

The

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Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

"Soviet Legality" in the Light of Trials and
Detention of Ukrainians

By Yuri Shukhevych-Berezynsky & Volodymyr Horbovy

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(Continued on Page 288)

“MOTHER RUSSIA’S” SHADOW OVER WESTERN EUROPE

Editorial

The Soviet Russian seizure of Czechoslovakia at the end of August, 1968, has served as a lightning bolt shattering abruptly the illusions of many Western statesmen regarding the relationship between the West and the Soviet Union. The invasion of that country by the Warsaw Pact countries (the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany — Rumania refused to take part in the nefarious aggression, while Albania, once a member of the pact, rescinded its membership in the pact recently) has been denounced by the majority of the Communist Parties of the world and by a number of African states.

As could have been expected, the Soviet Union did everything possible to prevent its brazen act of aggression against a sovereign state from being put on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council. The feeble attempts to do so by a few members were quickly nipped in the bud by Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik.

ROOT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK TRAGEDY

Despite the suddenness of the Russian grab of Czechoslovakia, this act of unprovoked aggression was neither unexpected nor novel in the long and bloody history of Russian imperialism. Several Western historical schools hold that the present Soviet foreign policy is but an improved version of the old Czarist policy of territorial aggrandizement. This point was explicitly made by Secretary of State Dean Acheson when he testified on June 21, 1951, before the House Foreign Relations Committee in Washington:

Historically, the Russian state has three great drives — to the west in Europe, to the south into the Middle East, and to the east in Asia. . . The Politburo has acted in the same way. It carried on the imperialist tradition. What it has added consists mainly of new weapons and new tactics. . . The ruling power in Moscow has long been the imperial power and it now rules over a greatly extended empire. . . It is clear that this process of encroachment and

consolidation by which Russia has grown in the last 500 years from the Duchy of Muscovy to a vast empire has got to be stopped. . .¹

Another great American statesman, the late U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Adlai E. Stevenson, in his Memorandum on Soviet Colonialism sent to U.N. members on November 25, 1961, took to task the "Self-Determination in the Soviet Empire":

We are told that the peoples of the Soviet Union enjoy the right of self-determination. Indeed, the Soviet regime at its inception issued a "Declaration of Rights" which proclaimed "the right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states.

How did this "right" work in practice? An independent Ukrainian Republic was recognized by the Bolsheviks in 1917, but in 1917 they established a rival Republic in Kharkov. In July, 1923, with the help of the Red Army, a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was established and incorporated into the USSR. . .²

It is to be recalled that in the fall of 1939, after the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Soviet Union attacked Finland under the pretext that the little civilized republic of Finland posed a "threat" to the USSR. At that time the free world community still had a conscience and a sense of justice: on December 14, 1939, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations.³

The Soviet Union had signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1929, solemnly promising to uphold the Statutes of the League of Nations and pledging itself above all not to resort to war. Moreover, the Soviet Union participated in formulating the historic definition of aggression during the collective security discussion held in the League of Nations on September 21, 1937. The definition may be used for an understanding of the real meaning of Soviet Russian foreign policy:

An aggression remains an aggression, whatever the formula beneath which it is disguised. No international principle can ever justify aggression, armed intervention, the invasion of other states, and the violation of international treaties which it implies. . .⁴

Yet the Soviet government not only invaded Finland in 1939, but the following year seized the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia

¹ *Captive Ukraine: Challenge to the World's Conscience*. World Congress of Free Ukrainians, November 16-19, 1967, New York, N.Y., 1967, pp. 5-6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³ *The Captive Nations: Nationalism of the Non-Russian Nations in the Soviet Union*. By Roman Smal-Stocki. Bookman Associates, New York, 1960, p. 66.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

and Lithuania in defiance of solemn treaties, and installed therein Communist puppet regimes against the will of the peoples.

After World War II the Soviet Union, again in violation of treaties and promises, installed Communist regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and East Germany. It also extended its colonial power and influence to North Korea. In 1948 Yugoslavia escaped from the tutelage of Moscow and became the first communist state to be ruled independently of Russian control and supervision. Subsequently, Moscow added North Vietnam, Tibet and Cuba to its roster of subservient puppets.

After the death of Stalin in 1953 and his gradual degradation as a "leader of the proletariat," the fissures in the foundations of the Soviet empire became evident. In 1956 the centrifugal forces racking the Soviet totalitarian empire erupted in the Hungarian uprising and the upheavals in Poland. Rumania was the first of the satellites to follow its own "way toward socialism." In January of 1968 in Prague, the government of Antonin Novotny, a veteran Stalinist, gave way to a new government headed by Alexander Dubcek, a Slovak invariably described as an "idealist communist" who believed in the righteousness of his reforms. These were decidedly pro-democratic. Censorship of press and correspondence was lifted. The Czechoslovak economy, stagnating under the systematic Soviet squeeze, began to look hopefully toward the West for a revitalization of trade, including imports and the influx of hard currency. Tourism was encouraged both ways, and Czechoslovakia became a window through which the winds of freedom blew into the stifled, freedomless empire of Moscow.

In all other areas, including religion and the ethnic minorities, the Dubcek regime showed understanding and promised even greater reforms. The Catholic Church, including the Eastern Ukrainian Rite Catholic Church, was allowed to resume normal activities. The national minorities of Czechoslovakia, long suppressed and deprived of all national rights by the Novotny and earlier regimes, were assured of their independent rights as follows:

In the interest of strengthening the unity, cohesiveness, and national character of all ethnic groups in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic — Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians and Germans — it is necessary to draft a statute which determines the position and rights of the individual nationalities and safeguards their opportunities for a national life and for the development of their national character. The Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee realizes that, despite the undoubted results achieved, serious shortcomings have existed and still continue to exist in our efforts to solve the nationality

problems. We deem it necessary to emphasize that the principles of our program apply fully to the other nationalities as well as to our two nations. . .⁵

ANTI-RUSSIAN DOMINO THEORY

This avowed liberal policy toward the nationalities in Czechoslovakia was anathema as far as the Soviet Russian "nationality policy" itself was concerned. The Kremlin for the past 50 years has been applying its own nationality policy, which in effect is a policy of unbridled Russification. Moscow did allow a degree of cultural development of the non-Russian nations (their culture was supposed to be "national in form, but socialist in content"), but it suppressed quickly any manifestation of nationalism, even in culture and literature, with harsh brutality and savagery.

We recall the systematic purges of Ukrainian cultural life in Ukraine in the 1930's, 1940's and, most recently, in 1965-67, when some 200 Ukrainian writers, poets, literary critics, students, professors and scientists were purged for advocating more freedom and emancipation of the Ukrainian people. (See, "Violation and Destruction of Human Rights in Ukraine," A Memorandum, submitted to the UN International Conference on Human Rights, held in Teheran, Iran, April 22 to May 13, 1968, appearing elsewhere in this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* — Ed.)

Unrest among Ukrainian intellectuals has been marked for the past few years, reaching a peak today:

A dozen writers in Ukraine have come under a threat of disciplinary action for a strong protest to the Soviet leadership over closed trials of intellectuals in Ukraine. . . Demands were raised this week at a Communist party meeting in Kiev, the capital of the Soviet republic, that the Ukrainian Writers' Union investigate activities of some "apolitical" writers who had provided material for "hostile propaganda. . ."

The dozen writers had joined 126 other Ukrainians, among them scientists, scholars, engineers and students, in protesting the trials of more than 200 intellectuals in Ukraine in 1965-1966. . .⁶

Ten days before the Soviet Russian seizure of Czechoslovakia the same reporter wrote from Moscow that the Ukrainian youth were demanding the same cultural opportunities that are being en-

⁵ "Czechoslovak Action Program," *Rude Pravo*, April 1, 1968, Prague, as reported by the Research Department of Radio Free Europe release of May 20, 1968.

⁶ "Party in Ukraine Assails Protesting Intellectuals," by Raymond H. Anderson, *The New York Times*, May 3, 1968.

joyed by the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The young Ukrainians denounced the communist paper, *Pravda Ukrainy*, for printing an article expressing horrified indignation that "howling" Western songs had been performed at a Comsomol gathering. . .⁷

The political developments in Czechoslovakia were more than the Kremlin could possibly abide. It had to move in and crush the nascent freedom in Czechoslovakia, although only a few days earlier the Soviet leadership had solemnly pledged itself to respect the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia:

The participants (at Bratislava) expressed a firm desire to do everything in their power towards the deepening of the all-sided collaboration of their countries on the basis of the *principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and national independence, territorial integrity, brotherly mutual self-assistance and solidarity* (Italics added — Ed.).⁸

How this respect for "sovereignty" looked in practice, the world now knows.

Prof. Albert Parry of Colgate University pointed out cogently why the Kremlin had to crush the budding freedom in Czechoslovakia:

Nor was it just a matter of Prague alone. The domino theory applies. With Prague gone, Warsaw and Budapest and certainly Bucharest would follow. The restless Soviet intellectuals would become yet more restless with such tempting examples before them, and the effect on the non-Russian national groups in the Soviet Union — especially the rebellious Ukrainians right next door to Czechoslovakia — was all too easily predictable. . .⁹

An even more eloquent argument as to what the liberalization program in Czechoslovakia meant for Ukraine was presented by George Weller after his tour in Rumania:

In the unfinished puzzle of why Russia crushed Czechoslovakia the missing clue to Soviet motivation is Ukraine.

Ukraine is nominally independent and provides one of Russia's two extra votes in the United Nations. But Ukraine is at once Moscow's greatest prize and her worst internal worry.

The 46 million Ukrainians are rich-blooded southerners, wealthy in lands and oil, climate and culture. . . But in the wild blood of the Ukrainians, freedom if allowed to spread, could mean revolution. It could even mean that the

⁷ "Ukrainian Youth Defy Music Curb," by Raymond H. Anderson, *The New York Times*, August 13, 1968.

⁸ *Literaturna Ukraina*, August 6, 1968, Kiev, Ukraine.

⁹ *The New York Times Magazine*, September 1, 1968, "Why Moscow Couldn't Stand Prague's Deviation," by Albert Parry.

right of secession, which the Soviet constitution guarantees, could be realized. From Ukraine, the disease of "independent socialism" could pass to the other 14 Soviet Republics. . . . When the crunch came in the Kremlin, the strongest voices demanding a takeover of Czechoslovakia were both Ukrainians. The loudest was the Ukrainian who stood to lose his job if Czech communism spread east: Peter Shelest, secretary of the Ukrainian party. It is he who must even now try to explain away the imprisonments of Ukrainian intellectuals. . . .

The hardest-nosed interventionist on the military side was another Ukrainian, Marshal Andrei Grechko. It was he who pleaded that if Czechoslovakia were permitted its liberalization, he no longer could guarantee the Soviet line of communication. . . . Pro-Soviet Ukrainians, like Shelest and Grechko, saw in these methods the right cure in Czechoslovakia (arrests and trials of Ukrainian intellectuals — Ed.), too. A quick dose of armor may save not only Czechoslovakia, but the adjoining priceless Ukraine, as they see it. . . .¹⁰

The widely popular German illustrated magazine, *Der Spiegel*, also picked up the "Ukrainian argument" in the Soviet Russian motivation in seizing Czechoslovakia.

A few days before the Moscow-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, the editors of *Der Spiegel* dispatched a team of writers to investigate the process of liberalization by the Dubcek government. Regarding the Ukrainian question, they reported:

Immediately after the removal of Novotny in Prague and the assumption of power by Dubcek, the radio station in Presov, situated close to the border of the USSR, especially the Ukrainian SSR, began broadcasting systematic programs in the Ukrainian language for the Ukrainian minority in the CSSR which lives for the most part in the Presov area. These broadcasts constantly explained the contents and essence of liberalization reforms in Czechoslovakia, including reference to the restoration of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, about the possibility of creation in the CSSR of new parties instead of one communist, and the like. These broadcasts were heard not only in the CSSR, but also in neighboring Ukraine, where, especially in its western part, exist strong anti-Soviet nationalist tendencies.¹¹

Der Spiegel proceeded to emphasize that the Ukrainian radio broadcasts were circulated from house to house not only in Ukraine, but in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia as well. In Ukraine, the German review went on, Communist meetings were called in Kiev and Kharkiv at which such questions as liberalization of the party, lifting of the press censorship and the monopolistic tendencies in the Soviet economy were openly discussed. It also reported that in

¹⁰ "Czech Unrest Spreads to Ukraine," by George Weller, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 10, 1968.

¹¹ *Der Spiegel*, August 26, 1968.

the last few years some 200 Ukrainian intellectuals have been arrested and tried in Ukraine, and also the fact that in 1917 Ukraine had left the Russian empire and proclaimed its own independent state, which was subsequently destroyed by Moscow. In its place Lenin substituted the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic."

It is perfectly plain — as has been known to us for a number of years — that Communist Russia cannot tolerate freedom in its peripheral borders without endangering its shaky imperial structure, which stands solely because it is supported by bayonets.

THE MAGNITUDE OF WESTERN GUILT

Western statesmen and observers were shocked at the abduction of Alexander Dubcek and his colleagues by the Soviet Russian police and their delivery in chains to Moscow for parleys. Yet this is nothing new in Russian history. Ukrainian diplomatic and peace emissaries were frequently kidnapped by Czarist governments; so were Baltic, Polish, and Finnish leaders, by both Czarist and Soviet governments. In 1956 Premier Imre Nagy and Gen. Pal Maleter went to "negotiate" with the Soviet government on behalf of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters, and never returned — dead or alive.

The degree of culpability of the West in what happened to Czechoslovakia is by no means small or excusable. No one, of course, expected the United States, Great Britain and France to send troops to repel the Russian "liberators" in Czechoslovakia. But their guilt lies in their long complacency and inactivity and, above all, in their belief that "Mother Russia" had "mellowed" and would not resort to conventional forms of aggression and territorial aggrandizement. It is a tragic thing that when the centrifugal forces in the USSR and its satellites were on the upswing, the Western nations should have been doing everything they could to placate the tyrants in the Kremlin and to establish a *detente*, even at the sacrifice of moral and ethical principles, once highly valued in the West.

President Charles de Gaulle of France has weakened NATO considerably by setting himself up as the "savior" of Europe from American influence and "imperialism." He almost destroyed France by letting the Communists have their way. He denounced the treatment of Czechoslovakia, but put the blame on the Yalta agreement, which, he said, had divided Europe into "Soviet" and "American" spheres of influence.

Western observers now report that the USSR and its subservient communist puppets had been preparing for the invasion of Czechoslovakia for almost six months, that is, since the advent of the

Dubcek government to power. It is reported that the CIA warned the U.S. Government on August 2, 1968, that the seizure of Czechoslovakia was imminent.

The reputable national magazine *Newsweek* reported in its issue of August 12, 1968 that President Johnson had been presented with 23 different drafts of position papers on the foment in Czechoslovakia, and "finally decided that the best course for the U.S. to follow was to say nothing at all." A State Department official explained:

The Russian-Czech conflict threatened to blow up Johnson's bridge-building to the East... He just hated the idea and couldn't bring himself to do anything about it...¹²

The U.S. policy, which has been predicated on the principle of not "rocking the boat" and of not "embarrassing" the Russians, has created a false sense of security and has made many look upon Communist Russia as a benign society, eager for "peaceful coexistence" with the West. While the freedom forces inside the USSR were being strangled, the United States ratified the Consular Convention Treaty with Moscow and renewed the "cultural exchange" agreement. All this has been totally incomprehensible to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

The reactions of several European governments have been notably anti-American. In Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and in a number of small countries the feeling has prevailed that Washington is playing the big-power game with Moscow, especially after it was reported in the press that President Johnson still wanted to meet Kosygin to discuss limitation of nuclear arms the day after the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. *The New Statesman* of London went so far as to say, "It is now pretty obvious that the Americans gave the Russians *carte blanche* to invade Czechoslovakia" (Cf. *The New York Times*, September 9, 1968).

The Western inaction, the massive dissatisfaction with existing democracy in most Western countries, the civil disorders and open sabotage of the established democratic institutions — all encourage the Kremlin to indulge its appetite and expansionist designs.

In order to divert world criticism, including the majority of the Communist Parties, Moscow now is picking new targets. The Soviet press has been assailing Rumania and Yugoslavia. A UPI dispatch from London reported that on September 20, 1968, Soviet Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, commander of Warsaw Pact armed forces, visited

¹² *Triumph*, September 1968, p. 7, Washington, D. C.

Bulgaria's capital, Sofia, to set up Soviet army garrisons in that country. Thus Moscow seeks to encircle Rumania and establish a direct territorial link with recalcitrant Yugoslavia.

THREAT TO WEST GERMANY

But most arrogant and most disturbing is the Soviet move against West Germany, which so far has confined itself to a propaganda barrage. Moscow contends that it has the right to intervene by military action in West Germany by virtue of two obscure articles of the United Nations Charter in order to prevent a rise of "neo-Nazism" and German resurgent aggression in general. In reality, Moscow is afraid of German economic success, and specifically its gradually growing influence in Eastern Europe.

Neither our strategic nuclear force, nor our nuclear tactical weapons, nor the conventional forces — the armies, navies, and air forces of the NATO alliance — moved a finger to stop the crushing of freedom in Czechoslovakia.

What will happen if Moscow moves on Rumania, Yugoslavia, and then West Germany? We cannot take comfort from any promises that the Kremlin leaders might have given Washington. Like Hitler's *Reich*, the Kremlin has made many promises, but what of them? The Czechs and Slovaks did not benefit by them.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, George F. Kennan, the architect of the "containment policy," has suddenly spoken against a *detente* with the USSR:

The United States should send 100,000 troops to West Germany and then tell the Soviet Union: "We will not take them out until you leave Czechoslovakia. . ." ¹³

The American diplomat condemned as "pure madness" any idea of President Johnson's meeting with the Kremlin leaders, and explained that "an atmosphere of cooperation with Russians simply does not exist. . ."

For over two decades the Russian Moloch has been building up for aggression and aggrandizement, while the West has been placating him thanks to its naive and gullible policy of "peaceful coexistence" and *detente*.

Moscow has now challenged Western Europe, and that challenge must and should not be ignored.

¹³ "Kennan Decries Talk on *Detente*," *The New York Times*, September 22, 1968.

“SOVIET LEGALITY” IN THE LIGHT OF TRIALS AND DETENTION OF UKRAINIANS

EDITOR'S NOTE: Large-scale arrests and trials by Communist courts in Ukraine have been widely publicized in the world press during 1968. *The Ukrainian Quarterly* has published excerpts from letters and petitions of two prominent Ukrainian intellectuals who are now in Soviet slave labor camps, *Vyacheslav M. Chornovil* and *Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky* (Nos. 1 and 2, 1968, of *The Quarterly*, respectively). Their appeals have appeared in the European and American press quite extensively.

In this issue, we are publishing letters from two other prominent Ukrainian political prisoners who appealed to the Soviet authorities and press in Ukraine and Russia. One of them is *Yuryi Shukhevych-Berezinsky*, son of General Roman Shukhevych, who under the *nom de guerre* of Taras Chuprynka commanded the powerful Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and who was killed by Soviet security police in 1950. Yuryi's letter was addressed to the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR in Kiev. The other petition was written by *Dr. Volodymyr Horbovy*, an eminent Ukrainian political trial attorney, who was sentenced to 25 years at hard labor for unspecified crimes. His letter was addressed to *Pravda* in Moscow. Hundreds of copies of these petitions are being circulated throughout Ukraine. Both documents show crass and unabashed violations by Soviet courts, and prove that the much-acclaimed “Soviet legality” is but propaganda claptrap for consumption by the Western world.

I. PETITION TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UKRAINIANS S.S.R.

July 1, 1967

In September of 1963, I was transported from the Mordovian camp where I was imprisoned, to Kiev — to the prison of the State Security (KGB), under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

I was not told the reason for my transfer to the prison for investigation; only the fact that from time to time I was taken by KGB officials to theaters, museums and industrial enterprises in Kiev, as well as to Zaporizhia, Kakhovka, Kherson and Kaniv, gave me an indication of what the real reasons were for it all and what would be demanded of me.

It actually happened in June, 1964, when KGB officials — Col. Kalash, Capt. Lytvyn and Capt. Merkatanenko — demanded that I write a statement for the Soviet press which would indicate that I was abandoning my nationalist views. To my question as to whether it could be a refusal to take part in any anti-Soviet activity in the future, I was told that it would not be enough. I was supposed to write a statement which would condemn nationalism in general, condemn the activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, give facts compromising Ukrainian nationalists, and also condemn the activities of the underground movement in Ukraine in 1944-1950.

After my refusal to write such a statement (or to broadcast it on the radio), I was offered the opportunity to write at least a description of my travels in Ukraine which would appear in the press. When I refused this proposition also, Col. Kalash said that I had to do it if I wanted the KGB to intercede on my behalf in obtaining a pardon for me.

Inasmuch as I do not consider myself to be guilty, I could not write such a petition, which I stated in writing, giving the following reasons:

1. As far back as 1956, the State Public Prosecutor appealed the decision of the Vladimirsky Court about my release as a minor, on the basis of the decree of April 24, 1954, arguing that I allegedly tried to establish contacts with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists abroad (which was completely groundless) and that my father was the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists' underground (which I cannot deny).

2. On August 21, 1958, on the day when I was supposed to be released from prison after serving a 10-year term, on the basis of the decision of the Association for the Assistance in Defense at the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, a new warrant for my arrest was issued. It was based on completely false charges of anti-Soviet agitation among the prisoners at the Vladimirskaia prison.

3. The charges were based on fictitious evidence of two KGB agents, criminal offenders who were specially prepared by 1st Lt. Galsky (now a Major) to give evidence, for which they were promised all sorts of privileges (which they later received).

4. The above mentioned witnesses (Burkov and Fomchenko) gave false evidence, each of which contradicted and even completely cancelled the previous one. But all this was not taken into account, neither by the interrogator nor by the prosecutor.

5. I was accused (one of the main items) of being interested in the details of the death of my father, Roman Shukhevych, who died on March 5, 1950, in the village of Bilohorshche near Lviv.

6. During my arrest on August 21, 1958, several poems of Olga Ilkiv were confiscated. Those were exclusively lyrical poems, but they were attached to the case and added to my charge on the ground that Olga Ilkiv was convicted for belonging to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and for illegal activities, and also because those poems were at one time published in underground publications. This I found out only during the inquest.

7. A literary examination by experts Lesyn and Kozachuk, which was conducted not only unsatisfactorily but most unfairly, categorized those confiscated poems as nationalistic, which did not correspond to the truth.

8. Notwithstanding the fact that my "crime" was committed in Vladimir on Klyazma (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic) and therefore, according to existing laws, should have been tried in a Vladimirsky Provincial Court, I was transported to the Lviv prison of the KGB, where the inquest was completed and where I was tried by the Lviv Provincial Court.

9. Although KGB authorities cover up all their actions with talks about the interests of the people, my trial took place on December 1, 1958, behind closed doors, contrary to existing laws. This shows that I was concealed from the public because they were afraid that the nefarious intrigues of the Lviv KGB would be exposed.

10. During the trial the court failed to look impartially into all details, aiming only to fulfill the wish of the KGB — to convict me at any price.

