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S P R I N G, 1965/ AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

# UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



**"Pray to God and have faith that the Ukrainian  
people will not perish, but will triumph in victory!"**

**— Pope Paul VI, February 25, 1965**

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
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**PICTURE ON THE COVER:** On January 25, 1965 His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church, announced the elevation of 27 Catholic prelates to the dignity of Cardinal. Among them were two outstanding Catholic leaders from behind the Iron Curtain: *His Eminence Joseph Cardinal Beran*, Czechoslovakia, who recently was released from several years of detention in communist prisons, and *His Eminence Joseph Cardinal Slipy*, Ukraine, who spent 18 years in Soviet prisons and concentration camps, and was released in January 1963 and allowed to come to Rome, upon direct intervention of the late Pope, John XXIII, with Soviet authorities. **ON THE PHOTO ARE:** Joseph Cardinal Beran (*first from right*) and Joseph Cardinal Slipy (*second from right in white hat*), after their investiture on February 25, 1965. Behind Cardinal Beran stands the Most Rev. Jaroslav Gabro, Bishop of St. Nicholas Ukrainian Catholic Diocese of Chicago, and the Most Rev. Ivan Buchko (*behind Cardinal Slipy*), Archbishop and Apostolic Visitor for Catholic Ukrainians in Western Europe.

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## AGGRESSION AT A CONFERENCE ON PEACE

### *Editorial*

"Peace on earth, which men of every era have most eagerly yearned for, can be firmly established only if the order laid down by God be dutifully observed..."

(Encyclical: *Pacem in Terris*,  
Pope John XXIII)

In an introductory statement to the book, *Peace on Earth*, published by the Ridge Press/Golden Press in New York, and with an *imprimatur* of Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York, the editors made the following statement:

In Easter Week of 1963, less than two months before his death, Pope John XXIII issued his encyclical letter, *Pacem in Terris*. It was a message of unique and monumental significance—unique because it was the first encyclical ever to be addressed beyond the limits of the Roman Catholic community to men of good will everywhere in the world, and monumental because it was immediately taken to heart by people of all faiths as a basic statement of the rights and responsibilities of man in the conduct of life and the achievement of peace on earth...

The book in question appeared on the occasion of an impressive international conference called specifically to discuss the late Pope John XXIII's famous encyclical, *Pacem in Terris* (Peace on Earth). The convocation was organized by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, whose president is Robert M. Hutchins. He also was chairman of the convocation, held at the New York Hilton Hotel, from Wednesday to Saturday, February 17-20, 1965.

The importance of the convocation is underscored by the fact that an array of American and international luminaries either appeared personally or sent special messages. Some 2,000 people (from the West and the communist-dominated countries, as well as from "non-aligned" nations) registered for the convocation. Other hundreds were turned away. Some 300 correspondents from many nations of the world attended the convocation, and the American press gave it very extensive coverage.

Suffice it to mention that President Johnson and Pope Paul VI sent messages, while Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey and UN Secretary U Thant delivered addresses.<sup>1</sup>

*Significantly, the State Department deemed it advisable not to send representatives, even for a token appearance.*

**MARKED DEPARTURE FROM MAIN OBJECTIVES OF 'PEACE ON EARTH'**

Despite the topical umbrella of the encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, the convocation drifted far to the left. In more than one respect it became a convenient vehicle for left-wing propaganda, heavily laden with pro-Soviet and pro-Communist trappings.

Some speakers either misunderstood or intentionally misrepresented the late Pope. Others apparently saw an opportunity to use the name and encyclical of an outstanding Pope to advance their own narrow and, regrettably, at times secularist viewpoints and objectives.

In fairness, we think that the misrepresentation is *de facto* explained in terms of a statement by Robert M. Hutchins, made at the outset of the conference:

It may turn out during these days, that the reason why *Pacem in Terris* was applauded throughout the world was that it was so general as to be meaningless or so vague that any partisan could put his own meaning into it...<sup>2</sup>

This, in a nutshell, can be characterized of what transpired at the four-day convocation, during which Pope John XXIII's historic

<sup>1</sup> Other internationally known personages who either spoke to the plenary session of the convocation or were members of special panels, were, among others: U. S. Ambassador to UN Adlai E. Stevenson; UN Assembly President Alex Quaison-Sackey; Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium; George F. Kennan, former U. S. Ambassador to the USSR and Yugoslavia; Carlo Schmid, Vice-President of the *Bundestag* of Germany; N. N. Inozemtsev, Deputy Chief Editor of *Pravda*; Paul Tillich, Professor of Theology, University of Chicago; Chief Justice Earl Warren; Philip C. Jessup and Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, members of the International Court of Justice; Luis Quintanilla, former president of the Organization of American States; Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, former UN General Assembly President; Pietro Nenni, Deputy Prime Minister of Italy; Miss Barbara Ward, British economist and writer; Alberto Lleras Camargo, former President of Colombia; Sen. J. Wm. Fulbright, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Lord Caradon, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom; Abba Eban, Deputy Prime Minister of Israel; Arnold Toynbee, British historian; Yevgenyi Zhukov, Chairman, Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the USSR; Linus Pauling, U. S. Nobel Science Laureate and Nobel Peace Laureate; and a whole array of American and international professors, writers, scientists and other known personages, as well as a few U. S. Senators and Congressmen.

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, February 19, 1965.



encyclical was used as a sociological rather than a theological or philosophical document.

One prominent speaker stated that Pope John XXIII was the first Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church who appealed to non-Catholics. The fact is that a number of Popes before Pope John XXIII appealed to non-Catholics on a variety of subjects. For instance, careful reading of *Pacem in Terris*, reveals that Pope John XXIII quoted several of his predecessors, and referred 32 times to Pope Pius XII, who was singularly "overlooked" in all references by the distinguished speakers.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, other speakers endeavored to portray Pope John XXIII as a champion of "peaceful coexistence." This provided a special opportunity for a Communist ideologist, who at home is waging a relentless atheistic campaign, to extol the late Pope for an alleged policy of "peaceful coexistence."

Comrade Inozemtsev, Deputy Chief Editor of *Pravda*, took the unique opportunity provided by American capitalists—reportedly, a well-known American publisher advanced \$50,000 to cover the costs of the convocation—to assail the United States for "aggression" in Vietnam. He also told the encyclical-inspired audience that the Soviet Union will continue to support "wars of national liberation" and also called for the admission of Red China and East Germany to the United Nations.

His Soviet colleague, Dr. Yevgenyi Zhukov, Director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, played the same tune. On the one hand he praised the American people whom he saw "as desiring peace," and on the other called for continuance of "revolutions and wars of national liberation," such as those in Cuba, Laos, the Congo, and elsewhere, where Russians and their communist puppets direct the "wars of national liberation."

On another occasion, Dr. Adam Schaff, member of the Central Committee, United Workers' (Communist) Party of Poland, and actually a police commissar who supervises Polish literature and is in constant battle with rebellious Polish intellectuals, took almost an hour to lecture the American people (and those who attended the convocation from other lands) on "tolerance," which apparently is unknown here. Although his talk was strictly a party-line propaganda effort, it did not fail to evoke enormous enthusiasm on the part of the audience, including a number of Catholic nuns, who fervently applauded the Communist orator giving a lecture on tolerance and democracy!

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<sup>3</sup> "Use and Misuse of *Pacem in Terris*," *The Tablet*, Brooklyn, N. Y., February 25, 1965.

It is significant that the convocation provided opportunity for an array of pro-Soviet and pro-Communist elements from the United States and elsewhere to air their views! Thus a number of elegantly attired women busily solicited from the audience signatures to a statement demanding "immediate withdrawal" of the U.S. armed forces from Vietnam!

This blatant anti-American agitation presumably occurred without the knowledge of the organizers of the convocation. But the organizers had themselves provided an excellent forum where anti-American views and propaganda could be expertly expounded and disseminated. Such a phenomenon could take place only in America, where anti-American elements conveniently hide behind the Constitution of the United States and demand their "constitutional rights," meanwhile abusing the traditional American sense of fair-play as well as freedom of speech and the press.

ITALIAN SOCIALIST ON POLITICAL ASPECT OF 'PACEM IN  
TERRIS' ENCYCLICAL

Among the more vociferous speakers at the convocation was Pietro Nenni, Deputy Premier of Italy, a seasoned Italian Socialist and ally of the Italian Communists. His statement on *Pacem in Terris* is noteworthy. It was through his interpretation of the great encyclical that the Italian Communists were able to make deep inroads into the essentially Catholic electorate in Italy. Said Signor Nenni:

It is superfluous to start out by saying that a Papal Encyclical is always a theological or ecumenical document which should not be interpreted in political terms. Yet at the time it was published, on April 11, 1963, and in subsequent studies and references, *Pacem in Terris* is also to be viewed as a political admonition addressed to men of good will, of all faiths, all beliefs and all social conditions; it is also addressed to Governments and, in particular, to the United Nations.

Although *Pacem in Terris* deals with man in his relations with God and society, there is nevertheless a connection between that document, the work of President Kennedy and the impetus given to peaceful coexistence by the then Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, which is strikingly apparent to the peoples of the world.

The second principle underlying *Pacem in Terris* is the realization that spiritual disarmament and the "disappearance of war psychosis" are just as necessary as military disarmament.

Solve the problems resulting from the war or from the establishment of new states or new nations; furnish the underdeveloped countries with the aid they urgently need if they are not to become a source of disorder, and, in some cases, of destruction; make substantial progress toward banning of nuclear weapons and the progressive reduction of conventional weapons; promote a direct

understanding between Washington and Moscow; these are the things we must do in order to make *Pacem in Terris* a reality...<sup>4</sup>

One wonders why some non-Catholics may be confused as to the true intention of *Pacem in Terris*. Here is an Italian leader, who, though a Socialist, should at least not be so rude as to say that the workability of *Pacem in Terris* depends on direct understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union!

KENNAN: APOSTLE OF DOOM

Among the most distinguished speakers who came to discuss the "practical political aspects" of *Pacem in Terris*, was also George F. Kennan, former U. S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and widely reputed author of the "containment policy" in the late 1940's. Mr. Kennan chose to make a passing reference to the Papal encyclical at the very end of his speech. But he said very much that should be carefully examined.

What in fact Kennan advocated was a "new faith in the ultimate humanity and sobriety of the people on the other side." A Soviet specialist and, often an apologist of Soviet policies, Kennan lashed out in a ringing attack on Western policies toward the USSR and communist-bloc countries generally.

In summary, he propounded a restriction of the role played by nuclear weapons in defense of Western Europe—a position staunchly defended by the Kremlin and its allies everywhere. Actually, U. S. nuclear weaponry is the major deterrent to Soviet aggressions in Western Europe. That part of the world would have been lost long ago, were it not for U.S. atomic weapons. Mr. Kennan also upbraided the U.S. for a policy of arming West Germany and for its refusal to recognize East Germany. He also wanted to reassure Eastern Europe on Germany's eastern frontiers. Finally, he assailed U. S. policies toward the Soviet Union, and called for a "basic revision of assumptions" concerning Soviet intentions in Europe.

Mr. Kennan stated:

Finally, I should like to plead for a basic revision of assumptions concerning Soviet intentions, both hypothetical and real. Western policy is apparently based on assessment of these intentions which has not changed appreciably from the days of the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, and which, even then, probably embraced serious elements of misinterpretation. The assumptions commonly made with respect to Soviet military intentions (assumptions reflected in the very word "deterrence") are ones that can be reconciled neither with communist doctrine (which does not envisage the bringing of so-

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<sup>4</sup> Address: H. E. the Hon. Pietro Nenni, Vice Premier of Italy, February 19, 1965.

cialism to peoples exclusively or primarily on the bayonets of foreign armies), nor with the moral commitments the Soviet leaders have assumed to their own people, nor with the present state of relations between Moscow and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. They impute to the Soviet leaders a total inhumanity not plausible even in nature, and out of accord with those humane ideals which we must recognize as lying, together with other elements less admirable in the eyes of some of us, as the origins of all European Marxism...<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, Mr. Kennan contends that the "inclusion of a united Germany, as a major component, in a Western defense system based primarily on nuclear weaponry [is] . . . in obvious conflict with its major political objective, which is the military and political retirement of the Soviet Union from Central Europe; for no Russian government, communist or otherwise, could afford to retire in the face of such a demand..."

Of course, Mr. Kennan never stops to wonder whether the Russians (Communist or otherwise) should be in Central Europe at all twenty years after the termination of World War II.

In other words, Kennan suggests that it is we, not the Soviet Union, who have been driving constantly for world domination during the past two decades! That it is we, and not the Kremlin leaders, who are unreasonable and belligerent! That it is we, and not Moscow, which is the greatest colonial and imperialist power in history!

Mr. Kennan's belief in the "humanity" of Soviet leaders can hardly be reconciled with what these "humane" leaders have done to the captive nations of Europe and Asia. Simply remember the starvation of Ukraine in 1932-33, the liquidations and "purges" in the 1930's, and the ruthless suppression of Ukrainian patriots after World War II. What of the Soviet Russian invasion of Finland in the winter of 1939? The brutal occupation of the Baltic States in 1940? The subversion of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary after 1945? The ruthless Soviet behavior during the East German uprisings after the death of Stalin? What about the barbaric "liquidation" of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine and the repression of religion generally? What of the slaughter of political prisoners of all nationalities in a number of Soviet slave labor camps—Vorkuta, Kingir and elsewhere—after the death of Stalin? How about the ruthless suppression of Hungarian freedom fighters during the fall of 1956? How about the Berlin Wall in 1961? What of the murder by a Soviet government agent of Stepan Bandera and Dr. Lev R. Rebet, Ukrainian nationalist leaders, in West Germany in 1957 and 1959? Does all that qualify the Kremlin leaders

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<sup>5</sup> Address: Hon. George F. Kennan, *Pacem in Terris* Convocation, February 18, 1965.



as "humane" and civilized persons, in whom we should have trust and confidence?

Our abandonment of Germany would precipitate a Soviet takeover which could lead to the fall of Western Europe as a whole. It is folly to think otherwise. It should be recalled that but a few weeks before the Polish uprising in Poznan in June, 1956, Mr. Kennan wrote about the finality of political settlement. He suggested that the peoples of Eastern Europe finally had reconciled themselves to the new Russian masters, and that there is nothing we can or should do about it.

But the Polish and, subsequently, the Hungarian uprisings demonstrated how wrong Mr. Kennan was and is. He was and is a prophet of doom and of the decline of the Western political system. Fortunately, his "prophesies" regarding Soviet plans and intentions have inevitably proved to be false and baseless.

It is regrettable that the sponsors of the *Pacem in Terris* Convocation should have failed to invite a humble American priest, who less prominent than those who spoke at the New York Hilton Hotel, is nonetheless far more qualified to speak about what *Pacem in Terris* or other Papal encyclicals mean to the people whom Communists abuse, enslave and mistreat.

His name is Rev. Walter J. Cizek, S. J., a native of Shenandoah, Pa. Of Polish ancestry, he spent 23 years in degrading Soviet concentration camps, where he was maltreated and tortured. Yet, firm in his faith, he survived. Father Cizek would have been a God-sent eyewitness of life behind the Iron Curtain, who could have refuted eloquently the nonsensical theories of George Kennan, as he assailed Western statesmen for imputing to Soviet leaders all sorts of "inhumanities," and that they want to conquer the whole of Europe. (Cf. "The Captive Nations Speak to America from Siberian Slave Camps," by Roman Smal-Stocki of Marquette University, which appears elsewhere in this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, and which deals with Fr. Cizek's book, *With God in Russia—Ed.*).

The *Pacem in Terris* Convocation unhappily misused a great Papal idea, inasmuch as it gathered on its program representatives of regimes which defy God and which subtly persecute religion. The use of *Pacem in Terris* as a cover to attack American policies in Europe and Asia was a crude trick which eventually will boomerang against those who underestimated the basic intelligence of the American people. Knowledgeable Americans were not fooled an iota by the brilliant spectacle, which turned out to be a forum for false prophesies and anti-American purposes.

## RELEVANT ROMAN STATEMENTS

### I. POPE PAUL VI'S ADDRESS TO UKRAINIANS

ROME, Italy.—On February 25, 1965 His Holiness Pope Paul VI received a large Ukrainian group on the occasion of the elevation of Metropolitan and Archbishop-Major Joseph Slipy to the dignity of cardinal. His Holiness' historic address delivered to the group is translated from the Italian and reads as follows:

MONSIGNOR CARDINAL, BROTHERS AND SONS:

*In these brief words, We wish to express Our great joy in meeting you on this particular occasion.*

*We wish to share with you Our thoughts and feelings born in Our soul at this joyful moment.*

*First of all, We wish to tell you why We have elevated your great and illustrious Metropolitan, Monsignor Joseph Slipy, to the dignity of cardinal.*

*In summing up these feelings, We wish to tell you that in doing so We wanted to express Our deep respect for Monsignor Joseph Slipy and for the entire Ukrainian people.*

*What binds Us with the Ukrainian people are the unforgettable events of Our life and Our event-filled memories. We had an opportunity to meet personally with Monsignor Andrew Sheptytsky in one of the most difficult periods of his life.*

*This honor for Us occurred at the time when We stayed in Warsaw for a few months, in the period of your history when the problem of Lviv and these parts of Ukrainian territory which were subsequently incorporated in the Polish state had emerged in full force on the international political arena. It was at that time that We had ample opportunity to learn about the Ukrainian national and political problems and the aspirations and sufferings of the Ukrainian people.*

*By elevating to the dignity of cardinal a Ukrainian Metropolitan, We wished to attest to the whole Church and the entire world that his suffering, his steadfastness in the confession of Christ's faith and his heroism are the priceless treasures of the universal Church and belong to the history of all ages.*

*To you, my Ukrainian sons, scattered throughout the whole world,—and We know well how staunchly you preserve your tradi-*

tions, and the special care with which you endeavor to retain your beautiful rite, your language and your culture,—We wished to give, through the elevation of your Metropolitan before the eyes of the Church and the whole world, a high and authoritative leader on whom you could rely and whom you could trust implicitly.

We also wish to reveal to you Our other intimate thoughts. When your Cardinal spoke, We could not understand, as We do not know the Ukrainian language. In the past We knew a few Polish words, but today even these few words We “nie pamiętam” (I don’t remember—in Polish—Ed.). But We did understand one phrase of greatest importance which the Monsignor Cardinal uttered in Latin: “Ubi est concordia, ibi est victoria” (Where there is unity, there is victory). This is the very living truth! We wish to reveal that by the elevation of your great Metropolitan to the dignity of Cardinal, We wanted to give to you, Ukrainians, a high spokesman for your unity, to establish a strong center of your religious, national and cultural life. We announce in the strongest possible manner, my Ukrainian sons, this important truth: If you are united among yourselves, you will remain nationally alive, you will develop, you will grow in good and great deeds, you will cultivate the virtues of the Gospel, you will possess great power and resistance, which you shall need in order to sustain all the sacrifices, labors and endeavors that the future will undoubtedly demand of you in the struggle for the preservation of your national name.

We have other deep feelings that We wish to reveal to you.

In placing before the eyes of the universal Church and the world the heroic Ukrainian Metropolitan and the entire Ukrainian people, We had and have the intention of reviving in the Ukrainian people new and great hopes! Continue your struggle! Lift up your spirits, my dear Ukrainian sons! Work and pray and rely on God! May the Almighty bless your efforts and fulfill your hopes and desires!

Let these words of Ours remain in your hearts forever, in memory of our meeting today:

Be faithful! Be strong, brave, steadfast! Pray to God and have faith that the Ukrainian people will not perish, but with God’s help and under the prudent guidance of your leaders, they will triumph in victory!

## II. CARDINAL SLIPY'S THANKSGIVING ADDRESS

ROME, Italy.— The following address by His Eminence Cardinal Joseph Slipy was made in reply to the historic address of His Holiness Pope Paul VI during the audience of the large Ukrainian group with the Pope on February 25, 1965:

*HOLY FATHER! When in our humility and modesty we look upon the arena of world events, we see above all the gigantic efforts of Your Holiness to bring about unity and preserve humanity from conflicts and war, and especially to bring about the unity of Christ's Church, torn by conflicts stemming from human weaknesses and frailties, and to restore to Her bosom all, and particularly the separated Christian Churches and communities, so that the Church of Christ may have a beneficial influence also upon earthly actions of states and peoples and fulfill in dignity Her tasks imposed by Christ the Lord.*

*We are happy and grateful to Your Holiness for Your great endeavors in reaching out to our suffering Church and people and embracing them under Your holy protection.*

*The political conditions of the past and the fact of being situated at the crossroads between the East and the West, with their often contradictory aspirations, weighed heavily upon our unity and contributed in large measure to religious, political and national strife and discord. And when we look today upon the sad past, we cannot but be most joyfully thankful to the Apostolic See for always striving to strengthen and unite our religious and political forces and instill in our soul the great power of unity. For the wisdom of the ancient Roman adage is that "Ubi est concordia, ibi est victoria" (Where there is unity, there is victory).*

*In the ancient past, the Apostle Andrew endeavored to unite the warring tribes in our lands with the help of the Gospel. This word was also preached by Pope Clement. His remains, found by the Slavic Apostles Cyril and Methodius who went to the Khazars on the Volga, also fulfilled a salutary mission among our people of awakening the veneration of Pope Clement, forgotten in the wake of the great migrations of peoples. His remains, brought to Rome, became a new stimulus for unity with the Apostolic See. It was Princess Olga who first sent her legates through Emperor Otto in 959, asking that Catholic bishops be sent to her land. Subsequently, Papal emissaries came to her grandson, Prince Yaropolk, and afterwards on three occasions the Papal legates came to Grand Prince Volodymyr in Kiev, bringing the remains of Pope Clement and recalling his martyred death in our lands.*

*It was for this reason that St. Volodymyr took the relics from Kherstones and brought them to Kiev.*



*These exchanges of legates by Grand Prince Volodymyr were intended to strengthen the great Kievan State, just as the Church of Christ had strengthened the peoples of Central Europe.*

*Then, other important events followed, such as the nomination of Grand Prince Izyaslav and his son, Yaropolk, as the rulers of Kiev by Pope Gregory VII; the nomination of Prince Danylo as the King by Pope Innocent IV in 1253; the elevation of Metropolitan Isidore of Kiev to the dignity of cardinal; endeavors at the Council of Florence for the restoration of unity of our Church with the Apostolic See; the Union of Brest of 1596, and its [Apostolic See's] further efforts for the rebirth of our Church, state and people relentlessly pursued by the Apostolic See through centuries of history, if occasionally interrupted by man's quarrels and strife.*

*We cannot begin to enumerate at this audience all of the graces received, nor can we fully express our deep gratitude for them.*

*But ever mindful of all previous graces bestowed upon us, we wish to pay our homage and express our heartfelt filial gratitude for accepting this humble servant into the College of Cardinals and, through the elevation of his modest person, recognizing the suffering of our people!*

*Your Holiness! Thousands upon thousands of thanks from those who could come, and even more from those who could not come to Your Holiness and express their deep feeling of love and filial loyalty. In these difficult times, the nomination of our Cardinal, the fourth in our history, reverberated in the hearts of our people, grieving and downtrodden, and elevated them in the eyes of other peoples as never before.*

*Please accept, our Holy Father, from our trembling lips, this heartfelt filial gratitude and kindly bestow upon us Your paternal Apostolic Blessings that we may continue in our work for the strengthening of our unity with the Apostolic Throne.*

## **RED TOTALITARIAN TRADE—ANOTHER COLD WAR INSTRUMENT**

*By* LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

One of the most vital issues before the American people is the question of expanding trade with the European sector of the totalitarian Red Empire. Since the wheat sales to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1963, there has been a steady build-up of pressure for a marked liberalization of our trade policy in relation to the USSR and its so-called satellites in Central Europe. In his State of the Union message the President provided further stimulus for this campaign when he declared: "In Eastern Europe restless nations are slowly beginning to assert their identity. Your government, assisted by leaders in labor and business, is exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with these countries and the Soviet Union. I will report our conclusions to the Congress."<sup>1</sup>

There are three points in this declaration deserving of comment. The first is the President's misleading identification of East European states and nations. The captive nations of Eastern Europe, meaning the suppressed people themselves, have always asserted their identity and have never ceased to be restless under the so-called Communist regimes. Even a slight familiarity with the resistance of these peoples to the Red totalitarian governments since World War II is enough for one to appreciate this fundamental fact. What the President is referring to are the states controlled by these governments and their ostensibly growing independence of Moscow's domination. The distinction drawn here is a basic one for any sound evaluation of one of the chief arguments being advanced in behalf of more East-West trade, namely that it would strengthen their "independence" more. In the light of this working distinction the "independence" spoken of appears as a mirage, and further uncontrolled trade would only fortify the Red totalitarians for more intensive Cold War operations against us and the Free World.

Another interesting point in the President's statement is the evident implication of the Administration's decision to increase

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<sup>1</sup> "Text of President Johnson's State of Union Message," *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., January 5, 1965.

“peaceful” trade with that part of the Empire. When a year ago the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commenced hearings on the issue, Administration representatives assumed an almost academic, non-committal view of the issue. For example, in reply to Senator Lausche’s question about no contemplated change in our trade policy toward the Empire, Secretary of Commerce said “That is right.”<sup>2</sup> Evidently, the Administration has been emboldened by developments of the past year.

