UKRAINA:

Europe's Greatest Problem

By LANCELOT LAWTON

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PREFACE TO SECOND REPRINT

The greatest value of this most interesting booklet is in the fact that it is written by an impartial and objective scholar and journalist. Bias of one form or another is running wild and rampant throughout the world. With regard to questions which in any shape or form concern the Russians or the U.S.S.R., persons who try to be objective or subjective always risk being called either a Communist or a fellow-traveller or a Fascist or Nazi collaborator. The chief criteria for such classification usually rests not with the views you hold but on the views you venture to criticize. In making available this second reprint of the very excellent material which Mr. Lancelot Lawton published in the East Europe and Contemporary Russia publication we cannot help but express our admiration for his foresight in being able to see and to express boldly in 1939 what many are only beginning to see in 1950.

It must only be added that insofar as certain facts are concerned there have been considerable changes brought about by the second World War. Thousands of Ukrainians from all the ethnographic territories of the Ukraine, and particularly from the largest portion which was within the U.S.S.R., have found themselves abroad as refugees or displaced persons. On the other hand, the entire territory has been forcibly incorporated into the U.S.S.R. and now has one master instead of four. Abroad, Ukrainian political parties now in exile have combined together in coalition to form the Ukrainian National Council and Executive Committee based on the last legal and legitimate free Ukrainian government which went into exile, the government of the Ukrainian National Republic of 1919-21. The second world war brought into great limelight the Ukrainian resistance movement (UPA) which fought against both the Germans and the Russians and is still continuing its heroic struggle. In every way, the Ukraine still remains one of Europe's greatest problems and deserving of most attention.

Thanks must be given to the Federation of Ukrainians in Great Britain, who materially helped to make this second reprint possible.

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(See line 8, page 4).

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The following is a report of an address given before the Near and Middle East Association on February 1st, at 55, Princes Gate, by kind permission of Sir Frank and Lady Newnes. Mr. Tracy Philipps, M.C., presided. Some historical and other notes are appended.

WITHIN the past few months, Ukraina, a nation unknown to the West, has come into the forefront of the world's attention. Most people, I think, are prepared to say that they know little or nothing about it. For this deficiency in knowledge they need not blame themselves. There are good reasons for it. The suppressors of Ukraina took care that she be unknown; they indeed denied that she even existed. It would be difficult to imagine anything more reprehensible than this silencing of a nation which by ancient right belongs to the European family of nations. But uncontrollable events have now brought Ukraina into the international arena.

In spite of the widespread and forgiveable ignorance which exists on the subject, the impression widely prevails that upon the solution of the Ukrainian problem will depend the fate of Europe. This impression is justified. Ukraina is from three to four times larger than, and contains a population equal to that of Great Britain. When Moscovia seized Ukraina, the conquest of the Caucasus quickly followed. From then on, the gates of the Near East were open to Russia, and her dream of the conquest of Constantinople ceased to be fantastic. From then on, also, unless they sought expansion overseas, the nations of Europe were doomed to remain cooped up in the peninsula at the tip of the vast continent that stretches from the North Sea to the Pacific. The Treaty of Versailles confirmed this territorial arrangement. As a consequence, the Moscovia of to-day, which goes by the name of the Soviet Union, rules over some 200 nationalities, occupying

a territory of nearly nine million square miles, while the other nations of Europe occupy but one and a half million square miles.

Of the nations subject to the Soviet Union, Ukraina is the largest and most important. Lying between two great mountain systems, the Caucasus and the Carpathians, in the East she touches the threshold of Asia, in the West thrusts into Central Europe and in the South has access to the Mediterranean, from her coast on the Black Sea. Before the War, she was divided between two countries, Russia and Austria-Hungary, and after the War, was split up among four: Russia, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia.*

If we bear in mind the unique geographical situation of Ukraina, we may well believe that at this time, when so many nations are resolved not merely to cling to their possessions, but to extend them, any serious attempt on the part of Ukraina to overthrow her conquerors and unite her four dismembered regions into a united independent Ukraina, must create consternation.

Should such an attempt succeed, a nation would appear in eastern Europe second only in size and population to Russia. So great an event would most likely be accompanied by, or cause, remarkable changes elsewhere. It would influence, if not determine, the fate of Bolshevism and the Soviet Union, as well as, perhaps, that of Germany and National Socialism. It would determine, too, the future of Poland, Rumania and neighbouring lands, and would create new and formidable problems for the British Empire.

What are the prospects of Ukraina's success? Before attempting to answer this question, I would like to say that I am not a friend of Ukraina. It is solely as a student of East Europe that I interest myself in her struggle.

Most Russians always had, and still have, a very primitive way of dealing with Ukraina; I speak of old-regime Russians, not of Soviet Russians. "There is not, and there never was, such a thing as a Ukrainian nation," they blandly declare. Such an assertion was actually made in an official pronouncement of the Minister of Interior in 1863, and has since been frequently reiterated. The territory which is called Ukraina, it is said, is simply the south of Russia. Many Poles also denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation. They said that Ukraina was merely a part of Poland. In

*See map page 2.

these rival pretences have lain the sources of Ukraina's tragical existence.

When there is so much to be said about contemporary events, I must not dwell for long upon the remote past. But as it is still asserted by Russians and to some, though to a lesser extent, by Poles that Ukrainian nationalism has no deep roots, a brief allusion to history is necessary for an understanding of modern events.

It can be established that during three separate periods an independent Ukrainian nation existed. The first of these periods was from the ninth to the thirteenth century. During these 300 years or more, on the territory now known as Ukraina, there was a powerful and cultured nation, one of the foremost in Europe. The nation known as Rus was the first Ukraina, and its capital was Kiev. Although its connections with the North were slender, Russians say that it was identical with Russia, a nation that actually came into existence some centuries later. Consequently, they have appropriated its history, its people, its heroes, its saints, its culture, and indeed its whole estate. Yet their own noted historian, Kluchevsky, recognised that the populations of the two regions constituted separate ethnographical entities, and that the physical characteristics of these two regions were markedly different.

The second period of Ukrainian independence was the Cossack period. When Ukraina, ravaged by Tartar hordes and attacked from the north, lay helpless, Lithuania and Poland encroached upon her territories; and in the sixteenth century, when the union between these two countries was cemented, she came almost wholly under Polish domination. It is interesting to recall that at this time the Lithuanians and Poles shared a common fear of Moscow and Germany. It seemed then as if Ukraina as a nation was about to disappear. In order to survive, the Ukrainian upper classes were forced to submit to Polonisation, and the Ukrainian peasants were enslaved by the Polish nobility and the Jews.

A remarkable development now occurred. The Cossacks, who, under the name of brodniks, had existed in ancient Ukraina, came together and founded their famous State on the islands below the great cataracts of the Dneipr. The system of government in this State might perhaps be described as a democratic despotism. Each year the Cossacks assembled and elected by vote a ruler,

called the Hetman, who had powers of life and death over his constituents. But always at the end of his term of office he was held accountable for his conduct, and if he had seriously misbehaved himself was liable to be impaled or beheaded.

