

The

VOL. XXIII, NO. 1, SPRING, 1967

Ukrainian

Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

Beginning of Fight for Rebirth  
Of Ukrainian Statehood

*By Roman Smal-Stocki*

Review of U.S. Policy Toward the USSR:  
A MAJOR THEME FOR THE 1967 CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

*By Lev E. Dobriansky*

**UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE**  
**PRIME ANTITHESIS TO FRAUDULENT RUSSIAN**  
**BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION**  
**49TH ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE**

Speeches of

**Hon. DANIEL J. FLOOD**  
of Pennsylvania

and

**Hon. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI**  
of Illinois

et al.

in the

House of Representatives and in the Senate of the United States

United States Printing Office, Washington, 1967

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VOL. XI (1955), Nos.: 1, 2, 3, 4	VOL. XXII (1966), Nos.: 1, 2, 3, 4

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**THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY**  
302 West 13th Street New York, N.Y. 10014

# The Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

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Published by the UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA, INC.

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SPRING, 1967

VOLUME XXIII — No. 1

\$1.25 A COPY



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*Editorial and Managing Office: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY*  
302-304 West 13th Street, New York, N.Y. 10014  
Tel.: WAtkins 4-5617

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## HALF A CENTURY OF UNEQUAL STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UKRAINIAN  
NATIONAL REVOLUTION

"... We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian nation could find the requisite conditions for its manifold development. Now we have lost this belief. We have become convinced that our ways differ from those of a reactionary or a revolutionary Russia... Our social and political ideals must be based not on the precepts of Oriental despotism, but on the principles of the life and development of civilized Europe, where human dignity is valued above all... Ukraine has always stood in her history, culturally and politically, nearer to Western Europe... If we wish to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we must conform to the civilized West..."<sup>1</sup>

*Prof. Michael Hrushevsky*

These measured words foretell the political tragedy and misfortune which became the inseparable ill companions of the Ukrainian people. They were uttered not by a street agitator or some inflammatory revolutionary, trying to incite the masses into rebellions and uprisings against the oppressive government. Instead, they are the words of a sedate savant, an erudite historian and statesman, and a Socialist and federalist who envisioned a world without war and oppression. He believed that after the fall of Russian Czarism a new era of democratic development would descend upon a "new Russia," one which would provide a measure of political cooperation with the non-Russian peoples on the basis of freedom and equality.

This year in the USSR already there is much fanfare amid the current preparations for the observances of the October Revolution. The Kremlin propaganda masters have been working overtime preparing slogans, inventing historical parallels and shoring-up the present Soviet historiography in order to justify the great "achievements" of the revolution.

Western historians and observers in their assessment of the Russian Revolution suffer from a kind of myopia which prevents

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<sup>1</sup> M. Hrushevsky. *On the Threshold of a New Ukraine*. Kiev, 1918 (in Ukrainian).

them from viewing the revolution of 1917 in a proper perspective. They are totally in accord with the view of Soviet historians that what occurred in Russia and its empire in that year was the "proletarian revolution." Most of them ignore the other aspects of this revolution, especially the upheavals which took place in the non-Russian nations of the Russian empire.

In Russia the anti-government forces—which included Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Socialists, Social-Revolutionaries, the liberal intelligentsia, peasantry and workers—waged the revolution against the despotic regime as such. The goal was to replace it with a liberal and more humane government. But in Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, Armenia, and in faraway Turkestan this revolution almost immediately assumed a *dual* character: a) it was a revolution against the despotic rule of the Czars and also b) a *national* revolution, aspiring to the establishment of home rule, a national government, independent of Russian control and supervision.

#### UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION

Even Soviet official historians cannot go so far as to deny the existence of the national revolutions which took place concurrently with the "proletarian revolution." What they try to do, however, is to minimize them as insignificant episodes instigated by "bourgeois counterrevolutionaries" and "foreign interventionists."

Yet there can be no question that the Ukrainian National Revolution was one of the strongest national tides that swept away the Russian Czarist empire. This is not to deny that similar and important national rebirth movements took place in other non-Russian nations of the empire: Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the countries of Turkestan, in the lands of the Cossacks and Tartars. All of these peoples seized the opportunity to rise and claim their national freedom and sovereignty, independent of Russian control. But owing to its numerical strength, territorial compactness and the undying desire of the people for freedom and national statehood, Ukraine from the very first days after the abdication of the Czar was taken up with the building of the national state, step by step, degree by degree, as a delicate balance was maintained between the rising nationalist tide of the Ukrainian people and the timid anti-Ukrainian attitude of the Russian Provisional Government on the one hand, and the Bolshevik agitation on the other hand.

On March 17, 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was established in Kiev. At once it took upon itself the leadership and guidance of the



Ukrainian National Revolution. In the brief period of a few months the *Rada* organized a new Ukrainian autonomous state. During the period of the Kerensky regime, the *Rada* issued two *Universals* (on June 23 and July 16, 1917, respectively), whereby it asserted its right to govern Ukraine. It proceeded to organize a separate Ukrainian national army which, despite the Bolshevik agitation, held the front against the Germans and Austrians. A wholly Ukrainian administration took over in Ukraine, while a network of Ukrainian schools spread across the country. The *Rada* also introduced a new judicial system, began preparations for the convocation of a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly and granted a broad autonomy for the national minorities in Ukraine.

All these burgeoning developments in Ukraine were resisted by the Kerensky government and sabotaged by the Bolsheviks. Had the Kerensky regime truly recognized for Ukraine what it preached, namely, democracy and self-determination, it itself might have survived. But Kerensky, although acclaimed as a great Russian democrat and liberal, chose to defend the old Russian imperial structure rather than freedom and democracy, and thus failed utterly to cope with the new forces of Bolshevism and the non-Russian nations.

When in the fall of 1917 the Bolsheviks accomplished their take-over in St. Petersburg, the *Rada* proceeded quickly to issue its Third *Universal* (November 20, 1917) by which it proclaimed Ukraine as the Ukrainian National Republic, still stressing, however, that Ukraine wished to remain a member in the Russian democratic federation as an equal member-state.

The Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin and Trotsky, did all they could to establish Soviet power in Ukraine, but failed ignominiously. At an All-Ukrainian Congress of Peasants, Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, some 60 delegates supported the Bolshevik position. The remainder of the some 2,500 delegates voted its support of the *Rada*.

#### RECOGNITION OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

Stunned by this crushing defeat, the Bolsheviks resorted to a now classic tactic: they recognized the *Rada* as the government of an independent Ukrainian state, only to organize a puppet "Ukrainian communist government" in Kharkiv and declare war on Ukraine when the *Rada* rejected their "ultimatum" to the *Rada* to cease the practice of disarming Bolshevik bands in Ukraine.

Yet the Soviet recognition of Ukrainian independence had been full and unequivocal. In a note of December 17, 1917, the *Sovnarkom* (Council of People's Commissars) stated:

Therefore, the Council of People's Commissars *recognizes the Ukrainian National Republic and its rights to full separation from Russia*, and that it may enter into negotiations with the Russian Republic in the matter of federal and other relations. The demand of Ukraine regarding her rights and independence of the Ukrainian people is recognized by the Council of People's Commissars without any limits or conditions... (Italics added — Ed.)<sup>2</sup>

At the same time two members of the *Entente*, France and Great Britain, also granted *de facto* recognition to the Ukrainian Republic. The French government sent General Tabouis and the British government Picton Bagge as duly accredited representatives of their respective governments in Kiev.

On January 22, 1918, the *Rada* made a final and definite step in the direction of the total triumph of the Ukrainian National Revolution: by its Fourth *Universal* it declared that the "Ukrainian National Republic becomes an independent, answerable to no one, free and sovereign State of the Ukrainian People." In the same historical document the *Rada* announced that the Secretariat General had become the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Republic; it called on all citizens to wage a defensive war against Communist Russia, and it called for a separate treaty with the Central Powers.

In a series of rapid strokes, Ukraine concluded on February 9, 1918, the Peace Treaty in Brest Litovsk, whereby Ukraine was recognized *de jure* by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. On the basis of this treaty and in exchange for Ukrainian food, Ukraine received military assistance from Germany and Austria, which helped the Ukrainian troops to clear Ukraine of Soviet bands and Red Guards.

Later, in April of 1918, Ukraine underwent a change in government; a monarchist government under *Hetman* Paul Skoropadsky held power until the fall of 1918, at which time he was succeeded by the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, headed by Simon Petlura.

On November 1, 1918, Western Ukraine, heretofore a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, proclaimed its independence and was forced to wage a defensive war against newly-born Poland, which coveted Western Ukraine as "its historical lands." Subsequent-

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Organ of the Provisional Government of Workers and Soldiers*, No. 28, December 20, 1917.

ly, by the Act of Union, signed on January 22, 1919, in Kiev, the Western Ukrainian National Republic (including the provinces of Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina) and the Ukrainian National Republic were united into one, independent and sovereign state of the Ukrainian people.

For almost three years, alone and unaided, the Ukrainian Republic put up a desperate but losing struggle against the Bolsheviks, the White Russian armies under Generals Denikin and Wrangel, and the Poles in the West.

With the defeat of the Central Powers the victorious Allies were only too eager to forget their promises regarding their war aims, especially their announced policy in pursuit of democracy and self-determination. Despite the fact that both France and Great Britain had extended *de facto* recognition to the Ukrainian Republic, they offered no help whatsoever. Some of the Allies were trying to restore the anachronistic Russian Czarism, others believed that Bolshevism would eventually evolve into a "working democracy," with which it would be easy to come to terms and establish a normal relationship. Still other Allies began building a *cordon sanitaire* in Eastern Europe, fearing a resurgent Germany more than a militant Communist Russia. The United States failed to support Ukraine, despite the fact that Wilson was an ardent proponent of national self-determination.

Eventually (in 1921) the Treaty of Riga between Communist Russia and Poland established a *status quo* as far as Ukraine was concerned. Eastern Ukraine, made a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic under a puppet Ukrainian communist government, was placed under control of Moscow; Western Ukraine (Galicia and a part of Volhynia) were ceded to Poland, Bukovina and part of Bessarabia went to Rumania, and Carpatho-Ukraine to Czechoslovakia. This partition lasted up until the outbreak of World War II.

As a result of World War II the USSR not only emerged a leading power, it also scored heavily at the expense of the Western Allies as far as territorial aggrandizement was concerned. Most of the Ukrainian ethnic lands are now within the Ukrainian SSR (some Ukrainian pockets remain in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Russia proper). Ukraine is a charter member of the United Nations and nominally is a "sovereign and independent state."

In reality, Ukraine is a colony of Communist Russia. The Ukrainian people are subjected to systematic Russification, persecution and outright genocide.

## "SOVIET HALF-CENTURY"

It is a great irony that the Western nations should tend to forget what actually happened fifty years ago in Russia and in Eastern Europe as a whole. They see only the great October Revolution, ignoring the fact that concurrent with the Bolshevik revolution there took place a series of *national* revolutions in the non-Russian countries.

*The New York Times*, commenting editorially on the "Soviet Half-Century" stated that "today however, the Soviet Union is one of the world's two most powerful and influential nations; its people enjoy the highest standard of living in all Russian history; and the world is richer for Soviet contributions to science, technology, music and literature" (Jan. 9, 1967).

While admitting that these achievements were purchased at enormous human and material cost, the paper eulogized the Russian people as a talented people who had made much greater contributions to the arts and sciences before the advent of Bolshevism. *The Times* limited itself to this criticism.

Not pointed out was that the Bolshevik revolution was a fraud. It deceived the Russian and non-Russian peoples alike. Not only did it fail to bring them freedom, it brought a totalitarian slavery worse than any known in Russian history. It established an aggressive and insatiable government. In the name of its spurious "proletarian revolution" Moscow attacked Ukraine, the Caucasian nations and the peoples of Turkestan; it waged an aggressive war against small Finland; it seized the Baltic countries, and it conspired with Hitler and helped to destroy Poland. It survived the Nazi attack mainly because of the overwhelming support given the USSR by the United States. After World War II the USSR spread its sinister power to Central Europe; it is mainly responsible for the establishment of Communist power in China; it instigated the war in Korea; it is principally guilty of helping Castro to come to power in Cuba, and it is also an ally of North Vietnam against the United States.

Communist Russia has suppressed freedom both for its own citizens and for those of the non-Russian nations which it keeps under its control.

Such is the balance sheet of fifty years of Russian communist domination.

## EDITORIAL NOTE

*This year of 1967 marks the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, with imperio-colonialist Moscow and its totalitarian partners assailing the free world with massive propaganda about the alleged outstanding achievements of that revolution.*

*The years 1967 and 1968 also constitute the 50th anniversary of the national revolutions of the non-Russian nations of the former Czarist Russian empire. These revolutions were the veritable anti-theses to the fraudulent Russian revolution, inasmuch as they espoused the principles of genuine freedom, national self-determination and sovereign equality of all nations.*

*Consequently, The Ukrainian Quarterly, beginning with this issue, will feature during 1967 and 1968 a series of articles dealing with the Ukrainian National Revolution and all the aspects of the re-born Ukrainian state, and its relations with Communist Russia and other neighboring nations. Special articles will deal with the national elements in the Russian (Czarist) and Soviet armies, and also the revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church at the time of the Ukrainian national rebirth.*

*Another series will be devoted to the national revolutions of Ukraine's neighbors—Byelorussia, the Baltic States, the Caucasian nations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia— and the Islamic nations of Turkestan.*

*The Ukrainian Quarterly, in these respective series, will demonstrate that the Bolshevik revolution was a fraud and that it failed to bring either freedom or progress to the Russian people; that it established an unprecedented tyrannical regime and enslaved a number of non-Russian nations. In short, the balance sheet of the fifty-year rule of imperio-colonialist Moscow is that of unbridled political terror, denial of human rights, social and economic exploitation, religious persecution, cultural and ethnic genocide of the non-Russian nations. These are the basic features of the Bolshevik revolution which Moscow claims is the millenium of the "international proletariat" throughout the world.*

*Indeed, the record is diametrically opposite: no millenium of progress but a backward, rigid and anti-human regime is the result of the Bolshevik revolution.*

## BEGINNING OF FIGHT FOR REBIRTH OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD

*By* ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

Ukrainians in the entire Free World have already begun the celebration of the fiftieth Anniversary of the rebirth of Ukrainian statehood. The rebirth started with the First *Universal* Proclamation of the Central *Rada* (Parliament) on the 23rd of June, 1917, and culminated in the Fourth *Universal* Proclamation of the 22nd of January, 1918.

It is the duty of historians here in free America to analyze the origins of these historical facts, to give the background of the political conceptions with which they were connected and to evaluate these facts for European and international politics.

The Ukrainian National Republic was born at the end of World War I in the convulsions of the revolution which took place throughout the Czarist Russian Empire. It is important for an understanding of the renewal of Ukrainian statehood to see clearly its historical roots.

Ideologically, these roots were active at least for a century, connected above all with the slogans of the Ukrainian national bard, Taras Shevchenko, who shaped and formed modern Ukrainian nationalism through the ideal of the "just and new law of George Washington," embracing the principles of the American Declaration of Independence. For just such a democratic state the Ukrainians started to fight under their national colors immediately after the outbreak of World War I.

First, let us review the international background of the war. The era before World War I had brought the period of imperialism of the European powers to its climax. The Industrial Revolution had created in Europe a series of great powers, which divided the whole planet among themselves and continued to struggle among themselves for markets for their products and also for the raw materials demanded by their growing industries. Already before World War I this Industrial Revolution had embraced Austria-Hungary and especially the European part of the Russian empire, creating here, too,

that important class of modern nations, the industrial proletariat. This proletariat strengthened the agrarian half-proletariat in Russia and Austria, heightening the burning and dynamic questions of social justice in all the non-Russian colonies of the Czarist empire, especially in Ukraine.

European politics before World War I were dominated by the consequences of the rise of the Second German Reich. That diplomatic and military mastermind, Bismarck, defeated Austria in 1866 at Sadova-Koenigsgraetz and France in 1870 at Sedan. Germany received not only Alsace-Lorraine but also an indemnity of five billion gold francs, a sum which stimulated enormously German industrial research, expansion and development of military and naval power. Not wishing a humiliated Austria ruled by Germans, Bismarck assigned her the role of a junior partner in Germany's expansion to the East—along the Danube, Europe's Mississippi, towards the Black Sea, the Balkans, and Dardanelles-Turkey. Italy, stopped in her expansion in Tunis by France, joined the political leadership of the new German Reich. Thus was born in 1882 the Triple Alliance, whose influence reached also into Rumania, ruled by the Hohenzollerns; Bulgaria, ruled by the Saxe-Coburg-Gothas; and even, through family ties, into Greece.

Before World War I erupted, the original Triple Alliance conception of Bismarck had broadened economically and politically into Friedrich Naumann's idea of "Mittel Europa" with the slogan "Berlin—Baghdad." This idea envisioned organizing the countries of Central Europe, the Balkans and Turkey under German leadership into a "common economic organism and market"; to unite all with a multi-trunk railway system connecting Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, Constantinople, and Baghdad, finally to reach Basra in the Persian Gulf.

German industrialists received the concession for the Turkish railway as early as 1899. Thus, Germany planned to capture as outlets for her industrial products the huge reservoirs of humanity in Asia, notably those of India, China and Japan. Through realization of this plan Germany expected to liberate her industrial production, trade and commerce from all the military controls of the British imperial lifeline and backbone—England, Gibraltar, Malta, Suez—and to eliminate the unending menace of the British Navy stationed in the North Sea opposite Bremen and Hamburg.

Let us also keep in mind that before World War I not the United States but Great Britain was the leading world power, not the dollar but the pound was regarded as the world *valuta* and not


Wall Street but Threadneedle Street was the world center of the money market. Therefore, the Triple Alliance under Germany's leadership, especially in its "Berlin-Baghdad" formulation, was a deadly challenge to the interests not only of Great Britain and France, but primarily to the ambitious plans of Russian imperialism in Central Europe and the Middle East.

France, after paying promptly the huge indemnity to Germany, reorganized her Empire and soon grew affluent again. All Frenchmen lived and worked for one end: revenge and reconsignment of Alsace-Lorraine. Although she definitely possessed the financial resources for a new war, France did not have the human material; an over-materialized France had developed a dangerously falling birthrate. Thus she turned to the great masses of the half-literate peasants of the Russian Empire which, in case of war, could serve as the "steamroller" or "cannon fodder" against Germany. The year of 1892, then, saw the erection of the French-Russian Alliance. France made sure to render the alliance meaningful by making large investments in Russian war industries, strategic railways and highways. Great Britain also joined this strange partnership between the republicanism and democracy of France and the divine right absolutism and autocracy of Russia, for the Berlin-Baghdad axis not only eluded the British control of the seas but also meant a dangerous economic challenge to British industry on the world market. Via the planned German Trans-Continental Railway, German products not only could reach the Asian markets more quickly, but above all be priced below the British. In 1907 the conflict between Russian and British imperialism in Asia was finally settled in Persia by a compromise, allowing Great Britain to join the *Entente Cordiale* against the common German enemy.

The Russian Empire, this "prison of nations," felt itself to be in mortal danger not only because of the German economic plans, but also because of the internal developments in the Austro-Hungarian multi-national empire. The idea of a free resurrected Poland and Ukraine did find a refuge in predominantly Catholic Austria under the comparatively liberal Austrian Constitution, which granted political rights to Ukrainians and Poles. Since 1907 universal suffrage, including that of women, had been granted by law in Austria. The Austrian Socialists elaborated a program (the Bruenn Program) of political and cultural autonomies for the nationalities, and it was common knowledge that the heir to the throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, was entertaining the idea of a reorganization of the old Empire and its historical provinces into a monarchical Switzerland,



# THE PROPOSED "BERLIN-BAGHDAD-BASRA" RAILWAY



- Legend:**
- The "Berlin-Baghdad-Basra" Railway Line;
  - The British Imperial lifeline;
  - The planned belt of buffer states between Russia proper and Central Europe.

in which all the pressing nationality problems would find a just solution. Thus the relatively liberal Austrian neighbor undermined the pillars of Russian imperialism: Russification, Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Militarism. The brutal Russian police and their Czarist terror state felt nothing less than panic.

Nor was this all. Russian imperialism saw its plans of expansion threatened as well. Russian Pan-Slavism sought not only suppression of the Ukrainian and Polish *Irredenta* in Austria but also a rule extending over the Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians. Russian Pan-Orthodoxy claimed, besides possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople, an Orthodox "protectorship" over Greece and Rumania and a legitimate encroachment into the Middle East. These great expectations of Russian Slavophilism, Pan-Slavism and the Muscovite "Moscow-the Third-Rome Mission" — all would be doomed in the event of Turkey's reorganization by Germany and a realization of the Berlin-Baghdad-Basra Railway.

Therefore, it is hardly accidental that the Serbian conspirators who assassinated Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo should have been inspired by Russian Pan-Slavism. To Russia belongs the role of triggering the World War I explosion.

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As the second point, we ask: What was the status of the Ukrainian nation as a political factor at this moment of the outbreak of the war? Ukraine was partitioned between Russia, possessing the bulk of its ethnographic territory, and Austria-Hungary. Under Russia the Ukrainians were a persecuted and exploited colonial nation, whose language was in fact forbidden in public life until the first revolution of 1904-5. The great expectations inspired by the first and second *Dumas*, in which Ukrainians were represented (40 in the first, 47 in the second), and the promise of the Club of Autonomists, consisting of delegates of all the non-Russian nationalities—all foundered in disappointment and the black reaction of Stolypin in Russia. But Ukrainian nationalism continued to express itself strongly in the *zemstvos*, the cooperative movement, in the Ukrainian fraternities at all the universities, and in a series of political ideological parties, particularly the Society of Ukrainian Progressivists, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, the Ukrainian National Party and the Social Democrats. In spite of all the persecution Kiev had its daily, *Rada*. With the help of some genuine Russian liberals the Ukrainians achieved in 1906 a great victory over the Russian

governmental policy regarding the Ukrainian language: the "Considered Opinion" of the Russian Imperial Academy of Liberal Arts and Sciences successfully defended the introduction of Ukrainian into the school system (Chairman of the committee was the Academician F. E. Korsh; members were the Academicians A. S. Famitsin, V. V. Zelensky, F. F. Fortunatov, A. A. Shakhmatov, A. S. Lappo-Danilevsky and S.F. Oldenburg.) Moreover, the translation of the Scriptures into Ukrainian was published, and was warmly welcomed by the masses and the priests, among whom were many Ukrainian patriots. Also, the first complete edition of Shevchenko's *Kobzar* appeared. And a great fount of national life was the Ukrainian theater in Russia.

Before World War I, Western Ukraine under Austria played the role of a Ukrainian Piedmont. Since 1873 there had functioned in Lviv (Lemberg) the First Ukrainian Academy of Liberal Arts and Sciences — the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Under the liberal Austrian rule the Ukrainians were allowed Ukrainian grade schools and *gymnasia* (junior colleges) and Ukrainian chairs in Lviv University. They developed a flourishing press, bank and insurance companies. Into being came Enlightenment Associations (*Prosvita*) with reading halls (around 3000 branches), agricultural and dairy associations, credit unions, a union of cooperative societies and a nationally conscious intelligentsia of priests, professors, teachers, doctors, lawyers and judges. In the Bukovina province the Ukrainians attained almost full autonomy: it was practically divided into a Ukrainian and a Rumanian part. Here the Ukrainians had chairs at Chernivtsi University for Slavistics, Ukrainian Philology, History and Orthodox Theology.

Religious problems were solved. In Lviv the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was Count Andrew Sheptytsky, while the Ukrainian Orthodox had their Bishop, T. Tyminsky, in Chernivtsi.

The Ukrainians who were under Hungary (in the present Carpatho-Ukraine) were not so fortunate, being subjected to a brutal Magyarization. A similar condition existed in Slovakia and Croatia.

The Russian Czarist Government spent about a million rubles a year on anti-Ukrainian propaganda in Austria-Hungary and even in America, organizing Russophile parties, Pan-Slavic groups and spy-centers. But in spite of all the efforts of Russian imperialism the Ukrainians as a political power increased in strength with every passing year, augmenting their parliamentarian faction in the Austrian Parliament and in the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina. These parliamentarian forums and international congresses were used for

a spirited defense of the Ukrainians under Russia and their political rights for "home rule." Ukrainians were ready to use against Russia all the well-known tactics to which the Irish resorted in their struggle against British imperialism.

