

The Millennium of Christianity in Rus' - Ukraine

Ukrainian Churches Under Soviet Rule: Two Case Studies

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw



Harvard University Ukrainian Studies Fund

The Millennium Series

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Soviet Rule:
Two Case Studies**

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Ukrainian Studies Fund
Harvard University
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The Ukrainian Studies Fund, Inc. was established in 1957. Its purpose is to raise funds for the establishment and support of Ukrainian scholarly centers at American universities. The organization has endowed three chairs in Ukrainian studies (history, literature, and linguistics) at Harvard University, and is in the process of completing the endowment of Harvard's Ukrainian Research Institute.

The Friends of HURI was established by a group of young professionals concerned about the cultural development of Ukraine and committed to the advancement of Ukrainian scholarship. The founding principle of this organization was two-fold: to seek financial support for HURI in the Ukrainian community and to draw the community into the academic and social life of Harvard University.

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FOREWORD

On the occasion of the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine the Ukrainian Studies Fund in conjunction with the Friends of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute has initiated the Millennium Series of seminal studies on historical and religious topics. The purpose of the Millennium Series is two-fold. First, although the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches are true successors to the Church formed in Kievan Rus' in 988, the Soviet state and the Russian Orthodox Church are attempting to portray the millennium as the thousandth anniversary of the Russian nation and of Russian Orthodoxy. Therefore it is vital that the West be informed about the religious history and culture of Kievan Rus' from the Ukrainian perspective. Second, Ukrainians themselves may not be aware of how much scholarly work has recently been done on topics relating to Ukraine's rich cultural and religious legacy. Therefore it is important to make readily available to all the heirs of Ukrainian Christianization a basis for re-examining their spiritual roots.

As part of the Millennium Series, the Ukrainian Studies Fund is presenting two works by Professor Bohdan R. Bociurkiw: "The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1920-1930: A Study in Religious Modernization" and "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy." One of the foremost scholars of religion in the Soviet Union, Professor Bociurkiw provides both extensive data and careful investigation to explain the fate of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches under Soviet rule.

As Ukrainians throughout the world approach the Millennium they are troubled by the current situation of religion in their homeland. Both the Ukrainian Orthodox and the Ukrainian Catholic Churches have been forcibly incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church. Although the Soviet regime has persecuted all religions, it has shown particular vehemence against the Ukrainian Churches. In reprinting these two articles by Professor Bociurkiw the USF seeks to increase public awareness of what Soviet policies toward Ukrainian Churches has been.

Harvard Ukrainian Studies Fund
Cambridge Massachusetts

I

THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALOUS ORTHODOX CHURCH, 1920-1930: A CASE STUDY IN RELIGIOUS MODERNIZATION

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

Modernization and religion remains a largely untouched problem in the scholarly literature on the post-1917 Ukraine.¹ While Soviet writings on religion and the church in the Ukrainian SSR have on the whole been concerned with the "unmasking" of the "reactionary" role of religion in socialist society and with "proving" its incompatibility with science and progress, the emphasis of the émigré and Western writers has largely wavered between martyrology and the politics of church-state relations in the Ukraine. Yet, perhaps even more so than the case of the Renovationist movement (obnovlenchestvo) within the Russian Church,² modern Ukrainian church history offers an example of a modernizing, religious organization which attempted to restructure the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine and reinterpret its doctrine in such ways as to bridge the gulf separating them from the contemporary Ukrainian political and social aspirations. This ecclesiastical organization which designated itself as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs³) forms the focus of this study. This essay will not delve into the continuing polemics concerning the "canonicity" of this church. Rather, we shall attempt to reconstruct briefly the

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genesis and evolution of the UAPTs and analyze the changing policy of the Soviet regime to the UAPTs culminating in the forcible "self-dissolution" of this church in 1930. In conclusion the paper will examine the principal structural and doctrinal changes introduced within the church by the Ukrainian autocephalists, and assess their significance from the viewpoint of the church's adaptation to political, cultural, and social change.

The revolutions of 1917--in their political, social, and nationalist dimensions--led to the rapid disruption of the traditional religio-political system in Russia represented by the symbiotic relationship of tsarist autocracy and Orthodoxy. This process culminated in a revolutionary disestablishment of the Russian Orthodox Church effected by the Bolshevik Separation Decree of February 5, 1918.

The secularization and expansion of the new revolutionary polity, to use Donald E. Smith's conceptual framework,⁴ involved a total secularization of education, law, and public life, a nationalization of the entire ecclesiastical property, and the imposition upon the church--now deprived even of a corporate status--of the far reaching polity dominance. The Soviet regime undertook a complete transvaluation of political culture with religion condemned to eventual extinction, to be replaced with a secular "political religion" officially designated as "Marxism-Leninsim."

In the Ukraine the secularizing impact of the Bolshevik rule was delayed by two years, by the emergence of at first autonomous and then independent Ukrainian statehood.⁵ Until 1919, the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was threatened not by the loss

of its established status but by the rise of the Ukrainian national church movement. From the perspective of this movement's leaders--a small group of the "nationally conscious" white urban priests, military chaplains, and lay intellectuals⁶--the Russian Orthodox Church appeared to represent a major obstacle to the national and social emancipation of the Ukrainian people; the church's past role as a legitimizer of autocracy, imperial unity, and the old social order, its hostility to the "Ukrainian separatism," its contempt for the Ukrainian language, its employment of religious sanctions against "rebels" (e.g., Mazepa) and, in recent memory, its close collaboration with the reactionary Union of the Russian People--all these features of the old religio-political system have contributed to the alienation of the large majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia from the established church prior to World War I. More and more of them came to dismiss religion as incompatible with modernization. The Ukrainian church movement which combined the renovationist objectives of the church's post-1905 "liberals" with the Ukrainian national and social aspirations, was determined to wrest the control of the church away from its conservative Russian episcopate, and infuse it with the Ukrainian values, culture, and language through the democratization of its structure. Hence the movement's three guiding principles of "autocephaly," "Ukrainianization," and "conciliarism." Perhaps more basic was the movement's desire to bring the church into the mainstream of the Ukrainian revolution as a legitimizing, integrating, and nation-building force that would bolster the fragile structure of the Ukrainian state.

The Ukrainian church movement failed to realize its objectives during the shortlived Ukrainian statehood.⁷ Opposed by the Russian episcopate and the conservative majority of the clergy, it was unsuccessful in its attempts to secure a timely and forceful intervention on its behalf either from the socialist-dominated central Rada or from the conservative Hetman regime. When finally the directorate decreed in January 1919 the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine⁸ it was too late. Before it could effectively "Ukrainianize" the church, the Ukrainian state was engulfed by the successive waves of the invading Bolshevik and White armies.

Paradoxically, it was only after the Soviet takeover of the Ukraine that the autocephalist movement centered around the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council (Rada) in Kiev, could successfully challenge the Russian control over the church through an ecclesiastical "revolution from below." Having "recognized" the Soviet separation decree⁹ (at the time when the Moscow Patriarchate continued its confrontation with Lenin's regime), the Ukrainian autocephalists took advantage of the new legislation by promptly "registering" a number of "Ukrainianized" parishes under the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council; by early 1920 the government formally recognized the "Union of Ukrainian Orthodox Parishes" as a separate ecclesiastical organization in the Ukraine under the All-Ukrainian Rada. Soon afterwards the Russian episcopate suspended all clergy of the Ukrainianized parishes to which the Rada responded in May 1920 with a formal proclamation of autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.¹⁰

The three year old struggle for control of the

church between Russian nationalism entrenched in the hierarchy and the upper clergy and Ukrainian nationalism of the lower clergy and lay church intelligentsia thus culminated in a split of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine into two hostile entities: the Russian (Patriarchal) Church headed by a Moscow-appointed Exarch, which derived its strength from its control of the entire hierarchy in an episcopate-centered church, as well as from its canonical continuity and habitual allegiance of the conservative majority of believers; and a minority Ukrainian Autocephalous Church centered around the lay-dominated councils (rady) which embraced the nationally conscious believers attracted by the national language and rites of the church and its message of national independence, ecclesiastical democratization, and social radicalism.

Having severed its links with the Russian episcopate, the All-Ukrainian Church Rada was able at first to secure archpastoral leadership for the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs) in the person of a retired Ukrainian archbishop, Parfenii Levytskyi of Poltava. However, when the Russian episcopate decided in February 1921 to unfrock all the Autocephalist clergy and ordered under threat of anathema an immediate dissolution of the UAPTs, Archbishop Parfenii broke his connections with the latter.¹¹ With no bishop now willing to assume the canonical leadership of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church or to ordain its episcopate,¹² the First All-Ukrainian Sobor of the UAPTs which met on October 14-30, 1921 took a fateful decision to create its own episcopate by resorting to what it claimed to be the practice of the ancient Alexandrine church.¹³ On

October 23, Archpriest Vasyl Lypkivskyi (b. 1864), the spiritual leader of the Ukrainian church movement and one of the organizers of the All-Ukrainian Church Rada (in 1919 he celebrated in Kiev the first Liturgy in the living Ukrainian language), was ordained Metropolitan of Kiev and All Ukraine through the laying-on of hands by the clerical and lay members of the sobor;¹⁴ then jointly with the sobor members, Metropolitan Lypkivskyi consecrated Archpriest Nestor Sharaivskyi as another bishop and late in October, the two hierarchs ordained four other priests as bishops for several Ukrainian dioceses. This departure from the established Orthodox procedures as well as a series of canonical reforms adopted by the 1921 sobor not only alienated some clerical supporters of the Ukrainian church movement, but also resulted in a virtual isolation of the UAPTs from other Orthodox churches which refused to recognize the canonical validity of its episcopate.

Nevertheless, despite a determined opposition on the part of the Russian church, the UAPTs rapidly expanded its following among the Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia. By early 1924 it embraced 30 bishops and approximately 1,500 priests and deacons serving nearly 1,100 parishes in the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁵ At the peak of its influence, the UAPTs might have had as many as three to six million followers.¹⁶ The UAPTs seriously weakened the hold of the Russian Church over the Ukrainian peasantry, especially in the provinces of Kiev, Podilia, Chernihiv, and Poltava, and it virtually deprived it of any following among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. During the 1920's the influence of the UAPTs spread beyond the Ukraine into Ukrainian settlements in Central Asia,

among émigrés in Western Europe, and in particular to the Ukrainians in the United States and Canada, where a separate diocese was formed (with some 148 parishes by 1927) under Archbishop Ioan Teodorovych.¹⁷

After 1922, regardless of the autocephalist protestations of loyalty to the Soviet system, Soviet authorities began to impose increasingly severe restrictions upon the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church which they accused of nationalistic tendencies. Having failed to force a merger between the UAPTs and the regime-supported "Living Church" in 1922-23,¹⁸ during the next three years, 1923-26, the authorities attempted to split the UAPTs by manipulating internal cleavages within its leadership, offering their support to "progressive" factions within its ranks--in particular the so-called "Active Christian Church."¹⁹ When the "Active Christian Church" failed to seize the control of the church, the Soviet police resorted in the summer of 1926 to repressive measures, arresting Metropolitan Lypkivskyi and a number of autocephalist leaders and ordering a dissolution of the church's central organ--the All-Ukrainian Church Rada. At the Second All-Ukrainian Sobor in October 1927, the authorities forced the dismissal of Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi who was replaced by Metropolitan Mykolai Boretskyi.²⁰

After a brief period of toleration during which the UAPTs was permitted to publish its journal Tserkva i zhyttia (Church and Life; 1927-28) as well as several religious books, the regime undertook, beginning in 1929, massive repressive measures against the autocephalist episcopate and clergy, closing most of the Ukrainian parishes. Charging

the UAPTs with collaboration with the recently "uncovered" underground "league for the Liberation of Ukraine" (SVU),²¹ the authorities staged in January 1930 the so-called "Extraordinary Sobor" which formally "dissolved" the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.²² Metropolitan Boretskyi and a number of other autocephalist leaders, including the church's principal ideologist, Volodymyr Chekhivskyi, were imprisoned or exiled. The remnants of the church (some 300 parishes) were allowed to reconstitute themselves by the end of 1920 as a "Ukrainian Orthodox Church" under Metropolitan Ivan Pavlovskyi of Kharkiv, but only after they renounced some of the principal ideas of the UAPTs and committed themselves to a total and unconditional loyalty to the regime.²³ Closely policed by the regime, this church was progressively decimated with its last parish suppressed in 1936.²⁴ Most of the autocephalist bishops and clergy and thousands of its lay activists perished in the bloodbath of the great purges.²⁵

In a manner characteristic of other dissident religious movements, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church based its initial claims to legitimacy on appeals to historical right, Apostolic teachings, and practices of early Christianity. Thus the Autocephalist "declaration of independence" (the so-called "First Letter" of the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Rada of May 1920) argued that the proclamation of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical independence from Moscow was merely the reaffirmation of the "virtual autocephaly," conciliar constitution, and national character of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine which the latter possessed before its unlawful annexation

by Moscow in 1686. For subsequently, the "Muscovite" church authorities, with the help of the tsars,

used prohibitions, banishments, violence and terror to abolish step-by-step not only the independence and conciliar constitution of the Ukrainian church, but almost everything in it that contained any characteristics of the national creativeness peculiar to the Ukrainian people.²⁶

The russification, centralization, and bureaucratization of the Orthodox Church--claimed the All-Ukrainian Rada--had alienated the Ukrainian people, denying them the full satisfaction of their religious needs. Accordingly, the autocephalist movement wanted to bring the church back to the Ukrainian people and the people into the church. But since 1917 the "Muscovite ecclesiastical authorities" have been sabotaging all legitimate attempts to revive the Ukrainian church and have shown themselves to be "not a good pastor, but an enemy of the Ukrainian people."²⁷

When the fateful First All-Ukrainian Church Sobor met in October 1921 in the Kievan Cathedral of St. Sophia, paramount in its delegates' minds were two questions: Was this gathering, in which no bishop participated, a canonically valid sobor, empowered to speak for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church? Could the sobor itself, in the absence of bishops, ordain the episcopate for the new church? With reference to the first question, the spiritual leader of the UAPTs, Archpriest Lypkivskyi argued for the recognition of the sobor's canonical validity as its members represented the entire Ukrainian church and as they gathered in Christ's name with firm belief in the presence of Christ and the Holy Spirit amongst

them.²⁸ Volodymyr Chekhivskyyi, the church's foremost lay ideologist, provided the answer to the second question. He advanced a thesis that since bishops in the apostolic times were consecrated by presbyters, the exclusive assumption of this right by the bishops represented a violation of the apostolic practice; since the grace of the Holy Spirit resides in the entire church, it should have the right to ordain its episcopate through its sobor representatives, despite the absence of the already ordained bishops, as this would simply be a return to the ancient practice of the Alexandrine church.²⁹ An overwhelming majority of the sobor members accepted the above arguments; a small minority of delegates, however, rejected this line of thought as a "Protestant deviation" and walked out of the sobor.³⁰

Having thus declared itself the genuine "voice of the Ukrainian church, inspired by the Holy Spirit," the 1921 sobor resolved that it should have the right to change those canons of the Orthodox church that, although established by the first seven Ecumenical Councils and justified in the past, could no longer meet the present vital needs of the Ukrainian church or further its organic development.³¹ This was indeed a momentous decision, for the sobor thereby assumed the prerogatives of the ecumenical councils and thus broke away from the established canonical framework of the Orthodox church. On this, relativistic, instrumental notion of the canonic rules were based all the subsequent innovations in the church rules introduced by the Kiev sobor.

The sobor proceeded to restructure the constitution of the Ukrainian church in an egalitarian, conciliar manner. "Episcopal autocracy" of the

traditional Orthodox church was declared a product of historical conditions and of a monarchic state, contrary to the spirit of Orthodoxy and the present needs of the Ukrainian Orthodox.³² "Among members of the Church there must be neither domination or coercion."