11. The attorney (Smirnova) acquainted herself with the case just before the session of the court. Realizing that it was useless to count on any objective defense, I declined the services of an attorney, but the court ignored my request to allow me to conduct my own defense, trying to cover up all their violations of legal standards.

12. The members of the literary court commission of experts often exceeded their authority as prescribed by law, by asking provocative questions (with the permission of the judge), which referred more to my personal views than to the actual case.

13. At the court hearing, only the witnesses for the prosecution (Fomchenko and Burkov) were heard. At the same time, the court did not find it necessary to hear the evidence of the other twelve witnesses who could refute the evidence of Burkov and Fomchenko.

14. Fearing that even at a closed trial I might expose through my questions the falsity of the evidence of the prosecutions' witnesses, I was not allowed to ask them any questions which would expose them as being KGB agents

and would show that their evidence was given according to Galsky's instructions.

15. Although it was clear from the very beginning that the witnesses were planted and that their evidence was false, the court decided that only they could be trusted and would not accept any other explanation or evidence, stating that it is the court's right to find which evidence is trustworthy.

16. When those witnesses were unable to carry out their task — to prove my guilt logically, the members of the court and the prosecutor came to their assistance by prompting them how to answer. The public prosecutor Kolyasnikov, who supported the accusation, was particularly helpful in that respect.

17. The members of the court and the public prosecutor were more interested in my ideologies as if they were punishable, than in the details of the case. They constantly emphasized my convictions and the fact whose son I was.

As a result of these abuses and according to the wishes of the KGB, I was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Although I had surmised the reasons for my conviction, I became soon convinced that my guesses were right.

Thus, even during the previous inquest, interrogator Vinogradov told me that the preliminary inquest is just a prelude, and that later I would have many more talks with the representatives of the security organs.

His prediction came true right after the court rendered the verdict. Several weeks later I was summoned by 1st Lt. Galsky who admitted during our conversation that the verdict which was based on the false testimony of witnesses was undoubtedly groundless, but (to quote his words)... "with your views and your convictions, we cannot let you go free...". I should have given them proofs of my loyalty in the form of a press conference, an article, a pamphlet or a public address on the radio, in which I would condemn the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, my own father, etc. "If we were certain that you would talk with us on that subject, we would not have resorted to such methods as arrest and trial," said Galsky at the conclusion of our talk.

It became clear to me that my trial was inspired by the KGB with the purpose of blackmailing me into appearing publicly with a statement which they wanted, and which had nothing to do with justice. I was promised that my case would be revised and that I would be released from prison if I agreed to their demands. When I refused, I was sent to a camp for political prisoners in Mordovia.

All this was presented in writing to Col. Kalash, which made any future talks on the subject impossible.

But even after this, the KGB would not leave me alone. Within a year, in July of 1965, when I was in the camp, I was summoned by the local representative of the KGB, Capt. Krut, who told me to send a petition for pardon to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR. I refused to send such a petition and agreed only to write a brief statement, in which I explained that I was tried unjustly and that I was appealing to the Presidium of the Supreme Council because all my previous appeals to the court and to the prosecutor's office were ineffective. The KGB was not satisfied with this, and Capt. Krut categorically demanded that I write a petition for pardon, which I refused to do. Then he said that the administration itself would write such a petition.

As it became known later, there was no petition, and my appeal remained unanswered. From this I deduced that my statement was not even forwarded to the Presidium. All this comedy was necessary only in order to have such a statement attached to my case. By doing this, the KGB would relinquish its responsibility for my case because a petition for pardon would be equivalent to an admission of guilt. My "case" is obviously too thin, which was confirmed by the representative of the KGB, Capt. Lytvyn, who said that the error of the Lviv KGB consisted of not having prepared the case properly.

Therefore, they resent not the obvious injustice and violation of legality, but the inability of the Lviv KGB to fabricate skillfully the necessary evidence. Therefore they have to camouflage this inability under the cover of a petition for pardon, which is supposed to erase all traces of a direct violation of legality, all traces of the crime committed by them.

Of the thirty-four years of my life, nineteen have been spent in prison. I spent the first ten years in prison on the basis of the decision of the Special Council at the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. And although the Association for Assistance in Defense at the Ministry of State Security was declared to be an illegal organ during the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its decisions have not lost their legal force, and many people, myself included, continued to stay in prison. Some of them are still there. The subsequent ten years in prison I got as a result of the direct instruction of the KGB, on the basis of evidence fabricated by them. They also continue to persecute my mother, Natalia Shukhe-

vych-Berezynska. And all this is going on while they make noisy declarations about justice, legality, etc.

A long time ago I ceased to believe in declared legality and justice, which I have never seen implemented.

Therefore, I appeal to you now, when I have only one year left to finish my second term of imprisonment. I appeal to you not because I have any illusions about you or any hope that you will be able to intervene and rectify violated justice, but I appeal to you because possibly in a few months a new crime will be committed against me — they will start again to fabricate a case against me in order to sentence me for the third time. And if they don't do that, nobody can guarantee that in a few months I won't be killed by some hired assassin, as was the case with many political prisoners after they were released. To name a few, there were: Lytvyn, Vart-sabyuk, Bergs, Melnikans, etc. Or I might die from mysterious causes.

It is also possible that a mass criminal act will be committed against all political prisoners in Mordovia (for which everything has been prepared already), they will all be exterminated, and later the executors of this crime will also be eliminated.

This has forced me to appeal to you and let you know that such things might occur. The knowledge of this will prevent you in the future from saying that you were not properly informed and that you bear no responsibility for the actions of the KGB because all this occurred without your knowledge.

Yuryi Shukhevych-Berezynsky
Mordovia, — OZERNY,
July 1, 1967.

II. PETITION TO THE EDITORS OF 'PRAVDA'

It has been the constant desire of mankind to attain perfection in human norms of moral behavior, in their attitude towards society and towards other people. In various periods of time, mankind has yielded to various ideals. Plato idealized goodness; Aristotle — social virtues; Copernicus — meekness; Buddha — humility; Christ — love of one's neighbor; Feuerbach — general love; Luis and Heideger — liberty; Marx — freedom of the proletariat. All of them strived to preserve human dignity.

In 1948, the United Nations Organization adopted the Declaration of Human Rights. In the preamble of this Declaration it is stressed that recognition of human dignity constitutes the foundation of freedom and justice. The creators of this world constitution unanimously decided to defend the rights of people by force of law. Further, this Declaration says that every person has the right to live, to be free and to enjoy inviolability of personal freedom (Art. 3); no one should be subjected to tortures or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Art. 5); all people are equal and have the right to protection without any discrimination (Art. 7); every person has the elementary right to regain his rights in the event they were violated (Art. 6); no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention (Art. 9). Article 10 states that everyone is entitled to have his case examined, in accordance with all requirements of justice, by an independent and impartial tribunal. Article 11 constitutes, in fact, the principle of justice, presuming innocence of a person until proven guilty.

All these resolutions of the said Declaration were accepted for the protection of man against barbaric acts and against encroachment on his rights and his dignity.

Thus, the General Assembly of the U.N. was instrumental in eliminating the police system of government and in bringing legal norms of genuine legality.

Since that announcement, the fate of an individual ceased to depend on whims of security or police organs, repugnant to human conscience. Through this, the determination of guilt of an individual becomes the responsibility of the court, and interference of security organs in the process of justice constitutes a disgrace, and not only from the point of view of humaneness and prestige. Genuine legality will not tolerate abuses of police. . . , because it constitutes an illegal usurpation of court authority.

The USSR is a co-author and a signatory of this Declaration. It was ratified by the Soviet Parliament and therefore it has the force of law in the Soviet Union. In addition, Soviet legislation proclaims that criminal legality is carried out only by the courts (Art. 3 of the Criminal Proceedings Code). Therefore, no one may be found guilty and convicted of a crime by other means than by a verdict of the court (Art. 13 of the Criminal Code). The above mentioned Declaration becomes a part of civil legislation. Art. 129 of the Principles of Civil Legislation states:

If an international treaty or an international agreement, in which the Soviet Union participates, establishes other regulations than those which are in the Soviet Civil Legislation, then regulations established by an international agreement are applicable.

Formally it follows that, in accordance with the resolution of the Declaration, Soviet law guarantees all human rights. However, Soviet practice denies and rejects all the achievements of the civilized world and demonstrates something quite opposite. All my life I have been observing both the spirit and the letter of the law. This was not difficult for me because by nature I was endowed with social awareness, and as a lawyer I always treated jurisprudence seriously. Never in my life have I committed any foul act. My only mistake was that I thoughtlessly trusted Soviet propaganda and allowed myself to be taken by the MGB. Before the war I had been a member of the bar in Lviv; during the war I was a judge of the Polish Court of Appeals in Crakow, and after the war I worked as a legal adviser in the Ministry of Lands in Czechoslovakia.

On the basis of a false denunciation, Poland declared that I was a war criminal because of alleged collaboration with the Germans. Poland demanded my extradition and stated I would be brought to trial. Because of that, the Czechoslovak authorities arrested me on the 1st of August, 1968, and handed me over to Polish authorities. The investigation in Warsaw lasted the whole year. It showed fully that the accusation was groundless. On the contrary, I proved that I was critical of Hitler's political aims, for which I was imprisoned by the Germans. It was easy for me to prove that the evidence against me was falsified and that it was prepared crudely and clumsily. The Polish authorities found themselves in an awkward situation. But instead of returning me, as a Czechoslovak citizen, to Czechoslovakia, they deported me to the Soviet Union. In addition, they passed to the Soviet authorities the original falsified evidence in a new, corrected edition. It is worth noting that the Polish court, in accordance with Polish law, was entitled to judge me. Nevertheless, Polish justice did not allow itself to be led astray. It managed to preserve its dignity and refused to put on trial an innocent person. This was not done by the Soviet authorities. The second year of investigation also passed without any results.

It is well known what the Soviet methods of inquest were at that time. The defendant was considered to be a criminal simply because he was arraigned. There existed only one-sided methods of investigation of criminal cases, which were essentially helping the

prosecution. However, I endured all the horrors of police cruelties and refuted all slanderous implications. Through lack of incriminating evidence I was not brought to trial, but, on the basis of the decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union, dated July 16, 1949, No. 2906-49, I was sent, in accordance with Art. 54-22k, to forced labor camps for twenty-five years. Thus, my guilt was established by administrative decree, that is by police decree. Naturally, the court does not administer, and the administration does not judge. It is the foundation of the Socialist constitution, of criminal legislation and of international law effective in the Soviet Union.

In addition, the XXth Congress stated clearly that the Association for Assistance of Defense of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is not an organ of justice. Obviously, I know about these matters. Contrary to the categorical norms of legality, I have been illegally imprisoned for twenty years, without a trial, without a sentence and without a chance to defend myself.

I resented such lawlessness. Therefore, in 1960, I sent a complaint to Moscow. My complaint was considered by the prosecutor's office of the USSR on August 31, 1960. It issued a brief reply, saying that in the opinion of the security organs the accusation was valid, and therefore the prosecutor's office is powerless against such a decision. It follows that in the Soviet Union it is not the prosecutor who supervises the police, but, on the contrary, the security organs dictate to the prosecutor's office what action to take. That is quite a custom! I was naturally astonished by such an interpretation of the decree, and on June 15, 1965, I filed a complaint with the Minister of Justice. Shortly after, this complaint was examined by the Attorney General of the USSR. On August 24, 1965, I received a strange reply. The Attorney General confirmed that allegedly my guilt was proved during the previous inquest, that is by a police decree, without a trial. My essentially convincing arguments about the inadmissibility of such legal ethics were ignored by him. He did not even mention the very important arguments which indicated violation of legality.

I practiced law in Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Besides, I am acquainted with legal proceedings of other countries of the civilized world. If a prosecutor in those countries expressed an opinion that the defendant could be found guilty in 1949, during a previous inquest, that is by a police decree, he would be barred from practicing law and declared a charlatan. Things are different in the USSR. Here, the attorneys of the republic, as well as the Attorney

General of the USSR, apply all sorts of improper measures to cover up the outrageous actions of the security organs. In reality, the institution which has been called by law to guard the legal order, violates that order, and thus brings infamy to the Socialist regime. I could not find any evidence of witnesses in the documents concerning my case. When they appeared later, their evidence reflected the ideas of the interrogator, not their own. That was another falsification, and the witnesses were introduced into my case in order to give it the appearance of (incomprehensible word — translator's note.). They probably live in the Soviet Union and can confirm my point of view. The prosecutor's assertion about the proof of my guilt is meaningless, which only proves his professional ignorance. The prosecutor should be familiar with the contents of Art. 31/96 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. In it, the meaning of doubt is clearly defined: "The Court bases its sentence only on those proofs which are examined during the court session." Soviet law does not recognize any other kind of doubt. The effort of the prosecutor to give legal power to police organs is in essence granting them excessive rights and privileges.

The comparison of humane foundations of Soviet legality with evident Soviet reality brings us inevitably to the conclusion that all grandiloquent articles of Soviet laws are in general and on the whole just fiction and are of purely propagandistic character. Reality is a striking example of all deceptive methods of Soviet official tight-rope-walking, and it clearly shows that lawlessness and abuses are natural and inseparable properties of the Soviet regime. Thus, the Soviet constitution and Soviet laws have been brought to the present level of civilization. The misfortune lies in the fact that the executive organs have not been able to rise to their responsibility. For instance, they cannot comprehend that prisons are only for criminals. They do not want to take into consideration the moral state of an individual who happens to find himself in that vicious circle. An unpleasant paradox results. Camarilla deliberately violates laws and enjoys freedom of action with impunity while decent people suffer in prisons, though genuine social morality demands the opposite. It should be noted that I am deprived of the right to write letters and receive parcels. I cannot even order and receive medicine and orthopedic equipment prescribed by a Soviet physician. I conduct myself in a dignified manner because I cannot behave differently. The severe measures taken against me have no legal basis. The determination of measures is essentially synonymous with determi-

nation of punishment. Usually, only the court is the proper organ for determination of punishment, not the administration which is only an executive and not a determining organ. It is also worth noting that general or enforced measures are applied in the Soviet Union only against bandits, robbers and hoodlums, while decent people are punished by severe and extremely severe measures. From my study of all this I would not want to draw a conclusion that the USSR is just an ignorant mechanism which acts according to the whim of some abstract doctrine. Society consists of living human beings who strive forward, perfecting their natural human customs and manners. On that road they sometimes encounter obstacles in the form of greater or smaller tyrants. But eventually the sound, creative sense prevailed and humanity liberated itself from temporary shackles. Undoubtedly human nature possesses an elemental yearning for goodness and justice. This characteristic creates an image of a complete human being. We must believe that court people also possess that yearning and that they wish to get rid of the uncertainties of their destiny. I happened to go through the pages of the Soviet press which condemned the governments of Spain, Portugal and other countries. Soviet statesmen are indignant of the fact that in those countries people are treated inhumanly and are put in jail without a trial. These statesmen demand that residents of Africa and Asia be given their human rights. What is the value of all this talking in comparison with Soviet reality? Don't these statesmen realize that the whole world studies Soviet laws and knows that many innocent people are suffering here in prisons and camps, without trials, without sentences and without being able to defend themselves?

It appears that it is wrong to violate the rights of a black person, but to do the same thing at home is right. What kind of ethic is this? We hear many speeches here about overcoming the cult of personality and about the restoration of legality. What is the value of these talks when the reality contradicts such drivel. Essentially, nothing has changed. Instead, there came more refined forms of mockery of human dignity.

I don't intend to rummage in the consciences of those statesmen. These are personal feelings which are not liable to objective examination, and they can be feigned. However, these statesmen know very well how they, with their demagogy, appear to listeners and readers who are well informed about Soviet reality. In front of me are two magazines: *Socialist Legality* and *The Communist*. Much is written in these publications about human rights and particularly

about personal immunity, at the same time stressing the meaning of presumption of innocence as the guardian of those rights. In particular, it is stated: "In the Soviet Union, presumption of innocence is not fiction but the expression of legality in a court procedure and a guarantee of an objective and thorough examination of the case. It is saturated with social-political content and has the force of law." This is the view of the official organ of the ruling party and of the USSR government. Thus, it binds the whole state apparatus and, foremost, the institutions of justice. Unfortunately, these penetrating deliberations do not reach the consciousness of the prosecutor, and he, in his primitive attitude, is unable to grasp and understand these reasonable and far-reaching resolutions.

A healthy social organism cannot stand such whims of the general "defender" of legality and order.

The above quoted proves that restoration of legality in a country constitutes an internal and elemental need of a citizen, and he should be helped. I cannot do that because I became a martyr in the Soviet Union. I can only sadly follow Soviet reality and inhale its vapors. This should be done, first of all, by the press, which is supposed to be the mouthpiece of public opinion. The press is supposed to expose and reveal shortcomings in the work of protective institutions of the nation and to assist the community in attaining a higher degree of security. The press is supposed to set the tone for the moral behavior of a citizen, at the same time strengthening respect for his rights and his dignity. In the event of violation of legality, it takes steps to improve existing conditions. This can be achieved only by the highest authority of the country, namely by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Therefore, directing this letter to the Attorney General's Office would be synonymous with burying the problem discussed in it. We may expect realistic restoration of legality in the Soviet Union only in such a case when your institution takes a stand with respect to existing problems and helps to realize such restoration. History knows no instances of limitless mockery of human dignity and human rights, because human nature essentially strives towards goodness, justice and self-preservation.

Undoubtedly, this tendency exists also in our Slavonic land. The press may contribute in a great degree towards acceleration of this process. This is a requirement not only of genuine journalistic ethics, but also of responsibility before history.

Dobrovlah, Spring of 1967.

VOLODYMYR HORBOVY

(Moldovian ASSR, St. Potma, P/O Yavas, p/s 385/7)

COMMUNISM'S ASIA STRATEGY

By ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN

The Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana during January 1966 was called to coordinate the various guerrilla movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Originally, China had called for an Afro-Asia conference to open on June 29, 1965 in Algiers. After Ben Bella's ouster, the conference was postponed until November, then canceled. The Havana Conference in which the Soviets participated as 'Asians' — they were represented by an Uzbek — had been in preparation for more than a year, which means that a decision to implement the tri-continental people's war strategy against the United States was made before January 1965.

There was 'anti-colonialist' unrest in parts of Africa, such as Mozambique, and a series of assassinations of African statesmen: some of these events and murders appear to have been related to communist strategy. A major effort was made to support the communist rebellion in the Congo for Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania in the east (to some extent also from Kenya), and from the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) in the west. It would appear that this operation was directed primarily from Tanzania. However, the rebel leaders in the Congo split, and the political situation in Burundi proved unstable. Despite many attempts to keep the rebellion alive during January 1965 and again in the summer, the Congo operation gradually disintegrated. Other preparations for instigating people's wars were made through Algeria and Ghana. The objectives and activities of Algeria are unclear, but Ghana's primary mission apparently was to initiate actions throughout the French-speaking countries of West Africa. In December, 1965 Ghana broke relations with Britain.

On the Chinese mainland itself strategic preparations were going forward. Chinese leaders decided during May 1964 to establish a food reserve of about fifty million tons of grain. By mid-1965, possibly half of that reserve had been procured through wheat imports from the West.

Despite its enormous impact on the economy, the nuclear program was achieving rapid and impressive progress. The nuclear bud-

get was raised substantially. On May 14, 1965, the second atomic device was detonated, a full-fledged bomb dropped from a TU-4 bomber. Special 'machine-building' ministries were established to manage the Chinese atomic, electronic, missile, aircraft and ship industries, as well as agricultural machinery plants. The defense budget was increased substantially to about seven billion JMP. Precisely how much of an increase this represented is uncertain, since the budget figures of the preceding years are disputed, but the 'leap' probably was by one-third or more.

During May 1965 the Viet Cong attempted to thwart the U.S. deployment. Heavy reinforcements streamed in from the North. On August 7, Peking announced that it would send volunteers to Vietnam if they were requested. Two days later Hanoi indicated, in ambiguous terms that it wanted to respond to this offer. On September 3, Lin Piao published a long doctrinal statement on the people's war which clearly spelled out that China wanted a maximum number of conflicts on three continents and was ready to support revolutionary operations. Lin expected all genuine revolutionaries to strike soon and in force.

By the end of September, Foreign Minister Chen Yi hinted broadly that war was imminent. On October 1, the *People's Daily* stated that *war with the United States* was inevitable and that the United States must and would be defeated by means of people's wars. The Communists staged their coup in Indonesia on this very day. If this plan had been successful, the Vietnamese conflict would have been pushed into the background by a far larger conflict — a conflict which, even without Soviet intervention, might have expanded into a third world war.

During March 1967 U.S. forces in South Vietnam launched operation 'Junction City' to flush out the Viet Cong command post near the Cambodian border. Large numbers of documents and photographs were secured which at last permitted identification of the Viet Cong high command. It turned out that the leader of all communist forces in South Vietnam was a regular North Vietnamese officer, the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh. A member of the North Vietnamese Politburo, ranking eighth in the hierarchy of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, and reported to be a fervent Maoist, General Thanh is believed to have taken command in early or mid-1965. The deputy commander of the 'liberation army' operating in South Vietnam is General Tran Van Trah, also a North Vietnamese officer and a pro-Maoist. Major General Tran Do, the third ranking officer,

a North Vietnamese expert in guerrilla warfare and also a Maoist, is the chief political commissar. Thus, the Viet Cong is essentially a Maoist-oriented politico-military organ of Hanoi (which, of course, does not imply that some Viet Cong elements do not desire some independence of action).

Hanoi enjoys Moscow's support; without it Ho could not continue the war. But Mao, whose support is likewise necessary for Hanoi, is split from Moscow. The main disagreement between the Russians and the Maoists centers on strategy. Logically, one would therefore assume that the Mao-Moscow split would place Hanoi in a quandary or induce one of the two feuding parties to withhold help from the other's protege. Yet the triangle operates on the basis of 'the enemy of my friend is my friend.' This unusual arrangement is precisely that which is prescribed by communist operational doctrine.

Despite major disputes, feuding communist groups are bound to cooperate within the context of the 'general line.' The rule that applies to communism as a world movement is that the several parties, irrespective of splits, must maintain full collaboration within the precisely agreed upon sphere of the general line which they all adopted. The Chinese attempted in 1963 to have the line changed, but failed: hence, the old line is still binding on them. In his speech of March 29, 1966 to the Twenty-third Party Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev underscored this continuing obligation. Regardless of 'differences of opinion,' Brezhnev explained, there still was 'unity of action between the Communists of all countries.' He called for the observance of the general line as formulated between 1956 and 1960.

The meaning and purpose of the general line is poorly understood in the Free World, where disputes and splits between Communists are naively interpreted as ruptures of fundamental solidarity and as insuperable obstacles to 'unity of action.' How this doctrine of the general line works in practice can be deduced from the debate on the 'people's war.' Lin Piao's lengthy treatise on the people's war, though dressed up as an anniversary speech, was designed to provide the overall theoretical framework for the operations planned during 1965 and 1966. The timing of the release of this document lends credence to the thesis that in 1965 the strategic initiative came from Peking; more specifically, from Mao.

