


Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism, and Separatism: An Assessment



Manoly R. Lupul
Editor

Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism, and Separatism: An Assessment

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Manoly R. Lupul



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Introduction

“What does it matter what the Ukrainian Canadians think about separatism?” was the comment occasionally made in the weeks preceding the conference whose proceedings this volume records. Some broadcasters, reporters, commentators, and others who help to shape public opinion have become so overwhelmed by the simple description of Canada as ‘English’ and ‘French’ that anyone who is genuinely concerned about Canada’s future and whose origins are neither Anglo-Celtic nor *Canadien* is either supposed to have no opinion or to have one which does not count. Needless to say, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies does not subscribe to this simple dualistic view of Canada and organized the conference to help all Canadians who appreciate Canada’s diverse origins to participate more effectively in the current national unity debate. The role Ukrainian Canadians have played in promoting multiculturalism as one of the main pillars of national unity is well known. As a result, even if the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies were not the conference’s sponsor, curiosity alone would justify an assessment by Ukrainian-Canadian academics of the impact of separatism upon multiculturalism at this critical period in Canada’s political history.

No conference can ever take place without the help of numerous individuals. The Institute is particularly indebted to the program participants, and especially to the Hon. Camille Laurin, Minister of State for Cultural Development in the Province of Quebec (who opened the conference with an address as gentle and sincere as it was provocative), and to Mr. Keith Spicer, recently retired commissioner of official languages (whose caustic humor turned a formidable banquet address into a thoroughly delightful experience). The Institute would also like to recognize the valuable contributions of Senator Paul Yuzyk, who introduced Mr. Spicer; Professor Ivan L. Rudnytsky and Mr. Bohdan Krawchenko who chaired the sessions; and Mrs. Luba Petryshyn, Mr. Ivan Jaworsky, and Dr. Andriy Hornjatkevych, who looked after the arrangements. The editorial assistance of Mrs. Petryshyn and Mr. Jaworsky in the preparation of this volume is also gratefully acknowledged. The typing of the manuscript was in the capable hands of Mrs. Petryshyn and Miss Assya Berezowsky.

Edmonton, Alberta
April 1978

M. R. L.
University of Alberta

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Opening Remarks

Manoly R. Lupul

I am very pleased to welcome you to what is an historic occasion for the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies—its first academic conference. The theme this year is “Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism and Separatism: An Assessment.” I say “this year” because this is the first of what, the Institute hopes, will be a series on Ukrainians in Canada, with special emphasis on developments since World War I.

The wisdom of the decision to emphasize more recent developments is clearly shown by the timeliness of this year’s theme—for it is truly difficult to conceive of a more important topic than the future relationship of the various peoples who live in Canada at this time of political crisis.

As an academic unit within an institution of higher learning, the Institute is fully aware that it has a responsibility to help Canadians of Ukrainian origin—and through them perhaps Canadians of all origins—to come to a better understanding of the terribly difficult issue of majority/minority relations in our democratic society.

But the Institute, it should be clear, only provides the forum for discussion; it itself is no oracle. Put another way, the Institute itself represents no particular view; it only enables others to air theirs. If the topic under discussion has profound political implications that does not render the Institute itself political; all it shows is that the Institute can be relevant to the issues of our time, for it helps those who attend its conferences to draw more informed opinions about the problems before us and our options.

It follows naturally also that in organizing this conference, it was not the intention of the Institute to bring about any preconceived

consensus. Should one emerge, its nature would undoubtedly be far more interesting than the fact that it emerged. However, the Ukrainian-Canadian community, like other communities in Canada, is no monolith, nor should it expect academics from its rank to be of one mind in their analyses and assessments. As a result, if you are here to get *the* Ukrainian-Canadian viewpoint either this evening or in the sessions that follow you may well go away disappointed. If, however, you enjoy intellectual discussion—and perhaps even the clash of ideas—you are, I hope, in the right place. Let us, then, begin the arduous dialectic, probing what is best for a piece of the earth called Canada, in whose fate we all have a stake at this time in human history.

Statement

Camille Laurin

I would first like to thank Dr. Lupul from the bottom of my heart for his very warm, sympathetic introduction. I wish to thank him and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies for this invitation to speak—one I was very honored to accept. I want to assure you from the outset that I do not deceive myself. I would like you to perceive me not as a “change challenger” but rather as a politician-scholar who feels more like a scholar than a politician.

Because the topic bestowed upon me is so large, so difficult, so complex, I would rather sit with you and discuss it for hours; it has so many dimensions. Moreover, I really feel very pleased to find myself in a university once more, because I have belonged to the university all my life. Having taught there, I feel much more at ease in academic than in political circles. I also know that topics like the one this evening deserve the scholarly consideration you usually bestow upon them; but fortunately or unfortunately ideas also come to be put into political terms and we have to tackle them from that angle or dimension also. Tonight, however, I really would like to discuss the topic before us from the scholarly or academic, rather than the political point of view, even though I know that the repercussions are bound to be political. For this reason, I have not really prepared the kind of paper you usually expect. I have chosen instead to grasp a few ideas, as we usually do in seminar discussions, to deliver them even in a kind of provocative way, to generate a better, more lively discussion. I will throw you ideas in a condensed form, speaking slowly, so that you can have time to think about them, so that they have time to deepen and your inner

thoughts may be expressed to enable a lively and fruitful discussion to follow.

When I received your invitation, two main themes came to my mind, themes you had chosen earlier for this conference. Foremost in my mind came the idea that I was being asked to speak to a group of persons for whom the word liberty has had particularly profound connotations. For personal and academic reasons, I know quite well the past history of Ukraine but am most conversant with the present. I have in mind, therefore, figures, pictures, images, ideas, sentences, which tell me of the present predicament of Ukraine and also of the solidarity of the brotherhood you may feel toward all those people who are presently in Ukraine, trying to fight for a country which is very dear to their hearts, suffering in the midst of all kinds of persecutions. So, even though we speak to each other here in Canada, as a background I have this country of yours in mind, to which part of your heart is profoundly attached and about which you think probably more than once daily.

I know therefore that for you, as for me, the word liberty has a particularly profound connotation, and secondly, I realize that in coming to Edmonton, I would have a privileged opportunity to address myself to the main principles which underline the policies of my government with respect to self-determination and cultural development. Let me say, at the outset, that the title of your symposium: "multiculturalism and separatism," gives ample food for thought. I would like to analyze, very briefly, the notion of separatism because it is precisely this word which lends itself to so much misunderstanding where the actual objectives of the Quebec government are concerned. For years now, the word separatism has been tagged on to every independentist movement that has existed in Quebec. Whenever a real independence party has been founded, politicians and journalists, from the anglophone sector in particular, have identified it as a separatist party. We can read into this a certain fear, and unfortunately sometimes bad faith. We are presented as a government whose objective is to break up Canada, to enclose Quebec within a kind of Great Wall of China to make Quebecers a kind of primitive tribe, affiliation with which depends on blood relationship, called elsewhere ethnocentrism. But I can tell you nothing could be more false or contrary to our philosophy and political ideology. We do not recognize ourselves in such statements, though we do not always have to contradict them or to provide contradictory information.

It is not Quebec's wish to close itself in but it is Quebec's wish to be open; it is Quebec's wish not to break up but to build. The only thing we want is to be masters of our own destiny, and I think there are some people here, in Alberta, who understand that language very well. Within

the limits of our ability, we want to be able to define for ourselves our economic, political, and cultural development. The model which we propose is based on Quebec's particular qualities and constraints. I can say with full confidence that Quebec does not want to be separated any more than any other healthy country would want to be. It is only normal, therefore, that independentists should feel insulted by the very use of that word. This is not a hang-up on their part, but a legitimate repudiation of a concept which finds no substantiation at all in the program of our government. On the other hand, we are accused of working against the current of contemporary history by certain die-hard federalists. I would simply say to that that Quebecers themselves want to be the principal scribes of their own history, and they have no tendency at the moment to allow themselves to be dictated to on that score by others. I would go on to add that for almost 20 years, world history has been characterized by the agony of colonization, on the one hand, and by the emergence of numerous independent nations, on the other. It is in this context that people today, people in our government, see Quebec.

