking lower than it had. Consequently, in order to increase the numbers of livestock--a very urgent present policy--the tax load on the product of private farming has been drastically reduced.

Industrial Policy

The three basic needs of the central leadership which we have noted with respect to agriculture--increased production, minimal producer satisfaction and party control--hold equally for industry. But, as between the two areas, both the theory and practice of Bolshevism have always treated indus-

trial expansion as the pre-eminent need and agricultural expansion as basically a means to industrial expansion. Unlike the case in agriculture, private enterprise never touched more than some minor areas of industrial production under the Bolshevik regime.

Determined to transform as quickly as possible a backward rural economy into a foremost industrial economy capable of supporting a Great Power, the leadership has persistently stressed the priority of heavy industry. The stress on heavy industry has meant fewer material and human resources available for the production of the consumer goods which individuals need or think they ought to have in their daily lives. There has been, consequently, a continuing problem of consumer satisfaction both in urban and rural communities. As in the case of agriculture, Ukraine has been more intimately involved than any of the other republics of the U.S.S.R., for as it has been the richest agricultural region of the U.S.S.R., it has also been the most highly industrialized and the one most capable of intensive development of heavy industry because of its large iron and coal resources.

During the past year the argument over the relative emphasis which ought to be placed on light or consumer-goods and heavy or capital-goods industry has been closely associated with an internal struggle for power within the Communist Party. The argument, it should be noted, has repeatedly cropped up in Party councils. It has never been a case of one or the other, but of how much more emphasis at a particular time on one or the other.

Difficulties in ensuring Party control of industrial life in Ukraine have not been as severe as those attendant upon trying to strike a balance between the maximum production of capital goods and minimal consumer satisfaction. But they persist. The principle of one-man rule in industrial management which was adopted during the thirties is still upheld. Much turns on the meaning which the local, raion, and oblast Party leaders give to the instruction that they must control plan fulfilment in the sense of supervising it, but not interfere with the functions of the manager. There is probably considerable variation from plant to plant in the degree of intervention which the responsible Party officials undertake.

The exposed border position of the republic, in combination with the leadership's desire to open up new interior areas of the U.S.S.R. for indus-

try has led to an industrial location policy in recent years which militates against the ultimate maintenance of Ukraine's position as the leading center of heavy industry.

Consumer Satisfaction Policy

Consumer satisfaction depends chiefly upon the decisions which the central leadership makes concerning the allocation of resources to consumer goods and services and to capital goods. However, within a given resource allocation for consumer goods and services it is possible to make a variety of decisions as to the kinds of goods and services which will be made available. Were it thought desirable to have an equalitarian society, the production of luxuries could be sharply limited and that of common staples stressed. There is every indication that it is current policy in Ukraine to please especially those whose incomes permit them to buy luxuries. This is consistent with the development which has been taking place since the end of rationing in 1934 of a system of socio-economic classes very similar in its general configuration to that which exists in non-Soviet countries. Insofar as material gratification makes for loyalty to the regime which provides it, this policy appears to reflect not only the desire of the more highly placed members of the Party hierarchy for material compensation commensurate with their social status, but also a calculated effort to make the non-Party intellectuals--executives, engineers, professional people, higher civil servants--also regard sovietism as a good thing.

Related to the matter of consumer satisfaction is the settled practice of the soviet system of providing an income to all in the form of certain social welfare services which are in addition to wages and salaries. Included in this supplementary income are medical and hospital care, free elementary education and lower high school education, and old age retirement benefits. Although hospital and educational facilities are certainly affected by the extent to which resources are allocated to consumer goods and services, they provide citizens with a constant, albeit small, increment of income.

Intraparty Policy

All of the policies discussed above are policies of the Communist Party. Their formulation and implementation, however, have been influenced by, and have influenced, the internal organization and activity of the

Party, too. An understanding of contemporary policy in Ukraine, therefore, requires some knowledge of inraparty policy.

During the early twenties, before the sovietization policy had yet emerged³⁴ and the rigid insistence on uniformity of behavior which has characterized sovietization was still in the future, the Bolshevik Party in Ukraine admitted to membership a substantial number of former Left Social Revolutionaries who had previously adopted the name, Borot'bists. The Borot'bists were strictly a Ukrainian phenomenon. They were very close to the Bolsheviks in their economic philosophy and program before the October Revolution, but they were also staunch Ukrainian nationalists. They did not want an independent Ukraine, as did the men of the Rada and Directory, but they believed that local autonomy and Union-wide socialism were compatible.

There was much opposition among the Bolsheviks to including the Borot'bists within the Bolshevik party when the request was made in 1919, but with Lenin in favor of the action the request was granted. Borot'bists rose to important positions in the republic's Party and governmental apparatus, their outstanding representative being Shumsky, who was Commissar of Education for Ukraine in the mid-twenties. It was, as a matter of fact, the Commissariat of Education which became the focal point of the Ukrainization policy which the central leadership fostered for several years prior to 1928.

The original Bolshevik mistrust of the Borot'bists never disappeared; and when the First Five Year Plan was put into operation, the Borot'bists were purged from the Party.

Although individuals who had been associated with still other parties prior to and during the early months after the October Revolution did manage to enter and remain in the Party, the Borot'bists were the only ones who ever joined the Bolshevik Party in Ukraine as a group.

During the twenties, also, the Party leadership recruited industrial workers almost exclusively, and in order to qualify these new members for

34 - That is, before it was decided to embark on the extensive and also rapid industrialization and collectivization program of the First Five Year Plan. There were, of course, tendencies in the direction of what we have defined as sovietization from the first months of Bolshevik power.

responsible Party and governmental positions a fairly elaborate program of general and technical, as well as political, education was organized for them. With the greatly increased emphasis on industrial development, which came at the end of the twenties, however, practical difficulties in relying almost exclusively upon a group which as a whole possessed little education and specialized skill became marked. And by the time the Second Five Year Plan was put into operation in 1933, managerial and engineering personnel of non-working class as well as working class origin were being recruited into the Party. In all likelihood, the rising international menace after 1933 accentuated the policy of trying to tie others than workers to the survival of the regime. At the end of 1936 the new "Stalin" Constitution, by omitting all classifications based on social origin, signalled that the leadership regarded class warfare and class discrimination within the U.S.S.R. to be at an end.

Of course, with the passage of years even the possibility of recruiting into the Party anyone who had ever been affiliated with another political group grew less and less. But as social classes, not unlike those found in non-Soviet countries, have also emerged with the passage of years, the policy of favoring workers for Party membership has been entirely superseded. A small number of skilled workers who have made unusually good records have been recruited in recent years. But by far the largest portion of the newer membership comes from the new intellectuals, the people of advanced education and highly specialized skills. At the same time, even intellectuals who are not deemed fit or ready for Party membership are being exposed to a vigorous program of indoctrination in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. For this group evening "universities" have been established in Kiev and Kharkov directly under the Party since the end of World War II. They offer two-year programs and award certificates of completion.³⁵

The Communist Party has thus become an elite group in two senses. Its membership still constitutes less than five per cent of the population of Ukraine. But this membership, in addition, has tended more and more to be drawn from a numerically small segment of that population. On the other hand, membership in the party is still possible for children of working class or peasant parents, even if not likely for the parents. This remains true

35 - Inkeles, op. cit., p. 54.

even though there has been a reduction of opportunity since 1940, as a result of two policies then introduced: (1) the charging of tuition fees in technical institutes and universities, and (2) the conscripting of certain students--mainly of working class origin, it seems--³⁶ for industrial work for several years, upon completion or before completion of secondary education. Indeed, the opportunity of rising has been the most important means by which the regime has protected itself while repressing the cultivation of non-Russian group values in Ukraine. The Ukrainian and other non-Russian cultures in the republic are severely restrained. But individuals from these cultural backgrounds, provided they play the game right, and that may well mean knowing and using Russian rather than their mother tongues, can reach places of power and status.

Party purges have been recurrent phenomena, and Ukraine has been strongly affected by them. These "cleansings" have had several motivations, ranging from considerations of efficiency and "public relations" to rivalries of factions seeking to become dominant in the Party.

Major purges affecting Ukraine have been those of the Borot'bists, other Ukrainian Communists associated with the Ukrainization policy of the mid-twenties, adherents of Trotsky, and the Rightist Bloc (led by Bukharin and Rykov). Most of the "Trotskyites" were purged after the exiling of Trotsky in 1927, but many of those who fell during the Great Purge of 1936-38 were accused of having been Trotskyites. Most of the other victims during the Great Purge were accused of having been part of the Rightist conspiracy, while both the Trotskyite and Rightist conspirators were alleged to have sought not only the assassination of Stalin and other leaders of the Party and government, but of working with the German government to make war on the U.S.S.R. and turn Ukraine over to Germany.

During the second half of the Great Purge occurred the most remarkable events of all. Hitherto, Party members who had been associated with one or another of the leaders of the opposition had been arrested. Now, members who had been known as Stalin's men also were caught up. Why events took this turn has not been satisfactorily explained to this day. In Ukraine one of Stalin's closest associates, Postyshev, who had been dispatched to the republic at the end of 1932 to deal with the difficult situation

36 - Bienstock, et al, op. cit., pp. 122-23.

then obtaining and who had done his job well enough to earn the hatred of most Ukrainians, was arrested. One commentator contends with respect to Postyshev, that he was purged because on one important occasion at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party he had taken the side of an argument opposed to that which Stalin took.³⁷ Another commentator, a Ukrainian, argues that as time went on Postyshev mellowed in his Ukrainian policy and thus came to be regarded by Stalin and his closest colleagues in the Politburo as unreliable.

Nothing like the sensational purge of 1936-38 has recurred in Ukraine. However, in a more quiet manner and on less grand a scale the policy of purge persists. Thus, during the eighteen months after the end of World War II, almost 50% of the first secretaries of the district Party organizations in Ukraine were removed.³⁸

Another important event of the postwar years indicative of a policy shift is the change in Party rules concerning the prerequisites of membership. Acceptance of the program and rules of the Party and undertaking to engage actively in some Party work, especially agitation in the factory or in the collective and machine tractor station, is all that is required. A reasonable mastery of the tenets of Marxism-Leninism is no longer a prerequisite of membership. Mastery of the basic doctrine of the Party is an obligation of the member to be met by study.³⁹

Terror as a Policy

An adjunct to each class of policies designed to further the process of sovietization is the policy of intimidation and sudden, seemingly arbitrary, arrest and punishment. One is justified in labeling this policy a policy of terror because it is an obvious continuation of the avowedly terroristic policy pursued by the Bolshevik leadership during the Civil War and into the early twenties. The administration of terror was the function at first of an Extraordinary Commission whose abbreviated full

37 - Kostyuk, Hryhory, The Fall of Postyshev (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954).

38 - Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 195-6.

39 - Inkeles, op. cit., p. 50.

title spelled out Cheka, and, as one of the Cheka leaders, Latsis, said in 1921, "'In its activities the Cheka has endeavored to produce such an impression on the people that the mere mention of the name Cheka would destroy the desire to sabotage, to extort, and to plot. '"⁴⁰

Once given its head, the policy of terror went far beyond protecting the Revolution against its enemies. Or perhaps it is that those who wielded the terror found themselves, as a result of the power which this constituted, able to redefine the term "counter-revolutionary" in any way and as frequently as they pleased.

The policy of terror has not affected the average citizen of Ukraine in his daily life to the same extent since the end of the Great Purge of 1938. It has been reserved for special groups, such as suspect Western Ukrainians. For the ordinary citizen, rather, it means an awareness that he can have the political police upon him at any time. He knows that there are agents of the police in virtually every place where a substantial number of people come together and that the police themselves, while part of the party apparatus, are at least on the local level autonomous and responsible only to the police next above them in the hierarchy.

40 - Quoted in Harold Berman, Russia in Focus (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1951), p. 195.

MAJOR POLICIES IN UKRAINE: NATIONALITY

Sources of Nationality Policy in Ukraine

"Bourgeois nationalism" has appeared more often as a charge against both party and non-party persons in Ukraine than in most other parts of the USSR. In view of the size, population, and economic importance of Ukraine, moreover, the Ukrainian is the most important nationality problem which the leaders of the USSR face. This does not mean that nationalism among ethnic Ukrainians outweighs all other consideration in their attitudes toward the present regime. Indeed, interviews with a rather large number of recent refugees from Ukraine indicate that non-national considerations are prior in the thinking of ethnic Ukrainians, but that there is a latent feeling about the differences between Ukrainians and Russians which is susceptible of being harnessed to dissatisfaction with one's economic or social position.⁴¹ Evidently, also, nationalism is more intense in the newer parts of the Ukrainian S.S.R. than in those which have been under sovietism since the early years of the regime. There are very clear indications of this latter point in the circumstances surrounding the deposition in June, 1953, of L. G. Melnikov, first secretary of the Party in Ukraine. Melnikov was denounced, presumably under the inspiration of Lavrenti Beria, for carrying on a reign of terror in an attempt to russify the Western Ukraine, which had been taken from Poland in September 1939, lost to the Germans for part of the war, and then recovered in 1944. Although Melnikov's russification policy may well have been the least of his sins in the eyes of his contemners, the charges against him do at least indicate that the regime faced a serious nationality problem in the new regions.

Nevertheless, there is a nationality problem for the regime in both Eastern and Western Ukraine. That much appears certain, even though we cannot delineate its extent and intensity with precision. Opposed to the leadership's unremitting aim of fostering the values of a new identification,

41 - See Frederick Wyle, et al, The Nationality Problem in the Soviet Union: the Ukrainian Case (Project on the Soviet Social System, Russian Research Center, Harvard University: A Final Report Submitted to the Director, Officer Education Research Laboratory - AFP and TRC of ARDC) (1954)

that of the "Soviet Man, " is a people which has not lost touch with ancestral values. Among these people, moreover, are some - we cannot say how many - who wish to cultivate love for all which they regard as having historically differentiated them from other peoples, and especially from the Russians. They are the active Ukrainian nationalists, and they praise those periods of their history and those symbols which show the national distinctiveness at its clearest.

Whether all Ukrainians who view their cultural heritage in this light also want a political establishment separate from the USSR is much less easily ascertained. There are two possible sources from which data on this matter can be secured, and one of them, the people living in Ukraine, is closed to the outside student. The other source, former residents of Ukraine now living in the United States or in other places outside of the U.S.S.R. are the second source. From them we can secure voluminous data, but their views cannot simply be declared to be the views of those who remain in Ukraine.

This much of an inference about sentiment in Ukraine today for an independent state we can make. People of this persuasion having come out of Ukraine from 1919 to the present (although very few have been able to come out since the consolidation of Soviet authority at the end of the war), it is probable that some of this persuasion remain in Ukraine, having been unable to leave. An important qualification is that most of those who have left Ukrainian soil since 1919 are Western Ukrainians, who were under Polish rule until 1939 and who were removed from under U.S.S.R. rule by the German occupation from 1941 to 1943-4. Thus, if the emigration factor were the only one upon which we could hand a conclusion, we could at best speak mainly about the Western Ukraine. But there is a second factor which, although it is not by itself a satisfactory index of nationalist sentiment, may with caution be used to supplement what is said by the more recent émigrés. This factor consists of the frequent warnings against bourgeois nationalist expressions or activities in Ukraine which the leadership has made down to recent months. Yet, when all has been said, we are obliged to conclude that we simply do not know even approximately how much separatist sentiment there may exist in Ukraine, or how close it may be to the surface of Ukrainian thought.

The Ukrainian emigrés who want an independent Ukraine depend for their argument to a remarkable extent upon a set of interpretations of distant, in some matters very distant, historical events, which are in many essential respects both obscure and hotly debated. Fortunately, it is not necessary for one who would like to discuss contemporary conditions in Ukraine to know who is right or wrong on these matters. He ought to know who is saying what about the past, because statements about the past, when they are made part of contemporary political argument are contemporary facts. But he does not have to be sure, in order to decide whether the Ukrainians are a nation or not, whether the people who inhabited the central Dneper lands from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries were or were not the biological ancestors of today's Ukrainians.

Ukrainian nationalist doctrine, as it has been presented (by persons and in written sources) outside of Ukraine over many years, claims for Ukrainians a racial origin quite different from that of the Russians, noting in particular the strong Finnish and Tartar elements in the latter. Ukrainians, on the other hand, are held to be essentially Dinaric, a racial designation which is sometimes given to the South Slavs, who now live to the southwest of the Ukrainians.⁴² These asserted racial differences are not simply physical differences. They are assumed to be associated with moral and intellectual qualities. Consequently, both race and history, according to Ukrainian nationalist doctrine, explain the moral and intellectual differences between Ukrainian Man and Russian Man which the doctrine stresses so much.

Between the First and Second World Wars, and especially after the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany, some Ukrainian nationalists, in exile in Germany,⁴³ developed a racial doctrine which contained many of the qualities of Nazi racial doctrine. However, the racialist element in Ukrainian nationalist doctrine antedates this latter-day development and is not dependent upon it, although the two have common roots in the pseudo-

42 - See Dolnytsky, Myron "A Geographer Looks at Eastern Europe," Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. VII, (Winter, 1951) p.40

43 - Western Ukrainians, mainly, in exile from that part of the Ukraine under Polish rule.

scientific thought about race which came to the fore during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Having established the theme of a unique ethnicity, most Ukrainian nationalists then proceed to mark out the territorial boundaries within which the people who are deemed to exhibit this ethnicity live. These boundaries are much more extensive than the political boundaries of the Ukrainian S.S.R. And since virtually all of the territory which is currently outside of the Ukrainian S.S.R. that is claimed as ethnographically Ukrainian is within the RSFSR, a "pure" nationalist ground for antagonism toward both the present regime and the Russian face of that regime exists.

The Ukrainian nationalist territorial claim is most limited and least charged with emotion in the Chernigov area, which is today border country between the Ukrainian and Belorussian S.S. R.'s. More extensive, and more charged with emotion because Great Russians are the antagonists, is the claim to the Kursk and Voronezh areas, which border on the north and northeast of the Ukrainian S.S.R., respectively. Most extensive of all is the claim to the Kuban river valley and the Northern Caucasus, areas into which Ukrainian emigration has moved in large numbers during the last two hundred years.

Ukrainian history and the Ukrainian language also have a distinctive character, in the Ukrainian nationalist view. The language, a fully independent member of the Slavonic family of languages, is held to be remote from Russian. The people who inhabited the areas around the city of Kiev from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries - the heartland of the Kievan Rus' state, which was overturned in the mid-thirteenth century by the Mongol invasions - are held to be the direct ancestors of today's Ukrainians. At the same time, they are not the ancestors of the Great Russians, it is insisted.⁴⁴ Before the mid-seventeenth century and the ill-fated Treaty of Pereyaslavl, which tied Cossack Ukraine to Muscovy,

44 - See Mikhail Hrushevsky, "The Traditional Scheme of Russian History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs," (1903), reprinted in Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences of the United States, Vol. II, No. 4 (Winter, 1952) 355-6. See also T. Doroshenko, A History of the Ukraine (Edmonton: the Institute Press, Ltd., 1939) p. 26

runs the nationalist thesis, the history of Ukraine and of Muscovy took entirely independent courses. The Ukrainian people were intimately associated with Western European civilization, by way of Poland; the Great Russians were Byzantine and Oriental by association and outlook. A major theme of Ukrainian nationalist history is the life of the Cossacks, people who fled from the onerous feudal and foreign control of Polish nobles to a free life on the left bank of the Dneper. There the Cossacks developed a highly individualistic community which was totally different from any organizational forms in either Muscovy or Poland. Singled out from among these people are the much smaller number of men who lived in a military community on an island in the Dneper below the Zaporozhe rapids. It was around this community that a Ukrainian Cossack state was organized, the leader, or Hetman, being elected annually by a vote of all members of the island group.⁴⁵ The gradual absorption of the Ukrainian Cossack state by Muscovy (later Russia) during the second half of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is characterized as Muscovite imperialism.

Ukrainian political nationalism is most anti-Soviet in the area of agricultural organization, but even here opinion varies. State control of industry receives a rather favorable response. Here it is perhaps necessary to distinguish representatives of Ukrainian nationalism who are outside of the U. S. S. R. and who unqualifiedly denounce sovietism, and their nationalist colleagues who remain in Ukraine. As has been said, we do not know how many of the latter there are. However, we do know that one of the sore points between Western and Eastern Ukrainian nationalists who came together in the German occupied Ukraine during the Second World War was the insistence of the latter on the inclusion of the principle of extensive state control of industry in the nationalist program. Significantly, the Western Ukrainians finally conceded the point.⁴⁶ Indeed, the followers of one of the two most celebrated leaders of the wartime nationalist movement Mel'nyk, were even obliged to abandon denunciation of the collective farm in favor of a program which left to its members the

45 - The Zaporozhe Sich (Fastness)

46 - Armstrong, John, Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-45 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955) p. 128

decision to retain or abolish it⁴⁷ But, first and foremost, Ukrainian nationalists are anti-Russian. This is not to say that they consign all individual Russians to the category of national enemies. But (it is to say that) Ukrainian nationalists find an enemy in anyone who attempts to tie the Ukraine to a Russian national state.

There is some indication of the growth under sovietism of another attitude concerning the kind of political entity which Ukraine ought to be. On the basis of a study of attitudes in Ukraine during the Second World War, one writer points to a fairly widespread tendency on the part of many ethnic Ukrainians and of many Russians in Ukraine to reject any ethnic national creed in favor of a creed based on identification with the territory of the Ukraine.⁴⁸

The central leadership of the U.S.S.R. for its part, and in all likelihood the local leadership in Ukraine which the central authorities control closely, are utterly opposed to a politically separate or even autonomous Ukraine. To support this basic policy and at the same time pursue the other basic policy of sovietization, however, the central leadership has been obliged repeatedly to shift, first in one direction, then in another. At any given moment the operational technique has been to make the least number of concessions to nationalism consistent with the twin policies of keeping the U.S.S.R. together and driving ahead with sovietization.

The Trans-national and Russian-national Elements in Nationality Policy in Ukraine

Nationality policy in Ukraine has been influenced by two rather contradictory factors. The great aim has been to replace all traditional national values by a set of new supra-national values. When it was still expected up to 1924 that revolution would come upon the rest of Europe and perhaps even other parts of the world, these new values were conceived of as truly international values. But after 1924, too, the goal has been to foster a value system that would be supra-national for at least the many nationalities living within the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the leadership

47 - Ibid.

48 - Ibid., pp. 268-9, 276

of the state which the Bolsheviks created has from the beginning been held by men of Russian cultural attachment, even if in some very outstanding cases they were not of Russian ethnicity.

The early Bolsheviks did not glorify their Russian identification. This would have been totally at odds with the internationalist character of their creed. But they were impatient of non-Russians, especially non-Russian Marxists, who wished to join socialism with nationalism and national self-determination. The Russian language and Russian culture, as all other national languages and cultures, were destined to be transitory, they believed. Ultimately, under communism, there would assuredly not be the language and culture of any existing national group. Was not culture, after all, but part of the superstructure which rested upon the economic organization of society?

Nevertheless, there were some Bolsheviks in the years just after the seizure of power who were inclined toward Russian nationalism. Despite their Bolshevik creed, they took it for granted that Russian culture was superior to all of the other cultures in the U.S.S.R. What existed here was a species of ethnocentrism which is worldwide and ages old. The degree of articulateness with which such Bolsheviks held to their Russian nationalism varied. But it was present to an extent sufficient to justify Lenin and others of the top leadership, including Stalin, in a decade-long policy of criticism and punishment of what were thought to be manifestations of great Russian chauvinism.

Crucial to the subsequent history of Great Russians nationalism in the Communist Party has been the preponderance of Russians recruited into the party since before the Revolution. This was not directly a nationality policy, for it defined no particular national cultural values. Its purpose, rather, was to enlist the positive support of the group most likely to prove loyal to Bolshevik aims. Yet the recruitment policy of the twenties was of fundamental importance to all specific nationality policies. For with Party membership went political power and therewith the capacity to make decisions concerning the formulation and implementation of nationality policies.

In 1922, seventy-two percent of the Party membership in the

U. S. S. R. was of Russian nationality.⁴⁹ A correspondingly high proportion of Party membership in Ukraine was of Russian nationality. There may have been some Russian nationalist bias in this recruitment. But it is doubtful that such bias was of major importance. More important was the fact that the Bolsheviks were doctrinally committed to the working class and committed against all other classes, including the peasantry. This, notwithstanding the middle and even upper class origin of many of the best known Bolshevik leaders. Although these commitments for and against were not always adhered to rigidly, it required an exceptional personal history during the twenties for a person of non-working class origin to gain admission into the Party. While even among Russians the working class constituted a small fraction of the population, more workers were of Russian than of any other nationality. The working class of the Ukrainian cities was predominantly Russian. For their part, the Russian workers of the Empire had tended to favor Bolsheviks or Mensheviks⁵⁰ among the groups opposed to the Tsarist regime. Some of these workers remained Menshevik in sympathy even after the Bolshevik seizure of power, but many others seem to have looked to the new regime with friendly expectation.

Contributing to our judgment that the preponderance of Russians in the Bolshevik Party of the twenties was not due to any major extent to Russian nationalist bias against non-Russians is the vigorous effort that was made then to recruit non-Russians into both the Party and the government departments. By 1927, this effort had increased the Ukrainian percentage of the Party from 5.9 to 11.7.⁵¹ On the other hand, the

49 - Pipes, op. cit. p. 269.

50 - The Mensheviks were the more moderate wing of the Marxist Party in the Russian empire, an organizational split between them and the Bolsheviks having occurred in 1903.

51 - Fainsod, op. cit. p. 219.

most powerful figure in Ukraine, the first secretary of the Party, was always a Russian or a Russianized personage of non-Ukrainian ethnicity.

No subsequent official figures on Party membership or office-holding according to nationality have been made available. The purge of 1936-38 certainly hit Ukrainians in these categories hard. Chubar, an alternate member and the only ethnic Ukrainian on the Politburo of the All-Union Party since the removal of Mykola Skrypnyk at the beginning of the decade, was the highest-placed Ukrainian victim. By the mid-thirties already, working class origin had ceased to be an important prerequisite for membership. During the Second World War, when a special effort was made to draw in new Party members from the armed forces, two-thirds of the Ukrainian membership as of May, 1946, was recruited.⁵² The latter fact suggests that the total Ukrainian membership fell considerably between 1936 and 1939. However, the wartime recruitment policy was general for the U.S.S.R., and the Ukrainian percentage fall before the war may or may not have been any greater than that of the Russian membership in the Party, which was also hit hard by the purge. At the raion level the Party secretaries today are mostly Ukrainian, as is the rank and file rural membership.⁵³ Since the raions include medium and small cities and towns but not large cities, we are still in the dark about the ethnic background of the Party leadership and rank and file membership in the latter.

Great Russians, in any case, because they dominate the central Party offices and the highest party offices in Ukraine are clearly the dominant nationality in the Party, and thus in the government of Ukraine. There can be no doubt, also, that among the Russians in the Party and government posts there are a goodly number who like to use their power, such as it is

52 - Brzezinski, Zbigniew, et al., Political Controls in the Soviet Army (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954), p. 26n.

53 - John S. Reshetar, and Michael M. Luther, Aspects of the Nationality Problem in the U.S.S.R. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, Human Resources Research Institute), p. 61.

at one or another territorial level in both hierarchies, to gratify their national pride and prejudices.

The two influences on nationality policy in Ukraine since 1919 thus described--a supra-national outlook which refuses to acknowledge precedence for any of the nationalities in the country and for the long run is really contemptuous of all nationalisms, and a built-in Russian-national bias--are, of course, contradictory. Nor has this contradictoriness prevented the appearance of both characteristics at the same time with respect to specific acts by officials. But looking at the history of nationality policy in Ukraine broadly, we see that history dividing into two overlapping periods, which we may call the Ukrainization and the Russian-national periods.

The Ukrainization Period

Prior to 1920, the deep contempt for all nationalisms as doomed remnants of capitalist societies which the Bolsheviki brought with them when they took over the government of the country, dominated the thought and behavior of Party functionaries. Their effort to establish their power in Ukraine had perforce led them into a policy of repressing Ukrainian nationalist sentiment, for this sentiment had for more than two years been joined to vigorous political action. But once the organized resistance of the Ukrainian Directory to Bolshevik rule ended, the leaders of the new regime found it possible, and indeed, in view of continuing small-scale peasant uprisings, necessary, to permit Ukrainians to cultivate at least some of their traditional national values. Thus, in October, 1920, began the period of Ukrainization of the cultural life of the Ukrainian S. S. R.

It was Stalin who announced the new shift by declaring that it was imperative that "all Soviet organs in the border territories be composed, as far as possible, of local people who know the way of life, the manners, the customs and language of the local population." Stalin warned over-enthusiastic party members against "cavalry raids" aimed at immediate communization, which included the elimination of such bourgeois habits

as identification with a particular nationality. He urged instead a cautious and well-conceived policy of gradually drawing the non-Russian masses into the general stream of Soviet development. So strong was the internationalism in the party, however, that in the following March Stalin had to defend himself against protests that his Commissariat of Nationalities was artificially cultivating Ukrainian nationalism.⁵⁴ At the same time he predicted that the cities of Ukraine would be Ukrainized 'ere long.

Ukrainization was further stimulated by the decision taken in 1925 to abandon the policy of immediate world revolution in favor of building socialism in one country. The country, however, was to be the U.S.S.R., not just Russia, so that there still remained the problem, at least for the time being, of reconciling the traditional nationalisms of the non-Russian peoples of the country with the march toward socialism. The problem was met by decreeing that the several national cultures would from now on be national in form and proletarian, --later, socialist--in content.

Examined solely for its own logical coherence, the formula, national in form, socialist in content, is woefully defective, especially in terms of a philosophy which regards all aspects of culture as responses to a particular kind of economic organization. But so long as it suited the purposes of the central leadership, the spurious distinction between content and form served as the basis for a set of policies which not only permitted but zealously encouraged the furtherance of Ukrainian national values.⁵⁵

Even economic policy was at first designed to some extent from nationality considerations, and thereby treated as a facet of cultural policy. Economic development was, according to a resolution of the Tenth Congress of the party in 1921, to be adjusted to the "ethnic, regional

54 - Reshetar and Luther, op. cit. pp. 23-4.

55 - See Solomon Schwarz, "The Soviet Concept and Conquest of National Cultures," Problems of Communism, Vol. II, No. 6 (1953), p. 43.

and traditional peculiarities of the population."⁵⁶ Subsequently, with the start of the First Five Year Plan in the autumn of 1928, economic policy, though never totally oblivious of popular reaction, went ahead without any planned regard for economic practices which might have been peculiarly associated with Ukrainian cultural traditions. Language development and use, folk arts and literature drawing upon the folk tradition, and research into national history, on the other hand, have continued to the present day as officially recognized facets of Ukrainian cultural activity. Indeed, so zealously did local party and government officials encourage the non-Russian cultures in Ukraine for a time (also Jewish-Yiddish in those communities where Jews constituted a majority of the population) that between 1925 and 1929 many who identified themselves with Russian culture, especially the Russian language, complained of discrimination. For example, in institutions of higher learning and in the courts, professors, attorneys and judges had to use Ukrainian. If they did not know it, they had to learn it. For many academic subjects a Ukrainian terminology had to be invented.⁵⁷ This policy contrasted sharply with that of the Tsars, which during the nineteenth century had flatly refused to recognize such a people as Ukrainians.⁵⁸

The Russian-National Note

Looking back one is now inclined to regard the period of 1925 to 1929 as the halcyon days of Ukrainian cultural opportunity. That they may be so regarded in comparison with pre-Bolshevik days as well as with the years since 1929 is evidenced by the return during the mid-twenties of many who had supported the Directory and who had chosen exile upon its defeat. Even Ukrainians of Galician, Bukovinan and Carpatho-Ruthenian origin, who had never lived under Russian rule, came to the Ukrainian

56 - Ibid.

57 - F. Beck, and W. Godin, Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession trans. by Eric Mesbacher and David Porter (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 143-4

58 - Those of Ukrainian ethnic affiliation were officially known as Little Russians.

S.S.R.⁵⁹ But for many leaders of the Ukrainian cultural revival, including Communists, the opportunities were not enough. One of these leaders, not a Communist, wrote subsequently

The time for insurrections and disturbances was past. It took many victims, many lives, and had but few positive results. For this reason the new organization, the 'Union for the Liberation of Ukraine,' formed on the basis of an older political organization, adopted new tactics. It based its fight with the occupant not on insurrection, armed resistance and bloodshed, but on gaining control of many branches of the economic and cultural life of the country, on the organization of the people and the raising of their national and political consciousness in order to hinder the Russians in their efforts to keep the people and the country in a backward condition and at the same time to promote the idea of national, economic and cultural individuality and thus prepare people for active resistance at the proper time in the future.⁶⁰

But even Ukrainian Communists were dissatisfied and complained again and again about the Great Russian chauvinists who were trying to balk the work of Ukrainization. One of them, Volobuyev, "went so far as to declare that the Soviet Russian economic policy was nothing but a colonial exploitation of the Ukrainian people."⁶¹

And then the central authorities struck. Free national cultural development had been a U.S.S.R. -wide policy, but it began to decline sooner in Ukraine than anywhere else. It was 1926, and Lazar Kaganovich had come as first secretary of the Party in Ukraine the year before. Oleksander Shumski, Commissar of Education for the republic and a Borot'bist, had complained to Stalin that certain top-ranking party and trade union officials had retarded the process of Ukrainization, and he

59 - See Pidhainy, S. O. (editor-in-chief), Black Deeds in the Kremlin: A White Book, Vol. 1, Book of Testimonies (Toronto: Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Communist Terror, 1953), p. 371.

60 - Statement by Kost Turkalo, the only survivor of the 45 members of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine who were tried for counter-revolutionary activity in Kharkov, March-April, 1930. (Quoted in Black Deeds in the Kremlin, p. 313.)

61 - Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," Review of Politics Vol. 14 (1952), p. 217.

specifically named Kaganovich in this connection. Shumski suggested a much greater development of Ukrainian cadres in the Party and the Ukrainization of the still largely Russian proletariat.

Stalin replied publicly. He criticized those who were 'still imbued with a spirit of irony and scepticism toward Ukrainian culture and social life.' But the brunt of his criticism was against Shumski's over-zealous Ukrainianism. Playing the reasonable arbitrationist, Stalin agreed that the party and Soviet apparatuses in Ukraine should be Ukrainized, however, he added, one could not compel Russian workers to renounce their language and culture and adopt the Ukrainian. To do this would be to act contrary to the principle of the free development of nationalities. One must be patient: gradually and spontaneously, as more and more Ukrainian peasants moved to the growing industrial centers, the proletariat of Ukraine would become Ukrainized. But Stalin did not stop here. He went on to charge Shumski with a more serious error: failing to realize that, in view of the weakness of the basic Communist cadres in the Ukraine, the cultural autonomy movement, which is almost always led by the non-Communist intelligentsia, may in places assume the character of a struggle for the alienation of Ukrainian culture and social life. Shumski's friend and protege, Mykola Khvylovy, the poet, who had advanced the slogan, "Away from Moscow," as a guide for Ukrainian art and belles lettres, was singled out to illustrate that even Ukrainian Communists were not immune from such defects in thought.⁶² Stalin concluded that such an un-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics could lead to a struggle against Moscow in general, against Russians in general, against Russian culture, and finally against the supreme achievement of Russian culture--Leninism.⁶³

Shumski was soon removed from his post as Commissar of Education. His removal signalled an attack on the other Borot'bists and on Trotskyites.

62 - Rehsetar and Luther, op. cit. p. 40.

63 - Ibid., p. 41.

In 1930 a show trial of forty five members of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (SVU), who were charged with counter-revolutionary activity, was held in Kharkov. But even then policy had not crystallized. This was followed by the arrest of some 4000 Komsomol members.⁶⁴ Tolerance of Ukrainian nationalism was declining sharply, but, in the main, it was non-Communist leaders of Ukrainian nationalist opinion, whom the regime had real reason to fear, who suffered. Skrypnyk, an old Bolshevik, but a staunch defender of Ukrainian rights as late as 1933, demanded a special Ukrainian Red Army and the incorporation into Ukraine of "Ukrainian territories still under Russian administration."⁶⁵

But now Stalin would bear no more. Skrypnyk was summoned to the Kremlin to explain himself, and shortly after his return to Ukraine in July, 1933, he committed suicide. At about the same time, the authorities announced that they had uncovered a subversive Ukrainian Military Organization, whose members were said to include Red Army commanders, scientific workers and young intellectuals.⁶⁶

Stalin's warning in his reply to Shumski that too much of an emphasis on national cultural values might lead, first, to an attack on things Russian, and from there to an attack on Russia's greatest product, Leninism, is the key to the shift in nationality policy in Ukraine which took place between 1926 and 1934. Ukrainian national values, as such, were no serious problem.

But if their cultivation led to anti-Russianism, whether by deliberate intent or not, then it might lead to a dislike for the new social order which Russians were obviously playing the leading part in creating. Thus, until the First Five Year plan and the policy of forced collectivization were adopted, Ukrainianization was still the official nationality policy, even though it had begun to unravel at the edges. By the time of the S. V. U. trial in Kharkov, collectivization and the fierce resistance to it was the

64 - Pap, op. cit. p. 221.

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66 - Ibid., p. 222.

most serious issue which the Bolshevik leadership faced. It is difficult to say, therefore, whether the intensification of attacks on Ukrainian nationalism in 1930 marked the triumph of Russian nationalism in the Party over the trans-national spirit of the first Bolshevik decade, or reflected the concern of the top command over the opposition or suspected opposition of the Ukrainian nationalists to the impositions of the newly instituted economic policy. Nationalists and economic resisters were often the same people, and, so far as government determined on having its way was concerned, one could not know who were just of one group or the other.

Official policy during the winter of 1932-33 poses a similar problem to the student of nationality policy in Ukraine. Peasant resistance to collectivization and to government requisitions of food resulted in a ruthless confiscation and refusal to redistribute a minimum of food to the people. The victims, of course, were Ukrainians, and the officials who made and implemented the policy calculatedly made it a Ukrainian policy. But the purpose was to punish and subdue peasantry opposed to collectivization.

Although Stalin's primary purpose in his letter to Shumski was to warn that overdoing cultural nationalism could lead to an alienation from Leninism, his statement that Leninism is the highest product of Russian culture was a remarkable departure from traditional Bolshevik doctrine. Lenin himself had seen nothing Russian about his ideas, which to him were simply an application to Russia of not only universally valid principles but of principles which had in the main been developed outside of Russia. To say, on the other hand, that the sacred doctrine is the product of a particular national culture is to put oneself well along the path toward making that national culture sacred, too.

Thus, the germ of the aggressive Russian nationalism which became so evident after the Second World War, appeared as early as 1926, in connection with Ukrainian conditions. It is important to note, however, that the germ did not grow into a mature policy until the end of the Second World War. Even the adoption by the top leadership of Ivan the Dread, Peter the Great, Suvorov, Kutuzov, and other eminent personalities of

the Imperial past as heroes who should now be admired by "Soviet Man" did not mean simply that sovietism and Russian nationalism were not walking hand in hand. True, these heroes were Russians who represented among other virtues Russian triumphs over non-Russians, including the ancestors of some of the constituent nationalities of the U.S.S.R. But the important point is that they were heroes who could be expected to arouse an affectionate response among more than half of the total population of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the response could be expected in a short time, as compared with the growth of a loyalty to the new, often fragmentary and frequently unpleasant symbols of sovietism. This does not speak well of the success which the Communist leadership had thus far attained in trying to foster an identification between the individual and the U.S.S.R. as a whole. But the great immediate purpose had now become the defense of the U.S.S.R. against an aggressive Germany, and, secondly, against a somewhat less certain menace posed by Japan. And for this purpose time was terribly short.

The wholesale removal of ethnic Ukrainians and Jews from Party and government in the Ukraine during the purge of 1936-38 hit not only the remanant of non-Communist intellectuals who had been identified with the intense cultural activity of the twenties but many Communists as well. Indeed, virtually the whole upper layer of the Ukrainian leadership in Party, government and cultural life was removed. Many non-Russian newspapers, schools, and theaters were closed down. By 1938, too, there was already under way a policy of Russianizing Ukrainian grammar and infusing Russian words into the Ukrainian language.

It may well be that the central leadership did exactly the wrong thing from the standpoint of its own desires when it assaulted Ukrainian national values in the wholesale way. There was genuine reason to question the ultimate intentions of the non-Communist Ukrainian intelligentsia toward the regime. But to most ethnic Ukrainians "the question of the predominance of the Ukrainian language and culture was of minor sig-

nificance..."⁶⁷ Many had shown a willingness during the twenties to assimilate to Russian culture, an attitude which was even more pronounced among the Jews. However, the seeming shift to Russian nationalism "automatically revived resistance to assimilation."⁶⁸

The formula, national in form, socialist in content, was not renounced during the Great Purge, nor has it been renounced to this day. Given its intrinsic ambiguity, it can be used as the leadership wishes. Thus, during the German war which followed on the heels of the purge, stress was laid on the important contribution which Ukrainian culture had made to the U.S.S.R. as a whole. A special incentive for this policy was the need of the regime to regain physical possession of the Ukraine, which had been lost to the invaders early in the war. However, in May, 1945, with Soviet power back in Ukraine and the war nearly won, Stalin initiated another phase in Ukrainian nationality policy, as he lauded the wartime loyalty of the Russians above that of any other people of the U.S.S.R. and proclaimed them "the leading force in the Soviet Union among all the peoples of the country."⁶⁹

Since the end of the war, unremitting praise of the Great Russians as the leading nationality of the country, as the elder brother nationality whose historic contributions to the growth of the U.S.S.R. and whose role as teacher should be welcomed by all of the other nationalities, has led many observers to conclude that here was policy come full circle. Here without a doubt was the old Russian nationalism, just as in Tsarist times.

The elder brother doctrine holds not only the Russian people but the Russian state as well to have been a progressive force throughout history. This means that even the gradual absorption of the Ukrainian people into the Russian empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a

67 - Armstrong, p. 287.

68 - Beck and Godin, p. 144.

69 - Quoted in Schwarz, "The Soviet Concept and Conquest of National Cultures," Problems of Communism, p. 45.

great upward step for the Ukrainians. Although the absorption was by a reactionary regime, it was objectively good because it eventually enabled Ukraine to share in the Bolshevik Revolution. Ukrainians are thus on the way to losing one of the last major sources of national cultural nourishment which the workings of the formula, national in form, socialist in content, has left them--hostility to Tsarist imperialism. What remains by way of a set of cultural values different from those which the regime has been ardently fostering for the U.S.S.R. as a single country is indeed very little. It is simply the Ukrainian language, which has itself been subjected to russification.⁷⁰ As had happened so many times before, Stalin formalized the newest stage of policy development in 1950, on the occasion of his attack on the linguistic theory of N. Y. Marr, by using the phrase, "socialist in content and national in form, i.e., in language."⁷¹

The nationality situation was made an issue after Stalin's death in connection with the purge of Beria. Judging from the charges against the hitherto powerful MVD chief beginning in July, 1953, Beria may have associated himself with some easing of the russification trend. What specific easements may have been involved are difficult to ferret out. We cautiously infer that there was some promise of easement because Beria was accused of stirring up bourgeois nationalist elements. There was a sudden halt to the employment of the Russian elder brother theme between March and July, the period of Beria's apparent ascendancy. However, even during this short period the russification of vocabularies was still being defended.⁷² Since the removal of Beria, the elder brother theme has again been vigorously expounded.⁷³

Action and Reaction in the Western Ukraine

The aims of the central leadership are uniform for all of Ukraine. Although the Western territories--former Eastern Galicia, Carpatho-

70 - See Schwarz, "The Soviet Concept and Conquest of National Cultures," Problems of Communism, p. 45.

71 - Joseph Stalin, "Marxism and the Problems of Linguistics," p. 43, quoted in Ibid., p. 45.

72 - Uriel Weinreich, "The Russification of Soviet Minority Languages," Problems of Communism, Vol. II, No. 6 (1953), p. 57.

73 - Ibid.

Ruthenia, and Bukovina--had never been under Russian or U.S.S.R. rule, and Bessarabia had been under Rumanian rule from 1919 to 1940, they must undergo the same sovietization as those parts of the Ukraine which have been in the U.S.S.R. for thirty five years and were part of the Russian empire for two to three hundred years. The new Ukrainian territories, thus, are being exposed to the same rapid changes as were the old ones in the early thirties. They are, however, being denied the meagre transition to sovietization which the period of the NEP constituted for Eastern Ukrainians.

In so integrating the Western Ukraine into the Soviet system, the central leadership has had to contend with two important problems. For several years after the war fairly sizeable detachments of Ukrainian nationalists carried on guerrilla warfare against the authorities, operating from hilly places in Carpatho-Ruthenia and Eastern Galicia. It may be that some of these opponents of the regime, or successors, are still unsubdued. But if this is so, there has nevertheless been no indication since 1951 of any important organized action on their part. The second problem is that of a generally wider distribution of nationalist sentiment among Western Ukrainians than Eastern Ukrainians, particularly among those who are of an age to have known the fierce struggle against Polish rule before the war or the successful efforts of the Carpatho-Ruthenians to gain substantial autonomy within Czechoslovakia. The younger generation is being exposed to all of the indoctrination and, presumably, opportunities given to Eastern Ukrainian youth. But the large number of pre-war adults poses a current problem which has no counterpart in the Eastern regions. One attempt at dealing with this problem has been large transfers of population from the Western Ukraine. But it is difficult to judge the effect of these transfers on the extensiveness and intensity of nationalist feeling in the Western Ukraine.

Russification or Uniformity?

Though the russification which has been fostered since the end of the Second World War naturally makes one think that Tsarist policy has been revived, a more subtle explanation of the fusion of russianism

and sovietism is called for. The great aim of the leadership for Ukraine since the repressions of 1929-30 has not been the glorification of things Russian because they are Russian. While such glorification undoubtedly helps to maintain the Russian nationalism of whose presence there can be no doubt, the primary purpose of the great change in nationality policy which began almost coincidentally with the First Five Year Plan and collectivization, and which reached all parts of the country, has been to achieve the maximum uniformity of behavior among the people of the U.S.S.R. Russian national symbols have become the instruments, and some Russians are consequently gratified. Some nationally sensitive Ukrainians, for this reason among others, acquire national grievances against the regime in Moscow, while appreciating that Russians suffer as much as they. Some nationally sensitive Ukrainians, intellectuals more than workers or peasants, refuse to distinguish between the regime and Russians. But, although irritation of ethnic Ukrainians is exactly what the central leadership has tried to avoid or keep to an unavoidable minimum, the leadership has always succumbed to its own insistence on maintaining the totalitarian kind of society which it and its predecessors since 1917 have created. Thus, although Russian nationalism is an active ingredient in the contemporary internal policy of the U.S.S.R., the most important point about that policy is that its primary purpose, amidst all the fluctuations which have characterized it, has been to maintain the power of Communist leadership as the latter directs the creation of the new industrial society.

Nationality policy in the U.S.S.R. is a policy for the enhancement of state power. As a state power policy, it does not have identical content over the years because the maintenance of maximum state power in the Soviet system is dependent upon the operation and interaction of several variables. Opportunities are thus afforded those who want to gratify their extended egos on both the Great Russian and Ukrainian sides to promote their purposes. Such opportunities are usually the opportunities of Great Russians because (1) Great Russians are the

backbone of the all-powerful Communist party, and thus can use their positions of power to cultivate their Great Russian nationalism, as some of them undoubtedly want to do; and (2) Great Russian symbols have been chosen--because they are the traditional symbols of the largest single ethnic group in the U.S.S.R. and even more so in the Party--as the instruments most likely to promote the uniformity which totalitarian goals require. But since the great concern of the leadership is to sustain the Soviet system and its own power within that system, the Great Russians, who in any case vary among themselves in their zeal for imposing Russian cultural values on others, do not always have their way.

This interpretation of the present policy of russification, it is necessary to add, is no more encouraging for the perpetuation of a distinctive Ukrainian culture than the more common Russian nationalist interpretation. For the sake of that uniformity in thought and behavior throughout the U.S.S.R. which proponents of a totalitarian philosophy deem essential to their goals, the intention in all likelihood is to eliminate eventually all non-Russian cultural traits, including non-Russian languages. This, however, is for the long run. For the predictable future, one may expect a continuation, with fluctuations in response to circumstances, of the present policy of biculturalism. That is to say, all Ukrainians will probably continue to learn Ukrainian at an early age. If they wish to make any kind of professional or political career for themselves, they will have to know Russian. As for the other facets of Ukrainian national culture--drama, history, et cetera--these will probably continue to be written and taught in terms of Soviet values and in the shadow of the Russian cultural tradition as that continues to be modified by Soviet interpretations.

UKRAINE AND THE USSR: THEIR IMPORTANCE FOR ONE ANOTHER

The answer one gives to the question of how important the Ukraine and the U.S.S.R. are to each other must be an evaluation rather than merely a summation of a number of measurable or quasi-measurable facts, for the answer depends upon what is included in the definition of importance.

The population of Ukraine has never been solely Ukrainian ethnically. In the mid-seventeenth century, when the northern half of left-bank Ukraine was joined to Muscovy, there were also Russians, Jews, Poles, Tatars, Greeks, and other peoples in the land. After the mid-18th century, there occurred a steady migration into left-bank and Black Sea Ukraine from the right-bank lands, which went to Russia from 1772-1795, and from Great Russia itself. As has been noted previously, the larger Ukrainian towns were mainly Russian, and up to the beginning of the Second World War only about one third of the populations of such great Ukrainian urban centers as Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, and Odessa were ethnic Ukrainian. In the huge urban complex of the Donets basin, the center of the Ukrainian industrial revolution, not only are the ethnic Ukrainians a minority, but the population as a whole is an unusually heterogeneous one, in which Russians predominate. As a result of the great destruction of the Jewish communities of Ukraine by the Germans during the last war, the relative proportion of ethnic Ukrainians in the cities has risen sharply, although part of the rise is due to a continuing migration from the countryside. It is hardly to be expected that, aside from more "realistic" consideration, a nationally-conscious group such as the Great Russians, both in the R.S.F.S.R. and in the Ukrainian S.S.R., would favor political separation of Russia and Ukraine.

The natural resources and labor power of Ukraine, the republic being the most densely populated in the U.S.S.R. and having the second largest population among the republics, are relevant simultaneously to the industrial and agricultural development of the entire Union and to its foreign policy. Rich in iron ore, in coal, in manganese, and in other essentials of a modern industrial society, the left-bank Ukraine has been the backbone of the industrial revolution which the Communist leadership has carried forward. The relation of an industrial structure to contemporary foreign and military policy is self-evident. Richness of soil has caused the Ukraine as a whole, and especially its southern steppe region, to become one of the main granaries and suppliers of industrial raw materials of the U.S.S.R., as it was of the Russian Empire, and the source of the country's grain export trade. The large rural population has served as a reservoir of manpower for the newly-risen industrial centers which sovietism has created. By the same token, both the old Empire and the new U.S.S.R. have drawn upon the Ukrainian population for much of the manning of their armed forces.

From a maritime standpoint, with respect both to military and commercial policy, the possession of Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea gives to the U.S.S.R. one of its few and much-sought warm water exits to the oceans. It is, to be sure, a qualified exit, for the Black Sea connects with the Mediterranean by means of a narrows, which is under Turkish control.

Possession of Ukraine is also crucial for Soviet policy in the Balkans, perhaps more than ever, since the U.S.S.R. has tied the Balkans to itself to an extent which had never existed for the Russian Empire. Ukraine is still athwart the route from northern European Russia to the Caucasus, and between eastern Europe outside of the U.S.S.R. and the lower Volga and, beyond that, Central Asia.

Air technology appears to have reinforced the strategic importance of Ukraine for the U.S.S.R. and also to have increased its strategic liabilities. From bases in Ukraine, Soviet planes can range far into the Mediterranean and the Near East. By the same token, however, the industrial facilities of Ukraine have been made into a somewhat doubtful asset, in the event of war, because they are exposed to attack from air bases which possible opponents of the U.S.S.R. can establish outside of but near Ukraine, as in Turkey, Crete, and Libya.

It can be said that any government of the central Russian lands would in all probability desire a continuing close political and economic tie with Ukraine, and that this view would be supported by Russian public opinion both in Russia proper and in Ukraine. For a fervent Russian nationalist, for a Russian concerned with maintaining or enhancing the international position of a Russian-centered state, or for a Russian who was simply determined to get things done as swiftly and as thoroughly as possible, this desire would probably approach the point of an insistence that could only be successfully opposed by superior force or the threat of superior force. Here Russian Communists and many non-Communists would hold a common position. The outside observer cannot fail to assume a genuine Russian interest in the continuation of the Ukrainian tie. To the outsider, the exact nature of what the tie should be is debatable. But in terms of sentiment, strategic proximity and the interest in maintaining a going economic and communications organization of which Ukraine is an integral part, that the Russians have a case cannot be denied.

Ukrainians who wish separation from the central Russian lands also have a case, both in terms of their own values and from the standpoint of the outside observer. Russia without Ukraine would be much less the Great Power than it is. Nevertheless, an

independent Ukraine of approximately the dimensions of the present Ukrainian S.S.R. would be weaker than a state which retained all of the present territory of the U.S.S.R., less Ukraine. Such an independent Ukraine would, consequently, be in danger of reabsorption into a Russian-Centered state, but it is a danger that could be averted with outside help.

As regards its security vis-a-vis other neighbors, an independent Ukraine could survive as well as other middling states, of which there are several in central and eastern Europe. It would in fact be the peer or even the superior of neighboring Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania. Aware of this, some Ukrainian nationalists have suggested an east-central European federation under Ukrainian leadership. Such an arrangement, they contend, would not only promote peace and prosperity within the federation, but would guard against a renewed Russian move southward and westward.

The danger of a large, even if weakened, Russian-Centered state to Ukrainian security would be a truly serious problem for an independent Ukraine. But, if, for the sake of analysis, this problem is set aside, there is no doubt that an independent Ukraine would be an economically viable state. And to the argument that Ukraine's prosperity would be even greater within a state having the present dimensions of the U.S.S.R. but governed according to liberal principles, the Ukrainian nationalist can answer that, given the existence of an economic minimum necessary for viability, the next consideration is independence rather than still more prosperity. Here is a conflict of values, and it is not for the outside observer to advise Ukrainians which value they should prize more highly.⁷⁴

74. - It is, however, permissible for the outsider who believes that his own values are involved in what Ukrainians and Russians do between themselves, to criticize either or both in terms of these values.

COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Before presenting a concise survey of methods of disseminating news in contemporary Ukraine, it may be useful to acquaint the reader first with the historical development of the Ukrainian press.

The first newspaper printed in Ukraine appeared in Lvov on January 1, 1776. It was a weekly written in French and published under the name of Gazette de Léopol. After a year the paper was discontinued, and it was only five years later that newspapers and periodicals began to appear in the same city in German and Polish.

Since 1890 the German language Lemberger Zeitung began to include a Ukrainian supplement called Narodna Chasopys.¹ Up to the revolutionary year of 1848 all newspapers and periodicals in the Ukrainian lands were printed in foreign languages--German, Polish, Russian, and Hungarian. The first weekly written in the Ukrainian language, Zoria Halytska, appeared on May 15, 1848, after the abolition of censorship in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.²

In the following year, 1849, there appeared three additional papers in the Ukrainian language. The Halytsko-Rusky Vistnyk was published three times, the Novynk twice and Pchola once a week. Pchola was, incidentally, the first literary-scientific journal in Ukrainian. Throughout the second half of the 19th century most of the press in Ukraine was still in foreign languages, although the number of publications in Ukrainian continued to grow.

Between the years 1848 and 1900 there were altogether 190 periodicals in the Ukrainian language, in Europe and America.³ About 70% of the entire Ukrainian press in the second half of the 19th century was concentrated in the Western parts of the country, under the rule of the Austro-

1 - The Slavonic Encyclopaedia, p. 1056.

2 - Ibid.

3 - Ibid.

Hungarian Empire.

The most important Western Ukrainian periodicals were Dilo (1880-1939), Hromadsky Holos (1895-1939), Svoboda (1897-1939), Literaturno-Naukovy Vistnyk - the Literary-scientific Herald (1898-1939), and the well-known Annals of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.⁴

In the beginning of the 20th century the main strongholds of the Ukrainian periodical press were Western Ukraine and America. In 1903, for example, there were 50 periodicals written in the Ukrainian language out of which 44 appeared in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and 6 on the American Continent.⁵

The development of the periodical press in Eastern Ukraine, at that time within the Russian Empire, followed a somewhat different pattern. In 1812 there appeared in Kharkov a weekly under the name of Kharkovsky Yezhenedelnik. Between 1816 and 1819 another periodical in Eastern Ukraine was published under the name of Ukrainsky Vistnyk (the Ukrainian Herald). Also worthy of mention is the Ukrainsky Zhurnal, as well as the Odessa Herald, the first daily newspaper in Ukraine (printed in Russian), started in 1828. One of the best known provincial papers in the Ukrainian lands of the Russian Empire was the Gubernskie Viedomosti, published by many local districts in Eastern Ukraine, until 1917.⁶

Up to the Russian Revolution of 1905, all periodical publications in Eastern Ukraine were in the Russian language. The first weekly published in Ukrainian under Russian Imperial rule was the Khliborob. It appeared in November 1905, in Lubny, and was edited by M. Shemet. After 5 issues the periodical was suspended by the Czarist censorship. During the same revolutionary year there appeared also the Hromadska Dumka (1906-1914), later the Rada, and many others.⁷ Just before the outbreak of World War I, there were 110 periodicals in the Ukrainian language throughout the world: 56 of these were published in Western

4 - The Slavonic Encyclopaedia, p. 1056.

5 - Ibid.

6 - Ibid.

7 - Ibid.

Ukraine, 23 in Eastern, 13 in the United States, 10 in Canada, 2 in Brazil and 6 in other countries.⁸

During World War I the Russian Imperial Government forbade the publication of all Ukrainian language periodicals, not only in Eastern Ukraine but also in the temporarily occupied territories of Galicia and Bukovina. As a result, after 1914 there were no Ukrainian periodicals in Ukraine itself.

Following the Soviet Revolution of 1917, the Ukrainian press entered a new period. From 1918 to 1919 the number of Ukrainian publications as well as their daily circulations increased very rapidly. There appeared numerous dailies in Eastern Ukraine, such as Vidrodzhennia, Narodnia Vola, Robitnycha Gazeta, Nova Rada, Ukraina, and others.⁹ In 1918 there were 218 periodicals printed in the Ukrainian language in Eastern Ukraine alone.

In Western provinces at the time the situation was not very favorable to the growth of Ukrainian press. The city of Lvov, being occupied by the Poles, about 50 Ukrainian periodicals had to be edited and published in provincial towns. For the time being the Ukrainian press in the West was declining, but soon afterward it resumed its upward trend. Before World War II Western Ukraine could boast of 143 different publications in the native language. At the same time in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic there were 465 papers and periodicals in Ukrainian alone.¹⁰

In the Ukrainian territories of the former Polish Republic, the Ukrainian press was relatively free, despite a strong censorship, and mostly in private hands. The most important Ukrainian minority publications were the daily newspapers Dilo, Novy Chas and Bat'kivschyna and numerous weekly and monthly journals, such as the Catholic Meta, Nedila and Nova Zoria. The best known satirical papers were Komar and Zyz.¹¹

8 - Ibid.

9 - The Slavonic Encyclopaedia, Press, p. 1056.

10 - Ibid.

11 - Ibid.

