

IVAN MAZEPA

*HETMAN OF
UKRAINE*



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IVAN MAZEPA: HETMAN OF UKRAINE

ON THE 250TH ANNIVERSARY
OF HIS RISING AGAINST RUSSIA

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Painting by Myron Levitsky

Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1632? — 1709)

CONTENTS :

Preface -----	7
The Heritage of Mazepa by <i>Walter Dushnyck</i> -----	9
The Political Struggle of Mazepa and Charles XII For Ukrainian Independence by <i>Bohdan Kentrschynskyj</i> -----	15
The World of Mazepa by <i>Clarence A Manning</i> -----	35
The Year 1709 by <i>Alexander Ohloblyn</i> -----	47
Ukraine, Poland and Sweden at the Time of Ivan Mazepa by <i>Oscar Halecki</i> -----	57
Mazepa in the Light of Contemporary English and American Sources by <i>Theodore Mackiw</i> -----	63
Ivan Mazepa — Patron of Culture and Arts of Ukraine by <i>Volodymyr Sichynsky</i> -----	81
Mazepa in Byron's Poem and in History by <i>Lydia Holubnychy</i> -----	91
Mazepa in English Literature by <i>Clarence A. Manning</i> -----	101
Life of Mazepa (1632? — 1709) by <i>Theodore Mackiw</i> -----	113

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE:

WALTER DUSHNYCK, Graduate of University of Louvain, Belgium, and Columbia University; writer and journalist, he is Editor of *The Ukrainian Bulletin* and Acting Editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, and author of several pamphlets and articles on Ukrainian and Soviet Russian affairs; recently he wrote a booklet, *In Quest of Freedom*, dealing with Ukraine's struggle for independence.

OSCAR HALECKI, prominent Polish historian and scholar; holds a Ph. D. degree from the University of Cracow, and honorary degrees from Universities of Lyons, Montreal and De Paul; President of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America, and Professor of History at the Universities of Fordham and Columbia.

LYDIA HOLUBNYCHY, presently a student at Columbia University, New York, N.Y. Born near Kharkiv, Ukraine, she came to this country in 1952 and recently became an American citizen. The Ukrainian version of her article appeared in the October, 1959, issue of the *Ukrainska Literaturna Hazeta*, Munich, Germany.

BOHDAN KENTRSCHYNSKYJ, holds a Ph. D. degree from the University of Munich (1951) and a Ph. Lic. from the University of Uppsala, Sweden (1958); is a historian of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, specializing in the eras of King Charles X Gustav and Charles XII of Sweden, and Khmelnytsky and Mazepa of Ukraine; author of *Charles X Gustav and the Eastern European Crisis 1654-1655*; is working now on a book about Sweden and Ukraine, 1654-1660, under a grant in Stockholm.

THEODORE MACKIW holds a Ph. D. degree from the University of Frankfurt; had also studied at Harvard Ext. School, Seton Hall University and the University of Zurich; he served on the Faculty of Schwyz Kollegium in Switzerland, Seton Hall, Hamden Hall School, Albertus Magnus and the Southern Connecticut State College.

CLARENCE A. MANNING, Ph. D., Associate Professor of Slavic Languages at Columbia University; author of several books on literature and history of Ukraine; his latest book, *A History of Slavic Studies in the United States*, was recently published by the Slavic Institute of Marquette University.

ALEXANDER OHLOBLYN, Ph. D., former professor at the University of Kiev; professor of history at the Free Ukrainian University in Prague and Munich; now professor of history at Ukrainian Technical Institute in New York and chairman of the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in U.S.; author of seven major books on Ukraine and Eastern Europe, among them, *Hetman Ivan Mazepa and His Times*.

VOLODYMYR SICHYNSKY, Ph. D., has written many works on the history of art, culture and industry, and has specialized in historic cartography, engravings, printings and bibliophilism; has made extensive studies on ancient and rare books; his latest book, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions*, was published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America a few years ago.

P R E F A C E

With the year of 1959, 250 years have elapsed since the crucial battle of Poltava (1709), which is considered one of the ten most important battles of all time. It influenced the entire course of the history of Eastern Europe for at least two and a half centuries. The victory of Peter I of Russia destroyed the hopes of King Charles XII of Sweden, bringing to an end all Swedish designs of maintaining a commanding position in Northern and Eastern Europe. It equally ruined the great work of HETMAN Ivan Mazepa in freeing Ukraine from Muscovite domination and establishing a free and independent Ukrainian state. With the victory at Poltava Russia gained such a preponderant political and strategical advantage that her unimpeded growth as a great imperial power became assured.

HETMAN Mazepa, perhaps more than King Charles XII of Sweden or any other European statesman of his time, understood the great peril which Russia represented to Europe. Therefore, he challenged that power, although he knew that the chances of crushing Russia were hardly overwhelmingly on his side.

Few men have received such contradictory verdicts from history as has Ivan Mazepa. The Russians of every political school, including the Soviet Russian school of today, have treated his very name as anathema and have denigrated him as a "traitor" or an ambitious intriguer. The great Romantic poets of Western Europe, such as Lord Byron and Victor Hugo, influenced by anti-Ukrainian propaganda, have treated him in terms of romantic legends which could scarcely have been true.

But for the Ukrainian people Ivan Mazepa was a great Ukrainian statesman, a man of learning, a patron of culture and the arts, and indeed a great Ukrainian patriot. Today his name remains as dangerous and symbolic for the Russian Communists as it was for the Russian Czars fifty, a hundred or two hundred years ago. Mazepa became a great symbol of Ukrainian freedom and independence which the Russians could neither accept nor destroy, although they had been quite ruthless and systematic in endeavoring to kill the spirit of patriotism and love of freedom which Mazepa instilled in the hearts of the Ukrainian people two hundred and fifty years ago.

The following series of articles and essays dealing with the various aspects of the Mazepa era in Ukrainian history has been prepared by authors known for their serious and penetrating research on Mazepa and his relations with both Russia and Sweden.

It is with the hope that these articles will cast a proper light on HETMAN Ivan Mazepa and his policies and will at least partially correct Russian distortions and misrepresentations, thereby permitting him to emerge in his true greatness and natural stature, that they are hereby issued in a special collection in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of his great endeavor.

UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

THE HERITAGE OF MAZEPA *

(250TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT ENDEAVOR)

By WALTER DUSHNYCK

"...The victory of June 27, 1709, gave the Russian empire not only a decisive predominance in Eastern Europe, but also pushed it on the path of imperialism, expansionist policies, new conquests and annexations for two centuries..."

MICHAEL HRUSHEVSKY, Ukraine's Foremost Historian.

These prophetic words of Michael Hrushevsky, the great Ukrainian historian and statesman, were uttered in 1909, but they remain valid and prophetic today, fifty years later. The Soviet Russian empire currently under the direction and leadership of Nikita S. Khrushchev, is at a point of growth and expansion never before attained in its history. It has expanded far in Central Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, Southern and Central Asia, and the Far East. It has mustered some spectacular achievements in space science and rocketry, and through blackmail, bluff and bluster has brought about the near collapse of the great Western alliance. It has subverted the peoples of Asia and Africa, and its tentacles now extend over the countries of Latin America.

Two-hundred and fifty years ago the Russian empire was recoiling from a series of catastrophic defeats inflicted by the victorious armies of King Charles XII of Sweden from the very beginning of the great Northern War which began in 1700. It was at that crucial moment of history that fate brought together two peoples who had equal reason to fear and oppose the Moscow of Peter I: Sweden and Ukraine.

The final battle, that of Poltava, was decisive not only for Sweden and Ukraine, but for Moscow and all Eastern Europe as well. For Sweden it meant the end of her predominance in Northern and Eastern Europe and, indeed, her end as a great power. For Ukraine, too, the year of 1709 was catastrophic, for it initiated the cruel and oppressive domination of Moscow with its inhuman features of genocide, economic exploitation and Russification.

* *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 4, December, 1959.

With the emergence of Moscow as a formidable power in Eastern and Northern Europe, its neighbors, such as Poland and Turkey, fell into a decline, which in turn facilitated the further growth and expansion of the modern Russian empire.

THE CHALLENGE OF MAZEPA

The great Ukrainian *hetman* and statesman, Ivan Mazepa, was one of the very few far-sighted statesmen of his time. He foresaw the danger for Eastern Europe from messianistic and expansionist Moscow. And, seeing it clearly, he decided to do everything in his power to challenge and dispel that danger before it was too late.

For 22 years of his rule over Ukraine (known as the *Hetman State*), Mazepa had lived in an uneasy "alliance" with and under the constant "protection" of the Russian Czar, an "alliance" which he had inherited from his predecessors as a crippling aftermath of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654). For many long years Mazepa planned a sharp break, waiting for a favorable opportunity to rise against the Russian Czar and liberate his people from Muscovite power and domination.

The opportunity finally came when in 1708, the victorious Swedish troops approached the borders of Ukraine. Mazepa acted, secure in the knowledge that the Ukrainians fervently desired their freedom and greatly encouraged by the successful campaigns of Charles XII and the progressive decline of the anti-Swedish coalition. Poland was conquered, and neutral Prussia had to respect its Northern neighbor. Austria, France, England and Holland either openly favored the Swedish King or maintained a "benevolent" neutrality.

Mazepa was the principal architect of the great anti-Russian coalition at the beginning of 1709. A few months after his official alliance with King Charles XII the plan of the coalition was completed. In addition to Ukraine and Sweden and their Western allies, the coalition was to include a series of Southern and Eastern European states and peoples, among them Turkey, the Crimea, Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, the Don, the Kuban Cherkesses, the Kalmuk, Horde, the Kazan Tartars and Bashkiria. After long years of patience and preparation, Mazepa acted boldly and decisively. Only Mazepa, possessed of exceptional intelligence, diplomatic talent and foresight, could have conceived such a formidable alliance and the need for it. The initial Russian success, such as the capture and destruction of Baturyn, Mazepa's capital and the merciless slaughter of some 7,000 men, women and children, were saddening but not

dismaying signs for Mazepa and his officers. The *Hetman* proceeded to raise against Moscow all the forces of the West and the East in accordance with a plan which was neither unnecessary nor illogical. Mazepa knew that the Swedish were not the principal enemy of Moscow. As one who had eyed the development of Russian policies for the course of several decades, he recognized the importance of the uprisings which had erupted with rhythmic regularity against Moscow in Astrakhan, Bashkiria, the Don. Biding his time, he suffered the sending by Czar Peter I of thousands of Ukrainian Kozaks to put down these revolts. He knew that only a strong coalition of all the peoples enslaved and threatened by Moscow could put up the requisite force to check the Russian expansion.

In the first months of 1709 the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance decided to oust the Russians from Ukraine, and it was for this purpose that a part of the Swedish-Ukrainian troops were sent to Slobidska Ukraina. The first intimation of the fate in store for Mazepa and Ukraine was given here. The expedition was a failure which was aggravated by King Charles XII himself. The Swedish monarch looked upon that Ukrainian territory as a part of the Russian state (which it formally was), and treated it accordingly. The local Ukrainian population refused to bear the persecution of the Swedish troops and mounted an anti-Swedish partisan warfare, thereby making the withdrawal of the Swedish forces mandatory.

Undaunted, Mazepa continued to build his alliance with the Crimea and the Ottoman Porte by sending his peace envoys there and worked untiringly to sway the Turks and Tartars to the side of Ukraine and King Charles XII.

COOPERATION OF THE ZAPOROZHIAN KOZAKS

One of the greatest successes of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa was the alliance which the Zaporozhian Host formed with him and the Swedish King. Nominally under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian *Hetman*, the Zaporozhian Kozaks had been in constant opposition to Mazepa, accusing him of conducting pro-Russian policies. In March, 1709, Mazepa succeeded in convincing the Zaporozhian Kozaks that their salvation as well as that of the whole of Ukraine lay in alliance with Sweden. A new treaty was signed between Mazepa and Hordienko, the *Otaman* of the Zaporozhian Host, on the one hand, and King Charles XII of Sweden, on the other. The King pledged not to conclude any treaty with the Russian Czar until Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Host would be wholly free of Russian domination and "protection." This gave Mazepa almost the whole of Ukraine

and assured the Swedish-Ukrainian coalition of unhampered communication with Poland, Turkey and the Crimea. Finally, Mazepa, through the intermediary of the Zaporozhians, succeeded in gaining Crimean assurance of military assistance. The Zaporozhian Kozaks themselves promised to supply at least 8,000 well trained troops, familiar with both the terrain and the military tactics of the Russians.

In June, 1709, the Swedish-Ukrainian troops (25,000 Swedes and about 12,000 Ukrainians) approached the Ukrainian city of Poltava, which was strongly held by some 50,000 Russian troops armed with 72 artillery pieces.

In the fierce battle which ensued, the victory went to the Russians. The remnants of the Swedish army surrendered at Perevolochna, while King Charles XII and Mazepa succeeded in escaping to Bender (present-day Rumania), where Mazepa, a man in his seventies, died shortly thereafter. The fate of Ukraine was sealed.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MAZEPA'S RISING

The historical significance of Mazepa's rise against Russia in 1709 has never been properly understood by the Western world. Mazepa has been depicted by Lord Byron and Victor Hugo as a man of adventurous if not frivolous character rather than as one of great intellect, political wisdom and courage. Russian propaganda promptly made him a "traitor" while the Russian Orthodox Church cast an "anathema" upon him. The richness of the irony can be appreciated from the fact that, besides being an ardent patriot, Mazepa was a great patron of the arts, and sciences, a benefactor of culture, libraries, painting, and a builder of churches not only in Ukraine, but in Lithuania, Moldavia, Syria and elsewhere.

Today, after a span of two hundred and fifty years, the whole grand design of Mazepa and King Charles XII of Sweden appears again in other forms as a timely reminder that a true anti-Russian coalition is not a matter of the past. Our modern alliances, such as NATO, CENTO and SEATO, are modern and more extensive replicas of the old Swedish-Ukrainian alliance.

The same struggle is still being waged. For the past two centuries Russian governments and Russian historiography have heaped condemnation and hatred upon Mazepa. In the present, the Russian Bolsheviks, well-qualified successors to the Russian imperial power, have also castigated Mazepa as an "agent of foreign feudalism and intervention." Not Peter I, the notorious aggressor, but Mazepa, the defender of his country, is the target of Moscow and the Soviet historical school.

The reason, of course, is evident. Mazepa represented a mortal danger to the integrity of the Russian empire. Since the ideals he represented survive, he must be denounced, vilified and ridiculed.

Unfortunately, Russian propaganda has succeeded to a considerable extent in nullifying the true import of Mazepa and his struggle against Peter I of Russia. But in the hearts and minds of the oppressed Ukrainian people Mazepa's true meaning and significance is beyond distortion or obliteration.

Mazepa has become a deathless symbol to the Ukrainians, who insist on existing in their own right as a free and sovereign nation. History has thus justified not only Mazepa himself, but also his beliefs and ideals. The cold war with the Russian Communist empire is still following the same course that Ivan Mazepa chose and there can be no peace so long as the enslaving Russian empire continues to exist as a malignant sore on the organism of humanity.

When it ceases to exist—and this time will undoubtedly come—then Ukraine as well as the other enslaved nations languishing now in the Soviet Russian prison of nations will become a free nation. When that time comes Mazepa will resume his full stature for the whole world. Until then Mazepa will continue to haunt the Kremlin totalitarians and enslavers, regardless whether or not they succeed in getting invited themselves to the United States and shaking hands with all they meet.



Cover page of the Arabic Gospei, published at the expense of Hetman Ivan Mazepa in the City of Aleppo, Syria, in 1708. It was one of his many acts as a patron of the Orthodox Church not only in Ukraine, but in other countries as well.

THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF MAZEPA AND CHARLES XII FOR UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE*

By BOHDAN KENTRSCHYNSKYJ

Any examination of the terms of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance of 1708 encounters great difficulties as far as sources are concerned. The last word of authority in this matter must belong to the late Prof. Borys Krupnytsky, who made a thorough analysis of the principal documents which cast light on the problem of the alliance of Charles XII with *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa and the Zaporozhian Kozaks. A summary of Prof. Krupnytsky's research appeared in a previous issue of this publication (cf. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1956, p. 47).

In addition to the documents ordinarily used by researchers for a reconstruction and an analysis of the alliance itself, there exists another group of source materials which makes possible the reconstruction of the political background of Ukraine against which this alliance was realized. It comprises the remnants of documents which bear on the political activity in Ukraine after the arrival of the Swedish troops and after Mazepa went over to the side of Charles XII. The *Hetman* and the King developed vast propaganda activities which evoked a strong reaction on the part of Czar Peter I and his protegee, *Hetman* Ivan Skoropadsky. These activities left abundant traces in the source material, both Swedish and Ukrainian, as well as of Russian origin. We have in mind the *universals* of Charles XII, the *universals*, open letters and activities of the agents of Mazepa; the *universals* of Skoropadsky; the manifestoes of Peter, and finally the correspondence of the latter and his high dignitaries.

The matter of the *universals* and manifestoes has been discussed more or less superficially in the Ukrainian and Swedish historical literature. Some researchers have remarked that the events in Ukraine between the arrival of Swedish troops and the battle of Poltava had a propaganda rather than a war character. The basis for such a just viewpoint is provided by traces of this propaganda in the contemporary press, the diaries of Charles' soldiers,

* *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 3, September, 1959.

and in other reports. Many documents of this category were published *in toto* in the past century in various Russian and Ukrainian source publications. Yet they do not provide a full picture. They can be completed, for instance, by the manifestoes of Peter, which constituted direct answers to the "shameful *universals* in the Little Russian language" of King Charles, as the irate Muscovite Czar called them. Altogether these materials give the gist of the reasons for which the Russo-Swedish conflict was waged in Ukraine in the fall of 1708 and the spring of 1709.

Propaganda materials present great difficulties to the historians, since factual and exact information are not to be expected. Their principal value lies in that they touch upon a number of problems and yield indirect testimony as to the existence of such problems at a given time. The data launched by the propaganda are totally worthless if they cannot be supported by other facts and documents acceptable to researchers. The *universals* and manifestoes of 1708-1709 do not solve the problem of the origin and content of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance, but they do cast light on what the Ukrainians hoped to gain from it, on the official interpretation of King Charles XII, and also on Russian fears of the political consequences of this alliance, which were documented by the emotional efforts of the Czar to put the Ukrainian and Swedish interpretation and comments in doubt.

Because of the impossibility of securing the primary sources for an examination of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance and problems allied with it, a more careful examination of the indicated material would not, however, be without special significance. A systematic analysis of the basic elements of the propaganda from the period of the "manifestoes war" will enlarge the horizon of our limited suppositions about both the Swedish-Ukrainian and the Russian viewpoints with respect to the actualization of Ukrainian independence in connection with transforming Ukraine into the principal *place d'arms* of the Russian-Swedish great power contest. This essay is written for the purpose of illuminating these problems.

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Although since the outbreak of the Great Northern War in 1700 eight years had elapsed before the events of war actually touched the Ukrainian lands which made up part of the *Hetman State* (*Hetmanshchyna*), yet from the very beginning of this war and its course a strong impact upon the formation of the internal political situation in Ukraine was evident. The defeats suffered by the

Czar on the fronts and the drawing-out of war operations for a number of years understandably evoked an internal ferment even in Muscovy proper, to say nothing of the autonomous or semi-autonomous countries, where ferment, open rebellions and national uprisings were always present.

When the Great Northern War began and when through all of Europe the news of the defeat of Peter at Narva spread with lightning speed, in Ukraine the repercussions of the uprising of Petryk were still very fresh.

An employee of Mazepa's chancery, Petro Ivanenko, nicknamed Petryk, had escaped to the Zaporozhian *Sich*, and from there had gone to the Crimean Khan, with whose help he proclaimed himself a *hetman*. It was another attempt to renew a Tatar-Turkish orientation, not infrequently employed in the policies of Ukrainian leaders aspiring to independence, especially in the second half of the XVIIth century during the reign of *Hetman* Petro Doroshenko.

In the *universals* of Petryk and in polemic proclamations and letters directed against him may be found a key to the national and social moods of the Ukrainian people at the end of the seventeenth century. Petryk was a clever demagogue, and in his propaganda he played on the emotions of the people, which he knew could easily be inflamed. His principal slogan in his *universals* was that of throwing off the Muscovite yoke. Although Petryk was an instrument of the Crimean Khan, nonetheless he had the traits of an honest patriot, and more than one of his political arguments was later incorporated into the *universals* of Mazepa.

In illuminating the hopeless situation of Ukraine under the rule of Moscow, Petryk wrote to the Zaporozhian Kozaks:

No wonder that the Polish King acts the way he does. We were once his subjects, but with God's help we liberated ourselves from his domination under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and inflicted upon him such evil that he cannot get rid of it to this day. No wonder that the Crimean Khan is against us: we always, ever since the olden times, have acted against the Crimean state, and are doing so now. But the acts of the Russian Czars are something else: they did not conquer us with sabers; our predecessors surrendered to them because of the Christian faith. In thrusting our people from the right bank of the Dnipro (Dnieper) to the left, the Muscovites exposed our people to all enemies, so that no matter from which side the enemy comes he can first burn our cities and villages and then take our inhabitants as prisoners, while Moscow rests secure behind our backs as if behind a wall. But even with this Moscow is not satisfied, but tries to turn us all into its slaves and servants. At first they put into slavery our *Hetmans* Mnohohrshny and Popovych (Ivan Samoylovych), who stood for us, and later on they wanted to subject us to eternal slavery . . . I also notified you that the Polish King, being dissatisfied with the Muscovite Czar because he did not fight against

the Crimea, himself wanted to make peace with the Horde and to declare war against Muscovy, in order to bring Ukraine back under his slavery. What fate would then await our Ukraine? Would not our brothers be put to death on the pole or drowned in water? Did they not force Kozak women to pour boiling water on their children, did they not pour cold water on our people during a bitter frost, did they not throw burning coal into the boots of our people? Did the Polish soldiers not rob our people of all their possessions? All this you remember well, and the Poles have not forgotten . . . Would they not do the same thing? . . . We have begun our work not to fight against our people, but to liberate ourselves from the robbery of Muscovites and of our own lords. You yourselves being of good head, judge and understand whether it is better to be in slavery or in freedom, whether a serf to a foreigner or your own master—under the Muscovite or the Pole—a peasant condemned to serfdom or a free Kozak!

The uprising of Petryk and his political agitation on a large scale, wielding an anti-Muscovite sword and playing on the patriotic aspirations of the Ukrainian masses, could not fail to evoke a reaction to the news that the bases of the powerful Muscovite state had begun to shake under the blows of a young and mysterious, almost legendary, "Lion of the North." The news was brought from the Baltic where the Czar was sending thousands of Kozaks to die in battles with the Swedes; the news also came from Poland and from Galicia and Volhynia, under the domination of Poland. The broad masses, who usually identified the policy of the *Hetman* with that of the Czar, the masses who formed a unified front against the Kozak officers, among whom they counted the *Hetman* as the most outstanding representative—they reacted to the news from the front by local, spontaneous outbursts, by rebellions and uprisings, by obstruction and opposition of every kind. As a rule the Ukrainian masses were supported by the Zaporozhian Kozaks.

But there were also other forms of reaction to the Swedish-Russian war among the Ukrainians. A new political trend, the "Swedish orientation," began to take root among the higher echelons of the Kozak nobility and officers. Among them the memory of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance concluded by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and King Charles X Gustav was still very fresh. Significantly, too, the desertions of Ukrainian Kozaks to the Swedish side in the Baltic, not only in the front lines but also from the regiments which were sent home, assumed such great proportions that Peter issued a special manifesto on January 9, 1702 (old style calendar). In it the Czar said that the ordinary Kozaks who had long fought against the Swedes in Livonia and who had been ordered to return home, "had deserted their regiments and their native country,

had not returned to their homes, but had gone over to the enemy, no one knows why . . . ” A pardon was promised to those who would return voluntarily, but the death penalty and a “curse” was assured for those who disobeyed the Czar.

The strong internal political tension in Ukraine, characterized above all by anti-Muscovite sentiments and rebellions, provided a fertile propaganda ground and attracted the interest of all factors which directly or indirectly took part in or were otherwise interested in the outcome of the gigantic contest between Charles XII and Peter I.

In addition to the Russian interests in Ukraine, there were also the Swedish, Polish, Tatar, Turkish and Don Cossack interests as well. Moreover, with the war operations approaching the frontiers of Ukraine there was a revival and reactivation of the various Ukrainian political orientations and conceptions, which of necessity were anti-Muscovite and pro-Russian, anti-Polish and pro-Polish, anti-Turko-Tatar and pro-Turko-Tatar.

Among these trends were those launched by certain social classes for the purpose of strengthening their positions, as for instance, the Kozak officers, or concomitantly a trend against their privileges, and so forth. The clergy had their own problems while various groups conducted secret wars against one another. The Zaporozhian *Sich* had its own policies, but there, too, there were various trends and orientations. And inasmuch as the influence of the Zaporozhian Kozaks upon the popular masses was extremely great, so at the *Sich*, parallel with the *Hetman* State, there competed various foreign movements and orientations as well.

All these segments resorted to intensive propaganda as a means to combat enemies and adversaries, their interests being at cross purposes. Their propaganda slogans were full of nuances which reflected the intricacies of the problems with which public opinion in Ukraine was preoccupied at that time. They allow one to feel the pulse of the era and to extract the postulates of the broad masses, political groups and personalities.

Propaganda feverishness attained its acme in the last months of 1708 and the first months of 1709, when the Swedish troops crossed the Ukrainian border, when the alliance between Mazepa and Charles XII was concluded and when the Zaporozhian Kozak host finally went over to the side of the *Hetman* and the Swedes.

Propaganda activities were effectuated by all possible methods known at that time: *universals*, manifestoes, and letters, which were sent to regiments and companies of troops and to cities and villages, and which were read in churches or posted on church

buildings. In his manifesto of May 26, 1709, Czar Peter ordered *Hetman* Skoropadsky to give it to "all our Zaporozhian troops and throughout the whole of Little Russia in cities, towns and villages to be read and also in the church, and to make it known to all . . ." The same device was employed by Mazepa and Charles XII.

The church was widely exploited for propaganda purposes. Priests through their sermons spread the propaganda, while wandering monks were engaged as agents for spreading news and reports, engaged in whispering campaigns, instigated revolts among the population, or simply acted as spies. Beggars, wandering musicians (*lirnyks*), merchants, Chumaks (venders of salt—Ed.), genuine and false (as well as genuine and impostor priests), served as propaganda media, constituting a vast network of propaganda activity in Ukraine. Letters and leaflets aimed at influential people in order to sway them to the one side, fraudulent and provocative letters designed to sow mistrust in the enemy camp, spreading of false reports and denunciations—all served as the propaganda means widely employed by both the warring camps in Ukraine.

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Both camps ascribed great value and weight to the propaganda weapon. Czar Peter was not only a master of its use, but he appreciated its importance. This continually allowed Mazepa, in his correspondence with Czar Peter and his ministers, to find good pretexts not to follow the Czar's order to join him with the Ukrainian troops.

"I am submitting to the wise judgment of your Imperial Highness," Mazepa wrote to Peter, "that if I, as the *Hetman* of Ukraine, leave the country, I am very much afraid . . . the enemy might resort to secretly sending alluring letters to the cities . . ." He had no deputy to whom he could entrust Ukraine, who would watch all activities of the enemy; look upon his tempting letters and warn against them, and he called upon the Czar to issue to all Ukrainian cities Czarist *universals*, ordering the Kozak officers to watch sharply for all enemy activities and not to accept or listen to his alluring letters and *universals*. The Czar was more than sensitive to such an appeal. He was constantly perturbed by the menace of the enemy's propaganda. As soon as he found out that Charles XII was directing his march toward Ukraine, he sent a letter to Mazepa in which he "proposed" to him to watch for any activities of the enemy in Ukraine and especially to be on the alert for and to intercept enticing letters.

Likewise, the closest advisers of the Czar, among them Menshikov, Golovkin and Sheremetev, always referred to the propaganda of the enemy in their correspondence with Mazepa. Golovkin admonished Mazepa to see to it that the Swedish King creates no factions in Ukraine. "Your Highness must especially take care that no agents from the enemy operate among the Little Russian people."

On October 29 (1708), five days after Mazepa went over to the Swedes, Sheremetev, commander-in-chief of the Russian troops, not suspecting Mazepa, appealed to him in a letter to send throughout Ukraine his *universals* opposing the "alluring" Swedish *universals*, which already had been circulated among the population. The first reaction of Menshikov, when he was finally convinced that Mazepa had gone over to Charles XII, was an appeal to the Czar to unleash the propaganda machinery. Czar Peter followed the advice of his aide and developed an intensive propaganda which, for the time being, put all war operations on a secondary level.