We subscribe unequivocally to the notion of interdependence—looking at the European Common Market, looking at the federation of South American republics, and at so many other associations of states in the world. We subscribe unequivocally to the notion of interdependence because we know this is the essence of future national and international conglomerates, because it is essential not only for their development but for the harmonious development of the world. So we also subscribe to the notion of interdependence among people in the economic, cultural, and social spheres. But let us not presume that such interdependence can be realized among unequal partners. All the common markets or political unions we know are based on the concept of national sovereignty. And after this national sovereignty is acquired, nations voluntarily renounce part of this sovereignty for superior motives—to realize common interests, on the one hand, and to achieve universal solidarity, progress, and development, on the other. And we desire to place ourselves in the main stream of modern history.

The recent debate which has surrounded the preparation and adoption of the Charter of the French Language in Quebec, as well as the refusal of provincial governments to sign reciprocal bilateral agreements with Quebec in the future, indicate yet again the unequal nature of the relationship between our so-called two founding peoples. And this brings one to speak of Canadian federation in the realm of culture. The federal policy of culture leans heavily on the constitutional power to collect taxes and allocate monies which enables that government

literally to invade all fields of culture, particularly in Quebec, for political reasons, negative as well as positive. Besides the Secretary of State, with its annual billion and a half dollar budget, 15 other ministries and federal organizations also develop programs of a cultural nature. Needless to say, these bold gestures of the federal government, so far as Quebec is concerned, pay little or no respect to what we believe to be our own priorities. We do not accept paternalistic cultural policies, because with the degree of evolution and maturity we have achieved we think we are big enough and developed enough to know what is best for us, and to allocate and spend money in the way that suits our needs and aspirations.

You may be surprised to learn that during the sixties, while Quebec was in the process of taking stock of its own priorities, its own identity, its own self, the federal government was progressively extending cultural control over it. There was a dialectical relationship between the two. With each positive movement, the federal government, which was watching Quebec evolve, tried to hinder, to postpone, or to prevent Quebec's natural evolution with the means at their disposal, namely, constitutional power and federal money. This cultural encroachment meant a progressive repression of the real Quebec culture. One thing, however, is certain: Quebec has what it needs for a peaceful and truthful coexistence with the rest of Canada. It has, after 300 years and more, its own culture, its own language, its own identity, its own land, its own history, its own institutions; in other words, it has already all the ingredients of nationhood. Culture, implied Oswald Spengler, is the expression of one's identity in history. It is not the fault of anyone, but the development of Quebec identity does not coincide with the development of the identity of the rest of Canada. Different peoples possess different identities. The failure of confederation has long since been the latent belief of many Quebecers, and in the last 15 or 20 years it has become the overt belief of an increasing number of Quebecers. On the level of language alone, federalists insist that Quebec should remain bilingual when the rest of Canada remains unilingual. This can only lead to assimilation, an eventuality no Quebecer can permit. The federal government assumes to be the government of all Canadians; on the international front it speaks on behalf of all of us. Occasionally, but grudgingly, Quebec is given a subaltern role in international conferences. The federal government recognizes certain language rights for francophones within federal institutions. These rights, however, do not extend to the broader notion of cultural rights. Lately we have even heard the Secretary of State saying that the whole field of culture pertains to the federal jurisdiction.

We can cast our minds back to the origin of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. What began as research into the necessary conditions for bilingualism and biculturalism ended in a system of folkloric multiculturalism and restricted bilingualism, restricted to federal departments and even further restricted within these federal departments themselves. This is what they call francophone units and they exist even in Quebec, where there are francophone units and anglophone units. Let us be quite exact about the issue here. Quebec is not asking for universal and Canadian bilingualism. Even if that were an important objective for us, it would never be possible in practice, and here we understand fully the feelings of westerners. More reasonably, we demand that Quebec should be as unilingual francophone as other parts of Canada are naturally unilingual anglophone. If the federal government contests this, it contests the validity of the very principles it puts into practice. Not only have the French people, then, seen themselves reduced to a language group, but their cultural rights have also been reduced to language rights. And the same language rights, in turn, have been reduced still further to the mere possibility of federal bilingual services in the principal centres of the country, with a notable exception even in Quebec, as was shown by the battle of Les Gens de l'Air and the Airport Controllers. Yet there are still many Canadians who believe that this is excessive, who are no longer scandalized by such a situation.

The fact—and we accept it—is that Canada is an English country, an anglophone country, and this country tolerates with varying degrees of unwillingness the bilingualism proposed by the federal government in recent years. Outside of Quebec and part of New Brunswick, almost all the people of the Dominion speak English exclusively or in addition to another language. In this vast milieu of English origin, or of English by adoption, people of French origin are drowned. In the whole of the west, their percentage has decreased in 10 to 5 years, from 6.7 to 5.8. In Manitoba, they are now placed after the British, Ukrainians, and Germans; in Saskatchewan, they are placed fifth and the situation is the same in Alberta. The west, it is sad to say, has become a cultural cemetery for the French, and maybe it was unavoidable. In the federal context, however, the linguistic balance in Quebec has become extremely precarious. The federal government has been asking, even pushing Quebec to become more and more bilingual, while allowing the rest of Canada to remain unilingually anglophone. This was the primary reason for the necessity of the Charter of the French Language in Quebec. To guarantee to the francophones, to the majority of Quebec, the use of their mother tongue, implies giving them basic tools with

which they can develop their culture. To live and develop, this Quebec cultural milieu can be accommodated neither by a federal policy of multiculturalism nor by provincial status. Quebec is the homeland of a culture, of a specific culture. It is a nation which is founded on the awareness it has to form a distinct entity, animated by a common will, and on the potential which it has regained to forge its own destiny.

Allow me, in a final word, to speak briefly of the situation of the minorities in the Quebec context. In the new Quebec society, which we are building, it is our intention to provide all minorities with the space necessary, with the tools and means necessary, to develop and sustain themselves. For example, we want, as far as possible, to develop teaching at the elementary level in the language of the mother tongue for each ethnic group. We want, as far as possible, to teach the history and culture of each minority, at the secondary level, to all francophones. We want, at the university level, to create and sustain Departments of Superior Studies in Italian, Greek, Arab, Ukrainian, and Portuguese cultures. We want to ask members of these ethnic groups to keep their respective cultures, to develop, as far as possible, according to their specific lines, and to participate in the cultural development of Quebec from their own space and their own traditions in a positive and progressive way.

The anglophone minority in Quebec, on the other hand, has evolved largely outside the main stream of the francophone majority, probably because it felt it had no use for it. It was not necessary, it was a hindrance. There were more important matters to attend to. But because of the situation, this minority has often demonstrated, in a conscious and unconscious way, some antagonism, indifference, or outright contempt toward the French culture, toward the main stream of the collective French language in Quebec. This minority, by virtue of its economic influence in Quebec, has remained an extremely powerful pole of attraction for all the other minorities, who have adopted the surest means of economic and social advancement by integrating into this so-called minority, which, in fact, was an economic majority. Perhaps it is necessary to recall that the francophone majority in Quebec is situated way down the scale of individual annual revenue, ninth to be precise, just ahead of the new immigrants who arrive in Quebec. This is another element which has prompted awareness in the French-speaking population in recent years and has become an object of scandal, to the point of producing the reactions we have seen progressively in the last few years.

We have also come to discover that the philosophy of multiculturalism, toward which the minorities are strongly drawn, eventually

leads to an almost total cultural isolation of one group from another. Maybe this is a situation which you will be able to improve in the rest of Canada, but in Quebec it has reached the kind of caricature proportions where French and English and all ethnic groups pursue parallel paths without ever even speaking to each other and exchanging the riches they may have.

