AN INTRODUCTION TO UKRAINIAN HISTORY

VOLUME III: NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURY UKRAINE

NICHOLAS L. FR.-CHIROVSKY

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AN INTRODUCTION TO UKRAINIAN HISTORY

Volume III: Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Ukraine

Nicholas L. Fr.-Chirovsky

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Philosophy in Economic Thought, Florham Park Press, Madison, N.J., 1972, (co-authored with V. Mott)

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Philosophical Foundations of Economic Doctrines, Florham Park Press, Florham Park, N.J., 1977 (co-authored with V. Mott), third edition 1981, second edition 1978

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AN INTRODUCTION TO UKRAINIAN HISTORY

Volume III

Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Ukraine

by Nicholas L. Fr.- Chirovsky
Seton Hall University



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
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
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PREFACE

As was the case with the first and second volumes of *An Introduction to Ukrainian History* which appeared on the market some three years apart, again some three years later this third volume is now available to the English-speaking reader, concluding the project. Of course, completing the work by bringing it up to date, to the 1980s, certainly gives the author a feeling of accomplishment, although he is aware of some of its shortcomings. However, after all, was anything ever perfect?

The third volume covers almost two hundred years of modern Ukrainian history, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the two centuries featured by a continuous and almost uninterrupted struggle of the Ukrainian people for their national and political, sovereign independence. It was a struggle to free Ukraine in particular from the overpowering domination by Russia, at first by the Tsarist regime and then by the Soviets.

The work has remained faithful to its initial intention to be *An Introduction to Ukrainian History,* a survey course for college and university students and a general reference book. It presents various aspects of the modern history of Ukraine in a brief and concise manner. This very feature of the work was either overlooked or misunderstood by some early reviewers of the previous volumes, some of whom claimed the works were either not deep enough or not analytical enough, or did not use all the possible source materials. But this was exactly what the author did not intend to do; otherwise he would have had to expand the whole project and publish ten or more volumes of primary research work. The author wanted to write an introductory history of Ukraine for general use, and not strictly a research work intended for scholars only.

This volume follows the same format of presentation as the two previous ones. It consists of two parts: the first one discusses nineteenth-century developments; the second one discusses the twentieth century and the recent Ukrainian past. During the nineteenth century Ukraine was subjugated to foreign rule by both Russia and Austria, so the government structure at that time is not covered in any chapters; the government then was exclusively foreign and not an organic part of the Ukrainian historical process. The second part covers the unceasing Ukrainian struggle for independence during the First World War, the inter-war period, the Second World War, and the post-war era. While the periods of national independence of the Ukrainian people were rather short because of their overpowering adversaries, the military struggles against their enemies, in particular in the form of insurgent and guerrilla warfare, were fierce and prolonged. For example, the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the UPA, following the Restoration of Ukrainian Statehood on June 30, 1941, lasted almost ten years in various forms of guerrilla warfare against the Nazis and the Reds, under some of the most unfavorable conditions and without any outside assistance or support. This was unlike the insurgent warfare going on in Europe or elsewhere at that time—the French, Norwegian, Polish, Yugoslavian, or Philippine resistance—which was supported materially and militarily by the Western Allies or the Soviet Union in order to defeat the Germans or the Japanese.

The political history of these two centuries in Ukraine is followed by chapters covering the government structure, spiritual and cultural developments, social structure, and economic life of the Ukrainian people, with the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries considered separately.

The source materials, the primary and secondary ones, are ample for this modern era of Ukrainian history. There are numerous official government records, compiled by Tsarist, Soviet, German, Polish, and other authorities; however, not

all are yet available for various reasons. This is, of course, an obstacle. In addition, there are the records of the UVO, OUN, and UPA, plus numerous memoirs, monographic accounts, and other written materials in Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, German, English, and other languages. Hence, it is quite a different situation from that of the early eras of Ukrainian history. In addition, the modern era is not entangled in any fundamental controversy, unlike, for example, the Kievan-*Rus'* period, which has been claimed by the Russians for political and imperialistic reasons without any truly scholarly basis for this claim. Nevertheless, while using the modern historical source material, one must be constantly on guard to discriminate between the historical facts of the recent past and the subjective opinions and subjective interpretations of these facts. Many of these historical events have been too recent and have personally involved many of the authors of the various writings, accounts, memoirs, monographs, historical books, and other sources. Thus, it is often difficult for them to be truly objective and impartial.

From the works on Ukrainian history which give a general overview of events, the following were important for writing the last volume of *An Introduction to Ukrainian History*: D. Doroshenko's *Narys istorii Ukrainy,* in two volumes, republished in Munich in 1966, and its updated English version by D. Doroshenko and O. Gerus, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, in one volume, published in Winnipeg in 1975; *Istoria Ukrainy*, by N. Polonska-Vasylenko, in two volumes, published in Munich in 1972 and 1976; M. Hrushevsky's *A History of Ukraine*, 1970; and I. Kholmsky's *Istoria Ukrainy* published in New York, 1971. All of them, however, with the exception of Gerus's updated English version of Doroshenko's *Survey,* have a serious shortcoming, since they terminate their coverage at World War I. I. Krypiakevych and M. Dolnytsky's *Istoria Ukrainy*, (1966), I. Nahayevsky's, *History of Ukraine*, (1975) and R. Szporluk's *Ukraine, A Brief History* (1982), though more up-to-date, are much too short—although

Nahayevsky gives very good coverage of church matters, while Szporluk supplies a good analysis of the most recent developments in Ukraine.

As far as the coverage of the independence struggle of 1917-1921 is concerned, the work of D. Doroshenko, *Istoria Ukrainy, 1917-1923,* in two volumes; M. Stachiv, N. Chirovsky, and P. Stercho, *Ukraine and the European Turmoil, 1917-1919,* two volumes (1973); M. Stachiv and Y. Sztendera, *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History, 1918-1923;* and several volumes of their Ukrainian-language counterparts, including P. Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revolutsii, 1917-1920*—in addition to many other works—are of the utmost importance. The history of the twentieth-century rebirth of Carpathian Ukraine is well presented in P. Stercho, *Diplomacy of Double Morality, Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine* (1971). The history of the independence struggle of the Ukrainian nationalists—the UVO, OUN, and UPA—is well presented in the works of P. Mirchuk (especially his *Narys istorii OUN*), Z. Knysh, O. Martovych, Y. Stetsko, M. Lebed, and others.

Most of the Soviet historical works on modern Ukraine must be used with utmost caution, because they largely give a distorted, pro-Russian interpretation which does not reflect the true state of affairs. This especially applies to the Soviet works on the political past of Ukraine which present a history of the Communist movement there, Russian-dominated and Moscow-directed, and ignore the permanent struggle of the Ukrainian people to free themselves from Soviet-Russian oppression. Also, Soviet works on modern Ukrainian culture, literature, arts, and social and economic processes are usually marked by the tendency to treat these developments as simple reflections of superior Russian developments. The "older-brother" approach is present and visable throughout.

Mirchuk's *Geschichte der Ukrainischen Kultur,* Luzhnytsky's, Fedoriv's, and Chubaty's histories of the Ukrainian churches, Chyzhevsky's and Radzykevych's his-

tories of Ukrainian literature, Kononenko's work on Ukrainian-Russian economic relations, and a great many other scholarly writings were of a great significance to complete the author's survey of modern Ukrainian history. In particular, for the most recent decades *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia,* published in two volumes, in 1963 and 1971 and edited by V. Kubiovych, supplied numerous articles and essays on various aspects of the modern Ukrainian past. These articles, written by notable and recognized authorities in their respective fields of scholarly specialization, were very helpful in completing the third volume of this work.

Finally, the author would like, without tiring the readers, to repeat or rather to paraphrase some remarks from the preface to the first volume of *Introduction to Ukrainian History.* It seems to him that another work in the field of Ukrainian history is definitely not superfluous in America or the West. For various reasons, and particularly because of very intensive Russian pressure to promote the Russian interpretation of the East European past, another look at that past may provide a more objective picture from the scholarly point of view. *Adiatur at altera pars* ("Listen also to the other side.") may only reaffirm any objective evaluation of some controversial and opposing views, approaches, and hypotheses. A better, deeper, and more objective understanding and comprehension of Ukrainian history, which has at times been distorted by Polish and Russian works and even by some Western publications, is the true and only intention of the author.

Maplewood, N.J. Nicholas L. Fr.-Chirovsky

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Maplewood, N.J. Nicholas L. Fr.-Chirovsky

PART ONE

Nineteenth-Century Ukraine

CHAPTER ONE

UKRAINIAN NATIONAL LIFE UNDER TSARIST ABSOLUTISM

The Nineteenth-Century Russian Empire—Russian Measures in Ukraine—Early Liberation and National Movements—The National Revival and Revolutionary Movements—Western Ukraine under the Austrian Empire

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY RUSSIAN EMPIRE. In the 1780s Ukraine became by force an integral part of the Russian Empire, one of the most autocratic and reactionary states of Europe. Five absolutist monarchs—Alexander I, Nicholas I, Alexander II, Alexander III, and Nicholas II—ruled the vast Russian Empire autocratically. Under their leadership it continued to grow according to the political blueprint left by Tsar Peter I and so faithfully followed up by Tsarina Catherine II in the course of the eighteenth century. In reality, it was the very same trend that had been so obsessively carried out from the earlier days of Tsars Ivans and Vasiliis. Wars, big and small, continued in the nineteenth century as before. Territorial expansion and the absorption of new lands and peoples of a variety of cultures and languages were, as before, the leitmotif of the Tsarist policies. All this was also motivated by a tradition of social reaction and economic backwardness which fully dominated the political phi-

losophy and the practical policies of the Tsars and their state apparatus.[1] Eventually, however, this reactionism and backwardness brought disastrous consequences, which at first expressed themselves in the fatal outcome of the Crimean War and culminated in a complete collapse of the Empire at the end of the First World War and in the bloodiest revolution of them all—the Communist-Bolshevik Revolution. At first the Revolution affirmed the liquidation of Tsarist autocracy, but then, and very soon, it resurrected it under the name of a "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.[2]

During the reigns of Tsar Alexander I and Nicholas I, until approximately 1855, modern Russia was politically ascending to the "top of the world," frequently performing a role as "policeman of Europe." But after the Crimean war, it became apparent that she was going downhill, in spite of some temporary successes.

Alexander I has been called an "enigmatic Tsar," since he was a complex bundle of contrasts. Theoretically, he was a well-educated liberal and reformer. Yet in many of his actions he was also a ruthless and arbitrary despot. His rule was influenced negatively by Aleksei Arakcheyev, who was sadistic, reactionary, and sick with ambition, and who by his friendship with the sovereign inspired some unfortunate official measures.

Alexander died in Tahanrih in Ukraine in 1825. However, his mysticism, liberalism, and religious inclinations gave rise to a legend. According to this legend, Alexander did not die in Tahanrih but secretly gave up the throne and became a holy hermit, Fiodor Kuzmich, who after "long peregrinations" died in Siberia in 1864. At any rate, Alexander's death or disappearance produced serious turmoil which almost caused a widespread revolution in the country.

Since 1815, secret societies, especially Freemasonic types, had proliferated and gradually gained importance. The call for reforms thus became ever louder. The so-called Southern

Society, under the leadership of Pestel, and the Northern Society in St. Petersburg, under Muraviov, became increasingly active and openly opposed to Alexander's successor, Nicholas. A liberal constitution, federal in character, was drawn by the conspirators to be presented to the new Tsar.

After some delay, Nicholas officially accepted the crown. The conspirators selected this very time for their revolt. Because the revolt occured in December, history has labeled the revolutionaries as "Decembrists" or, in Russian, "*Dekabristy.*" Some of them were very radical and extreme, such as Yakubovich, who suggested bloodshed and mass execution of reactionaries. Others were more moderate. Their immediate goal was to induce Nicholas to accept a national assembly, in order to limit his absolutist rule.

The Decembrist revolt was quickly suppressed, since it was limited to a rather small and select group of people, had little popular support, and no elaborate plan of action. Even the rebel leaders themselves did not believe success was possible. There was some street fighting in St. Petersburg, but a planned insurrection in Ukraine did not materialize and the Polish Patriotic Society did not actively join the uprising of the Decembrists in Russia proper. Arrests, investigations, and trials followed, conducted under Nicholas's personal supervision. The methods applied were devious and vicious. Eventually, five leaders of the revolt were hanged, and other rebels were condemned to hard labor, deported, or imprisoned for various terms.

In historical perspective, the Decembrist revolt has been closely tied up with the revolutionary traditions of Muscovite-Russian autocracy. Muscovy has always been a country of extremes: a country continuously ruled by extremely despotic princes, Grand Princes, Tsars, and Emperors, and at the same time recurrently shattered by the extreme revolutionary eruptions of the Bolotnikovs, Bulavins, Riazins, and Pugachovs to overthrow this despotism.

Some patriotic Ukrainians, the members of the educated

and upper classes, joined the *Decembrist* movement, having been driven by the desire to restore the political independence, or at least the autonomy, of their country. The Hetman traditions were still alive and well. Some of their programs outlined plans to divide the Russian Empire into some fifteen democratic states, including a free Ukraine. After the Decembrist revolt was suppressed, some Ukrainian intellectuals in later decades tried to contact Western courts and interest them in the Ukrainian cause as a way to reduce the "Russian threat" to Europe.

Thus, Nicholas ascended the throne amidst turmoil, general discontent, and aversion to his crude personality. He was quite different from Alexander. He was more primitive, less educated, and obsessed by militarism and strict discipline, even in civilian matters. Nicholas considered himself a monarch by "the grace of God," and his approach to political matters was similar to that of Peter the Great, except that he lacked Peter's abilities.

Nicholas I was aggressive and arrogant in his policies in Europe, the Near East, Central Asia, and Asia in general, thus antagonizing the European courts. Hence, he was popular neither with the legitimate governments nor the revolutionaries. All these developments brought upon him the Polish insurrection and the disastrous Crimean War. Amidst the dramatic events of that war, Tsar Nicholas died in March 1855.

The second half of the nineteenth century was the era of the last three Tsars: Alexander II, Alexander III, and Nicholas II. It was the era of a slow decline.

Alexander II was called the Tsar-liberator, but in reality he scarcely deserved the honor. He was inadequately educated and thrown prematurely into the state machinery to learn the job during his father's lifetime. There he was attracted to the state bureaucracy and its reactionary views. His inadequate education made him susceptible to the influence of traditional Russian institutions. Consequently, during his regime he

perpetuated a police state. Revolutionary activities and any national self-assertion movements of the dominated peoples and nationalities, including Ukrainians, were suppressed with utmost severity.

Alexander II was in fact opposed to the emancipation of serfs, and only his defeat in the Crimean War made him decide in favor of it, since he was afraid that otherwise a revolutionary tide might overthrow his regime. Also, something had to be done to combat Russian social and economic backwardness. The Tsar himself was an opportunist, always following the line of least resistance. His autocratic and reactionary regime of police terror produced a violent reaction among the liberals and the socialist revolutionaries. Several assassination attempts were made on Alexander's life. Eventually, an attempt in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1881 succeeded.

Alexander III, the second son of the murdered monarch, ascended to the throne immediately and had a rather short and relatively peaceful reign. The new Tsar, having grown up in an atmosphere of autocratic imperialism and Russian nationalism, and having been thoroughly trained in a chauvinistic interpretation of Russian history, became himself an ardent and militant Russian nationalist, attached to the traditions of Russian autocracy and religious Orthodoxy. The bureaucratic machine of a police state seemed to be an indispensable ingredient of the whole system. It was therefore promoted.

Absolute trust in the autocracy and the reliance on the police system enabled Alexander to disorganize the revolutionaries for a while. Police measures, exiles to Siberia, and imprisonments produced a superficial internal stability.

Nicholas II, Alexander's son, the last Tsar, ascended to the imperial throne in 1894. He was forced to abdicate in 1917. Nicholas was a man of average abilities and hardly inclined to raise himself to the stature of an autocrat. He was well educated but of a weak character. The Tsar was a moral and

devout husband under the influence of his wife, who in turn was under the half-mystical and half-sexual influence of a semi-literate peasant-charlatan, Gregory Rasputin. This certainly did not help the prestige of the throne. Rasputin acquired his position at the court through his supposed power to temporarily heal the hereditary hemophilia of the crown prince Aleksei. Then he gained significance as a political figure as well, and was involved in several court intrigues and scandals. He was used as an avenue of court favoritism, trusted by the Tsar and the Tsarina. Later on he even attempted to affect the higher levels of the country's politics.

Gregory Rasputin's influence at the beginning of the twentieth century was probably one of the darkest and most perverted pages of Russian history. The episode certainly shed a great deal of light on the general atmosphere of the Russian imperial court on the eve of revolutionary upheaval. In order to rid the Empire of the ill effects of Rasputin's influence on the Tsar, the Tsarina, and the state machine, and the fate of the country as a whole, a plot was organized and Rasputin was assassinated.[3]

Nicholas's rule can be divided into two different periods. The first one lasted from his ascendance to the throne until the Revolution of 1905, during which the old autocracy, bureaucratic regime, and the police system prevailed in accord with the Tsar's basic political convictions. The second one lasted from the Revolution of 1905 to the Revolution of 1917 and the collapse of the Tsardom, during which some vestiges of the autocratic power were surrendered, at least temporarily, and a semi-constitutionality was adopted. Actually, throughout the course of Nicholas's reign, the revolutionary activities of the socialistic and liberal groups and of the national minorities progressively undermined and paralyzed the Empire. Unaware of the approaching end, the autocracy sought to save itself by persecuting these revolutionary elements, which, of course, produced an ever-greater revolutionary reaction. Meanwhile, non-Russian peoples such as the

Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Gruzians, Siberians, and many others were getting ready to proclaim independent nation-states on the ruins of the Empire.

The First World War completely exhausted the Empire, and then the revolutionary waves washed away the Tsardom; Nicholas abdicated and became an ordinary citizen in March 1917. Then the Bolsheviks took over, and in July 1918 the entire imperial family, including Nicholas himself, was slaughtered in a cellar in the city of Yekaterinburg. But Ukraine and her people had had to endure a dark period of history under the domination of the Romanovs. Even their national identity had been denied and their full and complete absorption into the Russian "monolith" had been intended.

RUSSIAN MEASURES IN UKRAINE. As a result of the liquidation of the Hetman State and of the autonomy of the Territory of the Cossack Host, and of the partitions of Poland, which occupied a large part of Ukraine, the majority of the Ukrainian ethnic territory was gradually and methodically incorporated into the Russian Empire. Only half of her western provinces—Galicia, Carpathian Ukraine-Rus', and Bukovyna—were included in the Austrian Monarchy of the Hapsburgs. It must be remembered that the gradual absorption of Ukraine by Muscovy-Russia was carried out against the fundamental articles of the Pereyaslav Agreement of 1654, in which the Tsar had promised to honor Ukraine's rights and liberties and which had provided for her full national and political autonomy. The incorporation process was accomplished by force and against the will of the Ukrainian people and their leaders. The absorption of Ukraine by Russia took place, of course, at a time when Russian autocratic absolutism was at the zenith of its growth and strength. Ukraine had to endure its overall political ruthlessness. Moreover, its pressure against Ukraine and the Ukrainian people was much more aggressive and reckless than that

against the Russian people themselves—or, as a matter of fact, against any national minority in the Empire. In the case of other captive nations the Russian Tsarate simply applied its usual, though cruel, autocratic oppression in order to sustain the Empire. In the case of Ukraine, and Byeloruthenia as well, that oppression and terror was coupled with a full and complete official denial of Ukrainian national and cultural identity, distinctiveness, and individuality. Actually, throughout the entire nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century, St. Petersburg rigidly insisted in its official policies that there was no separate Ukrainian nationality, language, culture, and history, but that Ukrainians were simply a branch of the Russian people—the Little Russians, as they were officially called.[4] Their language, culture, and history were regarded as parts of the all-comprehensive Russian language, culture, and history. As has been pointed out in the earlier volumes of this work, this approach was a very convenient justification for Muscovite-Russian imperialism in this part of southeastern Europe. Consequently, any expression of Ukrainian national self-assertion throughout that entire era was simply equated with treason against Russia, and was dealt with utmost severity by all available measures of police terror. Any attempt on the part of the Ukrainian patriots to acquire recognition and an equal treatment for the Ukrainian culture, language, and history, or any other aspect of the Ukrainian national life in the Empire, was always met with contempt, hostility, and rejection as an expression of Ukrainian separatism, while any aspiration to national autonomy in Ukraine was held to be a crime against "Mother Russia." Such a general attitude of the ruling circles in Russia within the political framework of the Russian Empire, created a suffocating atmosphere for Ukraine, where the land and the people were threatened with slow and gradual dissipation and ultimate expiration. This official position of the St. Petersburg government was held to be an infallible principle which could not be opposed under any condition.

Such an opposition to the official stand was high treason *per se*, and hence was uprooted mercilessly by the secret police or uniformed gendarmery or by administrative chicanery on all government levels, from the small hamlet and local village to the province and the nation.

While the Tsarist court officially considered the Ukrainians a branch of the Russian people and hence equal to all the other branches, including the Great Russians, at the same time, the practical policies of the court were ones of discrimination and exploitation. Ukrainians were second-rate or third-rate subjects of the crown, unless they abandoned their nationality and became subservient and submissive to the Russian cause. Ukraine was considered a colony of the Empire, existing for the sake of the Empire and heavily exploited financially and economically to the utmost. Hence, the Tsarate applied double standards to Ukraine and her people, since her destiny was to serve only for the benefit of the Empire.

Immediately after the absorption of most territories of Ukraine by Russia, under the rule of Catherine II and then her son, Paul I, an attempt was made to eradicate any traces of the previous Hetmanate autonomy and the tradition of Ukrainian Cossack Statehood. All provincial and local government agencies were instructed to undertake every possible and available measure to unite the "Little Russian" territories with the common family of the Russian lands. Almost all old Cossack institutions, which reminded the people of the days of autonomy, administrative and judicial alike, were liquidated and substituted for by Russian institutions. Only a few institutions of Ukrainian origin were temporarily retained during the transition period, such as the regimental offices and military courts. The Cossack regiments were reorganized into the standing regiments of the *karabinery*, where for the time being they kept some of their old arrangements. Otherwise, the whole country was divided into a number of governor-generalships, *general-gubernatorstva*, and governorships, *gubernii*, according to the Russian pattern of pro-

vincial administration. Russian laws were gradually introduced to replace the Lithuanian Statute and other old laws.

Many Cossacks and upper-level members of Ukrainian society, who were desirous of keeping their privileged positions and overwhelmed by the might of the Empire, subserviently accepted imperial rule and offices, and at times were able to rise very high on the imperial social and political ladder, forsaking their people and their native country. This trend continued, thus making it the mission of the lower classes of society to save the Ukrainian nation from perishing. This mission was largely delegated to the peasantry and the married lower clergy.

The ascendance to the throne of Tsar Alexander I raised some hopes for the liberalization of the government, but they were soon dashed. He faithfully served the cause of Russian autocracy and power. Although Poland received political autonomy from him in the form of a Polish Kingdom of which he himself was the king, despite the fact that the Poles had fought faithfully on Napoleon's side, Ukraine did not taste of liberalization at all. On the contrary, in order to strengthen the Russian grip over the newly acquired territories, Alexander proceeded with the establishment of so-called "military settlements," where soldiers were supposed to be farmers and at the same time render military service on a continuous basis. Tsar Nicholas I continued the program, by which one or two thousand military people were settled in the southern regions of Ukraine to strengthen Russian domination there. He also increased the military garrisons in the country, and constructed a mighty fortress in Kiev, the symbol of his rule, to govern the land by the terror of autocracy.

Nicholas's reign was marked by severe reactionary measures in Ukraine, where the Decembrist movement had many sympathizers and where the times of Hetman autonomy had not yet been forgotten. Count A. Uvarov, a minister of education of the Empire, formulated the ideological background for these reactionary policies in three words: autocracy, orthod-

oxy, and nationality. It meant that all possible measures had to be undertaken to support Tsarist absolutism, the domination of the Orthodox religion, and of course the growth of the Russian nation, whereas anything which might oppose these three ideological principles had to be suppressed completely.[5] In accord with these ideological principles of Russian imperialism, as Kholmsky maintains, a large-scale Russification policy was intensified. The Tsar ordered the organization of a special commission the job of which was to devise proper methods for the eradication of any remnants of Ukrainian culture and for carrying out complete Russification there. The Russian language was introduced by force all over the country, in its schools, courts, and administrative offices, against the will of the people. The liquidation of any shadow of "Ukrainian separatism" became an obsession with some high Russian provincial officials, such as Bibikov, governor of Kiev, Dolgorukov, governor of Chernihiv, and Vorontsov, governor of Novorossijsk. On the occasion of the establishment of the Kievan University of St. Volodymyr in 1834, Tsar Nicholas made the following assertion: "The university is my creation, but I will not hesitate to be the first to raise my hand against it if it does not operate according to its very purpose and the master plan of the government. The very purpose of the university is the spreading of Russian culture and Russian nationality in Polonized western Russia"—referring to Right-Bank Ukraine. Hence, in order to suppress any revolutionary activities and the Ukrainian national movement, the university's students were subject to police supervision, including the searching of their apartments and the control of their private activities and religious beliefs and practices.[6] The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was completely subordinated to the authority of the Russian Holy Synod; the Uniat Church was mercilessly suppressed.

For a while, when the Government was concerned about the Polish insurrectional activities, Ukrainian Cossack regiments were reintroduced and their permanent existence promised by

Nicholas. Yet, immediately after that danger had subsided, the regiments were dissolved again, since St. Petersburg abhorred even the slightest indication of Ukrainian self-assertion and attempted to liquidate it on the spot.

The ascendance of Alexander II in 1855 to the throne again activated false hopes for the liberalization of rule in Ukraine. Truly, some amnesties of political transgressors followed—including some Ukrainian patriots, the members of the so-called Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius. Then, as a result of the setbacks of the Crimean War, the emancipation of peasant serfs was carrried out in 1861. Yet, the emancipation process was too slow and without any particular determination or enthusiasm on the part of the officials involved. According to the Government plan, it would have taken some twenty years until the peasants gained and fully paid for the ownership of the land. They were not immediately given full civilian and political rights and equality either. Too much land was still left in the hands of the royalty, nobility, and Church, while the peasants were poor and desired more land. The institution of the village community, the *obshchina*, which limited the rights of individual peasants to land, steadily contributed to the pauperization of the class. The whole emancipation process left a great deal to be desired. Yet in Ukraine it had a great impact on the overall social development and the revival of national awareness and self-assertion. It was certainly an improvement over the oppressive serfdom and bondage of the peasantry.

In the wake of the so-called Alexandrian reforms, in 1864 the judiciary was reorganized and the system of juries was introduced in some courts. Also, in the same year the territorial self-government, *zemstva*, was introduced. It was first introduced in Left-Bank Ukraine, and much later, in 1911, in Right-Bank Ukraine. The Russian Government was afraid to establish self-government in the right-bank provinces because of the Polish insurrection of 1861 and the relatively strong

Polish ethnic elements in these regions. St. Petersburg was not willing to surrender the self-government process to the domination of the Polish nobility. After Polish influences were weakened, the *zemstva* system was introduced in the western provinces.

The territorial self-government affected every aspect of Ukrainian life, cultural, social, and economic, and contributed to the development of national assertion. The entire population of land, all its classes, nobility, clergy, townspeople, and peasants, participated in the process without any discrimination, on the county and governorship levels. The *zemstva* administration had very broad responsibilities for health, education, and the economy; the maintenance of hospitals and the staffing of physicians, nurses, and other medical personnel; the building and maintenance of schools on all levels; the organization of continuous education and special training programs, technical and commercial, including Ukrainian studies; the fostering of agricultural progress by advancing new methods, better strains of crops, the use of machinery, and irrigation projects; and the promotion of the development of transportation and agricultural marketing. The functions of the *zemstva* self-governments were financed by a voluntary levy, largely borne by the rich, while their benefits were enjoyed largely by the less wealthy. The peasantry was helped in farming. The educational activities of the *zemstva* were financially assisted by the imperial ministry of education.

Morhun has described territorial self-government in Ukraine as one of the most important developments in the social, economic, and cultural life in the late nineteenth century. Veselovsky has underscored the close cooperation among the various Ukrainian social strata in the framework of the territorial self-government, which also gave wide opportunities of employment and self-expression to all those people who were unable to find work with the Government or any Government

agency because of political convictions that were unacceptable for the Tsarist regime.[7]

In 1870, an urban reform was introduced, which gave to the townspeople by and large benefits of self-government analogous to those the *zemstva* self-rule gave to the countryside. The towns received broad self-government powers, including responsibilities for health, education, and the urban economy—with approximately the same effects as the *zemstva* brought.

The impression of more liberal times and the effects of the emancipation and the territorial and urban reforms greatly facilitated the development of the Ukrainian national self-assertion movement, especially in its spiritual and cultural aspects. This immediately frightened the official Russian circles with the specter of Ukrainian "separatism." Russian chauvinists reacted immediately, having already started an anti-Ukrainian campaign of large proportions. Denunciations were sent to St. Petersburg which magnified the "Ukrainian danger." The Tsarist Minister of Interior Affairs, P. Valuiev, had issued a secret order in 1863 prohibiting the printing of books in Ukrainian. M. Yuzefovich, the superintendent of schools, was one of the leading promoters of the increased anti-Ukrainian agitation. Again a commission was established to study the problem of the growth of Ukrainian self-assertion. Its findings were completely permeated by Russian chauvinism. According to the commission it was unacceptable to permit any distinct Ukrainian language and literature, since such permission would create a solid foundation for the future separation of Ukraine from Russia. The so-called *Emskii Ukaz*, the Decree of Ems, by Tsar Alexander II in 1876, officially endorsed the entire senseless chauvinistic drive of Russia. The *Ukaz* officially and openly prohibited printing books in Ukrainian, including books of music and songs, the use of the Ukrainian language in theatrical stage performances, and the singing of Ukrainian songs publicly. The *Ukaz* simply followed Valuiev's precept from a few years

before that "there never was, there is not, and never can be a Ukrainian language." By such a crude measure the St. Petersburg Government expected to solve the issue of the growing Ukrainian self-assertion movement. It was mad reactionism. Without producing any of the desired effects for the Government, it provoked the indignation of the public and the rise of Ukrainian nationalism. Meanwhile, police terror and administrative chicanery by the Russian authorities continued to grow.[8]

Along with the development of Ukrainian self-assertion, which was taking new and more radical forms, revolutionary tides organically related to the Decembrists and Nihilists—of liberal, democratic, anarchist, and socialist ideological backgrounds—were rapidly gaining popularity and strength, undermining the very foundations of autocracy throughout the vast Empire. Also, other non-Russian nationalities—the Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, various Caucasian peoples, and many others—were, with ever-greater determination, opposing Russian centralism and aspiring toward national independence. In this way the nineteenth century came to an end.

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, unfortunately for the autocracy, the Revolution of 1905 followed, though the Government tried to prevent it by some half-hearted reforms. In December 1904, a gradual equality of peasants with other classes was legislated, while in February 1905 the people's representation in the legislative process was promised by Minister Buligin—in the name of the Tsar, of course. Meanwhile, meetings at industrial and other establishments, public gatherings, and banquets were held, and anti-Government resolutions were adopted and presented to authorities demanding the abolition of censorship, and freedom of speech, conscience, and assembly. The Government had to yield, at least partially. Censorship was eased; the anti-Ukrainian *Ems Ukaz* was repealed in part in 1904, allowing for the printing of books in Ukrainian, including the Bible; many

political prisoners were freed; and the problem of Ukrainian schools was raised.[9]

On Sunday, January 22, 1905 (according to the Gregorian calendar), a huge but peaceful and unarmed crowd approached the Winter Palace to petition the Tsar. However, the regime lost its nerve and ordered soldiers to fire into the masses. Over two hundred people were killed and several hundred injured. The masses became aroused. The unbelievable revolution became fact and revolutionary upheavals began under the tragic shadow of the so-called "Bloody Sunday." Though the Government realized its mistake, it did not want to admit to it—and it was already too late. Widespread strikes, street skirmishes and fighting, revolts of various army and navy units, and numerous peasant uprisings erupted all over. In Ukraine, sixty-four percent of all the counties experienced peasant revolts. Prime Minister S. Witte gave the tragic picture of the Empire's situation at the time in his *Memoirs*. For a while the Government did not know what to do. The revolution gave a mighty shot in the arm to the revival and activity of the Ukrainian national self-assertion movement.

Facing an inevitable downfall, the Tsarist Government began to retreat. A manifesto promising freedom of speech, conscience, and assembly was announced. The universities were granted the right to self-government. In October, the convocation of a State *Duma* (National Assembly), with legislative powers, was promulgated. It was supposed to consist of two chambers, the old State Council as an upper house, and the *Duma* as a lower one. Four electoral curias were established: for land owners, the urban population, peasants, and workers—but they were not given equal voting rights. The elections to the First *Duma* were boycotted by the leftists, while the Government used all kinds of unfair measures to prevent extremists from being elected, so that the *Duma* would be a willing tool of the Tsarate. From Ukraine, 102 representatives were sent to the First *Duma*. Of them, 42 formed the Ukrainian Parliamentary Group, which intended

to defend the Ukrainian cause. Its political platform demanded national autonomy.

The overall attitude of the *Duma* was hostile to the Government. Hence, it was soon dissolved. The Second *Duma* was much more leftist, since its election was not boycotted. But, because of this, it survived only 103 days and was sent home by the Tsar. This time the Ukrainian Parliamentary Group consisted of forty-seven representatives. The Third *Duma* became more conservative because of a new and changed voting law. During the deliberations of the Third *Duma*, Ukrainian national interests became much more popular. Demands were raised, to officially introduce the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and to establish Ukrainian schools there. Because this produced a violent reaction and the opposition of the Russian chauvinistic and imperialistic circles, nothing positive was done immediately. It focused attention on the Ukrainian question and built a solid foundation for the later moves of Ukrainian patriots. Furthermore, it proved beyond any doubt that the many decades of Tsarist police terror and administrative chicanery, intended to suppress Ukrainian national self-assertion, had failed fully and completely.

While in the course of 1906 the revolutionary mood subsided, in 1907 the Tsarist Government initiated its reactionary counter-offensive to stifle opposition and to restore autocracy, not realizing that by so doing it was swiftly moving towards an inevitable doom. All the old police measures were employed to suppress any form of revolutionarism. This reaction was supported by the nobility, the wealthy, and the rich peasants, as well as the middle-income townspeople. Among the devious methods of the regime was the inciting of anti-Semitism. Jews were declared to be responsible for all troubles, and bloody assaults, the *pogroms*, were organized semi-officially. During them Jews were killed and persecuted and their properties damaged and ruined. All the low elements of the society who might otherwise have joined the revolution-

ary causes were given a diversion to relieve the tense situation. The slogan *Byi yevreyiev, spasay Rosiyu* ("Beat the Jews, save Russia") was supposed to arrest the attention of and divert the proletariat from revolutionism. In Ukraine, anti-Semitism was soon coupled with official anti-Ukrainianism. In 1910 and 1911 Prime Minister P. Stolypin sharply denounced the Ukrainian self-assertion movement, afraid that it might lead to political autonomy and the eventual separation of Ukraine. Arrests, deportations, prohibitions of assemblies, and other actions against Ukrainian nationalism and police and administrative excesses by the regime soon followed.

Ukrainian national circles, in order to defend the Ukrainian cause, sought contacts with Russian liberal, democratic, progressive, and socialist circles and parties to gain their support against the official chauvinism and reaction of the autocracy, which was hated by all of them.

Stolypin, in order to weaken the brewing revolutionarism and discontent, revived Witte's idea and undertook an agricultural reform to attract the peasantry to the cause of the older order. Although, ever since the emancipation of the peasant serfs a great deal of land had been acquired by the peasants by purchase, they were substantially limited in its use by the so-called *obshchina,* the village commune. According to the law and Russian tradition, an individual peasant could not withdraw from the commune, either to sell or exchange the land, which was actually the property of the *obshchina* itself. As a result of the Stolypin Agricultural Reform of 1909, the individual property rights of the peasants on their land were fully granted and the *obshchina* was dissolved. The reform was enthusiastically greeted in Ukraine, where the individualistic psychology of the peasantry had dominated since prehistoric times, but it was somewhat contradictory to the essentially Russian collectivistic approach of the old *mir* and the contemporary *obshchina.*

In fact, the reform had its greatest success in Ukraine.

There the largest number of individual peasant farms was established of any part of the Empire. In the forty provinces of European Russia some 24 percent of all peasants left the *obshchina*. In Ukraine, in general over 32.2 percent of peasants did the same; in Right-Bank Ukraine 50.7 percent; in southern Ukraine 34.2 percent; in Left-Bank Ukraine 13.8 percent.[10] The reform was violently attacked by the ultra-right and the ultra-left, in particular by Marxist circles. The reactionary nobility and large landowners opposed the reform because they were afraid of losing the cheap peasant labor, while the socialist of all shades saw in the measure the liquidation of the poor and landless village proletariat. The socialists based their very hopes for bringing about the revolution and the liquidations of the hated autocracy once and for all on the poor village and urban proletariat, "who had nothing to loose but their chains." This was the general atmosphere on the eve of the First World War as far as the overall political and social domestic developments in the Russian Empire were concerned.

EARLY LIBERATION AND NATIONAL MOVEMENTS. The incorporation of Ukraine and the gradual liquidation of all the remnants of the Ukrainian Cossack institutions did not fully suppress the national idea of a revival of the Hetman state. Although a part of the upper Cossack and gentry classes having become a component of the Russian nobility (courtiers, *dvoriany*), loyally accepted service to the Tsar and the Empire, another part nursed national aspirations and even pointed out some prospective candidates for the renewed Hetman office: such as Prince Constantine, brother of Alexander I, with A. Hudovych as his regent. Alexander himself, before he became the Tsar, had also been under consideration, since with his early liberalism he was thought to be favorably inclined toward Ukraine.[11] There were also other political combinations in the minds of the Ukrainian patriots. V. Kapnist, for example, prepared an entire plan for the reintroduc-

tion of the Cossack system. The nobility in Ukraine searched in a semi-scholarly manner for its Cossack roots, and in its Cossack ancestors it looked for its aristocratic blood. Arkhyp Khudorba wrote a *History of Ukraine*, permeated by a strong anti-Russian feeling. The book, however, has not been preserved. Early secret societies were organized, in Novhorod Siversky and other places, and were known to be working for the restoration of Ukrainian political autonomy. The *History of Rusiv* and the *Ode to Serfdom,* mentioned before, were facilitating and strengthening these tendencies. Anything written and published by the Ukrainian patriots at this time underscored the deep differences between the Ukrainians and the Russians. These differences were also testified to by many foreign visitors who traveled through the Ukraine at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, such as J. Hueldenstaedt, J. Cherer, J. Engel, and V. Zuiev. In 1791, V. Kapnist visited Prussia and asked her Minister of Foreign Affairs whether the Prussian Government would help Ukraine in the case of a national insurrection against Russian autocracy. He received a negative answer, however.[12]

The Russian authorities were rather uneasy about these Ukrainian national feelings and tried to quell them by granting honors, privileges, and financial benefits to those of weak and subservient characters and persecuting and punishing the stubborn. Still, the nationally motivated conflict between Ukrainians and Russians was steadily growing; they did not like each other and treated each other with contempt and suspicion. Even foreign visitors became aware of this tense atmosphere after staying in Ukraine for only a short while.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century secret societies and lodges, in which the idea of Ukrainian autonomy was kept alive, were really proliferating in Ukraine. One of the oldest was in Novhorod Siversky. Others were in Kiev, Poltava, Chernihiv, and other cities, and in the countryside—being housed by wealthy Ukrainian landowners, such as those in Obukhivtsi (harbored by Kapnist) and in Ponurivtsi

(by Myklashevsky). The cities of Kharkiv and Poltava soon became the cultural centers of Ukraine: Kharkiv because of its university and Poltava because of the activities of Governor-General Nicholas Volkonskii-Repnin, who married K. Rozumovsky's granddaughter and in this way came into close contact with the Ukrainians and the Ukrainian cause. In Poltava, Repnin attracted many Ukrainian intellectuals, such as I. Kotlarevsky, V. Kapnist, and S. Kochubei, and let them work for the benefit of Ukrainian culture. With his support, D. Bantysh-Kamensky was able to publish his well-documented *History of Little Russia* in two volumes. Volkonskii-Repnin appealed to the Ukrainian landowners to take good care of their peasant-serfs, to raise their material well-being and their education, and scorned any excesses by the nobility, the *dvorianstvo*. Because of his progressive ideas and friendly attitude to the Ukrainian cause, the Ukrainian patriotic circles considered him as a possible candidate for the Hetman office, if the country's autonomy were ever restored, according to Ohloblyn.

Then, via Poland and Muscovy-Russia, Freemasonry came to Ukraine. Its lodges were organized at first in Poltava and Kiev, and then also in Zhytomyr, Kremianets, Refailka, and other places. They were secret associations, well disciplined, and their real purpose was not known to the lower ranks of membership. While in most cases these lodges had either a prevailingly Polish or Russian membership, in a few instances, such as the lodges in Kremianets and Vyshnyvtsi, they became more Ukrainian in their character and further contributed to the growth of national awareness. Because of their conspiratorial nature, the Tsarist Government began an anti-Freemasonry drive in order to suppress their existence. The membership of Freemasonry consisted of the gentry, teachers, physicians, army officers, and other members of the educated population, the *intelihentsia*.

With the suppression of Freemasonry, the 1820s witnessed a new development; secret political groups and societies came

into existence in Ukraine, such as the Little Russian Secret Society, the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, and some others, all of which intended to restore Ukrainian political autonomy. They were joined by such outstanding people of Ukraine of that time, as Lukashevych, Repnin, and Kochubei. Soon, the movement was associated with the Decembrist revolutionaries. Colonel M. Muraviov, his cousins, the grandchildren of Hetman D. Apostol—S. and M. Muraviov-Apostol, and two army officers—Colonel P. Pestel and Prince S. Trubetskoi, joined into a Union of Redemption, committed to limiting Tsarist autocracy. Then the Union split into the so-called Northern Society, centered in St. Petersburg, and the Southern Society, centered in the town of Tulchyn, in Ukraine, with two branches in two other places, in Kamianske and Vasylkiv. The Northern Society was less radical, committed to changing the autocracy into a constitutional monarchy, while the Southern one planned to establish a republic. P. Pestel, the head of the Southern Society, developed a program for the reconstruction of the Russian Empire according to which, after the liquidation of autocracy, all nationalities of the former empire would unite into one centralized republic, with a one-chamber parliament and with full personal freedom and equality for all citizens, private ownership of land, and freedom of enterprise.

In 1823, still another secret society was initiated, the Society of United Slavs, which organized the freedom-loving people of the lower social classes, with its center in Novhorod Siversky. It was thoroughly democratic and appealed to the peasants. The two older organizations, the Southern and the Northern Societies, confined their membership more to the aristocratic circles. Two years later, the Society of United Slavs formally merged with the Southern Society, but not for long. In St. Petersburg the Decembrist revolt, sponsored by the Northern and Southern Societies, was followed with disastrous consequences such as executions, imprisonments,

deportations, and exile of the guilty, not-guilty, and those incidentally associated with the societies and their December revolution. As has been pointed out, the revolution was ill prepared and poorly carried out. Even its leaders did not really expect its success. However, its impact on Ukraine was considerable, both by association and as a link between the preceding and succeeding liberation and revolutionary movements to abolish autocracy and to free the country. The suppression of the Decembrist revolt tempered the movement for a while, even in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, in the 1840s the liberation and revolutionary movements in Ukraine were revived again. Actually, revolutionary tidal waves swept across the entire European continent, influencing developments in Ukraine as well. In some instances a mystical element was introduced into the national-liberation movement in Poland, Bohemia, Russia, and Ukraine. The literary people and political leaders attempted to prove the messianic missions of their respective nations to contribute to the perfection and salvation of all mankind. Essays and books were written on the theme, contributing to a Romantic patriotism and the growth of resistance and revolutionary sentiments. In Ukraine, Mykola Kostomarov wrote such an essay about the messianic mission of the chosen Ukrainian people, *Knyha bytia ukrainskoho narodu,* the *Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People.* Then national messianism coupled with the Panslavic movement, the belief in a brotherhood of all Slavic peoples who, by means of the close political cooperation of all the equal Slavic nations, would be able to build new, better, free, and peaceful life conditions, without autocracy, police terror, and exploitation. It certainly was a revolutionary idea, and dreaded by reactionaries. Only later on did the Russians succeed in twisting the Panslavic movement to their own ends by persuading the Bohemians, Slovaks, Serbs, Bulgarians, and others to unite themselves under Russian leadership. As a result of such a Russian

maneuver, Panslavism degenerated into another device of Russian imperialism. Only the Ukrainians and Poles remained largely undeceived by the Russian version of Panslavism.[13]

Panslavism inspired associations and groups which were organized in Kharkiv and Kiev especially. A group of young professors and students of the Kievan university formed an illegal circle. M. Kostomarov, a historian; P. Kulish, an ethnographer and writer; M. Hulak, a historian of law; V. Bilozersky; and a few other younger people, all very nationally minded, joined the illegal circle, which propagated the abolition of serfdom and autonomy for Ukraine. Taras Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet of all times as well as an outstanding artist-painter, who made the most significant contribution to the revival of Ukrainian national self-assertion in the modern era and who acquired the title of Bard of Ukraine, was a spiritual leader of the circle.

In 1846, the circle was reorganized into the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood, *Kyrylo-Metodievske Bratstvo.* There were no representatives of the Ukrainian gentry in the Brotherhood; it was largely composed of members of the educated middle class. The name of the society hinted at its Panslavic ideology, since St. Cyril and Methodius were considered the Apostles of the Slavs. Along with Panslavism, the Brotherhood championed social e uality, the reconstruction of human society in accordance with the principles of Christianity, the abolition of serfdom, the abolition of Tsarist autocracy, the promotion of education for all social segments, Ukrainian political autonomy, and Ukrainian messianism. According to the Brotherhood's ideology, all Slavs should build a federation of equal and free Slavic states, with Ukraine having a leading role in the federation; Kiev would be the capital and the seat of the federal parliament. M. Kostomarov developed the statutes of the Brotherhood, while the ideas of his *Knyha bytia ukrainskoho narodu* became its ideological foundation. He was also the leader of the group, while Taras Shevchenko

was its idol, although it is not sure whether he was ever a full member of the society. Politically speaking, there were two wings in the Brotherhood: the moderate one, represented by Kostomarov and Kulish, which stood for gradual reforms; and the radical one, represented by Shevchenko, Hulak, and Savych, which propagated an armed uprising and the liquidation of autocracy. The meetings of the organization were secretly held, usually in Hulak's apartment.

The Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood did not exist long. In 1847 a certain Petrov informed the Tsarist police about the Brotherhood. The society was liquidated and all members arrested and exiled, while Taras Shevchenko was most harshly punished. He was exiled and forbidden to write and paint. No matter how short the existence of the Brotherhood was, its impact upon the growth of Ukrainian self-assertion was immense. Its outstanding members, having endured their punishments, continued to propagate and spread their ideas, restoring in the process the self-assurance of Ukraine as a nation.[14]

Meanwhile, the revolutionary waves of 1848, the "Spring of the Nations," swept through France, Austria, Italy, and other lands, substantially changing social and political conditions everywhere. In Russia, though an open revolution was avoided, revolutionary activities were growing and corroding the autocracy, and in so doing they added to the national independence movement of Ukraine. The temporary measures of the court, such as the strengthening of censorship and police terror, could not help, of course, in the long run. The Empire entered the Crimean War fully unprepared and was soundly beaten by the Ottoman Empire, England, France, and Austria, which were opposed to the growth of Russian imperialism in the Balkan Peninsula, the Near East, and Asia in general. Alexander II had to yield to some extent. In Ukraine, new forms of national self-assertion developed.

THE NATIONAL REVIVAL AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. The emancipation of the peasant serfs according to the Tsarist program—which neither made the peasants equal to other social classes nor gave them full individual freedom and full property rights on the land—produced general unhappiness and resulted in numerous peasant revolts across Ukraine. Ukrainian circles which were sympathetic with the plight of the village population soon developed the so-called "philo-peasant movement," *khlopomanstvo.* The "philo-peasant" members of the educated middle class, the *intelihentsia,* attempted to raise the educational level among villagers, to expose their social and economic plight, to deepen the studies of the Ukrainian ethnography and folklore, and to move generally closer to the village and its population as the healthy stock of the Ukrainian nation. Some of those "philo-peasants" exaggerated by dressing like peasants and associating themselves with the rural population. Their activities in the countryside to help the peasants educationally and materially aroused the suspicion and hostility of Government agencies and the large landowners, and brought upon them persecution and suppression. Soon the "philo-peasant" movement, which had brought the peasant class and the educated middle class close together, was replaced by the "popular movement," *narodnytstvo,* and the "Ukrainophile" movement, *ukrainophilstvo,* both of which featured a growing interest in the Ukrainian culture, language, and history, promoted a democratization of the society, and desired to serve the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian cause. The Polish uprising of 1863 greatly strengthened these trends. Volodymyr Antonovych, later on an outstanding historian and the leader of a school of historical thought, proclaimed himself to be Ukrainian and, together with other students, organized a student association in Kiev called "Society," *Hromada,* which promoted cultural and educational activities with a Ukrainian national slant. The Ukrainian language was widely used for cultural purposes.

The patriotic Ukrainian movement and Ukrainian cultural growth seriously frightened the Russian authorities, and this led to the notorious Valuiev order prohibiting the official use of Ukrainian language in print. There was a new wave of police terror against Ukrainian activists, which induced many to abandon the Ukrainian cause. Others limited their work to the cultural and educational fields without any political implications. St. Petersburg also supported the so-called "Moscowphile" trend, which attempted to deny the ethnic and national distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people and pretended to believe that they were a part of the Russian stock. The Moscowphile movement acted strictly in line with the chauvinistic doctrine of Russian authorities, and it was financed and aided in various ways by the St. Petersburg Government. Especially intensive Russian support was given to the movement in Galicia, which was under Austrian domination, where the Ukrainian national revival was on an upsurge at that time due to the more favorable attitude of the Austrian authorities.[15] Otherwise the Ukrainian patriots, largely members of the educated middle class, limited their activities to the cultural, social, and economic fields to improve the plight of the lower classes, and kept in close touch with the West-Ukrainian Galician national activists, who could operate under more freedom. Politically, the ideology of that group evolved from the earlier "philo-peasant" and "Ukrainophile" movements to favor the autonomy of Ukraine within the framework of a Russian federation, from autonomism to federalism, while the traditions of the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood were still very much alive.

The Old Society, *Stara Hromada*, organized by former members of the student *Hromada* and headed by V. Antonovych, was another result of the growing Ukrainian cultural and educational self-assertion. Soon, similar societies were founded in other towns, such as Kharkiv, Odessa, Chernihiv, Poltava, and St. Petersburg, where many Ukrainian activists gathered for various reasons. In 1874, the Old Society acquired

a newspaper, by which its beliefs were spread. Kiev became the cultural center of Ukraine again. In that year too the Old Society initiated the organization of the "Geographical Society," a branch of the Russian one, in Kiev. The Geographical Society indulged in studies of the Ukrainian geography, enthnography, language, history, and economy, and published several important works, including the *Istoricheskie piesni maloruskavo naroda,* the *Historical Songs of the Little Russian People.* In 1875, an archeological convention was held in Kiev, participated in by Ukrainian scholars. Ukraine was active again in scholarship on a worldwide basis.

Meanwhile a split was developing within the Old Society between the national and socialist wings. The national wing was lead by Antonovych, while the socialist wing, looking for contacts and cooperation with the Russian radical circles and de-emphasizing any strictly Ukrainian national concerns, was led by M. Drahomaniv, a historian and able activist. Because of his radicalism, Drahomaniv was relieved from his duties as assistant professor at the Kievan university. Then, he was sent by the Society abroad where, in Geneva, Switzerland, he organized a cultural Ukrainian center with a definite socialist and federalist character. That alienated him even more from the nationally minded majority of the Old Society, and it refused to support him financially anymore. Drahomaniv moved to Sophia in Bulgaria, where he continued his activities, which in the long run hurt the Ukrainian cause more than it helped it.

The *Stara Hromada* sponsored the publication of *Kievskaia Starina,* the *Kievan Antiquity.* It was written in the Russian language in order to avoid persecution and suppression, but was wholly dedicated to Ukrainian studies. This was after the proclamation of the notorious *Emskii Ukaz*, which totally prohibited the use of the Ukrainian language and which began an uncompromising Russian drive against Ukrainian culture.

The radicalization of the Ukrainian national movement

was progressing. In 1892, the *Brotherhood of Tarasivtsi,* followers of Taras Shevchenko, was organized. As dedicated Ukrainians they insisted on the use of the Ukrainian language in the family, schools, and public offices and in the defense of Ukrainian rights. M. Mikhnovsky, a future advocate of Ukrainian nationalism, and Y. Lypa, another Ukrainian nationalist, were among its members.

During the 1890s numerous societies, partially conspiratorial, were again organized; some of them being predominantly national in scope and others with a socialist slant and under Drahomaniv's influence. In 1897, a convention of delegates of these societies was held in Kiev, culminating in the formation of a "General Ukrainian Non-Partisan Democratic Organization," which then continued to establish its branches, *hromady,* all over Ukraine. Finally, in 1899, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, the RUP, was organized under the leadership of D. Antonovych. It consisted of the most active elements and immediately raised the demand for the political independence and sovereignty of Ukraine. The era of the autonomist and federalist orientation was by that time over, and the era of the national independence movement of Ukraine was beginning. Later, in 1905, the RUP evolved into two organizations: the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party, with a strictly Marxist ideology, and which reduced its political demands to Ukrainian autonomism; and the National Ukrainian Party, which firmly insisted on the principle of Ukrainian political sovereignty.

Parallel to the growth of Ukrainian nationalism, the socialist movement and labor organizations were also on the rise in Ukraine. In 1875, the first modern labor union was formed in Odessa, with a definitely revolutionary program to unite all workers in order to improve their conditions by overthrowing the autocracy and the capitalistic market system of economy. Socialist cells were organized everywhere and spread the socialist ideology among the working classes, and definitely weakened Ukrainian self-assertion within those classes. The

so-called Vitrova Incident greatly strengthened the revolutionary tension in Ukraine. Maria Vitrova, a teacher from the Chernihivian region and a revolutionary, was arrested in St. Petersburg in 1897 and committed suicide after an attempted rape during interrogation by a police chief. This sparked returning waves of street demonstrations and anti-Government strife throughout Ukraine. Government repression, arrests, deportations, dismissals from universities, and other measures of police terror could not halt the popular indignation and hostility towards the autocracy and its representatives.

The early twentieth century, on the eve of the First World War, witnessed an outburst of effectively organized political opposition. Parties of different political colors and shades proliferated, although the Government did not favor either their organization or growth. The parties ranged ideologically from reactionarism to liberalism, nationalism, and extreme Marxism. Some political parties operating in Ukraine were of Russian origin, such as the Anarchists, who were active in a conspiratorial way carrying out terrorism against the representatives of the Government and the capitalist order. In 1905, the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party split into two factions: the Socialist Minorites, *Mensheviks,* and the Communist Majorities, *Bolsheviks,* under the leadership of an uncompromising Marxist revolutionary, Vladimir Ulianov (party-name Nikolai Lenin). Both wings centered their attention on the industrial workers, while the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries attempted to revolutionize the peasant population and did not directly follow Marxist doctrines. The Constitutional-Democratic Party leaned toward the political center, and demanded a constitutional monarchy with a two-chamber parliament for Russia; while the Union of October 17, *Oktiabristi,* leaned toward reaction and wanted to preserve autocracy and Russian centralism. There were also strictly reactionary factions of Russian chauvinists which developed as a result of the Revolution of 1905. All these political factions had some following in Ukraine among the

Russian, non-Russian, and non-Ukrainian minorities, and to some extent among the Marxist-oriented Ukrainians. Some of these parties had field branches in Ukraine.[16]

There were strictly Ukrainian political parties in Ukraine at that time, such as the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party already mentioned, which then split into the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party, with a Marxist slant, and the National Ukrainian Party, with a nationalist slant, which demanded Ukrainian political sovereignty. The split took place in 1905. In the same year, the Ukrainian Radical-Democratic Party was organized, the political platform of which was Ukrainian political autonomy and a far-reaching agricultural reform. The party was joined by such outstanding Ukrainians as S. Yefremov, B. Hrinchenko, and D. Doroshenko. The groups published a score of newspapers to propagate their political programs, such as *Khliborob* ("The Farmer"), *Hromadska Dumka* ("Social Thought"), *Ridnyi Krai* ("Native Country"), *Selo* ("The Village"), *Zasiv* ("Sowing"), *Rilia* ("Plowing"), and many others, while the chief journals were *Vilna Ukraina* ("Free Ukraine"), *Nova Hromada* ("The New Society"), *Ukrainska Khata* ("Ukrainian Home"), and *Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk* ("The Literary-Scholarly Herald").

Soon the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, a Ukrainian version of a non-Marxist, peasant-oriented political faction, was also organized to complete the political mosaic of Ukraine of that time. Mostly the left-oriented Ukrainian parties sought to contact and to cooperate with the corresponding Russian parties, from which they hoped to receive assistance for the political and economic liberation of Ukraine. The future proved how wrong they were.[17]

Doroshenko mentioned the following characteristics of Ukrainian self-assertion feelings at the dawn of the twentieth century: "In 1900, in the two opposite corners of the Ukrainian land the youth manifested its dedication for the cause of the independence of Ukraine as its supreme ideal. In Kharkiv and

Poltava Mykola Mikhnovsky delivered a paper on that topic during a secret meeting of the Ukrainian youth, and there the call for Ukrainian political sovereignty was pronounced, while in Lviv, at a public meeting of the Ukrainian students, after Longin Tsehelsky delivered his speech, the resolutions, demanding the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, were accepted most enthusiastically by all present."[18] The stage for the new struggle to free Ukraine from foreign domination was set.

WESTERN UKRAINE UNDER THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE. West Ukraine, which, as a result of the first partition of Poland and other previous political dealings among Austria, Turkey, Transylvania, and Hungary, found herself under Hapsburg rule, consisted of three lands—Galicia, Carpathian Ukraine, and Bukovyna and parts of Bessarabia—about one-seventh of the entire Ukrainian ethnic territory by contemporary standards. Each territorial component of West Ukraine had a slightly different historical course of development, though at the end all three of them aspired to unite into one all-comprehensive and sovereign state of Ukrainian lands. This political ideal materialized at the end of the First World War.

The Austrian Government took over Galicia, in 1772, in a rather deplorable state of affairs. A completely deficient Polish regime of that time, corroded by the selfish interest of the nobility and gentry, had discriminated against and exploited the Ukrainian population. Under the rule of the enlightened Emperor Joseph II, the plight of Galicia was improved a little; its economy was raised; trade regulated; schools and hospitals built. In 1774 the so-called "Barbareum," an educational institution for preparing well-trained Uniat clergy was established, and ten years later was transferred to Lviv, the capital city of Galicia. Then a university was founded in Lviv, with four graduate schools established soon afterwards, including

a school of theology where lectures were delivered in the Ukrainian language. Otherwise, schooling was conducted in German and Polish. Initially, the Austrian Government did not realize fully that Galicia or Western Ukraine was populated by another nationality that was not the Polish one. Lifting the personal bondage of the peasants in 1782, leaving them only in material serfdom to the lords, partially improved their lot, but the Napoleonic wars, which badly exhausted the entire Austrian Empire, also had a negative impact, economically and otherwise, on Galicia and its Ukrainian population.

In spite of the Polish pressure to Polonize Galicia, the Austrian reforms and the dedicated services of the Ukrainian Catholic clergy for the welfare of the Ukrainian people contributed to strengthening their national self-assertion. In order to overcome the Polish efforts to subdue the Ukrainian masses (by deceiving the Austrian authorities as to the true state of affairs) and to mandate the Polish language in the schools, Rev. Mohylnytsky succeeded in establishing a number of private schools where instruction was done in Ukrainian. In the 1820s and 1830s, an impressive group of intellectuals gathered around Bishop I. Snihursky in Peremyshl, including Rev. J. Levytsky, Rev. J. Lozynsky, Rev. A. Dobriansky, and others, who, as Doroshenko and Polonska-Vasylenko have asserted, initiated the cultural revival of Galicia. In the next decade, the so-called *Rus'ka triitsia*, the Rus'ian Trio—Rev. M. Shashkevych, I. Vahylevych, and Ya. Holovatsky—all graduates of the Lviv Uniat seminary, brought that cultural revival to new heights that marked the distinct feature of Ukrainian national self-assertion. The turning point was the publication of the *Rusalka Dnistrova* ("The Dniester Mermaid"), the first literary collection in the vernacular Ukrainian language, which sparked a mighty national revival despite the fact that reactionary forces succeeded in confiscating most of the copies. The fire started could not be extinguished anymore. The revolutionary tidal wave of 1848 shook the very foundations of the Hapsburg Monarchy and

further contributed to the growth of Ukrainian national awareness.

In 1848, insurrections erupted all over the Hapsburg Empire, a combination of numerous nationalities of contrasting and opposed political interests. Emperor Ferdinand I hurriedly proclaimed a constitution and the emancipation of peasants, and quickly abdicated in favor of his nephew, Franz-Joseph. The revolutionary mood surfaced in Ukrainian Galicia as well. The *Holovna Rus'ka Rada,* The General Rus'ian Council, a kind of national autonomous government, was established and demanded the unification of all Ukrainian lands—Galicia, Bukovyna, and Carpathian Ukraine—under the Hapsburg sovereignty into one administrative entity separate from the Polish lands. The Polish-sponsored, artificial joining of Polish and Ukrainian ethnic lands into a common administrative province had so far given the Polish gentry an upper hand and resulted in discrimination against the Ukrainian national interest within the framework of the Austrian monarchy. The Poles had tried, by all possible means, to retain the eastern Ukrainian part of Galicia under their political control. Hence, the General Rus'ian Council proclaimed the unity of all Ukrainians and even organized its armed force, the National Guard, to defend the land against the Polish onslaught. It also published its own newspaper, the *Halytska Zoria* ("The Galician Star"), which expressed the political aspirations of the Ukrainians. However, the aristocratically oriented Vienna Government negotiated with the representatives of the Polish gentry rather than with the Ukrainian representatives who lacked nobility, and did not meet the Ukrainian demands for separating the Ukrainian ethnic part of Galicia from the Polish part. The same demand was also raised by the congress of Ukrainian scholars which convened in Lviv at the time of the revolutionary turmoil, without success. As a result of that congress, however, which intended to develop the Ukrainian arts and sciences, two chairs, of Ukrainian language and literature, were founded at

the University of Lviv. They greatly enhanced Ukrainian scholarship in the future, only to be ruthlessly suppressed under Russian autocracy.[19]

With the help of Russian troops sent by the Tsar, the Austrian Government succeeded in suppressing the revolution, in Hungary in particular, and began its reactionary measures. The constitution was repealed, the State Council and the General Rus'ian Council abolished, the Ukrainian part of Galicia left under Polish control, and the Ukrainians fully disillusioned. Only the emancipation of peasant serfs had lasting importance.

The Russian military intervention in the Austrian revolution made a great impression on some Ukrainians in Galicia who, having been overwhelmed by the supposed might of the Tsardom, were slowly adopting the *Moskalophile* (Moscowphile) political orientation, according to which there was supposedly no Ukraine, but only one Russian nation, of which Galicia was a part. The declining power of the Hapsburgs and Vienna's double-faced policy towards the Ukrainians, with Polish oppression tolerated by the Austrian Government, facilitated the growth of the *Moskalophile* trend among the educated class of the Ukrainians in Galicia, Bukovyna, and Carpathian Ukraine. The movement was substantially financed by St. Petersburg's money as well. The *Moskalophiles* hurt the Ukrainian national interests gravely, and at the same time antagonized the official circles in Vienna.

The adoption of a new constitution in Austria in 1861 did not help the Ukrainian cause much. The election procedures for the central and provincial legislative houses were regulated in such a way that the Polish gentry and landowners constituted a majority and Ukrainians had little representation. By controlling the houses, the Polish circles succeeded in Polonizing the Galician school system and the administrative apparatus of the land and dominating its economy. Complaints to Vienna did not help at all. The disenchantment was growing, facilitating a further growth of the *Moskalophile*

movement. It centered on the defense of the Uniat Church and Rus'ian nationality against the Polish onslaught, badly misinterpreting the concept of the Ukrainian nationality by identifying it with the so-called Great Russian people, the creators of the Empire. Money was flowing from St. Petersburg to promote the movement in order to undermine the cause of Ukrainian national revival. In the Russian Empire, that revival was regarded as a deadly threat to the integrity of Russia. It was suppressed there, as was discussed in previous sections of this chapter, by such measures as Valuiev's order to stop any public use of and printing of books in the Ukrainian language—which, according to Valuiev, "never was, is not, and cannot be"—and the cruel Ems decree of 1876, along with police and administrative chicanery. The defense of the Ukrainian culture centered around St. Yurii's Cathedral in Lviv, the seat of the Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitanate; however, the *Moskalophile* political orientation was also dominant there.

Only the younger generation of intellectuals and educated people, the *intelihentsia,* represented the nationally minded circles of Ukraine along Shashevych's line, publishing their own papers, such as the *Meta, Nyva,* and *Rusalka.* Secret Ukrainian societies and student fraternities were organized, collecting libraries and staging concerts and other public affairs, which boosted national self-assertion. They were called the *narodovtsi,* the populists.

With growing anti-Ukrainian pressure in Russia, the *narodovtsi* began a large-scale drive in West Ukraine toward strengthening Ukrainian culture and self-assertion. In 1861, *Rus'ka Besida* (Rus'ian Debate), a cultural association, was founded; in 1868, the *Prosvita* (Enlightenment), a nationwide organization to promote education and literacy among broad circles of the population, the peasants and workers; and in 1873 *Tovarystvo imeny Shevchenka* (Shevchenko Society), to promote literary activities. The *Prosvita* experienced marvelous growth and development throughout the last part of the

nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century, having successfully organized its branches in all towns and almost all major villages of West Ukraine, bringing education and literacy everywhere through the printing of popular books, the organizing of libraries, the staging of plays and concerts, the maintaining of reading halls, and providing enlightenment and advice in public lectures. The Shevchenko Society was reorganized in 1893 into the *Naukove Tovarystvo im Shevchenka*, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, a society of learning or academy of arts and sciences, to promote Ukrainian scholarship mostly in the areas of language, literature, culture, history, archeology, geography, and demography. It was largely financed by voluntary contributions of Ukrainians, rich and poor alike, from West and Dnieper Ukraine as well. It acquired its own print shop and has published literally hundreds of volumes of books, periodicals, papers, and the like throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After the Soviets occupied Galicia in the 1940s, they tried to liquidate the Society, as it was the symbol of Ukrainian scholarship, but it soon resumed its activities in the U.S., Canada, Western Europe, and Australia in order to promote the Ukrainian arts and sciences the Soviet regime had feverishly tried to subdue.[20] The very foundation of the scholarly achievements of the Society was laid down by M. Hrushevsky, the greatest Ukrainian historian and a prominent political figure of the newly established Ukrainian state in 1918.

The political upsurge in West Ukraine came about due to the activities of M. Drahomaniv, Ivan Franko—the second greatest Ukrainian literary figure after Shevchenko, and M. Pavlyk. Under Drahomaniv's influence, at the end of the 1880s, the Ukrainian Radical Party was organized, the goals of which were the defense of peasant interests and the betterment of the peasant economic and social plight, and the leadership of which was largely in the hands of I. Franko and M. Pavlyk. It published two papers, *Narod* ("The People") and *Khliborob* ("The Farmer"), to promote and to propagate its

political philosophy. In 1880, the leading paper in Galicia, *Dilo* ("The Deed"), was also founded. Then the Ukrainian populists, under the leadership of O. Barvinsky and Metropolitan S. Sembratovych, attempted to develop a political deal with the Polish leadership in order to weaken the *Moskalophile* movement in West Ukraine. Yet the Poles again disillusioned the Ukrainians by their double-faced political approach.

Soon the loyalist attitude of the Ukrainian political circles towards the government in Vienna was abandoned, and the call for creation of an independent Ukrainian state was raised. In the 1890s new political parties were organized, such as the National-Democratic Party, which called for the unification of all Ukrainians and the formation of a sovereign Ukrainian republic. It was led by Y. Romanchuk, K. Levytsky, and E. Olesnytsky. A little later, the left wing of this party established the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party, which, like the Radical and National-Democratic ones, called for independent Ukrainian statehood.[21]

In order to strengthen West Ukraine economically, all kinds of cooperative institutions were organized at the turn of the century: the Peasant Union (*Hospodar*), the Landed Credit Union, the Union of Dairy Companies, and the mercantile cooperative (*Narodna Torhivla*), which in 1907 became the central Commercial-Economic Institution. In 1904, the Auditing Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives was established, which became the standard-bearer of the Ukrainian cooperative movement at large. In 1911, the huge Countryside-Economic Landed Union of Commercial Cooperatives was founded.

On the basis of economic growth other organizations—educational, youth, and sports—were founded or grew. The Enlightenment Association and the Shevchenko Scientific Society were doing very well in supporting the national revival. Then the Ukrainian Educational or Pedagogical Association *Ridna Shkola,* was organized, and it covered Galicia with a network of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. Sports and physical education among Ukrainian

youth were promoted by the *Sitch* and *Sokoly* organizations, while a Ukrainian Scouting organization, the *Plast*, following the Baden-Powel pattern, was established in 1911. In the framework of all these institutions, Ukrainian national awareness and self-assertion were promoted. In almost every field of Ukrainian activity in West Ukraine, the most powerful influence was that of the great personality of Metropolitan Count Andrey Sheptytsky, who morally and financially supported every aspect of Ukrainian national life: education, health, cooperative movements, youth organizations, and scholarship. Soon, he became the symbol of Ukrainian national, political, and ecclesiastic, and cultural aspirations.

The growth of Ukrainian aspirations greatly increased the antagonism towards and the conflict with the Polish ethnic minority in Galicia—which, with the silent approval of the Vienna Government, continued to dominate the political scene by using all kinds of questionable measures, including the falsification of national and provincial elections, administrative chicanery, and even police terror. On the eve of the First World War, three political trends were active in Galicia: the *Moskalophile*, which was visibly losing its popularity; the Austrian-loyalist, which was diminishing due to declining Austrian political prestige and Vienna's unfairness toward the Ukrainian question; and the Ukrainian national movement, which was growing ever stronger. It was greatly aided by the renewed rejections by Vienna of the plan to divide Galicia into Polish and Ukrainian regions and to free in this way the Ukrainians from Polish harassment. The issue was widely and comprehensively discussed and even reached the Viennese parliament, but with no success. Armed conflict with the Poles was imminent. For her marvelous national revival, while at the same time every aspect of Ukrainian national life was suppressed under Russian rule, Galicia was called the "Ukrainian Piedmont."[22]

Carpathian Ukraine or Rus' experienced quite a different political fortune from Galicia. After having been first under

Hungarian domination, she was divided in 1526 between Austria, Transylvania, and Turkey. The land decayed because of prolonged wars. Serfdom was a little easier, however, and the country attracted some immigrants and colonists. Separated from the rest of the Ukraine by mountains, the country developed its own regional folklore and culture, language, poetry, and literature. Therefore, in the eighteenth century it lived rather peacefully under the rule of Empress Maria-Theresa and Emperor Joseph II of Austria. Serfdom was limited, and then abolished and reintroduced. That, of course, confused the peasants and caused spontaneous revolts and uprisings, which were soon subdued. Some intellectual contact between Carpathian Ukraine and Galicia was maintained.

The Hungarian insurrection of 1848 against Hapsburg rule was unsympathetically met by the Ukrainians, who had endured considerable oppression at the hands of Hungarian noblemen and local officials. They refused to join or to support the insurrection, which greatly angered the Hungarians. The General Rus'ian Council in Lviv was loyal to Austria, hence hostile to the Hungarian cause, and it warned the Carpathian Ukrainians not to cooperate with the Hungarians. Hungarian revenge and terror followed. Many Ukrainians left the land and emigrated to Galicia.

After the suppression of the insurrection and the restoration of Austrian rule, more stable times returned. A. Dobriansky became the Ukrainian leader. As a commissioner for the land, he presented a petition to Vienna to separate the "Rus'ian district" from the Hungarian ones, and to grant it relative freedom from the Hungarian noble overlords. Dobriansky became viceroy. Ukrainian national life fully recovered. The Ukrainian language was used in schools, offices, and literary and artistic fields. O. Dukhnovych, Y. Fentsyk, and others began to write in Ukrainian.

However, in 1867, as a result of the unfortunate war with Prussia, the Austrian Empire was reconstructed into an

Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. This surrendered Carpathian Ukraine totally into the hands of the Hungarian regime, which wanted by all available means, including violence and terror, to make the land completely Hungarian. The Magyarization methods progressed so far that even the Ukrainian Uniat Church was to some extent made their tool. The deplorable situation gave rise to the swift growth of *Moskalophilism,* which looked toward Russia for redemption from the Hungarian oppression. The Ukrainian self-assertion movement was at an all-time low. A rift developed between the *Moskalophile* educated class and the peasantry, which remained essentially Ukrainian. Furthermore, those educated Ukrainians who had no national backbone and wanted to progress in their careers joined the pro-Hungarian loyalist circle and deserted the common folk. The peasants, continuously dividing their small lots of land among their children, and being exploited by the Hungarian and renegade landlords, became progressively poorer and poorer. Bad crops for several years on the poor mountainous soil further contributed to their pauperization. These developments unleashed a mass emigration to the Americas in the 1880s.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Bishop Y. Firtsak of Priashiv initiated the so-called *Verkhovynska aktsia,* the Mountainous Action, a series of social and economic measures to assist the peasantry by establishing cooperative stores, business partnerships, thrift institutions, and the like. Meanwhile, economic assistance was coming from the emigrants in America, who had improved their material situation there.

Yet, politically, things were going from bad to worse. Magyarization measures completely destroyed Ukrainian schools and intellectual life. *Moskalophilism*, aided financially by St. Petersburg, distorted the Ukrainian language into an artificial mixture of Ukrainian, Russian, Old Church Slavonic, and Hungarian, the so-called *yazychie* jargon. The subservient

Russian Orthodox religion was introduced, also being subsidized by the St. Petersburg government in order to paralyze the Ukrainian self-assertion movement completely.[23]

Bukovyna, the third part of West Ukraine, also had its own history. For centuries Bukovyna had been changing her masters, from the Transylvanian or Moldavian *hospodars* to the Turkish sultans. In 1774 she was incorporated by the Hapsburg Monarchy; in 1786, she was joined with and made a part of Galicia; and in 1849, she was formed into a separate province of the monarchy. With the making of Bukovyna into a part of Galicia, the Polish and Romanian gentry and land owners succeeded in capturing the initiative, since the Hapsburg Government, as mentioned before, would rather listen to the "nobility" than to the "commoners." The Poles and the Romanians again tried to suppress any Ukrainian national movement by using their languages in schools and offices in place of Ukrainian. The Ukrainian Catholic Church vigorously opposed the Romanization and Polonization processes in Bukovyna. However, it had little success.

The revolutionary tidal wave of 1848, which shook the Hapsburg Monarchy down to its foundations, witnessed an insurrection in Bukovyna under the leadership of Lukian Kobylytsia. He demanded political autonomy for the land and full peasant property rights on all land. The uprising had a rather social character with only a minor national undertone. It was a struggle of the peasantry against the manorial system of the large landowners, who were largely foreigners: Romanians, Germans, and Poles. It was also the struggle of the Ukrainian element against the oppressive foreigners. Kobylytsia's uprising was suppressed in 1849, and the Austrians again did not listen to the voices of the Ukrainians.

In 1861, Bukovyna became a separate "crown land," with an arm of the central Vienna Government and provincial autonomous government agencies, a provincial parliament, and a provincial administration. The German and Romanian ethnic elements dominated these autonomous agencies due to

Viennese favoritism. Yet the spell of freedom sparked a Ukrainian revival, which ever more energetically opposed the foreigners. In 1869, *Rus'ka Besida* (The Rus'ian Debate) a literary and cultural association similar to that established in Lviv, was organized. The *Moskalophile* movement also developed there, but the nationally-minded Ukrainian people were taking the political and cultural initiative. The creation of a united Romania in 1878 and the fear of possible Romanian expansionism into Bukovyna induced Vienna to begin to favor the Ukrainian movement. Soon the Ukrainians succeeded in forcing out the *Moskalophiles* and taking over the leading Bukovinian institutions, the *Rus'ka Besida* and *Rus'ka Rada*.

Ukrainian newspapers were published and new organizations established. The leaders of the Ukrainian national movement in Bukovyna were Rev. S. Vorobkevych, Y. Fedkovych, S. Smal-Stotsky, M. Vasylko, and others. Vigorous cultural and political contacts with Galicia were resumed.

In 1906-1907, political parties were organized; the National-Democratic Party, loyal to Austria; the Ukrainian Radical Party, which was more aggressive in its demands; and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party, of a Marxist slant. These parties were the Bukovinian counterparts of the Galician political parties. Then, on the eve of the First World War, the Ukrainian self-assertion movement in Bukovyna also called for a unification of all Ukraine into one sovereign state with its capital in Kiev.[24]

Notes

[1]N. Fr.-Chirovsky, *The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia*, New York, 1957: a comprehensive analysis of Russian historical political expansionism.

[2]*Ibid.*, pp. 133-154.

[3]M. Rodzianko, *The Reign of Rasputin: An Empire's Collapse*, London, 1927: Russia of the nineteenth century, a comprehensive analysis, M. Flo-

rinsky, *Russia, A History and An Interpretation*, New York, 1953, Vol. II, pp. 897-1350; a short coverage, compare N. Fr.-Chirovsky, *An Introduction to Russian History*, New York, 1967, pp. 119-149.

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CHAPTER TWO

SPIRITUAL AND CULTURAL LIFE

The Orthodox Church—The Catholic Church—Education and Sciences—Literature—Architecture—Painting and Carving—Music and Theater—Other Arts

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Left-Bank provinces was immediately and completely subordinated to the Russian Holy Synod or Council and its ecclesiastic policies, while in the Right-Bank and West-Ukrainian provinces this occurred a little later—after the partitions of Poland, of course. The ecclesiastic policies of the Holy Synod were fully dominated by the traditional Russian caesaropapist philosophy, the essence of which was the supremacy of the secular power of the Tsar and his Government over the Orthodox Church and the religious life of the people. Throughout most of Russian history, the Russian Orthodox Church was, therefore, simply a political tool of the imperialist policies of Moscow, and later of St. Petersburg. There is no wonder, therefore, that the Tsarist regime, desirous of fully and completely dominating Ukraine, immediately resorted to Orthodoxy as a hopeful measure of Russifying the Ukrainian people and keeping them in complete discipline and submission by preying on their deep religious feelings. At the same time the regime began to annihilate the

Ukrainian Catholic Church, the spiritual authority of which was outside of Russia, in Rome, and which could not be forced to submit to Russian political interests. The real reason for annihilating the Union of Berest could not be revealed without embarrassment. Hence the pretext that the Church Union was a betrayal of righteous Orthodoxy was used to justify the persecution and, later, the liquidation of that Church.[1]

In order to completely weaken the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the Holy Synod moved ahead with secularization, the state confiscation of all Church diocesan, parochial, and monastic wealth and property, and the establishment of state funding of all ecclesiastic activities. In this way any financial autonomy of the Ukrainian Church was destroyed and the Church was made materially fully dependent on the state. The result was that it could not finance any ecclesiastic or educational undertakings that could benefit the Ukrainian cause. The Kievan-Mohylian Academy, which had done so much for Ukrainian spiritual, cultural, and educational life, suffered very badly—which was certainly the intent of the St. Petersburg Government and its Holy Synod. The state funding of the Orthodox Church, the dominant religion in the Empire, forced the Ukrainian metropolitans and bishops to follow government orders. Subsequently, the Holy Synod proceeded to appoint only Russians, Russified Ukrainians, foreigners, or submissive Ukrainians—sometimes even without the proper qualifications—to metropolitan and episcopal seats to make the Orthodox Church in Ukraine truly a Russian and imperial one. The parish priests, abbots of monasteries, and clerical-school officers were all forced to follow the orders of Russian superiors, who had no sympathy for the Ukrainian cause or the national and spiritual interests of the Ukrainians. The key positions in the Church in Ukraine were also staffed by people who were hostile to the Church Union. Soon, the parishes and monasteries were required to establish schools of lower or higher level with Russian-language instruction only. Ukrainian was not permitted at all.

In 1791, in Right-Bank and Western Ukraine, prior to the partitioning of Poland, a Church synod was convened by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—in the city of Pynsk. The synod was supposed to streamline religious organization and life, which were being exposed to Russian pressure and Polish discrimination. The resolutions of the Synod were historical as far as the efforts to protect the interests of the Ukrainian Church were concerned. First of all, the Synod underscored the fact that the Church remained under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, not that of Moscow. It was therefore an invalidation of the move made by Metropolitan Gedeon Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky in 1686, when he promoted the subordination of the Ukrainian Church to the Patriarch of Moscow. Second, the Synod affirmed the self-governing authority of the Church of Ukraine, to be administered by the National Synod of the Metropolitan, archbishops, and bishops. Third, the General Consistory or Office and the episcopal consistories were instructed to lead and to supervise ecclesiastic and spiritual matters. Fourth, local meetings of priests of each district were ordered to supervise these matters on a local basis. Fifth, it was resolved, that each parish was to have a school and a home for the elderly and needy. Of course, the partitions of Poland fully frustrated the intentions of the Synod of Pynsk, and produced an extension of the notorious authority of the Russian Holy Synod over the Ukrainian Church in the Right-Bank and West-Ukrainian eparchies (dioceses) with its deplorable effects on Ukraine, as just described.[2]

The reign of Nicholas I marked the primacy of Russian Orthodoxy throughout the entire Empire, which was identified with Russianism, the interests of the autocracy, and Russian nationalism. The dominance of Orthodoxy was accompanied by an unfavorable attitude towards Catholicism and an outright persecution of other religious denominations, especially of the Uniat Church and Protestant groups. Having been identified with Russian autocracy and national

interests, the Orthodox Church was made more than ever a forceful tool of Russification, while the newly appointed metropolitans and bishops for Ukraine neither had any real power nor were even interested in the affairs of their flocks.

The official tone set by Nicholas I actually continued throughout the nineteenth century, and ecclesiastic and religious matters in Ukraine simply went from bad to worse. Russian appointees to episcopal or other offices in Ukraine soon began to consider these appointments as temporary stepping-stones to further their ecclesiastic careers in Russia. Russian teachers in the seminaries, instructing in Russian and following Russian precepts and Russian interests, certainly alienated the clerics, as future priests, from the masses; and since then teachers were strictly Russian-oriented, the students could not find any intellectual or spiritual contact with them. The episcopal consistories appointed parish priests according to political rather than religious considerations. Parish priesthoods were passed down in families through inheritance, as a way of making a living rather than a spiritual vocation. Devotions and Masses were said or sung in Old Slavonic with a heavy Russian accent. Sermons were delivered only in Russian, while Ukrainian, which was understood by the masses, was strictly forbidden to be used in church: Ukrainian Church traditions and customs were not allowed to be practiced any longer, and church buildings were not allowed to be constructed in the Ukrainian architectural style. It was even officially forbidden by Russian Church authorities to translate the Holy Bible into Ukrainian. Which simply meant that even the Bible was supposed to be an instrument of the Russification of the Ukrainian people.

All this resulted in several most undesirable developments. First of all, a complete alienation of the Church hierarchy and priesthood from the bulk of the population occurred, which made Orthodoxy a formally practiced religion without any real spirituality and deep sense of faith in many cases.

Secondly, the thirst for the real faith induced the growth of various forms of Protestantism, in particular the Baptist and Evangelic movements, which undermined the religious homogeneity of the land. Baptists began to spread in the middle of the nineteenth century, in particular the Kherson, Katerynoslav, Volhinia, Chernihiv, and Kiev regions. They were popularly called the *Stundysty* in Ukraine. In addition, some mystically oriented sects, like the *Malovantsi* and *Shaloputy*, grew in the Kiev and Katerynoslav regions. All these religious groups and sects adopted a strongly anti-Ukrainian character. This phenomenon certainly testified to the fact that the official Orthodox Church was weak and inadequate spiritually. Soon, the Russian authorities, identifying the Orthodox with the Russian, began to persecute the sects. The Baptists acquired legal recognition for the first time after the Revolution of 1905.[3]

The educated middle class, the *intelihentsia*, being unhappy with official Orthodoxy, turned partially to atheism. M. Drahomaniv was a classic example of an atheistic intellectual in Ukraine at that time. He considered religion an anachronistic leftover of ancient primitivism. Certainly his atheism fit in with his materialist and socialist world outlook. On the other hand, really patriotic Ukrainophiles, such as V. Antonovych and O. Konysky, were sceptical towards official Orthodoxy as well. Atheism was the third undesirable development resulting from the failings of the Russian Orthodox Church, which by and large weakened the moral fiber of the society and made it vulnerable to imported radical movements, Marxism in particular. Marxism itself became a kind of self-styled religion, though thoroughly materialistic and completely opposed to any idealism or spiritualism.

Nevertheless, the broad masses of Ukrainian people still remained religious and Orthodox, practicing their faith and looking towards the centers of Ukrainian religious life—the Pecherska Lavra monastery in Kiev and the Pochaiv monas-

tery in Volhinia in particular. The revival of Ukrainian self-assertion was in some instances connected with a religious revival as well. In the seminaries, secret fraternities of the clerics were organized and the interests of the Ukrainian Church were underscored. Obviously, the Holy Synod was against any such developments. Attempts were also undertaken to translate the Bible into Ukrainian by H. Kvitka-Osnovianenko, M. Maksymovych, P. Kulish, and I. Pului. The New Testament published in Ukrainian in Vienna in 1871 scarcely reached Ukraine because of the Ems *Ukaz*.

At the end of the nineteenth century there was a Metropolitanate in Kiev—though the Metropolitan had no real authority under the rule of the Holy Synod—and nine eparchies (dioceses): Kiev, Poltava, Kharkiv, Kherson, Katerynoslav, Chernihiv, Volhinia, Podillia, and Symferopil (including the Crimean Peninsula).

At the end of the eighteenth century there were two eparchies in Bukovyna, in Radekhivtsi and Suchava, which held ecclesiastic authority over the Orthodox population of Ukrainians and Moldavians. At first the dioceses were under the jurisdiction of a Metropolitan, who had his seat abroad. Then Emperor Joseph II of Austria opposed that arrangement, and after a few jurisdictional changes, in 1783, Bukovyna was subjected to the authority of the Serbian Orthodox Church within the political borders of Austria. In 1873, the Bukovinian Metropolitanate was established in Chernivitsi, due to the efforts of Metropolitan Y. Hakman, who contributed greatly to the cultural development of the land by establishing schools, a seminary for the clerics, and the *Rus'ka Besida* Society—joined by Bukovinian Ukrainian intellectuals. The Romanians continuously tried to dominate the Orthodox Church there, and in 1880 a Romanianized Metropolitan occupied the seat, substantially damaging the Ukrainian national character of the Church. Before the First World War, a Ukrainian again became Metropolitan.[4]

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. Two branches of the Catholic Church in the Russian Empire, the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Church, experienced different fates throughout the nineteenth century. The Ukrainian Catholic Church was immediately exposed to persecution by the Russian government and the official Orthodox Church for two reasons: theoretically, because it was considered a betrayal of traditional Rus'ian Orthodoxy, its disloyal segment and a bridge for Polonization, which had to return to the Mother Church for the sake of "the wholesomeness of the Russian People," but practically, because it was considered the bulwark of Ukrainian separatism—an organization outside the authority of the Government which could not be used to advance the Russification of Ukraine, as mentioned before. Hence, it had to be neutralized.[5] Roman Catholicism was tolerated, at times even favored and at times slightly oppressed, but never was an attempt undertaken by St. Petersburg to liquidate it altogether.

Catherine II promised the Ukrainian Uniats freedom of worship before the Russians annexed the Right-Bank and West-Ukrainian provinces, but then she ordered all Uniats to return to the Orthodox Church. Thousands of Uniat parishes were liquidated, thousands of church buildings were give to the Orthodox, all Uniat Basilian monasteries were liquidated, and the Uniat hierarchy was largely suppressed. The Uniat Metropolitan, Theodosii Rostotsky, was forced to retire and ordered to live in St. Petersburg. Hundreds of thousands of Uniats were forced to accept Orthodoxy, while the Polish noblemen, who enjoyed a privileged position in the aristocratically ruled Russian Empire, applied the most notorious measures of terror and exploitation against the peasant population which was renouncing the Union. The oppression of the peasants was twofold: that of the Russian Government and the Polish nobility. Both of them were deadly afraid of possible peasant revolts and the repetition of the *Haidamaky* uprisings. At the same time, some representatives of the Roman

Catholic hierarchy, who were influential in St. Petersburg, such as Archbishop Stanislaw Bogusz-Sestrencewicz, out of hatred for Ukrainians in general, supported the anti-Union measures of Empress Catherine II.

With the ascent of Paul I to the throne, the situation of the Catholics and Uniats in the Empire impoved substantially, because the Tsar was favorably inclined toward Catholicism in general. He was even made the Grand Master of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in Malta, a Catholic order. He permitted the establishment of new Catholic dioceses in Ukraine and Byeloruthenia; established two Uniat dioceses and a number of parishes; released many Uniats from Siberia; allowed Metropolitan Rostotsky to reassume his duties; reopened some Basilian monasteries; and in general granted the Uniat Church its freedom of worship. The reactionary circles of Orthodoxy as well as some Catholics, such as notorious Bogusz-Sestrencewicz, protested against the Tsar's liberal moves favoring the Uniats, but to no avail.

Tsar Alexander I was also well disposed towards Catholicism and the Union. His personal friendship with a Polish nobleman, Adam Czartoryski, only strengthened that royal attitude. Yet that friendship with the Poles had a negative aspect. Not only did Alexander establish an autonomous Polish state on Polish ethnic territory, but all over Ukraine the Polish gentry and nobility enjoyed a privileged position—which they drastically abused by exploiting the Ukrainian peasant-serf and by discriminating against the Orthodox and the Uniats alike. The Ukrainian masses all of a sudden found themselves more than ever before exposed to the prevailing and constantly growing dominance of Polish ethnic element, which they greatly hated from times gone by. It was worse now than it had been under the rule of Catherine II, who had been somewhat hostile to the rebellious Polish nobility on political grounds.

Otherwise, Tsar Alexander was tolerant and fair to the Uniat Church: he allowed four new episcopal seats to be estab-

lished and appointed new Uniat Metropolitan, some with papal approval and some without—probably due to war developments which made it impossible to contact Rome. At this time there were a Uniat Metropolitanate for Ukraine and Byelorus'ia, four dioceses—in Vilna, Polotsk, Lutsk and Berest—three seminaries to train future priests, 1,476 parish churches, 1,985 secular priests, 47 monasteries, and almost one and a half million faithful. At the same time, there were about two million Roman Catholics in Ukraine.[5] The Orthodox felt neglected, however. For example, the Volhinian bishop had no proper cathedral church and no proper quarters for himself and his staff to live and work in. It seemed for a while that the Orthodox Church did not enjoy any Government support.

The traditional hostility among the three Churches, the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Uniat, continued. The Uniats still had to defend themselves against the onslaught of Polish Catholics, who tried forcefully to include the Uniats in their ranks. This was so much more dangerous because of the privileged treatment of the Poles by the Tsar. The Orthodox considered them apostates from the true faith and the Polish considered them as willing tools which would lead to the Polonization of Ukraine. There were no kind words for the Uniats, and this was effectively encouraged by Russian propaganda moves.

Conditions for the development of the Uniat Church turned very bad with Nicholas's ascent to the throne, and especially after the Polish uprising of 1831, when Orthodoxy was identified with autocracy and Russian nationalism. The Tsar's wrath toward the Union was strengthened greatly when a rather small number of Uniats joined the uprising. Nor was he favorably inclined towards Roman Catholicism, since it was largely identified with Polish nationalism and revolutionism. He adopted a hardline pro-Orthodox course of action. The Pochaiv monastery was taken away from the Uniats, the Basilian order was definitely liquidated and many monks

were exiled to Siberia, all Uniat seminaries were liquidated and all students were forced to study in Russian schools, many parishes and parish churches were given to the Orthodox, and the use of ecclesiastic books not printed in Russian was forbidden. Preparation for the complete annihilation of the Uniat Church was going on with full vigor.

In 1839, a decree of liquidation of the Uniat Church in the Russian Empire was promulgated, and its fusion with the Orthodox Church was thus accomplished. The decree was signed by twenty-one renegade priests, supposedly in the name of some two and a half million Uniat Catholics. Three years later the Holy See published a report on the martyrdom of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Russian Empire.[6]

However, in the Kholm and Pidlasha regions, the most northwestern end of the Ukrainian ethnic territory, the Church Union survived for some thirty-five more years. Parts of these regions were not annexed by Russia immediately after the partitions of Poland. They were, for a brief time, under Austrian occupation, and then included in the Polish Kingdom, the so-called Congress of Poland. Only with the liquidation of this Kingdom as a result of the uprising of 1831 were they annexed for the first time directly into Russia. The Uniat Church had been traditional in those regions for some two hundred years, and the Latinization of the Eastern-Byzantine rite was very intense. Trouble began with the overzealous efforts of some *Moskalophile* priests, some from Galicia, to purify the rites and to eliminate Latin impurities from the Church. The population, used to the tradition, objected. Then, a Galician *Moskalophile* priest, M. Popel, became administrator of the Kholm diocese and pushed very hard against Latin influences, making it a political issue and preparing for the inclusion of the Uniat Church into the Russian Orthodox Church organization under the Holy Synod. After Popel prohibited the observance of traditional Catholic Holy Days and the remembrance of the Pope in Masses, and substituted a reference to the Holy Synod, the people rebelled. Rus-

sian troops were called to suppress local uprisings. Bloodshed followed, being particularly dramatic in the villages of Pratulyn and Dreliv. Many peasants were killed and injured, many deported to Siberia, and hundreds of priests were imprisoned or exiled.

The tragedy was completed in 1876, when, supposedly at the request of the people, the Uniat Church in Kholm and Pidlasha was included in the official Russian Church. However, there were many who did not want to submit; they either left the country or continued to worship secretly. In the course of time, the Uniats "in the catacombs" sooner or later were Latinized and Polonized. It is interesting to underscore the fact that the bloody "conversion" of these regions to Orthodoxy was largely accomplished by the servile *Moskalophile* priests from Galicia.[7]

Yet the Uniat Church survived in Galicia, Carpathian Ukraine, and Bukovyna under the rule of the Hapsburgs. At first the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the western provinces was, of course, under the jurisdiction of the Kievan Metropolitan. But frequently, however, due to wars and Russian maneuvers, he was unable to actually manage his entire Church. After the Austrians incorporated these territories, only the bishops of Lviv and Peremyshl administered their dioceses, since the political borders between Russia and Austria did not allow the Metropolitan to exercise his ecclesiastic authority there, nor was the Austrian Government willing to allow him to do so when he was residing abroad. The Napoleonic Wars delayed to some extent the establishment of a separate Metropolitanate for the Ukrainian Uniat-Catholics under the sovereignty of the Austrian Emperor. But finally, in 1806, the matter was brought to a favorable conclusion by Emperor Franz I, and such a metropolitan seat was created in Lviv—with three dioceses, in Lviv, Peremyshl, and Kholm. A. Anhelovych became the first Uniat Metropolitan in Galicia. Because of the Congress of Vienna, the diocese of Kholm was soon separated from Lviv for all practical reasons.

Especially during these wars, when Polish legions allied with Napoleon occupied some parts of Galicia, the Ukrainians and their Church endured hard times because of discrimination and attempts of Polonization. Then, under Austrian rule, matters were stabilized to some extent. The Uniat clergy soon assumed a leading national and cultural role in Western Ukraine, having become a kind of upper stratum of society in the absence of Ukrainian nobility. The Uniat Catholic clergy was allowed to marry. Their families soon became the core of the Ukrainian *intelihentsia,* the educated class, which greatly contributed to a national revival. The Uniat Catholic Church became a kind of Ukrainian National Church, while the Orthodox Church in other parts of Ukraine was completely overrun and dominated by Russian political interests, as pointed out before. Of course, the Church in Galicia had to endure the struggle against the *Moskalophile* movement, which for a while endangered the substance of Ukrainian national self-assertion. Some Metropolitans, such as M. Levytsky, H. Yakhymovych, and Count A. Sheptytsky, ardently supported that national revival of the Church and of the Ukrainian people by promoting general education, by establishing schools, and by assisting cultural growth by any possible means. Others, such as J. Sembratovych, were not able to find the right course of action. Whenever a need arose, the Metropolitans also came to the defense of the persecuted and hunted Ukrainian Catholics in the Russian Empire, and they actively opposed the Latinization measures instigated either by the Jesuit order or the Poles under Austrian domination. Rev. M. Shashkevych actually initiated the national and cultural rebirth of the Western Ukrainians with his *Rusalka Dnistrova,* a literary collection written in vernacular Ukrainian. The Church promoted the establishment of a chair of Uniat Catholic theology at the Lviv university, where lecturing was done in Ukrainian.