King Charles XII also realized the great value of propaganda, although he considered the saber to be the principal argument. Swedish General Lagercrona, upon making the first contact with the Regiment of Starodub, sent out "alluring letters," in which he appealed to the population not to fear the Swedes, to remain peacefully in their homes and to sell bread and other foodstuffs to the Swedish army. The King prepared several manifestoes to the Ukrainian people even before his arrival in the *Hetman State*; their contents are known from a reply of Czar Peter of November 6, 1708. Other manifestoes were issued later by Charles XII. They were characterized by a deep analysis of the Ukrainian problem and liberal use of such arguments which would evoke the deepest reaction in Ukraine. These manifestoes were prepared in the Latin language by Olof Hermelin, Charles' Secretary of State, which subsequently were translated into the Ukrainian language. It appears that Hermelin was a great expert on Eastern Europe and had been a professor at the University of Dorpat before the war. He especially knew the Polish problem well which almost exclusively was in his hands at the field headquarters of Charles XII and toward which he became more and more skeptical with the passage of time.

Hetman Mazepa had to put his hopes on the weapon of propaganda, although in this respect he was in a rather inferior position; to the very last moment of his alliance with Czar Peter he had to conceal his plans and, moreover, to take part in the anti-Swedish propaganda activities. He would issue anti-Swedish manifestoes under the pressure of the Czar, and some on his own ini-

tiative as well, so as to dull the alertness of Peter. His anti-Russian *universals*, which he began issuing after his alliance with Charles XII, were in direct contradiction of his anti-Swedish manifestoes, which naturally detracted from their impact. As an experienced politician, Mazepa must have known this fact, but he might have counted on the anti-Russian attitude of the masses and probably believed that he could excite and inflame them toward a general anti-Russian uprising. There was also a possibility that the Swedes would not enter into Ukraine. If they advanced directly to Muscovy, the Czar would be forced to withdraw his troops from Ukraine. With such a turn of events there would be no basis for apprehension with regard to Mazepa's previous anti-Swedish manifestoes.

But the King suddenly turned southward toward Ukraine; Mazepa was forced to make the best of the situation.

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In the propaganda war Czar Peter succeeded in taking the initiative and developed activities which in intensity, originality and elasticity were without equal. In these activities he heeded the advice of his able and cherished counselor and aide, Alexei Menshikov. It was Menshikov who on October 26, 1708, at the moment he was sure that Mazepa had crossed the Desna River, immediately understood the political implications of this step and reported to the Czar: ". . . If he did this, *it was not for the sake of his person alone, but for the whole of Ukraine.*"

This paragraph from a letter of the Czar's closest collaborator and counselor has a special significance. According to the Russian propaganda and to those Western European historiographers who have been influenced by that propaganda, the picture of *Hetman Mazepa* has been that of a romantic adventurer, who, by concluding an alliance with the Swedish King from purely personal motives, betrayed not only his sovereign but his own people as well. The letter of Menshikov of October 26, 1708, clearly demonstrates that the rage against the "treason" was not conditioned solely by the subjective mentality of a sovereign moved by righteousness, but from the very beginning also inspired by the fear that the *Hetman's* step would provoke a nation-wide uprising in Ukraine.

Small wonder that this facet of the problem was seized upon by the foreign diplomats stationed in Moscow, who commented on the developments in Ukraine. For instance, Marquis de Torcy, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, received in mid-December, 1708, from one of his agents in Eastern Europe the following statement:

"On voit que ce qui a oblige les Moscovites a approcher est moins la crainte des Suedois que l'inquietude que leur donnent les mouvements de l'Ukraine et des Cosaques."

The Prussian Ambassador, Georg Johan Freiherr von Keyserling, saw the attempt of Peter I in Ukraine immediately after the arrival of the Swedes as one to "destroy this fire in its inception" (*"dis Feuer in der ersten Entzuendung zu daempfen"*).

In the above quoted words of Menshikov lay the basic indicators of the Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which is being followed to this very day by Russian historiography. To aver the contrary and make Mazepa a "traitor" to his own country and people has become the main task of Russian historians who treat the problems of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance of 1708-1709.

In the same letter Menshikov insisted that by mass propaganda appeals the Czar should confuse and throw into disorder the masses of the Ukrainian people: "I advise you that at this evil event it is necessary to keep the common people on our side by all kinds of promises through the publication of *universals*, expressing all the *Hetman's* mischief against this people, so that they should not be persuaded by any of his enticements."

Immediately after receipt of Menshikov's letter, that is, on October 27, 1708, the Czar set his propaganda apparatus in motion. He issued on that day the first manifesto to the Ukrainian people. It was carefully worded to the effect that *Hetman* Mazepa had somehow disappeared, probably through the activities of "enemy factions," and called on the officers to direct their troops to the Czar's headquarters. Simultaneously Czarist couriers were dispatched to every Ukrainian regiment with copies of the manifesto, signed personally by the Czar, and marked "urgent, urgent," with an order to have it read at once to all companies. On the second day the Czar issued another manifesto, replete with cliches which were to remain in the Russian propaganda machinery: that Mazepa was a "traitor," that he sold out Ukraine to Polish King Stanislaw Leszczynski, that he planned the restoration of the church union (with Rome), and the like. Peter announced the "election" of a new *hetman* by "free vote" and called the officers for a conference in the city of Hlukhiv. Not trusting manifestoes alone, the Czar wrote personal letters to Kozak colonels, church dignitaries, his own generals and the *Otaman (koshovy)* of the Zaporozhian *Sich*, in which he used the same arguments against Mazepa.

Peter considered that the "election" of a new *hetman* was an important factor; therefore, he ordered a series of spectacles through which he thought he would separate the masses from Ma-

zepa. On November 5, on the eve of the "election," a theatrical dethronement of Mazepa was staged in the city of Hlukhiv: all medals and orders were ripped off Mazepa's effigy, after which the effigy was hanged.

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In the meantime the *universals* of Mazepa and King Charles were spread widely throughout Ukraine, to which the Czar reacted quickly. On November 6 and on November 10, 1708, he issued two manifestoes in which he cleverly played on the prevailing moods and situations. On November 6, the "election" of *Hetman* Skoropadsky took place, and the whole procedure of the election, the oath and the speeches were grist for the propaganda mill. At the same time Menshikov captured and razed Baturyn, capital of Mazepa. The brutal punishment inflicted upon all the inhabitants—the wholesale murder of some 6,000 people regardless of age and sex—was extensively used by the Russian propaganda machinery to terrorize other Ukrainian cities. Carriers of the macabre news were not only refugees from Baturyn and its vicinity, not only special Muscovite agents whose purpose was to spread the news about the victory of Menshikov to all corners of Ukraine, but also Ukrainian Kozaks who upon capture were nailed to planks and dropped into the Desna River, so that the people of Ukraine might see how the Czar punished those who supported *Hetman* Mazepa. Brutal reprisals, torture and merciless destruction of cities and villages, at which both the Czar and King Charles XII were unequaled masters, were employed in order to create fear in the population rather than to achieve any military aims.

But at the same time Czar Peter also used other methods. He was generous in granting high privileges and great estates to those Kozaks who deserted the ranks of Mazepa. The same device was also used by Mazepa.

On November 10, 1708, the Czar ordered the public execution and torture of Mazepa's partisans captured in Baturyn. Men were impaled or roped to huge wheels and tortured to death. The Czar personally directed these executions. Moreover, he ordered all Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchs to come to Hlukhiv and take part in the "election" of Skoropadsky; it was there that he ordered the anathema of Mazepa (the official act of anathema was announced on November 12, 1708, in Hlukhiv and Moscow).

Unsure whether harsh methods would yield better results than soft ones, the Czar tortured the Ukrainians with one hand, while

11. 23
11. 174
oares, *Mosepa, Dux militum Laporuientium, amborum
partium Boris henis, celestis ordinis sancti Apostoli An
dree, aquila² albat² Heros.*

*S*ignificamus hoc nostris universalibus ad quemcunque spectat hoc scribere
propter deo cohorti Laptauionis, cuiuslibet ordini, et Dignitati, spiri
tualibus, bellicis, et communibus incalis; quod nos quoduis in parte
vultis nostris universalibus clarificamus, et significamus perfecte
omnes causas propter quas cum recepimus à sanā, in fausta, nunquam
sperabili moschovitica protectione, in munitionem Serenissimi Regis
Sueciae, derogamus apud magnitudinem eius Super Patriam nostram
tantam misericordiam, ut relictā iustā suā irā; quā habuit erga gen
tem nostram propter ad subditos moschoviticos, p. multos, in Comitibus
flantibus, factis, damnis, et depopulationibus à militibus nostri; non
solum hoc in eternam proiecit amicitiam, quidēque combustū per
uam raptū, innocentium feminarum, et Virginum, cruciata spoliatio
ne et innumerabili depopulatione cor eius Regalis Magnitudinis in
cunctia flammatum erat, et pari modo in redditum suscitabit fuerat erga
Patriam nostram, sed et nos Ducei, milites Laporuionenses et omnes
Senatus Consultum paratū Regis, tyrannā moschovitico, iugō infirmit
tes, prius, opera dilecti suam dignatus est suscipere munitionem, et ha
cūque Patriam nostram pollicitus, suis infractis viribus defendere,
donec illa ad antiquas leges et libertates quales fuerunt, Dam Boris
nabāt, postulat memoria Bohdanus chmelnicki, nō deueniet. Et
quāuis etiam pollicamur in illis supradictis universalibus, quatenus
ad damnum amabilis Patria nostra, Leges, libertates, bellica à nātō
cogitantibus, ac semper nobis inimicis, moschoviticis, ueniunt, qui
omni no uoluerunt sub nomine et protectione mentali munitionis,
Patrias nostras in possessionem recipere, populi Communionem dēuine
in seruitutem deducere, Tabernaculo suas construere rōnem militum
Laporuionensium

he patted them on the back with the other. So for many months before the Battle of Poltava he attempted to lure the Zaporozhian Kozaks by promises in his manifestoes or by bribing them with money. Swallowing his pride, he endured the chicanery practiced by the Zaporozhians with regard to his envoys. Only after the *Koshovy* of the Zaporozhian *Sich*, Hordienko, had finally decided to cast his lot with Mazepa, did Peter decide to destroy the Zaporozhian *Sich*. He ordered public torture of those who would not denounce Mazepa, and publicly rewarded those who did. He razed to the ground entire cities and villages which resisted his troops, a fate which befell Kolyberda, Perevolochna, Pochery, Pohary and others. But he also ordered the death penalty for his Russian soldiers if they pillaged Ukrainian villages at the "wrong time." He promised a half of Mazepa's treasure to those who would reveal where it was hidden. Through his ministers Peter devoted special attention to the Ukrainian students in Kiev, especially those who had come from Polish domination and from Lithuania. In the Czar's eyes students were as dangerous and unreliable as monks, about whom Golitzin wrote to Golovkin at the beginning of 1709 that "it is difficult to ascertain the loyalty of monks, inasmuch as the monks are avoiding us. In all Kiev I found only one man, namely, the Prefect of the Brotherhood Monastery, who was friendly to us."

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On the other hand, the Swedish-Ukrainian side was not asleep. King Charles XII issued several *universals*, while Mazepa was extremely active, issuing *universals* and letters and sending out hundreds of his expert agents throughout the country. On October 30, 1708, he wrote to Skoropadsky, then a Colonel of the Starodub Regiment, and to other members of the Ukrainian military elite. Letters were sent to all other Colonels. Because Mazepa's agents, whose task was to instigate the population against Moscow, were so numerous, many were captured by Czarist forces, as in Chyhyryn, Korsun and Bohuslav. These agents masqueraded under various guises: monks, *lirnyks*, beggars, and the like.

Mazepa did not overlook other ways of making friends, namely, gifts, money grants, and other privileges, especially in dealing with the Zaporozhian *Sich*. Parallel to the agents of the *Hetman* were the hundreds of Zaporozhian agents who were active in those areas where the *Sich* had specific interests, such as Stary and Novy Kodak. The propaganda of the Zaporozhians was very effective among the broad masses of the Ukrainian people, especially in the South, in which direction the Swedish troops were marching.

The Poles from the camp of King Leszczynski also tried to develop propaganda in Ukraine, but it was of narrow scope, being directed to influential individual Ukrainian families. Because of the animosity toward Poles in Ukraine, the Polish propaganda was doomed to failure, especially among the peasant masses.

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When we analyze the *universals* of Peter I and Skoropadsky on the one hand, and those of King Charles XII and Mazepa on the other, one significant fact strikes the eye, namely, all these manifestoes deal with the same drastic and timely problems and attitudes which permeated the minds of the Ukrainian society of that time. We find in them the same elements, except with different interpretations. On a primary level is the play upon and the exploitation of *national and patriotic emotions*. Mazepa speaks of "our fatherland" being brought to the edge of the abyss. King Charles XII calls to arms all "for whom the fatherland and the safety of wives and children is dear." He commends that everyone "who loves his fatherland" be loyal to *Hetman* Mazepa and promises to "drive out traitors of the fatherland everywhere and treat them as enemies."

Czar Peter appeals to the Ukrainian people to save the "unity of their fatherland" and "to liberate your fatherland from all dangers and destruction." In another manifesto he speaks of the "Little Russian land, your fatherland" and about the selling out by Mazepa of "your fatherland." These expressions, painstakingly elaborated by the Russian propaganda machinery, were echoed by Skoropadsky in assuring the Ukrainian people that Mazepa was "never a true son of our fatherland."

This element of necessity was connected with the problem of Russian-Ukrainian relations, which none of the contesting factors could forget or omit. Mazepa speaks of the "ever inimical Muscovite power" liquidating the remnants of Kozak privileges and liberties, usurping the power over Ukraine, occupying cities, planning to destroy the Kozak officers and to turn Kozaks into *dragons*, preparing to deport the Ukrainian population behind the Volga and to Siberia, and planning to settle the Ukrainian lands with Muscovites. The march of Russian troops into Ukraine is the beginning of the realization of these plans. All this, Mazepa wrote, he has learned from intimate friends in the entourage of the Czar.

King Charles XII repeatedly referred to the Russian yoke and tyranny under which the Ukrainian people languished.

The Czar and Skoropadsky spared no effort in refuting these accusations. Liquidation of privileges and liberties, wrote Czar Peter I, is "a plain lie," for all privileges and liberties bestowed by Czar Alexei "remain untouched and are solemnly observed." No Ukrainian cities are occupied by Russian troops, he continued, except those which were agreed upon for the period of war and which would be evacuated upon the destruction of the enemy.

. . . We can without shame assert that no people under the sun can boast of their liberty and privileges more than the Little Russian people under our Imperial Highness, because not a single penny from the Little Russian land is allowed to be taken into our Treasury..., and with our troops, maintained at our expense, we are defending the Little Russian land, the holy Orthodox churches and monasteries and cities and villages from the Musulman and heretic onslaught.

Skoropadsky announced that it was not true that "Moscow, that is, the Great Russian people, is inimical to our Little Russian people" and that it was sent to reduce the country to ruins. Since Ukraine has been in union with Muscovy, he wrote, she has flourished with churches, trade and other forms of welfare. There is no enmity with the Great Russians, on the contrary, from "them as those who profess the same faith we receive all amity." *

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In this battle of ideas and orientations great significance was ascribed to *religious motives*. Constant threats of a union of the Orthodox Church with Catholic Rome, persecution of Orthodoxy, etc. belonged to the most indiscriminate weapons in the psychological warfare armory of Czar Peter I against his adversaries, King Charles XII and Mazepa. The alleged selling out of Ukraine to the Poles, the Pope, the Uniates and the "heretics" was one of the heaviest artillery pieces which the Russian propaganda mounted. The extent to which this weapon was considered deadly is attested to by the fact that both the main adversaries resorted to the most paradoxical arguments to refute it. For instance, King Charles attacked Peter I for his statement to the effect that he, Charles, wanted to introduce the Lutheran faith in Ukraine, and in turn accused the Russian Czar that "he for a long time has been negotiating with the Roman Pope for the purpose of suppressing the Greek faith and of introducing the Roman faith in his empire."

* cf. The present-day communist propaganda line steadily pounded home by Moscow and its puppets in Ukraine is based on "Russian-Ukrainian friendship" and the "Russian older brother"—ED.

The evidence of this was already to be seen "in Moscow," where the Jesuits were being allowed to "establish" schools and churches. "There is no doubt" that after the termination of the war, the Czar would force all to accept the Roman faith. "From him such a faith the Little Russian people may expect . . ."

This was also a trenchant weapon which greatly irritated the Czar. He accused Mazepa of suggesting these arguments to Charles XII and denied that he had conducted any negotiations with Rome. He turned the argument against Charles XII, stating that it was he who had come to Ukraine to "enslave the Little Russian people again under the ancient Polish yoke . . . and to restore the Union."

All these propaganda arguments were diametrically opposed, nonetheless they were powerful psychological weapons in the struggle for the minds and souls of the Ukrainian people.

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Although space precludes analyzing all the other elements of this psychological warfare, we should like cursorily to examine some of them:

(1) *Taxes*: The Czar accused Mazepa of imposing taxes in Ukraine without his knowledge and approval, and promised to abolish them. Mazepa, on the other hand, accused the Czar of every evil and promised to bring about an easing of taxation;

(2) *Pillage*: Both warring sides accepted responsibility for pillage. The Czar promised to pay indemnities after the war for all damages caused by the Russian troops and encouraged the population to draw up lists of damages;

(3) *Tortures and Bestialities*: Each side accused the other of sadistic acts and submitted supporting evidence. Especially they accused each other of barbarous treatment of war prisoners;

(4) *Glorification of Self and Degradation of Enemy*: Boasting about one's bravery and deriding the enemy for his cowardice and barbarism was one of the most popular propaganda items.

(5) *Outlawing Enemy Propaganda*: Both sides issued stern warnings to their troops not to read the enemy's proclamations and to "shut your ears" to his manifestoes;

(6) *Mendacity*: The Czar assured his troops that the mendacity of the Swedes was notorious throughout Europe. The same argument was used by Charles XII with respect to the Russians;

(7) *Sabotage*: Both sides tried to incite the population to commit sabotage and muster active resistance against the enemy;

(8) *Promises and Threats*: Both sides used both rewards and threats, for unconditional loyalty in the first case, and severe reprisals in the second. In this respect the Czar proved to be much more forceful. He stimulated partisan activities by offering cash rewards for captured or slain Swedes; 2,000 rubles for capturing a Swedish general, 1,000 for a colonel, 5 rubles for the capture of other officers and enlisted men, and 3 rubles for slaying a Swedish soldier.

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The most interesting facet of this propaganda warfare was the question and treatment of the *state status and future independence of Ukraine*.

Mazepa openly staked his future on the liberation of Ukraine from the Muscovite yoke. The *Hetman* developed his independence slogans extensively in his *universals* and through his secret agents, declaring that the Swedish King will always defend Ukraine from "the tyrannical Muscovite yoke," will liberate its people and will "not only restore all rights" taken away from "the glorious Zaporozhian host" but will also increase them, "all of which he assured and confirmed with his Kingly word, never yet broken, and with his *written assurance*."

The Swedish King reiterated these goals in his *universals*.

Of course, this matter of liberation was a most sensitive one for the Russian side, and consequently the propaganda efforts of Peter were centered around it. He sought to convince the Ukrainian people that Mazepa was guided not by national interests, but by egotistic ones. The Czar repeatedly asserted that the separation of Ukraine from Muscovy would not bring about independence but a return under the Polish yoke. Between Mazepa and King Charles, he charged, there existed a secret agreement to this effect. The Swedish King reacted publicly with the flat statement that "it is the biggest lie ever known that we ever have negotiated with the illustrious Polish King to the effect that Ukraine will be given to Poland."

Peter I replied that the "Swedish King refutes by lies" and quoted a letter of Mazepa's to King Leszczyński which had been intercepted and which the Russians published in connection with another manifesto of Peter I (January 21, 1709).

In this manifesto the Czar said that Mazepa "in his lampoons in the form of *universals*, signed with his own hand and stamped with his seal and published for the instigation of the Little Russian people, swore with God-forgetting conscience that whatever he did

was for the welfare of the Little Russian people and for the conservation of their liberties, and that this people shall not be submitted either to Our own or to Polish authority, but only remain free, in which cause he allegedly received a promise from the Swedish King. Today, however, his blasphemous lie has become evident. He lied when he wrote this as he lied about all other things, having in mind to entice the Little Russian people . . . ”

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The letter was truly compromising. Unfortunately, we have no way of finding the *universals* in which either Mazepa or Charles XII took issue in the matter of the letter, if such *universals* have been preserved at all. On the other hand, the question of the authenticity of the letter arises. Mazepa's biographer Mykola Kostomarov quoted (1883) the "original" in the Russian Archives, but it is known that as far back as 1698 there were fabricated "original" letters of Mazepa to the Polish King Jan Sobieski. Although the falsification of the latter letters has been definitely established by impartial historians, the Soviet historiography treats these letters as "proof" that Mazepa tried to put Ukraine back under Polish authority. On the other hand, it is known that before the arrival of the Swedish army in Ukraine a secret liaison between Mazepa and the Swedish King was maintained through Leszczynski. It is not impossible that tactician Mazepa gave the impression that he was willing to accept the Polish conditions as long as Leszczynski was useful to him. But there are no data to support the thesis that either Mazepa or the Swedish government committed themselves at any time in the matter of Polish territorial claims with respect to Ukraine.

These two suppositions are bolstered by the fact that in the treaty between Charles and Mazepa and the Zaporozhians, Ukraine is considered as an independent partner. Leszczynski does not figure in it either as a sovereign or as an intermediary, nor is Poland mentioned. It would appear that after his alliance with the Swedes Mazepa presented Leszczynski with a *fait accompli*.

In the light of these considerations, the letter of Mazepa, even if authentic, loses much of its value. It is significant that in this letter, allegedly sent on December 5, 1708, there is no reference to the Swedes, with whom the *Hetman* had operated for a month and a half. Thus, it might be a matter of a letter written before the alliance with the Swedes, or of a falsification, or of a tactical-diplomatic

move in order to offset the probable bitterness and disappointment of Leszczynski when the latter found out about the contents of the Swedish-Ukrainian treaty.

This is directly attested to by the Czar in his propaganda efforts, in which stress is put not on the credulousness of the population with respect to Mazepa's alleged statements in the letter, but rather on the inconveniences of Ukrainian independence under Swedish protection. He assured the Ukrainians that no good could come from the Swedish alliance: the Swedes were of "different faith and tongue" and their country was far away from Ukraine. The Czar held forth the promise of further concessions and privileges to the Ukrainian people upon his victory over Charles XII.

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An analysis of the effectiveness of the Russian and anti-Russian propaganda which tore the hearts of the Ukrainian people on the eve of the great Swedish-Ukrainian tragedy at Poltava and Perevolochna, is outside the framework of this essay. We might note that the matter is by no means simple, as is represented by the traditional Russian historiography, both Czarist and Soviet: that the political theses advanced by Mazepa and Charles XII found no reaction among the Ukrainian masses. There is much substantial evidence to the contrary. Propaganda reveals its power only when its sponsors are victorious. We can fully agree with the Swedish historian Harald Hjaerne, who said:

We must take into consideration the fact that both the Czar and the Swedish King were foreign rulers in Ukraine whose status depended largely on the success of their arms. The Kozaks could not alone be decisive in this success, but the ultimate victory pushed the uncertain and shaky to the side of the victor.

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There remains the question how the Swedish and the Russian sides presented the matter of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance *before their own public opinion*. Did the propaganda for home consumption follow the same pattern as that in Ukraine, or was it, as often happens, of a different sort? The question can be definitely answered on the basis of reliable historical sources.

It is necessary to state at once that the propaganda of Charles XII in Sweden was in the main identical with his propaganda in Ukraine, while the Russian propaganda for Ukraine and for Russia differed basically.

The directives for the informing of the Swedish people in the homeland were prepared in the field headquarters of Charles XII

in the form of "Chancery Bulletins." These were sent to Stockholm where they were published in the newspaper, *Ordinaire Stockholmske Post-Tidender*. On the basis of these directives Swedish diplomats disseminated the Swedish propaganda throughout Western Europe, composing pamphlets, leaflets and brochures or providing material for the foreign press. At the beginning of 1709 the Stockholm newspaper reported that the purpose of Mazepa's union with King Charles XII was that of seeking the "protection of His Royal Majesty against Muscovite tyranny and oppression."

The act of joining the Swedish troops by Mazepa on October 29, 1708 (Swedish style), was extensively commented upon in the press. Immediately after his arrival Mazepa and his officers were received in audience by the King, the Stockholm newspaper said, at which time Mazepa "in a brief but emotional speech in Latin gave himself, his people and country over to the protection of His Royal Majesty and for the defense against the Muscovite tyranny, assuring that he would serve loyally with all his strength His Royal Majesty and would respect His Royal Majesty as their savior from the Muscovite yoke." To this he was given the answer that his arrival was the more pleasant to His Royal Majesty and it was appreciated that he, known for his bravery, manifested such great confidence in His Royal Majesty. And because His Royal Majesty had brought his troops to Ukraine not to harm the population, but for the purpose of avenging his unfaithful enemy, therefore His Royal Majesty desired *not only to take Mazepa and the population under his protection, but to try to liberate them—they who voluntarily had cast themselves into his arms—from this yoke under which they had been suffering to that day*. He expressed the hope that they on their part would loyally and truly serve His Royal Majesty, so that they can fully benefit by those fruits and advantages which, thanks to him, would follow.

As far as the Russian propaganda was concerned, we have already seen from the cited letter of Menshikov that the interpretation by Peter I of the purpose of Mazepa's alliance with Charles XII and King Leszczynski was far from the actual conviction entertained by the Russian government in this matter. This is even more firmly supported by a speech which Peter I delivered to his troops on June 26, 1709, on the eve of the Battle of Poltava:

The Swedish King and the impostor Leszczynski have swayed to their side the traitor Mazepa and have sworn mutually to detach Little Russia (Ukraine), to create of it an independent principality under the rule of this traitor, by incorporating into it Volhynia, and to put under Mazepa's sovereignty the Zaporozhian and Don Kozaks. Attracted by this hope, the traitor hoped to

mobilize 200,000 Kozak troops, bribe the Porte, the Crimean Khan and the Horde against us, and for the fulfillment of his evil design appeal to Little Russia, the Swedish King with all his forces, and also Leszczynski, who is marching with 25,000 troops, to unite with him. But thanks to God's help the Kozaks and the Little Russian people have remained faithful to us. The Swedish troops, because of our victories and the severity of winter, are reduced to half of their number, the troops of Leszczynski are defeated and dispersed, while the Sultan has confirmed the peace with us and has refused to send them relief troops and has forbade the Khan and the Horde to unite with them. Against us there remain barely 34 regiments, and these are not complete, but exhausted and miserable. We must finish off these remnants! To arms, comrades! Faith, Church and the Fatherland demand this of you.

On the eve of the battle Charles and Mazepa made an inspection of their troops, but we have no documents about the speeches delivered to the Ukrainian Kozaks, many of whom found a more dreadful fate the next day than their Swedish comrades in arms.

NOTE: All sources and references are to be found in works in the Swedish language by the author: (a) "*Propagandakriget i Ukraina 1708-1709*," *Karolinska Föerbundets Arsbok*, Stockholm, 1958, pp. 81-124; (b) *Mazepa*, Stockholm, 1959, Chapter XIII.

THE WORLD OF MAZEPA*

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

This year marks the 250th anniversary of the battle of Poltava which launched Peter I and modern Russia on its imperial way. That victory of Peter ruined Charles XII of Sweden and ended for good and all Swedish hopes of playing a commanding role in the European arena. It also marked the culmination and in a way the ruin of the work of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa for through his alliance with Charles he secured recognition by a great European power of an independent Ukraine and in the debacle which followed, he won deathless glory by carrying Charles to safety in Turkey even though the exertion was too much for him and he died a few months later, an exile but still a free man and *Hetman* of Ukraine.

Far too often modern historians have seen fit to present Mazepa through the eyes of Peter and to regard his efforts to win independence for his country as a mad action, based either upon some moral defect in his character or as the senile gesture of an old man dreaming of the days of his youth and unaware that history had moved on and left him in a stagnant backwater. Neither judgment is correct and although his hopes of liberty for his country failed, the background of those efforts was intelligible and the result was determined almost by chance.