In actual fact, the smaller minorities are traditionally assimilated into the anglophone minority and identified with that minority. Certain folklore events which traditionally take place did not hide this striking alienation during the public debate which accompanied the presentation of the Charter of the French Language in Quebec. Many of these smaller minorities became staunch defenders of certain biases and prejudices expressed by some members of the anglophone minority. One of the prime objectives of the Charter is to redress the imbalance of the fundamental injustice experienced by the francophone majority. Another objective will permit all minorities to define, at last, their cultural identity within the real Quebec context that is predominantly French. We know that the vast majority of Quebecers love Quebec and intend to remain there. We invite them not only to keep alive their language and their traditions but to rediscover their original culture in the social, cultural, and political context of the New Quebec which belongs to them as much as to the French-speaking people. We invite them to plant their roots in their new land, but for this we do not ask for assimilation. Rather we have tried to provide the social structure for a healthier integration. The Charter—the White Paper—has been the first step. We intend to publish in the next two months another White Paper which will continue in that direction and show that the New Quebec does not intend to assimilate, but asks and invites all minorities to participate fully in these new developments, to assure progress for them as well as for the French-speaking majority. So, our policy is based on recognition of the majority but also on respect for minorities. For the moment, these are a few of the thoughts I wish to share with you before we begin the actual discussion.

[A discussion followed with Dr. Laurin responding to comments and questions put to him by Dr. Bohdan Bociurkiw, Carleton University, and Professor Walter Tarnopolsky, York University.]

Dr. Bociurkiw:

Mr. Minister, I have been very much impressed by your candor and by the sentiments which guided your remarks. As a Ukrainian, I can appreciate your analogy between the aspirations of Ukraine and

Quebec, though I must say that never in its history has Ukraine had such constitutional, political, and human rights as those of Quebec within Canadian confederation. Ukrainians, I am certain, have frequently longed to see Ukraine enjoy at least these rights. But our problem here, apart from what sentiments we may share, is the cultural and linguistic survival and development of Ukrainians in Canada. And as far as I am concerned, I think that, in the long run, the secession of Quebec would be disastrous to those aspirations, as it will be (though I take it that you consider this inevitable anyway) disastrous in the long run to the survival of French-Canadian aspirations outside Quebec. Because I think that should this happen the demographic, ethnic, and linguistic balance would change in such a way that there would be no room for official bilingualism or multiculturalism and that the pressures for assimilation would increase immensely, I should like to ask you if Quebec, indeed, considers the price worth paying and will really leave the French-Canadian minorities outside Quebec to the mercy of the backlash and to whatever may happen to them as a result of the changed nature of Canada? Or does the present Quebec government and the Parti Québécois consider them doomed anyway?

Dr. Laurin:

Yes, I am often asked about this possible backlash against the French minority; that could happen. But let me tell you first that when Quebec was silent *vis-à-vis* the federalists on this question and there was peace and quiet, it was precisely then that the francophone minorities in Canada were slowly becoming assimilated. It was precisely when Quebec was purely and unquestionably federalist that the situation was worse for the minorities. If their lot has improved, it is only since 1966-67-68 when the independentist movement became active in Quebec, when it began to speak, to claim specificities, to ask that justice be done. We could probably attribute the election of Mr. Trudeau to this awakening of cultural identity in Quebec, and probably also we could view the adoption of the official languages law in Ottawa as a natural outcome of the Quebec resurgence. Even in St. Andrews [New Brunswick] it was probably because the prime minister of Quebec offered or asked for reciprocity and did not get it because Mr. Trudeau was opposed to it—if the provinces started to negotiate with each other and more specifically with Quebec, it would prove that Quebec could become independent and could negotiate the kind of association it desired—that the other premiers of Canada said they would ask the ministers of education to report within six months on ways to improve the situation of the francophone minority in each province in Canada.

And a week earlier the prime minister of British Columbia said he would legislate to establish a system whereby 1,000 francophone people in B.C. would at last have access to French schools for the first time in their history.

It is when Quebec is strong, when Quebec speaks up for itself, when Quebec requests to be respected as a specific culture that other provinces or the federal government become aware of the past, become aware of the present situation where French-Canadian rights are concerned, and prepare to do something for them. And even if Quebec became independent, with or without association, I think those gains would remain. And I think also that links—sentimental links, cultural links—could be established between Quebec as a state and the francophone minorities without impinging on provincial or Canadian jurisdiction. The same kind of links could be formed between Anglo-Quebecers and the anglophone population of Canada. With harmonious relations from one side to the other, perhaps the backlash would not happen because after all we live in a democracy and have lived in one for more than a hundred years. Democracy means adherence to some basic principles which we believe in deeply in our hearts, and which we have developed in our universities and political life. We adhere to these principles and if the political scene were to change in some way, we would not cease being democratic and stop adhering to those principles. So, I do not think we have a right to look at the ugly or sad side of things, rather than to the progressive or positive side. We have a tradition of civilization here in Canada and I can tell you that it is as strong in Quebec as in the other provinces. And I myself am fully confident that those ideals, those sets of principles would be adhered to more after independence than before. The idea of a backlash comes from the irrational, emotional feelings that have been expressed in the last six or seven years because there has been a debate with reactions and counter-reactions, but the best side of all of us remains and I think it will prevail in the long run because our convictions are deep, as is our dedication to them on either side of the frontier. This is what unites and will continue to unite every Quebecer and Canadian no matter what happens. I would not think therefore that there is a backlash to be feared by francophones in Canada or by any other minority, Ukrainians or Italians. I do not see, for example, that all the institutions devoted to multiculturalism that have been set up in Ottawa during the past 10 or 12 years will stop because there is a change in our political institutions. If those institutions, budgets, and attitudes have been adopted, it is not only because of the predicament of our present political situation, but because there is a new awareness of the richness we have and of the

rights of groups of people. This, I think, will stay no matter what happens. That is my opinion.

Dr. Bociurkiw:

I do not know if I should pursue the topic further, but it appears to me, Dr. Laurin, that you place before Canadians at the time of secession such high moral covenants which, once political realities are considered, might not be lived up to. The demographic balance with Quebec outside of Canada would change so much that considering the ties that bind politicians and electors, one is inclined to take a gloomier view. I can fully agree that it was, first, the quiet and then not so quiet revolution in Quebec which gave the stimulus not only to the French Canadians outside of Quebec, but to Ukrainian Canadians and other ethnic groups, but the bargaining power of Quebec can only continue as long as it remains within confederation either in its present shape or in a restructured form. I have, however, a related question. If we assume (and it is a reasonable assumption, at least judging from the successive Gallup polls) that the referendum, regardless of form or number, should turn against secession, what then, considering that within four or five years the government would have to face the electors again? Is there a third option, so to speak, perhaps of special status within Canada, if the majority of Quebec electors should think otherwise?

Dr. Laurin:

This is really an academic political question, for it is always difficult to look at the crystal ball and see the future taking form in front of our eyes. We think we will win the referendum and I think we have reasons to believe that we stand a good chance to win it. But it is true that we may lose it or that we may have to hold another referendum, but it is difficult to predict what may happen. For example, you know that for eight years Mr. Trudeau has been saying that Quebec is a province like any other province, Quebec will never have any special status, refusing any constitutional change from other political parties, from pundits, from scholars, from academics, from editors. Then suddenly, today or yesterday, he has proposed a constitutional amendment where he admits implicitly that Quebec is a special case. In the field of education, in the field of cultural security, he says he would prefer it otherwise but reluctantly a constitutional amendment is needed this year for all the other provinces, but for Quebec there would be an exception or exemption for the time being. However transitory the period, his move implies that he has finally recognized the specific circumstances that

render Quebecers insecure about their cultural future, and that he is ready to do something. If he has begun to change, who knows where it will stop? We accept that, like Quebec, the other provinces have some legitimate grievances, that easterners have become too dependent on Ottawa, that westerners are not being heard in Ottawa, and that the central power does not take heed of their legitimate concerns. Will he agree to decentralize, to regionalize Canada? Will he agree to work on the new constitution where the powers would be distributed differently than they are today? We do not know. I hope he will. Anyway today, to me his proposal was big news. It was important, significant.