For although Ukraine was politically partitioned, there were bonds which united Ukraine into a whole; these bonds were expressed by the revolutionary flame of Taras Shevchenko's poetry, the monumental poem "Moses" of Ivan Franko and the prophetic words of the poetess Lesya Ukrainka. Fundamental works already had been published: the political program of Julian Bachynsky, *Ukraina Irredenta*; the scientific *Ukrainian Grammar* by Stepan Smal-Stocki and Theodore Gartner and, above all, the monumental *History of Rus-Ukraine*, by Michael Hrushevsky. All scholars within and outside Russia were acquainted with old atlases and maps from the end of the 17th and the early 18th centuries depicting Ukraine as a separate nation.

This great progress of the Ukrainians and their participation in the Austrian Parliament and in international life made them acutely aware of the deep European crisis which exploded in the Balkan wars and manifested itself in the continuous armaments race. None doubted for a moment that Russian imperialism was girding itself for war. The Polish leader Josef Pilsudski, a Russian subject, organized his *Strzelec* Organization in Galicia under Austria as the core of the future Polish Legions for the oncoming war. Simultaneously, Ukrainians also started to prepare a national army for the same end in the forms of the *Sich*, the *Sokil* organization and the *Plast* (Scouts) Society, which soon embraced all the youth. Ukrainian public opinion believed that just as the Balkan wars were the last acts of a long drama of disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, in the course of which Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania became free nations, so would the approaching Russian war usher in the doom and disintegration of the Russian Empire, giving rise to a free Ukraine, the Caucasus, Finland, the Baltic States, Byeloruthenia, Turkestan and other national states. This was the mood and expectation of all Ukrainians outside and many of those inside Russia.

It is worthwhile also to note the American democratic influence on the Ukrainians. The existence of the Ukrainian emigration in the United States and Canada, the personal visits of Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky to America and Canada for the organization of Ukrainian Catholic Bishoprics, the existence of Ukrainian fraternal

organizations, the publication of Ukrainian press organs in the New World—all were experienced in the old country as strong stimuli against the Russian autocracy.

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The third angle for an understanding of the events of the time is the reaction of the Ukrainians to the outbreak of the war. The eruption of World War I with the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo compelled every nation in Europe to decide with what side its interests lay. World War I was a mortal challenge for every state and for every nationality without its own national state. Thus Ukrainians asked themselves the fateful question: Are the national interests of Ukraine linked with victory of the Triple Alliance of the Central Powers or with that of the *Entente Cordiale*, to which Russia, the deadly enemy of Ukraine, belongs?

The Ukrainian response was not unanimous. On the one hand, Simon Petlura, then editor of the journal *Ukrainskaya Zhyzn* in Moscow, took an unqualified stand against the Central Powers and against the so-called "Austrian Orientation" among the Ukrainians. In an article, "The War and the Ukrainians"<sup>1</sup> of July 30, 1914, Petlura severely condemned any orientation toward Germany and Austria-Hungary, and appealed to Ukrainians in Russia to do their duty to Russia as soldiers. He stressed that the allies of Russia were democratic France and Great Britain, and expressed the conviction that after the victory of the *Entente* the non-Russian nationalities, including Ukraine, would gain their national rights in the empire. The nationality problem would thus be solved. He appealed also to the Russian Government to display a "tolerant attitude to the Ukrainians in already occupied Galicia" to reassure the Ukrainians that the thus "unified Ukrainian nation" would have the possibility of an evolution of its rich forces in the "union with rejuvenated Russia and all the nationalities which populate it."

Soon the voice of Simon Petlura was strengthened by the return to Russia from Austria of the leading historian, Prof. Michael Hrushevsky, Professor of Ukrainian History for many years in Lviv University and latterly president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. In the liberal Russian paper *Rech*, Prof. Hrushevsky published a statement along the argumentation of Petlura. In fact, Hrushevsky

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<sup>1</sup> Simon Petlura, *Articles, Correspondence, Documents*. Published by the Simon Petlura Committee in America, New York, 1956, p. 184.

was an advocate of a European, or even a World Federation of Nations.

The motivations underlying the Petlura-Hrushevsky stand are readily discernible. In the first place, unmistakable was the desire to placate the Czarist Government in order to save from Russian *pogroms* the Ukrainian life inside Russia and in Russian-occupied Galicia and Bukovina. Secondly, these leading personalities had not only a deep belief in the democratic traditions of France and Great Britain but in their unlimited resources as well. They foresaw, therefore, not only an allied victory but also a revolution in Russia which would assure Ukraine the possibility of realizing the cherished ideal of every nation: unification of all its ethnographic territories in one state. And thirdly, Petlura and Hrushevsky had faith in the influence of some Russian liberals. (Let us not forget that the noted Russian historian, Prof. P. Miliukov, proposed in 1910 the introduction of the Ukrainian language into the school system.)

In any event, the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainians under Austria and the revolutionary elements of the Ukrainians under Russia sided with the Triple Alliance. The leaders of all Ukrainian parties met the challenge of World War I by forming the Supreme Ukrainian Council on the 5th of August, 1914.

The Ukrainian Supreme Council issued a proclamation, entitled "The War for the Freedom of Ukraine," which included the following political program:

Ukrainian nation! We face a decisive historical moment. The fate of states and nationalities is at stake. A war storm is embracing Europe and nothing can stop it. The Ukrainian nation is one of these nationalities which will be affected by the results of the war to the utmost extent. In this moment, a nation which wishes to live must have one common idea and one will and must express this will in action which will influence the history of states and nationalities. Therefore, in this moment the representatives of the Ukrainian people in Galicia of all political trends, united by a common national ideal, have formed this Supreme Council, which is the expression of this one common idea and one will of the Ukrainian nation. As we cannot avert this war, we must make certain that the sacrifices which the war demands from us may not be in vain and that the blood shed by the fathers may bring prosperity to their children. Our way is clear. The unsatiated imperialism of the Czarist Empire endangers our national life. The historical enemy of Ukraine cannot placidly accept the fact that the whole of Ukraine is still not in his hands. A Russian victory will bring to the Ukrainian people in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the same yoke under which 30 million Ukrainians now groan in the Russian empire. The present moment calls for the Ukrainian people to stand up unanimously against the Russian empire and to declare itself on the side of this state in which the Ukrainian national life has found liberty of development.

The victory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy will be our victory. The greater the defeat of Russia, the sooner the hour of liberation of Ukraine arrives. May our appeal find an echo in every Ukrainian heart! May it awaken in our people the old Kozak bravery! May the Ukrainian society engage all its material and moral forces for the destruction of Ukraine's historical enemy! May on the ruins of the Czarist empire rise the sun of a free Ukraine!"<sup>2</sup>

A similar attitude was struck by Mykola Zalizniak, exiled leader of the Ukrainian Social Revolutionary (Peasant) Party. In August of 1914 he proclaimed:

Nearing is a general European conflict which will decide the fate of states and will change the political map of Europe. The Ukrainian nation and Ukraine have for a long time been the slaves of the Muscovite government; for a long time they have suffered under that disgraceful yoke. In 1905 and 1906 we made the first attempt to destroy absolutist Russia and to transform the "Prison of Nations" into a constitutional state. This attempt was suppressed by the Russian government with its armed forces. Now has come the moment in which the very existence of its world empire is at stake. Let us use this auspicious moment, let us start anew the fight against the Muscovite government for the rights of our nation. Let us go to our people, let us inform them and organize them for an active fight for national liberty and independence, for economic liberation from the chains of estate owners and capitalists. Let us proclaim the idea of an independent Ukraine! Let us organize our nation for an armed fight! Let us weaken the Russian autocracy by all means at our disposal. Long live an independent Ukraine."<sup>3</sup>

More than 25,000 volunteers joined the *Sich* Rifleman Legion, which went to war against Russia on the side of Austria and her allies. The organization of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (U.L.U.), composed of political Ukrainian emigres from Ukraine, proclaimed itself as a representation of Ukraine under Russia. It consisted of Social-Democrats who had participated in the revolutionary events in Ukraine after the Russo-Japanese War and who now proclaimed that the interests of Ukraine demanded a victory of the Central Powers over Russian Czarism, the creation of a Ukrainian buffer state between central Europe and Russia and a disintegration of the Russian Empire into its ethnic components.

Immediately after the outbreak of the war the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine issued a proclamation in which it stated:

Ukrainians are convinced that the present war will decide their fate. The question is: whether the Ukrainian Piedmont, that refuge for our national life under Austria, will be destroyed or, whether our national life will blossom

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<sup>2</sup> *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, (The Great History of Ukraine) Ivan Tyktor, Winnipeg, 1948, pp. 748-49.

<sup>3</sup> G. Russka, *The Russian Socialists and the Present War*, Vienna, 1915.

also on the other side of the Zbruch River, far over the Dnieper to the shores of the Black Sea. The Ukrainians enslaved in Russia cannot look on events as passive witnesses. They have raised their voices and decided to claim their right to national independence. Historical necessity clearly demands the creation of an independent Ukrainian State between Russia and Europe. Establishment of this state is an urgent necessity for a further undisturbed development of the German people in Austro-Hungary and Germany. For the Ukrainian nation it will be the realization of a centuries-long cherished dream and struggle.<sup>4</sup>

The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine organized centers in Vienna and Berlin, and with the help of Austrian Ukrainians, conducted a great political activity which decisively influenced coming events in Eastern Europe.

The Union, to which belonged the Social Democrats A. Zhuk, V. Doroshenko, A. Skoropys-Yoltukhovsky and M. Melenevsky, won the backing of distinguished German and Austrian Socialists and Liberals, and also of the distinguished Jewish emigre Socialist from Russia, Alexander Parvus-Helphand. The Union elaborated a logical political conception of the necessity for helping Ukraine restore her statehood. The idea of an independent Ukraine was integrated by the Union into the German Berlin-Baghdad plan. Without the existence of a free Ukraine, Balticum, Byeloruthenia, the free Caucasus, and free Turkestan, the Central Powers would be at the mercy of Russia, who could at any moment disrupt the Berlin-Baghdad Line at its most sensitive point: Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Besides, a free Ukraine with its great economic resources would add to the self-sufficiency of the common market of "Mittel Europa."

These economic and geopolitical arguments were backed also by the active participation of the Ukrainian *Sich* Riflemen on the Eastern front, where they fought together with the Finnish and Polish legions. Both the U.L.U. and the *Sich* Legion actualized the nationality problem of the Russian Empire, the U.L.U. receiving much publicity throughout the whole of Russia because of the attacks upon it by the Russian paper in St. Petrograd, *Novoye Vremya*.

As a matter of historical fact, Germany and Austria did have some traditional connections with Ukraine. Among the titles of the emperor of Austria was the Ukrainian one of "King of Galicia and Volodymyria." And the German foreign office archives contained the record of an interview of the delegate of the Ukrainian Kozak nobility, V. Kapnist, with foreign minister Hertzberg (1791); Prussian help was then being sought in case of a revolution against

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<sup>4</sup> Axel Schmidt, *Ukraine, Land der Zukunft*, (Ukraine, the Land of the Future), Verlag Reimar Hobbing, Berlin, 1939.



Russia. Also, during the Crimean War (1854) the Ukrainian problem appeared in the report of the Prussian ambassador in London, Von Bunsen, who argued the necessity of pushing Russia back to her natural frontiers. Again, Bismarck, faced with limitless Russian imperialism, let Eduard Hartman (1887-1888) discuss the necessity of reestablishment of the old Kievan Rus State in the journal *Gegenwart*. Moreover, there existed in German a series of publications on Ukraine, and Ukraine was represented by special maps in old German atlases.

The U.L.U. established a broad diplomatic network, sending emissaries to Sofia, Switzerland, Sweden, Berlin, Munich and Constantinople. At the very beginning of World War I these emissaries scored a signal success: the Grand Vizier of Turkey, Talaat Pasha, declared as one of the war aims of Turkey an independent Ukrainian state.

The U.L.U. also conducted political-educational activity among the Ukrainian war prisoners of the Russian army in Austria and Germany. The Ukrainians were segregated in special camps. A U.L.U. staff of teachers, writers and journalists organized in these camp grade schools, folk universities (according to Danish models), theatres, choirs, camp newspapers. The camps (in Germany: Rastatt, Wetzlar, Slazwedel, Hann. Munden; in Austria: Freistadt) became practical seminars for democracy.<sup>5</sup> The war prisoners governed themselves through a freely elected parliament, which appointed a camp government and elected the camp president. From these camps sprang later the Ukrainian Gray and Blue Divisions, volunteering for service on the Eastern front.

The revolutionary work of the U.L.U. also reached, through Sweden and Finland, into the hinterland of the Eastern front, especially Ukraine. Holitsynsky, a delegate of the Kiev underground center *Moloda Hromada* (The Young Community), twice came to Germany, visiting the camps and returning to Ukraine. Patriotic war prisoners volunteered for revolutionary work and managed to be repatriated to Russia as "incurably sick persons." Many of these became members of the Ukrainian Volhynian Guard Regiment, stationed in Petrograd. On the 12th of March, 1917, this regiment mutinied, undoubtedly with the cooperation of U.L.U. emissaries, and thus started the revolution in Russia.

Thus for the events which followed in Ukraine and led to the renewal of Ukrainian statehood as the Ukrainian National Republic,

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<sup>5</sup> The work in the camps was partly patterned after the propaganda of the Americans Dr. Nicholas Russell and George Kennan in the Russian war prisoner camps in Japan 1904-1905, financed by the Jewish American patriot banker, Jacob Schiff.

the U.L.U. acted as a catalyst. The *Entente* hoped to keep Ukraine in the war, and France and England were the first states to recognize Ukraine, at the head of which stood M. Hrushevsky. Simon Petlura also became a prominent figure in Ukrainian public life. But the *Entente* could deliver neither weapons nor supplies, nor could it act as a stabilizing agent in the revolutionary events in Eastern Europe. The establishment of the Communist dictatorship in Petrograd and its aggressive actions against Ukraine forced the Ukrainian government to sign the Brest Litovsk Peace Treaty, which in fact was a triumph for the political conception represented by the U.L.U.

In the light, then, of all these events and developments since the beginning of World War I we must establish, for the chronology of the Ukrainian Revolution for renewal of Ukrainian statehood, the year 1914 as the beginning.

As a fourth point, we now evaluate the actions of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, the U.L.U. and the Ukrainian *Sich* Riflemen during the First World War. We may sum up the consequences of all their actions as follows:

1) They contributed to the outbreak of revolution in the Russian empire by placing on the agenda of World War I the whole nationality problem of the non-Russian nationalities of the Russian empire;

2) All their efforts culminated in the Brest Litovsk Peace Treaty. The name of Ukraine was put back on the political map of Europe and the Ukrainian National Republic gained *de jure* recognition from the Central Powers and their allies;

3) In almost direct consequence of the Ukrainian independence there followed similar acts by Idel-Ural (Tartars), Finland, the Kuban Cossacks, Lithuania, Estonia, Byeloruthenia (Byelorussia), the Don Cossacks, the North Caucasians, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Poland, Latvia, the Democratic Republic of the Far East (Siberia), and Turkestan, and thus the Russian colonial Empire fell to pieces.

4) These actions contributed also to the thwarting of a gigantic expansion on the part of Russian imperialism into Central Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East. The agreements of the Czarist government with France and Great Britain of March 1915 and May 1916 had brought Russian imperialism very near indeed to realization of its old aims. After an allied victory over the Central Powers Russia was to receive Constantinople, the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, islands in the Sea of Marmora and the islands Imbros and Tenedos. In addition, she was also to acquire large areas of

Turkish Armenia and Northern Kurdistan. And the Holy Land for all practical purposes would have become a Russian sphere of influence (despite the planned neutralization) and, lastly, an agreement with Great Britain had assured Persia's (Iran) incorporation into Russia. Had these agreements materialized, the Black and Caspian Seas would have become Russian waters and Russia would have extended its frontiers eastward to the Persian Gulf.

5) Taken in historical perspective, the Ukrainians, Poles, Finns, Georgians and Lithuanians used Germany and Austria against Russian imperialism. In turn, the Germans and Austrians capitalized on the explosive nationality problem in the Russian empire for their own war aims. This cooperation during World War I between the leaders of the Russian colonial nationalities and Germany and Austria achieved full success with the collapse of Russian imperialism at the end of the war in Eastern Europe. The nationality problem was also successfully used by the *Entente* against Germany (Polish Poznan and Alsace-Lorraine) and against Germany's ally Austria-Hungary (the congress of the Austro-Hungarian oppressed nationalities, during the war, in Rome led later to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). Active in this disintegration was the venerable Prof. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, abetted by Prof. Seton Watson and Wickham Steed, the London *Times* editor. Russia, too, successfully used Czech, Slovak, Serbian, and Croatian nationalism against Austria-Hungary, and Armenian nationalism against Turkey. And against Turkey Great Britain stimulated Armenian and Arabian nationalism, finally Zionism (Balfour Declaration, Nov. 1917), with telling effect. Thus started the world movement of revolutionary nationalism of the colonial nations, later stimulated by the American President Woodrow Wilson, a movement which disintegrated all the great colonial empires after World War II and which in our time has embraced Asia and Africa.

The German scholars who advised the German government showed, in following the traditions of Herder, great foresight with regard to the fundamental importance of the nationality problem for the modern world. Thanks to them, the German government during World War I supported not only the Ukrainians but the Poles (whose state was reestablished October 23, 1916, by the act of the two emperors Wilhelm II and Franz Josef I), the Caucasian and Turkestanian nations and the Irish under the leadership of Sir Roger Casement (the Irish component of the English war prisoners were kept near the Ukrainian camp in the neighborhood of Wetzlar). The Germans helped also India in its struggle for independence;

Berlin was host to the center of the Indian liberation movement, the Indian Committee (which also had a branch in Constantinople). Indian revolutionary propaganda leaflets were dropped from airplanes over Indian units of the British Army. In New York noted Hindu scholar, Dr. Chandrakant Chakravarty, served as liaison with the German Ambassador in Washington, Count Johann von Bernstorff. In America the paper *El Ghadar* was put out by the revolutionary Ramchandra, and more than 8,000 Hindus enlisted into formations and were trained in the use of guns and explosives in California, where the German Consul General in San Francisco, Franz Bopp, kept a protective eye on them. The Indians had a base in Siam (Thailand) with secret stores of weapons, and had worked up plans to march across Burma to India.<sup>6</sup>

6) To be underscored is the fact that all these revolutionary leaders of the colonial nations were in large part Socialists. Socialism, in short, was the main revolutionary force against imperialism for national liberation and the ideal of social justice.

The end result of the worldwide revolution of oppressed colonial and exploited nationalities against the European imperialisms, a result which stands out in comparing the world of post World War I with the present world of post World War II, is this: all the great colonial empires of Europe have disintegrated and disappeared with one exception—the new Red Soviet Empire, the contemporary prison of nations.

Now Americans will do well to recall the warning of Churchill: "If we will not face the realities, the realities will come and face us." At the same time that the United States as the trusted and revered leader of the free world has courageously upheld the right to self-determination for all colonial peoples and even helped to disintegrate in Asia and Africa the empires of her democratic allies — Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium — during all this time our Department of State has passively watched not only the rebuilding of the old Soviet empire but also the unbelievable expansion to a new zenith of Russian imperialism and colonialism.

Outside the Red Russian empire Russian imperialism has created a new imperial sphere embracing Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, the nationalities of Yugoslavia and Albania. In Asia Communism has encompassed China, Tibet, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.

<sup>6</sup> J. L. Paur, "The Ghadar Conspiracy," *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, October 2, 1966.

**REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR:  
A MAJOR THEME FOR THE 1967 CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK**

*By* LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

During the period of July 16-22 millions of Americans will again observe in one form or another the annual Captive Nations Week. As in the past few years, they will be joined by increasing numbers of peoples in other lands—in Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, and Africa—where the annual observance has also taken root. Developed into a vital tradition since its inception in 1959, Captive Nations Week is entering into its ninth year of observance, and each year has exceeded in breadth and depth all preceding years.<sup>1</sup> The full spectrum of the 1966 observance, here and abroad, is well described in book form, and thousands of copies have already entered into circulation both nationally and internationally.<sup>2</sup>

AMERICA'S BREED OF PAVLOVIAN DOGS

Captive Nations Week has from the start proven to be a national forum for the discussion and evaluation of U.S. foreign policy, current trends in Cold War developments, and forecasts of Red strategy and tactics in the immediate future. It has become the midway point in any calendar year for the crystallization of thought and action bearing on the Red Empire and its dozens of captive nations. Moscow and its syndicated associates make no bones about their aim to have the Week eliminated, and in our country several circles have responded to Pavlov's bell, salivating with the same desire in behalf of what they call "detente," "peaceful coexistence," "easing of tensions," "relaxation" and other strikingly appropriate

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<sup>1</sup> For a capsule account see author's article, "Forget The Captive Nations?", *Washington Report*, American Security Council, July 18, 1966.

<sup>2</sup> *Captive Nations Week: Red Nightmare, Freedom's Hope*. National Captive Nations Committee, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966, Washington, D.C. pp. 310.

physio-psychological terms for the Pavlovian experience. Few will forget *Izvestia's* compliments to the editor of *The Washington Post* for his salivated response, which it characterized as a "realistic understanding of the matter" and then poured on the following for nuclearitizing effect: "in a situation where the relation of power has shifted to the side of Socialism, the U.S. cannot force the peoples of the Socialist countries to adopt its standards without risking the holocaust of a world war. How long do the Capitol and the White House intend to amuse the world with their absurd plans?"<sup>3</sup> And the dog is supposed to rest euphorically until the bell rings again.

As in many other spheres of Cold War activity, the Red attempt to cultivate the breed of Pavlovian dogs with regard to Captive Nations Week is persistent and, in individual cases, successful. In 1966, for example, Radio Riga blurted out, "We recall a meeting with Shabad, a correspondent of *The New York Times*, after the 25th anniversary of Soviet Latvia. He said he had never written about any such 'Week' and would not do it in the future because it was all lies."<sup>4</sup> Interestingly enough, this controlled propaganda agency hammered away at the Week on six occasions. Here are a couple of samples: "The announcement that the so-called Captive Nations Week has been proclaimed, reaches us from the USA like a demagogical ghost. . . It cannot be fully ignored because such manifestations have become an important part of US political attitude (July 17, 1966). Three days later—"These miserable 'Captive Weeks,' proclaimed officially by Washington, serve not only the purpose of the cold war. The USA is endeavoring to pose, by this means, as a guardian of freedom and right, at a time when she conducts a sanguinary war against the Vietnamese people." Were he alive, Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, the famous Russian physiologist, would be aghast at the psycho-political applications of his theories on conditioned reflexes.

Especially illuminating is the fact that last year Moscow itself changed gears in radical departure as concerns its attitude toward the Week. After seven years of tirades and vehement denunciations it decided to try the technique of mute silence. This stance contrasted sharply with the past and particularly with Suslov's 1965 blast, "Especially disgusting is the villainous demagoguery of the imperialistic chieftains of the United States. Each year they organize the so-called Captive Nations Week, hypocritically pretending to be defenders of the nations that have escaped from their yoke." Undoubtedly,

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<sup>3</sup> *Izvestia*, Moscow, July 15, 1964.

<sup>4</sup> Radio Riga, Latvian S.S.R., July 23, 1966.

by the silent technique the boys in *Agitprop* hoped to minimize the impact of the Week and at the same time further their pretensions of peaceableness and conversion to "good and soft communism." They left the denunciatory task to puppets and subsidiaries, instead. For example, a Red periodical sought to tie the captive nations issue with anti-Semitism, referring to "criminals" who "are active in the organizations of the so-called 'captive nations' . . . have their own press and conduct war-inciting activities through demonstrations, picket lines, etc."<sup>5</sup> The Reds are apparently concerned that the "'captive nations' organizations are often connected with similar organizations in other countries in Europe and Latin America."<sup>6</sup>

If one bothers to scan the book on Captive Nations Week mentioned earlier, he cannot but be impressed by the fact that the spiritual communion extends to all continents of the world. In 1966, for instance, President J. Ongania of Argentina joined the many Chiefs of State in issuing a Captive Nations Week proclamation, urging government institutions and the people to mark the week by appropriate observance. Similar proclamations were issued by Argentine mayors, such as Mayor J. Schettini of Buenos Aires, and Cardinal A. Caggiano devoted a special solemn Mass for the captive nations in the Cathedral of that city. For the first time, too, Australia launched the observance, with Minister V. Meckman and others participating in rallies in Melbourne and elsewhere. Much to Moscow's chagrin, no doubt, the truths about the captive nations in the face of all the alleged "tremendous changes" in the Red Empire will not be allowed to be brushed under the rug of diplomatic expediency and make-believe.

