
THE VOL. XIX - NO. 2 SUMMER, 1963

WKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



THE CAPTIVE NATIONS NATIONALISM OF THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

By

Roman Smal-Stocki

With a Preface by Lev E. Dobriansky Institute of Ethnic Studies, Georgetown University

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THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV PART 2

Consultations with:

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session (September 9-11, 1959)

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(Including Index)

PERSECUTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE UKRAINIAN CHURCH BY THE RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIKS

By

Gregory Luznycky, Ph.D.

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
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PICTURE ON THE COVER: Latin America is one of the principal political objectives of the Kremlin. Ever since the establishment of the Soviet regime in Moscow, Latin America had a priority on the Russian communist strategical list for world conquest. With the subversion of Cuba into a communist satellite of Communist Russia the danger of Latin America being engulfed in Soviet schemes and intrigues became very real. Author Enrique Martinez Codo brings out some of the most recent developments in that huge sub-continent as well as providing some countermeasures which, if followed by the Western world, could eventually avert the Russian encroachement and occupation of South America. The cover was done by Thomas Shepko, Ukrainian American artist.

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THE FIVE PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

Editorial

The Fifth Observance of Captive Nations Week, held across the Nation in the week of July 14 to 20, 1963, was the most successful yet. In fact, by virtue of its results, the fifth observance represents a significant turning point in the rapid development of this American institution. For despite the fanfare surrounding the Chinese-Russian imperialist rift, the limited nuclear test ban treaty, and premature talk about a non-aggression treaty between the Warsaw Pact members and NATO, the 1963 Captive Nations Week evoked more interest on the part of our citizens and officials than ever before. The high plateau of interest attained in 1963 provides a solid basis for resounding Captive Nations Week action in 1964—a presidential year and the Fifth Anniversary of Captive Nations Week (July 12-18, 1964).

It isn't possible here to describe all the events and activities of the fifth observance. Most of them appear in the Congressional Record issues of July and August 1963. Nevertheless, a fair view of the scope and depth of the annual observance can be formed on the basis of the following highlights. In addition to the President, governors of over half the states and mayors of three dozen major cities in the country formally proclaimed the Week. Internationally, the Republic of China observed the Week with festivities conducted from one end of Taiwan to the other. In Turkey, Senator Fetki Tevetoglu submitted a resolution in the Turkish Senate for a similar observance. In time, there is no question that other countries will formally observe the Week.

Marked by various activities and ceremonies, the Week was observed in the United States in every section of the country. Concord, Boston, Hartford, New York, Rochester, Syracuse, Buffalo, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Tampa, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Indianapolis, San Francisco were only a few of the centers staging the observance. On radio and TV, particularly in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Washington, the Week and its meanings were discussed over

various stations, for example, the 285, in the Georgetown University Forum network, WPIT in Pittsburgh, WCAU in Philadelphia, WTOP in Washington and so forth.

In news and editorial coverage the 1963 Week surpassed all previous ones. Before, during and after the observance accounts appeared in such papers as the Manchester Union Leader, The New York Times, N. Y. Daily News, N. Y. Herald Tribune, N. Y. Journal American, New York Post, Philadelphia Inquirer, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Miami Herald, Indianapolis News, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Dallas Times-Herald and scores of others. The National Catholic Welfare Conference press gave full coverage to the Week, and papers such as the West Virginia Register, The Tablet of Brooklyn, N.Y., the Washington Standard and numerous others carried many interesting reports.

The UPI story by Neil Martin and the syndicated columns by John Chamberlain, Robert S. Boyd, Victor Lasky, Roscoe Drummond, Edith Kermit Roosevelt and others constructively directed public attention to the Week. Drummond, for example, in his column dealing with the change of atmosphere in Moscow pointed this out: "All this makes it the more welcome and timely that President Kennedy has just issued his proclamation calling for observance of 'Captive Nations Week' as provided by a Congressional resolution. It was a similar proclamation by President Eisenhower in 1959, upholding the 'just aspiration' of the peoples of Eastern Europe to recover their freedom, that caused Premier Khrushchev to turn with such fury on Vice President Nixon in the famous 'kitchen debate.'"

THE ANNUAL TOTALITARIAN SQUEAL

Since 1959, Moscow and its partners in totalitarian crime have harshly denounced the resolution and the Week. The fifth observance was no exception to this. In fact, early in the year a Soviet Russian weekly showed concern about the fifth observance and asked, "Is it not high time to discontinue the 'Captive Nations Week' in the United States? That is just as much a dead horse as the 'Hungarian Question'"?

Reacting immediately to the President's proclamation of July 5. Moscow added a new twist to its attack. An article in Pravda as-

¹ Drummond, Roscoe. "When Khrushchev Smiles," New York Herald Tribune, July 10, 1963.

² The New Times, Moscow, January 23, 1963

serts, "The President of the United States, losing his sense of reality, has declared a 'week of Captive Nations' and is trying to turn attention away from the struggle of the Negroes for their liberation." ³ While Harriman was preparing for his trip to Moscow, the Russian imperio-colonialists hitched the Week on to the race issue and stated that "racism is an inseparable part of the contemporary American system," in which they also see the "closest interconnection between racism and fascism." ⁴

On the first day of the '63 Week, *Izvestia* ran a lengthy editorial deriding the annual observance. Here are a few spicy excerpts. The Week "is a propagandistic trick of the American enemies of the freedom and independence of nations." In another paragraph it says, "We well know that it is American imperialism itself which is at present the basic supporter of the decaying colonial system, which is a world gendarme. While Washington propaganda is filling the air with words about freedom, 'realists' of that very country are waving bombs and shuffling dollars in order to strangle that freedom." Now the new twist again, "When President Kennedy proclaimed 'Captive Nations Week,' we celebrated our own week, beginning it by the publication of an article of the Negro writer James Baldwin which spoke of the tragedy of American Negroes." ⁵

In this fraudulent parallel Moscow went even so far as to present over Radio Moscow supposed American Negroes who claimed that the only captive nation in the world is the "Negro nation" in the United States. It broadcasted this theme night after night at the beginning of our observance. Apparently, Moscow's own arguments of the past do not seem impressive to itself now. In desperation it has sunk to this ludicrous level of trying to confuse issues of national independence and freedom with those of internal civil liberties; indeed, to the level of de-Americanizing the American Negro.

Elsewhere in the Red jungle similar rantings against the '63 Week were heard. For example, in North Korea, which is in Peiping's "ideological" camp, the President was smeared as a "third-class clown" for proclaiming the Week. Pyongyang Radio aired broadcasts to this effect and quoted the newspaper Rodong Shinmoon as calling Captive Nations Week "a despicable annual campaign of the U.S. ruling circles." ⁶

³ Pravda, Moscow, July 8, 1963.

⁴ UPI, "Pravda Raises Red Herring Cry," Washington Post, July 9, 1963

⁵ "The Captive Nations and Peoples," Izvestia, Moscow, July 14, 1963.

⁶ UPI, Tokyo, Japan, July 15, 1963.

SPIRITED CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION

Now, the exceptional aspect of the fifth observance was the deep interest shown in it by Congress. The *Congressional Record* for the two weeks of July 15-26 is replete with addresses and statements on the event. More, nearly three dozen Congressmen and Senators joined the National Captive Nations Committee as honorary members soon after the Week had been completed.

The Congressional observance of the Week was, to be sure, impressive in every respect. However, what concerned many legislators was the toned-down character of the President's proclamation, which significantly was the earliest issued on record—on July 5, a week before the start of the observance. This was not the first time that criticism was registered against the President's proclamations. In both 1961 and 1962 the White House was chided for weak proclamations. As one publication put it, "For the third year in a row, President Kennedy threw cold water on the hopes of eventual freedom held by peoples behind the iron and bamboo curtains by issuing a 'Captive Nations Week' proclamation which studiously and admittedly evaded reference to Communism."

How valid this and other criticisms are, naturally requires a careful reading and analysis of the five Presidential proclamations, not only comparing them with each other but relating all of them to the Captive Nations Week Resolution itself. In the judgment of Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, who authored the resolution and has been chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee in Washington since 1959, each of the five has strong points but still falls short of what Congress called for. Too often critics give evidence of not having read the resolution and all the proclamations.

THE FIVE PROCLAMATIONS

Before turning to the proclamations the reader would do well to scan the ordered contents of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, which was originally co-sponsored by Senators Douglas and Javits and later by seventeen other Senators. As Senate Joint Resolution 111, it became Public Law 86-90. Briefly, the resolution scared Khrushchev for these major reasons: (1) it was the first time our Government officially recognized the existence of numerous captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union itself; (2) it pointed directly to the source of the threat to world peace, namely, Russia and

⁷ "No Profile in Courage... JFK Again Shuns Red Captive Nations," Republican Congressional Committee Newsletter, No. 27, Wash., D. C. July 12 1963.

Russian imperialism; (3) it also cited the deceptive threat of communism; and (4) the resolution is self-renewing and requests the President "to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world." The last is an impediment to Moscow's cold war zigzags, as evidenced by the test ban treaty maneuver.

President Eisenhower's first proclamation on July 17, 1959—two days before the Week—did stress "the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Soviet communism" and referred to "the peoples of the Soviet-dominated nations." However, as related to the resolution, this was somewhat confusing. State Department pressure was exerted to get the President away from any specific reference to Soviet Russia and imperialistic Russian communism. Soviet communism and Soviet-dominated are terms which conveyed the impression that the captive nations are only those aggressed by the Soviet Union. But what about the greater number of captive nations in the USSR itself, and as enumerated in the resolution? This stratagem definitely weakened the proclamation.

The second proclamation issued by President Eisenhower on July 18, 1960, was almost a word-for-word replica of 1959. The proclamation was made a day after the Week had begun. Since the law is permissive rather than mandatory, it required some prodding to obtain this proclamation, and at that, in a Presidential campaign year. To be perfectly objective, the Kennedy record shows no such tardiness in proclaiming the Week.

In 1961 President Kennedy issued his first proclamation. Like the Eisenhower proclamations, his skirted not only points one and two mentioned above, but also any reference to communism, that is, point three. His *whereas* clauses were fewer, and on the whole, his proclamation was weaker than the two previous ones. The 1962 proclamation was substantially no different. Both proclamations were issued two days before the Week commenced.

The President's 1963 proclamation, however, represented a departure from all the preceding ones in two respects. First, it was issued eleven days before the observance began, on July 5. This time span is not much of a measure of Presidential inspiration, but on record it represents a difference, a departure from "established procedure." And, second, the proclamation strikes twice on "the principle of national self-determination" and "the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty."

Aside from the differences indicated, the five proclamations are based on parts of the Congressional resolution. Indeed, their existence is predicated on Public Law 86-90. The Kennedy proclama-

tions have eliminated the confusion created by the two Eisenhower proclamations which contained the Soviet communism and Soviet-dominated phrases. On the other hand, they have needlessly overlooked the weapon of ideological deception inherent in the term communism as manipulated by imperialist Moscow. They have failed, too, to bring out the imperialistic aspects of Moscow's aggression, which at least were alluded to in the Eisenhower proclamations. In short, then, all five Presidential proclamations have fallen short of the spirit and content of the resolution.

Is this fact a cause for despair? By no means. The proclamations have hewed close to the line of policy pursued by the State Department. The naive belief that the Russian totalitarians will change their stripes, that evolution will make for a transformed Soviet Russia, and that we must not irritate or provoke the Russian imperio-colonialists runs fundamentally through all these proclamations. Yet, the President, whoever he may be, legally need not issue a proclamation, and if he does, he must bend a bit toward the premisal resolution.

The significant fact is that since the institution of Captive Nations Week both Presidents have annually made their proclamations. This has reinforced the institution itself. Moreover, each year the Russian imperio-colonialists have reacted to the observance in a highly critical way. As the above belief withers away, there can be no doubt that the Presidential proclamations will reflect more poignantly and strikingly the spirit and contents of the resolution itself. This is only a matter of time—time for greater American understanding of Russian cold war maneuvers, time for the development of our own cold war strategy for victory, and time for adequate preparations toward a resounding Captive Nations Week in 1964.

COMMUNIST PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

By Enrique Martinez Codo

- 1. I am not a Communist, nor is the Movement Communist (January 13, 1959).
- 2. Let them not come, nor dream of starting false and calculated campaigns, of trying to confuse the people here, of questioning the Cuban revolution, of giving us such a specific qualification as calling us Communists (March 15, 1959).
- 3. With respect to communism, I can say just one thing: I am not a Communist, nor do the Communists have the power to be a determining factor in my country (April 18, 1959).
- 4. The Cuban people know that the revolutionary government is not communist (May 11, 1959).
- 5. It is quite clear that he who is anti-Communist is a counter-revolutionary (June 27, 1960).
- 6. I believe in Marxism. I absolutely believe in Marxism... Yes, I am saying this with complete satisfaction and utter confidence. I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall remain a Marxist-Leninist to the last day of my life. How am I? Am I half-and-half? We, the revolutionaries, do not know how to be or how to do anything half-and-half. We do everything one hundred percent! (December 1, 1961).

These six significant quotations from the speeches of Fidel Castro of Cuba clearly reveal the gradual nature of communist infiltration. In the beginning a concealment of his objectives and even his ideology in order to capitalize on public opinion, marked by discontent with the existing governmental trends. Then, little by little, public confession of his intentions and plans; disclosure of his militant Marxism-Leninism; and integration of his country into the communist orbit after elimination (through executions, deportations and assassinations) of all democratic, anti-communist opponents.

We are alarmed today at the success of Communism in establishing a beachhead in Cuba; but had we studied more carefully the problem which confronted the free world in 1917 and had we drawn the inescapable conclusions from the experience of others,—we would not have been surprised at all. Soviet tactics remain essentially the same.

Here we shall review the tactical behavior and the permanent objectives of international Communism on the one hand, and we shall examine its particular operations in Latin America, on the other. In addition, we shall attempt to outline a practical plan which should make impossible the victory of Marxism-Leninism on this continent, which won its freedom not quite a century and a half ago.

Let us look first at the communist objectives in relation to their appropriate doctrines and theories in full force, as affirmed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR:

... If anybody thinks that our smiles mean an abandonment of the doctrines of Marx, Engels and Lenin, he is wholly mistaken.

What does Marxist-Leninist doctrine say on this matter? We find the following in the writings and addresses of Soviet theoreticians.

In 1919, during the 8th Congress of the Communist Party, Lenin declared:

We live not just in one single state but in a system of states, and the existence for a long period of time of the Soviet Republic together with the imperialistic states is inconceivable. At the end one or the other has to triumph; but before this materializes a series of the most dire clashes between the Republic and the bourgeois states must take place.

Michael Frunze, Trotsky's successor as commander-in-chief of the Red Army, one of the most distinguished military strategists of the Communist world, founder of the Military Academy of Moscow which bears his name, and whose thoughts constitute the basic foundation for Soviet "practice," said:

Between our proletarian state and the rest of the bourgeois world only one condition can exist: a war that would require enormous tenacity, discipline, constancy, inflexibility, and unity of will! But external relationships... could sustain one modification: the state of open war could be replaced by some form of contractual relations that would permit, on a definite level, a peaceful coexistence of the two belligerent camps. However, these contractual forms do not change the fundamental state of these relations. It is indispensably necessary to understand and to admit publicly that the parallel coexistence of our proletarian state with the bourgeois-capitalistic states of the world for a prolonged period is impossible... the war that we shall fight will not be a national, but a revolutionary war...²

Stalin, who has been "excommunicated" because of the cult that glorified his personality but whose revolutionary theories survive in full force explained:

... the universal meaning of the October Revolution is that it constitutes the first step of a world revolution and is a powerful base for its future development.³

¹ Nikita S. Khrushchev: Address at a reception for a German Communist delegation given at the Kremlin on September 18, 1955.

² Michael Frunze: Works, Vol. II, p. 250; State Publishing House, Moscow.

³ Joseph Stalin: The Problems of Leninism, p. 105; Moscow, 1926.

Turning back to Lenin:

We are not pacifists... we have always affirmed that it would be stupid for the revolutionary proletariat to abstain from revolutionary wars that could be of essential importance to socialism.4

A Soviet military author, who signs his articles with the initial "G," writes the following in a study published by the War Ministry of the USSR:

Insurrection, considered as one of the forms of the struggle between classes, takes an essential place in the doctrine of Marx and Engels. The absolute necessity and the unavoidable practical application of this form of revolutionary action in a specified phase of the development of the struggle between classes in a given nation, is directly detached from the whole concept of social life, from the revolutionary role of violence in an historical process, from the role of a state as an instrument of the domination of classes, and from the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The denial of the necessity of an insurrection, of an armed struggle of the proletariat against ruling classes, leads inevitably to the denial of the struggle between classes, to the denial of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the revolution, and at the same time to a deformation of Marxism in its essence.

The insurrection should not be considered as an isolated act, without connection with the other aspects of the struggle between the classes. It is conditioned by all the previous struggles between the classes in a given country, being an organic continuation of this struggle. All strivings of a revolutionary party: the fight for an 8-hour working day, for increase of wages, for social security, etc... should be directed toward the preparation and the mobilization of the masses for the supreme form of the revolutionary struggle: the insurrection.⁵

The following statement is recognized by communist theoreticians as having originally been written by Lenin:

... the tactics of insurrection have their specific features which distinguish them from the ordinary tactics or regular troops; they are extremely complicated and their study requires long and tenacious application. As a consequence, a revolutionary party which boasts of being faithful to Marxism to the very end, which treats insurrection as a science and propagates the idea of insurrection in the working class, should face practically the problem of the education of its cadres, of the future leaders of the insurrection, and find a solution to the problem.

So we find the formation of clandestine cadres on the continent (in the Western Hemisphere), and the formation of cadres in the communist countries of Europe or Asia, utilizing herein student scholarships, special invitations, excursions by tourists, artistic and sports festivals, international gatherings of intellectuals, etc.

⁴ Lenin: Works, Vol. XXIII, pp. 360-361, Fourth Edition; Moscow.

⁵ "G": Problems of Insurrection (a pamphlet); State Publishing House, Moscow.

⁶ Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 145. Foreign Language Publications; Moscow, 1948.

The journalistic history of the last 30 years registers hundreds of cases in which police authorities of the Latin American countries discover and neutralize various schools for the formation of revolutionary cadres—cadres which are trained to lead the revolutionary hosts, the guerrillas, the terroristic groups and the groups for the defeat and execution of the anti-communist elements.

This clandestine activity is accompanied by an open, legal one—the formation of organizations purporting to be nationalistic but which in secret are communist, and which seek "national recuperation" by obtaining parliamentary seats, gubernatorial posts, and executive responsibilities in various ministries and public agencies. The formation of "united fronts," "popular fronts," and "anti-imperialistic liberation unions" also are favorite communist devices. The curious thing is that all these disguises have long been exposed.

Maurice Thorez, the prominent French communist leader, in a pamphlet published way back in 1936, himself informed us:

A government of the Popular Front would be a government that would provide every opportunity for agitation and propaganda to the organization and action of the working class and its Communist party, permitting preparation for a complete takeover of power by the working class; in brief, a government that would be a prelude for an armed insurrection to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Similarly, it is incumbent upon Communist deputies and their fellow-travelers to exploit their parliamentary seats towards the destruction of the democratic system.

Nothing can be plainer than the directives of Lenin himself, and the resolutions adopted in July of 1920 by the Second World Congress of the Communist International:

⁷ Maurice Thorez: Le Parti Communiste, ses luttes, ses taches, p. 10; Paris, 1936.

⁸ Lenin: Works, Vol. XXV, p. 580, Fourth Edition; Moscow.

a view to effect on propaganda, agitation and organization, should be accomplished according to the instructions of the party and the Central Committee.9

Moreover, these subversive elements are instructed to develop all their activities in absolute secrecy, through masquerade, leading a double life, and pretense of active militancy in the ranks of the anti-communists. In order not to provoke major resistance, communism takes good care at the beginning to pursue a moderate policy in respect to the unprepared elements of the high and middle classes in the countries just conquered or about to be conquered. Thus the Communists and fellow-travelers gradually enlist a large nucleus of the national bourgeoisie, which for reasons of survival, ideological sympathy, security, and liberation from a dictatorial and unpopular regime, fatally makes compromises with the representatives of the so-called "national liberation" movement.

In this respect the well-known Chinese leader, Mao Tse-tung, affirms and advises:

We cannot expand the national revolution successfully if we do not grant political and economic rights to its vanguard, if we do not give to the working class the possibility of throwing its might into the fight against imperialism and its lackeys, the national traitors. But should the national bourgeoisie attach itself to the united front of the fight against imperialism, then a community of interests is created between the working class and the national bourgeoisie. In the period of the democratic-bourgeois revolution the People's Republic does not eliminate in any way that private property which has no imperialistic or feudal character, does not confiscate in any way the industrial and commercial enterprises of the national bourgeoisie, but, on the contrary, stimulates the development of such enterprises. We protect all from the national bourgeoisie... always those, who do not support the imperialists and traitors of the nation... Labor legislation of the People's Republic defends the interests of the workers, while at the same time it is not directed against the enrichment of the national bourgeoisie, nor against the development of national industry and commerce, because this development does not protect the interests of imperialism but instead, favors the interests of the people... The workers and peasants constitute the principal body of government of the People's Republic... but at the same time the participation of representatives of other non-imperialistic and anti-feudal classes is admissible.10

The example of Fidel Castro, who in the interval of four years changed an emphatic "I am not a Communist" to a no less categorical "I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall remain Marxist-Leninist to the last day of my life," might seem extraordinary. But one who has read Lenin would not be surprised:

⁹ Second World Congress of Communist International; Resolutions; Moscow, 1920.

¹⁰ Mao Tse-tung: On the Tactics of the Struggle Against Japanese Imperialism, pp. 27-28; Foreign Language Publications, Peking, 1960.

Yes, you are incapable of adapting yourselves to conditions if you are not ready to drag your stomach in the mud; then you are not revolutionaries but charlatans...¹¹

And adding quickly:

We must be prepared to make all kinds of sacrifices, even lie, deceive, develop illegal operations, omit or suppress the $truth...^{12}$

Thus at the outset subversive regimes do not attack "national capitalism," thereby giving the impression of being moderate socialist regimes of Swedish type.

Having seen, thanks to the classics of Marxism-Leninism, that the main features of communist strategy are no mystery at all, let us now examine the maneuvers, objectives and tactics of communism in Latin America.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION AND SUBVERSION

Soviet global strategy seeks the disintegration of the Western world not by open and frank military encounter, but through internal corruption and seizure of power, country by country, in order to complete a fence around its principal target: the United States of America, main economic-military bulwark of the Western world. With this in mind, we can recognize that Communist action in Latin America is seeking:

- 1) To disrupt internally the countries of the continent and to organize guerrilla warfare with the aim of seizing power.
- 2) To expand "the camp of Socialist nations" until all the Latin American countries are conquered.
- 3) To destroy the Organization of American States and its military arm, the Inter-American Council of Defense; or even more desirable, to transform them into anti-Western political-military organizations similar to that of the Warsaw Pact.
- 4) To isolate the United States politically and economically from Latin America with the ultimate aim of its isolation and suffocation in the world market.

Thus can be seen the enormous importance of Latin America, not only because of its geographical proximity to the United States, the principal defensive center of the West, but because of the human aspect—the possibility that 200 million persons could fall under the yoke of communist tyranny. To all those optimists who hope that, because of historical tradition, the nonconformity of the people

¹¹ Lenin: Works, Vol. XXII, p. 324; Moscow, 1929.

¹² Lenin: Works, Vol. XXV, p. 199; Moscow, 1935.

and the influence of the Catholic Church, communism will never develop in Latin America, the example of Cuba may serve as a tragic mockery.

Countries of abundant but unbalanced vegetation, inhabited by heterogeneous peoples of all classes and from all countries of the world; countries in which have raged the political and economic rivalries of the great European powers along with more recently, North-American competition; countries of large peasant masses directed by ruling classes who did not know how to adapt themselves to the whirling developments of the last century—these Latin American nations constitute a perennial focus for political agitation (at times engendered from abroad by economic competition) and represent a lush field for the development of communism. It may stalk disguised as chauvinistic nationalism that raises the banners of economic liberation, social improvement, agricultural reform, political stability and anti-imperialism. Where this is not possible or too difficult because of governmental proscription and counter-measures, it raises the banners of national revolution, supported by a guerrilla movement.

