

**EXPERIENCE**

**WITH**

**RUSSIA**



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***by Vasyl Hryshko***

**NEW YORK — 1956**

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## F O R E W O R D

EXPERIENCE WITH RUSSIA is a unique analysis of the power force behind the throne of Communist imperialism. It is unique because it deals forthrightly with the connection between the historic force of Russian imperialism and Communist imperialism. Very few books appearing on the American scene have made a penetrating analysis of this phenomenon. In recent years a number of outstanding American newspapers have carried editorials and short articles on this subject, all of which show the need for a thorough study of this question.

The author uses as his analytical vehicle the tragic case of the Ukrainian nation whose sovereignty and independence has suffered at the hands of both these imperialistic forces. In a factual and documentary manner, he demonstrates the similarity of purpose, technique, and objective of Moscow imperialism, past and present.

The most common misunderstanding about the Soviet Union is that it is a nation of Russian people. The term *Russia* is constantly used as synonymous to USSR. Actually according to best estimates, which have been brought up-to-date from the official Soviet statistics we find that of a total population of approximately 202,000,000, 91,500,000 are Russian and 110,500,000 are non-Russian. Thus, the majority of the people, over 54 per cent of the USSR, are non-Russian.

The Ukraine, somewhat larger in area than France, is one of the richest countries in the world in agriculture, minerals, hydroelectric power and industry. It produces over 25 per cent of the grain, half of the coal and half of the salt of the USSR, and is second only to the United States in the mining of iron ore. In the production of steel it ranks fourth in the world, far ahead of such countries as France and Japan. It has the largest population of any of the satellite nations within the Soviet orbit.

The Ukrainian state dates from the 10th and 11th centuries when Kiev became a center of culture, long before the origin of the Russian state, which came into the political arena in the 15th century and was known as Muscovy. Similarly, Armenia, Georgia, and other non-Russian nations of the USSR have a tradition of culture, language and literature antedating Muscovite Russia by centuries.



Blessed by an extraordinary rich soil it is easy to visualize a hard-working, contented peasantry producing wheat, grain, cattle and dairy products more than sufficient for Eastern Europe with a surplus to Western Europe as well. Under the enlightened intellectual and scientific leadership of Ukrainian professional men (and they have proven themselves by sheer ability) the vast riches of iron ore, coal, pig iron, steel, hydroelectric power, textiles and other industries should warrant the development of a civilized Christian country, exchanging not only its commercial, agricultural and industrial products with both the East and the West, but, at long last, taking its part, based on its ancient Christian culture, in the progress of the world.

That would be the American idea. In our concept, such a hardy people should be allowed to pursue their ideals of freedom and independence and contribute in their own way to the culture and progress of the world.

But what do we see: Russian Communist imperialism, in the most brutal and inhuman orgy known to mankind, deliberately and with premeditation, created an artificial famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933, which resulted in over 4,000,000 dead from starvation. All this to crush the Ukrainian peasant because of his freedom-loving resistance to forcible Russian collectivization. In the words of Stalin, "The peasantry represents the basic army of the national movement. It is this that we have in mind when we say that the national question is, in essence, a question of peasantry." This was Stalin's way of solving the nationality problem.

And, in addition, there was the forcible deportation of millions of Ukrainian men, women and children to forced labor in Siberia and the Arctic regions. But imperialist Russian tyranny, whether it be under the Muscovite Tsars or under Moscow dominated communism, has never broken the spirit of the Ukrainians.

To go back to 1654, Ukraine, then an independent state, fearful of Polish domination, formed an alliance with Muscovy. The Russian Tsars soon broke the treaty and declared war on Ukraine. Fifty years of warfare culminated in a Russian victory and Ukraine was divided between Russia and Poland. Toward the end of the 18th century, Catherine II initiated deportations to Siberia on a vast scale.

In 1917 Ukraine achieved independence, as did Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and other non-Russian nations and also the Baltic States, Poland and Finland.

The weak Kerensky government, unable to cope with the rising tide of Bolshevism, concentrated its efforts on preventing the non-Russian nations from establishing their own independent states. Russian officials were ordered to boycott and sabotage all ordinances and decrees of the

Ukrainian *Rada* and to refuse to recognize its authority. Kerensky made two trips to Kiev at a time when his Russian Provisional Government was in a most precarious position in Petersburg. Nevertheless, despite his financial support to Russian agents in the country for the purpose of undermining the government, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* had the overwhelming support of the people; elections were held and Kerensky was forced to recognize the Central *Rada* as the supreme Parliament of Ukraine.

The Bolshevik *coup d'état* took place on November 7, 1917 which gave them total power in the Russian Federated Socialist Republic of Soviets. From the first the Russian Bolsheviks pursued the same policy toward the non-Russian nations but with more skill and deceitfulness. They recognized the Ukrainian Republic, but organized and financed agents, saboteurs and a fifth column throughout the land. Nevertheless, the Republic survived, if only for a few years, before final conquest by the Red Army. During this period diplomatic relations were established by Ukraine with a number of countries including Great Britain, France, and Turkey.

The tragedy after World War I was the failure of the Western democratic leaders to recognize the full significance of the struggle in the political vacuum created by the downfall of Tsarist Russian imperialism (under the Communists) and might have prevented the rise of Hitlerism and World War II. The Allied statesmen, opposed as they were to communism, failed to understand the potential political forces in Ukraine and the other non-Russian nations of the empire in their struggle for freedom and independence from imperialist Russia, whether Tsarist or Communist.

Instead, they gave their support to the remnants of the Tsarist armies under Denikin and Baron Wrangel. These forces fought in Ukraine, the Caucasus and other non-Russian regions where the newly created freedom-loving republics had no desire to return to Russian autocracy under a Tsar. The White Russian armies were, in the end, defeated, and the tragic result of this struggle was only to prepare the way for the new conqueror, Moscow-dominated communism.

In Russia proper there was no embittered civil war and very little resistance to communism whereas in each of the non-Russian countries the Bolsheviks met with stubborn armed resistance which took years to overcome. In comparing Ukraine with Russia Lenin stated: "In the course of two years, we finally succeeded in securing the sentiment and support of the greater part of the workers and peasants of Great Russia, but we did not end with winning over the sentiment and support of the majority of the working class of Ukraine."



During World War II the German *Wehrmacht* was welcomed with open arms in the USSR. Thousands of Red Army troops surrendered without a struggle. Nazi propaganda was extremely effective throughout the non-Russian countries and Ukraine was promised freedom and independence. In the initial stages the German High Command treated the occupied populations with the usual conventional military procedures. It was not until later when Hitler decided that the Gestapo, under Himmler, should have complete jurisdiction over the occupied areas that this policy was changed. The result is history. The local population was treated with extreme cruelty and the people became little better than slaves to the German occupying forces. Ukraine soon realized that it would have to fight the German Nazis as well as the Russian communists. The Ukrainian 14th Division organized in the early stages of the war fought with great distinction until they deserted and joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). This army, which numbered over 200,000 troops toward the latter part of the war, fought effectively the German army in the West and the Red army in the East. The UPA continued operations until 1947.

The Germans, in the meantime, organized from Great Russian POWs an army for the "Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" under the command of the captured Soviet General Vlassov. This army saw no action and performed guard duty until the very end of the war when the Soviet forces were approaching Prague. Instead of resisting the communist troops, this so-called army disintegrated from wholesale desertions to the Red Army.

It might be asked: Are not Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia and all the other non-Russian countries just as Communist as Russia proper? This is not and never has been the case. Stalin states: "The political bases of the proletarian dictatorship are the central (Great Russian) areas of Russia" and that in the non-Russian republics "the substantial part of the proletariat which lends support to the Soviet power belongs to the Great Russian nationality."

All power emanates from the All-Union Communist Party in Moscow. Party and government officials are appointed to all regions in the USSR from Moscow. According to official Soviet census as outlined by Mr. Hryshko, Russian membership in the party represented 65 per cent of the total (with Russians forming 46 per cent of the total population of the USSR). Ukraine comprised 11 per cent of the Party membership (Ukraine forming 21 per cent of the total population). However, the 11 per cent "Ukrainian" membership does not in any way mean that these members are all Ukrainians. A large proportion of this 11 per cent are Russians, either sent to or settled in Ukraine. 7 per cent

would be a truer proportion of the real Ukrainian membership in the Communist Party.

Recent events in the USSR, since the death of Stalin, lend substantiation on the authenticity of *Experience with Russia*.

At the time of Stalin's death the Kremlin issued, in the form of an editorial in *Pravda*, a unity call to the USSR in which it stressed "the confidence in the Soviet Government displayed by the Great Russian people, the leader among the peoples of our country . . ."

Soon after Stalin's death there were drastic shake-ups of top Party and government officials in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Byelorussia and each of the Baltic States, and they continue as of this writing. There was the rebellion in the Soviet Zone of Germany on June 17th 1953, with repercussions in Czechoslovakia, drastic changes in policy in Hungary and Rumania and even in the USSR. And later, the arrest of the number two man in the regime, Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior, L. P. Beria, boss of the secret police, internal and external espionage services, the slave labor camps and the atomic energy program. All these events point to a weakening of the central regime and resistance throughout non-Russian nations of the USSR, as well as the satellite countries, to Moscow-dominated imperialism.

American security depends on full and complete knowledge of the many nations that comprise the USSR so that the American public may come to know who are its friends and, particularly, who are its enemies. Mr. Hryshko brings out in his book *Experience with Russia*, the stark realities of the USSR. It is an indictment of Russian imperialism through the centuries, from the rule of Catherine II to the present time. It goes a long way toward a better understanding of conditions as they exist in the USSR today. It may offend the sensitivities of certain American experts on "Russia" who, unfortunately, have attained their expert status by an almost exclusive study of text books and other publications prepared by the hands of skillful Marxists. For them, this book provides the key for liberating their minds from biased prejudices and opening the door to objective study which is the very foundation of academic freedom.

There is a great need at this time for this type of scholarly work and it is hoped that there will be more like it in the future. Heretofore, the main source of knowledge has come from Communist propaganda in the form of books, speeches, and articles, and it is high time that the long struggle for freedom and independence of the non-Russian nations be brought to the foreground and given due recognition.

G. D. MENTZ, *Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, retired.*

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## P R E F A C E

The preparation of this book was connected with a special occasion, the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav between Ukraine and Moscow which was being ostentatiously celebrated in 1954 by Moscow. The relations, which were to prove so fatal to Ukraine and to lead to her complete subjugation by Russia, began with the signing of this Treaty in 1654.

This "anniversary" should most convincingly illustrate to all the free peoples of the world the peculiarly Russian method by which Moscow has already subjugated so many nations and even today aims at subjugating others. What is the method? First, pressing on a certain nation an "alliance" with Russia through a "treaty of friendship" or "mutual assistance"; then, the false interpretation and falsification of this treaty and the intrusion into domestic policies by means of internal intrigues and provocations; and, finally, open violations of the treaty and brutal subjugation of this country by force to Russian domination.

Such was the method by which Russia subjugated Ukraine, consistently violating and falsifying the Treaty signed with Ukraine at Pereyaslav 300 years ago.

This "anniversary" should be a definite warning to the whole world, especially those to whom Moscow offers "friendship" and "treaties of alliance" at this very time. What Russia really has in mind is an insidious plan for world domination.

Three hundred years of Ukrainian-Russian relations have meant three hundred years of continuous war. This war has been fought both in the open and in the underground. It has been extremely arduous for the long-suffering Ukrainian nation which has sacrificed so much in its desperate struggle for independence from Russia. The climax of this struggle was reached when Russian imperialism appeared in its communist form; and this struggle has continued for the past thirty eight years.

Russia glorified the year 1654 as the year of "Ukrainian-Russian friendship" in contradiction to historical fact. With this, the Russian Soviet government itself inadvertently admitted the complicated nationality

problem in the Soviet Union and even drew the world's attention to its importance. The Soviet Union's nationality problem is one of the most important considerations for the free world in its struggle with Soviet Russian imperialism.

This book is addressed to those who are interested in a problem of vital concern to all.

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## INTRODUCTION

The world today lies in the shadow of a formidable menace which bears the name of *Russian imperialism*.

This imperialism — which is cloaked in *Communist* garb and has for its springboard the USSR — already has brought under its sway millions of human beings and enslaved many independent nations both in Europe and Asia. Now it has become an immediate threat to America itself.

In this situation, which can be characterised as the situation before a *Third World War*, historical fate has imposed upon America the duty of leading the free world in its struggle against Russian imperialism. This responsibility now thrust upon America makes it of paramount importance not only for American statesmen but for American citizens as well to understand the nature of this enemy of mankind, now threatening to destroy and annihilate the entire free world.

Unfortunately, many Americans still demonstrate a confusion of thought and lack a clear idea of the nature of this enemy. This is based above all on the failure to understand two things: first, the relation between “Russian imperialism” and “communism,” and second, the real national and political force behind these two phenomena.

Since communism is an essentially international and not a national ideology, many thoughtful men and women are blind to its nature. Some fall into the grievous error of thinking that international communism, rather than Russian imperialism is the enemy of mankind. On the other hand, among those who do recognize that Russia is the real national and political force masquerading under the banner of communism, some believe that Russia today represents the sum total of all those peoples who have been forcibly incorporated into the Russian political state system which was previously known as the “Russian Empire,” and now as the USSR.

But the truth is quite different. Russian imperialism, the expression of the aggressive policies of Russia, is a phenomenon completely independent of communism as an ideology, in the same way as communism is a phenomenon independent of Russian imperialism. They have existed

and can exist independently of each other, each presenting a separate threat to the free world. What must be realized is that in their respective historical development these two phenomena have joined forces and thus have posed a threat far graver than if they had been posed separately. Each has increased the potential of the other. Russian imperialism, in accepting the ideological banner of communism, threatens not only individual nations and countries but the whole world. And communism, inasmuch as it has become the ideological shield of a real imperialistic power, has ceased to be an ideology but has become instead a threat to the world great powers.

As for the concrete national and political force which stands behind Russian imperialism, now garbed in communist cloth, here, too, the truth is simple: Russian imperialism remains *Russian* imperialism, no matter how many nationalities made up the former Russian empire or comprise the contemporary Soviet Union. Great empires, which were created through the conquest of various nations, have always been the instrument of a *nation-conqueror*. Whether or not the imperialistic policies of Russia of the past and present have been completely identified with the national interest of the Russian masses, nevertheless it is the *Russians* alone who are responsible for this imperialism and its outrageous conquests and not the conquered non-Russian peoples who were forcibly incorporated into the Russian "prison of nations."

All this must be brought home to the American people if they are to know and understand the nature of the enemy. The enemy has a dual character, and this dualism must always be kept in mind if we are to resist successfully. We should not be oblivious to the fact that communism lurks behind Russian imperialism; by the same reasoning, we cannot afford to be unaware that Russian imperialism is the motivating and generating force behind communism. However, we must not overlook the fact that *non-Russian* peoples, subjugated by the totalitarian system of the Russian empire of the past as well as of the present are included in the terms "Russia" and "Russians." These helpless victims are against Russian imperialism — not for it.

This is especially important today. For, if we want to know *who is our enemy*, in this struggle, it is even more important to know *who are our friends*.

*The non-Russian peoples, forcibly conquered by Russia and ruled by its despotic system of government, are among the natural friends of America and the free world at large in their struggle against, and opposition to Russian imperialism.*

Moreover, knowledge of the relations and attitude of these peoples toward Russia and Russian imperialism is exceedingly important in order

to learn the essence of Russian imperialism itself. A correct and exhaustive knowledge and understanding of Russian imperialism independent of communism will provide a truer perspective of the Communist role in transforming Russian imperialism into a world menace. The non-Russian nations, which found themselves under the domination of Russia and in its "prison of nations," were victims of Russian imperialism long before the latter assumed the ideological cover of communism. Since Russia heretofore has not threatened America directly, the fate of these nations has been unknown and of almost no concern to America and the free world in general. But now the tragic fate of these non-Russian peoples must be brought before the eyes of the American people, because, in the knowledge of what has happened to *them* under Russian domination, the American people will see the incontrovertible proof that, only after having completely subordinated and enslaved these peoples — while the rest of the world remained indifferent — has Russia succeeded in becoming a major imperialistic power. Now, with the help of the ideology of international communism, she is about to begin her assault upon the remaining free world.

In this book we are trying to present so to say „a case against Russia" or a concise bill of indictment against Russia on the part of one of the largest of the non-Russian peoples enslaved by Russian imperialism, namely the Ukrainian Nation. The fate of the Ukrainian people is typical and indicative of how Russian imperialism has developed through the bloody conquest and oppression of its weaker neighbors and why it is today an impacable threat to the entire free world.

However distant the struggle of the Ukrainian people for independence and liberty may seem to the American people, nevertheless, the Ukrainian indictment of Russia is an eloquent and portentous warning to all freedom-loving peoples including the American.

And it is especially timely and appropriate inasmuch as American policy on the Ukrainian-Russian problem was formulated under the influence of the Russians themselves, the result being that Americans underestimate and even ignore the vitally important problem of Ukraine. This in turn accounts for the many shortcomings in American policy toward the complex problem of the non-Russian peoples within the USSR, the primary position of which is occupied by Ukraine. It is the task of this book to call the attention of both the U. S. Government and the American people to this problem and to present it in the light of historical facts.

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## CHAPTER ONE: UKRAINE IN THE RUSSIAN "PRISON OF NATIONS"

### 1. *Russia — Prison of Nations*

The term "prison of nations" as applied to Russia or the present-day USSR is not an invention of the enemies of Russia, rather it is an expression describing aptly as well as accurately the nature of this state. It was first used by progressive Russians themselves; such outstanding Russian leaders as Herzen and Bakunin over one hundred years ago called Russia "a prison of nations," and from that time on this appellation has been tacitly accepted by all forthright and liberal Russians.

Obviously, the term "prison of nations" cannot be applied to Russia proper (Muscovy) i. e. the national fatherland of the Russian (Muscovite) people; rather it defines the gigantic and multi-national state that came into being as a "Russian empire" in the 18th century, and which, after the Revolution of 1917 and the victory of Bolshevism, adopted a new name, the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (USSR). This state has grown and developed as a result of the conquest by the Russian nation of numerous non-Russian peoples and territories over which she established a brutal and despotic rule. Her rule over the non-Russians bears all the characteristics of enforced enslavement — persecution in the field of national culture, political and national oppression, economic exploitation — so that this state has earned its name: "prison of nations."

The prison-like character of the Russian multi-national state-empire is clearly demonstrated in the history of its origin. In the 15th century this state was called the Moscow Tsardom and consisted of 55,000 square miles of territory. It was purely a Russian (Muscovite) national state.<sup>1</sup> From that time and approximately up until the end of the 19th century this state seized a territory in Europe and Asia which was 159 times larger than the original state. Thus, the *Moscow State* established its rule over 8,764,000 square miles of territory or 1/6 of the earth's surface.<sup>2</sup> In the process of this expansion the Moscow State subjugated about one hundred different nations, approximately 1/10 of the world's entire population;<sup>3</sup> among the subjugated peoples there were many large nations which had been independent until then.

The means by which Russia expanded her territory and population so tremendously do not require much explanation; during two centuries of Russian history, the 18th and 19th centuries, we find but 71 years and 8 months of peace, as against 128 years and 4 months of war. During this period Russia had 33 foreign and 2 domestic wars; 22 of these were aggressive wars aimed at the conquest of other countries which, taken together, lasted for 101 years. During this time in Central Asia and the Caucasus alone Russia had 65 years of war.<sup>4</sup>

The size of conquest may be shown in the following figures: at the end of the 15th century Russia possessed an area of 560,000 square kilometers; at the end of the 16th, 8,720,000 square kilometers; in the 17th, 14,399,000; in the 18th, 17,080,000 square kilometers, and in the 19th century, 22,311,992 square kilometers.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, by conquest and the suppression of many formerly independent nations the prison-like Russian Empire was created. Here, at the beginning of 20th century, more than 100,000,000 non-Russians, had been brought under the domination of less than 70,000,000 Russians. Thus, the ratio in the Russian Empire was about 2 Russians to 3 non-Russians.<sup>6</sup>

This fact is evident even from the biased official Russian census of 1897, which shows that non-Russian nations accounted for 57 per cent of "Russia's" population, whereas the Russians themselves made up only 43 per cent; thus the Russians constituted the national minority in this so-called "Russian State."<sup>7</sup> The above figures of the population of the Russian Empire and its nationality segments for 1897 also include 7,931,000 Poles who constituted 6.11% of the European population of Russia.

Among the non-Russian majority there are several large formerly self-governing nations which had been subjugated by Russia. Often these nations represent different races, beliefs, and cultures. (Even the Russians themselves have admitted that most of these peoples were on a higher cultural level than the Muscovites.<sup>8</sup> These peoples are: the Ukrainians with a population of more than 40,000,000; the Byelorussians, with more than 10,000,000; Turkestanians (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirghizs, Turkmen, Tadjiks) with some 20,000,000; the Caucasian peoples (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, North Caucasians) with about 10,000,000; the Baltic nations (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) with about 7,000,000 and others.<sup>9</sup>

However, despite the fact that the Russians were in the minority and that each of the conquered peoples possessed an ancient culture and separate government, the Russians not only sought to destroy their cultures and political systems, but deliberately omitted granting any political, national or cultural rights to the non-Russian peoples. Moreover

even the names designating the nationality of these peoples were banned within the boundaries of the Russian Empire; all the non-Russians were compelled to call themselves "Russians," to work in the interest of Russia, and to further her culture. The Russian government at all times assiduously enforced this program of Russification and assimilation through brazen terror and deportation.<sup>10</sup>

This method of Russian expansion lasted until the great Revolution of 1917, after which the Russian empire disintegrated and new, sovereign states were established which existed from 1917 to 1921. At that time Russian Bolshevism, having consolidated its position in Russia Proper, continued the traditional Russian imperialist policy. With Russian hands and in the name of Russian national and political interests, they reconquered these non-Russian peoples and restored the Russian prison of nations, but under a new name.

## *2. How Russia Conquered Ukraine*

The long-suffering Ukrainian people, one of the largest of the non-Russian nations, are numbered among the conquered nations. This conquest was effected through war, ruse and deceit.

Already in the 10th to 11th centuries, there was an Ukrainian state; it was called the Kievan State (the Principality of Kiev) after Kiev, the name of the capital of Ukraine.<sup>11</sup> The great kingdom with its capital in Kiev in the 9th to 12th Centuries was called the country of "Rus." The names "Rus" and "Ruthenians" were the official names of the country and people, the predecessors of the Ukrainians. Moreover, literary records of the XI century show that this territory was also called Ukraine by the people. The name "Rus" is not identical with the name "Russia." Rus existed long before the Russian (Moscow) state, which arrived on the historical scene as late as the 15th century in the form of the Moscow Tsardom.<sup>12</sup> After the devastation of the Kievan state by various Mongolian hordes in the 13th century the Ukrainian state survived more than a century on the territory of the Right Bank of Dnieper and Western Ukraine (Galician-Volhynian kingdom), but as a result of the dynastic situation it was divided among Poland (a smaller section) and Lithuania (the greater part of Ukr. territory). In the Lithuanian state the Ukrainians and Byelorussians constituted a fundamentally cultured element which enjoyed full freedom and the rule of their own Princes, and recognized only the over-rule of the Lithuanian dynasty. Ukrainian was the official language.

However, the Lithuanian state fell into a close union with Poland, which, through various diplomatic acts forced Lithuania into a still closer union and took the greater part of the Ukrainian territory away from it. (1569). After this the Polish government of nobles tried by all means to limit the equality of the Ukrainian nation, which was due it according to its constitution, and tried to convert the Ukrainian people and their territory into a colony. This brought about a long struggle of the Ukrainians for their freedom. A special Ukrainian army was formed on the model of a knightly order and called the "Zaporozhian Army" or the Zaporozhian Kozaks. This army was composed of escapees from Polish persecution on the lower Dnieper. It created its own independent Ukrainian knightly state, which entered into various negotiations with the Polish, Turkish and other sovereigns. The Ukrainian Kozaks often carried on uprisings against the Polish tyranny.

In the middle of the 17th century (1648) Ukraine was liberated from Polish rule and once again became an independent state in the form of the so-called "Cossacks Republic."<sup>13</sup> This was achieved through a national revolution under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. (The "Hetman" in this Ukrainian Kozak Republic was at once the head of the state and the Chief Commander of the Army. He was elected.) With the liberation from Poland Ukraine could not enjoy the blessing of peace even though Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky demonstrated the deepest desire for peaceful cooperation with Poland. The Polish kings marshalled all their forces to involve Ukraine in war again and waged one war after another with her. Ukraine was greatly weakened by these wars and desperately needed an ally in order to strengthen her position in Eastern Europe. Khmelnytsky worked out a plan to create a great alliance between Ukraine, Transylvania, Wallachia and Sweden, in order to maintain the balance of political power in that part of Europe. But before the alliance could be established Khmelnytsky vacillated between his allies of the time, Turkey and the Moscow Tsar in order to deter Poland from another armed threat against Ukraine. Finally he decided upon such a military union with the Tsar of Moscow, which he concluded in the Spring of 1654 as a fitting military agreement in Pereyaslav. On the basis of this Treaty, which was in effect a military threat to the Polish king, Ukraine was to retain its full national independence, which fact appears in the part of the Treaty reading:

1. The Ukrainian State is to enter an alliance with Muscovy under the Muscovite monarch (Tsar) as a separate state unit on an equal footing with the Muscovite State and possessed of a separate government headed by an elected *Hetman* and of a separate army.

2. All the rights and freedoms enjoyed by the Ukrainians in the Ukrainian state as represented by the republican form of government, democratic (elective) administration and the military organization as well as prior to the alliance with Muscovy were guaranteed specifically against any change or interference on the part of the Muscovite government, which thereby expressly agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine.

3. Ukraine under the *Hetman* reserved the right to entertain separate diplomatic relations with foreign countries except those with whom both the signatories were in hostile relationship.<sup>14</sup>

The treaty thus regulated the relations between Ukraine and Muscovy in what was a type of *feudal* alliance: an ordinary alliance between two states which symbolically placed both under the suzerainty of the monarch. Thus Ukraine was placed under the nominal "protection" of the tsar only, the Russian government or people had no authority or jurisdiction over the Ukrainian people and their state. The juridical form of this alliance cannot be denied even by the imperialistically-minded Russian historians, who state that "Ukraine had not been united with Muscovy as a province, but remained a separate state, with its own system of government, military, and even the right to establish relations with foreign states . . . Ukraine never united with the Muscovite state, but only recognized the Muscovite tsar as a *sui generis* protector. It was an individual alliance on a voluntary basis . . ."<sup>15</sup>

Even official Soviet-Russian historians, who represent the most imperialistic point of view, state that "according to the Treaty of Pereyaslav, Ukraine became a feudal republic, which established vassal relations with the Russian Tsar . . . but she remained a centralized state under her own national central government."<sup>16</sup>

The Ukrainians understood the Treaty as one between two independent parties — the Ukrainian Kozak State and the Tsar. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky accordingly formulated his policies after the Treaty and up until the time of his death. Moscow, on the other hand, did not only falsely interpret the Treaty, but falsified it as well. This evoked the stubborn resistance of the Ukrainian Government under Hetman Khmelnytsky, and in the time of his successor, Ivan Vyhovsky it led to Moscow's declaring war on Ukraine which ended in Moscow's resigning from its attempts to falsify because it did not have the means to defeat Ukraine.

The Ukrainians understood the Treaty as an ordinary alliance between two independent states, and, therefore, they signed it. But it was not so construed by the Russians (Muscovites), who interpreted it in their own fashion. Thus, in regard to monarchical authority, the Russian Tsar



was an absolute ruler. And since Ukraine had recognized the nominal authority of the Muscovite Tsar, the alliance was tantamount to a recognition of Muscovite jurisdiction over Ukraine. The Muscovite law held that treaty commitments with the Tsar were binding upon one party only and in no way obligated the Tsar, who was "responsible only to God."

Aside from the usual imperialistic tendencies of Moscow, which founded the false interpretation of the Treaty on their part, a misunderstanding was rooted in the very origin of the treaty, one which arose from the different ways of life of both people: the Ukrainian democratic system as contrasted with the Muscovite's autocratic-totalitarian way of life. This is also confirmed by several foreign historians who have analyzed this matter from an objective point of view.<sup>17</sup> The fact that the treaty was differently understood by both the contracting parties is also recognized by a Russian historian who stated that: "not understanding and not trusting each other, both in their relations were saying things they did not mean and acting in a way they did not want to act."<sup>18</sup>

These diametrically opposed interpretations of the Treaty of Pereyaslav by the Ukrainians and the Muscovites subsequently had fatal consequences for Ukraine. Making use of its own interpretation, the Muscovites began breaking the treaty almost immediately after signing. This occurred when Bohdan Khmelnytsky was still alive. He was the first to understand the Muscovite deceit. As one of the Russian historians has said: "Khmelnytsky, once crying, accused Moscow by saying: all this is not the way I wanted it to be nor how it was supposed to be."<sup>19</sup> Already in 1655-57, Khmelnytsky, planning a break with Moscow, began talks with Sweden and other countries with a view to forming military alliances. Only death prevented him from realizing his plan.<sup>20</sup> Instead, Moscow, which had always wanted to subjugate Ukraine, realized her plan. Under the pretext of the "treaty," Moscow began to act as an occupant.

When Muscovite intervention in the internal affairs of Ukraine became intolerable, the Ukrainians took a decided stand against it which led to war between the two states. The first Ukrainian-Muscovite war broke out in 1658, at which time Ukraine was under the *hetmanship* of Ivan Vyhovsky, Khmelnytsky's successor. During this war a short-lived military alliance between Ukraine and Poland was in force. The Ukrainian troops won an impressive military victory over the Muscovites near Kono-top in 1659, destroying and routing the Muscovite forces.<sup>21</sup>

Succeeding Ukrainian-Muscovite wars lasted for almost half a century with varying results. Ukrainian-Muscovite antagonism reached its height during the leadership of Hetman Petro Doroshenko (1665-1676). Hetman Petro Doroshenko was one of Ukraine's greatest statesmen. He

understood completely the threat which Russian imperialism posed to Eastern and Central Europe as well as to Ukraine, and attempted to protect Ukraine from this threat at all cost. Therefore, he estimated the geopolitical value of the Black Sea basin and of good neighborly relations with Turkey; he also based the entire future of the Ukrainian state on friendship with this country. After long diplomatic negotiations Hetman Doroshenko concluded a treaty with Turkey, in which he accepted the protectorate of the Turkish Sultan over Ukraine in return for military aid. Since Ukraine was engaged in settling scores with her other neighbor, Poland, this war ended in a severe Ukrainian defeat. In 1672 Hetman Doroshenko, confronted by vastly superior Russian troops, was taken prisoner and died in a Russian dungeon. Profiting by this defeat of Ukraine, Muscovy and Poland concluded a treaty, which partitioned Ukraine, Muscovy taking the larger part. (Ironically enough, Poland herself was partitioned over a hundred years later by Russia, Austria and Prussia. Austria took the Western Ukraine e.g., Galicia and Bukovina, together with a part of Poland). The great anti-Muscovite uprising in Ukraine under the leadership of Petryk (1692-1695) ended in a decisive defeat, and the end of the 17th century saw the beginning of the Muscovite domination of Ukraine.

The first stage of Russian domination was completed by Tsar Peter I who conquered, in addition to Ukraine, other new, non-Russian territories; thereby he transformed the Muscovite state into an empire, giving it in 1721 a new name, "Russia," and the Muscovite people the "Russian."<sup>22</sup> The name "Russia" was taken from Greek in the Middle Ages. In Greek literature and documents in Constantinople this name is applied only to the Kievan State Rus, which the Greeks named simply *Ros* or *Rossia*. In the age of the Kievan Orthodox Metropolitan of the 14th century it came to be name of the southern part of the metropolitanate (purely Ukrainian) and the Patriarchal office began calling it the metropolitanate of "Little Rus" contrary to the later Muscovy named in the metropolitanate office as "Great Russia". In this the Patriarchal office followed the Greek tradition which named the Greek colony in Italy "Greater Greece" in contrast to "Little Greece" as they called their native land. Thus, for the Greeks, Muscovy which once was a dependent country under Kievan Rus and was to a certain degree a colony of Rus, was in accordance with the Greek analogy — Great Russia. The term Little Rus and Great Rus was only formal terminology and was never in use among the people. The Muscovite bureaucrats later tried to cast this name upon Ukraine by force, but without success among the Ukrainian people. In Muscovy, that is, in Russia, the people never named themselves "Great Russians." The name "Great Russian" is purely a text

book term. The name "Little Rus" in Ukraine was a symbol of pride among the Ukrainian people.

During the reign of Peter I Ukraine remained, at least nominally, a separate state unit with an elective *hetman* and its own army and administration, however, its independence was limited, and it gradually became known as *Malaya Rossiya* (Little Russia), a part of Russia.

As a result of its great strengthening Russia constantly applied pressure on Ukraine in order to limit its national rights.

For many years after, however, the Ukrainian people, unable to reconcile themselves to their loss of freedom and independence, continued their struggle against Russia. The beginning of the 18th century witnessed a new Ukrainian-Russian war. Taking advantage of the Swedish-Russian war which began in 1700, Hetman Ivan Mazepa of Ukraine concluded a secret treaty with King Charles XII of Sweden in which it was decided to join forces against Russia. The Ukrainian Cossack army under the leadership of Kost Hordienko and supported by the Ukrainian peasant masses went to war against Moscow. But an unfortunate course of historical events decided the war; it culminated in the disastrous defeat of the Ukrainian and Swedish troops at the battle of Poltava in 1709. Even after this defeat the Ukrainians did not lay down their arms, but pursued their anti-Russian struggle with all available means. This resistance in the years 1710-1730 was led by Pylyp Orlyk, the exiled Ukrainian hetman.

The final crushing blow to Ukrainian freedom and autonomy was delivered by Russia during the reign of the Empress Catherine II (1762-1796). After a long exhaustive struggle against the recalcitrant Ukrainians, Russia at last managed to occupy the Ukrainian land and to step up the process of wiping out the remnants of Ukrainian independence. The Ukrainian autonomous administration under an elective *hetman* was abolished in 1764, and the Russian type of governor-generalship was introduced. This gradual and systematic liquidation by Russia of Ukrainian independence is attested to not only by Ukrainian, but also by Russian scholars, even those of imperialistic tendencies.<sup>23</sup>

Thus 110 years after the conclusion of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance, through treachery, ruse and violence, and after a series of long and bloody wars, Russia succeeded in fully occupying Ukraine and reducing it to a mere colony. As such, Ukraine survived under Tsarist domination until the Revolution of 1917.

### 3. *Terror, Genocide and Deportations of Ukrainians — Methods of Russian Domination Over Ukraine*

Russia was determined to possess Ukraine in order to transform it into a Russian colony, exploit its tremendous riches, and to use the territory. In pursuing its colonial and imperialist aims with respect to Ukraine, Russia stopped at nothing. She wanted the Ukrainian territory at any cost and, in order to dominate it more efficiently, she tried to subdue and destroy the Ukrainian population, which continuously resisted Russian domination. Therefore, *the main characteristic of Russian rule in Ukraine was the systematic policy aimed at destroying the Ukrainian people.*

The most illuminating facts of this cruel and inhuman Russian policy are to be found during the time of Peter I in his reprisals against the Ukrainian people for their attempt to liberate themselves under the leadership of Hetman Ivan Mazepa. *Long before the present masters of the Kremlin, the Russian rulers were guilty of genocide.*

After the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance became known, Russian troops began mass killings of the Ukrainian civilian population — people who had nothing to do with politics or the conduct of the war.

For example, on October 31, 1708 Russian troops under the command of Prince Menshikov captured Baturyn, the capital of *Hetman Mazepa*, and *ordered all the inhabitants — women, children and old people — to be summarily executed for attempting to resist the Russians.*<sup>24</sup> To terrorize the inhabitants the Russians tied Ukrainian bodies to logs and floated them down the Seym River so that they could be seen by villagers from the banks of the river. At the same time Russian troops under the command of Col. Kampel captured two towns, Mayachka and Nekhvoroscha in the Poltava province, and *killed all the inhabitants.*<sup>25</sup> A detachment of Russian troops under Col. Yakovlev *killed every Ukrainian man, woman, and child* in the towns of Kalyberda and Perevolochna on the Dnieper.<sup>26</sup> Later, on May 7, 1709 the same troops surrounded the Zaporozhian *Sich*, a stronghold of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and, after capturing it, *sadistically murdered every Ukrainian.*<sup>27</sup>

A repression — which took the form of mass murders — was practiced throughout Ukraine by order of Tsar Peter I. He often conducted and even actually participated in them himself. For instance, in the Ukrainian town of Lebedyn, headquarters of the Russian Army headed by Peter I, in the Tsar's presence and under his direction 900 Cossack officers were brutally tortured and then slain; several thousand Ukrainian Cossacks were imprisoned and sent into exile in Russia as slave laborers, their houses and property destroyed.<sup>28</sup> After the victory at Poltava the

Russians under the Command of Peter I tortured the Ukrainian captives on the rack.<sup>29</sup>

After the defeat of Mazepa and the occupation of Ukraine, the Russians adopted another method of destroying the Ukrainians. As the Bolsheviks today, they deported great masses of Ukrainians from Ukraine into Russia, where they were used as forced labor in various construction projects — the digging of canals, the erection of fortifications and the building of cities in the northern regions. The chances of survival for these captive Ukrainians were quite slim owing to the severe climate and to inhuman living conditions.

A contemporary eyewitness of these conditions, Colonel Cherniak, in his report to the Russian Senate in 1722 described the tortures to which the Ukrainian Cossacks were subjected while being forced by the Russians to work on the construction of the Lagoda canal (near Petersburg). He wrote: "In the construction camps on the Lagoda Canal there are many sick and dying Cossacks; frightful disease, the most common being fever and swelling of the feet, spread with appalling rapidity, causing many deaths. By order of Brigadier Leontiev, the officers in charge of the work — disregard the suffering of the poor Cossacks, mercilessly abusing the sick laborers, beating them with clubs and giving them no rest—day, night, or holiday—and on this account I fear that the Cossacks there will perish, as they did last year, when *only about a third returned home . . .*"<sup>30</sup>

This picture, typical of the Russian genocidal policy in the time of Peter I as well as later, resembles the Soviet-Russian practice of today to such a degree that an objective American scholar and publicist has said: "The Tsar employed a method which has frequently been utilized by the Soviet Government to break the resistance of the Ukrainians and other recalcitrant peoples: mass deportations to forced labor . . . There was a curious unconscious anticipation of a situation that arose two centuries later, when large numbers of Ukrainians perished in the famine of 1932-33 and because of banishment to timber camps and forced labor of Five-Year-Plan construction enterprises."<sup>31</sup>

According to the information in Russian Historical Archives, various Russian and Ukrainian historians report that at least 20,000 Ukrainians died between the years 1721 and 1725 while serving as slave laborers on the construction of the Lagoda canal during the construction of St. Petersburg.<sup>32</sup> Not without cause have the Ukrainian people retained in song and story until this very day the belief that Petersburg was built on the "bones of Ukrainians." This is why Ukrainians even now hate Petersburg. This hate is reflected in the poems of the Ukrainian national poet, Taras Shevchenko.



At the same time that these many thousands of Ukrainians died to build Petersburg not less than 10,000 Ukrainians died in the building of the Russian fortress Derbent on the Caspian Sea, and nearly 60,000 in building the Russian fortification along the coast of the Sea of Azov.<sup>33</sup>

Every Ukrainian protest against this policy toward the Ukraine was met with a terror far more severe than the persecution itself. Thus, in 1724, Pavlo Polubotok, then Hetman of Ukraine, arrived in Petersburg with a group of outstanding Ukrainians to submit to the Tsar a list of grievances drawn up by the people. The Russians arrested the Hetman and all the other Ukrainians with him on order of the Tsar and incarcerated them in the Peter and Paul Fortress( located on an island on the Neva river), where they remained until their death. Similarly, many other Ukrainians who tried to protest against the Russian terror were arrested and murdered.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to this, tens of thousands of Ukrainians perished when they were placed in the most dangerous advanced positions during the many wars which Russia engaged in to further her imperialistic interests. This was also done by the Bolsheviks in the last war. The same bloody policy motivated Peter I and all his successors. Thus, according to available information, in the Russian-Turkish war in 1735 over 34,000 Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants were killed.<sup>35</sup>

The Ukrainian Cossack losses as a result of this Russian policy, can best be seen from the registration which took place at the beginning of the 17th century: there had been in Ukraine 100,000 Cossacks and by 1735 only 20,000 remained.<sup>36</sup>

The great devastation of Ukraine as a result of this genocidal policy was confirmed by the Russian minister, Volinski, who, after visiting Ukraine in 1738, wrote to Petersburg: "I did not imagine Ukraine to be so devastated; that so many of its inhabitants had perished. So many people have been driven out by the war that no peasants are left to sow the fields. The fields are uncultivated because there is no one to work them."<sup>37</sup> This is exactly what was repeated in Ukraine two centuries later as a result of the genocidal policy of the Bolsheviks.

Through the many centuries the Russian tsars all pursued the same end, but each adding some new twist to more effectively and thoroughly exterminate the Ukrainians. One such innovation was the removal of Ukrainians from their native land and settling them in Siberia, and, in conjunction with this, the introduction of ethnic Russian settlers to take the place of the emigrants. The Russian Tsarina Catherine II initiated the colonization of Ukraine by the Russians on a vast scale in the years 1773-1783.

