Ukraine Lives!



In commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of Ukraine's independence

The Ukrainian Weekly, Parsippany, NJ

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The Ukrainian Weekly
Parsippany, N.J.

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Ukraine lives!

August 19, 2001 (Editorial)

Ten years ago we witnessed an event that many of us had dreamed about for decades: the rebirth of an independent Ukrainian state. When we think back to August 24, 1991, and the period immediately after this historic day, we recall the great joy within our community in this country and throughout the entire Ukrainian diaspora. The seemingly impossible had come to pass. Ukraine was free! And, caught up in the emotion of the moment, many naively thought it would all be smooth sailing ahead.

Our spirits were lifted even higher after we heard the incredible news about the nationwide referendum of December 1, 1991, in which an overwhelming 90 percent plus of the people of Ukraine voted to approve the Parliament's historic August declaration. But most of us understood that, once the euphoria was over, there would be a long and difficult process before true independence was achieved and before the vestiges of the Soviet system would be gone.

Now it is 10 years later – a decade has passed in a flash. During that time Ukraine has made great strides in nation- and state-building. We need only recall several free elections, the peaceful transfer of power from independent Ukraine's first president to its second, the adoption of a new Constitution of Ukraine, Ukraine's peaceful and good relations with all its neighbors, its growing presence in the international community of nations, Team Ukraine's participation in the Olympic Games and, of course, Pope John Paul II's momentous visit to Ukraine. There is no longer any doubt, as there was at several points during the fledgling state's first few years, that Ukraine will retain its independence.

But there are problem areas: corruption, abuse of power, a cynical and apathetic public that doesn't realize the power it wields, economic reform that hasn't progressed as quickly as had been hoped, and the replacement of Ukraine's once thoroughly pro-Western stance with a so-called multi-vectored foreign policy. Are these the growing pains of a young state, or something more deleterious and sinister? Time will tell, but so will the actions of both the leaders and the people of Ukraine. It is our fervent hope that these problems will be overcome – not simply overlooked – for that will guarantee Ukraine's further development as a democratic state.

Ten years is a short time for any new country to solve all its problems and to deal with all the issues it faces. It is also a milestone that should be marked, regardless of any shortcomings. As noted by Ukraine's ambassador to the United States, Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, this year's 10th anniversary of Ukraine's independence is the country's first true jubilee. It is a time for all of us together – the people of Ukraine and Ukrainians in the diaspora – to celebrate. In celebrating today we should look ahead to a better tomorrow and on to the next jubilee. We should neither become disillusioned nor lose sight of our goals; we should refocus on the cru-

cial tasks ahead in order to meet all challenges head on.

We should celebrate on this August 24 because we have been blessed with the chance to witness the proclamation and development of Ukraine's independence. We should celebrate Ukraine's independence because, though it seemed to happen overnight, this independence was the fruit of decades of dreams and work – in countless cases, of extreme sacrifice. As well, we should celebrate the fact that many of us, like our forebears, have been able to contribute to Ukraine's rebirth, albeit in different ways.

Thus, as we mark the 10th anniversary of Ukraine's Independence Day, we should recall the decades of hope and struggle from which it was born. And we should ponder how fortunate we are to be able to declare two very simple, yet eloquent, words: Ukraine lives!

EDITOR'S NOTE: The historic news stories and features in this volume are reproduced as they were originally published, save for some minor corrections made for clarity and/or consistency. However, we have left intact all spellings and transliterations as they appeared at the time because they, too, form part of the historical record of this period of transformations.

Thus, for example, the name of Ukraine's capital city appears as Kiev, Kyyiv and, ultimately, Kyiv. Whereas in the first selections in this volume it appears as Kiev, the generally accepted spelling at the time, beginning in 1993 it appears as Kyyiv, as adopted by the Ukrainian Mapping Agency, Ukraine's cartographic service, and subsequently by such entities as the U.S. Board for Geographic Names and the National Geographic Society. Ultimately, in October 1995 Ukraine's official Committee on Legal Terminology determined that the spelling would be Kyiv.

Readers will also note other changes in spellings as The Weekly adopted the transliteration system approved by Ukraine's officials. Thus, Odessa became Odesa, Ivano-Frankivske became Ivano-Frankivsk and Mykolayiv became Mykolaiv, Pliushch became Pliusch, and Serhiy became Serhii. There are exceptions of course, as in the case of persons who became known beyond Ukraine under a certain spelling, (e.g., Vyacheslav Chornovil), or in the case of personal preference. There are changes in terminology as well during the years of perebudova and independence. To wit, Ukraine's Parliament is referred to first as the Supreme Soviet, then the Supreme Council and, finally, the Verkhovna Rada.

Lest our readers think that such spelling changes affected only Ukraine, there are such examples as Kazakhstan, which became Kazakstan, Azerbaidzhan-Azerbaijan and Byelorussia-Belarus, plus the latter's capital city, Minsk-Miensk.

Finally, we should note that the vast majority of the articles in this volume are published in full. Some, however, have been abridged in order to allow a broader selection of articles or to focus on their most significant sections.

– Editor-in-Chief Roma Hadzewycz

Timeline

In the wake of the policies of glasnost, perestroika and demokratizatsia announced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, there was ferment throughout the USSR. Below is a timeline of key events leading up to the proclamation of Ukraine's independence on August 24, 1991, and its affirmation by a nationwide referendum on December 1, 1991.

December 30, 1987	The Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG) is reactivated.
April 26, 1988	Some 500 people participate in a march organized by the Ukrainian Culturological Club on Kyiv's Khreschatyk to mark the second anniversary of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster, carrying placards with slogans such as "Openness and Democracy to the End."
May-June 1988	Ukrainian Catholics in western Ukraine celebrate the Millennium of Christianity in Kyivan Rus' in secret by holding services in the forests of Buniv, Kalush, Hoshiv, Zarvanytsia and other sites.
June 5, 1988	As the official celebrations of the Millennium are held in Moscow, the Ukrainian Culturological Club hosts its own observances in Kyiv at the monument to St. Volodymyr the Great, the grand prince of Kyivan Rus'.
June 16, 1988	Between 6,000 and 8,000 people gather in Lviv to hear speakers declare no confidence in the local list of delegates to the 19th Communist Party conference to begin on June 29.
June 21, 1988	A rally in Lviv attracts 50,000 people who hear discussion of a revised list of delegates to the party conference. Authorities attempt to disperse the rally, which was held in front of the Druzhba Stadium.
July 7, 1988	A crowd of 10,000 to 20,000 witnesses the launching in Lviv of the Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika.
July 7, 1988	The Ukrainian Helsinki Group is transformed into the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which declares its formation on

	the basis of the founding principles announced on November 9, 1976, of the original UHG, whose complete name was Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords.
July 17, 1988	A group of 10,000 faithful gather in Zarvanytsia for Millennium services celebrated by Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk. Militia try to disperse the people – the largest gathering of Ukrainian Catholics in the USSR since the Stalin regime outlawed the Church in 1946.
August 4, 1988	On what came to be known as "Bloody Thursday," local authorities in Lviv use violent methods to disband a gathering of tens of thousands organized by the Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika. Forty-one people are detained and fined or sentenced to 15 days of administrative arrest.
September 1, 1988	Local authorities once again use force against 5,000 participants gathered silently in front of Ivan Franko State University in Lviv for a public meeting held without official permission.
November 13, 1988	Approximately 10,000 people attend an officially sanctioned meeting, organized by the cultural heritage organization Spadschyna, the Kyiv University student club Hromada, and the environmental groups Zelenyi Svit (Green World) and Noosfera, to focus on ecological issues.
November 14-18, 1988	Fifteen Ukrainian rights activists are among the 100 human, national and religious rights advocates invited to participate in talks on human rights issues with Soviet officials and a visiting delegation of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission).
December 10, 1988	Hundreds gather in Kyiv to observe International Human Rights Day at a rally organized by the Democratic Union. The unauthorized gathering results in the detention of local activists.
January 22, 1989	Lviv and Kyiv both mark Ukrainian Independence Day for the first time in decades. In Lviv, thousands gather for an unauthorized moleben in front of St. George Cathedral; in Kyiv, 60 activists meet in a Kyiv apartment to commemo-

rate the historic event of 1918 when the independent Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed.

February 11-12, 1989 — The Ukrainian Language Society holds its founding congress.

February 15, 1989 — The formation of the Initiative Committee for the Renewal of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is announced.

February 16, 1989 — Rukh publishes its draft program in Literaturna Ukraina.

February 19-21, 1989 — Large public rallies take place in Kyiv to protest the election laws on the eve of the March 26 elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and to call for the resignation of the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Volodymyr Scherbytsky, often referred to as "the mastodon of stagnation." The demonstrations coincide with a visit to Ukraine by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

February 26, 1989 — Between 20,000 and 30,000 people participate in an unsanctioned ecumenical memorial service in Lviv marking the 128th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's death.

March 4, 1989 — The Memorial Society, committed to honoring the victims of Stalinism and cleansing society of its Soviet vestiges, is founded in Kyiv. A public rally is held the next day.

March 12, 1989 — A pre-elections meeting organized in Lviv by the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Marian Society Myloserdia (Compassion) is violently dispersed, and nearly 300 people are detained.

March 26, 1989 — Elections to the 2,250-member USSR Congress of People's Deputies take place. Bye-elections are held on April 9, May 14 and May 21. Out of the total of 225 deputies representing Ukraine, 175 are elected in the four rounds of elections. Most are conservatives, though a handful of progressives do make the cut.

April 20-23, 1989 — Pre-elections meetings are held in Lviv for four consecutive days, drawing crowds of up to 25,000. The action also includes an hourlong warning strike at eight local factories and institutions. It is the first labor strike in Lviv since 1944.

May 3, 1989	A pre-elections rally attracts 30,000 in Lviv.
May 7, 1989	The Memorial Society organizes a mass meeting at Bykivnia, site of a mass grave of Stalin's victims. After a march from Kyiv to the site, a memorial service is offered.
mid-May through mid-September 1989	Ukrainian Greek-Catholic hunger strikers stage protests on Moscow's Arbat to call attention to the plight of their Church. They are especially active during the July session of the World Council of Churches held in Moscow. The protest is ended with the arrests of the group on September 18.
May 27, 1989	The founding conference of the Lviv regional Memorial Society is held.
June 18, 1989	Approximately 100,000 faithful participate in public religious services in Ivano-Frankivsk, responding to Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky's call for an international day of prayer.
August 19, 1989	The Russian Orthodox Parish of Ss. Peter and Paul announces that it is switching to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.
September 2, 1989	Tens of thousands in cities across Ukraine protest the draft election law that reserves special seats for the Communist Party and other official organizations: 50,000 in Lviv, 40,000 in Kyiv, 10,000 in Zhytomyr, 5,000 each in Dniprodzerzhynsk and Chervonohrad, and 2,000 in Kharkiv.
September 8-10, 1989	Writer Ivan Drach is elected to head Rukh, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova, at its founding congress in Kyiv.
September 17, 1989	Between 150,000 and 200,000 march in Lviv to demand the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. It is the largest demonstration of Ukrainian Catholics since World War II.
September 21, 1989	Exhumation of a mass grave begins in Demianiv Laz, a nature preserve south of Ivano-Frankivsk.
September 28, 1989	First Secretary of the CPU Volodymyr Scherbytsky, a holdover from the Brezhnev era, is retired.

October 1, 1989	A peaceful demonstration of 10,000 to 15,000 is violently dispersed by militia when participants stage a protest in front of Lviv's Druzhba Stadium where a concert celebrating the Soviet "reunification" of Ukrainian lands is held.
October 3, 1989	Nearly 30,000 Lviv residents rally to protest the violence of October 1; a two-hour work strike also is held.
October 10, 1989	Ivano-Frankivsk is the site of a pre-elections protest attended by 30,000.
October 15, 1989	Several thousand gather in Chervonohrad, Chernivtsi, Rivne and Zhytomyr, 500 in Dnipropetrovsk and 30,000 in Lviv to protest the elections law.
October 20, 1989	Faithful and clergy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church participate in a sobor in Lviv – the first since that Church's forced liquidation in the 1930s.
October 24, 1989	The all-union Supreme Soviet passes a law eliminating special seats for Communist Party and other official organizations' representatives in national and local elections.
October 26, 1989	Twenty factories and institutions in Lviv hold strikes and meetings to once again protest the October 1 police brutality in the city and the authorities' unwillingness to prosecute those responsible.
October 26-28, 1989	The Zelenyi Svit environmental association holds its founding congress.
October 27, 1989	The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet passes a concurrent law "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR."
October 28, 1989	The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decrees that from January 1, 1990, Ukrainian will be the state language of Ukraine, while Russian will be used for communication between nationality groups.
October 29, 1989	Thousands attend a memorial service at Demianiv Laz and a temporary marker is placed to indicate that a monument to the "victims of the represssions of 1939-1941" will soon be erected on the site.

October 28, 1989	The Congregation of the Church of the Transfiguration in Lviv, led by its pastor, leaves the Russian Orthodox Church and proclaims itself a Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.
mid-November 1989	The Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society is officially registered.
November 19, 1989	A public gathering in Kyiv attracts thousands of mourners, friends and family to the reburial in Ukraine of three inmates of the infamous Camp No. 36 in Perm in the Urals: rights activists Vasyl Stus, Oleksiy Tykhy and Yuriy Lytvyn. The three are reburied in Baikove Cemetery.
November 23, 1989	Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announces that Canada will open a Consulate in Kyiv in recognition of "the close ties of family and friendship that bind the people of Canada and Ukraine."
November 26, 1989	On a day of prayer and fasting proclaimed by Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky, thousands of faithful in western Ukraine participate in liturgies and molebens on the eve of a meeting between Pope John Paul II and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
November 28, 1989	The Ukrainian SSR's Council for Religious Affairs issues a decree permitting registration of Ukrainian Catholic congregations. The decree is proclaimed on December 1, coinciding with a meeting at the Vatican between the pope and the Soviet president.
December 10, 1989	The first officially sanctioned observance of International Human Rights Day is held in Lviv.
December 17, 1989	A public meeting organized in Kyiv by Rukh, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova, and dedicated to the memory of Dr. Andrei Sakharov, human rights campaigner and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, takes place with 30,000 people in attendance.
December 26, 1989	Supreme Soviet of Ukrainian SSR adopts a law making Christmas, Easter and the Feast of the Holy Trinity holidays in the republic.
January 21, 1990	Rukh organizes a 300-mile human chain linking Kyiv, Lviv

and Ivano-Frankivsk. Hundreds of thousands join hands to commemorate the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1918 and the reunification of Ukrainian lands one year later.

January 23, 1990 — The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church holds its first synod since its liquidation by the Soviets in 1946 at a bogus synod. The gathering declares the 1946 synod uncanonical and invalid.

February 9, 1990 — Rukh is officially registered by the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers. However, the registration comes too late for Rukh to put forth its own candidates for the parliamentary and local elections on March 4.

March 4, 1990 — Elections to the Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies. Candidates from the Democratic Bloc win landslide victories in western Ukrainian oblasts. A majority of the seats are forced into run-off elections.

March 18, 1990 — Democratic candidates score further impressive victories in the run-off. The Democratic Bloc now holds about 90 seats in the new Parliament.

April 6, 1990 — The Lviv City Council votes to return St. George Cathedral to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The Russian Orthodox Church refuses to yield.

April 29-30, 1990 — The Ukrainian Helsinki Union is disbanded to form the Ukrainian Republican Party.

May 15, 1990 — The new Parliament convenes. The bloc of conservative Communists holds 239 seats; the Democratic Bloc, now evolved into the National Council, has 125 deputies.

June 4, 1990 — Two candidates remain in the protracted race for Parliament chairman. The chief of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Volodymyr Ivashko, is elected with 60 percent of the vote as more than 100 opposition deputies boycott the election.

June 5-6, 1990 — Metropolitan Mstyslav of the U.S.-based Ukrainian Orthodox Church is elected patriarch of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church during that Church's first holy synod. The UAOC declares its full independence

from the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, which in March had granted autonomy to its exarchate in Ukraine headed by Metropolitan Filaret.

June 9, 1990 — British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher addresses the Parliament and reduces Ukraine to colonial status within the USSR. "The government and Parliament of Great Britain maintains direct relations with independent countries. With Ukraine relations can only be the same as those, let's say with California and Quebec," she said.

June 22, 1990 — Volodymyr Ivashko withdraws his candidacy for chief of the Communist Party of Ukraine in view of his new position in Parliament. Stanislav Hurenko is elected first secretary of the CPU.

July 11, 1990 — Volodymyr Ivashko submits his resignation from his post as chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament after he is elected deputy general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Parliament accepts the resignation a week later, on July 18.

July 16, 1990 — The Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine is overwhelmingly approved by Parliament. The vote is 355 for and four against. The people's deputies vote 339-5 to proclaim July 16 a national holiday in Ukraine.

July 23, 1990 — Leonid Kravchuk is elected to replace Volodymyr Ivashko as Parliament chairman.

July 30, 1990 — The Parliament adopts a resolution on military service which demands that Ukrainian soldiers serving "in regions of national conflict such as Armenia and Azerbaijan" be returned to Ukrainian territory by October 1.

August 1, 1990 — The Parliament votes overwhelmingly to close down the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.

August 3, 1990 — Parliament adopts a law on economic sovereignty of the Ukrainian republic.

August 19, 1990 — The first Ukrainian Catholic liturgy in 44 years is celebrated at St. George Cathedral. Hundreds of thousands attend.

September 5-7, 1990	The International Symposium on the Great Famine of 1932-1933 is held in Kyiv.
September 8, 1990	The first "Youth for Christ" rally since 1933 is held in Lviv with 40,000 participants.
September 28-30, 1990	The Green Party of Ukraine holds its founding congress.
September 30, 1990	Nearly 100,000 march in Kyiv to protest the new union treaty proposed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
October 1, 1990	Parliament reconvenes amid mass protests calling for the resignation of its chairman, Leonid Kravchuk, and Prime Minister Vitalii Masol, a leftover from the previous regime. Students erect a tent city on October Revolution Square where they continue the protest.
October 17, 1990	Prime Minister Vitalii Masol resigns.
October 20, 1990	Patriarch Mstyslav I of Kyiv and all Ukraine arrives at St. Sophia Cathedral, ending a 46-year banishment from his homeland.
October 23, 1990	The Parliament votes to delete Article 6 of the Ukrainian Constitution which refers to the "leading role" of the Communist Party and adopts other measures to bring the Constitution in line with the Declaration on State Sovereignty.
October 25-28, 1990	Rukh holds its second congress and declares that its principal goal is no longer "perebudova" but the "renewal of independent statehood for Ukraine."
October 28, 1990	UAOC faithful, supported by Ukrainian Catholics, demonstrate near St. Sophia Cathedral as newly elected Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Aleksei and Metropolitan Filaret serve liturgy at the shrine.
November 1, 1990	Leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, respectively, Metropolitan Volodymyr Sterniuk and Patriarch Mstyslav, meet in Lviv during anniversary commemorations of the 1918 proclamation of the Western Ukrainian National Republic.

November 18, 1990	The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church enthrones Mstyslav I as Patriarch of Kyiv and all Ukraine during ceremonies at St. Sophia Cathedral.
November 18, 1990	Canada announces that its consul general to Kyiv will be Ukrainian Canadian Nestor Gayowsky.
November 19, 1990	The United States announces that its consul to Kyiv will be Ukrainian American John Stepanchuk. Mr. Stepanchuk arrives in Kyiv in early 1991 to set up the consulate. Consul General Jon Gundersen arrives soon thereafter.
November 19, 1990	The chairmen of the Ukrainian and Russian Parliaments, respectively, Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin, sign an unprecedented 10-year bilateral pact between the two republics.
early December 1990	The Party for the Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine is formed.
December 15, 1990	The Democratic Party of Ukraine is founded.
March 17, 1991	A union-wide referendum on the preservation of the USSR is approved in Ukraine by 70.2 percent of the voters. At the same time, however, 80.2 percent approve another referendum question posed in Ukraine, indicating that they want their country to be "part of a union of Soviet sovereign states on the principles of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine."
March 30, 1991	Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky returns to Ukraine after a 53-year forced absence.
April 7, 1991	Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky celebrates Easter liturgy at St. George Cathedral in Lviv.
April 26, 1991	The day is proclaimed a national day of mourning in Ukraine. Twenty-five events, from memorial services to conferences and a requiem concert, are held between April 21 and 27 to mark the solemn fifth anniversary of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster.
August 1, 1991	President George Bush addresses the Ukrainian Parliament and cautions against "suicidal nationalism," thus making clear his reservations about Ukrainian statehood.

	The address comes to be known as the "Chicken Kiev" speech.
August 19-21, 1991	A coup d'état is attempted in the USSR, but soon fails.
August 24, 1991	The Ukrainian Parliament proclaims Ukraine an independent state, but notes that this matter is subject to a nationwide referendum.
August 28-29, 1991	A delegation from the Russian SFSR and the USSR Supreme Soviet rushes to Kyiv to resolve an "emergency situation" in the wake of Ukraine's independence proclamation. The talks result in a communiqué pledging cooperation to avert "the uncontrolled disintegration of the union state" through creation of "interim inter-state structures" for an undefined transitional period.
September 9, 1991	Dismantling begins of the huge statue of Lenin in Kyiv's October Revolution Square, now renamed Independence Square.
September 9, 1991	Canada's Consulate General in Kyiv is opened.
September 22 - October 2, 1991	Parliament Chairman Kravchuk visits Canada and the United States, and meets with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President George Bush.
September 23, 1991	The Ukrainian Parliament votes to dissolve the KGB and create the State Security Service.
September 27, 1991	The United States announces that Ukraine will be the first former Soviet republic to benefit from the Peace Corps program.
September 29 - October 5, 1991	A weeklong series of events in Kyiv mourns the mass killings of Jews, Ukrainians and others by the Nazis at Babyn Yar.
October 29, 1991	The Ukrainian Parliament votes to shut down the Chornobyl plant no later than 1993.
November 1991	The film "Holod '33" (Famine '33) wins first prize at the Kyiv Film Festival and premieres on Ukrainian television on the eve of the nationwide referendum on Ukraine's independence.

December 1, 1991	The population of Ukraine approves the August 24, 1991, declaration of independence with an astounding 90.32 percent of the vote. Leonid Kravchuk is elected the first president of newly independent Ukraine by 62 percent of the voters.
December 1, 1991	Poland becomes the first country to grant diplomatic recognition to independent Ukraine.
December 2, 1991	Canada becomes the first Western country to establish diplomatic relations with independent Ukraine.
December 5, 1991	Leonid Kravchuk is sworn in as Ukraine's president.
December 7, 1991	At a Slavic summit in Miensk, Belarus, Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian leaders announce the formation of a commonwealth of the three Slavic republics, leaving the door open for other former Soviet republics to join.
December 25, 1991	President George Bush announces that the United States recognizes the independence of Ukraine.
December 29, 1991	The Ukrainian Weekly's year-in-review issue reports that at press time 25 countries have extended formal recognition to Ukraine.



LVIV, 1988: One of the many public meetings held during the summer that attracted thousands in the wake of the new policy of perebudova (perestroika). This one is near Ivan Franko State University.

KYIV, JULY 16, 1990: Deputies in the Ukrainian SSR's Parliament applaud the adoption by that body of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine. The vote was an overwhelming 355-4.

KYIV, OCTOBER 23, 1990: Three days after his return to Ukraine, Patriarch Mstyslav I of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church appears at his first press conference.

KYIV, JUNE 23, 1991: Lev Lukianenko leads a protest march against a new union treaty with Moscow. The banner behind him reads: "No to the union treaty!"

From Perebudova to Independence

Herald editors renew Ukrainian Helsinki Group

January 17, 1988

NEW YORK – The editorial board of the samvydav journal the Ukrainian Herald has officially re-activated the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group by joining it en masse and announcing its new role as the group's official organ, reported the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group based here.

In an open letter dated December 30, 1987, the editors of the Herald, several of whom were already members, announced that they were joining the 11-year-old human rights group and renewing its activity, which had ceased since the early 1980s as a result of mass arrests, long-term imprisonment and deportation of its membership. The group, formed in November 1976 to monitor Soviet compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Accords in the Ukrainian SSR, has never officially disbanded.

Vyacheslav Chornovil, who joined the UHG in 1979, renewed the publication of the Ukrainian Herald last August in response to the new Soviet policy of glasnost, or openness.

The full text of the open letter, which is addressed to participants of the ongoing Helsinki review conference in Vienna, the Helsinki Federation and the International Association of journalists, follows (as translated by The Weekly from Ukrainian).

* * *

The newly proclaimed Soviet policy of glasnost has given rise to new hopes for democratic changes in our country and for the improvement of the international climate.

However, positive changes in the USSR have slowed down; furthermore, in recent times regression is evident. This is particularly evident in Ukraine, where the leadership, unchanged from the Brezhnev years, strives to change the republic into a true Vendée (department) of perestroika, or restructuring. This is confirmed by the unprecedented campaign of the last few years of harassment and repression against the first independent publishing organ in Ukraine – the uncensored journal Ukrainian Herald.

The numerous details of this pogrom are well-known by the international public. We remind you only that the continuous false attacks upon us in the republic's press, radio and television, and during meetings and conferences

organized by the leadership, have already lasted several weeks. Using lies and slander, they try to juxtapose us with our own nation, to depict us as foreign agents, supporters of terrorism, fascism and the like. Accordingly, toward the editorial board of the journal and its active contributors, they show no shame in using the basest methods: beatings, death threats, detention and brief arrests.

In connection with this, during the last few days representatives of repressive organs have sounded on the pages of the official press open threats of arrest against members of the journal's editorial board, or of our deportation beyond the borders of our fatherland. We ask the world's democratic public, primarily activists of the Helsinki movement and our colleagues-journalists, through the power of public support, not to permit the crushing of the first independent publishing organ in Ukraine.

From our perspective, while rejecting the slander and falsehoods, we declare that the platform of our activities is and remains [based on] the ideals of the international Helsinki movement. We remind all that the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, even in times of the most severe repression, did not announce the cessation of its activity, even though a considerable number of group members were serving time in special-regimen labor camps or were forced to leave their fatherland.

With the goal of renewing the activity of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, we announce that the editorial board of the journal Ukrainian Herald, whose several individual members already belong to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, will now en masse join the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and our journal will serve as its organ. Let the world judge how the Soviet government respects the Helsinki Final Act, which it signed.

We expect that within the complex situation in Ukraine, where the forces of stagnation and reaction endeavor to launch a counteroffensive, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and its organ, the Ukrainian Herald, will not remain alone.

Members of the editorial board:
Vasyl Barladianu, Mykhailo Horyn, Pavlo Skochok, Vyacheslav Chornovil
Lviv, December 30, 1987

Helsinki Accords monitors in Ukraine confirm their membership in group

March 27, 1988

NEW YORK – Human and national rights activists in Ukraine have taken yet another step to revitalize the Ukrainian Helsinki Group by confirming the intentions of long-time members to continue their activity in the group.

In a statement dated March 11 and released here by the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, the UHG's executive committee – consisting of Mykhailo Horyn, Zinoviy Krasivsky and Vyacheslav Chornovil – announced the following:

"The new social conditions in the USSR, the release of a significant portion of political prisoners, and a termination of criminal proceedings against human rights activists have made it possible to activate the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in Ukraine."

The first step in this re-activization was the December 1987 announcement that the independent journal Ukrainian Herald would be the Ukrainian Helsinki Group's official press organ and that the journal's editorial board had been co-opted into the group.

In the March 11 statement, the UHG's executive committee listed the following persons as having confirmed their membership in the group: Levko Lukianenko, Oksana Meshko, Mykola Matusevych, Mr. Krasivsky, Mr. Chornovil, Mr. Horyn, Petro Rozumny, Petro Sichko, Vasyl Sichko, Yosyf Zisels, Yaroslav Lesiv, Olha Matusevych and Vasyl Striltsiv.

Messrs. Lukianenko and Matusevych, it should be noted, are both serving sentences of "internal exile" – Mr. Lukianenko in the Tomskaya Oblast and Mr. Matusevych in the Chitinskaya Oblast.

The statement also lists the following members of the Ukrainian Herald's editorial board as new members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group: Vasyl Barladianu, Bohdan Horyn, Pavlo Skochok, Vitaliy Shevchenko, Stepan Sapeliak and Mykola Muratov.

The statement goes on to note that, "Because of their isolation and other reasons, contacts have not yet been established with a few members of the group (Ivan Kandyba and Mykola Horbal). But there is no reason to doubt their desire to take part in the group's work."

It is underlined in the document that the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, which was founded November 9, 1976, "never disbanded, as did the Moscow group, and never ceased to pursue its activities."

"Unable to prepare and publish collective documents owing to the mass arrests during all these difficult years, the majority of the group's members spoke out in behalf of the group individually," it states.

The statement also points out that the UHG "was subjected to a more devastating pogrom during the Brezhnev years of stagnation than any other Helsinki group in the USSR. All the members of this group served lengthy terms of imprisonment and internal exile, and four of its members – Oleksa Tykhy, Yuriy Lytvyn, Valeriy Marchenko and Vasyl Stus – died in frightful conditions in a special-regimen camp, a veritable death camp, where even now, against all dictates of common sense and despite the policy of democratization proclaimed in the USSR, the sufferings of Ukrainian Helsinki monitors Ivan Kandyba, Mykola Horbal, Ivan Sokulsky, Vitaliy Kalynychenko and

Hryhoriy Prykhodko continue."

Other UHG members are exiled outside the borders of Ukraine, under house arrest or subjected to various forms of persecution and harassment, the statement continues.

Finally, the statement announces, "As before, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group will base its activities on such fundamental international documents on human rights as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe."

Also, it is noted that, due to the emigration of Mykola Rudenko, UHG chairman, Levko Lukianenko, a founding member of the group, has assumed the chairmanship. Until a general meeting of the group is held, the executive committee composed of three secretaries will coordinate the group's activities and carry out operational tasks.

Outspoken Ukrainian artists describe effect of reforms on Ukraine's cultural life

April 17, 1988

by Marta Kolomayets
and Chrystyna Lapychak

After years of silence, a period of stagnation brought about by the repressive Brezhnev regime of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, the voices of official Ukrainian poets have re-emerged in the late 1980s, providing audiences in the West with a vivid and apparently sincere picture of Ukrainian cultural and literary life in Ukraine today.

Through various invitations, such writers as Dmytro Vasilovych Pavlychko and Ivan Fedorovych Drach were warmly greeted in North America during the month of March.

Mr. Pavlychko was one of three Soviet Ukrainian speakers making the rounds of Canadian universities for the sixth annual Shevchenko Readings, in celebration of the great Ukrainian bard's birth.

Mr. Drach and Yuriy Harasymovych Ilyenko, a Ukrainian filmmaker, were promoting five films made in the 1960s, some of which were shelved for more than 20 years. Among these films were "Well for the Thirsty," "Straw Bells" and "On the Eve of Kupalo." They were making their journey across the United States and Canada, stopping at Ukrainian centers en route to San Francisco for a film festival held in late March.

Messrs. Pavlychko and Drach met up in Toronto, where they were intro-

duced, and in some cases re-introduced, to the Ukrainian community. Both men spoke candidly and openly about the current situation in Ukraine. Joining them at this meeting was Mr. Ilyenko.

About a week later Mr. Drach was featured in a literary evening at Rutgers University in Newark, where he not only read his poetry, but engaged in an open discussion about current affairs and answered questions posed by the audience.

Both poets currently hold prestigious positions in the Writers' Union of Ukraine, serving as co-secretaries. Thus, their positions allow them to influence, suggest and promote policy relating to literature, language and education in the Ukrainian republic.

They are viewed as the link between Ukrainian culture in Ukraine and in the West, for both have been to Canada and the United States previously and promote the ideas of cultural exchange.

Mr. Drach, at age 51, is a prolific and talented poet, who comments on contemporary issues in his works. A native of the Kiev region of Ukraine, he attended the University of Kiev, where he studied philology. He also worked for a number of years at the Dovzhenko Studios, where he collaborated with Mr. Ilyenko, producing their first joint project, "Well for the Thirsty." (This marked the debut of Mr. Drach as a screenwriter and Mr. Ilyenko as a director.)

Mr. Drach was a visitor to the United States and Canada in the mid-1960s, when he enchanted Western audiences with the beauty of his poetry, and his frank and open discussions on a variety of topics. He has worked on the editorial boards of Literaturna Ukraina, Dnipro, Vitchyzna and News from Ukraine, the English-language weekly of the Association for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad, published in Kiev.

His collections of poetry, for which he has won the Shevchenko Prize for literature, awarded by the Writers' Union of the Ukrainian republic, include: "The Sun and the Word," "Kievan Sky" and "Solar Phoenix," among others.

Mr. Pavlychko hails from the Ivano-Frankivske region of Ukraine and is a graduate of Lviv University. The 58-year-old poet's works were first published in 1951; they have continued appearing on the pages of the Soviet press. He is known for his work in translating poetry of other nationalities, both foreign and within the borders of the Soviet Union. Mr. Pavlychko is also the winner of the Ostrovsky Literary Prize awarded by the Ukrainian Writers' Union for excellence in writing on youth themes.

His screenplay, "Dream," was released by the Kiev Film Studio in the 1960s. Currently Mr. Pavlychko serves on the editorial boards of Ukraina and News from Ukraine, and as secretary of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, heading a commission on language in the republic's schools.

Mr. Ilyenko, a filmmaker, first gained prominence as the cameraman for Sergei Paradzhanov's "Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors," which debuted in

the early 1960s. He made his directing debut with "Well for the Thirsty," which after being banned for 22 years has been shown for the first time in the Soviet Union in 1987, and in the West during this March tour. During the period of cultural suppression and neglect (the 1970s and early 1980s) Mr. Ilyenko's films sometimes found an international audience at film festivals in Europe, the United States (New York) and Japan, although they were rarely viewed in the Soviet Union. In the new, more liberal, cultural atmosphere currently developing in the Soviet Union, Mr. Ilyenko's films are being revived throughout the republics.

Below is a report on the thoughts voiced by all three men during public meetings in Toronto and New Jersey, which we offer our readers for the record. Although these "official cultural activists" are only one segment of Ukrainian society that is attempting to test the limits of glasnost (we have in mind the myriad unofficial groups and journals that have arisen throughout Ukraine and whose experiences with glasnost have been somewhat different from those of this threesome), certainly their voices provide a glimpse into a part of the reality that exists today in Ukraine. Thus, we quote extensively from the words of all three men, in an effort to acquaint our readers with this aspect of change in the republic's cultural life.

* * *

"Perhaps all of this (glasnost, cultural exchanges) is leading to the fact that our worlds, that our Ukrainian culture must be united, somehow, so that all that is best here and all that is best there must transact – must be those two wings with which our nation will live and exist. For with only one wing, a nation cannot soar very far," said Ivan Drach, using his famous poetic symbol, during an evening conversation with members of the Toronto Ukrainian community in March.

Both he and Dmytro Pavlychko support the idea of joint projects, and see that there are numerous possibilities in the new cultural climate blooming in Ukraine today.

"When intelligent people meet with other intelligent people, then anything is possible. Recent goings-on concerning such things, for example, have included certain contacts about which you probably already know ... Harvard University and its Ukrainian Institute with the Institute of Literature in Kiev. Such honored guests as Omeljan Pritsak, John Fizer, Hryts (George) Grabowicz, and others are expected to visit us.

"This is already very interesting, because this would not have been possible perhaps even only a year ago, or it would have been difficult to imagine such a possibility, and here it exists. There are ongoing discussions on whether we could possibly succeed in starting up some kind of joint journal, which would be published jointly with some of the writers in Kiev and Harvard University, and perhaps the New York group of writers, if it is at all

possible," said Mr. Drach during a literary evening held in his honor at Rutgers University's Newark campus.

"There are so many abundantly interesting projects," said Mr. Drach, commenting on a Ukrainian Literary Encyclopedia that both he and Mr. Pavlychko are currently involved with. "We are listing Emma Andievska, Bohdan Boychuk, [Ivan] Bahriany, names, which in earlier times, were not mentioned," said Mr. Drach. "We are also trying to publish Ukrainian poets and writers who live in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Priashivshchyna and Rumania," he added.

Both poets have literary careers which date back to the days of the "Shestydesiatnyky," whose status they spoke about at length during the Toronto meeting with the Ukrainian community.

"We stand behind everything, everything that does not contradict the vital existence of our people, our times ... all of this will be published, will exist, and everything that meets our criteria will be printed. We stand behind the full literary existence of our 'Shestydesiatnyky,' no matter what fate has dealt them. Some of them continued their literary work, some sat in prison, however, now in our lifetime, we have the opportunity to work, to create culture, our own culture – this is perhaps the most important, the most precious. Foremostly, we think about the spirit of our 'Shestydesiatnyky,' and we want their spirit to live on, to exist as part of our lives," said Mr. Drach.

Mr. Pavlychko discussed not only the "Shestydesiatnyky," the writers of the 1960s, but he also commented on the unclear literary situation of the 1970s and the new, emerging hopefuls of the 1980s, labeling them the "Vosmydesiatnyky." Among these new voices emerging in poetry, he included Mykola Tymchak, Stanislav Chenilevsky, Yuriy Andrukhovych, Natalka Bilotserkivets, Svitlana Zholob and Vasyl Harasymiuk. "I name these because they are the closest to me, and I'm most familiar with their work," said Mr. Pavlychko.

"A blossoming of an entire generation of interesting young poets has occurred in Ukraine; 20- and 30-year-olds who are extraordinarily fascinating," said Mr. Drach discussing the current Ukrainian literary scene. "I am very happy that at this, my (literary) evening, our friends from the Ukrainian Mission in New York are present. I think that they would also agreeably accept that the younger poets travel to Canada and the United States because undoubtedly this meant a lot to me (referring to his first trip to the West in 1966), my first trip to the United States and my contacts with many people, etc. And presently, there approaches an opportunity for the younger generation of poets, the 20- and 30-year-olds, to visit you here," stated Mr. Drach.

He also spoke of prose writers, many from his generation and younger, who are currently widely read in Ukraine. Among them, he named: Valentyn

Tarnavsky, Borys Kharchuk, Volodymyr Drozd, Valeriy Shevchuk, and the Tiutiunnyk brothers, Hryhir and Hryhoriy.

Discussing rehabilitated writers of the 20th century, Mr. Pavlychko told his audience in Toronto: "You already probably know that (Volodymyr) Vynnychenko is now being printed in Ukraine; his work has appeared in issue No. 12 (December 1987) of Kiev, [Mykola] Khvyliovy was printed in issue No. 12 (December 1987) of Vitchyzna. Bohdan Lepky and Osyp Turiansky are also being printed now," he added.

"However, we cannot print all of our past authors," said Mr. Pavlychko. "We would have to stop publishing all of our contemporary writers if we brought back to life all of our past ones. However, we clearly understand that among our past voices, which we want to bring back to life, we have writers of various degrees of talent; we must first bring into our cultural process the most important ones, for example, Khvyliovy, Mykola Zerov, Mykola Kulish. Two of these authors were published previously, except for Khvyliovy. However, their meaning for our Ukrainian culture is so great that we give them first and foremost consideration; we want to publish their complete works," said Mr. Pavlychko.

However, it seems that publishing plans are not solely limited to voices from the past. During his literary evening at Rutgers, Mr. Drach was questioned on the possibility of partial or full rehabilitation of works by the late poet Vasyl Stus. Mr. Stus, a dissident who died tragically at the notorious Perm labor camp in September 1985, is widely viewed by numerous critics as one of the greatest Ukrainian poets of the 20th century. The question was posed by Lydia Ruban, wife of political prisoner Petro Ruban. Mrs. Ruban is currently in the West seeking medical care for her paralyzed son Marko. The question elicited a rather positive response from Mr. Drach, who said: "If you are asking about Vasyl Stus, you probably know he was sent to a labor camp and died there, and to publish his poems is not simple. But as far as we are concerned, I and several others in our Secretariat of the Writers' Union, including Dmytro Pavlychko, secretary of the union, and First Secretary Yuriy Mushketyk, we support the publication of his poems, first in journals and later, after solving the problems, to publish a collection."

Mr. Drach reiterated these words during a discussion in Toronto, adding that he and Mr. Pavlychko stand firmly behind their commitment, as secretaries of the Writers' Union, to ensure that the "name of Vasyl Stus will live in our literature, will be a part of our lives."

During their discussions, it seemed that if it were solely up to Messrs. Drach and Pavlychko, there would be few limitations on what and who could be published in Ukraine today.

The writers' publishing plans for the near future do not include only the above-mentioned works. A member of the audience at Rutgers-Newark asked Mr. Drach whether the Writers' Union was planning any new publications or

editions this year marking the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan-Rus', to which Mr. Drach responded:

"Well, I cannot speak for the Writers' Union, but I know there are a series of publications in various publishing houses, and various commemorations are supposed to take place in June. Now I don't know whether this will succeed for us or not, but, as far as the Writers' Union is concerned, we would like, on the basis of these two distant and unrelated subjects, but this is how it turns out, so that the Millennium of Christianity and the Chornobyl tragedy, we would like ... to organize a Chornobyl forum, to which we would like to invite writers, experts and others, not only from the Soviet Union, but world-class scholars and religious activists from the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, and others ... I imagine this will not take place in Chornobyl, but in Kiev."

Although the picture of the literary world in Ukraine today, as painted by the two poets, seems quite optimistic, not all aspects of life are bright, as evidenced by the continuing repression of various dissenters, among them Mr. Ruban, who was transferred to Perm Camp 35 after the liquidation of Camp 36-1, the death camp for four Ukrainian political prisoners.

Her husband's fate promoted Mrs. Ruban to ask Mr. Drach about the continued existence of political prisoners in the USSR despite promises of reform. Mr. Drach replied:

"I cannot speak for Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev nor Volodymyr Vasyliovych Shcherbytsky, but I think that neither Gorbachev nor any of the writers, nor I, believe it is necessary to have political prisons, political prisoners, etc. I think that we are in the process [of changing the system so] that none of this will exist any longer, and we are trying to do this with all our energy, common sense, understanding and ability," he said.

As optimistic and positive as the two poets tried to seem during their meetings with the Ukrainian American and Ukrainian Canadian communities, neither could disguise his troubled tone when discussing the Ukrainian language problem.

Mr. Pavlychko, who heads the State Commission on Language in Schools, discussed this topic, saying: "The question of language is complex, yet at the same time simple. In 1927 we passed a law as to the status of the Ukrainian language on the territories of the Ukrainian SSR. The law has never been changed, or altered; it can be found in our two-volume book of the Ukrainian SSR laws and statutes.

"As a result of the harsh Stalin years, and the aftermath of those Stalin years, the situation in Ukraine did not improve along the lines of the Ukrainian language," Mr. Pavlychko explained.

"In Ukraine, in the large cities, in the oblast and trade centers, [a low percentage] of the schools remain Ukrainian schools. In Ukraine, in higher educational institutions, most of the subjects are taught in the Russian lan-

guage, although this is not true everywhere; the situation in western Ukraine is different. But, in general, the situation in my opinion is grave, if not catastrophic," he said.

"Also, our state agencies, our factories, our businesses and academic institutions and various other institutions have succeeded in forgetting the Ukrainian language.

"And this was brought up at our plenum – in a discussion about the Ukrainian language – and later in an official document titled 'Resolution of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party on Patriotic Upbringing,' where the prestige, the development and the preservation of the language were underscored, and this warmed us, and we have begun asking to include, in our constitution, all necessary laws to ensure a normal existence for our Ukrainian language.

"All of this has been written about, our government knows about this and, as a matter of fact, we have written a letter which was printed in Ukraine, as well as in the West," he said, referring to a Writers' Union statement signed by Messrs. Mushketyk, Borys Oliynyk and Pavlychko.

We have ongoing negotiations with representatives from our government, we continue our discussions, thinking: When will that moment come, when we will be able to formulate certain rules? We continue to discuss these themes in the press. It is no secret that there are people who think that the state status of the Ukrainian language might place other languages in an equal rights language situation – other languages which are heard in Ukraine, among them, Russian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, as well as other minorities, such as Greek, etc. In principle, if I were to generalize, I'd have to talk about bilingualism, about the culture of bilingualism, because we live in a multinational state and every Ukrainian should know the Russian language. But, I'm not talking about this, I'm talking about the fact that there are 10 million Russians in Ukraine, and every one of them who lives in Ukraine should know the Ukrainian language. I'm talking about the fact that our state institutions should grant priority to the native language of each given country ... this should be a priority.

"Our judicial documents, our trade, all of this should be transacted in the Ukrainian language, as it was during the time of Skrypnyk. We are returning to those days and demand the same things," said Mr. Pavlychko.

The nationalities question, Mr. Pavlychko said, is often referred to by Mr. Gorbachev and a special plenum will be devoted to it. Writers are anxiously awaiting this plenum. "We are preparing for this, we place great hope on Mr. Gorbachev, thinking that many issues will be resolved at this plenum, new directions will be outlined here," the poet commented.

"Everything we do now, we do with the premise that it was only yesterday we began the October Revolution. We demand to view the last 70 years from the sidelines, to see both the positives and negatives of those years, but

we constantly search for the golden thread that runs through this history of Lenin's directives on the nationalities questions, to the theory he proposed and the practice that came to be in the Soviet Union. The demands are set forth not only by Ukrainian writers, but also by writers of other republics; they are also set forth by our people," said Mr. Pavlychko.

The writers would not be considered the heroes of this play "if we did not feel this from our people, if we did not know what our teachers, our people, our students write to us, if we did not meet with our peasant folk and our workers who come up to us and say, 'We want to put our children in Ukrainian schools, but they do not exist ...

"Our democratic law states that a father can choose a school for his children with such and such a language of instruction, but it cannot be democratic because he has nothing to choose from. If we did not know all of this, we'd have nothing to base our demands on," said Mr. Pavlychko.

"But, no, our people are alive, we have our own language, it lives, it has its forms of life, it lives in the home, in a mother's heart, in our children, in our song, in our koliadka, in our traditions – yet it also lives in our institutions – it has not left there forever. We are not resurrecting it from the grave, we just want to pull it from its corner and lead it back into the spotlight, front and center, where it rightfully belongs," the poet added.

Mr. Drach also responded to the language situation in Ukraine, saying that he is not as optimistic as Mr. Pavlychko, whom Mr. Drach regards as an honored founder of the Commission on Language in Schools, and a champion in helping preserve the Ukrainian language.

"However, when I look at the situation to Ukrainianize Jews; then, in second place, Russians; then thirdly, our damned Ukrainians. Khakhly, malorosy – these are unbelievable things I see; we can try to explain these phenomena, and over-explain them, but when you think that over the last 15 years Kiev has grown to a population of 1 million, yet in practice it has become difficult to establish Ukrainian-language schools, be it a few, because you have a father and a mother who reason that they had a difficult life in poverty, and would like for their sons and daughters to be 'kulturni chelovieky,' " said Mr. Drach passionately.

"There you have it, these are the bizarre happenings, the reality in which we live in. And these are critical, incredibly critical, problems which we constantly face," he added.

* * *

Following his poetry-reading at Rutgers University, Mr. Drach described somewhat the genesis, death and rebirth of one of Mr. Ilyenko's controversial films, "Well for the Thirsty," for which he penned the script. The film, which was banned soon after its first series of screenings in Ukraine in 1965, symbolically and allegorically deals with such themes as age, death and gen-

eration gaps. It was brought back to life last year with screenings in Kiev and Moscow, thanks to the new policies of "hlasnist" and "perebudova," or openness and restructuring, according to Mr. Drach.

"I became acquainted with him [Mr. Ilyenko] during the filming of 'Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors'; he was the cameraman then. He took my first screenplay, this was my thesis – it was more or less like any other screenplay or any first work. Yurko Herasymovych Ilyenko was more prepared at that point to take on greater responsibility, and thus he created from this (script) an unusually poignant allegory. This allegory was relevant not only to the time in which we were living, in other words the 1960s, but relates to this time and to all times.

"This is an allegory about a person, about his age, about how he tries to overcome his age and overcome the death of his heritage. But there are these sharp, revealing scenes, which were concerned with the problems of parents and children then, problems of the generations, which were later actively examined by other artists ... but this was one of the first which touched upon these problems. It was still not in its proper time ... In one scene, one that was fairly drastic and harsh, it showed the walk of the children through the cemetery, where amid the sand dunes the children seek the grave of their mother and cannot find it in any way ... reflecting the sons' distant attitude toward their ancestors, their descendants and their roots ... these were poignant subjects. Film at that time, in general, belonged to the expressionistic ode form...many ode-type scripts were written, pathetic inventions ... and when concerning the Ukrainian landscape, well then it all had to have enchanting scenery, the Dnipro, etc. ... Not only among us [in Ukraine] but among you, individuals came and said, 'Indeed! You could not find nicer Ukrainian landscapes?'

"You see," the poet explained, "there is an elementary rule for allegory, which demands poignancy, as well as black and white, good and evil, and all of this condensed and poignantly presented. And, after all, if we are to discuss a historical prescription, then all of this [the action of the film] took place on the banks of the Dnipro, in the Chyhyryn region, so all of this does exist.

"Well, at first there was an aesthetic rejection of the film by our older generation of filmmakers ... Later, after it received more publicity, our writers came to see it, and while some accepted it, the majority of the older generation did not accept the film. All of this added up ... and was established in an ideological pretext, as an opportunity for re-educating our young authors. The film was charged as anti-Soviet activity, effectively banned, placed on the shelf, and only by some great miracle, wonder, this film was saved and, as you can see, exists in this form."

This "great miracle" or "wonder," according to the artists, has been, in effect, the emergence of official attempts at democratic reform, which has

made possible a new flourishing of the arts in the Ukrainian republic, perhaps not to the same extent as in other republics, but an emerging growth nevertheless.

In a mid-March interview in the Times-Union of Rochester, N.Y., Mr. Ilyenko's comments on glasnost were quoted in detail.

"My films are different in aesthetics," he said, "different in their treatment of subject matter. They were not quite fitting in with the accepted ideological framework.

"When you hear about the changes of perestroika, realize that it didn't happen all by itself. There's a reason: in cinema, in literature, in theater there has been a glowing there for years, but it never caught into flames. Every time there was a suppressive wave, that alone would develop curiosity of others. People would give attention and sympathy."

While the effects of democratization on Ukrainian writers and Ukrainian literature have been well-documented and are well-known in the West, less has been heard about the influence of liberalization on other branches of Ukrainian culture, such as cinema, dance, art, music, theater and cultural exchanges with the republic.

Speaking in Toronto, during the evening meeting with the Ukrainian community, Mr. Pavlychko discussed the stagnant state of contemporary modern Ukrainian music.

"I think this is where we have problems," he said. "We don't have much to brag about, because unfortunately we do not have a fully developed musical stage. We don't have the kind of music that would enthrall our youth based on Ukrainian folkloric themes.

"In other words, I would say that this branch of art is underdeveloped. Of course, we do have some ensembles that have achieved fame at home and are also known in the West," he added.

"We need an operatic stage, we need such artists as Mokrenko, or Dmytro Hnatiuk, who perform Ukrainian folk songs in a traditional spirit. However, we should create, we should consider the needs of our youth, which is constantly listening to foreign music, or that of other republics in the Soviet Union. Especially popular now is a Latvian composer ... we do not have such a composer who has a youth following, who could create a musical life and – youth is music," said Mr. Pavlychko.

"In art, the situation is brighter ... we have artists, true creators of a new era," the speaker continued. "One name that comes to mind is that of Ivan Marchuk, who is not familiar to Westerners. He is an artist who is not a member of the Artists' Union; at first they did not accept him and now that the union wants to accept him, he no longer wants to join," Mr. Pavlychko explained.

"In painting we also have other names; as I see it, work is going in various directions. We have very interesting, very profound artists, who not only

have a reputation in the Soviet Union, but in other socialist countries as well. Allow me to name one of them, who, if I'm not mistaken, currently resides in Toronto – Ivan Ostafijchuk."

Mr. Ostafijchuk happened to be in the audience that night, and Mr. Pavlychko, upon learning this, exclaimed affectionately, "Ivane, de ty, synku miy?" (Ivan, where are you, my son?).

Explaining that Mr. Ostafijchuk, who had just recently emigrated from Ukraine, could provide more detail about the contemporary art situation in Ukraine, Mr. Pavlychko was pleased that he had given proper credit to the émigré artist's work. He discussed Mr. Ostafijchuk's role in designing book covers for leading literary figures in Ukraine, including Lina Kostenko. Mr. Pavlychko also mentioned that two book jackets for his own collections of poetry had been designed by the artist.

"He is not only a book designer, but a most interesting expressionist, who not everyone can accept or understand," said the poet. "It would please me to see Ivan Ostafijchuk return to Lviv, to Ukraine, nonetheless, I hope that the fact that he is now in the West will not create a wall between him and Ukraine. We should strive toward achieving such goals that allow a writer or an artist to come from Ukraine to the West, not necessarily with a delegation, not necessarily by official invitation from some association, but simply by invitation from a friend ... to live here a bit, to stay here, without watchful guardians ... and Mr. Ostafijchuk has the opportunity to be a pioneer in this, to set a precedent," said Mr. Pavlychko.

"I wish him only the best on these Canadian lands among Ukrainians; however, I would like for him to continue to work for our literary circles, for our culture, even if it is from Canada ... may he only have that opportunity," Mr. Pavlychko said.

Official program honors Shevchenko, upstaging unofficial cultural protest

May 29, 1988

KIEV – What was expected to be an unofficial demonstration calling for "cultural autonomy" in this Ukrainian capital city on Sunday, May 22, took the form of an official afternoon program honoring the poet Taras Shevchenko, reported Ukrainian American tourists who returned from Ukraine on Tuesday, May 24.

The Ukrainian Culturological Club (UCC), based in Kiev, had organized an unofficial demonstration to protest the Ukrainian republic's lack of cultural freedom and suppression of the Ukrainian language. They were, how-

ever, "upstaged" by the Soviet Ukrainian authorities, who usurped their plans and interceded with an official program near the Shevchenko Monument across the way from the State University of Kiev.

According to the American tourists, about 800 people attended the official program, which included performances by local choirs and ensembles, as well as opening remarks by Borys Oliynyk, chairman of the State Commission on Landmarks, who stated: "Let this be a joint celebration to celebrate the poet Taras Shevchenko."

About 300 feet away from the official ceremonies, a group of 200 to 300 people broke away from the "main event" to conduct their own manifestation. These Ukrainians, dressed in embroidered shirts and blouses, led by a group of 50 to 60 university students, members of the UCC, held their own protest, an afternoon of song and poetry readings, reported the U.S. travelers.

The group had originally planned to read Shevchenko poetry during the official program, but, according to Oles Shevchenko, the Ukrainian antinuclear and national rights activist, they were denied permission to do this by the authorities. Mr. Shevchenko stated that the officials had told him the program was "totally filled."

"Imagine that," he responded, "an afternoon honoring Taras Shevchenko where his poetry is not permitted to be read."

Mr. Shevchenko and his group were allowed to place bouquets of flowers at the foot of the poet's monument.

The UCC-sponsored event, which ran parallel to the official program in time (tourists observed that the official program began at about 5 p.m.; the unofficial gathering began about 30 minutes later and both ran late into the night, with the last people dispersing after 10 p.m.), included groups of students and rights activists singing Ukrainian songs, among them Vasyl Symonenko's "Lebedi Materynstva."

It also included readings of poetry written by the Ukrainian national bard, Shevchenko. According to one New Yorker who witnessed this May 22 manifestation, Mr. Shevchenko read with great feeling Shevchenko's "Yurodyvyi" (The Feeble-Minded). When it began getting dark, this group of demonstrators held a candlelight vigil.

Among the Ukrainian human, national and religious rights activists and former political prisoners who had traveled to Kiev for the Sunday afternoon event were: Bohdan, Mykhailo and Olha Horyn, Maria Hel, Vyacheslav Chornovil and his wife, Atena Pashko, Oles Shevchenko, Opanas Zalyvakha, Yevhen Sverstiuk, Oles Serhiyenko, Vitaliy Kalynychenko (who was recently released from prison and currently resides in Kharkiv), Petro Rozumny, Serhiy Naboka, Alla Marchenko (widow of Valeriy), Olha Heyko-Matusevych, Yevhen Proniuk and Mykhailo Slobodian, to name but a few of the better-known dissidents.

According to the Ukrainian Americans who attended the demonstration, the organizers and participants of the afternoon "unofficial" protest did not experience any immediate repercussions because of their participation in this event.

May 22 marks the anniversary of the transfer of Taras Shevchenko's body from St. Petersburg to Kiev, and then to its final resting place in Kaniv, in 1861. During the days of Petro Shelest, Ukrainian Communist Party leader in the 1960s and early 1970s, Ukrainian patriots commemorated May 22 by holding demonstrations and poetry readings near the Shevchenko monument. The tradition was banned when Volodymyr Shcherbytsky came to power in 1972.

Non-Russian national rights activists form Committee of Patriotic Movements

June 26, 1988

by Bohdan Nahaylo

Representatives of six non-Russian national movements met in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv on June 11 and 12 and founded a Coordinating Committee of Patriotic Movements of the Peoples of the USSR. According to documents issued by the participants in the meeting that have just become available in Munich, the new committee is supported by national rights campaigners from Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia and Armenia.

Following a recently formed inter-nationality group to defend political prisoners, the new body represents the most ambitious attempt in the post-Stalin period by non-Russian dissidents to form a common front against Moscow's rule.

Inter-national defense committee

Shortly after the Gorbachev leadership inaugurated the policy of glasnost and began freeing political prisoners, Ukrainian and Armenian dissidents formed their own committees in defense of political prisoners. In September 1987 it was announced that the two groups had decided to join forces and found a joint Ukrainian-Armenian Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners. The initial press statement issued by this body was signed by Vyacheslav Chornovil for the Ukrainians and Paruir Airikyan for the Armenians.

Not long afterwards, representatives of a new Georgian Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners joined the Ukrainians and Armenians, and

the name of their organization was changed to the Inter-National Committee in Defense of Political Prisoners.

In December the authorities showed their unease about the new unofficial activity that was focusing attention on the nationalities question by preventing Messrs. Chornovil and Airikyan from attending an unofficial human rights seminar in Moscow at which they were to have chaired a section dealing with this sensitive issue.

Despite this setback, the first meeting of the Inter-National Committee in Defense of Political Prisoners was held in Yerevan on January 12-14. It was attended by five Armenians, two Georgians and two Ukrainians. The participants called on representatives of other nationalities to join forces with their organization and issued a statement addressed to the Soviet leadership. In it they drew attention to the fact that non-Russians have traditionally made up a disproportionately large number of the Soviet Union's political prisoners and linked the Soviet government's repressive policies to the USSR's "unresolved" national problems.

The programmatic aspect

In the same document, the representatives of three national movements proposed a series of "minimal" measures to facilitate the resolution of the nationalities question.

These included the introduction of constitutional provisions in all of the non-Russian republics making the national languages there the state language; the safeguarding of cultural facilities for smaller nations without their own statehood, and for national minorities living within the borders of other republics; the repeal of clauses in the education laws that have the effect of promoting Russification; a review of national problems left over from the Stalin era; recognition of the right of peoples to be reunited with their compatriots living outside the Soviet Union; and more say for the non-Russians in the way that the USSR's resources are distributed and environmental questions handled.

Example of inter-national solidarity

The following month the unrest in connection with the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region broke out, and within a few weeks Mr. Airikyan was arrested for his role in the Armenian protests. Interestingly, he was arrested on March 25, only days after Ukrainian and Georgian dissenters had been in Yerevan for a further meeting of their inter-national committee.

The day after Mr. Airikyan's arrest, the Ukrainian representative, Pavlo Skochok, immediately issued a statement expressing the support of his Ukrainian colleagues for the Armenian activist. On May 13 the Soviet Ukrainian daily Radianska Ukraina accused Mr. Skochok of having gone to

Yerevan to agitate the Armenians to continue their protests, and of "taking it upon himself to promise them 'the support of the Ukrainian people.' "

The committee expands

Since then, the Inter-National Committee has succeeded in attracting the participation of Baltic activists. At the meeting in Lviv earlier this month, leading representatives of the national movements in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia were also present. They included Lagle Parek and Mattu Vilu from Estonia, Antanas Terleckas and Eugenijus Krikovskis from Lithuania, and Ivars Zhukovskis from Latvia.

The Georgians were represented by Merab Kostava, and the Ukrainians by seven activists, including Mr. Chornovil, Mykhailo Horyn, Stepan Khmara and Pavlo Skochok. Although Armenian representatives could not attend, they were reported to have endorsed the proceedings.

Thus, the Lviv meeting brought together an impressive group of activists and was a milestone in the development of closer cooperation between national rights campaigners in the various non-Russian republics.

The meeting issued a new appeal from the Inter-National Committee to the Soviet government. Its authors demand the release of all political prisoners and their full rehabilitation, as well as investigations into the circumstances of the deaths in recent years of a number of imprisoned dissidents. The existence of political prisoners, the signatories argue, places in question the sincerity of the authorities' stated desire to build a society with the rule of law. It is still a case of "democracy with a gagged mouth," they state.

In order to demonstrate their concern about this matter, the participants of the meeting in Lviv announced that they would be holding hunger strikes from June 13 until the start of the Communist Party conference on June 28.

Non-Russian national movements

Significantly, the non-Russian activists also announced that they were forming a Coordinating Committee of the Patriotic Movements of the Peoples of the USSR. Its objective, according to the inaugural declaration, is to provide a means of exchanging experiences among the various non-Russian "national democratic movements," coordinating activity in between meetings and elaborating a common program. It is planned to hold a follow-up meeting in Latvia in September and to issue quarterly bulletins.

In the same document, the founding members of the coordinating committee express their concern about the "inability" of the Soviet leadership to resolve the national question. They note that the Kremlin's handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, the Gromyko Commission's response to the demand of the Crimean Tatars and the way in which elections of delegates to the party conference have chosen those responsible for many of the problems

in the union republics, has both disappointed and served as a warning to non-Russians "who placed their hopes on the Soviet leadership's new course."

Apart from endorsing the positions previously adopted by the international committee, the signatories also stress that, as far as they are concerned, change for the better in the Soviet Union "is inseparably linked with the complete political and economic decentralization of the USSR, which we envisage in the future as a confederation of separate sovereign states."

Another related document calls on all other "democratic" national movements in the USSR to support the coordinating committee. It categorically opposes any attempt by "reactionary forces" to "preserve the status quo and divide us, setting Azerbaidzhanis against Armenians, Russians and Ukrainians against Crimean Tatars, Christians against Muslims, Orthodox against Catholics and inciting everyone against the Jews."

When it comes to the Russians, the founders of the coordinating committee sound something of a critical and suspicious note. Having emphasized that they consider themselves to be representatives of nations that have been "forcibly made part of the Soviet Union," the non-Russian dissenters express the view that just as in the past, so today:

"... many of the activists in the Russian democratic opposition have not yet grasped the primary axiom of democracy: nations cannot be genuinely free if they oppress other nations, or if they serve as instruments of such oppression, which amounts to the same thing. From this stems an underestimation of national problems and a fear of the radicalization of national movements, of their going beyond [making] demands in the cultural and language spheres."