Lin's treatise is more than a restatement of Mao's views on guerrilla war. It deals with global strategy, sets forth a concept of how to defeat the United States, and offers full Chinese support to those who prosecute the right kind of people's wars. U.S. defeat in

Vietnam 'will lead to a chain reaction,' Lin stated. The more the war expands, 'the greater will be the chain reaction.' The struggle in Vietnam 'is now the focus of the struggle of the people of the world against U.S. aggression.' The 'colossus of U.S. imperialism,' Lin added, 'can be split up,' 'defeated,' and 'destroyed' 'piece by piece' by the 'peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and other regions.'

Hanoi neither modified nor rejected Lin's concept, or at least did not do so openly. By contrast, the Russians did not agree with the thesis that the United States can be defeated by means of a tri-continental people's war, and that the 'people's war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism; nor did they accept the corollary idea that the great assault should be mounted in 1965. Moscow was not interested in premature high-risk operations.

Soviet leaders disagree with Lin's assertion that the 'principal contradiction in the contemporary world' lies 'between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States.' Instead, Moscow finds this principal contradiction in the relationship between 'socialism' and 'capitalism,' i. e., between the USSR and the United States.

Lin, quoting Lenin, says that war, though destructive, 'is a great school' which shakes up the masses and accelerates 'social development to an unheard-of degree.' War pushes 'history forward' and is the main method of adding to one's strength. 'Whether one dares to fight a people's war... means whether one dares to embark on revolution. This is the most effective touchstone for distinguishing genuine from fake revolutionaries.' 'It is opportunism if one won't fight when one can win.' 'Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people never take a gloomy view of war.'

Brezhnev hardly takes a gloomy view of war. But at that time in history, he presumably found himself in closer agreement with another sentence in Lin's treatise: 'It is adventurism if one insists on fighting when one can't win.' In his speech to the Twenty-third Party Congress, which contained a reply to Lin, Brezhnev offered all kinds of support to revolutionary movements. Yet he did not associate himself with Lin's key point:

The spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb.

The Kremlin's attitude to this sort of bombast had been expressed on January 16, 1963 by Khrushchev:

The Albanian leaders talk a lot about rocket and nuclear war but nobody is worried by their talk. Everyone knows that they have nothing to their name but idle talk. . . Our responsibilities are different.*

The continuous general line has been that armed struggle must be used only when such a struggle can be won. The general line calls for both violent and nonviolent operations but does not, contrary to Lin's view, consider 'fighting' to be 'the first of all our strategies and tactics.' Nor does it call for a tri-continental revolutionary people's war. It does call for support to 'national liberation wars,' which is a quite different concept. In his report to the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU, delivered on March 29, 1966, Brezhnev specifically stated:

The principle of peaceful coexistence is not applicable to the relations between. . . colonialists and the victims of colonial oppression.

Soviet leaders fear that the USSR could bleed itself white if it were compelled to organize people's wars on a global scale. Whether or not Soviet leaders really believe — as Lin alleges they do — that 'a nation without nuclear weapons is incapable of defeating an enemy with nuclear weapons' and that 'nuclear weapons decide everything,' it is reasonably clear that in 1965 the Kremlin did not want, and was unwilling to waste scarce resources on a global people's war strategy. People's wars that are in progress, or that should arise because of compelling circumstances, must be supported as a matter of communist duty, but otherwise the priority strategic task is to achieve strategic-technological superiority over the United States.

There are three reasons for Moscow to support the Vietnamese war: (1) It is unfinished business and a communist defeat cannot be tolerated. (2) Aid to Ho and the Viet Cong is an obligation of communist solidarity. (3) The Vietnam war cuts deeply into the U.S. military budget, mostly at the expense of strategic weapons systems, and thereby facilitates Soviet nuclear strategy. But even in the case of Vietnam, Moscow was assisting only one specific national liberation war, whereas Mao promises to support local people's wars anywhere in order to bring about far-flung conflagrations.

The avowed purpose of the Havana Tri-Continental Conference was to coordinate the activities of communist guerrilla forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Guerrilla warfare leaders and experts

* Address to the Sixth Congress of the East German Communist Party in Berlin.

of some eighty 'liberation movements' reportedly attended the sessions. Although it is often asserted that this conference was carefully prepared by the Soviet Union, its underlying concept, namely, the instigation of a tri-continental revolutionary people's war, was formulated by Mao and Lin and is contrary to Moscow's strategy. If Moscow did in fact organize the conference, instead of capitalizing on China's labors, the purpose must have been to establish control over the various guerrilla movements. The Chinese failed to make much of an impact, and the Soviet delegates, together with Castro, prevailed. The resolutions were militant enough and called for revolutionary violence, but the conference took place at a time when it was already apparent that the great offensive scheme of 1965 had failed. Aid was offered to all the people on the three continents 'engaged in a struggle for national liberation,' but a deft editorial hand buried the more militant Mao-Lin line.

The Communist strategy might have succeeded — except that, as in the case of Korea, the United States again did the unpredicted. Whether the election rhetoric of 1964 concealed awareness by the U.S. government of the impending threat is questionable. The chances are that the full danger was not perceived and the customary illusions about communist intentions prevailed. After all, the Cold War conflict with the Communists was supposed to have been tacitly called off after the Cuban missile crisis. In any event, United States policy was not very realistic: Washington fully understood that it could not abandon South Vietnam, but it did not want to fight there. Instead, Washington desired to extend the alleged Cold War truce to Asia. Washington frantically signaled Hanoi and Peking that the United States harbored no aggressive designs, but on the contrary was willing to pay a substantial price for peace. This type of message meant little to Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh, who desired the war — indeed, urgently needed it.

Shortly before the election campaign began in earnest, a naval incident led to a substantial modification of U.S. policy. At the end of July 1964 Hanoi complained that U.S. warships were violating North Vietnamese coastal waters. On August 2, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked a U.S. destroyer on the open seas. On August 4, a new torpedo attack was directed against two U.S. destroyers. Thereupon U.S. carrier planes bombed shore installations and naval bases. On August 5, a third torpedo attack led to another retaliatory air strike and the deployment of F-102 fighters to South Vietnam. President Johnson declared that 'peace is the

only purpose of the course we pursue.' On August 7, Congress adopted a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to take all steps necessary to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia.

This is not the place to recount the course of the Vietnam war. Suffice it to say that during the next two years U.S. troop strength was increased twentyfold; in a prolonged series of ground engagements the large communist units operating in South Vietnam were defeated; the hard core of the Viet Cong was severely weakened; and the U.S. armed forces demonstrated that, in a tactical sense, the people's war held no secrets with which we were unfamiliar and posed no military threats with which we were unable to cope, provided we fielded sufficient numbers.

These U.S. successes were achieved under conditions especially favorable to the guerrillas. At the beginning of 1965, the Communists controlled a substantial portion of the country. The terrain was prepared thoroughly with thousands of tunnels, hideaways, munitions caches, communications facilities, training installations, and the like; some of these preparations had been started in 1941 (against the Japanese). The Viet Cong displayed superior knowledge of the countryside. They are still quite numerous and their first-line cadres have received thorough training. Two or even three generations of guerrillas have been trained successively, and experiences have been handed down from father to son and from elder to younger brother. In addition, the Communists possess ample logistics resources, short and defensible supply lines, and sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos where their troops are able to relax, regroup and recover. Yet, while the Viet Cong are superb fighters, they have proved no match in battle against U.S. troops; the North Vietnamese units quickly demonstrated that they were qualitatively not the equal of the battle-seasoned and more highly motivated hard-core Viet Cong. Thus, by August-September 1965, there no longer was a chance of a conclusive communist victory. Not surprisingly, the people's war in Thailand failed to materialize by the scheduled date, August 1965.

The great strategic maneuver which Mao had conceived, and in which Ho was playing the chief operational role, had been blocked in its initial and decisive phase. The American defeat would not occur in 1965, not even in 1966. According to documents captured in early 1967, U.S. defeat is now forecast for 1970 but Hanoi is holding open the option of a fifty-year war. Lin takes pride in the fact that the 'people's war led by the Chinese Communist Party,' which resulted in the capture of China, 'lasted for 22 years.' But even the most faith-

ful and hardened Viet Cong, as we know from captured documents, balk at this timetable.

U.S. signals were understood for the first time when the Communists received them on the battlefield. To be sure, Ho himself remained unimpressed by U.S. successes, and we cannot be certain about Mao's reactions. But after the situation in the Dominican Republic had been stabilized, Ben Bella was ousted in Algeria (June 19) and U.S. firepower 'signals' were comprehended by the more cautious 'professional' elements within the Chinese Communist Party. In September 1965 the CCP Central Committee held a conference to prepare the propaganda operations that were to accompany the impending battles. But the conference was marred by fundamental disagreements and unmistakably derogatory references to Stalin (read Mao): the anti-Maoist opposition wanted no part of the chairman's strategy.

On October 1, the communist coup in Indonesia was suppressed. The Indonesian Communist Party, generally considered to be the strongest outside the bloc, was destroyed in bloody massacres. Whether the coup was bungled; whether anti-communist Indonesian generals, including graduates of U.S. military schools, had been encouraged by the U.S. resistance in Vietnam; or whether opponents of Mao within his party had contrived the defeat, remains uncertain. But few intelligent observers of the psychological climate in Asia could disagree with the Australian Prime Minister, Harold Holt, when he said on January 12, 1967:

If communist expansion in South-East Asia had been allowed to proceed unchecked, I personally question whether the overthrow of communism in Indonesia would have occurred.

A desperate attempt was made to save the military situation in Vietnam through a change in battle tactics. As in Korea, the Communists tried a 'human sea' attack near the Cambodian border on November 14, 1965. When they were defeated, they were forced to de-escalate from 'mobile warfare' (as Lin calls operations with large units) to guerrilla tactics.

As a result of fortunes on the battlefield the 'psychological climate' was transformed. On December 18, Laos authorized U.S. air strikes against Vietnamese forces operating in its territory. Following a coup in Dahomey, the Chinese Communists were evicted. In half a dozen additional coups, mostly in West Africa, and culminating on February 24, 1966 in the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah who was

visiting Peking, the Maoist position in Africa crumbled. The insurgency in the Congo was defeated, and the people's war in the Caribbean miscarried.

American firmness in southeast Asia during 1966 and 1967 not only blunted the Communist thrust, but it encouraged the non-Communist states in that part of the world to strengthen their defenses, while regarding the United States as something other than a "paper tiger."

But Hanoi, Peking and Moscow believe they can achieve final victory through non-military means. Recognizing the impossibility of a military victory, they place more and more faith on the psychological and propagandistic aspects of the struggle. They are encouraged by the demonstrations in the United States, together with the strength of pacifist and isolationist sentiment.

Based on past performance, the United States, egged on by peace-at-any-price influences in Europe and the United Nations, might well agree to stop the bombing without reciprocity, and force the hapless south Vietnamese to accept a coalition government. Already, at the end of 1967, powerful voices outside the Communist world began to urge such a coalition, dominated by the Viet Cong. Whether President Johnson and his steadfast Secretary of State can withstand these pressures in an election year remains to be seen.

JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS: "I AM IN LOVE"

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Wiggins is in love. He is in love with his country, he says. This is not fiction but a true story of a man who was asked why he was interested in taking on the job of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In Wiggins' judgment the chief qualification for his interest in and acceptance of the President's nomination to this critical post is the passion of love. Now, it can truly be said, every loyal Boy Scout or Girl Scout is well on the road of qualifying for the august position of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Cultivate a love for your country and by all means announce it loudly and dramatically, and you, too, will qualify according to present standards.

The text of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Wiggins nomination falls far short of conveying the atmosphere in which this spectacle took place. Questions posed by some of the Senators present were totally irrelevant or superficial as concern the qualifications of the nominee. One or two behaved as though the entire procedure was mechanical and the approval of the nomination was a foregone conclusion. As we shall see, they were quite correct. But one had to be in attendance to witness the tragi-comedy and to appreciate the full emotional effect of the proceedings. When the chairman of the committee, Senator Fulbright, asked the witness "Why are you interested in this appointment?" and received the answer "I am interested in it for only one reason — I am in love," the resonance and tonal effect of his "What?," resounding through the large room, could hardly be sensed from any reading of the text.¹

For a full appreciation of this and other comical aspects of the hearing, there could be no substitute for attentive presence.

¹ *Nomination of James Russell Wiggins*, Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, USGPO, Washington 1968,, p. 3.

A FEW ASPECTS OF THE HEARING

Before we evaluate this sorry spectacle in our current diplomacy, let us view a couple more of these aspects. The case of Senator Case and his questioning is one for the books. Throughout he attempted to put words into Wiggins' mouth after it was considerably dried up by Senator Fulbright's persistent, though unsuccessful, interrogation. Concerning our intervention in Vietnam, Senator Case nudged the nominee by saying "You can talk about it anyway you want. I think it would be helpful, because we are not engaged in an investigation of you. You are confirmed already, as far as that goes."² Strange, isn't it? The whole and sole purpose of the hearing was to judge the nominee's qualifications for the U.N. position, and on the basis of the judgment to either confirm or not confirm the nomination. Here we have a frank and doubtlessly blunderous admission that regardless of any evaluation of Wiggins' abilities, the confirmation is rigged.

What is even more disgraceful about the manner in which this hearing was undertaken is the fact that the published record of it omits some meaningful statements made at the hearing. When, for example, Senator Case let it be known that confirmation was already assured, Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut intervened, "Will the Senator yield? I did not hear what you said. Has this action already been taken here?" To which Senator Case replied, "No, no. I was saying this perhaps rhetorically, slightly. But I would guess it is a fair prediction, and in fact I bet it would be unanimous."³ Naturally, the bet wasn't accepted. But isn't it odd that this significant exchange does not appear in the final, published account of the hearing? Its significance lies in the attitude shown toward this particular nomination, by and large uncritical, acquiescent, and even slobbering on the part of a few.

In his documented criticism of Wiggins' character, integrity and ability the writer was under no illusion as to the odds against the rejection of the nomination. Weighted account had been taken of the long Senate fight on the Fortas nomination to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, of the intense fever in Congress for adjournment, and the general feeling that this political pay-off for journalistic services rendered would cover only a three-month period. At this late stage it would have been a miracle if one or a group of Senators took up the cudgels for another nomination fight. In this circum-

² *Ibid.* p. 10

³ Quotes are from the recorded transcript of the hearing.

stance my aim was solely to provide for the public record the patent lack of qualifications on the part of the nominee. Much of the publicity surrounding Wiggins' nomination was false and untrue, particularly about his "integrity" and "objectivity." Those who have had any close encounter with him, wielding a pen behind a safe mahogany desk in *The Washington Post*, know differently, and the public record had to show this.

A number of rationalizations have been advanced in behalf of Wiggins' appointment. Some try to justify it as simply a retirement gift for an editor who cooperated closely with the White House. With greater accuracy others view it as an outright political pay-off for the foreign policy support given by Wiggins to the Administration. Perhaps the most fatuous rationalization is that Wiggins was selected to symbolize the low regard and displeasure held by the United States toward the U.N. at this time. If this were so, what has Secretary of State Dean Rusk been doing there? Actually, regardless of the motivation, the choice made reflects the low state of the Administration and reinforces further the poor image the U.S. possesses today in the world arena. Also, the treatment accorded this matter by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee produces an equally sad commentary on the proper execution of functions by the Senate; here, too, regardless of the cited pressures.

Two other important aspects of the hearing were Senator Dodd's insistence on time to permit a reading of a sufficient amount of the *Post's* editorials on foreign policy and Senator Fulbright's impatience with the nominee's vague and general responses. On several occasions during the hearing Senator Dodd pointed out the need for reading and examining the *Post's* editorials before a judgment could be made on the nomination. As he put it, "Mr. Wiggins has said very frankly he is not familiar with this problem, the problem of international affairs. He hasn't served in any official capacity. How does one know, then, what he thinks, how he will react, how he could handle his job up there, except by reading the editorials which he tells us generally have met with his approval?"⁴ No one contested this vital point, but the fact is that all fairly well knew that time would not be afforded for this necessary examination and, indeed, it was not. On the very day of the hearing the Administration moved "to push the nomination through the Senate committee and the

⁴ *Hearing*, p. 30.

Senate. . .”⁵ So, in effect, the committee approved the nomination of a man who admitted his unfamiliarity with international problems, admitted his personal control over the *Post's* editorials, and remained largely a mystery as to his views and opinions.

Concerning the last point, the grueling questioning pursued by Senator Fulbright revealed the paucity of the nominee's views and opinions. Though the committee chairman concentrated on the subject of Vietnam, the responses vibrated with vague generalities and stock phrases. Sentiment prevailed, including love, but nothing in the way of concrete knowledge and proposed actions seeped through. “I simply do not have a solution for the war in Vietnam” was typical of the simple answers given to other questions as well, such as a U.N. debate, agencies and the like.⁶ Senator Dodd stated what was quite evident to all present when he said “Senator Fulbright asked you this question. He said the United States has suffered great losses in Vietnam, lives, blood, money, just about everything one could think of, including prestige, and as I understood the Senator, he asked, what do we win, and what do we lose? I didn't hear you make any specific response.”⁷ The virtual absence of specific responses was the hallmark of Wiggins' testimony. And on the basis of some questionable standards, he was both chosen and confirmed to represent the strongest power on earth in the United Nations.

STANDARDS FOR A RESPECTABLE NATION

The scandalous aspects of the Wiggins spectacle emphasize both the depth of deterioration in U.S. foreign policy management and the need for standards on the part of a still respectable nation. Applied to this highly important post in the top world forum, these standards may be adapted to every other situation where the far-flung Russian threat presents itself. In any such nomination, one requisite is the selection of a well-rounded personality who has consistently shown a balance and fairness of outlook, an objectivity toward especially new and untried ideas, and a proven compassion for the needs and aspirations of all peoples, including the many different nations in the USSR. In the Wiggins case this requisite was scarcely satisfied. This writer, in opposition to his appointment, hammered away at

⁵ John W. Finney. “Wiggins Defends U.S. Vietnam Policy,” *The New York Times*, October 1, 1968.

⁶ AP release, October 1, 1968.

⁷ *Hearing*, p. 28.

his lack of objectivity and his malice as shown in the *Post's* numerous editorials which arbitrarily sought to "sweep under the rug in the interest of detente all evidences of Russian aggression and tyranny in Eastern Europe."⁸ More detailed evidence below will show the extent of Wiggins' extremism and viciousness.

Another important standard for judging a nominee to the U.N. post is the scope and depth of his knowledge of the Soviet Union, its origin, composition, chief developments and internal conflicts. Whether we wish to admit it or not, the chief sole and serious enemy to the security of our country is the totalitarian Russian base in that ersatz union. Dependence for such knowledge on staff members in the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. is not enough. The Ambassador is expected to show leadership, and this cannot be adequately displayed without independent knowledgeability. This writer was accurately quoted as saying that in this respect the Wiggins nomination is "an appalling one" and that "editorials under Wiggins' supervision showed the nominee lacked sufficient understanding of Soviet intentions and motives. . ."⁹ Here, too, some evidence below will indicate the appalling nature of the nomination.

Surely, an additional and reliable test is the judgment demonstrated by any such nominee as to his assessment of overall developments in Eastern Europe. In the wake of the Russian rape of Czechoslovakia, this standard of evaluation assumes even greater importance at this time. As the writer stressed, if the candidate showed himself to be tragically wrong, then he should not have even been considered in the first place. As revealed in the *Post's* editorials, Wiggins' notions about irritating the bear, the mellowing Bolshevik, and detente with "Russia" are out of this world and something to contemplate. The pro-Russian bias of the *Post*, in the sense of casting aside other peoples so that the empire may remain intact and peace through evolution may be attained, has been conspicuous for the past decade. This writer knows whereof he speaks, for the battle on these fundamental issues has been a continuous and running one, as the appendix of the hearing publication in part clearly shows.¹⁰ Much to everyone's surprise, the post-Wiggins administration in the *Post* decided to display some objectivity by reporting on the writer's testimony against the nomination. What it reported puts in a nut-

⁸ Finney, Op. cit. *The New York Times*.

⁹ "Fulbright Raps Wiggins Stand On Viet Policy," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., October 1, 1968.

¹⁰ See in particular the editorial "Up With Idel-Ural," p. 58.

shell the points registered here: "Dobriansky said he had waged a '10-year ideological conflict' with *The Washington Post* and that the Wiggins nomination, 'in a twilight Administration,' was 'scraping the bottom of the barrel.'" ¹¹

In these times, another very important standard of behavior is the courage of one's convictions. In addition to displaying honesty, fairness and objectivity even on the most controversial issues, a candidate for this or any other prominent position of representation should possess the metal of courage and an ability to defend his views in the open, face to face with his opponent. It is one thing to sit behind a desk with a pen in hand, lashing out against faceless adversaries; it is quite another to do this and courageously meet the challenges that ensue. Challenges for debate and open discussion have been offered to Wiggins, but he never had the courage to accept them even on his own home grounds and under rules set by impartial third parties. It can't be too strongly emphasized that at any time, no less the present, we can ill afford a weakling representing the U.S. in the U.N. In this propaganda arena the stakes are too high to entertain the superficial ambitions of a diplomatic nullity. The writer is certain that the Russians couldn't have been more pleased with this weak appointment, particularly in this period of the armed Russian occupation of Czecho-Slovakia. Could one envision a superficial Wiggins orally contending beyond a text prepared by a staff member with one of the dialectically trained Russian delegates on issues of imperialism, human rights, colonialism and related subjects?

These, then, constitute the standards, criteria, requisites, and tests by which a man should be initially judged for a high nomination and later judged for confirmation. In none of these instances does Wiggins fare well, and his appointment casts a serious shadow over the importance and significance of the U.S. Ambassadorship in the U.N. The record of Wiggins' editorial bias, manipulations, and cowardice is long and goes far beyond what is contained in the appendix of the published hearing. This writer, helped by Senator Dodd's insistence, appealed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to examine this record carefully, but sheer politics prevailed and the nomination was actually railroaded through the Senate. In light of the standards described above, to which there can be no rational objection, this hasty action certainly does not reflect well on our

¹¹ Warren Unna. "Fulbright Assails Wiggins on War," *The Washington Post*, October 1, 1968, p. 2.

current processes of government. And the stain will remain for some time to come.

SOME CHOICE POINTS OF EVIDENCE

Objectivity, knowledge, judgment, and courage are the keys for evaluating fairly and with principle the Wiggins nomination. Considering the first in his case, objectivity implies intellectual integrity, a disciplined willingness to observe and examine all aspects of a given object or situation, and a moral fairness toward those with contrary views and opinions. In numerous cases Wiggins has been found wanting on this score. In fact, wielding the means of a powerful newspaper, he manifested all the marks of sharp bias, a malicious bent, narrow-mindedness, and an evident cultural insularity. The best case to support this indictment was his almost personal and neurotic campaign to thwart the Congressional-directed erection of the Taras Shevchenko statue in the nation's capital.

Let it be emphasized at the start, the crucial point here is not the broad ramifications of this event which extended deep into the Kremlin and all parts of the Russian empire, including North Vietnam, but rather the manner in which an editor of a formidable organ treated it, and at that for a period of over six months. Moscow's response to our American action to erect a similar statue in the Red imperial capital, Khrushchev's hasty departure from Scandinavia to unveil their statue before ours in June, 1964, former President Eisenhower's memorable address at the monument, and many other internationally interrelated aspects were completely lost on Wiggins. Setting these intricate events aside, for they are not logically relevant to the issue at hand, let us just concentrate on how this so-called journalist of supposed integrity, honesty, and objectivity managed his erratic opposition.