The Cossack State was in reality the continuation, in an original form, of the independent Ukrainian nation. It is true that it acknowledged the Polish kings and sometimes served them, but it knew no law but its own, and no power on earth dared to attempt to dislodge it from its island stronghold. Whenever they felt so inclined, the the Cossacks went to war with Tartars, Turks, and even Poles. No wonder a Polish king, Stephen Batory, said of them: "One day an independent nation will spring from this scum."

As capable on sea as they were on land, the Cossacks frequently got as far as Anatolia, and returned laden with booty. Strong in them was the spirit of revolt which lives in Ukraina to-day. Beauplan, the French engineer to the Polish king, who at this time spent seventeen years in Ukraina, wrote of them: "Without liberty they do not desire to live, and for this reason it is, they are subject to revolts and rebel against the law of the country when they see themselves crushed, so that they are scarce seven or eight years without mutinying against them." Other authorities speak of them in a similar strain. All agree that they would stop at nothing to get their own way, that they were proud and vain, and that they preferred death to slavery.

Frequently the Cossacks were reinforced by Ukrainian peasants running away from the service of Polish landlords, and by men of all nations who loved fighting and freedom. It was from this martial and spirited material that the core of the Ukrainian nation was bred. The Ukrainian problem is therefore biological and racial, and no measures which fail to take account of that fact can possibly provide a solution. The Cossacks always took the side of the Ukrainian peasants. Impartial scholars agree that between the Polish landlords and the Jews, who were their agents, and not infrequently their masters, the peasants were ground into misery and destitution. With commendable objectivity, Jewish historians say that the Jews were then all powerful. They managed estates. They monopolised the cities. They controlled not only the taxes, but also the revenues of the Orthodox Church; the fees for christen-

ings and funerals were paid to them, and frequently as magistrates they administered justice. A Jew who lived in these times, one Moses Hanover, after mentioning that the Jews were frequently deprived of their hoards of gold and silver by the Cossacks, remarked that they merely suffered for their sins.

In 1641, the celebrated Cossack Hetman, known as Khmelnitsky, but whose real name was Khmel, mobilised all the Cossack forces and overthrew the dual tyranny. Ukraina then became free and independent, and Khmel was compared to Cromwell, with whom he actually corresponded. Not strong enough to fight simultaneously Poles, Moscovites and Tartars, she later concluded an alliance as between equals with Moscovia, but Moscovia was faithless and sent overwhelming forces into Ukraina, which she eventually annexed. Nine years later, weary of war and strife with Poland, and anxious to quell the Cossacks, whose revolts still continued, she came to terms with Poland, and divided Ukraina with her. But for a century afterwards the Cossacks desperately revolted at frequent intervals. On each of these occasions large numbers of them were deported to other parts of the country, and after the Soviet manner of extermination, many were sent to dig canals in the pestilential marshes near St. Petersburg, the deaths among them being enormous.

As soon as Moscovia secured her hold on Ukraina, she changed her name to that of Russia. Again it seemed as if the Ukrainian nation was to be extinguished; for, in order to survive, its upper classes had to do what was required of them, that is, submit to Russification or Polonisation. But among the people, the peasants, Ukrainian nationalism lived on. Beginning as a romantic movement in the early nineteenth century, it gradually assumed literary forms and finally became political. At first it would have been content with something less than autonomy, but as even Russian liberals would not hear of so restricted a concession, it gradually, but inevitably, went over to separatism.

Hitherto, culture had been centred in the South. Kiev was nearer to the West than Moscow, and derived much benefit from Latin sources. In reality, Moscovia was the pupil of Ukraina and learned nearly all she knew from her. But from the moment when she annexed Ukraina and changed her name to Russia, she deliberately

sought to give a setback to Ukraina—to retard its development. The use of the Ukrainian language in schools and in scientific and historical works was forbidden. Not only was everything possible done to destroy and curb the Ukrainian language, but also to eradicate the national consciousness to which it gave expression. Ukraina was treated as a colony. She was rich in grain and raw materials, and Russia, neglecting her own resources, drew lavishly upon those of the south. Power was centralised at Moscow; nearly all the officials appointed, particularly judges, were Russians, and Ukrainian patriots were exiled to Siberia. If, as Russian authorities aver, there was no Ukrainian nation, why should this oppression and Russification have been so persistently and cruelly pursued? Even the Russian Encyclopaedia could not avoid the admission that, "although it is difficult to discover the moment of its birth, national self-realisation has never died in Ukraina."

That Russian rulers, in spite of what they told foreigners, were at heart apprehensive, was proved by the following extract from a brochure written in 1907 by General Zalesski, President of the Kazan Branch of the Union of Russian People, called contemptuously by many "The Black Hundred": "For 1000 years the Russian people have been collecting a multitude of lands populated by various nationalities. Most of them continue to be hostile, and in the depths of their soul dream how to regain their independence, and sometimes actively revolt. Should a misfortune happen to Russia, these alien nationalities would rise and strive to overthrow the throne and the Russian State."

The condition of Ukrainians in Russia was much worse than that of Ukrainians in Galicia. In the partitionings of Poland which took place between 1772 and 1795, Ukraina, too, was partitioned, and Galicia went to Austria. Ukrainians there were allowed their own schools, their own literature, and finally their own professors at Lemberg (Lviv) University. This liberal attitude of Austria towards the Ukrainians was greatly resented by Russia, and the friction thus engendered was one of the chief causes of the Great War.

In 1914, the misfortune which General Zalesski feared came to Russia. It was the European War. As a result of it, in 1918 Ukraina for the third time in its history became an independent nation. I have little time to dwell upon the confused events of this

period. Attacked by the Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian Government invited the protection of the Central Powers. This invitation suited well the purpose of Germany and Austria-Hungary. They urgently were in need of grain, and, once their armies entered the country, they proceeded to collect supplies with a ruthlessness dictated by necessity. The Ukrainian Government, as it was bound to do, took the side of the peasants, and refusing to co-operate in this confiscation, was dismissed, and the German High Command appointed General Skoropadski, who had commanded a Russian Army Corps, and who was of Ukrainian descent, to be ruler of Ukraina with the title of Hetman.

The Germans, by whom he was supported, met with great opposition from the peasants, and many thousands of them were killed. When their resistance to the allies collapsed on the Western Front, they evacuated Ukraina, and Skoropadski, disguised as a German officer, made good his escape to Germany, where he lives to this day. *A Ukrainian Directory, headed by Petlura, attacked on all sides by Whites and Reds, did not last long, and soon a Soviet regime was set up in Ukraina.

At first, before the U.S.S.R. came into existence, the Bolsheviks conceded independence to Ukraina. This was merely a makeshift arrangement on their part to enable them to tide over a difficult period. In his writings, Lenin held that Great Russians, that is, in reality, Moscovites, were justified in feeling national pride, because, after all, they had created a revolutionary class, and had brought Socialism within the reach of humanity. "But," he added, "we are not sympathetic with small nations. We stand for centralisation and against the idea of federal relations."