Of these developments perhaps the most striking has been the increasing support given by various business groups to what is really a long-standing desire on the part of the Administration to change our trade policy toward the European sector of the Red Empire. The U. S. Chamber of Commerce is on record favoring such trade liberalization, and in 1964 some 60 American businessmen organized by Eldridge Haynes, president of Business International Corporation, made an unusual trip to Moscow to discuss with Kосygin and others the possibilities of such trade. Many in the group represent companies dealing in metals, machine tools, and heavy equipment. In addition to the peace argument cited above, this and similar groups raise the further essential argument that since our West European allies trade with Eastern Europe, there is no reason for us to be excluded from this market.

As matters stood at the beginning of 1965, labor organizations and leaders appeared to oppose the Administration’s position for augmented East-West trade. The arguments used are some that will be advanced here. To complete this general picture of pressure and counter-pressure, it is noteworthy that a leading so-called Communist writer, Victor Perlo, stated the Party’s position in the December 1964 issue of *New World Review* as follows: “During 1964, big holes were torn in the remaining barriers against free trade between Socialist countries and U. S. allies. The volume of such trade spurted forward at an accelerated rate. A further shift in domestic views put a majority of American business in favor of East-West trade.” This former New Deal official implicated in a Soviet espionage plot strongly urges such “free” trade.

#### FROM PRIMARY TO SECONDARY ARGUMENTS

If the reader were to wade through most of the literature written on this vital subject, he would undoubtedly feel somewhat frustrated by all the complex aspects brought up in connection with it. Yet, the issue is by no means as intricate and complex as some would

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<sup>2</sup> Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, *East-West Trade*, Part I, 1964, p. 84.

have us believe. Indeed, much of the seeming complexity stems from the various preconceptions that are brought forward in the examination of the issue. These preconceptions cover a wide field of understanding and misunderstanding of the Cold War, the character and composition of the USSR, the captive nations and their relation to Red totalitarian governments and states, trade as a normalizing agent or a powerful Cold War weapon, the significance of economic changes in the totalitarian Red Empire, and the very meaning of the empire itself. It is in this area that the issue will ultimately be resolved and not in that of considerable secondary minutia concerning laws, patent rights, copyrights, outstanding indebtedness and the like.

Thus, the primary arguments revolve about the questions of whether more liberal trade with the Eastern European sector of the Empire will contribute to peace or to the strengthening of so-called Communist economies for more intense Cold War operations, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; of whether it will further the independence of several captive nations or undermine the aspirations of these nations for freedom by fortifying the economies controlled by their totalitarian oppressors; of whether the increased West European trade with Eastern Europe is cause enough, both morally and politically, for us to imitate it. These are the primary and fundamental points, and with regard to each of them supporting arguments come into play.

In the secondary tier, implying a resolution of these primary points of contention, are the questions and problems relating to unsettled accounts, patent and copyright agreements, and trade treatment. Obviously, if we believe, for example, that more liberalized trade would contribute to "peace," the "growing independence" of so-called satellites, and a fairer share for American business, then an easy resolution of the secondary problems would take effect, with the Red totalitarian regimes accommodating it in some degree. Even prior to its recognition by us in 1933, the USSR repudiated debts to the U.S. in the amount of about \$628 million. During World War II, the USSR received approximately \$11 billion of lend-lease assistance from the U. S. This assistance was not terminated until 1947, and by pillage, reparation, and expropriation Moscow collected over \$30 billion worth of property in Germany and elsewhere. All this didn't deter us in 1951-52 to advance a negotiating figure of \$800 million for Moscow to settle its debts. It balked and offered instead \$300 million.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Special Study Mission to Europe, 1964*. House of Representatives, 1965, p. 8.



With this kind of record, it is unlikely that the liberalized trade advocates could be defeated should the primary arguments go their way. Some nominal settlement may be consummated or the Johnson Act, which prohibits the extension of private credit to any state in default of an indebtedness to the U. S., may be repealed. As to the lack of an agreement between the U. S. and the USSR on patents and copyrights, this secondary problem also is scarcely insurmountable. In fact, the trade-eager Russians themselves have shown an accommodating interest in making certain changes.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, with the dubious argument of increasing their purchases here, they are also seeking elimination of what they consider a discrimination against their exports to us, our withholding the most-favored-nation treatment to their exports.<sup>5</sup> This would involve granting the same tariff and trade concessions we extend to other trading partners. However, too great a concentration of discussion on these secondary problems tends to becloud the issue, which in essence revolves about the aforementioned primary points of consideration. Not too long ago, on June 21, 1963, Khrushchev told the Central Committee in Moscow, "We want—not only want but have dug—quite a deep hole, and shall exert efforts to dig this hole deeper and bury the capitalist system forever."

To gain a broader view and perspective on this extremely important issue, it is necessary to have some inkling of past American trade and aid experience with the Russian totalitarians. Second, a clear conception of the nature of Soviet Russian economic warfare is also indispensable. Third, the Red trade aggression against Western Europe should be properly understood. And lastly, some major outlines of a rational Free World trade policy in relation to the totalitarian Red Empire deserve careful analysis.

#### U. S. ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOVIET RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Anastas Mikoyan, the present nominal head of the USSR, once said, "A modern Communist is one who has the zeal of a Bolshevik and the practicality of a capitalist." If the record of U. S. economic contributions to the development and power of the Soviet Russian Empire is any guide, Mikoyan's "modern Communist" began operating in the early 20's. There seems to be almost a cyclical pattern in our economic assistance to the growth and protection of Moscow's empire, as well as to the permanent captivity of numerous non-Russian nations in the USSR. In the 1920's, then the 30's, then in the 40's, our efforts worked to the benefit of the regime. Now again in the

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<sup>4</sup> *East-West Trade*, p. 101.

<sup>5</sup> *Special Study Mission to Europe*, 1964, p. 8.

60's, many would have this repeated for diverse, intentional and unintentional reasons.

In 1921, when the new Soviet Russian Empire was being formed amidst famine and chaos, the American Relief Administration pursued its good, humanitarian intentions of feeding, clothing, and sheltering the people, but being an unconditional project, its expenditures of over \$40 million also assisted the entrenchment of the imperio-colonialist Soviet Russian regime.<sup>6</sup> This was the first case of good intentions pursued in a void of political exactions that led to wrong ends. Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination inspired nation after nation in the Czarist Russian Empire to establish its independence; then American economic assistance from 1919 on indirectly helped the Soviet Russian regime to destroy these independent nations.

The second case was the trade and all the contacts, peace, understanding, good will, and profits we pushed at the end of the 20's and in the 30's. By 1928-29, American industrial and electrical equipment, steel, dies, tools, oil refinery facilities and a host of other essential items poured into the USSR, along with basic American know-how and supervisory skill.<sup>7</sup> U. S. exports jumped from \$62 million in 1926 to \$136 million in 1930, then receded slightly in 1931, slumped heavily in 1932-34, and moved steadily upward to about \$87 million by 1940.<sup>8</sup> Strong business pressure was exerted in 1932 and '33 to have the U.S. recognize the USSR, arguing that this step would lead to a substantial increase in exports. As we all know, this recognition was given in 1933, and in 1935 we entered into a bilateral commercial agreement with the USSR, the latter promising to import from us at least \$30 million of goods annually.<sup>9</sup>

In his testimony on East-West trade Secretary of State Rusk admits all this. He observes: "Even before we recognized the USSR diplomatically, the Soviet trading company, Amtorg, operated widely in the United States, and American engineers and private corporations helped to build industrial plants and installations in the Soviet Union."<sup>10</sup> What the Secretary failed to point out is that this basic

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<sup>6</sup> In this field an excellent, well-written thesis deserving of publication is *The United States Contribution to the Soviet Economy* by Sister Marie Jerome Wilkerson, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

<sup>7</sup> Bron, S. G., *Soviet Economic Development and American Business*. H. Liveright, New York, 1930, p. 48.

<sup>8</sup> U. S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Commerce Yearbook*, Washington, D. C., 1931 thru 1939.

<sup>9</sup> Gayer, Arthur D. and Schmidt, Carl T., *American Economic Foreign Policy*. New York, 1939, p. 242.

<sup>10</sup> *East-West Trade*, p. 3.

economic assistance was extended at a time when the first Five Year Plan was launched, when Moscow had embarked on an imperio-colonialist program of crushing the forces of non-Russian nationalism within its empire, when a man-made famine of staggering proportions was already in the making. In this whole period the percentage of U.S. exports going to the USSR was never more than 4.3, but of what enormous incremental value it was to Moscow and its empire.

The third case of American contributions to the Soviet Russian Empire doesn't require any elaboration. Under lend-lease, U.S. exports to the USSR shot up to \$1.3 billion in 1942, or about 17.6 per cent of our total exports. As indicated earlier, our assistance totaled some \$11 billion for our survival, to be sure, but also without political foresight and acumen. While we were expending parts of this toward the close of the war and even beyond, Moscow was already launching its Cold War against the West. When we finally became aware of this, lend-lease was terminated in 1947, and in 1949 the Export Control Act was passed. U.S. exports to Eastern Europe dropped from \$120 million in 1948 to \$2.6 million in 1951. Since the early 50's, U.S. trade with the USSR in what are called non-strategic items grew at a slow rate, but in 1964 trade between the Free World and the Empire amounted to over \$8 billion, with the United States participating to the tune of only \$300 million and our West European allies to that of about \$5 billion.

With regard to the unquestioned strengthening of the USSR, no one has raised the crucial point of such trade and aid contributing to the imperio-colonialist hold of Moscow over the dozen captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. The United States, advocate of the freedom and independence of all nations, can scarcely maintain its historic principles by blindly trading with the USSR, Soviet Russia's primary empire, in effect reinforcing its imperio-colonialist reins over approximately 120 million non-Russians. Our sad record of the past may be explained away on grounds of ignorance and shortsightedness; today, there is little excuse for ignoring the effects of expanded trade with the USSR on the captive nations in the USSR. This even applies to the U. S. Chamber of Commerce resolution which calls "not only for freer trade with the Communists on non-strategic items but also for tightening Free World export controls on products or material contributing to the 'build-up of Communist war-making potential.'" <sup>11</sup> Some, however, "want to re-

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<sup>11</sup> "Chamber Backs Red Trade Expansion," *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., April 30, 1964.

peat the massive transfer to them of Western technology which took place in the thirties and early forties.”<sup>12</sup>

#### SOVIET RUSSIAN ECONOMIC WARFARE

In 1955, Khrushchev illumined the essence of Red totalitarian trade when he said, “we value trade least for economic reasons and most for political reasons.” It is naive to think, as unfortunately some Americans do, that trade with the totalitarian Red Empire is a peace-contributing, normalizing agent. Trade has been and will continue to be a highly important instrument, tool, and weapon in the arsenal of Red economic warfare, and this type of warfare against the Free World is an integral part of the Empire’s Cold War operation. Its systematic use is placed in a time dimension, covering even decades, as are other Cold War weapons. Red writers and strategists go as far back as 1917 to depict the stages of development in the employment of economic weapons against the “imperialist enemies” of the West, citing particularly (1) the build-up of USSR heavy industry in the 20’s and 30’s, to which we contributed heavily, and also the post-World War II reconstruction of that industry, which our Lend-Lease facilitated immeasurably, (2) the integration of East European economies and the combined plunge into the penetration of the world market in 1952, and (3) the present Red campaign of “liberating” underdeveloped countries from politico-economic ties with “the imperialists.” By 1980 the West would become so isolated and with lost markets so disrupted that victory for the “socialist camp” would be obvious.

Some may smirk at this type of stagistic thought and planning, but one can recall how Western businessmen literally laughed in 1952 when Moscow launched its economic offensive. “It has nothing of worth to export and little to pay for purchases,” was the usual retort. Total Red trade has soared over the past nine years to over \$10 billion with the Free World in 1964, and Red aid, such as it is, is estimated at about \$4 billion. In the process, numerous Western business interests have been squeezed out by nationalization and other schemes in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America; the USSR, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and others have penetrated neutral area markets; the USSR has made notable oil inroads in Western Europe; and to aid in all of this, as well as to enable the East European sector of the Empire to overcome many economic difficulties, the Red combine has managed to purchase volumes of economically strategic goods from Western Europe and other Free World areas.

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<sup>12</sup> “Trade with Soviet Russia,” *Congressional Record*, May 4, 1964, p. A2227.

When the Red Empire was in a severe agricultural crisis in 1963, President Kennedy rationalized the wheat deal in the negative terms that a denial would “convince their leaders that we are either too hostile or too timid to take any further steps toward peace... and that the logical course for them is a renewal of the Cold War.”<sup>13</sup> This statement in itself indicates how little grasp of the meaning of Russian “peaceful coexistence” and the Cold War our late President had. He didn’t even realize that the phase of peaceful coexistence—a political shield for Soviet Russian subversion and infiltration throughout the world—is an integral part of the Russian Cold War. Two years later, as an argument for the passage of a \$3.3 billion foreign aid program, President Johnson warned that Red pledges of economic aid quadrupled in 1964 to a new peak of \$1.3 billion as compared with \$360 million in ‘63 and \$325 million in ‘62, with about one half going to Near Eastern and South Asian countries. Though the figure is startling to this writer, the burning question is whether we are to assist the Red Empire in this by liberalizing trade with the totalitarian states of Eastern Europe. It would seem so from the President’s different statements.

All of these and other activities conducted by the Empire, sometimes in calculated zigzag manner, add up to the objective of increasing the economic potential of the empire at the expense of the “imperialist” enemies. Moreover, as one analyst aptly puts it, “In the Kremlin’s eyes, the goal of world communism can be achieved by a variety of methods: economic, political, ideological, military, psychological and other kinds of activities.”<sup>14</sup> Actually, the use of one method is accompanied to a greater or lesser extent by others. In the Red totalitarian scheme trade is not a normal concept of free exchanges of products between producers of states for mutual advantage of both. Moscow manipulates it for a variety of immediate or long-run political, propaganda, military and other objectives, which in turn are subordinate to the consummate objective of world empire. It also manipulates it in a variety of ways, depending on time and circumstance.

When an inventory is taken of these various manipulations and aims, it becomes clear that virtually no good for export to the empire is non-strategic. The cold war economies of the empire thrive on fertilizers, food, transportational facilities, plastics, clothing, as they would on imported technological data, heavy machinery, and

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<sup>13</sup> Massie, Robert K., “Should the U. S. Trade with Enemies?” *The Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, Pa., February 1, 1964.

<sup>14</sup> Allen, Robert Loring, *Communist Economic Warfare*, Committee on Un-American Activities, 1960, p. 14.

military weapons. As an instrument of the Red state, trade makes up deficiencies of the economy, influences policies of less powerful states, affords channels for vital information, permits industrial espionage, has wide propaganda uses, allows for the penetration of countries and their dependence on the empire without their having to go "communist," and gradually displaces Western influence in the area, primarily through political agitation for "socialism," "nationalization," and imitation of totalitarian economic plans. Each manipulation here has been applied in the underdeveloped area. In sharp contrast to normal, standard Western practices, the Red trading mechanism embraces all factors.

#### RED TRADE AGGRESSION

In 1961 the then Senator and now Vice President Humphrey accurately described the USSR's economic offensive as "a carefully thought out plan to disrupt normal commercial cooperation between the industrial nations of the West and the underdeveloped countries which need capital, to snare other nations into becoming economically dependent on the Soviet Union, and to promote friction within the Western alliance. What we are seeing is a form of economic banditry by the Soviet Union, another weapon in its imperialistic scheme."<sup>15</sup> Nothing has changed since then except that the offensive has become even more dangerous behind the facades of "peaceful coexistence" and the illusory independence of supposedly nationalist satrapies that are fully cooperating in the general economic build-up of the empire.

Moscow and its East European satrapies are not normal traders given to multilateral trade. Instead, in their Red trade aggression they exploit bilateral agreements that are adjusted to Plan requirements, are essentially concerned with barter to strengthen the empire rather than with comparative advantage, and constantly seek technologic prototypes in the West with considerable savings on research and development costs. It is hollow rhetoric to air, as one Senator has, that "Expanded trade, no matter who our trading partner, serves our economic self-interest."<sup>16</sup> Nor would trade with Red trading agencies lead to bridges of "ideas to the peoples of Eastern Europe." With self-sufficiency as the cardinal principle of the empire, the comparatively small volume of Red trade, being specifically oriented toward multiple values, garners more for them than for us.

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<sup>15</sup> "The Soviet Economic Offensive," *Congressional Record*, September 20, 1961, p. 19186.

<sup>16</sup> Magnuson, Warren G., "Establishment of a Council for Expanded Trade," *Congressional Record*, February 1, 1965, p. 1711.

Western economic progress has little to gain from the Red Empire, but the latter has much to gain from the West. Expanded Red trade with the United States would have both psychological and economic value for Moscow and its satrapies, particularly in relation to the underdeveloped countries.

There are many aspects to Red trade aggression, but we shall briefly cite some of the more dominant ones. Trader substitution is a Russian technique where no or little headway can be made by Moscow. Polish and Czecho-Slovak representatives usually came into play. Contrary to the myth of East European fragmentation and so-called nationalist renaissance, these and other non-Russian satrapies serve as excellent means for increased trade to strengthen the empire. In 1964, for example, Czecho-Slovak agents toured the U.S. and expressed a desire to purchase data-processing, computer and chemical equipment for, perhaps, Czech beer and even Skoda machine-tool equipment. On organic economic grounds, it would be foolhardy to think that industrial gains reaped by one member of the empire would not redound through intra-empire negotiations and trade to the others. Poland, which is held up as an example of pro-Western orientation, serves the same function for Moscow, especially when in its own economic stress the USSR cannot adequately deliver wool, cotton, rubber, chemicals, grain, and machinery. Some emphasize Poland's lack of farm collectivization, yet because of general planned activity its private sector cannot produce adequate foodstuffs and U. S. assistance through Public Law 480 fills in the gap. Meanwhile, "retrogressive tendencies" are noted in Poland,<sup>17</sup> the Polish Deputy Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz calls on the Red Council for Economic Mutual Assistance to achieve a higher-level coordination of national plans and for industrial specialization,<sup>18</sup> and, aside from staged storming of U. S. Embassies in the empire, including Warsaw, the Polish totalitarians greeted the Vietnam crisis with a trade agreement with North Vietnam, supplying cars, trucks and electro-technological equipment to the latter.<sup>19</sup>

An organic view of the Red Empire is necessary if the ebbs and flows, the blandishments and threats, the short-run adjustments and long-term designs are to be rationally understood. In sheer power terms, if the USSR were to collapse, it would be only a matter of time before all so-called Communist regimes, including Belgrade and Peking, would be overthrown. The only real satellite of the empire is Yugoslavia, which some uphold as another example of "bridge-

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<sup>17</sup> *Special Study Mission to Europe, 1964*, p. 12.

<sup>18</sup> *Reuters*, Warsaw, January 31, 1965.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, February 20, 1965.

constructing." Yet Tito, fully aware of his ultimate source of survival, frankly stated before the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, in December 1962, that Yugoslav-Soviet views were "identical or nearly so" on all issues. The blown-up and distorted case of Rumania also shows misleading gestures of "independence" concerning COMECON and its disputes with East Germany and Czecho-Slovakia but not really the USSR, its Latinized preparation by Moscow for Latin American penetration, and its need for Western equipment which Moscow cannot supply.

The empire's dumping operations of cotton, tin, oil and excess goods out of Plan are an additional aspect. Its "aid" programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America also demonstrate the full meaning of economic warfare. Its oil offensive in Western Europe, with crude oil exports increasing six-fold from 1955-60, or 3 to 19 million metric tons, has come to a standstill as Moscow seeks today modern prototype petroleum plants to expand it.<sup>20</sup> As thought is given to these many ramifications of the empire's economic warfare and our policy toward it, it might well be remembered that the USSR itself has more than doubled its trade contacts in the past twenty-five years and, closer to home, has sustained the Castro economy with over \$1 billion of goods and arms, a training program for about 3,000 Cubans in the empire, and a recent trade agreement covering \$640 million of goods.

#### OUTLINES OF A SANE FREE WORLD POLICY

"What can we do?" is the usual question raised when these many aspects of Red trade aggression are discussed. To simply take an inventory, as one study does, of arguments and counter-arguments on East-West trade can't help much in decision-making, though it is useful as a preliminary approach to the subject.<sup>21</sup> The preconceptions and perspectives of knowledge and understanding brought on the subject are more determinative than the logic of many of these arguments. Surely the following dominant facts surrounding the issue cannot be weighed lightly: (1) our pitiful long-run record of contributing economically to the growth, development, and defense of the inner sphere of the Soviet Russian Empire, namely the Soviet Union itself; (2) except in the military and foreign aid fields, our failure to furnish Cold War leadership for the Free World, and particularly Western Europe, in meeting the economic and other chal-

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<sup>20</sup> For an early incisive analysis see Herman, Leon M., "The Soviet Oil Offensive," *Congressional Record*, August 3, 1962, p. 14518.

<sup>21</sup> See Clabaugh, Samuel F. and Allen, Richard V., *East-West Trade*, Washington, D. C., 1964, pp. 103.



lenges of the totalitarian Red Empire; (3) the misleading illusion of empire disintegration and “growing satellite independence” which conduces to the empire’s successful strategy of obtaining strategic goods for its cold war economies and their world-wide obligations, and (4) our persistent neglect to match the politico-economic character of Red totalitarian trade with a common policy of trade predicated on political concession values.

The outlines of a sane Free World trade policy cannot be drawn without a vivid recognition of these underlying facts. To urge a complete economic embargo against the Red Empire, as we do actually practice in relation to Red China, North Korea, and North Vietnam, or to advocate “freer” trade with Eastern Europe because our allies indulge heavily in it or because of accidental gestures on the part of so-called satellites is in the present situation an extreme course disproportionate to our strategic cold war needs. We should have no hesitation or fear to utilize trade as a freedom weapon just as the Red totalitarians manipulate it as a weapon for conquest. Vague rhetoric about bridges of understanding, contacts with peoples, and the circulation of ideas—which again make up the form of good intentions that, strangely enough, we deny most other parts of the Red Empire with which we are not in actual physical combat—would not forge such a freedom weapon. In the context of things today, only trade predicated on specific political concession values, even involving pecuniary subsidy, could guarantee a weapon of freedom.

Possibilities for such methodic political predication are many. To mention only a few, surcease of Soviet Russian colonialism in the USSR, dismantling the Berlin Wall, satisfaction of World War II agreements, the reunification of Germany and many others. The advantage of such constant predication is that these real causes of our foremost problems today will be kept in the forefront of world attention and thought. Another great advantage would be the leverage it would afford us to rectify the problem of increasing West European trade with the Red Empire. With a new initiative on our part in this field, a NATO Council on Trade could be established to develop this economic weapon for freedom, to eliminate the present discrepancies between the narrower list of strategic items voluntarily observed by the Consultative Group-Coordinating Committee (CO-COM) and our list, and thereby to infuse a new life of partnership in the Atlantic Community. The consequent economic advantages of this course of action, in terms of intra-Community technological exchanges, broadened markets, and the underdeveloped markets, are literally limitless. In terms of Free World survival, they would be priceless.

## **“SO ARE THEY ALL, ALL HONORABLE MEN”**

*By* STEFAN T. POSSONY

Once upon a time, in 1925, there was a Communist International. Grigori Zinoviev was running its executive committee, the so-called ECCI. The German revolution attempted by Zinoviev had failed dismally in 1923. But Grigori still had his heart set on becoming the world's greatest revolutionary. To succeed Lenin, he urgently needed success. A firm believer in revolution now, he decided to look for his triumph in Bulgaria. From the aisles, a certain Joseph Stalin was “supporting” the undertaking: he gladly helped Grigori to fall flat on his face.

The Bulgarian communists were addicts of drastic action. Between November 1924 and April 1925, the country was systematically disorganized through sabotage, and close to 200 officers, policemen, priests, teachers and politicians fell victims to acts of terror. By circular letter of February 27, 1925, the Bulgarian central committee called for intensified terrorism that was to cripple the government. On March 19, the ECCI judging that a “revolutionary situation” was arising, ordered the mobilization of the Bulgarian communist party for April 15. Weapons were to be distributed after nightfall. An uprising was to be launched on the 16th.

The apparatus wasn't quite leak-proof. The Bulgarian government intercepted the written ECCI instruction on April 1 and published it on April 4. The plan was compromised. Zinoviev was reckless enough not to countermand the operation.

On April 14, snipers tried to murder King Boris. On the same day, General Kosta Georgiev, a prominent political leader, was assassinated. If the King had been killed, there would have been a solemn requiem mass in Sofia's *Sveta Nedelya* Cathedral; every cabinet minister and high official as well as all army and police commanders could be expected to attend. As it was, such a mass was celebrated for General Georgiev. Except for the King—who was attending the funeral of a professor killed by the bullets that had been aimed at the monarch—almost every Bulgarian of note was present.

The assassination served the tactical purpose of assembling Bulgaria's leadership under one roof at one time. After bribing, weeks

earlier, the sacristan Petar Zadgorski, communist terrorists booby-trapped the church with large explosive charges. On Holy Thursday, April 16, in the midst of the funeral services, the charges were detonated from the onion-shaped steeple. Among the 123 dead, there were 10 generals, three deputies, the mayor of Sofia, and the chief of police. Among the 323 wounded every single cabinet member had been hit on the head.

This gruesome crime was to be the signal for the insurrection but the rising speedily collapsed. Soon Zinoviev was to drain the bitter dregs of fortune's cup.

A thorough whitewash was urgently needed: on April 24, the ECCI denied communist complicity. On the following day, Chicherin, Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, followed suit and conveyed the impression as though he never heard of the Comintern. However, the trial of surviving terrorists which opened on May 1 in Sofia, provided ample proof of Moscow's involvement.