With a unique cultural insularity, the now U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. waged a campaign of blatant inconsistency and uncertainty as to his knowledge of the issue, and went far beyond all this to indulge in smear and hatred tactics, injecting anti-Semitism, the hyphenated American slur, and fictitious quantities and employing every filthy trick in the journalistic trade to prevent what Congress and the Eisenhower Administration had willed by accepted processes of legislation and execution. As for inconsistency and uncertainty, one need just compare a few passages among many in the editorials written by Wiggins or his directed reporter. In the first one he admits, "Yet, like most Americans, we have never read a line of Mr. Shev-

chenko's verse, in Ukrainian or otherwise. . ." ¹² Later, from one who hasn't read anything of Shevchenko, we read, "as a poet Shevchenko has no universal significance for Americans. He is the pet of a small minority, whatever his poetic merit." ¹³ This is supposed to be a reflection of intellectual integrity, which has been falsely ascribed to the nominee. As a further example, one need only compare this and other drivel with the highly laudatory article in the *Post* on "A Ukrainian Poet Gets Statue Billing," which in part states "For his poetry, Ukrainians both under and beyond Soviet rule adore him. Two non-Ukrainian Washingtonians familiar with his work speak of him as 'Pushkin and more,' 'ah, a Shakespeare.'" ¹⁴ Confusing? this is virtually nothing, but the reader can enjoy himself by reading the succession of *Post* editorials and articles as contained in a compact Congressional reprint. ¹⁵

Sparse in knowledge of the subject and thus short on objectivity, Wiggins then proceeded to apply the worst conceivable smear technique. These examples should be sufficient to indicate the type of man who was selected for the U.N. Designed for disunity and resurrected Old World hatreds, he wrote, "It is perhaps enough to say that both in the writings of the poet and in the efforts to exploit him there are elements which are offensive in various ways to Americans of Russian, German, Polish, Catholic, Jewish, Orthodox and even Ukrainian background. A statue of Shevchenko would be a monument to disunity and recrimination among Americans." ¹⁶ Not one of these groups was foolish enough to fall for this bait, but this didn't deter Wiggins. He kept plugging away with anti-Semitism, anti-Polish sentiments, and the guilt by association argument, this on the part of the *Post* which used to scream over Senator Joseph McCarthy's tactics.

Here are some choice examples from an editorial that is really a monument to ignorance. In one place, Wiggins wrote, "It is not just that Shevchenko said many anti-Semitic things that are an affront to the Jewish community of this country. . . It is not just that the poet is the idol of Communist Party members who have caused the Soviet Union to flower with libraries, collective farms, plants, vil-

¹² Editorial "Poetic Injustice," *The Washington Post*, September 23, 1963.

¹³ Editorial "The Shevchenko Affair," *The Washington Post*, October 18, 1963.

¹⁴ Stephen S. Rosenfeld, September 29, 1963.

¹⁵ *Shevchenko — A Monument to the Liberation, Freedom and Independence of All Captive Nations*, USGPO 1964.

¹⁶ Editorial "The Shevchenko Affair," *The Washington Post*, October 18, 1963.

lages, and memorials to his name. It is not just that his very name is, by reason of his flaming nationalism, an affront to members of the Polish minority. . . . The larger reason, however, is simply that Shevchenko is neither a universal poet nor a national poet of this country entitled to recognition in the United States."¹⁷ No facts or quoted passages were given for these baseless accusations, only fiction. How absurd all this was can be gleaned from Wiggins' first editorial in which he cried, "Next year will be the 400th anniversary of Shakespeare's birth. That the city has found precious space for the Ukraine's national poet and not yet found room for some comparable token to Shakespeare's genius is really remarkable."¹⁸ Shakespeare, too, contains what some may construe as anti-Semitic passages, but for "integrity"-Wiggins the malicious accusation should be reserved only for Shevchenko who, as a poet, likewise had to describe some aspects of life as they were.

Much was written to counteract and refute these scandalous editorials. In part, Wiggins admitted that "Objections of this newspaper to the proposed memorial to the Ukrainian poet, Shevchenko, have inspired a great many letters."¹⁹ The objectivity and fairness of the person and the newspaper can be gleaned from the fact that only a few of these "great many letters" were published in the *Post*. The newspaper has long prided itself for its liberal attitude, its supposed policy of seeing and examining all sides of an issue. This is one substantial case where this claim is hollow pretension. Hundreds of letters poured in to protest the fantasies concocted by Wiggins, but not even one-half of one percent saw publication in the *Post*, while the editor of integrity and objectivity kept rolling along with his campaign in the form of editorials, editorialized reports and articles, politicking on the Hill and with the puppet Soviet Ukrainian delegation to the U.N., and a wide variety of irresponsible journalistic methods aimed at disinformation and distortion. It will now be interesting to observe whether the *Post* will treasure the dubious legacy left by Wiggins or make good its liberal claim.

WIGGINS' KNOWLEDGE OF THE USSR AND COURAGE

The evidence can be cited on and on to prove that Wiggins, the present U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., is a man deficient both in

¹⁷ Editorial "Monument To Ignorance," *The Washington Post*, November 1, 1963.

¹⁸ Editorial "Poetic Injustice," *The Washington Post*, September 23, 1963.

¹⁹ Editorial "Monument To Ignorance."

integrity and objectivity. Constituting this evidence, what he suppressed in his paper found its way into a prime source of our Nation's history, the *Congressional Record*. My own book contains two chapters on the historic Shevchenko event and analyzes thoroughly the role played by Wiggins.²⁰ There are so many absurdities in Wiggins' editorials that to show and elaborate upon all of them would require another article. For instance, in his editorial of ignorance, he stated, "If Khrushchev should visit us again, he could lay a wreath on this memorial."²¹ Now, could anyone in his right senses visualize a Khrushchev, who in all his rule railed year in and year out against the Captive Nations Week Resolution, place a wreath on a memorial dedicated to the liberation and freedom of all the captive nations? The erratic and irresponsible editor of *The Washington Post* thought otherwise. Or take Wiggins' solicitation of the views of the puppet Soviet Ukrainian representative in the U.N. Naively and desperately, Wiggins quoted L. Y. Kizya as supporting the statue but protesting its use "to fan up animosity toward the Soviet Ukraine, and all the more to aggravate the cold war."²² Aside from the impropriety of an American citizen soliciting and injecting a foreigner into a domestic controversy — incidentally, a highly relevant matter that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should have looked into — Wiggins tried here his guilt by association technique, but it misfired when Kizya protested against the patriotic motives behind the statue's erection.

One can deduce from all this that Wiggins' knowledge of the Soviet Union is at best shaky. Here, too, considerable evidence shows it to be grossly deficient. The fact is that since 1959, when Congress passed the Captive Nations Week Resolution, the writer has been in a running and unremitting battle with Wiggins and the *Post* over the fundamental subject of the captive nations. The written record of Wiggins' lack of understanding and outright arrogance on this score could also account for several articles. It is sufficient in this analysis to offer some select examples which adequately substantiate my charge. As in the Shevchenko case, Wiggins deliberately suppressed the publication of numerous rebuttals, but they, too, found their way into the *Congressional Record* and an interested Congress.

²⁰ Lev E. Dobriansky, *The Vulnerable Russians*, New York, 1967, pp. 343-374.

²¹ Editorial "Monument to Ignorance," *The Washington Post*, November 1, 1963.

²² Editorial "Communists Love Shevchenko," *The Washington Post*, December 29, 1963.

In fact, just this past July, during the Tenth Observance of Captive Nations Week, Wiggins resorted to the unheard-of manipulation of extracting a couple of sentences from a National Captive Nations Committee press release and, without permission, converting them into a letter-to-the-editor over the writer's signature.²³

Highlighting this case are several editorials. One in July 24, 1959, titled "Irritating the Bear" opposed Congress' resolution because it would displease Moscow. In my reply of July 29, which was the only one published in full during this ten-year period, it was pointed out that patent truths cannot be ignored ostrich-like and that the *Post* was way off base factually in attributing the resolution to the work of some "foreigners" and exile groups, as though that would have been bad. However, how thoroughly lacking Wiggins is in his comprehension of the Soviet Union can be appreciated by the following. In another editorial against the resolution, Wiggins stated "White Ruthenia and Ukraine are political concoctions that describe aspirations more than a national entity."²⁴ The utter silliness of this statement may appear incredible to any cultured and educated person, but the fact is that this is what we have had to deal with. This is the new negative qualification for an appointment to the U.N. The same editorial held that the resolution "also includes 'Cossackia' and 'Idel-Ural' which never have existed as nations except for intervals of German invasion. They are about as much 'captives' of the Soviet Union as Anacostia and Cleveland Park are 'captives' of the District of Columbia."

And there is considerably more of this rubbish. "Ukrainian nationalism," states Wiggins, "is nothing if not anti-Russian."²⁵ Sarcastically, another attacks the resolution because "Its list included not only such ancient and recognized lands as White Ruthenia and Turkestan but historic Cossackia and storied Idel-Ural, too."²⁶ One could go on and on with the literary exchange that ensued, but the one thing Wiggins could not show was courage. The poor, little man behind the secure hahogany desk, wielding his powerful pen for the misinformation of the *Post's* readers, shied away from a direct challenge to justify his fictitious views. This writer put it very succinctly: "I challenge you to arrange a discussion meeting in the *Post's* auditorium, which would bring you face-to-face with living victims

²³ *Hearing*, p. 41.

²⁴ Editorial "Captive Nations," *The Washington Post*, July 11, 1964.

²⁵ Editorial "Captive Congressmen," *The Washington Post*, July 10, 1967.

²⁶ Editorial "Up With Idel-Ural," *The Washington Post*, July 8, 1966.

of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism from Idel-Ural, Turkestan, White Ruthenia, and Cossackia. . . Let us see how courageous you are in meeting these people — whom you think are ghosts without a national background of independence struggle — before the audience of the *Post's* personnel who, in this setting, would have the opportunity to gauge the level of their editor's understanding of this vital problem." ²⁷ The challenge was repeated several times and, needless to say, was never met.

A DIPLOMATIC OUTRAGE

The appointment of Wiggins to the U.N. is in every respect a diplomatic outrage. It reflects poorly on the White House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It brings discredit to our nation. It has now virtually made a joke of the institution of the U.S. Ambassadorship to the United Nations. The prudently silent reaction of foreign diplomats to this appalling appointment must be cause for considerable wonderment. When one recalls men of stature who have occupied that post, such as Senator Lodge and Adlai Stevenson, this action is a veritable stain on our national record. Let us hope that it will serve as a lesson for the future.

When the Wiggins type will have passed permanently from the scene, the countless who took to heart the enduring message of former President Eisenhower, will still labor and fight for integrity, objectivity, knowledge, judgment and courage as concerns the most vital of issues in our day. That message, spoken at the foot of the Shevchenko statue, is: "For my hope is that your magnificent march from the shadow of the Washington Monument to the foot of the statue of Taras Shevchenko will here kindle a new world movement in the hearts, minds, words, and actions of men." This world movement for the freedom of all the captive nations has been kindled.

²⁷ Lev E. Dobriansky. *From Moscow's Izvestia to Washington's Post*, New York, 1967.

THE WEST AND MOSCOW IN 1968

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

The latest Soviet moves in connection with Czechoslovakia have come as a disappointing surprise to President Johnson and many other Americans who had been optimistically hoping that the USSR had changed its basic policies and was seeking to develop friendly relations with the United States and other Western countries. They can still hardly believe their eyes or their powers of observation and reasoning, and they are hoping against hope that all this renewed activity is but a superficial change which will not seriously hold up what they regard as essential developments for the good of mankind.

There are far better reasons for the Soviet actions — as seen by themselves — than the mere occupation of Czechoslovakia to prevent the development of a new Czechoslovak national policy which would be at variance with the accepted desires of the Soviet doctrinaires and theorists.

In 1970 comes the centennial of the birth of Lenin. Already the leaders of Russian Communist thought are busy with the formulation of the necessary theses which will purport to show that the ideas of Lenin are, have been and will be the accepted line of policy for the Communist state in its dealings with its non-Communist neighbors, which it must outshine in all sections and finally overcome and relegate to a minor place in world affairs, if it does not wipe them out altogether. What could be a more exemplary action for such an anniversary than the repeated discomfiture of the United States? For here is the one rival that Moscow hates and at the same time fears, as it fears everywhere the flowering of freedom. The iron self-control of Stalin did not blind him to the facts of the struggle during the Second World War, and the determination of Moscow to put itself forward as the one champion of peace proved to be a fertile device. The crude ravings of Nikita Khrushchev as to the date when the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in agriculture gradually lost credibility; he became a liability instead of an asset, although all of his views on peaceful cooperation with the non-Com-

munist world while encouraging wars of liberation against the possessions and influences of non-Communists have proved most successful in Southeastern Asia. Here the American and Allied troops are involved in an apparently endless war against a relatively small country but one which is receiving from Moscow and the other Communist lands an apparently unlimited amount of modern weapons, while the United States carefully refrains from escalating the conflict by not bombing or blockading any of the main routes by which the weapons arrive.

At the same time the war and the protection of South Vietnam and South Korea against Communist aggression have become very unpopular with some vociferous elements of the American population, especially among the intellectuals and the younger generation who pretend to have sensitive consciences and who have become intensely concerned with the problem of the underprivileged and the Negro population. The causes of these phenomena cannot be summed up in the simple charge of Communist infiltration, although there are startling resemblances between the young intellectuals, the Students for a Democratic Society, the writings of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, etc. — resemblances that indicate some sort of contact that in the long run threatens the stability and strength of the United States and its ability to carry out its missions in the political and moral theatres of human activity, while a sloppiness in legal decisions prevents the government from making any determined response. It is the first time since 1917 and the establishment of Communism in the Soviet Union that that body has detected more than mere inertia and carelessness in the United States, and this time it is tempted to turn the present movement to good account.

Moscow has not forgotten the revolt of Tito of Yugoslavia against the iron rule of Stalin. Yet when Tito had taken the first steps, Stalin hesitated lest the United States and the West move to expel him completely and turn the country back to free rule. With as good a face as possible Stalin preserved at least the name of Communism, and a peace-loving West was determined to make no opposition. Still obsessed with the hope of reconciliation, the United States and its formal Western Allies succored the revolters in Hungary but did nothing more to help them get free. So by 1968 Brezhnev and Kosygin, realizing the difficulties confronting the American government, decided to promote a new crisis which would furnish many additional troubling problems.

NATO AND DE GAULLE

In addition there has been the confusion that has arisen in NATO as a result of the actions of President de Gaulle, who has called for a Europe of Nations extending from the Atlantic to the Urals and excluding American and British influence, at the same time he vetoes the English attempt to enter the Common Market. He has withdrawn almost all the French troops from NATO control and has seriously impeded airplane flights over French territory between the northern and southern members and has expelled the headquarters from French territory while he talks of the weapons of his force *de frappe* aimed westward as well as eastward. Meanwhile too many American representatives and senators plump for the return to America of not only the troops in Vietnam but our men in Europe as well in a general move to concentrate American interest on the war against poverty and similar internal questions. Thus in 1968 on the eve of Lenin's Centennial, Moscow is beginning to have hopes that the United States will voluntarily withdraw from its commitments in both Asia and Europe, thereby leaving the ground clear for Moscow to proclaim a tremendous victory in 1970 and the discomfiture of its main rival.

At the beginning of 1968 — before the present agitation in the United States had actually begun — it might have been predicted that something would happen in Europe. It was in vain that anti-Communist observers had stated that if the United States withdrew from Southeast Asia, it would be discredited also in Europe, but as time passed, the NATO countries except France began to feel that America was slighting its friends in Europe in the hope of reducing tensions with the USSR. Tension began to grow among the non-Communist countries of NATO which realized that their turn was next to face Moscow alone.

Yet early in the year there were evidences both to Moscow and the West that all was not well on either side of the Iron Curtain. The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, seemed to be seeking to escape to some extent from the direct overlordship of his Slavic neighbor. Romania appeared desirous of winning Chinese sympathy in the Soviet dispute with Red China and to be bent on achieving improved trade connections with the West. At the same time Ceausescu was not relaxing internally his grip upon the administrative machinery, and since Romania bordered only on the Black Sea and the Communist states of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Hungary, it did not seem to present any essential danger by its vagaries.

At the same time a more serious situation began to develop in Czechoslovakia. Before World War II many Czechs and Slovaks were extremely pro-Russian even if not pro-Communist. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia had been more fully exposed to democratic processes than the population in the other satellite states. Its First Secretary, Antonin Novotny, was apparently an unimaginative product of the Soviet bureaucracy. When we add to this his ill health, we can see that there was danger of a mild explosion.

It came in the old familiar form of literary discussions and of clandestine publications which became more and more daring. The final result was the enforced resignation of Novotny and the choice as the new First Secretary of the young Slovak Alexander Dubcek, who promised that he would see to it that the Slovak portion of the country in the east would be developed more rapidly and receive more funds than it had under Czech-dominated Communism. Finally as Dubcek and his followers seemed to be allowing the formation of various associations outside the Communist Party and even hinted at the formation of an opposition party, Moscow became uneasy. It called for a series of conferences with Czechoslovakia and its allies, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. For the next weeks conferences proliferated. There were meetings in Karlovy Vary, in Cierna (on the Soviet border) and in Bratislava of all six participants, in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and Moscow. Finally, after many believed that a reconciliation had been effected on terms satisfactory to both Moscow and Prague, Soviet armed forces accompanied by troops of the other Communist states except Romania and Yugoslavia moved across the Czechoslovak border and occupied all the leading centers, including the capital and commenced to make their power felt.

It is noteworthy that at the same time the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington made a hurried appearance at the State Department and secured an interview with President Johnson to try to make it clear that this was not an invasion but a friendly gesture from allies in the Communist world exercising the brotherly right of interference. He expressed the hope that the United Nations would not be involved. It was, however, and in a series of heated meetings all the other members of the Security Council except Hungary denounced the action as contrary to the Charter. The result might have been anticipated. All action on a resolution of condemnation was brought to an end by a renewed Soviet veto, a sign to the United Nations to keep its paws out of Moscow's way and thereby doom it-

self to a minor role in the affairs of the world, except as concerns the non-Communist free world, which is open to criticism, especially the United States — which is proud of the fact that it has never cast a veto.

At this writing, the Soviet forces have been on Czechoslovak territory for two months. There is still a question whether the East German forces have not been withdrawn since those forces were clearly acting against the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. Had the West so chosen, they could have objected to this violation at the risk of an open confrontation with Moscow and the danger of nuclear war and blackmail. Yet the peace forces in the United States, as they bewail the Soviet actions and recognize that President Johnson's hopes for another meeting with Kosygin would be highly inappropriate, still are insisting that it is essential to continue the negotiations on banning the spreading of atomic weapons or on any of the other subjects that have been brought up to weaken the United States and bind its hands in the matter of defending itself and the free world. They are also protesting illogically that the United States did not do more to express its support of the Czechoslovak liberals, even at the risk of being called by the Russians the aiders and abettors of the liberal movement as an expression of anti-Communism. The administration tried to avoid this but without success, for the same charges are being made in a particularly nasty way, and this brings up the other Soviet device for advancing its cause in Europe.

THE PROBLEMS OF WEST GERMANY

The present government in West Germany, as a response to the desire for opening up windows to the East, has been trying to establish commercial relations with the Communist nations as well as the Soviet Union. It has come to some sort of agreement with Rumania and was approaching, apparently with some success, Czechoslovakia in its more liberal phase. This provoked the charge that the West German government under American inspiration was trying to militarize the liberals of Czechoslovakia and was planning to ship weapons for a counter-Communist military coup in the country. This follows the familiar pattern in that Moscow holds that practically all the leaders of West Germany are former Nazis who are working to restore a Nazi regime, whereas the East Germans are thoroughly pure democrats and Communists. The West knows, however, that there are more unrepentant Nazis among the East German officials than in all West Germany in office and out. Yet for reasons of peaceful existence, the West has never tried to force Moscow to apply its own standards to those officials whom it pretends to trust.

Since the first of the year Moscow has continued to fulminate at West Germany for its hesitation in accepting the ban on the spread of nuclear weapons, etc., but chiefly in order to blackmail the state and remind Germany's allies of the vices of the Nazi regime. The first blow was delivered by the East German government, which reiterated its claim that the Western sectors of Berlin cannot be part of West Germany and accordingly forbade West German officials to travel by rail, bus or private car across the hundred-odd miles between the West German and Berlin borders. It then added to this a proviso that all West Germans coming from the homeland should procure East German transit visas to cross the disputed strip or to send goods across it. It also saw to it that the checking of these visas and permits required an unreasonable amount of time in the hope that it could weaken the Western sectors of Berlin by interfering with its population and the interchange of its wares. Naturally the Germans and the West protested to the Russian authorities, but whatever the stand of Moscow on other questions may be it has insisted stubbornly that the East German People's Democratic Republic is now a fully independent Communist state and that it would be contrary to Communist doctrine for Moscow to do more than offer advice, since it has waived all its imperialistic rights in East Germany even if it has stubbornly maintained them in West Germany against the Western Allies. Then when the Czechoslovak crisis exploded Moscow righteously demanded that the Czechoslovaks consent to the guarding of the Czech-West German frontier by Soviet and other Communist troops to be quartered on Czechoslovak territory.

We can scarcely blame Chancellor Kiesinger for feeling that his country is distinctly being threatened, for we have only to glance at the situation. West Germany exists in a relatively narrow strip extending from the Low Countries and the Baltic to the Swiss frontier. On the West is France, and despite de Gaulle's occasional tirades against Communism, he sooner or later returns to his anti-American and anti-British stance and does everything possible to prevent the rejuvenation and reform of NATO, the only consistent force that can oppose a Soviet attack. Because of this the peace advocates are advising the withdrawal of those troops especially the American, and placement of reliance upon long range missiles and a great air transportation system which will require several days to prepare. Kiesinger is also painfully aware of the fact that the relatively light border guards on the German side of the Czechoslovak border will

have to be strengthened, and in view of the threats of both East Germany and Moscow, he cannot fail to realize the real need for a revived NATO which can play as vital a role in 1968 as when it was first established in the late forties. Kiesinger is certainly too astute and too well informed not to be alarmed by the situation in the United States with its growing pacifistic movements and the turbulence among the college and university youth in connection with the Democratic Convention in Chicago as well as the disturbance in the Negro communities and their demand for all kinds of radical solutions. This at a time when the situations in the other continents, South America and Africa, are threatening to boil over as they have in Nigeria and Biafra and elsewhere, while the danger of revolution in other lands and the hatred generated by apartheid in the Southern African states are threatening to provoke new upheavals and outbreaks against the white population of those states.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the public opinion of the free world has been badly disturbed by the Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia. For several years all the "progressive" media and thinkers have been preaching busily that with the death of Stalin the old rigid Communism has passed hopelessly into the discard and that none of his successors can hope to have the prestige and the personal power to install again the elaborate espionage systems and the frenzied brutality which he and his aides practiced. Even such episodes as Khrushchev's pounding with his shoes in the United Nations seemed to many to be a crude improvement over the iron calm which Stalin maintained. Yet the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the stubborn and successful insistence of Malik that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was merely a question of communist brotherly discipline spoke too clearly and perhaps more clearly even than Stalin that there are to be no changes in the present distribution of power between the free and slave worlds except to incorporate more of the free countries in the iron shackles of the enslaved. It is not at all impossible that Moscow is now making the same mistake that Hitler did when he rashly made his agreement with Stalin for the division of Poland and thus brought into a war those powers which had allowed him to take with impunity the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia while Mussolini swallowed up Albania and some other sections.