The belief prevails in this country that no one can possibly know what is happening in Soviet Ukraina. It is a mistaken belief. There is abundant evidence in the Soviet press to show that, as Stalin himself has said, nationalism in Ukraina is a major danger. Many observers, both Ukrainian and foreign, agree that the conditions which exist justify this apprehension of the Soviet authorities. Both before and after the War, I myself was well acquainted with Ukrainian nationalism. In 1933, on returning from a visit to Ukraina, Mr. Gareth Jones gave a lecture and wrote some articles

[•]Killed in a bombing raid in Germany during the recent (1939-45) war.

in an English daily newspaper, in which he explicitly stated that there was a very strong national movement in Ukraina. Others have confirmed this statement. Prominent among these is Lazarevski, a Ukrainian, who lived ten years in Soviet Ukraina, and was well acquainted with the Ukrainian leaders.

Unlike old-regime Russians, the Bolsheviks do not deny that a Ukrainian nation exists. Lenin wrote these words: "By their oppression, Tsarism and the Great Russian bourgeoisie have left an abyss of bitterness, and detestation of the Great Russians generally, in the hearts of the neighbouring nations. Instead of self-determination, I propose a perfectly precise concept: the right of free secession." This right was actually set forth in the Constitution, but no procedure for claiming it was prescribed. Everyone who has openly advocated separatism in the Soviet Union has vanished.

Many Ukrainian Communists sincerely thought that Ukrainian autonomy would be maintained, and that a Ukrainian Party, a Ukrainian economic organisation, and a Ukrainian Red Army would be allowed to exist, independent of Moscow, but they were soon disillusioned. By the Constitution of 1924, which created what is known as the U.S.S.R., Ukraina was wholly deprived of autonomy, and all political, military and economic power was centralised at Moscow. Only the management of her own cultural affairs was left to her. The ulterior motive for this concession was explained by a leading Bolshevik theorist, named Popov, in these terms: "Bolsheviks must not remain outside the Ukrainian national development with which the masses are identified; otherwise it will take a course of its own which will be dangerous for us. In order to come nearer to the masses, we must learn the Ukrainian language."

In accordance with this counsel, the Ukrainian language was made the official language. After its prohibition in Tsarist times that was a great concession. Non-communists, chiefly those grouped round the Academy of Science, as well as communists, eagerly availed themselves of this opportunity, and promoted literary and cultural activities. Undoubtedly a patriotic revival had set in.

In 1925-26, opposition groups, led by Shumski, Maximovich and Khviliovi, a well-known writer, appeared in the Ukrainian

Communist Party and demanded the formulation of a National Communist Programme. Thereupon, the Central Committee of the Party in Kiev thought it necessary to inform the Executive Committee of the Third International in Moscow that the existence of these opposition groups was clearly indicative of anti-Soviet activity, both in the cities and in the villages, and that chauvinism was growing in Ukraina.

In 1929, the G.P.U. disclosed a widespread revolutionary organisation, called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraina. Forty-five of the leaders were sent to long terms of imprisonment and many of their associates were shot. Only two years later, in 1931, another revolutionary organisation was discovered, called the National Centre. That was the year in which the enforcement of collectivisation among the peasantry began.

Here it should be explained that the national movement was not confined to intellectuals. Among the intellectuals were many agriculturalists who were in close relationship with the peasants. In no part of the Soviet Union was collectivisation resisted with such stubbornness and strength as in Ukraina. The reason was that in Tsarist times, unlike most of the Russian peasants, the Ukrainian peasants had no village communal system, but were mainly individual farmers. By all means within their power they fought to retain their Ukrainian mode of life, and in the end over five million succumbed to famine and other causes. Little was heard of this great tragedy in the West.

In each of the famine years, 1932 and 1933, revolutionary conspiracy was again discovered; in 1932 it took the form of a military organisation, which included Red Army commanders. In 1933, 4,000 people were arrested. One prominent Ukrainian after another was found guilty of the capital crime of patriotism and vanished from the scene.

In 1933, Skrypnik, an old Bolshevik and a friend of Lenin, who occupied a number of high posts, including that of Vice-President of the Council of Commissars in Ukraina, was accused of conspiring to become a leader of independent Ukraina and, on being summoned to Moscow to account for his actions, committed suicide.

Postyshev, a Russian, was sent from the north to crush the rebellion. He was accompanied by many Russians, and large numbers of Russian troops. Nationalists were found in all spheres, and all over the country. Nearly half the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party were dismissed, together with hundreds of officials.

Many of the Ukrainian communists, who had been spared, congratulated Postyshev on his good work and, believing in their sincerity, he was very pleased with himself. At the same time, Lubchenko, the new President of the Council of Peoples' Commissars in Ukraina, proudly declared that under the strong leadership of the Party, Ukrainian nationalism had been completely destroyed. Yet within a year the trouble began all over again, and riots occurred in many regions. Soon, Lubchenko was compelled to say that "once more the Ukrainian nationalists are advancing in close formation," while Postyshev himself lamented that it was difficult to harmonise Bolshevism with nationalism; in the end, he said, nationalism always won. After that, he, too, was summoned to Moscow and subsequently disappeared, somewhere in the Far North.

Then, in January 1937, Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin's brother-in-law, was sent to Ukraina with a retinue of controllers and chekists. He found that many Ukrainian communists who were nationalists in disguise still remained; and soon a new conspiracy was discovered. This time the chief culprit was Lubchenko himself, the President of the Council of Commissars. At one time he had been bitterly hostile to the Ukrainian nationalists and had even acted as prosecutor of the first forty-five leaders to be arrested and put upon trial. Suddenly he began to protest against the introduction of the Russian language for young children in the schools on the ground that it hindered them from learning their own Ukrainian language. Russian, he said, could be taught much later as a foreign language. And, at a Communist Party Conference, he deplored that foreign elements, by which, of course, he meant Russian elements, obstructed Ukrainisation, which he said should be pursued with all energy.

Then Moscow sent a new representative to Ukraina, an expert chekist, named Israel Leplevski. Again, it was discovered that Ukrainian nationalists had obtained the leading posts in all enter-

prises and institutions, the Academy of Science, technical organisations and co-operative societies. Thereupon, Lubchenko committed suicide rather than face a trial. His successor, a young Communist, named Bondarenko, was unwise enough to accept an invitation to Moscow, and since then nothing had been heard of him.

For some time the Ukrainian Council of Commissars or Ministers was without a President. Then a well-known Russian chekist, named Korotchenkov, was appointed, and another well-known Russian chekist, named Khruschov, was made Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. About this time, Petrovski, an old Bolshevik and friend of Lenin, who had been President of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic since its beginning, was arrested and disappeared. Other Communists of equal prominence also vanished. Latterly, all Ukrainian nationalists have been represented as Trotskyists and hirelings of the Fascist powers.* Thus, in Ukraina during the last seventeen years, conspiracies have occurred at frequent intervals, and there have been numerous risings. These manifestations have not been merely anti-Soviet. They have always had a further object: the creation of an independent Ukrainian nation.

Soviet Ukraina is as large as was Germany before her union with Austria. It is sometimes said that, without her, Russia could not feed herself. That is not true. Ukrainian harvests are at present hardly sufficient to sustain the Ukrainian people, and when, as now, a large portion is taken by the Government, many Ukrainians must go hungry. It is true that to a not less extent than did Tsarist Russia the Soviet Russia depends upon Ukraina for coal, iron and other raw materials, but an abundance of them are available elsewhere in her own territory. If deprived of Ukraina, she would be driven to develop these resources of her own. It is only because she treated Ukraina as a colony that she could afford to neglect them.