The Week has also served the very important purpose of highlighting the numerous myths a number of Americans have been pavlovized into. For one, not a year goes by without the need for impressing upon our people the nonsensical conceptions still nurtured by many as to the nature and composition of the Soviet Union. Here is an outstanding example of misguided notions commercialized into the millions: "Geographically the largest single nation in the world, the land traditionally known as Russia sprawls across one-seventh of the earth's surface. . . After the U.S. this once-backward nation now produces more steel, oil, electric power, aluminum and

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<sup>5</sup> Chaim Suller. "Anti-Semitism In The USA," *Political Affairs*, Fall Issue, 1966, p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 28.

cement than any other country. In 1949 the USSR became the second nation to produce an atom bomb. . .”<sup>7</sup> In rudimentary fact, neither the Czarist Russian Empire—the so-called traditionally known Russia—nor the USSR has ever been a “nation,” and the present empire’s economic advances rest on broad foundations of Russian imperio-colonialist exploitation of over a dozen captive non-Russian nations and countries in the USSR, but one couldn’t know these fundamental facts from this superficial, commercialized effort to “inform” the American reader. The untiring dispenser of Kennan’s Fables spreads similar nonsense in garbled, sophisticated style, but fortunately few legislators are taken in by his involute language and weak judgments, notwithstanding the mass of conceptual confusion that underlies them.<sup>8</sup> It is a pity, indeed, that through the club alliance in the Department of State the case of Svetlana Stalina was initially entrusted to the dispenser’s care, but despite the fears of the club the situation can be properly sanitized by several Congressional hearings.<sup>9</sup> A vaunted ‘Russian expert’ is scarcely a competent analyst of one who can be tested on her Georgian background.

#### OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT ILLUSION

In the course of the 1967 Captive Nations Week several other myths, dominant wishful thoughts, and glaring omissions of thought will doubtlessly be underscored. One, of course, is the myth that the so-called satellites in Central Europe are progressing toward “independence.” For a striking expression of this myth, read this: “With the exception of East Germany, Russia has no more satellites, in the sense the term was used for so long. Rumania has defied her, as did Yugoslavia and Albania years ago. Czechoslovakia has proposed Eastern European military arrangements that exclude the Soviet Union. To keep her troops in Europe, Russia has been forced to negotiate status-of-forces agreements, not unlike the ones we have around the world. Where she used to be able to commandeer the production of Eastern Europe for her own use, Russia now sends her raw materials to Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Poland, to supply their growing industries.”<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The Editors of *Life*. *Handbook of the Nations and International Organizations*, Life World Library, New York, 1966, p. 14.

<sup>8</sup> “Kennan’s Version of Why Communist World Is Split,” *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D.C., February 5, 1967, p. C-3.

<sup>9</sup> For a timed and planted article see Murrey Marder, “U.S. Fears Svetlana Hill ‘Circus,’” *The Washington Post*, April 23, 1967.

<sup>10</sup> Senator Edward M. Kennedy. “Europe And The Next Generation,” *Congressional Record*, April 21, 1967, p. S5682.



Little has it occurred to the Senator grasping at these minor, accidental changes that each of these parts of the Red Empire is ultimately dependent for its survival under a Red regime upon the strength and power of the USSR. Also, the points he raises are given to other more accurate interpretations. The Rumanian contingent of the syndicate, for example, has defied the northern industrial sphere of captive Central Europe rather than what he calls "Russia." In short, there is no shred of substantial evidence that supports this convenient myth and, if as a case in point, the Senator wants to learn about Poland, he would do well to read the excellent summary on developments there as provided by one legislator who states, "Independence and liberalism in Soviet satellites—if Poland is typical of them—are myths."<sup>11</sup> Needless to say, as concerns the captive nations, the peoples themselves, nothing the Senator has said alters, or will alter, their basic state of captivity under the reign of the interlocking, though sometimes squabbling, Red syndicate.

Concerning Vietnam, those who have participated in the Captive Nations Week observances have consistently upheld President Johnson's actions in that heated arena of the Cold War. Criticisms have been directed, however, at the scope of his policy there and the implementation of our measures. Vietnam is a sterling example of our unpreparedness in the Cold War—too little and too late, followed as usual by desperate, last-minute recourse to military arms. At present, our situation there has assumed scandalous proportions, and when we are told that we can look forward to a long, drawn-out struggle, this is really the measure of the price facing us for our Cold War negligence in the past, from 1954 on.

The plight of the 17 million captive North Vietnamese will again be highlighted. It is strange, indeed, that few of our leaders ever discuss this troublesome subject. Yet it is crucial to our winning the war in South Vietnam. Canada's diplomat and former representative on the International Control Commission for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Theodore B. Blockley, has significantly pointed out, "Many of the North Vietnamese whom I met expressed the hope that one day the Americans would 'again' liberate them from tyranny and oppression. The previous liberation, in their minds, was from the Japanese."<sup>12</sup> Characterizing the ICC as not only impotent but a "fraud," the Canadian diplomat has revealed how thousands of North

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<sup>11</sup> Congressman Paul Findley, "Poland: The Myth of the Independent Satellite," *Congressional Record*, January 31, 1967, p. H832.

<sup>12</sup> Associated Press, New York, February 6, 1967.

Vietnamese had stormed the Canadian delegation's office in the mistaken belief that exit visas could be obtained. Lagging miserably in ways and means of psycho-political warfare, we haven't even begun to scratch the potentialities of the captive North Vietnamese in the war with totalitarian Hanoi, and this largely with free Vietnamese and Korean means in the spirit of "Asia For Free Asians."

Another chief theme of the 1967 Captive Nations Week observance is the fraudulence of the Russian Bolshevik revolution. Moscow and its associates are planning a tremendous propaganda show this coming November, celebrating the 50th anniversary of this tragic event. Though scarcely any Western journalist or commentator surmised it, even the designation of the new USSR spaceship—"Soyuz"—is symbolically tied up with the forthcoming propaganda show. The emphasis on the "union" of the USSR will be in the forefront to conceal the captivity and exploitation of the numerous non-Russian nations in that artificial state. The sharp contrast these past 50 years between expansive Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, particularly in the USSR, and the almost complete decolonization process in the Free World should be of basic educational worth to our citizenry.

For those under the powerful Pavlovian influence there will also be the need to stress the anti-anticommunism drive of the Red Syndicate, the deepening reality of the Cold War, and Red economic strategy in the whole East-West trade issue. Those who wishfully think that concepts of captive nations, Red Empire, communist conspiracy and so forth are rigid and deep-frozen representations of thought should begin familiarizing themselves with Red literature. Actually, such people are mental throw-backs to the mid-30s and appetizing meat for the Pavlovian exercise. To mention only one, Moscow's *International Affairs* is replete with articles on exploiting "intellectuals," non-Communists, and liberals in the West for the destruction of anti-Communism. The same applies to those who through conditioned reflexes are under the illusion that the Cold War has ended or is on the verge of ending. The illusion itself is a prime product of Moscow's Cold War management, and this at a time when we are deeply steeped in a heated sector of the Cold War, namely Vietnam itself. Last September, *Pravda* summed up the matter this way: "The ways and methods of revolution embrace the whole arsenal of methods in the class struggle... including armed struggle." By class struggle is meant divide and conquer in behalf of ultimate Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist power, and the struggle proliferates with varying intensity on every continent, including our own country.

To facilitate Moscow's world-wide Cold War operations, especially in Vietnam, by liberalizing our trade with its empire borders on psycho-political lunacy. The present drive for such liberalization is also a shining example of our Cold War ineptitude, and in the end will result in desperate measures of military intervention, as seen in Vietnam. The matter of trade was brought up time and time again in the fight over the Senate's ratification of the US-USSR Consular Convention, which was the first part of a package deal that spells only a series of American Cold War blunders and losses. It is regrettable that Senator Dirksen, who could have won great distinction in blocking the ratification, now thinks the USSR has made "a new ball game" for the East-West trade issue by signing a pact in March with Red China to step up the flow of war materials to North Vietnam.<sup>13</sup> No, the ball game still is the old one, and it was best shown during the hearings on the Consular Treaty. That episode alone should convince us of the dire need for a full review now of US policy toward the USSR, rather than for us to bounce haphazardly from issue to issue as the winds blow tactically from the East.

#### PARAMOUNT SYMBOL OF U.S. POLITICO-CULTURAL LAG

To appreciate how much narrow domestic politics and pressure were exerted on this basic Consular Treaty issue, we can start with the concerned declamations of a lady Senator who changed her mind at the last capricious moment. Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine solemnly declared, "I find it difficult to rationalize making a consular treaty with a nation that is helping the enemy kill American service personnel. This situation is completely contrary to the alleged treaty goal of the development of more friendly relations between the United States and Russia."

Concise and taken alone, this statement points to the three essential aspects of the controversy that had significantly surrounded the issue of the U.S. Senate's ratification of the treaty. These basic aspects are: the poor timing for the treaty's ratification, the acute doubtfulness of its advancing "more friendly relations," and the flagrant misconceptions (e. g., USSR is "Russia") justifying the pressing need for a full and thorough review of U.S. policy toward the USSR.

The treaty could not have been pushed for ratification at a worse conceivable time. Signed on June 1, 1964, the convention had not been put to the test of popular interest and criticism until the sum-

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<sup>13</sup> See on pact Karl E. Meyer, "Hanoi's Move In Sino-Soviet Pact Is Cited," *The Washington Post*, April 20, 1967.

mer of 1965 when an attempt was made to railroad it through the Senate for ratification. The attempt failed, but was repeated this past January, only to fail again as increasing numbers of Americans, concerned with the USSR's heavy support of Hanoi's aggression against South Vietnam, demanded at least open hearings on the treaty. The situation in Vietnam was radically different in 1964 than it is now. Americans weren't being killed daily by Russian and other communist arms as they have been in mounting numbers since 1965. In March of this year about 100,000 tons of war supplies were shipped into Haiphong, the chief port of North Vietnam, by Red ships from the USSR and the so-called "independent" satellites of Central Europe.

In contemporary circumstances it was not only difficult, as Senator Smith said, to rationalize Senate consent of this treaty, but it was also irrational to accept a pact which by substantive analysis would guarantee a clear, net psycho-political advantage to our prime enemy in Vietnam. The war in Vietnam would not last long if Moscow and its Red associates in Eastern Europe were, in the interest of genuine peace, to cut off their flow of critical war supplies to Hanoi. In this ultimate sense of sustaining power in the war, Moscow, rather than Hanoi, is our chief enemy in Vietnam. Well over 80 per cent of the high-powered items used by the North Vietnamese totalitarians is furnished by Moscow. Even now, long-range Russian weapons, the 140-mm. rockets, have been provided the Viet Cong to extensify the decimation of American lives.

"Subtle" rationalization in support of the treaty and the next step, liberalized trade with the USSR, had gone so far in Washington that it is being argued, "it is not to American advantage to have the flow of Russian aid to Hanoi reduced."<sup>14</sup> The twisted logic of this position is that Hanoi's greater dependence on USSR support as against Red Chinese aid would enable Moscow to influence its compatriot aggressors into peace negotiations. It is small wonder that letters to Senators from citizens across the nation, many of them with loved ones in the war, have ranged in the ratio of 200 to 1 against a treaty with the prime enemy. Senator Charles H. Percy of Illinois, who was elected to represent his alert constituents, actually boasted of defying a ratio of 7,000 to 46 in opposition to the pact.<sup>15</sup> Despite the feelings of many Republicans in the House

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<sup>14</sup> *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 1967.

<sup>15</sup> "Consular Pact Passes 1st Test," *The Evening Star*, March 10, 1967, p. A - 5.

of Representatives, this and similar actions in the Senate killed the possibility of making this episode an issue for Republicans in the 1968 Presidential election.<sup>16</sup> Only a 3rd Party candidate can make it a live issue.

Following the open, public hearings on the Consular Treaty, an obviously less "subtle" but further rationalization for Senate consent was the CIA's great desire to have the pact ratified. The new pitch to undecided Senators was the opportunity the treaty would provide for broadened CIA operations in the USSR. This so-called "confidential matter" changed the minds of several legislators as well as a few national leaders who had been previously against ratification. The rationalization only demonstrated how few really had bothered to seek convincing answers to poignant questions and points raised during the public hearings. Of course, a number were motivated to favor the treaty by political considerations far remote from its substantive contents, as next year's presidential elections, the open housing amendment, internal Party problems and the like.

The February hearings on the treaty established three general facts which should serve as solid lessons for America's alert citizenry in the future. As shown in the proceedings of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, the three facts are: (1) the clear inability of the treaty's proponents to meet the most fundamental points of criticism against its ratification, (2) a patent lack of awareness concerning the psycho-political ramifications of the pact, and (3) as indicated by outmoded preconceptions used, a deficient and stumbling understanding of the Soviet Union itself, which, behind the facade of "peaceful coexistence" is not only our prime enemy in Vietnam but also the chief instigator of anti-American attitudes and activity in Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.<sup>17</sup> These easily substantiated facts cast grave doubt on the objective of "more friendly relations" that the treaty is supposed to advance.

One major objection is that the treaty is superfluous and represents a sham performance of improving relations with the Soviet Union. It is part of the present concocted make-believe in detenting the USSR. The objection is firmly based on the Roosevelt-Litvinov exchanges of 1933 that established diplomatic relations between

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<sup>16</sup> Rep. John M. Ashbrook, "The Consular Convention With The Soviet Union—An Issue For the 1968 Presidential Campaign," *The Congressional Record*, January 26, 1967, p. H705.

<sup>17</sup> *Consular Convention With The Soviet Union*. Hearings, Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1967.

the United States and the USSR. Aside from adventitious references made to a proposed consular convention then and an exemplifying German-USSR Agreement of 1925, Litvinov expressly agreed to the protection of American citizens touring or residing in the USSR in a November 16, 1933 communication. It reads: "Furthermore, I desire to state that such rights will be granted to American nationals immediately upon the establishment of relations between our two countries."

Predicated on the establishment of simple relations, this agreement was never legally abrogated and thus, in international law, has remained in force to the present day. Supreme Court decisions, such as *U.S. vs. Belmont* in 1937 and *U.S. vs. Pink* in 1942, as well as a case in New York, are founded on the exchanges. The so-called Russian concession on notification and access in the present treaty is really no concession at all. This right should have been demanded long ago on the basis of the '33 agreements. When this vital point was brought up in the hearings, the chairman, Senator J. W. Fulbright, rightly admitted—for the record shows it—that the State Department was never challenged on this. And this after two years of concern with the treaty! Yet, following the hearings the State Department minced the truth in response to the Committee's inquiry when it predicated the whole Litvinov exchange and declaration of protection on the German-USSR Agreement of 1925.<sup>18</sup> It is amazing that no one in the Senate challenged this stratagem.

Another important legal objection is based on the misrepresentations in the treaty itself, which are clearly indicative of the askewed preconceptions dominating our officials who framed the pact. The treaty is replete with the notion of a "Soviet national," "a national of the sending state," "the national flag of the sending state," and "the national coat-of-arms of the sending state." Even on the basis of the USSR Constitution, not to mention rudimentary political realities in the USSR, there is no such political animal in existence as a "Soviet national," nor are there such objects in existence as a "national flag" or a "national coat-of-arms" of the USSR. These concepts are applicable to the United States, which is a nation-state, but they are myths as concerns the USSR, which is an empire-state made up of numerous, different national republics.

In a court of law, a contract of this sort, dealing in part with mythical objects, would be thrown out for its crass misrepresentations. But worse still, from a psycho-political point of view, Moscow

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<sup>18</sup> See *Congressional Record*, March 10, 1967, p. S3550.

surely must gloat over the unbridged gap of understanding shown by our professed bridge-builders with regard to the many non-Russian nations in the USSR. On the one hand, it naturally welcomes this treaty and its fantastic conceptual contents, for by all evidence the treaty is essentially a diplomatic affirmation of Moscow's imperium in imperio, the Soviet Union itself; on the other hand, it will unquestionably use the treaty in its dealings with the non-Russian nations as prime evidence of the fact that they have little to look forward to from a country that in one breath speaks of "friendship with *all* peoples" and in the next doesn't even recognize their distinctive national identities, which Moscow at least nominally does.

Aggravating all this further is the branch principle of consularism, the instrument that supposedly attests to the "national" integrity of the USSR. Regardless of the specious distinction made between the treaty as a body of guidelines and subsequent negotiations on consulate locations, the very proffer of this principle in regard to the multinational USSR reduces the non-Russian republics in that state to a territorial expression of "Russia," negates their distinctive national identities and sovereign popular wills, and creates an additional legal mess where in the United Nations our representatives recognize both *de jure* and *de facto* two original, sovereign Charter members, Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia. Again, on this point the State Department played on the weakness of many a Senator with a high-pressure memorandum that blatantly raised the question "Does the Convention prejudice the position of subject peoples incorporated against their will into the Soviet Union?" and then glibly answered it, "No, it does not."<sup>19</sup>

Plainly, if more windows are desired in "Russia," if mutual understanding toward all peoples were a sincere objective, and if we had the foresight to avoid these and other psycho-political disadvantages of the treaty, we would wisely consider the realistic alternative of setting up embassies in Byelorussia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Kazakh Turkestan. This is accommodated by Article 18a of the USSR constitution. It would also be a real test of Moscow's desire for peaceful relations. Moreover, on a reciprocal basis with their embassies in Washington, we would be able to cover their espionage and subversive political activity far more effectively than with "Russian" consulates in Chicago and other cities. It is noteworthy that the State Department has consistently opposed the far more

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<sup>19</sup> "US - USSR Consular Convention, Questions and Answers," Department of State, February 6, 1967, p. 7.

advantageous embassy idea because of the presence of more communists here; yet, with the consulate idea, it would allow for more of them in more vulnerable areas of the country.

Significantly, none of these points and criticisms were challenged by the treaty's proponents. The amateur show staged by Senators Morton and Percy avoided these points entirely, confused "Russia" and the USSR with "the Soviets" throughout, and came up with some fantastic interpretations as, for example, Latin American states won't follow us because they haven't in the past, not recognizing that Moscow just began to exert pressure there in a major way in the past ten years.<sup>20</sup> Neither have they or other proponents answered the additional criticism bearing on the real protection of Americans traveling in the USSR. Superficially bandying about the 20,000 figure of Americans touring the USSR annually and the 250 "Soviet nationals" here measures neither the relative intelligence worth of the projected ratio nor the scope of the hoped-for protection. With greater freedom of movement here the specially assigned 250 may in these terms be equivalent or exceed in value the 20,000 there, most of them given to typical American tourism and guided, of course, by overseeing Intourist. Furthermore, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the treaty's notification and access provision is no guarantee whatsoever against the continuation of arbitrary arrests of American nationals who, if they are important enough to Moscow, can easily be brainwashed in the span of three days. As in the recent Kazan-Komarek case, such Americans can be arrested and held incommunicado by the Russians indirectly on the terrain of their outer empire, in Poland or Czecho-Slovakia. It is noteworthy that almost immediately after the Senate's inept ratification the State Department released a brochure warning Americans, in effect, that travel in the USSR is at their own risk.<sup>21</sup>

The espionage and subversion disadvantages of the treaty were also not met with adequate explanation. The shell game of manipulating the 15 or 20 figure of Russian consular personnel expected here conceals the net disadvantage we face because of several reasons. One is that well spy-trained Russians would enjoy a larger pond to fish in here than we there. Second, the coefficient of their spy effectiveness is generally conceded to be greater. Third, a point which was completely overlooked though it is already well founded

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<sup>20</sup> *Congressional Record*, March 9, 1967, pp. S3461 - 3465.

<sup>21</sup> Hon. John R. Rarick, "Traveling to Communist Russia?", *Congressional Record*, April 10, 1967, p. A1676 - 77.



in this country, the Russians will have expanded opportunities for coercion, blackmail of U.S. citizens with relatives in the USSR, bribery, and sundry subversive tactics directed against ethnic groups; and this with unprecedented diplomatic immunity covering felonies such as murder and kidnapping. It doesn't require much imagination to see how little or no reciprocity there exists in this for us.

No reply could be found for the additional criticism that the treaty opens up a Pandora's box of Soviet Russian pressure against every free government in Latin America. With the supposed leader of the Free World extending this benefit to the rulers of the Kremlin, what Latin American government could refuse their request for a similar convention. Beginning with 15 or 20 here we may well end up with several hundred additional Russian operatives in the hemisphere, cloaked with diplomatic immunity and at a time when many of our own officials have been warning us to expect stepped-up Red subversion south of the border. The Morton reply mentioned above is about as lame as one would expect, for we're in the 60's not the 30's.

Finally, Secretary of State Rusk was honest to point out that one objective for the treaty's ratification is its contribution to "increasing trade between our two countries." This is just the first step, a part of a large package. Piercing the vagaries and slogans of "normalizing relations," "advancing peace," "improving communications" and so forth, an internal analysis of the treaty results in a grave, disadvantage for us. It will even be graver if our citizens permit the next part of the package deal to be handled as in slipshod a manner as the first one was. For, on trade, we will only be repeating our tragic economic errors of the 20's and 30's in regard to the USSR. Flushed with a supposed victory on ratification, Senator Morton is talking antiquated nonsense when he states, "There are strong indications that a new era is beginning for the peoples of Russia and Eastern Europe. It is in our national interest that we make sure that American ideas and skill become a part of that changing world."<sup>22</sup> He reveals not only his complete ignorance of the Cold War but also of the record of US trade with totalitarian powers.

Enough has been shown here to indicate the glaring politico-cultural lag existing in our country with regard to the USSR. It is almost like an ineradicable blind-spot for some legislators and others alike. However, the matter of accommodating Russian consulates in

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<sup>22</sup> "Morton Asks Widening of Red Contacts," *The Washington Post*, April 4, 1967.

this country still is not resolved. Proponents of the treaty repeated ad nauseum the point that ratification of the treaty does not necessarily mean the establishment of Russian consulates here, which is a subject for further negotiations. Also, in rationalizing his switch Senator Dirksen stressed emphatically that the "treaty would not enable the Soviet Union to establish a consulate in Chicago or any other city."<sup>23</sup> Not only this, but the citizenry was informed that Dirksen "was assured by Secretary of State Dean Rusk that 'appropriate Congressional Committees' would be consulted before a U.S. consulate was established in Russia as well as clearance with community official before a Soviet consulate could be located in this country."<sup>24</sup> This agreement opens up a whole new area on the issue, and Mayor Daley of Chicago has already declared that his city wants no Russian consulate. As we approach Captive Nations Week, pressure is building up to have other Mayors of our port-cities declare themselves along the same lines. It will be interesting to see what counter-pressure will be brought to bear to overcome the agreement.

#### TIME FOR REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR

The hearings on the Consular Convention have shown beyond question of doubt our pressing need for a full and thorough review of U.S. policy toward the USSR. On the scale of politico-diplomatic calculation the treaty definitely does not rest on a quid pro quo basis; the net disadvantage is ours. What makes the situation worse is that we, rather than the Russians, have pressed for it; and though the President could initiate negotiations for consulates without a treaty, it has been felt that at least the Senate should assume part of this responsibility. But the treaty is a vestigial remain of the 30's when our knowledge of "Russia" and its global ambitions and operations was quite wanting. Judging by the preconceptions and concepts displayed in the hearings, there still is the want, but will the need for such a review be recognized?

Never in our history has such a review been undertaken to eliminate the conceptual cobwebs which misdirect us into net disadvantageous positions. In part, Senator Roman Hruska has sensed this need in stating that this treaty and other measures "are going

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<sup>23</sup> "Consul Pact Will Not Aid Spies: Dirksen," *Chicago Tribune*, February 20, 1967.

<sup>24</sup> "Dirksen Says GOP To Back Consul Pact," *The Washington Post*, March 1, 1967.

to affect the basic philosophy of our relations with the Communist countries." There can be no better time than now to do what we have never done before but should have done long ago.

The author offers a proposed resolution which, in content, can be easily documented and substantiated on the basis of the misconceptions and contradictions to facts uttered by our foremost leaders in the past twenty years, exclusively in relation to the Soviet Union. We rightly pride ourselves in this country on seizing upon the innovative, the new, and the changing. It will be interesting to see whether, with courage and foresight, we can bring into full public view and for unprecedented examination and assessment our policy toward the USSR. The proposed measure reads as follows:

#### RESOLUTION ON REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR

Providing for a thorough review of U.S. policy toward the USSR.