A fourth document issued by the participants of the meeting in Lviv is addressed to President Ronald Reagan. Its authors express disappointment that the American leader did not raise the issue of national problems during his recent visit to the Soviet Union. The USSR, they maintain, "is anything but a union of equal peoples." It is still held together by force, and its constituent "nations find themselves in a Soviet straitjacket." The non-Russian activists end by expressing the hope that President Reagan will not abandon their cause.

Conclusion

One of the most dramatic effects of glasnost has been the way in which it has galvanized the non-Russians from the Baltic to the Caucasus. Until now, apart from non-Russian writers and cultural figures expressing interest in what is going on in other union republics, there have been few signs of any concerned activity.

Now it seems that an important start has been made by non-Russian dissidents in coordinating their activity and presenting a united front. It remains to be seen whether, even at a time of glasnost, the authorities will tolerate such a challenge.

Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika formed in Ukraine

July 24, 1988

by Dr. Roman Solchanyk

News has reached the West that a Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika has been formed in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv. The new organization, which represents a federation of several "informal" groups, was launched at a public rally on July 7 on the initiative of an "Action Group to Conduct Meetings." Between 10,000 and 20,000 people are said to have taken part in the gathering.

Earlier it had been reported that a similar group, the Popular Union to Promote Perestroika, had been formed in Kiev on June 9. Little is known of its activities. Similar "popular fronts" have recently surfaced in the Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.

The information that has become available thus far indicates that the Lviv rally – the latest in a series of recent mass public gatherings in that city – was a heated affair that witnessed verbal sparring matches between officially approved speakers and representatives of the informal groups.

From the very start, the authorities attempted to gain the upper hand by limiting the meeting's agenda to public discussion of only one topic – namely, the location of the proposed monument to the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko. This has emerged as a highly controversial local issue, involving charges that the Lviv officials are intent on downplaying the monument's significance by refusing to site it on the city's main thoroughfare.

In order to steer the discussion in the desired direction, the "authorized" speakers are reported to have opened the meeting earlier than scheduled. Observers noted the less than inconspicuous presence of specially selected "enthusiasts" in the crowd; their sole function appeared to be shouting down speakers from the informal groups.

Among the latter were Vyacheslav Chornovil, a former political prisoner and now chief editor of the unofficial journal Ukrainskyi Visnyk (Ukrainian Herald); the former political prisoners Mykhailo and Bohdan Horyn, both of whom are active in several unofficial groups, including the Inter-National Committee in Defense of Political Prisoners; and Ivan Makar, a design engineer at the Institute of Applied Problems of Mechanics and Mathematics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

Mr. Makar, together with Mr. Chornovil, the Horyn brothers, Iryna Kalynets and several others, was named in recent articles in the Lviv dailies

Vilna Ukraina and Lvovskaya Pravda that characterized the organizers of an earlier rally in Lviv as "nationalist"; Mr. Makar was singled out as "the conductor and master of ceremonies" and a "chairman" of the rally, which was held on June 16.

In spite of the efforts of the authorities, public sentiment supported the representatives of the informal groups. A resolution was adopted rejecting the officially approved site for the Shevchenko monument. At the same time, the decision was made to establish the Democratic Front, whose collective membership includes, among others, the Lviv Political Discussion Club, the Lviv branch of the Trust Group, the Public Committee of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the Lev Society, the Native Language Society, and the Jewish Cultural and Literary Society. The Lev Society and the Native Language Society have been referred to positively in the Soviet Ukrainian press.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union is a new organization. Its declaration of 20 founding principles is dated July 7. The first paragraph of the preamble states:

"The Ukrainian Helsinki Union [Spilka], as a federative association of self-ruling rights defense groups and organizations in the oblasts, raions and cities of Ukraine and beyond its borders, is being formed on the basis of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords and confirms allegiance to the rights defense principles of the group's declaration of November 9, 1976."

Little if anything is known about the Jewish group. It should be noted, however, that TASS, reporting recently on a meeting in Lviv commemorating the 45th anniversary of the destruction of the city's Jewish ghetto, remarked that "its participants discussed questions of protecting monuments of Jewish culture in Lviv Oblast, popularization of the Jewish language and literature, and supported the opening in Lviv of a Jewish school and a synagogue." It may be assumed that these activists are linked to the Jewish cultural and literary group.

The Democratic Front announced that its activities will be guided by the following "main principles":

- 1. The basic objectives of the Democratic Front are to promote perestroika; exercise public control over the democratic restructuring of government, public and party organs; cultivate democratic awareness in the public; and propagandize the ideas of perestroika.
- 2. The main thrust of the Democratic Front's activities should be participation in elections and control over their democratic conduct.
- 3. Membership in the Democratic Front is open to all who agree with its principles. Collective members of the Democratic Front may be guided by their own programs and put forth political, social, national and other demands that do not contradict general democratic principles.

Representatives of official organs, whose direct responsibility is to implement the ideas of perestroika, cannot join the Democratic Front.

- 4. The Democratic Front does not have organs defined by its main functions. Organizationally, it is a coalition whose organs only have consultative rights or executive functions.
- 5. The Democratic Front conducts its work through its collective members and support groups at enterprises, institutions, and at the local level.
- 6. The Democratic Front should influence the process of perestroika with the help of public committees, the press and other democratic methods.
- 7. The activities of the Democratic Front are guided by its statutes, which are based on the above principles.

The organizers announced that another rally is scheduled for early August, at which time a number of documents are to be made public.

In the meantime, Komsomolskaya Pravda has published its version of what transpired in Lviv on July 7. In an article appearing only three days later, the Moscow youth organ attempted to discredit the organizers of the rally, describing a group of them as "Western-supported, previously convicted 'rights defenders,' some of whom were in Moscow at a reception with President Reagan not too long ago."

Messrs. Makar, Chornovil and their supporters, it claimed, conducted the rally according to "their own scenario" and "demanded the immortalization of the memory of Banderites – members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists." The newspaper confirmed that "many thousands" took part in the meeting, but made no mention of the Democratic Front.

The formation of the Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika is the latest development stemming from a series of recent mass meetings in Lviv. The first of these, on June 16, was organized by the Action Group to Establish the T. H. Shevchenko Native Language Society, which reconstituted itself as the Action Group to Conduct Meetings. Between 6,000 and 8,000 people are reported to have gathered at the Ivan Franko monument, where they heard speakers declare "no confidence" in the local list of delegates to the 19th Communist Party Conference.

The authorities responded by promising to announce a program for the Moscow conference, as well as a new list of delegates at a public meeting scheduled for June 21 at the Druzhba Stadium. That morning, however, the city's mailboxes were filled with announcements urging residents not to attend the gathering. On the same day, Lviv's two main newspapers carried articles "exposing" the organizers of the meeting as "nationalists." Letters to the editor labeled them "nationalist and Uniate rowdies," "dependents of the CIA" and "paid agents of Western special services."

Simultaneously, authorities issued a list of 16 "Provisional Regulations for the Conduct of Meetings and Other Mass Initiatives Organized in the

Cities and Other Population Centers of Lviv Oblast."

Nonetheless, on June 21 about 50,000 people are said to have arrived at the stadium only to find that it had been "closed for repairs." A two-hour meeting outside of the stadium took place in spite of attempts to disturb the proceedings and demands by the authorities that the crowd disperse. It was decided to hold another rally on July 7. That meeting, as has now been learned, formed the Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika.

Lviv authorities crack down on public meetings

August 14, 1988

by Bohdan Nahaylo

News has reached the West about how the authorities in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv have been using force and administrative methods to prevent unofficial public meetings and unauthorized religious services.

According to the latest reports, on August 4 local police forcibly broke up a gathering in the city called by the Initiative Group of the newly formed Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika – an umbrella organization representing several "informal" groups.

Moreover, the authorities have also begun taking tougher action against members of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church after a number of unauthorized religious services last month that attracted several thousand worshippers.

For some time now the Ukrainian authorities have demonstrated their unease about the recent surge of independent public activity in Lviv. It will be recalled that in June and July three mass public meetings were held in the city, the largest of which, on June 21, attracted an estimated 50,000 people. On July 17 some 15,000 people were present when the Democratic Front was formed. The response of the authorities was to attack the organizers of the meetings in the press, issue warnings and threaten Ukrainian activists with criminal proceedings.

According to information issued by the unofficial Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the Lviv authorities did their utmost to prevent the meeting scheduled for the evening of August 4. Warnings were published in the local press pointing out that the gathering was prohibited, and the head of the initiative group, Ivan Makar, was arrested at 9 a.m. on the day of the planned meeting.

On the evening itself the militia cordoned off the statue of Ivan Franko, where the meeting was to have taken place.

Several thousand people nevertheless gathered in the surrounding streets and started singing patriotic songs. At this point special riot police with dogs were let loose on the crowds. They are reported to have beaten and

injured people, dragged some of them by their hair or feet to waiting vehicles, and seized cameras from anyone taking pictures.

The "press release" issued by the newly formed press service of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union on August 5 about the breaking up of the meeting indicates the shock and outrage which this action appears to have caused. It states:

"The barking of dogs, screaming of children and pitiful cries of women provided the final brushstrokes to the portrait: 'Democracy and Restructuring Ukrainian Style' ... Thus, on August 4, 1988, for the first time in many years, blood was shed on the pavements of Lviv, and together with it fell the last illusions of the people, who were treated by the authorities as if they were enemies."

On August 6 the Ukrainian Helsinki Union sent a protest telegram to Mikhail Gorbachev, claiming that what happened in Lviv on August 4 "is reminiscent of the methods used by the most reactionary regimes in subduing their population." In it the Ukrainian activists demanded that those "responsible for the anti-democratic pogrom" be made accountable for their actions.

(In an update on the events of August 4 in Lviv, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union's press service reported via telephone on August 8 a list of 23 persons who were known to have been detained, arrested or fined by local police, KGB and the 6th Spetsnaz [militia] Company on that evening. The 23 individuals, who range in age from 16 to 57, were reportedly held and tried one after another in proceedings that lasted until 3 a.m. the next morning.)

Meanwhile, the behavior of the western Ukrainian authorities seems also to have dashed hopes that the Soviet government may move towards legalizing the Ukrainian Catholic Church. According to a telephone interview conducted by the Associated Press with one of the leading Ukrainian Catholic activists, Ivan Hel, who is also based in Lviv, new police actions against his co-religionists "began after several church services that attracted thousands of people in July."

The activist said that on July 15 between 15,000 and 20,000 people had gathered in a village in the Ternopil region to celebrate the Millennium of the baptism of Kievan Rus'. Furthermore, on July 23 about 5,000 people met to hold a service for the victims of Stalinism.

"There is without doubt a sharp increase in pressure on the Church, and not only on the Church, but on the whole society," Mr. Hel told the AP.

He revealed that "police had broken up services, prevented rural residents from reaching other villages for services and levied heavy fines" on those taking part in unauthorized services: 300 rubles ($480) for the first offense, and up to 1,000 rubles ($1,600) for a second offense.

The AP pointed out that only in June Mr. Hel had told its representatives that the authorities had "started taking a more lenient attitude toward the [Ukrainian Catholic] Church, without granting it official status."

"Fortunate are those who remain steadfast through God's trials"

August 21, 1988

by Marta Kolomayets

JERSEY CITY, N.J. – More than 10,000 faithful, members of the outlawed Ukrainian Catholic Church, gathered in the clearing of the Zarvanytsia forest, Ternopil Oblast, to celebrate the Millennium of their Christian faith on Sunday, July 17, according to Western tourists who also participated in the religious ceremonies.

Reportedly the largest public gathering of Ukrainian Catholics in the Soviet Union since the Stalinist regime outlawed the Church in 1946, the Sunday service was celebrated by Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk of Ivano-Frankivsk.

People traveled to Zarvanytsia, the site of a shrine to the Virgin Mary and one of the most sacred places for Ukrainian Catholics, from towns and villages in the Ternopil, Lviv, Rivne and Transcarpathian oblasts to attend the Millennium services.

Some of the believers journeyed more than 1,000 kilometers (600 miles) and set up camp near the village of Zarvanytsia. Others, traveling by bus, were stopped by the police about five kilometers outside the village and ordered to turn back. The faithful refused and made the final leg of their pilgrimage on foot.

The militia kept a watchful eye over the untiring flock, frequently persuading them to disperse and return to their homes. According to Western eyewitnesses, more police appeared on the morning of July 17, accompanied by numerous party officials and Komsomol activists, but neither the stern warnings of the authorities, nor the heavy rains, which began at 2 a.m., could force the Ukrainian Catholics to break up their commemorations.

According to the Rev. Kenneth Olsen, a Ukrainian Catholic priest from British Columbia, faithful of all ages participated in a procession that wound its way to the site of the jubilee services, encircling a tall wooden cross spiked into the ground.

Bishop Vasylyk, with a handful of clergy at his side, instructed the faithful that he and his priests would hear confessions, and also offered full absolution to all who attended the service.

Members of the Committee in Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church were also present, collecting signatures for their petition for the legalization of the Church. The action, which saw bishops of the Church emerge from the underground, began in August 1987.

The document was sent to both Pope John Paul II and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and petitioned for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

To date, more than 30,000 signatures have been collected.

A service, which included the blessing of spring waters, began at 11 a.m., followed by high liturgy. Responses were sung by the faithful and more than 4,000 received the sacrament of Holy Communion.

In his moving sermon, Bishop Vasylyk, speaking into a microphone set up for the service, addressed his persecuted faithful, stating:

"Great is this day that the Lord has created. Let us rejoice in it and be jubilant. With these words I greet all of you, the sons and daughters of the Catholic Church, on this great holiday, the Millennium of the baptism of Kievan Rus'."

The hierarch spoke of the year 988, when Prince Volodymyr brought Christianity to his people, when they cast aside their pagan beliefs and inherited a new culture, a Christian culture. It is this culture, said Bishop Vasylyk, that has borne many great men.

"Fortunate are those who remain steadfast through God's trials; it is but a small cross in our lives that God's Providence has laid upon our shoulders. And fortunate are those who keep the faith, who do not stray from God's calling," said the bishop to the gathered faithful, who have endured more than four decades of persecution as members of the outlawed Church, which is known as the Church of the Catacombs.

Zarvanytsia has been regarded as a sacred site for many centuries. Although the first historical reference to the apparition of the Protectress Virgin Mary in this area was in 1458, legends date its existence back to the 13th century.

Multitudes in Lviv mark November 1 Act in historic vigil at Yaniv Cemetery

November 13, 1988

OTTAWA – Tens of thousands of Ukrainians in Lviv publicly commemorated the 70th anniversary of the November 1 Act that proclaimed the independence of western Ukraine and established the Western Ukrainian National Republic on the lands formerly ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

News of the public commemoration was reported by the Ukrainian Central Information Service and disseminated by the Ottawa-based Ukrainian Information Bureau.

Citing eyewitness sources, UCIS said that 20,000 to 50,000 persons, including several Ukrainian Catholic priests, took part in the candlelight ceremony at the historic Yaniv Cemetery on the outskirts of Lviv. According to

eyewitnesses, the crowd was described as a "sea of humanity" and others characterized the atmosphere as "very moving."

Other sources told The Ukrainian Weekly that the event marked the first time that a November 1 commemoration at the Yaniv Cemetery was held with official permission. The sources also said the clergymen officiating were believed to be the Revs. Mykhailo Havryliv and Petro Zeleniuk.

Requiem services were offered at the graves of Gen. Myron Tarnavsky, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), and Kost Levytsky, well-known publicist, lawyer and prime minister of the Western Ukrainian National Republic.

Ihor Kalynets, a national rights advocate whose activities stretch from the days of the generation of the 1960s ("Shestydesiatnyky"), read a collection of poems about the Russians' destruction of the graves of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen ("Sichovi Striltsi").

Rostyslav Bratun, a member of the official Writers' Union, delivered an address in which he spoke about fighting for the independence of Ukraine. The two-hour ceremony concluded with chants of "Slava Ukraini."

The throng sang songs of the Ukrainian "Striltsi," and the Ukrainian blue-and-yellow flag was displayed at the site of the ruined graves. The militia keenly monitored the ceremony, but made no attempt to disrupt it, the eyewitnesses reported.

U.S., Soviet officials address human rights in Moscow talks

Dissidents participate in historic meetings, voice concerns

November 27, 1988

by Roma Hadzewycz

MOSCOW – In what many observers both in the USSR and the United States described as an unprecedented series of meetings, a 14-member delegation representing the U.S. Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet met here for four days on November 14-17 to discuss a variety of human rights concerns.

The Moscow session, which culminated on Friday, November 18, with a press conference featuring U.S. and Soviet officials, was noteworthy also for the participation of approximately 100 human, national and religious rights activists, as well as refuseniks – a group representing all shades of dissent in the Soviet Union.

Among the rights activists present were 15 Ukrainians involved in the struggle for national and religious rights, including a delegation headed by Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk representing the still outlawed Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The U.S. delegation, headed by the chairman of the Helsinki Commission, Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), sought the release of all Soviet political prisoners – 179 cases were cited by the Americans – and the resolution of 600 refuseniks' cases. Though there was no concrete response from the Soviets regarding the political prisoners, officials did pledge to allow 147 refuseniks to leave the USSR, saying there were no barriers to their emigration.

Other members of the U.S. delegation, which was composed of Helsinki Commission members, as well as other members of Congress, were: Reps. Bill Richardson (D-N.M.), Christopher Smith (R-N.J.), Don Ritter (R-Pa.), John Porter (R-Ill.), Mickey Edwards (R-Okla.), John Lewis (D-Ga.), John LaFalce (D-N.Y.) and E. Clay Shaw Jr. (R-Fla.); Sens. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), the Helsinki Commission's co-chairman, and Charles Grassley (R-Iowa); Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of Defense Ronald Lehman and Assistant Secretary of Commerce Louis Laun.

Ukrainian participants

Ukrainian rights activists who participated at various times in formal and informal meetings with U.S. officials, luncheons with U.S. and Soviet delegates, and a reception at Spaso House, the official residence of the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, were: Mykhailo and Bohdan Horyn, Mykola Horbal, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Stepan Khmara, Oles Shevchenko, Serhiy Naboka, Yevhen Sverstiuk, Ivan and Maria Hel, Bishop Vasylyk, the Revs. Mykhailo Havryliv and Hryhoriy Simkailo, Mykhailo Osadchy and Mykola Muratov.

The U.S. delegation's five-day visit to the Soviet capital began on Monday, November 14, with an informal meeting at the U.S. Embassy compound with dissidents: refuseniks, Balts, Ukrainians, Russians, Pentecostals, Ukrainian Catholics, Russian Orthodox and others.

After an opening plenary session on Tuesday morning, November 15, formal sessions between the U.S. Congressional delegation and members of the Supreme Soviet were held on Tuesday and Wednesday in three working groups: freedom of religion (chaired by Sen. DeConcini), the individual and the law (Rep. Ritter, chair), and freedom of movement (Rep. Hoyer, chair).

Substantive issues raised

According to participants, many substantive issues were raised in these sessions, among them the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the release of the two Helsinki monitors still serving sentences for their

human rights activity, Lev Lukianenko and Mykola Matusevych of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, who are both serving exile sentences.

On Wednesday afternoon, November 15, the Helsinki Commission also hosted three separate luncheons which brought together Soviet officials and a smaller group of 15 dissidents. Among this group were Bishop Vasylyk and Mr. Chornovil.

According to Mr. Chornovil, a longtime human and national rights activist and veteran political prisoner, exchanges at the luncheons were forthright and substantive. Mr. Chornovil told The Weekly that Soviet officials and rights activists engaged in an unprecedented face-to-face discussion on human rights and reforms in the USSR. Among those present at the luncheon attended by Mr. Chornovil – persons hardly likely to sit down at the same table for a meal – were rights activists Lev Timofeyev and Kazys Saja, Izvestia editor Ivan Laptev and Veniamin Yakovlev of the All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Soviet Legislation.

During their stay in Moscow the U.S. delegates met also with the Commission on Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation headed by Fyodor Burlatsky.

Additionally, other meetings held outside the scope of official sessions took place between U.S. officials and Soviet dissenters. One such meeting brought several Ukrainian rights activists together with Rep. Ritter of the Helsinki Commission and Orest Deychakiwsky, a commission staffer.

A reception for members of the U.S. delegation, deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, rights activists and invited guests – several hundred persons in all – was held Thursday evening, November 17, at Spaso House.

Here one saw Ukrainian human rights activists, leaders of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Estonian national rights activists, members of the Hare Krishna sect, refuseniks and other dissidents mingling with American and Soviet officials, and speaking a variety of languages.

Many rights activists were seen thanking U.S. congressmen and senators for their years of support, and Ukrainian Catholics were observed speaking with Archbishop Theodore McCarrick of the Catholic Archdiocese in Newark, N.J. The prelate was an official observer at the U.S.-Soviet meetings in Moscow.

Among invited guests were Dr. David R. Marples of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, and Roma Hadzewycz, editor of The Ukrainian Weekly, both of whom were on a tour of journalists and scholars visiting the USSR.

The U.S. delegation's five days in Moscow came to a close on Friday, November 18, with a press conference at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was there that Rep. Hoyer described the four days of U.S.-Soviet talks as "very worthwhile," while his Soviet counterpart, Vadim Zagladin, secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and chairman of the Soviet deputies' delegation, said

the talks were a "success."

U.S. officials said they were satisfied they had been able to raise pressing human rights concerns, but that the talks had failed to meet the conditions, including release of all political prisoners, set out by Western states in order for a conference on human rights to be held in Moscow as part of the continuing Helsinki Accords review process.

Asked to sum up the feelings of the U.S. delegation at the conclusion of their meetings in Moscow, Mr. Deychakiwsky, a staffer of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, said, "for members of our delegation it was an unforgettable week – in particular our meetings with Soviet dissidents."

"Many members of our delegation," he continued, "were genuinely moved by their personal meetings with Soviet rights activists on whose behalf many of them had spoken out."

Mass meeting in Kiev focuses on ecological issues, political situation

December 4, 1988

by Dr. David Marples

KIEV – A major demonstration was held here on Chervonoarmiyska Street near the city center on November 13 with some 10,000 persons participating. (The Associated Press cited a figure of 20,000.) Although ostensibly convened to express the concern of the public over the ecological situation in the Ukrainian republic, the meeting also made several direct political statements and attacked the Kiev party hierarchy, making specific reference to First Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbytsky of the Communist Party of Ukraine and what was described as the "Brezhnevite" party apparatus in Ukraine.

Speakers interviewed have stated that they regard the demonstration as the first public step toward the formation of a Democratic Front to Promote Perestroika in Ukraine.

The demonstration was organized by four groups: the Ukrainian cultural heritage group Spadshchyna; Hromada, a student group from the University of Kiev; the ecological group Zelenyi Svit (Green World); and the informal ecological group called Noosfera.

Speakers at the meeting included well-known Ukrainian literary figures such as Yuriy Shcherbak and Dmytro Pavlychko, members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, such as Oles Shevchenko and Ivan Makar, representatives of the "green movements" and movements to form democratic fronts from Latvia and Lithuania, and activists from other parts of Ukraine, including Rostyslav

Bratun, a representative of the Lviv group called Lev Society (Tovarystvo Leva).

The Ukrainian press reported on the meeting initially in only two daily newspapers, neither of which is available in the West: Vechirniy Kyiv and Prapor Komunizmu. In the former newspaper, which published the most detailed of the two accounts, only selected speeches were publicized and the more controversial statements made by the meeting were omitted. Its focus was on the speeches of Dr. Shcherbak and a representative of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, F. Ya. Shipunov.

Ivan Makar speaks

The most explosive remarks, however, were made by Mr. Makar, who had been released only five days earlier from prison following his participation in a similar meeting in the city of Lviv this summer.

When Mr. Makar stepped forward to speak, the police, who were in attendance in the hundreds, switched off the microphones so that he was forced to shout his speech.

Mr. Makar stated that ecology should not be separated from social politics. He maintained that emphasis should be on "draconian laws" that the Supreme Soviet was about to pronounce upon (presumably the amendments to the USSR Constitution which, it was felt, would effectively nullify the right of republics to secede from the union). He went on to comment that coercion of Ukrainian citizens is continuing and that "our republic will not be granted any sovereignty."

He maintained that Ukrainians should align closely in their activities with the people of the Baltic republics and form a "truly national front." By doing this, he continued, Ukrainians could resolve their cultural, language and economic problems. If they did not work in close coordination with the Balts, however, then even if thousands of such meetings were held, Ukrainians would be unable to have any influence on party First Secretary Shcherbytsky or Ukrainian Minister of Health Anatoliy Romanenko.

Ecological catastrophe

Another controversial speech was made by Mr. Shipunov. He reportedly stated that the Ukrainian nation was approaching an ecological catastrophe and was virtually living within a single nuclear reactor (i.e., there are too many nuclear reactors in the republic). He considered that the nuclear program for building reactors in the republic constituted a "horrible crime" against the Ukrainian nation.

He pointed out that dangerous changes had been monitored in the ozone layer in the Kiev area, and that in the immediate future it was essential to remove and dismantle all the Ukrainian nuclear power plants and hydroelectric stations. He stated that although the Ukrainian SSR constitutes 2.7 percent of

Soviet territory it produces 50 percent of Soviet nuclear-generated electricity.

Dr. Shcherbak was cited as stating that Ukraine accounts for 23 percent of Soviet nuclear capacity. Neither figure is accurate, however, as for both production of electricity and capacity, Ukraine's share is around 34 percent of the Soviet total.

Resolutions presented

At the end of the meeting, one of the organizers presented a series of resolutions, which were not published in the accounts in the two newspapers, or indeed even cited. The resolutions are intended to form the basis of a petition that is to be circulated around the republic and ultimately sent to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. They embrace both ecological and political issues.

It is stated that the ecological situation in the world, and especially in Ukraine, is menacing and requires social action. Also, it was pointed out that the party apparatus in Ukraine does not represent the interests of the Ukrainian people and "thoughtlessly exploits natural resources."

It was pointed out in the resolutions that the whole truth about the Chornobyl disaster still has not been revealed and that the authorities are continuing to propagate the "myth" of the lack of energy alternatives to nuclear power. In addition to the 12 nuclear reactors in operation in the republic, a further 22 are planned.

First and foremost, it was stated, the demonstrators demanded that building work on the nuclear reactors at the Crimean and Chyhyryn stations be halted and that no new reactors should be constructed in Ukraine. The expansion of existing stations should also be brought to a halt, it was emphasized, and the three reactors now functioning at the Chornobyl plant should be switched off and the plant closed down completely.

The resolutions stated that reactors currently in operation in Ukraine should be examined by experts to ascertain whether their safety technology meets international standards. In other industries, it was felt that ecologically damaging industries in densely populated regions must be liquidated with future construction curtailed.

Attention was focused on the energy complex of South Ukraine (where a nuclear power plant and hydroelectric station are being built in conjunction with each other on the South Buh River in Mykolayiv Oblast). The resolutions declared that no further work should be undertaken on the complex until ecological studies have been undertaken.

Lift "veil of secrecy"

Also on ecology, it was stressed that the "veil of secrecy" over ecological issues must be lifted. (Only two days before the rally, it was reported that a chemical factory outside Kiev had emitted poisonous gas into the atmos-

phere. The only official account of this incident was a newspaper report that denied that there had been an accident.) A special ecological bulletin is to be established in the Ukrainian SSR. On matters pertaining to ecology, according to the resolutions, referenda must be held.

The meeting was stopped by the authorities after two and a half hours had transpired of the allotted four-hour timespan, evidently triggered by Mr. Makar's controversial speech. The fact that it was held and that speakers often departed from the officially sanctioned theme of ecology to demand a Democratic Front in Ukraine and to attack Mr. Shcherbytsky personally indicates a growing populist movement in Ukraine and shows increasing dissatisfaction with the current political situation.

The meeting was attended not only by members of the four groups but by a wide variety of officials, including some local party members. Conservative speeches defending the ecological situation in the republic were roundly booed.

However, the absence of detailed and accurate accounts in the press about the meeting suggests that the progress of glasnost in Ukraine still has a long way to go.

Initiative group seeks renewal of Ukrainian Orthodox Church

March 5, 1989

by Bohdan Nahaylo

A group of Ukrainian Christians led by a priest ordained in the Russian Orthodox Church have announced the formation of the Initiative Committee for the Renewal of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

In their inaugural statement, dated February 15 and addressed to the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR and to the international Christian community, the five founding members condemn the suppression of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church during the Stalin era and maintain that the Russian Orthodox Church "is not capable of satisfying the needs of Ukrainian Orthodox believers."

Background

Kievan Rus' was Christianized in 988. The majority of Ukrainian Christians have traditionally belonged to the Orthodox faith. In 1596, at the Union of Brest, some Ukrainian believers joined with Rome, becoming "Uniates," or Catholics of the Eastern Rite – that is, they retained the Eastern rite in worship.

It was not until 1685-1686 that Ukrainian Orthodoxy, hitherto under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, was absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church. Western Ukraine, which was under Austro-Hungarian and later Polish rule, became a bastion of Ukrainian Catholicism, while Russian-ruled Ukraine became the preserve of Orthodoxy.

Soon after the revolutions of 1917 a Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was established and, during the years that it was officially tolerated by the Soviet authorities, enjoyed remarkable success among Ukrainian Orthodox believers.

In the late 1920s, though, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was "liquidated" and its members forcibly amalgamated into the Russian Orthodox Church. In fact, the suppression of the vibrant Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church marked one of the first stages of the Stalinist assault against all forms of Ukrainian national assertiveness. During the Nazi occupation of Ukraine the Church was revived, only to be destroyed again when Soviet forces returned.

The Soviet line since then has been to remain silent about the history of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in the 1920s and, while ignoring the behavior of Russian Orthodox bishops and clergy in the German-occupied areas, to discredit the Ukrainian "autocephalists," together with the Ukrainian Catholic Church, as "collaborationist" Churches.

In the post-war period both the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church have been banned in the Soviet Union. The former has survived in the underground as a "catacomb" Church, and in recent years its members have been conducting a vigorous campaign for its legalization.

Until recently, however, there was relatively little evidence about the attitudes of Ukrainian Orthodox believers. Here it is worth noting that eastern Ukraine, together with Byelorussia (where an autocephalous Byelorussian Orthodox Church was established under German rule) are known to have been the two regions that were hardest hit by Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign.

Over the years, though, Ukrainian dissidents have sought to keep the issue of Ukrainian Orthodoxy alive. This question became especially pertinent last year when the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kremlin approached the celebrations of the Millennium of the Christianization of Kievan Rus' from an exclusively Russocentric position.

Father Mykhailechko's stand

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox cause was recently given impetus by the bold stand taken by a Russian Orthodox priest, Father Bohdan Mykhailechko, at the inaugural conference of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society that was held in Kiev on February 11-12.

Addressing an impressive gathering of hundreds of representatives of the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia and patriotically minded groups from throughout Ukraine, the Rev. Mykhailechko strongly attacked the "Russificatory" policy which he claimed the Russian Orthodox Church has been pursuing with respect to Ukraine since tsarist times.

He also condemned the Russian Orthodox Church's continuing "war" against the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches.

This is not only the first time on record that a Ukrainian priest from within the Russian Orthodox Church has broken ranks (the Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk was a political prisoner when he did so in the 1970s), but also the first time that the issue of the banned Ukrainian Churches has been raised in this way in the public arena.

Father Mykhailechko's biography

From what relatively little information is currently available about the Rev. Mykhailechko, it seems that Ukrainian patriotism has caused him quite a few problems in the past. According to a letter that he recently wrote to a Western addressee, he is 32 years old and used to live in the Lviv Oblast in western Ukraine.

He repeatedly failed entry examinations to the Moscow Russian Orthodox seminary. Eventually he was informed by the rector, Archbishop Vladimir, currently the metropolitan of Rostov, that the real reason why he was being barred from studying in the seminary was that the local authorities in the Lviv Oblast had characterized him as "politically unreliable."

Here it is worth noting that in 1977 the bishop of Poltava, Feodosy, complained among other things in a letter to Leonid Brezhnev about the political suspicion with which clergy from western Ukraine are regarded.

Finally, Mr. Mykhailechko was ordained by the Russian Orthodox archbishop of Riga, Leonid, and given a parish in Elgava in Latvia. Nevertheless, he was still denied the opportunity to complete his theological studies on the same grounds as before. After his courageous speech at the conference of the Ukrainian Language Society, the Rev. Mykhailechko was at first suspended from his duties and, on February 17, forced by the Church authorities to sign a statement relinguishing his pastoral duties.

Initiative group is formed

On February 15 the Rev. Mykhailechko and four others, Taras Antoniuk, Anatoliy Bytchenko, Mykola Budnyk and Larysa Lokhvytska, announced the formation of the Initiative Group for the Restoration of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church.

Mr. Antoniuk is the son of the former Ukrainian prisoner Zinoviy

Antoniuk. Ms. Lokhvytska is a former political prisoner and together with Mr. Bytchenko has been active in the informal Kiev-based Ukrainian Culturological Club. Mr. Budnyk is a resident of the Zhytomyr Oblast; at present no further details are known about him.

Initiative group's statement

The members of the initiative group begin their inaugural statement with the following words:

"Important changes are taking place in the spiritual life of our country. Even though this process is inconsistent and contradictory, light has now been shed on many problems that urgently need to be resolved. One of these is the religious question in the Ukrainian SSR, where Ukrainian believers have for decades been labeled as 'enemies of the people' and 'nationalists.' The majority of the population was deprived of the opportunity to preach, or to study in religious schools, especially in their native language."

Rejecting the tutelage of the Russian Orthodox Church, the authors strongly condemn the latter's policy towards their co-nationals:

"The hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church illegally usurped jurisdiction over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as far back as in 1685, shortly after the so-called reunification of Ukraine with Russia, and it still does not recognize the existence of a separate Ukrainian national religious tradition as such, complete with its own culture, language and rite; in other words, the Russian Orthodox Church still holds to a chauvinistic approach to the national question. Orthodox Ukraine cannot agree to such an anti-evangelical and anti-canonical practice. We, as a civilized nation, have an indisputable right to our own independent autocephalous Church."

The authors go on to trace the history of Ukrainian Orthodoxy from the Christianization of Kievan Rus' until the establishment of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the early 1920s. They point out that during the latter's nine-year existence it had over 5,000 parishes, 4,000 or so priests and 32 bishops led by Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky.

During the Stalinist suppression of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the authors continue, most of the Ukrainian Orthodox leaders died the deaths of martyrs in camps, prisons and places of exile. Ukrainian Churches were destroyed on a massive scale, and the remaining ones were handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church, which to this day continues to be hostile towards the idea of "Ukrainian" Orthodoxy.

The founders of the initiative group state that their intention is to seek redress for Ukrainian Orthodox believers through the restoration and legalization of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. They announce that they intend to start campaigning for these ends and will seek the registration of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox communities.

They also appeal to Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios, to Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox believers in the West, and to all Orthodox, Christians and people of good will to support their cause.

"We want," they declare in the statement's final sentence, "like all civilized people, to communicate with God in our own native language."

Conclusion

The formation of the initiative group provides Ukrainian Orthodoxy with a new voice and further highlights the already salient overlap between national and religious questions in Ukraine. It places further pressure on the Soviet authorities and the Moscow Patriarchate to recognize the grievances and aspirations of Ukrainian believers and to extend glasnost and democratization to them.

But, as both the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate are well aware, over half of the functioning Russian Orthodox Churches are located in Ukraine. This, and historic factors that have shaped Russian-Ukrainian relations, make this a delicate and politically charged question.

Ukrainian Memorial Society confronts vestiges of Stalinism in Ukraine

March 12, 1989

by Bohdan Nahaylo

Another important informal association has gotten off to an impressive start in Ukraine, strengthening the forces pushing for genuine democratization and national renewal in the republic. On March 4 the Ukrainian Memorial Society held its inaugural conference in Kiev. The following day, several thousand people are reported to have taken part in the society's first public rally, which also took place in the Ukrainian capital.

Like its namesake in Moscow, the Ukrainian Memorial Society is committed to honoring the victims of Stalinism and cleansing Soviet society of Stalinist vestiges, but it places its focus on Ukraine, and there is a national element in the goals it has set itself.

Background

It is not surprising that in Ukraine, which suffered so much at the hands of the Stalinist regime, there has been a strong response to the new anti-Stalin campaign that has developed since Mikhail Gorbachev ushered in glasnost and

democratization. The Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia, especially the writers, as well as a host of new informal groups, have sought a more honest depiction of Ukraine's recent past and the rehabilitation of the victims of political terror.

By last summer, for example, members of the Writers' Union of Ukraine were calling for erection of a monument in Kiev to the millions of victims of Stalin's man-made famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933, and the preparation of "White Books" on this tragedy, as well as on political persecution from the 1930s right up until the 1970s.

Towards the end of 1988 Memorial groups based on the original association by that name that had been founded in Moscow began to appear in Ukraine. One of the Ukrainian initiators, a former political prisoner and pensioner, I. A. Reznychenko, wrote a letter to Sovietskaya Kultura proposing that a "regional section" of Memorial be formed in Ukraine. He received favorable responses from readers in various cities in the republic and in the first part of October a meeting was held in Kiev of people who were interested in founding a Ukrainian Memorial Society.

At the end of November a plenum of the board of the Ukrainian Writers' Union expressed its support for the fledgling movement. One of the resolutions adopted at the meeting stated: "We consider the W[riters'] U[nion] of U[kraine] to be one of the sponsors of the republican historical-educational society Memorial – a public organization whose aim is to investigate Stalinist crimes, repressions and the famine in Ukraine of 1932-1933."

A few days later, a coordinating group to form a Memorial Society in Ukraine met in Kiev. According to Radio Kiev, the initiators included representatives of the "creative intelligentsia, clergy, workers, officials, students and also former inmates of Stalin's camps." On December 28, the workers' daily Robitnycha Hazeta announced that an Initiative Group of the Memorial Society had also been formed in Kharkiv and that it consisted of about 40 activists.

Official reaction

From the relatively scant information that has appeared in the Ukrainian press about the Ukrainian Memorial Society, it can be safely assumed that the defenders of the status quo in Ukraine have not been too enthusiastic about this organization.

After all, the Moscow Memorial Society is known to be supported by some of the USSR's most liberal cultural figures, while in Byelorussia a Memorial-type association has mobilized considerable public support and become a thorn in the side of the republic's authorities.

Vinnytsia and Bykivnia

What has been particularly telling has been the attitude of the authorities in Ukraine on the issue of Kuropaty- or Katyn-like sites in the republic

where there are known or suspected to be mass graves of political prisoners executed during the Stalin era.

For instance, the Ukrainian press and the authorities are still silent about what occurred in Vinnytsia in the late 1930s, even though during the war the Germans publicized the discovery of mass graves in the city containing almost 10,000 victims, all of whom had been killed by shots in the back of the neck.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Robert Conquest have described the crimes committed in Vinnytsia in "The Gulag Archipelago" and "The Great Terror," respectively.

The official attitude towards the case of what seems to be a similar site at Bykivnia, near Kiev, is also indicative. Last summer the authorities created a monument there on which it is stated that the grave contains the victims of "the Fascist occupiers."

Local residents, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the informal Kiev-based Ukrainian Culturological Club and more recently the Ukrainian Memorial Society, however, have collected evidence which indicates the mass executions were carried out on the site by the NKVD in the late 1930s. This public pressure has forced the authorities in Kiev to re-examine the origin of the mass grave.

Memorial meeting in Ivano-Frankivske

One further example of the attitude of the authorities in Ukraine should be mentioned. On January 29, an informal historical-cultural society in the western Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivske called Rukh (Movement) organized a public meeting to commemorate the victims of Stalinism. Local officials turned up, though, and sought to transform the gathering into a meeting to honor "the victims of the Banderist movement," that is, the Ukrainian nationalist resistance of the 1940s. Instead of supporting Rukh's calls for a monument to be put up in Ivano-Frankivske to those killed under Stalin, the local officials unsuccessfully proposed that a monument be erected to those who perished at the hands of "the nationalists."

Emerges at critical moment

The inaugural conference of the Ukrainian Memorial Society took place at a very delicate moment. Relations between the Shcherbytsky regime and those pressing for change in Ukraine are highly strained. In particular, since the end of last year Ukrainian literati have been under fire from the party authorities in Kiev for defiantly attempting to form a Ukrainian Baltic-type popular movement for restructuring.

Matters came to a head in February when Literaturna Ukraina published a Draft Program of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring proposed by initiative groups of the Kiev Branch of the

Writers' Union and of the Institute of Literature of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences.

Not only are writers actively involved in the Ukrainian Memorial Society, but also, among other things, their draft program emphasizes a certain overlap in goals between the new movement that they want to create and Memorial's.

But this is not all. Coming so soon after the first republican conference in January of the Ukrainian ecological Green World (Zeleny Svit) association and the inaugural conference on February 11-12 of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, the crystallization of yet another significant organization that is opposed to the status quo in Ukraine strengthens the challenge to the defenders of the old order.

Memorial's inaugural conference

The weekend on which the Ukrainian Memorial Society was launched coincided with the 36th anniversary of Stalin's death. Close to 500 people from throughout Ukraine are reported to have taken part in the society's inaugural conference, including representatives of the Ukrainian cultural society Slavutych in Moscow, the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church, and the main Ukrainian "dissident" organization – the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. Three representatives of the Latvian Baltic Front were present, as well as American and French diplomatic observers.

Among those who delivered the opening addresses was the poet and member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party Borys Oliynyk, who made an outspoken speech at the 19th Party Conference. Quite a few former political prisoners were present and two of them, Mykhailo Horyn and Yevhen Proniuk, were elected to the society's republican coordinating council.

In their discussions the delegates did not limit themselves to the famine of 1932-1933 and the purges of the 1930s. For example, a representative from Cherkassy raised the issue of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought both the Nazis and Soviet forces, and was not suppressed until the early 1950s. He called for a sober appraisal of the conditions that drove people into the Ukrainian anti-Soviet resistance movement.

Another speaker, Ihor Droboshtan, who was a leader of an uprising in the Vorkuta camps after Stalin's death, maintained that former victims of Stalinism be given not just "moral," but also material compensation, some of which should go to the Ukrainian Memorial Group's fund.

A third delegate, Mykhailo Horyn, a former political prisoner and a leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, pointed out that there were still a number of Ukrainian political prisoners and urged the society to campaign for the release of all those who have been imprisoned for their views.

(panakhyda) service for those buried near Bykivnia.

The mass grave had been uncovered a day after the Nazis entered Kiev in 1941. The exhumation revealed fresh cadavers: a woman with her infant child and many men. Photographs of these atrocities were published widely in the German occupation newspapers throughout Ukraine. The Germans also brought a local priest to the site and had him celebrate a requiem service.

The head of the Kievan branch of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, Oles Shevchenko, told the St. Sophia Association that the branch is gathering detailed information about this incident of Stalinist terror.

A woman has recently come forth and told of how, during one of the times that the grave was dug up, not only were local residents' bodies found but also the bodies of slain Polish Army officers. This statement was made to Ukrainian Helsinki Union member Zinoviy Melnyk.

The Ukrainian Memorial Society held its inaugural conference in Kiev on March 4. The following day several thousand people participated in the society's first public rally focusing on honoring the victims of Stalinism and filling in the "blank spots" of Ukrainian history related to that period, including the 1932-1933 Great Famine in which 7 million perished.

CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES CONVENES

Ukrainian faithful in Moscow raise Catholic Church issue

May 28, 1989

MOSCOW – More than 400 faithful took part in a Ukrainian Catholic moleben in front of the Moskva Hotel on Thursday morning, May 25, as newly elected deputies to the Congress of People's Deputies filed past them on their way to the first session of this parliament, according to Ivan Hel, head of the Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, who spoke with the Ukrainian Press Bureau based in Rome.

The faithful, many of whom have been on a hunger strike since Monday, May 22, took part in the 9 a.m. public memorial service at the hotel, Revolution Plaza and Karl Marx Street, called for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Soviet Union. A delegation of 150 to 200 Ukrainians from western Ukraine, among them Mr. Hel, took part in a two-and-a-half-hour service celebrated by the Rev. Petro Zeleniukh.

As they took part in the service, the newly elected deputies took notice of this peaceful protest. One of the deputies was Rostyslav Bratun, elected by the Lviv region residents. Well-acquainted with Mr. Hel, he stopped and

asked what it was Mr. Hel's delegation wanted. Mr. Hel asked Mr. Bratun to bring up the legalization of the Church, which was liquidated by the Soviet government in 1946 and "reunited with the Russian Orthodox Church."

Mr. Bratun then reportedly responded that he is now a people's deputy and if this is what his constituents want, this is the issue he will raise, if not during the opening session, then at the next session, according to the Ukrainian Catholic Press Bureau.

Mr. Hel then delivered greetings from Cardinal Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky to the faithful gathered in Moscow. These warm greetings were conveyed to Mr. Hel during a telephone conversation he had with Rome on Wednesday, May 24.

On that day, an estimated 500 persons attended a public service on Moscow's Arbat, Mr. Hel reported. That service also was celebrated by the Rev. Zeleniukh; 200 Ukrainian Catholic faithful and 300 Moscow citizens took part in that event.

Speaking on behalf of the faithful, Mr. Hel stated: "We called upon Soviet citizens present to support President Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of democracy and change in the Soviet Union. We said that if those policies are true, then the Ukrainian Catholic Church should be legalized. We asked if those present would support a call for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and all 500 hands went up into the air," he reported about the May 24 service.

According to the Ukrainian Catholic Press Bureau, the Ukrainian Catholic delegation in Moscow receives a steady stream of faithful arriving from Ukraine every day. After the Thursday moleben a large group went back to the Arbat, near the bookstore Ukrainskaya Kniga, where it continues its hunger strike. Mr. Hel reported that about 25 to 30 percent of these participants are young; they feel inspired by the events taking place in China today. And although originally their hunger strike was to continue until Saturday, May 27, given the fact that many of the hunger strikers are young, they may decide to extend their protest-hunger strike for a longer amount of time.

Mr. Hel also reported that the militia, which kept a watchful eye over the protesters both at the Moskva Hotel and on the Arbat, did not harass the demonstrators in any way. This handling of the demonstration was quite different than the harassment Ukrainian Catholics have experienced in Lviv, Mr. Hel noted.

While the Ukrainian Catholic faithful continue their hunger strike, the delegation of three Ukrainian Catholic bishops and three Ukrainian Catholic priests ended its hunger strike on Friday, May 19. The six began their protest in the lobby of the building of the Supreme Soviet on Wednesday, May 17, in an effort to force Soviet leaders to meet with them regarding the legalization of their Church in Ukraine.

Shcherbytsky assails "Rukh" and Ukrainian Helsinki Union

June 4, 1989

by Dr. Roman Solchanyk

Leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, addressing a plenum of the CPU Central Committee on May 16, assailed both the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika, known as "Rukh," and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, making it clear that the party views both groups as its main political opponents.

Although referring to the existence of "about 15 groups that are overtly destructive and anti-socialist in their orientation," most of what Mr. Shcherbytsky had to say about ideological problems in the republic focused precisely on these two organizations.

The harshest words were reserved for the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which Mr. Shcherbytsky described as being characterized by "extreme political adventurism and an open anti-Soviet position." The Ukrainian party chief told the plenum that the core of this group is centered in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv and is made up of people "known for their nationalist views."

Many of them were released from incarceration, he continued, under the condition that they would not engage in hostile activities against the state. But these pledges, he asserted, are being openly and brazenly violated: "The leaders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union are following a line [aimed at] undermining the constitutional laws and order; rehabilitating the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists]; and developing a broad 'national,' more precisely, a nationalist movement for the secession of Ukraine from the USSR."

As proof of this he cited the May 1 demonstration in Lviv, where representatives of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union were said to be shouting "nationalist slogans" and carrying the pre-Soviet blue-yellow national flag.

The party's attitude towards the Helsinki activists comes as no surprise. For some time now they have been subjected to scathing attacks in the press, particularly in the oblast and city newspapers and on local television. What is interesting, however, is First Secretary Shcherbytsky's claim that now "the extremist formations" are attempting to penetrate the "worker's collectives" and set up organization networks there.

The Ukrainian party leader voiced concern over the ease with which they are able to conduct unsanctioned rallies and meetings, warning "that this can no longer go on." He also called on the Lviv Oblast Party Committee

to finally "make a political evaluation of the activities and plans of this group," arguing that hesitation could result in "unforeseen consequences."

Mr. Shcherbytsky's remarks about the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika were somewhat less hostile, but unmistakably negative. He characterized Rukh as "a new political structure" that aims at mass appeal and "would stand above the organs of Soviet power and, in essence, would be in opposition to the CPSU." It is no accident, he noted, that the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and similar groups have announced their joining the movement.

According to Mr. Shcherbytsky, "the toilers do not accept the ideas of national exclusion, in essence, the separatist goals that the Popular Movement of Ukraine is imbued with, realizing that they run counter to the demands of perestroika and that they are destructive in character. Our people are seriously concerned and alarmed that the development of events could lead to the situation that has come about in the Baltic states and Transcaucasia."

In spite of such an unequivocal evaluation of Rukh's views and activities, Mr. Shcherbytsky provided an opening for its members and proponents to rejoin the fold, as it were. This is explained by the fact that the movement was initiated by respectable and well-known writers in Kiev and, as Mr. Shcherbytsky admitted, party members are sitting on its coordination council.

In this sense, therefore, the Popular Movement is much more of an embarrassment to the authorities than the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, whose members can be dismissed as "misfits," "criminals" and the like. For the same reasons, the movement is probably viewed as more dangerous because of its potential for attracting more supporters.

These considerations were no doubt uppermost in the minds of the Ukrainian party leadership when it launched a concerted attack on the movement in the republican press, primarily in the form of irate letters from "the public."

This anxiety about the movement is reflected in a document titled "On Work to Counteract Attempts to Form the So-Called Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika," which bears all the signs of a directive from the Dnipropetrovske Oblast Party Committee. After evaluating the organization's program, which is characterized as a piece of "political plagiarism" – i.e., its positive aspects are said to have been taken from party documents and the negative aspects from various informal groups, the document proceeds to outline specific measures that the Dnipropetrovske Oblast Party Committee deems necessary to "activate party influence in counteracting the Popular Movement of Ukraine."

These include:

- (1) keeping close watch over the movement and similar groups, and working with their leaders "on an individual basis" and with the backing of the labor collectives where they work;

- (2) instructing party commissions to investigate "with all severity" those party members taking part in the activities of groups that are in opposition to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union;
- (3) organizing meetings of party, Komsomol and trade union committees, as well as other mass and public organizations at all levels in order to evaluate, criticize and censure the movement's draft program;
- (4) activating discussion of the draft program in the mass media, "and in the process referring to the extremely negative consequences of the formation of popular fronts in the Baltic republics";
- (5) initiating criticism of the draft program at meetings with candidates for people's deputies; and
- (6) increasing the responsibility of all party workers and the ideological "aktiv" with regard to carrying out "the appropriate organizational and political work on a local basis to counteract the attempts to form cells of the Popular Movement of Ukraine in worker's collectives."

Clearly, Mr. Shcherbytsky and his colleagues are concerned about the challenge that nationally motivated groups, and specifically the movement, pose to the party's continued monopoly of the perestroika process. The danger stems from the explosive national question, which has the potential to make itself felt in virtually any sphere.

As a case in point, Mr. Shcherbytsky noted the "severe national overtones that have recently come to characterize ecological questions. "One cannot help but see," said the Ukrainian party leader, "that nationalist manifestations are at times taking on an aggressive and overtly anti-Soviet character in many parts of the republic."

150,000 Catholics march in Lviv; Lubachivsky looks to legalization

September 24, 1989

ROME – An estimated 150,000 Ukrainian Catholics marched through the streets of Lviv on Sunday, September 17, to demand that the Kremlin restore their Church's legal status, reported the Ukrainian Press Bureau based in Rome.

The crowd of faithful, which some sources in Ukraine report numbered 200,000 to 250,000, took part in the largest demonstration of Ukrainian Catholics since World War II. The day also marked the 50th anniversary of the Soviet takeover of Lviv in 1939 and was commemorated with black ribbons draping Ukrainian national flags, crosses and Church banners held in the daylong demonstration, reported the St. Sophia Religious Association of

Ukrainian Catholics in Canada.

In response to the Sunday demonstration, Cardinal Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, said: "It sends a message to the Soviet government: legalize our Church." He added that the demonstration proved, without a doubt, to both the Soviet government and Western observers that the estimated 5 million Ukrainian Catholics in the Soviet Union are loyal to their Church and to the Vatican.

The cardinal, who is the archbishop major of Lviv of the Ukrainian Catholics and metropolitan of the Lviv Archeparchy, told Reuters on Thursday, September 21, that the outlawed Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Soviet Union is likely to be legalized as a result of November's scheduled meeting between Pope John Paul II and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

He said that the Vatican had set discussion of the banned Church as a condition for the meeting, the first between a pope and a Kremlin leader. "We expect everything from the holy father and his talks with Gorbachev. He promised to defend us, and so we can expect many things from him," he said. "There is a very strong possibility that our Church in Ukraine will regain its rights. We must plan for that day," said the 76-year-old primate, who is based in Rome.

On Sunday, September 17, in Lviv the participants gathered on Pidvalna Street, near the regional Communist Party headquarters; an observer estimated the crowd which overflowed into a nearby park at 150,000. Here 16 Ukrainian Catholic priests concelebrated the divine liturgy. Among them were the Rev. Ivan Lopatchuk, who served 25 years in the labor camps; the Rev. Mykhailo Nyskohuz, who last May left the Russian Orthodox Church and along with his parish members joined the Ukrainian Catholic Church; and the Revs. Petro Zeleniukh, Ivan Bufan, Mykola Kostiuk, Vasyl Voronivsky and Mykhailo Havryliv.

The crowd gathered strength as it marched down a major thoroughfare (Lomonosov Street) to the former cathedral of the Ukrainian Catholic primate of Ukraine. The Cathedral of St. George was given to the Russian Orthodox Church when Stalin ordered the destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in 1946 and has become a symbol of the Soviet repression of the Church.

The crowd, when it reached the Church of St. George, was estimated to have reached 250,000 people. Joining in the demonstrations were representatives of the Baltic peoples and of other towns in the area of Lviv. However, on that Sunday morning police roadblocks stopped traffic moving into Lviv and turned back all those who were not residents of the city.

In front of St. George's the priests celebrated a moleben, and Ivan Hel, chairman of the Committee in Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, called on the crowd to give a show of hands of who favored the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Thousands of hands were thrust into the air.

A telegram addressed to President Mikhail Gorbachev and Pope John

Paul II, and calling for the legalization of the Church was read. Also read was a letter of the creative intelligentsia of Lviv and the deputies to the Congress of People's Deputies addressed to the president of the USSR. The letter, signed by official and unofficial personages: intellectuals, artists, university professors and politicians – called for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

After the conclusion of the service many demonstrators then walked to the city center, where at 7 p.m. they lined the streets, holding candles in a solemn manifestation of their desire to see their Church regain legal status.

The leader of the day's proceedings, Mr. Hel, appealed to the faithful to go home and at 10 p m. turn their lights and televisions off, and light candles for one-half hour in their windows. An observer described this moment as wonderful – many apartments and homes around her home turned the lights off and she could see hundreds of candles flickering in the windows, reported the St. Sophia Association.

The Committee in Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church applied a number of weeks ago for permission to conduct the mass rally on September 17. However, Lviv city authorities delayed making a decision on the permit. By mid-week Lviv Mayor Kotyk insisted that the permit issue be resolved and his recommendation was that it be granted. When the City Council met the vote was 7-5 against allowing the permit. It had become apparent that authorities in Kiev, Ukraine's capital, were putting pressure on Lviv officials to prevent the demonstration.

Following the unfavorable vote, Mr. Kotyk announced that if the result were not changed he would see it as a vote of no confidence and resign. This threat from the city's mayor resulted in the City Council withdrawing its decision and declaring that no position would be taken on the issue.

AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

Triumphant founding congress of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova

September 24, 1989

by Jaroslaw Koshiw
Special to The Ukrainian Weekly

KIEV – On September 8-10 in the city of Kiev, capital of Ukraine, the impossible happened. Over 1,000 political activists opposed to the rule of Moscow held a congress to demand an independent Ukrainian state. The del-

egates represented regional (oblast) organizations of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova or, in Ukrainian, Rukh.

The hall of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute was festooned with the hitherto forbidden blue-and-yellow national flags and tridents. Delegates covered their chests with badges of these symbols of Ukrainian independence. Outside the hall stood large crowds of supporters with blue-and-yellow flags, listening to the proceedings broadcast through loudspeakers.

The Kiev militia, with special riot troops at the ready, stood by. For the first time in Kiev, no one was arrested for displaying a Ukrainian flag or badge.

After three full days of explosive and chaotic debates, which at times threatened to destroy the congress, the Popular Movement adopted a statute, program and resolutions, and elected leaders. Originally, Rukh founders proposed that it recognize the leading role of the Communist Party. However, by the time of the Popular Movement congress, this didn't even appear in the proposed program and was not even debated. The most immediate demand of the congress was for direct and democratic elections for the presidency and the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

Late Sunday evening, after the congress had ended, delegates and supporters marched with blue-and-yellow flags about a mile to the statue of the 19th century awakener of Ukraine, poet Taras Shevchenko. There they held an enthusiastic midnight rally addressed by Rukh leaders, and Adam Michnik and Volodymyr Mokry from Poland's Solidarity.

The congress witnessed a number of dramatic moments. The two appearances at the podium of Leonid Kravchuk, chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Department of Ideology, astonished the delegates. His call for the movement to cooperate with the reformist elements of the party added a new and unexpected dimension to the proceedings. He warned the Popular Movement that it was not equal to the forces opposing it and called on it to scale down its demands.

The appearance of the more acceptable face of the party, Ivan Saliy, one of the Kiev party leaders, cheered the delegates. His call for the resignation of Ukraine's party boss, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, was met with thunderous applause.

The congress was electrified by the appearance of a Soviet troop commander from western Ukraine, Col. Vilen Martyrosian. A USSR Supreme Soviet deputy representing the Ukrainian town of Rivne and a member of Rukh, he told the delegates that he and like-minded commanders had decided to take the side of the people if an attempt was made to impose a military solution on the political problems of Ukraine. If that wasn't enough, the head of the Kiev Militia, Shapochka, sent greetings to the congress and wished it success.

No less dramatic were the presentations of former political prisoners,

most notably Lev Lukianenko, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Ivan Hel and many others. Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church called from the rostrum for the full legalization of the Church and return of all its property. A representative of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church also asked the delegates' help in the legalization of his Church.

Since the revolution of 1917-1920, Ukraine had never witnessed such a spectrum of opinions at a political meeting. It became clear to everyone present that the congress was the beginning of a new political order in Ukraine.

There were three main groupings at the congress.

The most prominent one consisted of delegations from the regions of western Ukraine: Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivske, symbolically represented in the leadership of Rukh by the former political prisoner Mykhailo Horyn. These delegations were the most numerous and vocal at the congress. Their air of confidence and their determination to achieve an independent Ukraine is backed by massive popular support.

Two weeks before the congress, on the anniversary of the Stalin-Hitler pact when western Ukraine was "liberated" by the Red Army, they led large demonstrations all over western Ukraine. The cities of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivske witnessed demonstrations of over 100,000 people. Of the many young delegates from western Ukraine who took part in the debates, Vasyl Chervony from Rivne stood out because of his gift of expressing himself, his political astuteness and combativeness.

Donbas delegates

From the other end of Ukraine, the Donbas, came delegations which essentially consisted of representatives of the coal miners' strike committees. They were led by strike leader Petro Poberezhny from Donetske. He, like the other miners' representatives, has none of the Ukrainian nationalist fervor of western Ukrainians. They support the demand for Ukrainian to be the state language, but demand the right to carry out their affairs locally in Russian, something not palatable to many western Ukrainian activists.

However, they exhibited even more confidence than the western Ukrainians because of their successful strike during the summer. They are for all practical purposes in political control of Donbas mining towns. Some of the strike committees have quartered themselves in local party buildings from which they rule their districts. They successfully intervened at the congress with the warning that if the Ukrainian nationalist symbols of the blue-and-yellow flag and the trident were adopted, the Popular Movement would be rejected by the Russian-speaking Donbas.

The Kiev delegates, headed by the flower of the Ukrainian literary and academic intelligentsia, and backed by numerous workplaces, had the largest impact at the conference. It was they who had organized the conference, pre-

pared the program, led the disparate elements in a common direction and were finally elected as its leaders.

It became clear during the proceedings that the organizers, led by Volodymyr Yavorivsky, Dmytro Pavlychko and Ivan Drach, all members of the Communist Party, had conspired with other reformist elements in the party to steer the congress away from confrontation to cooperation with a yet-to-be reformed Communist Party of Ukraine.

It fell upon Mr. Pavlychko, who chaired much of the proceedings, to successfully maneuver the delegates to soften or reject confrontational resolutions. Resolutions which from the party point of view were extreme were either sidetracked or voting on them was delayed in order that an alternative resolution could be presented by prepared speakers.

For example, the resolutions relating to the Chornobyl accident, including the holding of a public trial of First Secretary Shcherbytsky and other party leaders, were not put to a vote. The delegates were easily maneuvered to accept a poetic but empty resolution on ecology which didn't commit the Popular Movement to any specific action.

Threat of national strike

Only on one issue did Mr. Pavlychko's ability to control the fate of resolutions fail him, the vote relating to the new election law for the Ukrainian republican elections. The party's proposed election law is designed to give it the majority of delegates in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and with it the presidency. The congress accepted an alternative election law in which all the delegates and the presidency would be voted on directly. The delegates' fervor reached a peak in the discussion over what to do if the party enacts its proposed election law. Despite Mr. Pavlychko's efforts to delay the vote on this issue, the congress voted to call a national strike in Ukraine if the officially proposed election law is adopted.

Outside the three main regional groups, the delegates from the cities which separate the Kiev region from the Donbas, specifically the towns of Cherkassy, Dnipropetrovske, Kremenchuk and Poltava, were a distinct group, though small. They drew their strength from their workplaces. While they have adopted the blue-and-yellow flag and trident, they, like the Kiev delegates, are willing to scale down nationalist demands on the language question for the sake of close cooperation with the Donbas miners' strike committees.

Finally, there were 35 USSR Supreme Soviet deputies who support the Popular Movement. These deputies represent all major groups at the congress.

They and the yet-to-be elected deputies to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet are destined to play a leading role in the near future in what certainly will be

a tumultuous period in the political history of Ukraine.

The reformist members of the Communist Party, led by Mr. Kravchuk and even more so by Mr. Saliy, will also play a pivotal role in the future development of Rukh and the political situation. It is certain that at least in the Kiev party apparat there is open opposition to Mr. Shcherbytsky. But in the regions, especially in the cities of Kharkiv and Odessa, the resistance to change among the local party bosses is very strong. The Odessa party sent a selected delegation to the congress in opposition to one elected by the members of the Odessa Rukh. When the mandates of the party-appointed delegates were rejected by the Popular Movement's mandate committee, Ukrainian television used this to tell its audience that the congress was undemocratic. For this and other disinformation, Ukrainian television was excluded by the delegates from the congress.

In Kharkiv, while the congress was taking place, the party bosses staged a demonstration against the "nationalist" gathering in Kiev. It is yet to be seen what kind of a popular opposition can be organized against Rukh by the retreating conservative party leaders.