Catherine II formulated the essential of her genocidal policy as far back as 1764 in her secret instructions to the head of the Russian senate, Prince Vyazemsky. She wrote: "Even the very thought that they, as a nation, are different from the Russian should be wiped out of the Ukrainians. Since it is impossible to liquidate immediately all the self-governing institutions, which exist by law and are based on the special treaties with Russia by which Ukraine, Finland and the Baltic countries are governed, they should in a subtle way be placed in such a condition in which they will become Russified and cease to look like wolves out of woods."<sup>38</sup> So Catherine II, in the name of Russification chose colonization by Russians, or by foreigners loyal to Russia, as the "subtle way" to destroy Ukraine. As a result, by 1773 in the south of Ukraine, where there were no Russians and all the land had belonged to the Ukrainian Cossacks, there were now resettled 39,496 Russians and 342,000 foreigners. The number has increased steadily from year to year.<sup>39</sup> In 1775 in this area, the Russians abolished the principle of self-government for the Ukrainian Cossacks. Petro Kalnyshevsky, the leader of the Ukrainian Cossacks, together with many other Cossack officers was arrested and exiled to Solovky, and thereafter the great mass of Cossacks were forced to live beyond Ukrainian borders.<sup>40</sup> Their lands were divided among the new Russian nobility; among whom 68 per cent were Russian officers, 13.4 per cent were Russian landowners, and only 10.4 per cent were Ukrainians who had entered Russian service.<sup>41</sup> This colonization, accelerated during the reign of Catherine II, resulted in the entire south of Ukraine being named "New Russia."

At the same time (1783) Catherine II succeeded in imposing serfdom upon the Ukrainian people. Serfdom was unknown in Ukraine up to this time, and this attempt provoked a fierce resistance on the part of the free Ukrainian peasantry and the Cossacks. These recalcitrant Ukrainians were deported mercilessly by the thousands to Siberia. And soon, deportation of the Ukrainians to Siberia became the standard method of coping with Ukrainian resistance. Thus, Russia not only succeeded in removing the rebellious Ukrainians from Ukraine but also in colonizing Northern Siberia, a bleak land, where the climate and terrain offered little inducement to settlers. Later, when the Russian colonial policy in Southern Ukraine had deprived the Ukrainian peasants of the choice land, many actually voluntarily emigrated to Siberia in search of land.

Russian colonization of Siberia by Ukrainians assumed large-scale proportions in the latter half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, a proportion which is best illustrated by Russian statistics:

Between the years 1886 and 1896 over 170,000 Ukrainian peasants from but two Ukrainian provinces, Poltava and Chernyiv, were re-

settled in Siberia;<sup>42</sup> between the years 1906 and 1912 one million Ukrainians were resettled from four Ukrainian provinces.<sup>43</sup> Because of this systematic Russian colonization three Ukrainian provinces lost 5 persons in every 1,000 inhabitants in the years 1885-1904.<sup>44</sup>

To what extent the colonization of Siberia was effected at Ukrainian expense is fully disclosed by Russian official statistics:

In the years 1891-1900, 36 percent of the people resettled in Siberia were Ukrainians; this figure rose to 49 per cent in the years 1901-1910, and to 60 per cent in the years 1911-1914.<sup>45</sup>

As a result in the years 1906 and 1914, 1,610,000 Ukrainians were resettled in Siberia,<sup>46</sup> together approximately 2,250,000 Ukrainians were moved from Ukraine to Siberia and to other regions of Asia during this period of resettlement.<sup>47</sup> These resettlements were very disastrous for the Ukrainians. Russian statistics show that difficulties connected with resettlement and the hardships of life were so great that the death rate among the settlers reached 30-40 percent,<sup>48</sup> and that, in the years 1890-1914, as many as 480,000 Ukrainians fled back to Ukraine.<sup>49</sup>

While 2,250,000 Ukrainians had been sent out of Ukraine to Siberia and to the other regions of Asia, 2,000,000 Russians arrived in Ukraine,<sup>50</sup> it should also be noted that the forced expulsion of Ukrainians took place when the coal industry in the Donbas area was beginning to develop and when masses of workers were needed in Ukraine. As many as 56 per cent of the jobs were held by Russians.<sup>51</sup>

#### *4. Economic Exploitation of Ukraine by Tsarist Russia*

The genocidal colonial policy of Russia was evident in the economic system which deliberately exploited Ukrainian resources and Ukrainian labor. This system was introduced by Russia after the liquidation of Ukrainian independence.

One of the bases of this system was serfdom, the enslavement of the peasantry. This was widely practiced in Russia but unknown in Ukraine. Russia was not content with enslaving the free Ukrainians, but in addition, imposed an especially severe type of serfdom, severer than that imposed upon the Russian peasantry. In Russia a substantial part of the Russian peasantry did not have to work the landlord's estates; they had only to pay a tax (obrok). In Ukraine, on the other hand, the peasant serfs had to work 6-7 days a week for the landowners.<sup>52</sup> What made matters worse was the fact that these landowners were not Ukrainians, but Russians, Germans, Poles, or other nationalities whom the Russian government used to further its colonial policies. The Russian

landowners were very harsh toward their Ukrainian peasant serfs; they were the sole judges and executioners, punishing them for the least infraction, even sending them to Siberia. Serfdom was the main reason that the fertile Ukrainian land did not produce enough to support the population. Thus, there was hunger and misery and a declining rural population in Ukraine.<sup>53</sup>

Even the liberation of the serfs in all of Russia in 1861 did not ameliorate the situation of the Ukrainian peasantry which at that time formed the greater percentage of the Ukrainian population. To keep Ukraine in a permanent colonial status, the Russian government systematically and consistently hampered the development of industry in Ukraine; at the same time it concentrated trade and commerce in Russian hands. This economic policy decreased the demand for labor and consequently created a crisis by over-populating the rural areas.

This rural over-population, artificially created by Russian economic policy, increased so that by the end of the 19th century there were from 800 to 1,000 persons per every 1,000 hectares of arable land. In the most overpopulated areas of France and Germany there were only 500 persons per every 1,000 hectares of arable land.<sup>54</sup> As a result of this, the rural population began to emigrate; at the beginning of the 20th century the rate of emigration equaled 68 per cent of the natural growth of population.<sup>55</sup> This was caused by the fact that *almost 40 per cent of Ukrainian territory was in the possession of Russian or other non-Ukrainian landowners.*<sup>56</sup>

When Russia began to built up centers of industry in Ukraine for her own profit (coal and metal mining centers, the Donets and Kryvy Rih basins, sugar beet refineries, and distilleries), she imported Russian capital and Russian workers, thus eliminating local workers from the labor market. In this way she settled Ukrainian cities with Russians. There were no Russians in Ukraine at the time of annexation by Moscow. However by the end of the 19th century (according to the 1897 census) there were as many as 2,085,000 Russians — the entire population of Ukraine at that time was only 26,202,000 persons.<sup>57</sup> It should also be noted that this influx took place at a time, when the density of population in Russia equaled 26 persons per square kilometer, whereas in Ukraine, while the population density was almost three times as large or 70 persons per square kilometer.<sup>58</sup>

Occupying the cities and the large landed properties, the Russians were the ruling class in Ukraine. This is verified by official Russian information on the occupations of the different nationalities in Ukraine. According to the data of the 1897 census, 93 out of every hundred Ukrainians were peasants or workers; only 6 were employed by the gov-

ernment or in industry and business. At the same time as many as 61 out of every hundred Russians in Ukraine were of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia (47 of them being government officials) and only 39 were workers and peasants.<sup>59</sup> Only 8.8 per cent of the Ukrainians lived in cities and 91.2 per cent lived in villages; however 54 per cent of the Russians lived in cities and only 46 per cent in villages where they were all either officials or landowners, but not peasants.<sup>60</sup>

Thus, the social differentiation of the population of Ukraine was actually a *national* differentiation: the masses of toilers were Ukrainians; the Russians were the wealthy, privileged class who dictated the political and economic laws of the country and exploited its natural resources and its people. Such was the Russian colonial policy toward Ukraine, and it has been confirmed by Russian scholars. A characteristic statement of the situation is the following: "By the second half of the 19th century Ukraine had developed into one of the most industrially developed areas in Russia, yet her colonial status remained unchanged. The fact is that her industry was being built on imported capital and to a great extent on imported labor; in addition, the largest Ukrainian industry was mining (coal and ore). Finally, the colonial status of Ukraine was attested to by the heavy taxes levied on the people, especially the peasants, by the Russian government... The large landowners in Ukraine were mostly Russians. Russian landowners, the large army of Russian officials (*Russifiers*), Russian soldiers, the clergy and the commercial bourgeoisie formed the cornerstone of Russian chauvinism in Ukraine."<sup>61</sup>

In general the entire Russian economic policy consisted of the systematic exploitation of Ukrainian national resources without any accompanying investment in the development of the country. The entire Russian tax system, both direct and indirect, was for this purpose.

A striking instance of Russian plunder in Ukraine through its policy of heavy taxation is to be found in the following figures, taken from official Russian statistics: from 1882 to 1891, the Russian Imperial Treasury collected 1,428,717 rubles as ordinary taxes from Ukraine; in the same period, 727,128 rubles was spent in Ukraine. Thus, 701,589 rubles, almost one half of the collected money, did not come back to Ukraine. The same thing occurred in 1898 to 1906: 3,548,030 rubles were collected but only 1,881,347 rubles were spent. 1,766,693 rubles, again almost half of the collected money, went out of the country. Where did the money go? It was spent for the Russian needs. This is clear after a comparative study is made of official statistics of the taxes collected in Russia and spent there. For instance, in the Russian province of Petersburg, from 1882 to 1891: 1,490,345 rubles in taxes were collected. At the same time, 3,587,934 rubles were spent there; thus, 2,097,289 more



rubles than the sum collected were spent. Thus, money collected in Ukraine and the other non-Russian countries was spent in Russia. The same is true of the Petersburg province in the period from 1898 to 1906; 1,716,803 rubles were collected in taxes yet 3,536,709 rubles were spent, leaving a total of 1,819,906 rubles which again had been snatched from Ukraine and the other non-Russian countries.<sup>62</sup> Figures for the other periods show a similar picture of Russian plunder in Ukraine.

According to Russian statistics, the Russian state income from various taxes in Ukraine for the period 1898-1910 was 699,600,000 rubles, of which only 385,200,000 rubles were spent on Ukrainian needs. Thus, 45 per cent of the total taxes of Ukraine went to defray the cost of Russian development.<sup>63</sup> Ukraine, constituting only 17 per cent of the entire population of Russia, paid about 30 per cent of all the taxes of Russia.<sup>64</sup>

For the period of the last years before World War I, the Ukrainian tax increase amounted to 200,000,000 rubles annually.' This money was spent by the Russian government beyond the Ukraine. In addition to this, Moscow annually took 300,000,000 rubles more out of Ukraine.<sup>65</sup>

*Thus, Ukraine was forced to pay to her oppressor nearly half of all her state taxes (half a billion rubles) every year without receiving anything in exchange.*

The class that probably suffered most under this heavy taxation system was the Ukrainian peasantry. It also contributed to the fact that the financial status of the Ukrainian peasantry was much lower than that of the Russian peasantry, despite the fact that the Ukrainian peasant lived on more fertile land than the Russian. In Russia the average peasant was able to retain 25.6 poods of wheat per capita, but in Ukraine the average was from 19.6 to 21.5 poods of wheat per capita.<sup>66</sup> As one Russian economist stated: Russia needs 36,000,000 poods of grain more than it can normally produce to feed its people.<sup>67</sup> Russia not only covered this difference by Ukrainian grain, she even exported grain to foreign countries, 77 per cent of which was provided by Ukraine.<sup>68</sup>

But the Ukrainian rural population was not the only sufferer in this economic exploitation by Russia. Russian commercial policy, especially its tariff system, was also directed against the urban population of Ukraine. During the reign of Peter I, Russia had forbidden Ukraine to carry on commercial relations with foreign countries. Ukrainian merchandise and produce could be exported only to Russia. Later even the Ukrainian railroad system was laid in such a way that the major lines ran north in the direction of the northern Russian ports and commercial centers; railroad transport was cheaper in the direction of Moscow and Petersburg than in the direction of Kiev and Odessa. As a result U-

krainian products were made cheaper in the Russian markets or abroad than at home.<sup>69</sup> Construction of plants and factories in Ukraine was permitted only if they did not compete with those in Russia. Russia utilized the revenue from Ukraine to install rival plants that very often manufactured or finished goods imported from Ukraine. Ukraine exported four to nine times as much as she imported and was solely responsible for Russia having a favorable trade balance. Yet, certain industries were completely neglected and deprived of funds in favor of those in Russian areas.<sup>70</sup> Thus, Ukraine, which provided raw material for textiles and other goods in abundance, had no textile industry; this industry was almost wholly concentrated in Russia. Ukrainian raw materials were exported to Russia at cheap prices, but the finished textile products were imported into Ukraine from Russian plants and sold at extremely high prices.<sup>71</sup>

Ukraine possessed enough natural resources to support an independent economy and yet was reduced to the status of a mere colony. It must be concluded that the national enslavement of Ukraine by Tsarist Russia was above all an economic enslavement, a harsh exploitation of the Ukrainian people for the benefit of imperialist Russia. And, the national enslavement by Russia has long been the primary question among all Ukrainian classes who see in Russia their national enemy and oppressor.

### *5. National and Cultural Oppression by Russia and the Ukrainian Struggle for National Existence*

The most brutal and acute oppression by Tsarist Russia was manifested in the national and cultural life of the Ukrainians. Failing to destroy the Ukrainians physically, Russia, almost from the very beginning of its occupation of Ukraine, undertook the deliberate destruction of Ukrainian culture, language, and the very existence of the Ukrainian national entity itself.

An ukase of Peter I in 1720 forbade the printing of books in the Ukrainian language, and this amounted to a curtailment of the Ukrainian printing industry.<sup>72</sup> Simultaneously, outstanding cultural leaders and scientists were deported to Russia, where they were compelled to help organize Russian schools and cultural organizations — Russia being at that time culturally backward. The extent to which Russia took advantage of Ukrainian cultural sources is also evident from the fact that from 1700 to 1762 the Russian clergy (at that time carriers of culture) consisted in the majority of graduates of the Ukrainian Kievan Academy;<sup>73</sup>

in the first 30 years of the 18th century all the bishops in Russia were Ukrainians.<sup>74</sup> Russia not only bought the services of educated Ukrainians by granting certain privileges, but also she deported many such people from Ukraine to Russia much as they did recently with German scholars in order to improve Russian techniques. Moreover, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which at that time was the center of enlightenment and culture in Ukraine, was juridically subordinated to the Russian government and many of the Ukrainian clergymen were deported to Russia. As a result, the previous high cultural level of Ukraine began to decline while Ukrainian scientists and cultural leaders were developing and enriching Russian culture.

But it was in the 19th century that Ukrainian cultural life was most oppressed and persecuted. The Russian government endeavored to destroy the very name, "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian," and to Russify the people. All Ukrainian schools were closed and Russian schools were introduced in their place. Beginning in 1804 the Russian government officially prohibited the teaching of Ukrainian in the elementary public schools.<sup>75</sup> To keep the Ukrainian people illiterate and thus destroy their national spirit, the Russians allowed a very limited number of Russian schools, which were reserved only for Russians and fully Russified Ukrainians from cities. Such schools were pitifully few in number to educate the great masses of the people. The harm the Russians inflicted upon education can best be seen in the following information: in 1768 (before the liquidation of Ukrainian autonomy) in one province of Ukraine alone there were 134 schools, or one school for every 746 persons; in 1875, in the same province there were only 52 schools, that is, one school for every 17,143 persons.<sup>76</sup>

As a result the level of literacy became catastrophically low (as compared with the level which existed before Ukraine was subjugated by Russia). According to the many foreign visitors who came to Ukraine in the middle of the 17th century, e.g., among them the secretary of Macarius III, Patriarch of Antioch, Paul of Aleppo, a Syrian who visited Ukraine during the years 1654-1656, almost the entire urban and rural population was literate.<sup>77</sup> In 1897, according to Russian statistics, only 13 persons out of every 100 in Ukraine knew how to read and write.<sup>78</sup> The general literacy level fell to 16.4 per cent, and in some areas to 6.3 per cent.<sup>79</sup> That this was the result of Russian policy is proven by the fact that in Ukraine the level of literacy fell considerably while in Russia the literacy level rose to 36.1 per cent in the same period.<sup>80</sup>

Just how far this barbaric attempt to liquidate Ukrainian culture went can be illustrated by some data from the publishing field. After Ukrainian autonomy had disappeared, book publishing declined to an

extremely low level. In the last decade of the 18th century the Kievan Academy (later closed by the Russians) published 250 books; in a period of ten years in the middle of the 19th century only 25 Ukrainian books were published: in 1847 only one book was published; in 1848, 3; in 1849, 2; in 1850, 1; in 1851, 2; in 1852, 3; in 1853, 1; in 1854, 3; in 1855, 4; and in 1856, 5.<sup>81</sup>

Later Russian policy went even further: it attempted to totally prohibit the publishing of Ukrainian books and even attempted to wipe out the language itself. On July 18, 1863, the Russian Minister of the Interior, Valuyev, issued a special circular which not only prohibited the publishing of Ukrainian books of a cultural and educational value, which were designated for circulation among the people (this included ecclesiastical works), but also declared that "there is not, there has not been, and there can not be such a thing as a Ukrainian language."<sup>82</sup>

On May 18, 1876, Tsar Alexander II signed an official order (the so-called *Emski ukaz*, named for the German town Ems, where it was signed), which not only forbade publishing of all kinds of books both popular and scholarly in Ukraine but also made it illegal to import them from abroad, where some books were published after the decree had become effective in Ukraine.<sup>83</sup> In addition to this, the use of the Ukrainian language in theaters and the singing of Ukrainian songs were prohibited. This led to an absurd situation in which Ukrainian singers, in order not to have to sing Ukrainian songs in Russian translation, sang the songs in their French translation. It was characteristic of the Russian democratic intelligentsia of the time that nowhere was a protest lodged, or even mention made in the press of this uniquely idiotic ukase, with the exception of Ivan Turgenev who did so upon the request of Mykhailo Drahomaniv.<sup>84</sup>

Even the writing of the terms "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" were forbidden.<sup>85</sup> The Russian government devised an official slogan: "There never has been a Ukraine, there is none, and there will be none." Strict and drastic anti-Ukrainian ukases were in force in Ukraine until 1905, at which time they were slightly eased to be again strengthened before 1914.

This anti-Ukrainian policy of the Russian government led to the systematic persecution of Ukrainian poets, writers, artists, and publicists, many of whom were sent to prison or to Siberia for writing in the Ukrainian language. Most outstanding of all was Taras Shevchenko, the foremost poet of Ukraine (1814-1861), who spent 10 years in Russian prisons and in exile in the desert of Central Asia for writing "seditious poetry in the Ukrainian language." His works were prohibited in Ukraine before the Revolution of 1917.

Generally, Russia endeavored to lower the cultural level of the Ukrainian people in order to facilitate her task of transforming the freedom-loving people into Russian slaves. The proscription of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine served this Russian purpose well.

The barbarism of this Russian policy toward the Ukrainians is attested to by the Russians themselves. Moreover, the liberal part of the Russian intelligentsia even condemned it. For instance, the newspaper of the Russian Constitutional-Democratic Party, which was headed by Milyukov, *Rech*, (Petersburg, 1917, No. 64) stated: "No national movement in Russia was treated by the Russian government in a more cynical and brutal manner than the Ukrainian. From 1876 to 1905 the publishing of books in Ukrainian was forbidden with few if any exceptions. After war broke out in 1914, the Ukrainian press was completely suppressed, this occurred even prior to the suppression of the German. Before the Revolution, Ukrainian schools could not exist and teaching in Ukrainian was regarded as a crime."

Parallel to the physical suppression of the Ukrainians, Russian national and ethnic genocidal policies kept Ukraine under the heel of Russian imperialism until the outbreak of the Revolution of 1917. *In the more than 250 years since the conclusion of the Treaty of Pereyaslav and in the 150 years and more since the actual liquidation of Ukrainian autonomy, Ukraine had been transformed into a Russian colony.* However, this barbarous and draconic Russian domination in Ukraine engendered such hatred on the part of the Ukrainian people that when the year 1917 came, Ukraine became the primary bastion of the national revolution directed against the Russian empire, a revolution which soon became the rallying point of all the non-Russian peoples of the "Russian prison of nations" who rose up to fight for their freedom and independence.

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## CHAPTER TWO: THE UKRAINIAN STATE AND THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR OF 1917-1921

### 1. *Liberation Struggle of the Non-Russian Peoples of the Russian Empire and the Ukrainian National Revolution of 1917-1918*

On March 8, 1917 a great revolution of the non-Russian people broke out in protest against their national and social oppression in this multi-national Russian "prison of nations." This revolution, which caused the immediate fall of the autocratic Russian monarchy, also resulted in an abrupt dismemberment of the Russian empire and the establishment of various national independent states. In fact, this was a *chain of national revolutions*, all of which endeavored not only to destroy the despicable Russian tyranny but also to establish a democratic order, based on the principle of the freedom and independence of each nation in its own ethnographic territory.

One of the most powerful of these was the *Ukrainian Revolution*. It began simultaneously with the general Revolution in the Russian Empire in March, 1917. In Petrograd two army regiments, namely the Volynian and Lithuanian regiments, composed of Ukrainians and Lithuanians respectively, rose up against the Russian autocracy, thus giving the signal and providing leadership for latent revolutionary forces to rise against Russian imperialism.<sup>86</sup> Today it is absolutely established that the rebellion of these two regiments unleashed the long-dormant anti-Russian forces, started the greatest revolution in history, and brought about the speedy fall of Russian absolutism. The governmental reins passed into the hands of the Provisional Russian Government, which was initially under the domination and leadership of Russian conservative circles headed by Prince Lvov, and soon came under the influence of Russian socialists headed by Alexander Kerensky.

The overthrow of the Russian monarchy and its Government injected a new spirit into the enslaved nations. The victorious revolution was logically followed by the downfall of the entire system of "legal enslavement of nations" which had been carried out through prohibitions and oppressions. The popular revolution was the natural assumption of the right of self-determination. In this instance it was a foregone conclusion that the right of self-determination would be asserted by all nations enslaved by Tsardom, including Ukraine. Ukraine was no longer

required to resort to one, or another kind of interpretation of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 3 centuries before. The turn came for a stronger right than that of historical treaties of Tsars and their governments — the right of self-determination. The Ukrainian people immediately asserted this right after the removal of Tsarism and its Government in Russia.

The Ukrainians began the organization of their own state which they pursued with a great deal of enthusiasm, devotion and self-sacrifice. As early as the third day after the fall of the Russian monarchy, namely, March 18, 1917, all the Ukrainian democratic parties gathered in Kiev and created a provisional government, known as The Ukrainian Central Council (Ukrains'ka Tsentralna *Rada*) — referred to below as the Central *Rada* — under the presidency of Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the foremost Ukrainian historian. This newly-established center of Ukrainian authority and government was supported by great masses of the Ukrainian people who had assumed control over the local organs of government with enthusiasm and dispatch. On April 1, 1917 in Kiev, more than 100,000 participated in a mass demonstration and demanded a proclamation of complete independence for Ukraine.<sup>87</sup> On April 17-21, 1917 a Ukrainian National Congress was held in Kiev, which ratified the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as the legal and democratic government of Ukraine and authorized it to organize Ukrainian statehood. Parallel with this, a Ukrainian national army was formed by Ukrainian military leaders. On May 18-21, 1917 the first Ukrainian Military Congress was held, at which more than 700 delegates representing 900,000 Ukrainian soldiers of the former Russian armies adopted the following resolution:

“Our country is Ukraine and not Russia. We do not contemplate a war against Russia, but we will not allow her to use bayonets against us. We have our own bayonets, too.”<sup>88</sup>

We must keep in mind that at this time the Ukrainian people had only just broken out from complete enslavement which had lasted for many years. Its political parties, which heretofore had been compelled to act in the underground had, by the nature of things, few members among the masses. Only now were they able to spread their activities among the masses, and only now was it possible to develop the work of cultural, economic-cooperative and professional organizations. Likewise Ukrainian soldiers who had been drafted by Tsarism into the Russian Army at the beginning of World War I, and who were dispersed among various Russian regiments on all fronts, began to organize and demanded of the Provisional Government of Russia that they be incorporated into Ukrainian military units — regiments and divisions. The Russian Provisional Government viewed the Ukrainians through the prism of the Tsarist Government within this meaning that it considered them broken

long since, and therefore harmless. For this reason the Russian Provisional Government was reluctant to recognize that the Ukrainians had equal rights with the Russians, or even with the Poles, the latter still considered part of the Russian empire, albeit under military occupation of Germany.

Soon after that, on June 18-20, in the face of a proscription by the Russian Provisional Government, a grandiose Second Ukrainian Congress took place; 2,500 delegates representing 1,500,000 Ukrainian soldiers participated in this convention. It was decided to request the Ukrainian Central *Rada* "to break off relations with Russia immediately and completely and to begin the work of organizing an independent Ukraine."

As has been mentioned above, Ukrainian soldiers in the Russian Army were seldom grouped together in purely Ukrainian regiments. In addition, regiments with a Ukrainian majority were stationed on distant fronts of the Northwest or the Caucasus, far from Ukraine and dispersed among Russian regiments. Consequently the *Rada* had difficulties in maintaining liaison with them and organizing them. This was possible only in the cadres which were stationed in Ukraine and on nearby fronts.

At that time the *Rada* leadership still believed that Russian democratic parties will recognize full democracy immediately — as a self-understood right of Ukraine, and subsequently the democratic right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination — through their freely elected representatives to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. In general, the *Rada* leadership was ready to establish a federal union based on equality with other peoples of the Russian empire, including the Russians. In this belief the *Rada* dispatched (in April, 1917) its delegation to the Provisional Government in Petrograd with the object of conferring on conditions of collaboration. But in the course of negotiations it came to light that the Russian Government, now composed of democrats, would not discuss recognition of Ukraine's right of self-determination, nor even of federation or limited territorial autonomy. When the *Rada* delegation was met with a completely negative attitude of the Russian democrats in the Government towards the idea of self-determination for the Ukrainian people, it returned to Kiev, and after it made its report the *Rada* decided, without leave of the Russian Government, to begin organizing the government in Ukraine by its First Constitutional Law, the Universal. The Universal was quite clear on that point:

"From now on we ourselves shall determine our life."<sup>89</sup>

Over 50,000 soldiers declared themselves openly on the side of the *Rada*. In the eyes of the Provisional Government the *Rada's* prestige

mounted immensely because it was evident that the Rada enjoyed the confidence of both the civilian Ukrainian population as well as Ukrainian soldiers drafted into the Russian Army. Within the Russian Government two conceptions of further dealings with the Ukrainians were weighed: either to seek a compromise acceptable to Russia, or to break the Ukrainian liberation movement.

## *2. Russian Democracy Against Ukrainian Liberation and For Russian Imperialism*

When the Ukrainians embarked upon the road of freedom after the fall of Tsarism, they quite understandably assumed that the liquidation of the Russian monarchy and the assumption of power in Russia by a democratic government would in no way hamper the wish of the Ukrainian people to live their own democratic life in their own independent state. They believed that Russian democracy would recognize the right of the Ukrainian people to the same privilege it desired for the Russian people: to live a free life. The Ukrainians at that time were even willing to maintain a federative union with a democratic Russia until the convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly and a final decision representing the will of the majority as to the future relationship between Ukraine and Russia providing there were provisions for equality and independence; in any event the Central *Rada* wanted to bring about Ukrainian independence in a spirit of friendly cooperation with a democratic Russia and by democratic and legal methods. They did not want to resort to war. But it soon became apparent that Russian democracy assumed the same position with respect to Ukraine as had the Tsarist Russian government. It was also evident that the Russian democratic government under Kerensky, despite its weakness and inability to cope with the Bolshevik menace, was expending all its efforts to prevent the non-Russian people from establishing independent states or even reconstructing Russia into a federative union.

When the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as a parliamentary representation of the Ukrainian people, and the Secretariat-General established by the Rada as the provisional government of Ukraine began to organize the Ukrainian state administration, the Kerensky government reacted in a fashion scarcely compatible with its democratic pronouncements. Kerensky ordered all the Russian officials and organizations in Ukraine to boycott and subvert all ordinances and decrees of the *Rada*; in general, to oppose the *Rada with all means at their disposal*.<sup>90</sup> The Russian elements in Ukraine, however, soon revealed their inability to halt the Ukrainian national revival: a stable, independent state was organized

despite the Russian elements in Ukraine. The Russian Provisional Government was compelled to enter into negotiations with the Ukrainian Central *Rada* to attain an understanding between Ukraine and Russia.

On July 11, 1917 a delegation headed by Kerensky arrived in Kiev, but the ensuing negotiations failed as a result of the intransigence of Kerensky himself. Although the Ukrainian Central Rada enjoyed the unequivocal confidence of the entire Ukrainian people, at first Kerensky would not even agree to grant Ukraine home-rule under the leadership of the Rada and its Secretariat-General, before a Constituent Assembly would convene. Only later, when he understood the situation, Kerensky agreed to a compromise which restricted the Rada's authority, but recognized Ukraine's right to self-determination in principle. He agreed only to a limited Ukrainian autonomy within the boundaries of four Ukrainian *gubernias* and this excluded the most vital provinces of Ukraine, Kharkiv, the Donbas, and the Black Sea coast. In this stubborn refusal to recognize the rights of the Ukrainian people to freedom and independence, Kerensky proved as implacable a Russian imperialist as any of the Russian Tsars.

Nevertheless Kerensky finally had to agree to a recognition of the Rada as the representation of Ukraine and its Secretariat-General as the authority in Ukraine. This agreement was affirmed by the Russian Provisional Government on July 15, 1917, although it caused the resignation of some Ministers who were conservative democrats. The Rada enacted a ratification of the agreement by its Second Constitutional Law (The Second Universal of July 16, 1917).

Yet this recognition of the Ukrainian government proved to be insincere and deceitful. Although the Kerensky government recognized the Ukrainian government, at the same time it failed to liquidate the Russian governmental organs in Ukraine. On the contrary, it supported them financially and continued to treat them as institutions of the Russian Provisional Government. Moreover, the Kerensky government turned the Russian elements in Ukraine against the Ukrainian government, thereby worsening Ukrainian-Russian relations.<sup>91</sup> This occurred when the Kerensky government demonstrated its incapacity to oppose the ever-growing authority of the Bolsheviks under Lenin in Russia proper. Ironically, Kerensky and his ministers were more concerned in preventing the disintegration of the Russian Empire than in preventing Lenin from wresting the power from them. Kerensky and his Russian democratic ministers were thus less concerned about the introduction of a *democratic* order in Russia proper, and more about preserving at all cost the integrity of the empire conquered by the Tsars, even if this empire had again to come under monarchist or Bolshevik absolutism. Small wonder

that under these circumstances Lenin's party was able, on November 7, 1917, almost without opposition on the part of the Provisional Government of Kerensky, to stage a coup d'etat in the capital city of Petrograd and subsequently to seize power in Russia proper almost without firing a shot.

For tactical reasons Kerensky's Government kept postponing the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly, so that no voice could be gained in it by the reawakened enslaved nations. He set the election date for late November, 1917. Meanwhile the Russian Bolsheviks staged a coup on November 7. Thus the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly were held several weeks after the Bolsheviks had been in power in Russia proper. Voters in Ukraine also took part in this election, as well as in a subsequent election to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly (in January, 1918). And, among other things, these elections presented clear and decisive evidence of the will of a majority of the Ukrainian people: *Over 72 per cent of all votes in Ukraine were cast for the Ukrainian Central Rada and its announced policy of having Ukraine live its own political life, independent of and apart from Russia.*<sup>92</sup>

### 3. *The Ukrainian National Republic and the First War with Bolshevik Russia*

Convinced of the imperialistic and undemocratic approach of the Russian Provisional Government toward Ukraine and understanding the seriousness of the Bolshevik menace emerging in Russia, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* stepped up the organization of a state, fully and completely independent of Russia. The Central *Rada* realized that Russia was their national enemy and as soon as the Bolshevik *coup* became known (in Kiev the local Bolsheviks provoked an uprising on November 11, 1917), the Ukrainians found themselves in the unenviable position of having to fight against both the Russian Provisional Government under Kerensky and the new Russian Bolshevik government under Lenin. After a three-day struggle in Kiev, the Bolshevik uprising was suppressed by the Ukrainians.

On November 20, 1917 the Ukrainian Central *Rada* issued its Third *Universal*, which proclaimed the Ukrainian National Republic (*Ukrayins'ka Narodna Respublika*) and stated that the question of a future federation with Russia would be discussed only after a true democratic order had been established in Russia, and only on the basis of complete equality of all national states.



It soon became clear that, like the Russian democratic Provisional Government, the Russian Bolshevik government was guided by the same imperialistic tendencies as the government of the Russian Tsars. The Bolsheviks differed from the former Tsarist imperialists only in their greater dexterity and deceitfulness and in a more pronounced brutality and terrorization. Following Lenin's slogan, the Bolsheviks declared that they "recognize the right of each nation to self-determination and even to secession"; they formally recognized the separation of Ukraine from Russia by recognizing the Ukrainian national government. At the same time they proceeded to organize their agents, saboteurs and fifth-columnists within the Ukraine to undermine and destroy the government. *These agents were Russians and the Russified elements of the big cities and industrial centers.*

The official Russian historians of Bolshevism in Ukraine frankly admit this. For instance, in the "*History of the Communist Party of Ukraine*" N. Popov wrote: "It remains an indubitable fact that our Party in Ukraine until a very short time ago, and to a large extent even now, has been and continues to be *mostly a party of Russian and Russified proletariat* (N. Popov's italics) . . . An historical peculiarity of our Party in Ukraine is its *weak hold on the masses . . . The Party's influence on the army in Ukraine was weak; its influence on the peasants was almost nil.*"<sup>93</sup> The author continues: "After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, our Party in Ukraine was very weak; it had to cope with the united front of the various Ukrainian Socialist parties which had the widespread support of the Ukrainian peasants."<sup>94</sup>

In other words, Bolshevism did not maintain that it had sympathizers in Ukraine. In 1918, the entire Russian Communist Party, which included all Bolsheviks from the territory of Ukraine without regard to nationality, had only a membership of 3.2% in Ukraine in relation to the entire membership. Regarding the nationality of this 3.2% figure from Ukraine, the Ukrainians among them numbered less than 3%. Over 97% of the members of the Bolshevik Party in the Ukrainian territory were either Russians or Russified aliens. This is again shown by the results of the election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Ukraine, where the *Bolsheviks received only 10 per cent of all votes, while in Russia in general they succeeded in mustering over 25 per cent of the votes* and over 50 per cent of the votes in the central purely-Russian provinces (for instance, in Moscow province, 56 per cent voted for them).<sup>95</sup>

Abandoning all hopes of taking over the government of Ukraine through internal infiltration as had been done in Russia, the Bolsheviks decided to profit by the military weakness of the Ukrainian National Republic and take the country by sheer force.

With this in mind the Bolshevik government, i.e., the "Council of People's Commissars," on December 17, 1917 sent an *ultimatum* signed by Lenin and Stalin to the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. First of all the ultimatum recognized the Ukrainian National Republic "without qualification" and its right to separate from Russia, and at the same time contained the demand of capitulation to Soviet Russia within 48 hours, after the lapse of which a state of war ensued between the two nations. The text of this ultimatum serves as a classic example of how the Bolsheviks officially use their materialistic dialectics and how they employ tactics of infiltration and direct invasion to accomplish their ends.

The opening paragraph of the ultimatum reads:

"We, the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Republic, do recognize the Ukrainian National Republic and its right to complete separation from Russia or to enter into negotiations with the Russian Republic to establish federal or any other relations. All that bears on the national rights and the national independence of the Ukrainian people is recognized by us, the Soviet of People's Commissars, immediately, without any limitations and unconditionally . . . But . . ."

And then the Russian Bolsheviks entered their own stipulations and even ultimatum to the Ukrainian Central *Rada*:

"Within 48 hours all hostile actions against the Soviet (Russian) authority in Ukraine are to be suspended; all attempts to disarm the Soviet (Russian) troops and Red Guards in Ukraine are to cease to restrict the permission to any troops passing through the territory of Ukraine toward the Don or Ural and attempt to disorganize the front are to halt..." In short, the Bolsheviks wanted the Central *Rada* to sanction their right to intervene in Ukrainian national affairs and to approve the factual control of Ukraine by Russia. The ultimatum concluded with the ominous observation that in the event of a negative reply by the Central *Rada*, the government of Soviet Russia would consider itself "in a state of open war."<sup>96</sup>

Naturally, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* could not accept these demands, which in effect nullified the sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic. Without awaiting a reply, the Russian Bolshevik forces began military operations against Ukraine on the same day the ultimatum was delivered to the Central *Rada*.

This brutal aggression and unprovoked war on the part of Soviet Russia against the young Ukrainian republic caught the Ukrainians militarily unprepared. The Ukrainian army, the formation of which had been methodically opposed by Kerensky, was still in the organizational stage. The Bolsheviks, who controlled a strong Russian army under the leadership of former Tsarist officers, successfully penetrated deep into

Ukraine, not without encountering heroic resistance on the part of the Ukrainian masses.

In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian Army was only in the stage of formation, it offered heroic resistance to the overwhelming forces of the regular old army of Soviet Russia and to its new formations, the Red Guards. The attack of Soviet Russian armies came concentrically from the west (where the Bolshevik Government was withdrawing its forces from the German front), from the north and from the southwest, all in the direction of Ukraine's capital, Kiev, in order to cut off any avenue of escape for the Ukrainian Government, to capture it and thus liquidate Ukrainian statehood. The young Army of the Ukrainian National Republic waged successful battles since December, 1917, and although it had to retreat before superior forces, still it slowed the enemy's march on Kiev and the latter appeared in the vicinity of Kiev only early in February, or almost two months since the start of Russia's military aggression. Earlier the Army of the UNR withstood numerous bloody battles (for Kharkiv, Poltava, Romodan, Kremenchuk, Katerynoslav, Bakhmach, Zhmerynka, Korosten and Nish). Finally late in January the Soviet Russian Army approached Kiev from the northwest at the station of Kruty.

Thus, on January 31, 1918, two Russian Bolshevik army groups, under Yegorov and Berzin, encountered a Ukrainian student volunteer battallion from Kiev which in a feat of daring resistance held the superior Bolshevik forces for two and a half days. Only after the complete destruction of this small but brave Ukrainian force were the Bolshevik troops able to move on Kiev. This battle, which took place at the railroad station of Kruty, north of Kiev has become legendary in modern Ukrainian history; Kruty is now known as the "Ukrainian Thermopylae."

Anti-Bolshevik resistance was general among the Ukrainian people and embraced all social strata. The Russian Communist Party and its Government placed the most reliance on its ability to turn the sympathies of the councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies in their direction by demagoguery and slandering of the Ukrainian Central Rada, just as they succeeded in Russia proper early in November. Nevertheless, these hopes of the Bolsheviks came to naught as far as the councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies were concerned in Ukraine. The Bolsheviks demanded a convention of these councils of all Ukraine to be called to Kiev. The Ukrainian Central Rada agreed. This First All-Ukrainian Congress of Councils of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies met in Kiev on December 17, 1917. It was attended by about 2,500 elected deputies.

This Congress promptly condemned the Russian ultimatum to the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and voted to support the *Rada*.<sup>97</sup> The local

Council of Labor Deputies in Poltava passed a resolution condemning the Russian Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine and, throwing up barricades in the city, offered strong resistance to the invading Russian Communist forces.<sup>98</sup>

Being unable to wage war on two fronts, against the Central Powers (Austria-Hungary and Germany) and a defensive war against Soviet Russia, the Government of the Ukrainian Central Rada decided to enter into peace negotiations with the Central Powers at Brest. This occurred almost a month after Soviet Russia had already been negotiating peace with the Central Powers at Brest and withdrawing its forces from that front to throw them against the young Ukrainian state. Through adroit diplomacy the peace delegation of the Ukrainian National Republic succeeded in concluding an honorable peace in Brest, without any annexations in favor of the Central Powers and without any war reparations. A simultaneously concluded Commerce Treaty provided for an exchange of goods exclusively on gold parity, or for barter of goods of both parties of equal value. Both Treaties were concluded by the Ukrainian peace delegation on February 9, 1918, on the very day when the Bolsheviks succeeded, after several days' siege, to capture Kiev. By the Peace Treaty the Central Powers recognized complete sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic *de jure*, the latter having somewhat earlier, of its own volition (by the Fourth Universal of the Central Rada) proclaimed its complete sovereignty and independence.

#### 4. *War of Ukraine Against Bolshevik Russia — A National Russian-Ukrainian War*

The principal reason for the Russian-Ukrainian war of 1917-1918 was similar to that which had caused all the wars between Ukraine and Russia since the ill-fated Treaty of 1654. The basic Russian motivation was the wish to dominate Ukraine and to exploit her people and natural resources; Ukraine on the other hand fought for the right to live an independent life on her own land.

The aggressive spirit of Russian Bolshevism toward Ukraine, a continuation of traditional Russian imperialism, has often been stressed by the Russian Bolshevik leaders themselves. Georgi Piatakov, leader of the Russian Bolsheviks in Ukraine (actually, his father owned large sugar refineries in Ukraine and thus was a Russian capitalist), stated when the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was established: "We cannot support the Ukrainians because their movement is dangerous to the Russian proletariat. Russia cannot exist without the Ukrainian sugar industry the

same can be said of its coal (Donbas), grain (the Black Sea black earth belt), and so on.”<sup>99</sup> What is clear is that the need of Ukrainian grain, sugar and coal compelled the Russian Bolsheviks to aggression just as it had their predecessors, the Russian Tsars, the aristocracy and the military.

There is no reason to believe that the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic prohibited exports of these products to Russia for purposes of blockading Russia. On the contrary, the Ukrainian Government in a separate note to the Council of People’s Commissars of Russia declared that it will gladly continue to export raw materials required by Russia, particularly grain, coal, pig-iron and sugar on condition that these products would either be exchanged for manufactured goods needed by the Ukrainian population, or paid for in a settlement of accounts. Russia never desired one or the other because all she wanted was to benefit of Ukrainian labor and products through a colonial system, i.e. for nothing, or at half price. This was also the desire of Soviet Russia, and hence her military aggression against Ukraine of December, 1917.