Mazepa was born in the first half of the seventeenth century. He was trained in that period and inherited its ideas. In fact he was still a young man when Bohdan Khmelnytsky raised the standard of revolt against Poland and his long and adventurous career spanned the effective life of the *Hetman* state. He witnessed the rise of the Zaporozhian *Sich* to political prominence and his death set it on the path of an almost inevitable decline but it was his work that made it possible for Ukraine to rise again and to struggle anew for its liberty and independence. It may therefore be worthwhile to notice the change in the position of the countries of Eastern Europe during his lifetime and the impact upon them of the newer forces that were beginning to stir in Western Europe.

Let us look back at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Western Europe was being torn to bits by the wars resulting from

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This map of Ukraine or the "Land of the Kozaks" represents generally the Ukrainian lands of the Mazepa era. The cartographer was Johann Baptista Homann, who published it in *Atlas Maior*, in 1710 in Nuremberg, Germany.

the Protestant Reformation. The German princes were sharply divided between those who remained loyal to Rome and those who followed the ideas of Luther and Calvin. These culminated in the Thirty Years War which from 1618 to 1648 engrossed the entire attention of Western Europe. Almost every country in the Western half of Europe poured out blood and treasure in the apparently endless campaigns which devastated city after city and left the heart of the continent, the German states, almost helpless for another century, while their rivals and allies alike reaped the profits.

The struggle left Poland and the East to itself and gave the region a chance to solve the pressing problems of reorganization at a moment when it could be almost secure against Western interference. At the beginning of the century there was no doubt that Poland was the main bulwark of the political structure but there was no doubt also that Poland was living in a disorganized anarchy

under which the central forces were helpless either to adopt a policy or to follow one already formed.

At the moment when in Moscow Ivan the Terrible, his *oprichniks* and hangmen were crushing the power of the old *boyars* and extinguishing the last survivals of liberty and civic independence in such places as Novgorod the Great, the magnates and the lesser *szlachta* of Poland were perverting the old "golden liberty" of Poland to their own class privileges and were hamstringing every attempt of the Kings to exercise any effective control over Polish policy. The nobles were so intent upon crushing the Orthodox population of the Ukrainian districts and producing a purely Polish Latin Catholic state that they never stopped to realize the cost of that policy. The more far-sighted but politically helpless kings could do little to stop it and thus arose the problem of the Zaporozhian *Sich*.

The Kings of Poland needed the Kozaks to protect their southern border against the Turks and the Crimean Tatars but they were unable to secure for them a suitable place within the framework of the *Rzeczpospolita Polska*, for the Kozaks were Orthodox, they were good and brave fighters who had tasted the fruits of liberty and were in no mind to be praised to the skies during wartime and reduced to serfdom immediately after. Even the device of registering a few thousand Kozaks was not a safety valve in time of war, kings and nobles alike were only too glad to enroll as Kozaks as large a part of the Ukrainian population as was possible. Then to add to the difficulties of the state a policy of matrimonial alliances had brought to the throne the Vasas of Sweden. At the time it seemed advantageous but the impact of the Reformation upon Sweden created hostilities between the Catholic and Lutheran Vasas and both sides dreamed of welding the joint state under their own faith.

So the problem was joined. The Kings of Poland wanted to find some solution that would satisfy the Kozaks. The nobles on the other hand sought only to suppress them but they were unwilling to make a consistent effort to replace them on the exposed frontiers of the state with an equally efficient body of troops and they preferred to exert their power in spasmodic attempts at pacification and suppression only to call in a few years again upon the same men whom they had roundly denounced.

On the other hand the Kozaks so closely confined their interest to the struggle against the Turks and Tatars that they had not given thought to the creation of their own local government. Long accustomed to the feudal rule of the nobles, they had not provided an answer to the great wave of Polonization which had spread

among those nobles. Even the Vyshnevetsky family which had furnished some of the great Kozak leaders in the sixteenth century threw their lot in with the Poles, adopted the Roman Catholic Rite and appeared as the most bitter enemies of their former brothers. It required some new impulse from outside to remedy this situation and it was Bohdan Khmelnytsky who furnished it immediately after the close of the Thirty Years War.

Yet as if there were not troubles enough in Eastern Europe, there was still the problem of the Turks. After their capture of Constantinople, the Ottoman Turks had cemented their hold upon the entire Balkan Peninsula except for the small district of Montenegro, a land-locked principality, and they had pushed up the valley of the Danube to place a strong garrison in Budapest in the heart of Europe. From there they were able to menace not only Poland but the Holy Roman Empire as a whole and yet Europe had nothing better to do than to waste its resources on internecine religious wars. In the mountainous regions there were still some semi-independent principalities as Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia, areas where the Christians had some hopes of maintaining themselves, even though they were nominally subject to the Sultans. Then in the further east the Sultan had extended his power over the Crimean Tatars, the last important remains of the Golden Horde which for a couple of centuries had counted the Muscovites among its most loyal servants and had breathed into them its own spirit.

This was the political world of the day but the cultural situation was equally confused. The fall of the Byzantine Empire had deprived the Orthodox of that cultural center to which they had looked for centuries. The Patriarchs of Constantinople, no longer the second in control of a Christian Empire, were made and unmade with zeal by the Sultans and their advisers and subjected to all kinds of impositions and Turkish political schemes. They had been forced from their great churches such as St. Sophia into the Phanar where they attempted to provide for the religious and cultural needs of the Christian East but against tremendous odds.

Those odds did not become less when the ambassadors of the various European powers tried to use them for the purposes of the European religious disputes. France and England, the Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire, the Italian cities and Spain all poured money into the Sublime Porte to keep on the patriarchal throne an incumbent favorable to either Roman Catholicism or Protestantism of some sort. The Patriarch had no printing press at his disposal and he was compelled to secure any necessary printed books from one of the ambassadors in Constantinople and to trust that the

texts had not been too badly altered for political and religious propaganda. The Monasteries of Mount Athos and some in the Danubian province tried to supply the lack but again the need was far greater than the supply and the Patriarchs who had previously been the patrons of culture were now compelled to beg through the Eastern world for alms to secure the funds to meet the Turkish impositions and to give some aid to their impoverished flocks.

It was here that the Czars of Moscow saw their opportunity to drive a hard bargain politically as well as culturally. The Czars had long claimed that by the marriage of Ivan III and Sophia Paleolog, they had become the political heirs of the Emperor of Constantinople. Now they used their resources and their donations to have the Metropolitan of Moscow reclassified as a Patriarch and as the Patriarch of the Third Rome, they demanded that he take precedence over the older Patriarchs and be recognized not only as the political and religious but also the cultural head of the entire Orthodox world at a time when education was at a lower ebb in Moscow than in any of the other Orthodox cities. They insisted on the maintenance of all the peculiarities that had been introduced into the Russian Church in the past as the norms of all Orthodoxy in the future. It is true that in the middle of the seventeenth century, they did modify this position by inviting the scholars from Kiev and using them in responsible posts but at the same time the strains of this concession were still visible in the twentieth century in the Russian Church through the sects of the Old Believers who never tolerated even this slight withdrawal from the standards of Muscovite omniscience.

It is small wonder that the leaders of Ukrainian thought were torn by the end of the sixteenth century whether it was better to retain what they could and make an agreement with Rome, whether they should cherish their own attachment to an impoverished Constantinople or whether they should swallow their intellects and their patriotism and join Moscow. The first attitude prevailed among those groups which were later to become the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The third attitude was shared by the unthinking who saw in Moscow a center of Orthodoxy, such as it was. The second was the position taken by the Kievan Academy and the brotherhoods of many Ukrainian cities which sought to borrow from the West what they could profitably take and at the same time maintain the old contacts in the hope of a better day.

At the same time the turn of political events in the sixteenth century had brought the Polish court and the magnates into close contact with the culture of the Italian city states. Many young Poles

studied in Italy and brought back the gains of the Renaissance so as to make the Wawel at Krakow a center of Italian luxury and thought. A little later the introduction of the Jesuits to counteract Protestant missionaries in Poland brought in a new touch and gave new ideals to education. All combined to incorporate Poland even more fully than before in the newly developing world of the West and thus rendered its cultural influence even greater and in a way more menacing to Ukraine than it had been earlier.

All these varying factors were reflected in the Ukrainian movement during the seventeenth century. Once the Ukrainian nobles had been largely Polonized, the masses of the people were left rudderless. Some, the more uneducated, clamored for Muscovite support. The better educated and the more far-sighted renewed their efforts to revive their own culture and to connect it again with the half-forgotten memories of the old Kievan Rus, when Kiev had been next to Constantinople a center of culture and political power, known and respected not only in the east of Europe but as far west as France where one of the daughters of Yaroslav the Wise had married a King of France.

In this political and cultural crisis, Ukraine was at the very center of events. Its connections with Constantinople, loose as they had become during the centuries of the decline of the city on the Bosphorus, still insured it a hearing throughout the entire East. At the same time it had never openly broken those connections and despised them as had Moscow. It was open by position to the Moslem world and more than that, it was easily subjected to the cultural influences coming through Poland from the West. It remained only for the Ukrainian leaders to pick the proper path.

This is well shown by the educational revival. There were those men like the great polemical writer Ivan Vyshensky who saw the people destined to follow in the old paths and revivify them. Yet the brotherhoods, largely composed of artisans in the cities, saw what they had to learn and in their schools they endeavored to revive a knowledge of the Greek language by calling teachers from Constantinople but at the same time they attempted to rival the Jesuit colleges which were being established throughout the country at Polish inspiration by introducing a course of study which would have the same appeal as the more thoroughly Western orientation given by their opponents.

This combination of the old and the modern was the distinguishing feature of the Ukrainian educational revival. The process reached its height in the school at Kiev which was later developed by Metropolitan Petro Mohyla into an Academy. This for a century

was the most famous school of its kind in Eastern Europe and in its international reputation it was more than able to compete with any of the Polish schools and also with the school of the Patriarch on the island of Chalki in the Sea of Marmora.

Yet Mohyla was himself a product of the complicated political and cultural position in which Ukraine found itself. He was a Moldavian *hospodar*, one of the nobles from the south who had been for a while in the Polish service and his acquaintance with the entire area and all fields of thought inspired in him a dream of still more far-reaching activity. This was nothing less than a reorganization of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the administrative and scholarly lines of the West. With remarkable success he was able to fit the prevailing Orthodox theology into the scholastic method and his restatement of many of the problems of the Orthodox Church remained in vogue for almost two centuries. Mohyla's *Catechism* and other writings with their combination of scholastic method and Orthodox theology competed throughout the entire East with the Protestantizing writings of the Patriarch Kyrillos Loukaris who was more or less under Dutch influence despite the close relations that Loukaris had with the Zaporozhian Kozaks who were at the time raiding the Ottoman lands and even the outskirts of the Turkish capital.

When the great storm of an organized Kozak rebellion broke under Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1649, the *Hetman* naturally turned his gaze to the south. He early realized that the Crimean Tatars, while they were willing to back him to a certain degree, still feared a rejuvenated Ukraine and were willing to forget their hostility with the Poles, now that a newer and closer rival had appeared. He looked to the south and dreamed of an independent Ukraine which could draw upon the help and assistance of all those semi-autonomous principalities between him and the Sublime Porte. It was only the death of his older and able son Tymish in Moldavia and the consequent disruption of all his plans that he started on that ill-fated path which led to the Treaty of Pereyaslav and allowed Moscow once and for all to enter the internal affairs of the Kozak host. It was a move that was to cost Ukraine dearly in the future, when his guiding hand was removed.

Yet we must not imagine that for Moscow this century was an era of unrelenting progress. The old dynasty of the Rurikoviches, the last ruling scions of the old royal family of Kievan Rus, had died out and with it the last traditions of the rights of the Grand Princes and Czars of Moscow to reign over all the Eastern Slavs. The new dynasty of the Romanovs had a struggle to reassert it-

self as the embodiment of Muscovite claims and it was not until the middle of the century that Czar Alexis was able to boast of anything like the authority of the former rulers. Then there began an almost imperceptible infiltration of Western ideas into the Muscovite mode of life.

Just about the time of Khmelnytsky's revolt, the Czar supported Patriarch Nikon in an effort to reform the Orthodox Church of Moscow on the lines of Constantinople and he encountered bitter opposition not only from the people but the nobles and the hierarchy. That was why Nikon and the Czar began to invite Kievan monks and scholars to Moscow, even though they looked upon them with suspicion. Nikon too awoke the Czar's suspicions and was banished but the work slowly went on, as Alexis and his successors schemed to extend their power over Ukraine.

It was even for them a hard struggle. *Hetman* I. Vyhovsky, Khmelnytsky's assistant and successor, even made a treaty with the Poles, bringing the Host back as a third equal member of the Republic along with Poland and Lithuania but the Polish nobles rejected this and a Russian engineered revolt overthrew the power of Vyhovsky who paid the penalty for his clearheadedness. There were in the Host pro-Polish, pro-Russian and even pro-Turkish parties and these to a large degree neutralized one another and left the Kozaks powerless.

Finally Alexis to solidify his position took a decided step. By the Treaty of Andrusiv, he and the Poles divided Ukrainian territory along the line of the Dnieper. The agreement held and from that time there were two *Hetmans*, sometimes cooperating against odds and sometimes hostile. It was frankly a stopgap to defeat the Kozak hopes but circumstances gave Moscow the advantage.

In 1683 Sultan Mohammed IV and his Grand Vizier Kara Mustapha decided upon a move to further the power of Islam. They attacked Vienna in the hope that they could drive the Christians out of the Danube valley and menace the Holy Roman Empire and the heart of Europe. Thanks to a sudden attack by a force of Poles and Kozaks under King John Sobieski, the attack on Vienna proved a boomerang. Vienna was saved and in short order the Turks were driven out of Budapest and within a few years were forced temporarily to surrender Belgrade. The turn in Turkish fortunes had come and the steady withdrawal of Moslem power began.

Poland did not profit because of her internal condition but the Regent Sophia of Moscow saw her opportunity. With Turkey momentarily prostrate, she exerted pressure on the Turks to have the Patriarch of Constantinople transfer to Moscow the control over

the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This was in 1685, just at the period when Mazepa was rising to influence in the service of *Hetman Samiylovych*.

The consequences of this transfer gradually became evident and even more than the political division of the country at Andrusiv, it put Ukraine at the mercy of both the Muscovites and the Poles. Slowly the Metropolitans and hierarchy of Kiev lost all power of independent action or publication. Slowly but steadily they were isolated from the south and an iron curtain closed over Ukraine. The leading scholars of Kiev were given good positions in Moscow, if they would bend the knee or Siberia if they would not. On the other hand those still under Poland found their position equally intolerable. The Orthodox Church there was completely isolated and the only protection of any individuals was to accede to the Ukrainian Catholic Church which became the spokesman for that part of the Ukrainian people.

The full consequences of this division were mitigated by Mazepa, after he became *Hetman*. It was his European court at Baturn that was visited by European travelers. It was through him that new ideas could find shelter and support. It was through him that the Kozaks were used to extend Muscovite holdings to the Black Sea.

He could do all this because in a strange way he had won the confidence of Peter I who had made himself sole Czar in 1689 and was filled then as throughout his life with a mad desire to tear Moscow from its old moorings and if possible destroy them as he went on to what he called Europeanization. Mazepa's whole interest was to find a way to unify Ukraine, to develop it to the best of his capacity, so far as he could keep the confidence of Peter, and to introduce such reforms as would make the Host once again an organized body able to function for the well-being of the people. At the same time, as the list of his donations compiled by his nephew after his death shows, he continued in the traditions of the earlier Ukrainians and made rich gifts to churches and monasteries throughout the entire Patriarchate of Constantinople as well as throughout the whole of Ukraine.

Thus when the Northern War started at the very end of the seventeenth century, the balance of power in Eastern Europe had been entirely changed. One factor remained, an unreformed Poland, but that was no longer a menace or a threat to any one. The unthinking policy of the Polish nobles toward the Kozaks had brought it about that the Kozaks had developed over a large part of their territory their own government, a government it is true that was

bound by Moscow but still one that was treated as a separate entity, even though its rights were consistently disregarded.

Poland under the Saxon kings had no real voice of its own and only a few Poles were willing to see it. They continued to dream of the past, even though their moves were being controlled by forces outside of their own territory. Augustus II could make his agreements and enforce them through his Saxon subjects and troops and the Polish nobles could murmur or accept. It made no difference.

Turkey had been fatally weakened, how fatally no one knew. Moscow had taken Azov from the Crimean Tatars and they were only a more or less helpless appendage, withering on the vine to be plucked by Moscow or the Kozaks at will. Yet the main heart of Turkey, the Balkans, still remained, and it would take many years before the fate of the Christians there was decided.

There were only two great powers in the area. There was Sweden, which had practically made the Baltic Sea a Swedish lake and there was a reorganized Moscow-Russia under the imperious command of that northern giant, Peter I, who was willing to change everything except his own unbridled personal power. The Northern War, nominally between the boy King of Sweden, Charles XII, on the one side and Moscow, Denmark and Poland on the other, was in reality concerned with one or two questions. Could Peter crash through the Swedish lines to the Baltic Sea at some point and compel the Swedes to evacuate their holdings to the south? Or could Charles drive deeper into Europe, secure a firm base south of the Baltic and force Peter to the east? If the answer was to be first, Ukraine would inevitably have been totally absorbed in the Russian interior. If the second was the answer, Ukraine could find a new support either in the south of the new empire or could secure a foothold on the Black Sea either with or against the consent of the Ottoman Empire.

After the victory of the Swedes at Narva, when the King proved his ability, Mazepa hoped that he would continue to Moscow with his troops based on the Swedish possessions in Finland. When Charles turned against Poland, the old *Hetman* realized that Peter was only waiting to wipe out the Kozak organization and Ukraine and felt that it was his duty to try to help his people by some sort of a practical alliance with the King. How to do it?

The advance of Charles into Ukraine and the move against Poltava indicated that Charles had perhaps vague hopes of opening up the southern route to supplies. The war was fought against the background of the War of the Spanish Succession in which again all of Western Europe was involved. Those moves favored some

plans of Mazepa; they hampered others. The crucial battle of Poltava was lost but the masterly way in which the old *Hetman* carried Charles to safety in the south and the work of Orlyk and the diplomacy of Charles postponed for a half century the complete victory of Moscow. The results made it clear that if Ukraine was not to be the decisive factor in solving the problem of the Balkan Christians, Moscow for its part would have to reckon with the Empire advancing down the Danube and the maritime nations of the West sailing in through the Mediterranean Sea.

The battle of Poltava made Moscow and the Russian Empire. It postponed the liberation of Ukraine. Two hundred fifty years later, despite all the efforts of Czars and Commissars, Moscow has not yet solved the riddle of the Straits. That elusive goal, the goal of Peter, still remains and so long as it does, there is hope for the independence of Ukraine and the reopening of those roads in all directions that were the glory of the medieval Rus.



The Brotherhood Church in Kiev, capital of Ukraine, erected by *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa in 1690-1695. The church was destroyed by the Soviet government in 1937.

THE YEAR 1709

By ALEXANDER OHLOBLYN

I

Hetman Ivan Mazepa met the new year of 1709 in his castle in Hadiach amid rather unfavorable circumstances. The old year was unfavorable for the great designs of the *Hetman* and for Ukraine. That which he had feared most had come at a time when the *Hetman* was least prepared. His ally, King Charles XII of Sweden, contrary to all the plans and expectations of Mazepa, was compelled, in endeavoring to conquer Moscow, to enter upon the territory of the Ukrainian state. Therefore, the arena of war operations was automatically transferred to Ukraine. When the *Hetman* was told of this development, he said wrathfully:

The devil is bringing him here. He has upset all my plans, and his interests as well as mine; he will lure all the Great Russian troops here for our ruin and destruction.

What was most unfortunate was that the *Hetman* had to reveal his hand at a most inopportune time. Ukraine was not as yet ready to wage the struggle for liberation from the Muscovite yoke. The Ukrainian troops for the most part were dispersed outside the borders of Ukraine; the fortresses throughout Ukraine were not adequately prepared for defense. Internal political relations had been aggravated after the affairs of Kochubey and Iskra, who had treacherously denounced the *Hetman* and paid for it with their lives. The populace, always dissatisfied with exploitation at the hands of the Kozak officers and state officials, was ready to heed any incitement to riot and rebellion. The broadly outlined international political plans of the *Hetman* were not completed as yet, while the defeat and death of Kindrat Bulavin, *Otaman* of the Don, had dashed all hope of the *Hetman* for assistance from the Don. Finally, Mazepa still could not assure for himself the assistance of the Kozaks of Right-Bank Ukraine, while the support of the Zaporozhian Host, always in opposition to the policy of the *Hetman*, was very dubious at the very least. Therefore, the old *Hetman* knew well what he had to fear.

But fortunately he could not know how events would shape up. The immediate future was much more dire than Mazepa could imagine. His capital Baturyn, with its state institutions, treasury and archives, with all the churches and palaces which Mazepa had erected, with its libraries and arms collection, unequalled anywhere in Europe, and all the other treasures amassed for twenty years by the great statesman and leader of Ukraine—fell victim to fire and Muscovite barbarism.

Czar Peter I and Menshikov, by plundering the capital of Ukraine in a barbarous manner, knew well what they were doing. The Swedish eyewitness of the campaign, Gyllenstierna, said that the destruction of Baturyn terrorized the whole of Ukraine.

"Moscow is enraged, Moscow has razed Baturyn to the ground, killing all the inhabitants, not even sparing the little children," was the general fear in Ukraine. A French diplomat reported to his government that "Muscovite General Menshikov has brought to Ukraine all the horrors of revenge and war. All partisans of Mazepa have been barbarously tortured, and Ukraine ruined by pillage presents a horrible picture of the barbarism of the victors."

Inhuman reprisals on the part of the Russians, their torturing and executions in Hlukhiv and Lebedyn, of which the people were to talk in dread for a hundred years as "barbarities and beastly acts which defy human imagination" (*Istoria Rusiv*), completed the Muscovite revenge upon Ukraine.

The fall of Baturyn and the occupation of part of the *Hetman-state* by Russian troops gave Peter I an opportunity to disperse the Ukrainian forces. A decree on the election of a new *hetman*, the horrible ceremonies of excommunicating of *Hetman* Mazepa in Hlukhiv, the traditional Russian policy of vengeance and brutality, the demagogic manifestoes of the Czar, in which he lied that "no other people under the sun can pride themselves on enjoying such liberties, privileges and lightness of control than the Little Russian people by our imperial grace," and that Mazepa had gone over to the Swedes "in order to enslave the Little Russian land and subject it to Polish domination," and, finally, the Swedish atrocities committed upon the Ukrainian people—all this made itself heavily felt.

But *Hetman* Mazepa was not one to submit to fate in docile fashion. We have all indications to believe that despite the temporary setback evoked by the defeats of 1708, the *Hetman* began the new year with fresh hope for a successful end of the war. In 1709 he did manage to develop vast diplomatic and military-strategical activity, the results of which were evident, regrettably, after it was

too late. But this at least allows us to recreate the year 1709, and in the ruin of Ukraine of that time to see not only a picture of the future defeats of Ukraine, but also the inevitability of the final Ukrainian victory.

This most important page in the history of Ukraine, that of the year 1709, has yet to be written. In appraising it Ukrainian historiography for a long time patterned itself after the Muscovite, but in the opposite direction. In the center of the thought of both is Poltava—the Battle of Poltava. The difference is that the Russians glorify 1709, while the Ukrainians deplore it. This has also been due to the fact that there are no Ukrainian archives dealing with those times. There are no Ukrainian memoirs, diaries, correspondence and the like; almost everything has to be reconstructed on the basis of foreign sources, and on those for the most part inimical to the cause of the Ukrainians. As a result, very little would seem to be known about the activity of the Ukrainian government of Mazepa in 1709. It would seem at times that not only had the Ukrainian government disappeared from the territory occupied by the Swedes, but that there are no traces of any activities at all.

In reality, this was not so by far. A series of fragmentary documents indicates that immediately after the sacking of Baturyn and the events that followed, the *Hetman* developed a vast military-administrative and diplomatic activity. The greatest merit of the modern Ukrainian historiography has been its determination of the correct perspective of the historical events of that era. Borys Krupnytsky, the eminent Ukrainian historian, wrote:

Mazepa and the Ukrainians oriented toward him were seeking a solution at a most propitious moment in the European situation. The former allies of Muscovy, assailed by the military genius of King Charles XII, were neutralized: Poland was conquered, while neutral Prussia had to keep still. Austria, France, England and Holland either openly leaned toward the Swedish King or did nothing to impede his operational designs. Turkey was ready—at least under the condition of success—to join the anti-Russian coalition. Charles XII commanded a first-rate army in Europe, well armed and remanned during his stay in Saxony.

The same considerations were motivating the actions of *Hetman* Mazepa at the beginning of 1709. It was in 1709 that the grandiose plan of the *Hetman* on the anti-Russian coalition was finally completed. The coalition was to embrace, in addition to Ukraine, Sweden and their Western allies, a series of Southern and Eastern European states and peoples, such as Turkey, the Crimea, Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, the Don, the Kuban Cherkesses, the Kalmuk Horde, the Kazan Tartars and Bashkiria. This was a

truly great plan, worthy of an outstanding politician, diplomat and statesman, a plan which would destroy the Russian power and create an invincible dam against Russian imperialism. Only Mazepa, who united in his being great culture and experience of European politics with an excellent and penetrating knowledge of the European East, especially Muscovy and its danger not only for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe he knew so well—only Mazepa could have been the author of such a plan. What meant the small and exhausted Swedish army far away from its home bases in comparison to the great mobilization of European and Asiatic forces by Mazepa? Of what significance the defeat of this army when the *Hetman* was readying all the forces of Europe and Asia against Moscow?

The plan of Mazepa was neither groundless nor unnecessary. Mazepa knew well that the principal enemy of Moscow was not Sweden, which could always come to an agreement with Moscow. Mazepa had been following the developments of political events in Eastern Europe for several decades, had been in close touch with all those national and social movements and uprisings against Moscow which erupted either in Astrakhan, Bashkiria or in the Don area, for the suppression of which he was compelled to send Ukrainian regiments. He best could understand that only a coalition of all the enslaved and threatened peoples could muster a powerful enough resistance to Muscovite expansion.

On the other hand, the creation of such a vast anti-Russian coalition also had an immediate military importance and significance. The loss of Baturyn and with it all of the Ukrainian artillery, and even more, the dispersal of the Ukrainian forces as a result of Russian terror and deceit, clearly proved to the *Hetman* that even the bravest Swedish army, far from its home base, would not on its own be able to defeat the Russian troops, which disposed of great supplies and armed forces over a great part of Ukraine, and above all, were served from their own Russian bases. Thus it was necessary to think about the creation of military reserves, of armed forces to support the Swedish army, or even to replace it, if necessary. Above all it was necessary to mobilize all those forces in the various anti-Russian countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe (the Zaporozhian Host, the Don Insurgents headed by Ignatius Nekrasov, successor to Kindrat Bulavin, which operated then in the Kuban area, the Crimea, and above all, Turkey). Toward that goal Mazepa directed all his efforts in 1709. It was he who was the true creator of the plan of the Eastern European coalition in the XVIII century directed against Moscow. Undoubtedly, the new Turko-

Russian War which ended in a Russian debacle in 1711 on the Prut, was one of the results of Mazepa's planning in 1709.

II

The very first months of 1709 were already marked by great activity on the part of the Allies in the military and diplomatic fields. The King and the *Hetman* considered it their first objective to drive the Russian troops out of Ukraine and to transfer the military operations to the territory of Muscovy. But the expedition of Charles XII in Slobidska Ukraine in February, 1709, had more than this objective to attain. The King ascribed to it a great significance, and Mazepa participated in it with his troops. This campaign would be little, if at all understandable, if we did not know the far-reaching designs of the *Hetman*. Beyond all doubt, it was connected with the planned new military alliance against Russia, in which the important factors were Turkey and the Crimea. On the other hand, this campaign was designed to force the Don Cossacks and the peoples of the Northern Caucasus and the Lower Volga to rise against Moscow. The fears of Peter I that the King was aiming at Voronezh, the base of the Russian flotilla, were not unfounded. When the King approached the city of Kolomak, the *Hetman* told him:

The war progresses luckily for Your Majesty: we are only some eight miles from the frontier of Asia.

But the Eastern campaign of Charles XII and Mazepa was impeded by extremely bad weather. After a severe winter, with an unusual amount of snow, in the middle of February suddenly came the spring; on Feb. 13 there was a torrential downpour, which resulted in great floods, which in turn caused damage to the army and its supplies and, in fact, put a stop to the military operations. Meanwhile the Russian troops which had remained in the *Hetman* State, profiting by the absence of the principal Swedish forces, extended their operations and occupied more of the Ukrainian territory.