On May 11, George Dimitrov, exiled Bulgarian party leader, was condemned to death *in absentia*. On May 19, he issued a denial of his own and his party's participation in the bombing of the Cathedral. He alleged that a Polish agent by the name of Serge Druzhilovski had forged the incriminating ECCI instruction. As a matter of fact, there was a forged version. The scholarly world soon "confirmed" that the documents published by Sofia were "crude forgeries." In 1927, Druzhilovski was tried in Moscow and reportedly confessed that he had fabricated the Bulgarian intercepts.

In 1933, when Dimitrov was before a Nazi tribunal (he was accused of having master-minded the burning of the Reichstag building), he reasserted that the Sofia outrage had not been organized by the Bulgarian communist party. The bombing of the Cathedral, he disclosed, had been the handiwork of the Bulgarian police.

There matters rested until late 1948 when Dimitrov, now prime minister of Bulgaria and at loggerheads with Stalin, confessed to the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian CP that *Sveta Nedelya* had been blown up by the "military organization of the party." This act of terrorism, he complained, constituted an "ultra-left deviation." Probably to put pressure on Stalin, Dimitrov emphasized that early in 1925, he had warned against terrorism. This was true—Dimitrov usually tended toward a right "deviation"—just as it was true that in 1925, the party was steering a left course. But this does not change the twin facts that the outrage had been committed by communists and that the Bulgarian party was acting upon instructions from the Comintern.

As to Druzhilovski, it turned out that he was a Soviet intelligence agent. In order to invalidate the genuine intercepts disclosed by the Bulgarian government, he had been told to fabricate documents that could be "unmasked" as forgeries. (The trade knows this technique of tainting authentic evidence through forgery as "dys-information.")

In 1949, the Federation of Bulgarian Anarcho-Communists claimed credit for the attempt on the life of King Boris. Seemingly, therefore, this deed was performed by a splinter group, but since the timing was too perfect to be accidental, this was probably a "proxy" job. In other words, the party did not desire to be held responsible for the King's death.

Finally, in 1953, Ivan Karaivanov, a leader of the Bulgarian party, a Comintern official, and an old chum of Dimitrov, disclosed after his defection to Tito that the crime in the Cathedral had been "worked out by Russian and Bulgarian NKVD agents." (He should have said: "OGPU agents.")

"As everybody knows, Marxists do not believe in terror." Lee Oswald was barely apprehended when this often-heard claim was reiterated loudly and clearly. Not everyone knew about Marxist anti-terrorism, however. A quarter of a national sample queried by opinion researchers from Chicago University thought the President had been killed by a communist, and only about 12% (most of them "intellectuals," no doubt) believed it was the work of a right-wing fanatic (AP, March 7, 1964).

In the light of Stalin's "liquidation of the *Kulaks* as a class," of the party and army purges, of several genocides, of the Katyn murders, of party purges in the satellite states, of the assassination of French President Doumer, and of the murder of Kirov, Reiss, Trotsky, Sedov, Petlura, Konovalts, Generals Krivitsky, Miller and Kutiepov, the staged suicide of Masaryk and possibly the murder of Gorky and his son, etc., etc., it would not appear that Stalin rejected terrorism too firmly.

Lenin killed fewer people than Stalin but he was clearly a terrorist, too. Lenin established the Cheka, the mother organization of all communist terror groups. He ordered, or approved, the assassination of the entire Imperial family. He repeatedly ordered mass terror, for example on August 9, 1918. Under Lenin's regime, on September 5, 1918, "red terror" was promulgated by decree.

In 1918, Lenin asked that terrorism be practiced against speculators. If the speculators were not shot "on the spot," the struggle against speculation would be unsuccessful. The plunderers of wine cellars—the "beasts will drown the revolution in wine"—also should be shot without trial. Unfortunately, Lenin complained, nobody obeys.

A year later he pronounced terrorism to be "absolutely necessary." On March 3, 1922, Lenin, in a letter to Kamenev, wrote that terrorism had not been rendered unnecessary by the NEP.<sup>1</sup> On May 17, 1922, he asked that a paragraph be inserted in the criminal code explaining "the essence and justification of terror, its necessity, its limits."

In matters of terrorism, Lenin was even more two-faced than usual. Thus, he once promised Gorky to save a grand duke, but arranged secretly for the latter's execution. Next to a portrait of Karl Marx, a picture of Stepan Khalturin decorated Lenin's office. Khalturin had attempted to kill Alexander II through staging an enormous explosion in the Winter Palace. A large number of people were killed but the Czar escaped. Khalturin proved to be an unsuccessful terrorist. Hence Lenin's admiration for him seems paradoxical. Krasin explained Lenin's predilection for terrorism through his cowardice. Whatever the psychological explanation may be, Lenin remained a devotee of terrorism to the end of his life, even after he had abandoned other features of the communist creed.

It will be objected that most of this was not terror as a revolutionary technique but terror exercised by the dictatorship. Very well, let's look at the facts.

Marx did not expect much from terrorism, it is true, but he, too, had his lapses. For example, he wrote on November 7, 1848:

The cannibalism of the counterrevolution will convince the peoples that there is only one means to shorten, simplify and concentrate the murderous death pangs... of the old society and the bloody birth pangs of the new society, only one means—revolutionary terrorism (Marx-Engels, *Werke*, vol. 5, p. 457).

In May 1901, Lenin wrote in a programmatic article:

We have never rejected terror on principle, nor can we do so. Terror is a form of military operation that may be usefully applied or may even be essential in certain moments... (*Selected Works*, vol. II, p. 17).

In 1902, the newly founded social revolutionary party which, in line with Russian revolutionary tradition, strongly believed in individual terror, murdered the Russian minister of the interior. The social revolutionaries let it be known that henceforth their "combat group" would consider the czar and all high state dignitaries to be fair targets. The first Russian Marxist and former pro-terrorist, G. V. Plekhanov, allowed that political assassination is not a crime, though terrorism may not be a suitable form of the class struggle. "Killing is no murder," he wrote in English. (The English phrase is by Edward Sexby, 1658.)

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<sup>1</sup> *Sochineniya*, 2nd edition, vol. 22, p. 243; *Leninskiĭ Sbornik*, vol. 36, p. 443ff. In this letter Lenin also talked about economic terrorism.

1918, when Lenin thought it expedient to eliminate Wilhelm Mirbach, German ambassador to Moscow, Jacob Blyumkin, an *ad hoc* member of the left social revolutionary party, was used. This arrangement provided Lenin with a bonus—a convenient pretext to suppress the left social revolutionaries.<sup>2</sup> Blyumkin later became one of Trotsky's closest collaborators.

In March 1920, shortly before the Soviet-Polish war, Lenin concerned himself with foreign communism and strongly criticized the negative attitude of the French and German parties toward terrorism. Their rejection of terrorism meant a "turning away from the essence of the proletarian dictatorship, a transition to the position of petty bourgeois democracy." Terrorism, Lenin implied, serves to create "revolutionary consciousness." "Abandoning violence and terror... would be tantamount to becoming... a sob sister." "In the judgment of the Russian communist party, there is no room for such parties in the Communist International."

At approximately the same time, Leon Trotsky (who later was to voice loud opposition to terrorism) wrote in *Terrorism and Communism*:

Logically, the revolution does not need terrorism just as "logically," it does not require the armed uprising. What a promising platitude! But the revolution demands of the revolutionary class that it reaches for its objectives with all the means at its disposal: whenever necessary [the revolutionary class must resort to] armed uprising, and whenever necessary to terrorism.

In July 1920, the second congress of the Comintern accepted this point under the innocuous formula that communist parties must combine legal and illegal work as an "absolute necessity." Shortly thereafter, Russian experts set up a terror or T-apparatus in the German and Bulgarian communist parties, and probably in most other parties. The German T-group was ineffective, because the left deviationists wanted to kill individuals whom the right proponents of coexistence with Germany wanted to keep alive. The first German T-group, together with its pistols and vials of typhus *bacilli*, ended before the German Supreme Court. The chief Russian terror planner was exchanged for German student-tourists whom the Soviets had arrested to force the return of their expert. It took Stalin to organize the murder business efficiently.

But what about Khrushchev? Well, the benign Nikita was a member of the "troika" which, during 1937 and 1938, carried out the purges that Stalin ordered. Molotov and Yeshov were the two other

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<sup>2</sup> See my *Lenin, the Compulsive Revolutionary*, Chicago, Regnery, 1964, pp. 282-284.

members. Khrushchev ran two purges in Ukraine. Doubts have been expressed about the precise modus of Stalin's departure for the communist hunting grounds. Poskrybyshev, Stalin's right hand man, hardly died in bed. Beria and many of his followers fell victim to Khrushchev's brand of terrorism; according to one version, Beria was shot right in the middle of a Presidium session. The killing of Imre Nagy and Gen. Maleter, not to mention other Hungarian victims, must have been ordered by Khrushchev. The simulated suicide of the Danish UN official Pavl Bang-Jensen bears all the earmarks of a KGB job. Assassination expert Khokhlov was sent to kill G. S. Okolovich, chief of the Russian NTS party's secret staff. The Ukrainian leaders Rebet and Bandera were murdered by a Soviet agent who confessed and was tried in Germany: this agent disclosed that he was scheduled to take a refresher course in a training area where a simulated American town has been built. Pavl Zernov, deputy minister of medium machinery construction (a key figure in the atomic program), and V. V. Borisoglebsky, the judge presiding over U-2 pilot Powers' trial, fell victim to the defection of Yuri Nossenko.

Does all this history suggest that Oswald was ordered by the Kremlin to murder President Kennedy? It does not. The evidence simply shows that the communists, if and when they consider an assassination to be useful, would not hesitate to kill. It is unlikely that Khrushchev was interested in the elimination of the President. But some of his domestic and bloc opponents, or one or the other of his intelligence services, may have been anxious to change the world political situation. Radical "left deviationists" may have been eager to accelerate the world revolution: after all, the murder in Texas coincided with "armed struggle" in Venezuela and *attentats* against two presidential candidates and President Betancourt. Indeed Oswald may have acted on his own—if we take Lenin literally, acts of individual terrorism do not require party approval.

Lenin taught that it is imperative to "stir up hatred."<sup>3</sup> It is, therefore, not particularly surprising that a devotee of the Leninist creed reaches out for a rifle and guns down the man who, as he sees it, incarnates the hated class enemy. To an orthodox and activist communist, the President's conciliatory attitude would mean only that Kennedy, instead of using force, wanted to defeat communism through deception and entrapment. As Disraeli said in one of his novels: "Mr. Kremlin himself was distinguished for ignorance, for he had only one idea—and was wrong." But wrong or not, the Free World must realize that terrorism has always been and remains a key communist technique. As Stalin put it: "Strike and strike again."

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<sup>3</sup> *Sochimeniya*, vol. 12, p. 383.

## UKRAINE: 1965

By GEORGE SAVOR  
(As told to LEO HEIMAN)

Hardpacked snow crunched under my boots as I walked down Lenin Street towards the General Post Office on Kiev's Kreshchatik Avenue. Despite the cold sub-zero weather, the open-air bookstalls lining the sidewalk on both sides of the post office building were crowded like the banks of the Seine in Paris on a bright summer day.

Thousands of men and women were crowded into the narrow space between the rough trestle tables supporting second-hand books and old dog-eared magazines, and the edge of the sidewalk.

From time to time, militia patrolmen elbowed a narrow path through the milling crowd, which closed like a tidal wave behind their burly overcoated figures. Old women with their feet encased in "valenki" felt boots, young elegant-looking wives of senior officials sporting tailored fur coats, villagers in sheepskins and bespectacled intellectuals shuddering in the gusts of cold wind—did not budge from the open-air book market.

This was a phenomenon which I could not understand at first. I myself like to acquire Soviet publications for my private library at home. Many Soviet books, newspapers, pamphlets and magazines are not available in the West, because Moscow authorities ban their sale outside the USSR. But it is perfectly legal for a tourist to acquire them and bring them back after a visit to the Soviet Union.

Therefore, it became a habit with me to visit all official bookshops in every Soviet city, within 48 hours of my arrival, just after the first round of official calls and business conferences.

I bought about fifty books, pamphlets and scientific publications in Kiev at the "Political Bookshop" on Red Army Street, "Shevchenko Bookshop" on the avenue bearing the great Ukrainian poet's name, *Druzhba* (friendship) Bookshop on Kreshchatik Avenue and "Science" Bookshop on Kirov Street.

All these stores were stocked with literally thousands of volumes on a hundred different subjects, apart from countless titles of fiction, poetry and children's stories.



The prices were reasonable, about two-thirds below the current price level for hardcover books in the West, and regular subscribers to certain literary magazines or publishing houses were entitled to 50 per cent reductions as well.

I saw no reason, therefore, for the mass assault on the Kreshchatik open-air book market, which is permitted twice a week, on Sundays and Wednesdays.

Intrigued to see what the people of Kiev were buying from the second-hand dealers, and why, I pushed my way through the crowd and approached a table heaped with books in varying stages of decomposition, presided over by an old crone with the face like a bird of prey, wrapped in multiple layers of shawls and kerchiefs. Her beady eyes were riveted to the hands of customers, as if the tattered books were the most precious thing in the world.

A middle-aged man standing next to me selected five books from the heap, and haggled with the old woman for about ten minutes, until they agreed on the price. He paid her twenty rubles (about \$22), put the books in his briefcase and moved to the next stall.

I could no longer control my curiosity, and caught up with him. "Excuse me, citizen. I am a stranger here and it interests me to know why did you pay twenty rubles for five old books, when you could have bought eight new ones for the same money in one of the shops." The man, a gaunt, cadaverous intellectual type with an old-fashioned tie around a frayed shirt collar, looked me up and down, as if trying to figure out where I came from.

I spoke good Russian, but it was evident that I came from abroad. Was it safe to confide in me?

He apparently decided that it was.

"These are books in the Ukrainian language published before the Revolution," he replied curtly and disappeared in the crowd.

So that was it. But if the book stalls peddled literature not approved by the authorities, why was the open-air market tolerated and even encouraged?

Moreover, a crowd of any size in the Soviet Union invariably attracts secret police detectives and security agents.

These "seksots," as they are known in the USSR, would have spotted any illegal sales of anti-Soviet literature a long time ago. And yet, the hungry-looking intellectual acted as if he had struck real pay dirt. I went back to the stalls and began browsing through the books myself. It did not take me very long to find out part of the answer.

The missing parts of the Kreshchatik open-air book market puzzle were filled in by friends and Soviet officials who discussed

the problem off the record. In the best journalistic tradition, let me answer the five W's—Who, What, Where, When and Why.

Who is selling? In theory, everybody who has a private library, inherits a collection of rare or old books, and wants to get rid of it, is entitled to erect a trestle stand on Khreshchatik Avenue and sell his stuff to the public. Since old books have no official price, he can demand as much as the traffic will bear. Persons peddling pornography, anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary literature are liable to heavy prison sentences if caught. Since the definitions of anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary literature are very broad, and can be stretched *ad infinitum*, the secret police could crack down on any pretext at any time. In fact, they seldom—if at all—interfere.

One may well ask, what is going on in Kiev?

Is the Kreshchatik book market a symbol of some new Soviet democracy, liberty and freedom the West does not know about? Since when are citizens of the USSR allowed to choose their own reading material?

Alas, the millennium has not yet arrived in the Soviet Union. In actual fact, the book stalls along Kreshchatik Avenue are controlled by a syndicate in cahoots with the secret police. Syndicate stooges buy old books cheap and sell them at great profit. And woe to the poor widow or naive heirs who decide to sell their library without requesting the syndicate's permission.

Goons hired by the syndicate will steal their books, tear out pages, stage fake fights during which the trestle table is overturned and the books trampled into the snow, or just beat up the "independents" and rob them of the day's proceeds on their way home.

And it is easier to become a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee than of the Kreshchatik book-peddlers' syndicate. One must pay a 500-ruble "entrance fee" and pass through three stages of apprenticeship to be accepted as a full-fledged member. The syndicate cooperates with the secret police on the old Russian principle *ruka ruku moyet* (one hand washes the other).

Persons who want to sell their libraries or inherited collections of old books, either carry the whole load themselves to the book market and negotiate on the spot, or invite syndicate professionals to their homes, to appraise the books and quote an opening price.

Few syndicate professionals are erudite persons. In fact, most are semi-literates. But their practical knowledge of books and authors, official attitudes and various "thaws" is unmatched by veteran librarians with college degrees.

Nine out of ten syndicate members are secret police informers, I learned during my sojourn in Kiev. They know that while the list

of forbidden books could be stretched for miles, the authorities will ignore pornography, "decadent" literature, anti-Semitism and sheer smut, but will crack down in all cases of Trotskyism, Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism," Zionism and "dissident revisionism."

For example, it is pretty safe to peddle books praising the old Czarist regime, or describing in great and sordid detail the life of a prostitute in a Moscow bordello. But anything printed in the Hebrew language is automatically classified as "Zionist propaganda," even if it is only a prayer book, a religious calendar or the Bible. When syndicate buyers spot a book falling into one of the four categories mentioned above, they buy it and tip off the police about the source of their acquisition.

Investigators then decide whether to arrest the persons who kept such books in their possession for years, without destroying them, or handing them over to the authorities.

The forbidden books are not seized by the police, but placed on the Kreshchatik stalls, like a bait for counterrevolutionaries to expose themselves through buying them. While persons who sell such books can claim that they just discovered a trunkload of volumes in their attic and did not even look at the titles, no one who buys them from the Kreshchatik market can say he was unaware of their subversive nature.

The forbidden books are marked with symbols understandable only to the salesmen and secret police officers. The buyers are followed home and arrested.

This explains the apparent freedom of literary expression in Kiev. There is no freedom at all. But police "agents provocateurs" are at work, luring innocent victims to their trestle tables.

Who is buying?

There is no clear-cut answer to this one. I have seen Red Army officers, airline pilots, aged professors, housewives, high school students, college girls, teachers and long-haired literary types rubbing shoulders with sailors, fishermen and farmers from the sticks.

By the time he graduates from a four-year university course, the average student must acquire some 200 different books and scientific texts. Even at the low official price and special reduction for students, it adds up to a lot of money. Foreign students at Kiev University—Africans, Cubans, Arabs, Indians and Indonesians—get these books for free. They are supposed to turn them over to the University's own second-hand bookshop upon departure. But most foreigners make their way to the Kreshchatik market, sell their books to the syndicate, and run across the street to the Perlyna Jewelry Shop to buy baubles and cheap costume jewelry for their girl friends.

Bona fide collectors can always find something of value, lovers of filth can wallow in pornography, and people who yearn for the wide-open spaces of Arctic prison camps can discover a short-cut to misery by browsing in the Ukrainian-language section and buying nationalist publications.

Still, with so many books and customers around, the unforeseen happens sometimes. The Soviet police are still investigating the "Halan Affair" which took place in 1962, and which remains an unsolved puzzle on the files of Kiev UKGB (State Security Administration).

That year, I was told, the Kreshchatik book market was flooded by hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of volumes of Yaroslav Halan's collected works, published by the official Goslitizdat center of the Ukrainian "republic." Yaroslav Halan was a Ukrainian renegade and a communist spy from way back in 1923. As a matter of fact, even his Ukrainian ancestry is in doubt, because at different times in his life he claimed to be Polish, Russian and even Austrian.

In any case, he was very active in the communist apparatus in prewar Austria, Poland and Western Ukraine, being in charge of recruiting espionage operatives among left-wing intellectuals and "progressive" journalists. He wrote in the Ukrainian, Polish, Russian and German languages, and was appointed during the Second World War to head the psychological warfare section at the Central Committee of the "Ukrainian" Communist Party. After the Second World War, Halan headed the intellectual and popular propaganda campaigns against the Catholic Church in general and the Ukrainian Catholic Church in particular.

His vitriolic pamphlet, "I Spit on the Pope" and "The Apostles of Treason," caused so much genuine indignation in Western Ukraine, that the Soviet authorities feared an explosion of popular wrath and resentment. On October 24, 1949, the renegade Yaroslav Halan was mowed down by a burst of machine gun fire in his office in Lviv.

To this day, it is not known who liquidated the communist "agent-provocateur." I have heard three different versions of Halan's death during my brief sojourn in Lviv.

The official Soviet version is that Halan was assassinated by "agents of the Vatican." To make sure these ridiculous charges would stick, the Russians produced a brainwashed prisoner, a Ukrainian nationalist sympathizer who was tortured in the cellars of KGB headquarters in Lviv with truth-drug injections, electric shock treatments, boiling water and blocks of ice. After a few months of such treatment, he became a robot who did whatever the Reds ordered him to do.

He told the court a crazy story of having been recruited for a special "Vatican espionage service" by the late Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, and smuggled out by the Ukrainian nationalist underground to Rome, where he underwent a six-month training course in espionage, sabotage, terror and political assassination at the Vatican. He was parachuted near Lviv from an American aircraft, according to his "confession," with the specific mission of organizing and carrying out the liquidation of Yaroslav Halan.

The brainwashed prisoner was condemned to death by the court. Soviet propaganda exploited his "confession" and trial to vilify the Catholic Church and create a new communist martyr, while further blackening the reputation of the Ukrainian national liberation movement as "a tool of Fascism, reaction and Vatican murder gangs."

The second version is that Halan was really rubbed out by Ukrainian freedom fighters, who regarded him as their Enemy Number One, and desired to avenge his numerous victims. Soviet secret police never learned who shot Halan. To save their reputation and achieve a major propaganda success, the MVD produced a brainwashed prisoner who "confessed" in court.

The third, and to me the most likely, version is that Halan was murdered by his own Soviet masters.

Following the publication of the obscene pamphlets against the Pope and the beloved Metropolitan Sheptytsky, Halan became more of a liability than an asset. His activities failed to intimidate the Ukrainian nationalists and their sympathizers, but on the contrary brought new recruits for the underground and converts for the nationalist cause.

By killing their own stooge Halan, the Soviets achieved three major objectives: they got rid of a deadweight liability and a veteran agent who knew too many secrets anyway, they implicated the Vatican and the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and they obtained additional material for their propaganda campaign against the nationalist movement.

But to get back to the Kreshchatik book market, the volumes of Halan's collected works sold like hot cakes on the rough trestle stands.

It took the secret police informers a few weeks to ask themselves why are customers buying Halan at all. His books never sold well, and the official stores were still stocked with them. So why buy them second-hand at Kreshchatik? Moreover, what is the reason for the sudden popularity?

The police stoolies began reading one of the books taken at random from the heap and nearly fainted. The red-black-yellow cover,

the first ten or twelve pages, as well as the last ones, were the same as in the official edition. But the inside pages were a clever forgery of Halan's essays and stories. Thus, "I Spit on the Pope" became "I Spit on the Kremlin."

The title of "The Apostles of Treason" was not changed, but the text charged the Kremlin and its Ukrainian stooges with selling out the Ukrainian people.

The secret police ordered an immediate investigation. It was obvious that the "Halan Affair" was an organized effort of the nationalist underground. But the doctored inside pages were printed, not mimeographed or reproduced with the offset process. The investigators concluded, therefore, that the phony books could not be printed, bound and disseminated by any local underground. It had to be the work of "American Intelligence" and/or the Ukrainian nationalist center in Germany.

But assuming that was the case, why were the books sold in Kiev only, not in Lviv, Kharkiv and other Ukrainian cities with second-hand book markets? This is a riddle the secret police are still trying to solve, although more than twenty persons have been arrested so far for possessing the forbidden books. Apart from the Kreshchatik second-hand book market, which is a world apart, with laws and regulations of its own, the secret police in Kiev keep an eye peeled for "irregular" activities at a dozen other spots, I learned during my sojourn in the Ukrainian capital. Stoolies and informers are active at the General Post Office, Intercity Telephone Station, Railway Booking Office, the Central Department Store, the Central Jewelry Shop, the Specialized Fur Shop, and the "Intourist," "Kiev," "Leningrad," "Moskva," "Ukraina," "Teatralny" and "Stolichny" restaurants.

Kiev has about 300 eateries, ranging from simple *Pivnaya* taverns near the river port, to the swank Big Seven named above. Police agents keep an eye on the clientele of the expensive restaurants as a matter of routine, to check who is dining there and how much money customers spend. If an official who earns 160 rubles a month suddenly blows 80 rubles on a seven-course dinner with iced vodka and champagne, and is doing this not once but several times, the informers assume that he is embezzling official funds or working some illegal racket, and report him to the secret police.

The same goes for big spenders at the jewelry, fur and department stores.

I could understand why police plain-clothes men watch the Railway Booking Office and Intercity Telephone Station for wanted criminals, suspected nationalists, Western agents and other "security

risks," although it is difficult to believe that professional spies or seasoned underground resistants will buy tickets from the booking office or establish long-range contact via the Intercity telephone exchange.

But what really intrigued me was the reason for the presence of so many uniformed and plain-clothes police at the General Post Office.

All foreign letters are censored anyway, and spies do not have to enter the GPO to mail a local postcard. I then learned that the detectives are mainly interested in the clientele of two GOP sections—“*Do Vostrebvaniya*” (*Poste Restante*) and “Philatelic Service.” One of the magazines I bought at Kreshchatik but could not take out of the Soviet Union because its circulation is limited to the USSR by law, was the monthly journal *Pogranichnik* (Frontier Guard), official organ of the Border Security Administration of State Security Committee.

One of the articles dealt with the problems of stamp collectors and their correspondence with philatelists abroad. Written in the bombastic propaganda tone of communist agitators, it nevertheless disclosed some very interesting details.

According to the article I read, the Ukrainian national liberation movement is utilizing the addresses of stamp collectors in the Soviet Union, to funnel instructions and secret information. Bona fide stamp collectors, who are registered with the Philatelic Service section at the General Post Office, are allowed to correspond with collectors abroad, whose names they culled from their Philatelic Club publications, provided all letters are mailed via the official Philatelic Service.