The constitution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church. . . shall henceforth be popular and conciliar (vsenarodnio-sobornopravnyi). The church itself should administer all ecclesiastical affairs. . . .³³

The episcopal, organization of the church was now to be replaced by a loose hierarchy of the lay-dominated, self-governing church councils (rady), from the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council heading the UAPTs between the All-Ukrainian sobors, down to the regional, district, and parish church councils. All church offices, including episcopal ones, were made elective.³⁴ The bishops and the clergy were to serve merely as honorary chairmen of the respective rady. Like the later "Living Church," the Kiev sobor declared that the "white," married priests shall have equal rights with the monastic clergy in elevation to the episcopal rank.³⁵ Rules governing the clergy were liberalized granting them the rights of divorce and remarriage, and allowing them to wear civilian clothes outside the church, shave their beards, and cut their hair.³⁶

The Autocephalists had shown little sympathy for the monastic clergy--the staunchest defenders of the status quo: "today's monasteries," resolved the 1921 sobor, "have departed a long way from their ideal and should be transformed in the direction of the ancient monastic religious-toiling communes. . . ."37

The sobor confirmed the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church proclaimed by the All-Ukrainian Church Rada in May 1920, and repudiated the seventeenth-century annexation of the Kiev metropolis by the Moscow patriarchate as an "immoral," "anti-canonical," and illegitimate act of violence.³⁸ The gathering also decreed the complete Ukrainianization of the church life, including a broad utilization of folk art and folk music in church rites, the revival of the historic Ukrainian religious customs and traditions, and a wide scope for "ecclesiastical creativity."³⁹ It also provided for the broadest participation of laymen in all phases of ecclesiastical life and emphasized the further development of church brotherhoods (a traditional form of the organized lay influence in the Ukrainian church) and the cultivation of lay preaching (blahovistia)-- a novum for the Orthodox church.⁴⁰

As for the church's relationship to the Soviet state, the sobor accepted the official separation of the church from the state as corresponding to "the teachings of Christ"⁴¹ and granting "freedom of confession in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic."⁴² At the same time, the gathering committed the church to an apolitical platform:

whoever introduces elements of coercion, of social class, political or national oppression into the life of the church should be⁴³ excluded from the church until he repents.

The 1921 All-Ukrainian Sobor represented a radical break with the canonical status quo, a break which, at least as far as the mode of ordaining the first two bishops of the church was concerned, was less a matter of choice than the consequence of the

unfavorable circumstances attending the birth of the UAPTs.⁴⁴ What emerged from the reforms effected by this gathering was a new church which, while professing to be Orthodox, severed its canonical links with other Orthodox churches. Its canons, doctrine, and organization combined elements of Orthodoxy with such apparently Protestant features as elected, married episcopate; abolition of rigid distinctions between priesthood and lay believers; lay preaching; conciliar self-government at all levels of the church; and, above all, a pragmatic approach to the Orthodox canons.

As could be expected, the Russian Orthodox Church (and later, the Renovatianist Church) now condemned the UAPTs as "anti-canonical," "deprived of Divine Grace," "heretical," and "Protestant" sect. Singled out as the sobor's chief "heresy" was its conciliar consecration of the new episcopate--hence the derogatory names of samosviaty (the "self-consecrated ones") or lipkovtsy (after the name of the first bishop of the UAPTs) or the "Ukrainian schism."⁴⁵ Despite some abortive attempts on the part of the UAPTs to establish relations with other Orthodox churches,⁴⁶ none of them has ever recognized the canonicity of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. A few of the bishops and the clergy of the UAPTs appeared to be troubled by the question of their "canonicity" as Orthodox,⁴⁷ but most seemed to have reconciled themselves to their ecclesiastical isolation. Indeed, they probably agreed with Metropolitan Lypkivskiyi's view that this isolation of the UAPTs, its "distinct stream of grace" offered the best guarantee of the church's spiritual independence from Moscow:

As long as it remains a Ukrainian church based on the principles established by the 1921 sobor, it cannot merge with anyone, and must pursue its own road, perhaps the most difficult one, but also the most dignified one.⁴⁸

The ecclesiastical revolution effected by the 1921 sobor could be viewed as a delayed extension of the idelas of the Ukrainian revolution into the ecclesiastical and religious-cultural spheres. The Autocephalist reinterpretation of the Orthodox doctrine sought to provide religious legitimation for the cause of the Ukrainian national and social liberation, while the structural changes within the church clearly reflected the movement's egalitarian, populist orientation. The restructured church clearly relied on those strata of the church which were most sympathetic to the nationalist cause and, at least indirectly, it aimed at "politicizing" the Ukrainian masses, at drawing them via the Ukrainian parishes and self-governing rady into the process of nation-building, at "awakening" the Ukrainian peasantry to the realization of their social potential.

To gain an insight into the nature of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, the underlying values, motivations, and goals of its leaders, we shall examine more systematically the Autocephalist "ideology" as it evolved during the 1920s. It will be analyzed especially from the viewpoint of its relationship to the rapid political, cultural, and socio-economic changes experienced by the Ukraine during its first decade of the Soviet rule. The Autocephalist writers⁴⁹ described their own ideology in terms of the following five principles: (1) The separation of the

church from the state; (2) autocephaly; (3) conciliarism; (4) Ukrainianization; and (5) Christianization of life.⁵⁰

The first of the avowed principles of the UAPTs--that of the separation of the church from the state--undoubtedly aimed at the church's adaptation to the new political reality: the traditional Orthodox formula of the "symphony" of spiritual and temporal powers could not anymore be applied with regard to the militantly atheistic state; moreover, it was this very separation principle of the Soviet religious legislation that enabled the Ukrainian autocephalist movement to wrest away from the Moscow patriarchate a number of churches in the Ukraine. Setting forth the pattern to be followed by other religious organizations in the USSR, the Autocephalist reformulation of church-state relations reached back to the pre-Constantine times, invoking Christ's distinction between "the things that are Caesar's and those that are God's." Only in separation from the civil power, where there is no mutual interference on the part of the state and the church, can the latter enjoy "true freedom," for being built on love, the church is incompatible with coercion--the necessary attribute of the state.

The church should be strictly apolitical. The church's efforts to obtain support and protection from the state, the resulting transformation of the church into a handmaiden of the state, a willing submission of the church to the exploitation by the state as a political factor, as well as hostile activities of the church against the state-- [all these] are contrary to the nature of the church. . . .⁵¹

By the same token, the church must be loyal to the

state--regardless of its form or regime--as the protector of order and justice in society, in accordance with the teachings of Christ and the Apostles. But should the truth of men (i.e., of the state) contradict that of God, "we shall courageously carry out the will of God."⁵²

Nevertheless, at least one of the submissions of the Autocephalist All-Ukrainian Rada to the Soviet Ukrainian Government⁵³ went beyond this prescription in its attempt to "prove" basic compatibility of the UAPTs and the socialist state--perhaps reflecting the influence of some radical socialist members of the church.⁵⁴ Yet the very same document insisted that "the church is not a political organization and cannot assume any party or state functions," and it pointedly proclaimed that "any persecution of the Christian faith is contrary to the truth of proletarian life."⁵⁵

Much more fundamental to the ideology of the UAPTs was its second basic principle--that of autocephaly--the ecclesiastical equivalent of the ideal of national independence from Russia. After the demise of the shortlived Ukrainian People's Republic, the Ukrainian church remained the one area in which this ideal could still be pursued; not accidentally and, of course, not unbeknown to the Soviet authorities, it was the UAPTs that offered a haven to many former participants in the Ukrainian liberation struggle, including some prominent Ukrainian intellectuals turned "internal émigres" within a political system they could not accept, and which would not accept them.⁵⁶ In demanding the autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, after the break-up of the Russian empire the Ukrainian movement neverthe-

less stood on firm canonical and historical grounds. Even after the collapse of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the largely fictitious "sovereignty" of the Ukrainian SSR was a strong enough argument for church autocephaly (which was indirectly admitted by the Moscow patriarchate when it offered its belated recognition to the autocephaly of the Orthodox church in Georgia in 1943).⁵⁷ Whatever arguments they advanced for the ecclesiastical independence of the Ukraine from Moscow, the Autocephalists firmly believed that subordination to the Russian church was not compatible anymore with the state of national consciousness in the Ukraine and represented a major obstacle to the still unfinished task of nation-building and that autocephaly was a prerequisite for realizing such other goals of the movement as the Ukrainianization and democratization of the church in the republic.

Ukrainianization--another basic principle of the UAPTs--was based on the premise that true religious experience can only be attained in a national church, in one's native tongue, in the familiar context of national culture. "Christianization of life," too, demands that the teachings of Christ be transmitted to the faithful in their own language; only when the people understand the services, rites, and teachings of the church can they meaningfully and creatively participate in church life. At the same time, this principle of the UAPTs antedated and later paralleled (and, to some extent, competed with) the official "Ukrainianization policy" of the Soviet regime, a policy which aimed at both the sinking of the regime's roots into the Ukrainian ethno-cultural ground and the political mobilization of the Ukrainian

masses. The Ukrainianization program of the UAPTs not only involved the replacement of Church Slavonic and Russian by the living Ukrainian language, but also included derussification of church rites, traditions, religious art, music, and other aspects of "ecclesiastical culture." The once ridiculed "market language" of the common people, viewed as "uncultured" and "unfit" for sacral purposes,⁵⁸ was--together with the peasant folk speaking this language--given a new sense of dignity and respect. According to the contemporaries, among the Ukrainian peasantry it was indeed the Ukrainian-language church services with their revived native rites and chants that offered the strongest attraction to the new church.⁵⁹

The most characteristic feature of the Autocephalist doctrine and practice--that of conciliar self-government (sobornopravnist)--was derived from the egalitarian, participatory self-government of the ancient Christian communities. But subsequently, argued the Autocephalist writers, the church was "corrupted" by monarchic and oligarchic principles as a result of the "Christianization" of the Roman empire. As it grew in power, wealth, and privilege, the church abandoned its conciliar practices and became increasingly alienated from the people, the process which was also due to the growing influence of the monastic clergy "who generally professed contempt for the world and everything temporal. . . ."60 In Russia, having been assimilated into the bureaucratic and police system of the empire, the Orthodox church "ceased to be apostolic and became an imperial [church]."61 At the same time, conciliarism in the UAPTs was rationalized as a revival of the traditional democratic practices of the Ukrainian church

before its absorption by Moscow.⁶²

"Live ecclesiastical creativity" also demands the fullest participation of laymen in all phases of church life. Being built on love and concord, church life excludes coercion; hence the only legitimate order in the church is that in which there is a conscious spiritual and moral identity between those who make decisions and those who carry them out.⁶³

In his somewhat idealized description of the Autocephalist parishes, Metropolitan Lypkivskyyi noted that

in the countryside, a Ukrainian parish leaves its peculiar imprint over the whole village, elevates it and unites it, gives it its aim--an idea to live for, Almost every Ukrainian parish has a composer of its own and sings his works in the church; in almost every parish there are homegrown poets. . .and chroniclers. This has already become a general feature of all Ukrainian parishes--beautiful choirs, both artistic and popular,[with] their own, self-taught choir directors, their own original songs;parish church councils meet every week, discuss all church matters, even look after the moral life of the parish like the ancient brotherhoods. Each Ukrainian parish has its own sisterhood, which looks after the cleanliness and the beautifying of the church,aids the clergy. . . . [and] on holy days, together with the parish council, the sisterhoods provide common meals for the poor and the visitors,a kind of fraternity develops among the individual Ukrainian parishes. One feels that precisely on this basis can one achieve the unity of our people.⁶⁴

Closely intertwined with the principle of conciliarism was the Autocephalist belief that both the apostolic succession and the gift of grace reside in the whole church, including its laymen. Accordingly,

the canons of the 1921 sobor significantly narrowed the gap between the priesthood and laity and largely reduced distinctions between the orders of the clergy to that of function, while the ecclesiastical potestas jurisdictionis was vested in the elected, predominantly lay rady and sobors.

The Autocephalist attempts to combine conciliarism with the institution of the episcopate and the insistence of the UAPTs on remaining genuinely Orthodox--could not but institutionalize within the church a tension between these two principles of ecclesiastical organization. Before long, the Soviet authorities began to exploit and manipulate for their own ends personality conflicts and factional cleavages which began to surface within the UAPTs largely as a result of difficulties experienced by the church in reconciling the autocratic tradition of episcopal rule with the modernized notion of ecclesiastical democracy ("radopraviiie").⁶⁵

"Christianization"--the last of the five major principles of the Autocephalist doctrine--was conceived as the mission of the church to Christianize human life, to fill in the chasm between Christian values and actual life. The UAPTs was to strive towards the realization of "the kingdom of social truth [justice] on earth," to impress upon society and the state the hitherto neglected social ideals of Christianity.⁶⁶ These ideals coalesce into a single precept--"love thy neighbor"--which, in the words of an Autocephalist bishop--calls for (1) the love of the "lesser brother" (the neglected, oppressed social strata); (2) love for other peoples; (3) the equality and brotherhood of men and nations; (4) the love of truth and, for the sake of truth, of those

who disagree with us; and (6) love of our enemies.⁶⁷

Viewed as a whole, the ideology of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church yields some striking analogies with the social and cultural ideals of the Ukrainian national movement, attesting to the interdependence of social-political and religious thought. Thus the Ukrainian intelligentsia's exaltation of the "people," or to be more precise, the peasantry as the mainstay of nationality and the repository of its cultural values and creative energies, finds its parallel in the UAPTs in the implicit recognition of the "people" as the bearer of divine grace and the locus of true piety and living faith.⁶⁸ In addition to the already noted parallel between claims to political and to ecclesiastical independence, we find an analogy between the democratic aspirations and procedures of the Ukrainian revolution and the autocephalist emphasis on conciliarism and egalitarianism. Furthermore, both political and ecclesiastical manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism reveal a markedly ethnographic, defensive notion of nationality, reflected especially in their sometimes exaggerated cult of the national language.

Some elements of the autocephalist ideology appear to be rationalizations of the frustrated aspirations of the Ukrainian church movement or justifications of the revolutionary methods, partly chosen by, and partly forced upon, the movement in the realization of its objectives. The canonical innovations of the 1921 sobor seem to be a case in point. In some ways, this can also be said of the autocephalist defense of sobornopravnist. Meeting hostile reaction on the part of the Russian episcopate, and finding little support from the clergy, the movement could

best promote its ends by introducing the conciliar principle in ecclesiastical government, whereby Ukrainian laymen could be relied upon to neutralize the Russian influence entrenched in the hierarchy of the church.

At the same time, allowance must be made for the influence on autocephalist ideology of the existing political situation in the Ukraine (i.e., the Soviet regime), whether in terms of the church's adaptation to the official values and norms (including the Soviet legislation on religion), or in terms of assuming a "protective coloring" to ward off harassment and persecution by the regime. This environmental influence can be detected in the autocephalist doctrine of church-state relations and in the social principles of the UAPTs, but it could have also played some part in the radical interpretation of the conciliar principle in the Autocephalous Church.