The commander-in-chief of the Bolshevik troops in Ukraine was even more candid in defining the reasons for Russian aggression: “It was necessary to maintain the connection between Petrograd and the industrial and agricultural peripheral areas; an independent Ukraine would deny Soviet Russia access to the Caucasus and the oil of Baku and at the same time deprive the Soviet center of the coal of the Donbas, the manganese of Kryvy Rih and the bread of Ukraine . . .”<sup>100</sup>

This policy of exploitation, not only of Ukraine but other non-Russian peoples and countries as well, was formulated by Stalin himself as follows:

“Central Russia (Russia proper — V. H.), this center of world revolution, cannot long exist without the help of the peripheral areas (non-Russian territories — V. H.), which possess the necessary resources of raw materials and food products. Any attempt to separate these countries from Russia must be eliminated. The demand for separation of these areas at the present stage of the revolution is extremely counter-revolutionary . . .”<sup>101</sup>

In the light of the official program and these official pronouncements, it is clear why Bolshevik Russia chose an imperialist method of conquering Ukraine, direct military aggression. It was a well-known and accepted fact that *in Ukraine the Russian Bolsheviks would not get any cooperation from the Ukrainian people; their only allies would be their direct agents.*

Despite propaganda to the effect that the Russian Revolution was “international and Communist” in character, *the war of the Russian*

*Bolsheviks against Ukraine was above all a national Russian war against the Ukrainian people.* All Russian propaganda statements to the effect that Bolshevism was an “international phenomenon,” that it did not emanate from Russia, and that it was an indigenous Ukrainian movement, are refuted by the fact that Russian Bolshevik leaders were in charge of Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Another leader of the Russian Bolsheviks, A. Ivanov, second in command to Piatakov, writes that the Russian Bolsheviks in Ukraine “could not take the initiative against the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, because the Ukrainian military units were nationalistically inclined, fully supporting the *Rada*. It was necessary to subvert them from within . . .”<sup>102</sup>

Still another Russian Bolshevik leader in Ukraine, Zatonski, declared at that time: “Because there is as yet no split among the Ukrainians, we have to carry on the fight with the Ukrainian nation; and there is only a small group of Bolsheviks to do this.”<sup>103</sup> Regarding this, the Bolshevik journal *Litopys revoliutsiï* writes:

“But it was impossible to break the Ukrainian national front, therefore the Russian Republic was compelled to use its military strength to transform Ukraine into a Soviet state . . .”<sup>104</sup>

Other Russian Bolsheviks attest to the fact that neither the peasants nor the proletariat supported the Bolsheviks in Ukraine. For example, one of the outstanding Russian Bolshevik leaders against Ukraine, M. Mayorov, writes:

“The peasantry, unsympathetic toward the Bolsheviks remained passive.”<sup>105</sup>

Antonov-Ovsiienko, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops in Ukraine, writes that even the “local soviets and the proletariat did not want to defend the Bolshevik revolution in Ukraine and prevented others from doing so . . .”<sup>106</sup>

While it is true that the Russian Bolsheviks had recruited Ukrainians who were communistically-inclined as agents, their role as hirelings and their pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian attitudes were so evident that no illusions as to their true nature remained. They could not be considered even by the Russians themselves as “local *Ukrainian Communists*.”

When the Russian Bolshevik troops had penetrated deep into Ukraine, Moscow promptly set up a puppet “Soviet government of Ukraine” (a practice known to the West only after World War II) and proclaimed Ukraine a “Soviet Socialist Republic.” That this “Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine” was not at all a Ukrainian government is confirmed by a Communist review. *Litopys revoliutsiï* writes that the members of this “Ukrainian” government “did not know how to speak Ukrainian, because all were foreigners,” and therefore this “government” did not



enjoy the confidence of the Ukrainian people who had never heard these names before.”<sup>107</sup>

About this “Soviet Regime in Ukraine” an official Russian historian of Bolshevism in the Ukraine wrote: “The Soviet Ukrainian regime did not even have the support of the strongest proletarian organizations in Ukraine. This made it extremely difficult to secure the support of the masses.”<sup>108</sup> Therefore, continues the Bolshevik review, even in the first temporary capital of this “government,” Kharkiv, which was one of the most Russified cities of Ukraine, this “government” had no solid support and “all the Ukrainian units of the Bolshevik army in Kharkiv were disarmed, because they refused to defend the Soviet authority.”<sup>109</sup> This is why (as the Bolsheviks themselves write): “military units from Soviet Russia were sent to assist this government.”<sup>110</sup> The Soviet Review concludes: “The troops which had been brought into Ukraine from Russia by Antonov-Ovsienko provided the only military support the Soviet government of Ukraine was able to muster against the Ukrainian Central *Rada* . . .”<sup>111</sup> The forces Bolshevik Russia used to conquer Ukraine are plainly revealed by the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in his *Memoirs*. He writes that his invading army consisted of the following regular Russian military units: The 60th Siberian Infantry regiment; the Bryansk detachment of the Red Guards; artillery units from Orsha; infantry and cavalry from Novgorod; an infantry division with heavy and light artillery from the Northern front under the command of Pozern, and so forth.<sup>112</sup>

These military units consisted exclusively of Russians and the Ukrainians did not participate in them. This is evident from a report of the Bolshevik commissar Likov to Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Soviet Russia, Krylenko. Likov describes how military units were recruited for the Ukrainian war: “I am disarming the Ukrainians . . . In order to dispatch units against the Ukrainians, I have first to eliminate the Ukrainians . . . It is possible to go to Kiev with the remainder. There is no alternative.”<sup>113</sup>

And the commander of the Russian troops which attacked Kiev, Col. Muraviev (a former Tsarist army officer who defected to the Bolsheviks for nationalist and imperialist reasons), wrote in his report on the battle of Kruty on January 31, 1918: “The Petrograd Red Guards, the Vyborg and the Moscow Guards bore the brunt of the entire struggle . . .”<sup>114</sup>

After the defeat of the Ukrainian national forces, Ukraine was subjugated by the Russian military forces. *The Soviet authority in Ukraine was carried from Russia by Russian troops, and by no one else.*

Col. Muraviev in “Order of the Day, No. 14” of February 10, 1918 stated: “We carry the Soviet authority from the far north on our bayo-

nets. Wherever we impose it, without flinching we support it with our bayonets . . . ”<sup>115</sup>

When the same Col. Muraviev took Kiev in February of 1918 (he held it only a short time), he wired Lenin in Moscow: “All authority, conquered by bayonets, has been transferred to Ukrainian Soviets.”<sup>116</sup>

Finally, another Russian historian of Bolshevism in Ukraine, N. Popov, dwells upon the factors which made it possible for the Bolsheviks to conquer Ukraine in 1918: “The actual help of Soviet Russia was of great importance in this matter. In the industrial centers of Ukraine, such as Kharkiv and Katerynoslav, the *local Bolsheviks had neither the strength, nor the resoluteness to seize power*. In Kharkiv and Katerynoslav *this was achieved as a result of the active participation in and the initiative of the army units which arrived from North Russia*, the detachments of Sivers and Antonov-Ovsienko, which came mostly from the Petersburg and Moscow garrisons . . . *It was these detachments that established the Soviet government in Kharkiv and made it possible to call for the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets.*”<sup>117</sup>

But even more eloquently does the behavior of the Russian troops in Ukraine demonstrate this Russian nationalist and aggressive character. After capturing Kiev, the Russians began to slaughter Ukrainians simply because they heard them speaking Ukrainian.<sup>118</sup> V. Zatonsky, one of the most active of the Russian agents and an outstanding Ukrainian Communist, describes in his *Memoirs* the occupation of Kiev by the Soviet army units under Muraviev’s command in 1918: “We marched into the city. Bodies, bodies and blood . . . At that time anyone who had any connection with the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was simply shot on the streets. . . I myself was nearly shot. I was arrested by a patrolman on the street, because I had a *Ukrainian* certificate although it really was a Soviet certificate. The word “soviet” had been translated “rada.” The Ukrainization of this term almost cost me my life. I was saved by mere chance. I found in my pocket a certificate signed by Lenin.” And Zatonsky writes further in his *Memoirs* that a similar event occurred at the same time to another Bolshevik leader of Ukrainian origin, Skrypnyk. Zatonsky concluded: “the Soviet Ukraine was created by those who killed people for speaking but one Ukrainian word.”<sup>119</sup>

It should be mentioned that the Russian minority in the Ukrainian cities, especially Kiev, by and large hailed the Bolsheviks as being responsible for the victory of Russian imperialistic centralism over the Ukrainians, the “Separatists.” They maintained this in spite of their general hostility to Bolshevism and their love for the old tsarist Russia.

Thus, the Kievan town-*duma*, composed of tsarist Russian officials — monarchists — hailed the entry of the Russian-Bolshevik army of

Muraviev as "the renewal of a united all-Russian revolutionary front."<sup>120</sup> At the time of the battle for Kiev, the Russian bourgeois-elements and even former tsarist policemen-monarchists supported the Russian Bolsheviks by shooting Ukrainian defenders in the back.<sup>121</sup> And it was for this reason that the Bolsheviks, after their Kievan victory, directed their terror against the Ukrainians and not against the "bourgeoisie" in general. This was a "national" terror. Slaughtering Ukrainians merely because they used the Ukrainian language on the streets, the Bolsheviks at the same time did not harm the Russian nationalists even if these Russians proved to be anti-Bolshevik. Members of the Ukrainian Social-Revolutionary Party, e.g., Zarudny (the Minister of Agriculture in the Central *Rada*), Puhach, Bochkovsky, and others were killed by the Bolsheviks without trial, while Savenko, the leader of the Russian monarchists in Kiev and the editor of the anti-Ukrainian newspaper "Kievlanin," was abruptly freed — in spite of the fact that his newspaper was at the time anti-Bolshevik.<sup>122</sup> The Bolsheviks destroyed the Ukrainian press and closed Ukrainian schools and cultural institutions and even eliminated the use of the Ukrainian language in public; however, they did not touch the Russian "bourgeois" press nor the Russian pre-Revolutionary organizations.

The real reason for such a cruel Bolshevik attack was that they aimed at the complete subjugation in order to exploit Ukraine for the benefit of Russia who especially at that time needed Ukrainian goods.

In addition to the massacre of Ukrainians the Russian Bolsheviks speedily began to loot Ukraine. In his *Memoirs* Antonov-Ovsienko reports: "Immediately after the establishment of the Soviet authority in Ukraine, Moscow and Petrograd sent special emissaries to speed up the requisition of grain."<sup>123</sup>

The principal reason for Russia's aggression against Ukraine was their desire for the grain and other natural resources.

##### 5. *Ukraine in the Struggle Against Foreign Aggression — the Second War of Bolshevik Russia Against Ukraine*

After the capture of Kiev by the Russian Bolsheviks (February 9, 1918) the Ukrainian Central *Rada* of the Ukrainian National Republic, its authority still intact throughout most of the country, was forced to retreat to the city of Zhytomir in Volhynia. The Armies of the Ukrainian National Republic, after their retreat from Kiev, soon deployed their forces for a new front in Volhynia and Podilla, where they not only offered resistance, but began a counter-attack. They held the front not only

until the conclusion of peace in Brest (February 9, 1918), but even for a week and a half longer. The Government of the Ukrainian National Republic perceived, however, that its own forces will be insufficient to repel the Russian invasion of Ukraine within a short time and to save Ukraine from being robbed. Therefore, on February 18, it decided to conclude a military pact with the two Central Powers providing for military aid of the Central Powers in order to stage a counteroffensive of the UNR Army against Russian aggressors. Supported by these new allies and strengthened by military units organized by Ukrainians in the Western Ukrainian territory held by Austro-Hungary, the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic, expelled the Russian Bolshevik troops from Ukraine in March of 1918. On March 3, 1918, Soviet Russia concluded a peace treaty with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk by the terms of which the Russian Bolsheviks obligated themselves to "conclude immediately a peace treaty with the Ukrainian National Republic and to recognize the peace treaty existing between this state and Germany and its allies."<sup>124</sup> Negotiations between Ukraine and Russia began on May 23, 1918. Characteristically, the *Russian* delegation was headed by Christian Rakovsky, who was of Bulgarian origin and a Romanian citizen and had previously never even visited Ukraine, and who subsequently became the head of the Soviet "Ukrainian" government, and Dmitri Z. Manuisky, who until just recently, was the "Foreign Minister" of the Soviet government in Ukraine. This fact heavily underscores the nature of the Soviet power in Ukraine: all the organs of this power, including "heads" and "ministers" of Ukraine, have been Russian agents and puppets.

The relations between Ukraine and Germany and her allies were of short duration. The Ukrainian Central *Rada* found itself in conflict with Germany when the German command intervened in the Ukrainian internal affairs. As a result the Germans engineered a *coup d'état*, dispersed the Central *Rada*, and installed General Paul Skoropadsky as *hetman* of Ukraine. This event took place on April 29, 1918.<sup>125</sup>

The Germans were not interested at all in the form of the Ukrainian government, nor in the welfare of the Ukrainian people. They wanted Ukrainian food products, particularly wheat and meat, and other natural resources of Ukraine. In their desire to exploit Ukraine, the Germans conducted themselves as did the Russians, small wonder then, that on November 14, 1918 there was a national uprising in Ukraine not only against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky, but also against the German Army which had been his sponsor.

The anti-German and anti-Skoropadsky uprising was directed by a specially-formed Directory, composed of the most outstanding members

of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. The Directory was composed of 5 members and was elected by the Ukrainian National Alliance, created several months before the uprising by all Ukrainian political parties. Simon Petlura, an outstanding Ukrainian political leader and very popular with the Ukrainian soldiers was one of the inspiring organizers of the anti-German uprising. Supported by the Ukrainian people, Petlura, as Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian national army, entered Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, while the Germans hurriedly evacuated the Ukrainian territory and retreated to Germany. Thus was the Ukrainian National Republic restored.

One of the first acts of the Directory Government of the Ukrainian National Republic was a proclamation of elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, which, in the spirit of the times was named "The Labor Congress of Ukraine." Taking part in the elections were not only all Ukrainian political parties, but also the minorities' (Jewish, Russian). The results gave a vast majority to the Ukrainian democratic parties. There were only a scant few dozen adherents of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" among the 593 returned to office. The Congress convened in Kiev on January 24, 1919 and adopted a temporary democratic constitution. The Labor Congress resolved that for a final drafting of a constitution an all-national Constituent Assembly should be elected.

The importance of the Labor Congress of Ukraine, a legislative body can be judged by its all-Ukrainian character; for the first time in the modern history of Ukraine, all its territories were fully represented.

On January 22, 1919, the eve of the Congress, a manifesto was issued in Kiev, proclaiming the union of all Ukrainian territories which formerly had been under various foreign occupations (Russian, Austro-Hungarian) into one sovereign state of the Ukrainian people: The Ukrainian National Republic. Thus the Labor Congress of Ukraine was an all-Ukrainian Parliament, whose decisions are recorded by history as the decisions and will of the Ukrainian people. The actual practice of this body has since become the political credo of the Ukrainian people:

1. The establishment of a free, independent, and sovereign state of the Ukrainian people;

2. The introduction of a democratic system of government, and it was this system of government which the Ukrainian people desired.

However, while the Ukrainian National Republic was busy organizing the new democracy, Bolshevik Russia was preparing a new aggression. Despite the fact that Bolshevik Russia had signed an armistice with Ukraine and had recognized the independence of the Ukrainian state, the Russian Bolsheviks, taking advantage of the uprising against the Germans began a military aggression against the young state.

The second Bolshevik aggression, like the first, was of a Russian imperialist nature. *Even the Bolshevik puppets who were to rule Ukraine, were organized not in Ukraine but in Russia (in Kursk), and acted as Russian agents without any attempt to hide behind Ukrainian slogans.*

As early as July 5, 1918 the Russian Bolsheviks summoned the so-called "First Congress of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine" in Moscow. This branch of the Russian Communist Party, a mere Russian "puppet" created in Moscow by Moscow, in its first public declaration stated:

"The First Congress of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (KP(b)U) considers that the task of our Party is the struggle for a *revolutionary unification of Ukraine with Russia* on the basis of a *proletarian centralism within the Russian Soviet republic . . .*"<sup>126</sup> (Italics by author).

It was thus stated plainly and unequivocally that the objectives of this Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, which had been organized by Moscow, were purely Russian, not Ukrainian nor even international.

The Second Congress of the same "Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine", which took place on October 15, 1918 *in Moscow*, even more clearly revealed the Russian imperialistic character of the second Ukrainian invasion. The Congress stated in a Resolution:

"In its preparatory work (for the assumption of power in Ukraine) the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, *relying on the forces of proletarian Russia, should subordinate all its activities to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party* and choose the moment of attack in conjunction with it . . ." <sup>127</sup>

Could there be any possible doubt, after these statements, as to the *Russian* character of the so-called "Communist government of Ukraine"?

A thoroughgoing description of the second Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine by Russia is provided by *Litopys revolyutsiyi*, a Communist review in the Ukrainian language:

"The Soviet of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Republic and, upon its directives, the Revolutionary Military Soviet (then the highest military authority) decided upon military operations against Ukraine. On November 17, in the city of Kursk, (a Russian city near the Ukrainian border — V. H.) a 'Ukrainian front headquarters' was established with the false appellation 'Headquarters for troops on the Kursk front.' It was made up of Antonov-Ovsienko, Stalin, and Zatonski. The following military units were at its disposal: the 42nd Voronezh infantry regiment, the Orlov cavalry division, the Moscow division, a detachment of Kozhevnikov from Ufa, etc . . ." <sup>128</sup>



We must bear in mind at all times that the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, established in Moscow in July, 1918 was not, as a matter of fact, any party, but simply a provincial organization of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Ukraine. This "party" was in all respects under the management of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in Moscow not only actually, but also formally, on the basis of the organizational by-laws of the party.

The leadership and the military elements were essentially *Russian*. And in Kursk, Stalin, as secretary of the Communist Party, created a second puppet Communist "government" on instructions from the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. This was under the leadership of Georgi P. Piatakov who has previously been mentioned. It is significant that in this supposedly "Ukrainian" government, all the members were Russians except for one Bolshevik of Ukrainian origin.

And within Ukraine, Russians and Russified foreigners (not Ukrainians) were the forces on which the Bolsheviks counted. This was admitted by the Bolsheviks in their official publications; for instance, in the declarations of the Bolshevik leader in Ukraine, Zatonsky, and in the different descriptions of this period by the Russian historian of Bolshevism in Ukraine, N. Popov. The former declared in *Communist*, the organ of the Communist Party, (No. 3-4, 1918): "In Ukraine the Bolshevik Party consists chiefly of Russians."<sup>129</sup> The latter wrote: "The great part of the working class masses which took part in the movement directed against the *Directoriya* were of non-Ukrainian nationality."<sup>130</sup> In addition to Russian troops, the *Russian* Communist Party sent hundreds of *Russian* agents into Ukraine. Leon Trotsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops, instructed them as follows:

"... By one way or another Ukraine must be returned to Russia... Without Ukrainian coal, iron, ore, grain, lard and the Black Sea, Russia cannot exist... In regard to the necessity of the Soviet government to export grain from Ukraine, all means can be considered legitimate..."<sup>131</sup>

Following the Russian invasion, Moscow sent 2,700 special agents into Ukraine whose purpose was to organize the requisitioning of Ukrainian grain.<sup>132</sup>

In late December, 1918, after the Russian troops had crossed the Ukrainian borders, the second Russian-Ukrainian war began (the official date of declaring war is Jan. 11, 1919). Ukraine found itself in an unusually difficult situation. Ukraine was suffering from a two-pronged assault, in the West by Poland, which coveted the Western Ukrainian lands (Galicia), and in the East by the "White Russian" armies under General Denikin, attempting to save the Tsarist Russian Empire. It is significant that the "White Russian" armies were as merciless and fero-

cious toward the Ukrainians as they were toward the Bolsheviks. They were more determined to destroy the young Ukrainian state than the growing Bolshevik power.

In this favorable situation the Russian Bolshevik armies advanced through Ukraine. On February 6, 1919 they succeeded in taking Kiev and capturing a large part of Ukraine. By means of Russian bayonets the puppet "Soviet government of Ukraine" was placed on the neck of the Ukrainian people with Russian bayonets. This government proclaimed in an official statement of January 26, 1919: "First, we resolutely declare our solidarity with Soviet Russia, the cradle of the world-Revolution and the source for moral and material support for the world proletarian uprising. Proximity to Russia obliges us to make our revolutionary front equal that of the Russian proletariat. We declare the enemies of Soviet Russia to be also the enemies of Soviet Ukraine."<sup>133</sup> Future events proved that the entire Ukrainian people had been declared "enemies."

#### *6. Russian Bolshevik Spoliation of Ukraine and The Unified Ukrainian Resistance*

Returning to the Ukraine in 1919, the Russian Bolshevik looters began to persecute the Ukrainian people with renewed zeal and to destroy the economy of Ukraine. This spoliation policy was admitted by *Pravda*, the organ of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In commenting on Red Army incursion into Ukraine, the Communist organ wrote:

"After bloody and difficult struggle, the Red Army opened a path to the grain, because it conquered Ukraine. It opened a path to coal, because it conquered two-thirds of the Donbas," and further: "What Ukraine has given us already is only a small part of the produce on which Soviet Russia rightfully depends. Bread and meat must be brought from Ukraine as soon as possible and as much as possible."<sup>134</sup> A. Shlikhter, the special commissar appointed by Moscow to collect provisions in Ukraine, expressed this predatory passion on Moscow's part. Addressing a special meeting of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919, he declared: "You all should remember how much easier we breathed as Ukraine with the advance of the Red Army gradually bowed to Soviet rule: rich Ukraine, that granary is ours' . . . We have there four central army detachments for the express purpose of collecting provisions. Let us put our hopes in them! We have also sent many workers who will be able to flood all the Ukrainian villages. We should always remember that the eyes of the Russian proletariat are turned toward Ukraine."<sup>135</sup>

But it was none other than Lenin himself who expressed most cogently the ruinous character of the second Russian invasion of Ukraine. In his articles and directives of 1919 he hypocritically criticized the policy of the Germans in Ukraine, accusing them of "imperialistic" plans with respect to Ukraine, and added that out of the 60 million *poods* of wheat they had planned to take from Ukraine, they were actually able to take only 9 million *poods* of wheat. At the same time he revealed what the conquest of Ukraine meant to Russia: "Now, with the *conquest of Ukraine*, our strength is growing. We can now say that we have the source of grain and food products and the possibility of securing fuel from the Donbas . . . We should move at least 3,000 railroad workers, and also a number of peasants, from starving northern Russian into Ukraine. The Ukrainian Soviet government (created by the Russians, V. H.) has already issued a decree on the shipping of 100 million *poods* of available wheat."<sup>136</sup> Thus, the Russian spoliation was much worse than the German.

The Ukrainian people responded to this new Russian aggression with a stubborn and determined resistance, a fact which is emphasized by the Russian Bolsheviki themselves. Lenin, in his articles about the difficulties encountered in Ukraine, wrote:

"In Ukraine there are great supplies of grain, but it is very difficult to get them: the partisans are active everywhere . . . We sent our best forces into Ukraine to secure food supplies, and we heard them say in unison: 'There are plenty of supplies, but we cannot get them immediately.' From our comrades in Ukraine comes the cry: *There is no one to build the Soviet power in Ukraine.*"<sup>137</sup> (Italics of author).

The "comrades" of Lenin in Ukraine, that is, the puppet "Communist Party of Bolsheviki of Ukraine" (created by the Russians as an integral part of a single Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviki under a Central Committee in Moscow), was in a difficult situation owing to the hostility of the Ukrainian masses to Russian Communism. A Russian historian of Bolshevism in Ukraine wrote: "After the overthrow of the Directory, the Soviet government came into *direct conflict with the masses of Ukrainian peasants*. The Soviet government was surrounded by hostile elements on every hand."<sup>138</sup> (Author's italics).

The *Communist* of January 9, 1919 reported: "A sporadic wave of large and small peasant uprisings has completely disorganized the first stages of Soviet construction in Ukraine in the last few months; it is one of the most outstanding facts of the present singular situation in Ukraine."<sup>139</sup>

The next head of the Russian "puppet" government in Ukraine, Christian Rakovsky, in his book *The Struggle for the Liberation of the*

*Village*, observed that between April 1, 1919 and June 20, 1919, there were 328 peasant uprisings and revolts in the territory held by the Bolsheviks. Thus, in April 1919 there were 93 uprisings; in the first half of May, 28 uprisings; and for 20 days of June, 207 uprisings.<sup>140</sup> A vivid description of the Russian-Bolshevik plunder of Ukraine at this time is given us by the Moscow commissar, Shlikhter, in this one line: "Blood was spilled for every pood of grain collected."<sup>141</sup> It is to be emphasized that the Ukrainian peasantry rose against Soviet Russian authority as a single and unified national and political force. This is clearly stressed in the resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine:

"Banditry (as the Russian Bolsheviks referred to any anti-Soviet uprising in Ukraine, V. H.) in 1919 in Ukraine was *uprising of the politically unified Ukrainian village against Soviet authority . . .*"<sup>142</sup>

The peasantry was not the only class to resist and oppose the Russian Bolshevism in Ukraine. The above quoted Communist historian, N. Popov, in discussing the early stages of Soviet domination of Ukraine, pointed out: "All things considered the working class did not give the Soviet authority in Ukraine the support expected of it . . ."

Even the Ukrainian Communists expressed their opposition to the Russian looting of Ukraine, stating at their Homel meeting that "Ukraine is regarded as an object to be exploited for her material resources."<sup>143</sup>

This resistance of the Ukrainian city and village to the Russian Bolshevik invaders enabled the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic to deliver a decisive blow in the second Russian invasion. Popov analyzes the causes of the Russian retreat: "*A lack of support for the Soviet authority on the part of the peasant masses and insufficient proletarian activity — which were taken advantage of by the counter-revolution — constituted a decisive influence in the second stage of the struggle for Soviet power in Ukraine; the Soviet government was again compelled to quit Ukrainian territory . . .*"<sup>144</sup>

Supported by waves of uprisings throughout Ukraine, the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic undertook a large-scale offensive against the Russian troops and on August 30, 1919 entered Kiev and hurled the Russians east of the Dnieper River.

Ironnically, at the very moment that the Ukrainian armies were pursuing the Bolshevik troops and gaining an ever-increasing momentum, a second Russian invasion by the so-called "White Russian" armies of General Denikin struck Ukraine from the East. These "White Russians" were engaged in a civil war against the Bolsheviks and operated on the Don. Taking advantage of the Bolshevik retreat from Kiev, they attacked

the Ukrainian national armies on the flank and succeeded in reaching Kiev at the same time as the Ukrainian armies.<sup>145</sup> Kiev was the center of stubborn battles between the Ukrainians and the "White Russians"; the attempts of the Ukrainians to come to an agreement with Denikin came to nought. On September 24, 1919 the government of the Ukrainian National Republic was compelled to declare war against the Denikin forces.<sup>146</sup>

Thus Denikin and his political advisers from the camp of "White Russians," instead of going ahead against Moscow while their flank was guarded by the friendly Army of the UNR, preferred to throw their large main force against the Army of UNR and thus weakened their anti-Bolshevik front. As a result, Denikin defeated the Army of the UNR in December, 1919, but was soon conquered by the Bolsheviks in January, 1920.

### 7. *"White Russians' " Part in the Struggle of Red Russians Against Ukraine*

The two-front war against both "Red" and "White" Russians and the third front created by the invasion of the Western Ukraine by the newly-restored Republic of Poland, created the so-called "triangle of death" for the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic at the end of 1919. Deprived of assistance from the Western Allies and pressed on three fronts by their enemies, the Ukrainians fought desperately to save their newly-founded democratic republic. The struggle against Bolshevism was the main task of the new state so the Ukrainian government endeavored to make peace with Poland to be able to concentrate its forces against Moscow.

The attempts of the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic to conclude peace with Poland proved futile because the Polish Government pursued its imperialistic plans, desiring to conquer Ukrainian lands if not to the Dniro, then at least to the rivers Zbruch and Sluch. Commissions of the Paris Peace Conference were unsuccessful, too. The proposal of British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, approved by the Paris Peace Conference and by President Woodrow Wilson that the boundary between Ukraine and Poland follow a basically ethnographic line was rejected by Poland. Poland continued to wage war on Ukraine at a time when Ukraine was in mortal peril at the hands of overwhelming Bolshevik odds. Only when the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic, under a two-pronged squeeze of the Reds and Whites, suffered its first major defeat in December, 1919, the Polish Government decided to conclude an armistice with the Ukrainian National Republic. This was at

a time when, late in 1919 and early 1920 the Army of the UNR was already quite weak and could not alone withstand Russian pressure, being without arms and medicine. It was only then that Poland made use of the UNR's weakness and agreed to make peace with Ukraine on very burdensome conditions for Ukraine. This was finalized by a treaty of April 22, 1920. But let us again consider the "White" Russians.

The "White Russians," despite the fact that they too were engaged in a war against the Bolsheviks, and the Ukrainians could not reach any understanding. And the reason was that the principal goal of the "White Russians" was not the defeat of the Bolsheviks, but rather the preservation of the Russian empire at all costs and the incorporation of Ukraine and other non-Russian countries into the Russian "prison of nations." In opposing the Ukrainian national armies while the latter were combatting the Bolsheviks, the "White Russians," naturally, helped the "Red Russians" tremendously to destroy Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik forces. Tragically, these "White Russians" not only helped the Bolsheviks crush the Ukrainian armies, the only genuinely democratic force in Eastern Europe at that time fighting the Communists, but to ensure their own defeat. In their chauvinist shortsightedness and imperialistic zeal, the "White Russians" were determined to create a unified Russian empire, even of it was under Bolshevik control. They desired this more than a democratic Russian state, with Ukraine and other non-Russian countries free and independent of Russia.

That the "White Russians" were indeed guided not by the goal of a decisive defeat of Bolshevism, but rather by their nationalistic determination to preserve the Russian territorial empire and thus keep the non-Russian peoples in Russian continued enslavement, is amply demonstrated by writings and testimonies of the leaders of the "White Russian movement." The Commander-in-Chief of this movement, General Denikin, writes in his memoirs: "The preservation of a united Russian state was a symbol of my faith, as well as that of the entire volunteer White army . . . It was an Orthodox symbol allowing for no doubts, vacillations or compromises . . . These views formed the basis of our relationship with Ukraine . . .<sup>147</sup> And further: "An accord with Petlura (i.e. with the army of independent Ukraine), who was trying to separate Ukraine from Russia, would have meant a break with the idea of a one and indivisible Russia, — an idea which was deeply rooted in the mind of both leaders and soldiers (of "the white" army) . . . I gave this advice to my volunteer army: I do not recognize an independent Ukraine."<sup>148</sup> Based on this order and this "non-recognition of an independent Ukraine" a war was begun against Ukraine instead of a common struggle against Bolshevism.



Another outstanding leader of the "White Russians," Gen. Wrangel, the Commander-in-Chief of the "White Russian" armies after the debacle of Gen. Denikin, wrote:

"After proclaiming the slogan of a 'one, great and indivisible Russia, the Commander-in-Chief (Denikin, V. H.,) with extreme fanaticism contested everything which went counter to the truth as he saw it . . ." <sup>149</sup> With such an attitude toward the non-Russian peoples who had suffered Tsarist slavery, many "White Russians" could not help but be won over by Bolshevik propaganda to their "cause of liberation."

Another eye-witness and historian of the "White Russian movement," E. von Wahl, comments: "The non-Russian people were told frankly that their national aspirations would be suppressed. *Three-fourths of all the efforts of White leaders were expended in the struggle against the national aspirations of the local population . . .*" <sup>150</sup>

The assistance rendered the "Red Russians" by the "White Russians" was not limited in Ukraine to the fact that "three-fourths of all the efforts of the White leaders were expended in the struggle against the national aspirations." In Ukraine these efforts meant the looting of resources and terrorization of the population. The character of the "White Russian" army in Ukraine was best understood by the Ukrainian people, who instinctively sensed the rapacious nature of these "White Russians." The Ukrainians nicknamed these armies the "Looting Army" (the Russian abbreviation, *Dobrar'miya*, meaning "the Volunteer Army" was converted into *Hrabarmiya* — which means "Looting Army" in Ukrainian). The pronunciation was similar. The truth of this characterization of the Russian "white" army is found in the statement of its commander in the south Ukraine, General Wrangel, who declared in his *Memoirs*: "The plunder of the native population was systematic and unpunished and carried out as a matter of course." (Quoted from the book of one of the most distinguished ideologists and leaders of the Russian "White movement," P. Milyukov, *Rossiya na perelome* [Russia at the Turning Point], (Paris, 1927, II, 208).

In addition, the "White Russians" were notorious for their barbarous, anti-Semitic excesses and pogroms in Ukraine. In this they loyally continued Russian traditional policy of anti-Semitism. From the middle of the 19th century on drastic anti-Semitic laws and rules had been introduced into Russia (for instance, Jews except those who were rich or had university degrees were forbidden to live in Russia proper; the bulk of the Jewish population was forced to live in Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania; <sup>151</sup> the Tsarist government, supported by Russian chauvinists and nationalists, invented the slogan, "Beat the Jews and Save Russia,"

a slogan thoroughly practiced by the "White Russian" armies of Denikin and Wrangel).

*The policies of the "White Russians" in Ukraine were largely responsible for the eventual success of the Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine.* They provoked such an intense hatred among the population that the peasantry were moved to mass uprisings and rebellions against them. This, of course, worked to the advantage of the Bolsheviks, who made every possible propaganda use of the atrocities and barbarous behavior of the "White Russians" in Ukraine. This played an important part in the Soviet Russian conquest of Ukraine. Under these circumstances the Bolsheviks defeated Denikin, repulsing his remnants to the Crimea and occupied almost all of Ukraine to Volhynia and Podilla. Only a small part of Ukraine was held by the undefeated Army under General Omelanych-Pavlenko and the UNR Government stayed with this unit.

Impartial Russian, Ukrainian and Jewish observers of the period assign much of the responsibility for the conquest of Ukraine by the Russian Bolsheviks to the "White Russians". Thus, an objective Jewish observer and student of these developments in Ukraine, A. Goldenweiser, writes in his *Memoirs*: "The national intolerance of the command of the 'White Russians found its punishment in the fate of the White Russian army. *The 'Whites' proclaimed that all and everything Ukrainian was 'treasonable.'* Of course, there was hardly a possibility of reaching an understanding with Petlura. *By such policies they (the 'White Russians,' V. H.) transformed this natural ally (Petlura — V. H.) into the enemy . . .* Ukraine remained intransigent."<sup>152</sup>

Von Wahl voices the same opinion: "This short-sighted attitude toward the non-Russian nations convinced these peoples that it was more advantageous to have the still-weak Bolsheviks as neighbors rather than the 'White Russians.' The latter threatened in the event of a victory over Bolshevism to destroy Ukrainian independence. The responsibility for Ukraine falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks rests with the White Russians because of the errors committed in the years 1918-1919. These errors, and not Bolshevik strength, caused the failure of a struggle which could have succeeded only had it been supported by the peoples of the former Russian Empire on the promise of freedom . . ."<sup>153</sup> N. Popov also describes Denikin's role as a contributing factor to the victory of Bolshevism in Ukraine in the following lines: "The U.N.R. [Ukrainian National Republic] perished under the pressure of Denikin's reaction. The downfall of the Directory was started by the Bolsheviks and was completed by Denikin."<sup>154</sup>

The most tragic fact in this situation was that the Entente, above all Britain and France, aligned themselves on the side of the "White

Russians,” granting them all-out aid and assistance. And the latter used this aid not against the Bolsheviks but against Ukraine. One of the participants and a witness of this struggle, Dr. Arnold Margolin, has written in his book, *Ukraine and the Policy of the Entente*: “England, of course, could not foresee this circumstance that the arms which she was sending so liberally to Denikin for the purpose of war against the Bolsheviks, would be used against the Ukrainian army, against the legitimate desires of the Ukrainian people to defend their own land and their freedom with their own breasts . . .”<sup>155</sup>

But it was Stalin who perhaps most accurately of all understood the “White Russians’ ” contribution to the struggle of the Bolsheviks for Ukraine and the other non-Russian nations. He wrote with evident gratification:

“We should not forget that the area of activities of the White generals was limited to the countries inhabited above all by the non-Russian nationalities, and that these nationalities could not but hate them for their imperialistic and Russification policies. The Entente, which supported these generals, could only rely on the Russified elements of these countries. In this way they only increased the hatred of the population of these countries toward themselves and deepened their sympathy for the Soviet authority. This circumstance caused the internal weakness in the rear areas, the weakness on their fronts, and finally, their defeat and *our victory* . . .”<sup>156</sup>

#### *8. The Third Phase of the Russian-Ukrainian War and the United Front of Russian Imperialism*

By the end of 1919 Denikin had concentrated all his forces against the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic and subjected it to a serious defeat. The Ukrainian Army was backed against the Polish front. In this situation only one UNR Army under the command of Gen. Omelanovych-Pavlenko succeeded in breaking through the ring of surrounding Denikin forces and operated on the enemy’s rear since December, 1919. The UNR Government stayed with this Army. Two other armies had been pushed by Denikin’s forces to territories already occupied by Poland. A considerable part of the UNR Army deliberately went underground and joined the detachments of partisans which at first made sorties against Denikin’s rear, and after his defeat conducted a mobile warfare against the Bolsheviks. Ukrainian statehood was at that time in great peril.

Ukrainian diplomacy was extremely active endeavoring in Paris and other European capitals to obtain allied support to continue the

struggle. Unfortunately, the Allies were busy consolidating their victory over the Central Powers and refused any help to the hard-pressed Ukrainians who, at that time, constituted the only effective force fighting against communism.

In the spring of 1920, when Poland and Soviet Russia opened hostilities, the government of the Ukrainian National Republic under Petlura formed a military alliance with the Pilsudski government. The Ukrainian armies, together with the Polish armies, pushed back the Soviet troops and even succeeded in capturing Kiev in May, 1920.

But this third phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war ended in complete defeat for the Ukrainians. Having liquidated all other fronts — the “White Russian” front in particular — Soviet Russia could bring its full strength to bear upon Ukraine. At this time in Russia proper, all the Russian national elements had been consolidated behind the new regime. In particular, former Tsarist officers — many of whom had fought under Denikin and Wrangel — went over to the Soviet regime attributing the traditional Russian imperialist interest, zeal and solicitude of the Russia of the Tsars to the “new” Russia. At the beginning of 1919, according to Russian sources, as many as *three quarters of the officers of the Red Army consisted of former tsarist officers*.<sup>157</sup> And in 1920, many of those tsarist officers who had been in the “White” army defected to the Bolsheviks, among them, General Slashchov, one of those closest to Denikin). This was especially evident during the joint Ukrainian Polish offensive against the Soviet troops in the spring of 1920.

One of the best known Russian Tsarist Generals, Gen. A. Brusilov, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Russian armies at the time of the Provisional Government under Kerensky, issued an exceedingly patriotic appeal to all Russian officers to support wholeheartedly the new Soviet Russian regime, which defended Russia’s interests.<sup>158</sup> He stressed the fact that the new Soviet Russian army needed trained and experienced officers and the General himself became head of a special council of former Tsarist generals and admirals who directed the military operations of the Soviet Russian general staff. This helped enormously the Soviet troops in the war against the Ukrainian-Polish force.

The war of the Ukrainian National Republic in alliance with Poland in this third phase of the war against Soviet Russian aggression was very dramatic. At first the two allied armies succeeded to break the Bolshevik front in a quick blow and advance all the way to the Dniro. But right after this success, in May 1920, the two armies suffered heavy blows against their flanks, and then their front was broken and the Bolshevik armies went forward in a threatening move against Warsaw

in the north and Lviv in the south. It looked as though the battles for Lviv and Warsaw will be lost by the two allied armies and that the Bolsheviks will continue their march against Germany and thence France, as they openly admitted. But the battle was lost by the Bolsheviks at three major points. The Poles repulsed them near Warsaw, and the decisive factor in their defeat near Zamoste and Lviv was the Ukrainian Army. The defeated Bolshevik Armies made a hurried retreat to the east. The Army of the Ukrainian National Republic began to pursue them. But in Poland decisive voices were raised against continued war and for peace with Soviet Russia along a line at that time reached by the Polish Army, i.e. the line of the rivers Zbruch and Sluch. The Polish Government began armistice negotiations with Soviet Russia without prior consultation with the Government of the UNR in spite of the fact that the Treaty of alliance stipulated that any armistice or peace negotiations must be agreed upon by both parties. Having concluded an armistice behind the back of the Ukrainian Government, Poland made it possible for the Bolsheviks to throw all their forces against the Army of the UNR, and after a hard battle to push it back on territory occupied by Poland on November 12, 1920, where the UNR Army was, in accordance with the Polish-Soviet agreement, disarmed and interned by the Poles.

After that the only opposition to Russian Soviet occupation of Ukraine was partisan warfare of detachments of the UNR Army and of insurgents.