They can also receive stamps and letters from their philatelic pen pals without incurring official displeasure.

According to the *Pogranichnik* article, “Ukrainian fascists” in West Germany utilized the stamp exchange for their own “nefarious purposes.” All officers of KPP (Control and Search) units were advised therefore to pay greater attention to collectors of stamps, coins, matchboxes and cigarette packs.

I have dealt at length with the secret police aspects of life in the Ukrainian capital for two reasons. First, all newspaper reports notwithstanding and despite the greater degree of freedom a foreigner feels in the Soviet Union, the secret police are still the decisive factor, especially in Ukraine, in 1965.

True, they do not shadow foreigners and follow them like hungry dogs. This was both foolish and unnecessary. But police detectives and informers infest all hotels, restaurants, airports, department stores, open-air markets and railway stations.

Moreover, Soviet propaganda has trumpeted from time to time, since 1945, that Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism" is dead. But you don't mention a dead thing as often as the Soviet press still does, credit it with so many "evil things" and "nefarious activities" and fear it as much as the Reds do.

In fact, as shown by the case of Yaroslav Halan's doctored books, the phony philatelic correspondence and other recent affairs, the nationalist underground movement is still very much alive.

Twenty years have passed since the end of the Second World War, and it stands to reason that the bulk of Ukrainian freedom fighters are young men and women who grew up under Soviet rule after the war. Most of them are members of the Comsomol (Young Communist League). What makes them gravitate to anti-Soviet circles and risk their young lives by engaging in nationalist resistance activities?

I learned the truth during my stay in Lviv. Heavy snow blizzards blanketed the Kiev area on the day of my departure, and all flights from the new Borispil airport were cancelled. The Intourist office exchanged my Aeroflot voucher for a first class railway express ticket. A taxicab picked me up from my hotel on Lenin Street. We swerved left along the Volodymyrska Avenue, right again to Taras Shevchenko Boulevard, and halted in a traffic jam at the intersection of Komintern Street, a ruler-straight thoroughfare linking the center of the city with the Vokzalny (Central Railway Station) Square. Hundreds of women, their faces blue from cold, were shoveling snow into a line of dump trucks. The mechanical equipment—bulldozers and snow ploughs—stood immobilized on the sidewalk. The machines ran out of fuel and could not clear the road. Trucks with diesel oil could not bring up the necessary fuel as long as the road was covered by hub-deep snow. So hundreds of women were mobilized to clear the street first—Soviet economic planning at its stupid best.

It was still snowing when our train rolled into the Lviv station. The Intourist office had a car waiting for me. Because of the heavy snows, my planned schedule of visits to industrial plants in the Lviv area was disrupted. But the Intourist people obliged with a ticket to a show at the Ivan Franko Theater, devoted to Ukrainian folklore and music.

The top star and main attraction was the famous Ukrainian songstress Oksana Petrusenko, who is to the Ukrainians what the late Edith Piaf was to the French. While most plays, operas and shows are performed in the Russian language, the authorities allow the use of Ukrainian for musicals and what they call "estradny" (variety) shows.



Oksana Petrusenko was really good, especially her singing of old Ukrainian songs. The enthusiastic audience forced her to sing three encores of "Oi ne svity misyachenku." Towards the end of her program, Miss Petrusenko asked the audience whether they wanted her to sing anything special to end the evening with.

*Podmoskovniye Vechera!* (Moscow Nights!)—shouted a group of Red Army officers in the front rows. *Svityt Misiats!* (The Moon Shines!)—pleaded a middle-aged woman in a tearful voice.

But the loudest shouts came from the cheaper balcony seats. *Zapovit!* (Testament!)—yelled a group of students from Lviv University.

Now, the "Testament" was written over 100 years ago by the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko whom the Reds now claim as one of "their own" progressive revolutionaries. So the song is legal as a poem. But when sung to a stirring tune, it becomes the unofficial hymn of the Ukrainian nationalist underground. Of course, I had no idea of it. All these facts were explained to me later by my friends, who accompanied me to the theater.

Miss Petrusenko agreed to sing the "Testament," although she was no doubt aware that it will constitute a black mark against her in secret police files. The "Testament" is a serious song, and certainly out of place at a gay and merry variety show. By singing it, she stressed her feelings and solidarity with the students. The Russian officers did not like it, especially when the audience rose as she began to sing. They remained seated, but their hostile demonstration against a great patriotic song only underscored the unbridgeable gulf between the oppressed Ukrainians and their Russian colonizers.

How proud of her national heritage and conscious of her status as Ukraine's national songstress Miss Petrusenko really is, was illustrated at another variety show I attended in Odessa, shortly before my departure from the Soviet Union.

The star of the evening was the Ukrainian crooner Vasyl Derevenko, who appeared together with the gypsy torch singer Raissa Zhemchuzhnaya. Although a Ukrainian himself, he did not sing a single song in the Ukrainian language. His repertoire consisted of six Russian songs—mostly *chastushki* (village couplets)—and translations of four Armenian, Azarbaijanian and Uzbek songs—in the Russian language.

Miss Zhemchuzhnaya was singing in Russian and Rumanian. This in a city which is supposed to be Ukrainian, and certainly is if one looks beneath the Russified surface. But the Odessa authorities are frowning upon the use of the Ukrainian language and Derevenko lacked Miss Petrusenko's courage and integrity.

When the Soviet authorities opened a Permanent Exhibition of Agricultural Achievements on the campus of the Lviv Agricultural Engineering Institute, a group of pro-nationalist students painted a huge black slogan over the building's façade—*Bula Ukraina Bohata, Ta Stala Bidna* (Ukraine Was Rich Once, But Is Poor Now). Secret police arrested a dozen suspects, but it goes without saying that police terror alone cannot eradicate the nationalistic sentiments among the young people, not even in 1965.

I have talked to several students who trusted me, after introductions were made through mutual friends. As far as I could gauge their feelings, their resentment is inarticulate and unchanneled into any single track. They resent the Russification campaign, the open disdain with which Russian officials, teachers and officers treat Ukrainians, and the evident fact that Moscow regards the Russian nation as a ruler of the Soviet Union and the non-Russian captive peoples as second-class citizens, who ought to be grateful for being given the chance to become Russians.

The process of Russification is becoming more efficient every year, and its long-range effect cannot be estimated now. Students must learn Russian to graduate. No important texts are ever printed in any other language. They are assigned to remote areas of the Soviet Union upon graduation, and their places are taken by Russians.

All this is resented by the young Ukrainians who believe themselves to be just as good as their Russian colleagues, if not better. Surprisingly, there is very little national hatred in Ukraine. The seething resentment is directed mostly against the Moscow regime. Another factor which contributes to pro-nationalist sentiments among the students is the red-carpet treatment extended by the authorities to foreign students from so-called underdeveloped countries. The young Ukrainians want to know why is Moscow courting such students from Central Africa, Zanzibar, Sudan, etc., as if they were the spearhead of progressive humanity, while denying the same treatment to Ukrainians at home. Why is Moscow encouraging them to develop their own languages and cultures, and to sever their dependence upon English and French. But at home, it does not encourage the Ukrainians to develop their language and culture (which do not require as much development). On the contrary, Moscow is doing all it can to suppress the Ukrainian language and culture. You can't fool all the people all the time, and the Ukrainian students are nobody's fools. They see what is going on around them, and ask themselves why should they be treated worse than students from underdeveloped Africa?

Just because Moscow needs Ukraine as a colony? This then is the background to the very real resentment which pulsates in Ukrainian intellectual circles and throughout university campuses in 1965.

But I would not say that the pro-Nationalist students identify themselves with any outspokenly anti-communist movement. In fact, they seem to me to resent the Soviet regime, without opposing communism as a social system. Moreover, they do not really know what they want. Their ideas are still dim and undeveloped. They lack clear-cut aims and objectives. But they do know what they hate. They hate the constant Russian encroachment and colonization, the systematic suppression of the Ukrainian national heritage, and the assignment system which uproots many students from their homes and disperses them all over the Soviet Union.

Thus for the time being, some way must be found to encourage the proud nationalist sentiments of young Ukrainians and channel them in the right direction. As far as I could see, they do not hate communism. In fact, they do not even imagine complete freedom and independence. But they want to be at least a Soviet satellite, like Poland, Hungary or Rumania, and not a Soviet slave as at present.

In short, they do not seem to mind if their global, fiscal and defense policies are dictated by Moscow. But they want to be Ukrainians at home, like the Poles, Hungarians, Rumanians and Bulgarians in their respective countries.

They will not hesitate therefore to crush any revolt with tanks, guns, flamethrowers, napalm and dynamite. But they cannot crush resistance of the mind. And Ukraine in 1965 is ripe for psychological action. The Ukrainians do not ask much. They do not ask for the same favored treatment as Yemen, Kuwait and Mali. They do not even hope to free themselves entirely from Russian domination—at least not for the time being. All they want and pray for is to exchange the chain and ball of slaves for the lighter strings of satellites.

They admit that Ukraine is quite prosperous now. But this is not thanks to Soviet occupation, but in spite of it. Without Moscow's domination, Ukraine could have been Europe's richest country.

The students and young intellectuals realize this too. They are more aware of what is going on in the outside world than is generally believed. And a way must be found to reach their hearts, minds and emotions.

## **THE CAPTIVE NATIONS SPEAK TO AMERICA FROM SIBERIAN SLAVE CAMPS**

*By* ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

After 23 years in Soviet prisons, slave labor camps and Siberia, Father Walter J. Ciszek, an American Jesuit of Polish descent, was exchanged in October, 1963, for a Soviet "diplomat" detained by our Administration and returned to the USA. In 1964 appeared the monumental book: *With God in Russia*, by Walter J. Ciszek, S.J., with Daniel L. Flaherty, S. J., McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, Toronto, London. The America Press, New York, 302 pp., \$5.95.\*)

As a young seminarian in Woodstock College in 1934, the author, who was born in 1904, volunteered for "Russian Studies" in Rome. Later on he joined the Jesuit Center in Albertin, then in northern Poland. With the outbreak of World War II in 1939 this place fell under Soviet occupation—and thus started his fantastic adventure, not the least remarkable of which was that he survived it. Apparently Providence wished a living witness to tell America the truth about the Soviet empire, its Captive Nations and the plight of religion under the rule of the Muscovite anti-christ, the Russian Communist Party.

### I

The adventure, unique for an American priest, really started when Father Ciszek, together with two other Byzantine-Slavic Rite priests, Nestrov and Makar, decided to volunteer as lumber workers in the Ural forests, some 750 miles northeast of Moscow. In order to conceal his calling he changed his name to Wladimir Lypinski, unfortunately a suspicious name as far as Russian intelligence was concerned, for it closely resembled the name of a distinguished Ukrainian statesman and historian, Viacheslav Lypynsky.

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\*) EDITOR'S NOTE: Because the book by Father Walter J. Ciszek, an American priest, is an extraordinary document of life behind the Iron Curtain, graphically describing the terror that permeates Soviet life and, at the same time, presenting a moving account of personal courage and devotion, it is dealt with here at length by Prof. Smal-Stocki, an authority on the enslaved nations of the USSR.

Before setting out on his religious expedition, Father Ciszek went to Lviv (Lemberg), the capital of "liberated" Western Ukraine, to report to famed Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan Andriy Count Sheptytsky and to ask his blessings for his mission into Russia. Consulting the Metropolitan was natural enough, for the latter had received special authority from the Pope to oversee Catholic matters in the Soviet Union. (Because of their antipathy to religion the Soviet secret police were quick to view the venerable churchman as the head of a spy ring operating in the USSR.)

The Metropolitan was "not happy with the names we had chosen" (p. 21), warned Father Ciszek and friends to be careful, and then:

As a final safeguard, the Archbishop tore a page from a book, tore it in half again, then gave us half and kept the other half himself. If we sent anyone to him with a message, he told us, or especially if we sent any candidates for the seminary to him from the Urals, we were to send along a piece of that page so it could be matched against the half sheet by the Archbishop to prove that the man or message had indeed come from us.

Thus, it is important to note in passing, the Metropolitan did not anticipate his impending "accidental" death, for he integrated this Jesuit mission into his plans and dreamed even of educating seminarians from Russia.

Father Ciszek and his friends then left for the Ural forests and their work of devotion. Serving as a simple laborer and then as a truck driver in the Teplaya-Gora lumber camp, Father Ciszek at once became aware of the Captive Nations problem. The other workers, Ukrainians and White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), had been exiles since 1937. Later, in Chasovoy, he met Poles, Jews, and people of other nationalities. When the war with Germany broke out all the workers were drilled as soldiers for the Leningrad front. And it was at this moment that the NKVD, undoubtedly having kept him under surveillance, surrounded his barrack and arrested him and his companion Nestrov as German spies.

Now the time of travail began for Father Ciszek. He was "interrogated" in Russian prisons from Chasovoy to Perm, and he soon learned that his identity was no secret: American born, Jesuit, Vatican-educated.

Step by step now followed the inhuman methods of the NKVD designed to break down any victim: an unrelenting series of interrogations, often lasting the whole day and then, after continual threats, torture:

Sometimes I'd have to sit bolt upright on the edge of the chair for hour after hour... Sometimes, if the interrogator didn't like an answer, he'd give me a blow in the face that would send me sprawling on the floor... The interrogator

summoned a pair of guards and led me into an adjoining room with thick carpets on the floor and heavily padded walls. There I would be worked over with rubber clubs on the back of the head and when I'd try to drop my head, I'd get a smashing blow to the face... Several times, too, instead of being brought back to the large cell, I was put in a small, black room, like a box, so pitch dark I literally could not see my hand in front of my face, and stifling hot, I might be there one hour or overnight... At the background of all these tortures is the experience that nightly some prisoners were called up to be shot...

As a "spy" Father Ciszek was given top priority by the NKVD; he was transferred to the dread Lubyanka prison in Moscow, even during the battle for Moscow. The strong possibility of Moscow's evacuation then forced the NKVD to shunt its prisoner to a Saratov jail, where he came up against the NKVD technique of planting informers and provocateurs among the prisoners. After being subjected to the efforts of a whole group of interrogators, he was brought back to Moscow once the German drive on the city had been checked.

Now began his "most intensive period of interrogation," (p. 67) wherein he got to know Soviet hypocrisy and terror at its worst. Because he mentioned that in Perm physical force had been used during interrogation, the interrogator from Perm was immediately summoned to Moscow and confronted with his victim "because we are not allowed to use American third degree methods in the USSR!" (p. 69). "During the next three months, Sedov (the interrogator) dwelt especially on my relationships with Archbishop Sheptycki (Sheptytsky) and the mission I had received from him" (p. 71). Father Ciszek and Sheptytsky gradually became the center of the investigation. "The worst part of the whole three months came when Sedov went through my wallet and discovered the torn book page Metropolitan Sheptycki had given me" (p. 72). There followed endless questions about everything pertaining to the activities and life of the Metropolitan, Rome, the Pope, and the Jesuits...

One night at 2 A.M. a guard woke Father Ciszek and brought him to Sedov's office. To his surprise he was offered sandwiches and hot tea.

A little treat for breaking up your sleep... "Here, have some tea." Sedov said, dropping in a big lump of sugar. "Drink it while it's hot"... I finished about half the glass... then felt my jaws getting tight, my hand falling to the desk... I slipped back into the chair... When I came to again I was on my feet. Someone was holding me, and there was a tight-fitting apparatus of some sort, almost like a football helmet, on my head... Sedov was holding my head and pulling at my eyelids, looking into my eyes. He was staring intently and his eyes blazed like evil incarnate. That was my impression—of something almost diabolic, certainly inhuman... Then I blacked out... after that... someone jerking at my neck with rubber cords, so that quick, sharp shocks ran down my back and stung my neck. Someone was also jerking at my wrists, and shocks were running up my arms. Then I remember being at a table, propped up. Sedov

was shouting at me loudly, shaking my face... He put a pen into my hand at one point and moved it. What I was doing with it, I don't know. Perhaps I was signing a paper on the desk, but I just can't remember. I woke up again, and was given more pills and a drink of water... Other interrogators came up to me, shaking their heads and laughing... Finally, I was taken to a box. I sat down and huddled into a corner. When I opened my eyes, everything seemed to be falling on me, the walls and ceiling pressing in. Everything was burning, fiery red. I wiped my eyes, but the fiery red persisted in the tumbling walls. I was terrified. I threw my arms across my head and yelled; I remember shouting and shouting. I felt menaced, attacked; I huddled deeper into the corner. Then I fell asleep... Finally, a guard brought me back to my cell. (pp. 76-78)

Such was the climax of the Russian Communist methods which Father Cizek survived, the climax of the centuries-long traditions of the Muscovite *oprichniki* of Ivan the Terrible and their Communist successors.

Several weeks later Father Cizek was brought—again at 2 A.M.—to a detention box. A commissar and the chief of the prison, both intoxicated, handed him a paper which proclaimed an “administrative sentence” for subversive activities—fifteen years at hard labor, July 26, 1942! But for the next three years he was still kept for “supplementary information” in the Lubianka and Butirka prisons. In the latter prison he met his companion Nestrov, who had also received a sentence of fifteen years.

Father Cizek was offered a Russian parish if he would break with the Pope (p. 85), because “the Pope is on the side of the Fascists.” Another time there was talk of going to Rome “to arrange a concordat between the Pope and the Soviet Union” (p. 85); an aide of Beria apparently thought of using Father Cizek as a “witness” for the Katyn massacre. But the valiant priest remained unbroken. He wrote petitions to Stalin, insisting that the American Embassy be informed of his fate. (There was never any reply.) And once an interrogator said to him “with an unbelieving shake of his head and a deep sigh, ‘I don't know how you are still alive.’” (p. 86).

It is to be noted here that thousands of political prisoners, including Christian priests, went through this Russian Communist hell of the NKVD—and did not survive.

Yet another survivor is His Eminence Joseph Cardinal Slipy, who is the successor of Metropolitan Sheptytsky and who now is in Rome. The chief editor of the *Saturday Review*, Norman Cousins, acted as middleman between Washington and Khrushchev in the release of Metropolitan Slipy after 18 years of prison camps in Siberia. In the *Saturday Review* of November 7, 1964, Cousins wrote:

He (Khrushchev) spoke about Bishop Slipy's predecessor, Metropolitan Sheptytsky, who died, the Chairman (Khrushchev) said, under circumstances

that suggested his departure from this earth may have been unnaturally accelerated, although he did not say by whom.

There can be little doubt that the NKVD murdered the Metropolitan; it charged him with being the chief "spy" and mastermind of the Vatican in the Soviet Union. These charges were still being aired last year (No. 7 issue of *Vitchyzna*, organ of the Union of Ukrainian Writers).

## II

In June 1946 Father Ciszek was transferred to the Siberian slave camps of Norilsk. He was a coal-loader in Dudinka, worked a year in the Arctic mines, then was a construction laborer and a hospital aide in Norilsk.

Here again in the camps he met up with the whole nationality problem of the Soviet Union—the Captive Nations. He worked with Lithuanians, Caucasians, Poles, Latvians, Jews, Estonians, Tartars, etc. All these ethnic groups desperately kept their own national language and identity, forming a common front against the Russian oppressors. "The Baltic peoples, the Poles, and the Ukrainians were the work horses of the camp, the backbone of construction work" he writes (p. 167).

He also met another imprisoned priest:

Here, for the first time, I met a priest I hadn't seen since 1941. He had been told I was in camp, so he came looking for me from group to group... I asked him who he was. 'I'm Father Viktor,' he said. 'Don't you remember me?' 'No,' I said. 'Remember the day you came to Archbishop Shepticki in Lviv? I was the one who met you at the door and let you out afterwards.' Father Viktor asked what happened to me, what camp I'd been in, and how I was. He went on to tell me how he himself had been arrested, and how the officials in Lviv had been afraid to move against the Archbishop (Sheptytsky) for fear of the people. He told me I was the ninth priest in Camp 4... There were two Polish Catholic priests, three Lithuanian Catholic priests, one Latvian and now me. I told him about Father Casper (another Pole) who had come, too. He asked if we had said Mass. I told him about the arrangements in Camp 5. Viktor told me they all said Mass regularly in Camp 4 and assured me he would make arrangements to supply Father Casper and me with whatever we needed to celebrate Mass."

One is deeply moved to read how this Ukrainian priest, apparently a close collaborator of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, kept the flag of Christ flying in the Siberian camps, how all the priests therein served as real pastors of their flocks and how, conspiratorially, one helped another in administering the religious needs of the unhappy exiles with spiritual consolation, Holy Masses, confessions and Holy Communion:



The first night, Father Viktor came to see me (in the hospital) and brought with him everything I needed to say Mass. He gave me a written copy of the Oriental liturgy, a little metal chalice, paten and all, in a small portable box, and he even had real Mass wine and altar breads. When all the orderlies and doctors had finished, long after midnight, Misha (another seminarian from the Russicum in Rome) stepped out of his office and beckoned me in. There I said Mass, Misha assisting. Every night after that, with rare exceptions, I said Mass in the medical center. On holidays, as well as on Sundays, one or two of the doctors would also attend my Mass. Several of them also went to confession and Communion regularly.

Father Viktor was a little fellow, stocky, with chestnut hair, a pointed chin, thin nose and glasses... He worked at the factory site as head of a crew which measured the temperature of the poured concrete... Viktor had friends galore, both among the workers and the camp officials, so he was hardly ever assigned to work at hard labor. Consequently, he had time to do a tremendous amount of spiritual work. He was always on the go, visiting the sick and hearing confessions. His little shack at the construction site was an ideal location for hearing confessions during the day, or giving guidance and counseling to one or two of the prisoners (pp. 173-174).

In January of 1953 rumors reached the camp that Stalin was dead, and as a result the constant unrest in the camp attained a pitch of turbulence. When in March Stalin's death was announced over the camp loudspeakers, two brigades of "Ukrainian tough partisans, the 'Banderovcy,' who hated the Russians," openly rebelled. They formed a revolt Committee and presented specific demands to the administration, which in turn called in convoys of troops. Finally General Zveriev himself appeared. The two brigades of "Banderovcy" were trapped and subdued with gun butts. But soon the whole camp rose up and formed a Revolutionary Committee which demanded an investigative commission to be sent from Moscow and general improvement of living conditions. The whole description of this revolt in which all nationalities participated (pp. 177-199) is a very valuable report by a living witness on the continuous struggle of the Captive Nations against Russian imperialism and colonialism.

### III

In the meantime Father Ciszek's term finally ran out. With the help of a Lithuanian doctor he gained a limited freedom, working as a laboratory assistant, later as a garage mechanic in Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Abakan. But at the same time, whenever and wherever it was possible, he served as a priest. So did his Ukrainian friend, Father Viktor, who had completed his sentence four months earlier.

At this time Norilsk was a kind of boom town, at night a dangerous place with robberies, thefts, and murders almost common-

place. Father Ciszek gives a most interesting picture of Ukrainian life in this Siberian exile and is full of praise for their organizational faculties:

So the Ukrainians formed their own "militia." Every night, three or four men patrolled the worst places and trouble spots around the old camp...

The Ukrainians were organized in other ways, too. They were almost militantly religious. In fact, they clung to religion tenaciously, as a part of their national heritage and tradition. Out in their camp, they held huge weddings and christenings, openly religious. And when one of their leaders died, they organized a mammoth funeral—with a choir of more than 200 and a big cross with flowers and crepe to lead the funeral procession.

From the camps, they walked right through the main streets of the town on the way to the cemetery, singing *Sviaty Bozhe* (Holy God) at the top of their lungs. The cortege walked straight down Octobrskaya, stopping traffic, with the cross and choir leading the procession ... then the men bearing the coffin on their shoulders, followed by huge crowds of mourners. The people on the sidewalks of Octobrskaya, the main boulevard, were astounded at such a big religious demonstration. Some of them crossed themselves as the coffin passed.

At the cemetery, the Ukrainians chanted the full burial ceremony; then they returned in procession to the dead man's home to eat a ceremonial meal and pay their traditional respects. Afterward, there was quite an investigation by the KGB to find out who had organized the whole thing. Father Viktor was called out several times, since he was known to work among the Ukrainians. He was severely cross-examined and threatened by the KGB for what they considered his "subversive activities" and "agitating."

In 1957 the KGB (successor of the NKVD) started to investigate the activities of Father Ciszek, calling him in and giving him a "last warning." Father Viktor and his Ukrainian priest companion, Father Neron, also received "final warnings" to stop "unwarranted activities." Thus one night the three sat around and discussed their future:

At length, quite reluctantly, I agreed that it might be better for Neron and Viktor to leave Norilsk and go to Ukraine. Many of our Ukrainian "parishioners" had already gone home and it was obvious from their letters the need was almost equally great there as it was here in Siberia. Viktor and Neron felt it would make more sense for them to return and be of service to the faithful in Ukraine, than to be hampered or even arrested here out of sheer bravado.

Father Ciszek inherited not only Viktor's chapel, but his congregation as well. But soon this great adventurous mission, blessed by the servant of God, Metropolitan Sheptytsky, came to an end, for the sisters of Father Ciszek established contact with him by letters, and our Embassy thus discovered an American citizen in Siberia...

#### IV

From the scholarly point of view, the editing of the book for Americans is not on a proper level.

First, there is a lack of footnotes providing the necessary perspective for Father Ciszek's mission and the personalities he met.