*Whereas* in his 1967 State of the Union Message the President declared "the genius of the American political system has always been expressed through creative debate that offers reasonable alternatives"; and

*Whereas* U.S. policy toward the USSR is most crucial to the issue of global peace or war, and the cumulative evidence of the past two decades, including Greece, Iran, Korea, Cuba, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam, casts a reasonable and heavy doubt on the peace-insuring efficacy of the pursued policy; and

*Whereas* there has never been a thorough Congressional review of our policy toward the USSR, even at levels below another Great Debate, examining and illuminating questionable preconceptions, arrant conceptual confusions, contradictions to fact and principle, and high-level counter-contradictions that have surrounded this policy; and

*Whereas* proposed particular measures, such as the U.S. - USSR Consular Convention, U.S. - Soviet trade, cultural exchange agreements, etc., depend for their accurate and proper evaluation on the soundness or no of the underlying assumptions and criteria in the general policy; and

*Whereas* these assumptions and criteria have been too frequently conveyed by official assertions that are patently contrary to fact and/or principle, and especially at this time deserve to be openly and thoroughly examined; and

*Whereas*, to cite one example, on the highest level an old, imperial Czarist Russian usage, albeit fictional to present conditions, has been revived in the thought "The common interests of *the peoples of Russia* and the United States are many"; and

*Whereas*, by way of further example, the notion expressed by one of our Presidents, "no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Russian suffered in the course of the Second World War," contradicts the facts that the ravaged territories in the USSR were largely non-Russian and the losses of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Armenians and other non-Russian nationals were equal if not greater; and

*Whereas*, in additional contradiction to fact, more than one national leader has voiced the mythical constructions of "200 million Russians" in existence and the USSR as "Russia,"; and

*Whereas*, to mention another apt example, a high-level conception misjudges "areas, such as the Ukraine, Armenia, or Georgia" as constituting "traditional parts of the Soviet Union... an historical state," which factually has been in existence for only forty-five years; and

*Whereas*, in sharp contradiction to this quoted misconception, an outstanding official U.S. statement in the United Nations emphasizes: "An independent Ukrainian Republic was recognized by the Bolsheviks in 1917" and

later "with the help of the Red Army, a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was established and incorporated into the USSR"; also, "In 1920, the Soviet army invaded, and Armenian independence, so long awaited, was snuffed out"; also, "In 1921, the Red Army came to the aid of Communists rebelling against the independent State of Georgia and installed a Soviet regime"; and

*Whereas* these selected examples of basic confusion, contradictions of reality, and official counter-contradictions are compounded by growing doubts related to operating principles, double-standards, and policy inconsistencies, even at a time when the USSR and its syndicated Red associates supply the totalitarian Red regime in North Vietnam to kill increasing numbers of American defenders of independent South Vietnam; and

*Whereas*, on the basis of these and numerous other points of evidence, it is not inconceivable that the forthcoming 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, which gave rise to Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and its world-wide aggressive ambitions, might elicit in "the spirit of peaceful coexistence" harmful expressions virtually equating this fraudulent revolution with our own American Revolution and its symbolization of national independence, individual liberty, and freedom; and

*Whereas* a genuine policy of peaceful coexistence means progressive reciprocity, substantial reduction of barriers year by year, the absence of controlled movements, an intensified understanding between nations in the USSR and the United States, and surcease from indirect provocation in other parts of the Free World, none of which has been realized in the past decade; and

*Whereas* a policy founded on basic misconceptions, myths, and internal contradictions generates a grand illusion which in the long run can only lead to disastrous results for our independence and national security and certainly, in the short run and with reference to the nations in the USSR, fails to validate the President's declaration in his 1966 State of the Union Message: "The fifth and most important principle of our foreign policy is support of national independence—the right of each people to govern themselves and to shape their own institutions . . . We follow this principle by encouraging the end of colonial rule": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the United States of America (or the House of Representatives) in Congress assembled, That a complete and thorough review of U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. be undertaken. The review shall be conducted by means of public hearings, designated studies relevant to all essential aspects of the subject, and scheduled symposia consisting of Members of the Senate (the House), representatives of interested areas in our Government, and invited participants from the private sector of our society. The results of this comprehensive review will be made available by publication and other media to the American public. On the basis of the results the Senate (the House) shall determine what "reasonable alternatives" exist to our present policy toward the USSR.

In the midst of many foolish notions being expressed almost daily with reference to our commitment in Vietnam and the obvious inconsistency, nay irrationality, of policies pursued by the Administration in relation to different but inseparable sectors of the Red Empire, the American people, who in the last resort are called upon to sustain the price of policy misjudgments, are at least entitled to this kind of review—a truly first Great Debate on U.S. policy toward the USSR. Will courage, foresight, and open-mindedness prevail? This is the question for Captive Nations Week, 1967—or are we content to pursue make-believe measures based on crass misconceptions, Pavlovianized reactions, and insular political considerations?

## **UKRAINE: 1966**

*By* LEO HEIMAN

What were Ukraine and Ukrainians really like in 1966?

The Soviet government is one thing. The peoples it dominates in the non-Russian republics of the USSR are something entirely different. On these pages are first-hand impressions of Ukraine in 1966—as it really was. The impressions come from four veteran travel agents who have just returned from the Soviet Union. Eleven Israeli travel agents were originally invited by the official Soviet IN-TOURIST agency to spend three to five weeks in the Soviet Union, studying the arrangements made by the appropriate government agencies to boost popular tourism from the West. What the Russians really want is to divert American Jews visiting Israel into touring the USSR on their way back home, at little extra cost. Under such package deals, one can pray in Jerusalem and eat caviar in Moscow before going back to the Bronx. Also, the Russians want to step up group tours of teachers, lawyers, doctors and other professional groups, while frowning on individual tourism which causes endless headaches to their security police.

Three of the eleven agents turned down the offer, and only eight took part in the junket, all expenses paid by INTOURIST. Four refused to be interviewed at all, upon their return to the Holy Land, claiming it is unethical to speak out the truth about hosts who have just paid your expenses. The remaining four were willing to talk on the condition no names would be mentioned. For obvious reasons, they hesitated to speak up at first and had to be assured their anonymity would be respected. They stand to lose profitable business if INTOURIST blacklists them for disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda—and, of course, any objective and truthful report from Ukraine is interpreted by Moscow as anti-Soviet propaganda.

But taking all these limitations and handicaps into account, one gets a very good idea of what was going on in Ukraine in 1966 after talking to the four men who had been there, and who are naturally more perceptive than ordinary travellers. To protect the

actual sources of information, this article will provide a composite picture of the four lengthy interviews. Here's Ukraine 1966:

We arrived in Kharkiv on July 17, 1966. A tall young man with a luxurious handlebar mustache met us at the railway station and shook hands all around. "My name is Ivan Skrypko, and I am your guide in this beautiful city," he said. "I hope you will enjoy your visit to Kharkiv." He then led the way to a "Raketa" bus, a convertible-like vehicle with an open roof and 12 upholstered seats. On our way out, we had to step over drunks rolling on station steps and vomiting all over the beautifully-arranged flower beds in the station square. No policemen were in sight, and the sordid picture both shocked and sobered us. Scores of men in the prime of life looked like dehumanized Skid Row bums, staggering along the walls, and drinking vodka straight from bottlenecks.

"Are the people celebrating some holiday?" I asked Comrade Skrypko. He shook his head. "No, no holiday now. Most are passengers in transit, waiting for a train, or farm workers on their way back home from a visit to Kharkiv. We had drunks before, of course, but now the situation is worse because of the 'Butylochna Golovka' (bottle head) regulations."

It transpired that Moscow is pursuing in Ukraine the same policy with regard to state-sponsored consumption of hard liquor as was in vogue for centuries of feudal Polish and corrupt Czarist Russian rule before 1917.

At that time, vodka spirits sold by government-operated monopolies served the triple purpose of amassing great profits, making the Ukrainians too drunk to worry about their status as virtual slaves of the Poles and/or Russians, and granting liquor-selling franchises to local collaborators and stooges.

The Soviet authorities are aware that drunkenness cripples numerous branches of the national economy, since it causes absenteeism from work, poor performance on the part of laborers suffering from hangovers, health hazards, traffic accidents and crime.

On the other hand, unless people are kept permanently drunk, they will not forget their misery and their drab life. Alcoholic stupor induces escapism of the simplest and crudest type. Moreover, the government reaps colossal profits from its vodka monopoly. From time to time, halfhearted attempts are made to curtail alcoholism by promoting the sales of beer, wine and other mildly alcoholic drinks. But the customers don't get the same kick out of wine, and the only result of such campaigns is a mushrooming boom of illegal

stills, brewing "samogon" (moonshine) vodka out of flour, sugar, bread, maize or beets.

To curtail alcoholism, the authorities have promulgated laws prohibiting sales of vodka to customers in unsealed bottles, with the exception of first-rate restaurants. This was the official reason. The real cause of this order was that unscrupulous store managers would dilute the vodka with water, and cheat both customers and the government, while salting away millions of rubles in illegal profits. From now on, you must drink a full bottle of vodka, or none at all. Hence the numerous drunks.

After the sobering encounter with Moscow-sponsored alcoholism, we moved out to see the sprawling city. Ivan Skrypko rattled off facts, details and historical dates with the amazing efficiency of a human tape recorder.

"Kharkiv," he explained, "was founded in the year 1664 by Russian serfs who fled south towards the freedom of the wide, open steppes from their feudal lords in the Briansk, Orel and Voronezh districts of the Russian State. The fugitives built mud huts and clapboard shacks along the tributaries of rivers flowing south to the Black Sea. Such settlements were called 'Slobodki' from the old Russian word 'Sloboda'—meaning freedom. It is spelled 'Svoboda' in modern Russian, but the old pronunciation has been retained in the Serbo-Croat, Bulgarian and other Southern Slav languages.

"Because the free settlements were built on the outer periphery of Russian-controlled territory, and periphery means 'Okraina' in modern Russian, the entire area was known as 'Slobodska Ukraina' in archaic Russian spoken at that time."

We were not acquainted with Ukrainian history at that time, and I doubt whether any foreign tourist would have reason to assume the smiling INTOURIST guide to be feeding him a concoction of lies, half-truths and historical falsehoods. As a matter of fact, we learned the truth only by pure chance, while shopping for books in Moscow, on our way out of the Soviet Union.

I bought a historical atlas which showed the development and changing borders of East European nations since the 13th century Mongol invasions. Kharkiv is on the map of Ukraine during the 1648-1654 liberation war against Poland. Perhaps it was only a village then, but it was certainly founded before 1664. Another map shows that in the 16th century, the territory designated as "Slobodska Ukraina" on Soviet maps, was controlled by Lithuanian lords. Kharkiv does not appear on 16th century maps, and it stands to reason that if refugees founded it, they must have been Ukrainians

fleeing east from oppression by Polish lords (after Lithuania's union with Poland), rather than Russians fleeing south.

This may seem an obscure point, against the vast background of present-day conflicts and upheavals raging across the world from Cuba to China. But it illustrates Moscow's determination to destroy Ukrainian national consciousness by alcoholism, Russification and other methods, including falsification of history. I suppose that all this can be justified by dialectical materialism, but it certainly leaves a bad taste in one's mouth.

Let us go back to our efficient guide, however. "Although it was built by Russians, Kharkiv was handed over to the Ukrainian Socialist Republic after the October Revolution," Comrade Skrypko continued. "It is now Ukraine's second biggest city, with over a million inhabitants, and some of the biggest industrial plants in the Soviet Union. We are especially proud of our locomotive, tractor and machine-tool works, which are among the biggest in the world. The city and all factories were destroyed by the Fascists during the German occupation in World War Two, but the Soviet people rebuilt everything, and it is now even more beautiful and prosperous than before. Kharkiv is also a famous cultural center. Apart from elementary and grade schools, the city has 105 middle (i.e. secondary) schools, 31 technical schools (i.e. vocational high schools), 24 university-level colleges and institutes and 44 research centers, employing over 10,000 scientists and postgraduate students.

"Let us continue our stroll through Central Park, named after the father of our October Revolution, Vladimir Illich Lenin. To the left, you can see the Museum of Natural History, one of the city's fourteen different museums. We also have six permanent theaters, including two ballets and one opera, 21 movie theaters, a symphonic orchestra, a television station, two radio stations and a circus.

"How many churches and synagogues?" someone asked.

"Ten churches and one synagogue are still open," Skrypko replied without a moment's hesitation, "but they will not last very long either. You see, before the Revolution, Kharkiv had over 400 churches, close to 80 synagogues and an equal number of brothels. The bordellos corrupted a man's body, the houses of worship corrupted his spirit. The free socialist people's state has no need of either. But it was easier to eradicate prostitution than religion. After all, there are many old people who still believe in superstitions, and religion is one of them. But after the old generation dies out, we shall turn the remaining churches into youth clubs and museums, as we did with the others. We believe in the dignity of man, not in the mercy of God."



Let me add at this point that Skrypko was wrong on both counts. Later that day, when I went out for an evening stroll along the main street towards Lenin Square, I was accosted at least twenty times by free-lance prostitutes and pimps soliciting business openly and unashamedly in plain view of policemen and "*Druzhinniki*" (public order enforcers) on street corners.

"Aren't you afraid of the police?" I asked a scar-faced pimp. "Legaviye? We pay them off," he snorted and nodded to a police sergeant across the street, who raised his hand in a mock salute.

It did not surprise me that Kharkiv's only synagogue was filled to capacity with Jews. After all, religion is their only link with their people, history, heritage, destiny and relatives abroad.

But the ten churches were crowded, too, and not only with "old superstitious people." Indeed, apart from their usual assortment of beggars on church steps and drunks sprawling over tombstones in the churchyard, the majority of worshipers were people in their thirties. They had been born and educated under Soviet rule, but something made them go back to the faith of their parents. It is impossible to carry out any kind of objective research in the Soviet Union, but my conclusion is that, when they are teenagers and students, people accept the official theory of atheism, hook, line and sinker. (They are not, and cannot be, fanatical communists as long as they have rock-and-roll, miniskirts, twist and lipstick on their minds. They are not different from the hedonistic, materialistic and atheistic teenagers in the West, including my own country.) It is only after they get married, have children of their own, learn at first hand about the insecurity of life and vagaries of fate, and pass through the crucial thirties to the watershed of the forties, that they turn towards God and religion in a frantic search for the spiritual values of life.

Ivan Skrypko did not tell us his age, but he could not have been more than 25-27 years old. He was a fanatical and indoctrinated communist. As an INTOURIST guide, he must have been a *seksot* (secret police agent) as well. And although a Ukrainian by birth, he was a pro-Russian renegade. But I am willing to bet seven to one, that in ten-fifteen years, Comrade Skrypko will himself gravitate towards a church, if he can find one still open in Kharkiv, and if the Soviet Union exists that long. We returned to our "Raketa" bus and drove to Shevchenko Square.

"You can see the statue of Ukraine's national poet. He fought for the freedom of the common people, social justice and equality."

"In which language did he write?" one of us asked.

"In Russian, of course," our guide replied without blinking an eye.

"And what is the language of Ukraine?"

"Ukrainian, but it's more or less like Russian, with the exception of some words and pronunciation." "And what is your nationality by birth?" I persisted.

"Both of my parents are Ukrainians, but I consider myself a member of the great Russian nation and proud of it, too. That way I can have both Shevchenko and Pushkin," he grinned, proving that even INTOURIST guides can have a sense of humor.

We visited one of Kharkiv's middle (junior high) schools. The headmaster, Semyon Antonovich Sudets, received us in his office, beneath the portraits of Lenin, Kosygin and Brezhnev. "We have over one thousand pupils," he declared proudly, "but you can't see them now. We have summer vacations, you know."

"What is the language of instruction in your school?" I inquired.

"Russian," the headmaster declared.

"But isn't Kharkiv a Ukrainian city?"

"Certainly. But this is a free and democratic country. Russian is the language of the future. One must know Russian to study in college or the research institute. And if the majority of parents desire their children to learn Russian, we are obliged by law to respect their wishes."

"In that case, why don't you have Jewish schools?"

"Because the majority of parents do not wish their children to receive their basic and secondary educational instruction in any other language but Russian. Even if they are Jews, why make them different from other pupils by sending them to separate schools? The parents themselves do not want it," he said, and got up to indicate that the interview was over.

In all communist states of Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe, collective agriculture has been quietly scuttled in recent years. Some countries, like Poland and Yugoslavia, never seriously tried to collectivize agriculture in the first place. Others, like Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, are now giving the land back to the peasants, reasoning that it is better to bypass an insurmountable obstacle of the communist dogma, than starve to death.

In all communist countries, with the significant exception of Yugoslavia, agriculture has failed to rebound to the 1936 level. Despite tractors, modern equipment, automated machinery and fertilizers, the East European countries which exported wheat, sugar, meat

and other agricultural products in 1936, must buy wheat from the United States, Canada, France and Australia to reduce the spectre of starvation to manageable proportions. Only the Yugoslavs can feed themselves and still export foodstuffs to neighboring countries, because their economy is not hogtied to the Kremlin's master plan.

But compared to Ukraine's fertile land and booming agriculture, even Yugoslavia is a poor backwater. Ukraine used to be the granary of Czarist Russia, and I was born in Jerusalem thanks to my grandfather, who operated grain elevators in Odessa, and saved enough money to buy a family estate in the Holy Land. As a child, I used to hear his stories about Ukraine's precious gold—i. e. wheat.

"This is better than real gold, my child," grandfather explained, "because you can mine gold only once, and then you must abandon the mines after they are empty. But you can harvest wheat year after year, and Mother Earth never tires of growing more. . ."

In short, I grew up on stories of Ukrainian wheat and booming agriculture, and I could not understand why Moscow had to sell its gold reserves to buy wheat from the United States and Canada, when it exploits Ukrainian agriculture as Czarist Russia did. After all, it's the same earth, the same rains, the same seeds and the same people. Only the machinery is more efficient. Instead of horses, they have tractors. Instead of hand sickles, modern combines which save thousands of working hours with one single pass. There should be more of everything, instead of perennial shortages of foodstuffs.

My first shock came when I visited the Farmers' Market in Kiev's Podil Quarter. The puny tomatoes, sickly cucumbers, green apples and worm-eaten cabbage heads would have been dumped in the refuse heap in any civilized country. Back home in Israel, we have laws against selling inferior or diseased agricultural produce. We would not feed such low-grade stuff even to our farm animals. And here in Kiev, the bustling capital of Ukraine, long queues of hungry-looking people formed in front of the dilapidated wooden stands, to buy up scraps and offal at free-market (i. e., not officially controlled) prices.

On the other hand, the glittering Gastronom delicatessen shops along Khreshchatyk and Volodymyrska Streets were filled with top-grade luxury foods, including caviar, smoked fish, jellied meat, a hundred different kinds of sausage, crabs, pickles and whatnot. But few people could afford the expensive luxury foods, or the gargantuan meals in hotels and restaurants. And I saw queues in front of almost every shop selling bread and potatoes.

This only intensified my natural curiosity concerning the decline of Ukrainian agriculture. So, when our Kiev guide, Mrs. Nadezhda Solovyeva, asked whether we had any special requests—after all, we were official guests of INTOURIST, classified as a “*delegatsya*” (state-sponsored delegation on a Moscow-paid junket)—I asked to visit a *kolkhoz*, an agricultural collective near Odessa.

She promised to arrange the trip, and kept her word, too. One day before we left Ukraine for Moscow, we were taken in tow by Mikhail Kazantsev, a grizzled representative of the INTOURIST branch office in Odessa, and driven in two Volga cars to the *kolkhoz* Krasnogvardeysky (Red Guards), near Dniprovsky Liman estuary, about forty-five kilometers northeast of Odessa.

We were received by Comrade Ivan Zakharovich Gluchko, a fiftyish man with a leathery face who said he had been a lieutenant-colonel in the 37th Soviet Army during the Second World War, and wore two rows of decorations on his pinstriped jacket to prove it. He was now *predsedatel*, chairman of the agricultural collective. He led us to his house, where a table was laden with the traditional tea-brewing *samovar*, bottles of vodka, platters of *zakuski*, saucers with home-made marmalades and fruit preserves, pungent garlic sausage and fresh honey. There we met Mrs. Gluchko, a plump, grey-haired woman who apologized for the “modest” refreshments by saying she had been advised only one day in advance of our arrival, whereas it took four to five days to prepare a really festive meal. She spoke Ukrainian, whereas her husband spoke Russian only. It was evident his wife’s Ukrainian diction displeased him, but it later transpired that she was a local girl, without too much formal education, while he had been graduated from the Kiev Agricultural Institute before the Second World War. This seems to be the dividing line between Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking Ukrainians today. The regime is determined to force all educated Ukrainians—the intellectual, professional, administrative and cultural elite of the “constituent republic”—to forget their own tongue and speak Russian only. This is achieved by various methods, ranging from offering a top-level education and academic studies in Russian only, to making college graduates ashamed of their Ukrainian-speaking spouses or parents.

At the same time, the regime seems to be sponsoring Ukrainian folklore, songs, light comedies and popular poetry contests “for the masses.”

And after Comrade Gluchko belted down a few generous shots of vodka, he stopped calling it “*vodka*”, but “*sivukha*” or “*horilka*” (both traditional Ukrainian names for hard liquor) instead, and

demonstrated his knowledge of Ukrainian songs, making up in volume what he lacked in harmony and tune control.

Three other men got up to shake our hands. They introduced themselves as Vladimir Grigoryevich Shubin, the political control officer of MTS machinery-and-tractor pools, who had come to supervise harvest planning at Krasnogvardeyski; Piotr Ivanovich Stypa, Gluchko's chief accountant; and Miron Yevseyevich Kravitz, who claimed to be a purebred Ukrainian, although his name sounded as Jewish as Goldstein's Kosher Delicatessen, and to whom we never got the chance to talk alone. He was the roving correspondent of *Radyanska Ukraina*, the official communist mouthpiece in Ukraine, specializing in vignettes and constructive criticism from collectives.

After the first round of drinks and food, following the usual small talk about weather, climate, trains, planes and how do we like the Soviet Union, Comrade Gluchko told us a few facts about his collective.

The *kolkhoz* (actually it ought to have been *kolhosp* in Ukrainian, but he addressed us in Russian) was founded in 1930 on land seized from absentee landlords, monasteries and *kurkuls* (affluent farmers). In 1931, 140 peasant families joined the collective, contributing their land, animals, implements and other property.

"Were they compelled to join, was there any form of pressure?" one of our group wanted to know.

Comrade Gluchko shook his head. "No, not at all. There was a lengthy political explanation campaign, of course. It pointed out the obvious advantages of collectivization, and conditioned the farmers for the inevitable march of progress. But we did not force anyone to join us. However, those who tried to swim alone against the current of history, were either tossed on reefs or drowned. You can't oppose historical trends, especially if they are socially just and economically correct, for selfish materialistic or emotional reasons. Class enemies, including the *kurkuls* and bourgeois nationalists, attempted to sabotage the collectivization program. They poisoned cattle, cut tendons of horses, set fire to buildings and granaries, poured kerosene into flour and stole vital machinery parts. When this did not succeed, they murdered Soviet activists, abducted their children, tortured wives of party officials, and collaborated later with the Fascists when the Germans temporarily occupied this area during the Great Patriotic War. Because of their misdeeds, there was a famine in Ukraine in the 1930's, and thousands of innocent people died. The class enemies and speculators hoarded grain and burned collective property. They hoped to sell their ill-gotten stocks at speculative blackmarket prices and

to undermine the collectives they hated. But the people rose against them as one, seized the secretly hoarded grain and let the class enemies starve instead.

"After the temporary upheavals in 1934, another 40 families joined our collective. The war and Fascist occupation destroyed everything, except the proud spirit of the Soviet people. Nearly all able-bodied men were killed in action or taken away to concentration and labor camps. Most of the young women were taken too, rounded up by the Fascists. All buildings were burned to the ground, all livestock and machinery seized by the enemy. The fields were mined, and unexploded shells were a hazard for many years after the war. We started from scratch, with old folks, children, widows, a few cripples invalided out of the army, and some wounded veterans like myself, who were the first to be demobilized after the war.

"Today, we have three separate villages with 472 privately-owned houses, over 50 collectively-owned buildings, 2,230 members, of whom over 1,600 are capable of contributing physical labor. We have 2,000 hectares of wheat, 600 hectares of vegetables, and 200 hectares of vineyards, apart from trucks, combines, power generators, tractors and livestock. We have a nursery, a primary and a secondary school, and a small clinic, too. Of our 2,000 head of cattle, some 400 are owned privately, the rest collectively. We are harvesting bumper crops of wheat, potatoes, tomatoes and grapes, and many of our members own motorcycles, sewing machines and television sets. Yes, we are among the happiest and most prosperous people in the world."