But what was most important was that the failure of the campaign in Slobidska Ukraine caused partisan warfare against the Swedes. King Charles XII looked upon Slobidska Ukraine as a part of the Russian state (which formally it was). For the Swedes it was an "enemy's country," and to be treated accordingly. Therefore, the local *Ukrainian* population took the brunt of Swedish persecution and oppression. The consequences were extremely damaging for the Swedes, as large-scale partisan warfare by Ukrainian peasants erupted against them in Slobidska Ukraine and also in some parts of the *Hetman State*, uprisings which were cleverly capitalized upon by the Russian army command to the advantage of Muscovy.

But far more successful was the diplomatic activity of the Allies. It must be understood that had it not been for Mazepa, the situation of the Swedes in Ukraine would have been more serious; their continued struggle against Moscow would have been totally hopeless. Although the failure of Charles XII's campaign in February, 1709, could not but cool off the governments of Turkey and the Crimea, nevertheless Mazepa succeeded not only in preserving the pattern of the coalition, but successfully continued to negotiate with these states. A series of Ukrainian delegations to the Crimea and the diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Porte saved the southern flank of the anti-Russian front and also saved the Swedish cause after the Poltava catastrophe.

Undoubtedly, one of the greatest successes of the policy of *Hetman* Mazepa in 1709 was the bringing to his side of the Zaporozhian Kozaks. Although formally recognizing the sovereignty of the *Hetman's* authority, the Zaporozhian *Sich* throughout the whole reign of Mazepa had been in open opposition to his government, which was accused of a hostile national (pro-Russian) and a hostile social (pro-aristocratic) policy, both of which were considered as being contrary to the interest of the Ukrainian people. Several times the Zaporozhian *Sich* had risen against the government of the *Hetman* and supported the various actions of the Kozak officers' opposition in Poltava. Kost Hordienko, *Koshovy Otaman* of the *Sich* and one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the *Sich*, had openly opposed Mazepa. Small wonder that the Zaporozhians looked upon the policies of the *Hetman* with great distrust and suspicion. Only after the brutal and barbarous conduct of the Russian troops in the south of Ukraine and in the *Hetman* State, the influence of the Don Cossacks and the Crimea, and above all, the dexterous policy of Mazepa who made peace with the Poltava opposition—only after all this did the attitude of the Zaporozhian Kozaks change.

Subsequently the battle for the Zaporozhian *Sich* between Mazepa and Peter I entered a new phase. A Russian mission which was sent to the *Sich* by Peter I and which also included a delegate from the newly-elected *Hetman* Skoropadsky and a representative of the clergy in the person of Rev. Irodion Zhurakovsky, was received very badly and eventually expelled. On the other hand, the mission of *Hetman* Mazepa, consisting of Attorney General Vasyl Chuykevych, Col. Kost Mokievsky of Chyhyryn and Fedir Myrovych, was greeted with great fanfare. On March 12, 1709, the Zaporozhian *Rada* voted to support the *Hetman*.

On March 27, 1709, *Otaman* Hordienko at the head of the Zaporozhian delegation appeared at the headquarters of King Charles XII, and the next day a treaty between *Hetman* Mazepa and *Otaman* Hordienko on the one hand, and King Charles XII on the other, was signed in Velyki Budyshcha. In the treaty the Zaporozhian *Sich* joined the Ukrainian-Swedish alliance, and the Swedish King pledged himself not to sign any agreement or treaty with the Russian Czar until Ukraine and the Zaporozhian *Sich* had been liberated from Muscovite domination.

It was a great triumph for *Hetman* Mazepa, which in great measure compensated for the loss of Baturyn and the northern Left-Bank of the Dnieper. Under the supreme authority of *Hetman* Mazepa was united a great part of the Ukrainian territory—the Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine and the entire Southern Ukraine, with the Zaporozhian *Sich*. The latter had a great significance, inasmuch as it insured uninterrupted communication with Poland, Turkey and the Crimea.

But even more important was that Mazepa finally succeeded in liquidating the opposition of the Zaporozhian *Sich*, which development had a great influence and repercussion among the Ukrainian masses. The decision of the Zaporozhian Kozaks to support Mazepa provoked a series of anti-Russian uprisings in various parts of the Left-Bank and the Right-Bank Ukraine, and even in Slobidska Ukraine, creating a powerful threat to the Russian armies.

Another asset of the support of the Zaporozhian *Sich* was its military and diplomatic help. Through it the *Hetman* and the King reached an understanding with the Crimea in the matter of Tartar help, while Turkey began to look more favorably at the anti-Russian alliance. Finally, the 8,000 well-armed and well-trained Zaporozhian troops, well acquainted with the terrain and Russian military tactics, were a welcome addition to the depleted *Ukrainian* military force of Mazepa.

The city of Poltava came to the fore at once. Mazepa on several occasions pointed out to the King the significance of this fortress and trading center, which straddled the crossroads of important trade routes to the Zaporozhian *Sich* and the Crimea and Turkey, to the Right-Bank Ukraine and Poland, Slobidska Ukraine, Muscovy, and the Don. In Poltava, too, there were strong Ukrainian autonomist groups. The significance of Poltava was well understood by Peter I who in December, 1708, brought in strong military contingents and occupied it, which development greatly impaired the operations of the Allies. In addition, Poltava was necessary as a springboard for

a new operation against Russia. With Poltava in their hands, the *Hetman* and the King could have waited for the arrival of the Polish King Stanislaw and the Swedish General Krassau, and for the eventual joining with the alliance of Turkey and the Crimea.

But, regrettably, this well-outlined plan did not succeed. The Swedes who reached Poltava at the beginning of April, failed to capture it, and on May 1, 1709, were forced to lay siege to it, a siege extremely onerous because of the lack of heavy artillery on the part of the Swedes. Polish King Stanislaw Leszczynski and Swedish General Krassau, heavily preoccupied with the pro-Russian Polish magnates in Poland and hindered by the Russian troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine, could not come to the assistance of Charles XII. The Turks and Tartars continued to await more favorable developments, while the partisan warfare against the Swedes assumed great proportions, which in turn compelled the Swedes to divert their forces and apply severe reprisals. The siege of Poltava and the partisan warfare prevented Charles XII from coming up with assistance for the anti-Russian uprisings in the *Hetman* State, which finally was suppressed by the Russian troops. Finally, on May 14, 1709, a Russian force under the command of Col. Yakovlev attacked the *Sich* and razed to the ground that old stronghold of Ukrainian autonomism and barbarously killed all the Ukrainian Kozaks he succeeded in capturing.

The destruction of the *Sich* was another shock for the Ukrainians which, like that of the destruction of Baturyn, had a great psychological impact upon them. In fact, it decided the fate of the whole campaign. From this time on the initiative finally went over into the hands of the Russians. The Swedes could not capture Poltava and were compelled to accept a general battle in the least favorable circumstances. King Charles XII was wounded. The Swedish army of 25,000 had to face a Russian army of 50,000 men, with 72 pieces of heavy artillery.

The final result of the battle is only too well known. The defeated Swedish army, instead of retreating toward the Crimea, capitulated at Perevolochna on June 30, 1709. King Charles XII with a small detachment of his warriors turned toward Podilia in order to united with King Stanislaw Leszczynski of Poland and his General Krassau, but upon the suggestion of Mazepa, he went to Turkey instead. Mazepa and Hordienko with their guard detachments and a number of high officers, went with the King. It was in Turkey that Mazepa died on September 22, 1709 (old calendar style).

III

For the Ukrainian state the battle of Poltava was a great catastrophe, but its historical significance is by no means negative. The Ukrainian historiography has looked upon that date through the prism of emotionalism and sentimentalism without seeing the creative elements which had been preserved amid the ruin of the great designs of Mazepa. The Poltava catastrophe of 1709 not only tragically ended a page of Ukrainian history which had been initiated by the great Bohdan Khmelnytsky, but it opened up a new era of struggle and suffering for the Ukrainian nation.

Regrettably, we know little about the activity of *Hetman* Mazepa and the Ukrainian government in exile; we are not in possession of any detailed information thereof. But we do know the military, diplomatic and ideological results. We cannot afford to underestimate the great shock which befell the ailing *Hetman* after Poltava. The old antagonisms and intrigues which existed between him and his officers on the one hand, and those between the Zaporozhians and the *Hetman* on the other, must have come into play again. But Mazepa and his followers did not lay down their arms. The war was far from finished and the strength of the Swedish state not spent, and the determined decision of the King to continue the struggle against Moscow gave the Ukrainian government some grounds for optimism.

One of the important developments after the battle was that the Ukrainian problem was officially introduced into the international forum. The Ukrainian exile government quickly recognized the great political significance of its diplomatic activity, which was extremely successfully conducted by *Hetman* Pylyp Orlyk, successor to Mazepa. On the other hand, in diplomatic circles as well as in the public opinion of Europe the Ukrainian problem had ceased to be an internal problem of Russia. This was mainly due to the conclusion of the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance. In all official acts of the Mazepinist emigration it was underscored that Ukraine, in making the treaty with Sweden, was following the tradition of the Ukrainian state as it was conceived by Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

From the viewpoint of the Ukrainian exile government the Russian government was a "usurper of Ukraine," as stated by *Hetman* Orlyk. "No matter how great are the Muscovite barbarities, they give no legal right to the Russians with respect to Ukraine. On the contrary, the Kozaks have behind them an international and natural law, a main principle of which is that the people always have the right to protest against oppression and to restore the

practice of their ancient rights when an opportune time comes," wrote *Hetman Orlyk*.

This political concept, which reflected a new political situation of Ukraine and its emigre government, could not but influence the natural process of crystallizing of Ukrainian statehood thought. The Ukrainian emigration had to find for itself and the world a formula of state self-determination and such norms of state system which, corresponding to the real relation of the Ukrainian forces, would blend the traditional ideals and forms of the Ukrainian state with a system of government prevailing in most Western European states. The constitution of Ukraine, which was adopted in 1710 in the city of Bender, is an eternal monument of Ukrainian thought which defined the Ukrainian state as a *Hetmanite* monarchy of the parliamentary type, and which was a result of political deliberations and discussions which preoccupied the Ukrainian emigration in 1709.

The year of 1709 also gave birth to the Ukrainian political emigration, the emigration which succeeded in preserving the Ukrainian state almost to the end of the XVIIIth century, which extended the golden thread of the Ukrainian national ideal from Orlyk to Kapnist, and which, through Voltaire, proclaimed to the entire world: "Ukraine always aspired to freedom."

This dictum was born in 1709. This is a testament of the Ukrainians and a design for the future.

UKRAINE, POLAND AND SWEDEN AT THE TIME OF IVAN MAZEPA*

By OSCAR HALECKI

The 250th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava and the subsequent death of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa is sad to commemorate not only for the Ukrainians. The great Polish historian Wladyslaw Konopczynski, who knew that whole period so well, rightly pointed out that the defeat of 1709 ended at the same time the chances for Ukrainian independence, the prospects for Stanislaw Leszczynski's rule in Poland, and Sweden's role as a great power. It is, therefore, important and instructive for all three nations to study why that happened in spite of an unusually promising situation in which these countries, in the persons of their most prominent representatives, had created an apparently powerful coalition against the threatening advance of Russian imperialism.

It is, of course, obvious that one of the reasons for such a turn of events was the extraordinary energy and ability of Czar Peter I who from the Russian point of view is correctly called the Great. But it seems equally true that even he, with all his ruthlessness and versatility, would hardly have succeeded in meeting the challenge which he had provoked himself, if not for the tragic mistakes made by his opponents.

Most fateful indeed were the surprising mistakes of Sweden's famous hero, Charles XII. It is utterly unfair to blame him, as is sometimes done by those who consider Russia a frequent victim of Western aggression, for having attacked and invaded that country. On the contrary, the war, known in history as the Great Northern War had started nine years before Poltava with an anti-Swedish coalition set up by the Czar who had carefully planned an entirely unprovoked aggression against one of his western neighbors. And if immediately after his victory at Narva, in 1700, the King of Sweden had marched against Moscow, he would have been not only well justified in doing so, but would have seized an excellent opportunity for rapidly and completely defeating his main enemy. He turned instead against the least dangerous one: the Saxon King of Poland, Augustus II, who personally was indeed involved in the plot

* *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 2, June, 1959.

against Charles XII but without any knowledge and responsibility of the Poles and without any interest of Saxony. Yet it was precisely these two countries which were punished by a Swedish invasion, absorbing for about eight years the best forces of Sweden, while to Peter I ample time was left to recover from his initial defeat and to organize Russia's forces of resistance. During these long years, practically wasted by his opponent, the Czar put an end to his internal troubles, achieved his almost revolutionary military and financial reforms, and even succeeded in occupying a substantial part of those Baltic provinces which were his foremost war aim.

But Charles XII, in addition to this strategic error, made another and equally disastrous mistake. He treated Poland as a conquered country, recalling to the Poles who in 1660 had effected a reconciliation with the Swedes, the hardships of another Swedish invasion before that date. Although the candidate whom he wanted to replace Augustus II on the Polish throne was rather well chosen, that first election of Leszczyński, dictated by Charles XII, was obviously illegal and necessarily divided the Poles into two camps fighting each other and conducting different policies. It is true that the election of the Saxon, in 1697, had also been illegal, enforced as it was by the future partitioning powers against the decision of the majority of the Poles; but it had been at least formally legalized two years later, and therefore it was understandable that many Poles resented another, this time Swedish, interference with their constitutional rights and that all of them were confused when suddenly they had two different Kings.

Nevertheless it was a great mistake that the Polish nation did not unite in those critical years. After all, Augustus II had first violated their constitution and drawn them against the vital interests of the country into a senseless war which could benefit only their more dangerous Russian enemy; and then, when defeated and threatened by Charles XII in his Saxon homeland, he had himself, in one of the conditions of the Treaty of Altranstadt, resigned all his claims to the Polish crown. It was, therefore, unfortunate that in spite of these facts the Elector of Saxony continued to have supporters in both the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania partly occupied by Russian forces, and that some of them would rather turn to these eastern invaders and consider them allies against the Swedish. Unfortunately King Stanisław I did not have the whole nation behind him when his Swedish protector at last decided to turn against Peter I and when a Polish-Swedish alliance against the common Russian enemy, which had

seemed so desirable already at the time of the Jagellonians, could at last materialize.

Leszczynski also realized how desirable it was to include in such a cooperation the Ukrainian Kozaks. However, this would seem rather difficult to achieve. Ukrainian-Swedish cooperation, never easy if only for geographic reasons, had been tried before but against Poland, when in the days of Bohdan Khmelnytsky any chance of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation seemed hopeless. In general the whole preceding century had left behind a painful tradition of Polish-Ukrainian conflicts, obscuring the memories of bygone common struggles against Muscovites, Turks, and Tartars. And particularly vivid was Ukrainian resentment raised by the partition of Ukraine between Poland and Muscovy, in 1667. But it was precisely that partition for which the Kozaks and their internal divisions were not irresponsible, that had made them aware that Moscow's rule, extended even to Kiev, was the worst of all, destroying all hopes of independence and respecting not even the promised autonomy. The failure of the conception of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 with the autocratic Czardom, a failure which by now had become obvious, was a serious argument in favor of a return to the conception of the Hadyach agreement of 1658-59 with the Commonwealth, suggested by Leszczynski.

Both the unique chance of support of the Ukrainian independence movement by a victorious King of Sweden who was on his way to Moscow and could be persuaded to choose a way through Ukraine, and the futility of re-uniting Ukraine by bringing the western part also under the rule of Peter I, were well recognized by *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa. Much more than the equally famous Khmelnytsky he deserves to be considered the most prominent leader the Kozaks ever had after Konashevych and Vyhovsky. Sharing their Western orientation, fully in agreement with the genuine heritage of old Kievan Rus, he was equally prominent in promoting the political and the cultural development of a Kozak State based upon that heritage, and therefore well qualified to seize the historic opportunity of 1708-09.

However, while joining wholeheartedly in the tribute which is paid to Mazepa on the anniversary of these events, the historian is obliged to admit that he, too, just as Charles XII and so many Poles, made mistakes which contributed to the disappointing fact that the great opportunity was missed. His policy before Poltava has been rightly called Machiavellian and had indeed the same justifications and the same shortcomings which are typical of the ideas of the great Florentine patriot. The game which the *Hetman*

played for several years hoping to prove smarter than the Czar, could mislead for some time even a man as shrewd and suspicious as was Peter I. But it misled at the same time most of the Kozaks also, who could hardly find out what Mazepa really planned and wanted, and therefore were not ready to join the fight for freedom when its outbreak could no longer be delayed.

All this explains to a large extent the tragedy of Poltava where the exhausted Swedish army, cut off from its natural bases, had to fight practically alone. But that Russian victory, important as it was, was after all only one battle in the course of a war which was to last twelve more years before the Treaty of Nystad, in 1721, made Peter's victory final. That he was very near to defeat in 1711, when Polish and Ukrainian exiles had persuaded Turkey to enter the war against Russia, is very well known; but it is equally clear that the declining Ottoman Empire, still hoping to gain Ukraine for itself, could not be of any real help neither for her or for Poland and faraway Sweden. It is only thanks to recent historical research that we are now aware of another, more promising opportunity to check Russian imperialism, which appeared in the last phase of the Northern War when several years after Mazepa's death Pylyp Orlyk tried to continue his policy as *Hetman* in exile.

In 1719, in Vienna, a treaty was concluded between Emperor Charles VI, George I, King of England and Elector of Hanover, and last but not least, Augustus II, but only as Elector of Saxony, in order to put an end to the Czar's aggressive policy. The Western powers were particularly alarmed because Russian forces had already appeared, for the first time in history, on German soil, but all depended, of course, on the cooperation of Russia's directly threatened neighbors. And since Charles XII was already dead and Sweden anxious to get out of the war, decisive was the attitude of the Poles which in turn would strongly influence that of the Kozaks. Yet the Polish Diet of the following year refused to adhere to the Treaty of Vienna and the whole project of anti-Russian action was given up.

Was this another mistake, this time exclusively Polish, which confirmed the results of Poltava? It could seem so, but for two reasons the opposition of the Diet is understandable. First, Poland needed peace even more than Sweden and could rightly doubt whether Austria and English forces were ready to help her effectively on the distant eastern front, especially as both powers had hardly recovered from the War of the Spanish Succession, and Austria from an additional Turkish war. Furthermore, it was difficult to expect from the Poles any confidence in the policy of their Saxon King who from a long alliance with Peter I suddenly turned



Portrait of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa. An etching of D. Haliakovsky of 1708.


to a coalition against him and who always was prepared to sacrifice the interests of the country to his personal ambitions.

There remains, however, a most instructive lesson to be drawn from the experiences before and after Poltava. There was no longer any possible defense against Russia's rising power and her interference with the fate of her western neighbors, since these neighbors had not decided to cooperate closely. Even more than for Sweden which in view of her geographical position eventually escaped Russian conquest and only lost Finland one hundred years later, that lesson was inescapable for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and for the Kozak Ukraine. For these peoples both a defensive alliance and internal unity were already in the days of Mazepa a question of life and death. Therefore they join today in commemorating the great leader and in recognizing the basic soundness of his policy which could have favorably decided that question, if not for a complex series of circumstances largely beyond his control.


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MAZEPPA IN 1890



MAZEPPA TODAY



Ukrainians To Present Pageant In Honor Of 'Mazepa'

Rev. and Mrs. T. Haar Honored Sunday On Twenty-fifth Wedding Anniversary

The Rev. T. Haar, pastor of the Lutheran church, and Mrs. T. Haar, who celebrated their twenty-fifth wedding anniversary Sunday, were the guests of honor at a reception given by the church members at the home of the pastor's parents, Mr. and Mrs. T. Haar, at 1000 N. 1st St. The reception was held at 2 o'clock and was attended by a large number of friends and relatives. The couple were married 25 years ago in the Lutheran church at St. Paul, Minn. They have four children: Mrs. T. Haar, Mrs. T. Haar, Mrs. T. Haar, and Mrs. T. Haar.

250th Anniversary

The Ukrainian community in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area is celebrating the 250th anniversary of the founding of the town of Mazeppa, Minn. The celebration will be held on Sunday, June 10, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon at the Ukrainian church at 1000 N. 1st St. The church will be decorated with Ukrainian flags and bunting. The celebration is being held in honor of the town's founder, Ivan Mazepa, who was born in 1639 and died in 1709. Mazepa was a Ukrainian nobleman and a member of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmanate. He was a close ally of Peter the Great of Russia and played a significant role in the Russian conquest of Ukraine. The town of Mazeppa was founded in 1890 by a group of Ukrainian immigrants who named it in honor of their country's first hetman, Ivan Mazepa.

The front page of *The Mazeppa Journal* in Mazeppa, Minn. The two photographs present the town as it looks today and as it looked in 1890 upon its founding by Ira Seeley, a Minnesota pioneer, who named the town after the Ukrainian *Hetman*.

MAZEPA IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH AND AMERICAN SOURCES*

By THEODORE MACKIW

At the mention of the name Mazepa, an English-speaking person thinks of Byron's mythical hero rather than of a historical person. And yet the historical Mazepa is very different from the one in literature.

Let it be fully understood that *Hetman*¹ Ivan Mazepa was the Chief Executive of the Ukrainian autonomous state under the protectorate of Muscovy, a condition which at that time was quite common, even for such countries as Holland under Spain (1559-1648), Prussia under Poland (1525-1660) and Livonia (Latvia) and Estonia under Sweden (1648-1721). Although Ukraine was under the Russian protectorate, nevertheless, as the German historian Hans Schumann has observed in his dissertation, Ukraine had her own territory, her own people, her own democratic system of government, her own military forces, (namely the Kozaks), her own law, her own administration, and her own monetary system, so that the creator of this military republic, better known as *Hetman State*, B. Khmelnytsky, was practically an independent ruler.²

The figure of *Hetman* I. Mazepa, along with *Hetman* B. Khmelnytsky, is a personality that stands out not only in modern Ukrainian history, but also in world history.

It is true that Mazepa's rights were limited, but he still used the full power of his civil and military authority, and was also regarded as the Chief Executive by contemporary foreign diplomats in Moscow. For example, Jean de Baluse, a French envoy in Moscow,³ who visited Mazepa in 1704 in Baturyn, (the Ukrainian capital at that time), remarked in his memoirs: "...from Muscovy I went to

* *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 4, December, 1959.

¹ *Hetman*—literally translated means "Headman," the official title of the Chief Executive of Ukraine from 1648-1764.

² Hans Schumann, *Der Hetmanstaat 1654-1764* (*The Hetmanstate 1654-1764*), Breslau 1936, p. 4.

³ *Pisma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikogo* (*Letters and Documents of Emperor Peter the Great*), St. Petersburg 1893, Vol. III, pp. 35-35.

Ukraine, the country of the Cossacks, where for a few days I was the guest of Prince Mazepa, who is the supreme authority in this country.”⁴

Ukraine was distinguished from Muscovy even by the foreigners in the Russian service at that time. For example, Patrick Gordon, 1635-1699, a Scotch General in the Russian service and a friend of Czar Peter I,⁵ distinguished Ukraine from Muscovy. In his diary, (June 1687), Gordon stated the Kozaks were “allies of the invading force”⁶ against the Crimea in 1687. (In this campaign 50,000 Kozaks participated under the command of their *Hetman*, Ivan Samiylovych.) In addition it is to be pointed out that P. Gordon in his *World Atlas* drew separate boundaries between Poland, Ukraine and Russia.⁷

The French diplomat Foy de la Neuville, (supposedly Baillet Adrian), 1649-1706,⁸ in the service of the Polish King Jan Sobieski, as his envoy in Moscow, stressed in his memoirs about Mazepa that “this Prince is not comely in his person, but a very knowing Man, and speaks Latin to perfection. He is Cossack born, and was one of King Cazimir’s pages, and afterwards an Officer in his Guards.”⁹

The Austrian diplomat Johann Georg Korb, in Moscow 1698-1699, also distinguished Mazepa as the *Hetman* of the Kozaks from the other Russian generals during the Turkish War 1695-1699.¹⁰

Mazepa had already become known throughout Europe because of his participation on the side of the anti-Turkish coalition, the “Holy Alliance,” in two campaigns (1687, 1689) against the Crimea. This “Holy Alliance,” to which belonged Austria, Venice, Poland, and from 1686, Russia, was organized by the German Emperor Leo-

⁴ Baluse's memoirs were discovered by the Ukrainian historian Elias Borshchak in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* in Paris. See: V. Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions*, New York 1953, pp. 113-114.

⁵ Patrick Gordon, *Passages from Diary*, Aberdeen 1859, p. 172; S. Buxhoeveden, *A Cavalier in Muscovy*, London 1932; *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. VIII, pp. 222-224.

⁶ P. Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

⁷ P. Gordon, *Geography Anatomized, or a Compleat Geographical Grammer*, etc., London 1693, pp. 25, 49.

⁸ Library of Congress, *Catalog of Books*, issued to July 31, 1942, Vol. 50, p. 295.

⁹ Foy de la Neuville, *Relation curieuse et nouvelle de Moscovie*, etc., The Hague 1699; I used the English translation: *An Account of Muscovy as It Was in the Year 1689*, London 1699, p. 43.

¹⁰ J. G. Korb, *Diarium Itineris in Moscoviam*, etc., Vienna 1700 or 1701, I used the English translation by MacDonnel, *Diary of an Austrian Secretary of the Legation*, etc., London 1863, Vol. I, pp. 113, 124, 144; cf. V. Sichynsky. *op. cit.*, pp. 114-121.

pold I in 1684. Attention was also called to Mazepa by the fact that this war against the Turks assumed an international character, and he took an active part in it.¹¹

Afterwards, during the Great Northern War, (1700-1721), Mazepa's alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII was one of the most remarkable events, and received general attention throughout the political world. Mazepa and his alliance with Sweden was mentioned in the reports or memoirs of contemporary diplomats in Moscow and at the headquarters of the Swedish King.

The English envoy extraordinary in Moscow 1704-1711, Lord Charles Whitworth,¹² (1675-1725), writing his report of November 10, 1708, expressed his doubt that Mazepa, as a man of seventy years of age, very rich, without children, enjoying the confidence of the Czar and executing his authority like a monarch, would have joined the Swedish King for selfish or other personal reasons.¹³

In his memoirs, Whitworth, giving a brief history of Ukraine, the Kozaks, and the Zaporozhians, whom the author distinguishes from the Russian Don Cossacks, also mentioned Mazepa and his alliance with Sweden. According to Whitworth, the riches of Ukraine "drew upon them, (sc. the Kozaks) the envy of the Muscovite Nobility and Government, who by Degrees made several Incroachments on their liberties, and from hence sprung an universal Discontent, and the Revolt of Mazepa with the King of Sweden; which being ill-managed, the Residence Town of Bathurin was immediately taken and burnt, and above six thousand Persons put to the Sword without Distinction of age or sex."¹⁴

Although the Kozaks of Ukraine were shocked and disorganized by the massacre in Baturyn, continued Whitworth, "the Cossacks of Zaporoh or Falls . . . openly declared for Mazepa, and continued firm to him to the last; two or three Thousand followed his fortune to Bender, and are still with the King of Sweden; most of the rest

¹¹ See footnote No. 47.

¹² *The Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XXI, pp. 161-162.

¹³ "*Diplomaticheskiye doniseniya angliyskogo posla (Whitworth) s 1704 po 1708 god i s 1708 po 1711 god*" ("*Diplomatic Repots of the English Envoy (Whitworth) from the year 1704 to 1708, and from the year 1708 to 1711*"), *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva (Collection of Works of the Imperial Russian Historical Society)*, St. Petersburg 1886, Vol. 50, p. 108; cf., B. Krupnyckyj, *Hetman Mazepa und seine Zeit*, p. 161; V. Sichynsky, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

¹⁴ Charles Lord Whitworth, *An Account of Russia As It was in the Year 1710*, Strawberry Hill 1758, p. 24.

were cut to Pieces, so that the Remains of that Name are at present very inconsiderable.”¹⁵

Describing the cultural affairs in Muscovy, Whitworth remarked that the education of the Russian clergy was very poor, except for some few who were educated in Kiev.¹⁶

Similarly to Whitworth, the Austrian envoy in Moscow, Pleyer, in his report of November 16, 1708, mentioned Mazepa and his alliance with the Swedish King.¹⁷

The Prussian envoy in Moscow (1702-1711), Baron Georg Johann von Kayserling,¹⁸ wrote in his report of November 17-28, 1708, the following comments on Mazepa: “...and there could not be and that he will have great support from his nation. Especially the Cossacks like him very much, because the present Government treats them very badly and they are robbed of their liberties. Therefore it is rather to be believed that either all the people, or at least the bigger part of them will follow the example of their leader.”¹⁹

In the report of November 28, 1708, Kayserling, like Whitworth in his memoirs, remarked that the massacre and destruction of a doubt that this man is loved as well as respected by his people, Baturyn “frightened the Ukrainian people very much.”²⁰

¹⁵ Charles Whitworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 40, 46; (“...their Parish Priests and Chaplains are very ignorant, their utmost Education being to repeat the Service with a musical Accent and to read a Chapter in the Bible... their Monks and dignified Clergy though almost equally ignorant, except some few educated at Cioff” [sc. Kiev]...).