Not a single word explains the stature of Metropolitan Sheptytsky. Yet Sheptytsky is not only one of the great personalities of modern Ukrainian history, but of the Catholic Church in Europe. He visited the United States twice, and finally achieved in Rome the creation of a bishopric for the Catholic Ukrainians in Philadelphia, Pa. (which has already been elevated to a Metropolitanate with two dioceses: Stamford, Connecticut, and Chicago, Illinois). During World War I, he was the famous prisoner of the Czar near Kursk, and had received special authority from the Pope to oversee spiritually the Byeloruthenians (Byelorussians), Russians and Ukrainians, then under the Russian Czarist regime. Before World War I, he had visited Russia incognito and befriended the Russian philosopher, Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900).

Metropolitan Sheptytsky was not only universally respected as a theologian, scholar and one of the organizers of the Unionistic Congresses at Velehrad, Czechoslovakia, but he was also admired by the Orthodox of Poland for his courageous defense of their Churches against the brutal actions of the Polish Government. His role as a protector of the Jews during Hitler's occupation of Lviv and Western Ukraine is on record. He also consecrated as his successor, Joseph Cardinal Slipy. Metropolitan Sheptytsky is presently in the process of beatification.

Even the Jesuit General Count Ledochowski did not get a footnote; perhaps the American Jesuits themselves do not know his background. Originally bearing the Ukrainian name of Halka, the family of the Counts Ledochowskis accepted their present name at the end of the 18th century. They were *boyars* of Viking (Norman) origin of the Grand Duke Volodymyr in Kiev and were originally Orthodox. One of them, according to their family legend, participated in the mission to Constantinople before the official acceptance of Christianity by Rus-Ukraine. From this family the Polish Cardinal Ledochowski descended, who, during the *Kulturkampf* in Prussia, was imprisoned by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.

Next, an explanatory footnote for Americans is needed to explain the overwhelming majority of non-Russians in the forced labor camps. A couple of sentences at least to present the nationality problem to the reader, a couple of sentences on the Captive Nations Resolution of our Congress. And who are the "Banderovey," where did their name come from? Stepan Bandera, Ukrainian freedom fighter, was murdered by an agent of the KGB in Munich, Germany five years ago with the most modern "achievement" of Russian Communist civi-

lization: a pistol discharging cyanide, leaving its victim dead of an apparent heart attack.

Second, there are many mistakes in the transcriptions or spellings of Russian and Ukrainian words in the book. It shouldn't be "Katerzani" but "Katorzhani" (p. 200); not "polozenie pasporta" but "polozhenie pasporta" (p. 216); not Lats but Latvians (p. 112); not (street name) Tarassa Schevichenko but Tarasa Shevchenko (in Abakan, Siberia); not "Valogda" but "Valodia" (p. 224); not "Vashya" but "Vasia" (p. 172); not "Banderovcy" but "Banderivtsy" (p. 188). But the worst offender: a Ukrainian-Russian "*otaman*" (chief) is spelled "Ottoman," thereby providing an opportunity for Americans to erroneously identify one with the Turks (Ottaman).

## V

Summing up, this book of a saintly Jesuit priest and hero is an extraordinary document of personal courage and a matchless dedication to the cause of Christ. It will serve as a primary source for the study of the Russian Communist Neanderthal regime—for the study of its persecutions of human freedom and dignity and of the terroristic methods which Russian imperialism uses to rule over the Captive Nations.

The book is convincing proof of the wisdom of our Congress, which in the Captive Nations Resolution put itself on record as supporting the old but imperishable ideas of the American Declaration of Independence and Wilson's principle of self-determination for all Captive Nations of the Soviet Union, the victims of Russian barbarian imperialism.

The book should be used by the USIA for all libraries in the free world; a copy should be found in every college library.

Because through this book the Captive Nations appeal to the conscience of the free world, the book merits translation into the languages of all civilized nations.

## **THE NEW SOVIET REGIME AFTER SIX MONTHS**

*By* CLARENCE A. MANNING

It is now almost six months since Nikita Khrushchev was unceremoniously ousted by the Presidium and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from his posts as First Secretary of the Party and Prime Minister of the Soviet government. It was widely believed at the time that this was really a palace revolution made by men who owed in large part their positions to him but who had nevertheless decided to oust him for the sake of their own advancement. Those who really profited from it were the new First Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, and the new Prime Minister, Aleksey Kosygin, with some of their special favorites and proteges.

At the time of the coup the new regime gave no satisfactory explanations for it. They only spoke vaguely about the unreliable character of Khrushchev, his autocratic methods of dealing with problems and personalities and a deterioration of his health. It might almost be summed up in a statement that Khrushchev like his predecessor Stalin had commenced to foster a "cult of personality" whereby he had taken credit not only for unmasking the old tyrant but had claimed credit for many of the important actions during Stalin's last years for which he had never been duly appreciated. There were vague statements that the new regime was going to manifest collective leadership and that in the near future all would be well.

After six months, what does the situation seem to be? During this period Khrushchev's name has hardly appeared in print and he has passed into an oblivion as deep as that which engulfed the so-called "anti-party" group of Molotov, Bulganin, Malenkov and Kaganovich who had earlier attempted to remove him. There are the vaguest remarks as to where the deposed prime minister now is residing, although the impression has been given out that he is not in confinement but if he has been seen by any of the foreign colony in Moscow, no one has mentioned it. For all intents and purposes Khrushchev has passed from public view and if his fall has been noted by any of his known main enemies, they have so far not profited by any rehabilitation, even if only partial. [Since the article went to print, Mr. Khrushchev made a public appearance during a local "election" in Moscow; he also was credited with giving an interview to a French

newspaperman, which was promptly denied by the Soviet government—Ed.]

It may be worth while therefore to look at some of the developments both internal and external and try to see what was involved other than mere personal ambitions and intrigues.

A very considerable number of high officials who had been appointed by Khrushchev have been removed and in some cases those men whom they replaced have been called back to their former posts. Thus we may mention the fact that Marshal Zhukov, who was generally recognized as the ablest Soviet army commander in World War II, has once again appeared modestly in the news as signing the death notice of one of his former subordinates. But this is no new experience for Zhukov. He early attracted the jealousy of Stalin and was rewarded with more and more obscure posts from which he emerged after Stalin's death, perhaps to foil the intrigues of Beria. Then he enjoyed a period of relative honor during which he was able to intervene and back Khrushchev in his fight against the anti-party group, only to be summarily relegated to obscurity by Khrushchev, when he was sent on a mission to Yugoslavia and found himself deposed on his return to Moscow. Is his new emergence a sign of a new sense of fairness or is he because of his military knowledge and experience slated for some important post in new actions which the present leaders are preparing?

Another protege of both Stalin and Khrushchev to feel the official disapproval is the stormy petrel of Soviet biology, Trofim Lysenko. He has been removed from his post and strong support is being given to those biologists who have long resisted Lysenko's unorthodox theories of genetics. This does represent apparently a victory for sanity and science.

In the same way the new regime has undone many of Khrushchev's reforms in the organization of the Soviet Union. One early casualty was the late leader's attempt to separate almost completely agriculture and industry by creating two Union-wide branches in all spheres of government. Side by side with this the importance of Khrushchev's regional divisions has been reduced and his decentralizing schemes have largely foundered. This has been shown by the recreation of many ministries of production which had been completely abolished in favor of regional councils and the new men have gone even further in creating what is apparently a central ministry for the development of improved weapons although it is camouflaged as a general machine development. This is obviously a move to strengthen the party control from the centre over many sectors

of Soviet life, for this could not have been exercised so satisfactorily in a decentralized administration.

On the other hand, in his latest phase Khrushchev advocated giving more responsibility to the managers of the different factories in the regulation of their production schedules coupled with an insistence that the factories show a profitable management with some attention to adapting their products particularly in consumer goods to the needs and desires of the population who are to buy them. This process has been liberalized and broadened under the new regime in a way similar to that in which Stalin discredited his rivals and once he had crushed them, he adopted many times in a somewhat changed form the ideas for which they had been opposing him.

What seems a more doubtful and potentially dangerous procedure which is occurring with ominous frequency is the toleration of attacks by African and Asian students with Soviet connivance and the neutrality of the Moscow authorities on the American and other embassies and installations of the West. Stalin, whatever his virtues or vices, kept these at a minimum for he was too well aware of the disastrous results of a mob out of hand, turning not against its avowed object but against something else. Khrushchev barely allowed it but Brezhnev and Kosygin seem to believe that all that is needed to wipe out any bad impression are a few crocodile tears and a mealy mouthed apology. That they are sometimes wrong may be judged by the fact that they were roundly condemned by the Chinese Communists for using violent means finally to suppress the last attack on the American Embassy after they had allowed it to continue unstopped for some time.

In the field of literature and the arts, there came a slight thaw immediately after the new regime assumed office. Yet we may well wonder whether even this is permanent or merely a looser interpretation of the term "socialist realism." At a recent conference of Russian writers, Sholokhov, one of the ablest of the Russian literary men, proclaimed again the necessity for a strict control of literature and the impossibility of granting unlimited freedom to writers in view of their national importance as teachers of the people and human engineers, while as yet we know little about the personal tastes of the new leaders.

So far as we can tell by their appearances both Brezhnev and Kosygin are colorless, if efficient, men. They have none of that ebullient and extroversion that characterized Nikita at every turn, none of that peasant boorishness and cunning that expressed itself in his often tasteless and almost indecent use of peasant mottoes and language. They seem to be typical bureaucrats but perhaps they

are still sparring with each other in the hope of finding a weak point in his opponent's guard.

To a very large extent they are hiding the relations between the government and the party. This was certainly true for many years of the early period of Stalin's rule, where even the Soviet diplomats had on their staffs trained intriguers and Communist activists, while they themselves maintained a real or assumed ignorance of all undercover Soviet operations in a given country. This has been marked in addition by the fact that Kosygin visited Peking, North Vietnam and North Korea alone with a staff drawn largely from Army and Air Force circles. Later he went to East Germany and he was not on hand to meet the representatives of the various Communist Parties which were gathering in Moscow for the latest conference. Apparently that task was left to Brezhnev as the head of the Party at the present time. Yet as experience has shown, this kind of cooperation is difficult to carry on and there is a tremendous pressure on an ambitious man to try to place himself, if only for the sake of security in a strong position in both the bureaucracy of the Party and that of the government. In the early days of his position First Secretary Khrushchev accompanied Bulganin on all his important trips so as to assert the authority of the Party and this made it obvious that Khrushchev was aiming at the control of both bureaucracies but so far there has been no substantial clue to the balance of power in the present regime and it is very possible that some of the other members of the Central Committee have hopes for themselves. The one thing of which we can be tolerably sure is that Mikoyan does not have any hope or desire for a foremost position of power but that he will always be as he has been, a very clever and versatile man who can go through the Soviet jungle without arousing hostility that threatens his own position.

Everything seems to indicate that internally apart from the elimination of some of Khrushchev's enthusiastic reforms and the dropping of his most subservient flatterers, little has changed, although there will be a rewriting of history to reduce his newly inflated participation in the events of his lifetime. What of the external situation?

Here everything is much more unclear. The new regime immediately proclaimed that it was continuing Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless peaceful coexistence in its Soviet form is scarcely clear to the average American. In ordinary language it means that two countries are to have normal peaceful relations and it is so accepted in broad circles of the United States. But to the Soviet leaders it has a very different meaning. There its sense



is that there will be no war between capitalistic and Communistic states but this does not prevent the right of the Communists to infiltrate and overthrow even by force of arms any non-Communist government, while at the same time the capitalistic free states are debarred from any action by force or propaganda to break the unity of the Communist world and return any section, even one seized by force, to a free non-Communist regime. Thus the landing of missiles in Cuba and the support of attacks on the Venezuelan government were justified by peaceful coexistence, since Castro had proclaimed himself a Communist and President Betancourt was an anti-Communist. The crisis ended with an assumed removal of the missiles but it involved the tacit acceptance by Washington of a Communist regime in Cuba. The same situation prevails in North Vietnam which is protected as a part of the Communist world, while it has the right under peaceful coexistence to send its armed forces into South Vietnam. Obviously the only question is the advantage of an escalation of the war by the Communists and that is a matter only for them to decide.

The solution to this is entangled in the relations of the Soviet Union and Communist China. In his time Stalin was the unchallenged leader of the Communist camp. Throughout his entire career, he looked down upon the Chinese Communists, because they did not rise to power by his methods and under his advice. When Stalin died, Mao Tse-tung believed that he was entitled to become the next unchallenged leader based upon the number of members in the Chinese Communist Party and his own years of leadership. This was challenged by Khrushchev and the Kremlin.

This challenge took the form of a downgrading of Stalin, a denunciation of his "cult of personality," and the declaration that he was an almost insane sadist, condemning good Communists for alleged crimes as enemies of the people. Part of this was true but since Khrushchev was one of his most zealous aides, it was hard to believe that he was as innocent as he claimed. It further visualized the elevation of Lenin still higher, a restudy of the ideas of Lenin and the claim that Lenin also believed in peaceful coexistence.

The Chinese answered by calling this revisionism, a serious crime in the Communist code. They decried peaceful coexistence, repeated their threats to conquer Taiwan and continually threatened the United States, especially over the offshore islands near Amoy held by the Taiwan government, even though the United States exerted great influence to keep the non-Communist Chinese from making extensive inroads on the mainland, even when these might have

brought great profit. Yet it is to be noted that the Red Chinese also did not risk an open war.

Apparently in this situation Khrushchev saw the possibility of dealing his enemies a blow and demanded the calling of a conference finally to end the ideological struggle which was increasing steadily in bitterness. Peking refused to have anything to do with this and there seems to be evidence that Khrushchev was willing in case of continued Chinese opposition even to read them out of the Party. This was too strong medicine for many of the Soviet Central Committee and the coup that dropped Khrushchev was the result.

The new leaders seem to have made an effort to restore harmony in the Communist camp. They downgraded and postponed the proposed conference called by Khrushchev. A high Chinese delegation appeared in Moscow and for a time it seemed as if they were successful.

Yet it is very obvious that if Khrushchev's claim to leadership was disputed, the Chinese, following Mao who is approximately the age of Khrushchev, would be even more unwilling to recognize the position of Brezhnev and Kosygin who are ten years younger and were mere children at the time of the October Revolution. As a result, the denunciations by the Chinese have again increased in bitterness and they have made it clear that they regard the new leaders as tarred with Khrushchev's pitch. Even Kosygin on his recent visit to Peking was received correctly but not warmly and with the full display of Communist pageantry. It is now very evident that they are not willing to accord the men in the Kremlin a position any higher than they do of Sukarno of Indonesia, an attitude that the Kremlin is hesitating to accept.

The Chinese declined to attend a conference called by the Kremlin, and so did the Rumanians, who have been tending to move nearer to China in order to loosen their bonds with Moscow. The Yugoslavs were not even invited, because they were the chief targets of Communist China in the early stages of the controversy. Other Asian countries also declined and some of the Western Communist Parties attended only with severe misgivings and at the last moment. Every day it went on, Peking delivered violent accusations at the Kremlin and accused it of endeavoring to make peace with the American imperialists by betraying the Communist cause. The final communique merely indicated the need for a larger conference meeting after prolonged preparation in an endeavor to solve the ideological questions involved. When that conference can meet is highly uncertain.

In the meantime Peking has not been idle in other fields, especially in Asia and Africa, in both of which continents it has found welcome ground for its attacks on Moscow as a white country hostile to the non-white races. It has been able to bar Moscow from an Asian-African Conference and it has exploited Moscow's failure to secure a preponderant position in many of the undeveloped countries of Africa, where the Kremlin at first built high hopes as Guinea.

In the United Nations, where Moscow for years apparently sought to seat Red China, that country has more or less disavowed a desire for membership until it has been reconstructed on Chinese terms, and China has welcomed Sukarno's withdrawal of Indonesia from the organization. This has been another defeat for the Kremlin, since it had poured consistently many million dollars into the arming of Indonesia to checkmate the West. To cite but a few other examples, the pro-Chinese Communists had succeeded in securing practical control of the Communist Party in India particularly in the southern state of Kerala, where Communism has been strongest and this despite the wave of repulsion that swept India when it was attacked in the north by the Red Chinese. In Africa the Chinese seem to have secured almost a stifling grip on the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville, formerly the French Congo), a strong position in Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar) and until they were expelled, in the smaller state of Burundi which gave easy access to the rebels in the Congo (Leopoldville). Chinese arms and advisers have appeared in many others states and it is no longer possible for Moscow to pretend that these Communist groups are only splinter groups in the mass parties which are loyal to Moscow. At the same time, so far as we can judge, Peking cannot give its proteges the advanced arms or supplies on the same scale as Moscow and its chief propaganda slogan must be the opposition to imperialist America and the charge that Moscow is selling out Communism on behalf of peaceful coexistence (in the Western sense).

If Moscow does not refute this charge or if it fails to give adequate support to those Asiatic and African countries which it has encouraged to start "wars of liberation" in the name of peaceful coexistence it will lose steadily its influence in those parts of the world, and so it is stepping up its attacks on the United States, renewing its charges of aggression and claiming that the United States is endangering peaceful coexistence by supporting anti-Communist movements that are still fighting for their national independence. At the same time it is wooing American and Western capitalists in the name of peaceful coexistence and urging the removal of all restrictions on the sale to Moscow and its satellites of materials that

will strengthen their military potential. It is the same device that Lenin used in the New Economic Policy, when far too many statesmen and business men believed that he was returning the Soviet state to normal lines and they were all too willing to assist him. We find the same feeling today when many reputable and respected leaders in Congress and out are urging toleration on the assurance that the Kremlin really wants to reduce tension and they protest against all statements to the effect that Moscow is playing its own game, that has been planned to weaken the free world.

It was in pursuance of this policy that Kosygin made his trip to both North Vietnam and North Korea and on his return he noted that both states had agreed to cooperate more closely with the Soviet Union and he broadly hinted that both states would receive more Soviet assistance for the purpose of strengthening their liberating role. In other words, after trying to placate Peking unsuccessfully, Moscow is going to interfere more vigorously, while still hoping that by one device or another it can force the United States out of both Asia and Africa. In that effort we can be sure that any Communist support of the United Nations will be withdrawn at whatever moment it seems advisable and the United States should watch carefully to see what state or states will follow Indonesia. There has long been a dream in Moscow of remodelling the United Nations to increase Communist power and to use it for its own purposes. If Moscow can do it without having to bow to China, it will try but we cannot be sure but that as in the time of the Mongols it will not prefer to seek Asian support rather than European, if Europe maintains those principles of freedom under which it has developed.

With this program favored in the Kremlin, the United States and the free world must close their ears to the siren songs of a relief of tensions and an increase of friendly contacts, continue their policy of supporting freedom throughout the world and not waste valuable energy and money in trying to support governments like that of Egypt and Indonesia which are pledged to the destruction of freedom. They should rather support those Arab, African and Asian states which are resolute in their opposition to the Communist allurements and refuse any support to any state, satellite or one in the prison of nations until they can deal with a free regime. The more the Kremlin ties itself to the apron strings of Red China, the greater will be the internal tensions in the USSR and the sooner will the sun of liberty arise. When that does and Mao passes, it is doubtful if even Chinese Communism can stand against a renewed stream of liberty and freedom.

## UKRAINIAN KOZAKS AND THE VATICAN IN 1594\*

By LUBOMYR R. WYNAR

In the last decade of the XVIth century the Austrian Habsburgs and the Vatican state developed a plan for a great international coalition directed against the Ottoman Empire. In this alliance of western and eastern European states the Ukrainian Kozaks were intended to play an important role. The mission to Ukraine of the Austrian nobleman, Erich Lassota, the envoy of Emperor Rudolph II, and of the papal legate Alexander Comulovich (Don Alessandro Comoli), a Croatian priest, clearly shows the interest of the European powers in the Kozaks' military potential.<sup>1</sup>

The international situation at the end of the XVIth century had become unusually tense. During the reign of Sultan Selim II (1566-1574) Turkey had extended its dominion over Cyprus as a result of its victory in the three year war with Venice (1570-1573). It is true that in the sea battle at Lepanto (1571) the Turkish fleet was defeated by the Holy League, which was organized on the initiative of Pope Pius V, but this extensive victory was only of temporary importance. While the European forces were being weakened by internal conflicts, especially between Venice and Spain, the Turks quickly rebuilt their fleet.

By 1590 the Turkish-Persian war (1577-1589) had ended to the advantage of Sultan Murad II (1574-1595), who extended the Turkish dominion to Georgia, Azerbaijan and other lands in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea. Now the Sultan directed his attention to the Eu-

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<sup>1</sup> On Comulovich's mission, see the following works: Mych. Antonovych, "Studii z chasiv Nalyvaika," *Pratsi Ukraïnskoho Istorychno-Filolohichnoho T-va v Prazi*, IV (1942) 32-115; E. Barvinsky, "Prychynky do istorii znosyn tsisaria Rudolfa II i papy Klymentyia VIII z kozakamy r. 1593 i 1594," *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva Shevchenka*, X (1896) 1-34; Euzelije Fermendzin, "Prilozi k poznavanju diplomatskohoga poslanstva Aleksandra Komulovica medju slavene od godine 1593. do 1597.," *Starine*, XXXVI (1918) 7-30; L. Wynar, "Kozatski zviasky z Avstriu i Vatykanom v 1593-1595 rokakh," *Na Slidakh*, No. 4 (1956) 17-23; and in *Muzeyni Visti*, No. 1-2 (1957) 15-20.

ropean continent and, in particular, to the Austro-Hungarian territories. Although military action had broken out earlier, the Austro-Turkish war was officially declared in 1593.<sup>2</sup>

During the time that Pope Clement VIII (the former Cardinal Ippolito Aldobrandini) occupied the papal throne (1592), the conception of a new crusade against the Turks arose in Vatican circles. Its chief promoter was Alexander Comulovich, the papal legate. Similar endeavors which had previously been made by the Ukrainian Kozaks to organize an anti-Turkish campaign through the papal nuncio in Poland had met with no response.<sup>3</sup> Comulovich planned to realize this anti-Turkish league primarily through the support of the Slavic nations in the Balkans (Serbia, Moldavia and Bulgaria) <sup>4</sup> which were under Turkish domination and were ready to revolt at the first opportunity, as well as that of Albania, noted for its virulent anti-Turkish sentiments. He proposed to include Transylvania, Wallachia, Poland, Muscovy and the Ukrainian Kozaks in the league. At the same time the Holy See was in contact with Persia. The Ukrainian Kozaks were to cooperate with the Transylvanian, Wallachian and Moldavian armies, all of which were to be led by Cardinal Andrew Batory of Transylvania. The Papal legate Cardinal Francisko Sforza was to head an army from the west, which was to march across Albania, through the Balkans and on to Constantinople, where both forces would meet. Comulovich <sup>5</sup> presented his detailed plan to Clement VIII at the beginning of 1593.<sup>6</sup>

The Pope's *instruptione* which Alexander Comulovich received regarding his mission to the different states, as well as his own special reports and correspondence concerning his travels, are important sources for understanding the attitude of the Vatican toward

<sup>2</sup> Important documents on this phase of the Austro-Turkish war are to be found in: *Monumenta Spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium*, ed. Acad. Scientiarum et Artium Slavorum Meridionalium. (Zagrabiae, 1884), v. decimum quintum. (15)

<sup>3</sup> Previous endeavors in organizing an anti-Turkish campaign are discussed in Oskar Halecki, *From Florence to Brest (1439-1596)* (*Sacrum Poloniae Millennium*, Roma, 1958) 203-204, 255-256; and, L. Boratynski, "Kozacy i Watykan," *Przegląd Polski* (Kraków, 1906) 20-40.

<sup>4</sup> Recently discussed in G. E. Rothenberg, "Christian Insurrections in Turkish Dalmatia, 1580-1596," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, XL (1961) No. 94, 136-147.

<sup>5</sup> For more information about Comulovich see: M. Vanine, "Alexander Komulovic (1548-1608)," reprint from *Napredak* (Sarajevo, 1908); and, P. Pierling, *La Russie et le Saint-Siege*, II (Paris, 1897) 329-360.

<sup>6</sup> K. Horvat, ed., "Monumenta historica nova: historiam Bosnae et vicinarum provinciarum illustrantia," *Glasnik zemaljskoga Muzeja v Bosni i Herzegovini*, (Sarajevo, 1908) XXI, No. 20, 14-16.

the eastern European states.<sup>7</sup> In addition to these instructions, Comulovich also received letters of recommendation to Andrew Batory, to the Moldavian Hospodar Aaron,<sup>8</sup> to the Wallachian Hospodar Michael the Brave,<sup>9</sup> and to the Kozak *Hetman* and the Kozak host,<sup>10</sup> his itinerary thereby including all the states from which the Vatican hoped to obtain assistance.

Comulovich journeyed from Vienna to Transylvania, where in February of 1594 he stayed at the court of Sigismund Batory in Alba Longa. He then traveled to Moldavia, which was ruled by Aaron, avoiding Turkish-controlled Wallachia, and on to Ukraine.

In Transylvania Sigismund Batory, who enjoyed cordial relations with Rudolph II, immediately indicated his willingness to join the anti-Turkish league. Comulovich's papal instructions directed him to obtain in Transylvania more thorough information about the Kozaks in relation to the league: "...mainly, does it seem to them (in Transylvania—L. W.) that the Kozaks can inflict serious injury upon the enemy, and would they be glad if the Kozaks did this, or would the movements of the Kozaks give them an excuse that they cannot go against the Turks and leave their fatherland without protection, because the Kozaks move about like eagles—flying first in one direction and then in the other."<sup>11</sup> Here is a clear indication that the Vatican was already fairly well informed of the Kozak raids into bordering countries (chiefly into Moldavia). During his brief stay in Transylvania Comulovich sent an erroneous message of a Moldavian Kozak agreement which did not exist at the time.<sup>12</sup>

From Alba Longa the papal legate went to Moldavia, which was under Turkish protection and was also bound to Ukraine by close political, economic and cultural ties. In the second half of the XVIth century, for instance, there were more than twenty significant Kozak

<sup>7</sup> The instructions were written in November, 1593. They were published by Father Pierling, "Novi izvori o L. Komulovicu," Document IV. A. (Romae, 21 Novembris, 1593). "Instruttione a Don Alessandro Comuli, arciprete di San Girolamo de Roma, mandato da Papa Clemente VIII. a diversi Principi et Potentati delle parti settentrionali," *Starine* (1884) XVI, 220-231.