"In that case, perhaps you would care to explain why the Government of the Soviet Union is forced to buy wheat from capitalist countries, and pay for it with precious gold and foreign currency? I read in the newspapers that Ukrainian wheat exports were Russia's principal source of income in previous historical periods, and now the trend has been reversed despite the great progress made by collective agriculture. What is the objective reason for it?"

Gluchko looked around helplessly, trying to get off the hook. Comrade Shubin, a Russian, came to his rescue.

"We realize that the capitalists are trying to make temporary propaganda gains out of our wheat acquisitions abroad, but why is this question so important to you?" he wanted to know.

I replied that as a travel agent, it was my work and duty to advise tourists, tell them what to see in the Soviet Union, what to admire, where to go, and so on. Many of our prospective clients are teachers, farmers, students or intellectuals who have a deep and genuine interest in collective agriculture. After all, we in Israel also

have collective agriculture (*kibbutz*) competing against cooperative agriculture (*moshav*) and individually owned farms. Only we do not settle our disputes with sabotage, arson and poisoning of cattle.

Every reader of newspapers, I went on, knows that Ukraine and grain are synonymous. The achievements of the Soviet Union in the realms of science and technology speak for themselves. But an empire which sends rockets to the moon, and manned satellites orbiting around the earth, is not yet capable of eradicating the long lines in front of Kiev bread-and-potato shops, which I have seen with my own eyes, and the Farmers Market is a disgrace no tourist should be allowed to see.

Comrade Shubin sighed and looked obliquely at Comrade Krawitz, who was busy scribbling in his notebook.

"There is a connection between the two, and there are six main reasons for our acquisitions of wheat abroad. Three reasons are objective, three subjective. Let us tackle the objective reasons first.

"During the past fifty years, the population of the Soviet Union has increased, from 120 million in 1917 to well over 230 million in 1966. Thus, the number of people has almost doubled, but the land has remained the same. What was enough to feed 120 million people, and leave a surplus for exports does not suffice for 230 million.

"Secondly, people are eating more and better than before. Under the corrupt Czarist regime, only the moneyed classes, the nobles, capitalists, *kurkuls* and exploiters of the people ate well, while the impoverished masses barely survived on the fringe of starvation. Now nobody wants just bread, but bread with butter. Not only bread with butter, with *shproty* (smoked sardines) on top. Once a farmer ate meat three times a year—when he slaughtered a pig for Christmas, when his cow gave birth to a stillborn calf and when one of his scrawny chickens died of old age. Today we eat meat every day, and some of us twice a day.

"Third, and perhaps most important, is that Czarist Russia was a backward agricultural nation, while the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the world's greatest and most modern industrial power. Our urban population has grown from 10 million in 1917 to over 70 million in 1966. It was easier for the farmers to feed themselves, than for the farmers to feed also the growing urban populace, which, however, produces our industrial and scientific achievements. There is also the matter of sufficient manpower. In the old days, all a *kurkul* had to do was whistle, and he got a legion of poor peasant boys willing to work for him for two *kopecks*, two loaves of bread and two kicks in the pants. Today, our *predsedatel* can whistle until tomor-

row, but many young people prefer to study in college or the institutes, settle in the city and visit their village only for the summer vacations, to teach their children that you do not milk a cow by turning a faucet."

Everybody laughed at that, and we had another round of drinks on the house. "Now the three subjective reasons," Comrade Shubin continued. "First, unlike Czarist Russia which oppressed smaller nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is helping other nations, especially the newly-emerging ones, to free themselves from the shackles of colonialism and capitalist exploitation. We have many commitments to help our friends overseas. We cannot let our friends in Egypt or Cuba starve because they are surrounded by imperialists plotting their destruction. Therefore, we send them our own wheat to feed the masses. This depletes our emergency stocks. Naturally, we still have enough, but unless we have an emergency stockpile, the imperialists could blackmail us in the wake of disastrous droughts, floods or other calamities. Therefore, we prefer to buy as much as we send out, to retain the balance. As to paying gold for it, what is gold—I ask you. Just yellow metal, not good enough for building tractors, and too heavy for lavatory seats. Let the capitalists hoard gold. We prefer to hoard goodwill and wisdom."

There were loud cheers and another round of drinks, this time from tea glasses filled to the brim. One of our group passed out and slid under the table, where he snored like a buzz saw.

"The second subjective reason is that human nature is prone to mistakes and errors. During the cult of personality period, certain officials ignored the needs of the people. They dictated *ukases* without bothering to check their practicability on the spot. One department instructed us to plant additional acreage with sugar beets, the second ordered more wheat, the third drafted able-bodied men and women for canal, railway or highway construction projects, the fourth punished us for failing to carry out the other three. As a matter of fact, we could use more wheat, beets, canals, roads and railways, but not all at once. Still, this period is over and now there is no more room for such stupidities. It takes time, however, to switch back from sugar beets to wheat, because we now get natural sugar from Cuba.

"Last but not least, the older generation did not understand that collective property is more important than their miserable *Podkhoz* (*Podsobnoye Khozyaistvo* — privately owned property allowed in the fenced-in backyards of privately-owned houses). To take care of their two rows of green peas and one row of cucumbers, which they



hoped to sell at free-market prices, they neglected to work from dawn to dusk during *strada* (harvest time). We got around it by offering better *trudoden* norms," he concluded.

Mrs. Gluchko heaped a generous portion of buckwheat pancakes, dipped in thick sour cream and dripping with honey, on my plate and handed me a wooden spoon. "Eat first, argue later," she smiled.

"What is *trudoden*?" I mumbled through a mouthful of sour cream. Comrade Stypa, the chief accountant in charge of administration and logistics, gulped down a tumbler of vodka, cleared his throat and chewed noisily on a pickled cucumber before replying. "Our collective grossed 23 million rubles last year," he said. "After paying our taxes to the government in the form of agricultural deliveries, and earmarking funds for new buildings, fertilizers, social welfare, education and equipment, we were still left with 8,000,000 rubles net. We divided it into 1,600 parts, that is, the number of our active workers. It means each earned 5,000 rubles last year. . ."

(This sounded like a lot of money to me — \$5,550 at the official exchange rate — and I thought Stypa was just pulling my leg. But I learned later that either through an oversight or to impress me with talk of millions, his figures were in terms of old rubles. In new rubles, which are legal tender today, the average earning of a Krasno-gvardeyski farmer is \$ 555 a year, which is about what an American or Canadian farmer makes in one bad month. But even this seemed too good to be true. . . )

"Dividing the 5,000 rubles by 365 days of the year, you receive about 15 rubles (i. e. \$1.60) as our *trudoden* norm. But since not everyone works 365 days a year, and seeing as some work is more productive and valuable than other, we have different pay scales based on a member's real contribution to our collective effort."

"How much is a chief accountant's work worth in terms of your *trudoden* norms?" I asked. "I get six *trudoden* norms for every day in office, and Comrade *predsedatel* here receives 16 *trudoden* norms, because he works 14 hours a day and is responsible for everything," Comrade Stypa said, spelling out communist equality and socialist justice.

Now I saw the light! Without intending to enlighten me, Comrade Stypa disclosed the secret of what was wrong with communist economy in general, and Ukrainian agriculture in particular. Obviously, no farmer—unless he was a complete lunatic—was going to kill himself working in the sun-scorched fields for \$ 1.60 a day, at a time when one kilogram of slightly rotten tomatoes fetched three times as much on the Farmers Market. Nor were the Ukrainian

peasants crazy enough to work overtime and sleep out in the fields during harvest time—as they did when they owned their farms privately—to save time going there and back. Even if they worked 16 hours a day, and harvested twice as much as they were supposed to, all they would get out of it is two *trudoden* norms—\$ 3.20 a day—certainly no great shakes at a time when a dozen eggs from one's private chicken coop can be sold for \$ 3.60, and one does not have to work so hard for them. On top of everything, why should farmers earn more money for their collective when the Chairman, political instruction officer, administrative secretary and sundry freeloaders ride the gravy train on six to sixteen *trudoden* norms a day?

Some work must be done, for *lodyrs* (bums) and “social parasites” are punished by law, private property can be seized and a person can be expelled from the collective to become a *brodyaga* (hobo). But no one is going to overwork himself. When the Chairman or Control Commission members arrive on their periodic inspection trips through the fields, vineyards and orchards, there are frantic bursts of feverish activity, followed by a siesta-like lethargy after the big shots disappear. Little wonder that a substantial share of the grain crop should remain uncollected in most villages by the time the first autumn rains arrive, and wheat should rot on the stalk.

In all fairness, one must admit that industrialization and technological progress also have hurt Soviet agriculture. In the Western countries, too, young men and women pack up and leave their parents' farms to work in big city industrial plants, to study in college, to search for more sophisticated experiences and an easier life. Deserted farms and ghost villages are a problem even in such highly advanced countries like Sweden and Switzerland. But the key difference between West and East is that private property retains its value. If it no longer pays a farmer to grow wheat, he grows maize or sets up a poultry farm. Or he builds a motel with a swimming pool . . . And the moment wheat prices go up, he can afford to pay hired help to work for him in the fields. But Ukrainian farmers in the Soviet Union are serfs in the fullest sense of this word. They do not even have the illusion of freedom—man's most precious possession.

There is a great deal of construction going on throughout the Soviet Union, and Ukraine is no exception. As a matter of fact, Kiev is in second place after Moscow as far as recently built-up space is concerned. The speed with which the Soviets erect prefabricated apartment buildings is incredible. While visiting Ukraine we saw new blocks of six, seven and eight-story apartment buildings going up in Dar-

nytsia, a suburb of Kiev across the Dnieper River, and Fontanka, a suburb of Odessa. Our INTOURIST guides were naturally eager to show this off, and took us back to Darnytsia on our way out in order to show the changes which had taken place in the ten days since we were there. For sheer bursts of speed, nothing can beat the Soviet building methods. That's for sure. But . . .

It is the dream of every young married couple to receive a two-room flat in one of the new buildings. The huge blocks have been designed by the Central Construction Bureau, and are of eight different types, adaptable to all climates and terrain conditions in the USSR. The Ukrainian Construction Bureau chose three of the eight basic types approved by the Soviet Government. The design is modern-utilitarian, but living there can become a nightmare . . . An average six-story building has five entrances, five staircases and five elevator shafts. Up to thirty self-contained flats are clustered around each shaft, for a total of 150 apartments in one building.

Down at ground level are one-room apartments, known as *kavalerka* in local slang, earmarked for single men who cannot share the noisy *obshchezhitye* barracks with a hundred other men for one reason or another.

Bachelor communist party members, Comsomol activists, promising writers, unmarried scientists, journalists and the like move into the *kavalerka* flats, which resound with drunken orgies and boisterous revelries, much to the annoyance of more sedate neighbors. Since rackets are inevitable, some downstairs flats are turned over, sooner or later, to local vice syndicates for use as brothels. This is especially evident in Moscow in the residential suburbs of Pervomaisk, east of the Yaroslavsk, Kazan and Leningrad railroad stations.

While we were in Moscow, police and auxiliary militia squads raided several blocks of Pervomaisk flats to flush out prostitutes and their clients from *kavalerka* flats which were supposed to be occupied by communist activists.

The next three-four floors in the prefabricated apartment buildings consist of two-room flats, with a small kitchen, bathroom and lavatory, and are designed for young married couples. Strings must be pulled, devotion to the communist cause demonstrated and—more important—bribes paid to get such a flat for the nominal monthly rent of fourteen kopecks per square meter of living space (it adds up to the equivalent of \$ 10 a month for a two-room flat in Moscow and Kiev, less in smaller cities, where the rates are correspondingly lower). There is a long waiting list for each of the vacant flats, and unless one can pull strings and influence important people with the

right connections in the right places, it is essential to fork over up to a thousand rubles (\$ 1,100) in expensive gifts and hard cash to get to first base. To prevent corruption, some cities in the Soviet Union have introduced Public Boards, composed of city administration, communist party and labor union representatives, which hold open hearings once a month and decide who should move up to the top of the waiting lists. But some citizens prefer the old system of dealing with one or two key officials in charge of apartment allocation.

"After all," a young Ukrainian engineer told me, "it is easier to bribe two men than an entire Public Board . . ."

The upper one-two floors of prefabricated buildings are composed of three- and four-room apartments. In theory, the bigger flats are to be handed over at nominal rent to citizens blessed with oversize families, prominent scientists, writers, research specialists, etc. Even space explorers and top ballet dancers do not rate more than a four-room flat. Also, under a law promulgated in 1965, the big apartments may be bought outright—instead of renting them—by the same category of persons. One must pay the cost of construction materials and labor, but not of ground or intrinsic real-estate value. A four-room apartment in Moscow sells for the equivalent of \$ 12,000, in Kiev and Kharkiv for about \$ 10,000. This is not so expensive, but two more conditions must be fulfilled. First, the prospective buyer must prove he had earned the money, or saved it, honestly. Since it is almost impossible to save a penny from the low wages and official salaries paid by the government, the whole deal seems to be restricted (seems to be, because there are as many rackets as there are loopholes) to prolific writers, movie directors, top stars, scientific inventors, circus performers and people of other categories who receive handsome bonuses on top of their official pay.

Second, the buyer is informed—and he must sign a pledge to that effect—that the whole contract is null and void if he tries to sublet one or more rooms, turn over the apartment to other persons, or use it for immoral purposes. In such cases the apartment is seized by the House Committee, and no compensation is paid to the owner who gets the bum's rush and a stiff fine, too.

In actual fact, racketeers get around the restrictions by getting people with "legal money" to buy such co-op flats in the prefabricated buildings. Then, "hot money" (from speculation, black market deals, smuggling and bank robberies) is utilized by the crooks to build a *dacha* villa in a quiet forest or river-bank area, no questions asked. Naturally, most people prefer the privacy of a *dacha* to the cabbage-and-sewer bouquet of apartment buildings. And a *dacha* can be

built with private funds by private contractors provided they are registered in the name of persons with "legal money." The construction materials and labor cost five to ten times as much, but the crooks do not lack "hot money." The moment an owner moves to his villa, his co-op apartment is taken over by the mob, which silences the House Committee with bribes or threats—usually, a combination of the two. It is estimated that nearly one-third of the co-op apartments are actually controlled by the underworld and sundry speculators. They use them as hideouts for gangsters on the lam, when the heat is on; as dumps for black market goods; or as their own pads if and when they go "legit" for a prolonged period of time. The crooks usually register in the "Domashnaya Kniga" (register of a building's inhabitants, including visiting relatives and guests staying over 24 hours), a copy of which is handed to the local police station, and regularly updated by the House Committee.

They fabricate non-existing family ties with the real owner, who relaxes in his ill-gotten villa, and he confirms that his "brother-in-law," "uncle" or "first cousin" is staying with him, in case the authorities check back.

I have visited several new apartment buildings in the Kiev suburb of Darnytsia, and what I saw there is typical of all such developments in the USSR and is certainly no slur on the Kiev people alone.

To begin with, plumbing is the eternal bottleneck of communism. Any Westerner who has stayed in Soviet hotels knows this. And the hotels are naturally first-rate compared to the slapdash apartment buildings, erected in slipshod fashion at a breathtaking speed, but with little regard to their quality or tidiness. In any communist hotel, not only in the Soviet Union but even in the more advanced "socialist people's democracies," three things happen when you try to take a shower or bath: cold water runs from the tap marked "hot" (and vice versa), the bathtub drain cannot be closed for lack of a proper-sized plug, and dirty water gurgles back into the bathroom via the toilet. In ultra-modern hotels, it takes about two years for the pipes to become clogged, and no amount of communist devotion and magic can ever clear them afterwards.

And if hotels are like that, one can well imagine the state of the prefabricated apartment buildings. The ready-wall sections are brought to the construction site with sewer and water pipes, gas mains, electric wires, outlets and garbage chutes installed or builtin. The bathrooms, kitchens and lavatories come as ready-made units aboard huge transporters, and are lifted by 100-ton cranes to be bolted into position. Construction methods of this type demand split-

second timing and fraction-of-inch accuracy. But the construction crews are concerned only with fulfilling and overfulfilling their weekly building quota. All they want is get the building ready in the shortest possible time, split a handsome bonus for working ahead of schedule, and move on to the next slipshod site. As a result improperly placed walls, floors and ceilings crack the moment the first inhabitants move in. Wet plaster falls in fist-sized flakes on peacefully sleeping children at night—some have been hurt or permanently maimed when their rooms collapsed. Elevators break down, and their shafts are used as garbage chutes.

The “young married couples,” move into the two-room flats with three to four children, one or two mothers-in-law, grandfather or younger (still unmarried) sister, a truckload of heavy furniture (since production quotas in Soviet furniture plants are calculated on the basis of weight, factory managers utilize the heaviest wood available), five-six chickens and an occasional goat, which is tethered on the small living-room balcony.

But since the prefabricated pipe sections do not connect with each other, or perfectly fit into the outlets, and there are inch-wide gaps between the wall sections themselves, sewage soon floods the corridors. Then the cracks are plugged with an assortment of rags, and it's the turn of the garbage chutes to become clogged. And after a lifetime of sharing a communal kitchen with five other families, each housewife believes it is her sacred duty to utilize her private kitchen for cooking, laundry (washing and ironing) and bathing the children (bathrooms do not work, and the bathtubs are utilized as beds for the mother-in-law or kid sister). The adults are expected to make their ablutions at the local *banya* (public bath), to prevent additional sewage burstings in their overcrowded apartments. The results can be well imagined. Some new buildings crack at once, and some ceilings are known to have collapsed during boisterous housewarming ceremonies, accompanied by vodka drinking and folk dancing with rhythmical boot thumping.

Now, to round out this account of life in Ukraine in 1966, here is a short ABC of what we saw, heard and experienced:

ARMY—The regime does not trust Ukrainians as much as they did in the Second World War, when whole divisions and army groups were composed of Ukrainian conscripts. But cannon fodder is one thing, strategic missiles and nuclear rockets something else again. We visited only three Ukrainian ports—Odessa, Mykolayiv and Sevastopol—but nearly all the sailors we met there were Russians. Even in

the AEROFLOT airliners at Kiev airport, the hostesses were Ukrainian, the pilots Russian.

If Ukrainians are drafted at all, they are sent to serve with the Far Eastern Army on the Chinese frontier, the Turkestan Command on the Sinkiang border, or the Arctic Command in the Far North. They are obliged to take their discharge there, and most are enticed to settle on the Soviet Union's exposed periphery after demobilization. This serves the double purpose of denuding Ukraine of young people, slowing down the Ukrainian birth rate, and flooding key Ukrainian areas with settlers from Russia, while at the same time colonizing remote regions and beefing up frontier defenses vis-a-vis Red China.

The draft-age Ukrainians who are not inducted as conscripts in the armed forces, are sent to compulsory work projects east of the Volga—dam construction in Siberia, canal digging in Uzbekistan, agricultural development of the notorious "Virgin Lands" in Kazakhstan, and the like. This provides Moscow with cheap labor, and since a certain percentage of the young workers are persuaded to settle for keeps in the remote areas after their three-year contracts expire, they get the same results as with conscripts—to wit, Ukraine for the Russians, Ukrainians for Siberia. When we visited Kiev, there was a major hard-sell campaign to round up 300,000 "volunteers" for Kamchatka, Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands in the Pacific, where the fish canning industries, oilfields and natural gas fields suffered from shortages of manpower. Target figures are usually set well above official estimates, and I guess the authorities would be happy with 100,000 "volunteers." But it illustrates the official policy of population control.

**CRIME**—this is a subject which deserves book-length treatment, since it exposes the falsehoods of communist philosophy and official Soviet propaganda. The Reds claim that crime stems from social injustices, capitalist exploitation, class differences, envy and sub-human conditions of the working classes. They explain the incidence of crime in the Soviet Union by blaming "left-overs of capitalism" (after 50 years of communist rule and indoctrination!) and "cultural poison" injected into Soviet society by Western movies, music, radio, records, visitors and fashions. Crime-wise, Ukraine is not different from other areas of the Soviet Union, though there is less rape than in Moscow, and less bank robberies than in Byelorussia. Crime is divided into organized crime, free-lance crime and economic crimes—the latter term covering a wide range of illegal activities, from hoarding potatoes to selling kissproof lipsticks manufactured in some

dim cellar by enterprising promoters. Free-lance crime ranges from murder of wayward spouses by jealous husbands to one-man holdups of banks and post office branches. Police naturally find free-lance crime easier to solve and deal with than organized crime, which is controlled by underworld syndicates. Gang wars and mob violence accompany the division of lucrative territories between rival syndicates.

The gangsters prefer to operate in tourist resorts, ports, and major urban centers. According to reliable information, six syndicates—three Ukrainian and three Russian—control organized crime in Ukraine this year—including vice, drugs, gold and foreign currency, large-scale theft of construction materials, extortion and blackmail. The Carpathian syndicate holds sway over Lviv and Chernivtsi. The Kiev syndicate operates in the capital, and the Odessa syndicate siphons off profits from the Soviet Union's busiest port. The Russian hoodlums control the Crimea syndicate which "works" the principal Black Sea tourist resorts, the Lumber syndicate which smuggles planks, boards and logs to treeless Eastern Ukraine for sales through black market outlets to private buyers (for house building or repair purposes), and the Coal syndicate which steals coal from Donbas mines for illegal disposal elsewhere. The big-time gangsters reside in luxury hotels, eat, drink, make merry and openly boast of their exploits.

"I have the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, three Public Prosecutors, seven police chiefs and eleven judges in my pocket," a scarfaced mobster told me in Kiev's Hotel Moskva.

MUSIC—The Ukrainians seem to be obsessed with gramophone records. I have never seen so many shops selling records, nor so many people buying them as in Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa and Lviv. The records are quite cheap and their average quality is good. A 45 rpm single sells for about fifty cents in American money. A 33 1/3 rpm long-play, sells for about three dollars. Phonograph prices range from about \$35 for a regular gramophone to \$72 for battery-operated ones with automatic volume controls and stereo loudspeakers. Hi-fi rigs sell for up to \$300, but only fans buy them. In greatest demand are old-fashioned record-players which must be cranked by hand. They are no longer produced, and must be bought second-hand from "*kommisyonka*" shops. Explained a blonde co-ed who had just bought a manually-operated record-player: "They are better for picnics and outdoor parties than modern one. Because where can you get new batteries to replace the original ones?"



Ukrainian folk songs, love ballads and modern dance tunes are usually recorded on 45 rpm singles. The 33 1/3 rpm long-play records are devoted to operas, symphonies, and classical music performed by top orchestras, or to Red Army songs, songs of the Civil War, songs of the Great Patriotic War, and the like.

In great demand are tape-recorded jam sessions of local jazz bands, which are tolerated but not allowed to record their Big Sound or Rock rhythms. Enterprising free-lancers, usually students, record the jam sessions held weekly in local youth clubs and university gardens, and peddle the spools of tape at railway stations, and in front of the official record stores. Rackets and cheating are inevitable, police crack down from time to time, and the "salesmen" fight each other with gusto. In Moscow, a seven-man trumpet-and-guitar band called "Kremlovskiye Pizhony"—the Kremlin Stool Pigeons, has thousands of devoted fans and just as many sworn enemies in official circles.

But they cannot hold a candle to "Taras Bulba and His Boys," a Kiev quintet with two electric organs, two electric guitars and the biggest drum I have ever seen. They rigged up the electrical instruments themselves, and their only problem is the fuses which burn out the moment they plug their wires into wall sockets and let loose with the Big Sound.

To sum up our impressions of the brief (22-day) visit to Ukraine in the summer of 1966, there is some material and economic progress—though nothing much compared to Western Europe. Agriculture is still the problematic stepchild of the communist economy. And fifty years of communist rule have resulted in a cultural and moral stagnation, coupled with crime, juvenile delinquency and a general disdain of the law. This can be applied to the whole Soviet Union, but what is specific of Ukraine is Moscow's determination to Russify it by the application of a wide variety of methods, ranging from the insidious and devilishly clever to the almost unbelievably crude.

Nationalism as such is implied, but not evident. It stands to reason no Ukrainian was going to confide in a bunch of foreigners, especially an official "*delegatsya*" shepherded by INTOURIST guides. But one does not require great insight to notice that the Ukrainians resent Moscow's meddling in their local affairs, Russian influence and communist controls—in that order.

Without communist inefficiency, Russian colonialist exploitation and conflicting Moscow *ukases*, Ukraine could have been Europe's richest land, perhaps one of the world's most prosperous countries.