¹⁷ S. Tomashivskyj, *Z donesen avstriyskoho posla Pleyera v Moskvu 1708 i 1709 rr.* (“From the Reports of the Austrian Envoy Pleyer in Moscow in the years 1708 and 1709”), *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva Shevchenka* (Publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, further quoted as ZNTS), Lviv 1909, Vol. 92, p. 242.

¹⁸ Friedrich Duckmeyer, *Korbs Diarium itineris in Moscoviam, und Quellen die es ergaenzen* (Korb's Diary and Sources Which Explain It), Berlin 1910, Vol. I, pp. 409, 411, 451.

¹⁹ Kayserling's reports are located in the *Prussian Secret Archives*, in Berlin-Dahlem, Rep. XI, Russland 19a; see: B. Krupnyckyj, *Z donesen Kayserlinga 1708-1709 rr.* (“From Kayserling's Reports in the Years of 1708-1709”), *Mazepa*, Vol. II, p. 27, published in *Praci Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu* (Publications of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute, further quoted as PUNI), Warsaw 1939, Vol. 47 “...Jedennoch ist nicht woll zu glauben, dass dieser Mann, der bey seiner ebenso sehr geliebet als geehrt gewesen, nicht einen groesseren Anhang gehabt haben sollte. Zumahlen da die Cossacken sonder dem mit dieser Regierung von welcher sie sehr hart und mit oefftener Verletzung ihrer Freyheiten tractiret worden, zufrieden seyen. Dahero ist vielmehr zu besorgen, dass entweder diese ganze Nation oder doch wenigstens der groesste Theil derselben dem Exempel ihres Chefs folgen werde...”)

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28, ff.



Portrait of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa. An etching by Leo Tarasevych in 1695.

Mazepa and his alliance with Charles XII were also mentioned in the reports and memoirs by the Prussian representatives at the Swedish Headquarters (August 5, 1708 — July 12, 1709), Colonel-lieutenant D. N. von Siltmann;²¹ by a friend and adjutant of Charles XII, a Polish general, Stanislaw Poniatowski;²² by the Slovak emissary of the Lutherans to the Swedish King, Daniel Krman;²³ by the Swedish historiographers and eye-witnesses Gustav Adlerfelt²⁴ and Georg Andrew Nordberg;²⁵ by the German field chaplain of Maximilian Emanuel, Prince of Wuerttemberg in the Swedish Army, Johann Wendel Bardili;²⁶ and finally by the contemporary press.

In speaking about the English contemporary sources, *The History of the Wars of His Present Majesty Charles XII, by a Scots Gentleman in the Swedish Service*, published in London 1715, should be mentioned. According to the German historian Otto Haintz, the author of these memoirs supposedly was the brilliant journalist and writer of that time, Daniel Defoe (1661-1731),²⁷ who however, never participated in the Great Northern War,²⁸ and therefore this work is worthless as a historical source.

Using some information supposedly delivered by Matveyev, the Russian envoy in London, Defoe, writing a biography of Peter the

²¹ Reports and Diary of von Siltmann, according to the German historian O. Haintz, are located in the *Prussian Secret Archives* in Berlin-Dahlem, and also translated into Swedish by A. Quennerstedt, *Karolinska Krigares Dagbocker*, Lund, 1901-1918, Vol. III; see O. Haintz, *Koenig Karl XII. von Schweden* (King Charles XII of Sweden), Berlin 1936, Vol. I, p. 240.

²² *Remarques d'un seigneur Polonais sur l'histoire de Charles XII*, The Hague 1741, also in the English translation: *Remarks on M. de Voltaire's History of Charles XII, King of Sweden*, etc., London 1741.

²³ Krman's reports were published in *Monumenta Hungariae Historica Scriptores*, Budapest 1894, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 425-494; cf. S. Tomashivsky, "Slovak emissary in Ukraine", *Naukovyi Zbirnyk prysviachenyi M. Hrushevskomu*, Lviv 1906, pp. 301-345; V. Sichynsky, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

²⁴ G. Adlerfelt, *Histoire Militaire de Charles XII, roi de Suede*, Amsterdam 1740, 3 Vols.; I used the English translation: *The Military History of Charles XII, King of Sweden*, London 1740, 3 vols.

²⁵ G. A. Nordberg, *Konung Karl XII: se Historia*, Stockholm 1740, 2 Vols.

²⁶ J. W. Bardili, *Reise-Beschreibung von Pultawa durch das Desert Dzike Pole nach Bender*, etc., (A Description of Voyage from Poltava through the Desert Dzike Pole to Bender, etc.), Stuttgart 1714, which was included in another volume of his under the title: *Des Weyland Durchl. Printzens Maximilian Emanuel Hertzog in Wuerttemberg... Reisen und Campagnen*, etc., (The Voyages and Campaigns of Prince Maximilian Emanuel of Wuerttemberg, etc.), Stuttgart 1730.

²⁷ *The Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. V, pp. 730-742.

²⁸ O. Haintz, *Karl XII. von Schweden im Urteil der Geschichte* (Charles XII in the Judgment of History), Berlin 1936, pp. 7-8.

Great,²⁹ also mentioned Mazepa and his alliance with Charles XII. According to Defoe, Charles XII having made a secret alliance with "General Mazeppa, the famous Chief of the Cossacks," who gave a promise to join him with 30,000 men,³⁰ "to the Surprise, not of the Russians only, but of all the World, the King, left the Direct Road for Moscow on his Right and march'd Directly to Czernikov on the River Desna on the Frontiers of the Cossacks Country," where he met the "Rebel" Mazepa.³¹

As to Mazepa himself, Defoe wrote that "Mazeppa was not a King in Title, he was equal to a King in Power, and every way Equal if not Superior to King Augustus in the divided Circumstances, in which Power stood, even at the best of it."³²

Further, Defoe described already known events, such as the destruction of Baturyn by Menshikov, the Battle of Poltava, etc.

This Ukrainian-Swedish Alliance of 1708, had raised the controversial question as to whether or not Mazepa had invited Charles XII to enter Ukraine, and failed to give the help expected by the Swedish King. For that Mazepa is blamed by some historians even today. However, as a matter of fact, Charles had no intention of entering Ukraine, nor had Mazepa invited him to do so.

As to the campaign against Moscow, Charles XII had made his plan already in Saxony. According to his plan, the Swedish Army proposed to proceed as follows: From the North, Gen. Lybecker would go in the direction of Ingria and Petersburg to pin down the Russian troops, while Charles XII himself, with the main Swedish Army, would proceed on the route between Smolensk-Moscow. At the same time from the South the Polish King, Stanislaw Leszczyński, with his Army and a Swedish Corps under the command of Gen. Crassau would proceed to cut off the Russians from Ukraine.

Mazepa, according to his secret agreement with the Swedish King, was supposed to deliver the fortresses in Severia, supply the Swedish Army with food, and join Charles XII on his "march directly to Moscow."³³ Mazepa did not expect the Swedish King to enter Ukraine, and when he learned that Charles XII had entered it, he angrily remarked to his chancellor, Philip Orlyk "...it is the devil, who sends him here. He is going to ruin all my plans and bring in

²⁹ D. Defoe, *An Impartial History of the Life and Actions of Peter Alexowitz ... Czar of Muscovy*, etc., London 1728.

³⁰ D. Defoe, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 208.

³³ G. Adlerfelt, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 193-194.

his wake the Russian troops. Now our Ukraine will be devastated and lost." ³⁴

Charles XII was warned by his adviser, Count Charles Piper, not to go into Ukraine. On the contrary, he urged his King to retreat in order to secure Gen. Lewenthaupt's Corps, which was on the way from Riga to join the Swedish Army.³⁵ (It is true, however, that in the spring of 1707 Mazepa asked the Swedish King to come into Ukraine, but at that time he refused Mazepa's offer.³⁶)

Besides, according to the German historian Otto Haintz, a campaign against Moscow through Ukraine at that time, from the strategic point of view, was impossible.³⁷ (Even during World War II, Hitler's plans to attack Moscow from Ukraine proved unsuccessful.³⁸)

The cause of the failure of Charles XII's campaign against Moscow and his defeat at Poltava, (July 7, 1709) was neither his alliance with *Hetman Mazepa*, nor the King's decision to enter Ukraine. He was simply forced to enter Ukraine to save his Army from famine, because as contemporary eyewitnesses in their memoirs attested, the Russians burnt and destroyed everything on their retreat.³⁹

Charles XII's campaign against Moscow could have been successful, if, first of all, the Swedish generals had carried out their King's orders at the right time and right place. Already some contemporary high ranking officers in the Swedish Army blamed the Swedish commanding generals, "who commanded separate bodies of the Army, committed diverse mistakes, and were most unsuccessful everywhere." ⁴⁰

³⁴ A. Brueckner, "*Peter der Grosse*", ("Peter the Great"), Onken's *Allgemeine Geschichte*, Berlin 1879, Vol. IV, p. 408; B. Krupnyckyj, *Hetman Mazepa und seine Zeit 1687-1709 (Hetman Mazepa and His Epoch, 1687-1709)*, Leipzig 1942, p. 186; C. A. Manning, *Hetman of Ukraine: Ivan Mazepa*, New York 1957, p. 170.

³⁵ G. A. Nordberg, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 868.

³⁶ G. A. Nordberg, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 829; Bardili, *op. cit.*, p. 407,

³⁷ O. Haintz, *Koenig Karl XII von Schweden*, p. 119.

³⁸ Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff (1657-1945)*, New York 1953, pp. 399-400, ff.

³⁹ G. Adlerfelt, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 43-44 (The Russian Gen. Sheremeteyev "laid all the towns and villages in ashes, destroying everything within a circumference of ten or twelve miles; so that nothing but fire was seen everywhere, and the air was so darkened with smoke that we could hardly see the sun"); J. W. Bardili, *op. cit.*, p. 409 (the food situation was catastrophic, "the Prince had to eat hard black bread, which he had never eaten before").

⁴⁰ G. Adlerfelt, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 198; S. Poniatowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 21, 22

For example, Gen. Lybecker, who "had sufficient forces to invade the provinces of Novgorod and Pleskow," (sc. Pskov), and tie up the Czar's Army,⁴¹ unnecessarily retreated from Ingria to Riga, without his King's order, thus leaving the Czar a free hand to attack Gen. Lewenthaupt's Corps (at Desna, September 29, 1708).⁴² Gen. Lewenthaupt moved too slowly, and his "fatal delay ...beyond the day fixed, was the real cause of the misfortune, which afterwards befell the King of Sweden."⁴³ The King himself, being unaware of Gen. Lybecker's retreat, did not hurry to help Gen. Lewenthaupt, but instead, upon entering Ukraine, sent his Gen. Lagercrona to seize the fortresses in Siveria. Gen. Lagercrona of his "own Fault and Negligence" failed to do so.⁴⁴ Gen. Crassau with his Corps never arrived from Poland to join the main Swedish Army.⁴⁵ The other generals, as for instance, Gen. Roos, and especially, Field Marshal G. Rehnshoeld, who commanded the Swedish Army at the battle of Poltava, (because the King was wounded), according to the Polish General S. Poniatowski, "was so at a Loss here, (sc. Poltava), that he did nothing but run from one Side to the other, without giving one necessary Order."⁴⁶

The contemporary press in Western Europe, although without great value as a historical source, should nevertheless be taken into consideration and analyzed as an element which expressed and helped to form public opinion.

There were many reasons why the contemporary press in Europe, in Germany particularly, wrote about Mazepa. He was mentioned for his participation on the side of the "Holy Alliance" against the Turks. Since this war took on an international character, it is understood why in further developments on the Turkish front, where Mazepa took an active part, the European press, especially the German, reported about him and his deeds.⁴⁷

⁴¹ G. Adlerfelt, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 204.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁴⁴ S. Poniatowski, *op. cit.*, p. 18; G. Adlerfelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-211; J. Bardili, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

⁴⁵ O. Haintz, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

⁴⁶ S. Poniatowski, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁴⁷ *Leipziger Post-Ordinar, Zeitung*, August 13, 1687; *Berliner Dienstag Fa-ma*, August 28, 1687; *Theatrum Europeum*, etc., Frankfurt a. M. 1635-1738, Vol. XIII, pp. 66, 652, Vol. XIV, p. 415; *Neu-eroeffneter Historischer Bildersaal*, etc., Nuremberg 1699-1765, Vol. V, pp. 853, 855; *Historische Remarques*, etc., Hamburg Jan. 22, 1704, No. 4, pp. 26-27; *Europaeische Fama*, etc., Leipzig 1704, 2nd ed. in 1706, Vol. XXV, published on the front page Mazepa's picture and a three-page favorable biography, pp. 57-60. (More about Mazepa in the contemporary

Furthermore, the election of August II of Saxony as King of the Polish Kingdom (1697), to which belonged a part of Ukraine, (the right bank of the Dnieper River), aroused public interest about the Kozaks, and Mazepa as their leader, not only in Germany, but also in England and even across the Atlantic Ocean, in America. Especially Mazepa's alliance with Charles XII again provided the press with rich material.

One of the English daily newspapers which mentioned Mazepa in connection with the military operations in Poland against the Swedes was London's *The Daily Courant*. *The Daily Courant* began publication on March 11, 1702, and is considered as the first daily paper in England. In its first edition the publisher stated that "this Courant . . . being design'd to give all the Material News as soon as every Post arrives; and is confin'd to half Compass to save the Publick at least half the Impertinences of Ordinary Newspapers."⁴⁸ The first editor was E. Mallett, who was succeeded by Thomas Buckley, an enterprising printer, who "added very greatly to the amount and variety of its intelligence."⁴⁹

Using the Dutch *Leiden Gazette* of August 5, 1704, as its source of information, *The Daily Courant* of August 14, 1704, (No. 727), reported that Mazepa, the Commander-in-Chief of 20,000 Kozaks "sent several messengers to his Majesty August."⁵⁰ In the edition of October 18, 1704, *The Daily Courant* wrote that "the Cossacks under the Command of General Mironowicz, (sc. Col. Myrovych), are on their way to join the main forces of "General Mazeppa, who with the Rest of his Army is on the Frontiers of the Ukraine and Volhynia."⁵¹

There was not much news about Mazepa, but when he joined the Swedish King, (October 26, 1708), *The Daily Courant* using *The Amsterdam Courier*, which published the report of November 16,


German press see: B. Krupnyckyj, *Hetman Mazepa v osvittleniu nimeckoi literatury yoho chasu* (Hetman Mazepa in the Light of the German Literature of His Time), Zhovkva 1932; V. Zhyla, "Ukrainske kozactvo v svitli nimeckoi literatury v pershij polovyni XVIII stolittia, desertaciya T. Mackowa" ("The Ukrainian Kozaks in the Light of the German Literature of the First Half of the XVIIIth Century," A Dissertation of T. Mackiw), *Novy Shliakh*, No. 32 & 33, Winnipeg, April 22 and 25, 1953.

⁴⁸ James Grant, *The Newspaper Press: Its Origin, Progress and Present Position*, London 1871, Vol. I, pp. 85, 86, 88.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁵⁰ Cf., N. Kostomarov, *Mazepa i mazepintsy* (Mazepa and His Followers), St. Petersburg 1905, Vol. VI, p. 527.

⁵¹ Cf., *Europaeische Fama*, Vol. LXXX, p. 615; *Neu-eroeffneter Historischer Bildersaal*, Vol. VI, p. 25.



Front pages of *The London Gazette* and *The Daily Courant*, of January, 1708 and December, 1708, respectively, which extensively reported on developments in the Swedish-Ukrainian-Russian war in Ukraine, and especially the activities of Hetman Ivan Mazepa.

1708, from the Czar's headquarters on the Desna River, as its source of information, gave long and detailed information about Mazepa's alliance. According to this report, Mazepa, 70 years of

age, whom *The Daily Courant* called "General and Commander-in-Chief" of the Kozaks, marching under the pretext of attacking the Swedes, joined the Swedish King. After crossing the Desna River, commented *The Daily Courant*, Mazepa disclosed to the Kozaks his plan to join the Swedes. However, the majority of the Kozaks who for a long time were dissatisfied with Mazepa, disapproved of this plan and recrossed the Desna, leaving him with an army of 1,000 men and three colonels, taken by force. Upon this news, the Czar issued a manifesto to the Ukrainian Bishops and higher officers to elect a new *hetman* in the city of Hlukhiv. The Kozaks chose I. Skoropadsky. Further, the Czar ordered Menshikov to seize Mazepa's capital, Baturyn, which he captured and executed 5,000 to 6,000 Cossacks there, and seized the artillery and the food supply. The new *Hetman* Skoropadsky joined the Czar's Army, ended the report of *The Daily Courant*.

Until the battle of Poltava, (July 7, 1709), there were no further reports about Mazepa in *The Daily Courant*. Commenting about the fate of the Swedish Army, *The Daily Courant* of August 16, 1709, (No. 2437) remarked that "General Mazepa has found means to escape." As the source of information, *The Daily Courant* used the *Amsterdam Gazette*, which referred to the letter of the Russian Envoy in Berlin, M. de Leith, (August 13, 1709). Using the information from Dresden, August 14, 1709, *The Daily Courant* in the same edition reported that "General Mazeppa took another Route to escape the Muscovites, who are in pursuit of him and the King of Sweden."

Publishing the terms of the capitulation of the Swedish Gen. Lewenthaupt at Perevolochna, *The Daily Courant* of August 22, 1709, (No. 2442), mentioned that according to the fifth paragraph "the Zaporogians and other Rebels now among the Troops of Sweden shall be immediately deliver'd to his Czarish Majesty."

The Daily Courant was not the only newspaper which wrote about Mazepa. Reports about him can be found in the semi-weekly, *The London Gazette*. *The London Gazette*, which was originally printed at Oxford and was named *The Oxford Gazette*, was the official newspaper of the Government.⁵² According to the English historian Lord Macaulay, *The London Gazette* did not have a good standing, because of not printing domestic affairs, except some unimportant events at home and some foreign affairs.⁵³

⁵² J. Grant, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 43

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Using reports from Vienna of December 26, 1708, *The London Gazette* of January 3, 1709, (No. 4502) printed on its first page that "Count Mazepa, General of the Cossacks" joined the Swedish, however, with a small number of troops and three colonels, because the majority of the Cossacks decided to return to the Czar; that afterwards Menshikov seized Mazepa's residence, the city of Baturyn, which had a garrison of 6,000 men and "put all he found in it to the Sword"; that the Czar permitted the election of a new *Hetman* "a Nobleman Skoropadsky." In addition, it is remarked that "the Czar had been endeavoring, for some time past, (sc. 1706), to procure for General Mazepa the Dignity of a Prince of the Empire."⁵⁴ At the end of this report, *The London Gazette* commented that according to Russian sources,⁵⁵ the Swedish King "was encamped between Starodub and Czenikow, (sc. Chernyhiw), on the River Desna; but we have been long without direct Advices from the Swedish Army."

Upon the message about the battle of Poltava, using reports from Vienna of August 7, 1709, *The London Gazette* of August 16, 1709, (No. 4574), remarked that "the account of the victory over the Swedes in Ukrania is so very circumstantial." Only two weeks later, using the official reports of July 17, 1709, from Moscow, which was brought by Russian messenger to London, *The London Gazette* of August 30, 1709, (No. 4580), described the battle of Poltava, confirmed the Russian victory and remarked that "Mazeppa with his body of Cossacks made his Escape," which was also joined by the Swedish King with two thousand men.

Using information of September 3, 1709 from the Hague, *The London Gazette* of September 6, 1709, (No. 4583), reported that "Charles XII safely arrived in Oczakow," but according to the Russian sources, "the Nephew of General Mazeppa, (sc. A. Voynarovsky), and several considerable Ministers were taken Prisoners." (This information was not true. Voynarovsky was captured on August 21, 1716 in Hamburg by the Russian agent Boetticher, a German by origin, and was sent to Jakutsk in Siberia.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ F. Duckemeyer, "*Korbs Diarium itineris in Moscoviam und die Quellen, die es ergaenzen*" ("Korb's Diary and Sources, Which Explain It), *Historische Hefte*, Berlin 1910, No. 10, p. 81; S. Tomashivskyj, "*Mazepa i avstriyska polityka*" ("Mazepa and Austrian Policy"), *ZNTS*, Vol. 92, p. 244-245.

⁵⁵ The report from the Czar's headquarters at the Desna River, November 16, 1708.

⁵⁶ Johann Christian von Engel, *Geschichte der Ukraine und der ukrainischen Kosaken* (*The History of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Kozaks*), Halle 1796, p. 328.

The London Gazette of September 10, 1709, (No. 4585), using Russian sources of information, reported that "General Mazeppa, and several principal Ministers of the Swedish Majesty were brought Prisoners to the Czar at Kiovia,"⁵⁷ (sc. Kiev). (The Russians neither captured Mazepa, nor succeeded in extraditing Mazepa from the Turkish Government, although offering quite a big sum of money (300,000 ducats).⁵⁸ Mazepa, at the age of 77 years, died on October 2, 1709, (new calendar) in the village of Varnytsia, near Bender.⁵⁹

This mistake was also corrected by *The London Gazette* itself, which, using reports of July 31, 1709, from Moscow, stated that "General Mazeppa with some few of his Followers passed the Nieper,"⁶⁰ (sc. Dnieper).

Mazepa was mentioned not only by the European but also by the contemporary American press. One of the contemporary American newspapers, New England's *The Boston News-Letter*, reporting on the Great Northern War, several times mentioned the name of Mazepa.

The Boston News-Letter, a weekly, was established on April 24, 1704, and was published by John Campbell.⁶¹ J. Campbell, 1653-1728, was a Scot, who arrived in Boston between 1695-1698. In 1702 he became a Boston postmaster. At that time the Post Office was a center of information, and Campbell utilized this for his weekly newspaper.⁶² Although Boston was some two months away from Europe, Campbell essayed to record all the important news in chronological order. During eight months of 1709 *The Boston News-Letter* underwent some difficulties and was suspended, but afterwards resumed publication.⁶³

The Boston News-Letter, using the dispatches from Hamburg of August 15, 1704, as its source of information, reported that "the Cossacks commanded by the famous Mazeppa, consisting of 19,000 Choice Men, with a Train of Artillery of 36 Pieces have join'd King Augustus near Jawarrow."⁶⁴

⁵⁷ cf., *Europaeische Fama*, Vol. 92, p. 642.

⁵⁸ M. Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, New Haven 1941, p. 369.

⁵⁹ B. Krupnycky, "Miscellanea Mazepiana," *Mazepa*, Vol. II, p. 90, ff, published by PUNI, Warsaw 1939, Vol. 47.

⁶⁰ *The London Gazette*, September 22, 1709, No. 4590; cf., *Europaeische Fama*, Vol. 94, p. 788.

⁶¹ Frank L. Mott, *American Journalism*, New York 1950, pp. 13-14.

⁶² *The Dictionary of American Biography*, New York 1948, Vol. III, p. 456.

⁶³ Clarence S. Brigham, *History and Bibliography of American Newspapers 1690-1820*, Worcester 1947, Vol. I, pp. 328-329.

⁶⁴ *The Boston News-Letter*, No. 41, Jan. 29, 1705.

According to the information of July 23, 1706 from Danzig, *The Boston News-Letter* mentioned that the "Kozaks under the Command of General Wisnarowski, (sc. Voynarovsky), nephew of General Mazeppa, have arrived in the Neighbourhood of Lublin, from whence they are to continue their march towards Great Poland."⁶⁵

Because of some difficulties, as mentioned above, *The Boston News-Letter* was suspended for eight months in 1709, and this explains why there were no further reports on Mazepa. However, how diligently the editor recorded the news on Ukraine is shown by the fact that even after the death of Mazepa, (October 2, 1709), *The Boston News-Letter*, using information of March 16, 1711, from Vienna, reported that the Kozaks together with the Polish troops marched "directly into Ukrainia."⁶⁶

The English and the American contemporary press, using the Russian reports through German and Dutch channels, wrote rather in a neutral light about Mazepa and his alliance with the Swedish King, stating facts without comments, in contrast to the German contemporary press, which called Mazepa a "traitor, who did not fear God," "super-rebel, selfish," etc.⁶⁷

A brief analysis of the Russian propaganda abroad also should be mentioned.

After the battle at Narva, (November 20, 1700), where Charles XII with 8,000 troops routed 40,000 Russians, the way against defenseless Moscow was open. As a matter of fact, the Swedish generals advised their King to march toward Moscow and defeat the Czar first. However, the King considered Augustus II more dangerous than the Russians.⁶⁸ While the Swedish King plunged himself into a six-year struggle in Poland and Saxony, the Czar feverishly worked on the reorganization of his army and building his young navy. For that purpose he badly needed foreign engineers, officers and all kinds of experts and tradesmen, whom he tried to recruit everywhere. This was no easy task in view of the prevailing opinion of Muscovy in the West, not to mention the general fear of the victorious Swedes.

Muscovy was described as a barbaric country by several contemporary diplomats in Moscow in their diaries⁶⁹ and in the German

⁶⁵ *The Boston News-Letter*, No. 198, Feb. 2, 1707.

⁶⁶ *The Boston News-Letter*, No. 392, Oct. 22, 1711

⁶⁷ *Europaeische Fama*, Vol. 91, p. 566; *Theatrum Europeum*, Vol. XVIII, p. 273, *Neu-eroeffneter Historischer Bildersaal*, Vol. VII, p. 257.

⁶⁸ O. Haintz, *Koenig Karl XII*, p. 52.

⁶⁹ The French diplomat, Foy de la Neuville described the Muscovites as "...true barbarians, distrustful, mendacious, cruel, debauchees, greedy and profit-

press.⁷⁰ The anti-Russian public opinion existed not only in Germany, but also in Holland, where, a few years earlier, Peter I had been greeted with joy. However, according to the German historian F. Duckmeyer, Holland became a center of anti-Russian propaganda in Western Europe.⁷¹ Then, in 1704, the hostility of public opinion was increased even further by the publication, after his return from Moscow, of the memoirs of Prof. M. Neubauer, a former tutor of the Czar's son Alex. This book, emphasizing the poor conditions and the bad treatment of foreigners in Moscow, influenced public opinion not only in Germany, but in other countries as well.⁷²

It is clear that under such circumstances the Czar could not find volunteers even for a good salary. He well realized that as long as public opinion in Western Europe was against him, no one would go into his service. He now decided to do everything possible to stop the anti-Russian propaganda.

First, through diplomatic channels, Peter succeeded in persuading the governments in Saxony and Prussia to forbid the publication of anything hostile to Muscovy.⁷³ Further, he authorized a Livonian adventurer, Johann R. Patkul, to take all measures to persuade German scholars and writers to work for Russia. In 1702 Patkul succeeded in engaging a German lawyer, Heinrich Baron von Huyssen from Strassburg, for the Czar's service. Huyssen's service in Moscow and his diplomatic activity in Western Europe were described by a Danish scholar, Peter van Haven.

Peter van Haven, (1715-1757), attended the University of Copenhagen and Helmstaedt, where he received his Doctorate of Theology. In 1737 he travelled to Petersburg, Moscow and the Asov. On his return in 1742 van Haven met von Huyssen, who told van Haven about his activities as a Russian diplomat, and having died on the boat, he left to van Haven his very interesting memoirs and notes.

lovers," *op. cit.*, p. 95; J. G. Korb, an Austrian diplomat, wrote in his diary that "The whole Russian race is rather in a state of slavery than of freedom," *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 192, ff; the English envoy-extraordinary, Lord Charles Whitworth wrote in his memoirs that Russia "began to emerge from barbarism in the year 1710," *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 38-40.