Comulovich's correspondence is published in: Pierling—Fr. Racki, "L. Komulovica izvestaj i listovi o poslanstvu u Tursku, rdelj, Moldavsku i Poljsku," *Starine* (1884) XVI, 209-251. Also in, *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes* (1550-1850); II (1594-1608), (Romae, 1959) 5-33.

<sup>8</sup> Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitore la Istoria Romanilor*, III, 1: 1576-1599 (Bucuresti, 1880) CLXIII, pp. 174-175.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, CLXI, CLXII, pp. 173-174.

<sup>10</sup> *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantia* (Romae, 1953) I, Nos. 129, 130. pp. 133-135.

<sup>11</sup> Pierling, *op. cit.*, XVI, p. 225.

<sup>12</sup> *Starine* (1882) XIV, p. 89.

raids into Moldavia with the purpose of changing the political situation in that country or of destroying the material resources in Turkish possession.<sup>13</sup>

The Vatican and Austria both desired to secure at all costs Kozak cooperations with Moldavia and Transylvania. Aaron, however, because of his cordial relations with the Porte, could not decide whether to declare war against the Turks. Only because of his fear of the Kozaks, rather than because of Comulovich's diplomacy, did he later make a promise of loyalty to Rudolph II through Kozak Captain Demkovych.

In March of 1594 Comulovich arrived at Kamenets Podilsky, having acquired several letters of recommendation from Aaron, including one addressed to the Kozaks.<sup>14</sup> His chief task was to obtain information about the Kozaks and to establish contact with them. This is indicated in the papal instructions to Archbishop D. Solikovsky of Lviv, whom Comulovich also was to contact.

Clement wrote:

Having accomplished what you have been ordered to do in Transylvania, direct your travels to Lviv, where you will find the Archbishop (D. Solikovsky), a man of great ardence and strong influence; you will turn to him. Informing him about the plans for the Kozaks, be very careful, because it may be that love for the fatherland, fear of drawing Turkish weapons against Poland, may make him see in a bad light what to others is blessed—for Christian affairs—to strike at the enemy from all sides.

For this you will tell him that your mission's main purpose is to ascertain the state of affairs in Moldavia and Wallachia and to find out of what use those princes and their peoples can be—whether for the Catholic faith or for the war against the Turks. Taking into consideration his attitude, you will speak more or less broadly about the matter of the Kozaks. If you notice that he is opposed to this matter, and if in conversation with him and others you come to believe that the Poles will not like any movement on the part of the Kozaks, then you will have to conceal your intentions all the more. And in order to avoid interference you will select a place for the negotiations on the border of Poland; for this Kamianets or the fortifications on the border, such as Kaniv, Korsyn', or Cherkasy, would be suitable.<sup>15</sup>

There is no doubt that the Vatican was well informed about the "Polish-Kozak policy," as well as about the hostile attitude of the Kozaks to the Polish pro-Turkish policy at that time. Clement VIII, while still a cardinal, had visited Poland and was acquainted with the Polish-Kozak situation. That is why Clement points out: "Informing

<sup>13</sup> For more details on Moldavian-Ukrainian ties see our work: "Ukrainian-Moldavian Political Relations in the Second Half of the XVIth Century." (Type-written dissertation), Munich, 1956.

<sup>14</sup> Pierling-Rackl, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

<sup>15</sup> Pierling, "Novi Izvori...", *Starine*, XVI, 226.



him about... Kozaks, be very careful..." In view of this, O. Halecki's statement that Comulovich and the Vatican were not acquainted with the complex north-eastern European politics, "...no knowledge at all of the problem of north-eastern Europe...",<sup>16</sup> is rather doubtful. On the other hand, there is documentary evidence that Poland hindered cooperation between the Kozaks and Rudolph II as much as it could and, at the beginning of the 90's, because of the Polish anti-Habsburg attitude, refused to participate in an anti-Turkish league.<sup>17</sup>

In general Poland's attitude toward the plans of Rudolph II and Clement VIII was not positive. Instead of joining the proposed coalition as Transylvania had done, Poland decided not to break off relations with the Porte, and, furthermore, decided to hinder the Kozaks' joining the anti-Turkish league. The Warsaw Senate in its letter of April 26, 1594 assured Sultan Murad of the friendliness of Poland to Turkey in the following words:

Serenissimis Regibus nostris ac Regno huic et amicitiam intercedere non ignoramus. Quod quemadmodum a maioribus Suis Serenitas Vestra sancte esse observatam commemorat, ita non minore studio sinceritate antecessores Serenissimi Regis nostri in eo tuendo et servando versatos esse pro certo confirmare possumus.

This letter also mentions the Kozaks as enemies of both Poland and Turkey: "De Cozakis porro latronibus perpetuis, nihil aliud possumus respondere, quam illos acerrimos quoque nostros esse hostes."<sup>18</sup>

But despite these flattering addresses to the Porte and assurances of sincere friendliness to the Sultan, the Tartar raids on Ukrainian lands continued. Poland also was endangered by Turkish and Tartar military power.

On the whole the relations of the Holy See with the Ukrainian Kozaks were positive. Numerous reports from Poland, Germany and Austria about the Kozaks' attacks on the Tartars and Turks and about their frequent victories created in the Vatican a favorable opinion about the military potential and daring of the Kozaks. Vatican diplomats were well informed about the results of the Kozak negotiations with Rudolph II and of the mission of the Kozak leader, Khlopitsky, to Prague.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Halecki, "From Florence...", p. 257.

<sup>17</sup> The Polish-Austrian conflict of that time is well analyzed in Josef Macurek's work: *Zapas Polska a Habsburku o Pristup k Cernemu Mori Naslonku 16. stol.* (Praha, 1931).

<sup>18</sup> E. Barvinsky, *op. cit.*, Documents, No. 4, pp. 28-29.

<sup>19</sup> *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum...* II (1594-1608) No. 395, p. 6; et No. 400 p. 9.

The Ukrainian Kozaks, at this time, were divided into three military organizations. The Zaporozhian Kozaks, who had their main base on the island of Khortytsia in the Dnieper and were under the leadership of Khrystoph Kosynsky (and later under Bohdan Mykoshynsky), were the best organized and the most influential of the three. The second formation was the registered Kozak outfit under the leadership of the Polish noblemen Jan Oryshowsky and Mykola Iazlovetsky. The third group consisted of several independent Kozak units under the leadership of various *otamans*. Of the latter the most important was the army of Severyn Nalyvaiko, the famous organizer of the Kozaks, who was a former Kozak captain in the service of Prince Ostrozky.

The relations of the Zaporozhian Kozaks with Poland, and later of Nalyvaiko's group also, were openly hostile. In 1592 the Polish Diet drew up a set of restrictive laws for the Kozaks, in which the Zaporozhian Kozaks were declared enemies of the state:

... Wsytko kozactwo nizowe za takimi ich iawnemi excessami in patria infamos de regnoque et dominiis bannitos et proscriptos pronunczyulemy ac pro rebellibus et hostibus patriae declaruiemy czasy wiecznemi y one per publicas proclamaciones obwolacz kazalismy.<sup>20</sup>

The Polish *szlachta* and King Sigismund III considered the Kozak raids on Moldavia and the Tatar territories to be disruptive to Polish relations with Turkey and the Crimea. On the other hand, the Kozaks' defense of the Ukrainian population in the Volost' from the social oppression of the *szlachta* and the religious oppression of the government<sup>21</sup> was viewed as disrupting the authority of the government. Also, the growth of the Kozak cohorts was a threatening indication of a popular uprising against Polish administration, as was partly the case in the revolt of Kryshtoph Kosynsky (1591-23). This attitude toward the Kozaks can be seen clearly in the instructions of the *szlachta* from Vilna to the Warsaw Diet about the Kozak uprising of 1590: "... Kozaki nizowe ysz nie tylko swym swowolenstwem pacta et federa z obostronnemi sasiady wzruszaia, ale tez y nam bardzo dobrze sie daly znac..."<sup>22</sup>

At the time of Comulovych's journey to Ukraine's Zaporozhian Kozaks had already established close ties with Rudolph II

<sup>20</sup> *Dzherela do istorii Ukrainy-Rusy*, VIII, No. 48, p. 70.

<sup>21</sup> In regard to this, the popular movements in Bratslavschyna and the revolutionary movement of the Bratslav townspeople against the royal administration should be mentioned. See: L. Wynar, "Severyn Nalyvayko i revoliutsiyni rukh bratslavskoho mischanstva (1594-1596)," *Rozbudova Derzhavy*, No. 20, Toronto; Denver, 1957.

<sup>22</sup> *Dzherela...*, VIII, No. 41, p. 65.

and were fighting over Tartar possessions.<sup>23</sup> Stanyslav Khlopitsky had been influential in establishing connections between the Kozaks and Austria. These relations of the Ukrainian Kozaks with Austria and their cooperation with Rudolph II indicated, in fact, the Kozak independence of Polish authorities who tried at all costs to sever these relations.

The military potential of the Kozaks was quite significant and could have had a decisive influence on the progress of the anti-Turkish campaign. Even the greatest enemies of the Kozaks, the Turks, later admitted their valor. In the words of the analyst Najim: "One can truly say that nowhere can one find men who care so little about their lives and are so unafraid of death."<sup>24</sup> All of Europe was aware of the worthiness of the Kozak army.

There is no definite information about Comulovich's activities in Kamianets Podilsky, except for one letter in which he mentioned meeting two Kozaks "who are to be found not far from here,"<sup>25</sup> whom he described as "alli Cosachi" as distinct from the Zaporozhians or "li Cosachi di Boristene."

The question arises as to the identity of these two men. Were they representatives of the registered Kozaks or of the independent groups? Probably they were representatives of an independent Kozak formation which was not formally connected with the Zaporozhian *Sich*. It is quite likely they represented Nalyvaiko, the aforementioned *Otaman* of an independent group. M. Antonovych sees these unknown men as the Kozak Kozlynsky and his kinsman, both of whom in March of 1594 established, on their own initiative, an agreement with Aaron against the Tartars.<sup>26</sup> Antonovych, however, is not sure whether Kozlynsky was not in fact a deputy of Orishovsky, the leader of the registered Kozaks. Kozlynsky did not leave any permanent records, and he most probably belonged to one of the smaller Kozak formations. It is doubtful whether Comulovich came to any agreement with him, especially since the Pope instructed him: "In regard to the Kozaks again, it is probable that they have been informed about your arrival and your desire to come to an agreement with them, and they will continually send people to spy on you..."<sup>27</sup>

The papal legate, therefore, had to be very careful. We may connect Nalyvaiko's raid on Turkish possessions between Tighina

<sup>23</sup> L. Wynar, "Kozatski zviazky..." (*Na Slidakh*), p. 17-18.

<sup>24</sup> *Collectanea z dziejopisow tureckich rzeczy do historii polskiej sluzaccych*. I (Warsaw, 1885) 181.

<sup>25</sup> Pierling-Racki, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95.

<sup>26</sup> Antonovych, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>27</sup> Pierling, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

(Bendery) and Akkerman in the first half of June of 1594 with Comulovich's mission, and it seems more probable, therefore, that Comulovich met with Nalyvaiko's men during his stay in Kamianets Podilsky.

Examination of the letters of the Pope to the Kozak *Hetman* gives us additional proof of the Vatican's knowledge about the Kozaks' anti-Turkish activities.<sup>28</sup>

Clement VIII wrote to the Kozak *Hetman*: "Quo in genere scimus illustrem esse tuorum Cosachiorum militiam, eamque propterea Christianae Reipublicae adversus communem fidei nostrae hostes magno usui esse posse."<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately, this letter is not personally addressed and it is difficult to determine to which Kozak group it was sent. A similar letter was addressed to the Kozaks—"Dilectis filiis Cosachiis Militibus"—in which the Pope exhorted them to join the anti-Turkish campaign and stressed their bravery: "... et vestram virtutem et militarem fortitudinem notam et persectam habemus."<sup>30</sup> Probably the Pope was referring to the Zaporozhian Kozaks, who had won the most renown battling with the Turks.

From Kamianets Podilsky Comulovich traveled to Lviv. During this journey he visited Prince Ostrozky, and later Bishop Solikovsky. His mission was to influence Prince Ostrozky to support the plan of the Pope and Rudolph II. Comulovich believed that the active support of Prince Ostrozky would force the Polish king to move against the Porte.<sup>31</sup> It is well known that Comulovich was a frequent guest of Prince Ostrozky,<sup>32</sup> and that through him he tried to influence the king.

By the 29th of April Comulovich returned to Kamianets Podilsky in order to conclude the negotiations. In his letter from Cracow Comulovich mentioned that he had talked with a man who led 2,500 soldiers. This man, he continued, had asked for 100 florins and

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<sup>28</sup> The Vatican knew about the Kozaks and their bravery against the Turks in the eighties. The Kozaks' destruction of Tighina in 1583 especially spread their name. See Boratynsky, "Kozacy i Watykan" (*Przegląd Polski*, Pazdziernik, 1906, pp. 20-21. The papal nuncio in Venice also mentioned the Kozaks many times.

<sup>29</sup> *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum...*, I, No. 120, pp. 233-234.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 130, p. 235.

<sup>31</sup> *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum...* II, No. 409, pp. 14-14: "... et questo passo e bastante secondo che dice Don Alessandro a mettere in necessità il Re di Polonia a rompersi col Turco..."

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 420, p. 2: "... il quale Don Alessandro ho inteso ch'e in Polonia, et che andava et veniva spesso dal Duca d'Ostroga..."

promised to unite with the Zaporozhian Kozaks,<sup>33</sup> and to cooperate with Aaron. Though Comulovich does not mention this man's name, the historical sources give us reason to identify him definitely as Severyn Nalyvaiko who, in April of that year, had withdrawn from the service of Prince Ostrozky. D. Evarnytsky,<sup>34</sup> and after him E. Barvinsky,<sup>35</sup> advanced the hypothesis that Comulovich was negotiating with *Koshovy* Bohdan Mykoshynsky. They did not, however, see the letters of Comulovich, which were published later, and thus advanced an erroneous hypothesis. B. Mykoshynsky joined with the Kozaks in an anti-Turkish campaign because of an agreement with Rudolph II.

Therefore, it was Nalyvaiko who was negotiating with Comulovich. The individual articles of their agreement are not known; however, Comulovich no doubt was faithful to the Vatican instructions which requested him to ask the Kozaks whether they could ... "attack Montecastro, suddenly which the Poles call Koslow, and go this way along the shore of the Black Sea, where much booty can be gotten, and the Turks would not even be able to defend themselves, because they are occupied with fighting the Christians." The legate was also to find out whether the neighboring Tartars of Perekop could be incited to rebel against the Turks. To finance this raid the Pope assigned approximately 12,000 zloty, which Comulovich was to pay to the Kozaks as soon as they set out for "the land of the enemy."

Hrushevsky affirms that Comulovich's negotiations with Nalyvaiko "did not come to anything."<sup>36</sup> This statement in the light of new interpretations of historical sources cannot be justified. In Comulovich's letter from Cracow, which has already been mentioned, it is clearly stated that the Kozak leader received 100 florins for his services. It should be pointed out again that Pope Clement VIII developed his plans for an anti-Turkish league in cooperation with Rudolph II. M. Hrushevsky connected Nalyvaiko's raid of June 1594 with his later attack on the Tartar horde. M. Antonovych has made a documentary proof of the existence of two maneuvers on the part of Nalyvaiko.<sup>37</sup> And it is this June maneuver that we connect with Comulovich's negotiations. The Kozaks moved out of Maciev to the lower Dnister, where they occupied the city of Parkany and later

<sup>33</sup> Pierling-Racki, *op. cit.*, *Starine* XIV: VIII. Comuleo al Cardinale S. Giorgio. Cracovia, 15 October 1594, p. 101.

<sup>34</sup> D. Evarnytsky, *Istoriia zaporozhskikh kozakov*, II (SPB, 1895) 101.

<sup>35</sup> E. Barvinsky, *op. cit.*, 18.

<sup>36</sup> Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 200.

<sup>37</sup> Antonovych, *op. cit.*, 54.

destroyed Turkish possessions between Tighina and Akkerman. In one of his later reports Comulovich affirmed that the Kozaks had "... fulfilled their mission."<sup>38</sup> This was the last instance of cooperation between Nalyvaiko and Comulovich.

Severyn Nalyvaiko, who was in alliance with Austria, had different plans for the future role of Ukraine. The Danzig archives preserve documents in which it is stated, "The Kozaks declare that they will protect all poor and oppressed people who will flee to them from the tyranny of Poland. In general it can be noted that they have founded a new republic, in which Nalyvaiko, it seems, has assumed the title of Prince."<sup>39</sup> Though this report is exaggerated, it contains a measure of truth. Preoccupied with his plans, Nalyvaiko could not devote himself to the Papal legate. Comulovich, therefore, began to look for new contacts among the *nyzovi* Kozaks. Knowing of the strained relations between Nalyvaiko and the Zaporozhians, he tried to ease them and to breach their differences.<sup>40</sup> As is known, the Zaporozhians under Loboda marched with Nalyvaiko's army on Moldavia. To what extent Comulovich was instrumental in bringing them together is not indicated in historical sources.

Comulovich attempted to make contact with the Zaporozhians through the *starosta* of Sniatyn, Mykola Iazlovetsky, who had been leader of the registered Kozaks since the decision of the Polish diet in 1590. It is possible that Comulovich had more trust in him than in Nalyvaiko, since the former was a Polish nobleman and the leader of the "legalized" Kozaks. In any case, on August 30 an agreement was reached between Comulovich and Iazlovetsky, through which Iazlovetsky agreed to send the Zaporozhians and the Kozaks of Nalyvaiko on an anti-Turkish raid, while he meanwhile would create a diversion on the Black Sea or attack the Tartars who were returning from Hungary.<sup>41</sup>

At this time Comulovich handed over to Iazlovetsky the Papal funds for the organization of an army. At the beginning of September Iazlovetsky traveled to the Dnieper and made an agreement with Loboda that the latter would move out into the steppe with 600 Zaporozhians and join Nalyvaiko's men and the registered Kozaks. Iazlovetsky planned to organize a total of about 20,000 men.

In early October Iazlovetsky set out with the Zaporozhians. Vatican diplomats were optimistic about Iazlovetsky's army and

<sup>38</sup> Pierling-Racki, *op. cit.*, XIV, 108.

<sup>39</sup> Antonovych, *Dodatok*, No. 22.

<sup>40</sup> Pierling-Racki, *op. cit.*, XIV, 101.

<sup>41</sup> The agreement was contracted on August 30th, 1594, in Sarafia; c. f. Pierling-Racki, *op. cit.*, 111.

foresaw a great victory; however, this attempt failed. During the march the Kozaks deserted Iazlovetsky, thereby causing his subsequent death.<sup>42</sup> The reasons for the Kozaks' desertion, in the author's opinion, may be found in their unwillingness to serve under a Polish nobleman. This desertion brought to an end the positive results of Comulovich's mission to the Kozaks. (Later, however, they again joined battle against the Turks under the Habsburg Emperor's banners.)

In summing up Comulovich's mission, it must be affirmed that he was only partially successful. His meetings with Nalyvaiko, the Ostrozky princes and Archbishop Solikovskiy could have shaken his faith in the Zaporozhians to a certain extent. Nevertheless, he did succeed in organizing one successful raid of Nalyvaiko as well as the attempt of Iazlovetsky.

Despite the hostility between Iazlovetsky and the Kozaks, Comulovich clearly recognized the worthiness of the Kozaks in battle against the Turks and Tartars. The Vatican attentively observed every Kozak victory as well as the reactions of Poland. In one message of December 9, 1594, we read that the Polish senators accused Rudolph II and Clement VIII of deliberately sending the Kozaks to Moldavia and Wallachia in order to force the Poles to break off their ties with Turkey.<sup>43</sup> The Vatican attempted to improve the relations between Austria and Poland, but this attempt was complicated by the Zaporzhians and the men of Nalyvaiko fighting under the Emperor's banners.

Comulovich's mission, although it failed in its immediate objectives, was successful in persuading the Kozaks to join Austria and the Vatican in an anti-Turkish coalition.

## A P P E N D I X

### DOCUMENTA CLEMENTIS PP. VIII

Reprinted from *Documenta Pontificorum Romanorum Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantia*, Romae 1953, vol. I., pp. 233-235.

Romae, 8. XI. 1593

*Capitaneum Cosaccorum Clemens VII hortatur, ut simul cum aliis Turchas repellere curent.*

ASV, *Ep. ad Principes*, vol. 25, fol. 195v-196v, nr. 21.

A. Theiner, *Vet. Mon. Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. III, p. 211, nr. 164 c.

<sup>42</sup> Reinoldi Heidenstenii secretarii Regii *Rerum Polonicarum ab excessu Sigismundi Augusti*, Libri XII (Francofurti ad Moenum 1672) X, p. 307.

<sup>43</sup> *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum. op. cit.*, II (1594) No. 442, 33-36; No. 456 (1592) 46.

Dilecto filio, nobili viro, Capitaneo generali Cosachiorum<sup>150</sup>.  
 CLEMENS PP. VIII. Dilecte fili, nobilis vir, salutem etc.

In hac sublimi beatissimi Apostoli Petri sede non nostris meritis, sed divina voluntate collocati, ad omnes Christianae Reipublicae partes oculos sollicitudinis nostrae assidue convertimus, quemadmodum a nobis officii nostri pastoralis ratio postulat; sed hoc potissimum tempore id agimus, cum eadem Republica magnis fluctibus agitata ab haereticis et infidelibus vehementissime oppugnatur. Nos autem in tam multis calamitatibus, quae partim nos premunt, partim imminet et propinquae sunt, non solum ad patrem misericordiarum per orationes et sacrificia confugimus, in quo potissimum spes nostra reposita est, sed humanis etiam rationibus, ut par est, publicis incommodis remedium adhibere, quantum divina gratia adiutrice possumus. Omni sane studio conamur, et filios nostros Principes catholicos et nationes ac populos bellica laude florentes ad fidei, et Reipublicae causam non minus pie quam fortiter tuendam nostra paterna voce excitamus<sup>151</sup>.

Quo in genere scimus illustrem esse tuorum Cosachiorum militiam, eamque propterea Christianae Reipublicae adversus communes fidei nostrae hostes magno usui esse posse. Tum multa quoque de tua virtute et rei militaris scientia accepimus: viris enim fortibus fortem et prudentem virum praeesse aequum est. Neque vero dubitamus te huius S. Rom. Eccl. omnium Christifidelium matris et studiosum et observantem esse, cupereque pro Dei gloria et Christianae Reipublicae

<sup>150</sup> Nomen huius Capitanei, qui "hetman" vocabatur ignotum est. Ut videtur, hoc neque in intentione erat Clementis VIII, quia legatus pontificus in campum ignotum profiscebatur. Non multum antea inter Cosacos agebat Christophorus Kosynskyj (1591-1593), postea Severianus Nalyvajko. Interea possunt etiam commemorari nomina Joannis Orisovskyj, qui nominatus a rege Sigismundo an. 1590 ut capitaneus Cosacorum sic dictorum "in indicem illatorum" (rejestrovych), putabatur eratque sub obedientia N. Jazloveckyj. Secundum relationem Joannis Matthaei Wacker, qui anno 1593 (sub finem anni) ut legatus Imperatoris in Poloniam venit, ut foedus contra Turcas et auxilium expeteret, post Chr. Kosynskyj dux Cosacorum erat Mykosynskyj, cui ad latus adstabat etiam S. Nalyvajko. Cum his personis, verosimiliter, Cumuleus tractare debuit. Cfr. *Enc. Ucrainae*, p. 410; E. Barvinskyi, *Prycynky do istoriji znosyn cisarja Rudolfa II i Papy Klymenta VIII z kozakamy roku 1593 i 1594*, in *Zapysky N. T. Sh.*, vol. X (1896), p. 1-34, cum aliquibus documentis.

<sup>151</sup> Agebatur de bello contra Turcas, in quo agents principalis ex parte Occidentis erat Imperator Rudolphus II, cuius Regno periculum imminet. Quia Europa centralis et occidentalis in hoc communi negotio christianitatis dissentiebat, programma Clementis VIII erat, ut ad periculum profligandum unirentur vires Poloniae, Moscoviae, Austriae, Hungariae, nec non exercitus Cosacorum, qui tartaros in Mari Nigro et in Crimea disturbare debebat, et attentionem illorum et vires a campo belli principali avertere.



dignitate praeclarum aliquid aggredi, et Deo iuvante efficere, quod posteritatis memoria celebretur, et quod multo est praestantius, aeternam tibi afferat felicitatem. Nos igitur te valde in Domino diligentes, et de tua in nos et hanc Sanctam Sedem voluntate magnopere confidentes mittimus ad te, et ad milites tuos hunc dilectum filium Alexandrum Comuleum<sup>152</sup>, Illyricum, familiarem nostrum, sacerdotem Domini pium et religiosum nobisque valde gratum, ob gravissimas Christianae Reipublicae et fidei Catholicae causas, de quibus is tecum nostro nomine aget. Quare hortamur te, ut eum humaniter audias, eique omnem fidem, ac si nos ipsi tecum loqueremur, habeas. Tu vero, vir fortissime, audi vocem matris tuae Romanae Ecclesiae, fortitudinem istam tuam et in bellicoso populo auctoritatem offer Deo et beato Petro, imple desiderium nostrum; erit hoc tibi et genti tuae in omnes aetates gloriosum, quod Apostolica Sedes difficillimo tempore multum virtuti vestrae et pietati tribuendum merito duxerit.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, sub Annulo Piscatoris, die VIII Novembris MDLXXXIII, Pontificatus Nostri Anno secundo.