In order to meet the needs of the growing Church, a new third diocese was established in Galicia, in the city of Stanis-

laviv (today called Ivano-Frankivske), while new orders, religious assemblies, and educational circles were organized to assist that growth.[8]

In Carpathian Ukraine, under Austrian domination, there was a Uniat diocese in Mukachiv. In 1776, the Uniat Catholics were granted equal rights with the Roman Catholics. In 1780, the episcopal seat was transferred to the city of Uzhhorod, and the diocese was well provided for financially. In 1816, a new diocese of Priashiv was established. Until the Congress of Vienna, the Ukrainian national atmosphere prevailed in the Uniat Catholic Church. Thereafter, the Austrian Government was afraid of the so-called "Slavic threat" in the Empire and began to favor the Hungarian ethnic element there. Soon, the Hungarians started a large-scale and intense Magyarization, and even tried to make the Uniat Church a tool of this Magyarization of the Ukrainian population. This irresponsible action gave rise to a rapid growth of the *Moskalophile* movement as an opposition to Hungarian discriminatory practices, which imposed the Hungarian language on Ukrainians in schools, administrative offices, and other institutions. Bishop S. Pankovych tried to stop the growth of *Moskalophilism*, but did not meet with any success because of stupidity of Hungarian policies. By the end of the nineteenth century Carpathian Ukraine was declining nationally and religiously under Hungarian oppression.[9]

EDUCATION AND SCIENCES. As pointed out in the previous volume, the educational system was well developed in Hetman Ukraine, but then it began to decline under the pressure of the Russian Government. Hence, at the beginning of the nineteenth century there were only a few parish schools in the Ukrainian countryside, while in towns and cities there were the so-called county schools, the number of which was gradually increasing with the progress of time. Also, special

schools were established for the sons of soldiers, the so-called *Kantonist* schools, but then they were discontinued.

In the middle of the nineteenth century under the pressure of liberal ideas, as Polonska-Vasylenko has asserted, a trend toward broad general education, particularly on the elementary level, began growing in strength. In 1864, a liberal law was enacted allowing the establishment of private elementary schools for broad classes of the population in accordance with particular local needs. The *zemstva,* landed self-government bodies, and the municipal administrations organized and supervised these three- or five-year schools, popularly identified as one- or two-grade schools. The priests were in charge of the religious and moral instruction. Instruction was given exclusively in Russian and the use of Ukrainian was banned, according to the chauvinistic scheme of the St. Petersburg Government. All schools were under the control of the Ministry of Education.

The *zemstva* self-government of the countryside greatly contributed to the growth of elementary education with its moral, organizational, and financial assistance. The *zemstva* contributed almost eighty-five percent of all finances needed to maintain education of the countryside.[10] Another development in the overall drive for more popular schooling was represented by Sunday schools, in which instruction was conducted on Sundays and holy days for children and adults (mostly workers, craftsmen, and artisans) by teachers, university students, and university professors who taught voluntarily and without any monetary compensation. The instruction was financed by private benefactors. The Government was rather disturbed by this phenomenon outside its control and the Sunday schools were liquidated in 1862 and during the chauvinist anti-Ukrainian drive of the 1860s and 1870s.

The so-called *glavnii narodnii uchilishcha*, the main popular instructional institutions, comparable to today's junior high schools, were the first institutions of middle education, and they existed only in large cities such as Kiev or Kharkiv.

There were also various vocational schools in cities and towns, such as clerical seminaries, musical, agricultural, commercial, and medical institutes. The first European-style preparatory or high school, initially consisting of four year instruction, was established in Ukraine in 1804. In 1828, the instructional program of these *gimnazii*, the preparatory schools, was extended to seven, and then finally to eight, years. Three types of *gimnazii* evolved with time: the classical one, in which Latin and Greek were taught; the humanistic one, where only Latin was taught; and the realistic one, where emphasis was put on natural sciences and mathematics, without teaching Latin or Greek. The middle-level schools were rather well developed in the Right-Bank regions to serve the needs of the Polish gentry, without paying much attention to the needs of the Ukrainian masses. At first these schools spread Polonization. However, in the 1860s, after the Polish uprising, a program of complete Russianization was introduced there as well as in other parts of Ukraine.

With regard to middle-level education, the *zemstvo* self-government was especially active, for it established, financed, and maintained schools throughout the land. At the same time the number of private schools was growing under state supervision. The colleges and lyceums in larger cities of the land—such as Kiev, Nizhyn, and Odessa—offered even broader programs of education and enjoyed a privileged position among the middle-level teaching institutions. The teachers' schools on the middle educational level were similar to the *gimnazii*, but they offered educational courses, as well.

The schools for girls represented a different category. In the first half of the nineteenth century there were only the so-called "institutes for noble virgins," with private dormitories. In 1850 the first *gimnazium* was opened for girls. However, it was on a lower educational level. There was no admittance of women to universities. Subsequently, a number of high schools for girls were organized, both public and private.

Most schools of the middle level were under the authority of

Ivan Franko, prominent Ukrainian poet and writer

Father Markian Shashkevych Prominent Western Ukrainian poet

Lesia Ukrainka Memorial by Michael Chereshniowsky in Ukrainian Cultural Garden, Cleveland, Ohio



Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian poet

A building of the Ivan Franko University, Lviv

Cathedral of St. George in Lviv

Hetman Khmelnytsky Memorial in Kiev

the Ministry of Education, military schools under the authority of the Ministry of War, commercial schools under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and seminaries and parochial schools under the Holy Synod.

The Hadiach Agreement of 1658, as I have previously pointed out, had referred to the need for a university in Ukraine. In Hetman Ukraine, on various occasions during the Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, demands for establishing a university in Ukraine were raised again. Finally, the first university in the Ukraine was founded in Kharkiv in 1805, having been financed by the local gentry and businessmen. P. Hulak-Artemovsky was its rector, while outstanding scholars of that time—Ukrainians and foreigners such as I. Schad, I. Sreznevsky, M. Kostomarov, A. Metlynsky, and others—taught there. Subsequently, in 1834, the university in Kiev was established, and M. Maksymovych, a well-known Ukrainian scholar, became its first rector. M. Kostomarov and V. Antonovych, both historians, were the professors. Both universities became centers of the development of Ukrainian scholarship and intellectualism, as well as of the development of Ukrainian national and political thought. The former students of the universities soon became the second and third generation of Ukrainian scholars, and they spread Ukrainian studies throughout the whole country. In 1864, a university was also organized in the city of Odessa.[11]

The educational process in Western Ukraine experienced a different development. At the time of the annexation of Galicia, Carpathian Ukraine, and Bukovyna, the educational standards there were very low. There were only the so-called cantor or *diakivski* schools, conducted by church cantors, in which the beginnings of reading and writing were taught. Then, in 1777, the Austrian Government carried out a reform and introduced the so-called trivial schools in the countryside and small towns and the so-called main schools in large towns. After the confiscation of church properties under Emperor Joseph II, a school fund was established to finance

education. German was the instructional language. Meanwhile, Ukrainian bishops urged the establishment of parish schools. The school network was gradually growing. After the Polish gentry had to some extent overcome the misfortunes of the partition of Poland and the defeat of Napoleon, with whom the Poles had allied themselves, it increased its pressure to Polonize Galicia. Domination of the school system was one of the ways to reach that goal. The Vienna government listened to the request of the aristocratic Poles and agreed to make Polish the instructional language in most schools. In Bukovyna, German was initially the instructional language, but it was actually despised by the Ukrainian population. After the school reform in the 1870s, Ukrainian was gradually introduced as the language of instruction. In Galicia Ukrainian was used in the parochial schools for a little while, before the Polish pressure there was intensified.

Initially the school system at the elementary level in Carpathian Ukraine was superior to that in Galicia and Bukovyna, due to the efforts of Bishop A. Bachynsky. In 1793, there were some 300 parochial schools teaching in Ukrainian. Later on that number increased. However, after the province was surrendered to the Hungarians in 1867, the Magyarization of schools was intensively undertaken and the number of the Ukrainian elementary schools catastrophically declined in a short time. While in 1881 there were over 350 schools, in 1899 there were only 88, and in 1906 only 23 Ukrainian schools left.[12]

As far as the middle level of education was concerned, its set-up in Western Ukraine was similar to that under the Russian occupation, with the exception that Ukrainian was later admitted as the language of instruction, either totally or partially. In Galicia even Ukrainian *gimnazii*, preparatory schools, were established at the end of the nineteenth century. At first, the *gimnazii* offered either a five or six-year instructional program, later on extending to the standard eight-year program. Initially, Ukrainian was used only in the lower

grades, while German or Polish were the main languages despite Ukrainian opposition. The first fully Ukrainian *gimnazium* was established in the city of Peremyshl in 1887, followed up by similar institutions in Kolomyia, Lviv, and Ternopil. The *gimnazii* were either classical, humanistic, or realistic according to the programs of instruction, as pointed out already. In Bukovyna, by the end of the nineteenth century, there were two *gimnazii* and either German and Ukrainian or Romanian and Ukrainian were used as instructional tongues. There were also other schools of the higher level, clerical seminaries, teachers' colleges, and schools for girls. In Carpathian Ukraine, there were three *gimnazii.*

The University of Lviv was established in 1784. At first the lectures were in Latin, and from 1817 in German. A chair of Ukrainian language and literature was established in 1849; a chair of Ukrainian history, occupied by M. Hrushevsky, the most outstanding of the Ukrainian historians, in 1884; and of literature, in 1900. In Bukovyna, a German university in Chernivtsi was founded in 1875, and three chairs of Ukrainian language, literature, and theology were introduced.

In addition to the universities, there were in various cities of Ukraine other schools of a college level, such as theological academies, technical colleges, schools of veterinary science, and agricultural colleges.[13]

It was unfortunate that most of the schools on various levels were established by foreign governments and that mostly foreign languages were used for instruction, with only a few exceptions. Still, these schools contributed to the intellectual growth of the society. It is important to emphasize the fact that, because in Western Ukraine there were schools and university chairs where the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian studies could be promoted, the national revival and self-assertion were a very prominent there.

Polonska-Vasylenko has rightly noted that the lack of Ukrainian universities, where Ukrainian studies could be carried out, was compensated for by numerous and active

scholarly societies, which faithfully promoted Ukrainian scholarship under the unfavorable conditions of foreign occupation. In 1835, a Temporary Committee for Studies of Antiquity was founded, subsequently renamed the Temporary Commission for Research of Old Documents, and it existed until the Revolution of 1917. *Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* ("Archives of South Western Russia"), a series of chronicles and other historical material documenting the past and published over the years, was the work of the Commission and still has an invaluable scholarly worth. The Odessa Society of History and Antiquity, established in 1839, researched the ancient Greek colonization of the Black Sea shores. In 1869, in Kiev and Kharkiv, societies of natural sciences were organized and affiliated with the universities. The organization of the Ukrainian branch of the Geographical Society in the early 1870s promoted the study of Ukrainian ethnography, demography, and folklore. Historical and historical-philological societies designed to research and study Ukrainian history were founded as affiliations of the universities of Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odessa and of various colleges and academies. In various cities, local and regional societies and committees were organized, to research the past of the respective regions—such as Volhinia, Kuban, Chernihiv, Katerynoslav, Poltava, and Podolia. Although the works of all these societies were published in Russian, because the Ukrainian language was largely banned, the historical value of these publications was enormous.

Naukove Tovarystvo im Shevchenka (the Shevchenko Scientific Society), established in 1873, was briefly referred to in connection with the Ukrainian national revival in West Ukraine. Being free from the harassments of the Russian regime, it did magnificent scholarly work in Lviv, and earned over the years a reputation as the first Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, having published hundreds of volumes of periodicals, monographs, historical source materials, special studies, works of literature, and other publications in various

scholarly fields, including the pure sciences. In 1973, in New York, the Society celebrated, with an impressive scholarly congress, its centennial anniversary.[14]

The nineteenth century saw another cultural activity in Ukraine, namely an energetic effort to organize and maintain museums in various cities. The first museum was organized in Theodosia, in the Crimean Peninsula, in 1811, and subsequently was renamed the Museum of Regional Studies. Perhaps then most important from the scholarly point of view, the Odessa City Museum of Antiquities was founded in 1825. In 1858 it became affiliated with the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities. Later on, similar museums of antiquities, with archeological interests, were established in Kerch and Kiev (1837). The historical-archeological museums became most numerous, and soon contained valuable and large collections, such as those in Chernihiv and Kamianets-Podilsky.

In the second half of the century, the Museum of Church Antiquities was founded at the Kievan Theological Academy. The efforts to organize a nationwide museum in Kiev began in 1884. Then, five years later, the City Industrial Museum of Arts and Sciences was opened. The museum in Katerynoslav, the Museum of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, a Church Museum in Lviv, and several regional museums in various cities, including those in Bukovyna and Carpathian Ukraine, completed the picture.

Scholarly activities developed impressively in the course of the nineteenth century and until the outbreak of the First World War in Ukraine, and the achievements were greater than those in some politically free nations of Europe. Theology developed in connection with various theological seminaries and academies. The Kievan Theological Academy was established in 1819 after the Kievan-Mohylian Academy (a symbol of Ukrainian cultural self-assertion) was liquidated by the Russians in 1817; the *Barbareum* Theological Seminary in Vienna for the Ukrainian Uniat Catholics was established in 1774; the *Studium Ruthenum* Seminary in Lviv was

established in 1783. In these and other theological seminaries, professors wrote theological and philosophical treatises, sermons, and other works in the fields of moral philosophy, ethics, interpretation of testamentary texts, history of the Church, and canon law. Needless to say, in Eastern Ukraine the theology was Orthodox and heavily affected by the politically oriented pressure of the Holy Synod, the supreme Russian Orthodox authority under the Tsar. Any really important theological studies could scarcely develop under this pressure. The struggle to achieve a Ukrainian translation of the Bible and to research into the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church dominated the religious mind. In connection with the attempts to complete a Ukrainian translation of the Old and New Testaments, the names of P. Kulish, I. Pului, and P. Morachevsky must be mentioned. In spite of the Russian efforts to make the Orthodox Church the tool of Russianization of Ukraine, the theological seminaries in the latter part of the nineteenth century were the centers of an ever-stronger Ukrainian national self-assertion movement. In Western Ukraine, where the Uniat Church prevailed, the theological mind was influenced to some extent by Roman Catholicism. There were several outstanding theologians. In the first half of the nineteenth century, M. Harasevych was working in the areas of pastoral theology and Church history. He published the *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*. M. Hrynevetsky and A. Radkevych were involved in the work of interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. M. Levytsky also interpreted the Scriptures and acquired fame as a scholar in the area of canon law. In the latter part of the century, M. Lavrivsky worked in the field of canon law as well, while Y. Pelesh was an outstanding church historian.

The Ukrainian philosophical thought at that time was at first under the heavy influence of the German idealism of Fichte, Kant, Schelling, and then Hegel. It was advanced by V. Dohvovych (1783-1849), a priest from Carpathian Ukraine, who wrote three volumes on Kant and on philosophers'

thoughts, *Critica Purae Rationis*, *Critica Practicae Rationis*, and *Definitiones Philosophicae*. As Mirchuk has asserted, the works were concerned with problems of life and ethics rather than metaphysics. I. Schad, a German-born philosopher who taught in the Kharkiv university at the turn of the century, further popularized this philosophical orientation when he published the *Institutiones Iuris Naturae*. A. Dudrovych, at approximately the same time, followed Schad in his German idealism, although he emphasized the thinking of Schelling. N. Bilous of Nizhyn, as well as J. Mikhnevych, professor in Kiev and Odessa in the middle of the century, had essentially the same intellectual interests. Also, D. Kavunnyk-Vellansky, J. Mikhnevych, O. Novytsky, and S. Gogotsky must be mentioned. Gogotsky published a *Critical Survey of Kant's Philosophy* in Kiev (1847). Apparently the most outstanding philosopher of them all in the middle of the nineteenth century, mainly because of his original thinking, was P. Yurkevych, who criticized Kant's skepticism. A. Potebnia, in the second half of the century, was under the influence of Humboldt and Lotze. P. Redkyn followed Hegel when teaching in Moscow and St. Petersburg. There were also other philosophical thinkers, such as Hankevych, Lesevych, and Kistiakivsky who wrote *Critics of Marxism*.[15]

The official Russian pressure to eradicate Ukrainian self-assertion produced a most natural reaction on the part of the Ukrainian intellectuals. Studies directly connected with Ukraine—her past, culture, arts and language especially—developed impressively. These also included the history, archeology, geography (with demography and ethnography), linguistics, sociology, and economics of the Ukrainian people. Ukrainian history-writing had been advanced by such outstanding historians as D. Bantysh-Kamensky, who published *Istoria Maloi Rossii* ("A History of Little Russia") in 1822. O. Bodiansky published a substantial number of source materials of great importance for Ukrainian history in Moscow, including *Istoria Rusov*, Samovydets' *Litopys*, some Cossack

diaries and many others. Contrary to official Russian imperial doctrine, Ukrainian historians attempted to prove beyond any doubt the distinction between the Ukrainian and Muscovite-Russian cultures, languages and histories. As one historian after another contributed something new, a clear picture began to emerge. M. Maksymovych's scholarly interests were very broad, including demography, folklore, and history. He attempted to bring forth the evidence that the origin of the Ukrainian nation was more ancient than that of the Muscovite-Russian one. M. Kostomarov underscored, in his voluminous studies of the past, the importance of popular democratic movements in Ukrainian national history. P. Kulish, who again exhibited very broad interests in Ukrainian studies—in history, ethnography, literature, and literary writings—and who published among other things the *Zapysky o yuzhnoi Rusy*, emphasized the significance of the gentry and the urban population in the historical process of Ukraine. V. Antonovych, an outstanding member of the "Ukrainian historical school" and Ukrainian political and social activist with an interest in archeology, educated a number of historians and archeologists in the spirit of Ukrainian national self-assertion, which they subsequently spread throughout the land. O. Lazarevsky researched social and economic developments in the Cossack-Hetman state. Doubtlessly, M. Hrushevsky was the most outstanding of all Ukrainian historians. He authored a most fundamental work in Ukrainian history, his ten-volume *Istoria Ukrainy-Rusy*, published gradually over the years. Its scholarly value cannot be overemphasized even today. He also published in several volumes *Istoria ukrainskoi literatury*. His article, published in 1903, the *Traditional System of "Russian History" versus National History of Eastern Slavs*, proved beyond doubt the historical irrationality of beginning Russian history with the historical beginnings of Ukraine, and leaving the real historical beginnings of Muscovy-Russia poorly researched.[16] M. Harasevych and Y. Pelesh developed studies of the history of the Church,

while M. Vladimirsky-Budanov laid the foundation of the history of law in Ukraine. M. Vasylenko and D. Doroshenko belonged to a younger generation of the historians.

In the second half of the nineteenth century archeological studies began to develop impressively. The Third Archeological Congress, held in Kiev, in 1875, was the triumph of that branch of Ukrainian scholarship. It was attended by some 120 archeologists of the country, placing the discipline on a Western-European level, as Kurinnyi has pointed out. F. Vovk of the Kievan university, M. Maksymovych, V. Antonovych (who "put archeological studies...on a truly scientific basis"), V. Khvoiko (who discovered traces of the Tripillian culture in Ukraine), N. Biliashevsky, and Y. Sitsinsky must be mentioned in this connection.

Political thought was advanced by M. Drahomaniv, V. Antonovych, M. Kostomarov, P. Kulish, and on the threshold of the twentieth century by M. Mikhnovsky, D. Dontsov, V. Lypynsky, and many others. Ukrainian political thought progressed from the *khlopomany* (peasant-phile movement) to the *narodovtsi* (popular movement), to the advocacy of the political autonomy of Ukraine along with federalism with Russia, and finally to the self-assertion of Ukraine in her own state, the sovereignty of the nation, and the doctrine of Ukrainian Nationalism.

Geography, ethnography, and demography, together with studies of Ukrainian folklore, were well represented by many scholars. Stephan Rudnytsky may well be considered the father of Ukrainian geography, having published books in that area. Anthropology was advanced by F. Vovk, ethnography by P. Chubynsky and I. Rudchenko. Y. Markovych, by the turn of the century, had published various ethnographical and geographical studies, in particular the *Zapysky o Malorosii* ("Notations on Little Rus'ia"), which may have been intended as the first volume of a proposed encyclopedia of Ukraine, concerned with the geography and ethnography of the land. H. Kalynovsky, M. Tsertelev, M. Maksymovych, I.

Sreznevsky, and others studied Ukrainian folklore and published several collections of Ukrainian songs from all over the country. The Geographical Society in Kiev substantially fostered that area of scholarly interest.

Ukrainian philology and linguistics developed progressively over the century, starting with such scholars as A. Pavlovsky, who published a grammar of the Ukrainian language in St. Petersburg in 1818. Then, towards the middle of the century, philology and linguistics were advanced by the works of M. Makysmovych, O. Bodiansky, and I. Sreznevsky, J. Levytsky, I. Vahylevych, and Y. Holovatsky contributed to grammatical studies in Galicia. O. Bodiansky proved scientifically that the Ukrainian language was distinct from the Russian and Polish languages. In the latter part of the century, linguistics and literary studies were continued by O. Potebnia and N. Sumtsov (at the Kharkiv university) and by S. Smal-Stotsky, I. Franko, K. Studynsky, and others in West Ukraine.

The study of jurisprudence advanced in the universities of Kiev, Kharkiv, and Lviv. A. Kistiakovsky and M. Vladymyrsky-Budanov developed the discipline of the history of law and legal institutions. D. Bahalii, M. Tuhan-Baranovsky, and M. Ziber advanced economics. D. Bahalii researched the economic history of *Slobidska* Ukraine, M. Tuhan-Baranovsky elaborated a theory of economic fluctuations, while M. Ziber was a Marxist sociologist and economist.

Physical sciences were also developing. Astronomical research progressed in all three universities. The Kharkiv observatory was founded in 1808, another in Kiev in 1845, and yet another in Odessa in 1871. Mathematics was well represented by N. Lobachevsky, the creator of a new geometrical system. M. Ostrohradsky contributed to the beginnings of calculus and invented the so-called Ostrohradsky formula, while V. Buniakovsky and D. Grave, a little later in the century, headed the School of Algebra in Kiev. Many Ukrainians worked in the fields of mathematics, physics, physiology, and

related areas in various Russian universities and were mistakenly considered to be Russian scientists. I. Prokopovych was a physicist and mathematician; A. Prokopovych-Antonsky a natural scientist; D. Kavunnyk-Vellansky a physiologist and an outstanding philosopher, a student of Schelling. In medical science M. Terekhovsky, D. Samoilovych, and E. Buialsky excelled. Studies in animal husbandry were conducted at the Veterinary Institute of Kharkiv. In the Technical Institutes in Kiev and Kharkiv and the College of Mining in Katerynoslav research in metallurgy, mechanical and electrical engineering, mechanics, and mining was conducted by many outstanding scientists.[17]

LITERATURE. Although the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries were an era of national suppression by the Russians, the cultural life of the Ukrainian people—in particular, their literature—developed most impressively; this was the golden era of Ukrainian literary life. Ukrainian literature at that time developed more impressively and reached a higher level than the literature of many independent states. On the other hand, Ukrainian writers and poets became the standard-bearers of the growing national self-assertion, and frequently—as in the cases of Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, and Lesia Ukrainka—became the leaders of national independence movement.

The splendid development of literary creations of various kinds—prose, poetry, and all types of drama trends—was initiated by Ivan Kotlarevsky. He was actually the first writer to successfully use the living Ukrainian language in his works, and he did it persistently, being convinced that Ukrainian literature should develop in this direction. The publication of the first three chapters of his *Eneida* ("Aeneid"), paraphrasing Vergil's celebrated work by making Aeneas a Ukrainian Cossack, in St. Petersburg in 1798, marked the victorious entrance of Ukrainian into the modern literary

world. *Eneida* was a comical travesty of the original Roman literary creation, reflecting the Ukrainian way of life and its national background. The comical aspect of the work can be seen in its modernizations and in the use of Latin and, frequently, even vulgar expressions:

> Aeneas, noster magnus panus
> And Troianorum mighty prince
> A-roaming o'er the sea, a gypsy,
> Ad te, O rex, has sent us nunc.
> Rogamus, domine Latine,
> Do not destroy our wretched heads.[18]

Kotlarevsky also introduced a serious aspect to his poetic creation; there was compassion for the serfs, and sharp criticism of the gentry. Heavy drinking, dancing, and merrymaking, were included, along with democratic and humanistic undertones, deep love of his country, and reminiscences of its glorious past. *Eneida* became extremely popular at the time and it had enormous impact on the growth of national feelings. In his two leading dramatic works, *Natalka Poltavka* and *Moskal Charivnyk* ("Nataly of Poltava" and "Moscovite, the Sorcerer"), he portrayed the Ukrainian way of life and its customs with a degree of sentimentality and scorned those who alienated themselves from their nationality. Both dramatic works had comic undertones. Petro Artemovsky-Hulak, professor and president of the University of Kharkiv, continued in the same vein, popularizing the Ukrainian language in his travesties, fairy tales, and ballads. The trend had started and was growing in strength.

In 1841 Yevhen Hrebinka published his almanac, the *Swallow*, in which he printed the works of other writers, including those of Taras Shevchenko. He also published a collection of fairy tales entitled the *Proverbia*, in which, under the guise of fables and allegories, human relations, social and political,

were pictured. Although the themes of his fables were borrowed from others (mostly foreign story tellers), Hrebinka introduced a strictly Ukrainian national coloring and depicted the prevailing conditions under Russian rules.

Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko was the first to write a Ukrainian novel. He wrote several of them, of which *Marusia* ("Mary") and *Serdechna Oksana* ("Unfortunate Oksana"), were perhaps the best. Both novels were extremely sentimental, reflecting the peasant way of life in Ukraine. In the first work, Kvitka-Osnovianenko described the unhappy outcome of a true love, while in the latter he depicted the tragedy of a girl who lovingly trusted a Russian scoundrel. All his novels were permeated by his Christian world outlook. He wrote also some comic stories—such as *Saldatski Patret* ("A Soldier's Portrait"), *Pidbrekhach* ("A Liar"), and *Kupovanyi rozum* ("A Brain Purchased")—and a few dramatic works, of which a comedy, *Svatannia na Honcharivtsi* ("Matchmaking in Honcharivka"), is most famous. It is still staged today in Ukraine. Some short stories of his are based on ancient Ukrainian folklore, such as beliefs in witches, vampires, and devils. Kvitka's literary ambition was to give a picture of the Ukrainian village and its life, and he succeeded superbly. He died in 1843 as the popular trend came to an end in Ukrainian literature.

Under the influence of the Western European literary movements, Romanticism arrived in Ukraine. It was an attempt to grasp the world beyond its intellectual comprehension, reaching for the mysterious world of fantasy, intuition, and subconsciousness. It gave rise to the growth of nationalism in the literary creations of individual nations by underscoring their specific national features and drives, including the drive toward a national independent existence. Some elements of Romanticism could already be found in the works of Artemovsky and Kvitka, but the early Ukrainian Romantics were Lev Borovykovsky and Amvrozii Metlynsky. Their ballads and poems were permeated with deep feelings of love,

nostalgia, the glorification of the past, and the beauty of their country, the steppes, and burial grounds—along with reminders of the historical greatness of the Cossacks.

The Romantic literary epoch, marked in particular by the names of Markian Shashkevych in West Ukraine and Taras Shevchenko in East Ukraine, greatly contributed to the spontaneous and powerful revival of national self-assertion, which soon led to the strong political movement to achieve national political independence. The collections of Ukrainian songs and other monuments of folklore by M. Tsertelev, M. Maksymovych, and I. Sreznevsky advanced the trend by supplying literature with a great many new themes and motifs of the unknown, mysterious, emotional, and historical, all of it bearing strong national characteristics.

Markian Shashkevych prepared an almanac, *Zoria* ("The Star"), in the living Ukrainian language and in the phonetic alphabet, but it was barred from publication. Then he changed it slightly and published it with the assistance of Yakiv Holovatsky in Budapest, in 1837, under the new title of *Rusalka Dnistrova* ("The Dniester Mermaid"). The work aimed at "blowing away the clouds of dark fog" which covered the life of Ukrainians and was intended to "connect them with a full and glaring sunshine." Soon the works of the so-called *Ruthenian Trio*—Shashkevych, Y. Holovatsky, and I. Vahylevych—were promoting the literary and national revival in West Ukraine. Shashkevych wrote and published many works of lasting value; original poems of a lyrical nature, (of which *Vesnivka,* "The Spring Flower", became most popular), religious psalms, historical articles, historical poems (such as *Nalyvaiko* or *Khmelnystkoho obstuplennia Lvova,* "Khmelnvtsky's seige of Lviv", and others.

His poem *Pobratymy* ("The Blood Brother") is marked by deep Ukrainian patriotism, and the short story *Olena* ("Helena") is characterized by the strong Romantic undertones which permeate all his literary creations. Since he was a Ukrainian priest, Shashkevych gave a full expression of his

religious and patriotic feelings in his *Ruslanovi psalmy* ("Ruslan's Psalms"). He was born in 1811 and died in 1843, having lived a fruitful life in only thirty-two years.[19]

Mykola Ustianovych followed in Shashkevych's footsteps. He was also a priest, showing the significant role played by the Uniat clergy in the literary and national resurgence of Ukraine. Writing strictly in the Romantic tone, Ustianovych left several poems and two novels about the life of the Carpathian mountaineers, *Mest verkhovyntsia* ("Mountaineer's Revenge") and *Strastnyi chetver* ("Good Thursday"), both being well written with well-developed plots. A. Mohylnytsky, another Romanticist, in the poem *Skyt Maniavskyi* told the legendary story of the founding of a famous monastery in the Carpathian Mountains.

In Eastern or Dnieper Ukraine, a genius bard, Taras Shevchenko, illuminated the entire nation. He was born on March 9, 1814 and died on February 26, 1861, and in the course of his relatively short life, being a free man only a few years (at first a serf until 1838 and then a political prisoner of the Tsarist regime from 1847 to 1858), he was able to inspire his entire beloved homeland. He had a sad life story, but was a glorious inspiration to the nation.

Shevchenko started his literary career as a Romanticist, writing beautiful ballads: *Prychyna* ("The Cause"), *Topola* ("Poplar Tree"), and *Utoplena* ("A Drowned Female"). The literary value of these ballads and others is superb. In *Perebendia* the poet analyzed the impact of art upon the human soul.

Shevchenko's historical and political poems give full expression to his untempered love of his fatherland by idealizing its glorious past and praising national heroes while condemning traitors, the Polish domination, and the Tsarist terror. The most notable among them were *Subotiv, Rozryta mohyla* ("The Ransacked Grave"), *Velykyi Lokh* ("An Enormous Dugout"), and *Hamalia*. The greatest historical epic of his, *Haidamaky* ("The Haidamaks"), is a retelling of the story of

the Ukrainian uprisings against Polish oppression. Other creations of his were poems depicting the social problems of his day, such as *Kateryna* ("Catherine"), *Naimychka* ("The Housemaid"), and *Sova* ("The Owl"). The political poems caused problems for Shevchenko; he was imprisoned by the Tsarist authorities and deported to Central Asia for his sharp criticism of the regime and Russian oppression in Ukraine. *Son* ("The Dream"), *Kavkaz* ("The Caucasus"), *Poslanie* ("The Epistle"), and *Velykyi Lokh* are outstanding examples of Shevchenko's poems of this kind. With a renewed fervor, Shevchenko criticized the Tsarist regime in his poem *Neofity* ("The Neophytes"). Of the dramatic works of the poet, *Nazar Stodola* is probably the best. Shevchenko's lyrical works expressed his personal sufferings and tragic experiences.

Shevchenko's poetic works are at the artistic level of those of Pushkin, Mickewicz, Goethe, Schiller, and other Western European poets. They feature versatility of forms, techniques, themes, and artistic approaches, and have given rise to many critical writings. The Ukrainian nation as a whole has found, in Shevchenko's works, the fountain of new national life. In his *Testament* he called on the Ukrainian people to rise to arms after his death against the foreign oppressors, to arrange a blood bath for them, and to re-establish a free and independent state of their own.[20]

Shevchenko inspired a great many followers of his ideas and thoughts, including P. Kulish, M. Vovchok, O. Storozhenko, and others. P. Kulish left behind a rich literary inheritance: poetry, translations, short stories, and some dramatic works such as *Petro Sahaidachnyi* and *Baida, Kniaz Vyshnyvetskyi*. His historical novel, *Chorna Rada* ("The Mob Council"), is still popular today. Marko Vovchok, the pen name of Maria Markovych, portrayed, in her short stories, the tragic truth about the life of the peasant-serfs. Her stories moved the conscience of all people of good will and were translated into other languages. *Instytutka* ("A Girl-Student"), *Dva Syny* ("Two Sons"), and an historical novel—*Marusia*—

were among her other works. Hanna Barvinok, Oleksa Storozhenko, Stepan Rudansky, Leonid Hlibiv, and Yurii Fedkovych added to the treasures of Ukrainian literature. Yurii Fedkovych, from Bukovyna, exhibited an original literary talent as a poet and a short story writer, artistically describing the life of the Carpathian mountain people, the *Hutsuly*, in his numerous stories.

Eventually a new trend, realism, came into being replacing romanticism. The realistic approach in literature attempted to reconstruct real life truthfully in novels and short stories. Oleksander Konysky wrote over fifty such novels and stories. Ivan Nechui-Levytsky wrote outstanding novels such as *Mykola Dzheria*, about a Ukrainian fisherman, *Burlachka,* about the life of factory workers, and above all *Khmary* ("The Clouds"), about the Ukrainian educated class caught between its idealism and materialism. Panas Rudchenko, the pen name of R. Myrnyi, created poems, short stories, and dramas, but was primarily a story-teller-psychologist who portrayed the conflicts between the rich and the poor and struggles against injustices. Finally, Borys Hrinchenko published poems, short stories, novels, and dramatic works. His novel *Soniashnyi promin* ("Sunbeam"), perhaps the most outstanding of his literary works, reflected the difficulties of bringing enlightenment to the common people under Russian domination.

Dramatic works enriched Ukrainian literature and strengthened Ukrainian national self-assertion, especially after the Ems decree of 1876. M. Starytsky, M. Kropyvnytsky, and Ivan Tobilevych (the pen name of I. Karpenko-Karyi) were the most outstanding of the dramatists. However, their literary contributions will be briefly discussed in connection with the Ukrainian theater in the nineteenth century, since these people were not only authors, but organizers and performers.

In the late part of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian literature was raised to new heights by ingenious talents such as Ivan Franko and Lesia Ukrainka, and great authors such as

Olha Kobylanska, Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, and Vasyl Stefanyk. Ivan Franko gave the Ukrainian people splendid literary creations of poetry and prose. At first he was under the socialist influence of M. Drahomaniv, but later on he partially freed himself from this, and his literary works were permeated above all by passionate patriotism. His activities were varied: he was a poet, a writer, a journalist, an editor, a literary critic, a political activist, and a scholar.

In the field of poetry, Ivan Franko published several collections of lyrics, such as *Z vershyn i nezyn* ("From Hills and Valleys"), *Ziviale Lystia* ("The Faded Leaves"), *Iz dniv zhurby* ("From the Days of Sadness"), and *Semper Tiro,* between the years of 1887 and 1911. His socialist pioneering zeal to move his people ahead was fully expressed in his poem *Kameniari* ("Stonecutters"), while in *Panski Zharty* ("The Master's Jests") he reflected the horrors of peasant-serfdom. The misery of peasantry was also pictured in *Naimyt* ("Hired Hand"). Franko reached the very peak of his creativity in *Moisei* ("Moses"), where in an allegorical way he urged the Ukrainian people to rise up and build a better future for themselves. Another beautiful poem is *Ivan Vyshensky,* about a spiritual leader who did not live up to his responsibilities.

Franko wrote several outstanding novels with social backgrounds such as *Boryslav smiietsia* ("The Laughing Boryslav") and *Osnovy Suspilstva* ("Social Foundations"), other novels such as *Zahkar Berkut,* and a fantastic story—*Petrii i Dovbushchuky.* He published eight novels in all. His many short stories, such as *Ripnyk, Boa constrictor, Pid oborohom* ("Under the Shelter"), and *Malyi Myron* ("Little Myron"), have very diversified themes and reflect different social conditions, particularly the lives of peasants and workers.

Of course, Franko also contributed to Ukrainian dramatic works with such works as *Ukradene shchastia* ("Stolen Happiness"), *Uchytel* ("The Teacher"), *Riabynia* ("The Female Slave"), and others. He also worked ardently as a translator of Goethe, Byron, Homer, and Pushkin. One should also not

forget his splendid poetic works written for young people, *Lys Mykyta* ("Fox the Operator"), *Koval Basim* ("Basim, the Blacksmith"), and *Abu Kazymovi kaptsi* ("Abu Kazim's Slippers"), all full of humor and moral lessons. Born in 1856, Franko died in 1916, after having contributed immensely to Ukrainian literature.[21]

Larysa Kosach-Kvitka (pen-name Lesia Ukrainka), the third literary giant of that era, was born in 1871 and died in 1913. Like Franko, Lesia Ukrainka was totally concerned with the lives and fortunes of the Ukrainian people, as has been argued by M. Hrushevsky. She published several collections of her lyrics—*Na krylakh pisen* ("On the Wings of Songs"), *Dumy i mrii* ("Thoughts and Dreams"), and *Vidhuky* ("Echoes")—between 1892 and 1902. In the two latter collections patriotic-social and lyrical undertones take over, showing her deep belief in the need for a better future for her people. In the strictly personal lyrics, her sad life of loneliness, illness, and love and deep attachment to nature are reflected. Her talent came to full expression in her poetic works, such as *Rusalka* ("Mermaid"), *Robert Bruce*, and *Izolda Biloruka*, and her dramatic works, such as *Cassandra, Vavylonskyi polon* ("Babylon Captivity"), *Advokat Martian*, ("Attorney Martian"), *Orhia* ("Orgy"), *Boiarynia* ("Boyar Woman"), *Lisova pisnia* ("The Forest Song"), and many others. They showed not only her poetic genius and her comprehensive and high-level education, but also her passionate love for her fatherland and her defense of the rights of her nation to have a sovereign existence of its own. Her poetic forms were superb.[22]

A powerful drive toward literary beauty is found in the works of Olha Kobylanska, Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, and Vasyl Stefanyk. In addition to many short stories, Kobylanska published several novels which analyzed social problems particularly the emancipation struggle of women, and marked by strongly romantic undertones, such as *Tsarivna* ("Tsar's Daughter"), *Zemla* ("Earth"), and *U nedilu rano zilla*

kopala ("On Sunday Morning She Dug Out Weeds"), as well as *Niobe, Apostol cherni* ("Mob's Apostle"), and others. Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, who was one of the most outstanding Ukrainian literary figures of the late nineteenth century, has been described as "a poet of the beauty of nature and the beauty of human soul." He mainly wrote short stories, published in several collections, which in most cases describe and analyze social ills, such as in *V putakh shaitana* ("In Devil's Shackles"), *U hrishnyi svit* ("In a Sinful World"), and *Poiedynok* ("Duel"). He became a master of the new impressionism in literature. A masterpiece in Ukrainian literature is his novelette *Tini zabutykh predkiv* ("The Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors") based on Hutsul folklore of the Carpathian mountaineers, which is combined with fantasy.[23]

Vasyl Stefanyk published several collections of masterful short stories: *Synia knyzhechka* ("A Blue Booklet"), *Kaminnyi khrest* ("A Stone Cross"), *Moie slovo* ("My Word"), and others, in which he analyzed in a most penetrating way the peasant psyche and peasant misery, using the dialect of the Sub-Carpathian Ukrainian village. Of course, there were many more noteworthy literary figures of the nineteenth century who cannot be covered in this short survey. More great literature was written in the twentieth century, and the discussion of this will soon occur in chapter 7.[24]

ARCHITECTURE. With the elimination of Ukrainian political autonomy after the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the sciences and arts, including architecture, suffered a serious setback. Under the Russian impact, the Ukrainian Baroque style faded away and the imitations of the classical style of ancient Greek and Roman times was made popular in Ukraine. This followed the contemporary trend in the arts throughout Europe and was particularly appealing to the imperial ambitions of the Russian Tsars and their longing for grandeur. In the area of church construction, the Russian

pressure was especially strong. A St. Petersburg decree of 1800 prohibited the building of churches in Ukraine according to the traditional Ukrainian wooden-and-stone patterns. The plans of new churches were sent from Moscow and St. Petersburg. The ecclesiastical authorities there were advised to follow the Russian church style in order to produce, at least superficially, an impression of uniformity between Ukraine and Russia. Even in church construction St. Petersburg was afraid of Ukrainian "separatism" and tried to suppress it. All that contributed to the decline of the construction industry and of architectural originality.

The palaces of Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovsky in Baturyn (built by an English architect, C. Cameron), and in Pochep (constructed by Ukrainian, O. Yanovsky, according to the plans of Vallen de la Motte), Zavadovsky's palace in Lalychi (built by an Italian master-architect, G. Quarenghi), and the building of the Odessa Opera House (constructed by a French architect, T. de Thomon), were representative classical structures in Ukraine at that time.

As Mirtchuk has asserted, a little later, in connection with the popular and practical attitude toward life, works of art, including architecture, were permeated by riches and opulence and leaned toward an affluent combination of various styles, at times tasteless, and known as Eclecticism. Its examples could be found in all major cities of Ukraine—Kiev, Odessa, Kharkiv, Lviv, and Chernyvtsi.[25] There was also the influence of the Viennese Neo-Renaissance, which reached as far as the city of Rostov on the Don River. The city theaters of Kiev, Lviv and Odessa were simply copies of Viennese theaters and resembled each other.

The era of eclectic buildings represented a general decline of architectural values and was featured by a lack of originality and creativity. After the abolition of the traditional guild system in Ukraine by the Russian authorities, the normal training of craft builders in the traditional Ukrainian art of construction was interrupted. The vocational training in the

newly established trade schools initially was hopelessly inadequate, and then was restructured strictly according to the Russian patterns. Moreover, the Ukrainian colonial status in the Empire did not provide adequate career opportunities, hence many candidates for the architectural and construction professions left Ukraine and sought better opportunities for their individual development and success either in Russia or elsewhere. All these circumstances accounted for the overall decline of the art in Ukraine—a trend that comes along with a general artistic impoverishment in this field in Europe as well.

Subsequently, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Romantic trend in architecture partially took over and led to a revival of historical styles of the past. In East Europe Romanticism revived Byzantine patterns in the pseudo-Byzantine style, with, however, a strong Russian interpretation. This did not lead to any artistic enthusiasm in Ukraine or any appreciable growth of architecture either.

Then, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the so-called Viennese Secession style and French architectural modernism found some followers in Ukraine. Meanwhile the architects D. Diachenko and S. Tymoshenko made an effort to revive a Ukrainian national style, attempting to combine the old wooden structural patterns with the elements of the Ukrainian Baroque.[26]

PAINTING AND CARVING. With the domination of Ukraine by Russia, a great many Ukrainian artist-painters were either attracted to or brought by compulsion to St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other Russian cities to create and to acquire fame there. They included K. Holovachevsky, I. Sabluchok (Sablukov), and A. Losenko. Sabluchok, however, later on decided to return to Ukraine and established a school of painting in Kharkiv in 1767. It was the era of classicism in

painting, as well as of an attempt to reflect nature in a beautiful but realistic way: the people, the surroundings, and the landscapes. Portraits were particularly popular. In this Losenko excelled. He studied in Paris and from there brought the Classical style of painting to Eastern Europe, becoming president of the Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg. He made classicism popular throughout the Empire. His religious pictures were also very famous.

Another outstanding artist of that time was D. Levytsky, whose paintings can be found in the best European art galleries. His techniques were diversified, his portraits superb. V. Borovykovsky was more one-sided in his techniques and worked in Russia. At the same time L. Dolnytsky created in West Ukraine. Many Ukrainian artist-painters of the classical style worked in other foreign countries, such as Poland, Hungary, and Germany. They contributed to and were included in galleries of these respective lands. They excelled, according to the Classical tradition, in portrait painting.

Subsequently, a slight stagnation in painting followed in Ukraine. It was challenged by Taras Shevchenko, an outstanding artist-painter as well as a great literary figure. Shevchenko started as a classicist in painting, having created several beautiful portraits, but then he moved away from that orientation and painted according to the so-called "idealist realism," the school of painting initiated by I. Kramsky and represented mostly by Ukrainians—hence largely national in character. Idealist realism attempted in a photographical way to reflect reality vividly and beautifully, including social problems of the national and historical background. T. Shevchenko himself was a very diversified painter, using water colors, oil, crayons, pastel, pencil, and charcoal, and he left behind an enormous artistic inheritance of pictures, portraits, self-portraits, landscapes, and scenes of social and ethnographic background from Ukraine and Central Asia—where he was exiled by the Russian autocratic regime. In self-portraits, as Yaniv has pointed out, he reflected his tragic misfortunes

of life. In fact, Shevchenko introduced idealist realism to the St. Petersburg Academy of Arts.

The art of portrait painting continued to develop, being represented by such names as D. Bezperchyi and K. Kostandi. Meanwhile, historical painting was evolving, depicting important events of the Ukrainian past. M. Ivasiuk created his famous "Khmelnytsky's Entrance to Kiev," the reproductions of which are even today in almost all the homes of patriotic and educated Ukrainians—along with the picture by I. Riepin, "The Cossacks Write a Letter to the Sultan," an extremely popular piece of art depicting various characters among the Cossacks. O. Slastion illustrated Shevchenko's epic, *Haidamaky*. In Galicia, realistic painting was represented by A. Manastyrsky and O. Kurylas.

Mykola Ge issued a call to return from Russia to Ukraine and to create in the homeland. In his paintings he reflected patriotism and philosophical problems, while his religious pictures were rather unorthodox for his time. They were rejected by Russian censorship. Yaroshenko painted revolutionary scenes, while Pymonenko depicted themes from the life of the Ukrainian village and the Cossack *Sitch*. Beautiful Ukrainian landscapes were created by A. Kuindzhi. M. Samokysha left behind some 6,000 paintings. He was one of the greatest painters of battle scenes, creating a great many battle pictures of the past. K. Ustianovych painted a huge image of Moses. S. Vasylkivsky studied and then recreated in his paintings historical vestments and national ornamental motifs, while A. Zhdakha illustrated Ukrainian national songs. At the end of the nineteenth century many artists—including M. Pymonenko, P. Martynovych, I. Izhakevych, Zhdakha, and others—under the leadership of O. Slastion and S. Vasylkivsky—formed a circle which concentrated on using only Ukrainian national themes. Other outstanding painters of the late nineteenth century were I. Kramsky, O. Lytovchenko, and I. Aivazovsky.

Carving, sculpture, and engraving developed impressively

in Ukraine in the nineteenth century in spite of political oppression. The Russian takeover at first produced an artistic decline, but soon a revival followed. At first the Classical approach prevailed in carving and sculpture. Two important artists, I. Martos and M. Kozlovsky, worked at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Both of them, however, though Ukrainian, functioned in Russia. Hence, they are generally and mistakenly considered Russians. I. Martos was hailed as the most outstanding sculptor in Russia. He excelled in making tombstones and was referred to as "a poet of a dreamy and sad grace, whose marble is crying." His huge statues were of a lesser artistic quality. After receiving a very good education, he became a teacher and then a president of the St. Petersburg Academy of Arts.

Subsequently, with the progress of time, Ukrainian sculptors were influenced by the mood of national self-assertion and this changed their art to a more Ukrainian one in its characteristics and motifs. M. Mykeshyn, a Byelorus'ian by origin, created the famous monument of Bohdan Khmelnytsky on horseback in Kiev. F. Kamensky, who continued in the Classical style, and P. Zabilo, who carved busts of famous people, both emigrated to America and worked in the United States. L. Pozen carved Kotlarevsky's monument in Poltava. V. Beklemishev merits mention here for his originality, while F. Balavensky effectively combined the Classical traditions with elements of the Ukrainian folklore. He also created some monumental works, such as the "Olympic Games" and "Phryne's Triumph March," as well as allegoric sculptures, such as "Charity," "Love," and "Life." P. Viitovych, Balavensky's contemporary, worked in West Ukraine ornamenting the theater of Lviv, the city's main railway station, and its industrial museum. H. Kuznevych carved monuments, and later on emigrated to America and worked in Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia. M. Parashchuk worked in Bulgaria and carved heads of famous literary figures, while M. Brynsky, carved two remarkable monuments—one for the

laborers who died in Vienna during the social unrest and one for the Ukrainian war prisoners who died in Prague.

One should not forget Yura Shkryblak and his sons, the outstanding Ukrainian mountain sculptors of the nineteenth century, who raised the art of folk-carving to a new height. The art of carving among the mountaineers, the *Hutsuly,* in the Carpathian regions became very stylish and very artistic, combining carving with painting and incrustations.[27]

Taras Shevchenko also revived the traditional Ukrainian art of engraving in the nineteenth century. He created a series of outstanding graphics of landscapes, folklore scenes, and historical scenes, in which the light and shadow were beautifully combined. Other artists, such as Vaslkivsky, Samokysha, Slastion, and Zhdakha, followed his example and worked on graphics.[28]

MUSIC AND THEATER. Because of the political pressure of the Russian Tsarist regime, music in Ukraine was at first limited only to popular theatrical productions—which, however, had a great impact on the national revival. The music to *Natalka Poltavka,* the comedy by I. Kotlarevsky, was composed by several composers, Ukrainian and foreign, such as Borytsky, Vasyliev, Jedlichka, and Markovych. The music for other stage productions was also created by several composers such as that for *Vechernytsi* ("The Evening Dance"), by P. Nishchynsky, which seems to have some of the best music of the time. M. Arkas composed the music for Shevchenko's *Kateryna* (of a rather mediocre quality), while S. Hulak-Artemovsky wrote the not-so-very-original music for *The Cossack Beyond the Danube River,* the motifs of which were borrowed from the West. This operetta still enjoys great popularity. Vakhnianyn composed one of the better operas, *Kupalo,* which is related to Ukrainian folklore. In the early nineteenth century, stage productions based on the Ukrain-

ian folklore and national customs and traditions began to affect greatly the national revival of the country. It made the Russian authorities very suspicious.

In Western Ukraine, M. Verbytsky excelled, having written the music for the Ukrainian national anthem and Shevchenko's *Testament* while also composing rhapsodies and operettas. In the city of Peremyshl the so-called Peremyshl School of Music originated—joined by many, including Verbytsky—which had to its credit many musical compositions. These compositions, referred to as the *dumky* and *shumky*, were closely related to folklore songs but of a mediocre artistic value. Yet, as Yaniv and Mirtschuk have asserted, they substantially increased popular interest in music.[29]

Mykola Lysenko (1842-1842) became the greatest representative and exponent of Ukrainian music. He received a careful musical education at home, in Kiev, and abroad in Leipzig and St. Petersburg. Then he began his illustrious career as a musician and composer. He based nearly his entire musical output on the national folklore of Ukraine. His music became thoroughly Ukrainian, aided by his deep knowledge of the country. Lysenko invested an enormous amount of work gathering and ordering a huge amount of musical folklore material. He sharply separated Ukrainian from the Russian songs and music, which were so different in spirit, motifs, and techniques. His musical creation was varied: he composed operas (like *Christmas Night* and *Taras Bulba*), operas for children, music for Shevchenko's poetry, and much other music. He was acknowledged as a master of musical miniatures. His grand compositions, however, were considered of a lesser quality. He must be considered the greatest Ukrainian composer, however, thoroughly nationalistic and imitated to some extent by others, such as K. Stetsenko, M. Leontovych, and Y. Stepovyi. Stetsenko composed operas. Leontovych admired folklore motifs and embellished them, but he was also original in his musical creations. Stepovyi (family name Yakymenko), who also began with folklore, then composed for

piano. Synytsia preferred instrumental compositions and was more original in this respect.

Lysenko's influence was also felt in West Ukraine, affecting to some extent the musical work of Nyzhankivsky and Kolessa. D. Sichynsky was the first professional composer in West Ukraine. He created the opera *Roksolana* and many piano and choir compositions. Other notable composers were Lavrivsky, Matiuk, Kolachevsky, and Sokalsky (who wrote a work about the Ukrainian and Russian folklore music).[30]

As far as the theatrical arts were concerned, dramatic writing was developed most impressively in the nineteenth century by such people as Kotlarevsky, Kvitka-Osnovianenko, Shevchenko, and Lesia Ukrainka, and this greatly facilitated theatrical production. The other leading personalities of the Ukrainian theater at that time included M. Starytsky, M. Kropyvnytsky, and I. Tobilevych (literary name Karpenko-Karyi) and they also contributed substantially to dramatic literature.

Starytsky also wrote lyrics, but he merits most recognition for his comedies and serious dramas, such as *Christmas Night, The Black Sea Cossacks, Oi ne khody Hrytsui tai na vechernytsi* ("Don't go to the Evening Dance, Oh, Gregg"), and *Cyhanka Aza,* ("Aza, the Gypsy"), all of them still popular and frequently staged in Ukrainian theaters. During his entire lifetime Starytsky worked ardently toward raising Ukrainian theatrical art to West-European levels. Kropyvnytsky worked during his entire life for the Ukrainian theater. Like Starytsky, he wrote for the stage while at the same time being an outstanding director and actor. In his dramas he reflected the Ukrainian way of life and its customs and traditions. He wrote some forty-four plays, including *Olesia, Dvi simii* ("Two Families"), and *Nevolnyk,* ("The Captive"). Tobilevych presented the life of the Ukrainian village in his plays, but he also attempted to reflect its social problems and to contribute to their solution. Hence, he can be considered the father of the Ukrainian social drama. For working diligently

in the Ukrainian cause, he was exiled for three years by Russian authorities. Among his many plays there were: *Burlaka* ("The Vagabond"), *Rozumnyi i duren* ("The Smart and the Stupid"), *Martyn Borula, Naimychka* ("The Handmaid"), *Beztalanna* ("The One without Luck"), and the historical dramas *Serbyn* ("The Serb"), *Ponad Dniprom* ("At the Dnieper"), and *Sava Chalyi*. At the end of the nineteenth century several new playwrights appeared, including Starytska-Cherniakhivska, Yanovska, and Cherkasenko.[31]

At first amateur and then professional theaters developed from the serf theaters which were organized and maintained by the gentry. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century there was a semi-professional theater sponsored by Governor Kishensky, while the amateur theater in Poltava under the sponsorship of Governor Riepnin became professional and achieved high artistic quality. It was directed for a while by Kotlarevsky, who staged plays in the Ukrainian language. The fame of the Poltava theater was enhanced by outstanding performers: Neletova, a singer; Uharov, a comedian; and Shchepkin, who performed his parts very realistically and was acclaimed. Subsequently new theaters were organized in Kiev and Odessa. Solenyk was considered at times to be better than Shchepkin. By the 1860s and 1870s a large number of amateur and semi-professional theater groups had been organized. Their living and working conditions were difficult, but their work greatly contributed to the revival of the Ukrainian national self-assertion.

As was pointed out, Russian authorities became suspicious of the Ukrainian theater very quickly. In order to avoid harassment frequently three or four languages were used in plays, in a curious mishmosh, but because national folklore or historical, social, and psychological themes were stressed, the performances awakened the masses and pushed them toward Ukrainian national awareness.

Following Valuiev's anti-Ukrainian policy of the sixties, and provoked by the splendid growth of Ukrainian cultural

life, including theatrical art, in 1876 the notorious Ems edict was promulgated, aimed at stopping that cultural growth by prohibiting the public use of the Ukrainian language in speech or print. The edict was a failure. It could not be fully enforced, and six years later it lost its legal power to a great extent. In 1881 Kropyvnytsky received permission to organize a theatrical company and was allowed to stage plays in Kiev, Krememchuk, and Kharkiv. The tour of his group in Russia in 1886-1887 brought them the highest recognition and praise. In Russia the Ukrainian theater became highly respected.[32] The popular interest in theater was very great and, in spite of continued harassment by Russian authorities in Ukraine and the difficult living conditions of the theatrical troupes—demanding continuous traveling and personal sacrifices, at the end of the century some thirty companies performed throughout Ukraine.

Some outstanding directors and actors of the Ukrainian theater of the nineteenth century include: I. Tobilevych and his family, M. Sadovsky, his sister M. Sadovska-Barilotti, M. Kropyvnytsky, M. Starytsky, the ingenious star of the Ukrainian stage M. Zankovetska, the Rubchak family, P. Saksahansky, and many others. After the Revolution of 1905 the conditions of the Ukrainian theater improved a great deal.

In West Ukraine, in Lviv in particular, plays were staged in the 1830s and 1840s in the Uniat seminary. Rev. I Ozarkevych contributed greatly to the development of the art by writing and directing the plays. In 1864 the first professional theater, in the framework of the social-recreational society *Besida*, was established. It was initially directed by professionals from East Ukraine. Soon, a high artistic level was achieved by the Galician theater. Artistic contacts between the theaters in East and West Ukraine at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries were quite active and lively.[33]

OTHER ARTS. Wood carving, ceramics, embroidery, needlework, tapestries, and other fields of folk arts continued to develop during the nineteenth century in spite of unfavorable conditions, such as political domination by foreign powers and peasant bondage in Ukraine. Yet, in the middle of the century especially, wood carving reached a high level of development in the Poltava, Smil, Sumy, Volhinia, and Galicia regions. It featured symmetry, harmony, and lightness. Hope chests were richly decorated through carving and then painted in red, blue, and black. Crosses were also beautifully cut and placed in cemeteries and at crossroads, a very popular custom throughout the land. Geometric and plant patterns and designs were used differently in different parts of the country. In particular the Hutsuls, the Carpathian mountaineers, excelled in the art. Yura Shkryblak (1828-1885) and his sons were masters of the art in the mountains. They have been mentioned before in connection with carving in general. The Hutsuls carved canes, pistols, muskets, powder boxes, kegs, axes, and other objects, and decorated their huts and churches with carvings. They also decorated utensils of all kinds with colorful inlaying on top of cuttings.

Ceramics concentrated in modern times in the Sokal, Podilla, Poltava, Pidlashia, Chernihiv, Lviv, and Kharkiv provinces. Here geometric and plant design was also widespread. Several schools of ceramics and pottery were established in Kiev, Myrhorod, Opishnia, Lviv, and Kolomyia. The painting and ornamenting of glass, however, declined in the nineteenth century.

Tapestries, traditional in the Ukraine, led to the production of carpets and rugs, the *kylymy*, for the decoration of floors and walls. At the beginning of the century the nobility sponsored the making of tapestries. Then a slight decline of the art followed, but it was revived in the century by the sponsorship of the *zemstvo*, the territorial self-government. The *zemstva* assisted and subsidized the making of tapestries and subsequently established trade schools, in Dikhtiarka village,

Podilla, Vikno, Galician Yuziv, the Vynnytsia region, and other places. Galician tapestries featured geometric patterns, as well as those in Podilla, while in the Eastern Ukraine decorative plant motifs were favored. Some Balkan and Persian influences may be detected in the Ukrainian provinces closer to the Southwest or the East respectively.

Embroidery as a national Ukrainian art, already popular throughout the entire land, reached new heights. In North Ukraine geometrical motifs prevailed; in the central belt plant motifs; and in West Ukraine traditional patterns of all kinds—from geometrical to plant. Animal patterns were very rarely encountered as Horniatkevych has asserted. The use of colors and techniques continued to vary widely from one region of the country to the other. Embroidery was used to ornament skirts, shirts, blouses, kerchiefs, towels, jackets, and fur coats, while embroidered kerchiefs and towels were in broad use in folk rites and customs. Some embroidery patterns were adopted for tapestries and woodcuttings. Various embroidery techniques included the *nyz, pidbyrannia, khrestyk, lyshtva, zavolikannia,* and *chysnytsia* (the so-called solid-stitch techniques), and the *mereszhka, stiahuvannia,* and *vyrizuvannia* (the so-called open-stitch techniques). The embroidery of church vestments had a different character and developed into a different branch of the art. Albs, chasubles, stoles, and veils were embroidered, as well as such things as altar covers.

Of course, egg painting and designing continued as a highly elaborate work with various techniques, different motifs, and different uses of colors in each separate section of the land. Egg-designing was brought to America and became rather well liked and popular there. As a matter of fact, the Ukrainian art of egg-painting and designing has been acclaimed over that of other nationalities, including the Poles, the Serbs, and the Russians.[34]

[14]W. Lew, *A Century of Dedicated Work for Scholarship and Nation; A Brief History of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*, New York, 1973; *Congress of Ukrainian Scholars on the Centennial of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*, New York, 1973, Mirtschuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-141.

[15]On theology and philosophy: Mirtschuk, *ibid.*, pp. 127-131; B. Krawciw, O. Ohloblyn, "Scholarship," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, ed. by V. Kubiovych, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 238-247; V. Doroshenko, B. Krawciw, "Scholarship in Western Ukrainian Lands and Abroad," *ibid.*, pp. 248-252.

[16]Krawciw, Ohloblyn, *loc. cit.*, 240; Doroshenko, Krawciw, *loc. cit.*, 248-249; Mirtchuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-139.

[17]On pure sciences; Krawciw, Ohloblyn, *ibid.*, p. 242-245.

[18]C. Manning, *Ukrainian Literature, Studies of the Leading Authors*, Jersey City, 1944, p. 26.

[19]Markian Shashkevych, V. Radzykevych, *Istoria ukrainskoi literatury, Nova doba*, Detroit, Vol. II, 1956, pp. 44-56; the same *Istoria ukrainskoi literatury*, New York, 1964, pp. 59-65.

[20]Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-445; Radzykevych, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-86: on Shevchenko's life and poetic creations: P. Zaitsev, *Zhyttia Tarasa Shevchenka*, Paris-New York-Munich, 1955; T. Shevchenko, *Song out of Darkness, Selected Poems*, transl. by V. Rich, London, 1961.

[21]On Franko's poetry and other writings: Manning *op. cit.*, pp. 76-88: Radzykevych, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-120; P. Cundy, *Ivan Franko, The Poet of Western Ukraine, Selected Poems*, New York, 1948; I. Franko, *Moses and Other Poems*, transl. by V. Rich and P. Cundy, New York, 1973; I. Franko, *The Master's Jests*, transl. by R. Tatchyn, New York, 1979.

[22]The third literary giant: Lesia Ukrainka: Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-95; Radzykevych, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-129.

[23]Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky: Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-103; Radzykevych, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-134; also, Y. Fedorenko, *Stylevi shukannia Mykhaila Kotsiubynskoho*, Toronto-New York, 1975.

[24]Briefly on the Ukrainian literature at that time: D. Chyzhevsky, "Romanticism," and N. Hlobenko, "The Period of Realism" and "The Age of Modernism," all in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 1007-1042.

[25]Mirtschuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-202; V. Yaniv, *Narys ukrainskoi kultury*, New York, 1961, pp. 45-46.

[26]J. Mirtschuk, *Handbuch der Ukraine*, Leipzig, 1941, pp. 366-367.

[27]Yaniv, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[28]Mirtschuk, *Geschichte der Ukrainishen Kultur*, pp. 205-207, 214-216; Yaniv, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51, 58-60; D. Shcherbakivsky and F. Ernst, *Ukrainskyi portret 17-20 st.*, Kiev, 1925; D. Antonovych, "Ukrainske Malarstvo," *Ukrainska kultura*, Podjebrady, 1940.

[29]Mirtchuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-175; Yaniv, *op. cit.*, p. 72

[30]On Lysenko's musical creation: Yaniv, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73; Mirtschuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-178; M. Heilig, "Tvorchestvo N.V. Lysenka," *Sovietskaia muzyka,* Moscow, 1941, Nr. 3.

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[32]S. Tobilevych, *Koryfei ukrainskoho teatru,* Kiev, 1947; M. Kropyvnytsky, "K istorii ukrainskovo teatra," *Kievskaia Starina,* Kiev, 1905, Vol. V: O. Biletsky and J. Mamontov, *Ukrainskyi teatr,* Kharkiv, 1941; Mirtschuk, *op. cit.,* pp. 185-187; Yaniv, *op. cit.,* pp. 78-80.

[33]Some materials for the Ukrainian theater in the past; O. Lysiak and H. Luzhnytsky, eds., *Nash teatr,* collective work, New York-Paris-Sidney-Toronto, 1975, on various pages.

[34]The folk arts: D. Horniatkevych and O. Povstenko, "Wood carving," D. Horniatkevych, "Kylym-making"; V. Sichynsky, "Weaving," D. Horniatkevych and L. Nenadkevych, "Embroideries"; V. Sichynsky, "Ceramics," all essays in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia,* Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 383-417.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY UKRAINE

Ethnic Changes—Social Changes: The Upper Class of Courtiers—The Cossacks—Townspeople and the Development of the Middle Class—Peasants—Industrial Workers

ETHNIC CHANGES. With complete incorporation into the Russian Empire by 1781-1783, Ukraine became a borderland and a colony of Russia. In order to strengthen its rule there, the St. Petersburg Government continuously promoted an influx of Russian and other foreign ethnic elements to Ukraine. They were encouraged to come to settle there, and become the loyal pillars of the occupational regime amidst the "unreliable" Ukrainian (Little Russian or *khakhly**) masses. Among Ukrainians the memories of the autonomous Hetmanate and the Cossack Host, and the *Haidamak* uprisings, were very much alive. These foreign ethnic elements penetrated the Ukrainian upper class, the Ukrainian town, and, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian industrial proletariat. They constituted an ever-growing percentage of the population and were hostile toward the Ukrainian national cause. However, the foreign influx into the peasant class was quickly

*Derogatory Russian name for Ukrainians.

assimilated and became Ukrainian, while the peasants became the foundation of the upcoming national resurgence.

In the southern and eastern provinces of Ukraine in particular the population was still rather sparse, while the regions' economic potential was great. Hence, the Russian Government promoted the colonization processes there. H. Potiomkin, Catherine II's favorite, who had unlimited authority over Ukraine, greatly encouraged a settlement program in the southern and southeastern regions. As a governor-general of the land, he encouraged anybody who came there to settle permanently, even though he might be a runaway serf from the Polish or Russian-dominated areas, and thus legally the property of the landlord. People came, therefore, from Russia, Poland, the Balkan Peninsula, Bohemia, and Germany, Greece, and Armenia. They all were welcomed and were allowed to enjoy temporarily favorable terms of colonization. Potiomkin refused to return the runaway peasant serfs to their original owners in spite of the owners' violent protests. Supported by the Empress, he asserted that these refugees had been mistreated and that their living conditions had been unbearable in the original settlements they had come from. Thus he was not going to return them to their owners. It was a simple method to colonize empty areas which otherwise would have stayed economically barren.

Potiomkin and other men of authority sponsored a trilateral colonization program involving manorial, rural, and urban settlements. Manorial colonization consisted of large grants to grandees, gentry, and formerly high-ranking military and civilian officials. The grants ranged from 1,500 to 12,000 *desiatyns*, or from 4,000 to 32,500 acres of land, with the obligation to settle from 25 to 200 peasant homesteads. In some cases the settlement was a very difficult task. At times settlers were hard to get, but slowly progress was made. Rural colonization consisted of government-promoted peasant settlements where the settlers became so-called "fiscal peasants." Each homestead received 60 *desiatyns*, some 162 acres, of land to develop.

They had some obligation toward the state treasury but otherwise remained free. Urban colonization consisted of founding towns and cities, to which merchants and craftsmen were attracted and where guild organizations were encouraged. Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Russians, Germans, and other nationalities settled in new towns such as Nakhichevan, Mariupil, Kherson, Katerynoslav, and Odessa. These towns and cities soon became the centers of Russian administration, and grew very quickly. The influx of foreigners and Russian officials strengthened the alien ethnic element in urban areas, as opposed to the prevailingly Ukrainian ethnic stock of the countryside.[1]

Of course, the Cossacks contributed to the colonization process substantially. Some of them joined the upper social classes and participated in the manorial colonization, while many participated in the rural settlements and merged with the "fiscal peasants." The threat of Turkish war in 1787 contributed to a partial reconstruction of the old Cossack units. However, the officers were appointed by the Russian authorities and not elected according to Cossack tradition. In this way, the so-called Black Sea Military came into being. After the war, a part of the unit was settled in the steppes between the Dniester and Boh Rivers, while another part subsequently moved east of the Azov Sea to the sub-Caucasian Kuban region, the southern and northern banks of the Kuban River. The Cossacks brought their traditional organization of the *palanky* and *kureni* system, Cossack insignia, and the Ukrainian language, customs, and folklore. Their colonization added to Ukraine the vast Kuban area, extending the Ukrainian ethnic territory far to the southeast. Colonization also proceeded to the east.

Hence the colonization process added to Ukraine an enormous territory of hundreds of thousands of square miles, pushing the ethnic borders of the country to the banks of the Black Sea and Azov Sea, and east of the latter towards the Caucasian mountains, along the banks of the Kuban River,

and northeast to the left bank of the Don River. In the southeast, the Ukrainian colonization reached the Danube River. These vast territorial extensions were made by the Ukrainian peasant and Cossack plough in spite of harsh Russian administrative measures and ruthless Russianization policies.[2] The foreign colonists in the Ukrainian rural countryside—including Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, Poles, Germans, Czechs, and others—soon assimilated into the Ukrainian peasant class. Only a few remained alien. In the urban centers, however, the foreigners either retained their ethnicity longer or were Russianized, enlarging the Russian minority in Ukraine.

The Russian minority in Ukraine grew for several reasons. There was, first of all, a continuous and steady influx of Muscovite-Russian officials of the higher and lower ranks, clerks and assistants, nobles and capitalists, supporting the administrative machinery and the colonial economic interests of Russia in Ukraine, and living largely in the cities and large towns, the centers of the provincial government agencies. Also, Russian merchants and craftsmen largely concentrated in the urban regions. In the Right-bank towns, the Jewish population, mostly mercantile was considerable.[3] Then, with the emergence of the industrial working class in the last part of the nineteenth century, Russian workers moved into the Ukrainian manufacturing centers, primarily the Donets Basin, Kryvyi Rih, Kharkiv, and Kiev regions. (It is worthwhile to point out here that, the outbreak of revolutions in the Empire—in particular, the Bolshevik Revolution—was spearheaded by Russian workers and not by Ukrainians.) With the growth of the so-called middle class, the *intelihentsia* (the intelligentsia or educated social stratum) of professionals, university graduates, physicians, dentists, lawyers, engineers, professional managers of the middle and higher levels and government officials, the Russian ethnic influx increased, raising the Russian percentage of the population in Ukraine.

In West Ukraine, under the Austrian domination, the ethnic pattern developed a little differently. In Galicia, the gentry and landowners were primarily Polish; in Carpathian Ukraine, Hungarian; in Bukovyna, Romanian, while in all three areas the percentage of Germans increased slightly particularly in Bukovyna. In all of West Ukraine the peasant class was predominantly Ukrainian, with a very small percentage of foreigners—Poles, Czechs, Germans, and others. Here too the ethnic differentiation between the landowner and peasant further aggravated the unfavorable social plight of the peasant serf. The West-Ukrainian town contained a considerable percentage of foreigners—Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Germans, and Jews—who were merchants, craftsmen, members of the middle-class intelligentsia and industrial workers as well. There were, however, no Cossacks in West Ukraine.[4]

SOCIAL CHANGES; THE UPPER CLASS OF COURTIERS. Two forces influenced the social evolution in Ukraine during the nineteenth century: the overall social changes in Europe in general, due to the growth of education, sciences, and industrial progress; and Ukraine's being forced into the framework of the imperial social structure, which, of course, experienced great changes as well but which was also marked by extreme reactionism. The Russian Empire at the time of Nicholas I was a backward, feudal-serf society. It had changed into a Russian-styled, semi-capitalist society by the time of Nicholas II. At first, that society was marked by the complete dominance of the state-serving aristocracy, the *dvoriany* (the courtiers), which put all other classes at a disadvantage—the peasantry in particular. But the dominant position of the courtiers was weakened, while the terrible conditions of the peasants were improved after the abolition of serfdom in the Russian Empire in 1861. The peasant received personal freedom and partial land ownership. The middle class of the *intelihentsia* began to develop with the growth of industriali-

zation and professionalism. At the same time the development of modern industries produced the emergence of a new class of industrial workers, the industrial proletariat. The latter superseded the traditional trade craftsmen and artisans and the guild organizations. Although under reactionary Tsarism the social process in Ukraine continued to preserve sharper class distinctions than in the West for some time—favoring the nobility, the *dvoriany*, and discriminating against lower classes such as the peasants and industrial workers—yet a progressive trend toward more equality and personal freedom for all was under way as a delayed effect of the impact of Western liberal and socialist ideas. There is little doubt, however, that the comparatively backward social evolution in the Empire, among other factors—like the absolutist Tsarist rule and the superficiality and hypocrisy of the Russian Orthodox Church—induced the growth of radical ideologies and then the violent revolutionary reaction which enabled Ukraine to free herself politically from Russian domination and establish her own independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. It must be underscored here that the social conflicts in Ukraine, resulting from this steady evolution, were greatly increased by national antagonism among the classes. The nobility was predominantly foreign, while the peasantry and Cossacks were predominantly Ukrainian.

Even before complete incorporation, the class-oriented Russian system had gradually penetrated Ukraine. The former gentry of Polish and Ukrainian descent and the upper levels of Cossack society were slowly being transformed into the Russian *dvorianstvo* (the courtier level, the nobility), which in the Empire was totally at the service of the state and the Tsar. Catherine II granted *dvorianstvo* rights and privileges to these upper levels of Ukrainian society, but noble ancestry had, in most cases, to be proven on an individual family basis. Indeed, a great many members of the gentry and many Cossacks of rank feverishly attempted to prove their noble status, with the Department of Heraldry of the State Senate having

the final say. The members of gentry and the Cossacks of rank normally attained the desired status, while the majority of insignia Cossacks failed, and either remained insignia Cossacks or declined to the level of the peasantry. The very issue seemed to some outstanding contemporaries to be of great importance. People like A. Chepa, V. Poletyka, R. Markovych, T. Kalynsky, and some others considered the matter of Ukraine having a nobility a very serious one and helped others to search for their roots so they could acquire this status. Searching for noble ancestry, these people came in contact with historical source materials and discovered the wealth of the Ukrainian past. This too contributed to the resurgence of national awareness in Ukraine, which had been heavily suppressed by the Tsars.[5] The problem of proving noble ancestry was mostly centered in Left-bank Ukraine, where the upper level of the society was to a great extent of Ukrainian descent. Among them the Hetman-Cossack traditions were very much alive. A strong and politically oriented upper class could assure a proper national leadership. In Right-Bank Ukraine, the problem was of lesser importance, because the Cossack traditions there were much weaker, on the one hand, and because the Polish gentry had captured the initiative for a while, on the other. There were but a few Ukrainian families that might have acquired *dvorianstvo* status after the area was incorporated by Russia. For a while the Polish gentry exploited its dominant social position in Right-bank Ukraine, oppressing the Ukrainian serf population ruthlessly. But this did not last long. The Polish uprising of 1830-31, sympathized with and supported by the Polish gentry everywhere, largely reduced the Poles' social position. The landed properties of many nobles were confiscated and given to Russian courtiers. Of course, this did not help the Ukrainian lower classes at all, since the new owners brought with them their harsh Russian serfdom and soil bondage and an exceptionally favorable social position they achieved at the expense of other classes.

The courtiers, the *dvoriany*, were, as pointed out above, the servants of the state and bound to render military and civilian service to the Empire. Their noble position was largely regulated by the so-called *Table of Ranks*, which provided for fourteen noble ranks according to the nature of the respective services rendered from low to high. By the decree of 1845, the hereditary nobility was to be granted to individuals who reached the bureaucratic Rank Five. Nobilization of commoners was possible for special services to the Tsar and the state, or after having reached certain social positions. Impoverishment of an individual courtier and his family could lead to the loss of noble status.

The courtiers had full property rights and relative personal freedom—at times dependent upon the capricious whims of the Tsar and his favorites—and an elevated social status, and owned townships and villages and peasant-serfs living there. At first, the nobles and landowners had complete power over the serfs. They could marry them, divorce them, sell them, lose them in a game of cards, flog them, for whatever reason, imprison them, send them to Siberia, separate their families, inherit them, give them as presents, separate them from their tenant land, and put them to any kind of work. Subsequent developments somewhat limited that abusive authority.

The favored status of the nobles prevailed at the expense of other social classes, the peasants in particular, until the Emancipation Act of 1861. It partially freed the peasant population from the abuses of the *dvoriany* and landowners, and from that time on, under the impact of liberal ideas, the elevated position of the nobility slowly began to decline.[6]

In West Ukraine similar conditions prevailed, but for a shorter time. The peasants were freed by the Austrian Government in 1848, while the landowners were guaranteed certain compensation for having lost their previous prerogatives. Yet the dominant position of the Polish and Hungarian landowners persisted in the respective provinces.[7]

THE COSSACKS. At that time the Cossacks were a specifically Ukrainian social phenomenon which, however, spilled over to, and had its counterpart in, the Don region in the nineteenth century. The Cossacks were for a long time ranked between the nobility and the peasantry in Ukraine. As has been mentioned, their upper levels succeeded in merging with the *dvoriany*, though most Cossacks continued as a separate class until the Revolution of 1917. They constituted a free village population mostly agricultural, especially in the Chernihiv, Poltava, and southern regions—where their social position was maintained by law and tradition, as Polonska-Vasylenko has pointed out. Although the courtiers tried at times to revoke their class prerogatives and treat them like peasant-serfs, the Cossacks successfully resisted in most instances and preserved their status, owning the soil and being free from serfdom. But the Cossack class began gradually to diminish. Trying to escape their responsibilities to work on canal and fortress constructions, or trying to evade strict subordination to the *sotnyky* (the centurions)—the class chiefs of their para-military organization or because of their progressive impoverishment through the continuous division of their properties by inheritance, the Cossacks gradually deserted their class and often became free commoners doing work for rich landlords for pay compensation and under the landlords' protection. Some even became peasants. Yet in most cases the Cossacks jealously tried to defend their class identity, and even when living with the peasants in the same villages, they kept themselves separate from the latter. Intermarriages were very rare. As indicated, the Cossacks were personally free, owned and inherited land and other properties, could not be flogged, and were not under the authority of the courtiers but of their own class and the state. There were no Cossacks in the Western-Ukrainian regions.[8]

TOWNSPEOPLE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS. A traditional component of the old society—the townspeople, merchants, and craftsmen—also underwent a substantial evolution in the course of the nineteenth century. Large towns were progressively populated by incoming Russian merchants and craftsmen who soon, being supported by the government circles, dominated the more important commercial and handicraft activities. They established a majority in the so-called first and second guilds, while only third ones, the inferior ones, remained for the Ukrainians. It did not take long before some leading Russian mercantile families established themselves in Ukraine. Imported Russian merchandise progressively invaded the Ukrainian town, and subsequently, the countryside. The Ukrainian townspeople were soon forced out of the urban centers, where Russians and other foreigners prevailed, and moved to the suburbs.

The abolition of the guild system in the town organizations, which soon occurred in the Empire, allowed Ukrainians to practice various trades more freely. However, since the Middle Ages the guilds had been educating and training the young generations of craftsmen and artisans. After the abolition of the guilds, and before a workable system of trade schools had developed in Ukraine, certain crafts—in particular those which required some artistic abilities such as ceramics, the making of tapestries and carpet-making, suffered a brief decline.

Some southern towns, especially Odessa, acquired the character of true international commercial centers in the second half of the century. Numerous nationalities—Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Poles, Greeks, Germans, Armenians, French, Bulgarians, and many others—were involved in their businesses and handicraft trades. In other cities and towns Russians and Jews dominated the mercantile business, while Ukrainians were often craftsmen.

In 1832 a law was adopted in the Empire allowing the dignity of "honorary citizens" to be granted to the rich townspeople, who had begun to occupy a social position between the courtiers and the commoners. The honor could have been granted on a personal or family-hereditary basis. It certainly enhanced the prestige of the rich townspeople. Otherwise, they were exempt from military service, the poll tax, and corporal punishments. Subsequently, the honor began to be conferred, not only on merchants and other businessmen, but on outstanding citizens in general—university graduates, professionals, scholars, artists, and others. Although this particular law actually complicated the social structure of the Empire—as well as in Ukraine—it was an important link in the development of the *intelihentsia*, the educated and salaried workers as opposed to the industrial proletariat.

The old "blood nobility" could no longer carry on the burdensome responsibilities of leadership in government and social and intellectual life, and the new class of *intelihentsia* was gradually taking over. The membership of this class was recruited at first primarily from the townspeople, but subsequently from all social strata—the old nobility, the courtiers, the Cossacks, the clergy, and the peasantry—and its common denominator was education, in particular the university and gimmazium education. There were several universities and other institutions of higher education in Ukraine, yet many Ukrainians in ever-growing numbers were attending universities in Russia, Austria and other countries. These educated people were slowly taking over the administration and the judiciary, the provincial self-government, the social and professional organizations, and so on. This new class consisted therefore, of state and *zemstvo* officials, other bureaucrats on the national and provincial levels, university graduates, all kinds of professionals—physicians, dentists, lawyers, engineers, professors, and teachers—and other educated people who held respectable jobs and respectable social positions. With the growth of education, the sciences, and professional-

ism and industrialization in modern society, while the middle class was growing larger and larger and more and more influential, the blood aristocracy and landowners, mostly oriented toward agriculture, were progressively losing their dominant position in the society at large. The *intelihentsia* tended to live in a concentrated manner in towns and cities, fundamentally changing the character of the urban population. It no longer consisted mainly of merchants and craftsmen as in the Middle Ages. Subsequently the *intelihentsia* began to spread slowly over the countryside, capturing the social, political, and economic leadership there as well.

The social position of the middle class was scarcely regulated by law or tradition, but it was there and it was growing. Though its status was below that of the nobility in the reactionary and backward Russian Empire, it was certainly above that of the peasantry—though peasants were relatively free and even owned land at that time—and certainly above that of city people—merchants, small businessmen, craftsmen, and the new class of industrial workers, the industrial proletariat.[9]

The paramount importance of the *intelihentsia* developed for another specific reason. It was the standard-bearer of the new ideas—progressive, democratic, liberal, and national or radical, Marxian, Proudhonian and Fourierian. In Ukraine, the Russian and other non-Ukrainian members of the class were the bearers of democratic, liberal, and to a great extent radical ideologies. Those of Ukrainian nationality were the advocates of Ukrainian national ideas, of the country's intellectual revival, national self-assertion and political independence, under both the Russian and Austrian domination. While old Ukrainian nobility and gentry had largely deserted their faith and nation, the new *intelihentsia* in Ukraine mainly recruited from the peasantry and clergy through education, took over the national leadership in the nineteenth century and led the nation to its national independence at the time of the First World War.

PEASANTS. The social position of the peasants became worse and worse in the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth centuries with the progressive penetration of the class-oriented Russian social order into Ukraine. The Russian Government progressively introduced its own harsh style of serfdom and soil bondage to ever wider regions of Ukraine. During the colonization process, the peasant settlers were temporarily given freedom, but then serfdom and bondage were forcefully imposed upon them—at first in Left-bank, then in Right-bank, and ultimately in Southern Ukraine—as the Russian rule became more deeply entrenched.

At the end of the eighteenth century the Russian nobleman and manorial landlord had by law complete administrative and judicial authority over his serfs, although at that time his property rights over the peasants were still somewhat limited. Although all land was owned by the landlord and state, and the peasant was in effect a tenant farmer, the land could not be sold arbitrarily.

Mistreatment and poor conditions soon provoked mass flights of serfs to the southern and eastern borders of Ukraine, where full serfdom had not been introduced as yet. They also provoked many large and small peasant rebellions, ruthlessly quelled by the landlords aided by the government. For some time, the Tsarist regime had considered serfdom one of the pillars of its autocracy, and was more willing to strengthen serfdom's grip than to loosen it.[10] Hence, in the early nineteenth century serfdom became excessively oppressive. The landlord received full authority over the serf's personal life and death—the serf, in whom the state was not at all interested. As was explained when discussing the *dvoriany*, the serf could be sold, bought, lost in a game of cards, flogged and mistreated, married and separated from his family with land or without land, assigned any kind of work to do, deported to Siberia, killed intentionally or by negligence, or given to the army for a service of up to twenty-five years. The landlord was

not responsible for his treatment of a serf to anybody. Any complaints about a landlord's behavior with his serfs were punishable. The whole personal life of a serf was totally subject to the caprices of the landlord.

The Government, and even Nicholas I, recognized to some degree that serfs were not being treated properly. Several committees on the central and provincial levels were appointed to study the problem, but nothing really worthwhile came out of their work. A decree was issued defining the rights of so-called "obliged peasants,"—who were supposed to do a specific amount of work and pay a tax of *obrok*, and who could not be sold individually—but it was not much of an improvement. Many landlords in any case ignored the decree.[11]

Of course, the landlord could assign any work to the serf and could take the serf's children to perform any services in the castle or palace or for training or education as lackeys, house servants, artists, or the like. Many serfs hated these functions because they took them away from the soil and made them materially and personally completely dependent. Working on farm soil at least gave them an illusion of some independence.

With the emergence and growth of manufacturing in the second half of the nineteenth century, some manorial industries began to arise. The serfs were soon employed in unsafe and poorly equipped industrial establishments. After abolition of serfdom, poor and landless peasants often became manorial or urban industrial workers.

At the beginning of the century the work obligations of the peasant-serfs were by no means uniform and varied from one section of Ukraine to another. They were about three to four days a week in the Left-Bank, up to six in the Right-bank, and two in the southern provinces. The service obligations included field or shop work, forest work, and road and bridge work, plus deliveries of hens, geese, calves, sheep, and so on, on various occasions such as harvests and on Christmas, Easter, and

other holy days. Subsequently, some of these obligations were replaced by a tax of *obrok*, which certainly eased the lot of the serfs.

Since the reform of Nicholas I, as V already mentioned, did not bring any real relief to the peasants, in Ukraine Governor General D. Bibikov tried to some extent to help the peasants by reducing landlords' abuses. With the so-called *Inventory Rules* he was able to bring about some standardization of the serf's obligations. The *Rules* provided for the peasants' permanent use of land, three days' work obligation a week for men and one day for women, no work on holy days, no capricious transfer of peasants without land from one place to another, and a general limitation of abuses. Polish landlords in particular objected to the *Rules* however, and they finally succeeded under the Bibikov's successor, Vasilchikov, in nullifying the reforms.

One of the harshest peasant burdens was the compulsory military service. The landlord could capriciously send any of his serfs for twenty-five years of military duty. The conditions were bad and the serf normally returned as an invalid. If a given serf family had only one son, losing that son to the army could ruin its existence, since there then was no young man to do all the chores and provide for the family's subsistence.

The adverse living conditions of the serfs induced them at first to run away to those regions of southern and southeastern Ukraine where serfdom had not yet been fully introduced. When there was no opportunity to run away, peasants staged numerous uprisings driven by despair and hoping against hope to free themselves. The uprisings, which were rather frequent in the 1820s and 1830s, were ruthlessly suppressed and the peasants harshly punished by the authorities. Of course, the insurgent leaders suffered most; they were either executed or sent to Siberia for life. One of them, Ustym Kormeluk, was an educated man, and he ably organized peasant resistance against the nobles. He was captured a few times, and even deported to Siberia, but he always skillfully escaped

and returned to help the peasants. During his lifetime he became a mythical hero for the peasants.

The revocation of Bibikov's *Inventory Rules* by his short-sighted successor, Vasilchikov, gave rise to another wave of uprisings. Especially famous was the so-called "Kievan Cossackdom" of 1855, resulting from a double-faced Russian policy which had misled the peasants. It was, of course, cruelly crushed by the Tsarist regime.[12]

The loss of the Crimean War by Russia proved beyond any doubt the fundamental weakness of the Empire, and serfdom was seen as one of its major ills. The emancipation of peasant-serfs was then considered as a way to improve conditions in Russia. Again, many commissions on the national and provincial levels were created to study the matter and to propose solutions. Conflicts between the conservatives and liberals caused many rumors, and the rumors incited unhappiness and turmoil among the peasants. Finally, in 1861, the Emancipation Act was proclaimed, without, however, solving the issue satisfactorily. A two-year period was allowed to grant the peasants full personal freedom and a twenty-year period to accomplish a transfer of land ownership from the landlords to the freed peasants. Financing the transfer of land and compensating the landowners was not provided for intelligently in the Act and the process had to be revised subsequently. The peasant land allotments varied according to the quality of soil, which put the Ukrainian peasants at a disadvantage. They received less land than they could efficently use. They received less acreage to plant than they had been getting for permanent use as tenants under Bibikov's *Inventory Rules*. Thus, the peasants were unhappy, and their hunger for land was only sharpened. In addition, so-called "temporary obligations" were introduced supposedly to moderate hardships of landowners who had suddenly lost free labor.

The *obshchina*, referred to in Ukraine as the *podvirne*, was another factor which limited the effectiveness of the Emanci-

pation. It was a form of communal property system for the peasants, going back in tradition to the old Russian *mir*. The village commune owned the land, soil, forest, and meadows, and it allotted certain fields to individual families for farming and tilling. An individual farmer was not allowed either to sell or to buy land. This limitation on property and disposition rights definitely contributed to discontent and loss of production. The *obshchina* was particularly hated in Ukraine, where individualism was traditional and any communal approach alien to the Ukrainian psyche. The concept of *mir* had been unknown in the past in Ukraine.

As mentioned, the payments for the land—which was actually purchased from the previous landowners, as foreseen by the Emancipation Act—were originally too high. In addition, the banks handling the financing procedure managed matters clumsily. Hence, the payments had to be scaled down later on. The "temporary obligations" and joint responsibility of the peasants for tax payments were reduced in 1881. The social conflict continued, however, since nobody was happy. The liberals wanted to make peasants completely free and independent; the conservatives desired to retain some limitations in order to preserve the class barriers and differentiation; while the peasants wanted to get more land.

Then, under the impact of the revolutionary upheaval, in 1909 Prime Minister P. Stolypin sponsored an Agricultural Reform, which was mentioned in the first chapter of this volume. Stolypin intended to create a rich and strong peasant class, resistant to the revolutionary slogans of the Marxists and other radicals. The reform abolished the *obshchina* and gave the peasants individual property rights on the land. Only forests and meadows remained collectively owned by the village community. The Reform was most successful in Ukraine; the largest percentage of peasants of anywhere in the Empire assumed private land ownership there. Individual peasant soil ownership became a fact of life in Ukraine, after the class had suffered deprivation and discrimination for cen-

turies. It was quite an achievement on the very eve of the Empire's disintegration in 1917. For the peasantry there had been a long social progress from complete serfdom and soil bondage at the beginning of the nineteenth century to complete freedom of person and property at the beginning of the twentieth century. Still, the reactionary Tsardom was doomed to fail on all accounts, since it was outdated and could not withstand the powerful impact of Western liberalism, especially in the field of social progress.[13]

The social position of the Ukrainian peasant in the western provinces under Austrian authority was theoretically better than in the eastern ones. Under reforms introduced by Maria-Theresa and Joseph II serfdom was abolished. The so-called *panshchyna*, the *corvee* or service obligations without pay, was established. Land was divided into the dominial or estate lands and the rustic or peasant ones. Still, the now-Ukrainian estate owners abused the system. The Polish and Hungarian landowners, Roman Catholics, mistreated and exploited the peasantry, not only for being Ukrainian, but for being Uniat or Orthodox. In many instances the plight of the Ukrainian peasant in Galicia, for instance, was no better than under the oppressive Russian serfdom and bondage. Ivan Franko very convincingly and dramatically depicted the *panshchyna* before the Emancipation Act of 1848 in his poem *Master's Jests*. The horrors of peasant living conditions in the East were depicted by Taras Shevchenko in his many outstanding poetic creations.[14] The liberation of peasants from the *panshchyna* in the Western Ukrainian provinces came more than a decade earlier than the Emancipation Act in the Russian Empire.

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS. In the second half, or rather in the last thirty years, of the nineteenth century, industrial development on a modern scale emerged in Ukraine. Coal, metallurgy and textile industries led the way. Of course, this

led to the growth of the industrial labor force, at times referred to as the industrial proletariat. A new urban class of people thus superseded the traditional craftsmen in the towns and cities. The first cadres of industrial workers were recruited from the landless and pauperized peasants. They moved to the towns and cities expecting to be able to earn a living more successfully there than in the countryside. The industrial growth of Ukraine also attracted more Russians to Ukrainian towns and cities—Russian capitalists, educated people, and industrial workers—strengthening the foreign ethnic element in Ukraine. At first, the industrial worker was definitely considered as belonging to the lowest class in society, especially when the peasants improved their lot after the Emancipation and became partially an owning class. The industrial worker owned nothing but his hands for hire. In fact, in the beginning he did not receive any benefits from industrial development. He was paid miserably and he lived poorly. Furthermore, the early industrial growth in Ukraine was largely financed by Russian and other foreign capital, which did not result in much compassion for the Ukrainian worker.

The first generation of industrial workers consisted largely of peasants and to some extent poor craftsmen and artisans. Later on a kind of hereditary proletariat developed—from father to son, as Pokrovsky has asserted. Working and living conditions were substandard: few workers could afford living quarters, many were sleeping in the workshops. Low wages, long working hours, high prices, no precision in the terms of employment, and no safety on the industrial premises put the worker at a great disadvantage. Initially, the state had no interest at all in the industrial proletariat. Unions were either forbidden or discriminated against. By the end of the century adverse conditions had provoked many strikes, instigated by radicals. Strikes were criminal offenses and were harshly repressed by the use of police and military forces.[15]

The wage rates were very low. At the end of the nineteenth

century the average wage was about 187 rubles a year, scarcely providing for minimum subsistence. Wages were rising slowly, but too slowly to be adequate. By 1913 the average wage for industrial employment was about 300 rubles. Though the material position of the worker was slightly improved, it was still below Western standards. No wonder that the proletariat was susceptible to the slogans of the Marxists and other radicals. It must be pointed out here again, however, that during the revolutions of 1917 Russian and other foreign workers were the standard-bearers of Communism, not the Ukrainian workers even though at the time Ukrainians constituted a very substantial percentage of the work force.[16]

The 1880s finally produced some social legislation to aid the workers. Night work by children and women was outlawed; sick benefits, financed by the employer and employee contributions, and accident insurance were introduced. In 1906, labor unions and employer organizations were authorized and the machinery for labor-management arbitration and inquiries into wage rates provided. Yet, each union was supposed to have a separate charter and any union amalgamations and federations were prohibited. Furthermore, the government administration, in spite of legislation, was definitely anti-union. Stolypin and his successors practically eliminated the union movement. Factory inspectors were introduced to watch over industrial fairness and safety, but for a long time they were simply ignored by the employers. In 1897, the work day was shortened to eleven and a half hours.

Such was the plight of the industrial worker in Ukraine because of the reactionary attitude of the Russian Tsarist regime on the eve of the First World War and the revolutionary upheavals. The war and the upheavals enabled Ukraine to overthrow Russian domination and to proclaim her political independence and sovereignty. Still, at that time the industrial worker in the West received more concessions and benefits.[17]

Notes

[1]N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoria Ukrainy*, Munich, 1976, Vol. II, p. 299; I. Hurzhii, *Rozvytok tovarnoho vyrobnytstva i torhivli na Ukraini*, Kiev, 1962, pp. 91 and 97.

[2]Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 271-277; the same, "Pivdenna Ukraina 1787 roku," *Zapysky*, Istr.-Fil. Viddil Ukrainskoi Adademii Nauk, Kiev, 1930, Nr. XXIV, pp. 335-359 and others; the same, "Pivdenna Ukraina pisla zruinuvannia Sichi," *Naukovi Zapysky*, Ukrainskyi Vilnyi Universtet, Munich, 1963, Nr. 7; V. Dubrovsky, "Selanski vtechi na Livoberezhnii Ukraini," *Chernihiv ta pivnichne Livoberezhzhia*, Kiev, 1928; D. Doroshenko, *Narys istorii Ukrainy*, Munich, 1966, Vol. II, pp. 240-245.

[3]In the Russian Empire a strong anti-Semitic policy of the official circles prevailed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Jewish population was allowed to live only in the western borderlands, including Ukraine, and was barred from taking permanent residence east of a specific demarcation line, with only a few exceptions allowed. Then, in the early twentieth century, the Jews were blamed for the Empire's troubles and revolutionary turmoil and the so-called *pogroms*, assaults, were staged, supported by official agencies.

[4]Western Ukraine: Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoria*, Vol. II, pp. 329, 346, and others; I. Vytanovych, "The Western Ukrainian Lands under Austria and Hungary, 1772-1918," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 697-707; I. Kholmsky, *Istoria Ukrainy*, New York, 1971, pp. 351-352.

[5]Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 269.

[6]The *dvoriany*; *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269, 299; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 268-270; L. Okinshevych, *Znachne viiskove tovarsytvo v Ukraini-Hetmanshchyni, XVII-XVIII st.*, Munich, 1948, pp. 167-168 and others; Kholmsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-311.

[7]Vytanovych, *loc. cit.* I. Rudnytsky, "Bukovyna and Carpatho-Ukraine," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 707-714.