⁷⁰ *Neu-eroeffneter Historischer Bildersaal*, when reporting about Muscovy referred to it as the "barbarian nation," Vol. IV, pp. 427, 596, cf., R. E. Pruntz, *Die Geschichte des deutschen Journalismus (The History of German Journalism)*, Hannover 1845, Vol. I, p. 153.

⁷¹ F. Duckmeyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

⁷² F. Duckmeyer, *op. cit.*, p. 2; V. Sichynsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-137; cf. *Pisma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Veligogo*, Vol. III, p. 879.

⁷³ F. Duckmeyer, *op. cit.*, p. 8; *Pisma i bumagi*, etc., Vol. III, p. 879 ff.

Using this material as his source of information, van Haven wrote a book about Russia.⁷⁴ It is to be added that van Haven later became a chaplain at the Danish Embassy in Petersburg and after his return in 1747, he taught at the University of Soroe.⁷⁵

According to van Haven, von Huyssen began his activities immediately after entering the Russian service. He travelled to such centers as Basel, Berlin, Geneva, the Hague, Hamburg, Leipzig, Paris, Prague, Vienna, and so forth, trying to enlist officers to join the Russian Army and trying to persuade German scholars and writers to write favorably about Muscovy.⁷⁶ Although Huyssen was quite successful in this work, the Czar apparently needed him in Moscow and ordered him to report there, where he arrived at the end of 1703. Here he took the position of an adviser at the Foreign Office. In 1705, however, the Czar sent him as his official envoy to Germany, where he was active until 1707. During this time, von Huyssen succeeded in winning for the Czar such newspapers and magazines as *Europaeische Fama* in Leipzig, *Historische Remarques* in Hamburg, *Neu-eroeffneter Historischer Bildersaal* in Nuremberg, *Monatlicher Staatsspiegel* in Augsburg, *Neu-eroeffneter Welt- und Staatsspiegel* in the Hague and others.⁷⁷ From that time on, those newspapers and magazines began to publish favorable articles about Russia.

There is quite a great deal of literature written about Mazepa. It was Voltaire who made Mazepa's name known throughout Europe in his *History of Charles XII*.⁷⁸ The Hungarian-German historian Johann Christian von Engel, (1770-1814), in his history of Ukraine, published by the German-English Scientific Society, expressed his doubts that Mazepa should be condemned.⁷⁹ The Ukrainian historian

⁷⁴ P. van Haven, *Nye of forbedrede Efterraetningen om det russiske Rige* (*New Improved Accounts About the Russian Empire*), Copenhagen 1747, 2 vols.; I used the German translation under the title: *Unterschiedene Abschnitte aus neuen verbesserten Nachrichten von dem Russischen Reich*, published by Anton Fr. Buesching in his *Magazin fuer die neue Historie und Geographie*, Halle 1776, Vol. X, pp. 279-364.

⁷⁵ Johann Chr. Adelung, *Gelehrten Lexikon* (*Lexicon of Scholars*), Leipzig 1787, Vol. II, pp. 828-829; *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon* (*Danish Biography*), Copenhagen 1936, Vol. IX, p. 478.

⁷⁶ P. van Haven, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

⁷⁷ P. van Haven, *op. cit.*, p. 319; F. Duckmeyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 82; P. Pekarskij, *Nauka i literatura pry Petre Velikom* (*Science and Literature at the Time of Peter the Great*), St. Petersburg 1862, Vol. I, pp. 62-107.

⁷⁸ Voltaire, *Histoire de Charles XII*, Rouen 1731; I used the English translation by John J. Stockdale, *History of Charles XII, King of Sweden*, London 1807, pp. 258-262.

⁷⁹ J. Ch. von Engel, *op. cit.*, pp. 307, 321.

Mykola Kostomarov, (1817-1885), although writing quite an accurate biography of Mazepa, stressed him in a negative light.⁸⁰ Kostomarov's monograph was translated from Russian into French by E. M. de Voguee,⁸¹ into English by J. Millington,⁸² and by C. M. Anderson.⁸³ Mazepa was described positively by the English historian B. Sands in his essay.⁸⁴ Another English historian, B. H. Summer, mentioned Mazepa and his policy.⁸⁵ Recently an essay about Mazepa was published in the English historical magazine by L. R. Lewitter, who often contradicts himself in his judgment about Mazepa.⁸⁶ In the United States Clarence A. Manning wrote a book, in which the author in a lucid style described the life and deeds of Mazepa.⁸⁷ Finally, some brief essays about Mazepa published in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, should be mentioned.⁸⁸

Today it is no longer necessary to defend Mazepa's policy and his alliance with the Swedish King. His contemporary reliable and prominent eyewitnesses regarded Mazepa as a great Ukrainian patriot and hero. Even the prominent Russian historian, S. F. Platonov, justified Mazepa for his alliance with Charles XII.⁸⁹ The Jewish historian Alexander Brueckner, Professor at the Berlin University, regarded Mazepa's policy as "*ein Meisterstueck*" (a masterpiece), and his attempt to liberate Ukraine as "an heroic act."⁹⁰

⁸⁰ N. Kostomarov, *op. cit.*,

⁸¹ E. M. de Voguee, "*Mazepa. La legende et l'histoire*" ("*Mazepa: The Legend and History*"), *Revue des deux Mondes*, Vol. 48, 1881; later in *Trois drames de l'histoire de Russie*, Paris 1911.

⁸² J. Millington, *The True Story of Mazepa*, London 1884.

⁸³ C. M. Anderson, "Mazepa as known in legend and in history," *A Czarevitch of the Eighteenth Century*, London 1913, pp. 169-239.

⁸⁴ B. Sands, *The Ukraine*, London 1914, pp. 31-32.

⁸⁵ B. H. Summer, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford 1949, pp. 17, 25.

⁸⁶ L. R. Lewitter, "Mazeppa," *History Today*, London 1957, Vol. VII, pp. 590-596.

⁸⁷ C. A. Manning, *op. cit.*

⁸⁸ A. Andrusiak "Ivan Mazepa, Hetman of Ukraine," Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 31-37; N. Chubaty, "Mazepa's Champion in the '*Secret du Roi*' of Louis XV, King of France," Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 37-51; O. Halecki, "Ukraine, Poland and Sweden at the Time of Ivan Mazepa," Vol. XV, No. 2, pp. 128-132; B. Krupnytsky, "The Mazeppists," Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 204-214, and "The Swedish-Ukrainian Treaties of Alliance 1708-1709," Vol. XII, No. 1, pp. 47-57; C. A. Manning, "Mazepa in English Literature," Vol. XV, No. 2, pp. 133-144 — all in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, New York.

⁸⁹ S. F. Platonov, *Geschichte Russlands (History of Russia)*, Leipzig 1927, p. 255.

⁹⁰ A. Brueckner, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

IVAN MAZEPA — PATRON OF CULTURE AND ARTS OF UKRAINE*

By VOLODYMYR SICHYNSKY

The era of the reign of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa (1687-1709), who ruled Ukraine uninterruptedly for twenty-two years, belongs to the most flourishing period of culture, science and arts in Ukraine, unequalled by any other period of the Ukrainian Kozak state. During Mazepa's reign the arts and the general culture in Ukraine attained such a high degree of development and displayed such originality that they justly were given the name of "Ukrainian baroque."

Mazepa's patronage of Ukrainian arts and science was not an ephemeral affair or a hobby designed to achieve personal glory and popularity. He was a typical representative of the enlightened Ukrainian society, a spokesman of a cultural process which is characterized by piety for the past history of one's country, by respect for human creativeness and by love of the arts and beauty. Patronage of this kind is an indispensable means of elevating the cultural level of society, of forging the unity of the nation and of building up its resistance against the pressures of politically-misguided and aggressive neighbors.

The noble and beneficial influence of Ivan Mazepa was evident in every phase of Ukrainian spiritual and material culture—in science, education, literature, the theater, music, military, secular and church architecture, all the branches of arts, engraving, artisan-ship and industry.

Science, education and instruction, as bases of the cultural and economic development of the people, found the enthusiastic support of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa. A dense network of primary and secondary schools in his time was chiefly responsible for the fact that almost the entire population of Ukraine, including women, was literate. This was attested to by numerous foreign travelers who visited Ukraine at that time.

Mazepa paid especial attention to the development of the Academy of Kiev, which soon became one of the greatest centers and bastions of science and education not only in Ukraine, but in the

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
whole of Eastern Europe. Foreign visitors called the Academy a "flourishing university" and a "most famous school" (Beauplan, Manstein, Bell). Through the efforts of Mazepa and his financial donations the Academy was transformed into a university in 1700. At the beginning of the XVIIIth century the number of students at the Academy reached 2,000, who represented a cross-section of the population of Ukraine: the nobility and high military families, city dwellers and simple Kozaks. Such democracy in institutions of learning was an exceptional phenomenon in the whole of Europe and made for the fact that in Ukraine there were no marked social distinctions among the various strata of the population. The Academy attracted students not only from all corners of Ukraine, but also from the neighboring countries of Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia and, later on, Muscovy. There were students from Greece and Arab countries as well.

The curricula of the Academy, in addition to philosophy and religion, included the study of foreign languages (Greek, Latin and German) and all other subjects known at that time: the natural sciences, medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and the arts, especially architecture, painting and engraving. The professors teaching at the Academy were noted scientists and writers, who translated books written in Latin and German into the Church Slavonic language.

Mention should also be made of the fact that all important religious, polemic and philosophic treatises, texts of the natural sciences and of mathematics; texts of song, music, architecture, books on military science (fortifications and artillery), and books on education, the art of speaking, philology, poetry, lexicons and dictionaries—all of which were known in Eastern Europe in the XVIIth-XVIIIth centuries, either came from Ukraine or were connected with the Academy of Kiev.

Mazepa donated sizeable sums of money for the remodeling and extension of the building of the Academy itself so that in 1704 it was an impressive edifice, worthy of symbolizing Ukrainian culture and science. The renovation of the Academy's *Bohoyavlennia* Church cost Mazepa 200,000 *zlotys*. In addition, the *Hetman* provided the sum of 1,000 *zlotys* annually toward the maintenance of dormitories for needy students.

The College of Chernihiv was the second higher school in Ukraine rebuilt and developed by Ivan Mazepa. In 1700-1702 he built a new building for the College, which, from the architectural viewpoint, represented a valuable example of the Ukrainian baroque. Significantly, all higher schools in Muscovy had been patterned after the Academy of Kiev and other colleges of Ukraine.



The St. Nicholas Cathedral in Kiev, which was built by *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa of Ukraine, in 1690-1696. The cathedral was demolished on orders of the Soviet government in 1937, as a measure against the religious beliefs of the Ukrainians.

Architecture was one of the most favored subjects of Mazepa's patronage, upon which he lavished fortunes. He built fortresses, public buildings and churches. The palaces of the *Hetman* in Baturyn, Chernihiv and elsewhere were of great architectural value as examples of a unique Ukrainian style. Most of them were razed to the ground upon orders of Czar Peter I after the Battle of Poltava.

Mazepa not only provided abundant sums of money for the purpose of architectural constructions, but was also an innovator and planner of these projects. On the basis of historical documents, as well as from the history of the edifices themselves, we know that with the very first years of his reign Mazepa saw to it that

the Ukrainian architects increased in number. The first known Ukrainian architects of his era were Ivan Zarudny, Stepan Kovnir, Prokip Kornievych, Apanas Peryatynsky, Yosyp and Fedir Starchenko, Martyn Tomashevych and Ivan Fedorovych. Ukrainian specialists and artists increased in number also in other branches of Ukrainian culture, especially in the field of engraving.

The example of the *Hetman* was followed by the entire Kozak nobility, which contributed generously to the general cultural development. Noted in this regard were such Kozak Colonels as Hertsyk, Myklashevsky, Mokievsky, Dunin-Borkovsky, Borokhovych and Myrovych.

Mazepa completed three huge churches which had been started by his predecessors, renovated and expanded five churches which had been erected by the Princes of the XIth-XIIth centuries, and put up another four churches. In addition, he was responsible for at least 10 smaller churches. Some 25 churches were built by him in the years 1690-1706.

He completed the Mharsky Monastery in the Poltava province, a structure begun by *Hetman* Ivan Samoylovych in 1684. Two other imposing churches, the Mykolaivska Church in the Pechersk and the Brotherhood Church in the Podol in Kiev, reflected the influence of the Western European basilica type of architecture. They were erected by architect Yosyp Starchenko in 1690-1696.

In these constructions the old Ukrainian architectural tradition was evident as well as the original characteristic of finished details. After the Battle of Poltava the Russian Czarist administration ordered Mazepa's insignia and coat of arms to be removed from all his churches, while the Soviet regime ordered both churches demolished.

The All Saints Church of the Pecherska Lavra is noted for its original Ukrainian style, not known in the architecture of other peoples. It is most evident in its central building with 5 cupolas and original ornaments. The Church was erected in 1696-1698; over the main altar was the coat of arms of Ivan Mazepa, its patron and founder, which subsequently was removed by the Russian government.

Among other more important churches built by Mazepa was the Ascension Church (*Voznesennia*) in Pereyaslav, 1695-1700.

Mazepa also was very active in the restoration and reconstruction of architectural monuments of the Middle Ages (XIth-XIIIth centuries). His work of restoration paralleled his statehood aspirations—he sought to awaken interest in the historical past and to connect the Ukrainian political life of his day with that of the old

period of Ukrainian statehood. This task required tremendous effort, energy and money, but was rewarding in the end. While the exteriors of churches were renovated and given a national character, the interiors remained intact, thus making for an original Ukrainian baroque.

From the viewpoint of historical significance, the most valuable churches restored by Mazepa were:

St. Sophia Cathedral in Kiev, founded in 1017; the so-called "Gold-Plated" Monastery of St. Michael, erected at the beginning of the XIIth century, and the Main Church of the Pecherska Lavra, erected in 1073.

The most remarkable reconstruction was that of St. Sophia Cathedral which, from a 5-cupola roof, was transformed into a 9-cupola cathedral, adorned with strikingly beautiful designs and motifs.

No less attractive was the architecture of the "Gold-Plated" Monastery, which was demolished by the Soviet regime in 1934 upon the express orders of the Kremlin.

(It is interesting to note that in Russia proper the Russian communist government refrained from destroying churches of historical note. In Ukraine, on the other hand, the churches were leveled as a means of "fighting religious prejudices" of the people. Needless to say, the churches and monasteries built by Mazepa were assigned "priority in destruction" by Moscow.)

Other churches reconstructed by Mazepa included the Trinity Church of the Pecherska Lavra, the St. Cyril Church in Kiev, a few churches in Chernihiv, and several monasteries and smaller houses of worship throughout Ukraine.

It is estimated that the *Hetman* spent at least 2,000,000 *zlotys* in this work. This figure was arrived at by the so-called Bender Commission, appointed by King Charles XII of Sweden to assess the estate of the dead *Hetman*. Ukrainian officers, especially those of the General Staff of Mazepa, provided detailed data on sums expended by the *Hetman* for his various cultural and scientific foundations throughout Ukraine.

The patronage of Mazepa in the fields of the humanistic sciences, education and instruction was so extensive that it is quite impossible to detail here the development of the various branches of learning which resulted from his support and influence. Literature, the theater, music, the song, printing, libraries, engraving and etching—all developed and flourished at the end of the XVIIth and at the beginning of the XVIIIth century.

It was during the reign of Mazepa that a number of outstanding books of both religious and lay character appeared, rendered in extraordinary and elaborate print with beautiful etchings and good binding. First place in the art of printing in Eastern Europe was held by the Pecherska Lavra in Kiev.

Books dealing with Ivan Mazepa were destroyed by the Russian government, but at least 20 various editions have survived. These books are replete with descriptions of his high knightly virtues, which strengthened the spirit of and respect for Ukrainian tradition. Despite the fact that the baroque provoked a "high style" in literature, folklore elements and influence of the Ukrainian popular vernacular, especially in the Kozak *dumas*, made their mark. Some of these literary works are ascribed to *Hetman Mazepa's* authorship.

Books and collecting were among the most favored hobbies of Mazepa, which is also attested to by foreign travelers who were received by the Ukrainian leader in his capital city of Baturyn. The French diplomatic envoy, Jean Baluse, who visited Mazepa at the end of 1704, wrote:

Ruler Mazepa showed me his collection of arms, one of the most beautiful that I ever have seen in my life, and also a selected library, with books in Latin everywhere.

There developed during the time of Mazepa a new literary form known as "Kozak chronicles" (*litopys*). Of these special significance is attached to the *Litopys samovydtisia* (*The Chronicle of the Eye-witness*), allegedly written by Colonel Fedir Kandyba, a military secretary at the chancery of the *Hetman*; *Diystvia* (*Events*) of Col. H. Hrabianka, and *Skazanie o voyni Kozatskoi* (*Story of the Kozak War*), by S. Velychko, secretary of the General Military Chancery. Permeating these Kozak chronicles is Ukrainian patriotism, with references to Ukrainian antiquity as well as an emphasis on the geographical, cultural and economic separateness of Ukraine.

General public instruction in Ukraine went parallel with education; the problem of education received much attention at the time of Mazepa. Formation of the spiritual life of the youth, religious and national education, codes of ethics and social behavior, relations of the family, marriage, etc.—all these topics were widely discussed. In this connection a special series of books was published, containing "proverbs," "stories" and "humor," which were circulated among the people. One such book, *Etyka abo Filozofia pravouchytelna* (*Ethics or Philosophy of Virtuous Living*) of 1712, contained 62 engravings of M. Zybrytsky, and was translated in modern times in St. Petersburg, Lviv, Moscow and Vienna.



The "Gold-Plated" Monastery in Kiev, which was erected in 1108, but remodeled by *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa during his reign in Ukraine. The Monastery was razed in 1934 by the Soviet government during its campaign against religion.

A number of foreign travelers who visited Ukraine reported on the high level of education and science. In the second half of the XVIIth century, Paul of Aleppo, in writing that the whole population of Ukraine was literate, remarked about the Ukrainian upper classes:

Among monastery principals (cf. the Pecherska Lavra) there are learned people, jurists and speakers, who know logic and philosophy and dwell upon deep problems.

Similar reports were made by the Swede K. J. Hildebrandt in 1688, by the Scot P. Gordon, the Dane Jul Just in 1711, and others.

Knowledge of foreign languages was a general characteristic of the cultural life of Ukraine of the Mazepa era, in which trend Mazepa provided stimulating leadership and direction. Contemporaries wrote that Ivan Mazepa was a master of Latin, and fluently spoke the Dutch, Italian, German, French, and Polish languages. It was

not a rarity that a Ukrainian officer of the Mazepa era should know, in addition to the Latin, also the German, French, and Italian languages.

Hence Ukrainians were used by Muscovite publications in the capacities of interpreters, diplomats, editors, proof-readers and so on, as is attested to by documentary evidence. Generally speaking, Ukrainian cultural cadres at the time built up the cultural life of Muscovy, serving as teachers, judges, priests, artists, and the like.

Russian historian P. Pekarsky wrote in his monumental work, *Nauka pri Petrie* (*Science under Peter*), published in Petersburg in 1862:

The Little Russian erudite class had one good point, namely, with its assistance, xenophobia disappeared from Kiev, which is being supported in Moscow . . . At the beginning of the XVIIIth century, in the field of public instruction in Russia the Kievans were the principal leaders: all important translations from the classic languages, all monumental treatises on the dogmas of faith, all sermons, the majority of poetic works on the glorification of victories and great men, theatrical works—all these were written by Little Russians or were composed under their supervision" (Vol. II, p. 2, 4-5). [Little Russian was the term by which Russian chauvinists referred to the Ukrainians—ED.]

The support of engraving and etching tendered by Ivan Mazepa was considerable. Engraving on stone, wood, metal, and especially on precious metals, became widely practiced in Ukraine. Mazepa's buildings—architectural monuments—provide ample material for the study of Ukrainian engraving, which was noted for its original style and design. Engraving was widely applied in decorating the *iconostasis*, the principal ornament of churches. The *iconostasis* of the Mazepa era was of great dimensions, being several stories in height, and therefore cost much money. In all churches built by Mazepa there were impressive *iconostases* built by first-rate Ukrainian artists. The beautiful and ornate *iconostases* of the "Gold-Plated" Monastery and the Mykolaivska Church in Kiev were barbarously destroyed and burned in the 30's by the Soviet Russian government.

The metal-casting industry was highly developed at the time of Mazepa; from his era remain products of a high technical and artistic level. Bells, cannons, church objects and domestic appliances were covered with etchings, sometimes even with portraits. The casting of bells in Ukraine was a highly intricate and expensive art, and the church bells were known to be huge and extremely costly. Russian government could not destroy these objects so easily, some church bells have survived to our time. At least four bells of an Mazepa was a great patron of this art as well. Inasmuch as the

extremely rare quality have been preserved: that of Novhorod-Siversky of 1698; the Domanytsky Monastery in the Chernihiv province, 1699; Chernihiv, 1701, and the St. Sophia Cathedral, Kiev.

Priceless jewelry products of silver and gold, often adorned with rubies and diamonds, were among the commonplace gifts given to the churches by Mazepa. These treasures were confiscated by the Soviet Russian government.

The era of Ivan Mazepa considerably promoted the development of painting. The Academy of Kiev and the painting school of the Pecherska Lavra were the centers of the art. Ukrainian monumental painting was well acquainted with the Western European trends, especially the Italian and Dutch schools. Portraiture was dominated by realism and the monumental form. In *iconostasis* painting the realistic trend went so far as to have Ukrainian Kozak folklore scenes reproduced. Religious paintings very often contained portraits of church "patrons and donors." (In existence are many church pictures with a likeness of Ivan Mazepa.)

Engraving had special significance; it was not only a branch of the arts, but served as a unique means of reproducing drawings, portraits, maps and sketches. In Kiev alone, at the time of Mazepa, there were 20 famous engravers. The founder of the Ukrainian school of engraving was Alexander A. Tarasevych, who was educated and who worked for a number of years in the West. In 1688 Tarasevych, upon the invitation of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa, came to Kiev. Proving to be an excellent master of his metier, he worked for many Western European publications, notably those in Augsburg, drawing portraits of kings, princes, emperors, state and church dignitaries, and the like. His school in Kiev produced the majority of Ukrainian engravers, including D. Halyakhovsky, Leo Tarasevych, Ivan Shchyrsky, Ivan Myhura and Ivan Strelbytsky. All were inspired by Ivan Mazepa; their work contained many references to Mazepa's coat of arms, allegorical symbols and his likeness in recognition of his good deeds for people and country.

Extremely popular at the time was the engraving of the so-called "academic theses," that is, engravings representing academic debates and artistic soirees of the Academy of Kiev. Executed by outstanding Ukrainian engravers, very often the students of the Academy, these were dedicated to important persons. At least four such engraved "academic theses" were dedicated to Mazepa.

Mazepa's deeds as a patron of the arts and sciences were not limited to Ukraine alone, but extended outside the frontiers of Ukraine, thereby contributing toward better political, cultural and economic relations with foreign nations. It is known that he founded

churches in Vilno and in Poland. His generous hand extended as far as Palestine, the Greek Athos and the Near East, especially Syria, Antioch and Alexandria. In Syria Mazepa donated a Gospel printed in the Arab language to the city of Aleppo in 1708. Mazepa also gave a silver chalice and other church objects to the Church of the Divine Tomb in Jerusalem.

Another of Mazepa's concerns was the development of industry in Ukraine. We might mention here the industry of papermaking, which developed to a high degree under Mazepa. There are documentary data to the effect that in Chernihiv province alone there were 12 paper plants in the XVIIIth century. Ivan Mazepa founded a few paper factories, especially in the village of Bilytsia in 1680.

The production of glass, which began to develop in Ukraine at the beginning of the XVIth century, reached its highest level of production at the time of Mazepa, especially with regard to artistic glassware. Under the *Hetman's* aegis, at least four new glass factories were established.

Ceramic production also developed to a high degree, especially in the proper *Hetmanshchyna*, in such centers as Starodub, Kozeltsi, Nizhen, Chernihiv, Ichnya, Oleshnya, Pohari, Novhorod-Siversky and Baturyn. Ceramic factories are known to have existed also in the provinces of Kiev and Podilia, and in Galicia and Volhynia as well.

Textile production had a great economic significance, providing as it did material for clothing for the entire population. During the reign of Mazepa the textile industry in Ukraine attained sizeable proportions and provided linen, broadcloth, silk and other textiles.

The organizers and promoters of industry and of the entire economic life in Ukraine were Kozak officers who not only were well trained in the military art, but constituted an enlightened class with an understanding of the economy and the technique of production and trade.

Under the direction and leadership of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa, who generously supported science, education, the schools, the church and the whole economy of the country, Ukraine was well on the road to economic, cultural and political independence. Under normal conditions Ukraine would have flourished, a great and powerful nation.

MAZEPA IN BYRON'S POEM AND IN HISTORY*

By LYDIA HOLUBNYCHY**

Of all the outstanding personalities in Ukrainian history, Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa, a statesman of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, is probably the best known to the West. Yet as a political figure, as a fighter for Ukraine's liberation from Russia, it seems that he is known only to historians and politicians. To the general public and the artistic world Mazepa is merely a romantic figure, a rich subject for an artistic composition. Byron was one of the first to devote a poem to this man;¹ his Mazepa, as one critic has remarked, remains "the most celebrated treatment of the subject"² in Europe.

Mazeppa was written by Byron in Italy in 1818³ and published in June, 1819.⁴ In the poem, with the battle of Poltava just over, the defeated allies—Charles XII of Sweden and *Hetman* Mazepa of Ukraine—flee from the pursuing Russian troops. During a brief halt, old Mazepa relates to the wounded king a romantic incident of his youth, in which he, a young page at the Polish Court, having been caught in a love affair with a married lady, is severely punished by her old husband. Mazepa is tied naked to a wild horse, which carries him off into the "wilderness."

It is significant that many critics and commentators, leaving almost entirely unnoticed Byron's ingenious composition of the poem—the unity of two different times in one place in the form of a parallel presentation of the aged and young Mazepa—concentrate

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¹ Mazepa is also the hero of Victor Hugo's *Les Orientales*, A. Pushkin's *Poltava*, J. Slowacki's drama *Mazeppa*, F. Liszt's symphonic poem "Mazeppa," and so forth.

² Samuel Marion Tucker (ed.), *Selections from Byron; The Prisoner of Chillon, Mazeppa and Other Poems* (Boston, 1907), p. 56.

³ John Murray (ed.), *Lord Byron's Correspondence, Chiefly with Lady Melbourne, Mr. Hobhouse, the Hon. Douglas Kinnaird, and P. B. Shelley* (New York, 1922) 2:64.

⁴ Leslie A. Marchand, *Byron: A Biography* (New York, 1957), 2:804.

HETMAN MAZEPA AND KING CHARLES XII



Canvas painting of Hetman Ivan Mazepa of Ukraine and King Charles XII of Sweden, by Gustaf Cederstroem, 1880, Stockholm.

their attention mainly on the sentimental adventure of Mazepa's youth. A contemporary critic in *The Monthly Review*, for instance, beholds only "a love-intrigue" in the poem,⁵ and so does that of *The Monthly Magazine*.⁶ The same treatment is accorded *Mazeppa* by Elton.⁷ The critic in *Blackwood's*, however, notes the "contrast" between the youthful and the old Mazepa expressed in the setting of the story.⁸ This contrast is also observed by S. M. Tucker.⁹ A reviewer in *The Gentleman's Magazine* indicates that the old Mazepa is not entirely ignored, but, outside of a casual notice, the critic elaborates

⁵ Unsigned, "Mazeppa, a Poem," *The Monthly Review or Literary Journal Enlarged*, 89:312 (July, 1819).

⁶ Unsigned, "New Books Published in July; with an Historical and Critical Proemium," *The Monthly Magazine or British Register*, 48:57 (August 1819).

⁷ Oliver Elton, *A Survey of English Literature, 1780-1830* (London, 1912), 2:152-153.

⁸ Unsigned, "Mazeppa," *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, 5:429 (July 1819).

⁹ *Selections from Byron*, p. 56.

in detail upon Mazepa's "ride."¹⁰ A similar tendency is observed in Clinton's analysis of the poem."

This disposition to see in the poem only the youthful Mazepa can be explained, however, not only by the romantic haze surrounding his image in the West but indeed by the poem itself, an overwhelming part of which is devoted to the description of the *amour* in the *Hetman's* youth. Byron begins it in Stanza IV and carries it up to the end. Since Byron's presentation of Mazepa's love affair, his wild ride, his physical and mental sufferings, and the scenery of the country through which he dashed is elaborate and vivid, small wonder that it pushes into the background the mature Mazepa of the poem, of whom the poet treats mainly in Stanzas III and IV.