This struggle was actively supported by the masses of Ukrainian peasants. And this was natural because after this last victory, Soviet Russia so plundered the occupied country that this policy was the direct cause of the catastrophic famine of 1921. How this came about can be seen in the Bolsheviks' own explanation: "The average Ukrainian yield amounted to some 1,000,000,000 poods of grain a year. In 1920 only 460,000,000 poods were harvested in the entire Ukraine. This was not enough even for Ukraine. The richest provinces not only could not afford to export grain but even needed immediate help themselves. Nevertheless, at this time 50,000,000 poods of grain were collected as "provision" taxes and then another 36,000,000 poods of grain were collected for "help" to Soviet Russia."<sup>159</sup>

As a result of this Russian plunder, 2,500,000 Ukrainians suffered in the famine of 1921.<sup>160</sup> Under such conditions it becomes clear why peasants rebelled against Russian-Bolshevik occupation on such a large scale. During 1920-21 many peasant uprisings took place in Ukraine. These were spontaneous manifestations against the Soviet-Russian occupants. However all were carried out under the slogan "the struggle

for the renewal of the independence of the Ukrainian National Republic" and, therefore, were called "Petlurovite" uprisings. The reports of the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of Counter-Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation) for 1920 and 1921 bear witness to the scope. These reports picture the relations between the people and the occupation forces in those years: In June of 1920, in the province of Kiev alone, there were 11 peasants' uprisings; in July, the number of uprisings grew to 51; in August there were as many as 106 uprisings. During this same time in the province of Poltava there were respectively 76, 99 and 98 uprisings. In one month alone, April 1921, there were 87 active military operations on the part of the Soviet army against these so-called "Petlurovite" uprisings in Ukraine. In these operations 5,016 rebels were killed and 4,242 taken prisoner. At the same time 28 Ukrainian secret organizations of a rebel character were revealed.<sup>161</sup> In general, as other Soviet official sources disclose, in 1921 40,000 Ukrainian peasant rebels moved against the Bolshevik occupying force; 6,000 Ukrainian rebel organizations (local rebel centers) were spotted and liquidated by the Bolsheviks.<sup>162</sup> One of the major encounters between Ukrainian partisans and Soviet Russian troops took place at Bazar in December 1921, where the Bolsheviks executed 359 captured Ukrainian soldiers. This tragic event of modern Ukrainian history terminated large-scale Ukrainian resistance against the Russian Bolsheviks. Lacking popular support, the Bolsheviks (as they admit themselves) maintained their authority only as a result of the "powerful support of the *Russian* Soviet government." What this "powerful support" really amounted to can be seen from the fact that, in 1920, the Red Army garrisoned in Ukraine consisted of 85 per cent Russians and only 8 per cent Ukrainians.<sup>163</sup> In a similar manner, of the representatives of the Soviet government in Ukraine ("elected" from the local population) only 12.75 per cent represented the Communist element of the Ukrainian peasantry; the rest consisted of soldiers of the Russian Red Army and the Russian proletariat.<sup>164</sup>

For some five long years the Ukrainians waged a gallant and determined war against the Bolsheviks. The Russian Bolsheviks invaded Ukraine three times and each time they were beaten and expelled from Ukraine. Had the Ukrainians received a modicum of support from the Western Allies, Ukraine would surely have survived and the scourge of Bolshevism would have been either confined to Russia proper, where it originated, or completely destroyed.

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## CHAPTER III: UKRAINE UNDER RED RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

### 1. *Creation of a Soviet Ukrainian Republic and the Deceitful “Nationality Policy” of the Russian Bolsheviks*

After five years of stubborn struggle, Ukraine succumbed. One of the reasons was that the Russian Bolsheviks, after several defeats, suddenly changed their course with respect to their “national policy” in Ukraine: they resorted to the clever and deceitful maneuver of recognizing the national independence of Ukraine.

Popov, in his *Outline of the History of the CP(b)U*, writes:

“By the end of 1919 the need to correct the errors and the turns of the Party line in the matter of the peasantry and the national question had become clear. Under the influence of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and, in great measure, under the personal influence of Lenin himself, these errors were corrected. This created favorable conditions for the final defeat of the counter-revolution and for the establishment of Soviet power in Ukrainian territory...”<sup>173</sup>

And truly, Lenin, ever the political realist, concluded that “to ignore the importance of the national question in Ukraine would be to commit a deep and dangerous error...”<sup>174</sup> After Denikin’s defeat in Ukraine late in 1919, he wrote the famous “Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine,” in which he proclaimed: “The government of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks recognize Ukrainian independence. It is self-evident and a recognized fact that only the Ukrainian workers and peasants at their All-Ukrainian Congress of the Soviets can and will decide the matter of whether Ukraine is to be united with Russia or remain a sovereign and independent republic...”<sup>175</sup> Addressing the Russian Bolsheviks in Ukraine, Lenin admonished in the same letter:

“We, Russian Communists, should be liberal to the disagreement between the Ukrainian Communists and ourselves on the question of national independence, its form, and its union with Russia,—in general, on the *national question*...”<sup>176</sup>

Finally, after bitter experience had taught them the importance of the national question, the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine passed a special resolution pertaining to this at its conference

in 1920. It states: “ *the national question is the most important in Ukraine. Unless this problem is settled, the Revolution in Ukraine can not succeed.*”<sup>177</sup>

Following Lenin's directives, the Russian Bolsheviks in Ukraine changed their national policy, or, to be more exact, changed the propaganda slogans with which they had come armed from Russia. They made concessions to the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for national independence. In order to placate the Ukrainian national opposition, the Bolsheviks in Ukraine received orders from their party headquarters in Moscow to form and organize a “national” state as a distinct Ukrainian Soviet Republic, legally independent of Russia. The “Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,” which the Russian Bolsheviks created in 1918, was formally proclaimed completely independent, and, in addition, it was not a part of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic but had equal status.

On December 29, 1920, these two republics even concluded an agreement pertaining to economic and military matters and, at the same time, they recognized the mutual independence and sovereignty of each other.<sup>178</sup> As formally separate and independent republics, Russia and Ukraine individually signed a treaty with Poland on March 18, 1921 in Riga. Also, both established separate and diplomatic relations with Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Austria. All these concessions to the Ukrainian national movement were obviously, in Moscow's plans, only a matter of formality and not substance. Moscow had no wish for a real Ukrainian state, even Soviet in form and in close federal union with Russia. Moscow wanted to continue to hold Ukraine in colonial dependence. For this reason Moscow would not let power in Ukraine get into the hands of Bolsheviks of Ukrainian stock, but instead “ukrainized” its own Russian occupation administration in Ukraine, i.e. taught Russian officials the Ukrainian language. Political and economic power remained in the hands of Russians. But formal concessions were quite considerable.

Simultaneously, the Ukrainian language was proclaimed the official language in Ukraine and the Soviet state gave some support to Ukrainian culture. This proclamation of the Central Committee of the Russian C. P. has already been made in a Party directive of December, 1919; it announced: “Ukrainian culture (language, school, etc.) has been suppressed by Tsarism and the ruling classes of Russia during the course of centuries, and therefore the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party obligates all members of the Party to help remove in every way the obstacles impeding the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture. Since one might, in view of the century-long

oppression, readily discern nationalist tendencies among the backward part of the Ukrainian masses, the members of the Russian Communist Party should observe extreme caution with them, persuading them with a word of friendly explanation of the common interests of the working masses of Ukraine and Russia..."<sup>179</sup>

But this declaration remained a mere tactical promise for a long time and it was little known even among the Communists in Ukraine. Up to the end of 1921 nothing was done to put this declaration into practice. Only in 1922-23 was it "remembered," and then the Communists changed the course of their national policy. This was a compromise which the Russian Bolsheviks were forced to make because of their failure to win the Ukrainians over. It was therefore imperative to arrange matters so that the provincial organization of the Russian Communist Party in Ukraine which falsely claimed to be a party (the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine), should appear in the eyes of Ukrainians more in the nature of a party which was allegedly separate from the Russian Communist Party. The Russian Bolsheviks accordingly reshaped the Communist Party of Ukraine to assume a more Ukrainian character. This was accomplished by having a small group of Ukrainian Communists, *borotbisty* (the Fighters) join the CP(b)U, which earlier, although they stood on an ideological communist platform, even conducted a struggle against the Russian Bolsheviks and organized a series of military uprisings (Hryhoriev and Zeleny in 1919).<sup>180</sup>

The Bolshevik's difficulty in adjusting themselves in a hostile Ukraine is reflected in their attempt to Ukrainianize the Party even if only in appearance. Before the *Borotbisty* joined the Communist party, as recounted by the Bolsheviks themselves, they had not only lacked a sufficient number of Communists of Ukrainian origin, but they did not even have people who knew the Ukrainian language and who thus could be helpful in contacting the local people. Popov described this in the following terms: "Only after the *Borotbisty* had joined the CP(b)U, did we get a significant number of Ukrainian-speaking personnel."<sup>181</sup>

The 'new mode' of supporting all and everything Ukrainian began officially in 1922 with the proclamation of the official "Ukrainization" of the entire state and administrative apparatus of the Soviet government in Ukraine. This policy also included the Red Army in Ukraine. This extremely clever and far-reaching step resulted in weakening the anti-Russian and anti-Communist sentiments of the Ukrainians and, in turn, helped lessen the severity of the Russian-Ukrainian struggle (it nevertheless continued in various parts of Ukraine until 1924). Thus, in making concessions to the national aspirations of the Ukrainians, and in placating a small group of sincere Ukrainian Communists, in

particular, the Russians succeeded in consolidating their authority in Ukraine.

Despite this Ukrainization, the Soviet authority in Ukraine, as in all other non-Russian territories, remained essentially a *Russian* authority, even in the purely physical sense. The Communist Party of Ukraine was never Ukrainian, although it also included a certain number of Ukrainian Communists in its ranks. It remained a Russian Communist Party in Ukraine, and this is best exemplified by its membership.

The 1922 Party census revealed—after the “Ukrainization” policy was in full swing—that *the Russians formed 53.6 per cent of the membership of the Communist Party of Ukraine although they comprised only 6 per cent of the entire Ukrainian population. On the other hand, the Ukrainians, who comprised 87 per cent of the total population of Ukraine at that time, formed only 23.3 per cent of members, but only 11.3 per cent of them knew and used the Ukrainian language.* According to the same census, *79.4 per cent of the membership of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine considered themselves Russians and used the Russian language.* Russians formed 64.5 per cent of the Red Army while the Ukrainians formed but 14 per cent; the remainder consisted of various national elements, either Russified or, culturally, Russians.<sup>182</sup> In regard to the Soviet administrative apparatus, Soviet statistics in 1923 stated that only 1/10 to 1/5 of the Soviet officials knew the Ukrainian language.<sup>183</sup> However, among the Communists, even after the “Ukrainization,” not more than 24 per cent could speak Ukrainian.<sup>184</sup>

After all these concessions made by the Bolsheviks to the Ukrainians, it is quite clear that the Soviet authority in Ukraine, particularly the Communist Party and the Red Army, remained an alien and detested foreign occupant.

The creation and establishment of a nominally independent Soviet Ukrainian state was a deceitful and clever maneuver on the part of the Russian Bolsheviks, dictated by circumstances and the pressure of the national movement. The fact that the Russians had been forced to alter their policy in Ukraine was admitted by Stalin himself, then special Commissar of the Russian Soviet Republic for Nationalities, when he stated at the first All-Ukrainian Conference of the CPbU in Kharkiv on June 2, 1921:

“A Ukrainian *nation* does exist. Therefore it becomes the duty of the Communists to develop her cultures. *One cannot go against history...*”<sup>185</sup>

The historian, Popov, in his book *Stalin*, discussing the significance of the national problem in Ukraine and the special attention that Stalin gave to this problem, writes: “The ultimate success of the Soviet power

in Ukraine depended on carrying out a positive national policy; therefore, the very special attention paid to Ukraine in those years by Comrade Stalin, and by Lenin, is quite understandable. Even prior to the beginning of the struggle for Soviet power in Ukraine at the end of 1918, Comrade Stalin appointed members of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to direct this work along Party and military lines... Stalin sharply underscored *the immense significance of a correct national policy in Ukraine, not only from the domestic, but also from the international point of view...*"<sup>186</sup>

The phrase a "correct national policy in Ukraine" is explained by this same historian, Popov, in *The Communist*:

*"Ukrainization has never been and is not now our goal. It is merely a means for establishing closer contacts with the Ukrainian masses without which the Party cannot succeed in Ukraine. The practical purpose of Ukrainization is to bring the masses of Ukrainian people into the orbit of Communist influence. The Ukrainian national development has its own peculiar pattern; if the non-Ukrainian proletariat (Communists) in Ukraine does not adapt itself to this pattern, then a very dangerous situation may develop not only for the Soviet authority in Ukraine, but for communism in general...."*"<sup>187</sup>

Hence, it is apparent just what compelled the Russian Bolsheviks to grant concessions to the Ukrainians and what these concessions have meant in the over-all Russian plan to subvert Ukraine.

## 2. The Soviet Regime—A Russian Phenomenon

The Soviet regime which the Russian Bolsheviks "brought on the tips of their bayonets" into Ukraine and other non-Russian territories, despite its international and Communist propaganda slogans, is essentially *a Russian national phenomenon* and irrevocably connected with Russian nationalist imperialism. This is recognized even by some Russian historians and authorities on Bolshevism. For instance, the world-famous Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev writes in his book, *The Russian Idea*:

*"Russian communism is the expression of the Russian Messianic idea... Communism is a Russian phenomenon irrespective of its Marxist ideology. It is an important element in the messianism of the Russian people..."*"<sup>188</sup>

Another great Russian thinker and publicist, Professor G. Fedotov, in his article in the Russian emigre review, *Novy Zhurnal*, (The New Journal) wrote:

*"Communism (although supra-national in form) is a product of the Russian historical process... Russia is ready to give communism to the world—voluntarily or by force—but only under conditions compatible with her own national interests... To say that communism has nothing in common with the Russian people is to tell a white lie. Originally, an international idea, Bolshevism became Russified in its Russian environment and the passion of this people in a period of decline."*<sup>189</sup> (italics by author).

Prof. Michael Karpovich, a prominent Russian historian now on the faculty of Harvard University, stressed this same point:

*"The Bolshevik Revolution, carried out under the banner name of victory of victorious internationalism, has resulted in the birth of Russian nationalism."*<sup>190</sup> (italics by author)

An important fact—one attesting to the national character of Bolshevism—is that the Bolshevik regime, after attaining power, was not perceptibly opposed by the Russian people but it was strongly opposed by non-Russian people, especially the Ukrainians. Even such Russian opposition movements against the Bolsheviks as "white armies" existed not in Russia proper, but in Siberia, the Don, Baltic lands and parts of the Caucasus. There the Russian minorities, which were under the influence of non-Russian elements, formed "white armies" and attracted a certain number of Russians from Russia proper. This explains the army of Gen. Yudenich in the Baltic lands, Denikin's army in the Don, North Caucasus and part of Ukraine, Admiral Kolchak's army in Siberia etc. In Russia proper there was almost no opposition. Fedotov in his essay, *Decline of Empires*, observed:

*"It is true that the Bolshevik Party absorbed the revolutionary criminal elements of all the peoples of Russia, but not to the same degree. In most cases, Russians were the ideologues and creators of the party. Bolshevism gained power in Petersburg and Moscow without difficulty and Great Russia scarcely experienced the civil war. However, the non-Russian countries put up a stubborn resistance. Apparently, there was something in the Great Russian traditions which nurtured Bolshevism to a far greater degree than elsewhere in the Empire. The soil (for Bolshevism in Great Russia) was prepared by slavery, the village commune (obshchina), and absolutism..."*<sup>191</sup> (italics by author).

The Bolshevik leaders themselves attested most positively to the Russian character of Bolshevism. They admitted and recognized that in Russia they were able to seize power with ease with Russian support. While in the non-Russian countries they were compelled to wage a stubborn and prolonged struggle in order to establish the Soviet power.



Lenin, in 1919, discussed this point: "The elections to the Constituent Assembly of Russia in November 1917, as compared with the two-year civil war, 1917-1919, are extremely instructive. The areas with the smallest Bolshevik following are revealed: Eastern-Urals and Siberia, 12 and 10 per cent, respectively, of the total vote; next, *Ukraine*, 10 per cent of the votes. (In Central Russia, 50 per cent of the votes was cast for the Bolshevik Party, V.H.). It is in these areas, where the percentage of Bolshevik votes in November 1917 was the smallest, that we witness the greatest success in counter-revolutionary movements and uprisings and in the formation of counter-revolutionary organizations... The 'final decision' was not reached until after a long period of difficult struggle and hard-won victories which are not as yet ended either in Siberia or *Ukraine*. And one cannot vouch that it will *finally* (Lenin's italics, V.H.) end, say, in a year or so..."<sup>192</sup>

In comparing Ukraine with Russia, Lenin stated:

*"In only two years we succeeded in winning the sentiment and support of the greater part of the workers and peasants of Great Russia, but we were not able to win the sentiment and support of the majority of the working class of Ukraine..."*<sup>193</sup> (Italics by author).

Stalin stressed this point more strongly in 1920:

*...."Already at the beginning of the October Revolution there was apparent a certain geographical demarcation between the revolution and counter-revolution. In the further development of the civil war the areas of the revolution and counter-revolution were conclusively defined. Russia proper, with her industrial, cultural, and political centers (Moscow, Petrograd), and with a homogenous national population, mostly Russian, was transformed into the base of the Revolution. The peripheral countries—mainly the southern and eastern areas with populations varying greatly in national composition: Cossacks, Tartars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz in the east, and Ukrainians, and the Caucasians, Chechens, Ingush and other Moslem peoples in the south were transformed into a base for the counter-revolution. It is not difficult to see that in such a geographic disposition of opposing forces there was nothing unnatural. And indeed, what should form the base of the Soviet government if not the Moscow-Petrograd proletariat?... In contrast to the peripheral countries, Russia proper presents an entirely different picture. First, it is a unified and integrated nationality, because nine-tenths of her population is composed of Great Russians. Second, the Moscow-Petrograd proletariat was popular with the Russian peasants and, drawing them into the orbit of the Soviet government, helped achieve a class unity. This, among other things, explains the astounding rapport between the front and the hinterland of Soviet Russia. The Soviet government had only*

*to call for reinforcements at the front, and Russia was ready immediately to send a number of regiments. Here is where we must look for the "source" of the amazing force and unprecedented elasticity manifested by Soviet Russia in time of crisis. Here, too, we must look for explanation of the fact—incomprehensible to enlightened Allied leaders—that a counter-revolutionary army, after reaching the borders of Russia proper, inevitably meets with defeat..."*<sup>194</sup> (Italics by author).

In the light of this characterization of the geographical and national demarcation of Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik forces, we see clearly why Stalin, in one of his articles (previously quoted), stated that "Russia proper is the foyer of world revolution" and, that it is to the interest of this Russia to conquer and subdue all non-Russian "peripheral" countries. This becomes increasingly clear when we consider the great difficulties the Bolsheviks experienced in their conquest of Ukraine, where, as Lenin himself said, "there is no one to build the Soviet power."

### *3. The Soviet Regime: A Russian Regime*

It is indisputable, therefore, that the Soviet regime, brought into Ukraine by Russian Bolshevik troops, was and has remained an alien (i.e. Russian), occupational government. Those concessions, made by the Russians to strengthen their authority in Ukraine and in other non-Russian countries, have a distinctive, tactical character. Stalin, the leading Bolshevik "specialist" on "the national question" has been most frank in his views on nationalities, the aim of Russian policy in Ukraine, and the Russian part in subjugating non-Russian peoples. He says:

*"1. It is clear that the political basis of the proletarian dictatorship is, first and foremost, the central areas of Russia (that is, Russia proper), and not the peripheral countries..."*<sup>195</sup> (Italics by author).

*"2. The situation in a number of national republics (Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan) is complicated by the fact that the essential part of the proletariat, constituting the basis of the Soviet authority, is of Great Russian nationality..."*<sup>196</sup> (Italics by author).

*3. "It is imperative that our Soviet regime be not only a Russian regime (as it is now) but also a regime of international character... in order that the masses of other nationalities may feel that the Soviet regime is their very own. The organs of government must be composed of local people who know the language, customs, and traditions of a given nationality. Only under these conditions will we have the possibility of transforming the Soviet regime into a regime of international character..."*<sup>197</sup> (Italics added —author)

4. *"No one will claim that Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Kirghizia, Bashkiria, Tartaria and the other non-Russian countries can exist without a locally-run government. Moreover, the true Sovietization of these areas and their transformation into Soviet countries, intimately connected with Central Russia in a unified policy, is not possible without organization of the governmental apparatus on a broad base of people who know the customs and the language... Therefore, all steps should be taken to guarantee that the Soviet government in the republics be not only Russian, but also "national." To this end it is necessary that all organs, both of the Party and Soviet, gradually become "nationalized" (native-ized). Only in this way will the Soviet regime be transformed from a Russian regime into a "national" government, one looked upon by the working masses of all the republics as being their own proper government..."*<sup>198</sup> (Italics by author).

Stalin expressed these ideas in the years 1922-24, that is, after the Bolsheviks' victory over Ukraine and the other non-Russian countries. These are official statements which prove that the Soviet government, even after the conquest of the non-Russian territories, was exclusively *a Russian government*, and that the Russian Bolsheviks had to face the problem of converting it into representative of the many nationalities. As is evident from Stalin's words, the Bolsheviks only wanted to use "natives" because of their language and knowledge of the area. They wanted in this way to bring the peripheral countries into a closer union with "Central Russia," creating thus a unified policy. From the Moscow point of view, this was a safeguard for their imperialist interests in the non-Russian lands; but the character of the Soviet government in the non-Russian republics even after the local people, i.e., "natives," were represented, remained unchanged: it was still *Russian* and *foreign*.

The data of an official census of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine, mentioned above, shows that these people were, in reality, the Soviet government, and the data on the personnel of the Soviet Army in Ukraine shows that the number of local people serving in the local Soviet governments was strikingly small as compared with the number of Russians. As to the character of this government in Ukraine, official Soviet sources indicate that the "native" agents (CPbU) were more zealous than the Russians themselves in their efforts to Russify and centralize the country.

For instance, a resolution of the plenum of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CPbU) in 1926 contained the following complaint:

"The Ukrainian Party organization in the beginning did not properly evaluate the importance of the national problem in Ukraine; some mem-

bers going so far as to deny the existence of the Ukrainian nation as such... Only with great difficulty and only at the intercession of Comrade Lenin was it possible to rectify this underestimation of the national problem and its incorrect interpretation by the leading members of the Party. Only after the XIIth Congress of the Russian Communist Party did the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine take up Ukrainization..."<sup>199</sup> For it is not the national origin of one or another representative of the Soviet government that matters, nor is it the tactical maneuvers employed by this government among the "natives" that is important; it is the national-political interests these representatives defend which shows the power they represent.

Sverdlov, Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (a position corresponding to that of Chief Executive, or President) at the time of the III Congress of the CP(b)U plainly revealed whose orders the CP(b)U was, and is, carrying out:

"Comrades, all of you know that *the basic principles and directives are given not by your own Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, but by our own Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party*. It cannot be otherwise, be it in Ukraine, or in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, or wherever we create independent Soviet republics—everywhere we must maintain the supremacy of our Communist Party. Everywhere the general leadership belongs to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party..."<sup>200</sup>

#### 4. *Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the Soviet Union—A New Arena of the Russian-Ukrainian Struggle*

After the Soviet Russian victory in Ukraine, the Russian-Ukrainian national struggle did not cease, but developed new and more flexible forms. Armed struggle and resistance subsided understandably enough, but the political struggle became more intense and determined.

The Ukrainian Soviet Republic became the new arena of the Russian-Ukrainian struggle. The Ukrainians received, after a long and stubborn struggle against Russian imperialism, formal recognition of their statehood in the form of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and endeavored to fill this form with Ukrainian national content. The Ukrainians infiltrated gradually into the governmental, executive and the Communist Party apparatus and made a supreme effort to give the Ukrainian Soviet Republic a true Ukrainian character. This infiltration was facilitated by the great progress of "Ukrainization," which was sponsored by the Bolsheviks, and the swift and unprecedented development of Ukrainian culture,

which succeeded in embracing wide masses of the Ukrainian population. Soon not only the cultural life of Ukraine, but to a great extent, the economic life as well, was concentrated in Ukrainian hands.

The Russian Bolsheviks, having made these tactical concessions to the Ukrainians, did not remain idle. They sought for new ways to consolidate their domination over Ukraine and, thus, prevent the Ukrainians from effectively resisting Russia. Thus, at the end of 1922, at the X Congress of Soviets of the Russian Soviet Republic, the Russian Bolsheviks advanced a new plan: to effect a union of all independent republics to be called the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (USSR). This was posed by Stalin, who declared: "The old treaties and conventions regulating the relations between the Russian Soviet Republic and the other Soviet republics have served their purpose and become obsolete..."<sup>201</sup>

The matter of a "closer union among the Soviet republics" was discussed in a series of negotiations carried on by the governments of these republics. The Soviet government of Ukraine was forced to accept the proposal, although the Ukrainian governmental leaders (particularly Mykola Skrypnyk, one of the most outstanding of the Ukrainian Communists), advanced their own project which called for the retention by each republic of its sovereignty and independence.

For almost a year (1922-1923) an intense struggle went on among the various Communist governments over these two projects (the one advanced by the Russians and the other by the Ukrainians with the support of the Byelorussian, Georgian and other non-Russian Communist parties).

The official version of the creation of the USSR describes this struggle in the following way: "Elaboration of the Soviet constitution was made in spite of violent resistance on the part of nationalistic elements... local national elements tried to prevent the creation of a Soviet federation by supporting projects which aimed rather at the creation of a confederation. The Ukrainian and Byelorussian projects aimed at confederation instead of federation..."<sup>202</sup> In order to create a "Soviet federation," as the author of the official history of the "Soviet constitution" writes, Stalin had to "fight the local nationalist and confederative, separatist element (Skrypnyk, Rakovsky, and the Georgian leaders, who had deviated from the general Party line). They all opposed a brotherly unification of the Soviet Republics..."<sup>203</sup>

Another official Soviet history of the Constitution of the USSR mentions the following details: "The most violent separatism appeared in the Ukrainian project. It did not consider the problem of creating a Union but wanted to preserve the "relations of conventions" which had

existed during the civil war. The Ukrainian project limited the rights of the all-Union bodies, and eliminated those without which a continuous union of nations, Soviet federation, is impossible.”<sup>204</sup>

The extent of the conflict between the Ukrainian and Russian Communists over this question can be seen from the following declaration of Stalin: “The question of federation versus confederation is not a petty question. Is it an accident that the Ukrainians in perusing the project of the constitution crossed out the sentence which states the “Republics will comprise a Union?...” Why did they do this? Is it a mere accident that in their counter-proposition the Ukrainians were against merging their ministries of foreign affairs and of foreign trade with those of the Union?.. How can there be a Union?..”<sup>205</sup> A compromise solution was finally reached: the USSR was created, but each Republic retained sovereign rights and prerogatives as an independent Republic; each possessed its own constitution and retained the right to secede from the USSR.

On July 6, 1923, the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and the Caucasian Republics, having signed a treaty, issued a Declaration announcing the formation of the USSR and on January 31, 1924 adopted the first constitution of the USSR. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic was guaranteed formal sovereignty by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR in the following phrase: “The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic enters into the USSR as a sovereign contracting state and reserves its right of secession.”<sup>206</sup>

Thus the USSR represented a new compromise between the two opposing forces, Russian imperialistic centralism and the non-Russian aspiration for national independence.

This “compromise” between two such opposing forces was too superficial and unnatural to furnish a peaceful *modus vivendi*. The essence of this conflict was revealed in two diametrically opposed interpretations regarding the creation of the USSR. One, that of Stalin, is as follows (the Russian interpretation, V. H.): “The establishment of the USSR means the *victory of the new Russia; it has transformed the red banner from a Party flag into the State flag, and has gathered the peoples of the Soviet Republics around it in order to unite them into one state—the USSR.*”<sup>207</sup>

Stalin, in expressing his views on the USSR, was quite candid. The USSR, in his understanding, was the equivalent of a “*new Russia*” and “*one state*,” and, in practice, it meant the liquidation of the sovereignty of the Soviet Republics.

Another interpretation, that of Mykola Skrypnyk, the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and co-author of the Con-



stitution of the USSR, was as follows: "We, the Ukrainian people, oppressed for centuries, we the Ukrainian State of workers and peasants, have been the initiators of the organization of the USSR *as a union of brotherly, free, independent and self-sustaining Socialist Republics.*"<sup>208</sup>

The Russian imperialistic tendency in the USSR became manifest almost immediately in the intense pressure exerted on the Bolshevik Party and the government by the imperialistic and chauvinistic Russian officials in both Party and State. Stalin admitted at the XII Congress of the Russian Communist Party that Russian imperialistic nationalism is characteristic of the Soviet Russians:

"We are witnessing the growth, not by days, but by hours, of a Russian imperialistic nationalism, a most obdurate form of chauvinism. It endeavors to erase everything non-Russian, to gather all the threads of leadership around the Russian center and to suppress everything which is non-Russian."<sup>209</sup> And further Stalin says: "It is not at all an accident that the Messrs. "Smenovekhovtsy" ("White" Russian emigrants of Soviet orientation) are now praising the Communist-Bolsheviks, as if telling them: you can talk about Bolshevism as much as you like, but we know that you have done what Denikin failed to do: you Bolsheviks have restored the idea of Great Russia, or you will restore it in some way. This is not an accident..."<sup>210</sup>

One of the resolutions of the XII Congress of the Russian Communist Party described this Russian chauvinistic drive: "A substantial number of Soviet officials, both in the center as well as in the Republics, look upon the Union of the Republics not as a union of equal units, but as a step toward the liquidation of these Republics and the beginning of the creation of a 'one and indivisible' (Russia)... All this is but an attempt to strengthen the domination of the Great Russian nationality."<sup>211</sup>

Some Ukrainian representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic who were Ukrainians vigorously opposed these Russian nationalistic tendencies in the USSR. For instance, Skrypnyk, in the name of Ukraine, brought an official complaint before the Executive Committee of the Comintern, which was subsequently endorsed by the entire Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine. In it this old Ukrainian Communist wrote:

"The Russian imperialistic deviation in the Communist Party in Ukraine manifests itself in the following ways: a diminution of Ukraine's significance as a sovereign state and as a member state of the Union of Republics; the Union of Republics itself is viewed as an actual liquidation of the national Republics; Russian culture is given an All-Union importance, and in every-day Ukrainian life the Russian language is given a preference."<sup>212</sup>

No matter how courageous and intrepid were the efforts of the Ukrainian communist representatives in resisting this Russian imperialistic tendency, they were doomed. The views of Lenin and of his Russian Communist Party, developed by Stalin were becoming indisputable doctrine and gospel in regard to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.

### *5. National and Political Enslavement of Ukraine by Russia in USSR—Soviet “Equality of Peoples”*

As devised by the Russian Bolsheviks, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was an excellent solution, providing for the national, political and economic enslavement of Ukraine and the other non-Russian countries. The superiority and ingeniousness of this solution, as compared with that of the Russian Empire, lies in the fact that the preservation of the formal state sovereignty of the non-Russian republics of the USSR, served as a clever ruse for Russian domination. Actually, it has provided the Russians with a propaganda argument abroad to the effect that Russia is not the dominating power in Ukraine, but is one of the “equal” nations of the USSR, as is Ukraine.

The All-Union Communist Party was not some new party, created out of the union of communist parties of the respective Union Republics, inasmuch as such parties never really existed. The formations, which in the Union Republics bore the name “parties” were simply a propaganda subterfuge of Moscow, as they were only provincial organizations of a *single* and *indivisible* party—the Russian Communist Party. They did not, and could not possess their own political will, but had to carry out all directives of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. Responsible officials of these “parties” were appointed by Moscow and frequently they were dispatched to their jobs from Russia proper.

These parties were not merely formally simple provincial organizations of a *single* Russian Communist Party, but they were actually Russian organizations in conquered non-Russian lands—Ukraine, Byelorussia, etc. Non-Russian communists in those non-Russian lands were admitted by the Central Committee only in limited numbers, so that the non-Russians were always in a minority. With the creation of the Soviet Union the Russian Communist Party was, for a certain period, denominated the All-Union Communist Party, but its Russian character remained unchanged.

Thus, formally and actually, the absorption of all power in the USSR by the All-Union Party has meant the domination of the *Russian Bol-*

sheviks. Because of the USSR's social-political structure, the Russian Communist Party is the dominating group, the one exercising the "dictatorship of the proletariat;" consequently, *it is the expression of the Russian political idea, whose guiding interest is the national interest of Russia.* ..

To clarify this fact of the *national domination and leadership of Russia in the USSR* further, let us take a look at some official Soviet statistics on the national composition of the All-Union Communist Party. After the Bolshevik victory, the Communist Party in the USSR was a Russian Party so far as its national character was concerned. Between the first and the second Party census (1926-1927), the Russians formed 72.96 per cent of the Communist Party, although the Russians constituted only 52.91 per cent of the entire population of the USSR (according to the census taken in 1926). At the same time the Ukrainians, who constituted 20.5 per cent of the population, comprised only 5.88 per cent of the membership in the Party. Other non-Russian nationalities were even less represented in the Party.<sup>213</sup>

This ratio was little changed by the new national policy which was introduced by the Bolsheviks in 1923-30, and which, ostensibly, favored the non-Russian peoples (e.g. "Ukrainization" in Ukraine).

According to the party census of 1927, a period of far-reaching concessions to Ukraine, the national composition of the membership of the All-Union Communist Party was as follows:

*Russians— 65 per cent of the total membership* (the Russians constituted about 53 per cent of the total population of the USSR at that time);

*Ukrainians — 11 per cent of the total membership* (the Ukrainians constituted nearly 21 per cent of the total population of the USSR).<sup>214</sup>

*Thus, the ratio of Russians in the All-Union Communist Party was 12 per cent higher than their ratio to the total population of the USSR and, conversely, the ratio of Ukrainians was 10 per cent less than their ratio to the total population.*

The ratio of non-Russians in the Party was 12 per cent less than their ratio to the total population of the USSR, according to Soviet data.

*Actually, the number of Russians in the Communist Party was much higher, as high as 72 per cent if we consider that a substantial part of the non-Russian members of the party considered themselves, culturally and ideologically, Russians.* For instance, over 50 per cent of the Ukrainians in the party, according to the 1927 census, spoke Russian and considered themselves Russians rather than Ukrainians.

True Ukrainians, according to the Soviet census, constituted only 7 per cent of the total membership of the Party. *Compare the fact that the Russians formed 72 per cent of the Communist Party and the 53 per cent of the total USSR population with the fact that the Ukrainians formed 7 per cent of the Party—although 21 per cent of the total population of the USSR and you will have a clear picture of the Russian character and the nature of the All-Union Communist Party.*<sup>215</sup>

This official Soviet data speaks eloquently of the dominance of the Russian elements in the All-Union Communist Party.

However, as is well-known, the Communist Party rules in the USSR with the help of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus. These two exercise the so-called “dictatorship of the proletariat,” which is essentially the dictatorship of the *city* proletariat over the peasantry. If we consider that the proletariat in the USSR is mainly Russian and that the peasantry constitutes a large percent of the population in the non-Russian countries, we see that Russian supremacy in the All-Union Communist Party is nothing less than the national and social enslavement of the non-Russian countries by Russia.

Stalin defined the “social character” of the national problem of the USSR as follows:

“What is the class nature of the nationalities’ problem? The class nature of the nationalities’ problem can be defined by determining the relations between the proletariat of the nationality, which, until this time, had been predominant, and the peasantry of the previously oppressed nationalities (I bear in mind our Soviet background).”<sup>216</sup>

Stalin’s words become even clearer when we recall his statements that the “political basis of the proletarian dictatorship is the central area of Russia” and in the non-Russian Republics a “substantial part of the proletariat which lends support to the Soviet power belongs to the Great Russian nationality.” This forcefully underscores the *Russian* character of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” over the “non-proletarian” non-Russian peoples of the national Republics of the USSR.

By settling ethnic Russians in the cities and industrial centers of the non-Russian countries, a unique nationalistic and imperialistic policy instituted even before the Revolution, Russia succeeded in creating a Russian numerical superiority in the major non-Russian *cities*. Therefore, it is quite natural that the Bolshevik “proletarian” movement, the Bolshevik Party and the Bolshevik bureaucracy both in Ukraine and the other non-Russian lands was, to an overwhelming degree, *Russian* and that after the conquest of Ukraine, the Russians should of necessity become the *privileged and leading element*.

The statistics on the prevalence of *Russian elements* in Ukraine are quite curious and interesting. In the first decade of the Soviet regime the Russian commanding position was so apparent that even the Bolsheviks spoke about it as a phenomenon which endangered their relations with the Ukrainian people, and, hence they tried by different methods to foster Ukrainian cooperation. As official sources of the period attest, the Russians assumed the control of all phases of Ukrainian life to an even greater extent than before the Revolution. For instance, in 1926, when the Russians constituted only 5.6 per cent of the Ukrainian population,<sup>217</sup> they yet formed 49.5 per cent of those engaged in financial and industrial fields. However, the Ukrainians constituted only 15.5 per cent of those in these fields, although they constituted 87.6 per cent of the entire population.<sup>218</sup> As for the Soviet government, Russians and the Russified foreigners constituted 76 per cent; only 24 per cent were Ukrainians. Only 17 per cent of them could speak Ukrainian,<sup>219</sup> which means that they were either Russified Ukrainians, or indigenous Ukrainians who were Russians at heart. It should be added that the Ukrainians active in the Soviet government served, by and large, in the country, in the Tsar's time; in the cities the government officials were for the most part Russians. Soviet statistics for 1926 show that in the village councils (*Selsovety*) 87.40 per cent were Ukrainians; Russians and foreigners accounted for only 7.84 per cent; but the provincial councils consisted of only 45 per cent Ukrainians, the rest were Russians and other aliens.<sup>220</sup>

This Russian prevalence in the Government of Ukraine did not change in the second decade. However, during the industrialization of the country in the period of Stalin's Five Year Plans the Ukrainian element in the cities began to increase. The following statistics, taken from a book on the national composition of the proletariat, pertain to this:

*In 1931 in Ukraine only 22 per cent of the Soviet officials (in the Party and administration) were of Ukrainian nationality, while at the same time Ukrainian mental workers reached 78 per cent. And the number of Ukrainians in the administration steadily decreased. For instance, from 1926 to 1931, Ukrainians among the Soviet officials in Ukraine decreased 18 per cent, while at the same time Ukrainian mental workers increased 18 per cent. In other words, the Ukrainians in their own country have been steadily deprived of the more desirable occupations, and these positions have been filled by Russian aliens.*<sup>221</sup>

In this connection it is necessary to add that the Constitution of the USSR itself was drawn up so as to give one republic, the Russian, an absolute monopoly of the central Soviet authority, and, consequently this Russian Republic has a formal and actual superiority over the other

national republics. Thus, *the Soviet Russian Republic has ten times more in the higher organs of the Soviet government than any other republic.* According to the first Constitution of the USSR, Russia had 64 votes in the Supreme Soviet, while Ukraine had only 4. In the second Constitution, Russia had 251 votes, while Ukraine was apportioned but 36 votes.<sup>222</sup>

This highly disproportionate number of votes allowed Russia a great “constitutional” superiority. Since she is a “federated republic,” each “autonomous republic” and each “autonomous *oblast*” which was a part of the Russian Republic, had separate votes which were counted as Russian. But representation in the Supreme Soviet was based not on national but on territorial representation. Therefore, deputies from Russia’s “autonomous republics” and “*oblast*” were not the non-Russian nationalities inhabiting these areas, but simply the Russian officials who had been sent from Moscow to rule and administer these lands.

Stalin, the architect of the USSR, recognized this undeniable inequality between the Russians and non-Russians:

*“We have proclaimed legal equality; but there is a vast difference between legal and real equality... A number of republics and peoples are not in a position to take full advantage of the rights and possibilities open to them by virtue of national equality; they are not in a position to raise themselves to a higher level of development... Only one nation, namely, the Great Russian, has proved more developed in the political sense than the other nations. Hence, this actual inequality.”*<sup>223</sup>

Stalin’s description of the Russians as a “more developed” nation in the political sense must be interpreted to mean their more uncritical acceptance of Bolshevism; also that Stalin considered them to be a higher “proletarian race” than the other non-Russian peoples. Nevertheless, the fact that Stalin recognized and admitted the inequality of the nations in the USSR is of great importance.

In the light of these facts and documents it is now evident that the “equality of nations” and the idea of “national republics” in the USSR was never applied in reality. This vaunted “equality” served only as a propaganda slogan for export. It not only misled many people abroad but served to conceal the actual enslavement of the non-Russian peoples by Russia.

### *Economic Side of the National Enslavement of Ukraine by Russia in the USSR*

As in the old Russian Empire, the Ukrainian enslavement in the USSR is primarily the complete economic exploitation of her resources and her

labor power for the benefit of Russia. As a result of the existence of formally recognized national republics, there has been invented in the USSR a highly complex and confusing system of economic and financial inter-relationships between the Union-Republics and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the economic and financial exploitation is far less overt and direct than in Tsarist Russia. The present system of economic exploitation by Russia is very well camouflaged, but it exists nevertheless, and in extent and degree surpasses many-fold the exploitation Ukraine suffered under the domination of the Russian Tsars.

*The basic fields of economic life, (industry, agriculture, finances, etc.) in Ukraine and in the other non-Russian countries are not concentrated in the hands of local ministries, but in the hands of the central ministry in Moscow.* This is proven by the fact that the national republics are deprived of theoretical and real control over their natural resources; these are controlled by Moscow in the interest of the Russians exclusively. This complete centralization of all economic life is one of the most typical characteristics of the Soviet economic system. The extent of the centralization of Ukrainian economy in Moscow can be seen from the following data for 1927; 3/4 of all Ukrainian industrial plants were under the direct control of Moscow; thus 70 per cent of all the industrial workers worked for Moscow. (See—"Komunist" (Kharkiv), October 28, 1927). This was the picture in Ukraine in the period of the "New Economic Policy," a period of relatively little centralization as compared with other periods. In the following years, that is, during the period of Stalin's Five Year Plans (after 1930), centralization to Moscow's advantage increased to a much larger degree. For instance in 1934, 83 per cent of all the industrial capital of Ukraine belonged to Moscow.<sup>224</sup>

Therefore, as Stalin himself has said, Russia is the "political basis of the proletarian dictatorship," that is, *the Soviet government is essentially a Russian power, and economic centralization means the control and management of economic interests for the benefit of Russia and to the detriment of the national republics. The whole economic life of the USSR is guided by this principle which is the fundamental economic law of the Soviet Russian totalitarian empire.*

As a rule, Moscow is loath to publish any statistical data or facts which indicate the colonial character of the relation between the Ukrainian economy and the Russian economy in the USSR. Nevertheless, some information on the colonial exploitation of Ukraine by Russia may be ascertained from certain statistical data of the period, a time when this exploitation had not as yet reached its zenith and when it was still permissible to discuss the economic relationship between



Ukraine and Russia in the press or at meetings of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

For instance, *Bilshovyk Ukrainy* (Ukrainian Bolshevik) for 1928, the official organ of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, released figures which indicated that *over 20 per cent of all the income of Ukraine received by Russia was in the form of regular colonial taxation.*<sup>225</sup>

It is almost unnecessary to point out that when Moscow subsequently increased this economic centralization, then this taxation increased considerably. As a result, Ukrainian taxation in the period of the USSR has been much higher than in the Russian Soviet Republic. As a matter of fact, it has been higher than the taxation levied on Ukraine in the time of the Russian Tsars.