The congress elected Mr. Drach as its leader for a two-year term. Mr. Drach, though certainly a person of integrity, is no match for politically hardened regional leaders. This is also true of his assistant, Serhiy Koniev, an articulate and well-liked radical and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy from Dniprodzerzhynske.

The two most forceful political personalities are to be found in the elected Secretariat of 10 people who will be employed full-time to administer the Popular Movement. Mykhailo Horyn, who will chair the Secretariat, represents the toughest strain of the movement for an independent Ukrainian republic, and is as combative a political personality as they come in the Soviet Union.

On the same level of resoluteness, but not political astuteness, is Dmytro Poyizd, a young police detective, who organized the dozens of stewards with blue-and-yellow arm bands who forcefully guarded all the doors of the congress hall from the mobs which besieged them. From the podium, sounding like a future minister of internal affairs, Mr. Poyizd called for organizing self-defense teams throughout Ukraine against repressions.

The nine members of the Secretariat, apart from its head, Mr. Horyn, received the most votes in the following order: Volodymyr Muliava, Mykola Porovsky, Serhiy Odarych, Bohdan Ternopilsky, Maria Kuzenko, Maria Anteniuk, Viktor Linchevsky, Vsevolod Tskiv and Mr. Poyizd.

A survey of the delegates' backgrounds was carried out at the congress by the organizers, and the following results were announced:

- In all, 1,158 delegates were elected throughout the regions of Ukraine representing 280,000 active members; 1,109 delegates attended the congress. The largest delegations were from the cities of Kiev, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil

and Ivano-Frankivske. Three of the 25 regions of Ukraine, Crimea, Voroshylovhrad and Transcarpathia, didn't hold regional Rukh congresses to elect delegates.

- By nationality, 944 were Ukrainians, 77 Russians, nine Jews, six Poles, six Byelorussians, two Armenians, and one Korean, Greek, Hungarian, Czech and Crimean Tatar. The appearance of a Ukrainian-speaking North Korean living in Ukraine was one of the many exotic moments of the Congress.
- By profession the delegates were: engineers (329); teachers (130); academics (121); workers (109); cultural workers (104); doctors (48); journalists (42); lawyers (25); farmers (16); party employees (six); self-employed (six); and less than six were students, priests, architects, shop employees, actors etc. Two of the delegates were unemployed.
- There were 228 members of the Communist Party and 24 Komsomol members. Statistics on the allegiance of the delegates to the various unofficial groupings were not available. There were at least a few dozen members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which is by far the best politically organized unofficial grouping in Ukraine. All its major leaders, like Messrs. Lukianenko and Chornovil, were delegates and gave well-received speeches.

Among the guests from outside the Soviet Union, there were representatives from Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania. From Poland, Messrs. Michnik and Mokry, the latter a member of the Polish Parliament and a Ukrainian, spoke on the behalf of Solidarity.

Surprisingly, there was only one guest each from the United States, Canada and Great Britain: Prof. Taras Hunczak from the United States, Chrystia Freeland from Canada and Jaroslav Koshiw from Great Britain. It is not clear why visas were refused to many others from North America who wanted to come.

The Shcherbytsky-controlled newspaper Pravda Ukrainy published a slanderous article during the congress accusing Prof. Hunczak and Ms. Freeland of being enemies of the Soviet state. This maneuver backfired, however, as the congress invited the accused to the podium and enthusiastically greeted them.

Among the many slogans loudly chanted by the delegates, the one which in the end prevailed, almost to the exclusion of all others, was unity. The delegates sensed that the potential for fragmentation was very high on the language question, the independence symbols and the relationship to the Communist Party.

Freedom of speech is becoming the norm in Ukraine, whether it be at the congress, or on the streets. Yet to come is the freedom of the press and the broadcast media, and the right to organize political parties. But the first steps in this direction are being taken.

The congress voted that Rukh should publish its own newspaper, to be

called Narodna Hazeta, and elected its first editor, Anatoliy Shevchenko. The newspaper is to be printed by the publishing house in Kiev that prints all the major newspapers available in Ukraine, and where the print workers are supporters of the Popular Movement. This, and the possibility of Rukh having its own building in Kiev, was the carrot that caused even some of the toughest nationalists to agree to the softening of the congress resolutions. Political realism decided the final outcome of the congress.

The Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova has been born. Time is not on its side, as conservative forces are gathering strength for a counter-reformation. The next few months, especially the outcome of the republican elections, will decide the political future of Ukraine for years to come.

Jaroslav Koshiw from Great Britain attended the founding congress of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova as a guest.

Ukrainian to be state language of Ukraine effective January

November 19, 1989

JERSEY CITY, N.J. – Ukrainian will become the state language in the Ukrainian SSR effective January 1, 1990, in accordance with a decision of the republic's Supreme Soviet adopted on October 28.

The newly adopted law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" also recognizes Russian as the language of inter-nationality communication between nations of the USSR, as well as the inalienable right of the individual to choose a language of interpersonal communication.

The law outlines procedures for use of the Ukrainian and other languages in the Ukrainian SSR, and notes that certain aspects of the new law will be phased in during the next three to five years, while others may take five to 10 years.

The law is divided into six sections: general principles; language of government, party and public organs, businesses, institutions and organizations; language of education, information and culture; language of mass information media and communications; language of names; and promotion of the national-cultural development of Ukrainians living beyond the borders of the Ukrainian SSR.

The law states:

"The Ukrainian SSR recognizes the vitality and social value of all national languages and unconditionally guarantees its citizens national-cultural and language rights, founded on the belief that only the free develop-

ment and equality of rights of national languages and a high level of language culture are the basis of mutual spiritual understanding, mutual cultural enrichment and strengthening of the friendship of nations.

"The Ukrainian language is one of the determining factors of the national identity of the Ukrainian nation.

"The Ukrainian SSR ensures the Ukrainian language the status of state language with the aim of promoting comprehensive development of the spiritual creative forces of the Ukrainian nation and guaranteeing its sovereign national-state future.

"To instill in citizens, regardless of their nationality, an understanding of the social status of the Ukrainian language as the state language in the Ukrainian SSR, and the Russian language as the language of inter-nationality communication of nations of the USSR is the duty of government, party and public organizations, and mass information media of the republic. The selection of a language of interpersonal communication of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR is an inalienable right of the citizens themselves."

The full text of the law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" was published in the November 5 issue of Kultura i Zhyttia, the official newspaper of the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and the Cultural Workers' Union, a copy of which was recently received here at the editorial offices of Svoboda and The Ukrainian Weekly.

Article 2 of the law states:

"In accordance with the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, the state language of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is the Ukrainian language.

"The Ukrainian SSR guarantees the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life.

"Republic and local government, party and public organizations, businesses, institutions and organizations create for all citizens essential conditions for learning the Ukrainian language and improving their mastery of it."

Article 3 provides that:

"The Ukrainian SSR creates essential conditions for the development and use of languages of other nationalities in the republic.

"In the work of government, party and public organs, businesses, institutions and organizations located in areas of compact settlement where a majority of citizens of other nationalities reside, other national languages may be used along with the Ukrainian language.

"In a situation where citizens of other nationalities who form a majority of the population in administrative-territorial units or areas of settlement do not have an appropriate command of the national language, or when within the boundaries of these administrative-territorial units or areas of settlement several nationalities reside compactly and one of these nationalities is the majority of the population, the Ukrainian language or another language

agreed upon by the population may be used in the aforementioned organs and organizations."

Article 4 notes:

"The languages of inter-nationality communication in the Ukrainian SSR are the Ukrainian, Russian and other languages.

"The Ukrainian SSR guarantees the free use of the Russian language as the language of inter-nationality communication of nations of the USSR."

The right of citizens to use any language they desire is delineated in Article 5, while Article 8 outlaws discrimination based on language.

Article 6, meanwhile, states that "Personnel of government, party and public organs, institutions and organizations should have a command of the Ukrainian and Russian languages and, when indispensable, another national language to the extent needed to perform their duties."

The law also stipulates that Ukrainian is the language to be used in all record-keeping and documentation, at conferences and other forums, within the judicial system, in documents dealing with the election of people's deputies and in services to citizens.

All government acts, according to the law, are adopted in Ukrainian and then published in both the Ukrainian and Russian languages.

Russian is the language to be used in relations between the Ukrainian SSR and all-union bodies or bodies of other republics of the USSR.

As regards international agreements, however, these are made in Ukrainian and the language of the other party.

Both Ukrainian and Russian are used in citizens' documents (passports; birth, marriage and death certificates; employment and education documents), as well as in technical documentation.

In the section of the law on the language of education, it is stated that citizens "have the inalienable right to choose the language of instruction for children" and that "the Ukrainian SSR guarantees each child the right to be raised and obtain an education in his national language."

"This right," it goes on to state, "is ensured through the creation of a network of pre-school institutions and schools that provide education and instruction in the Ukrainian and other national languages."

The law stipulates that Ukrainian is the language of instruction in pre-school institutions, general public schools, technical and professional schools, special secondary schools and higher educational institutions, but also provides that in areas densely populated by persons of other nationalities other languages may be used.

In general public schools, both Ukrainian and Russian are mandatory subjects.

In the field of scholarship, Ukrainian or Russian may be used; in the realm of information, Ukrainian and Russian are employed, according to the law.

Ukrainian is the language to be used in the official mass communications media; however, other languages also may be used, in accordance with the newly adopted law. Communications via the postal and telegraph systems are accepted in either the Ukrainian or Russian language. Announcements and advertisements are to be in Ukrainian; however, a translation into another national language may also be provided alongside the Ukrainian text.

Goods marked for sale and instructions on their use are in the Ukrainian language. Goods exported outside the Ukrainian SSR may be marked in the Ukrainian or Russian language.

Official names in the Ukrainian SSR, according to the law, will appear in the Ukrainian language. It is stipulated that, on the right side or below the Ukrainian name, the name may also be given in another language.

Toponyms (place names, including street names and the like) are to be given in Ukrainian. In places settled by a majority of citizens of another nationality such names may be given in their language but they are to be transliterated from the Ukrainian name. Toponyms of areas outside Ukraine are given in Ukrainian in transliteration from the original language.

All geographical publications for use in the Ukrainian SSR are to be published in the Ukrainian language.

Citizens have the right to use names in accordance with their national traditions. Their names are written in Ukrainian transliterated from the original national language.

Finally, the law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" makes provisions for the promotion of the national-cultural development of Ukrainians living in other republics of the USSR, as well as for such assistance to groups, organizations and schools in foreign countries outside the USSR.

Death camp victims laid to rest

Bodies of Stus, Lytvyn, Tykhy returned to Ukraine

November 26, 1989

LONDON – The bodies of the late Vasyl Stus, Yuriy Lytvyn and Oleksiy Tykhy, who all died while languishing in the notorious special-regimen bloc of Perm Labor Camp No. 36-1 between 1984 and 1985, were transported to their final resting ground in Ukraine on November 18, reported the Ukrainian Press Agency based here.

At 8:30 p.m. local time, an aircraft carrying the bodies of the three dissidents landed at Kiev airport. Some 1,000 people in black mourning attire, many holding Ukrainian national flags, reportedly attended a ceremony at

the airport, addressed by Mykhailo Horyn, head of the Secretariat of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova, or Rukh, and a leading member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox priests celebrated a religious service by the coffins, which were draped with blue-and-yellow flags, the UPA reported. The coffins were then transferred to the St. Mary the Protectress (Pokrova) Church in Kiev.

The next morning, Sunday, November 19, the UPA reported, a Ukrainian Catholic priest celebrated a requiem service, or panakhyda, which was attended by thousands of people. At 11 a.m. the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM) organized a mass meeting at one of Kiev's stadiums, which was addressed by Kiev SNUM leader Dmytro Korchynsky on behalf of the Society of the Repressed, Oles Fedorchuk, Oles Serhiyenko and Yevhen Chernyshov from the Ukrainian National Democratic League. According to the UPA, militia tried to prevent the meeting but were unsuccessful.

The meeting ended with a procession walking in the direction of St. Sophia Cathedral, where three vehicles bearing the bodies of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group members joined the procession, the UPA said in a press release.

Estimates of between 10,000 and 30,000 people have been given on the attendance of the funeral procession, which made its way to the famous Baikove Cemetery, where through the intercession of Rukh the three men were laid to rest among some of Ukraine's best known writers, poets and intellectuals.

During the funeral, a Ukrainian Catholic priest, a Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox priest and a Russian Orthodox priest conducted a panakhyda, the UPA and the press service of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union reported.

Eulogies were given by former dissidents Vyacheslav Chornovil, Lev Lukianenko, Zinoviy Krasivsky, Vasyl Ovsienko and Mykhailyna Kotsiubynska, as well as Rukh leader Ivan Drach, poets Oleh Orach and Atena Pashko, a representative of the miners of the Donbas, and the mother of the late Yuriy Lytvyn.

The widows of Vasyl Stus and Oleksiy Tykhy, as well as their children, also took part in all the ceremonies, the UHU's press service reported on November 20.

Mr. Chornovil bade farewell to his long-suffering comrades in a moving eulogy.

"Dear comrades Vasyl, Yuriy and Oleksa! Fate did not allow you to live an extra two or three years for the imperial prison gates to open with a creak. But what joy and relief your return would have brought to our people had you been alive and active. After all, you never submitted to the situation. All three, without a second thought, became members of the Ukrainian

Helsinki Group, which in those years meant immediate long-term imprisonment or death. You were the precursors of genuine, not showpiece, restructuring of society a long time before those who stooped and yielded under the imperial whip even spoke about it. Today you would have been on the front line of the struggle for the ideals of democracy, national and social liberation of our people, for our state independence and our honorable place in the family of nations of the world.

"You were not ordinary people, and were very talented. Vasyl's poetry, much of which is still being held by the KGB, will be an immortal part of the heritage of our people. Yuriy's work also waits to be read and remains hidden behind locked doors. Oleksa excelled as a talented academic with an analytical mind.

"But you also possessed something which representatives of our spiritual elite lacked in those dark years – unwavering courage, the ability to look proudly into the eyes of the enemy and not retreat from the ideals. This is why your names will forever be written in gold letters in the history of our suffering, but immortal, nation.

"Today, in this time of renewal and struggle, when not only our national flags fly above us, but the idea of the renewal of our state independence greets us, we obtained one more victory, albeit a tragic one for you. If the bodies of millions of Ukrainians lie in the outskirts of the empire in nameless graves, you came back to rest in your native land, to the major cemetery in the capital of Ukraine. There will always be a well-worn path to your graves."

Considered one of the finest Ukrainian poets and translators, Stus died at the age of 47 on September 4, 1985, in the hospital of the notoriously harsh special-regimen zone of Perm Camp 36-1, where he was serving a 10-year labor camp sentence for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

A teacher and founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Tykhy died on May 6, 1984, at the age of 57 in the same camp following a long illness. He was serving a 10-year labor camp term under the trumped-up charge of "illegal possession of a firearm."

Lytvyn, a journalist and poet, apparently committed suicide in the same Perm Camp 36-1 on September 5, 1984, at the age of 50. He was likewise serving a 10-year labor camp sentence.

Human chain links multitudes across Ukraine

January 28, 1990

JERSEY CITY, N.J. – Multitudes of smiling, flag-waving Ukrainians, estimated by various sources at up to half a million, joined hands on January 21 for 300 miles between Kiev and Lviv in a symbolic human chain commem-

orating the brief period of Ukrainian unity and independence over 70 years ago, reported the Associated Press, the Ukrainian Press Agency and the St. Sophia Religious Association of Canada.

The human chain, organized by the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova, or Rukh, appeared to have successfully linked hundreds of thousands of people across the 300-mile stretch from St. Sophia's Square in Kiev westward through the cities of Zhytomyr, Rivne, Ternopil and Lviv, and even made a loop to Ivano-Frankivske.

The St. Sophia Religious Association reported that 500,000 people participated, while the UPA reported 250,000, and the AP said 100,000 people, waving Ukrainian blue-and-yellow flags and banners proclaiming "For a United, Independent Ukraine," gathered for this peaceful demonstration of national unity and pride.

Rukh organized the officially sanctioned chain, commemorating both the January 22, 1918, proclamation of Ukrainian independence and the act of reunification of Ukrainian lands one year later, because "we felt the hunger for unity," Volodymyr Yavorivsky, a leading Rukh activist, told the AP.

"We needed to feel we are a people, we are a nation united against the problems of Chornobyl, economic problems, ecological problems and the party apparatus," Mr. Yavorivsky, a USSR people's deputy from Kiev, was quoted as saying.

The day's events began in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, with a moleben celebrated by priests from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church at 11 a.m. in front of St. Sophia's Sobor, reported the UPA of London. Since 8 a.m. thousands of people had come to the square in front of St. Sophia's and all along the planned route of the human chain by bus, train, trolley, private car and foot. Special busloads of people were organized by Rukh and other informal organizations, such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Ukrainian National Democratic League, to fill in gaps along the route.

The human chain began at noon as church bells rang in Kiev and Lviv. The first person in the chain was Kiev poet and Rukh head Ivan Drach, followed by members of Rukh's Secretariat, then clergy and laypeople from the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Brotherhood, followed by activists from regional Rukh organizations and various informal associations from all over Ukraine, Kharkiv, Poltava, Odessa, the Crimea, Donetske, Dnipropetrovske, Mykolayiv and Ivano-Frankivske. In Kiev the route extended from St. Sophia's Square, down Volodymyr Street, Shevchenko Boulevard and Victory Prospect, toward the main westbound highway linking all the cities. Smiling militiamen were extremely helpful in keeping order to make the occasion a success, reported the UPA.

The hourlong human chain was followed by public rallies in cities along the route, and other cities of Ukraine, including Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovske. The 4 p.m. mass meeting in Kiev drew between 80,000 and

100,000 to St. Sophia's Square, where they were addressed by Kiev poet and head of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society Dmytro Pavlychko and heard a reading of the full text of the Fourth Universal of January 22, 1918, which proclaimed Ukrainian independence.

Among the 32 speakers who addressed the banner and flag-waving crowd were Kiev writer Oles Honchar, UHU president Lev Lukianenko, Messrs. Drach and Yavorivsky, Mykhailo Horyn, as well as activists of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

During the Kiev rally, the militia, to the disappointment of the crowd, took down from the roof of a building a large banner with the slogan "Out with the occupiers!"

The crowd in Kiev reportedly included children and the elderly, handicapped, Hare Krishnas and Jewish refuseniks, in a show of unity, reported the AP. Representatives of various nationalities living in Ukraine also participated, including Russians, Poles, Jews, Armenians, Bulgarians and others.

In Lviv, where the chain was reportedly three columns deep, a moleben was celebrated by Ukrainian Catholic clergy at 11 a.m. at the so-called rock, the site of the planned Taras Shevchenko monument in the city's center. Before the human chain began at noon, Vyacheslav Chornovil, a UHU activist, reportedly addressed the crowd at the site of the Shevchenko monument, where the chain was to end, but was spontaneously extended southeast to Ivano-Frankivske.

Up to 100,000 people reportedly attended a mass meeting at 5 p.m. in Lviv, which was addressed once again by Mr. Chornovil, Lviv Rukh head Orest Vlokh, Lviv writer Roman Lubkivsky, representatives of Jewish and Armenian cultural societies, and guests from Lithuania.

Reports indicated that the human chain was solid all throughout the route.

Ukraine proclaims sovereignty

July 22, 1990

JERSEY CITY, N.J. – The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on Monday, July 16, proclaimed the republic's state sovereignty, defined as "supremacy, independence, fullness and indivisibility of the republic's authority within the boundaries of its territory, and its independence and equality in external relations."

The Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine was overwhelmingly approved by the Ukrainian Parliament by a vote of 355 for and 4 against.

News of the vote and the full Ukrainian-language text of the declaration

were received via fax from the Kiev offices of Rukh, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova. According to Leonid Chuhunov, liaison of Rukh's Department of Foreign Relations, the vote came at 10:08 a.m. Kiev time.

The document decrees that Ukrainian SSR laws take precedence on Ukrainian territory over all-union laws, and declares that the Ukrainian SSR will maintain its own army and its own national bank and, if necessary, has the power to introduce its own currency.

In addition, the declaration proclaims that the republic is "a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs," and states that the republic will not accept, will not produce and will not procure nuclear weapons.

Though the declaration stopped short of calling for Ukraine's secession from the USSR, many observers pointed out that it goes farther than similar steps toward sovereignty taken by other Soviet republics, particularly in its provision regarding armed forces and its non-participation in any military bloc.

Other republics that have proclaimed their sovereignty recently include Moldavia, Russia and Uzbekistan; the Baltic states have gone farther, asserting their independence.

Adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine, following a morning roll call vote in the Parliament, was greeted by the people's deputies with a standing ovation and tumultuous applause. Later that day the deputies voted 339-5 to proclaim July 16 a national holiday in Ukraine.

Public celebration

The Ukrainian Press Agency reported that some 5,000 to 10,000 Kiev residents celebrated Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty on the evening of its proclamation by gathering in the capital city's October Revolution Square.

At the meeting People's Deputy Bohdan Horyn proposed declaring July 16 Independence Day. The people's deputy also proposed that the name of the square should be changed to Independence Square.

The suggestions were met with cheers, cries of "Glory to Ukraine" and prolonged applause. Mr. Horyn was quoted as saying that the declaration was the first step towards full independence.

He was followed to the podium by Oles Shevchenko, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Larysa Skoryk and Mykola Porovsky, all deputies in the Ukrainian Parliament.

Mr. Shevchenko proclaimed that "from today our children will be born in a free country and not in a colony belonging to Moscow," the UPA noted.

The large crowd of people formed into a column and marched towards St. Sophia Square. Several people were dressed in Kozak costumes. The column stopped briefly at the building where in 1917-1918 the Ukrainian Central

Council had held its meetings. Several people gave speeches in memory of the first president of the Ukrainian National Republic, Mykhailo Hrushevsky.

The column of people then proceeded towards the Taras Shevchenko monument, where wreaths were laid, according to the UPA.

Self-determination

In the first section of the declaration titled "Self-Determination of the Ukrainian Nation," it is noted: "The Ukrainian SSR, as a sovereign national state, develops within existing boundaries on the basis of the realization of the Ukrainian nation's inalienable right to self-determination."

The people of Ukraine – defined as "citizens of the republic of all nationalities" – are the sole source of state authority in the republic, according to the declaration. The document states that all the republic's wealth and resources are the property of its people, and it notes that the Ukrainian SSR guarantees protection for all forms of ownership.

As regards the issue of citizenship, according to various news sources one of the sticking points of the declaration, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a version that provides for Ukrainian SSR citizenship, while allowing citizens to retain USSR citizenship.

The declaration deals also with the matter of environmental protection, stating that the Ukrainian SSR determines procedures for protection of nature, as well as for use of its natural resources. It states that the republic has the right to ban or halt ecologically dangerous enterprises and that it has the right to seek "compensation for damages to the ecology of Ukraine brought about by the acts of union organs."

The Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine is composed of a preamble and 10 sections: Self-Determination of the Ukrainian Nation, Rule of the People, State Authority, Citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR, Territorial Supremacy, Economic Independence, Ecological Safety, Cultural Development, External and Internal Security, and International Relations.

In its conclusion the declaration notes that the Ukrainian SSR's relations with other Soviet republics are conducted "on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs."

It is also stated that the declaration is to serve as the basis for a new constitution and laws of the republic, and that its principles are to be "utilized in the preparation of a new union agreement."

Debate on declaration

The Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine was debated by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet point by point, and its provisions were put to a vote section by section.

On July 11 the title of the proclamation was adopted. Mr. Chornovil's

proposal that the name of the republic be changed from Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to Republic of Ukraine was voted down, reported the Ukrainian Press Agency.

The sections on Self-Determination of the Ukrainian Nation, Rule of the People and State Authority also were approved that day.

The next day, July 12, the deputies discussed the citizenship issue. Communist Party members supported the idea of dual – Ukrainian SSR and all-union – citizenship, while Democratic Bloc deputies grouped in the National Council (Narodna Rada) argued that this made no judicial sense, the UPA reported.

That day 207 persons voted in favor of the dual citizenship provision, but this did not constitute a majority and, therefore, the measure was not adopted.

Discussion then turned to the sections on Territorial Supremacy, Economic Independence and Ecological Safety, which were approved by the people's deputies.

On July 13, 238 voted to approve the section on External and Internal Security, which includes a provision on the right of Ukraine to maintain its own armed forces and notes that citizens of the Ukrainian SSR perform their military service on the territory of the republic and cannot be used for military aims outside its borders without the consent of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. Passage of this section was welcomed by a loud round of applause.

Next came International Relations, the last section of the declaration, which was supported by a vote of 317 deputies.

The deputies then returned to the issue of citizenship that had sharply divided them. Ultimately, the measure providing for Ukrainian SSR citizenship while guaranteeing citizens the right to retain USSR citizenship was approved by a vote of 296 for and 26 against.

After the weekend the deputies returned to vote on the adoption of the entire Declaration on State Sovereignty.

After the overwhelming vote approving the measure, several deputies welcomed its passage. Among them were Roman Lubkivsky of Lviv, who suggested that July 16 be observed as a national holiday of Ukraine's sovereignty, and Ivan Zayets, who argued that the declaration should be given the force of law.

Henrikh Altunian noted that the declaration was the first step toward the freedom of the people of Ukraine and called on his fellow deputies to observe a moment of silence for Ukraine's fallen heroes – from Hetman Petro Konashevych Sahaidachny to poet and human rights advocate Vasyl Stus – who had fought for decades for Ukraine's freedom.

* * *

Parliament sessions continued this week with discussions and debates on the composition of the government of Ukraine.

On July 18 the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet finally accepted the resignation submitted a week earlier by Volodymyr Ivashko as its chairman and nominated candidates to replace him.

Citing TASS, Radio Liberty reported that 27 persons have been nominated for the position of Parliament chairman, which is equivalent to president of the republic.

Among the candidates are Stanislav Hurenko, first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (who had replaced Mr. Ivashko in that party position upon his resignation), and another party leader, Leonid Kravchuk.

Democratic Bloc candidates include Volodymyr Yavorivsky and Ihor Yukhnovsky.

Patriarch Mstyslav returns to Ukraine

Enthronement scheduled for November 17-18

October 28, 1990

KIEV – Thousands of Ukrainian faithful welcomed Patriarch Mstyslav of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the diaspora, as he triumphantly set foot on Ukrainian soil, Saturday evening, October 20 – after an absence of 46 years.

At the entrance to the golden-domed St. Sophia Cathedral in Ukraine's capital city, the 92-year-old patriarch dropped to his knees and kissed the ground three times. Amid the chiming of bells which filled the square, he entered the church and celebrated a moleben of thanksgiving that evening.

Arriving in Kiev earlier that day, the Ukrainian Orthodox primate and his escort, the Very Rev. Archimandrite Andriy Partykevich, were greeted by the hierarchy of the recently reborn UAOC, led by Metropolitan Ioann, as well as a group of people's deputies, other government officials, numerous clergymen, members of the St. Andrew Brotherhood and UAOC faithful, reported the Metropolitan's Chancery based in South Bound Brook, N.J.

Plans have already been made for enthronement ceremonies, scheduled for the weekend of November 17-18, when the prelate will be installed as patriarch of Ukraine. As The Weekly was going to press, it was not known what church in Kiev would host the jubilant ceremonies.

During his first week in the Ukrainian capital city, Patriarch Mstyslav met with Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk in the chambers of the Supreme Soviet. He also delivered the invocation and addressed the second

congress of Rukh, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova, which convened on Thursday morning, October 25.

Patriarch Mstyslav began his long-awaited journey to Ukraine on Friday evening, October 19, after months of waiting for a Soviet visa.

During a brief layover in Moscow, the Ukrainian patriarch was greeted by Ukrainian Deputies Yuriy Sorochyk of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Les Taniuk, a deputy of the Ukrainian Parliament, as well as representatives of the local branch of the Slavutych Society, who waved Ukrainian blue-and-yellow banners.

In Kiev, the first to address the patriarch was Metropolitan Ioann. In turn, Metropolitan Mstyslav was approached by children, who greeted him with the traditional bread and salt. The clerics from the United States were surrounded by a Ukrainian Kozak honor guard, whose members then proceeded to carry the patriarch, seated in a specially designed chair, into the cheering crowd. There, a representative of the national sisterhood greeted the hierarch with a beautiful korovay (traditional bread), while the people chanted "Glory to the Patriarch" and "Long Live the Patriarch."

After the welcoming ceremony, a three-kilometer-long motorcade took Patriarch Mstyslav from Boryspil Airport to downtown Kiev. The road leading into the city was flanked by more well-wishers, waving blue-and-yellow flags. The motorcade's destination was St. Sophia, which barely held the throng that had come to greet the patriarch. Having reached the square, the hierarch this time declined the honor guards' offer to carry him and walked towards the cathedral by himself. He fell onto his knees and, with the sound of chiming bells filling the square, kissed the ground thrice. Tears of happiness shone in the eyes of those in attendance.

Inside St. Sophia Cathedral Patriarch Mstyslav, assisted by members of the hierarchy and clergy of the UAOC, then celebrated a moleben. After the service he addressed the clergy and brotherhood members in attendance. Afterwards he stepped onto a specially prepared podium before the cathedral and addressed the faithful as a father speaking to his children.

Long after the patriarch had been taken to his hotel, the crowd in St. Sophia Square lingered for an extended period of time and rejoiced in the fact that its prayers were answered – that it lived to see its patriarch.

On Sunday, October 21, St. Andrew Cathedral in Kiev, where Patriarch Mstyslav had been consecrated to the episcopacy in 1942, was the site of an archpastoral divine liturgy officiated by him. Gathered in and around the church were some 50,000 people.

That same day the patriarch also returned to St. Sophia an icon of St. Nicholas which until recently adorned St. Andrew Memorial Church in South Bound Brook, N.J. Returned together with the icon was a 13th century pectoral cross.

Rukh declares Ukraine's independence as its goal

November 4, 1990

by Roma Hadzewycz

KIEV – The second all-Ukrainian congress of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perebudova concluded here on Sunday, October 28, with Rukh emphasizing that its principal goal no longer is perebudova (restructuring) but "renewal of independent statehood for Ukraine."

Reflecting this significant change, the words "for perebudova" were deleted from the name of the organization, which now encompasses more than 630,000 members and claims some 5 million supporters throughout the republic.

The Rukh congress, attended by 2,020 voting delegates (plus an additional 105 with an advisory role), voted to delineate its role also as "creation through non-violent means of a democratic parliamentary republic."

Writer and Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy Ivan Drach was confirmed as president of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for another year, as he had been elected to a two-year term at Rukh's founding congress in September 1989.

He will head a restructured Rukh organization that includes four autonomous but interrelated bodies: the Political Council, the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council, the Nationalities Council and the Council of Collegia.

Mykhailo Horyn, formerly head of the Rukh Secretariat, was elected first vice-chairman of Rukh and chairman of the Political Council, which unites representatives of political parties and public organizations that are collective members of Rukh. Bohdan Ternopilsky was approved as Mr. Horyn's deputy in the Political Council.

Delegates to the congress had approved collective membership for organizations active within Ukraine – but not outside its borders – in addition to individual membership. The reference to organizations active within the republic is an important distinction because it, in effect, forbids collective membership to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is Moscow-based. However, it could allow for the membership of an independent Communist Party of Ukraine.

The Coordinating Council is headed by Mykola Porovsky. Bohdan Telenko is vice-chairman of that body, the executive organ of Rukh's Grand Council. (The Grand Council is to meet not less than four times per year and it is Rukh's highest governing body between all-Ukrainian congresses.)

Ivan Zayets was elected chairman of the Council of Collegia, which encompasses subcommittees of experts in such fields as economics, ecology,

science and the law. Volodymyr Muliava is vice-chairman of the council.

The Nationalities Council, which includes representatives of all national groups residing in Ukraine, is chaired by Oleksander Burakovsky; Voleslav Helchenko is its vice-chairman.

Viktor Burlakov was elected chairman of the Rukh Secretariat.

All the aforementioned council chairmen and the chairman of the Secretariat are, at the same time, vice-chairmen of Rukh. In addition, the following persons were elected to the leadership of Rukh as vice-chairpersons representing various groups and geographic areas: Serhiy Koniev (democratic councils), Oles Doniy (youth), Oleksander Lavrynovych, Larysa Skoryk (women), Serhiy Holovaty (Kiev), Olena Bondarenko (Luhanske), Lubomyr Senyk (Lviv), Viktor Tsymbaliuk (Odessa) and Mykola Yakovyna (Ivano-Frankivske).

Congress resolutions, appeals

The Rukh congress also approved a series of resolutions and appeals during its final day of sessions.

Among them were an appeal to all nations residing in Ukraine, which stressed that Rukh seeks power through peaceful means in order to better the lot of all the people of Ukraine, as well as appeals to peasants, the military, youth, teachers and Christians of all denominations.

Resolutions were adopted regarding the union treaty, economic borders of Ukraine, creation of a democratic bloc called Democratic Ukraine, interethnic relations, creation of a Ukrainian national army and the return of Ukraine's soldiers to the republic's territory, the situation in Crimea and the fate of former political prisoners.

In addition, the delegates approved a proposal that Rukh should help promote establishment of the Ukrainian youth organization Plast in the eastern and central regions of Ukraine. The proposal also called for creation of a Plast supporters group within the Rukh organization.

Concluding press conference

At a press briefing held once the congress was adjourned, members of the new Rukh leadership spoke about the significance of the second all-Ukrainian congress of the Popular Movement of Ukraine.

Mr. Zayets, chairman of the Council of Collegia, pointed out that with this congress Rukh had stepped from public meeting-type activity to concrete deeds.

He stressed the importance of the resolution on Ukraine's economic borders and noted that Rukh would soon announce a contest to design a new monetary unit for Ukraine, the aim being a design that stressed the continuity of Ukrainian statehood.

Mr. Zayets also pointed out that the congress clarified Rukh's previously vague position on independent statehood for Ukraine.

"The political situation today is such that the empire is crumbling and it is obvious to everyone that only a sovereign Ukraine will be able to lead our people out of this crisis," he said.

Volodymyr Cherniak, a prominent economist and USSR people's deputy who previously headed Rukh's Council of Collegia, emphasized that economic issues are indeed the most important for Ukraine at this time.

"Our program, in a word, is sovereignty," he said.

"We are proposing our own currency – the hryvnia, an independent banking system, a free market and ways to motivate workers," he said.

He continued: "The way out of our present (economic) crisis is to leave the union. ... We are faced with disintegration of the USSR. Ukraine, of necessity, must negotiate agreements with other republics – but not with the administrative command center."

Also at the press conference, the head of the congress press center, Dmytro Ponomarchuk, reported that the four-day conclave had attracted 445 accredited correspondents.

Among them were correspondents from publications as diverse as The Village Voice, U.S. News and World Report, Literaturnaya Gazeta, the independent Latvian newspaper Atmoda, Radianska Zhinka, Vechirniy Kyiv and The European.

Greetings to Rukh

The first two days of Rukh's second congress were devoted largely to presentations by leading Rukh activists and greetings from representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, among them: Erast Huculak of the Canadian Friends of Rukh; Taras Hunczak of the National Fund to Aid Ukraine (which encompasses both the Rukh and the Children of Chornobyl Relief funds); presidents of the two largest Ukrainian fraternal organizations, Ulana Diachuk of the Ukrainian National Association and John Oleksyn of the Ukrainian Fraternal Association; Yakiv Suslensky of the Society for Ukrainian-Jewish Contacts based in Israel; Maria Savchak, president of the Ukrainian National Women's League of America; and others too numerous to mention.

Canada's deputy minister for external affairs, Patrick Boyer, addressed the delegates and guests on behalf of his government, and Marta Shmigel read a message from U.S. Congresswoman Louise Slaughter.

Dr. Volodymyr Mokry greeted the conclave from the Polish Sejm, of which he is a member, and on behalf of Lech Walesa, the Solidarity leader now seeking to become president of Poland.

Greetings were also delivered by Bohdan Nahaylo of Radio Liberty's Ukrainian service and Roman Kupchinsky of Prolog Publishers.

Messages of solidarity with the Ukrainian people's aspirations came from Crimean Tatars, leaders of Sajudis, Lithuania's popular front, as well as from national movements in Georgia, Moldavia, Armenia, Latvia, Uzbekistan and other republics.

A presentation providing the American perspective on Ukraine was delivered by Robert McConnell, a Washington lawyer and activist of the local Rukh support committee known as Ukraine 2000.

Pastor John Shep of the Lutheran Church, who directs the program "Thoughts of Faith," also addressed the gathering. He brought to the Rukh congress 3,000 copies each of Bibles and Bible stories that were distributed to all delegates and guests who wished to receive them.

Pastor Oleksa Harbuziuk of the All-Ukrainian Evangelical Baptist Fellowship, too, was among the well-wishers at the historic congress.

Ivan Pliushch addressed the congress in his capacity as vice-chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, noting that "I, too, love Ukraine and believe that Ukraine will be sovereign, free and independent."

"Today we need a democratic center which would consolidate all those democratic forces around healthy thinking, around ... our Declaration of State Sovereignty," he continued. "If we unite with you, we will show through deeds, not words or slogans, our unity, and we truly will create a lawful, free and independent state that will have horizontal and other contacts with other states and will take an active part in the building of the common European home. Then we, at our next gathering, will say that our work was not in vain."

Congress presentations

A large part of the agenda was devoted to special presentations. In addition to Mr. Drach's comments on the "political situation in Ukraine," there were addresses on Ukraine's path to becoming a lawful state (Mr. Holovatyi), political aspects of economic reform (Mr. Zayets), an economic model for Ukraine (Oleksander Savchenko), problems of a national army (Mykhailo Kosiv), political parties, public organizations and Rukh (Lev Lukianenko), Rukh and problems of the village (Stepan Kolesnyk), inter-ethnic relations and national rebirth in Ukraine (Mr. Burakovsky), Ukraine: a state of inter-ethnic peace (Leonid Shulman), the role of the Church in the rebirth of Ukrainian statehood (Yevhen Sverstiuk), medicine and health in Ukraine (Lubomyr Pyrih), organizational activity of Rukh (Mr. Porovsky), Rukh and rule by the people (Mr. Koniev) and the student movement (Oles Doniy).

Reports on Rukh activity during the first year of its existence were delivered by Volodymyr Yavorivsky (Council of Representatives), Mr. Cherniak (Council of Collegia), Dmytro Pavlychko (Nationalities Council), Mr. Horyn (Secretariat), Anatoliy Shevchenko (Rukh's newspaper, Narodna Hazeta),

Volodymyr Konfederatenko (Financial Commission) and Ihor Yukhnovsky (National Council in Ukraine's Parliament).

Reports on proposed amendments to the Rukh charter and program were delivered, respectively, by Mr. Lavrynovych and Vitaliy Donchyk.

Groups present at congress

Among the myriad groups whose representatives participated in the congress were 17 strike committees throughout Ukraine, the Ukrainian Republican and Democratic parties, the Inter-Party Assembly, anarcho-syndicalists, the Ukrainian Forum of Soldiers' Mothers, veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Donbas miners and military men from various services.

Also represented were the Ukrainian Language Society, Green World, Memorial, the Democratic Platform of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as well as the CPSU, the Komsomol, the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Peasants' Democratic Party.

In all, 44 political and public organizations sent delegates to the second Rukh congress.

Outside the congress hall, delegates and guests viewed numerous displays: independent publications, photographs, chronicles of the activity of Rukh branches, the history of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, as well as informational exhibits on problems of the environment.

An exhibit of poster art focused on the most pressing problems of the day in Ukraine: blank spots in history, Chornobyl's fallout, Russification, pollution and religious repression. During one afternoon break, a documentary on the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933, "Harvest of Despair," was screened.

During the first evening of the congress, a special concert was presented in the Ukraina Palace, featuring Ukrainian folk musicians and singers, as well as laureates of the first Chervona Ruta festival of Ukrainian music, among them Vasyl Zhdankin, the Telniuk sisters, Eduard Drach, Vika, Komu Vnyz, Volodymyr Davydov, Oleh Pavlyshyn and Oleksander Tyshchenko.

During the recesses, various ensembles of folk singers and musicians performed in the lobbies and on the broad staircases of the Ukraina Palace of Culture.

* * *

The day after the congress had adjourned, the banners on the Khreshchatyk and Red Army Street, and the huge billboard across from the Dnipro Hotel were gone. Workers were already busy decorating Kiev's main boulevard for the upcoming (November 7) anniversary of the revolution – an anniversary that this year will be like none before.



KYIV, AUGUST 24, 1991: After voting to adopt the Proclamation of the Independence of Ukraine, members of Parliament carry a huge blue-and-yellow Ukrainian national flag into the session hall.

KYIV, AUGUST 1991: Anti-Soviet graffiti on the soon-to-be-dismantled Lenin monument located in the city center on the Khreschatyk boulevard.

KYIV, JANUARY 1992: Cadets of the military academy take an oath of office, swearing allegiance to newly independent Ukraine.

WASHINGTON, MAY 6, 1992: Presidents George Bush and Leonid Kravchuk appear at a signing ceremony at the White House during the recently elected Ukrainian leader's first visit to the United States.

Ukraine declares independence

Ukraine, Russia sign interim bilateral pact

September 1, 1991

by Chrystyna Lapychak
Kiev Press Bureau

KIEV – In an overwhelming vote that stunned the majority of the people of Ukraine, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine declared the republic's independence from the Soviet Union on August 24 and in the days that followed began to take its first steps toward building an independent democratic state.

Among their first moves, leaders of the Ukrainian Parliament reached a temporary economic and military agreement with a delegation of leaders of the Russian Parliament during their impromptu official visit to Kiev on August 28-29.

The negotiations and resulting joint communiqué signed by Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Kravchuk and Russian Federation Vice-President Aleksander Rutskoy were meant to serve as a response to a recent statement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin questioning the current borders of republics that declared independence following the failed coup.

"Because there are rumors that Ukraine and Russia will quarrel," said Mr. Rutskoy upon the delegation's arrival at the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, "our main purpose in Kiev is to stabilize our mutual relationship and to negotiate a program during this transitional period as union structures no longer govern the state."

The two parties, whose talks were held in the presence of five representatives of the all-union Supreme Soviet, agreed "to make joint efforts to prevent the uncontrolled disintegration of the union state, to create a temporary structure for building up individual states, subjects of the former union," and to maintain the functioning of the economy.

They also stipulated that all the "subjects of the former union" would be invited to help prepare a new economic agreement on a horizontal basis and agreed to the creation of a collective security system during the transitional period. The parties agreed not to make any unilateral decisions on military and strategic issues, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons.

Another major point of the agreement was the parties' reconfirmation of

the articles of the bilateral agreement between Ukraine and Russia of November 19, 1990, regarding mutual respect for one another's territorial integrity.

The republics' leaders also pledged to continue to uphold the USSR's obligations as delineated in various international agreements, particularly those concerning arms control. Finally, Ukraine and Russia agreed to exchange representatives to maintain constant communication.

Up to 10,000 people congregated outside the Parliament building, often chanting "independence" and "Ukraine without Moscow," while the negotiations dragged on for nearly 12 hours inside. The crowd booed Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, who attended the talks as an observer from the USSR Supreme Soviet, when he addressed them on the steps, saying, "whoever said being independent and being together were contradictory?"

However, Mr. Sobchak also said: "No one questions Ukrainian independence, but there exist political and economic questions to be solved."

The Russian parliamentary delegation included, in addition to Mr. Rutskoy, prominent economist Grigory Yavlinsky and four others.

Other than Mr. Kravchuk, the Ukrainian side included Vice-Premier Kostiantyn Masyk, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, presidium members Vasyl Durdynets, Vasyl Yevtukhov, Oleksander Yemets, Dmytro Pavlychko, Volodymyr Pylypchuk, Anatoliy Chepurny and Ihor Yukhnovsky, and Rukh Chairman Ivan Drach. Deputies V. Vasylenko, Levko Lukianenko, Oleksander Moroz, Volodymyr Filenko and Vyacheslav Chornovil served as consultants.

The all-union delegation consisted of Mr. Sobchak, Yuriy Ryzhov, Serhiy Riabchenko and Dr. Yuriy Shcherbak.

Historic vote for independence

The Communist-dominated Ukrainian Parliament's vote for independence last Saturday came as a big surprise to the majority of citizens of this nation of 52 million.

During the tense 11-hour extraordinary session on August 24, the heated debate focused on the behavior of parliamentary, government and Communist Party leaders during the failed Moscow coup of August 19-21.

Several thousand people gathered in front of the Supreme Soviet building shouted "Shame on Kravchuk" as he addressed the session, defending his cautious actions during the crisis. His address was followed by speeches by Communist majority leader Mr. Moroz and National Council leader Mr. Yukhnovsky.

Mr. Yukhnovsky presented the National Council's list of legislation in reaction to the coup: immediate declaration of independence; depoliticization of the Ukrainian Procuracy, KGB, Internal Affairs Ministry and militia,

state organs, institutions and workplaces, central television, radio and press; the immediate release of imprisoned People's Deputy Stepan Khmara and reversal of last November's vote stripping Dr. Khmara of his official immunity; the firing of Ukrainian SSR Chief Procurator Mykhailo Potebenko and Ukrainian TV chief Mykola Okhmakevych for complicity with the coup regime; and the creation of a special commission to investigate the actions of officials during the botched overthrow.

As thousands of flag-waving Ukrainians outside chanted "independence," the debate inside lasted for hours and several breaks were called to alleviate the tension and allow the majority and minority groups to hold strategy meetings.

After Volodymyr Yavorivsky proposed the vote on independence, reading aloud the text of the resolution and act on the declaration of independence, Mr. Kravchuk called a one-hour break, when the Communist majority met and debated the historic issue.

During their debate it appeared that most of the Communists felt there was no choice other than a decision to secede and, as they expressed it, distance themselves from the events in Moscow, particularly the strong anti-Communist movement in the Russian Parliament.

"If we don't vote for independence, it will be a disaster," said Ukrainian Communist Party chief Stanislav Hurenko during the debate.

Toward the end of the debate, two representatives from the National Council, Messrs. Yavorivsky and Pavlychko, came to the majority meeting to propose a compromise: a clause in the resolution requiring a nationwide referendum on independence on December 1.

After the break, at 5:55 p.m., the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine voted 321 to 2, with 6 abstentions, out of 360, for the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state – Ukraine.

At 6 p.m., the Ukrainian Parliament voted 346 to 1, with 3 abstentions (out of 362), for the resolution declaring Ukraine an independent, democratic state, effective immediately, and calling for a republican referendum on December 1.

Expressions of euphoria from the crowd gathered outside could be heard coming through the windows to the foyer, and could occasionally be heard as the doors into the session hall were opened.

The Parliament also voted for the creation of a national guard of Ukraine and turned jurisdiction over all the armed forces located on Ukrainian territory over to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

Democrats won only a partial victory in the vote for depoliticization. While the resolution on the depoliticization of the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy, Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB passed easily, the legislature voted three times on the issue of depoliticization of state organs, institutions and

workplaces. The final result was a compromise, where the decision was left up to the workers' collectives.

A proposal suggested by Second Deputy Chairman Volodymyr Hryniov to pass a resolution sealing off all party headquarters and archives to investigate possible collaboration in the coup failed to pass in Saturday's session.

The rest of the proposed legislation was passed along for consideration by the presidium, which met every day last week, Saturday through Friday.

In the final moments of the historic session, which ended at about 9 p.m., Chairman Kravchuk decided to permit a large blue-and-yellow Ukrainian flag, on the proposal of Mr. Chornovil, to be carried into the session hall by democratic deputies and draped over the podium. Mr. Chornovil said the flag had hung on a tank that defended the Russian Parliament building during the coup.

As most deputies filed out of the hall, members of the opposition National Council, including many former political prisoners, remained for a few minutes in front of the flag-draped podium, singing "Hey u Luzi Chervona Kalyna" and "Shche Ne Vmerla Ukraina," and raising their hands in the sign of the trident.

The deputies departed the session hall singing the Ukrainian national anthem and filed outside before the delirious crowd for a rally, which later moved to October Revolution Square.

Other than the crowd that had gathered at the Parliament, the streets of Kiev were quiet, with few signs of open celebration.

In the days that followed, the Presidium passed a number of resolutions and decrees: nationalizing all CPU property and handing it over to the Supreme Soviet and local councils; issuing an amnesty for all political prisoners; suspending all CPU activities and freezing CPU assets and bank accounts pending official investigations into possible collaboration with the coup plotters; setting up a committee of inquiry into official behavior during the coup; and establishing a committee on military matters related to the creation of a Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

People's Deputy Stepan Khmara and his co-defendants, as well as Oles Serhiyenko and Anatoliy Lupynis were freed in the early morning of Monday, August 26, in connection with the amnesty.

Following the failure of the Supreme Soviet to pass a decree sealing off CPU headquarters throughout the republic, local councils nationwide, including the Kiev City Council Executive Committee, have voted to do so.

On Sunday, August 25, the Kiev city leadership issued an order to seal off all the oblast and city party headquarters within Kiev city limits, as well as the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine located on Ordzhonikidze Street.

The orders were carried out, and the red flag of the USSR was taken down off the Stalinesque building. The office of Ukrainian Party Chief

Hurenko also was sealed off.

On Monday, August 26, the City Executive Committee of Ukraine's capital city also voted to remove all the monuments of Communist heroes from public places, including the Lenin monument on the central October Revolution Square. The large square will be renamed Ukrainian Independence Square as will the central metro station below it, the executive committee decided.

EDITORIAL

Independence: bye-bye, USSR

September 1, 1991

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is no more. In its place, on August 24, arose an independent democratic state called, simply, Ukraine.

Events unfolded quickly. Almost without warning and, literally, overnight, Ukraine's long-sought independence became reality. Impelled by the failed coup in Moscow, the obvious disintegration of the union and the hopeless demise of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian Parliament overwhelmingly adopted the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine. Democrats, Communists and those in between all saw that Ukraine simply must seize the moment, that Ukraine must take its future into its own hands and not wait for outside forces to determine the destiny of this nation of 52 million.

Suddenly the news media were replete with reports on "the vital Ukraine," "the agricultural and industrial powerhouse" and "the breadbasket of the USSR." Commentators pointed out that the second most populous republic of what was the Soviet Union – and, according to Deutsche Bank, the republic ranked highest in terms of economic criteria on its chances of succeeding on its own – would now play the decisive role in defining what type of union or federation, if any, would be formed in place of the USSR.

All around, day by day, the USSR was withering away. The coup's principal achievement was to prove that central power in the Soviet empire is dead, and power was fast devolving to the republics. "What has happened is the collapse of the central empire, the full destruction of the structures of imperial power. There can be no illusions: the Soviet Union no longer exists," Dr. Yuriy Shcherbak, people's deputy from Ukraine, told the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin was perhaps the first to realize this as he seized power, issuing decrees, subordinating all-union matters and institutions to the RSFSR and shamelessly dictating to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

But the actions of Tsar Boris soon aroused the suspicions of republics which saw the resurrection of "Big Brother" Russia, a republic "more equal" than others. Mr. Yeltsin's spokesman warned republics sharing borders with Russia that it would not let them secede, taking heavily populated Russian areas with them (i.e., the Crimea and Donbas in Ukraine, and northern Kazakhstan).

Finally, Russia's emissaries had to travel to Ukraine to persuade that newly independent state to sign a temporary bilateral agreement on military and economic matters in an attempt to halt the "uncontrolled disintegration" of the union seen by many around the globe as an extremely dangerous situation – especially in view of the fact that nuclear weapons are found in various republics. Ukraine acted responsibly, signing an agreement with Russia on these crucial matters but at the same time emphasizing that this is a bilateral, horizontal agreement between two equals – not a precursor to any new form of union. (It should be noted that the pact goes so far as to refer to the "former USSR.") And, a pledge to respect each other's territorial integrity was reconfirmed as part of the deal.

Thus, Ukraine appears to have passed its first big hurdle as an independent state. But what lies ahead? Many more hurdles, we are certain. As we've seen lately, so much can happen in so little time. And there are three months between now and December 1, when the people of Ukraine of all nationalities will be asked to affirm Ukraine's independence declaration in a plebiscite.

Surely, there is no one in Ukraine who doubts that it will be completely independent. Observers worldwide have commented that Ukraine's independence declaration is irreversible. Mr. Gorbachev, now more clearly than ever a transitional figure in the USSR, still hopes to save the union, but is slowly becoming aware that his vast country and the people have changed. Meanwhile, governments around the world have begun reacting to the reality that exists on the territory of what once was the monolithic USSR.

Here in the U.S., we are somewhat buoyed by President George Bush's statement earlier this week that the U.S. "will respect the freely expressed wishes of the people of Ukraine" in the upcoming referendum and his pledge to "continue to move in a way to encourage independence and self-determination" – words he dared not utter in Kiev so recently. However, we also point to Mr. Bush's inaction this week on the issue of recognition of the independent Baltic states. Ever prudent, Mr. Bush said he did not want to contribute to anarchy in the USSR and would prefer to wait until the USSR Supreme Soviet grants the Baltic states their independence, thus implying U.S. recognition of Soviet authority over Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.

So, what lies ahead? Much work in preparation for the December 1 referendum in Ukraine. Much work in preparing world leaders to accept an independent Ukraine as a participant and partner in international affairs. Will the leaders and people of Ukraine, and Ukrainians in the diaspora, be equal to the task?

U.N. Mission stresses statehood of Ukraine

September 1, 1991

by Marta Kolomayets

UNITED NATIONS – Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Nations Gennadi Udovenko informed the office of the Secretary General of the United Nations that his permanent mission to this international assembly will be officially designated as representing Ukraine, effective August 24.

Mr. Udovenko notified the U.N. of this action on Monday morning, August 26, a consequence of the Ukrainian Parliament's proclamation of the independence of Ukraine, a founding member of the United Nations.

During a press conference held at the United Nations headquarters on Wednesday morning, August 28, Mr. Udovenko familiarized reporters with the text of the historic declaration, as well as other documents passed by the Ukrainian Parliament since the coup failure earlier last week. He reported that in the preamble of the act the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine declared the independence of Ukraine and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state – Ukraine – "based on the right of a nation to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international legal documents and realizing the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine."

"At the United Nations, legally and technically, this historic document adopted by the Parliament of Ukraine does not change our status in the U.N., because since 1945 Ukraine (until August 24, it was referred to as the Ukrainian SSR) has been a sovereign state of the United Nations. And we have been treated on equal footing with the Soviet Union, the United States, Botswana, Lesotho and any other country. At least that was my understanding," he added.

"Since the Declaration on State Sovereignty last year, we have been strongly advocating the establishment of direct relations, be they diplomatic, consular or economic, with foreign countries," he concluded.

"We welcome any country to recognize our independence, as soon as possible, but for the time being we are recognizing the independence of others, for example, the Baltic nations," he said.

He said he hoped that Ukraine's newly proclaimed independence would facilitate more active participation in the United Nations.

"Ukraine is now working on its own foreign policy. Here at the U.N. we had a joint foreign policy with Moscow, but since last July we've been working on our own foreign policy and that includes fulfilling our international commitments," he added.

Although much of the world has been alarmed by the fact that with the break-up of the empire republics that store the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons may act irresponsibly, Mr. Udovenko assured reporters that, as regards Ukraine, "a very peace-loving nation," there is no reason to be concerned.

"We should not dramatize this issue in regard to the use of nuclear arms. We are ready to give them to central control – whatever that may be," he said, adding that it may be too early to comment on these issues.

"We are now only in the process of creating our own Ministry of Defense," he said, while noting that Ukraine is committed to be a nuclear-free zone abiding by three principles: not to produce, not to use and not to allow the location of nuclear weapons on its territory.

Pressed by some reporters for a concrete answer, Mr. Udovenko replied, "Ukraine will find a solution that will be satisfactory to all parties involved," and if the central government collapses, he added, "the Russian Federation in cooperation with Ukraine will reach a joint decision."

Mr. Udovenko also said that when Ukraine is fully independent it shall consider joining the signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which Ukraine could not previously do because it was part of the USSR.

As for future relations toward the center, Mr. Udovenko said that the Ukrainian Parliament has declared its full independence and that act will be confirmed by a referendum. "Certainly, we do not live in a vacuum. We have been in this union for so many years, therefore, some kind of economic union is a must. With regard to a political union, this will have to be seen."

"We don't see any problems in our relations with republics," he added. Commenting on the minorities' situation in Ukraine and immigration questions, Mr. Udovenko pointed out that Ukraine was proclaimed a democratic country and, in keeping with these principles, each person has the right to leave the country if he or she so chooses.

"My personal view is that we must create such conditions for all people, Russians, Jews, Hungarians, Bulgarians, that they will not want to leave our country. This is the main thing."

Currently, the Ukrainian Mission to the United Nations is located in the same building as the Soviet and Byelorussian missions, and often people have mistaken it as that of only the Soviet Mission. "I can just as easily say that the Soviet Mission is located in the Ukrainian Mission headquarters. Ukraine claims 25 percent of all Soviet properties abroad," said Mr. Udovenko, who plans to remain in the building on East 67th Street in New York.

Mr. Udovenko also plans to remain in the Communist Party. "Well, for now the activities of the Communist Party have been suspended," he reported. "And now it is very easy to resign from the party, it is not heroism."

But does he remain committed to the principles of the Communist Party? "I can answer that with a question. Which party do you mean? I am committed

to the ideal goals of the Communist Party, good goals of the Communist Party, but not their implementation. Everything went the wrong way. The principles that were declared were as good as those in the Bible," he concluded.

Ukraine's declaration of independence: What the act means for Ukraine

September 1, 1991

by Ihor Yukhnovsky

Only independence will allow Ukraine to optimize its economic and social development. To think that one can reorganize a country as massive and diverse as the USSR in its present form is wishful thinking. The effort required for this task is simply too great.

The break-up of the Soviet Union is a natural process. The emergence of Ukraine as a state is a logical outcome of the striving of the Ukrainian people for self-determination. In this regard, it is important to stress that we consider all citizens of our republic as the Ukrainian people; the people are the sole source of power in the republic.

But how can a democratic Ukrainian state be established? The Supreme Rada (Parliament) proclaimed independence and decreed the holding of a referendum on December 1, 1991, to affirm this act. In the Ukrainian Parliament there exists an official democratic opposition; it was on its initiative that the extraordinary session of Parliament was held and independence proclaimed. As a member of the United Nations, Ukraine joins the Vienna Convention. A crucial issue for us is our relationship to Russia and to the union treaty.

Ukraine will not sign a union treaty in which the union is a sovereign state in its own right and a subject of international law. However, we will enter into agreements for economic, political, military and cultural cooperation with Russia and the other republics.

If the de-communization of our republic proceeds normally, we will have good relations with Russia. It is essential that this process be carried out along a strictly constitutional path. We will not be satisfied with anything less than full democratization.

The division of the armed forces of the USSR is an issue of paramount importance. Ukraine will establish its own national army. However, we want to place strategic weapons under inter-republican jurisdiction. We want Ukraine to be nuclear-free.

Ukraine will pursue radical economic reform. We are asserting control of our economy by nationalizing the property of all-union organs and by estab-

lishing our own currency. We will encourage the development of private enterprise and will create a climate favorable for foreign investment. Ukraine will assume its share of the USSR foreign debt.

Independence for us means that we finally have a chance to establish a free and open society.

Ihor Yukhnovsky is a member of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Parliament and leader of the parliamentary opposition, the National Council.

INDEPENDENCE
Over 90% vote yes in referendum; Kravchuk elected president of Ukraine

December 8, 1991

by Chrystyna Lapychak
Kiev Press Bureau

KIEV – "On the map of the world a new European state has emerged. Its name – Ukraine."

A special session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine opened with these words by First Deputy Chairman Ivan Pliushch, as Leonid Kravchuk was sworn in as the first popularly elected president of a united new independent Ukrainian state, inaugurating a new era in the often tragic 1,000-year-old history of the Ukrainian nation.

Four days after an overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens – 90.32 percent – voted "yes" in the December 1 referendum on independence and elected him chief executive, President Kravchuk took his oath of office to the people of Ukraine with his hand placed on two documents: Ukraine's current Constitution and the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine.

"I solemnly swear to the people of Ukraine to realize my authority as president, to strictly adhere to the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, to respect and protect the rights and liberties of people and citizens, to defend the sovereignty of Ukraine and to conscientiously fulfill my obligations," pledged the new president.

On a table next to him lay the over 500-year-old Peresopnytsky Gospel, the first Bible in Old Ukrainian, "as a symbol of the continuity of Ukrainian history," according to Deputy Ivan Zayets.

In the space above the chairman's podium, where a giant statue of Lenin once stood, was a blue-and-yellow Ukrainian national flag.

During the solemn ceremonies, which featured a choir singing "Bozhe

Velykyi Yedynyi" and "Shche Ne Vmerla Ukraina" and an address by the new president, the Ukrainian Parliament formally renounced Ukraine's participation in the 1924 act creating the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The legislature issued a statement to the parliaments and peoples of the world, announcing its intentions and directions in foreign and domestic policy, particularly in questions of international cooperation, human rights, nuclear disarmament, respect for borders and economic reform.

President Kravchuk also outlined his vision of Ukraine's political, economic and social direction as a fledgling European democracy, repeating the basic principles in his campaign platform and responding to the concerns of many foreign countries in an effort to win their recognition.

The results of the December 1 plebiscite also rendered invalid the results of the March 17 all-union referendum on a renewed union, said Deputy Vitaliy Boyko, chairman of the Central Election Commission, during the special session. It also served as a vote of confidence in the existing Ukrainian Supreme Council, said Mr. Pliushch.

Mr. Pliushch was elected chairman of the Ukrainian legislature by a vote of 261 to 100 following the ceremonial part of the session.

International reaction to the results of the referendum and presidential race dominated the days following December 1.

Poland and Canada were the first states to recognize Ukraine on December 2. The next day, Hungary and Ukraine signed the first protocol establishing full diplomatic relations and transforming the Hungarian Consulate in Kiev to the first foreign embassy here.

In a significant move, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a statement on December 3 recognizing Ukraine's independence and expressing the need for forging new interstate relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Mr. Yeltsin had announced several times last week that if Ukraine did not join the new political Union of Sovereign States neither would the RSFSR.

President Kravchuk repeatedly stated over the last two weeks that Ukraine would pursue relations with Russia and the other former Soviet republics on a bilateral level as equal, independent states.

The leaders of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus were set to meet in Minsk on December 7 to coordinate economic reform measures in the three former Soviet republics.

During a press conference following his swearing-in ceremony, the silver-haired president said that he would have no right to sign a union treaty that some 31 million people had rejected in last Sunday's vote for Ukrainian independence.

The Bush administration issued a restrained response early last week, welcoming the favorable referendum results and congratulating Mr. Kravchuk on his election. The statement stopped short of formal recognition and reiterated many of the previously stated U.S. requirements for recognition.

"The first Western leader to call Mr. Kravchuk after the referendum was (U.S. President George) Bush," said Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko at a December 3 press conference.

In his telephone conversation with the American leader, as well as in all of his public statements, Mr. Kravchuk has tried to reassure Western leaders of Ukraine's willingness to address their concerns. These include repayment of foreign debts, nuclear disarmament, adherence to international agreements, respect of existing borders, harmonious relations with Russia and the center, and rights guarantees for national minorities in Ukraine.