The strategists of Latin American communism have appreciated this situation very well and, as always, have published their conclusions. And, curiously again, these seem to be unknown to those responsible for the political conduct of this continent. In fact, in a Marxist publication edited in Rio de la Plata and distributed throughout this continent, we read these surprising lines:

The political crisis and governmental instability in almost all the countries are a direct reflection of the social crisis. As never before in its history, Latin America is being shaken by a wave of movements and struggles of the proletariat and the petit-bourgeoisie in the countries of advanced industrial, capitalist development. As never before the petit-bourgeoisie mobilizes a tendency toward revolutionary radicalism: in Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua and Santo Domingo the crisis is acute and profound. Throughout Central America and the north of South America the revolution for an agrarian reform and the gigantic mobilization of peasantry develop irresistibly... the general line conduces to a guerrilla warfare, "Cuban style," that involves all the peasant movements, the petit-bourgeoisie and the workers in an anti-imperialistic and anti-oligarchic struggle that leads to an anti-imperialistic war in America... The triumph of the Cuban revolution as well as of the Bolivian revolution are the most powerful blows delivered against the dominion of Yankee imperialism in Latin America. The Cuban masses have demonstrated how it is possible to destroy an army, equipped and directed by Yankee imperialism. The workers, peasants and the impoverished petitbourgeoisie are ready to combat imperialism and oligarchy. The anti-imperialistie struggle in these countries is developing for different reasons and grounds. Conditions have never been more favorable for a struggle against the overthrow of imperialism. 13

These words are clear, but how many of these reading them are trying to do something about studying and understanding the enemy? Actually, too few. There is so much unknown about the communist threat that some, out of fear, do not even try to catch a glimpse of it, saying merely that all of this is due to "capitalistic propaganda to dominate the workers."

In this manner sight is lost of the fact that communism is a world outlook, a Weltanschauung, developing in all the fields of human activity with the objective of imposing a central communist government upon the entire globe. This objective is worth all the ideological struggle, armed subversion, economic competition, Muscovite imperialism, nationalistic agitation, and so on. To oppose the communist drive under only one of these aspects constitutes one of the most costly and, unfortunately most frequent mistakes of the free world powers. Viewed against the true dimensions of the communist onslaught it is easy to see why social improvements or an agrarian reform would be woefully ineffective in the face of a corrosive guerrilla movement; or how inappropriate and inconclusive the most energetic military operation would be against a strike sparked by the social injustice caused by a proprietor whose mentality is behind the times.

Let us examine how the communist action manifests itself in Latin America:

1) The Intellectual Field: Communism, or rather the cryptocommunist political factions, are represented as the legitimate continuers of the struggle for the national liberation and independence that, they affirm, was betrayed by oligarchic reactionary elements which, in a definite moment in the history of the given country, delivered the country over to new foreign imperialists. Thus the "party line" accepts the great framers of the fatherland (San Martin, Bolivar, Marti, Morazan, Juarez), presenting them as spiritual children of the revolutionary and progressive ideas of the French Revolution who dreamed of establishing a fatherland free from Spanish feudal imperialism; as liberal in the religious sense and as progressive in the social sense; as true forerunners and followers of the objectives of the Socialist revolution that erupted in Europe in 1848.

An example of this action is the "Open Letter to Argentine Patriots" written by the eminent Italo-Argentine Communist leader Victorio Codovilla, published as long ago as November of 1944:

¹³ Editorial in Revista Marxista Latinoamericana (Latin American Marxist Magazine), Vol. V., No. 9, pp. 3-10; Montevideo, 1959.

The Party must transform itself as heir to the better patriotic traditions of the country. Its cadres and affiliates, who are already studying national history, should intensify their study and consider themselves continuers of the work of the outstanding patriots, who fought to secure the liberty of the country in the economic, political and social orders, and to popularize the great democratic and progressive endeavors of Moreno, San Martin, Belgrano, Rivadavia, Sarmiento, Alberdi, Mitre, Alem, Justo and Ponce (personalities highly appreciated in Argentine history for their outstanding work.—E.M.C.). At the same time it ought make the people aware of the despotic and tyrannical work of the representatives of reaction and feudalism who propose to continue as spiritual heirs of the Spanish colonizers..." 14

In this way many innocent or deliberately instructed intellectuals proceed to form legions of sympathizers, integrated with "progressivists," (intellectuals, students, artists, nationalists, etc.).

2) The Political Field: As the Fidel Castro maneuver in Cuba makes evident, communism is not coming forward with the old communist slogans; it is not even hoisting this name over its political party.

Once consciousness of the necessity for an "emancipating struggle" has been duly created, the Communists spark the formation of "popular fronts," "united anti-imperialistic fronts," "fronts of national liberation"—taking special care not to mention the word "communist" and thereby securing the attachment of large segments of public opinion, such segments not dreaming that they are acting as "useful dupes" of the Marxist-Leninist conspiracy. And, as always, the ideologists of the proletarian revolution announced to the four winds:

... To overcome the crisis of growth, needed above all is a united anti-imperialistic front and a united proletarian front in each country, and a united Latin American anti-imperialistic front. The real weakness of the masses consists of a lack of organisms that would unify their struggles and centralize the objectives of the anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalistic class. Conditions have never been more favorable for the development of an alliance of farm workers in Latin America...¹⁵

3) The Social-Economic Field: In the first place, the communist action orients itself on an identification with the first executors of the national emancipation, trying to match their natural fight against the economic absolutism in the colonies with present-day economic tendencies seeking an utopian "economic liberation and self-determination" with such slogans as "buy from those that buy from us," "commerce does not recognize political ideologies," "if the English

¹⁴ Reproduced partially in Nueva Era (New Era), Vol. II (1950), No. 1, p.35.

¹⁵ Revista Marxista Latinoamericana (Latin American Marxist Magazine), op. cit., p. 8.

and the French trade with the Eastern European countries, we can, too." Not forgotten, either, is avoiding an unchainment of action against private property and free enterprise; it is "adjusted" in proportion to the stability of the government in a given country. The difficulties created for Latin American markets by the self-sustainment achieved by the countries integrated into the European Common Market are favorable for presenting the "urgent necessity and convenience" of trading with the countries within the communist orbit.

Another maneuver, sinister enough but practical and proved in numerous cases, consists of the infiltration of persons (functionaries and directors) into the governing bodies of the national economies, where through their administrative and governmental measures they wreak havoc: fomenting an inflation, creating unemployment, misery, and pauperism, and, in general, discrediting the democratic system in the economic sphere. The crypto-communist functionaries support with all their might the methods, the procedures and the persons who cooperate in intensifying the national decline, cruelly combatting, on the other hand, all those who dare oppose or fight them.

In the second place, communism exploits the traditional tactics of the struggle between the classes adapting its agitation to the characteristics of the particular Latin American country, especially with regard to the large peasant proletariat (60% of the population in South America and 67% in Central America). Thus agrarian reform figures in all political and economic programs of the cryptocommunist factions; the characteristics of this maneuver being noteworthy because they represent the peculiarities of a "revolution" more than they do an agrarian "reform."

Elsewhere in the social sphere communist action is trying to enlist the sympathies of the middle class which, in general throughout Latin America, is the one most buffeted by the continual ups-and downs of the economic situation. It should not be forgotten that as a rule all the communist leaders have originated and continue to originate from the middle class or petit-bourgeoisie of such countries; and that the Cuban revolution, the Chinese revolution, the coup d'etat of Prague, the regime of Pankow as well as the Russian revolution itself—were promoted and supported by middle-class elements who were joined by the misled masses of peasants and workers only at a much later date.

4) The Religious Field: Communist action had tried to effectuate a turn of 180 degrees in Latin America when it demanded and sponsored atheism and when the fight against the Vatican was

an obligatory theme of all communist gatherings. Appreciating the large landholdings and spread of the Catholic Church in our Continent, communism is now trying to attract the sympathies of all believers, suggesting that communism and Christianity are not two opposite poles as once believed. The "united front" accepts the incorporation of Christian believers, betraying antagonism toward them.

In the international arena the rapprochement between Moscow and Rome is exploited to the fullest; the "new religious policy" of the Kremlin is commented on favorably as is the freeing of certain high prelates who had been confined in the USSR and other communist countries of the world, as well as the exchange of messages, greetings and visits between the Vatican and the Soviet Union. Concomitantly, propaganda is disseminated for the creation of an awareness of the "necessity" for filtering out the reactionary hierarchy of the Catholic Church, replacing them with "young and progressive" priests. What is outstanding in this matter is that Communist arguments look for support in American history itself, exploiting for their own ends the historical fact that the new governments established after the revolution expelled from their dioceses all the bishops and priests who had been supporting the permanency of Spanish power in Latin America. The editors of a Communist publication in Rio de la Plata made this clever comment:

... the heroes of the May Revolution and the American Emancipation were excommunicated by the Vatican—as nowadays are the most progressive men of our epoch. Yesterday, the Vatican was, with the feudal Holy Alliance, as today it is with the imperialist Yankee Holy Alliance, against the people and the emancipation movements... As is known, to regulate preaching according to the doctrine of the Church, is inherent with the ecclesiastical authorities. The men of May and San Martin did not hesitate to exercise this episcopal authority without any scruples, and proceeded to organize a National Church, detaching from her all priests hostile to the Revolution and relying on priests who adhered to the new renovating ideas... The majority of the lower clergy supported the emancipating work of San Martin...¹⁶

pointing out at the same time that:

... these are harvesting the heritage of the Liberator who, like the Communists today and the men of May yesterday, are inspired by the most advanced ideal of our time: Marxism-Leninism.¹⁷

The objective of this maneuver is evident: to reduce the Catholic Church to a state similar to that in which the Russian Orthodox

¹⁶ Nueva Era (New Era), op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁷ Nueva Era (New Era), op. cit., p. 36.

Church lives at the present time; that it to say, as a pacified instrument, destined to perish with time.

5) The Military Field: the Communists maintain:

a) Popular forces can win a war against an army; b) Not always is it necessary to have all the conditions for a revolution: an insurrectional focus can create them; c) In undeveloped America the grounds for an armed struggle should fundamentally be the open country.¹⁸

Therefore it is evident that action in this field constitutes a true synthesis of the developments in the other fields of human activity; that is to say, it is total, presenting itself in the forms of psychological war, guerrilla war, and popular war.

The first is seeking the moral disintegration of the opponent and the spiritual consolidation of partisan lines; the second is aimed at the disintegration of the political, police and military administrative apparatus of the country, and the third is trying to mold and mobilize the entire population (both rural and urban) in a common fight against the government in force. Usually these develop simultaneously and are independent of one another until they obtain the form of an "army of national liberation" that carries on an "anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalistic war of national liberation." This is the ultimate stage of the military action which does not necessarily have to materialize in order to obtain success, (unlike the military action of Cuba). There are the examples of China and Vietnam, where guerrilla forces expanded slowly till they formed regular armies of liberation with the help of other foreign communist powers (in China with the help of the USSR; in Vietnam with Chinese help).

It may be readily confirmed that in all Latin American countries communist guerrilla forces exist in formation or in action as manifested by various incidents and police verification in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina and Chile, not excluding the small but strategic countries of Central America and Mexico. Proofs are overwhelming; schools for the formation of cadres and guerrillas are discovered in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay, Venezuela and Colombia; large quantities of printed instructions for the organization of guerrillas are unearthed everywhere and are no longer newsworthy. To be mentioned is "Che" Guevara's pamphlet Guerrilla Warfare, which was printed and distributed by the millions throughout Latin America. This work constitutes something more than war memoirs; it is an ingenious manual

¹⁸ Ernesto "Che" Guevara: *Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 11; "Ladra" Publications, Montevideo, 1960.

for the instruction and formation of guerrillas, revealing in its author a profound knowledge of this type of fight and an erudition in military tactics that ought be impossible for a civilian who did not even perform his military obligation in his native country—a theoretical and practical knowledge which could only have been obtained in schools for military-revolutionary conduct in Russia.

Likewise, other communist directives, issued to guerrillas of FULNA (Frente Unido de Liberacion Nacional—United Front of National Liberation, a crypto-communist organization that pursues armed insurrection in Paraguay), plainly were edited by experts in military art, not by dilettantes. Nor should it be overlooked that the majority of the high-ranking Latin American communist leaders completed graduate courses at war colleges of the Red Army, and almost all of them secretly boast of being part of a high military hierarchy that will come into prominence once communism succeeds in imposing itself upon the entire world.

This constructive action, devoted to the formation of guerrillas, is being developed in parallel with another form of destructive character which has as its objective the elimination of Latin American military forces. Another communist revolutionary theoretician, Nicholas Bukharin, explains this policy brazenly:

The army that marches on orders of the generals and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat should be destroyed, since otherwise it would mean the death of the revolution. We should not be afraid of this destruction of the bourgeois army. Where bourgeois discipline is intact, there the bourgeoisle is invincible. Since the principal force of a bourgeois state resides in the army, to annihilate the bourgeoisie it is imperative to undermine and destroy the bourgeois army. 20

"Che" Guevara recognizes this necessity as well when he affirms:

Naturally, no definite victory can be obtained without proceeding with the systematic and total rupture of the army that supports the old regime.²¹

The destruction of the "bourgeois army" is carried out under many guises: demands for a "reduction of the military budget"; critical attacks leveled against the cadres of the regular army; demands for "reduction of compulsory military service"; "proofs" that the American countries in actuality "do not require offensive armies in their national economies"; urging of "general disarmament" of the Continent in the framework of "peaceful coexistence" between all peoples and soliciting of the proscription of nuclear arms from

¹⁹ Nicholas Bukharin: The A.B.C. of Communism, p. 124; Buenos Aires.

²⁰ Nicholas Bukharin: op. cit., pp. 122 and 123.

²¹ Ernesto "Che" Guevara: op. cit., p. 163.

and in Latin America; tabulation of all the works that it "would be possible to realize" with the moneys given the military budget; claims that external security is now guaranteed because of the presence of such international bodies as the OAS and the UN, a good corps of police being adequate for internal security. In this connection, there are many persons, sincere and of good will, who approve and support these measures without realizing that they are helping destroy the last pillars supporting the already feeble Latin American democratic regimes.

Lately, military support of the communist regime has been bolstered with the arrival of considerable shipments of arms and military equipment from the Soviet bloc, followed by contingents of military instructors and then by regular Red Army or MVD units as was the case in Cuba. This presence of Soviet troops in a "liberated" country has various objectives: to mold and instruct the incipient regular native communist forces; to support a new regime internationally, giving it a fiction of external endorsement (the case of Cuba is proof how serious such endorsement is); and, moreover, to support the regime internally against any threat of armed uprising, as took place in Hungary in 1956, when Russian tanks crushed the popular revolt.

Having briefly described the "practice" of communist subversion in Latin America, we shall now concern ourselves with some desirable measures which, in our judgment, should be adopted in order that the common enemy may be destroyed.

FACING THE ENEMY

Since communism is a Weltanschauung, active in all fields of human endeavor, we cannot withdraw our attention from the defense of any of these fields, retaining at the same time a broad outlook upon the entire problem.

In the first place, the main action to be developed is the matter of information. Information about the enemy, his plans and tactics, his doctrines and theories, information which could be disseminated universally without any particular effort, and in all mediums, circles, centers, professions, schools, etc. In a sustained and objective manner communism should be denounced for the great hoax that it really is. To be exposed is the real and oppressive misery that exists in all the nations having had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the deputies and puppets of the Kremlin, including the USSR itself, which in a highly deceitful manner is trying to pass itself off as a "paradise of the proletariat." Knowledge shall furnish us with new powers

and answer the classical question: Why are we fighting? or the simple and short: Why?

Along this path we should develop at least some of the following ideas:

- 1) The Intellectual Field: We should intensify the teaching and dissemination of the democratic and Christian ideas of our mentors, their constant search for liberty within the framework of the dignity of the human being and with the absence in these ideas of any communist or "progressive" tint of Marxism-Leninism. We should and can enhance the cult of Latin American historical tradition without necessarily falling into chauvinistic xenophobia which would furnish additional ammunition for the enemies of American democracy.
- 2) The Political Field: The traditional parties should undertake a thorough reorganization and readjustment of their political platforms in accordance with the new demands of the hour. In particular, the governing bodies should make every effort to study and recognize the disguised enemy who tries or has already infiltrated their party ranks and then proceed to repel or eliminate him from their parties. Similarly, they should make every effort to lead the public opinion of the American nations along the path of true democracy.
- 3) The Social-Economic Field: All statesmen, political leaders, entrepreneurs and traders should exert themselves to realize in real, sensible and truly unselfish ways the general precepts of the inspired pontifical Encyclicals of Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris, which in a remarkable fashion reiterate measures that could and should be adopted to accommodate some obsolete socio-economical structures in the bloodless fight taking place in this field between the free and communist worlds.

As a yard-stick of regional American collaboration may be taken the basic aspirations as pointed out by President Kennedy in his message on the "Alliance for Progress" which in reality are not far from the general lines laid down by the late Pontiff.

4) The Religious Field: The Catholic Church, which is preeminent throughout this continent, should resolve her grave missionary problem in Latin America as well as the problem of the notable disparity that exists between the religious vocations and the fast growth of the population. The priests and all clergy in general should, for their part, be competent not only in matters of faith and dogma but also in dialectic confrontation of the socio-political situation incited by communist agitation and, most of all, be sufficiently middle-of-the-road-minded to avoid being overtaken by the claws of "progressiveness" and a disproportionate and uncontrolled preoccupation with material necessities for their believers.

Likewise, in order to avoid the disorientation which, for example, is shown by the Italian electoral masses, it would be desirable to intensify pastoral teachings on the impossibility of reconciling atheistic and materialistic communist doctrines and practices with the religious and social doctrines of the Church; the irreconcilability of a double Christian and communist militancy, and so on.

5) The Military Field: Two possibilities should be considered; in the first place, before an intervention on the part of the armed forces proves necessary for suppression of a communist uprising, and, second, during such intervention.

In the first case, there must be a consolidation and enhancement of the prestige enjoyed by the armed forces in public opinion. The affectional and disciplinary ties that exist between the distinct hierarchies of the military personnel should be strengthened; the importance of moral instruction and public information in relation to the false promises and tactics of communism should be emphasized.

The passage through the ranks of new draftees, whose classes are renewed each year, should be used to the utmost to complete the work initiated by the primary and secondary school in its moral and civic aspect, or to initiate such work if it is found wanting.

Regarding military instruction in its strict sense, constant emphasis should be placed on teaching counter-guerrilla warfare, on standardization of the military equipment and materials of all the Latin American countries, on concrescence of concurrent measures to be undertaken in universal fashion throughout all the nations of this continent. The necessity of preparation for anti-guerrilla warfare, which at the present time constitutes merely a vague desire or eagerness, must be converted into an essential faculty in order that American democracy might survive—as recognized by President Kennedy not long ago. ²²

In the second case, when the uprising reaches the stage where intervention of the armed forces becomes necessary, the principal objective of the latter should be the destruction of the communist military (guerrilla) apparatus, an action that should be carried out without hesitation and to the last consequence, yet nevertheless carried out with the utmost correctness, respecting existing international arrangements in regard to the treatment of prisoners of

²² According to news reports published on May 9, 1963, President Kennedy called upon the Air Force, and through it upon the rest of the armed forces of the Continent to be prepared for an active fight against subversive and guerrilla forces, able to go into action in Latin America.

war, and so on. The rehabilitation of the population won over by communism or the crypto-communist propaganda of the guerrilla movement must likewise constitute a vital objective of the anti-guerrilla struggle. These persons should be convinced that in democracy and in Western Christian society a human being enjoys far longer possibilities to unfold and to develop himself. In these cases it should be kept in mind that in order to convince a group skeptical of the advantage offered by democracy, nothing will better serve than clear and concrete illustrations from the other side. There is no intention here to promote demagoguery, but to attend to real necessities and to take advantage of the bald truth.

The feaders of the anti-Communist counter-guerrilla struggle should be constantly aware of the fact that their enemy is not just the small group or the swarming band of enemy in front of them, but that they are taking part in an important battle in one of the regions of the big world war unleashed by Bolshevik imperialism, and that victory over those local guerrillas constitutes a victory over the principal enemy, quartered in the Kremlin.

It is a very common and costly mistake to consider these guerrillas mere nationalist revolutionaries; in reality they are conscious or unconscious agents of the great international revolution. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung took it upon himself to reveal the mystery of communist support offered to Marxist revolutions raging throughout the world, when in the year 1935 he asserted:

In our times any country, any nation that maintains revolutionary struggle needs international support ... only oppressed nations and oppressed classes can wage just wars... All just wars help each other; all unjust wars should be transformed into just wars: this is the Leninist line...²³

Here, of course, the only "just" wars are those unleashed by the Communists. When people oppressed by the Soviet invaders try to rise against them or *Gauleiters* installed by them, the Communists do not hesitate to resort to the severest measures of repression and genocide: note Ukraine, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Tibet, etc.

CONCLUSION

We have examined rather quickly but, we trust, objectively a series of maneuvers and tactics employed by communism in Latin America at the present time. We hope that we have defined the problems, the solutions to which merit the consideration and effort of many. Fortunately, the doctrines and ideas of the communist lead-

²³ Mao Tse-tung: op. cit., p. 31.

ers are self-evident. Astonishingly, however, it seems that all that Marx, Lenin, Frunze, Bukharin, Trotsky, Stalin, Khrushchev, Manuilsky, Mao Tse-tung and others openly wrote and published about their aims has been read and is continued to be read by Communists alone. If the Western world would read and meditate more about those subversive and revolutionary theories and contemplate their results and realities, it would soon convince itself of many things. First of all, that the Marxist-Leninist Weltaschauung, allied with the ancient and hereditary Muscovite imperialism, is based on terror, deceit, characteristic misery and unrelenting threat—all this developing cleverly and swiftly thanks to our own relative ignorance and disorder.

One proof of all this is the serious problem confronting Latin America at the present time, wherein large masses of the population are still being won over by the "anti-imperialistic, liberating revolution," thanks to the criminal stubbornness of certain leading classes, politicians, detached professionals, industrial and commercial entrepreneurs—to whom nothing has happened in the last sixty years. These are unaffected by the tragedy of invaded Tibet, Indochina and Korea, the tragedy of Latin America with her constant turbulence and threat of revolutionary war, the installation of bases with atomic rockets some 90 miles from the North American territory.

It seems that those whose way lies between the "I am not a Communist" of 1959 and "I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall remain Marxist-Leninist to the last day of my life" of 1961, should serve to awaken those that are sleeping and induce them to reflect on the lurking threat and which, for the sake of our survival, we must, necessarily, face together and eradicate from the face of our continent and the entire globe forever.

THE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY AND THE COLD WAR

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

With the so-called first step toward guaranteeing the peace, it would do well for most Americans to learn an old Turkestanian proverb: "When you travel with a Russian, make sure you carry an ax." The Kennedy Administration has decided to travel with the Russians on the limited nuclear test-ban treaty. What ax, if any, is it carrying?

The partial nuclear test-ban treaty may well give rise to the biggest hoax of the cold war. The hoax is the beginning of the end of the cold war itself. Many Americans already are talking in this uncritical vein. If such talk should assume serious proportions, the unswerving enemy will have scored a momentous victory in the cold war. The effects of this spreading illusion would be catastrophic for our cold war efforts and operations, inferior though they have been.

In the Senate hearings on the treaty many delicate questions and points will undoubtedly be raised. Indeed, the treaty itself is an awful gamble with our national security. Testing of all kinds is necessary for the advancement of our military technological knowledge and thus, in all its ramifications, of our national interests. Testing is by nature experimentation, and through the latter we learn more in ways of development and control. Even the dangers of fallout have by this normal process been reduced to a thin minimum. Are we to deprive ourselves of such critical knowledge because of emotional and irrational pleas for peace, much of it stimulated by Moscow's propaganda machine for the past eight years? The greatest guarantee against the outbreak of a hot global war is our overall military and technological superiority. The treaty does not conduce to this guarantee.

Also, what of the indispensable development of the anti-missile missile, which only by atmospheric testing can be efficiently undertaken? Would a ratified treaty lead to the demobilization of our nuclear capital as represented by our assembled scientists, engineers, facilities and so forth? Who in his right mind would trust the Rus-

sians not to cheat on undetectable nuclear explosions in the atmosphere under one kiloton and the use of their results for adapted massive missile development? Furthermore, since it is held with some validity that the heavy expenditures involved in nuclear testing have compelled the Russian totalitarians to seize upon this treaty, aren't we relieving them of this extra burden to patch up their imperial economy for even more intensive cold war operations—the Chicoms?