The most recent list of newspapers and periodicals in the Ukrainian S. S. R. is that included in the Newspapers and Magazines of the U. S. S. R. for 1955.¹² This Soviet publication indicates that of the Ukrainian newspapers in the Ukrainian language two (Zirka - Dawn and Literaturna Gazeta-Literary Newspaper) appear once a week, and Pravda Ukrainy (published also in Russian) and Radyanska Ukraina-Soviet Ukraine, daily except on holidays.¹³

All of the periodicals shown on the list are monthly journals. They are: Barvinok (Periwinkle), Vitchyzna (Fatherland), Dnipro (Dneipr), Zhovten' (October), Zmina (The Young Generation), Kommunist Ukrainy (Communist of the Ukraine), Pioneria (Pioneers), Radyanska Zhinka (Soviet Woman) and Ukraina (Ukraine).¹⁴

The most widely known paper in Soviet Ukraine is the Kiev daily, Radyanska Ukraina (Soviet Ukraine), established in 1938 as the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian S. S. R. and of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S. S. R.¹⁵ This paper has a second, local edition for Western Ukraine, published in Lvov under the name of Vilna Ukraina.

Detailed data about all Ukrainian newspapers, published in Ukraine between 1917 and 1953, can be found in the Union List of the Library of Congress, compiled by Paul L. Horecky.¹⁶ Similarly, extensive information about the Ukrainian Press abroad, particularly in the United States and Canada, can be found in the Iuvileinyi Al'manakh SVOBODY 1893-1953, published by the Ukrainian National Association, 81-83 Grand St., Jersey City, N. J.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize that all Ukrainian publications in Soviet Ukraine, like all publications in the Soviet Union in general,

12 - Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga Moscow, 1955.

13 - Newspapers and Magazines of the U. S. S. R. for 1955, p. 36.

14 - Ibid. pp. 36-37.

15 - Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Newspapers 1917-1953, A Union List, p. 35.

16 - Ibid.

are Party-and-Government-controlled and for the most part Government-owned and operated. This statement is amply confirmed by the definition of the task and nature of the press in the U.S.S.R. as it appears in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia for 1937. According to that official document, the "Soviet Press is a mighty instrument of the Communist Party and the Soviet State, in the organization and Communist education of the Soviet People, in the establishment of a Communist society." The Encyclopaedia asserts that these tasks were assigned to the Soviet Press by Lenin and Stalin who outlined the basic principles of its future development. The Soviet Press is supposed to be a "Party press" in the fullest sense of the word.¹⁷

By its very nature, therefore, the Ukrainian press in the Soviet Union differs profoundly from the press in democratic countries. It is a state and party institution in the same way in which the various ministries, courts, and the police are also state and party instruments. In a sense, there is no Ukrainian press in the Soviet Union, but only a Soviet press in the Ukrainian language.¹⁸

The main sources of information at the disposal of Soviet Ukrainian journalists is the TASS, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union. There is a local variety of the TASS in Ukraine, called the RATAU, the Radio-Telegraph Agency of the Ukraine. It goes without saying that all foreign news is tightly censored and accessible to the Ukrainian public only through the official, state-controlled media.¹⁹

The journalists are recruited from two sources: on the one hand from the ranks of the professionals with appropriate academic degrees, and on the other from the ranks of the Party activists.²⁰ The Soviet Ukraine has a special institute for the preparation of newspaper men, under the name of the Ukrainian Communist Institute of Journalism (UKIZh).²¹

17 - Presa Pidsovets'koi Ukrainy, by L. Liman, Al'manakh SVOBODY, pp. 201-205.

18 - Loc. cit.

19 - Loc. cit.

20 - Loc. cit.

21 - Loc. cit.

After World War II a School of Journalism was established at the University of Kharkov, and another institution of the same nature was founded in Kiev, in the fall of 1952.²² It is quite safe to assume that young journalists in Soviet Ukraine, who pass through these academic institutions, are receiving the best available training in the fields of mass psychology, public opinion, propaganda and other related fields, in addition to a thorough indoctrination in Marxism. It will be their task, after all, to influence the minds of the Ukrainian people in general, and of the younger generation in particular. This special category of "educators" is responsible for the elimination of religious "prejudices," the inculcation of the Marxian way of thinking, particularly in the fields of history and the social sciences, and the suppression of all symptoms of the so-called "bourgeois nationalism."

The Ukrainian newspapers printed in the Soviet Union, like most newspapers of that multi-national country, differ from the usual Western newspapers not only in their content but in their outward form itself. They are usually printed on a very small number of pages, seldom exceeding six to eight. Unlike the periodical literature, especially that in foreign languages, and for foreign consumption, which is printed on excellent paper and illustrated with superb photography, the Soviet newspapers are printed usually on a rather poor paper and their photography is definitely less impressive than its average Western counterpart.

As for their content, the Soviet Ukrainian newspapers are even more strikingly different from the average Western press. Whatever is regarded as an expression of "bourgeois decadence" is, of course, omitted. The so-called society columns, so prominent in the Western press, are inconceivable in a Soviet paper. Traffic and other accidents, murder, suicides, burglaries and other aspects of social disorganization are hardly ever recorded. The same applies to advertising. However, in addition to foreign news, political criticism, anti-religious propaganda, new laws and regulations and a great deal of statistically incomplete data on the surpassing or non-fulfilment of various norms of production, most newspapers pay a great deal of attention to literary criticism, theatrical life

22 - Loc. cit.

and other cultural activities. It goes without saying that all foreign news as well as information of domestic origin is heavily censored, and, that all material published in Soviet Ukraine, except for possible clandestine printing, is expected to conform to the principles of Marxism.

As for the other means of communication and information, such as telephones, radio, television, motion picture, etc., no statistically complete and meaningful facts are available either from Soviet or other sources. It is true that Soviet newspapers in Ukraine constantly boast of the "electrification and radiofication" of the countryside, that they often claim that the number of radio-receivers in certain regions is "twice as large as the year before," but one never knows what that number was in the past and what it will be in the future. The same applies to telephone facilities and the number of television sets. Toward the end of 1954 and in the beginning of 1955 the Moscow newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia, criticized on more than one occasion the slowness of the construction of television centers in Kharkov and Kiev. It is to be expected that these television stations have by now been put into operation.

Many Soviet soldiers (particularly those who entered the capitals of South-Eastern Europe with the troops of the so-called Ukrainian Front under Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin) expressed open amazement that a private citizen in those countries could have a radio with all frequencies and all stations. It is known from those soldiers, as well as from many people who have returned from the Soviet Union, that instead of complete radios in the European and American sense of the word, most Soviet citizens have only the so-called radio-receivers (radio-priemniki = radio-tochki), capable of receiving only the censored program of the local stations. The possession of a full-fledged radio reception is not against the law, but it is connected with great expenses and considerable dangers of political suspicion.

As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the motion picture industry in the Ukraine is openly in the service of the Communist Party and State. The political tendency is apparent in most Soviet movies, and even when it is not obvious it is almost always present. The very few motion pictures without any Communist propaganda are based either on well-known historical themes or on the wealth of the folklore. On the whole, Soviet

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movies are technically equal to Western productions. It is a matter of common knowledge to all students of Soviet affairs, that the motion picture industry in Ukraine, as well as elsewhere in the Soviet Union was used during the last war as a very effective means of stirring dormant patriotic feelings and deep-seated animosity toward the invaders. This was done by successful revivals and re-enactments of famous historical personalities and well-known events and problems.(Kutuzov, Alexander Nevsky, Suvorov, the Sorochinsky Fair, the Unvanquished, the Young Guard, etc.). Although most of these movies are not based on specifically Ukrainian themes, they must have exerted a considerable influence on the movie-going public of the country.

EDUCATION

"A"-lj

General Information

Since 1933-34, the Ukrainian educational system has been organized along the same lines as the Soviet educational system in general. Primary and secondary schools and pedagogical institutes are under the control of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education. Some VUZ's (Institutions of Higher Education) are under the appropriate all Union or Union Republican ministry; others (including the universities) are under the Ministry of Higher Education which is now to be a Union Republican ministry. According to Ukrainian emigree sources, in 1946 there were 78,709 lower schools (elementary and secondary schools), attended by 5,660,000 students. Of the 159 VUZ's open in 1947, there were: 52 Pedagogical Institutes, 45 Technological-Industrial Institutes, 19 Agricultural Institutes, 14 Medical Institutes, nine Trade Institutes, and six Institutes of Law and Economics.¹ Ukraine's seven universities are located in the cities of Kiev, Khar'kov, Odessa, L'vov, Uzhgorod (opened in 1946), and Chernovtsy. According to Soviet sources there are now (1954) a total of 6,600,000 students and over 300,000 teachers in the Ukraine, averaging out to 22 students per teacher (this figure probably includes students in night schools, but not those taking extension courses).² In view of the often admitted teacher shortage throughout the Soviet Union, this appears to be a rather low number of students per teacher. During the war, of course, the number of students dropped sharply. Thus, there were 230,000 students in trade schools, railroad schools, and FZO's in 1941 and only 136,566 in 1946.³

1 - Bilets'kii et al, "Osvita i Shkil'nitstvo Pid Sovetami" (Education and Schools under the Soviets--in Ukrainian), Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva (Ukrainian Encyclopedia), Volume III, Munich-New York, 1949, p. 942.

2 - Virnyk, Ukrainskaia S.S.R. (The Ukrainian Soviet Republic), Moscow, 1954, p. 164.

3 - Bilets'kii, Op. Cit., p. 940.

The Soviet claim that most new schools are seven and ten-year schools seems to be consonant with the assumption that large numbers of Ukrainians were deprived of the opportunity for secondary education during the war.

Of the total 1955 Ukrainian Soviet Republic budget of 26,335,900,000 rubles, 8,193,880,000, or about 39%, were set aside for educational purposes. (It should be kept in mind that these figures do not represent the total amount to be spent in the Ukraine, but only the amount officially assigned to the Republic). About one half of this amount (4,212,500,000 rubles) is to be spent on primary and general secondary education. 1,287,200,000 is designated for the support of the technological secondary schools and the VUZ's, 287,100,000 for research (including 115,500,000 for the Academy of Sciences), and the balance for nurseries, libraries, palaces and houses of culture, and other cultural-educational activities. In line with the present campaign to extend universal education from seven to ten years of schooling, it is very optimistically stated that this budget will serve to raise the number of students attending secondary schools to five times the 1950 attendance. The largest increase in number of VUZ students will probably, as in the past, reflect increased enrollment in technological institutes, rather than in universities. An article in Pravda of July 3, 1952, p. 2 entitled "New Admissions to Ukrainian Institutions of Higher Education" boasts that: "This year Ukrainian institutions of higher education will have 45,400 new students. This is the most ever admitted in the republic. About 2,000 students will attend the first class of Khar'kov Polytechnical Institute. The Kiev Polytechnical Institute will admit more than 1500 persons and the L'vov Polytechnical Institute more than 1600. Eleven departments in the T. G. Shevchenko State University in Kiev will have more than 1000 students in the first class. The Odessa Hydrotechnical Institute will open its evening branch at the Kakhovka hydro-electric construction project when the new academic year begins." The emphasis on technological training shown in this article is consonant with what is considered to be true of the Soviet Union as a whole.⁴

⁴ - See Status and Trends in Soviet Scientific and Technical Manpower Resources, 4 May 1955, Washington, D. C. pp. 1-10.

Aims and General Problems

From the point of view of the Soviet leadership in Ukraine, education can be said to have three major aims: 1) the inculcation of "civic virtue" among individuals qua citizens by training them to accept the desired value norms of Soviet society, (e. g. belief in Soviet ideology, patriotism, etc.) as expressed by specific injunctions of the Party and government (i. e. "Soviet" patriotism, rather than "narrow bourgeois nationalism"; ideology as interpreted by the latest Party Congress, rather than as privately deduced from the reading of Marx), 2) the inculcation of "social virtue" among individuals qua social beings in the form of habits of behavior and loyalties required for social stability, e. g. work discipline, family, class (school), and professional loyalty, personal honesty, respect for superiors, etc., 3) the training of specialists who will do a competent and devoted job in the tasks required of them by an industrial economy.

As in non-Soviet society, these three aims are often contradictory. This is manifested in situations in which loyalty to one's family clashes with loyalty to one's job or to the Party, devotion to the successful technical completion of a job clashes with the demands of the Party or with bureaucratic procedures, loyalty to the Party or bureaucracy superiors clashes with loyalty to one's fellow workers or family. The desired personality types of a) the scientist--skeptical and critical--, b) the "good citizen"--does what he is told to do and believes what he is told to believe--, and c) "good neighbor"--honest, loyal to his colleagues, devoted to his family--are not only different, but at times contradictory. These contradictions are (probably) sharper in a totalitarian society than in a less rigidly controlled one, since the conflicting values imposed on individuals are more rigorously defined and enforced by the state and the area of common-sense compromise among them is more limited.

Since formal education is a major tool of inculcation of values and patterns of behavior, the conflicts in Soviet values manifest themselves as conflicts in the aims of education. Thus the oft-repeated charge that students merely repeat the "correct interpretation" of theoretical problems without thinking them through for themselves could be said to represent an

attempt by students to avoid the strongly criticized "incorrect interpretation" of theoretical problems. The demand that scientists conform to bureaucratically determined procedure in meeting planned goals conflicts with the demand that they make socially useful discoveries, just as the demand that they make socially useful discoveries conflicts with their desire to engage in what they believe to be intellectually worthwhile research. More concretely, the great emphasis on science, mathematics, and professional and industrial training in the school program leaves that much less time for indoctrinating the students with Soviet social norms and ideology. Extra-curricular, state-organized group activities (Pioneers, Komsomol, Party, Trade Union) represent attempts to fill this need.

In short, problems created by the conflicting values implicit in the ideals of "civic virtue", "social virtue", and rational-technological competency manifest themselves very sharply in the area of educational policy decisions, i. e., in determining the answer to the question: "What kind of citizens do we want to produce?"

Organization

Formal education is organized as follows: Four years of primary education, starting at the age of seven, and three years of basic secondary education are officially compulsory and uniform. Students preparing for higher education then receive an additional three years of general secondary education. Those preparing for such non-professional occupations as medical technicians, trade specialists, railroad workers, or factory workers, enter specialist schools or on-the-job-training schools (FZO) for a period of additional training lasting from six months to four years. The 19th Party Congress announced as the Soviet educational goal: "to complete, by the end of the five-year plan, the changeover from universal seven-year to 10-year schooling in Republic capitals, cities under Republic control, and oblast', krai, and large industrial centers; to prepare for completion of the changeover by the next five-year plan the remaining cities and rural areas in general." Thus, it is the announced intention of the Soviet leadership to establish universal 10-year education within ten years. However, this goal is based on the highly questionable assump-

tion that there is now universal seven-year education in the urban areas and that universal seven-year education is achievable in the rural areas within five years.

Higher educational institutions (VUZ) are of two types--specialist and university--thus repeating the distinction between general and specialized education made after seven years of schooling. Generally, ten years of primary and secondary education are required for admission to any VUZ. Admission to VUZ is by examination, only students with exceptionally high grades being exempted from this rule. Most students receive some form of stipend from the government, covering tuition and part of living expenses.⁵ The size of the stipend is generally determined by the student's grades and year of study as well as by the type of program studied. Graduation from VUZ's entails from two or three years of study in the case of Pedagogical Institutes to six years of study in the case of Medical Institutes.

Some students continue their study and research for approximately two years, during which time they receive a raise in stipend and the title of "aspirant." Upon passing an examination and submitting a thesis they receive another raise in stipend, are granted the title of "candidate", and begin work on a doctoral thesis.

A network of nurseries, kindergartens, correspondence schools, and special schools supplements the activities of formal education.

5 - Eric Ashby, Scientist in Russia (Suffolk: Pelican Books, 1947), p. 73, estimates that 90% of the students receive stipends. His observations seem to be honest and perceptive, and he consistently maintains an attitude of scepticism towards Soviet claims which he has not personally verified. However, most of his conclusions are based on first hand observation of Moscow University life only. Not only are conditions in universities probably better than in other VUZ's, but educational and living standards in Moscow are undoubtedly among the highest in the Soviet Union.

School Program and Regimen

Primary and secondary school curricula are uniform throughout the republic.⁶ Notwithstanding the heavy emphasis placed on such "useful" subjects as natural science and mathematics, secondary school education is considered to be quite general and "liberal" in nature, as indeed it is in comparison with higher education. In VUZ's (including universities), with the exception of certain universally required courses--Marxism-Leninism, Soviet Constitution, foreign languages--courses taken are all in the student's field of specialty. The school regimen is quite rigorous. Such time as is left over from studies is devoted to Komsomol-organized extra-curricular activities.⁷ Social sciences are almost completely absent from general secondary and higher school curricula; Marxism-Leninism and Soviet Constitution appear to be the Soviet equivalents of such courses.

Discipline is utilized as a means of implementing the goals of the educational system--developing habits of "civic virtue" and "social virtue." This involves training the student in the desired kind of loyalty and obedience to the Soviet system, institutions, and ideology on the one hand and developing in him personal habits of socialized behavior on the other.

6 - Following are the ten subjects to which most class hours are devoted in the Russian ten-year schools (based on class-hours per subject, 1933-34): Russian language and literature--2522 hours; arithmetic--1112 hours; algebra, geometry, trigonometry--980 hours; military and physical training--916 hours; history--713 hours; foreign language (usually one per school of either English, German, or French)--653 hours; geography--570 hours; natural history--523 hours; physics--472 hours; literature 424 hours. Although no textbook is completely free of some political propaganda, the only course expressly political in nature is "Constitution of the U.S.S.R." to which a total of only 65 hours is devoted. From the fifth grade on, 32 hours per week are supposed to be spent in the classroom. Due to the perennial shortages of teachers, textbooks, and students (i.e. truants), the rigorous curriculum and high number of classroom hours per week described above represent what is more an ideal than a generally practiced rule.

7 - Ashby, Op. Cit., p. 81. Again, conditions in Moscow are undoubtedly better organized and more rigorous than in provincial universities and non-university VUZ's.

The so-called labor draft in the U.S.S.R. is organized as follows (by an edict of June 19, 1947): Boys 14-17 years old and girls 15-18 years old are liable to be drafted into one of the secondary specialist schools or FZO's. Upon graduation, they are under obligation to accept an employment assignment for a period of four years. Thus, the state is legally empowered to allocate its specialists in whatever manner it finds necessary or convenient. A semi-military regime is maintained at these labor-draft schools.⁸

Co-education:

In July of 1954, a government decision re-introduced co-education into the primary and secondary schools of the Soviet Union. Co-education had initially been established with the revolution as one of those social reforms which demonstrated the communist ethos. However, in 1943 a governmental decree began a changeover to separate education. Implementation began in 1945. Exactly how widespread separate education ever became is not known. Both types of schools continued to exist, and the evidence indicates that separate schools were in a minority, having been established primarily in major cities.

Control

All education below the VUZ is the responsibility of the Ukrainian Ministry. Technical VUZ's are generally under the control of the appropriate Union-Republic ministry, e.g. chemical institutes under the Ministry of Chemical Industry, medical institutes under the Ministry of Health, law schools under the Ministry of Justice, etc. Other VUZ's are under the Union-Republic Ministry of Higher Education. As in most other spheres of state-organized Soviet life, policy decisions of importance are made at the All-Union Party level, local decisions being largely restricted to technical matters of local significance. The very fact that the educational system is so well-organized and that even relatively minor decisions are considered to be within the jurisdiction of high-level policy-makers means

8 - For a detailed description of the regimen imposed, see Kulski, pp. 485-490.

that the area of decisions considered to be of "local significance" only will be very restricted. Thus, the fact that primary and secondary education is officially directed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education does not mean that such questions as the choice of secondary school textbooks or the determination of the curriculum are actually a matter of Republic initiative. Teachers are organized into unions, whose role is similar to that played by other Soviet trade unions. The most "active" teachers form the faculty Party cell. Most children between the ages of ten and sixteen are members of the Pioneers, an organization sponsored by the Communist Party. An apparently successful attempt is made to organize almost all extra-curricular around this organization. For youth from sixteen to twenty-six years old, the Komsomol fills the same function. University extra-curricular life is almost completely dominated by this social-political youth arm of the Party, and students are the most active element of the Komsomol. Both announced and unannounced inspections are conducted under the initiative of the Ministry of Education or its local organs.

Occasional exposés in the local and national press constitute another form of social and political control. Such exposés invariably offer a detailed description of the blameworthy activity of specific individuals, thus making it clear that no one is safe from such public exposure. (It should be mentioned here that the demands made on students and educational administrators are simply impossible to meet in view of the present cultural level of the students and the unavailability of trained teachers and physical facilities. This makes falsification of records and reports universally necessary, and so everyone in the system becomes a potential object of exposure and criticism. Since almost everyone is liable to criticism, exposure in the press points up certain kinds of shortcomings in education, but cannot serve as an accurate indicator of their extent or degree. In other words, the undoubtedly accurate public criticism of a certain individual or school could well have been directed at any number of other individuals or schools, and is thus made for reasons often having little to do with the educational system as such).

Upon graduation from a VUZ, the student is generally liable to a three-year assignment, which he must accept.

The Functioning of the Educational System--Shortcomings

From time to time, articles appear in the Soviet press exposing "serious shortcomings in the schools." Certain of these "shortcomings"-- administrative red-tape, shortages of teachers, classrooms, and textbooks, inadequate transportation, heating, lighting, and cafeteria facilities-- are common to all educational systems. Others, at least in degree, are unique to the Soviet system.

One source of difficulty for the educational system is the nature of Soviet administrative practices affecting education. Soviet leaders appear to have a proclivity for producing numerically expressible "concrete results." Literature on education, for example, is often primarily devoted to the publication of statistics on graduates per year, square meters of classroom per student, vitamins and calories per school lunch, and so forth. Schools are required to produce a certain number of graduates per year, teachers--a certain number of five's (the highest grade), students--a certain number of pages of memorized material. As long as educational "results" are so precisely expressed and the demand of the system on individuals is in terms of such mathematical "results", the quality of education necessarily suffers. In industry such deficiencies are often called "sabotage" or "falsification of plans in order to meet the quota at all costs"; in education the charge is "formalism." "Shortcomings", as exposed in the Soviet press, are generally of two kinds--those which are "economic", that is, numerically expressible (high percentage of failures, low percentage of attendance, shortages of supplies or personnel), and those which are qualitative or "formalistic."

A second source of difficulty is the inflexibility of Soviet educational planning. As it now stands, the school curriculum is so rigorous and rigid that most schools are simply unable to follow it. Since the system itself provides no legal means of adjusting the curriculum to local conditions, individuals are forced to improvise in order to give the appearance of having fulfilled their responsibilities. This is also true with respect to the fulfillment of the more "economic" aspects of the plan, such as building schools and implementing the Party goal of universal primary and secondary education. The tendency to assume the existence of cultural and economic homo-

geneity where it is actually lacking, with its consequent insistence on homogeneous results, both hinders the educational work in particular areas and disrupts coordination within the system as a whole. For example, the rural-urban dichotomy is enormous throughout the Soviet Union. This results from differences in cultural level, quality and extent of educational facilities, and distance from center of administrative control, as well as from administrative favoritism. Nevertheless, graduates of rural primary schools are assumed to have covered the same amount of material as students in cities with an equal number of years of schooling. Thus, when rural children are transferred to urban secondary schools, no adjustment is considered necessary, and confusion in the classroom ensues. The same situation occurs when graduates of secondary schools in small towns enroll in VUZ's, which are usually located in large cities. The distinction made in the 19th Party Congress decision between "Republic capitals, cities under Republic control, . . . oblast', krai, and large industrial centers" and "the remaining cities and rural areas in general" indicates that some discrepancy between educational levels in rural and urban areas has now been recognized. However, there is still no official recognition of the very important difference between the quality of education in town and country.

A third source of difficulty is the unavoidable problem of integrating newly Sovietized areas into the Soviet system in general and into the Soviet educational system in particular.

Regional Problems

The two areas recently added to the Ukraine--the Western provinces and Crimea--appear to be having unique educational difficulties. The problem in the Western provinces is undoubtedly the more serious one. The entire system (or what was left of it after the war) had to be readjusted to the Soviet educational regimen, involving the education and reeducation of a significant percentage of the 8,000,000 new citizens who had never before attended Soviet schools. The need to stamp out political opposition among university students must certainly have aggravated this already serious problem. Constant emphasis in Soviet sources on the large

amount of educational "reconstruction" in that area offers at least a hint of the seriousness of the problem. Since the war, 2500 new schools and 25 VUZ's have been opened in the Western provinces alone. In Crimea, there seems to be a problem of "Ukrainianizing" an area which has only recently been transferred from R.S.F.S.R. to Ukrainian S.S.R.

THE CHURCH IN UKRAINE

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Introduction

The religious history of Ukraine may be best understood in terms of a centuries-long struggle of Ukrainians for their national church on one hand, and of a struggle between Byzantium (and later Moscow) and Rome for spiritual allegiance of the Ukrainian people on the other.

Both the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic (Uniate) churches stem from the single Christian church which split formally in 1054, and hence share many of their traditions, ecclesiastical and cultural features. The Orthodox church does not recognize the Pope as head of the Christian church, and subscribes only to those articles of faith established by the first seven Ecumenical Councils.¹ Furthermore, it is characterized by participation of laymen in church-government (sobors). The Greek-Catholic church, while acceding to all the dogmas of the Catholic church and recognizing the authority of the Pope, shares with the Orthodox its Byzantine-Slavic rite, church law, church hierarchy and organization, the Julian calendar and the right of the candidates for the priesthood to marry.

In 1937 there were approximately 3,500,000 Greek-Catholics in Poland (Galicia), 500,000 in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine and Priashiv region), and 100,000 in Bukovyna, plus over 1,000,000 Ukrainian Greek-Catholics in the U.S., Canada and other countries.² All the remaining Ukrainians (over 30 millions) may, with insignificant exceptions, be regarded as Orthodox or of Orthodox parents. Other denominations existing within the present boundaries of the Ukrainian S.S.R. are Jews,³

1 - For a detailed discussion of differences and similarities between the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic churches see N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko and M. Chubaty, "Tserkva"/The Church/, Encyclopedia Ukrainoznavstva/ Encyclopedia of Ukraine/, (Munich-New York: 1949), Vol. I, part 2, p. 626.

2 - Statistical data on Ukrainian Greek-Catholics are cited in Geza B. Grosschmid, "The Kremlin and the Eastern Catholic Church," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 4, Autumn 1953, p. 326.

3 - Only an undetermined small fraction of the pre-war 2.5 million Jews in the present territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. survived Nazi liquidation or returned from the regions to which they had been evacuated by the Soviet authorities.

Roman-Catholics (almost exclusively Poles),⁴ and various Protestant sects, in particular Evangelicals and Baptists.⁵

Historical Perspective

In 988 the ruler of Kievan Rus', Vladimir the Great, officially accepted Christianity and undertook a wholesale conversion of his subjects. The new faith and Church organization were taken from Byzantium, and the Old-Slavic lingua franca of the Southern and Eastern Slavs became the language of the Church (Church-Slavic) and soon, of the literature of Kievan Rus'. The influence of Latin Christianity was not absent, however, in Kievan Rus' and survived, despite the subsequent split of 1054, in the Ukrainian church of the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries.⁶

The Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus' in 1240 led to the decline of Kiev as a political and ecclesiastical center in Eastern Europe, and to the emergence of two rival religious centres associated with the development of Ukrainian and Russian (Muscovite) nationalities.⁷ In the beginning of the fifteenth century the metropolitan see was restored in Kiev, with jurisdiction over the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Kingdom,⁸ and recognizing the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople.⁹

4 - Only a few hundred thousand Poles remained in the Ukrainian S.S.R. after the post-war exchange of population between the Ukrainian S.S.R. and Poland.

5 - According to a recent statement by J. I. Zhidkov, president of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists, the number of Baptists in the U.S.S.R. in 1955 was 500,000 (New York Times, July 6, 1955). As reported by some writers, a large part if not a majority of the Baptists reside in the Ukrainian S.S.R.

6 - At least two attempts to bring about the Union may be mentioned, one negotiated between King Danylo of Galicia-Volhynia and Pope Innocent IV in 1250's, another at the Council of Florence (known as Florentine Union) in 1439.

7 - In 1299 the Kievan Metropolitan transferred his see to Vladimir on Klazma (moved in the middle of the fourteenth century to Moscow), and in 1303 the Metropoly of Halych was established.

8 - During the fourteenth century Lithuanian Grand Duchy gradually expanded into the Ukraine only to be replaced there by Poland after the Union of Lublin in 1569.

9 - Meanwhile, in 1448 the Metropoly of Moscow formally broke away

Within the Polish-Lithuanian state, the status and organization of the Orthodox Church progressively deteriorated. Some of the old Ukrainian nobility became Catholic to preserve their privileges, and there was mounting pressure from the Polish Roman-Catholic church for conversion of the Orthodox Ukrainians. Most of the Church hierarchy finally decided to enter into a union with Rome while maintaining internal autonomy, Eastern rites and the traditions of the Ukrainian church. The union at Brest-Litovsk in 1596 gave birth to the Uniate (Greek-Catholic) church, and a sharp polemical and political struggle developed between the Uniate and Orthodox camps. When in the beginning of the seventeenth century the Orthodox church in the Ukraine found itself without a hierarchy as Polish authorities refused to allow consecration of new bishops, the Cossacks took the initiative in restoring the Orthodox hierarchy and extending to it their military protection. This opened the way to a new revival of the Orthodox church.

The vulnerability of the Orthodox church to political changes became again manifested after the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654. Beginning with the later seventeenth century, the church hierarchy in the Ukraine became progressively Russified. The nineteenth century Orthodox Church in Ukraine bears little distinctiveness from the general Russian Orthodox Church. Except for the lower clergy, the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine did not participate in the nineteenth century cultural and national revival of Ukrainians, and its alienation from the Ukrainian masses tended to open a spiritual vacuum in which dissident religious sects could find a favorable ground.

from the Patriarchate of Constantinople and in 1589 an independent Patriarchate of Moscow was established.

The Uniate (Greek-Catholic) Church

Established in 1596, the Uniate (Greek-Catholic)¹⁰ Church did not succeed in winning allegiance of the majority of Ukrainians. Practically limited to the Polish-controlled part of the Ukraine, the Uniate Church started to expand more rapidly only during the eighteenth century, but the partitions of Poland doomed it in those territories that were annexed by Russia. The Russian authorities used all means, including violence, to convert Uniates to Orthodoxy, and in 1838 finally banned the Uniate Church within the boundaries of the Russian Empire.¹¹

Those parts of Ukraine that were annexed to Austria - namely Galicia, Bukovyna and Carpatho-Ukraine¹², were the only ones where the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) church was extended not only official tolerance but also active assistance. Higher theological schools for the Greek-Catholic clergy were established in Vienna and L'vov, and produced leaders who undertook the task of purging its rite from Polish influences. The powerful Basilian order was reformed. The Greek-Catholic clergy, hitherto considerably polonized, became in the nineteenth century the leading force in the cultural and political revival in the Austrian Ukraine, forming the basis of the later intelligentsia.

The Second World War and the subsequent political changes had a profound effect upon the destiny of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In September 1939, Western Ukraine was annexed to the Soviet Union and included in the Ukrainian S.S.R. While the Church hierarchy was left alone and religious practices were, with some exceptions, not

10 - The name "Greek-Catholic" has apparently been introduced in the eighteenth century by Austrian government to designate all the Catholics of Eastern rite within the Austrian Empire. The modern tendency of Ukrainian Uniates is to designate their church as the Ukrainian Catholic Church of Eastern Rite.

11 - I. Mirchuk, "The Ukrainian Church," Ukraine and Its People, A Handbook, Edited by I. Mirchuk, (Munich: Ukrainian Free University, 1949), p. 58.

12 - Prior to the formation of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Carpatho-Ukraine (Uhors'ka Rus') had been within the Kingdom of Hungary since the thirteenth to fourteenth century.

interfered with by the Soviet Authorities, a series of official measures was undertaken to limit the influence of the Greek-Catholic church and to undermine its economic basis. Some priests and laymen associated with Church activities were arrested and a number liquidated, particularly at the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. But in general, during their 22-month stay in the Western Ukraine, the Soviet authorities were reluctant to open a frontal attack against the Church.

During the three-year German occupation of Western Ukraine, most of the limitations imposed upon the Greek-Catholic Church by the Soviets were abolished, although the Nazi authorities did not hide their contempt of religion and their distrust of the Greek-Catholic Church as an independent organization with Ukrainian nationalist tendencies.

Liquidation of the Uniate Church

When in the middle of 1944 the Soviet armies reoccupied Ukraine, all the Greek-Catholic Church hierarchy remained in the country. At first, the Soviet measures largely resembled those undertaken in 1939 - 1941. In the following months the official campaign against the Church mounted with its hierarchy and clergy being accused of treason, collaboration with Poles and Germans, assisting the U.P.A.¹³ insurgents, and acting as "agents of the Vatican." Finally on April 1, 1945, Metropolitan Yosyp Slipyi, and all the remaining members of the hierarchy were arrested.¹⁴

While the arrests of the hierarchy and clergy were under way, the Moscow Patriarchal Synod issued an appeal to the Ukrainian Catholics to forsake their church, to join the Russian Orthodox Church, and to recognize the jurisdiction of the Moscow-appointed Russian Orthodox Bishop of L'vov and Tarnopol, Makariy.¹⁵ This apparently unsuccessful appeal

13 - Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

14 - Further fate of the Greek-Catholic hierarchy has been reported in various Western publications. See Michael Pap, "The Ukrainian Problem," Soviet Imperialism: Its Origins and Tactics, A Symposium, Ed. by W. Gurian, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), p. 70.

15 - Nicholas D. Chubaty, "Russian Church Policy in Ukraine," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 1, Autumn 1954, p. 53.

was followed by the organization of an "Initiatory Group for the Reunion of one Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church," composed of Rev. H. Kostelnyk and two other apostate Greek clergymen.¹⁶ Backed by the Soviet authorities, the "Initiatory Group" appealed to the clergy and faithful to join the Russian Orthodoxy, condemning the Vatican as "a destructive force, proud of power, a collaborator with Poland for the destruction of the Ukrainian rite, the Ukrainian Church and the Ukrainian people."¹⁷ As, despite the official pressure, only 42 clergymen of the total 2,700 answered the "Group's" appeal, the latter appealed for aid to the Council of the People's Commissars of the Ukrainian S.S.R. The reply,¹⁸ signed by the commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars for the Russian Orthodox Church, recognized the "Initiatory Group" as the sole provisional ecclesiastical authority over the Greek-Orthodox Church and invested it with the administration of the Church, promising the "Group" governmental support in working out "reunion" and requesting that all clergymen refusing the authority of the "Group" be reported to the Government.

In reply to the above order three hundred Greek-Catholic priests of the Western Ukraine addressed a letter of protest¹⁹ to Molotov separating themselves from the "Initiatory Group" and asking for the release of the Church hierarchy from imprisonment and pleading that the Greek-Catholic Church be permitted to retain the freedom in Church affairs "guaranteed" by the Stalin Constitution. Reportedly, the mass arrests of the resisting clergy and faithful were the only reply to that letter. In this

16 - Before assuming the leadership of the "Initiatory Group," Rev. Kostelnyk spent several months in Soviet prison.

17 - Grosschmid, op. cit., 327.

18 - For the complete text of Commissioner Khodchenko's reply see Nicholas D. Chubaty, "Russian Church Policy in Ukraine," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Autumn 1945, p. 54.

19 - Complete text in Nicholas D. Chubaty, Ibid., p. 55.

atmosphere in March 1946 a "sobor of the Greek Catholic Church" was summoned by the "Initiatory Group" in L'vov. Some two hundred clergy and laymen, in the presence of representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate and the government, formally declared the Union of Brest-Litvosk of 1596 null and void, and proclaimed "reunion" with the Russian Orthodox Church.

The Sobor was followed by measures to implement its decisions. Every parish and monastery was obliged to sign a declaration of adherence and reprisals were taken against those who voiced their opposition. Only part of the clergy acceded to the "reunion"; the remaining ones have either been arrested or deprived of their positions, or having gone into hiding.²⁰ Reports have been published in the Ukrainian émigré press claiming that there exists an underground Greek-Catholic Church in Western Ukraine.

In a similar manner the Greek-Catholic dioceses of Mukachevo (Carpatho-Ukraine) and Priashiv (Slovakia) were "re-united" with the Russian Orthodoxy in 1948 and 1950 respectively.

Thus by 1950 all of the Greek-Catholic Church of Western Ukraine had been liquidated as an independent church body united with Rome, and subordinated to the Kievan Metropolitan Ioan, the exarch in Ukraine of the Patriarch of Moscow.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church since 1917.

In the wake of the February Revolution in 1917 and the resurgence of the nationalist movement in Ukraine came attempts to re-establish a distinct national Orthodox Church. However, subsequent events postponed the realization of these plans. Finally, in October 1921, under the Soviet regime, the All-Ukrainian Church Sobor (Council) met in Kiev to organize the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. As no Russian Orthodox bishop, nor the patriarchs of Georgia and

²⁰ Gray MacEoin, The Communist War on Religion (New York, 1951) p. 71.

Constantinople,²¹ agreed to consecrate in a canonical manner the hierarchy for the new church; the members of the Sobor, lower clergy and laymen, resorted to the ancient Christian practice of the Alexandrine church of consecrating bishops and consecrated Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky and one bishop by laying their hands upon the elected candidates, thus breaking with the canonical principle of apostolic succession. The Autocephalous Church extended rapidly throughout Ukraine, claiming in 1923, 35 bishops and 3,000 parishes.²² From the start it met a bitter opposition of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, recognizing the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. and of the "Living Church." The latter came into being in Moscow in 1922. Based on recognition of and loyalty toward the Soviet regime, approving the separation of the Church and State, the "Living Church" represented a "sort of trade-union movement of parish-priests" directed chiefly against the monastic bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church.²³ Despite a belated grant of autonomy to the "Living Church" in the Ukraine, its development there was hampered by its non-Ukrainian origin and by the growth of the Autocephalous Church,²⁴ which appealed to the national sentiments of Ukrainians by its return to ancient Ukrainian church customs, replacement of Old Slavic with the spoken Ukrainian language and its identification with Ukrainian cultural values. Many of the prominent cultural and intellectual leaders of Ukraine actively participated in the Autocephalous church.

With the end of the "Ukrainization" policy in the Ukraine, repressive measures against the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church increased; it was charged with being a tool of the "Petlurites."²⁵ In 1927 the Soviet

21 - John Shelton Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State 1917-1950, (Boston, 1953), p. 145.

22 - John A. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 189.

23 - Curtiss, op. cit., p. 138.

24 - By 1927 the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church claimed 10,657 priests in the Ukraine. (N. Polonska-Vasylenko and M. Chubatyi, op. cit., p. 618.)

25 - Followers of the Ukrainian nationalist leader Symon Petlura who headed the Ukrainian Government in 1919-21, and (at that time) the exile government (in France.).

authorities removed Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyi from the leadership of the Autocephalous Church and shortly afterwards arrested him. The wholesale liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church came in 1930 in connection with the trial of the leaders of the underground "League for the Liberation of Ukraine",²⁶ among whom were some leading lay-members of the Autocephalous Church. Soon afterwards the whole hierarchy of that Church,²⁷ 12 archbishops, 11 bishops and thousands of clergy and faithful were arrested and most of them disappeared.²⁸

Up to the outbreak of World War II, only a small fraction of the churches, none of them Autocephalist, remained open in the Ukraine, with the few active clergymen belonging mostly to the Russian (Patriarchal) Church or, less frequently, to the "Living Church" that had shrunk considerably, having lost official backing.

There are some indications that by the end of the decade, the regime was coming to realize the futility of terroristic measures against religion and gradually reversed its policy in religious matters. But it was only during the Soviet-German war that the new Soviet religious policy was officially promulgated, and for the most of that war Ukraine found itself outside Soviet control.

A brief mention shall be made at this point, of the fate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Volhynia, Kholmshchyna and the Ukrainian part of Polesia - the territories annexed by Poland in 1921. Of approximately 4,000,000 Orthodox in Poland, there were about 2,500,000 Ukrainians.²⁹ In 1924 the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland,

²⁶ Curtiss, op. cit., p. 235.

²⁷ The only surviving member of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church is Metropolitan I. Theodorovych who managed to escape to the U.S.A. where he now heads the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

²⁸ For a more detailed account of the liquidation of the Autocephalist hierarchy in Ukraine see Nicholas Prychodko, "The abolition of Religion in Ukraine," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 2, Summer, 1950, pp. 243-244.

²⁹ N. Polon'ska-Vasylenko and M. Chubaty, op. cit., p. 618.

was established and recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople. It was subjected to much stricter Government control than the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, and was governed by the decrees of the Ministry of Religious Cults and Public Enlightenment. The church, its seminaries, hierarchy and clergy were subject to increasing pressure of polonization.

Organization, Structure and the Legal Status of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

The Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine represents a territorial subdivision within a centralized all-Union Church organization. It is subordinated to the Patriarchal Synod of the Church in Moscow, headed by the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia³⁰ who administers the Russian Orthodox church in the Ukraine through his Exarch, the Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia.³¹ The church in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is at the same time subject to control by the Commissioner of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. for the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, representing the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church attached to the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. The number of dioceses, clergy, churches and parishes in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is unknown. It is known that in 1946 there were in Ukraine three theological seminaries³² and an undetermined number of monasteries, including famous Kievo Petchers'ka Lavra, and reportedly there were three convents in Kiev with 2,000 nuns,³³ in existence in the Ukrainian S.S.R.

According to the government decree of August 14, 1945, which implicitly repealed parts of the older basic decrees on State-Church relations, the Russian Orthodox Church has the rights of a corporate person; the parishes, dioceses and the national churches have the

30 - Since Patriarch Sergey's death in 1944, the Synod is headed by Patriarch Alexius elected in January, 1945.

31 - The present Exarch is Metropolitan Ioan (Sokolov), a Russian.

32 - The only two theological academies are in the Russian S.F.S.R. The three theological seminaries in Ukraine, are reportedly in Kiev, Lutsk and Odessa. (John Shelton Curtiss, *op. cit.*, p. 308.)

33 - N.S. Timasheff, ("Religion in Russia," The Soviet Union: Background, ideology, Reality. A Symposium, W. Gurian Ed., University of Notre Dame Press, 1951) p. 159. The number of nuns reported seems to be considerably inflated.

right to build, acquire or rent churches, and to acquire objects used to divine services. The churches can be reopened on application of local population. A religious group of 20 or more members may acquire or rent buildings, possess all objects necessary for divine services hire personnel, organize workshops for the production of tapers, robes, etc.³⁴ Another decree issued on August 22, 1946, relieved monasteries from taxes on land and buildings. Many of the monasteries exist in form of "artels" (artisan teams) or "agricultural communes" pledged to self-sufficiency and distributing their surpluses among the needy.³⁵

The 1945 decree abolished the democratic structure given to the parishes in 1917-8, and charged with the conduct of parish affairs a small executive committee of four, composed of the parish priest, the church warden, his deputy and the parish treasurer, the last three elected by the general meeting of the parishioners. In general the financial position of the Russian Orthodox Church has been markedly improved in comparison with the inter-war period. The taxes on churches were reduced and at least some of the churches are reported to have a fair income based on collections among the faithful, spontaneous donations and sale of tapers. Church buildings are apparently kept in good repair and the government pays maintenance expenses of the most famous cathedrals.³⁶

The facilities for the training of priests are scarce and even more pressing is the shortage of instructors with theological degrees. The major problem facing the Russian Orthodox Church is to overcome the ignorance in theological matters of the majority of recently ordained priests who, at best, received some theological training through correspondence courses or summer schools. The theological schools are financed from the Church treasury alone although the salaries of

34 - Timasheff, op.cit., p. 175.

35 - Ibid., pp. 158-9.

36 - Ibid., p. 164.

instructors and scholarships are equivalent to these in State institutions.³⁷

Official obstacles no longer prevent elementary religious instruction of children but it must be confined to the church-buildings or private apartments.

Visitors to the U.S.S.R. report large church attendance on Sundays, but among the faithful the womenfolk and older men seem to prevail. Due to the shortage of priests, group baptisms, weddings, confessions and funerals are frequently performed.³⁸

While there is a probably large number of believers who do not care about politics as long as they can attend churches without being exposed to persecution, "by carefully reading some of the official statements on anti-religious propaganda, one can perceive in them indirect acknowledgement that, in countryside, at least some priests and part of the flock are dissatisfied with the ways chosen by the top of the Church system."³⁹ This would be particularly true in respect to the Western Ukraine with still living memories of the suppressed Ukrainian Greek-Catholic church and areas embraced by the Ukrainian Autocephalous church during the last war.

Soviet State and the Church

The Soviet attitude towards organized religion has been shaped primarily by two factors, ideological and political. The Communist view of religion may be traced back to Marx' definition:

Religious belief is at one and the same time an expression of real poverty and a protest against real poverty. Religion is the sigh of an oppressed creature, the soul of a heartless world, the spirit of timelessness. It is opium of the people.⁴⁰

37 - Timasheff, Ibid., pp. 154-6.

38 - Ibid., p. 167.

39 - Ibid., p. 174-5.

40 - "K Kritike Gegel'evskoi Filosofii Prava" in Mysli K. Marksa i F. Engelsa o Religii, 2nd Edition, (Leningrad, 1929), p. 356.

Religion has thus been identified with the poverty, ignorance and superstition of "have-nots" exploited by the "haves", to imbue the masses with the fear of, and humility and subservience toward the exploiting class. Destruction of class exploitation and general education would, in the opinion of the Communist writers, deprive religion of its very basis and replace it with science. This view was held by Lenin who was expressly hostile to religion, but regarded it as a matter of secondary importance.⁴¹

The political factor responsible for the Soviet attitude toward organized religion was the close identification of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Tsarist regime and its open hostility to the Bolshevik revolution and government in the early 1920's. While later, Patriarch Tikhon and his successor Sergius succeeded in reversing the attitude of the Russian church and proving its loyalty to the regime, the charges of disloyalty" and conspiring with the anti-Soviet forces served as an official justification for persecution and eventual liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and of the Greek-Catholic Church in the Western Ukraine. Similar charges have been lately advanced against the Roman Catholics in the U.S.S.R.,⁴² Jews and Moslems.

Soviet policy toward the Russian Orthodox Church represented, in Andre Pierre's words, a complex "vacillation between force and prosecution on one hand, and persuasion and propaganda on the other."⁴³ Separation of the Church from the State and school and seizure of the Church property in 1918, prohibition of the acquisition of new property by the Church, excessive taxation, denial of civil rights to the clergy, confiscation of church valuables in 1921, closing of churches and arrests of clergy and faithful,-- were combined with atheistic propaganda in

41 - Curtiss, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

42 - Particularly in Lithuania after the last war.

43 - Andre Pierre, op. cit., p. 19.

schools, and youth organizations, opening of anti-religious museums, staging of frequently violent anti-religious demonstration, etc. In 1925 a League of Militant Atheists was launched by the Soviet authorities and invested with central direction and co-ordination of atheist propaganda in the U.S.S.R.

During the late thirties the attitude of the Soviet government toward the Russian Orthodox Church underwent a gradual evolution. The regime was coming to realize the futility of terroristic measures against religion and the declarations of loyalty on the part of the Church hierarchy, the threat of war and the growing emphasis on Russian nationalism influenced this change, which found its reflection in the restoration of civil rights to the clergy and formal reaffirmation of the "freedom of conscience" in Stalin's Constitution of 1936.⁴⁴

The outbreak of the Soviet-German war in 1941 caused the Soviet government to make open concessions to Russian Orthodoxy, and to some other religious groups. The upsurge of religious feelings in the face of war-time deprivations, the hope of utilizing religion to strengthen popular morale, further concessions to Russian nationalism, the external propaganda value of "religious freedom" in the U.S.S.R., and the energetic support extended to the regime in its war-effort by the Russian Orthodox Church - led the government to recall the anti-religious campaign, disband the League of Militant Atheists, and publicly to recognize the Russian Orthodox Church as its ally. In 1943, the government allowed the election of Metropolitan Sergius to the Patriarchal see of Moscow and established a Council of Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church to deal with the Church's relations to the government. A similar governmental body was created to deal with the affairs of other denominations. A limited number of religious publications and theological institutions were allowed, as well as the reopening of churches and monasteries. The Russian Orthodox Church reciprocated

44 - "In order to insure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the State, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." (Article 124).

with its support of the government's (internal and foreign) policies, with appeals to the population to back the regime and resist the Germans, financial donations to the army, and excommunication of the autocephalous hierarchy in Ukraine.

Concessions to Russian Orthodoxy continued after the war. As Andre Pierre has observed, "the regime has learned its lesson well: toleration coupled with control was much more profitable than persecution."⁴⁵ The Russian Orthodox Church, on its part, rationalized its compromise in terms of benevolent neutrality towards the state. The official view was expressed by archpriest Gregory Razumovsky at the Conference of the Orthodox Churches held in Moscow in 1948:

The power is given (to the Church) only to teach, to teach the peoples, and not their governors, and to teach only that which Christ has ordained. This is quite different from denouncing or criticising the governors of the people, which is not ordained in the commandments of Christ, neither is it shown in the example of his life.⁴⁶

The post-war attitude of the Soviet regime toward the church was described in the 1947 supplementary volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia⁴⁷ and may be summarized as follows:

After the Bolshevik Revolution many churchmen and some of the faithful actively opposed the Soviet regime. The tide turned, however, in 1927 with the declaration of loyalty by metropolitan Sergius. The Great Patriotic War proved the loyalty of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Soviet regime, and the government responded with a change of policies. Although the Party and Government position toward religion remained unchanged and the Party and the Komsomol take patient but relentless measures against religion, the State meets religious needs of the believers as long as religion prejudices exist. But the Churches are entirely separated from the state and school, and their activities are confined to divine services.

45 - Andre Pierre, op. cit., p. 20.

46 - Henry Waddams, "The Church in Soviet Russia," Soviet Studies (Oxford, 1954), Vol. V, No. 1, July 1953, p. 15.

47 - A. Kolossov, "Religion and the Church", summarized in Timasheff, op. cit. pp. 175-6. Also see Curtiss, op. cit. p. 320.

Churches are not allowed to influence people outside places of worship or to participate in political activities. All denominations are treated equally, but the state is not passive and combats immoral or disloyal sects.

In practice, however, as Timasheff points out,⁴⁸ the Soviet government returned to one of the main principles of the Tsarist religious policy, by arranging religious denominations in a hierarchy with a different treatment according to their order of rank. The top rank was granted to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Church of Armenia and the Baptists⁴⁹ occupying the next place below; the next rank below seems to be occupied by various protestant groups, Old Believers, and Buddhists; still lower rank belongs to the Lutherans (in the Baltic Republics), Jews and Moslems. At the very bottom at the verge of toleration are the Roman Catholics. Outlawed and completely suppressed are the Ukrainian Greek Catholics (Uniates) and the Autocephalous churches of Ukraine and Belorussia.

The compromise between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet State presented to both of them advantages and disadvantages. The Russian Orthodox Church gained an official recognition from the State, and has "substantially profited from the expansionist policy of the Soviet government. It has also gained advantage by 'annexing' the Uniates and, perhaps,, by being enabled to 'convert' some other groups, by means of the Missionary Council.⁵⁰ It had been finally enabled to pose the question whether, in our day, the old slogan 'Moscow the Third Rome' should not be actualized, by transferring precedence among the Eastern Churches from Constantinople to Moscow."⁵¹

But at the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church had to pay heavily for those concessions. It cannot openly oppose atheistic policies

48 - Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 185-190.

49 - According to Timasheff, (pp. 185-6) the center of the Baptist group is in Ukraine, where apparently it has the largest following. The official designation of the Baptist Church in the U.S.S.R. is "All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists." See also note 3 on first page of this chapter.

50 - Established in Moscow in 1948.

51 - Timasheff, op. cit., pp. 163-4.

of the regime, and its hierarchs have occasionally to make statements hardly compatible with the spirit of religion; it had to repudiate the martyrs of the years of persecution and to accept its share of responsibility for the suppression of the Uniates and other religious groups "converted" to Russian Orthodoxy.

Among the advantages derived by the Soviet state from a compromise with the Church were the strengthening of the patriotic attitudes of the Russians during the war, Church support of the Pan-Slavic movement, its active participation in the so-called "Peace movement", and the canalizing of religious sentiments into a government-controlled framework. But on the other hand, as Timasheff points out, the concessions extended to the Russian Orthodox Church weakened the two basic principles of the Soviet system; for, however controlled, the Church conveys to the faithful ideas that differ from the official truth, and its personnel, although supervised, are selected and promoted independently of the Party.⁵²

While offering concessions to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Soviet State has not abandoned its basically hostile attitude towards religion but rather adopted different means of decreasing its influence among the people and for the time being of making best out of its surviving strength. After the war, the anti-religious propaganda was re-instituted but in regard to Russian Orthodoxy it emphasised persuasion, rather than violence, stressing the contradictions between science and religion. Established in Moscow in 1947, the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge replaced the defunct militant atheists.⁵³ No religious tolerance was extended to the Party and Komsomol membership, the upper strata of administration and the Army, although sanctions taken against practising believers in their ranks were milder than in the past. But no anti-religious publications,

52 - Ibid., p. 192.

53 - Andre Pierre, op. cit. p. 21.

museums or public demonstrations have been reported in the postwar U.S.S.R.

In June of 1954, a sudden reversal in Soviet Church policy took place when the Central Committee of the Party called on the Communists to revitalize the anti-religious campaign. It was followed by a press campaign against "religious survivals", particularly among the youth in the Komsomol, with frequent denunciations of church-going officials and public insults to believers.⁵⁴ But already in November of that year the violence of the anti-religious press campaign was subjected to sharp criticism from above and the propagandists were characterized as "persons ignorant of science and atheistic propaganda" employing "stupid anecdotes and fables about the clergy." Instead, the Party stressed again persuasion and sweet reasonableness.

The Party, doubtlessly, had to take cognizance of the tenacity and persistence of religious sentiments among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Explanation of this phenomenon was attempted by the Party ideological organ, the Kommunist:

Religion has always thrived and still thrives on the misfortunes of men and the privations of the people... It is not surprising that, under the influence of the calamities and sufferings of war-time, and also owing to the lessening of scientific-atheistic propaganda, deep-rooted religious prejudices have been affirmed outright by men who were believers before the war, or by those who have not yet succeeded in really breaking with religion.⁵⁵

The Party press did not fail to notice an alarming number of "false atheists" and "chameleon Communists" who "proclaim themselves to be atheist but who do not hesitate to adopt a strange attitude of compromise toward religious ceremonies."⁵⁶ It is the old people that are to be blamed, particularly the "grandmothers" who encourage "religious obscurantism" in the young and constitute a "social danger."⁵⁷

54 - For example, the Zakarpats'ka Pravda (Uzhhorod) described membership in religious sects as an "anti-social activity" and called believers "lackeys of international imperialism." Andre Pierre, ibid., p. 22.

55 - Kommunist, No. 13, September 1954.

56 - Molodoi Kommunist, No. 4, 1954.

57 - Partiynaya Zhyzn', No. 15, 1954.

Religion, notes the Kommunist, not only harms the national economy by its feasts and ceremonies encouraging absenteeism, but also

...kills the social activity of believers, diverting them from the struggle for Communism...Religion propagates pessimistic views on life, poisons man's conscience, and turns him from the straight road that leads to true happiness on earth.⁵⁸

Whatever are the reasons for the tenacity of religious beliefs in the Soviet Union, they are likely to persist for a long time, at least as long as the people have to face the suffering and privations of Soviet life. Religion offers one of the few avenues of escape from the "bleak and stultifying environment" and "the oppressiveness of Soviet Life."⁵⁹ In case of the Ukraine, even this avenue has been half-closed by the destruction of the national church organization and the imposition of a Russian church hierarchy.

58 - Kommunist, September 1954.

59 - Andre Pierre, op. cit. p. 28.

UKRAINIAN FOLKLORE
AS A CONTAINER AND REFLECTOR OF THE
WORLD VIEW AND ETHOS

"A" lh

The following is an essay on the world view and ethos of the Ukrainians as reflected in their folklore and recorded in several standard collections during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It goes without saying that the ideas of the world and norms of human conduct expressed in the Ukrainian folklore do not necessarily coincide with corresponding conceptions in the minds of modern Ukrainians living in an environment of almost universal literacy, scientific thinking, and rapidly expanding urbanization based on modern industrial technology.

According to Professor Redfield, "Of all that is connoted by culture, world view attends especially to the way a man, in a particular society, sees himself in relation to all else. It is the properties of existence as distinguished from and related to the self. It is, in short, a man's idea of the Universe. It is that organization of ideas which answers to a man the questions: 'Where am I?' 'Among what do I move?' 'What are my relations to these things?' This is, precisely, the sense in which the term world view will be used in this study.

By ethos we shall mean the over-all system of values, the organization of goals, ideals, standards, and preferences; the concepts of good and evil, physical, aesthetic and moral.

For convenience, and according to its subject matter, we shall divide the whole material into four major categories: 1) concepts of God and the Universe; 2) ideas of nature and its phenomena; 3) magic and extra-natural beings; and 4) views about one's place in society.

In all cases we shall have to deal with two facets of the subject-matter-- on the one hand, the theoretical views of the Ukrainian people on the nature of the world in which man exists and on his place and destiny in the cosmos; and on the other, the ethical points of view and moral lessons drawn from daily experience. The above two facets-- the metaphysical and the ethical--are so inextricably intertwined that it is often difficult to decide which of them should be said to prevail. This difficulty

is further increased by the fact that many of the examples we shall have to use can serve as illustrations in more than one of our four fundamental methodological divisions. This study presupposes that it is impossible to imagine a popular system of values and ethical norms unattached to a theory of the Universe--that is, the realm of popular ethics unsupported by that of metaphysics--and, conversely, that it is impossible to conceive a popular theory of the Universe which does not reflect the sum total of the life experiences of the group which formulated it.

Wherever evidence permits, we shall describe the condition in which particular fragments of this world view and ethos were caught by the Soviet Revolution, as well as their fate since that time. There can be no doubt that during the last three decades the folklore of the Ukrainians underwent numerous and significant transformations in both form and content, not only as a result of almost universal literacy, intensive industrialization and rapid urbanization, but also under the impact of compulsory public education, popularization of science through press and radio, and systematic propaganda of the Bolshevik interpretation of Marxian philosophy in all spheres of life. Besides, the folklore of Ukraine, like that of other parts of the Soviet Union, has been somewhat affected by systematic and imposed popularizations of various artificial poems inspired by the Soviet Government and the Communist Party. It is of interest to mention here that these party-inspired folk songs attempt to imitate as closely as possible the style, vocabulary and imagery characteristic of the genuine, spontaneous folklore of the non-communist masses.

Where direct information is unavailable, we shall limit ourselves to cautious inferences from contextual evidence, and where absolutely no hints are on hand concerning the present state of certain beliefs, we shall have to resort to reasonable guesses based under similar conditions in other parts of the world.

Concepts of God and the Universe

In its ambitious claim that it is the only scientific interpretation of life and the world, the Marxian philosophy regards religion and theology, from the most primitive to the most sophisticated, as mere survivals of a pre-scientific mentality, an essentially backward way of thinking determined at every level of social development by specific

features of the relationship between the so-called "means of production" on the one hand and the so-called "productive forces" on the other. In a classless society, which, according to Soviet and other Marxian theoreticians, is the ultimate goal and inevitable outcome of all social struggles and class antagonisms, the ideological superstructure, that is, the scientific, philosophical, legal and moral conceptions, which always and of necessity reflect the degree of technological and economic progress of the social base, will be completely free from all survivals of religion, which, with magic and other "superstitions", will no longer be able to serve as "the opiate of the people."

The purpose of this essay is to present a thorough general review of certain fragments of the Ukrainian folk literature, prose as well as poetry, which, in our opinion, most faithfully reflects the basic popular ideas about the world and the ways of achieving the good life. The examples we have selected date from the first recorded references of the Byzantine Greeks to the Slavs of Kievan Rus' until today.