A Ukrainian schoolteacher in Lviv spelled it out for us: "Most countries, even the prosperous ones, always lack something. Sweden has steel, but it lacks coal. Britain has coal, but it lacks iron. Germany has both coal and iron, but it lacks wheat, France has coal, iron and wheat, but no forests. Spain has coal, iron, wheat and forests, but no oil. The Middle East has oil, but nothing else. Only Ukraine has got everything one needs for carefree prosperity. You name it, we've got it. And we have the best ports, railways, highways and communications in the USSR. . . ." "What about carefree prosperity?" we asked. "Let me tell you a little story, call it a parable if you wish. A bird left its nest before it learned to fly. A raven hit it with its beak, and the wounded little bird fell into a heap of cow dung, where it recovered slowly and painfully. He is still inside that dung. It is soft, it is warm, and it provides an illusion of safety. He got used to the bad smell too. But even if the little bird tells himself he is happy, the fact remains that dung is dung and birds were born to fly . . ."

He got up and left us without saying an additional word. Even our INTOURIST escorts were silent for a change.

## THE AMERICAN AND UKRAINIAN REVOLUTIONS

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

The American Revolution and the establishment of the United States as an independent Republic had a great effect on Slavic thought in the early part of the nineteenth century, even though we may well question how thoroughly the Slavic thinkers understood the events of that eighteenth century movement, the first effective struggle for the rights of man and for a really free government. There were echoes of the organization of the United States in all the movements for a United States of Slavia and for a great Slavic federation in which all the different Slavic peoples would find their own freely-elected governments in one larger whole. It offered a vision of what could become an alternative to the prevailing concept of a great multi-national empire in which none of the component parts would have any guaranteed rights, if the absolute monarch did not choose to grant them in a special case. We find echoes in the writing of the Slovak, Jan Kollar, in the declarations of the Russian Decembrists and in many other such movements.

Yet nowhere was it pointed out more strongly than in Ukraine. The last remains of the privileges of the Zaporozhian Kozaks were suppressed at almost the same time when the United States became independent. The *Hetman* State and the Zaporozhian *Sich* were abolished and the memory of them was still fresh in the minds of many of the older generation. There were still lively groups for political discussion in various local centers, and on his return to Ukraine Taras Shevchenko, the great poet of his people, showed himself familiar with all these talks in his Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. It was not for nothing that he wrote his appeal for a new Washington with "a new and just law" for Ukraine and this became almost a slogan in the mouths of his forward-looking compatriots. And it was treasured zealously in the thoughts and actions of the men of 1917 and 1918 as an ideal.

Yet other things were happening in the second half of the nineteenth century which were in sharp conflict with that vision. The events of 1848 and the dispersal of the Slavic Congress in that year

by armed force in Prague and later the beginnings of Socialism, Marxian and non-Marxian, swept an increasing number of Ukrainian thinkers into their stream, while the conditions under which the popular masses received a minimum of social rights and prosperity together with an increase in population made a new solution necessary with the least possible delay, while the number of men who had secured any practical knowledge of the methods of administration had remained at a minimum. So that by 1917 the number of Ukrainians who had definite theories about government was far greater than the number who had had experience in government above the lowest levels. It remains then to see how the American experience was in a way twisted by those who would apply it.

The Thirteen American colonies, beginning with Virginia and then Massachusetts in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, had been established in accordance with English practice and had basically English institutions. They had been started by London merchant companies or by royal grants to favorites. The populations were not entirely of English, Scotch and Irish stock, but there were large settlements of Dutch, Swedes, Huguenot French and Germans, especially from the Pfalz (Palatinate), who had maintained themselves as more or less isolated groups. Even in New York, which had been settled as New Netherlands on the Dutch pattern, a royal governor had been superimposed when the British took over the Dutch holdings after an attack on New Amsterdam, the capital, now New York. There were differences in the local statutes and institutions. They varied with the changes in the English royal house and with the rights received by each individual colony, but until the early part of the eighteenth century the colonies had lived independently, followed, under a series of usually more or less incompetent royal governors, their individual devices, and relations between the colonies were almost deliberately kept anything but close.

To a surprising extent the colonies, underpopulated and hemmed in between the Appalachian Mountains and the sea, were exposed to the ravages of various tribes and confederations of hostile Indians and were compelled to be responsible for their own protection. In the north these Indians were more or less controlled by the French in Quebec who sought to extend a line of French forts along the St. Lawrence River and then across to the Ohio and the Mississippi to its mouth at New Orleans. On rare occasions when England and France were at war, some British ships and men would be sent across the Atlantic to help the colonies or to capture some especially ob-

jectionable fort along the Atlantic seaboard of Canada. But they soon withdrew and things went on much as before.

Yet as time passed, the colonists did become aware of their common interests, although without any special enthusiasm. In case of need, each colony sent its own agents to Great Britain for its own objectives. In the West the boundaries of the colonies were vague and all claims reached to the Pacific Ocean, wherever that was. This is not an exaggeration of the situation.

Thus, when the Governor of Virginia sent a young man by the name of George Washington to bring back reports on the French movements in the neighborhood of what is now Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was not consulted. The result was the opening of the last stage of the Second Hundred Year War between England and France and the sending of a small force of British regulars under General Braddock to destroy Fort Duquesne. Washington, made a Colonel in the Virginia Militia, raised and commanded the Virginian troops who alone succeeded in rescuing the mortally wounded Braddock from a French and Indian ambush. After this the Virginian troops took little part in the war. It was New England and New York troops who cooperated with the British forces out of Boston and New York.

With the end of the war and the removal of the constant menace of French aggression in the north, the way seemed open for a period of peaceful development. However, the British government under the influence of the new king, George III, decided to tighten up the administration. Parliament now declared its right to interfere in every aspect of colonial life to secure money to pay off the British war debt. This involved also the placing of garrisons in various seaport towns in addition to the regiment of the Royal Americans on Governors Island, New York, and also at vital points in the interior, while more and more the British authorities in Quebec tried to use the French for the fur trade in the West. The British Navigation Acts were refurbished to check the colonial trade with Europe and the West Indies and various other taxes, as the Stamp Act and the tax on tea, served to irritate the colonists who refused to accept the new innovations.

It was not long before Benjamin Franklin, who had organized a sort of colonial postal service, was sent to England as a representative of Pennsylvania on some state matters, but he soon became the representative of almost all the colonies in London.

The growing discontent led to the withdrawing of most of the royal governors who took refuge on British ships in the harbors and they were joined by a small number of ardent royalists. Yet the in-

ternal administration went on as before with the general assemblies in control in each colony; they were still composed of almost the same members with some new elective members or coopted members and occasionally met as a distinct body, with the same powers in some place other than the legal and usual capital. In other words, the colony governments changed not only slowly but decisively and painlessly.

When the British, alarmed over the situation in Boston, threw more troops into the city and closed the port, it seemed almost the last straw and the feeling grew that something should be done. The call for a Continental Congress was sent out and this met in the autumn of 1774 in Philadelphia. It consisted of 54 members from twelve of the thirteen colonies (Georgia sent none), but these men were well familiar with the administrative methods of their colonies and almost all were competent exponents of the art of governing as practiced in the colonies. They organized themselves, decided to grant each colony one vote and to try for negotiations with Great Britain. In the meanwhile bands of Minutemen were founded throughout the colonies out of the local militias, many of whom had served in the war against France, and stores of ammunition were built up.

When in April, 1775, General Gage, the commander in Boston, forced hostilities by trying to seize the Massachusetts leaders and the stores at Concord and Lexington, the revolt flared. The Second Continental Congress was held and here George Washington openly appeared in his Virginia uniform and was speedily appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army to be formed. The struggle was now on in earnest but it was still carried on in defense of the rights of Englishmen and still was in the name of the King. Work began on drawing up a general scheme of government, the Articles of Confederation, which made the Continental Congress absolutely dependent for funds on the contributions of the different colonies, which could not be compelled to honor any demand of the center. In other words, the war was to be fought by thirteen (for Georgia had joined) independent but allied colonies.

During the rest of 1775, the Continental Congress began to assume the role of the civilian command of a political organization actively engaged in war and with the transfer of military operations from Boston to New York, which speedily fell into the British hands. The feeling for independence grew rapidly. The Continental Congress President, John Hancock of Massachusetts, accordingly appointed a committee to draw up an appropriate Declaration of Independence and after considerable revision, this was duly adopted on July 4, 1776

and signed by John Hancock. Later all the other members added their signatures including Charles Carroll of Carrolltown, Maryland, who dryly remarked, "We must hang together or we'll hang separately." To a surprising degree they did hang together and galvanized into life a new form of government.

The system, adopted by the Articles of Confederation, was kept throughout the war. At its close, the states became even more averse to supporting the Continental Congress, and after Independence many states failed to send delegates. Yet the country staggered through to independence and peace. Then Connecticut gave up its claims to the Northwest Territories, now the Middle States, to the central government. In 1787 Washington and some of his friends called the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. They quickly decided to scrap the old form of government, and after some months they presented the new Constitution substantially as it is today and created a new nation able to exist.

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We can contrast this with the situation in Ukraine in 1917. Almost overnight the entire Czarist system crumbled with the abdication of Czar Nicholas II. With him disappeared the power of the higher bureaucracy which had been able to thwart the wishes of the *Duma* almost at will, and the *Duma* at best was not representative. The authority of that group which formed the Provisional Government was challenged immediately by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies even though that was not yet under the control of the Bolsheviks, for Lenin had not yet returned in a German sealed train. On all sides there began an intense political struggle on ideological grounds amid calls for an immediate "peace with no annexations or indemnities." The full extent of the war weariness of the empire now became evident and there was no firm hand to succeed in gathering and remodelling the instruments of government.

In this situation the Ukrainian soldiers, usually formed into almost solid Ukrainian divisions with Russian officers, began to display the hitherto banned Ukrainian colors of blue and yellow and to call for the introduction of Ukrainian as the language of command. They also wanted peace, although they insisted upon the granting of equal rights to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, something of which they had been deprived since the ending of the *Hetman* State and the *Sich*. The same feelings were displayed in Kiev and in the other Ukrainian centers to the south and east throughout the whole of Greater Ukraine.

In this crisis Professor Michael Hrushevsky, the great Ukrainian historian, who had been in exile in Northern Russia, appeared in Petrograd and then after one or two speeches returned to Kiev and took over first the unofficial and then the official leadership of the Ukrainian movement. He had an encyclopedic knowledge of the past history and social interests of the Ukrainian peasant and had been a leader already for nearly half a century, first in Galicia and later in Greater Ukraine, but he had necessarily had little practical knowledge of political administration, although he was the recognized spokesman not only for the Ukrainian Progressives but for all the forward-looking democratic parties.

In Kiev his closest collaborator was perhaps the writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko, a Social Democrat but by no means a Bolshevik. He had long been known for his outspoken opposition to the Czarist government and had more than once found it expedient to bow before the storm and to leave the Empire for a time. For some years he had lived near M. Gorky in Italy and was exceedingly well known in all Ukraine.

The two men were instrumental in the holding of the early Ukrainian congresses which resulted in the broadening of the Central *Rada* which became the administrative controller of the Ukrainian movement. Neither man was fully in sympathy with the desires of the Ukrainian soldiers, and both sought to solve the manifold and varied problems peacefully and if possible come to an agreement with the Provisional Government and secure a Ukrainian state associated with the free Russia which had been promised by the Provisional Government. They were also suspicious of the role of Simon Petlura, who for years as a non-soldier had studied military tactics and theories and as Minister of War in the Little *Rada* or cabinet, kept calling for the creation of a Ukrainian army that would be able to take the field in case of need. Yet all these men, whatever their parties, agreed that the first question was to secure such autonomy or independence as would permit the Ukrainian peasants to solve by themselves, without Russian or Petrograd interference, the distribution of Ukrainian land to needy and landless Ukrainian peasants who had been forced into dependence on the great Ukrainian landholders, most of whom were Russian nobles.

We do not need to go into a detailed description of all the difficulties which they encountered. The Provisional Government, whether under Prince Lvov or Alexander Kerensky, continued to assert the impossibility of granting any real autonomy until the meeting of the Russian Constituent Assembly and the necessity of maintaining



the unity of the Russian Empire, and this was maintained with almost equal fervor by the Petrograd Soviet which was growing more under the influence of Lenin.

On the other hand, the *Rada* had to contend with the remains of the old Russian organizations in Kiev and the other Ukrainian cities. These Russian organizations were better and more closely organized and richer than the newer Ukrainian groupings which had arisen since the downfall of the monarchy, however much popular support they received. The Russians composed and controlled the police and they had an armed garrison of former Russian soldiers selected largely for their non-Ukrainian character at their command and a large and wealthy propertied class willing to support them. As a result, even in Kiev itself where the *Rada* met, it was necessary to counter the constant plotting and demands of this old group of Russian loyalists, even though they no longer had any close support from Petrograd. At the same time, elements that broke off from them, especially among the city workers, had a tendency to support the Petrograd Soviet which was becoming more Bolshevik every day.

Even so, it was a mark of the success of the *Rada* that it succeeded in holding its position, forming as cabinet the General Secretariat and issuing the first two *Universals* in the summer of 1917 and of extending its influence, even though some of its administrative and financial measures could not be carried out as effectively as it desired. It accomplished much, though there were frequent rumors that Kerensky was planning to arrest the leaders and carry them to Petrograd for trial, although this never was attempted.

The situation changed materially when Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd in the October Revolution (N.S. November 7). This seriously weakened the power of the Russian monarchists in Kiev but it also threw new responsibilities on the *Rada* which issued the Third *Universal*, going further toward Ukrainian independence.

This roused the *Rada* to a full sense of the danger to which Ukraine was exposed and hurried steps were taken to prepare for defense. The entire Western front was being abandoned by all sections of the Russian army and the demoralization increased as the troops, including many of the Ukrainian divisions which had sought early Ukrainization, streamed across Ukrainian territory on their way to their homes not as organized units in most cases but as a disorderly mob, pillaging as they went to maintain life.

On December 13, there was in Kiev a Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies intended to pave the way for a Soviet seizure of Ukraine, but the *Rada* saw to it that its supporters were well represented and when a vote was taken, scarcely sixty out of more than two thousand voted for the Soviets. These immediately withdrew to Kharkiv and took steps to form the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The *Rada* with its Ukrainized Division of General Paul Skoropadsky foiled soon an armed uprising and disarmed the chief Communist units and moved them out of Ukraine. This was followed on December 17 by the Bolshevik recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic as an independent state, followed immediately by an ultimatum ordering Ukraine to return the arms which it had taken from the Communist forces, release all Communists and refuse passage to the Don Cossacks who were returning home and with whom the Communists were fighting. Otherwise the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, composed primarily of Russians, would declare war. When the *Rada* rejected the ultimatum, a Russian "Ukrainian" army speedily began to invade Ukraine.

The Western powers, France, Great Britain and the United States had already entered into relations with the *Rada* but with the Dardanelles closed, they could send no assistance or supplies. In the meanwhile the Soviets had entered into peace negotiations with the Germans and Austrians at Brest, so as to free them from German hostility and allow them to press the war on Ukraine more successfully. The *Rada* determined in its turn to send delegates to Brest to seek peace with Germany and aid against the Communists. They secured both but none too soon, for as it happened the government withdrew from Kiev, and the Bolsheviks for the first time captured the city and commenced a period of terror and massacre. The undertrained and hastily gathered Ukrainian army with a shortage of supplies had been unable to cope with the better armed Russians from the north with their access to the supplies left by the Czarist regime, despite the bravery and self-sacrifice shown by the students of the cadet corps at the battle of Kruty.

Yet the decision to seek German help had bad consequences, for it allowed the Poles and the supporters of the old regime abroad to depict the entire Ukrainian struggle as one inspired by Germany and from that time on neither the French, British nor Americans would render any aid or furnish supplies to the Ukrainian government and its armed forces. Instead they completely boycotted the struggle and threw their support to the Poles and the so-called White Russians.

The German army speedily ended the Bolshevik menace and cleared Ukraine but the *Rada* still proved unable to take decisive action either on the land question or the task of building an army and to carry out the provisions of the agreement with Germany for the furnishing of grain. As a result, the Germans, who in 1918 were already beginning to suffer from a food shortage, invaded and dispersed the *Rada* by force despite the protests of Hrushevsky and the other leaders. These at once withdrew and this time the Germans turned to the conservative landowners and used them to set up a new government, the state of Ukraine, under General Paul Skoropadsky as *Hetman*.

The government of the *Hetman* was itself largely dependent upon the Germans and it introduced definitely reactionary legislation which deeply offended all classes of the peasants and workers. In the meantime the more active members of the *Rada* concealed their activities and waited while a Bolshevik peace mission remained in Kiev indulging in secret propaganda. The *Hetman* and the Germans still did not strengthen the army or provide new and trained cadres but rather drew nearer to the position of the White Russians and visualized the *Hetman* state as part of a future Russian federation with much the same system as before the collapse.

When the regime of the Kaiser ended on November 11, it was obvious that the days of the *Hetman* state were numbered. Petlura and Vynnychenko rallied some Ukrainian troops and the Western Ukrainian Riflemen of the *Sich* and by a series of almost brilliant maneuvers took control of Kiev and restored the Ukrainian National Republic with relatively little bloodshed.

The new state which adopted even more radical views than in 1917 was immediately menaced by a new invasion of a Communist army in the name of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic but much else had changed. The Western allies refused any help to the new government and while representatives of the Republic of Western Ukraine appeared in Kiev and proclaimed the establishment of one Ukrainian state, this was of necessity more symbolic than effective. The government was soon replaced by a small Directory in which Petlura took the leading role, while the Poles continued pressure on the West and a French-Greek detachment seized Odessa and favored the revived and rearmed White Russians.

The next two years saw a gallant and hopeless struggle as the under-equipped Ukrainian army, deprived of supplies and even medicine by the allied blockade and faced not only by avowed enemies and a typhus epidemic, but unruly local bands under various self-

appointed *otamans* who changed sides almost at will, struggled on. It fought its way back into Kiev only to be forced out by a White Russian army well equipped by the West.

Finally, as a last desperate measure, Petlura abandoned Western Ukraine and made an alliance with Marshal Pilsudski of Poland. Once again in the spring of 1920 a joint Ukrainian-Polish army entered Kiev. Then came the great attack led by the Cavalry Army of Budenny which forced the withdrawal from Kiev and the retreat to the Vistula where in early September, again with French help and a brilliant counterstroke by the Polish-Ukrainian forces at Warsaw, the Soviet army was destroyed and withdrew in complete defeat.

Yet by now the Poles forgot all about the treaty of alliance with Ukraine and, in October, signed an armistice with the Bolsheviks at Riga. This doomed the Ukrainian cause. For a while the Ukrainian army was sheltered in Polish territory from which it made a few desperate sorties but it was soon disarmed and the organized struggle came to an end, while the Communists put down scattered revolts inside Ukraine with great brutality and slaughter.

In retrospect, we can see the causes of the final debacle. The *Rada* and the General Secretariat, torn by ideological disputes and voicing conflicting political theories, had been unable to adopt a general and firm stand on the land question and the other vital issues of establishing an internal administration able to win the support of the peasants. They did not lack ideals or patriotism but they had not had sufficient experience to set up a viable regime which could mobilize the human and material resources of Ukraine for the struggle.

Perhaps the location of Ukraine, with the Dardanelles closed in the crucial period and no reliable source of supplies, made their task impossible. Yet it was precisely those assets, the preserving of a competent local administration, the patriotism of the militia and the gradual formation of a Continental Army under a commander who combined military leadership with supreme loyalty and personal integrity, that allowed the young United States to continue what seemed a hopeless struggle until it culminated in the alliance with France and victory.

That was the reason why Taras Shevchenko could appeal for a new Washington with a new and righteous law. The attempt in 1917 failed but it aroused a new interest and a new life in Ukrainian society as a whole and the time will surely come when a new opportunity will be presented for Ukraine to merge its traditions of Kozak liberty and a modern free state. May it be soon!

## BOOK REVIEWS

**THE FORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC.** By Oleh Semenovych Pidhainy, St. Thomas University. Preface by M. Mladenovic, McGill University. New Review Books, Toronto-New York, pp. 685, 1966.

In this year of 1967 the entire world is resounding under the strident propaganda from Moscow announcing the observances of the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, which, according to the Kremlin, was the opening of a blissful era in mankind's history. The events which took place in 1917 were indeed epoch-making, precipitating a series of great changes in Europe and elsewhere. But no paradise on earth was established by the Bolsheviks, and no freedom was attained for the liberty-starved Russian and non-Russian peoples of the former Czarist prison of nations.

The non-Russian nations, too, will observe an outstanding anniversary, for in 1967 fifty years have elapsed since their own national revolutions erupted, culminating in the establishment of their own independent and sovereign states.

Ukraine was one of the first captive nations of the Czarist empire to rise and fight for freedom. The epic story of the struggle of the Ukrainian people is vividly narrated in Prof. Pidhainy's *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic*.

From the viewpoint of Eastern European and Ukrainian history here is a very important and reliable work. Author Pidhainy reveals a sure and unerring hand in delving into the endless chaos, confusion and mutual hostility that characterized the time in which Ukraine thrust itself upward to achieve national statehood.

In nine fact-packed chapters the author lucidly demonstrates how the Ukrainians succeeded in acquiring the three fundamental prerequisites for existence as an independent state: a central authority in command of the Ukrainian ethnic territory, a *de facto* acceptance of the new government by other countries, and, finally, a *de jure* recognition by foreign powers, allowing the new state to become a member of the international family of nations.

In Chapters I-II the author meticulously details the establishment and initial functioning of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and its tedious and drawn-out negotiations with the Kerensky Provisional Government. The latter body, supposedly a democratic one, was wholly hostile to the idea of an independent Ukraine, even though the *Rada*, in dealing with the Kerensky regime, made abundantly clear Ukraine's willingness to remain within a democratic Russian federation as an autonomous unit. Further on, in Chapters III - VI, the author deals with the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic by the *Rada*, its real and actual control of the administration and the army; the recognition *de facto* of the Ukrainian Republic by the governments of France and Great Britain, and, finally, the recognition of the independent Ukrainian government by Communist Russia and the subsequent Russo-Ukrainian war, which was initiated by Lenin and Trotsky.

The final Chapters, VII - IX, dwell on the recognition of Ukraine by the Central Powers in the Brest Litovsk Peace Treaty and the consolidation of the Ukrainian Republic.

Although the new Russian government claimed it would follow a democratic course, it immediately set up all sorts of obstacles in the way of the Central *Rada*, thus impeding the realization of Ukrainian autonomy. The Bolshevik revolution unleashed a plethora of forces which often clashed, owing to differing political programs and objectives. In Ukraine, too, there were groups which represented all types of economic and social ideas and class interests. Most of the Russian groups in Ukraine were openly hostile to the Ukrainian movement. The other national minorities were divided. The Jews, for example, split into factions, some supporting the *Rada*, others siding with the Bolsheviks.

One of the significant points made in the book is the fact that it was the French and British who first recognized Ukraine as an independent state, and not the Germans and Austrians as is popularly believed in the West. Long before the signing of the peace treaty in Brest Litovsk both the French and the British governments had sent special envoys to Kiev who were *de facto* accredited with the Ukrainian government. The French envoy, General Tabouis, after presenting his credentials to the Ukrainian government in Kiev, reported to Paris.

"... Perhaps in the future the Ukraine will be considered an error... it may become an undesirable child, but there is the fact: this child is born; in the general disarray, the total disintegration, the Ukraine seems bound to become a point of crystallization, and therefore let us help her..." (p. 302).

Great Britain followed suit by dispatching Picton Bagge as the "Representative of Great Britain in Ukraine." The British envoy assured the Ukrainian government that "the Government of His British Majesty... will support in all its strength the Ukrainian government in its endeavor which it undertook for the purpose of making a good government, maintain order and combat the Central Powers, the enemies of democracy and humanity..." (p. 366).

The author is unmistakably critical of American officialdom for its lack of interest in Ukraine. Although France and Great Britain did extend *de facto* recognition to Ukraine, the United States refused to follow suit, although an American Consulate was established in Kiev and despite pressures exerted by Paris and London on Washington. He discloses that American archives provide much less information than those of Great Britain, France or Germany, inasmuch as many events in or affecting Ukraine were simply not recorded by American officials at that time, especially those stationed in Russia and Ukraine.

From the transliteration viewpoint the book is not free, unfortunately, from some errors and undesirable conventions. For instance, the use of "the" with Ukraine has never been and is not used by Ukrainian scholars for obvious reasons. Also, in designating the Ukrainian "soft sign" the author uses cumbersome apostrophes (*Beresteys'kyi myr, al'manakh, borot'ba, etc.*), even in the titles of books and articles. The Slavic languages are difficult enough for non-Slavs without introducing additional signs and symbols. Again, some surnames are given without given names (Stepankivsky, Gen, Tabouis, etc.).