The burden of these and many more questions rests with the proponents of this treaty, not its opponents. Even from a strictly legal point of view the treaty is subject to serious question. Much can and will be made of Article IV in the treaty which states that, "Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty..." What national sovereignty is exercised by an empire-state such as the Soviet Union, and a democratic but multi-national entity like United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland? Two of the three "original parties," the Depository Governments, are mischaracterized and fallaciously defined right from the start. If parties to a contract are misrepresented in light of fact and logic, the entire contract is overshadowed by this basic invalidity. In a court of law such an ill-based contract could hardly survive the court's objective strictures. Why should it in this all-important case? Or are we to multiply error and fiction?

Highly important, too, for a studied consideration of the treaty are the points of an armaments race and a succeeding non-aggression pact. The treaty is supposed to herald the intention of curbing the armaments race. In developing more powerful and efficient weapons the United States has been in no race. Regardless of what Moscow does or does not do, our goal should unqualifiedly be an adequacy of the best weapons along the full spectrum of weaponry. As to a succeeding non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations, a ratification of the partial test-ban treaty should in no way be interpreted as a predication for such a pact. Khrushchev's one great dream has been to obtain our acceptance of his empire. In point of logic, for a non-aggressor to agree with an historical aggressor on non-aggression is a rather one-sided and even absurd agreement. As an imperio-colonialist power Moscow, in fact, is in a state of constant aggression, and any such simple agreement on non-aggression would sanctify this state. It is all important to keep the test-ban treaty and this proposed pact strictly apart.

TREATY—A SHAFT OF LIGHT IN THE COLD WAR?

Perhaps the most important of questions bears on the cold war implications of the test-ban treaty? Is it, as the President has said,

a shaft of light in the cold war? To believe this is only a psychological preparation for the hoax mentioned earlier. Such naive belief runs counter to the facts of typical Russian cold war play; it blindly ignores the utterances of the Soviet Russian totalitarians. More, it reduces our own effectiveness. The test-ban treaty itself is in part the result of Russian cold war calculation.

From Moscow's point of view, the treaty can serve numerous ends. It is a slap at Red China; it will decelerate American progress in military technology and weaponry; it can accommodate Russian cheating; it will permit the retention of Russian superiority in high megatonnage weaponry; it will allow a diversion of resources in the economy that might enhance output for more effective cold war operations; and it is a lever for the exaction of a possible non-aggression pact and all that this would entail to the cold-war detriment of the United States and the Free World.

Neither can Moscow's sudden accession to the test-ban treaty be divorced from its evaluation of the political factors surrounding Washington and London. Administrations in both centers will be up for election next year, and in both the United States and Great Britain the pressure to show something as an offset to Cuba and the scandalous Profumo case, respectively, is intense.

The treaty and its assumed observance will in no way lead to the cessation of the cold war. The treaty cannot rationally be regarded as even the first step to any such eventuality. Indeed, to think in the most ultimate terms that the cold war could end without the necessary collapse of the imperial structure maintained by Moscow suggests both an unfamiliarity with East European history and a failure to understand the nature of the cold war itself. But, for that matter, both deficiencies have for too long punctuated U.S. foreign policy.

Moreover, despite its imperialist rift with Peiping, Moscow has been thoroughly consistent in its resolve to wage the cold war on the basis on its meaning of "peaceful coexistence." Taking just the most recent period, we should review a few examples of Moscow's meaning. In January 1957, Khrushchev minced no words when he declared: "For all of us... Stalin's name is inseparable from Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, each one of us, members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, strives to be as faithful to Marxism-Leninism... as Stalin was faithful to this cause." The cause of Stalin was the cause of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.

On January 6, 1961, Khrushchev reaffirmed traditional Russian cold war policy when he stated, "We will beat the U.S. with small wars of liberation. We will nibble them to exhaustion all over the

globe, in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia." New? Not at all. For centuries Russian imperio-colonialists have been "liberating" non-Russian peoples for one reason or another. Significantly, even during the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow, July 1963, Russian organs emphasized that the Red Chinese have nothing over the Soviet Russians in the pursuit of these "wars of liberation." And this immediately prior to the signing of the nuclear test-ban treaty!

THE INTENSIFIED COLD WAR

Confronted now by the massive competition issuing from Peiping for leadership among the Communist Parties throughout the world, Moscow will have to intensify its cold war efforts in order that its demonstrative deeds will exceed the stern competitor's. Unavoidably, we shall feel the brunt of all this. Whether we like it or not, the demands for cold war education on our part will be greater than ever before.

In meeting these demands we shall truly have to re-examine our views, habits, and notions regarding the Soviet Union. Karl Marx wrote, "The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing." In the contemporary context this, of course, is an extreme historical observation, since the eagle, the lion and others are capable of more than nothing. Yet this Marxian insight into the nature of the beast, regardless of his ideologic pigmentation, carries immense weight and validity in the one sphere on clear-cut Soviet Russian superiority—the all-embracing sphere of political psychology, artful propaganda, systematic image-making. It is in this sphere, incorporating and inter-relating into a manifest whole of projected imagery factors of ideologic, political, economic, military-space, and general cultural character, that imperial Moscow wages its communist assault on American freedom.

In 1960, and on many occasions since, we Americans have been seriously concerned about the image of the United States in the world at large. We have been concerned about our prestige, about how other peoples and nations regard us as to our intentions, our goals, economic performance, scientific feats, military capability, and national will. However, curiously enough, we have paid relatively little attention to the totalistic processes and attainments of Soviet Russian image-making. Category by category, ranging from the ideologic to the athletic, on the average we far surpass the Russians, but yet somehow, in the aggregate and in the minds of millions throughout the world, we are held to be in fierce competition by an adversary who claims the future will rest with him.

The whole of the Soviet Russian image far exceeds the sum of its parts. The remarkable ability of Moscow's totalitarians to project such a dynamic and imposing image is the consummate result of a number of institutional reasons. This unique capacity in global Potemkinism is founded in the totalizing political realm on a rich heritage of practical and speculative experience that includes, over the centuries, the cumulative achievements of empire-building, the deep perceptions into the recesses of human behavior by the Dostoyevskys, the Tolstoys, and the Pavlovs, the long traditions of revolutionary and conspiratorial activity, the secret society, and the Iron Curtain, and—in the basic institutional lineage of the khans, czars, and commissars—efficient practices in totalitarian control. A study and understanding of this type of assault—the assault of creative imagery to influence, deceive, and confuse in preparation for practical conquest—should guard us against emotional swings of under-estimation as well as over-estimation, against needless concessions as well as narrow rigidity, in coping with the centuries-shaped adversary. Above all, knowing that the Soviet Union is the crucial power center and all else, including Red China, is basically adventitious, they should motivate us in concentrating on a complete unmasking of both the assault and the assaulter.

SOVIET RUSSIAN IDEOLOGY IN THE COLD WAR

When Khrushchev visited the United States in 1959, every American had the opportunity to witness at first hand the display and manipulation of the philosophico-ideologic component in the image Moscow has sought to convey to the world. The march of communism, burying decadent capitalism, is supposedly in the historical works. This was the philosophico-ideologic pitch made by Khrushchev; this has been the fraudulent pitch made by the successors of the Russian czars since the establishment of Soviet Russia in 1917 and the forced inception of the Soviet Union in 1923. And, strangely enough, countless of our citizens continue to believe that the real struggle is between capitalism and communism. This specious belief is an ideological-propagandist achievement by Moscow.

Those who have had systematic training in Marxism and its organic structure of thought, have over the years attempted to impress upon the inquiring mind the fact that Marxism is a mythical foundation of Leninism and all the ismatic variations that have followed. The arbitrary attachment of Marxism to the Soviet Russian ideologic scheme may lend philosophical dignity and status to the superficial operationalism of Lenin's works and those that followed, but in fact Marxism bears as much relationship to Russian totalitar-

ian thought and, objectively, to the Soviet Union, as does French Physoicracy to our society. On fundamental doctrinal points of economic determinism, the concept of society versus state, the forced institution of socialism in underdeveloped areas, the Leninist totalitarian vanguard, Marxian philosophical humanism, and the labor theory of value, Marxism in the Russian ideological scheme stands as a crass perversion.

Fortunately, in our country more and more is being written about this ideologic perversion. More and more of our people are beginning to realize that communism is an instrument of ideologic deception manipulated by the real enemy, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism; that Marxism is a false credential in the Soviet Russian image, a façade behind which the real forces of imperialist conquest and colonial exploitation operate; that the real struggle is not between capitalism and communism but, instead, between freedom and Soviet Russian totalitarianism; and that Moscow's cold war manipulation of a perverted ideology is not a new practice. The czars, like the commissars, also hid behind ideologic masks—those of religious Orthodoxy and racist Pan-Slavism.

Accumulated evidence clearly shows that when we strike out against ideologic communism, scarcely a ripple is produced in Moscow. On the other hand, when we penetrate the ideologic veneer and merely scratch the real enemy of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the bear squeals. Much remains to be done in exposing the philosophico-ideologic fraud of the Soviet Russian image, and negatively a study of Marxism can do it. Positively, a study of Marxism and its historical interpretations and insights into the Russian Empire, traditional Russian cold war activity, and the perennial goals of Russian statism helps immensely in the formation of accurate historical perspectives on this East European and Asiatic problem. However, it is also indispensable to penetrate the political component of the total Soviet Russian image for our understanding of the communist assault on American freedom.

THE SOVIET RUSSIAN POTEMKIN VILLAGE

Marx called the Czarist Russian Empire a "prison house of nations." Today, this conception is no less applicable to the Commissars' Soviet Union, the political component in the Soviet Russian image. When, as in the case of Marxism and communist ideology, we fail to analyze critically the terms in use and carelessly identify Russia and the Soviet Union, Moscow has no problem in projecting the image of an expanding nation-state with numerous so-called minorities and ethnic groups, similar to the United States. In fact, this fallacious

concept is contained in the test-ban treaty. When, on the other hand, the U.S.S.R. is shown to be an imperio-colonial system where many different nations are held in captivity, Moscow is compelled to shift its cold war gears and attempts to cast the image of multi-national fraternity and brotherhood.

The facts are that the Soviet Union is a "prison house of nations," a basic empire which forms the foundation of the expanded Soviet Russian empire, and that colonial exploitation in this substrate empire is rife. The more we concentrate on the true nature of the U.S.S.R., the more Moscow is compelled to defend its false image of multi-national coexistence, and the more we see the opportunities before us in the cold war. How all this came to be what it is, is the clue to an understanding of the last remaining major empire in the world.

Evidence on this vital score is abundant. When Khrushchev in July 1959, exploded over the Captive Nations Week Resolution, he did so because, for the first time, an official act of our Government pierced the false image of the U.S.S.R. In 1960 he appeared in the U.N., purposely to deflect growing attention in this country on the imperio-colonialism that prevails in the U.S.S.R. by stimulating debate on so-called Western imperialism and colonialism. Down to this day, when pressure is exerted and the false image of the U.S.S.R. the global-appealing Potemkin Village—is placed under critical scrutiny, Moscow takes to the defensive in an attempt to preserve its image. Witness these examples, for instance: (1) the series titled The Fifteen Soviet Republics, Today and Tomorrow (Soviet Booklets, London, 1959-60) that was ordered by Moscow for mass printing in England soon after the Captive Nations Week episode in 1959; (2) the scandalous UNESCO study, Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR (by I.P. Tsamevian and S. Ronin, UNESCO, 1962), which we helped to subsidize but which few Americans have been able to obtain-including, it is said, Ambassador Stevenson—is a neat, disreputable work of half-truths designed to preserve at all costs the political component of the Soviet Russian image.

Here, too, much study and work remain to be done. Yet, when our own Secretary of State believes the Soviet Union is an historical state, of which Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine are "traditional parts"—only to be completely contradicted by our U. N Ambassador shortly thereafter; when we spend \$20,000 for an Arms Control and Disarmament study (Walter Milis: The Political Control of an International Police Force) to be told that "Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the capability of the

Soviet police system to keep law and order over the 200-million odd Russians and the many additional millions in the satellite states"; when, repeating an old and stale argument, Rostow tells us that it is "an American interest to see the end of nationhood as it has been historically defined," one cannot but begin to wonder who is helping whom in preserving the Soviet Russian image. Regrettably, even the President affects the cause of truth when in his American University address in June 1963 he stated the quarter-truth that "no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Russians suffered in the course of the Second World War." We need hardly wonder how the Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R., who actually suffered the chief brunt of the Nazi German invasion, must react to this misleading statement of an American President.

OTHER COLD WAR 'MUSTS' FOR US

The economic, military and cultural components of the grand Soviet Russian image are subject to the same critical analysis for practical disintegration. From every viewpoint, the colonial economy in the U.S.S.R. is essentially an underdeveloped economy with overdeveloped ambitions. One cannot but express amazement at times at some of the comparisons drawn between our national economy and the Soviet imperial economy, as though the two in essence were comparable. From an economy that for exactly forty years has found it difficult to solve the elementary problem of adequately feeding its population, we have little to fear in terms of civilized economic progress.

Militarily, the U.S.S.R. is, of course, an imposing power. But, its quantitative equipment, furnished by its industrial technocracy and cold war economy, is no guarantee of its ultimate qualitative power. The military history of Russia's imperial forces in this century alone fails to attest to such ultimate power in the final showdown.

The grand image induces timidity and fear in intended victims. We are the prime target of this projected Soviet Russian image. It is an image that can be understood, deflated, and tactfully destroyed. America's victory in the cold war, with peace but toward justice and freedom, necessitates that these things be done. We cannot repeat too often Marx's own observation on the Russian Empire, now in the guise of the Soviet Union, "The only way to deal with a power like Russia is the fearless way." The partial nuclear test-ban treaty is not an expression of such fearlessness. The intensified cold war should induce it.

KARL MARX: APOSTLE OF COMMUNISM, FEARED AND HATED RUSSIA

By Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby (Ret.) * MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence: 1941-1951

Karl Marx, venerated apostle of Communism, feared and hated Czarist Russia and had no desire or concept that Russia should ever become the seat of global Communism. It was Berlin, Paris or London rather than the Kremlin which he envisaged as the citadel of the revolutionary proletariat. Karl Marx served as European correspondent of The New York Daily Tribune and wrote significant dispatches, in the period of 1853-1856, from exile in London. These brilliant reports have become a rarity in Western libraries. Naturally, they have been prudently omitted from all Soviet editions of Marx's writings. The Tribune might do well to reprint them. They represent a brilliant expose of Czarist expansionism, and a devastating forecast of Communist-Bolshevik evolution and maneuvers in terms of Mongoloid-Pan-Slavism, then and today. A venturesome German publisher (Seewald Verlag) has released a reprint of Marx's dispatches under the suggestive title: The Russian Drive for Expansion and the Policy of the Western Powers. The reports deal, of course, with an almost forgotten historic background, with the U.S. slowly moving toward civil war and Russia moving toward Constantinople and an outlet on the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf.

The publication of this series is a political event of considerable significance for it thoroughly destroys the Kremlin legend of Karl Marx, as the champion of Russian claims to Communist universal leadership.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: A CONSTANT OF CZARS AND COMMISSARS

Karl Marx's reports are a complete exposé of Russia's messianic complex, an almost pathologic expansionist urge of all Russian rulers

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—from Ivan the Terrible to the Romanovs—a calculable "constant" inherent in Russian foreign policy.

Said Marx:

What has changed? Nothing at all! Russia's policy is unchangeable. Russia's methods, tactics and maneuvers may change but the lodestar of Russian policy—world domination—is a fixed star...

It is all the same whether the "Czar" is called Alexander, Nicholas, Kerensky, Stalin or Khrushchev! The secular aim does not change, whether Russian annexation aids were embellished—as in Czarist days—with the slogan of "protection of Christianity, the Eastern Church or the Slav peoples," or whether they are currently camouflaged by the Soviet regime with social slogans of "the liberation of the world from the Capitalist yoke." Karl Marx defines Czarist-Bolshevik evolution in a terrifying "equation," viz:

Czarist Absolutism: Enslavement of the World Communist Absolutism: Enslavement of the World

No art of interpretation, however skillful, can obliterate the sensational disclosures that in Marx's opinion the struggle between Russia and the West takes precedence over the dialectics between "Capital and Workers" and that, however critical his doctrinaire attitude, his personal sympathies are clearly with the West. It is precisely in assessing the "constants of Russian policy" that Karl Marx, long since endowed with an aura of infallibility by the Communist rulers, is in agreement with such outstanding political thinkers as the French Liberal Alexis de Tocqueville, the Royalist Marquis de Custine, the Spanish Conservative Donoso Cortes or the Ukrainian nationalist theoretician D. Dontsov. The picture of Karl Marx which the Kremlin has, with a certain degree of success, presented to the world is thus a fake. In his reports, Karl Marx gives the modern reader a political lesson which is in every respect remarkable and still applicable today.

KARL MARX FORECASTS RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM

We have selected some of Marx's brilliant thoughts on this subject, viz:

... Pan-Slavism is a form of Russian imperialism—it is not a movement that strives for national independence but a movement which, directed against Europe, would destroy all cultural values that history has created though thousands of years. This could not be achieved without eradicating Austria, Hungary, Turkey and a major part of Germany from the (political) map...

- ... There is only one way of dealing with an absolute power like Russia and that is by absolute fearlessness...
 - ... A system of intimidation is less expensive than actual warfare...
- ... Russia hands the Western Chancelleries diplomatic notes—like throwing bones to a dog—in order to give them some harmless pleasure whilst she herself uses this opportunity to gain more time (and space)...
- ... Inasmuch as Russia counts on the cowardice and fear of the Western powers, she intimidates Europe and pushes her demands as far as possible in order to pretend later that she is "generous" since she will content herself with more immediate though lesser aims...

Karl Marx recognized the enormous dynamic force of the huge Russian Empire with regard to the Turkish question and, with prophetic vision, over a hundred years ago warned against the dangers which could arise for Europe in this connection (the dissolution of the Near East).

MARX RECOGNIZES THE RUSSIAN GAMBIT

However decisive the break of 1917 may have been in the social structure of Russia, the aims of conquest and annexation as key objectives of Russian foreign policy have remained the same, irrespective of the slogans Russia uses in order to camouflage her policy of eventual conquest. The fact that opinions on this subject, today more topical and applicable than ever, originate from Karl Marx, the prophet of Communism, makes them all the more interesting. Note the following:

Czarist Russia fears the revolution which is bound to follow any general war on the Continent more than the Sultan fears an aggression on the part of the Czar. If the other powers remain firm, Russia will most certainly withdraw discreetly.

It is a mistake to assume that political propaganda and psychological warfare are an innovation of our day. Karl Marx proves convincingly that the methods which are practiced to perfection by the Communist regime today were by no means unknown to Czarist Russia.

Just as Khrushchev conjures up the specter of Stalinism or Mao's world conquest in order to deceive the West, so the Czars in former days tried out the same methods. Marx has this to say:

With all due respect to the so-called "Old Russian Party," I know from various well-informed Russians—themselves of the aristocracy with whom I frequently associated in Paris, that it has long since died out and is only occasionally resurrected to a sham existence when the Czar needs a bogy to force Western Europe into passive patience as regards Russia's arrogant

claims (of the moment). Hence the resurrection of a Menshikov and his appearance in the fairy tale-like, "old Russian" style.

CZARIST AND COMMUNIST DIALECTICS

The poor Czar is allegedly peace-loving, but Menshikov is the real warmonger! Just as today Khrushchev is allegedly the peacemaker, while the evil Molotov (a Stalinist symbol) appears on the scene from time to time as a warmonger in order to intimidate the West and force it to yield to peace-loving Khrushchev so that "Stalinists" will not return to power!

Compare a Marx statement forecasting the analogous Russian policy of today:

...It must be stressed that Besika Bay is 150 miles away from Constantinople. The Czar claims the right to occupy Turkish territory, but forbids England and France to navigate in neutral waters without his special permission. He extols his own generous patience with which he allowed the Sublime Porte a completely free choice as to the form in which it will renounce its sovereignty...

...The Czar regrets that the West does not recognize the harmless character of Russia's religious protectorate in foreign countries.

Karl Marx's reports are an excellent survey of Russia's policy during fifty years before the Crimean War and of the traditional political maxims of the Russian Empire which go back a long way in history. It is a historical and political exposé which does credit to his sharp, analytical powers and to his gift of interpretation. As nowadays, much time and energy were then wasted in futile conferences:

... After a first triumph (the removal from the office of the Serbian Minister Garaschanin) Russia now insists that all anti-Russian officers shall be excluded from service...

Is not Communist Russia doing the same thing nowadays intermittently demanding the dismissal of anti-Russian elements in Western cabinets?

After a short survey of the methods and principles of Russian policy, the validity of which is applicable in our day, Karl Marx gives an outline of the old Russian game of vacillating promises, political pledges, blackmail and intimidation. He exhorts the Western powers to be on their guard and gives a very apt description of the potential weakness inherent in the division and lack of unity of Europe.

CZARIST RUSSIAN POLICY OF INTIMIDATION AND BLACKMAIL

Marx affirms that the idea of the diplomatic superiority of the Russians owes its effectiveness only to the division and timidity

of the Western nations and that it is an error to believe in or accept Russia's superior military strength. He writes:

... The Czar relied to the end on the intimidation of Turkey and the Powers that supported it, namely France and England, as an adequate means of making them accept the demands.

... Menshikov's appearance and behavior in Constantinople were simply those of a tyrant. The proclamations by Nesselrode were the threats of a tyrant (Exactly like Khrushchev's recent behavior in the United Nations!)...

... There is only one way of dealing with a power like Russia and that is by fearlessness.

... In this way, the Western powers have shown their fear of Russia with every step, a fear on which the Czar and his advisers have always relied. They have been intimidated and have done their best accordingly to create precisely the very evil of which they were so afraid...

... The prestige of Russian diplomacy and the renown of Russia's military strength can be maintained far more easily and securely in peace than in war...

... A system of intimidation is far less expensive than actual warfare...

... Russian incursions into Europe will probably be limited to diplomacy and political intrigues, carried out on the one hand by unscrupulous arrogance, and supported on the other hand by weakness and faintheartedness...

These facts recognized by Marx are reminiscent of Russian policy today and of the attitude of the West toward the USSR.

With reference to the historical Russo-Turkish power struggle, Marx was unable to foresee what central position Constantinople would occupy in Russia's foreign policy—but without exaggerating the analogy, we should like to add that we have here a clear parallel in the position of Berlin in the present conflict between Russia and the West.

MARX FORECASTS COMMUNIST RUSSIA'S DIPLOMACY

The course of current events has shown how accurate Karl Marx was in his analysis of relations between Russia and Austria and/or Russia and Turkey and how justified were his warnings to the West, unfortunately unheeded by the latter. Since the system of the balance of power in Central and East Europe has meanwhile been destroyed to the advantage of Russia, Marx's criticism of "Germans in Russian service who are hankering after war" assumes a new and highly topical significance in view of the Russia puppet Governors in the present Soviet Zone of Germany.

Karl Marx's sympathies in the dramatic conflict between Russia and the West, which has been smoldering for so long, are clearly

with the West. In spite of this fact, or to be more exact, precisely because of this fact, he frequently criticizes the policy of the Western Powers. In his opinion the Governments of the West are either too foolish or too trusting to see through the perfidious Russian game of intrigue, or they let themselves be overly impressed by a Russian power play, or else are so unscrupulous that they play one against the other and in this way ultimately aid Russia. Thus the West, whose victory Karl Marx sincerely and profoundly desired, finds in him a relentless but clear-sighted critic, who teaches us a historical lesson which is applicable today and should open our eyes to the hoax of "coexistence." Marx writes:

... The Russian bear will certainly be capable of anything as long as he knows that the other animals with which he is dealing are not capable of anything...

CZARIST POLICY VIS-A-VIS NEUTRALISM

In the terminology of our day, one might, in fact, describe Karl Marx as an "anti-anti-Communist activitist." He heaps sarcastic reproaches on the West, particularly the British Government, to the effect that they passively accept Russia's violations of rights and even try to persuade their allies, and Turks, to offer Russia an armistice which is only likely to be of advantage to the latter country. He says:

...The only chance which now remains is that the war should at last cease to be a one-sided affair...

With regard to the Prussian and Austrian policy of neutrality (of that time) he strikes a modern note:

... The efforts of Russian policy are in the first place directed toward securing the neutrality of the German states and preventing them from forming an alliance with the Western powers (a striking analogy to NATO of today?).

In his reports, Karl Marx uses language which one would expect of a General in the Golden Age of Militarism. One of his biographers, Leopold Schwarzschild, has, indeed, rather aptly called him "The red Prussian." Marx maintained:

... Europe may be rotten, but a war should have aroused the healthy elements. A war should have called forth some latent forces. Surely 250 million people should have sufficient courage to carry a decent fight...