I read papers from Vancouver to Halifax and I see that there is a movement, something is changing in the Canadian scene. I see people from all walks of life, especially in academic circles, telling everyone that the constitution has to be redrafted, not amended. So, at the same time that Quebec has been proposing a state or political regime that suits its own needs, aspirations, problems, five or six years later we now see the beginnings of something similar taking place in other parts of Canada. What will happen? Will Canadians make strides in our direction, will we meet to discuss matters one of these days, to discuss association before independence? Maybe it is possible to agree on some matters where we could associate and at the same time assume full powers in other domains. You know that in the field of political science we may take the cat by the tail or by the head to come to the center. But in the end we have dissected it just the same. Although we do not know what will happen, we know what we think at the present time. We know what the federal government thought up to last year, and now the scene is beginning to change. We are looking, listening; we are ready to talk, to discuss, and we will see what happens.

Professor Tarnopolsky:

First of all let me, as an invitee, congratulate the Government of Alberta for its wise decision in funding the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. I think it may be something that the minister might keep in mind in the White Paper he is proposing for Quebec, as a tangible illustration of one's proclaimed belief in the equality of all. Second, as still a westerner at heart, even though transplanted geographically into the center of Canada, I would like to welcome the minister to the west and express my regret, perhaps for all Canadians, for the great geographical spread that exists between us. In fact, it is much easier for us in Ontario or Quebec to visit Mexico than it is to visit Saskatchewan or Alberta, and that may be part of the problem in this

country. I think we have all been moved by your expression of humanity in this matter and I want to come back to it later with respect to minorities.

You spoke about being masters of your own destiny, or Jean Lesage's original *maître chez nous*, and of course it was your prime minister who popularized the theme (he was then a federalist): Do you not really think that that is the wish of everybody, but that it is almost impossible for anybody? In other words, we in Canada would like to be Canadians, not dominated by the United States. The United States would like to do what it wants without being held back by France or Britain or Germany or Japan or anyone else. Even the Soviet Union has some limitations placed upon it occasionally in some of its relations. Do you not think that many of the problems we think we have and which we pin on others are just the circumstances under which we must live? As you say, you are conscious of the fact that you are part of North America. As a result, the objects, the policies of your government are sovereignty-association, which means that you are interested in economic union. But in an economic union one does not always have one's own way. One has to compromise, and yet one of the things you talk about is wanting to control your economic as well as your social destiny. Are you not, in a way, putting too much emphasis on circumstances and assuming that you can change the restraints on the use of the French language, the expression of French culture—on your identity—when in fact they are all due to normal circumstances within Canada? Quebec is poorer per capita than Ontario or Alberta, but certainly more wealthy than Newfoundland and New Brunswick, so that the economic disadvantages are not just the result of language or culture. Part of the problem is regional, part geographic, and part a matter of being at the center. I wonder, then, if it is only because of the difference of language that one feels that there is some responsibility elsewhere. Or is it really the necessity of living in an increasingly interdependent world, and that the pressures on Quebec are not going to diminish with independence or some kind of accommodation with Canada?

Dr. Laurin:

Yours is a call for relativism and in a way you are right theoretically. We can never really be fully independent; we cannot ever really be the complete masters of our destiny. There are always some constraints, some concessions we would have to make, but it depends on what is bargained for and in what fields. For example, for me, as for many others, it may be easier to trade off certain advantages in the economic sphere for other economic advantages. We have done that for centuries

and we have been doing so for the last 15 years in the Kennedy round of talks. If it were only economic trade-offs, I think Quebec would never consider extreme measures. But when it comes to matters of language, culture, and identity—matters which are intimate and which are closely linked with what makes us distinctive—what is at stake is very dear to our hearts. Not only is it part of the great French heritage, which has given so much to the world over the last one thousand years, but we are able to be ourselves, to maintain ourselves in the kind of existence made possible through the language we learned on the knees of our mothers. In such matters, I think the emotions are deeper, the concerns are deeper, and the will is stronger.

* For years and years and years we have been hindered in our development in ways that were not acceptable, that were not necessary, even when we felt we had all the ingredients that would allow us to develop fully. Today we are mature; we have come of age as a nation as well as individuals, and we are ready to make our own choices, to develop in the way we have chosen for ourselves. I think dealing with such matters is different than dealing with political or economic matters. But when cultural and linguistic and economic problems are linked, as I indicated in my initial remarks, the difficulties mount. In Quebec, the French-speaking people are at the bottom of the economic list in their own home. Why? When we start to analyze the situation (because we are not dumb) and see that it is linked to the language we speak, we become determined to break the barriers that prevent so many French-speaking people from gaining access to the kind of jobs for which they prepared themselves through study. For 50, 60 years we have been told that it is our fault that we have not gone to school long enough, have not been prepared, have not studied economics and did not know how to handle business, were a priest-ridden province, not competent particularly in the field of business. In the last 15 or 20 years, however, we have spent millions and billions of dollars to get instruction, to build universities. Seven to ten thousand graduate with diplomas each year, but still the proportion at the bottom remains, the same barriers exist because of the language problem. We concluded that something is very wrong, very rotten in the state of Denmark, and we are beginning to look at political solutions, after having tried all the others.

Whether we can ever be masters of our destiny is a question of degree, a question of context, a question of domains. We have to be masters of our own destiny as far as the language and culture are concerned. If we want (and we do want) to remain faithful to ourselves, if we want to retain whatever natural pride we have, our sense of dignity, if we have a sense of responsibility to ourselves and to our children, I think we

cannot compromise in the fields of language and culture. But for the rest, we are ready to compromise. In the field of economics, for example, in the field of deciding together what kind of external policy we might conduct, in the field of exchanges, in the field of justice, and in many fields, we are ready to define something new. Whatever form the future will take remains to be seen, but we want the substance, the real substance not only of our grievances but of our realities and needs, to be understood by other Canadians, and we want to be listened to and to discuss reasonably what can be done. It is because we have not been listened to in the last 50 or 60 years that finally we have come to a solution by ourselves and are now ready to act. I would say that the majority of French-speaking people are in agreement with us, because what we say is what they feel. But this is a beginning. The ball now being in the other court, we can start discussing like reasonable human beings from political and economic points of view, and we will see what happens. We offered a definite proposal, but we are ready to listen to what others have to say. I am sure that we can come (I would not say to a compromise) but to a solution that may fit the needs of the rest of the country as well as Quebec.

Professor Tarnopolsky:

One of the issues here is multiculturalism and the interests of what you, in Quebec, call anglophones; *i.e.*, those who are not of Anglo-Celtic or French descent. One of the things that I think disturbs a number of people who might be English-speaking but who are not English Canadian is the following: in your speech you referred to Quebec and the rest of Canada, which really means that in your mind we are all the same—because we are English-speaking, we are all the same. In your White Paper, amplified in your speech, you refer on a number of occasions to the fact that your first step is to establish the French fact in Quebec. For example, you say in your White Paper that integration of immigrants into the French-speaking community will not be possible until Quebec society has become wholly French, and then in your reference to the position of the “others,” you say that only when the survival of the French language is assured will the second-language teaching programs be seen in their proper light and become truly effective. In all this, the impression one gets is “Wait, when we have looked after ourselves, believe us, we will look after you.” Our response, I think, can only be along the lines of something I said several years ago at the Ontario Conference on Economic and Cultural Nationalism, which was that like the Cabots and the Lodges: “The French speak only to the English and the English speak only to themselves.” And

the rest of us have nobody to speak to. Yet if self-determination is basic, everyone has the moral right to retain one's culture and language. It is a practical reality. Apart from the fact that you have felt quite clearly, I think, some of the things Ukrainians have felt and some of us have felt, how do we know that we will not have to wait another hundred years, at which time there will be nobody left in Quebec who is not either totally Québécois French or a surviving remnant in Westmount of the English-speaking Québécois, with all the rest of us squeezed out? How can we be sure that those of Ukrainian, Italian, Greek, or Portuguese descent, who played the role of second-class citizens to the English-speaking Quebecers for the last 100 years, will not now play the role of third-class citizens in the New Quebec, and that not only will a knowledge of French be required but some kind of Québécois *esprit*, which really means that one gives up one's own and joins something else? What do you expect such people to do and what are you prepared to do for them in the light of your White Paper and some of the things you have said in the past?