The Soviet Government makes no pretence of being merciful to its opponents. From Poland one might expect better things.

This circumstance is largely responsible for the illusion widely prevalent outside the Soviet Union that the national movement in Ukraina was originated by Germany.

Yet the relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians are as bad as they can be. In 1918, the Ukrainians set up an independent Government in Eastern Galicia, which they desired should belong to a Great Ukraina, with its capital in Kiev. After severe fighting, this Government was suppressed by the Poles, who later, after their war with the Bolsheviks, gained from them two Ukrainian districts. Volynia and Polisia. At that time, Pilsudski was dreaming of the ultimate revival of the old Polish Empire to be composed of three federated states, Poland, Lithuania and Ukraina, The allies, faced with an accomplished fact, accepted it, largely because France had the illusion that a big Poland meant a strong Poland; but they stipulated that autonomy should be granted to the Ukrainians in Galicia. The Polish Government agreed to this condition, and, furthermore, signed a treaty intended to safeguard minorities. Frequently, by Parliamentary and other means, the Ukrainians have striven to induce the Poles to keep their word. So far they have failed. A state of permanent revolution now exists in Polish Ukraina.

The Ukrainians complain that their population, which they say amounts to six millions, is deliberately under-estimated, and that to facilitate this under-estimation, large sections are wrongfully named Ruthenians. They complain that they have no University of their own in Lviv, that they are only allowed a small percentage of students at the Polish Universities, and that, on completing their education, these students cannot find any occupation outside business and petty trade. They complain that estates are being broken up in Ukrainian territory and distributed to Poles and not Ukrainians, that, in other words, Poles are systematically colonising Western Ukraina. They complain that their press is heavily censored and that organisations having no other object than the promotion of sport are frequently dissolved. They complain that local officials are a law unto themselves and that there is no justice for a Ukrainian, a fact which is well known to the Polish population, and which causes it to treat the Ukrainians with but scant respect. They complain that several thousands of Ukrainians are in prisons or in camps, and that arrested Ukrainians are kept in gaol for a long time without any charge being preferred against them, while the police hunt for evidence. They complain that offences which

are punished heavily when they are committed by Ukrainians are passed over lightly when they are committed by Poles. It must not be thought that the Ukrainians have done nothing but revolt. They have tried to build up a life of their own, and have created competently-managed organisations for assisting education, agriculture and co-operative enterprises. A number of Ukrainians, it is true, have resorted to terrorist acts. On the other hand, the Government's methods of oppression or pacification, as it is called, have been terroristic. The truth is that two proud and obstinate wills have clashed, and so acute is the resultant tension that it is now impossible to come to an agreement about anything.

The Ukrainians are determined to have freedom. The Poles are in no hurry to give it to them. They believe that they must have Galicia, Volynia and Polisia, which constitute one-third of their whole territory, to protect themselves against Soviet Russia. But they cannot imagine that the best form of protection is a contented Galicia.

Under Rumania in Bessarabia, which was formerly a Russian province, and in Bukovina, which was formerly Austrian, there are about one million Ukrainians. Here, too, the Allies, faced with accomplished facts, accepted them. In Rumania the Ukrainians are treated as badly as elsewhere, and in one respect worse. For they are not even regarded as worthy of serious notice. From the concessions granted to other minorities they have been excluded. How farcical is the regime to which they are subjected may be judged from the fact that not only is their press heavily censored, but it is compelled to print material which the Government supplies in praise of itself.

Lastly, we come to the fourth and smallest of the Ukrainian lands, which after the War was transferred from Hungary to Czechoslovakia. Hidden away on the slopes of the Carpathians, remote from the beaten European tracks, is a little region some 12,000 square kilometers in area, the population of which is predominantly Ukrainian or Ruthenian, as it is called. For centuries it belonged to the Magyars. The people were mostly peasants, wretchedly poor. No one knew much about them. They were neglected and overlooked. Certainly it was never suspected that they had national yearnings. But they did produce some intellectuals,

and at the end of the War, although there was much confusion among them, it was clear that they wished for autonomy or union with the Ukrainian Republic under Petlura. The Czechs exploited the situation greatly to their own advantage, and occupied the territory, citing as justification a pact which Masaryk had concluded at Philadelphia in 1918 with a group of emigrants from Carpathian Ukraina, who agreed to its inclusion in the Czechoslovakian State on condition that full autonomy were granted. The Peace Conference again accepted an accomplished fact, but stipulated that the territory should be an autonomous unit and be given the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czechoslovakian State. The Czechs failed to carry out this condition. They governed the region mainly with their own officials, introduced their own language as the official language, and provided far fewer schools for the Ukrainians than they did for their own people. They encouraged White Russians-that is, Russians of the old regime-to spread their literature and language, and did all they could to persuade the Ukrainians that they were Russians, or of special Carpathian-Ruthenian nationality. Yet, in 1919, the Czechoslovakian Academy of Science had declared that the country was a Ukrainian country and that its language should be, and was in fact, Ukrainian. Finally, as we know, Czechoslovakia entered into a pact with the Soviet Union.

The reason which Czechoslovakia gave for withholding self-government was that the Ukrainians were backward, but it must be admitted that she was not over-anxious to assist them to come forward. In 1934, Dr. Benes said of Carpathian Ukraina: "This part of the Czechoslovakian Republic belongs to us, and always will."*

Divided among four nations, and of interest to so many, the Ukrainian problem is vast and complicated, but amidst its currents

[•] Following the Award made by representatives of Germany and Italy at Vienna on November 2, an Autonomous State was set up in Carpathian Ukraine, and a Government with a Catholic priest, Monseigneur Voloshin, the Ukrainian leader, at its head, was formed. An election was held on February 12, and of the total number of votes recorded, 94.2 per cent. were given to supporters of the Government. From the beginning, the Czech Government sought to re-impose its authority, and early in March resorted to forcible measures. The occupation of Carpathian Ukraine by Hungary followed.

and cross-currents its true nature is discernible. The Ukrainians are a peasant people. For that reason they have been kept down. For centuries they have been under the domination of Russians, Poles and Jews. Their towns and industries were almost wholly in the hands of these peoples. How they and their occupation were regarded may be judged from the fact that Hebrew fathers counselled their sons never to become labourers on the land.

I am afraid that Ukraina was not the only country where cultivators of the soil were looked down upon. But this urban contempt for agriculture is, I hope, now passing. To-day, the peasants of all lands are demanding to be uplifted and respected. It is natural, therefore, that the Ukrainian question should come to the fore at this moment, and that the Ukrainian peasant people should have produced a crop of vigorous young leaders. If earlier I dwelt upon the martial qualities of their ancestors, it was because I wished to show that the Ukrainians have a great fighting tradition. I would like to add now that, mingled with all the defects, they have too all the qualities of a peasant people, and not a few great gifts, including capacity for scholarship, for art, for music, and indeed for all useful activities.

You will expect me to say something about the attitude of foreign nations to Ukraina. Ukraina contains all the raw materials and supplies which Germany needs. It is plain that Germany's future will be closely bound with South-East Europe. In the past, she and Austria had strong ties with this region, both economic and cultural. Indeed, Germans say that they were predominant there. When the Germans speak of South-Eastern Europe, they have in mind Ukraina. But, at the moment, foreign nations are barred from economic and cultural access to this territory. Consequently, Germany is deeply interested in the Ukrainian National Movement.