Religion is apparently still strong in the Ukraine but evidence is not available concerning present folk ideas about God and other matters of religion.

(The content and form of modern religiosity in Ukraine, even if direct information about them were available, could not be understood without at least general familiarity with the official theology of the Orthodox Church. In the same way, even if our factual knowledge about it were considerably greater, we could not expect to understand the peculiar nature of Christianity in Ukraine without some previous knowledge of the world view and ethos of the Slavs of Kievan Rus', before their conversion by the Byzantine missionaries.)

To some, extensive church-going and other manifestations of mass religiosity represent a genuine expression of piety, but they also offer an excellent channel for the conscious or unconscious utterance of general frustration and disaffection, a popular safety-valve for the release of accumulated protest, anger and despair.

A thousand years ago, before their acceptance of Christianity in the year 988, the ancestors of modern Ukrainians believed in the same forces of the Universe as other old-Slavic groups. In addition to many powers of nature and of the super-natural, they faced and dealt with a series of

extra-natural beings, such as fairies, dragons, etc.

With other ancient Slavs they shared most members of the Pantheon, headed, in all probability, by the angry thunder-god Perun, or the powerful sun-god Khors. Historians of religion are not in complete agreement about the hierarchy of old-Slavic deities and their respective functions. According to N.S. Derzhavin and other Russian scholars, the supreme deity of all ancient Slavs was a god of heaven, Nebo, master of the sky and sunlight. It was only later that out of this nebulous arch-deity there developed several major and minor gods with a more or less clear division of labor and jurisdiction, which for a long time reflected the economic and social organization of the agricultural and cattle-raising ancestors of all modern Slavs.

The earliest historical reference to Perun is found in Procopius, a Byzantine historian of the sixth century. He asserts that the Slavs believe in "a god who forges thunder-bolts and is the sole master of the Universe;" that "they sacrifice oxen and all kinds of beasts to him," and that "when in danger of death, they promise, if they escape, to offer a sacrifice." He also mentions that they "worship rivers and nymphs and other divinities, and practice divination at their sacrifices." The first explicit mention of Perun occurs in a treaty, concluded in the year 945 between the Slavs of Kievan Rus' and the Byzantine Greeks. In that international document the Kievans swear by Perun, as well as by Volos, the god of livestock.

Around the year 980 there existed in Kiev a wooden statue of Perun with a silver head and a golden beard, surrounded by the figures of other deities, the supreme god held in his hand a thunder-bolt. Following his conversion to Christianity in 988, Prince Volodymir the Great had the idol tied to the tail of a horse and dragged to the Dnieper. Thus he intended to expose the old, dethroned deity to public ridicule and humiliation and show his people that Perun was not really a god, but only the symbol of a fictitious idea. It is interesting to mention that in their struggle against the church and religion the Soviets have subjected many sacred symbols of Orthodox Christianity to the same treatment and with the same purpose in mind.

As in other countries that partake of the Christian tradition, the official theology of the church had to adapt itself to the deep-seated and

often ineradicable beliefs of the pre-Christian, pagan world view. For example, thunder and lightning, once in the jurisdiction of Perun, passed after the conversion to Christianity into the hands of St. Elijah, the Judeo-Christian prophet "who rides a fiery chariot whenever it thunders." Still alive before the Soviet Revolution, this popular belief has probably disappeared by now under the impact of Communist education and general dissemination of scientific knowledge.

The function of Volos or Veles, the old-Slavic god of the livestock, is now performed by St. Iurii, symbol of spring and fertility, and Christian patrol of cattle. He is particularly honored among the Hutsuls, a group of cattle-raising Ukrainians in the Carpathian Mountains.

Judging from Ukrainian folk literature, the Christian idea of God was not accepted in the process of conversion without important changes. It is true that God is usually referred to as the creator of the Universe, the supreme judge and master of all things, but he is not always associated with the idea of Justice. While the folklore contains the belief in ultimate justice after death, there is a strong feeling in many folk texts that this world is essentially one of injustice:

"O, this world, this world is a great treason,
For injustice rules in it everywhere!"

The obvious conflict between the presence of injustice in this world and God's supposed righteousness is usually reconciled in accordance with the Judeo-Christian doctrine of temptation: God gave man a free will, he tempts his creatures because he loves them, and he punishes them because they have failed.

Another obvious contradiction is that between the popular conception of the free will, implicit in the belief in temptation, and the idea of Dolia, a singularly complicated notion which, depending on the context, can be translated as Fate, Destiny, Luck or Fortune. The Dolia cannot be changed, influenced, escaped or abandoned. Written into the book of life, it has the character of necessity. In certain contexts it is spoken of as a personification of the souls of the ancestors.

The Dolia has a similar meaning when it is regarded as mother's gift to her child at birth. "Dala mati kozakovi, chorni brovi, Ta ne dala tomi kozakovi doli." The whole idea assumes a different meaning when

it is identified with "God's providence," the "teaching" of one's guardian angel, or as mere "foreboding" of events to come. Dolia shohos' vishohuye, dolia shchos' chuye."

In the Ukrainian Koliadky and wedding songs Dolia is also mentioned as a gift of God. From this it would follow that, since not all men are fortunate, not all of them receive from their creator the same kind of destiny. That this belief is not in accordance with Orthodox Christianity, is obvious to anyone who is familiar with the basic theology of the Church.

Yet, as if to confirm the rule that "there is no rule without exception," the Ukrainian ritual songs occasionally display the belief that the Dolia, although as a rule inescapable and unchangeable, can in certain cases be influenced by the proper magic, inherent in certain words and acts, such as songs and dances.

On the basis of the information obtained from recent refugees from the Soviet Ukraine, the concept of the Dolia is still alive even among the urban population, at least as a belief in good and bad luck. This phenomenon will not surprise anyone who recalls that the same belief in Luck still prevails in our own highly industrialized, secularized and scientifically oriented society. Its obstinate refusal to die attracted the attention, among others, of the eminent American economist and sociologist, Thorstein Veblen, in his famous Theory of the Leisure Class.

One of the most important texts of the Ukrainian folk literature is the so-called Hlubynna Knyha (The Profound Book). A very ancient example of religious and moralistic folk poetry, it is well known to all Ukrainians, regardless of their formal education. The main theme of this product of the anonymous folk wisdom is the unceasing struggle between Injustice and Justice, Nepravda and Pravda. Probably related, through Christianity or otherwise, to some of the many Near-Eastern versions of the ancient Zoroastrian dualism, the Hlubynna Knyha describes the temporary triumph of Nepravda, due to the wickedness of men. The Pravda has to leave this earth and look for a temporary exile in heaven, from where it will ultimately return when the forces of Good triumph over those of Evil, that is, when men return to righteousness.

Like many other human groups deprived of their freedom and

independence for long periods of time, the Ukrainians are extremely preoccupied with the idea of Justice. In many cases this concept is used as a supreme moral appeal without any reference to God. If one can judge by the frequency and intensity with which the topic of Justice and Injustice appears in the Ukrainian folk literature, it would seem safe to say that, although thrifty and proud of their material possessions, the Ukrainians are usually moved by motives of a moral and spiritual nature. Even historical and political polemics argue chiefly in terms of justice and injustice. Although important in themselves, in comparison with Pravda, material interests are of secondary significance. To excite the greatest amount of their energy, one should touch their sensibility and sensitivity, their individual honor and national pride, as these are related to their obsession with Pravda.

From the song of Karmeluk, a peasant rebel of the early 19th century, it is evident that the Ukrainian people distinguish the principle of moral law, of social justice in a higher sense of the word, from formal law, from the existing sanctions of the legal code. Karmeluk, the peasant rebel says:

"I am called a robber,

They say that I kill.

But I kill nobody,

For I have a soul.

I but take from the rich

And give to the poor...

After thus dividing the money I took,

I am not a sinner..."

This world of injustice comes to an end. Death is an inevitable experience of all living things. Like many other peoples, the Ukrainians believe in life after death. This belief still exists, particularly among elderly people in outlying rural areas. According to the Ukrainian folklore, the Soul is a small transparent being, associated with images of a "white lamb", a "golden bird", a butterfly or steam. It is not clear in what part of the body the soul (Dusha) is located. After death, it is described as sitting at the head of the deceased until the bell tolls. For

seven days the Dusha wanders through the places of its good and evil deeds. It accompanies the deceased during the funeral and weeps when he is laid in the grave (Dusha plache za tilom.) When the man happens to be a sinner, his soul expiates for his transgressions, in accordance with Judeo-Christian morality. Similarly, souls of good people are believed to go to Paradise.

There is ample evidence from Soviet and other sources that the authorities in Ukraine, particularly the educators and the officials of the agit-prop (propaganda and political agitation organization), are trying to eradicate this and other remnants of the so-called "pre-scientific mentality." In reference to the survivals of religious beliefs throughout the country, a recent number of the Sovetskaia Etnografia calls upon all Soviet ethnographers, folklorists and anthropologists not only to record the process of disappearance of these "remnants of the capitalist past" but also to take active part in their speedy elimination. To a Western anthropologist and folklorist it is very difficult to see how his Soviet colleagues can accomplish both of these assignments simultaneously and successfully. For it stands to reason that if they are really interested in the current beliefs and superstitions of the Ukrainian and other Soviet Peoples, they must at least pretend to take these beliefs seriously, to respect them or tolerate them. And what Soviet scholar could conceivably afford the intellectual luxury of such a pretense, without which no informant could be expected to give an uninhibited, honest answer? Obviously, their political duty to contribute to the elimination of religious "prejudices" must prevent the Soviet from successfully performing their genuine academic and scientific task--the objective and unbiased recording, description and analysis of the transition of the Soviet people from the so-called "pre-scientific" to the so-called "scientific" way of thinking and view of life. Apparently, the kind of objectivity which most Western scholars take for granted and for which their Soviet colleagues probably hope and despair, would be even more repulsive to the Soviet rulers than "art for the sake of art."

Nature and its Phenomena

In the Ukrainian folk literature Nature is regarded as distinct from

man on the one hand and God on the other. It is the physical frame within which life takes place. But unlike modern science, the Ukrainian folklore does not regard nature as a playground of impersonal laws, forces and elements. As in many other folk traditions, among the Ukrainians, nature is highly personified and anthropomorphic.

For example, the sun is often referred to as the "Tear of the Skies," the "Lord's right face." Likewise, the moon, the "Lord's left cheek," and this younger brother of the sun's is called "Kniaz", which means prince. Associated with the earth's satellite are many popular beliefs about the changes in weather, animals and men. Stars are called "children of the sun and the moon." Among the Hutsuls in the Carpathian Mountains they are also referred to as "God's sheep." In this connection it is interesting to point out that the Hutsuls are herdsmen. Similarly, the celestial bodies are often described in terms of the Ukrainian kinship and marriage customs.

Of all the forces of nature, Frost (Moroz) and Wind are most frequently encountered. The wind is pictured as an angry old man who lives beyond the seas and runs over the world. When he winks one eye and moves one side of his mustache he causes the wind to blow. When he winks both eyes and moves both sides of his mustache, he causes a storm.

It is not without significance to mention that Moroz, a good-natured old man with a big red nose, has been mobilized by the Soviet Government to play a special role in the process of mass re-education and mental re-conditioning. Present in the folklore not only of the Ukrainians but also of the Great Russians and Belorussians, Did Moroz was an ideal choice when, unable to break the traditional Christian custom of St. Nicholas (Santa Claus), the Soviets decided to look for his substitute. Throughout the Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet world Did Moroz (Grandpa Frost) is as popular among youngsters as Santa Claus in the Western world.

Thus, we see that, just as Christianity at one time had to make a compromise with, and adapt itself to, many deep-seated pre-Christian customs and beliefs, so the Soviet version of Marxism is forced to make

a compromise with certain Christian tradition. Naturally, Grandpa Frost does not arrive in the Soviet Ukraine at the same time as he arrived in other parts of the world under the name of Santa Claus, or St. Nicholas. Making his visits to Soviet children on the New Years Eve, he concentrates their attention on that official holiday, and thereby inevitably reduces their interest in the still lingering celebrations of the religious holidays of St. Nicholas and Christmas.

As in other systems of folk beliefs, in the Ukrainian folklore the soul is an attribute not only of animals and plants but also of rocks, rivers, lakes, and fountains. In fact, all natural phenomena are believed to be inhabited by special kinds of souls.

(In a more extensive study, it would be interesting to find out something about legends, myths of origin and other popular explanations of the development of various natural phenomena. Similarly, it might be of importance to find out the characteristic attitude of the Ukrainian people toward certain species of plants and animals. It is well known to anthropologists that attitudes toward particular species are very much culturally conditioned. Consequently, a species favored in one culture may be tolerated or even resented in another.)

Most of the customs and rituals related to nature and its phenomena are based on the belief that the peasant and his property have one and the same common Dolia. The magic conjuring of natural forces is always specific and on someone's behalf. Nature is regarded as egocentric and moved by powers identical with those that guide the human actions. The Ukrainian peasant seems to have believed in the past that the laws of nature may be influenced or changed and its forces appeased by magic, conjuring, ritual purification, and otherwise. Regardless of the naiveté of his beliefs in his own powers over nature, it is important to stress that his basic attitude toward the world was not one of passive yielding to, but rather one of acting upon it with a view to harnessing and subjugating its forces to his own needs. It is well known to anthropologists that the basic attitudes toward the properties of existence are not the same in all cultures, that certain societies act upon nature more and others less, depending on their fundamental desire to adapt it to their own ends.

One of the basic features of Marxism as a philosophy is its dedication to action rather than passive speculation and contemplation of reality. Marx repeatedly emphasized, in one form or another, that one of the chief differences between his philosophy and its predecessors was that the pre-Marxian systems of thought were interested primarily in a mere explanation of the world, while Marxism held that the chief task of philosophy was to change the world.

Thus, we see that at least in their basic attitudes toward nature, the Ukrainian peasants are not in irreconcilable conflict with the official Soviet philosophy. Their serious dispute begins when the touchy problem of private property and individual freedom is approached. Otherwise, given their basic interest in changing the world, rather than yielding to it passively and fatalistically, (compare with Ukrainian beliefs concerning the Dolia!) it was not difficult for the Soviets, or any other government, to substitute in the course of time modern technology and scientific knowledge for magic and superstition.

As in many other folk literature, in the Ukrainian folklore nature is not morally neutral. It reacts to good and evil in the same way in which society reacts to right and wrong.

In a 17th century Duman (epic song) about Oleksei Popovych, a popular hero of both Ukrainian and Russian folklore, a group of Cossacks is caught by a storm on the Black Sea. The boat is in danger of sinking, because one member of the crew, Oleksei Popovych is an unconfessed sinner, a violator of the social code. In order to save his comrades he offers himself for sacrifice, to be tossed overboard and drowned in the sea. He confesses to all his transgressions and repents in public. It is only after his friends have forgiven him that the storm calms down.

This poem is an interesting illustration of the moral involvement of nature in human affairs. The sea's angry reaction to the sinner's presence in the boat means that even if a culprit escapes censure by God and society, nature will expose him. The attitude toward nature expressed in this 17th century product of the Ukrainian folk mind has long since disappeared, but the custom of public confession and self-humiliation before the whole community, so important throughout

the Soviet world, does not seem to be without precedent in the traditional world view and ethos of the Ukrainians.

Magic and Extra-Natural Beings

In the preface to his Tractatus theologico-politicus Spinoza says the following: "If human beings were able to govern their affairs by firm decisions, or if fortune always favored them, there would be no superstition..." This 17th century observation of a great philosopher clearly anticipates the opinions about magic of an outstanding anthropologist of our times. The study of the Ukrainian folklore confirms Malinowski's assertion that "we find magic whenever the elements of chance and accident, and the emotional play between hope and fear have a wide and extensive range."

In a technologically underdeveloped society, with little or no scientific control over the forces of nature, exposed to the mercy of many cataclysms and catastrophes such as, for instance, flood and plague, the ancestors of modern Ukrainians, like many other peoples prior to the Industrial Revolution relied on magic and superstition as methods of handling the mysterious and often hostile phenomena of the world.

Thus, in addition to the forces of the super natural and the intra-natural souls and spirits believed to inhabit particular objects and phenomena, the anonymous creators of the Ukrainian folk literature imagined and coped with an entire world of powerful beings with super-human traits who can be conveniently classified as forces of the extra-natural.

It goes without saying that most of the beliefs and practices we are about to review have either completely disappeared in the Soviet Ukraine, or are in the process of rapidly vanishing. That some belief in magic still survives and represents a serious problem to officials responsible for the "ideological welfare" of the Ukrainian people is evident from occasional complaints in Soviet newspapers and technical journals against the apparently widespread visits to holy places, such as "miraculous" icons, wells with supposedly "curative powers" etc., especially by Ukrainian peasant women.

The Ukrainian folk literature is unusually rich in examples of invocations (zamovliuvannia), striking examples of the administration of magic by means of words. The belief in the mysterious power of oral expression is apparent in the frequent practice of benediction and malediction. The Ukrainian peasants still resort to it, convinced that nobody can escape the consequences of a cleverly conceived and properly worded good or bad wish. In this respect particularly dreadful is the malediction of a mother. In the Cossack Duma pro Okkseia Popovycha, a poem dating probably from the 17th century, we can see the power of parental benediction, which can be as strong as their malediction. Their blessing can save a man in danger, while their curse can ruin him.

The characteristic features of every invocation are wish, comparison, and purification. Its outward form always depends on the psychology of the person that performs it. An old man making an invocation believes that he will achieve the desired results if he faithfully observes all the necessary rules. If what he expected from the invocation does not materialize, the fault does not lie in the invocation itself nor his native belief in its power but always in something else: either the time selected was not propitious, or the prescribed ritual was not followed exactly. Finally, the moral condition of the person performing the invocation may not have been satisfactory.

The authority of every formula as well as of every invocator, can be successfully challenged only by a stronger, better phrased formula or by a mightier, more formidable conjurer. The following is an example of the kind of invocation which was in use in the process of ritual healing: If an old man is trying to calm a crying child, supposed to be ill, he will address the crying itself, treating it as if it were a person: "Thou, bad, impure crying, I say to Thee, in the name of all divine powers: wherever Thou came from, whatever Thou came from, whether from the rocks or from the steppes, whether by the waters or by the roads or cross-roads; whether Thou came from the thunders or from the lightnings, or from fire or water, wherever Thou came from--there now go! Just as nobody saw Thee when Thou came so let nobody see Thee as Thou leavest. Leave and do not enter again! I defy Thee and curse Thee with

all divine powers... Vanish now completely and disappear. Thou accursed and conjured for all times, Amen!"

In this instance we find the Christian expression Amen! grafted on to a pre-Christian, pagan base. Similar invocations are employed to win love or sow hatred, as well as to influence the forces of nature to give rain, yield and abundant crop, etc. There exist special formulae against evil eyes (urod), snake-bite, adverse gossips, hiccups and other unpleasant experiences.

Among the tools of magic, in addition to chants and incantations, worthy of mention are certain species of plants, animals and sacrifices. For example: "polya", or wormwood, is supposed to be an effective means against witchcraft; garlic against certain diseases; "lubystok" is used to improve an unsuccessful love, as well as, occasionally, against the "mavky" spirits of the forests. "Barvinok" of periwinkle is the symbol of first love and marriage. An egg is rolled to drive away fear from a child in fright. In accordance with a widespread belief among many peoples that "the like produces the like", the Ukrainian folklore maintains that one can blind one's enemies by blinding a frog, or simply piercing a piece of paper. Likewise, as a part of the rain-making rituals, water is poured over plants, trees, cattle or people. To appease the spirits of the earth an Easter egg is "sacrificed" to a newly ploughed field. In most cases fire is used for ritual purification. Black roosters are sacrificed to drive away livestock diseases. The so-called cow-death is "expelled" from the village by a woman throwing a black rooster into the fire and shouting: "Perish, perish and disappear, Thou black sickness!" Afterwards the woman, harnessed to a plough, passes three times around the village to prevent the sickness from returning. As in other folk literature of Eastern Europe, in the Ukrainian folklore one frequently comes across magic by numbers, especially seven. For instance, in the preparation of the "korovay" a kind of wedding cake, one is supposed to use flour from seven fields, water from seven wells, etc. It is, of course, impossible to determine whether this ritual, prescribed by the folklore, was ever widely practiced.

Among the so-called extra-natural beings, the Ukrainian folk

literature speaks of Rusalky and Mavky, of the Chuhayster and Devil, and of the Domovyk, Vidma and Upyr.

The Rusalky and Mavky are supposed to be girls who died an unnatural death, either by accident, through someone's violence, or by suicide. Occasionally babies who die unchristened also become spirits of the waters, lakes and fields. Perched on a tree they wait for people who pass by to descend upon them and tickle them to death. It is quite possible that the Rusalky and Mavky, feared by the Ukrainian peasants about a decade ago, are still remembered in certain isolated and inaccessible areas.

The Chuhayster is believed to be a male spirit who pursues and devours the Mavky. Among the Hutsuls, in the Carpathians, he was regarded as a man charmed into a spirit by witchcraft. As a rule, he is not supposed to harm men, if they are willing to stop on the road and have a dance with him.

Devil or Chort is often referred to as Did'ko. This word, meaning grandpa, has a somewhat affectionate and endearing connotation. In the Ukrainian folklore he is described as having existed before all creation. As an echo of the ancient Zoroastrian and Manichean themes about the ontological dualism which we already encountered in the beginning of this paper, the Devil is supposed to have created the material world, from the primeval rocks to the bodies of men. Only the spiritual world is the work of God. This doctrine is obviously at variance with the official teaching of the Orthodox and other Christian churches, and it probably entered the Ukrainian folklore through some translation of the Apocrypha.

In certain cases the Devil is described as a personification of the evil principle of existence. In other instances he appears in plural, as the "Devils" who can be wise as well as stupid. In his unceasing conspiracy against man he can undergo countless transformations: now he appears as "vodianyky", the spirit of the waters, now as "lisovyky", the spirit of the forests.

Domovyk is the usually beneficial spirit of the household, pictured as an old, gray-haired man. Man's success in farming and other activities depends upon his harmony with the Domovyk. He is believed to live in a

hut under the oven, which is the center of the household, the ancient place of burial of the ancestors. To preserve the continuity of the family and good relations with the ancestors, the first fire set in a new household is usually transferred from an old home.

The most popular figure of the Ukrainian folk imagination is the Vid'ma, or witch. Vid'my are divided into born witches and witches by training. The former can undo their misdeeds, the latter cannot. As in other folk literatures the witches are described as ugly old women, riding a broom or kociuba, and flying through the chimney to their witch-meetings held under the leadership of a male Vid'mak. The witches' main occupation is the milking of other peoples' cows. On the basis of our familiarity with the survivals of such beliefs in other East European countries, it is not unsafe to assume that they still exist, at least among the older generation of rural Ukrainians.

Upyr or Vid'mak is sometimes a male witch and sometimes a vampire "who sucks the blood of sleeping children." Present in the folklore of many peoples, particularly the Southern Slavs, this popular belief may be an unconscious attempt to account for exceptionally high infant mortality.

Many magic elements are present in the songs and rituals known under the name of vesnianky and hailky. Performed in the spring to stimulate the growth of vegetation, particularly of a bountiful harvest, these rites resemble a prayer to the powers of nature to convey their blessings upon men. All the members of the household are supposed to be ritually purified; animals are sprinkled with holy water and the graves of the ancestors are honored by provody, special feasts held at the grave site. During these ceremonies a painted Easter egg, Krashanka, often a real masterpiece of color and design, for which the Ukrainians are famous, is offered to the dead.

Another interesting custom practiced during the Easter week is the burial of Kostrub or Kostruben'ko, the image of an unloved old man who was married to a young girl. After the burial the girl rejoiced, symbolizing the departure of winter and the arrival of spring.

Associated with the welcoming of the spring are many customs of courtship and love. The feast of the Kupalo, held during the shortest

night of the year is a survival of the ancient pagan festival that later became connected with the celebration of St. John the Baptist. The whole festival symbolizes the highest point of nature's growth and honors the sun at the summit of its creative powers. This ritual is best preserved among the Hutsuls and Lemki in the Western Ukraine. Effigies of Kupalo (a male) and Marena (a female), made of grass, twigs and flowers by unmarried youths and girls are the center of the ceremony. The young people dance around them and finally the figures are torn apart in a simulated struggle between girls who defend them and boys who attack them. The remnants are thrown into fire or water. On the one hand the destruction of the effigies symbolizes the approaching death of the summer, on the other, the ancient sacrifice to the god of harvest and plenty. Jumping over the fire during the Kupalo feast is regarded as a rite of purification. Another theme of this festival has strongly erotic and personal overtones: it symbolizes marriage and fortune-telling, particularly with regard to love. Wreaths of flowers are sent down the river in the belief that those who pick them up will marry during the same year. During the Kupalo night the fern, Paporot', which actually never blooms, is supposed to blossom with the flower of happiness. The fact that no one ever finds it is explained in the folklore by the allegation that all the evil forces of nature conspire against anyone who might try to get the flower.

The Obzhynky or harvest festivals represent a kind of Thanksgiving to nature for its abundant gifts. The theme of these festivals is the struggle between the forces of life and death, summer and winter, youth and age.

It is possible that some of these rituals still survive even in the Kolkhozes, side by side with other customs which the Soviets do not find harmful. For example, the offering of bread and salt, as symbols of hospitality, is not only still practised in the Ukraine as well as Russia, but even encouraged as a beautiful folk custom, which, along with dances and songs, can be photographed and recorded for propaganda purposes.

Views About One's Place in Society

The highest value in the hierarchy of the Ukrainian ethos is freedom, individual as well as national. From the anonymous folk barks to Shovphenko, all Ukrainian poets sing about and extol freedom as the highest goal of personal and social strivings. Shovohenki calls it

"Braters'ka nasha vola "Our brotherly freedom
Bsz Kholopa i bez pana." Without serf and without lord."

Even more strongly the love of freedom is expressed in the so-called Dumy dealing with Bohdan Khmelnyteky and his wars of liberation against the Polish feudal lords. With obvious self-satisfaction an anonymous Ukrainian poet of the 17th century speaks about his love for Ukraine in the following manner:

"O nowhere is it better,
Nowhere is it nicer
Than in our Ukraine,
For there is no Pole
And there is no lord (Polish landlord)
And there is no Union (The Uniate Church)."

As among other peoples engaged in the struggle for survival and affirmation of their national individuality, discipline and conformity to the mores is regarded in the Ukrainian folklore as one of the highest virtues. All individual ambitions must be submerged to the collective aspirations of the group. One is supposed to marry young, obey the advice of the elders, work hard, live virtuously, and raise a family. The struggle for the so-called Slava (personal glory), once at the center of the ethos of Cossack warriors, is now of virtually no importance, but the ideal of social solidarity, of the principle of "one for all and all for one", is apparent in many folk texts. In a Duma describing the flight of three brothers from the city of Azov, held by the enemy, all three of them perish due to the lack of solidarity and loyalty. Similarly, most Ukrainian poets, folk as well as professional, regard the betrayal of one's own people as the gravest sin. This opinion is expressed, among others, by Taras Shevchenko himself.

In the religious chant about "The Rich Man and Lazarus" the Ukrainian folk poets describe the evils of social inequality between two brothers. The purity and righteousness of a poor man's soul are held to be superior to the material riches of the wealthy. One of the variants of this chant depicts the easy, painless death of the poor Lazarus, who goes directly to heaven, and the tortuous and painful end of his rich and heartless brother, whose soul goes to hell.

As can be seen from our essays on the Ukrainian kinship and family, the bonds of relatedness are very strong and highly respected. Likewise, the ideals of sexual morality are strict and rigidly observed. While this traditional attitude may have been in conflict with the early post-Revolutionary Soviet period of sexual experimentation, it is in perfect agreement with the now increasing tendency toward general conservatism in personal and family morals, propagated by the most responsible organs of the Party.

On the basis of their painful historical experience, surrounded mostly by real or imagined enemies, the Ukrainians, although fundamentally friendly, warm and hospitable, are on the surface cautious, suspicious and reserved. Of their negative stereotypes about their external and internal neighbors, as reflected in their folklore, those directed against Poles and Russians seem to appear more frequently than those against the Jews. For understandable reasons, the Ukrainian folklore abounds in negative references to Tartars, and Ottoman Turks, as well as to the attempts of the Western Church to impose the Union upon the Orthodox of the Ukraine. Equally negative is the Ukrainian attitude toward the Germans. Little evidence is available concerning their opinions about their Northern neighbors and brothers, the Belorussians, as well as about the various groups living in the Kuban, but on the basis of our limited knowledge of these matters it appears that the Ukrainians do not dislike these peoples.

The best summary of the Ukrainian ethos, showing a detailed enumeration of the entire hierarchy of values, can be found in the Duman pro Oleksia Popvycha, included in the appendix.

In conclusion, we can only repeat that the remnants of the pre-scientific world view and ethos in Ukraine are rapidly disappearing, and that the Soviet authorities preserve and cultivate only those aspects of the

rich folk heritage which can be profitably used for their propaganda purposes. The rest of the folklore, if not regarded as harmful, is merely tolerated. During the last war, for example, the regime made excellent use not only of the Ukrainian folk songs and dances but also of references to popular folk heroes and attitudes toward traditional friends and enemies.

UKRAINIAN LITERATURE

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1. Introduction

The history of Ukrainian literature is usually divided into three major periods: (1) The Ancient Period, lasting from the 11th to 14th century; (2) The Middle Period covering the 15th-18th centuries, and (3) The Modern Period (since 1798). While the Ancient Period, and in particular the literature of Kievan Rus', is a common literary treasure of Ukrainians, Russians and Belorussians, leading Ukrainian scholars emphasize an intimate connection of that ancient literature with the later literary history of the Ukraine.

2. The Ancient Period

This period dates from the introduction of Christianity in Kievan Rus' and adoption of the Old (Church) Slavic as the literary language of the Eastern Slavs. Under their influence the old pagan folk-poetry declines and religious writings dominate that period, with the monastic clergy almost monopolizing literary activity, making the Kievo-Petchers'ka Lavra (Monastery of the Caves in Kive) for several centuries the principal literary center of Eastern Europe. The literature of Kievan Rus' embraced a large number of translated religious writings borrowed from Byzantium, and of a series of original works: rhetorical and panegyric writings, lives of saints and apocryphas, historical and legal works, lyric and epic poetry.

Among the most valued rhetorical works of that time are those by metropolitan Ilarion (Slovo ozakoni i blahodati, 1040's), Klym Smolatykh and prince Volodymyr Monomakh. The most important among the lives of the saints, and for a long time the most popular book is the Kievo-Petchers'kyi Pateryk, followed by the writings of Jacob Mnikh and Nestor.

The outstanding literary monuments of the Kievan era are the ancient Kievan Chronicle and Galician-Volhynian Chronicle which combine realistic historical narrative with poetical legends and philosophical observations, as well as the Rus'ka Pravda, the great legal code of the Kievan state. Besides a religious lyric poetry cultivated at the monasteries, a great, truly original, epic poetry, considerably inspired by the folklore,

developed within the dryzhyna (military) and boyar (nobility) classes of Rus'. The greatest among the contemporary epic works recognized as one of the masterpieces of world literature is the anonymous Slovo o polku Ihoreve (Song of Ihor's Host) written around 1186 and describing the unhappy campaign of the princes of Rus' against the Polovtsi.

Characteristic features of the literature of Kievan Rus' were its adaptation of Byzantine and Oriental models to the native scene, and of Christian ideals to the older traditions of East Slavic folklore, as well as its growing sense of national distinctiveness; its esthetic functions are inseparable from the cognitive and moralizing-didactical functions; it is impossible to separate in the writings of that period literature from science, poetry from prose.¹ Its background and roots are in a large body of ancient folklore, now mostly lost.

With the 13th century, and particularly after the Mongol invasion the original literature of Kievan Rus' declines, its place being largely taken by compilative works. The few preserved original writings of that period reveal growing elements of mysticism and ascetism.

3. The Middle Period

Gradually penetrating from the West, influences of the Renaissance and Reformation revitalized Ukrainian literature in the 16th century, and the new Western trends were combined with the old traditions of Kievan Rus' and the growing influence of the popular language. The fact that the clergy continued to dominate literary work, and the religious struggle that opened in the Ukraine between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, deprived Ukrainian literature of the Middle Period of many elements of the West-European Renaissance. Thus, most of the writings of the 16th and early 17th centuries bear a polemical and theological character, the outstanding example being the Messages and Dialogues of Ivan Vyshens'ky advocating the return to the 'true Christianity' of the early Church and realization of the Christian values in social and private life.

¹ L. Bilecky, "Literature: Stara doba," (Literature: Ancient Period), Encyclopedia Ukrainoznavstva (Encyclopedia of Ukraine), Munich, New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1949, p. 740.

Under the influence of the Reformation and religious struggle in the Ukraine, there appeared, in the second half of the 16th century, a first translation of the Scriptures into spoken Ukrainian (Peresopnyts'ka Evanhelie) and a new translation of the Scriptures into Church Slavic (Ostrozhs'ka Biblia) based on the scholarly investigation of the oldest Greek texts, which became for several centuries the generally accepted version for the Slavic Orthodox world.

In the 17th and 18th centuries Baroque became a prevailing literary and artistic style in Ukraine. Assimilated into the native Ukrainian tradition, it opened a brilliant period of Ukrainian literature which finds now a generous patron in the Cossack elite of the Hetman State.

The poetry of the Baroque period is characterized by syllabic verse with female rhymes, and embraces religious, political (I. Mazepa), panegyric and philosophical (H. Skovoroda) themes. By far the most popular genre are dramatic works of that period, represented by Vladimir of T. Prokopovych, Mylost' Bozhiya (unknown author) describing victories of hetman Khmelnyts'ky, and comedies of M. Dovhalevs'ky. While most of the contemporary literary works use a mixture of Church Slavic and vernacular Ukrainian with some borrowings from Polish and Latin, spoken Ukrainian appears often in the comedies (the so-called Intermedias) which abound in the imagery, stereotypes and humor of the folklore.

As the clergy continued to play an important role in literary life, rhetoric and theological writings figure prominently in the Baroque literature, particularly those of Cyril Stavrovets'ky, metropolitan Petro Mohyla, Innokentiy Gisel. A prominent place in literature of the XVIII belongs to Hryhoriy Skovoroda, the great Ukrainian philosopher, whose dialogues are characterized by the belief that self-cognition is the only road to the discovery of truth and by a practical search for happiness that may, however, be found only in man's harmony with nature and peace with God.²

A distinct and distinguished place in the Ukrainian Baroque literature is occupied by historical writings - Cossack Chronicles of Samovydet's,

²I. Mirchuk, "Istoria ukrains'koi filosofii" - History of Ukrainian Philosophy, Encyclopedia Ukrainoznavstva Encyclopedia of Ukraine, (Munich, 1949), p. 719.

Hrabianka and Velychko; the first attempts at a systematic elaboration of Ukrainian history are found in the Synopsis of I. Gisel, and writings of T. Safonovych and P. Kokhanovs'ky.

With the annexation of Ukrainian lands by Russian Tsars in the middle of the eighteenth century and gradual Russification or Polonization of the Ukrainian elite, literature and the literary language of the Cossack Ukraine decline. Many Ukrainian writers of that period turned to the Russian language; even such a patriotic work as Istoria Rusov (ascribed to H. Poletyka) was written in Russian. An exodus of writers from the Ukraine to the North to seek wider recognition and more brilliant careers in Russian literature drained Ukraine of literary talents, such as that of the world-famous Gogol.

4. The Modern Period

Yet this decline of the Ukrainian literature did not last long. Under the refreshing impact of late Classicism and Romanticism a new literary renaissance set in, characterized by an intense interest in the Ukrainian past and idealization of the Cossacks, increasing attention to peasant life and strong notes of social and national protest, as well as by the spoken popular Ukrainian elevated by the modern Ukrainian writers to the status of a literary language.

The literary revival started in Eastern Ukraine under Russian rule, with the publication of Ivan Kotlarevs'ky's travesty of the Aeneid in 1798, followed by the works of P. Hulak-Artemovs'ky and H. Kvitka Osnovianenko, the father of the modern Ukrainian prose. While these early heralds of a new Ukrainian literature were late followers of Classicism it was Romanticism that became a predominant literary style of the new generation of Ukrainian writers and produced the unique and many-sided talent of Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), the greatest Ukrainian poet and distinguished painter, worshipped since by the Ukrainian people as their national prophet and spiritual leader. Brought up in serfdom in the province of Kiev, persecuted for his political activities, and exiled to Asia by the Tsar, Shevchenko left a tremendous impact upon the further development of Ukrainian literature and of the Ukrainian nation as a whole. In his Kobzar,

a book whose poems resemble very much the manner of Ukrainian folk songs, which became a national gospel in Ukraine, Shevchenko raised his voice in protest against the national and social oppression of the Ukrainian people and pointing back to the glorious and heroic past of Cossack Ukraine, called his countrymen to rise and throw away the chains of Russian Tsardom. His vision of Ukraine "without a serf and without a master" in the family of free nations, his fierce belief that "Ukraine will rise and disperse the darkness of slavery" and "the light of truth will shine" again, his appeals to the national unity and brotherly love among Ukrainians as a prerequisite of victorious struggle for independence presented to Ukrainians more than a mere poetical testament, but the basic political program for the Ukrainian national movement which properly adopted Shevchenko as its father and symbol.

Among the contemporaries of Shevchenko, deserving mention are Pantelaymon Kulish, a very talented poet, novelist and ethnographer, translator into the Ukrainian of Scriptures and many foreign classics, and O. Storozhenko and E. Hrebinka.

Literary awakening takes place also in the Western Ukraine (Galicia) beginning with publication of Rusalka Dnistrovaya in 1837 by Markian Shashkevych and prose works of Korniylo Ustianovych, followed by a similar awakening in Bukovyna highlighted by the works of O. Yuriy Fed'kovych.

At first underestimated or ridiculed as "peasant literature", regenerating Ukrainian literature with its growing stimulus to Ukrainian national consciousness, alarmed the Russian government. In 1863, the Russian minister of education forbid publications in the Ukrainian language. In 1876 this prohibition was made even more all-embracing and continued in force until the 1905 revolution.

The prohibition of their national language did not prevent a Ukrainian literary revival; it only forced Ukrainian writers to publish henceforward their works in Galicia or abroad, whence they were smuggled into the Russian-ruled Ukraine.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Realism gradually came to dominate Ukrainian literature, progressively replacing the old

ethnographic school. The most prominent writer of the transitional period and perhaps the greatest master of Ukrainian prose in her century was Marko Vovchok (Maria Markovych) whose novel Marusia became one of the most popular books in Europe, having been translated in most of the European languages.³ Compared to Harriet Beecher Stowe, Vovchok filled her works with burning indignation against human bondage of any kind and profound sympathy with the Ukrainian serfs.

Marko Vovchok's Tales remain a living classic. Her work bears the stamp of native originality in form and content, coupled with the power to touch the most sensitive strings in the reader's heart, and through it there runs a democratic, freedom-loving, humanitarian philosophy of life.⁴

The writers of the realist school introduce into the Ukrainian literature new themes of life and problems of the workers and intelligentsia, and dwell upon social injustice and national oppression in Ukraine. While in the novels of O. Konys'ky, I. Nechuy-Levyts'ky and B. Hrinchenko the ethnographic element still shares a place with narodnytstvo, the works of Panas Myrny (Khiba revut' voly koly vasla povni) emphasize social problems of Ukrainian village and city. Among the writers of that period the place of prominence belongs to Ivan Franko (1856-1916), a son of Western Ukraine, regarded as second only to Shevchenko in Ukrainian literature. His tremendous literary heritage combines novels, (Zakhar Berkut), short stories (Boryslavs'ki opovidannia), dramas, poems (Moses), literary history and criticism, and publicistics. They reflect a great sense of humanism, sympathy with the young Ukrainian proletariat and intelligentsia struggling for their place in society, and a democratic nationalism combined with social radicalism.

Ukrainian drama of the 19th century, founded by Kotlarevs'ky's Natalka Polavka, combines elements of ethnographism, romanticism and realism. Among the playwrights of that period three names merit attention:

3 - Percival Cundy, "Marko Vovchok", The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 3, 1946-7, p. 117.

4 - Ibid., p. 118.

5 - A kind of Ukrainian democratic nationalism.

M. Starytsky, M. Kropyvnyts'ky and the greatest among them--Ivan Tobilevych (Karpenko Kary).

By the beginning of the twentieth century, and particularly after the Russian revolution of 1905, the pressure of the Tsarist regime on Ukrainian literature decreased. Kiev resumes the role of an all-Ukrainian cultural centre. Among a series of newly established literary journals Literaturno-Naukovy vistnyk⁶ (Literary-Scientific Herald) plays an important role in literary and intellectual developments in Ukraine, attracting leading literary talents, facilitating contacts with the literary trends of the West and promoting higher standards of literary work.

At that period impressionist, symbolist and neo-romantic trends penetrate Ukrainian literature, which attempts to synthesize them with the tradition of narodnytstvo and to preserve its contact with the Ukrainian masses, while tempering some piquant and urbane features of these Western influences. This search for a synthesis of new and old combined with the ambition to place Ukrainian on a par with other European literatures, characterizes the works of Mykhaylo Kotsiubyns'ky, a master of the impressionist short story. Vasyl Stefanyk, who writes his impressionistic short stories in the dialect of the Galician piedmont, breaks with the old idealization of the peasant life, painting tragic poverty and illiteracy in the West Ukrainian village. Another prominent writer of that period is Volodymyr Vynnychenko, whose stories and dramas reflect the influence of Dostoyevsky and French decadence, and are characterised by a realistic manner, strong interest in pathological and anti-social types, and preoccupation with the class conflict and the life of the revolutionary underground, of which the author had a first-hand knowledge.

In the sphere of poetry and drama of the early twentieth century, two authors rise to enduring prominence: Oleksander Oles' (Z zhurboyu radist' obnialas'), a poet of great popularity characterized by intimate lyricism, a strong patriotic note and a melodic verse, and the greatest Ukrainian poetess, Lesia Ukrainka (1871-1913),⁷ who combines tradition

6 - Published in Lviv (1898-1907) and since 1907 in Kiev.

7 - Real name: Laryssa Kosach.

with originality and strong influence of world literature. In her dramatic poems (Robert Brus, Cassandre, Orgy, Kaminny hospodar) she elaborates the universal themes of human love, dignity and freedom, worships a strong heroic individuality and exhibits a sense of an intense feeling of nationalism, the qualities that make Ivan Franko call her "the only man in contemporary Ukrainian literature."

The Ukrainian national revolution of 1917-1921, although lacking conditions necessary for normal literary work and publication, tremendously influenced the path of Ukrainian literature. Since that time the primary characteristic of Ukrainian literature is its conscious struggle for the preservation and development of Ukrainian national and cultural distinctiveness against the ideological and russifying pressures of the Soviet regime. Due to the presence of a Communist regime in Ukraine a great wave of emigration took many Ukrainian writers abroad.⁸

Since 1921 Ukrainian literature developed along two distinct paths: in the Soviet Ukraine, after short-lived concessions, it has been deprived of its best talents and made a tool of an alien regime; only outside of the U.S.S.R. in the Western Ukraine, until its occupation by the Soviets, and in exile, could Ukrainian writers freely express the thoughts and desires of their nation.

5. Ukrainian Literature under the Soviets

From the point of view of the attitude of the Communist Party toward Ukrainian national problems the history of Ukrainian literature in the Ukrainian S.S.R. may be roughly divided into two periods. The first - that of "Ukrainization" lasted from 1921 to the early 30's. The years following 1921 belonged to the period of NEP, a time of some general liberalism in the Soviet Union. In the Ukrainian S.S.R. it was characterized by considerable concessions made to Ukrainian culture and science which led to the great upsurge of Ukrainian creative forces (called by some Ukrainian writers "Ukrainian Renaissance").

8 - Among them O. Oles', V. Vynnychenko, V. Samiilenko and others.

In the early 30's (during the First Five Year Plan) the period of relative liberalism in Soviet literature came to an end. "It was the most gloomy and barren period in Soviet letters," that of the dictatorship of the R. A. P. P. (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers). "The depiction of the Five Year Plan and of the class-war within its framework is the one and only problem of Soviet Literature" declared the R. A. P. P. organ in 1930. The R. A. P. P. instigated the arrest, exiles of nonconformist writers as "subversive", among them many Ukrainians.

This second period of Ukrainian Literature, starting then, is a period of Sovietization and attempts at Russification. It was accompanied by a ruthless liquidation of many leading Ukrainian writers, cultural workers, scientists and all those who would not conform with the new Soviet course.

During the period of "Ukrainization," the literary life of the Ukrainian S. S. R. concentrated around a series of literary organs and organizations which follow different literary styles. Most of the Ukrainian writers of the 1920's broke with the nineteenth century ethnographic approach and search for new paths of literary expression; assimilating into Ukrainian literature modernistic trends they formed several literary schools such as symbolism, futurist and neoclassicist; some writers, on the other hand, attempted to develop a "proletarian literature" in conformity with the official doctrine.

Ukrainian symbolism, unlike that of Western Europe, does not break with reality; its principal features are philosophical depth, a fundamental musical character and new principles of unity with the folk song.⁹ The poetical works of the leading exponent of symbolism, Pavlo Tychyna (*1891), and perhaps the greatest among the Ukrainian poets of the 1920's, are characterized by a pantheistic world-view which sees the cosmos and nature enfolded in sublime musical harmony. In his early works (Soniashni klarnety, Pluh) the Ukrainian national revolution appears as an awakening of an inner music of the world which till that time

9 - Yuriy Sherekh, "Trends in Ukrainian Literature under Soviets," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 2, Spring 1948, p. 152.

has slumbered in the Ukrainian nation.¹⁰ One of the first to be fired upon by the Soviet authorities, Tychna responds with several years of silence and finally breaks down; since 1931 his works follow the Party line while sacrificing much of Tychna's talent and originality.

Ukrainian futurism represented a movement of the urban intelligentsia against the old cultural traditions associated with the Ukrainian village, and was characterized by the destruction of poetic forms, extreme subjectivism and formalism, and praise of the modern technical civilization. Represented by M. Semenko, this movement did not produce any writer of distinction.

The neoclassicist school embraced rather a heterogeneous membership united by a common detachment from the Soviet reality, demand for greater poetical culture and the idea of going back to the sources of European literature to enrich and perfect Ukrainian literature. While the most representative member and ideologue of that group was Mykola Zerov, poet, literary critic and professor of Ukrainian literature at Kiev University, the most talented neoclassicist and, besides Tychna, the greatest modern Ukrainian poet, was Maksym Ryls'ky (*1895). His early works (Na bilykh ostrovakh, Pid osinnimy zoriamy, Synia dalechin'),

are the works of a mature artist whose mastery is complete. The range of subjects covered by Ryls'ky is immense. It includes expression of the love which the poet turned hunter feels for the natural beauty of his native land and for his friends, the peasants, wise in their inherited wisdom, racy of the soil, epic accounts of scenes from the history and literature of classical antiquity . . . all presented with a magnificent richness of style, exquisite artistry and a wonderful feeling for the precise word.¹¹

Among the works of M. Ryls'ky a distinct place is occupied by his translations of the principal works of Rustavelli, Mickiewicz and Pushkin. In the early 1930's, Ryls'ky was arrested, but eventually conformed and survived as one of the "official poets" of the regime.

10 - Ibid.

12 - Mykola Hlobenko, "Thirty-Five Years of Ukrainian Literature in the U.S. S.R.," The Slavonic and East-European Review, Vol. XXXIII, No. 80, Dec. 1954, p. 6.

United around the literary organization Hart and closely associated with the national Communist group of Borot'bisty,¹² "proletarian writers," while accepting the Communist doctrine, aimed at the development of a distinctly Ukrainian "proletarian literature." Having chosen the path of independence, these writers

rejected persistent attempts of the Russian proletarian organizations to merge with them. Firmly convinced of the higher quality of their native resources, they not only refused to be guided by their Russian colleagues (except for the formal acceptance of the theory of proletarian literature) but attempted with some success to seize the initiative in propaganda and independently to contact Ukrainian literary groups in the Western Ukraine, the United States and Canada.¹³

Led by the Borot'bisty V. Ellan-Blakytny, Hart united a number of writers of stature (P. Panch, A. Holovko, V. Sosiura, M. Khvylovy) many of whom have later abandoned its ranks to seek their own paths of literary expression.

Having started as a "proletarian writer," captivated by the elemental power of the Communist revolution and dreaming of a new free Communist Ukraine, Mykola Khvylovy (1893-1933) became a tragic symbol of the generation that saw their dreams shattered by the policies of the Kremlin. Khvylovy's poetical and prose works. (Syni etudy, Ya, Maty, Valdshnepy) form a transition from lyrical impressionism to voluntaristic romanticism, from the glorification of the "transmontane commune" of the "stormy days" of the revolution, to the idea of independent Ukraine as a leader of the "Asiatic renaissance"--cultural and national revival of the submerged nations of Eurasia. In his essays (Apolohety pysaryzmu, Dumky proty techiyi, Kamo hriadeshy, Ukraina chy Malorossiia?) Khvylovy sought for new paths of development of Ukrainian literature, calling upon Ukrainian writers to orient themselves towards Western Europe, and not Moscow.

"Toward which world literature should it (Ukrainian literature) orient itself?" On no account towards Russia. This is uncondi-

12 - Dr. George Luckyj, The Extent and Nature of the Ukrainian Writers' Resistance to the Formation of the Soviet Writers' Union (1932-34), Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Seminar Notes, Jan. 9, 1953), pp. 2-3.

13 - Ibid., p. 3.

tional. One must not confuse our political union with literature. Our poetry must run away as fast as possible from Russian literature and its styles . . . The point is that Russian literature has been burdening us for ages; it has been the master of the situation who has trained us to imitate him slavishly. Thus, if we try to feed our young art with it, we shall impede its development . . . Our orientation is towards Western European art, its style and its techniques."14

Struggling against the "psychological conquest" of the Ukraine by Moscow and its produce--"Little Russianism," Khvylovy attacks at the same time both the old apolitical ethnographism and primitive "massovism" in Ukrainian literature. Himself a member of the Party, he comes to see a degeneration of the Communist revolution into a petty-bourgeois bureaucratic oligarchy with the Party becoming a new "collector of the Russian lands." This leads him to call upon his contemporaries to run "away from Moscow" and to unite around their own national ideal. The views of Khvylovy were shared by many Ukrainian writers, even some leading Ukrainian Communists like Shums'ky, and created a heated "Literary Discussion" of 1925-28, which led the Party, alarmed by the wide appeal of Khvylovy's ideas in the Ukraine, to take a stand against Khvylovy and to condemn him as a "bourgeois nationalist." Stalin himself attacked "khvylovism" as a dangerous deviation:

Khvylovy's demands that the proletariat in the Ukraine be immediately de-Russified, his belief that "Ukrainian poetry should keep as far away as possible from Russian literature and style," his pronouncement that "proletarian ideas are familiar to us without the help of Russian art," his passionate belief in some messianic role for the young Ukrainian intelligentsia . . . all this and much more in the mouth of this Ukrainian Communist sounds . . . more than strange. At a time when the Western European proletarian classes and their Communist parties are full of affection for Moscow, this citadel of the international revolutionary movement, . . . Khvylovy has nothing to say in favor of Moscow except to call on Ukrainian leaders to run away from Moscow as soon as possible . . . 15

Public condemnation of Khvylovy and his supporters, forced recantations and destruction of their "counter-revolutionary" writings, were followed in the early 1930's by arrests and deportations in the

14 - M. Khvylovy, "Apolohety pysaryzmu", Kultura i pohut, Feb. -March, 1926, quoted in Luckyj, Ibid., p. 4.

15 - Luckyj, Ibid., p. 5.

midst of which Khvylovy committed suicide (1933).

United around Khvylovy's organization VAPLITE (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) were some of the most prominent Ukrainian writers, among them the greatest Ukrainian dramatist, Mykola Kulish. His expressionist dramas (Myna Mazaylo, Narodniy Malakhiy, Sonate Pathetique) combine a biting satire on the degeneration of the Communist revolution with the belief in the irreconcilability of Communism with the Ukrainian mentality. In his last and greatest drama Sonate Pathetique, an unique adaptation of the technique of the traditional Ukrainian vertep (puppet show) to the modern stage, Kulish advances the idea of national revolution as the only road towards free development of creative forces of Ukraine.

Other outstanding members of VAPLITE were Arkadiy Lubchenko, Mykola Bazhan and Yuriy Yanovs'ky. In his principal work Vertep, Lubchenko deals with many philosophical problems of life and death, time and man in relation to nature and community, ending with a hymn to active and creative individuality.¹⁶ Mykola Bazhan, who evolved from futurism to romanticism, devotes his poems (Riz'blena tin', Budivli) to the strong individualistic personality, filling them with profound philosophical content dealing with the meaning of historical problems of vital contemporary importance to Ukrainians.¹⁷ The works of Yuriy Yanovs'ky (Mayster Korabla, Chotyry shabli), regarded as the greatest contemporary Ukrainian prose writer, show him as a master of style, using a rhythmic, poetized language resembling the manner of Ukrainian folklore, to extol men of strong will and heroic deeds who struggle for the freedom and glory of their native land.

Among the other writers of the "Ukrainization" period who deserve mention are V. Pidmohyl'ny, O. Vyshniak, A. Holovko, T. Os'machka, E. Pluzhnyk, O. Vlyzko and Y. Sosiura, a talented lyric poet.

With the end of the policy of "Ukrainization", and growing

16 - Yu. Sherekh, op. cit., p. 161.

17 - M. Hlobenko, op. cit., p. 7.

repressive measures against manifestations of Ukrainian national or cultural independence, all literary organizations in the U.S.S.R. (R.A. P.P. included), and in Ukraine, were dissolved. On the other hand the writers had been regimented in 1934 in an official Union of the Soviet Writers of Ukraine, directly subordinated to the All-Union Union of the Soviet Writers. The only acceptable literary style in the U.S.S.R. became "socialist realism." "Bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism" having been declared the "main danger" in the U.S.S.R., a wholesale liquidation of nationally-minded Ukrainian writers took place during the 1930's. By the end of 1934, (at the time of the great purges in the U.S. S.R.), 22 leading Ukrainian writers had been silenced, among them Khvylovy, Kulish, Zerov, Dosvitniy, Slisarenko, Vlyz'ko, Pidmohylny.¹⁸ By the end of the decade about 100 Ukrainian writers disappeared, their names and works being completely eliminated from the libraries and textbooks -- the best testimony to the extent of the resistance of Ukrainian writers to Sovietization. Only three arrested writers were able to resume writing after expiating their "sins".¹⁹

Having found it impossible to achieve harmony and unity in culture on an all-Union scale, the central Communist government resorted to violent means in order to stop the decentralizing forces, one of the most vigorous of them being Ukrainian literature . . . Not only had the spontaneous development of Ukrainian literature been arrested and its tendencies suppressed; they were to be replaced by concepts imported from Soviet Russia. The Soviet theory of art as "socialist in content and national in form" came to read "Soviet (Russian) in content and only national in language," and since 1939, some Ukrainian writers (Honchar, Vershyhora) abandoned the national form, some of their works being first published in Russian.²⁰

Since 1933 Ukrainian literature shows a marked decline, with the surviving Ukrainian writers forced to "rebuild" themselves and to toe the Party line. The literature has been forced into a framework of Soviet propaganda and compelled to sing of "Great Stalin", to praise the "joyful life", Five-Year Plans, "the friendship of the Soviet peoples", which in practice meant glorification of the "older Russian brother".

18 - G. Luckyj, op. cit., p. 17.

19 - Ibid., p. 18.

20 - Ibid., p. 19.

In the years that followed the great purge in Soviet Ukrainian literature, few literary works of note appeared in the Ukrainian S. S. R. : some poems by P. Tychyna, M. Ryls'ky, Bazhan, Sosiura. Several new names entered Soviet Ukrainian literature: A. Malyshko, O. Kopylenko, L. Pervomays'ky, N. Rybak, I. Le (historical novel (Nalyvayko) . In the field of drama, a number of works, mostly of propagandist character, were produced by I. Mykytenko, I. Kocherha and Oleksander Korniychuk (Zahybel Eskadry, Bohdan Khmelnyts'ky), a playwright of considerable talent, who by the late 30's became the Party's official watchdog over Ukrainian literature.

The Soviet-German war started a period of relatively tolerant and liberal attitude of the Communist Party toward Soviet literature. Mass hostility of Ukrainians toward the Soviet regime, and loss of Ukraine to the Germans forced upon the Soviet government temporary concessions to Ukrainian literature. National sentiment, traditionalism and flight from "socialist realism" characterize some of the war-time works of Sosiura (Lubit' Ukrainu), P. Panch (Zaporozhtsi), P. Tychyna (Pokhoron druha), M. Ryls'ky, Yu. Yanovs'ky, and even O. Korniychuk. Among the younger writers that appeared during and after the war, attention is merited by V. Kozachenko, O. Honchar (trilogy Praporonostsi), and in the field of drama-- I. Kocherha.

But with the end of the war, the policy of liberalism was finished. With the Soviet troops re-occupying the Ukraine, concessions to literature, Ukrainian naturally included, came to an end. Already, in August 1944, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine condemned the newly published Narys istorii Ukrains'koi literatury (The Outline of the History of Ukrainian Literature), accusing Ukrainian writers of "having relaxed the struggle on the ideological front." In 1946 there was started a new literary policy, that of rigid controls and of intransigence. It was officially formulated on August 14, 1946, in a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. Later it was commented upon in the famous speeches by Zhdanov, member of the Politburo. Many writers' and poets' works were labeled as politically and ideologically

obnoxious. Harmful "bourgeois nationalist tendencies" were said to exist in some national Republics (the Ukrainian, Tartar, and Bashkir in particular). Literature was told that its duty is to "castigate and attack boldly bourgeois culture." Actually Soviet literature was mobilized for the purpose of psychological warfare and propaganda. A number of Ukrainian writers were subjected to sharp official criticism, in particular M. Ryls'ky, Yu. Yanovs'ky and I. Senchenko, for "having once again attempted to bring nationalist conceptions into Soviet Ukrainian literature."²¹ The attention of Ukrainian writers was again forcibly directed to the "friendship of peoples... glorification of the achievements of Old Muscovy and new Moscow, rapturous adulation of the 'Great Russian People' with assurances of undying and indestructible friendship."²² Written along this line were the post-war works of I. Kocherha (Yaroslav Mudry), L. Dmyterko (Naviky razom) and N. Rybak (Pereyaslavs'ka rada).

In 1947 Yu. Yanovs'ky's novel Zhyva voda, depicting the post-war reconstruction in Ukraine, attracted the fire of official criticism for having been "written in the spirit of bourgeois literature" with "too much attention to biological elements in the Human make-up" and "emphasizing national and traditional features of life in a Ukrainian village."²³

In 1951 Volodymyr Sosiura's poem Lubit' Ukrainu²⁴ (Love Ukraine), written during the war and hitherto widely publicized, was officially proscribed as "bourgeois nationalist" and the poet compelled to make humiliating recantations.

Sosiura... represents the Ukraine as standing alone... without connection with the great Russian people and the other peoples of the Soviet Union... The author refused to see that in the battle to free Ukraine the sons of all the peoples of the S. U., and foremost the sons of great Russia, took part; about them he kept a crude and insulting silence.... Sosiura while praising a certain "exclusiveness"

21 - M. Hlobenko, op. cit., p. 15.

22 - Ibid.

23 - Ibid., p. 16.