By directly responding to U.S. requirements, "Ukrainian leaders are only being realistic," said John Hewko, a Washington attorney and adviser to Ukraine's legislature.

"They want to make their message loud and clear that they're for these principles. They realize that Ukraine can't be a player in the world unless the U.S. recognizes it. It is the only superpower and its opinion is very important," he said.

"They feel that 'we've been waiting for hundreds of years, why blow it?' It's not only that. It really is their position," said Mr. Hewko.

Thomas Niles, an assistant to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, was scheduled to arrive in Kiev on December 6 for discussions with Ukrainian leaders. His trip will apparently serve as a preparation for an official visit by Secretary Baker in mid-December.

The overwhelming "yes" vote and high voter turnout – 84.16 percent of eligible voters – exceeded all expectations.

Opposition leaders last week reacted with pride and interpreted the results as a victory for their platform, despite the fact that their candidates, led by Lviv Oblast Council Chairman Vyacheslav Chornovil, lost the presidential race.

"I will have won these elections no matter what happens, even if I don't become president. The pre-election campaign gave me the opportunity to travel all over Ukraine, to meet the people and to politicize the east," said a smiling Mr. Chornovil moments after he voted at a Lviv polling station last Sunday.

Mr. Chornovil received 23.27 percent of the vote; Levko Lukianenko, 4.49 percent; Volodymyr Hryniov, 4.17 percent; Ihor Yukhnovsky, 1.74; and Leopold Taburiansky, 0.57 percent.

"Kravchuk may have won, but so did our program," said Rukh Chairman and Deputy Ivan Drach on Monday. "Kravchuk's program was taken from the programs of Rukh, the Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Republican Party," he said.

"Throughout the democratic world, despite intensive campaign battles, once a president is chosen the people rally around him," said another Rukh leader, Mykhailo Horyn.

"It is our task as an opposition to create an environment that allows the new president to lead in state-building," he said last week. "It is our task to dili-

gently supervise so that the president indeed builds an independent Ukraine."

Even before the results started coming in, Ukrainians and the many visitors who observed the elections began celebrating Ukraine's independence with parties in restaurants and private homes on Sunday night.

Most of the 100 international observers who traveled throughout Ukraine to monitor the voting concluded that the process was democratic and that no deliberate violations occurred in their presence.

Among them were 23 Americans, including 12 official observers from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the U.S. Consulate in Kiev, the State Department, the Helsinki Commission and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who monitored polling stations in Kiev, Kaniv, Odessa, the Crimea, Kharkiv, Lviv and Chernivtsi.

Also among the observers were five Canadian members of Parliament, seven MPs from the Europarliament and one deputy from Germany's Bundestag.

"We congratulate you on your excellent results," said Gert Weisskirchen, the German deputy, at a December 3 press conference. "With such results all national minority groups in Ukraine said 'yes.' We have seen the peaceful birth of a state, and this referendum is the basis for the peaceful future of your nation," he said.

EDITORIAL

Life after December 1

December 8, 1991

A state, to prosper, must be built on foundations of a moral character, and this character is the principal element of its strength and the only guarantee of its permanence and prosperity.

– J. Currie

After the celebrations of independence cease, after the euphoria subsides, the new, free democratic state of Ukraine will only begin the long and difficult road to true independence.

Only now can the 52 million citizens of Ukraine show that they are indeed committed to the development of their nation-state. After centuries of failed attempts to attain lasting self-government, a goal that has eluded them throughout their historical experience, the people of Ukraine are faced with a bright future of their own design.

The overwhelming 90 percent vote for independence on Sunday, December 1, testifies to the fact that, after centuries of oppression, centuries

of Russification and decades of communism, the people are slowly waking up from a deep slumber that kept them complacent, passive, and at times even indifferent to their fate, to their future.

Over the past few months, events in what is now the former Soviet Union have transpired at a dizzying pace. Just last year the Ukrainian Parliament declared Ukraine sovereign. Yet, in March of this year the people voted to join a "new and improved union" under the guidance of Mikhail Gorbachev, while expressing overwhelming support for Ukraine's Declaration on State Sovereignty. But the events of August 19 changed all that.

Superficially it may look like the road to independence was smooth; it may seem that Ukraine benefited from circumstances beyond its control.

Indeed, the course of action taken by Mr. Gorbachev, his policies of "glasnost and perestroika" in the 1980s, had allowed the citizens of Ukraine this historic opportunity to move toward statehood. And, the actions of Russian President Boris Yeltsin served as a catalyst for Ukraine's Act of the Declaration of Independence on August 24.

But, Ukraine's independence, its ongoing evolution into a full-fledged nation-state, is built on the bones of its ancestors. Over the centuries many great patriots worked toward the emergence of a free Ukraine. In this century alone millions fell victim to Stalin's policies of collectivization and destruction of the intelligentsia and the Churches, millions died at the hands of both Nazi and Communist oppressors.

Within the last two decades men of such moral fiber as Vasyl Stus, Oleksa Tykhy and Valeriy Marchenko perished in the Soviet gulag; others, such as Ukrainian Helsinki Group founders Gen. Petro Grigorenko and Oksana Meshko did not live to see the day they had always dreamed of. But their principles, their ideals are embodied in the thread of Ukraine; their sacrifices have borne fruit.

Soon after his release from the Soviet gulag, Ukrainian Republican Party leader Levko Lukianenko, a 27-year veteran of the Soviet prisons, said in an interview:

"I consider myself a fortunate man. At the summit of my youth, I truly fell in love with Ukraine. I fell in love with its song, its land; I fell in love with its past, its Kozak era. And I did not want all of this to perish ...

"And everywhere I traveled, I thought, what can I do for the good of Ukraine? Continuously I studied history and contemplated the situation Ukraine found itself in. When I entered university I wanted to gain the knowledge that would help me in the struggle for an independent Ukraine..."

The former political prisoner's words reflect the sacred hope and holy struggle for Ukraine's independence that have been passed on, unchanged, from generation to generation. Today, we are the generation fortunate to be blessed with the realization of the age-old dream of a free Ukraine.

Slava Ukraini!

Canada recognizes Ukraine

December 8, 1991

OTTAWA – Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced on Monday, December 2, that Canada has decided to recognize Ukraine as an independent state.

The prime minister noted that reports from Canadian observers indicate that Ukraine has conducted a free and democratic referendum. He said that the massive and overwhelming vote testifies to the strong desire of the people of Ukraine for an independent country.

Canada will shortly open negotiations on establishing diplomatic relations with Ukraine.

As part of those negotiations, Canada will wish to be satisfied with respect to Ukraine's stated intentions that it will: ensure that nuclear weapons remain under secure control until they are disposed of; comply with existing arms control, disarmament and other international agreements; and adhere to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE documents, with particular attention to full respect for human rights and the protection of minorities.

The prime minister confirmed that senior officials will be going to Kiev in the coming days to convey Canada's position and to begin the process of negotiations.

[Canada thus became the second country to officially recognize Ukraine's independence. Poland, Ukraine's crucial western neighbor, was the first country to grant diplomatic recognition. "Relations between Poland and Ukraine are very good and ambassadors will be exchanged soon," said Wladylaw Klaczynski, spokesman for the Polish Foreign Ministry, on Monday, December 2.]

Ukraine ratifies amended agreement on commonwealth

December 15, 1991

by Chrystyna Lapychak
Kiev Press Bureau

KIEV – The Supreme Council of Ukraine on Tuesday, December 10, ratified 288 to 10, with certain key changes and amendments, the Agreement on

the Formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States signed last Sunday by the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, and the parliamentary chairman of Belarus.

The agreement, widely viewed as the final nail in the coffin of the dying Soviet Union, was signed in a hunting lodge outside Brest as Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Belarusian Sejm Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich concluded a two-day Slavic summit on December 7-8 in Belarus.

The three leaders signed the accord just over one week after Ukraine's declaration of independence was overwhelmingly confirmed in a December 1 plebiscite.

The Russian Federation recognized Ukrainian statehood two days later. Several opposition deputies have privately connected Russia's quick recognition, which is of key importance to Ukraine, to Ukraine's agreement to join the commonwealth.

In its December 10 vote the Ukrainian Parliament added and changed key points in the agreement, strengthening the sovereignty of the individual member-states.

The most significant changes and additions were made in Articles 5,6 and 7 of the 14-point accord. They regard the issues of mutual respect for existing state borders, the right to form separate non-strategic national armed forces based on Soviet troops on their territory, consultations instead of coordination of foreign policy, and consensus decisions by the member-states of recommendations by the yet-to-be-formed coordinating institutes in Minsk.

"The attempts of the center to revive an old union are not only unrealistic, but harmful, as they deceive our peoples," said Ukrainian President Kravchuk during a news conference on Monday, December 9, in Kiev.

"This was not an attempt to form a Slavic commonwealth. I mentioned already on December 5 the idea of a commonwealth and we consulted with Nursultan Nazarbayev [of Kazakhstan]. We decided to give the text of the agreement to all the former Soviet republics, including the Baltics," said President Kravchuk.

"I said before that Ukraine will sign no treaty which makes it part of another state. We said we could agree to something on the model of the European community. So we all came together and agreed that this was the only correct approach to stop the unregulated and uncontrolled disintegration in all aspects of life," he said.

"We acted according to our authority, our constitutions of our independent states and according to international legal norms," he asserted.

"Ukraine, in all of its matters, remains independent. We agreed that the issues of a national currency and national army were the business of each state, while issues such as nuclear weapons would be jointly regulated by agreements," said the president.

The accord foresees coordination in two keys areas: economic reform and joint control of strategic forces.

"Together we'll introduce economic reforms, helping each other, yet acting independently," said President Kravchuk. "For this period we'll keep the ruble. Yeltsin has agreed to give us a mass of rubles so we can raise wages and pensions before freeing prices."

"The control over nuclear weapons will be joint," he said. "This black briefcase will be in the hands of three leaders and the buttons will be connected. In other words they will only work when pressed by all three simultaneously. Therefore, this system does not increase the danger, but strengthens the guarantees against danger. We had to agree on a collective command because this is an issue of global character."

"The union has disintegrated, and people are concerned about how we will live now. I believe that this agreement does not limit our sovereignty by a single sentence. The union no longer exists, and every state of the world must now deal directly with Ukraine and Belarus and Kazakhstan and others. I think this is a signal, not only a signal, but a fact," said the president.

"This is not a new state," said Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, on December 9. "This is created on the model of the European Community. The agreement has no legal status as a subject of international law and it certainly is not eternal. This is all a transitional moment. In the future we'd like to join the European Community and the European common home," he said.

"Right now we have no other choice. This agreement will serve as a bridge to cross the abyss – to avoid military conflict, especially after the allegations by (Leningrad Mayor Anatoly) Sobchak. This is our absolute guarantee that we are peacefully moving toward democracy," said Mr. Pavlychko.

FORGING DIPLOMATIC TIES

United States recognizes Ukraine, plans to establish diplomatic relations

December 29, 1991

JERSEY CITY, N.J. – Within hours of the formal resignation of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the United States recognized the independence of Ukraine, one of the founding states of the new Commonwealth of Independent States.

U.S. President George Bush, satisfied with the assurances on nuclear safety, democracy and free markets he had received from the former

republics, announced, in a televised speech and a written statement issued on December 25, that the United States would establish diplomatic relations with Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Kyrgystan.

He said that diplomatic relations with the other republics – Moldova, Turkmenistan, Azerbaidzhan, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan, all members of the new Commonwealth, and with Georgia, the sole republic that has refused to join the Commonwealth, would come "when they are found to comply with principles of democratic rule and human rights."

In his address, Mr. Bush noted that Washington would accept Russia as successor to the Soviet Union as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

President Bush prefaced his announcement of recognition, saying that "during these last few months you and I have witnessed one of the greatest dramas of the 20th century – the historic and revolutionary transformation of a totalitarian dictatorship, the Soviet Union, and the liberation of its peoples," noting that "new independent nations have emerged out of the wreckage of the Soviet empire."

For its part, the European Community said in a statement from the Netherlands that it will speed up the establishment of diplomatic ties with the new states.

Britain, the Netherlands, Israel and the European Community said that they recognize the Russian Federation as the legal successor to the Soviet Union. Canada announced that it would establish diplomatic relations immediately with Russia.

As regards the establishment of embassies in the new national capitals, a U.S. administration official said that, in the case of Ukraine, the logistics involved would be relatively easy, given the presence of an already functioning consulate.

1992: THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Ukraine: a year of transition

December 27, 1992

by Dr. Roman Solchanyk
RFE/RL Research Institute

Ukraine's first year as an independent state witnessed a fundamental realignment of political forces within the country that resulted in the division of the democratic forces into two basic camps, both committed to the

same overall goal of consolidating independence, but with differing views on how best to achieve that end. A key issue separating the two camps is the attitude towards the policies and persona of President Leonid Kravchuk. In spite of these differences, Ukraine remains politically tranquil, showing few if any signs of the deep political divisions that have beset several of its newly independent neighbors, including Russia, and which, in some cases, have led to civil war and armed conflict.

At the same time, the Ukrainian experience has once again shown that politics and economics are tightly interwoven. The steadily worsening economic situation combined with the government's inability or, as critics have argued, unwillingness to press ahead with economic reform resulted in the forced resignation of Prime Minister Vitold Fokin and his Cabinet. The new government, headed by an experienced representative of the industrial lobby, has pledged to move towards a market economy at a steady pace, but without resorting to "shock therapy." For the time being, the opposition is prepared to let the new government demonstrate what it can do.

Much depends on Ukraine's relations, both political and economic, with Russia. After an initial period of confrontation, the tensions between the two most important members of the CIS have subsided.

President Kravchuk and Russian President Boris Yeltsin held two summit meetings in 1992 to iron out their differences, but it would be naively optimistic to suggest that the Ukrainian-Russian relationship has suddenly undergone a fundamental transformation. The basic question of whether Russia is able to abandon its view of Ukraine as an integral part of Russia, which has been conditioned by several centuries of history, remains open.

Moreover, there are any number of practical problems stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union that the two sides have yet to resolve. One of these is the disposition of the strategic nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory. Although Ukraine has pledged to become a non-nuclear state, there is a growing pro-nuclear lobby in the country that cannot be ignored. This, in turn, is a problem of utmost interest to the West, and one that directly impinges on Ukraine's relations with the outside world.

Political landscape

In a recent article, the well-known literary critic and commentator Mykola Ryabchuk portrayed the current situation in the Ukrainian democratic camp in terms of the Faust-Mephistopheles syndrome. The suggestion, of course, is that a pact had been made with the devil (personified by Mr. Kravchuk) for the sake of Ukrainian independent statehood. Mr. Ryabchuk had in mind primarily developments within Rukh, which emerged during the period of perestroika and served as an umbrella organization bringing together the democratic opposition to the Communist regime. In the course of 1992 Rukh split into two camps. The fault line was the policies and per-

sona of Mr. Kravchuk, who, as the ideological secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, had previously been the nemesis of the democrats.

On one side of this fault line is Vyacheslav Chornovil – a prominent former political prisoner, the first head of the democratically elected Lviv Oblast Council, and runner-up to Mr. Kravchuk in the December 1991 presidential elections – who enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of Rukh organizations in the oblasts, particularly in western Ukraine.

Mr. Chornovil insists that a democratic society cannot be created without an opposition, and he has taken it upon himself to lead what he calls a "constructive opposition" to the political and economic policies associated with President Kravchuk. Specifically, Mr. Chornovil points to what might be termed the "unfinished revolution" in Ukraine, criticizing the Ukrainian president's reliance on the old Communist Party apparat in the state administration and the hesitation on the part of the executive branch to fully commit itself to radical market-oriented economic reform. No doubt there is an element of personal conflict between Mr. Chornovil and President Kravchuk that can be traced to the presidential campaign. It came to the surface at the World Forum of Ukrainians in Kiev in August, which witnessed a biting attack on Mr. Chornovil by the Ukrainian president.

On the other side of the barricades are many prominent figures from the old democratic opposition like Ivan Drach, the first head of Rukh; Dmytro Pavlychko, the first head of the Ukrainian Language Society; Mykhailo Horyn, also a long-time political prisoner and now head of the Ukrainian Republican Party; Larysa Skoryk, earlier one of the most outspoken critics of Mr. Kravchuk in the Parliament; and other key figures in the Rukh central leadership. The point of departure for this group is the defense and consolidation of Ukrainian statehood, which is identified with President Kravchuk.

Moreover, the Ukrainian leader has skillfully courted the opposition. In his speech to the opening meeting of the fifth session of the Parliament in January, Mr. Kravchuk called for a roundtable of political parties, groups, movements and trade unions to discuss the formation of a government of popular accord and emphasized that Rukh could play the leading role in such an undertaking. When the roundtable convened in February, the president advanced the idea of creating a State Duma (Council), the leadership of which was subsequently staffed almost exclusively by prominent figures from the opposition. Representatives of the latter have also been named to important posts in the state administration, government and the diplomatic corps. In short, President Kravchuk has succeeded in co-opting both the Rukh program and many of its top leaders.

The split between the two Rukh camps was visible for all to see at the organization's third congress on February 28-March 1. Although the majority of delegates supported Mr. Chornovil's line of "constructive opposition," a formal split was averted by electing three co-chairmen (Messrs. Chornovil,

Drach and Horyn) and agreeing on a compromise resolution that characterized Rukh as being in opposition, but at the same time supporting President Kravchuk's policies insofar as they do not conflict with its platform. Subsequently, Mr. Horyn left the triumvirate to take over the leadership of the Ukrainian Republican Party. Mr. Drach, on the other hand, while formally retaining his post as co-chairman, simply stopped playing an active role in the Rukh leadership.

At the fourth congress, which was held December 4-6, Mr. Chornovil assumed full control of Rukh and, in effect, transformed the organization into a political party. The delegates voted to annul the institution of co-chairmen and went on to elect Mr. Chornovil as sole head of the organization by an overwhelming vote of 423-8.

Thus, by the end of 1992, Rukh, armed with a new program of state-building adopted at its congress, was transformed into a political base for Mr. Chornovil's expected candidacy in the next presidential elections. With about 50,000 card-carrying members and many more supporters and sympathizers, it is the largest and most important political grouping in Ukraine.

In the meantime, the Rukh minority formed its own organization on August 2 called the Congress of National Democratic Forces (CNDF). This coalition was put together by Mr. Horyn's Ukrainian Republican Party and the Democratic Party of Ukraine led by Yuriy Badzio and Mr. Pavlychko, and was joined by a number of center-right political parties and groups. The CNDF clearly delineated its line in support of Mr. Kravchuk, while joining Rukh in the call for a new Cabinet of Ministers and new parliamentary elections.

A third coalition that emerged in 1992 is New Ukraine, which was formed in January and may be said to reflect the views of the democratic center-left. The driving force behind New Ukraine is the Party for Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, which traces its origins to the Democratic Platform in the Communist Party of Ukraine. It groups together various social democratic, liberal, Green and trade-union organizations, and also includes representatives of the rising industrial and business lobbies.

In its early stages, New Ukraine focused primarily on promoting the acceleration of economic reform. By the spring, however, the coalition went into political opposition to the government, and at its first congress in June it declared that it opposed the president and the presently constituted Parliament as well. Since then New Ukraine has been coordinating its activities with Rukh in the organization of a referendum to force early parliamentary elections. However, the effort to gather 3 million signatures by the December 21 deadline on a petition calling for a referendum has proved unsuccessful, which testifies to the widespread political apathy and disenchantment among the population.

The left opposition is represented by the Socialist Party of Ukraine,

which was formed in October 1991 as the successor to the banned Communist Party of Ukraine. The Socialists, led by People's Deputy Oleksander Moroz, convoked their second congress in December and concentrated their energies on the party's "anti-crisis" economic program, which is openly hostile to the market and privatization, and on the campaign to lift the ban on the Communist Party.

With a membership of close to 30,000, the Socialist Party of Ukraine cannot be ignored as a political force. But even their numbers do not tell the full story. The notion of "socialism" is still very popular among large segments of the population, particularly in times of economic misery, and the socialists have skillfully played this card in their appeals to the masses.

On the other side of the political spectrum, 1992 witnessed the organizational formation of several ultranationalist and extremist groups proclaiming their commitment to exclusively "Ukrainian national interests."

Politics and the economy

At the end of September President Kravchuk finally caved in to opposition criticism of the government's economic policy and on September 30 announced the retirement of Prime Minister Fokin. The Ukrainian president decided to sacrifice his head of government, but wanted to retain the core of the Cabinet of Ministers. However, on October 1 the Parliament adopted a resolution expressing no confidence in the entire government, forcing President Kravchuk to name a new Cabinet head within a 10-day period.

The president responded by selecting First Deputy Prime Minister Valentyn Symonenko as interim prime minister; and on October 13 he proposed the candidacy of Leonid Kuchma, whom the lawmakers approved by a large majority. Mr. Kuchma, general director of the Southern Machine Construction Plant production association in Dnipropetrovske, which is described as the largest missile production plant in the world, is a 54-year-old Ukrainian who has spent most of his working life at the plant he now heads.

His initial statements left observers with the impression that the new Ukrainian prime minister is a practical-minded manager who will pursue a gradual course to the market and is intent on avoiding the "shock therapy" identified with a rapid embrace of the market.

The Cabinet crisis in the fall was preceded by several months of inconclusive attempts to launch a program of economic reform against a background of political infighting between proponents of a radical reform package and traditionalists wary of the market. At the same time, the country was experiencing a steady deterioration of the economic situation characterized by a decline in production, spiraling inflation and increasing prices for consumer goods. In the first two months of 1992, for example, industrial production fell by more than 17 percent, as compared to the same period in the pre-

vious year; production of consumer goods declined by more than 23 percent; and production of foodstuffs dropped by almost 36 percent.

The duality in the approach to economic reform was reflected in the virtually simultaneous appointments in March of Oleksander Yemelianov as chairman of the State Council's Collegium on Questions of Economic Policy and Volodymyr Lanovoy as deputy prime minister and minister of economics.

Mr. Yemelianov, who came from the State Planning Committee, was charged with formulating economic policy, which resulted in a document titled "Fundamentals of the Economic Policy of Ukraine" that envisaged introduction of a Ukrainian currency and preparations for an immediate abandonment of the ruble zone. The plan was approved in principle by the Parliament at a closed session on March 24.

Mr. Lanovoy is a 40-year-old proponent of radical market reform and one of the leaders of the New Ukraine coalition. Several days after Mr. Yemelianov's "Fundamentals" was approved, he subjected the document to stinging criticism, saying that it was not a program but rather a hastily assembled collection of incompetent and anti-market responses to the liberalization of prices introduced in Russia earlier in the year. Clearly, such a situation could not be maintained for very long.

And, indeed, on July 11 President Kravchuk sacked Mr. Lanovoy, unconvincingly arguing that a high-ranking government official could not simultaneously be a member of an opposition political group. In his place Mr. Kravchuk appointed Valentyn Symonenko as first deputy prime minister. Mr. Symonenko previously served as mayor of Odessa and was then appointed presidential representative in the Odessa oblast. His appointment, and especially the firing of Mr. Lanovoy were widely interpreted as backtracking on economic reform.

By all accounts, Mr. Symonenko was President Kravchuk's first choice to succeed Mr. Fokin, against whom the opposition mounted a determined campaign in the summer. After an unsuccessful attempt on June 3 to place a vote of no confidence on the Parliament's agenda, on July 7 the Parliament placed the question of confidence in the government on its agenda. The prime minister responded by citing President Kravchuk's support and reading a prepared statement demanding that either the lawmakers accept his terms or assume responsibility for the situation in the country; thereafter, most of the ministers left the hall. Parliament, in turn, before recessing for the summer, passed a resolution proposing that the president submit new candidates for ministerial posts.

At the same time, more than 20 political parties and groups formed a coalition called "A New Parliament for an Independent Ukraine," which demanded the government's resignation, new parliamentary elections and a referendum on the dissolution of Parliament. When the Parliament reconvened in September against the background of what was described by Mr.

Fokin as a "profound crisis" in the economy, Mr. Symonenko still did not have a completed economic reform package. In the final analysis, the Fokin-Symonenko plan for "deepening" economic reforms and a restructuring of the Cabinet of Ministers never saw the light of day. The government was forced to resign on October 1.

Within two weeks of his appointment on October 13, Mr. Kuchma presented his choices for ministerial posts, which were approved by the Parliament on October 27. The job of deputy prime minister and minister of economics went to Viktor Pynzenyk, who had previously criticized the government's economic policies.

Mr. Kuchma himself came out in support of market reforms, but emphasized that the transition should be a gradual one. According to the new prime minister, the process should begin with the privatization of small and medium-sized enterprises, consumer services, trade and agricultural production facilities. Large state-run enterprises should be denationalized at a slow pace, and only those deemed essential would continue to be subsidized. Mr. Kuchma has also come out strongly in favor of maintaining close economic ties with Russia.

At the end of November the Parliament granted Mr. Kuchma extraordinary powers for a period of six months in order to facilitate his economic reform program of tight budget and wage controls combined with accelerated privatization and what appears to be a serious effort to wipe out corruption.

Foreign policy: Russia, the CIS and the West

Ukraine's relations with Russia go well beyond the question of bilateral relations between the two most important successor states to the Soviet Union. They impinge on the fate of Russia itself, on the future of the CIS, and are crucial to Western security interests. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that the litmus test for Russia's future course of development is whether or not it can live with an independent Ukraine.

That question is still open. For many Russians, regardless of their political convictions, the "loss" of Ukraine is simply incomprehensible. The problem is primarily a historical one. Russian political thought traditionally viewed "Little Russia" (Ukraine) as an integral part of Russia and "Little Russians" (Ukrainians) as part of the "all-Russian" (obshcherusskoy) nation. Stated differently, Ukraine and Ukrainians were never considered to be legitimate concepts. Indeed, Russian historiography traces the origins of the Russian state to Kievan Rus'. The "loss" of Ukraine, therefore, represents the loss of a key aspect of Russian history and, consequently, Russian national identity. Ukrainian independence has had the practical effect of forcing Russia to reconstruct its national memory.

Admittedly, this is not an easy process. Leading Russian political figures,

both in the Yeltsin camp and in the "red-brown" coalition of self-styled patriots and disgruntled Communists, have on numerous occasions made it clear they cannot accept an independent Ukraine.

The Russian opposition has been particularly forthright. Sergei Baburin, a central figure in the National Salvation Front, was quoted in May as telling Kiev's ambassador in Moscow that "either Ukraine reunites with Russia, or there will be war." Leading Russian democrats like St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak and former Moscow Mayor Gavrill Popov, although considerably more diplomatic, reacted to Ukraine's independence with undisguised horror and territorial claims.

And statements like those by Vice-President Aleksander Rutskoi that the Russian Federation should not be confused with Russia or Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Poltoranin's reference to President Kravchuk's "separatism" in the context of centrifugal movements inside Russia suggest that the Russian White House is not entirely immune to what the Ukrainian president has often referred to as Russian "imperial thinking."

This problem was reflected in the tense relations between Kiev and Moscow throughout the first half of 1992, which were clearly visible, particularly in the disputes over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. On January 23 the Russian Parliament voted overwhelmingly to adopt a resolution instructing two of its committees to examine the constitutionality of the 1954 decisions to transfer the Crimea from the RSFSR to Ukraine. In another resolution, the Ukrainian Parliament was asked to find a speedy resolution to all questions related to the Black Sea Fleet. An unsuccessful attempt was made to place both of these issues on the agenda of the Sixth Congress of Russian People's Deputies in April. The following month, a closed session of the Russian Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution declaring the 1954 transfer of the Crimea as being "without the force of law." More recently, the Seventh Congress of Russian People's Deputies on December 5 called into question Ukraine's right to the Crimean city of Sevastopol, which is home to the Black Sea Fleet.

Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk held two summits in 1992. The first, in the southern Russian resort town of Dagomys on June 23, focused on economic issues and set the stage for the current negotiations on a new Ukrainian-Russian treaty. The Crimean question was not on the agenda, which represented a victory for the Ukrainian position that this is purely an internal Ukrainian matter.

The second summit was held in Yalta in August and yielded an interim solution to the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet by placing it under joint Ukrainian-Russian command for a three-year period, after which it is to be divided between the two sides. Negotiations on the issue are continuing.

But it would be overly optimistic to assume that these specific problems have been resolved and, more important, that the larger issue of Russia's

attitude toward an independent Ukraine has suddenly been reversed. Recent statements by Vice-President Rutskoi on the Crimea and, even more disturbing, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's remark that territorial claims on Ukraine could not be excluded provide little ground for optimism on this score.

From Kiev's standpoint, the Russian version of the draft of a new treaty between Ukraine and Russia, which was made public in September, gives added weight to Henry Kissinger's claim he never met a Russian who accepted that Ukraine can be truly independent. The draft, among other things, calls for a joint military doctrine and provides for the use of Ukrainian territory by Russia's military, and has been rejected by Kiev.

The Ukrainian-Russian imbroglio has also had a visible impact on the course of developments in the CIS. The latter was formed by Ukraine, Russia and Belarus in December of 1991, but Kiev's motivations for joining were quite different from those of its two Slavic neighbors. The latter were prepared to sign Mikhail Gorbachev's confederative union treaty but ultimately did not do so because Ukraine rejected Mr. Gorbachev's plans outright. The result was the CIS, which Mr. Yeltsin agreed to in order to maintain the link with Ukraine. For Mr. Kravchuk and the Ukrainian leadership, the CIS provided a mechanism for what has been described as a civilized divorce process.

These two diametrically opposed approaches largely explain the ineffectiveness of the CIS. Russia would like to see a more tightly integrated CIS replete with its own charter and coordinating bodies. Ukraine has flatly rejected all suggestions of transforming the CIS into a new "superstate," and on various occasions President Kravchuk and other Ukrainian leaders have suggested that Ukraine will abandon the Commonwealth.

Rukh and other political groupings have incorporated the demand that Ukraine leave the CIS into their programs. The frustration of the Russian side can be seen in the appeal addressed by the Seventh Congress of Russian People's Deputies to the Parliaments of the Soviet successor states to consider forming a confederation or some other form of closer association of European and Asian states.

All of these problems are viewed with dismay from Washington, London, Bonn and other Western capitals. Their main concern is the fact that Russia and Ukraine, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan, have formidable arsenals of nuclear weapons on their territories. The nuclear arms issue also has a Ukrainian-Russian angle. As a matter of principle, Kiev has objected to Moscow's determined effort to play the role of sole successor to the USSR, especially in international affairs. A case in point is negotiations with the West on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Ukraine's position that it is an independent party in the nuclear arms negotiations was finally agreed to in May with the signing of the Lisbon protocol to START. Neither the West nor Russia were anxious for Ukraine,

Belarus and Kazakhstan to, in effect, join the nuclear club. Only several months earlier, in March, Ukraine suspended its transfer of short-range nuclear weapons to Russia, claiming there was no guarantee the arms were actually being destroyed as had been agreed. The transfers were subsequently resumed and by May, when President Kravchuk visited Washington, all tactical nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukrainian territory.

But the problem of strategic nuclear weapons remains, with Ukraine demanding the right to "administer" these weapons while leaving "operational management" to the command of the CIS armed forces. Moreover, increasingly Ukraine is being seen as stalling on the ratification of START, which President Kravchuk recently admitted would not be possible before the new year. At the same time, there is a growing and increasingly vocal lobby in Ukraine that argues for the retention of a nuclear capability, and Mr. Kravchuk himself has insisted that Ukraine should be given security guarantees and financial compensation before it becomes nuclear-free.

* * *

Thus, the balance sheet of one year of Ukrainian independence presents a mixed picture. President Kravchuk and his allies in the democratic camp succeeded in asserting and consolidating Ukrainian independence vis-à-vis Russia and in the international arena. But now they are faced with the no less formidable task of providing the economic underpinning for translating that independence into something concrete with which ordinary citizens can identify and which, in the final analysis, will provide the backbone and muscle needed to promote the development not only of an independent but also a democratic state and civil society.

1992: THE YEAR IN REVIEW

The task of nation-building

December 27, 1992 (Abridged)

After the euphoria of independence subsided, in 1992, Ukraine was faced with the arduous task of building a democratic, independent nation. Throughout the year, it asserted its de jure status by adopting attributes of a sovereign state.

On the first day of the fifth session of its 12th convocation the Parliament adopted the blue-and-yellow flag as the state flag of Ukraine; during the winter months the Supreme Council went on to approve the trident as the state emblem (February 19) and to adopt a national anthem for

Ukraine. August 24 was designated a state holiday, "Ukrainian Independence Day," marking the date in 1991 that the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence, voting in the aftermath of the attempted coup in Moscow.

In May Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that new passports would be issued to every citizen of Ukraine over a five-year period between 1993 and 1998. The new Ukrainian passport will be based on international standards and will be valid both for internal identification and for foreign travel, unlike the case during the Soviet era when separate passports were issued for domestic and external use.

Although Ukraine began issuing its own stamps in March 1992, it slowed the process of producing stamps soon afterward. Because of various technical difficulties, Ukrainian postal authorities were forced to utilize remaining Soviet supplies before attempting to produce more of their own stamps.

Two debut 15-kopek stamps which did manage to come into circulation on Sunday, March 1, depict two historic eras in Ukraine's glorious past. The first stamp celebrated 500 years of Kozak history, while the second marked 100 years of Ukrainian emigration to Canada.

In 1992 Ukraine also hoped to introduce its own monetary unit, the hryvnia, but due to the inconvertibility of the ruble, and subsequently the coupon, economic experts advised that Ukraine hold off until it could back its money with reserves. Thus, throughout 1992, the coupon, a flimsy piece of paper in various colors and in various denominations – described by Westerners as "Monopoly money" – circulated throughout Ukraine. By the end of the year Ukraine became a ruble-free zone.

Although the coupon was intended as a "transitional currency," according to Ukrainian officials "the unscheduled transformation of the coupon appears to be an irreversible shove toward the separation of the Russian and Ukrainian economies." By the end of the year President Leonid Kravchuk issued a decree officially removing the ruble from circulation in Ukraine, and making the karbovanets (basically, a renamed coupon) legal tender. It is not yet clear when the hryvnia will be introduced.

Ukraine also began to seriously concentrate on the establishment of its own army. Taking the oath of allegiance became a regular event, as pledges were administered in military schools, at army bases, naval fleets and national guard headquarters.

According to a recent report in the Financial Times, in Ukraine there are reckoned to be about 700,000 troops, including forces withdrawn by Moscow from Germany, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia. Under agreed manpower ceilings, these are due to be reduced to 450,000 in 1995. The official aim is a strength, by the end of the decade, of 250,000, roughly equivalent to the United Kingdom's. Most members of the military have signed oaths of allegiance to Ukraine. Experts say some 10,000 officers have refused and are due

to leave. But, there may be up to 200,000 Ukrainian officers currently serving in other republics who are eligible to return.

Ukraine's troops arrived in Sarajevo, on July 29, as part of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia, along with French, Egyptian and Canadian servicemen. By the end of the year three Ukrainian soldiers had lost their lives defending the citizens of this war-torn region of eastern Europe.

By year's end the United Nations established an interim office in Kiev, in accordance with an agreement signed by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko on October 6.

As Ukraine further established itself as a European state and a full-fledged member of the global community, it was admitted as a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at a January meeting in Prague of foreign ministers. In late February Mr. Kravchuk signed the Helsinki Accords.

Also in late February, Ukraine was asked to join NATO's Cooperation Council by Secretary General Manfred Woerner during his visit to Ukraine. ...

1992 was also a year of firsts for Ukraine, as citizens jubilantly celebrated the first anniversary of Ukrainian independence on August 24 and later, perhaps without much fanfare, the first anniversary of the historic referendum confirming Ukraine's independence on December 1.

However, the August 24 holiday was dampened for members of the diaspora who gathered in Kiev at the World Forum of Ukrainians. A statement issued by President Kravchuk threatened to expel any foreigner openly critical of the Ukrainian government, Supreme Council and the president's policies. ...

Also, veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were given their day of glory, 50 years after their valiant struggle to achieve a free Ukraine. Thousands of veterans marched through the streets of Kiev on August 9 and called on Ukraine's Parliament to recognize their defense of Ukraine during World War II. ...

U.S. and Ukraine finalize embassy purchase

January 3, 1993

by Eugene M. Iwanciw
UNA Washington Office

WASHINGTON – Just one year and four days after U.S. recognition of Ukraine, the government of Ukraine concluded the purchase of a historic building in Washington for use as its embassy in the United States. The building, known as Forrest-Marbury Court, is located at 3350 M St. NW in

the historic Georgetown district of Washington. Months of negotiations with both the seller of the building and the Department of State, which had to approve the purchase agreement, culminated with the December 29, 1992, signing ceremony at the current Embassy of Ukraine.

Soon after the establishment of the Embassy at its present temporary location in a downtown Washington office building, the Ukrainian delegation began searching for a permanent chancery for the Ukrainian Embassy. Working with a Washington realtor, Ambassador Oleh Bilorus and his staff visited numerous buildings before identifying Forrest-Marbury Court as a suitable site for a permanent embassy. This was followed by extensive price negotiations with the sellers. The purchase price agreed upon was $4 million.

The building, located steps from Key Bridge, is on the corner of M and 34th streets next to Francis Scott Key Memorial Park. The original portion of the building was constructed circa 1788. Between 1986 and 1989 the building was renovated and expanded. The 48,000-square-foot edifice was placed on the National Register of Historic Places on July 2, 1973 (see sidebar).

When Ukraine requested State Department approval of the purchase, it was initially denied due to the failure of the Ukrainian government to identify a new residence for the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, according to a State Department official. After about two months of negotiations and inquiries by members of Congress, the State Department relented and approved the purchase.

Since the U.S. government does not own land in Ukraine, the State Department required that the land on which the future Ukrainian Embassy stands be turned over to the U.S. government and leased to Ukraine for 90 years at a price of $1.

The December 29 signing ceremony involved Andrew Eschleman of Forrest Marbury Corp., owner of the property; Harry W. Porter III of the Office of Foreign Missions of the U.S. Department of State; and Ambassador Bilorus. In addition to the signing of the contract and deed, the U.S. and Ukrainian representatives signed the lease agreement.

After the signing of the documents, the ambassador, Embassy staff, State Department officials, lawyers, and guests toasted the new purchase with champagne from Ukraine. Mr. Porter toasted Ukraine and welcomed them to the community. "You have a superb property which will allow you to grow as our relations will continue to grow," stated Mr. Porter. Ambassador Bilorus replied that "this is a special day in the history of this Embassy and my country. Ukraine disappeared for centuries but now is emerging on the European scene." He concluded his remarks with the now familiar toast: "God bless America and God bless Ukraine."

The building was originally designed as a commercial/residential property. In addition to space for offices, it contains an interior landscaped courtyard, an outside terrace, garage parking for 21 cars and eight apartments.

According to the Ukrainian Embassy, some staff will reside on the premises. The building will not, however, be the ambassador's residence. Ukraine is still waiting for the St. Sophia Society to turn over its building in Washington for use as the ambassador's residence as originally agreed to earlier this year.

While the Embassy plans to begin moving its offices to the new chancery early in January, the Consulate will remain at the 1828 L St. location for a number of months. The new facility requires interior design work before it can be fully utilized as a chancery, consulate and residence for Ukraine.

New Ukrainian Embassy complex is U.S. historic landmark

January 3, 1993

by Eugene M. Iwanciw
UNA Washington Office

WASHINGTON – One of the earliest structures built in Washington, the meticulously restored, historically significant Forrest-Marbury House is an integral part of the newly constructed Forrest-Marbury Court. The exterior of the Forrest-Marbury House has been restored to reflect the Greek Revival period based upon a Civil War-era photograph. The interior incorporates elements of the Federalist and Greek Revival styles.

The remainder of the Forrest-Marbury Court complex is centered around and is architecturally compatible with the historical design and flow of the restored Forrest-Marbury House. All of the restoration work conforms to the Secretary of the Interior's Standards for Historic Preservation.

Forrest-Marbury Court's six levels feature a brick coachway leading to a landscaped courtyard and two spacious terraces with stunning views of the Potomac River and the Virginia Palisades.

Previously designated a Category I "building of great importance to the National Cultural Heritage" by the Joint Committee on Landmarks of Washington, D.C., Forrest-Marbury House is one of only six Category I buildings in private ownership in the District of Columbia. (The others are the Octagon House built in 1800, Tudor Place built in 1815, St. John's Church built in 1815, the Decatur House built in 1818, and Union Station built in 1903. Publicly owned Category I buildings include the White House, the Smithsonian Castle, the Supreme Court, the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument). It was placed on the National Register of Historic Places on July 2, 1973.

In 1695 the parcel of land on which the Forrest-Marbury Court now rests was known as "New Scotland Hundreds" of Prince Georges County, Md. In 1752 the Maryland Provincial Assembly honored King George II of England by creating a town bearing his name, George Town (now Georgetown).

The lot was purchased in 1785 by Benjamin Stoddert for the sum of 1,000 pounds in gold and silver. In 1788 he contracted for the construction of a substantial "Gentleman's House" on the property. Gen. Uriah Forrest, a Revolutionary War hero and Stoddert's partner, was the first to take up residence in the new house. During the time he lived there, the Continental Congress, meeting in Philadelphia, decided that the new nation's capital should be along the Potomac River. They entrusted Gen. George Washington with the responsibility of selecting a suitable site.

Both Stoddert and Forrest had served as Washington's officers in the Revolutionary War, and Forrest had at one time been Washington's aide-de-camp. Because of this friendship, Washington asked these men to assist in securing agreements from the 19 original landowners of the area so the government could acquire their land for a capital city. These efforts culminated with an agreement in principle which was reached at the famous March 29, 1791, dinner hosted by Forrest at his home. Washington's diary for that date reads, "dined at Col. Forrest's today with the Commissioner and others."

Thus, the Forrest-Marbury House is the site of one of the United States' most significant historical events, the establishment of the federal city of Washington, D.C. With the selection of the nation's capital, development along the Potomac started to expand. Construction on the White House began in 1792, the Capitol Building in 1793, and Georgetown University in 1789.

On December 6, 1980, William Marbury, a Federalist and supporter of President John Adams, purchased Forrest-Marbury House for 2,250 pounds (about $5,850 at that time). A short time after Marbury took up residence in his new home, he became involved in one of the most, if not the most, significant court cases in U.S. history.

On his last day in office, President Adams signed commissions naming 42 loyalists to his party as "Justice of the Peace" for the District of Columbia. The commissions were sent to the Secretary of State to be sealed and delivered. However, a number, including William Marbury's disappeared.

In 1803 Marbury filed suit against then Secretary of State James Madison, demanding that his commission as Justice of the Peace be delivered. The case, Marbury vs. Madison was heard by Chief Justice of the United States John Marshall. The court ruled on behalf of the defendant, James Madison, on the grounds that Mr. Marbury's basis for filing was unconstitutional. This landmark case established the Supreme Court's power to rule on the constitutionality of laws passed by Congress and further

confirmed this branch of the government's right of judicial review.

Francis Scott Key lived just one block west of Forrest-Marbury House when he wrote the national anthem. While the house in which Key lived is no longer standing, in 1987 Congress designated land immediately to the west of Forrest-Marbury Court as a park honoring Francis Scott Key. A private, non-profit foundation is currently raising funds to construct an appropriate monument to Key and the anthem, "The Star Spangled Banner." Plans include the re-landscaping of the site and the display of a bust of Francis Scott Key along with a 15-star-and-stripes flag (circa 1814).

Ukraine deactivates some missiles as good will gesture toward West

December 26, 1993

by Marta Kolomayets
Kyyiv Press Bureau

KYYIV – In what has been called a gesture of good will toward the West, Ukraine has deactivated 17 of its 46 SS-24 missiles and plans to take three more off military alert by the end of the year, Ukrainian officials said on Monday, December 20.

"Seventeen missiles have been deactivated," said Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, explaining that the warheads have been removed from the launchers and placed in a storage complex. He said the remaining 26 missiles would be deactivated by the end of 1994. The SS-24s, which are the most modern of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, carry 10 warheads each; to date 170 warheads have been removed from the launchers.

"I think the world community will evaluate this step accordingly," said Mr. Shmarov, who is in charge of the defense conversion complex.

President Leonid Kravchuk confirmed this news, which came just three days after high-level delegations from the United States, Russia and Ukraine met in Kyyiv. That delegation included Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov, U.S. Ambassador at Large Strobe Talbott and U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Warren Perry, as well as Deputy Prime Minister Shmarov and Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk.

According to Ukrainian government sources, Ukraine reached a preliminary agreement with the other two nuclear states on receiving compensation for its nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kravchuk told reporters on Tuesday, December 21, that a three-way agreement regarding compensation for nuclear weapons, security guarantees

and scientific and technical assistance would soon be signed by the three nations, but could not give details, adding only that it would be an agreement based on international principles. He said this topic was discussed during a meeting with Vice President Al Gore last week in Budapest, where the two leaders had traveled for the funeral of Joszef Antall, former prime minister of Hungary.

However, there was no immediate comment from U.S. or Russian government officials.

"We have removed the warheads from the missile launchers and placed them on the 'object S' [storage complex]. They can be put back on the missiles. But, I'd like to stress a different matter; if they are on the missiles, who can utilize them? Russia. The button is in Moscow," said Mr. Kravchuk.

Although Ukrainian officials have been tight-lipped about the possible conditions of compensation, government sources have said compensation for strategic weapons included a promise to supply 50 tons of uranium for Ukrainian nuclear power stations. Compensation for tactical weapons would include Russia's agreement to reduce Ukraine's bill for gas and oil, which is to reach world prices by January 1994.

However, the nuclear weapons remain on Ukrainian territory, noted Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasiuk.

"Essentially, we are taking them off military alert as a safety measure, as well as to demonstrate to the world community that Ukraine does not have plans or opportunities to take part in nuclear blackmail," he noted.

"These steps are not part of fulfilling START I obligations; we cannot begin fulfilling them until the conditions accompanying START I ratification are met," said Mr. Tarasiuk.

The deputy foreign minister noted that only two warheads from SS-19s had been transferred to Russia since the summer because their safety mechanisms were due to expire and they posed an ecological hazard.

Parliament left in the dark

However, few legislators were aware of early deactivization.

"Shmarov is the most dangerous criminal; he has signed a pact with Kravchuk and the United States and with his actions he has sharply decreased Ukraine's defense possibilities," said Stepan Khmara, a national democrat who has led the pro-nuclear lobby in the Parliament.

"Ukraine is now open to any kind of aggression. It is no longer able to defend itself. Shmarov should be taken to trial for such an action. He took missiles off military alert, the SS-24s, some of which have safety guarantees until 2015," said Mr. Khmara.

"This is not the time to fool people, to tell them that we have nuclear weapons which we can utilize for our defense, our national interests. This would be a plain lie," said Mr. Kravchuk.

Ukraine joins Partnership for Peace

February 13, 1994

JERSEY CITY, N.J. – Ukraine joined NATO's new Partnership for Peace Program on Tuesday, February 8, becoming the first member of the Commonwealth of Independent States to do so.

Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko signed the document formalizing membership in the plan at NATO headquarters in Brussels, calling it a "reasonable and pragmatic alternative to partial and selective NATO enlargement."

"We strongly appreciate the open nature of the ... program and the absence of any intentions to draw new dividing lines in Europe," Mr. Zlenko told the Associated Press in Brussels.

"I think that Ukraine's joining the Partnership for Peace will strengthen our international prestige and give us additional national security guarantees," said Anton Buteyko, President Leonid Kravchuk's chief foreign policy adviser.

President Kravchuk told the Ukrainian Parliament that "an important step has been made in building a European security system, in bringing together Eastern and Western Europe. "Ukraine's signature in the Partnership for Peace Plan will not in any way affect our relations with Russia. Russia itself will have to join ... When we all will have signed, then there will be real mutual interaction of all countries."

Ukraine became the sixth nation to join the Partnership for Peace; Hungary also became a member on February 8. They were preceded by Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Romania. Slovakia and Bulgaria were also scheduled to sign later this week.

Although the former Warsaw Pact states see the agreement as a prelude to full membership in the 16-nation Western alliance, Mr. Zlenko told NATO ambassadors that accepting more full members now would only weaken security in Europe. "It would by no means strengthen security in Europe, but on the contrary might throw the situation off balance," he said.

Ukraine's decision to join is part of a warming in relations with the West after President Kravchuk's renewed commitment to eliminate his country's nuclear weapons and comes just days after Ukraine's Parliament approved a nuclear disarmament package in Kyyiv on February 3.

The Supreme Council has not yet acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, although Mr. Zlenko has said that the Parliament will endorse the NPT "in the nearest future."

He also said Ukraine would use the partnership program to bring Ukraine's armed forces up to standards, enabling it to eventually join the NATO alliance. The partnership deal will include joint training, exercises

and defense planning, but makes no promises regarding membership or security guarantees for Eastern European states.

Originally, the Partnership for Peace was offered as a link to NATO, and thereby the West, for the new democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, including Russia. However, as democracy suffered setbacks in Russia, the program is now being portrayed additionally as a protective grouping against Russia if things go wrong in Moscow.

Inviting Russia to participate, while simultaneously assuring Moscow's former satellites that the "partnership" is their access to NATO assistance if Russia turns aggressive, is "the perfect way to hedge this cosmic bet" about Russia's future course, a senior U.S. official recently told The Washington Post.

The Council of Advisors to the Parliament of Ukraine recently reported that Kyyiv's decision to join the expanded NATO program underscores Ukraine's intention to keep the CIS military alliance in check and prevent it from becoming an instrument that could reinvigorate the former Soviet Union.

A national Gallup poll of 1,215 respondents in Ukraine, published on January 19 in Kievski Viedomosti (Kyyiv News), showed that 51.4 percent of those polled favored Ukraine joining NATO. Twenty percent of the respondents were opposed to Ukraine's membership in NATO and 26.9 percent remained indifferent.

The Gallup poll, compared to other polls taken on security, shows that more and more Ukrainians are beginning to change their security orientation away from Moscow and toward the West.

Ukrainians in Russia participate in first nationalities congress

May 15, 1994

by Viktoria Hubska and Roman Woronowycz
Kyyiv Press Bureau

MOSCOW – Ukrainians who live in Russia have strived to reassert their ethnic identity here since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Lately, they have achieved a smidgeon of success.

Through more than 70 years of forced assimilation, many quietly maintained their traditions and culture, although others succumbed to Russification. Some were forced to move here in relocation projects conjured up by Soviet demagogues to dilute the ethnic make-up of the nations they subjugated. Others came because, realistically, Moscow was where the jobs

and the opportunities were. They were dissuaded from developing community ties – at times through intimidation or even outright violence.

With the collapse of the empire, the Ukrainian "hromada" here slowly began to regroup and coalesce. But it has been difficult, due to the fickle nature of Russian politics. Just as quickly as the country absorbed a degree of democratic liberalism, segments of the population recoiled into fanatic ultra-nationalism. Now, Ukrainians living here must deal with the aftershock and fight a growing popular movement calling for Russia to go back to its imperialistic, Russophilic ways.

But the 6 million Ukrainians who live in Russia are alive and attempting to strengthen their commitment to maintaining their ethnic heritage. Ukrainian organizations are found in all of Russia's regions in the form of Sunday language schools, choral ensembles, parishes (although no Ukrainian churches have been legitimized), libraries and business clubs. Two Ukrainian-language newspapers, the Ukrainian Courier and Selection, are now published, albeit through private funds.

In October 1993, the various Ukrainian-minded organizations united under the umbrella of the Organization of Ukrainians of Russia (OUR). They gained just a bit more credibility on April 29 when the OUR took part in the first ever Congress of Nationalities of Russia (CNR).

Russia has not accredited the CNR. However, 10 percent of Russia's populace was represented at the congress, a force with which the Russian government will eventually have to come to terms. Among the 15 ethnic groups present were Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Koreans and Turks.

The CNR conference was a one-day affair, at which various speakers presented their views on how the united ethnic front should proceed in developing political power in Russia. The 150 delegates listened first to a greeting from Russian President Boris Yeltsin, immediately followed by one from the Ukrainian National Association based in the United States. Mychaylo Chlenov of the Jewish Union Vaad gave the keynote address.

The congress agreed on the most important focus for the near term: to work to develop a consultative assembly of nationalities in the Russian Parliament to support ethnic culture and education.

Vitaliy Zorych, a leader of OUR and a member of the CNR, said, "In the end we want our members to be elected to the Russian Parliament in 1995, because no political party defends the rights of minorities in the current Russian Parliament."

The agenda of the OUR, which was registered with the CNR in February and unlike the CNR has also been allowed to register with the Russian government (also in February), is more aggressive than that. Its initial agenda includes: sustaining the national rebirth of Ukrainians in Russia; working for democratic values and democratic reforms; support for reconciliation in

Ukrainian-Russian relations and cooperation with other ethnic unions.

Financially, the organization has been supported by a contribution from the Russian governmental Committee on Matters of Nationalities and Federation chaired by Serhiy Shakhray, himself an admitted Ukrainian. But the most fertile source has been Ukraine's Ministry of Culture, which donated 80 million rubles.

The head of the OUR, Oleksander Rudenko-Desniak, a writer by trade, said another of the organization's goals is to spur the resolution of differences between Ukraine and Russia and to discover points of concurrence, so that the two countries can agree on the integrity of their borders and the need to maintain relations in economic trade.

No one should claim that this Ukrainian diaspora wants to structure itself like the Western diaspora of North America and Europe; they are more likely to support the Kuchma faction in the politics of Ukraine than to find a nest within the nationalistic group of a politician like Vyacheslav Chornovil.

In the elections to the Russian Federation's Parliament, the OUR called for the Ukrainian diaspora to vote for candidates from the PRES-UNION, the party headed by Mr. Shakhray, which was the only political entity that realized the need to reconcile within Russia the problems of minorities in Russia. However, he is not a Vyacheslav Chornovil or even a Leonid Kravchuk when it comes to protecting Ukrainian interests.

Likewise, no amount of financial support can overcome the policy of inertia of a Russian bureaucracy desiring to continue the subjugation of a Ukrainian minority. The assistant director of the OUR, Volodymyr Zakharenko, who also spoke at the congress, said: "We have not a single Ukrainian-language public school here. No law exists regarding the protection of ethnic minorities. Without it we have no guarantees that tomorrow we will again not be subject to persecution." He added that it is the responsibility of the Russian government to pass laws guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities.

Yevhen Ahitayev, head of the Commission on Ethnicity of the Moscow City Council and a member of OUR, said, "I dream of a good Ukrainian school in Moscow." He said that right now there is no permanent location for a Ukrainian-language school and that he drives his daughter three hours every Sunday so that she can attend a weekly class.

In the five years of its existence, the Sunday Ukrainian-language school in Moscow has changed its address eight times.

Pavlo Popovych, the former Soviet cosmonaut, now a member of the OUR, said that Mr. Ahitayev is not the only one who makes the long drive. "Kids from all ends of Moscow travel two to three hours to attend classes. They learn literature, history and Ukrainian traditions." Unfortunately, because the school doesn't have its own building and must rent, "Many times classrooms are in short supply," said Mr. Ahitayev.

The Slavutych Society, which Cosmonaut Popovych founded in 1988, is currently fighting to have the government allow the program to establish a home in a building where the Ukrainian language was taught in the 1920s and 1930s.

Overt discrimination does not exist, unless you consider the government's refusal to finance public schools in the Ukrainian language as an example. Vasyl Kolomaysky of the OUR explained that he has not witnessed overt discrimination against Ukrainians "on the streets or in the workplace."

But anti-Ukrainianism does linger in the shadows. Mr. Zorych said, "In Russia, anti-Ukrainian newspapers increasingly are being published. One paper, Arguments, wrote that Russian territories have been stolen (by Ukraine)."

Vitaliy Zvarych, another OUR member, said that if you watch the proceedings of the Russian Parliament on television you quickly realize that those who you know to be Ukrainians hide their ancestry. "If you are a Ukrainian patriot (living in Moscow) and express it, then you cannot be politically effective."

Ukraine elects Leonid Kuchma president

Eastern industrialist is second president of post-Soviet Ukraine

July 17, 1994

by Marta Kolomayets
Kyyiv Press Bureau

KYYIV – In an upset victory, Leonid Danylovych Kuchma was elected Ukraine's second president on Sunday, July 10, beginning a new era – for better or worse – in this country of 52 million people. Mr. Kuchma, 55, who is the former director of the world's largest rocket factory and the ex-prime minister of Ukraine, is scheduled to be inaugurated on Tuesday, July 19, in Ukraine's Parliament.

"As president of Ukraine, I will always work in the interests of Ukraine as a whole, not in the interests of separate regions," said the president-elect during his first press conference on Wednesday afternoon, July 13, in an attempt to quell fears of a split between Ukraine's eastern and western regions.

"The first thing I want is national reconciliation," Mr. Kuchma declared, after flying into Kyyiv from his home in Dnipropetrovske on Monday evening, July 11. "What has been done during this presidential marathon is a crime. To say there is confrontation between the west and east is a political game," he added.

Despite the fact that last Sunday's trip to the polls was the fourth in as many months for Ukraine' s citizens, voter turnout was high. Over 71 percent exercised their freedom of choice in these second presidential elections.

It was a close race to the end, but over 14 million, or 52 percent, of Ukraine's citizens cast their ballots for Mr. Kuchma. Mr. Kravchuk got 45 percent of the vote, with a little over 12 million people voting for the man who led Ukraine in its early days of independence. About 644,000 voters, or 2.4 percent, crossed out both candidates on the ballot.

After the first round of elections on June 26, President Leonid Kravchuk led the race, with close to 38 percent of the vote; Mr. Kuchma finished second with over 31 percent. During his last two weeks of campaigning, Mr. Kuchma was able to capture over 21 percent, a feat that would be the envy of any American politician.

"The split between the east and the west was used to mobilize the electorate in eastern Ukraine. It became a challenge to eastern Ukrainians to prove that they were just as committed to the electoral process," said Viktor Nebozhenko, an independent sociologist whose firm, Ukrainian Barometer, provided Mr. Kuchma's campaign team with information based on four national surveys. Demographically, more people live in Ukraine's east and south than in the west.

Most of western Ukraine voted loyally for President Kravchuk, where he received between 94 and 95 percent in the Galician oblasts of Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivske and Lviv, because western Ukrainians perceive him as the guarantor of Ukraine's independence, although he was once the ideology secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

In the eastern oblasts of Luhanske and Donetske Mr. Kuchma received 88 and 79 percent of the vote, respectively, while in the Crimea he got close to 90 percent of the vote, because citizens of these regions perceive the deterioration in relations with Russia as a prime factor in the breakdown of the economy in Ukraine.

Although Mr. Kravchuk has not been seen since his defeat on Sunday, Ivan Yemets, the chairman of the Central Election Commission, told reporters that Mr. Kravchuk "accepted the consequences of the vote with dignity."

Mr. Kravchuk sent Mr. Kuchma a congratulatory telegram on Tuesday, July 12. Mr. Kravchuk noted that he hoped Mr. Kuchma would help promote Ukraine's democratization, economic reforms and international prestige.

On Thursday morning, July 14, Mr. Kuchma received his certificate from the Central Election Commission, confirming his victory in the July 10 election.

At the commission's headquarters, its members, Mr. Kuchma's supporters and a group of journalists witnessed this historic moment.

Obviously moved, Mr. Kuchma solemnly promised to build one "united, sovereign democratic state of Ukraine."

Although he has been perceived as a pro-Russian politician, in his first

days after being elected Mr. Kuchma gave no such signs; he spoke only in Ukrainian and only of working for the good of the Ukrainian nation.

Most of the citizens of eastern Ukraine perceived Mr. Kuchma as a president who would pursue closer ties with Russia, but in the first few days after his election he has done nothing to indicate that this will be his policy line. As a matter of fact, Mr. Kuchma has promised to work with all countries that will help Ukraine get on the road to market reform.

Difficult times ahead

Mr. Kuchma has a difficult road ahead of him: he must not only reconcile the citizens of Ukraine, who are divided along cultural lines, but he must find a constructive approach to the Communist-dominated Parliament.

One of his most important tasks is to heal the division between the east and west of the country. "I don't want there to be talk of eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine, I want there to be one united Ukraine," he said soon after his election.

Mr. Kuchma hopes that a healthy economy will satisfy all the citizens of Ukraine, but the job ahead is not easy.

He also faces a tough Parliament, chaired by Socialist Oleksander Moroz, who does not want a strong president as the head of the country. The Communists and Socialists in Parliament also do not agree with Mr. Kuchma about the pace of market reforms and privatization.

Mr. Kuchma wants aid and modern technology from the West, including the $4 billion promised by the G-7. In order to get it, he has to move on economic issues such as privatization and monetary reforms.

At the moment, no political party in Parliament has voiced opposition to Mr. Kuchma. Most, including Rukh, are taking a wait-and-see attitude.

Kuchma and Parliament resolve deadlock over law on powers

June 11, 1995

by Marta Kolomayets
Kyyiv Press Bureau

KYYIV – Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and the Parliament resolved their deadlock on division of powers and decided to sign a constitutional agreement, promising to work together to end a months-long power struggle between the two branches of power.

The Parliament on June 7 voted 240-81 to accept the compromise, negotiated by a group of deputies and the Ukrainian president, which cancels President Kuchma's plan to hold a nationwide plebiscite on confidence in the president and the Parliament.

The unprecedented agreement, which implements the "Law on State Power and Local Government" adopted by the Parliament on May 18 but not put into force because of contradictory articles in the existing Ukrainian Constitution, will serve as a "petit constitution" until a new constitution is drawn up and accepted by the Parliament. President Kuchma and key deputies in the Parliament have said this process could take up to a year.

The Ukrainian president addressed the Parliament in a 12-minute speech on June 7, telling the deputies there was little choice given today's political situation. "Either we work together and sign this agreement, or I turn to the people in a national referendum," said Mr. Kuchma.

"We should understand that this agreement will become a most important political-legal act that, in a non-traditional manner, will strengthen the relations between the president and the Supreme Council, and will create a new foundation for the organization of state power in the country," said President Kuchma.

To underscore its significance, President Kuchma offered to hold a signing ceremony at the prestigious Mariyinsky Palace on June 8, inviting not only Parliament Chairman Oleksander Moroz, but the 240 deputies who voted by name to sign the constitutional agreement.

"Finally, this document will lead us out of our current political crisis, stop our increasingly confrontational relations and will rid our society of its state of anxiety over insecurity in the future," he added.

Mr. Moroz took the podium after Mr. Kuchma's remarks were favorably received by many of the deputies.

While not backing down from any of his previous positions, Chairman Moroz chronologically outlined the situation that had developed between the two branches of power. He noted: "We have collided, and the president hoped that he could maneuver out of this collision by calling a referendum. This course was not constitutional. We made the right decision and began working on a new constitution," he said, addressing his colleagues in the Parliament.

"A national referendum would not lead to the consolidation of our state," said Mr. Moroz. Though he is a leader of the Socialist Party, he nevertheless encouraged fellow deputies to vote in favor of a constitutional agreement in order to move out of a paralyzing political situation. He told his colleagues that he would sign the agreement and encouraged them to do the same.

"Personally, I will sign the agreement and vote for it. And let every deputy's conscience be his guide, [let him] understand the importance of his

choice," said Mr. Moroz.