Romae, 8. XI. 1593

*Idem exercitui Cosaccorum.*

ASV, *Ep. ad Principes*, vol. 25, fol. 197-198, nr. 23.

Theiner, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 211, nr. 164 d.

Dilectis filiis Cosachiis Militibus<sup>153</sup>.

CLEMENS PP. VIII. Dilecti filii, salutem etc.

Beatissimi Apostolorum Principis Petri, meritis licet imparibus, divina tamen dispositione haeredes et successores, cui omnes Christi oves pascendae et gubernandae ab longe et prope paternae caritatis sinu complectimur, et in communi Christianae Reipublicae necessitate omnes veluti unius matris S. Rom. Cath. Ecclesiae filios ad opem matri ferendam advocamus.

<sup>152</sup> Alexander Cumuleus (Komulovic), origine croatus, qui postea etiam in missionibus in Europa orientali nomine S. Sedis agebat, diversasque missiones obibat (Lithuania, Moscovia, etc.).

<sup>153</sup> Caetus hominum liberorum, qui a fine saec. XV cursum medium et inferiorem fluminis Dnipro incolabant, et ad defensionem contra incursiones tartarorum armati erant, imo ut incursiones has praevenirent, et saepe punirent ex sua parte excursions faciebant in Crimeam, et circumvicina territoria imo usque in ora Asiae Minoris et ad Constantinopolim usque perveniebant. Hisce in excursionibus saepe saepius per Pontem Euxinum procedebant. Non est mirum, quod in programmate Imperatoris Rudulphi II et Clementis VIII contra Turcas sibi proprium et specialem occupabant locum. Cfr. E. Barvinskyj, *op. cit.*

Vos igitur et filios nostros in Christo agnoscimus et vos paterno amore prosequimur, et vestram virtutem et militarem fortitudinem notam et perspectam habemus, et de vestra in Nos atque hanc Apostolicam Sedem observantia ea nobis pollicemur, quae a Christianis hominibus virisque fortissimis Romanorum Pontificem, Christi in terris Vicarium et totius gregis Domini Pastorem, expectare aequum est, nimirum ut pro Dei gloria, pro fidei defensione, pro Christianae Reipublicae conservatione omnia quamvis ardua et difficilia aggredi parati sitis; nihil enim viros fortes magis docet, nihil est ad laudem bellicam illustrius, nihil ad memoriam posteritatis gloriosius, quam communem Christianam Rempublicam defendere, sanctam religionem nostram tueri et pro christiani nominis maiestate vitam et sanguinem, si ita opus sit, profundere, hoc paesertim tempore cum teterrimus Turcarum tyrannus tanta adversus Christianos rabie incensus est, ut non solum omnes dirae servitutis iugo opprimere, sed penitus nomen christianum delere, quod Deus in illum convertat atque extinguere conetur.

Nos autem pro nostro pastoralis officio de universali Ecclesia Dei silliciti mittimus ad vos ob gravissimas religionis et publicae utilitatis causas hunc dilectum filium Alexandrum Comuleum, Illyricum, presbyterum insigni pietate et zelo familiarem nostrum et nobis pergratum, quem vobis in Domino commendamus, ut eum vos nostro nomine alloquentem libenter audiatis fidemque ulla dubitatione plenam habeatis; ea enim acturus est vobiscum, quae ad Dei honorem vestraeque nationis et militiae dignitatem valde pertinet. Vos autem, viri potentes, accingimini, ut Deo exercituum strenue servientes immortales palmas et coronas, quae nunquam marcescunt reporetis.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum etc., ut supra.

## BOOK REVIEWS

**THE SECOND SOVIET REPUBLIC: *The Ukraine After World War II.*** By Yaroslav Bilinsky. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N. J., 1964. Pp. 539, \$12.50.

Among the many books that have appeared recently on Ukraine and the USSR in general the present volume by Dr. Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II*, is by far the most comprehensive and complete.

The main purpose of the author in writing this book was to prove that Ukraine, as the second largest republic, is not only a complete economic, social and cultural entity within the Soviet Russian empire, but also that the spirit of Ukrainian nationalism is alive and the desire of the Ukrainian people to freedom and independence is unquenchable.

In his thorough and objective analysis Dr. Bilinsky has demonstrated ably the failure of Soviet methods designed to integrate Ukraine into the USSR. These methods, if anything, have served to augment rather than diminish the Ukrainian national consciousness.

In his ten chapters the author presents a wealth of information and data resulting in a full picture of Ukraine and Russian communist policies therein since the end of World War II. After a historical survey Dr. Bilinsky proceeds to discuss such topics as "Some Factors Underlying Ukrainian Nationalism"; "Integration of Western Ukraine I: Administrative, Agricultural, and Religious Policies"; "Integration of Western Ukraine II: Armed Resistance—The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Underground"; "Soviet Linguistic Policy: Extent of the Ukrainian Language in the Ukrainian SSR"; "Soviet Interpretation of Taras Shevchenko"; "Soviet Interpretation of Ukrainian History: Some Problems"; "The Communist Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with Emphasis on the Years after Stalin's Death"; "The Ukrainian SSR in International Affairs" and "Ukrainian Nationalism after the War: Conclusions."

One of the most significant aspects of the Soviet policies in Ukraine is the over-all drive for the integration and creation of a "Soviet man." Toward that end the Kremlin utilizes all means at its disposal: the physical liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, the ruthless and summary extermination of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet underground; systematic enforcement of Russification; attempts to limit the use of the Ukrainian language and to eliminate the Ukrainian literary and cultural heritage, and, finally, official favoritism for hand-picked Ukrainian Communists, and the massive propaganda dominating the schools, the press and the state-controlled radio.

Dr. Bilinsky has availed himself of a large body of statistical information from official Soviet sources for his evaluation of the demographic and socio-economic roots of Ukrainian nationalism. He has also utilized the monumental compilation of data of the Harvard Project of the Soviet Social System, gathered in interviews with former Soviet citizens. The author also has conducted his

own interviews in this country and in Western Europe, including some with defectors from the Soviet army and former deportees from Soviet slave labor camps.

It is also to the credit of the author that he has been able to organize this abundant material in an order which is easy to follow. For instance, much of the lengthy documentation and reports on important topics, such as Ukrainian-Jewish relations, have been placed in appendices, where they can be readily and easily consulted by specialists interested in the subject matter.

Although the book deals exclusively with Ukraine, in a broader sense it applies also to Soviet policies practiced in regard to all other non-Russian countries, or "republics," which the Kremlin is holding firmly, by terror and coercion, but which are widely publicized as "free and sovereign states" and which theoretically may secede at any time from the Soviet Union.

Dr. Bilinsky is an American citizen who was born in Ukraine but who obtained all his higher education in the United States. His book is the result of ten years' study of Ukraine, five of them as an undergraduate at Harvard and a graduate student at Princeton, where he earned his Ph. D. degree. In addition, Dr. Bilinsky did research on his book on a Penfield Travelling Scholarship granted by the University of Pennsylvania and at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, where he was an associate.

The author has also contributed to American, British and German scholarly magazines. His article, entitled, "The Totalitarian Challenge to American Democracy," appeared in the Winter 1960 issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (Vol. XVI, No. 4, Winter, 1960). He is presently a member of the Political Science Department at the University of Delaware.

The book contains an Appendix, an extensive Bibliography, a Glossary and an Index, as well as much documentation.

There is, regrettably, one drawback from the viewpoint of this reviewer: Dr. Bilinsky subscribes to the use of the definite article before Ukraine, which has not been and is not now the practice of Ukrainian American organizations, publications and the overwhelming majority of writers and journalists. The monumental English-language encyclopedia, *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, published by the University of Toronto Press in the fall of 1963, does not use "the" before Ukraine.

On the whole, however, the book is a rich source of knowledge and information on Ukraine and the economic, cultural and social processes that the Ukrainian people have undergone during the last two decades. It should serve as a refreshingly unbiased source for our libraries, universities, newspaper offices, and above all, for our policy-making bodies in Washington, who too frequently fall back upon sources which are provided by elements which, if not hostile to Ukraine, are at best unobjective and prejudiced.

Therefore, we recommend Dr. Bilinsky's book to all those seeking the true story of Ukraine, the key-non-Russian nation in the USSR, which has a long and uninterrupted struggle for national freedom, independence and self-government.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

**DUKHOVI VPLYVY KIEVA NA MOSKOVSHCHYNU V DOBU HETMANSKOI UKRAINY** (*Spiritual Influences of Kiev on Muscovy in the Era of Hetmanite Ukraine*). By Dr. Franko Bohdan Korchmaryk. Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York, 135 pp. 1964.

This book of Dr. Korchmaryk is dedicated to one of the cardinal features of the history of Ukraine, the influence of its culture on that of Muscovy, especially after the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654.

This aspect of Ukrainian history has already been dealt with (in the first quarter of this century) in the works of M. Hrushevsky, K. Kharlampovych, V. Einhorn, V. Kluchevsky, Metropolitan Ilarion, B. Krupnytsky, A. Sobolevsky and other researchers, both Ukrainian and Russian. All have described how in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries, the leading classes of Ukraine, regardless of all obstacles of political character, lived a common life with Western Europe. The constant ties with Rome and the trends of the Reformation and the Renaissance which found in Ukraine eager partisans and adherents, all brought Ukraine into one cultural unity with Europe. Ukrainian youth studied at various universities in Germany and Italy; these ties were strengthened by German colonists who brought into Ukraine the Magdeburg Laws and schools of the Western European type, established above all by the Jesuits.

The Russian historian, E. Shmurlo, vividly depicted the difference between the cultures of Ukraine and Muscovy in the XVI-XVII centuries: at a time when Ukraine shared a common spiritual life with Western Europe, Muscovy remained in a state of half-savage barbarism. Neither the Renaissance nor the Reformation had touched Muscovy; travelers then were "uncovering" Muscovy just as Columbus had discovered America. Yet what the historians of Ukraine and Russia knew has not prevented Soviet historians from writing about the "superiority" of Russian culture and its "beneficial" influence upon the culture of Ukraine.

Hence in addition to its value as a scientific contribution the work of Dr. Korchmaryk also possesses an important political significance. The author has carefully collected and analyzed a great mass of materials, which depicts in an historic aspect the considerable influence of Ukraine upon Muscovy in the various fields of culture, about all in education and in the arts.

Dr. Korchmaryk has divided his work into six chapters: 1) "The Theory of the 'Third Rome' and the 'True' Russian Orthodoxy"; 2) "Representatives of 'Kievan Science' (Culture) and Their Literary Activity in Muscovy"; 3) "Struggle Against Obscurantism and Occupation of Important Positions in the Muscovite Church by Ecclesiastical Representatives of the 'Kievan Science'"; 4) "The Mohyla Academy in Kiev and the Organization of Schools in the Muscovite Lands in the Time of Hetmanite Ukraine"; 5) "The Kiev School Drama and the Creation of the First Theater in the New Capital of the Muscovite State—Petersburg"; 6) "The Kiev Church Song and Its Spread in the Muscovite State."

In his work the author has collected and evaluated without bias an impressive literature, especially the literature of the Russian writers. Citing authors and researchers, Dr. Korchmaryk impressively supports his thesis of the higher state of Ukrainian culture in the XVIIth-XVIIIth centuries.

The core of Dr. Korchmaryk's work embraces two problems: the struggle against illiteracy (obscurantism) and the organization of schools in Muscovy.

The author thus assigns a good deal of his attention to the progressive influence of the Ukrainian clergy, most of whom were graduates of the Mohyla Academy and bearers of European culture and civilization, upon the scarcely literate Muscovite clergy, who were prone to see "heresy" in any new literary

or cultural trend. With the influx of Ukrainian priests, including a great number of monks, the level of literacy among the Russian clergy rose considerably. Gradually the Kievan clergy occupied more and more important posts in Muscovy, including those of bishops, archbishops, missionaries and the like. The establishment of the Synod found the key posts also occupied by Ukrainians, who held them throughout the XVIIIth century.

The author subsequently describes the role of the Mohyla Academy in Kiev, which became a center of education and enlightenment for Muscovy, "the principal carrier of South Russian (Ukrainian—ed.) influence in Muscovite society," as expressed S. F. Platonov, outstanding Russian historian. He calls special attention to a network of monasteries which, especially under Patriarch Nikon, "became the principal centers of cultural-religious life among the Muscovite society" and, in a sense, colonies of the Kievan clergy. Ukrainian monks established various schools, such as a school of interpreters where monks labored on translations of works in foreign languages, especially in church literature. Another Russian historian, S. M. Soloviev, did not hesitate to state that "a Great Russian could learn safely from a Little Russian (Ukrainian—ed.) in a monk's garb." Dr. Korchmaryk depicts a vast network of schools of various types which extended over the Muscovite territory from the Muscovite Academy to the province of Tobolsk, where Ukrainians were the principal organizers and teachers.

The chapter dedicated to the Kiev school drama is especially interesting inasmuch as this theatrical form penetrated deeply into the system of the Mohyla Academy and other schools in Ukraine. The system was adopted by Muscovy, where it flourished. The dramatic works of two Ukrainians, Dmytro Tuptalo and Theofan Prokopovych, gave birth to the theater in Russia.

Discussing church music in the last chapter, the author discloses a wealth of knowledge and materials to be found only in special books on music. These materials lend additional support to the author's thesis of the heavy influence of Ukrainian culture on that of Muscovy.

Dr. Korchmaryk's book fails, however, to mention the blossoming of Ukrainian culture during the reign of Czar Feodor, when the Muscovite court became acquainted with Ukrainian costumes, language, church music and social manners. Had the author devoted more attention to the era of Czar Feodor, the colored portrayal of Czar Peter I would have been scaled down and brought closer to the truth. This reviewer cannot see Patriarch Joachim, as does the author, in a "glorious light." This prelate was one of the principal leaders of the illegal subordination of the Ukrainian Church to the Moscow Patriarchate. Patriarch Joachim was not a Ukrainian, but a Russian (born in Rostov); he came to Kiev with the Russian troops in 1654 and entered the monastery. In 1657 he went to Moscow to enter the Iversky Monastery. His career undoubtedly owes more to his friendship with Czar Alexei than to the "moral and intellectual traits" Dr. Korchmaryk imputes to him. It should also be noted that there was a difference in the documents on the subordination of the Ukrainian Church to the Patriarchate of Moscow which were submitted to the Ukrainian Church. The document of the Czar at least theoretically assured the Ukrainian Church of its rights, while that of Patriarch Joachim did not.

But these few flaws do not begin to affect the value of Dr. Korchmaryk's book. Indeed, what is highly desirable is that his book be published in several foreign languages so that the true relation between the Ukrainian and Russian cultures be made known to the world at large.

**CAPTIVE NATIONS IN THE USSR.** Edited by the League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany, 1963, pp. 112.

It is unfortunate that this compact work hasn't received the circulation it deserves in this country. In fact, vitally interested circles in the subject didn't receive copies of the book until late 1964. Yet the exposition on the captive nations in the Soviet Union was published a year before. Nevertheless, the contents of the book are by no means outdated; on the contrary, they are perhaps more applicable and certainly more comprehensible in the American environment than they might have been earlier. With broader and more expert circulation, the book would undoubtedly make its educational contribution to American understanding of the nature and composition of the Soviet Union, particularly the strategic value of the captive non-Russian nations in that primary Soviet Russian Empire.

The work is competently organized and neatly developed. The foreword to the main text places adequate stress on what it calls Soviet imperialism, though the alert reader will become amply impressed by the Russian character of this imperialism. There is, of course, no reason to be squeamish about calling a spade a spade if truth is being determined. To designate the chief enemy as Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism doesn't involve any indictment of the long oppressed Russian people themselves. This messy identification has been a trick used by both the Soviet Russian masters and would-be anti-Communist Russian masters to distract attention from the ultimate source of the world's chief problem, namely, the barbaric institutions of traditional Russian tyranny and imperio-colonialism. Rationally, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism is really the enemy of both the unvested Russian people and the captive non-Russian nations, as well as the still Free World. The semantic discrepancy between the needlessly cautious introduction in the foreword and the patent facts presented in the chapters of the book itself is obvious. Actually, there is no need for such cautious fear.

But the editors nonetheless make their telling points in the foreword. They emphasize the complete hypocrisy of Moscow and its proponency of anti-colonialism and national self-determination in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As they point out, "The Achilles heel of Soviet diplomacy is that its declamations are at complete variance with its actual policies." These policies are foreign domination, imperio-colonial exploitation, and genocide in the non-Russian countries of the USSR itself. An egregious error made by the editors is to refer to the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR as "national minorities." Scientifically and politically, there is no basis for this erroneous conception. Their concluding paragraph gives the gist of their pitch: "Peace is only possible after the colonial peoples of the whole world, including those of Europe and Asia, have gained their freedom from Soviet domination." They mean Soviet Russian domination.

The chapters are systematically devoted to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia or White Ruthenia, Crimea, Georgia, Idel-Ural, North Caucasus, Turkestan, and Ukraine. Set in the same alphabetical order, each captive nation is indicated at the beginning of the work with its national flag and appropriate colors. The array appears very attractive and impressive. Covering all of these captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, the chapters are short and concise. They deal with historical background essentials which the unfamiliar reader wants as he approaches this seemingly complex and intricate subject. Much to the credit of the editors, the treatment is not taxing, not cluttered up with comparatively

minor historical details. It has been, for example, difficult for many American readers, students and scholars alike, to read with solid comprehension the innovative reports and studies on these nations which the Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression prepared and distributed over a decade ago. Not that those reports are not simply and clearly written, but rather that too many details were incorporated in order to offer a maximum authoritative weight to them. This problem is wisely avoided in the present presentation. Nor is there any real need to meet it today.

Each chapter is interestingly and constructively written. On Armenia, for instance, the reader is taken back to ancient times when the Armenian nation was already in existence. Under Tigranus the Great (94-54 B.C.) Armenian rule covered Mesopotamia and Palestine. He is then exposed to the division of Armenia between two imperialist powers, Russia and Turkey. Leading into this century, the concise analysis enables the reader to appreciate the indomitable aspirations of the Armenian people for freedom and national independence with the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Armenia on May 28, 1918. The rape of this newly independent state by the Russians in 1920-21 is well described. The story of Armenian resistance against Soviet Russian domination is carried down to World War II.

After reading the essentials in the history of Armenia, the reader cannot but grasp the pattern laid out for the subsequent illuminating chapters. Long history, geography, population, the impact of foreign imperialist enterprise, and the contemporary fight against imperio-colonialist Moscow constitute the systematic sequence of topics that provides the reader with a composite and not unwieldy picture of the centuries-long existence of a given nation. Azerbaijan is depicted in terms of this format, as indeed are all the other captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. This Moslem country also was independent for over a thousand years, and its contributions to civilization through the works of Genjevi Nizami, Fuzuli and many others are concisely described. With the break-up of the Czarist Russian Empire, Azerbaijan also quickly seized the opportunity to declare its independence on May 28, 1918. Its colonialist exploitation by the Russians, particularly in oil, is impressively conveyed to the most casual reader.

Complex as the history of the Byelorussian or White Ruthenian nation may appear, the chapter devoted to this third largest Slavic but non-Russian nation in the USSR is clear and edifying. The writer of this chapter was obviously well aware of the terminological difficulties encountered in tracing the history of this nation. A footnote in German style, more than half of page 33, very effectively resolves the problem by showing the fact that the Poles were once known as the Lechites, the Czechs as Bohemians, Russians as Muscovites and so forth. In the Middle Ages and later the Byelorussians were known as the Kryvichy and Ruthenians, and still later, confused with the conquering Russians. Basically, with relation to traditional Russian imperialism, the story of this nation is no different from the others. On March 25, 1918 the Byelorussian people also declared their independence. Two years later, the new state was under Soviet Russian occupation.

The cases of Georgia, Turkestan, and Ukraine will appear equally or even more clear-cut than the preceding ones. This is especially true of Georgia and Ukraine, both for the reason of their compact national being and the fact that under Soviet Russian domination their territories were not carved up into additional "republics" as was the case with Turkestan. As shown quite effectively in the treatment of Turkestan, the five Central Asian republics—Turk-



menistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, and Kirghizia—are Russian-created political entities designed to squelch any identity of Turkestanian nationality. The facts as presented in this work reveal a continuing fear of Turkestanian “bourgeois nationalism” among the people of this national, non-Russian area.

What doubtlessly will be of new and fascinating interest to the uninitiated American reader is the compact histories of the Crimea, Idel-Ural, and North Caucasias. Several peoples are involved in these entities and the question of organic national ties will invariably be brought up. The authors of the work unfortunately do not meet this objection head-on, as they should have. Certainly Idel-Ural and North Caucasias have all the necessary credentials for statehood. The latter, for example, was an independent republic on May 11, 1918 and was recognized by Iran, Turkey and others. The others, too, demonstrated their people’s will for independence. However, the national sinews weren’t as strong as in the case of the other non-Russian nations, though the desire to strengthen and intensify them was as strong as could be expected in the circumstances. Yet, when compared to most newly independent states in Asia and Africa today, which are uncritically passed off as “nations,” these have equal and better credentials in terms of national aspirations and cultivation.

This work represents another important stride in Free World education on this all-important subject. Without doubt, many others will follow, with equal simplicity, clarity, and patience.

*Georgetown University*

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

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POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN THE USSR. By Myron Rush, New York. Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. xv, 223. 5.95.

As most Rand books, this is a dependable and a valuable analysis of politics from the standpoint of “behavioral sciences.” And it is more than timely, since the manuscript had been completed just before the *coup d’etat* which deposed Khrushchev from his position as ruler in the USSR, and thus precipitated the succession crisis that the USSR is now undergoing.

Fortunately for the author, and thus for us, Dr. Rush, a senior research staff member of the Rand Corporation (and currently Visiting Professor of Government at Cornell University), had been studying the succession in the USSR for several years “in the conviction that the lack of legitimate and recognized means for the transfer of power is the crucial problem within the Soviet regime, and there is a qualitative difference between Soviet politics in a period of personal rule and Soviet politics in a period of succession” (p. xv).

Rush’s assumption is that “under a personal ruler the principal problem is formulating policy and gaining acceptance for it; in a period of succession the principal problem is determination of who in fact, if not in right, can make the decision.”

Such analysis shows that in a time of crises in the Soviet Union, characterizing the disappearance of one Soviet dictator and the final determination of his successor, there is much greater flexibility in the Soviet system than exists normally, and that there are greater opportunities for outside nations to influence developments within the ruling clique in the Kremlin. Thus the present leadership is “more impressionable” than previously, and even such international steps as state visits, may produce visible results.

This judgment is obviously favoring the tendency of President Johnson and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to have “talks.”

Maybe Rush, as well as Johnson and Wilson, might get some results from such an action, although the reviewer is in full disagreement with this assumption, since all historical evidence has shown that all "summit meetings" have always produced damaging consequences for the Western Allies, and especially in the long-range results. It is true that "in the Soviet political system, the passing of the ruler inevitably produces a crisis in the leadership," (p. xiv); but it also true that, in general, the Kremlin clique has also worked on behalf of the causes of the Soviet state only, while using international ideologies and weapons, while the Anglo-Saxon spokesmen have been guided, more often than not, by vague international and "One World" motives, complicated by the assumptions that the Soviet rulers might be brought to "reason" by personal appeals.

These points are, to be fair, also hinted by Rush who, to be sure, is quite provocative in his chapter IX on "Implications for the West" (pp. 197-207). But, from the standpoint of realism, actually Rush's best chapter is the concluding one, "Epilogue: The End of Khrushchev's Rule," (pp. 208-214), where he points out that, in spite of the rise of Brezhnev, "Khrushchev's heir presumptive, and Podgorny, the counter heir, it remains to be seen, however, who if any one will triumph and become Russia's (USSR) new ruler." (p. 214).

Even better is Rush's epithet on Khrushchev: "Khrushchev's personal rule finally depended on the institutions of violence, the political police and the army. When the conspirators deprived him of access to these institutions, either by subverting their heads or by physically constraining Khrushchev, his power was at an end. Without the power to command, his authority, which had been sustained by 'the cult of personality,' dissolved. Khrushchev had arrogated to himself the power which others could seize from him and claim, in their turn, to have received from 'the people and the Party.' Thus does Russia (USSR?) change its rulers." (p. 214).

All in all, Rush is a brilliant analyst. But it is also quite safe to claim that he is a much better historian (a historical sociologist) than a prophet and should Johnson and Wilson use his arguments to prop up their hopes for settling some Western-Soviet problems by a summit meeting, they ought to also read up on the geopolitical dynamics of Soviet Russian imperialism which, actually, has never changed its goal—in spite of the zigzag tactics.

*University of Bridgeport*

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

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***CRISIS IN WORLD COMMUNISM: MARXISM IN SEARCH OF EFFICIENCY.***

By Frank O'Brien, New York, The Free Press, 1964, pp. 191.