Dr. Laurin:

What you have just said made me think of Voltaire: "Give me two lines of anyone and I will make them hang." Because words are always relative, they never give the true meaning of the one who writes them. They have to be taken in a larger context. I have, moreover, said many other things not in the White Paper. For example, I said that Quebec has to become as French as Ontario or any other province in Canada is English, but Italians, Portuguese, and Ukrainians live well in Ontario. They have their roots, they have their associations, they have developed their own specific cultural activities and they look happy. Yet in spite of all this Ontario is English. What is that, what does that mean? Ontario is institutionally English: English is the language of law, the language of justice, the language of work, the language of business, the language of the professions, the language spoken on the street, the common language, the language of communication, the language of social cohesion, and that is rightly so. Such is the situation in every country, even in those so-called federalist countries like Switzerland. Switzerland is thriving but in the French part everything is French, in the German part German, just as in Ontario everything is English. Quebec, too, will be French institutionally. That does not mean that everyone will have to speak French. The English minority will continue to be born, to live, and to die in English. They will have their schools, they will have their social services, their hospitals, their newspapers, their radio and TV stations, their cultural groups, their churches, and we will not intrude.

In spite of this Quebec will be French because Quebec French will be the official language, the language of internal communications, the language which the administration will use with the citizens, with the official bodies, as is done elsewhere.

I think we have to understand the true meaning of words. Quebec will be French as far as Ottawa's federal service intends to be bilingual, by which Ottawa means giving service in both languages spoken by the citizens who ask for help. It will be the same in Quebec, but this will not prevent the English minority or any other minority from speaking their own language in all the places or situations where they find themselves together. Not only will this not prevent any minority from developing its own cultural institutions, but the White Paper is explicit that the government considers all minorities to be an asset from the political, cultural, and social point of view. Our philosophy is not that of the melting pot; quite the contrary. We believe that each minority group brings its own system of values, its own human qualities. In some, for example, there is courage, in others tenacity, in still others intuitiveness, and in certain others reality. We do not want to be deprived of these qualities, and we intend to put all means, budgetary or institutional, at the groups' disposal to help them develop along their own lines. I alluded to that in the White Paper, and I will return to the point in another White Paper I am now preparing as policy for the Government of Quebec in all kinds of spheres. I intend, for example, to provide funds for the ethnic press, for the cultural groups themselves, for summer camps, Sunday schools, Saturday schools, and for the maintenance or creation of departments in universities. Competent individuals from ethnic groups will be encouraged to work in the Quebec government and all kinds of governmental bodies, but this is perfectly compatible, in my opinion, with Quebec being institutionally French. I see the French culture as a converging focus for the other cultures because it is a culture of the majority, but as a converging focus it should not delete or abolish the other cultures but, on the contrary, invite them, exchange with them, entertain a dialogue with them which should become more and more dynamic as time goes on. I do not have a word for this. Multi-culturalism, cultural pluralism, I do not know. I am not too anxious to find a name. I am more interested in things which are not only democratic but respectful of human individuality, human singularity, human richness, which are shared by all the nations and ethnic groups in the world.

Professor Tarnopolsky:

I would just have a very brief follow-up on that last point. If what

you say in your first White Paper and what you intend to include in your next one to protect the various ethnocultural groups in Quebec is true, I do not know why you use the term cultural pluralism in your talk and avoid multiculturalism. I do not know the difference between the two terms. Why is there such a resistance in Quebec to the policy of multiculturalism? For a moment, let us assume that Mr. Trudeau is honest in promoting multiculturalism (even while admitting that it is greatly underfunded), is not the federal government's multicultural policy really what you say you want to do? Why, then, should there be any criticism of, or resistance to, the federal policy of multiculturalism in the Province of Quebec?

Dr. Laurin:

I would say that difficulties probably arose because it was sometimes, if not often, used to erase the true spirit of confederation which, in the opinion of Quebecers, was an agreement between the two founding peoples—a kind of new contract whereby two founding peoples joined to rearrange the political situation. Many Quebecers felt that, as the situation developed in other provinces or in the federal government, there were people or politicians who tended, or wanted, to forget the original arrangement and to replace it with a new implicit philosophy, with which they could better oppose the idea of contract or agreement between two founding peoples. Emphasis was placed on multiculturalism as a way of diluting the original agreement or the original philosophy, but again I would not quarrel about words. I am more interested in the substance of things, and for want of a better term, I am personally ready to accept multiculturalism as long as I am able to apply it in my own way.

[Dr. Laurin was then questioned by individuals in the audience.]

Question:

Dr. Laurin, this is essentially a continuation of Professor Tarnopolsky's original question. As you have indicated, the inadequacy of Québécois involvement in the economics of Quebec is reflected in the comparatively low standard of living of the Québécois in comparison to other ethnic groups within Quebec itself. I would argue this inadequate economic role is the result of external investment, whose economic (and political) power, in fact, precedes the desired cultural and language autonomy to which you have referred. How does Quebec or the Parti Québécois hope to finance its cultural and language autonomy

in the context of today's Canada-United States economic interdependence, or, if you prefer, Canadian-American domination?

Dr. Laurin:

I would tend to make a joke and answer as did Mr. Wolfe of the Scottish National Party recently: "*It's Scotland oil or it's Alberta oil.*" We do not have oil in Quebec but I think we have many other riches, and the value of the dollar in the end depends on the material resources a country has. I think there are plenty in Quebec, and if a country is intelligent enough, clever enough to organize its institutions and economy, I think it has as good a chance as any other to succeed, often with less means or fewer material resources at its disposal. The present situation in Quebec may be a little worse than in Alberta or Ontario, but it is better than in New Brunswick or Newfoundland or Nova Scotia. In any case, the situation in Canada is bad everywhere today, with the rate of unemployment high enough to indicate a crisis perhaps not just in Canada but in the whole Western world. The world-wide economic situation is not linked specifically with the Quebec problem, with the Quebec cultural problem, the Quebec language problem.

As far as the future is concerned, I think certain situations have existed where Quebec has traditionally exported certain goods and imported others sometimes for hundreds of years. Even after having heard many other provincial premiers say that if Quebec secedes we will not do business with it any more, I wonder if we must take this as a final word. The language of money, the language of business, you know, is a stringent language, and when it comes to incomes, businessmen and employees both tend, I think, to forget their emotions a little and look at other realities. For example, if Ontario is the main provider of durable goods, and Quebec retaliated by declaring that it would buy its refrigerators or cars from the United States, or elsewhere, who would suffer most? It would be the province which had usually provided those goods. I think, again, that there have been commercial excesses which have existed for a long time, habits that have been formed to the best advantage of peoples on both sides of hypothetical frontiers, and we rely on common sense, on good business sense to discuss such relationships in the light of the political solutions we might take. Maybe it will not be necessary because everything will depend on what will come first in our discussions. As I have said, maybe we could discuss association before discussing independence; maybe we will have a go at the root, at the substance of things, without thinking too much of labelling or formulation. But the real substance of things in the end are the natural resources, the natural wealth which a country or a province has,

because in this Western world we have exchanged goods for centuries and centuries and it will so remain, regardless of the change in political regimes. But again this is anticipation. Looking at the kind of resources we have, I think we stand in as good a situation as any other nation. We would like to avoid, if possible, the economic repercussions or impact that would follow a change in the constitutional regime. Humans being what they are, we would like to avoid that, we hope to be able to avoid that, but even if we cannot avoid it, or to a certain extent reduce it, we think that Quebec, in the long run, has what it takes to stand on its own feet sooner or later.

Question:

With reference to your forthcoming White Paper on the cultural policy toward other ethnic groups in Quebec, I am particularly interested in your plan to implement this within the schools. Alberta has a bilingual school program where any ethnic group can provide 50 per cent of the instruction in any language other than English. Do you plan to have yours of a similar nature and if so, bearing in mind that my ethnic background consists of four ethnic groups, and should I marry someone of an equally mixed background to make eight ethnic groups, what qualifications would our kids have to have, were we to move to Quebec, to get into one of your programs in the light of the difficulties we hear about in regards to English schooling in Quebec this year? Would my children have to take half of their schooling in French and 1/16 in the language of the other ethnic groups?