24 - See Appendix II.

of the Ukrainian language, considered it possible not even to mention the Russian language which is to every Ukrainian as much native as is the Ukrainian itself. . . All this bespeaks the fact that Sosiura has not freed himself from the influences of hostile bourgeois nationalistic ideology. . . ²⁵

At the seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in 1952, the First Secretary of the Party, L. J. Melnikov, devoted considerable time to the "serious ideological distortions and mistakes" of the Soviet Ukrainian literature. Sosiura's "Lubit' Ukrainu" came again under fire:

This poem grossly distorts the image dear to Soviet man, of our socialist native land--the Soviet Union and its integral part, the Soviet Ukraine. . . This poem was actually taken up and used as a weapon by the Ukrainian nationalists. . . Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists have always and everywhere pursued the goal of tearing the Ukrainian people away from the fraternal Russian people and delivering them to the colonial bondage of foreign imperialists. . . Bourgeois nationalism is the most lively and politically dangerous survival of capitalism in the people's mind. ²⁶

Even such true followers of the Party line as O. Korniychuk did not escape criticism, together with his wife, the Polish writer, W. Wasilewska, for having "committed major ideological errors in the libretto of the opera "Bohdan Khmelnytsky." But Melnikov's criticism was not limited only to the past "mistakes"; the silence of some writers was also censured:

Writers Sosiura, Rylsky and Pervomaysky have not written new works to prove their re-orientation since they were sharply criticized for mistakes they committed.

In the same speech, Melnikov attacked another Ukrainian writer, L. Smelyans'ky,

. . . Smelyans'ky. . . asserts that only the country provides a healthy population and that only the country is the source and preserver of the national traditions of the Ukrainian people. The author sees these traditions in the biological characteristics of

25 - From Pravda Ukrainy (Kiev), July 15, 1951

26 - Pravda, Oct. 7, 1952.

people and not in their socialist thinking. He does not see the new Soviet Kiev and its people but turns all of his attention to the distant past. This ideologically faulty short story was not only not criticized, but it travels from anthology to anthology and is praised by certain writers as a model of socialist romantic writing.²⁷

Decimated by the terror of the 1930's, the war, and emigration, literature in contemporary Soviet Ukraine does not show the same vitality as in the 1920's. Continuing ideological and russifying pressures of the regime and the exposed although profitable position of a writer in the Soviet world do not stimulate originality and inspiration of Ukrainian writers, nor do they attract into literary ranks many new talents. Nevertheless, however restrained and supervised, one of the few remaining channels for the expression of Ukrainian national aspirations and its perpetual regeneration, its very existence is a testimony to the vitality of the creative forces of the people.

6. Ukrainian Literature Outside the Ukrainian S. S. R.

Literature between the two wars developed under relatively freer conditions in the Western Ukraine than in the Ukrainian S. S. R. Reflecting the impact of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-21, the literature of West Ukraine was charged with nationalism, while at the same time more fully partaking of the literary developments of Western Europe. The literary life concentrated in a series of circles built around literary magazines of different schools and political ideologies.

The most significant group developed around the literary-scientific magazine Visnyk²⁸, edited by Dmytro Dontsov, a noted literary critic and Nationalist publicist, the ideologist of the group whose main characteristics were an intense nationalism, and emphasis on voluntarism and romanticism. The outstanding representatives of the Visnykivtsi were E. Malaniuk, Yu. Klen, O. Stefanovych, L. Mosendz and O. Teliha, and perhaps the greatest and the most original among them--Oleh Olzhych (Kandyba), noted archeologist, publicist and poet, whose poetry (collections Rin', Vezhi, Pidzamcha)

27 - Ibid.

28 - Known prior to 1933 as Literaturno Naukovy Visnyk.

reveal an idealist, almost ascetic philosophy, longing for a new Ukrainian man who will wholly identify himself with the struggle for freedom of his people. Putting his ideas in deed, O. Olzhych played a leading role in the Ukrainian anti-German resistance. He was captured in 1954, and liquidated in the Nazi concentration camp at Sachsenhausen. His poetry won wide popularity among the young Ukrainian generation. Associated with the Visnyk group also was the greatest living West Ukrainian novelist, Ulas Samchuk, whose sober, realistic style differed, however, from that of Visnykivtsi. His monumental trilogy Volyn' shows a strong epic talent, reminding of Reymont's Chłopi (Polish) and J. Kolas' V. poleskoi hlushi. (Belorussian).

Another important literary circle emerged around the Warsaw magazine My. Its leading representative was Ivan Lypa, one of the greatest modern Ukrainian poets (Svitlist', Suvorist'), novelist and political essayist (Pryznachennia Ukrainy) whose works reflect a poetic mastery, a strong patriotic note and profound philosophical thought.

The group associated with the L'vov magazine Dzvony produced, among others, a very original talent in Bohdan I. Antonych (Try persteni, Knyha leva), a leading representative of Ukrainian imaginisme whose poetry reflects boundless optimism, a pantheistic enchantment with the beauty of nature and close affinity to West-Ukrainian folklore.

Among other West Ukrainian writers deserving mention are S. Hordyns'ky, Yu Kosach, H. Zhurba, as well as the Carpatho-Ukrainian writers V. Grendzha-Dons'ky and I. Irlavs'ky.

Throughout the inter-war period, the older generation of Ukrainian writers, in Western Ukraine or in exile, continued their literary work. Among them mention must be made of V. Vynnychenko, O. Oles', V. Stefanyk, M. Kobylans'ka.

The second world war and the Soviet occupation of all Ukrainian territory led to a great exodus of Ukrainian intellectuals to the West. Many leading Ukrainian writers have continued their literary activities since 1945, in Western Europe or on the American continent, often lacking necessary material conditions for creative work and publication. Immediately after the war Ukrainian emigree writers united in the liter-

ary organization M. U. R. (Ukrainian Artistic Movement) led by novelist U. Samchuk and literary critic Yu. Sherekh. After the majority of the Ukrainian emigration moved to the U.S. and Canada, literary life became decentralized, being associated with several literary magazines like Kyiv (Philadelphia), Novi Dni (Toronto), Porohy, (Buenos Aires) and various Ukrainian newspapers. Many outstanding literary works appeared since, in exile, to mention only the prose works of U. Samchuk (Ost), D. Humenna (Dity chumats'koho shlahku), Yu. Kosach, T. Os'machka (Starshy bovaryn), I. Bahriany (Getsemans'ky sad), and in the field of poetry--the works of Yu. Klen (Popil imperii), E. Malaniuk, M. Orest (Dusha i dol'a), V. Barka (Apostoly), S. Hordyns'ky, O. Laturyns'ka, O. Stefanovych. Some new and talented young writers appeared in the emigree literature among whom mention is deserved by L. Lyman, L. Poltava, Yar Slavutych and P. Karpenko-Krynytsia.

The prevailing characteristics of the Ukrainian emigree literature are its humanist note, strong sense of patriotism, and assimilation of newer Western themes and artistic media into Ukrainian literary tradition. Ukrainian writers in exile are characterized by a strong sense of social duty in accordance with the traditional Ukrainian concept of writers as spiritual leaders of their people. They are aware of the fact that as long as their colleagues in the Ukraine are subjects of the Communist regime, they are the only ones that are in a position to express freely what they freely and sincerely believe to be the real thoughts, dreams and desires of their nation.

UKRAINIAN FOLK MUSIC

"A" 1-i

Ukrainian folk music is characterized by strong Western influences, modern harmonies, and chordal arrangement of melody. Compared to the stronger and more melancholy songs of the north, the Ukrainian are delicate, graceful and gay. Russia has borrowed many of her folk tunes from the Ukraine (though the ballads characteristic of Great Russia are not found in the Ukraine).¹ The different chromatic colorings indicate an Eastern influence, though in modern times the Western major and minor modes have been incorporated into the Ukrainian song, the several modes blending into a rich and varied harmony. The musical structure has much in common with the hymns of the Greek church.

The oldest ritualistic songs are diatonic, often based on a very short scale range.² Dance songs are generally in a major key, slower songs in the minor key. Both the dance rhythm and the more developed, freer recitative forms are used. Generally the songs are sung in unison, but there is some use of the folk poliphony where the sequence of two voices follows in parallel thirds, octaves and sometimes fifths.³ There has been a considerable use of folk melodies in the work of modern Ukrainian composers, principally Mykola Lysenko, a precursor of the nationalist tendency.⁴

Instrumentalists

The primary native musical instrument is the Kobza-Bandura.

¹Sokolov, Russian Folklore.

²Examples are found of a very old pentatonic mode.

³W. Wytwyck, "Ukrainian Folk Music," (unpublished pamphlet), Detroit, 1949.

⁴Also works by Ludkevych, Revutsky, Barvinsky, Latoshynsky, Kostenko, Nyshankivsky, and the American-Ukrainian composers, Hayvoronsky, Pecheniha-Outlitsky and Prdatkevito.

The kobza, imported from Asia, became popular in the sixteenth century. At the same time, the lute, a somewhat similar instrument, was introduced from Europe. The two instruments evolved, in the Ukraine, into the bandura, which omitted the finger board and added shorter strings. The bandura has six long strings--tuned in intervals of fourths; and six to eighteen short strings--tuned diatonically. Because the instrument requires a long period of training, a special class of musician-singers has developed; it holds a place of honor in Ukrainian society. The bandurists are a group exclusively of men, and often exclusively of blind men. The repertoire includes historical songs, religious psalms, satirical, witty and dancing songs; but the singing of the "Dumy," the epic songs of heroes dating from the Cossack period of the 16th and 17th centuries or the later wars of Hetman Khmelnytsky is primary. The musical accompaniment is less important than the words, which usually have a strong moral element.

Folk Song Lyrics

Each event has its proper song, the origins of which can sometimes be traced back a thousand years. The composers of the songs were generally women and girls, carriers of folk traditions.⁵ Two cycles of ritualistic songs, originating in Ukrainian mythology, were the Christmas carols (kolyadki) and the songs of spring. The latter, sung at Easter in rejoicing at the rebirth of nature, can be traced to heathen invocations to the spring deity.⁶ The "kolyadki" are vestiges of a ritual in praise of the Sun-God; they are sung at the end of December. The ritual is magical--to secure good health, happiness and a bountiful harvest throughout the approaching year.

⁵Wytwyck, op. cit.

⁶Prominent among these is the spring choral dance, "Khorovod."

The most popular of the folk songs, the kolyadki, are peculiar to the Ukraine. The Russians do not share these, although many other folk songs are common to both peoples.

The wedding song cycles are outstanding for the ritualized mourning they express. The girl weeps at her cruel fate of being sent away from the family circle to strangers. Other folk songs range widely in theme. Earlier songs tell of the Tartar and the Turkish invasions and of the Mongol domination. They relate the devastation of the Ukraine and the suffering of the Ukrainian people. Later, they tell of the revenge of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with the development of the warrior Cossacks. In addition, there are Chumak songs,⁷ love songs, songs describing family life, and lullabies.

Folk music was first collected in 1730 when a great interest in ethnography prompted the collections of Pratsch, Balakirev, Rimsky-Korsakov, Melgunovard, Filipov, and others.

⁷The Chumaks were salt traders who traveled to the Crimea to bring salt to the Ukraine. The journey was dangerous though profitable.

UKRAINIAN MUSIC

"A"-li

Ukrainian music attracted the attention of the Western world only toward the end of the 18th century. Its historical development is very long and its tradition rich and interesting.

The Golden Age of Ukrainian music lasted from the 16th to the 18th centuries, thus coinciding with what Professor Mirchuk calls "the heroic age of Ukrainian history."¹ Another name of this interval in the development of Ukrainian music is the Cossack period. The main characteristic of Cossack songs is their expression of patriotic feelings as revealed in the perpetual struggles of the Ukrainians against the Tartars, Poles and Muscovites. The main form of this music which flourished in the 17th and 18th centuries is the so-called Duma, sung by the Kobsars, a special, local variety of bards and minstrels, rhapsodists and troubadours. Organized in a guild to protect their professional interests, the Kobsars were also known as bandurists and lirnyks. Like their medieval predecessors in the West, these bards and minstrels traveled and wandered all over the country, supported not only by the magnates and feudal lords, but also by the Cossack warriors and masses of simple peasants.

The annexation of Ukraine by the powerful Polish-Lithuanian State and the intensive spread of Roman Catholicism left an important imprint on Ukrainian Church music. To compete successfully with the polyphonic vocal and instrumental music (primarily the organ) of the Catholics, the Orthodox Church, which does not employ instrumental music, had to cultivate the more complex and subtle forms of choral singing, which represents to this day the sole original gender of Ukrainian Church music. "This choral singing, supported by church

1 - Mirchuk, Ukraine and its People, p. 234.

brotherhoods, was preserved throughout Ukraine till the end of the 17th century."²

The most recent period of Ukrainian music is marked by typical European traits, such as the octave structure of the melodic line, a clear separation of major and minor keys, regular harmonies, etc. Most of the early Western music in Ukraine was brought to the country by sons of wealthy Cossack aristocracy on their return from Europe. Such outstanding Italian composers as Giovanni Palestrina, Alessandro Scarlatti and Giuseppe Sarti, as well as many others, were well known and often performed in Kiev of the 18th century. Under Italian influence there developed a specifically Ukrainian style of liturgical chord singing. The most gifted representatives of this imported trend were Demeter Bortniansky, (1721-1825?), Maksim Berezovsky, (1745-1777) and Artem Wedel (1767-1806). These three representatives of older Ukrainian music, of whom Bortniansky is the best known, studied at the famous Kiev Academy. Besides, Bortniansky and Berezovsky received a thorough training in Italy, the latter in Bologna and the former in Venice, Rome and Naples. After his return from Italy, Bortniansky was the conductor of the Imperial Court Orchestra in St. Petersburg. But, regardless of the controversy as to whether he should be regarded as a Great-Russian or a Ukrainian,

Bortniansky's is undoubtedly one of the most eminent names among the composers of church music in all Orthodox countries.

Of the Ukrainian musicians of the 19th and 20th centuries, the most outstanding collectors of musical folklore were Mykola Lysenko (1842-1912), the country's greatest composer, from Poltava, M. Verbytsky (1815-1870) and I. Lavrysky, from Galicia, and scores of others.

Bortniansky also wrote the operas "Creonte" and "Quinto Fabio". These works, first performed in Italy, were not inspired by Ukrainian folklore, and remained alien to the Ukrainian public. However, during

2 - Ibid., p. 235

the Romantic movement, with its interest in country life and the heroic exploits of the past, Ukrainian professional music found its proper stimulus and sources of inspiration. The best examples of these early national compositions are the light opera "Cossack the Rhymester" by Prince Shahovsky (1777-1846); the classical musical comedy "Natalka Poltavka" by Ivan Kotliarevsky; "The Zaporog Cossack beyond the Danube"; by Hulak-Artemovsky (1813-1873); and an opera-like setting of Sheuchenko's "Kateryna" by Mykola Arkas (1852-1909).

Artemovsky's opera "The Zaporog Cossack beyond the Danube" is under obvious influence of Mozart's "Il Seraglio".

Mykola Lysenko was outstandingly successful in several fields of music. A graduate of the Leipzig Conservatory, he based his compositions on folk melodies. With great sophistication and talent he revealed the essence of his country's music in the simple and beautiful peasant tunes, mistakenly regarded by some of his predecessors as crude and primitive. With the thoroughness of an ethnographer and musicologist he applied to Ukrainian musical folklore the most rigorous scientific methods. After establishing the scale of the Ukrainian folk-song, Lysenko developed from it a suitable harmony. He did not want simply to graft the music of the West onto Ukrainian folklore. Very early he realized that such great universal masters as Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Wagner and Brahms built their magnificent compositions on a scale derived from the German folk song.

Among Lysenko's followers the most important are M. Leontovych (1877-1921) and K. Stetsenko (1882-1922), both of whom found their inspiration in the vocal music of the 16th century and in Ukrainian folk melodies.

Following the end of World War I, Lysenko's work began to affect instrumental music as well, not only in Kiev, but also in the provinces. In Western Ukraine, Stanislov Ludkevych (1879) started to write music in the real European sense, although definitely rooted in the tunes of

the folklore.

Ludkevych's main contribution consists in the fact that he demonstrated the possibility of expressing the national individuality of Ukrainian melodies in instrumental as well as vocal compositions.

The most important works of this composer are "The Caucasus", a great symphony for solos, chorus and orchestra, the "Valse Melancolique", and the "Rhapsody of the Ukrainian Legion". Other Ukrainian musicians of international reputation are V. Barvinsky and P. Kozitsky, authors of suites and string quartets, and L. Revutshy and R. Prydatkevich, composers of string quartets and symphonies. Vasyl

Barvynsky is director of the Ukrainian Academy of Music in L'vov, a neo-romantic and an accomplished master of chamber composition. A student of Vitezslav Novak in Prague, he learned how to utilize the hidden potentialities of Ukrainian folk tunes in the same manner in which his master used the inherent wealth of Slovak folk melodies. Stylistically close to Barvynsky is Nestor Nyzhankivsky (1893 - 1940), son of a 19th century composer and a student of the Austrian master Marx. M.O. Hayvoronsky wrote a suite and several symphonic poems and M. Verckivsky a ballet and a Requiem. B. Kudryk is well known for his violin sonata, and Stephanie Turkevich for her piano quintet. Zenon Lysko (1895) and Mykola Kolesa (1898), who composed a suite for orchestra and a quartet, overcame the obviousness of their folk inspiration in excellent works which, nevertheless, retain the best qualities of the folklore.

A special place among modern Ukrainian composers belongs to Anton Rudnytsky, who consciously broke away from all national themes in an attempt to introduce into Ukrainian music some of the extreme modernistic tendencies from the West.

A very significant figure among the Ukrainian musicians in the Soviet Union is Boris Lotoshynsky, (1895-) professor in the Institute of Music in Kiev and a gifted and prolific composer. Radical

and daring in his experimentation with the modern technique, he wrote numerous works for violin and piano as well as symphonies, and music for films. He wrote atonal music, as well as compositions inspired by Ukrainian folklore. Of these works the best known is his "Overture to Four Ukrainian Songs" and his successful opera, "The Gold Hoop".

Victor Rascuko (1896) composer of a string quartet and two symphonies, is a professor at the LYSENKO Institute in Kiev, and MYKHAILO VERYKIVSKY (1896), the conductor of the KHARKOV opera. These two composers are real masters of the instrumental and vocal miniature.

According to the Slavonic Encyclopedia, four Ukrainian composers in exile are living now in the United States. They are M.O. Hayvaronsky, R. Prydatkevic, P. Pechenika-Ouglitsky and M. Rudnytsky.

UKRAINIAN PAINTING

"A" - 1 i

The first traces of painting in what is today Ukraine are the decorative designs preserved on the remains of the so-called "painted pottery" of the Trypillian ("Tripolie") culture (3-4 thousand B.C.). Further evidence of early painting in this area are numerous pictures on ancient Grecian urns, as well as frescoes from Greco-Roman tombs.

As a full-grown, monumental art, however, painting in what is now Ukraine did not appear before the rise of the Kievan State (10th - 13th century). The oldest local examples of the Byzantine school can be seen on the walls of the churches in Crimea, particularly in Kerch' and Khersenes.

The earlier Hellenistic influence, combined with later, Byzantine elements is clearly recognizable in the frescoes of Kiev and Chernigov. The famous mosaics decorating the walls of Kiev's Saint Sophia and Mikhailevsky Sobor (1108) represent a mature synthesis of all previous trends. The best preserved mosaics in the Cathedral of Saint Sophia are "Christ the Pontokrator," the apostles, the evangelists, "Oranta," etc.

As in other Slavic countries that passed through the school of Byzantine civilization (particularly medieval Bulgaria and Serbia), in the prosperous and powerful Kievan state painting is not exclusively of a sacred, religious character. Side by side with numerous scenes from church history one can observe quite a few secular, lay compositions, including in addition to formal portraits of princes and their families, many details of daily life, war, and hunting. Particularly interesting in this respect are the frescoes of Kiev's Saint Sophia, dating from the eleventh century. Of considerable historical as well as artistic value are the fresco compositions in the church of St. Cyril in the same city, illustrating the various phases of the relationship between Kievan Rus' and the Eastern Roman Empire.

Between the tenth and thirteenth centuries the general level and quality of the decorative painting were so high and so widely appreciated that even after the Mongolian invasion and the destruction of Kiev, it continued to exert a strong influence on the art of neighbouring countries,

particularly Poland and the Lithuanian-Belorussian state. Many Ukrainian¹ painters were hired and supported by Polish kinds and nobles for whom they decorated numerous churches and palaces. An especially outstanding example of this Ukrainian art outside the Ukrainian ethnic territory are the famous fifteenth century murals in the Church of Sandomierz, in Lublin's Holy Trinity (1418), and in the Holy Cross Chapel of the Wawel Cathedral in Cracow. The Ukrainian artists of that period enjoy the admiration and protection of such illustrious and powerful Maecenas as Casimir the Great of Poland and Yagell of Lithuania. The most talented of these painters was the fifteenth century muralist Andrey, master of the already mentioned Holy Trinity in Lublin (1418).

In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Ukrainian painting received its first direct stimulus from other than Hellenistic and Byzantine sources. Strong Western influences began to penetrate the province of Galicia, particularly from southern Germany. The ancient city of Nuremberg became the most important single source of Gothic and Renaissance elements in Ukrainian painting. It is well established, for example, that Veit Stess, Hans Kulmbach and the brother of Albrecht Dürer, the famous master of the German Renaissance, stayed and painted in Cracow. According to Professor Mirchuk, the picture of the Resurrection in the L'vov National Museum is vividly reminiscent of a similar composition by Wehlgemuth, the well-known Nuremberg painter, "and even of an early work in the Munich Pinakethek by Dürer, Wehlgemuth's pupil."²

Pre-Renaissance Gothic influence is obvious in the otherwise Byzantine frescoes painted in the fourteenth century in the Armenian Cathedral at L'vov.

An important branch of medieval Ukrainian painting, particularly in the West, was iconography, which began to overcome the stereotyped stiffness and immobility of hieratic Byzantine art and acquire an increasing

1 - Some of these same painters and works are claimed also by Belorussians.

2 - I. Mirchuk, ed. Ukraine and its People, Ukrainian Free University Press, U. U. A. R. C. Munich 1949, p. 246.

number of features characteristic of realism.

Italian, Dutch, and German Renaissance left their most powerful traces in the remarkable works of the so-called L'viv School of Ukrainian painting. The most important examples of this are the paintings in the Holy Trinity, the Lavra and other churches of the Ukrainian capital, as well as the iconostas in a church of Behorodchany (1698), painted by Ivan Kondzelevich. Of considerable importance are also the iconostases in the Holy Friday Church in L'vov, St. Andrew Church in Kiev, and the Church of Koselets.

In general, Ukrainian iconography has a style of its own, remarkably different from that of the Russian icon. As in the early fresco murals, so in their icons the Ukrainian artists represent not only saints and holy scenes but also elements of the nations' political and social history such as portraits of Cossacks and their hetmans, lay founders and benefactors of churches, etc.

The most gifted artist of the Ukrainian Renaissance was Fedushka of Sambir, whose "Annunciation" (1579), was preserved in the Ecclesiastical and Archeological Museum of Zhitemir, in the province of Volhynia. Following the Ukrainian Renaissance and its beautiful blending of local features with Eastern as well as Western influences, the Baroque represents one of the most creative periods in the history of Ukrainian painting.

This rich and elaborate international style, originally introduced and spread by the Jesuits, easily penetrated Galicia and other parts of Western Ukraine. But the Eastern, Cossack provinces, hostile to Poland and Catholicism only gradually accepted the new art, after it had adapted itself to current popular conceptions. Thus, under the patronage of the ruling classes, there developed from Jesuit Baroque a specifically Ukrainian variety of the movement known as Cossack Baroque.

Examples of the magnificent Cossack portraiture painted in the Baroque style can still be seen in museums and galleries of L'vov, Kiev, Kharkov, Poltava and elsewhere. In all these portraits one cannot help observing significant strides toward newer, more realistic interpretations, and away from medievalism. Hetmans and Church dignitaries depicted

in these fine works are not particularly deep psychological studies but rather emphatic expressions and representations of power.

During the Rococo period (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) the old Ukrainian iconography was still alive, but, almost hermetically closed and unresponsive to influences from the outside, it gradually became completely petrified in a cold and sterile formalism. As a result, of course, its once strong appeal to the public started to decline.

On the other hand, all the modern currents in Ukrainian painting began to abandon religious motifs and subjects in favor of increasingly secular, historical themes. The achievements of Ukrainian painters toward the end of the eighteenth century were so impressive that many foreign critics described them as equal to the best contemporary masters of France and England.

Especially outstanding were the Ukrainian painters of classicism, particularly Antin Losenko (1737-1773), Dmitro Levitsky (1735-1822), and Vasyl Borovykovsky (1757-1825). These three great artists mark the highest point in the development of Ukrainian painting but at the same time the end of its self-conscious existence for a long time to come. Their works are in a way not in the main stream of Ukrainian painting, because they lived and produced outside Ukraine.

Following the destruction of the Ukrainian Cossack state, whose Hetmans, particularly Ivan Mazepa, were generous and enlightened patrons of the arts, most Ukrainian masters had to leave their native country in search of more favorable working conditions in Moscow and other Russian cities. Especially famous were those who settled in St. Petersburg, where for a long time they directed and taught at the newly established Academy of Arts. Thus, though once a leading country in the field of painting, the Ukraine became for a while only an artistic "province" of the Russian Empire. The loss of political independence and the rapid denationalization of the nobility, which became russified, polonized or germanized, contributed to the decline of artistic productivity in the Ukrainian lands. But Ukrainian art did not cease to exist. In Galicia, for example, prominent Ukrainian painters like Luke Dolynsky and Theodore Yakhymovich, one of the decorators of the Vienna Opera,

continued to work as Ukrainians. Another Galician artist, whose name deserves to be mentioned, is Kornylo Ustianovich, widely known as the painter of "Moses".

The shift from academism to realism in the evolution of Ukrainian painting first became apparent in the works of Taras Shevchenko, the greatest poet of his country and the actual founder of modern Ukrainian national consciousness. This man of manysided genius was a highly gifted painter, having developed his talent in St. Petersburg under the well-known teacher Charles Bruelow. Shevchenko's pictorial works consist of fine historical paintings, beautiful water colors, portraits and engraving, but he was above all an excellent master of drawing. Among his numerous followers in the field of painting one has to mention at least Ivan Aivazovsky, famous for his Picture of the Sea, Arkhip Kuindzhi, Kost Trutovsky and Porfir Martynovich.

The best representative of the Ukrainian school of impressionism is Mykola Samokish (1860-). Other well known impressionists are Mykola Pimonenko, Sergiy Vasilkivsky (1854-1914), and Photius Krasitsky, renowned for his painting, Guest from Zaporozhia. In addition to original works of art, these painters have dedicated much of their time and ability to the collection and study of ancient Ukrainian monuments. Besides "Subjects of Ukrainian Ornament in the seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries," they published a scholarly collection of "Ukrainian Antiques," including twenty reproductions of Ukrainian types from folklore and history.

Modern Western-European influence on Ukrainian impressionism is particularly noticeable in the works of Alexander Murashko (1875-1919) and Ivan Trush, well-known for his paintings of the "Shores of Dneper" and of Crimea. But it is important to stress that these artists, and particularly Murashko, whose work was highly acclaimed in Paris, Munich and Venice, are not mere followers of their Western models and inspirations. They are obviously trying to find their own authentic expression, based on local, Ukrainian impulses and rooted in the national tradition. After an admirable success abroad, Murashko returned to his native land, determined to organize there an art center that would

secure a prominent place for his country in the treasury of European and world culture.

According to Professor Mirchuk, one of the most talented landscape painters in modern Ukrainian art is Mykola Burachek, professor at the Academy of Art in Kiev, "a master of color who can create out of nothing whole symphonies of the most delicate tones."³

Among the expressionists and symbolists the most outstanding are Olexa Novakivsky, a painter from L'vov, Vasyl and Fedir Krychevsky from Kiev, Modesto Sosenko and Petro Kholodny (1876-1930). Vasyl Krychevsky deserves special mention not only because his work is appreciated in Germany, England and America, but also, and particularly, because he made a conscious attempt to create a national Ukrainian style in all branches of art.

Although his work is definitely based on the Byzantine-Ukrainian tradition, combined with various modernistic trends, Petro Kholodny cannot be placed without arbitrariness into any simple scheme. Following his emigration from the Soviet Union, he painted an entire gallery of exquisite works, all of which clearly demonstrate his great and versatile talent. Among his best works are the beautiful colored glass windows in the Uspenska Tserkva (the Church of Assumption) in L'vov.

The representatives of the so-called neo-Byzantine school pleaded for a return to the ancient traditions of the Kievan State. This movement is also known under the name of the "Boychuk School," derived from its father Mykhailo Boychuk (1882-1937), whose monumental murals, despite their Byzantine features, bear a strong resemblance to the works of Diego Rivera in Mexico and Porpinari in Brazil.⁴ It is not difficult to explain why this interesting group of outspoken anti-realists in the field of painting is frowned upon and even persecuted in the Soviet Ukraine for alleged "nationalist deviation." The most prominent "Boychukists" or "neo-Byzantines" are I. Padalka, Vasyl Sedliar, Mykola Azovsky, Oksana Pavlenko, Vasyl Kryzhanivsky, Mikhailo Osinchuk and others.

3 - Mirchuk, Ukraine and its People, Ukrainian Free University Press, Munich, 1949, p. 248.

4 - The Slavonic Encyclopedia, p. 71.

Among the representatives of other modern movements, such as futurism and cubism, no names are worth of special mention, but among the neo-classicists there is at least one painter, Mykola Hlushchenko (1901-), who deserves serious attention, having established a fine reputation in Paris and Berlin.

Anatol Petrytsky, one of the most highly talented Ukrainian painters, is under the influence of modern French art. Among his followers the most promising are Oleksa Hryshchenko, Mykhailo Andri-enko, Severin Burachok and others.

In that current of modern Ukrainian painting which tries to combine contemporary international trends with ancient national traditions the best known names are Mykhailo Dmytrenko, Edward Kozak, Halina Mazepa and Volodymyr Lasovsky.

All private and professional associations of Ukrainian painters in the Soviet Ukraine were abolished by Moscow in 1932, and replaced by a new organization sponsored and controlled by the Government.

At the end of this brief review of the history and achievements of Ukrainian painting, it may be of interest to mention that a number of great artists, known throughout the world as Russian, are claimed by certain Ukrainian scholars in exile as having been of completely or partially Ukrainian descent. One of those controversial giants is Nikola Ghe (Mykola Ge) (1831-1894), a personal friend of the famous Russian novelist Leo Tolstoi, and one of the most profound masters of the entire nineteenth century. Others on the same list are Illia Riepin (1844-1930), Ivan Stanislavsky (1860-1907), of partially Polish origin, and Mykola Yaroshenko.

It is true that Riepin is the author of the magnificent masterpiece "Zaporozhians write a Letter to the Turkish Sultan," and that he and other Russian artists may really have been of Ukrainian extraction, but, apparently, they all identified themselves with the Great Russians, no less than Domenico Theotokopuli (1547-1614), the famous El Greco, although undoubtedly a Greek by birth, finally identified himself with the Spaniards.

UKRAINIAN SCULPTURE

"A" li

The oldest sculptural remains in Ukraine date from the fourth century B.C. They consist mostly of engravings and low-reliefs decorating numerous Grecian urns and representing various scenes from the daily life of the Scythians who inhabited the Northern Shores of the Black Sea in the first millennium before the Christian era.

During the golden period of the Kievan State, from the 11th to the 13th century, sculpture developed mainly as an appendix to architecture, an auxiliary art with a purely decorative function. Many richly ornamented porticos, pillars and sarcophagi, dating from the Kievan Rus', can still be seen in the churches not only of the Ukrainian capital, but also of Chernigov, Halich and other cities.

During the 14th and 15th centuries the fundamentally Byzantine motifs of the Ukrainian decorative sculpture merged with certain patterns of Western origin. This fusion of the ornamental traits from Byzantium with Gothic and Romanesque borrowings from the West was particularly strong during the Renaissance, when it left a profound imprint upon the decorated sarcophagi and tombs of Ukrainian feudal potentates. The best examples of this highly specialized and applied sculpture are the graves of Prince Ostrozhsky in Kiev, 1534, and of M. Herburt in L'vov. The figures of the buried are represented in full armor, lying or relaxing in a comfortable pose in a harmonious context with the architecture. The tomb of the Grand Prince Constantin Ostrozhsky, "the brave champion and protector of the Faith in the East," located in the famous Cave-Monastery in Kiev, and the monument to M. Herburt in the L'vov Cathedral are compared by Prof. Mirchuk to "Venetian or North Italian sculpture."¹ It is important to mention, however, that Herburt's monument in L'vov is not the work of Ukrainian hands, having been executed by P. Labenwolf, a South-German master from Nuremberg. The most outstanding examples of the Ukrainian Renaissance style in the field of applied, decorative sculpture, are the elaborate frames of icons, preserved in the Western parts of the country. Especially

1 - I. Mirchuk, Ukraine and its People. p. 243

beautiful are the icon frames in the Church of Holy Friday in L'vov and the church of Rogatyn, from 1649.

During the Baroque and Rococo periods the Ukrainian decorative sculpture developed still further, not only as an ornamental art in churches, on graves and frames of icons, but also in the form of icons themselves, beautifully carved in wood. Particularly impressive is the ornamental sculpture covering the walls of Ukrainian churches of the so-called "Cossack Baroque." In certain cases the carved iconostates, rich in splendid stylization of herbs and flowers, are several stories high. The specific Ukrainian physiognomy of these exquisite carvings is beyond any dispute, and they represent the highest and most original achievement of the Ukrainian people in the field of sculpture.² Numerous examples of floral ornamentation can be found in L'vov, Kiev, and Buchach.

After the fall of the Ukrainian Cossack State many Ukrainian sculptors and wood-carvers moved to the cities of Russia where their work became partially lost to the repository of national Ukrainian culture. Among these masters, belonging predominantly to the period of classicism, the most highly gifted were Ivan Martos (1752-1835) and Michael Kozlovsky (1753-1802). Like many outstanding painters of Ukrainian extraction, these sculptors must be regarded as Russians. A pupil of Canova, and later professor and Rector of the Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg, Martos was the real founder of Russian sculpture, having trained an entire school of eminent disciples. Similarly, Kozlovsky contributed a great deal to the growth of Russian sculpture, despite his premature death,

In the 19th century there appeared on the horizon the first Ukrainian sculpture with a strong and clear national consciousness. Under the influence of the Romantic Movement they stressed their Ukrainian particularity by choosing primarily historical and popular local subjects. The most outstanding representative of that generation, with strong leanings toward academic realism, was Michael Mykyshyn (1836-1896), the sculptor of the monument to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and illustrator of many

2 - Ibid.

books of Gogol and Shevchenko. Not particularly polished in technique, Mykyshyn was a sculptor of great talent and powerful imagination.

Another gifted Ukrainian sculptor of the 19th century was Fedir Kamenskyi (1822-?) who left his native land for America, where as a professor of sculpture in New York, he created one of the first busts of Shevchenko. The poet of the Ukraine was sculptured also by Parmen Zabilo (1830-1890), the well-known author of the monument to Gogol in Nyshin, as well as of busts of the painter Borovikovsky, Galagan and others. Leonid Posen (1849-1921) is renowned for his impressive monument to Kotkyarevsky, the founder of modern Ukrainian literature. The monument is decorated with beautiful reliefs referring to the main works of this important Ukrainian writer. In addition to Vladimir Beclemishev (1861), who inspired the academic tradition with new vitality and fresh forms of expression, Fedir Balavensky (1864) belongs to the same generation and the same artistic circles. He is famous in his country for having introduced into Ukrainian sculpture many folk motifs, and his work as a whole represents a successful combination of ethnographic elements and classical tradition. His best known pieces are "The Triumph of Phryne" and "The Olympic Games" of his allegorical figures. and compositions especially worthy of mention are those adorning the building of the Ukrainian Red Cross in Kiev, and representing "Medicine", "Mercy", "Love", and "Life". Contemporaries of Balavensky in Galicia were Gregor Kuznevich and Peter Wiytovych, a student of the well-known Viennese sculptor Zumbusch. After a thorough training in Italy, Kuznevich came to America where he created a number of monumental works in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Cleveland.

A group of talented sculptors, including M. Parashchuk (born in 1889), B. Cratko (1884-), M. Brynsky and M. Havrylko (1882-1919), carried the Ukrainian sculpture from realism to impressionism. M. Parashchuk is particularly well-known for his monumental style in commercial architecture. Bernhard Kratko, professor of sculpture at the Academy of Art in Kiev, has a highly personal style in his combination of synthetic monumentalism and neo-classicism. Michael Havrylko was

a belated romantic with a great and original talent. He is known as "the artist of the popular plan for the Shevchenko monument in Kiev in which mastery over form is combined with imagination of wide sweep and a tendency to romanticism."³

Like painting, modern Ukrainian sculpture is characterized by monumentality and realism, strongly encouraged by the policies of the Soviet regime. The most significant representative of modern Ukrainian sculpture, Alexander Arkhypenko (1877-), is an important exception to this general statement. Like all original artists, he defies classification and easy definition. He is not a follower of any trend, movement or fashion, although the Slavonic Encyclopedia calls him "a great experimentalist in form who forsook futurism for neo-classicism."⁴ If anything, he may prove to be the founder of a new movement, a school of his own to be followed by other lesser artists. Since 1913, when he emigrated to America, he has been known in artistic circles throughout the Western world. Little interested in the conventional treatment of the physical phenomena, he is trying to express his own, intimate world, by means of highly personal logical and psychological devices. It is understandable that his work is not in good grace among the conventional sculptors in the Soviet Ukraine, committed, often despite themselves, to the so-called socialist realism. But even the Ukrainian exiles object to Arkhypenko's extravagant individualism. Professor Mirchuk, for example, at the end of an expression of reluctant praise, has this to say about the artist: "...what this sculptor creates is not a product of the Ukrainian spirit; the eccentric, the abnormal, the artificial in his creations has nothing at all to do with the healthy instincts of peasant people rooted in its own soil."⁵

Much more typical of contemporary Ukrainian sculpture is Nastia Pysarenko, whose very original technique is followed by an entire school

3 - I. Mirchuk, p. 244

4 - The Slavonic Encyclopedia, p. 72

5 - I. Mirchuk, p. 245

of artists interested in emphasizing the national tradition and rigorous adherence to form. The best known modern Ukrainian sculptor of the school of expressionism is Vasyl Masiutin, and the best master of bronze, Fedir Yemetz. Among the exiles particularly famous is Constantin Stakhovsky, sculpture of many superb figures of animals, based on live models from the zoos of Berlin, London and Vienna.

Like Bohdan Mukhyn and Hryhor Kruk, Oksana Laturynskaia is a neo-romantic. Together, these artists represent a group unto themselves, whose works are described by critics as "poems in stone,"⁶ based on a most delicate understanding and feeling for the problems of modern form.

Worthy of mention, at the end of this short and very sketchy survey are also Sergey Litvinenko, Constantin Buldin, Michailo Cheresniavsky, Antin Pavlos, and Mykola Mukhin.

In general, the development of Ukrainian sculpture through the centuries has not been an easy one. In the past it was obstructed by the oppressive measures of the Czarist autocracy. Today it is hindered in its free search for expression by the Soviet dictatorship. All this has been a serious impediment to spontaneous artistic activity. It is very telling to mention in conclusion that the Soviet monument to Shevchenko in the East Ukrainian city of Kharkiv was built by non-Ukrainian artists.

In spite of all these obstacles and misfortunes, the Ukrainian sculpture can boast of remarkable achievements, comparable to those of much more fortunate nations.

6 - Ibid.

UKRAINIAN ARCHITECTURE

"A" - li

The oldest architectural monuments on the territory of Ukraine date from the eighth and seventh centuries B. C., when the northern shores of the Black Sea began to absorb the cultural consequences of their commercial ties with numerous Grecian states. At that time, the Hellenes had already established a number of colonies, particularly in Crimea, where the city of Khersones became an important center of ancient Mediterranean civilization, and later, in the first millennium of the Christian era, one of the main gates of Byzantine influence. There is no doubt that the chief foreign component in the architecture of early Kiev was that of Constantinople. From the 10th and 13th centuries the Byzantine style underwent many important adaptations and local manifestations so that even the earliest architectural remains of the Kievan State are by no means mere copies and replicas of their Byzantine models. In the 10th and 13th centuries, the most widespread type of church construction was the so-called three-nave building whose best examples are the Desiatynna Church in Kiev (986-996) and the Savior Cathedral (Spasivska Katedra) in Chernigov (1024-1051), with three naves and five cupolas. The Desiatynna was destroyed during the Mongol siege of Kiev in the year 1240, and excavated in the 1930's.

The most important and, artistically, the most valuable architectural monument of the Kievan State is the 11th century Church of Holy Wisdom (St. Sophia) built by Prince Yaroslav the Wise in Kiev (1017-1037). The architects and decorators of this masterpiece were obviously Byzantine Greeks, hired and paid by the Kievan ruler. At first, the cathedral had five naves and nine cupolas, but it was considerably changed by Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who had it remodeled in the Baroque style in the 17th century. The original structure, which had very few rivals even in the Byzantine Empire, exerted a powerful influence as far north as Pskov and Novgorod, and as far east as Vladimir-Suzdal.

In addition to St. Sophia, Kiev could boast of many other churches, such as Mikhailovsky Sobor (1108), Kievo-Pecherska (1073), St. Cyril's church (1140), etc. The famous Mikhailovsky Sobor,

one of the architectural treasures of the early 12th century, was destroyed by the Soviets in 1934 to make room for the new building of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. But, although the main center of its ancient architecture, Kiev is not the only city of Ukraine to preserve the splendor that was Kievan Rus'. North of the Ukrainian capital, Chernigov prides itself on the old Church of Boris and Hlib (1120), and in the west, in Vladimir-Volynsky, one can still admire the Uspensky Cathedral, built in the year 1160. These are only a few of the many architectural landmarks which cannot be enumerated in a short review.

In view of the fact that the Ukrainian territory has suffered in the course of centuries many invasions and devastations, it is almost a miracle that so many ancient buildings still survive intact. However, there is no doubt that quite a few architectural masterpieces perished without a trace in the destructions of Kiev in 1169 and 1203, as well as in other raids of Mongolian hordes and, later, Muscovite princes and Polish kings. There is ample archaeological evidence that wars and invasions are responsible for the destruction of many Ukrainian churches and monasteries as well as of secular buildings. In the western Ukraine, for example, near the city of Halich, the archaeologists have uncovered 30 basements dating from the 12th and 13th centuries, and including the foundations of an enormous cathedral--almost as large as Kiev's St. Sophia. Of the buildings that were once obviously there, only the Romanesque Church of St. Panteleimon, built in the 12th century, still survives.

Of the secular architecture, that of a military nature is best preserved. Remnants of defense walls, castles, and towers--that once belonged to various local princes of Galician Kievan Rus'--are found, for example, near the city of Kholm.

The most powerful Western influence in the ecclesiastical architecture of Ukraine is the Romanesque style, which had a chance to penetrate the western parts of the country before the Mongolian invasion separated Ukraine from the Western world. The most important survival of the local Ukrainian combination of Byzantine and Romanesque elements is the late - 14th century Church of St. Nicholas in L'vov. The

Gothic influence is apparent in the basic construction of the Armenian Cathedral, in the same city (1363).

Throughout the 14th and 15th centuries, Ukraine was ravaged by constant wars and invasions which called into being the need for the development of massive defense constructions. Huge fortresses can still be seen in Kiev, Khotyn, Ostrog, Lutsk, and elsewhere. The church construction itself had to be adapted to the turbulent times. This is especially obvious in the Church of Sutkivtsy (in Podolia) which is really a church-fortress.

After the absorption of Galicia by Poland, in 1349, the prevalent church style was for a while German Gothic, still apparent in the Roman Catholic architecture of the area, attributed largely to Polish and German settlers. It was not until the 15th and 16th centuries that the Renaissance began to affect Ukraine's architecture--through the activity of imported masters from Italy. Among the most valuable and best preserved examples of the Ukrainian architectural Renaissance are the house of the 16th century patricians of L'vov, castles in Kamenets Podolsky (1541), Peremyshl and Berezhany.

The finest example of the Ukrainian Renaissance is the famous Vołosika Tserkva in L'vov, built in 1572 with the financial assistance of the Hospodar of Moldavia. That graceful and harmonious building with the well-known Korniak tower is a combination of Italian forms and local Ukrainian features. On the whole, the most original and most worthwhile monuments of the Ukrainian Renaissance style are located in Galicia, the westernmost province of the country.

In the 17th and 18th centuries Ukrainian architecture entered its second phase of development, known as the "Cossack Baroque." This was the predominant style of the Cossack State--generously supported by the Hetmans and the higher nobility. The Cossack Baroque is a combination of traditional Ukrainian patterns adapted from Byzantine models and many new traits borrowed from the West. In Kiev, alone, Hetman Ivan Mazepa had built five large new churches and remodelled many others in the new Cossack style. The most successful application of the Ukrainian Baroque to an older, Byzantine structure was the alteration and reconstruction of

Kievo-Pecherska Lavra by architect S. Kovnir in the middle of the 10th century. The renowned Church of St. Nicholas, a military Cathedral, built under Mazepa, was destroyed in the 1930's by the Soviets. Another architectural landmark in Kiev, dating from the same period, is the so-called Zborevsky's Gate, known for its ornamental decoration.

In the course of time, the Cossack Baroque, like Baroque everywhere, gradually developed into Rococo. The most famous Rococo buildings in Ukraine are St. Andres's Church in Kiev, dating from 1744, and the monumental Cathedral of St. George in L'vov, built in the same year by the gifted architect, Meritin. Other renowned examples of Ukrainian ecclesiastical Rococo are churches Pochov, Koselets, and other towns.

The transition from Rococo to Classicism is noticeable in the Kievo-Pecherska Lavra, and even more so in various palatial buildings. In 1801 an official Ukaz of the Russian Emperor forbade the construction of churches in the local Ukrainian styles.

Ukrainian architecture of the 19th century was characterized by Eclecticism as well as by the appearance of many modern trends, influenced in certain cases by national Ukrainian motifs. Particularly famous among the modern Ukrainian architects was I. Levinsky, from L'vov. In 1902, V. Krychevsky, another outstanding Ukrainian architect, now in Venezuela, combined a number of Baroque motifs with patterns borrowed from the folk architecture in wood, and applied the synthesis to the famous Zemstvo Palace in the city of Poltava, destroyed by the Germans in World War II. He tried to adapt the traditional style of Ukrainian wooden architecture to stone, and add the traditional ornaments from pottery and peasant houses to both interior and exterior decorations. This example was followed by O. Lushpinsky, E. Nahirny, O. Diadchenko, and S. Timoshenko.

Contemporary architecture in the Soviet Ukraine differs from current trends throughout the world in being subjected to the officially enforced Soviet trends.

UKRAINIAN GRAPHIC ART

"A" - II

In the history of Ukrainian art as a whole the graphic art occupies a place of extraordinary importance. Its golden age was the second half of the seventeenth century, during the rule of Hetman Ivan Mazepa.

At that time the achievements of Ukrainian graphic artists were so great that the influence of their works spread far beyond the borders of the Ukraine. Especially beneficial was the effect of their technique upon the growth of graphic art in Belorussia, Poland, Rumania and Muscovite Russia.

The father of the Ukrainian graphic art was Alexander Tarasevych (1672-1720). Throughout the seventeenth century there was no greater master of copperplate etching in all Eastern Europe. A talented pupil of the Kilian Brothers, the famous Augsburg engravers, he has left not only numerous illustrations and book ornaments but also exquisite portraits of his contemporaries. The best among these are the likenesses of Hetman Samoylovych, Empress Sophia, and many others.

In the eighteenth century the center of Ukrainian engraving was Kiev, but under its powerful influence there sprang up additional centers in Chernigov, L'vov, and other towns. Among the contemporaries of Taracovych, the most outstanding were Ivan Myhura and Hryhor Levytsky. In 1720 an order of Emperor Peter I prohibited the publication of books in the Ukrainian language. This was a serious blow to Ukrainian engravers and printers whose work was now limited to exclusively religious publications. Yet, despite all repressive measures of Moscow, Kiev continued to lead all of Eastern Europe in the field of graphic art throughout the eighteenth century. At that time the city could boast of no less than fifty engravers.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the Ukrainian engraving began to show the influence of certain new techniques, introduced into the country around 1820. One of these new techniques was the so-called lithographic method, applied in L'vov and Odessa in the second decade of the same century. Most of the masters who introduced lithography and xylography, came from various Western countries, particularly

Austria and Germany. An important school of xylographers was soon established in the famous Lavra Monastery in Kiev.

The most important figure at the outset of modern Ukrainian engraving was Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), the many-sided genius to whom the Ukrainian nationalism owes its very foundation. This great poet and talented painter was also an excellent etcher. He made a series of brilliant engravings that had a powerful influence on the development of this branch of art, not only in his native country but in Russia itself. The publication of his Ukraine in Pictures was a landmark in the history of Ukrainian etching. This work was the first collection of copperplates depicting various subjects from Ukrainian folklore and national history. Shevchenko's work was continued by another gifted artist, Leo Zemchuzhnikov (1828-1912), who published many etchings of his own as well as those by other artists.

In the beginning of the twentieth century the art of book production underwent a general renaissance, primarily in the field of illustrations. The Ukrainian engravers re-discovered their own splendid traditions. The leader of this movement was Vasyl Krychewsky, an outstanding decorative artist who painted many delicate landscapes in refined transparent coloring.

A close collaborator of M. Hrushevsky, the eminent Ukrainian historian, Krychewsky studied the ancient traditions of book decoration from the times of the independent Cossack State. On the basis of his study of these masterpieces Krychewsky developed new forms of expression, a new national style, followed, among others, by M. Boychuk, the talented and controversial founder of the so-called neo-Byzantine school of painting in the Soviet Ukraine.

The most original modern Ukrainian engraver was Jury Narbut (1883-1920), who opened an entirely new perspective for graphic art in the Ukraine. Attracted since early childhood by examples of ancient Ukrainian writing, he became an accomplished artist in the art of calligraphy. A pupil of Holosy's in Munich, Narbut had a fine reputation before the outbreak of World War I. However, separated from his na-

tive land, he was not yet in a position to formulate his own style. This he could do only upon his return to Kiev, in 1917, where he got in touch with Vasyl Krychewsky, Michailo Boychuk and their specifically Ukrainian themes and techniques. Unfortunately for the history of the Ukrainian engraving, his brilliant, but meteorically short career came to a sudden end, when he died in Kiev in 1920. Narbut was the designer of all the state documents of the Independent Ukrainian State, as well as of its money, postage stamps and diplomas.

In all these fine works of graphic art Narbut relied on the traditions inherited from the past, particularly those of the Baroque period under Hetman Mazepa. Recognized throughout the world as a great artist, he is completely out of favor in the Soviet Union, probably for his successful attempt to create, in the field of graphic art, a distinct Ukrainian style. In 1932 a group of Ukrainian scholars decided to pay homage to the artist by publishing a book about him and his work. However, before the volume was completed it was destroyed by the Soviet authorities, and all persons connected with its preparation were sent to the sub-arctic regions of Russia.¹

Besides Krychewsky, Boychuk and Narbut, Ukrainian graphic art is worthily represented by Narbut's pupils, Robert Lisovsky (1893-), Leo Lozovsky (1901-1922), Morko Kynarsky (1893-) and Sophia Nalepinska-Boychuk.

In Western Ukraine graphic art was under the leadership of Pavlo Kovzhun (1896-1939), a many-sided artist who added his own contributions to such modernistic trends as futurism, cubism and constructivism. One of the best artists in the field of woodcuts in the Soviet Union is Oleksa Kravchenko, a Ukrainian by birth whose works, however, have nothing especially Ukrainian about them. He is especially well known for his illustrations of the works of Gogol. Worthy of special mention in this review of Ukrainian graphic art is Vasyl Masiutyn, who is not

¹ - Sviatoslav Hordynsky: "Ukrainian Graphic Art," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 3, Summer 1948, p. 227.

only a fine sculptor but also an inspired etcher. His historical portraits of Bohden Khmelnytsky, Ivan Mazepa and the last Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky, are regarded by Professor Mirchuk as "striking revelations in the province of Ukrainian art."²

In the Soviet Ukraine graphic art, like art in general, is completely in the service of the regime. Deprived of their freedom of expression and spontaneous artistic creation, more than half of contemporary Ukrainian engravers live in self-imposed exile.

The roots of modern Ukrainian graphic art go back for almost a thousand years, to the period of Kievan Rus', whose books, printed in the eleventh century were decorated with beautiful illuminated miniatures, combining the most exquisite borrowing from both East and West. One of the most precious examples of that early art of book production are the miniatures in the so-called Ostromyr Bible of 1057, and the Almanac of Prince Svyatoslav of 1073. Since, however, these early monuments of graphic art on the territory of Ukraine are claimed also by the Great-Russians and Belorussians, it is advisable not to apply the term "Ukrainian" to examples of graphic art prior to the seventeenth century.

2 - Mirchuk: Ukraine and its People, p. 252.

THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY

INTRODUCTION

The organization of the Ukrainian Soviet economy provides for the simultaneous achievement of (1) authority and (2) flexibility. The provision for authority is designed to permit the leaders of the Soviet state to guide the economy toward Soviet ends. The provision for flexibility is designed to permit frequent substitutions of ends as well as extensive adaptability to altering circumstances. The Soviets attempt to reconcile the frequently conflicting demands of authority and flexibility. The economic organization facilitates maximization of a combination (a function, technically) of authority over, and flexibility in, the operation of the economy.

Maximization of authority plus flexibility is achieved by using a variety of (a) combinations of centralized with decentralized decision making, and (b) maintenance of multiple standards for the guidance and evaluation of performance.

Centralized decision making is embodied in bureaucratic hierarchy, in the limits of discretion allowed (de jure and de facto) to successive lower agents,^{1, 2} and to the rules according to which the lower agents

1 - This formulation represents one of several possible interpretations of the organization of the Soviet economy. Others, many of which have been helpful in the preparation of this analysis, may be found in: Oscar Lange, The Working Principles of the Soviet Economy; Bienstock, Schwarz, and Yugov, Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture; David Granick, Management of the Industrial Firm in the U.S.S.R.; Joseph Berliner, The Soviet Industrial Enterprise (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1953, to be published); Franklyn Holzman, Taxation in the Soviet Union (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1951, recently published); Maurice Dobb, Soviet Economic Development since 1917; A. Arakelian, Industrial Management in the U.S.S.R.; Herbert Dinerstein, Communism and the Russian Peasant; and many additional Soviet and non-Soviet sources.

2 - I shall speak as though the organization of the economy were unchanging. In point of fact, it is continually adapting itself to the changing needs of the growing economy. The apparent existence of a trend will be pointed out at the end of the section. In the meantime, I shall take advantage of the constancy of fundamental relations in the organization to discuss it at one point in time.

are to make decisions within these limits. Centralization is also expressed through the general legal system and the monetary and fiscal framework.

Decentralized decision-making may be found principally in the exercise of discretion on lower levels of the hierarchy within the prescribed limits; in the operation of the Soviet price system; cost-accounting; and "socialist competition"; and in mass participation in its various forms.

For the subordinate, and indeed for all decision-making agents, there exist at any one time several standards of performance which are to some extent mutually incompatible. On the one hand, he is free to choose that standard which is most in accord with his particular need and with the circumstances of the moment. On the other hand, he must adjust his performance to that set of standards which is most likely to be invoked. In addition, he must stand ready to be judged by this or some other set of standards, and to accept the consequences.

Centralization vs. decentralization and multiplicity of standards both serve to increase authority and flexibility. In general, however, it may be said that the centralized methods of decision-making predominantly bolster authority and the decentralized ones extend flexibility. The opposite effects, so to say, are supplied by multiplicity of standards; the very multiplicity introduces an element of flexibility into generally centralized decision-making, while the subsequent choice among standards augments authority in decentralized decision-making.

"Planning" in the Soviet economy properly refers to this totality of instrumental ends, plus the "final" ends of one point in time, inserted one step removed. Planning equals administration equals making of all decisions at each point in time. Planning, it might thus be said, is continuous over time and inclusive of all decisions within the range of the economy. Note that this does not assert that all institutions were set up and all rules devised with the deliberate intention of making the economy look and work as it does; nor that the "planned" Soviet economy does not permit or provide for autonomy in making decisions at "lower" levels.

The degree of autonomy is of particular importance for understanding structure and operation of the Ukrainian economy. If autonomy is understood as referring to the ability to make decisions without reference to any circumstances outside of the decision-making unit, the term is meaningless or at best useless. Autonomy may better be understood as referring to the degree and range of opportunity, de jure or de facto for making decisions and assuming responsibility for the consequences of decisions.

Where, then, is autonomy in the organization of Ukrainian economic affairs? Certain decisions, the most important ones, about the Ukrainian economy are not made by Ukrainians or in Ukraine, nor with only the benefit of Ukrainians in mind. Most decisions about Ukrainian economic affairs, however, are made by Ukrainians in Ukraine, and partly for the benefit of Ukrainians.

Two essential features of Soviet economic planning will serve as the background for the discussion: (1) Although the welfare of the population of a particular area is deemed important, the benefit of the Soviet Union as a whole is regarded as paramount. (2) The drive toward the further development of the economy underlies all other considerations.³

Centralization of investment decisions may serve as a point of departure. Selection of goods to be produced and general allocation of particularly scarce factors are made in the higher organs of the government. These decisions are passed down through the hierarchy, becoming increasingly specific as they go along. They are made effective largely through directives allotting maximum quantities of scarce materials to lower agencies. Acquisition of the material occurs through market purchases, however. Allocation of investment is set out in the materials plan prepared by Gosplan and in the more detailed "plans" of subsidiary agencies. It is complemented in money terms by the financial plan which includes the cash plan, the credit plan and the state

3 - Joseph Berliner, op. cit. p. 764.

budget.

The allocation of less scarce factors is left to more decentralized decision. These factors may conveniently be divided into two kinds: non-human and human. Soviet attempts to provide for optimum utilization of each differ in some significant aspects. The allocation of non-human resources among alternate uses is mostly organized in terms of a price system in which enterprise, roughly corresponding to the American firm, operates independently. Proper allocation is achieved by a combination of fairly centralized price-setting, specification of limits of discretion for the enterprise manager, and certain rules of management. Investment is similarly handled, as are ordinary operating decisions. Centralization of investment decisions is effected by prescribing the narrower limits of discretion for the manager in matters of investment than for other operating decisions.

Optimum use of human resources is also effected through a market. Although lower administration agencies and enterprises are largely directed to use specific amounts of labor, they must obtain the human factors on the market like other factors. However, at least until recently, the range of discretion in its disposition is wider to holders of human factors (labor) than to holders of other factors. Accordingly, the Soviets have regarded an incentive system as a most useful means of mobilizing and allocating labor. Incentives are of many types. Particularly important, however, is a sharply graduated system of money wage rates, replete with piecework rates, bonuses, etc. To be effective as incentives, however, wages and wage differences must bring with them command over consumer goods.

Effective command over consumer goods, and effective incentives from rewards for effort require, in a complex society with a higher-than-subsistence level of living, a large measure of consumer choice among goods on the market. Consumer choice is most easily organized through the medium of a market in which individuals receive payment in money, which has command over all the goods available in that market. Each good and service has a price. Consumer choice in the market then at once makes pay differentials effective. At the same time it solves in

a very decentralized fashion the otherwise complex problems of distributing available goods among the various claimants. Successful operation of this market requires one other major adjustment: The total of claims must be equated to the total of goods and services available on the market. The tax system, with the turnover tax as its mainstay, is designed to do just that. It may be noted that there is nonetheless a continual "shortage" of consumer goods on the market as there is also a shortage of factors on the factor market. Where Western economies have chosen to organize factor allocation and consumer goods distribution by means of a buyers market, the Soviets have chosen to work through a sellers market. In a rapidly developing economy with inflationary pressures, and one too poor to be able to maintain the large stocks necessary in a buyers market, this may be sound policy.