"People today are worried about other matters: the complex preparations for the harvest, the anxiety about drought in the south, flooding in the Volyn region, the closing of state-run factories and unemployment," said Mr. Moroz.

"Signing this constitutional agreement allows us to implement the law on power without the constitutional majority we need but can't get in the current Parliament," he noted. "We should compromise if only for the sole purpose of giving our people hope and the opportunity of change for the better," he explained during the parliamentary session, which was broadcast live on Ukrainian State Radio.

"This shows political maturity on the part of the Ukrainian president," said Oleksander Lavrynovych, a reform-minded deputy in the Parliament and a member of the Rukh faction. He acknowledged that democratic factions meeting with the president had indeed encouraged him to stay away from the plebiscite and reach a compromise instead.

"It's a good thing that the president heeded the voice of the Parliament, attended the session and officially stated that he favored a constitutional accord," said Deputy Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine's first president.

"This is not the last step in the struggle among branches of power; the struggle will go on," said Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil.

However, the Communist faction in Parliament, which has slowly been losing its base since the Agrarians split and formed a new Agrarian-Reform faction numbering more than 25 deputies, called the move a "constitutional overthrow."

The Reforms faction reported that of the 81 deputies who voted against the agreement, 64 were Communists (three Communists voted for the accord), eight were Socialists, three were non-aligned, two were members of the Statehood faction, one each was from the Agrarian, Reforms and Independent factions.

Communist leader Petro Symonenko said that if the constitutional accord was to be constitutional, it had to be approved by two-thirds of the Parliament. "The vote on the accord proves that power-seekers have no respect for either the Constitution or the law," he added. "The psychological pressure on the Parliament and public opinion does no credit to the president, who has spoken about the Supreme Council's inefficiency."

During his address, President Kuchma promised closer cooperation with the Parliament, a "Government Day" when deputies will have sessions with ministers as well as regular meetings between the president and the Parliament's Presidium.

In the constitutional agreement Mr. Kuchma pledged he would hold off on any national referendums until a new constitution is adopted, and would only hold such a poll if it regarded the Constitution itself.

Gorbachev, Kravchuk recall early days of Chornobyl disaster

May 12, 1996

by Marta Kolomayets
Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV – A decade after the devastating explosion at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev continues to deny that the Soviet leadership intentionally concealed the scale of the accident, reported Interfax-Ukraine on April 26.

Mr. Gorbachev told a news conference in Moscow on the 10th anniversary of the Chornobyl accident that "we failed to do something only because we were unaware of what had happened." "I believe we were simply unprepared," he added.

"In the beginning, when our top scientists and a government commission arrived there (Chornobyl), they all stayed silent because they did not know what to report – because they could not understand anything," he said.

"And only gradually we started to understand the scale of the event and the dangers," added the former general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who is currently running for president of Russia in the June elections.

Former Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk gave the BBC (British Broadcasting Corp.) Ukrainian service an interview on April 26, recalling the events of April 26-May 1, 1986, in Kyiv.

Mr. Kravchuk, then the head of the propaganda and agitation division of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, recalled that he came into work at 10 a.m. on Saturday morning, April 26, and stopped in to see First Secretary Volodymyr Ivashko, who told him of the Chornobyl accident. But at that point he did not realize the scope of the accident, thinking it was just a fire at the reactor.

In the afternoon Mr. Kravchuk took a car out to his dacha at Koncha-Zaspa to the south of Kyiv, but before he even got out of the car, his wife signaled that he was wanted back at the Central Committee headquarters.

"Returning to Kyiv, I got into a car with Mr. Ivashko and Andriy Serdiuk, who is currently the deputy minister of health, but at the time was a secretary at the CC dealing, I think, with issues of science, and we drove out to Chornobyl," he recalled.

Mr. Kravchuk recalled noticing the convoys of buses moving toward Chornobyl, but insists that he was still not aware of the full extent of the

accident. Even after the decision was made (on the evening of April 26) to evacuate the residents of Prypiat, and this was done in the afternoon on the 27th, Mr. Kravchuk did not think they would leave their town forever.

"On April 30 I was at the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, where we were deciding about whether or not to hold May Day parades on May 1. Various thoughts were expressed, but a decision to hold the celebrations was reached. If not everybody knew everything on April 26, 27 and 28, on April 29 and 30 everybody knew what had happened. And, I think the decision on April 30 you can call 'criminal,' " said Mr. Kravchuk.

"I recall standing on the reviewing stand on May 1 and Ivashko turning to me and saying that I should let the television station know that there should be footage of people frolicking in the park, children singing. 'This is the directive of the Politburo, to convey that everything is calm and nothing terrible has happened,' said Ivashko," Mr. Kravchuk told the BBC last week.

Although Mr. Kravchuk stated that he did not get to the television station to convey this information, indeed, the station showed exactly what Mr. Ivashko had hoped for.

"We were all at the reviewing stand, and we were all armed with dosimeters," recalled Mr. Kravchuk, adding that he noticed how the needles on the dosimeters started moving out of control. It was precisely that day, on May 1, that the wind direction shifted toward Kyiv from Chornobyl, he said.

The reasoning of the party bureaucrats to go on with the demonstration, said Mr. Kravchuk, was that mass panic would be created, causing havoc among more than 2.5 million city residents. He added that officials were also worried about another explosion at Chornobyl at the fourth reactor, where the temperatures were continually rising.

"I cannot say that in Moscow they knew everything that had occurred on April 26, but I am convinced that they knew a catastrophe – and not just an ordinary fire – had occurred. You needn't be a specialist to understand this. I think that the leadership in Moscow and Volodymyr Shcherbytsky had all the information," said Mr. Kravchuk, who is now a deputy in the Ukrainian Parliament.

However, Mr. Kravchuk added that he did not know the full extent of Chornobyl until he became the chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament in 1990.

"If we had been a normal state, with a normal ideology and normal policy, we would have told the world the truth about the accident right away. And, Ukraine and Belarus should have been declared ecological disaster zones through the United Nations. But back then we carried the philosophy of a Soviet state and the party, which proclaimed that we were the best, the strongest, the grandest, that our people are the most patient and ideologically tempered, that we can conquer all," he said.

Only on May 14, 1986, did Soviet leader Gorbachev address the state about the "misfortune" of April 26 – and he accused the West of exaggerating its seriousness and "defaming" the Soviet Union.

Ukraine to seek special partnership with NATO

June 30, 1996

by Marta Kolomayets
Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV – Apparently worried about Russia's opposition to the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and keen on becoming an integral part of European structures, Ukraine plans to seek associate membership in this security alliance, a top Ukrainian diplomat told reporters on June 25, during a Foreign Ministry press briefing in Kyiv.

"Ukraine favors a special partnership with NATO and the signing of a relevant agreement. The essence of this partnership may be expressed in Ukraine's 'associate status in NATO,'" said Ihor Kharchenko, the chief of the Foreign Ministry's political analysis department.

His words echoed the actions of President Leonid Kuchma, who on that same day, during an official visit to Poland, signed a joint declaration with President Aleksander Kwasniewski on mutual support for joining "as soon as possible" European economic, political and security structures.

Calling Poland Ukraine's "special strategic partner," President Kuchma said that this western neighbor wants to be Ukraine's bridge to European Union structures. He also made it clear that Ukraine would not oppose Poland's full membership in NATO, which it has been seeking since 1989.

"NATO expansion is no menace to Ukraine," said President Kuchma, but he cautioned that the alliance must take Russia into consideration when expanding. "A nation like Russia cannot be left out of processes currently under way," he added.

However, both President Kuchma and Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials – perhaps in an attempt to allay Russia's concerns – stressed that although Ukraine has a stake in the development of special relations with NATO, it does not raise the question of admission as a full member. But, it has already submitted a proposal to the NATO leadership and to all member-countries of the alliance to grant Ukraine a special associate status. This comes at a time when NATO itself is reviewing its strategy and changing its mechanisms.

Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko presented this idea of a "special partnership," during a NATO workshop on political-military decision making, held in Warsaw on June 21, which would result in an associate membership for Ukraine.

At the Berlin meeting of NATO foreign ministers on June 3-4, said Mr. Udovenko, "NATO once more confirmed its decision to open its membership for Central and Eastern European countries, as well as to 'further enhance

its strong relationship with Ukraine.' "

The Ukrainian diplomat also said that "Ukraine regards the NATO enlargement as part of a broad and comprehensive process of building up a new European security architecture, which itself represents part of an overall European integration process, that includes also the EU enlargement, as well as regional European cooperation development."

"Standing firmly against the creation of new dividing lines in Europe, we in Ukraine are convinced that, with enough political will, it would be possible to find appropriate, mutually advantageous modalities of European integration processes, including different level integration of new European democracies into such basic structures as the EU, the WEU and NATO," explained Mr. Udovenko.

And, according to Mr. Kharchenko, the 1949 Washington agreement on NATO, which provides for only full-scale membership in the alliance, was formed in a different era.

"It was signed in an absolutely different historical situation," said Mr. Kharchenko, explaining that it was created during the Cold War as security against an enemy that does not exist today. "The alliance's goals were somewhat different from today's," he noted.

"The strategic aim of Ukraine, as President Leonid Kuchma stated recently in Paris, is full-fledged integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. And, this is, in President Kuchma's words, not political romanticism, but a very pragmatic decision. On one hand, this vocation is based on our deep feeling of being a natural historical and cultural part of Europe, on a strong desire to restore historical justice – Ukraine's return into Europe, rebirth of its former linkage and unity with the rest of the continent. However, on the other hand, it is caused by very objective reasons, very urgent needs – our security concerns, as well as economic transformation process necessities," Foreign Minister Udovenko said in Warsaw.

Ukraine already is part of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, which has given 27 countries a kind of associate membership. Ukraine, which was the first former Soviet republic to join the PFP (in February 1994), is also active in the Bosnian peace-implementation force (IFOR).

And in September of 1995 Ukraine reached an agreement with NATO on a 16 + 1 cooperation (16 being the member-states of NATO and 1 being Ukraine). Ukrainian officials would like to see this relationship broadened.

But Mr. Udovenko frets that this may not be enough for his nation of 52 million. "I would like to emphasize that stability and security, due to our sensitive geopolitical position, have a very special value for Ukraine," he said.

"They are indispensable and basic for radical economic and social transformation processes. With the growing uncertainty in the East, including the further political development of Russia and of the CIS on one hand, and the development of European integration processes in the West on the other hand,

Ukraine can ensure its legitimate interests not to become a 'buffer zone' between the two integrating communities only by essential activation of its relationship with European structures, including NATO. And we expect understanding of our position and interests," explained Minister Udovenko.

Although Ukraine does not oppose its western neighbors' accession to NATO, "it does not even accept the theoretical probability of the deployment of nuclear weapons in immediate proximity to Ukrainian borders," cautioned Mr. Kharchenko.

Speaking at a press conference in Warsaw on June 25, Presidents Kuchma and Kwasniewski both said that they did not believe there would be any need to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of Central and Eastern European countries.

Ukraine, once the third largest nuclear power in the world, voluntarily removed nuclear weapons from its territory after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and it will never consent to the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO's new member-states, stressed Mr. Udovenko during the Warsaw workshop sponsored by the alliance.

"The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe will definitely enhance confidence and stability in this region, and it would also be in keeping with NATO policy to relieve Europe of nuclear arms," said the foreign minister.

JOURNALIST'S NOTEBOOK IN UKRAINE

Warning: this column may be hazardous to your health

June 30, 1996

by Marta Kolomayets
Kyiv Press Bureau

Before you begin reading this column, I feel I should warn Weekly readers who have heart conditions or high blood pressure, or suffer from being tried and true Ukrainian patriots and idealists, to stop here and turn to the next page.

Unfortunately what you are about to read is not fiction nor is it history dug up from the annals of the bad old days of the Soviet empire.

It happened right here in Kyiv, right now, June 24, 1996, two months before the fifth anniversary of Ukrainian independence. And, if I had not seen it with my own eyes, I would not have believed it.

It all began on Monday afternoon, June 24, after an unproductive Parliament session on Friday, June 21, regarding adoption of the draft constitution in its second reading.

Although they were not getting anywhere on Friday, Parliament Chairman Oleksander Moroz was determined to have the deputies get to work on Monday, at noon, despite the fact that the last week of the month is always devoted to lawmakers' work in their oblasts and raions.

Ignoring threats from left-wing factions in Parliament, who seemed hell-bent on stalling adoption of independent Ukraine's first constitution until after the Russian presidential elections on July 3, Mr. Moroz (who is the leader of the Socialist Party and, therefore, a member of the left wing himself) was firm in his commitment to work on Ukraine's fundamental law.

He even put a ban on any travel outside of Kyiv for the 422 lawmakers currently holding mandates to ensure that there would be a quorum in the Parliament chambers on Monday, June 24.

Sure enough, 392 deputies registered for the session, enabling the tedious work of adopting, article by article, the 161-article draft constitution (which needs 301 votes to pass) to begin. The work day was even extended until 8 p.m. to allow the deputies more time to examine matters as integral for a neophyte democracy as state symbols, the status of language and the right to private property.

But the work went slowly, as the deputies could not even agree on the first phrase of the preamble to the constitution: "We the Ukrainian people ... (Ukrainskyi narod)." Such staunch members of the left as Natalia Vitrenko (a former Socialist Party member who quarreled with Mr. Moroz and left a few months ago to form her own leftist party) and her sidekick, Volodymyr Marchenko, voted against this idea. Oleksander Tkachenko, vice-chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, abstained from voting on this issue. Which leads this writer to ask: What is he then? (Is he not one of the "Ukrainian people"?)

[The good news is that the next day the Parliament did adopt the preamble in full, which begins: "We, the Ukrainian people – Ukrainian citizens of all nationalities ...]

However, on Monday no one knew what was going to happen on Tuesday, or if there was even going to be a Tuesday session, because Monday looked very bleak indeed.

I have chosen to talk about the debate regarding Ukraine's state symbols: the blue-and-yellow flag; the trident (tryzub), which dates back to the times of Prince Volodymyr the Great; the Ukrainian national anthem; and the capital of Ukraine. Well, this discussion – or should I say shouting match – was quite an eye-opener.

Mykhailo Syrota, who belongs to the centrist faction in Parliament, for the last two months has had the thankless task of attempting to find compromise on scores of issues, trying to keep deputies from all factions on the ad

hoc committee out of fist fights and dubious diatribes, striving to plow through over 2,000 suggestions submitted by lawmakers and incorporating the best into this latest version of the draft. He is now true to his name (syrota – orphan) – he is the lonely guy who stands in front of the podium, reading the ad hoc committee's proposals for various articles, which Chairman Moroz then puts to a vote.

And so, Mr. Syrota, who had yet to lose his cool, was – unbeknownst to all – about to lose it on the issue of the Ukrainian flag.

Article 20 reads: The state flag of Ukraine is a blue-and-yellow banner (two horizontal stripes of equal size). When Mr. Syrota read this and it was put to a vote, only 202 deputies voted for the flag, while 122 voted against it. For the record, among those who voted against the blue-and-yellow flag, which was adopted as the national flag by law in 1992, were: Anatoliy Franchuk (President Leonid Kuchma's in-law), Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko, Inter-Regional Deputies group leader Yuriy Boldyrev and Parliament Vice-Chairman Oleksander Tkachenko.

While the right and center forces expressed outrage and began to stomp out of the legislature, Mr. Syrota tried to deal with the bedlam, hoping to reason with his colleagues in the chambers.

Mr. Moroz then stated the following: "Unfortunately, we don't have national symbols in Ukraine, as of yet."

Mr. Syrota: "What do you mean, we don't have symbols?"

Mr. Moroz: "Legitimate state symbols we don't have ..."

Mr. Syrota: "We have state symbols in Ukraine, and they are, respected colleagues, recognized throughout the world. ... Perhaps some of you don't want these symbols, but we do have them.

"Look at the flag that has been flying over the Parliament, on our cupola for the last five years. ...

"We will not let you remove it, we will not allow it," said Mr. Syrota, choked up.

Mr. Moroz then acknowledged that the flag had been adopted by law in Parliament – but, he noted, this was not a constitutional majority decision.

Bedlam continued in the corridors of power, with left-wingers yelling out obscenities, right-wingers walking out, pulling out their cards of registration.

One Communist (I can't swear which one it was) yelled out that the blue-and-yellow banner is not a flag, but a rag (in Russian).

Mr. Syrota continued to defend his country's flag and honor.

Needless to say, the trident of Volodymyr the Great also did not get the necessary majority to pass in the Parliament.

Although deputies did provide a constitutional majority granting Kyiv the status of capital of Ukraine (344 votes), seven deputies voted against and six abstained. Among those against this motion were Communist Yevhen Marmazov, as well as two members of the Peasant Party, one from the Inter-

Regional Bloc of Deputies and two from the Independent faction of deputies. One can only wonder: Is it Moscow they want as their capital?

I could go on and on about the various issues under attack today in free and independent Ukraine. But, I'll save it for a time when I can laugh about it instead of cry...

EDITORIAL

Ukraine comes of age

July 7, 1996

It was perhaps the most historic moment in the short life of independent Ukraine. The Parliament's adoption last week of the Constitution of Ukraine – in a highly dramatic, tense, yet civilized all-night marathon session – proved not only to the citizens of Ukraine, but to the world, that this nation of 52 million is slowly and steadily emerging as a major player alongside the member-states of the democratic European community.

"There is no going back for us," said Justice Minister Serhiy Holovaty, one of the main authors of Ukraine's fundamental law. "We were given a choice, and we chose freedom," he said explaining that the newly adopted document, European in spirit and Ukrainian in character, in his mind, solidifies Ukraine's independence and its development as a democratic state.

In many ways, the adoption of the Constitution consolidated the majority of the forces in Parliament for the first time since Ukraine proclaimed its independence.

True, the vote for independence almost five years ago in the parliamentary chambers also was dramatic, but it was dictated by historic circumstances in the collapsing Soviet Union, not by the free will of the lawmakers in the Ukrainian Supreme Council. When that vote took place, for the majority of the deputies in the Communist-dominated legislature it was not a sign of true convictions. In all honesty, for the Communists in 1991 the vote for independence was a vote for personal salvation.

But June 28, 1996, was different. It showed that in five years of independence, Ukraine's lawmakers had grown into statesmen, elected officials who represent the citizens of the democratic state of Ukraine.

It was Parliament Chairman Oleksander Moroz who summed up the events of the night of June 27-28 most succinctly: "The strength of the Constitution is the fact that it created a precedent of unity in the Supreme Council, which I hope will be a lasting factor in the work of the legislature."

And President Leonid Kuchma, present in the session hall for the Constitution vote, commended the Parliament for its work. "I want to say

that, regardless of what side anyone took in the past, in this situation you all came down on the side of Ukraine. This last event proved that we, in a critical moment, are worthy of being called the representatives of the Ukrainian people."

As the deputies in the hall saluted the adoption of the Constitution with rounds of applause and a standing ovation, the stress and strain of the nonstop 16-hour session subsided for the moment. As Ukraine's national anthem was played, the faces of many of the deputies were solemn, as they seemed to reflect on the meaning of the event that had just transpired.

It was a moment when most deputies felt proud to be Ukrainian. And, it should be a moment of great pride not only for Ukraine's citizens, who have been legitimized as a nation in the Constitution, but also for all the millions of people around the world whose roots are deeply embedded in the black soil (chornozem) of Ukraine.

Despite the fact that the Constitution was a long time in coming – Ukraine's sovereignty was proclaimed six years ago (on July 16, 1990) and its independence was declared almost five years ago (on August 24, 1991) – it now seems that this historic moment was well worth the wait.

Unlike the constitutional process in Moscow, in the fall of 1993, there were no tanks rolling down the streets. There was no army ordered by the president to storm the Parliament building. No one dissolved the popularly elected Parliament and, in the end, there was no need for a national referendum on the Constitution.

There was no panic in society; citizens were not warned to run for cover. There was no gunfire resounding through the night and no bloodshed. Undoubtedly, the most salient component in the entire process was the fact that no human lives were lost in the name of democracy.

It was yet another peaceful transition for the independent state of Ukraine. As Justice Minister Serhiy Holovaty so aptly pointed out: "The citizens of Ukraine went to sleep in one country, and got up the next morning in a new, constitutionally legitimized democratic state."

NATO initials preliminary agreement with Ukraine

June 8, 1997

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV – Ukraine and NATO achieved a preliminary agreement on a special partnership charter on May 29 at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Sintra, Portugal. Ukrainian officials believe the pact will keep the country out

of a military gray zone as a buffer between the rest of Europe and Russia.

Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Hennadii Udovenko, who initialed the agreement along with NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, was quoted by the Associated Press as commenting, "This is a very important day for Ukraine." All 16 NATO foreign ministers were present at the ceremony, including U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

The charter will give Ukraine a presence in NATO although not full membership. Ukraine will have expanded military relations with NATO Headquarters through a military liaison mission, and it will have the right to consult with the alliance on perceived military threats.

Ukraine has had limited military relations with the North Atlantic alliance by way of the Partnership for Peace program that NATO has promoted for all former countries of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Ukraine has actively participated in the PFP; today Ukraine has a representation both at NATO headquarters and the central command post in Brussels, regularly participates in NATO joint military exercises and is being encouraged to develop NATO-like military standards.

Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council said at a press conference on May 30 that the charter also incorporates assurances that the leaders of the nuclear powers gave Ukraine in the Budapest Memorandum signed by the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China in December 1994, which provide for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and inviolability of Ukraine's borders.

Mr. Horbulin explained that, in accordance with the charter, Ukraine and NATO will hold consultations at least twice a year within the framework of a commission comprising representatives of NATO and Ukraine.

Anton Buteiko, Ukraine's vice minister for foreign affairs who was in Sintra for the initialization of the agreement, said Ukraine received most of what it was looking for. "I must say that nearly all of Ukraine's positions are reflected in the final document," he pointed out.

The document is a political paper between the member-states of NATO and Ukraine. Although it carries the weight of the promises given within it by the leaders of those countries, it holds no international legal status as a treaty would.

Mr. Horbulin said Ukraine is satisfied with the security assurances it has received, but would have preferred the document hold treaty status. "We would have liked the charter to have had de jure status," he explained. Then with a smile he added, "I would have liked the document to read that NATO defends Ukraine from all threats on life, but that is unrealistic. But we would have liked a defense agreement."

Because it is not a treaty, however, it does not need to be ratified by Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, which Mr. Horbulin said he realized could have been a problem – albeit one he had been willing to face.

He also said the agreement differs from the one Russia signed with NATO on May 14. "It is different in character, substance and approach," said Mr. Horbulin. "The Ukraine-NATO document is one between entities that are forming and developing normal relations. The Russia-NATO document is one that delineates and smoothes over points of friction."

Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma had initiated talks on a special agreement between Ukraine and NATO in June 1995 at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, at a time when Moscow and NATO were sparring over NATO's plans to expand eastward. Mr. Kuchma said at the time that Ukraine could end up as a buffer zone between two military camps.

He will sign the charter he conceived in a formal ceremony with NATO Secretary-General Solana on July 9 in Madrid, where Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are expected to be invited to join the alliance. Mr. Buteiko said that, in accordance with international norms, changes can occur to a document between its initialization and formal signing, but he does not foresee this occurring.

Ukraine, Russia sign long-awaited bilateral treaty

June 8, 1997

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV – Russia's President Boris Yeltsin came to Ukraine on May 30 on his first official state visit and signed a comprehensive treaty on friendship and cooperation with his Ukrainian counterpart, President Leonid Kuchma. In the document Russia formally recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country that for centuries was a centerpiece of its empire.

The treaty marks "a new era" in the often bitter historic relations between the two countries, said President Yeltsin after signing the "big treaty," as the two leaders have been calling it.

Later, at a ceremony at the monument to the "Liberator Soldier," not far from where the two presidents signed the historic document, President Yeltsin explicitly stated Russia's recognition of the independence of Ukraine. "Ukraine is an independent country, and we will hold this premise sacred," he said. He added that Russia "does not lay claim on any part of Ukraine or on any of its cities."

The two leaders signed three documents in all at the Mariinsky Palace in Kyiv on May 31: the big treaty called the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, a statement on the Black Sea Fleet and an agreement of cooperation in the development of a common space industry.

The bilateral treaty, which has a life of 10 years but is automatically extended unless either side calls for its cancellation, is a far-reaching document that addresses increased military, political, cultural and economic relations between the two countries. In the document the two parties agree on the inviolability of their territories, and pledge to build mutual relations on the basis of "non-use of force or threat of force, including economic or any other means," and "not to conclude with third parties any agreements aimed against the opposite side."

The treaty underscores compliance with the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Accords and its subsequent agreements, and reaffirms adherence to the Tripartite Statement signed by the presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States in January 1994 and the Budapest Memorandum of security guarantees given Ukraine by the nuclear states in December 1994.

There are also statements on the development of free trade between the neighbors; cooperation in scientific-technical development in the fields of outer space exploration, aircraft and nuclear engineering, metallurgy, electronics, and the fuel and energy sector; and establishment of information-cultural centers in Kyiv and Moscow.

Speaking to reporters as he saw President Yeltsin off at Boryspil Airport, Mr. Kuchma said, "This was an event of huge importance that opens a new stage in relations between our two countries."

"Ukraine is a smaller country than Russia, but there are fewer politicians in Russia now who think that Ukraine can be strangled by force and kept as a vassal," Reuters quoted the Ukrainian president as saying.

Arrival on the seventh try

After six previous failed attempts to visit Ukraine in the last two years, President Yeltsin finally made it on the seventh try. In Moscow, before his departure for Kyiv, he explained that more than elections in Russia or his ill health, it was the issue of the Black Sea Fleet that had kept him away. "I could not come to Kyiv until we had an agreement on the Black Sea Fleet," said the Russian leader, according to Interfax-Ukraine. He explained that, except for resolution of the Black Sea Fleet issue, the treaty had been basically ready for almost two years.

Two days before President Yeltsin arrived here, his prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, signed an accord on the division of the Black Sea Fleet, which has been a source of serious friction between the two countries almost from the day the Soviet Union fell apart.

Finally having crossed all the "t's" and dotted all the "i's," which is how Prime Minister Chernomyrdin described final preparations for the big treaty after he had signed the Black Sea Fleet accord, President Yeltsin and the whole Russian delegation made overt efforts to express their pleasure with

the historic occurrences in Kyiv. Upon his arrival at Boryspil Airport outside Kyiv, the Russian president, looking fit although a bit slow, spoke of "breaking the big knots" in relations between Ukraine and Russia, after which "the little and medium-size knots would fall apart."

As for his first visit to Ukraine since 1990, he said, "It is with great excitement that I set foot on Ukrainian soil."

Russia's Foreign Minister Primakov emphasized the need for closer relations between the two countries. "The relations between our two countries should be more than neighborly, they should be fraternal," he said during a meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, Hennadii Udovenko. He used the phrase "fraternal relations" three times in his short introductory statement.

Many here speculate that Russia has become eager to cooperate more closely with Ukraine to lure it away from NATO, with which the Kyiv government is seeking closer ties, although not membership. While visiting the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on May 30, Mr. Yeltsin even promised that Russia would defend Ukraine in an emergency.

The chairman of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, Volodymyr Horbulin, was quick to explain later that evening that the remark was unsolicited and that Ukraine had requested no security assurances. "Even though President Yeltsin may have had good intentions, it was never requested by the Ukrainian side," said Mr. Horbulin.

Many issues have complicated Russian-Ukrainian relations in the last six years, from Russian claims on the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol to the splitting of the Black Sea Fleet, to the status of the Ukrainian language in Russia and Russian in Ukraine, and problems of oil and gas supplies, for which Ukraine is overwhelmingly dependent on Russia. There is also the historical aspect of Russia's more than 300-year hegemony over Ukraine, the consequence of which is a Ukraine rightfully leery of moving closer than necessary to its former "big brother."

The treaty that Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma signed far from settles many of the disagreements between Ukraine and Russia. For one thing, there is still no delineated border between the two states. However, in the week before the summit, an interstate commission was formed to solidify a border, which is expected to take a month. Also, Ukraine remains the only country on which Russia assesses a tax of 20 percent on imports and exports from its territory. President Yeltsin assured Ukrainian government officials before he departed that he would make sure the tax would be halved. He called the double taxation "banditry."

For Ukraine it was the culmination of what can be considered to be among the most important several days in the past six years. On May 29, on the eve of President Yeltsin's visit, the two countries agreed to the division of the Black Sea Fleet. Also that day, Foreign Minister Udovenko initialed the Ukraine-NATO charter in Sintra, Portugal, with all 16 ministers of NATO present.

These events were sandwiched by two other major occurrences: an agreement with Belarus that delineates borders between the two countries and one with Romania that was signed on June 2 that will recognize existing borders and lands. Thus, Ukraine finally will have border and friendship treaties with all of its neighbors.

1998: THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Kyiv reconstructs ancient treasures

December 27, 1998

Although Ukraine's economy and the standard of living of its citizens continued to decline in 1998, the country's capital experienced a revitalization not seen in decades. Two of Kyiv's most historic architectural and cultural treasures, as well as the city center, were reconstructed, thus bringing the city closer to the standards of Europe's great cities.

The most dynamic addition to the city's architectural treasure trove was the rebuilding of the historic St. Michael Golden-Domed Sobor, once at the center of Ukrainian spiritual life, based on computer renderings of the Sobor's 19th century appearance.

The 12th century church and neighboring monastery complex, which had been destroyed several times through the ages, were demolished again in 1936 by orders of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin as he tried to stifle Ukrainian cultural and spiritual development.

Plans to reconstruct the sobor began in 1995, after President Leonid Kuchma issued a presidential decree. Actual construction began in late 1997, after a two-year archaeological excavation that turned up much of historic value and a few surprises.

More than 260 valuable ancient artifacts were discovered during the dig. In addition, a portion of the historic church still intact was uncovered.

The major surprise of the excavation was the discovery of the remains of another ancient church that stood several meters from St. Michael's. Experts have yet to find any historical record that such a church existed.

The bell tower of St. Michael's was completed first, in time for the Kyiv Days celebrations the weekend of May 14. More than 3,000 people were on hand for the official ribbon-cutting ceremony and the blessing of the 46-meter-high structure, including President Kuchma and Prime Minister Valerii Pustovoitenko.

The bell tower, which also holds a chapel dedicated to victims of the Great Famine of 1932-1933 and a museum of the history of the church and

old Kyiv, as well as the carillons, faces the equally historic St. Sophia Sobor located about 300 meters to the north.

To connect the two religious shrines, Mykhailivsky Square, located before the bell tower, was enlarged and renovated, and a promenade constructed.

Six months later President Kuchma again visited the site to take part in the ceremonial placing of a two-meter Byzantine cross atop the largest of the six golden cupolas that now cap the church and symbolize the completion of the construction phase of the rebuilding of St. Michael's.

Next year experts and artists will paint and adorn the interior of the church with new frescoes and mosaics, done according to the style and techniques of the 12th century.

Many of the historical artworks that were saved before the church was destroyed are found in Kyiv, at St. Sophia Sobor and the Monastery of the Caves (Pecherska Lavra) complex, but few of those will be moved back into the new church. Unlike St. Sophia Sobor, which will remain a museum, the new St. Michael's is planned to be a functioning church, and officials do not want the ancient works damaged.

However, other religious objects that belonged to the church, some of which were deposited in the Tretiakov Gallery in Moscow after 1936, will be returned.

New church construction played a major part in the physical revitalization of Kyiv in 1998. In addition to the six golden domes of St. Michael's reappearing on the Kyiv skyline, the single dome of the Church of the Assumption of the Blessed Mother of Pyrohoscha returned. The Assumption Church, which also belongs to the Kyiv Patriarchate, was rebuilt on the site that it once occupied in the Podil district of lower Kyiv and opened in time for Easter 1998.

The construction of two other churches, one at the center of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and as ancient as St. Michael's, the other Greek-Catholic, with a new and controversial design, also was begun in 1998.

The 11th century Dormition Cathedral (Uspenskii Sobor) in the Monastery of the Caves complex, which was blown up by retreating Soviet Red Army forces in September 1941, will also be restored to its historic design. On the same day that President Kuchma witnessed the topping of St. Michael Golden-Domed Sobor with a cross on its highest cupola, he also placed a time capsule in the foundation of the Dormition Cathedral. Both Orthodox churches are scheduled to be completed in time for the celebrations in Ukraine of the second millennium of Christianity.

Ukrainian Greek-Catholics also finally will have a church and monastery in Kyiv befitting their status as the second largest Christian confession in the country. Ground-breaking for St. Vasylii Church took place in July 1998, with construction scheduled to be completed by September 1999.

The non-traditional architectural design of the church, developed by architect Larysa Skoryk, was the subject of some criticism from the Ukrainian diaspora, which has contributed more than $100,000 to the $600,000 project. Instead of the traditional domes and cupolas, the new church will incorporate a series of small roofs over the church called "dashky."

The church proper will have room for 400 to 500 worshippers, and the monastery will house about a dozen monks.

Churches were not the only cultural symbols going up in Kyiv in 1998. A long overdue memorial to Mykhailo Hrushevsky, historian, chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada and president of the Ukrainian National Republic, was unveiled on December 1, the seventh anniversary of the Ukrainian referendum that upheld the August 24, 1991, declaration of independence.

The Hrushevsky memorial stands on a new city square adjoining the Kyiv Teachers' Building where the Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed on January 22, 1918.

However historic or needed these building efforts were, the one that received the most publicity – and garnered the most controversy – was the renovation of the Kyiv city center during the summer months.

In a $25 million effort to rehabilitate Kyiv's main thoroughfare, which hadn't seen a facelift since it was rebuilt after World War II, the Khreschatyk's street and adjoining sidewalks were uprooted and repaved, pedestrian underpasses were reconstructed, new light fixtures were installed above the street and on surrounding buildings, and a fountain was built at the entrance to the Khreschatyk Passage.

Renovation plans began after workers discovered that 50-year-old communications and electrical cables buried below the street had deteriorated dangerously. The work was completed on August 16, in time for Ukrainian Independence Day a week later.

Kyiv Mayor Oleksander Omelchenko told reporters during a ribbon-cutting ceremony and tour of the Khreschatyk after work was completed that the two-month renovation blitz had transformed the historic strip into "a street as beautiful as any in Europe."

Allthough national deputies in the nation's Parliament did not voice disagreement with the Kyiv mayor's assertion, some did question the cost of the work at a time when the country was experiencing such difficult economic times and called for an investigative committee to be formed, which has not yet delivered its findings.

Kyiv residents also questioned the need for such an extravagant undertaking. While work proceeded on the Khreschatyk, the most common statement heard from Kyivans was: "They can't pay back wages and pensions, but they can put marble in the underpasses."

The revitalization of the Khreschatyk was the second phase of a general

sprucing up that Kyiv underwent in 1998. In the spring months, major city arteries were repaved, half-finished construction projects that had languished for years were completed, and many buildings in the city center were given a new coat of paint.

It was all done in preparation for Kyiv's first major international event: the board of governors meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a convention of European bankers and businessmen that Ukraine hoped would bring badly needed international investment.

Preparations also included the renovations of several Kyiv hotels to bring them up to world standards.

The convention went off without a hitch, and delegates left Kyiv impressed with the beauty of the city. At the closing press conference of the convention, EBRD Acting President Charles Frank said, "Kyiv can rest assured that it has gained many new admirers."

Ukraine mourns Chornovil

April 4, 1999

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV – Tens of thousands of people bid a final farewell to Vyacheslav Chornovil on March 29 in an emotional display of the respect that this country held for the former Soviet political dissident and leader of the Rukh Party.

As Ukraine observed a national day of mourning, people from all over the country traveled to the nation's capital – police reported a figure of 10,000 – to join with tens of thousands more Kyivans in what many consider the largest funeral this city has ever seen.

Mr. Chornovil, 61, longtime leader of the Rukh Party, died in an automobile accident late on March 25, while returning from a political meeting in Kirovohrad with Hennadii Udovenko, former foreign affairs minister and now national deputy, whose candidacy for president Mr. Chornovil was supporting.

Under a piercing blue spring sky, crowds approaching 50,000 lined the streets to witness the funeral procession, jammed St. Volodymyr Sobor to hear the funeral service, and squeezed through the front gates of historic Baikove Cemetery, where they climbed atop monuments and grave markers to get a view of the late Rukh leader's final resting place.

"Kyiv has not seen a funeral like this in a long time," one middle-aged woman said as she waited on the streets of Kyiv for the funeral procession to

pass by. Her remarks were echoed by National Deputy Yaroslav Kendzior.

Outside the Teacher's Building, where the Ukrainian government proclaimed an independent Ukraine in 1918, nearly 20,000 mourners, many teary-eyed, some obviously overwrought, gathered to view the open casket inside. They began arriving before daylight to pay respects to the former political prisoner and democratic leader who committed more than 30 years of his life to the fight for an independent Ukraine.

The viewing lasted nearly three hours, during which some 8,000 people passed by the casket. The building was opened an hour earlier than had been planned because of the immense crowd and the nearly kilometer-long queue that had already formed by 9:30 a.m.

Inside and outside, the walls were lined with hundreds of wreaths: large official arrangements from foreign governments, the president, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Verkhovna Rada, and the many regional and local Rukh organizations, as well as small personal tributes.

Mr. Chornovil's body lay in a simple oak casket, which was surrounded by flowers tossed by the bereaved as they took a last look at the man who was a major political force in newly independent Ukraine's turbulent first eight years.

A state honor guard of four national guardsmen stood stiffly at attention at each corner of the casket. Outside, a military detachment, which also included an orchestra, waited to escort the body to the church and then the cemetery.

Officially, Ukraine was represented by President Leonid Kuchma, who arrived with Prime Minister Valerii Pustovoitenko and Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksander Tkachenko to pay his respects. After standing before the casket in a moment of silence, the three Ukrainian leaders, with whom Mr. Chornovil had tussled often in the political arena, approached Mr. Chornovil's widow, Atena Pashko, and offered words of condolence. They then left the building to await the arrival of the casket at St. Volodymyr Sobor, the site of the funeral moleben.

Most leaders of the Verkhovna Rada's 14 factions attended, as did most national deputies from Ukraine's Parliament and most ministers from the government. Notable by their absence were Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko and Progressive Socialist leader Natalia Vitrenko.

Some members of Ukraine's staid political elite had trouble concealing their emotions for a man whom people loved or hated, but toward whom they had difficulty being indifferent. A red-eyed Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of Ukraine and current member of Parliament, with whom Mr. Chornovil had clashed also, removed his glasses and brushed away tears after paying his respects. National Deputy Vitalii Zhuravski, head of the Christian Democratic Party, sobbed.

Official delegations from the United States, led by Ambassador Steven

Pifer, and Poland, which included members of the Polish Parliament, also paid their respects and offered condolences to the bereaved.

Approaching Mr. Chornovil's widow, Ambassador Pifer presented a letter of condolence from President Bill Clinton.

Mr. Chornovil's fellow former dissidents were present in abundance, among them Lev Lukianenko, Ivan Hel, Yurii Badzio, the Horyn brothers and Iryna Kalynets.

Ms. Kalynets hugged and consoled Mr. Chornovil's son Taras, who of all the family members seemed to be the most distraught.

That day, however, the common people lining the streets best expressed the love that the Rukh leader evoked in a large portion of the populace. They arrived by the thousands from all regions of Ukraine. Whether dressed in the natty attire that marks the new Ukrainian middle class, or in the drab, crumbled sport coats and babushky (kerchiefs) common to the villages of Ukraine, they cried and prayed in memory of Mr. Chornovil.

They tossed flowers and sang hymns as the casket proceeded up Volodymyrska Street from the Teacher's Building (once the headquarters of the Central Rada) to St. Volodymyr Sobor, where Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate led the funeral service, and afterwards, along the route from the cathedral to Baikove Cemetery, the historic final resting place of many of Ukraine's cultural, religious and political elite.

Patriarch Filaret, speaking before the beginning of services at the sobor, touched on the controversial and painful last days of Mr. Chornovil's life, when he was ousted as the chairman of the Rukh Party by a group of young members of Parliament. His refusal to accept his removal caused a political split within the party that has led to the creation of two Rukhs.

"Now is the time for all democratic and centrist forces to unite. ... There must be only one Rukh," said Patriarch Filaret to the masses jammed into the Orthodox cathedral.

He echoed statements made earlier by Mr. Chornovil's press secretary, Dmytro Ponomarchuk, who was with Mr. Chornovil in the ill-fated automobile that broadsided a giant tandem trailer outside Kyiv late on the night of March 25, and who escaped death only because he was asleep in the back seat as the car went under the trailer.

"The best tribute to Vyacheslav Chornovil would be if both Rukhs united in his memory," said Mr. Ponomarchuk from his hospital bed two days after the fateful night.

The crowd that stood outside the Teacher's Building on the morning of the funeral did not seem ready to accept that proposal, at the time. As the official delegation from the Rukh Party that had broken ranks with Mr. Chornovil arrived to pay its respects, the crowd broke into chants of "Shame, shame," and shouts of "traitors" and "schismatics."

The delegation, led by new party leader Yurii Kostenko, quickly shuffled into the building, stopped briefly at the casket and shuffled out. None of them approached Ms. Pashko to offer condolences, and no representative from the Kostenko Rukh was seen later, either at church or the cemetery.

After the one-hour funeral service at St. Volodymyr Sobor – which the thousands who could not get inside the church heard on large speakers set up outside – funeral organizers utilized a hearse to carry the casket for the two-hour walk to the cemetery.

At Baikove the main gates of the historical cemetery were quickly closed to keep the masses out after the official funeral participants had entered, but then reopened minutes later, when the surging crowd looked as if it might break the down barrier.

One elderly lady, overcome by emotion and having lost self-control, fought through the densely packed crowd with two carnations in hand, screaming: "Let me see him, let me see the Ukrainian Jesus. I have the flower of his soul in my hand."

Overall, however, the crowd was subdued and respectful.

Mr. Udovenko, the former minister of foreign affairs, who directed the funeral arrangements as the head of the Verkhovna Rada's ad hoc funeral committee and who witnessed the tragic death of Mr. Chornovil from a car trailing the Chornovil automobile as the group returned to Kyiv that fateful night, led a public meeting at Baikove.

There were political moments – statements by some Rukh leaders who had stuck by Mr. Chornovil condemning the political schism and the Rukh Party led by Mr. Kostenko, but for the most part the speakers, politicians, former political dissidents and foreign guests recalled and paid homage to the memory of a person they loved and respected.

National Deputy Mykhailo Kosiv of the Rukh Party summed up best why so many had turned out to pay their respects to a man whose time as a political leader was marked by much controversy. "It took such a tragic death for people to realize who it was that we had among us," said Mr. Kosiv.

Another Rukh national deputy, Lila Hryhorovych, called Mr. Chornovil the Ukrainian Washington and likened him to Nelson Mandela. "Our Washington, the great Vyacheslav Chornovil, unfortunately, did not reach his final destiny as did a similar figure, Nelson Mandela," said Ms. Hryhorovych.

Viktor Pynzenyk, a national deputy who leads the Reform and Order Party, which had formed a coalition with Mr. Chornovil to support Mr. Udovenko for the presidency, said that Mr. Chornovil changed people. "Anybody who met Vyacheslav Maksymovych could not help but be affected by his energy. He simply fired up people with his ideas and his tenacity," said Mr. Pynzenyk.

A member of the Armenian Parliament who had spent time in the Soviet

gulag with Mr. Chornovil recalled how even in prison he was a leader and organizer.

Kyiv Mayor Oleksander Omelchenko announced that a street in Kyiv would be renamed in memory of Mr. Chornovil.

Then, as the casket was lowered into the ground, the army orchestra struck the first notes of the Ukrainian national anthem and a seven-gun salute went off in honor of the man about whom Mykhailo Horyn had said just moments before: "History will show that without him today's independent Ukraine would not have been possible."

In an irony of fate and history, Mr. Chornovil's burial site at Baikove Cemetery lies some 30 yards from the grave of the former head of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the person who was part of the regime that persecuted and incarcerated the rights advocate for 20 years.

However, Mr. Chornovil still will be in opposition, even if symbolically: his grave lies on the opposite side of the walkway.

22-nation summit in Yalta seeks end to division of Europe

September 19, 1999

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

YALTA – Fifty-four years after the leaders of the victorious Allied Forces of World War II configured the geopolitical map of post-war Europe, which ended with its eastern half artificially isolated from the rest of the continent and dominated by Soviet Russia, Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma hosted a second summit here, attended by 22 European countries, to symbolically close the door on that part of history and express the singleness of Europe.

"It is greatly symbolic that we are gathered here, where our fate was decided for us in 1945. Today we are working to destroy those dividing lines," said Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus at the ceremonial opening of the summit at the lavish Livadia Palace, summer home of the 19th century Russian tsars and the place where U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin met at the infamous Yalta Conference more than five decades ago.

Officially called the "International Conference on Baltic-Black Sea Cooperation: Towards an Integrated Europe in the 21st Century Without Dividing Lines," the summit set as its larger goal the further integration of

the former Warsaw Pact countries and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union into mainstream European economic and political structures.

The agenda, however, was more specific than that. The subjects of discussion ranged from the continued development of a transportation corridor for oil and gas from the Transcaucasus region through Ukraine to the Baltic Sea, to the creation of an overall security structure for all of Europe.

A hot topic was how to resolve the practical problems that confront the Baltic-Black Sea countries that have emerged from behind the Iron Curtain but have yet to be included in NATO and have little hope of joining the European Union in the near future. Those issues include visa arrangements, border and customs regulations, and trade agreements. Ukraine's President Kuchma, whose country borders the three newest member-states of NATO, all of which are also strong candidates for membership in the EU, said the potential for a divided Europe remains.

"I must tell you that, with the Iron Curtain down, there still exists the danger of a far more humane, but no less dangerous, paper curtain being put up between Eastern Europe and Western Europe," said Mr. Kuchma.

Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski also addressed the divisions that still exist on the European continent in his address to the summit. He stated that it is not up to the EU to determine who belongs to Europe and who does not.

'There should be no open or subtle dividing lines in Europe," said Mr. Kwasniewski. He also called on Europe to accept Ukraine into its free trade association after it gains status in the World Trade Organization.

Another key issue was the continued effort by the Baltic and Black Sea neighbors to have gas and oil from the Caspian Sea Basin routed through the Black Sea and Ukraine to Central Europe. Western oil and gas conglomerates are blocking any plans for a new routing, as is the U.S. government, even as Azerbaijan's President Haidar Aliyev, whose country controls many of the recently discovered oil fields, has expressed support for it.

President Aliyev met with President Kuchma to discuss the Ukrainian transport corridor soon after his arrival in Yalta.

The summit participants also addressed ecological issues and communications technologies in the region, as well as problems with illegal migration, drug smuggling and arms trafficking.

Presidents or prime ministers of 14 of the 22 countries attended "Yalta II," as it has been dubbed, while others sent ambassador-level representatives. The participating countries were, for the most part, members of either the Council of Baltic Countries or the Organization of Black Sea Cooperation. They included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Sweden.

Also present were representatives of the foremost European geopolitical structures: the European Union, the European Commission, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and NATO.

The group agreed on two joint statements. One was an expression of sympathy and solidarity with Turkey and Greece, which were recently hit by a series of earthquakes, while the other declared the need for a joint effort and cooperation by all of Europe in resolving the continent's problems in the 21st century. It reaffirmed "the inherent right of all states to choose the means to ensure their own security," while expressing the need to promote beneficial cooperation among the countries; to undertake joint efforts for the resolution and prevention of conflicts; to develop economic cooperation through joint projects in the fields of energy, transport, communications, ecology and other spheres; to deepen cooperation in humanitarian fields; and to combat terrorism.

The summit was not without its controversies, one of which involved a statement by the Russian representative to the conference, First Vice Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko, condemning possible future NATO expansion eastward.

"The further expansion of NATO, with regard to the Baltic countries and southeastern Europe, will lead to a new dividing line, and in no way to further security," said Mr. Khristenko at the Livadia Palace during the opening session of the summit.

His remarks seemed to contradict the passage in the joint statement, which Russia signed, on the inherent right of all states to choose the means of their defense. Yet it was fully in line with Russia's continued insistence that NATO expand no further.

Another problem arose when Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka issued a statement in Miensk that Kyiv had withdrawn an invitation to attend the summit under pressure from the European Union, which Mr. Lukashenka said he considered an unfriendly gesture by Belarus's southern neighbor. Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that it never issued such an invitation (see sidebar).

Several presidential candidates in Kyiv criticized the largely ceremonial summit in Yalta, which resulted from a proposal put forward by President Kuchma at a 1997 meeting of Baltic countries in Vilnius, Lithuania, as a pre-election tactic by candidate Kuchma to show Ukrainian voters his foreign policy acumen and the international respect he carries.

Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasyuk downplayed the charges at a press conference in Yalta and said the international gathering of leaders had been planned well before the presidential campaign began.

However, on the main road to Yalta from the Crimean capital city of Symferopol, where the autonomous peninsula's only airport is located, it was

clear that somebody had already mixed pre-election politics with international diplomacy. Endorsements for the re-election of the president were spray-painted on most bridges and roadside abutments along the highway that the dignitaries, the guests and members of the press traveled. Other graffiti had been conspicuously painted over, and no other candidate endorsements were evident.

Kuchma abolishes collective farms

December 19, 1999

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV – In the first tangible evidence that Ukraine will now move quickly on economic restructuring and reforms, President Leonid Kuchma issued a decree calling for the reorganization of the country's vast system of collective farm enterprises into private enterprises and agricultural cooperatives.

As could have been expected, the announcement was greeted in Ukraine's Parliament with criticism and cynicism.

The December 3 decree marks the first step in a reinvigorated economic reform process that President Kuchma announced in his inaugural speech on November 30.

Under the presidential decree, collective farms have until April 2000 to turn over their land to the workers, who formally own it, and give them their ownership certificates.

Holders of certificates issued back in 1994 now may take their plot of land, which is to be doled out by individual village councils, combine it with others in a clear contractual arrangement, sell it or rent it.

Most importantly, the document orders the simplification of the process of obtaining individual plots of lands and strict oversight to ensure that the process is transparent and fair, with equal access for all those wishing to take part in it.

The decree urges that, where possible, geographical boundaries of the old collective farms remain intact.

In 1994 workers and villagers of collective farms had been allocated pieces of land in what was to have been the beginning of land reform. However, because the process of obtaining land shares was vague and costly, few peasants successfully obtained their plots.

The collective farm directors made the process still more difficult by putting up bureaucratic obstacles – at times simply refusing to turn over government-alloted plots or parceling out land that was not arable or remotely located.

Ukraine's agricultural sector has been in steep decline since independence and has produced lower and lower grain yields with each passing year. While the Soviet Union collected about 50 million tons of grain annually on average, the 1999 harvest came in at about 25 million tons.

Part of the reason lies with the Ukrainian government's failure to thus far produce an effective land reform policy.

"The point of this document is to announce that collective farms are ineffective forms of property," said Minister of Agriculture Mykhailo Hladii on December 6.

He explained that 86 percent of collective farms are expected to show losses in 1999, while most of the private enterprises will turn a profit.

Mr. Hladii was careful to point out that the decree does not give the go-ahead for the general sale of land, but merely allows individuals within the collective to transfer property among the collective as they formulate their private enterprises and cooperatives.

"It does not say that land is a commodity and thus subject to sale and purchase," explained Mr. Hladii. "In keeping with the Land Code, farmers working the land have the right to purchase a part of it."

The minister noted that Ukraine has a limited land market, which allows for the sale of land plots only among owners.

Oleksander Tkachenko, chairman of Ukraine's Parliament, quickly attacked the decree at a press conference on December 7. He said the abolition of collective farms would lead to famine and questioned its constitutionality. Mr. Tkachenko also accused President Kuchma of caving in to pressure from the International Monetary Fund.

Other Parliament leaders also criticized the agricultural reform decree. "The decree is issued in a totalitarian way and may cause unforeseen consequences, including starvation in Ukraine under current economic conditions," said National Deputy Vasyl Kuratsenko of the Peasant Party, a member of the Parliment's Agricultural Committee, according to UNIAN. He said the committee will appeal to Ukraine's Constitutional Court to examine the document's legality.

Another national deputy, Oleksander Riabchenko of the Green Party faction, said he agreed with the president's move, but that it must be backed up by law.

"This matter has now been politically proclaimed, but it still must be legislatively enacted," said Mr. Riabchenko.

The agricultural reform decree offers the beginning of long-awaited radical economic reforms. The process ostensibly began immediately after President Kuchma took office in 1994, but quickly bogged down as competing interests pressured the president into postponements and delays. At his November 30 inauguration President Kuchma announced that the reform effort would be reinvigorated and would take on a radical character.

The president's economic reform tsar, Vice Prime Minister Serhii Tyhypko, who has become the front man in the effort to step up the pace, said a day before the inauguration that a sea change in thinking must take place in government and society.

Mr. Tyhypko described what the Kuchma administration pursued in the first term as "the politics of small steps and compromises," which had led to "economic stagnation, the growth of internal conflicts and a twisting of market ideology."

He said the only realistic alternative is the implementation of a complex plan of radical economic reforms, in which he included: new monetary, pricing and budget policies; a change in the role of the government from an economic player to a regulator of the private sector, to include extensive administrative reforms; and the creation of favorable terms for the development of small and medium-size businesses.

Mr. Tyhypko said the government should no longer subsidize budget deficits and should allow the hryvnia to float against world currencies to determine its real worth. Prices of certain staple goods should no longer be government-subsidized, and welfare programs for the less fortunate must be revamped and run according to clear and strict requirements.

In the budget realm, the vice prime minister called for an end to government support for bankrupt and deficit-making government enterprises, and more effective utilization of resources for government services and social support for the population; an end to tax-free status to certain industries identified as "critical"; and audit control and registration of all government contracts.

He said that municipalities must take responsibility for their own budgets, which should be allocated in blocks and then audited, while the private sector must assume responsibility for the development of the economy, with the government reduced to the role of stimulator and regulator.

Extensive administrative reform is required, according to Mr. Tyhypko, along with a reorientation of the role of bureaucrats away from that of controllers and overseers to public servants, whose responsibilities should be to make society run effectively, efficiently and safely.

He called for broad privatization, to include segments of industry that have been excluded from the process thus far, and said that factories which cannot be sold off should be declared bankrupt or reorganized. The process itself must be simplified and made completely transparent, said Mr. Tyhypko.

In his comprehensive plan, the vice prime minister also called for extensive banking reform and the development of bankruptcy laws. He admitted that housing subsidies must be removed and communal services payments on apartments increased.

Mr. Tyhypko said that, while Ukrainian society had expressed its rejec-

tion of the command-control style of the Communist system in the presidential elections, it had not yet delineated what it expects as an alternative, and called on such a public debate to begin. Before radical reforms can take place, society must give its approval, suggested the vice prime minister.

"The core of the discussion that is needed today is to choose a direction. It is happening – in informal kitchen settings, in discussions on government portfolios. But society needs a serious and intelligent public discussion," said Mr. Tyhypko.

750,000 participate in pilgrimage to Zarvanytsia shrine

July 30, 2000

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

ZARVANYTSIA, Ukraine – They came by car, by bus and on foot. Some traveled for a week, others for a few hours. They arrived from Donetsk in the east of Ukraine and from New York in the east of the United States, but mostly from the regions of western Ukraine. Adults, children, pensioners, the indigent and the disabled, and unexpectedly large numbers of teenagers and young adults congregated from many of the corners of the world in the small village of Zarvanytsia, located on the banks of the meandering Strypa River in the Terebovlia region of the Ternopil Oblast of western Ukraine.

By Friday afternoon, July 21, the roads to Zarvanytsia were clogged with a train of humanity slowly making its way to one of the holiest shrines of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

An elderly woman walked the road to the shrine from the city of Ivano-Frankivsk. It took four days. A young man from the city of Stryi, located not far from the Polish border, said he decided to join a group of pilgrims walking to Zarvanytsia on the spur of the moment. A middle-aged man made the trek from a neighboring village. It took him and his family "merely" seven hours, as he explained.

What drew them was the July 22-23 All-Ukrainian Pilgrimage of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the Zarvanytsia shrine, and before it was over nearly 750,000 people had taken part, making it one of the largest gatherings of Ukrainians ever. Although authorities could not give exact figures, they estimated that at least 200,000 people had entered the grounds of the Marian shrine on each of the two days of the weekend event, with over 250,000 more gathered for an evening candlelight vigil on Saturday evening.

Organized as a second millennium celebration of the birth of Jesus Christ by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the objective reason for the mass gathering was the blessing of the new Sobor of the Mother of God of Zarvanytsia. However, it was more than that. Church leaders said that, in addition to giving thanks for the re-emergence of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church after nearly a half century of persecution, they hoped the pilgrimage would become an act of forgiveness and purification, an opportunity for the Church and the faithful to ask forgiveness for their own affronts and those committed by the various Ukrainian religious confessions against one another over the last century. It was also a chance to pray for the reunification of the long-divided Ukrainian Church.

It became still more: an act of mass bonding for the faithful of the long-suffering Church, as people made new acquaintances and renewed old ones.

"I came to pray for my family, for our health and well-being, but also for Nenka Ukraina (Mother Ukraine), so that she finally achieves her potential," said Vasyl Hladchuk, who had traveled from the nearby village of Monastyrsk.

Some of the pilgrims slept in hotels in Ternopil, while others found rooms in neighboring villages. But most spent the night together on the grounds of the shrine: in tents or under the stars, or in the vehicles that carried them there. Many did not sleep at all, but spent the starlit hours praying and attending services through the morning.

Meals for a large portion of the pilgrims consisted of bits of fatback or sausage and coarse black bread, along with fruits and vegetables, which they had brought with themselves and ate together as they sat on rocks, tree stumps or the bare ground. Others built campfires and ate more fully, while a large number didn't eat at all, preferring to fast and sustain themselves on the water that flows from the Zarvanytsia spring that is said to have healing powers.

Men, women and children, dressed in everything from low cut t-shirts emblazoned with the Calvin Klein logo and shorts to folk costumes embroidered in the style of the geographic region from which they hailed, took part in a dizzying array of choral contests, concerts, prayer services and divine liturgies dedicated to the Mother of God of Zarvanytsia, who is credited for numerous miracles at this site through the healing waters of a spring that bubbles to the earth's surface only meters from the Strypa River. There was also a youth meeting, an art exhibit and a conference on martyrs of the 20th century.

Across the river from the sobor, a tent city rose on the first day of the retreat, home to several thousand mostly college-age adults and a smattering of older folks, representatives of parishes and church organizations, as well as three Ukrainian youth groups: the Ukrainian scouting organization, Plast; the Tryzub Society Youth Organization of Stepan Bandera; and the

Youth: Hope of Ukraine group. They camped out, swam and attended various events during the day, and sang and played Ukrainian religious and folk songs at night.

Visitors jammed the main street of the tiny village of less than a thousand inhabitants to buy ice cream, soda and an assortment of icons, rosary beads, prayer books and crosses. They also queued at faucets through which the spring water now flows to fill water bottles and jugs to take home.

Throughout the weekend there were many compelling sights: men and women praying the rosary under trees or beneath the shrine built over the wellspring; elderly women lying prostrate, their heads bowed to the ground for the entire two-hour duration of the Sunday divine liturgy; a man in a makeshift wheelchair washing his legs with spring water at one of the many faucets near the foot of the sobor.

Three events highlighted this remarkable weekend and gathering.

First was the rain-soaked blessing of the sobor and its main altar on Saturday afternoon. At about 4 p.m., as dark clouds gathered overhead, the bishops and clergy of the Church circled and then entered the still unfinished sobor, whose exterior cupolas are not yet all gilded and whose interior still lacks icons, frescoes and an iconostas.

While the blessing of the structure and an archiepiscopal divine liturgy took place in the upper church, other bishops blessed the main altar in the lower church and implanted a relic of St. Josaphat Kuntsevych beneath the altar's surface.

The church blessing did not go off without several hitches. First, Bishop Lubomyr Husar, the administrative head of the Church, who carries out official duties for the leader of the Church, the aged and ill Cardinal Ivan Lubachivsky, was delayed and did not show up for the liturgy.

Second, when the rains arrived, the hierarchy decided to change the venue of the divine liturgy from its original site on a stage before the church, which sits atop a hill overlooking a large valley, and to do it all inside. The only problem was that no one told the faithful, more than 50,000 of whom stood in the rain waiting patiently for the appearance of the Church hierarchy and the beginning of the divine liturgy. Also, no one thought to provide external speakers so that the throngs outside could hear the services taking place within the church. As word spread among the crowd that the divine liturgy was well under way inside, the disappointed masses dispersed.

Much more successful – in fact, an awe-inspiring visual spectacle – was the evening candlelight vigil, which began after the sun had set that evening. As large throngs again began to gather in the open field beneath the sobor, on the streets of the village and in the surrounding hills a procession from the village church, led by Bishop Iulian Voronovsky, proceeded to the shrine for a moleben prayer service.

As electrical lighting was extinguished, the ensuing darkness gradually

was illuminated by an increasingly larger number of tiny points of light, which eventually engulfed the whole area as if millions of fireflies had descended upon the crowd.

Following the prayer service, a bas-relief icon of the Mother of God of Zarvanytsia was blessed and mounted in the shrine.

As candles continued to burn, which they did for a good portion of the night, tens of thousands of believers made their way to the stations of the cross located in the woods behind the sobor, where they waited patiently for hours before following the clergy through the 12 sites of the service, which commemorates the suffering of Christ during his crucifixion.

Well after midnight, those who still were not sleeping listened to a concert featuring Nina Matvienko, considered Ukraine's queen of traditional folk music.

The final day culminated with another archiepiscopal divine liturgy held on the stage erected before the sobor. Present were most of the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate's representative, Bishop Vasylyi of Kolomyia; and two representatives from the Vatican – Apostolic Nuncio to Ukraine Archbishop Mykola Eterovic and special papal emissary, Archbishop Vinko Pulic of Sarajevo.

Bishop Husar, who led the church service, explained that he was pleased Pope John Paul II had chosen Archbishop Pulic as his emissary, because he represents a Slavic Church – one that also had suffered from Communist persecution, much as the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church had.

While Archbishop Eterovic read a greeting from the pope, Archbishop Pulic gave the sermon during the service. Both Vatican representatives emphasized in their remarks that the acrimony, and even hatred, that may still linger from the events of the past must be cleansed from the hearts of the faithful. Archbishop Pulic underscored that the major tragedy of the Ukrainian nation has been its religious divisiveness.

Following completion of the church service, Ukraine's vice prime minister for humanitarian affairs, Mykola Zhulynskyi, who along with Minister of Emergency Situations Vasyl Durdynets led the official Ukrainian delegation representing the government and President Leonid Kuchma, extended greetings to the Church and those gathered. President Kuchma was vacationing in Yalta that week.

The celebrations, the prayer services and the divine liturgies that occurred in Zarvanytsia were a celebration of the Mother of God, who many believe has performed miracles through the waters that flow from a spring there. According to legend, in the 13th century the Mother of God appeared to a monk who was fleeing the Mongol invasion that had destroyed Kyiv. On the banks of the Strypa River, he prayed to her for protection. In his sleep the monk had a vision of the Mother of God, with two angels hovering beside

her. She smiled and touched the monk with her cloak. As he awoke, he saw a brilliant light beaming near the river. Approaching it, he came upon an icon of the Mother of God with Jesus in her arms.