On the whole, however, the book is an excellent treatment of the history of Ukraine, adding welcome light on an important area of the world left for too long in obscurity.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

**TARAS SEVCENKO; SEIN LEBEN UND SEIN WERK.** Unter der Redaktion von Jurij Bojko und Erwin Koschmieder. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965, xvi, 492 pp., DM 68.

Among the many works on Shevchenko released in Ukraine and abroad in 1964, the 150th anniversary of his birth, the German publication *Taras Sevcenko: Sein Leben und sein Werk*, stands out as a unique contribution to the works on this great Ukrainian poet. The present volume, the result of the collaboration and research of Jurij Bojko and Erwin Koschmieder, presents the most recent study on Shevchenko in German. Indeed, high praise is to be bestowed on the editors of this fine publication for having attempted to show the totality of Shevchenko's literary genius. They have included in their work biographical materials, literary and aesthetic studies, Shevchenko's own poetical works, a diary in translation and also memoirs of Shevchenko's contemporaries.

The preface to this work was written by the well-known German Slavist, Dr. E. Koschmieder, who stresses the importance of Shevchenko to his nation and to the world. He sees in Shevchenko a productive personality and a creative spirit whom it is highly worthwhile to know and to study.

The literary studies written by Dr. Jurij Bojko are authoritative through their thorough and polished mastery of the material presented and their reliability even in minute details. Dr. Bojko is known abroad as a Ukrainian Shevchenko scholar who has written a number of studies covering Shevchenko's life and works. In his studies he presents a complete and many-sided portrait of the poet through his exclusive and unusual method of comparisons. The central place in this publication is occupied by Bojko's "Sevcenko und die westeuropäische Literatur," where an attempt has been made to assign Shevchenko a place among the great literary masters of the Western world and to show Shevchenko's literary ingenuity and the forces which linked him to the great Western literary heritage. This particular study published now in German, appeared originally in Ukrainian and has had three editions in English. As of now it is the most elaborate work in this field because of its judicious selection of materials and its bold method of comparison.

In this study by Bojko Shevchenko stands as a symbol in which characteristic attitudes of Western literary thought have found a beautifully pure and spontaneous expression. It is exactly here where Shevchenko appears truly great, not only through his poetic mastery, but through the sum of his human manifestations. To show his intellectual and emotional profile, Dr. Bojko outlines the decisive stages of his life which crystallized the individual productions that stand out among the poetical works of other great poets. Because of the great variety and flexibility in his approach, Dr. Bojko succeeds to a great extent in comprehending Shevchenko's productive personality and its expression in literary art. This understanding helps the author to grasp thoroughly his works and his contact with the Western heritage. Shevchenko, as presented by Bojko, is the embodiment of a great creative force which permeated the Western heritage with Ukrainian artistic expressions and with elements of Ukrainian folk speech, all of which gave Shevchenko's poetry an astonishing power of expression and a colorful cast.

The translations of Shevchenko's poetical works are well selected. The editors used the translations of eleven different translators. Among them we find translations by the famous Ukrainian poet and writer, Ivan Franko, who accomplished much in the study of Shevchenko's poetry in Ukrainian. The

poems included in this edition are well representative of Shevchenko's themes and display the variety of his poetic style. Reading the notes accompanying the translated poetry one finds that the editors worked diligently in an effort to improve certain stanzas. The greatest asset of all these translations lies in the fact that the editors had artistic considerations in mind and tried to bring all other factors into harmony with them. In almost every case the translations prove adequately that they were rendered by experienced and poetically-minded people who strove to translate the Ukrainian text as closely as possible and at the same time to provide good German poetry.

To see the merits of a German translation let us examine the ballad "Die Ertrunkene" (Utoplena), translated by A. Kurella, and its Ukrainian original by Shevchenko:

Tiefe Nacht. Der Wind ist müde,  
 Ruht im Haine still,  
 Dann erwacht er — leise fragt er  
 Bei dem grünen Schilf:  
 "Sag doch, sag: am Ufer hüben  
 Wer kämmt sich hier? Sag!  
 Sag doch, sag: am Ufer drüben  
 Wer rauft sich das Haar?  
 Sag doch, sag!" — so fragt er leise,  
 Weht noch, und dann geht er  
 Wieder schlafen, bis der Himmel  
 Morgendlich sich rötet.

Ukrainian original:

Viter u haji ne hulaje —  
 Vnochi spochyvaje;  
 Prokynet'sja, — tyxesen'ko  
 V osoky pytaje:  
 "Xto se, xto se po sim boci  
 Cheshe kosu? Xto se?...  
 Xto se, xto se po tim boci  
 Rve na sobi kosy?...  
 Xto se, xto se?" — tyxesen'ko  
 Spytaje — povije,  
 Ta i zadrima, poky neba  
 Kraj zachervonije.

(*Kobzar*, vol. 1, p. 265, Winnipeg, 1952)

"Utoplena" is a very difficult ballad for translation purposes. In this example, Shevchenko made use of words for pictorial descriptions which also rendered sound effects. This feature added to the accuracy, secrecy and liveliness of the scene. The German translation does not have as strong a sound effect as its Ukrainian original despite the fact that the translator made an effort to use alliteration as his basic phonetic principle. However, the German translation shows great accuracy in depicting scenes, provides for the secrecy



which is so characteristic of any ballad and presents all the features of liveliness truly in Shevchenko's style. In this translation the ballad meter is preserved and remains adequate in meaning. It appears natural and unprosaic and matches German poetry. However, in order to overcome structural differences between the German and Ukrainian, the translator rendered 49 of Shevchenko's words in 63 German words.

To be mentioned is that almost all translations are as close as possible to the original, and most of them are on a high aesthetic level. Each translation has something original which displays the personality and the poetic abilities of the translator. Perhaps it is of greater value to publish the translations of works by several translators rather than of one. In this approach, the publication gains several exclusively fine and original features in individual poems. It loses, however, its overall character. The editors of this publication were well aware of this fact and did their utmost to give the majority of the translations cohesion and unity.

The fragments of Shevchenko's diary were translated for this edition by L. Bucyna. The translator preserved Shevchenko's prosaic letter style, thus retaining the humor and sorrow of the great poet. Well depicted is the religious mood which is so characteristic of Shevchenko the thinker.

A great asset to this publication is its well organized and specialized bibliography with, for example, such subtitles as Shevchenko's place in world literature, the problems of translating Shevchenko's works into other languages, the ideological fight for Shevchenko's work, censorship and Shevchenko, etc. This edition of studies on Shevchenko and his poetry offers much for those who read German. First, it gives them a clear-cut image of Shevchenko as an immortal bard; second, it shows that his poetic word was fiery and creative, full of invincible spirit; third, that his great poetic mastery was adequately based on the poetical heritage of Western Europe.

If any criticism is to be voiced against this publication, it would apply to studies covering the life of Shevchenko which should be presented to the German reader in a different fashion than to Ukrainians. We must understand that viewpoints which are obvious for Ukrainians can be easily misunderstood by Germans. The dark times of Nicholas I could be depicted more distinctly; then Shevchenko would appear not only as a great poet but also as a great and invincible human being, and his cult among Ukrainians would become more meaningful for Germans and other foreign readers.

The great merit of the publication lies in the fact that the editors did not overlook the basic unity of Shevchenko's personality. They integrated all the features of his life and works, thus giving an adequate response to the title of this edition. We believe that the reader who has followed the editors' presentation from beginning to end will acquire a total and comprehensive view of Shevchenko, who rose from the lowest social position to become the great poet of his nation.

*Taras Sevcenko; sein Leben und sein Werk* is sponsored by the "Arbeits- und Forderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften," Munich, Sevcenko-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften," Sarcelles, and the "Unabhängige Assoziation zur Erforschung der sowjetischen Theorie und Praxis in den nationalen Fragen," Munich.

**THE COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATUS.** By Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov. Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc., Henry Regnery Company, Illinois, 1966, pp. 422.

For those inebriated with feelings about the approaching end of the Cold War, the evolution of good and soft communism, and a progressive detente with "Russia," this work can serve as an indispensable and sobering tonic. Perspective, content, careful documentation, experience, and close reasoning backed by substantiating evidence are the main ingredients of this truly valuable presentation. They are the means by which the author demonstrates, in effect, the Grand Illusion imprisoning the minds of so many in the democratic West. Numerous books on the Communist Party and its apparatus in the Soviet Union have been written in the past, but this reviewer cannot recall one that can be compared with this study as to depth, meaningful interpretation and analysis, and understanding of the multi-national complex of the USSR.

One of the reasons for the outstanding nature of the work is the author himself. A Chechen by nationality, Avtorkhanov had been a member of the Communist Party from 1927 to 1937. In the period of 1930-1934 he became the chief of the Organizational Department of the Chechen Regional Party Committee and also of the party publishing house. By 1937 he was graduated from the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow and soon thereafter was caught in Stalin's Great Purge, arrested as an "enemy of the people," and imprisoned for five years. World War II provided the occasion for his liberation, and since 1943 he has resided in Free Germany. The writer is associated with the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR and has written prolifically on various subjects pertaining to the Soviet Union. Judging by this background alone, it is obvious that the author brings a wealth of experience to the treatment of this vital subject.

The book is neatly and systematically arranged, lucidly written, and packed with notes assembled at the end so that even a beginner can grasp the fundamental importance of the CP apparatus both within and without the USSR. The first three chapters deal with Lenin's doctrines of the Party, revolution, and dictatorship, and each is studded with significant quotations buttressing the author's chief thesis that what exists in the USSR is a partocracy which is distinguishable from the ordinary totalitarianisms witnessed in non-communist areas. Chapters IV through IX cover in methodical fashion the Party cadres, the social transformation of the CPSU, the evolution of the Party's statutes, and the hierarchical committee network, with an analysis in each case drawn along historical and theoretical lines. The remainder of the book is devoted to the superior relationships of the Party with the institutions of the government, or *soviets*, the trade unions, the Comsomol, the economy, armed forces, and secret police, as well as its relations with the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR (under the so-called nationality question) and other non-Russian states under the caption of "foreign policy." The final chapter consists of the author's arguments for the acceptance of his thesis on partocracy.

Analysts with a profound appreciation of the background, scope, and depth of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism cannot but find the author's thesis unconvincing. Mind you, this is not to detract from his substantial contributions in the work. To simply differentiate his partocracy from Nazi, Fascist and other forms of non-Russian totalitarianism on the basis of "the will of one

party," pitting it up against the state, is clearly insufficient grounds for not accurately defining Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism as also being totalitarian. His thesis entails a blatant contradiction and fails to answer some fundamental questions. When he avers "the Party is the State," he indicates his own contradiction. Any state exists for the purpose of governing, and unless one posits with extreme, unbridled idealism an environment of real economic abundance where no scarce, economic goods would exist, there still would be the need for governing, even if by the Party itself. On non-determinist grounds, there would even be a greater need, for the vices of men would not be eliminated by economic abundance. Furthermore, there was as intense a Party consciousness in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy as one finds in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

It is regrettable that the author fails to cast the total picture into total balance. Admittedly, the Party is the main, focal point, and the author does a superb job in showing how a truly totalitarian party subordinates all of life to itself, including the state but excluding in great measure the inner consciences of men. But, logically, if the empire-state of the USSR were placed under intense psycho-political fire, particularly in terms of the captive nations issue, the Party itself, albeit the cohesive agent, would suffer immeasurably. Khrushchev, Suslov and others haven't squealed and bombasted on this score for vocal rehearsing. This area appears to be a complete blind-spot in the author's analysis, and nowhere does he raise the point that the new "Soviet man" can only become a Russian or Russianized being, speaking the Russian language, and enduring both the barbarisms and goods of Russian culture. In short, by overemphasizing the Party, though its role is crucial and central, the writer failed to carry through and project his analysis in chapter XIII where he furnishes many examples of Russian genocide of the non-Russian nations, Russification, and Russian colonialist exploitation.

Aside from his untenable thesis, the author scores well on certain essential points and not so well on others. The emphasis placed on the apparatus as a structural system, in which no individual counts for much in the last analysis, is quite important. Also, his stress on Lenin as a professional revolutionary is to the point. However, aside from one reference to the significant relationship, Lenin's heavy dependence on the works of the Prussian General von Clausewitz, who learned what he wrote mostly in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 19th century, is scarcely grasped. As a matter of fact, the writer seems to be woefully weak in the Czarist Russian precedents to the current Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist network.

The reader will profit immensely from the author's incisive observations on the basic opportunism of Lenin and his successors, the differences between Marxism and Leninism as concern the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the subject of economic maturation, and a totalitarian Party, and the outlines and directions of what is fundamentally Soviet Russian, rather than USSR, foreign policy. If he is versed in the subjects, he won't gain much in terms of complete political thought from the treatment given to Stalin's collectivization program, the reasons for Stalin's push to have non-Russian republic representation in the United Nations, and the historical context of Russian cold war tactics and empire-building. On this last point, it would probably stun the author to relate the tactics of a Khrushchev or Stalin, not to mention the two dull

types now leading the Red enterprise, with those of Ivan the Terrible or Alexander I.

Despite the many strictures and more that can be easily advanced against the work, it is, nevertheless, a worthwhile and illuminating study. Its prime value at this time rests in its basic refutation of "peaceful coexistence" and other illusory conceptions. It is must reading for the layman as well as the specialist.

*Georgetown University*

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

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**THE ICON AND THE AXE. AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN CULTURE.** By James H. Billington. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. pp. xviii + 786 + xxxiii.

This is an extremely interesting and well-written book. If in places it is difficult to read, it is largely because the author has introduced much material which is by no means new but which has been overlooked or ignored by most scholars heretofore. He has aimed at presenting an overall interpretation of Great Russian culture—the culture of the Russian North—and he has traced the two symbols of his title down into the period of the Communists in cogent fashion.

It is only unfortunate that he, like most American and western writers, should persist in applying the word "Russian" to the culture of Kiev in the early days instead of employing a word which is more suitable for the period. His first chapter on Kiev graphically depicts the tremendous difference between that culture, especially in its views of human life, Constantinople and Europe, at a time when the princesses of Kiev married freely into the various European royal families, and that which emerged from the northern forests. This attitude toward Europe and the Greeks is far more characteristic of Ukraine throughout its history than it is of Moscow and the Great Russians.

The author does recognize, however, the independent character of Rus' in several places. Thus he states (p. 16): "The chroniclers in the Russian north sensed that they were somewhat out of, using the term 'Rus' primarily for the old politico-cultural center on the Dnieper around Kiev." Or, again on the same page: "The mention of Russia that had been so frequent in early medieval French literature vanished altogether in the course of the fourteenth century" after the fall of Kiev and the transfer of power to the north and east.

"A sense of separation within the domain of the Eastern Slavs had already been suggested by the tenth-century Byzantine distinction between 'near' and 'distant' Rus' and in the thirteenth century the distinction between 'great' Russia in the north and 'little' Russia in the south was gradually transplanted from Byzantium to Russia." But it was more than a question of size because in the Greek-Byzantine terminology Little Greece was the homeland and the center and Magna Graecia the entire area in which Greek colonies from the homeland had been planted among non-Greek peoples. So great Rus' was regarded as being made up of settlements from the south rather than as component parts of the Kievan kernel.

He also lays too little stress on the fact that the band of union in the early period was not only a religious one. An important tie was that all the princes were descended from the family of Rurik through Vladimir (Volodymyr) and Yaroslav the Wise. Prince Andrei Bogoliubsky, who transferred the power, was

himself a descendant of Volodymyr Monomakh, the last great Grand Prince of Kiev. The princes of Moscow profited by all this, and the line continued there until the death of Feodor Ioannovich at the very end of the sixteenth century. Then with the coming of the Romanovs new theories had to be devised to make up for the disappearance of the line and to satisfy the burgeoning desire of Moscow for control. The solution was the theory of the "unity" of the Russian people and the degradation of the Ukrainian language to a local dialect (although even before the Russian Revolution the leading Russian philologists admitted the falsity of this, declaring that both Ukrainian and Great Russian had evolved as distinct languages from the original ancestor or ancestors of the entire Slavic group).

In describing the confrontation with Europe, he rightly shows the different results in the two areas. Foreign influences were first exerted on Novgorod and Moscow largely by the Hanseatic factories in Novgorod and Pskov. Through these, Spanish monks were able to persuade the more rigorous Muscovites to look with some admiration at the Spanish Inquisition as a means of strengthening the state. The Kievan area maintained more or less open communication with the Byzantines until the fall of Constantinople and later with the more developed cultures of the West, even though it led into dependence upon the Poles and a social denaturalization of most of their noble class.

As we read the volume we become aware of the fact that the kernel of Kievan Rus' was the steppe zone, the great invasion route of the nomads. Kiev was the center through which passed all the early missions to Asia. Moscow, along with its territories, on the other hand, was originally in the forest zone of the great primeval forests and therefore able to preserve its strength until it was ready to move for its own aggrandizement.

In his discussions of the cultural aspects, it is regrettable that the author should have paid so little attention to the *Tale of Igor* (Ihor) which is clearly of southern origin, even though the copy found was preserved in the north. (Although the authenticity of the work has often been disputed, especially by French scholars, for with the scanty remains of literature of the early period we can hardly find any parallels, many of its features are characteristic of many Ukrainian works from later centuries.)

All, in all, however, the author is to be commended for his work. A subsequent edition might rectify the tendency to change uses for words in order to describe Ukraine while still classifying it under Russia; this flaw confuses a reader who is not aware of the continuing efforts of Moscow to annihilate or Russify the Ukrainian culture, language and tradition.

*Columbia University*

CLARENCE A. MANNING

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BEYOND THE COLD WAR. Marshall D. Shulman. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966. \$3.75.

The delicate diplomatic handling of the recent defection of Stalin's daughter dramatically illustrated the fact that the character of the Cold War has definitely altered. Nevertheless it is difficult to imagine the government of the Soviet Union responding in a similarly restrained manner to an equally prominent defection from the West. Naivete and obsequiousness in the game of politics in no way enhance an adversary's respect for his enemies—or for his new-found friends.

But the nature of the Cold War has changed, and Professor Shulman has

written a limpid, concise, and intelligent book, for the specialist and the layman alike, describing the significant factors responsible for this change. In briefly examining the history of the Cold War, Professor Shulman finds that the policy of containment has proved successful, and combined with other factors, it has, since about 1955, brought about a strategic stabilization between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to him, the elements that have contributed to the process of stabilization include: the paradoxical development of military technology to the point where more military power does not necessarily produce more security; the technological innovations in transportation and communication responsible for the increasingly centralized command and control of foreign policy—at the same time, making an encounter world-wide in focus and involvement; the industrial growth of Western Europe and Japan enlarging their role in international politics; and the decolonization of Asia and Africa, and the explosion of nationalism in the underdeveloped countries.

The stabilization brought about by these factors, in turn, has had important reverberations on Cold War politics. It has led to the fragmentation of both blocs. It has made the contenders rely less on military capabilities and more on political and economic maneuvers. It has shifted military activity more to the underdeveloped areas. And it has led the Soviet leaders to concentrate on the further development of the Soviet economy as a means of expanding Soviet power and influence.

Professor Shulman devotes a chapter of his book to the recent academic debate concerning the transformation of the Soviet system. The debate centers on the question whether an advanced industrialized society can function and develop under a highly centralized economic and political system of government. Phrased in a more direct manner, the question is whether the Communist Party can retain and justify its administrative and controlling functions over an increasingly complex and economic system. The Soviet system has now become highly complex and diversified and requires trained specialists and technicians. It can no longer rely upon the former less sophisticated methods of control and administration. To be efficient, it must follow its own *apolitical* logic and rationale. Consequently, a number of analysts argue that the Party is in trouble. It was seriously compromised by the 1956 de-Stalinization campaign. Its position as the leading Communist Party and as the official and infallible exponent of Communist ideology has been seriously challenged by China and by the Western Communist Parties. Also, one of the basic ideological justifications for the Party's rule and policy has been further undermined by the Party's own tacit acknowledgment that the world-wide proletarian revolution is in fact a myth. And now even the economic system that it helped to create is turning on its master and demanding more freedom and independence. The Party is fully aware of these problems, and Khrushchev's abortive attempt in 1962 to divide the Party into agricultural and industrial sectors was meant to correct a number of these shortcomings by making the Party more directly relevant to the system. The new leaders are wary of the divisive forces that such a split might unleash and prefer to keep the Party in a more aloof but united position. Thus the problem of the Party's role under the present new and different conditions has not yet been resolved. For the moment it has been merely shelved and postponed.

Internally, the Soviet system has also changed in its reduced reliance upon terror as an economically and politically motivating force, in its increased emphasis on the production of consumer goods, and in the rise of vocal interest

groups. Therefore some observers argue that these new elements are leading the Soviet Union to develop into a pluralistic, and, in time, into a democratic society. Professor Shulman is skeptical of such optimistic conclusions. He does not overestimate the independent dynamism of these seemingly pluralistic forces, nor does he underestimate the ability of the Party to adopt to new conditions while retaining its monopoly on political and economic power.

However, Professor Shulman's interest lies in foreign policy, and he correctly observes that Soviet foreign policy is primarily shaped by the external environment and not by domestic developments. Similarly, he understands that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union both in the past and at present is motivated by purely national interests and not by the symbolic language of Communist ideology.

In examining Soviet foreign policy toward the West during the last decade, Professor Shulman notes that the USSR attempts to encourage the fragmentation of the Western bloc rather than revolutionary trends. Also, the Soviet Union realizes that these fragmenting interests are best served under conditions of reduced tension. The dilemma is that the reduction in tensions tends to increase the trend toward fragmentation within its own bloc. Also because of the militant and ambitious attitude of China, the Soviet leaders are forced to increase their own militancy in order to retain the loyalty of the emerging nations. This militancy, understandably, again serves to increase tensions with the West. Thus in many ways the USSR faces a two-horned dilemma, if not a two-front conflict, in all of its major foreign policy decisions.

In the light of his above analysis, Professor Shulman therefore concludes that although the terms and the environment of the Cold War have greatly changed, the conflict itself is not over. However, the earlier narrow view of the Cold War is no longer applicable or realistic, especially in providing a framework for foreign policy decisions.

There is only one important oversight in this otherwise considered examination of Cold War politics. Professor Shulman is fully aware of what he himself calls the "explosive factors of nationalism," and yet he does not take into account the significant fact that the Soviet Union is a conglomeration of at least sixteen nations which are far from content with their secondary place in the Soviet Union. For decades the only justification the Communist Party had for maintaining and enlarging its hegemony over the nations of the former Czarist Empire was the ideological myth of its leading role in the world-wide Communist revolution. Now that the myth has deteriorated and has been recognized as a convenient rationalization, and the reality of Russian nationalism is correctly discerned as the motivating force of Soviet foreign policy, the ideological justification for the present Communist Empire has disintegrated. Now there exists no sound political, cultural, or logical reason why Russians should rule over Armenians, Byelorussians, Estonians, Georgians, Kazakhs, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and the many other nations within the forced and artificial collection of countries that is called the Soviet Union. Russia today is the greatest colonialist, the last imperialistic nation in the world. Yet this obvious fact is seldom mentioned or even recognized by the West. Perhaps the West fears to face this unpleasant fact and its consequences, or, as with the defection of Stalin's daughter, it is needlessly too delicate and too diplomatic. Politically, this is a serious error, and humanistically, it is brutal. It is not necessary nor feasible to conduct a policy of brinkmanship. However to completely ignore the national strivings of over half the population of the Soviet Union is to be blind to political realities and pos-

sibilities. And political analysts who should be aware of these facts but overlook them, may unwittingly do harm to their government's foreign policy interests, its security and prestige.

WALTER ODAJNYK

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*THE POLITICS OF SURRENDER.* By M. Stanton Evans, New York: Devin-Adair, 1966, pp. 567.

Young Stan Evans, editor of the *Indianapolis News* and prolific writer in behalf of conservative and anti-Communist causes, always writes an exciting and important book. This one is no exception. In it, he argues persuasively that slavery continues to advance over freedom because Communism has a goal and the Free World has none, unless it be "live and let live."

*The Politics of Surrender* is the best up-to-date analysis of the Communist-Free World confrontation that I have seen; it deserves the widest possible readership. Mr. Evans is particularly skillful in dissecting non-Communist (as distinguished from anti-Communist) responses to the Communist challenge. Among these are the notions of Walt Rostow, J. William Fulbright, the *Liberal Papers*, various disarmament schemes, trade and cultural exchanges, and others. In each case Mr. Evans believes that the response is either inadequate, or that it actually contributes in an unwitting way, to Communist advances.