The ideology of the UAPTs, especially its ideals of autocephaly, Ukrainization, and conciliarism (so-bornopravnist'), found many adherents in the Ukraine, as it objectified and elevated to the level of conscious action the traditional national values and aspirations. There can be no better testimony to the vitality of the autocephalist ideology, despite the hindering effect of the canonical reforms of 1921, than the fact that both the patriarchal and the Renovationist branches of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine were compelled by their flock to adopt at least some of the autocephalist principles.⁶⁹ The revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church during World War II in the German-occupied Ukraine (however with a canonically ordained episcopate) further underlines the tenacity of the ideals

espoused by the UAPTs.⁷⁰

Soviet attitudes towards the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church underwent radical changes during the decade 1920-1930, changes which in part paralleled the shifts in the party's religious and nationalities policies. During its early years, the new regime maintained a relatively benevolent position vis-á-vis the Ukrainian church movement and placed no major obstacles in the way of the formation and initial expansion of the UAPTs.⁷¹ Underlying this official line were probably such tactical considerations as, on the one hand, the desire to undermine the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine which was compromised by its collaboration with the Whites and which continued to defy Soviet religious legislation; and, on the other hand, the hope of winning the sympathies of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the peasantry for the still unstable Bolshevik rule in the Ukraine. It also seems that the UAPTs was enjoying a degree of sympathy and support from the national communist minority within the Communist Party of the Ukraine, especially some Borotbisty and Ukapiisty⁷² who might have viewed this church as a useful vehicle for raising national consciousness of the peasant masses.

It seems that the regime did not expect at that time that the Autocephalist movement would soon get out of hand, develop mass following, and transform itself from a faction in the Orthodox ranks into a national church, preaching a revolutionary gospel that combined a revitalized Christian message with Ukrainian nationalism and social radicalism. The rapidly rising popularity of the UAPTs made the authorities more suspicious of the political implications

of the Autocephalist ideology. As Metropolitan Lypkivskyi was to observe some years later, the very idea of autocephaly "also conceals within itself the idea of political independence" and "educates the people in national consciousness."⁷³

Not long after the 1921 sobor, the Soviet Ukrainian press began to attack the UAPTs for the alleged betrayal of its "revolutionary" platform. Writing in June 1922, in the official daily of the Kharkiv government, Visty, V. Ellan (Blakytnyi) openly accused the Autocephalists of "counterrevolutionary" tendencies:

The first period of the Autocephalous Church's existence--the period of a 'revolutionary struggle against the monarchist church,' the period of 'revolutionary' phrase[ology]--comes to an end. A second [period] begins--the crystallization of the forces of the kulak counterrevolution under the domes of the conquered churches. And then, inevitably, there will come the third period--the attempt openly to attack our Soviet fortresses, riding the waves of the petty-bourgeois element. . . . The mask comes off the face of the yellow-blue⁷⁴ clericalism, and all those who have believed the mask and have followed the charlatans, will repudiate them. . . .⁷⁵

The press attacks signalled the start of a concerted campaign--that was to continue until 1926--at first, to intimidate the leaders and the following of the UAPTs, into joining the so-called "Living Church," and subsequently to paralyze the normal operation of the church and to split and destroy it from within through a succession of the so-called "progressive" and "loyalist" schisms to which the authorities and the OGPU were prepared to offer their open support.⁷⁶ Even if eventually the regime had had some success in "persuading" several Autocephalist bishops and a

group of clergy to launch a splinter "Active Christian Church," it soon discovered that it was much more difficult to break down or "re-educate" the large lay following of the UAPTs who overwhelmingly repudiated the "Active Church" faction through which the authorities hoped to win internal control of the UAPTs. The Autocephalist laymen and conciliar grassroots democracy proved to be the church's most reliable bulwark against the take-over and corruption from within by the so-called "progressives."

Its failure with the "Active Church" led the regime to adopt new tactics against the UAPTs. By 1926 the authorities resorted to direct administrative and police repressions, suppressing the activities of the All-Ukrainian Church Rada, and arresting the primate of the church, Metropolitan Lypkivskyi. The government made it now clear that the church would be allowed to function only if it would adopt a more "acceptable" policy, under such new leadership as would have the "confidence" of the authorities. By playing on the growing anxiety in the Autocephalist ranks about the future of the UAPTs and by encouraging hopes that the submission to the government's pressure might bring the church some of its long denied rights--the authorities succeeded in bringing about a change in the leadership and orientation of the UAPTs. There was a striking analogy between the line taken by the regime in the Ukraine and the tactics used to break down the remaining opposition in the Russian Orthodox Church.⁷⁷

In return for its "confession" of political sins and the purge of Metropolitan Lypkivskyi and some other "unacceptable" Autocephalist leaders as well as the church's adoption of a more "loyalist" line

vis-à-vis the regime and its submission to the stricter governmental control, the Soviet Ukrainian government allowed the UAPTs to resume its activities and to hold its second sobor in 1927. Despite the fact that some new concessions were now offered to the church,⁷⁸ including the dissolution of the "Active Church," the UAPTs had to pay an additional price for its survival in terms of the growing alienation of its grass-roots following who grew suspicious of the new Autocephalist leadership; some laymen now openly accused the new All-Ukrainian Rada of having "sold out" to the atheist state. Perhaps this deepening division between leaders and followers was one of the principal expectations motivating the shift in the regime's tactics towards the UAPTs.

By mid-1928, the Soviet authorities began to withdraw their recent concessions to the "reformed" UAPTs: its publications were suppressed and more and more of its churches and clergy were deprived of the official "registration" in the rising tide of antireligious campaign. By the summer of 1929, the OGPU began mass arrests of the Autocephalist leaders and clergy, without sparing even those who faithfully collaborated with the regime in "purging" the church. In November of that year the OGPU announced the "uncovering" of a "counterrevolutionary" League for the Liberation of the Ukraine and accused the UAPTs of having served as a "branch" of this organization⁷⁹--an accusation which amounted to a death verdict for the Autocephalous Church.

The end was not long in coming. Terrorized remnants of the Autocephalist episcopate and clergy were assembled at the so-called "extraordinary Sobor" in Kiev in January 1930 and "persuaded" to dis-

solve the UAPTs and to "confess" to all charges addressed against it by the authorities. The resolution of this "Sobor"--undoubtedly drafted with the participation of the OGPU⁸⁰--sheds some light on the motives underlying the Soviet decision to liquidate the UAPTs:

. . . after liberating itself from political-monarchic oppression, the UAPTs was not destined to become a true Christian church, free and removed from the peculiar nationalistic, chauvinistic politics (politykanstvo). This is a fact, because the UAPTs was reborn during the political struggle and it was revived and later led by people who had suffered defeat on the open political front and who, having joined the church, intended to, and actually did, exploit it as an instrument for further struggle against the Soviet regime and hence also against the justice of the social revolution.

It was natural that the leading organs of the UAPTs. . . revealed themselves through clearly non-ecclesiastical actions of a nationalist-political, anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary nature. The same can also be said of the clergy of all ranks, beginning with Metropolitan Lypkivskiyi. . . :

All this, accordingly, made the UAPTs a synonym of counterrevolution in the Ukraine Under the circumstances, it was completely logical that autocephaly should become a symbol of Petlurite independence, that Ukrainianization should be exploited as a means of inciting national enmity, and that conciliarism should transform itself into a demagogical means of political influence in order to reach the appointed end.⁸¹

What motivated the Soviet authorities in forcing "self-dissolution" of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church? To supply possible answers to this question, one has to place this event in the broader context of Soviet religious, economic, and nationality policies around the turn of the decade.

The period extending from the early months of 1929 to March 1930 featured an attack on religion unprecedented in its violence throughout the USSR, an attack which coincided with the industrialization drive and the forcible collectivization of agriculture. The 1929-1930 developments in the Ukraine revealed two major tendencies: on the one hand, all religious groups were affected by the new legal and administrative restrictions on religious activities and the Godless campaign of church-closing and "priest-baiting;" on the other hand, however, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was singled out for sweeping repressive measures and ultimate "self-dissolution" as an allegedly "political organization" engaged in "anti-Soviet," "counterrevolutionary" activities. The complete suppression of the UAPTs, after it had accepted the regime's terms in 1926 (analogous to those adopted earlier by the Living-Renovationist Church and, in 1927, by the Patriarchate), as well as the nature of the official charges against this church and the timing of its dissolution, point to considerations other than mere anti-religious zeal on the part of the Soviet Ukrainian authorities. Nor was it accidental that the Autocephalous Church was dragged into the affair of the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine," despite the lack of any convincing evidence to support the official charge that the former served as the "propaganda apparatus" and "military reserves" of the "League;" by lumping the UAPTs together with the "League," the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and a number of other Ukrainian institutions, the regime underlined the common object of its attacks--the Ukrainian nationalism in its political, religious,

cultural, and other manifestations.

The events of 1930 dramatized the reversal of Soviet nationality policy, from maintaining a balance between the Russian and Ukrainian nationalisms to a growing reliance on Russian nationalism as an integrating, centralizing force in an increasingly totalitarian regime. The struggle for the ecclesiastical liberation of the Ukraine, the autocephalist "Away from Moscow," could no longer be reconciled with the official formula of the "leading role" of the Russian people, which was now projected from the political sphere onto all the other facets of Russo-Ukrainian relations, including the ecclesiastical-religious sphere.

To be sure, Stalin's "Dizziness from Success" warning in March 1930⁸² brought about some abatement in the antireligious campaign. In the Ukraine, the well-purged remnants of the new "dissolved" UAPTs were allowed for the time being to organize themselves into a closely policed "Ukrainian Orthodox Church," but had to abandon the Autocephalist ideology, especially the principle of conciliar self-government.⁸³ Not a single Ukrainianized parish, however, was destined to survive the great terror. Though soon after, following the Nazi invasion of the USSR, Stalin would embark on a "religious NEP," never again would the Soviet authorities tolerate an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

One is tempted to ascribe one more motive to the Soviet decision to suppress the UAPTs and, that is, the long standing Bolshevik hostility--once articulated by Lenin--to any "refined," "modernized" religion as much more dangerous obstacle to the realization of the party's blueprint for society, than a

"primitive," "obscurantist," or "corrupt" religion. In his 1909 polemics against the so-called "bourgeois anticlericalism," Lenin accused the Octobrists of combating "the extremes of clericalism and police surveillance [over the church]"

in order to strengthen the influence of religion on the masses, to substitute more subtle and more advance methods of stupefying the people, in place of at least some methods which are too crude, too antiquated, and too played-out to achieve their purpose. A police religion will not suffice anymore to fool the masses--give us religion that is more cultured, renovated, more clever, one that would do its work in a self-governing parish--this is what capital[ism] demands from autocracy.⁸⁴

Elsewhere, in his articles on Tolstoy (1908-11), Lenin again voiced his hostility to modernized, refined religion. A "renovated" religion of love, purged of state domination, corruption, and obscurantism he considered a more dangerous enemy to the Bolshevik cause than the petrified established church:

. . . .the advocacy of one of the most vile things existing in the world--religion--and the attempts to replace the official priests by priests of moral conviction, represents the cultivation of the most subtle and, therefore, most loathsome kind of clericalism.⁸⁵

It may well be that the modernizing orientation of the Ukrainian Autocephalist Church--its attempts to update the Orthodox Church, to make it relevant to the rapidly changing society, to employ it as an instrument of nation-building--were no less important reasons for the Soviet suppression of this church than the regime's fear of Ukrainian national-

ism which, it believed, found its massive institutional expression in the UAPTs after suffering temporary defeat on the military and political fronts.

NOTES

1. For principal studies on the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine since 1917, see: Vasyl Lypkivskyyi, Istoriia Ukrainskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy. Rozdil VII: Vidrozhennia Ukrainskoi tserkvy (Winnipeg, 1961); Friedrich Heyer, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945 (Koeln-Braunsfeld: R. Muller, 1953); Ivan Vlasovskyyi, Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, vol. IV (New York-Bound Brook, N.J., 1961); and this writer's doctoral dissertation, "Soviet Church Policy in the Ukraine, 1919-1939," University of Chicago, 1961. For Soviet accounts of the UAPTs, see Vasyl Ellan (Blakytnyi), Ukrainska Avtokefalna Tserkva i ii poperednyky (Kharkiv, 1923); and Iu. Samoilovich, Tserkov ukrainskogo sotsial-fashizma (Moscow, 1932). Russian émigré interpretation of the UAPTs appears in K. V. Fotiev, Popytki ukrainskoi tserkovnoi avtokefalii v XX veke (Munich, 1955).

2. On the Renovationist Church, see Julius F. Hecker, Religion under the Soviets (New York: Vanguard Press, 1927); B. Titlinov, Novaia tserkov (Petrograd-Moscow, 1923); Sergius Troitsky, "The Living Church," appended to William C. Emhardt, Religion in Soviet Russia: Anarchy (Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1929); Heyer, Kirche; R. Stupperich, "Lebendige Kirche," Kirche in Osten, vol. 3 (1960); and this writer's "The Renovationist Church in the Soviet Ukraine, 1922-1939," The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., No. 1-2 (New York 1961), pp. 41-74. Of special interest are A. Levitin and V. Shavrov, "Ocherki po istorii russkoi tserkovnoi smuty," in Novyi zhurnal, Nos. 85-88 (New York, 1966-67); and A. Krasnov, "Zakat obhovlenchestva," Grani, No. 86 (1972), pp. 93-116; and Nos. 87-88 (1973), pp. 235-73. For a recent Soviet treatment of the problem, see A. A. Shishkin, Sushchnost i kriticheskaia otsenka "obnovlenskogo" raskola russkoi provoslavnoi tserkvy.

3. The abbreviation stands for Ukrainska Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva.

4. See Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

5. See John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952).

6. Most of them attended theological seminaries, where they participated in secret Ukrainian circles.

7. The maximum offered by the Moscow Patriarchate, in response to Ukrainian demands, was a limited autonomy approved by Patriarch Tikhon in September 1918. For details, see Dmytro Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy 1917-1923 rr. 2 (Uzhhorod, 1932): 328-30.

8. The Law on the Supreme Authority in the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church of January 1, 1919.

9. The Soviet Ukrainian Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church (adopted on January 22, 1919) significantly omitted the provision of the Russian Decree denying religious associations the rights of a juridical person (added only in 1921). See Iv. Sukhopliuev, Vidokremiennia tserkvy vid derzhavy. Zbirnyk zakonopolozhen. . . (Kharkiv, 1930). Ukrainian Autocephalists were the first ecclesiastical organization to recognize this Decree in the Ukraine.

10. "Vid Vseukrainskoi Provoslavnoi Tserkovnoi Rady do udrainskoho pravoslavnoho hromadianstva. Lyst pershyi" (May 5, 1920), reproduced in Tserkva i zhyttia, No. 1 (1927), pp. 120-23.

11. See Ivan Shram, "Iak tvorylas Ukrainska Avtokefalna Tserkva," Na varti (Volodymyr Volynskiy), Nos. 7-8 (May 1925), pp. 2-5.

12. During the summer and early fall of 1921, the All-Ukrainian Rada desperately searched for sympathetic bishops to consecrate two of its candidates for episcopal offices in the UAPTs. Hopes that the newly autocephalous Georgian Orthodox Church would assist the UAPTs in this respect, could not be realized due to Soviet-Georgian hostilities.

13. See Volodymyr Chekhivskiy, Za Tserkvu, Khrys-

tovu hromadu, proty tsarstva tmy (Kharkiv, 1922).

14. For description of the ceremony by a participant, see V. Chekhivskiyi, "Osnovy vyzvolennia Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserky," Tserkva i zhyttia, Nos. 2-3 (1927), p. 189.

15. See Vlasovskiyi, Narys, pp. 359-32.

16. In 1925, Archbishop Iosif (Krechetovich) of the same church, spoke of three million Autocephalists in Proiskhozhdenie i sushchnost samosviatstva lipkovtsev (Kharkiv, 1925), cited in A. Richynskiyi, Problemy ukrainskoi relihiinoi svidomosti (Volodymyr Volynskiyi, 1933), p. 6. Former secretary of the Renovatist Synod in the Ukraine, Archbishop Serafim (Ladde) estimated in 1929 the Autocephalist following at some six million in "Die Lage der Orthodoxen Kirche in der Ukraine," Eiche 10 [1931]:11-40.