[8]N. Polonska-Vasylenko, "Ukrainske kozatsvo," *Ukrainska diisnist*, Berlin, 1944, Nr. 34; the same, *Istoria*, Vol. II, pp. 270-271; Doroshenko *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 242-245.

[9]Kholmsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-313; M. Florinsky, Russia, *A History and an Interpretation*, New York, 1953, Vol. II, pp. 786 and others; M. Pokrovsky, *Brief History of Russia*, London, 1933, Vol. I, pp. 143-44.

[10]Florinsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 777; "Count Uvarov, the ablest ideologist of the regime, expressed the views of the conservative elements when he held that 'serfdom is closely tied up with autocracy and even with the preserva-

tion of imperial unity (*yedinoderzhavie*)': they are two parallel forces which have grown together."

[11]Florinsky, *ibid.*, on the *Obrok*, Vol. II, pp. 885-886, 926, and others; Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 269-270, 299-303; Kholmsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-308; on the peasantry in general: K. Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia, A History of the Economic Relations between Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1917*, Milwaukee, 1958, pp. 7-21 and 33-36; Pokrovsky, *op cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 118-137; Florinsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 777-785, 882-896, and 1211-1226.

[12]Bibikov's intended reform: Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 302; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 285-286.

[13]Stolypin's reform: M. Velychkivsky, *Stolypinska zemelna reforma*, London, 1964; V. Doroshenko, *Ukrainstvo v Rosii*, Vienna, 1917, pp. 70-71 and 97-99; Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-48; also, P. Lyashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia*, New York, 1949, pp. 745-749.

[14]I. Franko, *Master's Jests*, trans. R. Tatchyn, New York, 1979; T. Shevchenko, *Song out of Darkness*, trans. V. Rich, London, 1961; in particular, N. Chirovsky, "Kartyna sotsialno-ekonomichnoho polozhennia Ukrainy v poeziakh Tarasa Shevchenka," *Taras Shevchenko, Zbirnyk dopovidei Svitovoho Kongresu Ukrainskoi Vilnoi Nauky dla vshanuvannia storichchia smerty Patrona NTSH*, New York-Paris-Toronto, 1962, pp. 110-120. Peasantry in West Ukraine: I. Vytanovych, "Agriculture in Western Ukraine before 1914," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971. Vol. II, pp. 848-849.

[15]Pokrovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 209-227.

[16]"The failure of the attempt to provoke a general Communist insurrection in Ukraine proved to the leadership of the Russian Communist Party, fully and convincingly, that it could not expect or count on the Ukrainian peasants or workers to follow the Communist revolutionary slogan." M. Stachiw, P. Stercho, and N. Chirovsky, *Ukraine and the European Turmoil, 1917-1919*, New York, 1973, Vol. II, p. 83.

[17]Industrial workers: Florinsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, 1227-1230; Pokrovsky *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 200-233.

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Ukraine as a Colony of the Russian Empire—Extractive Industries—Agriculture—Mining and Manufacturing—Heavy and Light Industries—Food and the Processing of Agricultural Materials—Domestic Trade—Foreign Trade—Transportation and Communication—Finance

UKRAINE AS A COLONY OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE. The national economy of Muscovy of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries was predominantly a natural and rather poor one. Agriculture was very backward, the soil was largely cultivated by serfs, and the fertility of land was very low. The use of animal manure was not widespread. Only horses and oxen were raised, on a limited scale. The handicrafts were highly primitive as compared with the West. The very weak economic position of the crafts in Muscovy at that time is best shown by the fact that no guild system existed to advance the efficiency of industrial production. Great territorial distances and an almost complete lack of roads hampered domestic trade, and there was no international trade worth mentioning. Survival largely depended on a self-sufficient clan economy. No wonder, therefore, that under such conditions the Muscovite national economy remained at a subsistence level for so long. This was the time, however, of territorial expansion and imperialism.

Thus Muscovy could not continue for long with only a subsistence economy as its material basis.

At the same time, the Ukrainian economy was quite efficient. Its agriculture produced great surpluses, evident by its large exports of wheat; the crafts were effectively developed and largely organized in guilds. The predominantly forest economy of Muscovy could be efficiently supplemented by the steppe farming economy of Ukraine, and with that in mind among other considerations, the Muscovites planned their long-term policies toward Ukraine. In order to supplement its primitive economy, in the seventeenth century Muscovy penetrated various borderlands politically, but simply seizing those areas by force was not enough. So the Muscovite government tried to encourage agricultural colonization by half-military and half-economic ventures. The method was applied in the Don River regions and the borderlands of Asia.

Ukraine, being at one time a source of wealth for Poland, had developed an efficient agriculture with the features of a predominantly steppe economy, having been successful in the colonization of the Black Sea steppes. It therefore seemed that she would eventually be a valuable acquisition for the emerging Empire. From the Muscovite-Russian point of view, Ukraine fitted only too well into the framework of the young imperial economy, the more so because the low level of productivity and the economic backwardness of Muscovy had already generated the idea of the "all-Russian market," to include all new borderlands and territorial acquisitions in order to increase productivity. Since it seemed to promise self-sufficiency, the "all-Russian market" was championed by the serf-holding landlords and emerging mercantile classes in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They believed that their economic backwardness would thus be overcome by means of territorial expansion and inter-regional exchange. As a result, various annexations were made to build a strong economic basis for national growth and political imperialism. It was partially a conscious and perhaps

partially subconscious or instinctive drive. The Russian political spirit had been imperialistic for centuries. The Pereyaslav Treaty, the gradual violation of its economic and financial terms in particular, the gradual reduction of Ukrainian autonomy, and the final incorporation of Ukraine into the Empire were some of the many steps in building the expanded Russian economy of the future.[1]

It was not by all means incidental that the economic and financial terms of the Treaty were among the first to be violated by the Tsarist Government. This was discussed at lengths at the end of the previous volume of this work. As mentioned, among the original clauses of the agreement, later forged by Moscow, was one on the financial autonomy of Ukraine. It affirmed the right of the Hetman Government to collect taxes and to arrange financial matters as in a sovereign state. Muscovy was only to receive an annual levy. Otherwise it was to keep out of the financial affairs of Ukraine. Of course, the Muscovites were reluctant to accept that particular provision, but they did not push too hard during the negotiations. Yet, after the Muscovite *voyevody* and officials arrived in Ukraine, they immediately began to violate Ukraine's financial sovereignty. They started to levy and collect their own taxes and to interfere also in the other economic matters of Ukraine. For example, they made land grants, something that was entirely outside of their authority. However, these tactics were in perfect accord with the original mental reservations of the Muscovites. At the time of the negotiations they were already planning to make Ukraine a part of their "all-Russian market" and to use it for food and raw materials.

When Peter I started to develop his huge military machine, he at once placed Ukraine in the position of a thoroughly exploited colony. In Muscovy, a Baltic commercial fleet was started; large workshops such as shipyards, metallurgic establishments, mines, and clothing factories were promoted by joint, private, and government initiatives, frequently employing 1,000 to 1,500 people. An attempt was made to

develop a system of internal waterways. Ukraine's agricultural character was retained to provide raw materials for the Russian market and Peter's war efforts. Appropriate legislative and administrative measures were accordingly adopted by Moscow's Government. No serious attempts were made by Russian authorities to sponsor any mining, metallurgic, textile, or garment industries in Ukraine, although the objective conditions existed to develop them there. Of course, there were small workshops in the north-eastern regions of Ukraine, but their size and volume of production rarely matched those of Russia. Many more plants were established at that time under Polish rule in Right-bank Ukraine. Neither was much attention paid by Moscow to the commercial fleet in the Black Sea, in order not to create competition for the Baltic ports. From the political point of view however, in light of the traditional Muscovite-Russian ambitions of some day conquering Constantinople, this would seem rather inconsistent if not illogical. It is noteworthy to mention that Ukrainian commercial navigation on the Black Sea was allowed by the Ukrainian-Turkish agreements of 1649-1653. However, the bulk of Ukrainian exports at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries were directed through northern Russian ports, even with the higher costs of overland shipping.[2]

Lyashchenko, the official historian of the national economy of Russia and the Soviet Union—paraphrasing Lenin, who in his works frequently talked about Tsarist exploitation of the non-Russian nationalities of the Empire—stated clearly that Ukraine was, during the first half of the nineteenth century, still in the status of a colony. "In the economic sense the national borderlands of Russia served...the home provinces in the capacity of colonies or semi-colonies."[3] In fact, that statement about the colonial exploitation of Ukraine should be extended to the whole nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries as well to reflect conditions properly. Balzak described the situation in a very picturesque way. He said, "The policies of Tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie were

directed toward retarding the development of industry in the Russian colonies, in Turkistan, the Caucasus, Siberia, Kazakhstan, and so on, toward keeping these areas in the role of appendages, sources of agrarian raw material for the central industrial region, and toward holding back their independent development. The natural resources and the principal productive strength, the large population of the borderlands, were depleted ruthlessly. Industrial development in the colonies of Tsarist Russia was permitted only to the extent that it corresponded with the interests of the mother country."[4] Hence, the trend that began immediately after the Pereyaslav Treaty was continued by the Russian Imperial Government until the revolution of 1917.

As a later reflection of the mercantilist policies during the first half of the nineteenth century, a textile industry was developed in Russia proper around Tver, Yaroslavl, Moscow, Vladimir, and other cities; cotton processing was established around Ivanovo, Voznesensk, Vladimir, and Moscow; and metallurgical industries were launched. At the same time, little attention was paid to Ukraine and to her regions of rich minerals which could realistically provide for a rather effective industrial growth. In Right-Bank Ukraine, where some manufacturing emerged under the Polish rule in the eighteenth century, a Russian-sponsored industrial decline followed. Subsequently no industries to speak of were permitted to exist there for decades. Ukraine was to be kept an agricultural colony, production of grain was fostered, and the newly instituted raising of sugar beets was encouraged. Peasant serfdom, as mentioned, was stabilized to increase the profitability of large-scale land holdings with cheap Ukrainian peasant work. The system was subsequently extended over the vast territories of steppes in Ukraine. The new landlords were largely Russians and foreigners, which strengthened Russian domination in that non-Russian land. When in 1861 the peasant emancipation was carried out, the size of the land allotments was arranged in such a way as to put at a disadvantage

the black-soil regions, including Ukraine. Practically, it meant that the Ukrainian peasants were to have lower productivity because of smaller soil acreage so they would not become economically too strong and too independent.[5] The Black Sea ports and mercantile fleet were kept inadequate for Ukraine's heavy grain exports. Non-agricultural exports and imports were still largely directed through the Baltic and even Far Eastern ports, though this was scarcely expedient because of the high costs of overland shipping.

The second half of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries were marked by the further development of the "all-Russian market." By this time it had acquired a "Eurasian" perspective. Imperial economic life centered on interprovincial exchange and commerce to keep foreign trade at a minimum especially imperial imports, and to maintain relative self-sufficiency. The following statistical table indicates clearly the tendency of Russian economic policy to be protectionist and to discourage foreign trade.

Foreign Trade
(In Millions of Dollars)

Country	*1912*	*1913*
Russia	$1,384	$1,490
Belgium, with Luxembourg	1,652	1,595
Germany	5,064	5,370
England	5,995	6,297

Even small Belgium, together with Luxembourg, maintained a larger amount of foreign trade than the Russian Empire, and the two other nations in the table exceeded the Empire by three to four times prior to World War I.[6]

All this was reflected in the Ukrainian economic plight within the Russian market; however, Ukraine's colonial status acquired different characteristics later on. Kononenko,

following the findings of other economists such as Slabchenko and Volubuiev, has rather lengthily discussed this in his work *Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations*. He says that in the later part of the century the colonial status of Ukraine changed. It moved away from its agricultural economy and from a West-European pattern of colonial exploitation. Later, Ukraine ceased to be an industrially and culturally primitive land—an annex to the motherland from which she derived raw materials to supply her industrial output. In the last part of the nineteenth century Ukraine experienced her "stormy industrial development," including mining, the heavy-machine industry, and textile and clothing manufacturing, in such areas as the Donets Basin, the Kryvyi Rih region, and the Kharkiv industrial district. Of course certain branches of light and heavy industry were held back in their development, so that the motherland would continue to hold the upper hand in competition. Ukraine was still a colony for the benefit of the motherland, and her exploitation was still going on through various channels. Russian and foreign capital investments dominated her industrial growth and were frequently undertaken in a discriminatory way to force her economy in a specific direction. There was a heavy outflow of industrial earnings from Ukraine in the form of dividends and interest, channeled to Russia or other foreign countries and their capitalistic investors instead of being reinvested to further Ukraine's economic growth. Those earnings, taken away from Ukraine, were to a great extent the result of large-scale exploitation of Ukrainian working men with very low wages, prolonged working hours, and substandard working conditions. Taken together, this exploitation was greatly responsbile for the investors' financial gains. Furthermore, in order to retard the development of Ukraine's own capital and enterprise, the Russian authorities opposed the growth of the Ukrainian cooperative movement, which was not in the interest of the Russian and foreign capitalists. Nor was a capitalistically strong Ukraine politi-

cally desirable for St. Petersburg.[7] A different form of exploitation was applied by Russia then.

In some other respects, Ukraine was still a source of food and raw materials for the vast imperial markets. She was often forced against her real interest to accept three-forths of her imports from the Empire. At times these imports were manufactured from Ukraine's own raw materials outside Ukraine. Ukrainian exports, mainly of agricultural products, continued to be frequently directed through the Baltic ports, despite the nearness of the Black and Azov Sea ports. Ukrainian ports were often neglected and the Ukrainian commercial fleet was kept small and largely confined to coastal trading.[8] The discriminatory policy of the Russian authorities toward Ukrainian economic interests can be illustrated by the following. In order to stimulate the development of the Russian markets, special railroad rates were adopted, such as the "Cheliabinsk break," to favor the long distance shipments of produce and merchandise between Great Russia and her colonies. Ukraine, being relatively close to the central Russian market, including the Black Sea regions, did not profit from these reduced rates at all.

Russian gains from the domination of Ukraine were otherwise enormous; the Ukrainian economy contributed some 20 percent of the imperial gross national product, while only about 5 percent was returned to Ukraine for her domestic purpose and needs. It was only due to the heavy Ukrainian grain exports that Russia could maintain a favorable balance of trade by offsetting her imports prior to World War I. The Ukrainian wheat exports, for instance, amounted to 80 percent of the total wheat exports of the Russian imperial economy. The large and growing production of sugar beets in Ukraine, their refining, the consumption of the sugar in Russia, and substantial sugar exports constituted a considerable part of the all-Russian market. The incorporation of the Ukrainian economy in the Russian tax system greatly contributed to Russian internal revenue collections, which were

largely used for the development of other imperial regions. Eventually they subsidized the establishment of rival factories in Russia proper to compete successfully with the emerging young capitalistic enterprises of Ukraine.

Any struggle for the economic emancipation of Ukraine during the Tsarist times was hopeless, because Ukraine was divided into several administrative units. But this fight flared up during the 1920s, undertaken by the Ukrainian Communists in the framework of the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic when they demanded her economic independence from Russia to end exploitation by any foreign interests.

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, AGRICULTURE. The extractive industries, such as hunting, fishing, apiculture, agriculture, forestry, cattle-raising, and farming, continued to develop in Ukraine, although their individual importance in the national economy underwent a substantial change.

Hunting gradually lost its significance as a source of food, skins, and fur, being supplemented by the growth of cattle-raising and farming. Hunting grounds were dwindling, and hunting itself became economically secondary. It remained largely as a sport and recreation for the courtiers and the peasants. Fewer and fewer people attempted to make a living by hunting. Hunting techniques changed as well. The traditional use of nets, trained birds, and digging holes declined, although hounds were still used for hunting. Firearms, rifles, and shotguns, largely took over. The resources of wild game dwindled also. Big-game, bears, wild boars, and buffaloes were largely gone, and hunting was limited to game-wolves, foxes, deer, and birds—wild geese, ducks, blackcocks, and some others. Some hunting grounds, especially forests, remained the communal property of village peasants longer than their fields did. The nobility hunted for pleasure on its own grounds.

Fishing, of course, still remained an important industry. The food supply for village, town, and manor came from the plentiful fish in many rivers and lakes. In addition, manorial and monastery landlords maintained artificial ponds where fish were raised to fill the local demand and sometimes for export. Some fish processing was going on, but the industry had declined after the eighteenth century.

Cattle-raising was still an important branch of the economy. Until the second quarter of the nineteenth century it equalled agriculture in importance in some parts of Ukraine. In particular, in the southern steppe regions, where labor was short, cattle-breeding was a rather profitable occupation. Cows, oxen, horses, sheep, goats, and hogs were also widely bred throughout Ukraine, in some parts of the country more than in others. In 1799, in southern Ukraine there were 169 horse- and 269 cattle-breeding establishments; in 1830, in the Katerynoslav region alone, there were 287 horse- and 311 cattle-breeding stations. The size and extent of the industry can be well-illustrated by the following: in 1840, 11,000 horses were sold in the Kievan district alone; in the 1820s and 1830s about 20,000 head of cattle from Ukraine were sold in St. Petersburg annually; and in the 1840s, 160,000 head in St. Petersburg and Moscow together. Subsequently with the expansion of grain production, cattle-raising began to decline.

As long as the fallow system prevailed in farming, there was enough animal food available and a large number of cattle and other animals were raised, especially in the steppe regions. However, with the progressive introduction of the three-field system in these areas, the overall balance was upset; the supply of animal food automatically declined and fewer animals were raised and kept by manors and peasant farms as well. It also had another negative consequence. It made tilling of soil difficult, because there were not enough draft animals to do the work. There was also a shortage of manure to fertilize the land, and agricultural progress was slowed down. The introduction of the crop-rotation system

improved the situation to some extent at first but soon Left-Bank Ukraine in particular was hard hit.

Sheep-raising grew in importance throughout the eighteenth century and the first part of the nineteenth. In 1854, there were almost 10 million sheep bred in Ukraine for wool, woolen materials, and skins. In 1866, however, the number declined to about seven million head. Under the pressure of expanded tilling for grain, in particular in the steppe regions, and declining demand for wool abroad, the sheep-breeding industry gradually diminished. Wool exportation amounted by 1831 to some 1.4 million tons, then increased to 10 million tons in the 1860s, and subsequently decreased sharply. In 1910, there were only 1.2 million sheep in Ukraine. Yet raising other animals increased during the period.

The raising of cattle and horses grew substantially up to the beginning of World War I. On the eve of World War I, there were in Ukraine some 13.5 million heads of cattle. The raising of oxen, which were traditionally used as draft animals, declined, being replaced by a sharp increase of horses bred for that purpose. In 1912, the number of horses reached some 7 million, much too large a number for economic needs. The slow introduction of agricultural machinery gradually brought about a decrease in the number of horses, a development clearly logical from the economic point of view, according to Dyminsky.[9] Raising hogs began to increase in the later part of the nineteenth century, especially in the northwest and the Kuban region. On the eve of World War I there were about 7.1 million hogs in Ukraine.

Initially, inferior breeds of cattle, horses, and sheep were raised in Ukraine. Then the *zemstvo* self-government made an attempt to improve the situation, and by education and promotion tried to introduce better breeds of cows, in particular. The average milk production was then rather low, some 600 to 1,000 quarts per cow annually.[10] Hay, straw, oats, clover, barley, and some other plants were used as animal fodder, while the by-products of the growing sugar-refining

industry—which could have been used for that purpose—were largely exported. Overall, there was a shortage of fodder in most parts of Ukraine (because of certain problems in the farm industry to be discussed later on), except in the Carpathian, Sub-Caucasian, and Polissia regions. That, plus a relative economic backwardness, for the most part accounted for the inadequate amount of cattle-raising in Ukraine—less than could be expected from such an important agricultural country, as Dyminsky has pointed out.

Poultry-farming in Ukraine was neither intensive nor significantly progressive during the nineteenth century. Hens, ducks, and geese were among the most popular birds raised, while turkeys were rarely bred. Yet some poultry and large quantities of eggs were exported, most certainly at the expense of domestic food needs. Apiculture, the breeding of bees for wax and honey, a traditional Ukrainian occupation, continued on a rather large scale on the manors, and peasant farms and in the forests. Some manorial economies maintained thousands of beehives. In 1827, in the Poltaya region alone landowners sold 1.3 million *pudy*, or 12.9 thousand pounds, of wax, and approximately 7 thousand *pudy*, or 131 thousand pounds, of honey. Other regions of the country were doing even better in this respect, and the figures clearly illustrate the extent of the industry. However, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the landlord and peasant were preoccupied more by other business propositions and paid less attention to apiculture. Its economic significance understandably declined.

Agricultural pursuits, concentrated on the production of all kinds of grains and staples, were the most important branches of extractive industries at that time. A considerable progress in technology and management, improved or better qualities in the assortment of crops, and a very impressive increase in the acreage under cultivation were achieved during the nineteenth century. Very early, Ukraine began to be referred to as "the granary of Europe." In 1830 some 8,300 tons, in 1840

some 13,800 tons, and in 1847 some 27,600 tons of wheat were exported from Ukraine through the Black Sea ports alone. Enormous amounts of grain were shipped by cargo trains to Russia, to the West, and also through Baltic Sea ports. On the eve of World War I Ukraine produced some 25 million tons of four main grains—wheat, barley, rye, and oats—some 10 percent of the world production. Between 1909 and 1913 Ukraine exported some 7.9 million tons of grain, some 4.3 million tons of wheat and 2.7 tons of barley alone. Wheat exports constituted some 20 percent of the world's wheat exported annually.[11]

The Ukrainian sowing area rapidly grew. Between 1775 and 1851 it increased by 25 times and was still expanding. On the eve of World War I the sowing area of Ukraine amounted to some 68.9 million acres of arable soil, of which some three-fourths was black earth of great fertility. All these figures should give an approximate idea of the importance and the growth of the agricultural economy of the land. Of course, it would have reached much greater production levels if the country had been free and not exposed to Russian discriminatory measures. The yields per acre in Ukraine, though slowly improving, were behind those of Germany, Hungary, France, Canada, and in particular the United States.

All kinds of crops were raised in Ukraine in the nineteenth century, wheat and barley ranking first and second, then buckwheat, millet, oats, corn, hemp, flax, sugar beets, tobacco, and others. Wheat prevailed especially in the agricultural central belt, as well as in the southern regions. Tobacco was popular in the Poltava region; hemp in the Chernihiv, Novhorod Siversky, Starodub, and Mhlyiv districts. According to Hurzhii, in the 1850s, in the Strodub and Mhlyniv counties alone hemp textures were sold for almost one million rubles. Flax again was cultivated in southern Ukraine. Since the end of the eighteenth century sugar-beet production had become popular and was growing fast. From 1848 to 1860 alone, the acreage of sugar-beet production increased from 75,000 to 98,000 acres. At the end of the nineteenth century Ukraine

had the largest production of that crop in Eastern Europe. Between 1900 and 1913, the area devoted to sugar-beet production increased by three and a half times, while the productivity per acre increased by 20 percent. Other crops were produced in different ratios and with different preferences in different parts of the country.

A variety of fruits was raised in the manorial and peasant orchards: apples, pears, plums, and sweet and sour cherries in particular, along with berries, raspberries, blue and black berries, currants, and others. Grapes were raised on a very limited scale in the southern regions. Orchards were popular in most parts of Ukraine. The leading varieties of vegetables were cabbage, cucumbers, pumpkins, onions, garlic, turnips, beets, and of course, potatoes. Tomatoes came into use later on.

A definite priority was given to grain production. From the total acreage under cultivation in 1913, spring wheat took 27 percent; winter wheat 10.7 percent; barley, 24.5 percent; rye 17.8 percent; oats, 10.3 percent; and other crops 9.7 percent. The yield per acre was still inadequate, though better than in Russia, and it doubled in the fifty years prior to the First World War. It was, however, on the average about 650 pounds of grain per acre, while in Germany the yield was about 1,540 pounds. The productivity of the manorial farms was about 20-25 percent higher than that of the peasant farms. The overall low productivity was caused by many factors: agrarian overpopulation, inadequate peasant land allotment—either rented or owned, an inadequate number of draft animals such as horses and oxen for field work, primitive implements and tools, unsatisfactory progress in the use of modern machines and agricultural equipment, and discriminatory Russian policies—to name the most important factors.[12]

Between 1860 and 1900, the rural population of Ukraine increased by some eighty-six percent, while its landholdings increased at the same time by only forty-one percent. This disproportion produced, of course, an agrarian overpopula-

tion in relation to the available land and the farm technology. That in its turn made labor very cheap, while prices of land rose faster than its productivity and soon outran, in some cases, the expected yields of the soil. Obviously, these developments seriously hindered capital investments to modernize and to mechanize the farming industry. In the long-run this made Ukrainian agriculture much less efficient than that of Western nations. The shortage of land in relation to the growing population also had another result. There was a serious underemployment of village populations; there were too many mouths to feed and not enough full-time work for everybody in the villages. There were simply too many hands for hire, and the slow industrial growth of the country at this early stage could scarcely absorb all the surplus peasant labor. Meanwhile, the exodus to the city continued. In this particular respect, matters were better in Russia itself. Industrial growth there was faster and was encouraged by the Government. But it was often deliberately slowed in Ukraine by Russian authorities. This was one of the major repercussions of Russian colonialism in Ukraine, as I have mentioned before. Hence, the Ukrainian peasant had to rely largely on soil which was in short supply since this was really the only way left to him to survive.[13]

With the beginning of industrialization in the Donets Basin and later on in other regions, many peasants abandoned their small farms and moved to these industrial regions, looking for better living conditions. However, the early plight of the industrial proletariat was scarcely worthy of envy.

A serious land shortage plagued the Ukrainian peasant before and after Emancipation. Before Emancipation of the serfs, all land was in the hands of the landowners, and the peasant serfs actually rented the land they cultivated. Though they were increasingly willing to rent more and cultivate more, in most cases they were given the chance. After the Emancipation, in many cases the land shortage became even worse than ever. Ostapenko, Slabchenko, Kononenko, and

other students of the Ukrainian economy have admitted as much. The Emancipation Act allotted an inadequate amount of soil to the peasants. Despite the fact that they could eventually establish their property rights after all the payments and other obligations toward the former landowners were met, too much land was still left in the hands of the manorial landowners—as future developments proved. In addition, the land allotments in Ukraine were discriminatory, as previously mentioned; the fertile black-soil regions were given smaller allotments. As a result the land which was made available to the Ukrainian peasant was smaller by allotment than the acreage tilled by the serfs prior to Emancipation. When the increase of population is taken into account, we can see that the land shortage and the "land hunger" were actually becoming worse.[14]

In order to close the gap, peasants tried to help themselves by renting more and more land. Meanwhile, the manorial economies progressively declined for reasons to be discussed later. Rental, however, by which the peasant attempted to increase the soil acreage under his cultivation in order to improve his living conditions, was hardly financially profitable. Slabchenko has pointed out that, since a peasant farm could not normally produce enough for a family, and since the population was rising, the peasants rented more land, and the more they rented, the more the demand for land rose, making the rental payments rise significantly. As a result, the peasant found himself in a precarious position. Although by renting more land he acquired more food, his monetary gain was significantly below the value of the food he could buy if he worked for the wages at the time prevailing in the market. The only winner was the landowner, who earned more by leasing his land to peasants than by attempting to employ hired labor. The situation of the peasant lessee worsened after the Emancipation.

There was also another devastating result. The more land one rented, the lower was the rent payment in average per

acre. That gave rise to speculation. The market speculators rented huge acreages from the landowners for relatively low rates, and then immediately leased smaller lots to peasants for relatively higher rates. For a number of years there were literally millions of acres tilled and cultivated under that rent-lease system, which was another form of exploitation of the small peasant. Nevertheless, the shortage of land made the rent-lease system very popular among the poorer peasants—those who owned less than sixty-five acres of land per family. Since that poorer element constituted more than one half of all peasants, it meant that one half of them resorted to renting. But from the point of simple economics it was not a profitable business for them at all, simply a necessary evil.

Opys Poltavskoi gubernii enumerated three classes of rent-lease arrangements: leasing of land out of necessity by peasants who had less than twenty-seven acres of land and needed land to supplement their families' food; economically motivated leasing by those who had between twenty-seven and eighty acres and who wanted a comfortable living; and so-called industrial leasing by those who owned over eighty-one acres and who looked for profit. Yet, in spite of the extensive use of rent-leasing, the "hunger for land" continued.

Another cause of agricultural difficulties was related to defective territorial land distribution. In numerous cases a peasant had to till land plots located in different and, at times, quite distant places from each other. This always caused a waste of time and effort. Of course, the problem was related to the ineffectiveness of the *obshchina* or collective system of peasant landholding.

The *obshchina* system, traditional in Russia but alien to Ukraine, was forced upon the Ukrainian peasants after the Emancipation Act, although it was not uniformly practiced throughout Ukraine. In Right-bank Ukraine, and in the Poltava and Chernihiv regions, the peasants became full-fledged landowners. In the steppe regions of Kherson, Katerynoslav,

Kharkiv, and elsewhere, the land was left for the most part at the disposal of the village community, the *obshchina*, which was collectively responsible for tax payments, indebtedness, and periodic land redistribution among its members. The *obshchina* system was not completely adhered to in Ukraine, being alien and unappreciated. Periodic redistribution was ignored in over eighty percent of the cases. Otherwise, the system would have limited farmers' freedom in tilling and using the soil. After Stolypin abolished the *obshchina*, a feeling of relief came over Ukraine. Land productivity increased too, since the bothersome restrictions were now gone. Peasants received more freedom. Meanwhile, they acquired more land by purchase from manorial landowners, and subsequently they improved farming techniques, bought more equipment, and thus broadened their economic base. After Stolypin's reform, the *obshchina* disintegrated very rapidly in Ukraine, proving once again the Ukrainians' individualistic drive. In Ukraine the largest number of peasants of anywhere in the Empire left the village community and established their private property rights on land. According to Lyashchenko, by January 1, 1916, in European Russia some twenty-four percent of the peasants had left the *obshchina*; in Right-bank Ukraine almost fifty-one percent, in southern Ukraine over thirty-four percent, and in Left-Bank Ukraine almost fourteen percent had followed the trend and affirmed their private ownership of soil. Only meadows, forests, and some small areas remained at the communal disposition of the village.

The Emancipation Act was ill-conceived from the economic point of view in another respect. It did not give enough land to the peasants and left too much of it in the hands of the large landowners, who were not able to manage even with hired labor. By the 1870s it was clearly apparent that a great many landowners were not capable of coping with the new situation. They had lost free serf labor and now had to pay for it.

The costs of running the manors increased, requiring greater productivity by means of technical and scientific progress. But this was scarcely possible on short notice. The high costs of hired labor and inefficient management by hired managers (while the owners were frequently away, residing in the capital, or large cities, or abroad) brought an avalanche of bankruptcies and land sales to peasants or other buyers, townspeople and speculators. The peasants, hungry for land, progressively bought up more and more of it, and as they became wealthier, they wanted more and more to buy. They bought on credit and at ever higher prices, which did not leave them much chance to purchase improved farm implements. This hampered the progress of farm technology leaving Ukrainian agriculture relatively primitive compared to that of the West. It hardly mattered that the peasant in the twentieth century had much more land at his disposal than ever before. Furthermore, as the price of land rose, the rental payments rose, producing new financial problems. Higher rental payments were another hindrance to financing the purchase of machine equipment, draft animals, and better cultures for cultivation.

While immediately after the Emancipation Act in 1861, the price of land was rather uniform throughout the country, by 1913 it had increased on average by, though at various rates, some 65 percent, and in the last sixteen years before World War I it quadrupled in various regions of the country. Yet the peasants continued to buy land for literally millions of rubles, in southern Ukraine in particular. While the Emancipation Act gave peasants some 45.7 percent of land, due to massive peasant land purchases thereafter, by 1917 the peasants owned some 65 percent of all the land and some 83 percent of the arable soil in Ukraine. Peasant landholding was, however, unevenly distributed in various parts of the country. But the land shortage had lessened somewhat and living and working conditions had improved somewhat.

Yet, peasant holdings, small by Western standards, pre-

vailed—some 24 acres per household, with local variations geographically and in accordance with the density of population. The Kiev region was the poorest in that respect, with some 11.8 acres, and the Kherson and Tavria regions the best, with some 25 and 33.5 acres per household respectively.[15] This meant that large peasant landholdings were more numerous in southern provinces of Ukraine. In Western Ukraine, in Galicia and Carpathian Ukraine in particular, the peasant landholdings were much smaller than in the eastern regions, putting the peasants there in a bad economic squeeze.

As has already been mentioned in other connections, the Ukrainian economy suffered as a result of the relative primitivism of farm technology. The three-field system continued too long, and the crop rotation system was adopted too slowly in some parts of Ukraine, on the manors primarily. In the 1880s animal manure was only rarely used as fertilizer on the peasant farms, since it was generally believed to be harmful to the black soil. Only wealthier farmers could afford more draft animals, machinery, and progressive methods of management. The amounts of money spent and credit used to buy more and more land did not allow for the general purchase of modern farm implements. The manors especially were in decline. Unable to operate profitably with hired labor, they ran into deep indebtedness, and often sold out to the peasants. Only a few were able to afford modern and progressive machinery. Hence, low agricultural productivity was general.

Frequently the peasants who had land but inadequate equipment hired others who had the equipment and paid them a high price for the services rendered. That diminished the hoped-for gains of those who paid high prices for purchasing or renting land. Ostapenko has quoted the following statistics in this respect: In 1917, when the peasants were tilling some 63 million acres of land, they had 2 million metal ploughs, 1.5 million tillers, 4 million harrows, 2.6 million carts, 7,000 steam threshers, 55,000 seeders, 43,000 reapers, and some

156,000 winnowers. The fact that there was about one winnower per 475 acres of land on the average shows convincingly the inadequacy of agricultural equipment and implements, which was largely responsible for low farm productivity.[16]

The agricultural overpopulation of Ukraine at that time, plus these other developments, made hired farm work rather cheap, comparatively speaking, and that relative cheapness was another contributory factor to slow modernization, which was costly by comparison. All in all, the overpopulation, a surplus of farm workers, farm underemployment, low wages, and the low profitability of peasant farming—including the cost of renting additional acreage—caused a very low standard of living among the majority of the peasant population.

The *zemstvo* self-governing system, however, did a great deal to improve the dramatic plight of agriculture. The *zemstvo* agencies assisted the peasants in developing progressive farming methods, planting better crops, and raising better breeds of cattle and horses, and organized village credit unions to aid the peasantry financially as well as village cooperatives. The agronomists working for the *zemstva* encouraged agricultural progress by holding public lectures, making visual demonstrations, and experimenting in planting. In the last decade before the war of 1914, real progress was visible in the Ukrainian farm economy. Crop rotation became popular and use of farm machinery doubled. The Gentry's Land Banks, established in 1885, financially assisted the large landowners to manage their affairs with low-interest credit, while the Peasant Land Banks, established in 1882, tried to finance peasant land purchases at ever-rising prices. The gentry's land was purchased on a large scale not only by peasants but by merchants, other townspeople, some *intelihentsia*, speculators, and other groups. With the reorganization of the Land Banks in 1905 peasant land purchases increased enormously, so that between 1905 and 1915 the peasants acquired some twenty-one million acres of land.

On the average, sixty-eight percent of acreage was used to plant food for domestic needs, while thirty-two percent of the acreage was cultivated for export. Yet, although the Ukrainian farm economy was growing, the large export of grain, in particular, did not indicate a grain surplus or high standard of living. The truth was that these exports were made at the expense of people and animals, producing a general undernourishment. This was another aspect of the Russian exploitation of Ukraine, and her farm economy especially. In order to repair Russia's foreign balance of payments, wheat and other grains were exported from the empire at heavy human cost, in Left- and Right-bank Ukraine in particular. Only Southern Ukraine, the steppe regions, produced a real surplus, and this could easily have been consumed domestically by provinces where bread was short. The relatively unjust taxation of farmers in Ukraine after the emancipation of the serfs was another indication of the exploitation of the country.

The plight of the Ukrainian agricultural economy in the western provinces under Austrian domination was in many respects even worse. Although Emperor Joseph II tried to ease up the social and economic plight of the peasant, by mitigating the hardships of bondage and by giving land to them, in the long run it did not help. Too much land was left in the possession of the landlords. At the beginning of the nineteenth century approximately 20 percent of the peasants cultivated less than three acres of soil per family. In the middle of the century the percentage rose to over 27 percent. After the abolition of bondage in 1848 the peasants became full-fledged landowners. But they owned only 55.6 percent of land, while the large land estates totaled 44.4 percent. About 70 percent of all peasants were unable to achieve any agricultural progress at all, as Vytanovych has stated, since they could produce only enough crops for their meager subsistence. Furthermore, the liberal legal system of the Austrian monarchy led to a hopeless subdivision and fragmentation of peasant farms into narrow strips of scattered and noncontiguous land plots.

Hence, many peasants even tried to abandon their meager farms. The Galician *diet*, dominated by the Polish landlords, resisted any reform which would benefit Ukrainian villagers.

In certain parts of West Ukraine—in Pokutia, Carpathian Ukraine, and Bukovyna—potatoes and corn (maize) literally saved the population from starvation. Large estates could not adapt themselves to using hired and paid labor, as in the eastern provinces; hence there was little mechanization and progress. Consequently, the large estates and the peasant farms alike used the same backward cultivation techniques. The adoption of the crop-rotation system was the only major improvement. In the twentieth century only iron ploughs, a few mechanical threshers, and some other auxiliary tools were used. Intensive orchard and garden economies were absent. Under the impact of Polish ethnic prejudice, only 102 thousand acres of land were sold to the Ukrainian peasants following the disintegration of the large estate holdings, while the immigrant Polish peasants were able to purchase 539 thousand acres of that land, thus strengthening the Polish ethnic element in Galicia. This was clearly against the Ukrainian national interest in Western Ukraine.

Cattle, horses, hogs, goats, and poultry were raised, and the animal industry of the peasants, though modest, was more effective and productive than on the large estates. Gradual agricultural progress began on the eve of World War I, as a result of educational programs of such societies as the *Prosvita* and the *Silskyi Hospodar*, which attempted to raise the enlightenment and standard of living of the Western Ukrainian peasantry.[17]

MINING AND MANUFACTURING. In the second half of the nineteenth century the Ukrainian economy experienced

its "Industrial Revolution." It was not, perhaps, as spectacular as that in the West, yet it was of lasting importance for the country. The scope and magnitude of the revolution in Ukraine were certainly lessened by Russian policy, as shall be pointed out below. Actually, in the early nineteenth century there were three separate Industrial Revolutions taking place in three different regions: in Right-bank and Western Ukraine, in Left-bank and Village Ukraine, and in southern Ukraine. The industrial development of each region was different and specific, being, of course, based on past industrial experience.

Since the seventeenth century Right-bank and Western Ukraine had had little opportunity to grow industrially. Her economy was stifled by Polish-styled serfdom and bondage. Some eighty percent of her people were economically in shackles. Much of the population suffered from poverty, a low standard of living, and minimal industrial activity. A rather low number of craftsmen and artisans were scattered in towns and throughout the countryside, and the small demand for their services came mainly from the gentry. Since Western Ukraine had been under Polish domination longer than the Right-bank provinces, its plight was in this respect even worse.

However, in the second half of the nineteenth century there was a rapid development of the sugar-refining industry, which was supplied with large quantities of sugar beets, cheaply produced by manorial plantations working with peasant-serf labor. Sugar refineries began to proliferate throughout the land. At the same time, as an outgrowth of sugar-refining, alcohol distilling began to develop on a larger scale.

In Left-bank and *Slobidska* Ukraine, on the other hand, the local gentry and the upper levels of Cossack society became involved in industrial pursuits, using serfs and hired laborers, at a much earlier date than in the western regions. Salt and saltpeter and glass production, ore extraction, and the alcohol

industry developed successfully and supplied domestic as well as some foreign markets. Industrial products were even exported to Russia, in spite of high Russian tariffs. In fact, in some instances Russian demand contributed greatly to the early industrial development of Left-Bank and Village Ukraine.

According to the historical sources, by the 1840s there were nine towns with a population of over 100,000. A large number of craftsmen and artisans busily produced all kinds of manufactured goods in these towns. As pointed out already, during the Hetman-Cossack period there was a textile factory in Putyvl, a tobacco factory in Okhtykra, sail and line plants in Pochep and Sheptakivka, gunpowder manufacturing in Shostka, and silk production in Kiev and Nizhyn. Hence, there was a solid base for industrial development in the nineteenth century.

Southern Ukraine was incorporated by the Russian Empire later than Left-Bank Ukraine, but rather favorable government policies there promoted agricultural growth, which was soon followed by industrial development. By 1840, manufacturing of iron farm equipment had been launched by private initiative.[18]

Chronologically, the Kievan region was the first to attain industrial prominence, being followed by the Kherson, Kharkiv, and Poltava regions, and the Donets Basin. The industrial growth may be partially illustrated by the following statistics:

Year	*Number of Industrial Establishments*
1783	200
1825	1,649
1860	2,147
1875	5,332
1885	10,699
1895	30,310

From 1860 to 1895, the work force employed by these enterprises increased 2.4 times, from 85.8 thousand to 205.3 thousand people, while the output increased in worth by 5.5, from some 45 to 261 million rubles.[19]

At first, manorial factories, the so-called *votchina*, prevailed, but with real industrial growth they were largely replaced by urban "commercialized" plants. Of course Ukrainian manufacturing suffered from unfair Russian competition from its earliest days. First of all, the Russian industrial establishments were often heavily subsidized by the Government. Secondly, they were protected by the tariff policies of St. Petersburg, which were detrimental to Ukrainian interests, as will be seen later on. Thirdly, Russian policies, as pointed out before, aimed at the establishment of a close economic tie between Ukraine and Russia, making the former dependent upon the latter. Russian and foreign capital investments in Ukraine were one of the ways used to make Ukraine a colonial, agricultural, and industrially supplementary possession of the Empire.

Yet the enormous industrial potential of Ukraine was in many respects powerful enough to overcome to some degree these political and man-made constraints.

Between 1825 and 1850 in almost all Ukrainian regions a mechanization of industrial plants was in progress. The number of establishments and workers involved and their output were steadily increasing. A little later, in the 1860s and 1870s, Ukraine had about 17.4 percent of all the industrial plants, 15.1 percent of the entire industrial work force, and some 11.8 percent of the industrial output of the entire imperial economy, and the figures were steadily and substantially rising. The following statistical table gives a clear picture of the specific nature of the Ukrainian industrial economy in those days:

Branch of Industry	Number of enterprises			Production total in thousand rubles		
	Ukraine	Russia	%Ukr.	Ukraine	Russia	%Ukr.
Manufacturing of cotton	13	986	1.3	475.0	928,496.6	0.5
Manufacturing of wool......	48	1,037	4.6	9,461.3	225,346.7	4.2
Manufacturing of silk.......	..	277	0.0	......	34,549.4	0.0
Manufacturing of linen-hemp....................	40	175	22.8	6,567.7	93,491.4	7.0
Manufacturing of other textiles	28	384	7.3	733.6	49,632.5	1.5
Paper manufacturing	232	1,333	17.4	11,389.4	128,889.3	9.0
Mechanical woodworking...	290	1,900	15.3	10,604.3	119,510.9	8.9
Metal working shops and machine building.........	197	916	21.5	60,442.6	347,371.3	17.4
Repair shops	59	323	18.2	1,388.5	13,644.3	10.1
Other metal manufacturing	86	712	12.1	5,010.8	67,345.8	7.3
Railroad shops	36	176	20.4	22,543.4	71,466.4	31.6
Shipbuilding yards	6	17	35.2	451.6	43,800.3	10.3
Manufacturing of minerals...	278	1,521	18.3	15,600.6	97,726.0	16.0
Manufacturing industry of mining products	13	186	7.0	84,483.7	214,841.5	39.4
Processing of animal products..................	91	1,153	7.9	11,035.6	159,241.5	6.9
Processing of consumption goods under internal tax..	1,968	7,948	24.8	503,482.2	1,515,513.3	33.3
Chemical industry..........	80	801	10.0	18,514.6	387,812.6	4.8
TOTALS:	3,465	19,845	17.4	762,184.9	4,498,679.8	16.9

Kononenko supplied the following interpretation of these statistical figures: "The first thing that strikes us upon closer analysis of the above table is the conspicuously unilateral development of the industry. Processing of consumption goods constitutes 66.1 percent of Ukraine's total industrial production, and together with metallurgy, mining, and pro-

cessing minerals, 88 percent. All other branches of industry add up to only 12 percent of the total, and some, like textiles, chemicals, and the processing of animal products, are virtually lacking. One or another branch of industry may be lacking because its development would, due to natural conditions, be unprofitable, but we never encounter a normal situation in which only two or three branches of industry prosper while in all other respects the national economy makes itself dependent upon an outside economic body. Such a situation gravely contradicts the economic interests of the national community and can only exist under circumstances in which these interests are subject to some other interests, whenever, in other words, an economic system is merely an adjunct of another, dominant system. It is the most convincing sign of a colonial position."[20] In the 1860s and 1870s, the Kievan region was still mostly industrial, mainly because of sugar production, which employed some 38 percent of all the industrial work force and constituted some 42 percent of the Ukrainian industrial output. The Kharkiv and Cherniviv regions followed behind.

In the third quarter of the nineteenth century the woodworking, textile, carpet, fur, shoe, and pottery industries developed in various sections of the country, for domestic consumption and use as well as for exports abroad. For example, carpets from Kharkiv and furs from Poltava were well known outside Ukraine. In Right-Bank Ukraine, which was somewhat industrially backward, as has been mentioned, sugar, alcohol (vodka and beer), textiles, rope, leather goods, soap, candles, tobacco, silk, linens, wooden articles, and crude iron and glass were manufactured on an increasing scale. Some of these enterprises were state funded or even directly state managed or leased, such as the foundry in Luhansk, the gunpowder plant in Shostka, the arsenal in Kiev, the woolen plant in Katerynoslav, china production in Mezhyhiria, and some coal mines in the Donets Basin—these were, however, on a small scale. A machine-building industry was emerging, but

it never really succeeded. For the most part, private initiative was progressively taking the lead in industrial development.

The Crimean War was actually the turning point in industrialization throughout the entire Russian Empire, including Ukraine. As indicated already, the defeat in that war was largely attributed to the economic backwardness of Russia. The emancipation of the serfs and increased agricultural efficiency and industrialization were the leading measures used to improve the situation. The St. Petersburg Government increasingly took the lead in these social and economic undertakings to speed up the modernization and industrialization of Eastern Europe. The last twenty-five or thirty years of the century were most important in this respect. The economic and in particular industrial progress of the Empire, including Ukraine, at the time was at a greater rate than that of the Soviet Union under the forced Bolshevik industrialization efforts of the first forty years of the Communist era.[21]

In particular, the 1870s brought about the construction of railroads, which greatly increased Ukraine's industrialization. Railroads provided cheap and speedy transportation. They linked together the Donets Basin coal reserves with the Kryvyi-Rih iron ore deposits, and greatly facilitated the growth of iron and steel manufacturing in Ukraine. In addition, at the same time they were themselves among the largest consumers of iron and steel. Hence, railroads affected the development of industry in two different ways.

In addition, railroads subsequently aided the growth of other industrial activities, especially the processing of agricultural raw materials, commercialized farming, and the exports of grains, coal, ores, and other bulky materials as well as finished goods. Furthermore, the railroad network enabled industrial business operations to grow large enough to make their operations quite economical.

There is no doubt that without discriminatory Russian economic policies—such as tariffs, differential shipping charges, and subsidies for Russian plants—Ukrainian industrial

capacity would have developed much more effectively. These discriminatory practices at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century included: specific territorial planning; construction of railroad tracks in such a way as to connect southern Ukrainian regions directly with Russia; differential railroads charges, favorable for Russian long-distance shipments and unfavorable for Ukrainian transportation needs; extra charges for the shipment of the bulky raw materials and semi-fabricates, out of Ukraine, and no extra charges for shipping the finished articles out of Russia, such as machinery and textiles; diverting Ukrainian exports and imports from the Black and Azov Sea ports; and favorable treatment of foreign, including Russian, capital investments in Ukraine along with the suppression of Ukrainian domestic capital formation which otherwise would have certainly promoted the country's economic independence. That, of course, was not to be permitted by St. Petersburg. Foreign investments controlled Ukrainian manufacturing in certain areas but they certainly did not support the country's economic and financial independence.

On the eve of World War I foreign capital controlled the following percentages of major industries in Ukraine:

Industry	*Percentage*
Coal	70
Pig iron	67
Steel	58
Iron ore	87
Machine-building	100

Foreign investments in Ukraine constituted one third of those in the whole Russian empire, amounting at that time to some 413.8 million gold rubles, and they largely came from France, Belgium, Germany, and England. Of course, as far as

Ukraine was concerned, Russian investments could be considered foreign, as well, since they did not serve Ukrainian economic interests. There were some important Ukrainian capitalists and industrialists—such as Yakhnenko, Symerenko, Tereshchenko, Kandyba, and Alchevsky. But the Russian Government preferred to discriminate against them.

The rapid growth of industry in the last quarter of the nineteenth century can be seen in the following statistics:

Year	*No. of establishments*	*No. of workers*	*Output in mill. of rubles*
1865	2,147	95,200	47.2
1875	5,332	115,500	105.8
1895	30,130	205,300	260.9

In a decade, from 1865 to 1875, the number of plants increased by about 2.4 times, the number of workers by 20,000 people, and the output by some 120 percent. Then in the next twenty years, from 1875 to 1895, the number of plants increased by almost 6 times, the number of workers by 90,000, and the output by 155 percent. Productivity growth was most impressive in coal and iron-ore mining as well as in iron and steel manufacturing. In metal working and machine-building it was much more modest, while in some areas, such as consumer goods production according to available data, it was actually declining.[22]

The territorial distribution of industries in Ukraine was based, of course, on the availability of mineral and other raw-material resources. In the Katerynoslav and Kryvyi Rih regions there were heavy industry and metallurgy; in the Donbas mining, coke production, and related manufacturing; in Kiev and the Right-Bank regions sugar production; in the Carpathian and Black Sea areas petroleum extraction and refining; and in Nikopol manganese ore production. Other industries were sparsely distributed throughout the land. All

industries then were heavily affected by business-cycle fluctuations, by the regular rotation of prosperity, depression, and recovery.

In the early twentieth century Ukrainian industrial growth continued. Between 1910 and 1913 alone the annual growth rate of leading industries was as follows:

Industry	*Percentage*
Iron ore	17.2
Pig iron	14.5
Coal	21.4
Consumer industries	4.5

Light and consumer industries were lagging behind in their development due to Russian policies.[23] The specific importance of Ukrainian manufacturing, especially in the heavy industries and metallurgy, in the framework of the Russian Eurasian market was enormous. In 1913, Ukrainian industries constituted the following percentages of the total industries of the Empire:

Industry	*Percentage*
Coal	78.2
Coke	100.0
Iron ore	74.5
Pig iron	69.5
Steel	58.1
Metalworking	20.2
Machine-building	18.4
Gross industrial output	24.3

In the twentieth century the specific importance of extractive industries in the country's economy continued to be far greater—some 70 percent of the imperial total—than that of

manufacturing finished products, which was only some 15 percent of the imperial total because of the continuation of Russian discriminatory measures.[24] Ukraine was induced to produce cheap raw materials and semi-fabricates, while her production of finished goods of a higher value was suppressed to enable the central Russian industrial regions to predominate. As has been pointed out, from the very beginning Ukraine had an absolute advantage over Russia in certain areas of industry and this enabled Ukraine to develop her economic potentials despite the intentions of St. Petersburg. The geographical distribution of the industrial capabilities of the Ukrainian economy in the early twentieth century was as follows:

Region	*Percentage*
Southeast	33.0
Southwest	23.6
Northeast	17.1
Black Sea area	12.8
West	13.5
Ukrainian Total[25]	100.0

An important, though not necessarily positive, role in the development of some Ukrainian industries was played by cartels (agreements among companies in the same business, such as sugar or coal), which attempted to control production, prices, and market distribution. Their interests were Russo-European oriented rather than Ukrainian. The cartels became an economic power at the beginning of the twentieth century. The *Prodamet* cartel regulated the metallurgical business, the *Produhol* cartel, coal extraction and distribution, the *Prodwagon* cartel, railroad equipment and sugar refining. There were also strictly Russian-operated cartels in Ukraine—such

as the *Krovla*—which controlled metallurgy in the Urals—but they did not succeed in acquiring any dominant position there. Kononenko has pointed out that these cartels actually constituted an integral part of the colonial exploitation of the country.[26] In some instances, they managed to establish their dictatorial position in the marketing process, and, being foreign financed, were responsible for an enormous flow of money abroad from Ukraine in the form of dividends and interest. Between 1891 and 1910, the cartels were responsible for some 2.7 billion gold rubles leaving Ukraine, making the country poorer and the Russian and foreign interests richer.

The *Prodamet* and *Produhol* by no means limited their activities to Ukraine. They expanded their economic influence beyond that country and, in addition to several Ukrainian corporations and business associations, included foreign corporations as well. For example, the *Prodamet* consisted of fourteen Ukrainian, one Russian, three Baltic, and nine Polish companies. The Ukrainian firms were most important components of the cartel responsible for some three-fourths of its output.

Unfortunately for Ukraine, the cartels were run by Russian and foreign banks, with managerial centers normally located in St. Petersburg. The top management personnel were either Russians or foreigners with no interest in Ukraine. Though privately owned and operated, the cartels were well aware of the official St. Petersburg policy toward Ukraine and readily cooperated with the Government. The high prices charged by the cartels hurt the Ukrainian consumer. When Ukrainian-based manufacturers of agricultural machinery asked the *Prodamet* to lower prices to aid both the industry and agriculture, the cartel paid scarcely any attention to the request. The cartels regulated quotas, prices, and distribution, imposed penalties for producing more than agreed quantities, and paid premiums for underproducing and not meeting quota targets. At one time this resulted in a drastic metal shortage, as has been pointed out by Lyashchenko. After the organization of

the cartels, not a single new plant was constructed in the affected industries in Ukraine, Kononenko has maintained.[27]

In Western Ukraine, under Austrian domination, the industrial development was more modest than in Eastern Ukraine. In the beginning, there was no middle class at all. The peasant masses were poor and there was very little demand for industrial production. There was also no domestic capital that could be used. In other words there were none of the prerequisites for industrial development. As late as 1841, Galicia, for example, with one-fifth of the Austrian empire's population, was responsible only for 7.5 percent of the empire's total industrial output. This largely consisted of food processing, flour milling, and alcohol distilling.[28] It could scarcely compete with the industrial centers of the Monarchy.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, the extraction of petroleum and its refining in the Sub-Carpathian region launched the industrial development of Galicia. By 1910, tiny Galicia was producing some 4 percent of the world's petroleum. Its petroleum industry had 448 enterprises with some 36 thousand workers. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the twentieth century other industrial pursuits—involving food, lumber and woodworking, apparel, and machine-building and repair—had been started on a slightly larger scale. But, the composition and the small scale of those industries clearly pointed to the economic underdevelopment of the land. In the Carpathian Ukraine at that time about 20 thousand workers were involved in lumber, woodworking and wood-processing, and tar and pitch manufacturing. In Bukovyna, some 10 thousand men were employed in food processing and lumber work. In addition, there were home industries aimed strictly at family and local consumption.[29]

HEAVY AND LIGHT INDUSTRIES. Ukrainian coal deposits were huge, but they were discovered relatively late, while

their economic significance was appreciated even later. The first attempts to mine coal in the Donets Basin were made at the end of the eighteenth century, according to records, yet the mining industry was not developed until a century later. Actually, poor transportation facilities delayed mining and the use of coal for industrial and home-heating needs. In addition, rich timber resources, cheaply cut and shipped on the rivers, served effectively as cheap fuel and contributed to the delay. But the reckless exploitation of timber resources badly hurt the Ukrainian economy and countryside. Timber reserves were speedily depleted and earth erosion, soil sanding, and decrease of the water supply followed. Some small rivers simply disappeared.

Construction of railroads, as indicated, made possible cheap, long-distance shipments of bulky materials, coal in particular. Since railroads were great users of coal, they promoted large-scale coal mining. This aided in the development of metallurgy and other industries, and helped home heating as well. French capital was the first to finance coal mining and coal processing, in the early 1870s. By the 1890s the industry was already a large-scale economic factor in Ukraine. It has been estimated that only about 30 percent of the capital investments in the coal industry came from local sources, while about 70 percent came from Russia and other foreign countries, from banks and capitalists.

Mining of coal progressed rapidly, although it was hurt by a depression in the 1870s, as well as by subsequent discriminatory railroad rates applied to Ukraine. This discrimination put Ukrainian coal mining at a disadvantage, competing with coal imported from abroad to the Russian Empire. Even a small duty on foreign coal would have greatly helped the Ukrainian industry. Yet St. Petersburg stubbornly and persistently refused to introduce such a duty. It did not want to hurt even indirectly the interests of the central Russian industrial regions, as Sobolev and Kononenko have asserted.[30] The mining of coal in Ukraine progressed as follows:

Year	Millions of tons	Ukraine's percentage of the imperial total
1885	1.8	44.1
1895	4.6	53.7
1905	12.6	69.1
1913	24.7	70.3

The Donets Basin supplied most of the East European market with coal. In order to facilitate swift shipments of coal, the Donbas was soon covered with a very dense network of railroad tracks, denser than that of Germany. On the eve of World War I, Ukraine supplied over 77 percent of the total coal production of the Russian empire.

Petroleum extraction and refining also developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, at the time of the Ukrainian industrial revolution. As has been mentioned in the previous volume, oil was already known in West Ukraine in the sixteenth century, but its economic importance was not appreciated until some three centuries later. Then, Austrian and British capital ventured into Ukrainian petroleum drilling and refining, and by the end of the century controlled some 78 percent of its raw output and some 73 percent of its processing. In the 1904-1910 era, Galician petroleum production constituted some 4 percent of the total world output. Petroleum was extracted and refined in the Galician Sub-Carpathian region, in the Kuban Sub-Caucasian area, near the city of Maikop, and in the Donets Basin and Black Sea coast and Crimean region. In these latter three areas, however, the oil deposits were of minor importance. The following statistics may illustrate the potential of the petroleum industry:

Year	*Thousand tons*[31]
1875	22.1
1895	188.9
1909	2,053.1
1914	877.0

Natural gas deposits were known as early as 1910, but their extraction began later on. Peat had been used as a low-calorie fuel since the seventeenth century, but it never acquired any economic significance before World War I. The production of electricity began shortly before that war. By 1913 it had reached some 543.4 million kilowatt-hours of output, with a capacity equal to 304,300 kilowatts produced mainly in the Donbas. Electricity was used for lighting only, without any industrial application. Such was the general picture of energy-production industries in Ukraine at the beginning of World War I.

Building iron pits, extracting iron ore, and processing it into iron by simple methods were traditional in Ukraine, as pointed out in the previous volume. They apparently go back to the seventh century B.C. Yet again, the modern iron and steel industry did not emerge until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, although blast furnaces existed in Right-bank Ukraine in the middle of the eighteenth century, where iron ore was smelted with charcoal. According to the available records, in the 1830s in Ukraine there were over 150 such smelting ovens. In the first part of the nineteenth century smelting declined, however, because timber resources were becoming exhausted and charcoal was in short supply.

The use of coal for smelting revolutionized the metallurgical industry, and the rapid expansion of iron and steel production followed. Of course, the introduction of railroad transportation, as pointed out, powerfully affected the development of metallurgy. Railroads connected the coal-rich Donets Basin

with the iron-rich Kryvyi Rih (Dnieper Bend) region and the manganese-rich Nikopol in a close triangular pattern within which the needed raw materials and semi-fabricates could be speedily supplied. Kerch Peninsula, with its own deposits, was also close enough to the triangle to promote further growth of the metallurgic industry.

There were also some other contributory factors which made the industry a success. Capital was adequately supplied by growing corporate organizations. The relatively new industry was using modern technology and production methods. Many foreign specialists supplied progressive technical knowhow. The speedily growing demand for iron and steel due to the development of numerous industrial needs (railroad tracks and equipment, agricultural implements, sugar-refining equipment, textile machinery, and many others) was also becoming more and more important. All these factors promised high profits for the future as well, as Koropetsky has concluded. An experimental blast furnace, using coke for smelting, proved successful in Kerch in the middle of the nineteenth century. Subsequently, additional modern iron and steel works were established within the triangle mentioned above. On the eve of the twentieth century in Ukraine there were seventeen integrated metallurgical establishments; ten in the Donets Basin, three in the Dnieper Bend, and four in the Kerch region which produced not only pig and wrought iron and steel, but bricks, tiles, and numerous chemicals generated by the coking process.[32]

The very fact that out of these seventeen integrated iron and steel works about four were domestically owned, while the others were dominated by French, Belgian, German, English, and American capital, was detrimental to Ukrainian economic interests. Yet the industry grew rapidly, even faster than in other regions of the Empire giving Ukraine an absolute advantage. It happened as follows:

Year	*Pig iron*		*Rolled Steel*	
	Thousand tons	*Ukraine's %*	*Thousand tons*	*Ukraine's %*
1880	21,294.1	5.0	26,208.2	4.5
1890	219,493.3	24.3	140,868.9	17.8
1900	1,500,417.3	51.8	969,701.9	44.0
1910	2,070,444.6	68.1	1,619,991.9	53.7

These are truly impressive statistics, in particular with respect to Ukraine's percentage of the Empire's total.[33]

Although the depression of 1901-1904 caused some setbacks in the development of metallurgy, it was soon compensated from by the growing demand for iron and steel during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. By 1913, the industry's production was already more than sixty percent of the Empire's total output, and on the eve of World War I it was well above eighty percent. In 1902, the metallurgical cartel, *Prodamet*, was put together, and four years later it controlled some eighty percent of Ukraine's output of iron and steel, affecting greatly the course of events in the many other industries, which depended on these two semi-fabricates. The *Prodament*, as has been pointed out, fixed prices and output, arranged a quota system, and managed the market distribution, all of which hurt domestic Ukrainian interests.

In this industry as well St. Petersburg policies were working against Ukrainian industrial interests. I have mentioned before that the importation of iron and steel to the Russian Empire from abroad was burdened with a very negligible duty. This was in order to secure their supply to the central Muscovite industrial regions regardless of the fact that this foreign competition negatively influenced the development of Ukrainian metallurgy, as Kononenko has asserted. Appeals to raise the tariffs against foreign importations produced few

results. Ukraine was to be kept in a colonial status, subservient to the central Russian economic interests.

Directly related to iron and steel manufacturing—and near rich coal deposits, mostly in the Donbas region—coking processes were developed, which supplied much-needed coke and a variety of chemicals. Prior to World War I, Ukraine was the only land in the Empire which produced coke. In 1913, she produced 4.4 million tons of coke, nearly one hundred percent of the imperial total.

On the lower bank of the Dnieper River, in the region of Nikopol, manganese ore deposits were found and began to be exploited in the 1860s. Manganese is used in manufacturing a great many products and commodities, including steel. Mining the ore rapidly increased before World War I, also with the help of the foreign capital. Between 1895 and 1915, manganese output increased from 42.7 to 229.3 million tons, some two-thirds of the Empire's production at that time.

While in the coal and metallurgical industries Ukraine was able to assert herself and to achieve substantial economic success in spite of discriminatory Russian policies and other obstacles, such as foreign-capital exploitation and boom-or-bust business cycles, Ukraine's progress in machine-building and metal-working industries was very modest indeed. It was another indication of the colonial status of the country. The manufacture of the finished fabricates and goods—such as machines, metals, and other tools, factory equipment and implements, and textiles—was reserved by the Russian Government and Russian capital for Central Russia.

In 1841, however a Ukrainian landowner, Kandyba was able to establish the first machine-building plant in Chernihiv. The plant manufactured farm equipment, steam boilers, machinery, and equipment for sugar refineries and textile factories. By 1846, there were four similar plants in Ukraine; in 1854, eight; and in 1863, twenty-five. The industry was backward by Western standards, and far below Ukrainian

industrial capabilities. Machine toolmaking made up only about 2.2 percent of the Empire total. In the 1870s Ukrainian machine building increased a little. Plants were built in Oleksandrivka, Kiev, Katerynoslav, Berdianske, Kharkiv, Odessa, Kherson, and other places. By 1890, manufacturing of locomotives, railroad cars, and railroad equipment was taking place in Luhanske, Kharkiv, Kateryoslav, Mykolaiv, and Stryi; metallurgical equipment was centered mainly in the Donbas, and ship-building in Kherson and Mykolaiv. Foreign capital largely financed the industry and West-European machinery equipped these plants. According to Koropetsky, by 1913 the Ukrainian machine-building produced some 25 percent of the total imperial output, about 52.9 percent of farm equipment, 40.0 percent of steam locomotives, 17 percent of railroad cars, and only 3.7 percent of machine tools. The total imperial output did not include Poland and the Baltic countries.[34]

The chemical industry was poorly developed, though the resources were available. The production of tar, potash, pitch, and saltpeter was traditional in Ukraine, though it was still on a small scale in the nineteenth century, constituting only some nine percent of the imperial total. The following statistics indicated the situation:

Year	*Value of output of chemicals in millions of rubles*
1884	1.9
1900	7.7
1912	23.9

Match production was done in Poltava, Kherson, and Chernihiv. Wax, cosmetics, varnishes, potash, and some other chemical products were also manufactured on a small scale. Saltpeter represented a special case. In 1812 in Ukraine, some 351 establishments manufactured saltpeter, mostly in Left-bank Ukraine. By 1852 their number had declined to

some 179, and it continued to decline further since it could be much more cheaply produced in Chile. Simply, the competition was too intense. On the other hand, chemical production based on coking was increasing slightly with the growth of iron and steel manufacturing. It supplied benzene, various lubricants, pitch, ammonium chloride and sulfate, and some others. By 1913, chemical industries in terms of their leading production, supplied:

Products[35]	*Quantity in tons*	*Ukraine's percentage of the imperial total*
Mineral fertilizers	35,600	40
Sulfuric acid	45,300	31
Caustic soda	39,600	72
Soda ash	119,000	74

Construction materials continued to be produced, as had been done for many centuries, but on a small scale, by nineteenth century standards. Bricks were manufactured on the manorial estates and in the villages and towns as handicrafts. Manufacturing of bricks in factories emerged first in the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century. By 1900, there were in the country some 197 brick plants, and by 1912, 252 plants. That year their total output was worth some 456 million rubles.

The first cement-production plant was established in the Podillia region in the middle of the 1870s. Toward the end of the century the industry expanded substantially. In 1912, there were twelve large cement factories, centered mainly in the Donets Basin, with an output of almost 300 thousand tons. Roofing tiles were manufactured by rather small plants mainly in the Kiev and Kharkiv regions, and the production grew as follows:

Year	*No. of establishments*	*Output in millions of rubles*
1875	826	2.7
1895	1,546	3.4

In addition, in the 1880s there were some 11 alabaster and 16 floor-tile plants. Lumber for construction purposes was processed in many sawmills. By 1890 there were some 121 medium-sized sawmills with some 2.1 million rubles worth of sawn wood for all purposes: buildings, furniture, and household appliances. Sawmills were scattered throughout the country, particularly in the Volhinian and Kievan regions. Furniture manufacturing was predominantly done on a handicraft basis. There were but a few small furniture plants.

Glass, china, and pottery production continued to make modest progress through the century. In 1913 in Ukraine there were about thirty-two large glass works, along with some small-scale establishments scattered throughout the Kievan, Galician, Podollian, and Volhinian regions in particular. Nine china plants had a modest production for domestic use only. Pottery was traditionally manufactured all over the country in households and on a handicraft basis.

Woodworking, again a traditional craft, as has been mentioned in previous chapters, developed in households and as a handicraft, primarily in the Carpathian mountains, on a smaller scale.

Wood was also used in paper manufacturing and there were some twenty paper mills toward the end of the nineteenth century, mainly in Volhinia. By 1913 their number had increased to thirty-two, employing some 14,500 workers. Printing, publishing and the manufacture of musical instruments, medical supplies, and cheap and real jewelry completed the picture. Printing was far below Western European standards. In 1875 there were about seventeen printing shops with about 180,000 rubles worth of production, which by 1895

increased to some 638,000 rubles. Printing in the Kievan *Pecherska Lavra*, Lviv, *Stavropigia*, Pochaiv monastery, and elsewhere, of course, continued.

FOOD AND THE PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL MATERIALS. Processing agricultural and related raw materials and food production constituted another vast and important branch of the Ukrainian economy of the nineteenth century. This branch was composed of a great variety of processing industries: sugar, meat, dairy, flour, macaroni, grits, canned food, fish processing, vegetable oils, distilling and brewing, soft drinks, salt, tobacco, textiles and garments, leather and footwear, soap and candles, and many others. Ukrainian agriculture, relying on fertile soil, and related fields such as cattle raising and forestry, built on a strong basis for the development of these industrial pursuits. Most of the industries, of course, had been traditional in Ukraine for centuries, but largely limited to household, craft, and *kustar* production. Since the industries had a well-established historical foundation, increasing population and a slowly rising standard of living promoted their growth. By 1913, food industries produced an output worth almost one billion rubles, in over 1,600 plants, with a work force of about 170,000 people, the output reaching 45.7 percent of the Empire's total.[36]

The sugar industry undoubtedly occupied the most prominent position among these economic pursuits. It developed rather swiftly once manufacturing was begun. The first sugar-refining plant was established in Troshchyn, in the Kievan district, in 1824. The large landowners immediately recognized the great opportunity and began to grow more sugar beets to supply the raw material for the growing number of sugar refineries. By 1865 there were already 181 refineries in Ukraine and in 1914, 210 refineries, some 84 percent of all the refineries in the Russian Empire. Available

resources, growing demand, and new technology enabled the sugar enterprises to prosper. By the 1870s the new technology had resulted in an eight-fold productivity increase. In 1881-1882 the output of granulated sugar amounted to some 200,900 tons. It increased by 1913-1914 to 1,104,800 tons, some 80 to 85 percent of all the granulated and some 73 to 75 percent of all the refined sugar of the Empire.[37]

Although the sugar industry was widely scattered throughout the country, its main concentration was in the Kievan, Volhinian, and Podillian regions, as well as in Western Ukraine and the Kuban land. The work force engaged by the sugar industry constituted about one-fifth of the total Ukrainian labor employment. Sugar manufacturing was largely owned and operated by local entrepreneurs and capitalists, unlike the coal and metallurgical industries, where foreign interests prevailed. Corporate businesses ran the industry, and in 1887 a sugar cartel was set up to curb competition and increase profits. By 1902, this cartel, being assisted by the Government, controlled some 92 percent of sugar interests. Meanwhile, small refineries either closed down or joined large organizations. A monopolist trend was taking over, bringing with it an increased efficiency. Important names in the industry included Bobrzynski and Branicki (Polish noblemen), Yakhnenko and Symerenko (Ukrainian peasants), the brothers Tereshchenko and Kharytonenko (Ukrainian merchants), and Brodsky and Halperin (Jewish capitalists). Ukraine became one of the leading sugar producers in the world. Her output of sugar was seven times as great as that of all Russia. On the eve of World War I, in 1914, there were exactly 241 refineries processing sugar beets planted on almost 2 million acres of land, with some 1.5 million tons of sugar production.[38]

The enormous potential of sugar manufacturing was rigidly limited by the northern border of Ukraine, as Kononenko has pointed out. North of that border the sugar content of the beets dramatically declined, making the industry almost unprofitable. In addition, Russian discriminatory policies

were at work. In order to eliminate the natural Ukrainian advantage in sugar manufacturing St. Petersburg continuously increased its oppressive excise tax on sugar, eventually some 40 percent of the selling price. That substantially reduced domestic demand and consumption. The Ukrainian peasant could scarcely afford sugar at such a price. The tax made sugar an important export item of the Empire, and it was sold very cheaply abroad, so that the German peasant could even feed his hogs with Ukrainian sugar. At the same time, the Russians protected their own sugar production by favorable railroad rates for shipment and by tariff policy manipulations. In addition, they permitted foreign-produced sugar to enter the Empire at favorable terms, which was detrimental to Ukrainian sugar interests. At one point Governor Vasilchikov of Kiev demanded a fairer treatment of the Ukrainian sugar industry by St. Petersburg, but he was virtually ignored. Kononenko was correct when he asserted: "If Ukrainian sugar was finally able to win, and largely pushed foreign sugar off the market, it was only because of high profitability."[39]

In other food industries in Ukraine St. Petersburg also used excessive excises, discriminatory tariffs, and some administrative manipulations to limit their development including distilling, brewing, and textile manufacturing. As Kononenko has asserted, distilling was hampered by Russian Government policies. At one time, a special tax was imposed on distilling, which resulted in a decline of the number of distilleries. The tax affected, of course, alcohol distribution. In northern Ukraine, by 1863 there were 180 distributors of alcohol, while twenty years later, the number had declined to 52. In the Kiev, Poltava, and Katerynoslav regions, by 1863, there were 887 distilleries. Three years later only 499 were left, while their production in the same period had decreased from 4.2 to 2.7 million barrels of spirits.

There was another development in the industry which must be emphasized here in order to give a proper picture of the

situation. At first, distilling was done by small enterprises. Landlords ran manorial distilleries, peasants ran household distilleries, and merchants ran small distilleries in the cities. Then, in the second half of the century, large enterprises took over and small distilleries began to disappear which certainly accounted for the decline in the number of distilleries. The less efficient ones could not absorb the excise taxation. Large enterprises were more efficient, and this was largely responsible for the five-fold increase of production in the 1860s, from 3.6 to 16 million barrels of vodka. The growth of the industry, in spite of Government discrimination, continued, largely because of the cheapness of the raw materials—potatoes and grain—which assured its profitability at the expense of agricultural interests. By 1859, there were 36,817 taverns selling alcohol. That will give some idea of the extent of the demand. Ukrainian spirits were exported to Russia, Byeloruthenia, and Poland. Beer production was scattered throughout the country, carried out by small and medium-sized breweries, while wine production, confined mainly to the southern regions, never amounted to anything significant because of the climate and the low tariffs on wine imports which hindered domestic manufacturing.[40]

Salt production proceeded in the West Ukraine, Katerynoslav, Kherson, and Kharkiv regions, and the Crimean Peninsula. In 1814, there were only 5 salt-boiling establishments in East Ukraine. By 1861 the number had increased to some 128. Along with salt-boiling, candle and soap manufacturing developed. In 1838, there were some 88 candle-manufacturing plants in the country, and by 1861, some 130, with an output worth over one million rubles. In 1861 some 54 soap factories produced about 316 thousand rubles' worth of soap.

Flour milling and the production of grits and cereals continued to develop, as in the past, in households and small enterprises. Large-scale, commercialized milling came into being in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Flour mills, driven by wind or water, were to be found all over the country,

but in particular, as the records indicate, in the Kiev, Podillia, Volhinia, Chernihiv, Galicia and Bukovyna regions. The mills produced flour largely for local consumption. Not much of it was exported. Grain, however, was an important export item. Vegetable oils were produced from sunflower, hemp, and flax. Although the industry was rather concentrated in the Kherson, Poltava, and Katerynoslav regions, vegetable oils were manufactured in households in other provinces of the land as well.

Dairy production—including milk and milk products, sour cream, butter, various kinds of cheese, buttermilk, and eggs—was largely confined to the manors and peasant households for much of the century. Factory-like cooperative or commercialized dairy enterprises emerged towards the end of the century, being facilitated in many cases, by the *zemstvo* system. Dairy production grew with the general increase in population, and the *zemstvo* agencies promoted progressive methods of organization and management, as well as the raising of better breeds of cattle with progressive breeding techniques. Factory-like cooperative dairy enterprises could soon be found in various parts of the country, including West Ukraine. Dairy enterprises on the manors also used progressive techniques.

In addition to the food industries, many other industrial pursuits were traditionally based in the households, on a craft and *kustar* basis, but in the latter part of the century the factory system began to take over. Textiles, linen, cloth, socks, nets, leather and footwear, furs, carpets, household and kitchen appliances, and other products of light industry were being manufactured in increasing amounts, for domestic use and for export on a limited scale. Yet these industries also were exposed to discriminatory Russian policies, including tariffs and administrative impediments. Beginning in the 1820s, St. Petersburg favored and protected competing industries in Russia, which were allowed to develop at will. That made it virtually impossible for their Ukrainian counterparts

to become truly competitive. Any Ukrainian undertaking in these areas faced Russian and Polish market domination. St. Petersburg was adamant on maintaining Russian dominance. Hence Russian and Polish exports fulfilled the Ukrainian demand for various products of the light industries to an ever-increasing percentage. Kononenko has shown us ample proof that, although, for example, the textile industry was slowly growing, Russian tariffs and shipment charges hurt Ukrainian textile manufacturing and other light industries considerably. Ukrainian protests were ignored, since St. Petersburg, as always, was more interested in the central Muscovite industrial regions than in the welfare of the borderlands. Requests to raise import duties into Ukraine came from all over the country and from various Ukrainian industrial sectors as well, but to no avail. The following statistical table shows the inferior position of Ukraine in representative light industries:

Industry	*Production in thousands of rubles*		*Ukraine's percentage of the imperial total*
	Ukraine	*Russia*	
Cotton	475.0	928,496.6	0.5
Wool	9,461.3	225,346.7	4.2
Silk	0.0	34,549.4	0.0
Linen-hemp	6,567.7	93,491.4	7.0
Other textiles	733.6	49,632.5	1.5

Ukraine, having no comparative advantage and coming relatively late into the field of light industries, and being hampered by Russian discrimination, could not develop as it might. Things would have been definitely different if Ukraine had been an independent nation.[41]

In 1865 there were only five small cotton-processing plants, which subsequently were forced by foreign competition to

close. The linen industry was a little more successful. It progressed slightly, as indicated below:

Year	*Number of plants*	*Output in rubles*
1865	2	9,300
1895	42	413,000

There were also 5 jute and rope plants in Ukraine in 1865, with their output slightly rising. The production of canvas, hosiery, and gloves declined in the latter part of the century. Woolen manufacturing, however, fared a little better. In 1865, there were some 144 woolen establishments with about 3.6 million rubles of production, while thirty years later the number of establishments had increased to 194 and their output had declined a little to about 3.3 million. The industry was first centered in the Podillia and Volhinia provinces, and then later on it expanded to the Poltava region as well. In the Kharkiv and Kherson regions a wool-washing industry was launched. The industry employed no more than several thousand people. The leather and footwear industry functioned in many small- and medium-sized establishments throughout the land, with its largest concentration in the Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv regions, as well as in West Ukraine, where it existed on a craft basis. This industry also suffered because of Russian discriminatory policies which allowed foreign imports to come in at low duty rates. In 1783 in Ukraine there were some 200 leather establishments supplying shoes, boots, belts, saddles, caps, and other articles. By 1865 their number had increased to 449 with an output worth about 1.3 million rubles. In 1805 there were 27 tanning plants, and in 1860, 254. Production of furs was largely centered in the Kievan region, but furs were manufactured to a lesser degree in other places in Ukraine. In 1885 there were 55 fur enterprises with production worth some 790,000 rubles. In the

Chernihiv district there were 5 bristle plants, with output worth some 235,000 rubles.[42]

Although references have been made to the home-based manufacturing pursuits, at this point a few more words must be added to complete the brief picture of the industrial production in Ukraine in the nineteenth century. Home industries were traditional. They were of a small scale, strictly to cover local and regional demand. Only in a few cases did such production receive national acclaim. In particular in the forest and mountain regions during wintertime, when the peasant was relatively free from his farm work and serf obligations, he engaged in various craft pursuits in his home, such as woodworking, pottery-making, weaving, metal-working, and leather work. In addition, the old craft system remained on the scene. In the villages and towns, shoemakers, tailors, smiths, carpenters, basketweavers, and many other craftsmen tried to produce for local demand. In 1911-1912, home-based manufacturing employed some 400,000 people.

DOMESTIC TRADE. At the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century the old and traditional forms of domestic trading prevailed in Ukraine, although some modern forms of commercial activity, such as establishing permanent stores and the use of credit, were beginning to emerge. Trading was still largely carried out at periodical fairs and almost daily at marketplaces in the towns and villages. Stores were rather rare, though their number was growing. Of course, as in the past, bad roads continued to hamper the growth of trade for a long time. The first Ukrainian highway, connecting Kiev, Berest, and Kharkiv, was constructed in the 1850s, while the first railroad between Kiev and Kursk was put into operation in the late 1860s, to aid commercial activities. Water transportation on major rivers continued to

be an important channel of trade, though waterfalls, sandbars, bad weather, winter frosts, and spring floods hindered it to a great extent.

Fairs and marketplaces accounted for most trading. The fairs were of various sizes: all-imperial, all-Ukrainian, regional, and countywide. For example, the fairs held first at Dubno and after 1797 at Kiev were attended by merchants and other interested people from all over the Empire, and from abroad as well. These large fairs, and especially the Kievan ones, were called *kontrakty*, "contracts," since spot agreements were often made for future deliveries of commodities or merchandise. Ten or fifteen thousand people or more might attend these fairs, and two to three million rubles worth of goods might be traded: all kinds of food, sugar, grain, textiles, appliances, cattle, horses, garments, footwear, furniture, metal products, jewelry, wax, honey, tobacco, raw materials, pictures, knitting ware, and other goods. At the large fairs—like those in Kiev, Kharkiv, Berdychiv, Romni, Sumy, or Krolovets—one could meet merchants not only from all over the Empire, as mentioned, but from France, Germany, Turkey, Armenia, Venice, Austria, the Caucasian lands, Siberia, and elsewhere. The Kievan *kontrakty* retained their economic significance almost until World War I. At the fairs at Romni, which lasted for two months each, some twenty million rubles worth of goods were moved in the 1840s.

During the fairs, because of the mass of people who attended, all kinds of social gatherings—such as balls, shows, operas, concerts, and other artistic performances—went on. The Decembrist revolutionaries, for example, arranged their secret meetings during the fairs, as Polonska-Vasylenko has asserted, in order to avoid being noticed by the police. Hence, the fairs were not only important economically.

The fairs were both general, dealing with a great variety of merchandise, and special, handling only certain items or a related group of items—such as horse or cattle fairs in Hadi-

ach or Yelysavethrad and woolen fairs in Kharkiv. There were urban and rural fairs, some lasting a few days or a few weeks. The difference between the urban and rural fairs was in the kinds of goods handled. The rural or village fairs dealt in horses, cattle, and farm produce, while the urban fairs largely handled manufactured goods and were on a larger scale.[43]

Along with the fairs, a great deal of trading was also done in the urban and rural marketplaces on a daily basis or during a few days of each week. The days and times of trading were strictly regulated by tradition and local authorities. The fairs and marketplaces were frequented by merchants, craftsmen, friars, Cossacks, members of the gentry or their deputies, and peasants willing to sell their products or buy what they needed.

At the end of the eighteenth century some deep changes began to emerge. More and more permanent stores were opened—some general, selling a variety of merchandise, and some selling products of a special trade. In addition, the number of professional merchants multiplied quickly and the volume of commercial operations increased. Between 1825 and 1861 the number of merchants in Ukrainian towns and cities increased more than ten times on the average, and in the city of Odessa a staggering forty-two times. During the same period of time the number of stores quadrupled, increasing from 3,662 to 15,089. At the same time, the economic significance of the fairs and marketplaces began slowly to decline.

The vast majority of the merchant class was non-Ukrainian—Russian, Polish, Jewish, Armenian, Greek, even French and Italian—and largely subservient to the Russian overlords. The ethnic composition of the class was, of course, different in different parts of the country. Again Odessa was most international in this respect, while in the Right-bank regions Polish and Jewish elements prevailed. The result of all this was that the foreigners had no loyalty to Ukrainian

economic interests. Tsar Nicholas I, in fact, resettled a number of rich Russian merchants to Ukraine in order to strengthen the Russian ethnic stock there, which was loyal to the Government, and to acquire more control over Ukrainian commerce in the country's large cities, especially in the capital of Kiev.

As in the previous period, the interests of the merchant class suffered because of overpowering competition from the Cossacks and courtiers, who used certain class advantages of their own, and from the peasants as well. In order to protect their economic interests, the merchants as well as the craftsmen, continued their traditional guild organizations even though in 1786 the guilds had been reorganized and renamed *upravy*, "administrations." The guilds maintained their boards of trade, where meetings were held, some stores located, and treasuries and records kept. The memberships were under the guild administrations and judiciaries, which supervised production and quality control, pricing and market distribution, and the training of apprentices. This was very much according to tradition, and included attempts to limit membership. For example, the slaughterers' guilds maintained only one slaughterhouse in each city, and all slaughtering was supposed to be done there on payment of a fee. Similar exclusiveness was practiced by the fishermen's guilds. Although after the Napoleonic wars workshops and commercial industries began to grow, the crafts and *kustar* businesses and mercantile enterprises continued to employ the majority of the urban population. In 1831 the guild system in the crafts and commerce was officially abolished as being outdated. However, its customs and traditions in the social life of the towns survived until the Revolution.

The second half of the nineteenth century brought railroads and steamships, and these two developments substantially changed and increased the composition and volume of trading. At the same time the participation of foreign capital

greatly increased in Ukrainian domestic commerce. It frequently took the form of corporative businesses with substantial foreign interests. Subsequently the use of credit and insurance, also with substantial foreign capital, increased in commercial operations.

The prevalence of foreign capital and the growing role of foreigners in Ukrainian trading in general activated the cooperative movement as a form of the Ukrainian self-defense. It tried to free, at least to some extent, Ukrainian commercial interests from foreign, and in particular Russian, capitalistic pressure. The cooperative movement, including consumer, producer, and credit cooperatives, began in Ukraine in the 1860s. At first, its development was slow due to lack of understanding, a kind of resistant hostility toward novelty, and an unfavorable Government attitude toward a nationally motivated Ukrainian movement.

Yet by 1895 there were already 250 cooperatives. In this year credit unions, and two years later consumer cooperatives, received their legal regulations; that is, the respective laws were passed. This gave a new impetus to the growth of cooperatives. The secret Ukrainian societies, the *hromady*, and the *zemstvo* self-governments took the lead in supporting the the cooperative movement as a way to assist the less wealthy segments of the society. At first mostly small credit unions were organized, which affected commercial activities indirectly. There will be additional discussion of this in the section on finances. Consumer and producer cooperatives lagged behind.

While initially the movement in Ukraine was part of the all-Russian system, after 1905 it took on a more national character. The Poltava and Kiev regions led in this. In 1908 in Kiev, and two years later in Vynnytsia, an association of consumer cooperatives was established. However, in 1913 the Ukrainian associations were dissolved by the Government, and the Ukrainian cooperative movement once again was forced to be a part of the Russian system. The conflict between

Russian imperial and Ukrainian national economic interests continued. Soon, however, Kiev took over leadership in the movement again, and the publication of cooperative papers and other periodicals in Ukrainian was initiated to educate and enlighten the masses as to the advantages of the movement. B. Martos must be credited for initiating the training programs and courses to prepare qualified workers for the movement. V. Domanytsky, O. Yurkevych, K. Baranovsky, B. Martos, P. Pozharsky, F. Kryzhanivsky, and others were pioneers and leaders in the field, in this way helping Ukrainian economic interests to become stronger and more independent. Cooperative enterprises, including consumer cooperatives grew steadily in number and in commercial and financial power, as the following shows:

Year	*Number of cooperatives*
1895	250
1900	450
1905	820
1910	2,100
1914	6,510

By January 1914, out of the total number of 6,510, 3,022 were consumer cooperatives handling merchandising for the benefit of the membership.[44]

Farm, building, and manufacturing cooperatives developed modestly. In 1897, farm cooperatives were permitted by law to engage in commercial operations. M. Levytsky was their promoter and champion. Russian authorities continued to harass Ukrainian cooperatives. For example, they opposed the formation of cooperative unions. Finally, in 1909, such a

union was formed in Berdianske, and it was followed up by others. Yet a central organization of cooperatives was never achieved.

In West Ukraine, the cooperative movement began to grow in the 1870s in an attempt to build up the commercial and credit activities of the people. Fraternal cooperative organizations were supported by church parishes and the *Prosvita* association. In 1883 *Narodnia Torhivla*, National Commerce, a central consumer cooperative association of the Rochdale type, was established, and it subsequently and energetically proceeded to organize cooperative stores throughout Galicia. The *Prosvita* maintained cooperative trading posts on its premises along with reading rooms throughout the land. While the Austrian law of 1867 to promote the cooperative movement failed, that of 1873 was more successful. Soon credit unions developed, and in 1898, the *Kraiovyi Soiuz Kredytovyi*, Land Credit Association, was organized to support commercial transactions indirectly. In 1904, the Land Audit Union was established to audit cooperatives legally and it became a central body of the movement in Galicia. The cooperative papers *Ekonomist* and *Samopomich* were published. In 1912, *Narodnia Torhivla* maintained 18 branch stores and 831 affiliated cooperative stores in various towns and villages of Galicia. Farm cooperatives began to develop in 1904 and were largely involved in milk and dairy processing and selling. In 1907 the Land Dairy Association was formed. In 1914 in Galicia there were 609 cooperatives, of which forty percent were consumer or other trading cooperatives. The gross sales of commercial cooperatives that year reached some 20,157,000 Austrian *kronen* in value. I. Petrushevych and Rev. O. Nyzhankivsky, among others, were prominent activists in the Galician cooperativism. The city of Lviv was the center for most of the umbrella organizations of cooperatives.

In Bukovyna, the cooperative movement began in the 1880s under Galician influence, pioneered there by S. Smal-Stocky

and L. Kohut. In Carpathian Ukraine, the movement was not very successful.[45]

FOREIGN TRADE. As an extensive and predominantly agricultural country, in the course of the early nineteenth century Ukraine continued her traditional pattern of economic cooperation and exchange with other nations, mainly exporting grain, some processed foods, cattle, meat, leather, wax, honey, and other items, and importing manufactured goods, tea and coffee, spices, wines, and some luxuries. Yet with the progress of time, and in particular because of a gradual industrialization in the last part of the century, the composition of Ukrainian foreign trade began slowly to change, and some semi-manufactured and some finished industrial goods began to be added to the country's exports. The total volume of foreign trade also began to increase. Nevertheless, the prevalence of agricultural exports and industrial imports continued until World War I.

The establishment of a firm access to the Black and Azov Seas and the founding on their shores of new cities and ports, such as Odessa and Kherson, substantially increased the volume of foreign trade with other lands. However, that increase would have been much larger, if St. Petersburg had not favored the Baltic Sea ports, including the port of Arkhangelsk on the shores of the White Sea, and discriminated against the Black Sea ports whenever any conflict of interests developed. Discriminatory railroad rates, as already mentioned, magnified the issue. Nevertheless, during the so-called Continental Blockade of Europe in 1808, for example, the port of Odessa alone handled some 100 million rubles worth of coffee, cotton, and sugar. When the city of Odessa was made a free area between 1819 and 1859, and exports and imports could pass through it duty free, the volume of foreign trade expanded again and the city itself grew impressively. At that

time the exports of grain through Odessa, Kherson, and other minor ports increased to over 300,000 tons a year. Salt pork, leather and leather products, furs, and still other items were added to the exports.[46]

It is rather difficult to acquire an exact picture of Ukrainian foreign trade in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century because Ukraine was not treated as a separate economic unit. Her individual provinces were considered parts of the Russian or Austrian empires. G. Kryvchenko and A. Koporsky did some pioneering work in ascertaining the place of Ukraine as a separate economic entity with respect to her foreign trade, yet their approach was too restrictive, largely limited to nine central and eastern Ukrainian provinces without paying attention to Western Ukraine, Kuban, and some other eastern borderlands. Hence, some gross omissions in their work are apparent.[47] Galician, Bukovynian, and Carpatho-Ukrainian foreign trade was considered Austrian, and Kubanian foreign trade Russian, and thus not even mentioned by the two authors.

There is another difficulty to be encountered. Strictly speaking, Ukrainian foreign trade meant Ukraine's trade, not only with Germany, the Balkan countries, or France, but also with Russia proper, Poland, the Baltic countries, or Siberia. It did not matter that the latter, together with Ukraine, were parts of the same Empire. However, to acquire any exact statistics for the period in question about Ukraine's commercial dealings with these other territorial components of the Empire is almost impossible. One must be satisfied with approximations.

As a continuation of the patterns of the early parts of the nineteenth century, Ukraine's foreign trade activities in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries were extremely favorable. Her exports exceeded her imports substantially. The following statistics for the central and eastern provinces of the country prove the point:

Approximate Trade Balance of Eastern Ukraine (1909-11)[48]

Goods exported	Total exports		Exports to other parts of the Russian empire		Exports abroad	
	In mill. rub.	%	In mill. rub.	%	In mill. rub.	%
Grain	257.7	32.5	4.7	1.1	252.3	69.3
Flour	110.7	14.0	76.7	18.0	34.0	9.4
Other plant products	30.9	3.9	6.1	1.4	24.8	6.8
Animal products	56.4	7.1	29.5	6.9	26.9	7.4
Processed agric. products	221.7	28.0	199.4	46.8	22.3	6.1
Mining products	12.4	1.6	9.0	2.1	3.4	1.0
Metal and metal products	90.1	11.4	90.1	21.1	—	—
Other industrial products	10.1	1.5	10.8	2.6	—	—
TOTALS	790.0	100.0	426.3	100.0	363.7	100.0

Goods imported	Total imports		Imports from other parts of the Russian empire		Imports from abroad	
	In mill. rub.	%	In mill. rub.	%	In mill. rub.	%
Textiles	188.6	40.4	187.9	52.0	0.8	0.7
Machines and metal products	34.6	7.4	5.3	1.5	29.3	28.9
Oil and oil products	33.5	7.2	30.7	8.5	2.8	2.4
Leather and leather goods	31.3	6.7	27.9	7.7	3.4	3.2
Notions	28.1	6.0	23.9	6.6	4.2	4.0
Chemical products	7.1	1.6	—	—	7.5	7.1
Alcoholic beverages	26.0	5.6	23.1	6.4	2.9	2.7
Tea, coffee, and spices	32.7	7.0	5.7	1.6	27.0	25.6
Fish	29.3	6.3	23.7	6.6	5.5	5.3
Lumber	12.1	2.6	12.1	3.4	—	—
Others	43.7	9.2	20.7	5.7	22.6	21.0
TOTALS	467.0	100.0	361.0	100.0	106.0	100.0
Gross trade (exports and imports)	1,257.0		787.3		469.7	
Favorable trade balance	**323.0**		**65.0**		**258.0**	

The trade balance for the provinces—excluding Western Ukraine and some other Ukrainian lands in the Russian Empire, such as Kuban and Woronizh—in 1909-1911 showed exports worth 790 million rubles. Of this some 86 percent was agricultural. Grain and flour constituted some 46 percent, followed by other products of agriculture and the extractive industries, and metals and metal products. Imports were worth some 467 million rubles and included textiles, machines and metal products, petroleum and petroleum products, leather and leather goods, tea, coffee, and spices. Total foreign trade for the bulk of Ukrainian territory was worth 1,257 million rubles, with a favorable excess of exports over imports of 323 million rubles.

Out of the 790 million rubles of exports, 426.3 million's worth went to Russia proper and other lands of the Empire: Poland, the Baltic countries, Byeloruthenia, Siberia, the Caucasian lands, and Central Asiatic lands. The rest went to West European, Balkan, Near East, and other nations. Out of the 467 million rubles worth of imports, 361 million came from Russia proper and other lands of the Empire, some three-fourths of the total, and only 106 million from other nations of the world. This fit the imperial pattern perfectly. Russia was never heavily involved in foreign trade. Prior to World War I, as mentioned in the first section of this chapter, her foreign trade volume was smaller than that of little Belgium and Luxembourg, and smaller by far than that of Germany and England. The imperial needs were largely satisfied by inter-provincial commerce. Hence, little foreign trade with outside nations was allowed to Ukraine. In 1913 the Empire allocated to Ukraine not even seven percent of its total international commerce, to Ukraine's great disadvantage, another indication of Ukraine's colonial position.[49] As far as the origin of imports was concerned, textiles—some fifty-two percent—came largely from Russia proper and Poland, machines and metal products from Germany; wood from Russia and Byeloruthenia, and groceries and spices from other lands.

Galicia, Bukovyna, and Carpathian Ukraine, the territorial parts of the Austrian Empire, must be evaluated separately. Galicia maintained a proportion between its exports and imports as similar to that of Eastern Ukraine, and its international balance of trade was also favorable. Its main exports were wood, cattle, meat and hogs. In the latter part of the century petroleum and petroleum products were added to the list. The foreign trade of Bukovyna and Carpathian Ukraine was negligible. A little wood and food were exported from those regions. The importation of textiles, luxuries, and manufactured goods, coming from other parts of the monarchy and abroad, supplemented the Western Ukrainian economy. Kuban, the most southeastern province of Ukraine, extending southward towards the Caucasian Mountains and treated by St. Petersburg as a strictly Russian territory, had an exceedingly favorable balance of trade, substantially adding to an even more favorable overall foreign balance of trade for the Ukrainian economy. Kuban exported wheat, barley, sunflower oil, seeds, cakes, and tobacco—with a considerable surplus over its imports of textiles, manufactured goods, and some luxuries. With respect to Europe, Ukraine was definitely "an extensive agricultural provider," and with respect to Russia, she was an exploited colonial economy, as Dyminsky has asserted.