The monk decided to stay in the area and build a chapel to house the icon. Eventually he constructed a church and an adjoining monastery. Over the centuries many cases of miraculous healing have been recorded by the monks who have resided there for centuries. Prince Vasylko of Terebovlia was reportedly cured of a serious affliction in the 16th century.

During the Soviet era, Communist Party officials repeatedly tried to cap the wellspring to no avail, according to local lore. When they covered one fount, water would burst forth from another.

Pilgrims, who continued to visit the shrine even after it was officially shut down, often would be met by local militia with dogs or barbed wire to dissuade believers from entering. Although the faithful could not avoid the dogs, more often than not barbed wire erected one day would be pitched into the Strypa by the next.

Chornobyl shuts down as world watches

December 24, 2000

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV – As representatives of the international community watched, President Leonid Kuchma gave the order on December 15 that shut down forever the third nuclear reactor at the Chornobyl power plant, effectively beginning the de-commissioning of the site of the world's worst nuclear accident.

"In accordance with a decision made by Ukraine and from agreements made with the world community, I direct that the No. 3 reactor at Chornobyl be shut down," Mr. Kuchma said at 1:16 p.m. Kyiv time, in ordering Vitalii Tolstonohov, the general director of the Chornobyl nuclear plant, to begin the shutdown operation.

President Kuchma and his guests then viewed the control room of reactor No. 3 via a live feed on a large monitor at the Ukraina Palace concert hall, while an engineer at Chornobyl threw the switch that halted the huge, atomically fueled, electricity-generating turbine.

Thus, Ukraine fulfilled a promise it had made when it signed an agreement with the Group of Seven most industrialized countries in 1995 to do so in return for financial support for the development of compensatory energy-generating sources. As late as the beginning of December some doubt remained

about whether Ukraine would follow through on its promise and whether the West was adhering to its part of the bargain. However, uncertainty diminished when the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development agreed to extend to Ukraine a $215 million loan to help with the completion of nuclear reactors near the cities of Khmelnytskyi and Rivne.

The momentous closing day – which Western leaders had awaited for a decade – was the culmination of a process that began on March 29, when the Ukrainian government announced it would begin final preparations to bring the power plant offline forever by the end of the year. Then on June 5, during a visit to Kyiv by U.S. President Bill Clinton, President Kuchma announced that the long-sought shutdown would take place on December 15.

During the 40-minute ceremony at the Ukraina Palace, President Kuchma said that for Ukraine the closing of Chornobyl is "of epochal importance."

"In doing so we are, first, paying tribute to the memory of those who died of the diseases caused by this catastrophe during their effort to eliminate the consequences of the disaster; second, we are confirming once more that we are fully committed to our obligations to the world; third, we are parting once and for all with totalitarianism, its tyranny, indifference and cruelty to human beings, society and nature," stated Mr. Kuchma.

The president cited statistics that tell the story of what the Chornobyl catastrophe has done to Ukraine and its development:

- nearly 3.5 million affected either directly by the disaster or its consequences;
- nearly 10 percent of the territory of Ukraine irradiated;
- 160,000 people moved from 170 abandoned localities;
- total economic losses, directly or indirectly related to the disaster, approaching $130 billion;
- in some years 12 percent of the national budget dedicated to Chornobyl-related expenses.

Ukraine could little afford loss of the energy generated by the last running reactor at Chornobyl, which supplies 5 percent of the country's electricity. The country is almost entirely dependent on Russia for its natural gas and oil needs, but with little financial means to pay for what it needs because of a decade-long economic plunge that has only recently leveled off – a fact the president emphasized.

"We realize that Chornobyl is a threat to the entire world and, consequently, we are ready to sacrifice a part of our national interest for the sake of global safety," explained Mr. Kuchma.

Meanwhile, members of the Ukrainian government, including Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko, said it was time for the last working nuclear reactor to go.

"We have a working reactor basically separated by a wall from the one

that was destroyed in the accident, we have to take such things into consideration," explained Mr. Yuschenko.

He was referring to the fact that the third reactor and the one that blew up are adjacent to one another and separated merely by a single long hallway.

The Verkhovna Rada, however, gave an indication on December 14 that someone had convinced a majority of national deputies that the third reactor could and should remain online when it passed a resolution calling on the president to keep the reactor going until April. The idea, as explained in the text of the draft bill, was to make sure that the money promised by the EBRD for Khmelnytskyi and Rivne would arrive and be utilized.

Mr. Yuschenko also told journalists before the closing ceremony began that, while the financial support provided by the world community thus far is sufficient, it would not be enough to cover all the Chornobyl-related expenses that would arise in the future.

"We can say that the money is there to complete the first stage, but future [Ukrainian] governments will have a serious job finding additional resources," said Prime Minister Yuschenko.

Ukraine had received financing from several sources in the last year to help prod it along on the path to its December 15 date with destiny. In addition to the $215 million Ukraine received from the EBRD on December 7, it had received another $100 million from the EBRD in mid-October to help purchase carbon fuels for energy generation to compensate for the electricity lost at Chornobyl. The European Commission added $27 million to that amount a few weeks later.

In addition, the international community had raised some $273 million in early July to meet 90 percent of the financial requirement to rebuild the sarcophagus over the destroyed fourth reactor block.

Mr. Yuschenko said Ukraine's decision to close the Chornobyl nuclear reactor was unprecedented and unique – comparable in international significance to its 1994 decision to give up its nuclear weapons arsenal, which at the time was the third largest in the world.

Few among the diplomats on hand for the ceremony would have argued. For most it was a day of acclaim and accolades. Pierre Cardin, the legendary fashion designer, who is currently the goodwill ambassador for UNESCO, said that the world could only thank Ukraine for its largesse in shutting down Chornobyl.

"It is a very, very big day for Ukraine, and for the world, too," said Mr. Cardin in the foyer of the Kyiv concert hall, as foreign diplomats and Ukrainian politicians mingled while awaiting the start of the ceremony.

Throughout the day President Kuchma received letters of congratulations from various state leaders, including the presidents of France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Hungary and Israel, as well as the chairman of the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

President Clinton sent a greeting filmed on videotape in which he stated, "Today is a great day for Ukraine and for the world." Mr. Clinton applauded Ukraine for its "heroic" commitment "to fulfill its historic decision."

But not everybody was backslapping and hand-clasping on this historic day. Russian Energy Minister Yevgenii Adamov told reporters in Moscow, according to Interfax-Ukraine, that it was a bad move on Ukraine's part.

"I can't see any reason to celebrate this event. This event is akin to a funeral," said Mr. Adamov. He explained that Ukraine made the decision "too early, in a hurry and under pressure."

Although most of Europe and the world would disagree with him, those who depended on the plant for their jobs would not. President Kuchma went to visit those people and their families the day before the de-commissioning ceremony took place. He told the plant's workers and managers that he understands the bitter words he heard them speak during his daylong visit. However, he emphasized that, in the end, he still considered it his responsibility to make the right decision to take the third reactor offline forever.

"No matter what the critics say, Chornobyl could not continue to operate until April without extensive and costly technical maintenance," explained Mr. Kuchma.

He said he would take the Chornobyl workers under his patronage and offered personal assurances that "no one will be left jobless or uncared for."

The Chornobyl shutdown came less than four months before the 15th anniversary of the explosion, which sent a huge plume of radioactivity into the atmosphere over Ukraine and Belarus, and on to northern Europe.

The accident, the result of a failed experiment to squeeze more energy production out of the reactor that occurred about 1 a.m. on April 26, 1986, not only exposed the dangers of nuclear energy in general, but the state of Soviet engineering, as well as the regime's twisted policy of secrecy at all costs.

Even after the blast had scattered tons of nuclear materials in a 10-kilometer periphery and while uncontrolled flames continued to send radioactive smoke into the atmosphere for the next several days, the government kept absolutely mum and allowed for May Day parades and celebrations to proceed in the nearby city of Prypiat and in the capital city of Kyiv, about two hours' drive south of the plant.

It was not until a week later that the Soviet leadership admitted something had gone dangerously wrong at Chornobyl.

What went wrong, and everything that still must be done to right it, will not end with the de-commissioning of Chornobyl. Experts say that the territory and the fields immediately surrounding the nuclear power complex are unusable and uninhabitable for at least several thousand years.

Even in the near future there are the problems associated with rebuilding the crumbling sarcophagus over the destroyed No. 4 reactor, which will

cost $758 million, and the medical costs to treat the hundreds of thousands of current and future victims.

Just because the last working reactor is shut down does not mean that its nuclear fuel will no longer be a threat. Along with the 37 tons of melted nuclear materials and 63 tons of nuclear dust still contained within the sarcophagus, there is the matter of some 2,000 active nuclear fuel rods in the third reactor, which for technical reasons cannot be removed until 2008.

Helsinki Commission examines Ukraine 10 years after independence

May 20, 2001

by Yaro Bihun
Special to The Ukrainian Weekly

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe recently took a long, hard look at how democracy and human rights are developing in Ukraine 10 years after the country gained independence.

While the subject of the May 2 hearing of the so-called "Helsinki Commission" was broad – covering also the past and future of the U.S.-Ukrainian political, economic and assistance relationships – commission members focused especially on Ukraine's current political problems, including the so-called "tape scandal," which allegedly links President Leonid Kuchma to the murder of a young journalist, Heorhii Gongadze, as well as to some high-level corruption; the ouster of the Western-oriented, reformist Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko; and the perceived recent shift of Ukraine's strategic orientation from the West back to Moscow.

The discussion of these issues by a U.S. government body was seen to be important enough by Ukraine to have its position presented by President Kuchma's top national security advisor, Yevhen Marchuk – a last-minute upgrade from the originally scheduled appearance by Ukraine's ambassador to Washington.

And it was judged to be important enough by Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-Colo.), who scheduled the hearing at this time in the legislative calendar, despite the politically intense budget process evolving on Capitol Hill, and by five of his congressional colleagues who took the time from other hearings to participate in at least part of the hearing.

In addition to Mr. Marchuk, the panel heard from Jon Purnell, deputy special advisor to the U.S. secretary of state for the new independent states,

Freedom House President Adrian Karatnycky and Ariel Cohen of The Heritage Foundation. It was the first hearing in Congress devoted exclusively to Ukrainian issues in recent memory.

Sen. Campbell set the tone at the outset of the hearing, expressing the commission's concern about developments in Ukraine, including "pervasive high-level corruption," the Gongadze affair and other human rights problems.

"Given the importance of our relationship with Ukraine – and let there be no doubt that it is a very important relationship – the commission has become increasingly concerned about the direction in which Ukraine appears to be heading," he said.

The chairman's concern and assessment of the importance of the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship was echoed by his co-chairman, Rep. Christopher H. Smith.

"Despite the forces hostile to reform, it is clear that the United States must not abandon Ukraine," the New Jersey Republican said. "Whether through political support or through concrete assistance to strengthen democracy, it is incumbent upon us to work with the Ukrainian people so that the promise for a better future for which so many sacrifices were made will, at long last, become a reality."

Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), who chaired the Helsinki Commission in the late 1980s, spoke about the high hopes many people had for Ukraine when it became independent. Some of them were realized, he said, as evidenced by the dismantling of its nuclear arsenal, the way it treated its minorities and the constructive relations it built with neighboring states.

But he, too, expressed concern about recent developments, that, he said, "were only amplified by last week's dismissal of Prime Minister Yuschenko, a reformer who was not only the most trusted politician in Ukraine, but under whose stewardship Ukraine was enjoying economic growth for the first time in over a decade."

As the lead-off witness, the State Department's Mr. Purnell presented a subdued but diplomatic view of the situation in Ukraine in his testimony: "For now, I can say that the present situation is mixed, but that the potential is unlimited." And judging by headlines over the past few months, he added, "they have not been positive, and some of the news has been downright ugly."

He described the evolving events of the Gongadze-tape scandal, which developed further into a government crisis with opposition calls for the removal of the president. The crisis expanded further after the arrest of Vice Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the break-up of the reform-minded majority in the Verkhovna Rada and, ultimately, the no-confidence vote on April 26 that brought down the Yuschenko government.

"All of this is very disturbing, and the United States has urged Ukrainian authorities to deal effectively with these issues," Mr. Purnell said.

The State Department official said it was too early to assess the effect of Mr. Yuschenko's ouster. It will depend on the ability of the president, the Parliament and the new government to rebuild the political consensus that worked so well last year, he added.

In the area of human rights, Mr. Purnell said, the United States has "pulled no punches" in describing Ukraine's problems in such areas as media freedom and the independence of the judiciary.

"These facts, however, should not blind us to some equally valid general observations, such as that Ukraine has made a commitment to democracy and respect for human rights," he added, citing the sensitive treatment of its minorities, the holding of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, protection of religious freedom and the existence of a diverse press. "The problems concerning media freedom mar this last statement; they do not negate it," he said.

Mr. Purnell said that Ukraine faces some major challenges and that, as it takes the necessary steps, the United States and its European allies are prepared to assist "in a substantial way."

The appearance as a witness before the Helsinki Commission by such a high-ranking foreign government official as Mr. Marchuk was "unusual but not unprecedented," according to a commission source. The former head of the KGB in Ukraine, who served as prime minister for a year in the mid-1990s, dropped his opposition to President Kuchma's re-election and was subsequently appointed by him to the National Security and Defense Council.

Over the past nine years, Mr. Marchuk told the commission, "Ukraine has proven to the world community its ability to implement undertaken commitments and shown a consistency in realizing its non-bloc foreign policy course."

He cited as examples the elimination of its nuclear stockpile, its adherence to international arms control and non-proliferation regimes, and the closure of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.

In its foreign policy Ukraine remains oriented toward Europe, he said, noting that this position was restated by President Kuchma following the Yuschenko no-confidence vote. Ukraine cooperates with NATO and participates in its peacekeeping operations.

"We have demonstrated to the world that Ukraine is a predictable, consistent and responsible partner," he said. "We speak the same language with Moscow, Brussels and Washington. It is the language of our national interest."

He said the recent "activization" of Ukraine's high-level dialogue with Russia was the result of the necessity to solve some past and present "complex problems."

As for the recent tape scandal and the Gongadze affair, Mr. Marchuk said that they "complicated the political process" and "were used to instigate

the political crisis in Ukraine." But he pointed to a silver lining in the crisis: the existence of conflicts in a society, he said, is a "natural component of a complex process of the maturing of the young Ukrainian democracy."

The Ukrainian official stressed the continued importance of the U.S.-Ukraine relationship and called on the U.S. Congress to abandon the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which is holding back the development of full bilateral trade ties.

The commission's newest member, Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-Fla.), pressed Mr. Marchuk on why President Kuchma apparently would not support Prime Minister Yuschenko in his battle with the Verkhovna Rada.

Mr. Marchuk admitted that Mr. Yuschenko's ouster was a "bad event," but not necessarily a "tragedy." He said that the president did speak up for Mr. Yuschenko, albeit without success, and suggested that the prime minister's demise resulted more from his political inexperience, overconfidence and an inability to work together with the Parliament rather than a lack of presidential support.

Rep. Hastings said that he has always backed U.S. assistance to Ukraine, but he, too, is deeply troubled by the prevalent corruption and obstacles to foreign investment in Ukraine.

While corruption is known to exist at various levels in the United States, he said, it is not universally ignored here by the government, as it seems to be in Ukraine, where "certain things cannot happen ... but for certain officials knowing about them and failing to do anything about it, or knowing about it and participating, or knowing about it and not caring."

"You say that Ukraine has met certain standards for normal trade relations," he went on. "I say to you that if I had a million dollars to invest today – and I don't – I'm not so sure I would invest it in Ukraine, any more than I know doggone well I wouldn't invest it in the Congo, and I wouldn't invest it in Indonesia."

Also participating in the hearing were U.S. representatives Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.) and Zach Wamp (R-Tenn.).

Freedom House President Karatnycky, who in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine flatly stated that Ukraine has the worst reputation in the world today, added before the commission that "even the most neutral and objective observers would have to say that, in its first decade of independence, the state of freedom in Ukraine and Ukraine's record of progress toward a competitive market economy and an open, democratic society has been disappointing."

It is now widely believed that President Kuchma "sits at the top of a corrupt, perhaps criminal, structure of power," which he either directs or is unable to reform, Mr. Karatnycky said. And it was corruption that was behind the recent removal of the reformist prime minister, he said.

Mr. Yuschenko's re-assertion of control over the corruption-riddled ener-

gy sector resulted in an estimated annual loss of up to $2 billion of ill-gotten gains for a small group of "economic magnates." He explained that these magnates, who control political parties with more than a quarter of the seats in the Verkhovna Rada, broke away from the reform bloc in Parliament and sided with the Communist Party to topple Mr. Yuschenko.

Mr. Karatnycky pointed out that the Ukrainian system of government is full of contradictions, citing the example of the head of the government tax authority being allowed to continue as the head of a political party. This, he said, is not considered a conflict of interest under Ukrainian law.

Despite Mr. Kuchma's many well-deserved criticisms, Mr. Karatnycky said, the West should not mistake him for a tyrant, "a Mr. [Alyaksandr] Lukashenka." He stressed that there is a systemic problem in the government that places an "excessive concentration of power in the presidency."

Mr. Karatnycky also recommended that some way be found to bring back into the legal economy those who made large amounts of money in the early years of the gray market. Many of Ukraine's so-called oligarchs, who once were wedded to corruption, now thrive in the open market and could "be reconfigured," he said.

In conclusion, the Freedom House president stated that the billions of dollars of U.S. and other foreign aid to Ukraine "have not all been in vain."

Dr. Cohen, a research fellow with The Heritage Foundation, devoted some of his remarks to the mystery of the secret tapes that were reportedly made by a presidential bodyguard, Maj. Mykola Melnychenko, who has subsequently received asylum in the United States.

It is still not clear who was behind this extensive taping, he said. What is clear is that the Ukrainian presidency suffered a serious blow to its legitimacy, he explained.

"Ukraine as a nation has been weakened by all that," Dr. Cohen said. And, as the West has distanced itself from Ukraine, Kyiv "seems to be drifting into Russia's orbit," he added, noting that under Moscow's pressure President Kuchma fired pro-Western Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasyuk, slowed down its cooperation within the regional organization of non-Russian former Soviet republics called GUUAM and signed a number of bilateral military cooperation agreements.

Dr. Cohen suggested that the 1,000 hours of the secret Melnychenko tape recordings may contain "important information that goes beyond the Gongadze affair."

Sitting in the audience throughout the hearing was Myroslava Gongadze, Heorhii Gongadze's widow, and their two young daughters. Commenting on the hearing afterwards, she said it was important for Ukraine to have the world realize "how difficult the situation is in Ukraine."

"I hope that such things as this hearing will help bring about a change," she said.

ZARVANYTSIA, JULY 22-23, 2000: Some of the 750,000 who flocked to the shrine of the Mother of God of Zarvanytsia for a pilgrimage and the blessing of a new church on the site.

KYIV, JUNE 23, 2001: Pope John Paul II waves to onlookers as he leaves the Church of St. Nicholas at Askold's Tomb after praying before the icon of the Mother of God of Zarvanytsia during his historic visit to Ukraine.

KYIV, AUGUST 22, 2001: Seen outside the Parliament building on the day of a special ceremonial session of the Verkhovna Rada marking the 10th anniversary of Ukraine's independence are members of Parliament, past and present, President Leonid Kuchma, Prime Minister Anatolii Kinakh and special guests.

KYIV, AUGUST 24, 2001: During the parade marking the 10th anniversary of Ukraine's independence, sailors of Ukraine's naval forces march with their flag.

Kyiv undergoes remodeling on the eve of 10th anniversary celebrations

August 19, 2001

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV – Some are calling it the "new Kyiv." The city's mayor, Oleksander Omelchenko, has said it is the capital city moving into the 21st century. There are those Kyivans who are thrilled by the changes, while others are calling them a waste of money and materials in a country where many of the citizens continue to eek out survival.

Most city dwellers of this metropolis of more than 2.7 million are simply happy that all the construction and remodeling that has taken place over the last six months, and the associated road closures and traffic jams that have put the city into terminal gridlock, is drawing to a close as the city begins final preparations for the 10th anniversary celebrations of Ukraine's independence.

What seems to please Mayor Omelchenko most, given that he has proudly stated it several times over the last months, is that the various projects have proceeded without municipal or state funds. The mayor has explained that private concerns have either contributed or invested their own finances into both the private and public projects.

The city center has been most affected by the changes, especially the city's main thoroughfare, the Khreschatyk. The major cause of the disruption has been the six-month reconstruction of the city's central plaza, Independence Square, which lies at one end of the kilometer-long street, and summer-long development and street improvements at the other end, near the Bessarabian Market.

The main train station also has undergone an extensive facelift, as have many historic buildings in the downtown area, as well as parks and squares throughout the city.

Independence Square, which will be at the center of the 10th anniversary activities on August 24, will be completed in time, Mayor Omelchenko asserted on August 14, dispelling rumors to the contrary.

"Contrary to what some have said and what others would like to see, everything is on schedule and will be ready," said Mr. Omelchenko after completing a review of the area.

The square has been the center of controversy since the very beginning of the reconstruction project. Oppositionist politicians had laid plans to use the plaza for demonstrations and strikes against the administration of President Leonid Kuchma this past February, when the square was abruptly cordoned off and boarded up over their objections, with the official explanation being that preparatory work on the site was needed.

Soon after construction finally began in April, engineers found the remains of the ancient Liadski Gates of 11th century Kyivan Rus'. City engineers on a tight deadline and archaeologists bent on saving the remains found themselves at odds over how to proceed. The compromise that resulted – save the central portion of the gates, but destroy the outer extension and limit the excavation work for artifacts – satisfied no one.

That problem went away when two pylons that supported the remains, which had been dug out and were to be encased in glass for public viewing on the new square, collapsed at the end of June. The disaster, in which no one was hurt, was only one of several accidents or unfortunate incidents that marred construction. Another major setback occurred when a 60-ton platform that supported a monument to Archangel Michael, the only artifice that was to remain from the original square, collapsed after a sand slide and resulted in the injury of two workers.

It will take at least another half-year before the central plaza is finished. A major feature of the new square will be an extensive labyrinth of shops, as well as a parking structure located below its surface. For Independence Day, however, Mayor Omelchenko assured that the surface of the square, if not the subterranean structure, would be entirely completed.

On Independence Day city dwellers and guests will see a radically different square. An extensive roof-like glass structure will cover the north side of the square, which is bisected by the Khreschatyk, while a 60-foot high gilded monument will dominate the south side. Adorning the top of the memorial will be a golden-winged woman representing 10 years of Ukrainian independence. President Kuchma will unveil the symbol of Ukrainian independence on August 23, during ceremonies marking the opening of the square.

Construction at the other end of the Khreschatyk, where workers are building a second underground mall while also renovating a historic piece of architecture that has lain dormant for the last decade, will be sufficiently completed to allow for the normal movement of traffic, much to the relief of shop owners. The area, located just west of the Khreschatyk, along Chervonoarmiyska Street, is considered the city's main shopping district. Construction has severely limited pedestrian and auto access to many shops since the end of spring. The street will reopen on August 22.

Rail traffic also has been affected by the changes taking place in the Ukrainian capital city. Since May the city's main train station has undergone major renovations, which have made the building nearly inaccessible for the

last two months. Passengers often had to gather near blackboards as station workers scribbled train delays or new schedules on them, which forced passengers to search for ways to get around the closed building to board trains.

By the week prior to the beginning of Independence Day celebrations, the work was coming to a close. The building's exterior facade was complete, and workers were attaching large marble plates that would constitute the interior walls. Contractors had brought in artisans from Poland and Hungary at higher rates of pay to make sure the work proceeded smoothly and the deadline for completion was met. The train station was still not ready but, according to one worker, would be finished on time.

"It is going to take a full effort, but you can be sure that it will at least look complete by next week," said Petro Riznyk, a bricklayer from Rivne working at the train station site. He had traveled to Kyiv in June after hearing that workers were needed to complete the various projects. Although Mr. Riznyk would not state what he was making, he said that some workers were taking in up to $40 a day, an exorbitant amount of money in the current Ukrainian economy, but obviously not in the new Kyiv.

INTERVIEW: An academic and professional viewpoint of Ukraine

August 19, August 26 and September 2, 2001 (Abridged)

by Andrew Nynka

On August 24, 1991, for the first time in decades, Ukraine stepped onto the international stage, striving to create its own independent future. Its rich natural resources and optimistic diaspora fueled a belief that Ukraine was moving towards a strong footing among European circles. On the other hand, academics and observers were very well aware of the leadership's inexperience, a frail and crumbling infrastructure, Soviet mentality and rampant corruption, and many feared Ukraine would quickly become yet another bloody Eastern European uncertainty.

Ten years have proven neither forecast quite right. Although questions regarding lack of transparency, corruption and rights abuses still exist, Ukraine has managed to keep a state of relative peace among its citizens and has accomplished the first democratic transfer of power from its first president to its second.

At this critical crossroads 10 years after its proclamation of independence, Ukraine must evaluate and learn from its past, as this past is not only a chronology of events but an indicator of the future. Furthermore, it is a text-

book to decipher and learn from as Ukraine works toward developing and strengthening its democracy.

The following interviews constitute a three-part series conducted with experts and scholars in the United States and Canada to reflect upon Ukraine's 10-year development and its outlook for the future.

* * *

***OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY** is a staff advisor for the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission).*

Can you comment on the expectations of the diaspora regarding the possibilities of Ukrainian independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s?

The achievement of independence for Ukraine was a major historical event – both for Ukraine and for Europe, the importance of which cannot be overstated. And it was an unexpected event – it's now easy to forget that most people, including Ukrainian Americans, never thought that independence would occur in their lifetimes. If someone, say, in 1987 or even 1988, would have said that Ukraine will be independent by the end of 1991, he or she would have been given looks of skepticism, or worse. Yet Ukraine did achieve that independence, and it has lasted now for 10 years. With respect to diaspora expectations, there was a fairly high degree of understandable euphoria, especially among the post-war political emigration. Although many understood that change would not be automatic, my recollection is that most expected there would be more progress than has been the case, especially on issues such as the use of the Ukrainian language.

Decades of Soviet rule have left a consequential, and in most instances, negative mark on the mentality of the Ukrainian people. Has Ukraine made any significant reform-oriented achievements in the last 10 years to overcome that mentality?

The very fact of the achievement of independence is to be celebrated and so is the fact that this independence has lasted. In the early 1990s there were some analysts who predicted Ukraine would break apart and made much of the differences between eastern and western Ukraine. Yet Ukraine has survived. And there have been real achievements over the last 10 years, including internal stability, the development of state institutions, tolerance for its national minorities, constructive relations with its neighbors, cooperation with the West, especially the United States, and the recent positive economic indicators, including the recent rise in GNP and industrial production. And anyone who hasn't seen Kyiv in the last 10 years will most certainly be in for

a pleasant surprise. On the other hand, despite the progress, the quality of Ukraine's independence leaves something to be desired.

Ukraine has had 10 years now to find its place – whether in the European community, the eastern/Russian embrace or some combination of the two. Do you see any significant factors that may lead you to believe Ukraine has found its place in the foreign context?

I find it hard to have a great deal of enthusiasm for the 10th anniversary celebrations partly because Ukraine has not yet found its place. Yes, everyone recognizes that the deep scars left by Soviet Communist oppression will take time to heal and change does not take place overnight. But what troubles me is the direction in which Ukraine has been heading in the last few years. Problems with media freedoms, murdered journalists whose investigations raise serious concerns about the rule of law and democratic processes in Ukraine, and pervasive corruption at high levels, among other problems, raise profound questions about whether Ukrainian authorities are truly committed to becoming part of the Euro-Atlantic community, despite their rhetoric. There's a saying, "if you talk the talk, you have to walk the walk." Ukraine still very much needs to "walk the walk."

Ukraine has faced many uncertainties and challenges as it struggles with democratic reforms (the lack of rule of law, corruption, issues with transparency, mafia/oligarchic control of media, etc.). In your opinion, which of these has troubled Ukraine the most?

While all of these have a destructive influence on Ukraine, the effect of large-scale corruption is especially corrosive, and I believe it has made Ukraine vulnerable to the influence of Russia. In fact, I think that those – a minority – who argue against criticizing Ukraine because somehow this will push Ukraine in the direction of Russia have the argument backward. Moreover, I doubt if those who gave up their lives over the centuries for the ideal of an independent Ukraine would have wanted to see an independent Ukraine that benefits a small corrupt elite at the expense of the overwhelming majority of the population and keeps Ukraine from realizing its full economic potential. The behavior of the oligarchs and their patrons in Ukraine – who have thwarted economic reforms and a favorable climate for most foreign investment – indicates little in common with Ukraine's stated European aspirations.

The United States recognizes Ukraine as a pivotal and strategic player in bridging the gap between Eastern Europe and the West. How have U.S.-Ukrainian relations changed since Ukraine became independent?

I would say that there has been a radical transformation – first and foremost, by the very fact that prior to independence Ukraine, for all practical purposes, was a colony isolated from the world. It had no attributes of a state. As a result, there was relatively little knowledge about Ukraine, not only among the general public, but even within the U.S. government and among the so-called "foreign policy establishment." Within the U.S. government Ukraine tended to come up mostly through our concerns about human rights issues and Captive Nations annual proclamations. I must note that prior to independence the U.S. Congress was active on behalf of Ukrainian issues – human rights, Helsinki monitors and other political prisoners, defense of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church to a rather significant extent – something that I've found many political leaders in Ukraine aren't really aware of.

Following independence, the United States established relations with Ukraine as it would with any other "real" country. Moreover, there has been a significant evolution in understanding Ukraine, especially its geostrategic significance.

Immediately after independence, there was a tendency to see Ukraine through the prism of the nuclear disarmament issue, or through the prism of Russia, but this changed. Relations improved markedly in the mid-1990s and Ukraine became – and still remains – one of the United States largest recipients of bilateral assistance, and a cooperative and constructive relationship has emerged in the military, security, economic, cultural and other fields.

Now, everybody in government and the foreign policy establishment, except perhaps the most obtuse or stubbornly Russo-centric, understands that a genuinely independent, stable, democratic Ukraine is absolutely in U.S. and Western interests. Moreover, I think that the United States and Canada are definitely ahead of the Europeans (with the obvious exception of Poland and several other of Ukraine's neighbors) in understanding Ukraine's importance.

This is not to suggest, however, that there is not room for improvement on the part of the United States in forging a more coherent policy towards Ukraine.

There have been some setbacks in U.S.-Ukrainian relations of late. ... National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had exactly the right message during her recent visit to Kyiv, in saying that Ukraine's integration into Europe depends on democratic reforms, transparent probes into killings of journalists and fair elections, emphasizing that we'll be watching the Rada elections in 2002. ...

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Can you comment on your personal expectations, in August of 1991, for the newly emerged Ukraine? Did you believe Ukraine would be capable of standing on its own two feet or, as some have forecaste, be lucky to last through the year? How has it lived up to those expectations?

I think that all of us, in the diaspora in general and even those in academia and journalism, were optimistic at the start of Ukraine's independence. At the same time we have to remember that we did not expect Ukraine to become independent as quickly as it did. Most of us thought it would take several years for the Soviet Union to slowly disintegrate. The fact that independence landed in our lap was very surprising to all of us; nevertheless, we had highly romantic expectations of the country. One of the features that comes out in any academic study of Ukraine over the last 10 years is the degree to which we, both academics and diaspora, underestimated the legacy of Russian and Soviet rule in Ukraine.

This legacy is far deeper than any of us wanted to believe at the time and we can see this by the fact that events have moved far differently, far more slowly, and in the fact that, pretty much, the people running Ukraine today are not that different from the people who ran Ukraine in the late Soviet era. It's not surprising, therefore, that the mentality of many in the leadership hasn't changed substantially. ...

One has to look at the people who are in charge of Ukraine. They are part of the former Soviet Ukrainian elite who basically, in the late Brezhnev era, although still officially members of the Communist Party, unofficially laughed at the Communist Party. Hence, it was very easy for them to ditch the CP. They had a very nihilistic, cynical view of life, of the public at large and of events in general. What Ukraine has seen in the last 10 years is that this Soviet Ukrainian elite, which now turned into a sort of oligarchic elite that runs Ukraine, has been unable to formulate any ideology, any vision of what they are building both domestically and in the foreign policy arena.

Ukraine has had 10 years to show signs of progress – of moving along with policies to promote reform. In which general area do you believe Ukraine has had the least success?

I would say that probably the saddest aspect is in the arena of nation-building. The former Soviet Ukrainian elite and the current oligarchic elite don't really have a problem with the blue-and-yellow flag, the tryzub, or for that matter, [Mykhailo] Hrushevsky's historiography. On these points they're willing to defer to the national democrats because they don't really have any alternative. An independent state has to have its own symbols, but then again, it took 10 years, of course, to take the hammer and sickle off of the Ukrainian Parliament.

Can you comment on the development of the Ukrainian language?

This is something that is close to the heart of many people in the diaspora. It's rather a complex situation. Basically, the business elite in Ukraine is largely Russian-speaking, but the Kuchma elite understands the importance of language as a factor sustaining independence.

Ukraine has had a half-hearted commitment to language; it's not a commitment that we readily understand. One can see this if you go around Kyiv and look at the book fairs and see what's for sale. One should look at the media in particular, where there's been an explosion of Russian-language publications. It is not an anti-Ukrainian language policy like in Belarus, where the state is forcibly moving out the Belarusian language in favor of Russian. But neither is it a policy that encourages the Ukrainian language. And in that respect they are failing with the issue of language. It all goes back to a lack of any real program and vision for a Ukrainian state on the part of the current ruling elite.

Do you believe that sometime in the future, perhaps within the next five or 10 years, specifically referring to some of the new blocs forming such as Yulia Tymoshenko's or Viktor Yuschenko's blocs, Ukraine will develop a group of politicians that could ascend to the higher ranks and bring vision to Ukraine and create meaningful change?

... There are some key differences between the Yuschenko bloc and the current ruling elites. First of all, it's generational; there's no question that the current ruling elites, i.e. the de-ideologized ex-national Communists, have an inbred cynicism which stems from the Brezhnev era. At their stage in life to ditch communism was fine, but in return they wanted to be well-paid for it. Thus, they have an orientation that is basically schizophrenically divided as an economic and cultural orientation to the East (i.e., to Russia – culturally in terms of the Russian language and culture, and economically because that's where they can make short-term corrupt deals).

The orientation towards the West is for political and security issues because they need the West, particularly the United States and NATO, to support them geopoliticaly. So this kind of schizophrenic division is a reflection of the current people in power. But such people as the Tarasyuks and Yuschenkos who've traveled to the West, who've been trained in the West and who haven't been corrupted by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era are not inbred cynics. The latter have a different orientation, and for this they are seen as such a threat to the Kuchma elites. They are economically oriented to the West because they don't want short-term, corrupt economic gain; they want trans-

parent economic reform and Western, not Russian, investment. They are culturally oriented to the West. They speak the English language, they look to Western culture and civilization, they want to be seen as part of Europe.

The Kuchma elites can't decide whether they're part of Europe or part of Eurasia. And that's an important thing to grasp because the current elites talk about Ukraine's integration and return to Europe, but it's pure rhetoric meant to keep Russia at bay. ...

As regards Ukraine's involvement with Western institutions, do you see Ukraine leaning towards NATO? Do you see a spot for Ukraine in NATO?

No, only if the Yuschenko group becomes ascendant in Ukraine. The current elites in Ukraine used the NATO card, up until 1999, very effectively to force Russia to accept Ukraine's borders. It's not a coincidence that in May 1997 Boris Yeltsin came to Kyiv to sign a treaty with Ukraine and two months later Ukraine signed a charter with NATO. Nor is it a coincidence that in early 1999 both houses of the Russian Parliament ratified the Ukrainian treaty which basically sealed the question of the Ukrainian-Russian border and then Ukraine suddenly stopped talking about NATO membership. Subsequently, from 1999 Ukraine only talked about aspiring to the EU and no longer to NATO. So prior to 1999 Ukraine talked about integrating into trans-Atlantic and European structures, i.e., NATO and the EU, right? But from 1999 it only talks about joining European (i.e., EU) structures. So the NATO card was used very effectively to get Russia to recognize Ukraine's borders and it continues to be used now as part of this schizophrenic orientation I have talked about.

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How do you view the attainment of Ukrainian independence in the context of Ukrainian history?

We need to remember, first of all, that founding, creating and maintaining a state is a very tough job – a very difficult operation. The ability of a given nation to win and retain independence depends on whether the people of that nation themselves want to fight for it and achieve it. It also depends on historical circumstances that are beyond the control of a given nation. I feel that the Ukrainian declaration of independence, the referendum and the fact that Ukraine has survived as an independent state for 10 years is an

extraordinary accomplishment – an extraordinary achievement in itself.

Anybody who looks back at Ukrainian history should ask himself or herself when the last time was that a Ukrainian state existed uninterruptedly for 10 years with borders embracing, basically, all of the lands where Ukrainians lived. They should try to recall the last time when a Ukrainian state was at peace with all of its neighbors and had no civil war and no class conflict within. I don't think it would be very easy for anyone to quote an example from the past in the last 300 or 400 years when this was the case.

Regardless of other circumstances, the very job of creating a new state is an extremely difficult one, whether it was a state created after World War I or World War II or in Africa or Asia. From this point of view, considering under what terrible conditions the Ukrainian people have lived for generations, I think that the creation of Ukraine in 1991 as an independent state and its survival up to now is a monumental accomplishment with few precedents in Ukrainian history.

In the context of Eastern European history, how would you rate Ukraine's progress since gaining independence?

When I look at 1991 and the 10 years since, I first try to compare that period to the way Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union looked 10 years after the first world war. Let's start with 1921, when hostilities finally ended, the Soviet civil war ended, the revolution ended and the peace treaty was signed between Poland, Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia.

How did Eastern Europe, Ukraine, the USSR and Poland look in 1931? They were 10 years from the end of hostilities and revolution. You will discover that most of the countries in Eastern Europe were no longer democratic, if they ever had been, but were dictatorships. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania are examples. The Baltic states were not exactly democratic. Even Poland had a coup d'état in 1926, and around 1931 it was already quite an authoritarian country. In the Soviet Union 10 years after 1921, in the early 1930s, you had collectivization under way and a turn to mass terror. It was shortly after political trials of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the economic situation was pretty bad.

Second, I look at Ukraine in comparison to other Eastern European countries in the last 10 or so years. We see that the other post-Soviet republics have not always done very well and, in fact, in many cases have done very badly. In this light, when you compare Ukraine with Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, and Yugoslavia and its successors, as well as with the situation in Eastern Europe 10 years after the first world war, you see a remarkable achievement. Ukraine has survived and has avoided internal conflict between different regions, ethnic groups and religious groups, and has also avoided conflict with its neighbors. In fact, one of the great achieve-

ments, in my opinion, an achievement on a truly historical and monumental scale, is the presence of good relations with Poland.

How has the Ukrainian political leadership handled the new push for democratic reform since independence?

First of all, we have to remember that the people in charge of an independent Ukraine in 1991 were basically the people who represented the Soviet regime in Ukraine and, shall we say, converted themselves to the Ukrainian idea shortly before 1991 or even in the course of that year. They owed their careers in Kyiv to the fact that they were loyal servants of Moscow. It was quite an accomplishment for them to decide that from now on they would be serving Ukraine. What is very important here is that, unlike the leaders of past Communist countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic or Romania, people in charge of Ukraine at that time had to start taking lessons in Ukrainian. So they had to break with being Communist, and they had to learn to be Ukrainian.

In effect, Ukraine had a very tough job of moving toward independence and building a democratic, law-abiding state with people in charge who were not very qualified, to put it delicately. And there was no alternative group to replace them. So, from this point of view, to me as a historian, the fact that the leaders of the national democratic movement and the newly independent Ukrainian ex-Communists together managed to preserve the territorial integrity of Ukraine, to create a Ukrainian army, to create a Ukrainian diplomatic service, and to build up embassies and consulates in many countries of the world was a great accomplishment.

In order for Ukraine to progress and move along the road of Western-oriented reform, what fundamental first steps will it need to take to create lasting, effective change?

The essential needs for Ukraine and its people are to build a progressive, civilized, civil society. Ukraine has built a state in 10 years, but that state is very imperfect because the society is not strong enough and not independent enough to control that state. It is unable to watch over the politicians and to see to it that they do their job right. In order to do that you need to have grassroots democracy-building. It starts with various villages, towns, cities, groups, NGOs, student associations, farmers' groups, religious groups, etc. In order for a society to be successful, to be modern and to run well, people have to become organized. And that is the precondition. The coming decade, the decade that has already begun, should be a decade of organization at the grassroots level, and then at the regional and national levels.

In order to decide where to go, what to do domestically or where to go internationally, you need to have an informed public opinion. It is very

important to organize institutions of communications – the media. Ukraine needs to have a high-quality press. It needs to have well-informed, responsible, honest journalists. It needs TV, radio, newspapers and magazines. And one of the responsibilities of that kind of media structure should be to intelligently present to the people, to the citizens, the alternatives.

So, to return to it, one of the shortcomings of present-day Ukraine is the insufficient development of public discourse in the media and in academia. And when I say media, I mean both TV and print media. I think Ukraine is still insufficiently developed to create a group of people who would be analysts and commentators, people who would inform society, who would present alternatives, who would encourage discussion.

... I think one of the things the Soviets accomplished was to make many Ukrainians think that somehow Ukraine is an inferior country, that Ukrainians are incapable of doing anything right if left to themselves. I regard this idea – that the Ukrainians are "born losers" and will mess things up if if they are let free, and that therefore it is imperative for Russia to take care of them and watch over them so that they behave – as one of the most pernicious psychological legacies of Soviet, and also tsarist, rule over Ukraine. While one should be very critical of one's country and of one's own people, in cases when such criticism is justified, the tendency to characterize nations in sweeping terms, whether favorably or unfavorably, is dangerous. I am encouraged by the signs that especially the younger people regard it as a self-evident truth that Ukraine is – and should of course remain – an independent country. They are critical of lots of things they see around them; in most cases they are right. But it is possible for them to work for a better life and to believe that they will be able to succeed if they try hard enough, because they are able to draw on what has been accomplished by those who brought us August 24, 1991, and have kept the country going for 10 years.

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Ukraine has remained independent through its first decade and has established itself in the international arena. What must Ukraine now do in order to solidify its international presence and continue on the path of democratic reform?

The NGOs will certainly play a role. It's also important that Ukraine does not get too cut off from European structures, because Ukraine's ties

with the West are critical for the future of democracy. On a positive note, Ukraine definitely has a national presence now. Nation-building is probably the area that has had the most success. So I don't see any possibility of Ukraine moving into some sort of union with Russia like Belarus has. The population is generally dissatisfied, but at the same time I don't believe it's dissatisfied with the fact that it's part of Ukraine as opposed to the Soviet Union or a part of some great bloc. By the same token, Russia is sort of waiting in the wings to see what happens in Ukraine without getting too involved, probably because Russia has some different priorities at the present time. In that respect, I think that if Ukraine could develop better contacts with the West it could possibly aim, in five or 10 years, for associate membership in the European Union (EU). At the moment, Kuchma has given lip service to a lot of these changes without doing anything constructive, and the Europeans are quite upset with that and the more obvious infringements on human rights that have been taking place.

There was a point where, in the early 1990s, Europe realized that Ukraine would gain its independence. Was there any thought that Ukraine would not survive as an independent democracy?

There was a lot of speculation in the early 1990s that there would be all kinds of civil strife: problems in Crimea, Russians wanting to break away, etc. That side of Ukrainian development has just not happened, and I don't really think that the potential was there for it to happen either. There were one or two lunatics in Crimea – one thinks back to Meshkov. But on the whole I don't think there are many sources of civil strife in Ukraine. That's one big advantage of Ukrainian society today compared to some of the other republics. Even though the Russians represent quite a large group in Ukraine, about a fifth of the population, they're fairly well assimilated. I don't think they look at things in terms of "Russian," with the possible exception of Crimea, and certainly not in the Donbas region. I think that economic issues are the most important issue for Ukrainians.

I think it's fair to say that Europe's perception of Ukraine in the early 1990s was fairly negative and pessimistic. Do you see Ukraine making any progress in changing that perception, and where do you see Ukraine's future role in Europe?

The perception of Ukraine by Europe seems to have gone through a period of disillusionment. It was odd because in 1991 and 1992 it seemed to me that it was the United States that had the jaundiced view of Ukraine, and Europe had the optimistic one. Now it seems, at least until very recently, to have come full circle. The United States made a very conscious decision, under [President Bill] Clinton, to orient its foreign policy in that part of the

world around Ukraine and really regard Russia as the main problem. This situation has changed quite a bit. The fact that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is in power is having an enormous impact, because it has taken a lot of pressure off of Ukraine. Some of that pressure is back now, because Putin is a figure of great power, but he is also a much more subtle type of leader. He wants to centralize Russia and make it the dominant force in the region. And I think it will put a certain amount of pressure on Ukraine and its difficult geostrategic position in between the two powers (the West and Russia).

Has corruption reached its highest point or will we see a cleaner, more transparent Ukrainian elite?

It could still get worse. Corruption and bureaucracy are worse now than 10 years ago, and, in terms of the former Soviet republics, Ukraine is really up there with the best of them. Perhaps that was inevitable given the lack of a real, united opposition. I think the difficulty is that there is only one power group and it is monopolizing political life. There need to be more. So if there is going to be a change, it is going to have to come through the existing institutions, especially the Parliament, which has been changing. About six months ago there was clearly a majority of non-Communist support in the Parliament for the first time. But then it seemed to dissipate with the Gongadze scandal. The opposition would have to work through the Parliament and come up with some sort of unity on certain issues. Maybe they will have to infiltrate the left as well. I don't see the leftist groups as all anti-democratic, and I believe there are some people in the Socialist Party and other left-leaning parties that could be incorporated into a general unified movement.

As a historian who has spent time dealing with the nuclear energy industry, can you comment on the issue of Chornobyl and the reactor's recent closing?

This was a very important and strong move made by Ukraine. But, paradoxically, with the closure in Chornobyl, I think Ukraine has lost a little bit of its political clout with the West because that was always an issue that Ukraine could bring up. "We will close Chornobyl if you provide us with sufficient aid, credits or whatever," Ukraine could say. I think that it had to be closed, but it's left quite a mess behind for Ukraine. How to monitor the station; what to do with Slavutych; and how to reorient the energy industry with the loss of the Chornobyl reactor, which was once the largest nuclear power station, are all problems.

... I do think that there will be a reduction in both aid and attention to problems created by Chornobyl. It is unfortunate, because the problems today are probably greater then they were 15 years ago. And that's some-

thing that Ukraine is going to have to focus on and bring to the attention of the world in a different way. At the same time, nuclear power is still very important for Ukrainian energy. It would be in severe straits if all the nuclear power stations were suddenly closed down.

I don't think that the United States would stop aiding Ukraine, but I couldn't possibly predict what this current administration will do. I've tried to follow the events to see what direction it's taking, and I honestly can't tell. Although I don't think Ukraine will be forgotten, it is too important, on account of its position in Europe, to be neglected. That area – Poland, Ukraine and Belarus – is a very, very critical part of Europe, and I think it is likely to remain so.

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As a specialist and researcher in the field of Ukrainian affairs, what is your perspective on the progress Ukraine has made in its efforts at state- and nation-building from 1991 to the present?

I think it's more useful, more constructive, if we look at Ukraine in "big picture" terms. ... Ten years is not a long time, but people tend to forget the things that were happening in 1990 and 1991. If you recall, most observers, politicians and columnists were saying that such a place like Ukraine couldn't possibly exist. This was the view of the West, not to mention people and politicians in Moscow. If you remember, liberal individuals like [Anatolii] Sobchak, then Mayor of St. Petersburg, or [Sergei] Stankevich, then deputy mayor of Moscow, were basically treating the notion of an independent Ukraine as a joke. On the one hand as a joke and on the other hand as a sort of threat to the world. I remember very clearly, Sobchak, who is now deceased, saying if Ukraine is allowed to have an army and if it is allowed to be independent it will create some kind of third world war. These were well-respected people who, during the period of perestroika, were appearing on CNN almost every other day.

I remember President George Bush and his famous speech on August 1, 1991, in the Ukrainian Parliament in which he was essentially saying: Ukraine should not be independent because it cannot be independent. It would cause disastrous problems for other people, for humanity. Nobody, whether in Moscow,

Washington, or London, believed that this place was, number one, legitimate; and number two, [they believed] if it was independent, it shouldn't be.

I remember very clearly one of these think-tanks in Washington – one of these public policy places – actually suggesting that this would be a terrible calamity. They said the best thing the United States could do is to persuade the Ukrainians to voluntarily give away some of its territory, presumably Crimea or Donetsk, to Russia in order to avoid conflict.

It was also predicted that if this place, Ukraine, is allowed to exist we will have some kind of Rwanda situation – some kind of genocide against Russians.

If you look at Ukraine over the last 10 years you will find that it is one of the bright spots among the post-Soviet states. Let's compare Ukraine to its immediate neighbors. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka – a person who is recognized largely by most people in Europe as a dictator – has brought Belarus to the position of a pariah state in the middle of Europe. Moldova is a country where a large chunk of its territory has not been politically controlled by the capital.

Look at Russia. The coup attempt in August, the shelling of the Russian Parliament in October 1993, tanks in the streets, individuals like [Vladimir] Zhirinovsky claiming that Finland will be re-incorporated into Russia; the list of nonsense that's been going on in Russia, including the two wars in Chechnya, is long. You can look at problems regarding shooting, killing, enclaves and so on. Many of these areas are turning into dictatorships with one-man rule.

So, when you compare Ukraine to its "fraternal former Soviet republics," you have a pretty nice place.

Ukraine has accentuated a desire to build itself into the European framework. Do you believe that the European Union and NATO view this favorably?

What I find interesting here is that countries like Bulgaria and Romania, whose economies are, frankly, not very much better than Ukraine's, are being embraced by Brussels, by the European Union. They will eventually become members of NATO, and they may eventually also become members of the European Union, which shows to me that the Europeans, namely that those people who sit around those nice big tables in Brussels and make policy, don't consider Ukraine to be a European country.

I don't know if you saw in the New York Review of Books a couple of weeks ago, Timothy Garton Ash had an article about European issues in which he actually said that in a private conversation with one of the commissioners of the European Union, that individual – he didn't name him – said that there's no way Ukraine will ever become European. NATO's position will be that "oh yeah, we want a stable and secure Ukraine because it serves

our security interests," but the notion of Ukraine ever becoming European is considered to be absurd by people in Europe.

What degree of legitimacy do you see foreign heads of state giving Ukraine? Have they begun to treat Ukraine as a legitimate independent country?

I think it's fair to say that the United States and Canada remain the major supporters of Ukraine in spite of the difficulties there – in spite of the human rights violations. Traditionally a place like Germany, in terms of the European continent, is the leading supporter in terms of credits and economic aid. Traditionally places like Paris have always had a skeptical view of Ukraine. I think it's fair to say that France has not shown any major commitment to places other than Russia in the former Soviet Union. But again, this is anecdotal.

One can certainly distinguish between specific countries, and certainly the United States and Canada stand out above anyone else, and I think that the leadership in Kyiv should consider itself fortunate that this is the case. Even under this administration, although there will probably be cuts in foreign aid, I think the situation could have been much worse.

Can you comment on the development of the Ukrainian language over the course of the past 10 years, specifically with regard to any conflicts with the ingrained Russian language?

I think that a lot of the diaspora's perception and judgments on issues of language were misplaced. For some reason, even though I considered myself an unbiased researcher, well-educated and so on, it seems to me that subconsciously I bought into this idea that there was a Ukrainian-Russian friction in terms of language.

The point is that there really isn't. Whatever friction there is, is minimal, and if you look at the public opinion surveys you'll find, consistently over the last 10 years, that the overwhelming majority of people have no problems, certainly on an ethnic basis. They don't say that they've been discriminated against. The value that they assign to the language that people speak is minimal, minuscule and so on.

I think this is one of those disparities that you have between the diaspora and the situation there on the ground. Namely, that the language issue really is not much of an issue for the overwhelming majority of the people there.

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Is it safe to say that Ukrainian politicians, faced with the possibility of leading a country for the first time, were very timid and inexperienced in 1991?

I would say that would be a realistic assessment. They were truly afraid because, after all, there was still a powerful army and KGB control from Moscow, but people on the street were demonstrating outside of the Parliament shouting "Freedom for Ukraine, Freedom for Ukraine!" Thousands of people shouting. They closed the windows in the Parliament building, but the windows were vibrating at the time.

Now, having said that, of course after 1991 what you have is the representatives of Rukh in particular beginning to escalate their activities, but unfortunately they did not understand what politics is really all about. I cannot fault anybody really. While they had good intentions, they had no experience in political matters. The experience was in the hands of the members of the former Communist Party.

What were some of the expectations for the newly independent Ukrainian state?

The expectations were great that there would be a transformation from one system to another immediately and that Ukrainianism would assert itself. Well it didn't. And, objectively speaking, it couldn't because the Soviet Union had been working at its system very consistently for over 70 years and now all of the sudden to change things – well it would have taken more than a human effort. So, from my perspective, having spent a lot of time in Ukraine, I would say that, yes, the expectations of the idealists were not realized completely. Although not everything was destroyed by the Communists, despite their efforts to destroy the national idea.

When the pope went to Ukraine the reaction of the Ukrainian people was very positive, even in eastern Ukraine; even what the leaders of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church said in the newspapers was very positive. And that in itself is a very, very positive fact. But there is a revival, so I don't think you can negate everything.

Yes, there is a rather significant Russian influence, but it will take time for those who are under this influence to realize that they are citizens of Ukraine. What the Ukrainians need is not so much an ethnic national consciousness but the idea of political nationalism. Your origin should not be of concern – whether you are a Georgian like Heorhii Gongadze – you are a Ukrainian citizen. In any case, this also takes time. And they seem to be

going slowly in that direction. The problem is somewhat in the leadership camp. They seem to be ambivalent about which direction they want to take.

Has there been a change in the mentality of the public since 1991?

Well, there is a change among the younger people. I noticed that when I was teaching at universities and giving lectures. There are already elements of youthful exuberance and political consciousness. There are people who are already of a different mental framework. And it is important to note here that we cannot divide this along regional lines. Western Ukraine was not so hot either, despite the fact that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was there for a long time, but even today western Ukraine has people left over from the same Soviet regime.

The expectations of an immediate national culture were unrealistic because the dominant culture was the Russian culture. Anybody educated or of some significance spoke Russian. People from a collective farm spoke Ukrainian. How do you change this mentality? It was not so long ago that one young lawyer here said: "What kind of language do we speak here at this gathering?" They replied: "You know, we are pro-Americans, we speak professional English." The person who replied is Ukrainian-born mind you. This kind of problem existed there, and it will take time before this fact changes.

The problem is that change should proceed from the center of the government. If Ukraine had different people at the top they would insist "that in my government, in my Cabinet, in my whatever, you speak the state language – the Ukrainian language;" if you go to the Ukrainian Parliament you speak the official language of the Ukrainian Parliament. But it will take a new generation to overcome these obstacles.

So what could one say happened over the last 10 years? Well, even the latest reports show a growth in Ukraine's economy. It is not reflected yet in the income of the people, but it takes time. We should understand Ukraine still has to retool its industries to serve consumers.

... There are a lot of problems, there is no doubt about it, but look at the issue of education. In the city of Kyiv for example, schools have been Ukrainianized to the point where I think that only 17 schools are left with the Russian language of instruction. That is a fantastic accomplishment for a city in which something like five, or thereabout, families spoke Ukrainian in 1905. There are things that have improved and yet there are still problems.

There are problems with the press, for example, as everybody knows, publication of books, etc., but these things are passing. In 10 years things have improved tremendously. Even the Ukrainian armed forces publish a journal called Ukrainian Army – perhaps the best military journal in Eastern Europe. So I am not enthusiastic, but in a guarded fashion I am optimistic that things

will improve with the passing years as the younger generation comes to power.

As far as the economic condition, you had people who lost a sense of private property. John Locke said that what constitutes an independent country of equals is their belief in the protection of life, liberty and property. Well, they lost that sense of property – individual property. In Soviet-era Ukraine you had collective farms and an industry – instead of being created to serve the needs of community, three-quarters of it was created to produce and serve the interests of the Soviet military machine. Even today this remains a problem.

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What progress, if any, has Ukraine made over the course of its first independent decade?

Well, the first point to be made is the fact that Ukraine exists as a relatively functioning state. That it is now in its second year of some significant economic upturn, the fact that it is at peace with its neighbors and the fact that it is, in terms of inter-ethnic relations, at harmony at home suggests that a lot has been accomplished. It is very true that many people regarded the possibility of Ukrainian statehood with skepticism. They thought that there would be an early move towards the Commonwealth of Independent States, and I think it is to the credit of the leaders of Ukraine, both in terms of opposition and civil society, and also government leaders, that they steered a course that built statehood. And that is an immense accomplishment and cannot be denigrated or denied.

At the same time, I think it is very clear that Ukraine's evolution, economically and politically, has been distorted by the definite emergence of very high levels of political and economic corruption, by patterns of semi-authoritarian behavior at the top echelon of its leadership.

Yes, a journalist can be killed under very suspicious circumstances, but what this does is it brings greater international attention, greater public scrutiny domestically and greater examination of the types of issues that this man was addressing in his life. It seems to me that in the Gongadze case we have an embodiment of two co-existing Ukraines.

One is the democratic, open and tolerant Ukraine in which there are more and more Ukrainian citizens, particularly in the younger generations, who believe society has to be governed by the same open rules they see in Western Europe, the United States or even in Central Europe, in places like

Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic.

The other Ukraine has people enmeshed in this more corrupt system who want to keep things in the dark, who want to know what other people are doing to discover their wrongdoings, the corruption and the malfeasance which is part of the current Ukraine.

It seems to me that you're dealing with a quasi-authoritarian president who has limits on how he can function and behave. You have a fairly active civil society, particularly in the center, in Kyiv, where a lot of the politics is shaped. You have economic growth with some new pluralistic economic forces, and you have economic players who are not playing by the old corrupt rules, who are making money the old-fashioned way – they're earning it.

Are the citizens of Ukraine, the general population, passive about what's happening to Ukraine? And, if that is the case, how do you break that mentality – break the citizens' Soviet mentality?

In order to encourage its citizens, Ukraine must look after economic growth, the creation of a bigger middle class, ensuring that its citizens do not have to worry about the next week's paycheck – Ukraine must first solve these issues. If the patterns of economic growth are sustained I think that Ukraine's society will become more interested. Once this begins you will see more interest groups developing to sustain that pattern of growth.

Secondly, I think that we've seen a change in Ukrainian politics. Although you still have – and I think this is the biggest obstacle that continues in Ukraine – the fact that about 25 to 35 percent of the electorate always cast votes for an irrelevant opposition party that, in the Parliament and even in presidential politics, makes it very difficult to shape a broad coalition so long as this irrelevant Communist Party exists. The reason being that it siphons off protest votes and opposition votes from people who are legitimately unhappy with the situation. It puts them in a direction which is so unconstructive that neither the oligarchic pro-presidential groups nor the anti-presidential reformer groups can be in a stable bloc or coalition.

There is some attrition of the Communist vote – it's a generational thing. It's also very important that you have such factors as [Oleksander] Moroz and [Yulia] Tymoshenko – two structures around which radical opposition sentiments have an electoral expression which is outside that of the Communists or some ultra-nationalist or extremist party. The development of a normal left and a normal right in Ukraine, which I think we are beginning to see, suggests that maybe that deadlock will be broken. In Ukraine you will have normal civic activism, people preparing and people basically focusing on electoral politics, the use of the media, normal civic activism. Some of this is beginning in Ukraine and, as the economic turnaround takes hold, you will see more of it in the future.

In general, what are some of the differences in Ukraine between now and five years ago?

Well, I think you have a much better probing media. You have some substantial land reform and some sense of direct ownership or direct responsibility which has made the agri-business/food-processing sectors much more potentially efficient and independent of their old subsidy orientation, a very different civil and civic society with a practical understanding of the craft of building a modern political system, a substantial amount of sophistication in civil society. You now have ministers and individuals who've worked in government and Parliament who understand the types of reforms and structures that are necessary in order to implement and promote change. You now also have the experience of two years of economic growth so that you don't have the kind of intense skepticism that greeted the past economic reform package five years ago.

ESSAYS: What Ukraine's independence means to me

August 19, 2001

PARSIPPANY, N.J. – The Ukrainian National Association sponsored an essay contest in celebration of the 10th anniversary of Ukraine's independence. The contest, whose theme was "What the Independence of Ukraine Means to Me," was open to high school and college students, and essays were to be written in either Ukrainian or English.

First prize was shared by Laura Fulmes, 16, a student at Holy Name High School in Cleveland, who submitted a Ukrainian-language essay, and Anne Maziak, 19, of Bloomfield Hills, Mich., a student at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, who wrote in English. Peter Steciuk, 20, of Convent Station, N.J., a student at Harvard University, won second prize. Third prize was awarded to Bohdan Kedyulych, 21, of Bethlehem, Pa., a student at Northampton Community College, who wrote in Ukrainian.

Following are the best English-language essays.

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by Anne Sophia Maziak

I was only 9 years old when it happened, but there's no way I could forget August 24, 1991. For the first time in over seven decades Ukraine was pronounced a free country! A nation in its own right, Ukraine was no longer tied to the Soviet empire, to "Mother Russia," or to communism. Imagine the celebration that went on that day! My family heard the news over a Ukrainian

radio program, and The Ukrainian Weekly and Svoboda proclaimed the news to all. Talk of the fall of the Russian empire and the newly freed countries abounded. And well it should have! The implications of this day and the following months were enormous.

Being only 9 years old, I did not understand everything that went into that day of rejoicing, but now, on the celebration of a decade of Ukrainian independence, I can look back with knowledge and understand how very much that day would come to mean to me.

The biggest part of my life is my Ukrainian culture. From the earliest part of my life, my parents stressed how important it was to know my culture and roots. Now I need no encouragement in celebrating my heritage; I love it and would never be able to turn away from it. As a result of Ukraine's independence, I believe that Ukraine as a whole is due much more respect than it has been shown in the past, as do its history, its art, its traditions and its beauty. The haunting beauty of "Ivan Kupalo," the delicate designs of a "pysanka," and the mighty power of "Volodymyr Velykyi," now more than ever, deserve to be noticed by the world. Indeed, interest has piqued in Ukraine, and people are more aware of the country, its culture and its dealings.

However, simply because Ukraine has secured its independence from Russia over the past 10 years does not mean that Ukrainians can stop worrying about their country. On the contrary, now is the time to personally seize control and take the initiative to promote Ukraine's issues. For a Ukrainian in the United States or in another foreign country, this means keeping informed about political and cultural issues, this means being active in Ukrainian organizations, this means raising the next generation with knowledge of their roots, this means showing support for her country and, foremost, this means proudly proclaiming her love for Ukraine and by example encouraging others to do so. This is how I show my own love for my country and my pride in being a child of an independent Ukraine.

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by Peter Steciuk

When Ukraine declared its independence, three generations of my family shared in the happiness of the occasion, united by a sense of pride and thankfulness. Our estranged homeland, our fatherland, had finally become a free and independent nation. Only now, 10 years later, do I realize that we did not share a common experience on that August day.