CZARIST PAN-SLAVISM—COMMUNIST PAN-SLAVISM

Pan-Slavism—a form of Russian expansionism—as a political force has lost none of its significance but is still on occasion utilized ideologically by Soviet Russia. Karl Marx has rightly assessed its

dynamic power and has explicitly stressed the danger for Europe which may arise out of it.

Nicholas I and then Alexander II threatened Austria with it when expedient:

- ... Alexander II will set himself up at the head of the Pan-Slavist movement and will change his title of Emperor of all Russians to that of Emperor of all Slavs...
- ...It is the first step toward transferring the war to the entire continent and openly giving it a European character...
- ... It is no longer a question of who rules in Constantinople but of who rules over all Europe...
- ... Pan-Slavism has nowadays been transformed from an idea into a political program—or rather into a political threat, which is supported by 800,000 Russian bayonets...

KARL MARX ON GUERRILLAS AND CONVENTIONAL ARMIES

- ... Every form of insurgent and irregular warfare against a powerful professional army nowadays needs the support of a regular army, if it is to be successful...
- ... It cannot be denied that precisely at a time when Russian influence on European politics was stronger than ever, the actual efficiency of the Russian army by no means justified such a political position...

Karl Marx was undoubtedly an authority on Russia, but like so many Western politicians, scholars and statesmen, he was influenced by Russian historiographers, and he interpreted the founding of the Kiev principality quite falsely and described it as a "Russian state." The Kiev principality was a Ukrainian state and not Russian.

Ukraine was closely connected with Greek and Byazantine cultures and Marx's view that Russia's culture was of Greek and Byzantine origin is incorrect, since the Russians for hundreds of years were more influenced by the Mongols. As the capital of the Ukrainian state, Kiev was the center of Greek and Roman culture in the East; Moscow was fundamentally the opposite of the Ukrainian, i. e. the Occidental and Greek way of thinking, and constantly fought it.

USSR MONGOLOID PAN-SLAVISM

The fact that Pan-Slavism was and is a form of Russian imperialism, has been correctly appraised by Marx. But he is wrong in believing that all the Slav peoples were enthusiastic about Pan-Slavism. On the contrary, the Poles, Ukrainians, Byelorussians,

Slovaks and Croats, all belonging to the Slav race, were nevertheless opposed to Pan-Slavism since they were Russia's avowed enemies. If some of the intellectuals among the Czechs or Serbians were in favor of Pan-Slavism, it was only because the Serbs or the Czechs erroneously hoped that the Russians would support them in their fight for independence. But they were deceived again and again by the Russians. Incidentally, just as there is no Pan-Germanism, so too, there is no such thing as Pan-Slavism, i.e. as an organic, racially binding idea. For hundreds of years, Germanic England was the arch-enemy of Germanic Germany. Germanic Denmark and Norway were hostile to Germanic Germany. Wars were not conducted for racial reasons but for national imperialist reasons. That is why Russian imperialism resorts to all kinds of camouflage in order to have a sham reason for new conquests.

Various ideas which Marx formulates must be rectified, as for example the fact that he uses one term only to designate the entire southern territory of the Russian Imperium—from the Don to the Dniester and from the Don to the Niemen—namely New Russia or West Russia. It is perfectly obvious that what is meant here is the territory of the Ukrainian nation.

Marx also refused to recognize the Byelorussian nation—a curious error in his otherwise excellent reportage.

UKRAINE: 1963

By LEV BRODSKY (As told to LEO HEIMAN)

Till the day I left the Soviet Union in February of 1963, I was employed as an assistant camera-unit director at the USCD (Ukrainian Studio of Film Chronicles and Documentary Motion Pictures) in Kiev.

How I left the USSR is something which can't be told as long as certain people are alive. Let me say that saying goodbye to the "socialist paradise" was very costly—in money, health, suffering, and otherwise.

Luckily, I was not married at the time, and a fictitious marriage with a Polish woman—arranged at the price of 15,000 new rubles (about \$17,000 at the official exchange rate), enabled me to obtain the desired exit permit to Warsaw, from where it was comparatively easy to continue my odyssey to freedom.

To get the 15,000 rubles, I was forced to steal unprocessed movie tapes, cut them into yard-long strips for Leica-type cameras, and sell them on the black market at cut-rate prices.

I thus ran the risks of being arrested by the police, charged with "robbery of state property" and sentenced to death by firing squad under the new laws which provide mandatory death sentences.

I would have done anything, including murder, to get out of the Soviet Union, and I am not ashamed of stealing the USCD films. To be sure, I wasn't the only one to live off such rackets. The salaries at our film studios weren't bad, but people who wanted a decent suit of clothes, or some extra money—as I did—had to supply Leica films to amateur photographers on the black market. In any free society, the prices for consumer goods would be much lower, the products easily obtainable, and if a man wanted to buy a house, a car or take a trip abroad, all he has to do is ask his bank for a loan, buy things on the installment plan, or take advantage of some of the "travel now—pay later" schemes.

No such things were possible in the Soviet Union. Our Executive Director, Victor Pichurkin, used to paraphrase Lenin's old dictum "Kto nye rabotayet, tot nye yest" (he who does not work, does not eat) and tell us that "Kto nye voruyet, tot nye zhivyet" (he who does not steal, does not live). Alas for poor Victor, he was denounced to the OBSCHIS (Otdel Borby s Chishchnishetsvom i Spekulatsey—Department for Combatting Thefts and Speculation) section of the secret police, by his ex-wife, and sentenced to 15 years at hard "corrective" labor in Eastern Siberia.

Now, our studio, like any other commercial, industrial, agricultural or educational enterprise in the Soviet Union, had to work strictly according to the plan. Our annual plan for 1962 provided for completion of 52 weekly newsreels, 6 full-length documentary-historical films, 6 travelogue movies, and 26 two-reel propaganda and films on subjects of current interest.

Unexposed film was delivered to our stores in accordance with this plan. Now, since everybody in the studios was stealing unprocessed film for his own use and for profitable resale, we had to register an excessive amount of spoilage, or cutting-room rejects, to account for the missing footage. Inspection and police crackdowns were unavoidable, unless we could give our enterprise such a good name with the authorities as to remain above suspicion. For this, we falsified history, and cooked up such propaganda tripe that even the old communist party members among us could not stomach it any longer.

I'll mention here only a few of the documentary feature titles produced by our crew before going on with my story, describing the conditions and life in Ukraine, as I saw it in 1963 and before.

* * *

First of all, let me mention one fact which may seem unimportant from the Western point of view, but exposes the patent lies and falsehoods of official Soviet propaganda. On paper, Ukraine is a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. It has its "own" Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, President of the Supreme Soviet, Chairman of State Security Committee, etc. But not a single one of the documentary films produced by our studio in 1962 and before was spoken in the Ukrainian language. Even the newsreels, presumably destined for local cinemas, were in Russian. The only documentary film where the Ukrainian language was even mentioned was the 9-reel "Karpatskaya Rapsodya" (Carpathian Rhapsody), describing the life of Ukrainian Hutsul foresters, shepherds and mountaineers high up in the mountains of the Carpathian range. The people filmed on location had their voices taken down on our sound tape in their own peculiar Hutsul dialect. But the running commentary was in Russian.

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No one ever suggested that the Ukrainian Studio of Film Chronicles and Documentary Motion Pictures should produce at least half—if not all—of the newsreels and movies in the language of the country it purported to represent.

As a matter of fact, we did have a special sound-effects crew of three men and five women, trained to dub any kind of film in a sort of Russified Ukrainian, in which pure Russian words, inflection, accent and pronunciation outweighed the Ukrainian language roots by about three to one. I was told that newsreels and some of the documentaries earmarked for public showing in certain rural districts were dubbed by our sound effects crew in their Russified Ukrainian. But big-city audiences heard only Russian spoken in the movies. And pure Ukrainian was strictly taboo in the Kiev film studios.

Even our colleagues from the Kiev Art Film Studios and Yalta Entertainment Film Center were not allowed to use more than one or two sentences of unalloyed Ukrainian per picture. Vassili Ivchenko, a good friend of mine, who was a Senior Unit Director with the Kiev Art Films, was praised for his fine work in filming the movie version of the famed "Song of the Forest," by the Ukrainian national poetess, Lesya Ukrainka. But only I know how difficult it was for him to film this Ukrainian epic in the Russian language, throwing in a couple of "pure" Ukrainian sentences now and then strictly for laughs.

In this film, as in any other motion picture produced in the Soviet-controlled Ukrainian studios, the heroes, intellectuals, officers, commissars, beautiful girls and other "positive characters" must speak Russian. The villains speak some kind of bastardized Russian with a phony foreign accent. The Ukrainian sentences are reserved for "simple but honest" folk, usually some mustachioed driver, a strong but dumb blacksmith, or some heavy-set forester who is all brawn and no brain. The obvious implication is that only uneducated, uncouth and "uncultured" persons prefer Ukrainian to Russian, which is supposed to be the language of the "intelligentsia," officialdom, and the educated classes. That this implication is not confined only to movies may be seen by visiting any Ukrainian city in 1963.

Ukrainian is still spoken in the villages and predominantly rural districts. Workers who live in the suburbs and hasten to their shift at the industrial plants, peasants who carry their private-garden produce for sale at the market, and *novobrantsy* (recruits drafted for military service) all still speak Ukrainian even in the towns. But 45 years of Soviet indoctrination, and 200-plus years of Czarist

Russification which preceded the Soviet rule, have placed the Russian language on a kind of pedestal in Ukraine.

Obviously, one can't get ahead in studies, work, employment, or any kind of career if one uses the Ukrainian language. Students who fail exams in the Russian language are not admitted to secondary schools, let alone universities or colleges. Officers do not receive their commissions, if their Russian is not clear, precise and correct. Newspapermen, movie people, writers, artists and lawyers must know Russian first. Ukrainian later, if at all.

Why is this emphasis on the Russification of Ukraine so important to Moscow? For the same reason that the Kremlin rulers are committed to eradicating any kind of independent national thinking. Take the Jews, for instance. The teaching of the Hebrew language in the Soviet Union is a criminal political offense, punishable by up to 12 years of penal servitude. Why? Because Hebrew has been resurrected as a living language by the Zionists, and the Russian communists regard the Jewish national liberation movement as one of their greatest enemies.

Yiddish, an Eastern European Jewish dialect incorporating medieval German, Polish, Russian, Ukrainian and Hebrew roots, is still allowed as a spoken language only. Yiddish-language schools, theaters and newspapers have been closed down. There is a monthly magazine printed by a group of renegade Jewish Communists in a bastardized Yiddish containing a heavy percentage of Russian words.

The campaign against the Ukrainian language has not yet gotten to this stage, but it is well on the way. After all, there are fifteen times as many Ukrainians as Jews in the USSR, and it's not easy to eradicate their linguistic heritage. But the Kremlin masters view the Ukrainian national liberation movement as their mortal enemy, on a par with Zionism. The current trend is to cripple the language, without hurting the so-called "cultural heritage." In other words, millions of copies of books by Shevchenko, Franko and other Ukrainian writers are still being printed, circulated and distributed—but many of them in the Russian language.

Ukrainian songs and operas are performed all over—again in the Russian language. Even Ukrainian folk songs have been adapted to the Russian. So what does the "cultural heritage" mean? Embroidered shirts, folk dances and songs performed in a bastardized, mongrel Russian-Ukrainian dialect.

The same is happening in the neighboring republic of Byelorussia. But the process of enforced Russification is less evident in other Soviet republics. Russian is the dominant, official and "career" language in all corners of the USSR, but Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,

and the five "Moslem" republics of Central Asia, as well as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, are still allowed to soft-pedal their process of Russification.

The two other victims are Moldavia and Kazakhstan, which are being speedily turned into Russian-speaking "republics." Tartar, Buryat, Mongol and Circassian districs will be next on the Russification list. The Trans-Caucasian, Baltic, and Central Asia republics (with the exception of Kazakhstan) will be the last. But Ukraine is target Number One of Moscow's master brains.

What makes a nation? People, territorial unity and common language are the most necessary ingredients of nationalism. Common religious faith, destiny, or historical heritage are also important in fanning the flames of national pride. The Soviet system has not changed, but the times we live in have undergone a radical change. It is no longer possible for the Kremlin big-shots to order a genocide campaign of mass executions, deportations or nationwide starvation against Ukraine, or any other non-Russian nation, as Stalin did from 1934 to 1944.

Small-scale repressions and non-violent oppression by "legal" means are still possible, of course. But any large-scale, Nazi-type genocide would cause an immediate world public opinion reaction against Moscow.

Mass media of information, global communications, and cold war propaganda channels have so developed their impact in recent years that not even Moscow can now ignore world public opinion if it is aroused to a sufficient degree of indignation.

On the other hand, the Soviet empire is still committed to a forcible melting-pot unification of the "Great Russian Heartland." This is a geopolitical, rather than a purely ideological concept. Off-hand, I would say that Moscow regards the "Great Russian Heartland" as stretching from the Carpathian Mountains in the west to the Pacific Ocean in the east, and from the Arctic ice wastes in the north, to the Caucasus ranges and the Caspian Sea in the south. This concept encompasses Byelorussia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Kazakhstan and several smaller Tartar, Mongol and Buryat districts as integral parts of "Greater Russia." It leaves the future of the three Baltic states in doubt and permits the existence of the non-Russian Soviet republics of Trans-Caucasia and Central Asia on the outer periphery of the Soviet Union.

In my offical capacity as assistant camera-unit director at the Kiev USCD, I travelled all over Ukraine, filming newsreel, documentary and film-chronicle shots. I have thus gained first-hand knowledge of, and acquaintance with, the true state of affairs in Ukraine, Anno Domini 1963.

Parallel with, and growing out of the enforced Russification process, a planned population shift is evident in recent years. There are over 42 million Ukrainians in the Soviet Union, but only 32 million of them live in Ukraine proper. On the other hand, close to 7½ million Russians have been moved into the Ukrainian Republic within the framework of the "Greater Russian Heartland" integration campaign.

This population shift is evident in the republic's capital, Kiev, and in its southern regions. It is less felt in Western, Northern and Central Ukraine. But Odessa, Simferopol, Yalta, Sevastopol, Kerch and Zhdanov are now more Russian than Ukrainian. The situation in Kiev, Donetsk, Nikolayev, Kherson and Kharkiv is fifty-fifty, with more Russians moving in every month. Chernihiv, Kanev, Zaporozhe, Kirovograd, Lviv, Rovno, Cherkassy, Krivy-Rih, Ternopol, Stanislaviv, Dniepropetrovsk and Poltava are still Ukrainian, but have sizeable Russian population groups.

If, over the next decade, another ten million Ukrainians are forced to migrate eastwards, while twelve million Russians move in to replace them, Ukraine will have a predictable population balance of some 25 million Ukrainians— mostly in the villages, and at least 20 million Russians in the cities and industrial regions. If the Russified Ukrainians are counted as well, the national balance will be tilted into the Russian-Heartland favor, and Ukraine will become just another district of Russia, like the Upper Volga, or the Lower Urals.

What is happening to the dispossessed Ukrainians, and what makes them pack up and move? In the beginning of the planned population-shift program, that is, in the years 1945-1949, more than a million Ukrainians suspected of supporting the nationalist freedom fighters, or sympathizing with the Ukrainian national liberation movement, were deported to Central Asia and Siberia. Others left voluntarily, attracted by promises of a better life. Still others felt that by resettling in remote regions they could perhaps escape persecution by the secret police. Nowadays, the planned population shift is executed by the Comsomol (Young Communist League), "Profsoyuz" (trade unions), "Oblono" (department of people's education) and other communist-front organizations.

To illustrate a few cases known to me: A young Ukrainian girl who had just been graduated from a Teachers College applied for assignment to a Kiev Secondary School as a German-language in-

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structor. She was told there were no vacancies in the Kiev "Oblono" district. This was quite true. If there are any vacancies, and there are hundreds (if not thousands) every year, Russian teachers are brought up to fill the vacant posts. Since no one is allowed to remain unemployed in the Soviet Union—there is even a law against "tuneyadtsy," i. e., people who refuse to do physical work—the young woman was offered a "temporary job" as a fitter at the Kiev Automobile Factory. If she refused, she would be expelled from the Comsomol and blackballed as a "tunevadets," to face legal charges in court. If she agreed, she could work at the factory till doomsday. Therefore, she accepted an assignment to teach the German language at the Secondary School in Semipalatinsk, on the border of Kazakhstan and Central Siberia. She was engaged to be married to a young architect, who was also faced with the same kind of employment problem. He elected to accompany her to the distant Siberian town, where he obtained an important post as Assistant Director of the Town Construction Planning Commission.

The parents of the girl and of her fiance also applied for resettlement to Kazakhstan. Back in Kiev, they lived in cramped one-room flats, with a common toilet and kitchen facilities shared by five or six families. In Semipalatinsk, they were given comfortable three room apartments in new blocks of apartment houses on the city's outskirts, loans for new furniture and steady employment. Russians from Tambov Oblast moved into their vacated rooms in Kiev.

Another case I know of concerns a river-barge dispatcher at the Kiev Dnieper Waterway Administration. He was a young man, married, and father of two. He was quite efficient, but had his human faults. He was in love with another woman and used to drink excessively. He was especially fond of "Pertsovka," a sharp vodka seasoned by throat-burning peppers. Because of his illicit love affair, he was late or absent from his job on a few occasions. At other times, he was quite drunk and made mistakes.

In Stalin's day, he would have been tried for "criminal negligence" and "deliberate wrecking," sentenced to slave-labor in Siberia, and hustled off to his doom. Khrushchev's regime is much subtler, if not less deadly, in this respect. The young man was called on the carpet by his "natshalnik" (chief) and advised that he had broken nine different laws against "progul" (absenteeism), alcoholism, negligence, disturbance of work discipline, etc. If tried on all these charges, he could be sentenced to a total of 15 years in jail. But the "natshalnik," a Russian, suggested there was a way out. "You are a young man, you can still make amends and correct your despicable behavior. Think of your wife and children. Do it for them.

Do you want your two boys to grow up, with their father a common criminal in prison?"

The dispatcher, now sobered up, begged his chief to help him. The boss suggested a "quickie transfer" to the Baikal-Yakutsk-Lena waterway system administration in Eastern Siberia, which was developing fast and needed qualified personnel. The whole family left Kiev for Irkutsk, where a job was waiting for the man.

Today, there are close to a million Ukrainians in Kazakhstan another million in Kirghizia, Uzbekistan and Turkestan, half a million each in the basins of the Kuban, Terek and Ural Rivers, at least two million in Siberia, and smaller groups all over the Soviet Union, from Kamchatka to Klaipeda.

Indeed, thanks to the Moscow-directed population shift program, there is some justification for all the movies being dubbed in the Russian language at our studios. After all, since the urban populace speaks Russian in eight cases out of ten, why give them old-style Ukrainian? After my arrival in the free Western world, I was amazed to hear that people were not aware of the changes in the Soviet Union. They still think in terms of the Stalin era. Those times are gone, perhaps forever. True, people still disappear, and the secret police have not forgotten the various methods of brainwashing a prisoner and making him confess to anything.

But Khrushchev's methods are both subtler and more dangerous than Stalin's. Deportations, massacres and brutal reprisals of the Stalin era were not efficient, from Moscow's point of view. They necessitated the stationing of large security police forces, the lowering of industrial and agricultural efficiency, and generated general fear, panic and seething discontent. Today's methods do not make people happy either, but they are more efficient, and hence more dangerous.

A realistic picture of Ukraine in 1963 would write some things down in the debit rubric, and some in the credit column of the Soviet-domination ledger. The Soviets must be credited with industrialization, technological and scientific education, and a general development of Ukrainian ports, waterways, railroads and highways. Of course, their motives have been selfish all along the line. Ukraine is the richest non-Russian colony of the Moscow empire. Its development and industrialization help the USSR to produce rockets, missiles, nuclear weapons, armaments for export to foreign countries, steel for warships and oil pipelines, and a variety of other products. Moscow could not exist without Ukrainian wheat and corn, iron ore and coal, its ship-building industry, locomotive works, tractor plants, meat, eggs, butter, milk and fruits.

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Since general development, industrialization and intensive education is always accompanied by high-pressure Russification (all technical colleges and engineering institutes in Ukraine lecture in Russian only, although token lip service is paid to something called—by Russians with a morbid sense of humor—Ukrainian culture), and millions of Russians are moved in to replace the outgoing Ukrainians, the current state of affairs can be best described as a period of consolidation of Moscow's considerable postwar gains, before pushing ahead with the final "integration" of Ukraine into "Greater Russia."

Compared to any time in the past, after the 1917 Soviet Revolution and the 1918-1921 Civil War, there is more prosperity in Ukraine than ever before. By Western standards—which amazed me at first, being unused to the glut of goods, products and services on this side of the Iron Curtain—the department stores, cooperative markets and grocery shops in Ukrainian towns and cities lack the basic minimum of products. And in village stores, one can get only sizeeleven shoes of a certain color, only a certain type of sewing needles and only white thread, for instance. To obtain size-ten shoes, a bigger needle, or black thread, the peasant must travel to other villages, or visit a bigger town. But even this is astounding progress. For 45 years, Soviet shops were empty and devoid even of old wrapping paper, which was used by the managers to roll their evil-smelling makhorka cigarettes. By Soviet standards, the Ukrainian shops and markets are now a horn of plenty. Peasants no longer buy whatever is offered, but only whatever they need. In former years, they bought things they had no need of, like skis on the snowless Black Sea shore, or electric light bulbs in villages which had no electricity. Everything a shop had to sell was snapped up, whether the consumer needed it or not, for the simple reason that there was a perennial shortage of goods, Bulbs could be changed for candles in the cities, while skis could be sold at a profit in northern regions, to buy old rubber tires (for shoe-sole repair) in return.

Now things are quite different. There are still shortages, to be sure, otherwise I would not have been able to sell stolen film on the black market. But, from the material point of view, the farmers and city-dwellers fare much better than before. Now that their bellies are filled with bread, salt pork, herrings and potatoes, which are cheap and plentiful, and their shoulders covered with Soviet-type coats (padded shoulders, wide sleeves, five-inch lapels), the people begin to worry about the spiritual desert they live in. There are numerous indications that Ukrainian intellectuals are dissatisfied and disenchanted. This goes even for army officers and communist party

members. Man does not live by bread alone, and they want something more out of life than food, clothes and a roof over their heads.

The failure of the regime to provide a satisfactory raison d'etre for the intellectuals (the masses do not worry about such things, being satisfied as long as they are well-fed, dressed, warm and dry), is Debit Entry Number One. Other bad marks on the ledger of the Soviet Russian administration in Ukraine must be given for agricultural inefficiency, administrative corruption, juvenile delinquency, crime and rackets.

Ukraine is the granary and meat packing plant of the Soviet Union, not because of Soviet collective agricultural methods, but despite them. It still produces less wheat, meat, fruits, vegetables, eggs and milk now, despite 45 years of Soviet modernization, mechanization, scientific innovation and "progressive" collectivization, than the same cultivated areas produced back in 1912, before the First World War.

The Ukrainian farmer is very efficient and works hard. But his heart is not in his work. There is ample proof of it year after year, during harvest and marketing periods. The average Ukrainian farmer reaps more from his small half-acre uchastok than the kolkhoz collects from ten acres of collective ground. The kolkhoz has tractors, combines, trucks, fertilizers, ample manpower, trained agronoms and agricultural-engineering graduates. The farmer can work on his small half-acre (that's the maximum allowed, and even this is being cut down now) only with his own hands. He is permitted to plan fruit trees, vegetables, sunflowers, watermelons and cornallegedly for his family's private use—on the narrow slice of ground between his front porch and the wooden picket fence along the main village street. He is also allowed to keep one cow, up to ten chickens, one calf and two pigs for private use. He and his wife zan devote themselves to their private livestock and gardens only after working 10 to 12 hours in the kolkhoz fields, orchards, cattle farms and piggeries. But the miracle is that Ukrainian farmers produce more foodstuffs out of their private, non-mechanized and unscientifically cultivated half-acre parcels of ground than the kolkhoz and sovkhoz collectives deliver all told to the state. Had there been a real land reform in Ukraine, and had the land-instead of being stolen by the communistic state—been divided among the peasants, as the Bolsheviks promised in 1917, I am sure Ukraine would have been the richest country on earth-what with its agricultural, industrial, mineral, seaport, river and manpower potential; perhaps richer even than the United States.