The Russian economic exploitation of Ukraine is best exemplified by the Five Year Plans. According to these plans the major capital investments in the over-all budget of the USSR were used to construct industrial centers in Russia, while Ukraine and the other national republics received only insignificant quotas of the budgetary investment. For instance, by the end of the First Five Year Plan (1931-1932), Ukraine was supplying 63-69 per cent of the Soviet Union's coal, 70-77 per cent of the iron, 83 per cent of the coke, 75 per cent of the manganese, 69 per cent of the pig iron, 63 per cent of the steel, 69 per cent of the sugar, 60 per cent of the preserved food, 76 per cent of the vegetable oil, and, of course 1/4 of the entire grain supply. Thus Ukraine, at this time was first among these Republics because of the specific size of her contribution to the economic resources of the USSR, supplying 2/3 of the entire production.<sup>226</sup> Yet, with a population amounting to 18 per cent of the entire population of the USSR, Ukraine was apportioned only 2.46 to 2.64 per cent of the state budget of the USSR for the same period. During the second Five Year Plan (1932-1937), Ukraine, which supplied about 60 per cent of the Soviet Union's entire material resources, was allocated only 3.5 to 4 per cent of the budget of the USSR.<sup>228</sup>

The policy of "colonial-robbery" by Moscow is very apparent in comparing the financial investments made for economic and cultural development in the Ukrainian SSR and the Russian SFSR during the period of this Second Five Year Plan. In 1937, 70.7 per cent of the general budget of the USSR was allocated to Russia and only 16.8 per cent, to Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine supplied not only almost 2/3 of the Soviet Union's material resources most important to the economy, but received only 1/6 of the financial investments of the USSR whereas Russia appropriated 3/4 for herself.<sup>229</sup>

What this meant in practice is shown by the following figures: in 1938, 744,938,000 rubles were allocated for capital reconstruction in Moscow alone, whereas only 143,100,000 rubles were allocated to the entire Ukraine for this purpose. Ukraine, with 40,000,000 people, received five times less than did Moscow with a population of 4,000,000.<sup>230</sup> It is no wonder that Moscow changed from a city with a pre-Revolutionary population of 1,850,000 to a city of 4,000,000 inhabitants during the course of two Five Year Plans. Ukrainian cities, such as Kiev and Odessa, on the other hand, which before the Revolution had had a population of 600,000 each, were reduced to 518,000 and 421,000 inhabitants respectively by 1936.<sup>231</sup>

An especially striking difference between Ukrainians and Russians in the Soviet Union is to be seen in the different material level of these two peoples. Despite the fact that the Ukrainian industry ranked higher than that of the other republics of the USSR, the Ukrainian workers earned next to the lowest wages. According to official data (1931), in the Ukrainian metal industry which supplied 70 per cent of the total production of the USSR, the level of wages was 11th; the level of the coal miners' wages was 19th; and that of the coke industry as low as 27th. Yet, Ukraine ranked first in the production of coal, coke and metals.<sup>232</sup> Wages, working conditions, housing, social security and cultural services for the Ukrainian workers have always been below the Russian level, especially that of Moscow and Leningrad, where the workers' wages are the highest.

Using Ukraine's natural resources and exploiting her industry Russia began to increase her own industrial production during the Five Year Plans especially in those fields which competed with Ukrainian production. Thus, during the Five Year Plan period, the Ukrainian mining industry (coal, iron, pig iron, steel) did not develop at the same rate as the Russian, although statistics showed a more intense exploitation of these fields. And in addition, during the same period Russia, having taken possession of the main Ukrainian industries, subordinated them directly to Moscow by the so-called "unionwide" ministries created by the new Soviet Constitution of 1936.

Thus did Russia realize its colonial policy with regard to Ukraine; to hold her simply as a base of supply for Russia and to keep in colonial status, dependent on Russia.

This Russian policy was especially evident in the Ukrainian manufacturing industry. During the period of the Five Year Plans, Russia, intensively developing within its own country various industries to process Ukrainian raw materials, purposely retarded these industries in Ukraine. This is evident in the statistics of Soviet investments in manu-

facturing in Russia and Ukraine during the second Five Year Plan. According to this, Ukraine, which supplied Russia with the largest amount of raw materials and unfinished products received only 1/14 of the total capital investments to develop her own industry.<sup>233</sup> At the end of the second Five Year Plan, Ukraine, the producer of most of the metals and other raw materials for machine construction and the supplier of this to Russia, did not have her own automotive industry. It was all concentrated in Russia. This is true also in the manufacture of metal products; 81 per cent of this industry is concentrated in Russia in spite of the fact that the metal itself is supplied by Ukraine.<sup>234</sup> Soviet Russia, as Tsarist Russia, simply takes Ukrainian raw materials and forces Ukraine to buy "Russian" manufactured articles at a much higher price than if they had been manufactured in Ukraine.

Russian industry is financed not only with Ukrainian money, but is built by Ukrainian manpower as well. The central government of the USSR, controlled and dominated almost exclusively by Russians, for many years has been deporting Ukrainians on a massive scale to slave labor camps, located for the most part in ethnic Russian territory. They have used this slave labor for large-scale constructions (the White Sea-Baltic and the Moscow-Volga Canals; the Siberian and the Baikal-Amur railroads), the reconstruction and rebuilding of such cities as Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Vologda, Kotlas and Ukhta-Pechorsk, and in Kolyma and many other forest and mining (coal and iron) regions of Northern Russia. The labor policies of the Soviet government discriminate against the Ukrainians in their own country, despite the manpower shortage in Ukrainian industries. As a result, many are forced to seek employment (with the "help" of the Soviet government) outside Ukraine. This explains why the Russians attach such great importance to their proletariat in the non-Russian republics. In sending ethnic Russians into the non-Russian lands and compelling the non-Russian peoples by various ways and methods to seek employment in Russia proper they create artificial migrations which are to the definite advantage of Russia. While the non-Russian populations steadily decrease as a result of these policies, the Russian element is steadily increasing. In Ukraine, for instance, the rural population is declining, while the *working class* and the "*proletariat*" (Russians) are on the increase.

The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* discusses this decline of the rural population of Ukraine (16 per cent in the years 1926-1933):

"The decline of the rural population of Ukraine is explained also by the resettling of people to work from the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

on the large constructions and (to organize) for newly-settled territories in the east of the USSR.”<sup>235</sup>

At the same time the same *Encyclopedia* stated, in a different edition, that “Ukraine suffers from a shortage of manpower, especially in the Donbas...”<sup>236</sup> Russia, taking advantage of this artificial shortage of workers in the industrial areas of Ukraine, colonized Ukraine with Russian national elements, dispatching every year some 325,000 workers to these areas.<sup>237</sup>

One of the most flagrant aspects of her economic exploitation, is the so-called “wheat and sugar beet scheme” of Ukrainian agriculture. According to this scheme, Ukrainian wheat and sugar beet is systematically exported to Russia to feed the Russian population or is used for export without any regard to the needs of the Ukrainian people. Russia actually confiscates Ukrainian agricultural products without any compensation to Ukraine.

Similarly, Russia exports the available raw materials vital to industry and manufacturing without any regard to the needs of the Ukrainian industries. In this respect Bolshevik Russia faithfully follows the same colonial policy which Tsarist Russia pursued with respect to Ukraine.

This economic exploitation of Ukraine is closely connected with a genocidal policy which Moscow applies as a corollary instrument of its national policy in Ukraine from time to time. Statistics on the natural increase of the Ukrainian population during the Soviet-Russian “reign” illustrate this. In 1924-29 the natural growth of population ceased and regressed from 2.45 to 1.77 per cent; during the next decade (1929-1939) it declined catastrophically to 0.2 per cent.<sup>238</sup> These figures conclusively prove that for a period of ten years, from 1929 to 1939, Ukraine lost as a result of this decline 5,000,000 people which would have represented this increase.<sup>239</sup> It should be remembered that during the period between the two censuses (1929-1939), Ukraine lost some 7,500,000 people as a result of Moscow’s genocidal economic policy. In the years 1932-1933, during the so-called “transition period” of Soviet agriculture (collectivization), Moscow removed all the surplus wheat in Ukraine and created a large-scale artificial famine which killed millions of the Ukrainian peasants who refused to join the Russian-inspired collective farms.

## 7. National and Cultural Enslavement of Ukraine

As in Tsarist Russia, the most brutal and drastic form of Russian enslavement and persecution was exercised in the cultural life of the

Ukrainian people. In the early years of the Soviet Russian domination (the years 1922-1930), that is, during the era of Russian flirtation and compromises and particularly during the era of "Ukrainization," the cultural and national life of Ukraine reached a relatively high peak of development. The Ukrainian language, culture, literature, arts, science and the press, in a very short time (seven years), developed to an unparalleled degree. This cultural development was obviously quite severely handicapped not only by the very atmosphere of dictatorship of the Russian Communist Party (or, as it was then called the All-Union Communist Party), but also formally by Bolshevik censorship which permitted publication only of what it believed to be safe for the supreme power of Moscow. Ukrainian creativeness would have reached much higher peaks if it had been given an opportunity to develop in free Ukraine, without those compulsory communist "trappings."

As a result of this extraordinary development, the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation began to take effect and it evoked great fears and anxieties in Russia. To cope with this situation, the Russian Bolsheviks, Larin and Zinoviev, advanced a "theory of the struggle between two cultures"; that of Russia and that of the non-Russian peoples. According to this, Russian culture was declared a "proletarian culture," that is, Communist, and as such enjoyed the full support and protection of the Soviet state; the cultures of the non-Russian peoples were classified as "bourgeois cultures," and, as such, detrimental and inimical to the Soviet system of life.<sup>241</sup>

Thereupon leading Russian Communists demanded that only the "truly proletarian culture" (Russian) be given the full support of the Communist state, while those of the non-Russian peoples, which represented the "bourgeois concept of society," be denied any support from the Soviet state and thus be allowed to wither away.

At the outset these "theories" were only subjects for Party discussions, i.e., they did not have the official approval of the Politburo of All-U.C.P., actually the Soviet government. It soon became apparent, however, that the Soviet government, without waiting for official or legislative approval, was actually carrying out this program. This program was implemented with force and vigor when Stalin assumed dictatorial power in the USSR.

The first blow of this totalitarian axe fell in the years 1929-1930 upon Ukrainian national life, that is, Ukrainian culture. It assumed the form of a terroristic *pogrom* directed against *Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev*. Toward the end of 1929 it was announced that the All-Ukrainian Academy (VUAN—All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences) had become a "citadel of the Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution";

several prominent and leading Ukrainian scientists were arrested for allegedly participating in the organization of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" (SVU—*Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy*), whose general purpose was to organize spiritual opposition against the ruling Russian regime in Ukraine, and to rise at the appropriate moment in order to establish a free and independent democratic state in Ukraine.

By the beginning of 1930 *forty five Ukrainian scientists*, professors, and other learned men of Ukraine, among them, Professor *Serhiy Yefremov*, Vice-President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, were subjected to a mock trial in Kharkiv and condemned either to life or very long prison terms. (It is significant that, although some of these Ukrainian leaders were condemned to 10 years of hard labor, none has been released, despite the fact that at the moment of this writing some 25 years have elapsed).

Subsequently (in 1931), the Soviet government announced the exposure of a clandestine Ukrainian revolutionary organization, the *Ukrainian National Center*," headed by none other than Professor *Michael Hrushevsky*, the eminent Ukrainian historian, head of the Historical Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and former President of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*. He was arrested and exiled to the Caucasus, where he died in obscurity in 1934. On that occasion, the Historical Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was broken up and its members were arrested and deported into the interior of the USSR. A highly scientific review of the Historical Section of the Academy, *Ukraine*, was suspended, and the Academy itself practically was converted into a branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

In regard to the liquidation of Ukrainian scholars at this time, Zatonsky, Minister of Education in Ukraine, published in 1934 the statistics that for the year 1933 alone the number of scholars in Ukraine had decreased from 10,063 to 8,414, that is, 16.4 per cent of the entire number, or 1,649 persons, had been removed, as the result of a "purge of hostile elements from the learned personnel," as the Minister himself has so eloquently put it.<sup>242</sup> What "removed" meant, can be seen from the fact that of these Ukrainian scholars who had been "removed," 152 died, either shot to death or martyred in prison and concentration camps.<sup>243</sup>

Moscow's attack upon the Ukrainian language and literature paralleled this blow against the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: In the years 1930-1933 most of the prominent Ukrainian philologists were accused of "advocating the cultivation of the idea that the Ukrainian language was distinct from the Russian:" they were subject to severe persecution and oppression. In those years the Soviet government for-

bade the use of the Ukrainian dictionaries which had been published only a few years earlier by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. In addition, a special Linguistic Institute was broken up and its members arrested and deported from Ukraine. While it is true that the Ukrainian language as such was not banned from public use (as did happen during the rule of the Russian Tsars), still the Ukrainians were systematically terrorized in order to enlist their support of the Russification program and discourage their use of their own language. Eventually a new "linguistic policy" was introduced in Ukraine, the purpose of which was to Russify the Ukrainian language, step by step, that is, to make it as similar as possible to the Russian.<sup>224</sup>

Under Moscow's new anti-Ukrainian policy, the Ukrainian literature was also severely discriminated against. Ukrainian writers, poets, journalists, and others, who had become prominent in the years 1922-1930, were declared "Ukrainian nationalists" and their works proscribed. The principal center of Ukrainian literary life, the "Free Academy of Proletarian Literature" (*Vaplite*), was liquidated as a "nationalist organization"; its members were arrested, and simply executed or sent to slave labor camps. Other Ukrainian literary organizations, such as *Lanka*, *Mars*, *Prolitfront*, etc., were closed, and their members were accused of being "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists." The latter were liquidated either in slave labor camps or in the cellars of the GPU and NKVD as had happened to the members of the Vaplite group. The editors of a number of Ukrainian literary reviews—*Literaturny Yarmarok* (The Literary Bazaar), *Prolitfront* (The Proletarian Literary Front), *Nova generatsiya* (The New Generation), *Avangard* (The Vanguard) and others—were either executed by the GPU-NKVD or sent to slave labor camps, where they soon died from torture and malnutrition.<sup>245</sup>

The peak of the Russian terror against Ukrainian literary life and against Ukrainian writers and poets was reached in 1933-1934, when *Mykola Khvylovy*, an outstanding Ukrainian writer committed suicide in protest against the pogrom, which was directed against the nation and its culture. On December 15, 1934 the Ministry of the NKVD announced the *execution of 28 Ukrainian writers and poets for an alleged "Ukrainian nationalist plot and conspiracy" against Moscow*. Among those executed were such well-known Ukrainian writers and poets as *H. Kosynka*, *D. Falkivsky*, *O. Vlysko*, *K. Burevy*, and *I. Krushelnytsky*.<sup>246</sup> Hundreds of others were executed without trial, without even a public report of their execution.

This wave of Russian terror was not limited to Ukrainian writers and poets; leaders in other phases of Ukrainian national life met the same fate. Ukrainian intellectuals, who had been in Ukraine at this



time and who have only recently escaped, estimate that more than 500 of the most outstanding of Ukrainian scientists, writers, poets, journalists, artists and others in the cultural field were executed or imprisoned during this period, 1933-1934.<sup>247</sup>

At the same time, Moscow began the systematic liquidation of the *Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church*. This church up to this time (1930-1933) had survived the Soviets anti-religious and atheistic policies, which the government had fostered since the very inception of the Soviet state. Now, because the Ukrainian Autocephalic Church was *a national Ukrainian church*, with no juridical or administrative connection with the Russian Orthodox Church, this anti-religious campaign became very violent and brutal. Moscow saw in the Ukrainian church, in particular, an enemy, just as it saw a menace in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and the Ukrainian language and literature.

The very fact of the existence of an *autocephalous*, or completely independent Ukrainian Church was, in the eyes of Moscow, an act hostile to her, because every Ukrainian who belonged to this church logically developed this political thought: if the church is to be independent, the state should be independent, too.

*As a result of this Soviet Russian terror directed against the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, all (2,800) Ukrainian churches were closed. Thirty-five Ukrainian Orthodox bishops, including Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky of Kiev, and a majority of the Ukrainian Orthodox priests (10,657 in 1927) were liquidated.*<sup>248</sup>

The Ukrainian educational system was also seriously damaged in those years. In 1933 alone, during the "purge," 4,000 Ukrainian teachers were fired and the Russification of the schools, especially colleges and universities, continued.<sup>249</sup> After 1933 the Ukrainian school system was such that only the grammar schools remained Ukrainian and only in these schools was the percentage of Ukrainian children in the proper proportion to the Ukrainian population. The higher schools were less accessible to Ukrainians; the percentage of Ukrainians attending these schools was very small as compared with the number of Russian students, although Russian nationals constituted a minority in Ukraine. Soviet statistics show that, in 1937, while the Ukrainians accounted for 80 per cent of the population, they accounted for only 75 per cent of the students in high schools, 54 per cent of those in the colleges and universities, and only 48 per cent of those in the institutions for scholarly research. Of those holding top positions in the scientific institutions only 23 per cent were Ukrainians.<sup>250</sup> Supported by the Russian Soviet Government, the Russian national minority were predominant in the higher

educational institutions. Thus, the Russians usurped all the key positions in Ukraine.

If we compare the educational system of Ukraine with that of Russia, we see that the Ukrainian system was on a lower level. Government school subsidies in Russia and in Ukraine indicate this inequality immediately. Soviet statistics for 1939 show that only 87 schools were built in the entire Ukraine in one year, whereas in Moscow alone 70 new school buildings were built that year. Therefore, in Moscow, there was one school building to every 55, 000 inhabitants; at the same time in Ukraine, there was one school building to every 354,000 inhabitants.<sup>251</sup>

So the policy of ruthless and systematic persecution of everything and anything Ukrainian in the early thirties contributed considerably to the decline of Ukrainian culture and of Ukrainian national life in general. Although Moscow did not go so far as to prohibit the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian schools and the Ukrainian communist press, yet these media were utilized in the Russification of Ukraine.

#### *8. Natonal Resistance Against Russian Enslavement of Ukraine— Ukrainian Communists Take Part In It*

It is not surprising that this enslavement of Ukraine by Communist Russia evoked a strong and well-planned resistance on the part of the Ukrainian people. As we previously noted, the anti-Russian resistance of the Ukrainian people did not cease with the termination of the Ukrainian National Republic (November 12, 1920). Only now the resistance was in response to oppression as it appeared in the various spheres of the Ukrainian national life; political, economic and cultural. This resistance was of varying intensity and impetus, achieving full momentum when the Russian Bolsheviks switched from their policy of compromise (Ukrainization) to a policy of overt and naked Russification in the years 1930-1934.

This continuous resistance of the Ukrainian nation is best demonstrated by the long list of Ukrainian anti-Soviet organizations and movements which were discovered in Ukraine by the GPU and the NKVD at various times during the period 1922-1939. And the assertion of some anti-Communist Russian refugees in the United States that the Ukrainians accepted Bolshevism without resistance, and that they even helped establish this tyrannical system of government is completely refuted.

A list of Ukrainian anti-Soviet revolutionary organizations which existed and were active in Ukraine follows; it should be added that these were "officially" uncovered by the Soviet security police and publicized

in the Soviet press. Again, they were of national importance (there were numerous local Ukrainian anti-Soviet organizations), and for this reason the Russians deemed it necessary to publicize their disclosures.

1. From 1920-1924: "Brotherhood of Ukrainian Statehood" (*Bratstvo Ukrainskoyi Derzhavnosti—BUD*);
2. From 1925-1930: "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" (*Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy—SVU*);
3. From 1926-1930: "Association of Ukrainian Youth" (*Spilka Ukrayinskoyi Molodi—SUM*);
4. From 1930-1933: "The Ukrainian Military Organization" (*Ukrayinska Viyskova Orhanizatsiya—UVO*);
5. From 1931-1935: "The Ukrainian National Center" (*Ukrayinsky Natsionalny Tsentr*);
6. From 1933-1937: "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (*Orhanizatsiya Ukrayinskykh Natsionalistiv—OUN*);
7. From 1934-1938: "The Ukrainian Nationalist Trotskyist Bloc" (*Ukrayinsky Natsionalistychno-Trotskisty Blok*);
8. From 1936-1938: "The Ukrainian Underground Organization" (*Ukrayinska Pidpilna Orhanizatsiya*—directed by some members of the government and the Communist Party of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.<sup>252</sup>

It was often the case that special Soviet *agents provocateurs* were discovered among the loyal Ukrainian resistance groups after these groups were uncovered. These people had been planted in these organizations by the Soviet secret police for the purpose of spying, informing, and, what is most interesting, provoking large sections of the Ukrainian population to express their real anti-Russian feelings so that the Russians could later resort to large-scale reprisals and punishment. There were thousands of Ukrainians, more or less well-known, who were arrested and executed, sometimes without trial, but always for one thing: *Ukrainian nationalism and the attempt to separate Ukraine from Russia*.

The extent and the depth of the Ukrainian national resistance against Moscow in the thirties is exemplified by a special resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U of November 29, 1933, which stressed that the "*principal danger in Ukraine is the Ukrainian nationalist deviation*."<sup>253</sup> We must bear in mind that the Russian-Soviet potentates applied the terms "nationalist" or "bourgeois nationalist" to every Ukrainian who showed any opposition to the power which ruled Ukraine, or who, even without showing any formal opposition engaged in positive activities for the benefit of the Ukrainian people to develop their cultural, economic and political power. Moscow and her

governors in Ukraine applied such terms as "bourgeois nationalist" by name to leaders who belonged to various ideological camps, like Hrushevsky, Holubovych, Khrystyuk—socialist-revolutionaries, Mazepa—social-democrat, Vynnychenko—member of Ukrainian Communist Party, Shumsky—erstwhile Borotbist and subsequently member of the Russian Communist Party and CP(b)U, Skrypnyk—an old Bolshevik of Ukrainian origin, Konovalets—chief of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, etc.

The idea of this resolution was repeated by Stalin at the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in January 1934.<sup>254</sup> Indeed, since 1933, "Ukrainian nationalism" has continued to be the "principal danger" in Ukraine dominated by Russia.

The Ukrainian resistance to this enslavement in the thirties was best shown in the struggle on the cultural front, a struggle for the cultural and spiritual sovereignty and independence from Russia. The most important role in this struggle was played by *Mykola Khvylovy*, an outstanding Ukrainian writer and important Ukrainian Communist. In the years 1925-1928 he published a few books and pamphlets: *Kamo hriadeshi?* (Whither Goest Thou?); *Dumky proty techiyi* (Thoughts Against the Trend), and a novel, *Valdshnepy* (Woodsnipes). He openly proclaimed in these works, the principle of cultural independence from Russia. He also advanced his own interpretation of "theory of the struggle between two cultures" in which he opposed the Russian theory of the superiority of the Russian culture over that of the non-Russian peoples. Khvylovy's interpretation emphasized the *struggle of a young, active and unhampered Ukrainian culture oriented in accord with Ukrainian cultural tradition generally toward the West and opposed the enforced dominance of the old and backward culture of Russia*. He called on the young Ukrainian generation to study and follow the great cultural trends and developments of Western Europe and to turn away from Moscow as the source of cultural inspiration. His slogan "Away from Moscow," became gospel for the Ukrainian generation of the thirties under the Soviet Russian domination.<sup>225</sup>

This Ukrainian cultural resistance was matched by the general political resistance which was supported and often led by some of the Ukrainian Communists themselves. The role of the Ukrainian Communists in the fight against Russian domination was extremely serious and important, since at this period, (to 1933) the Communists still had a freedom of discussion which non-Party citizens did not have.

Hence Ukrainian Communists could bring up political questions that non-Party members dared not raise. Only because Khvylovy belonged to the Communist Party was he able to propagate the slogan, "Away

from Moscow," in literature and call upon the youth to fight for the independence of Ukrainian culture. These thoughts and ideas of Khvylovy gained many adherents among Communist ranks in the Ukraine and they soon coalesced into political opposition which was officially labelled *Khvylovism* by the Soviet government.

What Mykola Khvylovy and his adherents performed in the sector of literature, similar undertakings in politics were performed by *Alexander Shumsky*, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and Commissar of Public Instruction of Ukraine. Shumsky became the leader of a powerful Ukrainian opposition not only in the Party, but throughout Ukraine as well.<sup>256</sup> Labelled by Moscow as *Shumskism* and as *Khvylovism*, this opposition became a tremendous national momentum and challenged the Russian rule. The basic postulates of this opposition can be summarized as follows: *Ukraine, although possessed of a communist system, must be a separate, independent state, one in which there must not and should not be any Russian influence whatsoever.*

In combating Russification of Ukraine, the opposition called for a vigorous and sincere implementation of "Ukrainization" and the de-Russification of Ukraine. While accepting the Communist ideology and the necessity of a union of all the Soviet republics, the opposition requested that Russia be just another member of equal republics of the USSR, and not a privileged and dominating force. Relying upon and citing the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR (which assured Ukraine and other non-Russian republics the right to secede from the USSR), the opposition encouraged public opinion in Ukraine (by raising the question in the Communist press, at meetings and at discussions, etc.), to avail itself of this right, because Russia, theoretically but an equal member of the USSR, had violated and usurped the rights guaranteed in the Constitution.

This group of Ukrainian Communists (which movement might be termed *Ukrainian Titoism*), headed by Shumsky and Khvylovy, continued the struggle legally through discussion in the press and at meetings during the years (1926-1928). Later (1929-1933) it was forced underground and suffered heavy losses; its members were either exiled or executed. Khvylovy committed suicide, while Shumsky was arrested, tried and executed. All in all, the liquidation of the opposition in the Communist Party of Ukraine resulted in the liquidation of several thousand Ukrainian Communists.<sup>257</sup>

However, the destruction of the Shumsky-Khvylovy force did not put an end to the opposition within the ranks of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The pressure of the Ukrainian national movement was so great

at all times that it could not be psychologically resisted even by significant strata of the communist party who were of Ukrainian origin. A new opposition group soon appeared, headed by the oldest Ukrainian Bolshevik, a friend of Lenin, *Mykola Skrypnyk*, who succeeded Shumsky as Commissar of Public Instruction. Enjoying considerable prestige among the Bolsheviks in Ukraine and a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, as well as a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Skrypnyk was in a much stronger position than the others to press his opposition views not only in theory but in practice as well. It was Skrypnyk, with his followers and sympathizers in the Communist Party and the Soviet government of Ukraine, who was able to transfer his support into the actual political field. Skrypnyk was able to place reliable Ukrainians in the state apparatus, particularly in the department of public instruction and culture; and these Ukrainians steadily and methodically attempted to transform the formal Soviet state into a real Ukrainian state. But, here, too, Moscow was quickly aware of the far-reaching dangers and consequences of Skrypnyk's Ukrainian policies. Skrypnyk was secretly charged with "plotting" against the Soviet government and called to Moscow to repent before the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. Fearing arrest and execution, Skrypnyk committed suicide on August 7, 1933. Members of his opposition group in the Communist Party of Ukraine as well as thousands of his followers in the state apparatus of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and administration were summarily arrested during the course of the years 1933-1935; a great number were executed as "traitors" and bourgeois nationalists," while many others were isolated in slave labor camps throughout the Soviet Union.<sup>258</sup>

Among the outstanding members of the Ukrainian national opposition in the Communist Party of Ukraine was M. Volubuyev, a prominent Ukrainian economist. As early as 1928 he had published a series of articles in *Bilshovyk Ukrayiny*, proving, with economic arguments, that Ukraine had been put in a position of complete colonial dependency vis a vis Russia.<sup>259</sup>

In the economic field Volobuyev did what Shumsky and Khvylovy did in politics and culture; he served notice to the Ukrainian people that, in spite of the theoretical "equality" in the USSR, Ukraine was actually a heavily subjugated nation. He was arrested, like hundreds of other Ukrainian Communists, and executed by the Russians.<sup>260</sup>

The extent of the terroristic reprisals against this national opposition ("nationalist," as the Russians termed them officially) can be ascertained from official Soviet sources. By a special decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, issued on January

24, 1933 in Moscow, the loyalty of the Communist Party of Ukraine was questioned and judged unreliable. A special Moscow representative, Stalin's envoy, Postyshev, was sent to Ukraine. 1,340 Russian Communist commissars and 7,000 selected Russian Communists accompanied him with orders to carry out a large "purge" of any and all "hostile" elements, especially the "nationalistic" elements.<sup>261</sup>

Under the leadership of Postyshev and his commissars, 35.5 per cent of the Ukrainian Communists were purged in 1933.<sup>262</sup> Among those purged were 26,400 Ukrainians accused of "Ukrainian nationalism."<sup>263</sup> In Kiev alone 50 per cent of the Communists were purged.<sup>264</sup> Of 267,907 Communists in four Ukrainian provinces (Kiev, Odessa, Donets and Vinnitsya), 51,713 were purged for "Ukrainian nationalism."<sup>265</sup> 1,942 secretaries of the *oblast* and *rayon* Party organizations were purged in the Communist Party in Ukraine.<sup>266</sup> In many villages Party organizations were dissolved and replaced by so-called "political departments," headed by 3,000 Communists, mostly Russians, sent from the cities.<sup>267</sup> Also 1,300 Ukrainian members of the "Communist Youth" (*komsomol'tsi*) were purged—chiefly because they were, as it was said, "inflected by Ukrainian nationalism."<sup>268</sup> Many Ukrainian state employees also fell victims to the purge. In Kharkiv alone, then the capital of Ukraine, 2,500 Ukrainians were purged.<sup>269</sup> Over 2,000 Ukrainians were purged in the Ukrainian educational system. They were accused of "Ukrainian nationalism." In the various institutions of the System of Cooperatives and Procurements over 1,000 Ukrainians were purged.<sup>270</sup> Most of the victims were arrested and convicted. According to the official statement of Postyshev, 3,500 Ukrainians were arrested without legal reason.<sup>271</sup> These victims of the purge were as a rule replaced by men sent from Russia or recruited from among the Russians living in Ukrainian cities, men whom Moscow could trust. 107,000 such persons were sent into Ukrainian villages to take over the important positions.<sup>272</sup>

These facts, of course, pertain only to the "purges" conducted among governmental officials and the Party members. What the Soviet statistics fail to mention is the fact that these "purges" affected every Ukrainian village and town and every Ukrainian family. I was a witness of the time when all the Kharkiv prisons, not only the cells, but prison corridors as well were filled with thousands of Ukrainian peasants, who had been accused of being "nationalist counter-revolutionaries."

A growth in Ukrainian opposition not only in the field of culture, but also in economics marked this period. The economic situation became grave as a result of the brazen Russian pillage, and this was a vital issue to the masses of the Ukrainian people, particularly the Ukrainian peasantry, who first felt this brutal and oppressive Russian policy..



## 9. *Liquidation of Ukrainian Peasantry and Moscow-Organized Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933*

The years 1929-1934 represent the period of the sharpest Ukrainian-Russian conflict. These were the years of the First Five Year Plan, a time when Stalin decided to prove that it was possible to "build socialism in one country." (Originally, this had been thought possible only after a world revolution). In Ukraine those years are known and remembered as the years of forced collectivization and catastrophic famine. The Ukrainian peasantry became the chief victim of this "socialist experiment," which Stalin introduced into Ukraine with unbelievable brutality and terror. Although collectivization was introduced among the peasants in other parts of the USSR (including the Russian), because Ukraine is the chief producer of grain and the principal food-stuffs for the whole of the USSR and for Russia, it was here that the most drastic measures were taken to insure a rapid and complete "turn-about."

Moreover, this forced collectivization aimed not only at *social-political* objectives, as was the case in Russia, but also at *national-political* objectives. According to Stalin's formula, the "*national question is above all a question of the relationship between the proletariat of the dominating nation and the peasantry of the subjugated nations.*"<sup>273</sup> Therefore, these national-political objectives in Ukraine included the liquidation of Ukrainian peasantry not only as a social group, but also as the bearer of the Ukrainian national spirit and Ukrainian nationalism, this most "dangerous phenomenon" for the Russian "proletariat" and its domination in Ukraine. Therefore, collectivization and liquidation of the peasantry "as a class of *kurkuls*" (wealthy peasants) was pursued with a cruelty and terror unmatched in any other area of the USSR. In Russia itself collectivization was not strongly opposed because the Russian peasant, psychologically and socially, was disposed to accept enforced collectivization. In Russia, the tradition of *an obshchina*, or the village commune was always strong among the peasants. Such a tradition did not exist in Ukraine where a tradition of democratic individualism had always prevailed. Objective Russian scholars emphasize this principal difference between Ukrainians and Russians. One of them writes: "The rural commune, as it developed in Great Russia, never established itself among the Ukrainians, except where there was direct Great Russian influence. The Ukrainian village community (*hromada*) was a looser and freer organizational form which allowed more individualism."<sup>274</sup> Because the process of collectivization was better attuned to Russia than Ukraine, it was accomplished there with less effort.

In addition, collectivization in Russia met with less resistance because there no national-political conflict was involved, as was the case in Ukraine.

The enormous difficulties of collectivization in Ukraine were assessed by Stalin:

“The peasantry represents the basic army of the national movement... Without the peasantry there could not be a powerful national movement. This is what is meant when we say that the *national question is essentially, a question of the peasantry.*”<sup>275</sup>

It is evident, then, that the collectivization of the peasantry and the “liquidation of *kurkuls*” (kulaks) was essentially an attempt to liquidate the peasantry as the “basic army of the national movement.”

The Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party in Moscow was well aware of the role of the so-called “kurkuls” among the Ukrainian peasants. As medium well-off and wealthier farmers they had had an opportunity to take an interest in educational, cultural and political matters for several generations. As a result, they constituted the most enlightened part of the Ukrainian peasantry and were the standard-bearers of national-political and cultural endeavors. In order to nip in the root not only the Ukrainian peasantry, but the Ukrainian nation, it was not sufficient to transform the structure of the economy of the Ukrainian countryside, they had to destroy physically the entire class of “kurkuls.”

Collectivization in Ukraine was instituted earlier than in Russia and terminated later; the reason was simple; collectivization met with much greater resistance in Ukraine. Objective foreign observers have shown that in general the stiffest resistance to collectivization occurred in the non-Russian parts of the USSR,<sup>276</sup> especially in Ukraine, the largest agricultural country in the USSR. Waves of rebellion, peasant uprisings and open revolts against forced collectivization occurred throughout Ukraine in these years. Those peasant uprisings which took place at the time of the disclosure of the “Union for the Liberation of Ukraine,” (SVU) helped to form a solid Ukrainian anti-Russian national opposition under the name of this Union (SVU). But the GPU was too quick and too efficient to permit these uprisings to influence Stalin's plans for the collectivization of Ukrainian agriculture in any way.

Terror of unbelievable fury descended upon Ukrainian villages and towns. In almost every village the most active and prominent peasants were arrested and executed. (The author of this book was arrested together with a number of pupils of a village school and a few hundred Ukrainain peasants from the village of Yahotyn in the province of Pol-

tava in connection with the case of SVU and witnessed the mass executions of Ukrainian peasants in the GPU prison in the town of Pryluky. The executions followed a certain pattern: from each village of the *rayon* at least 2 persons were executed; from other villages, where there had been anti-Soviet uprisings, entire "*kurkul* groups," numbering from 20 to 50 persons, were all executed, for instance, the villages of Sokyryntsi, Hrabarivka and Drabove in the Pryluka *okrug* (district).

In general, the more active and the more nationalistic Ukrainian peasants, called *kurkuls* (a Ukrainian term, corresponding to the Russian *kulak*, denoting a well-to-do peasant), were deported in 1930 to various parts of the USSR to become part of the slave labor force (to the Solovetsky Islands, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Vologda, etc.). The great majority of these Ukrainian peasants died from cold and starvation.

Some idea of the extent of the terrorist reprisals against the Ukrainian peasants in connection with collectivization in 1930-31, is documented in official Soviet sources. For instance, it is widely known that at the XVI Conference of the Communist Party of the USSR which took place in Moscow on April 23, 1929, a plan for "dekulakization" was decided upon. "Dekulakization" means expropriating for the benefit of the state not only all of the land but even the livestock, machinery, household goods and wearing apparel, and sending the land-owner and his family to Siberia. According to the plan, 5 per cent of the peasants were classified as "kulaks."<sup>277</sup> Statistics show that there were 5,200,000 farms in Ukraine before collectivization; 5 per cent of this would be 260,000 farms.<sup>278</sup> If we assume that such farms belonged to peasant families averaging 6 members (as a rule such farms were owned and run by large families), then according to the plan accepted before collectivization had even begun, some 1,500,000 Ukrainian peasants were destined to become the victims of "dekulakization." After the completion of "dekulakization" official Soviet reports stated that 200,000 Ukrainian farms had been confiscated. This means that about 1,200,000 persons fell victim to this action.<sup>279</sup> These figures include only those farms and families which were "legally" classified as "kulaks," but even the Soviet official press has stated that, in the process of realization, this plan was "overfullfilled" by 15 per cent.<sup>280</sup> If we were now to assume that in Ukraine the plan was "overfullfilled" by only half that percentage and that only 7.5 per cent of the farmers were "dekulakized" then this would mean that more than 2,200,000 persons had fallen victim to this action. It should be noted that, as compared with the other sections of the USSR, the largest number of "kulaks" was in Ukraine, and, therefore, the percentage of "dekulakized" peasants there was also higher than average. This means that not less than 10 per cent of the farms

or some 3,000,000 persons were involved. This is confirmed by eyewitnesses, researchers and experts on the question.

One eyewitness, Yuri Horlis-Horsky, reports that during only one "wave of arrests" in Ukraine (and there was 4 such "waves") 35,000 *Ukrainian peasants families*, averaging 5 persons per family, were deported from Ukraine. *By the end of 1932 2,400,00 persons had been deported from Ukraine, which number included women, children and the aged.* The same eyewitness states that most of the children between the ages of 8 and 9 died during the long journey in cold and unsanitary freight cars.<sup>281</sup>

These cruelties in effectuating the Ukrainian collectivization and "dekulakization" were not only ordered by Moscow, but were also entrusted to Russian hands—in Ukraine as well as in the other non-Russian parts of the USSR. The Russians acknowledge their leading role in the collectivization program with all its brutality; in fact they are proud of this, their achievement. As is widely known collectivization was carried out under the leadership of "twenty-five thousand Communists"; these were Party officials from the large cities sent from the center for this purpose. They are described by an official Soviet source as follows: "As the vanguard of Soviet society, the Russian workers' class spear-headed socialist reconstruction not only in industry but also in agriculture. In 1930, 25,000 workers were sent to different villages with this purpose. Russian workers were the best propagandists and organizers of collectives in the country. The leading role in this great movement was played by the workers from Moscow and Leningrad. These two centers alone sent over 40 per cent of the said twenty five thousand workers to the different villages of the USSR. And the largest percentage of volunteers was to be found among the Russian workers. These workers showed the most courage and the greatest devotion in the fight against the enemies of collectivism. Selflessly and devotedly they fought the kulaks in the villages."<sup>282</sup> It was these Russian workers who fought the peasants of Ukraine.

The terrorized Ukrainian peasants were compelled in 1930-1933 by brute force to join the collective farm system. And it is worthy of mention that Ukrainian peasants fought against this modern form of slavery, while collectivization was accepted without any considerable opposition in Russia and by 1931 the collective system was firmly entrenched there. Soviet statistics bear out this vigorous opposition to collectivization on the part of Ukrainian peasants. For instance, the Soviet economic review, *Socialisticheskoye stroitelstvo* (*The Socialist Construction*), in commenting on the decline of collective farms in the USSR in the years 1931-1933, states that in Ukraine the number of collective farms declined

considerably in that period. The following data is given for the whole of the USSR:

In 1931 there were 211,000 collective farms in the USSR; in 1932, the figure remained the same. By 1933 this figure had increased to 224,000. In Ukraine, the reverse took place: in 1931 there were 35,000 collective farms, in 1932 only 25,000 and in 1933 the number had fallen to 24,000.<sup>283</sup> The number of collective farms (*kolkhoz*) in Ukraine diminished by 11,000 as a result of the peasants' resistance.

The struggle of the Ukrainian peasantry against collectivization did not cease even after they were forcibly integrated into the collective farm system. Moscow pressed forward with its gigantic plans, which included an enormous wheat export to the detriment of the Ukrainian economy. "Plans" and more "plans" were sent from Moscow to Ukraine calling for more and more wheat to be requisitioned from the peasants. Communist organizations received orders to meet their "wheat quota" without regard to the needs of the Ukrainian peasantry; in the event of the peasants' failure to meet these quotas, orders were in effect that all available food stuff in Ukraine should be requisitioned. Since the Ukrainian peasants unhesitatingly sabotaged these barbaric and drastic *ukases* of Moscow, the Russian Bolsheviks resorted to even more inhuman methods of exploiting Ukrainian economic resources and oppressing the Ukrainian people.