This volume, prepared by the Assistant Research Director of the Committee for Economic Development, is a very readable and sensible analysis of the entire Communist economic situation and particularly that of the Soviet Union and the reasons for the apparent slowing of the rate of growth in the Western Communist economies. Unlike many such works the volume does not gloss over the progress that had been made in the economy of the Russian Empire prior to 1913 as compared with the situation in China and the so-called underdeveloped countries. It is also satisfactory in the fact that the author accepts as an essential part of Communist thought the idea that it is the basic object of the Communist world to surpass, and overwhelm the capitalistic, free world and that peaceful coexistence in the sense in which Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Kosygin use it is in reality hostile coexistence and that the Soviet trade campaign

is intended not as a participation in the peaceful development of trade but as a hostile penetration of the free world for its own purposes and for use as a weapon against the free world.

Throughout he lays great stress on the fact that agriculture not only in the Soviet Union but in all the European Communist states is in an unsatisfactory condition because the Communist Party, acknowledging the utterly disproportionate production of the private plots of the workers on the collective farms, still cannot accept the obvious lesson that private initiative and proper returns to the individual are the essential key to this prosperity because it threatens the doctrine that the Communist Party and its leaders know best what is good for the people. On the other hand the author sees in the Chinese Communist position a device for mobilizing and controlling the Chinese poverty-stricken masses which cannot even by hard labor furnish the capital for complete industrialization and will not be able to do so for a long period of time. In this he sees a menace to the Soviet position in many undeveloped countries for it "may be moving Russia, in the view of the world's poorer masses, toward the position of a luxury purveyor of economic development" (p. 139), while its policy of subordinating agriculture to industrial development is barring it from that triumphant passage from socialist hardship to Communist abundance that it needs to convince the world of the validity of Communist teachings' as it sees them.

The author treats the economy of the Soviet Union as a whole but it would have been helpful and enlightening, if he had considered also the changes in certain well-defined areas as Ukraine. He hints at this in his discussion of the New Lands program and the plan for corn production. Here for Western Russia, he should have substituted Ukraine, when he says "Since only Western Russia has a growing season long enough for corn, USSR corn output could be radically increased only if a major part of Russia's bread grain production could be transferred from Western Russia to the New Lands, releasing West Russia land for planting to corn. The corn was wanted as the basis for improvement of the most backward sector of all in Soviet agriculture, livestock production" (p. 45) and he adds in a footnote, "Actually long enough only to mature corn, for the most part, to the point of green silage for cattle feed." This is quite different from the corn production of the American corn belt. He might have added similar discussion of the damage done by Communist theorizing to other sections as the cattle and dairy industry in the Baltic Republics, etc..

Yet despite these omissions, the work is a valuable and careful study and it should be read with interest not only by students of Russian agriculture but by all businessmen and others interested in the Soviet role in the world markets. We can only congratulate the author and wish that his work will achieve the broad circulation which it deserves.

*Columbia University*

CLARENCE A. MANNING

## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"NAIVETE OR TREASON?," an article by General I. N. Konovodov. *Cossacks Life*, Providence, Rhode Island, June 1964.

It is encouraging for all Americans who are advocates of the freedom and independence of the non-Russian nations in the USSR to witness the growth of Americans of Cossack origin in their educational, political, and literary activities. This journal, though still in its embryonic stage, is a good example of such growth. With more articles in English, as this one, the publication should in time open many American eyes.

Writing from France, this former deputy of the Cossack Parliament minces no words in his direct criticisms of the writings of George F. Kennan. Those on the American scene have long discounted the notions of this supposed expert on "Russia." Even his first boss in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, Ambassador William Bullitt, discredited the man for his uneducated ideas about Russian history and politics. This Cossack writer digs deep and goes well back into Muscovite history, to Czar Ivan IV (The Terrible), to his Oprichina, led by the Tartar Maluta Skuratov, to demonstrate that Ivan's "axe and broom" is in essence Stalin's "hammer and sickle" and that Kennan has misread imperialist Russian history.

In his reference to *Hetman* Khmelnitsky and the 1654 Pereyaslav Treaty, which Kennan himself has no comprehension of, the writer could have explained that it was purely a military pact with Muscovy and by no means a compact of union. His strictures of Kennan on the Captive Nations Week Resolution are blunt but wholesomely correct. In knowledgeable American circles today Kennan isn't taken seriously.

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"DEBATES OF THE SENATE," an official report. 26th Parliament of Canada, Ottawa, Canada, Vol. 113, 1964.

An excellent summary of the issue of Soviet Russian imperialism and its coverage in the United Nations is provided in an address delivered by the Honorable Paul Yuzyk. The Canadian Senator was a recent member of the Canadian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. In this address he appraises his country's policy in the U.N. as regards the Soviet Union.

"We can be proud," he declares, "that Canada was one of the first in the United Nations to challenge Russian colonialism." With ample quotations, he systematically recounts the stand taken by the former Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker. One quote begins in this forthright manner: "The Soviet Union, while pretending otherwise, is a colonial power and a colossus of empires." The Senator quotes at length from U. S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's condemnation of Soviet Russian colonialism on November 25, 1961.

However, he deplors the fact that Canadian-U. S. harmony on this issue was not continued at the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations. As he

states it, "It appears that the new Canadian Government decided to pursue a policy of non-commitment, ostensibly in view of the impending wheat sales to the Soviet Union at that time." The Senator points out that wheat sales to the USSR didn't prevent Diefenbaker from pressing on a fundamental issue.

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"TARAS H. SHEVCHENKO (1814-1861)," an article by M. Lacheta. *News Digest—International*, Australian Lithuanian Information Alliance, Sydney, Australia, May, 1964.

Many fine articles appear in this issue of the quarterly review of East-West political relations and news from behind the Iron Curtain. In addition to this one, articles on "Vynnytsia—'The Ukrainian Katyn,'" "The Refugees" and other important subjects make up this interesting issue.

This short piece on Shevchenko commemorates the 150th Anniversary of his birth. As has been repeatedly pointed out, the writer correctly stresses that "As an apostle of liberty and an enemy of all kinds of inhuman oppression, Shevchenko goes beyond the narrow limits of his country and of Russia."

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"COMRADE ENKO, THE WARHORSE OF RUSSIA," an article by Roman Olynyk. *Military Review*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 1964.

A most refreshing viewpoint is developed in this article concerning Russia's actual dependence on Ukraine's reservoir of skilled and specialized manpower. Dr. Olynyk, who is a lecturer at the University of Montreal and also at the Staff College of the Royal Canadian Air Force, dips back into history to show how the Russian empire-builders exploited such manpower. Name after name is fastidiously spelled out so that he concludes, "Comradenko is still the warhorse of the Russian empire."

But, in this well-written article, the writer calls for a more discriminating eye by the West on the many Ukrainians in various "Soviet missions." As he concludes, "Whoever can locate accurately, and interpret in modern terms, the age-old aspirations of Comrade Enko will discover a valuable key to the Pandora's box of Russian weaknesses."

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"DOBRIANSKY VOICES HOPE," a report. *The China Post*, Taipei, Taiwan, China, November 21, 1964.

Attending the 10th Assembly of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League in the Republic of China, Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky voiced the hope that in the current U.N. Assembly firm opposition to Red China's admission would be maintained. The Georgetown University professor and also president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America succeeded in having the APACL pass a resolution calling upon its members to influence every free Asian parliament to legislate a Captive Nations Week Resolution, similar to that of the United States.

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"REPORT ON 'FATE OF CHURCH' IN USSR," an article by J. J. Gilbert. NCWC release, National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D. C., December 18, 1964.

This scooping release by the NCWC press service has received nationwide attention. It has been published in practically every major Catholic organ in the United States and Canada. *The Tablet* in New York, the *New World* in

Chicago, *Progress* in Winnipeg and scores of other papers have published this article on a recent study issued by the Committee on the Judiciary in the House of Representatives. The response has been so great to this commentary that available copies of the study have been quickly depleted and a second printing is under way in the new Congress.

Actually of book form, the study referred to is titled *Nations, Peoples, and Countries in the USSR*. It was undertaken by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University with the assistance of Dr. Wasył Shimoniak of Marquette University. The study deals with the genocidal population policy of Soviet Russia within the USSR.

Quoting the Georgetown professor at length, the writer states "that there are many forms of genocide, and the form it took under Khrushchev was 'more subtle' than it was under Stalin, 'but nevertheless the objective is the same, namely, the so-called assimilation of the many non-Russian nations and peoples in the USSR.'" An important paragraph is cited by Gilbert with reference to the fate of the Catholic Church in the USSR and countries occupied by the Russians from 1917 to 1959. The statistics on murders, deportations and imprisonment of Catholic bishops, priests, monks, and believers are impressive and are furnished by the Russian totalitarians themselves.

Another prominent quote in the lengthy article pertains to the genocide of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church. As the writer put it, "The study says 'The whole Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, with all its clergy, was dissolved and many of its members were deported to Siberia.'" Although concentrating on religious genocide, the author generally places equal stress on the many other forms of Soviet Russian genocide.

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"KHRUSHCHEV'S PAPER BEAR," an article by Charles J. V. Murphy, *Fortune Magazine*, New York, N. Y., December 1964.

In the period of 1957-63 not too many individuals or groups in this country had the wisdom and courage to point out the fundamental weaknesses and the fraud of Khrushchev and his imperio-colonialist regime. In this journal and through the educational activities of the nation-wide organization, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, these points and many others were repeated time and time again so that our fellow Americans would regain their composure and equilibrium after each propaganda thrust by Khrushchev. Now, from admitted hindsight, the author of this exceptional article paints the former Russian dictator as "not only a reckless gambler but a bluffer besides."

Those who have clung to the spurious distinction that the Red Chinese are the reckless ones and the Soviet Russians are the cautious type should read this piece carefully. All the fascinating concrete cases dealt with more than substantiate the writer's general assessment of Khrushchev: "He was beyond doubt the most audacious political faker and charlatan that the 20th century has so far produced." The author could have appropriately dubbed him the Red Russian Potemkin of this century since a paragraph is devoted to Prince Gregory Potemkin, who in the late 18th century was delegated by Catherine the Great to colonize southwestern parts of the Russian Empire and to cover up his immense bungling set up false-front villages, the "Potemkin vilages," for the Empress' inspection.

Quite interesting, too, is the author's position on Red China and the Cuban crisis. He holds that in 1961-62 Red China was "truly a paper tiger" which

could have been torn asunder if we had resolved to back up a Nationalist Chinese invasion of the mainland. This, too, was advocated by only a few at the time. As to the myth of our "victory" in Cuba, the author soundly points out that "the executive branch of the Government had both the information and the power to call Khrushchev's bluff and to finish off Castro." Here, too, certain groups are on record supporting a sane exercise of American power.

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"TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S REMARKS," an address by President Lyndon B. Johnson, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Washington, D. C., February 3, 1965.

In this short address to a leading Jewish organization the President refers back to his desire as expressed in his State of the Union message for an exchange of visits with the new Soviet leaders. He would have them "come to see us, come to meet us and to learn firsthand the determination here in our beloved America for peace and the equal determination to support freedom." This point is highly debatable.

What is not debatable is the President's erroneous preconception concerning the Soviet Union. He states, "I believe such visits would reassure an anxious world that our two nations are each striving toward the goal of peace." Aside from the illusion that any such visit could offer such reassurance while Russian agents are roaming the world and disrupting peace, it is really inexcusable at this late stage for a head of state to imagine the USSR as being a "nation." In short, if one's knowledge is faulty, how much sounder is one's judgment? And this in relation to the most critical problem confronting our nation.

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"DANGER IN VISIT BY RUSSIANS," an article by Marguerite Higgins. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., January 16, 1965.

Some pointed answers to the President's remarks above are offered with telling effect in this cogently written article. First, as the writer states it, "there is plenty of history in this matter... and there is not the slightest evidence to support the contention that exposure to Americans and American goods necessarily sweetens in any enduring way the normally harsh course of Russian-American relations or softens the Kremlin's dictatorship." Khrushchev visited us, observed how peaceful we are, and then decided to place missiles in Cuba.

On trade, ample stress is placed on American business influence to recognize the USSR in 1932. During the 30's, American businessmen and engineers contributed heavily to Stalin's industrialization plans. He displayed his gratitude by signing a pact with Hitler that sparked off World War II. During World War II billions of dollars worth of American machines and machine tools poured into the USSR. Stalin again showed his appreciation by subjecting the U. S. to the frigid winds of the Russian Cold War.

Indeed, if ignorance hadn't played such a prominent role, one could say our economic relations with the Soviet Russians since the early 20's border on political idiocy. It is evident in present conditions that Moscow is banking heavily on a resurgence of American ignorance.

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"THE ROOTS OF RUSSIA," comments and discussion. *Proceedings*, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, October 1964.

This world-renowned journal published a commentary from Moscow on an article written a year before by Dr. Lev E. Dobriensky on "The Roots of Rus-

sia." The commentary appeared as an article, titled "An American Historian Falsifies the History of the USSR," in the January 1964 issue of *Voprosi Istorii*. It wasn't necessary to comment on the commentary because the latter furnished in tone and content its own back-firing comments.

As one should expect, the author of the original article is immediately attacked for not possessing "a professor's scientific conscientiousness and erudition," for foisting "on the reader a distorted concept of the USSR," for building "an idealistic and completely trumped-up scheme of the historical development of the Russian people from the 15th century to our day," and so forth on this supposed "Russian Marxian" plane of "objective" historical criticism.

Nowhere in the commentary is any presented fact met headlong. Instead, Dobriansky is accused of a "gross slander against Soviet democracy"; he's also berated for "Slandering the October Revolution and distorting the history of the civil war"; and the professor is attacked for "blasphemously" characterizing the Soviet Union as "the rebirth of the 'Muscovite empire.'" The only objective criticism is that of an illustration provided by the journal and not seen by the author prior to publication. This had little to do with the text, and the editors graciously admit this fact in a footnote.

The reader should scan this Russian commentary. It is enough to indicate the level of Russian historical scholarship today. Apparently, the original article struck home.

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"OUR OBLIGATION TO LIBERATE CAPTIVE NATIONS," an article by Rev. Cletus Healy, S. J., *The Truth About Communism*, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1964.

In a clear, systematic presentation of underlying philosophical principles the writer impresses upon the reader a true moral obligation to liberate the captive nations. Methodically he assembles all the essential arguments in the captioned sections of basic moral considerations, the natural law, and our international obligations, and logically concludes with practical courses of action under the heading of "How Resist?" The focal point of his operational recommendations is the liberation of the captive nations.

Throughout this tightly-knitted justification for such action the judgments of several Popes are effectively introduced. Pope Pius XII, in his Christmas message of 1939, is appropriately quoted: "A fundamental postulate of any just and honorable peace is an assurance for all nations, great or small, powerful or weak, of their right to life and independence." As concerns the currently bandied "peaceful coexistence" concept, Pius XII's observation in his 1954 Christmas message today holds truer than ever before: "Now it is clear that simple coexistence does not deserve the name of peace to which Christian tradition, formed in the school of the lofty intellects of Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, has come to apply the definition 'tranquillity of order'... It has about it nothing of true 'order,' which presupposes a series of relationships converging towards a common purpose that is right and just."

Only a slight sympathetic thought and reflection on the captive nations in Europe, Asia, and Latin America are called for to perceive the depth and strength of these Papal judgments. The Jesuit writer rightly concludes, "Our most reasonable hope of never facing a real atomic showdown lies in a policy of strength..." Such a policy is necessarily oriented toward *all* the captive nations.



"U.S. OBSERVANCE OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK—U.S. NEED OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CAPTIVE NATIONS," an address by the Honorable Edward J. Derwinski. *The Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., August 21, 1964.

Addresses such as this one are valuable not only for the ideas they express but also because of the factual and detailed content they contain. Congressman Derwinski sets forth the scope of the 1964 Captive Nations Week Observance in the United States and explains why a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations is so vital for us in the Cold War. In his words, "we have before us a wonderful opportunity to expose the fraudulent image of the Soviet Union and to advance the cause of freedom in behalf of all the captive nations and, indeed, of the free world itself."

The presentation makes much of Moscow's blast against the Week. The July 15 issue of *Izvestia* complained, "With every passing year 'Captive Nations Week' becomes a nuisance." It continued, "The stupid situation in which the Washington legislators and rulers found themselves is becoming evident even for those who earnestly propagate the imperialistic policy of the USA." The Russians also sought vain comfort in a self-made fiction that the '64 observance was "passive."

On the imagined passivity of the observance, the address is appended by official proclamations from all major states in the Union, significant articles and statements, and selected programs of rallies. So "passive" was the observance that for the first time a major political Party highlighted its convention with the observance. As to the nuisance aspect of the Week, Derwinski replies to this quite poignantly: "No doubt, it has been and is a nuisance for the Soviet Russian strategy of peaceful coexistence, which is an integral part of its total cold war strategy aimed at the destruction of American will and power."

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"POLISH VOICE IN DEFENSE OF CAPTIVE NATIONS," a commentary by John Switalski. *Polish American*, Chicago, Illinois, December 19, 1964.

For a clear and incisive indictment of the Administration and some so-called Kremlinologists as concerns Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, this article can scarcely be improved upon. Starting with USSR President Mikoyan's address on the 47th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, in which he "assured the world that the Soviet Union wants an end to colonialism so that all nations can be free," the author raises numerous telling points and questions. As to the captive nations, "Why this silence on the part of our government and its representatives in the State Department and the U.N.?"

The worst imperio-colonial system in the history of mankind has been the Soviet Russian one. "It would seem," as the writer aptly put it, "that Secretary of State Dean Rusk or U.N. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson could raise the question of the captive nations without creating a war crisis." He adds, "by failing to speak out, the Johnson Administration makes the captive nations plank in the Democratic platform also look like a hypocritical statement."

Showing the complete naivete of the Chicago columnist Sidney Harris, who claims that "Russia has changed enormously," the writer continues with his pointed questions: "And why the indifference to the rights of such ancient nations as Armenia and Georgia? Or to the Ukrainian nation as populous as France?" These questions breed their own answers.

"THE DAMNED GIVE UP," an article by Yuriy Smolych. *Literaturna Ukraina*, Kiev, Ukraine, October 6, 1964.

Discussion and slanted comments about the Shevchenko Statue of Liberty in Washington go on. This article, reproduced in the valuable *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press* in New York, takes up the case of the rejected soil. As usual, the entire piece is charged with vituperation and hurt vengeance, which is enough to indicate the paucity of its arguments. Nonetheless, for momentary entertainment, the article is worth reading.

It is obvious from the start that Moscow's puppets in Kiev are smarting from the refusal of American groups to have them participate in the unveiling of Shevchenko's statue in Washington in 1964. They simply had no place in this strictly American affair oriented toward the liberation of the captive Ukrainian nation. To have the captors and their lackeys participate would have been grossly incongruous, to say the least. The boys were beaten at their game, and they don't like it.

The writer's erratic conceptions about this historic event are indeed choice. He thinks the free soil of America is not "sacred soil" for the monument. His remarks about Mr. Platon Stasiuk, which virtually paint him as being completely naive about all this, suggest that the Stasiuks are no longer Americans, for when in Ukraine they "were on their native soil again." And the semantic parade of spiced nomers—"counter-revolutionary nationalist groups," "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," "reactionary imperialists" and so forth—provides a reliable barometer of the temperature in which this article was written. The writer and his puppet colleagues seemed to be terribly concerned about "the deluge of anti-Soviet articles which appeared in the reactionary press overseas on the occasion of the erection of the Shevchenko monument."

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"NEW PAPAL APPOINTMENTS," a report. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., January 23, 1965.

This organ and papers throughout the world carried the news of the Papal appointments to the College of Cardinals. Twenty-seven new appointments were made at this time. Several more are expected in the course of 1965.

Of particular importance is the elevation of Archbishop Joseph Slipy to the Cardinalate. His appointment by the Holy Father unquestionably signifies at this time the increasing stature of the Ukrainian nation and people, as against the paper government in Kiev, in world affairs. Recognition of this by the Vatican has solid long-term significance.

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America was quick to congratulate the new Ukrainian Cardinal. In a message to him, it declared, "This nomination, of which all Ukrainians regardless of their faith and political beliefs are justly proud, is a recognition of the Supreme Pontiff of your long suffering and martyrdom for the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian people."

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"THE FIGHT IN UKRAINE DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS," an article by A. Mykulyn, *ABN Correspondence*, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany, October-December, 1964.

For those who imagine that no cold war exists in the Soviet Russian Empire, particularly in the USSR, this well-written article will bring them back to reality. The writer presents a brief but detailed survey of the cold war

that has been going on for the past five years in Ukraine. Each report is documented by a quoted source, chiefly that of a Soviet Russian or Ukrainian agency.

On December 11, 1959, for example, *Trud* (No. 287) reported the capture of Ukrainian nationalists in Nyzy, near Lviv, by the KGB. The Russian paper *Literaturnaya Gazeta* reported on January 22, 1960 that a plenum of the writers' association in Ukraine "had dealt with the combatting of Ukrainian nationalism, especially the combatting of the Bandera Movement." On August 24, 1961 the Free German paper *Abendzeitung* reported: "The Soviet scientist, Mykola Ivanovych Sereda, who fled to the West from the USSR, disclosed to Austrian officials that there is an active anti-Russian resistance movement in Ukraine."

Little wonder that the year before, at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party in Ukraine, Podgorny, the first secretary of the Party's central committee, announced an intensified fight "against every form of the bourgeois ideology of Ukrainian nationalism." On February 21, 1962, *Radyanska Ukraina* reported that this puppet chieftain "called for a strengthened and ruthless fight against the Ukrainian nationalists" at an ideological meeting of the central committee. The same source reported on January 24, 1963 about a trial in Uzhhorod against captured Ukrainian nationalists. *Prykarpatska Pravda* reported in June 1964 that a trial of OUN members took place in Ukraine on February 28, 1964. These are only a few examples.

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"RUSS-UKRAINIANS STACK KREMLIN DECK," an article by Robert Conquest. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., December 27, 1964.

It would appear from this article that Ukrainian quislings are on the brink of capturing and leading the Soviet Union. The writer, an English author now with the Columbia University Institute of Soviet Studies, doesn't use the term "The Ukrainian Mafia," but his description of recent changes in the Kremlin amounts to a possible control of the USSR by this mafia.

The writer goes down the list of quislings: Brezhnev, Nikolai V. Podgorny, Andrei P. Kirilenko, Dmitri S. Polyansky, Pyotr E. Shelest, Vladimir Semichastny, head of the KGB, and many others. His position is that political stability is absent in Moscow and "further surprises are likely." He also asks, "For how can the Soviet Communist Party let itself be ruled by such a local cadre—and one from a section of the party always regarded as unreliable?"

In Conquest's opinion, the Russian faction will play up to Malinovsky and the army to prevent the "Ukrainian" capture. He says, "It seems likely that a political faction opposed to the Ukrainians would defend the Marshal for the moment as a temporary ally against a common enemy." It's strange that the writer fails to designate Malinovsky as a Ukrainian, which by birth he is. This would complicate his analysis somewhat. Also, if he were aware of how quisling Ukrainians in the past, going far back beyond Catherine the Great, had been brought into the employ of Russian imperialist interests, his thesis wouldn't appear so alluring. The factor of growing Western interest in Ukraine escapes him entirely. This factor will account for even more Russian window-dressing of Ukrainians in the Kremlin, a sort of potemkinized Russian-Ukrainian solidarity in Moscow's global imperio-colonial scheme.

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"ISMAIL GASPIRALI," an article by M. Ulkusal. *National Centre of Crimean Turks Publications*, Ankara, Turkey, 1964.

Ismail Gaspirali was an outstanding reformer of Turkism who lived from 1851 to 1914. This essay pays tribute to his works on the occasion of the 50th

anniversary of his death. The writer is a jurist and also the president of the National Centre of Crimean Turks, located in Turkey.

The Centre issues periodically publications dealing with the Moslem Turkic nations in the USSR. Often its publications relate Turkic problems to those of the other non-Russian nations in the USSR. In this article the life of Ismail is clearly depicted, first as a teacher of the Russian language in Crimea, then an observer in Paris, followed by a career of journalism, education, and political revolutionary activity in the Czarist Russian Empire.

Like so many other non-Russian patriots of his day, Ismail fought the sinister forces of Russification and traditional Russian imperio-colonialism. He too, sought freedom for his people.

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“SOVIET COLONIAL EXPLOITATION IN STATISTICS,” a commentary. *Elta*, Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, New York, N. Y., September 20, 1964.

On August 29, 1964, in a speech at Banska Bystrica, Czecho-Slovakia, Khrushchev again wailed against “imperialists” who still talk of “liberating Eastern European nations.” He also raised his favorite question, “From whom, I ask, are they to be liberated? The people in these countries chose the Socialist system themselves of their own free will.” Highlighting this bold lie, the editors of this informative publication proceed to show the manner by which Moscow raped the three Baltic nations and now exploits not only the Baltic colonies but also those in other parts of this primary Soviet Russian Empire.

The editors lean heavily on the recent analysis made by Abdurakhman G. Avtorkhanov, a researcher at the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich and a graduate of the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow. The analysis places great stress on the lagging industrialization of the non-Russian republics. It points out, “The industrialization of the national republics lags significantly behind that of the Russian metropolis.” One solid indication of this is the high percentage of urban population in the RSFSR (52%) as against that of Lithuania (39%).

Another indicator of the lag in the non-Russian republics is the basic agricultural character of these colonies. As the analysis observes it, “The native population by itself is still basically agricultural in a majority of the Union republics and in all of the autonomous republics.” The “internationalization” policy pushed by Moscow, whereby non-Russian cities have become targets for Russian migration, serves to extend Moscow’s imperial control and to denationalize these republics. In short, Soviet Russian genocide is now a silk-gloved operation.

*L. E.D.*

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