The distribution of income is thus largely determined by the real purchasing power of payments received for individual services rendered. Money income derives almost exclusively from wage payments, and in the case of peasants, from the sale of primary commodities. Only small returns can be had from the ownership of property in any sense.

Real income is then determined by the purchasing power of money income, which is in turn dependent on several policies which are largely centrally determined, although they are, in part, decentrally applied. The first of these may be summarized in the size of the entire basket of consumers goods and the selection of these goods to be produced. The government maintains central control over this selection in order to permit centralized investment decisions.⁴ If consumers were permitted to purchase and withhold purchases of all sorts of goods entirely at their

4 - Some writers distinguish between "consumer choice" among existing commodities and "consumer sovereignty" in the selection of commodities to be produced. They proceed to argue that the Soviet economy permits only the first of these, while Western economies exhibit both. See for instance, Oscar Lange; *op. cit.* After using this formulation myself in an earlier draft, this distinction formulation no longer seems adequate. I have not found it possible to define "consumer sovereignty" with sufficient precision to permit use of the concept in analysing the organization of an economy, much less in comparing one economy with another.

pleasure, the power to induce enterprises to produce one type of good instead of another, to make consumption goods instead of producer and "social" goods, would be diverted from the government to the consumer. The maintenance of a sellers market helps to prevent this. The "size" of the consumer goods basket, mentioned above, refers only to the distribution of productive effort between goods and services distributed through the market, and those serving the society through some other channel. These latter services may be classed mainly under social services, defense, and investment. The decisions to produce these are also made centrally. By convention, goods and services on the market and social services are regarded as real income. Defense and investment are not. The size of real income therefore depends initially on very centralized decisions about the allocation of productive resources among these two sets of uses.

Effective purchasing power or real income is also dependent on the pattern of centrally determined prices and on the extent of taxation in its various forms. It should be noted, however, that both of the last two "determinants" of real income, prices and taxes, only determine the distribution of real income among different individuals or inhabitants of different regions. They can determine relative real incomes alone, since total real income is already determined by the policy which allocates productive resources among uses. The decision with regard to the size of investment relative to national income is primary. The allocation of productive factors and the availability of consumers goods are derivative; and money income, price level and tax rate or tax burden are solely reflective. Relative prices and relative taxes then help to determine the distribution of this income among different people.

FRAMEWORK OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

The organization of the Soviet economy may conveniently be studied in terms of: 1) the particular institutions, agencies, and agents who actually operate (really decide) in the system; 2) the laws and rules of operation; 3) the hierarchies; 4) organization of the producers goods

market; and 5) organization of the consumers goods market; 6) distribution of income and wealth; and finally, 7) the operation of the economy as a whole. The first three of these topics may be discussed as the framework of the economy.

Institutions

Industrial production is institutionally divided into production under: 1) ministries of all-union (entire Soviet Union) supervision; 2) Republican (Ukraine,) ministries; 3) ministries of local production; 4) non-industrial ministries and offices, such as the Ministry of Procurement which supervises some milling of flour; and 5) cooperatives. As might be expected, All-union ministries, numbering 26 in 1948, supervise the industries which are most important to the Soviet developmental efforts and the production of which is geographically most wide-spread.⁵ Republican ministries, generally nine in number, handle the production of some light industries and food industry in the republic concerned.⁶ It is important to note, however, that the enterprises under both kinds of ministries are owned by the Soviet State. They are merely Republican supervised. But even this Republican supervision is largely formal because industries under supervision by ministries of the Republics like all other industries, are included in the economic planning of the entire Soviet Union.⁷ Local industries, also state owned, produce goods primarily for local consumption and largely from local materials.

5 - The following figures relating to Ukraine in 1936 give some indication of the relative importance of these supervisory agencies: 1588 enterprises under all-union ministries with 965,911 employees had a gross output of 8,169,885 rubles. Corresponding figures for enterprises of republican ministries were 125 enterprises with 42,355 employees and 352,859 rubles out put; 873 oblast enterprises with 102,688 employees and an output worth 966,751 rubles; and city and raion enterprises, employing 31,404 and producing 217,350 rubles worth. (These figures seem not to represent the entire Ukrainian industrial output for that year, however). Source: Administration of Economic Accounting of the Ukrainian S.S.R.; Radianska torhivlia U.S.S.R.; Kiev 1936; p. 14.

6 - An exception is that Coal mining in Ukraine was transferred to the supervision of a Ukrainian ministry in 1954.

7 - This does not mean that there is no Republican or local autonomy in the operation of either All-union or Republican industries.

Cooperatively organized production accounts for a considerable percentage of total production. Cooperative enterprises, unlike the predominant state enterprises, are owned by the membership. About 80% of this production is carried on by producers cooperatives. The remainder of production is divided among disabled persons' coops, consumers' coops which engage in some industrial production on collective farms. The cooperatives generally consist of several, often many, enterprises. Admission is by payment of dues and ownership of shares in a production fund; and immediate control lies with the general membership. The cooperatives are combined into local, and these into regional unions of cooperatives.

Agricultural production is carried on by kolkhozy (collective farms), sovkhozy (state farms), kolkhozniki (individual members of kolkhozy producing on privately owned plots). Independent private farmers are now very rare, even in the newly acquired Western provinces of Ukraine and Belorussia. Most capital equipment in agricultural production, other than land and buildings, is state-owned and is provided through machine tractor stations, "MTS".

Laws and Rules

The laws and rules of operation, including the system of incentives, determine the manner in which the above mentioned agents make their economic decisions within the economic organization. Many of these rules including the system of multiple standards are never made explicit in Soviet, as in other societies. Only a few of those that are more or less on the surface can be mentioned here. Aside from the general system of incentives which will become more clear as we proceed, the two major rules may be said to be the following: All directives from a higher agent, in a legitimate hierarchy, to a lower agent have legal force (the force of law). They must be obeyed under pain of fines, dismissal, or legal prosecution. At the same time, except for top level decisions by a collegium like the Presidium, one man rule prevails: a minister or a manager, for instance, carries full respon-

sibility for all decisions of his own and of his subordinates. To illustrate, an administrative directive to an enterprise in accordance with a five year plan has the force of law for the manager of the enterprise; and he is fully empowered and held responsible for the carrying out of the directive by the enterprise. The directive, of course, specifies only a very few of the decisions that must be taken in order to have it carried out. All the other decisions are up to the manager and his subordinates, and are made in context of the entire system of rules and incentives, including that of the price system.

Hierarchy

Formally the most important hierarchy in the organization of economic decisions is the planning and administrative bureaucracy which supervises and runs the state-owned industrial plant. The highest policy-making agency in this bureaucracy is the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. Specifically charged with economic decisions has been the Economic Council of the Council of Ministers. It has attached to it the State Planning Commission, commonly known as Gosplan. Gosplan is a secretariat similar to that of the Bureau of the Budget and as such is the top staff agency concerned with coordinating the economic decision-making process. Immediately below are the various Union ministries and Republican Ministries, each with an attached planning agency similar to Gosplan. Each of these ministries is in the charge of one minister--in accordance with the rule of one-man responsibility. Subordinate to each ministry are several glavki, each concerned with a particular segment of the ministry's field of supervision. In some cases trusts or combines occupy the next hierarchical level. In most cases enterprises are the immediate subordinates of the glavks.

Enterprises are the basic units of production and of decision-making in Soviet industry, as firms are in American industry. Again, in accord with the rule of one man responsibility, each enterprise is run by a manager whose role is similar to that of his American counterpart. Although every such enterprise, cooperatives excepted, is

state-established and state-owned, it has a substantially independent existence. Each enterprise has command over its own fixed capital and working capital, and it has access to credit. It maintains a separate account at Gosbank, the State bank. Its manager is entirely responsible for the conduct of its operation. Other aspects of its independence, such as the apparently powerful motive of continued maintenance of the organization (the enterprise), will be suggested in the discussion of the operation of the producers goods market. Enterprises, of course, have yet lower levels of operation and decision-making. These are commonly departments (tsekhi); and these in turn include shops (uchastki). The operation of these organs, however, is not very significant in the functioning of the economy, although the adequacy of their performance is, of course, economically significant. Only brief attention can be devoted to the problem raised by the operation of the economy at this level.

The administration of cooperative production and of agricultural production is similar to that of state industrial production. The limits of discretion for the lower decision-making levels is, however, in general wider. Cooperative production is ultimately under the supervision of the Central Administration for Producer and Consumer Cooperatives. Subsidiary to this agency are Republican administrations for producers cooperatives and subordinate to these, various regional and city administrations. All of these agencies are organs of the state. The Unions of cooperatives, which are subsidiary to these agencies, are private. Agricultural production is under a similar regional bureaucracy.

Other hierarchies are also instrumental in the direction of economic activity. These additional hierarchies are largely independent of the administrative one, and of each other, although in some cases there may be multiple membership. Gosplan has its own field representatives, but these are subsidiary agents of one of the agencies already included in the administrative bureaucracy. The lower agents of the Ministry of State Control, however, are independent of the administrative hierarchy. The Ministry itself, of course, is an agent

of the Council of Ministers. The bureaucracy of the State Bank is largely independent of other hierarchies. Its members also reach down to the lower decision-making levels. Some attempt is made to have the chief accountants in each enterprise "report" directly to the glavk of which it is a member. The labor union members and officers are part of a union hierarchy which reaches upward.

The Communist Party hierarchy parallels the administrative hierarchy over the entire gamut. Membership is in many cases the same as that in the administrative bureaucracy, particularly at the very bottom and at the very top. Extensive efforts in the late 1930's and again since 1950 have attempted to bring about a large increase of membership in both hierarchies at the level of enterprise manager, kolkhoz chairman, and somewhat less at that of their immediate subordinates, such as chief engineers and chief accountants. The influence of the Communist Party hierarchy on the organization of economic activity is, in many cases, subtle. The nature and degree of this influence is a perennial matter of dispute among students of this question, particularly in the West.

Three principal instrumental purposes may be advanced in explanation of the existence and function of this complex of hierarchies. Each hierarchy may well have a purpose peculiar to it; thus, the State Bank hierarchy is supposed to run the banking service. The general purpose may be said to be: 1) to set standards; 2) to exercise control; and 3) to stimulate and guide mass participation. Not all of these purposes apply uniformly to all hierarchies.

The first two purposes, particularly, may be understood in the context of the principle of multiplicity of standards. The suggestion was advanced earlier that economic performance is guided and evaluated in accordance with several standards, and that this arrangement renders the system more flexible than it otherwise might be. The existence of several hierarchies facilitates this. Different hierarchies develop and advance different standards. A manager of an enterprise thus finds that due, in part, to the influence on his "environment" of the various hierarchies, he is subject to a variety of often conflicting standards.

The existence of several hierarchies also makes possible the multiple standard arrangement, by the checks that each exercises on the performance of the membership of the others.

As was noted earlier, particular individuals may hold dual or multiple membership. This is useful in allowing the existence of a complex of hierarchies to permit, arouse, and guide participation in the decision-making process by agents on a hierarchical level which is lower than that on which a particular decision is to be made. This may occur in two ways in particular. The existence of an alternative hierarchy provides a medium for criticism of superiors by subordinates. The other hierarchy offers a channel of communication from the subordinate to an agent on a higher level without requiring him to go through his superior. This dulls the power of the superior to prevent criticism of his performance and it also encourages him to decrease the occasion for criticism. The other main service of the alternative hierarchies is to encourage increased interest and to stimulate suggestions at the lower levels of the other hierarchy.

The work of the Communist Party is illustrative of these functions of hierarchies alternative to the planning-administrative bureaucracy. The Communist Party sets alternative standards. It sets up scales of priority with respect to the emphasis that different targets of a production plan ought to receive, and it organizes campaigns to reach them. All of the targets, which were handed down by the administrative bureaucracy, are supposed to be met; and provision for their attainment is made. However, difficulties arise, or the needs of the moment change, so that hog production may suddenly seem more important than cattle production. The Communist Party then advertises this change in emphasis. This change in circumstances and the change in policy are instances of the previously emphasized types of flexibility provided by the system.

The Communist Party also exercises checks and control over the performance of members of the administrative hierarchy. It keeps a constant eye on performance at all levels of the decision-making organization, and reports upward any suspected malperformance. In

accordance with one man rule, the local Party secretary may not change any decisions made by the manager or by others in the administrative hierarchy. But it must frequently happen that under Party pressure the manager himself will alter his decisions. The Communist Party is particularly active in encouraging and guiding mass participation. Dual membership of managers in both hierarchies brings them under the direct influence of Party education. The Party regards "political education" of the worker and farmer as one of its most important tasks. This education is directed largely at familiarizing him with the Soviet policy of developing an industrial economy and at acclimating him to the new circumstances which are its result. The worker and peasant are encouraged to participate actively in the various ways necessary for building the Soviet society. Many of these bear on his participation in the economic life of the country in ways other than merely doing his job. Additional evidence of the participation in the economic process by the various hierarchies will appear in the remainder of the discussion.

It is important to note that the existence of complex hierarchies and the influence that they exert on a particular decision environment is not meant to controvert the rule of one man authority and responsibility. The practical conflict between these two policies has received wide notice in the Soviet Union and will bear further examination.

ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION--INDUSTRY

The organization and operation of the productive process by industry in the Soviet Union may conveniently be studied by looking at the functioning of the decision-making hierarchy and the factor market, and their relation to the operation of the enterprise and the formation of decisions by its manager.

The enterprise and its manager occupy the bottom rung of the administrative bureaucracy. This bureaucracy and the other hierarchies work out "plans" which are transmitted to the enterprise by directives coming down through the hierarchies. These directives refer largely to the basic policy requirements of the plans as they concern the particular enterprise. Within the limits of discretion which they set, the manager makes the necessary operational decisions. These decisions must be made within the framework of, and according to the rules and requirements of, the other important organization, that of the market or price system. The ultimate operation of the hierarchy, and of the enterprise in particular, is effected through, and operates according to the rules and requirements of, this market. For some purposes it will be helpful to divide this market into that for non-human factors and that for human factors, i.e. the labor market. Additional insight into the organization of production may also be gained by a brief consideration of the operation of the hierarchy within the enterprise, and by a study of mass participation and its direction by the Communist Party and labor unions.

Bureaucratic Planning

The planning process should be regarded as continuous if it is to be properly understood. In an important sense all economic decisions are "planned": they are anticipated, and their nature and consequences are provided for in the "planned" organization of the economy. This much may be said of the American economy equally as well as of the Soviet economy. It cannot be said that particular members of the society intentionally provided for the organization and operation of the economy

as a drafting engineer does for that of a machine or plant, but there is a rhyme and reason to the operation of the economy which is adequately understood by some members of the society and on which they have had and continue to have significant intentional influence. This influence may be seen clearly in the operation of the bureaucracy, less easily in that of the price system.

Distinctions made frequently within hierarchical planning in the Soviet Union among plans for periods of 15 years or longer, 5 years, 1 year, 1/4 year, a month or a week, the issuance of ad hoc directives, the carrying out of the plans as expressed through all of the decisions made, and the "administration" and control, endogenous and exogenous to the bureaucracy. Of these the formation of five year plans have received the greatest publicity; day to day decisions are in bulk the most important, and the yearly and quarterly plans play the greatest role in planning in the narrow, conventional sense of that word.

"Down, up, down" briefly summarizes the flow of information during the formation of plans. The broad policy decisions are initially made at the top of the hierarchy, presumably in the Council of Ministers or the Presidium. They are passed down through the bureaucracy and through other channels of communication in the form of requests for information. These become narrower but increasingly specific as they go down. This process introduces significant decentralization into the organization of decisions. Each agency is dependent on those immediately below for the information it needs to compile its part of the plan. The agency below is generally motivated to supply that information which will eventually result in a plan which is in accord with its interests. Enterprises, for instance, are tempted to understate their productive capacity and to overstate their need for funds and materials. The glavk, on the other hand, may be anxious to make a high output record, although it, too, does not wish a plan which its enterprises will be unable to fulfill. Contending interests like these may even lead to bargaining between officials on adjacent levels of the bureaucracy.

Once compiled, the information is fed back up through the bureaucracy, being assembled as it goes up. Gosplan is responsible for the final assembly (for 5 year plans and 1 year plans particularly) and revision. Acceptance, rejection and revision on a policy level is, of course, the prerogative of the Council of Ministers of which Gosplan is merely a staff agency. These decisions made, the plans are passed back down the bureaucracy, again becoming increasingly specific as they go. The Council prescribes certain tasks to the ministries, these go to their glavks, and then to the enterprises. As might be expected, shorter term plans are predominantly worked out at the lower levels and longer term plans at higher levels. Planning of production for geographically localized consumption is similarly organized. It should be emphasized again, however, that this schematization of plan formation is highly artificial. A much truer description would be one which bears out the continuity at all times of decision-making at all levels, including the day-to-day relations between officials on different levels.

The structure of the bureaucracy reflects a division according to categories of production and geographical location. The principal operating departments of the Council of Ministers are the ministries, each of which supervises the production of one major group of goods. Republican ministries, of course, combine a production and territorial division. Each glavk also has under its supervision the production of a particular, and smaller, range of goods in a particular territory. The same obviously holds for the enterprise itself, where responsibility is also divided primarily according to particular branches of the enterprise's production. Thus, there are departments and their superintendents, senior shift and/or shop foremen, shops and shifts and their foremen, and, finally, brigades and their brigadiers. The last of these, the brigadier, is already a production worker, who merely takes on some additional supervisory and instructional duties.

The "functional" requirements of the productive process are now primarily taken care of by staff agencies or agents attached to the various operating agencies of the bureaucracy. The nature of these staff agencies corresponds to the varying needs of the particular levels.

The Council of Ministers has such staff agencies as Gosplan, the Board of Weights and Measures, Board of Manpower and Committee on Standards. The Ministries and glavks have divisions of finance, planning, personnel, accounting, etc. Enterprises exhibit such staff sectors as planning, technical, personnel, finances and bookkeeping, technical and quality control, procurement and marketing, and the chief mechanic.

Not all needs, however, can be met adequately by this production-staff arrangement. At various levels of the bureaucracy some auxiliary and semi-independent agencies with bureaucracies of their own may be found. Most notable of these are probably Gosbank and the Ministry of State Control. These, like the TVA in the United States, cannot well be classified under either staff or "line" production organizations. There are similarly related agencies under the supervision of the enterprises, also. These are such organizations as those that handle transport, housing (for workers), nurseries (for worker's children), and subsidiary manufacturing plants.

The plan which the bureaucracy is to bring to fruition may be divided into the materials plan and the financial plan. The materials plan sets out which goods are to be produced and what factors are to be used in their production. It allocates tasks to the various productive units and, particularly with respect to scarce resources, allots them the requisite factors, in terms of physical quantities. The financial plan comprises the budget, the cash plan, and the credit plan.

It has been said that the plans make three sorts of contributions.⁸ They set goals or targets and lend inspiration to the public. The latter is particularly concentration of effort and emphasis. They serve to integrate and coordinate the operation of the economy.

In general, enterprises initiate many proposals; and glavks pass approval or disapproval on some of these. This arrangement introduces more decentralization and flexibility than strict adherence to downward instruction would. The selection of proposals for review again reflects the systematic use of multiple standards, enforced at will.

8 - D. Granick, op. cit., p. 62.

The most important kinds of directives, as they are received by the enterprise from the glavk, may be summarized.⁹ In surveying them particular attention should be paid to the way in which they set out limits of discretion for the period concerned to the manager of the enterprise. 1.) The enterprise receives directives concerning the type, quantity, quality, and assortment of production. In real terms these appear in the materials plan and in money terms in the budget. The selection of goods to be produced is thus made not by the consumer nor by the enterprise, but by higher agencies. 2.) Capital expenditures in real terms are largely beyond the discretion of the enterprise. 3.) The amount of labor to be used, the wages to be paid, the norm of productivity to be attained are specified by categories of production. 4.) Directives specify the maximum cost per unit that is to be permitted or the percentage change, usually reduction, from a base that is to be attained.

5.) Materials are allotted to the enterprise in real and monetary terms. The most scarce materials, those included in the categories "quota" and "funded" are allotted by designating maximum physical amounts of each factor that the enterprise will be permitted to use. This decision is made in a very centralized manner. For a few years the Soviets even maintained a sister agency to Gosplan called Gosnab, which was charged with all materials planning. Allocation of funded factors must be approved at the Council of Ministers level, while quota ones may be allotted by the Ministry. From the point of view of the firm, this comes to much the same thing. Both types of factors must nonetheless be obtained by the firm on and through the market. The allotments merely establish legal maxima. Other factors are allocated decentrally through the market alone. 6.) The limits to the financial freedom of the enterprise are determined, in part, by the initial allotment of fixed and working capital. A variety of less formalized rules affect the enterprise. Among these are advice on use of resources and on technical development. Priorities are set up, campaigns are organized and the like.

9 - Ibid, p. 68.

Another important service of the bureaucracy is fixing prices. Prices for most goods in the Soviet Union, particularly producers goods, are officially set. Prices are determined on various levels of the bureaucracy. Price determination on the part of the bureaucracy may be regarded as another instance of dovetailing centralized, hierarchical decision-making with decentralized, market decision-making. The bureaucratically set prices are used in transactions on the factor market and the consumers goods market. Price-setting on the factor market only is discussed at this point.

Prices must reflect the existing relations between demand for, and supply of, factors in the economy, and must conform to Soviet policy as to what those relations should be or become. In a market system prices act as cues to potential buyers and sellers of alternative factors, who wish to know which alternative they should choose to serve their best interests. To give good cues, prices must reflect real alternatives more or less adequately. If prices are not based on the real demand-supply situation in the economy, the Soviets might as well instruct each potential buyer and seller on exactly what to do and dispense with the market altogether. On the other hand, the Soviets also use the cues to potential buyers and sellers to indicate the direction in which Soviet policy wishes the economy to move. Otherwise, they might as well allow the price-cues to be determined entirely in the market, as is by and large the case in Western economies.

The Soviets have found it very difficult to set prices so as to reflect both existing alternatives and Soviet policy. Until recently, several sets of prices were used in the factor market, each determined in a different way. Prices changed very infrequently even though circumstances in the rapidly developing economy altered continually. Many prices continued to be based on the alternative cost relationships that prevailed in 1926-27. Prices were kept low on factors which are very scarce, but which are thought to be particularly useful in the production of other factors whose production the Soviets want to encourage. Prices of goods which at one time were costly, but which had become relatively cheaper to produce continued to be high. In general, prices reflected

both actual alternatives and Soviet policy inadequately.

1950 saw the beginning of an extensive price reform in the Soviet factor market. The multiple price system was largely abolished. Prices have been brought up to date to reflect current economic conditions. Economic policy implementation through the setting of prices that are greatly out of line with alternative costs has been drastically reduced. Subsidies to favored industries in the form of higher prices, for instance, have been gradually reduced. This method of subsidization had been the subject of increasing criticism in the Soviet theoretical literature. In other words, decentralized market decision making has come to have an increasingly important place in Soviet organization of economic activity. This does not mean, however, that Soviet policy is no longer being implemented in and by the economy. The organization and operation of the factor market are merely other tools for the implementation of Soviet economic policy.

The Factor Market

The Soviet factor market is analogous to the corresponding sector of other economies, such as that of the United States. The practice of issuing instructions to the decision-making agents on the line about some matters of production, and the official establishment of prices, introduce important differences into the organization of the economy. Once directives are issued and prices set, however, the position of the Soviet enterprise in the factor market is much like that of the American firm in its market. The resemblance is particularly close in wartime when hierarchically-made decisions increasingly set the stage for decision-making in both systems.

The Soviet government assumed and maintains the responsibility for the organization and supervision of the operation of the factor market. The government provides the monetary framework and the money for the market's operation. The government sets the bulk of the enterprises up in business. The government is charged with supervising the operation of the informal rules and with issuing and enforcing such special rules as may be necessary. It carries this task out chiefly by manipu-

lating the incentives which affect the enterprise managers and other decision-making agents. I shall discuss these in turn.

The monetary framework of the factor market (and the consumer goods market), as is customary elsewhere, is established and maintained by the government. The government issues and withdraws cash to meet the needs of the economy as stated in the Cash Plan of the Financial Plan. The government maintains the State Bank (Gosbank) with branches throughout the country. Every enterprise has an account with this bank. The great bulk of inter-enterprise transactions are cleared through Gosbank which credits and debits the accounts of the enterprises involved. Additionally, Gosbank extends short-term credit in amounts and for purposes outlined in the Credit Plan of the Financial Plan. The government also maintains a number of "industrial" banks which extend long-term credit for investment purposes, again in accordance with the Credit Plan.¹⁰

State enterprises owe their existence to the government. They carry on almost all of Soviet production. The government establishes an enterprise where and when it sees a need for it. This enterprise is henceforth a juridical person. It is entitled to bring suit in the courts, and it may be sued. It is given "financial independence." The government, through one of its industrial banks, provides the fixed capital in the form of land, buildings, equipment, etc. These are registered in the name of the new enterprise and may not be disposed of by the enterprise. The government also issues a fund of working capital to the enterprise in the form of an account at Gosbank and a supply of cash. The enterprise has access to governmental short-term credit facilities (Gosbank). Both the amount of fixed capital and the permanent amount of working capital may be similarly increased over the years to meet the needs of the enterprise in an expanding economy. Some growth of the enterprise may also occur through the use of retained earnings, although permission therefor¹¹ is supposed to be granted from above.

10 - The implications of cash and credit management for the operation of the economy as a whole will be discussed in the section dealing with the organization of the entire economy.

The enterprise, through its manager, is charged to use its juridical and financial independence in carrying out the directives of the bureaucracy within the structure of incentives and restraints supplied by the market. Other agencies of the bureaucracy, neither higher nor lower, glavki or shops, do not have this degree of independence nor this amount of responsibility. Internally, the enterprise carries out the directives through a bureaucratic organization of production similar to that of the hierarchical system of which the enterprise itself is a part. Externally the firm operates by entering into contractual relationships with other agencies, which may be other enterprises like itself, its own glavk or ministry, the supply or procurement division of other glavki or ministries. These contractual relationships generally cover promises to deliver or accept certain goods, at a particular time and place, and for a specified price. They are legally enforceable, with certain exceptions, in case of breach of contract by either party. The manager of each enterprise has wide powers of discretion in entering into these contracts, and presumably each manager attempts to contract for an appropriate quid pro quo.

Cost Accounting

The operation of the firm, externally and internally, is to be guided by a set of rules. In terms of our analysis, the enterprise is to meet a set of multiple and often conflicting standards. The central standard, at least in theory, is that set up by khozraschet, or cost accounting. The principal difference between the external and the internal effects of the cost accounting rule is that the responsibility for internal operation (with respect to standards set by that rule) remains almost exclusively within the firm and may be dealt with by the manager through his internal bureaucracy. External operation becomes a matter of public concern involving various independent agencies. From the point of view of the enterprise manager, khozraschet is a necessity externally and a convenience internally. Nonetheless, internal cost accounting has received much emphasis in recent years. Here I shall

deal primarily with the operations of the enterprise as they affect its relations with other enterprises and with its superiors. We shall deal first with the standards set by the market, and with the incentives bearing on the manager to meet these standards, then with other standards confronting the manager, finally with the overall relations of the enterprise.

The primary rules of *khozraschet* are: minimize cost and maximize unplanned profit. Both of these rules are to be followed while meeting-or exceeding planned output and selling it at established prices. Managers must guide the operations of their enterprises in accordance with these rules. The sense in which they "must" do so will be considered later. At this point I wish to consider some of the decisions that this might involve for the manager and how the bureaucracy manages to influence the decisions by altering the circumstances under which the manager must operate and apply the rules.

The operating decisions of the enterprise manager are not unlike those that the manager of an American firm must make. As we have seen, the enterprise is supplied with a stock of fixed and working capital. In most cases, of course, the supply comes from the previous year's operations. New or enlarged enterprises receive all or part of the capital, respectively, from the State. The enterprise is also given certain credit privileges at Gosbank. These are designed principally to finance inventories and seasonally heavy loads. With this capital the enterprise is charged to carry out the directives of its *glavk*. These directives order the manager to produce a minimum quantity of a more or less specified line of goods (including factors). The manager may find that he is allotted maxima in the use of some factors.

Within these limits, and sometimes others, the manager must, or may, make the operating decisions necessary. He will purchase factors by entering into contracts with available suppliers. He will combine these factors in production. He will sell the products, sometimes as directed, sometimes as he chooses. All of these operations require countless decisions that the manager must make himself or delegate to his subordinates. They are not made for him by Gosplan, the ministry, the *glavk*, the Communist Party, or anybody else.

Khozraschet requires that he maximize unplanned profit and minimize costs. Other standards, to be discussed below, may counsel him to do otherwise. The instructions with respect to costs and profits generally call for the same operating decisions, given that a minimum output is also specified. But in cases where production exceeds the minimum, the cost standard becomes subsidiary; and where profits are negative, the profit standard becomes inoperative. Reliance then falls on the other standard. The principal financial evaluation of performance is institutionally tied to the profit standard. This may be seen by looking at the composition of the payment for output.

The composition of the price or revenue received by the enterprise for its sales is suggestive of the considerations that influence operating decisions. The price or revenue received may be divided into the following parts: (1) costs of production, including cost of materials, wages and salaries, depreciation, interest on short term credit; (2) turnover tax, calculated as a percentage of price or as a specified payment per unit produced; (3) planned profits and unplanned profits, both destined for the profits tax, retention, and Director's fund; (4) social insurance deduction, varying from 3.7 per cent to 10.7 per cent of the payroll.

In most cases the cost minimization rule and the profit maximization rule come to the same thing. The size of several of the components of price or revenue, notably, taxes, is fixed outside the enterprise. The remaining components resolve themselves largely into costs and profits, which when added equal revenue (minus unchangeable deductions -- taxes). The discretion of the manager therefore rests on varying revenue, cost, and profit. Minimum output, however, sets a floor under revenue and thus practically limits the manager's discretion to the adjustment of cost and profit. As will be seen immediately below, the rule that profits in excess of planned profits (unplanned profits) are to be maximized also forces the manager to concentrate on costs even when he is not faced with any floor to revenue, or when the floor is ineffective because output is in excess of the minimum. In short, the profit maximization rule generally calls for minimizing costs.

The manager can, however, lower his costs in a large variety of ways. He can reduce his use of expensive materials, improve labor productivity, lower administrative costs, reduce expenditures on interest, etc. Not all of these means of reducing costs need be socially desirable. Some cost reductions to enterprise A may involve nothing but a shift of this cost to enterprise B or to the consumer. It may even involve a larger cost to B than was saved by A, thus increasing costs to the community at large. The Soviets are fully aware of this possibility and have tried to prevent this kind of cost "reduction." A significant share of Soviet difficulties in the organization of production arise in connection with attempts to remedy poor organization in this area.

Two notable cost reductions to a particular enterprise, which Soviets do not consider cost reductions to the economy as a whole, involve quality deterioration and production of relatively higher priced goods. The manager may reduce his overall costs by using less, or less expensive, materials and by producing goods of inferior quality. This is clearly not a cost reduction to the economy. If goods of high and low quality sell at the same prices, the cost is merely passed on to the buyer in a hidden form. Again, the manager may also so adjust his product mix as to produce relatively more goods bearing a high officially set price than those having a lower price. If in either event the manager can sell his entire output anyway, he obviously stands to gain by the use of both of these methods. It will be recalled that a sellers' market generally prevails in the Soviet Union. Therefore, this procedure has usually been open to the manager.

Until recently Soviet attempts to remedy this and similar situations have turned largely on narrowing the manager's limits of discretion. The Soviets have attempted the difficult job of quantifying quality standards and adding these to the quantity standards already contained in the directives to the enterprise. Similarly, the Soviets tried reducing the manager's discretion with respect to the product mix he could produce. Both of these attempts at remedy increased the specificity of directives and involved increased centralization of decision-making. They have not met with great success.

For the foregoing reasons, among others, the Soviets have not placed exclusive reliance on the cost reduction standard. Profit maximization has received independent attention as a standard of performance. Soviet manipulation of the manager's incentives has been tied largely to his profit position.

The Soviets have tried to sharpen the impact of the profit maximization standard on the manager by varying the relations between the components of revenue. The sale price is set officially and relatively centrally. The first claim on the revenue of the enterprise falls to the turnover tax. Claim to the remainder of the enterprise's revenue is shared in the following way by costs, the profits tax, and profits remaining with the enterprise (I shall omit social insurance for the sake of simplicity). A level of "planned" profits is specified for the enterprise by the glavk, taking into account expected revenue, expected costs, and taxes. Almost all of these profits are consumed by the profits tax, which is formally paid by the glavk but is apportioned by it among its enterprises. Profit maximization refers, then, to maximization of the ratio of profits in excess of this planned level (unplanned profits) to planned profits or total profits. Only about one half of the unplanned profits are withdrawn by the profits tax. The other half remains with the enterprise and is shared by retained profits and the Director's Fund. Both taxes, but particularly the profits tax, reduce the size of the base on which the amount of profits remaining with the enterprise is calculated and therefore increase the percentage of these profits on that base. By thus raising the percentage increase of profits remaining with the enterprise that is due to any cost reduction, the Soviets appear to have sharpened the impact of a cost reduction on the incentives of the manager. At the same time, they have increased the sensitivity of the profit maximization standard.¹¹ The equality of effectiveness of the profit standard between firms having different costs is maintained by merely making the levels of their planned profits similarly marginal.

The emphasis placed on the maximization of unplanned profits also effectively prohibits the reduction of cost by merely reducing

11 - This argument was suggested by Holzman, op. cit.

output. This procedure might increase revenue and profit if the enterprise faces an inelastic demand curve. It could not increase the ratio of unplanned profits to planned or total profits regardless of the elasticity of the demand curve.

The profit maximization standard has always provided little or no incentive to enterprises which were able to make little or no profit either because of their own cost position in their industry or because of a price for the product of the entire industry which was kept low in order to encourage the use of that product by other industries. For these enterprises the main reliance has been placed on the cost minimization standard. Since the Second World War the impact on these enterprises of the profit maximization standard has been increased. The percentage of profits taxed and left with the enterprise is now varied within a range set by the performance that can reasonably be expected of particular enterprises. Indeed, different ranges apply to different *glavks*, and the *glavks* are permitted in turn to vary the percentages among their enterprises. Since 1949 the turnover tax on producers has been largely abolished. Reliance on the profits tax has been increased. The profits tax absorbs a minimum of 10 per cent from all enterprises, even those for whom a smaller contribution to the budget than receipt from the budget is scheduled. This is to maintain budgetary control over all enterprises. The maximum rate of the profits tax was changed to 81 per cent. Of the remaining profits 2 per cent to 10 per cent of planned profits and 25 per cent to 75 per cent of unplanned profits are destined for the Director's Fund.¹² These changes are designed to increase the incentive effects of the profits standard for low and no profit producers and to cease penalizing them for circumstances beyond their control.

The opportunity to add funds to the Director's Fund is frequently regarded as the mainstay of the incentive system which induces the

12 - The rates have more recently been revised again, but I do not yet have the figures. New provisions have also been added to the law requiring enterprises to meet more precise standards of output and product mix before the Director's fund provisions go into effect.

manager to follow the financial rules of the khozraschet game. Until now the explanation of the manager's conduct of his business has been limited to references to the directives he receives and the rules that he is asked to follow. Additional light may be thrown on the nature of the organization of the factor market by investigating some of the incentives which induce the manager to follow directives and rules. One, but by no means the only one, of these may be found in the Director's Fund arrangement. As we have seen, this fund is built up primarily from allocations from untaxed unplanned profits. The Director's Fund is a depository of money which the manager may use for the benefit of the enterprise and its employees. According to law a minimum of 50 per cent of the Fund is to be spent on housing for employees. The remainder may be used for financing bonuses and vacations for workers and management and other uses designed to improve the efficiency and thereby the profitability of the enterprise. Additions to this fund and/or growth of its size, which are related to the profitability of the enterprise, presumably raise the workers' regard for the manager and generally raise the status of the manager in the community. The manager's personal welfare is thus tied directly to the profitability of his enterprise.

Other Standards

Many additional standards serve to guide and evaluate the performance of the enterprise at any given time. Most of these standards refer to the production of the enterprise just as do the bureaucratic directives and khozraschet. The fact that the Soviets place great reliance on these additional standards emphasizes the insufficiency of the directives and the rules of khozraschet for the organization of the factor market. These standards probably play a much larger role in organizing the factor market than the space that I devote to them would suggest.

The other standards may be discussed under the rubrics of campaigns, priorities, and socialist competition. It should be emphasized again that the directives received by the enterprise are not by any means limited to those included in the yearly and quarterly plans.

Glavks and even ministries issue directives every day of the year, and a particular firm may receive several "ad hoc" directives on any one day. These "non-plan" directives range in subject matter from the most important policy questions to the most insignificant details. The manager is subjected to continual written and oral communications from the bureaucracies about all manner of issues, notwithstanding his independence and authority.

From time to time the Soviets announce more or less well defined orders of priority to guide subsequent production decisions. These priorities are superimposed on such priorities as are already implicit in the directives under the then current yearly or quarterly plan. They are generally less well defined, and are only inadequately able to take account of the requisites for the financial success and the previously made contractual commitments of individual enterprises. Nonetheless, the enterprises "must" be guided by these priorities as they are guided by directives, *khozraschet*, and the obligation to fulfill contracts.

Similarly, campaigns are occasionally organized. These campaigns aim to encourage enterprises and their members to meet certain new standards of production or better to meet old ones. Frequently, the campaigns refer to a functional issue, such as methods of accounting or personnel relations, rather than to a production standard. Functional questions affect all or most of the units in the economy, or at least in a particular ministry, in the same way. The bureaucracy is, however, not organized along functional lines. Therefore, it seems more efficient to communicate the top level wishes about functional matters to all operating units directly through a campaign rather than down through each branch of the bureaucracy. Since these "directives" are not channeled through the bureaucracy, they appear to carry less weight. The Communist Party usually offers its hierarchy for the organization of campaigns. The influence of the Party lends considerable weight to the campaigns. Frequently, the bureaucracy announces special awards, or bonuses, eligibility for which is tied to cooperation in the campaigns.

Socialist competition is another means used to organize

production in the factor market. Again, often under the auspices of the Communist Party, or, sometimes, of the labor union, rivalry is organized between different productive units in similar circumstances. These units may be shops, departments, enterprises, or groups of enterprises. Socialist competition is often tied in with either a plan or a campaign. The press is instrumental in disseminating standards and performances under all of these headings. Both the general press, and the organs of the various industries or other associations of common concern, devote a large proportion of the space in their pages to production in accordance with the various standards.

A great many incentives influence the manager and other agents to meet the various standards as best they can. I have already discussed the role of the Director's Fund in this connection. The pay of the manager and his immediate subordinates is closely tied to the performance of the enterprise by the use of bonuses and pay in kind. In 1947 the average percentages of base pay paid in bonuses ranged from 21 per cent in the food industry to 51 per cent in ferrous metals.¹³ The bonuses of many individuals frequently account for a larger proportion of income than does the base pay. Bonuses are progressively tied to indices of plan fulfillment and overfulfillment, cost reduction, profitability, etc.¹⁴ Managers and others are similarly rewarded for performance through pay in kind of goods and services which are difficult to obtain on the market. The chief of these is improved housing. Increases of pay in kind are tied mostly to the manager's movement upward on the industrial ladder, such as that from a smaller enterprise to a bigger one or to a *glavk*. Managers are appointed to their jobs by the ministries and are selected on the basis of political and economic merit. But, as will be seen, this upward mobility is tied to performance within a particular job. A counterpart of mobility is an extremely high turnover of individuals in the various bureaucratic

13 - J. Berliner, op.cit., p. 80

14 - Berliner regards plan fulfillment and the associated bonuses as by far the single most important standard and incentive in the organization of enterprise activity.

positions. Consequently, incentives tend to influence managers and others only over a short time span. Managers are motivated, for instance, to sacrifice the future life of equipment to current plan fulfillment: two years later the managers may have a different job anyway.

The manager's status is tied in various ways to his performance in the industrial arena. Poor performance may bring punishment in the form of reprimands, fines, movement to a position lower on the ladder of success, removal from positions of responsibility, criminal prosecution and sentence, expulsion from the Communist Party, and general public disapproval in the wider community, as expressed through the press, and in the local community, as expressed in personal relations. Good performance, on the other hand, is similarly rewarded. In addition to increased financial compensation through bonuses, the manager and others may receive various prizes ranging from "Hero of Socialist Labor" to the Stalin Prize. These prizes carry financial stipends, many privileges such as certain tax exemptions, and of course, honor in the community. Good performance occasions promotion up the ladder and increased power. It improves prestige and admiration in the community within the plant, the local area or industry, and regionally or nationally.¹⁵

The ever-present possibility of review which may lead to approval or disapproval helps to keep all the foregoing in the mind of the decision-making agents on all levels. The agencies of review will be discussed below.

Patriotism and ideologies of various kinds also appear to provide major incentives. The Communist Party is instrumental in instilling ideological incentives into decision-making agents on all levels, and it appears to have been successful therein.

¹⁵ - Of course performance may count differently in various communities, such as his "industrial" community and his "local civic community." In that case, and it is a frequent one, the manager is torn between multiple standards.

The many influences to which the manager and other decision makers are subject might be summarized under high goals, multiple standards, and the sellers' market. The directives received by the managers almost uniformly call for achievement of goals which are very difficult to attain. Standards in general are many and often conflicting. A single bureaucracy often sets up standards for its lower agents which are incompatible with each other. The presence of many bureaucracies, and the existence of other interests such as those of the civic community in which the members of the enterprise must live, only increase the multiplicity of standards. Insert these influences on the manager into a framework of a market, in which demand and supply at the given price are invariably unequal, and the resulting conflicts subject the manager to continual pressure.

The many conflicting influences may, for the purposes of discussion, be drawn together into an opposition between the two major needs of industrial activity in the enterprise: production and survival of the organization.¹⁶ One might say that "production" represents primarily a public end, although as we have seen it is also internalized by the enterprise and its manager. "Survival of the organization" suggests primarily a set of private, enterprise-wide, ends; although, of course, its existence has nationwide effects that are necessary to the operation of the economy. Managers and their enterprises may be said to be acting as though they were concerned with insuring their own survival, increasing their own "empires" and augmenting their autonomy in them. On the other hand, the strains of the system of multiple standards induce many officials to "let sleeping dogs lie" and to live as peacefully as possible. These frequently incompatible policies and methods of survival deserve more detailed

16 - This dichotomy is suggested and developed by Peter Drucker in The Concept of the Corporation, a study based on the General Motors Corporation. The similarity between organization of economic decision-making within General Motors and in the Soviet economy is striking and instructive.

attention.¹⁷ Transactions made at prices other than the official ones are made in violation of the law. As might be expected in such a market, capital is perennially in short supply. Enterprises receive a supply of fixed and working capital from the state. However, many enterprises find the state budget very stingy in supplying additional capital over time. The credit supply is often limited to use for specified purposes. One of these purposes is the financing of goods in transit; a necessary job for which the supply of owned working capital is (apparently purposely) inadequate. Anticipations with respect to future output and future supplies are frequently found to be mistaken. Yet it is difficult for a poor economy undergoing rapid development to insure itself against eventualities by accumulating stock-piles of materials.

Each of many enterprises has resorted to a variety of practices in an attempt to reduce the rigors of market behavior for itself and still to meet such standards as it can. Many firms find their planned allocations inadequate for the requirements which multiple standards impose on them. "Rather than face this long drawn-out process every time a shortage of some material threatens production, the firm often prefers to turn to the well-established informal procurement system, one of the major elements of which is blat."¹⁸ "Blat" is the use of personal influence to obtain various favors. Blat is so widespread and necessary for the operation of the procurement system that many enterprises maintain a full time or part time specialist in blat called a tolkach or pusher. He represents the interests of one or more enterprises and expedites procurement for them by using his influence with potential suppliers. Some tolkachi specialize in particular lines of merchandise; others under-

17 - Berliner has distinguished three "principles of management" which summarize what I term the "means for survival": providing for a safety factor, simulation or feigning the meeting of standards, and blat or the use of personal influence to obtain materials and favors. He devotes over a hundred pages to the discussion of each of these.

18 - J. Berhner, op. cit., p. 454.

take to procure anything at a price. The role of the tolkach in a sellers market may be likened to the function of the salesman in a buyers market. Both improve the allocation of goods at the margin. The reduction in the exchange of goods which their absence would create may be small from the point of view of the economy as a whole, but would be critical to individual enterprises and firms.¹⁹ Informal relations with agents higher in a hierarchy than oneself, with agents elsewhere on the same level, and with agents in other hierarchies, have become highly important. Press criticism of these "family relations" is frequent. Many enterprises make determined and successful efforts to increase their supply of capital (or to maintain it when the legitimate provisions are not adequate even for that). Stockpiling for unforeseen eventualities, particularly of poorly allocated auxiliary materials, is widespread.

These activities are in turn made possible by others. Breach of contract is widespread. Often the requirements of new directives or new campaigns or priorities make impossible the fulfillment of contracts already signed. At other times, new opportunities, if they are to be used advantageously, require a change in plans at the expense of some suppliers or clients. Debts to suppliers sometimes reach staggering amounts. Many firms, paradoxically, become insolvent in order to maintain their existence. Insolvency introduces greater bank control into the management of the enterprise. Gosbank is permitted to attach funds and transfer them to creditors without the approval of insolvent enterprises. Nonetheless, managers are frequently willing to exchange this loss of autonomy for the gain in freedom to operate which comes from that use of funds in the procurement, for instance, of materials; since "In the reality of Soviet plant management a ton in the warehouse is worth ten tons on paper."²⁰

19 - Scattered comments on tolkachi suggest that the personality types also that are attracted to this profession are similar to those that enter sales work in the West. However, most uses of blat are illegal while selling is not.

20 - Berliner, op. cit., p. 247.

These uses are likely to be stockpiling, maintenance and repair, construction, services to workers, etc. Another source of funds for the manager's expenditure is profits. As was noted earlier, retained profits are designed to be ploughed back into the enterprise. A minimum of 50 per cent of the Director's Fund is according to law to be used for the provision of housing for workers. Yet in five ministries in 1936 only 3.7 per cent of profits were spent on housing while 50 per cent were used for production.²¹

All of the activities discussed in the previous paragraphs involve greater or lesser degrees of illegality. Yet they are by and large sanctioned. They considerably increase the range of discretion available to the manager. They provide for increased decentralization of decision-making and the additional flexibility that goes with this decentralization. This formally illegal system of decentralized decision-making is not, however, free from any direction from the center.

The decentralized decisions made in furtherance of organizational survival and those made to promote production are centrally controlled, or "planned" by a variety of institutions. The checks and controls internal to the bureaucracy account for part, but only a part, of the more centralized direction of economic activity. Other decisions are open to review via the accountant's responsibility to the *glavk*, through the Ministry of State Control, Gosbank, the Communist Party, labor unions, and public criticism or approval. The Ministry of State Control maintains its own agents in the field to report to the Council of Ministers on performance in any and all of the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Gosbank is enabled to maintain checks on performance in the enterprises because the enterprises are forced to maintain their accounts with Gosbank and because they are dependent on it for short term credit.

The guiding and controlling operations of the Communist Party are far-flung. Dual membership of managers and others in the Party and the bureaucracy gives the Party personal influence

21 - D. Granick, op. cit., p. 170.

in policy formation at lower levels of decision-making similar to that which it exercises at the higher levels. Party rewards and penalties are added to, and frequently are more important than, the regular bureaucratic rewards and penalties. Party channels of communication are kept open for criticism of malperformance both by party members and by non-members. Labor Union participation in the decision-making process is significant. It will be discussed in a later section.

General public criticism and approval utilizes the foregoing channels, and others as well. Probably the most important of these is the press. Publicity in the press is a widely used medium to reach both the public at large and agents of influence on higher levels of the bureaucracy and in other hierarchies. Criticism of superiors is frequently made in letters to the editor. Some of these criticisms are investigated by the paper's reporters.²² If they are found to be valid, they are publicized; and this comes to the attention of people in positions of control as well as to that of the public at large. The channels of communication of the Communist Party are also available for use in this way.

The agents of direction, supervision, and control have many ways available to them to exercise these functions. Many of these ways are implicit in the previous discussions. I shall single out for special attention those which are concerned with the "illegal" conduct discussed previously. Probably the most important thing to be said on this score is that the use of these techniques, although formally illegal, is an everyday affair in many quarters and that it is sanctioned and even applauded on many sides. Many standards exist at any one time on the basis of which to judge the

22 - Would-be critics have to calculate whether their criticism is likely to be taken up by the press, for if the press does not make the issue its own the critic is left exposed to the wrath of his superior.

performance and conduct of a manager.²³ It is universally recognized that the manager must violate some of these if he is to satisfy others. He will be judged on his "overall" performance. The following example, one of many possible ones, may serve to illustrate the situation:

Over many years, the Magnitogorsk Stalin Firm had violated its financial plan and the State laws. It had accumulated huge debts to suppliers because its funds were tied up in illegal capital construction and in supplying consumers' goods to its workers. It had given nonexistent items as 'security' for loans from the State Bank. Yet, although these conditions were exposed in a national magazine, the firm's director was still retained at his post, and in less than two years was given the second highest job in all Heavy Industry. The reason was clear: on the whole, his management had been successful.²⁴

Illegal conduct, then, is officially sanctioned when it is instrumental in improving performance. Sometimes it is overlooked due to collusion between two or more agents, each of whom is legally liable for some reason. Additionally, the motivation of the would-be controlling agent to interfere is frequently dampened because his financial and status interests are tied to the overall performance of the organization he is to control. Both the accountant and the glavk, for instance, stand to lose from underfulfillment of the enterprise plan. This should not be taken to mean that Soviet standards of public morality are low. Rather, it should be understood that formally illegal conduct helps to meet important economic needs and is consequently socially legitimized.

23 - A writer on Soviet law writes in discussing a case, "The case suggests that it is not always possible for a state manager to know which of the various orders from agencies purporting to have planning authority are binding upon him, unless he is skilled in the hierarchy of planning orders. The case suggests further, however, that he has a remedy when he is faced with a conflict and he does not know what to do. He can take his problem to the State Arbitration System in the form of a dispute with a party with which he has a contract and obtain a decision which will protect him." J.N. Hazard; Law and Social Change in the USSR; Tornot, the Carswell Co. Ltd., 1953; p. 55.

24 - Reported in D. Granick, op.cit., pp. 151-152.

The key to the operation of this system is selective prosecution followed by self criticism. The agents in authority in the various hierarchies and among the wider public allow most "illegal" but "legitimate" conduct to pass. Only occasional infractions of the law, including failures to meet standards many of which have the force of law, are enforced. However, the community enjoys the opportunity to convert potential authority into real authority at any time, and the agent is aware of the ever present threat of review and enforcement. For the fact remains that at any one time managers usually are guilty of several infractions of the law and many failures to meet standards. The manager is subject to many standards, such as plan overfulfillment, financial success, maintenance of enterprise autonomy, keeping within the limits prescribed by law. His job is to evaluate the costs and benefits to himself and to the enterprise of engaging in each of the many operations which each of these standards call for. He must predict which of the several standards are most important at that time, and which are most likely to be invoked for evaluation by his superiors (and subordinates). If he subsequently finds that he chose to sacrifice the wrong standards and/or engaged in the wrong kinds of illegal conduct, he is then expected to engage in self criticism of his management of the enterprise and to confess his errors. The manager had been guilty of failure to meet the standards set for him, including those of remaining within the law. John Hazard writes in a similar vein in commenting on a typical legal case:²⁵

25 - He reports the case as follows: "A contract had been executed to excavate 16,000 cu. meters of earth at a rate of 1 ruble 74 kopecs per cubic meter. Work began and after one month specialists representing both parties surveyed the excavation and reached the conclusion that a mistake had been made as to the quality of the soil, as the result of which the rate per cubic meter was too low. Yet, no amendment was made to the contract, and the work continued for another month. Then, in the dead of night, the excavating corporation moved its excavators from the spot and stopped work. The builders thereafter proceeded to complete the excavation by hiring manual labor, but no complaint was made until the work was complete, and then suit was brought. Damages to

"The facts suggest that the managers of the two corporations felt remarkably free to make their own decisions in matters of great concern involving thousands of rubles of expense. While they were disciplined for their actions it may be presumed that they acted as they did because the general temper of the community at that time permitted such action."

This use of multiplicity of standards introduces at one time decentralization and centralization, flexibility and authority into the Soviet decision-making process. Managers are permitted a wide range of discretion in making their operating decisions, including even breach of law and contract. They can make relatively quick and fine adjustments in their operations to meet the needs of the moment. Higher levels of authority in the hierarchies are enabled easily to make their ever changing wishes felt by adding new

the amount of 83,271 rubles were claimed on the ground that this represented the excess cost of manual labor over mechanical excavation, to complete the work.

The excavating corporation argued in its defense that it had been forced to stop work because the soil had become so wet that its excavators and lorries had sunk into ponds. Evidence was introduced by the builders that four days after the withdrawal of the excavating corporation they had put experts into the excavation who surveyed the soil and found that it was very heavy sandstone clay filled with medium sized boulders. This commission of experts had been put to work without any notice to the excavating corporation.

The tribunal's decisions must have surprised both parties. The arbitrator declared that the excavating corporation and the building corporation had both been at fault, and so seriously at fault that their action was criminal. The prosecutor was informed of the facts to determine whether prosecution should follow. The arbitrator was incensed that the excavating corporation had stopped work without notice to the other party, and that the building corporation had remained passive and spent 83,000 rubles of State funds on costly manual labor without trying to make the excavating corporation return to the job. No damages were awarded because the decision to employ manual labor had been taken by the building corporation on its own initiative and without trying to have the work completed by the other party." J.N. Hazard. Law and Social Change in the USSR. Toronto: The Carswell Co., Ltd. 1953. Pp. 58-59.

standards or shifting the emphasis among existing ones.²⁶ This very alteration of standards, of course, introduces into the system a much greater need to make adjustments at lower levels than if managers had only to adjust to acts of God and the vagaries of the market.

The system also provides for a high degree of authority. Higher level agents in the hierarchies are enabled to set standards. The system provides for the enforcement of the standards precisely because the enforcement is selective. Subordinates are always subject to criticism because they are always in the wrong someplace. Superiors are relatively protected from criticism because it is difficult, with imprecise standards, to pin them down. Subordinates can be expected to engage in self criticism and confession of error when indeed they have been in error.²⁷

Two major avenues for the improvement of the operation of the factor market appear to present themselves. The Soviets have tried both to some extent. One way is to increase further the number of standards more compatible with each other. The first seems to reduce the range of discretion of the manager still further. The latter appears to augment the manager's discretion. As will be pointed out below, this is not necessarily the case. In the following paragraphs I shall briefly deal with the method of increasing the specificity of standards. The other alternative, increase in compatibility among standards, will come under dis-

26 - The imprecision of the existence of multiple standards helps protect high and intermediary agents from possible future changes in the climate of opinion; only the last responsible agent on any hierarchy bears the full brunt of mistakes all up along the hierarchy because he is held responsible regardless of the imprecision of standards.

27 - Of course, it is understood by everyone that the guilty party would have been in some error regardless of what he did since he must work in a world where he cannot satisfy all standards at once and a world in which results, not intentions, are used as criteria of judgment.

cussion in the section on the operation of the economy as a whole. It will be seen that a major instrument in increasing compatibility among standards is to make prices reflect real alternatives more adequately.

In some instances the Soviets have tried to improve the operation of the factor market by increasing the specificity of instructions to lower levels of the hierarchies. We have seen how they have relied on this method in their attempt to improve the quality and mix of production, for instance. However, particularly since 1950, they have reduced their reliance on additional directives. They appear to realize that increased specificity of standards actually increases the range of discretion of the manager, instead of decreasing it. Increased specificity of standards, instead of determining the manager's decisions more precisely, overdetermines them and forces him to make even more decisions on his own. The more precisely defined the prescriptions are, the greater becomes the manager's ability to find loopholes which permit him to avoid them. If the prescriptions are mutually incompatible besides, the manager is forced into (additional) illegal conduct. Fewer, more general standards avoid this situation.²⁸

Sanctioned illegality and informality, then, is a necessary counterpart of the system of multiple standards. Moreover, some sanctioned illegality obviates the need to multiply standards still further, and thus to induce additional illegality while only un-

28 - This situation is dramatically illustrated in the State of California. Its constitution, the bulkiest in the United States, attempts to prescribe so many things so precisely that the result is the opposite of that intended: people are more easily able to get around the rules by minutely changing the circumstances so as not to come within the narrowly defined limits of the rules. Failing this resourcefulness among the people, administration in the State might break down altogether.

necessarily complicating the administrative process. The only alternative would be to abandon the system altogether. This would sacrifice the benefits in terms of flexibility and authority which the arrangement does offer.

Some remarks made by Berliner in concluding his own study may serve well here, also. "That the Soviet enterprise has achieved a relatively high productivity of labor only points up the question of how this is possible when enterprises follow such principles as the safety factor, simulation and blat, and, indeed, when they are supported in these activities by some of the highest agencies of the state which are charged with controlling them. The answer is that, while it is difficult to measure the extent to which these practices affect efficiency there are reasons for believing that many of the practices contribute toward greater efficiency rather than less."²⁹ "The existence of the safety factor.....introduces an element of elasticity....."³⁰ "When simulation takes the form of manipulation of accounting categories there are benefits to the economy in the form of great flexibility in enterprise activity."³¹ "In the case of the phenomena associated with blat the positive benefits of the economy accrue from the fact that resources are put into production which otherwise may have lain idle."³²

²⁹ - J. Berliner, op. cit., p. 749.

³⁰ - Ibid., p. 750.

³¹ - Ibid., pp. 753-4.

³² - Ibid., p. 761.

THE LABOR MARKET 'A'-lm

By the term 'labor market' I mean that system which organizes, in whatever way, the use of labor in the productive process outside of agriculture. I shall devote major attention to industry, although, of course, labor is also used by trade, the professions, administration and other service occupations. Agricultural labor will be discussed in the section on agriculture. The labor market, like the factor market, also displays a mixture of incentives, directives, administrative controls, and legal sanctions, many of which impinge on any one agent. These 'organize' the use of labor. The labor market, however, appears to place somewhat less reliance on multiple incompatible standards than does the factor market. Initially it would seem that greater reliance is placed on statutory law and its accompanying legal sanctions. However, a closer inspection suggests that, particularly in recent years, the law is honored largely in the breach in the labor market also.

The operation of the labor market may be conveniently discussed in terms of the following functions which it organizes: recruitment of laborers into the nonagricultural working force, the allocation of labor among the various occupations, the encouragement of effort by workers, and promotion and maintenance of labor discipline. Some other matters which are frequently discussed in connection with labor will here be treated in the immediately following section on Mass Participation.

Recruitment

Mass recruitment of labor into the industrial labor force became necessary with the rapid expansion since 1870 of industrial areas such as the Donbas. The recruitment problem became critical with the advent of the five year plans. Until recently the peasantry was the only source of new labor for industry. The spotty industrial development of the pre-plan period permitted the attraction of labor from large areas. Thus, the growing industrial population of the Donbas and Kharkov, for instance, came primarily from Russian rather than Ukrainian areas. The increased competition of other expanding industrial areas forced

each industrial area to look closer to home for additional labor supplies before going far abroad for them. At the same time the previously widespread arrangement which permitted peasants to engage in seasonal industrial work failed any longer to meet the needs of a budding industrial economy. In the 1930's Industry, with the aid and encouragement of the State, began serious recruitment of labor and then sought to transform the erstwhile members of the peasantry into a permanent industrial labor force.