According to the "economic plan" for 1932-1933, the Soviet government planned to gather 1,300 million *poods* of grain, Ukraine being assessed 350 million *poods alone* (35 per cent of all planned grain). But in 1932 as a result of the mass deportation of Ukrainian peasants and the mass evacuation of villages to escape forcible collectivization, the arable area had diminished by 20 per cent, so that more than 300 million *poods* of grain were not harvested. S. Kosior, head of the Communist Party of Ukraine at that time, officially stated this at the Party conference in Khar-kiv in November 1932.<sup>284</sup> As reported by Moscow's *Ekonomicheskaya zhizn*, December 15, 1932, Ukraine fulfilled only 56 per cent of the wheat quota assigned by the "grain plan."<sup>285</sup>

Ukraine could have fulfilled this "grain plan" 100 per cent only by surrendering all the available grain in the country, and this would have meant the physical destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry. Even the Communist Party of Ukraine did not dare advance such an inhuman course; it appealed to Moscow to mitigate its demands. But Moscow rejected this appeal and berated the Communist officials in Ukraine for timidity and lack of vision. On January 24, 1933 the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party voted a special resolution in regard to the situation in Ukraine, which stated:

"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it a proven fact that Ukrainian Party organizations have not fulfilled their assignments with respect to the grain harvest and have failed to execute the grain plan in general . . ." <sup>286</sup>

In the same resolution the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party relieved S. Kosior as Moscow's top man in Ukraine. To replace him Moscow sent P. Postyshev, a prominent Russian Bolshevik and a confidant of Stalin.

Upon his arrival in Ukraine (with secret police and a complete GPU apparatus), Postyshev initiated a large-scale "purge" of "Ukrainian nationalists," and subsequently, with the assistance of *Russian personnel* brought with him from Russia, conducted a "campaign to surrender grain" the aim of which was to fulfill the orders of Moscow 100 per cent. The methods of this "campaign" were wretchedly inhuman and draconic, and the purpose of the Muscovite policies was *national and political*, i.e. against the Ukrainian people as such and with a view to further the *Russian national interest*. As a result, the Ukrainian people, including many Ukrainian Communists, united in their anti-Russian struggle and opposition.

This opposition was singled out in an official Soviet document. A decision of the Soviet of People's Commissars of Ukraine and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on December 6, 1932 stated:

"Because of the shameless break-down of the grain-collection campaign in various *rayons* of Ukraine, the Soviet of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine order the local Party and administration authorities to eradicate the sabotage of grain which was organized by the counter-revolutionary and *kurkul* elements. Also, *the opposition of a number of Communists, leaders of this sabotage*, must be stamped out, and the passive and indifferent attitude toward this *sabotage on the part of some Party organizations* must be liquidated. The Soviet of People's Commissars and the Central Committee have decided to *blacklist* all those localities which conduct criminal sabotage, and to apply against them the following *reprisals*:

"1. To *suspend* the flow of all merchandize and to suspend all state and cooperative trade in these localities; to *close* all state and cooperative stores and to remove all supplies of merchandize;

"2. *prohibit* trade of products of prime need, which trade heretofore had been conducted by collective farms and individual homesteads;

"3. to *suspend* all credits destined for these localities, and to withdraw at once all credits already given to them;

“4. to *overhaul* the personnel of the administration and economic organizations and to *remove* all enemy elements therefrom;

“5. to do the same on collective farms by removal therefrom of all enemy elements engaged in sabotage...”<sup>287</sup>

One can see that these were extraordinary steps usually put into practice only by an enemy during a military occupation. This was nothing more than a blockade by starvation on the part of a foreign and hostile Soviet regime. And such steps were evident throughout Ukraine. As can be seen from the decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars (*Radnarkom*) and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, issued on December 15, 1932, during the period of this blockade by starvation as many as 82 *rayons of Ukraine were blackmailed at the same time*.<sup>288</sup> How many more Ukrainian rayons were so classified remains unknown, because no later information was published in the Soviet press.

By such methods the Russian Bolsheviks succeeded in stripping all the available grain from Ukraine; by the spring of 1933 Postyshev was able to report to Moscow that “Ukraine has fulfilled its planned quota of grain.” Stalin thereupon elevated Postyshev to among the highest dignitaries of the Soviet Union.

But at what price was this plan fulfilled? We might note well that already on February 26, 1933, when the spring sowing in Ukraine was about to start, Moscow, by a special decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, was forced to loan Ukraine 20,300 poods of grain to make it possible for her to sow the fields.<sup>289</sup> This means that all the grain had been removed from Ukraine, so that there was none left even for sowing. Who then was responsible for this? Of course, Moscow, that is Russia, who has always been in need of Ukrainian grain. But now the latter “was lending” grain to Ukraine!

So in the early spring of -1933 in Ukraine, the breadbasket of Europe, a man-made famine was in full swing. It began in 1932, and in the first phase over 1,504,000 lives were lost, a fact which is substantiated by official Soviet statistics. For instance, an official Soviet publication in Kharkiv reported that on January 1, 1932 Ukraine had a population of 32,680,700<sup>290</sup>; a year later another publication, *Narodne hospodarstvo USSR*, reported that the population of Ukraine (on January 1, 1933) was only 31,901,500.<sup>291</sup> Thus in one year 779,200 persons had vanished. If we add the percentage increase of population, which in Ukraine was always 2.36 per cent, we obtain the final figure of 1,504,000 persons lost to Ukraine.



But the main toll of lives was taken in 1933, the year of a vast and unprecedented famine in the history of this rich and resourceful land. Naturally enough, Moscow never published any statistics or population figures for that year; it attempted to conceal from the world the heinous genocide it perpetrated upon the defenseless Ukrainian nation. But the magnitude of the losses can be ascertained on the basis of the official population census of January 17, 1939. According to this census Ukraine had a population of only 30,960,200 in 1939!<sup>292</sup>

When we compare the 32,680,700 persons living in Ukraine in 1932 with the 1939 figure of 30,960,200, we see that, taking into account the normal 2.36 per cent annual increase, *in 7 years Ukraine had lost 7,465,000 persons!* Of this number *some 4,821,600 persons, or roughly 18.8 per cent of the Ukrainian population, died in the years 1932-1933!* *This is a conservative estimate of the number of Ukrainians who died from hunger and starvation in these years.* Other Ukrainian sources raise this figure to 6,000,000.<sup>293</sup>

Taking even the lower figure 18.8 per cent, the percentage of famine victims in Ukraine was *five times* greater than that in the great famine in India in 1918-1919, and *twice* the percentage of casualties suffered by all the warring nations in the years 1914-1918. It means that, in 1933, *25,000 people died daily in the villages of Ukraine, or more than 1,000 per hour, or 17 every minute.*<sup>294</sup> During the famine, Moscow forbade foreigners to travel through Ukraine; and for this reason few foreigners knew anything about the real magnitude of this catastrophe. But for those who visited Ukraine after the famine had ended, it was soon evident how many Ukrainians had died in the famine. The American publicist Chamberlain, whom we have mentioned earlier in this book, wrote: "In the autumn of 1933, when the ban on travel in the Ukraine by foreign journalists was lifted, I went with my wife, who was herself born in the Ukraine, to learn at first hand what had happened in the Ukraine. We visited two widely separated regions, one in the neighborhood of Poltava, on the left bank of the Dniepr, the other near the town of Bila Tserkva, on the right bank. We also made systematic inquiries at railway stations as we traveled across the country... What had happened was not hardship, or privation, or distress, or food shortage, to mention the deceptively euphemistic words that were allowed to pass the Soviet censorship, but *stark, outright famine, with its victims counted in the millions.* No one will probably ever know the exact toll of death, because the Soviet Government preserved the strictest secrecy about the whole question, officially denied that there was any famine, and rebuffed all attempts to organize relief abroad. But every village I visited reported *a death rate of not less than ten per cent.* This was not an ir-

responsible estimate, but the figure given out by the local Soviets... A woman in Poltava declared that "no war ever took from us so many people." This was certainly no exaggeration..."<sup>295</sup>

The consequence of the famine in Ukraine can also be seen in the reductions made in the plans for the cultivation of the winter crops in the autumn of 1933: *one million hectares less than in 1930.*<sup>296</sup>

*Yet the most shocking and inhuman aspect of this dreadful famine was that it had been artificially created by the Soviet government in Moscow as a means of compelling the Ukrainian peasantry to join the detested collective farm system!* And at the same time it served as a pretext for the physical destruction of a most vital part of the Ukrainian population. Ukraine is extremely rich; only premeditated policies could have created such a devastating famine.

Official Soviet statistics again prove that Ukraine had plenty of grain and foodstuffs in 1932. Thus, *in 1932, 894,000,000 poods of grain were harvested in Ukraine, that is, 94,000,000 poods more than in 1928, a year considered the most prosperous with respect to the harvest yield.*<sup>297</sup> This means that for the fiscal year 1932-1933 there were 22.5 *poods* of grain per capita in Ukraine, normally an ample amount to carry one over to the next harvest.

The anti-Ukrainian, political character of this famine is again attested to by the fact that, in Russia, which depends heavily on the supply of Ukrainian grain, there was no famine at any time; moreover, it was to Russia that the Ukrainians fled in order to find food and nourishment. Another fact attesting to the artificiality of the famine was the coordination of the Muscovite political reprisals against the Ukrainians with the 1933 famine. And 1933 was designated by Moscow as the year which would see the "principal danger" in Ukraine, i.e. "Ukrainian nationalism," liquidated. The Russian Bolsheviks had concluded that in order to solve the "National question" in Ukraine, all that was necessary was to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry, this "basic army of the national movement" in Stalin's words. According to Stalin the whole "problem of the nationalities is first and foremost one of the peasantry."

Finally, Postyshev himself, the iron commissar of Ukraine at this time, has confirmed that the year 1933 was "the *year* of the destruction of the Ukrainian counter-revolution" by means of terror and famine. Summing up Moscow's achievements in the grain collection campaign in Ukraine, Postyshev at the XII Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine in January 1934 declared in words that were repeated in the Congress' resolutions:

“The Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution was wiped out in 1933 and the nationalist deviation under the direction of Skrypnyk was disclosed and destroyed. The Congress commends the herculean work of the GPU organs in liquidating the nationalist counter-revolutionary elements.”<sup>298</sup>

#### 10. *National Genocide—Essence of Russian Policy Toward Ukraine*

After this extensive *pogrom* of Ukrainians in 1933 the national antagonism between Ukraine and Russia deepened considerably, but naturally the intensity of the open Ukrainian anti-Russian resistance was weakened. The Ukrainian national movement in the USSR was forced underground and continued its anti-Russian struggle according to the rules of clandestine warfare. One positive result of the Russian *pogrom* of 1933 was that it clarified the relations between Russia and Ukraine: Russia, the alien occupying power and Ukraine, the stricken and conquered nation. All illusions as to the “equality and brotherhood” of all nations in the USSR had been completely and permanently shattered. Moreover, the Ukrainians came to the inevitable conclusion that, considering the cruelty and barbarity of the Russian methods, they would have to adopt a more elastic facade if they wished to preserve their nation from the ravages of the ever-intensifying genocidal policy of Moscow.

Despite the more cautious and elastic Ukrainian opposition to Moscow’s totalitarian rule, the Russian policy was essentially a consistent *national genocidal policy* which sought to destroy the Ukrainian nation as such. *This genocide of Moscow—the greatest crime in the history of mankind—is evident in the systematic reprisals undertaken against the Ukrainians, the wholesale executions, deportations, and mass murders on an unprecedented scale.* These genocidal policies were very severe during the reign of terror of the Moscow Politburo carried out by Yezhov, Commissar of the GPU in 1937-1938. Naturally, this reign of terror descended upon all the republics of the USSR, including the Russian SSRF, but it was in the non-Russian republics, and particularly in Ukraine, that this terror was doubled in ferocity because here, in addition to all the general reprisals, were added also *national* reprisals.

Suffice it to say that during the course of this anti-Ukrainian policy Moscow destroyed the then government of the Ukrainian SSR, arrested and executed all members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and replaced and changed both the government and the entire Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. P. Lubchenko, the head of the government of the Ukrainian SSR, (he committed suicide in 1937), was accused of “directing an underground

Ukrainian nationalist organization" whose purpose was to "separate Ukraine from the USSR." It would appear that the entire government of Ukraine made up this "underground nationalist organization which plotted the separation of Ukraine from the USS."<sup>300</sup>

After destroying in 1937-1938 the entire government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Moscow sent another of its top-notch Bolsheviks to rule Ukraine. This time it was Nikita S. Khrushchev, another confidant of the Moscow Politburo and personally of Stalin, who soon imported an additional extensive Russian apparatus, including both the NKVD and the Communists, and with their help began curbing the recalcitrant and rebellious Ukraine.

In the same way as in the time of Postyshev, Ukrainians became the victims of a mass "purge of hostile," mainly "nationalistic" elements. The range of this new purge is evident from the statistics on the Ukrainian Communists caught in it. In Kiev, between August 1937 and June 1938, more than 50 per cent of the members of the Communist Party were "purged" (and, of course, arrested).<sup>301</sup> How many non-Party men were arrested is clear from the contemporary Soviet press, which stated that in Ukraine from 100 to 300 teachers were arrested in every administrative rayon.<sup>302</sup> (A rayon is the smallest administrative-territorial unit in the USSR). All of them were arrested chiefly for their "Ukrainian nationalism."

In general, it is typical that such "purges" and terrors in the USSR should be aimed mainly at the non-Russian peoples.

There are no statistics extant on the number of non-Russian people who were claimed by the Russian terror of 1937-1938. The only reliable information comes from political prisoners themselves who were liberated or escaped from the various Russian slave camps and who, during the last war, were able to escape to the West. The author of this book was arrested and deported to one of the most notorious Russian death camps—Kolyma—where several years were spent (1937-1940). Here I made note of the very significant ratio of Russian to non-Russian political prisoners.

*The small number of ethnic Russians among the prisoners as compared with the number of ethnic Russians in the USSR (53 per cent) or in the All-Union Communist Party (up to 72 per cent) was most striking.*

*However, the most important phenomenon was that not a single Russian was in a slave labor camp because of his Russian nationalism, despite the fact that Russians preach and practice overtly not only Russian nationalism, but Russian chauvinism with respect to the non-Russian people of the USSR!*

*On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of political prisoners from among the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR were those condemned for the nationalism and patriotism which they professed for their own countries.*

The lack of Soviet reprisals against Russian nationalism, and the systematic persecution of non-Russian nationalism, particularly of Ukrainian nationalism, establishes unequivocally the Soviet Russian tendency to destroy the non-Russian peoples through genocide. Certain official Soviet statistics verify this policy of Moscow. Although there is no official data as to the number of Ukrainians who starved to death during the famine of 1932-1933, we have, nevertheless, two population censuses of the USSR,—that of 1926 and that of 1939. If we compare them, we readily obtain the terrifying result of Russian genocide with respect to Ukraine.

*According to the 1926 census there were 77,791,124 Russians, comprising 53 per cent of the population of the USSR, while at the same time there were 31,194,976 Ukrainians, or 20.5 per cent of the entire population of the Soviet Union.*<sup>303</sup>

*The census of January 17, 1939 places the number of Russians at 99,019,929 or 58.41 per cent, while the number of Ukrainians is given as 28,070,404 or 16.56 per cent.*<sup>304</sup>

*Thus in twelve years the number of Russians increased 21,318,805 (over 30 per cent), while the number of Ukrainians decreased 3,124,572 (about 10 per cent). What is horri-fying is the fact that the census shows an absolute decrease of the Ukrainian population. If we add to this decrease the natural yearly increase of population we obtain the staggering figure of 7,465,000 persons who vanished from Ukraine between 1926 and 1939. Since there was no catastrophic disaster that would negate the normal population increase, we come to the inevitable conclusion that millions of people must have been either executed or starved to death, or in some other way disappeared from Ukraine.*

This is also supported by Ukrainian census figures. *In 1926 in Ukraine 87.6 per cent of the population were Ukrainians while 5.6 per cent were Russians.*<sup>305</sup> In the 1939 census the nationality figures in Ukraine were not given, but the *Little Soviet Encyclopedia* reported that already in 1931 the percentage of Ukrainians in Ukraine had decreased to 80 per cent, while that of Russians had increased to 9.2 per cent.<sup>306</sup>

This is the net result of the Russian genocidal policy in Ukraine.

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## CHAPTER FOUR: UKRAINIAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE DURING WORLD WAR II

### 1. *Ukraine at Time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact*

As a consequence of this anti-nationality policy of the Russian Bolsheviks, the sentiments of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR were very anti-Russian and anti-Communist on the eve of World War II. Naturally, hopes ran high for an early liberation from the Russian Bolshevik tyranny should the USSR become involved in a general war. Yet, it is historically incorrect to propagate, as non-Communist *Russian* emigres do, that anti-Soviet feeling among the Russians was as strong and intense as it was among the non-Russian peoples. Although the rank and file of the Russian people suffered from the Bolshevik tyranny and dictatorship although not in the same degree as non-Russians, the Russian elite were too imbued with the new "Soviet patriotism" to hope for an early downfall of the Soviet totalitarian system; and when the war clouds gathered they cast their lot with the "Soviet fatherland." We should always bear in mind that Russia proper, both during Tsarism, as well as during Bolshevism, occupied in the economic field vis a vis the conquered non-Russian nations a position of an economic metropolis and treated the conquered nations as colonial lands. Such colonial relationship brings unto the metropolis considerable and obvious benefits of an economic nature not only to the elite of the metropolis, but also to the lower classes, particularly labor. Russia employed state resources for the development of her own industry at the expense of colonial exploitation of non-Russian nations, and thus the laborer or the son of a peasant who could not make enough to live on the land of his fathers easily obtained work in industry, and at better wages than workers recruited from the peasantry e.g. in Ukraine. In addition the workers in Ukraine were frequently unemployed because the lack of land created an oversupply of farm labor seeking employment in the cities, and in the cities of Ukraine development of industries was purposely neglected by the Russian authorities. To this must be added another moment of economic benefit which accrued to Russian peasants and workers under the Bolshevik regime, and which did not accrue to those of Ukraine and other non-Russian lands: fewer obstacles were put in the way of Russian workers and peasants joining the party in power, and this way they

created a state, economic and party bureaucracy composed of millions of people, highly paid and occupying positions of high social prestige. Great masses of them were dispatched as leading representatives to non-Russian territories, where they were charged with holding these territories in obedience to Moscow. Thus a great number of workers and peasants of Russia proper enjoyed and enjoy considerable economic privileges flowing from colonial exploitation of non-Russian nations, and for this reason they support this colonialism out of their own self-interest. This economic interest is also the cause of "Soviet Russian" patriotism of the lower classes of the Russian nation. As far as the Russian elite is concerned, there is no doubt whatsoever, that it had ever been taken care of better than under the Bolshevik regime. Russian scientists, professors, writers and artists are in the highest graces of the regime. Their national feelings are not only never subject to insult, as those of the non-Russian nationals, but flattered and nurtured. They have only one thing in common with the non-Russians, and particularly with the Ukrainians: they have no political freedom and no freedom of thought. Nevertheless there is this difference between the Russian elite and the Ukrainians: by tradition, a majority of the Russian elite has been accustomed to a lack of political freedom, while the Ukrainian tradition, down to the lowest social strata, has always been freedom-loving.

But the Ukrainians and the other non-Russian peoples, for whom the Soviet empire or any other Russian state system was nothing but a "prison of nations," had no valid reason to defend the Soviet Union before the onslaught of a foreign aggressor. They all waited for a war as the only salvation from their oppression and enslavement. Hence when the war between the USSR and Germany came, they simply cast their lot with the invading enemy, so great was their hatred of Russian Bolshevism.

The first phase of World War II—from September 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941 (known as the "era of friendship between Stalin and Hitler")—was extremely unfavorable for the Ukrainians, since it brought almost all the Western Ukrainian territories, which hitherto had been outside the zone of communist control, under Soviet domination. As a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, all Ukrainian lands, which had been conquered by Poland in 1920 and occupied until the war in 1939 (Eastern Galicia, Volhynia and Polissya) were given as a gift to Stalin by Hitler. Later the Russians, in like manner, took possession of other Ukrainian lands—Bukovina and part of Besarabia—which after the restoration of the Ukrainian state were part of the Ukrainian Na-



tional Republic and which were conquered by Romania by force of arms and held until 1940.

It is true that the union of all Ukrainian lands into one sovereign and independent Ukrainian state had been the centuries-old political objective of all Ukrainians. But union under a detestable Russian Communist regime, although a nominal Ukrainian state, was in some respects a heavy blow to the Ukrainian national liberation struggle. In modern times this political objective of the Ukrainian nation had been realized in 1918-1919, when the Ukrainian National Republic was joined by all Western Ukrainian lands which had therefore been under the rule of Austria-Hungary (Galicia, Bukovyna and Carpatho-Ukraine). This was accomplished by constitutional means, by enactment of the Constituent Assembly of these lands composed of deputies to former Austrian legislative bodies (Parliament of Vienna and Land Assemblies) which had been chosen in general elections, and of deputies of countries elected after the revolution. This Constituent Assembly, by an act of January 3, 1919, resolved that these lands should be united into a single Ukrainian National Republic. This act was ratified by the constitutional law of the Ukrainian Labor Congress on January 28, 1919, and preceded by the Universal of the Directory of the UNR issued in Kiev on January 22, 1919. Unfortunately these territories were able to remain within the free Ukrainian State only until July, 1919, at which time Poland and Romania succeeded in breaking the line of defense of the Ukrainian Army and occupied Galicia and Bukovyna. Carpatho-Ukraine was taken by Czechoslovakia. In addition, Poland conquered by force of arms other Western Ukrainian lands from the UNR (Kholm, Pidlashya, Volhynia and part of Polissya) taking advantage of the fact that the Ukrainian National Republic was at the time engaged in a difficult defensive war against Soviet Russia.

To be fully aware of what the Stalin-Hitler deal meant to the Ukrainians, one must remember that the 7,500,000 Ukrainians within the borders of the Polish state were living under much better conditions than were their brothers in Eastern Ukraine under the Russian domination.

Polish-occupied Western Ukraine, with a great number of a Ukrainian population which since time immemorial had constituted a majority, did not resign the Ukrainian attempts that Ukraine should comprise one nation, completely independent of any other. Although on the territory occupied by Poland a military regime existed until 1921, the Ukrainians stubbornly continued to declare that they do not accept Polish occupation. Legal representatives of this territory protested to the free democratic world, in particular to the Paris Peace Conference and to the Council of the League of Nations.

It should be noted that under Austrian rule Galicia had been, for many decades, governed by a constitutional regime with democratic freedoms. This gave an opportunity to that part of the Ukrainian nation to develop in Galicia a high degree of culture, and to organize economically and politically. In elections to the Austrian Parliament this territory always returned a compact majority of Ukrainian deputies who declared that this part of the nation desires unification in a single independent Ukrainian state. The political organization of Ukrainians in this territory represented all democratic parties: conservative Christian-democrats, national-democrats, radical-democrats and social-democrats. The masses of the people were behind them.

When in 1922, the Polish Government conducted general elections to the Assembly and Senate in Warsaw also in this territory, Galicia assumed a negative stand and boycotted the elections as a sign of protest against Polish occupation. The boycott was complete and only the Polish and Jewish minorities went to the polls. In the other part of Western Ukrainian lands (Kholm, Pidlashya, Polissya and Volynia), the Ukrainian parties took a different line for tactical reasons, and took part in the elections so as to be able to choose representatives who would voice their protest against occupation from the rostrum of the legislature. There the Ukrainian parties united with the minorities (Jews, Germans, Czechs). It must be noted that the election result was catastrophic for the Polish Government, not a single Polish deputy being returned from this territory. Thus, it was like a plebiscite, conducted by the Polish authorities which voted against Polish sovereignty over these lands. The elected representatives and senators issued a solemn declaration at the first session of the Assembly (Sejm) and Senate in which they stated that the Ukrainian people do not wish to belong to Poland, but strive to reestablish their own unified independent democratic nation on all lands of Ukraine. In the next elections of 1928 all Ukrainians in Western Ukraine went to the polls. This time Galicia also elected a large majority of Ukrainian deputies. They also solemnly declared in the Assembly and Senate that the Ukrainian people of all Western Ukrainian lands desire their own unified independent democratic state.

All Ukrainian political parties in Western Ukraine conducted a lively activity also in the field of culture and economics. The entire movement was clearly of a democratic and national nature. It was a mass movement, conducted by legal means, although the Polish regime was, since the coup d'état of Marshal Pilsudski (1926), semi-totalitarian. It is noteworthy that the number of sympathizers of a communist order were much less numerous in Western Ukraine than in Warsaw. Communist sympathizers among the Ukrainians counted less than 3% in 1930.

Under such conditions of a semi-totalitarian Polish regime which, contrary to Polish laws then in effect, oppressed the Ukrainian movement heavily, it was only natural that the Ukrainian developed an underground movement of revolutionary warfare. Such an organization, under the name "Ukrainian Military Organization" (UVO) was established in 1920. It was an inter-party organization, and at its top level representatives of Ukrainian democratic parties had a decisive voice. As a result of a dispute on the tactics, some party members began to leave the organization. The Radicals were the first to leave, followed by the National-democrats in 1928. This left only nationalist elements in the UVO which until that time had been non-partisan. In 1929/30 they transformed the UVO into a new organization of a political nature under the name "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN) under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets, former commander of a corps of the Army of the UNR (Corps of the Sitch Riflemen). This was an underground organization which engaged in acts of terrorism against representatives of the Polish regime.

In 1939, when war broke out between Germany and Poland, the entire mass of the Ukrainian population under Polish occupation was unequivocally opposed to Poland and at the same time against Russian occupation (communist) of the rest of Ukraine. All political trends, regardless of party stood for realization of unification and independence.

It is thus plain why Western Ukraine was a prize booty when Nazi Germany presented it to Soviet Russia in September 1939. The Russians had been waiting for this moment for years; they knew that so long as a powerful nationalistic segment continued to exist close to Ukraine, the 32,000,000 Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR would be ever rebellious and recalcitrant. Therefore, they immediately proceeded to decapitate this Ukrainian independence movement in Western Ukraine by arresting all active Ukrainian elements, as they had done in Ukraine in the years 1933-1938.

The extent of the Soviet Russian terror inflicted upon the Ukrainian population of Western Ukraine is indicated by the mass executions perpetrated by the NKVD during the Russian retreat in the face of the advancing German armies in 1941.

*In Lviv alone the Russians left 10,000 corpses of Ukrainian men and women who had been murdered in the city prisons; in Lutsk, 3,000 were killed, in Dubno, 1,000. Hundreds of Ukrainians were brutally slain by the retreating Russians in the Western Ukrainian cities of Striy, Stanislaviv, Drohobych, Zolochiv, Ternopil, Kolomeya, Buchach, Berezhany and others.<sup>307</sup>*

These victims were only those Ukrainian political prisoners whom the Russians were unable to deport into the interior of the Soviet Union; the greater number had been arrested previously and deported to slave labor camps in Siberia, Turkestan and the Far East. The Russians deported not only those Ukrainians whom they suspected of anti-Soviet activities, but also the innocent members of their families. *During the Bolshevik rule in Western Ukraine (from September 17, 1939 to June 22, 1941) about 750,000 men and women were killed or deported to Siberia).*<sup>308</sup> The sudden attack and swift advance of the German armies prevented the Russians from carrying out the vast purges and deportations of Ukrainians from Western Ukraine they originally planned.

But, despite the presence of the Russian terror, which came about in the uniting of these two lands, the Soviet annexation of Western Ukraine had also its positive side: the union of the Ukrainians of Western Ukraine, who had been less terrorized and more highly organized, with those of Eastern Ukraine strengthened the Ukrainian liberation movement, which soon emerged as a powerful force directed against both Stalin and Hitler.

## *2. The German-Russian War: German-Russian Cooperation in the Struggle Against Ukrainian Liberation*

The first weeks of the German-Russian war, which began on June 22, 1941, fully revealed the deep hostility of the Ukrainian people to Bolshevism; thousands upon thousands of Ukrainians refused to defend the Soviet regime. Well-known to all is the mass surrender of Soviet divisions in Ukraine. (These had been mobilized prior to the war and were composed largely of Ukrainians; the Russian divisions had been withdrawn to the interior of the Soviet Union almost simultaneously with the German invasion of the USSR).

The mass surrender and desertion of the Ukrainians and other ethnically non-Russian troops of the Soviet armies were due in part to the clever German propaganda campaign that Hitler launched simultaneously with his armed attack on the USSR. The Germans spread rumors and propaganda to the effect that they were coming to Ukraine as "friends and allies" of the Ukrainians in their struggle against the Bolsheviks and that they would help the Ukrainians to establish their own independent Ukrainian state. Isolated from the rest of the world by the Russian Bolsheviks, the Ukrainians did not know the evil Hitler represented. In fact, they were so accustomed to disbelieving Soviet propaganda that the more anti-German in tone it was the more it appeared to the Ukrainians to be a mass of lies. Finally, the Ukrainians believed that nobody, not

even Hitler, could possibly be any worse than the Russians. Hence they thought that the war would be to their advantage and that the Germans would certainly be on their side in their struggle for freedom and independence.

Soon it was apparent that the German plans for Ukraine differed little from those of Russia, except that the Germans were even more aggressive and brutal in their methods. The illusions which the Ukrainians had entertained with respect to Germany were quickly dissipated, and they quickly realized that they would have to fight simultaneously against Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, these two great totalitarian powers. Some Ukrainian circles in Western Ukraine were convinced that Germany, even if only for reasons of her own self-interest in waging war against Russian-Bolshevik might, will obviously proclaim the liberation of all enslaved nations of the Soviet Union and will not put any obstacles in the way of their reestablishing their own states, and in particular in the western lands of the Soviet Union: Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic lands. These illusions were shared by some circles of other nations, too. But immediately following the first weeks of German military occupation of Ukraine these expectations proved to be empty illusions. Although German military authorities at first pretended not to notice that Ukrainians were taking over the local civilian administration, immediately upon the arrival of German civil occupation authorities, there was an end put to this. The Germans not only took over the entire administration of conquered territories, but they introduced their totalitarian order, prohibiting any kind of political activity and outlawing political organizations. Those who at the beginning, were subject to illusions and had engaged in taking over the local administration were arrested by the Gestapo or confined. Only one organization was permitted — a relief committee of a charitable nature, the same kind for Poles and Ukrainians. Numerous arrests provoked strong resentment among the Ukrainians.

Under these circumstances an anti-German movement got under way which was simultaneously anti-Bolshevik. The idea began to spread that out of this war a free and democratic Ukraine should emerge. It was then that the Gestapo proclaimed the Ukrainian liberation movement to be the Germans' greatest enemy in the East.

It was a rude awakening although it proved to be extremely salutary, for it warned the Ukrainians at the outset not to expect anything from the Germans. It taught them that the Germans had also come to Ukraine to enslave the nation and to exploit the riches of the Ukrainian land. Thus, the Ukrainians once again were placed between the anvil and the

hammer. They saw now that they would have to fight alone, without any help or support from abroad.

Ukraine—created a widespread, popular anti-German feeling. In the fall of 1941 the OUN officially proclaimed anti-German warfare and began organizing a powerful Ukrainian underground resistance movement. An official German proclamation states, “Our enemies are: the Communists, the *Banderivtsi* (members of the OUN under Bandera leadership, ed.), and the partisans; potentially the most dangerous are the *Banderivtsi* who must by all means be wiped out.”<sup>309</sup> The name *Banderivtsi* as used by the Germans meant all the Ukrainian forces fighting against them.

Having proclaimed the Ukrainian liberation movement “most dangerous” for the German system in Eastern Europe, the Germans, logically enough, very quickly found willing collaborators among the Russian elements in Ukraine who considered this movement as most dangerous to themselves. These Russian elements, constituting the remnants of the old Russian privileged class in Ukraine, had collaborated with the Bolsheviks for the same reason and now they became docile servants of the Nazi invaders and the willing allies of the Gestapo in their persecution and oppression of the Ukrainian people. In all Ukrainian cities where the local administration had been in the hands of the Ukrainians since the beginning of the German occupation, the Germans ousted the Ukrainians and by the end of 1941, had replaced them with these Russian and pro-Russian elements. The latter were especially brutal and cruel in their methods of combatting the Ukrainians. They simply drew up a list of Ukrainian patriots, not infrequently using the secret dossier of the GPU and NKVD archives, and gave it to the Gestapo as a “list of the most important political enemies and foes of Germany.” Thousands of Ukrainian patriots were executed as a result of this Russian denunciation.

How these German-Russian machinations worked is illustrated by the events which took place in Kiev at the beginning of 1942. The Nazis arrested and executed Professor Bahaliy, mayor of the city of Kiev, and the entire editorial staff of *Ukrainske Slovo* (The Ukrainian Word), which the Nazis had permitted to be published by patriotic Ukrainians. Among those executed were Ivan Rohach, the editor-in-chief; Olena Teliha, prominent Ukrainian poetess; Irlivsky, Ukrainian poet; the journalists, Oliynyk and Mykhalsky, and many others. The publicist, Myron Orlyk, an outstanding Ukrainian Nationalist leader was shot down on a street in Kiev while resisting arrest by Gestapo agents. The Nazis promptly set up a new city administration consisting entirely of Russians and Russophiles, most of whom had occupied prominent positions dur-

ing the Bolshevik regime. The Nazis entrusted the editorship of a new Ukrainian newspaper, the *Nove Ukrainske Slovo* (The New Ukrainian Word), which was supported and maintained by the Nazi administration to a well-known Russian agent, Shtepa, who now became a German agent. As editor-in-chief of this newspaper, Shtepa called on the Ukrainians to support Hitler's "new order" and attacked the Ukrainian patriots who were fighting the Nazi invaders. He also tried to popularize the idea of a traditional "German-Russian friendship," which, he declared, "dated back to the time of Peter I and Catherine II."<sup>310</sup> (Ironically enough, this same Shtepa now lives in the USA and was being pampered as one of the "leaders of the Ukrainian Federalist Movement.")

What happened in Kiev took place also in other Ukrainian cities—Dnipropetrovsk, Kryvy Rih, Poltava, Kharkiv—where Ukrainian patriots were arrested *en masse*, while all key positions in the Ukrainian administration were given to Russians, particularly to the Russian Fascist group known as the "NTS" or "Solidarists." The free Ukrainian press was proscribed and the Ukrainian newspapers printed in Czechoslovakia and Germany were banned in Ukraine. Only one *Russian* newspaper, *Novoye slovo* (The New Word), published by the "National Labor Union" (NTS) in Berlin, a group which actually was nothing but a Russian fascist organization created and supported by the German Nazis, was allowed to circulate in Ukraine.

Hundreds of Russian agents, supported by the Germans, were operating throughout Ukraine and participated directly in the German administration of Ukraine. Even such a proponent of Nazism as Alfred Rosenberg was not "ideologically pure" when it comes to the question of "Russian contamination." A Russified Baltic German, who had once been a "White Guardist," Rosenberg surrounded himself with "White Russian advisers" and "specialists" and adapted his policies in Ukraine, as well as in other non-Russian countries of the USSR, to their counsel. Moreover, into the ranks of the German army, and especially into the Gestapo, there entered many members of the Russian Fascist organization, NTS, who according to their own statements and proclamations were used by the Nazis as German agents in combatting the Ukrainian independence movement.

Finally, there were thousands of Bolshevik agents purposely left behind the front lines by the retreating Soviet troops and they also aided the German anti-Ukrainian action. The struggle against the Ukrainian independence movement from the viewpoint of the Bolsheviks was one of the most important tasks of Soviet strategy for two reasons: first, by encouraging one of their own principal enemies in the USSR; second, by provoking the Germans to brutal excesses against the Ukrainian



people, the Russians, at one and the same time, instigated and abetted Ukrainian hatred for the Nazis, thereby making the Ukrainians more amenable to Soviet Russian propaganda.

### *3.Ukrainian Struggle on Two Fronts: German-Russian Cooperation Behind The Front Lines*

An outstanding phenomenon of the war was the fact that the German armies were able to make rapid advances only on the territories of the non-Russian peoples, and only until these peoples began to realize the actual intent of the Germans with respect to their liberation. The fact that millions of the non-Russian peoples naively believed that the Germans were coming to liberate them from Soviet Russian slavery, contributed in no small way to the swift disintegration of the Soviet fighting machine in the first months of the German-Soviet war.

Conversely, the Soviet front consolidated the moment the German armies reached Russian territory proper and after they had exhibited their hostility to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. For it was the great anti-German resistance mustered in Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Caucasus which disrupted the German supply and communication lines and contributed substantially to the ultimate German debacle.

By this time (1942) the Ukrainian armed resistance against the Germans had grown enormously in tenacity and determination. The Ukrainians realized that they would have to fight against both Nazism and Bolshevism. The Ukrainian underground armed resistance was consequently conducted under the slogan: "Against Hitler and Against Stalin—For an Independent Ukraine." This underground took the form of a military and political movement with the name, UPA—*Ukrayinska Povstancha Armiya*, (*Ukrainian Insurgent Army*). It originated in the forests of the Ukrainian provinces of Volynia and Polissia under the leadership of Taras Bulba-Borovets. This organizer of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was at the beginning in close contact with circles of the government in exile of the Ukrainian National Republic and he had the support of appropriate democratic circles of party leaders. Later there were separately created various other underground military organizations of resistance, of which some collaborated with Bulba and others with Bandera's OUN. After some controversial rivalry among these organizations they became united under the predominant influence of the OUN. The ranks of the UPA were constantly being filled with young Ukrainians fleeing mobilization into the German armies or conscription into German labor groups (in 1942 the Germans deported over

3,000,000 Ukrainians to slave labor in Germany). In 1943 the UPA emerged as a powerful military force, under the leadership of General *Taras Chuprynka-Shukhevych* (who was subsequently killed by MVD security troops on March 5, 1950 in Western Ukraine). There were a few tens of thousands well-trained fighters and an equal number of auxiliary forces under its command; in 1944, when Germany was defeated, the UPA has tens of thousands fighters, according to Ukrainian underground sources.<sup>311</sup>

Naturally, the Germans were compelled to throw a considerable number of forces against the UPA; and in their offensive against the Ukrainian underground they instituted large-scale reprisals against, and executions of, the Ukrainian civilian population. According to official German data, *1,541 Ukrainian men and women were publicly executed by the Germans between October 1943 and June 1944 for cooperating with the UPA, while several thousand suspects were thrown into concentration camps.*<sup>312</sup>

*In addition, several thousand UPA men died fighting against the German troops and the Gestapo in the Western and Northern Ukraine.*

Since the UPA was at this time also waging guerilla warfare against the Bolsheviks, the Russian Bolshevik agents collaborated fully with the Nazis in combating the UPA and the Ukrainians in general. Soon Moscow began to issue special proclamations addressed to the UPA in behalf of the so-called "government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," promising full pardon and rehabilitation to those UPA members who would join the Soviet armed forces. One such proclamation, issued on February 12, 1944, was signed by Nikita Khrushchev, then virtual Communist dictator of Ukraine, using Ukrainian patriotic slogans in order to entice UPA fighters to stop their warfare against the Russians.<sup>313</sup>

But the UPA only redoubled its underground activities and, as the German-Soviet front moved westward, it declared implacable war against the Bolsheviks. When Germany collapsed in the spring of 1945, the UPA was at the peak of its military strength. It continued fighting the Bolsheviks in the vain hope that the Western Allies, upon the destruction of Nazi tyranny, would turn against the Russian tyranny. In so fighting against the hated Russian Bolsheviks the UPA not only gathered round it the Ukrainian people, but in addition it became a symbol of resistance and the rallying center for all the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.

#### *4. Ukrainian Resistance and the Vlassov Movement*

The German-Soviet war demonstrated most clearly "the geographical lines of demarcation," as Stalin put it, in the political forces and the

tendencies among the various nationalities of the USSR. First of all, the German-Soviet war proved that there was *no Russian national (non-Bolshevik) anti Nazi resistance, as there was no Russian national (not pro-German) anti-Bolshevik resistance. The anti-communist Russian forces collaborated with the Nazis. The Russians fought only with the Bolsheviks against the Germans or with the Germans against the Bolsheviks. The anti-communist Russians failed to create any national resistance movement for a non-Communist democratic Russia which would oppose both Communism and Nazism, as did the Ukrainians and the other non-Russian peoples of the USSR!*

When the UPA entered upon the military scene as an independent Ukrainian force, the anti-Communist Russians allowed themselves to be organized by the Nazis into a "Russian liberation movement" under the direction of General Andrei Vlassov, a captured Bolshevik general. The Gestapo (actually, Himmler himself) persuaded him to organize a volunteer corps composed of Soviet prisoners-of-war to fight against the Soviet troops.

Originally, this Vlassov movement was strictly a military formation which the Nazis did not trust enough to use at the front; therefore it was used primarily as a police force in the German-occupied countries of Western and Northern Europe. But later, in the fall of 1944, the Nazis, upon the advice of NTS leaders, created a political organization, *KONR (Komitet Osvobozhdenia Narodov Rossii)*, "Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia," also headed by General Vlassov.

White Russian emigres, especially their Fascist segment, the NTS, played an important role in the Vlassov movement. Its underlying principles were based on an historical Russian-German friendship, which was popularized by the active Russian-German agent, Shtepa. As Vlassov himself put it, in an interview with German journalists, "The German-Russian alliance is based on a long-standing harmonious accord, which arose from economic and geographical necessity."<sup>314</sup> One of Vlassov's chief lieutenants, General Zhelenkov, in this same interview, declared that the German-Russian alliance, in addition to being directed against the Bolsheviks, was also directed against the western allies: "By assuming the burdensome struggle against Bolshevism which is supported by the imperialistic United States and England, Germany is defending all peoples, all cultures and all civilizations"<sup>315</sup>

In the same issue of *Volya Naroda*, in which the preceding statements appeared, one finds another statement by Vlassov on his conversation with Himmler, from which it is clear that Himmler and his Gestapo inspired and directed the "Vlassov liberation movement."