17. In December 1923, Archbishop Teodorovych was sent by the All-Ukrainian Rada to assume leadership of a combined American-Canadian diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

18. See Zhivaia Tserkov, No. 3, (Moscow, 1922), pp. 19-20; Golos Pravoslavnoi Ukrainy, No. 4 (Kharkiv, 1925), p. 4; Heyer, Kirche, p. 95; and Lypkivskiyi, Istoriia, pp. 120-124.

19. See Sukhopliuiev, Ukrainski avtokefalisty, pp. 47-56; Lypkivskiyi, Istoriia, pp. 124-137; Komunist (Kharkiv), October 24, 1925; and V. Potiienko, "Tserkovna sprava na Ukraini," Knipro, August 1, 1925, p. 1.

20. Lypkivskiyi, Istoriia, pp. 144-166; Vlasovskiyi, Narys, pp. 198-207.

21. Izvestiia, November 22, 1929; Proletarska pravda (Kiev), December 22, 1929.

22. See Dmytro Ihnatiuk, Ukrainska avtokefalna tserkva i Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy (Kharkiv-Kiev, 1930), pp. 23-31.

23. For details, see this writer's "Soviet Church Policy in the Ukraine," pp. 288-295; Lypkivskiyi, Istoriia, 173-175; Samoilovich, Tserkov, p. 123; Dnipro, January 15, 1934.

24. See this writer's "Radianska tserkovna polityka i pravoslavna tserkva v Ukraini v roky 1929-39," in Samostiina Ukraina (Chicago, 1965-66).
25. Ibid.
26. Cited in Tserkva i zhyttia, No. 1, (1927), p. 120.
27. Ibid., p. 122.
28. Lypkivskyi, Istoriia, pp. 36-37.
29. Ibid., pp. 39-40; Chekhivskyi, Za Tserkvu.
30. Vlasovskiy, Narys, pp. 117-118.
31. Vseukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkovna Rada, Diiannia Vseukrainskoho Pravoslavnoho Tserkovnoho Soboru v m. Kyievi 14-30 zhovtnia n. s. 1921 r., 2nd ed. (Frankfurt a. M., 1946), pp. 3-4.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 7.
34. Ibid., p. 14.
35. Ibid., p. 14-15.
36. Ibid., p. 15.
37. Ibid., p. 10.
38. Ibid., pp. 4-7. Cf. [Vseukrainska Pravoslavna Rada], Pidvalyny Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserdvy, 2nd ed. (Tarniv, 1922), pp. 2-5.
39. Vseukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkovna Rada, Diiannia, pp. 7-12, 30-31.
40. Ibid., pp. 12-27.
41. Ibid., p. 8.
42. Sobor's resolution on the church's attitude towards the Soviet regime, reproduced in Michel d'Herbigny, S.J., "Documents inedits. 'L'Eglise Orthodoxe Panukrainienne' crée en 1921 à Kiev," Orientalia christiana 1 (June 1923):119.

43. Vseukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkovna Rada, Diiannia, p. 9.

44. Interview with the late Metropolitan Ioann Teodorovych, Philadelphia, August 1958. Cf. Archpriest Viktor Solovii, "Rozlam V Ukrainskii Avtokefanii Tserkvi ta sproby ioho likvidatsii" in Na shliakhu do iedynoi UAPTs (Sydney-Melbourne, 1957), p. 17.

45. Lypkivskyi, Istoriia, pp. 48-52.

46. See Tserkva i zhyttia, Nos. 2-3 (1927), pp. 139-148.

47. These anxieties among some members of the UAPTs were exploited by the Soviet authorities which actively encouraged them during 1923-26 to secede from the UAPTs.

48. Lypkivskyi, Istoriia, p. 48.

49. The most comprehensive treatment of the autocephalist ideology appears in an article by Archbishop K. Krotevych, "Do ideolohii UAPTs," Tserkva i zhyttia, No. 1 (1928), pp. 14-28. Also important in this respect are Chekhivskyi, Za Tserkva; Lypkivskyi, Istoriia; as well as a series of articles by the Autocephalist bishops M. Pyvovariv, K. Maliushkevych, and M. Karabinevych which appeared in Tserkva i zhyttia during 1927-28.

50. Krotevych, "Do ideolohii," lists also a sixth principle, "the union of churches," which seems to reflect the UAPTs' eagerness to overcome its canonical isolation.

51. Archbishop M. Pyvovariv, "Tserkva v derzhavi i ikh vidokremlennia," Tserkva i zhyttia, No. 1 (1928), p. 25.

52. Ibid., p. 31.

53. "Pryliudna zaiava zibrannia 22-29 zhovtnia 1922 r. Vseukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkovnoi Rady Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Avtokefalnoi Tserkvy," Pontificio Instituto Orientale Rome. (mimeographed, n.p., n.d.). According to Lypkivski, Istoriia, p. 128, this declaration--"written far too much in the spirit of 'class struggle' and 'dictatorship of the proletariat'"--was adopted in "order to rebut various

charges of counterrevolutionary activity, pro-Petliura orientation, etc., which were directed [by the regime] against the UAPTs." The adoption and announcement of this document "probably stopped further arrests" of the Autocephalist leaders.

54. The Declaration was reportedly drafted by Volodymyr Chekhivskyyi, the principal lay ideologist of the UAPTs, one of the former leaders of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party. Among the Autocephalist leaders were also such former Socialists as Archbishops Oleksander Iareshchenko and Ivan Pavlovskyyi, and layman Mykhailo Moroz who headed the All-Ukrainian Rada from 1919 to 1924.

55. "Pryliudna zaiava," p. 5.

56. Cf. V. Potienko, "Vidnovlennia ierarkhii Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy. Zapyzana dopovid na Zborkh Sv. Andriivskoho Ukrainskoho Bratstva v Sosnovytsiakh, 1 sichnia 1944 r."

57. See Zhurnal moskovskoi patriarkhii, March, 1944, pp. 6-8.

58. See, e.g., "Iz 'Molitovnika' Arkhiep. Oleksii, Kievlianin, December 23, 1917. Cf. Lypkivskyyi, Istoriia, pp. 54-55.

59. Lypkivskyyi, *ibid.*, pp. 90-91. A leading Ukrainian Communist V. Ellan (Blakytnyi), editor of the official government daily Visti (Kharkiv), admitted in early 1922 that "we do not control the spontaneous Ukrainianization, which is taking the form of Autocephaly even in the workers' districts." No. 77 (1922); cited in Ukrainskyi pravoslavnyi kalendar na 1958 rik [South Bound Brook, N.J., 1958], p. 127.

60. Pidvalyny Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, pp. 8-10.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

63. Krotevych, "Do ideolohii," p. 18.

64. Lypkivskyyi, Istoriia, pp. 101-102.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-117.

66. Pyvovaryv, "Tserkva v derzhari," p. 31.

67. Krotevych, "Do ideolohii," p. 22.

68. An interesting illustration of this tendency can be found in Metropolitan Lypkivskyy's use of such terms as "popular-conciliar consecration" (of bishops), "popular hierarchy," "popular metropolitan," "popular church," "popular grace" (narodnia blahodat), or even "new Ukrainian grace." See Istoriia, pp. 44-45, 50, 52-53.

69. Note, for example, a resolution adopted in September 1922 by a conference of delegates to an abortive Ukrainian Orthodox Sobor in Kiev convoked by the Patriarchal Church but banned at the last moment by the Soviet authorities; the conference resolved in favor of an autocephaly, Ukrainianization, and conciliarism for the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine but the predominantly Russian episcopate of the Ukrainian dioceses refused to take any decisive action on these demands. Later, a group of Ukrainian bishops led by Feofil Buldovskyy of Lubny seceded in 1925 from the Russian Church and proclaimed themselves as an autocephalous "Sobor of Bishops of the entire Ukraine" (see Ukrainskyi Pravoslavnyi Blahovisnyk [Kharkiv], no. 1 (1926), p. 9). The Renovationist Church in the Ukraine, though it remained largely Russian in leadership and orientation, also formally adopted autocephaly at its Kharkiv Sobor in May 1925 (see this writer's "The Renovationist Church in the Soviet Ukraine," pp. 59-67).

70. For the best available account of the wartime UAPTs, see Vlasovskyy, Narys, Vol. 4, Part 2, pp. 178-271.

71. On the rationale of the early Soviet policy with respect to the UAPTs, see an article in a March 1921 issue of the Kharkiv government daily, Visti, by Vasyl Ellan-Blakytnyi, "Tserkva chy shchoś inshe?" reproduced in V. Ellan-Blakytnui, Tvory (Kiev, 1958), vol. 2, esp. p. 252.

72. Borot'bisty, the left wing of the Ukrainian Social Revolutionary Party, were forced to "dissolve themselves" in March 1920, with a number of them joining the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, among them Ellan-Blakytnyi, O. Shumskyy, and H. Hrynko who were offered important posts in the

Ukrainian Party-State apparatus during the "Ukrainianization" stage of the Soviet nationality policy in the republic. Ukapisty (Ukrainian Communist Party, formerly the left wing of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party) continued in existence until their "self-dissolution" in 1925, with a number of Ukapisty joining the CP(b)U.

73. Lypkivskyi, Istoriia, p. 124.

74. Ukrainian national colors, repudiated by the Soviet regime.

75. "Zle prykladzhena mashkara," reproduced in Ellan-Blakytnyi, Tvory, pp. 271-272.

76. See this writer's "Soviet Church Policy in the Ukraine," pp. 253-269.

77. Cf. Fletcher, Study, chapter 1.

78. Including the publication of a journal Tserkva i zhyttia, a newsletter Tserkovni visti, and a few books.

79. Izvestiia, November 22, 1929. This was a completely unsubstantiated charge, according to Lypkivskyi, Istoriia, p. 169.

80. Ibid., pp. 169-171.

81. Ihnatiuk, Ukrainska tserkva, pp. 27-31.

82. Pravda, March 15, 1930.

83. See Lypkivskyi, Istoriia, pp. 173-175; Samoilovich, Tserkov, p. 123; and this writer's "Radianska tserkovna polityka."

84. "The Classes and Parties--Their Attitudes towards Religion," cited in V.I. Lenin, Religion (New York: International Publishers, 1933), p. 25.

85. Cited ibid., pp. 37-38.

II

*The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy**

BOHDAN R. BOCIURKIW

DURING THE SECOND HALF of the 1940's, in a series of co-ordinated official moves, the formal organization of the Uniate (Greek Catholic)¹ church had been virtually wiped out throughout the Soviet bloc² with most of its clergy either forcibly "converted" to Orthodoxy or driven into the "catacombs." Viewed from a larger historical perspective, the suppression of the Eastern Catholic Church in the Soviet sphere of influence represented but another, this time an eastward, swing of the pendulum of the centuries-long ecclesiastical struggle between Moscow and Rome, seemingly closing a chapter of history that opened with the Union of Brest in 1596. To a student of Soviet politics, the events of 1945-49 and their aftermath provide a rare insight into the nature and techniques of the Kremlin's church policy at the point where the latter converged with the régime's nationality policy, one of the principal variables of Soviet ecclesiastical policy.

This paper proposes to deal with only one, though by far the largest, of the Uniate Churches—the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, embracing at the time of its liquidation (in the Ukrainian SSR alone) four dioceses with a metropolitan, seven bishops, some 2,400 priests,

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¹The term "Greek Catholic" had been introduced in the eighteenth century by the Austrian authorities to designate all the Catholics of Eastern rite within the Empire. Among the West Ukrainians, this designation, as well as the more recent one, "Ukrainian Catholic," have largely replaced the historical name "Uniate." The three designations will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.

²Affected by the bloc-wide suppression of Eastern Catholicism were—in addition to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Eastern Galicia, the Carpatho-Ukraine, Poland, and the Prešov diocese in north-eastern Slovakia—the Uniate Churches in Western Belorussia (some 30,000 believers), Rumania (4 dioceses with 1.4 million faithful in 1932), and Hungary (1 diocese with some 142,000 members). See "Vatikan a pravoslavna cirkev," *Svetlo Pravoslávta*, No. 3-4 (July 1, 1950), p. 44; and Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union* (London, 1961), p. 226.

over 600 monks and 1,000 nuns, and nearly four million believers.³ With its descriptive element necessarily limited to manageable proportions, the paper will analyse such aspects of the problem as the motivations behind the Soviet decision to liquidate the Uniate Church, the techniques employed, the degree of success attained by the "re-union" campaign, the role played in these developments by the Russian Orthodox Church, and, finally, the larger political significance of these events.

I

Though it was only in September, 1939, that the Soviet annexation of the Western Ukraine brought the régime face-to-face with the problem of policy towards the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the two main considerations that were to enter into the formulation of such policy were readily identifiable in the Party's line on religion over the past two decades. On the one hand, there was the ideological compulsion to combat all religion as a scientifically untenable and socially harmful "illusion" presenting an obstacle to the realization of Communist society. On the other hand, there was the Leninist formula subordinating the anti-religious struggle to the larger political and economic objectives of the Bolshevik Party, above all, to the paramount consideration of the conquest and maintenance of political power.⁴ The inevitable tension between the Soviet ideological and pragmatic considerations has necessitated not only the continuous adjustment of religious policy to changing policies in such other spheres as economy, nationalities, and foreign affairs, but it has also led the Kremlin to discriminate among different religious groups according to their current political usefulness to the régime.

³According to the official Polish statistical yearbook for 1934, the Galician Metropolis of the Greek Catholic Church then embraced one metropolitan, 7 bishops and 1 apostolic administrator, 2,341 secular clergy, 609 monks (including 159 monastic priests), 1,060 nuns, one theological academy and 2 seminaries with 634 students, 145 novices, 32 monasteries and 139 convents, and 1,907 parishes with some 3.9 million believers (cited in Stepan Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* [Munich, 1947], p. 144; cf. *Svetlo Pravoslavia*, "Vatikan"). The Mukachiv diocese in the Carpatho-Ukraine (occupied by Soviet troops in October, 1944, and formally annexed to the Ukrainian SSR by the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of June 29, 1945) included before the war one bishop, 354 priests, 35 monks and 50 nuns in 5 monasteries and 3 convents, 281 parishes with 459 churches and 461,555 believers (R.N., "Holhota Unii v Karpats'kii Ukraini," *Zhyttia i slovo*, No. 3-4 [1949], p. 327). The calculation for the year 1945 is largely based on Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, pp. 144-45.

⁴See Lenin's article, "Ob otnoshenii rabochei partii k religii," first published in the Paris *Proletarii*, No. 45 (May 26, 1909).

In terms of its political rating with the Bolsheviks, Catholicism had been, since the early 1920's, accorded one of the least favorable positions in the sliding scale of official toleration. Beginning with the 1923 trial of Cieplak, Budkiewicz, and other Catholic leaders, the successive waves of persecution had by the late 1930's destroyed organized Catholicism within the U.S.S.R.⁵ Among the early victims of this campaign was the incipient Russian Greek Catholic Church under Exarch Leonid Fedorov, the first of the Uniate Churches suppressed by the Soviet régime.⁶

Several reasons could be suggested for this unrelenting official hostility to the Catholic Church: the latter's continued resistance to the more extreme provisions of the Soviet ecclesiastical legislation, particularly to the prohibition of religious instruction of the youth and the seizure of the consecrated church valuables;⁷ the Church's relative invulnerability to "Sovietization"; its close association with the Western-oriented national minorities, especially the Poles;⁸ and, above all, the Catholics' subordination to the Vatican—that "bulwark of the world reaction"—commanding a global ecclesiastical organization and pursuing policies that were deemed hostile to both the Russian people and international Communism.⁹

Most of these considerations entered into the shaping of the Soviet attitude towards the Greek Catholic Church. The latter, indeed, had

⁵On the little illuminated martyrology of the Roman Catholic Church in the U.S.S.R. from 1923 to 1939, see Albert Galter, *The Red Book of the Persecuted Church* (2nd ed., Westminster, Md., 1957), pp. 46–52; and Kolarz, *Religion*, pp. 197–204.