Before I was graduated from the Institute of Film Production in Kiev (class of 1951). I tried to study law. But I gave it up after a year, because only idiots or criminals can be lawyers under the Soviet system, which denies the accused prisoner basic human rights. But while I studied at the Law Faculty of Kiev University, we were told by our instructors that crime, prostitution and juvenile delinquency are direct results of the rotten capitalistic system. It was proved to us scientifically and dialectically that criminals are not born, but made. It was therefore axiomatic that rotten social, moral and economic conditions in the reactionary bourgeois countries contributed to a rising crime rate. It was equally obvious that a pure socialist society, such as was being developed in the Soviet Union, would not suffer from the evils of capitalism, and there would therefore be no reasons whatever for crime, prostitution or delinquency. It was so logical that I myself believed it, until the day I saw pimps offering teen-aged prostitutes to passersby on Khreshchatyk, Kiev's main thoroughfare.

Today, I can only laugh at my naivete. The general crime and juvenile delinquency rate in the Soviet Union is unequalled anywhere else in the world, not even in New York's Central Park, or the dark alleys of Algier's Casbah. The most crime-ridden city in the Soviet Union is Moscow, followed by Kiev, Odessa, Rostov, Tbilisi, Baku, Kishinev and Sverdlovsk in that order. Leningrad, Riga, Minsk, Tashkent and Lviv complain of crime, too, but are relatively tame by comparison.

Analysis of crime in Soviet-ruled Ukraine must first consider the difference between the hoodlums of Kiev and Odessa. The Odessa underworld is ruled by Russian gangsters, the notorious "Odesskiye Blatniye" mobs, which terrorize even the security police with their nail-studded sticks and sharp razor blades cunningly hidden between the fingers of their hands. The Kiev gangsters are mostly Ukrainians and call themselves "Dniprovska Holytba." There is no love lost between the Odessa and Kiev gangs, and regular battles are being fought for disputed territory, such as the new Kakhovka car trailer park.

Kakhovka on the Dnieper River is now being developed as a major tourist center. Its location on the river, astride the main tourist route to the Crimea and the Black Sea, is indeed magnificent. A new four-lane highway, connecting Kiev with Simferopol and Yalta, was completed last year. Foreign tourists are encouraged to stay overnight at the Kakhovka motor camp and continue their journey south the next day.

A narrower two-lane road branches out of the main highway to link up with the Nikolayev-Odessa road network. The Odessa underworld controls the prostitutes, pimps, pickpockets, thieves, blackmarketeers and speculators who prey on the Crimean tourist trade. From April through September the Crimea is a virtual gold mine to the underworld.

The Odessa gangs also wage a ruthless campaign against the Rostov underworld ("Rostovskiye Felony") which exercises control over the Caucasus Gold Coast Strip (Sochi-Gagry-Suhumi). But when Kakhovka became a major tourist attraction, the Kiev mobsters decided to muscle in. For two years bloody battles were fought with guns, knives, razors and deadly piano wire, until an uneasy truce was negotiated between the gangs. The Odessa gangs and their subsidiaries control the entire Black Sea coast, from the Danube east to the Crimea, including the Simferopol-Yalta-Kerch triangle. The Don River, the Azov Sea and Caucasus coast are ruled by the Rostov mobs. Farther east, the vicious Saratov gangs operate a tight crime syndicate along the Volga River and the Caspian Sea. Sverdlovsk mobs control the Ural and Western Siberia.

The Kiev underworld, on the other hand, operates in the north-to-south direction, its control being acknowledged all along the Dnieper River, from Smolensk to Nikolayev. If a passenger on one of the river boats has his pockets picked, or misses a valuable watch, the man to see is not Colonel Ivan Fedotov, the police (people's militia) commissioner in Kiev, but Vaska Horbaty (Hunchback Vasya), who runs the Kiev underworld's ransom and pay-off rackets.

I knew Vaska for some years, ever since my wallet was stolen at the Komsomolskaya bus stop, back in 1957. I did not mind losing the money so much as missing the only pictures of my parents and sisters, who were killed by Nazi murder squads during the German occupation in World War II.

I kept them in my wallet and cried with bitter tears when I discovered it was stolen from my trouser pocket while waiting for the bus to the Film Studios. I learned later that the thieves arranged what they called "toltshok" (artificial pushing), which disorganizes the queue of waiting passengers and pick their pockets while they mill around in utter confusion. I told my boss of the theft, and asked for a day off to contact the "Ugrozysk" (Ugolovny Rozysk—Criminal Investigation) section of the police. They owed us some favors, especially after we had given them a publicity boost by filming their new prowl cars in action for one of our documentaries, titled "Grazhdane, mozhete spat spokoyno" (Citizens, You Can Sleep Peacefully). With

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their aid, I hoped to recover my late parents' photos. The money I was willing to give up as lost.

My boss heard me out and thought for a while. "I will give you a day off, but if you want to get the photos back, don't go to the cops. All they know is to arrest some harmless drunks. The wallet business looks to me like a professional job. It's best to contact Vaska Horbaty. He will help you, for a price."

He gave me the address; I found Vaska, paid him the required ransom, and got back the photos. Later on, I was able to arrange similar deals on behalf of friends. It was from Vaska—who had top contacts at the police headquarters as well—that I gained an insight into the operations of the Kiev and Odessa underworlds. There is one particular gang, known as "Zhelyazki," which specializes in thefts and robberies from railroad trains. The armed railway guards have orders to shoot first and ask questions later, but they fear the tough "Zhelyazki" gangsters, and prefer to look the other way while sealed boxcars are emptied of valuable cargo and mail vans are broken into and robbed.

All this crime is accepted as a fact of life by the people of U-kraine. They do not expect anything else from Soviet law-enforcement methods. The Odessa gangs specialize in smuggling narcotics (via foreign seamen) into the USSR, waterfront prostitution, tourist gold-and-currency deals, and armed robberies. In Kiev, narcotics are seldom used, and there are relatively few drug addicts, compared to Moscow or Odessa. But prostitution flourishes as never before. Even Western psychologists and sociologists assume that women are forced into prostitution by social and economic conditions. Only a small percentage of women would voluntarily choose it as their way of life. Unemployment and lack of education are given by experts as the two main reasons for the growth of prostitution. That is certainly not true in Soviet-ruled Ukraine and other parts of the USSR.

Unemployment is prohibited by law, and there is always work for unemployed persons in the "virgin lands" of Kazakhstan and Siberia. Education is both free and universal, at least up to the eighth grade of secondary school. While no one can expect Western standards of living, no one has to starve either, be homeless or chronically unemployed. In that case, there should not be a single prostitute, beggar or panhandler in the Soviet Union.

Alas, the reality is different. Please take a stroll with me along the tree-lined streets of beautiful ancient-new Kiev on a warm summer evening. Most churches have been seized by the Soviets and either razed to make room for ugly blocks of sugar-cube apartment buildings or turned into sports clubs, libraries and research institutes. The same thing happened to the Jewish synagogues. But the few churches still open are thronged with believers. A crowd of hideously mutilated invalids and beggars blocks the approach to the wide staircase in front of the church. In pitiful voices they beg for a few kopeks. There is a law against begging and panhandling. According to regulations, the two burly militia sergeants on patrol across the street, should have summoned a prison-service truck and rounded up all the beggars who are a real eyesore, disfiguring a genuine historical monument.

But they ignore the outcasts and pointedly look the other way, to crack down on some careless driver or harmless drunk. Only a foreigner would wonder why. Any Kievlanin (i.e. native of Kiev) knows that most of the beggars are not real cripples but crooks and veteran members of the beggars' syndicate, affiliated with the Kiev underworld.

If the police start any trouble, the two sergeants would be hunted down and carved up with razors until their own mothers would not be able to identify them at the morgue. And the churchgoers give alms, some out of sheer pity, but most out of fear. The professional beggars keep red or violet ink in small bottles hidden beneath their vermin-infested rags. If people ignore their pleas and do not throw a few coins into the boxes, a woman's coat, or a man's best suit is splashed with the indelible ink and ruined. We continue strolling down the Kotovsky Boulevard, named after a communist partisan leader of the 1917 Revolution. Multi-colored lights of pleasure boats, passenger steamers, ferries and riverside cafes glitter along the Dnieper. Kiev is built on the high Western bank (the righthand one) of the Dnieper. The left, eastern bank is low and flat. Suburbs, "rabochi poselok" (barracks-like housing for workers), small villas, and endless rows of shacks, huts and makeshift cabins stretch for miles off the eastern bank. The Kiev City Council has built a large Park of Culture and Relaxation across the river. But only people from the eastbank suburbs frequent it, and not even they at night. Cars and buses are moving down the Pervomaisky Prospekt, towards the new Panoramic Movie Theater, featuring the film based on Lesya Ukrainka's "Song of the Forest." We board a bus, but step down after a few stops and cross Shchors Square towards Derzhinsky Boulevard. This avenue, as well as mainline Khreshshatyk, are filled with elegant women who slowly stroll up and down, looking for single men whom they accost in Russian slang: "Pogulayem, golubchik?" (Let's have some fun, my dove?).

Prostitution is a criminal offense in the Soviet Union, but no militiamen were in evidence. They knew that pimps lurked in the

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shadows, ready to slash out with razors if any attempt is made to crack down on their lucrative racket. Some police sergeants in charge of an "uchastok" (patrol district) are regularly paid off by the vice syndicates.

Much worse is the situation in front of Kiev's newest and biggest luxury hotel. The 16-story, 800-room Hotel Moskva is located smack in the middle of a tree-lined square, overlooking the river and the west-bank boulevards. Young school-age girls loiter in front of the hotel, offering everything—including themselves—for a few foreign-made nylon stockings, orlon sweaters or chewing gum. The illicit love is consummated right in the square below the hotel, amidst the shrubbery and trees. Is this the "progressive" education of Soviet youth?

Some things I saw sickened me far more than torture, prisons or slave labor. The Soviet Union is undergoing a veritable plague of juvenile delinquency, teen-age prostitution, crime and rackets in schools and universities, because the young boys and girls instinctively feel their lives are empty and devoid of all content.

But "holigany" (juvenile delinquents) and "ugolovniki" (hardened criminals) enjoy comparative freedom and immunity from prosecution. Even if arrested and brought to trial, they receive relatively light sentences, with the right of appeal, amnesty, pardon and parole. If sent to corrective labor camps, they are appointed to senior posts, to live like parasitic leeches off the political or economic crime convicts.

There are fewer convicted "politicals" now than at any previous time in Soviet history, though still more than under the Czars. But all kinds of persecutions and molestations are being carried out under the common heading of "Economic Offense Against the State" for which the death sentence is mandatory. For reasons which are both objective and subjective, Ukraine has drawn most of the "economic crime" trials, out of all proportion to its size and territory.

The objective reasons are twofold. First of all, many (if not most) inhabitants of Ukraine, especially Ukrainians, Jews and Poles, hate the Moscow regime, despise communism and resent Soviet rule. They do not regard stealing from the state as a crime (I myself did not regard stealing film as a crime, albeit well aware of the dangers if caught), and in many cases rationalize theft of money, building materials, foodstuffs, textiles etc. as a patriotic act of sabotage against the Kremlin tyrants.

Another reason is that Ukraine is extremely well-developed commercially, industrially and agriculturally, as well as communicationswise. There is a lot to steal from, and easily-accessible big-city markets mean that everything can be sold in a hurry. The assistant manager of the Lena Gold Mines in Northeastern Siberia may be able to steal five truckloads of gold. But how will he get it out of the wilderness, and how will he sell the "hot" stuff?

The subjective reasons are evident as well. It seems stupid to shoot a man for keeping a few pounds sterling in foreign notes in his prayer book. In any other country, this would be no offense at all. Even in countries with foreign currency controls, only a token fine would be imposed by the court for keeping "valuta."

But if the man's name happens to be Isaac Abramovich Izakson, it's a good chance to kill several birds with one stone—crack down on Jews, and terrorize them, whip up popular anti-Semitism, and divert the people's anger and righteous indignation from the arch-criminals in the Kremlin to the small-fry offenders in Kiev. In case newspaper readers and radio listeners miss the point, the stories stress that the prayer book in which foreign money bills were found was a Hebrew-language edition of the Jewish Bible. The same methods are utilized against Ukrainians suspected of nationalist sentiments. Filling a beer stein with foam instead of beer is a racket well known to the habitues of German "Bierstuben," English pubs and U.S. bars. A beer-filled stein without its crown of foam, looks and feels unappetizing, but a shrewd barman can add so much foam per portion that he can pocket an exorbitant profit at day's end. This is no crime in the free Western world. If the customers think they are being given foam instead of beer, they will either protest in no uncertain terms, or take their business across the street to a more honest bar.

But if the manager of a Kiev riverside "Pivnaya" happens to be known as a "Ukrainian" Ukrainian—that is, he is reported by neighborhood snoops to be singing patriotic Ukrainian songs with his children, addresses his customers in "pure" Ukrainian language, and so forth—the secret police know how to handle the beer-foam business.

Thus readers of Kiev newspapers could read all about one Antin Mykhailovich Popudrenko, who "cheated honest port workers and barge stevedores" of 56,780 liters of beer (who made this calculation, and how was foam converted into liters of beer?) over a period of four years, realizing an ill-gotten profit of 39,200 new rubles, which he used to buy a private "dacha" near Kiev for his married daughter.

After this opening shot, other "revelations" followed. Popudrenko was a "kurkul" and son of a "kulak," according to the papers. Both words are deadly insults in Soviet lingo. In Western usage, both mean a more or less prosperous farmer, and if that is a crime—why should a farmer strive to be poor rather than prosperous? In 1918 and 1919, while a young man, he was a "Petlura bandit" and committed "many crimes" against the Soviet republic. Simple arithmetic showed that this could not be true.

Popudrenko was, at the time of his arrest in 1962, 54 years old. In 1918-1919, he was about ten years old, hardly the age for Civil War fighting! During World War II and the German occupation, he collaborated with the Nazis, according to the press reports. About that, I can't say. Perhaps true, perhaps not. Knowing Soviet propaganda at first hand, I would not be surprised if "Nazi collaborator" Popudrenko actually served as a Red Army soldier all during the war.

After adding that the arrested "wrecker, thief, robber and gutless slime" Popudrenko maintained postwar contacts with "bourgeois nationalist fascist" elements, the papers praised the police for catching him red-handed. Actually, Popudrenko was denounced by one of his waitresses who solicited customers for a private callgirl racket and who wanted to be cut in on the beer-foam deal as well.

The economic system in the Soviet Union is based on several rather stupid misconceptions of day-dreaming intellectuals of pre-revolutionary days. They reasoned that since money is the root of all evil, profit must be evil too. Ergo, private profit by individuals is a crime. As applied to present-day Ukraine, such economic theories are not only idiotic, but ridiculous as well. On March 12, 1962, I went with a newsreel camera team to shoot a short documentary on the festive opening of the Cherkassky Synthetic Fiber Combine, at Cherkassy on the Dnieper River.

This was one of the biggest textile plants in the USSR, and the ceremony was attended by Peter Rozenko (Deputy "Prime Minister" of Ukraine and Chief of the State Planning Commission) and Alexander Kazanets (Number Two man in the Ukrainian communist hierarchy).

We newsreel operators were shown everything there was to see. The huge combine consisted of a dozen plants. "The trunks of trees from the Carpathian Mountains and corn stalks from the steppes of Kremenchuh will be fed into one end, and ready-made men's suits, women's dresses, children's jackets, officer's overcoats, naval "Bushlat" bluejackets and army uniforms will come out at the other end the Executive Director explained with pardonable pride, "and all machinery was produced in the Soviet Union..."

This was not quite true. I myself saw machinery bearing Czechoslovak and East German trade marks. But who was to argue about such things in a country which sends rockets to the moon? We made quite a good newsreel (in Russian, of course, since all speeches were in that language, too), full of pep-talk propaganda, and I had all but forgotten about the "wonder plant" at Cherkassy when about seven months later I read in the papers about the trial of the Assistant Production Manager and three members of his staff. I myself feel they were not guilty. What happened was the factory produced 120,000 men's suits and could not ship them as planned to department stores, because the suits lacked buttons. In any free economy, buttons would have been no problem. But the Cherkassy plant had to wait until buttons arrived from Ivano-Frankovsk (Stanislaviv) in Western Ukraine. When the buttons finally arrived, they were white, red, yellow, and orange-colored, but not a single black button suitable for men's suits. Work at the Cherkassy plant was halted indefinitely all along the production line.

But the plant had its annual quota to fulfill, and the Executive Director, a Russian, ordered his Production Manager, a Ukrainian, to "get black buttons, no matter how." The Production Manager hired a special trouble shooter, one Grigori Podolsky (nationality unspecified), to travel to Ivano-Frankovsk and make a deal with the manager of the Karl Marx Button and Belt Factory. He would let him have 750 suits, worth about 200,000 rubles, in exchange for 3,000,000 black buttons of the necessary sizes.

The Stanislaviv people agreed at once. For them, 750 men's suits represented a veritable fortune in negotiable securities. But since their small factory could not turn out three million buttons within the time specified, they subleased portions of the deal to other enterprises.

Well, to cut a long story short, when the police rounded up the entire "gang," they left the Russian Executive Director alone. But three Jews, two Ukrainians and one Pole were sentenced to death for "speculating in buttons." If this had happened in any free foreign country, they would have been rewarded and promoted for showing business-like initiative, instead of being executed on trumped-up charges of speculation.

I have dealt at length with crime, rackets, vice and corruption not only because they are typical of the Soviet regime, but because the Soviet Russian system of administration, legal procedure and law-enforcement punishment is grotesque. Sending a man to certain death in the icy wastes of the Far North because he served one inch more of beer-foam than prescribed by regulations, or shooting efficient businessmen because they exchanged men's suits for buttons, and raked in some commission profit on the side, is reminiscent of feudal Yemen or Saudi Arabia, where a thief's hand is cut off,

a liar's tongue torn out, and a man has his eyes gouged out if he looks at another man's harem.

Not even the cruel Czarist officials in reactionary Imperial Russia were as brutally stupid as Moscow's "gauleiters" in Ukraine. I have tried to present an objective, true and accurate picture of life in Ukraine, in 1962-1963.

I hope my predictions won't come true, but I fear that at least four non-Russian Soviet nationalities—Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Jews, and Tartars—face cultural and national annihilation. Physically, they won't be harmed. In fact, their material conditions and living standards may even improve.

The commissars are succeeding where the Czars have failed. And one can even understand—if not sympathize with—the geopolitical motives of Moscow's Russification policy. But at a time when the Soviet regime sets itself up as the champion of "progress" and "anticolonialist liberation," Moscow's brutal oppression, feudal-era punishments, cultural annihilation of minorities, resettlement of ethnic groups, and large-scale falsification of history, coupled with administrative and moral corruption, flourishing crime and rackets, are themselves fascist and reactionary.

Having escaped from the Soviet Union, I am convinced that all truly progressive revolutionaries and advocates of progress must fight colonialism, fascism and reaction, not only in some remote Angola or North Borneo, but in the Soviet Russian Empire, which has already gobbled up one-sixth of the globe, and threatens to swallow the rest.

THE CONFUSION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

President Kennedy is steadily becoming more and more aware of the crisis that is looming both in the American foreign policy as a whole and in NATO in particular. He and his advisers are apparently resenting very bitterly the repeated assertions by President de Gaulle that Europe and especially France as the leading continental power (in de Gaulle's opinion) must have its own nuclear and atomic force, for otherwise there can be no guarantee that at a crucial moment the United States may hesitate to use nuclear and atomic arms against the Communist world when America itself can be seriously threatened and damaged by Communist missiles. In all this de Gaulle is saying aloud what undoubtedly many Europeans are thinking silently. At the same time it is very evident that for the most part Europe realizes that it needs American armed might to resist the attackers from the east and it is fairly sure that if the moment comes and Europe is embroiled, America will be forced to step in with far less delay than in 1917 and 1941, when the war had already been brought to a stalemate or the Germans were on the road to victory. As a result in almost every speech that the President has delivered so far on his European trip, he has stressed America's intention to respect its commitments and come to the defense of Europe and the free world.

Yet apparently President Kennedy does not realize that there is a fatal split in American foreign policy between ideals and reality. He does not see that if his speeches and the words of the Secretary of State affirm the loyalty of the United States to the ideal of freedom, the actions of the government and sometimes of the President himself seem to be in contradiction to other speeches and actions. This in a way reflects upon the confidence in the American position and tends to encourage Europe to put itself into a position where, if necessary, it can force America's hand.

At the same time the fact is that the four main goals which the administration and the State Department are seeking do not lie in the same line and can only be reached by differing modes of action. Those goals ideally are all facets of one picture and are all worthy of a struggle to achieve but there must be still the question which goal is the ultimate one to the attainment of which the others are secondary. Those goals are the spreading of freedom throughout the world, the maintenance of peace and the abolition of war, the strengthening of the United Nations, and the raising of the standards of living in the underdeveloped countries. All of these are worthwhile but so far as we can see, the methods that must be taken to attain them are essentially contradictory.

Freedom for all men must be the ultimate goal. Once that is achieved, all the others become subordinate and will be attained almost automatically. Barring the rare possibility that a mad man could obtain control in a free world with a rule of law and justice, international tribunals and world armed forces would easily serve to put down an aggression no matter where he made his appearance.

Peace can scarcely be secured permanently without freedom. History has told us that sooner or later any dictator will want to display his power and when he finds an opportunity or feels himself sufficiently strong, he will not hesitate to attack his neighbor to his own advantage.

The strengthening of a world organization is a good thing but the only time that the United Nations has acted in accordance with the terms and ideals of the Charter, it became involved in the Korean War and in the negotiations and armistice that lulled this to sleep, the principles of the United Nations were trodden underfoot and there have been no serious efforts to repair the damage.

On the other hand, as Moscow itself has shown, the most rapid way to develop the economy of a state is by the use of brute force directed against its own citizens, for if it is idle to talk of democracy to a hungry people, a strong leader can grind out from them the necessary capital to increase the power of the state, even if it does not improve the lot of the average citizen. It is of course possible to have a voluntary system of austerity but this requires an educated and patriotic and aware citizenry, something which is scarcely to be found in the new and undeveloped nations. If this is to be the goal, there is little need to worry as to whether the government in question is free or not. The main thing is to bring about material progress and to risk a moral and intellectual deterioration.

In an ideal world progress toward attaining any one of the four would automatically be reflected in an advance in the other three but this is not an ideal world, however the pacifists and intellectuals may try to scissor it to suit their theories. There is a harsh reality about it that confounds the theorists and nullifies their hopes and that is the theories and actions of the Communist states. It was the idea of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that there was a definite predestination toward the attainment of these goals and that sooner or later they would be achieved peacefully and certainly. Yet as we look out today, we see not the working toward the ideal but the decline of freedom, surrender in place of peace, chaos in the United Nations, and growing disparity despite the amount of money invested by the United States for the good of the underdeveloped countries. It is a disturbing picture.

Let us look on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The differences between Moscow and Peiping are over Khrushchev's theory of peaceful coexistence but as Khrushchev has stressed again and again, peaceful coexistence does not mean peace. It is only the most advanced and complicated form of ideological struggle expressed in an Aesopic language. The object is to infiltrate the bourgeois world with crypto-Communists and weaken it until the Communists are able to administer by force, if necessary, the final defeat to all that is not Communist and does not bow before the Communist leadership. Then the world will be free to obey, peaceful to serve, with the United Nations reflecting every word of the Communist overlords, and the underdeveloped states pouring their riches into the common treasury and receiving back what Moscow doles out. There is never a thought of a reconciliation or an understanding. There is only to be submission and silence.

Faced with this doctrine, the American authorities and far too many of the American public believe in peace without victory, peace without freedom, if only there can be peace. From the time of the emergence of Communism, the free world and the United States have never understood its implacability and have constantly tried to find some way to contain it and to preserve the territory of the old Russian Empire intact at all cost. Not one foot of territory that has once passed under Russian Communist control has been liberated. At first there was the idea that Communism would fall by itself. Communism after World War II penetrated Central Europe. There were only platitudes offered as excuses that the once free countries would not always be under Communist slavery and any sign of relaxation of Russian Communist control has been enough to offer hopes of a change. Then those hopes have regularly been nipped but they always revive and the State Department is very hurt when Congress seeks to impose some barrier to the continuation of this losing game, whether by seeking to forbid imports from enslaved states or by considering such resolutions as the one of the Captive Nations or the effort to create a committee of Congress to keep watch over them.

It serves, so the State Department says, to deprive it of flexibility in its policies. Now we can be confident that if a nuclear ban is ever to be secured, it will be by more American concessions to Russian sensibilities. If anything else is to be achieved, it will be by Western concessions, not through the mediation of even an "honest broker," a role Great Britain tried to play in the continental politics of the nineteenth century.