It is difficult to imagine how Ukraina could free herself from Soviet domination without external aid. While I am confident that most of her people would welcome this aid, at least for a time, I am equally confident that their leaders do not wish to exchange one conqueror for another—they want an independent Ukraina. Naturally, they will not lightly reject assistance from whatever

quarter it may come. The question is, upon what terms would such assistance be made available?

Since he has been in power, Hitler has said nothing of importance about Ukraina, and what he said before was not very clear, for although in *Mein Kampf* he remarked, referring doubtless to Russia: "We direct the eyes of our people towards the land in the East," a little further on he admonished these German people: "Not to see their future aim in an intoxicating course of conquests like those of Alexander, but in the diligent work of the German plough."

Germany cannot have forgotten her not very pleasant experience in Ukraina in 1918. If now economic opportunity were to be the price of her assistance, then perhaps Ukraina might be willing to pay it. Up to the present, Germany is the only Great Power which has seriously interested itself in this region. Democracies pick and choose very carefully those to whom they extend their sympathy, and not always the peoples and nationalities who need it most get it.

Poland, too, would like to see Ukraina separated from the U.S.S.R., but not if it were achieved by Germany. Ukraina is her next-door neighbour and she considers that, geographically, historically and economically, she alone has the right to be seriously interested in the future of Ukraina. She considers too, that German intervention in this region would imperil her own existence, and involve the loss of Galicia, Volynia and Polisia.

Nevertheless, the problem is dominated by the reality of German power, the urgency of German interests, and the belief that only she could render such external assistance as would enable the Ukrainians to free themselves from the Soviet Union.

These considerations at once suggest the question: What should be the attitude of Great Britain? Our attitude, I think, should be the Ukrainian attitude. We should stand on the side of Ukraina and of any nation who is ready to help her on terms she is willing to accept. In other words, we should strive to bring about a solution such as she herself desires. To do so, I am convinced, would be in our interests as well as in hers.

Great changes are bound to come in Eastern Europe, and other problems not dissimilar from that of Ukraina will occur. If these

problems are to be solved in a new spirit and in a new way, then some means must be found by which young and small nations can live an independent existence along with older and more powerful nations.

Historical and other Notes

TWO DIFFERENT PEOPLES

Many Russians declare that Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, and Russians are one and the same people. They base their assertion upon the fact that at one time the Ukrainians called themselves ruski, while the Russians (that is, the Great Russians or Moscovites) spoke in the past, and indeed still speak of themselves as russki. The Russians say that they call themselves russki because in reality they are identical with the Ukrainian people.

Is this contention justified? The issue thus raised has more than an academic interest; the insistent repetition of the Russian assertion has spread confusion. Consequently there is need for historical inquiry. Yet, whichever way the decision may go, the Ukrainian claim to national independence cannot be invalidated. To substantiate such a claim, it is sufficient that at the present time an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians should realise that they are a nationality distinct from other nationalities. That this condition is fulfilled, no one who has conscientiously investigated the modern Ukrainian movement can for one moment doubt. But if it be demonstrated that Ukrainian nationalism has deep roots in history, who will deny that its cause would gain immeasurably?

Let us see first what Russian scientists themselves have to say on the subject. The academician, F. E. Korsh, postulated the matter this way:—

"Of a Ukrainian, a logically-thinking man will say: 'Yes, he is ruski; all the same, he is not a Great Russian.' But a Russian

White Ruthenians in the Soviet Union number five and a half millions and occupy a territory which is the size of England, situated to the north-west of Soviet Ukraine. A strong separatist movement has developed among them.

² Russians spell Russki with a double "s," Ukrainians with a single "s." Russians pronounce the word harder than do Ukrainians.

specialist in patriotism will exclaim: 'Aha! he is russki. So, too, are we. Therefore he is the same as we, and is not entitled to demand anything out of the ordinary."3

Elsewhere. Korsh remarked: "This double meaning of the words Rus and Russki occasions misunderstandings, not always sincere. among our theoretical and practical politicians."4

Here it should be explained that in ancient times the word Rus was applied to a territory, a state and a people. Old historical documents speak of Rus firstly as the land of the Poliany tribe. and secondly as the State in the basin of the Dniepr, the capital of which was Kiev.5

The State was composed of the territories of Kiev, Chernigov and Perevaslav. Hence, Rus of those times was synonymous with what in later times were the Ukrainian lands. Other territories occupied by Eastern Slavs were not called Rus or Rus lands. A wealth of historical evidence is available to prove this statement. I regret that I have only space here to cite one or two examples.

In the Novgorod I Chronicle it was recorded: "That year (1145) the whole land of Rus went against Halich and laid waste to many of its territories." Thus, it is plain that Halich was not Rus. The same Chronicle also referred to a journey made in 1135 by Burgomaster Myroslav and Archbishop Nyphont from Novgorod into Rus, and mentioned that in 1221, "they showed the road to Kniaz" (Chief) Vsevolod, saying: 'We do not want you; go where you please - go to your father in Rus." Thus, it is plain that Novgorod was not Rus.

Among other testimony from the ancient Chronicles bearing directly upon the subject under discussion may be cited the following: "And Sviatoslav came with the people of Suzdal, Smolensk and Polotsk to Rus" (in the year 1167)"... he (a Moscovite Kniaz) is going from Moscow to Rus." Thus, it is plain that Suzdal, Smolensk, Polotsk and Moscow were not Rus.

³ Patriot o Mazeppynstve; Istoria Vedomosti; 1912, p. 53. Zavoevateli i Zavoevanie. Byrzhevia Vedomosti, No. 14254.

Lektsii i issledovania, by V. SERGIEVICH, pp. 61-62; Obzor istorii Russkago prava, by M. Vladimirsky-Budanov, p. 25.
 Kniaz is a title of Oriental origin. Actually, the word means "head" or "chief." It is translated "Prince"; but it does not mean "Prince" in the sense in which that title is ordinarily understood in Western Europe.

As has been said, much more historical evidence could be adduced to show that in ancient times—that is, from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries—the designations "Rus" and "Rus lands" were applied to the regions of Kiev, Chernigov and Pereyaslav, not to other regions occupied by Eastern Slavs.

It is true that some ancient chronicles alluded to the Novgorod, Smolensk, Suzdal and Moscow kniazi (chiefs) as Russki kniazi; but they did so only because these kniazi were descendants of the Rus dynasty of Vladimir the Great or Vladimir Monomakh. The designation was therefore dynastic only; it did not mean that the inhabitants of the regions over which the chiefs ruled were Ruski (or, alternatively, Rusy, Rusini, or Rusichi).

When in the thirteenth century the Kiev state fell, the name of Rus went to Halich-Volynia, not to Vladimir-Suzdal, and the kinsmen of the Kievan people in Halich (Galicia), Volynia and remote Subcarpathian Rus came to be known as Ruski or Rusiny. The fact that these names are preserved to our day in Subcarpathian Rus (or Carpatho-Ukraine) has enabled the Russians to claim that the people of this region are Russians, whereas, in reality, they are Ukrainians. Consequently, much confusion has wilfully been caused in the minds of many foreigners.