⁶Rev. Leonid Fedorov (1879–1935), a native of St. Petersburg, was appointed by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi as Exarch for the incipient Russian Greek Catholic Church at its first synod held in the Russian capital in May, 1917. By the time of his imprisonment and trial in March, 1923 (together with Cieplak, Budkiewicz, and thirteen other Catholic leaders), there were only some ten priests and a few thousand faithful in his jurisdiction (Galter, *The Red Book*, p. 41). The lengthy imprisonment decreed for Exarch Fedorov doomed his young Church, whose destruction was apparently motivated at that time by Soviet fears that it might become a bridge of understanding between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. For a brief biography of Fedorov, see Gregor Prokoptschuk, *Der Metropolit. Leben und Wirken des grossen Foerderers der Kircheneinheit Graf Andreas Scheptytzkyj* (Munich, 1955), pp. 91–93. An elaborate discussion of the 1923 trial appears in Francis McCullagh, *The Bolshevik Persecution of Christianity* (London, 1924), pp. 99–281, 329–52, 361–66.

⁷McCullagh, *The Bolshevik Persecution*, pp. 106–107.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 108–19; Boleslaw Szczesniak, *The Russian Revolution and Religion, 1917–1925* (South Bend, Ind., 1959), pp. 226–33.

⁹See, for example, the article by the chief Soviet "Vatican expert," M. Sheinman, "Poslevoennaia politika Vatikana," *Antireligioznik*, No. 5 (1939), pp. 7–14; and Iaroslav Halan, *Tvory* (Kiev, 1952), Vol. II, pp. 336–53. Cf. Kolarz, *Religion*, pp. 176–78, 181–82.

been treated in pre-revolutionary Russia with an even greater hostility than the Roman Catholics, as a spearhead of the Roman-Polish advance against "Holy Russia" and the means of separating the Ukrainians and Belorussians from Moscow.¹⁰ Unlike its Roman Catholic counterpart, the Uniate Church was in effect outlawed in the Russian Empire following the "re-union" at the Polotsk Sobor of 1839 (except for the Kholm diocese of the Uniate Church, which was formerly absorbed into the Russian Church only by 1875). Undoubtedly, with the Stalinist régime becoming, since the 1930's, increasingly receptive to the traditionalistic notions of the Russian national interest, this negative evaluation of the Uniate Church, reinforced by the awareness of its close identification with Ukrainian national aspirations, could not but influence Soviet policy towards this Church.

It may be that already at the time of the first Soviet occupation of the Western Ukraine (1939-41) the Kremlin had reached a decision to force the incorporation of the local Greek Catholics into the Russian Orthodox Church, and some evidence suggests that both the régime and the near-moribund Moscow Patriarchate were acting in concert towards this end. Thus, during 1939-41 the Soviet authorities had engaged in an intensive probing into the internal defences of the Church, a study of the divisive issues in its midst,¹¹ and a collection of incriminative evidence against it.¹² Beginning with 1940, the N.K.V.D. began to apply increasing pressure upon the prominent L'viv priest, Dr. Havryil Kostel'nyk,¹³ a controversial figure known for his outspoken critique of the Vatican's Uniate policies, to launch a schismatic movement within the Greek Catholic Church aiming at its separation

¹⁰See, e.g., Halan, *Tvoiry*, Vol. II, pp. 276-78, 288-330.

¹¹The Soviet police and "specialists on religion" had shown special interest in the "ritualists" (*obriadovtst*) among the Uniate clergy and in the personal and group tensions and animosities within the Church. See Mykhailo Khomiak, "Borot'ba ukrains'koi katolyts'koi tserkvy proty komunizmu," *Logos*, Vol. I, No. 4 (1950), pp. 284-85; and Milena Rudnyts'ka (ed.), *Zakhidnia Ukraina pid bol'shevykamy*, IX. 1939-VI. 1941 (New York, 1958), pp. 123, 140.

¹²This task was, reportedly, entrusted to the rector of the L'viv University, Bychenko, who, however, confidentially informed Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi of this, warning him of the "inevitable liquidation" of the Greek Catholic Church (Khomiak, "Borot'ba," p. 61). Similar inquisitory role ("to acquaint oneself with the perfidies of the Greek Catholic Church") was admittedly assigned to a Communist writer, V. Beliaev, dispatched to L'viv in the fall of 1939 (*Mystetstvo*, No. 1 [1960], p. 20). After the war Beliaev published a series of pamphlets and articles attacking the Uniate church, especially the late Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi.

¹³A brief sketch of Kostel'nyk's personality appears in Rev. Dr. Ivan Hryniokh, "The Destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Soviet Union," *Prologue*, No. 1-2, 1960, p. 20.

from Rome.¹⁴ Simultaneously, with the inevitable blessings from the authorities, the Patriarchate dispatched, in 1940, Archbishop Nikolai Iarushevich as the Patriarchal Exarch for the newly annexed territories¹⁵ and early in 1941 ordained Archimandrite Panteleimon Rudyk as the Orthodox bishop for the solidly Catholic Dioceses of L'viv and Stanislav.¹⁶

The Soviet press, while maintaining silence on the question of "re-union," left no doubts about the official estimate of the political and social role of the Uniate Church. Barely a month after the "liberation" of the Western Ukraine, the Kiev *Komunist* published a sweeping indictment of the Church:

During the entire history of the Uniate Church right to our times, the Uniate clergy performed the role of a faithful servant of bourgeois Poland in the Western Ukraine. They assisted her in the realization of a policy of

¹⁴See, among others, Kostel'nyk's pamphlet *Nova doba nashoi Tserkvy* (L'viv, 1926), in which he voices the then not unpopular (among the "white" Greek Catholic clergy) "Ukrainian-uniate messianism" with its disparagement of the dogmatic differences between the Roman and the Orthodox churches, the urge to restore the "purity" of the Eastern rite in the Uniate church, to "create ideology" in the Union, to bring together all Uniate rites and to make them an "equivalent countervailing power" between the East and West. For his criticism of the Vatican, Rev. Kostel'nyk was removed in 1930, both from the professorship in the L'viv theological academy and from the editorship of the ecclesiastical review *Nyva*. Nothing, however, in Kostel'nyk's inter-war pronouncements has pointed either to his desire to "reunite" with the Russian Orthodox Church or to his sympathies for the Soviet régime (see, e.g., his article "Persha zustrich z bol'shevykamy," reproduced in Rudnyts'ka, *Zakhidnia Ukraina*, pp. 15-27). Although the Soviet police tried to blackmail Rev. Kostel'nyk into organizing a split in the Greek Catholic Church by arresting his 17-year-old son (who evidently was executed in June, 1941), Kostel'nyk successfully resisted the pressure (Khomiak, "Borot'ba," No. 4 [1950], pp. 285-86; cf. Hrynioch, "The Destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," p. 21). At the same time, the authorities attempted to "convince" Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislav and his vicar, Bishop Liatyshevs'kyi, to challenge the jurisdiction of their superior, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi (Khomiak, "Borot'ba," No. 4 [1950], p. 286).

¹⁵In January, 1941, while visiting the sole Orthodox parish in L'viv, he issued a call for the "re-union of the Greek Catholics with the Russian Orthodox Church" (*ibid.*, No. 1 [1951], pp. 60-61).

¹⁶Earlier the Patriarchate tried unsuccessfully to entrust the task of "conversion" of the Uniates to Archbishop Oleksii (Hromads'kyi) of Kremianets'. Later, on August 1, 1941, Oleksii wrote to one of his fellow-bishops: ". . . I was left at first [after the 1940 "reunion" with Moscow] only with Kremianets' region with a title of [a bishop of] Halych and Ternopil' and with an order to convert the Uniates to Orthodoxy. However, I wrote then to Metropolitan Sergei [of Moscow] that the one-year-old Bolshevik rule provoked such a hatred of Moscow that one must place a cross for a long time over the Orthodox mission in Galicia. This is why Archimandrite Panteleimon was consecrated as bishop of L'viv. . ." (*ibid.*, p. 62).

brutal exploitation and inhuman national oppression of the people of the Western Ukraine. The Uniate metropolitan, the bishop, the priest, [and] the monk were faithful servants of the counter-revolution, traitors to the interests of the people, its enemies. . . .¹⁷

However grotesque, these lethal charges were apparently designed to intimidate the clergy and undermine its lay support; yet they neither attained these objectives nor were they followed up at the time by a frontal assault upon the Church. To be sure, the new régime hastened to nationalize the land holdings of the Church and promptly closed its monasteries, theological schools, publications, charitable institutions, and lay organizations. Yet it failed to introduce some of the most destructive provisions of the Soviet ecclesiastical legislation,¹⁸ nor was the Union of the Militant Godless evidently permitted to extend its organizational network into the Western Ukraine.¹⁹ While discriminatory taxation was imposed upon the clergy and a number of the latter were arrested with over forty priests either deported or executed,²⁰ the Soviet measures against the Greek Catholic episcopate—despite the latter's resistance to anti-religious measures²¹—did not extend beyond the rather awkward attempts to plant informers in

¹⁷F. Iastrebov, "Uniaty'ke dukhivnytstvo na sluzhbi u pol'skoho panstva," *Komunist*, October 9, 1939. A somewhat less distorted assessment of the Union appeared in the journal of the League of Militant Godless, *Antireligioznik*: I. El'vin, "Tserkov' na sluzhbe pol'skikh panov," November, 1939, pp. 21–26; and V. Rozhitsyn, "Uniiia," October, 1939, pp. 56–57.

¹⁸In particular such provisions as the nationalization of church buildings and their contents, the transfer of the churches and clergy under the control of the lay "twenties," and the enforcement of the prohibition of religious instruction by the clergy of the youth under the age of eighteen. See Ivan Sukhopluev, *Vidokremleunia tserkvy vid derzhavy. Zbirnyk zakonopolozhen' S.R.S.R. i U.R.S.R., instruktсии, obizhnykiu i poisnen' Narkomvnusprav U.R.S.R.* (Kharkiv, 1930).

¹⁹N. S. Timasheff, *Religion in Soviet Russia (1917–1942)* (London, 1943), pp. 143–44. The contents of *Antireligioznik* for the period under discussion tend to confirm Professor Timasheff's statement.

²⁰Khomiak, "Borot'ba," Vol. II, No. 1, p. 63; Iaroslav Nahurs'kyi, "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi v litakh 1939–40," *Zhyttia i slovo*, No. 2 [Autumn, 1948], p. 161. M. Rudnyts'ka (*Zakhidnia Ukraina*, pp. 140–41) supplies a list of twenty-eight priests who disappeared without trace from the L'viv diocese alone.

²¹See the pastoral letters of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi addressed to the clergy and believers during the years 1939–40, reproduced in *L'vūs'ki Arkhyeparkhial'ni Vidomosti*, Vols. LII [1939] and LIII [1940]. Most of the Metropolitan's messages aim at the countering of the régime's atheist propaganda, especially among the youth. On several occasions, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi protested to the Kiev and L'viv authorities against such Soviet measures as the barring of the clergy from attending the sick and dying in hospitals and the banning of religious practices in schools (see Khomiak, "Borot'ba," Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 282–83; and *First Victims of Communism, White Book on the Religious Persecution in Ukraine* [Rome, 1953], pp. 27–28). Convoked in May, 1940, the Archdiocesan

their entourage.²² Indeed, during the first Soviet occupation of the Western Ukraine, the new authorities displayed considerable caution in dealing with the Greek Catholic Church, a caution apparently dictated by the uncertain international situation and the strategically exposed character of this newly annexed territory, as well as by the strong popular base and internal cohesiveness of the Church.²³

II

The second Soviet occupation of the Western Ukraine in 1944 placed the local Greek Catholic Church in a much more vulnerable position than during its first encounter with the Bolshevik régime. The mass exodus of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the face of the returning Red Army not only seriously weakened the Church's lay base, but it also swept along some 10 per cent of the Uniate clergy.²⁴ On November 1, 1944, the aged Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi passed away, his death deprived the Church—at the most critical time of its existence—of a world-renowned leader who over his forty-three years on the metropolitan see of L'viv forged a unique hold over the clergy and the people of the Western Ukraine.²⁵ The strategic position of this territory that may have restrained the Soviets in dealing with the Church in 1939–41 was now fundamentally changed; by the early spring of 1945 the Soviet armies were storming Berlin with the frontiers of the Kremlin's *imperium* soon extending to the Danube and Elbe. The open moral support given by the Greek Catholic Church to the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the three-year German occu-

Sobor of the Metropoly (the first such gathering since 1891) protested against the liquidation of the monasteries and nunneries and the confiscation of church property, and excommunicated those engaged into, or profiting from, this confiscation (Khomiak, "Borot'ba," Vol. I, No. 4, p. 283).

²²*Ibid.*, p. 286.

²³Despite determined Soviet attempts to weaken the Church, not a single member of the Greek Catholic clergy had publicly renounced the priesthood or defied the authority of the hierarchy during the years 1939–44.

²⁴Some 250–300 Greek Catholic priests left the Western Ukraine before the return of the Red Army in 1944 (*Svitlo*, No. 4, 1960, p. 158). On Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's efforts to arrest the exodus of the clergy, see Rev. I. Hryniokh, *Sluha Bozhiji Andrei—Blahovisnyk Iednosty* (Munich, 1961), p. 22.

²⁵It is significant that in March, 1946, having just "voted" to dissolve the Greek Catholic Church, the participants in the L'viv Sobor held a service commemorating Sheptyts'kyi as "precursor of re-union" (with the Russian Orthodox Church), despite the appearance of vicious attacks against the late Metropolitan in the Soviet press at that time (see *Dziannia Soboru Hreko-Katolyts'koi Tserkvy, 8–10 bereznia 1946, u L'vovi*, [L'viv, 1946], pp. 136–37). As late as 1958, Sheptyts'kyi's portrait was still displayed in the [now Orthodox] Archbishop's palace in L'viv (Kolarz, *Religion*, p. 241).

pation had now exposed the Church to charges of "treason to the Soviet Fatherland."²⁶ Moreover, it now had to face in the revitalized Moscow Patriarchate a powerful and aggressive rival, officially praised for its contribution to the Soviet war effort and enjoying the support of Stalin's government.

The momentous change in the relations between the régime and the Russian Orthodox Church, epitomized in the "concordat" of September, 1943,²⁷ could not help but crystallize the Soviet decision to liquidate the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church by the way of its "reunion" with the Russian Church in the tradition of the nineteenth-century tsarist church policy. From the Soviet point of view, the immediate political benefits of such a line of action apparently outweighed the long-range ideological considerations and the embarrassment of employing the organs of an atheist state as part-time "missionaries" for the "patriotic church." An outright suppression or even a mere "self-dissolution" of the Uniate Church would have provoked a greater popular resistance locally and a more adverse reaction abroad, at the time when the Kremlin continued to cultivate the image of a "new" and "democratic" Russia. The display of naked force involved in such a suppression would have had a disturbing effect not only upon the Roman Catholics but also upon the Orthodox within the U.S.S.R. and in the areas of Soviet expansion; and, finally, the destruction of a formal ecclesiastical structure, as the Bolsheviks had learned from their past experience, did not do away with the religious beliefs and practices among the laymen, but indeed magnified the problems of their surveillance and control. On the other hand, by staging a "reunion" with Orthodoxy, the régime could have expected to exploit some divisive issues within the Greek Catholic clergy (for

²⁶Both by virtue of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's unique position as a spiritual and national leader of the Western Ukraine and because of the important part traditionally played by the Uniate clergy in the leadership of the public and cultural life, the Church could not escape involvement in the massive nationalist movement that "surfaced" with the Bolshevik retreat from the country, only to descend again into semi-legality and underground as the Germans unfolded their plans for the Ukraine. The Church's moral support of the Ukrainian nationalist movement cannot, however, be construed as "support of the German Fascists." The Church's record, incidentally, in protecting members of the Jewish minority against Nazi extermination measures can be favourably compared with that of any of the Churches in Nazi-occupied Europe. See, e.g. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945* (New York, 1955), pp. 171-72.