When I was 10, I merely borrowed my parents' identity. But at age 20 this is no longer possible. My parents and grandparents all emigrated from Ukraine, while I have never left the American continent. They vividly remember their journeys to the new land, while I have never known any other. As wartime refugees, it is easier for them than for me to say what independence means. Sadly, for years I mistook their identity for my own,

not able to tell the difference.

My parents and grandparents were Ukrainian, but I was only of Ukrainian descent. Learning to speak the language and memorizing a few poems is a start, but identity must be a conscious choice. Just as my parents could not become Americans until they resolved to do so, I cannot become a true Ukrainian until I do the same. Only then can I ever truly share in the pride of Ukrainian independence or the pain of its problems.

Ironically, the presence of an independent Ukrainian state has shown me the extent to which I have not made this choice. Opening the front page of Svoboda sometimes makes me feel guilty. I am embarrassed to acknowledge how unfamiliar I am with the people, places and events that shape the modern Ukrainian world. Had Ukraine remained the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it would have been all too easy to yearn for independence with no real knowledge of the modern entity. An independent Ukraine presents us with the homeland that we longed for, yet Ukrainian news seems so distant and foreign. I feel even more ashamed when I think of all the times I refused to speak Ukrainian at home and all the copies of The Ukrainian Weekly and Svoboda that had gone unread.

I realize now that when Ukraine declared independence, I could not share in my parents' experience because I did not understand the events. Ukrainian independence can mean little until it ceases to exist only as an abstract idea. Thankfully, a person's identity is not set in stone. There is still time to make my parents' experience of Ukrainian independence my own. But this time it will be genuine and personal because it will be my choice. Although I can never be Ukrainian in the same way as someone raised in Ukraine, I am Ukrainian. I am beginning to bridge the gap between myself and my heritage. I intend to visit the country I have only read about in books. As a Ukrainian, I will be able to share in the dreams and disappointments of an independent Ukraine.

Kyiv students provide perspective on Ukrainian independence

August 26, 2001

by Iryna Lawrin
and Liuda Liulko

Ten years ago they were kids and probably not fully aware of what was happening or what it meant when Ukraine declared independence on August 24, 1991. Today they are university students, some of them attending the best universities the country has to offer. In the last 10 years, as they have grown to

adulthood, they have watched the country fight to overcome economic malaise and to develop a democratic, civil society based on the rule of law. It has been difficult for society as a whole and undoubtedly for many of these students.

We thought it would be interesting to ask them their impressions of 10 years of Ukrainian independence. We put two questions to them: First, what are your impressions of 10 years of independence in general? And second, what specific incident or event over the last 10 years sticks in your mind? Here are their responses.

Volodymyr Havrylov, 20, Kyiv, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy: Independence is a normal process for any state. My attitude is totally positive, and I believe it is a very natural process and a logical one, too.

Around the time independence was declared I spent a lot of time in western Ukraine, and I remember large meetings of people who wanted independence and the huge spiritual uplift felt by the people. This was probably the brightest moment – the most notable moment of all that is tied to independence. This is most likely because then there were romantic expectations, and now there is merely the plain everyday drudgery, and that is never a bright spot.

Olena Khazinova, 17, Kyiv, National University of Culture and the Arts: [An independent Ukraine] is better than belonging to the USSR. It is better that our country is independent, although while we are independent we are still too dependent on Russia and on other countries.

The fact that everything in Kyiv is being reconstructed and remodeled; the digs that are taking place; that everything is becoming better, more like Europe – that is my biggest impression.

Petro Horshkov, 21, Kyiv, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy: My attitude towards independence is positive, of course, because this is my country. But we have had many wasted chances, back since the very beginning in 1991-1992. The problem is that nothing was changed to the very root. When the same people hold the same positions, only having changed the color of their stripes, nothing can or will get better.

My biggest impression is the construction in the capital. Kyiv is being rebuilt. There are also the presidential elections. But I can't tell you which ranks first [in importance] and which is second, because the elections didn't change anything for the better.

Mykhailo Lukashuk, 17, Kyiv, Kyiv National Avionics University: Independence is a nice thing. People are satisfied because we strove for it for many years. We wanted it for many years. Everything is

being rebuilt. It's okay that we have problems; it's not all that bad. But now unemployment is falling, construction is booming and jobs are being created. Finally people have a little money in their pockets, and that is good.

Independence is a good thing. It's good that it happened for both the young and the old. Everything is getting better.

Yurii Zhukov, 23, National Medical University: I am indifferent to Ukrainian independence. I believe that all the [construction] work that is currently under way smacks of grandiosity and nothing else.

Oleksandra, 17, Kyiv, Kyiv Polytechnical University: I think that independence is a good thing, although I have yet to feel what it truly means. But I have felt the deep economic crisis of the 10 years of independence. Things are beginning to get better, however, and I think everything will be okay.

My single strongest memory is of the terrible traffic jams in Kyiv this past summer as the mayor rebuilt the city. They say that thanks to the renovation work, however, in the future there will be absolutely no traffic jams.

Oksana, 18, National University of Consumer Technology: It is better to be independent, as a single unitary state. As for what lasting images I have, I always remember the athletes and musicians who perform at various international events and give a positive image of Ukraine.

Anastasia Makeyeva, 18, Dnipropetrovsk, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy: I will list those events I believe would be most often mentioned [in regard to events that left lasting impressions]: the visit by President Bill Clinton to Ukraine; the visit by the pope of Rome to Ukraine; and the visit of Sting [the rock musician].

The visits epitomize and personify in some way three differing aspects of society: culture, religion and politics. The unifying aspect here is that the visits by the three were examples of the much-liberalized mindset of society, at least on the surface.

And, of course, independence was that starting point from which the progressiveness and the changes in our society began. Thus far it has been difficult.

For me, for example, before independence was finally achieved, I had a very idealized vision of what that meant. I am from the eastern oblasts, and a different attitude exists there, a different atmosphere than in Kyiv. When I moved here I realized that I had too many expectations. Regardless of the problems that exist, created by us, a beginning has sprouted and it is not a bad one.

Ukrainian American students' perspective on independence

August 26, 2001

by Andrew Olesnycky

I was 9 years old when Ukraine declared independence. That made me old enough to understand how much the event meant to those I loved, but naive enough to think that we were celebrating an end to the problems of our troubled homeland.

Of course, at the time I believed I understood the implications of freedom. The issue seemed simple: we were a prosperous country made poor by Soviet usurpers; freedom would instantly bring back our prosperity, culture and worldwide respectability. I, who imagined the leaders of the old regime shamefully riding their tanks back to Moscow in the tradition of the Soviet war parade, would years later painfully discover that the Communist Party still holds considerable clout in Ukraine, and that at one point more than a third of its citizens favored reuniting with Russia.

I also assumed that the people of Ukraine would be as nationalistic as our grandparents were. I didn't understand that the residue of communism, like the Russian language, couldn't be easily wiped clean from the Ukrainian psyche.

As Ukraine faced the necessary tribulations that come with starting a government from scratch, my generation was left to wrestle with the sobering realization that the Ukraine we'd have the chance to visit in the coming years wouldn't be the perfect, mythical land we'd heard about as children.

For some of us this learning experience culminated in a visit to Ukraine. While the child in us wondered whether we'd be seeing any Kozaky, the adult in us gazed at the Soviet radio-jamming towers and struggled to communicate with those in Kyiv who could speak only Russian.

Some young Ukrainian Americans have distanced themselves from the ancestral homeland that now feels foreign to them, though many are doing what they can to help create a renaissance of Ukrainian prosperity and culture.

But today, Ukrainian nationalism requires more than wearing an anti-Communist T-shirt. Without an imperialist power to oppose, political activism is much more complex, involving more thought and research.

The following are excerpts from conversations with my peers about how the youths of the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States and Canada have responded to the evolution of Ukraine since its inception as a modern free state on August 24, 1991.

Damian Hornich, 21, Hamilton, Ontario: When Ukraine was under the USSR, the diaspora had a clear-cut, tangible goal: to free our nation from communism. Now that Ukraine is free, some of the youth of the diaspora have become less nationalistic, thinking that there's nothing left to fight for, but a lot of us are excited at the new opportunities to be active in Ukraine.

I think that in North America Ukrainian society pushes our youth more toward Ukrainian cultural expression rather than political activism. It seems that we're more interested in maintaining our heritage than planning for the future.

I've definitely become more nationalistic since independence because, besides getting older, I've also met people from Ukraine and heard their stories, getting insight into what it is like in Ukraine. Getting to know them is an inspiration because it brings me closer to what is happening overseas, raising both my awareness and national pride.

North American youth will be most likely to help Ukraine if they visit and actually experience what's going on there. I admire the Jewish community for organizing trips that allow their youth to see the current problems in their country, putting all the history they learned into perspective. If we spend some time in Ukraine and make more of an effort to interact with new Ukrainian immigrants, we'll gain more of the tools we need to solve Ukraine's current problems.

Paul Farmiga, 20, Clifton, N.J.: Before Ukrainian independence, the USSR was, in some respects, a crutch. If we in the diaspora were upset with the state of affairs in Ukraine, we always had someone to blame. Now we realize that bashing the USSR won't lead to progress. Instead, we need to help our country succeed. And the young Ukrainians in the diaspora need to do all they can to help.

There are young people in the diaspora working hard to protect Ukraine's future, but a lot of us are comfortable here overseas. A lot of us are happy to just sit for four hours on Saturday morning at a Ukrainian school. I think we're not as active as we could be.

I've been to Ukrainian fund-raisers where a dozen youths show up even though many more were expected. However, if it's a social function, you'll have 200 young people show up, with less of the young Ukrainian community missing the event. Much of our activity in the Ukrainian community is done for our own enjoyment. After all, we're young and don't see any particular emergency to go out of our way to help Ukraine.

Roman Holowinsky, 22, New Brunswick, N.J.: A lot of our generation is complacent or uninterested in helping Ukraine. Without having lived through the tougher moments in Ukrainian history, we don't fully appreciate Ukraine's independence and consequently are less interested in the cur-

rent situation in Ukraine. Maybe as we get older we'll want to revert to our roots, but in general we've lived an easy life. Our grandparents set up organizations like the UNA [Ukrainian National Association] and the UFA [Ukrainian Fraternal Association], and built the Ukrainian resorts. We were born into the Ukrainian culture without having to work to develop it. When I was the president of the Rutgers Ukrainian Club, it was pretty clear that a lot of people my age weren't concerned with Ukrainian politics. It's hard to get people active for a cause that they're not passionate about.

But finding ways to get involved with Ukraine can be confusing to our generation. Never having lived in Ukraine and with only a superficial knowledge of Ukrainian politics and lifestyles, there seems to be very little we can do from the outside. I have the heart to help Ukraine in a significant way, but I feel that I don't have the means to do something that will have a lasting positive effect.

What young Ukrainian Americans who are daunted by the challenges in helping Ukraine should do is start helping the established organizations based in the U.S. and Canada. Organizations like the CCRF [Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund] are working hands-on with people in Ukraine, helping them get to the point where they won't need any outside help. Once Ukraine is in better shape, it will be easier for us to get involved on a more personal level.

Yarema Belej, 20, Toronto, Ontario: Our generation is going to grow up with a free Ukraine, as opposed to our parents and grandparents who grew up with the promise of a free Ukraine. I think how that will affect us is yet to be seen.

The young Ukrainians in North America want to help Ukraine, but we're going to have to learn to do it differently than how it was done before independence. Right now there are few examples to follow in how to effectively aid Ukraine's growth. Our generation is going to have to find out what works in Ukraine.

In the future, we're going to be involved more with development. We've been somewhat active with Ukraine thus far, but we'll help even more so in the future once things in Ukraine get sorted out. It will take time for Ukraine to move away from the effects of communism. Once they do that, it will be easier for us to help.

Not that we should keep our hands off Ukraine for a few generations, but until Ukraine has rid itself of the remnants of communism, I don't think we can expect to see real results. It's only been 10 years since independence; historically speaking, that's very little time in the evolution of a country.

Christina Baranetsky, 19, Short Hills, N.J.: Before independence it seemed like everyone in the Ukrainian American diaspora was fighting for Ukraine's freedom. Now it seems that the younger generation isn't as worried and thinks that, because Ukraine has made it 10 years, it will develop just fine on its own. But it's not fair to say that people have completely stopped helping;

I know a few people our age who are volunteering in Ukraine this summer.

I think our generation must pay more attention to current events in Ukraine and try our hardest to visit. If we're uninformed about Ukraine, the only frame of reference we have is what we learned about Ukrainian history. Visiting Ukraine can tell us what the real problems are and what we can do to help them, but most importantly it would inspire us to get involved.

As we lose people from our grandparents' generation, we're bound to lose some of the motivation to help Ukraine, because they are the ones with first-hand experiences in Ukraine. They don't love Ukraine because they were taught to love it in Plast or Ukrainian school; they love it because they grew up there. To make sure that activism doesn't die out in the American diaspora, our generation needs to gain its own first-hand experiences in Ukraine, finding causes that we're passionate about.

Christian Koschil, 20, Torrance, Calif.: As a 10-year-old watching broadcasts of Ukraine's declaration of independence, I expected a quick and complete return to the strong and glorious Ukraine that I had learned about from my elders. But, as I grew older, I spoke to people who had visited and saw how long it was taking to make small political changes. Then, as a teen, I was forced to make a very grown-up realization: a modern Ukraine wouldn't be the same place I had read about in my Ukrainian schoolbook.

Now I feel out of touch with modern Ukraine. The Ukrainian people have been through such a different experience than what we've had in the United States. The youth of the American diaspora are happy that Ukraine is free, but we're unsure of what to do about it. We don't really know where the country is headed, and we're not sure about our future role.

Also, the idea of nationalism, which was so clear during the time of Russian occupation, has become very blurry in the eyes of Ukrainian American youth. It was much easier just to oppose the Communists.

Ukraine celebrates 10th anniversary of its independence

September 2, 2001

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

KYIV – For a 10th anniversary birthday bash, one day is not enough. Ukraine decided it needed a week to celebrate, and then did so with a flourish. The culmination came on August 24, when nearly 50,000 residents of

Kyiv came out onto the capital city's main thoroughfare, the Khreschatyk, on a sunny, late summer day to view the largest military parade in the country's decade of existence.

Three foreign leaders – Russian President Vladimir Putin, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski – stood on the reviewing stand alongside Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma and much of the country's government and legislative leadership. Also on hand were representative delegations from several other countries, including Canada, the United States, China and Chile, as Ukraine first put its military hardware on display and then the talents of its youth. The show was a striking exhibition of what ostensibly assures security now and what will secure its existence in the future.

Minister of Defense Oleksander Kuzmuk gave the single address of the celebration, a short presentation in which he underscored the current readiness of Ukraine's military force after the completion of extensive organizational restructuring, which was followed by the national anthem, the religious hymn "Bozhe Velykyi Yedynyi" and the release of hundreds of white doves into the bright blue sky.

After that came the goose-stepping soldiers in sharp military dress – more than 4,000 in all from the various branches of the armed forces, law enforcement agencies and many of the military academies and lyceums. The hardware followed, some 300 pieces, led by armored personnel carriers and U.S.-donated Hummers. After that, 10 of Ukraine's state-of-the-art main battle tanks, T-84s, which the country claims are on par with any similar piece of machinery in the West, rumbled down the Khreschatyk in a cloud of diesel smoke. Long-barrelled howitzers and thin-nosed Zenit series anti-ballistic missiles on carriers brought up the rear.

The first part of the two-and-a-half hour show concluded with a flyover of 42 various Ukrainian aircraft, including a short aerial exercise of MiG-29 fighter jets by the Sokil aerial exhibition squadron and the appearance of the world's two largest airplanes, the AN-124 Ruslan and the AN-225 Mria. The finale included a daytime fireworks display, during which five Ukrainian blue-yellow standards appeared from a burst of pyrotechnics and floated downwards under miniature parachutes.

Singers on parade floats, dancers and colorful pageantry came next, with the spotlight on youngsters, before Ukrainian Olympic champions carrying a huge blue-yellow banner and para-Olympic athletes along with more youngsters, these from the various athletic clubs and sports federations of Ukraine, completed the spectacle with a gymnastics display before the reviewing stand.

Increasingly larger crowds, which reached more than half a million, according to police estimates, filled the city center as the day continued, culminating in a series of rock and pop concerts throughout the city in the early evening hours and a huge fireworks salute to end the day's events.

For Ukrainians the party officially began the previous Saturday, August 18, when the Third World Forum of Ukrainians opened, and ended on Sunday, August 26, when the last concert on Kyiv's European Square ended in the evening.

By August 25 celebrations had hit such a crescendo that the sale of hard liquor was banned in the city center until after the nightly concerts were over at about 10 p.m. Law enforcement officials, however, reported no serious problems with crowd control and even noted a reduction in crime during the four days that Ukrainians officially had off from work.

Not everything was all-out partying, however. There were also solemn commemorations, official celebrations and much wreath-laying, along with the opening of the city's revamped Independence Square and the introduction of a new 62-meter column, atop which stands what state officials hope will be Ukraine's lady liberty.

In one of the week's highlights, Kyiv city officials, led by Mayor Oleksander Omelchenko – whose stature as a person who gets things done continued to grow with this latest success – presented the bleached concrete and granite plaza, that stands at the very heart of the city to Kyiv residents and the Ukrainian nation on August 23, with a colorful show that included huge balloon arrangements and an effective daytime fireworks display. The center of attention was the gilded female figure, in a green patina holding a guelder rose (kalyna) above her head, perched atop the 62-meter granite column that dominates the square.

President Kuchma, who attended the ceremony along with President Kwasniewski of Poland and an entourage of Ukrainian government officials, said in a short speech that he hoped that 10, 20 and even 100 years from now the statue would come to symbolize Ukrainian independence, democracy and liberty.

"This monument and this renewed square, which carries the hallowed name 'Independence,' must carry with it other symbols – liberty, faith and beauty, respect for human intelligence and human toil," stated Mr. Kuchma.

The president also said he would like the figure to represent the unity of the various ethnic and religious groups in Ukraine.

It was an event-filled day for the president, beginning with a moleben at St. Sophia Sobor in the heart of Kyiv, which was attended by representatives of all the major religious confessions of the country. There the president, Prime Minister Anatolii Kinakh and Verkhovna Rada Chairman Ivan Pliusch lit prayer candles for the country.

Then Mr. Kuchma traveled to the St. Volodymyr the Great Monument, overlooking the Dnipro River, for another prayer service before moving on to memorials to Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's bard, and Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the president of its first republic, as well as to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, where he laid wreaths.

After the afternoon appearance at the opening of Independence Square, the president was off to a jubilee concert at the Ukraina Palace of Culture (Palats Ukrainy) concert hall, along with Presidents Kwasniewski, Putin and Trajkovski. Mr. Kuchma was the single speaker before the beginning of the multi-media show. He gave a lengthy 50-minute discourse on Ukraine's accomplishments of the last 10 years and a delineation of what still needs to be done.

The president said that, in terms of its importance to the Ukrainian nation, the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine passed on August 24, 1991, could be compared to the christening of Kyivan Rus' in 988. He said that Ukrainian independence is "irreversible" and called the 10th anniversary "the end of the first and most difficult stage."

The previous day, in another highlight of the week's commemorations, the same members of the Verkhovna Rada who had carried the large Ukrainian flag into the session hall 10 years ago, when the Parliament voted to proclaim Ukraine's independence and to leave the Soviet Union, re-enacted the historic event to mighty applause during a ceremonial session of the Verkhovna Rada.

A large portion of the Kyiv diplomatic corps, along with most of the past and present members of the Parliament, as well as President Kuchma, Prime Minister Kinakh and his Cabinet, and Supreme Court and Constitutional Court judges, were on hand to view the proceedings, which included an address by Chairman Pliusch.

The session also included the reading of a proclamation by National Deputy Ihor Yukhnovsky from the Verkhovna Rada to the parliaments of the world in which the Ukrainian legislature pledged to continue the development of parliamentarism and democracy in the country.

Embassies in Ukraine share their thoughts on the first decade

September 2, 2001

by Roman Woronowycz
Kyiv Press Bureau

To round out our comprehensive coverage of the celebration of Ukraine's 10th anniversary, The Ukrainian Weekly decided to turn to the diplomatic community in Kyiv. We contacted six foreign embassies in Kyiv whose countries have close relations with Ukraine – Belarus, Canada, Germany, Poland, Russia and the United States – to request their thoughts on 10 years of Ukrainian independence.

The specific questions posed to the ambassadors were: In your estimation, how has your country's position vis-à-vis Ukraine changed over the past 10 years? How do you see relations developing further between your country and Ukraine?

Not all the ambassadors responded directly, two gave answers through subordinates, and only the Embassy of Russia failed to provide any response. Initially, a representative of the Russian Embassy told The Weekly that Ambassador Viktor Chernomyrdin was in Moscow. In later attempts to reach the ambassador we were simply informed that he was busy and not available for comment.

Following are the responses of five embassies.

Ambassadorial Aide Valerii Baranovskyi of the Republic of Belarus: Ukraine and Belarus were among the first to recognize one another's independence and to develop diplomatic relations, which have since developed very dynamically. There have been 69 international and intergovernmental accords signed between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus.

Among the fundamental documents that establish our relationship and our economic cooperation are the Agreement on Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus, and the Agreement between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus on Economic Cooperation for the years 1999-2008. There also are intergovernmental agreements on free trade, on stimulating investment and on military-technical cooperation.

In the 1995-2001 timeframe there were 14 meetings between Presidents Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine and Alyaksandr Lukashenka of the Republic of Belarus. In 2001 the president of Ukraine visited the Republic of Belarus twice, and the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs once each.

The various ministers and heads of governmental departments of Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus are in constant contact. We also have a very active Ukrainian-Belarusian inter-governmental commission on economic and trade cooperation, which has met officially six times.

Relations between Belarus and Ukraine can and should develop only for the better, as should be the case between brotherly Slavic neighbors. We have many common and interesting projects, which when implemented will benefit both countries. We have many common interests in the international arena and much in common in our cultural life.

The last 10 years have included events of great importance that have changed the political map of the world. In this time the countries and circumstances under which we live have changed. The developmental tendencies of Ukraine in the last decade of the 20th century are similar to those of the rest of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

As regards Ukraine, of primary importance is that it became an indepen-

dent country, which develops its own foreign policies and takes an active part in international organizations. Ukraine is actively building a fully democratic civil society. The country is developing legislation that meets international norms.

The president of Ukraine and the government are working purposefully to ensure the needs of society. This is a difficult task, without a doubt, with many obstacles.

However, we, its closest neighbors and friends, believe that Ukraine will overcome temporary difficulties and will very soon become the most prosperous country of the region.

Ambassador Designate Andrew Robinson of Canada: Since 1991, when Canada was the first Western country to recognize Ukraine's independence, the two countries have continued to develop a strong and productive relationship. As Ukraine grows increasingly confident in its independence, the strengths of its people and its manifold resources, reinforces its prospects for economic growth, and takes advantage of opportunities to participate in regional and international initiatives and organizations, the relations between our two countries will continue to grow and strengthen.

Canada is interested first and foremost in the development of a healthy, economically prosperous and democratic Ukraine. Our bilateral relations continue to be directed to furthering this goal. In this regard, our technical cooperation program, manifested in many forms and economic sectors, plays a positive role in encouraging these welcome developments. Ukraine's economic growth of the past year, as well as its prospects for this and the next year, create new opportunities for partnership and trade. These will only be enhanced by continued attention to developing the rule of law, transparency and the promotion of conditions favorable to foreign investment.

Canada believes that a vital and independent Ukraine has a critical role to play on the regional and international stages. In this respect, we are particularly pleased to see Ukraine take an active part in the United Nations through its current membership in the Security Council, and by its continuing participation in the U.N.'s global peacekeeping operations. Ukraine's constructive and close cooperation with NATO also is warmly welcomed by Canada. Developing Ukraine's international and multilateral role will mean new opportunities for Canadian-Ukrainian cooperation. Our partnership is driven by a special dynamic of friendship and shared history, which will ensure its strength and success.

Ambassador Ditmar Schtuedemann of the Federal Republic of Germany: The Federal Republic of Germany, without exaggeration, can be called one of those that aided in the birth of today's independent Ukrainian state. The change in relations between the East and the West at the end of

the 1980s, the center of which was the reunion of Germany, also opened the doors for Ukrainian independence. Germany has been present in Ukraine since the beginning of the new era – from 1989 when it established a general consulate, which became a full-fledged embassy at the beginning of 1992.

I would also like to recall again that after World War II many immigrants found temporary or long-term refuge in Germany and did much there to retain their personal Ukrainian origins.

The Federal Republic of Germany accompanied and supported contemporary Ukraine in its complicated path of transformation from the very beginning. It supported this with specific recommendations within the country – for instance a group of German economic consultants is doing wonderful work there – but also in contacts at the highest political levels and by working actively within the European Union and other international organizations to accommodate Ukraine's needs. Inasmuch as our own history is marked with many critical turning points, we understand well the special difficulties in the reorganization of the state and society that are taking place in Ukraine.

Our own history also showed us that reforms must begin and continue decisively, that indecision means a step backward, and that the principles of democracy, rule of law, transparency and civil society will either be realized in full or not at all. We wish Ukrainian political leaders additional courage, courage to confirm their European choice and more quickly complete necessary reforms. The citizens of the country will be grateful for this.

Chargé d'Affaires Wojczek Zajaczkowski of the Republic of Poland: In speaking of the relationship between Poland and Ukraine it must be said, first and foremost, that it is in regards to the existence of two independent countries. Until 1991 we did not have the abilities to develop relations with a free and independent Ukraine. From the Polish point of view, the appearance of an independent Ukraine on the map of Europe is one of the most important events of the 20th century.

I believe that earlier, when one spoke of Poles and Ukrainians, historical themes dominated: Volyn, Akcja Wisla and even more distant historical events. No one considered how Ukraine and Poland would live alongside one another at the end of the 20th century.

When an independent Ukrainian state appeared, many people in Poland asked the question: How can it be – how will we be able to live with this country, which was not on the map earlier and about which many stereotypes existed in Poland, a country with which many were altogether unfamiliar? What type of domestic and foreign policies would it pursue?

But I believe that rather quickly after Ukraine's independence Poles came to understand that [the country] is one of Poland's best neighbors.

I believe this portrays fully the context of the changes that have taken

place in the last 10 years: the initial reservations and unfamiliarity with this full partner, which changed into unbridled confidence and the development of relations in practically all spheres.

Ambassador Carlos Pascual of the United States: I think that the relationship between the United States and Ukraine has evolved over the years and that it will continue to evolve, particularly as Ukraine's own policies change and evolve. But I also believe that there continues to be a consistent vision of this relationship: a Ukraine that is a part of Europe that is whole and free and at peace, a Europe that shares with the United States the common values of a democratic society and a market-oriented economy.

Ten years ago Ukraine made a choice for independence and sovereignty, and Ukrainians declared their hopes for integration into Europe. Ukraine has made progress in the difficult tasks of building a new state and a new society. Today's Ukraine is still not what all Ukrainians hope it would be. Much remains to be done to complete and consolidate economic reform, and to guarantee democratic institutions and individual rights. The United States continues to work with Ukraine on these difficult issues and to urge Ukraine's leadership to make the choices that will bring about a stronger, more prosperous and more democratic Ukraine.

During the coming months Ukraine has another historic opportunity to demonstrate that it is moving in the right direction. Holding free and fair parliamentary and local elections will be a big step along this road, as will the transparent and conclusive resolution of the cases of the journalists [Heorhii] Gongadze and [Ihor] Aleksandrov. We hope that our relations with Ukraine, with its government and with its people, can continue to grow and develop. But this can happen only on the basis of Ukraine's forward movement on these important issues.

EDITORIAL

Celebrating the 10th

September 2, 2001

The gala celebrations in Kyiv of the 10th anniversary of Ukraine's independence assumed many forms: public and private, official and unofficial, those for the elite, those to which one had to have an official invitation...

Our focus in this piece is the truly public celebrations, the ones we witnessed on the streets of Ukraine's capital city as we opted to be "z narodom" – with the people. The centerpiece of those celebrations was independent Ukraine's largest military parade ever – with over 4,000 military personnel

and cadets marching and 300 military vehicles rumbling down the Khreschatyk, as well as a flyover of fighter jets, helicopters and the two largest cargo planes in the world. Yes, it was a military display that some might find reminiscent of Soviet times, but it was also a manifestation of pride in Ukraine and its potential in terms of its people and their talent.

To Ukraine's credit, the August 24 parade also celebrated the country's myriad ethnic groups and its folk ensembles, its athletes and its youth, as well as its history and culture. Perhaps one of the most inspiring moments of the parade was Lysenko's beautiful religious hymn, "Prayer for Ukraine" ("Bozhe Velykyi Yedynyi, nam Ukrainu khrany..." – lyrics by Konysky), whose strains were heard down the Khreschatyk at the start of the festivities that day.

The parade's onlookers included all segments of Ukrainian society, people of various ethnic origins and representatives of various Ukrainian groups from beyond the borders of Ukraine. Uniformed members of youth groups were present to watch the parade. Plast members from Ukraine and the United States, and other points abroad, mingled; a large contingent of SUMivtsi participating in a worldwide Zlet was in attendance. It was a day for all to celebrate.

The festivities on the Khreschatyk actually began with the official reopening on August 23 of Independence Square and the unveiling of a new monument, a 62-meter-high column topped by a somewhat mysterious woman. Just who she was, the public did not seem to know. Officially, however, the structure is known as the monument to Ukraine's independence. So be it. The celebrations continued the next day with more concerts and other events as the city center and, indeed, all parts of the city, were buzzing with people from near and far. The Ukrainian and Russian languages, among others, could be heard throughout, and Ukrainian citizens and guests of all backgrounds were seen proudly wearing blue-and-yellow neckerchiefs and headbands, and waving Ukrainian flags.

During these festive days the Khreschatyk was bedecked with colorful billboards that greeted the public and Ukraine: "Greetings on Independence Day," "On your holiday, dear Ukraine." Others exhorted the public, in poet Volodymyr Sosiura's words, to "Love Ukraine" – a patriotic poem for which the Soviets once had branded him as a "bourgeois nationalist."

Even commercial establishments got into the act. Perhaps most notable was the Reebok shop on the city's main boulevard which offered eloquent greetings on Independence Day to: "All those who are lucky to have been born Ukrainian, who learned at least a few new Ukrainian words during the last 10 years, who root for our team at the Olympics, who vote in the elections, who love the Carpathians, who believe that their future is here, who will never leave this land for the sake of illusory promises of the good life abroad, who are Ukrainian not only because of a stamp in a passport or even despite a stamp in a passport."

It was an inclusive and inspiring message marking the first decade of Ukraine's independence. "Mnohaya Lita, Ukraino!" And "Mnohaya Lita" to all your people, whoever and wherever they may be.

FACES AND PLACES

I believe in Ukraine

September 2, 2001

by Myron B. Kuropas

Ukraine lives! The nation-state established by the people of Ukraine has survived for 10 years – longer than at any time in history. This is truly a time to rejoice, to celebrate, to dance for joy, to sing and shout.

The dreams of thousands of diaspora Ukrainians were finally realized in August and December of 1991, when well over 90 percent of the people of Ukraine voted for independence. How delighted we all were to know that Ukraine finally had a government that was beholden to no foreign power – not Moscow, not Warsaw, not anyone.

The first few years of Ukrainian independence were exhilarating. The Communist Party was outlawed and it was as if the gates of hell were thrown open and heaven was around the corner. Ukrainians could travel freely. They could say what they wished, write what they wanted and read what they pleased. They could build churches and worship where and however their convictions dictated. The elixir of freedom was intoxicating, and we all had our fill after a long, long dry spell.

Our joy was not to last. Slowly, and almost imperceptibly, things began to change. Thanks to pressure from the West, the Communist Party was legalized. Ukrainians were informed that democracies should tolerate all political parties. Legalization allowed the same Communist thugs who oppressed the Ukrainian people during Soviet times to make a comeback. They allied themselves with criminals and charlatans. Soon the Communists were the major power in the Verkhovna Rada. Some elections were rigged. Some government officials proved to be swindlers, pirates, corrupt to the core. Honest presidential candidates met with unfortunate accidents and died.

Some journalists critical of the government were either murdered or simply disappeared. As crooked government officials and oligarchs built obscene new houses and dachas with stolen money, doctors, teachers, engineers and skilled workers weren't paid for months. Old people were swindled out of their apartments to make room for Ukraine's new criminal class. Confiscatory taxes were leveled against honest businessmen. Monies were

siphoned out of the economy and stashed in foreign bank accounts. Unemployment soared. Anyone who could, fled, and the population of Ukraine declined, along with the average life span.

We in the diaspora watched Ukraine's degradation with growing dismay. This couldn't be happening, we told ourselves. The people of Ukraine are like us. They're good people, religious people, hard-working people. Independence wasn't supposed to be like this.

How naive we were. We didn't realize that our vision of an independent Ukraine was different from the vision of Ukraine's bosses. We couldn't understand that their values, their aspirations, were different from ours. We yearned for freedom, justice and civility. They were driven by a lust for power.

Our disillusionment was soon followed by anger. We yearned to know what went wrong while fearing the worst. Things will get better, we rationalized. Ukraine cannot change overnight. Slowly and reluctantly, however, we began to confront reality. Gradually, and ever so hesitantly, we became openly critical of our beloved Ukraine – the same Ukraine we waited all of our lives to see independent.

"Give us time," replied officials in Ukraine. We held back again, fearful lest our condemnations hurt Ukraine's chances for Western assistance. But when life in Ukraine continued to decline, when the situation went from bad to worse, we became even more vocal. And this really angered certain officials over there. "How dare you? What right do you have to judge us? We don't need your advice," they responded.

The fact of the matter is that we in the diaspora not only have the right but the obligation to call attention to the outrages currently being perpetrated against the people of Ukraine.

Think about it. While many of Ukraine's present leaders were happily singing "The International," we in the diaspora were passionately proclaiming "Sche Ne Vmerla Ukraina." While they enthusiastically exhibited their hammer and sickle medals and banners, we proudly displayed the trident. They spoke Russian. We spoke Ukrainian. They destroyed churches. We built them. They waved the red-and-blue flag of Soviet Ukraine. We marched with blue-and-yellow flags. They celebrated the October Revolution. We commemorated the declarations of 1918 and 1941. They fought for a Marxist-Leninist world. We sent our sons and daughters to fight Communists in Korea and Vietnam. I ask you: Who has more of a moral right to speak out, Ukraine's present nomenklatura or us?

Complaining is not enough, however. We must continue to help Ukraine find its way. And we must maintain our faith, the same faith that sustained us in the past. We need to believe in Ukraine's future greatness.

I believe that someday Ukraine will be a nation of laws, not of oligarchs and petty bureaucrats more interested in their own personal aggrandizement than in the welfare of the people of Ukraine.

I believe that someday Ukraine will have a president who will preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, especially those provisions that call for freedom of speech and the press.

I believe that someday Ukraine will have a justice system that will provide equal protection for all, not just the rich and powerful.

I believe that Ukraine will one day establish an economic system predicated on natural and human resource development, free markets and honorable individual initiative.

I believe that the people of Ukraine will finally come to grips with their Soviet past, identify the most egregious crimes of the Soviet horror and punish the perpetrators.

I believe that the Orthodox people of Ukraine will forget their personal differences and ambitions, and unite into one powerful Ukrainian Orthodox Church. I also believe that all Ukrainians of faith – Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Jew and Muslim alike – will come to respect each other and realize that there is but one God.

I believe all this because it's true. Ukraine has a long history of survival against the greatest of odds. And things are better in Ukraine today than they were 10 years ago. They really are. I am convinced that the people of Ukraine will weather the present crisis and live to experience a glorious and fulfilling future. Slava Ukraini!

2001: THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Ukraine's foreign affairs: a sullied image's effects

January 6, 2002 (Abridged)

For Ukraine, 2001 should have been a year dedicated, first and foremost, to celebrating as the country marked its first decade as an independent state. The celebratory mood was marred, however, by controversy and intrigue surrounding the disappearance of an independent journalist in September 2000 and the appearance of secret recordings that implicated the Ukrainian president and top government officials in the affair.

The controversy known variously as "Gongadzegate" and "Tapegate" greatly influenced Ukraine's foreign affairs in 2001 and affected Ukraine's standing in the international community. The country was all but ostracized in the first half of the year. In fact, no Western leader visited Kyiv in 2001 until the last month of the year, when German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder paid a call after the scandals had quieted and, for all practical purposes, had become dormant.

Officials in Washington showed they were not going to ignore the affair in the first days of the new year. On January 10 Steven Sestanovich, special assistant to the U.S. secretary of state with responsibility for the former Soviet states, called for "a speedy and transparent investigation" into Heorhii Gongadze's apparent murder.

But the scandal went truly international on January 25 when the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) officially condemned the lack of freedom of expression in Ukraine and agreed to organize an independent investigation into certain aspects of the Gongadze affair. While PACE refrained from sanctioning Ukraine for its less than pristine human rights record of late, it voted to take responsibility for an independent analysis of the audiotapes allegedly recorded in the Ukrainian president's office and to give their source political asylum. ...

PACE again raised its collective voice regarding Ukraine on April 15 when it voted to recommend to its Committee of Ministers that it should suspend Ukraine's membership. While the action was never taken, the vote came after Hanne Severinsen, a PACE member and rapporteur on Ukraine, charged Kyiv with abuse of human and civil rights.

"It concerns misuse of authority, particularly oppression of freedom of speech and oppression of opposition," Ms. Severinsen told Radio Liberty, underscoring that the president of Ukraine was specifically responsible.

The next day the U.S. State Department announced that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service had granted political asylum to Myroslava Gongadze, the spouse of the murdered journalist, and their 3-year-old twin daughters, along with Maj. Mykola Melnychenko, the presidential bodyguard who allegedly recorded the president's conversations. ...

The pressure applied by the international community to resolve the murder slowly dissipated, even though as late as November 28 U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual claimed that, in the eyes of the United States, the Gongadze affair was not over and that Ukraine still had to resolve the case to clear the black mark from its record.

By the time of the visit of German Chancellor Schroeder to Kyiv on December 6, those types of remarks were becoming much less strident. At a press conference at the Mariinsky Palace Mr. Schroeder's reply to a question on Ukraine's human rights was taciturn and even accommodating.

While admitting that, "I don't think things are altogether good," he explained that "things have the possibility of improving." Mr. Schroeder also let it be known that Ukraine's international standing in the eyes of Germany was where it should be. "We not only do not have any problems in our relations, they are very good as well," stated Mr. Schroeder as a satisfied President Kuchma looked on.

While Western leaders were rare in Ukraine in 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin was there several times.

His most important appearance in the country came two days after some 5,000 demonstrators called for Mr. Kuchma's political head in Kyiv. Then Mr. Putin flew into the southern city of Dnipropetrovsk for a previously scheduled meeting with Mr. Kuchma in what many Western media outlets called a move to prop up the faltering Kuchma administration.

The two sides signed 16 assorted bilateral documents on closer economic and trade relations, the most important of which were deals on the joint development of military and space technology, including cooperation in research and development of joint missile production. The two countries also agreed to support each other in the modernization and upgrading of heavy machinery factories, many of which are directly connected to the military-industrial sector.

Finally, in a controversial agreement, Ukraine decided to reconnect to Russia's electric grid, which would give the energy-starved country access to Russian electricity generation. ...

The agreements reached during the Russian president's visit in many respects were but mere tiles in a mosaic of new cooperation between Kyiv and Moscow laid over the course of 2001 in political, military and economic relations – all part of a new foreign relations doctrine Ukraine had announced at the beginning of the year.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatolii Zlenko officially presented the new approach in a major policy address on February 4. He said Ukraine was moving into a more mature stage of its diplomatic relations and would place an accent on developing its "European characteristics" and promulgating the country's economic interests in its diplomatic efforts as "ambassadors of Ukrainian business."

He acknowledged, however, that a new pragmatic chapter in relations with Russia had opened and that bilateral cooperation had taken on a "realistic and practical meaning." He underscored that a policy of close-knit relations with Russia was not mutually exclusive with Ukraine's new pro-European policy. ...

Ukraine-Russia economic relations attained a new level of visibility on May 10 when President Putin announced that he had named former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, one of the most powerful figures in Russian politics and business over the past decade, as the new ambassador to Ukraine and his special envoy on economic and trade relations.

In announcing the move, President Putin said "We would have difficulty finding a person who better knows the state of bilateral relations between the two countries."

The business tycoon, who once headed the Russian natural gas monolith Gazprom and whose wife, it turned out, is Ukrainian, said that his top responsibility at the outset would be to resolve energy problems between the two countries.

However, many critics of the move in Ukraine feared the appointment of

a person of such stature and influence – and a personal friend of President Kuchma – was the beginning of Moscow's policy of strong economic influence over Ukraine. Some even called the move "the appointment of a new prime minister for Ukraine by President Putin." ...

Russian President Putin made another visit to Ukraine on July 28, as relations between him and President Kuchma deepened, to jointly open a restored Orthodox cathedral with President Kuchma in Khersonesos, the site of an ancient Greek colony on the southern tip of the Crimea Peninsula just outside Sevastopol, where it is said Grand Prince Volodymyr the Great was baptized in the 10th century.

The meeting was the second in a week between the two presidents, who had met in Sochi, Russia, only days before. That prompted a question as to why the two were meeting so often lately, to which the Russian president replied "We shall be meeting even more often."

The next day the two leaders were in Sevastopol, which both the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian naval forces call home, to mark Russia's Navy Day. The celebrations ended in controversy when Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov emphasized prior to his departure from Sevastopol that the city and the entire Crimean Peninsula are Russian territory and should be part of Russia proper.

Ambassador Chernomyrdin issued a critical response to Mr. Luzhkov's statement a few days later in which he called the Moscow mayor's words a violation of law.

Mr. Putin again visited Ukraine for the 10th anniversary celebrations of Ukrainian independence. He attended a gala concert with the Ukrainian president and watched a military parade in Kyiv from a reviewing stand on Independence Square, along with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski. ...

Ukraine was active in 2001 also in the United Nations, where it occupied a chair for a second and final year on the organization's Security Council as a non-permanent member.

Most notably, it called for a special emergency session of the Security Council on the day of the September 11 attack, which for security reasons was held outside the international organization's headquarters – at Ukraine's Mission to the U.N. The meeting resulted in the coordination of a U.N. response to the attack and a declaration by the Security Council.

During its two years as a part of the Security Council, Ukraine had led the effort to reform the U.N. body, including granting the Central European region another seat.

Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Minister Zlenko reasserted that goal during his address to the U.N. General Assembly on November 18. "We will consistently advocate the need to improve the Security Council's methods of work and to enlarge its membership. As a Central European nation Ukraine will actively

lobby for an additional seat on the council for the region," Mr. Zlenko stated.

Canada, a strategic partner and one of the first to formally exchange diplomatic notes with Ukraine when it did so on January 27, 1992, sent its foreign minister to Kyiv as the year ended – another sign that the West was reinvigorating its relations with Ukraine – to commemorate a decade of cooperation. Foreign Minister John Manley visited Kyiv on December 5 and met with Foreign Affairs Minister Zlenko and President Kuchma. The purpose of the trip, as Mr. Zlenko explained, was to enhance the special partnership between the two countries

"We've jointly come to the conclusion that the year 2002, the 10th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Canada, will mark a new stage in the further development of special relations," explained Mr. Zlenko, who emphasized the already close cultural relations between the two countries as a result of a large Ukrainian ethnic population that has existed in Canada for much of its 125 years of independence.

Mr. Manley said Ukraine must not be left behind Russia in the process of obtaining membership in the World Trade Organization and that Canada would continue to support its effort to gain membership. He emphasized, however, that Ukraine still had to complete more economic reforms and fulfill other conditions for entry.

Ukraine's relations with China showed warming in 2001 after Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Kyiv on July 20-21. He enlisted Ukraine's support for his country's opposition to the U.S. missile defense shield plans and preservation of the ABM treaty in a joint declaration of friendship and cooperation signed by the two sides. Presidents Jiang and Kuchma discussed a wide variety of issues in the political, social and economic realms, and agreed on an extradition treaty and an accord on cooperation in tourism.

Ukrainian experts noted that it was not a coincidence that Mr. Jiang made his visit – one stop on his tour of former Soviet republics – at the same time the United States was pressuring its partners to support the new missile defense shield.

U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stopped in Ukraine four days after the Chinese president's departure on her way to Russia. During meetings with President Kuchma and Prime Minister Kinakh in Kyiv, Dr. Rice praised Ukraine's recent economic achievements.

"I know that you have had a difficult time shepherding through the economic reforms that you are undertaking here in Ukraine," said Dr. Rice. "I am here to encourage you on behalf of President [George W.] Bush to continue to push forward all these reforms."

Dr. Rice said Ukraine needed to proceed with a "transparent" investigation into the death of Mr. Gongadze, the missing Internet journalist, and to conclude free and fair parliamentary elections in March 2002, which she said "would make a tremendous difference in Ukraine's standing in the world, to

the investment climate here and toward building a European vision that we all have for Ukraine." ...

The visit by Dr. Rice, the highest-ranking U.S. official to travel to Ukraine in 2001, was a part of continuing bilateral strategic relations between Washington and Kyiv, which also included FBI assistance in the Gongadze case, as well as the continued extension of financial aid and expert advice.

Part of that assistance has been directed at supporting Ukraine's effort to rid itself of its nuclear arsenal, a seven-year-long process that culminated in 2001 with the dismantling of the last TU-160 bombers and the destruction of the last SS-24 ICBM missile silos. Both projects were part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

The last TU-160 strategic bomber was de-commissioned at Pryluky Air Base on February 3, when a U.S.-made Caterpillar excavator fitted with a giant scissor-like tool snipped the nose cone and the tail of the last functioning TU-160 in Ukraine – during its time one of the most feared pieces in the Soviet military arsenal.

On October 30 came the end of another chapter of the Cold War, when the Bechtel Corp., in cooperation with the Ukrainian military, destroyed the last SS-24 ICBM missile silo located just outside the city of Pervomaisk in the Mykolaiv Oblast. ...

The United States also showed its support for a decision by the Verkhovna Rada to undertake radical land reform and the approval of a new Land Code on October 25 by announcing six days later that it would allot $14.5 million to Ukraine to hasten the process of land privatization and defray some of the costs. The money is expected to help about 1.8 million Ukrainians receive land certificates within a 24- to 27-month period.

However, not all was completely rosy in U.S.-Ukraine relations, particularly in the area of intellectual rights and audio/video recording piracy in Ukraine, an unresolved point of friction for several years that came to a head in 2001. In September Washington demanded that Ukraine do more to stop illegal piracy of music CDs and computer software or face U.S. sanctions in November if new laws weren't enacted. Washington then delayed the trade penalties by a month when it became apparent that new legislation was imminent.

Ukraine had been slowly moving to curb the bootleg market in high-tech audio technology for nearly a year, but the Parliament had been dragging its feet on new legislation, partly because of fears that their own bootlegged products would merely be replaced with Russian materials and partly because the political left did not feel a need to respond to U.S. demands.

A bill on the matter was voted down by the Verkhovna Rada on November 22, resulting in renewed threats from the U.S. to begin sanctions on December 1. The deadline was pushed back to December 12 after a version of a new bill passed initial review in the Parliament on November 29. After the Parliament failed, twice, to approve the bill on December 20, the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative announced that trade sanctions would be imposed on January 23, 2002.

During 2001 the United States continued to support the Kharkiv Initiative, a project developed to support the Kharkiv region after Ukraine agreed in 1999 not to supply Iran with large turbines for a nuclear power plant. The U.S. continued to promote business exchanges and support for local entrepreneurial activity.

The United States also supplied relief to the Transcarpathian region after floods devastated the area early in the spring.

Ukraine responded to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. by giving its full support to a global war against terrorism and becoming part of the alliance. President Kuchma, while indicating Ukrainian soldiers would not take part in ground action in Afghanistan after the suffering the Ukrainian SSR's soldiers endured during the Soviet-Afghan War, did, however, give permission for limited U.S. access to Ukrainian air space for transport of cargo.

Ukrainian citizens also expressed deep sympathy and support for the thousands who perished and for those who survived the World Trade Center and the Pentagon calamities by placing scores, if not hundreds, of flowers, bouquets and handwritten greetings before the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv in the days immediately following the tragedy.

The show of support continued with a requiem concert at the National Opera House in Kyiv held in accordance with Ukrainian tradition on the 40th day after the tragedy (October 22) and attended by U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual. The Odesa Philharmonic, conducted by American Earle Hobart, performed. Then on December 11, the 90th day since the terrorist act, the U.S. Embassy sponsored a memorial service at St. Alexander's Roman Catholic Cathedral in Kyiv that was attended by representatives of the international diplomatic community, Ukrainian government officials and Ukrainian citizens.

On the significance of 10 years

January 6, 2002

Ukraine's politicians were asked to comment on what they think is the greatest achievement of 10 years of Ukrainian independence. Following are some of the responses gathered by Roman Woronowycz of the Kyiv Press Bureau, with the assistance of Liuda Liulko.

Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of independent Ukraine: There is a country called Ukraine, and that is all that is important. We can discuss the details, and debate the negatives and positives, but nobody can disagree today with the fact that Ukraine is a country found on the map of

the world, a European country. Furthermore, in 10 years we have had the good fortune to have avoided foreign conflict and domestic strife. But I repeat, here the most important element remains that Ukraine exists.

Ivan Drach, a leader of Rukh in the years just before and after independence, head of the State Committee on Radio and Television: The biggest accomplishment? That the country has survived these 10 years. That is it. What else can there be?

National Deputy Les Taniuk, former stage director who was part of the Rukh movement from its beginnings: The main achievement was the end of the empire – the end of the Soviet Union. It was an achievement propelled by a desire for independence primarily on the part of Ukraine, the Baltic states and Georgia. It was a monumental historical moment. The second one is that Ukraine appeared on the European map, not through violent overthrow, but by a vote – a national referendum. And when we began to analyze that vote we saw that while more than 90 percent of ethnic Ukrainians voted for independence, 80 percent of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine did as well. And Jews were at about 90 percent in support, while Tatar support came out to some 96 percent. It turned out that not only did Ukrainians want out [of the Soviet Union], but Jews, Tatars, Russians and Germans did, too.

National Deputy Taras Chornovil, son of Vyacheslav Chornovil, the late leader of the Rukh Party: I would say the biggest achievement is the basic fact of independence, but I do not believe the independence we gained has been developed properly these past 10 years.

National Deputy Stepan Khmara, a leader of the opposition to President Leonid Kuchma: The positive aspect is that the international community de jure has recognized Ukraine as an independent state for 10 years. This has huge historical implications. But independence needs to be filled with content. Much still needs to be done so that Ukraine gets that leadership which will make it what it deserves to be.

Former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko: The most important is that Ukraine is a country on the map of the world. It is a known entity. I understand the pessimism that is evident in the country. But remember, 10 years is absolutely a kid's age. It is a young country. That does not mean, however, that the leadership can use that as an excuse for certain failures. On the other hand, a lot has been accomplished. It is just that a lot still needs to be done.

Levko Lukianenko, chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party, former Soviet political prisoner, former national deputy, former

ambassador to Canada: The main thing is that Ukraine has established itself legally. It has also accomplished many things: it created a government system, a court system, a legislative system and a Constitutional Court.

Petro Symonenko, chairman of the Communist Party of Ukraine: Of course there are achievements. The gross domestic product has fallen by two times. The number of heads of cattle on Ukrainian farms has fallen by two-thirds. Industrial output is down by 15 percent to 20 percent. The average pay for a worker is $50 U.S. and for a pensioner a whopping $20 per month. Our government is considered the most corrupt in Europe and the world. These are unique achievements that we should be proud of as we move toward Europe.

2001: THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Ukrainian Churches: papal visit tops the news

January 6, 2002 (Abridged)

Religious activity in Ukraine came to a historic peak this year when the country's Greek-Catholic faithful, long persecuted under Soviet rule, welcomed the head of the Catholic Church and the successor to St. Peter on ancient Rus' soil. The holy father's pilgrimage, which roused strong opposition from some Orthodox cirlces, fulfilled a long-held dream of both the Ukrainian faithful and the Catholic primate to openly and jointly concelebrate Eastern rite liturgy.

For five days between June 23 and 27, Pope John Paul II, the leader of nearly 1 billion faithful of the Catholic Church, visited his 6-million-strong flock in Ukraine in a trip that, in the end, surpassed all expectations. It left an indelible mark on the millions who came out to see him, as well as on his relations with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that has been in communion with the Vatican See for over 400 years.

It was the 94th official foreign journey in the 24 years of the papacy of the Polish holy father, but one that his personal secretary called "a long-held dream," one that he had talked about for "11, 12, even 14 years."

Nearly 3 million people, the faithful and the curious, saw the aging and frail pontiff during a youth rally and at four divine liturgies, two in Kyiv and two in Lviv – celebrated in the Latin and Byzantine rites. People came from all over the world: Ukrainians from Australia, Canada and the United States, along with hundreds of thousands of Poles and thousands of Belarusians and Russians, Germans, Hungarians, Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks, and two Congolese who happened to have been in Kyiv at the time.

In many ways it was a trip home. Although Pope John Paul II was not

born in Ukraine, his Ukrainian mother was born outside of Drohobych. And while this was his first trip to Ukraine as the head of the Catholic Church, he had spent time in the western part of the country in his youth and had been stationed there during his military service.

Attendance was low at the two divine liturgies offered during Pope John Paul II's stay in Kyiv because, not only was the weather threatening, but people were put off by the tight security and a belief that more of the same would make it difficult to get to the Chaika Aerodrome. The distance to the aerodrome, located eight miles from the city center, also did not help.

There were bright spots, however – first and foremost at the meeting of the Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, where the holy father was quite unexpectedly greeted with hugs and kisses by the leaders of two of three Orthodox confessions in Ukraine. Warm words by the chief rabbi of Kyiv and Ukraine and the head mufti of the Crimean Tatars gave further proof that it was only a minority of Ukraine's confessions that opposed the pope's journey to Ukraine.

The papal visit caused a large wave of concern among certain Orthodox leaders. Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) requested that Pope John Paul II's trip to Ukraine be postponed in a written letter approved by the UOC-MP Holy Synod and Council of Bishops issued on January 22. Metropolitan Volodymyr said the current poor relations between Ukrainian Greek-Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox faithful in western Ukraine was the main reason he opposed the scheduled visit.

The letter threatened that, if the pope's visit went ahead as planned, Metropolitan Volodymyr and the 42 hierarchs of the UOC-MP, which are part of the Russian Orthodox Church and continue to claim millions of faithful in Ukraine, would not meet the holy father and none of their clergy would take part in the program of the visit. The letter seemed to be an attempt to forbid the pope to meet with anybody representing either of the two Ukrainian Orthodox Churches that do not recognize the Moscow Patriarch – and particularly named Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate, whom the Moscow Patriarchate had excommunicated.

The letter requesting that the pope should have "postponed" his visit to Ukraine seemed an unsuccessful attempt to disguise a deeper motive: the UOC-MP was notifying the pope that it does not want him in Ukraine at all, ever.

Reacting to these efforts by the UOC-MP to have the visit canceled, both the Ukrainian government and the Vatican issued strong statements on January 23 stating that such actions will not derail the pontiff's June trip. A Vatican spokesman that same day issued a statement reconfirming the pope's plans. The statement explained that the 86-year-old pontiff "will meet with Ukrainian Catholics, and he hopes that he will be able to promote a peaceful ecumenical dialogue in this country." It added, "The visit is to take

place as it was scheduled."

In protest against the papal visit some 250 faithful of the UOC-MP marched from the Monastery of the Caves in Kyiv, one of the holiest sites of Orthodoxy, to the Verkhovna Rada building on May 25, calling for the visit to be canceled.

The head of the UOC-MP also expressed concern that the pontiff would meet with the leaders of the two other Ukrainian Orthodox confessions, the UOC – Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, both of which the Moscow Church views as non-canonical.

On June 21, about 3,000 UOC-MP supporters again protested on the streets of Kyiv carrying placards proclaiming, "The pope is persona non-grata," "The pope is the forerunner of the anti-Christ" and "Orthodoxy or death." It was the fourth and largest protest by UOC-MP faithful preceding the holy father's visit.

During a press conference in Kyiv on May 29, the papal nuncio to Ukraine, Archbishop Nikola Eterovic, delineated a threefold mission for the pope's trip: to meet with the leadership of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which "has deep roots and is very dynamic," as the archbishop explained, and celebrate its successful revival after persecution under Soviet rule, to develop contacts with the Ukrainian government, and to continue a dialogue with the Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

Pope John Paul II won over many Kyivans with assertions that he recognizes the ancient city as the "cradle of Eastern Christianity," a statement he used during several appearances and one repeated by his press secretary during a meeting with journalists.

He also gave Ukrainian Greek-Catholics great pleasure by stopping at St. Nicholas Church, their tiny sanctuary located at the site of the Askold's Tomb shrine in Kyiv. There the pontiff prayed to the Mother of God of Zarvanytsia, whose icon had been brought to Kyiv from the tiny village in western Ukraine especially at the pope's request.

During his two and a half days in Kyiv, Pope John Paul II made quick and quiet side trips to honor those murdered by the two totalitarian regimes that scourged Ukraine through much of the 20th century.

On June 24 in the woods outside Bykivnia, a small village bordering Kyiv, the pope memorialized and paid tribute to the thousands of Ukrainian religious and political leaders, artists, writers and teachers who were executed there during Stalin's Great Terror.

On June 25 he paid his respects to the 32,000 Jews massacred by the Nazis at Babyn Yar in a 72-hour time period and to the tens of thousands of Jews and Kyiv residents of other nationalities also murdered there.

The pope also visited St. Alexander's Roman Catholic Church on the last day of his Kyiv trip and met with political and business leaders at the Mariinsky Palace. Sixteen of the 17 leaders of the largest religious confessions met with the head of the Catholic Church on June 24 at Kyiv Symphony Hall. Not present was Metropolitan Volodymyr of the UOC-MP,

which had said from the outset that its leader would not meet with the pope.

However, the most interesting moment occurred at the very beginning of the hourlong meeting, when during introductions the leaders of the other two Orthodox confessions, Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate and Metropolitan Mefodii of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church kissed the holy pontiff on both cheeks. At the end of the meeting they repeated their actions, clearly in defiant response to threats from ROC Patriarch Aleksei II that any private discussions between what his Church considers illegal, non-canonical elements of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the pope could lead to a breakdown in relations between Moscow and the Vatican.

The rhythm of the visit markedly quickened and took on a soaring element when the pope's Ukrainian airliner touched down in Lviv. There the mood of Pope John Paul II, who had acted soberly and with restraint during the first part of his trip, lightened considerably.

He was greeted by hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic supporters and well-wishers as his entourage and his popemobile wound through the narrow, cobblestone streets of the medieval town. It gathered more momentum during the first mass, celebrated in Polish in the Latin Rite and largely attended by Poles – more than 100,000 of whom had crossed the border on the previous day.

The trip began to crescendo that afternoon at a youth rally attended by a crowd estimated at 250,000 to 500,000, mostly young people. As what seemed like a never-ending downpour continued to drench and chill the crowd, Pope John Paul II interrupted his homily and spontaneously broke into song. For more than a minute, with an unusually sure and steady voice, he sang several stanzas of a Polish folk song calling for the rain to stop. The solo caused squeals of delight and laughter, and raised the spirits of the drenched multitudes.

The climax, however, occurred the next day, when between 1 million and 1.5 million people descended on the Lviv Hippodrome for the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic liturgy and the beatification of 27 martyrs of the faith and the foundress of a religious order, the largest single group to achieve the status of "blessed" in the more than 400-year history of the UGCC.

Jeffrey Wills, spokesperson for the UGCC press service, called it "the largest gathering of people in history for a Byzantine liturgy." The Rev. Dr. Borys Gudziak, rector of the Lviv Theological Institute, referring to the Byzantine tradition in which everybody takes part in singing the liturgy, called it the "largest choir ever assembled."

The 28 blessed – 26 of whom perished as a result of Soviet persecution between 1935 and 1973, and one who died at the hands of the Nazis at the Polish concentration camp in Majdanek – consisted of eight bishops, eight priests, seven monks, four nuns and one layperson. Their faces were displayed on two large screens on either side of the stage on which the altar stood as their biographies and the grizzly details of some of their deaths were read prior to the liturgy. ...

Ukraine's Independence Day

Excerpted below are The Ukrainian Weekly's editorials written on the occasion of Ukraine's independence anniversaries from 1992 through 2000. The editorial published on the occasion of the 10th anniversary – titled "Ukraine Lives!" – appears as the lead article to this book.

The first anniversary

August 23, 1992

Last year, on August 24, 1991, as a direct consequence of the failed coup d'état in Moscow, members of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Council voted overwhelmingly to adopt the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine. The vote came at an extraordinary session of the republic's Parliament convened on the initiative of the democratic opposition – a minority in the 450- member body. It came as a great surprise to the Ukrainian population that the Communist Party-dominated Parliament voted 321-2 with six abstentions (out of 360 members present) for "the creation of an independent Ukrainian state – Ukraine." A companion resolution provided for immediate implementation of the proclamation of independence and for a public referendum on December 1, 1991, to affirm the declaration. And thus, the balance of power in Ukraine had shifted in favor of fledgling democratic forces and Ukraine had crossed the Rubicon, choosing the path toward independence.

In short order, structures of the Communist Party of Ukraine were dismantled, Lenin's towering likeness was removed from the most prominent spot on the Khreshchatyk, the Ukrainian capital's main boulevard, and October Revolution Square in the center of Kiev was officially renamed Independence Square. Similar repudiations of the repugnant Communist past occurred throughout Ukraine.

Much more significant, however, was that Ukraine's declaration of independence – the realization of a centuries-old dream borne by Ukrainians around the globe – put an end, once and for all, to any hopes for the conclusion of a new union treaty and guaranteed the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. ...

After December 1, when over 90 percent voted "yes" for Ukraine's independence in a nationwide plebiscite, the first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament, Ivan Pliushch, said: "A new European state has emerged on the map of the world. Its name: Ukraine." Four days later the newly elected presi-

dent, Leonid Kravchuk, took the oath of office while placing his hand on two documents: the Constitution and the declaration of independence of Ukraine. ...

On the threshold of the third year

August 22, 1993

Today the people of Ukraine realize that their country, and they along with it, entered a new era with the declaration on August 24, 1991, of an independent Ukrainian state. They have come to realize also that the re-establishment of independence not only owes much to the sacrifices of the past, but now requires new sacrifices if Ukraine is to emerge from its multiple crises.

Foremost among these crises, of course, is the economic crisis: inflation run amok, skyrocketing prices, useless economic structures of the old Soviet order, a decline in production and a deficit of hard currency for the purchase of essential supplies. To add to the difficulties, Russia has repeatedly applied economic leverage – such as an oil and gas embargo – to try to force Ukraine to toe the line. As well, the possible establishment of an economic union among several former Soviet republics, which many see as a pretense for renewal of subordination to Moscow, looms as a threat to Ukraine.