However, Ukrainian's foreign balance of payments—her overall total of debits and credits toward the rest of the world, was not so favorable at all. Russian and other foreign investments in the local, steel, and iron, railroad, and other industries, and short-term capital movements and foreign services rendered—in particular, in the shipping industry—resulted in an annual outflow of millions upon millions of gold rubles in the form of interest and dividend payments to Russian, Belgium, French, German, English, American, Greek, and other capitalists. It was estimated, as pointed out before, that between 1891 and 1910 some 2.7 billion rubles left Ukraine to pay Russian and other foreign investors, some 130 million

rubles annually.[50] In the two-year period of 1909 to 1911 the surplus of exports over imports amounted to some 323 million rubles, or about 160 million per year. Consequently, the surplus in Ukraine's foreign balance of payments in those years was rather modest, but only because of her heavy grain exports and the definitely favorable position of the Kuban region in foreign trading. But the generally unfavorable pattern and trend prevailed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS. Transportation of various forms developed poorly in the course of the nineteenth century. This happened, not because there were no conditions in Ukraine for effective transportation, but rather because the land was a Russian colonial borderland. Muscovy-Russia was never able to establish any efficient and orderly transportation system, as Dyminsky has asserted.

Water transportation had been, of course, traditional in Ukraine since prehistoric times. In the nineteenth century, however, weather conditions caused wide fluctuations in the water level—freezing in winter, floods in the spring, and low water in the summer. In addition, frequent sandbars and waterfalls substantially weakened the dependability of water transportation. Practically speaking, nothing was done to improve the situation. The main rivers, such as the Dnieper, Dniester, Desna, Boh, Inhulets, Inhul, Prypiat, as well as some mountain rivers, were more or less level and could have been successfully used for shipping bulky materials—grain and lumber in particular. Little irrigation was done under the Russian rule. Only a few canals were constructed and utilized: the Oginski Canal, linking the Dnieper system with the Baltic Sea, and the Royal Canal, linking some Black Sea ports with the Baltic; another canal connected the Donets River with the Samara and Vovcha Rivers, and there were some smaller

ones also. The few canals did promote some long-distance transportation of bulky commodities. The Danube River connected Ukraine with the Balkan lands and the central European countries via the Black Sea.

In 1823, the first steamboat was put into operation on the Dniester River, while in 1835 the first steamboat company was organized to ship gravel for the construction of a fort in Kiev. Of course, with the construction of railroads and some highways, the relative importance of river transportation declined in the late nineteenthe century.[51]

Sea transportation was growing a little more impressively. Above all, the Black and Azov Sea littorals were well developed, with easy access from the land as well. The only shortcomings there were shallow waters near the coast and occasional freezing in winter, but they were not major obstacles for sea transportation. The first modern ports were put into operation in Kerson in 1778, in Sebastopol in 1784, and in Odessa in 1794. By the end of the eighteenth century there were also a few other ports, operating on the shores of the Black and Azov Seas. Odessa was the largest since it was frozen for only two to three weeks a year and the largest shipments of grain and staples were handled there. In the nineteenth century other important ports were: Mykolaiv, through which grains and ores were shipped; Kherson, for grain and lumber; and Novorossiisk, on the east coast of the Black Sea, for grain and wool. On the Azov Sea there were: Mariupil, Tahanrih, Rostov, and Berdianske, and in the Crimean Peninsula, Sebastopol and Teodosia. Ukrainian grain and other commodities were also shipped in large quantities through the Baltic ports—such as Danzig and Koenigsberg in particular. The exports through the Black Sea ports gained great importance, especially after the introduction of railroads and the construction of the Suez Canal.

By 1913, Ukrainian ports handled some forty-five percent of all shipments of coal, ores, sugar, metals, building materials, petroleum, and other commodities. This included the coastal

trade, which totaled 13 million tons annually. Actually, the coastal trade constituted some seventy percent, and foreign trade thirty percent, of the total cargo handled. The domestic merchant marine was inadequate and deficient: some 416 steam ships, 887 sailboats, 22 motor boats, with a total capacity of only 473,000 tons. It was no wonder, therefore, that the bulk of shipments was handled by foreigners, Greeks in particular. Before World War I, there were normally more Greek ships in the port of Odessa than domestic ships. Odessa was a true international city at that time. As far as sea traffic was concerned, Ukraine ranked about thirteenth in the world.[52]

The condition of the roads in Ukraine under the Russian Tsars was deplorable. Until the late nineteenth century there were scarcely any paved roads or highways in Ukraine. The Government did not take any interest in the matter whatsoever. Dirt roads and broad trails, highly dependent on the weather, either dusty or muddy or frozen, prevailed for most of the century. The first highway was constructed toward the end of the century, and later progress was very modest and below any Western standards. The construction of railroads actually delayed any interest in highway building. The road situation in West Ukraine, under Austrian occupation, however, was much better.

By 1914, Central and Eastern Ukraine had about 3,500 kilometers of paved roads, while small Galicia had some 10,000 kilometers. Southern Ukraine had literally no highways at all, despite the fact that important industrial centers were located there. There were practically no motor vehicles on the roads that existed. The dirt roads and broad trails were still used by members of the *chumak* profession to transport grain to the sea ports and bring salt from there to the northern parts of the country. The *chumak* was a kind of wholesaler at that time, and rich peasants dominated the profession.

The first railroad was constructed between Odessa and Balta, over a distance of 260 kilometers, between 1868 and 1870. It was then extended to Kremenchuck and Kiev. The

Russian regime stopped the first German initiative to build a long-distance line to connect Ukraine with Central Europe. St. Petersburg saw this as a threat to Russian interests. Subsequently, railroad lines were constructed in such a way as to tie Ukraine to the Russian Eurasian markets, running from south to north rather than from east to west—which might have connected the diversified economic regions of the country with each other. The east-west pattern could have made Ukraine more economically independent of the Russian imperial markets. East-west lines were constructed later. With respect to railroad construction, the situation in West Ukraine was much better as well. The city of Lviv became a junction of nine railroad lines, while Kiev had only two and Kharkiv six.

Of course, the south-north railroad lines carried bulky commodities—grain, flour, coal, ore, steel, and iron—to Black and Azov Sea ports as well as other ports. But since the lines were connected to Russian lines, these commodities were also shipped to the Baltic Sea without regard to Ukrainian interests.

In the 1870s a rather thick network of lines went under construction in the Donets Basin. Ultimately the railroad network in that region became better developed than any in Western Europe. In 1884, the coal-rich Donbas was connected with the ore-rich Kryvyi Rih region, and the event had an immensely important impact on the industrial growth of Ukraine, as has been pointed out. In 1914, in Eastern Ukraine there were some 17,000 kilometers of railroad tracks, about 3.2 kilometers per 10,000 people; the total tonnage carried reached 95.5 million, while 49 million passengers travelled by railroad. The situation was still more advantageous in Western Ukraine, especially in Galicia. The city of Lviv was connected with Vienna and Chernivtsi in 1866, and with Carpathian Ukraine in 1874. There were some 3,700 kilometers of trackage or 6.0 kilometers per 10,000 population in Western Ukraine. Total Ukrainian railroad trackage reached 17,700 kilometers excluding of course some borderland regions.

In the Austrian monarchy, the railroad was owned by the

Government, while in the Russian Empire, including Ukraine, private-stock corporations initiated railroad construction. In Ukraine, this was done by the so-called South-Western Railroad Company, but in the 1880s the Government took over the operation. Yet, on the eve of World War I some twenty percent of the railroads were still operated by private companies, mostly Belgian and French. The state-operated railways were heavily indebted abroad, since French and German capitalists owned substantial amounts of their bonds. It was another instance of the considerable outflow of interest and dividends in the form of gold currency to foreign countries, negatively affecting the Ukrainian international balance of payments.

The height of railroad construction in the Russian Empire was reached in the 1870s and 80s, prompting a large demand for Ukrainian steel and rail production. This affected the development of Ukrainian heavy manufacturing most favorably. Only the discriminatory tariff policies and railroad rates, which favored Russian long-distance shipping, had a negative impact. They detoured Ukrainian exports to Russia and Russian ports, even though exporting to other countries might have been more advantageous for the Ukrainian economy, as pointed out previously.[53]

The communications media developed slowly. The postal service was run by the Government after 1750. In 1913, in Ukraine there was one post office per 415 square kilometers or 25,000 people, and one letter or parcel of mail was sent per eight persons annually. Telegraph service was installed in the 1840s in Galicia, and in the 1850s in Central and Eastern Ukraine. Telegraph connections between Lviv and Vienna were established in 1846, and between Kiev and St. Petersburg in 1855. Telephone service was started in the 1880s. The first local telephones were installed as follows, in Odessa, 1882; Lviv, 1884; Kiev, 1886; and Kharkiv, 1888. Long-distance communications were first introduced in 1912. In 1913, the network of communications was basically as follows:

Number of communications centers (in thousands)	1.4
Distance mail carried (in thousands of kilometers)	11.2
Letters and parcels (in millions)	270.5
Periodicals (in millions)	105.8
Telegrams sent (in millions)	9.2
Long-distance calls	—

The development of the Ukrainian press was slowed and even prevented by the official Russification policies of St. Petersburg, including the notorious Ems decree of 1876, which prohibited the public use of the Ukrainian language in word and print. The growth of the Ukrainian-language press was rather inadequate, as shown below:

Year[54]	1848	1881	1900	1913
World	2	28	40	141
Russian Empire	—	—	1	19

Due to this discrimination against the Ukrainian language, Ukraine was flooded by Russian periodicals on the eve of World War I, while only nineteen periodicals were in Ukrainian. At the same time, in Western Ukraine, under Austrian occupation, eighty Ukrainian periodicals were published—dailies, weeklies, and otherwise. The first Ukrainian news agency, the Information Committee in Lviv, was established in 1912. The Ukrainian emigrants in the United States, Canada and South America published several newspapers in Ukrainian prior to World War I—such as *Svoboda*, *Naradonia Vola*, *Ameryka*, *Kanadyskyi Farmer*, and *Zoria*—to counteract the aggressive discrimination and misinformation concerning the Ukrainian problem.[55]

FINANCE. With the growth of the Ukrainian economy and of its gross national product, the need for its financial backing was also immeasurably increased. The growth of financial backing for the Ukrainian economy at times affected it positively and at times negatively. In particular, the increase of the significance of foreign capital, including Russian capital, in Ukraine had its serious negative aspects. The composition of foreign interests involved was constantly changing, but at all times these interests were, willingly and unwillingly, the tools of the ever more intensive colonial exploitation of Ukraine by the Russian Empire.

The monetary system in Ukraine, of course, had to be Russian; the ruble with its 100 kopieks was the circulating monetary unit. Prior to the currency reform in 1897, essentially two types of money circulated: silver rubles and treasury notes. In 1897, a reform was carried out and the gold ruble was introduced.

The money was appreciated, resulting in the fall of the prices of grain, affecting negatively the Ukrainian agricultural economy, of which grain was the leading export item. At the same time, Russian authorities pressed for more and more grain exports, even against the domestic Ukrainian interests, in order to repair their own foreign balance of payments. By 1910, the ruble was worth about US $0.51.

The economic expansion in Ukraine resulted in a growing need for credit, which brought about the emergence of commercial and other banking. The first banks were Russian, and they in particular assisted the settlement of "steppe" Ukraine. This ultimately resulted in the growth of the influential landed interests, a phenomenon that was not necessarily welcome from the Ukrainian point of view. In 1806 the branches of the State Loan Bank were established in Odessa and Theodisia, and subsequently, in the 1830s, in Kiev, Kharkiv, Poltava, and other towns. This was banking strictly under state auspices. The first private commercial bank was established

in the city of Odessa around 1830. Later on, private corporative banking institutions were organized again in Kiev (the Kievan Private Commercial Bank), in Odessa (the Odessa Merchant Bank and the Odessa Discount Bank), and in Kharkiv, Kremenchuk, Poltava, and so on. At the same time, in Western Ukraine international banks operated in the towns of Lviv, Chernivtsi, and others. Then, following the development of capitalism in Ukraine, the organization of commodity and stock exchanges came about in Kiev in 1885, and subsequently in Odessa, Kremenchuk, and Kharkiv—where securities and foreign exchanges were traded. In 1862, a Corporative Credit Association was launched in Odessa, followed by the organization of mutual savings banks, mortgage banks, and savings-and-loan associations.

At first, as in other countries, there was a high rate of bank failures due to lack of experience and supervision. Later local banking with some Ukrainian control began to be established throughout the land. By the 1870s and 1880s the process of Ukrainian capital creation was under way. This could have secured the economic independence of the land. However, in the 1890s Ukrainian capital was ruined as a consequence of an economic crisis, the currency reform of 1897, and the centralist policies of the Russian Government. These policies harnessed Russian and other foreign capital to promote the interests of the imperial "Eurasian market," making the borderlands, including Ukraine, subservient. St. Petersburg looked with disfavor upon Ukrainian capital formation. Also important was the decline in the grain prices due to currency reform, with landowners and peasants being forced to sell grain cheaply. Coupled with the depressions and recessions (1894-1895, 1899-1902, and 1906-1909), all this contributed to the ruination of the Ukrainian capital base. Alchevsky, a millionaire, tried to mobilize Ukrainian capital. He ran the Kharkiv Land Bank, and organized the Olekseiev Mining Industry Association to get the industry into Ukrainian hands in the Donets region, Kiev and Kharkiv and to achieve

some economic independence. He was followed by others, particularly in the sugar industry, such as Tereshchenko, Kandyba, Aranderenko, Yakhnenko, and Symerenko. Yet, in the wake of these developments, Alchevsky and the others were forced to submit to foreign capital interests, and Alchevsky's place was taken by a Russian capitalist, Riabushinskii, as Kononenko has pointed out.[56]

Hence, the domestic Ukrainian banks began to fail and foreign interests began to take over. This was also accomplished by so-called "financial reorganizations," the process which was intended to eliminate Ukrainian capital formation and to enhance the domination of foreign capital in the "convenient investment market" in Ukraine.[57] In line with Russian centralist policies, Russian and other foreign capital interests soon achieved control in mining, heavy industry, coal, iron and steel, machine-building, metal-working, shipbuilding, railroads, and banking. For example, the Azov-Donets Bank—controlled by French and German capital, with some twenty-three branches in Ukraine—or the Petersburg International Commercial Bank—controlled by German, French, and English interests, also with many branches—financed the operations of these industries. The Northern Bank was entirely French-owned and it merged with the Russian-Asiatic Bank, which in turn was dominated by Russian, French, and English capital interests. The Ukrainian sugar industry was subsequently heavily controlled by three Russian banks, which in turn were controlled by the Deutsche Bank. Quite a complicated capital-interest interrelationship.

The problem of foreign capital domination in Ukraine can be easily distorted by a tendencious interpretation, and this has been attempted by Russian Marxist economists, who have tried to blur the picture of Russian exploitation of the Ukrainian economy. Pointing at the foreign capital interests in Ukraine during Tsarist times, these Marxists attempted to prove that Ukraine was not exploited by the Russian imperial

interests, but by the foreign capitalists. It fitted in well with the Marxian theoretical structure, and at the same time vindicated "alleged" Russian imperialism. However, under close analytical scrutiny, this assertion proves wrong. The Russian Empire badly needed foreign capital to develop its incipient industrialization. Foreign investments in the imperial economy were rapidly increasing over the years:

Year	*Foreign investments (in millions of rubles)*
1870	26.5
1900	911.0
1913	1,350.0

In 1913, some 466 million rubles were invested in the Ukrainian economy alone, the bulk of which was in Franco-Belgian hands, as mentioned before.[58] St. Petersburg knew too well how to utilize these investments to advance its large-scale "Eurasian-market" interests, to make them serve the imperial centralist trends, and to strengthen its economic and political grip over the borderlands. Foreign investments did not break, but rather facilitated, Russian centralism, as Volobuiev, Kononenko, and other economists have agreed. Furthermore, Russia, having increased her economic (especially industrial) potential with the assistance of foreign capital, could easily put greater pressure on her colonial borderlands and exploit them so much more intensely. And this was really the case with Ukraine. Foreign capital was instrumental in the Russian domination of that country. Kononenko has said this clearly: "The most essential characteristics of the financial expansion of Western European capital in Ukraine were its two goals: to join in the exploitation of the national economy of Ukraine and to strengthen the colonial dependence of Ukraine upon Russia." The industrial profits of Ukrainian enterprises were much higher than those of Russian ones:

some 34.1 percent in relation to capital investments, while some 20 to 25 percent of this was going abroad to pay dividends and interests, and only some 9 to 14 percent remained in the country for domestic capital accumulation.[59] This greatly upset the Ukrainian foreign balance of payments.

In the 1890s an attempt was undertaken to defend Ukrainian interests against foreign capital invasion including Russian, by means of the cooperative movement and the cooperative credit unions. Although the movement helped a little, the credit unions were definitely too weak to resist the adverse impact of foreign capital domination. The cooperative movement has been discussed in connection with domestic trade, and it was indicated then that the credit cooperatives were most numerous and economically the strongest in financing small business operations. In 1914, there were in Central and Eastern Ukraine some 3,092 credit unions assisting farming, trade, crafts, and other undertakings. The manufacturing cooperatives, the *artyli*, based on voluntary membership, however, never amounted to anything financially significant. They definitely were no match for huge corporative businesses, and in particular the cartel financed by the invasion of massive foreign capital.

Cooperative credit in farming, on the other hand, was a significant financial development. By 1913, some 50 percent of all peasant farms belonged to 2,477 credit unions, which certainly saved many farmers from loan sharks and high rates of usury, and gave them a more equal break financially.

Public finance was poorly organized in the Russian Empire. Revenues were largely derived from an outdated poll tax, alcohol taxation, other excises, and railroad charges. Due to heavy military expenditures and frequent business subsidies, the treasury faced a permanent deficit. The national debt of the Empire in 1914 (before the war was even started) reached 8.8 billion rubles, 48 percent of which was held by foreigners. Ukraine suffered financially because of the irresponsible public economy. In 1913, according to estimates, St. Petersburg

extracted from Ukraine some 650 million rubles in revenues, while only some 585 million were returned there in the form of expenditures.[60] Consequently, the Russian Government retained 65 million rubles, or 9.9 percent of receipts to finance all kinds of projects outside Ukraine. This represented another instance of financial exploitation, a trend which persisted throughout the entire nineteenth century.

In Western Ukraine the Austrian banks operated their branches in cities and towns such as Lviv, Peremyshl, Ternopil, and others. Commercial banks were rather poorly developed, but there were savings banks, mortgage banks, credit unions, and savings-and-loan associations. Public finance was better organized in the Austrian Monarchy than the Russian Empire. The tax system was more elaborate and functioned more effectively, although it heavily burdened the Western Ukrainian peasantry.[61]

Notes

[1]N. Czyrowski (Chirovsky), "Economic Aspects of the Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaty of 1654," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, New York, Winter, 1954, No. 1, pp. 85-92.

[2]R. Dyminsky, "Economic Life," *Ukraine and Its People*, ed. by I. Mirtschuk, Munich, 1949, pp. 127-129, 195-197; M. Slabchenko, *Materialy do ekonomichno-sotsialnoi istorii Ukrainy 19-ho storichcha*, Kharkiv, 1925, p. 278: "Ukraine suffered from this very much, being obliged to ship grain too far"; in 1870, 22 percent of the Ukrainian trade went through the Baltic ports and 59 percent through the Black Sea; in 1877, 40 percent through the Baltic and only 37 percent through the Black Sea. The Chelabinsk-break: P. Lyashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia*, New York, 1949, p. 513.

[3]*Ibid.*, pp. 347; also, N. Chirovsky, *The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia*, New York, 1957; pp. 52-63; "Economic Aspects of the Russian Aggression in Ukraine."

[4]K. Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia, A History of the Economic Rela-*

tions between Ukraine and Russia, 1964-1917, Milwaukee, 1958, pp. 101-124 in particular.

[5]Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 383; also, P. Skrebitskii, *Krestianskoie dielo v tsarstvovanie imperatora Aleksandra II*, Bonn, 1863, Vols. I-IV; Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-57.

[6]*Commerce Yearbook*, 1930, Vol. II, "Foreign Countries," pp. 57, 544, 579; total value in millions of dollars computed by the author.

[7]Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-124, 158-195; R. Dyminsky and V. Holubnychy, "Ukrainian Economy in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 696-699.

[8]V. Kubiovych and V. Holubnychy, "Sea Transport," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 921-922; J. Goldstein, *Russia, Her Economic Past and Future*, New York, 1919, p. 46; the unfavorable position of the Black Sea ports was quite evident in the statistical tables supplied.

[9]Dyminsky, "Economic Life," p. 140.

[10]V. Kubiovych, "Animal Husbandry," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, pp. 882-883; Dyminsky, *loc. cit.*, pp. 139-142.

[11]K. Kononenko, V. Kubiovych, and G. Makhiv, "Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Ukraine from the Early Nineteenth Century to 1914," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 840-848; I. Vytanovych, "Agriculture in Western Ukraine before 1914," *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 848-849; Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia*, pp. 33-101.

[12]S. Ostapenko, "Kapitalizm na Ukraini," *Chervonyi Shlakh*, Kharkiv, 1924, pp. 118-124.

[13]Kononenko., pp. 83-95: overpopulation and land holdings; pp. 53-68: land shortage and lease of land.

[14]Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-91; Kononenko, Kubiovych, and Makhiv, *op. cit.*, 843-844; P. Lyashchenko, *Istoria narodnavo khaziastva SSSR*, Moscow, 1947, Vol. II, p. 265; M. Velychkivsky, *Stolypinska zemelna reforma*, London, 1964; also; N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoria Ukrainy*, Munich, 1976, Vol. II, pp. 426-429.

[15]M. Porsh, "Iz statystyky Ukrainy," *Ukraina*, Kiev, 1907, Vol. III, pp. 11-12, 34, 46ff. V. Kosinskii, *K agrarnomu voprosu*, Moscow, 1911, Vol. I, p. 479; Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-60.

[16]Ostapenko, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[17]Vytanovych, *loc. cit.*

[18]A general description of the industrial development: I. Koropeckyj, "Industry, General Characteristics," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 750-782; Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-124; O. Ohloblyn, *Peredkapitalistychna fabryka*, Kiev, 1925.

[19]Koropeckyj, *op. cit.*, p. 754; Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 342.

[20]M. Volobuiev, "Do problemy ukrainskoi ekonomiky," *Bolshevyk Ukrainy*, Kiev, 1928 Nos. 2-3; Kononenko, *op. cit.* p. 121.

[21]"Russia's Growth under Communists: Less rapid than during the last forty years of the Czars," *U.S. News and World Report*, Nov. 1959, p. 75: a summary of economists' findings.

[22]Koropeckyj, *loc. cit.*, pp. 754-755.

[23]*Ibid.*

[24]*Ibid.* p. 756.

[25]*Ibid.* p. 758.

[26]Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-195; the syndicates, P. Lyashchenko, *Istoria narodnavo khaziaistva SSSR*, Leningrad, 1952, Vol. II, pp. 297-337; P. Khromov, *Ekonomicheskoie rozvitie Rossii v XIX-XX vv.*, Moscow, 1950, p. 368: "All those cartels were organized in the form of common trading corporations....In reality they were strict monopolies which, through a small group of monopolists, controlled the entire industry and dictated all market conditions."

[27]Kononenko, *op. cit.* Vol. II, p. 192; Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 315 and 320.

[28]Koropeckyj, *op. cit.*, pp. 757-758.

[29]*Ibid.*

[30]Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-138; M. Sobolev, *Tamozhennaia polityka Rossii*, Tomsk, 1911, pp. 438, 514, 524, and others.

[31]Koropeckyj, *op. cit.* p. 788; Dyminsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.

[32]Koropeckyj, *op. cit.*, pp. 791-793; metallurgy: Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-157; *Metallurgicheskie zavody Yuga Rossii*, Kharkiv, 1923; B. Kramarov, *Hirnycha promyslovist Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy*, Kharkiv, 1926; F. Yastrebov, "Rozvytok promyslovoho kapitalizmu," *Istoria Ukrainskoi RSR*, Kiev, 1953, Vol. I, pp. 494-501 and others.

[33]Kononenko, *loc. cit.*

[34]V. Holubnychy, "Machinery, Equipment, and Fabricated Metal Products," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 801-803.

[35]I. Koropeckyj, "Chemical Industry," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, p. 809.

[36]I. Koropeckyj, "Food Industry," *Ibid.*, Vol. II, 829-830; Dyminsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-187; Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 342-343.

[37]Koropeckyj, *loc. cit.*; on the sugar industry in general: K. Voblyi: *Opyt istorii sveklo-sakharnoi promyshlennosty SSSR*, Moscow, 1929, Vol. I, pp. 146-165; Kononenko; *op. cit.*, pp. 124-130; Yastrebov, *op. cit.*, 395, 501-502.

[38]Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p 344; Kononenko, *op. cit.*, p. 194; Dyminsky, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

[39]Kononenko, *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

[40]Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 342; briefly on manufacturing, including sugar production: I. Kholmsky, *Istoria Ukrainy*, New York, 1971, pp. 304-305; "In the regions of Kiev, Poltava, and Katerynoslav there were 887 distilleries in 1863 with a production of 4.2 million barrels of spirits; in 1884, only 678 distilleries with a production of 3.4 barrels; and in 1866, 499 distilleries with 2.7 million barrels"; a visible decline: N. Yasnopolskii. *O geographicheskom razpridilenii gosudarstvennikh dokhodov i raskhodov*, Kiev, 1893, Vol. II, p. 74.

[41]Volobuiev, *loc. cit.*

[42]Koropeckyj, "Light Industry," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 820-821.

[43]I. Hurzhii, *Rozvytok tovarnoho vyrobnytstva i torhivli na Ukraini*, Kiev, 1962, pp. 80-83, 98-99, 105-108, 117-129, and others; Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 347-351; the Kievan contracts: I. Starovoitenko, "Ekonomichnyi rozvytok Kyiva," *Istoria Kyiva*, Kiev, 1960, Vol. I, pp. 404-409; Kholmsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-306.

[44]The cooperative movement: I. Vytanovych and D. Pisniachevsky, "The Cooperative Movement," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 978-980; I. Vytanovych, "In Western Lands," *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 982-984; A. Zhuk, *Ukrainska kooperatsia v Halychyni*, Lviv-Kiev, 1913; I. Vytanovych, *Istoria ukrainskoho kooperatyvnoho rukhu*, New York, 1964.

[45]*Ibid.*, also Vytanovych, "In Western Lands," *Ibid.*; Dyminsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-212.

[46]Kholmsky, *loc. cit.*; Dyminsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-202; also the same, "External Trade," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 933-935.

[47]A. Koporsky, *Torgovyi balans Ukrainy v 1913 g.*, Kharkiv, 1923; G. Kryvchenko, *Vnieshnia torgovlia Ukrainy v nastoiashcheie vremia i do voiny*, 1923.

[48]Dyminsky, *loc. cit.*

[49]*Ibid.*

[50]Kononenko, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

[51]Water transportation: Dyminsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-195; Kholmsky, *loc. cit.*, V. Kubiovych and V. Holubnychy, "River Transportation," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 924-927.

[52]Sea Traffic: Dyminsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-197; Kubiovych and Holubnychy, "Sea Transportation," *ibid.*, pp. 921-922.

[53]Kononenko, *op. cit.*, 196-217; Kubiovych and Holubnychy, "Railroads," *ibid.*, pp. 914-916; Dyminsky, *ibid.*, pp. 189-192.

[54]Kubiovych and Holubnychy, "Communications," *ibid.*, pp 931-932.

[55]*Ibid.*

[56]Kononenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-170; Khromov, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

[57]N. Vanag, "Finansovii kapital v tiazheloi industrii," *Proleteri*, Moscow, 1930, pp. 19-23; also, Kononenko, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

[58]V. Holubnychy, "Finance," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 952-957; Kononenko, *op. cit.*, p. 159; Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 156.

[59]Kononenko, *ibid.*, p. 173.

[60]M. Golman, "Russkii imperializm," *Priboi*, Leningrad, 1926, p. 305.

[61]Holubnychy, *loc. cit.*, p. 956.

PART TWO

Twentieth-Century Ukraine

Young soldiers of the UPA in the Lemko Land, 1947: Vasylko, age 14 (left) and Tarasyk, 15 (right)

Easter Sunday, 1946, in UPA Hideout in the Carpathian Mountains

Facsimile of *The Ukrainian Weekly* Front Page

СВОБОДА

Український Щоденник

SVOBODA

Ukrainian Daily

SECTION II.

The Ukrainian Weekly

Western Ukrainians Declare Their Independence And Establish Government

NAZIS ARREST AND THEN EXILE ITS LEADERS

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PERMANENT STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

The First World War and the Russian Revolutions-Developments in Ukraine—The Central Rada—The Hetman Government—Western Ukraine—The Directorate—Between the Wars: the Ukrainian SSR—Between the Wars: the Western regions; the *UVO* and the *OUN*—The Second World War—The Struggle for Independence; the 30th of June and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army—The UPA and the OUN Struggle in the Post-War Years—The Soviet-Russian Domination in the Postwar Era—The Great Exodus and the Ukrainians in the Free World

THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS. Whoever studies the political situation in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century can easily understand that the outbreak of the First World War was not unexpected. The causes of a large-scale war had been systematically accumulated over the decades, and the constellation of allied and hostile powers on a worldwide scale was the result.

As far as Russia was concerned, there were four major causes of its involvement in the debacle. First, the Russo-Austrian conflict of interests in the Balkans; second, the Russo-German test in the Near East; third, the Russian desire

to obtain free access to the Mediterranean and to dominate the Straits; and fourth, the Ukrainian question.

The traditional expansionist ambitions of the Russian Empire had not receded although its political strength was disintegrating. Domination of the Balkans, the Straits, and the Near East were a long-range plan which was endangered by Austrian and German penetration. Hence, the Russians did not hesitate to encounter their adversaries when the opportunity presented itself. Striving for imperial greatness, the Tsars suppressed the large non-Russian nationalities in a constant and decisive drive to Russianize them (particularly, the Ukrainians and Byeloruthenians) and to build an overwhelming Russian mass. However, in the Western Ukrainian provinces under Austria's domination, the Ukrainian nationality and its culture freely developed and radiated from there into the Eastern Ukrainian provinces under Russian rule. Hence, a war with Austria would not only give Russia a chance to strengthen her influence in the Balkans, but also would enable her to dominate Western Ukraine and suppress this source of continuous trouble. There were also some other contributory factors, such as the Polish question and German Far East aspirations, which placed Russia in the Allied camp of the Entente and against the Central Powers, chiefly Germany and Austria.

The Balkan countries were divided in their political orientations. Serbia, close to the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy and endangered by the expression of the Hapsburg imperialism through the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and sympathetic with the fate of the Croatians and Slovenians and other Slavs under Austrian-Hungarian domination, allied herself with Russia. Romania was also on the Russian side. At the same time Bulgaria, having experienced the arrogance of Russian imperialism in the past, associated itself with the Central Powers. Turkey, having been involved in a centuries-old struggle against Russian expansionism of the "Third Rome" type, allied itself with Germany and Austria. This was

the political configuration in East Europe which was to lead to the First World War.

On June 28, 1914, Archduke Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated by Serbo-Croation conspirators, who were in contact with the Serbian Government in Belgrade. Four weeks later, Vienna presented Belgrade with an ultimatum and found the reply unsatisfactory. On July 28, 1914, Austria declared war on Serbia. Russia was forced to act because she was also partially responsible for the militant attitude of the Serbs and Croats.

Then war events moved quickly. On August 3rd, Germany declared war on Russia. Germany invaded Belgium, bringing Great Britain into the war on August 4th. The Turks joined the Central Powers. Although the forces of the Entente powers—Russia, England, France—and other Allied countries were greater, they lacked a uniform command. The forces of the Central Powers, on the other hand, were from the very beginning under German coordination. This was one of the reasons for their initial military successes.

Without proper preparations, two Russian armies under Rennenkampf and Samsonov invaded East Prussia, where they were badly beaten by the Hindenburg in the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914. However, this battle made it impossible for the Germans to carry out their original plan of defeating France first.

The Russians had more luck on the Austrian front. The Austrian offensive was broken, and the Russian forces invaded Western Ukraine and part of Little (Austrian) Poland.

Western Ukraine remained under the Russian occupation only a few months, from September 1914 to June 1915, when the Russians were forced back by another offensive of the German-Austrian armies, but not before the Russian occupational administration showed its true intentions. Ukrainian cultural life was suppressed; all Ukrainian newspapers and publications were stopped; Ukrainian leaders were arrested and deported deep into Russia; and a forced introduction of

the Orthodox faith was initiated to replace the Ukrainian Uniat Catholic Church. The Russian administration was determined to liquidate "Ukrainian separatism" completely.

In the spring of 1915, the German-Austrian forces initiated a new and powerful offensive at Gorlice (Horlytsi). The Russian armies were forced to retreat in panic. A Russian disaster followed. Poland, Lithuania, Curland, Western Ukraine, and Western Byeloruthenia were taken by the Central Powers, and in the fall of 1915 the front was pushed hundreds of miles deep into the East.

When in early 1917 the Western Allies were ready to strike, Russia was pushed into revolutionary turmoil. Amidst the preparations for another offensive, the so-called March Revolution dethroned Tsar Nicholas II. A new Temporary Government took over with full determination to continue the war on the side of the Allies to achieve victory. In July a new offensive was even launched. Initially it was successful. However, the Temporary Government was too liberal in its dealings with the leftist extremists. The Bolsheviks were pressing hard for an immediate end of hostilities, and persuaded the soldiers and sailors to throw down their arms, desert, and go home.

On November 7th and 8th, the Bolsheviks carried out a second revolution, the so-called October Revolution. Practically speaking, all hostilities ceased immediately and the Russian army ceased to exist. The old empire began to disintegrate rapidly. One nationality after another at once seized the opportunity to proclaim its national autonomy and independence: Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, the Don Cossacks, Gruzia, Siberia, and others. German and Austrian troops occupied vast western borderlands of the dismembered empire.

The new Soviet government of the Bolsheviks, completely controlled by Lenin and Trotsky, initiated official talks on ceasing hostilities. In November Trotsky communicated to all embassies in Petrograd the decision of his government to

negotiate an armistice with the Central Powers. The Allies wanted to prevent any unilateral Russian negotiations. An Allied military mission under Judson was sent to talk with the Soviets, but it failed in its endeavors. On December 3, 1917 armistice talks began, and on March 3, 1918 a peace treaty in Berest Litovsky was signed by Russia. In this way, Red Russia, to be known in the near future as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a new version of the Russian empire, laid down its arms and accepted humiliating peace terms.[1]

DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE. The outbreak of the war released a new wave of Russian chauvinism throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian organizations, like *Prosvita* (Enlightenment), were suppressed or closed outright, and no printing in Ukrainian was allowed. Ukrainian cultural and political activists, like the already famous professor-historian M. Hrushevsky, were arrested and deported to distant Russian cities and localities. At the same time in Western Ukraine, the Austrian Government started the repressions of the *Moskalophiles*. Whoever was suspected of being friendly toward Russia, either rightly or wrongly—including priests, intellectuals, or even peasants—was arrested and sent to concentration camps, in Talerhof, Theresienstadt, and elsewhere. Polish smear tactics against Ukrainian patriots were behind the indiscriminate Austrian crackdown, which unjustly hurt many loyal anti-Russian Ukrainians.

On the other hand, a freer political climate for Ukrainian activities in Galicia, Bukovyna, and Carpathian Ukraine enabled the forming of the Ukrainian General Council, *Ukrainska Holovna Rada*, in the city of Lviv. It was joined by three major political parties, the National Democrats, the Radicals and the Social-Democrats, and headed by Kost Levytsky. Its purpose was the defense of Ukrainian interests in Austria-Hungary during the war. At the same time, under the *Rada's* auspices the Legion of the Ukrainian Sitch Rifle-

men, the *Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi*, a military organization, was formed to fight against the Russians alongside the Austrian armed forces, with the aim of eventually freeing Ukraine from Russian domination.

The Sitch Riflemen units were quickly trained, and the first two companies, under the commands of Captains V. Didushok and O. Semeniuk, were sent to the front to fight against the Russians. Other company units followed. In the spring of 1915 the Sitch Riflemen distinguished themselves in several battles: on Mount Makivka and Mount Lysonia, at Zobolotiv and Semykivka, and elsewhere. The Riflemen were fighting with the dream of liberating Ukraine from its lengthy Muscovite-Russian subjugation. Another important battle of theirs took place at Potutory in the fall of 1916. Soon, the *Sitchovi Striltsi* military exploits began to be seen in a romantic light. Enhanced by lyrical and patriotic songs which were written and composed mainly by R. Kupchynsky and L. Lepkyi, the soldiers were greatly inspired in their struggle. The songs have survived up to the present day with their praise for the heroism of the struggle for independence.

In order to protect the interests of the Ukrainian war prisoners and former Russian soldiers in Austria, in August 1915 a group of East Ukrainians formed the so-called *Soyuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy*, (Union for Ukraine's Liberation). This was headed by D. Dontsov and V. Doroshenko, who were two outstanding intellectuals and patriots of that time. The *Soyuz* from its very beginning championed the idea of the political liberation of Ukraine.[2]

Meanwhile the Russians occupied Western Ukraine, incorporated her into the Empire prematurely, and launched a ruthless Russification drive in the best tradition of the Ems Decree and Valuiev's administration to destroy "the last vestiges of Ukrainian separatism" once and for all. All Western Ukrainian social, political, and cultural institutions were liquidated. Over twelve thousand Ukrainian patriots were arrested and deported to distant localities in Russia. Among

them were the Metropolitan of Lviv, Count Andrei Sheptytsky, and many priests and intellectuals. The Ukrainian Catholic Church was persecuted, while the Russian Orthodox Church was introduced by force and some Orthodox parishes and schools were established. The policies were carried out by the Russian Governor, Count A. Bobrynskii, who had a rather primitive administrative staff to work with. Furthermore, the primitivism of the Russian officials made the life of the Western Ukrainians much more difficult. In April 1915, Tsar Nicholas II visited Galicia, trying to give the impression that the land had become Russian forever.

Although it seemed at first that the Russians had established themselves firmly in Western Ukraine, the German-Austrian counter-offensive in the spring of 1915 drove them eastwards and freed the country from the oppressive rule. The *Moskalophile* collaborators left the land with the Russian troops, while the retreating authorities deported thousands of Ukrainian patriots deep into Russia. Siberia once more was filled with Ukrainians. Because of a new Russian offensive a year later, some parts of Western Ukraine fell once again under Russian domination. A Galician-Bukovinian general province was created with F. Trepov and then D. Doroshenko as Governor-General. This time, however, due to rather unfavorable war developments, no national oppression was applied against the Ukrainians. Doroshenko, a Ukrainian, did everything possible to help the Ukrainian cause. He appointed Ukrainian officials, reactivated urban self-government, introduced Ukrainian-speaking schools, and permitted charitable organizations to operate.

The war dragged on and the Russian patriotic frenzy wore off with the progress of time. General dissatisfaction spread wider and wider as war developments became more and more unfavorable. Soon revolutionary agitation dominated the political scene. The Rasputin scandal at the St. Petersburg court fully demonstrated the Monarchy's moral decay. Rasputin, a half-literate peasant, had acquired some magical influence

over the imperial family and had exploited it badly. In order to rid the empire of his negative influence, Rasputin was assassinated in an aristocratic plot. Serious economic difficulties in the country completed the tragic situation. Finally, in March 1917, a revolution toppled the traditional absolutist regime. Petersburg was soon renamed Petrograd. All this was greeted with relief by Ukrainians everywhere, whether they were in Ukraine or Russia, and a better and freer tomorrow was generally expected.

In order to coordinate the work of all Ukrainian forces, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives initiated the formation of the Ukrainian Central Rada, or Council, joined by most political parties, and representatives of the intelligentsia, workers, clergy and students, and educational and cultural institutions. Prof. Mykhailo Hrushevsky was elected its head. A few days later the Central Rada issued a proclamation to the Ukrainian people calling for the preservation of peace and for everybody's contribution to the cause of building a new and free life. There was an immediate formation and establishment of new organizations, associations, and unions, including cooperatives. There were also numerous meetings, conventions, and congresses, which testified to the fact that a new and freer life in Ukraine was beginning. Political parties were becoming stronger and more influential.

Although the reactionary and Marxist Russian forces were marshaling their ranks to repress the Ukrainian national revival, on the 19th of April the Ukrainian National Congress was held in Kiev, attended by some 900 delegates from all walks of life. It was a powerful manifestation of Ukrainian self-assertion. The Congress sanctioned the Central Rada as the temporary Ukrainian Government of an autonomous Ukraine in federation with democratic Russia. A Presidium of the Rada, with Hrushevsky as its head, was reelected, and it was assumed that the whole land would be governed by a network of regional, county, and local councils.[3] Subsequently

the Central Rada formed its executive committee, which was soon known as the Little Council.

Gradually the Central Rada asserted itself as the National Government of Ukraine, although it was opposed by two said Russian-oriented forces. The representatives of the Petrograd Temporary Government attempted to capture the initiative and to set themselves up as a lawful government in Kiev by forcing the Rada to be reduced to an unimportant position. At the same time the Marxist radicals—in particular the Bolsheviks, led by N. Lenin—tried to organize their "councils of workers and soldiers" and to usurp all power for themselves. These radical councils were largely composed of Russians and other foreigners, with only a minority of Ukrainians. The Bolshevik or Communist propaganda, however, confused the peasantry to some extent. The peasants believed the insincere Bolshevik slogans, that all land should belong to them. They attacked large landholdings and tried to confiscate and divide them among themselves. The revolutionary violence spread in the countryside hurting the Ukrainian national interest. The Bolsheviks expected to gain from the spreading chaos.

In order to stop that violent trend from expanding, a Union of Landowners, joined by wealthy peasants, was formed with the intention of opposing the willful confiscation and takeover of landed properties. A legal solution was sought to satisfy the traditional peasant hunger for land. The Central Rada attempted, at a later date, to solve the problem by a land reform. The Bolsheviks, as future developments proved, did not intend to keep the initial promise given to the peasants and surrender all land into their hands. They only used the peasants to undermine the Rada's authority.

The war front was progressively disintegrating, and the situation raised the problem of whether to form Ukraine's own military force. There were two opposite views in that regard. The nationally minded circles, led by Mykola Mikhnovsky and others, insisted on the immediate organization of

the strong Ukrainian armed forces needed for the defense of national interests and political independence. In May and June of that year two Military Conventions were held in Kiev, which expressly demanded the formation of a distinctly Ukrainian military force in those days of uncertainty. A Military Bureau and a Military Club were established to proceed with the task. Ukrainian soldiers were separated from the Russian soldiers and Ukrainian regiments were organized. They soon distinguished themselves by discipline and order in contrast to the Russian ones. In September 1917, there were about twenty-seven Ukrainian military divisions, with some 4,000,000 soldiers, who had a relatively high morale.[1]

However, it was the tragedy of Ukraine at that time that the socialists of various factions—represented ably by V. Vynnychenko, an outstanding literary figure but a poor statesman, and M. Hrushevksy, an outstanding scholar but an equally mediocre statesman—were decisive pacifists and antimilitarists. They placed the dreamy idea of international brotherhood above the practical national interests of their fatherland in war and revolution-torn Eastern Europe. The socialists dominated the political scene and decided the issue. Vynnychenko and others asserted that Ukraine did not want anybody's land. They wanted to live in peace with other nations and consequently did not need any armed forces. They naïvely believed in socialist slogans, at the same time that Lenin's Bolsheviks were about to invade Ukraine militarily. The Russian Marxists were not blinded by the doctrine; they were practical imperialists in the Tsarist tradition.

By the time the Ukrainian socialists had comprehended the bitter reality, it was already too late. There was no time left to organize adequate armed forces to resist Moscow's Bolshevik aggression. The failings of the Central Rada's socialist leadership were applied, to a similar degree, to its relationship with the democratic-socialist Temporary Government. Eventually, the socialist anti-military bias in Ukraine turned out to

be one of the leading causes of the collapse of the national independence struggle.

THE CENTRAL RADA. The Rada had asserted itself as the highest government agency in Ukraine by the summer of 1917. It then sent a delegation to the Petrograd Temporary Government, which had replaced the Tsarist regime, with certain demands: for a broad and comprehensive political autonomy for the Ukrainian territories; for a permanent Ukrainian representation in the Temporary Government; for a reorganization of the armed forces and educational system on a national basis; and for the appointment of Ukrainians only to the public offices of Ukraine, as well as a release of all Western Ukrainians from war imprisonment. At the same time, the delegation expressed the desire of Ukraine to remain in federation with Russia in the new federal democratic political setup to be adopted in the near future. A similar demand for political autonomy was at the same time put forward by a Peasant Convention in Kiev. The socialist leadership in Ukraine did not insist on Ukraine's national independence, as was the case with the nationalist circles headed by M. Mikhnovsky, D. Dontsov, and L. Tsehelsky.

Nevertheless, the Temporary Government rejected these rather modest demands of the Central Rada, which desired to live in peace and in community with the Russian socialists. Petrograd's move induced the Rada to proclaim the so-called First Universal on June 25, 1917, which announced that the Ukrainian people were going to build their own political life. Consequently, the Universal created the Secretariat-General, an executive cabinet, headed by V. Vynnychenko, to administer the autonomous land. The cabinet was joined by S. Yefremov, S. Petlura, B. Martos, V. Sadovsky, K. Baranovsky, I. Steshenko, M. Stasiuk, and P. Khrystiuk as secretary-general of the agency. In response to the Universal

the frightened Temporary Government approved Ukraine's autonomous status.

The Second Universal of the Central Rada was proclaimed on July 16, 1917 to show the willingness of the Ukrainian Government to cooperate with the Temporary Government on the basis of legitimacy. The Second Universal declared that Ukraine did not intend to separate herself and would remain in a federation with the Russian republic, and that she would honor the decisions of the future All-Russian Constituent Assembly.[5]

Subsequently, the Central Rada and the Little Rada were reorganized by changing the partisan and professional representation and including in their framework the representation of national minorities. This increased their membership and would produce substantial difficulties in the future, since the minorities' representation was largely against either Ukrainian autonomy or independence. After the structure of the Rada was reorganized, it began to develop a temporary statute for the country's administration. Petrograd's Temporary Government rejected the statutory proposal and suggested to Kiev its own "Temporary Instruction," which attempted to limit Ukrainian autonomy jurisdictionally as well as territorially. Furthermore, Petrograd insisted on the inclusion of the national minority membership in the Secretariat-General, essentially to weaken its working ability and its desire for autonomy.

Finally, in the summer, the war front collapsed completely and chaos spread everywhere. A decline in the popularity of the Temporary Government contributed to an increase of the Central Rada's authority, although its major weakness was in its inability to be resolute and rigorous in dealing with the disorganized masses of soldiers who were trying to return home and rejecting any responsibility for the country and people. The Rada's nonsensical, socialist-motivated, insistence on demobilizing all army units, leaving the country defenseless in uncertain times, only added to the mounting

problems. In order to counteract these chaotic developments a somewhat spontaneous movement of the Free Cossackdom emerged. The movement was aimed at the organization of a military force on a voluntary basis to defend Ukraine against any possible foreign aggression and to restore law and order internally in individual localities, counties, and regions. It spread throughout the land and recognized only the Ukrainian Government, the Central Rada, and the Secretariat-General. The spontaneous and powerful growth of the Free Cossackdom, an essentially healthy and patriotic movement, was best manifested by its mass convention in October 1917. General P. Skoropadsky was elected its honorary head.

According to some leading individuals, such as O. Lototsky, the movement was the only force which could have saved Ukraine's freedom. However, the anti-militarist trend was already too advanced, and the political determination among the socialist leadership to achieve political independence too weak. Because of such immature politicians as M. Kovalevsky, V. Vynnychenko, P. Fedenko, O. Shulhyn, and others the Free Cossackdom movement could not succeed in realizing its original plans.

The overall political situation in Eastern Europe and Ukraine was basically changed by the second revolution, the so-called Bolshevik October Revolution, carried out by the Marxist extremists who were led by N. Lenin and his associates. They took over when the moderate, social-democratic-liberal Temporary Government proved incapable of holding power. Bolshevik radicalism despised the whole idea of federalism. Moreover, the Bolsheviks persistently exhibited hostile attitudes towards the Ukrainian National Government, were opposed to the basic idea of Ukrainian political independence, and by continuous radical agitation and subversion attempted to spread chaos to weaken the Ukrainian Government activities and to prepare a Bolshevik revolution and takeover in Ukraine. In response to the new setup, on November 20th the Central Rada issued the Third Universal, which pro-

claimed an independent Ukrainian republic, its territory expanded to include five more regions populated by Ukrainians. It also guaranteed four basic freedoms for its citizens, and made all land a public property. The extreme position with respect to land ownership was adopted simply to weaken the impact of vicious Bolshevik agitation. The Universal still referred to the concept of federalism, but apparently of a new altered one: a federation of independent states of various nationalities formerly forced to live within the Tsarist Empire. Otherwise, the Third Universal signified a complete change in the political status of Ukraine from a formerly autonomous territory to a free and sovereign national state.[6]

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks were increasing their activity in Ukraine. The peasants and workers were instigated to attack and plunder landed properties, manorial establishments, and factories. The peasants attempted to divide among themselves the land of large landowners. Disorder was promoted. Yet, at the Constituent Assembly at the end of November, the Ukrainian political parties and the Ukrainian national point of view prevailed with 77 percent of the delegates, while the Bolsheviks succeeded in getting only 10 percent, consisting mostly of Russian and ethnically foreign delegates. All subsequent maneuvers of the Bolsheviks, directed by Moscow, to take over the Central Rada failed. Finally, unable to dominate the Rada in any legitimate way, they organized a Red convention of "workers, peasants, and soldiers" in December in the capital of Kiev in order to set up a rival government to oppose the national Central Rada. There, too the Bolsheviks were scarcely able to acquire some 8 percent of the votes, and M. Hrushevsky was elected the head of the assembly. They then under Moscow's advice, moved the whole operation to Kharkiv, already captured by the Bolsheviks, where they formed a supposed Red Ukrainian Government under the name of the Central Executive Committee of Councils. It was Moscow's puppet regime, composed of Russians, other foreigners, and one or two Ukrainian Bolsheviks. The Central Executive

Committee supposedly annulled all the legal measures of the Central Rada and the Secretariat-General in Kiev, ordered a massive requisition and export of Ukrainian grain to Muscovy, and immediately initiated war operations against the Ukrainian Government by means of the "Red Guards,"—consisting of Russians, Latvians, Asians, and other ethnic elements imported from Red Russia to conquer Ukraine. The first Red Russian war against Ukraine progressed, while the Kharkiv puppet regime was used as a smokescreen to cover up the operation. The Red Guards were led by Com. V. Antonov-Ovsienko, and subsequently aided by Col. M. Muraviov, who brought in additional troops for the conquest of Ukraine for the Reds.

The similarities in socialist ideology, which was largely Marxist, between the Central Rada leadership and the Reds confused the issue substantially. The peasantry, which wanted more land, expected to get it from the Bolsheviks, and adopted a rather passive attitude, waiting to see who was going to win the war. On the other hand, national minorities in Ukraine, mainly Russians and Jews, actively supported the Bolshevik cause and aided the advance of the Red Guards by last-minute uprisings, agitation, and other means. Furthermore, while the Bolsheviks immediately associated Russian imperial interests with Marxist ideology and fully appreciated the value of armed forces in the pursuit of their political goals, the Ukrainian socialists put Marxist ideology ahead of Ukrainian national interests, resulting in their extremely weak and liberal attitude towards Bolshevik subversion and aggression. All those factors led to the weakening of Ukrainian resistance and the successful progress of the Red Russian armed invasion.

Facing the Red Russian aggression, and having lost any hope for a peaceful cooperation with new Russia, the Central Rada solemnly proclaimed the Fourth Universal, which was in reality an univocal and unconditional declaration of Ukrainian political independence. The solemn proclamation took place on January 22, 1918. At the same time, the

Secretariat-General was reorganized in a Cabinet of Ministers, while the country was to be governed by councils of citizens from all walks of life, on all levels—local, county, and regional—as intended before. It was stated that the Government was bound to work for the people's general welfare. The question of a federation with Russia was postponed to some future time, after the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly had convened.

The most irrational item in the Universal was its insistence on the demobilization of all armed forces and their replacement by a militia, organized on a voluntary basis, exactly at the time of the Red Russian military invasion. One must simply wonder at the naïvete and irrationality of the Ukrainian socialists of the time. Socialists in other lands—Germany, Russia, and Poland, for example—acted quite differently when national needs required.[7]

It was a very critical time for the young Ukrainian National Republic. Meanwhile, peace negotiations between the Central Powers—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—and separate delegations from Ukraine and Red Russia began in Berest Litovsky on January 6, 1918. In order to undermine the political position of the Ukrainian peace delegation and to weaken the status of the Central Rada as the Ukrainian Government and its ability to negotiate, L. Trotsky prolonged the negotiations to enable the Red Guards to invade as much Ukrainian territory as possible and to capture the capital city of Kiev in the name of the Kharkiv Red Central Executive Committee. The delegates of the Kharkiv "Government then arrived in Berest and were included in the Russian Bolshevik delegation." The Red Guards were trying to undermine the legitimacy of the Rada to negotiate a treaty in the name of Ukraine. Under Muraviov and other commanders they soon captured Poltava, Hlukhiv, and Korolovets. The proclamation of the Fourth Universal was carried out amid the sounds of distant artillery shelling. Scarcely a week after the solemn declaration of independence, on January 28-29,

the politically important Battle of Kruty took place. Although the Ukrainian forces at Kruty were inadequate and no match for the massive Red assault, the battle enabled the Ukrainian Government to stay in the capital of Kiev a while longer. This in turn made it possible for the delegation of the Central Rada to conclude and sign the Peace Treaty of Berest Litovsky, acquiring international recognition and fortifying the political status of the new state. Even Red Russia had to recognize Ukrainian sovereignty, and the political status of the Russian puppet, the Kharkiv Central Committee, was nullified.

On February 9, 1918, the Peace Treaty of Berest between the Central Powers and Ukraine was signed. The Ukrainian delegation—O. Sevriuk, M. Lubynsky, and M. Levytsky—showed a great deal of diplomatic skill during the negotiations. The Treaty provided for the halt of all military operations; the western boundaries of the Ukrainian National Republic were drawn up in general terms; diplomatic relations were initiated among the partner-nations; the release of war prisoners was agreed upon; and military and economic cooperation was initiated between Germany and Austria, on the one hand, and Ukraine, on the other. The political status of Western Ukraine was to be decided later on.[8]

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks took Kiev and began a massacre of Ukrainian patriots, officers, soldiers, and civilians. Over 5,000 people were executed. The fictitious "Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Republic" was proclaimed. The legitimate Ukrainian Government had to withdraw temporarily to the city of Zhytomyr, where it had a busy time. However, immediately after the signing of the treaty, Ukrainian armed forces, assisted by German and Austrian troops, began a large-scale offensive to drive the invading Red Guards out of the country. Despite signing the peace treaty and officially recognizing Ukrainian sovereignty, the Bolsheviks were in no hurry to leave the grain-rich country. But the offensive forced the Red Russians to retreat, and the capital of Kiev was liberated after a bloody three-week occupation. The Central Rada

returned to the capital. However, the Bolsheviks left behind numerous agents throughout the land, and their vicious anti-Ukrainian propaganda and agitation continued to undermine the authority of the Ukrainian Government. The Central Rada, because of its political ideology, was not able to take any resolute stand against the Red Russian subversion.

However, in spite of the Bolshevik agitation and the anti-Ukrainian attitude of the national minorities—Russians, Poles, and others—the authority of the Rada began to grow, and it slowly established control over an ever-widening territory in Right- and Left-bank Ukraine. Its administration and judiciary were gradually put in place. The Bolshevik troops were largely driven out of Ukraine, and Muraviov was held responsible for this defeat by Moscow. Meanwhile, the Peace Treaty of Berest was ratified by Ukraine.

The Central Rada was constantly seeking to establish close relations with other nations. England and France were the first Allied countries to contact Ukraine diplomatically. After the fall of the Temporary Government, the Allies generally expressed interest in the new republic. English, French, Italian, Japanese, Romanian, Serbian, and Bulgarian missions took up permanent residence in Kiev. Subsequently, permanent representations of France and England were established in the capital. The relations with Romania and Czechoslovakia were friendly. However, after Ukraine launched her peace negotiations with the Central Powers, the diplomatic contacts with the Allies terminated.

Soon the alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary brought some serious friction. In particular, Germany wanted Ukrainian grain and food supplies, which the Rada was not able to deliver because of internal unrest. Berlin was also not thrilled with the Ukrainian socialists and their weak enforcement of law. The German military authorities began grain requisitions on their own, arrested and even executed individuals suspected of being hostile, and abused their status as an ally. The Germans attempted to establish their own

administration since the Ukrainian Government was seen as too weak, and they disarmed certain Ukrainian army units. The Ukrainian authorities protested, but to no avail.

The weakness of the Central Rada in general, its obsession with socialism, its economic measures—such as land reform and other land policies, its inability to cooperate with the conservative circles, and the general desire for a strong government promoted a dissatisfaction with the system, and a change was inevitable. On April 29, 1918, a *coup d' ètat* was carried out; the democratic and republican system of Central Rada was abolished and a constitutional monarchy of the Hetmanate was inaugurated.

THE HETMAN GOVERNMENT. All the reasons enumerated above, led Ukrainian conservative circles to work for a change in the government system. The possibility of introducing the Hetman system, traditional for Ukraine, was discussed. Subsequently the idea crystallized, and several candidates for the traditional state office were put forward: M. Mikhnovsky, Y. Chykalenko and General Pavlo Skoropadsky. Skoropadsky soon attracted the most attention. He was well known as a capable military man, an organizer of the Ukrainian military units, and a descendent of an old aristocratic Ukrainian family. His ancestor, Ivan, had been a Hetman at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In order to give Ukraine a strong government, a conspiracy between the Ukrainian conservatives and the German military command was arranged.

On April 28, 1918 an armed German military unit gained entrance to the meeting hall of the Central Rada by force, disbursed the meeting, arrested a few people, and made the agency unable to function. On the next day, April 29, a prearranged Peasant Congress was held in Kiev, attended also by large landowners. It sharply criticized the Central Rada

socialist experimentations and unanimously elected Gen. Pavlo Skoropadsky as the Hetman of Ukraine. The new Ukrainian state was intended as a constitutional monarchy. It was no longer a weak republican government, and initially it had no popular representation. Subsequently, a parliament was to be elected. Private property rights for land were restored, but a land reform was promised for the future.

The new Government immediately asked for the cooperation of the socialist parties and invited them to join the cabinet of ministers and other administrative bodies. It was the only logical move which would end the chaos and begin positive state construction. If the socialist leaders had been men of stature, they would certainly have agreed. But they were not. Instead they took an extremely hostile position and refused to cooperate in any respect. The socialists did, however, negotiate with the German authorities, which had liquidated the Rada by force. For them, ironically, a foreign force was more acceptable than Ukrainian conservatism.[9]

After one failed attempt, M. Vasylenko was able to set up a predominately Ukrainian cabinet. Only four ministers were not Ukrainian, but they were all effective administrators. Yet the socialists did not want to acknowledge it as Ukrainian. For some of them, Ukrainian meant socialist only. Others viciously asserted that "if Ukraine cannot be socialistic, then there should not be any free Ukraine at all."[10]

Moreover, from the very beginning of the Hetman administration, the socialists spread subversion, insincere anti-Hetman agitation among workers and peasants, and civil disobedience. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party split. Its left wing, the *Borotbisty* (the Fighters), fully accepted Communist policies, ideologies, and tactics. They were ready to work with the Russian Bolsheviks, who had made war against Ukraine, but not with the Hetman Government, which wanted to save her.

In May, the so-called Ukrainian National Association, *Ukrainskyi Natsionalnyi Soyuz*, composed of all kinds of

socialist factions and groups, was organized. It immediately began an organized struggle against the Hetman Government "as not Ukrainian and bourgeois." Press campaigns and strikes continued. At the same time, the Russian ethnic minority, with the help of other minorities, continued its anti-Ukrainian activities and openly denied the right of Ukraine to be free and independent. Radical groups—Russian Bolsheviks and anarchists in particular—resorted to open terrorism, dynamiting and bombing depots of arms and gunpowder in various places such as Kiev and Odessa. They also assassinated important persons, such as German Field Marshal Eichhorn, and attempted to assassinate the Hetman. The terrorism demoralized the general population with fear, which was the clear intention of the Red Russians. There were, of course, certain segments of the Ukrainian people which sincerely supported the Hetman Government. Their loyalty was expressed in their conventions and declarations. They included landowners, industrialists, and financiers, who were associated in the *Protofis* as a kind of a professional group.

Immediately after assuming authority, the Hetman promulgated the so-called *Zakon pro Tymchasovyi Derzhavnyi Ustriii Ukrainy* (Act on the Temporary State Constitution of Ukraine), in order to overcome the spreading chaos and provide law and order. Several gatherings were prohibited. It is doubtless that, in spite of some imperfections and difficulties, the Hetman era was most constructive as compared with the preceding one of the Central Rada and the subsequent one of the Directorate. D. Doroshenko and M. Vasylenko, two Ukrainian ministers, did everything possible to advance state construction in the Ukrainian interest. Considerable activity was begun internationally to obtain a broad recognition of Ukrainian statehood by other powers. Close diplomatic relations were maintained with Germany. But some friction developed between the Ukrainian state and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy concerning Western Ukraine, still under Austro-Hungarian occupation. Diplomatic contacts and negotiations

dary schools had been organized, while Russian schools were retained in the cities and towns to serve the Russian ethnic minority. The teaching of the Ukrainian language, history, and geography became mandatory. Two Ukrainian universities were established in Kiev and Kamianets Podilsky, while additional ones in all major cities were being planned. A Historical-Philological Institute was opened in Poltava, and other similar projects were undertaken for other cities. With Government support and under its auspices, a great number of textbooks in Ukrainian were published to assist the educational process. The Ukrainian State Archives, the National Gallery of Arts, The Historical Museum, and the Ukrainian National Library (which soon housed over a million books) were founded. The Government tried to lay firm foundations for the development of Ukrainian culture. In November, the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, *Ukrainska Akademia Nauk*, was established in Kiev. The Ukrainian Theater and Opera were opened. In order to bring religious affairs into some kind of order, a Ministry of Religious Beliefs was introduced in the Hetman Cabinet.

Large-scale measures were undertaken to organize Ukrainian armed forces for the defense of the country, and several reliable and well-disciplined military units were formed immediately. Furthermore, a project was begun to re-establish the traditional Ukrainian Cossackdom, to achieve the following purposes: first, to create a strong middle class of landowners of deep conservative traditions; second, to develop a thoroughly Ukrainian semi-military organization to defend Ukraine against Bolshevism; and third, to establish in this way close ties with similar Cossack organizations on the Don and Kuban Rivers in their common struggle against Red Russian aggression. Also, a Ukrainian navy was launched on the Black Sea waters.

All attempts to bring the socialists to cooperate with the conservatives brought only partial success. In October, five

members of the Ukrainian National Association joined the Hetman Cabinet for a short period of time, to complete tasks started by their conservative predecessors.

Most important political developments soon followed. The Central Powers capitulated, Armistice Day ended the First World War, and subsequently German and Austrian troops left Ukraine. But the country still did not develop adequate armed forces for its defense against Red Russian aggression. The Allies, the Entente nations, were interested in the restoration of a great Poland and in either a Tsarist or democratic Russia. An independent Ukrainian state was not in their plans since neither the Polish nor White (Tsarist) Russian political leadership wished an independent Ukraine. They continued their aggressive anti-Ukrainian campaign in Paris, London, and Washington in particular. Hence, there was no room for a free Ukraine in the Wilson Declaration. The official policy of France and the United States involved the persistent denial of any right of Ukraine to be a separate nation; she was considered a part of Russia. Repetitive French and American statements insisted that an independent Ukraine would never be recognized, that Ukraine never had been an independent nation and never would be one. Polish and White Russian emissaries thus succeeded in their efforts.

The efforts of the Hetman Government to change the Allied position did not make much progress. Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Doroshenko, was replaced before his mission to contact Paris and London was concluded. Korostovets' mission to Jassy, the capital of Romania, at that time to negotiate with representatives of the Allies, failed. A subsequent French answer to Skoropadsky was not only rejection of a friendly approach, but a direct insult to the Ukrainian Government.[11]

Later on, another political misfortune began to afflict the country. Largely under Bolshevik agitation, various rebel leaders—M. Shynkar, N. Makhno (the most notorious, being an anarchist), and others—began to undermine the people's

trust in the Ukrainian Government and promoted social disintegration. This made the stabilization of the country quite difficult.

In this most inopportune time the socialist Ukrainian National Association elected the so-called Directorate of five members: V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura, F. Shvets, P. Andrievsky, and A. Makarenko. On December 14, it made an appeal to the people. Having declared itself the supreme government of Ukraine, it called for the complete liquidation of the Hetman system. An anti-Hetman uprising began after German neutrality was secured. The military force of the Government was not adequate, and its commander-in-chief, Count Keller, proved to be the Hetman's and Ukraine's enemy.

Facing the hostile and pro-Russian attitude of the Entente leadership, Hetman Skoropadsky, in order to place the Ukrainian cause in a more favorable international position, issued a proclamation on November 14—at exactly the moment when the Directorate began its insurrection. It pledged a future federation with Russia to help in her political restoration after the Bolsheviks had been defeated. Some later said that the Directorate rose against the Hetman because of his supposedly pro-Russian stand, but this was only a political deception. Actually the socialists themselves had been in no hurry to proclaim Ukrainian independence in 1917, and only under the pressure of public opinion and in the presence of Bolshevik aggression did they do so on January 22, 1918.

The armed forces of the Directorate defeated the Hetman's troops in the Battle of Motivylovka on November 18. This sealed the fate of the monarchistic era, though some sporadic fighting continued for about four weeks. The Hetman abdicated on December 14, 1918 and went abroad, while the Directorate took over. The planned constitutional monarchy, which had accomplished a great deal in spite of many difficulties, was terminated, and democratic republicanism returned. It was not given a chance, however, to sustain Ukrainian politi-

cal independence. The Entente Powers, which had not been ready to cooperate with the conservative Hetman Government, were even less willing to cooperate with the socialist Directorate, which they viewed as close to Bolshevik radicalism. Needless to say, this was a mistake.[12]

WESTERN UKRAINE. National awareness and political resolve were well established in Western Ukraine, and in Galicia in particular. The military organization of the *Ukrainski Sitchovi Striltsi*, which had been formed immediately upon the outbreak of the First World War, had continuously engaged in anti-Russian war operations. Their goal of attaining Ukrainian national independence, as mentioned previously, was clear evidence of the national maturity of the land. Of course, as long as the Central Powers maintained their military superiority in the East, the Western Ukrainians could do nothing to achieve national self-assertion. However, with the progressive decline of the political and military hold of the Central Powers, Ukrainian circles immediately began to work for their national sovereignty. It is obvious that the declaration of independence of the Ukrainian National Republic on January 22, 1918 in Kiev, and the subsequent signing of the Peace Treaty of Berest Litovsky in February, greatly increased the national morale of the Western Ukrainians. The secret provisions of the Treaty, about the autonomous status of Western regions and their possible unification with the rest of Ukraine, were encouraging, even if Austria never lived up to the agreement.

In September 1918, a Military Committee was organized in the capital of Galicia, the city of Lviv, to marshall the necessary armed forces to take over the Government after the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had disintegrated. National awareness and the idea of statehood in Galicia were not partially paralyzed by radical socialism, as it was in Eastern Ukraine, according to Polonska-Vasylenko.[13] Conspiratorial

activities rapidly covered the entire land, including towns and the countryside, to prevent the Poles, who were driven by their historical imperialism toward the east, from establishing themselves politically in Galicia. Subsequently, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation to Vienna and the newly organized Ukrainian National Council or *Rada*, which included top Ukrainian churchmen such as Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky and Bishop H. Khomyshyn, concluded that the future Western Ukrainian state should include all western provinces; Galicia, Bukovyna, Carpathian Ukraine, and other minor provinces. National minorities were asked to send delegates to the *Rada*. The adoption of a democratic constitution was planned. The *Rada* kept in touch with the Hetman Government in Kiev, as well as the Ukrainian National Association.

The matter of the unification of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian state on the banks of the Dnieper River, after a long debate, was left unresolved. There were various reasons. First of all, the Wilson Declaration championed the right of self-determination for all the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This gave Western Ukraine the chance of being recognized in the future as an independent, or at least autonomous, national unit. At the same time, the Wilson Declaration referred to East Ukraine, then an independent state, as a southern part of territory of Russia, leaving her with no similar hope. A unification might have threatened Western Ukraine with the possibility of being incorporated in a restored Russian Empire. Western Ukrainians hated even the remote probability of this kind of solution. Secondly, the national democratic majority and leadership of Western Ukraine was not enthusiastic about either Hetman conservatism or the socialist radicalism of the Ukrainian National Association.

While the Polish minority was preparing the takeover of Galicia in the name of its illusory "historical rights," the Ukrainian military, commanded by Captain D. Vitovsky,

successfully accomplished a *coup d'ètat* and seized the capital of Lviv. State authority was seized from the Austrian viceroy by the Ukrainian National Rada on November 1, 1918. Western Ukraine became independent. The Polish leadership, taken by surprise but not discouraged, launched a counterattack, and a prolonged struggle for Galicia began. Polish prospects were much better because the Poles received broad moral and material support from the Entente powers,—and of France in particular—while Western Ukrainians were denied any assistance from the pro-Polish and pro-Russian West. The Hetman regime, on the verge of falling could not help much. Only small detachments of the *Sitch* Riflemen were sent west to assist the struggle militarily. Meanwhile, the Romanians also showed hostility toward Western Ukrainian statehood. Though Bukovyna expressed its desire to join the Ukrainian state, on November 11 the Romanians seized that land and incorporated it—a move that was subsequently sanctioned by the Treaty of St. Germain. Carpathian Ukraine did not succeed in joining the Western Ukrainian National Republic; she was given by the same treaty to Czechoslovakia. Anti-Ukrainian feelings in Paris, Washington, and London in this way received practical expression. Ukraine was dismembered again.

While the war with Poland continued, the Ukrainian troops lacked arms and ammunition. On January 22, 1919, after prolonged negotiations in Khvastiv, the Act of the Unification of the Ukrainian National Republic and the Western Ukrainian National Republic into one unified Ukrainian National Republic was accomplished at a solemn ceremony in Kiev. From now on Western Ukraine was called the Western Region of the UNR. It was the greatest day in the modern history of Ukraine, after many centuries of being divided among and occupied by various imperialistic and hostile powers. In actuality, however, the two political units continued to function separately, even on the international level, dispatching separate representations to defend the cause of

Ukrainian national independence. The Wilson Declaration, with its dubious provisions concerning Ukraine, and the aforementioned antagonism between the Western national democrats and the Eastern radical socialists insured that the two parts of the country would function separately.[14]

Meanwhile, the war became more and more unfavorable for Western Ukraine. Poland was a much larger country than Western Ukraine and enjoyed much greater popularity with the Western Allies due to the propaganda activities of such men as I. Paderewski, a famous pianist, and R. Dmowski, a politician. These two men and their associates embarked on an anti-Ukrainian campaign, presenting the Ukrainian cause as a German intrigue without any national substance. The Peace Conference of Paris sent two missions to mediate the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, but both of them were pro-Polish and their recommendations were hardly acceptable to the Ukrainians. Then, in April 1919, fresh Polish army units under the command of Gen. J. Haller and well-equipped with arms and ammunition, arrived from France, supposedly to protect Poland against any Bolshevik assault. But the Polish Government dispatched these units against Western Ukraine on the false pretext of an imminent Ukrainian attack, while the Romanians continued to threaten the Ukrainian front from the south. The Western Ukrainian forces were compelled to retreat.

These developments triggered a reorganization of the Ukrainian Government to face the peril: E. Petrushevych became the dictator and General O. Hrekiv the commander-in-chief. The so-called Chortkiv Offensive was launched to throw back the Polish invasion army. Its success brought in thousands of volunteers who wanted to defend their country against the enemy. But the shortage of arms and ammunition soon frustrated this courageous military endeavor. The Kievan Government sent sparse military help, in the form of several army and artillery units under the command of A. Dolud and Colonel Kravchuk, to join with the Western

Ukrainians in their struggle. Nevertheless, a new Polish offensive began, with massive French help in arms and ammunition. Ukrainians were denied even Red Cross medical and hospital assistance. Their army units were soon forced out of Galicia altogether. They left Western Ukraine and joined the forces of the Ukrainian National Republic in the common struggle against Russian-Bolshevik aggression.

A heroic epic was over. It had been marked by national solidarity, patriotism, and discipline. In Western Ukraine there were no anti-government excesses and pro-Bolshevik agitation, unlike in Eastern Ukraine. From now on, the fortunes of Western and Eastern Ukraine would be united, though not without frictions.

THE DIRECTORATE. The entire period of the Directorate, from December 1918 to October 1920, was a very trying time since the Ukrainian National Republic was beset by a score of enemies. Soviet Russia was working toward the conquest of Ukraine and its annexation. Poland illogically cooperated with the Soviets to liquidate Ukrainian independence, instead of allying herself with Ukraine to contain Soviet imperialism at its very beginning. The White (Tsarist) Russian armies, which dreamed of the restoration of an old monarchistic or republican Russia, carried on an equally absurd policy of warfare against Ukraine, instead of working together with Ukraine to stamp out the Bolshevik terror for their mutual benefit. The Western Allies, who consistently denied the right of Ukraine to sovereignty and independence, directly assisted the Poles and the White Russians to defeat the Ukrainian struggle for freedom, while indirectly helping the Reds to overcome their political and military difficulties, to enslave almost all of Eastern Europe, and to become, later, a threat to the entire Free World. Finally, there was even Romania, which did much to increase Ukrainian difficulties. Of course Soviet Russia was the worst and most dangerous enemy.

Domestically, matters were also in turmoil. Bolshevik propaganda, secretly serving the Russian cause, continued to confuse the peasants and workers. Some politicians were even ready to adopt the Soviet program for Ukraine. And several military commanders—like Makhno, Zelenyi, Hryhoriiv, and others—instead of loyally following the orders of the Central Government, pursued their own paranoic policies. They wavered between the Bolsheviks and the Directorate. Sometimes they cooperated with the former, sometimes with the latter.

From the very beginning of the Directorate's rule, two political orientations collided with each other: the pro-Entente orientation, represented by S. Petlura, O. Hrekiv, S. Ostapenko, and others; and the pro-Bolshevik or Soviet orientation, represented by V. Vynnychenko, V. Chekhivsky, M. Shapoval, and others. Unfortunately, both trends had no prospect of success because of Soviet aggressiveness and Allied stubbornness. Only a national union of all social and political factions could have saved national independence, which, because of Marxist agitation, was drifting away.

According to the intended plan, the Directorate was supposed to be a temporary, partially legislative, and partially executive body of the Government. The national Labor Congress about to convene was meant to be the people's representative. However, the composition of the Labor Congress was very radically socialistic. Only working people, laborers and peasants, were supposed to be represented. No landowners, industrialists, capitalists, professionals, or any other members of the educated class, (*intelihentsia*), were admitted to the supposed "national representation." It was an illogical approach which deeply antagonized the conservative circles, which were treated like social outcasts. The Council of Ministers was meant to be the highest executive body, while local administration was to be handled by councils composed only of working people.

Immediately after the withdrawal of German troops from

Ukraine, Soviet Russia launched her second war against Ukraine, without any official declaration of the resumption of hostilities. At an earlier date L. Trotsky had stated that Russia was just waiting for an opportune time to invade Ukraine. Torn by civil war, Russia hungered for Ukrainian bread and tried to get it at any price. The Directorate's armed forces were inadequate; they lacked arms and officers, and commanders of individual units frequently lacked proper military experience. The anti-military psychology of the Ukrainian socialists, as mentioned before, was the basic cause of the problem. Hence, the Soviet invasion proceeded swiftly. In November 1918 in Moscow, a "Soviet Ukrainian" Government was formed, largely composed of non-Ukrainians. This was another one of Moscow's puppets, and was soon sent to Ukraine to replace the Directorate. Soviet divisions moved to establish the authority of that "Soviet Ukrainian" government.

The turmoil that the invasion caused led to calls for the replacement of the slow-moving Directorate by a ruling body of three men—S. Petlura, E. Konovalets and A. Melnyk—but that idea did not materialize in spite of the dangerous situation. On the 23rd of January, 1919, the Labor Congress began its deliberations, with the participation of the Western Ukrainian delegation. The unification of the Ukrainian National Republic and the Western Ukrainian National Republic into one Ukrainian state was ratified, the Directorate as a temporary supreme authority was approved, the convocation of a national parliament was projected, a temporary constitution was adopted, and some additional measures introduced. Vynnychenko was elected the chairman of the Congress. Meanwhile, the Soviet-Russian troops had approached Kiev, and the Directorate and the Council of Ministers began the evacuation of the capital. They soon left for the city of Vynnytsia, which became a temporary seat of the Government.[15]

The unfortunate course of the war led to feverish attempts of Ukrainian circles to gain the support of the Allies for the

Ukrainian cause, but they were met with hostility by the Allied representatives—in particular the representatives of the French military interventions force in Odessa. Whenever approached by the Ukrainian emissaries—General O. Hrekiv, O. Nazaruk, S. Ostapenko, and others—the Allied representatives, such as Colonel H. Freidenberg, made harsh demands. These included the dismissal of Vynnychenko and Petlura for their "Bolshevik convictions," the inclusion of conservatives in the Ukrainian cabinet, cooperation with White Russians, and the Allied control of Ukrainian finances. The issue of Ukrainian national sovereignty was ignored and no commitments made in this respect.[16] As a result of the Allied pressure, Vynnychenko resigned from the Directorate, Petlura assumed authority, and a new cabinet was formed with conservative participation. The Reds immediately launched a new propaganda campaign against the Directorate as "bourgeois," since it had become more rightist and more favorable to the Allies.

Nevertheless, the rapid progress of the Soviet-Russian invasion of Ukraine made overtures to the Allies unsuccessful. No Allied assistance arrived. Ostapenko's cabinet was soon replaced by a radically socialist one with B. Martos as its head. In fact, after Vynnychenko's departure, S. Petlura assumed the positions of head of the Directorate and commander-in-chief of all the armed forces. He was definitely more of a statesman than anybody else in the UNR. He was pro-Western and definitely anti-Soviet, unlike Vynnychenko. He fully understood the need for strong Ukrainian armed forces for the defense of the country's independence. Petlura favored a strong government. All his actions indicated his patriotism and national awareness, and this made him the symbol of Ukrainian self-assertion and of the freedom movement. The Soviet-Russian leadership soon identified Petlura with Ukrainian "separatism," and every Ukrainian patriot from then on was called a *Petlurivets*, or Petlura man. This was similar to what had happened after 1709, when every

Ukrainian patriot opposing Russian domination was called a *Mazepynets*, a Mazepa man.

By May, Petlura had succeeded in establishing a regular Ukrainian army out of loose insurgent units. This resulted in a short but successful Ukrainian offensive. But, a Soviet-Russian counteroffensive forced the Ukrainian Government to withdraw to Kamianets Podilsky, which for a while became the political and cultural center of the Republic. Meanwhile, conservative circles made certain positive suggestions for government reform.

However, time was running short. In February 1919, the so-called Soviet Ukrainian Government, under K. Rakovsky, entered the capital of Kiev for the second time, touching off an unheard-of wave of terror. This in turn unleashed a massive wave of anti-Red uprisings, since the Reds did not live up to the promises given to peasants and workers but suppressed any opposition with utmost cruelty. All of Ukraine, from end to end, was literally burning with a spontaneous fire of resistance. The unruly Ottomans turned against the Soviets and their puppet, the Soviet Ukrainian Government.

Some differences between the Galician and Eastern Ukrainian leadership, which have been referred to before, were resolved, and a united offensive of the Galician and East Ukrainian armies was begun in the direction of Kiev, Korosten, and Odessa. The Bolsheviks retreated quickly and evacuated the capital of Kiev without resistance. This might have perhaps been a turning point in the entire struggle for independence, marking the ultimate defeat of the Bolsheviks, had it not been for the unexpected aggression of the Russian White armies under the supreme command of General A. Denikin and assisted by the Allies. Denikin committed an incredible political and military blunder. Instead of accepting and cooperating with the Ukrainian independence struggle, as he was advised to do by Winston Churchill, in order to gain an ally in his war against the Bolsheviks, he attacked the Ukrainian armed forces, committed himself to a second front, and wea-

kened his and the Ukrainian resistance to the Bolshevik onslaught. He was bound to lose, while at the same time dooming the Ukrainian independence struggle. Later, after his defeat, Denikin left Ukraine and admitted his unforgivable mistake. By then it was too late, however.

The imminent onslaught of the White armies came rather unexpectedly, in the middle of the united Ukrainian offensive to recapture the Right-Bank of the country. On the 31st of August, Ukrainian armies entered Kiev, but because of Denikin's move, they were forced to an immediate retreat. Having been flanked by the White Russians, the Galician army command negotiated a truce and an alliance with Denikin's force, supposedly to fight together against the Bolsheviks. Yet this kind of arrangement, made unilaterally, was absolutely unacceptable to the Directorate, which opposed any dealings with the White Russian extremists. The rift between the two Ukrainian Governments deepened again. The generals responsible for the unauthorized negotiations with Denikin were tried but not punished. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian armies found themselves in a "death triangle," surrounded on three sides by the Polish army from the west, the Bolsheviks from the north and east, and the White Russians from the southeast. At the same time they lacked supplies, arms, ammunition, and medical assistance to counteract epidemics of disease. The Entente powers had no compassion.[17] With this turn for the worse, some Ukrainian circles, especially from Galicia, began to lose hope of sustaining independence and became inclined to accept a status of autonomy for Ukraine as an alternative.

By November 1919, the Directorate had begun to fall apart, and some of its members left for abroad. Petlura was automatically becoming the central political figure. Meanwhile, the armed forces were losing ground, and a plan for insurgent warfare from behind the enemy lines was put together. The so-called "Winter Expedition," *Zymovyi pokhid*, was staged under the command of two generals, M. Omelanovych-

Pavlenko and Y. Tiutiunyk. It carried out guerilla operations for more than five months in the Right- and the Left-Bank regions, always being met by a friendly population, which supplied the expedition with food and other necessities. The people were equally tired of both the Red and White Russian occupation forces, which were equally cruel toward the Ukrainians. When operating from behind the enemy lines, the expedition forces were joined by scattered units of the Galician army. Finally, the command of the expedition received the order to return west.

Meanwhile, the Galician army, under the command of General M. Tarnavsky, had remained in alliance with Denikin in Eastern Ukraine and was threatened with annihilation after the latter's imminent defeat. It therefore allied itself with the Reds, and was even called "the Ukrainian Galician Red Army." This angered the Petlura Government, which opposed any such unauthorized deals. Joining the Reds was a last resort to save the Galician units from complete annihilation. The deal was definitely a damaging move from the point of view of the overall struggle for Ukrainian independence.

At the same time, negotiations were undertaken between the representation of the Directorate Government and the Polish Government concerning military action against the Soviets and the future political structure of Eastern Europe. The so-called Warsaw Treaty was signed in April 1920. The Treaty provided the following: the Polish government recognized the Ukrainian National Republic as an independent nation and the Directorate as its supreme authority; the borders between Ukraine and Poland would run on the Zbruch River and northwards, ceding to Poland Galicia, West Volhinia, West Polissia, Pidlasha, and other western provinces of Ukraine—with exact boundaries to be arranged at a later date. A military convention was reached between both nations for common action against the Soviets, and the provisions of the Treaty were to be kept secret. There were also other points in the agreement that were of lesser importance,

such as the safeguarding of the rights of one nationality within the borders of the other.[18]

Though they tried to keep it secret, the Treaty became partially known, and it produced an enormous amount of indignation among most Ukrainians, particularly the Galicians. It nullified the Western Ukrainian struggle for independence, which bordered on national treason. This was too heavy a price to pay for any convention with Poland, which by itself could scarcely help Ukrainian liberation—as subsequent developments proved. Petlura knew about the Treaty, and he became the main target of all the anger. Subsequently, some Ukrainian political circles, such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries with Hrushevsky and Shapoval, declared the Treaty invalid and not binding.

In the meantime, a common Polish-Ukrainian offensive was launched against the Soviets. It was badly handled by the Polish command, especially the Polish leader, J. Pilsudski. Moreover, the Polish troops in Ukraine behaved as if they were in a hostile and conquered country. On May 7, 1920 the Ukrainian armed forces once more entered the capital of Kiev, but did not stay long. The Soviet Russian counteroffensive pushed both allied armies west, soon threatening the Polish capital of Warsaw. Warsaw was almost miraculously saved from the Soviet onslaught, and this was later called "The Miracle on Vistula River." Ukrainian troops greatly contributed to the victory. The Soviets were pushed back.

Unwilling to fight anymore, the Poles initiated separate peace negotiations with Soviet Russia. In November of 1920 the Treaty of Riga was concluded. Ukraine was again divided between her traditional enemies, Poland and Russia, as had been done in 1667. Western Ukraine, West Volhinia, West Polissia, Pidlasha, and other minor western regions, such as the Khom and Lemko regions were incorporated by Poland. The Right- and Left-bank regions and Village and Kuban Ukraine became part of the new Russian state—which was soon to be called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the

USSR, or the Soviet Union. Eventually some parts of the Ukrainian ethnic territory under the Soviets were given the deceiving name of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was only an administrative district of the centrally ruled USSR. Bukovyna, as pointed out, was incorporated by Romania, and Carpathian Ukraine by Czechoslovakia.

As a result of the unhappy outcome of the liberation struggle and the Treaty of Riga, the main armed forces of the Directorate and Western Ukraine retreated to Poland, where they were disarmed and interned in prisoner-of-war camps. In 1921, some insurgent units were organized from the prisoners of war, and the Second Winter Expedition was undertaken to penetrate the Soviet-occupied Ukrainian territories. It was a courageous move, which was not expected to succeed. The expedition units were rather small and inadequately armed. They were quickly defeated by the Reds. One group, after being captured and refusing to cooperate, was massacred by gunfire at Bazar, on November 21, 1921, while singing the Ukrainian national anthem. The 359 heroes of Bazar, executed by the Reds, were remembered by their people for a long time. The guerilla and insurgent warfare continued in Ukraine for a few years, but was mercilessly put down by the Soviet army and secret police units.

The Treaty of Riga terminated the rule of the Directorate and the Western Ukrainian Government, although they continued to operate in exile for some time, especially in diplomatic areas, to keep the Ukrainian cause alive.

BETWEEN THE WARS: THE UKRAINIAN SSR. Though officially proclaiming the right of every nationality to its political self-determination, in reality the Russian Bolsheviks had planned the takeover and domination of Ukraine from the beginning. Their plan to conquer Ukraine was disguised under the slogans of a Communist revolution which would supposedly free the land from bourgeois exploitation and cap-

italist domination. For Lenin's Bolsheviks any form of government and economic structure which was not Russian-Bolshevik or Russian-Bolshevik-controlled was considered bourgeois-capitalist. The Central Rada and the Directorate were thoroughly socialistic and anti-capitalistic, but Lenin's Bolsheviks conveniently forgot the fact and called them bourgeois-capitalist in order to hide their own imperialist aggression in Ukraine. The Soviets later applied the same approach successfully in subsequent conquests in Europe and Asia.

A Ukraine-based Communist revolution against the Central Rada or the Directorate could not be seriously hoped for by Moscow. The Communists or Bolsheviks, largely Russians and foreigners, represented only a negligible force in Ukraine.[19] In the election to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917, the Bolsheviks received only 10 percent of all votes. Angered by the defeat, the Bolsheviks presented the Central Rada with a kind of war ultimatum, accusing it of pursuing bourgeois policies in Ukraine. Thereupon a kind of a *coup d'ètat* was planned by Moscow. In December 1917, as referred to above, at the Convention of the Peasant, Worker, and Soldier Deputies in Kiev, the Bolsheviks attempted to take over the Government. They soon found out that they could count on only 150 deputies out of the total of 2000. Their democratic defeat was clear cut. They then moved their headquarters to the city of Kharkiv. At their convention, which was dominated by Russians and foreigners, they established a Central Executive Committee of the Worker, Peasant, and Soldier Councils and declared that this would be the Supreme Government of Ukraine. The Committee immediately proceeded with the ruthless requisition of grain and other foods to be shipped to distant regions of Russia. Furthermore, the Russian Red Guards, under the disguise of a military force of the Bolshevik Government of Ukraine, launched war operations against the Central Rada. They were under the command of a Russian Bolshevik, V. Antonov-Ovsienko.

After having taken Kiev in February 1918, the Russians proclaimed the so-called "Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic," in which the Ukrainian Communists constituted a minority and had very little to say. A gruesome terror was begun against the Ukrainian independence movement and its representatives.

Once the German and Austrian troops left Ukraine after Armistice Day, the Red Guards immediately resumed their war operations, but this time against the Directorate Government—without any formal declaration of war. It was supposed to be a civil war, according to the Bolshevik interpretation, between the Directorate and the Communist forces. In fact, however, it was the second Soviet Russian invasion of Ukraine, during which the Western Allies short sightedly denied any military assistance to the Ukrainian Government, unwittingly helping the Soviet Russians to conquer the country and build a broad base for their future world expansion.

Meanwhile, in February 1919, K. Rakovsky transferred the seat of his Bolshevik Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to Kiev and resumed the reign of terror exterminating Ukrainian patriots and frightening the general population in order to quell any kind of opposition. There were also ruthless requisitions of grain to feed Russian regions. Rakovsky's regime continued to prove its character as a puppet government of Moscow subservient to Russian political and economic interests. Following the Russian pattern, an All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission was formed. This was a notorious secret police, administered by Moscow, which undertook the task of exterminating any kind of Ukrainian national resistance by arrests, executions, and deportations on the mere suspicion of so-called "counterrevolutionism." A member of that secret police in Poltava, Shchurov, praised himself for having "finished off four thousand *khakhly* in prison."[20]

The Bolshevik terror produced, of course, waves of guerilla

resistance throughout the country. Numerous anti-Soviet uprisings continued to flare up in various parts of the land until 1923. However, by December 1919, Soviet Russian rule was firmly established in Ukraine. Neither the united offensive of the Ukrainian armies in the summer of 1919, nor the Polish-Ukrainian offensive a few months later could do much. Until 1921 Soviet Russian and Soviet Ukrainian relations were based on a kind of international agreement. After 1922 the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was gradually changed into a constituent member of the future Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and these relations became strictly internal matters regulated by the Communist Party. Still, in 1922, membership in that party in Ukraine was predominantly non-Ukrainian. Russians constituted 54, Ukrainians 23, Jews 14, and Poles 8 percent of all members.

These early years were the time of the so-called "War Communism" in Russia, which was an experiment by Lenin and his associates and which produced terrible calamities everywhere. "War Communism" hit Ukraine hard. It was an attempt at a ruthless and speedy collectivization and nationalization. Enterprises were taken over by the Government; large land holdings were turned into state farms; and peasants were forced to join collective farms. The measures failed shamefully. Complete economic chaos followed in all lands under Soviet Russian domination, including Ukraine. Economic difficulties and discontent with the Bolshevik regime resulted in a strong anti-Government movement. This movement culminated in the rebellion of Russian sailors, once the standard bearers of the Revolution, on the *Potemkin* warship. Hence, Lenin and his Bolshevik associates were forced to compromise. In 1921, the so-called New Economic Policy was adopted. The NEP program, a partial liberalization of "War Communism," was by no means a retreat, but rather a temporary compromise. The collectivization and nationalization processes in agriculture and other economic sectors were

slowed down, and private ownership and initiative in small-scale business operations were allowed to repair the hopeless economic situation.

Politically, the NEP era was marked by a temporary liberalization in the individual non-Russian lands, and in Ukraine this took the form of so-called "Ukrainianization." The Russianization pressure was lessened. To some extent, Ukrainians dominated the Party and Government machinery and various sections of the national-cultural life. Under the leadership of M. Skrypnyk, who was either the First Secretary of the Party or the head of the Government, the Ukrainian language was introduced all over the country, in the administration, education, press, and other sectors. Ukrainians staffed top political, economic, social, cultural, and educational positions in the country. A revival of Ukrainian scholarship and literary and artistic activities was successfully begun. The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences was revitalized. Ukrainian associations of writers, poets, musicians, artists, and intellectuals were established. Fine Ukrainian poets, prose writers, playwrights, painters, architects, scholars, and other artists attempted to move Ukraine ahead culturally. Historical studies on the Ukrainian past were once again undertaken objectively without forced Russian interpretation. The "Ukrainianization" approach, in order to avert any of Moscow's suspicions, insisted, as implied by Skrypnyk and his associates, that the propagation of Marxism would only succeed in Ukraine if introduced to the people in their own spoken language. Hence, the era of NEP substantially contributed to the growth of Ukrainian national self-awareness and the independence movement. But Moscow did not want this to happen. As a result a Soviet Russian antipathy to "Ukrainianization" soon developed, and Bolshevik extremism was reintroduced.

The specter of the Ukrainian struggle for independence, however, constantly disturbed and frightened Moscow. Hence, the liquidation of the very symbol of that struggle in the years

1918 to 1921, *Otaman* Symon Petlura, was masterminded by Soviet intelligence. Petlura lived in Paris at the time of his death. He was assassinated by Schwartzbard, an agent of Moscow, on May 25, 1926. By eliminating Petlura, the symbol, the Soviet Russians expected to weaken the Ukrainian national movement, which they called the Petlura Movement. The assassination was accomplished at a time when Moscow was planning to put an end to "Ukrainianization" and to return to the radical Russianization of Ukraine.

In the meantime, Lenin, the all-powerful Soviet Russian dictator, died. After a prolonged power struggle among the Bolshevik leaders, Josef Stalin emerged as the new leader of the Soviet Union. He was a Marxist-Leninist extremist of the worst kind, obsessed with Russian imperialism. He was afraid that the NEP liberalization and "Ukrainianization," among other things, would endanger the integrity of the Soviet Union and its Russian domination. Stalin also felt that the whole liberalization was a departure from Marxist doctrine and would delay the arrival of Communism. Because of this, Stalin totally abrogated the New Economic Policy and launched the so-called Planning Era, featured by radical centralization, all-out Russianization, and dramatic radical-socialist experimentation.

The NEP era was scarcely eight years in existence. In 1926 and 1927 the retreat from the liberal course was noticeable, while in 1928 the NEP came to an abrupt end. In Ukraine, this was followed by an awesome terror campaign, which was initiated by Stalin and carried out by the two dreaded chiefs of the Soviet secret police, N. Yezhov and G. Yagoda. Russian terror was primarily intended to destroy any vestiges of Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism," in whatever form it could have manifested itself during the NEP period. Terror measures were undertaken in the name of saving the integrity of the Soviet Union, a new form of the Russian Empire, of which Ukrainian "nationalism" was considered the worst enemy.

The liquidation of the "Ukrainianization" era was achieved by massive arrests, prolonged imprisonments, massive deportations to concentration camps in the distant northern Siberian and Far Eastern regions of the Soviet Union, and mass executions of Ukrainians of all walks of life—in particular, wealthy peasants, the *kurkuly*, and intellectuals, often for no cause and on mere suspicion only. In order to break the back of the resistance of the individualistically minded Ukrainian peasantry, an artificial famine was created by Moscow. In the fall of 1932, after most of the peasants had been forcibly collectivized, a massive drive of grain requisitioning was initiated with the false promise that adequate amounts would be delivered at a later date for food and planting. The promise was never kept, and in the winter of 1932 and the subsequent spring an awesome famine spread throughout the Ukrainian countryside. As a result some 7,000,000 people starved to death in Ukraine, while at the same time there was no shortage of food in the provinces of Russia itself. The very core of the Ukrainian population was totally terrorized.

Then came the turn for the upper levels of Ukrainian society. Though the terror continued for many years after the NEP was annulled, for two years, between October 1936 and November 1938, no less that 800,000 Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were jailed, exiled to concentration camps, or shot—according to Holubnychy.[21] All Ukrainian political leadership in the Communist Party and the Government from the time of the NEP liberalization was liquidated. Some committed suicide, such as M. Skrypnyk and M. Khvylovyi. Others were jailed, sentenced, exiled, or executed, such as T. Komar-Palashchuk, A. Khvylia, and A. Shumsky. The whole Communist Party of Ukraine was mercilessly purged of those who were accused of bourgeois nationalism or other alleged crimes.

Moscow used the NEP as a means of completely exposing and destroying the very core of the Ukrainian patriotic

movement. During the NEP liberalization, all Ukrainian national activists who believed that the time had come to free Ukraine from radically socialist Russia had surfaced. Their hopes were badly disillusioned by the Yezhov and Yagoda terror of the Thirties. The Bolshevik regime found it easy to seize and liquidate all those activists who were a threat to the integrity of the Soviet Union. A frontal attack was also launched against the educated and intellectual levels of Ukrainian society, the cultural leaders. Court proceedings were staged against the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, the SVU—which included leading intellectuals such as S. Yefremov, M. Slabchenko, O. Hermaize, and others—and the Ukrainian Youth Association, the SUM—consisting of the most active youth representatives and led by M. Pavlushkov. Although the arrests included thousands of people, only a few were tried and sentenced publicly. Thousands were accused of working for the cause of a free democratic Ukraine separate from the Soviet Union, and were exiled or executed without even being tried. Moscow accused the SVU and SUM of being organized widely throughout the whole country. In this way the Russian authorities destroyed Ukrainian intellectual life and its youth movement. The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences soon became a branch of the Soviet Academy. Various cultural, professional, and artistic associations and organizations were directly subordinated to Moscow's centralized control and thoroughly Russified. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was completely suppressed.