That the anti-Communist Russians failed to put up any anti-Communist resistance is quite understandable. The anti-Bolshevik struggle of the anti-Communist Russian has a purely *social* character, and not a national one. *So far as the national question is concerned, both Bolsheviks and White Russians see eye to eye.* Even more than that, *the White Russians see in Bolshevism the incarnation of their nationalistic and imperialistic dreams.* Therefore, when the Germans attacked the USSR, the Russians, unlike the non-Russian peoples, foresaw the possible destruction of their cherished dream—the Russian empire. While in Ukraine there was developed a powerful anti-Bolshevik as well as an anti-Nazi Ukrainian resistance movement, in Russia proper there appeared no anti-Bolshevik resistance whatsoever. Russians, e.g., the Vlassov group, who fought against Stalin, were inspired and organized by the Germans and, as such, had no popular support among the Russian masses. This truth was amply demonstrated during the first encounter of the “Vlassov Army” with the Soviet troops at the front. Instead of the Soviet troops defection to the “Vlassov Army,” as the Germans had expected, the contrary happened: many of the “Vlassovites” defected to the Soviets! The Bolsheviks, moreover, succeeded in infiltrating Vlassov’s general staff to such an extent that the “Vlassov Army,” the ROA (Russian Liberation Army), actually betrayed the Germans in their last-ditch defense of Prague and thus helped the Soviet troops to capture the Czech capital.

The UPA in Ukraine was quite different from this Nazi-inspired “Vlassov liberation movement.” The UPA, a genuine Ukrainian national force, fought both German Nazism and Russian Bolshevism at the same time, thus creating a unique record—as an underground movement it fought against the two most powerful tyrannies of all time, alone and unaided. Even Vlassov himself was forced to recognize the vitality of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, in an interview with a reporter of *Der Voelkischer Beobachter* on December 7, 1944, he declared:

“There is not a single settlement in Ukraine that does not contain a small group of Ukrainian nationalists, unselfishly devoted to the struggle for the welfare of the Ukrainian people... Coordination of national aspirations now finds a powerful expression in the Ukrainian partisan movement.”

Naturally, the Nazis, as well as Vlassov himself, endeavored to harness this powerful Ukrainian resistance movement; therefore, the Vlassov committee was called not the “Russian Committee,” but a “Committee of the peoples of Russia.” But no Ukrainian patriot except a few German agents and collaborators, such as Shtepa, Bohatyrchuk, etc., joined this committee. On the contrary, the entire Ukrainian independence movement soon found itself in open conflict with the Vlassov movement, in-

asmuch as the latter was being used by the Nazis against the Ukrainian people.

It is true that by mid-1943 there was created, within the German Army a large unit under the name "Division Galicia" (Dyviziya Halychyna) which in 1945 was transformed into the First Division of the Ukrainian Army. Nevertheless, this division was of an entirely different nature. Its nature was purely Ukrainian national and not Nazi. The German authorities agreed to its creation only after long and many tries of Ukrainian initiators of this proposition because for a long time the Germans would not permit the existence of any Ukrainian national military unit which would fight in the name of Ukrainian interests against Bolshevik Russia. As is well known, the initiators of this Ukrainian division arrived at their plans from the following political conclusions: Germany must lose the war. As a result the Western Allies will come in direct contact with the Soviet run for world conquest, and particularly of all Europe. Hence the inevitable conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. In this situation the Allies will need a good auxiliary army on the spot, composed of Ukrainian people. The nucleus of such an army would be precisely the Ukrainian Division which at the decisive moment will cross over to the side of the Allies. The creators of the Ukrainian Division accurately foresaw the inevitable conflict of the West with the Bolsheviks, but they made a basic error as to the time of this conflict. It should also be noted that during the war the First Ukrainian Division made such maneuvers towards the end of the war, so as to reach the Allies in the direction of Italy, and there to put itself at the Allies' disposal.

Thus the nature of the First Ukrainian Division was entirely different from the Vlassov movement.

Only in the last days of Nazi Germany, when the German armies were being routed in the West and in the East, did the Germans allow the creation of a Ukrainian national committee; but this was a Ukrainian national organization and not an instrument of Nazi policy. It is an historical fact that the Ukrainian liberation movement during World War II remained purely Ukrainian and that it fought against all the invaders of Ukrainian territory.

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## CHAPTER FIVE: UKRAINE AND RUSSIA AFTER WORLD WAR II

### 1. *The New Russification Policy of Russian Bolshevism*

With the end of World War II and the victory of Russian Bolshevism, Ukraine was again swept by a crushing wave of Russification from Moscow. Russia now unleashed a broad attack upon the entire Ukrainian national life, after the intense patriotic upheaval in Ukraine as well as in the other non-Russian republics during the war forced the Russian Bolsheviks to make some concessions to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.

On February 1, 1944 the Soviet government decreed that some of the non-Russian republics of the USSR, particularly Ukraine, could establish direct diplomatic relations with foreign countries, function as independent states in the field of international relations, especially with regard to the nascent United Nations, and, in addition, maintain their own armies. Furthermore, according to this declaration, Ukraine was allowed to establish ministries of foreign affairs and defense. In this fashion, Ukraine was admitted into the United Nations as a separate Soviet state. Within Ukraine, Ukrainian literature was permitted to dwell upon Ukrainian national and patriotic themes, and some of the outstanding Ukrainian writers and poets purged in 1933-1938 were permitted to return to Ukraine from exile.

All these measures, to be sure, were merely tactical maneuvers on the one hand to win over the Ukrainian people, and on the other to demonstrate to the Western world, whose assistance at this time was of paramount importance to the USSR, that Moscow was really through with dictatorship and national oppression. Yet, despite the transparency of Bolshevik maneuvers, the concessions contained certain moral and political advantages for the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. For instance, the membership of Ukraine and Byelorussia in the United Nations—despite the fact that these countries have been represented there by Russian puppets and stooges, and not by genuine Ukrainian and Byelorussian representatives—nonetheless gave these countries quasi-diplomatic recognition, which in turn strengthened the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples to complete freedom and independence.

However, as in the past, these Russian maneuvers and tactics were only a smoke screen concealing a new Russification policy and oppression of the non-Russian peoples.

This new general attack against the non-Russian nationalities began with Stalin's famous toast to the Russian nation which he delivered on May 24, 1945 during his address to a gathering of Soviet commanders in the Kremlin. His words, which became a legacy for Russian chauvinists and nationalists, were:

*"I drink above all to the health of the Russian people, because they are the most outstanding of all the nations which make up the Soviet Union. I propose this toast to the health of the Russian people, because in this war among all the nations of our country, they have merited general recognition as the directing force of the Soviet Union. I toast the health of the Russian people not only because they are the leading people, but also because they possess clear wisdom, steady character, and patience..."*<sup>310</sup>

This statement of Stalin mounted to a proclamation of a new Russian nationalist doctrine based on the "superiority" of the Russian people; it portended a frank nationalistic course. Dropping the disguise of internationalism and Communist phraseology, Stalin's judgment of the Russian nation as the "leading" nation in the USSR put an official end to the much professed "equality" of nations in the Soviet Union. It meant that Russia proper had been officially proclaimed a "super-nation"; Russian Communist leadership was now imbued with the Nazi racial theories of the superiority of a single race. A few days after Stalin's address, *Pravda* stated that "the Russian man is a type of human envisaged by the best brains of humanity!"

In one way Stalin's complimenting the Russian people on their patience is justified. The Russian people have been very tolerant of Bolshevism; of all the peoples of the USSR, they have resisted this modern scourge of humanity the least. Indeed, Stalin had good reason to be thankful to the Russian people

Stalin, in fact, was not exaggerating when he praised the Russian people as the mainstay of his despotic regime. Of the more than 10,000 "Heroes of the Soviet Union," men and women decorated for outstanding services rendered the Soviet government (communism) over 7,000 are Russians.<sup>317</sup> When we remember that most of the German-Soviet war was waged in the non-Russian territories, the fact that 70 per cent of the "heroes" were Russian—who constitute over 50 per cent of the entire population of the USSR—it is indisputable that the Communist regime would have collapsed had it not been for the overwhelming support of the Russian people. It is not without cause that in its praise of



the "Great Russian people," Soviet propaganda stressed above all their devotion to the Soviet Government, holding this virtue as an example to be emulated by the other peoples of the USSR. Thus, Soviet propaganda writes: "The Russian people, who have always been supremely devoted to their Fatherland, loved it even more after it became socialistic. The Russian people also had implicit faith in their "very own" Soviet Government during this war, in their "very own" Bolshevik Party and in their leader Stalin. The Russian people, at the front as well as in the rear, showed all the other peoples of the USSR a magnificent example of heroism, courage, and self-sacrifice. Russian soldiers and officers constituted the main bulwark of the military power of our land... Russian soldiers did the fighting not only for Russian towns and villages, but also for Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic countries, and Bessarabia, and thus were an example to the soldiers of the other nationalities. In peace, the Russian people are also models of devotion..."<sup>318</sup>

The degree of the Russians' devotion to Bolshevism is apparent in the statistical comparison of the ratio of Russians to non-Russians in the Bolshevik Party. A striking example of the higher ratio of Russians to non-Russians is the fact that in 1949 in the Moscow Province of the Russian Soviet Republic of the 9,000,000 inhabitants, 600,000 were members of the Communist Party. And in the entire Ukrainian Soviet Republic, only 684,000 out of a total population of 42,000,000 were Party members. Thus there were not many more Communist Party members in the whole of Ukraine than there were in a single Russian province; and of these 684,000 members of the party in Ukraine 25 per cent were Russians living in Ukraine,<sup>319</sup> there was also a large percentage of other russified minorities in Ukraine (Greeks, Jews, Poles), so that the number of Ukrainian communists was not much above half of the total.

Because of this close identity of the Russian people with Bolshevism, Stalin not only proclaimed the Russians the "leading nation of the USSR," but put this racial precept into practice. He persecuted the non-Russian peoples with such zeal and determination that the Russian Tsars appear by comparison to be innocent amateurs in this political metier. Bolshevik Russian philologists proclaimed the Russian language the "world language of socialism,"<sup>320</sup> and as such was fit to be imposed upon all subjugated peoples. From this there has followed the deliberate destruction of the languages of the non-Russian nations, since these languages are not "languages of socialism." This has contributed to the genocide of the non-Russian peoples in order to make room for the "most outstanding" Russian people.

## 2. Russian Genocide and Ukrainian Resistance to Russia in the Post-War Years

The most proven and efficient method of Russifying the Ukrainians after World War II was the policy of mass terror for the express purpose of genocide and eventual Russian colonization. This was the same method previously used. The principal target of Russian genocidal policies after the last war was the Western Ukraine, the operational base of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). During 1945-1947 the UPA waged systematic guerilla warfare on a large scale, wreaking terrific losses upon the Russian NKVD and MVD. In retribution, the Russians applied the principle of collective responsibility, arresting, deporting and killing relatives of any Ukrainian who served in the UPA. Because of the large-scale participation of the Ukrainian population in the activities of the UPA, Russian retaliatory measures touched a huge percentage of the Ukrainian population in Western Ukraine. All Ukrainians whose sons, husbands, fathers or any other relatives were known to be in the Ukrainian underground were summarily arrested and deported to slave labor camps in the interior of the USSR. *In some localities 25 per cent of the Ukrainian population was thus deported; in other Ukrainian provinces, like Lemkivshchyna (on the Polish-Ukrainian border, the northern side of the Carpathian Mountains), all the Ukrainians were deported or dispersed.* Most of these deportees, as reported subsequently by refugees who managed by one means or another to escape to the West, were sent to forced labor camps, although they had been neither tried nor convicted of any crimes.

All UPA members, when captured, are executed immediately; therefore, few permit themselves to be taken alive.

The Soviet Russian attempt to liquidate the UPA in Western Ukraine after the end of World War II bore all the earmarks of a regular war. This war was conducted with unbelievable ferocity on both sides, especially during the years 1945-1947. Large-scale military encounters between Ukrainian insurgents and Soviet Russian troops took place in the vicinity of the Black Forest in the Stanislaviv Province and near the cities of Bircha and Hrubeshiv (Polish-Ukrainian border); entire divisions of Soviet MVD and MGB troops participated. In 1947 the Ukrainian underground resistance was so powerful and inflicted so much damage on the Soviet forces in the Western Ukrainian triangle bordering on the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia that the Soviet government was compelled to conclude a mutual military agreement with Poland and Czechoslovakia on May 12, 1947 directed against the UPA and the Ukrainian liberation movement in general. The combined Soviet-Polish-Czech troops,

under the direct command of Kruglov, Minister of the Interior of the USSR, unleashed a furious counter-offensive against the UPA, destroying and pillaging entire areas along the Polish-Ukrainian border.<sup>321</sup>

As a result of this joint Russian-Polish-Czech campaign against the UPA in 1947, the UPA had to reorganize into small "invisible" combat teams, and to decentralize the organization to preserve the network and manpower. But despite the unrelenting pressure of the MVD and MGB, the UPA survived and although smaller in size continues to exist, under the most secretive conditions. In 1947-1948 several detachments of the UPA succeeded in crossing the Ukrainian-Czech border and in reaching the U.S. Zone of Germany and Austria. There they were given shelter and political refuge. The fact that some three hundred Ukrainian resisters had braved the Iron Curtain and eluded the powerful MVD and satellite security troops gained much publicity and the approbation of the world press.<sup>322</sup>

In March 1950, fierce skirmishes between the UPA and MGB security forces still took place, additional proof that the Russians had failed to wipe out Ukrainian resistance. In one of these pitched battles the MGB troops ambushed and killed Gen. *Taras Chuprynka-Shukhevych*, Commander-In-Chief of the UPA.

*From the conclusion of World War II, to January 1, 1951, the UPA had killed over 35,000 Russian MVD and MGB officers and men, according to Ukrainian underground sources. This is an outstanding and heroic record, demonstrating anew the undying will of the Ukrainian people to rid themselves of Russian enslavement.*<sup>323</sup>

In the Eastern Ukraine the Russian Bolshevik terror was directed against those Ukrainians who had been forcibly taken by the Nazis to slave labor in Germany and those who had been captured by the German troops. When we realize that by the end of the war there were at least 5,000,000 Ukrainians in Germany, we can see that the Russians were kept extremely busy. At least 90 per cent of these Ukrainians were either overtaken by the advancing Soviet troops in Germany or forcibly repatriated by the Western Allies. According to eyewitness reports, most of these repatriates were sent to Soviet slave labor camps, while a substantial number, particularly those of military rank, were summarily executed as "traitors and deserters."

The extent of the Russian terrorization and devastation is best exemplified by Soviet statistics made public in connection with the 1950 elections in the USSR. According to these statistics the Ukrainian population had diminished by some 2,000,000 after the war, while the Russian population during the same period had increased by 16,000,000.<sup>324</sup> All this occurred when new Ukrainian territories had been added to the

Ukrainian SSR as a result of World War II; to be specific, Western Ukraine (Galicia, Volynia and Polissia, which prior to 1939 were occupied by Poland), Carpatho-Ukraine (formerly part of Czechoslovakia), and the Ukrainian provinces of Bukovina and Bessarabia, once part of Rumania—with a combined Ukrainian population of 8,000,000. Thus, after the war which, according to Soviet statistics, had cost the entire USSR some 8,000,000 lives, the Ukrainian population should have been increased rather than diminished.

The obvious question arises: *Why had the population of Ukraine decreased by 2,000,000, although some 8,000,000 other Ukrainians had been added to the USSR? And furthermore, why is it that the number of Russians, whom Stalin qualified as the main foundation of the Soviet regime and whom he described as the ones who had borne the brunt of the war, not only did not decrease, but on the contrary, increased by 16,000,000 despite the fact that no new Russian territories and no additional Russian population had been added to the USSR?*

It is clear that the decrease of the Ukrainian population must be attributed to the widespread Russian policy of genocide, deportation and destruction; this terrorization fell heavily on those 5,000,000 Ukrainians who were repatriated from Germany.

The increase of the Russian population meanwhile is easily explained: the Soviet government does not conduct genocidal policies against the Russian people, who are, as Stalin said, the “most outstanding nation of all the nations of the USSR.”

### *3. Ukrainians and Other Non-Russian Peoples of the USSR—Principal Object of Exploitation and Main Force of Resistance Against Bolshevism*

The Ukrainian national liberation movement as well as the national liberation movements of all the other non-Russian peoples of the USSR, has become the principal target of Russian terror and persecution. Of course, by emphasizing the role of Russian imperialism and nationalism in Bolshevik expansion, we do not wish by any means to give the impression that the rank and file of the Russian people do not suffer from Communist oppression. They do indeed. But what is little known in the West is that the non-Russian peoples of the USSR suffer not only from the Communist dictatorship but also from national persecution by Moscow.

For instance, one of the most prominent of the recent Soviet escapees, Col. A.H. Tokayev, thus defines the oppression of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR: *“In the USSR there exists not one, but two types of*

*oppression of the population: one directed against the Russian people themselves, and the other directed against the so-called 'national minorities.'*"<sup>325</sup> While all the people, regardless of national origin, suffer from Communist persecution, the non-Russian peoples in contrast to the Russian suffer from a *double oppression and persecution*. The Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Cossacks, Azerbaidzhani, Turkomans and others are also subject to national persecution and are, in fact, victims of Russian nationalistic chauvinism as much as they are victims of Russian Bolshevism, and at the same time the non-Russian nations are subject to the additional economic colonial exploitation by Russia.

However, national enslavement in the USSR is inseparable from the general social, political and economic enslavement, and actually supplements these aspects. How can we otherwise explain the fact that the two great waves of mass Soviet "purges" in the post-war years in the USSR, especially the reprisals against "local nationalism and cosmopolitanism," have taken place in the non-Russian republics, and that it is the non-Russian peoples, above all, who are the principal objects of the inhuman exploitation afforded by the slave labor system. Now the Russian Bolsheviks began to carry out their national-political reprisals not only against individuals of one or the other non-Russian peoples but against some of the non-Russian peoples as a whole. It was decided to wipe out certain Soviet National Republics and provinces as national units. Since the main burden of these reprisals falls upon the shoulders of the doubly-oppressed non-Russian peoples, the result is that the latter have furnished the cheap labor for Soviet production.

Russian oppression of the non-Russian peoples was especially aggravated in the years following World War II and the victory of Bolshevism. Inflated with national pride, Moscow, with the official support of the Politburo of the Communist Party in Moscow and its dictatorial regime, increased the fury of its enslavement and persecution of the non-Russian peoples.

*For instance, in 1944-1947 Moscow "liquidated" the national republics and autonomous areas of the Northern Caucasus (Chechens, Ingush, Karachay), the Crimea (Tartars), the Kalmuk Autonomous Republic, and others.*

The term "liquidation" means exactly what it denotes: the entire indigenous population of these areas was either executed, deported or dispersed, *while hundreds of thousands of Russians were brought in from Russia proper to replace them.*

Even some recent liberal Russian escapees and refugees attest to the fact that the non-Russian peoples, and above all the Ukrainians, are the principal victims of Russian enslavement.

For instance, one of the outstanding Russian emigre publicists, G. Fedotov, on the basis of his studies of refugees from the USSR, in an article in the Russian-language review, *Novy Zhurnal* (The New Journal), stated:

“According to the testimony of refugees the ‘nationals’ (that is the non-Russian peoples—V.H.) constitute the greater number of inmates in the slave labor camps. Their number is not at all in proportion to those guilty of espousing various political trends in Great Russia because such do not exist. In this non-descript mass of prisoners, if only among those classified as ‘spies,’ what one sees primarily is that most of them are of the ‘minority’ people of Russia.”<sup>326</sup>

Another representative of the non-Russian peoples, E. Krakowiecki, a Pole, in his *Book About Kolyma*,—(Kolyma, the largest and the most dreadful place of imprisonment and slave labor in the whole of the USSR),—writes: “In Kolyma the mixture of peoples constitutes a veritable Tower of Babel. The Ukrainians, understandably, are the most numerous there. Almost every second prisoner is a Ukrainian.”<sup>327</sup>

*Inasmuch as it is the non-Russian peoples of the USSR who are the principal object of exploitation and oppression by the Russians, it cannot but follow that these are peoples who constitute the main force of resistance against Moscow.*

Col. Tokayev, the North Caucasian refugee and a former high officer in the Soviet army of occupation in Germany, emphasizes this fact vigorously when he writes:

“One of the most serious forms of resistance to the Stalinist regime in the USSR is the resistance which flourishes in the soil of ‘local nationalism,’ as local patriotism is officially labelled in the USSR. Today no crime is bigger in the eyes of the Politburo than local patriotism.”<sup>328</sup>

This statement supports what the Ukrainians have long been insisting upon: the resistance of the non-Russian peoples constitutes the most powerful weapon against the Kremlin and its sinister rule. The implacable war which Moscow is waging against Ukrainian nationalism, this “principal danger” for the Russian system of government, is yet another proof of the strength of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.

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## CHAPTER SIX: NON-COMMUNIST RUSSIANS AND THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM

### *1. Kinship of Russian Emigration and Imperialistic Policies of Bolshevism*

As the Russian Bolsheviks in the USSR directed their terroristic, Russification assault against the non-Russian peoples, aiming at their total eradication as national entities, the non-Communist Russian emigration in the free world sponsored the same policy with respect to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR in their propaganda. The varied Russian emigration, differing from the Russian Bolsheviks only as to form of government and social system, was and still is in total agreement with the present rulers of the Kremlin in regard to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. In fact, *all Russian emigres are in complete accord with the Bolsheviks insofar as the genocidal policies of Moscow with respect to the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Turkomans, Tartars and others are concerned.*

In fact, the kinship of the Russian non-Bolshevik emigration for the Bolsheviks as preservers and keepers of the Russian "prison of nations," has a long and rich history. At the very beginning of the Soviet era, that is, after the termination of the Civil War, a war of the "Red" Russians against the "White" Russians, thousands of "White" Russians abandoned their intransigent anti-Communist stand and gradually became "Pink" and "Red" Russians when it was apparent that the Bolsheviks would continue the imperialistic policies of the Russian Tsars. The mass metamorphoses outside the USSR of "White Russians" into "Red Russians" took place in the years 1922-1927 and was known as *Zmenovekhovtsy* (The Changing Landmarks Group). This change was directed by Professor Ustrialov, one of the principal leaders of the Miliukov group of Russian non-Communist emigres in Western Europe.

It was of this group that Stalin once said, "it is not accidental that the *Zmenovekhovtsy* praise us; saying that what Denikin failed to accomplish the Bolsheviks did."

Later the non-Communist Russian emigration became the principal source of Communist agents and spies abroad. During and after World War II the greater part of the Russian emigration in Europe, Asia and America lived by the precept enunciated by Professor Paul Miliukov: "*Who is not with Stalin, is with Hitler!*" He stated further that the "Rus-



sian people not only have accepted the Soviet regime as a fact, but have reconciled themselves to its shortcomings and have appraised its advantages."<sup>329</sup>

A large and substantial segment of the Russian emigration, under the leadership of Maklakov (also from the Miliukov group), went over to Stalin, while another segment, especially the younger Russian emigres led by NTS and General Vlassov, went over to Hitler. The remainder of the so-called Russian "democratic" emigration adhered to the Bolshevik solution of whether the non-Russian peoples were to belong to a Russian empire or be independent. That is, the non-Russian peoples were to be denied their right to freedom and independence. In other matters the Russian "democrats" have been, of course, against Communism. But, in practice, the solidarity of Russian "democracy" and Bolshevism in the matter of Russian imperialism logically and inevitably has led it to a factual approval of the Communist regime in the name of a "great and indivisible Russia."

This Russian emigres' position with respect to Bolshevism was defined by Y. Denike, a Russian journalist, in *Novy Zhurnal*: "Those who had fought against Bolshevik power because they thought it would lead to the decline of the Russian state, have now been reconciled to it, because it has become apparent that Soviet Russia is a unified, centralized state. They may well bless Stalin that he not only reclaimed for Russia all that she had lost after World War I, but even acquired new possessions..."<sup>330</sup>

"*The Russian emigration,*" writes M. Vishnyak, another Russian journalist, "has long since realized that Soviet authority is the Russian authority. Who, except notorious anti-Semites, would ever deny that the Soviet authority is the Russian authority?"<sup>331</sup>

If this is so, it is only natural that in the eyes of the Russian "democrats" the imperialism of Russian Bolsheviks should become a laudable thing. And what is more, — some of the Russian "democrats" wrote apologies for the despotic gang of criminals in the Kremlin denying the imperialistic policies of the Bolsheviks.

For instance S. Soloveichik, writing in the *Novy Zhurnal*, says:

"One cannot accuse the Soviet Government of imperialism, when it cancels the results of the partitioning of Russia..."<sup>332</sup>

What he had in mind was that, as a result of the Revolution of 1917, some of the non-Russian peoples succeeded in liberating themselves from Russia; some countries succeeded in preserving their independence: Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, while others were again reconquered,—Ukraine, Byelorussia, the countries of the Caucasus and the like.

Russian “democrats,” although declaring their readiness to fight for the “freedom of Russia,” have, since the victory of Bolshevism in the last war, manifested a willingness to renounce freedom and to espouse tyranny as long as Russia is preserved as a great territorial empire, dominating the vast non-Russian lands and ruling over millions of conquered, non-Russian peoples.

This complete indifference to freedom, as long as the imperialistic power of Russia is maintained, was expressed by none other than the “symbol of Russian democracy,” Alexander Kerensky. The much celebrated “Russian democrat,” now in the United States, wrote in his article on Miliukov:

*“Russia, must exist strong and powerful no matter who is ruling her or how. From this arises his (Miliukov’s) testament to us: be on watchful guard for Russia—whatever be her name—absolutely, unconditionally, and to the last breath...”*<sup>333</sup>

This was not a casual pronouncement by Kerensky, leader of the Russian “democrats.” These same “democrats” from the origin of the Soviet power in Russia had stated the same thing. For instance the paper of Kerensky’s party (Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries) in 1921 wrote: “We, the Russian democrats in general, are willing to support the Bolsheviks and anything which will help unite Russia, even though it be a government of bandits.”<sup>334</sup>

It is quite clear that for Russian “democrats” of the Kerensky type it is quite immaterial “who is ruling” Russia, whether it be a Bolshevik dictator or some other Russian despot just so long as Russia *exists* “*strong and powerful*.” Thus, it matters not to Mr. Kerensky what kind of government Russia has as long as it remains a Russian empire. To support that Russian empire—Communist, Fascist, despotic and tyrannical—Russian democrats, through the mouth of Kerensky, pledge their “last breath.”

And truly, in the matter of defending the imperialistic position of the USSR, the Russian “democratic” emigration has been serving the Bolsheviks “absolutely, unconditionally and to the last breath.” So far as the treatment of the non-Russian peoples in the USSR by Russian Bolsheviks is concerned, Russian “democrats” have said nothing critical, much less condemnatory. Not a single word of criticism has escaped from the mouths of these celebrated Russian “democrats” in the United States on the inhuman genocidal policies of Moscow with respect to Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic nations, the peoples of the Caucasus, Turkestan and others. Russian “democrats” do not condemn these inhuman policies; on the contrary, they defend them most vigorously and methodically.

For instance, a prominent leader of the Russian Social-Democrats in the United States, Raphael Abramovich, in his unlimited enthusiasm for Bolshevik policies with respect to the non-Russian peoples, has stated:

*"They (the Bolsheviks, V.H.) are despots and tyrants, dictators and hangmen, and they are guilty of many crimes; save one: they are not dismembering Russia..."*<sup>335</sup>

For Russian "democrats" there is no greater crime than "dismembering Russia," which means the liberation of the non-Russian peoples from Russian enslavement. All other crimes of Lenin and the gang of his criminal successors in the Kremlin—fade in the eyes of Russian "democrats" before one of Politburo "merits": it proved of all the Russian governments to be the most successful defender of the "indivisibility" of Russia.

Another Russian "democrat," Mr. M. Weinbaum, editor-in chief of *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* of New York, recently recognized the Bolsheviks as true and great Russian patriots. He wrote:

*"The crumbling of the Russian empire in 1917 released centrifugal forces—the desire of separate nations to secede from the empire. But the Bolsheviks through force and deceit succeeded in restoring the indivisibility of Russia, transforming it into the USSR..."*<sup>336</sup>

## *2. Unified Front of Communist and Anti-Communist Russians Against Liberation of Ukraine*

With the "indivisibility" of this "prison of nations" as its principal political heritage, the Russian emigration of all hues and colors unites solidly with Bolshevism in regard to the largest enslaved nation—Ukraine. In discussing the Ukrainians and their aspirations for complete freedom and independence the Russian emigration began whitewashing the Bolshevik criminal regime, repeating shamelessly that "there is no national enslavement in the USSR" and that therefore, according to them, Ukrainians' separatist desire was baseless.

These protestations of the Russian emigres to the effect that no national enslavement exists in the USSR, especially in Ukraine, have been completely refuted by facts presented in the previous chapters of this book. These are so powerful and so patent that they can easily be verified by whoever seeks the truth; it would be pointless to repeat them here. We call the attention of the world memorably to the fact that the Russian emigres, even those professing democracy, persistently deny the national enslavement of the non-Russians by the Bolsheviks, and, thus, defend the worst tyranny mankind has ever known.

The national question in multi-national states and empires is most difficult to resolve; no state or empire has solved this question satisfactorily. And in the USSR, as Stalin stated, "the national question must be the primary one."

But Stalin said more: "The only regime capable of solving the national question, capable of creating conditions which guarantee the peaceful co-existence and brotherly cooperation of various nationalities,— is a Soviet regime, a regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat."<sup>337</sup>

When the Russian emigration propagandizes that in the USSR the national question has been constructively solved,—which is contrary to the facts—it only helps support the Russian Communist regime, and, by so doing, is guilty of a criminal disservice to the free world. Russian emigres so faithfully follow the propaganda of the Kremlin tyrants that they even use the same phraseology and slogans in regard to the national question of the USSR, as the following example shows:

The Moscow Communist organ, *Pravda*, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of the USSR, writes: "Our Fatherland, the Soviet Union, created by the common effort of our peoples, is a wonderful example of the solution of the national question, the destruction of national enslavement and the flourishing of real friendship and cooperation among them... All the nations of the USSR are equal in their rights, all benefit from the same laws in all the branches of the economic, state and cultural life of the community... the nations of our fatherland are justly proud of these great achievements... It is our duty to solidify and strengthen all these accomplishments..."<sup>338</sup>

And the Russian "democrats" on this side of the Iron Curtain speak in the same manner when they discuss the problem of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. For instance, *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, the organ of the Russian "democratic" emigration in the United States, writes:

*"The present-day USSR has been created through the common effort of the component nations... There is no national enslavement in the USSR... National tolerance, real friendship among the peoples... these are the positive phenomena of Soviet reality, phenomena which are always welcomed by the masses in the Soviet Union... We have to support this process, because it marks the irrefutable and great progress on the part of our Fatherland..."* <sup>339</sup>

In presenting the USSR as a sort of "paradise of nations," the Russian emigration suggests to the free world that the Soviet Union is really an earthly paradise because national freedom is the basis of human freedom, and this multi-national state, which guarantees national freedom to all the nations subjected to its rule, is therefore a true democratic paradise, and not a totalitarian hell.

This interpretation of the national question in the USSR, even at a cursory glance, is a deliberate and shameless falsification of the real facts. We can only explain the blind and ruthless adherence to this sinister chauvinism by their complete subservience to Russian imperialism and their desire to serve it, as Kerensky put it, "absolutely, unconditionally, and to the last breath," no matter "who is ruling, or how." And to further the ends of Russian imperialism, whose exponents are now Bolshevik rulers, the Russian emigration remains silent about all the crimes which the Russian Bolsheviks have committed with respect to the non-Russian peoples.

However, the Russian emigration, whose propaganda is violently anti-Ukrainian, delights in pointing to the Soviet Russian "achievement": Bolshevik terror and persecution of the Ukrainian people and jubilantly praise the results of the Communist policies in Ukraine as a most advantageous program for Russification.

For instance, Russian "democrats" on this side of the Iron Curtain are extremely satisfied with the Kremlin's genocidal policies toward Ukraine and the other non-Russian republics. They say, however, that in the future, when the Soviet regime has been abolished, the Ukrainians should be allowed to their independence, but only if this be the decision of a national "plebiscite" (Russian-style,—V. H.). The Russian emigre press quite frankly states that the determining factor in the plebiscite will not be the Ukrainians but the Russians who as a result of persistent Russification in Ukraine are there in ever increasing numbers.

With satisfaction and gratification the *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* appraises the Russification policies of Moscow in Ukraine and comments:

*"It is worthwhile to note that the Russians now constitute 70-80 per cent of the great cities, which are so to say the brains of Ukraine... Separatist tendencies which existed 15 years ago even in Party circles (Khvylovy, Shumsky, Skrypnyk) decline from day to day because of the everlasting centralization of all life in the USSR..."*<sup>340</sup>

This pseudo-democratic Russian paper is frankly not displeased that millions of Ukrainians have been deported from Ukraine or killed and that in their stead Russian settlers have been brought into Ukraine, thus curtailing Ukrainian aspirations to freedom and independence. In approving the Kremlin's Russification and genocidal policies in Ukraine, the Russian "democrats" even ascribe to the Bolsheviks "achievements" which the latter do not claim; official Soviet statistics give the average percentage of Russians in the most Russified great cities of Ukraine as about 39 per cent.<sup>341</sup> As to the "decline" of the Ukrainian "separatist" tendencies, we need only peruse the Soviet press of Ukraine, which is constantly engaged in a campaign against "Ukrainian bourgeois nation-

alism." This "nationalism" is manifested in literature (Volodymyr Sosiura and his poem, "*Love Ukraine*"), <sup>342</sup> arts, science, and last but not least, in the Communist Party of Ukraine itself.

It is most curious that the entire Russian emigre policy with respect to the Ukrainians hinges upon the results of the Bolshevik Russification policies in Ukraine. Russian emigre politicians base their future plans with respect to Ukraine and the other non-Russian countries of the USSR upon the Bolshevik schemes for the non-Russian peoples. Specifically, the Russian emigres believe that the Kremlin's genocidal policies will be of considerable help in the future in settling their scores with the Ukrainians—with those, at least, who still remain!

How Russian "democrats" on this side of the Iron Curtain envisage a "Russian plebiscite" in Ukraine is revealed by the Russian "democratic" newspapers in the United States:

*"Speaking concretely, if there were a plebiscite to decide whether Ukraine was to become an independent state, then the Ukrainians who live or lived outside Ukraine (e.g. the millions deported by the Bolsheviks to Siberia, V.H.) should not be allowed to take part in the plebiscite..."*<sup>343</sup>

Another Russian "democratic" newspaper, commenting on the deportations of the Ukrainians by the Bolsheviks, jubilantly writes:

*"As far as we can see, the monstrous Bolshevik policy of deportation of the population might contribute to an easy solution of the problem ("plebiscite" on secession or non-separation of Ukraine from Russia, V.H.)..."*<sup>344</sup>

As we see it, there exists an admirable unity of thought and action between Russian non-Bolsheviks and Russian Bolsheviks concerning the aspirations of the Ukrainians to freedom and independence. While the Bolsheviks systematically deport Ukrainians and replace them with Russians, the "anti"-Bolshevik Russian emigres capitalize upon this cruel bestiality. This is cynical figuring. The Russian emigre politicians count on this inhuman policy of Russification to pave the way for a future Russian plebiscite in Ukraine. This would add up to nothing more or less than a *Russian* plebiscite in Ukraine without the Ukrainians.

In the light of these facts it is clear that this unity of thought and action on the part of both Russian Bolsheviks and Russian non-Bolsheviks stems from the same political motivation: to paralyze and impede the liberation of the Ukrainian people from Russian enslavement. Where the Bolsheviks call those Ukrainians who desire freedom "traitors" and "enemies of the people," the non-Bolshevik Russians call them "separatists" and "extremists." Both these anti-Ukrainian actions—in the USSR and among the emigres—are but facets of the same Russian policy.

### 3. *Russian Propaganda of the Bolshevik Legend of "Friendship of Peoples" and the "Soviet People"*

To disguise its imperialist nature before the democratic world, particularly the United States, the Russian emigration deliberately propagates the legend that in the USSR all national differences have been erased and, in consequence, a new "Soviet people" (Russian, to be exact) has developed. Following the Stalinist theory that the "ideal solution of the nationality question is in the USSR," the Russian emigration blindly apes the Bolshevik propaganda line on the "brotherly friendship of peoples" and the "equality" of all the peoples of the USSR," who seemingly are so happy and blessed in the Soviet Russian paradise that they willingly renounce their ethnic entity and are summarily integrated into a unified "Soviet nation."

There is no doubt that Russian emigres spread this deceitful propaganda with one purpose in mind, namely, to depict the USSR as a unique political and moral force, strongly welded into a new "Soviet" nation — sheer legend which has no basis in fact at all. We must not forget that the Bolsheviks forcibly impose this Stalinist "friendship of nations;" and the "unity of the USSR" is maintained by sheer terror and persecuton of the MVD and MGB. By propagating this myth about the "ideal unity" of all the peoples of the USSR, the Russian emigres wittingly serve the Kremlin despots by making the USSR seem far stronger and more powerful than it is in reality. Only recently *Pravda* declared: "*Our country is afraid of no enemy, so long as there exists the indestructible friendship of the peoples of the USSR.*"<sup>345</sup>

To repeat this Muscovite fabrication is to commit a crime of the highest degree.

But it is in the United States that this propaganda of the "solution of the national question" in the USSR, according to the "nationality formula of Stalin," is being most vigorously pursued. Russian emigres are very busy persuading the American public that the USSR is just another United States, another "melting pot" of various races, cultures, nationalities and religions, and that the "Soviet people" (*sovetski narod*— a term invented by the Russian Bolsheviks to embrace all the peoples of the USSR, but which in actuality is meant to denote the Russian people) is a political and ethnic reality.

This analogy between the United States and the USSR has no real basis as is evident by comparing their histories. The United States became a democratic nation through the process of normal colonization by settlers who came here to seek freedom and the opportunity for a better life. The Russian Empire, on the other hand, and its successor, the



USSR, arose through brutal and bloody conquests of various nations and countries. Moreover, the enslavement of the various non-Russian peoples by Moscow did not destroy their national identity, but on the contrary, strengthened their desire to be free and independent of the Russian oppressor. It must be added that prior to Russian conquest the majority of the non-Russian countries conquered by Moscow—e.g. Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Byelorussia, and Turkestan — possessed a state organization and a culture and civilization superior to that of the Russians. Hence the non-Russian peoples could never reconcile themselves to Russian enslavement; they always strove, and continue to strive, to throw off the Russian yoke. The history of the Ukrainian people and their ceaseless struggle against Russian tyranny as depicted in this work, is but one (the Ukrainian) aspect of what the Russians have done to the conquered peoples. The history of the Caucasus—the bloody and genocidal conquest of the brave peoples of the Caucasus by the Russians—is another eloquent example which belies the Russian emigre propaganda to the effect that the USSR (Russia) is a “voluntary melting pot” of nations, cultures and religions—like the United States of America.

Every student of American history knows the origin of the United States of America, its fantastically swift economic, political and cultural development, and the successful amalgamation of various races and cultures into one powerful nation. But this process is in no way similar to the process of Russian territorial conquests in Europe and Asia. Above all, Russia conquered entire *nations and states*, and has become known as the “prison of nations” because of her brutal Russification policies, persecution and genocide. To accept—as the Russian emigres among us would like us to do—the analogy between the United States and the USSR, is inconceivable to a rational human being.

Another myth which is being propagated by Russian “democrats” in the United States (always following the line of the Kremlin despots) is the so-called “friendship” between the oppressed peoples and their oppressor. Stalin initiated the “nationality policy.” It amounted to nominal recognition of the non-Russian nations in the USSR but, in actuality, served to promote the imperialistic designs of Moscow. The Ukrainian example depicted here is the best illustration of what that “nationality policy” has meant in practice. Soviet Russian propaganda has been trumpeting for years that the various nations of the USSR are “happy” under the “sun of the Stalinist Constitution,” that they live “in eternal friendship,” and that national antagonism no longer exist within this Soviet paradise.

Now, how does this "friendship of peoples" in the USSR operate in practice? Can the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Tartars, Armenians and others, regard themselves as "friends and equals" of the Russians, who oppress them, persecute their national heroes, destroy their national language and culture, and perpetrate outright genocide in order to destroy them as national and ethnic entities? How can they consider themselves "friends and equals" of the Russians, when the entire Kremlin oligarchy believe in the principle of the superiority of the Russian nation over all other nations in the world, particularly those conquered by Moscow?

True, real friendship exists among the oppressed non-Russian nationalities of the USSR, just as it did among the non-Russian nations of the former Russian empire. Early in 1917, most of the non-Russian nationalities proclaimed their independence and refused to live any longer with the Russians. They summoned a powerful congress of the non-Russian nationalities in Kiev, and they declared their desire to be free and independent. During World War II (in 1943), representatives of the non-Russian nationalities gathered together and formed the common front against the Germans and Russians; many of them supported the UPA and the Ukrainian anti-Soviet underground resistance.<sup>346</sup> These movements and actions hardly stemmed from "friendship" for the Russians, their oppressor and tyrant.

In any event to accept the Russian theory that the non-Russian peoples of the USSR have simply fused, to form a "Soviet people," is to accept a great fallacy. Moreover, the development of anti-Russian trends, of opposition and underground resistance movements, has been greatly accelerated by the fact that the Russians have become a nation of oppressors.

Finally, the average man in the USSR also knows the falsity of these Russian claims; the more Soviet propaganda trumpets the "friendship" of the peoples within the Soviet slave empire, the more is he convinced that the contrary is true. The more Communist propaganda prattles about the "happy and prosperous life" in the USSR, the more he becomes aware of how miserable and depressing that life really is.

The anti-Russian feeling of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR has become all the more intense because the Communist regime favors and advocates Russian nationalism and the Russian people. Since the end of World War II, Stalin and his associates in the Kremlin have been idealizing the Russian people as a super-race not only in relation to the conquered non-Russian peoples of the USSR, but in relation to the Western world as well. The "older brother"—this euphemistic appellation which Moscow bestowed upon the Russian people—has become a

symbol of enslavement and oppression not only in Ukraine, Beylorussia and Lithuania, but in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well.

The Western press is replete with Russian propaganda about the great “achievements” allegedly accomplished by the Russian people.