It should be added that Rus was transcribed in Latin as Ruthenia, and the name of its people as Rutheni. Here, again, we have revealed the source of much confusion in our time, not a little of which was deliberately occasioned by the enemies of the Ukrainians. Often in statistical data, Ruthenians are represented as a different people from Ukrainians; whereas, actually, they are one and the same.

GREAT RUSSIA AND LITTLE RUSSIA

The designation "Great Russia" is applied by Russians to the territory where they live, and that of "Little Russia" to the territory where the Ukrainians live. Frequently it is intended that the comparison which these terms imply should be derogatory to the Ukrainians.

Actually, the designations "Great Rus" and "Little Rus" are of Byzantine origin. In 1299, when Maxim, the Metropolite of Kiev, left for Vladimir, and later, when his successor Peter removed

to Moscow, the Patriarch of Constantinople, and also the Byzantine Emperor, began to refer to the Metropolia of Kiev as "Little Rus." According to Greek understanding, "Little Rus." meant "Rus Proper" as distinct from "Great Rus," which comprised outlying territories; analogous examples were: "Greece Minor," which meant "Greece Proper," and "Greece Major" or "Great Greece," which embraced all colonial possessions.

It is interesting to trace down through history the juggling with names and titles which led to a reversal or a distortion of their original meaning or application. When, in 1299, Maxim, the Metropolite of Kiev, went to reside in Vladimir, he continued to use his title, "Metropolite of Kiev and of all Rus." The Moscovite Kniaz, Ivan Kalita, forced his successor, Peter, to go to Moscow and at the same time, to enhance his own dignity took upon himself the title of "Grand Kniaz of all Rus." Yet, at that period, not a square inch of Rus or Rus lands was under his domination. In 1416, a Metropolitan Cathedra was again re-established in Kiev. Gregory Tsemblak, who was appointed to fill this high office, was independent of Moscow, and, as a matter of course, he resumed the title to which he alone was entitled: "Metropolite of Kiev and of all Rus."

In the fourteenth century, the designations "Little Rus" and "Great Rus" found new application. As a result of Tartar raids, there were in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries large migrations from Kievan Rus to the outlying western-most provinces of Halich (Galicia) and Volynia. Eventually, these provinces surpassed Kiev in power and prosperity, and their ruler came to be known as "Autocrat of all Rus Lands." In the early fourteenth century, several Metropolites sought to encroach upon each other's area of jurisdiction. The dispute was settled by the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Holy Synod, who re-divided the dioceses. To one Metropolitan was allotted Galicia and Volynia, under the name "Little Rus," to the other the remainder of the territories under the name of "Great Rus." Precedent was therefore adhered to; the prefix "Little" being attached to the most important of the two regions—the ruling centre.

In 1335, George II of Halich (Galicia) proclaimed himself to be: "By the Grace of God the Hereditary Kniaz of all Smaller

Rus." According to some authorities, this act was intended to be recognition of the fact that his throne was of more recent origin than that of Kiev, the cradle of the race and its culture. On the other hand, it might merely have been an endorsement of the ecclesiastical delimitation.

From 1340, almost all of Rus (Ukraina) came under the formal domination of Lithuania, and Halich under that of Poland. The name Rus, it should be emphasised, applied then not to Moscovia but to the territories of Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslav, White Russia, Volynia and Halich (Galicia). With the exception of small portions of Chernigov and Siverski territories, and then only for a short period, no part of Rus or of Rus lands came under the dominion of the Tsars. But towards the end of the sixteenth century, when Moscovia proclaimed herself to be the third and last Rome and the sole possessor of Christian truth, 7 her Monarch began to style himself "Tsar of Rus," which occasioned a protest from Poland, whose monarch at that time was also styled "Ruler of Rus," a title derived from the formal dominion of Poland over Rus lands.

In 1648 the Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnitsky, drove the Poles from the whole territory of Rus or Ukraina and styled himself: "Monarch and Autocrat of Rus,' a title to which he had full right at that time. According to Kluchevski, "Little Rus still lay beyond the horizon of Moscovite politics." The Poles, renewing their attack upon Ukraina, Khmelnitsky was forced to seek aid. He had the choice of several allies and eventually inclined to Moscovia. Soon she abused his trust and cunningly utilised the occasion to annex Ukraina. She also seized White Rus and Lithuania, whereupon the Tsar proceeded to aggrandise the Imperial title with these words: "Autocrat of Great Rus and Little Rus and White Rus and Lithuania and Volynia and Podolia." Kluchevski, the Russian historian, tells us that for several decades the Little Russian question exhausted Moscovite foreign policy, and made it difficult to hold Kiev and the Eastern Ukraine.

⁷ At this period Russia was very weak. The legend that she was the Third Rome was created in order to bring about a patriotic revival. It is propagated to this day in certain circles, but there is no more justification for it than for the equally preposterous assertion that the Russian moujik is destined to save the world, which, too, was originated in a period of depression after 1812 during the reign of Alexander I.

As we have seen, in the XVII century for the first time, Great Rus and Little Rus were mentioned in the title of the sovereign of Moscovia. The manifest purpose in placing them in this order was to exalt the status of the north-eastern territories on which Moscovia was established and to lower that of the region which, according to Greek and Byzantine designation, had been Rus Proper.

Yet for a long time afterwards the tsardom of Moscovia was known as Moscovia, and its people called themselves Moscovites. It was not until the closing period of the XVII, and the beginning of the XVIII century that the terms "Russia" to denote the State and "Great Russian" to denote the people came into use. Up to the XVII century foreigners called Moscovia and her people by their true names; to them Moscovia was Moscovia and her people the Moscovite people.

UKRAINA

When in order to support their pretence to superiority, the Moscovites transposed the meaning of the terms "Little Russia" and "Great Russia" and, making play with the prefix "Little," sought to stamp upon Little Russians the mark of inferiority, the people of the South abandoned the name and adopted that of Ukraina. The change was justified, for Ukraina is a not less historic name than Rus. As far back as the twelfth century the country was sometimes called Ukraina, and its inhabitants Ukrainians. In the Ipatiev Chronicle, for example, it was recorded that when Vladimir Hlibovich, Kniaz of Pereyaslav, died, "Ukraina mourned him greatly," and that in 1189 Kniaz Rostislav "went from Smolensk to Halichian Ukraina." Further references to Ukraina are to be found in ancient records in 1213, 1268, and 1282. Describing the campaigns of Hetman Nalyvaiko the old Cossack duma said: "In our glorious Ukraina; none aided the Ukrainians when strife visited our Ukrainian lands."