There has been a steady avoidance by the United States of any definite facing of this problem since World War II. The troops of the United States and the United Nations were hampered by it in the Korean War. When the Poles and still more the Hungarians endeavored to liberate thmselves, they received no support, while the Hungarian Communists were willingly supplied not only by Russian guns but by Soviet troops. The protests over the Berlin wall were merely formal and the confrontation in Cuba was allowed to fade away as soon as Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles, whether he did or not. Now the United States is opposed to Cuban efforts to liberate themselves, lest it start another chain of incidents, while it withdraws its objections to the Hungarian Communist government set up by Soviet arms.

This defeatist attitude which postpones to the Greek Kalends the possibility of any liberation reached its high point in the letter of Secretary Rusk to Chairman Flood who had invited him to testify on the subject of a Committee on the Captive Nations. The Secretary remarked among other things: "The President and I have both expressed the conviction that a final settlement of the problem of Berlin, of Germany and of Central Europe must take account of the right of self-determination of the peoples concerned. However, the United States Government's position is weakened by any action which confuses the rights of formerly independent peoples or nations with the status of areas, such as the Ukraine, Armenia or Georgia, which are traditional parts of the Soviet Union. Reference to these latter areas places the United States Government in the undesirable position of seeming to advocate the dismemberment of an historical state." The slightest knowledge of history reveals that these "areas" were deliberately conquered by imperial Russia or taken by intrigue, that they revolted on the downfall of the Russian Empire and declared their independence, and that when they were reconquered by force of arms by the Muscovite Communists, even Moscow was forced to recognize that they had been independent and instead of reverting to the old system of a unitary state, it set them up as independent Soviet republics with the hypothetical right of secession and even included Ukraine as an independent state in the

United Nations along with Byelorussia. Ukraine has no actual independence but it has a paper status and a seat in the United Nations with a vote equal to that of any nation that is not one of the permanent members of the Security Council. Apparently by the logic of the State Department, the assumption of control over an area by the Kremlin Communists is sufficient reason why the United States is to be debarred from protests, and even the setting up of a Communist regime in the so-called satellite states is an unpleasant fact but one that cannot be too bitterly resented. Once this is fully understood, the way will surely be open at the proper time to extend Kremlin rule more fully and perhaps to include still more states in the Soviet Union, as it did include the independent republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

At the same time, the American allies have seen with amazement and concern the interest of the United States in having Sukarno of Indonesia who is partly a devotee of Moscow take over from the Netherlands the western part of New Guinea with its inhabitants, the Papuans who are in no way related to the Indonesians. The United States is likewise exerting more or less open pressure on Portugal to liberate its African colonies of Angola and Mozambique, even though the developed and educated parts of the native population are Portuguese citizens in the fullest sense without regard to race. We may admit that Portuguese training of the natives for citizenship is unpardonably slow and that there is scarcely any democracy in the area, but there is at least as much as there is in the Soviet slave camps and probably a great deal more.

It is small wonder then that despite the solemn assurances of President Kennedy and his statements as to the close links between the United States and Europe, doubts are rising as to the real meaning of the American foreign policy both toward Europe, the Communist complex of nations, and the so-called unaligned but scarcely neutral nations of Asia and Africa with their opposition to Western "colonialism." Time and again spokesmen for both the State Department and the administration have made clear the nature of Russian colonialism but somehow or other any tendency toward action disappears and is replaced by new declarations with reasons for maintaining the status quo and allowing the Moscow nibbling to continue. Naturally Western Europe does not want to see hostilities break out but it is disturbed by many of the American retreats and hesitations.

On the other hand, when the United States shifts its emphasis from liberation and freedom to peace, it involves itself in other ways. For example, when President Kennedy in his address at the American University stated that new approaches must be tried to reduce tension, that idea was translated in the minds of many European non-Communist leftists as an approach toward Communism, an olive branch, and it has more or less given consolation to the Italian Communists and has discouraged any tendency in the more leftist Socialists to seek a compromise with the centre parties. It is in line with Khrushchev's latest device to reform the popular fronts, which strengthened the European resistance to the demands of Hitler but tended to create splits in the different countries between conservative patriots and doctrinaire socialists and Communists and thus indirectly weakened the sense of national unity in many of the countries, especially France, where the split became so strong that there were riots between the parties in Paris and the outcome favored the development of Fascist or semi-Fascist movements. That was Stalin's device and as a good Communist, Khrushchev, despite his repudiation of Stalin, has judged it opportune to try it again.

This is coupled with the American enthusiasm for trying to present a true picture of itself to the Communists, in trying to win friends behind the Iron Curtain by the exchange of theatrical companies, visits of scientists and trivial actions of these and other kinds. The attempt to break down Soviet aloofness by entertainment and kindness will have no more effect than the efforts to satisfy Stalin's appetite by recognizing that he had a distinct interest in having the border states friendly to him although his interpretation of friendship was to set up a Communist government which would obey the dictates of Moscow.

Even the establishment of the hot line between Moscow and Washington to prevent war by accident, the sole accomplishment of the Disarmament Conference which France had the sense to boycott, can be used by Soviet propaganda to give the impression that the United States is finally coming around to Khrushchev's ideas. It is an open secret, denied by no one, that in all the conferences of the Communist bloc, it is the word of Moscow that triumphs except perhaps in the case of the Chinese Communists. The hot line serves as a demonstration that the United States is steadily assuming the same position in the Western Alliance. It may not be true but Khrushchev has made it clear again and again that if the United States and the Soviet Union agreed, there could be no opposition in East or West. He has made it also clear but not in so many words that that agreement and friendship was predicated on the subservience of the West to Moscow. Apparently even the concession of three on the spot inspections offered by Moscow has now been withdrawn and the West according to an official spokesman in Pravda would be well advised to accept Moscow's point of view so as to obtain peace, and the ban on atomic weapons.

It is the same thing with the United Nations. Moscow by its vetoes has turned the Security Council into a joke, and work as the United States will, it has not developed that sense of world public opinion that will restrain the Communist overlords from infiltration and the spreading of ill will and discontent. It is idle to say that all this is produced by the poverty of the underdeveloped nations. That might result in violence but it would not be a violence that in all degrees harmonized with everything to which the United States was opposed.

It is contrary to the principles of modern historical scholarship and to modern philosophy to seek the individuals behind these movements. At the present moment they stand out all too clearly, for as we look at their biographies we see that almost every one of the malcontent leaders has spent some time under Soviet influence. There are many more who have revolted against it, who have realized that behind the mask of Lenino-Marxism or Marxo-Leninism there lurks a more fiendish and degenerate brutality than in the honest anger and superstition of an uneducated peasant.

In fighting these perverse tendencies Americans have been too prone to believe that they have found the only answer and that they must remold all peoples to their pattern of democracy. That is an exaggerated point of view but it is held unconsciously and becomes obnoxious only when it is pointed out by hostile agitators who are not interested in the people concerned but in controlling their destinies. That is why all too often Moscow has failed and why there is still confidence in wide circles in America.

How then can this confusion be abolished? The United States and then the free world must rededicate itself to the cause of liberty and liberation and ever keep this as its first goal. It must see peace only as a step to freedom and not as an end in itself. It must meet Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence with a readiness to help the nations within the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union win back their freedom exactly as Moscow is hoping to reach with its infiltrators into the free world. It must treat the United Nations in the same way and refuse to be bound any more than the Soviet Union to policies that are disadvantageous to it and the cause of freedom.

It was the goal of the signers of the American Constitution to build a government around which the wise and just could rally. That must be the gist of the American position today. The rest is in the hands of God.

GOLDEN JUBILEE OF PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINIANS IN POLITICAL LIFE IN CANADA

Bu V. J. KAYE-KYSILEWSKYJ

On April 21, 1963, the Ukrainians in Canada celebrated the Golden Jubilee of their participation in the political life of Canada, an anniversary which, although deserving the widest recognition, is hardly known outside of Canada.

Fifty years ago (April 21, 1913) the constituency of Whitford in the eight-year-old Province of Alberta elected Andrew S. Shandro, 27, to serve as their representative in the Alberta Parliament. Born in Ruskyi Banyliw in Bukovina, Shandro had come to Canada with his parents who took a homestead in the Edna district in 1898 in what was later to become the settlement of Shandro.

In the general election of 1917, Shandro, then serving with the Canadian Armed Forces as a commissioned officer in the 218th Infantry Battalion, was re-elected by acclamation. He died in 1942 at the age of 56.

Shandro paved the way for other Ukrainians aspiring to public life. In 1915 the constituency of Gimli in Manitoba elected Taras D. Ferley, Independent Liberal and the first Ukrainian to enter the Manitoba Legislature. He was born in 1882 in Balyntsi, Galicia, and had arrived in Canada in 1903.

In 1926 Michael Luchkovich, born in 1892 in Shamokin, Pa., and who went to Canada in 1907, was elected by the United Farmers of Alberta of the Vegreville (Alberta) constituency to represent them in the Federal Parliament in Ottawa. He thus became the first Ukrainian to enter national politics, representing in the House of Commons not only his constituency but all the Ukrainians of Canada as well.

A record in parliamentary service was established by Nicholas Volodymyr Bachynsky, first elected by the Fisher constituency in Manitoba in 1922, who served without interruption for 33 years as a member of the Manitoba Parliament. For a number of years he was its Vice-Speaker and served as its Speaker from 1950 to 1955. He had come to Canada in 1907 and was a teacher by profes-

sion. His older brother, a barrister in Galicia, was for a number of years a member of the Austrian Parliament in Vienna, and during the Polish regime a member of the Sejm in Warsaw from 1928 until his death in 1930.

In 1934 the Saskatchewan constituency of Kelvington S. elected Dr. George E. Dragan, M. D., the son of a pioneer settler from Pleasant Home in Manitoba. He was the first Ukrainian to serve in the Saskatchewan Parliament.

In 1951 the Toronto-Bellwood constituency elected a young brilliant barrister, John Yaremko, to represent it in the provincial legislature. He was the first Ukrainian to sit in the Ontario Parliament. In 1961 John Yaremko was called to the Cabinet as Provincial Secretary and the first Minister of Citizenship.

In 1952 Alexander G. Kuziak, representing the Canora constituency in the Saskatchewan Parliament, was appointed Minister of Telephones and Minister in Charge of the Government Finance Office. He was the first Ukrainian to attain cabinet rank in Canada and in the British Commonwealth of Nations in general. In 1956 he was appointed Minister of Natural Resources. Kuziak was born in 1908 in Canora, Saskatchewan, the son of Ukrainian pioneer settlers.

In Manitoba, in 1955, Michael N. Hryhorchuk, representing the Ethelbert constituency which his father, Nicholas A. Hryhorchuk, had represented from 1922 until 1945, entered the Cabinet as Attorney General and remained in the post until 1959.

The first Ukrainian to be called to the Alberta Cabinet is Ambrose Holowach, a former member of the House of Commons in Ottawa from 1953-1958 and a member of the Alberta Parliament since 1959. He was appointed Provincial Secretary in 1962.

In the Federal Cabinet in Ottawa the position of Minister of Labor has been held since 1957 by Michael Starr, P. C., former Mayor of Oshawa in Ontario. He was born in 1910 at Copper Cliff, Ont.*

In 1955 the first Senator of Ukrainian origin was called upon to sit in the Canadian Upper Chamber. He was William M. Wall, born in 1911 in Ethelbert, Manitoba. He died in 1962. Since then two more Senators of Ukrainian origin have entered the Upper Chamber: John Hnatyshyn and Prof. Paul Yuzyk.

Although the Ukrainians form only 2.6 per cent (474,000, according to the 1961 census) of the total population of Canada, the

^{*} Mr. Starr lost his Cabinet post with the defeat of John G. Diefenbaker's party in the April 1963 elections.

number of members of Ukrainian origin in various parliaments of Canada in 1963 was 26, including four Cabinet Ministers. The significance of this lively participation in the political life of Canada may be perceived only if a comparison is made with conditions which have prevailed in other parts of the world where Ukrainians live, including their ethnic territories in the USSR, the old Austro-Hungary, and Poland.

Ukrainians in their ancestral provinces of Galicia and Bukovina remained under Austrian rule for nearly 150 years (1772 to the downfall of the Austrian Empire in 1918) and numbered in excess of four faillion, but only in the last year of the Empire's existence was the first Ukrainian Cabinet Minister appointed in Vienna. He was Prof. Ivan Horbachevsky, a doctor of medicine who became Health Minister in December of 1917.

During the twenty years of Polish rule in Galicia and Volhynia, where six and a half million Ukrainians lived, not one Ukrainian ever held a ministerial post.

The achievements of a numerically far smaller group in Canada are therefore the more noteworthy. During the fifty years that have passed since the first Ukrainian entered the political arena, 75 persons of Ukrainian origin have served in the parliaments of the Prairie Provinces, Ontario, and in the Federal Parliament in Ottawa.

Most of these Ukrainian Canadians have belonged to the teaching profession. This was the main profession chosen by the sons and daughters of the Ukrainian pioneer settlers during the first decades of their life in Canada. It also served in many cases as the stepping stone to further academic achievements and to careers in law, medicine, dentistry, and so on.

The Winnipeg Free Press of December 21, 1953, commenting on the election of four House of Commons members of Ukrainian origin in 1953, wrote:

...But even more remarkable is the degree in which the Ukrainians have merged into the wider Canadian community. While rightly retaining much of their rich culture of the land of their forebears, the Ukrainian-Canadians form no pressure group politically. Their choice of Party is dictated by individual preference, the best possible indication that theirs is a Canadian rather than a racial outlook.

The year 1963 marked the 50th anniversary of the entry of Ukrainian Canadians in the political life of Canada. Before the year 1963 is over new names will be added to the list of the seventy-five who have served the country since 1913.

The Toronto Daily Star of October 30, 1956 wrote on the occasion of the election of Stephen Juba, a member of the Manitoba Legislature, to the office of the Mayor of Winnipeg, the capital of Manitoba.

Stephen Juba, a man of Ukrainian ancestry, has been elected mayor of Winnipeg, which should be no occasion of surprise, for this energetic and able ethnic group has been forging to positions of leadership in almost every field of Canadian endeavor. They are to be found in the top ranks of every profession, in commerce, the arts, and politics, while it was recently stated that at least 150 of our leading scientists are either Ukrainian-born or of Ukrainian ancestry.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SHOES OF THE FISHERMAN. By Morris L. West, New York: William Morrow & Company, 1963. 374 p.

Since its issuance on May 27, five days before the death of John XXIII, this new novel by the author of *The Devil's Advocate* (1959) has been on best-seller lists. Que of them has listed it in first place for much of the time. More recently the Literary Guild began distributing it as a premium book. That it has, or will be, read by many thousands of the English-speaking world is a foregone conclusion. The timing, plus the fictional account of a Pontiff's problems amidst ideological conflict, ensured success, given the amount of advertising decided on.

But the primary reason for reviewing *The Shoes of the Fisherman* in these pages is the subject matter. For the pontiff whose election and early reign are fictionally recorded is a Ukrainian named Kiril Lakota, who chooses to be called Kiril I as pope. On his papal coat of arms appears a dove with olive branch, surmounting a bear rampant. The motto rounding out the symbolism stirs historical memories at the same time it points to a challenging future. *Ex Oriente Lux* (Light out of the East) is the motto selected. Those seriously interested in Eastern Europe should at least know the theme of this novel being read by so many contemporaries.

Novelist and playright Morris West has a varied background. Born in Melbourne, Australia, in 1916, he spent fourteen years with the Christian Brothers before reverting to the lay state in 1942 and before he had taken final vows in that congregation of religious teachers. After service in Army Intelligence during World War II, West was successfully involved in an Australian recording and transcription business for some years, but he finally exchanged this exacting work for the opportunity to write what he preferred and liked. His first stay in Italy resulted in a novel Children of the Sun (1957), which attracted much attention in England. It centers around the street urchins of Naples and a priest endeavoring to salvage them. When West returned to Italy in 1958 as Vatican correspondent of The Daily Mail, he collected background data for The Devil's Advocate, featuring a Curial prelate as its central character, and for Daughter of Silence (1962), with a setting in Northern Italy. There is no question about this author's interest in the Italian scene. His latest novel confirms this interest and reveals much background knowledge.

Had the publication date not suggested the timing, it could have been easily deduced from references throughout the novel. The pontificate of Kiril I, elected by acclamation because of his impressive sanctity, begins within the present period of East-West discussions. This is confirmed, though no dates are mentioned, by references to conditions of change and unrest in Africa and Latin America, and to talk of a pending nuclear crisis, presumably in China. If Author West did not intend Kiril I as a fictional successor of John XXIII, he at least envisaged him as mounting the throne of the Fisherman not long after the reign of John.

Many of the characters are readily identifiable. A native African cardinal named Rugambwe speaks of language problems to the Pope, although somewhat differently than some reports attribute to the real African counterpart. A Polish cardinal named Potocki has certain things in common with the ordinary of Warsaw. A cardinal from Germany doubles at times for the present archbishop of Munich. And similarities do not stop there. Cardinals from Asia and Latin America, in Rome for the conclave, reveal traits found in real life. The Curial cardinals are even more readily identifiable, though at times too roughly sketched. Finally, there are fictionalized replicas of individuals in public life, and of Teilhard de Chardin, in the person of the Jesuit paleontologist Jean Tèlèmond, newly returned from twenty years of obscurity in Asia. Those so inclined could play a game identifying individuals and evaluating the adequacy of the portrayals. We shall not attempt it here.

The two leading figures are Kiril and Kamenev, the latter a premier of the Soviet Union and the former the newly elected pontiff, who feels himself somewhat suspect as non-Italian and of non-Latin rite, as he takes over the See of Rome. Kamenev is the erstwhile persecutor and interrogator of Kiril Lakota, for whom he has developed a respect and affection. Increasingly concerned about the possibilities of nuclear war, and moved by a secular faith in humanity as well as by an inchoate religious feeling, the Soviet premier initiates a series of "sunflower letters" to Kiril, which are very hush-hush and which solicit his mediation in protecting the peace. The sunflower motif is chosen as recalling earlier experiences of the two K's, and also as a code for purposes of identification. The intermediary is a George Wilhelm Foster, whose Germanic name is an alias and whose unscheduled appearances introduce a cloak-and-dagger element. The other K, Kiril the pontiff, uses as messenger to the President an American cardinal, who dutifully transmits the messages but personally expresses doubts about the ultimate outcome of negotiations.

The peace objective is at least partially achieved in the final chapter, wherein the Pope's advisors agree that some risk can appropriately be run and that his projected trips by jet to distant parts may well further the cause of religion as well as of peace. It is an inconclusive ending, although the new Pope emerges from the consultations with a new determination and courage. He accepts the fact that a pontiff's life involves great loneliness and that he must personally make the decisions others will support but fear to urge in advance.

Throughout the story are several subordinate plots. One involves a middle-aged American journalist of status, named George Faber, whose marital aspirations bring him in conflict with an Italian minister of state, especially after connivance at criminal acts puts him on the defensive. There is the intertwining story of the attractive Jewish girl, noted for charitable concern for the poor and helpless, if not for past sanctity, who is in the process of spiritual renewal and growth. She persuades the pontiff to find refuges for babies born deformed from a thalidomide-type drug. The portrayal of her character is perhaps the most convincing of the subordinate personages in this complex story.

Some evaluative observations are here in order. Kiril Lakota is something of a composite of Metropolitan Joseph Slipy and Cardinal Agagianian. He has spent seventeen years in imprisonment and exile, periodically harassed by Kamenev and emerging as a heroic, if somewhat shadowy, figure. He enters the conclave garbed as a Byzantine prelate and clearly identified as a Ukrainian and archbishop of Lviv. The author says he was appointed to that post, despite his youth, after World War II as successor to Andrey Sheptytsky. He ends up in Rome, a cardinal in petto, but announced in time to join the college of car-

dinals at the conclave. Author West, perhaps unwittingly, refers to Kiril as speaking of his mother tongue as Russian and himself a Russian. This is not in accord with the earlier portrayal of him as a Ukrainian from Lviv. Some Ukrainians may understandably be inclined to criticize the author for such inconsistencies. Nevertheless, West's overall treatment is basically sympathetic to the Ukrainian Church and the Ukrainian people.

To West's credit it should be noted that he pays explicit tribute to the other Ukrainian prelates who were imprisoned and died. He briefly portrays them as martyrs to the faith, at the same time Kiril is painted as one who survived because of great stamina and because Kamenev needed him at a future date in the interests of peace. Some of the reviewers have managed to discuss the book without indicating Kiril's background and the fate of his fellow bishops.

Kamenev is an even more shadowy character, with basically good instincts, who hopes to surmount the intrigue and struggle in which he has thus far managed to survive. But he cannot move freely, it seems, because of public opinion and the expectations and demands of the ideologically committed around him. He is at once the symbol of an evolving system and its captive. He cannot evolve faster than the system permits. Hence, he secretly solicits the good offices of his friend and one-time victim, Kiril, now the Pope.

The President of the United States is very sketchily portrayed, but also emerges as one caught in a system he cannot elude. He is simply designated as Robert throughout the novel, and not of the Pontiff's faith. In all this character sketching, West reveals himself as committed to a "great man" approach to history. The evolving but unbelieving premier of secular humanist outlook, the saintly and risk-taking pontiff, and the eager but calculating President, all have about them something of the man on horseback. And what hesitancy they have is overcome by the recurring appearance of some deus ex machina. Presumably, all ends happily.

Kiril is not without human shortcomings, though these are usually unidentified as such in the story. He has about him a certain amount of political naiveté, not only as regards the international situation, but perhaps more in the matter of appraising tensions within the Church and their causes. The friendship of the pope for Jean Télèmond reveals some theological naivetè on the part of Kiril, or is it the author, as regards the theology of the supernatural. This all adds to dramatic conflict when the Holy Office makes its report on Tèlémond's works. But in the meantime Kiril seems insufficiently aware of the intellectual and doctrinal problems associated with intellectual integration of the several levels of knowledge, and of the relations of science to theology. Too much centers on the "project" relating to evolutionary theory. And there are elements of naiveté, as well as of self-conscious writing, in the "secret memorials" of Kiril which are interspersed through the book and purportedly reveal the pope's personal reflections on, and reactions to, what is happening around him.

In balance, The Shoes of the Fisherman manifests a healthy respect for the Eastern Church and for the Ukrainians, especially amidst the trials of religious persecution. It portrays Christianity as world-wide in scope, transcending the limitations of West European religious outlook. However, it does not portray sharply enough certain important sources of misunderstanding between Orthodox and Catholics, and between Catholics of Latin rite and those of Eastern rites. In the effort to hasten peace, or at least to forestall nuclear war, the story overlooks acute political differences even within the Atlantic com-

munity. Too much is attributed to a few international leaders and too little to patiently built up mutual understanding. Nevertheless, the reading of West's latest novel can be a rewarding experience, if one does not focus on shortcomings and sees it as a fictionalized effort to further religious unity and world peace. The lesson may be a little too obvious, but it is timely and relevant.

Fordham University WILLIAM J. GIBBONS, S. J.

ORIENTE CATTOLICO (The Catholic Orient). Cenni storici e statistiche, Città' del Vaticano, 1962, pp. xiv-812. (Sacra Congregazione per la Chiesa Orientale).

This work, a directory of the Christian Orient, has only two predecessors: Statistica con cenni storici della gerarchia e dei fedeli di rito orientale, of 1929 and of 1932. The Oriente Cattolico is issued under extraordinary circumstances, especially in regard to those Oriental Catholics who are actually under persecution; therefore, the statistics given here refer to the time before persecution.

The present work has been issued under the supervision of the Sacred Congregation for Oriental Churches, from whose archives the statistics are mostly taken; enlisted in its presentation was the cooperation of the professors of the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome.

It is divided in 7 parts, preceded by an Introduction.

The first part deals with the Holy See as regards the Catholic Orient. Here are enumerated all the Cardinals of Oriental rite throughout the whole history of that institute. Among them are three Ukrainians: Isidore of Kiev (1459-1463), Michael Levytsky (1856-1858), and Silvester Sembratovych (1895-1898). Then narrated is the history of the S. Congregation for Oriental Churches, with pertinent documents and lists of its Cardinals and officials past and present. Of especial interest are the Commissions connected with the S. Congregation, in which some Ukrainians have taken part:

- 1. The Pontifical Commission for Codification of Oriental Canon Law (a history of it was furnished by the late Cardinal A. Coussa). Serving as consultors were the following Ukrainians: Rev. D. Holovetsky, Rev. Th. Halushchynsky and Rev. J. Zayachkivsky (all Basilians); in preparing the sources: D. Holovetsky, Th. Halushchynsky and M. Wojnar. Cited in the bibliographical notes on the new Oriental code are the articles of Revs. St. Holubovych, M. Komar and M. Wojnar.
- 2. The Liturgical Commission (instituted on February 8, 1930) up to the present has been dealing with editions of liturgical books in the following rites: Greek, Chaldean, Siriac, Maronite, Coptic Ethiopic, and Byzantino-Slavic. It is also dealing with Ukrainian liturgical books, being worked on by Rev. J. Zayachkivsky.
- 3. The Pontifical Commission for Oriental Churches, in preparation for the Ecumenical Council Vatican II. Among the members of this Commission are two Ukrainian Archbishops: Ivan Buchko and Constantine Bohachevsky (who died in 1961); as Secretary, Fr. Athanasius Welyky (the present Protoarchimandrite of the Basilian Order of St. Josaphat), and as Consultor, Rev. Meletius Wojnar, OSBM.