Dr. Laurin:

At the present time in Quebec we have two complete school systems, from kindergarten to university, in both French and English. But no attention at all has been given to teaching in other mother tongues. The ethnic groups have been obliged to develop their own private systems by keeping certain schools open on certain evenings, or certain days of the week, or half days or Sundays. The Quebec government has helped with some money (not much really), and the federal government is also providing some money (again not much). This is just a beginning really. In the White Paper on language policy this would change. At the moment, the minister of education has created a task force which is to inquire into the feasibility of giving normal teaching at the elementary school level in the mother tongue for the most important ethnic groups, such as the Italians, the Greeks, and the Jews. Such feasibility studies are necessary because we have to have teachers, manuals, books, not only schools. With population trends the same

in Quebec as in other provinces, we have a lot of empty schools, but we have to have teachers and teaching materials. Within a year or a year and a half, we hope to come with a proposal to the ethnic groups in Quebec to offer teaching in the maternal language where there is a concentration of people not speaking French or English.

But this is only one of the things we have in mind. We would like also to introduce into the curriculum, at the secondary level, the cultural aspects and history of all the peoples forming the mosaic of the Quebec community. This would benefit not only the Italians or Greeks, for example, but the English-speaking and French-speaking people of Quebec. I think this would be a contribution to better understanding and a means to avoid the isolation I referred to earlier. The above changes were mentioned in the first White Paper; others will be given in the one I am preparing. We also intend to hold symposia in a few months where we will discuss such projects and others that will come from various interested bodies. It is through this process of mutual exchange and consultation that we wish to make explicit, concrete, and real the philosophy I have just expressed.

As far as your other question is concerned, if nothing changes, should you come to settle permanently in Quebec, and if your English studies have not been in Quebec, you would be obliged to send your children to French schools. I hope, however, that the proposal that there be reciprocity is accepted, and I do believe that it has a good chance to be accepted in one way or another in the coming years. That may only be my hope, but it is a well-reasoned hope.

Question:

You have said that the west has become a cultural cemetery for the French. I submit to you that one of the reasons for this is the historical neglect by the Province of Quebec of the French-Canadian minority in western Canada. Now, all of a sudden, with your most recent language policy and your negotiations with the other provinces, you have shown some attention to the French Canadians outside Quebec, a position which, I think, is very insincere, an insincerity reinforced by your statement that Quebec cannot lose, regardless of the course the premiers decide to take in reaction to Quebec's language policy. But let us assume that, in fact, your government is sincere in its concern for the French minority in western Canada. That sincerity has been a long time coming and that concern has been a long time coming. Why, then, are you not also willing to give western Canadians or Canadians outside of Quebec time to develop concern for the French language? That concern is now evident in Alberta which, as you are aware, has a

bilingual French-English program. My question, then, is twofold: Why are you not ready to wait for the rest of Canada to build its tolerance to the French language, and what is your government doing now, while still in confederation, to help French Canadians outside Quebec preserve their cultural identity and language?

Dr. Laurin:

If we had acted the way you seem to be suggesting, I think I would quickly hear very strong objections from your provincial premier, who would tell me to mind my own business. We did not do more than we did because there was no other choice. Each province is sovereign in the field of education and we have no right as Quebecers to invade or to intrude in that domain outside our borders. So, I do not think it is because Quebec has abandoned or left to their unhappy lot the French-speaking people in Alberta or in the west that they have experienced difficulties. It is because Quebec had no jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter. Such developments have to be explained in other ways. For example, either that they have become less and less numerous on account of immigration, or because various western governments have been very slow to give French Canadians access to French schools, or because English is really the language of communication in the west (and rightly so, because every country needs a common language, a language of communication) and even though the French-speaking people in the west may speak French at home, to earn a living or develop a career their children know that they not only have to learn English but they have to know it very well to win the positions they dream about. So, I think, those reasons are much more important than the one you mentioned. This is not to say that Quebec remains indifferent, but the only way it can intervene, the only obligation it has, is a moral obligation, not a political obligation. The only way it can intervene is by discussion, by negotiation at those meetings that take place from time to time, or by occasional editorializing about the subject. I think such are the only means at the disposal of Quebec, and even though Quebec intends to use them, they will never be a substitute for the action of specific provincial governments.

Question:

Is it not a fact that all legislation, including Bill 101, that Quebec has passed or is proposing to pass may be disallowed by the federal government as was the legislation passed by Alberta's Social Credit government during its early years in power?

Dr. Laurin:

Yes, you are right. Ottawa has a right to disallow and I think the last time it used that right was, as you said, against Alberta in 1943. But it was on a matter which I do not think was as important as the cultural destiny of a province or a people, and in spite of that I think there was such an upheaval at the time that the federal government has refrained from doing so since, because its actions would be difficult to accept today, what with the present evolution of Canadian democracy and of Canadian federalism. So, even though I admit that theoretically you are right, I do not think that it is congruent or consistent with present political evolution.

Question:

When you spoke of confederation as being a kind of deal worked out originally between the two founding nations, French and English, you did a very Canadian thing: you overlooked another central fact of life here on this continent and that is the plight of the native people. Here in Alberta we witness the phenomenon of native people coming to a new kind of understanding, an awareness of themselves similar to that of the people of Quebec in the fifties and sixties. They proclaim themselves a nation and demand to be treated as such. Similarly, the Inuit people now ask to be masters of their own destiny, independent but interdependent in accordance with reality. Are the native people of this country not a special case as well, just as Quebec is a special case, and do they not have their own history, their territorial claims, their culture, their tradition? They are more oppressed, perhaps the most oppressed group of people in every province. Would an independent Quebec grant native people the same kind of separatist arrangement that you are asking for within Canada?

Dr. Laurin:

I think that the federal government deprived the native people of their language and their culture by packing them into reserves, and by treating them in a paternalistic way. I think the federal government will do anything to prevent the native people in Canada from achieving the status to which you referred. I am well aware of that. As far as the Inuit people are concerned in Quebec, the point at issue between us is not the original language and culture, which are fully guaranteed in the charter in Bill 101. The point at issue is the use of their second language, which they claim is English. For us it could be English for a transitory period because this is the second language they have used under the trusteeship of the federal government for so many years. We add, how-

ever, that living in Quebec, as they do, if they want to communicate with the rest of Quebec, if they want to communicate with the French-speaking people already living among them and whose number will probably increase in the coming years, they should gradually introduce the use of French. Certain Inuit have accepted that, others have not. Be that as it may, I am of the opinion that they are people of Canada and of Quebec and that they have rights not only to their culture and to their language but to develop as they wish. The Quebec government would not like to imitate the federal government by treating them in a paternalistic manner. What we have in mind for the Inuit, in particular, is to give them the authority, the institutions, and the budget to develop according to their wishes, according to their specificity, with the modern tools that they will need. For this, we have in mind a plan, a project where they would be full masters of their institutions, of their municipal or regional bodies, and also masters of their cultural development. We have discussed the plan at length with some Inuit people and when the present conflict has subsided, I think we will find an agreement with them, a means to ensure this new venture, which will be quite different from the situation prevailing now on Quebec's Indian reserves.

We are also concerned about those Indians who have left the reserves and still want to retain their specificity. We have started talking with them. Their situation is more difficult because they have become citizens in their own right. However, we know that there is a movement among them to retain or to restore their original culture, in the same way that some Ukrainians here want to regain contact with their ancestors by coming back to the Ukrainian language. This we understand and we are ready to help them, but not with the kind of institutions the federal government has given them in Quebec or elsewhere in Canada. We are just at the beginning of our discussions and I think we will proceed in this field with at least as much consideration as I described earlier in discussing the other ethnic groups.

Question:

What is your view of the school boards in Montreal which have accepted children in clear breach of the new language law?