The circumstances and incentives which induced peasants to move to the cities in the thirties were numerous. Although the importance of some of them undoubtedly declined over the years, they were probably again operative in the recently acquired western areas during the postwar years. The degree of influence on the peasant of any of these can not well be judged. The incentives and circumstances can only be briefly mentioned.

One important factor was the impact of the thorough Soviet propaganda in favor of city life and of an urban-socialized society, particularly on the young. Also, the new circumstances of peasant life which collectivization brought about must have induced many peasants to leave the land. The opportunity to escape from ways which they consider old fashioned must have appeal for the young. Some may be attracted by the free education which is available to those who leave the land. Higher income and/or a higher level of living in the city undoubtedly offer important inducements to peasants to urbanize.³³ Military service undoubtedly acquainted many peasants with other ways

33 - I am not prepared to assert that urban income or standard of living exceeds the rural one, but some figures would seem to imply this. For instance, U.N.R.R.A. found that in 1945 the urban per capita consumption of oils and fats in the Ukraine exceeded that of rural consumption by 5.14:3.86 and that for animal fat the excess was still greater. (U.N.R.R.A. European Regional Office; Economic Rehabilitation in the Ukraine; London, 1947, pp. 27-28). Similarly, we know that prices of industrial consumers goods are typically higher in rural areas than in urban ones. In any case, what is significant in this context is that the peasant may regard urban incomes as higher, if only due to a money illusion.

and thus facilitated their urbanization after discharge.

The national economy, as the non-agricultural sector of the economy is now called, also organized these and other incentives into a system of recruitment. During the thirties individual enterprises sent out labor solicitors who made contracts with kolkhozes and with kolkhozniks for the transfer of peasants to the employ of the enterprise. Kolkhozes were granted favors in procurement of industrial commodities and capital equipment to induce them to part with some of their labor supply. Quotas were set for kolkhozes stating a minimum amount of labor which they had to release. These quotas did not necessarily put any pressure on particular individuals since they could be filled by volunteers.

The year 1940 saw the beginning of the recruitment system known as the state labor reserves. This system now provides for a two year enrollment into trade schools of boys 14-17 and girls 15-16 years of age. Six month on-the-job training schools also enroll people to the age of 19. Many people volunteer for positions in these schools; others are drafted. Students are trained at state expense and are obliged to work for at least two years at the job in which they are placed upon graduation. The state labor reserves system is obviously an attempt to fashion a more skilled labor force in a more organized manner than heretofore.

Some recent developments in the recruitment picture may deserve mention. The war occasioned the enlistment of still greater numbers of women into the labor force than the already previously high proportion. Many of these remained in industrial work after the war. Many peasants who had left the land for the army probably did not return there after the war but settled in the cities. The Fourth Five Year Plan which called for a large percentage growth of the industrial labor force was quickly overfulfilled. By 1950 movement from the land to the cities came to be discouraged through restrictions on the issuance of necessary passports. The Fifth Five Year Plan, like the ill fated third plan, called for a reduced rate of growth of the industrial labor force. At the same time, the percentage of people attending grades 8

through 10 is to be increased by 4 times in the cities and 4.5 times in the rural areas, thus reducing the potential labor supply for a few years. Moreover, the percentage of new industrial labor which comes from the land has fallen. New sources of labor have become available in the cities themselves. One may speculate that the severe shortage of urban housing and associated urban services is now inducing the Soviets to restrain their recruitment of additional population for the cities and to substitute the use of already resident labor and of more laborsaving machinery for investment in urban population.³⁴

Allocation

The allocation of labor among the various non-agricultural lines of employment is also affected by a complex, and not easily identifiable, mechanism.³⁵ Ministerial directives to managers and managerial directives to workers, universal laws which govern the disposition of particular positions all, again, working within the framework of a 'free' market, serve to allocate labor among jobs. Until 1940, at any rate, the Soviets placed greater reliance on the use of a market for the allocation of labor than for any other task except the distribution of consumers goods.³⁶ The imposition and subsequent use of the edicts of June 19 and 26, 1940 has made the understanding of the operation of labor allocation more difficult.

In the 1930's, the operation of the labor market was analogous to that of the factor market. The number of workers to be used and the amount of wages to be spent were largely specified to the enterprise by plan directives from above. The Soviet priorities among outputs were

34 - Gregory Grossman investigates this point more fully in an unpublished paper entitled Some Current Trends in Soviet Capital Formation.

35 - I have benefited from conversation with Jerzy Gliksman of the RAND Corporation in the preparation of this section.

36 - Indeed, until the abolition of rationing in 1935 not even the distribution of consumers goods relied as much on the market, and it was precisely this imperfection of the consumers goods market which then interfered with the operation of the labor market and which, at least in part, occasioned the abolition of rationing.

reflected in the plans for labor inputs just as they were in those for other inputs. The actual procurement of labor was, however, organized through use of a market. In order to hire in that market managers had to bid for labor by offering wages graduated with respect to skill and by offering wage incentives differentiated according to the desirabilities of the various occupations. The industrial wage schedule is graduated into categories, frequently seven, which are to reflect skill differences. The base rate of the highest is 3 to 4 times that of the lowest. In other words, each enterprise had to attract and maintain its labor supply within the restraints imposed on it by the various directives it received. Enterprises advertised openings and then entered into individual labor contracts with the workers attracted.

The multiple standards with which the enterprise was faced made the procurement of labor supplies no easier than that of factor supplies. If anything, plan infringement and other illegal activity predominated more even in the labor market than in the factor market. Each enterprise and industry as a whole was faced with a perpetual labor shortage, at least a shortage relative to the demands placed by planned output. Particular enterprises additionally found their own planned allocation of labor contrary to their wishes. In consequence, enterprises typically overexpended their planned wages funds and raided each other of their labor supplies. This illegal conduct was partly hidden by juggling the enterprise books and it was largely condoned by higher authorities in the interest of achieving higher outputs.³⁷

Several measures associated particularly with labor discipline were introduced which appear also to have altered the organization of the allocation of labor among jobs. Henceforth a worker was to be permitted to leave his place of employment only on the approval of this employer. This approval is to be entered into the worker's labor book, and no other enterprise is permitted to hire the worker without the same.

37 - Individual supervisory agents may regard their approval as occasioned by plan fulfillment or self interest or other reasons; looking at the same thing from the outside, however, the same approval looks like it serves to improve the organization and operation of the economy.

The would-be employer was made legally liable to observe this restriction. The law specified circumstances, pertaining mostly to the worker's personal welfare, under which the manager was bound to issue a permit. Similar regulations also outlined particular circumstances, such as a workstoppage, under which a worker might be compulsorily transferred between jobs within an enterprise.³⁸ Under the law a ministry might transfer a worker between enterprises only under very special circumstances. If effective, these laws presumably influence the allocation of labor at least in that they prevent that allocation which would exist in their absence and under the market.

Some allocation of labor by directive has existed all along. It was observed earlier that students graduating from state vocational schools are directed to their first jobs by the Ministry of State Labor reserves. Of course, managers are assigned to their positions. Skilled workers such as engineers, accountants, and some mechanics, are also subject to assignment and transfer by the ministry to any enterprise under its jurisdiction. Campaigns in the press and by Kosmosol urging workers to move to particular areas must also influence the allocation of labor. Thus, Pravda Ukraine in 1955 carries numerous articles and editorials with titles such as these: "Let us all go to Donbas", "Ukrainian patriots go to Donbas", "To be a coal mine shafter--it sounds glorious." Additional consumer goods are also pumped into the Donbas to attract workers. Moreover, the articles suggest that the reallocation of labor to the Donbas is a redistribution of labor already in urban areas, and not urbanization of rural labor.

38 - The following report of a legal case may be illustrative: Boris A. Konstantinovsky, Soviet Law in Action, p. 54. Lissak v. Third Bread Plant.

Lissak, a worker of the Third Bread Plant of Odessa, was dismissed from his job for having refused to be transferred to the First Bread Plant. He brought suit, requesting to be reinstated in his job. He justified his refusal to be transferred on the ground that such transfer was not required by the necessities of work, but was solely the result of a desire to get rid of him, because he had written in the wall newspaper about the unsatisfactory working conditions in the bread plant.

The Labor Court found that Lissak had been dismissed because of his criticism of the director's actions, voiced both in meetings and in

This complex of techniques for the allocation of labor admits of various interpretations. The existence of such a variety of influences may suggest that none of the influences is sufficiently pronounced to do the entire job. For instance, wage incentives are not carried far enough to accomplish the desired allocation of labor without the help of other influences. Neither are "controls" strong enough to operate adequately without incentive wages. One might also argue that one type of influence cannot possibly be adequate for all people so that a variety of influences is necessary in order to be sure that there will always be an influence which is effective for every kind of person. Alternatively, one might conclude that in the labor market as in the factor market the Soviets wish to maintain a whole battery of overlapping influences rather than to rely on one alone.

A closer look at the circumstances and particularly at recent developments in the labor market may aid us in choosing among these interpretations. The wage funds continue to be overexpended. Most worker requests to leave their job are now honored by their managers and permission seems to be granted increasingly readily. In other cases, non-compliance with the 1940 labor laws has been increasing steadily since the end of the war. The recent edition of a standard text on labor law

the press. Since there had been no ground to dismiss him, the court reinstated him to his job with award of four months' back pay for the time he had been obliged to stay away.

The Regional Court dismissed the appeal of the bread plant.

At the protest of the Regional Procurator, the Civil Collegium of the Ukrainian Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Labor Court on the ground that the management of the bread plant had acted in full conformity with Article 37 of the Labor Code, which provides that an employee may not be transferred from one enterprise or locality to another without his consent, but that if he refuses to transfer he may be discharged. This decision was brought before the Plenum of the Supreme Court by protest of its president. The Plenum handed down the following ruling:

1. The dismissal of a worker for refusal to be transferred to another enterprise under Article 37 of the Labor Code, is permissible only if the transfer is in the interests of the business.

2. The Labor Court found that the transfer was not prompted by business considerations, but by the desire to get rid of a man who had criticized the management. Under these circumstances it was right in reinstating Lissak to his former job.

omits the chapter which had been concerned with the disciplinary laws. However, the laws do not appear ever to have been actually repealed. All three of these circumstances suggest that reliance on the market has been continued and is increasing, now that the rigors of war-imposed conditions have disappeared. They suggest that enterprises must be bidding against each other for labor. It seems unlikely, for instance, that the overexpenditure of labor could be explained by payment for increased output within the enterprise, for if workers did not and could not leave their jobs extra expenditure would seem to be unnecessary to incite them to greater output. The existence of instances of continued apparent misallocation of labor lends additional support to this picture of the labor market as a relatively "free market". The labor shortage in the Donbas disappears only slowly and apparently without much recourse to directives. Similarly, there were complaints that in 1953, of 72,000 agricultural specialists in the Ukraine, 55,000 were working neither in kolхозes nor in MTS.³⁹ The editor of Konstantinovsky comments: "In general, Professor Konstantinovsky's cases support the view that Soviet law in action treats the worker more favorably than Soviet law in books would indicate. There are many ways legally to avoid the harsh laws which the government has enacted to counteract the relatively strong position which Soviet labor in fact occupies by virtue of its scarcity."⁴⁰

39 - Berliner's impression appears to confirm my analysis. He writes, "But scattered reports indicate that turnover in mines for example still assumes large proportions. In late 1949 managers are still accused of hiring workers without checking the conditions under which they left their previous employment. The impression that competition and turnover are still realistic things is supported by other indications from the literature." Berliner, op. cit., p. 406.

40 - Konstantinovsky, op. cit., p. 47.

The failure so far to repeal the laws suggests, however, that the Soviets are anxious to maintain the protection that the law offers in some eventualities. In those cases where the incentive system does not work, or more precisely where the incentive system would have to be unduly burdened to handle marginal cases, the law remains available. Since egalitarianism prohibits the use of incentive wages for a particular job, which are too much higher than other wages, the regular incentive system may be unable to cope with some unusual situations, and these marginal situations can then be handled by recourse to the law. It appears that the use of "forced labor" performs functions similar to these legal controls. Forced labor is typically used on jobs which are too disagreeable to permit easy recruitment by other means.⁴¹

Effort

The Soviets display a strong desire to improve and increase industrial production through the encouragement of effort and initiative among workers. The present section deals with the promotion of effort and initiative among workers by the use, primarily, of piece rates and bonuses. Discussion of the encouragement of initiative, such as Stakhanovism, is reserved for the section on mass participation. Financial remuneration in nonagricultural employment may be broken down into payment with respect to the place or type of employment, payment for the worker's capacity, time or piecework payment for work performed, and various bonuses or awards. The first two components were discussed above. The last one will receive most attention in a later section. The following paragraphs will be devoted to the matter of payment for work performed.

⁴¹ - It seems more plausible to interpret the use of forced labor on disagreeable jobs by arguing that it is so used because the job must be done than by arguing that it is done to make the laborers concerned uncomfortable.

Financial reward for increased effort is paid primarily through the use of piecework rates and awards for workers, and through the grant of bonuses to salaried employees. Piece rates are established for output within each wage category. Piecework schedules are sometimes proportional, sometimes progressive. Progressive piecework schedules are proportional up to a previously set output norm; after that they may rise very sharply in order to stimulate output above the norm. The norms are based on time and motion studies and are set in accordance with planned output. They are set upon consultation between management and the union, both of whose predominant aim is to raise the rates overtime. A variety of awards usually exist to stimulate still greater output and to encourage workers to meet various other standards such as better quality, reduced cost, etc. While piecework payments are met out of the regular wage fund, these awards come mostly out of the directors fund. Some awards for increased effort are distributed by higher agencies including the council of Ministers. However, most of the awards granted by these agencies are to reward the kind of initiative with which we will deal in the section on mass participation. (Sometimes the latter standards and awards tend to become debased, however, until they are hardly distinguishable from those rewarding mere effort and increased output. The awarding of the title "stakhanovite" became so increasingly routinized and so much tied to mere output norms that it recently had to be abandoned and replaced with that of "innovator."

Salaried employees who cannot well be paid by piecework rates but who nonetheless are in a position to influence the achievement of output and other standards are rewarded by means of bonuses. Administrative and managerial personnel receive bonuses tied to performance indices of the organizations under their jurisdiction be they departments, enterprises or ministries. The managerial personnel of the enterprise also receive bonuses tied to the performance of the enterprise as a whole. Many of the bonuses are tied to plan fulfillment of output. Some bonuses refer to more specialized standards such as the bonus for increased quality which is receivable

by the quality control engineer. Of course, the bonus system sets up some conflicting incentives in rewarding some people for, say, improving quality and others for reducing cost. On the other hand, the fact that many of the bonuses of controlling personnel, such as accountants or ministers, are tied to the performance of the organization as a whole detracts from their incentive to exercise their controlling functions insofar as they would interfere with meeting the enterprise's major standards.

Discipline

Labor discipline has been a perennial problem in the Soviet economy as it has in all other rapidly industrializing economies. Workers who only recently gave up their peasant life, or still worse workers who hope to remain peasants and regarded their industrial job as a mere interlude, are able only with great difficulty to meet the exacting requirements of industrial work. One of the remarkable achievements of the Soviet period, however accomplished, would seem to be their success in transforming millions of peasants into workers governed by the clock and by the fine and detailed distinctions not usually found in agricultural life. Moreover, the perpetual labor shortage did not permit the Soviets to rely on the threat of unemployment to induce the workers to conform to the standards of industrial production. They found other means to discipline the industrial labor force.

The most widely discussed problems of labor discipline are those of "flitting" from job to job, absenteeism, and tardiness. One line of attack on all of these has been the issuance to each worker of a labor book in which his work history is recorded. Since the worker must present this book to any prospective employer, he is made responsible for his record. The Soviet attempt to promote and enforce discipline culminated in the beforementioned laws of 1940. Various milder measures had continued to prove inadequate. These laws and their subsequent amendments provide that employees may not leave their job without the consent of the employer, and they severely discourage absenteeism and tardiness. Illegal termination of employment is

punishable by imprisonment and a worker who is more than 20 minutes late is regarded as absent, and repeated unauthorized absenteeism is punished with compulsory work at one's job at up to 25 per cent reduced pay. This provision, of course, is designed to discourage infraction of the law in order to be fired; for this would only reduce labor discipline in an economy with continued full employment. Other infractions of the law, such as failure to conform to other aspects of work hours are accorded proportionately severe punishments.

Other disciplinary requirements of industrial work have received less publicity. Nonetheless, the problems offered by necessarily fine distinctions among sizes, by minutely detailed sequences of operations, and by unfamiliar tasks, equipment, and surroundings generally must have been equal to those posed by mere appearance on the job. It is difficult to say how these problems were met in the various phases of non-agricultural employment. Only little of this is explained by the several regulations which provide for the worker's responsibility for his equipment. Additional light on the transformation of millions of peasants into an industrial work force will be shed by a better understanding of the Soviet attempts to stimulate mass participation.

The Communist Party and Unions: Mass Participation⁴²

"A" - 10

Our understanding of the organization of the Soviet economy is dependent on an assessment of the contribution of mass participation. By "mass participation" I refer to the policy and reality of involving individuals and groups in the performance of their tasks beyond the participation for which the regular system of rules and incentives provides. "Mass participation" does not refer simply to greater participation by more people regardless of what the associated incentives are.

The promotion and organization of mass participation is official state and Communist Party policy. It is an important part of the job of "political and social education" which the Communist Party has taken upon itself. Both have wide application in the Sovietization of Ukrainian society. The concern here will be limited to an examination of the role of mass participation in the non-agricultural economy. The emphasis will be on the contribution of mass participation in the industrialization of a primarily agricultural area and society.⁴³ Implementation of the mass participation policy has come primarily through the Communist Party membership and through the unions. It is they, primarily, who promote and organize mass participation in its various aspects. For this reason the significance of the unions, which has so frequently been decried, is I think very great. Unions should properly be interpreted as the chosen vehicles for bringing the social industrial revolution to the working population and for molding them into an industrial labor force.

42 - In connection with this section the reader is referred to Alexander Vucinich: Soviet Economic Institutions - The Social Structure of Production Units. This study, although concerned with other questions, discusses many of the same circumstances in Soviet industry.

43 - Of course, mass participation is relevant also to the organization of agriculture. However, I have the impression that mass participation has received rather less emphasis in the promotion of collectivized agriculture and that this may help to explain the relative lack of success of Soviet Agricultural policy. No doubt, mass participation is also an important element of Sovietization through the political process, but this matter cannot be discussed here.

The discussion may conveniently be approached by looking in turn at the media of mass participation, innovation, criticism, and social services; and by speculating briefly about what appears to be its principal contribution, personal involvement. The stimulation of effort, which might have been included, was discussed in the previous section. It will also be useful to distinguish between the mass participation on the part of all members of the organization and between the "mass participation" of the leaders or actives. This will permit us to detect the Soviet use of the "cadre" method in the organization of the economy.

Initiative

The Communist Party and the unions encourage people at all levels of the industrial organization to assume initiative in improving the performance of the organization. The resultant participation is supposedly above and beyond the call of duty. However, expectation of the extraordinary seems to be quite common. Socialist competition, suggestions for improvements, production conferences, and collective agreements may all be interpreted to offer channels for the assumption and expression of initiative among the bulk of the workers. Initiative among leaders or actives has successively taken the forms of activism, stakhanovism, and innovation. I shall discuss these in turn.

I have previously noted that the Party and the unions attempt to secure increased output and other improved performance by organizing socialist competition among workers. Participation has become increasingly widespread, at least formally. Socialist competition probably is responsible for some increased output. It also keeps before the mass of the workers the need to join in concerted common efforts to raise industrial output for the common good.

The managements of enterprises receive numerous suggestions from the rank and file relating to possible improvements in production methods. Of course, these suggestions are encouraged; and they are rewarded if found to be useful. The fact that almost none of them are ever patented may suggest that the improvements suggested are not very significant. Nonetheless, the arrangement helps to enlist rank and file support for the interests of the enterprise and the economy.

On a similar footing are the production conferences. Attendance at these is large, at shop conferences often 100%. They are designed, in part, to serve as media for the discussion and solution of existing production problems. They are also used to propagate the methods of advanced workers and actives.

The collective labor agreements of the postwar era may also be interpreted as attempts to promote greater mass participation and, indeed, to enlist rank and file initiative. They do not, and are not meant to, offer management and labor opportunity to bargain with each other. Quite the opposite, they are designed to instill in the workers some measure of personal commitment to the production plan. The hope is held, in fact, that workers will initiate promises to overfulfill the output plans.

A large part of the program to promote initiative, although highly publicized and directed at all members of the industrial organization, is expected to appeal to only a small minority of the workers. Particularly enthusiastic, devoted, and capable people arise from among their fellows and undertake, more or less on their own initiative, to make spectacular productive records. We may refer to these people as "actives," although their official titles have changed over the years. The nature of their particular contributions has gone through these fairly distinct phases. As these were officially promoted, they presumably met the needs of the moment. In the early thirties their initiative took the forms of "activism." Activism consisted principally of setting spectacularly high production records through very extraordinary efforts. Stekhanovism, which followed after 1935, changed the emphasis to "rationalizing" production methods or improving the organization of production methods. This improvement might then be applied in other shops, factories, or even ministries, thus permitting the spread of some, though usually smaller, output increases or cost savings through other parts of the economy. Stekhanovism eventually became corrupted until it remained little more than meeting high output levels. In recent years "innovation" appears to have taken the place of Stekhanovism as the approved channel for special initiative.⁴⁴ Innovation, it would

44 - These recent developments are discussed by Jerry Glikson in a still unpublished manuscript, which he kindly permitted me to read. See also A. Vucinich, Soviet Economic Institutions, passim.

seem, abandons the emphasis on improvements in the organization of productive methods and shifts it instead to improvements in the tools of production.⁴⁵

Assessment of the effectiveness and significance of this organized initiative poses interesting but difficult questions. Examples of initiative among the bulk of the workers are widespread, but their effect is probably shallow. The ones pertaining to actives undoubtedly make profound changes, but they are limited in number. Initiative by the rank and file has frequently become easily corrupted into mere routinized "going through the motions." Socialist competition frequently remains competition in name only. Many production conferences are no doubt attended with little enthusiasm and under moral, political or economic pressure. For many, organized initiative is a sham. Nonetheless, mass participation through initiative certainly exceeds the actual increases in production which they make themselves. If the well-known Communist cadre method produces any results, the effectiveness of the activists should not be measured solely by their numbers. They serve to demonstrate possibilities, and they are presented to their fellows as examples after which to pattern themselves. The use of activists permits spectacular advances which, although not often duplicable elsewhere, set the tone for production throughout the economy. In so doing activism and its successors probably augment personal involvement among those who participate only in the forms of organized mass initiative.

Criticism

Official policy also encourages criticism by subordinates throughout the hierarchies. A variety of channels are maintained which permit the expression and provide for the utilization of this criticism. Since I have had other occasions to refer to organized criticism, I shall only discuss its relevance to mass participation at this point. Again, it is useful to distinguish participation through criticism on the part of the rank and file from "criticism" by controlling agents who are maintained specifically for that purpose.

45 - This shift of emphasis suggests that the economy has left the stage where organization of borrowed tools and techniques poses the more important bottleneck for a developing economy, and that it has reached the point where progress awaits the development of new tools.

The rank and file, and subordinates generally, are encouraged to criticize the decisions and conduct of their superiors. The object of the criticism, no doubt, is not supposed to be the elimination of a personal grievance but to remedy, if possible, the situation which permits such personal grievances, as well as public ills, to arise. What appears relevant in the present context is that the organization makes an effort to enlist the interest of all of its members in the improved operation of the organization and particularly in the correction of circumstances that are due to the inflexibilities of hierarchical organization. To that end, the organization makes official provision for the direct criticism of superiors by subordinates to these superiors, to superiors one step removed, and to agents in parallel hierarchies. The communist party, plant, industrial, local and national papers, and the unions all provide such channels. Production conferences offer some opportunity for direct criticism with institutionalized protection of superior decisions. Criticism on the part of agents who are at least in part designated for that very purpose, such as accountants, ministry representatives, etc., has been discussed elsewhere in this paper.

Service

Unions are also significant service organizations. Although these service functions are important in their own right, they may be discussed at this point because they have implication also for mass participation. The service of the unions is for their membership, of course, but it also accrues to the members' families and thereby to the community much more than is usual in other countries. Much of the administrative work on the part of the unions is provided on a free and voluntary basis by its membership, so that with respect to their service function the unions might almost be regarded as communal self-help or mutual aid societies.

The major service and allied functions of the unions may be briefly indicated. The unions administer almost the entire social security system of the state. They establish and administer such community services as schools, kindergartens (creches) sanatoria and rest homes, and

cultural and entertainment facilities. Unions handle worker grievances through their membership in half of the Raschetno-Konfliktnye Komissii (RKK) or grievance commissions. The grievances refer primarily to matters of interpretations of the various labor agreements, regulations and laws. Safety inspection is also a union charge. It has been suggested that this provision of social and community service on the part of the industrial unions serves to tie and orient the entire community to the industrial enterprise.⁴⁶ The participation of the unions which are organized on a plantwide level promotes much more of an enterprise community than might otherwise be the case and thus also promotes community interest and participation in the affairs of the industrial plant. In any case, the service function of unions promotes mass participation within the plant, in our sense.

Personal Involvement

The essence of the Soviet mass participation policy would seem to lie in the attempt to elicit some measure of personal involvement in the Soviet program on the part of the population at large. The industrial revolution is after all a social revolution as well as a technical one. The organization of new tasks in industry as well as elsewhere must suffer if it is dependent solely on a formal system of rules and incentives. That organization would be much improved, and consequently the Soviet policy more successful, if the people had some personal commitment to the system and some personal involvement in their tasks. The Soviet mass participation policy may be interpreted as an attempt to achieve just that.

Mass participation complements the more formal incentive system. It seems to help in overcoming some of the system's shortcomings. The traditional sterility of bureaucracy is somewhat abated by the introduction of initiative, criticism, and generally personal involvement. Any success of mass participation on this score augments the flexibility of the system while substantially maintaining authority as long as the personal commitment is to the "correct" policy. Personal involvement al-

46 - J. Berliner, op. cit. and Vucinich, op. cit.

so helps to prevent and counteract pro forma following of rules and stimulation of meeting standards, which is a liability of a system using formalized standards from which the Soviet system suffers heavily.⁴⁷ Increased personal involvement on all levels of the economy probably also serves to compensate individuals for the impersonality, pressure, and personal sacrifice which the system imposes on them. We have seen how managers and other officials have spontaneously modified the formal organization of the economy in an attempt to overcome these liabilities of the system. I think it may be said that there also exists this formal provision for the reduction of the formalism of the Soviet economic organization.⁴⁸

47 - It was noted earlier how a multiplicity of standards permits evasion of the rules' intent by simulating the meeting of standards. The term "simulation" is suggested by Berliner who devotes a major section of his work to make-believe standard fulfillment.

48 - It should be said of the modifications of the formal organization of the Soviet economy which mass participation introduces that they are not entirely easily absorbed by that system. Stekhanovism, for instance, has found opposition both among workers and managers. Workers resent the raising of norms which follow Stekhanovite innovations. Managers are loath to have the relatively smooth operation of their enterprise disturbed by eager beavers who are anxious to have everything reorganized. In general, bureaucratism tends to resist interference with the existing bureaucratic organization.

ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION - AGRICULTURE

The organization of agricultural production both resembles and differs from the organization of industrial production as set out in the preceding pages. The major principles of organization, such as maintenance of authority and provision for flexibility through the use of multiple standards, appear to hold for the agricultural sector as they do for the industrial one. However, the problems of agricultural organization and the methods used to deal with them frequently differ markedly from those found in industry. Khrushchev's now famous report Measures for the Further Development of Agriculture in the U.S.S.R. inquires, "What are the reasons for the general inadequate level of agricultural output, and for the lag of a number of major branches of agriculture?"⁴⁹ Khrushchev's answer devotes attention to the following phases of organization of agricultural production: 1) The relation between agriculture and industry; 2) The relations among various units of production in agriculture; 3) Incentives; 4) Administration of the agricultural sector as a whole and the role of the Communist Party; 5) Mechanization. These problem areas can serve as a useful outline for our discussion of the organization of agriculture.

The Relation between Agriculture and Industry

The relationship between country and town, peasant and urbanite, and more lately between agriculture and industry has been a traditional source of major social and economic problems in Russia. The rise of Communism as a political force only added to these problems. Born of industry, heralded by urban people, Communism has been unable to deal sympathetically with the concerns of the countryside.

49 - N.S. Khrushchov, Measures for the Further Development of Agriculture in the U.S.S.R.; Report delivered at a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, September 3, 1953; All references will be to this edition; Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954.

Unable, within their theoretical framework, to formulate an agricultural program which would be popular in the countryside, the early Marxists and the later Communist leaders sought a new solution to the "peasant problem." Their solutions aimed at bringing about the transformation of the peasantry into a group indistinguishable from the urban proletariat, and they refused to admit any conflict of interest between peasants and workers. The Communist program for agriculture has been a series of compromises between doctrine and reality, guided by the principle of proletarian - peasant unity, and disregarding any conflict between the interests of the two groups -- or rather, resolving such conflicts in favor of the proletarian element. The Communist solution to the problem of city vs. country consists simply in abolition of inter-group antagonism by abolition of one of the groups -- in the ultimate destruction of the peasantry as a social group, and, meanwhile, in the complete disregard of its distinctive needs and interests.

In the words of Stalin, "The question of the relation between proletariat and peasantry is the essence of the problem of the erection of the socialist economy."⁵⁰ The Communist program to solve the question was well stated by L.M. Kaganovich:

We proceed towards the elimination of the antagonisms between town and country not on the basis of the liquidation of the towns, but on the basis of their modification and the socialist alteration of the village and its elevation to the level of the most advanced urban culture.⁵¹

We are proceeding. . . toward the development of an advanced, urban socialist culture where none existed before -- where there was savagery and age old darkness.⁵²

The program, though compromised as for instance in the predominant

50 - J. Stalin, Works, Vol. VII, p. 173.

51 - Quoted in Kalzak, et. al.; Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R., p. 159, from L. M. Kaganovich, Report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 1931.

52 - Ibid, p. 160, from L. M. Kaganovich, For the Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow and the Towns of the U.S.S.R., O.G.I.Z., Moskovsky Rabochi, Moscow, 1931, p. 68.

establishment of kolkhozes instead of sovkhozes and again in the abandonment of the plan to establish agrogorods or factory towns in the fields, has had far-reaching effects.

The first reason assigned by Khrushchev for the backwardness of agriculture is that the Soviets, unable to do everything at once, have sacrificed improvements in agriculture to the attainment of progress in industry. The Soviets have channeled most investment into industry, probably making agriculture itself pay for some industrial capital formation. They have made their express goal the creation of an industrial urban society, and devoted major attention to industrial progress. They have channeled the great bulk of investment into industry, possibly at the expense of agriculture, in absolute as well as relative cost. Geographical price differences typically favor urban areas. These circumstances, as well as higher wages, have also attracted many capable, enterprising and ambitious persons into urban centers. It appears, for instance, that of the 72,000 trained agricultural specialists in the Ukraine in 1951, 7000 worked on kolkhozes and 5000 on MTS; the remaining 55,000 were elsewhere, most of them presumably in the cities.

Only recently have the Soviets decided that the sacrifice of agriculture has gone too far, that continued industrial progress and urban welfare are beginning to depend on a better development of the agricultural sector. Khrushchev now suggests that "work in rural districts is important and honorable work.", and encourages Communist Party members and trained people of all sorts to forsake their urban life to come to the aid of agriculture.⁵³ The recent reforms in agricultural organization, outlined in the succeeding sections, appear to have been successful in attracting some people back to the countryside, at the same time that they are contributing to improvements in agriculture.

53 - N.S. Khrushchev, op.cit.; p. 91.

Units of Agricultural Production and their Relation

A variety of decision-making units are directly concerned with agricultural production. Before turning to Krushchev's criticism of the relations among them, it is appropriate to discuss each in some detail.

The principal agricultural producing units are kolkhozes, or collective farms sovkhoses or state farms, kolkhozniki or individual collective farmers, edinochniki, or independent farmers, and machine tractor stations.

Kolkhozes are the most important units of agricultural production. The distribution of land among agricultural users within the pre-accession boundaries of the Ukraine in 1940 was: Kolkhozes 83.7 per cent, sovkhoses 7.9 per cent, edinochniki 0.2 per cent, state land fund and forest 8.2 per cent.⁵⁴ Collectivization of the western oblasts, interrupted by the war, proceeded rapidly after 1948. The percentage of agricultural land in the west already collectivized in 1948 was only 9.6 per cent, but it rose to 49 per cent in 1949 and 92.7 per cent in 1950, and reached 95.2 per cent in 1951. The latter figure represents the collectivization of over 99 per cent of all arable land.⁵⁵

54 - Akademiia Nauk Ukrain's'koi RSR. Council on Scientific and Technical Propaganda. D. F. Virnyk, Ekonomichy Rozkvit Ukrain's'k RSR--torzhestvo lenins'ko-stalins'koi natsional'noi polityky. (Economic Prosperity of the Ukrainian S.S.R. --A Triumph Stalin's Nationality Policy) Vydavny stvo an URSR, Kiev, 1951 p. 31.

55 - Institut Ekonomiki Akademii Nauk Ukrain's'koi S.S.R. Ocherki Razvitiia Narodnogo Khoziaistva Ukrain's'koi S.S.R. (Outline of the Growth of the National Economy of the Ukrainian S.S.R.) Moskva, 1954, p. 524.

The number of collective farms which had risen from 5000 in 1926 to 27,000 in 1940, rose to a high of 33,653 in 1950.⁵⁶ At that time the program of consolidation of kolkhozes into larger units was initiated, which, by 1953, reduced the number of kolkhozes by more than half to 15,770. In 1950 the average kolkhoz in the eastern Ukraine had held 922 hectares of land and had been composed to 156 households and 321 workers. Consolidation frequently more than doubled these numbers. At the same time the number of sovkhozes rose from 300 in 1926 to 875 in 1940, and then declined to 763 in 1949. Machine' and Tractor Stations, first established in 1928, numbered 1225 in 1940 and 1397 in 1955, with 149 additional ones reported under construction. Thus in 1953 there was one MTS for every eleven kolkhozes.

In terms of output the importance of kolkhozes is smaller than the foregoing figures would imply. They are important in the production of grain and technical crops alone with the sovkhoses, but they contribute only small portion of livestock products and vegetables. The economy is largely dependent for these commodities on private production on the individual plots of kolkhozniki. It is significant that official dissatisfaction with the volume of agricultural production has for some years been concentrated precisely on the commodities.

Production on individual plots by kolkhozniki appears to have suffered recently from the increasing pressure from local agricultural authorities to devote more attention to communal production than to private plots. At the same time, livestock and vegetable production appears to offer relatively low returns, and the necessary supplies such as feed and fertilizer are difficult to obtain, so that the production of greater quantities of these commodities is not encouraged. Khurshchev censured local authorities, anxious to make a good showing for themselves, for interfering unduly with private production. On the other hand, sufficient incentives to induce kolkhozniki voluntarily to devote more time to communal kolkhoz production appear still to be missing.

56 - These and the following figures are from the data in the author's possession, which also present data for intervening years and on other aspects of collectivization.

Incentives

The inadequacy of the system of incentives is the major defect of agricultural organization. Khrushchev has emphasized both that for agricultural organization producers have been inadequate and that they have been inappropriate. The former defect induces the decision-making unit to expend too little effort in doing the right thing, and the latter induces him to do the wrong thing altogether. From the point of view of the individual the former is of major importance. With respect to proper organization of agriculture as a whole both really come to the same thing. We may examine kolkhoz and kolkhoznik production in turn.

The organization of productive effort in kolkhozes is effected through use of a hierarchical decision-making system and through provision of rewards geared to performance. Two features of kolkhoz production distinguish it notably from the organization of industrial production. One is the much smaller reliance on the market to allocate inputs among various uses. The other is the residual nature of the kolkhoz claim to reward. The operation of the hierarchical organization appears to be similar to that of industry.

The working force of the kolkhoz is divided into several brigades and these in turn into links. The former may comprise about 50 individuals and the latter 10. Each has one individual at its head. The tasks of the kolkhoz are distributed among the brigades. These divide them in turn among their links and these in turn among the individuals. As the rewards of the kolkhoz itself are geared to its achievement, the rewards of the brigades and the links are geared to theirs. Individuals share rewards with the other members of the group. Brigades and links are each supposed to be assigned charge over the same complementary inputs and the same tasks for any one production period, and indeed over successive periods. For instance, there may be one or more livestock brigades and several field brigades. The former have charged to them the care of particular livestock, and the latter the cultivation of particular fields with particular

implements. Rewards are then distributed among brigades in accordance with their individual performance. Tasks are assigned to the brigades by the kolkhoz management, to subordinate units by the brigadiers and so on. Rewards are similarly assigned.

Brigades were the principal decision-making and ascription units before the war. In the postwar years links received increasing emphasis because, being smaller, they offered the opportunity to allocate responsibility more minutely and to distribute rewards more in accordance with achievement. Links have recently been deemphasized, however, apparently because their very smallness and intimacy permitted the development of individualism, which the Soviets have sought to discourage.

Rewards to individuals are distributed in accordance with their contribution of effort according to a fixed scale. The various tasks are graded in terms of "work days", presumably in accordance with the marginal productivity of the task. Thus sheep herders receive half a workday per day of work on their task, while some field workers may receive two workday credits per day's work, and the manager four. Rewards are distributed among individuals by dividing the share of reward allotted to the whole unit by the total number of workdays accumulated by all members combined, and then assigned each member the resulting equivalent value of one workday multiplied by his accumulated number of workday units. As in industry, a bonus system is tied to plan fulfillment and overfulfillment.

Despite the attempts to tie rewards more closely to the productive achievement of small groups and to the contribution of individuals, the incentive system appears not to be serving its purpose adequately at the lowest level. The individual's share of his marginal contribution is too small to induce him to devote maximum effort to kolkhoz production. At the same time, his identification with larger groups appears to be too weak to permit tying rewards to them alone, and providing for the distribution of reward within them on some basis other than achievement or contribution. The inadequacy of the incentive system is due not only to its weakness

at these points, but may also be traced to the organization of the distribution of product and reward at the kolkhoz level.

The following table illustrates the approximate disposition of grain and leguminous crops among claimants in 1938:⁵⁷

Compulsory State Delivery	15
MTS	16
"Decentralized" state, coop, and market sales	5.1
Payment for state-advanced seed	2
Seed fund	18.6
Fodder fund	13.6
Kolkhozniki	26.9
Miscellaneous	2.8
	<u>100.0</u>

The claimants are listed more or less in order of primacy of their claims. The State reserves first claim through its tax on agriculture. The tax is collected through the imposition of a compulsory delivery quota for kolkhoz products, which are paid for at prices much lower than those realized by the State through sale to the urban consumer.

All claimants other than the state have residual claims only. The cost of a poor crop is borne entirely by them. The second strongest claim is exercised by the MTS.

Decentralized open market sales, at prices higher than compulsory delivery prices, are voluntary. The other claimants, including the various funds, receive their due in turn. The residual is divided among the membership of the kolkhoz according to the formula outlined earlier. Income from sales of its product by the kolkhoz is similarly divided among the membership, although a part is reserved for a capital fund.

The reward of the kolkhoz is a function of several factors, of which some are under its control, others not. The kolkhoz has substantial freedom to determine its own rate of capital accumulation

57 - Baykov; Soviet Economic System; p. 311.

and the amount of its inputs. The arrangement by which its tax load is not dependent directly on its income, and which permits it to obtain higher prices for its output above the quota, encourages increases in investment. The same arrangement also discourages maximum expenditure of effort, because the membership bears all risk from weather and other eventualities and has, in its private plots, an alternative channel for its efforts.

Kolkhoz discretion in attempts to maximize income is limited. Both location and specific directives from the glavk prevent wide selection among crops, and officially set prices determine the rate of payment that can be received. Khrushchev notes that the ruble value of one workday varied as follows when derived from government procurements and purchases of different commodities:⁵⁸

Cotton - Central Asia	17-36
Sugar beets - Ukraine	12
Industrial crops - U.S.S.R.	18
Grain, N. Caucasus	8-14
Livestock - U.S.S.R.	5
Livestock - Ukraine	4
Grain - U.S.S.R.	less than 4, according to H. Schwartz ⁵⁹

It is clear that the incentives to produce some commodities are out of line with those applying to others.

Kolkhozniki also carry on agricultural production on their private plots. These plots are frequently about one acre in size and consequently are not suitable for extensive agriculture. Kolkhozniki concentrate their private production in vegetable and live-stock. The head of the family controls the plot, but it is cultivated for the family unit as a whole, as is traditional. This is unlike the system in kolkhozes, where ascription occurs according to individual and not by family. The product is partly consumed at home and partly marketed in free markets in villages and towns. The reward

58-N. S. Khrushchev, op. cit; pp. 10-11.

59 - H. Schwartz; Russia's Soviet Economy, p. 318.

is determined exclusively by the amount produced and the prices received in the market, except for a small income tax on personal income derived from this source.

Although the share of family income derived from kolkhoz production is generally greater than that derived from privately owned plots, the incentives to devote attention to the latter seem to be greater than those inducing effort in kolkhoz production. This is because marginal effort is more highly rewarded when devoted to private production than when expended on kolkhoz production.

Livestock raising offers a good illustration of the relations among productive units and the operation of the incentive system. The following table sets out production and marketing of livestock products by producing unit in 1935.

TABLE I					
Livestock Products Produced and Marketed in % by Productive Unit					
	Kolk- hoz	Sovk- hoz	Total Com- munal	Kolkhoz- niki	Other Private Indivi- duals
Percent of Total Production					
Meat and Fat	17.6	17.8	35.4	48.1	16.5
Milk	16.4	11.1	27.5	54.4	18.1
Percent of Marketed Output					
Meat and Fat	22.7	30.5	53.2	32.8	14.0
Milk	29.0	24.8	53.8	34.8	11.4
Percent of Output marketed					
Meat and Fat	75.7	100.0		40	
Milk	63.6	80.6		27.8	

Source: N. Nimitz, Statistics of Soviet Agriculture, p. 75

Livestock production is predominantly under the care of private productive units, particularly kolkhozniki. The table indicates that in 1935 kolkhozniki and other private producers accounted for more than half of all livestock production. However, they consumed a much larger portion of their own output and of all livestock products. These relations have changed somewhat in more recent years. The share of non-kolkhozniki producers fell rapidly. The share of private output generally also fell as kolkhozes put pressure on their members to transfer their livestock to communal ownership. It is likely that some of the recent increases in kolkhoz-owned cattle was due not to increased production but to such changes in ownership. This state of affairs came under severe criticism from Khrushchev in his discussion of the relations among producing units. In accordance with most recent policy, private ownership of livestock is again being encouraged.

The overall level of livestock production has been at issue even more than the distribution of livestock ownership. Livestock production had for many years been relatively unprofitable, as is suggested by the relative ruble value of workday units cited previously. To remedy this situation, the new livestock program calls for payment of higher prices for livestock products to producers. Taxes on kolkhozniki have been reduced as well. A corn growing program and a building program have been instituted. The success of the latter two programs would seem to be dependent almost entirely on the inducement to increase livestock production offered by higher prices. No independent incentives are provided to induce peasants to grow corn and invest larger amounts of capital in livestock sheds and auxiliary equipment. In fact, Khrushchev maintains that the government cannot finance any of the increased investment except by allocating some investment funds to the production of additional building materials.

Mechanization

The bulk of agricultural machinery is owned by the state. Of state owned machinery, a small part is owned and used by sovkhoses, which are state enterprises. The vast remainder, destined for use on kolkhoz land, is owned and administered by so-called Machine Tractor Stations (MTS). The state merely sells to the kolkhozes the services of the machines and of the associated personnel.

The MTS are independent state enterprises, much as are industrial enterprises. At the head of each MTS is a director who is appointed by the regional agricultural administration (glavk). The staff consists primarily of mechanics and other maintenance personnel and of some agricultural machine operators. Until recently, most of the tractor drivers were hired seasonally from surrounding kolkhozes. Attached to the MTS also are agronomists and veterinarians (zootechnicians). It is significant that the authority immediately below the MTS director is the vice director for political affairs. The MTS are not merely sources of mechanized power, nor even this plus disseminators of technical advice, but also a major agency of political education, the outposts of urban communism in the countryside.

The MTS service the kolkhozes in their districts, receiving part of the crop as payment in kind. The kolkhozes and the MTS contract for the use during particular periods of a specified amount and type of tractor and combine service for plowing, sowing, and harvesting. The MTS aids in planning other inputs into kolkhoz agriculture as well. The agronomist may frequently work out the crop rotation plan, and decide the depth of sowing and plowing, prescribe use of fertilizer and the like. Kolkhozes until lately have paid the MTS about 20% of the crop for services performed. Tractor drivers, who are frequently members of the kolkhozes, have generally received direct payments in kind from kolkhozes, in addition to their wage from the MTS.

The entire arrangement has worked exceedingly poorly. The

provision of mechanized power to agriculture has been organized less satisfactorily than any other phase of agricultural production, perhaps than any other aspect of Soviet economic organization.

The major inadequacies in the mechanization of agriculture are related to the following circumstances. 1) The MTS are not equipped to do the job required of them. 2) The area serviced by each MTS is too large. 3) The training of personnel is inadequate. 4) Their work is improperly timed. 5) Responsibility is improperly divided. 6) The system of incentives does not induce proper performance.

These circumstances are all interconnected. The inadequacy of the incentive system is part and parcel of the preceding deficiencies.

A single MTS services about 10 kolkhozes. Thus, it supplies mechanized power to about 4,000 workers and 10,000 or more hectares of sown land, and additional fallow land. The problem of coordination inputs on this large a scale must be very difficult. Yet, as will be seen, responsibility for the decisions involved is extremely divided, and the system of incentives in use until recently did not produce coordinated performance. High as the number of machines in Soviet agriculture is, it is not high enough. Lack of capital need not itself be an organizational defect, but the inadequate supply of machinery places a heavy load on existing machinery, and this augments organizational difficulties. The workload per machine is much higher than in the United States. Proper maintenance and operation of the equipment is accordingly of prime importance, but MTS also lack adequate maintenance facilities. Their personnel is inadequately trained; spare parts are always in short supply; repair shops are poorly equipped. Until recently, tractor drivers were predominantly recruited from surrounding villages for seasonal periods only. They had insufficient training to run the machines properly, and were altogether unable to make small repairs in the field.

Improper timing of operations, to fit seasonal rhythms of crops and soil, is common. The size of the area covered by one operation is too large. Equipment breaks down continually, disrupting tight schedules of plowing or harvesting. Improper timing causes very large harvesting losses, and possibly more than wipes out the advantage of machine harvesting.

The personnel problems of the MTS are only a symptom of the general Soviet subordination of the needs of agriculture to those of industry: Able and enterprising people are attracted to the cities. An objective of recent agricultural reforms is to supply MTS with better and more permanent staffs. Tractor drivers are no longer to be merely seasonally hired kolkhoz members, but are to become permanent employees of the MTS. They are receiving much more training, some at special schools, others at training centers in the field.

The incentive system for MTS employees is inadequate to provide for proper performance of their tasks. The permanent staffs of the MTS consist of wage and salary earning employees. Their earnings depend on performance as do those of industrial workers. In the case of MTS employees, particularly of mechanics, however, stress in performance is primarily on improvement of quality rather than on increase of quantity.

Machine operators in the field have until recently received cash wages from the MTS and payments in kind from the kolkhozes they served. Payments varied with the harvest of the kolkhoz concerned. Since a well-located or well-managed kolkhoz could pay more for its work, it was to the advantage of machine operators, and the MTS generally, to concentrate their services on the more productive kolkhozes to the detriment of the weaker ones. Thus, available mechanical power was improperly allocated among potential users. Payments are now made only to the MTS itself, according to the amount of service rendered, not to the total income of the kolkhoz, and machine operators no longer receive fees from the kolkhoz. This change in the basis of payment would

seem to reduce the over-all incentive of the MTS to perform well. If MTS payments are only a function of inputs, and not of outputs, a major defect in allocation of inputs among kolkhozes is removed, but the incentive to increase total output of all kolkhozes combined is also further reduced. The fundamental difficulty lies in the separation of mechanical power from other agricultural factors, and the monopoly position of the MTS in control of the power. Separation disperses control, responsibility, and benefits. The distribution of benefits, and possibly the allocation of control and responsibility, could be handled by use of a market, as is the coordination of many other operation in the economy. But this is not compatible with the monopoly position of the MTS. Regulation of their power, by prohibiting the use of share contracts, appears not to solve the problem; it only reduces MTS incentives.

Administration

Agriculture is under the supervision of various All Union and republican ministries, the most important of which are the respective ministries of agriculture and procurement. Since the war the Council on Kolkhoz Affairs has also risen to importance. These agencies work through regional subdivisions, much as do the industrial ones. Responsibility and authority are much more divided, however, than in the case of industry. This division of authority is not compensated by the provision of a market to coordinate decisions; instead, agencies and directives are multiplied, so that the provision for decentralized decision-making appears to be smaller in agriculture than in industry. Khrushchev suggests that "the very structure of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Agriculture and Procurement and of its organs in the localities is such as to render them incapable of promptly settling the questions raised by the collective farms and the MTS".⁶⁰ He

60 - NS.Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 73.

observes additionally that "an enormous number of agricultural specialists and collective farm personnel are diverted from their direct duties and put to compiling all sorts of summaries, surveys and reports. In the course of the year every collective farm submits to its district agricultural authority returns covering some ten thousand different statistical items. The volume of statistical data that the collective farms have to submit today is nearly eight times as great as it was before the war."⁶¹ A Soviet cartoon depicts a typewriter and appends the caption "the most important agricultural machine." Directives and reports appear to play a more important role in governing day to day decisions in agriculture than in industry.

The inefficiency of the administrative machinery for agriculture is attested to by more recent speeches by Khrushchev, and by the concurrently proposed reforms. The administrative machinery has been found to be too unwieldy to take proper account of regional and other variations. Decisions made at the top, despite some provisions for modification at lower levels, have been too frequently applied wholesale to large regions, for only part of which they were appropriate. Flexibility in decision-making, more important in agriculture than in industry, has been less adequately provided for. Perhaps their zeal to reform agriculture, combined with a lack of trust in the peasantry, has prevented the Soviets from granting to agriculture the measure of freedom accorded to industry.

The recently announced reforms aim to remedy this situation. Planning for agriculture is to be drastically decentralized. Instead of planning sown areas for kolkhozes crop by crop at high administrative levels, much more generalized standards are to be announced. Lower decision-making units, including kolkhozes, are to be permitted much greater discretion in deciding the product mix with which they intend to fulfil their output plans. The formal administrative structure is to be simplified in order to unify the now divided responsibilities and authority. The MTS have been selected as one of the main recipients of

61 - Ibid. ; p. 74.

additional authority in the organization of agricultural production. It is proposed particularly that their domain be extended to include procurement and livestock raising to a much greater extent than hertofore. At the same time responsibility within the various rural branches of the Communist Party is scheduled to be consolidated.

The Soviet concern with making agriculture over in their own image has led to the consolidation in State hands of the disposition of most of the inputs and outputs of agriculture. Thus the State and/or the Party has assumed virtual monopoly control over the source of inputs of draught power and machinery, electricity, fuel, fertilizer, transport, irrigation, and seed. The Party exercises a considerable influence on the selection and placement of important agricultural personnel, and the state circumscribes the disposition of the land. This leaves peasant labor as virtually the only input which is not directly controlled by state organs. At the same time, the state has also undertaken the disposition of the bulk of the agricultural output. The result is that the peasants have few alternatives open to them other than to do the bidding of the state organs or to refuse to cooperate. Both courses may be costly in terms of their welfare. The major area of freedom in production remaining to the peasant is provided by the division of authority among the various agencies of the state and the relatively uncontrolled production and distribution of privately produced commodities.

The existence of various administrative hierarchies, each with differing scope of authority, produces a combination of authority and flexibility similar to that which appears to exist in the industrial sector. The Soviets happen to have taken only moderate advantage of this, for they have sought to enforce decrees to a greater extent in agriculture than in the industrial sector. The control exerted by the Communist Party appears to have been tighter, and the reliance on mass participation rather smaller. The reason may be that the changes wrought in agriculture have had to be much greater than those in other phases of life in Soviet times.

Remarks

The agricultural procurement system may be regarded either as an arrangement designed to force the peasants to give up their produce for urban consumption, or as a tax on agriculture. The methods of taxation used to tax the urban population are not suitable for agriculture, because of the peasants' reliance on self produced commodities. Consequently, peasants are taxed through the turnover tax on agricultural commodities. The burden of this tax is actually on the agricultural producer who is forced to pay a tax in kind amounting to the price difference between the price he receives and resale price, minus processing and distribution costs received by the State.

The turnover tax began as a tax on sales. Because this encouraged home consumption, the tax base was moved backwards into output. In order not to discourage the expansion of output the tax was moved still farther back to fall on planned output as a base. Since this still permitted the peasant to exercise some discretion in determining the size of his tax base, the tax liability was finally based on potential output measured by ownership of arable land. In other words, the turnover tax on agriculture is now actually a property tax on agricultural land held by the kolkhozes. It differs from other property taxes only in that the kolkhozes are prevented by law from avoiding tax payment by selling the land. The only recourse open to peasants is to leave agriculture altogether and enter some other vocation. The tax is payable in terms of more or less specified commodities corresponding to the delivery quotas. The only way to acquire these commodities is to produce them, unless the taxpayer is willing and able to acquire them for retail rather than government delivery prices on the open market. Substitution among commodities at government prices has been possible only to a limited extent. The recently proposed reforms which would generalize standards used in planning agricultural output would also permit the peasant greater choice among commodities with which to pay tax.

The turnover tax on agricultural commodities might be regarded as a means of collecting the earnings of the communally owned land which

the state permits the kolkhozes to use. The tax appropriates for the state the reward earned by state owned land for their contribution to production just as the MTS receives payment for the contribution of machinery, and the peasants for the contribution of labor. This interpretation would seem to be supported by the observation that delivery quotas are so adjusted among kolkhozes as to collect differential rent which might accrue to them from variation in the quality and location of their land. A rough estimate of the proportion of kolkhoz income taxed away by the turnover tax and of the proportion of farm income paid out for land rent in the United States indicates that the two are of similar magnitudes, both around 34 per cent.⁶² It may be then, that the reward of land for its contribution to agricultural production is appropriated by the state.

The state receives payment for the services of machinery provided by MTS as well. Holzman's calculations indicate, however, that the payment received by MTS has generally been larger than the productive contribution made by their equipment. While the MTS operate in the red, if their income is calculated in terms of the low delivery prices at which they receive their payment in kind, they will operate in the black if it is measured in terms of the higher "real" price of the products received. This interpretation would seem to be supported also by the observation that agricultural producers who chose not to avail themselves of the services of the MTS were forced to meet higher delivery quotas. Nonetheless, comparison of payments received by MTS indicate that they seem to be about the same as those received by owners of draught power in the 1920's.

62 - D. G. Johnson in an unpublished manuscript.

ORGANIZATION OF DISTRIBUTION

"A" - 3c

Distribution of goods and services in Ukraine is effected largely by a consumer goods market. We have seen how production is organized by means of hierarchical direction, official pricing and taxing, and a factor market. For the organization of distribution the Soviets place almost exclusive reliance on official pricing and taxation and a consumer goods market only. They mostly dispense with bureaucratic direction and permit consumer choice among available goods.

In a complex society with a high degree of division of labor, a consumer goods market is almost a necessity. The number of decisions involved in organizing the everyday distribution of all goods among all consumers is not even open to estimation. The task of distributing specified amounts of goods and services to each consumer would be impossibly complex and much too costly. We have seen that even the smaller job of allocating factors has to be handled, in part, decentrally. Consequently, the Soviets have elected to allow consumer choice to take care of most of the decisions necessary for distribution.

The effectiveness of the wage incentive system also appears to be dependent on the availability of consumer choice. The preceding section demonstrated how the operation of the labor market is organized largely by an incentive system tied to wage differentials. If wage earners in their capacity as consumers were unable to spend differential wages differently, much of the incentive effects of differential wages would probably disappear. The complexity of a differential consumption pattern can only be handled by consumer market choice.

Consumer claims to goods and services derive almost exclusively from productive services rendered by the consumers in their capacities as producers. In the Soviet Union these services are largely labor services and are remunerated in the form of wages and salaries. Most property is owned by the state, and most property income is disposed by the state.⁶³ The only major exception to this is agricultural income.

⁶³ - Purchasing power due to credit creation also accrues eventually in the form of wages since all effective demand for non-labor factors

Privately owned residences and the income derived from them constitute a minor exception. For present purposes, however, it is possible to treat collective farm income as though it were a wage income, leaving only independently earned income as deriving from owned property.⁶⁴ A minor exception is interest received from invested monetary stocks. The claims are, of course, expressed in monetary terms. The supply of money in the economy, therefore, is significant in determining the amount of claims. The supply of money is, in turn, formally governed by the Cash Plan of the Financial Plan. Actually, however, the size of wage payments almost fully determines the amount of current purchasing power, except for that derived from the free market for agricultural produce. (This distinction in the determination of purchasing power was dramatically illustrated by the relative rise of peasant earnings during the Second World War and by the subsequent Monetary reform of 1947 which drastically reduced the value of these accumulated earnings.) In other words, the size of output and wage level per unit time determine the level of purchasing power per unit time, except for aberrations due to monetary savings.

The amount of money payment received by the population for production is not matched by the money value of goods available on the market. The producer-consumers are paid for the services they render in the production of all goods and services. Many of these goods and services never reach the consumer goods market, on which that payment becomes purchasing power. A large part of the goods and services produced is distributed through channels other than the consumer goods market. These goods and their channels of distribution fall roughly into the following categories: producers goods, distributed through the factor market; administration, distributed through the hierarchies; armaments, distributed through a special market; social and cultural services, inso-

in one part of the economy must be matched by a reduction of demand for factors elsewhere.

64 - The previous section discussed the special problems for taxation that are due to the form in which income is received by peasants.

far as not purchased on the market, mainly distributed hierarchically without reference to consumer choice. The first two categories were considered in previous sections of this paper; the last two will receive little attention in this paper, except for some discussion of education and allied services.

The Soviet Union for various reasons of economic, political, and social policy does not distribute a large proportion of the goods produced through the consumer goods market. It devotes a large part of its production to investment because of its policy of developing the economy. It spends considerable resources on defense and administration for reasons of apparent political necessity. It either dispenses with, or prohibits the use of, consumer choice in the distribution of many social and cultural services which in Western economies are distributed through the market. The Soviets apparently feel that some of these services everybody would want in roughly equal amounts anyway, so that they can be distributed by fiat. They wish to promote the consumption of others, like compulsory education, regardless of what the wishes of individual consumers might be.

The diversion of a large proportion of production from the market, given Soviet and Western methods of pricing, introduces a large inequality between purchasing power and claims on goods available for purchase on that market. Payment is made for the production of all goods, but not all goods that are produced come to the market (although, as we said, they are distributed in other ways). The market is not well able to distribute the goods available among the potential consumers unless the monetary claims are equated, at least roughly, to the money value of the goods available.

There are two obvious methods available to equate effective demand and supply on the consumer goods market. The first of these is to set the prices of consumer goods high enough so that their purchase will absorb all of the purchasing power generated in the production of goods, both distributed through the market and elsewhere. This would require attaching prices to consumer goods which are entirely out of keeping with their costs of production. Since the same kind of goods (pencils, for instance) are frequently purchased both by consumers and producers, pricing without regard to costs would interfere in turn with the operation of the factor

market. For this reason, apparently, the Soviets regard high cost-prices as generally impractical.