The second part of this work is devoted to particular Oriental rites. It gives a general historical sketch of each rite and statistics on its present numbers, both Catholic and non-Catholic branches. Clear maps illustrate their territorial locations. At present there are 17 canonical rites in the Orient, but the authors

of Oriente Cattolico preferred to deal not with these rites as such, but with ethnic groups, placing them in 5 original rites, i.e. Alexandrean, Antiochean, Constantinopolitan or Byzantine, Chaldean and Armenian. In this way they enumerated, for example under the Constantinopolitan (original) rite 18 ethnic groups: Albanians, Byelorussians, Bulgarians, Chinese, Estonians, Finns, Japanese, Georgians, Greeks, Hungarians, Italo-Albanians, Melkites, Rumanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Ukrainians and Yugoslavs, who certainly do not constitute all and each of them the particular canonical rite.

This apparently was the hardest problem to be resolved and, as the authors say in the Introduction (p. VII), this new approach to the problem will be more and more clarified by the facts in the future. Naturally, we are expecting to see the determination of the Ukrainian rite (sometimes even this term is occasionally used in the work, e.g. p. 4). Canonically, it comprises those ethnic groups which are following the liturgical and canonical discipline of the metropoly of Kiev, and the Holy See considers them as belonging to the Ukrainian rite. They comprise Ukrainians, Byelorussians, some Hungarians, some Slovaks, and some Croatians and Macedonians with their emigrations to the different countries. In *Oriente Cattolico* these national groups are considered separately, without determining what singular, actual, canonical rite they constitute.

In regard to the Ukrainians, there is retained the old tendency to call them by a double name: "Ukrainians," and the old name, "Ruthenians," applying the latter to all those who are in or from Carpatho-Ukraine. But according to the latest information the name "Ruthenian" has already disappeared in Europe, being retained only among some emigrants from Carpatho-Ukraine in the U.S. (the Pittsburgh Apostolic Exarchate). Therefore, it cannot be applied in general to all those in and from Carpatho-Ukraine. I would suggest calling them Ukrainians from Carpatho-Ukraine, with the note that some of them in the U.S. still prefer the old name of Ruthenian. In regard to Slovakia there are still some thousands of Ukrainian Catholics in North Slovakia who should not be mixed with the Slovaks of Ukrainian canonical rite, a fact which Oriente Cattolico seems to have overlooked (p. 320).

The third part of *Oriente Cattolico* deals with the geographical settlements of Oriental Catholics, from which the following statistics on Ukrainians are drawn: in Argentina, all Ukrainian Catholics number 92,000; in Brazil, 86,500; in Canada, 201,512; in the U.S., 300,000 Ukrainians and 297,000 "Ruthenians;" in Austria, 3,000; in France, 20,000; in Germany, 18,000; in England, 20,000; in Yugoslavia, 40,000; in Poland, 150,000; and in Ukraine, 3,838,000. All told: 5,066,512.

The fourth part of *Oriente Cattolico* treats of the institutions of culture and education. Here are enumerated the Pontifical Institutes and Seminaries for Orientals in Rome and the Oriental Seminaries outside of Rome.

For Ukrainians Rome offers the Pontifical College (Seminary) of St. Josaphat (major) and the Ukrainian Minor Seminary of St. Josaphat. In the U. S. the Major Seminary of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Pittsburgh; the Ukrainian Intereparchial Major Seminary of St. Josaphat in Washington; and the Ukrainian Minor Seminary of St. Basil in Stamford. In Brazil there is the Ukrainian Minor Seminary "Cardinal Tisserant" in Mallet.

The fifth part of this work concerns itself with societies working for those of Oriental rite. Here it is necessary to add one existing in Holland (Apostolaat der Hereniging), which originally was erected to help the Ukrainian Church in

1926. Also another must be noted, that existing in Moravia (Apostolate of SS. Cyril and Methodius, 1891) which later maintained close relations with the Metropolitan of Halych, A. Sheptytsky, and had members throughout Galicia. Even one in Spain (Obra del Oriente Cristiano, 1941) worked with Ukrainian students.

The sixth part deals with religious male orders. Enumerated are the religious Orders and Congregations of each Oriental rite. In the Ukrainian rite are those of Oriental origin and those of Latin origin. Among the former are enumerated above all Studites, then monastic Orders, then the regular Order of Basilians of St. Josaphat. In the latter category are Redemptorists and Salesians in different countries; then Benedictines and Franciscans, only in the U.S.

The seventh and last part covers religious female orders, both of Oriental and of Latin origin. Both categories are noted for the Ukrainian church. Among the first are the Sisters of St. Basil the Great; the Studites-Sisters; the Sister Servants of Mary Immaculate; the Sisters-Catechists; the Sisters of Christian Charity; the Sisters of the Holy Family; the Sisters of St. Josaphat; the Sisters of St. Josaphat; the Sisters of St. Josaphat; the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul; the Missionary Sisters of Mother of God; and the Catechists of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. Those of Latin origin are the Sisters Little Workers of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary, who are working in some Ukrainian Church institutes in the U.S. (Washington, Philadelphia, Stamford).

Among the appendices, one deals with Oriental churches and chapels in Rome. The Ukrainian ones there are the old church of SS. Sergius and Bacchus (now used for the Latin rite) and the chapels of the aforementioned different Ukrainian institutions in Rome. A second appendix presents different statistics on the Catholic Orient.

As can be seen from the summary, this work is destined for practical use with regard to the Oriental Churches. It will be on the desks of all those who are interested in the subject because it provides the most important comprehensive information on it. The Ukrainian Catholic Church, as the largest among all Oriental Catholics (over 5 million in comparison with the total number of Oriental Catholics of 11 million) naturally occupies an important place in the attention of the authors of this work.

The positive features of this work include information brought up to date, the use of large and recent literature relevant to each topic (e.g., each rite); a comprehensive view gained by various means, as maps and general statistics, even on the separated brethren. Noteworthy progress has been made in regard to the Ukrainian problems: selection of the correct terminology—"Ukrainians" instead of "Ruthenians" (except as noted); correct names of bishopric sees: Lviv, Peremyshl, Stanislaviv; quotations from Ukrainian authors, and so forth.

Finally, as in each human work, there are some misunderstandings, different opinions, some omissions and simple errors.

To be pointed out is the lack of precise determination of the singular, actual, canonical rites, which in practice is of great importance.

Following the pagination of the book, we noted: p. 61, the reviewer's work, Acta Alexandri PP. IV, is not yet issued; p. 208, it would have been useful to add the Spanish work of Hilario Gomez, La Iglesia Rusa, Madrid 1948; p. 209, likewise: Alexandre Manvelichvili, Histoire de Georgie, Paris, 1951; p. 318, the transcription of the Slavic name should be Vorontsov instead of Voroncov; p. 326, a simple error: "il papa Callisto III" must be "Pio II"; p. 336, we missed the work of Ivan Vlasovsky, An Outline of the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 4 volumes, New York, 1955; p. 384, it would have been useful to add

the work of Antao Gregorio Magno, De Synodi Diamperitanae Natura atque Decretis, Goa 1952; p. 585, Sienchylo, not Sientylo; p. 634, we should have liked to see mention of the Dominican Province in Ukraine in the history of this Order's activity among Orientals.

The Catholic University of America

M. M. WOJNAR, OSBM

THE MEANING OF COMMUNISM. By William J. Miller in association with Henry L. Roberts and Marshall D. Shulman. Silver Burdett Company, Morristown, N. J., 1963, pp. 192.

In many sections of the United States the study of communism is being progressively advanced in the school systems. The curricula in both secondary schools and institutions of higher learning are making room for this systematic and indispensable study. Several states have already passed mandatory or permissive legislation to encourage this national development, and very likely in a few years all parts of the country will be engaged in what is in effect cold war education.

To serve this expanding program, much literature on communism, the Soviet Union and related subjects is in existence today. However, in some quarters attempts are being made to introduce works as "textbooks" on communism in the secondary school systems. The adoption of a given work as a textbook would obviously give it a weight and influence exceeding those of other works. The paramount question is, of course, which book qualifies as a "textbook"? One essential property of a text in any field is a comprehensive treatment of the subject, presenting all major data and interpretations, different theories and opposing views, with maximum attainable objectivity.

Keeping this indispensable criterion of a textbook in mind, we can easily assess the pretension of this work by William J. Miller to serve as a text on the secondary school level. Does it satisfy this basic criterion, not to mention other equally important criteria? The answer is an unequivocal no. Despite its many good qualities of content, organization, and presentation, the work falls far short of the mark. Its uncritical adoption as a textbook would mean an unfortunate infusion of one line of thought—and at that a misleading one—which would be a disservice both to the unsuspecting student and the general program itself.

Here are the specific reasons justifying our judgment. First, the title of the work is scarcely supported by any analytic content to be found from cover to cover. What really is the meaning of communism? To be told at the outset that both "as a symbol and as a tangible fact" the Berlin Wall is "the essence of the meaning of Communism" is hardly illuminating, even to a teen-ager. Nowhere in the work is there an attempted definition of the term, and Moscow's attempt in 1961 to define communism is completely overlooked. But the main point is that the author and his associates begin their presentation with the usual trite line that Marx started it all, then Lenin and his cohorts continued the movement with some modifications, until we arrive at Khrushchev. This is only one conception of the background to the present threat. What of the other that has traditional Russian imperialism as its empirical, historical starting point?

The work is grossly deficient in this respect. Although it dips into some aspects of Russian history, it provides no conception of the continuity of Russian imperialism, first Czarist, then Soviet, under the successive guises of philo-

sophical import, i.e., religious Orthodoxy, racist Pan-Slavism, and now materialist communism. It matters not whether the author and his associates disagree with this well grounded conception. If they're presenting the case for secondary school consumption, they're obliged to develop all dimensions of it and not misguide the student with this usual superficial presentation.

As a perceptive analyst of this work reads further, it isn't long before he comes to understand why this gaping hole in perspective and understanding exists. The author exhibits an almost complete lack of knowledge regarding the numerous captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. This is demonstrated time and time again, producing a great deal of confusion and in effect undermining the pretenses of the work for textbook purposes. For example, the non-Russian national forces at work in the Revolution of 1905 are not even mentioned, though they were quite determining. But worse still is the depiction of the revolutionary period from 1917 on as a purely Russian phenomenon. Reading this work, the trusting student would never come to know that many independent states, such as Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and others, emerged from the ashes of the Czarist Russian Empire.

Reference is made to the first Russian Bolshevik state, the "Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic," but the helpless student wouldn't know whether this territorially coincided with the present RSFSR or with the later USSR. Judging by other statements, it appears that the author believes the territories of the Caucasus, Ukraine and other non-Russian areas are Russian. Moreover, there are not only gross inaccuracies in this work but elements of fiction, too. For example, in 1920 the Poles were supposed to have been unhappy with the Curzon Line and thus sent troops "into the Ukraine"; eventually "the Red Army, under Mikhail Tukhachevsky, drove the Poles out" (pp. 73-74). The facts are that Trotsky's Red Army was pounding on the gates of Warsaw, and both Polish and Ukrainian forces drove the new imperialist Russians back into Russia. It was a misfortune of history that they honorably observed Russian territorial integrity and desisted from annihilating the Red Army.

Another untruth appears in the statements "What the Five-Year Plan really became was a new war—against the Russian people. It would kill millions upon millions of them" (pp. 82-83). Concrete evidence shows that the millions were Ukrainians. On the subject of resistance, the book plays up the really minor Kronstadt rebellion of 1921 and overlooks entirely the rash of resistance in the non-Russian areas from 1928 down to the 50s. Where an attempt is made to grapple with the basic non-Russian facts in the USSR, the reader is exposed to this nonsensical description of the Soviet Union—"The Soviet Union's population of 220 million inhabits a 'nation of nations'" (p. 128). An empire-state is called a "nation" in a work that aspires for textbook status and all that that involves when it comes to precise definitions and clear exposition. Then, just a few pages hence we are told that "more than 20 million Russians were killed" in World War II (p. 132).

One could go on and on criticizing this work for its factual historical defects, narrow perspective, and poor background. Its colorful pictures are scarely a substitute for its substantive deficiencies. If the book were adopted as a text anywhere, it would do greater harm in the long run than good.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

MOSKVA SLIOZAM NE VIRYT (Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears): The Tragedy of Ukraine in 1933. By Vasyl Hryshko. New York, 1963. DOBRUS Publisher, p. 68.

DUMKY PRO SUCHASNU UKRAINSKU SOVIETSKU ISTORIOHRAFIU (Thoughts on the Contemporary Soviet Ukrainian Historiography). By Alexander Ohloblyn. Organization for the Defense of Four Freedoms of Ukraine, New York, 1963, p. 88.

Through the efforts of DOBRUS (Democratic Association of Ukrainians Formerly Oppressed by the Soviets) a book in Ukrainian, *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears*, has just appeared here. Written by Vasyl Hryshko, noted Ukrainian American journalist and specialist in Soviet Ukrainian affairs, the booklet is penned on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the man-made famine which was deliberately organized by the Kremlin in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the Ukrainian people to collectivization.

Besides his scholarly qualifications, author Hryshko brings to bear the authority that comes only from experience: he himself is a survivor of the horrible man-made famine.

It may be of interest to note that at the time the Ukrainians in Western Ukraine were fully apprised of the famine; they had access to the international press, especially the American press, which had its correspondents in the Soviet Union. In Lviv, capital of Western Ukraine, a special Ukrainian relief committee was established for the purpose of assisting the famine-struck Ukraine. The Soviet government, however, flatly denied the existence of the famine and maintained, as millions died, that Ukraine needed no help from abroad. Nonetheless, through the efforts of Ukrainian leaders in Western Ukraine, particularly those serving on the "Committee for the Relief of Ukraine" in Lviv, an "International Committee to Assist Starving Ukraine" was founded in Western Europe under the honorary chairmanship of Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna. Upon the Committee's confrontation of the Soviet government regarding the famine in Ukraine, the Kremlin replied obdurately that there was no famine in Ukraine, and therefore no need of international assistance for Ukraine.

In 1933, author Hryshko justly remarked, the so-called *kurkuls* (*kulaks* in Russian) no longer existed as a social class: they all had been summarily "liquidated" in the previous years by the communist authorities. It is conservatively estimated that at least 1,200,000 Ukrainians were deported from Ukraine in 1933 as *kurkuls*, hence as "enemies of the people" and of the Kremlin-imposed collectivization. In the same year hundreds of collective farms in Ukraine had already appeared, operated to a large extent by the landless paupers.

The government of Soviet Ukraine, seeing the famine spread to alarming proportions, decided to advance some wheat rations to the collective farm workers against their income in kind from the new harvest. Moscow ruthlessly abrogated this decision of the Ukrainian Soviet government, and in an edict aired on November 20, 1932, stressed that the wages for working days (trudodni) would be forthcoming only after the sowing contingents had been fully completed. These included all the wheat supplies of the collective farms. In order to implement this decision, Moscow dispatched 112,000 party agitators, in most cases non-Ukrainians, who were ordered to subdue the Ukrainian villages at all costs.

Furthermore, in January, 1933, Moscow attacked the entire Ukrainian party apparatus, accusing it of lack of vigilance and of permitting the "growth of a powerful class enemy" in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government, that is,

the government of the Ukrainian SSR, was given no vote of confidence by the Kremlin masters.

Subsequently, Moscow dispatched to Ukraine its trusted satrap, Pavel Postyshev, an ardent Russian chauvinist, along with large numbers of NKVD troops in January, 1933. Postyshev openly declared that his mission was to "save" Ukraine from the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" and "Ukrainization." On March 1, 1933, Postyshev removed Vlas Chubar and Mykola Skrypnyk, head of the Ukrainian government and People's Commissar of Education of Ukraine, respectively.

This period of the Soviet Russian occupation of Ukraine is a black one. Over 6,000,000 Ukrainians died of starvation, while millions of others were deported from Ukraine. Desperate and disillusioned with communist ideology, Mykola Skrypnyk committed suicide. He was followed by Mykola Khvylovy, outstanding Ukrainian writer, who also died by his own hand. The victims of the Postyshev terror included many outstanding Ukrainian leaders, including those of Western and Carpatho-Ukraine, who paid with their lives for the ardent zeal and devotion which they manifested during the period of "Ukrainization." In this blood bath disappeared thousands of patriotic Ukrainians—intellectuals, peasants, workers, soldiers, professors, teachers, agronomists, writers, poets and even members of the left-wing Ukrainian political parties and the Social-Democrats.

The purpose of the famine in Ukraine—to crush the resistance of the Ukrainian peasants to collectivization and to deprive Ukraine of its political and cultural leadership—was accomplished all too well.

The work of Prof. Ohloblyn on the Soviet Ukrainian historiography is a third supplemented edition.

It relates how Ukrainian historiography could develop freely only in the period of the Ukrainian independent state (Ukrainian National Republic, 1917-1919), in which development the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, founded in Kiev on November 14, 1918, played a paramount role.

The field of Ukrainian historiography was expanded by such Ukrainian universities as those in Kiev, Kharkiv and Odessa, and by the various Pedagogical Institutes—Nizhyn, Dniepropetrovsk, Poltava and Chernyhiv. All the contemporary Ukrainian historians conducted their historical research according to the precepts of the historical school of Prof. Michael Hrushevsky, which he enunciated in 1904 in a Russian-language publication of the Russian Açademy of Sciences in St. Petersburg (Sbornik statey po Slavianoviedeniu, Vol. I. 1904). The basis of the historical school of Prof. M. Hrushevsky was the incontrovertible fact that the origin and development of the Kievan State was Ukrainian, as well as that the Kozak period of statehood was Ukrainian, with the Ukrainian statehood of 1917-1920 as a logical continuation.

When the Bolsheviks overran Ukraine at the end of 1920, they at first tolerated whatever work was being done in the field of Ukrainian historiography; and this work was extremely rich and fruitful In 1924 Prof. Hrushevsky, finally being allowed to return to Ukraine from Vienna, settled in Kiev and developed far-ranging scholarly activities in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He published a number of his historical books, founded several historical journals and reviews and grouped around him an impressive number of young historians. Among his publications of that time are: Proceedings of the Historico-Philological Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences; Scientific Collection of the His-

torical Section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences; Studies on the History of Ukraine; a monthly review, Ukraine, and many others. All the other scientific centers, such as those in Kharkiv, Odessa, Poltava, and Dniepropetrovsk, continued to develop their research studies and their publication activities, many works of which were published by the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev.

At the end of the 1920's the Bolsheviks began their efforts to curtail the development in general of Ukrainian historiography and the Ukrainian sciences. In 1929-1930 the Soviet government staged a huge show trial in Kharkiv of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine"; the accused numbered several Ukrainian men of science headed by Prof. Serhiy Yefremiv. The Communists attacked the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the universities in Kiev, Kharkiv and Odessa, and other research centers in Ukraine. First they "reformed" the Ukrainian Academy in Kiev by installing a number of Communists in the Academy, although these puppets possessed no scholastic qualifications for membership in this august and revered institution. One of the results of this "reform" was the arrest in 1931 of Prof. Hrushevsky and his deportation from Ukraine. He died in 1934 in the Caucasus.

Many Ukrainian professors and men of science were sentenced in the trial of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" to hard labor or long prison terms. The entire group at the Ukrainian Academy, organized by M. Hrushevsky, was deported to Siberia. Later a similar fate befell Ukrainian historians who labored in other Ukrainian universities or institutes.

During the great famine in Ukraine in 1933 the Ukrainian intellectual world suffered untold losses, inasmuch as Postyshev, the communist lackey in Ukraine, left no stone unturned in his zeal to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and political leadership. In 1937-1938 the equally murderous era of Yezhov succeeded the rule of Postyshev. Stalin sent into Ukraine his trusted Chekist, Yezhov, who, supported by Khrushchev, then a rising star in the USSR firmament, completed Postyshev's task of "liquidating" Ukrainian intellectuals. Ukrainian science, including Ukrainian historiography, fared poorly under these circumstances.

The Soviet government reorganized the Ukrainian Academy of Science and gave it a new name: "The Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR."

At the end of 1936 the Kremlin established the so-called "Institute of History of Ukraine" under the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. Activities at the Institute, however, were paralyzed by the Yezhov terror. Those Ukrainian historians who survived were compelled to make Ukrainian historiography conform to the requirements of the Communist Party.

World War II and the occupation of Ukraine by the Germans further contributed to the decline of Ukrainian historiography.

The postwar period with its perennial famines and persecutions of the Ukrainian people was hardly conducive to a positive development of Ukrainian historiography. Ukrainian historians had been terrorized into submission and silence. Since 1940 the Soviet regime has waged a systematic campaign to discredit the historical school of M. Hrushevsky, denouncing the foremost Ukrainian historian as a "reactionary bourgeois Ukrainian nationalist."

In 1954, on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654), the Communist Party introduced its own "theory" on Eastern Europe.

This historical scheme of the Communist Party propounded the following:
a) Kievan Rus' was not a Ukrainian state, but the common Russian (rusky)

state (thus Russia is as much the heir of the Kievan State as is Kiev, that is, Ukraine); b) the "union" of Ukraine with Russia in Pereyaslav in 1654 meant the merging of the Ukrainian people with the Muscovite people in a common "Russian" state, i. e. Muscovite, (thus the Kozak period of Ukrainian statehood is completely ignored); c) the USSR is a common "fatherland" because of the following factors: 1) a common social and political struggle; 2) a common "proletarian revolution" and building of "socialism," and 3) a common "socialist fatherland"—the USSR—under the leadership of the Russian "older brother" and their national and state center, Moscow. Thus, the conclusion is that the third Ukrainian state in the form of the Ukrainian National Republic was not legitimate.

It becomes quite evident that a Ukrainian historian, compelled to work under the mendacious communist system, cannot hope to oppose the official doctrine without endangering his own life. Thus the appearance of a new "history" to suit the postulates of the party.

Prof. Ohloblyn indicates, however, that there is some evidence that a few historians are now attempting to ignore the precepts of the party. He cites the work of Dr. Ivan Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, dealing with the social and political system of Left-Bank Ukraine in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. Prof. Krypiakevych has been followed by F. P. Shevchenko, V. A. Diadychenko, and others.

Furthermore, Prof. Ohloblyn states that Russian historians have much more freedom and access to sources than Ukrainian ones. Very often the Ukrainian historian, who writes merely to placate the party scheme, is corrected in favor of Ukraine by the Russian historian, who has access to historical sources inaccessible to the Ukrainian.

A noteworthy merit of Prof. Ohloblyn's work is his graphic presentation of Russian endeavors to eliminate from Ukrainian history not only Kievan Rus,' but also the second (Kozak) and the third (Ukrainian National Republic) periods of Ukrainian statehood.

Ukrainians in the free world—and the free world itself—are fortunate in that we have historians like Prof. Ohloblyn who reveal calmly and objectively the unbridled imperialistic and colonial policy of Moscow, which, in its annihilation of the captive nations, uses the falsification of the histories of the captive nations as another genocidal tool.

VASYL MUDRY

HANDBOOK ON COMMUNISM. Bochenski, Joseph M. & Niemeyer, Gerhart, Eds., Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962. Pp. xii, 686.

Overwhelmed as we have been in recent years with the ever-growing pile of books on the "mysteries" of Soviet Russia, one is bound to approach another with trepidation. Alas, this latest effort to reduce this complex phenomenon that is contemporary Sovietism to a synthesized manageable package does not relieve our misgivings. It presents some unusual features. One wonders, for instance, why it was necessary to go abroad to find a senior editor (Bochenski, "an eminent authority on Soviet philosophy and ideology," teaching at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland) and most of the contributors, whose efforts are presented in translation. The American academic landscape is literally crawling with eminent specialists, some of whom are not even noted in the numerous bibliographical references. In itself, of course, there is nothing wrong

with selecting foreign scholars here; but then a related question arises: why other non-English speaking specialists and representatives of the emigre and refugee groups have been passed over in the selection, although these groups have produced some quite well-known experts in areas handled here.