Dr. Laurin:

Well, in a democracy, if one does not accept a law, there are democratic means to dissent: for example, one can go to court or reject at the next election the government which passed what is considered to be a bad law. Those are the only means that can be tolerated in a democracy. I also think it is a shifting of responsibility, if not an outright mark

of irresponsibility, because the school boards place the responsibility on parents without informing them of the consequences their children might suffer in the future. They also promise to compensate for the loss of government funds through drives from which the anticipated millions might not come. So, even though I can understand the boards' reactions, I think it is impossible for the Quebec government to admit this kind of behavior, even though it will not take drastic action against it. It has stated its position, which is an administrative one, and it will let the people themselves judge. We hope that good sense, good reasoning will prevail, and if some anglophone people in Quebec are not satisfied they will choose other ways to let their views be known and have the situation changed, but for the moment I do not think it will help them to act in such an irresponsible manner.

Question:

Dr. Laurin, I would like to ask the following question: Why is it so that in Switzerland, which has very distinct cultural communities, the Swiss German is profoundly German, the Swiss Romansh is really French culturally, and yet there is a genuine feeling of Swiss political nationality and real commitment to Switzerland as a country, as a nation, which seems so absent in Canada today? This is one question; the other is: Do the French-Canadian people have a commitment to Canada as a whole or only to Quebec? What is their fatherland?

Dr. Laurin:

As far as Switzerland is concerned, I think it is true that they have a profound sense of national unity. It was slow to come because Switzerland has a long history and I think it took centuries to see that, if they wanted to retain their specific individuality, they had to unite. In a way, probably the German Swiss had 'big' Germany at their door, just as the French Swiss had 'big' France at their door, and it was as a defensive reaction that unity took place to preserve whatever was precious to them. They have managed to come to a *modus vivendi* where everyone is master in his own canton, in his house, and the matter of national belonging is something that has been given voluntarily, deliberately, reasonably by each in view of a common good. This common good in Canada, I think, has never emerged. In the last one hundred years, we took little time to think it over, to explore an agreement. Maybe if we had devoted more time to it, perhaps if we had made an effort to understand each other better when the time was right, we might have achieved something similar to what now exists in Switzerland. Maybe it is not too late, maybe we will come to it, but I do not think that we have here

the conditions that prevailed in Switzerland and which gave rise to what we know now as the Helvetic nation.

As to your second question, you know Quebecers were really the first Canadians. Quebecers gave a name to Canada. For a very long time Quebecers used to describe themselves as *les Canadiens*, the Canadians, and the English-speaking people were called *les Anglais*; they were not even called Canadians, and it is only as history developed that Quebecers felt less and less Canadian because of factors alluded to earlier, some linked with the federal power, others with the development of other parts of Canada, still others with the reactions of provincial governments toward francophone minorities. It would take too long to describe all this, but gradually Quebecers came to feel that they were restricted, that they were obliged to regress, to come back to their point of origin which was Quebec, from where all the explorers departed to discover the west. Gradually they found that they felt at home only in Quebec, because every time they left it, they were faced with another reality, an English reality, where nobody or very few spoke their language. They did not feel that they were understood and gradually they were obliged to restrict themselves, to come back to their point of departure. The time has come when Quebecers have found a new name and they perceive themselves more as Quebecers than Canadians, though at the bottom of their hearts they still perceive themselves as Canadians. Nonetheless, as time passes, the Quebecer tends to replace the Canadian more and more, and given more time, the former will become even more important.

Question:

As a professional psychiatrist, Dr. Laurin has diagnosed the situation in Quebec as one of suffering from an insecurity complex. What concerns me, first of all, is whether he feels that this insecurity has been modified by, or at least reached the beginnings of rehabilitation by, the election of November 15. Whether, in view of this, perhaps part of the need for a completely independent break from the rest of Canada has been accomplished and that a psychological break is not the end-all and be-all of what Quebec is struggling for. And as a supplementary to this, whether he sees some form of negotiated agreement giving greater powers to Quebec in the areas which he feels are necessary for its survival as a cultural entity, and whether these powers within a looser form of federation or associated status would be sufficient to satisfy the demands of Quebec.

Dr. Laurin:

As a psychiatrist and as a physician I am more interested in health

than in disease. I would rather think of myself as a physician in Chinese terms, where a doctor is paid as long as his customers are healthy. When his customers are sick he is not paid any more because it is now his responsibility to make them well again. However, I am not interested chiefly in complex definitions of health. One which impressed me a lot 15 years ago was that given by the World Health Organization, which defined health as a state of physical, mental, and social well-being. To be healthy, therefore, involves a lot of things, as you can see. After pondering that definition and looking not only at my patients but at my fellow Quebecers, I could see that some important ingredients were missing, and it is only after having diagnosed those missing elements that I came to the idea of what could be done to replace them. Positive conclusions about the needed ingredients which would constitute remedies followed. So, the needed remedies we think we have found to a certain extent. We would surely be pleased if the same remedies could be applied to Canada as a whole. Perhaps it is still not too late. I said earlier, things are changing in Quebec, and the changes are more visible since November 15. Perhaps they will be seen and understood by an increasing number of people in Canada in the coming years, what with all the current debate everywhere in Canada. One never knows what will happen. If to the change that has taken place in Quebec is added the change that is now taking place in other parts of Canada, a change that hopefully will assume concrete forms in the months or years to come, anything can happen. We can discuss and probably find better remedies that would be good for Quebec as well as for Canada, and even Quebec with Canada.

Ethnic Minorities and the Nationality Policy of the Parti Québécois

Ivan M. Myhul

Quebec nationalisms, both traditional and contemporary, assume that Quebec is a colonized, dominated, and dependent society, characterized by stress and frustration.¹ In traditional nationalist ideology, stress is depicted as a form of an anticipated harm against the French-Canadian community. Contemporary nationalism refers to impediments that hinder the affirmation of Quebec national identity as being stress conducive. Likewise, if frustration is seen as a reaction, an apprehension to goal blockage, then both forms of nationalism emphasize detraction from the goal of French-Canadian or Quebec nation-building as frustration productive.

In addition to stress and frustration, both ideologies refer to threat. Quebec society is depicted as threatened socio-economically, politically, and culturally by “foreign” (American and Anglo-Canadian) capital and institutions (federal government) and by “foreigners” (the *allogènes*² and the Anglo-Celtic Québécois).³

This reaction to, and fear of, foreigners is said to be a by-product of colonialism,⁴ the collective phobia of a people who exhibit the traits of an inferiority complex. The xenophobia of the French Québécois may be regarded as a hostile outburst that manifests itself in times of acute socio-economic crisis (the thirties, the late sixties, and seventies) and which ideologically muddles the source and substance of threat by detracting from real socio-economic causes by emphasizing irrelevant factors. In a sense, Quebec’s fear of foreigners is a displacement of real or perceived threat, frustration, and stress onto a collectivity that is even weaker than the French Québécois, that is, the *allogènes*.⁵

In the thirties xenophobia, with its heavy dosage of anti-Semitism,

was the isolationist response of a society disrupted by the challenge of capitalism and urbanization. With the immigrant influx to Montreal, anti-urban response became intertwined with xenophobia.⁶ Undoubtedly it was also the reaction of the French-Québécois petty bourgeoisie, threatened by the emergent *allogène* liberal professionals and small business men.⁷

Until the quiet revolution the dominant nationalist ideology, with its emphasis on the "culturalist" *survivance* of an ethnically homogeneous French-Canadian nation, stressed the establishment and maintenance of ethnic boundaries from within and without. Historically, the preservation of the ethnic boundary contributed toward the development of parallel Anglo-Celtic and French-Québécois structures and institutions. The maintenance of psychological boundary may be perceived in geographic terms with the emergence, in Montreal, of "zones of silence."⁸

This traditional, isolationist, agriculturalist, clerical, and anti-statist ideology, with its emphasis on ethnic boundaries, was not only not receptive, but positively hostile toward new immigrants. The perception of Quebec differed substantially from the rest of North American immigrant society. While English-speaking Canada subscribed to a view of immigrants as atomized and malleable ethnics who could be absorbed into the existing culture, French Quebec tended to identify ethnicity with nationality in the European sense, a phenomenon which precluded ethnic boundary crossing. Because of this ideological barrier as well as for socio-economic reasons, the *allogène* population of Quebec has tended, since the mid-1930s, to integrate into the Quebec Anglo-Celtic community. With time, this boundary crossing was reinforced by the process of language transfer or assimilation, and has contributed toward the emergence of a social entity called the Quebec anglophones. In North American terms, the emergence of a multi-ethnic anglophone population was the rule. In the Quebec context, the emergence of a multi-ethnic anglophone community came, in time, to be viewed as an ambiguous and threatening social category.