Nevertheless, there are two Mazepas in the poem. Byron's older Mazepa is a tempered soldier who sleeps outdoors "in an old oak's shade" with a "leafy couch" as his bed. He is "venerable"; he is "calm and bold"; his mind is powerful, capable of finding a way out of any difficult situation. Byron chooses to describe this Mazepa in the words of Charles XII, who refers to the *Hetman* as the wisest and the cleverest of all of his followers, comparing him with Alexander the Great and attributing to him all the fame of Ukraine. Byron's old Mazepa is also the man whom "thousands of Cossacks would follow anywhere," "where each would foremost bleed." Is this, then, a picture of an irresponsible, careless adventurer who "steals" others' wives? The aged Mazepa of Byron is the man who, creating history, is known in history. Historians, too, describe him as a potent personality—a diplomat, a soldier and, above all, a skilled politician, fighting for Ukraine's independence.¹² This depiction of Mazepa by Byron is the reason why it is difficult to agree with de Vogue that "the English poet, lacking exact information . . . did not pretend to revive a historical character."¹³

At this point it may be convenient to attempt to trace and investigate the sources on which Byron based his picture of *old*

¹⁰ Unsigned, "Mazeppa, a Poem," *The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle*, 89:43 (July 1819).

¹¹ George Clinton, *Memoires of the Life and Writings of Lord Byron* (London 1828), p. 415.

¹² Clarence A. Manning, *Hetman of Ukraine: Ivan Mazeppa* (New York, 1957), pp. 19-20, 34, 36, 48, 70ff, 165-166, 224. Also Elie Borschak, and René Martel, *La Vie de Mazeppa* (Paris, 1931), pp. 1-5, 75. Also Eugene Schuyler, *Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia* (New York, 1884), 2:43f.

¹³ E. M. de Vogue, *Trois drames de l'histoire de Russie: le fils de Pierre le Grand; Mazeppa; un changement de regne*. (Paris, 1911), p. 177.

Mazepa. Because the poet prefixed an excerpt from Voltaire's account of *young Mazepa* to the poem, almost all students of Byron's work assert that he derived his historic facts from Voltaire's *History of Charles XII*. Thus S. M. Tucker declares that "the poet doubtlessly gained his historic facts from the *Histoire de Charles XII*,"¹⁴ and so holds S. C. Chew¹⁵ among many others. An exception is G. Clinton, who suggests that besides using Voltaire, Byron took some incidents from the French novel *D'Azhema*.¹⁶ Leaving aside for a moment the discussion of whether or not Voltaire's account of the *young Mazepa* agrees with that of Byron, it indeed appears from Byron's description of the *aged Mazepa*—the real, historical Mazepa—that the poet obtained his general impression of him from Voltaire's *History of Charles XII*, wherein the latter describes Mazepa as "a man of great courage, of considerable enterprise, and most painstaking," as the man who "resolved to gain independence" from Russia for Ukraine.¹⁷ Yet it would appear a great oversimplification to assert, as de Vogue does, that "one day Lord Byron opened a volume of Voltaire and read there a dozen of lines which then acquired form and color in his imagination"¹⁸ (a view which is also expressed by Coleridge¹⁹) unless the word "imagination" is applied primarily to the "ride" story.

A systematic analysis of Byron's poem reveals the presence of some facts which he could have found neither in Voltaire nor even in his own imagination, however inspired. For instance, while Byron uses the term "*hetman*" (which is a Turkish-Ukrainian-Polish term), it is absent from both the original and the English editions of Voltaire's *History of Charles XII*, where instead appear such pallid terms as "general" and "prince." Moreover, whereas Voltaire does not touch upon the reign and character of John Casimir, the King of Poland in Mazepa's time, Byron describes his period (Stanza IV) correctly as peaceful, the king as unwarlike, and so forth. In addition, while describing Mazepa's ride through Ukraine in Stanza XI, Byron mentions the fact of the Turkish invasion of Ukraine, which actually took place at about the time of Mazepa's youth:²⁰

¹⁴ *Selections from Byron*, p. 56.

¹⁵ Samuel C. Chew (ed.), *Lord Byron: Childe Harold's Pilgrimage and Other Romantic Poems* (New York, 1936), p. 314.

¹⁶ *Memoires of the Life and Writings of Lord Byron*, p. 413.

¹⁷ F. M. A. de Voltaire, *History of Charles XII, King of Sweden* (London 1908), pp. 157-158.

¹⁸ *Trois drames de l'histoire de Russie*, p. 172.

¹⁹ Ernest Hartley Coleridge (ed.), *The Works of Lord Byron* (London, 1901), 4:201.

²⁰ Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941), pp. 311 ff.

the year before
A Turkish army had march'd o'er . . .

This fact, too, is absent from Voltaire's *History of Charles XII*. Finally, in Stanza XX, the following lines show that Byron made a mistake, which, however, has a revealing connotation:

To-morrow the Borysthenes²¹
May see our coursers graze at ease
Upon his Turkish bank . . .

This bank of the Borysthenes was not at all Turkish at the time of the Poltava battle, but it indeed was Turkish forty years earlier, in the times of *Hetman* Doroshenko, whose reign coincides with Mazepa's youth. Voltaire, however, does not make this error (because he does not mention the Turks in Ukraine at all), which fact, together with other facts just presented, indicates that prior to his writing of the poem Byron most probably had done some reading on the period of Mazepa's youth and consulted historic works in which the treatment of Ukraine's history was much broader than in Voltaire's *History of Charles XII*. It is impossible, of course, to ascertain definitely those sources which he did consult. The point is that such sources did exist in Byron's time. He might have read Voltaire's *Histoire de l'Empire de Russie sous Pierre-le-Grand*, where the term "*hetman*" appears for the first time and the Ukrainian *Hetmanite* state is described²² (though there is nothing on John Casimir or the Turkish occupation of Ukraine), or he could have used Gordon's *History of Peter the Great*, which affords an especially detailed treatment of Mazepa and his time and where ample data on the Turkish invasions are available,²³ or, for that matter, many other historical works.²⁴

While we can now be fairly confident that the aged Mazepa of the poem is the *historical* Mazepa, we cannot be so sure as far as the *youthful* Mazepa is concerned. It would seem that the poet took the general plot of the *affaire* from Voltaire. Yet, as in the case of

²¹ Borysthenes is an ancient Greek name for the Dnieper River.

²² F. M. A. de Voltaire, *Histoire de l'Empire de Russie sous Pierre-le-Grand* (Paris, 1835), pp. 18 ff.

²³ Alexander Gordon, *The History of Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia* (Aberdeen, 1755), 1:280 ff.

²⁴ We can mention only a few such books here: Banks, John. *A New History of the Life and Reign of Czar Peter the Great, Emperor of all Russia*. London: Hodges, 1740; Manvillon, Eleazarde. *Histoire de Pierre I surnomme le Grand, Empereur de toutes les Russies*. Amsterdam: Arkstee, 1742; Motley, John. *History of the Life of Peter I, Emperor of Russia*, 3 vols. London: Read, 1739.

the old Mazepa, the facts marshaled in Byron's story could not have been obtained from Voltaire alone.

Of course, the poem would not be a poem were it not for the imagination of the poet. Indeed, such a line as "conveying as the electric wire" (Stanza VI), which expresses the first impulse of love, and the scores of lines describing the feelings of the tormented victim during his ride are proof of Byron's fantasy, for who in the seventeenth century would conceive of an "electric wire"? And yet, in addition to these strokes of the poet's fancy, there are such elements in Byron's version of Mazepa's intrigue that suggest the presence of other contributing factors.

Most researchers maintain that Byron's own dalliance with Countess Theresa Guiccioli, a young Italian lady married to an old man past his prime, served as an inspiration for and is reflected in the poem. G. Brandes unequivocally avers that "whilst under the first impression of his attachment to the Countess, Byron also wrote *Mazeppa*."²⁵ Moore, too, affirms that "it is impossible not to suspect that the poet had some circumstances of his own personal history in mind, when he portrayed the fair Polish Theresa, her youthful lover and the jealous rage of the old Count Palatine."²⁶ Since Voltaire's story about Mazepa's *affaire* does not include the name of the lady, Dr. Englaender, who is quoted by Koelbing, founds his theory on the fact that the lady in the poem is also named Theresa.²⁷ However, his and similar theories are criticized by Koelbing on the ground that the poem allegedly was written *before* Byron was formally introduced to Theresa Guiccioli.²⁸

This view is shared by Coleridge²⁹ and by most of the early researchers on the same ground: Byron supposedly met Theresa for the first time in the autumn of 1818. At first glance this theory seems sound enough since *Mazeppa* had already been sent to the publisher in the fall of 1818.³⁰ And yet, did Byron really meet Countess Guiccioli for the first time in the autumn of 1818? According to the newest research of Marchand, Byron first met her at Mme. Albizzi's on the evening of January 22, 1818,³¹ that is, long

²⁵ Georg Brandes, *Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature* (New York, 1905), 4:329.

²⁶ Thomas Moore (ed.), *The Works of Lord Byron, with His Letters and Journals, and His Life* (London, 1832), 11:178.

²⁷ E. Koelbing, "D. Englaender, Lord Byron's *Mazeppa*; A Study," *Englische Studien*, 24:451f (1898).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

²⁹ *The Works of Lord Byron*, 4:213.

³⁰ Murray, *Lord Byron's Correspondence*, 2:89.

³¹ *Byron: A Biography*, 2:723.

before he had even begun working on his poem! There is a strong probability, therefore, that one of the early researchers, presumably Thomas Moore,³² erred on the time of Byron's first meeting with Theresa, and this mistake has subsequently been repeated by all the others. As we consider Marchand the most reliable and the latest source for the time being, we can assume that Byron knew Theresa before and while he was writing *Mazeppa*. Hence, the analogy between the poem and his own *affaire* seems to be quite valid.

Credence in such an analogy is further strengthened by some lines of the poem. "His junior she by thirty years" (Stanza IV) denotes a thirty-year difference in age between the young lady and her husband. That Theresa Guiccioli "is nineteen years old, and has a Count of fifty," too, can be found in Byron's letter to Hobhouse of April 6, 1819.³³ The following from Stanza VI may also indicate that, although the feeling of love might have sprung up at first sight, Byron had had to stay away from Theresa perhaps until the formal introduction in April of 1819:

I saw, and sigh'd — in silence wept
And still reluctant distance kept,
Until I was made known to her . . .

However, even besides Byron's own experience and his powers for invention, there seem to have been other sources that contributed to his version of the Mazepa story. The poem contains several lines in Stanza IV which can be construed as a palpable proof that the poet was aware of the original source on which Voltaire based his "wild horse" anecdote, though these lines have gone unnoticed until now by the analyzers and commentators. Having described the character of King John Casimir and the life at his Court, Byron interjects:

He was the Polish Solomon, —
So sung his poets, all but one,
Who, being unpensioned, made a satire,
And boasted that he could not flatter . . .

Who is this poet that Byron speaks of? Why does he insert this character into the poem where he is clearly out of place and serves no dramatic function? We venture to advance a hypothesis that Byron did it intentionally and that this enigmatic poet is J. C. Pasek. This leads us right into the problem of the very first origin of the "ride" story and its authenticity.

³² In his *Works of Lord Byron*, 4:144, he gives the date of Byron's first meeting with the Countess as "autumn, 1818."

³³ Murray, *op. cit.*, 2:106.

Pasek, a petty Polish nobleman serving at the Court together with Mazepa, relates his painful experiences with Mazepa in his memoirs, a collection of prose and poetry written about 1688.³⁴ Pasek's work, which has survived in several manuscripts, is considered a gem of early Polish literature. Describing the events of the year 1661, Pasek bitterly complains that Mazepa had denounced him to the King as a possible Russian spy and a plotter against the throne. For this, Pasek was court-martialed and all his estates confiscated, although subsequently he was pardoned by the King and fully rehabilitated. [Pasek's conspiracy and its consequences are also confirmed by Manning, a leading American authority on Mazepa.³⁵]

However, as the reason for Mazepa's leaving the Court and Poland in 1663, Pasek gives in his memoirs that very scandal which we find in Voltaire's *History of Charles XII* and in Byron's poem. According to Pasek, Mazepa pursued a liaison with a certain Mme Falbowski (no first name is given again), the young wife of one of Mazepa's neighbors in Volhynia. There are only two major differences between Pasek's story and that of Voltaire. First, Pasek's version takes place in Volhynia, outside the Polish Court, while Voltaire makes no mention of this. Second, in Pasek's story, the horse, which is not wild, brings Mazepa back to his own estate, while in Voltaire's, it brings him "back" to Ukraine's "wilderness." The fact that Byron's story also explicitly takes place outside the Court (Stanza IV) might be taken as an additional indication that he knew of the original account of Pasek.

Pasek concludes his reminiscences with quite a few lines of his poetry,³⁶ in which he openly gloats over Mazepa's misfortune and flays him unmercifully, calling him an "adulterer," "liar," and "thief" who had to leave Poland "because of this shame."³⁷

Pasek does not say wherefrom he derived his story of Mazepa's *amour*. However, since he actually was not in Volhynia himself at the time, but was negotiating with the Russians in Smolensk, it can be reasonably inferred that he could only have heard it from

³⁴ Jean-Chrysostome Pasek, *Les Memoires de Jean-Chrysostome Pasek, gentilhomme Polonais* (Paris, n. d.), pp. 185-190. Although this French edition has no date of publication, there is enough evidence to conclude that it was published in the twentieth century, i. e., not in Byron's time.

³⁵ *Hetman of Ukraine: Ivan Mazeppa*, p. 139.

³⁶ It must be mentioned here that the French edition of Pasek's memoirs omits his poetry, for it is an abridged edition; however, the verses are present in the original Polish edition, which we have also consulted: J. Ch. Pasek, *Pamiętniki*, (Cracow, 1929), p. 318.

³⁷ *Loo. cit.*

someone else or even fabricated it himself out of a desire for revenge. That his house was a center for Court gossip he admits himself in his memoirs: "Gostkowski was forbidden to visit me on the grounds that he was bringing me all the news which he could learn at the Court."³⁸

The learned opinion on whether Pasek's story is myth or truth ranges from one extreme to the other, though most researchers greatly doubt its genuineness. Borschak and Martel bluntly declare that "Pasek forged the whole piece" about the "fiery horse."³⁹ This view is also supported by Manning.⁴⁰ De Vogue, who visited Ukraine especially to investigate this problem, declares that he is not persuaded that it is not a legend.⁴¹ N. I. Kostomarov neither rejects nor confirms Pasek's story, though by giving some documented evidence on Mazepa's leaving Poland to serve the Ukrainian *Hetman* Doroshenko, contributed to the doubt of the accuracy of Pasek's facts.⁴² Some Polish researchers and critics, such as M. Wiszniewski and J. I. Kraszewski, hold that Pasek's memoirs, in general, contain many discrepancies, while others—A. Waga, J. Majorkiewicz—hold most of Pasek's work to be true.⁴³

However, how did Pasek's story of Mazepa's *amour* reach European capitals and Voltaire, in particular? Presumably, it was brought there by Polish emigres. There is undeniable evidence that Stanislaw Leszczynski, an exiled King of Poland living in Paris in Voltaire's time, was a source upon which Voltaire drew. According to the general index of Voltaire's works, he described the "Mazeppa affaire" in one place only—his *History of Charles XII*.⁴⁴ Yet, for some still unknown reasons, Voltaire himself was not sure to the end of his life whether this very book of his contained the historical truth; so he turned to Leszczynski and requested him in writing to certify as to the accuracy "of all the facts" presented in the book—the facts which, therefore, included the story about Mazepa, and Leszczynski willingly did this more than once.⁴⁵

How could the original story of Pasek reach Byron? Probably the same way it had reached Voltaire. An excerpt from Pasek's

³⁸ Pasek, *Pamiętniki*, p. 232.

³⁹ *La Vie de Mazeppa*, p. 9.

⁴⁰ *Hetman of Ukraine: Ivan Mazeppa*, p. 44.

⁴¹ *Trois drames de l'histoire de Russie*, p. 173.

⁴² N. I. Kostomarov. *Sobraniye sochineniy* (St. Petersburg, 1905), 16:389.

⁴³ Pasek, *Les Memoires*, p. 42 (introduction).

⁴⁴ F. W. A. Voltaire, *Oeuvres* (Paris, 1840), 72:117.

⁴⁵ Theodore Besterman (ed.), *Voltaire's Correspondence* (Geneva, 1958), 36:225, 235.

memoirs was first published in a Warsaw magazine, *Astrea*, in July, 1821.⁴⁶ The first complete edition of the memoirs was published in 1836.⁴⁷ Consequently, Byron could not have had access to these printed sources, which, moreover, were in Polish. But Pasek's memoirs circulated in Europe orally and in manuscript form. A Polish poet, Constantine Gaszynski, possessed Pasek's manuscript, which he tried, but failed, to publish in Paris in the 1820's.⁴⁸ Therefore, since "all roads lead to Rome," it can be assumed that, while inquiring about Mazepa's youth and reading some history books, Byron at least might have heard something about the "poet" who refused to praise John Casimir for leaving him "unpensioned," and, perhaps by way of indicating that this "poet" was the originator of Mazepa's story, Byron inserted him into the poem as a casually recalled person by the *Hetman*.

From the foregoing discussion, two major conclusions can be drawn. First, of the two different Mazepas presented in Byron's poem, old Mazepa's portrait closely corresponds to that of history, while the historic authenticity of the young Mazepa is rather nebulous. Second, although it is doubtless that Byron's poem is an artistic reproduction of Voltaire's presentation of Mazepa, there is ample evidence to suggest that the poet supplemented Voltaire's account by other historic sources, through his own romantic experience with Theresa Guiccioli, and by a version of the original Pasek story which the poet probably heard in one salon or another. Out of this material, Byron, through his impassioned powers of expression and superb artistic talent, succeeded in creating a poetic masterpiece, the beauty of which is not diminished by several minor inaccuracies with respect to the real Mazepa and his times.

⁴⁶ Pasek, *Les Memoires*, pp. 18 19.

⁴⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁴⁸ *Loc. cit.*

MAZEPA IN ENGLISH LITERATURE

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Ivan Mazepa was one of the greatest of the *Hetmans* of the Ukrainian Kozak state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Zaporozhian Kozaks under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky had developed through independence from Poland into a power of the first rank in Eastern Europe but Khmelnytsky's alliance with Czar Alexis of Moscow had led to the interference of the Muscovite bureaucracy into all aspects of Ukrainian life. It was against this interference that Mazepa was obliged to struggle throughout his entire career as *Hetman* and it was to escape this that he formed an alliance with King Charles XII of Sweden against Moscow. The defeat of the Swedes and the Kozaks at Poltava in 1709 not only doomed Sweden and stripped her of her holdings east of the Baltic Sea but it laid Ukraine helpless before the advancing forces of Czar Peter I. It was under these conditions that the aged Mazepa in one of his most brilliant feats succeeded in carrying Charles to safety in Turkey but the effort exhausted the seventy-year old leader and he died in exile soon after but carried to his grave his honors as *Hetman* and he received a funeral worthy of his rank. It was the fitting climax to a career that was filled with service to his people as he conceived it.

Mazepa had an attractive and striking personality. All the Western Europeans who came in contact with him either in his capital of Baturyn or on his many visits to Moscow stressed his graciousness, his deep knowledge of political and economic affairs, his high culture and his more than liberal donations to various Ukrainian and Orthodox institutions not only in Ukraine but throughout the entire Orthodox world. Mazepa was in a real sense the very culmination of all those cultural currents that flowed into the *Hetman* state from the West and were from there transmitted in a dilute form into Moscow and the East. We should expect the Western literatures to reflect in some degree these aspects of his career and yet, if we do, we will be extremely disappointed, for the figure of Mazepa as it appears in English literature, is inseparably connected not with the greatness of the *Hetman* but with a romantic canard that became early associated with his name.

* *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 2, June, 1959.

In a sense there is a reason for this. The interests of Western Europe were almost entirely involved in the struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism and in the first half of the seventeenth century these doctrinal disputes flared up into the ferocious Thirty Years War which left the German states a mere shambles and a pale picture of their former selves. The English succeeded in remaining almost entirely aloof from this conflict but at the same time they were busied with the no less furious conflicts between the Kings and Parliament which in a somewhat different form reflected various aspects of the same struggle. It was only natural that Khmelnytsky with his allies in Protestant Sweden should correspond with Oliver Cromwell but the restoration of the Stuarts put an abrupt end to negotiations between the English authorities and the Zaporozhian Kozaks. At the same time the Thirty Years War freed the hands of the Eastern European peoples to settle their own affairs without interference from the great powers of Central and Western Europe. Poland had a priceless opportunity to settle her own domestic problems and to work out a satisfactory solution of her relationships with the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians. Yet that opportunity was recklessly wasted. Poland took no effective steps to rearrange its internal affairs and merely brought about a situation where the embattled Kozaks, wedged in between the Republic of Poland, the aspirations of the Turks and the infiltrating processes of Moscow, lost their own power of independent movement and failed in their effort to make a new settlement based upon a Kozak regime in Kiev which could hold the balance of power between all of its neighbors. The situation was further complicated by the efforts of the Kings of Sweden to assert their claims to the Polish throne, to secure this for the Swedish line of the Vasa family and to make of the Baltic Sea a Swedish lake with the Swedes in control of all the Baltic sea-coast. There were thus three centers of conflict—Western and Central Europe, Ukraine and its neighbors, and Sweden. It was only the first of these that had ready access to English public opinion which was not ready to take sides in the others and was thoroughly indoctrinated with the Muscovite point of view thanks to the visit of Peter to England and the services of such men as Patrick Gordon in the Czar's army and entourage.

As the century drew to a close, Louis XIV of France tried to assert his authority over the whole of Western Europe and this led to another long and continued series of wars not only in Europe but also in America and in India. It led to continuous clashes between the French and English colonies in America and for a

century both the British and the Americans saw the whole field of European and international relations through the prism of this struggle between England and France on three continents.

The Northern War which opened with King Charles XII of Sweden embroiled with Peter of Moscow, Poland and Denmark went on simultaneously with the War of the Spanish Succession in which Great Britain, Holland, Austria, Denmark, Portugal and some of the German states were allied against France, Bavaria, Cologne and Spain. France and Moscow did their best to secure the intermingling of the two wars or perhaps we might say the liquidation of the one in which it was not involved, for France was constantly making efforts to induce Charles XII to give up his struggle against Moscow and take his place in the anti-British combination and Peter was trying to induce Marlborough to throw his talents and energy into the war against Sweden, even at the price of peace between Great Britain and France. The resulting complications produced a bedlam in which the cause of Ukraine and the Kozaks was hopelessly concealed from the minds of Western Europe and the position of Mazepa was thoroughly misinterpreted just as the cause of Ukraine later under the exiled *Hetman* Orlyk was involved in the fate of Sweden and France.

By this period too England as a maritime state was far more interested in exploration and expansion overseas. Moscow had not yet secured a firm hold on the Black Sea and the Dardanelles were still more or less closed to commerce. As a result English travellers and diplomats who reached Constantinople rarely penetrated into the interior. They knew the future Russia from access by St. Petersburg and Archangel. Ukraine and Kiev were not on the route of the Grand Tour taken by all young men of fashion and of wealth during the eighteenth century and there were few English travellers and diplomats who made the long and tedious journey overland to visit the Ukrainian centers. For a knowledge of Ukrainian affairs, they were dependent upon sources hostile to the Kozaks and these wasted no opportunities to stress Mazepa as a traitor in those lurid colors with which Peter had painted him.

Furthermore with all of his great qualities Mazepa was a favorable subject for criticism. A member of a Ukrainian noble family, he had been reared at the Polish court and had a definite position there even before the rise of Khmelnytsky and the independence of the Zaporozhians. His passage from the service of the King of Poland to the Kozaks aroused criticism among the Poles and they in their turn did not spare any efforts to blacken

his character, especially when they realized that he was no longer going to do their bidding.

It was just at this period that the young Mazepa made a bitter enemy, Jan Chrysostom Pasek. Pasek was a swashbuckling Pole, a brawler and a general disturber of the peace but unfortunately for Mazepa's reputation he possessed the fatal gift of not spoiling a good story. After several personal encounters with the young Ukrainian, Pasek in his memoirs told the unforgettable tale of Mazepa's ride. According to this, Mazepa was caught by the irate husband of a lady with whom he was having an affair and to take vengeance the husband had him bound naked on a wild horse which was then turned loose. Pasek covered himself in case of controversy by not giving either the time or place or even the precise name of the insulted husband, so that it was impossible to pin down the actual episode, if there was one, that served as the basis of the story. Yet that story, as Pasek told it, sounded convincing. In the original form, the horse carried Mazepa back to his own estates after a wild ride, but later gossips embroidered it even more. They told how the young man was so scratched up that the peasants believed that he was some supernatural monster from hell and secured the village priest to exorcise the demon. Each one added some new twist to the tale without regarding the fact that Mazepa could not have survived, if he had had to go through all the details with which they burdened him. It was a jolly example of a story, highly improbable at first, but becoming more and more fantastic with each individual new accretion. Thus at the moment when Peter let loose a torrent of denunciation and the vilest possible language on the defeated *Hetman*, there was already in existence a mass of scandalous stories connected with Mazepa and only waiting to be incorporated in a pseudo-historical account.

The next step in this collection of misrepresentations was to link the stories in some way with Mazepa's withdrawal from the Polish service and his entrance into the Zaporozhian Host. There was no need for this to excite wonder, for Polish and Ukrainian families were largely intermingled especially in the western part of Ukraine and there were many cases when as a result of some deliberate insult a Ukrainian gave up his hopes for serving with the King and yielded to the cause of his own people. But Mazepa's choice could not be made to seem so simple and entirely regardless of the geographical truth of the setting, some one discovered that it was the wild horse that had carried Mazepa to the Ukrainian camp. That was enough and when Voltaire set himself to write a history of Charles XII, he perpetuated the story and included it in

his celebrated history. The stage was set for poets and literary men to complete the immortalizing of Mazepa's ride.

This step was taken by Lord Byron who in 1818 published his poem *Mazeppa* and prefaced it with the appropriate passages from Voltaire. It was only natural that the story of the *Hetman* with all of its fantastic additions should appeal to the Scotch bard, for he was the very heart and soul of that Romanticism which sought everywhere to find examples of extravagant passion and of superhuman manifestations of the human will. The story as told by Voltaire fitted perfectly into his formula, for no ordinary mortal could have stood all the trials and tribulations which the mythical Mazepa had had to undergo.

Yet Byron did not lose touch with reality, for he represented the aged Mazepa in his own historical form and he gave vent to his anti-monarchical feelings in his description of Charles XII, who had sacrificed so many thousands of his people to satisfy his ambition:

For thousands fell that flight to aid:
And not a voice was heard t'upbraid
Ambition in his humbled hour,
When truth had nought to dread from power.

Yet even then he pays a tribute to Charles' endurance:

But yet through all,
Kinglike the monarch bore his fall,
And made, in this extreme of ill,
His pangs the vassal of his will:
All silent and subdued were they,
As once the nations round him lay.

Then the poet pictures Mazepa as he was during the retreat from Poltava:

Among the rest, Mazeppa made
His pillow in an old oak's shade —
Himself as rough, and scarce less old
The Ukraine's *hetman*, calm and bold,
But first, outspent with this long course,
The Cossack prince rubbed down his horse,
And made for him a leafy bed,
And smoothed his fetlocks and his mane,
And slacked his girth, and stripped his rein,
And joyed to see how well he fed;

His horse attended to, Mazeppa next looked to his arms and then he offered the King and his men what food he had available. Charles appreciated the old man and his tribute:

Of all our band,
Though firm of heart and strong of hand,
In skirmish, march, or forage, none
Can have less said or more have done
Than thee, Mazeppa! On the earth
So fit a pair had never birth,
Since Alexander's days till now,
As thy Bucephalus and thou:
All Scythia's fame to thine should yield
For prickling on o'er flood and field.

And at the end:

The *Hetman* threw
His length beneath the oak-tree shade,
With leafy couch already made,
A bed nor comfortless nor new
To him who took his rest whene'er
The hour arrived, no matter where:
His eyes the hastening slumbers steep.

Here we have the essence of the real Mazepa, the old courtier and campaigner who despite almost superhuman obstacles carried the wounded Charles XII to safety in Turkey practically out of the middle of the followers of Peter. Mazepa in this last ride called into play all the knowledge of the steppes and of the Russian enemy that he had stored up during the many years when he had ridden with the Kozaks hither and yon across the steppes. It would have been well, had the readers of Byron's poem taken as their evaluation of Mazepa that tribute to the aged man that Byron pays so handsomely in his account of the night when Mazepa and his Kozaks were on guard to protect the helpless Swedish King and his surviving followers.