The other method of equating effective demand to supply on the consumers goods market is to reduce the effective demand below the level it would attain if all receipts were used to bid on the market.⁶⁵ By and large, this is what the Soviets have elected to do. There are, in turn, a variety of ways to make effective demand lower than receipts, that is, to close the inflationary gap. Among these are voluntary saving, borrowing from the public, and taxation in its various forms. The Soviets rely on all of these.

The principle instruments used by the Soviets to narrow the inflationary gap are the turnover tax, various "budgetary differences," the personal income tax on urban people, the income tax on peasants, the tax on cooperatives, and the sale of government bonds. Social insurance payments and such components of price which do exceed costs might equally well be considered "taxation," that is, reductions of purchasing power. Of these, the turnover tax, including its auxiliary, the budgetary difference, is by far the most significant. The discussion of the organization of distribution will turn on the role of the turnover tax. The income taxes, although effective in reducing purchasing power, may more appropriately be discussed as instruments of income distribution. The reasons which would seem to explain the Soviet reliance on sales taxation rather than on income taxation, for instance, may be advanced after closer examination of price formation and taxation.

Pricing consumer goods and setting the rates of the turnover tax are the major tasks involved in organizing the distribution of consumer goods, given that the market and the agents in it (consumers and sellers) are already in operation. Prices to consumers include the sales tax. The tax is paid at one stage or another of the distributive process, often at that of the wholesaler. The tax is passed on, but the Soviets take care

65 - One might think that a third method would be to increase supply. But if this means increasing production, this method is illusory; it increases purchasing power at the same time.

not to pyramid the taxes. Prices are set mostly by the ministries, including the Republican ministries.

The significant aspects of price formation seem to be the following. The price to the final consumer is set so as to equate demand and supply at that price for the particular good and to help equate demand (as expressed by outstanding purchasing power) and supply of all goods. The cost of the good is calculated. The cost, including necessary transportation costs and dealers markups, is subtracted from the price. The difference is designated to be absorbed by the turnover tax. In other words, the turnover tax is the residual left over after necessary costs have been deducted from the price. This appears to be an attempt to tax away that "consumers surplus" generated by the distribution, and changes in the size, of income among groups given the existing pattern of tastes.⁶⁶ The tax is generally expressed as a percentage of price. Sometimes, for agricultural goods particularly, the Soviets use physical units of the commodity as a base.

Three refinements of this arrangement deserve separate treatment. They refer to marginal adjustments of the consumer price or turnover tax, incorrect anticipation of future purchasing power, and the maintenance of a sellers market. I shall discuss these in turn.

Marginal adjustments of the final price are necessary to make the system work properly. The Soviet economy exhibits geographical and temporal variations of both cost and demand for commodities of any one consumer good category. The cost of production for similar goods differs from one enterprise or locality to another. Tastes on the one hand and the amount of purchasing power on the other hand also differ among localities. Both cost and demand also change over time. If the turnover tax had to bridge the gap between cost and price of one category of goods for the entire economy, the adjustment would be impossibly rough. The "budgetary difference," which goes under a variety of names, permits a finer adjustment. At the same time marginal variation of the budgetary adjustment permits retention of the basic turnover tax rates for a larger area and for a longer period of time. The turnover tax rate is a rough

66 - It is not feasible, of course, to appropriate from each individual the consumers surplus which is due to differences in taste among the population (as represented by the triangle under the demand curve).

estimate of the tax necessary to mop up the previously indicated part of "consumer surplus" (in the small) and any excess purchasing power (in the large). The budgetary difference varies locally and over time; and it absorbs remaining marginal differences. The term "turnover tax" generally refers to both of these, as it well should, because they are substantially the same thing except for some administrative differences. The use of the budgetary difference as a supplement to the turnover tax merely increases the flexibility of the arrangement.

Frequently, the price-setting authorities estimate future purchasing power incorrectly. The shortage of factors, non-human and human, relative to the plan influenced demand for their use, exerts an upward pressure on their prices. Since non-human factors, except for some used in agriculture, are almost exclusively state owned, the pressure on their prices does not affect the amount of purchasing power. The pressure on the price of labor is reflected in continually rising money wages, and this does increase the amount of purchasing power, often beyond the expectations for a particular period. Since the tax rates and prices are by that time already set for that period, this excess purchasing power remains unabsorbed. It may become absorbed by appropriately high prices in the succeeding period, although by then wages may again have risen unexpectedly. This helps to account for the inflation of some years past.

Inflation and the resultant sellers market were, however, a continual part of the Soviet picture for many years. Had the government been really intent on altering this situation, it would surely have been able to do so. We can only reason that the Soviets must have had reasons which led them to prefer this arrangement to alternative ones. One might speculate that these reasons were similar to those suggested in explanation of the continued excess of demand over supply in the factor market. Additionally, it might be argued that the Soviets regard some pressure on the consumer as a small price to pay to reap the benefits of the money illusion which they seem to presume to exist among wage earners. In any case, it should be emphasized that demand and supply are equated tolerably well, and that the excess, although widely felt, is not necessarily very large.

A short analysis of the relation between the structure of the turnover tax and three other matters may be offered in additional support of the foregoing interpretation of the organization of distribution. I refer to the pattern of tax yield due to differences among commodities, to the relation of the regional pattern of taxes with that of investment, and to the relation of the pattern of turnover taxation over time to that of investment.

In a study of sales taxation between 1934 and 1940 in the Soviet Union it was found that 63.1 per cent of the revenue from the sales tax came from the purchase of food, and 76.3 per cent of the revenue was derived from the purchase of food, clothing and shoes combined.⁶⁷ It was evident that the great bulk of tax revenue was derived from commodities which account for much the largest part of the consumer's budget and for which the elasticity of demand is relatively low. The proportion of consumer income spent on these items helps to make a tax on them highly regressive. A very regressive tax is better suited to absorbing purchasing power than a less regressive one. Arguing in reverse, this suggests that if narrowing an inflationary gap is the Soviet ambition, the turnover tax is a most suited instrument. Low elasticity implies that only a high price will absorb all of the consumer surplus. Arguing similarly, it may be suggested that the intent to capture consumer surplus recommended the turnover tax.

The same study also estimated the following relative per capita incidence of the sales tax for 1936: Uzbekistan .756; Belorussia .697; R. S. F. S. R. .680; Ukraine .657; Georgia .423; Kirghizistan .307.⁶⁸ Note that the highest incidence is registered for Uzbekistan and the lowest for Georgia and Kirghizistan. This pattern correlates well with the pattern of regional income received from the production of a high percentage of commodities not entering the consumer goods market. Uzbekistan is a region in which a large proportion of agricultural production was of

67 - Coogan, Sales Tax in the Soviet Union, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950.

68 - Ibid., p. 300. Relative per capita incidence is defined as
$$\frac{\text{Trade volume per capita}}{\text{Sales tax per capita.}}$$

technical crops (producers goods), in which there was a small kolkhoz market, and in which there was relatively high investment. The opposite was true of Georgia and Kirghizistan. If it is indeed true that the turnover tax is meant to absorb purchasing power created in production which is not matched by the goods available in that market, then we should expect tax rates to be relatively high in regions in which a large proportion of the production is of commodities other than consumer goods, and low in those in which consumers goods make up a large part of total output. This expectation is borne out by the figures. The fact that the tax is shown to be relatively high in regions with well developed markets and a high trade turnover (Belorussia, Ukraine and R. S. F. S. R.) and low in the others, lends additional support to the argument.

The relation between relative tax yields from the turnover tax over time and the pattern of investment, similarly, appears to bear out the analysis of the organization of distribution. Another study of Soviet taxation found the following:⁶⁹

Year	<u>Tax Receipts</u> <u>Gross Value of</u> <u>Retail Trade</u>	<u>Percentage markup</u>
1931	47.	90
1935	63.	173
1937	60.3	151
1938	57.4	134
1939	59.3	145
1940	60.5	153
1947	77.3	340
1948	71.3	248
1949	63.8	176
1950	54.7	120

This pattern of the turnover tax correlates well with the time pattern of investment. The rise in the turnover tax rate to 1935 is accompanied by the then increases in investment expenditures under the first Five Year Plan. The decline between 1936 and 1938 was accompanied by the wider introduction of the profits tax and the relative shift to the production of consumption goods under the second Five Year Plan. The rise to 1940 suggests the increase in armaments expenditures and the increased reliance

69 - Holzman, op. cit., p. 187.

placed on the profits tax (the turnover tax was largely removed from producers). Again, high non-consumption production seems to be associated with high rates of turnover taxation.

A few words about the nature of the consumers goods market in the postwar era may be in place here.⁷⁰ The monetary reform of 1947 abolished wartime rationing and drastically reduced the value of outstanding purchasing power. One new ruble was issued for every ten old cash rubles; other rates of exchange were used for assets held in different forms. The section on the distribution of income will treat the distributive effects of the reform, which were aimed principally at reducing the cash stocks of peasants accumulated on kolkhoz markets during the war. Between 1947 and 1951 the percentage of total budgetary receipts, from the turnover tax, fell from 62 per cent to 53.5 per cent while those from the profits tax rose from 6.2 per cent to 15 per cent.⁷¹

This decline in the budgetary significance of the turnover tax, like the changes in postwar figures cited previously, may be traced to the increase in production of consumers goods and the price reductions of 1947 and of March 1, 1949, 1950, and 1951. The increase in the quantity of consumer goods maintained the level of aggregate turnover tax receipts at roughly the same level despite the decline in tax rates. (Profits taxes also declined with the better alignment of costs and prices in the factor market consequent to the reduction of subsidies.)

Consumers are still faced by three sets of prices. The most important of these is the set of official prices charged by state stores for industrial commodities and the minimum of agricultural commodities. Food products are also available at cooperative stores at "decentralized," but controlled and higher prices. Lastly, prices on the kolkhoz market are freely determined by demand and supply on each market. Because of the prevalence of the sellers' market in the other two markets, the price on the kolkhoz market is generally still higher. Since the 1947 monetary reform the Soviet Union has also been divided into three broad price

70 - A description of the consumer goods market will appear in the section on the structure of the economy.

71 - Holzman, op. cit., p. 330.

belts or zones. Zone I comprises Ukraine, Belorussia, the Crimea, the Baltic Republics and the Stalingrad area. Zone II includes the Moscow and Leningrad area. The remainder of the Soviet Union falls into Zone III. Basic prices are roughly the same in each zone. The general price level is the lowest in Zone I and the highest in Zone III. Price differences on industrial goods over and above those necessary to defray transportation costs have also prevailed between urban and rural areas. Rural prices have generally been higher. But the per capita incidence of the turnover tax is made higher in urban than rural areas. The explanation for these relations might be sought in the relative incomes earned in these sectors, and by the relation between their productive and consumption patterns.

To summarize, the organization of distribution is achieved primarily through the use of a consumer goods market using officially set prices and tax rates. Prices exclusive of taxes are usually roughly consonant with costs. Taxes then account for the differential between cost price and consumer price. If the "pure" price does not correspond to costs, then it becomes impossible to distinguish between "price" and "tax." In that case, pricing and taxing are the same thing: "pricing" to influence the distribution of goods. But even if pricing and taxing are not so fused, the rate of "burden" of taxation of the public has no useful independent meaning. The tax yield is planned so as to absorb all of the public's purchasing power which, though generated by production, is not matched by goods channeled through the consumer goods market. The tax "burden" therefore reflects prior decisions made about the product mix of the economy as a whole and about the industrial channels of distribution to be used.⁷² The Soviets decide to produce so many producer goods, so many armaments, so much administration, so much social and cultural service. They decide to distribute these to their users by particular methods: the factor market, consumer goods market, compulsory consumption, et cetera. They have the effective power to

72 - The relative burden among different segments of the population is another question and will be discussed in the section on income distribution.

do so. They set prices and taxes to implement these decisions.⁷³

The Distribution of Income

The present section is concerned with the organization of distribution of effective claims to goods and services among different agents in the economy.⁷⁴ The differential payment to labor for productive effort supplies and "distributes" money claims to a large part of the population. The several ways of payment for agricultural production distribute claims to those of the remaining, indeed the larger part, of the population. The relation between the amount of claims received by any one group to those received by another group, or the relations of income received by smaller categories of people, is influenced by various considerations of maintaining appropriate relations between costs and prices and of providing for adequate incentives. Most important decisions pertaining to distribution of income are centrally made.

The relative values of purchasing power to consumers are influenced by several additional circumstances. Relative values depend in part on the pattern of tastes of the consumers and the conformance of the product mix to the pattern of tastes. We have seen that the product mix is relatively centrally decided. The pattern of consumer goods prices is a significant element in the relative degree of satisfaction of tastes by different consumers. We have seen how these prices are set and how the variation in the components of price may affect the distribution of real income among consumers. Most of these decisions with regard to alternatives open to the consumer are made centrally. The choices are

73 - It is, of course, possible to look at this coin from the other side and to say that the Soviets tax the public a particular amount and then dispose of the resources so "acquired": I prefer the interpretation here advanced, because it seems to me better to permit the emphasis of essentials. However, one might wonder why the Soviets do not just rely on market forces to bring demand and supply to rough equality on the consumer goods market instead of using complicated and expensive administrative methods to do so.

74 - An attempt will be made to estimate the distribution of income by region and by other categories in the part of the paper dealing with the structure of the economy.

actually made decentrally by the various consumers. We have seen that monetary policy (the 1947 monetary reform, for instance) also is influential in the determination of the distribution of income.

The distribution of income, it appears, is by and large determined centrally. Questions of economic expedience, political policy and social equity all play their part. At the margin the distribution of income is influenced by decentralized decisions with respect to workers choice in the labor market and consumer choice in the consumer goods market. One additional instrument in the distribution of income deserves special mention: the income tax.

The Soviet income tax is an instrument of social policy. The urban income tax contributes about five per cent of the revenue and the rural income tax about three-four per cent. The anti-inflationary efforts of this reduction in purchasing power could be equally well brought about by a slight increase in turnover tax rates. The task of the income tax cannot, however, be well accomplished by the turnover tax. The turnover tax, as we have seen, is a rough instrument. Even the adjustments made feasible by the budgetary differences are useful only to effect regional and temporal variations. The income tax permits variation of the tax burden among social classes.

The urban income tax is almost proportional with respect to the amount of income received. Moreover, the top basic rate is 13 per cent. However, the tax schedule distinguishes among types of recipients of income: 1 a) Workers, salaried employees, students, others; 1 b) artisans and handicraft workers (in cooperatives); 2) artists; 3) recipients of independent incomes (professionals); 4) artisans and handicraft workers not in cooperatives, and recipients of income not derived from employment (priests, et cetera). The rates of taxation applied to recipients of income in these various classes vary enormously. Marginal rates in class 1-a rise from no tax to 13 per cent (marginal) tax on incomes in the 12,000 to 18,000 ruble bracket. The rates do not rise beyond that. Tax rates in class 1-b are ten per cent higher than those in class 1-a in each bracket. In contrast, rates for classes 2, 3, and 4 rise from rates of 1.5 per cent, 2 per cent, and 3 per cent, respectively, to marginal rates of 23 per cent, 55 per cent, and 56 per cent, respectively, for the 70,000 to 100,00 ruble

bracket. These are the highest marginal rates applied, except that for class 2 the marginal rate for the 300,000 ruble and over bracket also rises to 55 per cent.⁷⁵ The income tax rates are visibly designed to discourage the selection of particular ways of earning a living, and they penalize recipients of particular types of income for reasons of social policy.

Some auxiliary tax provisions have analogous influence on the distribution of income. The schedule of exemptions from the payment of income taxes refers to the following categories, among others: invalids and Heroes of the Soviet Union receive exemptions up to a certain amount of income; soldiers, Stalin Prize winners and pensioners are totally exempt; families with three or more dependents are entitled to a 30 per cent reduction. The small tax on families is similar to the last named exemption.

Income taxation of agricultural producers is more difficult to outline briefly. Moreover, recent months have seen important changes in the provisions of the tax law. It can be said, however, that the agricultural income tax is a similar instrument of social policy. Indeed, it has been used more sharply. The rates of taxation are moderately progressive on an index of estimated peasant income. The rates of taxation for peasants outside of state or collective farms have, however, been 100 per cent higher than corresponding rates for kolhozniks. Households in which some members did not work were penalized by a 20 per cent increase in the tax rates over the base rates. Enforcement of social policy through the use of differential taxation is even better illustrated by historical examples, such as the heavy taxation of kulaks.

In summary, the distribution of income is the result of a large number of factors. Taxation is among these, but is only one of several important ones. To understand how a particular distribution of income comes about it is necessary to study all of these aspects of Soviet economic organization. A knowledge of existing tax rates does not explain the income distribution.

75 - These and the following data are selected from Holzman, op. cit., p. 247. Holzman's source is Mar'iakhin, Nalaogi, pp. 61-68.

TRENDS

The organization of economic activity exhibits what appears to be a trend toward increasing decentralization. Conflict between the demands of authority and flexibility, brought to the fore in the preceeding pages, has been a major problem of Soviet economic organization. The surprisingly large concessions made to flexibility notwithstanding, the costs of provision for and maintenance of authority have been large. The economic costs may be summarized in terms of the misallocation of resources among uses for which the various provisions for authority have been primarily responsible. Although these costs may have been relatively small compared to the benefits in terms of economic growth, and the successful implementation of other Soviet economic, political, and social policies, the time pattern of the introduction of organizational changes suggests increasing Soviet concern over the size of these costs. The problem of authority and the intended solution of increased decentralization are reflected in three major areas of Soviet economic organization, which were discussed in the preceding pages: investment decisions and the pricing of factors, the labor market, and the administration of agriculture.

The introduction, since 1950, of a new set of prices into the factor market represents a major step towards decentralization. Economic growth had been based on the establishment of "infant industries," industries which were unprofitable during the early years of their existence but which, it was anticipated, would pay their way once on their feet. These industries required "protection" just as they do elsewhere. They needed subsidies; and the subsidies were administered through a price system in which prices did not reflect real costs. The price on the products of an infant industry was maintained low in order to permit and encourage other industries to use these products. The resulting loss to the infant industries was made up by outright subsidies from the budget. Funds for the budget were, and are, derived from taxes on the profits of other enterprises and from the turnover tax which for these purposes amounts to the same thing.

The costs of this arrangement exceeded those of the subsidies

themselves, because it entailed the maintenance of an inadequate pricing system. Some of these costs became apparent in the course of the preceding discussion. The pricing system interfered with the operation of the incentive system provided by *khozraschet*. It reduced incentives to economize in the use of scarce products, or allocation need not have been so dependent on the use of maxima. The system made very difficult, if not impossible, the determination of alternative costs; consequently it inhibited the organization of economic allocation of resources.

These and other ancillary costs of maintaining prices out of line with costs appear increasingly to have troubled the Soviets. Subsidies had drawn increasing criticism in Soviet economic journals. Finally, subsidies were drastically reduced; and prices were made more representative of alternative costs. In consequence, decentralized decisions have a greater impact on centralized decision-making; and a larger number of decisions can themselves be decentrally arrived at.

Our examination of postwar developments in the labor market suggests the existence of a trend toward greater reliance on decentralized decision there as well. The laws of 1940 have found decreasing application, either because employers increasingly permit workers to change jobs and/or because the restrictive provisions are enforced less and less. Indeed, as we noted, some of the provisions have even been omitted from a recent edition of a standard text on labor law. The appeals for workers, voiced in the press on behalf of various enterprises and regions, suggest renewed reliance on the market for the allocation of labor.

The most spectacular evidence of increased decentralization is offered by Khrushchev's recent speeches and the subsequent reforms in agricultural administration. Many agricultural decisions, including many concerned with the product mix, have been transferred from high administrative agents to the *kolkhozes*. Agricultural prices as well are being brought into line with costs of production in order to permit increased substitution of market incentives for administrative decrees and sanctions.

Developments in these three major areas corroborate the likelihood of increasing reliance on decentralized decision making for the organization of economic activity in the Soviet Union and its subdivision.

STRUCTURE OF UKRAINIAN AGRICULTURE

"A"-3a

The changing structure of Ukrainian agriculture may conveniently be discussed by investigating the changes in the amounts and proportions of inputs, the changing pattern of outputs, and the apparent effects of inputs on outputs. A short review of the postwar recovery and an evaluation of future trends and possibilities, particularly with respect to the corn-livestock program, will conclude the discussion.

Inputs

I shall consider the following kind of inputs: land, including irrigation; labor; machine and live power; electric power; and buildings and associated improvements. Information on fertilizer and similar inputs is insufficiently available to permit evaluation. Organization, which may properly be regarded as an input, was discussed in an earlier section.

Land

The total area of the Ukraine comprises about 60,260,000 hectares (148,842,000 A.). Before the recent addition of the Crimea the area was 57,600,000 ha. (142,272,000 A.).⁷⁸ Of this about 80 per cent is now considered arable land, which includes sown and fallow land, pastures, orchards, and the like. The Soviets continually try to increase the proportion of land sown to crops, but their success therein has been very small.

Actual sown area generally lags behind plans, and the increase within the post-1939 boundaries (not including the Crimea) has been from 30,243,000 ha.⁷⁹ in 1940 to 30,546,000 ha. in 1953.⁸⁰ The

78 - Great Soviet Encyclopedia, German Edition, 1952, Vol. 2, p. 1892

79 - Kalendar Dovidnyk na 1945 Rik (Information Calendar for the Year 1945), Ukrains'ke Derzhavne Vydavnystvo, p. 197.

80 - From a radio broadcast; data unavailable.

latter figure does, however, represent a considerable increase over the 1945 area, reduced to 22,682,000 ha. by the war.⁸¹ Draining of marshes in Polesia has made only small contributions to agricultural land. Irrigation, particularly in connection with the South Ukrainian Canal project, may add to and improve the crop area in the future. The increased use of newer lands in the Southeast (New Russia) deserves mention.

Past and proposed shifts in population and the substitution of winter wheat for spring wheat bear out this emphasis. Hectares of arable land per rural resident vary from 0.5 to 1 in the Western and Northern oblasts but reach 1.7 to 2.5 in the southern ones and 3.3 in the Crimea.⁸² The government is encouraging migration from the former areas and from some areas in the R.S.F.S.R. to the latter areas.

In short, inputs of land in comparable areas have not varied greatly except for the wartime reduction and the postwar recovery. The share of Ukrainian sown area of the U.S.S.R. total has, however, fallen, and is likely to fall further. The Ukraine, although still an important agricultural area, is yielding its place as the primary Russian agricultural producer to newer lands in Siberia.

Labor

Labor input in Ukrainian agriculture is high by American and European standards. No published figures referring to agricultural labor are available, but it has been possible to estimate some orders of magnitude . These estimates are presented in the following table. "Labor force in agriculture" is intended to measure those persons working only , and those persons working principally, in agriculture,

81 - Akademiia Nauk Ukrains'koi R.S.R. Instytut Ekonomyky. Narysy Rozvytku Narodnoho Hospodarstva Ukrains'koi R.S.R. (Outline of the Development of the Economy of the Ukrainian S.S.R.) Vydavnytstvo A.N. U.R.S.R., Kiev, 1949, p. 512.

82 - Bulletin on Soviet Economic Development, June 1954, p. 14.

but neither everybody doing any agricultural work nor merely those doing nothing but agricultural work.⁸³ "Population in agriculture" refers to the labor force and dependents. "Rural population", which is available from published sources, refers to a still larger number of people.

Table 2
POPULATION AND LABOR IN AGRICULTURE
(in millions)

		Rural Population	Population in Agriculture	Labor Force in Agriculture
1926	Absolute	23.6	22.4	14.1
	% of total	81.5	77.5	48.8
1938	Absolute	19.7	17.0	9.8
	% of total	63.8	53.2	30.7
1952	Absolute	24.0		
	% of total	60 (or less)		

The table suggests a number of important observations. The percentage of population living in rural areas has fallen somewhat more than 25 per cent since 1926, but it remains nearly 60 per cent of the total population. At the same time the percentage of the population that may be counted in the agricultural labor force has fallen by more than 33 per cent and now probably stands at somewhat less than 30 percent. Compared to about 6 per cent in the United States for 1952, this is still high. The difference in labor power may be somewhat smaller than that in labor force because in Ukraine the proportion of women in the agricultural labor force is very high. It was around 50 per cent during the thirties, but has certainly risen considerably because of wartime decimation of the male population.

83 - These distinctions are Warren Eason's, on whose work these estimates are based. The Agricultural Labor Force and Population of the U.S.S.R. : 1926-41.

Nonetheless, labor input in Ukrainian agriculture is high.

Despite the high labor input, a considerable proportion of the rural population and even of the agricultural population appears to make no productive contribution. The rural population, which includes rural people not engaged in agricultural pursuits, was about twice the size of the agricultural labor force in 1939. Even the agricultural population outside of, and presumably dependent on it, comprised 75 per cent of the agricultural labor force. Since rural population as a percentage of total population has fallen only moderately since before the war, the 1939 percentages for population and labor force in agriculture probably still give the correct order of magnitude. Only the difference between the percentages is likely to have narrowed, reflecting the likelihood that a larger percentage of rural women work than before the war (which in turn raises the percentage of women in the agricultural labor force).

The rate of decreases of the agricultural labor force appears to have fallen fairly consistently since the late thirties. The reasons for this trend are examined in the sections on organization and on industry. Here it may be observed that the maintenance of a relatively large labor force in agriculture may be wise and necessary in view of the recently enlarged demands placed on the agricultural sector. The new livestock program and the associated corn program are likely to place a heavy load on the available supply of agricultural labor. Livestock, raising particularly of cattle and hogs, may involve very labor-intensive production. This is necessarily the case when, as the succeeding sections demonstrate, appropriate capital equipment is practically non-existent. The corn program if carried out also promises to draw heavily on labor. Even in the United States, where mechanical equipment for harvesting corn is available, corn harvested for grain requires about 2.5 times as much labor as an equivalent amount of small grains such as wheat. Corn harvested for silage only -- and this is a major element of the new Soviet program -- demands about 75 percent more labor still. Thus for every hectare taken out of small grains and put into corn, agriculture should expect to expend 3 to 4 times as much labor -- even with the existence of cooperating harvesting and storage facilities. But these

remain largely unavailable in the Ukraine.⁸⁴

Machine and Live Power

Mechanization of agriculture has been a highly publicized Soviet policy. Use of live power has fallen both proportionately and absolutely. The horse population in the prewar boundaries fell from 5.6 million in 1929⁸⁵ to 3.3 million in 1940⁸⁶ and stood at 2.4 million in 1953 for postwar boundaries. In contrast, the number of agricultural machines has risen spectacularly, as the accompanying table illustrates.

Table 3
SELECTED FARM MACHINES
(in thousands)

	Tractors		Combines		Trucks	
	Total	M. T. S.	Total	M. T. S.	Total	M. T. S.
1920	.07					
1928	9.6	0.9				
1932	31.1	21.7	4.8 ^x	0.3 ^x	8	2
1937	83.9	79.3	26.7	21.5	21	15 ^y
1940 ^z	90 _{108.5}	74 ₁₀₂	31 ₃₂	25 ₂₆	50	35
1945 ^z	45.9 _{51.0}	46	15			
1946	53	42				
1947	53	43.8				
1948	less than 1940					
1952	167		44			
1953	182	152	51	41		
1954 ^z		159 ₁₆₁		45		
1955		160		45		27

Notes: x = 1933

y = 1937

z = disagreement among sources.

The planned distribution of total draught power in 1950 was 77.6 per cent mechanical and 22.4 per cent live. It may be seen that the bulk of mechanical power is owned by the M. T. S. Horses are owned mostly by kokholzes.

Mechanization of some agricultural tasks has increased rapidly with the introduction of these machines. The following table illustrates the percentages of plowing, sowing, and harvesting of grain, sugar beet and sunflower for selected years.

Table 4				
PERCENTAGE MECHANIZATION of				
	Plowing	Sowing Grain	Harvesting Grain. Sugar beet	Sunflower
1940 ^a	92	60	46	
1948	84	51		
1953 ^b	94	81	67	
1954 ^c	96	90	77	86 ^d 95 ^e

Sources:

- a - Virnyk op. cit., p. 32
- b - Rad'ians'ka Ukraina (Kiev), March 24, 1955
- c - Komunist Ukrainy, No. 3, March 1955
- d - United Nations Economic and Social Council, Full Implementation of Full Employment and Balance of Payment Policies, April 28, 1954, E2565.
- e - U.S. Department of State. Agricultural Information Compiled From the XVI Session of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. June 21, 1949.

In the Southeastern regions mechanization is even greater than is shown by these average figures which also cover the less mechanized

84 - The preceding prognosis is based on estimates made in D.G. Johnson's Analysis of Krushchev's Report on Livestock Produce.

85 - I. Mirchuk, Op. cit., p. 140.

86 - Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, t. 55, p. 817.

Western areas acquired after 1939. The increased number of machines accounts for most of this progress. Part of it, however, appears to be due to improved productivity of the machines and operators, for the hectare plowing equivalent per tractor has risen from 416 in 1934 to 539 in 1940 to 696 in 1954.⁸⁷

For other crops these tasks are much less mechanized. Planting and harvesting of potatoes and vegetables particularly remains dependent on hand labor. Adequate machinery for the proposed expansion of corn acreage is still in the design and production stage.

The previously noted high labor inputs are easily reconciled with this apparently high degree of mechanization by the following observation by Krushchev:⁸⁸

"Grain production is the most mechanized branch of agriculture, but even here a number of labor-consuming jobs are poorly mechanized or not mechanized at all. This refers above all to post-harvest processing of grain (cleaning and drying) weighing, loading and unloading grain, and harvesting and stacking of straw and chaff. In view of this, considerably more labor is consumed on post-harvest processing of grain and the harvesting of straw and chaff than on all preceding operations in raising grain crops. The problem of completing the complex mechanization of sugar beets is an acute one. Reports indicate that the harvesting of sugar beets is mechanized 80 percent; i in reality only 7 percent of the sugar beets is harvested by combines, while the remaining 73 percent is harvested by beet diggers. Furthermore, the beet digger is virtually an old spade. Its use mechanizes only the process of digging up the beets, while the remaining operations are done by hand . . ."⁸⁹

87 - D.F. Virnyk, "Dopomozhemo shvydshe zahoity tiazhki rany zapo- diiani viinoiu," (We Will Help to Heal Quickly the Wounds of the War), Visti of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, No. 4-5, 1945, pp. 65-66. For earlier years, the following percentage figures seem to apply:

	1928	1932	1937	1938
Machine	4	22.2	66.7	69.9
Animal	96	77.8	33.3	30.1

Cf. Gregor Makhiv, Collectivization of Agriculture in Ukraine, Research Program on the U.S.S.R., New York. Unpublished manuscript.

88 - Narysy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva. . ., pp. 399, 450; Komunist Ukrainy, No. 3, March 1955, p. 26.

89 - Pravda, March 21, 1954, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, May 5, 1954, p. 8.

Moreover, the care and feeding of livestock is hardly mechanized at all as the following table indicates.

Table 5	
MECHANIZATION OF WORK IN LIVESTOCK BREEDING IN COLLECTIVE FARMS IN 1954 (in percentages)	
Supply of water	27
Automatic watering	25
Steaming of fodder	27
Electric milking	2
Transport of fodder within kolkhoz	5
Siloing	49
Hay stacking	1
Hay making	44

Source: Komunist Ukrainy, No. 3, March 1955, p. 29

In short, mechanization has substantially replaced live draft power and some labor in the major tasks of cultivation. Its contribution to crop production affects about one-third of the requirements.⁹⁰ However, mechanization of livestock production and of auxiliary processes in crop production remains small. But it is just these tasks that demand large amounts of labor or show very low labor productivity. It will appear in a subsequent section that the productivity of land (yield) is reduced by these same circumstances. Continued increase in the number of tractors and combines will help to reduce the severe strain under which the machines and their operators now work. It will not, however, contribute greatly to improve livestock production or to reduce harvesting losses. Much less will it eliminate the large labor inputs. This awaits greater availability of electric or gasoline powered small equipment and a larger and better supply of buildings and allied improvements.

90 - Estimated in D.G. Johnson, The Study of the Growth Potential of Agriculture in the U.S.S.R., (unpublished manuscript), p. 34.

Electric Power

A major substitute for labor in American agriculture is electricity, but the Ukraine is very inadequately provided with electricity. The number of rural electric stations rose from 3200 in 1940⁹¹ to 4800 in 1954⁹². The number of stations built in the postwar years is of course greater than these figures indicate because wartime losses had also to be replaced. The percentage of kolkhozes using electricity rose from 4.7 percent in 1940⁹³ to 11 percent in 1949⁹⁴ and then to 25 percent in 1953.⁹⁵ However, the last percentage rise may be charged almost entirely to the reduction by almost half of the number of kolkhozes during that period. Sovkholzes and M.T.S., which a few years ago also were frequently without electricity, are now almost 100 percent electrified.⁹⁶ This must have meant substantial increases in percentage electrification in the Western oblasts.

Percentage electrification, low as it remains for kolkhozes, does not tell the entire story. Electric capacity in rural areas was variously reported to be 82,900 kw at the end of 1947 (142 percent of 1940)⁹⁷ and 58,670 kw in March 1948.⁹⁸ Taking the higher figure, this still is only 27 kw per station and suggests that even where electricity is available it does not perform many tasks. The fourth five year plan called for an increase of capacity to 20,300 kw.⁹⁹ In his recent speeches Krushchev has laid great emphasis on electrification of labor consuming tasks,

91 - Akademiia Nauk Ukrain's'koi R.S.R. Instytut Ekonomiky. Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii U.R.S.R. (Outline of the Economic Geography of the Ukrainian S.S.R.). Kiev. Vydavnytstvo A.N. U.R.S.R., 1949, Vol. 1, p. 410.

92 - Narysy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva . . ., p. 538.

93 - Computed from Kalendar dovidnik na 1947 rik. . ., p. 222.

94 - Computed from Pravda, August 17, 1949.

95 - Computed from Komunist Ukrainy, No. 3, March 1955, p. 31.

96 - Virnyk, op.cit.; p. 56.

97 - Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie, January 5, 1949.

98 - Pravda, April 14, 1948.

99 - Comparable data for the Western oblasts only in 1948 are: 65 stations, 1260 kw. capacity, for 90 kolkhozes and 65 M.T.S. Source: ibid.

particularly of livestock production. The progress of rural electrification, however, always seems to lag behind plan. Thus while the planned rural power capacity for the U.S.S.R. as a whole was 2 million kw, the actual capacity in 1950 reached only 770,000 kw.¹⁰⁰

Building and other Improvements

Adequate data on agricultural buildings and other improvements is not available. Nonetheless, the impression is unavoidable that existing capital in this form is inadequate to meet the demands of the Soviets and that construction proceeds slowly. A liberal estimate for postwar construction and reconstruction through 1953 of rural dwellings seems to be 1,900,000.¹⁰¹ 1,200,000 units were planned for over the fourth five year plan, but less than that were actually built. Other buildings, particularly housing for livestock, is probably even more scarce. Although virtually all kolkhozes now have three fermi (livestock farms for cattle, hogs and sheep), half of them appear to lack all housing for them.¹⁰² Individually owned livestock in winter remains housed predominantly in the residences of the kolkhozniks and goes without protection in the warmer months. Little information is available about the existence of barns and silos. It is certain, however, that silos, either upright or trench, do not now exist which could accommodate the proposed corn program. Construction has received recently a great deal of emphasis.¹⁰³ However, kolkhozes have been asked to provide for greatly increased construction, particularly in connection with the livestock program, out of their own resources, financial and otherwise. The unwillingness of the State to contribute heavily to the financing of additional construction, combined with the poverty of the kolkhozes themselves,

100 - N. Nimitz, Statistics of Soviet Agriculture, The Rand Corporation, RM-1250, May 7, 1954, p. 61.

101 - Estimated from Moscow News, November 12, 1948; H. Onyshchenko, "Rastvet khoziaistva i kul'tury Ukrainskoi S.S.R.", (Prosperity of the economy and culture of the Ukrainian S.S.R.), Planovoe Khoziaistvo, No. 1, 1954; D.F. Virnuk, op.cit., pp. 39-40.

102 - Broadcast, May 10, 1955.

103 - For instance, N. Khrushchev, Current Digest, March 23, 1955.

speaks ill for the likelihood of success for the building program. Insufficiency, additionally, of incentives was discussed in the section on organization.

Outputs

This section will discuss the commodity output of Ukrainian agriculture. I shall say whatever is possible about the kinds of commodities produced, changes in the pattern of output over time, and changes in amount of output. Since output data proper are mostly unavailable, primary reliance in preparing this section has been on data for sown area and on livestock population. Sown area figures provide a fairly adequate picture of the relations among outputs of various commodities. They do not, of course, tell us much about the size of output. Data on yields, which are presented in the succeeding section, will, however, throw some additional light on output size. Livestock population, if available yearly, provides a rough index of livestock output. Unfortunately, it does not tell us much about the quality or value of the product, nor about the yield per animal. The data on milk yield, however, reflect somewhat on the quality of animals in general.

Crop Pattern

The accompanying table illustrates the variety and relative importance of crops for a representative year. Since complete data are not available for any one year, I have chosen the set of contiguous years which provides the best available picture of crop production. The data are for hectares sown in 1938 and 1940 in the pre-1939 boundaries of the Ukraine. More recent figures referring to a greater spread of years may be found classified by crop in tables 15 to 25 of the appendix. The 1938 distribution of major crops among oblasts is presented in table 26 of the appendix.

Crop Pattern Change

Our understanding of Ukrainian agricultural output will be enhanced by time perspective greater than that presented in the tables. The picture of crop distribution in a "representative" year obscures the important changes which Ukrainian agriculture has undergone and is

Table 6
CROPS FOR A REPRESENTATIVE YEAR
(in thousands of hectares of sown area)

	1938	1940	% of representative annual total
Total	25,601	25,300	
Grains		16,900	66.8
Wheat	7,400 ^a		28.9
Winter	6,400		
Spring	1,000		
Rye		2,700	10.6
Barley		3,200	12.6
Oats		1,700	6.7
Millet		900	3.5
Buckwheat			
Rice			
Corn		1,000	3.9
Sugar beet		788	3.2
Technical crops		2,400	9.5
Flax	665		2.6
Hemp			
Olives	806		6.4
Tobacco		52 ^b	0.2
Sunflower	668		2.6
Cotton	228		0.9
Castor			
Soybean	35		0.1
Hops			
Potatoes		1,416	4.6
Vegetables		700	2.3
Fodder		3,946	15.0
<u>Orchards</u>		258 ^c	not a crop

From numerous sources.

Notes : a - 1938 sown area for wheat was unusually high. The 1940 new boundary total was less than 7 million ha. Thus, the percentage for wheat is inordinately high and should probably be reduced by about 4%. This would also help to remove the discrepancies in the summed total percentage figures. An additional explanation for the discrepancies may lie in possible failure to include all "fodder" in the total sown area figures.

b - figure is for new boundaries.

c - figure is for 1936.

supposed still to undergo. The following table, which traces acreage sown to major crops in selected years, illustrates the important observable trends in the pattern of crop output.

The most notable trend in relative crop output has been the decline in the proportion of grains to total sown acreage. As one of the traditional breadbaskets of Russia, Ukraine in 1923 devoted 90 percent of its sown area to grains. At the beginning of collectivization the percentage stood at 83 percent; it fell to the high sixties on the eve of the war,¹⁰⁴ and now appears to be in the high fifties. On the other hand, wheat, which, with about one third of the grain acreage, had already occupied first rank among the grains, now accounts for almost half of the grain sown. Thus, wheat has almost maintained its percentage of total acreage, while the acreage of coarser grains, oats and rye, has fallen sharply, relative both to acreage sown to all grains and to all crops. Winter wheat has increasingly replaced spring wheat as the newer wheat growing regions of the southeast (New Russia) have displaced in importance the old Kievan Ukraine.

It appears that Ukraine has yielded its place as the primary Russian breadbasket to newer areas in Siberia. Thus, the percentage of U.S.S.R. acreage devoted to grain that is located in Ukraine has fallen from 21.9 percent in 1913¹⁰⁵ to 15.9 percent in 1954.¹⁰⁶ The recent Soviet virgin lands program will further reduce that percentage. Similarly, Ukrainian export of grain fell from 4.5 million tons in 1913 to 1 million tons in 1934.¹⁰⁷ At the same time the output of grain per

104 - Note that the addition of the Western areas again raises the percentage of grain to total sown area. This implies a significantly higher percentage grain output in the "backward" Western areas. The percentage grain output had risen again in 1945 also, presumably because of the postwar food shortage, and relative industrial inactivity lent greater importance to grains.

105 - Narysy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva. . ., p. 281.

106 - Pravda, January 21, 1955.

107 - Franz Obermaier, Ukraine - Land der schwarzen Erde. (Ukraine-Land of Black Soil). Vienna: Wiener Verlagsgesellschaft, 1942.

Karte XII. Although 1934 was a year of extremely low grain production, this figure is probably not unrepresentative, because export had already fallen drastically in earlier years.

Table 7
AREA SOWN TO MAJOR CROPS
IN SELECTED YEARS

	Total sown	Grain		Wheat		Technical crops	
		'000ha	% of total	'000ha	% of total	'000ha	% of total
1913	22,893	20,710	90.4	7,560	33.0	809	3.5
1927	25,261	21,078	83.4	4,736 ^a	18.7	1,615	6.4
1937	25,124	18,193	72.4			2,358	9.4
1938	25,601	17,767	69.3	7,400	28.9	2,401	9.4
1940 (old)	25,300	16,900	66.8			2,400	9.5
1940 (new)	30,243	20,506	67.8	6,766	23.3	2,623	8.6
1945	22,682	17,225	75.9			1,504	6.6
1946	24,527			5,150	20.2	1,656	6.8
1947	25,527					1,951	7.6
1948	28,125	19,900	75.1				
1949	29,025	20,500	70.6				
1950 (plan)	30,500	19,600	64.2				
1950	29,589						
1951	29,910 ^d						
1952	29,626 ^d	13,100 ^e	44.2	7,177	24.2		
1953 (at 65% grain, 25:932)	30,546	16,856	56.0	7,922	25.9		
1954 (plan: 58% of 1953)	31,000 ^f	18,210	58.7				
1955 (plan: wheat 47% of grain)	31,000 ^f				29.0 ^g		47.0 ^g
1956							
1960 (plan)		23,846					

Continued on following page.

Table 7 (continued)

	<u>Corn</u>		<u>Sugar</u>		<u>Cotton</u>		<u>Feed</u>		<u>Soy beans</u>	
	'000ha	% of total	'000ha	% of total	'000ha	% of total	'000ha	% of total	'000ha	% of total
1913	535	2.3	533	2.3	none		471	2.0		
1927	1,221	4.8	647	2.5			466	1.8		
1937			816	3.2	223	0.7	2,546	10.1		
1938	1,000	3.9	805	3.1	228	0.7	3,300	12.8	668	
1940	1,000		788				3,946	15.0		
1940	780	2.6	820	2.7	235	0.7			612	2.0
1945			426							
1946	926		527						760	
1947	1,083		639						782	
1948	1,240	4.4	820	2.9	47	0.2				
1949			820		94	0.3				2.7
1950	1,642		830	2.7	110	0.3	5,400	17.7		
1950										
1951	2,215									
1952			886	3.0						
1953			958	3.2						
1954	3,100(plan)	5.4	985	3.3			6,000	19.6		
1955	5,000(plan)	16.8	1,102	3.5	110					
1956			1,285							
1960	6,200(plan)									

Continued on following page.

Table 7 (continued)

	Potatoes	Vegetables	Flax	Hemp	Tobacco	Makhorka
	'000ha	% of total	'000ha	% of total potatoes & vegetables		
1913	620	2.7	200	3.6	3.7	
1927	1,231	4.9		5.0		
1937	1,331	5.3				
1938	1,490	5.8		126% of '34		
1940	1,416	5.6	700	7.0	13.8	38.2
1940			700		8.0	31.0
1945						
1946	821					
1947	450		340			
1948						
1949						
1950	2,800 ^b	9.3			202	
1950	1,900					

Notes:

a - 1928

b - includes vegetables; 1900 (my estimate)

c - Two plan figures published.

d - 29,800,000 ha., an alternate figure

e - This figure seems inordinately low and should probably read 15-17 million ha.

f - Figures unavailable. Estimate based on 1953.

g - Planned percentage published in Zhivotnovodst.

h - Computed from 'g.'

head of population has fallen since 1913. It was about 7.8 centners per person per year in 1911-15, 5.7 in 1926, 5.6 in 1952, and maybe only 4.7 in 1954.¹⁰⁸ The decline in the production of coarse grains must mean a reduction of this formerly considerable export.

Land previously supporting the Ukrainian grain economy has been transferred principally to raising additional technical crops, potatoes, and fodder crops. This has occurred primarily in the northernmost belt of oblasts running from Volyn in the west to Voroshilovgrad in the east. Technical or industrial crops, so named because they are primarily designed for industrial processing rather than for human or animal consumption, have increased in percentage of total acreage from 3.5 percent in 1913 to 8.5 percent in 1950. They had reached almost 10 percent in 1940 and have probably surpassed this figure in recent years. This expansion in acreage devoted to technical crops is a symptom of increasing industrialization. It seems unlikely that a substantial portion of Ukrainian technical crops are exported to other parts of the Soviet Union. Cotton is probably an exception, since, as the section on industry will show, Ukraine had until recently almost no textile manufacturing. However, the area devoted to cotton has always been below one percent and since the war, appears to have remained below half of one percent. Such cotton as there is in Ukraine is grown largely on valuable irrigated lands in the south.

A large variety of crops seem to account for the expansion of acreage in technical crops: flax and hemp in the Northwest, olives, tobacco, kok-sagyz, soybean and castor. Data on these are largely unavailable. The acreage of two more important crops, sugar beet and sunflowers (for their oil-bearing seed), appears to have expanded only moderately. However, the gross output of sugar beet has expanded absolutely but has declined as a percentage of U.S.S.R. output. Ukrainian output was 89 million centners in 1913, 148 million ct. in

108 - Computed from grain output data in possession of the author. The 1952 computation is based on a 20 percent reduction of the listed output figure, which was for field harvest and not barn harvest, as were the others.

1940, and 182 million ct. in 1953, while the Ukrainian percentage of U.S.S.R. output declined from 82 percent in 1913 to 70.5 percent in 1940.¹⁰⁹ Corn (maize) which is sometimes termed a technical crop, deserves separate attention at a later point.

Potatoes and fodder crops account for the other major substitutions in land use. The area sown to potatoes had more than tripled in the period 1913 to 1950 and had increased from 2.7 to over 6 percent of total acreage sown. Output of other vegetables has risen more or less proportionately.¹¹⁰ Despite this increase, the Soviets, as was noted in the section on organization of agriculture, are very anxious to procure further large additions to the output of potatoes and vegetables. Because of the bulkiness of potatoes and the perishability of vegetables this expansion is to occur in the vicinities of urban areas. The percentage of acreage sown to fodder crops has risen from 2 to almost 20 percent of sown area. This increase probably reflects the shift of erstwhile pasture land into crop production, the recent emphasis on rotation with perennial grasses and other legumes, and the growing attempt to switch to "managed" livestock production instead of allowing stock to fend for itself. Some of the increased fodder crop acreage may well represent "cropping" of fodder on land which had previously provided fodder through pasturage. Despite this increase in fodder acreage, the Soviets are most anxious to expand fodder production also.¹¹¹

The growing importance of corn (maize) is particularly noteworthy. Corn has traditionally been a quite insignificant crop in the Ukraine and in Russia generally. In 1913 corn accounted for only 2.3 percent of sown acreage, and by as recently as 1948 this figure had risen to only 4.4 percent. The exact data since that date are unclear, but the general picture is unmistakable.

109 - Narysy rozvytku narodonoho hospodarstva. . ., pp. 29,449.

110 - It is not certain that the published figures for vegetable acreage include all vegetables grown on kol'khozniks' and privately owned plots.

111 - Part of the explanation may lie in the possibility that "fodder crops" have been redefined to include more crops such as corn and oats.

By 1953 corn acreage was to have risen to about 2.3 million ha. and the percentage of total area to about 8.4 percent. This represents almost a doubling of both 1948 figures. Since then the corn-hog program was put into high gear. For 1955 the planned acreage and percentage of total was doubled again bringing the acreage to 5 to 5.2 million ha. and the share of total area to over 16 percent. The planned acreage sown to corn for 1960 now stands at 6.2 million ha. or 26 percent of the total acreage sown to grains. Since the percentage of all grains sown to wheat has been increasing, this program must mean a drastic reduction in output of the minor grains and/or a considerable increase in total area sown. The Soviets have called for both. Cursory inspection does not, however, make apparent to this writer sufficient sources of this kind of land to permit the planned corn expansion. In evaluating the corn program for the U.S.S.R. as a whole another writer has concluded that only about half of the land required for the program is available among the sources mentioned by Krushchev.¹¹² At the same time that corn acreage as a whole is to expand, the proportion of all corn that is raised only for silage and not for grain (harvested before the ears ripen) is to rise sharply. This should improve the chances for success in raising corn in areas now devoted to the minor grains, which happen also to be the hardier grains.

So far, however, the planned goals for corn appear to have gone unfulfilled. The corn output for 1953 was 9 percent of the total grain output. Had the planned acreage of 8 percent of total been achieved (the available figures do not make entirely clear what actual acreage was), the percentage of grain output attributable to corn should probably have been higher, for corn yields more per acre, measured by weight, than do other grains. However, previous sections have pointed out that incentives and/or labor, machinery, and storage facilities all seem at this time to be inadequate to permit the corn

112 - D.G. Johnson, Analysis of Khrushchev's Report on Livestock Produce, American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, Inc., March, 1955, p. 5.

program to succeed.

A few additional observations will round out the discussion of Ukrainian non-livestock agricultural output. Non-field-crop, non-livestock agricultural production consists primarily of the maintenance of orchards and the production of timber. The acreage covered by orchards is very small, being probably less than a sixth that of vegetables or half that of melons. Undoubtedly the per acre value of the output is higher than that of vegetables, but the output of fruit is none-the less small. Information on timber output is almost unavailable. Timber production in the Ukraine, although probably relatively smaller than formerly, must still be considerable. Output, at least until recently, has, however, been perpetually short of plan; and this may account for the sparsity of data. Reforestation, not presumably to replace recently cut timber, but to improve the amount and distribution of moisture, has been a prominent Soviet policy of recent years. The success of this policy is as yet difficult to assess.

In summary, acreage sown and actual agricultural output has been rising only slowly, the latter faster than the former. Wartime ravages of population, land, and equipment reduced agricultural output in 1945 well below 1940 level. Total sown acreage and grain output proper reattained the 1940 level by 1950. This pattern was substantially duplicated by other crops, with the notable exception of cotton. These short term changes occurred within the dominant trends of reduction of percentage output of grains, particularly coarse and minor grains, and the rising importance of technical and fodder crops.

Livestock

Raising livestock and its derivative products, meat, fat, milk, wool, and hides, complements the peasants' growing of crops. The relative importance of livestock products in total Ukrainian agricultural output is difficult to gauge. The share of total money income of collective farms derived from livestock was about 20 percent in 1940.¹¹³

113 - Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii. . ., p. 412.

But at that time only about 25 percent of the cattle was owned by kolkhozes; most of the remainder belonged to kolkhozniks.¹¹⁴

The proportion of other livestock owned by kolkhozes was somewhat larger. On balance, the proportion of total agricultural output as a whole creditable to livestock must have been considerably in excess of 20 percent. Since livestock raising suffered from the war more than crop raising, its relative importance may have fallen somewhat, but it must remain high.

Since actual livestock output data are almost nonexistent, the following table presents the trends in livestock population. Unfortunately citation and computation difficulties render some particular figures among these figures less reliable than Soviet data generally. It is not always possible to place a great deal of faith in the accuracy of particular figures, but the table probably represents major trends truthfully.

The livestock population suffered severely during the period of collectivization. This loss was not made up until 1948 to 1940, and possibly in the old boundaries not even by the beginning of the war (definitely not in the case of sheep and goats). The annexation of the Western Ukraine increased the livestock population upwards of 25 percent, but the war more than wiped out this increase again. Since the war the increases in livestock have been fairly consistent and rapid. Cattle numbers more than doubled, hogs multiplied about 9-fold, sheep and goats increased 5-6fold, and horses probably doubled. Before 1950 the rate of increase in numbers lagged considerably behind plan, attaining a total of only 7.3 million head of cattle instead of the planned 12.2 million.¹¹⁵ Since then, however, the rate of increase appears to have risen, and plans have occasionally been overfulfilled. The number of cows as a percentage of cattle has posed a continually serious problem. Note, for instance, that before

114 - Unless otherwise cited, figures in this section are derived from the accompanying table.

115 - U.S. Department of State. Agricultural Information Compiled from XVI Session of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. . .

Table 8
LIVESTOCK POPULATION AT BEGINNING OF YEAR^a
(In thousands of heads)

	Total Cattle		Dairy Cattle		Hogs		Sheep & Goats		Horses	
	Total	Kolkhoz	Total	Kolkhoz	Total	Kolkhoz	Total	Kolkhoz	Total	Kolkhoz
1918	7706		3140		4629		6380			
1928 ^b	8605	20	3900	9	6963		8112			
1938 ^b	7759		3459		7729		3301		2937	
1938	9200				9500		5100		3200	
1940 ^(dd)	7749	1859	3480		7330		4750		3273	
1940 ^(WU) ^e	2586		1718		1466		772		1100	
1941 ^b	10751		5762		9059		6364		4573	
1941	10900				9200		7300		4700	
1945	7001	1613	3940		1804	321	2770	565	1768	578
1946										
1947		2298				415		1041		902
1948 ^(plan)		3000		450		1170		1450		1040
1949		4470		581		2679		2131		1425
1950	7350	5811	450 ^c		6432	5358	4400	3132		1824
1951	8850		605 ^c		8040		5665			
1952	10000		696		8680		7250			
1952	11863				8339		8175			
1953 ^f	11714		4948 ^d		9030		8343		2469	
1953 ^f	13243	6769	8140	1759	14487	7213	11417			
1954 ^f	16400	6553	5292	2097	16200		14000			

Notes: a - In 1953 the census date was moved back from January 1 to October 1 of the preceding year.

b - Sources give conflicting figures.

c - The smallness of these figures casts doubt on their accuracy unless they refer to cows in kolkhozes only.
(continued on following page.)

Table 8 (continued.)

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- d - The largeness of this figure casts doubt as to its accuracy.
 - e - These figures, for unknown date in 1939, when added to the livestock population of the 1940 'old' boundaries of the Ukraine, add up more or less to the 1941 Ukraine figure.
 - f - Figures are for October 1.

In several cases, where figures are for dates other than January 1, of the given year, the time difference may explain the discrepancies.

Sources: Tables in possession of author.

the war the percentage of cows in the Polish Ukraine was about 66 percent at the time of annexation, while in the Soviet Ukraine it reached only 45 percent or less. Since then, the problem has become more serious in both parts of the Ukraine. In 1949 for instance the planned percentage was 28 percent, yet the actual percentage was only 13 percent.¹¹⁶ Only in recent years has the rate of increase of cows again overtaken that of cattle as a whole. At the beginning of 1955 the number of cows stood between 6 and 7 million, or about one cow for every seven inhabitants.

For other categories the ratio of number of livestock to people is about one animal: 2 1/2 to 3 persons. With such numbers the output of livestock products cannot be very high by American or even European standards. The announcement of the new livestock program bears witness that it does not meet Soviet standards either. The small numbers of livestock tell only part of the story, however. The quality of the animals, and probably of their derivative products, is also low. Exact data are not available about the quality of livestock. However, complaints are frequent that the incidence of barrenness and of death of young animals is very high. This implies that surviving animals are not what they should be either.

Data on milk yield per cow, which are available, can improve our acquaintance with the situation. Aside from showing that milk production is low and that milk cows are of poor quality, milk yield data probably also reflect the quality of livestock as a whole. The following table summarizes average milk yield.

Table 9					
MILK YIELD PER COW (In kilograms per year)					
	1937	1950	1953	1954	1960
Kolkhozes	1282	1221	1142-38	1205	
Plan		2021		1550	1900-2400
Sovkhozes	2463		2603		
Plan					3400-3600

Source: Tables in author's possession.

It is apparent that milk yield is extremely low. Increases of yield averages for oblasts between 1953 and 1954 from 1319 kg. to 1625 kg. and from 2641 kg. to 3044 kg. are reported, but so are average yields of 600, 800, and 900 kilograms.¹¹⁷ The latter must outnumber the former. Increasing the production of milk per cow receives constant Soviet emphasis. It is noteworthy, however, that the planned milk yield was realistically reduced about 25 percent between 1950 and 1954. This permitted plan fulfillment to rise from 60 percent to 77 percent over that period. Targets for 1960 more than remove this reduction again.

Most of these data on milk production refer to cows owned by kolkhozes. Yield per cow in sovkhoses is more than twice that found in kolkhozes, presumably because they own better stock, possibly because they have facilities (fences, etc.) to improve the stock by controlled breeding. Only about 3 percent of the livestock is owned by Sovkhoses, however.¹¹⁸ About half of the cattle is owned by kolkhozniks or other private individuals. No specific information about the quality of these animals is available, but it is likely that they receive considerably better care than communally owned cattle. On the other hand, feed for them may be more scarce than for kolkhoz cattle. Nonetheless, on balance, the quality of livestock as a whole is probably better than consideration of the above figures alone would imply.

In conclusion, current livestock output may be briefly appraised by comparing it with the plans announced for 1960 at a recent plenary session of the Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party.¹¹⁹ In accordance with the newly instituted incentive system, which was discussed in the part on organization, standards are set in terms of land owned by the agricultural unit. The Soviets call for an output of

116 - Ibid.

117 - The daily press and various broadcasts.

118 - Pravda Ukrainy, March 19, 1947, gives the following figures for livestock in sovkhoses: cattle, 82,000; hogs, 96,000; sheep, 68,000.

119 - As reported by Izvestia, February 20, 1955, and translated in the Current Digest, Vol. VII, No. 8, April 6, 1955, pp. 5-6.

66 ct. of meat, 347 ct. of milk, and 75 kg. of wool per 100 hectares of land, and 45 ct. of pork per 100 ha. of arable land. These standards are considerably higher than current norms, probably unmet, of 27 ct. of meat, 260 ct. of milk, and 30 ct. of pork. To meet the former standards increases over 1954 production will be necessary by 60 percent for meat and fat, almost 100 percent for milk and eggs, and 80 percent for wool. To permit in turn this increase of livestock production, the Congress estimated that fodder output will have to rise 250 percent, silage output 350 percent, root crops and fodder melons 100 percent, and coarse fodders 50 percent. This in turn requires the introduction of more hybrid corn and of various other measures which are discussed elsewhere in this paper.

Productivity
Input : Output

Our understanding of the changing structure of Ukrainian agriculture may be further enhanced by considering some of the relations between inputs and outputs. The discussion will turn primarily around the average productivity of land (yields) , labor, and capital, and the relations among them. Much of the discussion will have to be speculative, as published material on these matters is largely nonexistent. Our material is based on statistical data in the author's possession. Unless otherwise noted, the sources for the following references may be found there.

Crop output per unit of land input, measured in yield per hectare, has been rising slowly but steadily. The published yield of all grains per hectare has risen from 8 ct. in 1901 to 1910 and 8.5 ct. at the beginning of collectivization to 14-15 ct. in 1940 and 1950. However, between 1933 and 1953 output and yield were measured in terms of field harvest rather than in terms of barn harvest, as had been the case previously and is the practice again. Use of this measure serves to hide the very large harvest, post-harvest, and storage losses which Ukrainian agriculture suffers. Moreover, these losses have most likely increased with the introduction of mechanical harvesting equipment which is notoriously wasteful of output per unit of land.