And then there are the more direct threats emanating from Russia. The historic "elder brother" has claimed some sort of special regional role as a superpower, overseer, peacekeeper, policeman. It has made outright territorial claims on Russian-populated regions of Ukraine such as the Donbas and Crimea, and, most recently, laid claim to the home port of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol. Certain circles in Russia have engaged in subversive activities such as attempting to instigate inter-ethnic conflicts within Ukraine and participating in military actions on Ukraine's borders. Nor should the Russian weapon of disinformation be forgotten – particularly as it has been used in regard to Ukraine's nukes and the nuclear status that Ukraine did not seek, but inherited from the USSR. ...

Ukraine has maintained its fragile independence in the face of great odds. It has made definite progress, albeit not as speedy as hoped, on the road to building a democratic society and creating a free market economy. Ukraine has not found itself mired in internal ethnic discord, or, for that matter, in any external military conflicts. Diplomatic relations have continually moved ahead, and even the United States has now adopted a new approach in dealing with the second most populous republic of the former Soviet Union, no longer treating Ukraine as an afterthought, or an appendage to Russia. ...

Thus, the second anniversary of Ukraine's independence should be time for sober reflection as Ukraine's real leaders try to rechart its course toward the goal of building a democratic state that will take its rightful place in the world community.

The fourth year begins

August 21, 1994

... As Ukraine approached the end of its third year of independence, the public went to the polls to elect a new Parliament in March, and April, and July, and August (with more to come in November). But, by the time of the third anniversary date, Ukraine had a new Supreme Council with 392 seats out of 450 filled.

As regards the presidential elections, ... on July 10, after the presidential runoff, much of Ukraine was shocked by the news that the other Leonid – Kuchma – had been elected president.

Still an unknown entity, Mr. Kuchma's first pronouncements could be described as a mixed bag, some reassuring, others sorely needing clarification. He pledged to build a "united, sovereign, democratic state of Ukraine." He cautioned that Ukraine would have to suffer through yet another "difficult testing period," and he emphasized that Ukraine must take immediate decisive steps in its economic policies, including monetary reform, liberalization of tax policy and foreign trade control. He spoke of Ukraine in the Eurasian economic and cultural space, and noted that Ukraine must actively defend its interests with the Commonwealth of Independent States. He noted also the need for "normalization" of relations with Russia and, pointing out that Ukraine is a multinational state, he proposed "giving the Russian language official status, while preserving state status for the Ukrainian language."

Still, by mid-July power had passed peacefully and democratically from the first president of independent Ukraine to the second. ...

So, what awaits Ukraine in its fourth year of independence? More conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of government? More stalemate? Or a new beginning? We'll soon find out. ...

The time for power plays has passed; pragmatism and action should be the watchwords for Ukraine's fourth year of freedom.

The fourth anniversary

August 20, 1995

Perhaps it's reassuring that as we mark the fourth anniversary of Ukraine's independence our commemorations have become well-established and low-key, dare we say, almost a matter of routine. Ukraine, it is clear, is making further progress, slow but steady, in buttressing its independence –

something that four years ago was so fragile, so tenuous, that one barely dared to breathe. Today we can dare to actually celebrate Ukrainian Independence Day; in Ukraine and elsewhere, there are now "traditional" observances of the day, as August 24 is our national holiday. ...

Four years ago, Ukraine's Supreme Council boldly declared the Soviet republic's independence in the face of "the mortal danger surrounding Ukraine in connection with the state coup in the USSR on August 19, 1991." ...

With one bold stroke, Ukraine had assumed both its place among the free states of the world and the formidable twin tasks of state- and nation-building. Defying great odds, newly reborn Ukraine survived a most critical period of threats from without and from within. Ukraine succeeded during the first years of its independence in establishing its identity as a democratic, nuclear-free and market-oriented state; today it is a country recognized as a major player on the world scene. ...

Independence: the fifth anniversary

August 18, 1996

Five years ago on August 19-21, hard-liners in Moscow attempted a coup d'état to depose Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. In Ukraine, the situation was tense. The chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet (Council), Leonid Kravchuk, was straddling the fence: he did not condemn the coup plotters, nor did he support President Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, who stood firm in the name of democracy. Meanwhile, democratic organizations – united in an ad hoc coalition called Independent Democratic Ukraine – called on the Ukrainian Supreme Council to condemn the coup and to distance itself from the so-called Emergency Committee in Moscow.

Ultimately, the coup, which was aimed at perpetuating the USSR, brought about the exact opposite. ...

Ukraine's orientation now is definitely Westward – toward Europe and beyond; Russia knows where it stands in relation to Ukraine; and Ukrainian remains the only state language (though language rights are guaranteed to all of Ukraine's minorities). Ukraine today is successfully being integrated into international and European structures, and it finally has a new Constitution to boot.

So, as Ukraine marks the fifth anniversary of an event that many of us thought would never come to pass, it is worth recalling where the reborn independent state called Ukaine has been. ...

The sixth anniversary

August 24, 1997

... In what he calls "a letter to friends" written before the convocation of the second World Forum of Ukrainians, Dr. James E. Mace writes of "a land and a people deeply deformed by an experience that those who underwent it are still groping to understand." He describes the remnants of Soviet-style thinking that still permeate society and government, and continue to stymie reform. ...

And yet, the young still find reason for hope: they believe in themselves and their own abilities. Given the chance, they firmly believe they will succeed. These are the thoughts of a group of students from Ukraine, ranging in age between 18 and 26, who attended the Ukrainian Summer Institute at Harvard University.

... Here in the diaspora, we have to adjust to the changing reality – a Ukraine with warts, if you will – now that the euphoria over independence has subsided – an understandable euphoria that was an appropriate response to the achievement of an ages-old dream that many thought would never come in their lifetimes. That is why our information media see the need to cover developments in Ukraine, and that is why our community members are asking themselves just how we should be involved in helping Ukraine forge a better tomorrow.

And so, dear readers, as we mark this sixth anniversary of Ukraine's proclamation of independence on August 24, 1991, besides having much to celebrate, we have much to ponder.

Seven years after

August 23, 1998

This year as we mark the anniversary of Ukraine's independence, we find ourselves asking: What can we say about independent Ukraine as it turns seven? ...

Perhaps the most significant reality is the one cited by Vice-President Al Gore before he left on his recent trip to Kyiv for a meeting of the Kuchma-Gore Commission: Ukraine's independence is no longer an issue; there is no going back to the Soviet Union. Today, it's Ukraine's economic and political vitality that is the central issue, he observed at a meeting with Ukrainian American community leaders.

Indeed. Ukraine, at age 7, faces myriad problems – tough problems for which there are no quick fixes. The economy is in need of serious corrective measures, corruption looms large and the Verkhovna Rada still has not done its job to provide a legislative basis for a better tomorrow. Journalists find themselves to be targets of those who do not like what they report, miners and teachers are not getting paid, senior citizens – the forgotten stratum of society – barely survive on their measly pensions, and parents wonder whether there will be enough money to provide for their kids. ...

Still, a glimmer of hope remains. Maybe, just maybe, the Parliament will come back from its summer recess and get down to brass tacks. Perhaps the national deputies will hear the voices of the people and realize that they, as the elected representatives of the people, must take the lead in securing the future of Ukraine and Ukrainians of all backgrounds.

To be sure, the promise of the independence proclaimed and affirmed in 1991 remains to be fulfilled. And yet, as we observe this seventh anniversary of the Parliament's declaration of Ukraine's independence, we must look back to see where Ukraine has been in order appreciate where it is today and where it is headed.

Mixed emotions

August 22, 1999

... [As we mark the eighth anniversary of Ukraine's independence], there's a bit of sadness, a bit of anger, some disgust, lots of exasperation and frustration, and a sense of pragmatic reality: eight years really isn't very much time to have turned this ship formerly called Soviet Ukraine around.

There remains much reason for hope and optimism, not the least of which is that the anniversary of independence has assumed almost a conventional character, both in the diaspora and in Ukraine. ...

Ukraine still gets high ratings for its foreign policy positions and responsible approach to national and international military and security issues. However, it is very distressing that an elected and appointed leadership in Ukraine seems either unwilling or unable to get a grip on the corruption that pervades almost all aspects of civic and economic life – corruption that prevents successful economic development, eats away at public morale and stymies individual freedom.

At its core, corruption is the inappropriate and abusive use of power for personal gain – mostly money and more power. And instead of power being used to guide, lead, develop, elevate, establish, respond, give, create – power in

Ukraine is being used to control, take, intimidate, scare, abuse, disrespect. ...

Among the few tools which the public can use to fight against this stagnation is the upcoming election. ... Honest elections force change, and we can only hope that the Ukrainian electorate will once again understand that, through the power of the vote, they give power to elected officials. And just as they give, they can also take away.

A glimmer of hope

August 20, 2000

An informal and unscientific survey of Kyivans conducted by our Kyiv Press Bureau to determine the mood in the capital city on the eve of the ninth anniversary of Ukraine's independence shows that few people are happy with most facets of life in the country today and that most do not believe that a prosperous future is possible in the near term. They see little reason to celebrate independence this year and cannot fathom that next year's 10th anniversary jubilee will give them any more reason.

People are fed up with insincere political promises that have led to false expectations. They believe that nothing can change in the country until the economy begins to move. They want jobs and are impatient for a better life. And they don't see a light at the end of the proverbial tunnel.

Whether visible or not, however, a tiny incandescent stream of light has begun to emit from the black hole that has been the Ukrainian economy for nearly a decade now. It may only be a microscopic pinhole to most economists, but no one can deny that a breakthrough has occurred this year in the Ukrainian economy. ...

To be sure, Ukraine will not climb out of the decade-long muck into which its economy has sunk overnight, or even before next year's 10th anniversary of independence. Too much of the political and economic infrastructure continues to require either reconstruction or fine-tuning. Foreign investors still are leery of the Ukrainian market, even as they laud its potential. More administrative housecleaning needs to take place, and the tax system still needs an overhaul. ...

But things are slowly beginning to change.

The recent improvement in the economy shows that perhaps the country is beginning to bounce back. Now a steady, if not spectacular, economic expansion may begin. We think that Ukrainians really do have reason to believe that tangible evidence of an invigorated economy will soon follow and that by this time next year, as the nation prepares for its 10th anniversary jubilee, there truly will be something to celebrate. ...

"The Glory of Byzantium" exhibition: commentary and interview

June 1 and June 8, 1997 (Abridged)

by Ika Koznarska Casanova

NEW YORK – "The Glory of Byzantium" has been referred to by Philippe de Montebello as the most challenging and important exhibition he has ever inaugurated in his 20 years as director of The Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Whereas other recent exhibitions on the art and culture of Byzantium encompassed the history of the Byzantine Empire (330-1453) and drew on works of art from national and local collections, "The Glory of Byzantium" is an international loan exhibition that focuses on the Middle Byzantine period. This Second Golden Age of Byzantine civilization, which witnessed the greatest expansion of the empire's cultural influence, begins with the restoration of the use of icons in 843 and ends with the occupation of Constantinople by Latin Crusaders from 1204 to 1261.

The loan of major works of art from 24 countries, including significant works that never before traveled, makes this an unprecedented exhibition that contributes to a broader and greater understanding of the nature and quality of Byzantine art.

"The Glory of Byzantium" is of historical significance not only for the Met. The exhibition has special significance for Ukraine, whose medieval treasures are being exhibited for the first time as part of an international loan exhibition in one of the leading museums of the world.

For Ukraine the significance is manifold.

In terms of the recent geopolitical changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, this is the first time that the country, which gained independence in 1991, has been able to take part in and be represented at an international exhibition, as a country in its own right and not as a Soviet republic frequently referred to as a province of Russia (i.e., "the Ukraine").

Moreover, not only is Ukraine taking part in the exhibit as an independent country, but given the specific context of its inclusion in the exhibition – the period of Kyivan Rus' – it is participating as a country whose cultural patrimony has not been subsumed under Russian history.

The very designation "Kievan Rus' " goes a long way to counter the established practice among scholars and journalists in the West to refer to

this period misleadingly as "Kievan Russia."

A separate gallery of the exhibition has been devoted to the religious and secular art of the Kyivan Rus' state.

There is an overall forthrightness in presentation of material, perhaps best exemplified by the reference, both in the text of the catalogue and in the audio-guide to the exhibition galleries, to the destruction of the Cathedral of St. Michael of the Golden Domes Monastery – one of the many Kyivan churches from the Princely Era that survived until the mid-1930s when it was demolished by Soviet authorities. After the demolition of St. Michael's in 1936, the mosaics that survived were transferred to the St. Sophia Museum. Two of these mosaics form part of the current exhibition.

Finally, the exhibition has initiated a new period of collaboration between The Metropolitan Museum and various countries, including Ukraine, which has facilitated much-needed professional contacts.

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The following interview was conducted with Helen C. Evans, associate curator for Early Christian and Byzantine Art at The Metropolitan Museum of Art, and Olenka Z. Pevny, research assistant at the museum's Department of Medieval Art.

A scholar of Early Christian, Byzantine and Armenian art, Dr. Evans is the co-curator of "The Glory of Byzantium" exhibition. She has lectured and published widely on the cross-cultural currents on the development of Christian art, its style and iconography. Most recently she was co-curator of the highly acclaimed exhibition "Treasures in Heaven: Armenian Illuminated Manuscripts" at the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York City (1994) and the Walters Gallery of Art in Baltimore (1994), and the exhibition "Textiles of Late Antiquity" at The Metropolitan Museum of Art (1996). Dr. Evans has been a major contributor to the catalogues published in association with these exhibitions and has written the major essay on neighbors of Byzantium and Armenia for "The Glory of Byzantium" exhibition catalogue.

Dr. Pevny is a graduate of New York University's Institute of Fine Arts, where she completed her doctoral dissertation in 1995 on the topic "The Kyrylivska Tserkva: The Appropriation of Byzantine Art and Architecture in Kiev."

Her research, funded by an International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) grant and facilitated by the Ukraina Society (Tovarystvo Ukraina) and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, took her to Kyiv and cities of western and eastern Ukraine, as well as St. Petersburg and Moscow, and such medieval Russian cities as Novgorod, Pskov, Vladimir and Suzdal.

Dr. Pevny was engaged in all aspects of the preparatory work for the exhibition, both here and abroad. Since the exhibition's opening in March, she has lectured extensively at the museum as well as in the Ukrainian com-

munity and scholarly institutions. Dr. Pevny is the author of the essay on Kyivan Rus' in the exhibition catalogue.

* * *

How did the idea for this exhibit come about?

Dr. Evans: In 1992 there was a marvelous exhibit in Paris at the Louvre called "Byzance," which was put together from collections of France, covering the history of Byzantium. I was asked by Philippe de Montebello, director of The Metropolitan Museum, who attended the Louvre exhibition, for a concept of an exhibition for The Metropolitan Museum. What we did was to focus on a sequel to the earlier "Age of Spirituality" exhibition at The Metropolitan Museum in 1977 and cover the Middle Byzantine Empire and its sphere of influence.

I drafted a memo describing the exhibition I wanted. I was encouraged and supported by William D. Wixcom, chairman of Medieval Art and The Cloisters and co-curator of the exhibition.

The preparation of the exhibition entailed extensive travel to arrange for loans to the exhibition.

Did you travel to Ukraine prior to the preparation of the exhibition?

Dr. Evans: I was briefly in Ukraine in 1989. Dr. Pevny was in Kyiv at the time working on her dissertation. In 1991 I attended an international congress of Byzantine studies held in Moscow which Dr. Pevny also attended. (This was right before the Moscow coup).

Subsequently, then Minister of Culture Ivan Dzyuba was in the U.S. and met with Dr. Mahrukh Tarapor, associate director for exhibitions, Dr. Pevny and me. We had already begun discussing Ukraine's participation in the exhibition. Mr. Dzyuba was very supportive of the idea and helpful in facilitating the process.

We returned to Ukraine several times, along with museum restorers, and met with museum officials to secure the loans. Dr. Pevny was involved in all of these trips.

What were the greatest challenges in putting the Kyivan Rus' segment together?

Dr. Evans: The greatest challenge was Ukraine. I don't think it was ever a question whether or not Ukraine would participate, but whether we would be able to obtain works that were critical to this segment of Ukraine's history.

Dr. Pevny: Ukraine was always willing to lend small-scale objects, but in order for Ukraine to occupy a prominent position in the exhibition it had to

lend large-scale works. Since no one knew how the works – the mosaics that we were asking – were mounted and because they had never been lent, convincing directors to let these works travel abroad to America was a novel idea and took a lot of convincing.

... The small jewelry objects that are housed in the Historical Treasures of Ukraine Museum in Kyiv travel fairly extensively. We borrowed only one object from that museum (and maybe the bracelet from the Historical Museum), but I can say that most of the other works that we borrowed from Ukraine – icons, reliefs, mosaics – have never traveled before. Also the works of Kyivan Rus' from Russia have never traveled before. So most of the works in the (Kyivan Rus') room have not been exhibited before.

Fifty-nine scholars and art historians, most of them working in America, were involved in the preparation of this exhibit. With regard to Kyivan Rus', are there elements incorporated in the scope of this exhibit which, heretofore, perhaps received cursory mention or scant treatment in the West?

Dr. Evans: As Prof. Ihor Sevcenko noted when he was here, the unique contribution of this exhibition was the recognition of the interconnections between Byzantine civilization and its neighbors, rather than seeing the latter simply as provincial Byzantines or seeing them only in terms of their own history. It is the linkage that we have done which was not done before.

I think that not just for Kyivan Rus' but for all the works in the exhibition, there is very little in this exhibition that isn't the most important work of its type. We have managed, through the generosity of states like Ukraine, to bring these works together. It's as if you walked across the Byzantine world during this period and you can see, for instance, how Ukraine took from Byzantium but you can also see a very strong sense of it creating its own identity, or of Novgorod creating its own identity.

... We have tried to recognize that Kyivan Rus' adopted the religion and culture of Byzantium while remaining politically independent; that Bulgaria accepted Orthodox Christianity and was conquered; that Armenia was conquered but never accepted Orthodoxy. Each has a different response.

How does Kyivan Rus' fit in the overall scheme of Byzantine art studies today? Are there different schools of interpretation with regard to Kyivan Rus'? For instance, is there a notable difference in the kind of scholarship on Kyivan Rus' being done in the West, in Ukraine and in Russia?

Dr. Evans: One can observe a profound difference in scholarship before and after the fall of the Soviet Union. Prior to its collapse there were certain

givens, constructs of history demanded by Marxist and capitalist conceptions that required different interpretations.

In this respect, I think that a big difference is that now that there is no Soviet Union, scholars from countries like Ukraine will not be filtered through the administrative culture of Moscow but will stand on their own.

In this exhibition, as Dr. Pevny points out in the lectures she gives, there has been a change from borrowing artifacts of cultural history which have been shorn of their religious association, to borrowing artifacts of cultural history which at their core are seriously religious.

Dr. Pevny, could you elaborate?

Dr. Pevny: There are very few Western scholarly works that deal with Kyivan Rus' art at all and it usually gets covered as an aside in the general texts on Byzantine art, with just a few pages or a few images.

There is a great difference between works written in the West because usually works produced here see Kyivan Rus' from Byzantine eyes, while usually the works written in Ukraine and Russia focus on Kyivan Rus' and don't really place it in the context of the broader Byzantine culture of the Middle Byzantine period.

As Dr. Evans mentioned, because most of the art is religious, Western studies focus more on the iconography and the ecclesiastical context of the works, whereas most of the works produced in the former Soviet Union are descriptive or focus more on the historical-political context.

Would you comment on the representative quality of the works on exhibit? In terms of stylistic comparisons within Byzantine art, what is the significance of the art and architecture of Kyivan Rus'?

Dr. Evans: We have borrowed what I think represents a reasonably comprehensive demonstration of the exceptional quality of the art of Kyivan Rus' – from the monumental to the small and intricate.

It reflects the wealth, the power and the ambition of Kyivan Rus', as well as the quality of the art which expresses its own sense of its destiny and perhaps, brings really to life the quotation Dr. Pevny uses – of travelers coming and thinking that they've reached Constantinople when they've reached Kyiv.

Dr. Pevny: I think that we borrowed the best works from the period of Kyivan Rus' that have been preserved and are transportable.

In the early surveys of Byzantine art and architecture in the West the art of Kyivan Rus' was often referred to as provincial.

Dr. Evans: The traditional approach to Byzantine art history was that the good works were in Constantinople and everything else was provincial. And

what we hope the exhibition will do is to portray the greatness of Constantinople but also show that it wasn't the only place where there was good work.

Western studies of art history always respected the differences between England, France, Germany and Italy in the Middle Ages, but the same books tended to speak of the Byzantine Empire as a monolith and to see Kyivan Rus' or any other of the people that we have identified as the neighbors of the Byzantine Empire as simply provincial Byzantines.

Not only is that a misunderstanding of history, but it provides a very simplistic view, and one that I'm very opposed to, because it implies that people did not have ideas of their own. I believe that when a Rus' imported a Byzantine artist or hired their own artist – that very soon they were demanding that the work respond to their interest which was often to be like Byzantium but it was also often another agenda.

Given the uncertainties and controversy surrounding the subject of Kyivan Rus' with regard to the question of the origin of Rus' and the issue of the common heritage of modern Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, how did you deal with this potentially problematic issue in terms of: preparatory work in your dealings with cultural institutions and government agencies in securing the loans; and, in terms of the actual exhibit, for instance, the provenance of objects on display and the essay on Kyivan Rus' in the exhibition catalogue?

Dr. Evans: Dr. Pevny worked very hard and very successfully in getting the editorial staff to recognize the need to use the languages of the countries that were lending works to the exhibition as opposed to doing what would have been done a decade earlier when everything would have been translated into Russian and we would have dealt with the Russian Ministry of Culture.

And so, on a very simple level, she spent a vast amount of time working with the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute on the transliteration system and on how to present this issue. That is something we considered at great length.

With respect to the broader question, we understood that the heart of Kyivan Rus' was Kyiv, and we went there for the loans that we wanted most. When Kyiv agreed to lend, it was later that we went to Russia and Belarus. We already had a basis for the loans.

As far as we are aware, there are no problems with the provenance in terms of the political transfer of the works we borrowed.

Dr. Pevny: We acknowledged the medieval state of Kyivan Rus'. We also recognized the three modern-day countries that occupy some of the territories that formed the Kyivan Rus' state.

Again, I think this was possible because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and, again, because Kyiv was the capital of Kyivan Rus', so that we

went there first. We very much wanted works from that city to form the core of the exhibition just as in the first section: we tried and successfully got loans from both Turkey and Greece to represent the core of Byzantium proper.

We recognized the present-day boundaries of each state. Also, everything was transliterated from the modern languages of the political entity from which the work was borrowed. So if an object comes from Ukraine, the name is transliterated from Ukrainian, from Russia – from Russian, and from Belarus – Belarusian.

In terms of art as heritage and part of a nation's patrimony, are there any disputed works that form part of the Kyivan Rus' segment of the exhibition to which potentially conflicting claims could be put forth?

Dr. Pevny: Each country wanted to be recognized at the exhibition and agreed to lend. We did not borrow works whose ownership is controversial. For example, the mosaics from St. Michael of the Golden Domes are borrowed from Kyiv and not the mosaics that have survived and are now at the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow.

In terms of the provenance for many of the pieces – like the Ostromir Lectionary or the icon "The Archangel with the Golden Hair" – the provenance is debated in scholarship. We actually don't know where the works were made. We dealt with this by acknowledging the two common sites that are acknowledged as possible provenance for these works.

Have there been any changes or revisions in the labeling of objects that form part of The Metropolitan's Byzantine collection in order to reflect recent geopolitical changes in Eastern Europe, specifically the break-up of the Soviet Union?

Dr. Evans: We have added Ukraine to the works that are from Kyiv.

We have very few works out on permanent exhibit in the medieval section to which this question applies.

We do have pieces from the hoard (a rich and representative collection of Kyivan Rus' jewelry) that were acquired by J. Pierpont Morgan at the turn of the century.

Transliterations in the catalogue, for both proper and place names, are from the languages of the participant countries; that is, they are from Ukrainian, if they apply to Ukraine, or from Georgian, Armenian, etc., rather than from Russian, the way it would have been done a decade ago. Why did you opt for the phonetically Russian form "Kievan" Rus' instead of the Ukrainian form "Kyivan" Rus'?

Dr. Evans: In the compromises worked out throughout the discussions in terms of not only of Ukraine but several other countries, we agreed to go with the well-known spelling of major cities, which is what the editorial department wanted.

At the time it seemed reasonable in part because the spelling within Ukraine was fluctuating as the transliteration was being worked out. And in part when we tried to send packages addressed to the Ukrainian spellings the Fed Ex packages were returned to us, noting that no such city exists.

I think that if the catalogue was coming out next year, the new spelling would be stable enough that we would have fought harder for its use.

In any case, the issue was something we knew. We had made the decision to stay with the old spelling. It wasn't that we were not aware that there was another spelling, but the argument of the editorial department that people would know the old spelling and know the city, that if we changed to the new spelling which was not yet known – that we would get that Federal Express package back.

Part of the problem is to make the information available both to the public that's aware of the history and to make it accessible to those who don't know the nuances of the history.

Dr. Pevny argued quite convincingly in her essay that Rus' was not a simple state. We have to start studying the material in a much more sophisticated manner than past history books tended to give.

Is there anything you would like to add?

Dr. Evans: As a non-Rus', I would like to say I hope the catalogue contributes to a more intense study of the art and culture of Kyivan Rus', including the translation of major works from Ukrainian scholarly literature.

Also, I should like to expand a bit on the transliterations. When we started the catalogue, it was suggested we use English for all the names of the sites of Kyivan Rus' and of the other neighbors of Byzantium whereas we'd be using French, Italian or German for sites of those countries. My office objected, noting that if one is going to use Italian names for Italian sites one should use Ukrainian names for Ukrainian sites.

In the end, we were constrained by the contract with the lending institutions as to how they wanted to be identified. So, after all of our debates, it turned out that some institutions filled out their names in English while others did not. It's not quite as pure a pattern as we argued for, but one of the aspects – the sites and languages were recognized.

Dr. Pevny: I hope this exhibition raises awareness of Kyivan Rus' so that there is more of a desire to study it.

Also, I hope the public and museum curators realize that there is art both in Russia and Ukraine that's worth exhibiting, that it can draw in crowds and thus help popularize the art of Eastern Europe.

Dr. Evans: And by extension, tourism. If people leave this exhibition excited by the art and want to see where it came from – this helps the economy of Ukraine.

The exhibit has elicited a strong and enthusiastic response.

Dr. Evans: So far, it's been very positive and outstanding.

Dr. Pevny: According to the chief registrar's tabulations, in mid-May the number of visitors to the exhibition was at 250,000 – which is quite a good response.

Dr. Evans: We're very pleased with the response of the Ukrainian community and appreciate their support in attending the exhibition and lectures.

We very much appreciate the support because large attendance convinces the museum that there is a perceived awareness and interest on the part of the public. Hopefully, it will also convince universities that there are students who would be interested in this field, that there's a need to hire scholars.

We're delighted that we've been able to present the exhibition in a way that has engendered that response, because I think we're both completely legitimate in the scholarly context and that we've also respected the medieval culture of a number of states that have made very important contributions to the history.

Dr. Pevny: I think we have managed to put together the best exhibit of Kyivan Rus' works thus far in the West with the loans we have gotten. Every work in the (Kyivan Rus') room is very significant – ranging from the mosaics from the Cathedral of the Mykhailivskyi Zolotoverkhyi Monastery, to the Ostromir Lectionary, to the "Archangel with the Golden Hair."

Ukraine and the Olympic Games

For decades, Ukraine's independent participation in the Olympic Games was a dream. With the declaration and affirmation of Ukraine's independence in 1991 the dream became reality, albeit not immediately.

According to publications of the Ukrainian World Congress, Ukraine's aspirations as an independent Olympic country can be traced back to 1916, when the Kyiv Olympic Committee was established. In 1920 the governments of the Ukrainian National Republic and the Western Ukrainian National Republic attempted to have Ukraine participate in the Olympics in Antwerp, Belgium. The following year, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic made similar overtures about independent Olympic participation, but the central authorities of the USSR disbanded the newly organized Ukrainian Olympic Committee.

A Ukrainian Olympic Committee was next established in the diaspora in

1956; that body unsuccessfully appealed to the International Olympic Committee to allow Ukraine to compete as a separate state in the Games, arguing that, after all, Ukraine had its own representation at the United Nations.

The issue resurfaced in Ukraine in the 1980s, and the initiation of a National Olympic Committee of Ukraine was widely discussed. Similar efforts to promote an independent Ukrainian Olympic movement were undertaken in 1989 by the World Congress of Free Ukrainians (which with the re-establishment of Ukraine's independence became known as the Ukrainian World Congress).

Finally, in December 1990, five months after the declaration of Ukraine's state sovereignty, sports activists from all oblasts of Ukraine gathered in Kyiv and established the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine, electing former Olympic champion sprinter Valerii Borzov – once known as the fastest man in the world by virtue of his 1972 Olympic gold medals in the 100 and 200 meters – as its chairman.

The following chronology of Ukraine's participation in the Olympic Games is based on reports published in The Ukrainian Weekly in the years 1991-2000. (A complete listing of Ukraine's Olympic medalists 1992 through 2000 follows this article.)

1992 Winter Olympics in Albertville, France

The year 1992 was a watershed in Ukrainian sports, with the new political reality leaving its mark on the scene.

On the Olympic front, the stage had been set by the Ukrainian Parliament's formal request to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), made in December 1991, to grant full status to Ukraine's team. World-renowned champion pole vaulter Serhii Bubka continued to be the athlete at the forefront of demands for separate representation when he asked, at a press conference in January: "Why not compete for Ukraine? ... I don't understand why we must be one team of 11 countries."

However, for the XVI Winter Olympiad in Albertville, France, which took place in February 1992, the interval was too brief, both in terms of IOC approval, and in terms of Ukrainian team organization. As a result, figure-skater Viktor Petrenko, who was billed everywhere as "the gold medal winner from Ukraine" competed as a representative of the EUN (Equipe Unifiee/Unified Team), and listened to the Olympic anthem as the five-ringed flag was raised during his medal ceremony. Fellow Ukrainian Oleksii Zhytnyk of Kiev was a member of the EUN Olympic champions in hockey.

1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona, Spain

On March 9, 1992, in Lausanne, Switzerland, the IOC made the formal decision to grant Ukraine provisional membership, which enabled its ath-

letes in non-team events to compete independently in Barcelona, but stipulated that in team sports they would continue to participate under the aegis of the Unified Team.

IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch conceded that all the newly independent republics "wanted to go independently, but ... the most important thing was to stick to the principle that the best athletes from all 12 republics should participate in Barcelona." However, the Olympic oligarch also added that Ukraine and the other republics will be free to compete for the first time as independent countries at the 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway.

In the end, some of the demands put forward by Mr. Borzov, head of the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine (NOC-Ukraine) and then the country's minister of sports, were accepted. These included a Ukrainian contingent marching together under a Ukrainian flag within the "Unies" group at the opening and closing ceremonies of the Barcelona Games, separate competition in individual events, and the raising of the national flag and playing of the national anthem when athletes won individual golds.

The first to see the blue-and-yellow flag rise to the strains of "Sche ne Vmerla Ukraina" at XXV Summer Olympiad in Barcelona was Oleh Kucherenko, a wrestler from Luhansk. The most prominent winner was Tetiana Gutsu of Odesa, who won the individual gymnastics gold under a blaze of TV cameras. Other gold medalists were Tetiana Lysenko (gymnastics, balance beam) and Oleksandra Tymoshenko (rhythmic gymnastics). All in all, the Ukrainian flag and anthem were brought out four times. Of course, it should have been five, but Mr. Bubka, the seemingly invincible pole vaulter, struck out with a "no height" performance that stunned the world.

Ukraine's individual athletes also took in 12 silver medals and four bronze, and its contingent contributed to six of the Unified Team's golds and three of the team bronzes. Their performance impressed many media analysts, as did the efforts of UOC chief Mr. Borzov, who was the subject of an NBC profile during the Games.

Though he did not earn an Olympic medal in 1992, that year Mr. Bubka broke Paavo Nurmi's mark of 29 world records in track and field events. By year's end he had 32 world records after setting new marks in August in Padua and in September in Tokyo.

1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway

The XVII Winter Olympiad in Lillehammer, Norway, was the first for a fully independent, separately recognized Team Ukraine, which fielded a contingent of 37 athletes. Ukraine finished 13th in the medal standings, with nine top-10 performances, and another 10 in the top 20.

The first medalist was Valentyna Tserbe, who took the bronze in the

biathlon, but the first gold medal went to 16-year-old figure skater Oksana Baiul. Mr. Petrenko, the Olympic champion in Albertville, along with three other much-heralded professionals, returned briefly to amateur status. His performance was somewhat disappointing, but he finished a solid fourth in men's figure skating.

After Ms. Baiul's win at the Winter Olympics, former President Leonid Kravchuk included her and Mr. Petrenko in his entourage for his official visit to Washington. U.S. President Bill Clinton ignored precedent and made Ms. Baiul the first Lillehammer Olympian (and a foreigner to boot) to be welcomed at the White House.

As the year drew to a close, Ms. Baiul sat, like a fidgety flower, as one of Barbara Walters' choices for top-10 most interesting people of the year, and the world's sympathy and concern for the graceful orphan from Ukraine seemed to shine from the interviewer's eyes.

1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta

Ukraine's debut as an independent state at the XXVI Summer Olympics held in Atlanta was an unqualified success.

At the 1996 Olympic Games, which celebrated 100 years since the Games were renewed, Ukraine took 10th place in the medals total, with 23 medals – nine of them gold – and finished ahead of countries such as Britain, Canada, Brazil and Poland.

The Ukrainian team arrived in the United States on July 6, after a send-off by thousands of Kyiv residents on Independence Square, which featured rock bands and an address by Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko. Until the beginning of the Games on July 19 they trained in Carrollton, Ga., the Ukrainian pre-Olympic training site.

Once in Atlanta, spunky Lilia Podkopayeva, 17, led the team of 235 athletes with two golds and a silver medal in gymnastics. In the individual all-around finals the 4-foot-9 inch dynamo showed that she would not be stopped. She gave an explosive performance in the floor exercise, which the judges rewarded with a 9.87 – the highest mark of the day.

The first gold medal for Ukraine was captured by Viacheslav Oliinyk of Mariupol four days into the competitions. Strongman Timur Taimazov was the first to set new Olympic and world records when he lifted 235 kg. in the clean and jerk in the 108-kg. weightlifting class. He broke his own mark by 1 kilogram.

Other gold medalists were Kateryna Serebrianska in rhythmic gymnastics, Rustam Sharipov in gymnastics (parallel bars), Inesa Kravets in triple jump and and the sailing (470) duo of Yevhen Bratslavets and Ihor Matvienko.

A surprise to many, but not to those who had followed his quick rise through the amateur ranks, was the golden victory of boxer Volodymyr

Klychko in the heavyweight class on the final day of the Olympic competitions. In the preliminary bouts he had upset two favorites, Laurence Clay-Bey of the United States and Russian Alexei Lezin, before meeting Paea Wolfgramm of Tonga in the finals.

The biggest disappointment was Mr. Bubka, the gold medalist in 1988 in Seoul, South Korea, whose bad luck at the 1992 Olympics continued in 1996. He withdrew from competition in the pole vault hours before the contest began and placed the blame on a strained Achilles' tendon. The only person to clear 20 feet and the odds-on gold medal favorite said doctors had told him he needed three to four months of complete rest.

The press seemed to have its eyes only on the Americans throughout the Atlanta Games, an impression that members of the foreign press also carried. NBC was especially guilty of maintaining a narrow viewpoint. One example given in The Weekly editorial from August 4, 1996, was a photo of the three medal winners in the shot put, two Americans and the Ukrainian bronze medalist Oleksander Bahach. As the caption commented, "He did not share the NBC spotlight, however, as the unabashedly jingoistic network's cameras focused on the two Americans, leaving Bahach out of the picture. Was there no room for Bahach on our TV screens?"

Minister of Sports and Youth Borzov and Laryssa Barabash-Temple of Atlanta were the major coordinators in obtaining the financing and making the arrangements that allowed the Ukrainian team's participation in the Atlanta Games to go off without a hitch.

Financing the squad was a particular problem. In May the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine (NOC-Ukraine) was informed that the budget crisis of the government would limit the size of the team and the money it would receive. As a result, funding for the Ukrainian Olympic movement was provided not only by the government but by Ukrainian organizations in Canada and the U.S., such as the Philadelphia Regional Olympic Committee, the Ukrainian Sports Federation of the United States and Canada, and the Ukrainian National Association. All told, Ukrainians in the United States and Canada donated $574,212.24 to the NOC-Ukraine.

1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan

The XVIII Winter Olympiad was held in Nagano, Japan, and Ukraine managed to string together a competitive contingent, despite the financial constraints that were making themselves strongly felt.

Just as it did prior to the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, the first at which the nascent country had a separate delegation, the Ukrainian government gave its competitors a gala send-off in Kyiv on January 28, attended by Prime Minister Valerii Pustovoitenko. All told, a team of 56 athletes represented Ukraine in Nagano, along with 47 trainers, and competed in 10 of the 14 Olympic winter events.

Stan Haba, veteran fund-raiser and head of the Canadian Friends of the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine, attended the gala, and was granted the honor of marching into Minami Stadium in Nagano together with the delegation led by flag-bearer Andrii Deryzemlia.

Ukrainian Canadian contributions went toward the purchase of athletic equipment, booking of hotel rooms closer to practice and competition sites and walkie-talkies for the biathlon team.

Team Ukraine's only medal winner was Olena Petrova, who brought home the silver in the 15-kilometer biathlon, but the story of the games was the four whirling teens of the freestyle aerial skiing event. Tetiana Kozachenko, 16, Alla Tsuper, 18, Olena Yunchyk, 15, and Yulia Kliukova, 16, all qualified for the finals of the women's competition and stayed in the top 10 to the last jump.

The very last competitor in the event knocked Ms. Kozachenko off the podium into fourth place, just ahead of Ms. Tsuper. Ms. Kliukova finished eighth, while Ms. Yunchyk was 10th – astounding placings for a country whose program in the sport was essentially non-existent before Ski Lacroix of Switzerland decided to sponsor Team Ukraine at the Lillehammer Games in 1994.

Otherwise, Iryna Taranenko Terelia, a veteran of the cross-country skiing circuits, came closest to winning a medal – she garnered two fourth-place finishes, missing the bronze in the 10-kilometer free pursuit race by 2.7 seconds.

At a welcoming ceremony back in Ukraine, Ms. Petrova received the Presidential Medal; Ms. Taranenko Terelia also was recognized; and Ms. Yunchyk was held to be the example of Ukraine's future potential.

2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney, Australia

Sydney, Australia, was the host of the XXVII Summer Olympic Games held beginning September 15.

The Sydney contingent was the first Ukrainian squad whose talents had been nurtured since national independence in 1991. "These are athletes who for the most part grew up in an independent Ukraine and have received their training in the system that Ukraine has developed," said Volodymyr Kulyk, an adviser to President Leonid Kuchma and longtime member of Ukraine's NOC.

Although it was a youthful squad, the Sydney team – comprising 39 athletes who competed in 26 sports – had some veteran athletes to provide guidance, insight and stability. Serhii Bubka, the 36-year-old superstar pole-vaulter, who had attended more Games than almost any of the athletes who gathered in Sydney, again captained the Ukrainian team as he did in Atlanta in 1996, when he carried the Ukrainian flag into the Olympic Stadium during the opening ceremonies.

Heading the Ukrainian delegation was Vice Minister for Sports Vasyl Zabroda, chief of mission of the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine. The official attaché of the NOC-Ukraine was Roman Dechnicz, a Sydney-based lawyer who chaired the Australian Friends of the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine (AFNOCU), the local community's vehicle for supporting Ukraine's participation. The Ukrainian delegation was supported by some 30 accredited volunteers from the Ukrainian Australian community who underwent official training through the Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG).

Ukraine's Yana Klochkova ruled the pool on September 16 when she won Ukraine's first gold medal at the Sydney Olympic Games, smashing the old world record, which had stood since 1997, and the old Olympic record, which had stood since 1980, and turning in a time of 4:33.59 in the 400-meter individual medley. Three days later the 18-year-old swimmer from Kharkiv captured Ukraine's second gold by winning the 200-meter individual medley, setting a new Olympic record with a time of 2:10.68. On September 22 she took silver in the women's 800-meter freestyle. Among Ukraine's men swimmers, Denis Sylantiev of Zaporizhia Oblast led the way with a silver medal in the 200-meter butterfly, with a time of 1:55.76.

Ukraine's men's cycling team of Oleksander Symonenko, Serhii Matveyev, Oleksander Fedenko and Serhii Cherniavskyi captured the silver medal in the team pursuit competition with a time of 4:04.520. World champion track cyclist Iryna Yanovych won the bronze medal in the women's sprint.

In gymnastics, one of the sports in which Ukraine was expected to field strong teams, the men's squad composed of Oleksander Beresh, Oleksander Svitlychnyi, Roman Zozulia, Valerii Honcharov, Valerii Pereshkura and Ruslan Mezentsev, won the silver medal – a medal that was particularly gratifying as it represented a victory over the Russian team, which earned the bronze. Two days later, Ukraine's top male gymnast, Mr. Beresh of Kherson Oblast, won the bronze in the individual all-around competition. Ukraine's women did not fare as well, as the team finished in sixth place.

Ukraine's third bronze of the Games came in judo, in the men's middleweight (90-kilogram) group, as Ruslan Mashurenko, who hails from Volyn Oblast, tied for third place in the event with Frenchman Frederic Demontfaucon. Ukraine earned its fourth silver medal thanks to the fine work of the archery team of Olena Sadovnycha of Kyiv Oblast, Kateryna Serdiuk of Kharkiv Oblast and Natalia Burdeina of Odesa Oblast.

Mykola Milchev of Odesa shot perfect 25s in all five rounds of the skeet shooting competition to win gold by one shot over Petr Malek of the Czech Republic. The experienced Mr. Milchev's performance equaled the current world record for the event.

In trampoline – an event debuting at the Sydney Olympics – 27-year-old

Oksana Tsyhuliova won a silver medal. Triple jumper Olena Hovorova turned in a personal best to win bronze in that event. Another jumper, Roman Schurenko, earned bronze in the long jump competition.

At the diving pool, longtime partners from Zaporizhia Hanna Sorokina, 24, and Olena Zhupina, 27, took bronze in synchronized 3-meter springboard diving. The pair had previously held the title of European champions in the event.

Ukraine's Davyd Soldadze delivered silver in Greco-Roman wrestling (97-kilogram class), while Yevhen Buslovych took a silver medal in the 58-kilogram freestyle wrestling competition.

In sailing, where Ukraine's chances of medaling were promising, the duo of Ruslana Taran and Olena Pakholchyk won bronze in the 470 class.

Ukraine's young Olympic boxers joined the Klychko brothers, Volodymyr and Vitalii, on the world's boxing stage with a surprise haul of two silver and three bronze medals. With five medals, Ukraine's fighters surpassed all expectations and strongly improved on their previous international record, placing in nearly half of the boxing competition's weight categories. In so doing they became the main contributors to Ukraine's overall medal count at the Sydney Games.

In the 60-kilogram category, Andrii Kotelnyk, the 1999 European champion, made it a contest for the heavily favored Cuban boxer, Mario Kindelan, but ultimately went down by a score of 14-4 in the gold medal bout. In the 67-kilogram category, Serhii Dotsenko fought a tenacious bout against Oleg Saitov of Russia in the gold medal decider, ultimately losing on points, 24-16, to the defending gold medalist and world champion. In the 51-kilogram category, Volodymyr Sydorenko shared the bronze with Frenchman Jerome Thomas. In the 54-kilogram category, Serhii Danylchenko took bronze in a tie with American Clarence Vinson. In the 81-kilogram category, Andrii Fedchuk took bronze jointly with Sergei Mihailov of Uzbekistan.

Team Ukraine completed the Olympics with three gold medals, 10 silver and 10 bronze, for a total of 23 medals. In general, Ukraine's medals at the Sydney Games were taken by rising stars, while many established athletes did not meet the test. For example, most of Ukraine's previous and current world champions – including Mr. Bubka in men's pole vault, Inga Babakova in women's high jump, Zhanna Pintusevych in women's sprint, Denys Gotfrid in weightlifting, Elbrus Tadeyev in freestyle wrestling, Olena Vitrychenko in rhythmic gymnastics and Serhii Holubytskyi in men's fencing – failed to place.

Mr. Bubka, considered the greatest pole vaulter ever, had announced in June that he would retire after the Sydney Olympics. The 36-year-old phenom had resumed full training three months prior to that, after undergoing tendon surgery for the second time in three years. Mr. Bubka said he was working hard to be in his best form for the Olympics. He won his sixth con-

secutive world title in 1997 after missing 10 months of competition due to an Achilles' tendon injury that had plagued him for several years.

At the conclusion of the Sydney Games he was elected as an athlete representative to the International Olympic Committee. Polling took place during the Olympics with all participating athletes eligible to cast a ballot. Mr. Bubka's election was announced at the closing ceremony of the Games and was greeted with much enthusiasm by athletes and sports fans from around the globe.

Ukraine's Olympic achievements

1992 WINTER OLYMPICS - ALBERTVILLE, FRANCE
(Ukrainian athletes compete as part of Unified Team)

Gold	Viktor Petrenko, figure skating

1992 SUMMER OLYMPICS – BARCELONA, SPAIN
(Ukrainian athletes compete as part of Unified Team)

Gold	Oleh Kucherenko, wrestling, Greco-Roman
	Tetiana Gutsu, gymnastics, all-around
	Tetiana Lysenko, gymnastics, balance beam
	Oleksandra Tymoshenko, rhythmic gymnastics
Silver	Olha Bryzhina, 400 m
	Inesa Kravets, long jump
	Tetiana Dorovskykh, 3,000 m
	Rostyslav Zaulychnyi, boxing
	Mykhailo Slyvinskyi, canoeing
	Serhii Holubytskyi, fencing (foil)
	Hryhorii Misiutyn, gymnastics, all-around
	Hryhorii Misiutyn, gymnastics, floor exercise
	Hryhorii Misiutyn, gymnastics, vault
	Hryhorii Misiutyn, gymnastics, horizontal bar
	Tetiana Gutsu, gymnastics, uneven bars
	Timur Taimazov, weightlifting
Bronze	Tetiana Gutsu, gymnastics, floor exercise
	Tetiana Lysenko, gymnastics, vault
	Ihor Korobchynskyi, gymnastics, parallel bars
	Oksana Skaldina, rhythmic gymnastics

1994 WINTER OLYMPICS – LILLEHAMMER, NORWAY

Gold Oksana Baiul, figure skating

Bronze Valentyna Tserbe, biathlon

1996 SUMMER OLYMPICS – ATLANTA, U.S.A.

Gold Lilia Podkopayeva, gymnastics, all-around
Lilia Podkopayeva, gymnastics, floor exercise
Inesa Kravets, triple jump
Volodymyr Klychko, boxing
Kateryna Serebrianska, rhythmic gymnastics
Rustam Sharipov, gymnastics, parallel bars
Timur Taimazov, weightlifting
Viacheslav Oliinyk, wrestling, Greco-Roman
Yevhen Bratslavets/Ihor Matvienko, yachting, 470

Silver Lilia Podkopayeva, gymnastics, balance beam
Women's Team *(Olena Ronzhyna, Inna Frolova, Svitlana Mazii, Dina Miftakhutdinova),* rowing, quadruple skulls

Bronze Olena Vitrychenko, rhythmic gymnastics
Inga Babakova, high jump
Oleksii Krykun, hammer throw
Oleksander Bahach, shot put
Oleh Kiriukin, boxing
Men's Team *(Ihor Korobchynskyi, Hryhorii Misiutyn, Volodymyr Shamenko, Rustam Sharipov, Oleksander Svitlychnyi, Yurii Yermakov),* gymnastics
Denys Gotfrid, weightlifting
Ruslana Taran/Olena Pakholchyk, yachting, 470
Andrii Kalashnikov, wrestling, Greco-Roman
Elbrus Tedeyev, wrestling, freestyle
Zaza Zazirov, wrestling, freestyle

1998 WINTER OLYMPICS – NAGANO, JAPAN

Silver Olena Petrova, biathlon

2000 SUMMER OLYMPICS – SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA

Gold Yana Klochkova, swimming, 400 m individual medley
Yana Klochkova, swimming, 200 m individual medley
Mykola Milchev, skeet shooting

Silver
Yana Klochkova, swimming, 800 m freestyle
Denys Sylantiev, swimming, 200 m butterfly
Men's Team *(Oleksander Beresh, Oleksander Svitlychnyi, Roman Zozulia, Valerii Honcharov, Valerii Pereshkura, Ruslan Mezentsev)*, gymnastics
Men's Team *(Oleksander Symonenko, Serhii Matveyev, Oleksander Fedenko, Serhii Cherniavskyi)*, cycling, team pursuit
Women's Team *(Olena Sadovnycha, Kateryna Serdiuk, Natalia Burdeina)*, archery
Oksana Tsyhuliova, trampoline
Andrii Kotelnyk, boxing
Serhii Dotsenko, boxing
Davyd Soldadze, wrestling
Yevhen Buslovych, wrestling

Bronze
Oleksander Beresh, gymnastics, all-around
Iryna Yanovych, cycling, sprint
Ruslan Mashurenko, judo
Hanna Sorokina/Olena Zhupina, synchronized diving
Olena Hovorova, triple jump
Roman Schurenko, long jump
Ruslana Taran/Olena Pakholchyk, yachting, 470
Serhii Danylchenko, boxing
Volodymyr Sydorenko, boxing
Andrii Fedchuk, boxing

FOCUS ON PHILATELY

A decade of Narbut Prize winners

September 9, 2001 (Abridged)

by Ingert Kuzych

The Narbut Prize has been awarded annually since 1993 for the best-designed stamp of the previous year (Ukraine resumed stamp production only in 1992). In honor of Ukraine's 10th anniversary of independence and the approaching first decade of Ukrainian stamp production (2002), it is appropriate to recall the winners of the Narbut Prize for the best Ukrainian stamp or souvenir sheet since the prize's inception.

Following are the prize winners for the years 1993 through 2001.

1993 – Larysa Koren, 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Mykola Lysenko, and Oleh Snarsky, National Flag and Trident Emblem of Ukraine (note: there was a tie in voting in 1993).

1994 – Yuriy Lohvyn, 75th Anniversary of Ukraine's First Postage Stamps.

1995 – Serhiy Byelyayev, 160th Anniversary of Kyiv University.

1996 – Yuriy Lohvyn, "Hetmans of Ukraine" series.

1997 – Serhiy Byelyayev, 150th Anniversary of the Kyiv University Astronomical Observatory (stamp triptych).

1998 – V. Taran and O. Kharuk, "The Founding of Kyiv" (Europa souvenir sheet).

1999 – V. Taran, O. Kharuk, S. Kharuk and V. Kozachenko, 350th Anniversary of the Beginning of the Ukrainian Struggle for Freedom Under Bohdan Khmelnytsky (souvenir sheet).

2000 – Oleksiy Shtanko, Yaroslav the Wise (souvenir sheet).

2001 – Kateryna Shtanko, Wildflowers of Ukraine (souvenir sheet).

Epilogue

Mnohaya Lita, Ukraino!

by Robert De Lossa

Following are remarks delivered on August 24, 2001, at the Ukrainian flag-raising ceremony at Boston City Hall, by Robert De Lossa, a managing editor, assistant institute director and director of publications at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute over the course of 12 years. He now is the editor of the Journal of Ukrainian Studies and a research associate of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta.

It was July 1990 and the atmosphere in Kyiv was electric. Ukraine had proclaimed, just the previous month, its sovereignty within the Soviet Union. The people seemed hopeful that they could now reclaim control over their lives, that something like Chornobyl would never happen again. They were hopeful that, given a chance, they would forge new economic and political relationships and would unleash the potential of the industrious Ukrainian people.

As a sign of this new assertion of Ukraine for Ukraine, the first Congress of the International Association of Ukrainianists had been called – something that would have been unthinkable even two years earlier, given the Soviet Union's pathological repression of anything that might have given Ukraine independent, international stature. But scholars swarmed to the capital city from all corners of the world, the streets boasted signs that proclaimed "Kyiv welcomes scholars to the First Congress of the Mizhnarodna Asotsiatsiia Ukrainistiv."

I needed to get back to my room on the sixth floor of the Hotel Moskva, before returning to the talks at the congress. So I repeated, in Ukrainian, across the elevator to the fellow in front of the buttons, "Excuse me, but I need to go to the sixth floor." He did not move. Beginning to suspect something that I had witnessed many times before, I repeated the request in Russian. This time, he turned to me and spat out, in Russian, in a voice full of fury and hate, and with eyes that said that I was the nexus of all that is wrong in the world, "I understood the first time." He continued to glare at me on the way up with such malevolence, such venom, that I suddenly understood what it must have felt like for an American of color to have tried to assert his or her rights in Birmingham in the '60s. What did I do? I spoke Ukrainian in a public place in Kyiv, *the capital of Ukraine,* in 1990.

For those of you of Ukrainian heritage, it is not surprising. For the rest

of us, it is essential that we realize that on the eve of Ukraine's independence, this was a common story. For people who remained Soviet in character and outlook, the idea of Ukrainian independence was akin to how segregationists viewed the civil rights movement. I was lucky. Others were beaten. Several Ukrainian language teachers were killed in eastern Ukraine.

But let me tell you another story.

Now it is July 1991. We (the staff of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard) have just gotten a call from the White House. President Bush is going to give a speech in Kyiv during his forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union and they need background "color." We agonize, searching for just the right "innocent" quote that will sound nice, but will also send the coded message that Ukrainian aspirations for freedom are justified. We find a quote from the great national poet Taras Shevchenko that praises Kyiv and the Dnipro river, but is part of a much larger work that calls Ukrainians to throw off their chains and live in freedom. We transliterate it carefully, add salutations and a few other niceties, and fax it down to the White House.

Our material is not used. And the speech turns out to be the "Chicken Kiev" speech, in which the president equates Ukrainian independence with suicidal nationalism. It is not a great day for us.

Then, things turn from sullen resignation to horror within three weeks, when an attempted military coup takes place in the Soviet Union. We had been upbeat for more than a year that Ukraine was on the cusp of a renaissance and at long last establishing itself as a truly sovereign nation. Now, on August 19 and 20 in 1991, we worry about civil war and an invasion of the country.

These are tense times. We follow the news as best we can through e-mail, which we are still getting used to. We have friends who are working for the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. They send news back. Things are confused and tense. There seems to be no violence, but no one is sure if it will hold. The democrats in Rukh, the reform movement that has taken an increasingly bold independentist orientation, are openly calling for full independence now.

And the miracle happens. The coup collapses and on August 24, 1991 – ten years ago today – the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine passes a piece of legislation, an act of independence, making Ukraine an independent, sovereign state and the Soviet Union, for all intents and purposes, a relic of history. On December 1, 1991, an overwhelming majority of Ukraine's citizens (over 90 percent) endorsed this decision in a national referendum. The U.S. recognized Ukraine as an independent state on December 25, 1991.

There was still much to do. (And I know that many, many of those in the diaspora contributed to what needed to be done.) There were millions of people like that fellow in the elevator. The speaker of the Parliament, Leonid Kravchuk (who would soon become the first president of the country), and

those around him, had to steer a careful course to avoid bloodshed. They did this – and we should be grateful to this day that the Ukrainians were level-headed enough that Europe did not have to face the Balkanization of an immense region in its heartland.

At the same time, the Ukrainians had to get the Soviet armed forces off their territory and build their own armed forces. This they also did without bloodshed. They had to create, essentially from scratch, a government with international credibility. They gave up Ukraine's nuclear weapons and significantly cut back on its strategic and tactical assets at a time when scores of Russian politicians were all but calling for the invasion of the country. Ukraine had the first (and so far only) peaceful transition of presidential power in the former Soviet Union by means of election in 1994, when Leonid Kuchma, the present president, beat Kravchuk. Ukrainians instituted a new Constitution in 1996 and, just this past year, fully overhauled the judiciary.

Ukraine was the first, perhaps most enthusiastic, member of NATO's Partnership for Peace. It is an amazing fact that just five years after a time when they technically had been enemies, American and Ukrainian soldiers would be on maneuvers together on Ukrainian soil, and that hundreds of Ukrainian officers would be studying in American institutions every year.

Ukraine signed a special charter with NATO in 1997, establishing a de facto Euro-Atlantic orientation. Ukraine has become an important member of United Nations peacekeeping details around the world. It has taken a leadership role in the Black Sea area and has sought to balance out Russian heavy-handedness in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Economically, the country stabilized hyperinflation by 1996 and successfully introduced a new currency, the *hryvnia*. This past year has seen an expansion of the official economy for the first time since independence.

Perhaps most importantly, now – 10 years later – there are few Ukrainian youth who will turn into that guy in the elevator. They are committed patriots of their country and value the things that keep it strong, including its language, culture and place on the world map.

That's not the whole story, of course. It has not been an easy road to freedom, and there are plot twists that are not so happy. The economy of Ukraine has finally turned around in the past year, but it reached horrifying depths before it got better. Ukraine, like much of the NIS, has its share of post-Soviet mafioso thug oligarchs. Soviet-style corruption is still rampant. Academic structures are struggling to survive. There is a moral crisis. There have been massive scandals at all levels of the government. The press is both free *and* repressed. The status of the national language and culture continues to be a problem. There isn't enough money for anything, especially education and culture.

What then are we to make of Ukraine at 10? What should we Americans do for Ukraine during the *next* 10 years?

The answer comes in the realization that an act of independence is not the birthing of a nation, but is the delivery of a notice of divorce to a partner that has been abusive. This was the case for America with the British Crown and so it was for Ukraine and the Soviet Union. That fellow in the elevator was the tip of an enormous iceberg.

Consider this: in the 20th century, Ukraine suffered World War I and a civil war fought mainly on its territory, both with the enormous loss of millions of lives and social infrastructure, and awful crystallizations of evil, like the pogroms against Jews and Mennonites and the mass killings of workers by Whites and intellectuals by Reds. There was a criminally handled famine in the 1920s that killed hundreds of thousands. There also was an induced terror famine in 1932-1933 that killed at least 6 million and perhaps 8 million, and turned genocidal in order to destroy the Ukrainian countryside. There was the mass murder by the Soviet secret police of most of Ukraine's elite cultural class during the 1930s. There was World War II, with fronts moving over the entire country twice, with the horrors of the Holocaust, enforced slavery and a new round of massacres of Ukrainian intellectuals and advocates of freedom, and with Ukrainian resistance fighters caught on all sides. There was another famine soon after World War II. Ukrainians suffered multiple repressions under post-war Soviet rule, due in large measure to the fact that Ukrainians in western Ukraine fought Soviet rule until 1956 and the Soviet center feared Ukrainian separatism more than anything else on the landscape.

Newly opened archives have shown that Soviet secret police fostered enmity between Ukrainian ethnicities (especially between ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian Jews) beginning in the early 1920s and lasting to the end of the Soviet period. Ukrainians who insisted on a free Ukraine were half of all political prisoners in the Soviet gulag, despite the fact that Ukrainians were only one-quarter of the population of the USSR; the last political prisoner to die in the gulag was the Ukrainian poet, Vasyl Stus. Ethnic Ukrainians had to become Russified to advance to the highest levels of academia, the government, or any other branch of society; the government consciously sought to make Ukrainian culture and its language as Russian as possible.

And then there was Chornobyl. *Chornobyl.* What would you think if you found out that our government quietly told all the upper-level federal employees in the city of Boston to get their kids out of town because a radiation cloud was about to settle over the city during the Fourth of July holiday, but then didn't tell anyone else and even let all the local school parades go on?

This was the century-long Ukrainian experience of history and government leading up to independence. Good government and social cooperation have had to be re-invented within a populace that has had good reason not to trust either.

Despite coming from such a dysfunctional house – or maybe *because* it consciously chose to leave it – Ukraine has wrought *miracles* over these past years. Seeing what this country came from, we Americans have our answer to what we should do: we need to have patience and a long perspective, because such a family history is not shaken off easily. There surely will be many cases of the children slipping back into the bad habits of the abusive past, before the whole family is able to shake off the nightmare.

Remembering where Ukraine has been allows us to distinguish the complexity of the government and the people and to avoid kneejerk reactions to those recent events that are predictable, like the political crises or the problems instituting rule of law, something that requires tremendous societal trust and understanding of good governance. It tells us that the society needs to be built up before the economy can be mended. And it tells us that the very best Ukraine we can support is one of social cooperation and trust, which means we need to support confidence and community-building efforts that bridge Ukraine's regions, ethnicities and faith groups.

What of the future? Ukrainians of *all* stripes increasingly believe in their country's future and take independence for granted. Despite a great need for its power, Chornobyl was shut down last year. The economy is strengthening and likely will settle in to grow at 3 to 5 percent per year over the next 10 years. The Ukrainian government has normally functioning embassies all over the world. It has increasingly sound fiscal policies at home and mature relations with international trade and lending institutions. Its scholars and technicians are world-class. It has Sea Launch and the Antonov Design Bureau. It has Andrii Shevchenko the soccer star in Milan, that "Golden Fish" Yana Klochkova the swimmer in Kharkiv, and the Klychko brothers boxing to victory all over the world.

There are increasing numbers of pragmatic reformers in the central and regional governments, and the pull toward Western sensibilities of personal liberty and democracy is increasingly strong among a youth that no longer remembers the Soviet Union. During the recent political crisis, a noisy, critical independent press could not be suppressed. Negotiating between East and West, Ukraine has had to be wily and creative. And, finally, the recent papal visit brilliantly showed Ukraine to the world in its complexity and glory and, most importantly, in its essential Europeanness.

Even 12 years ago none of us would have imagined that so soon we would be standing here, highlighting the astounding achievements of this country, finessing the difficulties and watching Ukraine's colors – sky blue and wheat yellow – being raised here in Boston. But this is the way it should be with any normal country that we love, admire, get angry at, have our hopes in, and which holds us fascinated even from afar. *Ukrcino – mnohaya lita! Slava Ukraini.* Happy Birthday, Ukraine!



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- has a large library (over 35,000 volumes) on Ukraine, many archival holdings, and is able to serve scholars throughout the world. The on-line catalogue is in both Ukrainian and English.
- publishes scholarly publications (in Ukrainian and English) dealing with Ukraine, e.g.,
  - TOWARDS AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF UKRAINE: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1955 (1995, G. Luckyj and R. Lindheim, eds.)
  - PRO PRAVOPYS I PROBLEMY MOVY (1997, L. Onyshkevych, A. Humesky, A. Danylenko, M. Zubrytska, and D. Shtohryn, eds.)
  - SVITY TARASA SHEVCHENKA II (2001, L. Onyshkevych, A. Humesky, and I. Fizer, eds.)
  - KONKORDANTSIA POETYCHNYKH TVORIV TARASA SHEVCHENKA, 4 vols. (2001, O. Ilnytzkyj and Y. Hawrysch)
- organizes scholarly conferences or specific panels at national and international conferences on history, literature, language and other areas dealing with Ukraine.
- organizes weekly public lectures on topics related to Ukrainian studies.
- provides research grants (e.g., archaeological excavations in Baturyn) to scholars and scholarships to students (primarily in Ukrainian studies).

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

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