Then to console the King and to put him to sleep by setting his mind at rest Mazepa tells how he came to join the Kozaks. He describes the luxurious and cultured life at the court of Jan Casimir and the poetic sports that were used to pass away the time instead of war and battles. It was here that he fell in love with the beautiful Theresa, the wife of a Count Palatine,

A count of fair and high descent,
Rich as a salt or silver mine;
And he was proud, ye may divine.

His wife was thirty years younger than he and so she and the youthful Mazepa fell madly in love. That was the one love of Mazepa's life:

I'd give
The Ukraine back again to live
It o'er once more — and be a page,
The happy page, who was the lord
Of one soft heart, and his own sword,
And had no other gem nor wealth
Save nature's gift of youth and health.

With this Mazepa goes through all the passions that inspire the Romantic poet as he describes how he and his beloved are caught by the irate husband and how in vengeance the Count has him bound to a wild horse and turns the horse loose. After more than a day of running, the horse drops dead and Mazepa, scarcely alive and unconscious, suddenly finds himself brought back to life by a Kozak girl. Her father has found him in the steppes and has brought him to his home and she nurses him back to life. Yet as befits the Romantic hero, he passes over the devotion that she shows him in relative silence and merely says that from there he has gone to be the *Hetman* of Ukraine.

It is the account of the ride on which Byron expends all of his undoubted talents and it is that picture of the mad rush of the crazed horse over hill and dale that remains in the memory and has completely confused and overshadowed that historic role of Mazepa which the poet elsewhere pictures so fully and accurately. Pasek has had his revenge for he, thanks to Byron, has impressed upon the English-speaking reader the picture of Mazepa, not as the intrepid leader but as the love-sick swain who was forced by overweening jealousy to take a hurricane ride and whose endurance won him an undying place in literature.

The effect which this conception of Mazepa had upon the mind of the Americans of the period is well illustrated in an unexpected manner by the history of the Mazepa Engine Company in New York. At the time fire protection was offered to the city by the Volunteer Fire Companies which fostered a great deal of inter-company rivalry. Many of these companies adopted badges and other symbols which signified the speed with which the volunteer members gathered and took their apparatus to the scene of the blaze and to the fortitude and bravery of the members in remaining at their posts, even at times of the greatest conflagrations. In the eighteen twenties, only a few years after the first copies of Byron's *Mazeppa* reached New York, we find that some of the volunteer

firemen were organized into a Mazepa Engine Company in an allusion to the speed of Mazepa's ride and the endurance of the hero during his mad flight across the steppes. The badge of the company represented the naked Mazepa bound to the wild horse. The company continued its existence with its ups and downs until it was replaced during the Civil War by a paid Fire Department. The badges of this company have been preserved and when it was finally disbanded, these badges were given to an offshoot company in the town of Nyack, New York. We could probably find still other examples of groups of the same character in some of the other American cities of the day. Yet we can cite this one example to see how thoroughly the character of Mazepa was detached from that of the Ukrainian *Hetman* and acquired an independent appeal with no thought of the source from which the story was taken, for there is no evidence that the founders of this Company had any other Ukrainian connection than their desire to appropriate the tradition which had been so well set in motion by Lord Byron.

Yet we have still not completed the history of the dissociation of Mazepa in English literature from his people and from his historical career. Byron had aided in the process but Byron had travelled extensively in the Ottoman Empire. He had lived among the Greeks, the Albanians and in Constantinople and though he was an ardent Hellenist and preferred to call the Dnieper the Borysthenes, its ancient Greek name, and to speak of Scythia, he had enough opportunity in Constantinople to meet or at least to hear about those Kozak groups which had chosen exile in Turkey to absorption by the steamroller of Russian Muscovite standardization.

The confusion was further intensified because of the widespread misunderstanding of the name of the people of Ukraine. There were in common use for Ukraine in the eighteenth and earlier centuries such old names as Sarmatia, Roxolania, etc. and there were also stories that the Kozaks (Cossacks as they were labelled) were not Slavs but Tartar tribes wandering around on the pathless steppes. As a result more than once Mazepa emerges on the literary scene not as a Slavic individual but he turns also into a Tartar and as such he can become the hero of works written in the full Romantic and melodramatic manner which brings together in one category Kozaks and Tartars. In this stage of development there can be no question of any contact between the literary figure of Mazepa and the real historical personage. Everything is permitted and a drama with Mazepa as the main figure has only one obligatory feature—the hero must be bound for a wild ride on the back of a wild horse.

All this is well shown in the drama by H. M. Milner, *Mazeppa* which was produced at the Theatre Royal in London in the eighteen thirties. The author may have read some Polish book to secure the titles and the names of his Polish protagonists and he also had read the *Arabian Nights* to good purpose.

In this Mazepa, a young Tartar, falls in love with Olinska, the daughter of a Castellan. She is sought in marriage by Premislas, a Count Palatine and a fabulously rich man. Despite the difference in their ages and wealth, Mazepa defies the Palatine and slightly wounds him. In a rage the Palatine has him bound to a horse which is turned loose. When the horse falls dead, Mazepa is so exhausted and disfigured that the Tartars who find him imagine that he is a supernatural figure, a Volpas, but he is saved and brought back to health by the Tartar Khan, the aged Abder Khan, who recognizes the unconscious young man as his long lost son. Abder Khan is old and since he has no direct heir, his position is sought by an ambitious lord, Thama, who decides to aid his prospects by murdering the old man, his lord, and for good measure he decides to slay the newly arrived Mazepa. Despite his exhaustion Mazepa proves his valor by saving both his father and himself and then as the duly recognized heir to the throne, he returns to Poland accompanied by his father and the latter's army. Once again he confronts the Count Palatine who is on the verge of forcing Olinska to marry him. The Count again tries to take vengeance but this time he is dealing not with a helpless page but with a proud and powerful Tartar chieftain. Mazepa's troops seize the castle and forbid the marriage and the play ends happily with the lovers united amid the blazing ruins and the Palatine finally and hopelessly thwarted. Romance and misconception have here won out entirely and have corrected not only history but even the romantic hero as drawn by Byron.

There is little need to pursue the study of the appearances in literature of this fantastic figure labelled Mazepa but it may be sufficient to mention as a curiosity the satirical vulgarization of it found in *Mazepa, An Equestrian Burlesque* published in 1856 as No. III of *Brady's Ethiopian Drama*, for it gives a good picture of some aspects of the American publishing business just before the Civil War. Brady pirated Dickens' *Household Words* and then in this series, he has obviously satirized the play of Milner. Mazepa, here renamed Satinette, is in love with Olinska, the daughter of Castiron of Hoboken, a shady character who is willing to sell his daughter to Count Coleslau, some punk, and a swindler in his own right. When Mazepa tries to reveal the scheme, he is tied to the

horse which carries him back to his father Abder Khan, Cream of Tartar and the boss white-washer of Jamaica, Long Island. Then Mazepa recovers, turns up as the minister who is to marry Olinska, and Count Coleslau is finally shown up, and again all ends well. It may well be doubted whether the author of this monstrosity had ever heard of the history of Mazepa or of the existence of countries in Eastern Europe.

It is a sad fact that the one idea that appeared in English and American literature about Mazepa and penetrated into the consciousness of the reading public was the utterly fantastic story of Mazepa's wild ride. Yet this was a canard that found respectable backing not only in the semi-literate and artistic circles but even in works of reference.

The 1881 edition of the *American Encyclopaedia* gives credence to this story and calls Mazepa a Pole. Then it alludes to the two versions extant of Mazepa's ride, the one according to which the horse carried him into a Kozak camp and the other [preferred by Passek] where the horse takes him back to his own estate and leaves Mazepa there so mortified that he refuses to continue to move in Polish circles and so makes his way to the Zaporozhians. The ride dies hard and even the 1951 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, while it has learned that Mazepa was a member of an Orthodox family, still finds it necessary to mention that the story is that he was thus treated by the irate husband of a Polish lady with whom he was in love.

Yet we must not blame too harshly the individuals who spread throughout the English-speaking world this grotesque picture of the great *Hetman*. Mazepa himself was well aware of the way in which in his own lifetime he was the object of hostile propaganda. He was in his youth too outstanding a representative of the Ukrainian noblemen in Poland to escape unscathed when he threw his lot in with the Zaporozhians after repeated insults to him by the Polish magnates with whom he was forced to associate. A trusted representative of King Jan Casimir, he could not be ignorant of the fact he would never be accepted by the Poles or given such posts as he might aspire to but that his life would be spent in futile missions to try to persuade the Host not to insist upon its rights in the face of Polish hostility and contempt. When he entered the service of Doroshenko and then of Samiylovych he was rewarded by a flood of scandals which emanated from Polish sources, even though they had little effect on Polish lords with whom he was compelled to treat in his new capacity.

He was the trusted friend of Peter, so long as the latter thought that he could use Mazepa by playing upon his personal ambitions to agree with the Czar's plans for taking from Ukraine those rights which had been guaranteed in the Treaty of Pereyaslav. When the Czar believed that the hour for that had come during the Northern War, Mazepa slipped away from his clutches and joined Charles XII so that Ukraine could maintain its traditional usages and freedoms. The full anger of Peter was directed against the Kozaks when he captured and burned Baturyn and massacred without discrimination all of the inhabitants of that city, men, women and children. For Mazepa himself he saved his choicest words of abuse and would have reserved the choicest tortures, if the *Hetman* had not escaped after Poltava. When he did that and carried off Charles XII to boot, there was nothing more for the Czar to add. Mazepa was roundly cursed in the churches, he was damned and compared to the worst criminals and traitors of history and the victorious Peter saw to it that the career of Mazepa was written up in appropriate terms. It made no difference for the evaluation of Mazepa and his work that he had left behind him the high regard of all with whom he came into contact, that Peter had praised him to the skies when he thought he could use him, and that Charles XII was his admirer and his friend in his last hours.

The agents of a declining Poland and a vindictive and advancing Russia grasped every opportunity, every breath of scandal to issue scurrilous propaganda against the man who in defense of his country had succeeded in thwarting their schemes to crush the Ukrainian Kozaks. Nothing was too fantastic for them to utter and to write and they succeeded in catching the ear of Europe, when Ukraine had no defender of equal note. English and American scholars and writers were only too ready to accept one or the other of these hostile sources as the truth and in default of serious study of the real history of Ukraine, they repeated whatever charges were the best accredited by the propaganda which they followed.

In the course of this process, public attention was centered on the story of Mazepa's ride, for it was an episode that true or false, fitted into the general conception of the Romantic poet and his dreams of life on the open steppe. So the story of Mazepa's ride passed into history and literature and there it has remained for the masses of the people who know Ukraine only vaguely as a part of Russia, whatever that may mean.

Today it is two centuries and a half since the Battle of Poltava. We can see now the consequences of that battle and the way in which it barred any normal spreading of free institutions in the

area. We can see what the defeat of Charles and Mazepa really meant to the world and why military historians rank Poltava as one of the decisive battles of the world. We can see that despite that, the spirit of Ukraine has not perished but is still alive even under the adverse conditions of the present.

Now on the anniversary of the battle, the problem is to correct the impressions that the world has of Ivan Mazepa and to try to restore to him that place in history which he fairly earned through his long years of service to his people. It is not only a question of producing new and more accurate histories but it is also the work of tearing down that strange phantom which for more than a century has wandered here and there through the pages of English literature wearing the name of the great *Hetman* but totally apart from him in his vices, his virtues and his accomplishments. It is the task of the present to give to the world a knowledge of the real Mazepa, that courtly and heroic figure who at the very end of his life was still able to conduct one of the great flights of history. It was the *Hetman* of an independent Ukraine that was buried with high honors in Jassy in 1709. It is as such a *Hetman* that English literature and the English and American people must learn to regard him and think of him, of his career, and of his people. To do this will be to erect the best monument to the memory of Ivan Mazepa.

LIFE OF MAZEPA 1632 (?) — 1709

By THEODORE MACKIW

At the mention of the name Mazepa, an English-speaking person thinks of Byron's hero rather than of a historical person. And yet the historical Mazepa is wholly different from the one in literature.

*Hetman*¹ Ivan Mazepa-Kolodynsky was descended from an old noble Ukrainian family. He was born at the ancestral seat in Maze-pyntsi, near Bila Tserkva in Ukraine. The exact date of his birth is not known, but that of March 20, 1632,² is generally accepted. His mother, Maryna Mokievsky, was descended from an old Ukrainian family. After the death of her husband (1665), she entered a monastery in Kiev, where she later became the Mother Superior. This, however, did not prevent her from taking an active part in the political life of the time, and her son, as *Hetman*, often came to her for advice. She died in 1707 at the age of 90 years. His father, Stepan Adam Mazepa, was a Ukrainian nobleman, supposedly a Catholic, and in the service of the Polish king; but in the war against Poland, he joined the Ukrainian *Hetman*, Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648-1657), creator of the modern Ukrainian or *Hetman* State. The drawn-out and difficult war with Poland led to an alliance in 1654 between Ukraine and Muscovy, known as the Treaty of Pereyaslav. Since Muscovy did not carry out the terms of this treaty, Khmelnytsky's successor, *Hetman* Ivan Vyhovsky (1657-1659), broke with Muscovy and concluded an agreement with Poland, known as the Treaty of Hadiach (September 6, 1658), according to which Ukraine was to return to Poland, this time as a separate, autonomous state. Stepan Adam Mazepa supported Vyhovsky's policy, and this may explain why he was promoted and why his son Ivan, after receiving an education in the Ukrainian College (*Kollegium*) in Kiev and (according to Ukrainian chronologist Ve-

¹ *Hetman* — literally translated means "Headman," the official title of the Chief Executive of Ukraine from 1648-1764.

² D. Doroshenko, "*Mazepa v istorychniy literaturi i zhytti*" ("Mazepa in Historical Literature and Life"), *Mazepa*, Vol. I, pp. 3-34, published in *Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu* (*Publications of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute*), Warsaw 1938, Vol. XLVI.

lychko) also in the Jesuits' College in Warsaw, became a page at the royal court of the Polish King Jan Kazimierz. The latter sent Mazepa to Holland to complete his military studies. After his return, the Polish King entrusted Mazepa with several diplomatic missions to the Ukrainian *Hetmans* and the Crimea from 1659 to 1663.

In 1663 Mazepa left the royal court for his home in Ukraine. The most popular story of why Mazepa left the royal court is told by the Polish nobleman Jan Chryzostom Pasek in his memoirs.³ Pasek, whom Prof. A. Brueckner called a personal enemy of Mazepa and an "incredible liar,"⁴ had personal dealings with Mazepa at the Polish Court (1662), and claimed that a Polish nobleman, Falbowski, had caught his wife in a tryst with Mazepa. Falbowski allegedly bound Mazepa on a horse without any clothes and let the horse go. The horse was stopped later by Kozaks, who freed Mazepa.⁵

This story appeared in Voltaire's history of Charles XII,⁶ and was also used by the Ukrainian historian N. Kostomarov in his very well known monograph about Mazepa.⁷ According to the German historian Otto Haintz, Voltaire's account is worthless as a historical source because he used a valueless compilation of his countryman H. de Limiers,⁸ who in turn supposedly followed the book of Daniel Defoe,⁹ who never participated in the "Great Northern War."¹⁰ As far as the Mazepa story is concerned, Voltaire obtained this information from one of the Polish emigres in Paris.¹¹

³ Jan Ch. Pasek, *Pamiętniki (Memoirs)*, Cracow 1929.

⁴ A. Brueckner, *Literatura Polska (The Polish Literature)*, Paris 1947, p. 101.

⁵ J. Pasek, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-318.

⁶ Voltaire, *Histoire de Charles XII*, Rouen 1731; I used the English translation by John J. Stockdale, *The History of Charles XII, King of Sweden*, London 1807, pp. 258-262.

⁷ N. Kostomarov, *Mazepa i mazepintsy (Mazepa and Mazepists)*, St. Petersburg 1905, Vol. VI, pp. 387-389.

⁸ H. F. de Limiers, *Histoire de Suede sous le regne de Charles XII (History of Sweden under the Reign of Charles XII)*, Amsterdam 1721.

⁹ *The History of the Wars of His Present Majesty Charles XII*, by a Scots gentleman in the Swedish service.

¹⁰ O. Haintz, *Karl XII von Schweden im Urteil der Geschichte (Charles XII of Sweden in the Judgment of History)*, Berlin 1936, pp. 7-8.

¹¹ D. Doroshenko, *Die Ukraine und ihre Geschichte im Lichte der West-Europäischen Literatur des XVIII. und der ersten Hälfte des XIX. Jahrhunderts (Ukraine and Her History in the Light of the Western European Literature of the XVIIIth and the First Half of the XIXth Centuries)*, Berlin 1927, pp. 10-11.



Painting by O. Kurylas

Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1632? — 1709)

It is not to be doubted, as a handsome and stalwart youth Mazepa sought out the opposite sex. However, the tale about Falbowski does not appear as dramatic as Pasek made it out to be in his memoirs. We have an excellent biographical sketch of Mazepa in the German weekly magazine in Hamburg, *Historische Remarques* of January 22, 1704, submitted by its correspondent from Moscow, under the dateline of November 27, 1703. The correspondent mentioned such personal details of the life of Mazepa as that he had married a rich widow, who died in 1702, that they had had one daughter, who also died, and that Mazepa's sister had been married three times. The author could even give the names of her three husbands, namely: Obydovsky, Vituslavsky and Voynarovsky. The son of the third marriage, Andriy Voynarovsky, came to live with his uncle Mazepa, who sent his nephew to study "philosophiam in Kiev." It might be added that this biography of Mazepa is not too favorable. The author accused Mazepa of denouncing his predecessor I. Samiylovych, although according to the Ukrainian historian, N. Andrusiak, Mazepa's signature did not appear on the denunciation.¹² Logically, inasmuch as the Moscow correspondent mentioned such personal data as listed, he surely would have included the Falbowski incident. Evidently, it was either unimportant or an outright myth. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the Polish King would have promoted Mazepa to a higher rank in 1665 after such a scandal.

In 1669 Mazepa joined the service of the Ukrainian *Hetman* Petro Doroshenko, who aspired to liberate Ukraine from both Muscovy and Poland, since they, according to the Treaty of Andrusiv (1667), had divided Ukraine into two parts. The Dnieper River was the boundary; on the right bank was Doroshenko under the Polish, and on the left bank the *Hetman* Ivan Samiylovych under the Russian protectorate. Mazepa became Doroshenko's close associate and was often sent on diplomatic missions. In 1674, on his mission to the Crimea, Mazepa was apprehended by Ivan Sirko, the leader (*Koshovyi*) of the Zaporozhian Kozaks, who had their own territory and their own administration. Sirko sent Mazepa to *Hetman* Samiylovych, who was the political opponent of Doroshenko. Although Mazepa's situation was rather perilous, Samiylovych recognized his high education and diplomatic skill, quickly promoting him from private instructor of his children to the highest military rank and the position of chancellor.

¹² N. Andrusiak, *Istoria kozachchyny (History of the Kozaks)*, Munich 1946, p. 108.

Since Mazepa's former commander, Doroshenko, recognized the authority of Samiylovych, Mazepa faithfully served the latter in many diplomatic missions, especially to Moscow. Here he made many influential acquaintances at the court. Chief among these was Count Vassiliy Golitsin, who, in order to save his reputation at the court during his first unsuccessful campaign in the Crimea (1687), persuaded the Kozaks to depose Samiylovych and elect Mazepa as the new *Hetman* on July 25, 1687.

Mazepa's policy was to strengthen Ukraine internally, to improve education and economic-social conditions in the country, to create a strong leadership, in short, to make Ukraine so strong that Moscow could not easily weaken her autonomous status. Taking advantage of a period of peace, Mazepa initiated valuable works in the field of culture, education, and building of schools and churches.¹³ In order to strengthen the position of the *Hetman* office politically, Mazepa sought to make it successive. Since he had no children of his own, Mazepa planned to appoint his nephew, Andriy Voynarovsky, as his successor.

However, the "Great Northern War" (1700-1721) disrupted Mazepa's plans. From 1700 on, the Czar demanded from him more and more troops to fight against the Swedish King and his ally, the newly-elected Polish King Stanislaw Leszczynski, or to build fortresses at the expense of the Kozaks. In return for their service, the Kozaks not only did not receive any pay, but were insulted, beaten and mistreated in many ways. On the other hand, as L. R. Lewitter observes in his essay, "Mazeppa," "the treatment meted out to the civilian population of Ukraine by the Russian Army, with its daily routine of plunder, arson, murder and rape, was more reminiscent of a punitive expedition than of allied troop movements."¹⁴

Such conduct on the part of the Russians must have inspired gloom in Mazepa's heart. In addition, in military circles rumors were spread to the effect the Czar intended to abolish the autonomy of Ukraine and annex her as part of the Russian Empire, because Peter could not protect Ukraine from a Swedish invasion. Moreover, said the rumors, he did not hide his intention of entrusting the

¹³ See: N. Andrusiak, "Hetman Mazepa yak kulturnyi diyach" ("Hetman Mazepa as Promoter of Culture"), *Mazepa*, Vol. II, pp. 69-87, *Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu* (Publications of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute), Warsaw 1939, Vol. XLVII; V. Sichynsky, *Ivan Mazepa — ludyha i mecenat* (Ivan Mazepa—the Man and Benefactor), Philadelphia 1951.

¹⁴ L. R. Lewitter, "Mazeppa," *History Today*, London 1957, Vol. VII, pp. 593-4.

defense of Ukraine to his favorite, a "pastry-cook's boy," A. Menshikov. These were not only rumors, for the Czar obtained the title of Count for Mazepa from the Austrian Emperor, Joseph I,¹⁵ and Menshikov, ignoring Mazepa, commanded the Kozaks himself.

Under such circumstances, in order to save the autonomous status of Ukraine (and not because of personal motives, as some historians have stated), Mazepa, risking his life, decided to ask Charles XII for assistance, just as Khmelnytsky had done when he concluded an alliance with the Swedish King Charles X, in 1656. Despite all precautions, in the spring of 1708, two traitors of his general staff, Gen. V. Kochubey and Col. S. Iskra, informed the Czar of Mazepa's secret negotiations with Charles XII. However, Peter ignored their denunciation and both traitors were condemned to death by a military tribunal. Mazepa proceeded to complete his secret negotiations with the Swedish King,¹⁶ although we do not know what the exact terms of the Ukrainian-Swedish alliance were.

It should be fully understood that this alliance was concluded between the heads of two countries. *Hetman* Mazepa was the chief executive of the Ukrainian autonomous state under the protectorate of Muscovy, a status which at the time was quite common, as for such countries as Holland under Spain (1559-1648), Prussia under Poland (1525-1660), and Estonia and Livonia (Latvia) under Sweden (1648-1721). Although Ukraine was under the Russian protectorate, nevertheless, as the German historian Hans Schumann observed in a dissertation, Ukraine had her own territory, her own people, her own military forces (namely, the Kozaks), her own law, her own administration, her own customs, her own language and even her own democratic system of government, so that the creator of this military republic (better known as the *Hetman State*), Bohdan Khmelnytsky, was practically an independent ruler.¹⁷

It is true that Mazepa's rights were more limited, but he still used the full power of his civic and military authority, and was also regarded as the Chief Executive by the contemporary foreign diplomats in Moscow. For example, Jean Baluse, the French envoy in Moscow, who visited Mazepa in 1704 in Baturyn (the Ukrainian

¹⁵ S. Tomashivsky, "*Mazepa i avstriyska polityka*" ("Mazepa and the Austrian Politics"), *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva Shevchenka* (Publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society), Lviv 1909, Vol. 92, pp. 244-5.

¹⁶ G. Adlerfelt, *Histoire de Charles XII, roi de Suede*, Amsterdam 1740, 3 Vols. (*The Military History of Charles XII, King of Sweden*), London 1740, Vol. III, pp. 193-194.

¹⁷ H. Schumann, *Der Hetmanstaat 1654-1764* (*The Hetman State 1654-1764*), Breslau 1936, p. 4.

capital at that time), remarked in his memoirs: "...From Muscovy I went to Ukraine, the country of the Kozaks, where for a few days I was the guest of Prince Mazepa, who is the supreme authority in this country."¹⁸

Mazepa's alliance with the Swedish King could have been successful if Charles XII had been able to march into Russia on the Smolensk-Moscow route, along the border between Ukraine and Russia, as he had originally planned. If Charles had proceeded on this route, Mazepa, then being cut off from the Russians by the Swedish Army, could have continued to act more or less as a neutral and could have made the final decision accordingly in the moment of victory. Charles was not able, however, to march directly toward Moscow, for the Czar had destroyed everything in his retreat, and the Swedish Army lacked food. Therefore, in September of 1708 the Swedish King suddenly turned south into Ukraine. Many historians have assumed that he did so by Mazepa's invitation, but there is no clear evidence to support this assumption, for such an action would have been contrary to Mazepa's own interest. As a matter of fact Mazepa was surprised by this step on the part of the Swedish King,¹⁹ whose situation became desperate after the loss of Gen. Lewnthaupt's corps (September 29, 1708). Charles' situation could have been saved if his generals, Lewnthaupt, Lybecker, Lagercrona and Krassau, had carried out his orders and instructions at the right time.²⁰ Because they failed to do so, and because of the extremely harsh winter in 1708-09, the result was the catastrophe at Poltava (July 7, 1709), where Charles XII and Mazepa were thoroughly defeated. After the Battle of Poltava, both the Swedish King and the *Hetman* had to flee to Turkey. Upon arriving at Bender, the aging Mazepa became very ill and on October 2 (n. s.), 1709,

¹⁸ Baluse's memoirs were discovered by the Ukrainian historian Elias Borshchak in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* in Paris. See: V. Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions*, New York 1953, p. 113.

¹⁹ When Mazepa learned that Charles XII entered Ukraine, he remarked to his Chancellor P. Orlyk: "...It is the Devil who sends him here. He is going to ruin all my plans and bring to us in his wake the Russian troops. Now our Ukraine is devastated and lost"; see: C. A. Manning, *Hetman of Ukraine, Ivan Mazepa*, New York 1957, p. 170.

²⁰ G. Adlerfelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-207; S. Poniatowski, *Remarques d'un seigneur Polonais sur l'histoire de Charles XII*, The Hague 1741 (*Remarks on M. de Voltaire's History of Charles XII, King of Sweden*), London 1741, pp. 17, 22. cf. O. Haintz, *Koenig Karl XII. von Schweden (Charles XII, King of Sweden)*, Berlin 1936, pp. 250-257.

he died in Varnytsia, near Bender.²¹ His body was transferred later to St. George's Cathedral in Galaz.

Undoubtedly, Mazepa was an unusual man, who not only is famous in Ukraine, but also stands out in world history. A. Brueckner regarded Mazepa's policy as "*ein Meisterstueck*" (a masterstroke) and his attempt to liberate Ukraine as "a heroic act."²² There is a great deal of literature devoted to Mazepa. Besides the works of the above mentioned historians, those of Nordberg, Bardili, von Engel, Umanec, Hrushevsky, Krupnytsky, Martel-Borshchak should be mentioned.²³

²¹ B. Krupnycky, "*Miscellanea Mazepiana*," *Mazepa*, Vol. II, p. 90, published in *Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu* (*Publications of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute*), Warsaw 1939, Vol. XLVII.

²² A. Brueckner, "*Peter der Grosse*" ("Peter the Great"), *Onken's Allgemeine Geschichte*, Berlin 1879, Vol. IV, p. 404.

²³ G. A. Nordberg, *Konung Karl XII:s Historia* (*History of King Charles XII*), Stockholm, 2 Vols.; J. W. Bardili, *Des Weyland Durchl. Printzens Maximilian Emanuel... Reisen und Campagnen*, etc. (*Voyages and Campaigns of Prince Maximilian Emanuel*, etc), Stuttgart 1730; J. Chr. von Engel, *Geschichte der Ukraine and der ukrainischen Kosaken*, etc. (*History of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Kozaks*), Halle 1796; F. Umanec, *Hetman Mazepa*, St. Petersburg 1897; M. Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, New Haven 1941; B. Krupnycky, *Hetman Mazepa und seine Zeit 1687-1709* (*Hetman Mazepa and His Epoch 1687-1709*). Leipzig 1942; R. Martel—I. Borshchak, *La vie de Mazepa* (*The Life of Mazepa*), Paris, 1931.

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