Be that as it may, one can be also quite critical about the selection of the topics. The claim that here is a "reliable compendium which would give all educated people access to the most important information about the main aspects of Communism, fully documented yet synthesized, and based on primary sources, with references to the best secondary materials" (p. v) is not quite borne out by the main coverage: The Structure of Communism (by Joseph M. Bochenski); The Philosophical, Sociological, and Economic Doctrines of Communism (by Joseph M. Bochenski, Emil G. Walter, and Gerhart Niemeyer); Communist Political Doctrine (by Gerhart Niemeyer); The Party (by John S. Reshetar, Jr.); The Methodology of Conquest (by John S. Reshetar, Jr., Stefan T. Possony, and W. W. Kulski); Soviet Imperialism (by Jan Librach); The Soviet Empire (by Walter Kolarz); Principles of Law (by Vladimir Gsovski); Crime and Punishment under the Soviet Regime (by David J. Dallin); The Peasants (by Karl A. Wittfogel); The Soviet Economy (by Ralph James); The Arts and Sciences (by John Fizer); Religion (by Joseph M. Bochenski); The Individual in Soviet Society (W.W. Kulski); A Critique of Communism (by Joseph M. Bochenski).

Although it is true that nearly every topic or concept can be found here or there if one searches for it diligently enough in the book, one can also wonder about such serious omissions as that of a special chapter on education, one of the most important instruments of communist social control and propaganda. (The topic in the Index is limited to pp. 21, 288, and 508-10.) And ought not the controversy over Lysenko be noted at least by listing him in the Index? Does not the Military play quite an important role in relationship to the Party? What about the geopolitical designs of the Kremlin? As for "Science," it is listed as being mentioned only once on p. 38! And when Bochenski and his associates treat the "Philosophical, Sociological, and Economic Doctrines of Communism," one searches in vain for some analysis in this chapter of what the concept of sociology has been within the framework of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist "logic."

Unfortunately, one could easily go on with regard to this aspect of the presentation. But let us analyze some other points in the execution of the project which are rather striking.

The location of the supporting footnotes complicates the presentation, since they are not to be found at the end of a chapter, but are printed, in toto, on pp. 599-646. This arrangement needlessly produces difficulty for the specialist who wishes to identify the numbered footnotes; the process is even more troublesome when one must refer to "A Key to Abbreviations Used in the Chapter Notes" (pp. 647-649).

This, however, is not so bad as the tendency of some authors to cite numerous footnotes referring to widely scattered forces; in this respect, a presentation is often less a synthesizing and definitive chapter than it is a kind of thesis straining to give the impression that a novel treatment of the topic is being presented.

This same weakness reappears in another form when we examine the bibliography (books: pp. 649-667; articles: pp. 667-672; and Western periodicals devoted to the study of communism: pp. 672-673). To cite just a few examples,

we would have liked the inclusion of S.A. Zinkovsky's Pan-Turkism and Islam Russia (Harvard, 1960); Isaac Deutscher's The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky: 1921-1929 (Oxford, 1959); D.A. Shub's Lenin (Doubleday, 1949); B. Souvarine's Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism (Longmans, 1939); L. Trotsky's Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence (Harper, 1946); Current Soviet Policies, Leo Gruliow, Ed., (Praeger, 1953, 1957) and L. Schapiro's The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State, 1917-1922 (Harvard, 1955).

As far as the articles are concerned, we find here valuable references: Current History, The Economist, The Annals, Byelorussian Review, and especially publications appearing in the USSR. But we certainly miss here any reference to The Ukrainian Quarterly, which has been systematically and academically producing a series of studies which have attracted international attention.

All in all, then, the work is not so much a handbook as it is a collection of special studies, especially featuring the work of Bochenski, on some outstanding aspects of communism, mainly the ideological. The contributions are undistinguished since they hardly contribute anything new, on the one hand, and do not consistently summarize all the worthwhile material, on the other. The book, thherefore, will do no particular harm to a public avid to learn more about Soviet Russia (and a little bit about Russia). The specialist, however, will look elsewhere.

University of Bridgeport

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

SECRET NAZI PLANS FOR EASTERN EUROPE. A Study of Lebensraum Policies. By Ihor Kamenetsky, New York, Bookman Associates 1961, p. 263.

The world has witnessed many strange leaders and thinkers. There have been aggressive conquerors who led their armies into far distant lands in quest of victory, honor or wealth. There have been thinkers from the time of Plato who have conjured up utopias out of their own brain, utopias intended to alter every aspect of human life and thought and ending almost invariably in the creation of a sterile anthill in which man is expected to live as an unfeeling cog in the execution of a grand design.

But it has remained for the twentieth century with its technological development, its methods of mass communication and its psychological insight to proceed to the execution of such theories in a totalitarian state. To the leaders of such totalitarian states the life of the individual or of millions of individuals who cannot be fitted into the standard pattern is of no concern and they can be removed with no more compunction than disease germs or pests of any kind.

This volume analyzes the general plans of Hitler as expressed in his writings and the writings and orders of his close associates as to the future of the Germans and the other peoples of Eastern Europe and discusses the methods by which he planned to carry out these plans. Hitler dreamed of combining in his Third Reich all those peoples of northern and north-western Europe who spoke a Germanic language. He succeeded in uniting them against him. Dr. Kamenetsky only alludes to this part of the story but he dwells upon the significance of his sense of the German Lebensraum—living space, which was to include Eastern Europe up to the Urals and which was to be steadily purged of its traditional population and replaced by a racially pure and specially trained German population to live there and to reign for a thousand years. It was not to be a squirearchy but a new people.

He traces the development of the theory of Lebensraum and of the means by which it was to be carried out chiefly by Heinrich Himmler as chief of the SS. It was not to be a simple process. The Jews were to be exterminated out of hand. The Slavs were to be intellectually moronized, their numbers were to be reduced, and they were gradually to be forced across the Urals as an ignorant horde or were to be kept forever as hewers of wood and drawers of water, a mass of leaderless slaves to be exploited and expended at will. The Baltic peoples were in a large part to be treated as Germans who had been seduced from their real heritage and who could therefore be restored. Besides, the authorities were to be on the watch for children of all peoples except the Jews who could be judged worthy of being reared as Germans and of becoming a worthy part of that new German population which was to be settled in the German Lebensraum.

"As Rosenberg defined it, it aimed neither at economic exploitation of certain peoples nor at the establishment of some strategic bases in the territories destined for German expansion, but at a complete settlement of the earmarked areas with peoples of the Germanic race. In Rosenberg's interpretation it was the union of people and soil which was essential to the Nazi brand of imperialism, not the domination of the foreign peoples. The latter must ultimately disappear from the German settlement area to make room for the colonists. ... There by an artificially created semi-rural way of life and extensive Nazi indoctrination, a certain homogeneous type of people would be created. They would be the healthiest, biologically the most vigorous and reproductive, and politically the most reliable people; and they would form a nucleus of the New German Empire" (p. 178)

It was a weird and inhuman utopia founded on pseudo-science and pseudo-history. Yet in the guise of a war against Communism, Hitler attempted to carry it out by creating German settlements, by crushing the native population, by exterminating millions of people and deporting others. It was against the interest of the German military program which should have called for the support of those millions of unfortunates who for over twenty years had been tortured and butchered to suit the Communist theories but it was not to be. Hitler knew best and when he finally fell, the West had no better remedy to offer his victims than to return them by the infamous Yalta agreements to the Soviet captivity in which they had languished and as a bonus to extend Soviet misrule and totalitarianism far further than it had ever gone before. It is that Soviet totalitarianism that is now speaking in their name as agents of the Kremlin in the United Nations and stirring up still more storms in which liberty and freedom can be crushed for good and all.

This is a valuable book including the preface by Professor Smal-Stocki. It shows what we are all too prone to forget, that despite the ardent speeches of Hitler, of Stalin, of Khrushchev and of many more tyrants there is only one way to a permanent peace, the establishment of free governments of free peoples that can work together for the welfare of humanity. No arbitrary design imposed by a dictator or a Soviet Executive Committee can replace it, if man is to develop his full capacity and his self-respect and human value.

Columbia University

CLARENCE A. MANNING

SOVIET MARXISM AND NATURAL SCIENCE 1917-1932. By David Joravsky. Columbia University Press, New York, 1961. xiv, 433 p.

In this solid and basic work, David Joravsky, professor of history at Brown University, posed for himself an important task—the analysis of the Soviet

Marxist doctrine, the so-called dialectical materialism, with regard to the development of the natural sciences in the Soviet Union. In the five chapters of the voluminous book the author relates the history of this question, limiting the scope of his work to the initial phase of the Soviet Union, from 1917 to 1932, a period during which all branches of science enjoyed a reasonable degree of freedom of development and during which it was still possible for scientists and researchers to arrive at more or less objective results.

As a point of departure the author presents a history of the natural sciences in pre-revolutionary Russia, and outlines the development of Bolshevik Marxism, as distinct from the original teachings of Marx, along with the latter's relation to natural sciences. He also dwells on the philosophical views of Lenin on the natural sciences. He then presents the history of development of science and philosophy under the Bolshevik regime, especially the natural sciences, which in the free world have no relation to politics and party convictions. Prof. Joravsky also uncovers the motives underlying the philosophical views of the Soviet Marxists, with particular attention to the natural sciences. He also notes that with the establishment of the Soviet power a stabilization and standardization of sciences began, as manifested in the mechanization of scientific methods as far back as 1922-1924. Prof. Joravsky points out that stabilization began with the rejection of positivism in science, i. e. the only valid approach to science, and a transition to the formalistic treatment of all sciences under the directives handed down by Stalin in 1924-1926.

In analyzing the attitude of Soviet "policy" to philosophy the author describes the so-called cultural revolution (not evolution!) of the sciences from the viewpoint of Marxist philosophy. Soviet philosophical speculation was the result of the internal ferment in the party from the time that Stalin, having seized power in his hands, began removing his opponents, mostly the Mensheviks. Hence the abnormal rejection by the Bolsheviks of the positivistic approach to science and the mechanization of science, that is, its reduction to clichéd methods of research. The first attempts at mechanization of the natural sciences were made under the pressure of the party cliques, which made their appearance as early as 1926. Philosophical speculation was diverted into the channels of propaganda, while scientific research, especially in the natural sciences, was subjected to strict party control. This was directed by Stalin himself, who at that time waged an implacable struggle against the so-called "enemies of the people," the Mensheviks. The school of Prof. Avraam M. Deborin, noted Menshevik naturalist from pre-revolutionary times, also was attacked, despite the fact that he was an adviser of Lenin. The onslaught on Deborin took place during the First Five-Year Plan. At that time, too, by Stalin's directives, the positivist philosophy had been roundly condemned and the natural sciences had become a preserve of dialectical materialism. A similar fate befell biology and physics. Dialectical materialism had become the practical philosophy of Bolshevism.

All Soviet scientists, including the naturalists, were compelled to subordinate their study and research to the dogma of dialectical materialism. This Marxo-Leninist teaching became the only philosophical doctrine in the USSR. It was the sole vehicle for the analysis of all scientific problems in order that the idealistic teachings of foreign, non-Bolshevik scientists be combatted.

By orders of the party and the government, the Bolshevik philosophers announced a thesis on the uncovering of a "natural order" by the naturalists. In 1894 Lenin had explained the compatibility of revolutionism with the development of science, a tenet which eventually became an attractive force of Marxism.

It was hard to see how the two contrary views could be reconciled. Yet the Bolshevik scientists themselves were forced to mutilate their theories and theses in order to conform to the directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Stalin, who on every occasion referred to the infallibility of Lenin's science and philosophy. All other suppositions in the USSR are impossible and excluded. Prof. Joravsky cites a series of various "deviations" which were severely condemned by the party as expressions of "bourgeois nationalism." Those who recanted and recalled their views were retrained as new specialists and teachers of Marxo-Leninist dialectical materialism.

Prof. Joravsky has availed himself of vast and extensive literature, primarily Russian, and has obviously used it critically and conscientiously. His work reveals to the American reader more than one secret of the Soviet methods used in science, which in the USSR is not free and cannot produce significant results. And although Prof. Joravsky perhaps could not obtain all the secrets of Soviet science, nonetheless he has come very close to the whole picture.

University of Scranton

VASYL LEW

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," addresses by the Honorable Daniel J. Flood et al. Congressional Record, Washington, D. C., July 15, 1963.

Inaugurating the Congressional observance of the Fifth Captive Nations Week, Congressman Flood of Pennsylvania led scores of legislators in proclaiming America's fixed dedication to the freedom and liberation of all the captive nations. Captive Nations Week took place in the week of July 14-20. The support shown during the Week is sufficient to convince any skeptic that the United States will not accede to the status quo of the Soviet Russian Empire.

As Flood states it in his opening address, "from Maine to Hawaii, from Florida to Alaska, Americans will by individual voice or organized rallies and ceremonies speak out in behalf of over 22 captive nations in Eurasia and this hemisphere." He stresses further that "they will urge that our Government renew its moral and political determination to seek the liberation and freedom of Cuba and the 2 dozen captive nations in Eastern Europe and Asia."

The addresses of Congressmen Gilbert, Mathias, Ryan of Michigan, Toll, Derwinski, and many others develop the same theme. Both Congressmen Flood and Derwinski offered the texts of proclamations issued by Governors and Mayors across the Nation. Much vital data on the Captive Nations Week Resolution, editorial and newspaper comments, and planned observances in various states and cities appear in this issue.

Following this opening legislative day on Capitol Hill, for a week and a half both Senators and Congressmen joined in increasing numbers to observe this fifth Week. The results here and across the country have exceeded those of all previous observances. When our Government is bent on negotiating with Moscow, despite its long record of broken treaties and promises, the popular brake represented by the captive nations position can be readily understood.

"GENEROUS AND EVERLASTING TREASURES," an article by Mykola Bazhan. Literaturna Ukraina, Kiev, Ukraine, April 16, 1963.

The valuable *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, published by the "Prolog" Research and Publishing Association in New York, presents this interesting article in its June, 1963 issue. The writer is deeply concerned about the preparations being made in the United States for the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Taras Shevchenko, the poet laureate of Ukraine. As a matter of fact, the establishment of the Shevchenko statue in Washington will be the crowning point of this celebration.

Propaganda vehemence is at its best in this significant article. The writer emphasizes that "our enemies are not asleep." "The American imperialists," he says, "relying on the agile servants—the Ukrainian nationalists—are planning to take advantage of the 150th anniversary for the monstrous, disgusting and provocative purpose of slandering the homeland of Shevchenko, Soviet U-

kraine, and our people with a flood of anti-Soviet insults, provocations, muck, lies and distortions." Evidently, the writer doesn't understand what he reads. The celebration in the United States will be an American event, provided by the United States Congress itself.

His obtuseness is further revealed when he states "The nationalist scribes, of the breed of Zaytzev, Dontsov and Dobriansky, are displaying an extraordinary adroitness in the matter of falsifying Shevchenko, and blasphemous distortion of his works, attempting to present our great poet as some kind of advertiser of the modern 'American way of life.' The writer is truly confused, mixing Americans with non-Americans, the colonial conditions prevalent in Soviet Ukraine with Shevchenko's homeland, and blasphemous distortions with the commonly shared ideals of Shevchenko and America.

"This is a fight," he writes, "together with Shevchenko, against the manhating ideofogy of imperialism and nationalism." Indeed it is, from an American viewpoint, against Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and for the goals of patriotic nationalists everywhere, including Ukraine.

"STRATEGY OF PEACE: FIRST, A TEST BAN?", a commentary. Newsweek, New York, July 15, 1963.

Attempts to arrive at a detente with the Soviet Union are the subject of this very instructive commentary. Falling back on the President's American University address last June, the commentator sees the consummation of a limited nuclear test ban treaty as the first step in the unfolding of Kennedy's strategy of peace. However, as he points out, "Washington clearly was watching its words," particularly with Captive Nations Week in process.

"As required by law," the commentary states, "Mr. Kennedy issued his annual proclamation declaring the third week in July 'Captive Nations Week.'" The fact is that the President is not required by law to issue a proclamation. The law is permissive, not mandatory. Then the commentary bears on the President's proclamation of July 5 and observes, "But its language was softer than in past editions, calling neither captive nor captor nations by name." Here, too, the fact is that no proclamation since 1959 has made such direct references. Since the proclamation is based on the Captive Nations Week Resolution, where the captor and captives are enumerated, it is doubtful that they need be repeated. However, there can be no question that a specific clause on this score would make the presidential proclamation a most effective one.

The comment that "White House staffers believed, indeed, that the President wouldn't have issued it at all if the choice had been his" is also subject to some doubt. For, by law, the President had a choice. What is interesting in all of this is the role played by Captive Nations Week in our relations with Moscow.

"AN AMERICAN INVESTMENT PAYS OFF," an article by Ted Hudes. Look Magazine, New York, July 2, 1963.

It is always comforting to read about the progress made by the thousands of displaced persons who came to these shores after World War II. Look Magazine went at it scientifically, picking a DP family at random in 1948 and checking on its progress ever since.

This article is an account of the development of the Corbett family that under another name arrived here in 1947. The family is of Ukrainian origin and

resides today in Silver Spring, Md. Demetrius Corbett worked in a clothing factory at first, then as a Ukrainian newspaper editor in Scranton, and now edits material for the Voice of America. His wife is a nurse and a son, George, attends the University of Maryland. In short, they have established themselves in their new country.

But, as this absorbing account shows, the most important aspect of this American investment paying off is the work consciously done by many of the newly arrived in the interests of their new Nation. When it comes to those of Ukrainian background, in most cases they know the nature of the Soviet Russian threat and rightly feel that this is both their last opportunity and duty to work toward its defeat.

"PRAVDA CHARGES PRESIDENT TRIES TO HIDE RACIAL STRIFE," a report. The New York Times, New York, July 9, 1963.

Almost immediately after the President's proclamations of Captive Nations Week on July 5, *Pravda* ran a piece on July 8 giving a new twist to Moscow's denunciation of the presidential proclamation and the Week's observance itself. The accusation now is that the President issued the proclamation to conceal the racial strife in the United States.

The pitch of this year's reaction is given in terms such as these: "Americans are trying to whip up an anti-Communist campaign in order to silence and imprison every Negro and every white man who is fighting against racism." Purposely confusing the issues of civil rights within a nation and the destruction of the independence of nations by Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the columnist goes on to state that "Racism is an inseparable part of the contemporary American system." More, it asserts that developments in the United States show the "closest interconnection between racism and Fascism."

It is clearly evident that Moscow is desperately groping for arguments to offset growing American understanding of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. Little thought is required to distinguish between civil rights and the rights of nations for self-determination and independence. To what frantic lengths Moscow is compelled to go is indicated by its Radio Moscow broadcasts featuring picked "American" Negroes who claim that they are the only real "captives," members of "the captive Negro nation in the United States." Such evidence in itself confirms the validity and wisdom of Captive Nations Week.

"IS RUSSIA SOFTENING? NO, SAYS LEADING SOCIALIST WRITER," an article by Julius Jacobson. *Human Events*, Washington, D.C., June 15. 1963.

Articles of this type should be reprinted in scores of American journals to combat the Moscow-induced notion that since Stalin major reforms have been enacted in the Soviet Union and that we can hope for a democratization of the Soviet Union. When the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Honorable J. William Fulbright, believes that under Khrushchev's "reforms" the U.S.S.R. will evolve into a benevolent, non-aggressive, open society, the need for open discussion on this issue is more urgent than ever before. What a powerful instrument in the cold war this illusion can be for Moscow!

Over a year ago the socialist Julius Jacobson wrote his analysis of this illusion in the *New Politics*, which he edits. Methodically he points out the following: (1) relaxation of terror and growth of democracy are two different propositions; (2) there hasn't been a single democratic institution under Khrush-

chev—no right to organize a critical press, no right to organize political parties, no freedom of speech, no free elections; (3) there are no free trade unions under Khrushchev; and (4) despite certain improvements in living conditions, the people are worse off than any other in a modern, industrial state.

It is unfortunate that Jacobson himself labors under the illusion that the Soviet Union is Russia and that all of it is a nation. If he had a more perceptive insight into the international fabric of the Soviet Union, he would have been able to offer even more striking examples of his well grounded thesis. The murders of Rebet and Bandera, the two Ukrainian nationalist leaders in exile, scarcely spell a complete relaxation of terror under Khrushchev. Moreover, Russification is a process just as heinous and genocidal as the rampant anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. under Khrushchev. Nonetheless, despite this deficient orientation, the writer makes his points tellingly.

"NOT MUCH CHANCE FOR A 'SELLOUT'", an article by John Chamberlain.

New York Journal American, New York, July 15, 1963.

Syndicated across the country, this column holds there isn't much of a chance for a "sellout" of the captive nations because of the membership and activities of the National Captive Nations Committee in Washington. "On the one hand," it states, "the sponsors of the Week, the insistently active National Captive Nations Committee, with Herbert Hoover, as its Honorary Chairman and the fire-breathing Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University as its working head, is busy deploring our "many grave sins of omission in the Cold War, for which we shall unquestionably pay heavily later." On the other hand, the Administration is seeking a detente with Moscow. But the chances of a sellout are slim.

The nationally respected writer of the column observes correctly that "If you don't believe the Senate would put its collective foot down on a treaty that would consign Eastern Europe to the Soviets in perpetuity, just take a look at the list of honorary members of the National Captive Nations Committee." He names Senators Douglas, Lausche, Keating and many others—a "bi-partisan list that crosses all lines, whether of party or ideology."

Captive Nations Week did come "at a strange conjunction of the stars." Or from Moscow's viewpoint, was it really strange? However, any objective reader of this column will agree that the "worries about a 'sellout' this week, then, are not very real..."

"CAPTIVE NATIONS MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN," an editorial. Manchester Union Leader, Manchester, New Hampshire, June 28, 1963.

This is just one of numerous editorials written in the Nation's papers prior to the 1963 Captive Nations Week. The growth of understanding in all sections of the country as concerns the strategic importance of all the captive nations to our own national security has been spectacular. From New Hampshire to Hawaii, the story is much the same; and this development augurs well for the future policy of our Government.

A substantial part of this editorial is devoted to Congressman Flood's resolution for the creation of a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations. As the editor puts it, "it is all imperative that the American people lend their vocal support to House Resolution 14, now pending before the House Rules Committee in Washington." Such support was given during the Week.

One result of the 1963 Week has been a further intensified effort to establish this special committee. At this time a majority of members on the House Rules Committee have declared themselves in favor of such a committee. Apparently it is only a question of time and patient action before the resolution reaches the floor of the House. There it will pass overwhelmingly.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK: THE WEEK K SQUIRMS," a United Press International article. New York Herald Tribune, New York, July 14, 1963.

In papers across the country this particular article received wide attention and comment. It sets forth most of the essentials pertaining to the Fifth Observance of Captive Nations Week. It reminds the readers of Khrushchev's explosive reaction to the Captive Nations Week Resolution in July, 1959, and predicts quite accurately that "Moscow—troubled by ideological difficulties with Red China and sensitive to the theme of this year's observance—'liberate Cuba'—is again expected to react bitterly." Pravda, Izvestia, Radio Moscow and other Moscow-controlled media have reacted bitterly. More will come.

Giving a general picture of the Fifth Observance, the article points out that the celebration "is guided on a national level by the National Captive Nations Committee, which lists former President Hoover as its honorary chairman and 85 Congressmen as honorary members." The article quotes Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, the committee chairman, on the growing scope of the annual observance, extending to the shores of Taiwan.

"CAPTIVE LANDS WILL HAUNT A-BAN TALKS," an article by Robert S. Boyd. The New York Post, New York, July 14, 1963.

Another syndicated piece in the wide publicity given to the 1963 Captive Nations Week is this article which stresses the irony of the observance and the beginning of Harriman's talks in Moscow on the limited nuclear test ban treaty. It correctly observes that in "legislative chambers, on city squares and the feet of statues throughout the land, speakers will denounce Soviet colonialism and vow that the United States will never forget the captive people behind the Iron Curtain." This happened from Concord, New Hampshire to Los Angeles, California.

Unless there are technical traps, a test ban treaty as such is not opposed by advocates of liberation. However, what would be strenuously opposed is a non-aggression pact as proposed by Moscow. The writer accurately states the position of captive nations' proponents when he reports, "An East-West pact, such as Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev has suggested, would amount to 'abandonment of the captive nations,' according to Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee." He is quoted further on this subject, for which all Americans must prepare themselves in the months ahead.

L. E. D.

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