There have already been certain reactions. Some of the cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union have been suddenly interrupted; those with Poland have been totally suspended for the present. It will

be the events of the next weeks that will indicate the definite trend of public opinion both in the United States and abroad. The casual and even the careful observer of American changes of public opinion realize at the present time that the United States is firmly set on a pacifistic course and that many of the political leaders are firmly committed to such a course. Yet there is one big warning that should be given to all these observers. In October, 1918, on the very eve of the elections in November, President Wilson issued an appeal for a Democratic victory in the elections which in his opinion was certain to be justified by the First World War, which was approaching a victorious end. It is true that today there is no opposition discernible similar to that in 1918 which was led by ex-President Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and which ignited a spark in the American voter; when the election returns were in, the Republicans had secured firm control of Congress and were pledged to resist what was regarded as President Wilson's stand against American interests. The answer was the failure of Wilson's policies in internationalism. No one can now say whether the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia may not have the same effect and lead the American people, including all the pacifistic factions except those who are honestly committed to the cause of Communism and radicalism in its various forms, to make a complete right about face and demand that any attempts to recognize and legalize, officially or not, part of the world as a Communist enclave to be regarded as supersacred be ended and that the nation come out firmly for a renewal of the American spirit of liberty and take up in earnest the cause of a real liberation to the end that the centennial of Lenin may mark the end of the prison of nations which he and Stalin planned and that by 1970 the Soviet Union may be as dead as the 1000 years of the Third Reich prepared by Adolf Hitler and his cohorts.

No one can tell with certainty but the events of the last weeks have thrown new complications into the already vastly unusual electorate situation in the United States. The results may be disastrous either for the United States or for its opponents, depending as such upon the faith and belief of the American people in its broad masses as on the will of any Communist enemy of liberty. We can only hope that once again the American people will choose wisely and well.

TIRED LIES FOR NEW BATTLES

By STEFAN T. POSSONY AND JULIUS EPSTEIN

On May 15, 1968, the newspaper *Sovietskaya Rossiya* called Thomas G. Masaryk an "absolute scoundrel" and accused him of having organized a conspiracy to murder V. I. Lenin. The founder of Czechoslovakia has been generally regarded as one of the most democratic and humane statesmen in the 20th century. Strongly Jeffersonian and Wilsonian in outlook, Thomas Masaryk was not the type to organize assassination plots.

Sovietskaya Rossiya is the official organ of the Russian republic within the Soviet "federation." Thus, the attack on Thomas Masaryk originated on the second echelon, not on the Politbureau level. Undoubtedly it was meant as a warning to the new Prague government that it should stop the disclosures about the 1948 murder, by Stalin's secret police, of Czechoslovak foreign minister Jan Masaryk — the son of Thomas. Yet the opposition within the CPSU also may have directed its warning at the present Kremlin leadership. The accusation about a plot against Lenin is tantamount to a charge of deicide and suggests that the Stalinists oppose accommodation with the Dubcek regime.

Was Thomas Masaryk guilty as charged? In mid-1917, Masaryk persuaded the democratic Russian government that Czech prisoners of war be organized as a "legion" to fight with the allies for an independent Czech state. Helped to power by the Germans in November 1917, Lenin made peace on March 3, 1918. The Germans and Austrians asked for the disbanding of the Czech Legion. Since, therefore, the future of this force was dependent upon Lenin's good-will, Masaryk adopted a policy of strict non-intervention in Russian affairs. This policy of non-antagonism paid off and on March 26, 1918, an agreement was reached authorizing the evacuation of the Legion through Vladivostok.

The French and British were fearful that Lenin would conclude a military alliance with Wilhelm II and prepared to land in Northern Russia. The French subventioned the Union for Defense of the Father-

land and Freedom. To facilitate the landing, the Union was to launch a mass uprising in the Upper Volga-Moscow area. The uprising was started early in July 1918 and failed.

The Union was run by Boris Victorovich Savinkov, a legendary terrorist who, among other killings, had been responsible for the assassination of the Czar's uncle. During 1917, Savinkov served as vice-minister of war in Kerensky's cabinet. Between 1918 and 1923, Savinkov was one of the few outstanding exile Socialists who had the potential to overthrow the Bolsheviks. The Communists feared him, penetrated his organizations, and gradually paralyzed his activities. In 1924, for reasons which still are disputed, Savinkov returned to the USSR.

Savinkov stood trial in August 1924, "confessed" freely about Western political warfare activities against the USSR, and was condemned to death. Thereupon the Politbureau pardoned him. When he was not freed as he had expected, he threw himself down a prison stairwell (1925). In 1948 the Communists asserted Jan Masaryk had killed himself by jumping out of a window.

Savinkov testified the French gave him 2.5 million rubles to organize the Volga uprising. He also testified that he received 200,000 rubles from the Czechs. He expressed the belief that the French and Czechs must have known he would resort to terrorism and asserted he was planning to kill Lenin and Trotsky. This testimony is the historical basis for the recent attack on Masaryk.

Savinkov did not disclose the date of the Czech payment. Convinced that Lenin did not want to give in to the Germans, Masaryk had left Moscow on March 7, 1918. The agreement of March 26 removed all reasons for Czech adventures in Russian politics. However, by the end of May, there was a rupture, and the Czechs took offensive military actions against local Bolshevik forces. Thus, it is most unlikely that before May the Czechs would have given financial support to Savinkov. Since they lacked funds, they could not, presumably, have acted without the French ambassador's approval even then. The Czech payment, it would seem, was actually made on behalf of the French to keep Savinkov going until Paris okayed the ambassador's insurrectional scheme.

Masaryk related that he met Savinkov and found him disappointing. Savinkov was "a terrorist Titan transformed into a Hamlet." The reasons for the meeting remain obscure. But before Masaryk's departure on March 7, insurrections and terrorism were unpromising tactics to protect Czech interests.

In fact, Savinkov did *not* assert that he had received money from Masaryk: the money was given in Masaryk's name by a certain Klecanda who was Masaryk's representative. It so happens that Klecanda died in Omsk on April 28, 1918. Omsk is about 1,500 miles from Moscow.

On April 21, a few Czechs were arrested in Moscow. This could have required a change in tactics. But Klecanda probably had left the Moscow area before these troubles erupted. If he was still around and wanted protection against such incidents, the obvious recourse would have been to ask for help from the Kremlin. Klecanda was fully informed about Masaryk's contingency plans. Even if he disobeyed Masaryk's instructions, he would have been unable in the two or three days at his disposal, to improvise a brand-new strategy of fomenting revolution.

The facts, therefore, are as follows: 1. Masaryk was seeking a *modus vivendi* with the Bolsheviks. He could not possibly have conspired with Savinkov to murder Lenin. 2. If Klecanda paid Savinkov, he departed from Masaryk's policy. 3. During May, the Czechs may have given money to Savinkov but by then Klecanda was dead. Hence Savinkov's testimony about Klecanda probably was false. 4. Masaryk learned about the troubles with the Bolsheviks only during May, when travelling to the U.S. He hardly sent a wire from Japan or America to Moscow asking for Lenin's assassination. 5. Whoever the Czech paymaster was: if he asked for this murder, which is unlikely, he was not acting on Masaryk's orders.

Savinkov's verdict only insinuated but did *not* state that Masaryk or Klecanda had instructed Savinkov to kill Lenin.

The fact is that Savinkov did *not* state that Masaryk or Klecanda had instructed Savinkov to kill Lenin.

The fact is that Savinkov did *not* prepare to murder Lenin.

Recent Soviet books discussing the various attempts on Lenin's life do *not* mention the alleged Masaryk conspiracy.

The allegation of 1924 against Thomas Masaryk was a Stalinist fabrication. The accusation of 1968 is a still more mendacious fabrication by Stalin's heirs.

GEORGE WASHINGTON TRADITIONS IN UKRAINE

In my book, *Shevchenko Meets America*, Marquette University, Slavic Institute, 1964, which contained a preface by my distinguished colleague, Alfred Sokolnicki, I discussed on pp. 26-27 (footnote 17) the Washington traditions in Ukraine.

Evidence for the existence of a cult of George Washington in Ukraine is to be found in the *Diary* of Mrs. P. Rozciszewska of the Kievan province:

May 21, 1827 — I also visited the Trzeciak family in Yaropovci. What a beautiful garden they have! Trees, flowers, and a beautiful setting. Mrs. Trzeciak showed me Washington's beloved tree — the *Bignonia Catalpa*. The hapless Muravjov always used to doff his hat before the tree, saying that one must pay homage to the tree of the great man... Alas, a few steps away grow tall cypresses and frowning pines, and they remind one of this splendid young man and his unhappy fate. Together with Mrs. Trzeciak, we wept there, moved by the remembrance of him and by our grief...

Who was the Muravjov mentioned in the *Diary*? Serge Muravjov-Apostol (1796-1826) was a descendant on his mother's side of the Ukrainian *Hetman*, Danylo Apostol. Educated in Paris and St. Petersburg, he played a leading role in the conspiracies of the "Union of Liberation" and the "Southern Society." As a colonel of the Cherny-hiv Regiment, he headed its mutiny and, after the failure of the Decembrist Revolt, was sentenced to death together with Ryleev, P. Pestel and Michael Bestuzhev-Riumin (1803-1826), who was a second lieutenant in the Poltava Regiment and liaison to Polish revolutionary societies.

About the tree mentioned in the *Diary*, I wrote:

Bignonia Catalpa, the supposed beloved tree of Washington, was brought to Europe from North America and was widely cultivated in Poland and Ukraine. It is a decorative tree with bell-shaped flowers.

But neither the noted historian of Marquette University, Rev. Raphael Hamilton, S.J., nor I could locate in the U.S. any material

to justify the East European traditions connected with this tree. I added:

We could not find any material to support this East European tradition that this tree was in fact a beloved favorite of Washington. We assume that it was brought from America to Poland and Ukraine and that here developed the legend by association: American Tree — Washington's Tree. Perhaps the following explanation can give some direction. For it we are indebted to our distinguished colleague, Rev. Raphael Hamilton, S. J., professor of history, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin:

In 1932 the Bicentennial Commission, appointed to celebrate the birth of George Washington, had extensive research done which was published as: "Honor to George Washington and Readings About George Washington." There on pages 97-98 Father Hamilton found that the only tree which the Commission is sure was planted by Washington and which still flourishes on the grounds of his home, Mt. Vernon, is a magnolia tree which the dictionary establishes to be very much the same as the Bignonia tree. Both have large decorative leaves and white, pink or red blossoms."

Teaching now in Washington, I availed myself of the opportunity to investigate the question on the very spot, Mt. Vernon: Had the Bignonia Catalpa Tree any link with George Washington or his home, Mt. Vernon, or is all merely an East European, Polish-Ukrainian legend? The Very Rev. Constantine Berdar, Rector of the Ukrainian Catholic Seminary in Washington, D. C., was my good guide and helper, and twice we inspected the Mr. Vernon Gardens. In a shop on the grounds I bought a series of publictaions, among them: *The Mount Vernon Gardens, a brief description of their origin and restoration, complete plant lists, plans and other illustration*. This is a publication of the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association of the Union, Mount Vernon, Virginia, 1960.

Among "Trees and Shrubs; A list of the trees and shrubs collected and planted by General Washington, which are represented in the general plantings," page 23, is: *Catalpa Tree — Catalpa Bignonoides*.

Therefore, summing up: 1. There can now be no doubt that the East European Washingtonian traditions are no legend but are based on the fact that this tree was a favorite of Washington and was in fact planted by him in his Mt. Vernon Gardens. This proves that Washington at least "liked this tree." 2. According to the aforementioned booklet Washington was in contact with French and German gardeners who could have brought it seeds to Europe. Cultivated on the estates of the nobility in Eastern Europe, this tree eventually reached Ukraine.

In the background of the Washingtonian symbolism of this tree was surely the great popularity of the American War of Independence and of George Washington, the man, among the Polish and Ukrainian gentry families on the right bank of the Dnieper in Ukraine at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As a quarter of a century later the Ukrainian Decabrists (Decembrists) organized their rebellion against the Czar in Kiev Province, Washington and the political regime in office in the USA were looked upon as ideals. Washington was the hero, and the pattern of the American regime in some parts and ideas were integrated into the project of state reforms which were discussed in the conspiratorial circles of the Southern Decembrists. The *Diary* of Mrs. P. Rosciszewska confirms this.

But there is a continuity of Washington and American traditions in Ukraine. The Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, a conspiratorial organization which emerged in Kiev twenty years later, propagated the ideas of a federation of all Slavic nationalities according to the pattern of the USA. In this way the name of George Washington again became a banner.

The national bard of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), was associated with this group. He formulated modern Ukrainian nationalism by expressing the longing for the coming of "Washington's just and new law," also for the Ukrainian nation.

The American Ukrainians erected in the capital of the United States, Washington, D.C., a monument of Shevchenko on 22nd and P Streets, N. W. It was unveiled by former President Dwight D. Eisenhower on June 27, 1964.

And thus the circle of Washington traditions closes: the gardens of Mt. Vernon to the Washington traditions in Ukraine and back to Mt. Vernon by way of this monument.

UKRAINE, 1967: A HISTORIAN'S PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS

By BOHDAN P. PROCKO

This essay is intended to mirror some of the writer's experiences and impressions gained during eleven days in Ukraine while on a six-week tour of the Soviet Union last summer as a member of a group of American historians. Our tour was designed to facilitate a broader understanding and appreciation of Soviet history by providing the invaluable opportunity to meet, professionally and socially, Soviet historians and to visit historically important cities and monuments, in addition to sampling the usual tourist attractions, such as collective farms, pioneer camps, museums, churches, kremlins, operas, and so forth.

1. KIEV

We arrived in Kiev on a pleasantly sunny afternoon in July, after a flight of an hour and thirty-five minutes from Vienna in a two-engine Soviet Aeroflot jet.

We deplaned a considerable distance from a rather nondescript terminal (characteristic of other Soviet airports visited) on top of which large Cyrillic letters proclaimed, both in Ukrainian and in Russian, "City of Kiev."

All of the customs personnel, many of whom wore what appeared to be military uniforms, spoke in Russian. The only bit of Ukrainian that I heard during the entire customs proceedings was spoken by a young customs official and a woman tourist whom he was advising concerning her customs declaration papers. It was while our travel-weary group patiently waited for the completion of customs that we were joined by our Intourist guide from Moscow, and a young historian (*aspirant*) from Moscow State University, both of whom were to accompany us during the entire six weeks of our Soviet tour, as well as by a city guide, a young girl, who remained with us during our stay in Kiev. It turned out that our Kiev guide spoke Ukrainian; I took the opportunity to converse with her at the terminal, (and on several other occasions while in the capital). Dur-

ing our chat at the terminal, a young fellow, perhaps another local guide, also joined our conversation for a brief period. Thus, with such a relatively promising beginning, it seemed that during our brief stop in Kiev I would be of service to my non-Ukrainian speaking colleagues. To my disappointment, however, this was not to be the case. On the contrary, the next several days showed that for all practical purposes my knowledge of the Ukrainian language was valueless. At the hotels, stores, and in the streets, as well as on guided tours of the city's historical sights, one heard and spoke Russian, not Ukrainian. Although, as I was to learn, the Ukrainian language was understood by many, it was obviously not the language in which everyday activities are carried on. I did not realize, at the outset, that this was the clue to what turned out to be the overriding impression of my visit: the extensive Russification of Ukraine.

We put up at the Hotel Moscow, which commands a grand view down to Khreshchatyk Street, the main thoroughfare of Kiev. The multi-storied hotel appeared to be a relatively lively place, with several local administrative offices, a post office, and a newspaper and book stand located in the ample lobby. During our sojourn here at no time did I personally hear the Ukrainian language spoken by any of the employees or the native guests while they went about their normal everyday activities. The peasant-type woman behind the newspaper stand gave no indication whatever that she understood Ukrainian. I had almost as much difficulty buying cards and stamps as did those of my colleagues who spoke neither Russian nor Ukrainian. Our very efficient waitress at the second floor restaurant gave cryptic replies in Russian to my inquiries, although I had a strong suspicion that she also spoke Ukrainian. When I asked, again in Ukrainian, for directions from a middle-aged couple conversing near the front entrance, they appeared surprised as, without speaking, they pointed in the proper direction.

I heard no Ukrainian spoken on Khreshchatyk or on other streets during our walks between our hotel and the Hotel Dnieper, the bookstores, the War Monument on the square, the Palace of Culture, and other places. At the foreign bar, in the more modern Hotel Dnieper, I literally could not make myself understood while attempting to order American drinks for myself and several colleagues. The very young blond barmaid seemed unwilling to make any effort at comprehension.

On our second day, July 10, we visited the historic Pecherska Lavra complex, now a state museum, which we entered through the Church of the Holy Trinity gateway. The local guide, another peasant type with gold teeth, proceeded to explain in rote-like fashion the historical significance of each structure and *ikon*. She did so, however, in Russian, despite the fact that our Kiev guide, whose job it was to translate the information into English for us, spoke Ukrainian.

We were joined for this tour and for the remainder of our stay in Kiev by two graduate students from the University who had come, we were informed, so that they might benefit from personal acquaintance with American historians. It turned out that both of them spoke Ukrainian, a fact they admitted upon being asked. This was the first time that I heard natives speak in the native language since meeting our Kiev guide at the airport the previous day. It should be added, however, that, although they spoke to me occasionally in their native tongue, at no time during their travels with our group did they use the Ukrainian language whenever conversing with each other.

At the entrance to the famed catacombs of the monastery another opportunity arose to speak in Ukrainian, on this occasion with an older native who had wandered into the underground entrance together with our group. Upon emerging from the caves, and as a result of my conversation with the native gentlemen who assured me that the youth spoke Ukrainian, I inquired of several members of a group of young "pioneers," who were also touring the Lavra grounds, whether they understood Ukrainian. Without breaking stride they replied with the affirmative Russian *da* rather than the Ukrainian *tak*. Later, the same inquiry made of young boys at the Museum grounds elicited similar replies.

Although the most outstanding physical characteristic of the entire Pecherska Lavra complex seemed to be the high bell tower built in the eighteenth century, particularly impressive was the extent of the catacombs themselves. The guide informed us that these caves were twenty meters long, reaching a depth of twenty meters below surface, and that they contained 120 mummies, including the well-lighted long coffin containing the blackened bones of the famed chronicler Nestor. Lastly, while at the partially restored Church of the Savior, also within the overall Lavra complex, we noticed that a three-armed cross had been scratched, apparently by some Soviet "hoodlums," on the marble top of the tomb of Yuri Dolgoruky, the founder of Moscow and the son of Volodymyr Monomakh, who had

built this structure adjoining the Lavra ground in the early twelfth century.

Both famed St. Sophia Cathedral and the Historical and Archeological Museum were on our agenda that afternoon. As was the case at the Pecherska Lavra so at St. Sophia's and at the Museum: the local guides directed our group through the premises using only the Russian language which our Ukrainian-speaking Kiev guide translated into English for our benefit. Perhaps the most striking feature of the interior of the multi-domed St. Sophia, now also a museum, was the great glass gold and multi-colored mosaic inside the central dome; especially eye-catching was the great mosaic of the standing Madonna on the concave surface of the central apse. It was difficult to comprehend that the multi-colored mosaic of the Madonna, with vivid blue and gold colors predominating, was created in the eleventh century. St. Sophia, which was undergoing renovations during our visit, contains the massive white marble sarcophagus of Prince Yaroslav the Wise, for the Cathedral also served as the burial place of princes and bishops.

Leaving St. Sophia and passing the monument of *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky on horseback in the great square, our bus took us to the Historical and Archeological Museum, located near St. Andrew's Church. The courtyard in front of the Museum, we were informed, was actually the foundation of a tenth century Church of the Tithes. The area is known as Volodymyr's Hill, because it is from this vantage point that Volodymyr is said to have observed, in 988, the people of Kiev being baptized below in the Dnieper River. Inside the museum, the museum's wealth of archeological artifacts held my attention less than did the provocative revolutionary posters of 1917 and later years.

In the evening we attended a truly impressive folk festival, which was held in the Palace of Culture across the street from the park-like grounds of our hotel. Numerous groups of the Kiev region competed for the privilege of representing the Republic in the final competition embracing all the Soviet Republics to be held in Moscow during the fiftieth anniversary celebration in November.

After a grand opening, which included a great deal of Red flag waving, virtually the entire program of song, dance, recitation and coming relief, as well as all the introductions and announcements, were conducted in what seemed to be excellent Ukrainian. This only served to underline the astonishing fact that little of this familiarity with the Ukrainian language was carried over into the ordinary

everyday life of the people. The very persons who performed in the festival had been reluctant to speak to me in Ukrainian earlier in the afternoon when I had attempted to strike up a conversation with them at the Moscow Hotel where they had gathered. Although they obviously understood me, they had, for the most part, replied in Russian. A young man dressed in a Ukrainian Kozak costume had replied to my question whether he understood Ukrainian with the Russian *da*. When I had then remarked that people seemed to be reluctant to use the Ukrainian language his reply was, "Oh no, that cannot be," as he walked rather sheepishly off. Outside, on the steps of the hotel, when I had approached another and asked whether the costume that he was wearing was that of the Hutsul region, he had stared at me in surprise before moving away.

To return to the festival, I fell into conversation with the woman on my left. When she asked me about my impressions of Kiev I couldn't resist stating that I found it very difficult to converse in Ukrainian with the natives — that most didn't seem to understand me. Her immediate reply was, "They understand." I returned to my hotel room disappointed at the thought that on the morrow I would leave Kiev, having had so little opportunity to use the language.

Nor were my impressions of the serious extent of Russification in Kiev altered the following morning, July 11, when we met with the Director and nine of the historians at the Institute of Historical Sciences of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. At the outset of our formal meeting, the Director inquired whether the conversation should be carried on in Ukrainian or in Russian. Our Moscow Intourist guide, who was our translator during all of our meetings with Soviet historians, was prompt to suggest Russian. In view of the fact that our group was composed primarily of American historians many of whom spoke or had some familiarity with Russian, whereas only three of us spoke or were familiar with the Ukrainian language, the suggestion did not seem unreasonable. Nevertheless we *were* meeting with Ukrainian historians in Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Director informed us that the Institute was interested in the history of Ukraine since antiquity. His summary of the Institute's publication plans was of special interest to me in view of the fact that my own experience in the previous two days indicated scant Ukrainian atmosphere in the capital of Ukraine. The Institute was in the process of preparing, we were informed, twenty-six volumes dealing with the history of the different regions of Ukraine. The

first volume, on the Kharkiv region, already had been issued; five others would be published soon; the rest were in various stages of progress. We were further informed that they had published a seventeen-volume Ukrainian social encyclopedia, and that a four-volume encyclopedia of Ukrainian history was in preparation, as was an encyclopedia on economics and another on agrarian cybernetics. Shortly, a two-volume history of Ukraine was to be published and a popular history of Ukraine was to be translated into foreign languages. They also plan to publish two-volume histories on the October Revolution in Ukraine, the working class in Ukraine, and on its peasantry as well. Also planned are single volume histories of the cultural development in Ukraine under socialism and on the history of the historical sciences. We were still further informed that more than eighty-six per cent of the Institute's publications were in the Ukrainian language, that over ninety per cent of the staff of the Institute were Ukrainians, and that the *aspirants* (post graduate students) in the main hailed from local areas.