²⁷The term "concordat" is used here figuratively to denote the wartime reconciliation between the régime and the Russian Church, culminating in the celebrated meeting of Stalin and Molotov with the patriarchal *locum tenens*, Metropolitan Sergei, and Metropolitans Alexei and Nikolai on September 4, 1943.

example, the questions of the celibate and the rite), to create a more persuasive fiction of a "voluntary" conversion, and, by bringing the Uniate flock into the controlled framework of the "loyal" Church, to minimize the extra-legal, "catacomb" church practices. The outright suppression or the annexation of the Greek Catholic Church to the Moscow Patriarchate was not, of course, the only possible way of dealing with the Uniate problem. In fact, the precedents of the Soviet church policy pointed rather to such devices as splitting the Church by sponsoring in its midst a "renovationist" or "patriotic" faction, staging a "progressive" *coup* to purge the religious group of a "reactionary" leadership, or, simply, reducing the Church by the appropriate doses of atheist propaganda, economic hardships, administrative harassment, and terror to a state of "neither life nor death," as indeed had become the case with the Russian Orthodox Church during the thirties, before the reversal of the Kremlin's tactics on religion.

To provide a more complete explanation of the Soviet motivation behind the liquidation *and* conversion of the Ukrainian Uniates to Orthodoxy, one must also make allowance for the impact of Russian nationalism upon the thinking of Soviet leaders at that time, and, at least indirectly, for the impact of the historical trustee of the Russian national interest, the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter, notwithstanding its ideological differences with the Party, made common cause with the régime, not only in defence of Russia against the German invaders, but also in the preservation and enlargement of the imperial patrimony. Their partnership in the struggle against Ukrainian nationalism and its ecclesiastical base in the Western Ukraine, the Union, could not but recommend to them the precedents of 1839 and 1875.

III

The techniques applied in the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church combined the well-tried methods of Soviet anti-religious warfare with some of the devices employed by the tsarist régime to convert the Uniates in the territories annexed after the partitions of Poland. Several interlocking stages could be detected in the process of the liquidation of the Union: (1) psychological preparation; (2) arrests of the leaders; (3) the emergence of a "patriotic" leadership to fill the void; (4) the intervention of the Moscow Patriarchate; (5) "re-education" of the Uniate clergy; (6) "voluntary" dissolution of the Union with Rome and a "reunion" with the Russian

Orthodox Church; and (7) the liquidation of the survivals of the Union.

Psychological preparation. The events immediately following the death of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi in November, 1944, did not indicate any change in the official treatment of the Uniáte Church. The authorities permitted the Church to hold an elaborate funeral ceremony for the deceased Metropolitan²⁸ and did not interfere with the enthronement of his successor, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyi; indeed the publication in the official press of reports on the latter's succession to the Galician see seemed to imply the régime's recognition of the new head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.²⁹ On its part, the Church actively sought to reach a more stable *modus vivendi* with both the Soviet government and the Moscow Patriarchate sending its delegation to confer with the governmental Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults in Moscow and to welcome the new Patriarch of Moscow, Alexei, on the occasion of his enthronement in January, 1945.³⁰

Before long, however, the authorities began to apply increasing pressure upon the Uniáte leadership to furnish further "proofs" of their loyalty to the régime by underwriting some of the latter's propaganda measures and joining with the authorities in actively combating the Ukrainian nationalist movement.³¹ When the Uniáte leadership failed, allegedly, to satisfy fully the Soviet demands,³² the authorities began to apply sanctions against the Church, including the suppression of the normal lines of communication between the episcopate and the parish priests. Thus insulated, rank-and-file clergy were now compelled to attend regional anti-Uniáte "enlightening" conferences conducted by Soviet officials.³³ By the spring of 1945 a vast campaign of slander and intimidation opened in the Soviet Ukrainian press

²⁸*First Victims of Communism*, p. 32.

²⁹*Pravda*, November 4, 1944.

³⁰The delegation consisting of Abbot Klymentii Sheptyts'kyi (brother of the late Metropolitan) and priests Kostel'nyk, Buchyns'kyi, and Kotiv reportedly carried to Moscow the Church's donation of 100,000 rubles for the Soviet Red Cross. Halan, *Tvory*, Vol. II, p. 285; *First Victims of Communism*, p. 32. The Ukrainian Catholic monthly *Svitlo* (No. 4, 1955, p. 31) reveals that the delegation was accorded a "hostile reception" in Moscow.

³¹*First Victims of Communism*, pp. 32-33; Hrynióch, "The Destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," p. 8; see also V. Beliaev, *Nauka i religiiá*, No. 11, 1960, pp. 66-67.

³²*First Victims of Communism*, p. 33; cf. Halan, *Tvory*, Vol. II, pp. 285, 381-82.

³³M. Dyrda, "Za chervonym murom," *Svitlo*, No. 11, 1946, pp. 2-3.

and radio.³⁴ Recalling by its violence the witchhunts of *Yezhovshchina*, this campaign featured increasingly grave political charges against the Greek Catholic Church—including espionage, treason, and subversion—demanding severe punishment for its leaders and urging the “uncorrupt” part of the clergy to abandon the Union and “return” to Orthodoxy.³⁵ To quote a typical passage from the principal official mouthpiece of this campaign, the writer Iaroslav Halan:

Our Soviet state had inserted in its fundamental law the inviolable and unbreakable words about the freedom of conscience. It does not interfere with one's own religious conviction. But one cannot look on calmly, when the servants of the Uniate Church exploit this freedom of religion in order to engage in criminal activities against the Ukrainian people, in the interests of Fascist Germany in the past [and] today for the glory and benefits of the Anglo-Saxon imperialists. Before the servants of the gods of swastika and trident there lies [only] one road—the road of treason against the people, the road of crimes, murders, monstrous frauds, lies, and deceit. This road will inevitably bring them to catastrophe. The people are merciless towards their mortal enemies, regardless of the clothes they wear. . . . The bloody activity of these criminals must be stopped decisively. . . .³⁶

Arrests of the leaders. Early on April 11, 1945, the N.K.G.B. simultaneously arrested the entire Greek Catholic hierarchy in the Western Ukraine, including Metropolitan Slipyi of L'viv and four bishops.³⁷

³⁴The campaign opened on April 6, 1945, with the publication in the L'viv daily, *Vil'na Ukraina*, of a violently anti-Uniate article, “Z khrestom chy nozhem? (With a cross of a knife?)” by V. Rosovych (V. Halan). Significantly, this article does not yet raise the issue of “re-union with the Russian Orthodox Church.

³⁵See, e.g., Halan's 1945 pamphlet “Sheho take uniiia? (What is Union?)” (reproduced in *Tvory*, Vol. II, pp. 288–330). The pamphlet which endorses the once condemned official tsarist version of the “reunion” of the Uniates in 1839 and 1875, indicts the Union with Rome as an attempt of “enemies” and “traitors” to split a “single family of Russian peoples.” Halan leaves no doubt as to the alternatives open to the Ukrainian Greek Catholics; either the “return to the faith of the ancestors” or “inevitable” “perdition.” Halan's anti-Uniate writings (which were disseminated in large printings during the “reunion” campaign in the West Ukrainian *oblasti*) abound in such characterizations of Catholicism as “a Fascist form of Christianity,” “citadel of American espionage,” “bastion of reaction,” “born in darkness, grown in human blood, parasiting on the wounds of mankind, the Vatican clique [represents] an ugly child of eternal meanness, a belated regurgitation of the sinister past, a crying anachronism” (*ibid.*, pp. 360–361, 363).

³⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 386–87.

³⁷Arrested, together with Metropolitan Josyf Slipyi, were his Auxiliary Bishop, Nykyta Budka, Bishop Mykola Charnets'kyi (Apostolic Visitor of Volhynia, residing in L'viv at that time), Bishop Hryhorii Khomyshyn of Stanislav, and his Coadjutor, Bishop Ivan Liatsyhev's'kyi. During a lengthy search of the Metropolitan's palace in L'viv and the Bishop's residence in Stanislav, all church archives were seized by the N.K.G.B. (later some documents from these archives

and began to round up leading members of the secular and monastic clergy. After a lengthy investigation in Kiev, the bishops were indicted by the end of February, 1946, for alleged "traitorous activities and collaboration with the German occupation forces"³⁸ and subsequently sentenced to long terms of forced labour.³⁹ In the meantime, the authorities took measures to prevent the election by the Uniate clergy of capitular vicars to administer the vacant sees.⁴⁰ At the same time, the provisions of the 1929 Soviet ecclesiastical code, hitherto held in abeyance in the Western Ukraine, were now put into effect. Accordingly, Soviet authorities began compiling an inventory of all ecclesiastical property, transferring the parishes under the control of the government-approved committees of laymen ("twenties"⁴¹) and pro-

were used in anti-Uniate propaganda). See Halan, *Tvory*, Vol. II, p. 382; and *First Victims of Communism*, p. 33. Shortly afterwards, in June, 1945, Soviet police in Berlin arrested another member of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic hierarchy, Msgr. Petro Verhun, Apostolic Visitor for Germany (Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, p. 139).

³⁸See the announcement of the Procuracy of the Ukr. S.S.R. reproduced in *L'Osservatore Romano*, No. 241, October 14-15, 1946.

³⁹After a trial in camera held in Kiev in 1946, the following sentences were imposed: Metropolitan Slipyi, eight years of forced labour; Bishop Khomyshyn, ten years; Bishops Budka and Liatyshevs'kyi, eight years; and Bishop Charnets'kyi, five years. While under the pre-trial investigation, the Uniate episcopate was reportedly subjected to severe pressure to renounce Rome and to join the Russian Orthodox Church (*First Victims of Communism*, p. 36). Metropolitan Slipyi, the only survivor among the arrested bishops, having served more than seventeen years of forced labour and administrative exile in Siberia, was released from the U.S.S.R. early in 1963 in a gesture of Soviet "good will" towards the Vatican. Bishop Khomyshyn died in a Kiev prison in January, 1947. Bishop Budka passed away in October, 1949, in the Karaganda region of Kazakh S.S.R. Msgr. Verhun died in Siberian exile in February, 1957. Bishops Liatyshevs'kyi and Charnets'kyi, after serving ten-year sentences, were allowed to return around 1955 to the Western Ukraine but were officially prohibited to perform any sacerdotal functions. Liatyshevs'kyi died in Stanislav on November 28, 1957; Charnets'kyi, in L'viv, on April 2, 1959. See *Svitlo*, February, 1957, p. 6; April, 1957, pp. 8-9; February, 1958, pp. 11-12; and *Logos*, April-June, 1959, pp. 82-83.

⁴⁰Following the arrest of the episcopate, Canons of the L'viv Archdiocese reportedly elected Rev. O. Gorchyns'kyi as the Vicar Capitular, who was immediately arrested by the N.K.G.B.; the same fate was suffered by his successor, Rev. M. Galian (Dyrda, "Za chervonym murom," p. 3). In May, 1945, the functions of the Vicar for Stanislav Diocese were assumed by a Basilian abbot, V. Balahurak, who managed for some time to continue his "illegal" functions and to maintain "illegal contact with Rome," until his discovery and arrest by the Soviet police (A. Z. Shysh, "Antynarodnia diial'nist' uniats'koi tsery," *Pytannia ateizmu* [Kiev, 1958], p. 173).

⁴¹All church property has, since 1919, been nationalized in the Ukr.S.S.R., with the church organizations deprived of the rights of a juridical person. Church buildings and all other "cult implements" must be formally "leased" from the government agencies by local (parish) groups of twenty laymen who sign a

hibiting sacerdotal functions by clergymen, except upon their "registration" with the authorities.⁴²

Emergence of a "patriotic" leadership. With the Uniate Church leaderless and thrown into confusion and panic, there emerged into the open on May 28, 1945, the so-called "Sponsoring (*Iniitsiatyvna*) Group for the Re-Union of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church." Led by a well-known L'viv priest, Havryil Kostel'nyk, long "conditioned" by the Soviet security organs,⁴³ the "group" proclaimed itself the only legal leadership of the Church.⁴⁴ On June 18, 1945, despite the overwhelming Uniate opposition to such self-appointed leadership,⁴⁵ the Soviet Ukrainian government issued an instruction whereby the "Sponsoring Group" was "officially recognized as the sole provisional ecclesiastical and administrative organ having the right to direct without reservation the existing Greek Catholic parishes in the Western *oblasti* of the Ukraine and promote their re-union with the Russian Orthodox Church." The "Group" was instructed to act in agreement with the Kiev representative of the governmental Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and to forward to the latter "the list of all those deans, priests, and superiors of monasteries who refuse to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Sponsoring Group. . . ."⁴⁶

"lease agreement" with the administration and are personally and collectively responsible for any violation of the agreement.

⁴²Dyrda, "Za chervonym murom," pp. 2-3.

⁴³See Hrynioch, "The Destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," pp. 21-22.

⁴⁴The other members of the "Sponsoring Group" were the priests Mykhailo Mel'nyk, Vicar General of the Peremyshl' diocese, and Antonii Pel'vets'kyi of Kopychyntsi, Stanislav diocese, as well as a layman, Serhii Khruts'kyi, designated as secretary of the "Group." Characteristically, while the "official" approval of the "Group" by Soviet authorities came only on June 18, on the very day of its inception—May 28—the "Sponsoring Group" addressed a message to the Greek Catholic clergy, announcing that the "Group" had been formed "with the approval of the state authorities," and that "the Soviet government will recognize only instructions issued by our Sponsoring Group and will not recognize any other administrative authority in the Greek Catholic Church" (*Diannia Soboru*, pp. 15, 23).

⁴⁵In reply to the "Group's" message, some 300 priests reportedly assembled in L'viv's St. George Cathedral on June 1 and addressed a letter to Viacheslav Molotov, in which they protested against the usurpation of authority by Kostel'nyk's "Group," appealed for the release of the arrested episcopate, and asked in the name of "liberty of conscience and religious practice" as "guaranteed by Stalin's Constitution" for the restoration of canonically leadership in the Church (W. Dushnyck, *Martyrdom in Ukraine: Russia Denies Religious Freedom* [New York, n.d.], p. 27).

⁴⁶For the text of the governmental reply, signed by the representative of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukr.S.S.R., P. Khodchenko, see *Diannia Soboru*, pp. 19-20. It is significant, that whereas the

Intervention of the Moscow Patriarchate. In the spring of 1945, a third force—the Russian Orthodox Church—intervened in the Western Ukraine to join with the authorities and the “Sponsoring Group” in the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church.⁴⁷ In April, 1945, the new Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Alexei (Simanskii) addressed a message “To the Clergy and Believers of the Greek Catholic Church,” pointedly ignoring the episcopate of this Church. The patriarchal message accused the Vatican and the Uniate hierarchy of pro-Fascist sympathies and called upon the faithful of “Galician Russia,” since “Divine Providence has restored to Russia her ancient frontiers” to break the bonds with the Vatican which were leading them “into darkness and spiritual ruin” and to “hasten return” to the Russian Orthodox Church.⁴⁸ Much later, on December 4, 1945, a similar message was addressed by the Patriarchal Exarch in Kiev, Metropolitan Ioan (Sokolov).⁴⁹ Meanwhile, in the wake of the arrests of the Uniate hierarchy, the Moscow Patriarchate hastily ordained as the new Orthodox bishop for Western Ukraine, the Kievan priest Makarii Oksiuk, with the mission to “assist” the “Sponsoring Group” in the “reunification” campaign.⁵⁰ Evidently, Makarii soon took charge of the “ecclesiastical” side of this campaign, later performing a similar role in the Carpatho-Ukraine, and winning for his efforts the dignity of archbishop for the “reunited” territories.