The leading Russian communist organ, *Bolshevik*, proclaims:

*“The Russian nation played the principal role in the struggle for the victory of socialism. The peoples of the USSR should be grateful to the Russian people for their free and happy life...”*<sup>347</sup>

One of the communist mouthpieces in Moscow: *Bloknot Agitatora*, in its panegyrics to the Russian nation says:

*“The Russian people have gathered around themselves the other peoples of our country. They have given the leadership in the struggle for the victory of socialism, and they are leading them towards communism...”*<sup>348</sup>

A special Soviet propaganda publication, in honor of the “Great Russian people,” says: “Universal historical honor for having created the multi-national socialist state belongs to the Great Russian people... The people of all the Socialist republics look upon the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian workers’ class as their natural leaders . . . The Russian people, as their past history has shown, have proved themselves prepared to be the leading force in the Soviet Union... Lenin was proud of the Great Russian nation, because she serves as an example to mankind, having given birth to the Bolshevik Party . . .”<sup>349</sup>

In the light of such facts, it is not difficult to see why all the non-Russian peoples of the USSR violently resent this alleged Russian “racial superiority” and the privileged position of the Russians in the USSR, and why they hate not only the Soviet Communist regime, but also the Russians as the supporters and guardians of the system that enslaves them.

It is also not difficult to understand why anti-Communist Russian emigres, contrary to the existing facts, propagate the Communist myth about the “friendship” and “unity” of the Russians and the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. They know that the very presence of the 110,000,000 non-Russian people in the USSR constitutes the weakest part of the Russian totalitarian structure, and to encourage these centrifugal forces (the aspirations of the non-Russian people to freedom and independence) is to weaken that structure and to endanger the Russian territorial empire.

The Bolshevik Russians are doing everything they can—through propaganda, terror and genocide—to suppress and completely eradicate these forces.

Non-Communist Russian emigres, more or less unwitting allies of Bolshevism, manufacture adroit propaganda to confuse American public opinion as to the real weakness of the Soviet system, and they conduct a systematic campaign against the non-Russian peoples to depreciate their real significance in the global struggle against communism and Russian imperialism.

#### 4. *Difference Between Russian and Ukrainian Attitude Toward Bolshevism and the USSR*

There is yet another fallacy which Russian “anti-Communist democrats” are zealously propagating; they say that since the Soviet Union is no longer “Russia” but a union of various republics, the non-Russian peoples are also to be held responsible for the establishment of the Communist regime. They are especially articulate in the case of the Ukrainians claiming that Ukraine is not occupied by the Russians, but is ruled by... Ukrainian Communists!

Generally speaking, Russian “democrats” in the United States endeavor to prove that Bolshevism is an “international” phenomenon and, therefore, has no relation to the Russian people as such. Among the arguments they advance in support of their thesis is the participation of non-Russian Communist leaders in the Soviet government and in the Communist Party of the USSR. From the inception of the Bolshevik system up to the outbreak of World War II, Russian non-communist emigres often accused the *Jews* of being the ones who had brought communism to power in Russia. Now they are blaming other scapegoats in order to excuse the Russians of responsibility for Bolshevik atrocities and genocide.

Previously we indicated the utter baselessness of such a thesis, and pointed out the kinship of Bolshevism and Russian imperialism. In this connection there are some internationally famous Russian writers who fully confirm this observation.

For instance, the late Nicholas Berdayev, outstanding Russian emigre philosopher, has written: “*Russian communism is far more traditional than it has been thought to be. Internationalism is only one of the many facets of the Russian Messianist idea. Fascism is far more international than communism...*”<sup>350</sup>

There is not the slightest doubt as to who rules Ukraine today. Even the fact that there is a Ukrainian Communist minority, retained by Moscow for window dressing and propaganda abroad, cannot conceal the overall character of the Russian occupation of Ukraine. It remains that those

Ukrainian Communists, who once collaborated with the Russian Bolsheviks, later led the Ukrainian national resistance and, subsequently, were destroyed for their "nationalism." The "Ukrainian Communists" serving the Russians today, are no longer Ukrainians; they are no more Ukrainians than, for example, Marshal Rokossovsky is a "Pole."

Still, in the case of these so-called Ukrainian Communists, it must be pointed out that there are very few who would be entrusted with a key position in Ukraine or anywhere else in the USSR. Until the present time there was not a single Ukrainian in the Politburo in Moscow. No Ukrainian was ever a general secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This certainly indicates how little influence the Ukrainians have in the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR.

The most outstanding aspect of the relation of these various non-Russian nationalities to Moscow is their desire for freedom and independence. All the non-Russian peoples are strong exponents of centrifugal tendencies and decentralization—of the USSR, no matter what the form of government. Even the non-Russian Communists of the USSR support these separatist tendencies, which, of course, tend to weaken the expansive dynamism of Russia. It is clear that *Moscow can wage a systematic and expansionist aggression abroad only so long as it is strong and centralized at home.*

And Moscow's policies both at home and abroad are related to the same objective: expansion and aggression. The internal Soviet policy consists of a perpetual drive towards centralization, the suppression of the national movements of the non-Russian peoples, and Russification.

There can be no doubt that the centralization and Russification conducted by the present Soviet government is for the benefit of the Russian nation. This is why the great majority of the Russian people, including the very vocal Russian "democrats" on this side of the Iron Curtain, sympathize with the Kremlin's foreign policy. No wonder that at the close of World War II, Russian (non-Communist) emigres were elated at the success of Russian Soviet arms; no wonder that they blessed Stalin for making Russia "great and immortal."

This is, in essence, the difference in the attitude of the Ukrainians and the Russians toward the present Soviet system. While the Russians see in it the perpetuation of the "grandeur and glory" of old Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainians and the other non-Russian peoples see in it their eternal enemy, oppressor of their liberties, merciless tyrant. Therefore, the Russian emigres, for whom the "grandeur and glory" of Russia means much more than the heritage of freedom and human decency, are enabled, without shame, to say:

*“They (Russians emigres, V. H.) look upon the world from the viewpoint of a great people and of a great state. But even the poorest of them, even the most intransigent opponent of communism, has in his soul a drop of pride for present-day Russia, this Russia which, although miserable and cruel, and one which has become a terror to the world, is nonetheless a powerful state...”<sup>351</sup>*

It is self-evident that the Ukrainians and the other non-Russian peoples have no “pride in present-day Russia”; rather, they are determined to destroy at any cost this monster of our time. It is therefore only the Ukrainians and the other enemies of the Soviet regime who can be trusted as true and faithful allies of the United States and the free world.

*Surely, Russian emigres oppose Bolshevism, but as a social and political system. They are in complete accord with Russian Bolshevik foreign policy and the present-day aggressive expansion both in Europe and in Asia.*

*The opposition of the Ukrainians to Bolshevism is uncompromising and, without reservations.*

*This is the difference in the attitudes of the Ukrainians and the Russians with respect to Bolshevism and the Soviet system—one which the United States must recognize and appreciate.*

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## CHAPTER SEVEN: THE RELATION OF AMERICA TO UKRAINE AND THE OTHER NATIONS ENSLAVED BY RUSSIA

### 1. *Ukraine and Other Non-Russian Nations,—The Most Trustworthy Allies of America*

The history of Ukrainian-Russian relations as summarized in this work is directly related to the foreign policy of the United States with respect to the Soviet Union and the non-Russian peoples subjugated by Moscow. Whether or not the American people desire it, the historical development of world affairs is leading America at an ever accelerating pace toward a final show-down with aggressive Russian imperialism. This America must face, not only as the leader of the Western world, but also as the defender of her own security and independence. And in that struggle, which will unquestionably decide whether we remain free or are enslaved by Moscow, the question of who is the enemy of America and who is her friend is of paramount importance.

In the Preface we emphasized very strongly that America is confronted by an implacable enemy, and that this enemy is *Russian imperialism* disguised in Communist garb. In presenting a short history of the Russian conquest and enslavement of the Ukrainian people we stated unequivocally that behind the ruthless and despotic regime of the Kremlin there is the Russian nation. Of course, it does not follow that the Russian people do not suffer from Communist persecution. Indeed, millions do. Yet there are other millions of Russians who see in Bolshevism an historical opportunity to expand Russia's territorial empire as much as possible. However, behind Russian imperialism there stands a substantial part of the Russian nation, the bearer and executioner of Bolshevik dogma. Again, we repeat that in no way do we consider the great masses of the Russian people the willing ally of Bolshevism and the enemy of the West.

Bolshevism, no matter how it is viewed, is *Russian imperialism*, and its far-reaching objectives and goal are essentially *Russian*. But we would not be worthy of the great privilege of fighting for the freedom of Ukraine and other non-Russian peoples enslaved by Moscow were we to identify the entire Russian people with Bolshevism, thus making of them all enemies of Western civilization. It is rather that Bolshevism as a political and social system is also inimical to the interests of the Russian people; Russian imperialism, as expressed by Bolshevism is a



manifestation of the decline, rather than the greatness, of the Russian people.

But we should not lose sight of the most typical traits of Bolshevism: its *Russian* imperialistic character and its solid *Russian face*.

When we seek to define the enemy of the United States and her friends and allies, we have to refer again to the analogy of Hitler and his tyrannical regime.

In the struggle against German Nazism during World War II, the United States and its allies knew definitely that their allies were all the peoples whom Hitler had subjugated and brutally oppressed. The United States and its allies did everything in their power to align these peoples against Hitler and his Nazi regime. Even more, the Western Allies did their utmost to exploit any cleavage between the Nazi regime and the German nation. But this tactical maneuver in no way changed the basic orientation of the United States and its allies that it was not the German nation who was to be considered the principal ally in the struggle against Hitlerism, but rather the peoples and countries that Hitlerism oppressed. In seeking the friendship and support of the non-German nations occupied by Germany, the Western Allies did not sanction the German conquest of foreign lands and nations. They would not have bought German friendship at the expense of the principles of freedom and universal liberty for which they went to war against Hitler. Therefore, it was not the German people who contributed to the final defeat of Nazism, but its victims.

Bolshevism must be dealt with in the same way. The fact remains that in this struggle the principal enemy confronting the United States and the free world will not be a fictitious Russian imperialism, but a very concrete and psychological enemy, *Russia* and the *Russians*.

It is quite understandable that in the struggle against the Kremlin despots the United States and its allies should do everything they can to win the majority of the Russian people over to their cause. But both the United States and its allies must realize that as long as Russian strength and power remains intact, any hope for friendship on the part of the Russian people is futile and unrealistic.

*The most reliable force to overthrow the Russian Bolshevik power is the enslaved non-Russian peoples; the most trustworthy, they are the natural allies of the United States in its struggle against Russian Bolshevism.*

Unfortunately a very dangerous trend of political thinking is propagated in the United States by Russian and pro-Russian elements who suggest that the prime need in any successful struggle against Bolshevism is the sympathy of the Russian people, even if gained at the expense

of the non-Russian peoples. This trend finds supporters among important American statesmen and leaders, who believe without cause that one can destroy Bolshevism without destroying the principal force behind it—*Russian imperialism*.

Influenced by this thought, these Americans would allow the satellite countries to recover so far as is possible, what they had lost to the USSR after World War II. That is, they have been convinced by the Russians that freedom and independence should be restored to the satellite countries, but not to those subjugated by Russia prior to World War II. Ukraine is definitely barred from this prospect of freedom and independence and certain segments of American public opinion guided by this thinking, go so far as to completely ignore the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples for freedom.

Yet, as we said before, it is not only in the interest of these non-Russian peoples, but of the United States and the American people, that these non-Russian peoples should be supported in their struggle against Russian imperialism and despotism. The existence or the destruction of the Russian-Bolshevik "prison of nations" depends on the life or death of these peoples, the prisoners there, and is a matter of vital importance to the continued security of America. While the friendship of the Russian people toward America is, so to speak, based on self-interest and is of a hypothetical character, the friendship of the non-Russian peoples toward America and her way of life is assured and definite.

## *2. The non-Russian Peoples—the "Achilles' Heel" of the USSR*

A basic reason for the exclusive concentration of some Americans on the idea of the "friendship" of the Russian people is the erroneous belief that the Russians constitute a majority part of the population of the USSR, as opposed to the "minority" of the non-Russian peoples, who are imprisoned in the Soviet Russian empire today. This conviction is based on the Soviet statistics of 1939, which disclosed that 58 per cent of the total population of the USSR were Russians.

Actually this figure no longer corresponds to the facts. Contemporary Soviet Russia's national composition is quite different from that of January 17, 1939, when the above-mentioned Soviet population count was made. After the incorporation of the Western Ukrainian, Beylorussian, Moldavian and Finnish territories and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1939-1940, and after the new territorial acquisitions in Asia in 1945—the present population of the USSR, so far as

its ethnic composition is concerned, is estimated on the basis of various official Soviet and U.S. statistics as follows:\*

Republic of the U.S.S.R.	Total	Russian	Non-Russian	Percentage of non-Russians
1. Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)	114,337,428	83,923,672	30,413,756	26.6
2. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	42,272,643	3,889,111	38,383,832	90.8
3. Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	10,525,511	757,837	9,767,674	92.8
4. Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic	1,120,000	91,840	1,028,160	91.8
5. Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic	1,950,502	239,912	1,710,590	87.7
6. Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic	3,134,070	78,352	3,055,718	97.5
7. Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic	2,321,225		2,321,225	100.0
8. Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic	3,722,252		3,722,252	100.0
9. Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic	1,346,709		1,346,709	100.0
10. Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic	3,372,794	327,161	3,045,633	90.3
11. Kazach Soviet Socialist Republic	6,458,175	1,272,260	5,185,915	80.3
12. Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic	6,601,619	369,691	6,231,928	94.4
13. Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic	1,317,693	98,827	1,218,866	92.5
14. Tadzik Soviet Socialist Republic	1,560,540		1,560,540	100.0
15. Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic	1,533,439	179,412	1,354,027	88.3
16. Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic	512,917	292,397	220,580	43.0
	Total	Russian	Non-Russian	Percentage of non-Russians
Estimated population	202,087,877	91,520,472	110,567,405	54.7

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\*) The figures are taken from the address of Hon. Edward M. O'Connor, U.S. Displaced Persons Commissioner, which was introduced, on October 17, 1951, into *The Congressional Record* by the Hon. George A. Smathers, Senator from Florida.

It is important to note that the official Soviet statistics include under "Russia" many of the non-Russian peoples, such as the Don and Kuban Cossacks, who not only are non-Russian but who are expressly opposed to being included with the Russians. Also, a significant number of Ukrainians and Byelorussians who live in the territory of the Russian SFSR, particularly in Siberia, are considered "Russian," despite the fact that they do not wish to be so considered. Moreover, the number of Russians is purposely and artificially increased by the Soviet government by intimidation and coercion. Thus, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, who have been deported for political "crimes" into the interior of Russia, are requested to register as Russians, rather than as Ukrainians and Byelorussians, if they wish to avoid further persecution at the hands of the Soviet Russian secret police. Russian sources indicate that, in 1939, some 1,500,000 Ukrainians had already become "Russians" in ethnic Russian territory.<sup>352</sup>

Even a superficial analysis of these statistics indicates that the percentage of the Russians has decreased in present-day USSR as compared with the pre-Revolution empire. Despite the Russian policy of genocide and Russification, which has considerably reduced the natural increase of the non-Russian peoples, the fact remains that *in present-day USSR the ethnic Russian population forms a minority rather than a majority of the total population.*

*On the basis of these figures it is self-evident that the non-Russian peoples of the USSR form the principal force; it is their attitude toward Bolshevism and Russian imperialism that will determine the ultimate outcome of the struggle between Moscow and the free world.*

But the numerical superiority of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR is not the only factor to be taken into account.

It is of primary significance that the non-Russian peoples, unlike the Russians, are the determined enemies of Bolshevism, with no reservations; they are the absolute opponents of that scourge. *Consequently, it is the non-Russian peoples who form the core of the anti-Bolshevik struggle, opposition, and resistance.*

Therefore, the Russian orientation of certain American statesmen, who are seeking active support against the Kremlin tyrants, is based on a miscalculated political opportunism.

It is utterly absurd to suppose that the Russian people would ever rise up against their present masters. The great majority of those people, rightly or wrongly, consider the Bolsheviks to be their own leaders who are realizing their age-old Russian imperialist dream.

*On the other hand, any anti-Bolshevik force, composed of a nation or a bloc of nations, would find ready allies and friends among the non-*

*Russian peoples who are opposed to Bolshevism, as the bearer of Russian imperialism, and to the Communist system, as a corrupt and despotic regime.*

*There is only one conclusion: The presence of the 110,000,000 non-Russian peoples in the USSR constitutes its greatest weakness and a true "Achilles' Heel," which must be fully and unconditionally exploited if America is to survive as a free and independent nation.*

### *3. Ukrainian Warning to America*

To conclude this short history of Ukrainian-Russian relations, we wish to point out what Ukrainians think of the United States as an opponent of Bolshevism.

Of all the non-Russian peoples of the USSR the Ukrainians are the most numerous and most stubborn in the struggle for national liberation and independence. This present book is a mild "bill of indictment" presented by the oppressed Ukrainians to Russia, and it should not escape the attention of the United States.

As we have pointed out, Ukraine is a powerful factor in the anti-Bolshevik struggle of the free world. To ignore or deprecate this fact is to court disaster and the ultimate defeat of the free world.

The United States must recognize Ukraine's value and the value of the other non-Russian countries of the USSR, if not for altruistic reasons then for its own security and well-being.

Meanwhile, we witness something quite different. Certain American circles, official as well as unofficial, have a tendency to ignore these latent forces, particularly that of Ukraine, and to play the Russian "game" by permitting themselves to be guided by the anti-democratic and pro-imperialist Russian emigres in the United States.

The Ukrainian-Russian problem is not only being scrupulously avoided by certain American statesmen and government leaders, but by some segments of the American press and other educational and propaganda media as well.

*Specifically, the "Voice of America,"—and this includes the Ukrainian-language section,—constantly eschews any reference to the actual relations between Russia and Ukraine, but limits itself mainly to non-political propaganda.*

*The same tendency to underplay the importance of the Ukrainian problem so as not to "irritate the Russian people" influences the various existing and especially created organizations and individual politicians.*

These American organizations tend to be "polite" to the Russians against the interests of the American people, since minimizing the importance of the anti-Bolshevik forces of the non-Russian peoples means the strengthening of Bolshevism and bolstering its chances to destroy America and the free world.

Hence, among a large segment of Ukrainian political circles in the emigration there is beginning to spread bitter disillusionment towards the policy of American political factors in relation to Ukraine. Because of the fact that the so-called "experts" and specialized organizations for matters of Eastern Europe are the most vociferous and because they hint that they are alleged spokesmen of official American policy, this can be very harmful to the United States which heretofore has enjoyed the most ardent sympathies of the Ukrainian people.

America's attitude toward Ukraine is extremely important because it is also a barometer of America's feelings and attitudes toward the other non-Russian peoples. For Ukraine, no matter how industriously the Russian emigres endeavor to conceal the fact, is the natural leader of all the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.

In the absence of a positive policy on the part of the United States of America with respect to the subjugated peoples of the USSR, Bolshevik propaganda cannot but be successful. Instead of maintaining a strong faith in America, the non-Russian peoples are obsessed by doubts and uncertainty as to what they can expect of America.

In the past few years, the Ukrainians in the free world, particularly those in the United States, have been doing their utmost to impress Americans with the all-important role Ukraine plays in the global anti-Bolshevik struggle. Success has been all too meager.

It is our earnest hope that this book will reach a great number of Americans who will see the impending threat of the Russian danger to America and will not hesitate to raise their voice in defense of Ukraine and the other non-Russian countries of the USSR, even though it be only to protect and defend America itself.

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## CHAPTER VIII: PRESENT UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN THE USSR AND ITS INTER- NATIONAL ROLE

### 1. *Stalin's Death and a New Acerbation of the National Question*

The events which took place in the USSR after the death of the Soviet dictator, Stalin, have added a few new touches to the picture of the Ukrainian-Russian relations as described in this book. But they have not changed the relations themselves; they have only served to focus and to clarify them within the USSR and the international arena.

First of all, the national question has become more aggravated. This was evident even before Stalin's death. Thus, in the period 1950-1953 almost the entire political struggle in the USSR centered on the problem of the so-called "bourgeois nationalism" within the national republics and on "cosmopolitanism" in the Union as a whole. Both represent the struggle against the opposition created by the non-Russian elements of Soviet society—found within the Communist Party as well—against the highly centralized and chauvinistic policy of Russian imperialism which Stalin steadfastly pursued.

While the term "bourgeois nationalism" was applied to every form of *non-Russian patriotism*, "cosmopolitanism" meant a *lack of Russian patriotism*, obligatory for all the peoples of the USSR.

Typical of the acerbation of the national problem in the USSR was the revival of traditional Russian anti-Semitism which recently became a part of the national policy. In the beginning, this was manifested in the practice of charging Soviet citizens of Jewish origin with "cosmopolitanism;" later, they resorted to terroristic provocations against the Jewish people as a whole. One of the most widely-known was the "disclosure" of an alleged "conspiracy" on the part of a group of Jewish physicians against the Soviet regime.

Anti-Semitism was a means of coping with the domestic difficulties of Russian imperialism: Russia always sought to solve her domestic difficulties arising from the relations among the different nationalities.

Soviet propaganda also sought to connect this trend with a "hate-America" campaign. The peoples of the USSR are set against the USA by telling them that it was American agents who had taught the Soviet Jews to cherish international ideas rather than Russian chauvinism.



Obviously it was in Ukraine that the national question at this time was most aggravated. It was there that "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" together with "cosmopolitanism" (and even "Jewish nationalism") was denounced as being most dangerous; and it was there that the Soviet regime directed its most powerful attack. In focussing attention on this important problem in Ukraine, L. Melnikov, the Russian leader of the Communists of Ukraine, on September 23, 1952, declared: "of all the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people, bourgeois nationalism has been the most lasting, and politically the most dangerous. Our task is to uncover any and all manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism no matter what form these manifestations take."<sup>353</sup>

Just how deep-rooted this "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" was is evident from the fact that even among the younger generation of Ukrainians, born and bred in the Soviet atmosphere, this influence was such a problem for the government that the XV Congress of the Young Communist League (Komsomol) of Ukraine paid special attention to it. It was declared: "In the minds of many of the Ukrainian youth there are still found remnants of capitalism; this is especially true of the national question. Our young men and women are subjected to the influence of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism... Today our most important task is to ruthlessly uncover this Ukrainian and Jewish nationalism."<sup>354</sup>

The XIX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR also devoted special attention to the national question. L. Beria, an expert on questions of domestic security for the USSR, emphasized this question. Beria not only stressed the great importance of the national question to the USSR, but also advocated ways of mitigating this national-political problem. From Beria's speech it is evident that even among the Communists in the USSR there was a powerful current of opposition which favored compromising with the national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples in order to resolve the national-political difficulties. But Stalin's general party line required the solution of the national question by means of terror, not compromise.

Such was the situation when on March 7, 1953, Stalin died. The death of the Soviet dictator, as was expected, created a great political crisis. And the crisis became acutely evident first in the national question. Already in the first declarations made by the post-Stalin triumvirate Malenkov-Beria-Molotov at Stalin's funeral on March 9, 1953, the emphasis was on the national question; this showed that what they feared most was a rising tide of "nationalism" among the peoples of the USSR. Malenkov stated: "For all of us the name of Stalin is forever connected with the solution of that most complex question, the national question... Our foremost duty is to achieve the strengthening of the multi-national

Soviet State. If the friendship of the peoples of our country is assured, we do not have to fear any enemies.”<sup>355</sup>

Beria, too, paid special attention to the national question. He stressed the importance of a positive solution of this question. In outlining the domestic policy of the post-Stalin government, he said: “Our domestic policy must be based on the fraternal friendship of the peoples of our country, that is, on the unification of the Soviet national republics into the great multi-national state—the USSR.”

Defining Stalin’s role in the struggle for a “successful” solution of the national question in the USSR, Molotov pointed out: “today this (the struggle for the solution of the national question—V.H.) is of great importance.”<sup>356</sup>

This “most important” question was especially evident in the struggle for power which now began in the camp of Stalin’s heirs. Beria, the domestic policy leader, being the chief of the security organs of the USSR and the representative of one of the non-Russian nations, knew exceedingly well the importance and the potential strength of this national moment in the life of the peoples of the USSR, and, in his struggle for power, counted upon the national elements among the non-Russian peoples who opposed the existing policy to win over the non-Russian peoples, he initiated a whole series of domestic political reforms to their advantage. His competitors, Malenkov and Molotov, fearing an outbreak on the part of the discontented non-Russian peoples in this time of political uncertainty, were compelled to display sympathy toward the non-Russian peoples and approve of what Beria was doing. Such was this period of relatively liberal national policy in the USSR following Stalin’s death.

The first move was to stop the proceedings on April 4, 1953 in the case of the Jewish doctors which had been fabricated by MGB; the anti-Semitic campaign was also stopped. The Soviet press propagandized against the “whipping up of national hostility” and against “preaching of the national superiority of one or the other nation, and giving that nation direct or indirect preference.”<sup>357</sup> After that, in Georgia, several local leaders who had previously been convicted for “bourgeois nationalism” were freed of the indictment, and their persecutors were tried instead. Similar changes took place in the other national republics.

But most of the changes took place in Ukraine. The first step taken in the attempt to win over the Ukrainians was that the former “president” of the Ukrainian SSR, H. Petrovsky, who, in 1938, had been condemned for “Ukrainian nationalism” and for attempting to “break with Russia,” suddenly was awarded an honorary Soviet order. After that, significant rearrangements in the government of the Ukrainian SSR were carried out and certain people, who previously had been accused of “Ukrainian na-

tionalist deviations," were now conspicuously placed in government positions (e.g., O. Korniychuk, who had been severely criticized for the "nationalistic tendencies" in his play, "Bohdan Khmelnytsky," in 1951, was now made a vice-president). The climax of all this was the removal of the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Moscow's envoy, Melnikov, on June 13, 1953. He was accused of overemphasizing Russification of Ukraine. This was something unheard of in the whole history of the Soviet Ukraine. It marked the first time that anyone had ever been officially accused of exaggerating the Russification policy. The policy of Russification had up to that time been the very essence of Soviet national policy. And Melnikov's case was emphasized even more by the fact that he, a Russian, was replaced by a Ukrainian, O. Kirichenko. This also marked the first time in the history of the Communist Party of Ukraine that this had happened.

The new liberal course in national policy, initiated by Beria, went so far that the official organ of the Communist Party of USSR, *Komunist*, even published an article stating that not only the nationalism of the non-Russian peoples but also Russian imperialistic chauvinism must be condemned.<sup>358</sup>

At this point the process of liberalizing the national policy in the USSR was stopped abruptly. These first steps to relieve the extremely harsh Russification policy in the national republics of the USSR created such an intense revival of anti-Russian centrifugal tendencies that the Russian chauvinistic bureaucrats and the military, and their leaders in the Kremlin, Malenkov and Molotov, were frightened. Relying on the spirit of the Russian centralist circles and following their wishes, Malenkov and Molotov, on July 10, 1953 accused Beria of being a "traitor," one who allegedly "had wanted to set up hostility among the Soviet peoples." Beria and his adherents were arrested and he was executed; and the national policy was now back on the old "general line" of Stalin's Russification and Russian centralism.

## *2. Ukrainian-Russian Relations: the Central Problem of the Post-Stalin Policy in the USSR*

Although Beria had been executed and the new course of the national policy of the USSR changed, Malenkov and his chauvinist Russian clique in the Kremlin were not able to mitigate the acuity of the national question and it again became the main problem of the post-Stalin government. This question became even more acute, and Beria's rivals were compelled to approve certain changes made in the national republics and

even to continue to make certain outward gestures in order to win the sympathy of the non-Russian peoples.

The new government had to resort to special maneuvers in Ukraine. During the period of relative liberalism in the national policy (the first few months following Stalin's death), not only was Moscow's envoy and Russifier, Melnikov, removed and replaced by a Ukrainian, but the leadership in general was almost completely taken over by local Ukrainian Communists. After the fall of Beria, Moscow did not dare to renege on these changes. All that could be done for the time being was to reinforce the military supervision over Ukraine. For this purpose Moscow's trusted men, Marshal Konev and General Chuikov, were sent to head the armed forces in Ukraine.

So much importance was attached to this problem of Ukrainian-Russian relations that Soviet political propaganda in the USSR was almost wholly preoccupied with it. Taking advantage of the Tercentenary Anniversary of the Treaty signed by Khmelnytsky in Pereyaslav in 1654, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, on January 12, 1954, issued special "Theses" on Ukrainian-Russian relations in which the whole year of 1954 was proclaimed—the "Jubilee Year of Ukrainian-Russian Friendship." The whole USSR was forced to celebrate this "Anniversary."<sup>359</sup> This Anniversary of the "Ukrainian-Russian alliance" has been carried out and this in itself reveals the fact of how afraid and how worried over the fate of this ill-fated alliance the Soviets are.

The fact that these "Theses" especially emphasized that Ukraine was an "independent, sovereign, national state" within the body of the USSR, and that the Communist Party of the USSR was the defender and protector of Ukrainian statehood must be mentioned. The overall aim of these "Theses" is to convince the Ukrainians, and the whole world, that Ukraine is not enslaved by Russia, but that she coexists as a republic in an "indissoluble fraternal union" with Russia—equal in all rights and privileges. In order to flatter the Ukrainians' national feelings, the "Theses" declare that the Ukrainians are—after the Russians—the "second, great people of the USSR" and stress their important role in the building and defense of the USSR.

Moscow's "Theses," on the occasion of the 300th Anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, were a kind of program for Ukrainian-Russian relations. As such, it is a document of so-to-say "concessions" on the part of Moscow in regard to the national-political aspirations of the Ukrainians. They show a certain retreat on the part of Moscow from the policy of complete Russification and the liquidation of Ukraine's

statehood. In this respect the fact that, in the "Theses," Russian chauvinism is referred to as a negative factor is most indicative.

Their main purpose, however, is to condemn Ukrainian nationalism. Aware of the popularity of this idea among the Ukrainian people, Moscow actually repeats Ukrainian nationalist slogans on the suzerainty of the Ukrainian State and then alleges that Ukraine has realized their aim in that she has achieved statehood in the form of a Ukrainian Soviet State. On the other hand, Moscow condemned all Ukrainians who showed any sympathy for Ukrainian independence as "agents of foreign countries," with the usual epithet of "bourgeois nationalists."

Together, with these "Theses" and the ostentatious celebration of the 300th Anniversary of Ukrainian-Russian relations, Moscow employed yet another maneuver in order to win over the sympathy of the Ukrainians. By a special decision of the Supreme Soviet on February 19, 1954, Ukraine was presented a gift from the Russian Soviet Republic: the Crimea was to be incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Geographically the Crimea is a part of Ukrainian territory and has always been connected with her by close historic, economic and cultural ties, and the Crimea never had any close economic or political relations with Moscow until its conquest. Nevertheless, administratively and politically, it had up to that time belonged to Russia although it had no particular ties with her. And now suddenly this territory was separated from Russia and given to Ukraine. This was done to coincide with the celebration of the 300th Anniversary of Ukrainian-Russian relations. This move on the part of Russia was much emphasized by Soviet propaganda as "proof" of Ukrainian-Russian friendship" and of the "development and strengthening of the Ukrainian state in the Union with the Russian people."

In this way, quite different from Stalin's post-war policy of direct Russification and abolishment of Ukrainian statehood, a post-Stalin course was plotted in the attempt to create the illusion among the Ukrainians that not only had the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state been realized but an extension of her territories and strengthening of her power had occurred. This proves the fact that Ukrainian national resistance was so strong that Russia's struggle with the Ukrainian national liberation movement was jeopardized and that more elaborate and cunning methods, and certain tactical concessions were required.

Of course, behind these new political tactics Moscow continued her old terrorist practice in regard to Ukraine—a practice of genocide. The latest proof that this practice is still in force is the new wave of mass re-settlement of Ukrainians in the Asian parts of the USSR (Siberia, Kazakhstan and the Far East) under the guise of "voluntary mobilization"

for the main object of this Soviet terror, a fact which is confirmed by the people who recently returned from the USSR. They state that 80 per cent of the inmates of Soviet concentration camps are Ukrainians.<sup>350</sup>

### *3. Ukrainian-Russian Relations; the National Question in the USSR; and the Present International Situation*

Ukrainian-Russian relations today create the most important problem in the political life of the USSR. Moscow seeks to solve the difficulties connected with this problem by creating an illusion of "Ukrainian-Russian friendship" while at the same time carrying out a terrorist-genocidal policy in regard to the Ukrainian people. This problem, conditioned largely by the present international and political situation of the USSR, is a result of the victory in World War II, whereby the USSR changed from an empire with the old Russian boundaries into a new imperial complex embracing the whole of East Europe as well as much of Asia, including China.

Within this complex (which now accounts for some 800,000,000 people of different races and nations), the Russian nation, although dominant is in the minority when compared with the non-Russian peoples. The Russians account for only 12 per cent of the total population. The non-Russian peoples of the USSR, together with the peoples of East Europe and Asia, constitute the overwhelming majority. Obviously, under such conditions, the consolidating of this complex under the aegis of Moscow can not be done on the basis of the Russian national core. This is why there has to be a more delicate rapprochement between the present national policy of Moscow and the principles of Communist internationalism.

Moreover, this rapprochement is also necessary to Moscow's future aggression which to be realized on an international scale, must be based on the power of her imperialist complex. While planning the new Communist diversion among the colonial and conquered peoples, mainly among the peoples of East, Moscow masquerades under the mask of a "defender of the idea of national independence and sovereignty of peoples." And therefore it is very important for her to be able to present to the world a perfect solution of the national question within the USSR itself. In fact, this was clearly stated by Stalin when he said:

"Our Union of Republics is being looked upon by the entire East as an experiment. If we successfully solve the national problem within the boundaries of this Union the whole East will see in our Union a banner of liberation and an example to follow; and this will then be the beginn-

ing of the end of world imperialism... If we, here, within the boundaries of our Union make mistakes and undermine confidence in the Russian proletariat of those people who had previously been oppressed by Russia, the attraction which the USSR has for the East will be destroyed; then imperialism will win, and we will be the ones to lose..."<sup>361</sup>

Molotov also had these same two factors in mind in connection with Moscow's plans for international aggression: the problem of consolidation of the new imperial complex under Moscow's control and the problem of winning over the sympathy of the colonial and dependent peoples, when, in his speech at Stalin's funeral, he declared: "Under present conditions the solution of the national question has a special importance in that it is connected with the creating of people's democracies and the sharpening of the national movements for liberation in colonial and subordinated countries."<sup>362</sup> And because of these factors Moscow today makes a fuss over "Ukrainian-Russian friendship" and the "friendship of the peoples of the USSR" throughout the world. A demonstration of her "achievements" in the solution of the national question in general and the more complicated Ukrainian national question in particular is necessary for Moscow as propaganda chiefly because of the great international importance attached to this question by the countries recently subjugated by communism (Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and others). For this reason the Comintern noted in a special resolution that "the Ukrainian question is one of the most important questions of Middle Europe."<sup>363</sup> The success or failure of her national policy with regard to Ukraine means victory or defeat for Moscow in the whole of Middle Europe.

In the light of these facts it is absolutely clear that the national question and the national difficulties in the USSR are of great importance to the Western world—today threatened by aggression on the part of Communist Moscow—and especially to America, who now leads the anti-Communist coalition. The Western powers greatest chance to succeed in the struggle against communism and Russian imperialism lies in taking advantage of Moscow's weak point in this field. That this is Russia's weakest point was recognized by Stalin himself, who pointed out, "the weak points of the Soviet regime are Turkestan and Ukraine."<sup>364</sup> Turkestan, because of the importance and the difficulty of solving the national question among the Moslem peoples of the Asian East; and Ukraine, because her problems are connected to those of the Slavic peoples of East Europe. Thus, those who wish to strike a severe blow against the aggressive Muscovite power should concentrate on these weak links in the communist empire. This means that the anti-Communist world must become for these enslaved peoples the bearer of the ideas



of liberation, independence and sovereignty for which they are struggling. Until now Moscow has factitiously carried the banner. This banner must be snatched from their hands; and this is the main task which must be assumed by freedom-loving America.

It is inconceivable that some American anti-Communist forces today not only do not attempt this task, but even deliberately avoid it. The chief argument of these forces, namely, that the "national question in the USSR is of no significant importance," is completely inconsistent in view of the irrefutable facts of Soviet reality. It is certain that any and all anti-Communist activity based on such a thesis is destined to inevitable and shameful failure. This is why it is such a grave mistake to give preference to the Russians who, it is alleged, are the "main force" in the struggle against Bolshevism. The truth is quite the opposite; it is completely evident today that the non-Russian nationalities in the Communist empire are physically as the majority and morally, as the dynamic revolutionary-liberating factor, the main and decisive core of the anti-Communist resistance. Even Moscow itself is today forced to make certain concessions to these powerful forces. It is therefore these forces that the free world must align itself with and must make the bulwark of their resistance if they wish to effectively combat the ever-growing Russian menace.

Today it is obvious how very important is the pressure exerted by the national question in the USSR as well as in all the areas under Communist domination. Criticism of Moscow's treatment of the national question and the unmasking of her nationalist-imperialist policy is a most important factor in the anti-Communist struggle. This is the only way to expose the USSR to the people, especially to the people recently subjugated by Moscow. This is the only way to bring about the moral disarmament of the USSR in the eyes of the people for whom Moscow plays the role of champion of "national liberation" in the anti-Communist struggle, as has been the case up to now in the activities of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, is to support the consolidation of Moscow's new empire and to assist her in overcoming the national and political difficulties which have arisen and, because of which, she is now forced to resort to new national-political maneuvers.

In his last speech at the XIX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in October, 1952, Stalin, addressing the Communists of the whole world declared: "The banner of national independence and national suzerainty in the capitalist world has been thrown overboard. No doubt it is our duty, the duty of the representatives of the Communist Party, to pick up this banner and to carry it forward, if we wish to be the leading force in our respective nations..."<sup>365</sup>

The main organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, "*Komunist*" wrote: "Under present conditions when the bourgeoisie sell the rights and independence of the nations; when the banner of the national independence and the national sovereignty is thrown overboard the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries pick up this banner. They will head the powerful national-liberating movement of the oppressed peoples which is shaking the whole foundation of the imperialist world. Under such circumstances the national policy of the Communist Party of the USSR — the policy of equality for all nations which assures the triumph of the ideology of friendship among peoples and proletarian internationalism — is an inspiring example to the whole world."<sup>366</sup>

Is it true that in the anti-Communist world there is no understanding of the importance of the national-liberation banner? Shall it remain a Communist weapon instead of becoming a weapon against it?... Is it true that the anti-Communist world in ignoring the national question in the USSR permits Moscow to retain the role of standard-bearer of this idea in the eyes of the masses who desire national freedom and who have not as yet drawn up ranks against Russian imperialism? Discarding the national-liberation-banner of the Soviet peoples from the free world's arsenal, as is done in certain American anti-Communist circles, shows that the danger of this banner becoming a Communist weapon, and not a weapon of the free world, is imminent. And it is this fact we wish to point out in this book.

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## C O N C L U S I O N

At the time of writing this book, great parades and special "festive sessions" of the Supreme Councils of the Ukrainian and the Russian Soviet Republics were taking place in Kiev and in Moscow to celebrate the "300th Anniversary of the Alliance between Russia and Ukraine" (1954-1954).

Moscow, trying in all possible ways to "woo" the recalcitrant Ukraine, issued a decree "conferring on the Ukrainian Soviet Republic the Order of Lenin." This is the first time in the history of the USSR that a republic has been endowed with an order. This same was also conferred on Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. The Soviet press is deluged with articles on the 300th Anniversary of Ukrainian-Russian relations. All the leaders of the Soviet Union are participating in the "celebration" and delivering speeches eulogizing the event.

At the same time, the Soviet radio and press announced on May 19, 1954 the execution of a member of the underground Ukrainian movement, Wasyl Okhrymovych, who had been sentenced to death by the Soviet Military Tribunal in Kiev. In addition, the Soviet press published sensational propaganda articles against emigre "Ukrainian nationalists" and stepped up its campaign of "watchfulness" of the Ukrainian underground. The slogan, "Ukrainian nationalism—the main danger," is repeated again and again.

The spectacle of a noisy celebration of "Ukrainian-Russian Friendship" which is combined with propaganda and terror against the Ukrainian national liberation movement, is the best possible picture of the real character of contemporary Ukrainian-Russian relations. This picture remains exactly the same as it has been during the past 300 years, a picture of incessant, but changing war between Ukraine and Russia, in which Russia tries to hide behind the false scenery of "celebration" and noise about "alliance" and "friendship."

A most notable fact should be mentioned: at the climax of these celebrations Moscow suddenly disclosed how extremely worried she was about the possibility of aid from American and other Western democratic anti-Communist forces to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, aid which might inevitably destroy the Russian communist Empire. Perturbed by such a possibility, Moscow initiated a vast scheme, accusing

the Ukrainian nationalists of being American agents and indicting America for "directing" the Ukrainian struggle against Moscow. This fact shows how terribly fearful Moscow is of any such possibility. It shows too the paramount importance of real cooperation between the American anti-Communist forces and the Ukrainians in the struggle against the greatest enemy of mankind. But, unfortunately, the required understanding of Ukraine's aspirations for liberation or the knowledge of the importance of the Ukrainian-Russian problem does not exist either in America or in the other Western nations.

And this is so because world opinion for many centuries has been formed under the influence of Russian science and propaganda about the "one Great Russia"; and this has obscured the truth and the real nature of this problem.

Russian science and Russian propaganda are supplying the whole world with historical and contemporary information on the character of the Ukrainian-Russian relations the only purpose of which is to further deceive the free world. This is why we feel it necessary to collect here the most important facts on the true nature of Ukrainian-Russian relations of the past 300 years and to present them to all who are interested in the true facts and character of these relations.

This book is a bill of indictment against Russia for 300 years of torture in Ukraine. Let Russia's cruelties and crimes in Ukraine be a warning to all those who do not wish their peoples to suffer a similar fate, victims of the Russian hangmen.

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