As a synonym for Rus, Ukraina was used in various foreign official documents, chronicles, geographies and charts from the XVI to the XVIII centuries. The records of the Sorbonne show that in the XVI century Ukrainian students were registered as "natione Ruthena de Ucraina"; on the geographical charts of

1580 in the National Library in Paris, the name Ucraina denotes the territories on both sides of the Dniepr, together with Kiev; the geographer Sansone headed his map of Ukraina, the date of which is 1641, "Ucraina o poese de Casacchi" (Ukraina, or the land of the Cossacks) and on it referred to the Moscovite state as "Muscovia": Hetman Khmelnitsky declared in 1649 to the Polish minister: "I left neither pan nor knigz (landlord nor chief) in Ukraina," and in his speech to the Kievan clergy in 1651 said: "God helped me to drive the Poles from Ukraina";8 a proclamation of Hetman Briukhovetsky in 1668 speaks of "Ukraina our beloved fatherland which Poland and Moscow want to divide."9

It should be added that up to the sixties of the XIX century the words "Ukraina" and "Ukrainians" were widely used in Russian literature as synonymous with the officially employed words, "Little Russia" and "Little Russians," Only in 1863 were they banned by censorship and removed from circulation. In that year the Minister of the Interior, M. Valuev, issued the well-known pronouncement: "The Ukrainian language never existed, does not exist and never will." Since that time to this day most Russians have been content to reiterate this assertion, without making any scientific effort to substantiate it.

But although "Ukraina" was banned in Russia it replaced the ancient name Rus in Galicia and Bukovina, territories outside the Russian Empire, and similarly in Bukovina and Galicia, "Ukrainian" replaced Rusin and Ruski, which were the ancient designations of the people. While these changes were introduced into life, they were not, it is true, officially recognised by the Austrian-Hungarian Government. In 1915 a group of Ukrainian members in the Reichsrath urged the Government to substitute Ukrainer for Ruthenen, but nothing came of the request.

We reach then this final conclusion: In ancient times, beginning from the IX century, those who dwelt in the land now known as Ukrainia called it Rus and themselves Ruski. Because the Moscovites, who were a quite different people, appropriated these designations, the original Ruski people elected to call their land Ukraina and themselves Ukrainians. They were wholly within their right

⁸ AktyIuzhno-Zapadnoi Rosii; vol. III, p. 444. 9 Istochniki Malorossiskoi istorii, by B. KAMENSKI: vol. I, p. 184.

in doing so; a nation is entitled to name itself. In this instance a name was not invented; an old name which had fallen into disrepute was dropped and a new name which had been current together with it, at least after the XII century, was brought into common usage. Thus Moscovia's claim to the heritage and geneology of Ukraina was effectively repudiated.

RACIAL ORIGINS

Not until the beginning of the XIX century did Russians deliberately and persistently spread the idea that the Russian people consisted of three branches: Great Russian, Little Russian, and White Russian. 10 The history of Ukraina went back to the IX century whereas that of Moscovia originated only in the XII century. Thus Moscovia came into existence nearly four centuries after Ukraina. How then could these two countries be one and the same?

Racially their peoples were compounded of quite different clements. Kluchevski, the classic Russian historian, declares that the Great Russian stock arose from a mixture of eastern Slav tribes with degenerate Finnish tribes and adds: "... there can be no doubt that the Finnish element played a part in the formation of the facial type of the Great Russian, since his physiognomy does not by any means reproduce everyone of the features generally characteristic of the Slav. The high cheek bones and the squat nose of the Great Russian bear credible witness to the influence of a Finnish admixture in his blood." On the other hand the same authority shows clearly that as far as can reasonably be ascertained, the Little Russian stock was exclusively of Slav formation.

Authorities following Kluchevski, who had much fresh material upon which to found judgment, did not doubt for a moment that the Ukrainian and Russian peoples were fundamentally different. Professor Chepurkovski, of Moscow University, expressed the opinion that ethnographically the eastern Great Russian had much in common with the Mordvini, Cheremissi and Bashkiri, and that

¹⁰ It was Karamzin, the historian of the Russian Empire, who first imparted to Russian historiography that chauvinistic spirit which has been so characteristic of it ever since. He was the historian of the State, not of the people; unfortunately, many of his successors, particularly authors of school text-books, followed in his false footsteps.

Great Russians living between the upper Dniepr and upper Volga were akin to Lithuanians, Zirians and Permiaks. The Ukrainians, said the same authority, were different from these Great Russians; they were similar to their western neighbours. The same conclusion has been reached by other equally notable authors of scientific works, including: A. A. Spitsin, A. N. Piupin, A. A. Korsakov, V. S. Ikonnikov, and more recently A. E. Presniakov, M. K. Liubavski and M. S. Hrushevsky.

In Ukrainskaya Zhizn, 1912, the academician Korsh well summed up the matter in the following language: "So evident is the distinction between Ukrainians and other Slav peoples that it is unnecessary to speak of it. Their difference from the people of the State-nation (Great Russians) manifests itself:

- 1. In language. The language of the Ukrainians is subdivided into dialects which are independent of the various branches of the Great Russian language.
- 2. In physical appearance and structure. It is possible to distinguish at sight between a Ukrainian and a Russian.
- 3. In characteristics. The Ukrainians have a humour peculiarly their own and a marked vivacity and sensitivity.
- 4. In customs and habits. So deeply rooted are their customs and habits that the Ukrainians preserve them even when they live in the midst of a Great Russian population.¹¹

"All such differences are real and could have resulted only from the fact that each people has led its life distinct from the other for many centuries. For that very reason the differences will endure, only becoming modified somewhat under the influence of human culture in general."

LANGUAGE

After much study and debate most scholars agreed that the Russian and Ukrainian languages were fundamentally different. This decision was reached after consideration of their phonetic maturity, morphology, lexigraphy and literary tradition. While some philologists, as for example, Shakhmatov and Korsh supposed

¹¹ It should be added that the costumes, cookery and the domestic architecture of the Ukrainians are markedly different from those of the Great Russians.

that at one time there existed an "old-Slavonic" (praslavianski) language, common to all Slavs, they one and all declared that as early as the IX century the language of Kiev Rus had its own individual traits which distinguished it from other Slavonic languages and that in course of time these differences became so accentuated that it was only possible with the aid of a dictionary of the Kievan Rus language to explain many of the obscurities of ancient Kievan literature.

In 1906 the Academy of Sciences was requested by the Council of Ministers to give a considered opinion upon the Ukrainian language. For this purpose, under the presidency of F. E. Korsh, a special Commission was composed consisting of A. S. Famitsin, V. V. Zelenski, F. F. Fortunatov, A. A. Shakhmatov, A. S. Lappo-Danilevski and S. F. Oldenburg. A report prepared by F. E. Korsh and A. A. Shakhmatov was approved by the Academy and submitted to the Council of Ministers; its main conclusions were that historic circumstances had brought about a complete differentiation between South-West Russia (Ukraina) and the region inhabited by Great Russians, that this differentiation was reflected in the languages of the two peoples, that instead of providing them with a common language, historical development had deepened dialectical differences manifested from the time when the two peoples first appeared on the stage of history, that in view of the fact that there was in existence a Little Russian language, as spoken by the people of Poltava, Kiev, Lvow, the Great Russian language spoken by the people of Moscow, Yaroslavl, Archangelsk and Novgorod, could not be considered as "all-Russian." Finally, the recommendation was made that the Little Russian people should have the same right as the Great Russian people to speak their own language in public and to print in it.

In 1906, the year when the report alluded to was issued, in response to an inquiry from the Council of Ministers, the Universities of Kiev and Kharkov endorsed the findings of the Academy, and added a request that Ukrainian literature should be given the same rights as those enjoyed by Russian literature, that the Holy Scripture should be translated into Ukrainian, that teaching in the primary schools in Ukraina should be conducted in Ukrainian

and that Ukrainian periodicals should be permitted to enter Russia from Galicia.