“Re-education” and purge of the Uniate Clergy. During the nine months following its inception, the “Sponsoring Group” undertook an intensive indoctrination campaign designed to “persuade” the Uniate clergy of the necessity of their union with the Orthodox Church. The main argument advanced in this campaign appeared to be of political and opportunistic rather than theological nature: the “disloyal” Uniate Church will not be tolerated by the Soviet power,

Uniate Church had hitherto been under the supervision of the governmental Council for the Affairs of [Non-Orthodox] Religious Cults, the Church has now been transferred to the jurisdiction of the state agency in charge of Orthodox Church, without waiting for the formality of “reunion.”

⁴⁷It is quite likely that the publicized meeting on April 10, 1945—on the eve of the arrests of the Greek Catholic bishops—between Stalin and Molotov, on the one side, and Patriarch Aleksei, Metropolitan Nikolai, and Protopresbyter N. F. Kolchytiskii, provided a formal opportunity to finalize the plans for a joint Church-state campaign in the Western Ukraine. See Moskovskaia Patriarkhiia, *Patriarkh Sergii i ego dukhovnoe nasledstvo* (Moscow, 1947), p. 376.

⁴⁸See Aleksei's *Poslanie*, cited in full in Dushnyck, *Martyrdom*, pp. 33–35.

⁴⁹See *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, No. 1, 1946, pp. 9–11.

⁵⁰Ordained in Moscow on April 22, 1945, Bishop Makarii arrived in L'viv already on April 27, after consultations in Kiev. See *Ėparkhial'nyi Visnyk*, No. 5, 1946, pp. 20–21; and *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, No. 3, 1961, p. 68.

so why expose ourselves to unnecessary sufferings in the manner of our "politically-blind bishops," if we could continue to serve our flock within the Russian Orthodox Church and, indeed, improve our political and economic position?⁵¹ The campaigning "Group" leaders also heavily played up the old "East-West" tensions within the Greek Catholic Church, with the obvious intent of winning over to Orthodoxy the Uniate elements dissatisfied with the Latinizing pressures and the rigors of celibacy.⁵² To broadcast its message, the "Sponsoring Group" was given a rare privilege of publishing brochures and a monthly journal, *Eparkhiial'nyi Visnyk*,⁵³ in addition to prominence given to its activities in the local press. However, the main devices of this "re-education" campaign were the district (*dekanal'ni*) conferences of clergy conducted by the leaders of the "Group," reportedly in the presence of Soviet security officials.⁵⁴ Where neither the anti-Uniate arguments nor threats of "non-registration" could persuade the priests to sign declarations of adherence to the "Group's" authority and aims, the N.K.G.B. organs intervened. When their less subtle methods of "persuasion" failed to break the resistance of the "recalcitrant" (*upirni*) clerics, the latter were summarily sentenced to varying terms of forced labour or deportation.⁵⁵ In this manner, from a handful of 42 adherents won over by the "Sponsoring Group" in the first month of the campaign,⁵⁶ the "Group's" alleged following grew to a total of 986 priests by March, 1946, representing about 49 per cent of then entire Greek Catholic clergy in the Western Ukraine.⁵⁷ Of some 1020 remaining, still "recalcitrant" priests—whose core consisted of the now largely dispersed monastic clergy—only 281 were still officially reported at large at that date.⁵⁸ The others, about

⁵¹See *Diiannia Soboru*, pp. 25–26, 59–75, 79–117.

⁵²*Ibid.*, pp. 21–22; *Eparkhiial'nyi Visnyk*, No. 2–3, 1946, pp. 3–7.

⁵³Already in August, 1945, the Sponsoring Group published Kostel'nyk's anti-papal treatise (*Apostol Petro i ryms'ki papy, abo dohmatychni osnovy papstva*), allegedly written in 1931, and now ordered by the Group as compulsory reading for the Greek Catholic clergy. In January, 1946, the Group began the publication of a monthly, *Eparkhiial'nyi Visnyk*, which had subsequently become the organ of the "reunited" dioceses, changing in February, 1948, to a new name—*Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*. This monthly (the only Ukrainian-language Orthodox periodical in the U.S.S.R.) reportedly discontinued publication by 1963. See also *Diiannia Soboru*, pp. 25, 61.

⁵⁴*Svitlo*, No. 10, 1961, p. 426; Dyrda, "Za chervonym murom," No. 12, 1946, p. 6.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*; *First Victims of Communism*, p. 40.

⁵⁶Dushnyck, *Martyrdom*, p. 27.

⁵⁷According to different estimates in *Svitlo* (No. 22, 1951, p. 3), the "converts" represented about one-third of the total clergy, since about one-half of the clergy had been arrested or deported, and the rest had gone into the religious "underground."

⁵⁸*Diiannia Soboru*, pp. 61, 53–58.

740 clerics, were thus either imprisoned and deported or in hiding.⁵⁹ The stage was now evidently set for the "canonic" completion of the "reunion."

Liquidation and "reunion." To create a fiction of a "voluntary" and "canonic" abolition of the Union with Rome and the Uniates' "return" to the Russian Church, the régime resorted to the precedent of the Polotsk Sobor of 1839,⁶⁰ with some features apparently borrowed from the arsenal of Soviet anti-church warfare of the 1920's.⁶¹ However, unlike on previous occasions, a canonically indispensable prerequisite was missing in 1946—the participation of bishops in the convocation and the conduct of a Church Sobor. Accordingly, as none of the imprisoned Uniate bishops could be "convinced" to join in such an undertaking, the Moscow Patriarch resorted to the ingenious device of having two leaders of the "Sponsoring Group," the priests Pel'vets'kyi and Mel'nyk, *secretly* ordained in Kiev, in February, 1946, as Orthodox bishops;⁶² at the same time, in the same secretive manner, Kostel'nyk and other leading members of the "Group" were formally admitted into the Russian Orthodox Church.⁶³ Thus, paradoxically, the Sobor of the Greek Catholic Church was to be convoked and directed by the clerics who had already ceased to belong to that Church.

The "Reunion Sobor" which met in L'viv from March 8 to 10, 1946, bore all the marks of careful stage management. The date was selected to coincide with the 350th anniversary of the Union of Brest.⁶⁴ There were no elections of delegates held in advance, nor were the agenda and rules of the Sobor previously published. Indeed, it appears from the proceedings of this gathering, that this very event was

⁵⁹Estimated on the basis of reports published in *First Victims of Communism*, pp. 40, 42, 64; *Svitlo*, No. 20, 1947, p. 1, and Dyrda, "Za chervonym murom," *ibid.*, No. 11, 1946, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁰For a well documented account of the "reunion" campaign that culminated in the 1839 Sobor (and which displayed striking analogies with the techniques used in the Western Ukraine in 1945-46), see Wasył Lencyk, "The Eastern Catholic Church and Tsar Nicholas I" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University, New York, 1961), especially pp. 114-97. Cf. Kolarz, *Religion*, p. 233.

⁶¹Note, in particular, the analogies with the *coup* staged in 1922 by the "Living Church" group in the Russian Orthodox Church, following the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon; the 1923 Renovatianist "Sobor"; and the "Self-Liquidatory" "Sobor" of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in January, 1930.

⁶²See *Diiannia Soboru*, pp. 27-31.

⁶³*Ibid.* Kostel'nyk was on this occasion awarded the highest ecclesiastical rank for white (married) clergy, that of *mitrofornyi protoierei* (protopresbyter).

⁶⁴There are some indications that the Sobor was originally scheduled for February (see a "premature" telegram of blessings sent to Kostel'nyk by Patriarch Aleksii "on the eve of the forthcoming Sobor," yet dated February 12; *ibid.*, p. 62).

withheld from public knowledge until the Sobor had completed its task.⁶⁵ Participation was on invitation of the "Sponsoring Group," with the 216 clerical and 19 lay "delegates" lodged in selected hotels and transported in groups to and from the Sobor sessions.⁶⁶ Besides the representatives of the Moscow Patriarch,⁶⁷ Soviet movie operators and press reporters were also on hand to record the proceedings in L'viv's St. George's Cathedral.⁶⁸ If any of the participants still held any hopes for the Union, these were dispelled on the eve of the Sobor by the well-timed announcement by the Soviet *prokuratura* which doomed the imprisoned bishops of the Church.⁶⁹ Conveniently dispensing with procedural niceties, the leaders of the "Sponsoring Group" appointed themselves as the presidium of the Sobor and announced its agenda.⁷⁰ After several hours of speeches by the leaders of the "Group" and a "discussion," the harmony of which was marred by a single voice suggesting the postponement of the Sobor,⁷¹ it was decided by an *open* vote to adopt the final decision on the future fate of the Church. The "Group" chairman, Kostel'nyk, then presented the gathering with a draft resolution which was adopted without further discussion by a unanimous show of hands. In this document, the Sobor, having condemned the Roman Church for "heresy" and for "siding with the bloody Fascism," declared that

. . . the Church Union was imposed upon our people in the sixteenth century by the aggressive Roman Catholic Poland as a bridge towards Polonization and Latinization. Under present circumstances, when, thanks to the heroic feats and the glorious victory of the Soviet Union, all the Ukrainian lands were gathered together, and the Ukrainian people became the master on its entire territory, it would be unreasonable to support further

⁶⁵See *ibid.*, p. 33.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 32-35.

⁶⁷The delegation consisted of Bishops Makarii of L'viv, Nestor of Uman', and Protopresbyter Konstantin Ruzhyts'kyi, chancellor of the Kievan Exarch. Later, on the second day of the proceedings, Metropolitan Ioan (Sokolov), Patriarchal Exarch for the Ukraine, appeared at the Sobor to "receive" the "converts" into the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church (*ibid.*, pp. 36, 45-46).

⁶⁸The film of the Sobor was subsequently shown to various visiting church dignitaries by the officials of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. See, e.g., *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, No. 10, 1946, p. 22.

⁶⁹See *L'vovskaia Pravda*, March 1, 1946.

⁷⁰Procedural questions were decided upon at a "pre-Sobor meeting" on March 6, attended by twenty priests (including members of the Sponsoring Group). *Dilannia Soboru*, pp. 33-35.

⁷¹As quoted by the Sobor Proceedings, priest Vasyl Lesiuk's motion read: "to regard the present Sobor as a preparatory phase of this matter [re-union] and to postpone the decision itself to a later date." The motion was reportedly defeated by a "unanimous" show of hands. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

Uniate tendencies and it would be an unforgivable sin to continue the hatred and fratricidal war within our people, of which the Union was the cause in history and must always remain so.⁷²

Accordingly, the Sobor resolved "to annul the Union with Rome, to break off the ties with the Vatican, and to return to the Orthodox faith and to the Russian Orthodox Church." It was only at this stage that the uninitiated "delegates" were presented with the two bishops "of their own," whose presence at the Sobor was apparently designed both to resolve the problem of the "canonical validity" of this gathering and to allay fears that henceforth the clergy would be ruled by the ethnically alien hierarchs.⁷³

The remaining two days of the L'viv Sobor were devoted to the ceremonial aspects of "reunion," in which the former Uniates were received into the Russian Orthodox Church by the Kievan Exarch Ioan and Bishop Makarii.⁷⁴ In addition to a petition which asked the Patriarch of Moscow for admission under his authority,⁷⁵ all "delegates" signed heavily political messages to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet,⁷⁶ Khrushchev, and, of course, Stalin, the latter document achieving the distinction of a delayed publication in *Pravda*.⁷⁷ Another message addressed to "the clergy and faithful of the Greek Catholic Church" urged the "recalcitrants" to abandon the hopeless resistance

⁷²*Ibid.*, pp. 127-28.

⁷³*Ibid.*, pp. 43-44. Evidently, the same consideration also figured in the choice of Makarii (Oksiuk) for the see of L'viv-Ternopil'. Makarii, according to *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii* (No. 12, 1947, p. 46), had a "perfect command of the Ukrainian language, with a Galician accent which impresses his Uniate audience." At the time of the secret consecration of Mel'nyk and Pel'vets'kyi as new Orthodox bishops for Drohobych and Stanislav dioceses (February 1946), the "Sponsoring Group" was promised that "sometime later there was to be consecrated [also] an Auxiliary Bishop for L'viv from among our own [people]" (*Diiannia Soboru*, p. 27). The promise was not made good until 1960, when Bishop Hryhorii Zakaliak was transferred from Bukovyna to L'viv (*Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, No. 6-7, 1960, p. 183).

⁷⁴*Diiannia Soboru*, pp. 45-46.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 136-37. The petition admits that "we must still overcome great and various obstacles in order to [ensure] the triumph of Holy Orthodoxy in every parish of our Church. Even such an artificial creation as the Union has its roots deep in the hearts of some of our people (especially among the monks and nuns), because they have been blinded from their infancy with the glory of the Roman Church" (p. 136).

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 145-47. "We want to have our religious heart," states the message, "not in Rome, which was to us a foster mother and had given us nothing, but in Kiev, which is the mother of all Rus', and in Moscow, which became the liberator and defender of all Slavs. . . . We notify about it [the re-union] the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr.S.S.R., so that it may note and recognize this historical change and take under [its] protection our, henceforth Orthodox again, Church" (p. 147).

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 141-42; *Pravda*, March 17, 1946.

to the entire "Orthodox Rus'": "Enough of tortures and sufferings . . . imposed by Rome on all peoples. . . . Do not waste your and people's energies for the realization of mistaken ideas."⁷⁸

Early in April, a delegation from the "reunited" dioceses, led by Kostel'nyk, was received by Patriarch Aleksei in Moscow, joining him in celebrating the "triumph of Orthodoxy." Mindful of adverse foreign reaction to the events in the Western Ukraine, the T.A.S.S. used this opportunity to interview Kostel'nyk, who assured the world of a perfectly "voluntary" nature of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church: all conversions occurred by "personal declarations" of the clergy; "there were no arrests of the Greek Catholic clergy either before or after the Sobor"; and, as for the arrest of the episcopate and "several priests," they were arrested not in their ecclesiastical capacity, but "as citizens of the U.S.S.R., for their treasonable activity."⁷⁹

Liquidation of the survivals of the Union. The expected outcome of the L'viv "Sobor" was followed by the equally predictable action of the Soviet authorities, which in effect gave the decisions of the Sobor the force of law in the entire Soviet territory,⁸⁰ recognizing them as binding not only for the clergy and laymen not represented at the Sobor but also for a jurisdictionally separate Mukachiv-Uzhhorod diocese of the Greek Catholic Church in the recently annexed Carpatho-Ukraine. Despite the existence of a large Orthodox minority in the Carpatho-Ukraine, the joint action of the Patriarchate (represented by Bishop Nestor during 1945-49) and the Soviet authorities produced until early 1949 only one "convert" among the Uniate clergy—an Uzhhorod priest, Irenei Kondratovych. Selected by the authorities as a "spokesman" for the Greek Catholic Church, he was given the distinction of announcing the "Act of Reunion" in the Mukachiv cathedral on August 28, 1949. Bishop Theodore Romzha of Mukachiv-Uzhhorod, having successfully withstood Soviet pressure to join the

⁷⁸*Diannia Soboru*, pp. 129-32.

⁷⁹The interview dated April 9, 1946, was reproduced in *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, No. 4, 1946, pp. 35-36.