The Russian terror in Ukraine, which began in 1928, continued until the outbreak of the Second World War with an uneven intensity. It was led by two Moscow viceroys, P. Postyshev and N. Khrushchev. The Russification process forcibly penetrated all areas of life of the country. Economic exploitation was very intense and growing. It was simply a mockery to call the country a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; it was a full-fledged colonial possession of Russia.[22]

BETWEEN THE WARS: THE WESTERN REGIONS; THE UVO AND THE OUN. The political fortunes of the Western Ukrainian provinces were quite different. Though the overall political situation was not favorable for the Ukrainian people under Polish, Czech, and Romanian domination, it was, however, tolerable in comparison to what was going on under Soviet Russian terror. The political fortunes of Carpathian Ukraine and Bukovyna were decided internationally by the Treaty of St. Germain in 1918. The political future of Galicia, Western Volhinia, Western Polissia, Pidlashia, and the Kholm and Lemko regions ceded to Poland by the Treaty of Riga, were not yet certain. The Western Allies did not recognize the provisions of this treaty. In March 1923, the so-called Council of Ambassadors of the United States, England, France, and Italy approved the Polish annexation of Galicia, with a provision for political and territorial autonomy for the Ukrainian population of the land. Warsaw promised to cooperate with the decision but never lived up to the promise. The fate of the other lands was tacitly approved according to the Riga convention.

The Polish Government immediately proceeded with the suppression of Ukrainian national life. Arrests, imprisonments, court proceedings, and the sentencing of Ukrainian national activists continued. The Polish language was forced upon the Ukrainian population in all western regions, including Galicia. The Polonization of the educational system proceeded. The chairs of Ukrainian language and history in the University of Lviv were eliminated. In response to such measures, Ukrainians organized a Secret Ukrainian University. The university operated for only a few years.

In order to eradicate the Ukrainian tradition of the land—connected with the name Galicia, *Halychyna*—the Polish Government officially renamed it Little Eastern Poland. They then established an artificial border between Galicia and other Ukrainian lands within the Polish state. They intended,

in this way, to prevent the spread of Ukrainian national self-awareness from Galicia, the city of Lviv in particular, to these other lands that were north and west of Galicia and that some had been under prolonged Russian-Tsarist rule. That rule, as was pointed out before, had attempted to suppress the slightest manifestation of Ukrainian national self-awareness. Galician Ukrainian organizations and associations were not allowed to open branches or to operate in these lands. The forbidden organizations included parties, cooperatives, Ukrainian-speaking schools, self-education institutions such as the *Prosvita*, and youth and women's organizations. The Ukrainian press was also not admitted to these regions.

The Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church was discriminated against in Galicia, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in other lands was actually persecuted. The Polish Government expected, through a forced introduction of Roman Catholicism, to Polonize the population. Many Orthodox churches were destroyed, demolished, closed, or converted into Roman Catholic churches. Polish police and military units were used to convert, by force, Orthodox believers to Catholicism. Neither the protests of the Ukrainian Orthodox or Catholic hierarchy, nor of the Ukrainian parliamentary representation in the Polish Parliament, the *seim*, brought relief. The complaints of the Ukrainian leadership at the League of Nations and at the Holy See were to no avail.[23]

Discriminatory Polish land policies made the Ukrainian peasants desperate. Though a large-scale division of manorial lands was undertaken, the Ukrainian peasants were not allowed to buy as much land as they wanted. Instead Polish colonists, often former soldiers, settled on Ukrainian land to strengthen the Polish ethnic stock and Polish domination. Ukrainians were removed from official positions in the administration and the judiciary and replaced by Poles. The Ukrainian language was banned from official use.[24]

Ukrainian self-defense against the Polish onslaught was

carried out in two ways, legally and by revolutionary measures. Legal self-defense was assumed by the Ukrainian political parties; in particular, the Ukrainian National-Democratic Union, the UNDO, which was the most influential and the majority party; the Radical Party, of socialist-agricultural orientation; and the Social-Democratic Party. Other political parties were either short-lived or of minor importance. The leading political figures of the time were D. Levytsky, S. Baran, S. Vytvytsky, V. Mudryi, Y. Pavlyvkovsky, L. Bachynsky, I. Makukh, M. Stakhiv, and L. Hankevych. The Communist Party, or rather several of its variations operated underground. Major parties were able to elect a few representatives to the Polish *seim* and the senate. They constituted the so-called Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation. The Representation attempted to defend the Ukrainian cause in Poland using democratic and parliamentary measures. However, because Polish elections were rigged in most cases, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation was always a small minority which could achieve very little.

Facing the grim reality under the Polish occupation, the former members of Ukrainian military formations during the struggle for independence of 1917-1921 soon organized an underground revolutionary resistance. The Ukrainian Military Organization, the UVO, was headed by Colonel Yevhen Konovalets, the commander of the Ukrainian Riflemen units which had operated in Eastern Ukraine under the authority of the Directorate. He became a kind of a hero of the independence struggle. The UVO immediately adopted revolutionary tactics to force the Polish Government to fulfill its promise of granting territorial autonomy to Galicia and to abandon its repressive measures. Assassinations were prepared and carried out against leading Polish figures; public buildings were blown up; railroad, telephone, and telegraph installations were disrupted;and police stations and post offices were attacked. While the headquarters of the UVO were abroad, an extensive underground organizational network was estab-

lished in Galicia and other lands under Polish occupation to continue the resistance.

In 1929, the UVO and some other minor nationalistic and revolutionary-minded groups held a congress in Vienna and established the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. It was a strictly disciplined, ideologically unified revolutionary force which uncompromisingly aimed at the restoration of Ukrainian statehood by any means available. This congress laid the organizational foundations and ideological framework for the OUN, with central and regional structures to carry on the struggle. Colonel Konovalets became the head of the OUN. He was, of course, the most natural choice. While the OUN, as Vytvytsky and Baran have stated, emanated from the UVO, its ideological framework was largely based on the political writings of D. Dontsov and M. Mikhnovsky, who were well-known political figures of the period from 1917 to 1921. Their writings were permeated by patriotism, idealism and the readiness of the individual to sacrifice for the supreme end of Ukrainian political independence.[25] It was a link in the development of Ukrainian political thought, from the nineteenth-century peasant-centered movement, through autonomism and federalism, to national sovereignty as the only alternative. Since the top leadership of the OUN was elected, there were elements of democracy, as far as its revolutionary and military character permitted. Historically the OUN was rooted in the prolonged struggle for independence and the short-lived Ukrainian statehood of the period from 1917 to 1921.

The OUN struggle was intended to be expanded throughout all of Ukraine, against all the occupational forces of Poland, the USSR, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, even though its activities manifested themselves primarily in Galicia. Soon an attempt was made to launch revolutionary activities in the so-called Ukrainian SSR. Some of those accused in the Kharkiv court trials in 1930, who were members of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Youth Associa-

tion, were aware of and connected with the program and the activities of the OUN. Later, the OUN network developed further in the Ukrainian SSR.[26]

Konovalets was especially interested in expanding revolutionary activities in lands under Soviet occupation. The Soviet secret police, the GPU or NKVD, planned an organized assassination of Konovalets hoping to weaken the fervor of the Ukrainian underground. In May 1938, Colonel Konovalets met in Rotterdam with an alleged OUN courier from the Ukrainian SSR, a man named Valukh, who apparently handed him a bomb and left. In a few minutes the bomb exploded and killed the head of the OUN. The assassinations of Petlura in Paris in 1926 and Konovalets in Rotterdam in 1938 showed the consistent efforts of the Soviet Government to liquidate Ukrainian resistance outside the USSR.[27]

The OUN continued to fight against Polish oppression, answering terror with terror and revolutionary measures. Collaborators with the government were killed, Polish properties destroyed, and Polish officials assassinated. The most famous assassination was that of the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, B. Pieracki, who had been responsible for many anti-Ukrainian acts. It was masterminded by the territorial leadership in Galicia, headed by Stepan Bandera. A Polish court sentenced three of the twelve men accused of being connected with the assassination of Minister Pieracki, including Bandera, to death. Others were sentenced to life or long-term imprisonment.[28] Then the death sentences were commuted to long-term imprisonments.

In 1930 the OUN revolutionary activities caused a violent Polish reaction, called the Pacification. Ukrainian towns and villages were invaded, burned, ruined, and plundered by police and military units. Ukrainian cultural, social, and economic institutions, schools, cooperatives, and *Prosvita* buildings were destroyed or demolished. Many Ukrainians, including priests, were beaten up or killed. Then, following the example of the Soviet Union and anticipating that of Nazi

Germany, a concentration camp was established in Bereza Kartuska. It was soon filled with Ukrainian activists, whether they were guilty of breaking Polish laws or not.

The Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation attempted to achieve some kind of normalization of life in Western Ukraine and avert any new pacification, but the OUN intensified its revolutionary activities in all Ukrainian lands under Polish domination. This uneasy situation, with normalization attempts on the one hand and increasing revolutionary acts of the Ukrainian underground on the other, continued until the outbreak of the Second World War, which brought the temporary liquidation of Polish statehood.

Meanwhile, a most remarkable historical experience took place in Carpathian Ukraine, which had for centuries been under foreign rule and separated from the rest of Ukraine. The Czech Government, being rather tolerant, allowed Ukrainian national, cultural, and economic life to develop freely according to democratic principles. Schools were largely Ukrainian. Still, the Czechs, traditionally notorious Russophiles, attempted to support the growth of the *Moscalophile* movement among the Ukrainian population in order to please the Soviets. This hurt the Ukrainian cause. They could not, however, stop the impressive growth of Ukrainian national self-assertion, which was greatly expanded due to the progressive penetration of the OUN movement into Carpathian Ukraine.

Then, in the fall of 1938, Hitler suddenly moved against Czechoslovakia in order to annex to the Third Reich the so-called Sudetenland, a border region populated by Germans. Czechoslovakia was forced to become a federated state, with Carpathian Ukraine as an autonomous land. The Carpathian *Sitch*, the core of which consisted of OUN members, became the military force of the new autonomous country. In March 1939, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as an independent nation. Carpathian Ukraine proclaimed her independence in the middle of March. Rev. A. Voloshyn became her first president and Y. Revai her first premier. Almost all the people

enthusiastically voted in the general elections. OUN members flocked to Carpathian Ukraine to participate in the building of the new state, and particularly to strengthen its military organization, the *Sitch*.

But the political existence of an independent Carpathian Ukraine was short lived, because of Hitler's duplicity, his anti-Ukrainian feelings, and his subsequent plans. In November of 1938, by German-Italian agreement, a part of the Ukrainian ethnic territory, along with its capital city of Uzhhorod, had been given to Hungary. Thus, even before the proclamation of its independence had been declared, Hitler had secretly encouraged Hungarian military aggression against Carpathian Ukraine. The Hungarian military soon moved against the new state. The Carpathian *Sitch* was supplied by volunteers from everywhere. After a short but very bloody struggle, however, the Hungarian armed force of some 40,000 men over-powered the Ukrainians. The Carpathian *Sitch* was also attacked from the north by volunteer Polish guerrilla fighters. They were sent there by the Polish Government, which believed that even a small independent Ukrainian state could endanger its own rule over Western Ukrainian regions. Both the Poles and the Hungarians acted with Hitler's blessings and were later properly rewarded.[29] The Carpathian-Ukrainian phenomenon was clear evidence, though, of the unceasing desire of the Ukrainians to be politically independent and of their enormous and vital power. The Transcarpathian region had for centuries been separated from the rest of Ukraine and had endured oppressive foreign rule. Nevertheless, it had given birth to a Ukrainian State.

The political fortunes of Bukovyna were sad. The Romanians annexed the land and put it under permanent martial law. They pretended that the Ukrainians were only Ukrainianized Romanians, and fierce Romanization policies were undertaken. The Ukrainian character of the land was completely denied. Only the Romanian language was officially allowed and only Romanian schools were permitted to exist.

Any Ukrainian national life was suppressed. No Ukrainian organizations or associations were allowed to operate. No Ukrainian press was permitted to operate. Still, in the 1930s, aggressive OUN tactics forced the Romanian Government to liberalize the regime.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR. The war began on September 1, 1939 with a German air attack on Poland and the German armies' crossing of the Polish borders without any formal declaration of hostilities. Later on, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Yugoslavia, and Russia were attacked in approximately the same way and manner. The suddenness of the attack was part of the German "Blitzkrieg" technique.

During the first twelve months of the German-Soviet alliance during the Second World War, the USSR made very significant progress in advancing socialism and Russian imperialism. On September 17th the Red Army crossed the Polish border and, according to a secret arrangement with Hitler, participated in the liquidation of the Polish state. Without a declaration of war, large areas of Western Byeloruthenia and Western Ukraine under temporary Polish administration were snatched away and occupied by the Soviets. Then, the Soviets held rigged elections to "legalize" the incorporation of those provinces into the Byeloruthenian SSR and Ukrainian SSR. As a part of the Nazi-Soviet blueprint for Europe, in November the Bolsheviks launched a war against Finland, whose borders were supposedly too close to Leningrad and thus threatened Soviet security. Soviet aggression against Finland outraged the Western powers, but it did not teach them anything. A few months later, out of political expediency the Western powers allied themselves with the Soviet Union.

In 1940, the Soviets invaded the three Baltic Republics—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—to open a "Wider Window"

to the West in line with imperialistic plans once launched by Ivan the Terrible and completed by Peter the Great. At first, pacts of friendship were offered to the Baltic nations. But soon, taking advantage of internal turmoil, the Soviets invaded and annexed the three countries as three more Soviet Socialist Republics. At about the same time, an ultimatum was presented to Romania, and subsequently the Red troops occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which were populated mostly by Ukrainians and had been a part of Romania since the First World War .

All these conquests enlarged the Soviet Union by some 170,000 square miles and brought about 22,000,000 more people under its control. The Soviet Union reclaimed the area because it had once been under the rule of the Tsars, and by so doing proved to be worthy of the Russian imperialist tradition.

In November 1940, Molotov, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, was called to Berlin to deal with the growing estrangement between the two Governments. He was told, among other things, to curtail Soviet territorial appetites and to agree to newly planned German moves of aggression. The situation went from bad to worse. In April 1941, Germany conquered Yugoslavia. Subsequently Greece was conquered, and an invasion of Crete followed. The Soviet leaders now knew that they would not see the "capitalistic" world bleeding to death as a result of its own imperialistic wars, and that they themselves would be involved in those wars. They reorganized internally in a feverish attempt to be ready for German attack. In order to avoid the menace of two fronts seven thousand miles apart, in Europe and in the Far East, on April 13, 1941 they concluded a non-aggression pact with Japan.

On June 22, 1941, Hitler ordered his armies to cross the borders of the USSR.

During 1941, the Germans achieved one victory after another over the Soviets. The German troops reached the suburbs of Leningrad and took Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, the

Perekop Isthmus, and—for a while—even Rostov. Moscow itself was seriously threatened. Millions of prisoners were taken by the Germans, mainly non-Russians. Naively believing that Hitler would free them from Russian-Communist oppression, they threw down their arms and refused to fight. In the Baltic lands, in Byeloruthenia, and in Ukraine, the German troops were hailed as liberators until bitter disillusion set in.

German rule in the conquered East European areas soon became anything but a liberation of the non-Russian nationalities from Russian oppression. Hitler was too sure of himself. He thought the Soviets to be as good as defeated. Hence, he did not deem it expedient to gain the friendship of the Ukrainians, Byeloruthenians, Crimean Tartars, Balts, and other peoples. Immediately he began to procure *Lebensraum* (living space) for the German nation by the extermination of the Slavic Eastern European nationalities for whom the Germans had always had contempt. The Hungarians, who were not Germanic or Nordic, were also included in the Nazi extermination scheme. German atrocities—mass murder and execution, extermination in concentration camps, and the insane genocide of the Jews—soon convinced the Eastern European peoples that the Germans were not bringing any liberation from Russian Bolshevik imperialism. Instead, there was a new German Nazi imperialism. A large-scale resistance and insurgent movement flared up throughout Eastern Europe. It began to fight against both German occupational forces and Bolshevik guerrilla raiders, who were roaming the forests and the inaccessible countryside. The fight was most determined and merciless.

In January 1943 the Germans were hurled back from Stalingrad, the turning point of the Soviet-German war. From that point on the victorious march of the German troops became a tragic defeat and retreat. Meanwhile the Western Allies scored successes in Africa. The United States developed

its striking power and the bombing of Germany began. Hence, Germany soon had to fight on several fronts. The task was impossible, and the Germans soon began to weaken.

The turn of the tide in favor of the Russians in the East was largely due to the tremendous Allied military and economic assistance, mostly in the form of Lend-Lease. The Soviets received some 18 billion dollars worth of Lend-Lease supplies, over 11 billion from the US alone. At Stalingrad, for example, the Soviet soldiers ate American food, fought with American weapons and ammunition, and drove American tanks. The planned collective economy of the Soviet Union was unable to support its defense demands. Hitler had largely counted on this, not anticipating the possibility of American material assistance to the USSR.

During 1943, the Soviet armies pushed steadily toward the west. The German armies retreated, applying the "scorched earth" policy. Industrial establishments were either dismantled or dynamited; agricultural equipment was demolished. A "desert" was left behind.

The Second World War was nearing its end. The Allies began holding important international conferences to decide the future of Germany and to outline post-war order and reconstruction. At Casablanca, Roosevelt and Churchill established the principle of unconditional German surrender. At Teheran in November 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin ironed out disagreements and strengthened cooperation. At Yalta in February 1945, the Big Three set up the principles of reconstruction of the post-war world, according to which all countries conquered by the Germans should be freed and their sovereignty restored. In fact, however, Eastern Europe was abandoned by the West to the Soviet Union, since the West agreed to Soviet military occupation of Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Once there, the Soviets set up Red regimes and turned these countries into Russian satellites.

Between April 17 and May 2, 1945 the Battle of Berlin was

fought by Soviet troops. Berlin then surrendered. On May 7, Germany capitulated unconditionally. From July 17 to August 2, the Potsdam Conference was held to put the finishing touches on the new political setup.

On August 5, 1945 the first atomic bomb was dropped by the United States on Hiroshima. On August 9, the second one was dropped on Nagasaki. On August 8, the USSR declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. On September 2, the Japanese surrendered. The Second World War was over.[30]

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE: THE 30TH OF JUNE 1941 AND THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY. Just as the First World War had sparked the hopes of Ukrainians that the international conflict would give them the opportunity to make their fatherland free and independent, so did the outbreak of the Second World War. Poland, an enemy of Ukrainian independence, collapsed immediately. The Ukrainians then hoped that somehow the Soviet Union, the new Russian empire, would also collapse as the war continued. Subsequent developments, however, were not very encouraging. Almost at the very beginning of the war, the Soviets occupied most of the Western Ukrainian regions, except for the Kholm, Pidlasha, and Lemko regions which, according to the Hitler-Stalin agreement, were included by the Germans in the so-called *Generalgouvernment* (of Poland). On November 1, 1939, the occupied western regions were annexed to the Ukrainian SSR by a decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and a part of the northern Polissia region was included in the Byeloruthenian SSR. In June 1940, Romania was forced to surrender to the Ukrainian SSR the land of Bukovyna and the Ukrainian-speaking portion of Bessarabia.

Out of all the past political organizations and parties, only the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the OUN, continued to be active in the underground. It resisted the Russian policies and terror measures used to force Russianization and

Sovietization upon the population. In order to suppress and to liquidate that opposition toward the Russians, the Soviet authorities—the Party and the secret police—began to prepare an all-out terror campaign to increase the number of arrests, imprisonments, and deportations to distant areas of the Soviet Union of the more active elements and leading representatives of the old "capitalist-nationalist" society of Western Ukraine.

Because a general expectation prevailed in Western Ukraine, supported by the growing activities of the OUN, that the war would ultimately bring an opportunity for Ukraine to regain her independence, anti-Russian opposition was on the rise. That general trend was perceived by the Soviets. Hence, on the eve of the German-Soviet war, the Soviets incarcerated thousands of people on mere suspicion of opposition. During the first days of the war the Soviets slaughtered over 10,000 men and women in various cities and towns of Western Ukraine such as Lviv, Sambir, Stanislaviv, and Ternopil, and subsequently repeated the performance in Eastern Ukraine, in Vynnytsia, Berdychiv, and other places as well. In this way the Ukrainian Holocaust of the Second World War began. Massive deportations were also in preparation, but the swift advance of the German armies frustrated this Soviet plan.[31]

Meanwhile, in the western regions under German occupation, west of the rivers Buh and Sian in the *Generalgouvernment*, the police system of the Gestapo prevailed. The German language was made official, while Ukrainian was admitted only as a supplementary and secondary tongue. However, because of the justified fear of Soviet repression, an avalanche of refugees arrived there. They were mainly from Galicia, Volhinia, and Bukovyna, and soon increased the Ukrainianization of these areas, which had been long suppressed by the Poles. The city of Cracow became the center of that Ukrainianization process, which was largely limited to the social, educational, cultural, religious, and economic aspects of life. Schools were organized, cultural associations—such as *Pros-*

vita and *Ridna Khata*—were established, cooperative movements were launched and expanded, and publishing was undertaken. In November 1939, the Ukrainian Central Committee—under the chairmanship of Volodymyr Kubiovych, with regional Relief Committees—was inaugurated to coordinate the national life of the Ukrainian community. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was freed from any Russian or Polish influences, and the Catholic Church was reorganized in the Lemko region and enlarged in other regions.

No political activities were permitted by the Germans. Nevertheless, the OUN underground expanded its operations in preparation for forthcoming events. They were watched with suspicion by the German *Gestapo*, the secret state police. Initially, the Nazis played politics in this respect, unwilling to disclose their true plans for the solution of the "Ukrainian question." The German-Soviet war was quickly approaching, which made the problem of Ukraine as a nation a very acute one in the view of the OUN. The younger generation of members was very suspicious of German intentions, though the Nazis kept silent. These members had not forgotten the treacherous conduct of Berlin during the Czechoslovakian crisis, when Carpathian Ukraine, after declaring its independence, was given to the Hungarians for annexation. At that time, the OUN membership had shed its blood under the command of M. Kolodzinsky, R. Shukhevych, Z. Kossak, and others to resist the approaching Hungarian army units. However, the so-called Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists, the PUN, headed by Colonel Andrii Melnyk, actually had accepted the German decision without any opposition. This outraged the membership of the younger generation.

In 1940, on the eve of the German-Soviet war, the same situation threatened to develop. A. Melnyk and his PUN were not willing to consider the possibility of open warfare against the powerful Nazi war machine. The younger and more revolutionary OUN members were ready for open warfare against the Germans if the Germans opposed the formation of an

independent Ukrainian state after the Soviet defeat. The conflict between the two wings of the OUN deepened as the war got closer. The final split came in the summer of 1940.[32]

A vast majority of the OUN members followed the uncompromising revolutionary call of a new leader, Stepan Bandera, an already famous revolutionary who had fought courageously against Polish domination and led the OUN in Western Ukraine in the pre-war era. The Bandera movement, the OUN (Revolutionary), was prepared to tolerate the Germans if they recognized an independent Ukrainian state in the future, and to wage war against the powerful Nazi war machine if they would not. A rather small minority remained with Col. Andrii Melnyk. But the Bandera movement, the *Banderivtsi*, soon captured all the initiative and was identified by Germans and Soviets with the uncompromising struggle for Ukrainian independence, as once the *Mazepyntsi* and the *Petlurivtsi* had been. No doubt the split between the two factions of the OUN hurt the cause, but the wavering attitude of the Melnyk faction in the hour of decision did not leave any time for reconsideration. The decision had to be made, and it was.[33]

The OUN (Revolutionary), to be ready for the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities with training and arms, sponsored the organization of the two legions of the so-called *Druzhyny Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv*, the DUN, (the Detachments of Ukrainian Nationalists), with the tacit consent of the German armed forces but without the approval of the Nazi Party. In the framework of the German armed forces, the legions were called the *Nachtigal* and the *Roland* detachments. Furthermore, both nationalist organizations readied the so-called *pokhidni grupy*, the marching units. These units were supposed to move quickly into Ukraine, ahead of or immediately after the front line, in order to assist the local population in organizing various aspects of national life which had been completely suppressed by Soviet terror for much too long. Here too the *Banderivtsi*, the Bandera men, were ahead of the game, and they largely dominated the scene by their dyna-

mism and uncompromising spirit. Soon all OUN units in Ukraine had been alerted.

On the 22nd of June 1941, the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. The two OUN legions and the marching units were immediately on the move. It was soon apparent that the Nazi leadership was planning to make Ukraine a colony of the Third Reich, rather than recognize her political independence. In order to prevent this, on the 30th of June the Bandera movement mobilized the leaders of Ukrainian society in the city of Lviv, and in the presence of the *Nachtigal* formation and the OUN activists—many of them recently released from Soviet prisons—the proclamation of the restoration of independent Ukrainian statehood was carried out with the backing of almost all Ukrainian political groups. The act was proclaimed by Yaroslav Stetsko, soon to be the prime minister of the newly reestablished state. It was, from the political point of view, a mature act expressing the will of the people. There was no wavering, doubt, or outside pressure behind this act, as had been the case in Kiev in January 1918.

The proclamation came as a surprise to the German authorities. It forced the Nazis to disclose their secret plans for Ukraine. As a result, the Nazis acted promptly. A special detachment arrived from Berlin to liquidate the Bandera movement. All top members of the movement, including S. Bandera, Y. Stetsko, and others, were arrested. The revocation of the Act of the 30th of June was demanded and refused. The Gestapo immediately began a massive terror campaign against the Bandera movement. During subsequent months thousands of people, many members of both nationalist organizations, were arrested, jailed, deported to the notorious German concentration camps, executed without proper trials, or tortured to death.

The *Nachtigal* and *Roland* military formations were quickly dissolved after they refused to take an oath of allegiance to the Third Reich and its Führer. The *Nachtigal* was turned into a guard unit to be sent out of Ukraine. Roman Shukhevych, one

of the *Nachtigal*'s top men, escaped and joined the OUN underground to continue armed resistance against the German onslaught.[34]

Meanwhile, the marching units of the OUN penetrated deeply into Ukraine, assisting the local population in organizing its national life, as planned, in its cultural, religious, educational, and economic aspects.

The spirit of Ukrainian nationalism spread throughout the Right-Bank and Left-Bank regions, attracting all active elements in the cities, towns, and countryside. The OUN was a growing underground, not only under the German occupation, but in Carpathian Ukraine, under the Hungarian domination, and in the so-called Transdnistria, a plot of southern Ukraine between the rivers Boh and Dniester. It was readying itself for the resurrection of an independent Ukraine, after the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. At the same time, the Gestapo began to hunt for the OUN members who had dared to defy Hitler's political designs. Some of the most prominent personalities of both wings of the OUN became victims of the Gestapo terror campaign and were imprisoned, shot, or sent to the concentration camps. Some of these victims were I. Klymiv-Legenda, D. Myron-Orlyk, O. Kandyba-Olzhych, and O. Teliha. The repression of the OUN went on in all Ukrainian provinces. Executions took place in 1941 and 1942 in all major cities, in Kiev, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, Krementchuk, Lubni, Shepetivka, Rivne, Kreminanets, Berest, Lviv, Stanislaviv, and other towns and townships.

In October 1941, the Ukrainian National Council or Rada was established under the auspices of the OUN, led by A. Melnyk, in Kiev. It hoped to become the central government agency in Ukraine, and was headed by N. Velychkivksy. Yet it was soon disbanded by the Germans before it could do any serious work.

In order to exploit Ukraine economically and to prepare her for German colonization in the future, the German authorities created, administratively, the so-called *Reichskommissariat*

Ukraine, which included Volhinia, southern Polissia, Right-Bank Ukraine, and a part of the Poltava province. In 1942, the Zaporizha region and a part of the Azov Sea area were added to the Commissariate. Most of the Left-Bank regions, which were close to the front line, were retained under direct military administration. The *Reichskommissariat* was then divided into the so-called *Bezirke* and *Gebiete*. The whole administration process was run by German commissioners. Eric Koch became the *Reichskommissar* and turned out to be a ruthless and bloody hangman. Collective and state farms were retained since they could serve the exploitation policies intended by the Third Reich for its newly acquired colony. A promised land reform to partially restore individual land possession and tilling, announced in 1942, had little practical effect as far as individual land allotments were concerned. During their occupation, the Germans exported from Ukraine over 12 million metric tons of farm produce, including 9.5 million tons of grain and flour, 7.6 million head of cattle, 9.3 million hogs, 7.8 million sheep, and 3.3 million horses to economically support their war machine.[35]

German political plans, police repression, and economic exploitation soon provoked popular resistance. At first sporadically and in isolated areas, units of armed resistance were organized in various parts of Western Ukraine, like that of Taras Bulba in Polissia. The OUN was always behind those units, and soon the Bandera movement became involved. By the fall of 1942, the armed resistance movement had already reached considerable proportions. The leadership of the Bandera movement reorganized the separate and isolated units of the insurgents into the popularly based Ukrainian Insurgent Army, *Ukrainka Povstanka Armia*, the UPA. Since it was a consolidated armed force of the Ukrainian people, the UPA was determined to fight for Ukrainian national independence in the tradition of the liberation struggle of the Twenties and of the Act of the 30th of June, 1941. Anti-German guerrilla warfare continued to grow. Taras Chuprynka, (Roman

Shukevych), already a well-known OUN leader, soon became the commander-in-chief of the UPA. The Ukrainian underground, opposing the Germans, penetrated the Left-Bank and Donbas and attempted to protect the peaceful population against the Nazi terror and economic exploitation.

The Nazis responded at first with an even greater terror, intending to destroy Ukraine economically. The marketplaces were raided by police and everything of value was taken away from the people; businesses were repossessed by German corporations and individuals for nominal prices; large cities were inadequately supplied with necessities, causing a decline in their industrial and commercial activities; and the population was sharply reduced by mass deportations of young people for forced labor in Germany. By 1943, some three million men and women had been deported. The Ukrainian workers in Germany, referred to as *Ostarbeiter*, were not treated well. At the same time the so-called "collective responsibility" principle was used in Ukraine to respond to any self-defense actions of the local population. The number of victims eventually reached hundreds of thousands. At the same time the military strength and the striking power of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army continued to rise, answering the German terror by damaging military supplies and supply routes, sabotaging requisitions, and preventing some German reprisals.

In order to take advantage of anti-German feelings, the Russians sent their own guerrilla fighters to Ukraine in 1943. They were directed and supplied by Moscow behind enemy lines. The largest detachment was led by S. Kovpak. However, the Soviet guerrillas did not gain any support from the local Ukrainian population. In fact, the UPA units immediately began to fight and exterminate these representatives of the other deadly enemy of Ukraine. The UPA units also had to fight the Polish underground, which was active in the western Ukrainian borderlands harassing the Ukrainian population.

Soon the German war effort began to falter and the German

authorities began to lose their grip over Ukraine. The Soviet armed forces, aided by arms, ammunition, and all kinds of supplies from the United States, began to advance steadily toward the west. In April 1943, realizing that they were losing the war, German authorities changed their policy and approved the creation of the "Galicia" Division, a regular military unit affiliated with the Waffen SS, which was intended to fight against the Soviets but not against the Western Allies. The Ukrainian Central Committee with V. Kubiovych cooperated with the plan, at a time when German defeat was already an unavoidable reality. The idea was to get arms into Ukrainian hands and to defend the land against the Bolshevik onslaught. The "Galicia" Division was organized and was soon sent to the front to fight. Though completely deserted by the Germans, it fought courageously in the Battle of Brody, August 1944. Meanwhile, a second Ukrainian division was organized in the hope that after the German defeat, perhaps with Allied assistance, the Soviets would be stopped and the Ukrainian national interest somehow protected.

At the same time the Germans were feebly holding the cities and towns. They had lost any effective control over the Ukrainian countryside, which was under the protection and administration of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*, mostly on territories not yet invaded by the Reds. In order to streamline the government of these territories and to prepare the resistance against the new invaders, in July 1944 the Bandera movement encouraged the establishment of the Ukrainian General Liberation Council (*Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada*). This was a kind of Ukrainian government with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as its armed force. German terror largely subsided for various reasons. First, the Germans were losing the war and were looking for friends. Second, terror was not compatible with the existence of two Ukrainian divisions fighting against the common enemy. And third, the UPA was too strong, with almost 200,000 guerrilla fighters. The Germans began to

release from prisons and concentration camps top Ukrainian leaders such as Stepan Bandera, Y. Stetsko—the prime minister of the new Ukrainian state, Col. A. Melnyk—the head of the other OUN faction, and some others.[36]

Moving westward the Red armed forces took the capital of Kiev in November 1943. The retreating Germans destroyed everything—factories, mines, bridges, highways, railroads—leaving behind in Left Bank Ukraine a so-called "zone of destruction." In the Right-Bank, they had no time to do the same thorough job because of a swift Soviet advance. In April 1944, all of Eastern and Central Ukraine was occupied by the Russians. In July, the Soviet troops entered Lviv, and in October Carpathian Ukraine was invaded. Again all of Ukraine was facing Soviet terror and exploitation.

In the hope of some kind of a political miracle, in the spring of 1945 a Ukrainian National Committee, under the chairmanship of General Pavlo Shandruk, was established. The committee took control of the two Ukrainian divisions created earlier. They were then renamed the Ukrainian National Army. The whole project was soon terminated by the end of the Second World War. Still the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, under General Roman Shukhevych, and the underground units of the OUN (Revolutionary) remained active, determined to fight against Soviet domination until Ukraine was free again.

THE UPA AND OUN STRUGGLE IN THE POSTWAR YEARS. During 1943 and 1944, the Soviets theoretically recaptured all Ukrainian territories. In actuality, it took a few years before they were able to restore their dominance over all of West Ukraine. The UHVR, the Ukrainian General Liberation Council, with its armed units of the UPA, controlled most parts of the countryside, as it had at the end of the German occupation. Initially, the Reds held the cities, towns, railroad connections, and military centers. General R. Shukhevych-

Taras Chuprynka, head of the UHVR and supreme commander of the UPA, directed the anti-Russian struggle. The organizational system of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, consisting of the UPA North, West, South, and East, was soon reorganized and consolidated so it could truly be an armed force of the Ukrainian people. It included a substantial number of OUN members who were its ideological and organizational backbone, and enjoyed the broad popular participation of residents of Ukrainian villages and towns. Many former members and officers of the Red army, the "Galicia" Division, the Communist Youth, and other segments of the Ukrainian society, united in their struggle against the Russian onslaught within the framework of the UPA.

The Red Army units, returning from the Western front, were ordered by the Kremlin to liquidate the UPA resistance. Yet these units, largely Ukrainian in their ethnic composition, proved to be totally unreliable. Their officers and soldiers were not willing to fight against the UPA forces, and some of them even joined the Ukrainian resistance. Hence, the whole campaign began to falter. These troops were soon replaced by special NKVD (secret police) detachments. In the first months of 1946 many fierce battles were fought between the UPA and the NKVD units, while the Insurgent Army undertook numerous raids in the Right-Bank regions and the borderlands near Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Byeloruthenia. Bloody encounters took place, especially in the Kholm and Lemko regions, in opposition to the large scale Russian-Polish resettlement and deportation projects in which entire Ukrainian villages and townships were to be moved either to the northwestern regions of Poland or to distant regions of the Soviet Union. In order to avoid deportation, many villagers and residents of towns joined the UPA detachments.

Because Western Ukraine was a hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism and anti-Russian resistance, and in order to liquidate the OUN and UPA, the NKVD began a mass terror

campaign against Western Ukrainians with wholesale deportations, imprisonments, public tortures, and executions. Special NKVD units "for UPA extermination" were engaged. Threats towards the stubborn and rewards for informers were introduced. Yet, the partriotic population by and large continued to give support to the guerrilla fighters. The Soviets spread false reports that the UPA and the OUN, identified under the common name of *Banderivtsi*, were Nazi collaborators, terrorists, enemies of the Ukrainian people, or the supporters of the Western capitalists. Mass trials of OUN members were conducted in all large cities of Western Ukraine, such as Lviv, Stanislaviv, Stryi, Drohobych, and Chortkiv. Anybody accused of Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalism was branded as a *Banderivets*, and subject to terror and persecution. But for about two years or more the Russian authorities still could not get the upper hand.

In 1947 an agreement was concluded among the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia to assault the UPA units collectively and to liquidate them. Meanwhile, Soviet Marshall M. Vatutin and Polish General W. Swierszczewski were killed by UPA detachments. The UPA command then changed its tactics and began to operate in small mobile units, from fortified bunkers in forest areas and the Carpathian mountains. From there they undertook raids against the NKVD, the army centers, and the seats of Soviet administration. At the same time several units of the insurgents were sent to the West. The units had to struggle through Polish, Czech, and Austrian territories to reach American-controlled regions in order to deliver eyewitness reports and heavy documentation concerning Ukrainian resistance against the Soviet onslaught. Not all the dispatched units made it through to the West, but those that did fully accomplished their mission.

In defiance of the Soviet regime, Soviet police stations were destroyed and police officers and informers were assassinated by units of the Ukrainian resistance. How hard it was for the Soviet authorities to break the UPA-OUN resistance was

made apparent by some eight amnesty appeals signed by top Government or Party officials and military dignitaries attempting to persuade the insurgents to surrender. However, it was all in vain. In March 1950 in Bilohorshcha, near the city of Lviv, General Roman Shukhevych, the UPA commander-in-chief, was killed in action. Then, in 1951, other top leaders, such as P. Poltava and O. Hornovyi, perished. In 1952-53, the Soviets succeeded in capturing a number of prominent OUN personages, whom they tried and sentenced to death or long imprisonment. It must be emphasized here that the UPA-OUN insurgent struggle was carried on solely by the Ukrainian people without any outside military or material assistance. This was a singular phenomenon during and after the Second World War, when most guerrilla wars were supported by outside help.

In spite of these misfortunes, the underground OUN organizational network was not eliminated. An unfortunate incident happened in 1953. This time, in cooperation with foreign intelligence, an OUN detachment, under B. Okhrymovych, was sent to Ukraine to contact the underground there. It was, however, immediately captured and liquidated by the Soviets because of a Russian spy ring within British intelligence which informed the Reds about the project and all of its details. Still, in 1954 A. Kirichenko, the Soviet party chief in the Ukrainian SSR, complained about OUN penetration of all facets of life; collective and state farms, industrial and commercial enterprises, the educational system, the administrative apparatus, labor organizations, and other institutions. In 1956, another appeal was made by the Soviet regime urging the armed units of UPA-OUN to surrender. The struggle was still going on, though on a smaller scale, especially in the Volhinia regions.[37]

The OUN and UPA struggle also had other repercussions. In the early 1950s large numbers of deportees, OUN and UPA members, soldiers and other patriotic elements, arrived in Soviet concentration camps. They soon organized and freed

themselves from the terror of the common criminals. These criminal elements were actually supported by the camp authorities, who wanted to make the political prisoners' lives miserable. The deportees began to stage a massive resistance against the *Gulag* administration and the guards. Soon, an OUN network, known as the Bandera movement was established in most camps. It became the backbone of numerous uprisings in the camps. A general uprising was planned to take place during the Korean War to coincide with a major Asiatic encounter such as an American invasion of Manchuria under General Douglas MacArthur. Such a possibility was taken seriously by both the Soviet authorities and the political prisoners. As a result of these developments, the Soviets lost partial control over the concentration camps, even though a major Asiatic encounter with the Americans did not occur. In order to prevent a complete breakdown of the *Gulag* system, the Soviet authorities then released about 80 per cent of the inmates and allowed them a somewhat freer life in the Asiatic regions, though they were not permitted to return to their homelands. Numerous Western eyewitnesses of these developments, such as John Noble, W. Ciszek, and others mentioned the leading role of the *Banderivtsi* throughout the *Gulag* system.[38]

The UPA struggle had a significant spiritual and intellectual impact. Numerous underground publications—small booklets, pamphlets, leaflets, periodicals, and other printed materials of political and literary contents authored by such people as P. Poltava and O. Hornovyi—were published and widely circulated in opposition to Soviet pressure and the Soviet way of life. Another result of the anti-Russification attitude, initiated by the struggle of the 1940s and 1950s and other political developments, was the Ukrainian cultural and political movement of the Sixties; the so-called Sexagesimals or *Shestydesiatnyky*. The de-Stalinization policies of Krushchev and the subsequent political "thaw" granted a little more freedom and enabled the movement to grow. The *Shestydesi-*

atnyky promoted a literary and intellectual revival in Urkaine, though with strong political overtones. This generation of intellectuals, literary figures, poets, writers, musicians, journalists, political thinkers, sculptors, and others insisted on the strict Ukrainianization of all aspects of life in the Ukrainian SSR. Prominent *Shestydesiatnyky* included V. Chornovil, L. Kostenko, V. Symonenko, V. Moroz, I. Dziuba, I. Svitlychnyi, S. Karavanskyi, and M. Osadchyi. Their defense of Ukraine's right to develop culturally and politically led them to discuss Ukraine's political status within the USSR, including her constitutional right to secede.

Ukraine's political independence was considered the best guarantee of her free spiritual and cultural growth. Secret organizations were formed, such as the United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union and the Ukrainian National Front. The trend was clear cut, though the term "nationalism" was carefully avoided in order not to arouse the suspicion of Soviet authorities. Later on, some of the *Shestydesiatnyky* admitted to having connections with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the OUN. The entire movement was a protest against the Russification of all facets of Ukrainian national life. Even P. Shelest, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, made statements in defense of Ukrainian culture and language, and the congress of Ukrainian writers and poets dared to come to the fore in the defense of Ukrainian spiritual and intellectual values.

Russian chauvinism, however, was on the alert. In the middle of the sixties new repressions were introduced, and soon almost all the *Shestydesiatnyky* were incarcerated in prisons, concentration camps, and insane asylums by the Soviet authorities. Some of them were murdered by the KGB, such as Alla Horska in 1970, an artist and defender of human rights. Still, even though the movement of the Sixties was largely suppressed by traditional Russian cruelty, a Ukrainian dissident movement surfaced in the Seventies as another link in

the permanent drive toward freedom in Ukraine. Underground papers such as *Ukrainsky Visnyk*, ("The Ukrainian Herald"), began to be published, continuing the defense of Ukraine's rights, culture, language, literature, and other values, while aggressively exposing Russianization measures.

The next important dissident group was the Ukrainian "Helsinki Group," which was organized in 1976, headed by M. Rudenko, and joined by N. Strokata-Karavanska, L. Lukianenko, O. Meshko, I. Kandyba, and others. The Ukrainian "Helsinki Group" did not simply demand human rights in the Ukrainian SSR as a result of the Helsinki Accords. It advocated even a political liberation of Ukraine from Soviet oppression which would automatically grant human rights for her people. The KGB reacted immediately. Most dissidents and members of the group were arrested, sentenced, and incarcerated for many years. Nothing else was to be expected from the Kremlin leaders. A few were allowed to go to the West, such as N. Strokata, S. Karavansky, and V. Moroz. The suppression of the *Shestydesiatnyky* and other dissidents in the USSR brought waves of protests and demonstrations in Western countries against Soviet political terror. Public condemnation of the Soviet tactics was unanimous. Protests were organized by Ukrainians in the Free World and joined by many prominent political figures in the West, including Presidents, senators, and congressmen.

THE SOVIET-RUSSIAN DOMINATION IN THE POST-WAR ERA. Meanwhile, Soviet-Russian domination of Ukraine continued, at times with the utmost cruelty, at other times with lesser intensity. But any form of Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalism, as Moscow preferred to call it, was suppressed. At one time Stalin wanted to deport all Ukrainians to Siberia or other distant Asiatic parts of the USSR to liquidate Ukrainian "separatism" once and for all, as he had done with the Crimean Tatars and the Kalmyks. "There were only too many

of them," according to Khrushchev, commenting on Stalin's desires.[39]

Immediately after the war, in 1945 and 1946, show trials of "collaborators" and "nationalists" were held in all major cities. Sentences were harsh—either execution or forced labor for ten to twenty-five years. It is estimated that about 300,000 people were sentenced this way. People who had returned from forced labor in Germany were for the most part shipped directly to Siberia, the Far East, or Central Asia. Only a few of them were allowed to go back to Ukraine. Russian nationalism, spurred on by Soviet war achievements, was on the rise. Any other type of nationalism in the Soviet Union, especially Ukrainian nationalism, was suppressed. OUN members and UPA soldiers were treated most cruelly, as pointed out before. Still, in order to have more votes in the United Nations, Moscow demanded two additional seats for the Ukrainian SSR and the Byeloruthenian SSR, and it received them. Although both republics were represented among sovereign nations, the Kremlin isolated Ukraine from the rest of the world and continued to speak in her name through the course of the postwar decades, as it had done before. The same was true in the case of Byeloruthenia. Anything Russian was considered exemplary, and the Russian people were praised as the greatest nation in the world. Anything carrying the mark of Ukrainian patriotism was considered bourgeois-nationalism and was to be exterminated completely.

Purges of "unreliable elements" were periodically undertaken, since Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalism was suspected everywhere: in education, cultural and artistic pursuits, business and the economy, industries and commerce, collective and state farms, labor, and government—including the Party. Along with the intensification of the Russification drive, the Russian language was required in all schools in Ukraine. Russian teachers and professors were brought from distant regions of the Soviet Union, while Ukrainian teaching and research staffs were substantially reduced. The publication of

books, journals, and other periodicals in Ukrainian was dramatically diminished and replaced by those in Russian. Higher education, colleges and universities, became almost entirely Russian. Khrushchev, the Party boss in Ukraine, was even dismissed for a while and replaced by L. Kaganovich, who was expected by Moscow to do a better job of eradicating Ukrainian nationalism.

In 1946 the Ukrainian Catholic Church was abolished by an uncanonical "synod." It was replaced by the official Russian Orthodoxy, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was unceremoniously annexed by the Moscow Patriarchate. Ukrainian priests, nuns, and faithful believers were imprisoned, tortured, killed, or deported to distant regions of the USSR. Only Russian Orthodoxy, a willing government tool, was reluctantly allowed to exist by the atheistic Soviet regime. Roman Catholicism was viewed with hostility.

During the collectivization drive, 1946-1949, in Western Ukraine, a half million peasants were deported and resettled in Poland and Russia to weaken resistance. By 1949, some 85 percent of all peasant farms were already collectivized, even though these farms soon proved to be remarkably inefficient, as Holubnychy has asserted.[40]

Industry, commerce, and the rest of the economy, including the cooperative movement, were fully socialized and subordinated to the government. Russians and other foreigners from the Soviet Union were imported as workers, technical personnel, and managers, since they were more reliable and more submissive to the regime.

After the cruel Stalin era passed in 1953, Russian chauvinism and terror began to decline. The celebration of the so-called "300th anniversary of the Reunification of Ukraine and Russia," in honor of the first version of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654, proved that more attention had to be paid to Ukraine as a political and cultural factor. Soviet propaganda began to call Ukraine the second greatest republic of the Union. In February 1954, the Crimean Peninsula, once a

Tartar Union republic, was given to Ukraine by Moscow as a supposedly friendly act. Funds allotted to the celebration were partially used by Ukrainians to publish scholarly and literary Ukrainian works. The Ukrainian SSR was even allowed by Moscow to join a few international organizations under the authority of the United Nations.

In 1957-1958, N. Khrushchev, the new Soviet ruler, introduced his de-Stalinization policies in administration, the economy, and other fields. This soon granted more freedom of action to Ukrainians. The de-Stalinization campaign removed from top Party and Government positions such men as V. Molotov, L. Kaganovich, G. Malenkov, G. Zhukov, and others of the "old guard." They were true Russian chauvinists who hated Ukraine and her political aspirations. Meanwhile, some deportees were returned home to various parts of Ukraine. Stalin's terror and personality cult were severely criticized.

Yet, this did not mean a real relaxation under Khrushchev. Ukraine continued to be a colony of Russia, and a new wave of terror was begun against the Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalists throughout the whole country. Trials were held and deportations and incarcerations continued as before. Moreover, in order to destroy psychologically the entire Ukrainian independence movement both in the country and abroad, the secret police under its chief, A. Shelepin, carried out assassinations in Munich. The first to be killed was L. Rebet, once an important figure of the OUN (Revolutionary) who had left the ranks of the Bandera movement and adopted a "democratic-liberal" approach. Then, in October of 1959, Stepan Bandera, the living symbol of the Ukrainian independence struggle in the middle of the twentieth century, was also assassinated.[41] But the Bandera movement, the OUN, was not terminated by the assassination of its leader. The membership of the OUN (Revolutionary) immediately centered itself around S. Lenkavsky and then Ya. Stetsko, the former prime minister of the re-established Ukrainian State in 1941,

as its subsequent leaders. The struggle still continues under the name of the *Banderivtsi.*

Between 1959 and 1962, during the so-called Khrushchev "Thaw," the Soviet Government returned to its harsh measures against Ukrainian nationalism. Trials against OUN and UPA members were resumed. Brezhnev's era, 1964-1982, was marked by a full-fledged and rapid intensification of Russian chauvinism and terror tactics in the Ukrainian SSR. The Russification of all walks of life was energetically resumed by the regime. P. Shelest was dismissed as the First Secretary of the Communist Party and replaced by a more submissive individual, V. Shcherbytsky. The Party, the government, education, the economic life, and cultural and artistic fields were overrun by Russians and persons loyal to the Russians who staffed all the top positions. New arrests, sentences, deportations, and executions followed. A crackdown on the *Shestydesiatnyky* in the 1960s and the dissidents in the 1970s was carried out by the regime.

The Russian language was favored everywhere and the censorship of all publications was intensified. Publications in Ukrainian were practically eliminated. Most publications dealing with the sciences, history, the arts, psychology, and sociology were printed in Russian. Most study of Ukrainian history prior to the nineteenth century was stopped. All schools, with a few exceptions, and all higher education were made exclusively Russian. The number of Ukrainian professors and students in the colleges and universities were dramatically reduced in Ukraine. Many Ukrainians were sent to other parts of the USSR to study.

A new constitution proposed by Brezhnev was adopted in 1978. It still upheld the supposed "sovereignty" of the Union republics, including the Ukrainian SSR, and guaranteed them the right "to secede from the Union." An agreement had earlier been concluded, in 1941, between the United States and the USSR to establish a separate American consulate in Kiev. This might have aided the Ukrainian position in interna-

tional affairs. Yet this separate consulate was never opened. In 1980, the U.S. embassy in Moscow even closed its branch in Kiev as a reprisal for the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Only satellite countries of the Soviet block were allowed by Moscow to maintain their representations in the Ukrainian SSR. Otherwise, the country was tightly sealed from the rest of the world, as it had been before under Tsarist rule.

After Brezhnev died in 1982, and Yuri Andropov assumed leadership in the Soviet Union, the Free World speculated about future developments, hoping for the best. Yet, taking into consideration Andropov's past—in particular his fifteen-year career as the chief of the KGB, where he was responsible for incarcerating, torturing, deporting, and executing millions of people in the name of Russia's greatness—Ukraine and the Ukrainians could only expect the worst. Nevertheless, their struggle for independence did not cease. [42] Chernenko's assumption of power a year later changed nothing. He soon died, and M. Gorbachev became the Kremlin's top man in 1985. The situation in Ukraine only worsened.

THE GREAT EXODUS AND THE UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD. The emigration of Ukrainians for economic and political reasons to the Americas and various lands in Europe began long before the First World War. The collapse of the independence struggle in the 1920s contributed to an increased number of emigrants to West European countries. Soon Vienna, Berlin, Prague, and Warsaw became centers of the political and cultural activities of Ukrainian emigré circles, which continued the struggle in behalf of a free Ukraine. The Second World War resulted in a subsequent mass exodus of Ukrainians to the West in order to avoid Soviet-Russian terror, persecution, and genocide.

At the end of the Second World War there were some three million Ukrainians in Germany and Austria alone. They consisted of forced laborers who had been deported by the Ger-

mans, prisoners of war, political prisoners in German jails and concentration camps, war evacuees, voluntary refugees from Soviet-dominated territories, and soldiers of the First and Second Divisions of the Ukrainian National Army. According to the terms of the Yalta Agreement between the West and the East, all Soviet citizens were supposed to be returned to the USSR. Soviet repatriation commissions arrived in West Germany, Austria, and other regions, and insisted on the forced repatriation of all Ukrainians, including those from Western Ukraine who had not been Soviet citizens prior to 1939. The American, British, and French military authorities were at first not adequately informed of the situation. This led to Soviet excesses, resulting in violence, riots, and sporadic suicides, killings, and injuries among the so-called displaced persons who were resisting forced repatriation to the USSR. By 1946 these incidents had halted any forced repatriation. Yet hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were returned to the Soviet Union. Most were shipped to distant regions of the USSR and not allowed to return to their homeland in Ukraine.

By 1946, in West Germany and Austria there were some 300,000 Ukrainians who did not want to go back to their enslaved country. A large percentage were well educated and professional people determined to continue to serve the cause of Ukraine's liberation by exposing the duplicity and crimes of the Soviets. The growing tension between the West and the USSR was in their favor. Soon, most of them were taken under the care and protection of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the UNRRA. After 1947 they were taken care of by the International Refugee Organization, the IRO. The former was supposed to provide temporary care and subsistence for the displaced persons, the DPs, while the latter was to carry out the resettlement of those who refused to go to their homelands. Of course, the DPs were not only Ukrainians, but Poles, Jews, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Armenians, Byeloruthenians, and others whose coun-

tries were, by force, included in the Soviet sphere of influence and domination. Not all voluntary refugees acquired the status of the DPs, but soon most of them were given the privilege of resettling in the West, including Australia and New Zealand.

Ukrainians in Western Europe immediately began to organize their national, cultural, social, political, and even economic activities while about eighty percent of them were living in refugee camps. Local committees were established. As early as November 1945, a Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration, under the chairmanship of V. Mudryi, was established. It coordinated the activities of Ukrainian emigrant circles and groups. Though at first Ukrainians were only recognized in accordance with their pre-war citizenship—Polish, Czechoslovakian, Romanian, or Soviet, after late 1945 they were officially considered a distinct national group within the UNRRA and IRO organizational network. They lived in some eighty camps which were predominantly Ukrainian. A minority of Ukrainians lived privately outside the camp system where they participated in the national life of the entire community.

Religious, cultural, educational, scientific, literary, and other areas of the national life of the Ukrainian community were quickly and effectively organized. Schools on various levels, including colleges and universities, began to operate. The Ukrainian Scouting Organization, *Plast*, and the Ukrainian Youth Association, *SUM*, which had a large membership, were revived. Professional societies were initiated, the Ukrainian press was revived, and books of various kinds were published. The Western atmosphere of freedom facilitated this organizational drive.

Political tension between the Western powers on the one hand and the Soviet block on the other encouraged the Ukrainian emigrants, and their political life flourished. The exile government of the UNR (the Ukrainian National Republic) was revived and joined by various political parties. The

UNR was headed by A. Levitsky, whose goal was to have representation for the Ukrainian cause abroad. Meanwhile, four main political orientations resumed their activities: the democrats, socialists, monarchists, and nationalists. In the democratic camp, the revived West Ukrainian National Democratic Union, the UNDO, was most important. In the socialist camp three old parties existed: the Social Democratic Labor Party, the USDRP; the Ukrainian Party of Social Revolutionaries, the UPSR; and the Western Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, the USRP. All these parties resumed their political activities after having kept silent during the war and the Nazi and Bolshevik terror. There was also a newly organized Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party, the URDP. The monarchist movement was represented by the Union of Hetmanites-Patriots, the SHD, which was of little significance. The nationalist movement at first consisted of two separate organizations, the OUN-R or the Bandera movement and the OUN-S or the followers of Melnyk. The former was larger and more active during the war and in the postwar era, while the latter got smaller as time progressed and gradually departed from the old precepts of Ukrainian nationalism. In 1948, the Bandera movement suffered a major loss. Largely under the leadership of M. Lebed and L. Rebet, a liberal wing under the name of the OUN-Abroad left the traditional organizational framework and included in its scope the so-called Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, the UHVR. The UHVR was the underground government in Ukraine in the late 1940s. The Lebed movement progressively departed from the old ideology and under the influence of Western liberalism gradually became a regular democratic-socialist-liberal political faction. Nevertheless, the *Banderivtsi* still continued to be the largest, most active, most uncompromising and revolutionary force in the Ukrainian DP camps. In 1947 an attempt was undertaken to unify all Ukrainian political factions, and the so-called *Ukrainska Natsionalna Rada*, the Ukrainian National Council (UNR),

was formed. Its executive organization was appointed and a charter signed. Yet it was not joined by all parties and groups, and its success was in doubt from the very beginning. In order to coordinate the anti-Soviet activities of all the captive nations, the Ukrainians initiated the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations, the ABN. It was activated under the energetic leadership of Y. Stetsko, a former prime minister, in 1946. Furthermore, contacts were established by various groups with foreign government agencies to expose Soviet cruelties and to promote the cause of Ukraine and all captive nations under Soviet domination. The political pattern of the Ukrainian emigrant community, with some new parties organized and some old ones disbanded, was carried to various lands where Ukrainians had permanently resettled, including the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand. Ukrainian emigrants took with them their zeal and determination to propagate the fight for Ukraine's cause and to expose the Soviet Union's chauvinistic and imperialistic designs. They transplanted their cultural, spiritual, religious, scholarly, educational, and artistic activities as much as possible, in order to promote their further growth and development in their new lands.[43]

By 1980, approximately three million Ukrainians lived in the Free World, and about one half of that number was settled in the United States as the largest, wealthiest, and the most active community in the diaspora. The beginnings of a substantial Ukrainian emigration to the US date back to even before the middle of the nineteenth century. Hence the emigrants after the Second World War found a solid support for the continuation of Ukrainian cultural values in the US. In 1940 the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the UCCA, was organized, and was soon recognized as the supreme Ukrainian representation by the U.S. Congress and state authorities. Lev Dobriansky excelled as its president for more than thirty years, after which he was appointed Ambassador to the Bahamas by President Reagan.

In spite of friction in 1980 during the thirteenth convention of the UCCA in Philadelphia, when a tiny liberal minority did not want to submit to the decisions of the vast majority led by the Ukrainian Liberation Front (the Bandera movement), the UCCA successfully continued its activities for the community's well-being and in behalf of Ukraine's cause. It was financed by voluntary contributions of all patriotic Ukrainian-Americans to the so-called Ukrainian National Levy for the Ukrainian National Fund.

By 1980, half a million Ukrainians lived in Canada, where they were even better organized than in the United States. They developed various aspects of community life, including education and literary and artistic creation. In 1940, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, the UCC, had been established as the leading representative of Ukrainian-Canadians. The UCC was headed for a long time by Msgr. V. Kushnir.

Ukrainian emigration in Brazil reached some 100,000 people, mainly concentrated in the province of Parana. It did not succeed, however, in establishing a national organization like the UCCA or UCC in the US and Canada, although efforts were made in that respect in 1910 and 1919. Ukrainians also developed their religious, social, educational, cultural, and economic life.

There were also an estimated 120,000 Ukrainian emigrants in Argentina in the 1970s. They established their own schools, press, publishing activities, and political parties (which consisted of the *Banderivtsi* and the *Melnykivtsi*). A tiny percentage of Ukrainian emigrants lived in the other countries of South America.

Ukrainian emigrants in Western Europe—West Germany, Austria, France, and Great Britain—contributed significantly to the growth of Ukrainian national life in the diaspora. In West Germany, the Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigration was the leading agency, and it united and coordinated the cultural and community activities of the Ukrainians, some 20,000 people in all. West Germany was an impor-

tant center for Ukrainian publishing activities. In Austria, the Coordinating Council of Ukrainian Organizations has been the top agency since 1967.

Ukrainian emigration to France had been substantial and active immediately after the Poltava tragedy of 1709, when Hryhorii and Pylyp Orlyk were active in popularizing the Ukrainian cause. Subsequently, Ukrainian political emigrants came to France after the Russian Revolution of 1905 and after the First World War. At first they were political emigrants seeking safety. In the 1920s, Western Ukrainian workers came to France looking for employment. During and after the Second World War a new wave of Ukrainians came. They were either forced laborers brought by German authorities or political refugees. In the 1980s, there were about 30,000 Ukrainians in France, where they developed their religious, social, scholarly, and educational activities. The Ukrainian Central Social Committee, founded in 1948, was the coordinating body.

Ukrainian emigration in Great Britain began in 1946-1947. The emigrants consisted of members of Gen. Anders' Polish Army Corps and the First and Second Divisions of the Ukrainian National Army, and subsequently some 20,000 Ukrainian DPs. In the 1980s, there were approximately 25,000 Ukrainian emigrants in England, largely under the auspices of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, which was ideologically related to the OUN-R. Their community life has been very well organized in various respects. Only their religious life, under the "direction" of Bishop Horniak, has to some extent been disorganized.

In Belgium, the Ukrainian group is relatively small, consisting of some 4,000 persons in the 1980s. Their community was very well organized in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Some 22,000 Ukrainians lived in Australia in the 1970s. They had come there between 1947 and 1950 from DP camps in Western Europe. Their national life has been well organized. The Federation of Ukrainian Associations in Australia

has been their top organizational body and representation. Ukrainian cultural, educational, and political activities have been flourishing, including the publication of papers and books and the maintaining of an Australian branch of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

Ukrainians have also been dispersed, because of Soviet-Russian oppression, throughout Eastern Europe, China, and other parts of Asia and even Africa, where they have always attempted to organize and preserve themselves as a distinct ethnic and national entity. Ukrainians all over the world have a constant hope that some day their fatherland will be free and that many of them will be able to return there.[44]

In November 1967, all Ukrainians in the diaspora organized their world-wide representation, *Svitovyi Kongress Vilnykh Ukraintsiv* (SKVU), the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU). The Congress was participated in by top representatives of Ukrainians in all the countries they had settled in, except for the Communist countries. Several conventions of the Congress were held in New York or Toronto. The Congress continued to adopt strictly national-political platforms, warning the Free World against the danger of Communist-inspired Russian imperialism, praising the heroic struggle for a free Ukraine in modern times, and demanding political independence and sovereignty for their homeland. For that Moscow badly slandered the WCFU.

For some reason liberal and leftist Ukrainian groups tried to wreck the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the representation in the United States, in 1980. They also attempted to split or to wreck the WCFU in Toronto in the winter of 1983. A day before the end of the fourth convention of the Congress, TASS, the Soviet news agency, proclaimed that the WCFU had collapsed. However, because of the politically mature stand of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, led by H. Bilynsky and backed up by the Ukrainian Liberation Front, the political unity of the Ukrainians in the diaspora was saved. A high price was paid, however. Another

liberal democratic representation of American Ukrainians was admitted to the Congress, the Ukrainian-American Coordination Council. Splitting the unity of the Ukrainian community in the United States, the largest and the most active community in the Free World, was definitely not in the Ukrainians' national interest.[45]

Notes

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[2]Polonska-Vasylenko, *loc. cit.*, pp. 444-445; D. Doroshenko, *Istoria Ukrainy*, 1917-1923, New York, 1954, Vol. I, pp. 31-37.

[3]N. Stachiv, N. Chirovsky, and P. Stercho, *Ukraine and the European Turmoil 1917-1919*, New York, 1973, Vol. I, pp. 30-38; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 57-60.

[4]I. Mazepa, *Ukraina v ohni i buri revolutsii*, Prometei Publishing Co., 1950, Vol. I, p. 29; Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 465.

[5]The text of the Second Universal: Stachiv, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 377-378, also, pp. 38-40.

[6]The text: Stachiv, *ibid.*, pp. 382-285; also pp. 49-53 for interpretation.

[7]The text of the Fourth Universal, *ibid.*, pp. 385-389; also pp. 62-64; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 256-276; M. Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, New Haven, 1970, pp. 521-539.

[8]P. Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revolutsii*, New York, 1969, Vol. II, pp. 91-116; also, Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 482-485.

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[11]Stachiv, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 183-193.

[12]The fall of the Hetmanate: *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 217-230; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*,

Vol. II, pp. 403-424; V. Andrievsky, *Z mynuloho*, Vol. II, *Vid Hetmana do Dyrektorii*, Berlin, 1921.

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[14]Stachiv, *Ukraine and the European Turmoil*, Vol. II, pp. 281-325; Polonska, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 526-531.

[15]P. Fedenko, "The Period of the Directory," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 754-758; Stachiv, *op. cit.*, Vol, II, pp. 119-182; the Labor Congress and other matters, Mazepa, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 80-95.

[16]Stachiv, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 340-503; negotiations with the Allies: Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 527, 534-535; Mazepa, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 93-96, 103-110.

[17]Fedenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 755-766; Mazepa, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 124-135; "The Death Triangle," Holubets, *op. cit.*, pp. 815-816.

[18]The Warsaw Treaty: Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 539-543; I. Borshchak, "Warshavsky dohovir," *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavsva*; Munich, 1949, Vol. II, pp. 210-211; S. Shelukhyn, "Lyst do S. Petlury. Ryzkyi dohovir," *Nemezyda*, No. 2, Lviv, 1936; second edition, Paris, 1948.

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[21]V. Holubnychy, "Ukraine between the Two World Wars," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 794-833; the respective figures: p. 828.

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[24]*Ibid.*, p. 848-849.

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[26]Mirtschuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 202-230.

[27]The Rotterdam tragedy: *Ibid.*, pp. 522-533; Petlura's assassination: I. Krypiakevych and M. Dolnytsky, *Istoria Ukrainy*, New York, 1966, p. 187; also, M. Kovalevsky, *Pry dzerelakh borotby*, Insbruk, 1960, pp. 616-617.

[28]P. Mirchuk, *Stepan Bandera*, New York-Toronto, 1961, pp. 44-66.

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[30]Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-203; Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 711-743.

[31]*Zlochyny Moskvy u Vynnytsi*, published by the Ukrainian Youth Association of America, SUMA, New York, 1951; Rev. I. Nahayevsky, *Istoria Ukrainy*, Philadelphia, 1975, p. 298; Krypiakevych, *op. cit.*, p. 208; V. Holubnychy and H.M., "Ukraine during the World War II, Central and Eastern Ukraine," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, p. 878: O. Martovych, *Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times*, Edinburgh, 1951, p. 91.

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[36]M. Lebed, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*, Munich, 1946; O. Martovych, *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army*, Munich, 1950; J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945*, New York, 1955; on the anti-German struggle: Nahayevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-331; Martovych, *Ukrainian Liberation Movement*, pp. 91-168; A. Bedrii, *OUN; i UPA*, New York, London, 1983.

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[38]Rev. W. Ciszek, *With God in Russia*, New York, 1964; the revolt, pp. 177-199, "For the most part, these were...*Banderovcy*, a famous band of tough Ukrainian partisans who hated the Soviets. None of them went to work at *Gor Stroi* or elsewhere, but they walked around the camp as though they owned it...They dealt with the camp officials in a way which plainly

indicated that they didn't want to be bothered." (182);"...but the *Banderovcy* ordered the officials to get away from their barracks" (183); A. Solzhenitsyn referred to the *Banderivtsi* incarcerated and active in the labor camps: *The Gulag Archipelago*, New York, 1974, pp. 62, 77, 86, 91, 99-100, and 519; B. Bailey, *The Captive Nations*, Chicago, 1969, pp. 75-83; A. Kniazhynsky, *Na dni SSSR*, New York, 1959, in particular the references to the UPA members, pp. 179-199; an eye witness report of M. Mytsio, inmate of the camps in the early 1950s, about the OUN and UPA activities.

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[40]Holubnychy, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 902.

[41]Mirchuk, *Stepan Bandera*, pp. 128-148; Holubnychy, *ibid.*, p. 910; *Moskovski vbyvtsi Bandery*, ed. D. Chaikovsky, Munich, 1965.

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[45]*Zvernennia IV SKVU do Ukrainskoho Narod i Rezolutsii IV Konhresu SKVU*, in *Vyzvolny Shlakh*, London, February 1984, XXXVII, Bk. 2 (431), pp. 163-168; also, *Visnyk SKVU*, May 1985, No. 1 (13), pp. 6-10.

Prof. Mykhailo Hrushevsky,
President of the Ukrainian
Democratic Republic, in his study

Msgr. Augustin Voloshyn
President of Carpatho-
Ukrainian Republic, 1939



Simeon Petlura
President of the Ukrainian
Democratic Republic

Colonel Andriy Melnyk
Successor to Konovalets in the
Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists

Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky

Colonal Evhen Konovalets
Head of the Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists
(Assassinated in Rotterdam, 1938)

General Roman Shukhevych
Commander-in-Chief of the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army

Yaroslav Stetsko
Prime Minister of the Ukrainian
Government in Lviv, 1941

Stefan Bandera
Head of the Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists
(Assassinated in Munich, 1959)

CHAPTER SIX

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF FREE UKRAINE

Constitutional and Legislative Process—Legislative Agencies—Administration and Finances—The Judiciary—The Military—Appendix:The Government of the Ukrainian SSR

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS. Once again the Ukrainian state structure and constitutional process had to start from scratch, with little organic connection to the Cossack-Hetman state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Only the ideological bond with national independence in the past was carried over to the twentieth century. Otherwise, the constitutional and political institutions of independent Ukraine were rather new. They originated and developed under the impact of West European democratic, republican, liberal, and socialistic currents, trends, and institutions. Though the ideals of national independence were inherited from Kievan-Galician and Cossack-Hetman times, the constitutional forms were new—although Cossack democratic and monarchistic undercurrents were present in the modern era.

The new constitutional structure of modern Ukraine displayed several fundamental characteristics which should be

kept in mind. First of all, it was only in its beginnings, with aspects of provisionalism and fragmentation. It was never developed because of war developments and the ultimate collapse of the independence struggle in the 1920s and 1940s. But some constitutional acts and legislative measures were adopted, and they indicated an overall trend. They tended to emphasize Ukrainian national independence. Otherwise, old Russian laws in Eastern Ukraine and Austrian laws in Western Ukraine—civil, penal, and procedural systems—were relied on. Although making Ukraine independent and sovereign was a revolutionary step, the new Ukrainian Government did not want to destroy or abolish all the old institutions, to build everything from scratch with the revolutionary zeal and obsession of the Russian Bolsheviks. In Ukraine, the transition was intended to be slow and well prepared. Nevertheless, mistakes were made.

Secondly, in Eastern Ukraine, formerly under Tsarist domination, the constitutional process moved very slowly away from autonomy and federalism. There was even opposition to Ukraine's political sovereignty by some socialist factions. A federation with Russia which was supposed to become democratic, socialist, and republican was favored by many but not without outside pressure. These trends finally matured in the independent statehood of the Ukrainian Republic as reflected in the four Universals or decrees of the Central Rada in Kiev between June 1917 and January 1918. That the Ukrainian leadership was influenced by socialism only blurred the picture. The situation was different in Western Ukraine, where leaders were not blinded by socialist doctrine. They did not vacillate or take gradual steps in the constitutional process. Instead there was a swift and revolutionary proclamation of independence by the National Rada in Lviv on November 1, 1918. Similarly a swift and revolutionary move to establish the Ukrainian statehood took place in June 1941 under the auspices of the OUN-R. These two events showed a great political maturity. Most importantly, the Unification Act of

January 1919, which united two Ukrainian states into one Ukrainian National Republic, fulfilled the political dreams of all Ukrainian patriots.

Thirdly, in all proclamations of Ukrainian independence and other legislative acts, including the Act of the 30th of June 1941, the notions of representative and democratic republicanism as the fundamental constitutional principles of the restored statehood, with the exception of those of the Hetman era, were clearly visible. In most cases these principles included a broad representation of all people in the country's government: of all the political, civic, cultural, and professional groups, with no discrimination based on sex, religion, or ethnic background. The only exception was the Labor Congress of January 1919, which gave preference to "working people" and discriminated against so-called "non-working groups."

Fourthly, in the constitutional and legislative acts of the Central Rada and the Directorate, the drive for liberalism, social reforms, civil liberties, individual freedom, protection by law, equality for all (with the exception of the Labor Congress), the rights of ethnic minorities (including their autonomous status), and law and order in the land was definitely manifested. The laws of the Hetman era were, on the other hand, more conservative and even reactionary in the sense of traditional monarchism. Law and order were stressed, but the theoretical equality of all citizens was not recognized.[1]

The constitutional process of the new state actually began with the formation of the Central Rada. Once news about the revolution in Russia reached Ukraine, this became the first body or agency of statehood to be restored. Overwhelming support was given to the Rada by the Ukrainian National Congress of April 19, 1917, attended by some 1,500 representatives from all walks of life. On June 23, 1917, the Central Rada, responsive to the wishes of the people, proclaimed the First Universal against the will of Petrograd Temporary Government. The Universal announced that from then on the

Ukrainian people would guide their own national life. Accordingly, the Central Rada would become the top government body of Ukraine. Ukraine, however, would remain in federation with Russia. From this point on, Ukraine would rule herself as a fully autonomous country and a subject of international law. In the future the laws of the new country would be enacted by a democratically elected Parliament or Congress. In the meantime, the Rada would undertake the responsibility of guarding the rights and welfare of the people.

Initially Petrograd's Government did not want to meet the Rada's demands of political autonomy for Ukraine, but after the Rada's unilateral and revolutionary move, Petrograd decided to talk and presented certain demands of its own. As a consequence of the negotiations with Petrograd, the Central Rada issued the Second Universal. It upheld Ukraine's autonomous status and confirmed the temporary legislative authority of the Rada. At the same time, its composition was completed by the representation of the ethnic minorities, and its agency, the Secretariat-General, a temporary executive authority for Ukraine, was reformed. The Second Universal was promulgated on July 17th.

The Central Rada, moving ahead to create a legal framework for the new nation, adopted a Temporary Constitutional Act on July 29th. This act was intended to prepare Ukraine's autonomous status for subsequent approval by the Ukrainian and Russian Constitutional Assemblies. The Secretariat-General was to be appointed by the Central Rada and accountable to it, but the appointment required a confirmation from Petrograd's Temporary Government. The Secretariat-General was to consist of fourteen Secretariats, ministries for various state functions (such as internal affairs, finance, military activities, food, justice, land affairs, education, trade and commerce, ethnic minorities, and others), and three deputy-secretaries for selected minorities—the Russians, Poles, and Jews. The agency was to supervise all administrative govern-

ment agencies in Ukraine. The Temporary Constitution also provided that all legislative acts of the Central Rada would require confirmation by the Temporary Government in Petrograd. Subsequently, the Temporary Government tried to make the Secretariat-General its administrative arm. It even issued instructions for it, describing its composition and competence, while the Rada in Kiev strenuously opposed this.

The collapse of the Temporary Government in Petrograd and the Bolshevik takeover, forced the Central Rada, on November 20, 1917, to proclaim the Third Universal in which the sovereign statehood of the Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed. A future Constituent Assembly was supposed to decide on the form of federation with Russia, a federation between two free and equal nations. It was assumed that with time Russia would become a democratic republic again. The Third Universal was, constitutionally speaking, a very important step forward; with its issuance Ukraine was no longer an autonomous land, but a sovereign nation. Its ties with Russia, however, were not fully severed. According to the Act, the Central Rada became Ukraine's highest legislative body, and the Secretariat-General her highest executive authority. The territory of the new nation was generally determined; the principle of justice was upheld by establishing a court system; the fundamental freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly, the right to form unions, and to strike, the inviolability of person and home, and the autonomous rights of the ethnic minorities were guaranteed; capital and corporal punishment were abolished; unproductive ownership of land by persons who did not work it was restricted; and other important matters were regulated.

More war, revolutionary developments, and diplomatic demands induced the Central Rada to promulgate the Fourth Universal on January 22, 1918. In this Universal, the full and complete sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic, with no reference to any future federative ties with the Russian Republic, was proclaimed. The Act inferred the people's

supreme authority in the land since its declaration of independence was proclaimed according to the will of the Ukrainian people. A subsequent Constitutional Assembly was supposed to establish a permanent government system for Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Central Rada continued as the supreme legislative body, but a Council of National Ministers was to assume the top executive authority by replacing the Secretariat-General. A continuation of the democratic-republican forms of government, however, can clearly be seen. Furthermore, following the socialistic belief in international brotherhood of workers, the Universal introduced a National Militia to replace the standing armed forces. A scheme of local administration was outlined, the socialization of any unproductive and large-scale landholdings was upheld, and nationalization of all natural resources was formally introduced. Accordingly, the Council of Ministers was to supervise the resumption of all industrial and other production. Even prior to the promulgation of the Universal, in November and December 1917, the Rada enacted additional laws concerning the electoral system. These provided for equal and secret ballots and establishment of a Supreme Court of Justice. Acts were adopted in January 1918 concerning agrarian reform, citizenship in the UNR, state colors and emblem, and the monetary system.

Signing and ratifying the Peace Treaty of Berest were other important constitutional measures that gave Ukraine international recognition as a sovereign nation. They also provided certain details about the territory of the new Republic.[2]

The enactment of a new Constitution of the UNR on April 29, 1918 constituted the climax of the legislative activity of the Central Rada era. The Act was intended to give Ukraine a workable, though temporary, legal framework for her political and social activities and other aspects of her national life. Its enactment preceded similar constitutions adopted by other newly established states after the First World War. The tem-

porary constitution consisted of eight chapters and eighty-three articles.

The temporary constitutional law affirmed the sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic. All authority was vested in the people, who acted through a National Parliament or Congress, the *seim*, elected by general, secret, equal, direct, and proportionate balloting for a three-year term. It was the top legislative authority in the land. The Chairman of the Congress was to act as the Head of the State, the President. The Congress was supposed to appoint the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Court of Justice. The constitutional act guaranteed to all citizens, regardless of their nationality or creed, all civil rights and personal freedoms. It provided for the abolition of capital and corporal punishment, as did some previous legislation. Article 6 of the Act granted broad autonomy to ethnic minorities to freely regulate their own affairs. With all its superior qualities of liberty, democracy, and republicanism, however, the constitutional law could not be put into operation because of the Hetman *coup d'ètat.* [3]

Under the auspices of the Central Rada, the constitutional evolution in Ukraine moved strictly on a democratic and republican course. But the Hetman *coup d'ètat* and the installation of the Hetman government changed the evolutionary direction towards the monarchist (at first autocratic but soon to be parliamentary) government structure. On April 29, 1918, with the takeover accomplished, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky issued a Manifesto proclaiming himself a ruler of Ukraine according to the Cossack tradition. He also promulgated an Act on the Provisional Government of the Ukrainian State. Specifics of the government were not announced, but it promised that law and order would be provided, that a Parliament would be called to convene, and that it would be up to the Parliament to outline the details of the new constitutional setup. Temporarily, however, the Hetman would assume all authority until the Parliament could convene.

In order to enable the government process to continue uninterrupted, the Hetman, as a temporary source of all legislation, appointed a prime minister. The Hetman reserved the right to confirm or to dismiss individual members of the Council of Ministers; he also appointed the justices of the Supreme Court and assumed the authority of Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces. As pointed out, legislative activity now changed direction. Two classes of citizens, the Cossacks and the common citizens, were named, though no definition was supplied nor were details provided. Apparently the Cossacks, according to the old tradition, were supposed to be a privileged class; hence there was no equality for all people. All nationalization acts of the Rada were annulled, and private-property rights on land were fully restored. The Rada's socialist land reform was repealed. This particular provision caused great antagonism because the major property owners were largely non-Ukrainian and because it took away from the small and landless peasants the chance to acquire more soil for cultivation and for decent living. Unrestricted buying and selling of land was restored by a law of June 14, 1918, although official permission for a transaction was still required when it dealt with more than 67.5 acres. A National Land Bank was formed to finance the purchase of land from large estate holdings.

Subsequently, the Hetman Government passed other laws to accomplish constitutional reconstruction. The National Militia was reorganized into a National Guard and placed under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The changes in provincial and municipal self-government introduced by the former regime were annulled, and a new electoral system for these bodies was enacted. In addition, a number of new laws to advance the educational process, the development of arts and sciences, and the formation of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences soon followed. A series of decrees restored the Ukrainian armed forces, and the Act of July 24, 1918 introduced a universal military conscription.

On November 14, 1918 the Hetman proclaimed an Act on the Union with the future Russian Federation. It was a constitutional retreat from the full state sovereignty of Ukraine achieved on January 22, 1918. The Act did not, however, meet all formal requirements. It was signed by Pavlo Skoropadsky without his Hetman title, and not countersigned by the prime minister as was required. Yet the act greatly angered Ukrainian patriots. Skoropadsky had yielded to Allied pressure. It soon sparked a revolt, long in preparation by the Ukrainian National Association. A month later the Hetman resigned, and this once again reversed the trend of constitutional development, from monarchism to democratic republicanism, in free Ukraine.[4]

The Ukrainian National Association, as mentioned, encompassed the majority of political parties, largely socialist, as well as labor unions and other factions, in opposition to the conservative and monarchistic Hetman regime. Soon a five-member Directorate was formed as a temporary democratic government in Ukraine in the Central Rada tradition. In the long run, there was to be the election of a Constituent Assembly to establish a permanent democratic-republican government in the restored Ukrainian National Republic. Temporarily, the Directorate was supposed to be a provisional legislative body, while the executive power was supposed to be vested in a Council of Ministers.

The Hetman laws inconsistent with the political and economic philosophy of the Directorate, including the laws on land, were abolished. The conditions in pre-Hetman times were to be restored, for the new regime was more socialistic and radical than that of the Central Rada. It departed from "popular representation democracy" and accepted the concept of a "working-people's democracy" of peasants, laborers, and working *intelihentsia*. The "non-working" and "parasite" groups of capitalists, large landowners, and those living at the expense of others were excluded from the country's supposedly "democratic" process. This was radicalism indeed,

and it was one of the reasons the Allies were reluctant to cooperate with the Directorate.

A very important act of the Directorate from the country's constitutional point of view was the Unification Act of January 22, 1919, which produced one unified Ukrainian National Republic. This now included the Western Ukrainian National Republic, established on November 1, 1918, in the city of Lviv, as a western province with an autonomous status. Although preliminary work toward the unification had begun before, as long as the Hetmanate prevailed in Kiev, there was hesitation to continue the talks, even among Western Ukrainians. Preliminary negotiations between representatives of the two Ukrainian republics were held in the town of Khvastiv on December 1, 1918 and a draft treaty was adopted. Then, on January 3, 1919, a resolution of the Western Ukrainian National Council, which authorized the State Secretariat to carry out necessary steps toward unification, was passed. The Unification Act was adopted and ratified by the respective authorities of both republics. Details of the unification, were supposed to be worked out by the future Constituent Assembly of the UNR. Until that time the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv would retain the legislative power, and the executive power of the autonomous Western territory would be held by its State Secretariat.[5]

Between January 22 and 28, 1919, the Labor Congress was held in Kiev. It was attended by 377 peasants, 118 laborers, 33 members of the *intelihentsia*, and 65 Western Ukrainian representatives. It was a radical expression of "working-people's democracy," but its radicalism was tempered to some extent by the more balanced Western Ukrainian delegation. The Congress adopted the Law on Provisional Government of the Ukrainian National Republic. It was necessary to do this because Bolshevik propaganda was making progress among the misinformed. According to the law, Ukraine was to be a representative democracy, ruled by a Parliament elected by general and secret balloting. The Bolshevik style of a "workers'

dictatorship" was rejected. The separation of powers—legislative, executive, and judicial—was reaffirmed. Because of war developments, the Directorate was given the temporary authority to adopt laws essential for national defense. These were to be submitted later to the Parliament for confirmation when conditions were normal.

The law vested executive power in the Council of Ministers, appointed by the Directorate. Local administrative and self-governing units were to be formed by respective elections sometime later on. Temporarily, local governments were put in the hands of commissioners appointed by central agencies and working with provisional local councils of working people. Thereafter a Universal to the Ukrainian People was proclaimed to explain the constitutional principles of the Labor Congress.[6]

On May 13, 1920, the Basic Law on the Constitution of the Ukrainian State was adopted by the Ukrainian National Rada, in Kamianets, but it never acquired any legal validity because of war developments. Yet it clearly reflected the political thought of the time and the desire of governing circles to provide a reliable legal framework for the nation in distress. The law affirmed the previous legal principles of democracy, republicanism, civil rights protection for all citizens, autonomy for the ethnic minorities, and strict separation of powers, and upheld the temporary supreme authority of the Directorate during war operations. Apparently, the idea of a "working people's democracy" was abandoned and replaced by a "democracy of all the people" in the later legislative activities of the Ukrainian socialists.

In November 1920, almost at the very end of the struggle for independence, the Directorate adopted two more legislative acts: On the Temporary Supreme Authority and On the National State Council of the UNR. The first law provided that, until a permanent constitution was adopted, the government functions would be divided among the Directorate, the State Council (the *seim* or parliament), and the Council of

Ministers. The Head of the Directorate meanwhile would function as the President of the UNR. According to the second law, the State Council, the *seim*, was to consist of representation of the people at large and their political, civic, scientific, professional, and cooperative elements. If the Head of the Directorate was not able to act for any reason, the prime minister would assume his authority.

Due to the war conditions, the State Council could not be properly elected and convened. Therefore the Directorate passed one of its final pieces of legislation. On January 9, 1921 it created the Council of the Ukrainian National Republic, which would act outside of Ukraine in behalf of Ukraine. The Council was supposed to consist of representatives of political parties and civic organizations and was to be vested with legislative authority. This action terminated the constitutional activity of the Directorate. It had been sporadic, largely theoretical, and at times faulty, but it had been consistently democratic and liberal and had tried to provide a just government and protection for the people.

The constitutional evolution in Western Ukraine progressed in a different way. With the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, the Western Ukrainians were left with a rather experienced parliamentary and political leadership. It consisted of former members of the Austrian lower and upper houses, including Ukrainian Catholic bishops who were working closely with the people. Eastern Ukraine was in a less favorable position in this respect. Russian autocracy did not allow the development of such well-trained political Ukrainian leadership. Such leadership had to start from scratch in Eastern Ukraine without any experience, which might well account for the mistakes it made.

On October 18, 1918 at the invitation of the Ukrainian parliamentary representation, a meeting was held to which the bishops, the members of the land diets, and leaders of political parties were called. The meeting was constituted as the Ukrainian National Rada or Council, which was estab-

BALTIC SEA
MOSCOW
RUSSIA
BYELORUSSIA
POLAND
KIEV
LVIV
UKRAINE
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
RUMANIA
KATERYNODAR
KALMYK
CASPIAN SEA
ASIA
CAUCASUS
BLACK SEA
ASIA
UKRAINE (USSR) — PRESENT BOUNDARIES
UKRAINIAN ETHNOGRAFIC TERRITORY


CARPATHO-UKRAINE
VIENNA AWARD BORDER
1939.
POLAND
(HALYCHYNA)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
Karpaty
Polonyna Rivna
Antalivs'ka Polyana
Polonyna Borzhava
Polonyna Kuk
Polonyna Krasna
Polonyns'kyy Svidovets'
Velykyy Dil
UZHHOROD
PERECHYN
Velyke BEREZNE
Seredniye
Chinadyovo
SVALYAVA
MUKACHIV (Mchachevo)
IRSHAVA
Berehy
BEREHOVO
Vary
Shalanky
SEVLYUSH
Korolevo n.T.
Rokosovo
KHUST
Horinchovo
Zolotarevo
Velyatyn
Vyshkova n.T.
TYACHIV
Ternove n.T.
VOLOVE (Mizhhirya)
Brustury
Yasinya
RAKHIV
Bohdan
Nyz. Apsha
Vysh. Apsha
Vel. Bychkiv
Trebushany
SIGHET
Nadvirna
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lished as a temporary Ukrainian government of the land, including Galicia, Bukovyna, Carpathian Ukraine, and the Lemko region. The Rada issued a constitutional resolution to form a Western Ukrainian state from these lands, but it did not secede from the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, which was trying to reorganize itself into a federation. The Rada also guaranteed the rights of the ethnic minorities in the new political organization. It was a definite beginning of a democratic-republican constitutional trend. A permanent constitutional structure was supposed to be established in the future by a popular representative body to be elected by general, equal, secret, and direct voting.

Since the Austrian authorities did not want to surrender government functions to the Ukrainian National Rada, it made a revolutionary move on November 1, proclaiming an independent Western Ukrainian National Republic and declaring itself the temporary government of the land until a Constitutional Assembly convened to adopt a constitution and devise a permanent government system. Meanwhile, Austrian laws remained in force. The Rada appointed a Temporary State Secretariat as the top executive body, a kind of a council of ministers. On November 13, a Temporary Fundamental Law of the Western Ukrainian National Republic was adopted. It determined the name of the new state as indicated, designated in general the outlines of its territory, confirmed the people's participation in the government process, and proclaimed the Ukrainian National Rada as the top legislative body and the State Secretariat as the top executive authority of the new state, until a future constitution could be adopted.

On January 4, 1919, a new legislative act spelled out the structure of the Rada. A Presidium of the Rada and an Executive Committee were formed to discharge the regular business of government. The Presidium and the Executive Committee were placed under the chairmanship of the Head of the WUNR. The Committee was authorized to appoint the secre-

taries and ministries, grant amnesties, approve and announce laws, and perform other government functions. The Head of the National Rada was regarded as President of the new Republic. A great similarity in the structures of both Ukrainian states, the UNR and the Western UNR, can easily be seen. The Act of November 16 provisionally regulated the provincial and local administrations, which were largely based on the old Austrian system. Later acts regulated the matters of the official language, the educational system and process, the definition of citizenship, and the parliamentary elections to be held in the future. On November 21, the Supreme Court of Justice was established. The Agrarian Reform Act was announced on April 14, 1919. It called for the expropriation of large landed estates not cultivated by their owners and the acquisition of this land in small lots by landless peasants.

The Unification Act of January 22, 1919, discussed previously, was of singular constitutional importance for Western Ukraine. The promulgation and the ratification of this Act took away the independent statehood from Western Ukraine and made the land an autonomous western province, an *oblast*, of the Ukrainian National Republic. The respective government agencies, the Rada and the State Secretariat, functioned only as autonomous bodies—at least theoretically. For all practical purposes, however, Lviv and Kiev continued to act separately. This was largely due to international developments.

Rather unfavorable war conditions substantially hindered the government activities, not only of the National Rada, but of its Presidium and of the State Secretariat. On June 9, 1919, in a manner similar to the ancient Roman tradition when the *res publica* was in distress, a law was adopted to authorize a "dictatorship" of one man for all military and civilian matters on a temporary basis. Yevhen Petrushevych was made the "dictator," handling all executive power, while the National Rada retained legislative power. Petrushevych was made accountable to the Rada. From a practical point of view, how-

ever, that accountability was nonexistent because of later military and political developments.

Meanwhile, because of the Ukrainian National Republic's highly unfavorable international situation, political preparations were made to restore the Western Ukrainian sovereignty and, in so doing, nullify the Unification Act of January 22, 1919. The Allies refused to cooperate with the Ukrainian National Republic, preferring to see it as a territorial part of either a republican, federative, or monarchistic Russia after the Bolshevik defeat. They were more favorably inclined toward Western Ukraine, which, as a former province of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, had a slim chance of recognition as a separate political entity. But soon the Western Ukrainian Government was forced from its territory, and could only mount some diplomatic efforts on behalf of Ukraine.[7]

During the independence struggle, the sovereign statehood of Ukraine was internationally recognized by many foreign powers. First of all, the co-signers of the Treaty of Berest—Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Soviet Russia—granted their recognition to the new state. At the time of the Hetman rule, Romania, the Don Cossack Republic, Kuban, and Poland followed the trend. Later on others, both long-existing and newly established countries, recognized the Ukrainian National Republic. Between 1917 and 1921, some twenty-five nations recognized Ukrainian statehood either *de facto* or *de iure*, fully or with some qualifications, and even temporarily—as did Great Britain and France. Foreign missions, consulates, and representations were sent to Kiev, including that of the Holy See. Western Ukrainian statehood acquired some *de facto* recognition through economic and diplomatic relations with some states. The Paris Peace Conference, for example, treated the Western Ukrainian delegation as a separate diplomatic unit, and international commissions tried to mediate the Ukrainian-Polish war conflict.[8]

When the Bolshevik forces had dominated most of the

Ukrainian ethnic territories, they finally created, after two abortive attempts, the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, a fictitious state. In fact, the Ukrainian SSR was only an administrative unit of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, centrally ruled by Moscow. The Ukrainian SSR could not be considered an heir of the Ukrainian National Republic since it fully lacked the national sovereignty the Republic had. The tradition of the Republic was revived by the Act of the 30th of June, 1941, which reestablished Ukrainian statehood, and called the 1920s and 1930s "the recent decades of a bloody Muscovite-Bolshevik enslavement" of Ukraine.

Certain legislative acts of 1917 and 1920 attempted to identify the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic. Initially it simply was assumed that provinces of the former Russian empire in which the Ukrainians constituted an ethnic majority would automatically constitute the territory of either autonomous or sovereign Ukraine. But in those days Ukrainian statehood never extended over the entire Ukrainian ethnic area. Petrograd's Temporary Government, through its Temporary Instruction for the Secretariat-General of August 4, 1917, declared that the Ukrainian autonomous territory was supposed to extend over "the provinces of Kiev, Volyn, Podillia, Poltava, and Chernihiv, but excluding the districts of Mhlyn, Surazh, Starodub, and Novozybkiv." It also provided that this territory could be enlarged if the people of other regions desired to join an autonomous Ukraine and if Petrograd approved. The Third Universal or decree of the Central Rada provided differently. It extended its authority over a much larger national area, which included Kiev, Podillia, Volyn, Poltava, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Tavria (without Crimea). Later plebiscites of the population would finally decide whether the provinces of Kursk, Kholm, Voronizh, and other regions where the Ukrainians constituted an ethnic majority would join the Ukrainian National Republic.

Subsequently, Article II of the Treaty of Berest of February 1918 outlined Ukraine's boundaries in the northwest and

north with Austria and Soviet Russia. Details were to be worked out later by special commissions. The boundaries with Soviet Russia were confirmed in June 1918 by preliminary treaty negotiations. The boundaries with the Don Cossack Republic were provisionally delineated by an agreement of August 7th of the same year. The boundaries with Romania were never settled because of the Bessarabian issue. Kiev claimed Bessarabia, which meanwhile was occupied by Romania.[9]

The Western Ukrainian Government insisted that its sovereign territory included all of eastern Galicia with a Ukrainian ethnic majority, Bukovyna, Carpathian Ukraine, and the Lemko region. Practically, however, its authority was largely limited to Galicia. With the Unification Act, of course, the national territory of the Ukrainian National Republic included the Western province, at least in theory.

All prior residents of the UNR were assumed to be citizens of the new state. Although during the Central Rada period workers, peasants, working members of the *intelihentsia*, and the educated middle class were favored, theoretically all citizens were considered equal regardless of nationality or religion. The rights and privileges of the people were generally spelled out by the four universals and other legislative acts, and they included the basic freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and press and the inviolability of person and home. During the Hetman era, as previously mentioned, things were a little different. Two classes were differentiated by the regime, the privileged Cossacks and the common citizens, although neither the classes nor their rights and privileges were described. Also, under the rule of the Directorate, all citizens were not treated equally. When the Labor Congress proclaimed the so-called "working people's democracy," the non-productive classes of the population, the capitalists and landowners, were denied political rights. Later on, however, there was no official insistence on this principle. In Western Ukraine, all citizens were considered equal.

The Second World War, or rather the German-Soviet war, provided an opportunity to restore Ukrainian statehood, but just for a short while. It was absolutely mandatory for the Ukrainian people to manifest their will to be free. Having learned of the hostile Nazi plans for Ukraine, through the initiative of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists led by S. Bandera, the National Convention met in the city of Lviv. There, the Act of the 30th of June, 1941, which reestablished the Ukrainian statehood, was promulgated. The Convention consisted of prominent figures from political life representing different political orientations and parties who were ready to oppose the German onslaught. The Act was then supported by two leading Ukrainian churchmen, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and Bishop Polikarp, later Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It was passed quickly in order so that the Nazis would be unable to prevent its promulgation to the Ukrainian people and the world.

According to the Act, Ukrainian national statehood was restored by the will of the Ukrainian people after a prolonged and bloody Muscovite-Bolshevik occupation. This meant, therefore, the people's sovereignty in the new state. The new state would care for the welfare of the population. A temporary government would be formed immediately to carry on public responsibilities. This government would then submit to a permanent Ukrainian government which would be organized in the capital of Ukraine, the city of Kiev. The organization of armed forces to defend Ukraine against the Russian onslaught would start immediately. The restored Ukrainian state would participate with other nations in establishing just and orderly conditions in the world.