It is common to reduce field harvest figures by about 20 percent to make them comparable with barn harvest figures. This would reduce the recent figures of grain yield to the vicinity of 11-12 ct. per ha. On the other hand, land in wheat yields less per hectare than in other small grains, and the proportion sown to wheat has been rising. However, the Soviets seem to have had greater success in raising wheat than in raising the yield of other small grains. On balance, the output of grains, per unit land, seems to have been rising.

Although sufficient yield data are unavailable to exhibit trends for technical crops, sugar beets excepted, it is probably safe to say that their yields per unit land has risen. Output of sugar beet per hectare seems to have doubled since the early thirties, although this observation may be influenced by peculiarities of measurement. Nonetheless, technical crop production has expanded; and it is known that inputs of cooperating factors such as fertilizers, and improved technology and methods, has been the rule for technical crop production, particularly in sovkhoses. Consequently, one might expect increases per unit of land input. Little that is definite can be said about output of vegetables, potatoes, and livestock per unit land. Yield figures for these are probably meaningless, because the production of these commodities is divided between very large scale (sovkhos and kolkhos) and very small scale (individual kolkhozniki) production.

Average labor productivity appears to have risen since collectivization. If the one-third decline in the agricultural labor force between 1926 and 1939, which is suggested by our rough calculations reflects real circumstances, output per labor input must have risen. For total output either remained the same or rose. Since then the decline of labor input within the same boundaries appears to have been considerably smaller, and the rise in output hardly larger. Considering the increase in area, output has risen somewhat, and labor input remained about the same. In other words, the rate of increase of labor productivity since the war has failed to match that of the prewar period. This conclusion corresponds to those of Johnson whose calculations for the whole U.S.S.R. suggest that about

75 percent of the 1928-1952 labor productivity was achieved before 1938.¹²⁰

The increase in labor productivity has been achieved in the face of a continual shift to the production of crops which are more labor consuming. Technical crops, potatoes and vegetables and corn all require relatively larger labor inputs than grain production. This is particularly true as mechanical equipment for the cultivation of these crops remains largely undeveloped. This circumstance has significant implications for the corn program, and vice versa. In the United States corn is generally not introduced into areas until its value per acre is at least twice that of competing crops, for the required labor input is, as was noted previously, about three times larger than for other grains. Unless the program is a great success, that is, unless harvesting and storage losses can be eliminated and income from the corn produced considerably increased, extensive introduction of corn is likely to reduce average productivity of labor (making marginal productivity negative) and to meet considerable resistance among the peasants.

Agricultural output per unit capital has probably fallen. Adequate data on Soviet capital investment in Ukrainian agriculture are not available. It is certain that compared to investment in industry it has been small. Indeed, as the sections on capital showed, only the establishment and equipment of the M.T.S. and the plans for irrigation have called for any noteworthy capital expenditure on agriculture. Nonetheless, since the input of capital probably increased more than output, output per unit input of capital must have fallen. One might also regard "organization", including improved agricultural techniques such as crop rotation and square cluster planting as an input. Organization

120 - D.G. Johnson, in The Study of the Growth Potential . . ., p. 28, calculated that between 1928 and 1938 output increased about 15 percent while the number of agricultural workers declined about 20 percent, or an increase of about 40 percent in output per labor input. Since then, his figures show only a 10 percent increase.

has undoubtedly improved. The personal cost to the peasants of this organization, due to collectivization and modernization of methods, is difficult to assess. So is the economic cost to the society of supporting the administrative organs responsible for this improved organization. But the cost of both must be considerable. The return from the new organization has certainly not been as large as the Soviets have wished. Johnson has estimated that two-thirds of the increased output of U.S.S.R. agriculture is matched by identifiable increased inputs.¹²¹ If we allocate all other inputs to "organization", this would leave one third of the increased output of agriculture as due to improved organization. But as we have seen, the increase has been relatively small, and per unit population Ukrainian agricultural output has not increased at all.

Corn - Hog Program

We may summarize the prospects for the corn-hog program. The percentage sown to corn of all the grain area is to rise to 26 percent by 1960. The output of fodder is to rise 250 percent and that of silage 350 percent. Meat production is scheduled to rise over 60 percent. If these goals are to be met, the Ukraine will have to devote a considerably larger amount of inputs to the production of corn and hogs than it does at present. It was suggested earlier that the labor input per hectare sown to corn will have to be well over twice that devoted to crops presently grown on the same land. New machinery will have to be developed. Corn varieties which can thrive under Ukrainian climatic and soil conditions have to be developed. It is interesting to note in this connection that the famed hybrid corn of Iowa has apparently not produced similarly large increases of yield in the Dakotas, whose climatic conditions more nearly approximate those of the Ukraine. Silos will have to be constructed, particularly because the program calls for the production of corn primarily for silage rather than for grain. It is generally conceded in the United States that loss of one-fourth to one-third of silage through frost and/or rotting is easy and common, and a larger proportion possible, unless trench silos are properly prepared.

121 - Ibid., p. 26.

It seems likely that in the near future Ukrainian peasants will lack the resources with which to build silos and will frequently lack the know-how to build adequate trench silos.

It is also generally conceded that an acre sown to corn will yield more feed value by far than an acre sown to other crops. With the growth of corn for silage rather than for grain, this may well be true even under the climatic and soil conditions of the Ukraine. Indeed, the feed value differential may be even greater than in regions better provided by nature. Nonetheless, the prospects for the success of the Ukrainian corn-hog program do not look too bright for the near future, and the wisdom of the program might be called into question. The reason for this would seem to lie in the extremely high costs of the program in terms of input other than land and climate. The high costs of labor, and the inadequate supply of requisite capital, which we have outlined, may spell either poor wisdom or failure, or both for the program.

THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY "A"-3b

The bulk of our discussion of non-agricultural production in the Ukraine will be confined to the analysis of the industrial sector. The treatment of the changing structure of industry will be similar to that used in the case of agriculture. A general outline of the development of Ukrainian industrial production is followed by an examination of the inputs of labor and of capital. Then we examine the output of raw materials, heavy industry, and light industry and food industry. Finally we estimate changes in productivity by comparing industrial output first with inputs of labor then with inputs of capital.

The industrial development of Ukraine first became noteworthy with the introduction of mining and raw materials production.

Ukraine soon became one of the foremost producers of raw materials in the Russian Empire and, indeed, of the world. Although the eighteenth and early nineteenth century development of Russian iron production was centered in the Urals, the eastern Ukraine, due to the more advantageous location and greater reserves of its mineral deposits, by the beginning of the twentieth century overtook all other Russian areas combined in the production of important raw materials. The occurrence of rich iron deposits at Krivoi Rog within 300 miles of the coal deposits of the Donbas, the plentiful supply of limestone, and the closer location of the entire Donetz region to existing centers of population attracted large amounts of capital to the area in the last half of the nineteenth century. Thus, while in 1867 the south produced only 03 % of Russian pig iron, by 1913 it accounted for 74 % of the pig iron and 87 % of the coal produced in Russia.¹²² The Ukraine had reached fourth and fifth place respectively among the iron ore and coal producing areas of the world,¹²³ and promised continued expansion of raw material production. Industrial production, either heavy or light, was, however, almost nonexistent in the pre-Soviet Ukraine. Further

122 - I. Mirchuk, op. cit., pp. 169-172.

123 - Ibid.

processing of, and manufacture based on, these raw materials occurred principally in the Leningrad and Moscow areas. The raw materials, except for the coal used locally as fuel for iron production and railroad transportation, was predominantly exported to these areas. Manufactures, including textiles, were imported. Among industries only food processing had reached any substantial development.

A number of additional economic factors appear to have become influential. Manganese became an increasingly important mineral and the large Ukrainian deposits of that ore began to be worked seriously. The deposits are at Nikopoli, also in the Dnieper-Donets region. Donbas coal and later the water power of the Dnieper became available for the production of electric power in the same region. Increasing urbanization initially necessitated by raw material production, and very high transportation costs to northern areas would seem to be additional factors explaining the succeeding developments in the region. Production of minerals expanded still more while increasing emphasis was devoted to more highly processed raw materials like steel and alloy metals, and to local utilization of byproducts. At the same time heavy industry, including the production of mining equipment, heavy machinery, and machine tools, came to be established in the same eastern part of the Ukraine which provided the requisite raw materials. However, light industry still found little home in the Ukraine. In short, the Soviets continued the trend in the first half of the twentieth century which had become established in the last half of the nineteenth century. They maintained the predominance of raw materials in non-agricultural production and only introduced some minor diversification by introducing the heavy machinery and chemical industries.

The value of gross industrial output had been 2159 million rubles (1926-27 prices) in 1913.¹²⁴ This scale of output was just reattained in 1926-27. With the introduction of the first Five Year Plan in 1928, industrial output began to rise at the rate of about 13% to 15% per year, and reached 22,360 million rubles (same prices) in 1940. In 1954 it

124 - Based on materials in possession of the author.

stood at 43,585 million rubles, or almost twice the prewar figure. This means that in the postwar years industrial output must have been rising at a still faster rate. The yearly output today is 20 times that of 1913 or 1926. At the same time the share of industry in the output of all material goods (not including services) rose from 48% in 1913 and 1926-27 to 80% in 1950. The accompanying table illustrates the changing structure of industrial output.

TABLE 10
STRUCTURE OF OUTPUT OF LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY
(In %)

	1913	1940
Coal industry	11.3	4.5
Metallurgy	19.4	10.3
Metal working & machine building	11.3	36.4
Chemical	3.0	5.5
Electrical	0.4	2.9
Construction	1.6	1.8
Light industry	2.6	9.7
Food industry	43.6	17.6
Others	6.8	11.3
	100.0	100.0

Source: *Narysy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva*, p. 439.

Labor

The expansion of the Ukrainian economy has required an increasing supply of labor. Yet, growth of the labor supply has been surprisingly small. Moreover, the rate of growth appears to have been erratic. The following table (next page) summarizes the increase in the number of workers and employees since the beginning of the Five Year Plans. The number of workers and employees almost tripled in the years 1927 to 1940. Their proportion of total population rose from about 6% in 1927-28 to 15% in 1937 and probably 17% or 18% in 1939. The lower proportion shown for 1940 reflects the annexation of the nonindustrial western Ukraine. Part of the Ukraine labor supply, particularly skilled workers, were transferred beyond the Urals during the war

TABLE 11

NUMBER OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES^a

year	number in 000's	% of population
1927-28	2020	6
1937	4700	15
1940	5950	14
1950	5988	16
1950 ^b	6700	17
1954	7610	18

Notes: a - includes some workers and employees in MTS
b - alternative estimate

to aid in the rapid industrialization of that area. No reliable data exist, but one author claims that almost none of these returned after the war, or that they were replaced by newer and younger workers from the central industrial district.¹²⁵ In the postwar years the percentage climbed back to 18%. Assuming that the urban residents form 40% of the population, this would mean that about 45% of the urban population are gainfully employed.¹²⁶ The monetary reform of 1947 was designed to increase this proportion, which since the war may have fallen somewhat. Nonetheless, the proportion of the urban, or indeed the entire, population employed outside of agriculture does not appear inordinately high.

No published data are available on the distribution of employment within the non-agricultural economy. Some very rough estimates are possible, however, if an analysis of data for the U. S. S. R. as a whole may be used as a guide.¹²⁷ In 1938 the proportion of workers and employees

125 - S. Protsiuk, "The Evacuation of Industry in 1941 and the Postwar Economy of Ukraine", Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. 5, 1949, p. 217.

126 - "Workers and employees" includes agricultural workers employed by MTS. These should be subtracted in making these computations but the estimates are so rough that accuracy would not be substantially improved.

127 - A. D. Redding, Distribution of U. S. S. R. Non-Agricultural Employment

listed as working in industry only accounted for about 39% of all non-agricultural labor;¹²⁸ and in 1941 the corresponding proportion was about 38%.¹²⁹ These percentages correspond well with Redding's findings of 42% for 1937 and 38% for 1941 (plan).¹³⁰ It may be, therefore, that Redding's calculations of the distribution of workers and employees among non-agricultural occupations for the U. S. S. R. can serve as a rough index of the Ukrainian distribution of labor. No obviously important differences between the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine appear to this writer. Redding presents the following percentages:

	U. S. S. R.		U. S.
	1937	1941 plan	1949
Industry	42.3	38.0	32.6
Construction	8.3	10.6	6.7
Transportation	11.4	12.0	5.8
Communications	1.5	1.6	1.5
Services: Including	36.6	36.5	53.3
Education	9.4	9.8	3.6
Trade	8.1	8.1	22.9
Other (Government, Administration, etc.)	18.3	17.1	23.8
Summed total	100.0	98.7	100.0

Some observations about the relation of the Soviet Ukrainian distribution of labor with that of the United States may be instructive.

The percentage of Ukrainian non-agricultural employment working in industry itself is higher than in the United States, but it is not as high as might be suggested by the publicity that Ukrainian industry has received.¹³¹

127 - (con't) 1928-1950: A Preliminary Study.

128 - This estimate is the result of interpolating the number of workers and employees computed by the author for 1937 and 1940, (5,160,000) subtracting the number of workers employed by the MTS in 1939, (241,000) and comparing this figure (4,919,000) with the number of industrial workers in 1938 (1,944,000) published in Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii..., p.266.

129 - Derived as in footnote 128, using 2,300,000 industrial workers as cited in ibid., p.271.

130 - Redding, op.cit., p.9

131 - Of the 1,944,000 industrial workers in Ukraine in 1938, 1.6 million, or 82%, worked in 11,000 larger scale enterprises; the remaining

The significantly higher proportion of workers in construction probably reflects the higher rate of real investment in the Ukrainian economy.¹³²

The higher Ukrainian percentage of employment in all non-service occupations combined (lower percentage in service occupations) probably would have been expected on the basis of Colin Clarke's thesis regarding the higher proportion of employment in tertiary activities in richer economies, and it probably reflects the lower productivity of Ukrainian labor. Some observations about the relative proportions within the service occupations are noteworthy. Education in the Ukraine commands a much higher percentage of employment than in the United States. On the other hand, the category "other," which includes government administration but also professional services, is so much smaller in the Ukraine that contrary to expectations the proportion of administrative employees may not be significantly larger in the Ukraine than in the United States. The much lower percentage of workers devoted to trade in the Ukraine probably reflects at once the use of a buyers market instead of a sellers market and the smaller proportion of output distributed through the consumer goods market.

Capital

Increased investment of capital played a still larger role in Ukrainian economic, and particularly industrial, development than did the growth in labor inputs. Moreover, the distribution of capital investment among uses probably favors industry more than does the distribution of labor inputs. Data on capital investment and other inputs are scarce, available

131 - (con't) 344,000 workers were distributed among 115,000 other enterprises. (Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii. . . , p.266). Of the 1,944,000 industrial workers also 220,372, or 11%, were employed by the steel industry and 97,000, or 5%, produced pig iron. (Akademiia Nauk Ukrainiskoi R. S. R. Instytut Ekonomiky. Rad'ians'ka Ukraina za 20 rokiv. (20 years of Soviet Ukraine.) Partvydavnytstvo Ts. K. K. P. bU. 1937, p.394.)

132 - I chose the year 1949 from among those presented for comparison by Redding because, although a recession year, it was the most normal of all the years presented. In other years, the percentage employed in American construction was still lower.

for scattered years only, and of course expressed in money terms. This makes it impossible to establish an adequate picture of the pattern of Soviet capital inputs in Ukraine. Money investment figures, particularly expressed in current rubles, tell us very little without national income or gross national product figures to which to relate them. The budget of the Ukrainian S. S. R. yields no information about total investments at all because investment in enterprises administered by all Union enterprises is not included.

A rough picture of capital investment in the Ukrainian industrial economy may emerge from the following. Measured in terms of 1926-27 rubles, the production of capital goods as a percentage of all industrial output was over 60% all through the 1930's, almost 70% in the later years, reached 78% in 1940, and was 70% again in 1953. The production of capital goods reflects on investment, although the two are by no means the same, especially in an economy like that of Ukraine which exports capital goods and imports consumer goods. Thus the share of capital goods in Ukrainian output was 51% and 52% already in 1913 and 1926-27, respectively. On the other hand, the proportion of capital goods used at home also rose steadily during this period, as a later section will demonstrate.

This distribution of output between capital goods and consumer goods permitted the investment of 997 billion rubles, measured in current prices, in the Ukrainian economy during the period 1929 to 1952. This investment was allocated among sectors as follows:¹³³

	billion rubles	percent
Heavy industry	638	64
Light industry	72	7
Transportation	193	20
Agriculture	94	9
	<u>997</u>	<u>100</u>

These figures require little comment. It is likely that the data are not for total investment, but that they refer primarily to state budgetary

133 - Akademiia Nauk Ukrains'koi R. S. R. Instytut Ekonomiky. Ocherki Rasvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Ukrainskoi S. S. R. (History of the Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian S. S. R.). Moscow, 1954, p. 502.

investment. In that case they would greatly overstate the investment in heavy industry, and probably transportation, which are subsidized by the budget, and understate investment in light industry and agriculture which finance their own investment to a much greater extent.

As heavy industry and light industry receive extended treatment in subsequent sections, additional comment may here be confined to transportation. As Ukraine probably already had the most adequate rail network in Russia, the Soviets have hardly extended the trackage at all. Almost the entire increase since 1928 is due to the addition of new territory. This suggests that the rail network remains substantially geared to the earlier role of Ukraine as an exporter of raw materials and grain to the north and an importer of finished goods from the north. The amount of freight carried and the average daily loadings, have, however, increased substantially. This implies that the bulk of the investment in transportation went into additional rolling stock and improved road beds and auxiliary facilities.

In consequence of this investment the value of fixed capital in industry multiplied eight fold-between 1927-28 and 1940. The war caused wholesale destruction and occasioned the removal of entire plants with their equipment to areas beyond the Urals, or later to Germany. All the equipment transferred to the east remained in operation there after the war.¹³⁴ Some equipment from Germany was returned. Little information is available about postwar investment in Ukraine. Scattered reports suggest that the percentage of total U.S.S.R. investment going into Ukraine since the war has been the same as in prewar days, notwithstanding the greater wartime destruction suffered by Ukraine. Nonetheless, prewar output levels were by and large reattained prior to 1950, and the number of urban houses built by that time exceeded the number destroyed by the war. Mining is now more mechanized than it was prior to the war, although complaints about inadequate mechanization continue.

In the absence of more adequate data it may be suggestive to

134 - S. Protsiuk, op. cit.

regard output of electric power as an index of the input of capital.¹³⁵ Since only 10 percent of the 1935 output of electricity was consumed by individuals,¹³⁶ while 66 percent of the 1940 output was used by industry alone and most of the remainder by transportation,¹³⁷ we are not far off in regarding electric output as an input for non-agricultural production. The input of power may serve as a rough index of capital inputs as a whole, and its rate of growth may thus be compared with that of the input of labor. Power output as an index of investment can also be used to compare investment in Ukraine and the U.S.S.R. as a whole. The necessary data are presented below.

Table 12
GROWTH RATES OF OUTPUT OF ELECTRIC POWER

	Billion Kwh.		Million W+E		KWh/W+E		% growth over preceding date	
	Ukr.	U.S.S.R.	Ukr.	U.S.S.R.	Ukr.	U.S.S.R.	Ukr.	U.S.S.R.
1927-8	1.243		2.02		615			
1937	9.343	36.4	4.7	27.0	1987	1348	309	
1940	11.938	48.3	5.95	31.2	2006	1548	1	15
1950	13.7 ^c	90.3	5.98 ^a	38.2 ^b	2291	2363	14	52
1952	18.5	115.0	6.93	40.7	2894	2825	26	20
1953	21.0	133.0	7.188	45.0	2921	2955	1	4
1954	23.876	147.0	7.6	47.0	3137	3127	7	6
1955 (plan)		162.5		47.0		3457		
1960 (plan)	60.0		8.2-8.8		7308 to 6810			

Notes: a - lower of two estimates, yielding a higher KWh/W+E.

b - Planned W+E was only 33.5 million. This would raise KW/W+E considerably.

c - D. Shimkin gives an output of 20 billion KW.

135 - This approach was suggested to me by Gregory Grossman in a paper entitled Some Current Trends in Soviet Capital Formation.

136 - Administration of State Accounting of the Ukrainian S.S.R. Sotsialistychna Ukraina (Socialist Ukraine.) Statistical abstracts. Kiev: Vydavnytstvo "Narodne Hospodarstvo ta Oblik", 1937, p. 12.

137 - Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii . . ., p. 287.

The yearly output of electric power in Ukraine has increased almost 20-fold since 1927-28 and more than two and a half times since 1937. During the same period input of labor has increased only 3.5 and 1.6 times respectively. Accordingly, electric output per worker has increased 58 percent over the latter period. Power per industrial worker only is, of course much higher, because workers in industry account for only about 40 percent of all workers and employees. Thus, electric power per industrial worker was about 4000Kw/h in 1935 and 5200 Kw/h in 1940.¹³⁸ Power output, both absolutely and per worker rose very rapidly between 1927 and 1937. Between 1937 and 1940 output continued to climb, but its proportion to labor inputs remained almost stable. After the war the prewar level of production of electricity was reattained before that of other commodities and was in 1950 already almost twice that of 1940. Since 1950 the rate of growth of electric output has again been very rapid, exceeding even the rate of growth during the first two five year plans. Power output per worker has risen only a little less rapidly. If the output of electricity is a valid guide to capital investment, Soviet investment in Ukraine has been large and rapid, particularly in the postwar years.

Comparison of Ukrainian and U.S.S.R. ratios of kilowatt hours per worker and employee indicates that, except for the war and immediate postwar years, the per worker input of electric power in Ukraine has exceeded that of the U.S.S.R., at least until this year. However, the rate of growth in the U.S.S.R. has been more than double that in Ukraine. Thus while kilowatt hours per worker rose 1 percent between 1937 and 1940, 58 percent between 1937 and 1954 and 56 percent between 1940 and 1954, the corresponding increases in the U.S.S.R. (including Ukraine) were 15 percent, 132 percent, and 102 percent, respectively. This difference in rates of growth, of course, reflects the rapid industrialization of other parts of the U.S.S.R. In view of the existing trend which suggests that the U.S.S.R. power-worker ratio will soon surpass that of Ukraine, it is interesting to note that for several years after the war the index

138 - Based on 1.8 million workers in 1935 and 2.3 million in 1940.

appears to have risen considerably faster in Ukraine than in the U. S. S. R., thus enabling Ukraine after wartime losses to catch the U. S. S. R. again by 1952.

In conclusion, Ukrainian economic development has followed on a rapid increase of both labor and capital. The number of workers and employees has increased 3.5-fold since 1927 and the yearly investment and existing stock of capital has increased several times that. Until recently, most of the workers were drawn from rural areas, although not primarily Ukrainian ones. They had to be supplied with capital, not only industrial, but also urban capital. The recently announced decline in recruitment from the countryside suggests that, high as the input of capital has been, it has been either too low or inadequately distributed among uses. Although wartime destruction of urban residences has been more than made good, new urban construction has never been adequate to provide for the influx of labor into industry, and therewith population into cities. Provision for additional urban facilities like water supply and sanitation is more difficult to measure, but it seems likely that it has even lagged behind residential construction. The plans for reduced rural recruitment and increased provision of municipal capital may suggest that the Soviets have decided that the provision only of industrial capital is insufficient and that the provision of municipal capital as well, including expenditures not only for the worker but for his family, is too expensive. The alternatives are to draw on the urban population itself for additional labor, which is only now becoming possible, and increasingly to substitute industrial capital for industrial labor.

Raw Materials

Turning now to the products of the economy, mining and processing of raw materials has been the nucleus of the Ukrainian non-agricultural economy since its birth a century ago. It remains so today despite its decline in importance relative to industrial production as a whole throughout the soviet period. The phenomenal increase in non-agricultural production relative to agricultural production has, however,

been primarily due to the increased output of the raw materials sector. The following table (next page) summarizes the growth of raw material production during the Soviet period. Additional data, both for intervening years and for other types of raw material, are in tables in possession of the author.

The table reflects several important developments. The 1954 output of the major types of raw material was five to six times larger than the already considerable output of 1913. This increase in output occurred in the face of two wars which each time all but halted production and rendered useless half of the equipment. Thus, the 1913 level of production was not reattained until just before the beginning of the first Five Year Plan. The second world war again reduced output to the 1913 and 1927 levels. One might say that the same aforementioned 400 to 500 percent increase of output occurred not only over the period 1913-1954, but as well over the shorter ones of 1927-1954 and 1945-1954. The pre-world war II level of output was reattained just prior to 1950. It may be noteworthy that steel production increased more rapidly than did the output of pig iron and other raw materials. Some students believe, however, that the high steel output of recent years is to be explained by the new inclusion of cast iron in the steel output figures. Manganese production has increased still more rapidly, but manganese, unlike the other raw materials has never been predominantly used within Ukraine.

Another important trend reflected by the table is the steady decline of Ukrainian raw materials production as a percentage of U. S. S. R. production. In 1913 Ukraine produced 60% to 80% of the U. S. S. R. output of individual raw materials in the coal-iron complex. By 1940 the proportions had fallen to 50% to 60%, and they are now about 30% to 40%. The most important decline in relative importance was shown by coal, which once accounted for the highest percentage among the raw materials and now has fallen to the lowest. The percentage decline of iron mining was sustained despite the recent rise in output, in absolute and percentage U. S. S. R. terms, of the open pit deposits at Kerch in the Crimea. Open pit mining at Krivoy Rog has declined rapidly from 33% in 1927 to 2.6% in 1950, so that almost all of the ore is now mined underground.¹³⁹ The

Table 13
OUTPUT OF RAW MATERIALS FOR SELECTED YEARS
(in thousands of tons and % USSR.)

	<u>1913</u>		<u>1927-8</u>		<u>1940</u>		<u>1945</u>		<u>1950</u>		<u>1954</u>		% increase 1913 - 1954
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	
Coal	22,760	78.2	24,800		83,800	50.5	44,000		92,400		110,000	32.2	500
Iron ore	6,400	69.3	4,671		18,700	63.0	6,460		21,000		31,809	52.5 ^b	497
Pig iron	2,882	68.4	2,361		9,200	61.2	2,300		9,700		14,850	50.0	515
Steel	2,441	57.7	2,409		8,600	47.1	2,800		8,800		15,450	41.2	633
Rolled steel	2,061	58.8	1,978		6,300	47.7	1,700		6,290 ^a		11,778	41.0	571
Manganese	276	22.2	499		892	37.8	499		1,200		1,962	34.8	711

Notes: a - 1948
b - 1950

Source: Tables in possession of author.

relative importance of the Krivoy Rog mines which stood at 47.5% in 1950 is by 1960 to decline still further to 36% of U.S.S.R. iron ore output, while that of the Kerch mines is to rise to 8% from 4.5% in 1950.¹⁴⁰

The decline in relative importance of Ukrainian raw materials production is due to the expansion of other Russian mining and metallurgical centers, and it has resulted in a steadily increasing use of Ukrainian raw materials by its own industries. The most important expansion occurred with the establishment of the Urals-Magnitorsk coal-iron complex, particularly its development in the 1940's to substitute for the war-ravaged Ukraine, and the postwar development of coal mining in the Moscow area fields. The far-reaching consequences of these and allied changes in the structure of the Soviet economy for Ukraine as well as for the U.S.S.R., will receive repeated comment in these pages. Here only their effects on the disposition of Ukrainian raw materials will be considered.

The expansion of raw materials production in other parts of the U.S.S.R. has been accompanied by increased local utilization of Ukrainian output. The following observations are based on tables in possession of the author. Although the absolute amount of raw materials exported from Ukraine has frequently risen, exports as a proportion of production have fallen sharply. The large coal requirements of the Central Industrial district (Leningrad-Moscow) came to be met increasingly from the Urals and are now also supplied by local coal mining. This has increasingly released Ukrainian coal production for use by Ukrainian industry, until in 1950 about 70% of Ukrainian coal was consumed at home. As the nearest supplier, Ukraine now sends part of its continued exports to eastern Europe, some of it undoubtedly from the West Ukrainian fields. 99% of the iron ore mined was processed in Ukraine already in 1937.

139 - These and the immediately following figures are derived from N. W. Rodin, Productivity in Soviet Iron Mining, 1890-1960., p. 35.

140 - The combined output of Krivoi Rog, Kerch, and Magnitogorsk accounted for 90% of Soviet production in 1940 but is scheduled to fall to 50% by 1960. Ibid.

Most noteworthy has been the increased local production and utilization of steel. A pattern of diversification of raw materials production appears to be emerging also within Ukraine.¹⁴¹ Pig iron and steel are produced both in the Donbas and the Dnieper areas, the former with its coal deposits predominating in pig iron, and the latter with iron mines predominating in steel. Production of steel, and of course, of pig iron, has also been established in the Crimea on the base of the Kerch iron deposits.

Less important, but not insignificant, is Ukrainian output of some other raw materials. Ukraine produces fuels other than coal, such as lignite, coke, and peat. The oil deposits of the western Ukraine yield petroleum and natural gas. Sulfates, aluminum and salts are also produced in moderate quantities.

Heavy Industry

Concurrently with the changes in the pattern of raw materials production Ukraine has seen a rapid development of heavy industry. The rate of increase in the output of metal working and machine building appears to have been nearly 25% per year during the thirties. Between 1940 and 1952 output per year doubled despite war damages and the need for postwar reconstruction. The value of yearly output, which in 1913 had been only 239 million rubles, reached 16.5 billion rubles (both in 1926-27 prices), or almost 70 times more than in 1952. The rate of growth of machine building alone has been even more rapid. This rate of expansion dwarfs that of raw materials output, and it plays a predominant role even in all non-agricultural output. Thus, the machine building industry accounted for 6.8% of industrial output in 1913, but it accounted for 25.5% in 1938.¹⁴² With all other metal working thrown in, the corresponding percentages were 11.3% in 1913, and 36.4% in 1940.¹⁴³ More recent data are not available, but reading of the

141 - Cf. Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii..., p. 320.

142 - These and the following figures may contain an upward bias in favor of heavy industry, because of the use of 1926-27 prices.

143 - Narysy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva..., p. 439.

current press makes it appear likely that the trend has continued, and that the share of heavy industry today exceeds that of 1940. The fifth Five Year Plan, for instance, called for an 84% increase of production by heavy industry between 1950 and 1955, while that of industry as a whole was expected to rise by 80%.

The structure of heavy industry itself can be discussed only in very general terms. Almost nothing can be said about changes of the structure without more complete postwar investment and output data. The output of the machine building industry was divided in the following way in 1938:

	%
Power machinery and equipment	13.4
Industrial machinery	15.4
Agricultural machinery	13.4
Transportation and communication	37.0
Other	20.8
	<u>100.0</u>

This already represented a considerable development of heavy industry, since in pre-Soviet days Ukrainian heavy industry produced little more than agricultural machinery, and not much of that.

Ukrainian heavy industry has been mostly concentrated in the five oblasts of the Dnepr-Donets region,¹⁴⁴ but the major cities elsewhere in the Ukraine, notably Kiev, Odessa, and Nikolaev have also had their share. Almost no heavy industry was to be found in the western part of even the pre-1939 Ukraine, until the postwar introduction of automobile production in Lvov.

During the thirties also, a large chemical industry was developed, based in large part on by-products from raw materials production -- coal, tar, salt, sulfur, etc.

Light and Food Industry

Ukrainian light industry has traditionally been very undeveloped, although much of the processed food consumed in Ukraine has been produced locally. Relevant data on light and food industry are sparse

144 - Kharkov, Voroshilovgrad, Stalino, Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk.

and scattered, and they permit only an outline view of the role which light industry and food industry play in the industrial economy as a whole. Textile and clothing production generally accounts for a substantial proportion of the output of light industry in its earlier stages. Russian textile production has traditionally been concentrated in the central industrial district. For the past century, however, Ukraine has been dependent on the central industrial district for its supply of manufactured textiles. In 1913 Ukraine accounted for .03 per cent of Russian textile production,¹⁴⁵ and her share had risen to only 3 per cent by 1940.¹⁴⁶ Her share of U.S.S.R. output of light industry as a whole was 8 per cent.¹⁴⁷ Other prominent lines of production by light industry are shoes, glass and pottery, wood products, and metal products, all based primarily on local raw materials, and processing of local and imported hemp and flax.

Processing of two of Ukraine's major agricultural outputs, sugar and grain, has always assured the food industry a major place in the Ukrainian economy. The output of sugar has doubled since pre-Soviet days, and its percentage of U.S.S.R. output has risen to 75 per cent. Milling of grain, and the production of alcohol from grain and potatoes have always had a major place in the economy. However, large scale plants are increasingly replacing small scale local production. The canning industry has grown, and produced 23 per cent of U.S.S.R. canned goods in 1940.

The rate of growth of light industries and good industries has increased in recent years. The third year plan, whose completion was interrupted by the war, and the fifth five year plan called for a rate of growth of these industries greater than under the first, second, and

145 - T.S. (pseud.), "Ukraine in the Economy of the U.S.S.R.", Ukrainian Quarterly, Vo. 3, 1947m p. 225.

146 - Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii..., p. 376.

147 - Ibid., p. 370.

fourth plans, and greater indeed, than the rate of growth of industry as a whole. On the whole, however, output remains low. Moreover, plan fulfillment by light industry typically lags behind that of other sectors of the economy. Particularly noteworthy seems to be the increasing industrialization of the Western oblasts. Gross industrial output in the West in 1952 is reported to have been more than three times 1939 output.¹⁴⁸ Lvov is to be turned into an industrial city. The 1953 output increase of all Ukrainian light industry over 1952 was 13 per cent, which compares favorably with the expansion of previously more emphasized industrial sectors.¹⁴⁹ The agricultural livestock program, if successful, should have repercussions also on industries processing livestock products. Interesting also are press reports of rapid increases in the production of light industry by consumer durables such as television sets and washing machines.

Productivity

In the absence of adequate published data on productivity, we have computed our own indices of productivity of labor and of capital. To arrive at an index of labor productivity we divided annual gross output of industry by the number of workers and employees for corresponding years. Our indices of the productivity of capital consists of the same gross output of industry divided by the value of fixed capital in industry and again by the output of electricity. Additionally, some scattered data from published sources bearing on productivity are presented. Due to the nature of the data used, individual figures do not yield much information. The figures must be regarded as indices and compared with each other.

148 - Rad'ianska Ukraina, January 6, 1954.

149 - Broadcast, December 14, 1953.

The following table presents our data bearing on the productivity of labor.

Table 14
PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOR

year	gross output million rubles	workers and employees millions	productivity output <u>workers and</u> employees	% growth
1925/6	2047	1.706	1200	
1927/8	2860	2.020	1420	18.3
1932	6927	4.361	1588	11.8
1937	16152	4.700	3436	116.4
1940	22360	5.950	3758	9.4
1950	25714	5.988	4294	14.3
1950a	25714	6.700	3838	2.0
1953	38571	7.188	5366	39.9
1954	43585	7.610	5727	6.7

Note: a) alternative figures for the number of workers and employees are presented.

The productivity of labor has risen. By our index, which relates industrial output to all workers and employees, productivity in 1954 was nearly five times that of 1925-26 and four times the productivity at the beginning of the five year plans in 1927-28. Labor productivity rose relatively slowly during the period of the first plan, a time during which the influx of labor was very high. Productivity, on the other hand, with the lower rate of labor influx rose very rapidly during the second plan period. Its rate of growth appears to have dropped again during the beginning of the third plan. Since 1950, productivity has

risen rapidly, despite the growth in the labor supply. Using the lower figure for workers and employees, labor productivity increased 50 per cent in that four year period; using the larger figure, it still rose 33 per cent.

It seems likely that, had we been able to base our index on inputs of industrial labor only, the index would have risen still more rapidly. Our own calculations for the period 1935-38 show that the productivity of industrial labor only rose 35 per cent while that of all workers and employees rose 32 per cent.¹⁵⁰ This is not a significantly larger rate of increase for industrial labor, but the table above indicates that this was a period of particularly rapid increase in the productivity of all labor. Published figures of industrial labor productivity for 1928-32, 1933-37, and 1940-50 show a considerably larger rate of increase than does our index for the first and last period, but a slower one for the middle period which overlaps with our period of most rapid increase.

The suggestion that labor productivity rose faster for industry alone is also supported by productivity data for individual industries. Annual output of coal per worker rose from 133 tons in 1927-28 to 313 tons in 1939, or 135 per cent or somewhat less than the increase of our index for the corresponding period. Annual output of iron ore per worker increased from 318 tons in 1927-8 to 984 tons in 1937, or an increase of 210 per cent, which is larger than that of our index despite continued substitution of easily worked open pit mines for underground mines. If data were available for labor productivity in the capital intensive industries which expanded so rapidly in Ukraine, they would undoubtedly show a much higher rate of increase.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the productivity of labor with its earnings. Western studies on changes in real wages in the U.S.S.R. agree fairly well that real wages fell during the thirties and remained below the 1928 level in 1948. Since that date, however,

¹⁵⁰ - Based on number of workers as cited in footnotes 129 and 130 in section on labor.

real wages appear to have risen very rapidly and have long since passed the 1948 level.¹⁵¹

The following table presents our indices for the productivity of capital.

Table 15					
PRODUCTIVITY OF CAPITAL					
year	output million rubles	capital million rubles	electric output million KW	<u>column 2</u> <u>column 3</u>	<u>column 2</u> <u>column 4</u>
1913	2159	2016	500	1.071	4.3
1927-8	2860	2141	1243	1.336	2.3
1932	6927	4390	3158	1.578	2.2
1935	12402	9307	7147	1.332	1.7
1937	16152	11968	9343	1.350	1.7
1940	22360	17600	11938	1.270	1.8
1950	25714		13700		1.8
1953	38571		21000		1.8
1954	43585		23876		1.8

According to our index, which compares industrial output with fixed capital in industry, the productivity of capital as a whole rose until about 1932. This was the period during which the growth in the number of workers was rapid and the rise in labor productivity correspondingly slow. With the beginning of the second five year plan the index begins to fall slowly, indicating that the growth in the supply of capital exceeded

¹⁵¹ - See for instance Janet Chapman, "Real Wages in the Soviet Union, 1928-52," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, May 1954, pp. 134-156. Miss Chapman presents her own estimates and compares them with those of two other writers.

the increase in industrial output. This confirms the existence at that time of the high rate of investment which we suggested in the section on capital inputs. Our other index compares industrial output with the production of electric power, which itself has already served us as an index of capital inputs. This index fell relatively rapidly before the introduction of the five year plans, declined at a more moderate rate until 1935, and then remained almost stable to the present.¹⁵² The close correspondence of the two indices would seem to lend additional justification to our use of either of them to estimate capital inputs and their productivity.

The moderate decline or near stability of the average productivity of capital, and the rise in the average productivity of labor summarizes much of Ukrainian industrial development. Yearly industrial output has risen 15 times during the five year plan period (since 1927-28), but this has required a still larger increase in capital and a 3.5-fold increase in the supply of labor. All of the inputs, and particularly most of the inputs of labor, do not contribute directly to industrial output, because they are inputs into other sectors of the non-agricultural economy.¹⁵³ But if we regard these other sectors as auxiliary

152 - The productivity of particular capital inputs has risen. Thus, the daily output of iron ore in tons per borer has risen as follows:

1913	3.5)	
1931	13.9)	
1936	33.9)	#92, p. 310
1940	55.9)	
1954	145.0*	<u>Trud</u> , 4.3.1954

* Norm

Similarly, tons of steel output per square meter of floor in open-hearth furnaces rose as follows:

1932	2.9	#32, p. 20-21
1934	3.7	#84, p. 343
1937	5.4	#84, p. 389
1953	7.1*	RU, 3.2.55, <u>Trud</u> , 2.30.54 & 4.6.54

* Average for three leading plants

153 - As we have seen, only a small part of the inputs considered here go into agriculture.

to industry proper, and consequently consider investment in them as necessary to the operation of the Ukrainian industrial economy,¹⁵⁴ we arrive at the conclusion that the relative growth of inputs has been larger than the relative growth of output. In terms of need for auxiliary productive facilities, Ukrainian industry has become more costly or less efficient. Put in another way, Ukrainian industry has become increasingly able to support "auxiliary" sectors of the economy.

154 - The expenditure of these resources is auxiliary, but necessary, in the same sense as are the investments in urban facilities discussed earlier.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL POLICY

Ukraine is a traditionally agricultural region inhabited by a peasant population. The reluctance with which its inhabitants have abandoned their rural life and ways has been discussed elsewhere. Ukrainian agriculture was long based almost exclusively on subsistence farming, but with the introduction of North-South rail connection and the establishment of the port of Odessa, Ukraine also became an exporter of grains. Soon, however, the share of grain in Ukrainian agricultural output began to decline while that of technical crops grew, an increasing share of grain was consumed domestically by the growing urban population of the eastern Ukraine while newer Siberian lands came to supply northern Russia, and Ukrainian grain exports declined again.¹⁵⁵ The port of Odessa nearly died, and the railroads were devoted more exclusively to the transport of raw materials and industrial goods.

Ukraine became a producer and exporter of raw materials instead, and on a scale never reached by her grain economy. The Ukrainian share of Russian production rose between 1860 and 1913 from nearly zero to 78 per cent of coal, 65 per cent of iron ore, 68 per cent of pig iron, and 57 per cent of steel. The provident location of mineral deposits in the eastern Ukraine combined with the willingness of labor to migrate there, in part from the Ukrainian countryside but primarily from Great Russia, gave the Ukraine a unique comparative advantage in the production of raw materials.

Soviet regional economic policy exhibits what appear to be two conflicting policies. On the one hand the Soviets seem to have a policy of extreme regionalization, which would lead them to expand the production of a few commodities in any one region to the virtual

155 - W. E. D. Allen, who in Chapter VII of his Ukraine, a History (1940) gives at once a very excellent analysis, the best of the Ukrainian economic development to that time, suggests that the Ukraine never really was an important exporter of grain, and that its role as a bread-basket has been much overrated.

exclusion of all other commodities and to tie each region to all others by mutual exchange. On the other hand, the Soviets seem to subscribe to a policy of regional diversification which would create several fairly self sufficient economic complexes in the U.S.S.R. Both policies, if indeed they are such, are reflected in recent structural changes in the economy of Ukraine. Each of the policies is undoubtedly based on various political, strategic, social, and economic considerations but only the economic considerations as they are reflected in the structural changes of the Ukrainian economy will be investigated here.

The emphasis on the production of raw materials and agricultural goods, each of which has itself been concentrated in different parts of Ukraine, is certainly an illustration of the apparent policy of regional specialization. But just as it was suggested that Ukraine appears to have enjoyed a comparative advantage along these lines, it can be argued that the longstanding Czarist as well as Soviet policy of failing to manufacture finished goods in Ukraine was in conformity with a comparative disadvantage therein on the part of Ukraine. Given that Ukraine lacked both urban facilities and an urban population, and that Ukrainians were in any case reluctant to move to cities, it was probably best that she concentrate on the production and export of raw materials, in exchange for which she was able to import finished goods from the north.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, it is likely that by using both the greater market area and the larger source of capital which her association with the rest of Russia provided, Ukraine achieved a more rapid rate of economic growth than would otherwise have been possible. This benefit, however, fell to Ukraine due to her tie with Russia and the resultant russification, and not due to the Sovietization of either.

The policy of regional diversification found reflection in the past expansion of Ukrainian heavy and machine tool industries, but it finds still greater expression in the most recent and prospective changes in

156 - Unfortunately it has not been possible to determine the terms of trade which Ukraine has enjoyed in this exchange.

the structure of the Ukrainian economy. I refer to the postwar expansion not only of production by heavy industry of many producers goods previously imported from the Central industrial district, but also the introduction of light industry and the increased emphasis on the production of technical props and livestock. Two economic considerations appear particularly relevant as possible explanations and justifications for these developments. The transportation costs of regional specialization are particularly heavy for the Soviet Union because of its size, and they may have increased in recent years due to the rising importance of specialized regions in the East. Soviet hopes of reducing these costs may serve to explain their increased emphasis on regional diversification which is reflected also in Ukraine.

Another consideration would seem to be still more important. It may well be that Ukrainian comparative advantage has been shifting. The expansion of raw materials production elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the provision of new sources of materials for the central industrial district, the relatively increased availability of skilled labor and urban facilities in Ukraine, may well be tending to shift the comparative advantage of Ukraine from the production of raw materials to that of producing more complex and diverse industrial commodities based on domestically available raw materials. This would leave the central industrial district in less commanding a position, would possibly force additional numbers of its labor to emigrate to the East, and would leave some newer Eastern regions to concentrate on the production of less finished goods, or indeed themselves to diversify them. Ukraine would become a more diversified economic region, but its ability to do so at a high level of production will have been a consequence of the very regional specialization of the past.

APPENDIX I

LEADING POLITICAL PERSONALITIES IN UKRAINE

Kirichenko, A. I.

**First Secretary of the Communist Party in Ukraine and
Member of the Presidium of the All-Union Communist Party.**

Kal'chenko, N. T.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine, Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers
(Prime Minister), and Member of the All-Union Central Com-
mittee.**

Hrechukha, N. T.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine and a First Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian Council
of Ministers.**

Podgorny, N. V.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine, a secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee,
and (as of April, 1953) a Member of the Central Inspection
Commission of the All-Union Communist Party.**

Nazarenko, I. D.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine and a Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee.**

Nikitchenko, V. F.

Chairman of the State Security Council in Ukraine.

Konev, I. S., Marshal

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine, and Deputy Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R.**

Chuikov, V. I.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine and Commander of the Kiev Military District.**

Sinita, M. S.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine.**

Davidov, A. I.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine.**

Hryshko, H. E.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine.**

Stafychuk, I. I.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine.**

Palladin, A. V.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine and President of the Ukrainian Academy of Science.**

Tychyna, P. H.

**Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party in
Ukraine and "official" poet.**

Bubnovsky, D. N.

A Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee.

Ivaschenko, O. Zh.

A Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee.

Yakovlev, I. D.

**First Secretary of the Kiev city Party Committee and
Alternate Member of the All-Union Central Committee.**

Pidtychenko, M. M.

**First Secretary of the Kiev city Party Committee and
Alternate Member of the All-Union Central Committee.**

Serdiuk, Z. T.

**First Secretary of the L'vov oblast Party Committee and
Alternate Member of the All-Union Central Committee.**

Titov, P. I.

First Secretary of the Crimea oblast Party Committee and
Alternate Member of the All-Union Central Committee.

Yepishev, A. A.

First Secretary of the Odessa oblast Party Committee and
Alternate Member of the All-Union Central Committee.

Postovalov, S. C.

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Crimea oblast
Soviet and Alternate Member of the All-Union Central Com-
mittee.

Fedorov, O. F.

First Secretary of the Zhitomir oblast Party Committee.

Ludnikov, _____, Colonel General

Commander of the Tauria Military District.

Korotchenko, D. S.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet ("President" of Ukraine).

Baranovsky, A.

Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and
Chairman of the State Planning Commission in Ukraine.

Gurev, _____

A Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

Neperezhny, _____

A Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

Onyshchenko, _____

A Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

Rozenko, _____

A Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

· 14: U. Chicago S-4, 5(1954-5)1955 RD1 Ukr. RD1

Veluiev, _____

A Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

Strekach, _____

Minister of Internal Affairs in Ukraine.

Kovpak, _____

Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Korneichuk, A. Y.

Chairman of the Board of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine.

APPENDIX II

DUMA ABOUT OLEKSIY POPOVYCH

Biletsky, L., Istoria Ukrayins'koi Literatury, Vol. I. (Folk Poetry)
Augsburg, 1947, pp. 227-230.

O, on the Black Sea,
O, on a white stone,
There sits a bright falcon;¹
Mournfully he moans,
And watchfully stares at the Black Sea,
On the black sea something wrong is happening.
An evil, hostile wave rises,
Breaking up into three parts
Brave Cossack vessels.
Then the first part is seized
and carried into Turkish land;
The second part is seized
And hurled into the mouth of the Danube.
And the third part loiters here
Amidst the Black Sea,
On a rapid swell,
And sinks into an evil storm....

O, in this part
There are many Cossacks,
And their commander
Is Hrytsko Kolomyichyn
Well known throughout the whole host.
He says to the Cossacks,
Weeping tears:
- "O, Cossacks, brave gentlemen!"²
Take good care,
Do not conceal your sins,
Confess your sins,
First of all before merciful God,
And before the Black Sea,
And before the Otaman Koshovy."³

Hearing this
All the Cossacks remain silent.
Only Oleksiy Popovych, of Puriatyn,
Responds:
- "O, Cossacks, brave gentlemen!
Do me a favor and take me, Oleksiy Popovych, alone,
Tie a white stone around my neck,
Cover my brave Cossack eyes with a red kytayka,"⁴
O, lower me alone into the Black Sea!
Let me alone give my head to the Black Sea

¹Ukr.: sokil.

²Ukr.: panove-molotse.

³Commander-in-Chief of the Zaporogian Sitch

⁴Red cloth symbolizing mourning and used to cover the dead.

Rather than that I destroy many guiltless souls,
Christians on the Black Sea. "

On hearing this, the Cossacks
Said to Oleksiy Popovych,
Famed knight⁵ and scribe!
Thou readest the Holy Scripture three times a day,
And teachest us, common Cossacks, good deeds,
Why, then, shalt thou have more sins than we? "

O, hearing this, Oleksiy Popvych
Says, weeping tears:

- "O, Cossacks, brave gentlemen!
I read the Holy Scripture three times a day,
And teach you common Cossacks, all good deeds,
But I have more sins than you.

As I was departing to join the host,
I did not start the right way,
Did not ask forgiveness of my father and mother,
Did not regard my older brother as a brother,
I showed my older sister great disrespect,
O, I pushed her away with my stirrup. . .
Perhaps, Cossacks, brave gentlemen,
This was my gravest sin . . .

O, also, when I was hastening from the town,
I smashed with my horse three hundred souls of small children,
Guiltlessly shed they their Christian blood.

O, young women ran out from the gates,
Grasped the children in their arms
And cursed me, Oleksiy Popovych.

O, also when I was riding past forty churches,
In my pride I did not remove my cap,
Did not make the sign of the cross,
Did not think of father's and mother's prayer.

Perhaps, Cossacks, brave gentlemen, this was the gravest of my sins...

O, also when I was passing the (Tsars') community
In my pride I did not take my cap off.

Did not say good day to the peasants and the Cossacks,
Did not greet them with the holiday . . .

Perhaps, Cossacks, brave gentlemen, this was my gravest sin . . .

It is my father's and mother's prayer that punishes me.

And if it did not drown me in the Black sea,
I would return to father and mother and kin,
And respect and honor my father and mother,
And regard my older brother as my own father,
And be as brother to close neighbors. "

⁵ Ukr.: lytsar.

As Oleksiy Popovych tells God all the truth about his sins,
The evil, hostile wave on the Black Sea begins to quiet.
It calms down and subsides
As if it had never been on the Black Sea.
O, it brings all Cossacks alive to Tendra Island.
As the Cossacks step out on the land,
They wonder greatly and say, weeping tears:
"When we were on the Black Sea, on the swift wave, in the evil storm,
We lost not a single Cossack from among the host,
Thanks to Oleksiy Popovych."

Oleksiy Popovych comes aboard,
Takes in his hands the Holy Scripture and reads it three times a day.
O, he teaches all the Cossacks good deeds.

-Hear ye, Cossacks, brave gentlemen,
How this Holy Scripture enlightens
And shows the power of the prayer:
O, when man honours and respects his father's and mother's prayer,
Then the father's and mother's prayer raises a man
From the bottom of the sea,
Ransoms the soul from great sins,
Brings it to the Kingdom of Heaven.
It is proper for us to remember thanks
For prayers
Since those with whom first we started to take bread and salt.

APPENDIX III

UKRAINIAN KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY

<u>English equivalents</u> (English)	<u>Ukrainian terms</u>
KINSHIP	RID
HUSBAND	CHOLOVIK, MUZH, DRUZHYNIA
WIFE	DRUZHYNIA, ZHINKA
FATHER	BAT'KO, TATO
MOTHER	MATY, MATIR, MAMA
CHILD	DYTYNA, DYTIA, pl. DITY
GRANDFATHER	DID
GRANDMOTHER	BABA
GRANDCHILD	VNUK, fem. VNUKA, VNUCHKA or ONUK, ONUKA
SON	SYN
DAUGHTER	DOCHKA, DON'KA
BROTHER	BRAT
SISTER	SESTRA
FATHER'S BROTHER	DIAD'KO, in West. Ukr. STRYIKO
FATHER'S SISTER	TITKA
MOTHER'S BROTHER	DIAD'KO, in West. Ukr. VUI, VUIKO
MOTHER'S SISTER	TITKA
FATHER'S BROTHER'S WIFE	STRYINA
" " SON	STRIECHNYI BRAT
" " DAUGHTER	STRIECHNA SESTRA
FATHER'S SISTER'S HUSBAND	DIAD'KO, VUIKO
" " SON	DVOERIDNYI BRAT
" " DAUGHTER	DVOERIDNA SESTRA
MOTHER'S BROTHER'S WIFE	VUINA, in East, Ukr. DLADYNA
" " SON	DVOERIDNYI BRAT
" " DAUGHTER	DVOERIDNA SESTRA

MOTHER'S SISTER'S HUSBAND	VUIKO
" " SON	TITOCHNYI BRAT
" " DAUGHTER	TITOCHNA SESTRA
BROTHER'S WIFE - to his sister	BRATOVA
" " - to his brother	BRATOVA
SISTER'S HUSBAND - to her brother	SHVAHER
" " - to her sister	SHVAHER
HUSBANDS OF TWO SISTERS- to each other	SHVAHER
WIVES OF TWO BROTHERS - to each other	BRATOVA, LATROVKA
DAUGHTER'S HUSBAND	ZIAT'
SON'S WIFE	NEVISTKA
WIFE'S FATHER	TEST'
WIFE'S MOTHER	TESHCHA
HUSBAND'S FATHER	TEST', in East. Ukr. SVEKOR
HUSBAND'S MOTHER	TESHCHA, in East. Ukr. SVEKRUKHA
WIFE'S BROTHER - to her husband	SHURYN, SHVAHER
BROTHER'S SON	NEBIZH, in West. Ukr. BRATANYCH
BROTHER'S DAUGHTER	NEBOHA, in West. Ukr. BRATANYTSLA
SISTER'S SON	NEBLAH, in West. Ukr. SESTRINCK
SISTER'S DAUGHTER	NEBOHA, in West. Ukr. SESTRINKA
HUSBAND'S SISTER - to his wife	ZOV YTSLA
HUSBAND'S BROTHER	DIVER
STEPFATHER	VITCHYM
STEPMOTHER	MACHUKHA
STEPSON or ADOPTED SON	PASYNOK
STEPDAUGHTER o ADOPTED DAUGHTER	NERIDNA DOCHKA, PODCHIRKA
TWINS	BLYZNIATA
RELATIVES	RODYCHI, KREVNI, SVOYAKY

FLANCE	NARECHENYI, SUDZHENYI
FLANCEE	NARECHENA, SUDZHENA
WIDOW	VDOVA
WIDOWER	VDIVETS'
STRAW-WIDOW	SOLOMLANA VDOVA
ORPHAN	SYROTA
KINSMAN	SVOLAK, in East. Ukr. RODICH
FAMILY	SIM'IA, in East. Ukr. RODYNA

EXTENDED KINSHIP RELATIONS

GODFATHER - to child's parents	KUM
GODMOTHER - to child's parents	KUMA
GODSON	POKHRESNYK, in East Ukr. * KHR'YSHCHENIK
GODDAUGHTER	POKHRESNYTSA, in East. Ukr. KHR YSHCHENYTSIA
GODFATHER - to his godchild	KHR YSHCHENYI or KHRESNYI BAT'KO
GODMOTHER - to her godchild	KHR YSHCHENA or KHRESNA MATY
SWORN BROTHER	POBRATYM
SWORN SISTER	POSESTRA
COUNTRYMAN	SEMLIAK

Appendix IV

LOVE UKRAINE!

—

By Volodymyr Sosyura

Love Ukraine, love it like the
sun;
Like the wind, and grass and
water. . .
In the hour of happiness and
in time of joy,
Love it in the hour of misfor-
tune.

Love Ukraine in your dream
and when you are awake,
Your cherry-like Ukraine,
Its beauty, eternally live and
new,
And its tongue like that of the
nightingale.

Among the brotherly peoples,
like a flourishing orchard
She is shining for centuries.
Love Ukraine with all your
hearts
And with all your deeds.

For us she is unique in the
world,
Only one in the sweet charm
of spaces. . .
She is in the stars, in the birch
And in every pulse of the
heart;
She is in the flower and bird,
in the electical fires,
In every song, in every duma,
In the child's smile, in the
girl's eyes,
And in the reddish fluttering
of banners. . .
As the fire that burns but
never burns out,
She lives in the paths and
meadows,
In the whistling of sirens, and
the waves of the Dnieper,

And in the fiery red clouds.
In the fire of cannonades that
crushed to death
The invading foreigners in
green uniforms,
In the bayonets that in the
darkness pierced our way,
To the springs, glorious and
sincere.
Young man! Give her your
smile,
Your tears and all you have. . .
You cannot love other people
If you do not love Ukraine.
Young girl! Like its blue sky
Love her every minute.
Your boy friend will not love
you
If you do not love Ukraine.
Love her in work, in love and
in battle,
Like a song that sails with the
star. . .
With all your heart love your
Ukraine,
And we will be eternal along
with her.

*

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
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
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


Minerals:


C	Coal	O	Oil & gas
Fe	Iron	Po	Potash
Mn	Manganese	Ph	Phosphorite
L	Lignite		


Source: Geograficheskiy Atlas SSSR, Moskva, 1954.






- Sources: 1. Geograficheskiy Atlas SSSR, Moskva, 1954.
2. T. Shabad Geography of the USSR, New York
 York, Columbia University Press, 1951.
3. S. Balzak, Economic Geography of the
 USSR, New York, Macmillan, 1952.





Sources: 1. Geograficheskiy Atlas SSSR, Moskva, 1954.
2. T. Shabad, Geography of the USSR, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1951.

UKRAINE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 1939



RURAL DENSITY:

Sq. Mi.	Sq. Km.
259-518	100 200
130-259	50-100
65-130	25 50
BELOW 65	BELOW 25






CITIES:

●	ABOVE 500,000
●	100,000-500,000
●	50,000-100,000
●	10,000-50,000


Source: Great Soviet Atlas, Moskva, 1939, Vol. II, Plate 11.



UKRAINE: BOUNDARY CHANGES 1897-1955,
Showing 1897 Guberniyas

-  International boundaries 1955.
-  Republic boundaries 1955.
-  International boundary 1945 (where differing from 1955).
-  International boundary 1938.
-  International boundary 1897.

Guberniyas of Russian Empire, 1897:



A	Bessarabia	G	Kursk (part)
B	Chernigov	H	Podol'sk
C	Don (part)	I	Poltava
D	Khar'kov	J	Tavrida
E	Kherson	K	Volynia
F	Kiev	L	Yekaterinoslav



Territory annexed to Ukraine, 1939-1955.

Sources:

1. V. P. Semenov, Russia, Polnoe Geograficheskoe Opisanie Nashogo Otechestva, V. 7 & 14, St. Petersburg, 1903.
2. La Pologne, Librairie Payot & Co., Lausanne & Paris, 1918, supplemental map, Carte Generale des Pays Polonais, 1:2,000,000.
3. Map, Poland, London Geographical Institute, 1944 (?), 1:1,650,000.
4. (Map), Karta Yevropeyskoy Chasti SSSR, 1934, 1:1,500,000.
5. Geograficheskiy Atlas SSSR, Moskva, 1954.