⁸⁰This action of the Soviet government, though not unprecedented, represented an outright violation of both the constitutional separation of Church and state and its legislation explicitly denied obligatory legal validity to decisions adopted by ecclesiastical institutions. No law or administrative order prohibiting the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has ever been published in the Soviet Union, though on several occasions Soviet spokesmen have referred to the Uniate Church as one of "prohibited" or "illegal" ecclesiastical organizations. There is indirect evidence that the Church had been banned by a secret administrative order.

Russian Orthodox Church, died in somewhat mysterious circumstances on November 1, 1947. His successor, Bishop Oleksander Khira, was immediately imprisoned by the N.K.G.B. and sentenced to ten years of forced labour. It was only after February, 1949, with the arrival in the Carpatho-Ukraine of Bishop Makarii, that the tried methods of "persuasion" were applied against the Greek Catholic "recalcitrants"—"conditioning" by the N.K.G.B. and mass arrests and deportations of those who failed to submit to Makarii their "declarations of conversion." No figures on "reunited" clergy were announced at the time of the "act of reunion" or after; it is likely that the small number of "converts" influenced the authorities' decision to dispense with the strategem of a "sobor" in the Carpatho-Ukraine.⁸¹

Throughout the Soviet Union, the priests of the "prohibited Church," who were still active, were now rounded up and charged with "illegal" performance of sacerdotal functions, while all the remaining Uniate monasteries were closed and converted to secular uses.⁸² Whatever remained of the Greek Catholic Church in the U.S.S.R. could henceforth subsist only in the "catacombs," or in the minds and consciences of the priests and believers camouflaged as converts to Orthodoxy.⁸³

IV

The artificial nature of the "reunion" left the Patriarchate and the régime with the problems of suppressing the continuing overt and passive resistance to Orthodoxy and the assimilation of the "converts" into the Russian Church. The dimensions of these problems have been well illustrated by the subsequent developments in the Western Ukraine. Thus in September, 1948, the ecclesiastical leader of the "reunion" campaign, Protopresbyter Kostel'nyk, was assassinated in

⁸¹ For the best available account of the "re-union" campaign in the Carpatho-Ukraine, see Vasylyl Markus', *Nyshchennia Hreko-Katolyts'koi Tserkvy v Mukachivskii Ieparkhii v 1945-1950 rr.* (Paris, 1962). See also *First Victims of Communism*, pp. 48-58; *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, No. 10, 1949, pp. 5-11; and *Svitlo*, No. 5, 1959, p. 210.

⁸² See Dyrda, "Za chervonym murom," No. 11, 1946, pp. 3-4; *Svitlo*, No. 20, 1947, p. 1; No. 12, 1951, p. 1; No. 10, 1961, pp. 425-26; No. 3, 1962, p. 118.

⁸³ See Kolarz's (*Religion*, pp. 241-43) discussion of the "Crypto-Catholic Church" in the Western Ukraine. In January, 1950, a sobor of bishops from "reunited" dioceses issued a lengthy declaration prohibiting a series of "Uniate practices" in the formally-Orthodox parishes (*Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, No. 10-11, 1957, pp. 116-18). The continued resistance to "innovations" among the clergy and faithful occupied a conference of the deans of the L'viv diocese in October, 1957 (*ibid.*, No. 12, 1957, pp. 368-72). Earlier, *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk* (No. 8-9, 1957, p. 257) reported on the difficulties encountered by the episcopate in "helping the clergy to be Orthodox not only in name and form, but also in spirit, as well as their conviction and consciousness."

L'viv, reportedly by the Ukrainian underground,⁸⁴ with the same fate befalling his Bolshevik counterpart, writer Halan, in October, 1949.⁸⁵ For years a portion of the Uniates, in particular urban intelligentsia, boycotted the "reunited" churches and attended the few remaining Roman Catholic Churches.⁸⁶ In numerous priestless parishes, churches remained closed due to the refusal of the faithful to admit Orthodox clergymen.⁸⁷

With many of the clergymen accepting Orthodoxy in form only and continuing to observe the traditional Greek Catholic practices, a large number of West Ukrainians apparently found the participation in the "new" Church preferable to a churchless existence. Nevertheless, a significant portion of the Uniate laymen have continued to depend on the infrequent services of the "illegal" priests and monks—those who, having opposed "conversion," escaped arrest by going into hiding or formally adopting secular vocations.⁸⁸ The number of these "illegal" priests increased, especially since the mid-fifties with the return of those "recalcitrant" clergymen who had completed their sentences or who profited from the post-Stalin amnesties. The resulting intensification of clandestine Uniate activities, combined with a widespread expectation that, with the "de-Stalinization," the régime would permit the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, caused by 1957 a considerable alarm within the local Orthodox Church, especially since in some parishes the faithful began to repudiate Orthodoxy.⁸⁹ These hopes failed to materialize, however. A declaration published by a conference of deans of the L'viv diocese in October, 1957, gave clear indication of the unchanged official position towards the Uniate Church:

⁸⁴*Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, No. 10, 1948, pp. 9–10.

⁸⁵See *Ukrains'ka Radians'ka Entsyklopediia*, Vol. III (Kiev, 1960), pp. 100–101.

⁸⁶See *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, No. 3, 1948, p. 70; and No. 5, 1948, p. 135.

⁸⁷In Stanislav diocese alone, there were at least 175 such parishes between 1946 and 1956 (*ibid.*, No. 7, 1957, p. 215).

⁸⁸For hostile accounts of the activity of the "illegal" Uniate clergy, see *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, No. 3, 1957, p. 70; No. 8–9, 1957, p. 255; No. 12, 1957, pp. 368–69; 373–74; No. 1, 1958, pp. 24–27; No. 5, 1958, pp. 133–35; No. 11–12, 1958, pp. 349–50; No. 6, 1959, p. 189; *Zhovten'*, No. 2, 1957, pp. 120–26; and *Komunist Ukrainy*, No. 7, 1959, pp. 77–82. According to a recent Soviet account (*Molod' Ukrainy*, September 11, 1964), Bishop Charnets'kyi "illegally" continued his archpastoral duties after returning to L'viv in 1955, including the ordination of new Uniate priests.

⁸⁹See, e.g., *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, No. 3, 1957, p. 70; No. 7, 1957, p. 255; No. 8–9, 1957, p. 284; No. 5, 1958, pp. 133–35. See also an article by Iu. Mel'nychuk ("*Vidpovid' fanatykovi*," *Zhovten'*, No. 2, 1957, pp. 120–126), attacking the "underground" Uniate clergy for their agitation in favour of "reopening of the traitorous Uniate Church."

. . . Rumours, spread by the Uniate fanatics and other opponents of Orthodoxy, that Union will be restored in the Western *oblasti* are inventions of our enemies calculated to deceive both the non-reunited clergy and the believers. The Union has been liquidated by our people. . . . And today the Union is a tool of the enemies of our Fatherland—the Soviet Union.⁹⁰

The subsequent Soviet manœuvres to reach some *modus vivendi* with the Vatican, including the release from the U.S.S.R., early in 1963, of the long-imprisoned primate of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj,⁹¹ have evidently not affected the Soviet attitude towards this Church. Indeed recent accounts in the Soviet press attest to the sharpening of Soviet repressive measures against the continuing activities of the "illegal" Uniate clergy.⁹²

v

The liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church did not stop, however, at the borders of the Soviet Union. In Poland, acting apparently on the request of the Soviet government, the authorities liquidated the oldest Ukrainian diocese of Peremyshl' and arrested Bishop Iosafat Kotsylovs'kyi and his Coadjutor, Bishop Hryhorii Lakota. In June, 1946, they were extradited, together with their senior priests, to the Soviet authorities and brought to Kiev for a trial. While awaiting his sentence, Bishop Kotsylovs'kyi died in the fall of 1947; Bishop Lakota perished in a Vorkuta concentration camp in June, 1951.⁹³ A number of Greek Catholic priests dispersed throughout Poland, while others accompanied the Ukrainian border population when it was summarily resettled by the Warsaw authorities to the new Polish territories in the West and the North. Despite the efforts of the Moscow Patriarchate to extend its "reunion" campaign to the Ukrainian minority in Poland, the support of some Polish clergy and, since 1956, the liberalization of Polish minority policy, made possible

⁹⁰*Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, No. 12, 1957, pp. 371–72.

⁹¹Having served his eight-year sentence, the Metropolitan was reportedly brought to Moscow in the spring of 1953, following the death of Stalin, for new investigation and high-level offers of his liberation and return to the Metropolitan see of L'viv, but at the price of repudiating the Union with Rome. The Metropolitan's insistence that the Soviet authorities legalize the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church resulted in another seven-year sentence, which Metropolitan Slipyi served in Krasnoïarskii krai. See *Svitlo*, No. 4, 1955, p. 31; and No. 3, 1962, p. 132; and *Ukrains'kyi Samostitnyk*, April 14, 1957.

⁹²See *Voiounychnyi ateist*, No. 12, 1963, pp. 22–24; *Nauka i religiia*, No. 12, 1963, pp. 30–34; *Molod' Ukrainy*, September 11, 1964; and, in particular, *Ogonek*, No. 46 (November, 1963), pp. 30–31 (reporting the discovery of "underground" Greek Catholic convents in L'viv).

⁹³See *First Victims of Communism*, pp. 46–47; and *Svitlo*, No. 11, 1955, p. 6.

the survival of some forty-one Greek Catholic parishes and a Basilian monastery in Warsaw.⁹⁴

In Czechoslovakia, the local Orthodox Church (a "satellite" of the Moscow Patriarchate) undertook after February, 1948, a "reunion" campaign among the Greek Catholics in the Ukrainian-speaking Prešov area of Slovakia. Directly supported by the Prague Government, the campaign featured the formation of "committees" for reunion, "re-education" campaigns by police officials, and the arrests of "recalcitrant" clergy, including Bishop Pavlo Goidych. (Condemned to life imprisonment in January, 1951, Goidych died in the Leopoldovo prison on July 19, 1960.) The campaign closed on April 28, 1950, with a civilian-dominated "Conference" in Prešov, which in a course of its one-day session proclaimed itself a "Greek Catholic Sobor" and "unanimously" voted to "reunite" the Prešov diocese with the Orthodox Church. Within a month, the Prague government decreed that "the Greek Catholic Church ceased to exist on the entire territory of Czechoslovakia." The Auxiliary Bishop of Prešov, Vasyl Hopko, who refused to recognize the validity of the régime-staged "Sobor," was arrested in 1951 and remained in prison until 1963.⁹⁵

It appeared at first that the sole surviving Ukrainian Greek Catholic diocese in the Communist bloc—the Križevci diocese in Yugoslavia—might also have met the fate of the rest of the Church, whether as a result of the pressures from the Moscow government and Patriarchate or due to the discriminatory anti-Catholic policies of the Belgrade government. However, Yugoslavia's break with the U.S.S.R. in 1948, and the subsequent relaxation of Tito's ecclesiastical policy, dispelled the immediate threat to this last outpost of the Greek Catholic Church in Communist Eastern Europe.

VI

The case of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, though only an episode in the larger drama of the political and ecclesiastical East-West struggle, yields a significant insight into the inter-connectedness

⁹⁴*Ukrains'ki Visti*, February 11, 1957. Following the "Polish October," the central executive and local branches of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (the only government-recognized Ukrainian organization in Poland) openly came in favour of "normalization" of the status of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland (see the Warsaw *Nashe slovo*, December 30, 1956; January 27, 1957; February 24, 1957; and July 21, 1957). Neither the Society's petitions nor the parallel action of the Ukrainian Catholic clergy resulted in a formal official recognition of the Church.

⁹⁵See *First Victims of Communism*, pp. 58–59; *Svitlo*, No. 11, 1960; "Konec Únie v Československu," *Svetlo Pravoslávia*, No. 1–2 (1950), pp. 1–27, and *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, No. 7, 1950, pp. 40–53.

of the Soviet ecclesiastical and nationality policies. The evidence presented suggests that in liquidating the Uniate Church and forcing its membership into joining the Russian Orthodox Church, the régime pursued several inter-connected objectives: to suppress a cohesive minority Church that was relatively invulnerable to Soviet influence and to reintegrate its following in a centralized and State-controlled ecclesiastical organization geared to the policy requirements of a totalitarian dictatorship; to roll back the ecclesiastical frontiers of the Catholic Church and minimize the influence upon Soviet subjects of the Vatican, traditionally considered as an international political force hostile to both the Russian national interests and international Communism; to destroy among the Western Ukrainians their most important, occident-oriented national institution that has now offered the sole legal outlet for their national aspirations; and in line with the "friendship of peoples" formula, to transfer the Uniate clergy and faithful into a Church traditionally identified with the idea of a "one and indivisible Russia." However paradoxical it may appear for a régime professing "scientific atheism," Soviet church policy has thus "rehabilitated" the once condemned principle of tsarism which identified Orthodoxy with nationality and loyalty to the régime and condemned the abandonment of the state church (in favour of Catholicism) as a political offence. This combination of traditional Russian nationalism and political expediency may have motivated the extension of the anti-Uniate policies into the satellite states, where the promotion of the Moscow Patriarchate's expansionist tendencies also provided the Kremlin with an additional and less conspicuous channel of influence, particularly suitable for capitalizing on pan-Slavic and pan-Orthodox sentiments.

As for the Moscow Patriarchate's role in the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church, the available evidence strongly suggests that in this respect it acted as a willing partner of the régime in what it may have considered a unique opportunity to fulfil its traditional ecclesiastical and national mission.⁹⁶ The Russian Orthodox Church may have succumbed to its historical weakness of relying on state intervention—the "secular sword"—in combating its religious adversaries. On the other hand, the possibility that the Patriarchate acted under pressure from the Soviet régime should not be altogether dismissed; rather than risk its recently won concessions, the Orthodox Church could have treated its part in the destruction of the Uniate

⁹⁶See, e.g., *Patriarch Serget i ego dukhovnoe nasledstvo*, pp. 372-73. Cf. Kolarz, *Religion*, pp. 235-37.

Church as but another of the required proofs of its loyalty and political usefulness to the régime.

If the Patriarchate indeed believed, in the late 1940's, in the régime's patriotic concern for Orthodoxy and the stability of the partnership between the Russian Church and the atheist state, they should have well remembered the proverbial difficulties of supping with the devil. Looked at from the perspective of the present, the régime's promotion of the Orthodox Church in the Western Ukraine and in the satellites, strengthening as it did the largest of the churches in the U.S.S.R., did not reflect a fundamental change in the Bolshevik attitude towards religion. While it might be argued that this Church-state partnership was the result of Stalin's deviation from the Marxist-Leninist line on religion,⁹⁷ even in the choice of methods to effect the "reunion," one can detect a basically anti-religious tendency of displaying the practical superiority of force over belief, of politics over religion, of opportunism over martyrdom, not to mention the compromising of a Christian church by having it join with an avowedly atheist régime in destroying another Christian church. As shown by the post-Stalinist developments in the realm of Church-state relations, the spectacular gains registered by the Moscow Patriarchate during its postwar ecclesiastical expansion turned out to be but insecure concessions tenable as long as they were found useful to the régime's short-range political goals. With the long-range ideological objectives of the Leninist line on religion reasserting themselves in the post-Stalin policies, the weapons applied against the Uniates two decades ago have, since 1959, been turned against the Russian Orthodox Church, including its "reunited" dioceses in the Western Ukraine.

⁹⁷Following the 1961 Party Congress, Soviet anti-religious propaganda began to attack Stalin for "the curtailment of anti-religious propaganda," "repressions" against professional *antireligiozniki*, violations of the "Leninist Decree on the Separation of Church from the State," concessions to the Church, "especially the Orthodox," etc. See, e.g., *Nauka i religiiia*, No. 4, 1962, p. 48; and O. T. Koroliiov, *Lenins'ki zapovity ateistam* (Kiev, 1963), p. 33.