Yaroslav Stetsko, a prominent figure of the OUN-R, was appointed the prime minister of the temporary council of ministers. He was joined by cabinet members, coming from various political parties and factions, who believed in the idea of Ukrainian national statehood on a democratic basis. The

OUN members constituted a minority in the cabinet. The other faction of the OUN, led by Colonel Melnyk, refused to cooperate.[10]

Although the Act of the 30th of June was a mature and resolute political move toward national sovereignty, carried without the hesitation and vacillation of 1918, it was too brief a statement. The Act did not regulate the structure of legislative and judicial authorities, the national territory, the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and other important matters. If the German terror campaign had not moved swiftly to suppress the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people, some other temporary constitutional law would have certainly followed to deal with these matters. For instance, immediate preparations were made to organize the provincial and local administrations by dividing Western Ukraine into four regions—Lviv, Stanislaviv, Ternopil, and Drohobych—and those into county districts, and local structures were hurriedly set up.[11]

Then, in July 1944, when large areas of Ukraine were already back under Soviet occupation, another government body was formed, the Ukrainian General Liberation Council, *Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada*, the UHVR. This was done through the Act on the Temporary Constitution of the UHVR. In this way a kind of underground Ukrainian government was created to direct the continuing struggle for independence, and in particular the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the UPA, against Russian and Polish occupational forces. Article 2 of the Act stressed the principle of the people's sovereign will. The aims of the UHVR were defined and its composition outlined. The Ukrainian General Liberation Council was supposed to consist of a General Convention (*Velykyi Zbir*), its Presidium and the Secretariat-General (a kind of a ministerial cabinet), the Supreme Court, and the College of Auditors. The division of powers was preserved, though the election procedure was not clearly determined.

During its operation, the UHVR promulgated decrees and announced political platforms, made appeals to the Ukrainian people in Ukraine and in the diaspora, and produced other documents in order to coordinate the revolutionary struggle. A diplomatic representation of the UHVR, headed by M. Lebed, was dispatched abroad to continue to work in behalf of the Ukrainian cause.[12]

LEGISLATIVE AGENCIES. In order to provide the new state with a constitutional and legal framework the organization of several legislative bodies or agencies was attempted. The actual organization, however, was either scarcely started, or never completed due to unfavorable developments of war and the final collapse of the struggle for independence. The position of the head of the state was unsettled. During the Central Rada period its Chairman or Head was supposed to act as a head of the state. The Temporary Constitutional Law of 1918 stated that the chairman of the unicameral National Parliament or Congress was to function as the Head of the Ukrainian National Republic. Yet the parliament was never elected under that law, and this provision could not be realized. Of course, during the Hetman period, the Hetman, with his monarchist bent, undoubtedly acted as the head of the Ukrainian state. Subsequently, the five-member Directorate was considered the collegiate head of the restored Republic, while the chairman of the Directorate, at first V. Vynnychenko and then S. Petlura, in actuality represented the UNR. In Western Ukraine, the chairman of the Ukrainian National Rada was assumed to be the head of the Western Ukrainian National Republic. After E. Petrushevych became a "dictator" he could scarcely have aspired to be "a head of the state," because Western Ukraine was at that time by right only an autonomous province of the Ukrainian National Republic. The "dictator" immediately created a Council of Plenipotentiaries to advise him in state matters.

On the other hand, from the very beginning of the restored Ukrainian statehood, attempts were undertaken to elect and to convene a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, which as a real representative of the people was expected to give the nation a constitutional and permanent government. An election and the convention of a Constituent Assembly as a supreme legislative body was constantly on the mind of the Central Rada. The Third Universal picked January 9, 1918 as the day for holding these elections, and January 22nd, two weeks later, as the day for the convention of the Assembly. On November 20, 1917, the Election Act, which foresaw secret, general, equal, and direct voting in the best democratic tradition, was adopted. All male and female citizens twenty years old or older received the voting privilege. The whole country was divided into a number of large electoral districts, each of which could elect from 9 to 45 deputies according to the size of their respective populations. All members of the military force also received the right to vote. The total number of deputies in the Constituent Assembly was supposed to be 301. A central electoral board as well as the regional and local electoral boards were set up. January 11th was then added as an extra day for balloting in order to give everybody the opportunity to vote. The elections were held on January 9th, as provided. The parties supporting Ukrainian independence gained a wide majority, with some 79 percent of the votes, over the Moscow-led Bolsheviks. This was clear-cut proof for the Bolsheviks that any hope of capturing the government in Ukraine through constitutional or legal means had to be abandoned. In the meantime, the Bolshevik war against the Ukrainian National Republic made the convening of the Constituent Assembly impossible. Upon its return to Kiev, the Central Rada designated May 12, 1918 as the new date for the convention. This time the Hetman *coup d'etat* frustrated the plan.

The Hetman, instead, promised the election of a parliament, but this never materialized. A Constituent Assembly was also envisioned by the Directorate, but because of the unstable

political situation a Labor Congress was convened as a socialist representation of the "working people's democracy." It was held between January 22 and 28, 1919. After the socialist efforts were at least partially overcome, the Directorate again entertained the thought of electing a State Council, a Parliament or *seim*, with a wide popular background. Finally, in November 1920, a legislative body of the National State Council was created. It could not, however, be either elected or convened, and the concept was soon replaced by that of a Council of the UNR—which never materialized either. Yet all this indicated the unsuppressed desire on the part of Ukrainian leaders to give the new state a legitimate legislative authority of a popular and democratic nature.

On the other hand, all kinds of congresses and conventions held at the dawn of the young republic had semi-official status in the state under construction. Some examples were the Ukrainian National Congress of April 19-20, 1917 which confirmed the Central Rada, three military conventions, peasant conventions, and others which simply expressed the views and opinions of the Ukrainian public. Of course, the so-called conventions of the "peasant, worker, and soldier deputies," dominated by Bolsheviks and subservient to Moscow's political designs, could not be considered legitimate legislative bodies of a sovereign Ukraine.

The Central Rada was definitely a legislative body of the resurrected Ukrainian state. It was created by the Association of Ukrainian Progressives once the news of the revolution in Russia had reached Ukraine. The Rada consisted initially of representatives from various political organizations, the cooperatives, the military, scholars, professionals, and students. Mykhailo Hrushevsky was elected chairman, V. Naumenko, vice-chairman, and D. Antonovych and D. Doroshenko, members. The Rada, as pointed out, was confirmed as a legitimate popular representation by the Ukrainian National Congress in April 1917. Then an Executive Committee of the

Rada was elected. This consisted of M. Hrushevsky as chairman and S. Yefremov and V. Vynnychenko as vice-chairman, and it soon became known as the Little Rada.

As a result of the negotiations with the Petrograd's Temporary Government, representatives of ethnic minorities were added to the Rada and the Little Rada and these bodies increased in number. The Central Rada was swelled to 822 delegates, including peasant, worker, and soldier representatives. In reality, however, not nearly so many deputies attended official meetings. The membership of the body was rather young and extremely socialistic. The ethnic minorities' representatives were a subversive force which worked against the Ukrainian national interests because of their pro-Russian orientation. The laws and resolutions of the Central Rada were published in the *Vistnyk zakoniv i rozporiadzhen* (the Herald of Laws and Regulations). The Little Rada also acted as a semi-legislative agency, and its findings and resolutions were submitted for the approval of the plenary Rada.[13]

The Directorate, the legislative body of the Ukrainian National Republic during its second political era, was selected by the Ukrainian National Association. It consisted of five members: V. Vynnychenko as its head, S. Petlura as its military chief, and P. Andrievsky, F. Shvets, and A. Makarenko. Before the Council of Ministers was appointed, the Directorate also exercised executive authority in the land. Subsequently, Vynnychenko, under pressure from the Allies, who could not accept his radical socialism and extremist ways, resigned. S. Petlura became head of the Directorate as well as the commander-in-chief, *holovnyi otaman*, of the Ukrainian armed forces. E. Petrushevych, the Western Ukrainian dictator, was added to the Directorate. The last full meeting of the Directorate took place in March 1919. Petlura, Shvets, and Makarenko functioned in the town of Rivna, while Petrushevych and Andrievsky were in Stanyslaviv. Since the Directorate could not operate effectively, the Ukrainian National

Council was formed in Kamianets Podilskyi by moderate political factions in December 1919. As a counterpart of the Directorate, it did not have much practical consequence.[14]

In Western Ukraine the Ukrainian National Rada—formed by the former Ukrainian parliamentary representatives in the upper and lower houses of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, the members of the land diets, and the Ukrainian Catholic bishops—became the highest legislative body for the newly established republic. In January 1919, a Presidium of the Rada and its Executive Committee, *vydil*, were organized. The *vydil* received power to approve and announce laws. After the Unification Act, of course, these agencies lost their sovereign powers and became simply agencies of the autonomous region.

In 1941, the National Convention, *Natsionalni Zbory*, in the city of Lviv was the embryo of a legislative house of the restored state, and it in fact promulgated the reestablishment of Ukrainian statehood. But German terror did not allow it to develop. The General Convention, *Velykyi Zbir*, of the Ukrainian General Liberation Council was supposed to be the highest legislative body during the struggle against Soviet domination. In 1941, no constitutional provision was made for an election or appointment of a head of the state.

ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCES. The Central Rada immediately appointed the Secretariat-General, subsequently subjected to an approval by the Petrograd Temporary Government, the highest executive body of the nation. Originally, the Secretariat-General consisted of fourteen departments or general secretariats: of internal affairs, finance, defense, food supplies, agriculture, justice, education, international affairs, industry and trade, post, telephone and telegraph, labor, and road construction and maintenance. The cabinet's title, the Secretariat-General, was taken from the history of the Cossack state to revitalize the national tradition. Within the

department of internal affairs, three deputy secretaries for Russian, Polish, and Jewish ethnic affairs were nominated. A representative of the Secretariat-General was appointed to the Temporary Government to watch over Ukrainian interests. Needless to say, the Temporary Government tried hard to limit the Secretariat's structure and jurisdiction and make it the arm of Russian administration in Ukraine. But this action was not successful in the long run.

The Secretariat-General required the Central Rada's vote of confidence to stay in office, in accordance with Western democratic principles. It was accountable to the Rada. Subsequently, with the proclamation of national independence, the Secretariat-General was replaced by the Council of National Ministers, equally accountable to the Central Rada, the top legislative body. The structure of the Council of Ministers was changed from time to time, while its composition varied according to the respective coalitions of various socialistic parties and factions and their respective political strength at a given time. The same principles guiding the cabinet's jurisdiction and responsibilities also prevailed during the era of the Directorate, except that it was then accountable to the latter. Of course, all these arrangements and practices were considered temporary. The cabinet's structure and jurisdiction was eventually to be decided on a permanent basis by a Constituent Assembly in accordance with parliamentary principles and procedures. Under the Directorate, there were eighteen ministries, with slightly different demarcations of authority and responsibility. The prime minister chaired the meetings, deliberations, and collective decision-making of the cabinet.

In Western Ukraine, the State Secretariat was established as a form of cabinet, with similar ministries or departments. It was to head the executive branch of government, the constitutional character of which changed by law to a provincial and autonomous administrative authority after the Unification Act of January 1919. With the proclamation of a "dictator-

ship" in Western Ukraine, the State Secretariat operated under Dictator Petrushevych's authority. These developments were regarded as strictly temporary.

The Hetman also ordered a Council of Ministers formed to head the country's administrative process. It consisted of fifteen ministers who headed fifteen respective ministries. In order to assist the Hetman with counsel or to rule the land when he could not function or was absent for any reason, a Council of Supreme Regents, consisting of three members, was formed. The name of its chairman was kept secret. The refusal of the socialists to cooperate with the Hetman was the major roadblock to the successful operation of the Hetman government. The cabinet was solely accountable to the Hetman. Each minister administered his respective field, as was the usual practice. The ministry of internal affairs was supposed to establish and maintain effective provincial and local administrations.

After the Central Rada assumed supreme authority in the country, in the provinces, *gubernias* following the Tsarist pattern—self-governing councils of counties, towns, and villages—were called on to carry on the administrative functions of their respective districts. An act of the Rada made this official. At first the councils were spontaneously formed and elected in a rather disorganized manner. Later, some electoral procedures were followed. The Constituent Assembly was expected to work out a permanent system for the country's administration by elected councils of working people on various levels. Their activities were supposed to be supervised by the central administration. Yet the council system was never fully developed; first because of the Hetman's takeover, and second because of continuous warfare. All those councils in the regions, counties, towns, and villages worked rather smoothly at first, but things soon began to deteriorate because of steadily spreading chaos. Much of this chaos was due to Bolshevik anti-Ukrainian agitation and the Bolsheviks' formation of extreme-left "councils of workers, soldiers, and pea-

sants" as the rival agencies. These Bolshevik "councils" followed the pattern of "party dictatorship." They were designed to paralyze the operations of the Central Rada and its field agencies, and to prepare for a Bolshevik takeover in Ukraine at an opportune time. On the other hand, the Hetman Government tried to use that growing chaos as the justification for its *coup d'ètat*.

Furthermore, on the provincial and county levels, according to pre-war territorial divisions, the provincial and county commissioners also participated in the administrative process. They were elected haphazardly at all kinds of political meetings and were expected to cooperate with the provincial and county committees and be aided and advised by executive committees. As the radicalization progressed, the executive committees were largely replaced by the "councils of workers, soldiers, and peasants." The authority of these commissioners was narrow and inadequate, as the militia was not subordinated to them. On the other hand, the militia was not a reliable force, since it was poorly organized, poorly disciplined, without experience, and frequently corrupt. It could not, therefore, serve any useful purpose.

After the return of the Central Rada to Kiev, the minister of internal affairs began to appoint provincial and county commissioners to streamline the country's territorial administration. This was done largely, however, on political grounds, according to party membership, and with little attention to the administrative abilities and experience of the candidates. In addition, the commissioners' authority was further reduced by introduction of new officials, the so-called provincial and county military commanders. These commanders took over local administrative powers as a result of war conditions. They were appointed by the minister of armed forces and were also accountable to him. They could issue rules and regulations, and thus made the commissioners totally superfluous. The authority of the commanders was based mainly on the number of military units, in particular German and Austrian

units, at their disposal. The system was too primitive to be effective.

Of course, many financial, industrial, agricultural, educational and other matters were not under the jurisdiction of either the commissioners or commanders. These were supervised by the respective ministries, and by their field offices and agencies in the provinces and counties.

The Hetman Government relieved the appointees of the previous administration and made new appointments from among the landowning class. The new Government really looked for experienced and professional people to staff the provincial and local offices. The appointments were made by the ministry of internal affairs. The office of commissioners was replaced by the office of elders, the *starosta*. The system of councils on various levels was considered too radical and totally eliminated.

The county militia was ineffectively run by the Central Rada, as already mentioned. It was reorganized by the Hetman Government, renamed the State Guard, and subordinated to a central Department of State Guard. At the same time inspectors of the provincial and county chiefs of the Guard were introduced to streamline field administration. In order to strengthen municipal administration, the office of the urban officer, the *miskyi otaman*, was established.

When the Directorate's *coup d'ètat* was accomplished, the provincial and local administration system was changed again to fit the new political philosophy. Plenipotentiary provincial and county commissioners were introduced and an attempt was made to restore the old municipal and village self-governing councils as well as the *zemstvo* approach. All of these were to be supervised by the commissioners. Of course, again because of setbacks in war, neither a complete introduction of self-government nor a maturing of the system was possible.

In Western Ukraine, the county system of administration used under Austrian rule was partially retained. The election

and operation of the community self-governing councils were supervised by district commissioners appointed by the State Secretariat. The heads of the councils acted with complete independence, and were at the same time the representatives of the state administration.[15]

Financial matters in the new state were under the control of the secretary-general of finances, and later, of the minister of finances. In December 1917 a new tax law was adopted by the Central Rada, but it never worked effectively because of the lack of peace. Hence, public revenues of the Republic were poor, while public expenditures under the Rada and the Directorate were largely covered by government borrowing and issuance of new money. Consequently, inflation was a constant phenomenon. The Labor Congress of 1919, for lack of time, did not even consider the financial affairs of the state.

An effective financial manager of the treasury was A. Rzhepetsky, Minister of Finance during the Hetman era. He attempted to prevent the squandering of public funds. The issuance of new currency was controlled to an extent. Foreign exchange was divided in two parts: one part was designed to cover the costs of numerous foreign missions to popularize the Ukrainian cause abroad, the other was used to pay for necessary war imports. Under the Hetman a state budget was set up. The *karbovanets* was the first Ukrainian monetary unit, soon replaced by the *hryvna*. The Ukrainian State Bank, a central banking institution which regulated the money and capital market, was established in 1918. This was soon followed by the State Land Bank, which assisted the land policies of the Government. Other aspects of Ukrainian finances during the independence struggle will be discussed in connection with overall economic developments.[16]

THE JUDICIARY. The concept of justice was deeply rooted in the minds of the Ukrainians since they had suffered

gravely under Tsarist oppression. Yet there was not enough time to develop a well-structured judiciary system. At first, the prewar courts, either of Russian or Austrian design, were retained, while some modifications were slowly undertaken. By the law of the Central Rada of December 17, 1917, the Supreme Court of Justice, with a seat in Kiev, was established. It consisted of three departments: the criminal, the civil, and the administrative. The last was supposed to protect the citizens, residents, and minorities against the possible abuse or incorrect application of administrative measures by public authorities. The Court also served as the highest appellate court of the land.

Then, in Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odessa three appellate courts were introduced. The lower courts were retained largely as they had been before the war. The first Russian-Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine left the Ukrainian judiciary literally in shambles, practically non-existent. It had to be newly organized almost from scratch after the Central Rada returned to Kiev.

The Hetman Government made serious attempts to put the judicial system on the right track. In July 1918 a separate Act replaced the previous Supreme Court with a State Senate with three general courts for each branch of judiciary: the criminal, civil, and administrative. Highly qualified persons were appointed to the respective benches. Along with the State Senate the law also established judicial chambers and appellate courts on a lower level. At first the Secretariat-General of Justice, and subsequently the Ministry of Justice, supervised the administration processes of the Ukrainian judiciary.[17]

The office of Attorney-General was also introduced to supervise and direct the provincial and local state-attorney offices along with existing court chambers. A five-year term in office was intended. But war conditions did not allow full development of the court system under the authority of the Directorate, which tried to follow the patterns set in the pre-Hetman era.

THE MILITARY. The socialistically minded Central Rada, which erroneously believed in a peaceful coexistence with Russian socialists, definitely had an anti-military orientation. This was reflected in the inadequate military organization and inadequate armed forces of the Ukrainian National Republic at the time. The mistake was so grave that the inadequacies continued throughout the entire era of the struggle for independence in the 1920s. Hence, when the Russian Bolsheviks started their first war against independent Ukraine, the country was practically powerless. This led to the tragic though heroic Battle of Kruty, the defense of the capital by a handful of soldiers and volunteers. Afterwards only the military alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary and these countries' armed forces saved the new state from being completely overrun by the Russians.

During the period of the First and Second Universals, the Ukrainian armed forces organized themselves somewhat spontaneously without any worthwhile directives from the Government. Ukrainian soldiers and officers of the armed forces of the former Tsar broke away from these units and formed "Ukrainianized" divisions and regiments. The spontaneous process went on without any official sanction from Kiev.

The second Military Congress in Kiev demanded "Ukrainianization" of the armed forces. A general military committee was formed to coordinate the process. In addition, Ukrainian armed units using former war prisoners were formed. By the end of 1917 there were some 16 divisions, 64 regiments of infantry with artillery units, a number of special detachments, and a few cavalry regiments that had been Ukrainianized. In December, the Central Rada ordered these forces to move to Ukraine. In its Fourth Universal, however, the Rada announced the demobilization of these armed units, replacing them with units of people's militia. This move was disastrous, it lacked any rationality in war time. After the Treaty of Berest most of the Ukrainian armed forces were deactivated,

and the German and Austrian troops represented the only defense against Red Russia.

The Free Cossack movement, a voluntary paramilitary organization separate from the Central Rada, attempted to provide some kind of defense. It began in May 1917, and in October it had swelled to 60,000 Cossacks. The movement soon adopted a strict military organization with companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades. All officers, however, were elected. The Free Cossacks formerly under the authority of the Secretariat-General of the Interior, were now subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, and arms were supposed to be supplied for the movement by the Government. Yet the movement substantially delayed the organization of regular army units.

Then, without much success, General V. Pavlenko attempted to form two regular army divisions. By the end of 1917, the meager armed forces of the UNR consisted of a few voluntary units of Riflemen organized by Colonel E. Konovalets from the Galician war prisoners, the "Blue" and "Grey" Divisions, and some other minor formations. By April 1918, the Ukrainian armed forces consisted of 15,000 men, 60 cannons, and 12 armored cars, and were headed by the Ministry of Defense. At that time, the navy consisted of about 78 large and small ships, supported by patrol and cargo vessels and 20 hydroplanes. The navy was headed by Naval Councils at first, and a little later subordinated to the Ministry of the Navy.

There too, of course, the Hetman Government maintained a much more serious and balanced attitude toward the problem of defense and the Ukrainian armed forces. The German authorities opposed the organization of the armed forces, and the socialists continued to agitate against it as well. By May 1918, there were eight regular army corps and four and a half cavalry divisions under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. In July 1918, a law on universal military service was enacted, and plans for general conscription were launched. The peacetime Ukrainian armed forces were supposed to con-

sist of 310,000 men. The establishment of a military academy, four cadet schools for each branch of arms, and five officer-training centers was planned. Rank designations were adopted and the length of recruit training for various branches of service determined. By November 1918, the armed forces had reached 60,000 men. In October the traditional Cossack organization was reintroduced by law. The navy, however, had been interned by the Germans, and only a few vessels were left under Ukrainian authority.

Military affairs were poorly supervised by the socialist Directorate. At the time of the *coup d'ètat* the Directorate had at its disposal some 40,000 regulars and some 100,000 insurgents, but during the war against Red Russia its armed forces declined to some 30,000 men. The army continuously suffered an acute shortage of officers. By August 1919, some 35,000 men, 180 cannons, 530 machine guns, 9 armored trains, 6 armored cars, 26 airplanes, and 4 radio stations comprised the armed forces of the Ukrainian National Republic. Including the Western Ukrainian military units, the total Ukrainian armed forces consisted of 85,000 men.

In Western Ukraine military affairs were in a little better shape. There was no socialist bias there. Hence, at the beginning of the First World War, the voluntary legion of Ukrainian *Sitch* Riflemen was already a component of the Austrian army. It was considered to be the start of a future Ukrainian army which would fight for the country's independence. It consisted of 2,500 men, was well trained, and participated in several battles against the Russians in which it distinguished itself honorably. Subsequently, in 1919, the legion was reorganized into the First Brigade of the Ukrainian Galician Army. In November 1917, as has already been mentioned, a battalion of *Sitch* Riflemen made up of Western Ukrainians who had been Russian war prisoners was formed in Eastern Ukraine. It eventually became one of the best military units in the Ukrainian National Republic.

The Ukrainian Galician armed forces were under the

authority of the State Secretariat of Defense. Universal military service was introduced in November 1918. By February 1919, the Galician army consisted of about 25,000 soldiers with bayonets, 600 soldiers with sabers, 150 cannons, and some 50,000 auxiliary troops. Western Ukraine had particularly good artillery, which decided several battles in her favor. The cavalry was weak. The army had one airborne squadron, but it lacked armored trains and motor vehicles. Training was carried out according to the traditional Austrian practice. At the time of the so-called Chortkiv offensive, the Galician army had reached some 75,000 men[18]

The Ukrainian nation paid a high price for neglecting military preparedness. It lost its struggle for political independence during and after the First World War. Thus, before and during the Second World War, the Ukrainian leadership energetically attempted several times to organize an armed force which would achieve or preserve national sovereignty against overwhelmingly unfavorable odds. The Carpathian *Sitch* in Carpathian Ukraine attempted to defend the land against Hungarian and Polish onslaughts in 1939. The *Sitch* was a voluntary military organization of some 15,000 men, with five garrisons and regular military training. With the declaration of independence by Carpathian Ukraine, the *Sitch* became the country's armed forces. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was the main factor in the formation of the Carpathian *Sitch*.[19]

Then, on the very eve of the German-Soviet war, the OUN-R, the Bandera movement, was able to organize—with, the consent of and within the German *Wehrmacht*—two legions, detachments of Ukrainian Nationalists known under the names of *Nachtigal* and *Roland*. They were intended to be the beginning of a future Ukrainian military force. The legions, consisting of a few hundred men, moved immediately towards Ukraine with the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities. The proclamation of the restoration of the Ukrainian statehood, on June 30, 1941, as well as Bandera's and Stetsko's refusal to

repeal the Act on Nazi demand, made the legionnaires untrustworthy in German eyes. Since the legionnaires refused to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler and the Third Reich, both legions were dissolved and the Germans made other plans for them, as has been pointed out already.

German terror measures in Ukraine and the German plan to make the country a colony of the Third Reich gave rise to spontaneous, though isolated, attempts to organize resistance movements throughout the country. One of the first attempts was the *Polissia Sitch*, organized by T. Bulba-Borovets and others. However, it lacked the vigor to become a nationwide fighting force. After the Bandera movement, the OUN-R undertook to organize an active resistance movement in the second half of 1942, Ukrainian guerrilla warfare flared up powerfully throughout the whole nation, though it was not of equal intensity in all territories of the country. The guerrillas were soon known as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armia,* the UPA.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which at its peak reached some 200,000 men and women, was at first headed by M. Lebed, then by D. Klachkivsky, and eventually by its legendary leader General R. Shukhevych-T. Chuprynka. At first, it was formed to resist German terror. After the German defeat and the return of Soviet-Russian occupation, it turned against the Red terror and continued, changing tactics a few times, to battle the Russians at least until 1953. These battles were fought under the most unfavorable and daunting conditions on territories under Soviet and Polish domination.

The UPA fought its struggle for an independent Ukraine without any foreign help or assistance. It was excellently organized, with medical assistance, public-relations activities, artistic and literary creations, and an excellent propaganda apparatus. Its guerrilla strategy was superb, the dedication and discipline of the insurgent soldiers excellent. It fought against overwhelming Soviet power. In order to defeat the UPA, the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia negotiated

a military alliance. Meanwhile, several units of UPA were sent to the West to testify to the unceasing Ukrainian struggle for independence.

Originally the Ukrainian Insurgent Army operated in four territorial groups: the UPA-North, the UPA-West, the UPA-South, and the UPA-East. The last group was the least successful, although some of its units operated in the Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, and Don Basin regions. Battalions and companies were the basic operational units of the UPA. Constant battles were waged with the Russian army and KGB units, and with the Polish army in the west. After 1946, however, because of the constantly growing enemy pressure, the UPA changed its military tactics and decentralized. The company and squad became its main operational units. The UPA remained under the control of the Ukrainian General Liberation Council. Initially only functional ranks were used, but later officer ranks were designated as well.[20]

After Germany's chances to win the war declined, German authorities agreed to the formation of the so-called Division "Galicia," a military unit within the Waffen SS. The Ukrainian idea here was similar—to acquire arms and training by any means possible for a future struggle for independence and particularly, to resist the threatened renewal of Soviet occupation. It was an infantry division of some 16,000 men, organized and trained according to German military requirements. Uniforms and ranks were German too. It was abandoned by the German command, and was decimated in the Battle of Brody by the Soviets in the summer of 1944. But then it was reorganized and filled with new volunteers, and by the spring of 1945 it numbered 18,000 men. After the Ukrainian National Committee was organized, the unit was renamed the First Division of the Ukrainian Army. At this time the organization of the Second Division was also in progress. General P. Shandruk was the supreme commander.[21]

APPENDIX: THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR. The so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was a creation of Moscow intended to dominate the country under the guise of an imaginary Union republic. It was supposed to be a free republic within a federation called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR, or the Soviet Union. In fact, neither the name nor the republican form of government of the Ukrainian SSR ever had any substance. Actually, the government of the Ukrainian SSR has a dual nature: there is the so-called constitutional government, which is fictional, and there is the actual government, which has nothing in common with the constitutional government.

The whole constitutional structure of the Ukrainian SSR has been patterned after the Soviet system. A supposedly free republic with a right to secede from the federation, Ukraine has been run by a unicameral legislative body and its presidium, the latter acting between the plenary sessions of the legislature. A Council of People's Ministers, formerly called commissars, is supposed to be the country's top executive body. There is also a Supreme Court. In fact, the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR has been changed and amended several times—in 1922, 1929, 1937, 1942, and 1979—to fit the needs and wishes of Moscow.

In reality, the Ukrainian SSR is simply an administrative region of a centrally and dictatorially ruled Red-Russian empire. The empire is distinctly fascist, in that the Politburo of the Communist Party's Central Committee holds all power and authority. This Politburo is above and not bound by the formal constitution or any legislative acts. The Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR is a regional unit of the Russian Party, without any independence, carrying out orders from the Kremlin. Only minor matters of a strictly local nature can be solved by the local Party or Government agencies. The Ukrainian SSR does not have its own armed forces, full-fledged foreign relations, monetary system, or even economic autonomy. All top Party and Government functionaries in

[2]P. Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revolutsii 1917-1920 rr.*, New York, 1969, Vol. II, pp. 77-116; N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoria Ukrainy*, Munich, 1976, Vol. II, pp. 480-482; also, D. Doroshenko, *Istoria Ukrainy 1917-1923 rr*, New York, 1954, Vol. I, pp. 295-326, 423-430.

[3]Starosolsky, *loc. cit.*; M. Stachiv, N. Chirovsky, and P. Stercho, *Ukraine and the European Turmoil, 1917-1919*, New York, 1973, Vol. I, pp. 27-75; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 99-130, 184-213, 256-276.

[4]Starosolsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61; M. Stakhiv, *Hetmanskyi rezhym v 1918 rotsi ta yoho derzhavno-pravna yakist*, New York, 1951; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 232-402; Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 497-504.

[5]The Unification Act: Stachiv and Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 30-65, 128; also, M. Stachiv and J. Sztendera, *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History, 1918-1923*, New York, 1969, Vol. I, pp. 129-134.

[6]Starosolsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-63; Stachiv and Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 234-320; Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 517-524; O. Pidhajny, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic*, I, Toronto, New York, 1966; D. Doroshenko and O. Gerus, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, Winnipeg, 1975, pp. 587-664; both chapters, updating Doroshenko's work, were written by O. Gerus, a good coverage of the events of 1917-21.

[7]Comprehensively on constitutional and legal developments in Western Ukraine: M. Stakhiv, *Zakhidnia Ukraina. Narys istorii derzhavnoho budivnytstva ta zbroinoi i dyplomatychnoi oborony v 1918-1923*, Scranton, 1959-1961; also, Stachiv and Sztendera, *op. cit.*, Vols. I-II, in particular, pp. 99-115, 218-235 in Vol. I, and 265-279 in Vol. II; also briefly, Starosolsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-66.

[8]Stachiv and Sztendera, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 11-30, 73-117, 175-233; Doroshenko and Gerus, *op. cit.*, pp. 651-660. On international status of the Ukrainian National Republic: V. Markus, "International Legal Status of the Ukrainian State," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 66-70.

[9]Markus, *ibid.*, Stachiv and Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 33, 45, 52, 381, 383; the description of the national territory by the Third Universal: "To the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic belong the lands settled by the Ukrainian majority [provinces of] Kiev, Podillia, Volhinia, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Kherson, Tavria [without Crimea]. . .regarding the joining of parts of the provinces of Kursk, Kholm, Voronizh and the bordering provinces and districts where the majority of the population is Ukrainian. . .the organized will of the people [will decide]": also, Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 114-115 (Instruction of the Temporary Government), Vol. II, pp. 51-52 (the Third Universal), p. 113 (the Treaty of Berest).

[10]Y. Stetsko, ed., *30 chervnia 1941*, Toronto, 1967, pp. 330-335; L. Shankovsky, "Za obiektyvnu otsinku Aktu 30 chervnia," *ibid.*, pp. 344-368; N.

Chirovsky, "Mizhnarodne znachennia, 30-ho chervnia 1941-ho roku," *Visnyk*, November, 1981, Nr. 11, pp. 3-6; P. Mirchuk, *Stepan Bandera*, New York, 1961, p. 82: about the refusal of the Melnyk wing to cooperate.

[11]O. Maritchak, "Administratsia Halychyny," *30 chervnia 1941*, Toronto, 1967, pp. 376-382.

[12]*Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada, Zbirka dokumentiv za 1944-1950 RR, Zakordonni chastyny OUN*, 1956, pp. 3-28 and following; L. Shankovsky, *Initsiatyvnyi Komitet Dla Stvorennia Ukrainskoi Holovnoi Vyzvolnoi Rady*, New York, 1985.

[13]Starosolsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-60; Stachiv and Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 30-32, 40-42; Doroshenko, *Istoria Ukrainy, 1917-1923*, Vol. I, pp. 100-123.

[14]Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 517-524; P. Fedorenko, "Doba Dyrektorii," *Entsyklopedia ukrainoznavstva*, Munich, 1949, Vol. I, pp. 518 and following: Stachiv and Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 295-318.

[15]On the central and local administration between 1917-1921: Doroshenko, *Istoria*, Vol. I, pp. 124-134, Vol. II, pp. 60-70, 85 and following; provincial administration: 129, 259 and following; village and urban administration, central government: 273, 317, 336-370, 377-402; Stachiv and Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 253-254, 297-302; the internal administration of the land: pp. 310-316; Vol. II, pp. 197-203; Starosolsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-66.

[16]V. Holubnychy, "Finance," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 56-58; B. Martos and Ya. Zozula, *Hroshi ukrainskoi derzhavy*, Munich, 1972.

[17]Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, judicial matters: pp. 371-376; Stachiv and Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 72-73; Starosolsky, *loc. cit.*

[18]V. Petriv and O. Dumin, according to "Ukrainian Armed Forces during the War of National Liberation," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 1065-1079; Z. Stefaniv, *Ukrainski zbroini syly 1917-1923 rr*, Munich, 1947, Vols. I-III; L. Shankovsky, *Ukrainska armia v borotbi za derzhavnist*, Munich, 1958; on the Free Cossacks: Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 77-78, and Polonska-Vasylenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 470, 503-504.

[19]P. Stercho, *Diplomacy of Double Morality*, New York, 1971; on the Carpathian *Sitch*: pp. 125-135, 257, 371-397, and other pages; V. Markus, "Ukrainian military formations in 1938-43," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, as quoted, Vol. II, pp. 1085-86.

[20]M. Lebed, *UPA, Ii heneza i dii u vyzvolnii borotbi ukrainskoho narodu*, Munich, 1946; P. Mirchuk, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*, 1942-1952, Munich, 1953; M. Prokop, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army", *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, as quoted, Vol. II, pp. 1089-1092, Doroshenko and Gerus, *op. cit.*, pp. 750-754, 763-767.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 754-758; P. Shandruk, *Arms of Valor*, New York, 1959, pp. 193-297.

[22] S. Olynyk, "Law and Government of the Ukrainian SSR," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, as quoted above, Vol. II, pp. 77-95; Olynyk gave a not very realistic picture of the Soviet-Ukrainian constitutional structure; J. Towster, *Political Power in the USSR, 1917-1947*, New York, 1948; briefly, *The Statesman's Yearbook*, 1983-1984, New York, 1983, p. 1250.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SPIRITUAL AND CULTURAL PROCESSES

Orthodox Church—Ukrainian Catholic Church—Education and Sciences—Literature—Music and Theater—Architecture—Painting and Carving—Other Arts

ORTHODOX CHURCH. On the eve of the First World War and the various revolutions, the state of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was rather pitiful from the national point of view. Although officially the Church enjoyed government protection and support—being headed by a Metropolitan of Kiev, with three archbishops, five bishops, and nineteen auxiliary bishops (with 1 academy, 1 pastoral-mission school, 9 seminaries, 1 pastoral school, 29 minor seminaries, and 102 monasteries)—it was thoroughly Russianized. The Russian language was compulsory in the Church in Ukraine, and only four out of the twenty-eight bishops were of Ukrainian descent. The Church was an arm of the Tsarist Government, according to the "ceasaropapist" doctrine, and its Russianization plans for all non-Russian peoples, the Ukrainians in particular. For example, each year the Church was forced to condemn Ivan Mazepa for his struggle to free the country from Russian domination in 1709. The yearly condemnations of Mazepa were tragically ridiculous.

After Ukraine became an autonomous and then sovereign

nation, in 1917-1918, attempts were undertaken to make the Ukrainian Orthodox Church autonomous and independent from any outside Church authority, and from the Moscow Patriarchate especially. Of course, Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow opposed the formation of the Autocephalous (or Autonomous) Orthodox Church in Ukraine, delaying the official procedures and ultimately denying his approval. V. Vynnychenko, who was familiar with the case, suggested that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church contact Ukrainian Catholics and form with them a Ukrainian Patriarchate in union with Rome. However, the Russianized Orthodox hierarchy in Ukraine had political motives and cooperated with Moscow's wishes, delaying the move toward an ecclesiastic independence for the Ukrainian National Republic. Nevertheless, the controversy continued.

Finally, in October 1921, a *synod* or council of the Orthodox lower clergy and laity was convened in Kiev and established the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the *Ukrainska Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva*. Vasyl Lypkivsky was elected and consecrated with the relics of St. Macarius and by public acclamation as the Metropolitan of the Church. Then he consecrated a number of new bishops. The whole move, patriotic and politically expedient, and in accord with ancient practice of the Alexandrian church was not in full compliance with canon law. Hence, many Ukrainian Orthodox believers stayed away from the new Church organization and sought other solutions. For the same reason, supposedly, the Greek, Romanian, and other Orthodox Churches denied recognition to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church.

Yet the Church grew and progressed well. By 1927, it already had 34 bishops, 3,000 priests, and about 10 million faithful. It was spreading dynamically in other territories outside Ukraine, where Ukrainians had been forced to settle because of Russian terror, unfortunate economic conditions, and war developments—even in such distant regions as Asiatic Russia, Western Europe, Canada, and the United States.[1]

There were also two other Orthodox Church organizations which existed in Ukraine at the same time. The Russian Patriarchal Church, supported by the conservative Russian and Russianized elements, officially recognized Moscow's authority and supposedly continued the old traditions. Later on, however, it became the Ukrainian Patriarchal Church, with a limited following. At the same time the Soviet Government favored another version of Orthodoxy, the so-called Synod-managed, Living-Apostolic, or Renovationist Church, hoping that it would temper the growth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which seemed to be too nationalist and too Ukrainian for Moscow's taste. There was little, if any, doctrinal difference among the three wings, but they differed constitutionally and organizationally: whether the Church should be dependent upon the Patriarch, independent, or synod-managed. Subsequently, the Ukrainian Patriarchal Church switched to canonical dependence on the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Synod-managed Church grew slowly, but because of Soviet backing it did not enjoy great popularity. Its growth was far below that of the Autocephalous Church. All three Church organizations had their own bishops, priests, parishes, seminaries, and religious publications.

However, early in 1929, the Kremlin decreed the abolition of free religious life, and the persecution of all religious denominations was put in motion. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church suffered especially. At first, church communities were harrassed by excessive and confiscatory taxation, which directly led to government takeovers of church buildings and other properties. Then bishops, priests, monks, nuns, and the faithful were arrested, deported, or killed in large numbers. All churches, chapels, and monasteries were closed; some were destroyed, some converted to other uses, such as theaters, warehouses, garages, or workshops. All religious publications were prohibited, including the printing of the Holy Bible. Between 1917 and 1935, the Bolsheviks deported or liquidated 217 bishops, 27,000 priests, and some 7

million faithful. Some church buildings were used as premises for atheistic or anti-religious propaganda activities. Only a few clerics managed to escape the persecution, such as Bishop Ivan Teodorovych, who subsequently became a prominent Church figure outside the Ukrainian SSR, on the North American continent. Yet, in spite of the cruel persecution and suppression of all forms of religious life, faith in God has survived in Ukraine with secret worship in private homes and "underground" or "catacomb" gatherings of the faithful, always under the riskiest and most threatening circumstances.[2]

Under Polish occupation in Western Ukraine, between 1919 and 1939, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church initially developed rather well. In 1924, the Patriarch of Constantinople recognized it as a canonical Autocephalous Church, since it did not suffer the legal handicaps of its counterpart in Kiev. The Metropolitan and the bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church were not generally recognized as validly and canonically consecrated and installed. But there was no doubt about the Church under Polish domination, and it was always considered fully canonical. It was led for many years by Metropolitan Dionisii. In the early 1930s, however, the Polish Government embarked on a "grand" assimilation and Polonization policy to absorb into the Polish national stock various national minorities. The Orthodox Ukrainian minority, in particular, was considered the easiest to assimilate. The Orthodox Church was completely subordinated to the Government. The Polish language was introduced in church services against popular opposition. Then, in the later Thirties, under the pretext that the territories had once been Catholic and were converted to Orthodoxy by Tsarist pressure, the Polish authorities, in the Kholm and Pidlasha regions, began an outright persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox population. Police and military forces were used to make the people Catholic and Polish. Blood was spilled. The authorities took away from the Orthodox believers 149 church buildings and gave them to the Roman Catholics, although the population

in those regions had never been Roman Catholic but rather Ukrainian Catholic. Almost 200 churches were demolished, and only 50 were left for the Orthodox believers to worship in. Frightened and intimidated, the Orthodox hierarchy and community leaders like Skrypnyk and Pevny scarcely dared raise their voices in defense of their Church. Only the Ukrainian-Catholic (Uniat) Metropolitan of Lviv, Andrei Sheptytsky, openly denounced the Polish cruelties. He even accused the Polish Government at the Holy See and asked for Papal assistance to protect the Orthodox against Polish onslaughts. In spite of the use of force to make the people Catholic and Polish, it was a complete *fiasco*. The Warsaw persecution produced open antagonism, but little gain for the Polish cause. Some Ukrainians, ignorant of conditions there, escaped to the Soviet Union rather than become Catholic by force. A few of them later returned, after suffering under the Soviets as well.

In Volhinia, which was too big for the Poles to swallow, the Orthodox Church was left alone to develop, at least for a while. Future priests were trained mainly in seminaries in Warsaw, Vilno, and Kremianets. Several religious periodicals—such as *Tserkva i Narid* (The Church and the People), *Dukhovnyi Siiach* (Spiritual Sower), and *Shliakh* (The Way)—were published, along with theological books sponsored by Orthodox scholarly societies such as the Petro Mohyla Society in Lutsk, where outstanding minds had gathered. There were, however, some difficulties. Polish authorities soon eliminated some seminaries, and theological studies were concentrated in Warsaw. A new type of priest was supposed to be educated there: an Orthodox Pole who would assist in the Polonization process in Volhinia and Polissia. On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalism was making progress among the young clerics and they became quite aggressive, which antagonized the older and more conservative clergy. This soon led to clashes and polarization during

religious congresses and meetings, such as the one in Lutsk in 1927.

Administratively, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Poland consisted of five eparchies (dioceses)—Warsaw, Polissia, Volhinia, Vilno, and Hrodno—with some 1,500 churches; the Volhinian eparchy was the largest one, with some 680 parishes and 7 monasteries.[3]

With the Soviet occupation of the Western Ukrainian regions in 1939-1941, the Russians immediately moved ahead to subordinate the Orthodox Church there to Muscovite authority. Soviet-appointed bishops were sent to make the so-called Orthodox Church a political tool of the Soviet Government. At the same time some preparations were undertaken for the "reunification" of Ukrainian Catholics (Uniates) with Russian Orthodoxy.

Under German occupation, at first, a revival of the Orthodox Church, which had become Autocephalous and thoroughly canonical, came to Ukraine. Soon there were more than ten Ukrainian bishops installed in various eparchies, and the religious life fully recovered and swiftly grew. But the Germans did not want a strong Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Hence they promoted frictions between Russian-oriented Orthodoxy, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, largely confined to the *Generalgouvernment*, and the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church, established in the *Reichskommissariat* in Eastern Ukraine. The German authorities meddled continually in religious matters, even though they had announced a "freedom of worship." The frictions and conflict, actually without any real substance and mostly personal and jurisdictional in nature, harmed the religious life. Hence, in October 1942 episcopal representatives, gathered in a synod in Pochaiv, signed an act of unification between the two branches of the Ukrainian Orthodox faith. However, it did not have any substantial effect. Things became even worse after the politics became involved. Two bishops of the

Autonomous Church were killed by guerrilla fighters, which provoked harsh German reprisals, the burning and destroying of villages and the execution of innocent people. Since some Autocephalous clergy maintained contacts with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the UPA, mutual accusations flared up. Then, with the return of Soviet occupation, most of the hierarchy and many priests and faithful of both Churches, afraid of Russian persecution, emigrated to the West, bringing with them some of their petty quarrels.

With the reestablishment of Soviet-Russian domination over most of Ukraine, the Orthodox Church was totally subordinated to Moscow's Patriarchate, and was transformed into the Kremlin's political tool. Many formal leaders and faithful of the two Ukrainian Orthodox branches were executed, imprisoned, or deported. The newly "consecrated" or "ordained" bishops and priests were often agents of the KGB, lacking any theological education and training. The Russian language was made dominant in the Church and Stalin's heavy hand was felt. Atheistic and anti-religious propaganda continued on the rise during the eras of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodoxy barely survived in the "catacombs," the underground.

In the 1980s, the official Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian SSR, a branch of the Moscow Patriarchate which included Carpathian Ukraine and Bukovyna, consisted of 19 eparchies (dioceses), some 35 monasteries and convents, 8,500 churches, 6,800 priests, and 3 seminaries. The Church lacked any ecclesiastic autonomy and was centrally governed by Moscow. The so-called Polish Orthodox Church in Poland, whose faithful were largely Ukrainian, received autonomy from Moscow in 1948, yet it too has remained under the dictates of Moscow's Patriarch.

The cause of Ukrainian Orthodoxy was partially saved, however, by its growth in the diaspora, in the Free World. Ukrainian Orthodox emigrants arrived in Canada and the United States long before the First World War, and imme-

diately began to construct churches and organize parishes and other church organizations. Then, because of some misunderstandings and rumors, a split developed within the Ukrainian Catholic Church in North America, and many of its members joined the Orthodox Church. A synod held in Saskatoon, Canada in 1919 accepted the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In 1924, contact was established with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in Kiev, and Archbishop I. Teodorovych, mentioned above, appointed by Metropolitan V. Lypkivsky, assumed the religious leadership of the Church in Canada and the United States. He was succeeded briefly in 1946 by Archbishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk, who soon left for the United States. The Canadian branch of the UAOC was then led by Metropolitan Ilarion Ohienko for a number of years, with its seat in Winnipeg. In the 1970s in Canada, there were four eparchies of the Church.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the United States, at first a part of the North American jurisdiction, was firmly established after the Second World War, and grew well under the leadership of Metropolitan Mstyslav, of Bound Brook, N.J. He established there an Orthodox seminary and a museum; he promoted scholarly and publishing activities and greatly contributed to the cultural growth of the entire Ukrainian community in this country. There was also another branch of the Orthodox Church in the United States. Canonically it was subordinated to the Patriarch of Constantinople, with its own Metropolitan. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church spread as well to Western Europe, Australia, some parts of South America, and even Asia, with several bishops—though their jurisdiction was rather confusing.

There were other minor Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in various parts of the world. These included the Ukrainian Patriarchal Orthodox Church, originating in Ukraine, as well as the Synod-managed and Autonomous Orthodox Church, also originating in Ukraine, as mentioned before. There were

still other rather small communities of Ukrainian Orthodox faithful who joined the Russian Orthodox Church, some of whom recognized the authority of the Patriarch of Moscow, and some of whom did not; many recognized the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, while still others remained completely independent. The quarrels and hostilities among all these factions of Orthodoxy, which originated in their homeland, were ideologically, politically, jurisdictionally, and at times personally biased, as well as Soviet instigated. This unfortunately contributed to a very blurred and confusing picture. One Ukrainian Orthodox Church would be the ideal solution.[4]

Ukrainian Protestant denominations—Baptists, Presbyterians, and others—had a rather small following in the Free World. However, in the Ukrainian SSR after the Second World War, as a result of the spiritual emptiness left behind by a bankrupt Marxism-Leninism and its atheistic campaigns, Protestant denominations gained ground and continued to grow.

UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. The Ukrainian Catholic Church, though much smaller than the Orthodox Church, represented a much more monolithic and cohesive entity than the latter, which consisted of many different and warring factions. The Ukrainian Catholic Church actively participated in the constitutional process of Western Ukrainian statehood of 1917-1921. Its head, Metropolitan Andrei Count Sheptytsky, an ingenious and outstanding personality of modern Ukrainian history, and other bishops belonged to the Ukrainian National Rada. As mentioned before, the Rada initiated the process of building a state in Western Ukraine. Many priests also participated in the county councils and administration and were state commissioners. The Holy See recognized the Ukrainian state of 1918-1921, and Count M.

Tyshkevych was accredited as the first Ukrainian ambassador at the Vatican.

After the Poles occupied Western Ukraine, some 1,000 Ukrainian priests were arrested and tried for participating in the political processes of the Ukrainian state. In order to advance the Ukrainian cause and the cause of the Catholic Church, Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky traveled abroad—to Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina—to boost the morale of his flock. It was only through the intervention of the Vatican that the Polish Government permitted him to return to his Metropolitan See in the city of Lviv. Although the Concordate was signed by the Warsaw Government with the Holy See to provide certain safeguards for Ukrainian Catholics, it did not stop Polish harassment and discrimination. Ukrainians were not admitted to schools of higher learning and to state employment, birth certificates were forged by the authorities to make Ukrainians into Roman Catholic Poles, and Ukrainian peasants were denied the right to buy land in their own country.

The Church suffered badly during the so-called Polish Pacification in 1930, when priests and faithful were injured and killed and church properties burned and ruined by Polish police and military units. Metropolitan Sheptytsky then intervened in Warsaw, with some success. In spite of Polish efforts, the Ukrainian Catholic Church developed rather well. The only major setback to that growth was the introduction of compulsory celibacy for priests in the two eparchies or dioceses of Stanislaviv and Peremyshl. But Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not allow this to happen under his jurisdiction in the Archdiocese of Lviv. Compulsory celibacy reduced the number of newly ordained priests, weakened the Church, and enabled Protestant sectarianism to grow in Galicia.

Before the Second World War in Western Ukraine there were 1 archeparchy, 2 eparchies, and 1 Apostolic Administration for the Lemko region, with some 2,490 parishes, 3,660 churches, 2,290 priests, and about 3,600,000 faithful, 5 semi-

naries, 3 major monastic orders, and a number of female convents.[5] In Volhinia, the Church faithful were not numerous and ecclesiastic affairs were administered by a bishop, with a seminary in the town of Dubno.

During the first short stay of the Soviets in Galicia, 1939-1941, they did not cause any major trouble for the Ukrainian Catholic Church, although some priests and religious were arrested, deported, or shot for imaginary crimes. Also, during the German occupation of 1941-1945, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was left pretty much alone, although its religious activities were severely restricted by the war operations.

Nevertheless, renewed Soviet occupation immediately brought terror and persecution of the Church. Nine bishops were arrested, tried and sentenced, together with many priests, religious, and faithful, immediately after the death of Metropolitan Andrei Count Sheptytsky. Two bishops soon perished in prison, and others received long-term sentences for alleged crimes. The new head of the Church, Metropolitan Joseph Slipyi, was incarcerated for eighteen years.

Subsequently, at the inspiration of the NKVD, the secret police, as well as the Communist Party, the so-called "Initiative Group of the Greek Catholic Reunion with the Russian Orthodox Church" was established, led by three renegade Catholic priests—H. Kostelnyk, M. Melnyk, and A. Pelvetsky—from three Galician eparchies. The infamous Group arranged the so-called Synod of Lviv, 8-10 March, 1946, which supposedly nullified the Church Union of Berest of 1596 and brought about the unification of the Ukrainian (Uniat) Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church. The whole "synod," from the legal point of view—its composition, competence, and canonical aspects—was fully invalid and not binding. It was, however, totally supported by the compulsory authority of the NKVD. Any opposition to the findings of the synod was smashed by the secret police. Many priests, monks, nuns, and faithful were incarcerated, deported, or executed for being unwilling to submit. New Orthodox bishops, some of

them former NKVD agents without any theological background, were appointed for the eparchies. The Russian language was soon forced upon the Church. In 1949 the jurisdiction of the "Reunification Act" was extended over the Ukrainian Catholics of Carpathian Ukraine and Bukovyna. The remaining two bishops of Mukachiv and Priashiv were eliminated. Nahayevsky has summarized well the Russian "reunification" measures: "Those who refused to bind themselves by signature were arrested. In 1946, for instance, 500-800 priests from the Archeparchy of Lviv were imprisoned, and from the district of Ternopil 150 priests were exiled to Siberia."[6]

With the "Great Exodus" of Ukrainians from their fatherland to escape Soviet-Russian genocide, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, like the Orthodox Church, was extended to the diaspora in the Free World. In the early 1980s, the Church had its followers in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, some other South American countries, Yugoslavia, Australia, New Zealand, and some parts of Asia. The Church was growing, mainly because it had received a new impetus for growth in 1963 with the release of Metropolitan Joseph Slipyi, at the age of seventy-one, from Soviet incarceration. This was due to the efforts of Pope John XXIII and President John F. Kennedy. In 1965, Pope Paul VI recognized Metropolitan Slipyi as Archbishop-Major of his church with the implicit rights of a Patriarch and soon made him a Cardinal of the Catholic Church. In accordance with the Second Vatican Council's *Decree on Eastern Catholic Churches*, in accord with the wishes of most bishops and faithful, and after he was so addressed in 1975 during a Holy Liturgy at St. Peter's Basilica in Rome, Metropolitan Slipyi accepted the title of "Patriarch of Kiev, Halych and all of Ruś-Ukraine."

The energy of the man was inexhaustible. He saved the Ukrainian Catholic Church from disintegration and assimilation when plans were in preparation to combine that Church and other Eastern Catholic Churches in a monolithic and artificial "Byzantine Catholic Church of America,"

Patriarch Joseph, in order to save his Church, summoned its bishops to a number of synods and gave it a renewed identity. This was not desired either by Moscow or Warsaw, and was even forbidden and not recognized as official by the Vatican. In order to defend his Church and to raise its image, on a few occasions Slipyi dared to publicly contradict Popes Paul VI and John Paul II, not to mention the powerful Curia, which exhibited a conciliatory attitude toward the Kremlin in the name of "ecumenism."

Although for political reasons the Vatican persistently denied official recognition to the Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate, which had a long and honorable tradition, Patriarch Joseph and his people never stopped demanding such recognition.

The Ukrainian Catholic eparchies existed everywhere in the world in the 1980s: four in the United States, five in Canada, one in Brazil, Argentina, Yugoslavia, and Australia (including New Zealand), and four in Western Europe—all with many parishes, parishoners, church organizations, and buildings. The Patriarchal constitution was supposed to provide the Church with cohesiveness, individuality, and self-rule, while in union with Rome—to save it for the future in spite of Russian attempts to destroy it. Nevertheless, because of the conciliatory attitude of the Vatican toward the Soviet Union, and in order to undermine the politically inconvenient Patriarchal movement, the Vatican began, in the 1970s and 1980s, to appoint to leading positions in the Ukrainian Church men who were not always the best choices. Yet, after the death of Patriarch Joseph I in the fall of 1984, his successor Myroslav-Ivan immediately resumed the efforts to acquire a full recognition for the said Patriarch.[7]

Between 1870 and 1914, a very large number of Ukrainians emigrated to the United States from the provinces of Carpatho-Ukraine and Galicia within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Some were listed as Ruthenians by the American Bureau of Immigration, beginning in 1899. Most of these were

Patriarch and Cardinal
Joseph I Slipyi,
Head of the Ukrainian
Catholic Pomisna Church

Andriy Sheptytsky
Metropolitan of Lviv



Vasyl Lypkivsky
Metropolitan of the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church

Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral
of the Immaculate Conception,
Philadelphia

Ukrainian Orthodox Church
Memorial, South Bound Brook,
New Jersey

Patriarchial
St. Sophia's Ukrainian
Catholic Cathedral, Rome

peasant-farmers. For centuries Carpatho-Ukraine had been under Hungarian rule, and was geographically separated from the rest of Ukraine by the Carpathian Mountains. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Carpatho-Ukraine became the center of the Russophile movement, a Russian-Tsarist intrigue meant to undermine the Ukrainian Catholic Church in that area as in Galicia, where Ukrainian self-awareness and assertiveness had been steadily increasing and influencing Ukrainians living within the confines of the Russian Empire. In the United States, the clergy and immigrants of these two groups, the self-conscious Ukrainians from Galicia and the Magyarized (Hungarianized) Ukrainians from Carpatho-Ukraine (who claimed to be a separate ethnic nationality of the so-called Ruthenians), clashed repeatedly. Bishop Ortynsky, the first Ukrainian Catholic bishop in the United States, died in 1916 amid the process of trying to unite the two groups. The lack of unity did not prevent the growth of the Church, and unity would have eventually been restored. However, for some inexplicable reasons, the Vatican delayed the matter. Finally, in 1924, it legalized this division by appointing a separate bishop for Ukrainians and a separate bishop for the so-called Ruthenians. So today, what had originally been only a separate eparchy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine is now an entirely separate Church, with its own hierarchy, 1 archeparchy, 3 eparchies, and a following of approximately 360,000 faithful in the United States. The official name of the church is the Ruthenian-Byzantine Catholic Church. Its members are mostly "Ruthenian," Slovak, and Hungarian Catholics.

EDUCATION AND SCIENCE. Concurrently with the beginnings of the independent Ukrainian state in the twentieth century, the process of developing a truly Ukrainian educational system was undertaken by the Central Rada, involving educators, teachers, journalists, scholars, and who-

ever understood well the significance of the matter. The groundwork for that work was prepared well in advance prior to the Revolution. The Western Ukrainians—educators, teachers and others—who stayed in the central regions of Ukraine as prisoners of war, hostages, or deportees of the Tsarist government helped greatly, as L. Biletsky has asserted.[8] The Secretariat-General of Education initiated the development of the Ukrainian school network, while the Society of School Education worked on production of textbooks and other educational materials. Congresses of teachers wholeheartedly supported the process. A first strictly Ukrainian preparatory (secondary) school, a *gimnazium*, was established in Kiev in 1917.

A network of elementary and secondary schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction gradually covered the land. Soon there were some eighty-five secondary schools or *gimnazii*. The educational commissioners in Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odessa supervised the educational process in all its aspects. The previous Russification trend was completely abolished. In order to prepare the teaching cadres, some outstanding scholars, such as M. Hrushevsky and M. Vasylenko, conducted instruction in Ukrainian studies on a higher level. School instruction and book publishing grew rapidly in spite of the war. In 1917, there were 300,000 copies of textbooks printed, and in 1918 the number had swelled to 2,000,000 printed. Instructional curricula were developed under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. The general instructional program included three levels: the junior and senior on the elementary level and the secondary level. Vocational schools were organized on three levels.

Since the school system was thoroughly national, the change of government from the republican to the monarchistic and vice versa scarcely affected the educational process. At the same time, however, the Ukrainian Government was very liberal and allowed, even at its own expense, the national minorities—Russians, Poles, and Jews—to have their own

educational institutions with their own languages of instruction, provided that Ukrainian was also taught as a required subject.

In October 1917 the Ukrainian University of Kiev was founded alongside the older institution, St. Volodymyr's University. The University of Kiev had departments of history, philology, physics and mathematics, law and medicine. Soon the Academy of Fine Arts was also inaugurated. In October 1918 the University of Kamianets Podilsky, the College of History and Philology of Poltava, the University of Katerynoslav, and other similar institutions were opened. New chairs of Ukrainian studies were established in the older schools of higher learning, such as older universities in Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odessa.

Publishing houses, subsidized by government loans, printed and marketed an ever-increasing number of books. Hundreds of thousands of volumes appeared in Ukraine, while books in Ukrainian were also published in Vienna, Berlin, and Leipzig. The *Prosvita* Society, with its libraries and reading halls and rooms in hundreds of localities, supplemented the process of educating the adult masses.

In Western Ukraine, the State Secretariat of Education assumed the task of developing a strictly Ukrainian educational system. Essentially the old Austrian system was retained for a while in the elementary schools, *gimnazii*, and vocational schools, with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. At the same time there were Polish schools, instructing in Polish, and Jewish schools, instructing in Hebrew, where Ukrainian was a required subject. The Ukrainianization process progressed well, in spite of the war. The University of Lviv was not Ukrainianized immediately, and only some subjects were taught in Ukrainian there. In the Kuban region the Ukrainian school system was established largely by private initiative and was rather inadequate. Most schools remained Russian in character, except for a progressive introduction of the Ukrainian language as a required subject.

The Soviet-Russian domination of Ukraine radically changed the picture. Education became officially free for everybody and thoroughly coeducational. Teaching religion was completely banned, while instruction in Marxism became compulsory on all levels of schooling, including kindergartens. The purpose of education was declared to be the advancement toward full Communism. The Communist philosophy permeated all segments of social life, including the schools. In the 1920s and early 1930s there was, as discussed before, a comprehensive Ukrainianization drive, sponsored largely by N. Skrypnyk, on the supposed assumption that Communist ideology could be best taught in the mother languages of the peoples involved. Hence the Ukrainian language was pushed in the Ukrainian SSR as the most effective tool of communication. Still there was also a hidden nationalist motive.

After several major and minor changes, three-level schooling was adopted: kindergarten, ten-year school (including elementary and secondary education), and higher education (colleges and universities). Vocational and technical schools were also introduced everywhere. Even on the university level professionalism was stressed.

The number of schools of all kinds and levels rapidly grew in terms of buildings, pupils, students, teachers, and professors. But social discrimination was practiced against certain classes of students: children of former capitalists and aristocrats, non-Communist political leaders, and the Orthodox lower clergy. The whole educational system of the Ukrainian SSR was strictly government controlled, centrally run, and minutely supervised by Moscow. Private schools were not permitted to operate at all.

In the 1930s, the Moscow Government made every effort to industrialize the land. It demanded more and more vocationally and professionally trained people to develop and run the industrial system. Therefore, during that decade the educational system continued to expand. At the same time, however, the era of Ukrainianization was over, and the Kremlin

embarked on an intense and ruthless Russianization and assimilation of all non-Russian nationalities of the USSR, including the Ukrainians. The intent was to create an ethnic monolith in the Soviet Union. The Russian language was progressively introduced everywhere in non-Russian regions as the basic tongue of instruction. In Ukraine, the number of Ukrainian schools was drastically and continually reduced, and they were replaced by Russian schools. The hours of instruction in Ukrainian were shortened and superseded by instruction in Russian. The number of Ukrainian students declined, fewer and fewer Ukrainian books could be found in the libraries. In every case, Russian publications, books and journals, were substituted for Ukrainian publications. After the Second World War some collections of Ukrainian books and archival materials were even burned under highly suspicious circumstances. Many patriotic Ukrainian scholars, teachers, and students active during the NEP and Ukrainianization era were arrested, deported, exiled, and liquidated physically. Thousands upon thousands of them died from Russian terror, as special studies of the tragedy have indicated. They were promptly replaced by foreign scholars and educators, especially Russians. The cultural genocide in Ukraine, sponsored by the Russian authorities, was pervasive and total.

The short German occupation of Ukraine was catastrophic from the point of view of education. Most schools were closed permanently. Only four-year elementary schooling was allowed to prepare the "slaves" for the Third Reich. Vocational training was permitted, but universities and colleges were not allowed to operate. Only in Galicia did the German authorities permit a few secondary schools and an institute of higher learning in Lviv to function temporarily.

With the return of Soviet occupation, the old Soviet educational system was largely restored in the Ukrainian SSR, with a few minor changes. In order to enable the war veterans and other adults to catch up with their schooling, night schools

were opened everywhere on several educational levels. At first a form of "Ukrainianization" was again permitted by Moscow to win the people over, but in the 1970s and 1980s the Russianization drive was resumed with an unheard-of fury and intensity to destroy any vestiges of Ukrainian culture. Schools with instruction in Ukrainian disappeared almost entirely. Ukrainian books and scholarly and professional journals were scarcely published, being generally superseded by Russian publications. Very few books in Ukrainian could be found in bookstores and libraries. Fewer and fewer Ukrainians were allowed to receive higher university or college degrees in Ukraine. Ever fewer Ukrainians worked as professors and research scientists there. Most professors and research scientists were urged to go to Russia to work. In the late seventies, the Russianization drive to create "one Soviet people" reached enormous proportions.

In Western Ukraine under Polish domination, at first the traditional Austrian school system was continued, although there was a progressive Polonization. Gradually changes began to be made, and the quality of elementary education began to get poorer. Ukrainian schools were replaced by Polish schools and the Polish language substituted for Ukrainian as the language of instruction. In the northern regions of Western Ukraine, the Kholm and Pidlasha districts, close to the Polish ethnic borders, the Polonization process in education was much more intense. There were no Ukrainian schools, and even religion was taught in Polish. In Volhinia in 1922-1923 there were still 443 Ukrainian schools, but in 1937-1938 there were only 8 left, and all were in the process of being replaced by Polish schools. The same process was going on in Polissia and the Lemko region.

State and privately operated Ukrainian schools—elementary, secondary, and vocational—were permitted to function only in Galicia, where there was a continuous struggle for more Ukrainian schools and a Ukrainian university. The *Ridna Shkola* Society, operating only in Galicia, in 1938, for

instance, financed a number of Ukrainian private schools at the elementary and secondary levels, with programs in Ukrainian and dormitory facilities. The society published books and journals and other educational materials and organized conferences and exhibits. Secondary and commercial education initiated by the *Ridna Shkola* was better developed than elementary education. Kindergartens were maintained everywhere. Finances for this purpose were obtained exclusively from private contributions collected at home, as well as abroad from Ukrainian emigrants mainly in the United States and Canada. Polish authorities frequently discriminated against Ukrainian schools by denying them public accreditations under all kinds of pretexts.

Although the Polish Government made an international commitment to establish a Ukrainian university in Galicia, it never lived up to it. In response to this, the Ukrainians organized an underground university, *Ukrainskyi Tainyi Universtet*, which gave higher education to many. The credits received at that university were never recognized by Poland, but they did receive recognition in Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Germany. The university soon terminated its operation. Three theological seminaries functioned in Lviv, Stanislaviv, and Peremyshl, for the three respective dioceses. In 1928 the Lviv seminary became the university-level Ukrainian Theological Academy. Its president and rector for many years was Rev. Joseph Slipyi, later Patriarch of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Youth organizations such as *Plast*, the Ukrainian scouting group, completed the educational process. In the 1930s, however, beause of the association of *Plast* with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and because of the Polish anti-Ukrainian drive, *Plast* was dissolved by the Polish authorities. It continued partially in the underground. There were also other youth organizations, such as *Luh* and *Sokoly*. Numerous papers and periodicals for young people and adults, such as *Dilo*, *Novyi Chas*, *Svit Dytyny*, and *Promin*,

raised the intellectual level of the community in Western Ukraine. In Eastern Ukraine such publications were filled with Communist and pro-Russian propaganda and indoctrination and were centrally controlled by Moscow. They had a rather negative impact on their Ukrainian readers.

The Czechoslovakian Government introduced compulsory education in Carpathian Ukraine and the Priashiv region, and substantially increased the number of elementary and secondary schools in comparison to the previous Hungarian regime. Ukrainian was the language of instruction in many schools but the Czechs, being incurable Russophiles, tried to introduce a kind of artificial jargon, a mixture of Ukrainian, Old Slavonic, and Russian, to please the Ruthenians, who were somewhat uncertain of their ethnic descent. The declaration of national independence of Carpathian Ukraine in 1938, however, resulted in a thorough Ukrainianization of all aspects of education, including educational journals. In the city of Uzhorod there was the only educational institution above the secondary-school level, a theological seminary for training the future priests. In Bukovyna, under Romanian domination, a strict Romanianization policy was pursued. Officials in fact denied there were any Ukrainians at all, admitting only to Ukrainianized Romanians who had to be brought back to their national roots by Romanian schools. In the late 1930s a struggle to have Ukrainian schools had only a limited success.[9]

During the First World War and immediately after it, a great many Ukrainian scholars and scientists left their homeland and went to Czechoslovakia, Austria, Germany, France, and elsewhere as political refugees, along with thousands upon thousands of others who wanted to escape Russian and Polish persecution. Schools were organized in the camps of Ukrainian prisoners of war and wherever Ukrainians were concentrated abroad. Ukrainian institutions of higher learning developed particularly well abroad. In 1920, the Ukrainian Free University was organized in Vienna as a response to

education in the Ukrainian SSR, which was in Soviet bondage. A year later, the university was transferred to Prague. It grew impressively; in the 1920s the average enrollment of students per year was about 390. It consisted of schools of history, philology, law, and, later on, of economics. In Podiebrady, also Czechoslovakia, there was the Academy of Technology and Economics. The Drahomaniv Pedagogical Institute was founded in Prague. Hundreds of professionals were trained in those schools of higher learning. The first two were transferred to Bavaria after the Second World War, the University to Munich and the Academy to Regensburg. Later the Academy moved to the U.S., where it terminated operations. The Ukrainian Free University continued functioning as an institution of higher learning through the Seventies and Eighties, concentrating largely on research and publication in the fields of Ukrainian studies, history, culture, linguistics, and literature. These were areas which were particularly suppressed by the Russians in the Ukrainian SSR. A few years after the Second World War, a Ukrainian Graduate School of Economics was opened in Munich.

Upon his release from the Soviet-Russian captivity, in the late 1960s, Patriarch Joseph I organized the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome. It subsequently received the recognition of the Vatican and the Italian Government. It distinguished itself with comprehensive research and publication in the areas of Ukrainian church history, the Ukrainian Eastern Rite, Eastern theological thought, and the history of the monastic life in Ukraine.

In 1968, a Mykhailo Hrushevsky Chair of Ukrainian History was established at Harvard University. In the late 1970s a chair of Ukrainian literature was also established at Harvard, and a chair of Ukrainian history at Toronto University. However, since they tried to keep up to date with so-called scholarship in the Ukrainian SSR, the scholarly work of all three chairs left a great deal to be desired. Consequently, in some ways these chairs hurt rather than helped Ukrainian

scholarship. Nevertheless, a number of American, Canadian, and other foreign universities offered excellent credited courses in Ukrainian history, literature, and philosophy.

Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox seminaries existed in the late 1980s in Washington, D.C.; Glencove, N.Y.; Bound Brook, N.J.; Rome, Italy; Ottawa, Canada; and elsewhere. Ukrainian elementary and secondary schools operated for a few years in the displaced-persons camps after the Second World War. In the 1980s Ukrainian elementary and secondary schools, largely parish schools or operated by religious orders, existed in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and South America.

After the Revolution of 1917, the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kiev broadened the scope of its scholarly activities and renewed its publications, *Zapysky* ("Memoirs") and *Zbirnyky* ("Collections of Works"). The natural sciences, technology and medicine were represented. The Academy of Fine Arts began its activities in late 1917. In the fall of 1918, the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences was established by the Hetman Government, with departments of history and philology, physics and mathematics, and social economics. In 1921, the Academy was reorganized as "the highest state scholarly institution" and renamed the All-Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, *Vseukrainska Akademia Nauk* (VAUN). It was joined by outstanding scholars who kept continuously in touch with Western scholarship during the period of the NEP and Ukrainianization. In addition, scholarly institutes existed in Kiev, Kharkiv, and Odessa, with lesser ones in Poltava, Nizhyn, Chernihiv, and other towns. However, in 1936, as a consequence of the ruthless Russianization drive, the VAUN was made the Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR and subordinated to that of the Soviet Union, giving it a distinctly provincial character and putting its scholarship in Soviet bondage. As pointed out above, hundreds upon hundreds of Ukrainian scholars were

physically liquidated by the Soviet secret police at that time in order to put an end to independent Ukrainian studies in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the oldest Ukrainian academy of scholarship, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, continued to operate in Lviv during the interwar years—with splendid results, having assembled the most outstanding scholars in Western Ukraine. It was also joined by famous foreign scholars as well. Its publication activity was quite impressive. The Society had its own building, press, library, and archives. However, Soviet occupation paralyzed its activities, and subsequently, in 1946, it was dissolved and incorporated into the Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. However, Ukrainian scholars soon renewed its existence in Munich. With the "Great Exodus" to other continents, it was spread elsewhere. In the early 1950s several branches of the Society were established in Western Europe (chaired by V. Kubiovych), in the United States (chaired successively by M. Chubaty, R. Smal-Stotsky, M. Stakhiv and O. Andrushikiv, and in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Y. Padokh), in Canada (at first chaired by E. Vertyporokh and then by B. Stebelsky), and in Australia (chaired by Y. Pelensky and then by I. Rybchyn and R. Mykytovych). Strictly speaking, these were not real branches but independent national societies. They were united throughout the world by the General Council of the Shevchenko Scientific Societies. Its most important scholarly publications have been *Zapysky* ("Memoirs"), *Zbirnyky* ("Collective Works"), and many monographic writings.

In order to counteract the Russian dominated Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, in the postwar years Ukrainian emigré scholars organized the Ukrainian Free Academy of Arts and Sciences with branches in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada, chaired at various times by such men of learning as M. Vietukhiv, D. Chyzhevsky and Y. Shevelov. Prior to the Second World War there

were Ukrainian scholarly institutes in Berlin and in Warsaw, and other lesser ones throughout the world.[10]

Though historical studies were mostly distorted by the Soviets to fit their political scheme, a few leading Ukrainian historians, working either in Ukraine or abroad, tried to preserve scholarly objectivity, and they must be mentioned. Of course, M. Hrushevsky heads the list. He had brought his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* up to the Hadiach Treaty, in ten comprehensive volumes, before he was left to die by Soviet authorities. Hrushevsky also published a scholarly *History of Ukrainian Literature* in five volumes. His scholarly contribution in the form of monographic works, shorter and longer historical essays, and articles and political writings is enormous. M. Slabchenko, essentially an economic historian, published his valuable *Organization of the Ukrainian Economy of the Hetman State, the 17th and 18th Century,* 1923-1924, in four volumes. D. Bahalii, a social-economic historian, researched the past of the Ukrainian borderlands. Among other works he published *An Outline of Ukrainian History from the Social-Economic Perspective* in 1928 and *A History of Slobidska Ukraine* in 1923. D. Doroshenko, an outstanding statesman as well, wrote a great deal, including *An Outline of Ukrainian History,* in two volumes, in 1932-1935, and *A History of Ukraine, 1917-1923*, in two volumes, 1930-1932. O. Ohloblyn, also a very prolific author in the 1960s and 1970s, published *An Outline of History of the Ukraine Factory* in 1925, and *Hetman Ivan Mazepa and His Era* in 1960, these being merely examples of his enormous literary output. N. Chubaty wrote on the political, ecclesiastical and legal history of Ukraine. In 1964 he published *Princely Rus'-Ukraine and the Origin of the Three Eastern Slavic Nationalities* in New York. *A History of the Ukrainian Church,* in two volumes, had not been completed at the time of his death, and the second volume was published posthumously in Rome. I. Krypiakevych also belonged to the pantheon of the Ukrainian historians of the middle of the twentieth century, and perhaps

his most outstanding work was the monograph *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, published in 1954. O. Hermaize was liquidated by the Soviets. I. Borshchak researched the activities of Hetman Pylyp Orlyk and General Hryhor Orlyk and Ukrainian-French relations. N. Polonska-Vasylenko wrote the two-volume work *A History of Ukraine*, published in the 1970s, along with many other works. M. Andrusiak researched the history of Ukrainian Cossacks. M. Stachiv wrote *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History, 1918-1923* with J. Sztendera, published in English in New York in 1969, and *Ukraine and the European Turmoil, 1917-1919* with N. Chirovsky and P. Stercho also published in English in New York in 1973. He also wrote extensively in Ukrainian. Stachiv distinguished himself as a sociologist as well.

The younger generation of historians included M. Braichevsky, who researched ancient and medieval Ukrainian history, for which he was suppressed by the Soviets. His important works include *The Origin of Rus'* and *When and How Kiev Originated*, in 1963 and 1968 respectively. O. Dombrovsky also belonged to the younger generation of historians. He studied the ancient history of Ukraine and published many essays in this area. M. Marchenko, O. Apanovych, I. Shevchenko, O. Pritsak, S. Horak, and many others may be mentioned for having contributed significantly to historical studies. Rev. A. Velykyi, Rev. I. Nazarko, Rev. I. Nahayevsky, H. Luzhnytsky, Rev. M. Voinar, O. Lototsky, I. Vlasovsky, I. Ohienko, and Y. Fedoriv earned distinction in the area of the Church history. H. Luzhnytsky published his celebrated *Ukrainian Church between the East and West* in 1954. Y. Fedoriv published *A History of the Church in Ukraine* in 1967, while I. Vlasovsky published *An Outline of Ukrainian Orthodox Church History* in 1954, in several volumes, all in Ukrainian. M. Vasylenko, A. Yakovliv, R. Lashchenko, M. Chubaty, L. Okinshevych, V. Hryshko, and V. Starosolsky were outstanding names in the history of legal institutions and jurisprudence. Okinshevych researched the Cossack era

and published, among other works, *The Outstanding Military Associates in Hetman Ukraine in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (*Znachne viiskove tovarystwo*) in 1948. A. Yakovliv also earned a special distinction in that field, having been as prolific a writer as Okinshevych. *Ukrainian Code of Law of 1743* and *The Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties of the 17th and 18th Centuries* were some of Yakovliv's publications. L. Vynar achieved a great success in publishing for more than twenty-five years in the United States a reputable professional journal, *The Ukrainian Historian*, in Ukrainian during the sixties, seventies, and eighties.

In the area of political thought V. Lypynsky, M. Mikhnovsky, D. Dontsov, M. Stsiborsky, P. Poltava, O. Hornovyi, S. Bandera, Y. Stetsko, S. Lenkavsky, and others distinguished themselves. Lypynsky elaborated on the monarchistic constitutional principles as applied to Ukraine in his *Letters to the Brothers-Tillers of the Soil* (*Lysty do brativ khliborobiv*). He combined history with political thought and philosophy in such works as his *Ukraine at the Turning Point* (*Ukraine na perelomi*), published in Vienna in 1920. M. Mikhnovsky and D. Dontsov wrote about Ukrainian nationalism. Dontsov was a prolific writer and publisher, and among his many works are *A History of Development of the Ukrainian Statehood Idea* (*Istoria rozvytku ukrainskoi derzhavnoi idei*) in 1917, *The Foundations of Our Policies* (*Pidstavy nashoi polityky*) in 1921, and *Nationalism* in 1926. M. Stsiborsky attempted to deal with practical aspects of the future Ukrainian state, such as preparing a tentative proposal for the country's constitution. Poltava and Hornovyi applied nationalist ideas to conditions in Ukraine in the post-war era. Sosnovsky's leading work was *Dnytro Dontsov* and *Ukraine in the International Arena, 1945-1965*. He died while working on a history of Ukrainian political thought. Bandera, Lenkavsky, and Stetsko, who were also active politically, in their many essays elaborated on and brought up to date various aspects of political thought. Democratic and socialist political thought

was elaborated on by I. Bahrianyi, V. Holubnychy, R. Ilnytsky, and others.

In the area of economics and the economic history of Ukraine, in addition to Slabchenko, Bahalii, and Ohloblyn, who have already been mentioned, substantial contributions were made by M. Tuhan-Baranovsky (who worked on the theory of business cycles), I. Dzhydzhora, M. Volobuiev, K. Voblyi, K. Kononenko, V. Dobrohaviev, V. Tymoshenko, B. Martos, O. Nesterenko, D. Vyrnyk, R. Dyminsky, N. Chirovsky, Z. Melnyk, V. Holubnychy, I. Koropetsky, B. Vynar, L. Dobriansky, V. Bandera, M. Bohatiuk, and many others. Most of them concentrated on the economic exploitation of the Ukrainian economy and its natural resources, labor, and financial and technological resources by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. For example, Volobuiev wrote *On the Problems of Ukrainian Economy* in 1928 and Voblyi wrote *Economic Geography of Ukraine* in 1927; Kononenko wrote *Ukraine and Russia, A History of the Economic Relations, 1654-1717*, published in English in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1958, and N. Chirovsky wrote *Ukrainian Economy*, published in English in 1965, and other works. The listings of works and authors is by far incomplete.

I. Rakovsky researched and published in the area of anthropology, and Z. Kuzela in ethnography; V. Kubiovych, M. Kulytsky, and I. Tesla earned distinction in geography and cartography, with Kubiovych's *Geography of Ukraine* meriting special mention. Kubiovych also deserves fame as the editor-in-chief of *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva* (in Ukrainian), and *Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopedia* (in English), published through the University of Toronto, in 1963 and 1971 respectively.

As with other disciplines, philosophy was stifled in the Ukrainian SSR. Materialist Marxist-Leninism prevented any attempt at original and free philosophical thought. Still, in 1961 the works of H. Skovoroda were republished in two volumes, and in 1966 *An Outline of History of Philosophy in*

Ukraine was printed—with a Marxist interpretation throughout. In the Free World, D. Chyzhevsky published *An Outline of the History of Philosophy in Ukraine* in 1931. In addition, he published the philosophical essays *Logic and Ethics* and *On Formalism in Ethics*. V. Lypynsky developed his political thought from the philosophical point of view. I. Mirchuk, D. Olianchyn, and N. Shlemkevych also contributed to the Ukrainian philosophical tradition. B. Rudko worked on the history of Ukrainian philosophy, referring to Shevchenko, Franko, and others.

Theological studies were pursued in the theological departments of various universities in Ukraine and abroad, such as the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome and the Orthodox and Catholic seminaries mentioned before. Of course, under the Soviets there was little scholarly work in theology. After the Second World War the Soviets pretended that theology could develop freely, but in point of fact it was not allowed to. Under the Polish occupation in Western Ukraine the situation was a little better. In the framework of the Society of Peter Mohyla, established in 1931 in Lutsk, influential lay church leaders such as O. Lototsky, I. Vlasovsky, M. Kobryn, S. Tymoshenko, and others published translations of all kinds of theological works. In 1955-1956 Vlasovsky published *An Outline of the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church*, in several volumes in Ukrainian. Orthodox dignitaries such as Metropolitan Ilarion Ohienko and Metropolitan Dionisii Valedynsky contributed to the development of theological thought. In the Ukrainian Catholic Church theological learning was advanced by Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky and Patriarch Joseph Slipyi, two outstanding scholars and theologians, and also by Revs. A. Velykyi, L. Nazarko, V. Pospishil, I. Nahaievsky, M. Voinar, P. Bilaniuk, and others. They contributed to the scholarly journals: *Bohoslovia* ("Theology"), published by the Theological Scholarly Society; *Analecta*, published by the Order of St. Basil the Great; and *Pratsi* ("Works"), published by the Ukrainian

Catholic Academy in Lviv. Most of these theological journals and collections were at first published in Western Ukraine, and then partially revived in Rome after the Second World War. Pospishil authored a significant essay, *Compulsory Celibacy for the Eastern Catholics in the Americas*, in 1977. In it, he opposed the idea of compulsory celibacy.

Ukrainian philology and literature were cruelly suppressed by the Soviets. Hence Ukrainian philologists and students of literature in West Ukraine and abroad made every effort to contribute to these two branches of the humanities. Outstanding names in these fields include: S. Yefremov, P. Yefremov, N. Zerov, V. Simovych, S. Smal-Stotsky, R. Smal-Stotsky, C. Andruseshyn, M. Vozniak, D. Chyzhevsky, Y. Shevelov, B. Kravtsiv, V. Lew, B. Romanenchuk, K. Kysilevsky, V. Radzykevych, I. Zilynsky, and M. Ovcharenko. They produced high-quality works in these fields to counteract the linguistic genocide of non-Russian languages in the USSR. Worth noting are Chyzhevsky's *History of Ukrainian Literature* (1956), S. Yefremov's *A History of Ukrainian Writings* (1919-1924), and M. Vozniak's *History of Ukrainian Literature* (1920-1921), the latter two works in two volumes. Hrushevsky's *History of Ukrainian Literature* has been mentioned before. R. Smal-Stotsky wrote *Ukrainian Language in the Soviet Ukraine* in 1926, and brought it up to date in 1969. Y. Shevelov's *An Outline of the Contemporary Literary Ukrainian Language* appeared in 1951, and his *A Prehistory of Slavic; the Historical Phonology of Common Slavic* in 1965. K. Kysilevsky wrote, among other works, *The Descriptive Grammar of the Ukrainian Language* in 1948 and *Ukrainian Linguistics of the Recent Time* in 1973.

Ukrainians distinguished themselves in the pure sciences as well after the First World War. D. Grave, S. Tymoshenko, M. Kravchuk, V. Petryshyn (all mathematicians), N. Krylov, V. Shaposhnikov, V. Kistiakovsky, M. Kasha, P. Kapytsia, A. Smakula, O. Bilaniuk (all concerned with various aspects of physics), V. Vernadsky (in mineralogy), L. Dmokhovsky (in

microbiology), A. Granovsky (in entomology), V. Lypsky (in botany), E. Votchal (in biology), and others were involved in continuous research and publishing in leading professional journals. This is a brief post-war summary of the scholarly and scientific achievements of Ukraine in the twentieth century.

LITERATURE. Ukrainian literary creativity reached its peak, beginning with T. Shevchenko, L. Ukrainka, and I. Franko in the later part of the nineteenth century, and extended into the twentieth; Franko died in 1916 and Lesia Ukrainka in 1913. But the creativity continued with great works of poetry, prose, and drama. At the dawn of the new century, Marko Cheremshyna, Stefan Vasylchenko, Tymotei Bordulak, Osyp Makovei, and Les Martovych contributed delightful short stories to the heritage of Ukrainian literature. However, Bohdan Lepkyi, a poet, prose writer, and scholar, was definitely the prominent literary figure of the first half of the twentieth century. His lyrics are deeply moving, characterized by deep religious feelings, patriotism, devotion to national traditions, love of nature, and compassion and concern for less fortunate people. He published several collections of lyrical poetry, including *Osin* ("The Autumn"), *Lystky padut* ("The Falling Leaves"), *Nad rikoiu* ("On the River"), and *Z hlybyny dushi* ("From the Depth of the Soul"). His short stories reflect the life of the Ukrainian villages and its villagers in a realistic way with lyrical overtones, and with deep concern for his fellowmen. He wrote and published several collections of his short stories, such as *Z sela* ("From the Village"), *Z zhyttia* ("From Life"), and *Na dorozi zhyttia* ("On Life's Path").

He wrote two kinds of novels, novels reflecting social life and social relations, such as *Pid tykhyi vechir* ("Toward a Silent Evening"), *Veselka mad pustarem* ("A Rainbow over

the Deserted Place"), and *Zirka* ("Starlet"); and historical novels, such as *Krutizh* ("Whirlpool"), *Sotnykivna* ("Centurion's Daughter"), and *Mazepa*. The four-part, six-volume historical novel *Mazepa* reflected the developments which led to Mazepa's break with Peter I and his alliance with Charles XII of Sweden, as well as the tragic events following the Battle of Poltava in 1709. It also included a fictionalization of Mazepa's personal life and his love for Motria, the daughter of his archenemy, Vasyl Kochubei.

The Ukrainian historical novel was also represented by such writers as Andril Chaikivsky, Osyp Nazaruk, Yulian Opilsky (Yurii Rudnytsky), Mykola Holubets, and quite later on by Yurii Kosach, and others. However, the literary quality of all those historical novels, although inspired by patriotism, was uneven, and at times left a great deal to be desired. *Pobratymy* ("The Blood Brothers"), the first part of a planned novel about Hetman P. Sahaidachny, by Chaikivsky; *Idu na vas* ("Moving against You"), by Opilsky; and Kosach's *Rubikon Khmelnytskoho* ("Khmelnytsky's Rubicon") may be considered among the better works.

Around 1906 a group of writers and artists formed "Young Muse," an association following the call of "art for art's sake," intending to serve the ideal of beauty. It was a reflection of Western literary and artistic trends. Young Muse was joined by poets and short-story and novel writers, such as Vasyl Pachovsky, Peter Karmansky, Stepan Charnetsky, Volodymyr Birchak, and Osyp Turiansky. Pachovsky was an original talent who created collections of poetry and dramatic works, such as *Rozsypani perly* ("Scattered Pearls") and *Sontse ruiny* ("The Sun of the Ruins"). Birchak wrote historical novels, while Turiansky's novel *Poza mezhamy bolu* ("Beyond the Limits of Pain") even gave a striking picture of war experiences. Franko and Turiansky were nominated for Nobel Prize for Literature. Lepkyi, as well as Vasyl Shchurat and Ulana Kravchenko, maintained contact with Young Muse. Shchurat was a remarkable poet, writer, scholar, and

translator of foreign works of literature, such as the *Nibelungenlied* and *Rolandslied*. Kravchenko published valuable collections of poetry.

Around the same time, in Eastern Ukraine a group of writers and poets gathered around the journal *Ukrainian Home*, and they also followed the call to pure art. These included Mykola Voronyi, Ahatanhel Krymsky (also an outstanding scholar), Ludmyla Vasylevska, and Mykola Cherniavsky. Oleksander Kandyba-Oles published a beautiful collection of poetry with nationalistic and lyrical overtones, *Z zhurboiu radist obnialasia* ("When Grief and Joy Embraced"), which immediately made him one of the leading poets of the time.

The First World War, the revolutions, and the struggle for independence created new conditions and gave an impetus to new trends. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, in his short stories, novels, and dramatic works, showed a great, though not always welcome, originality. He looked for contrasts in life, particularly social contrasts, and attempted to explain their causes. The themes of his works were rather daring, both in his prose and his dramas, such as *Krasa i syla* ("Beauty and Power"), *Temna syla* ("The Dark Force"), *Dym* ("Smoke"), *Hrikh* ("Sin"), and *Zakon* ("The Law"). He was a hedonist, and usually tried to justify immoral and antisocial acts as resulting from human drive to achieve delight and pleasure. Vynnychenko influenced some minor writers, such as A. Teslenko and N. Tkachenko.

Hryhorii Chuprynka, an idealist, ardent patriot, and romanticist, as well as an insurgent fighter, was a master of Ukrainian poetry. His talent was already apparent in his first collections of poetry, such as *Ohnetsvit* ("Fire Blossom"), *Meteore*, and *Kontrasty* ("The Contrasts"), in which he displayed a musicality of speech and a mastery of a variety of rhythmical structures. Roman Kupchynsky and Oles Babii gave poetic praise to the struggle for independence, especially to the exploits of the Ukrainian Riflemen. Pavlo Tychyna and Maksym Rylsky developed Ukrainian poetry to new heights

in the heady atmosphere of national independence. Tychyna's *Soniashi klarnety* ("Sunny Clarinets") and *Zolotyi homin* ("Golden Resonance") reflected optimism, joy of life, confidence in the victory of the national struggle, and mastery of poetic form. Rylskyi showed his poetic talent in such collections as *Na uzlissi* ("Young Forest") and *Synia dalechin* ("The Blue Distance"), which featured a classic calmness and a mastery of artistic form. Soon, however, both of them submitted to the political and ideological pressure of the Soviet regime and abandoned the national cause. Hence, they lost their poetic originality and mastery and became mediocre exponents of so-called socialist realism giving insincere praise to the Communist way of life. Osvald Burghardt, on the other hand, escaped from Soviet political and literary terror and, in the Free World, under the name of Yurii Klen published magnificent collections of poetry—*Proklati roky* ("The Damned Years"), *Karavely* ("Caravels"), and *Popil imperii* ("The Ashes of the Empire"), a great poem with historical overtones in which he reflected on the terrors of recent years experienced by the Ukrainian people under Soviet rule. Anger and indignation permeate his poetry, and a call for action can be deduced from his artistic words. His form was original; he attempted to go beyond neoclassical forms. He also wrote short stories, and was at the same time a scholar and a literary critic.

Mykola Zerov, Pavlo Fylypovych, and Mykhailo Drai-Khmara were proponents of neoclassical poetic forms, and for this they all perished at the hands of the Soviet rulers, exiled to distant regions of the USSR. Todos Osmachka was able to escape Soviet terror. He published both in Ukraine and in the Free World, and his several collections of poetry, such as *Skytski vohni* ("The Skythic Fires") and *Klekit* ("The Rattling"), showed strong form of expression. Dmytro Falkivsky was a promising talent, but he too was executed by the Soviets.

Volodymyr Sosiura exhibited some neoclassical elements

in his poetry. No doubt he was a great talent, but his submission to the pressure of Soviet socialist-realism hurt his literary output. While remaining a "proletarian poet," he at times expressed some Ukrainian patriotic thoughts, for which he was reprimanded several times by Soviet official circles. Most notable for this is his poem *Lubit Ukrainu* ("Love Ukraine"), but there are various others, which appear in his numerous collections, such as *Mazepa* and *Taras Trissylo.*

Yurií Yanovsky, Hryhorii Kosynka, Mykhailo Ivchenko, Mykola Khvylovyi, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, Arkadii Lubchenko, and many others developed Ukrainian prose in the postwar years. Yanovsky showed a great talent in his short stories and novels, such as *Maister korabla* ("Ship's Master"), and *Chotyry shabli* ("Four Sabers"). In some of them he told the sad story of the Soviet citizen. Kosynka was an outstanding novelist of the 1920's, but by describing the terrible plight of the Ukrainian peasant under the Soviets, he antagonized the authorities. He was eventually shot with two other writers, Vlyzko and Falkivsky. His works were idealistic, deep and original. Mykola Khvylovyi was one of the most outstanding talents among the writers of that era. He started with poetry but soon switched to prose, and published collections of short stories, such as *Syni etiudy* ("Blue Etudes") and *Osin* ("Autumn"), and a novel, *Valdshnepy.* At first a convinced Communist and even a traitor to his own people, he later on demanded that Ukraine break with Moscow. As a result of this psychological conflict, Khvylovyi committed suicide. Antonenko-Davydovych also antagonized Soviet authorities, and disappeared in 1933. Lubchenko was an "active" romanticist. Yuril Smolych pioneered with Ukrainian detective stories.

Mykola Kulish brought Ukrainian dramatic writing to new heights. He was a very prolific writer and produced many outstanding dramas—such as *Komuna v stepakh* ("Communism in the Steppes"), *Narodnii Malakhii* ("People's Mala-

chius") and *Patetychna sonata* ("Pathetic Sonata")—featured by mastery of dialogue, intelligent wit, and originality. As a Ukrainian patriot, he was exiled by the Russians.

This is but a brief account of literary creation in Ukraine in those unhappy days. Nevertheless, the literary picture of the country would not be complete without discussing what was produced in Western Ukraine and abroad. The enchanting novels and poetic works of the independence struggle of the 1920's—represented by Lev Lepkyi, Mykhailo Haivoronsky, Roman Kupchynsky, and many others—must here be mentioned. Kupchynsky's three-part novel, *Zametil* ("Blizzard"), was particularly loved by its readers. Fedir Dutko was rather weak as a writer, but prolific. Outstanding talent was displayed by Ulas Samchuk in his novels *Volyn* ("Volhinia"), *Ost, Choho ne hoit vohon* ("What Cannot Be Cured by Fire"), and others.

Writers and poets concentrated in Lviv, Warsaw, and Prague. Oles Babii, Bohdan Antonych, Bohdan Kravtsiv, Yevhen Malaniuk, Yuril Lypa, Olena Teliha, and Oleh Olzhych were particularly famous and important in modern literature. But there were others including such prose writers as Halyna Zhurba, Iryna Vilde, Daria Yaroslavska, and Yurii Kosach. Antonych published several collections of poetry, such as *Pryvitannia zhyttia* ("Welcome to Life"), *Try persteni* ("Three Rings"), and *Rotatsii* ("Rotations"), characterized by strength of expression and original creativity. Malaniuk, Kravtsiv, and Lypa used their talents to advance Ukrainian national ideology in many collections of poetry which were artistically done, well constructed, and moving. Malaniuk was called "the emperor of the iron verses." Lypa was also a talented author of works in the area of political thought, such as *Ukraine's Destiny*.

Olena Teliha and Oleh Olzhych were members of the OUN organization and fought for Ukraine's independence with poetic words as well as with active revolutionary measures.

Both left beautiful collections of poetry, such as Teliha's *Dusha na storozhi* ("A Soul on Guard") and Olzhych's *Vezhi* ("Towers"), which had considerable artistic value.

After the Second World War, in the diaspora some of those poets and writers continued their literary activities, while a new generation of literary figures joined the ranks. These included Ostap Tarnavsky, Leonid Poltava, Vasyl Barka, Leonid Mosendz, and many others. Several literary groups were formed: the *Visnyk* group, around the nationalist publicist D. Dontsov; the *My* group, which published a journal; the *Novi Shliakhy* group of pro-Soviet orientation; and the *Nazustrich* group, which also published a journal. In New York a group of poets followed modernistic trends.

Ukrainian prose in the Free World diaspora was ably represented by Ivan Bahrianyi's outstanding novels *Hetsemanskyi Sad* ("Gethsemane Garden") and *Tyhrolovy* ("The Tiger-Hunters"), Dokia Humena's novel *Dity chumatskoho shlakhu* ("The Children of the Chumak Trail"), and other works. In the Ukrainian SSR, Oles Honchar acquired fame with his novels, in particular *Sobor* ("The Cathedral").

Humorous-satirical writing in Ukraine and abroad was represented by Ostap Vyshnia, Roman Kupchynsky, Ivan Kernytsky, and Mykola Ponedilok.