This statistical information might have been more impressive had it not been for my experience in Kiev the previous two days or even if the ten representatives of the Ukrainian Institute had not used Russian rather than Ukrainian while conversing among themselves—let alone when addressing our group. Questions from our group brought conventional Soviet replies from the historians, thereby suggesting the probable flavor of the impressive list of historical publications cited. On one occasion, the question period approached a moment of vibrancy, when one of our colleagues raised the problem of current Ukrainian nationalism. The Soviet historians went into an impromptu and animated caucus in Russian before one of them finally volunteered an answer to the effect that they think of nationalism in the best sense — the harmonious development of all peoples — rather than in the “narrow” and “chauvinistic” way. A colleague of his added that the Ukrainian publications and other activities of the Institute demonstrate that they are the true Ukrainian nationalists. The tension quickly subsided as another of our number tactfully directed our attention away from the menacing waters of nationalism.

Soon our members were shaking hands with their hosts and hurrying out, for we had plane connections to make for Volgograd (Stalingrad) that afternoon. I, however, could not resist the impulse to speak with our Ukrainian hosts; accordingly, upon their withdrawal I followed them out into the hall by way of the back door

and proceeded to introduce myself in Ukrainian to those in the rear. I felt that they were pleasantly surprised to find that one of their American guests should speak Ukrainian, and all, with the exception of the Director who was too far down the hall to hear me, halted to converse with me. For the next ten or fifteen minutes I enjoyed a most delightful banter with them. When I finally forced myself to break away I ran down four flights of stairs without having the slightest idea what direction to take in order to catch up with my colleagues. Upon reaching the ground floor I was relieved to see our Intourist guide, who was on the phone attempting to locate me. His glance in my direction left no doubt about his irritation, for I had inadvertently delayed our departure for the airport.

At this juncture, I wish to add that Kiev is truly an attractive city. Except for Moscow and Leningrad, all the Soviet cities we visited, even those in arid Central Asia, contained a great deal of vegetation within their central core. None, however, had the abundance of greenery and the esthetic appeal of the Ukrainian capital. Without intending to slight the others, two cities stand out in my mind, Kiev and Moscow. Moscow, because it is so obviously the heart and soul, the cosmopolitan hub of the Soviet society; Kiev, because of its beauty. Kiev remains in the memory as the most picturesque city of our Soviet tour. A picture that will probably be little tarnished, even with the growth of the vast apartment complexes on the outskirts of the city.

2. YALTA — SIMFEROPOL — BAKHCHISARAI

We returned to Ukraine in the evening of July 14, landing at Simferopol, the administrative and industrial center of the Crimea, after an hour-and-a-half jet flight from Volgograd. Since our destination was Yalta on the southern coast, where we were to stay during our Crimean interlude, we had before us a long bus ride of approximately two-and-a-quarter hours.

Yalta, on the Black Sea, perhaps best known for its wines, health sanatoriums, and the Yalta Conference, is truly a beautiful resort. Our hotel, the Oreanda, was situated on a beach front street, which in effect was a delightful and popular promenade rather than a thoroughfare. The next morning we visited Livadia Palace, the site of the Yalta Conference, which is now a sanatorium for respiratory diseases. On either side of the entrance of the two-story white structure was a plaque, one in Russian, the other in Ukrainian, proclaiming that three heads of state had met here in 1945 to discuss post-

war policy with regard to Germany, the war with Japan, and the establishment of the United Nations. Also on our agenda during the day was the beautifully landscaped estate of Count Vorontsov, also now a sanatorium. In the early evening we drove east along the coast to the Artek pioneer camp complex where about 5,000 blue-and-gold-clad pioneers participated in a massive jamboree-like program (marching, bands, speakers, fireworks, relay races, and a soccer match) before a packed stadium of about fifteen thousand people. In the course of the program the massive assemblage was addressed by the late Yuri Gagarin and other dignitaries, such as the local Comsomol secretary, Party secretary, etc.

On the 16th we motored north to Simferopol and then southwest to Bakhchisarai, the old capital of the Crimean Khans. The town conveyed a Spanish or Moorish appearance. The square-shaped Palace of the Khans with its profusely decorated rooms contained varied historical works, including the famous Fountain of Tears described by Pushkin and the large Zadorozhny painting depicting Bohdan Khmelnytsky leaving his son with the Khan.

By early evening we had returned to Yalta. At eight o'clock we attended an open-air Red Army concert of songs and dances, held in a park within walking distance of our hotel. The performance, which also included a song in Ukrainian, was delightful. Unfortunately, however, the evening was marred toward the end of the program by what most of us considered an unnecessary and tasteless skit — a political satire — and this against imperialist America. Earlier, during the intermission, I had initiated a conversation in Russian (more precisely, in Ukrainianized Russian) with three teen-aged Soviet soldiers from Asia who were sitting to my left, and with a young couple sitting behind me. When the concert ended, I turned to these acquaintances intending to bid them farewell; however, both the soldiers and the couple already were on their way out. I had the distinct impression that they, as we, had been embarrassed by the anti-American satire; thus they had left as unobtrusively as possible.

The following day we enjoyed an hour's cruise along the Yalta shoreline in a small hydro-foil boat. Away from the shore, one was able to appreciate even more readily the splendid location of the resort, which nestles between two rivers, with the mountains in the background. By noon we were at the famed Golden Beach for a swim in the Black Sea. It was while swimming that I heard English spoken. The voices belonged to an American couple from New England who

were in the USSR for a Moscow film festival. This seemed to underline the fact that here, as was the case in Kiev, one waited in vain to hear the Ukrainian tongue spoken "out in the market place." In fact a few brief words exchanged with a university student working as a waiter during the summer months in the restaurant of our Yalta hotel constituted the sum total of my opportunities to converse in the Ukrainian language.

3. ODESSA

We left the Crimea early in the afternoon of July 18. The flight from Simferopol to Odessa in a Tupilov 124 jet, a type of plane that we frequently used while in the USSR, took only thirty-five minutes. Odessa, a *Hero City*, as is Kiev, is an important industrial, port and resort city. Of the half dozen Soviet cities that we had visited up to that point, Odessa appeared most western. Like many American cities, it had parallel streets and did not seem to possess any special characteristic of its own. When our city-guide was introduced to us, I felt that her facial features were undeniably Ukrainian. In due time I learned that she spoke a beautiful Ukrainian; she said, however, that she was not Ukrainian but Russian.

In the morning we began our tour of the city with a visit to the great Potemkin Staircase of one hundred ninety-two steps, which acts as a gala entrance to the city from the sea. During the tour that followed, our efficient guide provided us with some impressive statistics on Odessa, such as: the Archeological Museum situated behind the Duma building, which now houses the City Soviet, is the oldest in the country; Odessa is the fifth city in the Soviet Union in number of students; the port, which can accommodate one hundred and fifty ocean-going ships, is the most important in the Soviet Union; Odessa was occupied for two years in World War II, during which time 250,000 in the Odessa region were killed by the Germans and 75,000 more were taken to Germany, with 25,000 being killed in the city during the first day of occupation. Our tour also included the celebrated Alley of Glory, the head of which was graced with an equally impressive monument with the sea as backdrop. Near the monument on either side of the Alley were twelve well-kept graves of partisans with Ukrainian inscriptions on the white marble slabs. On our way back to the hotel we stopped briefly at the monument of the poet Taras Shevchenko, where several of our group took pictures. In the evening we attended the opera "La Traviata" — which was sung in Russian. After the performance we were joined,

for the bus ride back to the hotel, by a group of teachers from New York City who that day had visited a pioneer camp and were most eager to tell us all about their experience.

The next afternoon we motored to the Dzerzhinsky Collective Farm located about twenty-five miles southwest of Odessa on a lagoon of the Black Sea. The collective kindergarten children entertained us briefly with several dances and songs in Russian. Next, the chairman and his assistant led us to a meeting room where they provided us with considerable information about their collective farm. We were informed, for instance, that their collective had been organized in 1929 "by the free will of small farm owners." Then the chairman rattled off, from memory, a series of statistics on production, animals, equipment, and so on. Then the structure and the administrative characteristics of the farm were detailed. After a brief tour of the farm grounds, including a dairy barn with some fine-looking "red Steppe" milk cows, an outdoor banquet was prepared for us. The long canopied tables in the courtyard were literally covered with a variety of hot and cold foods and beverages. The vegetables and fruits were among the finest specimens seen or tasted during our entire Soviet tour. The chairman and assistant chairman, as well as several other leaders of the collective who had joined us in the delightful repast, were expert in seeing to it that their American guests ate and drank in full measure. The chairman, seated at my end of the long table, never tired of proposing toasts "for friendship." A powerful-looking man in his early forties, he was also a *Hero of Labor* of the Soviet Union. As a captain in the Red Army during the defense of Moscow, he had suffered the loss of an eye. I was particularly impressed by the ease with which he replied to our queries, whether couched in Russian or in Ukrainian. I also spoke to the assistant chairman in the Ukrainian language. He had attended classes in Lviv for three years; there, he assured me, the Ukrainian language is used by the natives to a greater degree. The chairman and his assistant were the only two persons at the farm with whom I spoke in Ukrainian. When speaking to each other or to other members of the collective, however, they spoke in Russian.

The following morning, July 21, we had a meeting at the Scientists Club with several historians from the University of Odessa. Among the items of special interest was the information that lectures on the foundations of communism and Leninism had been introduced three years ago in all departments of the University; that all students were required to take courses on the history of the

communist party and on scientific communism; and that it depended on the professor and students whether a lecture would be delivered in Russian or in Ukrainian.

After the meeting I spoke with both professors, who accompanied us to our bus. The one who had stated during our meeting that he lectured in Ukrainian conversed with me at length and gave me an autographed copy of his doctor's dissertation as a remembrance of our meeting. The dissertation, as well as the statement he graciously wrote on the title page, are both written in Russian. The second professor permitted me to do all the talking, limiting his remarks to *da, da*, whenever it seemed appropriate, making it impossible for me to determine whether or not he was fluent in Ukrainian. My conversation with the two University of Odessa professors was the last opportunity to attempt to speak the native tongue while in Ukraine, for shortly before two o'clock that afternoon our large two-engine jet, Tupilov 124, took off from Odessa airport bound for Leningrad.

To be added is that in Odessa as opposed to Kiev there seemed to be greater evidence of Ukrainian language signs in storefronts, offices, and particularly on street corners. However, there didn't seem to be any greater use of the native tongue. To illustrate: One late afternoon I accompanied a colleague to the main post office of Odessa, which was a considerable walk from our hotel on Prymorsky Boulevard. The section of the post office where packages were wrapped and mailed was very busy, dozens of natives hammering away at wooden boxes while others waited in line for service. After a rather frustrating hour of waiting in queues we completed our transaction. On our way back to the hotel we stumbled upon preparations for a movie scene to be filmed in the square at the head of the Potemkin steps. For a few moments we joined the mushrooming crowd, which was held back by good-humored policemen. Not once during this one-and-a-half-hour sojourn in downtown Odessa (during the late afternoon rush hour) did I hear a single word spoken in Ukrainian.

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Looking back on it all, the dominant impression of my eleven days in Ukraine was the overwhelming extent of Russification. Even after considering: that Kiev is the capital of Ukraine and therefore more cosmopolitan than the country-side in general; that Odessa is the Soviet Union's greatest port and therefore should have an inter-

national atmosphere; and that Yalta is the USSR's most popular resort and therefore crowded with foreign tourists — the fact remains that it was not Kiev's cosmopolitanism, or Odessa's internationalism, or Yalta's tourism that was dominant; rather, it was the omnipresence of the Russian language and the absence of Ukrainian in the three areas. At airports, hotels, restaurants, stores, post offices, and in the streets, everyone used Russian. Russian was used during our tours through museums, the collective farm and its nursery, our meetings with historians, etc. This is not to imply that the Ukrainians do not know their mother tongue, as I discovered. It is a fact, however, that little of their facility in the language is employed in their daily lives. A trenchant explanation for this unnatural situation was offered by one of our waitresses in Leningrad. She explained that Ukrainian was considered an inferior language; if one wished to be considered cultured, and to advance in Soviet society, one perforce spoke Russian. There is more to the problem, however. In our own hemisphere Canadians of French ancestry also feel the social pressure to use the dominant English language in order to advance in the professions, yet they continue to use their own language in the streets and in the schools, as well as at home.

Article 121 of the Soviet Constitution states that "citizens of the USSR have the right to education" and that "this right is insured . . . by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language." I am not certain that as a general rule instruction in the schools of the Ukrainian Republic is conducted in the native language. Certainly this was not indicated by my experience at the collective farm nursery school, nor in our meetings with the Ukrainian historians, nor in any other formal or informal situation that we encountered while in Ukraine. Except for the two occasions connected with stage performances, previously mentioned, not once in my eleven days in Ukraine did I hear the native language spoken except when I or other foreigners initiated the conversation.

The fact is that I have found more people to converse with in the Ukrainian language in Philadelphia or in New York than in Kiev or Odessa. Despite the fact that in Ukraine students are taught, signs hung, books published, and folk festivals are performed in the Ukrainian language, my general impression is that the use of the Ukrainian tongue has been pushed out of the area of everyday use and relegated to the less important areas of historical and cultural interest.

EAST TURKESTAN: VICTIM OF SINO-SOVIET COLONIALISM

By ARIN ENGIN

The story of the subjugation of East Turkestan rivals that of any modern victim of imperio-colonialism. Its cruel fate is that of being ravaged in turn by the two largest Communist empires, the USSR and Red China. A brief account follows.

From 1882 to 1911 East Turkestan was under the rule of the Manchus, the foreign dynasty that had held sway in China since 1649.

In 1911 the Chinese National Republic was established, East Turkestan becoming a nominal province of this entity. Many adventurers, in point of fact, took turns in ruling it. This state of affairs lasted until 1931 at which time a long-suffering populace no longer could tolerate conditions.

TEN YEARS OF RUSSIAN RULE

In that year a popular revolt erupted in the province of Kumul. By January of 1933 it had spread to the province of Turfan, where the leader was Mahmut Muhiti, to the Tarim region, where the leaders were Timur and Osman, to the Hoten region, spearheaded by Mehmet Emin Bugra, and to the Altai Mountains, where the people followed Sherif Han Tore. The Chinese were driven out of East Turkestan, with the exception of Urumchi, the capital.

Soviet Russia, sensing advantages for the taking, had sent in September of 1931 a delegation of seven persons, headed by Cansin Dorga, from Outer Mongolia. This delegation met with a rebuff on the part of the fighting nationalists. The Soviet Union thereupon contacted Ching Shu-rin, the Chinese Governor General of East Turkestan, and concluded a secret pact whereby the Chinese received arms.

In April, 1933, however, in the face of a nation-wide Turkish revolt, the Chinese Governor fled Urumchi. His place was taken by the military commandant, Shing Shih-tsai.

Although the nationalists, under the overall leadership of Hoja Niyaz, were reinforced by 1,000 militia of Muslim Chinese (called Tungan in China), the increasing weight of Soviet tanks, planes and armament was felt. In June of 1933, Hoja Niyaz was forced to compromise and accept the terms of the Chinese general. The territory to the north of the Celestial Mountains (Tenri Daglari) went to the Chinese, but the south was given to the Nationalists. So, on November 12, 1933, the independent East Turkestan Republic was born.

Soviet Russia lost no time in renewing its bid for a take-over. In January of the following year (1934) Soviet troops began advancing upon the frontiers of the new Turkish republic. With troops at his back, the Soviet Consul General in Urumchi, Abserov, went to Kashgar, capital of the new republic, and forced Hoja Niyaz, now president, to accept a joint administration with the Chinese general over the whole of East Turkestan.

It took the Nationalists three years to recuperate before rising against the cynical intrigues of the Russians. In April, 1937, uprisings took place, with the Hoten, Kashgar, Yarkent, Aksu and Kucha provinces and cities falling to the Nationalists.

No less than 12,000 troops were sent in at this juncture by the Soviet Union, plus 30 planes and 50 tanks. (At this time, the USSR was also conducting its bloody repressions in Ukraine, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians falling victims of executions and deportations). The Nationalist forces were forced to retreat; some 80,000 militia and civilians were killed by the Russians. Niyaz himself was arrested in Urumchi and executed. Some 10,000 of the intelligentsia were rounded up and slaughtered.

With the Russian and Chinese hordes engaging in wanton killing and destruction, new regional revolts burst forth, only to be bloodily crushed as well. Some 4,000 families, it is recorded, migrated to the Kansu and Kokonor provinces of China, diving into ditches on the way to escape strafing Russian planes.

Resistance persisted, however, erupting again (February, 1940 and June, 1941) with two revolts in the Altai Mountains, under leaders like Ak Teke, Isim Han, Raket and Kalman. (But in the ensuing ten years one name became illustrious: Osman Batur. His unflagging faith and remarkable courage fired his countrymen time and again during the long years of genocidal foreign rule.)

By the time of the outbreak of the Russo-German war in 1941, the Kremlin had installed troops in the frontier city of Kumul and

cavalry contingents on the Afghan, Indian and Tibetan frontiers. Abserov, the Consul, had begun to act like a governor general in Urumchi. In point of fact, the military and civil administrations had fallen into Russian hands (Generals Malenkov and Fiden), with the brother of Mao Tse-tung leavening Russian preponderance. On paper the Chinese ruled; in actuality the Russians held full sway. For example, the Kremlin cut off the trade of East Turkestan with China and India. Through a trade agency, *Sovsintorg*, established in each East Turkestan province, cheaply-bought raw materials were funneled to the Soviet Union. Exploited especially were East Turkestan's immense mineral riches, which the Soviet Union gained through a secret treaty with the puppet Chinese Governor, General Shing Shih-tsai (1937). The Kremlin even established a plane factory near Urumchi and started oil extraction in the vicinity of Shiho.

In these ten years of Russian rule not only unbridled colonialism was practiced in East Turkestan. Outright genocide claimed fully 300,000 souls from the intelligentsia and the spheres of commerce and religion. Needless to add, torture was a favorite device in bringing the East Turkestanians to heel.

NATIONALIST CHINA

Hard pressed in 1941, the Russians withdrew, only to be succeeded by Nationalist China as the oppressor. Terror and exploitation, however, scarcely diminished. Moreover, Chinese now were settled in East Turkestan, with communal properties belonging to the Turks being distributed among the foreign settlers. Atop this, a policy of forced assimilation was initiated. Newspapers, magazines, books — the written word more and more became Chinese instead of Turkish (Uigur). Intermarriage was encouraged by the Chinese as part of their assimilation drive. Lastly, taxes became exorbitant — all with a view to crushing the populace.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC

Racked by misery and unrelenting cruelty, a new revolt broke out in September of 1944. The provinces of Ili, Altai and Tarbagatay were cleared of the detested Chinese. In October, 1944, the second Republic of East Turkestan was proclaimed in the city of Ili, with Ali Khan Tore as president.

The equally hated second member of the twin oppressors soon intervened. Owing to the machinations of the Russians the Turkish

nationalists were forced into signing a treaty with China according to which a mixed government was to be established in Urumchi. The governors and sub-governors, the treaty stipulates, were to be elected by the people. Altai, Ili and Tarbagatay remained in the hands of the nationalist forces. Tore's vehement objections to the treaty as a whole earned for him, the second president of the republic, deportation to Moscow. A Russian puppet, Ahmet Can Kasim, took his place.

Thus the Russians were directly instrumental in subverting both republics, the first in 1933 in Kashgar, and the second in 1944 in Ili.

At this time (1945) three Turkish fighters for liberation returned to Eastern Turkestan. One was Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who in August of 1932 had gone to Nanking, the then capital of the Nationalist Chinese Government, to demand redemption of the promise of self-determination which had been given in 1924. Far-sightedly, he warned Chiang Kai-shek of the Russian menace and pointed out the necessity of granting autonomy to East Turkestan at once. His words went unheeded. Alptekin remained in Nanking until 1945, continuing the political struggle through publications. In this work he was joined by Mesur Sabri Baykuzu (1934) and Mehmet Emin Bugra (1943). All three were hailed upon their return to East Turkestan.

In May of 1945 the Chinese oppressor succumbed under the unrelenting subversive activities of the Russians, and withdrew, leaving the administration of the country in Turkish hands. Baykuzu became Governor General and newly-returned Alptekin took over as Secretary General of the fully autonomous Turkish government.

But the Chinese oppressor was only assuming a new guise; that of Communism. The Red Chinese forces were inexorably taking over all China. In September of 1949 the Commandant of the Nationalist Chinese forces (about 100,000 strong) surrendered to those of the Red Chinese.

With the advent of the Reds, the Turkish leaders and their followers by the thousands migrated to the free world. Led by Alptekin and Bugra, they traversed the icy Himalayas in the dead of winter, many perishing on the way to India and Pakistan.

The fate of the fighters for freedom in Ili is unknown; they simply disappeared under the flood of Russo-Chinese hordes.

In 1952 some 1,850 refugees managed to reach Turkey, the sister homeland where they were given assistance and land. A year earlier 350 refugees had made it safely to Pakistan.

On April 29, 1951, the Chinese Communist Party announced that 13,564 nationalist Turks had been arrested. In 1953 some 20,000 more were arrested. Estimates place the number slain by the Red Chinese at 100,000, including former Governor General Baykuzu.

An agrarian reform was instituted in East Turkestan two years after the influx of the Red Chinese. The first step was the break-up and distribution of the land of the wealthy. The second was the abolition of all private property. The third introduced wholesale collectivization, known as the "People's Communes" system. In 1958 family life was proscribed. Daily life became one of subsistence, with the Party ruling its every aspect. Moreover, some two-and-a-half million Chinese settlers to date have invaded the country. Although in 1955 the "Sinkiang Uigur Autonomous Region" was established, East Turkestan today is little more than a Red Chinese province. The economy, the military, the police, transportation — all are in their hands. (The Karamay and Shiho oil industry supplies most of China's oil needs.)

Sabotage and underground movements continue to this day in a land whose inhabitants have resisted oppression, whatever the cost. For example, during 1950-1953 there were 591 forays and 1490 acts of sabotage, and 213 official buildings were burnt. Guerrilla warfare is waged in the Kumul, Cherchen and Charklik regions.

During the recent upheaval in Red China, East Turkestan was one of the first areas to refuse to obey Peking. Reports have filtered through to the Free World of constant revolts.

The deathless spirit of nationalism in East Turkestan makes their people allies of the Free World. At this writing, however, no radio instrumentality beams any Uigur-Turkish programs to this oppressed people.

BOOK REVIEWS

INTERNATIONALISM OR RUSSIFICATION? A Study on the Soviet Nationalities Problem. By Ivan Dzyuba. Preface by Peter Archer, Barrister-at-Law, MP; Edited by M. Davis. The Camelot Press, Ltd., London and Southampton, 1968, pp. 240.