Numerous Ukrainian authorities, including Professor S. Smal-Stotski and Simovich, could be cited on the subject of the Ukrainian language, but in view of the clear and emphatic verdict of the Academy of Sciences—the chief Russian authority on philological matters—it would be superfluous to do so. I would merely add one individual opinion, that of the academician Korsh: "The maturity of a language from an historical and cultural point of view is established when it is a medium for the expression of the thought and feeling of a people who have their own culture and history and who form an ethnographic unit. Judged by these criteria, the language of the Ukrainians is as much a language as that of the Great Russians." 12

THE TIES BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH

It is only necessary to refer to Russian historians to demonstrate that from the beginning, the ties between Moscovia and Rus—that is North and South—were slender. Kluchevski says that it was "in the person of Andrei Bogoliubski, that the Great Russian first entered upon the historical stage," and he added "that entry cannot be deemed a happy one." It was Andrei Bogoliubski who, from Suzdal in the North, organized the expedition which in 1169 sacked Kiev. As a consequence of this outrage, and the growing contempt of his successors for Kiev, added Kluchevski, the estrangement between North and South became permanent.

Kluchevski declares that Moscow was the ethnographical centre of the Great Russian stock; for a long time the people who were destined to create Moscovia were hemmed in between the Volga and the Oka; their passage northward of the Volga was barred by colonists from Novgorod who were half free—booters; north-east, east and south they were cut off by alien peoples; while to the south and south-west they were denied access by the united Polish-Lithuanian Empire. Moscow arose in the midst of this population confined between the Volga and the Oka, a population which, according to Kluchevski, was effectually isolated from Rus or Ukraina.

¹² Ukrainski Narod i Ukrainski Yazyk : Izvestia Obshchey Slavianskoi Kultury ; 1913 ; vol. II, bk. 1.

The branch of the Rus dynasty in the North fell under the influence of Tartar customs, which already had much in common with those of the Finno-Ugrian population of this region, and it was from a mixture of certain tribes of Slav new-comers with this indigenous population that the Moscovite (Great Russian) stock emerged. Thus we have a possible explanation of how the rulers of the North became an eastern despotism imbued with uncontrollable desire to rule over others; of how they acquired their savage bellicosity and uncompromising characters. When in 1654 history brought the Ukrainians and the Moscovites face to face to negotiate a treaty, they had no mutual ties. The conferences were conducted with interpreters; the Ukrainians spoke of themselves as Ruski-people from Rus-and the Moscovites of themselves as Moscovites, that is people from Moscovia. Although both belonged to the Orthodox Faith, they did not feel that they shared a religion in common. To the Ukrainians the Tsar was merely an "eastern Orthodox Tsar," not a ruski tsar, for they alone were ruski and no tsar ruled over them.

CULTURE IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH

The South originated and promoted culture in the North; in other words, it was the Urainians who first imparted knowledge to the Great Russians. Ukraina was nearer to the West than Moscovia and maintained constant communication with foreign seats of learning. Moscovia, on the other hand, shut herself in and refused to allow her subjects to go abroad. Russian scholars freely admit the indebtedness of their country to Ukraina. Their writings on this subject would fill several volumes.

In all spheres of learning, art, and craftsmanship, in orthography, poetry, law, costume and custom, Ukrainian influences predominated in Moscovia. As early as the XIV century, many Ukrainians were employed as teachers in Moscow. In the XV and XVI centuries translations of Western books penetrated to Moscow, but these translations were made by Ukrainians. Books printed in the Rus language were used as text-books in Moscovia.

After the Treaty of Pereyaslav, concluded between Ukraina and Moscovia in 1654, Ukraina's cultural influence in the North greatly increased.

In Theofan Prokopovich, which was written in 1881 (p. 61), Professor Morosov (a Russian) records that Peter the Great saw that the Moscovite clergy were immeasurably behind the Kiev clergy in matters of education, that in Moscovia there were no people competent to educate the clergy, and that, therefore, it was necessary to seek the advice of scientists from Kiev. In his History of Russian Literature the academician Puipin (also a Russian) wrote: "In the XVII new forces penetrated and finally dominated Moscow's cultural life; these forces were the education, literature and general culture which had developed in Southern Rus, especially in Kiev. There were no real personalities at home; Moscow had to call upon men from Kiev for scientific and pedagogical work."

Peter the Great sent men to Kiev and Chernigov to learn the art of printing. In the first half of the XVIII century students were made professors of the Moscow Academy. In the XVII century Ukrainians occupied all high positions in the land. In 1786 public schools were created in Russia, and Ukrainians were appointed as teachers. At that time Kiev Academy was to all intents and purposes a teachers' college for all Russia.

BALKANIZATION

It is sometimes said that the liberation of the Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. would result in what is vaguely termed the "Balkanization of Russia"; in other words, it is suggested that the consequence would be the division of Russia into a number of small nations, whose quarrels would continually menace the peace of Europe. To prove the fallacy of such an argument it is only necessary to mention that the total area of the Balkan nations (Yugo-Slavia, Greece and Bulgaria) is 185,653 square miles, while that of Ukraina alone is approximately 360,000 square miles; and that the total population of the three Balkan nations is 26,217,200, while that of Soviet Ukraina is 36,000,000, and of Ukraina, as a whole, 48,000,000. Thus the area and population of Ukraina alone almost twice as large as those of the Balkans. Another consideration which should be borne in mind is that in the delimitation of Balkan frontiers national interests were frequently ignored and political and strategical motives dominated.

NATURAL RESOURCES

The wealth of Ukraina in raw materials may be judged from the following facts: in 1934 in world production: of petroleum she held the eighth place; of hydro-electric energy fourth place; of bituminous coal fourth place; of pig iron first place; of iron ore, third place; and of sugar, fourth place.

Ukraina possesses 4 per cent. of the estimated world supply of petroleum, which is 5,766,000,000 tons.

Ukraina's average annual cereal production is given below as a percentage of world and U.S.S.R. production:—

-	World production in tons	Ukraina's % of world output	Ukraina's % of U.S.S.R. output
Wheat	138,000,000	7.8	45.0
Maize	110,000,000	3.2	80.0
Potato	197,000,000	9.7	25.0
Rye	47,000,000	16.6	35.0
Barley	41,000,000	11.7	65.0
Oats	64,000,000	5.6	25.0

The following table gives the numbers of livestock in Ukrainia as compared with the U.S.S.R.:—

	U.S.S.R.	Ukraina	Ukraina's % of U.S.S.R
Horses	15,400,000	5,000,000	32.5
Cattle	45,800,000	12,000,000	26.2
Pigs	25,000,000	8,000,000	32.0
Sheep	61,100,000	16,000,000	26.2

The following table gives some of the leading exports from that part of Ukraina now known as Soviet Ukraina:—

	(111 11111110113 01 (0113)	
	1913	1934
Coal	7,200,000	19,700,000
Cereals	4,500,000	1,000,000
Ore	1,070,000	980,000
Steel and Pig Iron	1,600,000	3,370,000
Sugar	1,000,000	640,000

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