The author discusses several critical areas, such as south-east Asia, Cuba, Africa, and the Mediterranean, to demonstrate how the combination of Communist aggression and Free World ineptitude has led to a diminution of human freedoms. In one chapter Mr. Evans goes into the role of the *New York Times* in shaping not only public opinion but also government policy along anti-Communist lines. He cites the *Times* editorial policy during the Spanish civil war, the Chinese "civil war," the Castro take-over in Cuba, and Vietnam as cases in point. On the Russian famine of 1932-33, Mr. Evans quotes Walter Duranty of the *Times*: "There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition." Also noted are the important contributions of Herbert Matthews of the *Times* both during the Spanish affair and the Castro take-over (Castro might well have declared: "I got my job through the *New York Times*").

The best chapter is the last one, entitled "The History Theory of Conspiracy." Evans quotes Dr. Charles Malik: "If you believe... the outcome of the struggle in China, in Korea, in Indochina; the Communist penetration of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America; the absence of any effective countering force to the Communist Party; the relative decline in Western influence... could not have been helped, then you are already a Marxist."

Liberals, according to Mr. Evans, are chronically unable to understand the nature of the war we are in. They excuse Free World setbacks with talk about the inexorable forces of history. But as the author demonstrates, the Communists would have lost in Eastern Europe, China and elsewhere if nature had been allowed to take its course. After World War II the Free World was strong and the Communists weak. The Communists would have lost free elections anywhere. Even at that, Marxists like Jagan, Nkrumah and Sukarno have been deposed in spite of support from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. And, says Evans, "it is reasonable to conclude other Marxist dictators now receiving American largesses might be equally vulnerable if we stopped supporting them with



American dollars. "If a hold-up man confronts you on the street, you do not offer to give him the jackknife you have in your pocket or supply him with a few vitamin pills because he seems a little peaked."

A forward policy for the United States would have as its first objective the overthrow of Communist sanctuaries in Cuba and in North Vietnam: "If we are to relieve the free world from the pressures of aggression, we must stop guaranteeing the Communists that their bases of operation will be immune to our attack."

Mr. Evans' notes at the end of the book constitute a veritable bibliography of Cold War literature. There is an index.

*Le Moyne College*

ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN

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*NATIONALISM AND IDEOLOGY.* By Barbara Ward, New York, W. W. Norton, Inc., 1966, pp. 125.

Barbara Ward's recent book uses a description of past societal structures, a judgment of nationalism and its results, and a prescription for world peace in advancing her views on the modern world. The author chose three factors, kinship, ideology, and function, which she determined are of prime importance in the formation and preservation of communities. Kinship is the individual's sense of membership in a particular social organization. Ideology is the attachment of significance to man's life and the attempt, by man, to explain his life. Function is the structure of the organizations man uses to distribute necessary work within his community. These three interact at every stage of community, and yet there is an infinite variety of choices within the formulation of social structures. Varieties in social structures are seen both in history and in present-day life where we have tribalism existing beside great industrial nations.

The first social unit, the tribe, was followed by successively complex organizations such as empires, nation-states, and post-national states. Two groups also made important contributions to changing man's life. The Greeks gave man the organizations and concepts that hold dynamic nation-states together. The Jews gave man an idea of social justice and an awareness of the opportunity to escape resignation to life and death. The Jews also permitted man to participate, through the idea of God, in guiding their destinies. These two contributions gave rise to a great period of history, the Renaissance, and the nation-states.

The nation-state period of history is noteworthy for the rise of a middle class; this in turn resulted in new groups seeking and demanding effective participation in the political life of the community. This rise of the middle class was accompanied, in time, by the industrial revolution which brought with it competition between nations for markets, resources, and colonies. This conflict and competition led us into the period which Barbara Ward calls, "Nationalism's Failures." Nationalism, to her, is a failure because it does not satisfy all three themes, kinship, ideology, and function. The author also expresses the opinion that the validity of any political organization is determined by its ability to contribute to the survival of mankind. The reviewer feels that her criticism of nationalism is valid in the sense of its failing to prevent two world wars. However, her past judgment of nationalism does not project to future actions of nationalism merely because the author says it will.

The book also contains two substantial chapters on the developments in two "post-national" attempts, capitalism and communism. Capitalism was the

first attempt to combine the three necessary ingredients for a peaceful community. Because of America's isolation, it might have achieved this community. However, the disruptive measures required to keep such an economic system functioning, and the wars in Europe, forced America to become involved in the nationalistic conflict begun by the European nations.

The post-nationalistic attempt of communism was another attempt to achieve the trinity, this time on a worldwide basis. Marx, in attacking a social system violating hopes for justice, equality, and progress, formed a vision with far-reaching implications. The application of his ideology, as the author notes, will fail because of its utopian qualities. The pattern of nationalism within the USSR is traced from a brief account of the attempts by Georgia and Ukraine to establish autonomy to the recent nationalistic rumblings in Malaya and Indonesia. The author implies a force of divisiveness, caused by nationalism and ideology, within communism. She also implies a cohesive force within capitalism; however, neither of these forces are traced.

From the post-mortems on capitalism and communism, and their assumed failures, the book continues into a prescription for world peace. For Barbara Ward, peace will exist through world government. The United States, because it has maintained a wide sense of the family of man, is the one power capable of leading the world to a universal government. The United States has been the main instrument in the formation of institutions already existing at the international level. It is also qualified for its role because of its attempts to seek equality, and to lessen the gap between the very rich and the impoverished. Through its economic strength, the United States can and should set precedents in aiding underdeveloped nations, precedents hopefully to be followed by other industrial nations. On the basis of these criteria, the United States is qualified to become the savior of the world. The USSR is not qualified for leadership because it has remained a closed society.

For the author, man's major fault is his retention of "tribal" instincts geared to narrowly viewed self-interest. For man to become free these primitive instincts must be changed to reflect religion, and faith in mankind. It is with this transformation that man will become free of his passions and lead the world toward peace. The reviewer notes that political philosophy has been studying this problem of conflicting passion and reason for centuries. In the reviewer's opinion, this book does not add substantially to a solution of the problem.

As an interesting exposition of some factors relating to the growth of nationalism and men's attempts at governing systems, *Nationalism and Ideology* is enjoyable reading. As a serious attempt to study and understand nationalism, it falls short of the mark. The book is full of value-ridden definitions of nationalism. Definitions projected without attempting to study nationalism's present underlying concepts or any of nationalism's possible benefits. By relegating nationalism to being only a force breeding international conflict, the author overlooked entirely the possibility that nationalism may be the only alternative for peoples forced into subjection by others. Men who desire freedom may use nationalism as a tool to first free their people and nation; then they can enter the concert of nations and perform the momentous task of deciding, for themselves, the course their nation and its people must take.

**THE MEANING OF EUROPE.** By Denis de Rougemont. New York: Stein and Day, 1965, pp. 126, \$3.95.

Here is a brilliant discourse on Europe, comprising 4 lectures: I: "The Worldwide Adventure of Europeans"; II: "The Secrets of Europe's Vitality"; III: "Europe Unites"; IV: "Europe: What of the Future?" and an Appendix: "Sartre versus Europe." It is based on three propositions: (1) Europeans discovered the whole of the earth; nobody ever came up and discovered Europe; (2) Europe has held sway on all the continents in succession, and up till now has never been ruled by any foreign power; and (3) Europe has produced a civilization which is being imitated by the whole world, while the converse has never happened.

Those who still promote the questionable idea that Europe has been the foundation of Western Civilization—and hence expect it to continue to be so—will like this book. But there are also numerous skeptics who question seriously that this tail end of Eurasia will again achieve its former greatness. From this point of view the author can be challenged for his assumption that "Europe . . . is in process of uniting . . ." (p. 93). Is not the whole recent history in Europe—and elsewhere—characterized by more and more nationalism and separatism—not to speak of de Gaulle's ideas about Europe's "unity." Furthermore, it is true that Europe's civilization has been imitated everywhere; but what about the contemporary "Americanization" of Europe, and the efforts of Soviet Russia and Communist China to introduce their own brand of "civilization" there and everywhere?

In short, this small work may be viewed by many as stimulating reading rather than as a good analysis of the declining role of Europe.

**THE TEACHERS AND THE TAUGHT IN THE USSR.** By William Benton, New York: Antheneum, 1966, Pp. xiii, 174. \$4.50.

There is no question that this is a quite readable little book, although somewhat overpriced. The contribution in this field of its author is, too, somewhat overpraised. For instance, Vice-President Humphrey claims here: "Ten years ago Senator Benton became the first political leader in the United States to dramatize the Soviet Union's fundamental challenge to the West—its system of education and scientific research," and, further: "Thanks largely to Senator Benton . . . Congress passed the National Defense Education Act . . ." And Senator J. W. Fulbright, in the "Preface," states that Senator Benton had visited the USSR and "brought back reports—especially about Soviet education—which helped us revise our national appraisal of the Soviet challenge."

At any rate, the work brings up to date the information presented in Senator Benton's 1958 publication, *This is the Challenge*, voted by *The New York Times* as one of the 250 Best Books of the Year. It surveys, in a breezy style, full of personal touches, topics focused on the challenge of Soviet Education: the structure of the lower school, the thrust of Soviet higher education, impressions of two top Soviet educators, scientists on the Soviet "New Frontier," "The T in Soviet Means Teach," Soviet film makers, art as propaganda, "Education—Our Best Shield," Nikita Khrushchev, "Old Boy," and "What The Men in the Kremlin Worry About."

Although Ambassador Benton presents us with little that is new to the "Kremlinologist," what he says is said vividly and well.

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"AMERICA'S WAKEFUL ENEMY," an article by M. Stanton Evans. *Rally*, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, January, 1966.

The variety and quality of material in this new publication should attract a wide readership. The article considered here is an example of fine and engaging writing. It is extremely good on the Red strategy of peaceful coexistence." What mars it, however, is its flagrant weakness in East European history.

It's rather late in the game to know anything about Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the early captivity of the first non-Russian nations in 1918-22, the really old Russian techniques of Cold War engagement and "peaceful coexistence," etc. And a sentence of this order shows how much has to be re-taught: "When Hitler's troops rolled into Western Russia, they were greeted as liberators by the oppressed Russian populace." True, but how incidental in comparison to the massive response of all the nationals in the non-Russian republics of the USSR.

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"KIEV THE CAPTIVATING," an article by Peter Grose. *The New York Times*, New York, May 28, 1966.

How a superficial knowledge of the history of a country can lead to double and false meanings is well demonstrated by this otherwise entertaining article. The piece is about a dubious Muscovite paying a visit to Kiev and discovering it is quite a place. The writer portrays the capital city of Ukraine in rather alluring terms.

When he goes off on historical escapades, the article becomes somewhat suspect in validity. Khmelnytsky is depicted as joining Ukraine to Russia in 1648, red and blue are uncritically held as "Ukrainian national colors," Ukrainian puppet leaders are simply viewed as managing "a delicate blend of national pride with civic tributes to Marxism-Leninism," and though in part true, the "Kievite contribution to the building of the Russian nation is far older than that of the Muscovites"—so is Athens to Rome in relation to the Roman Empire. Sometimes a little knowledge can be worse than none.

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"CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION," hearings. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., January-February, 1967.

Almost 375 pages of interesting testimony make up this book on the U.S.-USSR Consular Convention. Although the treaty was ratified by the Senate, the battle itself had been a significant one. The Administration and

several treaty proponents in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations attempted to railroad the pact through the Senate without a hearing. This failed as a few alert organizations, including the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, demanded public hearings.

Just a brief examination of the many opposing testimonies here will convince one that numerous objections were left unanswered. The testimony and data provided by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, which alone take up over 60 pages, raised points that proponents found difficult to field or disagree with. His point on the superfluosity of the treaty, in view of the applicability of the Litvinov exchanges in 1933, could not be answered, and actually the State Department had not been challenged on this, though Secretary of State Rusk and others were questioned twice over a two-year period.

Political pressures of different sorts rather than careful, objective thinking accounted for the treaty's ratification. In a practical sense the issue has not come to an end. One of the chief arguments used by State to attract Senator Dirksen's vote, and through him five others (enough to have killed ratification) was that the treaty itself would not lead to the actual establishment of USSR consulates. This is a subject for further negotiations, and both Congressional committees and the communities involved would be consulted before consulates are established. It is reported that Mayor Daley of Chicago has already expressed his community's desire not to accommodate one. This may set a precedent for several other major port-cities.

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"LET US STOP VIOLATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER," an address by D. Z. Bilokolos. *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, Ukrainian S.S.R., October 13, 1966.

The chief of the Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations and also Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Mr. Bilokolos, kept up the tradition of maiden speeches in the world body. His predecessors showed displeasure over the Captive Nations Week observances in the U.S. and also the annual Ukrainian Independence Day celebration in Congress, and so does he as a good puppet to his Muscovite overlords.

In the 21st session of the UN General Assembly, the puppet really struck a high pitch. "Intervention in the internal affairs of other States," he exclaimed, "has become a customary feature of the foreign policy of the United States." Then, among other things, the annual Congressional celebration of Ukraine's lost independence is attacked. As he puts it in mild and dulcet tone, "Equally shameful and ludicrous are the annual sessions of both Houses of Congress, where attempts are made to bring back the predatory regime that was long ago thrown onto the scrap heap of history by the Ukrainian people."

One wonders what the reaction will be when the full focus of American attention is placed on the captivity of Ukraine. This is only a question of time. Plans for such a necessary development are constantly being worked and reworked on.

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"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, RED NIGHTMARE, FREEDOM'S HOPE," a Congressional reprint. National Captive Nations Committee, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1966.

This 310 page Congressional reprint will undoubtedly disturb the Bilokoloses and other so-called communists because of the truths and facts it con-

tains. The inner caption refers to the captive nations in these terms "From Hungary, to Poland, Ukraine, Turkestan, Mainland China, North Vietnam to Cuba and 20 Other Captive Nations." Thousands of copies were printed, and all essential organs here and abroad have been receiving them, including the totalitarian regimes of the Red states.

All that is to be known about the Captive Nations Week observance is contained in this work. The spectrum of activities, the list of captive nations, the Captive Nations Week Resolution (Public Law 86-90) itself, and the scope and depth of the traditional Week are provided. The world-wide distribution of this veritable handbook now renders it inexcusable for any important circle to admit ignorance concerning the Week. The letters that have been received in response to the work are both quantitatively impressive and qualitatively inspiring.

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"COMMUNIST OPPRESSION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE," a pamphlet. Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent, New York, N.Y., 1966.

While some are pursuing the illusions of "polycentrism," "detente," and "peaceful coexistence," those who follow closely the developments in Eastern Europe are recording both for history and subsequent political accounting the many prevailing and new oppressions in this crucial area of the world. This illuminating and well-written pamphlet relates the real story of what is transpiring there today. It provides sharp factual and interpretative contrasts to the myths and make-believe circulating in this country.

Quite methodically, the purposes and objectives of CACEED are described, and then each country of interest is analyzed in terms of contemporary developments. The countries treated are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. "How real is the relaxation of communist rule?" is a question that is next answered in the negative, and with adequate evidence. The organizations in this conference agree that our foreign policy in relation to the captive nations must be re-examined, and that the way is to uphold the captive nations cause.

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"NORTH PHILADELPHIA'S GREAT GOLDEN DOME," a feature article. *The Sunday Bulletin Magazine*, Philadelphia, Pa., January 1, 1967.

Starting the New Year on a scintillating and colorful note, this first issue features the shining Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral that has been erected in a Philadelphian section of "drab city buildings." The photos displayed are most attractive and eye-appealing, and the comments made about this enduring contribution are thoroughly well-founded.

Responsible for this achievement is Archbishop Ambrose Senyshyn, whose foresight, courage, and determination made this possible. The Metropolitan is prominently quoted in the article, "What Independence Hall is to all Philadelphia, this cathedral is to the Ukrainian Catholics of Philadelphia."

The editors of the magazine rightly point out that this new Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception is more than just an impos-

ing architectural landmark. It is also the spiritual home of the Byzantine Rite's Ukrainian Archeparchy of Philadelphia. But, in all truth, one must go beyond this, too. The edifice symbolizes also the free Ukrainian religious faith and determination to bring similar freedom to the captive Ukraine from which all this originally sprang.

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"UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE: PRIME ANTITHESIS TO FRAUDULENT RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION," a Congressional reprint. 49th Anniversary of Ukraine's Independence, United States Congress, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1967.

With the propaganda moonshine being prepared in Moscow and the entire Red Empire on the "glorious achievements" of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, this pamphlet comes at an auspicious time. Before and during the 50th anniversary of this historical tragedy this fall the Free World will be inundated with groundless propaganda. There might even be some foolish, official statements here, likening the Russian revolution to our own.

Over 75 pages in this product consist of Congressional addresses and the statements commemorating the recent 49th Anniversary of Ukraine's Independence in 1918. They all point out how Ukraine was one of the first victims of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the chief result of the Russian Bolshevik revolution. Copies are being sent to all sensitive agencies and circles well before the propaganda onslaught commences.

Moscow's designation of the spaceship series this year gives an indication of what the chief propaganda theme will be. *Soyuz* means union, and the Union of the S.S.R. will be underscored, though it is a fictitious one. Symbolic *Soyuz I* ended in tragedy, and this in itself may symbolize the long-run fate of the empire.

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"CAPTIVE NATIONS' WEEK IN PARLIAMENT," a report. *News Digest International*, International Information Centre, Sydney, Australia, December, 1966.

Last year Australia joined several other countries in observing Captive Nations Week. This was its first participation, and all augurs well for future observance. However, as shown in this report, much educational work remains to be done in the period ahead.

Senator Wheeldon, ALP, raised the question in the Australian Parliament whether the participation of government officials in the Week suggested that the government's policy does not recognize Ukraine as a proper "part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" and if so, "does the Government intend to take further action on this matter within the United Nations or elsewhere." Representing the Prime Minister, Senator Henty replied that the government "does recognize the Ukraine as an integral part of that country. Australian representatives have expressed Australia's views on Soviet colonialism many times in the United Nations in the past and will continue to do so on any appropriate occasion."

The logic involved in the reply is obviously rather slipshod. For if you're prepared to discuss "Soviet colonialism" in any serious manner, the imperialist conquest of Ukraine by Soviet Russia can scarcely be overlooked. If properly it is not overlooked, then implicitly Ukraine was no integral part of any USSR, and the original statement is completely baseless, at least in logic and fact if not in present political expediency. The wholesome fruit of the Week is shown in the very emergence of this kind of discussion. More observances should lead to more clarifying and rectifying discussions.

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"KOSYGIN SEES NEED FOR WORLD DETENTE..." an article by Karl E. Meyer. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., February 7, 1967.

The visit of USSR Premier Kosygin to Great Britain was marked with both naive hope and resultant disappointment. The Russian spoke about the spirit of detente and played on British hopes, which were directed toward peace in Vietnam. These hopes he fully dampened by his attacks against "American imperialistic aggression."

While numerous Britishers were being taken, a number of them showed where they stood with conviction from the start. As the writer states, "They paraded on the pavement across the street flourishing placards that bore slogans like 'abolish slave camps,' 'Freedom for Ukraine,' and 'Russia is the biggest colonial empire.'"

A visit by either of the leadership twins, Kosygin or Brezhnev, to the United States would be met by a similar and larger response. The Khrushchev visit in 1959 remains indelible in the minds of our people. With the diplomatic make-believe of the present, such educational exercise is even more urgent now.

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"TEN REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE U.S.-USSR CONSULAR TREATY, an article by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky. *Human Events*, Washington, D. C., February 11, 1967.

An article which originally appeared in this quarterly was re-published almost in full in this national periodical. During the fight over the Senate's ratification of the Consular Treaty it created a great deal of interest throughout the country. The responses and offers to speak were overwhelming.

One of the chief points raised was the legal invalidities of the treaty. For example, there is no such being as "a national of the Soviet Union." There are nationals, and these are Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and others. Judging by the responses, many citizens grasped this more easily than some of our Senators who failed to understand it at all.

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"NASSAU PRIEST MADE PRIMATE OF UKRAINIANS," a report. *Sunday News*, New York, N. Y., January 29, 1967.

The Very Reverend Archimandrite Andrew Kuschak of Mineola, Long Island, was recently consecrated titular bishop of Eukarpia and primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Diocese of America. This report gives a detailed ac-



count of the ceremony that took place at the Greek Orthodox Cathedral of the Holy Trinity in New York. Archbishop Iakovos, primate of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America, presided.

Doubtlessly, the event represented another milestone in Ukrainian status and activity in our American society. The new bishop was born in Western Ukraine and emigrated to Canada in 1928. Later he came to this country and served in parishes in Pennsylvania and New York.

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"VATICAN, RUSSIANS SEEK ACCORD," an article by George Black. *London Observer*, London, England, February 17, 1967.

The meeting of President Nicolai Podgorny and Pope Paul is viewed in this account as heralding a new era. Podgorny is characterized as "a forthright Ukrainian in the managerial mold" who would convey back to Moscow the consideration of "a more benevolent attitude to religion throughout the Communist bloc." The writer stresses that those responsible for this meeting are satisfied that "their efforts have succeeded in getting the church back into line with its ideal of 'perfect neutrality' between rival nations."

Curious, indeed, is the reasoning involved here. How the Church can become perfectly neutral toward communist atheism and Russian religious genocide is something to ponder. The explanation indicates that the advisers in the Vatican hardly have a grasp of the Cold War and the clear objective of Moscow to weaken beyond possible repair the moral fortress the Church represented against world-wide communism. In this whole affair, the release of Cardinal Slipy, a Ukrainian, to the Vatican, the appearance of Podgorny, a Ukrainian, and the Cold War facets from Moscow's viewpoint will undoubtedly make for highly interesting analysis sometime in the future.

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"GOOD BUSINESS," an editorial. *The Indianapolis News*, Indianapolis, Indiana, December 19, 1966.

With the quick-dollar forces mobilized and at work to liberalize generously our trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe generally, the editors of this mid-Western organ lean heavily on an article written by Dr. Dobriensky of Georgetown University, titled "Historical Lessons in Totalitarian Trade." The article demonstrates the increased trade between the United States and the Axis Powers before World War II.

After reciting a number of pertinent statistics in the article, the editors conclude, "We learned one painful lesson in such 'good business' in 1941. Now, it appears, we are having to learn it all over again." As then, so now, "peace through trade" is the rationalization for realizing a swift buck.

Contents of the article were also used in John Chamberlain's column at the end of January, which is nationally syndicated. Many individual newspapers, as the *Muncie Press*, the *Phoenix*, *Arizona Republic* and others, made similar use of it.

"TO THE EDITOR OF RADYANSKA UKRAINA....," an advertisement. *The New York Times*, New York, N. Y., April 5, 1967.

Archbishop Mstyslav, president of the Consistory of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the United States, signed this public letter addressed to the editor of the Soviet Ukrainian paper. It is essentially a challenge to the puppet organ to reveal completely the acts of Erich Koch in Ukraine during World War II. The organ has reported of late Koch's "living out his days in a Warsaw prison" for genocidal crimes in Ukraine and elsewhere.

"Such an editorial or article," writes the Archbishop, "would have and should have implied that Koch's massacres were in many respects similar to those of Stalin who, by the way, was denounced in the pages of your newspaper." The writer raises a number of additional challenging points. For example, "Why is it that the Czech village of Lidice, in which the Nazis killed several hundred inhabitants has become an object of endless description, movies or what have you, while Ukrainian villages such as Lidavka, Borschivka, Danychiv, Kopytiv... and dozens of others in which Koch burned alive or murdered thousands of innocent inhabitants, were never brought to the attention of the civilized world?"

As of this writing, the challenge to the Soviet Ukrainian paper has gone unanswered. Both Nazi and Russian barbarities in Ukraine are known to the civilized world, but the question here is whether the Soviet Ukrainian editor will equate the two.

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"HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS," by the Editors of Life. Life World Library, Time Incorporated, New York, 1966.

At this late stage of American understanding of the USSR it borders on stupidity to sell to the American public this characterization of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "Geographically the largest single nation in the world the land traditionally known as Russia sprawls across one seventh of the earth's surface... After the U.S. this once backward nation now produces more steel, oil, electric power, aluminum and cement than any other country. In 1949 the USSR became the second nation to produce an atom bomb..."

Plainly, the entire conception is misleading for the simple reason that the USSR has never been, is not now, nor will ever become "a nation." A high school student serious enough to consult many accurate works on the USSR would appreciate immediately the multi-national nature of the USSR. It appears that some adults will remain fixed to their mythical preconceptions to their death.

L. E. D.

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