Ivan Dzyuba's name received international prominence only a few years ago, specifically in the spring of 1966, at which time the American and European press reported the arrest of two Ukrainian literary critics, Ivan Dzyuba and Ivan Svitlychny. He quickly became known as one of the leading Ukrainian intellectuals who have fallen victim to Soviet Russian persecution and oppression.

He was born in 1931 (July 26) in a village in the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, where he completed his secondary education. After graduating he did research at the T. Shevchenko Institute of Literature of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. For some years he was a member of the editorial board of *Vitchyzna* (Fatherland), the official organ of the Ukrainian Writers' Union and served as literary adviser to the publishing house *Molod* (Youth). A frequent target of party criticism, he was threatened with expulsion from the Union for promoting "politically false concepts." He has not been permitted to publish anything since 1965, the year that saw the publication of his well-known essay on "The Honesty of Creative Research." Instead, he was given the job of language editor of the *Ukrainian-Biochemical Journal*.

His literary works have nevertheless circulated in clandestine fashion throughout Ukraine, in Russia, and also in Poland and Czechoslovakia. These works have done much to create a new genre featuring remarkable insight, opening for his readers entirely new vistas in literature. He won prestige and a considerable following among the young generation of both writers and readers. No respecter of accepted Communist opinions, he could not remain unchallenged by the party high priests and propaganda molders.

In the summer of 1965, concurrently with the arrest and trials of A. Sinyavsky and Yu. Daniel, a series of arrests and secret trials swept Ukraine. Dzyuba also was arrested and was held for some time by the police; he was finally released, apparently because of his incurable tuberculosis. While the trials of Russian writers in Moscow were public affairs, those in Ukraine were held *in camera*.

Along with other young Ukrainian intellectuals — V. Chornovil, S. Karavansky, V. Moroz and many others — both free and in Soviet labor camps— Dzyuba began writing petitions to members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, members of the government of the Ukrainian SSR, and notable Lenin Prize laureates about the conditions in Ukraine. Although there were no replies, rumors ran wild in Ukraine about mass arrests

of "nationalists," "counter-revolutionaries," "enemies of the Soviet state," and the like.

Inspired by his conviction that those arrested were no "wreckers" but people genuinely concerned with the condition of Ukrainian culture, and witnessing himself numerous instances "of an indefatigable, pitiless and absurd persecution of the national cultural life" in Ukraine, Dzyuba wrote *Internationalism or Russification?*, which charged violation of Lenin's nationalities policy in Ukraine by the present Soviet Russian leadership. Its main thesis is that Lenin's nationality policy called for a free and unrestricted Ukrainian culture as a part of the international proletarian culture. The author initially submitted his manuscript to Peter Yu. Shelest, first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and to Volodymyr V. Shcherbytsky, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Dzyuba details his charges that the Leninist nationalities policy has been grossly violated, beginning with Stalin and through Khrushchev's regime to that of Brezhnev and Kosygin. He asserts that a policy of persecution and oppression is hardly an answer to widespread discontent. He contends that the restoration of the Leninist nationalities policy is indispensable for the good of Communism and its future success.

He is vehement in stating that the turmoil and upheaval in Ukraine is a direct result of the Russification of the non-Russian peoples and rejects the charges of "bourgeois nationalism" leveled against Ukraine. Dzyuba moreover states unequivocally that the present oppressive policies of Moscow in Ukraine are the direct heritage of Czarist traditions. He is open in denouncing Russian chauvinism and the excesses it commits in the name of Communist ideology and international proletarianism. For him there is no question that Moscow espoused Russification as its instrument of policy in Ukraine, completely abandoning the nationalities principles and policies as defined by Lenin.

In this respect, *Internationalism or Russification?* is an outstanding and remarkable work, containing courageous statements of fact combined with scholarly analysis of depth and scope. What makes the work vivid is the fact that the author writes not only on the basis of his vast scholarly background, but also on that of his own experience.

For Dzyuba, human rights and liberty are closely related to national rights, as he finds that all the nations of the world, including the Communist, are developing and growing, except those in the USSR, which are doomed to sterile stagnation and which are targets of Russification.

The author provides a great wealth of irrefutable evidence, both historic and contemporary, from the cultural, educational, social, economic and administrative and political fields, to demonstrate the unbridled Russian chauvinism. Since this policy of narrow chauvinism suffocating a major nation in the USSR is contrary to both Leninism and contemporary trends in the world, he sees disaster as inevitable. He insists on the reversal of this anti-Leninist policy, and he also raises — indirectly — another important point: the failures of Russian non-conformist writers to raise their voices in defense of the non-Russian nations.

Internationalism or Russification? is a fresh and authoritative study of Soviet Russian behavior not only in the USSR, but in Czechoslovakia, Cuba and the United Nations as well. It is studded with hundreds of pertinent quotes

and cases to indicate the crass duplicity of the Kremlin leaders and the gap between their preached theories and their harsh, inhuman practices.

This book is "must" literature for our "Soviet area" specialists, industrialists and businessmen who are so prone to make deals with the USSR and, above all, for our policy-makers, who astonishingly fail to discern the facts of Soviet Russian behavior in the world and in its own empire.

Dzyuba's work is also meaningful because it is written from the viewpoint of a Marxist, not an antagonist or an anti-Communist. This is perhaps why the Soviet Russian totalitarians could not kill him on the spot; but of course this may still come to pass.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN LITERATURE IN CANADA. By M. I. Mandryka. Winnipeg-Ottawa. Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences. 1968. 247 pgs. \$6.00.

The study by M. I. Mandryka is the first comprehensive historical survey of Ukrainian Canadian literary pursuits. It commences with the first Ukrainian settlement in Canada, with emphasis on the characteristic features of Ukrainian Canadian literature, as distinct from the literatures of other Canadians, but nevertheless truly Canadian. The study is not purely literary, for it also views other cultural developments and therefore is a welcome account, on the occasion of Canada's Centennial, to the Canadian general cultural treasury.

In the opinion of this reviewer, M. I. Mandryka is correct in emphasizing the love of Ukrainians for the cultural heritage of their pioneer forefathers, as is common with Canadians of British, French, and other origins. This trait is crucial for the cultural future of Canada and for mutual understanding and appreciation among the various component elements that comprise the Canadian nation.

In his study the author distinguishes four periods in the history of Ukrainian literature in Canada:

- 1) First pioneer period (end of the 19th century);
- 2) Late pioneer period (beginning of the 20th century);
- 3) Period between the two World Wars, and;
- 4) Period after the Second World War.

Correspondingly, the book consists of an introduction, four chapters, and concluding remarks.

The introduction is limited to the historical background of the Ukrainian people and gives a brief account of Ukrainian literature in general, in order to put the analysis of the literary process into historical perspective. The first chapters, "Beginnings of Ukrainian Letters in Canada," stresses pioneer folklore and introduces distinctive authors. This period is characterized by nostalgia for sunny Ukraine and is permeated with hope for a brighter future. Poets Chernetsky and Fedyk are the most representative of this period in their search for consolation with reality.

Chapter Two serves as the dividing line between the period of the folkloristic songs and writings of early pioneer poets and the period of distinct advance in literary mastery. The first World War and its aftermath opened

new horizons and made for new achievements in Ukrainian Canadian literary production. Now appearing were a number of new authors born in Canada or educated there, who laid new foundations for the Ukrainian Canadian literary process. A significant cultural impact was also made by the Ukrainian intellectual political immigration which found a sanctuary in Canada. During this period an outstanding contribution was made by Illia Kiriak, who in his *Sons of the Soil* eloquently presented for the first time the Ukrainian settlement in Canada with all its social, spiritual, and cultural problems and gave evidence of Ukrainian integration into Canadian society without loss of identity or cultural heritage. The major literary achievements in poetry in this period belong to M. I. Mandryka himself, and are represented by his noteworthy five volumes of poetry published in Canada. Critical commentaries have evaluated the work of our author. Watson Kirkconnell in the *University of Toronto Quarterly* in 1960 wrote: "The death of his wife, Hanna, has unlocked the fountains of inspiration yet again, and the old springs have flowed in fresher, especially in the sections of the book entitled 'Elegies,' 'Happiness,' and 'Beauty,' where recollection of the past sanctify the present"... In this period the author also mentions learned men of letters of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian origin as well as writers-musicologists.

Chapter Four considers the period after the Second World War which saw a strong influx of new intellectual forces into Canada. In his concluding remarks the author stresses the general characteristics of Ukrainian Canadian literature and gives reasons why the history of Ukrainian literature in Canada cannot be written on the basis of chronological changes of literary currents, styles, schools, and abstract searches. This literature began some 75 years ago with folkloristic verses and gradually attained its present development, whose quality can be compared with the literatures of leading civilized nations.

The author is to be commended for his objectivity. He adequately encompasses all materials; little misses his scrutinizing eye or is scantily mentioned. The result is a very fine and judicious selection of material which appears for the first time in English. Several literary excerpts have been translated by the author himself.

The author in his work does not deal with rhetorical questions nor does he advance controversy for its own sake. On the contrary, the work offers a great variety of deep literary and philosophical questions where the author is specific and gives the reader a good taste of the best literary scholarship. His approach in the study is structural, but also includes social and historical factors.

The work is written in a clear style and is supported by adequate questions. In addition, the author has provided a selected bibliography and an index of authors. As a whole, this is a historical monograph and as such can be considered as a most useful contribution to the understanding of Ukrainian literary developments in Canada.

Mandryka's work has been published on the occasion of the Centennial of Canadian Confederation with the help of a grant from the Humanities Council of Canada, using funds provided by the Canada Council and subsidies from the Centennial Commission.

Texas Technological College

W. R. Zick

I WAS AN NKVD AGENT: A Top Soviet Spy Tells His Story. Anatoli Granowsky. The Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1962, pp. 343.

Here is an extraordinary book for anyone seeking the truth about Russian communism and the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet government. Its seen and unseen, ever-present ear and eye is the ever-ready secret police, the real basis of power of this government. Its very name was and is the most hated and despised word in Russian. Hence its official name has had to be changed many times. It began by being known as the CHEKA (the "Extraordinary Commission"), then it became the OGPU. Subsequently it became the NKVD, then the MVD and, finally, the KGB (Committee of State Security). A gigantic machine, a state within a state, with unlimited material resources, this arm of the state has administrated the vast empire of the concentration camps in Siberia and elsewhere.

In the present book (its value has not diminished since its publication in 1962), one of its top agents tells us of his life and his career as a Soviet spy. Bearing a well-known name in Ukraine, the author was born into a fairly well-to-do family with liberal tendencies. His uncle, while on a trip abroad, met Lenin in Zurich, where the author's father joined the party. After the revolution his father's star began to rise rapidly. From head of the Ukrainian State Spirits and Alcohol Section he rose to chief of construction of the giant Berezniakovsky Chemical Manufacturing Combine near Perm. There the family occupied a luxurious house, and sported a 5-room apartment opposite the Kremlin in Moscow; the father was now a bearer of the Lenin Order. The Granowsky family had at its disposal a Ford and a Buick, a motorboat, horses, tennis courts, expensive furniture, exquisite chinaware, silver, linen, paintings, and a retinue consisting of a maid, a cook and a governess. As a member of the Party Central Committee and chief of the Central Section for Construction and Railroads, the author's father was almost at the top of the hierarchical ladder. Vacations were spent in Black Sea and Caucasian summer resorts, where the Granowsky family met the elite of Kremlin power: Kalinin, Voroshilov, Tukhachevsky, and Stalin and his son Vassili.

Understandably, the son of anyone associating with such luminaries belonged to the "golden youth" of the Soviet elite. It was among them that the young Granowsky heard of the orgies of Yagoda, the then head of the NKVD. They lasted for days and were attended by men and women of the elite who gamboled in the nude in Yagoda's private swimming pool.

On November 5, 1937, at four o'clock in the morning the Granowsky family was awakened by a pounding at the door. The NKVD. They arrested the author's father and searched the apartment: the luxurious life of the party dignitary was at an end. The father disappeared without a trace, while mother and the children (two sons) were ostracized. All too soon they began to lead the miserable life of ordinary Soviet citizens. Finally the news came that the older Granowsky had been sentenced to years at hard labor for the "crimes of espionage, sabotage and counterrevolutionary activities..."

Beria had just taken over the NKVD apparatus, and since young Anatoli had met him on a number of occasions, he tried to see the police chief personally. For his pains he was arrested and thrown into the Butirki prison, where he was subjected to electric shock treatment and sundry other tortures until he was finally broken. A petition to Beria was heard: as a former member of the Soviet princelings he was admitted into the NKVD.

The author now describes the curriculum of a Soviet spy and counter-spy training, the methods of provocation and cloak-and-dagger operations. (Understandably, some of these disciplines are also part of standard training in other intelligence services.) One of these methods was instruction in how to use sex for spying purposes; special seminars were held in which spies were taught how to seduce women and how to use them for purposes of Soviet intelligence. What he relates taxes credulity, even in our times.

Anatoli Granowsky pursued his career as a spy in Ukraine, in such cities as Kiev, Lviv and Uzhorod. Here he saw the enormous depravity of the Soviet intelligence system, the full range of its cruelty and its inhumanity. One can say for Granowsky, however, that the "light shineth in the darkness." The human conscience began to revolt. At the first opportunity he escaped to Western Europe, and then came to America.

Although his book was written some years ago, it did not attract significant notice. Apparently, the prevailing atmosphere of *detente* and "coexistence" with the Soviet Union did not encourage the publishers to engage in heavy promotion of the book.

In perusing this book the reviewer could not help recalling the prophetic words of Konstantin Leontiev, the prominent Russian philosopher of the past century who said: "Muscovy-Russia has only one mission in world history, to bring about the incarnation of the Anti-Christ..." A similar prediction was offered by an American author Gordon Lindsay in his *Will the Anti-Christ Come Out of Russia?* (Living Publications, Wannamassa, N.Y., 1966).

The Catholic University of America

ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

THE FALL OF BERLIN. By Marshal Vasil I. Chuikov, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1967, pp. 261.

Marshal Chuikov, who is not to be confused with his World War II superior Zhukov, is the hero of Stalingrad, the author of *The Battle for Stalingrad*, the commander of the 8th Guards Army which was the first to enter Berlin after a long advance from Stalingrad to the German capital, and in the post-war period the Supreme Commander of Soviet Land Forces. Now, in retirement, he has produced his second war memoirs. These memoirs are revealing in many ways. The average American reader will doubtless find them stunning, overwhelming in certain respects, and suffused with heroism, sacrifice and even idealism. The more critical reader, however, will employ his background and knowledge concerning the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to evaluate with all objectivity the motivations of the author, the validity of the book's contents, and its possible effects.

Undeniably, the work is absorbing and provocative in parts. The reviewer completed reading it in two long sittings, and his marked impressions are successive and perhaps rather exclusive. The book begins with a detailed description of Chuikov's advance from Stalingrad to the Dniester River for over a year into 1944. But the author is quick to show one of his chief motivations for writing the work, namely to take a slap at the many war memoirs produced by German generals. As he puts it, "Each of these writers of memoirs, be it von Mannstein, Guderian, Hans Doerr or Tippleskirch, does all he can to show

that the Russians beat the Germans by weight of numbers, not by skill, and that the Russians' victory was achieved at the price of rivers of blood and mountains of smashed and wrecked machines." On the basis of his own experiences, he proposes to demonstrate the contrary. This initial pitch is repeated throughout the book, so much so and in so many different contexts that if one is looking for an objective military history for this period, he will not find it.

The work is studded with innumerable propagandistic interjections, and although the running accounts of battle experiences are fascinating, it becomes quite evident that the author's overall objective is to glorify the Soviet armed forces and to justify the political ends of the totalitarian Soviet state. It is these interjections that deserve the reader's utmost attention for they alone disclose the motivations, the degree of validity in the work's contents, and the intended effects. Concerning the German generals, what the author fails to understand is that their memoirs were not the only source of information regarding Russian military operations and behavior. American archives are filled with reliable and cross-checked intelligence and information provided by scores of defectors, escapees, displaced persons, underground operatives, and non-German military sources. The clean, heroic record manufactured by the author can't meet the test of massive evidence which does show Russian bodies detecting mines, Russian rapes, as in Budapest ranging in ages from 8 to 80, wanton and barbaric destruction, and a pervasive hunger for consumer goods, not to mention military supplies. All this does not detract from the valor and fighting prowess of the Russian and non-Russian Soviet soldier, but it cannot be brushed aside and concealed if a balanced portrayal of what actually transpired is to be given.

Another eye-opening interjection is the marshal's baseless view toward the opening of the second front. He says in part, "The long delay in the opening of the second front caused us, Soviet soldiers, to understand the actions of our Western allies much more correctly than they were represented in the messages full of endless soothing promises which the statesmen of the West fed us. We depended upon ourselves, in the abilities of our own state." Now, the fact is that any invasion by sea requires a long period of planning and build-up to insure its success. Understandably, the marshal could care less about an inordinate loss of allied lives just so long as quick action is taken and pressure on the eastern front is relieved. If what he imputes in this and similar passages were correct, then the invasion should have been into the Balkans, and the soft belly of Europe, which would have altered the course of post-World War II history to the benefit of free peoples and ourselves. As to depending on "the abilities of our own state," if the Russians didn't have the wheels we provided them in an eleven billion dollar gift, the dominion of their state would still be today somewhere about the present Soviet borders.

For a good dose of fatuous propaganda running through the work, just consider some of these examples. "The Polish people, regardless of the traitorous policy of Mikolajczyk's emigre government, stepped up the armed struggle against the Nazi invaders." He then compliments the National Council of Poland, a front "set up by the progressive forces," meaning communist. Apparently, the author overestimates the gullibility of his American reader who very likely is aware of the continued captivity of Poland since the 40's. For a bit of negative propaganda, the marshal recounts how he was briefed about "Bandera's men." When

his 8th Guards Army approached a forest to the west of Korosten, the briefing contained "Don't forget that here" — he warned us, pointing on the map — "in these woods, you may get Bandera's men putting in an appearance." "Understood," I replied. The woods were those in which our troops were to take up their positions" (p. 27). Nothing more is said about Bandera, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, its harrassing of the Russians, and its many remarkable feats. In fact, for the benefit of the unfamiliar reader, a desirable account of who Bandera was is significantly omitted.

The marshal's treatment of history scarcely commends the book to one's serious attention on this score. For instance, we are told that the "Poles, deceived by leaders like Pilsudski, Smigly-Rydz and Sikorski, had been hostile to Soviet Russia — to Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians — since 1917." There is truth in this for some periods; there is also untruth for a very critical period when independent Ukraine struggled for its life against the first wave of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism in 1918-20 and the names of Pilsudski and Petlura were matched. Also, throughout the work one finds an inaccurate but suggestive interchangeability in the use of "Soviet Russia" and "the Soviet Union." Moreover, the author shamelessly holds that "the capital of the Third Reich" is "the source of almost all the wars in Europe for many and many a year." He fails to point out the many more wars ignited by St. Petersburg and Moscow, including the two world wars in this century.

It is regrettable that this otherwise interesting work is so badly marred by fiction and propaganda. The parts on military flexibility, the general's criticisms against the rigid strategy and tactics of his superiors, anecdotes on individual battles in Poland and Germany, the tactics of street fighting in Berlin, and the suicidal resistance of SS troops make for productive understanding of the war as it was fought. But when the author departs from the military into the political, he stands naively nude. Being an indoctrinated general, he even indulges in a bit of philosophy that is remarkable for its superficiality and empirical barrenness. For example, in contrasting the Soviet and Nazi armies, he asks "Where does the difference lie? In the social difference between our armies. One is fighting for the interests of its people, the other — for the interests of a small handful of capitalists and imperialists" (p. 202).

Only in the later section of the book does one come across the term "Patriotic War," in the sense of fighting for "Russia" *per se* and not communism. This use is minimal in comparison with "the Soviet state," "Soviet patriotism" and the like. Nowhere, of course, is the basic totalitarianism and imperio-colonialism of Moscow alluded to. The proper and forced conception is largely a Soviet state with peacefully coexisting peoples, and in numerous places Ukrainians, Byelorussians and others are mentioned. Also, little credit is given to Moscow's Western allies for winning the war. On the contrary, the oft-repeated plotting between Nazi functionaries and Western leaders to stop the Russian menace suggests that the major brunt and glory were borne by the Russians in defeating the Nazi monster.

The importance of the book, therefore, is to be found not so much in its military disclosures but rather in the frequent interjections of accepted Red political doctrine, propaganda notes, and slated interpretations of cultural and non-military developments. Its intended effects with regard to the unwary American reader are several. One is to become sufficiently impressed by the prowess of the Soviet armies, though this is tempered by the marshal's several

pleas for peace and his basic hatred of war. Two, we are also to be impressed by the power of the Soviet state which resides behind this military prowess. And lastly, the German interpretations of the last world war are to be summarily discounted.

What all this obviously adds up to is the exploitation of one's rich military experiences for the purpose of furthering the psycho-political objectives of Moscow at this time. The author lends himself well to this. From our viewpoint, the question is how many will be taken in by this and how many not? It is part of the Cold War game to capitalize on short memories or no memory at all. The Russians are expert at this.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

RUSSIAN PEASANTS AND SOVIET POWER. A Study of Collectivization.

By M. Lewin. Translated by Irene Nove with the assistance of John Biggart. With a preface by Professor Alec Nove. London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1968, pp. 539.

This careful volume giving both history and analysis of the collectivization of agriculture during the years 1928-29 is by no means easy reading. This will be especially true for all those people who do not differentiate between the peoples inhabiting the Russian Empire (now the Soviet Union), grouping them under the term "Russians" as if the Soviet Union consisted of only one national entity. This also seems true of the author. Although he worked for a time "in the *kolkhozy*, iron-ore mines and metallurgic plants in the Urals and served in the Soviet army," he makes very few allusions to Ukraine or the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and disregards any of the features of Ukrainian life of the earlier periods, even of the civil war.

His work deals primarily with conditions in the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR): he is extremely familiar with all of the conditions of the old Russian village on the Great Russian terrain. Yet outside of a few passing references to Ukraine, he has confined his remarks to the legal, political and economic aspects of Great Russia. He does not find it necessary — or perhaps possible — to discuss how extensively in the early twenties the Ukrainian Soviet Republic modified legally or practically the decrees passed in Moscow for the administration of the RSFSR. It is undeniable that on many subjects the changes voted in Moscow were put into practice in the other republics without any formal measures taken by the rubber stamp, Moscow-appointed members of the other regimes. So, for instance, there is no mention of any of the movements, cultural or political, that swept over Ukraine before collectivization and no mention of men like Skrypyuk, an old Bolshevik, but a Ukrainian in his deepest sympathies.

The book is essentially a careful study of the disputes of Stalin with the Left and Right Deviationists, Trotsky and Bukharin and their followers over the relative advantages of slow and rapid industrialization, the perpetual revolution and the revolution in one country. These lasted from the introduction of the New Economic Policy before the death of Lenin to the exile of Trotsky and the later formal and final defeat of Bukharin and his party, when Stalin felt himself free to select elements from both groups and use his new-found freedom for speedy collectivization and the crushing of the peasantry. The

book stresses the fact that Stalin had an enormous talent, almost a genius, for scheming and maneuvering but that he was a crude thinker and an inept expounder of Leninism, Marxism or any other philosophy. He was interested solely in his personal power and control.