Literary critics were ably represented by two generations of scholars. The older one included M. Hrushevsky, O. Hrushevsky, S. Yefremov, M. Zerov, and A. Nikovsky; the younger one included D. Dontsov, O. Hrytsai, M. Rudnytsky, Y. Shevelov, M. Ostroverkha, L. Lutsiv, B. Romanenchuk, and others. The leading literary journals were: *The Literary-Scholarly Herald* (1922-1939), the journal *My* (1934-1939), *Postup* (1921-1930), *Dzvony* (1930-1939), and *Nazustrich* (1934-1939). In the Soviet Union such journals did not enjoy freedom and were forced to be subservient to Moscow's will.[12]

MUSIC AND THEATER. Both arts fluctuated in output because of manifold developments which facilitated and retarded the Ukrainian cultural process in the turbulent post-war years. The periods of national independence and of "Ukrainianization" in the 1920s resulted in an impressive growth of these arts. But the official Soviet artistic policy, socialist realism, which demanded constant praise of socialist and Communist achievements and exposure and condemnation of whatever was opposed, capitalism and nationalism particularly, put all arts in bondage and under intolerable pressure, and cheapened and impoverished the artistic life of the captive, non-Russian nationalities. Russian national artistic creations were certainly less affected by socialist realism. According to the doctrine, the arts were supposed to assist in the construction of socialism in the USSR and to grow only in that direction. Hence the doctrine paralyzed freedom in arts, making them only the tools of the Party and Government policies.

In the 1920s, Ukrainian traditions and national motifs still prevailed in music, and at the same time musicians and composers attempted to broaden the styles of composition and to develop instrumental music. The blending of national motifs with new musical elements, largely coming from the West, was achieved, for example, by L. Revutsky. Among other compositions, he wrote beautiful music to Shevchenko's and Tychna's poetic verses. His symphony *Es-Dur* was particularly famous, and featured in a musical festival in 1927. V. Kosenko composed more lyrical music than Revutsky, particularly for violin and piano accompanied by orchestra. B. Latoshynsky became a master of instrumental music and achieved success while experimenting in modern styles. He composed operas, such as *Zolotyiobruch*, as well as music for piano and violin, and reached new heights in the choral music. M. Verykivsky and P. Kozitsky became famous as composers of ballet music, such as Verykivsky's *Pan Kaniovsky* and Kozitsky's *Poryv*, as well as other beautiful music,

such as *Requiem to Lysenko's Memory* and *Dyvnyi Flot.* They all belonged to the so-called "Kievan group," which jointly developed large-scale instrumental musical forms with the basic features of the Ukrainian folk song but enriched by individual styles of musical creation. This was in spite of pressure by the Soviets to standardize music according to the socialist-realist pattern. The group was also joined by B. Yanovsky, who composed ballet music and operas, and V. Kostenko and O. Chyshko among others. They were all members of the Leontovych Musical Association, and remained faithful to the national musical traditions.

Nevertheless, in the early thirties socialist realism became absolutely dominant and freedom was totally denied to the artist, musician, poet, architect, painter, or sculptor. Various musical associations were liquidated and all composers and musicians were forced to join the Union of Soviet Musicians, an arm of the Party and government. The composers and musicians were to write and create the music the Party demanded according to Party standards to praise Communist society, Communist leaders, the Communist way of life, the Party, and the Soviet Government and to denounce freedom, individualism, and national patriotism (except Russian patriotism, of course). Odes, symphonies, ballads, and ballets were written to glorify Lenin and Stalin particularly. Musical compositions became standardized and boring. At the same time the Government demanded the elimination of Ukrainian national musical elements and motifs. Ukrainian music was supposed to imitate Russian music, and any artistic contacts with the West were excluded. Modern Western trends, motifs, and styles were forbidden, and Western music was scorned as a product of "rotten capitalism." However, the early Twenties were marked by a relative freedom, and M. Hrinchenko was able to produce his *History of Ukrainian Music*, the first attempt to survey the historical development of Ukrainian musical creations.[13]

During and after the Second World War a kind of a limited rebirth of Ukrainian music followed, although the pressure of socialist realism continued. A little freedom was allowed to gain Ukrainians' support for the "great fatherland's war." In the compositions of L. Hrabovsky, L. Kolodub, V. Sylvestriv, and M. Skoryk, one may find new trends, new ways of expression, and even the use of dodecophony. P. Maiboroda wrote beautiful songs, such as the very touching and very popular *Rushnychok* ("The Embroidered Towel"), which had a national motif, while V. Ivasiuk reintroduced national musical elements coupled with modern musical techniques and forms. For that he was eventually liquidated by the KGB. For years his grave was decorated with flowers.

Meanwhile, in Western Ukraine, with its musical center in the city of Lviv (the Lviv group), as well as abroad, Ukrainian musical composition reached new heights. In Lviv, the Lysenko Musical Association assembled Ukrainian musical talents. S. Ludkevych was the outstanding member of the group. He created grand compositions, such as *Caucasus*, to Shevchenko's poem and *Kaminiar* ("Stonebreaker"), to Franko's celebrated verses, both full of national musical motifs combined with traditional Ukrainian choral song. B. Barvinsky wrote music for orchestra following the same musical tradition. A. Rudnytsky composed the opera *Dniprelstan*, and later on, in the United States, *Anna Yaroslavna*, an historical opera about a French queen of Ukrainian descent. Z. Lysko and M. Kolessa looked for new forms in musical composition. After the annexation of Western Ukraine to the USSR, the same socialist realism was imposed on Western Ukrainian composition. A few Ukrainian musicians abroad tried to continue true Ukrainian musical creation, and they even organized an Association of Ukrainian Musicians.

Famous singers of that time included S. Krushelnytska, soprano; M. Mentsinsky, tenor; O. Myshuha, tenor; I. Malaniuk, mezzo-soprano; O. Rusnak-Gerlakh; Z. Dolnytsky; and a

great many others. O. Koshyts was a famous conductor who with his choir traveled throughout the world. His concerts greatly popularized Ukrainian music and songs everywhere. All in all, Ukrainian musical art definitely made substantial progress in the twentieth century.[14]

No matter how curious it may sound, during the war and the revolution theater was very active in Ukraine. Normally, turbulent times of war are not conducive to the growth of arts. In 1916, the experimental Young Theater, under the direction of Les Kurbas, descendent of a family of artists, experimented with new techniques of and new approaches to acting. Each of his stagings of new plays soon became an important artistic event. His *Velykyi Lokh* ("A Great Cave") and *Oedipus Rex* were unforgettable experiences. In 1922, under Bolshevik control, Les Kurbas took over the directorship of the Berezil Theater, and most of the actors of the Young Theater moved there with him. In 1926, the Berezil Theater was transferred to Kharkiv, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR at that time. Unsurpassed artistic heights were achieved through the close cooperation of an ingenious director, Kurbas, with an equally ingenious young playwright, M. Kulish. These two continuously experimented, and theatrical techniques were improved. Productions of *Myna Mazailo* and *Narodnyi Malakhii*, by Kulish, and *Maty i Ya* ("Mother and Me"), by Khvylovyi, were landmarks in the history of Ukrainian theater.

There were, of course, other theaters in Ukraine at that time. The Ukrainian State Dramaturgical Theater, under the direction of O. Zaharov and V. Kryvetsky, specialized in staging plays of psychological realism. The State National Theater, under the direction of M. Saksehansky, had some very famous performers. The Kharkiv Dramatic Academic Theater of Opera and Ballet and Franko's Theater in Kiev, under the direction of H. Yura, at first staged all kinds of plays, but subsequently had to submit to the restraints of socialist realism. The theaters were forced to stage plays which reflected the process of industrialization, life on collective farms, the

social and economic achievements of the Soviet era, and praise of the Soviet leadership. The Kharkiv Red Factory Theater and the Odessa "Revolution" Theater reflected the trend. As a result, the art slowly began to decline. At the time there were several other smaller theaters, and road shows staging plays in provincial cities and towns, such as Chernihiv, Poltava, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporizha, Sumy, and elsewhere.

As long as it followed the official socialist realism, theatrical art was financed by the Government in the Ukrainian SSR as a tool of Communist propaganda. The playwrights, O. Korniichuk and I. Mykytenko served this policy well in the 1930s and early 1940s, while I. Dniprovsky at times tried to bring some expressionist plays into the Ukrainian theater, most notably *Yablunevyi polon* and *Lubov i dym*.[15]

In Western Ukraine theatrical art developed freely during the struggle for independence. Polish domination was not unbearable to theater, particularly in Galicia. In the city of Lviv, where the theatrical tradition was rather old, there was a National Theater, directed by O. Zaharov, who had moved there from Kiev. He staged mostly psychological and realistic plays. After a brief decline of the theater due to Zaharov's departure for Carpathian Ukraine, it recovered under the direction of a new theatrical star, V. Blavatsky, Kurbas's pupil from the Berezil. In addition, two road theatrical groups distinguished themselves, one directed by J. Stadnyk and the other by M. Bentsal. O. Zaharov and M. Sadovsky helped theatrical art to flourish in Carpathian Ukraine for a while. But due to the inadequacy of the financial backing, their efforts were short-lived. The *Letiucha Estrada*, under the direction of N. Chyrsky and based in the town of Khust, gained some importance as well. In Bukovyna Ukrainian theater did not reach any artistic prominance, but it played a rather important role in helping to preserve the Ukrainian national identity—against the wishes of the Romanian Government.

During the brief German occupation of the Western Ukrainian regions, an Opera Theater in Lviv succeeded in reaching a high artistic and professional level. It staged operas, operettas, plays, and ballets, ably directed and produced by the famous theatrical personality V. Blavatsky, as well as by J. Hirniak, also a pupil of Les Kurbas. Blavatsky and Hirniak continued the theatrical tradition, together with a score of artists, in the Ukrainian DP camps.

The "Great Exodus" of Ukrainians to avoid Soviet terror took the theater to Western Europe, and then to the North American continent. Augsburg was an early theatrical center, followed by Regensburg, in Bavaria, where the Ensemble of Ukrainian Actors was established under the leadership of Blavatsky. Hirniak settled in Landeck in Austria. In both places plays and operettas of a relatively high quality were staged. Then, in the early 1950s, both theatrical groups moved to the United States. Blavatsky's group settled in Philadelphia, and Hirniak's in New York. For a number of years the art flourished in both cities, though occasionally plays were staged in other centers of Ukrainian population. The Philadelphia group was reorganized after Blavatsky's death into a strictly recreational theater. In New York the theatrical studio was eventually directed by O. Dobrovolsky. In the 1970s two volumes of collected works entitled *Nash Teater* ("Our Theater") were published, proving the deep affection of the Ukrainian people for the art.[16]

ARCHITECTURE. As has been indicated before, in general architecture declined visibly in the middle of the nineteenth century, particularly in Ukraine. At that time no particular professional or artistic centers existed and there was no financial backing for the development of Ukrainian architectural styles in wood or stone. Coincidentally, before the First World War, two Russian architects, G. Lukomskii and P. Alioshin, asserted that Cossack Baroque was a truly Ukrain-

ian architectural style and they began to propagate a resurgence of the style, particularly in Kiev. They initiated several new projects, such as the Kievan railroad station and the Kievan Land Administration building among others.

Yet the real champion of the true Ukrainian architectural style was V. Krychevsky. He was soon supported enthusiastically by Ukrainian students of the College of Civil Engineering in St. Petersburg, chaired at that time by S. Tymoshenko. Subsequently, S. Tymoshenko and D. Diachenko attempted to combine folk architecture with the Cossack Baroque in architectural projects in such places as Lubni, Poltava, and Kamianets Podilsky. During the era of Ukrainian national independence, the Association of Ukrainian Architects and the Ukrainian Architectural Institute in Kiev worked on the development of national architecture. Yet, in 1924 the Soviets merged these two institutions into the Ukrainian Institute of Architecture and put it under the Party's control. This largely terminated further work in this direction, although the attempt to promote genuine national architecture continued throughout the 1920s. It was represented by P. Holovchenko, R. Kramer, K. Kunytsia, and others, who designed worker's settlements, clubs, theaters, museums, and administrative buildings. However, in the 1930s centralized architectural planning was introduced by Soviet authorities. Freedom of artistic creativity was curtailed. So-called Functional Constructivism in steel and concrete—huge structures of simple and straight lines, with flat roofs, terraces, and balconies, without any decorations and ornamentation—became the norm under the impact of Western European architectural trends. The State Trust Building in Kharkiv (erected in 1925), the Kievan District Power Plant (1926), the Kievan railroad station, the State Planning Building in Kharkiv (1923-30), the textile factory in Kremenchuk, and the structures of the Dniprelstan were leading examples of Constructivism. There was simply no connection between the Ukrainian architectural tradition, which

stressed beauty and spirit, and the constructivism, which underscored grandeur and function and avoided art.

A little later, with the return of Russian chauvinism, the Soviets, who had also constrained architecture with socialist realism reintroduced Eclecticism. It was featured, as pointed out before, by a sometimes effective and sometimes unfortunate blending together of various styles—Classicism, Renaissance, Baroque, and Constructivist styles—giving an impression of grandeur. The approach was forced upon Ukrainian architects. Eclecticism was exemplified by such structures as the Building of the Council of People's Ministers, the Building of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, and the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and of the Ukrainian Military District, all in Kiev. A feeble attempt was made by O. Tatsii, I. Ivanchenko, and a few others to return to traditional Ukrainian national architecture, without much effect.

The German invasion of Ukrainian territories resulted in a massive destruction and demolition of some of the most beautiful monuments of the old Ukrainian architecture. After the war the Academy of Architecture with some well-known architects such as V. Zabolotnyi, undertook some reconstruction work in various parts of Ukraine. Some old wooden churches had some novelties added, as in the case of the Cossack cathedral in Novoselytsia on the Samara River.[17] After the Second World War the Soviet overlords continued to impose upon Ukraine huge, heavy structures with Eclectic and Constructivist patterns, at times resembling Western structures, such as the Sport Palace in Kiev, the hotel in Kaniv, and the Lviv Polytechnical Institute or the Hotel "Dnipro" in Kiev. They were alien, however, to the Ukrainian tradition. M. Hrechyna, O. Zavarov, N. Mykula, and A. Dobrovolsky were among the leading architects at that time.

PAINTING AND CARVING. Impressionism became popular among Ukrainians in the early twentieth century. This new style of painting attempted to reflect all shades of colors in the way they change from one to another and to solve the problem of light and shadow. M. Bashkirtseva was probably the first to adopt impressionism. She was an outstanding artist, but was prevented by her early death from reaching the heights of creativity. O. Murashko left realism, adopted impressionism, and after a while became rather popular in the West. He tried successfully to free himself from Russian influence, as Yaniv has asserted. Many Ukrainian painters studied and followed Western artistic patterns. Soon a great Polish artist, Jan Stanislavski from the Cracow Academy of Arts, began to affect deeply the younger generation of Ukrainian artists. Painters such as M. Burachek, I. Trush, and V. Maslanykiv continued to paint beautiful impressionist landscapes in Stanislavski's tradition. Maslanykiv acquired the title "poet of Ukraine's steppes" as a result of his paintings.

O. Novakivsky became the most outstanding impressionist. He created with fervor and used symbolic interpretation. During the interwar period he succeeded in establishing his own school of painting in the city of Lviv and trained a number of outstanding younger painters. Old Ukrainian motifs in painting were reintroduced by V. Krychevsky and his brother Fedir, both of whom specialized in monumental painting in the spirit of national art. Having started with the old Byzantine patterns, M. Sosenko and P. Kholodnyi became famous, along with M. Boichuk, by creating their own styles, which combined the Byzantine patterns with Renaissance style and Modernism. Boichuk started his own school of monumental painting in Kiev, attempting in his own unique and interesting way to solve many artistic problems. He was followed by a score of artists.

In 1917, the Ukrainian Academy of Arts was founded by the Hetman Government in the capital of Kiev. It was an event of great significance. The Academy gathered in its walls such

masters of the art of painting as Krychevsky, Murashko, Y. Narbut, Burachek, and many others. It fully resurrected the tradition of national art, which continued within the framework of the Institute of Arts under Soviet rule, though not for long. In the late thirties the Soviet regime began to persecute the artists who promoted national art and did not follow the principles of socialist realism, branding them as "counter-revolutionary nationalists." Boichuk, his school, and his pupils were largely eliminated for cultivating their original styles. Many followed the path toward liquidation or oblivion. Socialist realism took over, and painting degenerated to photographic and pompous glorifications of socialism, the Party, and the Government, as with other arts. All artistic contacts with the West were interrupted on Moscow's order, and Ukrainian art was blended with that of Russia.

Fortunately for the Ukrainian tradition, however, in Western Ukraine, where political conditions were more bearable, painting in a freer atmosphere to promote the national interest was resumed by a group of former Riflemen, such as O. Kurylas, Y. Butsmaniuk, L. Perfetsky, and others. Meanwhile, M. Osinchuk, Y. Muzyka, and V. Diadyniuk resurrected traditional church painting using slightly modernized Byzantine patterns. Some students of Novakivsky also acquired fame. Individual groups of Ukrainian artists were also working in Paris—such as A. Hryshchenko, whose marine landscapes made him famous abroad, and M. Hlushchenko—in Prague, such as I. Kulets and H. Mazepa—and in Warsaw, such as P. Kholodnyi, Jr., and P. Andrusiv. After the Second World War many of these artists came to the United States and continued their artistic creativity.

In 1947, a Union of Ukrainian Artists was founded in Munich, which greatly boosted the growth of the art. In the diaspora, in the Free World, a variety of artistic interests and styles developed. Realism in painting was represented by M. Krychevsky, M. Shramchenko, and O. Bulavytsky. Others, like M. Dmytrenko and M. Nedilko, combined realism with

impressionism. M. Moroz attempted in his pictures to express moods, feelings, and a harmony of colors. E. Kozak searched for a truly Ukrainian national style and became famous for cartoon drawing. Classical calm became evident in J. Hnizdovsky's works, while S. Borachok and M. Azovsky leaned again toward impressionism. Although a tendency toward modernism in painting was evident among almost all artists in the Free World after the war—such as B. Bozhemsky, T. Wirsta, A. Olenska-Petryshyn, L. Hutsaliuk, and many others—the ultra-modernistic trends—such as cubism, futurism, and surrealism—were largely ignored by Ukrainian painters. There were also a few American-born Ukrainian artists of considerable talent, such as Y. Surmach-Mills and J. Gaboda. H. Mazepa and V. Lasovsky experimented in fantasy art. Some of these painters acquired world-wide fame, including Hryshchenko, Krychevsky, Hnizdovsky, and Hutsaliuk. Z. Onyshkevych was representative of the young generation of American-trained artists. Andrusiv has continued to produce monumental creations from the historical past of Ukraine in the United States.[18]

In the Ukrainian SSR and Poland an attempt was made by some Ukrainian painters to break out of socialist realism and pursue their individual interests and modernistic tendencies in the late 1960s and 1970s—for example, V. Patyk and A. Horska. Some of them paid with their lives for being Ukrainian and individualistic in the arts, most notably A. Horska. But the Soviets cruelly suppressed such "counterrevolutionarism." Those painters who submitted could not rise above mediocrity, as Hordynsky has asserted indirectly.[19]

Carving and sculpture also reached new heights in spite of the rather unfavorable political developments of the twentieth century, with such sculptors as F. Balavensky, M. Havrylko, M. Parashchuk, M. Brynsky, I. Severa. Balavensky was the foremost pioneer of modern Ukrainian carving and sculpture combining classical traditions with Ukrainian artistic elements in these fields. His busts of leading Ukrain-

ian personalities of social and cultural life were outstanding. Subsequently, a score of sculptors of the younger generation tried to connect Ukrainian motifs with modernism, looking at the same time for inspiration from abroad. M. Havrylko, who exhibited a great imagination, was soon liquidated by the Soviets, while I. Severa, a considerable talent, received no recognition at all under the Soviet rule. Two others, Parashchuk and Brynsky, created abroad. The former, in contrast to Havrylko, used a psychological approach to his heads of outstanding figures, while the latter sculpted monumental scenes of social unrest. When he returned to the USSR, Brynsky found no recognition there. J. Dindo carved monumental scenes of peasants and workers according to Soviet requirements.

O. Arkhypenko, who left Ukraine and pursued his experimental art abroad, acquired the greatest international acclaim of all. He connected sculpture with coloring in an unorthodox manner by creating imaginary figures and forms to reflect thoughts and feelings. He extensively used curves, convexes, bulges, and empty spaces, combining all kinds of materials in the same works, a technique which was once considered radical. K. Stakhovsky excelled in carving small statuettes of animals, using various materials. He succeeded in establishing his own school of carving in Prague and trained a number of sculptors who gained more recognition such as Y. Norman, O. Laturynska, and V. Masiutyn. S. Lytvynenko worked in Lviv and abroad. B. Mukhyn distinguished himself by imagination and temperament in his creations. M. Dzyndra and A. Pavlos must be mentioned as well. M. Chereshniovsky received recognition in America by carving the busts of outstanding Ukrainian political leaders and decorating some churches in the Ukrainian style. L. Molodozhanyn created Shevchenko's monument in Washington, D.C.

In the Ukrainian SSR sculpture declined under the pressure of socialist realism. The sculptors turned out endless depictions of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Gorkii, and bemedalled Soviet

generals, and all kinds of Soviet "heroes." Yet some Ukrainian sculptors in Ukraine are worth mentioning, such as M. Lysenko, A. Bilostotsky, and O. Suprun.[20]

Graphics, having been revived in the nineteenth century, developed greatly in the twentieth century. V. Krychevsky pioneered the modern revival of Ukrainian graphics, having been encouraged by M. Hrushevsky. Boichuk and his school continued to promote the art, while Y. Narbut raised it to new heights. He was famous before the First World War in Russia, but after his arrival in Kiev in 1917, he reached the full development of his exceptional talent by using Ukrainian folklore motifs in graphics. In fact, he started a new school of graphics, and was followed by M. Kyrnarsky, R. Lisovsky, and P. Kovzhun. Kovzhun particularly, as Narbut's student, was successful in inspiring a number of younger artists, such as S. Hordynsky, E. Kozak, M. Osinchuk, and Y. Muzyka, who achieved fame either in painting or graphics. P. Kholodnyi resumed the Kievan princely patterns in graphics, and was followed by M. Stefanovych. Boichuk's school also produced outstanding graphic artists, such as Boichuk's wife. S. Nalepynska-Boichuk, A. Ruban, and I. Padalka.

V. Kasian acquired recognition for his illustrations of literary works by Ukrainian writers and as the interpretor of pain and struggle. M. Masiutyn made beautiful portraits of Ukrainian Hetmans. N. Khasevych and M. Chereshniovsky reflected the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in their graphics. J. Hnizdovsky also acquired national fame. In the Ukrainian SSR there were artists who wanted to continue the old traditions, but they were soon silenced by the official pressure of socialist realism. Some of the more outstanding Soviet-Ukrainian artists were S. Karaffa-Korbut, H. Havrylenko, and V. Kuzmenko.[21]

OTHER ARTS. The Ukrainian people always have exhibited an inclination toward artistic endeavors, which is con-

firmed by the development of all kinds of folk arts, from ceramics to wood-carving to embroidering. Ceramics and peasant pottery continued according to the traditional Ukrainian patterns, in some counties and provinces to a greater extent than in others, though local deviations in style and pattern prevailed. Of course, Soviet "cultural" pressure forced the traditional national motifs to disappear to be replaced by socialist realism. Glass and porcelain, painting and decorating at first continued in the national spirit, but the Soviet propaganda campaign also destroyed true artistry in these pursuits. Wood-carving of ornament crosses, dishes, furniture, doors, door and window frames, and some household appliances, ornamented by painting and incrustation, continued in the West. The production of the *kylymy*, carpets for wall and floor decoration, strictly in the spirit of Ukrainian national art, flourished again, showing distinct local designs and patterns. Perhaps the mountainous Hutsul region was most famous in this regard. Yet the *kylymy* were also made in other regions as well. Embroidering continued as the most widely practiced folk art in individual households in towns and the countryside. Easter-egg painting, the most truly Ukrainian art, later imitated by other ethnic communities, was largely repressed by Soviet authorities. Making metallic objects for decorative purposes also continued. Nevertheless, Soviet official policies, which at first attempted to suppress all kinds of Ukrainian folk art, later tried to make all folk arts the tools of Soviet-Russian propaganda and permeated them with the Soviet "spirit." Obviously, the artistry of the folk art could only decline and degenerate.

However, the "Great Exodus" of Ukrainians to all parts of the world took all these Ukrainian folk arts to the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South America, and Western Europe. All these arts were popularized abroad, and were loved, cherished, and even practiced by younger generations which had been born far away from Ukraine and had never seen the land of their fathers and grandfathers.[22]

Notes

[1]I. Nahayevsky, *History of Ukraine*, Philadelphia, 1975, pp. 278-279, 309-310; also D. Doroshenko and O. Gerus, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, Winnipeg, 1975, 706-712.

[2]*Ibid.*, pp. 709-711; Nahayevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-279, 288-290, 299; H. Luzhnytsky, *Ukrainska tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom*, Philadelphia, 1954, pp. 582-586.

[3]*Ibid.*, pp. 549-557; Y. Fedoriv, *Istoria tserkvy v Ukraini*, Toronto, 1967, pp. 298-300; B. Bociurkiw, "The Orthodox Church in Ukraine since 1917," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 167-173.

[4]Luzhnytsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 591-609; Fedoriv, *op. cit.*, pp. 335-344; I. Korovytsky, "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Abroad," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 204-208; Nahayevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-312.

[5]Luzhnytsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 537-557; Nahayevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-281; V. Lentsyk, "The Greek Catholic Church in Western Ukraine," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 190-195; B. Bociurkiv, "The Uniat Church in the Soviet Ukraine," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, VII, 1965.

[6]The "Reunification Act": Fedoriv, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-317; Doroshenko and Gerus, *op. cit.*, pp. 767-769; Nahayevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-285.

[7]State of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine and in the Free World: Nahayevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-318; V. Lentsyk, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church Abroad," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 200-204; J. Teodorovych. "UKPTs v Australii i Novii Zelandii," *Ukraintsi v Australii*, Melbourne, 1966; J. Madey, "Church, history of the Ukrainian," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Toronto, 1984, Vol. I, pp. 472-485; V. Lentsyk, (W. Lencyk), "Ukrainian Rite," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, Washington, D.C., 1979, Vol. XVII, pp. 673-676; K.L. Woodward, R. Dallas, E. Salholz, "The Vatican's Hold on the Ukrainians," *Newsweek*, April 7, 1980, p. 95; George A. Maloney, S.J., "The Death of a Church," *Diakonia*, Vol. XV, 1980, pp. 103-107; D. O'Grady, "Ukrainian Synod Part of Tricky Vatican Balancing Act," *Our Sunday Visitor*, May, 1980; R.P. Moroziuk, *Politicized Ecumenism; Rome, Moscow, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church*, Montreal, Concordia University, 1984; R.P. Moroziuk, *Politics of a Church Union*, Montreal, Concordia University, 1983.

[8]L. Biletsky and I. Herasymovych, "Education and Schools; Ukrainian National Republic (UNR)"; K. Bezkrovnyi, "Western Ukrainian National Republic," both articles in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 341-343; S. Posternak, *Iz istorii osvitnoho rukhu na Ukraini za chasiv revolutsii 1917-1919*, Kiev, 1920.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY UKRAINE

The Ethnic Changes and the Ethnic Composition—The Bolshevik Takeover and the Formation of the New Social Structure—The "New Class"—Industrial Workers—Agricultural Workers—Intellectual Workers; the *Intelihentsia*—Forced-Labor Groups—The Social Structure outside the Ukrainian SSR

THE ETHNIC CHANGES AND THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION. The twentieth century brought about substantial changes in the extent of the Ukrainian ethnic territory and the ethnic composition of Ukraine in general. Between 1897 and 1926, according to the respective statistical studies, the Ukrainian ethnic stock considerably increased at the expense of the Russian and Jewish national minorities. This increase was especially great in the southern steppe belt and the sub-Caucasian Kuban regions. At the same time, however, the percentage of Russians in proportion to the total population increased in the Donets Basin and the Kursk and Voronizh border provinces. This increase was due to southward pressure from the Russian ethnic stock, which wished to come closer to the "breadbasket" of Europe, the fertile Ukrainian soil. From 1926 until 1938, the Ukrainian ethnic stock continued to grow

in the Ukrainian SSR overall from 76.7 to 80.9 percent of the population. In the urban regions it grew from 32.5 to 46.2 percent, and in the countryside from 83.0 to 86.1 percent. The percentage of Russians declined in these years from 10.0 to 8.4. The Jewish minority declined from 8.4 to 5.6 percent. Some minor changes took place with respect to other ethnic minorities: the Poles, Romanians, Byeloruthenians, Hungarians, and Greeks. The percentage of Poles, for example, increased, while that of the Byeloruthenians decreased.[1]

The subsequent years saw harsh Soviet-Russian repression in the Ukraine. These included mass executions of Ukrainian patriots branded as bourgeois nationalists, mass deportations to supply a cheap labor force for the polar regions of the Soviet Union, and of course the Moscow-made famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933. It was arranged by the Kremlin to weaken the resistance of the Ukrainian peasantry against forced agricultural collectivization and to reduce the Ukrainian ethnic stock opposed to Russian-Communist domination. As a result, the percentage of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR substantially declined. This meant, of course, that the percentages of Russians and foreigners increased, as planned by Soviet authorities. The losses of Ukrainians as a consequence of these measures were staggering. As a result of the man-made famine over seven million Ukrainians died of starvation. Executions and deportations from the late thirties through the sixties added millions of human lives to those losses. The Second World War added even more.

Ruskin examined the problem and came to the following conclusion: "The changes in the population of Ukraine have been so great that we can hardly view them in their entirety. Physical extermination in some districts and areas has been widespread.... the replacement of Ukrainians by Russians has been sometimes on such a huge scale that we cannot say with accuracy how they have changed the ethnographic picture of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic."[2] In any case, according to the *Völkerkarte der Sowjetunion*, in 1926 there

were approximately 77.7 million Russians and 31.2 million Ukrainians in the USSR. In 1939, the number of Russians increased to 99 million and the number of Ukrainians decreased to 28 million. This certainly showed how the Kremlin had applied its policy of extermination in Ukraine to support the quantitative majority of Russians in the Soviet Union. Between 1917 and 1941 some 39 million Ukrainians were the victims of Russian-inspired genocide, if we assume on the average a normal 2 percent increase of population in the Ukrainian SSR in those years.[3] All these developments substantially changed the composition of the population of Ukraine. While in 1938 Ukrainians constituted approximately 80.8 percent and Russians 8.4 percent of the Ukrainian SSR's total population, in 1959 Ukrainians constituted only 76.8 and Russians 16.9 percent, according to official Soviet statistics. The real percentage loss might well have been much greater.[4]

The percentage of Russians increased for two other reasons: (a) because of heavy government-sponsored migration of Russians to the south to strengthen the Russian political grip there, (b) because of intense Russianization policies which weakened the Ukrainian ethnic stock. In the Kuban region the percentage of Russians grew even faster. The Jewish minority declined drastically due to the German genocide during the Second World War. It continued to decrease subsequently because of Russian-sponsored anti-Semitism in Ukraine. In the post-war years the Soviet Government, in its intemperate drive to create a supposedly monolithic "Soviet people," promoted a heavy influx of other nationalities into Ukraine. This "Soviet people" would unconditionally accept Russian language and Russian culture, and become in all things Russian. Creating an ethnic mixture was a precondition for the future formation of the "Soviet people." The Don Cossacks, Poles, Germans, Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Armenians, and Byeloruthenians had for centuries, as already pointed out, lived in Ukraine. The percentages of the respective ethnic groups had varied, of course, either increasing

or decreasing. But Soviet policies brought growing numbers of Kalmyks, Khazaks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Azerbeidzhanians, Gruzians, and other ethnic elements into Ukraine to affect the ethnic composition of the land.[5]

In the east and southeast, the Ukrainian ethnic territory was steadily shrinking. Its ethnic border was slowly but continually pushed westward under the powerful pressure of Moscow. In particular, the Kursk, Voronizh, and most eastern and southeastern parts of Village Ukraine, the Donets Basin, and the Kuban province were becoming progressively ethnically Russian. History was actually repeating itself. Centuries ago, these territories had been deserted by Ukrainians under the pressure of the Asiatic nomad conquerors. They had resettled them, however, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Another significant change in the ethnic composition was induced by the heavy urbanization of Ukraine as a result of the Soviet obsession with industrialization. The Soviet leadership was convinced that rapid industrialization would lead to a huge industrial "proletariat," the standard-bearer of Communism, and promote the economic growth of the USSR and its greater military power. Subsequently, that power would promote Communism in the whole world. In other words, industrialization was essential for Russian domination everywhere. Ukraine was, of course, a part of the plan. The following statistical table should clearly illustrate the urbanization process in the Ukrainian SSR:[6]

Population (percentages)	1913	1940	1960	1980
Urban	19.3	33.4	46.4	63.0
Countryside	80.7	66.6	53.6	37.0

The process had certain characteristics. First of all, in the cities and towns there was the heaviest concentration of

Russian ethnic stock, up to 30 percent, which indicated the growing Russian dominance in industrial-urban districts. Secondly, the urbanization process in the Russian USSR was even heavier than in Ukraine. By 1960, 52 percent of the population there was urbanized. This meant that the traditional policy of Moscow to keep Ukraine an agricultural colony of the Russian Empire and to make Russia itself an industrial giant was continuing. Moscow tried a most plausible compromise: to advance industrialization in Ukraine without losing her as a "breadbasket" of the USSR. As a matter of fact, about 81 percent of the entire Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine was a privileged and ruling class living in cities and towns. The countryside was left largely to the Ukrainian "peasant folk." Less than six percent of the Russian minority lived in the villages in 1980. In most cases they occupied commanding positions in the agricultural economy of the land.[7]

In Western Ukraine, which was under Polish, Czech, and Romanian occupations, the Ukrainian ethnic territory was also somewhat reduced. At the same time the percentages of those respective ethnic minorities in the compact Ukrainian regions increased. This increase was due to settlement policies of the occupation governments, especially Polish and Romanian denationalization drives which sought to make the Ukrainian territories Polish or Romanian. But many Soviet, Polish, and Romanian statistics were fabricated to make ethnic composition seem more favorable for the occupation governments. At times Ukrainian ethnic losses were not as bad as were indicated by official statistics. For example, in order to weaken the Ukrainian ethnic strength under its rule, at least on *paper*, the Polish Government introduced in its official statistics a non-existent differentiation among Ukrainians, Ruthenians, and so-called "natives" (*tuteshni*). But they all, in reality, belonged to one Ukrainian ethnic stock.

Yet, because of official religious persecution, denationali-

zation measures, and the mass importation of Polish colonists to West Ukraine, the western ethnic border was pushed somewhat eastward. Then the Polish Government eliminated large land properties, dividing them into medium- and small-sized farms, and brought Polish settlers to Galicia. The Ukrainian peasant, however, was not allowed to acquire that land. In Western Ukraine, under the Polish domination between 1910 and 1938, the percentage of Poles increased from 23.1 to 25.0, while the Jewish minority decreased from 12.3 to 9.8 percent.

Ukrainian ethnic losses were largest in the Pidlasha, Kholm, Bukovyna, Bessarabia, Village Ukraine, Don Basin, Black Sea steppe, and Kuban regions, where in fact the influx of foreign elements was substantial. Furthermore, because of deplorable living conditions under foreign rule, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians left the homeland and emigrated—to the U.S., Canada, Brazil, and Argentina in particular.[8]

THE BOLSHEVIK TAKEOVER AND THE FORMATION OF THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE. The old social structure prevailed in Ukraine during the first part of the twentieth century, until the revolutions which followed in the wake of the First World War and brought about the collapse of the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Ukrainian National Revolution led to the formation of the Central Rada and its strong socialist leanings. In addition, the revolution introduced some temporary social changes. The upper classes—the courtiers or *dvoriany*, landowners, capitalists, and other wealthy segments—were particularly weakened in the drive toward egalitarianism with respect to their legal and social standing and economic well-being. Their property rights, especially on land, were overridden or taken away from them, at least in theory, by acts like the 1918 Agricultural Reform Act of the Central Rada. At times

property rights were curtailed in actuality. The rich were discriminated against to some extent politically.

The National Revolution was definitely intended to raise the social, legal, and economic status of the working and peasant classes. The position of the educated people, the *intelihentsia*, was at least theoretically lowered, and the class was referred to as the working *intelihentsia*. The type of work performed was supposed to determine social status, but efforts were definitely aimed at establishing social equality sometime in the future. This was to be reached gradually.

At the time of the Hetmanate, however, the trend was reversed and again social differentiation was stressed by elevating the status of the landowners and capitalists. An attempt was made legally to create a new aristocratic class of "Cossacks" reminiscent of the historical Cossack-Hetman state. The lower classes were supposed to take their place. The return of the socialists to power under the Directorate cancelled the Hetman policies and egalitarian social trends were reintroduced. Aristocrats were denied political representation in the Labor Congress—a kind of temporary constituent assembly held in Kiev in January 1918, which has been mentioned before. The bourgeoisie, the traditional class of "exploiters," was also not worthy of political representation. According to the Marxist view, it was supposed to be destroyed.

The basic tendencies of social reconstruction in the Ukrainian National Republic were clearly visible. It is quite difficult to foretell how far it would have progressed if Ukrainian national independence had been preserved. It would be reasonable, however, on the basis of the typical Ukrainian preference for moderation, to assume that the early Marxist egalitarianism would have eventually been weakened and a balanced transition toward a Western-style social equality would have prevailed. Nevertheless, the elevated status of the *dvoriany* and capitalists would have certainly disappeared. It would have been a social reconstruction of Ukrainian making.[9]

With the domination of Ukraine by the Russian Bolsheviks,

however, a radical twist was added to the changing social structure. A radical Marxist element was introduced. The old social structure was ruthlessly and completely destroyed, supposedly in the name of social justice and equality. The aristocratic *dvoriany* and the capitalists were annihilated and completely disappeared. Ownership of land was totally taken over by the state. The upper bourgeoisie—capitalists, industrialists, financiers, and large-scale entrepreneurs—was eliminated. At the same time the state totally or partially nationalized various segments of the economy. Riasanovsky described that social and economic revolutionary process very well.[10] The middle and lower levels of bourgeoisie—small businessmen, shopkeepers, craftsmen, and land-possessing peasantry—were put under pressure, discriminated against, and badly weakened socially and economically. Although they tried, as Riasanovsky pointed out, "to make a comeback during the NEP era," they finally disappeared as a class during the planning eras beginning in the early 1930s. The clergy and religious, nuns and monks particularly, were denied all rights, persecuted, subject to wholesale murder, and ultimately annihilated as a group. The educated people, the *intelihentsia*, the so-called middle class, was the class with the most opposition to the new Bolshevik regime. Hence it was also destroyed to a large extent. The children of parents from discriminated social segments were also discriminated against. They were denied access to education and career opportunities.

On the other hand, the industrial worker was looked upon as the standard-bearer of the Communist movement. He was favored and socially elevated, even though theoretically Lenin's Bolshevik regime proclaimed a Marxist principle of equality for everyone. At the same time as the old social system was being subjected to a rapid destruction in the name of building a Marxian "classless" society, a new social stratification, based on sharp class distinctions, gradually began forming. It took distinct shape long before the Second World War, and continued to crystallize in the 1950s and

1960s. It is not yet completed but the new social structure, Russian in nature, in the Ukrainian SSR is currently quite apparent. In 1969, during a meeting celebrating the fifty-second anniversary of the Communist Revolution, Podgorny, one of the Soviet chiefs at that time, while referring to the so-called Model Collective Farm Statute, pointed out that agricultural workers already had become a separate "socialist"class distinct from industrial workers. From the point of view of the pure Marxist doctrine it was definitely a major ideological heresy, yet it was sanctioned by the Communist Party and Communist leadership. From the practical point of view the development was a bitter paradox, on the one hand, and a flat denial of the basic pretenses of Marxism, on the other.[11]

In 1956 Milovan Djilas, a Yugoslavian Marxist, published *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*. He fully exposed the hypocrisy of the so-called "classless" society of Marxism, and particularly the abusive "New Class," a breed of Communist "aristocracy." For that he paid dearly.[12] The work proved beyond any doubt that the idea or the concept of a "classless" society is simply a mirage and that no Communist country, whether it be Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, or any other, has made any progress toward that ideal. In the 1970s, Inkeles made an attempt to identify the new social structure in the Soviet Union—and of course in Ukraine, its colonial possession. The social stratification had become a very elaborate one.

Essentially three main classes may be differentiated in the USSR; the *intelihentsia* or educated salaried workers referred to as the *trudova intelihentsia*, industrial workers, and agricultural workers. Yet within each class there has been further differentiation, as follows:

I. Working *intelihentsia*:
   a. The ruling elite: a rather small segment consisting of top Party, Government, military, and economic offi-

cials, and prominent scientists, artists, poets, writers, and so on, referred to as the *nomenklatura*.

b. The superior *intelihentsia*: composed of the intermediary ranks of the above categories, including important technical specialists.

c. The general *intelihentsia*: composed of the professional segments, the middle ranks of the bureaucracy, managers of middle- and small-sized enterprises, technicians, and junior officers.

d. The white-collar group: consisting of petty bureaucrats, accountants, clerks, and office workers.

II. Industrial workers:

a. The working-class "aristocracy": comprising the most skilled and productive workers, in particular a large number of the so-called Stakhanov workers, the most productive piece-work laborers.

b. The rank-and-file workers of lesser skills and productivity, who earn slightly more or less than the average wage rates.

c. The disadvantaged workers of low skill and low productivity, who earn close to minimum subsistence wages.

d. The workers in the corrective labor camps or concentration camps who have the status of state slaves.

III. Agricultural workers:

a. The well-to-do workers, consisting of those particularly advantaged by virtue of location or land fertility, living on relatively prosperous state or collective farms, or those whose skills of trade or productivity enable them to attain the higher income brackets.

b. The average agricultural workers, who are less productive or less fortunate, who work on poorer lands or lands disadvantageously located, earn considerably less.

The social and economic positions of individual groups and sub-groups, however, did not necessarily follow these classifications strictly. Rather, they overlapped across the main social stratifications. Inkeles indicated that a more proper gradation of social status and economic well-being would be as follows: 1) ruling elite, 2) superior *intelihentsia*, 3) general *intelihentsia*, 4) working-class "aristocracy," 5) white-collar workers, 6) well-to-do agricultural workers, 7) average rank-and-file industrial workers, 8) average agricultural workers, 9) disadvantaged industrial workers, and 10) corrective or labor camp workers.[13]

While the new Soviet social stratification is essentially economic and functional in its nature, giving different social status to individual strata, a cultural element is involved in the process as well. In the sixties and seventies mental work was already rated more highly than manual work in the Soviet Union.

Class mobility, the transition from one class to another, upward or downward, was still considerable. Nevertheless, students agreed that forces leading to the intensification and precision of the lines of social division, and to the formalization and institutionalization of social differences, were continuously growing. They became so important that, in the late forties and fifties, the recognition and award for special and outstanding services to the State and the Party were differentiated, not only according to the respective contribution, but also according to the social standing and status of the individual who rendered the service. Hence, much higher awards, going into thousands of rubles, were normally given to the members of the upper levels of the Communist aristocracy, the "New Class," while much smaller awards were given to average citizens. Enormously large grants and very substantial gratuities were given to widows, heirs, and other members of families of prominent Soviet officials, scientists, and artists, compared to those given to the members of the lesser social ranks. Soon social status was also identified with

uniforms, insignia of rank, power, prestige, and income. This further added to the social stratification. Furthermore, the old Tsarist system of *chyny*, the civil-service ranks, was reintroduced by the Soviets. This system once was held by the Bolsheviks to be a symbol of discrimination and exploitation. Consequently, its reintroduction made a mockery of the Marxist pretense at egalitarianism.[14]

Subsequently, the tax system of the USSR was adjusted to favor the higher brackets of the society and its social ranks by becoming substantially regressive. This enabled the members of the "New Class" to accumulate huge fortunes for themselves, making it possible for them to live in beautiful homes in rich, exclusive neighborhoods and to enjoy various luxuries of life. Average citizens continued to suffer inadequate living facilities and frequent shortages of necessities.

In particular, as Ikeles had indicated, after the Second World War certain forces were set in motion to advance a closed class system. First, restrictions on access to educational opportunities were imposed by discriminating against the less advantaged. Second, the inheritance tax was reshaped in such a way as to preserve the social status of the "New Class." Third, access to certain positions and status was made dependent, in practice, upon birth. For example, admittance to certain military schools was reserved for the children of high officers, and important managerial positions were given to the graduates of particular schools. Fourth, certain legal and administrative measures were undertaken to strengthen the Soviet family. Fifth, social stratifications were intensified by unequal allocation of "scarce goods." The upper-class people could shop in different stores, get high-quality goods at high prices, and be admitted to exclusive restaurants and hotels not available to the common folk.[15] All those things made the social structure of the Soviet Union, including the Ukrainian SSR, much more discriminatory than in America or the West in general. The whole system is, of course, of Russian making and has been forced upon Ukraine.

A great deal of race, nationality, and sex discrimination has also been practiced in the USSR. This became much worse in the 1970s and 1980s, during which the growing Russianization drive to create a so-called "Soviet people," a national monolith that was thoroughly Russian, took place. No non-Russian patriot—Ukrainian, Armenian, Gruzian, Byeloruthenian, Lithuanian, or Estonian—could be a member of the ruling elite or the superior *intelihentsia*. He might be tolerated for a time as a member of a lower social stratum. Yet, if a non-Russian were too active, he could not even remain a member of his own social class for long. He would be demoted, or preferably sent to a concentration camp and turned into a state slave. Only a Russian or a thoroughly Russianized individual of non-Russian descent, a slave-like non-Russian loyal to the Russian cause, could be recognized as a full-fledged member of the "New Class," the Soviet ruling elite or aristocracy, or any other higher social class.

Women have never received equal rights in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Constitution, however, and the constitutions of individual Union republics and other documents and statements of leading Soviet personalities have many times claimed the contrary. At first, immediately after the Bolshevik takeover, women really made progress in the acquisition of equal rights with men in political, social, and economic respects. Many women, for example, were elevated to leading Soviet Government and Party bodies, such as Supreme Soviets and Party Committees and Congresses. But, as time progressed, the position of women worsened in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. In the 1970s women were scarcely to be found among top Government, Party, and economic (managerial) officials. The leading positions of top and middle administration and management were occupied largely by men. Of course, educational opportunities were available to women. Professional positions were open to women; some seventy-five percent of all medical doctors were women. But even then, men occupied commanding posts in the medical

profession. Women worked everywhere during the postwar years—in agriculture, commerce, industry, transportation and communication, administration and other fields—and their responsibilities grew. Yet they were always in subordinate positions. Clearly, the Bolsheviks have failed to deliver what they promised for women. The woman in the Ukrainian SSR has been loaded with many more duties, but she has failed to acquire more rights.[16]

THE "NEW CLASS." The "New Class" constitutes the Soviet aristocracy. In a narrower sense it would consist of only the ruling elite, a small circle of top Government, Party, military, and economic officials, prominent scientists, artists, and writers. In a broader sense, it might also include the superior *intelihentsia*, composed of the intermediary ranks of these segments and leading technical specialists. Of course, only Russians and those subservient to the Russian political cause, non-Russian minority members, and renegade Ukrainians belonged to the "Communist elite." A Ukrainian patriot, branded immediately as a "bourgeois nationalist," would never be admitted to the closed circle, or would be immediately expelled if so identified. This group is entrusted with preserving and enlarging the Russian Empire under the misleading name of the Soviet Union. Its members are distinguished by uniforms, insignia, status, wealth, privileges, and exaggerated pomp. They are mildly punished for common criminal offenses. The only unforgivable offense is political disloyalty to the Russian imperialist cause.

The "New Class," in uniforms and insignia and pomp, in the late 1970s looked quite different from Lenin and his comrades, clothed in shabby and worn-out trenchcoats at the time of the October Revolution, as Riasanovsky underscored. The change was staggering in the so-called country of "workers and peasants." "Equality" has been spelled out in the constitution there but completely forgotten in real life.

The ruling clique in the seventies constituted some fifteen percent of the total population. This portion of people definitely enjoyed more privileges than any upper social class in the so-called "capitalistic" West, including long vacations, exclusive neighborhoods, stores, hotels, and excessively high salaries—all more dramatically differentiated than in Western countries. The development of the "New Class" had been already initiated in the 1930s, but was intensified after the Second World War. This indicated a complete break between Marxist theory and Soviet reality, similar to the complete break between the theoretical or "constitutional" government structure and the real ruling body, the Politburo. Everything in the Soviet Union has been based on fundamental insincerity.

On the other hand, as opposed to earlier times when divorces were easy and abortions legal, family ties have been strengthened, marriages safeguarded, and class discipline promoted, to perpetuate the "New Class" as the standard-bearer of the Soviet-Russian Empire. The Empire is fragile otherwise, holding together many races, ethnic groups, nationalities, and one hundred and thirty languages and dialects, all marked by strong centrifugal tendencies. The ruling elite is considered the force that will eventually suppress all opposition and preserve the Empire. It has been identified with Russian chauvinism and imperialism. In order to receive its unqualified loyalty and support, the "New Class" has been showered with benefits and privileges at the very expense of lower social segments, which are used only as building materials for the State.

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS. That the industrial workers, in particular the Russian and the Russianized ones, were the standard-bearers of the Communist revolution, is a well-known fact, particularly since they seem to have gained by its success. The Communist Party and the Government support industrial workers as a class. They are considered the most

important component for the ultimate victory of Communism, as Karl Marx and Nikolai Lenin pointed out in their writings and speeches.

Hence, the industrial worker, rather disadvantaged under the Tsarist regime, was able to climb up the social ladder, becoming in many instances an important functionary in the Party, Government, army, navy, or other areas and assuming leading positions in industry, state and collective farms, cooperatives, and market distribution. Then, after being trained in modern technology, he could continue to move upward on the social ladder of the so-called socialist society. Social mobility, the transition from one class to another, was readily apparent. Frequently leading personalities in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR have been former workers. Of course, the entire class of the "industrial proletariat" increased and expanded enormously with the introduction of the Five-Year planning and forced industrial growth to make the Soviet Union an industrial giant.

The class has been internally differentiated, as mentioned before. Its upper levels have more rights and privileges and greater economic advantages in terms of wages, working hours, and other benefits. Riasanovsky has doubted, however, whether the masses of industrial workers are really better off under the Soviets than they were under the Tsars in social and economic respects.[17] Overall, however, the industrial worker faces much greater educational and cultural opportunity than ever before. This substantially advances his social mobility.

Industrial workers are subject to a special class law, the labor law, which has been codified, changed, and amended several times. In 1969, the latest version was promulgated, the Fundamental Labor Act. It described the rights and responsibilities of the industrial worker, the principles of work discipline, and the responsibility to produce for the socialist economy according to the worker's best ability. It regulated the process of wage-rate setting, rewards for special achievements, and penalties for breach of contract or negligence.

Social security, medical insurance, workman's compensation, factory safety provisions, and labor or trade unions were newly regulated by the Act. While every worker had to join the trade union, the union was not actually an organization to protect him, but the arm of the Party and Government to advance socialism and the economy of the land. Strikes of workers have been prohibited by the Constitution, as well as by the Fundamental Labor Act. Neither social security, the socialized medical insurance, nor workman's compensation benefits are really adequate enough to protect an average worker in case of a real emergency. There is no unemployment insurance, since it is not compatible with the "well-working" planned economy of the USSR. Women are greatly discriminated against within the class.[18]

AGRICULTURAL WORKERS. Some students of the Soviet society and economy call agricultural workers peasants. It is a misnomer. The term "peasant" traditionally precludes ownership or at least prolonged right to possess and to work on the land. Soviet agricultural or farm workers have neither ownership nor property rights nor possession of land. All land is owned by the Soviet state. The class of peasants was completely destroyed in Ukraine by the forced collectivization of the Great Famine between 1928 and 1933. Only "landless" agricultural or farm workers remained. These people are badly off socially. They became state serfs. The Soviet regime destroyed Ukrainian peasants because of their individualism, love of soil, and loyalty to the motherland—Ukraine.

Farm workers have many responsibilities but scarcely any practical rights. Theoretically, of course, they are equal and well protected. During the NEP era, 1921-1928, peasants tried to make a comeback but then they lost everything. No wonder there was a mass flight from village to town to attempt to improve their lot as industrial workers.

The Soviet state assumed complete land ownership imme-

diately after the success of the October Revolution in 1917, and in Ukraine after the completion of her occupation by the Russian Bolsheviks. It took years, however, until the peasantry was fully put in harness. In the 1980s, agricultural workers worked either directly for the state on state farms or indirectly on collective farms. While a minority of the farm workers are well-to-do, the majority scarcely owns anything and its standard of living is very low. It frequently suffers shortages and it's deprived. The labor of farm workers is mercilessly exploited. The class has been close to the bottom of Soviet society, except for the concentration-camp workers and prison workers—who are actually outside the legal framework of the society.

Because work compensation in wages and in kind was always very meager and inadequate, farm workers were allotted small plots of land, the "farmstead," from one half to one and one half acres, for their subsistence. The land was given to them for temporary use and not for ownership. The institution distinguished them from other segments of the society. The majority of farm workers have been legally locked into a separate class by the Model Collective Farm Statute, adopted in 1969. The act defined the rights, duties, and responsibilities of farm workers, which included the right to be paid for work, to receive training, to receive a "farmstead," to get assistance in repairs of premises, and to participate in farm administration. The act also defined the responsibility to work according to ability, to obey rules and regulations, to participate in social competition in order to increase the farm's productivity, to preserve the work discipline, and to promote Communist spirit. After long years of service a farm worker is entitled to some kind of a gift and a certificate of honor.[19]

INTELLECTUAL WORKERS, THE *INTELIHENTSIA*. As has been indicated, this class consisted of perhaps three

sub-divisions: the superior *intelihentsia* (if not included in the ruling elite in a narrower sense), the general *intelihentsia*, and the white-collar workers. The social stratum includes a great variety of people with university, college, and middle-school education; intermediary ranks of party, Government, education, and business functionaries; technical specialists; all kinds of professionals; middle and low-rank bureaucrats; managers of middle- and small-sized establishments; junior officers; technicians; accountants; clerks; and office workers. The pre-war *intelihentsia* was completely destroyed, but the socialist "working" *intelihentsia* has been continuously growing in numbers, prestige, and social significance. It is rising far above the masses of the industrial and agricultural laborers, as an ever-more important ingredient and component of the country's bureaucratic machinery. Its social mobility is considerable, provided that one is Russian or dedicated to the cause of the Russian domination within the Soviet Union and the expansion of Russian influence in the world.

While the *intelihentsia* might be identified as middle class, its lower segment, the white-collar workers, might be worse off socially and economically than well-to-do farm workers and the industrial "aristocracy." Since the Party and Government in all aspects and dimensions have been constantly growing, and more and more educated people, salaried workers, are needed to run the nation, the *intelihentsia* has been able to reserve for itself more and more economic benefits as well as more social recognition. Still, it has not been locked into the legal framework of a class law, like the Fundamental Labor Act or the Model Collective Farm Statute. Having formed itself into a distinct class, apart from and above other social segments, it is now taking Soviet society further away from the Marxist ideal of "classlessness"—if not in theory, then definitely in fact.

FORCED-LABOR GROUPS. Forced-labor groups are a singular social phenomenon born under totalitarian regimes, in particular under the Nazis and the Reds. Actually, forced-labor groups consist of people who, in most cases, have never committed any crimes, but whose only offense is either political dissent or the suspicion of dissent. These people have been sent by the millions to concentration camps or long-term prisons in order to destroy any opposition and provide cheap labor for the totalitarian war machine. Although, according to the law of the Soviet Union, forced-labor groups are outside the law of the country, they represent such a mass phenomenon that they must be considered, objectively speaking, as another class of Soviet society. Rather, it is the totalitarian Soviet regime, trampling over human rights, that should be put outside the law.

Forced-labor groups are a Soviet-Russian and not Ukrainian phenomenon, and the majority of those workers are in the distant regions of the USSR, not in Ukraine. The workers in the concentration camps—in official language, corrective labor camps—are mostly "politically unreliable elements," though some are common criminals. The majority of the political inmates is non-Russian, and in particular is Ukrainian. For that very reason, this section on forced labor has been included in the discussion of the social structure of the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainians in the concentration camps and prisons have been kept largely outside the borders of Ukraine. They are supposed to return to their homeland after having served their prescribed terms of incarceration as state slaves. Nevertheless, after returning home, they scarcely acquire full citizen rights.

As state slaves, the forced-labor groups represent a cheap labor supply for the shaky Soviet economy. The groups are ruthlessly exploited and mistreated and have a harsh duty to work under most adverse conditions without any civil and political rights. Their standard of living is at the starvation level. They are kept under continual surveillance by KGB

officials who frequently abuse their authority against inmates, who have scarcely any way to defend themselves. The high mortality rate of the inmates is horrifying. It is kept intentionally high by the Soviet regime and the KGB, in order to discourage any internal opposition.

Slave labor is used mostly in the distant regions of the Soviet Union. There free laborers are in very short supply due to intolerable climatic and other conditions—in particular in polar regions where rich resources are available. Those resources are badly needed by the ailing Soviet economy. Forced labor is used in mining, forest work, railroad and pipe-line construction, road construction, and other harsh projects.

After having served his term, the concentration-camp worker may be released and either allowed or not allowed to return to Ukraine. But he would never regain his social status as a former member of the elite or *intelihentsia*. He would remain greatly limited socially, subject to continuous police surveillance for years. His status might be described as half-free. The American Government investigated the problem of slave labor in the USSR in the early 1980s and considered the possibility of prohibiting the imports of Soviet goods manufactured by use of forced-labor groups.[20]

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OUTSIDE THE UKRAINIAN SSR. In the Ukrainian ethnic regions in the USSR, but outside the political borders of the Ukrainian SSR, the identical social structure and stratification, which has already been described, prevails. This applies to the entire Soviet Union. In Western Ukraine, however, under Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Romanian occupation the society was divided by and large into four classes, resembling to some extent the social arrangements prior to the First World War. The large landowners, capitalists, top businesses and financial people, and the remnants of the old hereditary aristocracy constituted the

upper social levels. They were without any legal distinction from the lower classes however. The *intelihentsia*, the educated salaried workers, the professionals of all kinds, government and economic officials and functionaries, bureaucrats of all kinds, white-collar workers, and clerks with little internal differentiation, constituted the rather small middle class with social prestige and an acceptable material status which came next. Next came the peasantry, the largest segment of society, with some 80 to 85 percent of the population, in most cases owning land and small- and medium-size farms with farm buildings, equipment, and animal stock. This was in contrast to the industrial workers, who did not own any production tools, except for their physical labor, which they could hire out for meager wages. Two types of peasantry could be differentiated: the relatively well-to-do peasants with land ownership and the poor—with inadequate land for even modest living—and landless peasants. The well-to-do peasants were proud of their status, and looked down upon the poor and landless. Finally, the industrial workers were few in number because of the economic or industrial underdevelopment of the regions—with some exceptions such as the oil regions of Drohobych, Boryslav, and Bytkiv. Industrial workers were rather poorly paid and socially degraded. Although theoretically speaking they were legally equal to the others, they had inadequate unionization to protect them. Social legislation had not developed well enough to secure for them adequate standards of living, decent wages, and decent working conditions.

There was, however, a definite trend toward more social and economic equality after the First World War. Individual classes were no longer legally frozen, and individual citizens were directly related to the state and public authorities, rather than indirectly through the class they belonged to. Theoretically they had the fullness of civil and political rights. Women were slowly rising in social recognition and equal treatment. Only a great deal of national discrimination

against the Ukrainian national minority, especially under Polish and Romanian domination, marred the picture. Overall, social developments were much more favorable in all respects than in the Ukrainian SSR. In the Ukrainian SSR, under Soviet-Russian domination, supposedly the country of "workers and peasants," social equality and social justice were promised, but not delivered.

Notes

[1]V. Kubiiovych, "The Ethnic Composition of the Population," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, p. 218.

[2]N. Ruskin, "Physical Extermination of the Population of the Soviet Union," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 3, Sept. 1956, p. 241.

[3]F. Pauser, *Die Ukraine*, Vienna, 1943, p. 84; Also, Ruskin, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-243.

[4]*Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR*, Statystychnyi zbirnyk, Kyiv, 1957, p. 7; Kubiovych, *op. cit.*, pp. 218 and 223.

[5]*Ibid.*, pp. 224-226.

[6]*Narodne hospodarstvo*, pp. 7-18; Also, for 1980, Kubiovych, *loc. cit.*, p. 207 and others.

[7]*loc.cit.*, p. 225.

[8]*loc.cit.*, pp. 223-227; Also I. Tesla, *Geografia Ukrainy*, Toronto, 1957, pp. 76-90.

[9]On the Marxist-oriented egalitarian mood: P. Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revolutsii, 1917-1920*, New York, 1969, Vol. I-IV, references scattered throughout the collected materials, in particular social legislation, Vol. II, Pt. II, pp. 128-132; also pp. 156-174; Vol. III, pp. 101-141; Vol, IV, pp. 3-31, and many other places; D. Doroshenko, *Istoria Ukrainy, 1917-1923*, New York, 1954, Vol. II, pp. 11-13; M. Stachiv, N. Chirovsky, and P. Stercho, *Ukraine and the European Turmoil, 1917-1919*, New York, 1973, Vol. I, pp. 66-68, 254-260, 261-277; the four universals, *ibid*, pp. 374-389; the Labor Congress: Vol. II, pp. 119-170; N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Istoria Ukriany*, Munich, 1976, Vol. II, 460-471, 482-544.

[10]N. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, New York, 1969, pp. 624-631.

[11]N. Chirovsky, "Sioma piatyrichka v ostannii stadii zavershennia," *Vyzvolnyi Shlakh*, Book 11-12 (272-273), November-December 1970, p. 1206.

[12]M. Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, New York, 1957; the same, *The Unperfect Society; Beyond the New Class*, New York, 1969.

[13]A. Inkeles, *Social Changes in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 15-152.

[14]*Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

[15]*Ibid.*, pp. 162-173.

[16]P. Gregory and R. Stuart, *Soviet Economic Structure and Performance*, New York, 1981, pp. 206-207; Ikeles, *op. cit.*, p. 50: "Impressive as it may be to know that seventy five percent of all doctors are women, we cannot acknowledge the average Soviet woman to have won equality of treatment with men. Their lot is still largely one of drudgery"; N. Dodge, *Women in the Soviet Economy*, Baltimore, 1966.

[17]Riasanovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 627.

[18]R. Conquest, *Industrial Worker in the USSR*, London, 1967; Gregory, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-196, 204-206; the Fundamental Labor Act of 1969; *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, Vol. XXII, No. 34, Sept. 1970.

[19]Riasanovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 625-626; R. Laird, ed., *Soviet Agriculture and Peasant Affairs*, Lawrence, Kansas, 1963; the Model Collective Farm Statute; *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, Vol. XXI, No. 17, May 1969. No. 21, June 1969; January 13, 1970, No. 50, pp. 9ff.

[20]D. Dallin and B. Nicolaevsky,. *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, New Haven, 1947; Gregory, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-198; A. Solzhenitsin, *The Gulag Archipelago*, New York, 1973-1974, Vol. I-II; S. Rosefielde, "How Reliable Are Available Estimates of Forced Concentration-Camp Labor in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 1981. The "corrective labor camps" have been largely filled with inmates of non-Russian ethnicity, mostly of the "national minorities" in the Soviet Union. On the national discrimination: W. Kulski, *The Soviet Regime—Communism in Practice*, Syracuse, N.Y., 1954; N. Chirovsky, *The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia*, New York, 1957, pp. 142-146; "The leading place within the brotherly family of equal nations in the USSR belongs to the great Russian nation," M. Kareva, "Stalinskaia konstitutsia i socialisticheskaia federatsia," *Sovietskoie Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, February 1951, No. 2, p. 17. About the Russian supernationalism and chauvinism: Y. Shumelda, *Vid Marksa do Malenkova*, Paris, 1955, 144-145, 170, and other places. The pressure even increased in that respect in the 1960s: Riasanovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 629-631; J. Kolasky. *Education in the Soviet Ukraine*, 1968, chapters 7 to 9 in particular; E. Goldhagen, ed., *The State of Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, New York, 1967.

CHAPTER NINE

GENERAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

Economy of Independent Ukraine—War Communism, the New Economic Policy, and the Planning Era—Economy of Western Ukraine—Agriculture—Cattle-Raising—Forestry, Hunting, and Fishing—Mining

ECONOMY OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE. As a consequence of the prolonged developments of the First World War, 1914-1918, the economic facilities of Ukraine were largely destroyed and her economic potential dramatically reduced throughout the whole country. The damage was most critical in the western regions. The Russo-Ukrainian and the Polish-Ukrainian wars, waged in defense of Ukrainian national independence, 1918-1921, continued to inflict more destruction and further reduced economic, agricultural, and industrial potential, making any normal and effective economic process scarcely possible. The arrival of the Communist system with the invading Red Army only worsened the economic situation.

Between 1914 and 1921 Ukrainian agricultural output was substantially reduced. The progress of the peasantry toward economic independence was halted, with the use of farm land

reduced from 50.9 million acres in 1916 to 39.7 million acres in 1920, and the soil yield reduced to 50 percent of the prewar level. The drought of 1921 and other troubles reduced the farm area further, to 33 million acres, and the yield to a record low of 25 percent of the 1914 level. The number of horses used in farming declined by one half, and cattle by two-thirds. A similar decline in agriculture took place in Western Ukraine, where 20 percent of the rural population lost its homes and farm buildings; the number of horses declined by 38 percent, cattle declined by 36 percent, and hogs by 79 percent. The area under cultivation decreased substantially as well. After the wars Western Ukrainian agriculture was able to rebuild its meager economic potential. Ukrainian forestry suffered considerably as well, from repeated warfare in the region. Between 1913 and 1923 the entire forest area was reduced by about 411 thousand acres.[1]

On the other hand, the Ukrainian national government, led by the socialists, was very well disposed toward the peasantry and tried to help it by all possible means. The Central Rada promulgated in January 1918 its Land Reform Act, which declared all land to be the property of all people. Large land ownership was prohibited and lands were expropriated without any compensation. It must be underscored here that most large landed property owners were foreigners, rather than Ukrainians, and that this move helped to weaken the foreign grip on the Ukrainian economy. All land thus became the property of the Ukrainian people at large. At the same time the Act recognized the right of every citizen, without any discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or ethnic origin, to use land for subsistence within the framework of law. The government, the municipalities, and local village communities were given the responsibility to supervise the private usage of land to protect the benefits of all and to safeguard the natural resources.

The size of the land allotment was supposed to be determined by the ability of the individual peasant family or other social

unit to till it and to raise crops exclusively by its own labor and for its own needs. No rentals were to be demanded by the government from the peasants or other tillers for land usage. The reallotments of land were to be carried out with consent of the respective authorities, and according to law. Nobody was supposed to be hurt in the process. The Land Reform Act provided for some transitionary measures until peace returned and the Constitutional Assembly of the nation could establish complete law and order. But the recognition of private land usage, without the full rights of private ownership, was a significant weakness of the Act, and the socialistic mood of the governing circles was responsible for this. The implementation of the Act, however, never came about because of repeated warfare with Soviet Russia.[2]

Meanwhile the peasants were encouraged by the act. They organized local communities, called *spilky*, and seized large properties, driving out the original owners and dividing the land among themselves, thus spreading chaos and disorder. Then, after the conservative Hetman rule was introduced, the traditional system of land ownership was reestablished. The new Government tried to take the captured land away from the peasants and force them to compensate the original owners. Punitive expeditions with the use of military force were sent against the rebellious peasantry. At the same time socialist and Communist propaganda incited the peasants, who were utterly confused by what was going on and did not know whether they were right or wrong. The Directorate reintroduced the Land Reform Act in January 1919, but at this time Soviet war agression, as mentioned before, prevented its practical application.

The All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, which subsequently assumed authority, largely as a Moscow puppet, tried to introduce its own Land Act in February 1920. It provided that all land was to belong to the peasants forever. However, it was suspended by the complete domination of Ukraine by Soviet Russia, the introduction of the "War

Communism," and the establishment of Soviet-style state ownership of all land. Hence, the Land Act of February 1920 never became law. Under the Soviet-Russian occupation rule, the Ukrainian peasantry was exposed to ruthless "grain requisitions" to feed Russia, which impoverished the peasants terribly.

The industrial development of independent Ukraine did not go well either because of war developments. The new Ukrainian Government established state control over the country's industries, and in January 1918 introduced an eight-hour work day for all industrial workers. Understandably, however, the warfare destroyed many industrial establishments and either reduced the operations of some industries or brought others to a full standstill. Working men either were drafted and sent to battle fields, or fled to the countryside in search of food and survival, or were involved in some kind of revolutionary activities, especially in the 1919-1921 era.

Large-scale heavy industry ceased to exist for all intents and purposes, while small-scale industries tried to continue their operations in such areas as sugar, alcohol, flour, footwear, and garment manufacture. In 1920 several types of industry operated at a very low percentage of their pre-war level:

Industry	*Percentage*
Coal	17.1
Steel	1.7
Rolled steel	1.8
Pig iron	0.5
Sugar	4.4
Flour	22.0

Overall, in 1920 about one-seventh of the industrial output of 1913 was reached. It was a most critical state of affairs. Electric power production, largely for lighting, declined heavily and was mostly limited to the Donets Basin. Coal production decreased as follows:

Year	Output in mill. of tons
1918	8.7
1919	5.4
1920	4.4

Oil production declined substantially too, although its high quality was preserved. Out of the sixty-three blast furnaces of the prewar era, only one was operating in 1919, and the output output of pig iron decreased as follows:

Year	Output in mill. of tons
1913	3.04
1918	0.2
1920	0.02

The dramatic decline was certainly caused by war operations. The extraction of manganese ore decreased very substantially, and only slowly recovered in the 1920s.

The machine-building industry collapsed entirely, and its prewar level of production was not regained until 1925, through a slow reconstruction of facilities. Glass, china, and pottery manufacturing operated at a very low level during that unfavorable time. Light industries, such as those involving textile, garment, and footwear production, fell in 1921 to only 52.3 percent of the 1914 level, and the bulk of this was allocated to fill military needs. For example, in 1920, 94 percent of all shoe production was requisitioned or purchased by armed forces. The output of light industries continued to decline during the so-called "War Communism." No less damage was sustained by the food industries. Cattle-holding decreased, as pointed out above, and as a result, meat production and processing fell drastically. For instance, pork production in 1913 amounted to some 659 thousand tons, and then it fell to a record low. It did not reach 659 thousand tons again until 1955.[3]

The transportation picture was mixed. Out of military considerations, several new railroad lines were constructed, in the border regions in particular. During the revolutionary times however, chaos prevailed in train operations. Out of 3100 locomotives in operation in 1913, only 1200 were functioning in central Ukrainian regions in 1921. Sea transportation was virtually nonexistent between 1917 and 1921, and only five percent of the commercial fleet survived in 1922. Port installations were on a very low operational level. No improvements were undertaken in river and road transportation. Scarcely any new roads were built, except for some small-scale road construction in Carpathian Ukraine.

Neither wars nor revolutions were conducive to large-scale foreign trade, although it continued to some degree, especially during the Hetman era, when the state matters were in better shape in Ukraine than under the Central Rada or the Directorate. During that short period Ukraine maintained trade relations with the Don Republic, the Crimean Peninsula, Romania, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and some other lands to a lesser extent. A separate treaty was signed with the Don Cossacks to normalize economic conditions with the Donets Basin. After the Treaty of Berest Lytovsky a number of separate agreements were concluded with the Central Powers to expand mutual trade relations and to stabilize the exchange rates among the respective national currencies. However, because of unfavorable war developments, neither Ukraine nor Germany nor Austria-Hungary were able to live up to the provisions of the agreements. Ukraine was unable to supply proper quantities of food to the Central Powers, and they were not able to deliver arms and implements to Ukraine.

In order to foster foreign trade, the Central Rada established the State Commission for Exchange of Goods. Under the Hetman rule the agency was reorganized and named the Committee of Foreign Trade, operating under the authority of the Ministry of Trade and Commerce.

The volume and variety of domestic trade declined at that

time and it was largely local in nature. Due to a substantial price inflation, the people used barter exchange to acquire some needed goods and services, and a persistent shortage of food and some basic materials prevailed. These developments led to a substantial growth of the cooperative movement, of consumer and producer cooperatives by which the population hoped to improve its material well-being.

The declaration of independence in the Third and then the Fourth Universals enabled the Ukrainian cooperative movement to separate itself from the Russian movement and its official philosophy and guidelines. The movement was enthusiastically supported by the Central Rada and the Directorate, because many top members of those governments were former cooperative activists and leaders. Also, the movement was perfectly in accord with the socialistic world-outlook, which permeated those governments. The movement aimed at full inclusion in the state machinery for its implementation, and expected to receive needed capital from the Government to boost its growth. Several All-Ukrainian Cooperative Congresses were held, attempting to finalize the country's cooperative structure. During the 1917-1921 period the number of cooperatives, expanding trade with consumer goods and work materials, increased in an almost inflationary manner, as follows:

Year	*Number of cooperatives*
1915	6,860
1917	9,200
1920	22,000

In 1918, there were 253 county, regional, and nationwide cooperative associations, while in 1920 there was almost no locality without a cooperative in the country's trade network, with some six million members of consumer, producer, and credit cooperative organizations.

Subsequently, six leading cooperative, professional, central organizations were established, of which the *Dnipresoiuz*, the *Tsentrala*, and the *Ukrainbank* were most important. The *Dnipresoiuz* was a kind of umbrella organization for the consumer cooperatives which united some 8,000 cooperatives and 80 county and regional cooperative associations, with gross sales of some 70 million rubles in 1918, active in commerce, foreign trade, industry, education,and publication. The *Tsentrala* combined the country's farm cooperatives, attempting to assist the Ukrainian peasant in this troublesome time. The *Ukrainbank* was the central organization for the credit unions and other credit cooperatives. The *Trudsoiuz* united the manufacturing cooperatives, the *Strakhsoiuz* the insurance cooperatives, and the *Knyhospilka* the cooperative book publishers. All cooperative organizations were headed nationally by the Ukrainian Central Cooperative Committee, chaired by M. Tuhan-Baranovsky, a famous economist, and directed by B. Martos, later a prime minister of the UNR. All these leading cooperative central organizations and associations subsequently involved themselves to a greater or lesser degree in foreign trade and finance operations.

As mentioned, the cooperative movement was also deeply involved in educational and publication activity in order to train a professional work force for the movement and to advance the knowledge of business. Schools were organized; lectures held; books, newspapers, and journals published. Some publications were continued from the pre-war era, but new ones were also initiated. The leading publications included: the *Komashnia-Muraveinyk*, the *Kooperatyvna Zoria*, *Silskyi Hospodar*, and the *Ukrainska Kooperatsia*. The leading names in the movement were M. Tuhan-Baranovsky, B. Martos, S. Borodaievsky, C. Voblyi, V. Kosynsky, and V. Sadovsky.

In Western Ukraine, on the other hand, the cooperative movement fared very poorly during 1918-1921 because of war

developments, but it recovered later on under Polish occupation.[7]

The independent Ukrainian state developed, of course, its own monetary and banking system. The Central Rada issued Ukrainian money, the *karbovanets*, as state credit notes equal to 0.766 grams of gold or 0.99 of the old Tsarist ruble. There were 53 million issued and they were well received by the public. As a result of the Russo-Ukrainian war of 1918, in March of that year a new monetary unit, the *hryvnia*, was introduced. It was equal approximately to one-half of the *karbovanets*, or 0.38 grams of gold. The move was undertaken to prevent large-scale Soviet counterfeiting aimed at undermining the Ukrainian economy. The *hryvnia* notes were printed in Germany on excellent paper, which the Soviets could not forge, and they were therefore a safer currency. The Treaty of Berest-Lytovsky attempted to fix to some extent the exchange rate between the Ukrainian monetary unit on the one hand and the German mark and Austrian crown on the other.

The Hetman Government reinstated the *karbovanets* as the national currency and put into circulation some 205 million. Subsequently, in order to meet economic and war needs, the Directorate issued an additional 670 million *karbovanets* notes. The Ukrainian currency was not covered by gold or foreign exchange, but its purchasing power was manipulated and based on government holdings of alcohol, sugar, flour, and other commodities. They were stored in the government warehouses and sold to the public for *karbovanets* notes, and were also accepted in lieu of tax payments.

There were also other currencies circulating in Ukraine at that time, such as Russian ruble paper notes and army notes issued by various army units. By the end of 1918 it was estimated that some 10 billion—and in the fall of 1919 some 30 billion—of all kinds of notes were circulating in Ukraine, producing an incredible inflation. M. Tuhan-Baronovsky

urged the Ukrainian Government to stop the circulation of various Russian paper notes in order to curb the inflation. It was finally done in January 1919, but the measure was delayed too long and could no longer prevent inflationary chaos.

It must be underscored, however, that the *karbovanets* by itself was not inflationary at all, and that it continued to circulate as a most valued currency acceptable to most people. One *karbovanets* was at first worth four Russian or Soviet rubles. In Odessa, in 1919, one American dollar was equal to eleven *karbovanets* notes or forty-five to fifty Soviet rubles. A little later, however, the inflation became unstoppable. Several Volhinian and Galician communities and some guerrilla organizations began to issue their own money in small denominations. Some issued paper notes or stamps or put their seals on other currencies.

The First and Second Soviet-Ukrainian Governments wanted to issue their own money, but were forbidden by Moscow to do so. As Moscow's puppets, they followed its order. The Soviet regime had other designs for Ukraine, which did not involve its fiscal autonomy. It planned from the very beginning to make Ukraine a Russian colony and part of the Soviet-Russian monetary system.[5]

The Ukrainian government promptly took over the Kievan branch of the State Bank of Russia and converted it into the Ukrainian State Bank, as a central bank for the Ukrainian money and capital markets. Subsequently the Ukrainian Land Bank was established to aid agriculture. Yet neither of them was able to coordinate the economic and financial matters of the republic. On the other hand, private banks were immediately placed under state control, according to socialistic doctrine. Only foreign investments were exempt from that control. However, the cooperative financial institutions, credit unions, savings and loan associations, and similar organizations developed very well in independent Ukraine. Over

3,300 cooperative financial institutions soon formed credit union association with county, regional, or nationwide jurisdictions, the so-called *Soiuzbanky* or Union Banks.

The largest of those *Soiuzbanky* was the Kievan Union Bank, with some 34 million in *karbovanets* notes of assets. Due to their financial success, the union banks soon began to establish their own commercial and industrial enterprises and involved themselves in all kinds of operations. In October 1917, the Ukrainian National Cooperative Bank was established, the capital stock of which was owned by cooperative, credit union, and mutual savings institutions. The bank, commonly referred to as the *Ukrainbank*, served as a financial intermediary between the State Treasury of the republic and the cooperative movement of the land, and it was involved in a variety of financial and commercial operations, including, as mentioned above, international trade and finance. Its assets reached 50 million *karbovanets* in 1919. After the completion of the occupation of Ukraine, the Soviet-Russian authorities immediately abolished the *Ukrainbank*, in December 1920, as inappropriate for their colonial designs for Ukraine within the future Soviet Empire.[6]

This has been a general picture of the national economy of Ukraine during the short era of her national independence.

WAR COMMUNISM, THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY, AND THE PLANNING ERA. The full subjugation of Ukraine by Soviet Russia was immediately followed by the introduction of the so-called "War Communism," sponsored by Lenin and his followers in the year 1917 and 1921. War Communism further deepened the economic troubles of the country. It was an all-out Bolshevik attempt of a speedy, ruthless and extreme, while ill-prepared and ill-carried out, introduction of radical socialist measures in the lands under the Bolshevik domination. During that era private initiative and enterprise were discouraged and suppressed, while the

state was not yet ready, lacking knowledge and experience, to take over the entire economic process. Economic chaos was overwhelming.

Deep economic calamities, coupled with the prolonged civil war, spread over Russia a ghost of famine, hence the Bolsheviks ordered ruthless "grain requisitions" throughout all of Ukraine, and all requisitioned "bread" was sent to Russia. Once Lenin was supposed to have said that rather Ukraine would starve to death, but her bread would feed the Russian workers. Obviously, the Ukrainian peasant responded to the requisitions with hostility, curtailed planting and reduced cattle raising merely to the level of his own needs. Hence the planting area further declined and the farm output diminished. The Bolsheviks branded the peasant attitude as sabotage, and applied reprisals by imprisoning, deporting and executing the peasants. Their wrath was turned in particular against the *kurkuls*, the rich peasants. The urban areas, on the other hand, were without food, water, light, fuel and other living necessities. The government and its various agencies were just not capable to handle the disintegrated economy.

The so-called Kronstadt rebellion of the Russian sailors of 1921 sobered up Lenin and his associates. The sailors, once the standard bearers of the Communist revolution, rose against the Communist rulers. It was a menacing signal. The Soviet government then brought the "War Communism" to an abrupt halt and promulgated the so-called New Economic Policy, the NEP. The new era was to last until 1928. It was supposedly the era of compromise and appeasement. Since the state could not handle the economic process, private enterprises were partially allowed in order to restore acceptable living conditions.

The grain requisitions were halted. A Land Code of Ukraine was adopted, and several times amended, which gave the peasants the right to use land without any time limitation. The right could be abrogated only under specific conditions named by the Code. The land allotments were diversified

according to the region: in Right-bank Ukraine they were smaller, some 37 acres, and in steppe Ukraine larger, some 117 acres of land per peasant family. The type of crops was largely left to the peasant's discretion. All this was a major departure from radical Marxism and a "compromise" with capitalistic private enterprise. The same measures were adopted in commerce and manufacturing, where limited and small-scale private enterprise for profit was permitted.

The NEP era brought about a significant economic recovery of the country. In a few years progress in farm technology was noticeable, and the farm yield increased to almost prewar level. The recovery was also promoted by the introduction of the cooperative movement, which had been initially disbanded as being too Ukrainian. The new cooperative trend, strictly government-controlled, included consumer cooperatives, credit unions, tractor pools, and cooperative renting of agricultural machinery and equipment. The volume of trade increased and the industrial production grew. By 1928 the output of coal had reached 24.8 million tons, almost at the pre-war level. Steel production, however, though increased, failed to rise to its 1914 level. The growth of the manganese industry lagged behind other branches of heavy manufacturing. Machine-building reached its prewar level in 1925. Wood working rose at a very slow pace during the entire period between the two World Wars. The introduction of the NEP greatly contributed to the reconstruction and expansion of light industries. The bulk of these industries were operated by small enterprises, and private initiative and profit motivation were essential. Over 8 million pairs of shoes and 153.8 million rubles worth of apparel were produced in 1925. For the same reason the output of food industries was able to exceed the pre-war level by 1926.

At first the Ukrainian SSR had its own People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, but with the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1923 Ukraine lost her uniqueness in that respect. Foreign trade became a state monopoly, strictly managed by the People's Commissariat, later on

Ministry of Foreign Trade, in Moscow. The trade between Ukraine and Russia, and later with other republics of the USSR, was officially regarded as domestic trade. Ukrainian foreign trade was administered by separate agencies, fully subordinated to Moscow. The volume of that trade rose slowly during the NEP, but it was far below the prewar level. This followed the policy of Moscow's Red Government, which was reluctant to have any extensive commercial relations with the outside world, and the capitalist West in particular, since it was afraid that the latter would try to destroy the Soviet socialist system under construction by the use of trade and finance.

Transportation fared poorly as well. By 1926, sea transportation had reached only 19 percent of its 1913 level. Cargo handled by the three largest ports, Odessa, Mykolaiv, and Mariupil, fell to an all-time low of 1.7 million tons. There was no progress at all in highway construction. Air navigation began to develop in 1923 and grew slowly. That year the Ukrainian Air Line was established. It operated until 1930 as an independent establishment under the authority of the Kievan Government. Radio broadcasting was started in 1924, when low-powered transmitters were installed in Kharkiv. The first powerful broadcasting station was constructed in Kiev in 1925. Subsequently, similar stations were built in other cities, such as Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, and Donetsk. The Kharkiv station built in 1927 was the most powerful in Ukraine, and the fourth most powerful in the entire Soviet Union at that time.

All banks in Ukraine were nationalized without any compensation and all foreign debts abrogated. During "War Communism," the Bolshevik regime pursued a hyperinflationary policy, aiming at the abolition of the "capitalistic" monetary system and its replacement by so-called labor-value certificates. Prices in 1921 were 858 times higher than in 1918. All savings were totally wiped out, banks were closed, and the entire economy was pushed into a deep depression. The so-called "financial experiment" was not accepted in Ukraine,

but chaos prevailed anyway. During the NEP era a reform of the monetary and banking system was undertaken to stabilize the economic conditions. Free trading in gold, silver, and foreign exchange was reestablished. In 1924, a new currency, the *chervonets*, was put into circulation with an official announcement that it was backed by gold up to 25 percent of its value. These were further measures to appease private interests during the NEP era. While at first the *chervonets* could be converted into gold and silver and freely circulate in the internationl market, in 1926 Moscow restricted that financial freedom, and, in 1928 completely abrogated it, making the unit domestic currency only, slowly returning to socialist radicalism under Stalin's rule.[7]

An essential change was introduced by the Soviet system quite early in its occupation of Ukraine. The Soviets always pushed for state, collective, or cooperative businesses, while discouraging private enterprise. During "War Communism" they began to organize so-called state farms, the *sovkhozy*, huge agricultural operations on the large landed properties that had belonged to the royalty, the nobility, the Church, and other landowners. Before the Revolution, Lenin and his Bolsheviks had said that all land should belong to the peasants. Yet, after the successful Bolshevik takeover, all land, even that owned by peasants, was declared to be state property. The peasants were not even allowed to take and divide the large landed estates among themselves. Peasant disappointment, especially in Ukraine, was enormous. State farms, directly government-operated, were ideologically preferred by socialist extremists over any other forms of farming in the Soviet Union. They were preferably used for one-crop planting, model farming, and agricultural experimentation. All workers on these farms were government employees. From the management point of view, however, they suffered more frequently from bureaucratic red tape, operational deficits, and lower productivity than the so-called collective farms, the *kolkhozy*.

The collective farms were organized by pooling together previously private peasant farms. Land was, theoretically speaking, given to the collective farms for permanent use by the state, the only landowner. The peasants were to contribute work, animals, tools, and implements on a permanent basis and be compensated from the farm output according to their labor input. The collective farms operated under the strict supervision of the State and the Communist party. Though the organization of the *kolkhoz* was started under the "War Communism," the process did not go very far. Neither under the New Economic Policy did the collectivization, carried out on a voluntary basis though urgently supported by the government, make any significant progress. The Ukrainian peasant, traditionally an individualist, did not want to submit himself to a new form of slavery or serfdom. Though the Government and the Party encouraged collectivization by all possible means, including propaganda, pressure, and favoritism, only a small percentage of poor or landless peasants joined the program.

In manufacturing, state plants, directly state owned and operated, substituted for the old large-scale enterprises, private, corporative, or otherwise in mining, heavy industry, and machine-building. In the consumer, light, and food industries cooperative plants were organized. Workers contributed their skill, labor, tools, and implements, and were supposedly compensated according to their productivity. Wages were in most cases either government-fixed or controlled. Collective farming and cooperative manufacturing were more agreeable to the radical Soviet Government, than private enterprise for a profit motive.

The New Economic Policy was not a retreat from socialist radicalism, as has been pointed out and was proven by later developments, but only a temporary measure by the Soviet system to gather strength in order to carry out a sweeping collectivization and nationalization of the economy a little later. Slow progress toward that ultimate goal was still made

during the NEP era. The trend can easily be shown in the decline of private enterprise in the Soviet Union during that period:

Year	*Retail Trade* *Percentage of private stores*
1922	75.0
1928	22.5
1930	5.6

Year	*Small Industrial Workshops* *Percentage of private establishments*
1925	19.9
1930	5.6
1931	0.0

The statistics made quite obvious the growing importance of state and cooperative establishments in commerce and manufacturing.[8]

The New Economic Policy, which entailed some degree of freedom, economic and national, proved to become dangerous for the arbitrary rule of Soviet Russia over the non-Russian peoples. Hence the Kremlin, under Stalin's leadership abrogated the NEP in 1928 and moved ahead with the so-called Planning Era. It was marked by the utmost harshness, ruthlessness, and extremity, as under "War Communism." The whole economic process was put under the control of a purposive, comprehensive, and centralized five-year economic plan, without any free interplay of market forces. One five-year plan was followed by another, with eleven of them until the 1980s.

The Soviet-Russian leadership was obsessed by industrialization for various reasons, ideological and military in particular. In order to mobilize any available capital to promote the industrialization process, Preobrazhensky devised a plan to

exploit all the capital from the agricultural sector, no matter what price had to be paid including agricultural ruin. Stalin translated that idea into a sweeping collectivization, putting the peasant into a modern collective serfdom and squeezing out of him every penny for the industrialization program. In November 1929 the Planning Era brought the forced collectivization of all farming, approved by the central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow. The decision was reaffirmed in 1930. No Ukrainian Government agency made the decision; the Russian Communists did. The ruthless collectivization was carried out to bring about "the liquidation of the *kulaks* or *kurkuls*, the rich peasants, as a class." They had supposedly resisted the collectivization process and were responsible for its poor showing under the NEP. Party activists were sent to the countryside to ruthlessly push the program ahead. Peasant opposition was broken by various economic and police measures, such as excessive taxes, excessive demand of cash payments, imprisonment, deportation, and execution. Peasants responded with the destruction of farm implements and the slaughtering of farm animals. Soviet progress in forced collectivization can be seen from the table below. As long as force was not applied, only a few peasants joined the collectives. Forced collectivization, however, progressed rapidly:

Year	*Percent households collectivized*	*Percent land collectivized*	*No. of collective farms*
1928 (Oct.)	3.4	3.8	9,700
1929 (Oct.)	8.6	8.9	14,300
1931 (April)	55.4	61.9	35,800
1933 (June)	69.5	86.1	24,200
1935 (Oct.)	91.3	98.0	27,400

In 1933, a system of forced deliveries from the collective farms to the state at fixed, nominal prices was introduced. This turned the collective farm workers into state serfs, exploited economically beyond any imagination by the state, the landlord, and pushed socially to the very bottom of Soviet society. For example, the market prices of farm produce, fixed by the Government, were 20 to 25 times higher than the nominal prices paid to the collective farms by the Government for the forced deliveries. The difference was kept by the state, the landlord, to finance its intended industrialization.

Subsequently, the so-called Machine-Tractor Stations, owned and operated by the state, were organized. They operated all farm machinery and implements and rented them to the collective farms to process the crops, for which the state collected excessive rentals. This was another form of farm exploitation.

Subsequently, with the Ukrainian peasant incarcerated in the collective farms and fully controlled by the state, the Soviet-Russian Government, in order to break down his opposition completely, organized a man-made famine in 1932-1933. As a result of this some seven million Ukrainian peasants starved to death. In the fall of 1932 all harvests were requisitioned by the state, and then neither grain nor other crops were issued for adequate diet and planting. Mass starvation developed, and the peasant opposition was broken once and for all. With the sale of the grain abroad the Soviet Government could buy foreign machinery and the know-how to start its industrialization.[9] The Ukrainian consumer was deprived in many cases of even the bare necessities of living, harassed with shortages, inferior quality, and high prices. Only the elite Communist ruling class was adequately supplied by special stores, where an average "comrade" was not admitted. Otherwise, at the beginning of the Planning Era, almost the entire official market distribution system became a plan-based and state-run operation. Yet, because of inefficiency, chronic shortages, discrimination, low-quality mer-

chandise, and other shortcomings of the system, a large-scale black market, which had originated during the war and War Communism and had lost its significance at the time of the NEP, gained nationwide importance and became a permanent Soviet institution. It was illegal and at times suppressed, yet generally tolerated by Government authorities as a necessary evil.

The two-and-a-half-year German occupation of Ukraine resulted in a dramatic decline of her economic potential and productivity. This resulted from ruthless German exploitation and long-term plans to use the land as an agricultural colony of the Third Reich. In order to supervise agriculture and farm deliveries, the so-called *Landswirtschaftsbezirke*, staffed largely by Germans, were organized. Other business pursuits were also put under the control of German authorities, including the cooperative movement, which by now was traditional for Ukrainians.

Berlin planned, in a period of four years, to make Ukraine a grain-growing area and a supplier of a few selective raw materials such as manganese ore from Nikopol. No industrial reconstruction was intended. Collective and state farms were retained intact by the Germans until the end of their occupation, and industrial and commercial establishments remained socialized, as under Soviet rule, since this was considered the best approach for future economic exploitation. This policy ruined the large cities of Ukraine, centers of mining and manufacturing. Their production output decreased tragically and their population declined greatly. For instance, coal production in the Donbas fell from 226,000 tons in 1941 to 10,000 tons in 1942, and the population of Kiev fell from one million prior to the war to some 330,000 in 1942.

The overall economic decline also resulted from a massive deportation of Ukrainians, up to three million men and women by 1943, to Germany for farm and factory work. They toiled like slaves under the most adverse living and working conditions and were branded as *Ostarbeiters*, the lowest

category of labor. During 1942, a number of Ukrainian enterprises were taken over by German corporations and individuals with nominal compensation. Enormous requisitions of grain and other produce forced the countryside to a near starvation diet. City and town markets were constantly raided by German police and security detachments, and everything of value was taken away, leaving urban areas lacking in food. They were speedily deserted.

Only the so-called All-Ukrainian cooperative Union and the Central Sugar Union achieved certain success in spite of the German terror that was impoverishing the country.

ECONOMY OF WEST UKRAINE. As indicated before, for a while after the First World War, Western Ukraine escaped being included in the Soviet Union. Galicia, Volhinia, Polissia, Pidlasha, and the Lemke region were temporarily incorporated into Poland, while Bukovyna went to Romania and Carpathian Ukraine to Czechoslovakia. These lands became part of the economies of their respective nations. Under Polish occupation the economy made little progress, beyond a full recovery from war destruction. Under the Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovakian control the free-market economy continued to prevail. Farming was private, businesses were based on private initiative and individual profit, and government direction was confined to providing law and order and securing certain social goals. This was slow economic development, but nothing spectacular. The Polish and Romanian economies were underdeveloped themselves and could make no favorable impact on the Western Ukrainian economy. The Czechoslovakian economy was in better shape, being quite advanced, and this enabled Carpathian Ukraine to achieve more progress.

In Poland, land was under government control, which was politically motivated. The Ukrainian peasant was discriminated against, and this adversely affected the agricultural

development of the Polish-dominated regions of Western Ukraine. The process of liquidation of large landed estates was in progress, but Ukrainian peasants, according to a secret directive, were allowed to purchase only five percent of the land under distribution. The rest was given to Polish settlers in order to increase the Polish ethnic population in those Ukrainian regions. Individual Ukrainian peasants were limited to a purchase of two acres each. In Volhinia and Polissia free land was given to Polish war veterans. Ukrainian peasants were kept poor intentionally. By 1938, the Polish authorities had divided some 1,980,000 acres of land, of which only a small part had been acquired by Ukrainians. Only later on, because of the heavy indebtedness of the Polish colonists, were Ukrainian peasants able to re-purchase some of this land.

In the 1930s, the peasants owned some 59 percent of the land, the large estates some 23 percent, and the Polish state some 18 percent. The peasants cultivated some 84 percent of all arable land. This proved to be very detrimental for agricultural development, with the average peasant farm in Western Ukraine quite small, as the following statistics for the interwar period indicate:

Size	*Percentage of Land*
5 acres or less	42%
5 to 12 acres	39%
12 to 25 acres	14%
Over 25 acres	5%

The small farms of five acres or less cultivated only some nine per cent of arable land. All this made the agricultural economy unhealthy and unproductive.[10] As a result, the crop yield per acre did not improve, and the overpopulation of the countryside and lack of industrial progress worsened the situation. In Volhinia things were a little better than in Galicia or the other regions.

Moderate economic progress was achieved largely due to the activities of the educational societies, such as *Prosvita* and *Ridna Skhola*, and the effect on the peasantry of the recovered cooperative movement and its educational programs. The peasants soon began to use better tools, chemical fertilizers, and machines available from farm cooperatives, and there was better conservation and processing of crops. *Maslosoiuz* (the Butter Union) promoted dairy processing and marketing; *Tsentrosoiuz* (the Central Union), advanced the exportation of eggs, meat products, fibers, and other articles; and *Silskyi Hospodar* assisted farming financially.In 1938, it had 1683 local branches and 107,200 members, with 137 college-trained agronomists to help the membership.

In Bukovyna very little agricultural progress was made, but in Carpathian Ukraine a remarkable advancement was achieved, largely because of the enlightened policies of the Czechoslovakian Government. The construction of highways and progressive educational programs helped to improve the farm economy. A land reform favorably affected some 87 percent of the peasants. Local farm organizations were also an asset.