The author emphasizes these points again and again as he shows how the attempts to stratify the peasants continually broke down in the face of the conflicting characteristics of the peasants, even the poorest, who desired equalization but who at the same time were envious of the *Kulaks* and desirous of becoming members of that group. This was especially marked of the *serednyaks*, the thrifty middle class, who, as the political need of the moment called for, could be separated from the kulaks or lumped with them. He shows that the problem of controlling these aspects of the peasant psychology grew constantly more difficult. The securing of funds from them for industrialization, whether by the use of the "scissors" or through attempts at partnership broke down by 1928, at a time when Stalin began to feel free to chart his own course. Yet the author refers only to the first stages of the attack on the peasants and the campaign for collectivization; he does not mention its result in Stalin's hands: the artificial famine in Ukraine and its frightful toll of human life.

For the reader who is interested in the internal struggle of the Russian Soviet Communist Party, the volume should be of the greatest interest. It is carefully compiled and documented and should receive — with these reservations on its applicability to the other republics — the attention it deserves.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

THE TALE OF THE UNEXTINGUISHED MOON AND OTHER STORIES. By Boris Pilnyak. Translated by Beatrice Scott. Introduction by Robert Payne, New York, Washington Square Press, 1967, pp. xviii + 266.

KIRA GEORGIEVNA. By Victor Nekrasov. Translated by Walter N. Vickery, New York, Pantheon Books, 1962, pp. 183.

The manuscripts of these books were composed almost forty years apart, and the world which they represent had changed much in the meantime. However, they have one thing in common. Pilnyak represents the literature as it was in the twenties before the rise of that ideological pattern of socialist realism which for more than twenty years under Stalin tried its best to formalize thinking and to treat literature and the creative arts as governed by abstract standards. The story of Nekrasov shows what emerged once that Procrustean bed was removed.

At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution or, better, the collapse of the Romanov dynasty — an unprecedented sweeping-away of a regime which had already been devitalized — the literature which arose assumed extraordinary variations. Some writers argued for a literature written in a new language. Others viewed the effects upon peasants and country and sought a revival of old traditional Russian life as distinguished from the Romanov turn to the West after Peter I. Others laid all the stress upon the new urban proletariat and the influence of Marxism in its Russian form.

Pilnyak tended to belong to the interested stream in the country, and he sees the old nobility and their nobles' nests as vanishing with no clear form

arising after them but merely one of peasants striving as best they can to preserve some of the few advantages of the past. He gives us a dying and weak culture in the throes of vanishing, and he does so brilliantly. At times, as in the title story, he savagely condemns the growing sternness of Stalin in his picture, which recalls the death of the Soviet commander Frunze. It is small wonder that he was punished as late as 1938. The last story, *The Birth of a Man*, from 1933, was written at the very outset of the period of socialist realism at a time when Pilnyak was trying to adjust his mind to the new and coming order.

Nekrasov shows the results. The acute period of prison camps for most enemies of the people is allegedly over. Those who have been released can find nothing familiar in the world to which they return. Those who escaped the camps cannot be proud of their escape and are themselves in an empty world without self-respect; their lot is even more painful than that of the first group, whose lives have been broken and who try in vain to pick up the fragments and piece them together, for there can be no reconstruction of a dead past.

The sensitive reader can thus form his own understanding of the significance of the iron hand of Stalin, the man of steel, on the rebuilding of the Russian prison of nations where silence was taken as the purr of satisfaction, as in the time of Nicholas I with Pushkin. We know what that period did to Shevchenko in the forties and the fifties of the past century; these two books reflect a similar period in the twentieth, with all its portents for the future as shown by the latest trials of literary men.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

COMMUNISM AND THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL QUESTION. By Paul Shoup. Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1968, pp. 308.

This book is a careful and well documented volume on the relations of Communism to the Yugoslav national question. As such it must be judged successful, but that does not mean it is either clear or easily intelligible. The lack of clarity stems from at least two causes: the innovations which have been made again and again by Tito himself in his reactions against the dictates of Stalin and the superficially changing views of the Soviet leaders after Stalin — Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Kosygin — but also because of the vague and ill-defined and perhaps ill-definable extent of the national question. This was originally a poetic dream of a possible union of all Southern Slavs in the minds of certain Yugoslav writers which was able to win a superficial support as practical men tried to put that dream into words. Their task was far more difficult than that of the Ukrainian *Rada* in its attempts to weld Eastern and Western Ukraine.

All the dividing lines of Europe have always run across Yugoslavia, and the people in each sector have interpreted that dream in their own way. Serbia, which had won its fight for freedom from the Turks, saw the situation differently from Croatia, which had been connected with Hungary, and from Slovenia, which had German-Austrian domination. So did Montenegro, which had maintained a shadowy independence since before the coming of the Turks, and Macedonia, which had been claimed in large part by Bulgaria. We do not include the Banat, Bosnia and Herzegovina which had passed under Austria-Hungary, etc.

All were dissatisfied under the first Constitution for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the application of the parliamentary rule under that Constitution. Then King Alexander abolished that and substituted a unified state. Wiser statesmen recognized that the country could not be separated into states nor could it be unified. Alexander's murder led to a period of general dissatisfaction again with all sections opposing the Germans, some also the Italians, and all one another. This paved the way for Tito and the Communists who found and forged minority control everywhere. He tried to solve the problem by a series of Soviet Republics but he had neither the force nor the power and resources to follow Stalin's methods. As a result, he was faced with demands from the richer and the poorer sections for money, and the policy of the Communism regime had to zigzag continually. The volume really ends with the removal from power of a Serb Communist, Alexander Rankovich, though a few additional pages allude to some of the later happenings. The author's efforts to confine the book to its limited subject leads him to avoid the necessary explanations which would have made the book clear.

He has attempted to define specifically Titoism as a variant of Stalinism and Sovietism and the changes in financial policy made necessary by the actual conditions. He has treated carefully the question of a Macedonian language versus Macedono-Bulgarian, although that aspect is now assuming increased importance and providing increased complications, as the European turmoil increases with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yet in the final analysis he has shown that the Yugoslav national question has not been solved by the application of Marxist-Leninist principles and philosophy, though it is perhaps a step nearer taking a definite shape which will mark progress in the cementing of minor differences, which can be too galling to allow peace but not dangerous enough to risk disintegration and civil war, the choice of this and all previous governments since 1918.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

THE VIEW FROM LENIN HILLS. By William Taubman. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967. Pp. 249. \$5.50.

This discursive and rather diffuse volume by an instructor in Political Science (at Amherst College) is quite an interesting contribution to the growing literature on "what goes on" among Soviet youth today. In this respect, the subtitle, "An American Student's Report on Soviet Youth in Ferment" is a better clue to the book's contents than its title.

Taubman recently spent a year living among the students at Moscow University, situated on Lenin Hills. He tells us how he went to their parties, ate with them, attended their seminars and political meetings, and sampled their version of that universal collegiate convention, the "non-stop bull session." He was trailed by the secret police and denied access to certain essential research facilities; and he hints that even Soviet "Mata Haris" tried to use their sex appeal on him.

The evocative picture that emerges of life at Moscow University is a readable study in cultural, social and educational contacts. Taubman is especially good when he shows us how the young Soviet citizens circumvent the rules they disapprove of, push the officials to the limit, and stage minor coups

that deliberately satirize Communist cant and procedures.

For the academically minded reader, the best part of the book is the concluding chapter (20, "Tell It Like It Is," pp. 238-249) which, in general, substantiates the current trends characterizing the growing abyss between the communist apparatus and the youth.

There is a chapter on "In East Europe" (Chapter 19, pp. pp. 226-237). The author describes therein his visit to Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Budapest, and Prague — all in one chapter. Too bad that it is so short and cursory, to the point of being hardly of any value. And "nowhere in East Europe was I aware of police surveillance" (p. 230). In this respect, Taubman's experience must have been unique.

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

GORKY AND V. I. LENIN: The Bridge and the Abyss, The Troubled Friendship of Maxim. By Bertram D. Wolfe, New York: F. A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. x, 180. \$5.95.

"For reasons having nothing to do with literature," claims Wolfe, "in the years of his decline Maxim Gorky was overpraised, his spirit misrepresented, and the worst of his works exalted as models for other writers and literary masterpieces." As a writer he was neither the "genius of proletarian literature" that Stalin's propaganda apparatus acclaimed him to be, nor the fabricator of the straitjacket called "socialist realism," nor "the mere minstrel of the forced labor construction camps of Belomor that some critics in exile have tended to reduce him to."

But Wolfe promises to tell us this pathetic story of Gorky's decline and his attempt to adapt himself to and secretly to moderate Stalin's brutal rule in another study. Here he limits himself to the years of Gorky's most creative period, appraises his stature as a writer by selecting that part of his work which stands up as literature, and throws some fresh light on his character in the years of his freedom by examining the peculiar ambivalence of his troubled and frequently stormy friendship with Lenin, that would find Lenin calling Gorky "the greatest proletarian writer" and denouncing him as "quite characterless in politics," and Gorky terming himself "a very dubious Marxist" and berating Lenin for his "cruel experiment on the Russian people." Yet, from their first meeting in 1907, and despite almost completely differing outlooks, the two men — one with a concept of world revolution that found man a mere object, the other with a concept of man that almost deified him — remained friends.

That stormy friendship and its results constitute one of the most intriguing chapters in modern political and literary history. What emerges from Wolfe's masterly handling of his subject is a better understanding of the true character of Maxim Gorky as man and artist than hagiographers or denigrators have given us; and since Gorky was the only artist and non-politician with whom Lenin preserved a life-long friendship, the story throws a fresh light on Lenin as well.

*Queensborough Community College of the
City University of New York*

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"THE CHORNOVIL PAPERS, A POSTSCRIPT," a review by Peter Worthington. *The Telegram*, Toronto, Canada, June 29, 1968.

This extensive and lucidly written review deals with a chapter that was smuggled through too late for inclusion in the recently published *The Chornovil Papers — The Misfortune of Intellect*. The young author, Vyacheslav Chornovil, is now in a Soviet prison in Ukraine for his heroic stand. In this postscript the case of Mikhail Horyn and his transfer to the notorious Vladimir Prison, 100 miles north of Moscow, are elaborated on in sordid detail. Vladimir is a KGB "Isolator prison" where prisoners serve their life sentences in solitary confinement.

The reviewer mentions Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski's comment on the papers, saying "that the 'nationality problem' could become more politically important in the Soviet Union than the racial issue has become in the United States." The comparison is ill-defined, and what the so-called Sovietologist has really just begun to recognize has for decades been the most vexing problem in the USSR. Let's hope he progresses further.

"UNITY IN VARIETY IS THE OBJECT," an article by Edward Bagromov. *The Times*, London, England, November 6, 1967.

Dr. Bagromov is a member of the Institute of Philosophy at the USSR Academy of Sciences and presents here another one of those supposedly calm, academic discourses on the multinational state of the USSR. In fact, it is another skillful propaganda piece with half-truths and baseless interpretations. The right to secede is brought up, the independence of non-Russian republics like Ukraine, Byelorussia, etc. is admitted for the 1918-20 period, but then a leap is taken into 1922-23 with the "voluntary" federation of these republics into the USSR. The international wars between Russia and these republics were non-existent!

"UKRAINIAN FREEDOM: A LOST CAUSE?," an editorial. *The Pittsburgh Press*, Pittsburgh, Pa., April 24, 1968.

On the occasion of the Freedom Manifestation Rallies sponsored by UCCA, this editorial raised the rhetorical point of Ukrainian freedom as a lost cause. Like Stalin, it holds that "it's quite unlikely that Stalin's successors would consider — even for a moment — any proposal to free the Ukrainian people." Ap-

propriately, it quotes Aney Nykonchuk, president of the Pittsburgh branch of the UCCA, "The spirit of nationalism in these people has overcome the Communist teachings." Its conclusion is self-explanatory: "But as long as free peoples of the world do not lose heart, as long as they continue to resist Communist expansion, there will always be hope that some day Ukrainians once again will stand as free men rather than Soviet subjects. Their cause is not yet lost."

"RUSSIA," a letter to the editor by J.M. Fizer, et al. *The New York Times*, New York, November 26, 1967.

Several signers of this letter take Harrison Salisbury to task for his somewhat absurd notion of "A Portrait of All the Russias." They rightly point out that Russia is not synonymous with the USSR. This inexcusable misidentity naturally blurs and obfuscates the whole vital issue of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR.

The terminological blinders of our Salisburys, Kennans and the like can be psychologically explained on the basis of their conditioning preconceptions of earlier years. And in most cases it is difficult, if not impossible, for our Russian expert antiquarians to shed these entrenched preconceptions. An understanding of this fact goes a long way in discounting many of their sand-filled interpretations. For the younger generations this point carries much weight and should be repeatedly stressed.

"EN GLEMT NATIONS," an article by L. B. Fabricius. *Frisproy*, Oslo, Norway, May 18, 1968.

In this Norwegian organ, which literally means speaking up, an unusually documented article is devoted to the forgotten nation, Ukraine itself. The author meticulously footnotes his points, so that eighteen footnotes of sources are found at the end of this newspaper article. Quoted several times is this journal.

The writer realizes his aim quite well. What for his readers had been forgotten, or perhaps never really known, is now recalled or known at first hand. Methodically, he covers all the essential data on Ukraine, its historical, political, and economic highlights. The Ukrainian Catholic Church receives major treatment as the author describes the work of Archbishop Sheptytsky and the experiences of Archbishop Slipy. In literature and in their heroism, Taras Shevchenko and Vasyl Symonenko are particularly highlighted. Indeed, with so much written about Ukraine in the past year, the nation is hardly forgotten. What is forgotten now and then, and quite conveniently at times is its rights, aspirations, and goals.

"MR. FLOOD — THE PIED PIPER," a commentary. *Literaturna Ukraina*, Kiev, Ukraine, February 20, 1968.

For over a decade now the U.S. Congress has regularly observed the commemoration of Ukraine's Independence in 1918. The record is an impressive one, so much so that both Moscow and Kiev are irritated by its growing signifi-

cance. This commentary is just another one in a long line of vituperative, sarcastic denunciations of the notable annual event.

Congressman Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania is the chief target now, though Minority Leader Gerald Ford, Congresswoman Edna Kelly and Congressman Michael Feighan come in for a verbal drubbing, too. Flood is depicted as a self-appointed "guardian of the Ukrainian people." Waxing melodramatic, the commentator races on, "The campaign was on. On January 23rd of this year, Mr. Flood delivered to the House of Representatives an address so hostile to the Ukrainian nation that it surpassed many, many of those which our enemies have given. We have in mind the 'traditional'... outcries in the American Congress." The lengthy commentary then strikes at the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, "a bibliography of literature of the bourgeois nationalist breed in the *Congressional Record*," and "deeds of the criminals."

Its ending sounds like sour grapes. "There is joy in the camps of these nationalist mercenaries: Mr. Flood himself is with them, congressmen support them. They shall continue to propagate the government policy of 'liberation.' What touching unity exists between the nationalists and American congressmen!"

END PAPERS — THE UKRAINIAN-RITE CATHOLIC CHURCH AT THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, 1962-65." Books of the Times, *The New York Times*, August 21, 1968.

This review of an important book unequivocally states, "The material is an invaluable source book for future historians, but right now it is an imposing news report, detailing the sufferings of six million in the Ukrainian-rite Catholic Church, the largest in numbers of the Eastern churches." And, indeed, it is.

Compiled by Dr. Walter Dushnyck, the editor of this journal, the book contains all available material dealing with the participation of the Ukrainian Catholic Bishops in the Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965. As such it is a veritable contribution to source work in scholarship that in time will evaluate this historic event.

"UKRAINIAN YOUTH DEMONSTRATE AGAINST RUSSIAN BARBARISM," a report. *Freedom Center News*, Seoul, Korea, October 4, 1968.

The Freedom Academy in Seoul, Korea, issues this news report weekly. It covers significant events throughout the world, dealing with communism and anti-communism. In this issue a concise report is presented on a protest demonstration by 300 Ukrainian students in front of the Russian Embassy in London.

As the report states, "They were protesting against the Russian crimes in Ukraine, in particular against the arrests of Ukrainian writers and young people, which have recently been intensified." The Czecho-Slovak crisis has shown the anxiety of Moscow over a possible spill-over of liberal and patriotic tendencies into neighboring Ukraine. An eventuality of that sort would create havoc for the Moscow imperio-colonialists.

"SOVIET FEAR IN UKRAINE," an article by Gordon-Brook-Shepherd. *Sunday Telegraph*, London, England, August 25, 1968.

In this organ and numerous others it is pointed out that one of the chief reasons for Moscow's rape of Czecho-Slovakia was the spill-over threat into Ukraine. The author begins, "Fear of a spreading disaffection inside the Soviet Union itself — above all of separatist agitation in Ukraine, which actually borders on Czechoslovakia — is thought in the West to have been the final spur which pushed the Soviet leaders over the brink."

The article cites the warnings uttered by Mr. Peter Shelest, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In effect, he warned "Stop Dubcek or I cannot guarantee the outcome at home." For the past three years there have been ever increasing rumblings of protest and criticism in Ukraine with regard to Moscow's Russification program and illegal methods of suppression. The mass arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals and writers well attest to this. The environment there has been ripe for an explosion.

"ARE WE FINANCING OUR OWN DESTRUCTION?," an appeal. *Young Americans For Freedom*, Washington, D. C., 1968.

This appeal to the American conscience has been rehearsed in the form of a six-page newspaper highlighting some of the most critical soft spots in our attitude and action toward the communists. Sponsored by an organization of young Americans, it contains most telling data, ranging from trade with the Red empire to a list of subversive organizations in the United States.

One whole page is devoted to the U.S.-USSR Consular Convention. The treaty fails to make semantic sense, but the Senate, under Administration pressure, nevertheless passed and ratified it uncritically. In a list of broken agreements by Moscow, the 1917 recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by Soviet Russia is noted, as well as its arbitrary repudiation by Moscow in 1918. The facts are presented in a most striking and telling manner. The study should enjoy a wide, national distribution.

"WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRAINIANS," a report by Richard Cotten. *Conservative Viewpoint*, Bakersfield, California, December 12-13, 1967.

Although the World Congress of Free Ukrainians was held in New York City a year ago and although this report was first published last December, copies are still in demand and circulation persists. The report is highly informative, with a front page photo of Ukrainians genocided by the Russians and the entire text of *The New York Times* advertisement on "Ukrainian National Revolution vs. Russian Bolshevik Revolution" reproduced.

"FIRE OVER THE UKRAINE," an article by Harry E. Dembkowski. *Polish American*, Chicago, Illinois, April 13, 1968.

As in so many other publications, this newspaper features the intellectual revolt in Ukraine. Using the 50th anniversaries as his context, the writer points

out, "Poland declared its independence in November of that year (1918), but this was preceded by many other similar declarations: by the Czechs, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Belo-Russians, Armenians, Georgians, Ukrainians — and a number of others."

With an elaboration of this background, the writer quickly plunges into Karavansky's petition to the President of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, dealing with the Russification of Ukrainian institutions, nationality discrimination and other relevant subjects. The piece is well written and also highly critical of *The Washington Post* for its ignorance of Ukraine and its independence in 1918.

"UKRAINIANS CALL DEFENSE LAWYERS 'MOST COMIC FIGURES IN OUR COURTS,'" a series of articles by Sid Goldberg. *The Pittsburgh Press*, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, May 3, 1968.

From April into May, a series on the Chornovil papers and the kangaroo trials in the USSR appeared in this newspaper. Each part went into considerable detail with regard to the operations of the KGB in Ukraine, the various cases treated, and the mass arrests that were staged.

The writer unquestionably sank his teeth into this vital subject and performed an undoubted public service in his area. There cannot be enough of such articles to inform Americans as to what has been transpiring in the Soviet Union, while many here have been nurturing illusions about "mellowing Russian communists."

"THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS," a review by Mark A. Coyle and Royal M. Wharton. *The New Guard*, Washington, D. C., June 1968.

An additional review of Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky's current work, *The Vulnerable Russians*, appears in this journal. The reviewers state at the outset that "the book fills a gap found all too often in one's approach to the Soviet Union." They then proceed to highlight the main tenets of the work, covering population, non-Russian resources in the Soviet Union, its various nations, and imperial character.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK — 1968," addresses led by Mr. Flood et al. *The Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., July 17, 1968.

The Tenth Observance of Captive Nations Week was held in July of this year. This series of addresses in the U.S. Congress was the kick-off in the U.S. observance. Congressman Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania set the pace when he declared, "We in Congress join with millions of our fellow Americans in expressing to the world our firm determination never to forget the freedom aspirations of all the captive nations and to work in every possible manner for the achievement of their eventual liberation from the bondage of Red totalitarianism and Sino-Soviet Russian colonialism."

Although the White House took another step to play down the Week, the *Record* shows right into September the results of the observance not only in the United States but in foreign lands as well. In the wake of Moscow's invasion of Czecho-Slovakia, the theses of the Week on Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism ring now with resounding truth. No better basis can be found for the Tenth Anniversary of the Week in July, 1969.

"KREMLIN'S BRAND OF 'ORDER' CHILLING," an article by Charles Bartlett.
The Evening Star, Washington, D. C., October 1, 1968.

Seizing upon the petition of Valentyn Moroz to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the writer depicts the increasingly tyrannical aspects of "Soviet justice" and Moscow's brand of 'order.' He stresses, "Stalinist memories are green also in Ukraine, which appears to have recently endured its most severe wave of purges since the 1930's."

The link-up between the Russian invasion of Czecho-Slovakia and the prevention of a blow-up in Ukraine is underscored here, too. Quoting Moroz, who now resides in a Russian prison camp, the writer points out "There is also order in the calm of a cemetery obtained at the expense of the death of everything that was alive."

L.E.D.

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(Concluded from Page 196)

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YURYI SHUKHEVYCH-BEREZYNSKY, son of General Roman Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka), commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; in 1948 Yuriy was arrested at the age of 15, and sentenced to 10 years at hard labor; released in 1958, he was rearrested and sentenced at first to 2 years at hard labor, and later to 10 years at hard labor for "anti-Soviet activities"; his plight in Soviet labor camps is described in his letter to the communist authorities in Kiev; unconfirmed reports are that he was released recently.

ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI, Ph.D. (University of Munich); former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Ukraine; former professor at the Universities of Warsaw, the Ukrainian Free University in Prague and Marquette University in Milwaukee; at present Visiting Professor at Catholic University of America and Director of the Ukrainian Studies Center at the Ukrainian Catholic Seminary in Washington, D.C.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968!

UKRAINE IN 1918-1920!

Fifty years have not changed the aggressive character of Russia. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is an exact replica of the Soviet Russian invasion of Ukraine in 1917-1918. Then and now Soviet Russian totalitarians brought "freedom" and "liberation" to the peoples of these countries, on the blades of their bayonets! To understand the essence of Russian imperialism and colonialism, and to comprehend the tragic events happening in Czechoslovakia,

r e a d

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

**AN OUTLINE OF HISTORY OF POLITICAL
AND MILITARY RELATIONS
(December 1917 — April 1918)**

By

MATTHEW STACHIW, L. L. D.

TRANSLATED FROM UKRAINIAN AND EDITED

By

WALTER DUSHNYCK

Preface by

PROF. CLARENCE A. MANNING

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