Western Ukrainian industry remained largely underdeveloped. In Galicia, with over five million people, there were only 534 industrial establishments with 20 workers or more. By 1938 industrial employment totalled 44,000. The major industries were salt mining, woodworking, cement production, food-processing, metal-working, building materials, and some home industries. In Volhinia the situation was no better. There about 20 thousand workers were employed in similar industries, as well as basalt and granite quarries and the lumber industry. In Bukovyna, there were some 105 establishments with 21 workers or more, with a total employment of about 15,000. Food-processing, wood working, and textile manufacturing were the leading industries. In Carpathian Ukraine there were about ten large establishments devoted to metal-working, wood processing, tobacco, and salt mining. In

addition there were also small-scale, craft enterprises to supply the population with some badly needed industrial necessities.

Only minor changes and improvements took place in the railroad system. Motor-vehicle use grew very slowly, largely for passenger transportation. Only 15 percent of cargo shipments went by truck. Private auto ownership was negligible, and bus transportation, taxicab use, and the use of official cars rose slowly at best. The communications industry was unimpressive, with negligible use of telephones, telegraph, and radio. Only the press developed well. The monetary and banking systems were run by the respective occupying countries.

However, the cooperative movement made a remarkable recovery, especially in Galicia. In 1922, the Land Committee for Cooperative Organization was established to promote the cooperative idea and to help in postwar reconstruction. The Audit Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives was reorganized, and in 1928 extended its activities to Volhinia and Polissia. The number of cooperatives—consumer, farm, producer, and credit unions—rose fast, as indicated by the following table:

Year	*Number of Cooperatives*
1923	834
1925	1,029
1934	3,193
1939	3,455

In 1939, the membership of the movement reached 643,000 people. Its leaders were Y. Pavlykovsky and O. Lutsky. Farm cooperatives numbered 2,360 or some 69 percent of the total, with 27 county and region associations. The *Tsentrobank* was the financial center of the credit cooperatives with 113 urban branches and 573 unions in the countryside. The *Narodna Torhivla* (the National Trading Union) with 18 branches, 27 warehouses, and 194 consumer cooperatives, reached average

annual sales of 159 million Polish *zloty* and 22.9 million in total assets for 1937-1938. The *Maslosoiuz*, with 143 regional dairies, pioneered in dairy farming and largely contributed to the rising living standards of the countryside. It controlled not only the Ukrainian but the Polish dairy market, and was the most active of all cooperative efforts in Western Ukraine. A. Palii and M. Khronoviat were its active leaders. The *Tsentrisoiuz* was the professional center of the cooperative movement. In addition there were some 250 cooperatives belonging to the so-called Ruthenian Audit Union, and some 600 belonged to Polish associations in the northwestern part of the land.

The movement grew because of the idealism and devotion of its leaders and membership, largely inspired by Ukrainian patriotism and national opposition to the Polish rule. The cooperative idea was popularized by the movement's own press and by the Ukrainian press in general. The leading cooperative publications were *Hospodarsko-kooperatyvnyi Chasopys*, *Kooperatyvna respublyka*, *Kooperatyvne molocharstvo*, and *Kredytova kooperatsia*.

The rather well-developed cooperative movement in Bukovyna withered away slowly under Romanian occupation, but it continued to grow in Carpathian Ukraine. In 1925, the Land Cooperative Association (*Kraiovyi Druzhestvennyi Soiuz*) became the central credit and audit union, while the Commercial Union of Economic Cooperative (*Torhovelnyi Soiuz Hospodarskykh Druzhestv*) was the headquarters for commercial activities. Both institutions were located in the city of Uzhorod.[11] As a result of the Second World War almost all Western Ukrainian territories were incorporated by the Soviet Union and became part of the Soviet economic system.

AGRICULTURE. As pointed out, Ukrainian agriculture experienced a terrifying shock as the result of the forced collectivization carried out by the Soviets in 1928-1933. Cul-

tivated land, grain production, livestock, productivity per acre and per worker, and the amount of agricultural exports declined catastrophically as a result. The reasons for such a situation are obvious to those who understand the individualistic psychology, the sense of private-property, and the deep love of his land of the Ukrainian peasant. The forced Soviet collectivization of the Ukrainian village attempted to crush peasant individualism, take away the peasant's beloved soil, and deny him any right to own land. All this adversely affected his psyche, lowered his industry and initiative, destroyed his morale, and as a consequence produced a decline in Ukrainian agriculture. The reluctance to collectivize among Ukrainian peasants is best shown by the collectivization rate prior to 1928, when it was voluntary, and thereafter, when it became compulsory.

Collectivization of Farms in Ukraine

Year	*Number of Collective Farms*
1922	2,810
1925	5,454
1934	26,000
1954	15,600
1958	13,300
1962	9,888
1980	7,096

Thus, only 5,454 collective farms were established in Ukraine during some six years when compulsion was minimal. Under the forced collectivization after 1928, during some three years, about 18,000 collectives were organized. A decline in the number of collective farms in 1954 and 1962 came as a result of government action to combine and amalgamate relatively small farms into larger units, so-called super-collectives.

Theoretically, collective farms are owned and operated by the peasant village population, which works there and shares in the farm's income. Practically, however, the state assumes

all controlling authority. The farm workers do not share in the income but are paid for each "working day," a norm which usually takes the average peasant more than a day to achieve. In the fifties and again in the sixties, Khrushchev advanced the idea of combining collective farms into giant agro-cities, where presumably industrial improvements such as mass production, scientific management, economical use of farm implements, mass procurement methods, and automation could be more successfully applied. However, the idea of agro-cities never advanced much beyond the planning stage.

Up to 1958, agricultural equipment and machinery were owned by the state, and operated by the so-called machine-tractor stations which served a number of surrounding farms. Since 1958, the machine-tractor stations have been progressively abolished, and collective farms have taken over the ownership of technical equipment.

At present (1980), along with the 7096 collective farms, there are 2110 state farms in Ukraine. The state farms are directly owned and operated by the Government, and agricultural production is more specialized there.

In recent years the number of state farms has increased and collective farms decreased in direct proportion to each other. The number of the state farms has fluctuated over the years due to the destruction of the Second World War and post-war policies designed to amalgamate small farm units into "super-farms" for greater efficiency:

Year	*Number of State Farms*[12]
1937	865
1950	935
1960	816
1980	2110

Actually, the Soviet system prefers state farms to collective farms. In 1953 Stalin stated that the conversion of all of Soviet agriculture to government-owned and operated state farms

would be one of the prerequisites for the introduction of full Communism. However, practical developments have worked against either form of socialist farming, state or collective.

Prior to the Soviet domination, before the First World War, Ukraine was one of the largest grain-exporting countries. The Soviet regime and collectivization greatly impaired and reduced the significance of Ukrainian agriculture, although some modernization, such as mechanization, has been introduced. Soviet statistics give the following data with respect to the farm area of the Ukrainian SSR:

Year	*Millions of Acres*
1913	68.9
1940	77.3
1958	80.3
1980	82.9

The statistics indicate an increase in the overall farm area in the years after the Communist revolution. Nevertheless, the acreage actually used for grain production for immediate consumer needs declined steadily, as shown below:

Grain-Sowing Area in Millions of Acres[13]

Year	*Acres*
1913	60.0
1940	52.6
1958	49.4
1980	40.7

The sowing area used directly for grain production is much smaller now than some sixty years ago, even though the population of the country has increased by some 14.5 million people during the same period of time. It has been the Soviet farm policy over the years to withdraw considerable acreage from grain production and convert it to the production of

sugar beets, cotton, and other staples—the so-called technical crops. Nevertheless, the decreased acreage for grain production would be no problem at all if it were compensated by an increase in farm productivity. But this has not been the case to any substantial degree.

For example, in 1909-1913, Ukraine produced some 25 million tons of the four leading grain crops—wheat, rye, barley, and oats—amounting to 10 percent of the total world grain output. In 1931-35, Ukrainian grain output decreased to 24.6 million tons, only 9 per cent of the world total. In later years, the Soviets claimed to have considerably increased land productivity per acre, but Western economists, taking into consideration the notorious Soviet troubles with their farm economy, did not believe the official Russian statistics. Harry Schwartz, summarizing Western evaluations, said that between 1949 and 1955 Soviet grain production remained essentially stationary, while 1952-1953 brought grain shortages due to low productivity. The years 1959-1960 again resulted in serious shortages in Soviet agriculture, and in the Ukrainian SSR in particular. In 1960 Khrushchev officially accused the Ukrainian Government and the Ukrainian people of negligence, lack of industry and socialist zeal, and even of sabotage. A purge followed.

It cannot be denied that the Soviets have made attempts since the First Five-Year Plan, in 1928, to increase agricultural productivity. Mechanization was advanced, scientific management of farms introduced, and electricity installed in more than half of the collective and almost all of the state farms. Emphasis was put on rational specialization in related crops. Powered farm machinery has been emphasized since 1958. Tractors, trucks, combines, elevators, and tractor-drawn machines such as corn planters, pickers, plows, and rotary hoes have aided the farm worker in an attempt to raise "socialist" efficiency. The following statistical table attempts to give an approximate picture of the mechanization of farming in the Ukrainian SSR:

Tractors and Combines between 1940 and 1980 in Thousands

	1940	1958	1962	1980
Tractors	77.3	251.2	339.2	408.8
Combines	27.9	66.8	64.2	89.9

Of course, these figures are low when compared with the mechanization of American, German, or French farming.[14] In 1962 American farmers operated over 5 million tractors and German farmers close to 750 thousand. In these two countries agricultural efficiency rose while the number of the mechanical implements increased and the percentage of farm workers to total population declined. This was not always the case in Ukraine under the Soviets.

As a matter of fact, success has been only modest in the Soviet effort to increase farm productivity. In order to conceal the discouraging facts, the Soviet Government has chosen in recent years to publish its agricultural statistics in terms of sowing acreage and percentages, rather than in volumes and tons of grain production per acre or per farm worker. The reason for the lack of farm success in Ukraine lies primarily in the psyche of the Ukrainian peasant, who psychologically did not accept collectivization, and in the internal deficiencies of Soviet economic planning, which is less adaptable to farming than to any other industry.

This situation is seen also in the case of the so-called farmsteads, small plots of land ranging from one-half to two acres of land, left at the disposition of individual peasant families for their private use. Although these farmsteads were small, both before and after the Second World War peasants managed to use them to produce a relatively high yield in flax, potatoes, sugar beets, hemp, vegetables, and sunflowers, while breeding a few chickens and keeping a cow or goat to add to their meager standard of living. They worked much more industriously on their own plots than on the collective farms. Eventually, in the fifties, the Soviet Government said

the farmsteads were responsible for low productivity in the collectives, and began their partial liquidation.

Prior to the First World War, Ukraine had been a granary of Europe, with large surpluses in grain production in the Dniepropetrovsk, Kherson, Tavria, and Kuban regions. As a result of Soviet policies, after the Second World War, Ukraine's acreage of wheat, rye, barley, and oats was considerably below the 1913 levels, and only the acreage and output of corn had substantially increased, according to the official *National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR* and other Soviet publications. However, there was some improvement in the 1950s in comparison with the 1940s and the early years of collectivization.

In so-called industrial crops—such as potatoes, sugar beets, cotton, hemp and flax, and tobacco—the Soviets achieved good results as far as volume and productivity rates are concerned. The production of potatoes was substantial in Ukraine prior to the First World War, although its efficiency per acre was low—far behind the United States, Germany, Belgium, and France. At that time, Ukraine occupied fourth place among the potato-producing nations of the world. During the forced collectivization, the potato productivity per acre declined drastically, as was the case with the production of grain. Later on the raising of potatoes greatly increased, especially on the farmsteads, to supplement the peasant diet.

Considerable success has been scored by the Soviets in the field of sugar-beet production. From 1913 to 1979, sugar beet crops were increased from 9.3 to 47.0 million tons, obviously at the expense of grain production. In 1935, Ukraine became the largest sugar-beet producer of the world, and she ranked as second with some 24 percent of the world's total in 1965. Sugar-beet productivity per acre is, however, still low in Ukraine as compared with Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States.[15]

The production of tobacco has been in relative regression. Tobacco acreage has not increased since 1913, while produc-

tivity per acre has risen only slightly, not keeping pace with the growing population. The production of cotton has been successful. The first experiments failed because of inadequate irrigation. According to the official Soviet statistics, cotton acreage has been reduced since 1940 by some 55-60 percent. In the eighteenth century, hemp and flax were important export crops in Ukraine, and they have recently regained their importance. Hemp acreage has increased since 1913 by some 30 percent, from 316.5 to 412.5 thousand acres. In the production of hemp and flax, Ukraine is now supposedly second in the world.

The early 1960s brought unexpected and grave worsening of farm conditions in the USSR, including the Ukrainian SSR. Even Khrushchev admitted this, as had been pointed out. The Seven-Year Plan had called for raising Soviet agricultural productivity by 20 to 25 per cent. Instead, in 1961, it decreased in some parts of the Soviet Union by more than 6 percent. There was not much improvement in 1980, as Soviet statistics indicated. *Narodnoie Khaziaistvo SSR v 1962* and *1980 gadu*, the official publications of the Central Statistical Agency of the USSR, supplied the following figures with respect to the relative achievements of Ukrainian agriculture in millions of tons relative to growth of population.

Product	*1961*	*1979*	*1980*
Wheat	15.2	17.3	21.3
Maize	14.0	3.9	4.0
Other grains	8.3	11.2	12.3
Sugar beets	29.4	47.0	47.2
Sunflowers	2.2	2.6	0.9
Flax	0.7	0.8	2.2
Potatoes	19.1	23.1	13.1
Meat	2.0	3.6	2.0
Milk	14.3	21.6	13.1

The relative decline in the grain production is all too appar-

ent, signifying real trouble to come if the trend continued.[16] The situation really got out of hand at the end of 1963. The Government of the USSR began negotiating with the United States, Canada, France, and some other countries to purchase grain and flour for more than one billion dollars to alleviate a dramatic food shortage. Droughts, mismanagement, lack of fertilizers, the rapidly declining labor efficiency of the farm, and undernourished farm workers all contributed to the overall decline in the agricultural economy of the Ukrainian SSR.

In January 1964, the American Central Intelligence Agency published a report on the overall plight of the Soviet economy: the decline of its annual growth from 8-10 to 2½ percent, its shrinking gold reserves, its decline in food production by some 25 percent of the 1961 level, the decrease in the wheat production by 10 million tons from the 1962 level, and other serious economic problems. According to the report, farming and the consumer-goods industries seemed again to be problems for the Soviet economy; heavy industries and the production of armaments were much sounder. The Soviets tried to some extent to conceal the gravity of their farm problems. But foreign visitors, in particular in Ukraine, and private letters received in America and Western Europe disclosed that no basic food—wheat flour, rice, cereals, fats, meat—was anywhere near an adequate supply, especially for the rural population. And by the late spring of 1964 a serious threat of famine had developed in Ukraine, the former bread-basket of Europe.[17]

The 1970s and early 1980s brought another catastrophic decline in farm output. In 1981, Brezhnev himself painted a very gloomy picture of agricultural economy. Since the 1960s the Soviets had been forced to import grain from various countries, as already pointed out, and the rate of importation had increased. This truly reflected farming conditions in Ukraine, which had been a bread basket of Europe when free enterprise in agriculture was allowed.

As Holubnychy has asserted, the gloomy state of the Ukrainian grain harvest can be seen in the following statistics:

Year	*Total Harvest, Millions of Tons*	*Average Yield per Acre in Tons*
1940	26.4	1.2
1946	16.5	0.5
1961	23.8	0.34
1966	23.8	0.69
1978	33.4	0.87
1980	33.9	1.1

The immediate post-war years saw a dramatic decline, followed by a slight recovery and a decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[18]

Fruit orchards were famous in Ukraine prior to the First World War. Collectivization largely destroyed fruit growing. Then the industry began to revive, but the Second World War diminished orchard acreage even more. In the early fifties, the Soviets again stressed fruit growing. Since then its acreage has been gradually rising, but too slowly and inadequately, and it is still far below the 1913 and 1940 levels.

CATTLE-RAISING. The forced collectivization process most adversely affected cattle-, horse-, and hog-raising in Ukraine. After the domination of Ukraine by the Soviets the raising of livestock declined. After 1934, it began to revive; according to Soviet statistics. The figures seemed to be considerably inflated, however, in view of the notorious shortages of meat, meat products, and dairy goods reported elsewhere.

Livestock in Millions of Head

	1941	1971	1981
Cows	5.9	8.6	9.2
Hogs	9.2	20.7	9.7
Sheep and Goats	7.3	9.0	9.2
Birds	69.6	155.2	232.8

Of course, these statistics need some explanation. When taken superficially, they may be grossly misleading. First of all, until 1928 was the era of the New Economic Policy, which was a temporary compromise with economic individualism. Hence, the Ukrainian peasant was relatively free to pursue his economic self-interest. His standard of living and his properties could increase to some extent. This is the explanation for the relatively high number of livestock in Ukraine in 1928.

The year 1933 is a dramatic contrast. The forced collectivization of 1929-1933 decimated livestock; the peasants did not want to cooperate with the collectivization, nor did the collective farm management have the knowledge and facilities to prevent this disaster. The number of livestock in 1933 was critically low.

The years 1940 and 1959 presented a mixed picture: the number of horses and goats progressively declined. The decline of horse breeding may be justified to some extent, however, by the progressive mechanization of collective and state farms—although a considerable amount of farm work was still done in a primitive way and the horse could certainly be helpful.

The increase of sheep breeding can be easily explained. Objectively, in Ukraine, especially in the mountain areas, there were good conditions for developing sheep rearing and wool production.

The number of cows and hogs has increased in the Ukrain-

ian SSR since the Second World War. But it must be borne in mind that a considerable percentage, perhaps up to 30 percent, of the total number belongs to the small peasant "farmsteads" which still continue the idea of private self-interest. *Statistical Collection of the Ukrainian SSR* indicated for 1955 that some 3.1 million cows and some 4.5 million hogs were raised on the "private" peasant farmsteads. These numbers certainly do not reflect any achievements of collectivization. They underscore the relative significance of the individual "farmsteads." The trend continues today.

Cattle-raising developed to some extent in North Caucasus, but the available pasture lands in the Carpathian Mountains were never properly utilized. Where more intensive methods of agriculture were introduced, as in Galicia, cattle-raising, and in particular sheep-rearing, had to yield ground.

FORESTRY, HUNTING, AND FISHING. Forestry is another weakness of the collective economy of the Soviet type in Ukraine. In the distant past Ukrainian forest resources had been substantial, and forestry was an important industry. But in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the profit-motivated Polish or Polanized nobility, which at that time claimed the ownership of land resources, ruthlessly exploited the Ukrainian forests by cutting timber, manufacturing tar and potash, and exporting these products on a grand scale. Woods were decimated and forest reserves dangerously depleted. Until the end of the nineteenth century no forest conservation or re-forestation programs were undertaken in Ukraine by the occupation governments. The First World War and the subsequent collectivization experiments caused a further depletion of the forests. From 1880 to 1932, forest reserves declined from 10.5 million to 6.2 million acres. Forest reserves exist mainly in the mountain areas of the Carpathians and Caucasus, and in the northern regions of Ukraine, Chernyhiv, Polissia, North Volhinia, and Pidlasha. The

Soviet regime did next to nothing to conserve or develop the forest resources of the Ukrainian SSR, although the opportunities for reforestation of the country were considerable.

As far as two other extractive industries, hunting and fishing were concerned, their economic significance in Ukraine was relatively negligible in the Soviet era. The Communist Government of the Ukrainian SSR paid little attention to hunting and fishing, inasmuch as these two activities have little military or industrial importance. The Soviets have so far been interested mostly in those industries with military potential. With the depletion of forest resources and the progress of scientific farming in the steppe areas, the reserves of game also decreased throughout Ukraine. By the end of the nineteenth century hunting had declined. At the moment hunting supplements the diet of the country folk in the forest areas, such as the Polissia marshes, and functions as recreation for Communist officials.

Fishing is a little more important than hunting, and it can be classified in three categories: high-sea, river-mount (or *lyman*), and interior-land fishing, in the rivers, lakes, and ponds. According to *The Soviet Union in Facts and Figures*, "a rich fish population is found in the rivers of the Baltic, Black Sea Basin. The fish population of the Black and Azov Seas contains herrings, bullheads, grey mullets, sturgeons, sea-pike, perch, etc." Not much statistical material has been published on the fishing industry; nor has much attention been paid to fishing in the scholarly works on the economy and economic geography of Ukraine published by the Academy of Learning of the Ukrainian SSR. This is, no doubt, an indication of the relatively minor significance of the industry in the framework of the Ukrainian national economy as a whole, although there are great opportunities for its development. *Narodnoie Khaziaistvo SSR* mentions only that there was a considerable decline in the industry after 1960, but that it has begun to recover in recent years as shown by the following statistics:

Total fish production in thousand tons

Year	*Year*	*Year*
1960	1965	1980
535.8	495.5	934.0

The collective fishing industry of the Danube River is centered in Vilkivo and Kilia. High-sea fishing and sea-fish processing industries, as a state-run business, developed in the Crimean Peninsula, in the cities of Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Ismail, and Tahanrih. In the city of Kerch, in the Crimea, there is a large harbor in which fishing occurs in the fall and spring when fish travel from the Black to Azov Sea. Interior-land fishing, river and lake fishing in particular, in large rivers and in the Polissia regions, has some economic importance, but not so much as other types of fishing.

In spite of the great weaknesses of the Ukrainian agriculture and related extractive industries, caused largely by collectivization and Soviet-Russian colonial exploitation, their economic significance and potential within the Soviet Eurasian economy are very considerable, as the approximate figures of the following table illustrate:

Output of Selected Commodities in Ukraine as Percentage of the Total Production of the USSR[19]

Commodity	*USSR*	*Ukr. SSR*
Sugar Beets	100	68.0
Grain	100	20.0
Potatoes	100	24.0
Fruits	100	30.0
Cattle	100	20.0
Hogs	100	28.0
Horses	100	16.8
Milk and Meat	100	25.0

MINING. Among mining resources, iron ore doubtlessly occupies the leading position. The principal iron ore deposits are located in the Kryvyi-Rih and Kerch regions, on the littorals of the Azov Sea, on the borders of the Zaporozhe, Donetsk, and Voroshilovhrad districts, in the Donets Basin, on the left bank of the Dnieper River toward the city of Poltava, in the so-called Kremenchuk deposits, in newly discovered deposits in the Dniepropetrovsk region, and in relatively poor but easily accessible deposits, in the Odessa, Kiev, Zhytomyr, Sub-Caucasia, and Polissia areas.

Iron ore deposits in the Kryvyi Rih area are rich and with a high iron content of about 60 percent iron. There are also poorer ores, some 25-45 percent of the deposits containing a percentage of other minerals, but little sulphur. The Kryvyi Rih deposits can be found on a territory some 70-75 miles long and from 3-4 miles wide.

The iron ore deposits in the Kerch Peninsula are of poorer quality; iron content runs 33-42 percent, with a considerable amount of manganese and phosphate. In other areas, including a southern part of the Kursk region, iron deposits do not have the same economic importance because they are not as rich, either qualitatively or quantitatively. Dniepropetrovsk, Odessa, and Kiev have brown oxygenic ores, but these deposits have been rather recently discovered and have not yet been adequately estimated and exploited. The Kremenchuk iron ore deposits are expected to be equal to the Kryvyi Rih ores in quality. Recently, in the Kryvyi Rih area, small deposits of uranium have been discovered, but the size of the deposits has not been disclosed by the Soviets.

Ukraine holds fifth place among the iron-ore producing nations of the world. She is responsible for some 56 percent of the total iron ore extraction of the Soviet Union, 51 percent of pig iron, and 38 per cent of the steel production. Only the United States, the Russian SSR, England, and France exceed Ukraine. Total iron ore deposits in Ukraine were estimated in 1965 at 17.312 million tons.

In the area of Nikopol, South Ukraine, on the right bank of the River Dniepre, are the richest deposits of manganese ores in the world. They cover an area of some sixty square miles, the western section of which has richer and better quality ores, averaging some 30 percent in manganese content. The deposits run from twenty-five to ninety yards deep and average two yards to one foot in thickness. Only the manganese ores extracted in Chiatura, Georgia and in India are of higher content and quality than those produced in Nikopol, Ukraine. Manganese ores can be found, in about thirty other places in Ukraine, in the Kirovohrad regions and the Carpathian mountains, but these deposits so far have little significance. Nevertheless Ukraine is the largest producer of manganese ore in the world, with a total estimated supply of 2,950 million tons, some 28 percent of the world's reserves and some 86 percent of the total Soviet reserves as of 1970.

Titanic ores are available in small quantities in several places in Ukraine. Mercury deposits in the Donets Basin, estimated at many tons of reserves, are very important for industrial uses. Quantitatively significant are the deposits of zinc and lead ores in the Kuban region and in the Donets Basin. Reserves of copper ores are negligible.In several places in Ukraine, aluminum, nickel, and chrome ore deposits have been discovered recently as a result of intensive scientific exploration sponsored by the Soviet Government. These deposits, however, have so far not been utilized to an adequate extent for the country's industrial purposes.

Among the non-metalic mineral resources in Ukraine, certainly coal deposits are most important. Large and rich coal deposits are available in the Donets Basin, covering an area of about 9,000 square miles, with the supply estimated at some 190 billion tons. For a long time, coal was mined in the seams which were immediately under the surface. This made mining possible at rather low costs. In the 1970s, however, deeper and deeper digging was required, and this presented a major cost problem to the Soviets. The Donets coal is of a lower quality

than that mined in the Soviet Kuzbas and the German Ruhr area; it contains more impurities, such as ashes and sulphur, making the carbonization process so much more difficult.

In the 1940s, considerable coal deposits were discovered in Western Ukraine, in the so-called Galician-Volhinian coal basin. They were estimated at 1.7 billion tons, and their full industrial capacity has not been realized until the 1970s. The sub-Caucasian and Kuban coal reserves, presently outside the political territory of Ukraine, have been estimated to be as high as 855 million tons. They have considerable industrial significance, although their quality and calorific value are relatively low. The coal deposits in the Crimean Peninsula, estimated as up to 340 million tons, are approximately of the same quality as those in the sub-Caucasian region and Kuban. Some coal deposits also exist in various places in the Dniepropetrovsk, Sumy, southern Kharkiv, and Chernyhiv regions.

Many varieties of coal can be identified in Ukraine. In the Donets Basin, high quality anthracite makes up some 30 percent of its total coal reserves. Bituminous coal constitutes some 25 percent of the Donets deposits. Gas and furnace coal, available mostly in the central and western sections of the Basin, and other kinds of coal are scattered all over in various sections of the country. Numerous deposits of brown coal in Western Ukraine, Kryvyi Rih, Volhinia, Dniepropetrovsk, the sub-Carpathian region, Carpathian Ukraine, and Bukovina represent a very important industrial raw material for the manufacture of gas and several by-products.

Among other fuels, natural gas is most abundantly supplied in Ukraine and in quantities which may suffice for many future generations. Its industrial use and application are currently increasing at a very fast rate. It can also be used to cover consumer and household needs. Natural gas deposits are available in many sections of the country: in the sub-Carpathian petroleum area and the Volhinian-Podillian plateau in Western Ukraine in particular; in the regions of

Dashava, Boryslav, Opary, and Kalush; in the Dniepropetrovsk, Donets, and Kharkiv areas and southern and eastern Ukraine; also in the Crimean Peninsula and on the shores of the Black and Azov Seas. The production of natural gas is relatively inexpensive, and today it is servicing, through huge pipe lines, several cities, such as Kiev, Kharkiv, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Ternopil, Zhytomyr, and Chernyhiv, as well as some villages. A huge pipe line, Dashava-Kiev-Bryansk-Moscow, brought Ukrainian natural gas to Moscow and other Russian cities. Subsequently, new pipe lines were initiated, including Dashava-Minsk-Vilnus-Riga and Minsk-Leningrad. This is another example of the colonial exploitation of Ukrainian resources to further Russian industrial growth. In the 1960s some 26 billion cubic meters of natural gas were produced yearly, and the Soviets developed plans to increase the output in the following fifteen years to 300 billion cubic meters yearly. Some natural gas was also located in north Caucasia, and it usually can be found along with petroleum deposits.

As far as oil reserves and production are concerned, Ukraine ranks among the important petroleum-producing nations of the world. Her petroleum reserves are estimated at up to several billion tons. The main oil reserves of Ukraine are located in sub-Carpathian Western Ukraine, the Dnieper-Donets Basin, Kuban, and sub-Caucasia. Western Ukrainian oil fields extend for some 300 miles, from the city of Jaslo to the Bukovina region, covering an area of some 23,000 acres, with wells located in Drohobych, Boryslav, Tustanovychi, Skhidnytsia, Bytkiv, and Jaslo. In the Kuban region, the oil fields extend from the Taman Peninsula to the city of Maikop, the center of the industry, and the River Laba. The sub-Caucasian oil area is located around the city of Groznyi and on the banks of the River Terek. The best petroleum is produced in Grozny, with sub-Carpathian oil ranking second. In the 1960's petroleum deposits, which have not been fully estimated and utilized as of yet, were discovered in the Dniepropetrovsk, Romni,

Poltava, and Myrhorod regions. Mineral wax, which is rare throughout the world, is available in small quantities in Boryslav and other places in sub-Carpathian Galicia.

Peat or turf reserves are to be found mainly in the northern section of Ukraine—Polissia, Cherniyhiv, Volhinia—and the northern Kiev area as well, with some reserves in Poltava and Western Ukraine. Total reserves were estimated in the past at up to 2.8 million tons.

Salt deposits—cooking, rock, and potash salts—occur throughout the entire country. Ukraine is probably the third country in the world, after the United States and Germany, as far as the riches of its salt reserves are concerned. The richest salt deposits are located in sub-Carpathian Western Ukraine—in the towns of Kalush, Stebnyk, and Solotvyna in particular—in the northwestern area of the Donets Basin, near the cities of Artimivske and Slavyanske, in the Poltava and Sumy regions, and in many salt lakes on the shores of the Black and Azov Seas. In the Crimean Peninsula alone, brine salt is derived from about 300 salt lakes. In Kuban, glauber salt is available. It is hard to estimate the total salt supply in the Ukrainian deposits. Up to 120 billion tons of extraordinarily pure salt, uniform in its chemical composition, may be in the Donets area, about 450 million tons in Western Ukraine, and many more millions of tons in other places. In the salt lakes on the sea shores, there are considerable quantities of other minerals, such as kaolin, bromide, and magnesium, along with salt.

Phosphate deposits can be found in three areas of Ukraine: on the banks of the River Dniester and its left-bank tributaries in Galicia and Podillia in the Chernyhiv region, on the right bank of the Desna River, and in the northwestern section of the Donets Basin. The total phosphate reserves in Ukraine have been estimated at up to 62 million tons. Podillian phosphates are of the highest quality with up to 38 percent phosphate acid content; Galicia deposits are up to 25 percent in

phosphate acid content, Desna deposits up to 20 percent, and Donets deposits up to 18 percent.

Among the other minerals worth mentioning in Ukraine, there are sulphur, kaolin, clay, limestone, gypsum, granite, quartz, sand, and labradorite. Sulphur deposits, along with gypsum and other minerals, are available in the Donets Basin, Podillia, Galicia, and Chernyhiv regions. Kaolin deposits cover a large area, from the Volhinian marshes to the shores of the Azov Sea, the central section of the Ukrainian crystalloid plateau, and can be found in more than one thousand locations. The quality of the deposits varies considerably, but they are estimated to have up to 50 million tons of pure kaolin. Clay deposits, like those of kaolin, are spread all over Ukraine, in the Donets Basin, Dniepropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Podillia, Volhinia, and Galicia. Gypsum deposits are in the Artymovsk and Podillia regions. Limestone can be found all over Ukraine, the quality ranging from excellent to poor. Granite of a great variety is available on the central crystalloid plateau, and in the Carpathian and Caucasian mountains. Graphite can be found in substantial quantities in Podillia, the Kryvyi Rih region, and on the littorals of the Azov Sea.[20]

The potential of the mining industry has already been indicated in the analysis of metallic and non-metallic ore resources available in Ukraine. Yet, before we turn to Ukrainian manufacturing industries, it is necessary to discuss briefly the extent, volume, and growth of mining under the Soviet regime in Ukraine as compared with pre-revolutionary days. This time, however, the comparison will be more favorable for the Soviets than in the case of agriculture. Since mining is essential for heavy industry and armament, it became one of the first concerns of the Russian-Communist regime. The growth in output of the mining industry has been enforced and therefore frequently rapid, and at expense of other branches of the economy of the Ukrainian SSR. A few statis-

tical figures, given below, will clearly illustrate the great increase in mining from 1913 to 1980, which is especially impressive in the years after World War II. The production volumes of coal, iron ore, petroleum, natural gas, manganese ore, and turf are reliable indicators of the trend between 1913 and 1980.

Growth of Mining Output of Selected Minerals[21]

Product and Year	*Tons (Millions of Cubic Meters of Natural Gas)*
A. Coal	
1913	22,796.000
1928	24,832.000
1956	137,700.000
1980	197,000.000
B. Iron Ore	
1913	6,870.000
1928	4,700.000
1933	17,200.000
1961	66,600.000
1980	125,500.000
C. Petroleum (in ethnic Ukraine)	
1913	2,490.000
1928	4,540.000
1962	7,000.000
1980	6,500.000
D. Manganese Ore	
1913	276.000
1928	531.000
1937	960.000
1962	2,300.000
1980	6,920.000
E. Natural Gas	
1913	—
1948	1,228.000
1955	2,927.600
1960	14,300.000
1962	26,150.000
1980	68,700.000

Unfortunately, however, this impressive increase in mining output has not been used to promote the overall development of Ukraine's national economy, nor to satisfy civilian needs and raise the standard of living of her population. Rather, it has facilitated the growth of the aggressive Soviet war machine, at the expense of the Ukrainian land and the Ukrainian people.

Nevertheless, modest achievements in the extractive industries and in agriculture in particular, in Ukraine and other parts of the USSR, at one time compelled Khrushchev to admit the value of capitalistic business methods. In 1963 he made an appeal to the people to act like capitalists but remain loyal to Communism. At one time, Khrushchev even suggested abandoning collective farming. Eventually, domestic economic chaos coupled with political and diplomatic unrest brought his dismissal from office, in October 1964.

Less than one month later, the new leadership of the USSR announced an important relaxation of restrictions on farming and gardening, in particular in Ukraine, where conditions were poor. Brezhnev, admitting the great productivity of the privately managed peasant "farmsteads" (33 percent of the agricultural output and almost 50 percent of the cattle raised in the Soviet Union), granted the peasants greater freedom in their small-scale farming and cattle-raising and indicated a need to compensate individual efficiency in these areas. However, as long as collectivism prevails in the USSR, there will be little economic improvement in the country, and even less in Ukraine.

Andropov's tenure was too short to affect the Ukrainian economy, although he tried to suppress inefficiency, negligence, carelessness, hoodlumism, embezzlement, and the like—but with little effect. The same campaign against vice was also undertaken by M. Gorbachev, also without much success.

Notes

[1]C. Kononenko and G. Makhiv, "Agriculture in Central and Eastern Ukraine, 1914-39," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 849-852; I. Vytanovych, "Agriculture of Western Ukraine between 1914 and 1939," *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 858-860.

[2]The text and interpretation of the Land Reform Act of January 1918: P. Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revolutsii, 1917-1920 rr.*, New York, 1969, Vol. II, pp. 128-132; also N. Chirovsky, "Silsko-hospodarska reforma z 1918 roku," 1978, in manuscript.

[3]I. Koropetsky, "Branches of Ukrainian Industry," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 782-801.

[4]I. Vytanovych, *Istoria ukrainskoho kooperatyvnoho rukhu*, New York, 1964; the same, "The Cooperative Movement, the Western Lands"; V. Holubnychy, "The Cooperative Movement, Cooperatives under the Communist Regime," both articles in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, as quoted, Vol. II, pp. 982-989; also E. Deshko, *Kooperatsia na Ukraini*, Kharkiv, 1927.

[5]B. Martos and Y. Zozula, *Hroshi ukrainskoi derzhavy*, Munich, 1972; also V. Holubnychy, "Finances," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, as quoted above, Vol. II, pp. 956-958.

[6]Martos, *ibid.*; Holubnychy, *ibid.*

[7]Holubnychy, "Soviet Finances before the 1930 Reform," *ibid.*; the same, "The Soviet Economic System in Ukraine," *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 710-724; I. Koropetsky, "Industry," *ibid.*, pp. 759-766; N. Chirovsky, *Ukrainian Economy*, New York, 1965, pp. 9-14, 31-32, 46-47, 69-70; Kononenko, Makhiv, and Holubnychy, *op. cit.*, pp. 849-858; I. Vytanovych, "Agriculture of Western Ukraine between 1914 and 1939," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 858-860.

[8]H. Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, New York, 1954, pp. 108-109.

[9]*Ibid.*, pp. 334-335; Kononenko, Makhiv, and Holubnychy, *op. cit.*, 853-854; W. Pliushch, "Health and Medical Services," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, community in the Free World solemnly and on a great scale commemorated the tragedy of "the Great Famine," artificially arranged by the Russians. *The Ukrainian Weekly, Special issue: The Great Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933*, Sunday, March 20, 1982. The issue contained a progress report on the forthcoming book on collectivization and the famine by R. Conquest to be published soon. Conquest concluded that, not seven or ten, but rather fourteen million Ukrainians were starved to death by the Soviet-Russian regime. Yet, the horrible crime did not move the conscience of the Free World as the shooting down of the Korean airline with 269

passengers in September 1983 did; W. Hryshko, *The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933*, Toronto, 1983; M. Dolot, *Who Killed Them and Why?*, Cambridge, 1984.

[10]Vytanovych, *loc. cit.*

[11]I. Vytanovych, "The Cooperative Movement," in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 984-987; the same, *Istoria ukrainskoho kooperatyvnoho rukhu*, as quoted.

[12]Collective and state farms: Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-33; *Narodnoie Khaziaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR*, 1980, Kiev, 1981. p. 138.

[13]Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34; *Narodnoie Khaziaistvo*, p. 155; hectares being converted in acreage.

[14]*Ibid.*, p. 144; also *Narodnoie Kaziaistvo SSSR v 1962*, Moscow, 1963, pp. 324-325, and for 1980, Moscow, 1981, pp. 260-261; Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[15]*Ibid.*, p. 37.

[16]*Narodnoie Khaziaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR*, pp. 148-151; Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

[17]*U.S. News and World Report*, Dec. 3, 1962, p. 65; May 6, 1963, pp. 45-47; Nov. 18, 1963, pp. 50-54; Jan. 20, 1964, pp. 54-65; *Svoboda*, daily, Jersey City, N.J., Dec. 27, 1963; M. Bohatiuk, "Moskva i svitove hospodarstvo," *Homin Ukrainy*, Toronto, Jan. 1 and 8, 1964; *New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1964, pp. 1-2, and Jan. 9, 1964, pp. 1 and 10.

[18]V. Holubnychy, "Agriculture in the Postwar Period (1945-68)," in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, as quoted, Vol. II., p. 861, and *Narodnoie Khaziaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR*, 1980, p. 192.

[19]*Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR*, Kiev, 1957, pp. 108-109, and *SSSR v tsyfrakh v 1960 gadu*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 128-144, percentages computed by the author; also Holubnychy, *op. cit.*, pp. 860-864; *The Statesman's Yearbook, 1982-1983*, New York, 1982, pp. 1252-1254.

[20]V. Holubnychy, "Mineral Resources," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, pp. 734-749; Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-27.

[21]*Ibid.*, p. 44; the tables were computed from the statistical figures quoted by *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR*, pp. 34-40; *SSSR v tsyfrakh*, pp. 141-143; and *Narodnoie Khaziaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR*, 1980, pp. 88-89, 110, 202, and others.

CHAPTER TEN

INDUSTRY, COMMERCE, AND FINANCE

Manufacturing—Metallurgy and Machine Industry—Electrical Industry—Chemical Industry—Construction Materials—Food Processing and Light Industries—Domestic Trade—Foreign Trade—Transportation—Communications—Finance

MANUFACTURING. Russian imperial interests, as mentioned before, began to penetrate Ukraine at the end of the seventeenth century. At that time also, the principles of mercantilism were applied in the politics and economics of the Tsarist empire, which intended Ukraine to be an agricultural colony of the Russian Eurasian market. This immediately determined the specific trend of the industrial development of the country. Only those industries were permitted to grow in Ukraine which were not potential competitors of Russian industry, or which were dependent upon the immediate availability of Ukrainian raw materials, the transportation of which to Russia itself was too costly. Once established as policy, it was then pursued by St. Petersburg with iron determination. Machine and metal-goods manufacturing can serve as an example. Only 17 percent of the total number of machine and metal workers of the empire were employed in Ukraine, while at the same time Ukraine supplied some 66 to 75 percent of all raw materials for machine and metal goods and tool

manufacturing of the entire Tsarist economy. The processing of those raw materials, therefore, was carried out largely in the Muscovite regions.

With the advent of the Communist Revolution and the Communist domination of Ukraine, things changed a little, but not for long. During the New Economic Policy era, various branches of manufacturing recovered from their wartime destruction and once more reached their prewar levels of output. They continued to rise steadily in terms of facilities and production volume. During the eras of the Five-Year Plans, however, although Ukrainian manufacturing industries were still increasing and expanding, their share of the total production of the USSR gradually declined. This came as a result of the economic policies of the Kremlin, which favored, protected, and enforced a dramatic increase of manufacturing in the territories of Russia proper, and which discriminated against Ukraine.

Great losses were suffered by Ukraine during the Second World War, not only because of war destruction from military operations, but also because of specific and discriminatory Soviet policies at that time. Military operations ruined some sixteen thousand industrial plants and establishments in Ukraine. Over and above that, however, the Soviets dismantled and evacuated a great many Ukrainian plants to distant regions of the Russian SSR, ostensibly to save them from the German invasion. But they were never returned to Ukraine, thus diminishing once more Ukrainian industrial potential. The Kharkiv tractor plant, one of the largest in the pre-war Soviet Union, was transferred to the Asian Altai land. The Kharkiv Transport-machine plant was evacuated to the Urals. Many machine, electrical, locomotive-construction, shipbuilding, and other industrial establishments from Kharkiv, Novokramatorske, Voroshylovhrad, Zaporizhe, and Odessa were dismantled and, totally or in large part, shipped to the eastern USSR. They remained there permanently, in line with the new Soviet economic policy of developing indus-

trial centers in the distant Asian regions of the Union, and because of the military considerations. Less important industrial activity was left to the Ukrainian SSR in the years to come.

Soviet discrimination against the national economy of Ukraine in the post-war era was evident in the Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans, and in the whole process of postwar reconstruction. The Fourth Five-Year Plan allocated to the Ukrainian SSR only 15.9 percent of total Soviet capital investments designed for reconstruction and development. The Fifth Five-Year Plan reduced that percentage to 15.2 percent, and the Seven-Year Plan to 11.1 percent. The allocation of capital investment in Ukraine has been far smaller than the overall importance of the Ukrainian economy to the entire Soviet Union, as already mentioned. This has been reflected in the rate of post-war development of Ukrainian manufacturing, which was considerably behind the rate of industrial growth of the Ural and Siberian manufacturing regions. A comparison of the years 1940 and 1955 in the production of pig iron and steel, using 1940 as the base, indicates the trend:

Pig Iron and Steel Production in Ukraine and the Ural and Siberian Regions, 1940-1955

1940 OUTPUT = 100[1]

Area	*Increase in Pig Iron Output by 1955*	*Increase in Steel Output by 1955*
Ukraine	60	55
Urals	260	270
Siberia	120	170

At the same time the production of coal in Ukraine increased

by 66 percent, but in the Russian coal regions (Muscovy, Kusbas, the Urals, and Karanganda) it increased by more than 300 percent on the average. It is most evident that the Soviets cared less for war-torn Ukrainian industries than for the relatively untouched Russian industries; and this major economic-political trend continued during the Seven-Year Plan of the USSR. Matters improved in the 1960s and 1970s, when Ukrainian metallurgical industries began to grow.

In order to properly evaluate the development of manufacturing in Ukraine, it is indispensable to analyze briefly the rate of growth of labor productivity in the entire USSR. In Tsarist Russia, industrial labor productivity was drastically lower than in the European West, as Balzak has stated.[2] In 1928 and 1932, it was still far behind that of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, as Schwartz has stated. Although, on the eve of the Second World War, it seemed the Soviet labor productivity was catching up with that of Great Britain and Germany, it was still only some 40 percent of the labor efficiency of the United States.[3]

The war greatly reduced the efficiency of labor in Ukraine because a great deal of capital equipment in industry was either demolished or evacuated to Russia; and during the first postwar years the Ukrainian worker had to produce with primitive and inadequate tools and appliances.

Official Soviet statistics claim that labor efficiency in Ukrainian industries increased, on average, by 66 percent from 1940 to 1955, and by almost 100 percent by 1960. But this statement is grossly inflated and deceiving. First of all, in the course of the fifties, the Soviet press repeatedly complained about low productivity in various plants throughout the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. This clearly indicated that not everything was going well in the Soviet Union. Secondly, assuming that by 1940 Ukrainian labor efficiency was about 45 percent of that in the United States (it was 40.5 percent for the whole USSR in 1937), by now it would be some 90 percent of that in the United States, according the *Soviet Statistical*

Collection. Campbell, however, has indicated that Soviet labor productivity ranged from less than 10 percent to 96.5 percent of American productivity per worker for various industries in the postwar years. He concluded, therefore, that on the average, by 1960, Soviet labor efficiency per worker was about 40 percent of the level of the United States. Galenson has estimated that Soviet work efficiency was about 65 percent of that of the United States in 1970.[4] The Russians themselves claimed some 50 percent of the American level of labor productivity in the 1970s, according to Campbell. The lack of a proper incentive system, uneven programs of mechanization for various industries, poor organization, faulty planning, and other reasons are given to explain the shortcomings in the Soviet economy.

Hence, the increase in labor productivity in Ukraine looks much more modest and less pretentious than the official statistical data of the Ukrainian SSR would indicate. It is lower than that of the entire USSR for obvious reasons; the greater war destruction in Ukraine, her colonial position in the Union, and lower capital investments in Ukraine than elsewhere in the Union. This does not mean, however, that there was no progress in labor productivity per worker in the economy of the Ukrainian SSR. Mechanization, rationalization, the minute division of labor, the system of assembly line and conveyer, and most recently, intense automation have been applied to increase the industrial efficiency in Ukraine, in Kharkiv, Kremenchuk, Odessa, and Kiev. Automation has also been introduced in the transportation industry and in other fields.

Although the potential for industrial growth has not been fully realized in Ukraine, her share in the industrial output of the Soviet Union as a whole is still a very considerable one. According to statistics for the 1970s the Ukrainian SSR manufactured approximately the following percentages of the total Soviet production:

Coal	36 percent
Iron ore	56 percent
Pig iron	51 percent
Steel	38 percent
Tractors	37 percent
Locomotives	78 percent
Cement	20 percent
Soda ash	50 percent

These percentages have not changed substantially since the 1970s.

Bearing in mind that these figures refer to the Ukrainian SSR, and not to the entire Ukrainian ethnic territory, we must increase Ukraine's share of total Soviet production, by some 4 to 5 percent on average, to give a true picture of Ukraine's value and significance in the economy of the USSR. Nevertheless, if these statistics are compared with similar statistics for Ukraine in 1913 and 1928, we can see Ukraine's slow decline in industrial importance in the Russian empire. As indicated, this comes from the Kremlin's policy of favoring other industrial regions in its vast Eurasian empire because of military and other considerations.

Although Ukrainian manufacturing industries spread throughout the nation, five distinct industrial centers can be named, the Donets Basin, Azov steel, Dniepre Bend, Kerch, and the Lviv (Galician-Volhinian) region. In most cases, these industrial concentrations are centered around raw materials. But sometimes the available labor and labor skills and an abundant supply of power and fuel are determining factors in the development of specific industrial concentrations.

In the Donets Basin, or the Donbas, the heavy iron, heavy engineering, non-ferrous metal, chemical, heavy machine, transportation equipment, iron and steel, construction equipment, coke, gypsum, and salt-processing industries have developed in the form of huge factory establishments such as the giant Novokramatorske machine-construction plant, one

of the largest in the world. The industries of the Basin are concentrated in the cities of Donetsk, Voroshylovhrad, Kramatorske, Horlivka, Makiivka, Constantynivka, Artymovske, and Slavyanske.

METALLURGY AND MACHINE INDUSTRY. In the Dniepre Bend industrial region, in the cities of Kryvyi Rih, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaprozhe, Dnieprodzierzhynsk, Kremenchuk, and Nikopol, pig-iron and steel manufacturing, ship-building, electro-technical manufacturing, radio and television equipment manufacturing, the chemical industry, agricultural machinery production, and other types of industry developed—mainly because of the availability of ores, the nearness of the Donets coal regions, and, most recently, the abundant supply of electrical power from the Dniepre hydro-electric stations in Kachovka, Dniepro-Stan, and Kremenchuk.

In the Azov steel region, with its centers in the cities of Zhdaniv (Mariupil) and Osypenko, with its large manufacturing establishments, heavy metallurgy, machine and turbo-generator construction, agricultural equipment manufacturing, food processing, and other types of industry are increasing their activities.

In the Kerch center, in the Crimean Peninsula, mining and heavy manufacturing have developed because of the nearness of raw-materials. Recently the chemical industry as an outgrowth of petroleum processing, machine construction, and food processing, has gained in importance. However, the Kerch basin has strong connections to the Donbas industrial center, and it can be partially considered an extension of the Donbas region. Thus, the recent economic administration of the Ukrainian SSR, uniting Kerch with the Kherson administrative unit, was poorly conceived.

An industrial region which has developed since the Second World War is the Galician-Volhinian coal basin. Its center is

the city of Lviv, the capital of West Ukraine. Prior to 1940, manufacturing was minimal there. Today, Lviv and some other cities of the basin produce agricultural machinery, mining equipment and tools, elevators, petroleum and natural gas extraction equipment, and some chemicals.

Other industrial plants and manufacturing establishments can be found all over Ukraine, in particular in larger cities, depending upon market needs, available resources, raw material, labor, and capital. The cities constitute their own industrial centers, as Dyminsky has said.

In the central agrarian sections of the country, the processing of agricultural raw materials (dairy products, sugar, textile products, leather goods, distilleries, and breweries), along with the manufacture of medium-heavy machinery, agricultural machinery, and other equipment, as well as building construction have developed in small and medium-sized establishments considerably smaller in size than those in the coal and ore industrial basins. In the Carpathian Mountains area, some chemical industries have developed in connection with petroleum and natural gas extraction and the mining of various kinds of salts. In the Caucasus region, petroleum and tobacco processing, leather manufacturing, and medium-sized machine construction have developed.

Among the large cities, Kharkiv, Kiev, Odessa, Kirovohrad, Donetsk, Sumy, Poltava, and Kherson have reached a high level of industrialization. Kharkiv has become a center for the manufacture of transportation equipment, machine construction, tractors, trucks, and automobiles, electro-technical equipment and appliances, and mine equipment, for shipyards and construction industries, and for food processing. Kiev, the capital city of the Ukrainian SSR, has concentrated in its vicinity shipbuilding and machine construction in particular, automation and excavation equipment, the manufacturing of electro-technical, transportation, chemical, and laboratory equipment, textile and garment factories, sugar refineries, and food processing establishments. In the city of Odessa,

the manufacture of plant equipment, locomotives, tractors, plows, combines, gas generators, motor cars, mining equipment, refrigeration and freezer equipment, cinema, radio and television equipment, food conservation equipment are all prominent along with leather working and the can industry. In Kirovohrad, tractors and other farm machines are manufactured. In Sumy, there is large-scale production of petroleum, and sugar, nitrate processing, and the manufacture of refining equipment serving the whole nation; in Poltava, textile, meat-processing, and electrical equipment. In Kherson, farm machinery and tools are primarily manufactured.

Industrial activities throughout the country are carried out according to the modern mass-production principle, with the application of progressively more modern technology and equipment, especially in the large plants. In many cases, however, in particular in the small towns and the countryside, the facilities and methods are backward, drastically reducing industrial productivity.[5] Automation is feverishly attempted in Ukraine, primarily in her larger plants, to enable the Soviet economy to match and to surpass the economy of the United States. When compared with the great strides in automation in American manufacturing however, Soviet attempts do not seem very impressive. Many things which are considered commonplace in America or West Europe have been hailed by the Soviet press as tremendous achievements, when introduced in Ukraine and elsewhere in the USSR, particularly in the areas of food processing and handling.

There certainly has been great progress in metallurgy, heavy industry, machine construction, and electro-technology in the Soviet Union as a whole and in the Ukrainian SSR, but little progress, if any, has been achieved in the consumer-goods industries, private-home construction, and the service industries. The lack of any balance in the rate of growth of various industrial fields in the Soviet economy is admitted by the Soviets themselves.

Increase in the Output of Producer and Consumer Goods in the USSR between 1928 and 1953 in millions of rubles[6]

Year	*Producer goods*	*Consumer goods*
1928	8.5	12.9
1940	84.8	53.0
1953	240.0	100.0

Thus, in 1928, producer goods constituted some 46.2 percent, and consumer goods 53.8 percent, of total Soviet industrial production. In 1953, according to Malenkov's statements as reported by Schwartz, producer goods were supposed to constitute 70 percent, and consumer goods only 30 percent, of the manufacturing output of the USSR. And the ratio has not changed even today. According to *USSR in Figures* in 1960, using 1940 as the base, in the course of the realization of the All-Union Seven-Year Plan, the output of the means of production was supposed to increase by 7.7 times, and of civilian goods by 4.5 times, by 1965, when the Plan was to be completed.

This means that, by 1965, the rubles value of the production of producer goods amounted to some 653 billion rubles, and of consumer goods some 408 billion. Hence, the output of civilian goods constituted some 37 percent of the total industrial production. Although it might have indicated some slight improvement in the satisfaction of consumer needs, the war-oriented preference shown by the Soviet Government for the manufacture of producer goods (metallurgy, heavy machinery, arms) was clearly evident. A similar discrimination against consumer-goods production was also indirectly disclosed in Khrushchev's economic goals for 1980 as presented to the Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow in October 1961. The revelations of the American Central Intelligence Agency in January 1964 concerning the dramatic decline of the Soviet rate of economic growth clearly imply that the greatest responsibility for that decline was borne by the

Soviet farming, housing, and consumer good industries, while the growth of heavy and armament industries continued on a much higher level. Hence, in the 1960s the contrast between the growth of heavy industry and light industries was greater than ever. This trend has continued until the 1980s, with little change.

Metallurgy, and the production of pig-and wrought-iron and steel had developed in Ukraine since the 1860s. By 1888, Ukraine produced only about 67,000 tons of pig iron, some 7 percent of the total output of the Russian empire. The production of steel was quite smaller. But in 1913, because of the involvement of the Kryvyi Rih Basin in the industry, Ukraine was already an important producer of these two leading industrial commodities. The First World War damaged Ukrainian heavy metallurgy to a considerable extent. By 1930, the prewar capacity of pig iron and steel manufacturing had been restored. During the era of the planned economy in the Ukrainian SSR, impressive progress in heavy metallurgy was achieved.

Pig Iron and Steel Production in the Ukrainian SSR in Millions of Tons[7]

Year	*Pig iron*	*Steel*
1913	2.9	2.4
1940	9.6	8.9
1960	24.1	26.1
1970	32.7	46.6
1980	36.0	53.7

The capacity of Ukrainian metallurgy may be fully understood and appreciated when compared with that of other countries. Thus, in 1959-60, for example, Ukraine's steel output exceeded that of France by some 10 million tons, and it was almost equal to the steel production of the Federal Republic of Germany. Of course, Ukrainian metallurgy suffered

tremendous destruction during the Second World War, but because of its strategic importance it was soon rebuilt. New blast furnaces were constructed, new production methods applied, and electric energy from old and new, post-war, giant hydroelectric stations extensively used. However, in spite of this impressive growth, the share of the Ukrainian iron and steel manufacturing in the total Soviet output of these two commodities steadily declined because of the continuing political and military considerations.

Ukraine's heavy metallurgy is centered in the Donets Basin, Dniepre Bend (Kryvyi Rih), and Azov areas.

Of course, in Ukraine, a major agricultural country prior to the First World War, the production of agricultural machinery began the growth of its machine industry. But the Soviets soon initiated the manufacturing of other machinery on a large scale. Tractors, motor cars, mining machinery, precision instruments, locomotive and railroad equipment, elevators, ships, heavy transport equipment, factory machines and equipment, and other heavy machinery and industrial tools, are currently manufactured in various parts of the Ukraine.

In 1913, there were only 450 machine construction establishments, with 52,000 employees. According to Nesterenko, by 1928 the Ukrainian machine industry had increased by 2.5 times, and by 1940 by 50 times, compared with the 1913 industrial level. The Second World War badly hurt the country's machine manufacturing, but due to an intensive reconstruction program the 1940 level was reached again in the mid-1950s according to Soviet sources. In 1980 the Ukrainian machine industry produced:

Machine equipment	279,000 units
Buses and trucks	206,156 units
Tractors	135,600 units
Combines	9,500 units

These figures, given by the USSR, are not very impressive, however, when compared with Germany—which in 1959 pro-

duced 1,571,209 passenger cars, commercial vehicles, and buses—or with England—which in 1960 manufactured 458,000 commercial motor vehicles. The proportions are equally unfavorable for other Ukrainian industries for 1961-1962, according to *The Statesman's Yearbook*, as well as for 1979 and 1980.[8]

Some giant machine establishments in Ukraine deserve special mention, however, such as the huge tractor plant in Kharkiv, where motor vehicles are also manufactured; the "Bolshevik" machine construction plant in Kiev; the Kharkiv and Luhansk locomotive production facilities; the Novokramatorske heavy machine construction plant; and automobile construction establishments in Zaporozhe, Lviv, and Kremenchuk, where tractors are also produced. Donbas, Dniepre Bend, Kharkiv, Kiev, and Odessa are centers of machine construction.

ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY. Electric energy has been an essential factor in the development of modern industrial capacity for fifty years. Of course, in the near future, atomic energy may largely replace electric power. The dawn of the new era has actually begun. The Soviets, however, in the early years of their plans to make the USSR an industrial giant and military power, had to rely on the development of electric energy production, and first of all in Ukraine. Prior to 1932, there was not much done in the field. In that year, the whole Ukrainian SSR produced only 2,800 million KWH of electric energy. At the same time, however, Germany was making available for industrial, commercial, and consumption 23,460 million; Italy 10,230 million; and small Switzerland 4,800 million.

During 1927-1933, the first huge hydro-electric station was constructed on the Dniepre River, the so-called Dniepro-Stan, with a 558 thousand-KWH production capacity. It was built by American engineers, and at that time it was the second

largest hydroelectric station in the world. Its importance was felt in the field of transportation as well, since it eliminated the cataracts on the Dniepre and made shipping on the river possible. During the Second World War, the Dniepre hydroelectric station was destroyed, but soon thereafter it was reconstructed with a 650 thousand-KWH production capacity. Later on, within the framework of the electrification and industrialization program, huge hydroelectric stations were constructed in Kakhovka (312 thousand KWH), in Terebla-Rikska (27 thousand KWH), and more recently in Kremenchuk (650 thousand KWH). The Dniepro-Stan, Kakhovka, and Kremenchuk hydro-electric stations were steps toward the full utilization of the potential power of the Dniepre River. Additional stations were also under construction or planned for construction in Dnieprodzierzhynsk, Kaniv, and Kiev. At that point the Dniepre was navigable up to Kremenchuk, but upon completion of the whole electrification project it became navigable and accessible for some sea-going vessels up to Kiev.

A number of small electric power stations were constructed in the fifties and sixties throughout the entire country, in West Ukraine, Donbas, and sub-Caucasia. The electric energy has been used primarily for industrial and production purposes but also for consumer needs. More than 60 percent of all collective farms are now electrified.

The growth in the output of electric power in the Ukrainian SSR has been impressive, as the following table indicates:

Electric Power Production in the Ukrainian SSR

Year	*Output*
1932	2,800 mill. KWH
1940	12,411 mill. KWH
1950	14,711 mill. KWH
1960	54,000 mill. KWH
1970	137,600 mill. KWH
1980	235,974 mill. KWH

In 1932, Ukraine was primitive and backward insofar as the production of electric power was concerned. In 1970, however, her electrical output was substantial, and already comparable with advanced West European nations such as Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland.

The electric power production of the entire Ukrainian ethnic area is considerably more (from 10 to 15 mill. KWH more) than that of the Ukrainian SSR alone. It must be stressed also that the Ukraine's natural potential to produce electricity is larger by far than what has been utilized to date.[9]

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. The chemical industry, again being militarily important, had been greatly developed by the Soviets. A considerable portion of the investment capital allocated to the Ukrainian SSR by the Seven-Year Plan, for example, was channeled into chemical-industrial activities. Traditionally, the manufacturing of chemical goods was connected with the processing of certain raw materials and the utilization of semi-finished industrial products, such as petroleum, natural gas, salts, bromides, phosphates, sulphates, nitrates, ammonia, anthracite and coke, wood and kaolin and gypsum. Hence, chemical industries developed where raw materials were available; in the Donbas, the Dniepre Bend, the sub-Carpathian and sub-Caucasian oil fields, the Galician-Volhinian coal basin, the Kerch region, and to a lesser degree in other places. In these areas the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, dyes, and synthetic chemicals emerged as by-products of the industry and because the facilities and skilled labor were available.

The production of soda ashes, potash, tar, artificial manure, lime, sulphuric acid, and sulphuric base had been going on in Ukraine since the pre-revolutionary period, but the growth of the chemical industry was slow, and continued to be slow after World War I and during the New Economic Policy era. In

1934, in the Ukrainian SSR and West Ukraine, there were some 220 chemical-industrial establishments, employing altogether about 31,000 workers. The Five-Year Plans then encouraged the industry because of its great strategic value.

At the present time in the Donets Basin, sulphuric acids, superphosphates, by-products of coke, nitrate acids, ammonia, potash salts, dyes, some pharmaceutical products, and other chemicals are manufactured in various cities, including Kostantynivka, Donetsk, and Slavianske. These and other chemical goods are also produced in the Dniepre Bend industrial center. In the city of Kryvyi Rih and its vicinity, dyestuffs from iron ore, anilin stuffs, chemicals from coke processing, ammonia, and sulpho-ammonia are produced; in Dnieprodzierzhynsk, nitrate is produced; in Dniepropetrovsk, hundreds of coke by-products and acids are manufactured. Salts, including potash, and artificial manure are produced in the Galician and sub-Carpathian regions. Petroleum by-products, hundreds of them, are manufactured in the sub-Carpathian and sub-Caucasian oil field regions, in the cities of Kalush and Holyn. The extraction and processing of petroleum was carried on in the regions of Lviv, Drohobych, Boryslav, Truskavets, Maikop, and Groznyi. There also the pharmaceutical and drug industries are important. Dyestuffs are produced in Zhytomyr, Chernyhiv, Izium, Slavianske, Kaniv, and Kharkiv. The Chernyhiv, Izium, Ternopil and Stanyslaviv regions are noted for phosphates production; kaolin processing has developed in Zaporozhe, Kiev, Donetsk, Rivna, and Dniepropetrovsk. In the cities of Sumy, Kharkiv, and Kiev there is considerable pharmaceutical manufacturing. Dry distillation of wood is done in the Kievan region and in Carpathian Ukraine. As Khrushchev has disclosed, however, the production and use of artificial fertilizer have been very inadequate. During subsequent decades the output of the chemical industries continued to be unsatisfactory, below Ukraine's economic potential, even though it continued to grow. The output of these industries increased as follows:[10]

Chemical Production of Ukraine

Year	*Thousand Tons*
1965	7,312
1970	11,541
1980	19,739

CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS. Some progress was also achieved by the Soviets in developing construction materials and related industries. Cement, insulation materials, paper boards, tiles, bricks, asbestos, lime architectural materials, steel construction equipment, gypsum, polished and finished granite rock, and other construction materials are being manufactured throughout Ukraine. In particular, the production of cement for concrete and construction works has increased substantially.

Cement Production in the Ukrainian SSR in Thousands of Tons[11]

Year	*Output*
1913	269
1928	297
1940	1,218
1960	8,010
1970	14,353
1980	20,110

Not much progress in cement production was achieved by the Soviets until 1928; but by 1940 it exceeded the 1913 level by 4.5 times. In 1960, however, Ukraine's cement manufacturing was still considerably below the production levels of the leading Western European nations; in this year France produced 14 million tons of cement and Germany almost 23 million tons. Cement-manufacturing establishments operated in Yenakievo, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Kiev, Kharkiv, Zdolbunovo,

and other places. Gypsum is produced in the Donetsk, Kiev, Odessa, and Kharkiv regions. The Donetsk region supplies some 70 percent of the total gypsum output of the Ukrainian SSR. Paper boards and other wall construction and decoration materials are manufactured, with up to 67 percent of their country's total production volume, in the following administrative regions: Voroshilovhrad, Donetsk, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Kiev, Odessa, and Kharkiv. Bricks and tiles are produced in large establishments in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Poltava, and of course in many small plants in various parts of the Republic. Glass manufacturing is inadequately developed in Ukraine, although its share of the total Soviet glass production is considerable—about 30 percent. There are huge glassworks primarily in the Donets Basin, where the industry is concentrated in the cities of Konstantynivka, Artymovske and Popasna. They account for some 70 percent of all the glass and mirror manufacturing of the Ukrainian SSR. Other large glassworks are located in the cities of Kiev, Odessa, and Kherson, and the regions of Zhytomyr and Kharkiv. Window glass, glass for industrial use, mirrors, table glass, bottles, and other glassware are also produced there, but not in sufficient quantities to meet the consumer needs of the country.

The lumber industry and wood manufacturing have been traditional in Ukraine. Carpentry, the manufacture of wooden wheels, barrel production, shingle-making, and wooden-house construction have been known there since time immemorial. Cutting down trees for lumber export and the production of tar and potash were once just about the leading industries in northern and mountainous Ukraine. The industry is concentrating in four major areas: West Ukraine (with the Carpathian and trans-Carpathian regions), Polissia, the steppe-forest regions and the Crimean Peninsula, and the sub-Caucasian regions. There large sawing mills, mechanical and electrical, and other wood manufacturing plants and concerns, including furniture factories, operated, along with

small-scale and primitive mills and workshops, either as state or cooperative industrial establishments.

Wood manufacturing and furniture production in Ukraine are backward and underdeveloped by American and European standards. Since their military significance is minor, the Soviets do not encourage them. Official statistics may indicate a considerable increase, for example, in furniture production in Ukraine, stating that, from 1955 to 1960, the value of its total output rose from 13 to more than 20 million rubles. But, as far as quantity and quality are concerned, the furniture is hopelessly inadequate for consumer needs. Some larger lumber-processing and furniture-manufacturing plants, however, are worthy of mention, such as those in Rakhiv, Yasyn, and Yaremche, lumber-industrial plants in Korosten, the huge furniture factories in Chernyhiv and Zhytomyr in Northern Ukraine, the furniture factories in Kiev and Kharkiv, and the giant lumber-industrial plants in Cherkasy, Donetsk, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Odessa, and elsewhere in central and southern Ukraine.

FOOD PROCESSING AND LIGHT INDUSTRIES. It was mentioned before that agricultural-raw-material processing, including the food-processing industry, which primarily served consumer needs, was discriminated against by the Soviets. Thus these industries could not develop well in Ukraine. However, beginning with the last quarter of the nineteenth century, sugar refining and manufacturing was important, ranking third in the country's economy after iron and coal production. In 1913, in Ukraine there were 198 refineries, producing 1.2 million tons of sugar. At that time, Ukraine was the second largest producer of beet sugar in the world, after Germany. During the First World War and the post-war years, the sugar industry considerably declined, like so many other economic activities in Ukraine at that time. Five-year planning took little interest in the recovery of Ukrainian sugar

production. The Soviets were busy developing sugar manufacturing in central Russia, Central Asia, and southern Siberia. In consequence of such policies, the Ukraine's share of total Soviet sugar production declined.

In 1934, the pre-war level of sugar output in the country was again restored, though only 170 refineries were in operation as against 198 in 1913. Afterwards, sugar production rose gradually in the Ukrainian SSR. Consider the following table:

1913	1.2 mill. tons
1928	1.0 mill. tons
1932	0.5 mill. tons
1940	1.5 mill. tons
1950	1.8 mill. tons
1960	3.8 mill. tons
1980	5.3 mill. tons

The table also indicates, among other things, the great damage done to the sugar industry by the forced collectivization (1928-1933).[12] Overall, however, the figures should be increased to give a true picture for ethnic Ukraine sugar production since it was introduced by the Soviets into the Kuban area and the southeastern section of the Ukrainian ethnic territory. Sugar refineries are located mainly in Vynnytsia, Cherkasy, Khmelnytsky, Sumy, Kiev, Poltava, Kharkiv, and Kirovohrad regions.

Agricultural-raw-material-processing industries—dairy, meat, flour-milling, bakery, brewing, and distilling establishments—are distributed throughout the entire country, with some individual concentrations of certain specific activities according to the natural conditions. Butter production is concentrated mainly in Podillia and south-steppe Ukraine. Meat production and processing is centered in approximately the same area, including Kharkiv, Lviv, Odessa, and the Donbas. Huge slaughterhouses are located in Vynnytsia, Darnytsia, Poltava, Kremenchuk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Voroshilovhrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Zhdanov, Odessa, and Lviv.

Flour-milling, once a very important industry in Ukraine, is on a steady decline, and is centered in the grain-producing sections of the country. Huge grain elevators operate in Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Kherson, Odessa, Mykolaiv, Zhdanov, Kharkiv, Kremenchuk, Lviv, and other large cities and ports, and at railroad crossings. The canned-food, macaroni, candy, and frozen-food industries are small and inadequate. The production of alcoholic beverages substantially increased under the Soviet regime, and distilleries and breweries operate mainly in the Polissia, Vynnytsia, Zhytomyr, Ternopil, Sumy, Poltava, Kiev, Kharkiv, Chernyhiv, and Cherkasy regions. The following table supplies some statistical figures for food production:

Food Production in the Ukrainian SSR[13]

Product	1958	1962	1980
Sugar (mill. tons)	3.6	4.5	5.3
Meat (mill. tons)	0.8	1.0	2.0
Butter (mill. tons)	7.7	0.9	0.9
Fish (mill. tons)	0.3	0.5	0.9
Canned food (mill. cans)	944.3	1418.0	3488.3
Wine (mill. decalit.)	13.6	23.8	—

Finally, a few words must be said about so-called "light" industry: leather, footwear, textile, and garment manufacturing. These industries, associated with farms and cattle-raising and the population's needs, were also traditional in the country for centuries. Because of Soviet economic policy, however, leather and textile manufacturing also suffered a considerable decline in development. Although the Soviets attempt to deny the fact, a comparison of the total output of shoes and textiles of the Ukrainian SSR with the production of these items in Western Europe clearly illustrates the unfavorable situation. Of course, some technical progress through

mechanization, electrification, and scientific management has been accomplished by the Soviets.

The leather and shoe industries are concentrated in huge factory establishments in the cities of Berdychiv, Vasylkiv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Kiev, Kremenchuk, Konstantynivka, Voroshilovhrad, and Lviv. Soviet statistics for 1979 indicated a production of 176 million pairs of leather footwear in Ukraine for that year only. But the figure is grossly inflated and misleading since the Soviets classify as leather footwear any shoe or boot which is made from cloth or rubber and contains only a negligible portion of leather, such as in heels or for decoration. Hence, the output of leather footwear in the Ukrainian SSR, is smaller by far than the official statistics indicate.

The textile industry flourished in old Cossack Ukraine. It was then suppressed by the Tsarist regime. In the course of the nineteenth century it was dominated by foreign capital, as Nesterenko has shown. Today, being collectivized and controlled by the Soviets, it is also dominated by foreign interests, and does not serve the needs of the Ukrainian people. Large textile and garment factories operate in various cities: Kiev, Korostyshiv, Radomyshl, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivske, Kolomya, Poltava, Lviv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Sumy, Kremenchuk, and other places. *USSR in Figures for 1960* and *National Economy of the USSR in 1980* gave the following picture of growth in the output of all kinds of textile materials:

Year	*Millions of Units*
1940	38.8
1960	154.0
1962	202.0
1976	429.4
1980	432.7

The total output of textiles included woolen, cotton, and silk materials. In 1962 the garment industry produced some 135.7

million units, and in 1980 some 432.7 million units of all kinds of clothing, including underwear.[14]

In 1940 there was a real scarcity of textile materials and clothing. In the late fifties some improvement was achieved, but the needs of the Ukrainian population are still not adequately met.

Manufacturing and all its branches are organized collectively, either in the form of so-called state factories or cooperative factories (producers' cooperatives). State-factory establishments are owned and managed directly by the Soviet Government, as was pointed out before, and all their employees are state hirelings. Metallurgy, heavy-machine production, electric-power production, the chemical industry, and the construction industry are all largely centered in enormous state factories and establishments. The bulk of Soviet manufacturing is carried out by state-owned enterprises. Producers' cooperatives, supposedly owned and operated by collectives of workers, are relatively less important. The cooperatives, manufacturing strictly in the framework of the state economic plan, operate chiefly in the fields of knitted goods, footwear, hardware, kitchen utensils, toys, furniture, processed food, and instrument production. In short, cooperative factories manufacture consumer goods, primarily from locally available raw materials or from by-products of the state establishments.

Until 1958, the whole industrial production process of the Soviet Union was extremely centralized, not only with respect to its planning but with respect to its administration as well. In 1958-59, a reorganization to promote decentralization and greater efficiency was undertaken. Practically, however, the entire reorganization remained on paper. The Ukrainian SSR was territorially divided into eleven economic administrative units (regions), which, according to their economic characteristics, make up five economic areas. The division was not very carefully and rationally made. *Ukrainian SSR*, the publication of the Ukrainian Academy of Learning, described the

economic areas as follows: first, the economic-administrative regions of the Donbas and Dniepre Ukraine, including Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Donetsk, and Voroshilovhrad; second, the central economic-administrative regions, including Kiev and Vynnytsia; third, the Kharkiv economic-administrative region; fourth, the Black Sea littoral regions, including Odessa and Kharkiv; and fifth, the western economic-administrative regions, including Lviv and Ivano-Frankivske. These divisions were prompted more by expediency than any other aspect of business and economy.

The Soviets always have been obsessed by the idea of constant changes in the economic-administrative structure to assure a greater production efficiency. Thus there have been frequent changes in the territorial and administrative division of the economy of the Ukrainian SSR. Centralization was followed by decentralization in 1958, and then by centralization again in 1963. In 1973, another reorganization was undertaken. The changes have been rarely successful.

In 1982-1983, Andropov proposed new reorganization measures, but little success was expected.[15] Reforms could not help, since the whole system of state capitalism was fundamentally flawed.

DOMESTIC TRADE. Trading in Soviet Ukraine is primarily run by the Government; foreign trade is an exclusive state monopoly, and only in domestic trade is a tiny element of private initiative allowed in the so-called peasant markets. Wholesaling is carried out by the state-owned and operated system of huge warehouses, called *Prombazy*. The warehouses receive merchandise from industrial, agricultural, and other establishments and then supply the goods to various retail distribution centers and agencies according to the Soviet economic plan. Soviet retail trade is a complicated matter, being carried out by a variety of store establishments, state stores, cooperative stores, and peasant markets. The

state stores are operated by various ministries of the Ukrainian SSR. Which particular ministry operates a particular store depends upon the kind of goods sold. The Ministry of Trade operates the huge system of Trade Stores (TORH), supplying most necessities for the population, the Ministry of Electrotechnical Instruments operates electric-appliance stores, and so on. The Ministry of Trade accounts for some 40 percent of domestic trade, and other ministries for about 6 percent with the rest going to cooperative and peasant-market trade. Some state stores sell to the general public without any restrictions, and others restrict their sales to select groups of people. In large cities, huge department stores handle a great variety of goods. There are also some mail-order houses.

An extensive network of consumer cooperative stores covers the country. They are organized in regional and central associations of cooperatives and supply the needs of their members, primarily industrial workers and the population of the village and the countryside. The peasant markets, though they are not favored by the Government, play a considerable part in the overall exchange process of the Ukrainian SSR. Food and living necessities are sold in the cooperative stores and peasant markets, while manufactured products, all kinds of appliances, drugs and medicine, and quality and luxury goods are sold mostly in the state-run commercial establishments.

Prices vary greatly, though they are fixed by the Government in most cases, except for the peasant markets. Quality goods at high prices are available for select groups of the population. For the general public relatively lower prices are charged, but the goods may be scarce or of poor quality. In the urban areas, things are better in this respect than in the rural regions, although some progress has been achieved in the countryside as well. Advertising and sales promotion are very poorly developed. State control has certainly hampered commerce in Ukraine, since commerce needs freedom of initiative perhaps more than any other activity. The Soviets claim a

continuous growth in Ukrainian domestic commerce, but it is certainly below Western standards in organization, volume, and efficiency.

Volume of Retail Trade[16]

(In billions of rubles, in prices of respective years, peasant markets excluded)

Year	*Volume*
1924	0.5
1930	3.7
1940	32.0
1950	57.3
1960	13.3
1980	46.7

The change in the value of retail trade in 1960 can be explained by a sweeping currency reform in the USSR on January 1, 1961, for which prices were partially adjusted.

These figures indicate a considerable development in Ukrainian domestic trade. It is questionable, however, whether price inflation, which has been continuously present in the economy, was taken into account by Soviet statisticians in arriving at these figures.

Recently, the Soviets have slightly improved delivery systems and have introduced some automation in their local marketing, primarily in the large cities.

FOREIGN TRADE. The Ukrainian people, since the most ancient times, have been greatly interested in foreign trade. They traditionally exported their main produce: honey, wax, skins, furs, lumber, and grain. In the most recent past they exported industrial products. The products exported depended upon the stage of economic evolution. Prior to the First World

War, Ukrainian export amounted to 720 million rubles, and it was composed mostly of agricultural products. Foreign-made manufactured goods constituted the bulk of her imports, as pointed out before.

However, an important differentiation has to be made when discussing Ukrainian foreign trade in the twentieth century. During most of the century, except during the short era of her national independence (1918-21), Ukraine was included as part of either the Tsarist empire or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Statistical figures for imperial and Soviet foreign trade are largely available, and Ukraine's participation is generally traceable or can be estimated. Ukrainian trade with foreign nations, included in the international trade of the Russian-Soviet economic complex, can be qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed. Ukraine's trade with other provinces of the Russian empire or other Republics of the USSR, however, is extremely difficult to analyze. There are, in fact, very few statistics available in this field. Kryvchenko, Shrah, Kobersky, and Kubiovych did some pioneering work estimating and appraising Ukrainian trade with Russia and her colonies. In fact, Ukraine's foreign trade has been both with Russia and with the rest of the world.

It was estimated that before the First World War Ukraine's exports exceeded imports by 323 million rubles, making the Ukrainian balance of trade highly favorable. Of course, Ukrainian grain production and export were primarily responsible. Ukraine's grain gave the Tsarist empire its own favorable balance of trade with the outside world. In fact, Ukraine accounted for 90 percent of the whole imperial export of wheat. Of course, as already discussed, Ukraine's foreign balance of payments was not favorable to the same degree due to her heavy dividend, interest, and fee payments to Russia and other nations for capital investments and services rendered.

The Soviet domination of Ukraine, however, produced very important changes in her international trade. First of all,

private initiative was completely eliminated from foreign trading and the whole field was nationalized and made a state monopoly. This brought a dramatic decline in the volume and value of Ukrainian foreign commerce, by some 70 percent in the first postwar years. From 1934 to 1945, the prewar levels of exports and imports, with a balance of trade in favor of Ukraine, were approximately restored. But the composition of the balance was very much different. The Russian share in it increased, and that of other nations decreased. Also, the percentage of industrial exports increased, and that of agricultural exports declined. After the Second World War, immediately after recovering from war destruction, Ukrainian foreign trade began to rise quickly with the so-called satellite countries. In 1949, the so-called Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, popularly called *Comecon*, was established to promote economic cooperation among the European Communist nations: the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania—with the later admittance of Outer Mongolia to the block. The Russian SSR has well understood how to secure considerable advantages for itself from Comecon trade. The terms of that trade, however, have not been always favorable and profitable for Ukraine, since its pattern was designed by Soviet economic planning in Moscow, and thus did not always coincide with the interests of the Ukrainian national economy. During the entire Tsarist and Soviet eras, in fact, Ukraine's interests were discriminated against in the field of foreign trade.

Ukraine's main export articles have been grain, sugar, cattle and meat, eggs, coal, iron ore, manganese ore, petroleum and petroleum products, machinery, and tools. Prior to the First World War, agricultural products accounted for 86 percent of the exports, and during the Soviet era their percentage declined to 30 percent, while industrial and mining products increased their export percentage in the reverse proportion. This came as a direct result of the Soviet economic policies, and above all Soviet farm problems and forced industrializa-

tion. Ukrainian grain went to Russia, Poland, Byeloruthenia, the Baltic countries, Germany, the Netherlands, England, France, Greece, and some other countries; cattle and meat were exported to Russia, Poland, Germany, and Austria; sugar to Russia, the Near East, and England; coal to Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and France; iron ore to Russia, Germany, Luxemburg, France, England, and Poland; petroleum products to Poland, Russia, and Germany.

Ukrainian imports come above all from Russia and her colonies. This pattern was forced upon Ukraine by the Tsarist Government, and the same policy was continued by the Soviets. From Russia, the Ukrainian SSR imports today manufactured products, machinery, tools, textiles, petroleum, tea to some extent, steel, cement, wood, phosphates, and some other articles. From other countries Ukraine receives machinery, citrus fruit, and electrical appliances, but the percentage is small compared to the total import figure. From the Comecon countries, excluding Russia, the Ukrainian SSR receives, in particular, machinery and machine tools, mechanical equipment, some building materials, fabrics, ores, and other items.

Failures in industrial production and distribution finally forced the Soviets in 1964 to adopt some individual initiative on a limited scale. A few factories were allowed to buy raw materials at low prices and to sell finished goods at a "best" possible price. It was the era of so-called Libermanist "liberalization." It ended in the 1970s, however, and, Moscow-oriented centralization was restored.

TRANSPORTATION. The whole marketing system of the Ukrainian SSR, in all its segments—transportation, communication, and trade—as we have said, is very inadequate compared with Western-European or American standards. Marketing was traditionally neglected in the Tsarist empire and, since its primary service is to the consumer, its growth

was retarded in the Soviet era as well. Transportation has so far made the most progress, because of its military significance, but in the fields of communication and trade, Soviet citizens in general, and citizens of the Ukrainian SSR in particular encounter painful shortcomings.

Presently, railroads are the most important means of transportation in Ukraine. The first railroad track was built in Ukraine in 1868-70, between Odessa and Balta, about 190 miles. In 1870 tracks were extended to Kiev. For a long time there was no direct railroad connection between the two leading cities in the country, Kiev and Kharkiv. Since this was essential for Ukrainian economic interests, but not for the imperial economy, the matter was neglected by the Tsarist regime. Railroad construction was used to divert Ukrainian exports from the Black Sea ports to the Baltic Sea harbors.

The Russians did not seem to have a good sense of transportation, and their transportation affairs were always in poor shape. In Ukraine, things were even worse, since there the transportation matters were affected by her colonial status. Railroads were in better shape in Western Ukraine, where the Austrian Government organized transportation more efficiently.

The First World War proved the inherent deficiencies of the Tsarist railroad system, which was partially responsible for the military defeats of the Russian armies. As a result of the war, a great deal of railroad equipment was demolished—some 61 percent of all locomotives and 30 percent of railroad cars, as Dyminsky has said. The Soviets partially understood the essential role of efficient transportation in industrial growth, and attempted to build up railroads during the Five-Year Plans prior to the Second World War. After the war they were reconstructed and some 4,000 km. of tracks were added in Ukraine. Intensive electrification and automation of the Ukrainian railroad system were undertaken, although overall it is far behind West European and American railroads in efficiency and modernization.

In 1980 the total length of tracks in the Ukrainian SSR was about 24,600 km., West Germany had 31,711 km., and France 34,444, although both nations are territorially smaller. The main railroad junctions in Ukraine are Kharkiv, Lviv, Kovel, Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Zhmerynka, Znamenka, Pomoshna, Khrystynivka, Kryvyi Rih, Yasynovata, and Slavianske.

Prior to the First World War, Ukraine had only 2,770 km. of paved or concrete highways, and inferior country roads were common. The need for highway construction was neither understood nor appreciated by the Tsarist regime, and was completely neglected until the Soviet era. The first Five-Year Plan began highway construction in Ukraine. By 1936, some 4,000 km. of highways had been built in the Ukrainian SSR, and some 600 km. in sub-Caucasia. In West Ukraine, there were some 10,100 km. of paved highways. In 1940, on the eve of the war, Ukraine had some 36,800 km. of highways, but with little motor-car traffic. After the Second World War, the Soviet Government undertook considerable highway reconstruction and expansion. In 1978, there were in the Ukrainian SSR, some 127,900 km. of paved highways and turnpikes available for military purposes and the country's economic needs. The road system, however, covers Ukrainian territory very unevenly; there are areas with a considerably developed network of paved highways, while other regions are still primitive in this respect. The military factor in the road-building program and its pattern should not be overlooked. Nevertheless, in spite of considerable road construction in Ukraine in the fifties, the country is still substantially behind Western European nations. In the 1970s Germany had 170,661 km. and France some 377,990 km. of paved highways and turnpikes, with much more motor-vehicle traffic than in the Ukrainian SSR.

Sea and inland waterway transportation was briefly discussed in connection with the analysis of Ukraine's natural resources. The Soviets slightly improved the navigability of

the rivers by increasing their mileage. In 1940, for example, in Ukraine there were only about 2,000 km. of navigable rivers, but in 1980 this had increased to some 4,700 km. The volume of the inland water shipments increased between 1940 and 1980 from 4.6 to 51.3 million tons of goods, and from 6.8 to 24.8 million passengers, according to Soviet statistics—which seem a bit exaggerated. Again, in comparison with Western European countries, the navigability of Ukrainian Rivers is poor, as has been indicated before. In 1960, Germany's navigable rivers amounted to 4,493 km., and France's to 31,260 km. Black and Azov Sea transportation is far below what it should be. First of all, Black and Azov Sea harbors were neglected and discriminated against in the Tsarist times. The Black Sea commercial fleet was always small. The Tsars preferred to develop the Baltic ports. Secondly, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus greatly reduced the navigability of the Black Sea. Some 70 percent of all sea traffic is made up of coastal shipping (*cabotage*), and only 30 percent is foreign trade carried through the Black and Azov Seas.

Ukrainian aviation was very underdeveloped in the 1950s. The air routes did not exceed 41,000 km. in distance covered, connecting Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Lviv, and also connecting Kiev with Sophia in Bulgaria, Budapest in Hungary, Bucharest in Romania, Prague in Czechoslovakia, Belgrade in Yugoslavia, and Moscow and Leningrad in Russia. All air transportation is run by the Government, of course. In the 1960s air passenger traffic employed IL-14, LI-2, and AN-2 planes along with some others. Soviet statistics claim that air transportation increased from 1940 to 1960 by some 17 times and continued to grow, but it is still far behind Germany, France, and England. From 1970 to 1980 passenger traffic increased from 7,950.5 million passenger kilometers to 14,567.4 million, while cargo traffic increased from 891.0 ton kilometers to 1,563.4, according to Soviet statistics.[18]

COMMUNICATIONS. At first the Soviet communications system was very poorly developed. It expanded slowly due to the economic deficiencies of socialism, until Soviet leaders fully recognized its usefulness for propaganda. But still. the Soviet Union lagged behind.

Communications Media in the USSR, US, German Federal Republic, and France in 1961-1962

Media	*USSR*	*USA*	*German Fedr. Rep.*	*France*
Telephone sets (in mill.)	2.9	75.2	6.0	4.1
Radio sets (in mill.)	30.6	48.5	16.6	12.0
Television sets (in mill.)	6.5	41.0	5.9	3.5
No. of radio stations	—	4613.0	150.0	97.0
No. of television stations	347.0	543.0	386.0	33.0
Press (daily periodicals)	9,111.0	1,854.0	1,400.0	130.0

Of course, there was no comparison between the USSR and the United States. But taking into consideration the enormous territory of the USSR, one-sixth of the entire continental surface of the globe, and its 245 million people in the early 1960s, and comparing it with West Germany and France, one can see that the Soviet Union even lagged behind these much smaller European nations. Ukraine fared very poorly as well. The entire USSR had many daily periodicals, but they were primarily committed to Communist and state propaganda.

The communications system of the Ukrainian SSR was not impressive either according to Western standards. In Ukraine in the early 1960s there were in operation or under construction twelve television stations: in Kiev, Kharkiv, Donets, Odessa, Lviv, Yalta, Voroshilovhrad, Zaporozhe, Kryvyi Rih, Chernihiv, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krasnodar: there were about

1.6 million radio and television sets, and no more than 3 million telephone sets—used mainly by Government, party, and other offices and agencies, and very seldom installed in or made available to private homes. In the Ukrainian SSR, 3,518 newspapers were published daily or periodically. About 2,800 were in Ukrainian, and the others primarily in Russian.

The 1970s and early 1980s brought substantial expansion and growth of the communications system in the Soviet Union and in Ukraine, but they were still behind Western and American standards by every statistical measure.

Communications Media in the USSR, US, German Federal Republic, and France in the Late 1970s

Media	*USSR*	*USA*	*German Fedr. Rep.*	*France*
Telephone sets (in mill.)	18.8	145.0	21.0	12.5
Radio sets (in mill.)	61.2	48.6	22.6	21.5
Television sets (in mill.)	80.0	140.0	20.0	15.6
No. of radio stations	1,500.0	4,357.0	171.0	103.0
No. of television stations and transmitters	750.0	721.0	224.0	178.0
Press (daily)	8,210.0	1,768.0	462.0	99.0

In Ukraine the increase in the communications media was noticeable. A few new television stations with transmitters were established. More telephones, radios, and television sets came in use. However, overall broadcasts in Ukrainian were dramatically reduced, while those in Russian were increased. Fewer papers were published in Ukrainian and more in Russian, as a result of the growing Russianization drive of the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s.

FINANCE. Ukrainian economic development has continually been hampered by a dramatic shortage of capital. During Tsarist times, Russian and foreign capital was invested in the Ukrainian economy, and any accumulation of Ukrainian-owned capital was discouraged. Russian authorities opposed and suppressed the producers' cooperative movement among the Ukrainians, on political and economic grounds. Dyminsky has stated that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, some 75 percent of all interest and dividends on capitalization went abroad. That income was used, in particular in Russia proper, to establish industries competing with the Ukraine's industries and products. In addition the imperial public finance policy was directed toward a reduction of Ukrainian-owned capital funds, keeping Government investments in Ukraine at a minimum and impoverishing her population in order to preserve the country as an agricultural colony of the imperial Eurasian market. Thus, between 1909 and 1913, the Ukrainian economy contributed some 20 percent to the total revenue collections of the Tsarist Empire, while only 12 percent of the total imperial public expenditures was allocated to Ukraine. Some 45-46 percent, therefore, of all public receipts from Ukraine at this period was diverted to Russian areas, to assist their economic growth at the expense of the Ukrainian national economy.

After the Communist Revolution and the Soviet domination of Ukraine, things did not change much. Of course, with the introduction of the concept of government ownership of all production means, privately owned capital accumulation and investment did not exist any more. From then on, all capitalization was a state matter. Yet the capital investments of the Soviet Government since 1918 have shown a systematic discrimination against capital accumulation and unhampered economic growth in Ukraine. The following two statistical tables of capital investment in the USSR as a whole and in the Ukrainian SSR illustrate the colonial policy of the Soviet

regime in Ukraine. Up to 1965, the figures are stated in the old inflated ruble.

Capital Investments in the USSR, and in Ukraine in Billions of Rubles (collective farms excluded)[20]

Years	*USSR*	*Ukr. SSR*
1918-26	16.5	3.0
1941-45	137.1	16.6
1951-55	720.1	103.4
1959-65	1970.0	219.0
1979-80	263.5	37.3

The figures translated into percentages expressing capital investments in Ukraine as compared with investments in the entire USSR give the following picture:

Capital Investment in the USSR and in the Ukrainian SSR the USSR Investment = 100; the Ukrainian SSR *Investment Expressed as a Percentage of the USSR Total*

Years	*USSR*	*Ukr.-SSR*
1918-26	100	18.2%
1941-45	100	12.1%
1951-55	100	14.3%
1959-65	100	11.1%
1979-80	100	14.2%

These figures are extremely indicative of the economic status of Ukraine within the Soviet Union.[21] The population of the Ukrainian SSR constitutes approximately 20 percent of the total population of the USSR. The Ukrainian economy, with respect to natural resources, pig iron and steel manufacturing, coal production and coal reserves, tractors and locomotive production, wheat and sugar beets raising, and many

other items, comes to some 30-68 percent of the total Soviet economy. But investments to develop and secure the growth of the Ukrainian economy are far below the relative economic potential of Ukraine. What is more, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, in 1980, allocated to the Ukrainian economy only some 14.2 percent of the Soviet total. It is low. It is therefore evident that the Soviets continue the Tsarist tradition of diverting a great deal of the economic capacity and revenue of Ukraine away from her own national economic life, and that they use them to develop and build up their Eurasian industries and other economic activities. Vynar has mentioned that, during the Fourth Five-Year Plan, Ukrainian capital investments as allocated by the all-Union plan constituted 15.9 percent of those allocated to the entire USSR.

The statistical figures refer to the Ukrainian SSR only. No doubt Soviet capital investments in Kuban and Southern Kursk and Voronizh, Ukrainian ethnic areas which have been incorporated into the Russian SSR, increase the percentage of investments in the entire Ukrainian country very little. In addition, those areas increase Ukrainian economic potential and the national income-generation of Ukraine as a whole in the total Eurasian economy of the Soviet Union. Although it is difficult to determine exact percentages and ratios in this regard, the colonial exploitation of Ukraine, and in particular of the Ukrainian SSR, by the Soviet regime is beyond any doubt. This causes a shortage of investment funds in Ukraine and hampers her economic growth, although the natural wealth of the country is great.

Notes

[1]B. Vynar, *Rozvytok ukrainskoi promyslovosty*, Denver, 1955, p. 134.

[2]S. Balzak, V. Vasiutin, and Y. Feigin, editors, *Economic Geography of the USSR*, New York, 1952, pp. 110-112; the improvement in the 1960s and

1970s was indicated by the fact that, from 1940 to 1980, metallurgical industries in the whole USSR grew by some 571 percent, and the Ukrainian SSR by some 600 percent: *Narodnoie khaziastvo SSR v 1980 g.*, Moscow, 1981, p. 135; *Narodnoie khasiastvo Ukrainskoi SSR v 1980 g*, Kiev, 1981, p. 110.

[3]H. Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, New York, 1954, p. 550.

[4]R. Campbell, *Soviet Economic Power*, Cambridge, 1960, pp. 59-67; the same, *The Soviet-type Economies*, Boston, 1974, pp. 105-115.

[5]Campbell, *Soviet Economic Power*, pp. 181-186; Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-253.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 130.

[7]*Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR*, Kiev, 1957, p. 36; *SSR v tsyfrakh*, Moscow, 1961, p. 141; *Narodnoie khaziastvo Ukrainskoi SSR, 1980*, Kiev, 1981, p. 110.

[8]*Ibid.*, pp. 88-89, 116, 118-119.

[9]N. Chirovsky, *Ukrainian Economy*, New York, 1965, pp. 59-60; *Narodnoie khaziaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR, 1980*, pp. 107-108.

[10]*Ibid.*, pp. 11-114; I. Koropetsky, "Chemical Industry," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 809-814; *Narodnoie khaziaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR*, p. 113.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 122; Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 61 and 87.

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 64; *Narodnoie khaziastvo Ukrainskoi*, p. 131.

[13]Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 65; *Narodnoie khaziastvo SSSR v 1962 g*, Moscow, 1963, 204-210; *The Statesman's Yearbook, 1963-1964*, New York, 1964, pp. 1547-1548; *Narodnoie khaziastvo Ukrainskoi SSR 1980*, pp. 129-135.

[14]*Ibid.*, pp. 124-126; Chirovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 66; *Narodnoie khaziaistvo SSSR v 1962 g*, pp. 200-201.

[15]On the Soviet reorganizational obsession: N. Chirovsky, "Liberman vs. Marx," *Studies for a New Central Europe*, New York, 1966, Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 34-48; the same, "Sioma piatyrichka v ostannii stadii zavershennia," *Vyzvolnyi Shlakh*, Nov. and Dec. 1970, pp. 1199-1218; the same, "The Soviet Five-Year Plan Fulfillment by 1973," *The Ukrainian Review*, London, 1974, Vol. III, pp. 38-67.

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[16]*Narodne hospodarstvo*, p. 393; *Narodnoie khaziastvo SSSR, 1962*, p. 519; *Narodnoie khaziastvo Ukrainskoi SSR, 1980*, p. 294.

[17]Chirovsky, "Liberman vs. Marx," *loc. cit.*; on domestic and foreign trade: Dyminsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-208; the same, E. Glovinsky, V. Holub-

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[18]*Narodnoie khaziastvo Ukrainskoi SSR, 1980*, pp. 198-202; Chirovsky, *Ukrainian Economy*, pp. 69-72; V. Kubiovych and V. Holubnychy, "Transportation and Communication," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, as quoted, Vol. II, pp. 912-933.

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