The post-World War II economic boom eclipsed Quebec's ethnic problems, and it is only in the late sixties, an era of multiple crises, that the *allogène* threat emerged to disturb the new liberal professional strata. Trained in administrative skills, steeped in a developmental and technological view of society, the new strata disestablished the rural and clerical segments of the Quebec petty bourgeoisie.⁹ Along with intellectuals, labor leaders, and journalists, this strata challenged and displaced the traditional ideology.¹⁰ Frustrated by clerical authoritarianism and effectively debarred from managerial positions in private

Anglo-dominated corporations, this petty bourgeoisie turned toward an entrepreneurial view of the Quebec state. As bureaucrats within a French-Quebec state, the members of the petty bourgeoisie could challenge the English-speaking Canadian bourgeoisie via state capitalism, and in the process transform Quebec society in the name of an ideology of *rattrapage*.¹¹

This process of Quebec state-building became intertwined with Quebec nation-building as Quebec "nation-ess" dislodged the nebulous idea of a French-Canadian nation. Quebec statehood emerged as a matrix in which the process of national self-realization was to take place. Not surprisingly, by the late sixties, sovereignty had emerged as a precondition of this national self-realization, because the concept of sovereignty evoked the integrity of a French-Québécois national community. In a sense, the politicization of nationalism was the result of a process of expanded state activity during the quiet revolution in the fields of health, welfare, and education, and, to some extent, the economy. The Québécois were encouraged to become politicized and to make political demands which, in turn, required further expansion of Quebec state power and authority.¹²

The quiet revolution raised expectations which were only partially met, and which contributed to further stress and frustration.¹³ Educational reform did not significantly improve the social mobility of the French Québécois. The language of work in the private sector remained essentially English, and, in addition, the Quebec state failed to produce social and economic programs demanded by the labor unions and French-Québécois working classes.¹⁴ Expectations of further expansion of the state sector were frustrated by the accession to power of Trudeau in Ottawa, and Bertrand and Bourassa in Quebec.

Symbolically, it was the 1968 St. Léonard school crisis that triggered the current wave of xenophobia. Contributing to the hostile outburst were the stress and frustration resulting from federal biculturalism, bilingualism, and multiculturalism policies, and the rapid assimilation of francophones in all parts of Canada and some assimilation in the Montreal region. However, the most serious threat to the survival of the French-Québécois nation came with the realization that the birth-rate in French Quebec had dropped substantially at a time when the multi-ethnic Quebec anglophone community, essentially concentrated in Montreal, had grown and was expanding.¹⁵ The identification of the *allogène* component of the anglophone community as the main threat to the French Québécois allowed a convergence of old and new nationalisms and the establishment of a broad nationalist alliance, *le Mouvement Québec français*, dedicated to linguistic, cultural, and ethnic

social engineering in Quebec.¹⁶ Proclaimed a danger, the *allogènes* became the scapegoats for more complex socio-economic problems and were used as a substitute for a confrontation with the Anglo-Celts of Quebec.¹⁷

According to nationalist thinking, the survival of the French Québécois would be assured provided the multi-ethnic Quebec anglophone community were dismantled. In order to engage in this act of social engineering it was necessary to impress the Quebec population that:

1. The multi-ethnic Quebec anglophone community was artificial and cultureless, and as such, could be done away with.¹⁸
2. The *allogène* ethnic boundary crossing was an “insensitive” and “treasonous” activity which disregarded the collective rights of the French Québécois; it was to be tolerated no longer, with past “unjust” practices to be punished.¹⁹
3. The Quebec Anglo-Celts, if they were to be tolerated, had to be encapsulated and cut off from any further demographic influx.²⁰
4. The concept of a Quebec nation had to be enlarged in order to legitimize the absorption of the *allogènes*.²¹ The Quebec nation was to become a multi-ethnic community which would be based on the French language and the cultural values of the French Québécois. Not surprisingly, language Bills 85, 63, and 22 were not well received by nationalist groups.²² Bill 63, passed in 1969 as “An Act to promote the French Language in Quebec,” exasperated the French-Québécois nationalists by pursuing the policy of ethnic boundary blurring through the provision of parental freedom of choice of the language of instruction. The “Official Languages Act” of 1974, Bill 22, proclaimed the French language as a national heritage and made it the official language of Quebec. Bill 22 did foresee ethnic boundary engineering, for the parental freedom of choice of language of instruction was severely restricted. Without employing an ethnic criterion, Bill 22 relied on the display of minimal competence in English to determine accessibility to English schools. Yet the legislation was condemned by nationalists as too weak. It is difficult, however, to assess the social engineering aspect of this bill because it was replaced too soon by Bill 101, “The Charter of the French Language.”²³

The Parti Québécois language legislation is not very original. It is more Cartesian rather than *ad hoc*, based on a whole series of premises as well as on past language legislation and nationalist demands. Despite the ideological emphasis on decolonization and emancipation, the Péquiste language policy is not marked by any significant de-Angliciza-

tion. In fact, the new language law is more confusing than Bill 22: the latter was explicitly pro-French Québécois; Bill 101 is pro-Québécois, without spelling out the latter's meaning. The most striking similarity between Bills 22 and 101 lies in the discrepancies between the linguistic and cultural affirmations, on the one hand, and the economic reality, on the other. This is due to the ideological orientation and the social base of the Parti Québécois. The party is an outgrowth and continuation of the quiet revolution. It is a nationalist, petty bourgeois party preoccupied with the development of a statist French-Québécois capitalism, in conflict with the Canadian industrial and financial bourgeoisie, but not with American monopolies.²⁴ The party is an advocate of social peace and a skillful manipulator of *souveraineté-association*, a pretext for not tackling socio-economic problems and for using the Canadian government as a scapegoat for all Quebec ills.²⁵ In a sense, the use of the "others" in Ottawa for the purpose of enhancing an assertive nationalist self-image may diminish the anti-foreigner reaction which for a long time has been symbolized by the *allogènes*. But for the moment, xenophobia is recognized as a serious French-Québécois problem and is identified as such by the Parti Québécois White Paper (*Quebec's Policy on the French Language*).²⁶ Foreigners, the "others," are said to be constantly perceived by the French Québécois as threatening their institutions, rights, and traditions. This, nevertheless, is justified on the grounds that Quebec is a colonized society:

Certainly, a people uncertain of its cultural future may at times adopt a hostile attitude to strangers who settle in its territory. Quebec society is unfortunately not always exempt from prejudice towards new arrivals.²⁷

Despite a history of ethnic problems in Quebec, the Parti Québécois, before its 1976 election, had made a few passing references to Inuits, Amerindians, and the Anglo-Celts, but said virtually nothing about the *allogènes*, except to designate them as a threat.²⁸ Since the Péquistes have formed the Quebec government, they have evolved a policy on the nationality question, an evolution characterized by hesitancy, inconsistency, and contradiction. The policy has incorporated virtually all the ideas of nationalist groups advanced in the last decade, to the exclusion of French unilinguists.

To formulate such a policy, the government was forced to attempt to define "Québécois" and to decide who qualified as a member of the Quebec "nation" and "people." Unfortunately, it appears that the

Parti Québécois has still to present a coherent conceptual formulation. Part of the problem seems to lie in the desire to combine an ethnocentric concept with a multi-ethnic one.²⁹

There are numerous references to ethnicity as being co-terminous with a nation. A Quebec nation is thus defined by a normative concept of culture, by the existence of a high culture. This means that the Quebec nation is not simply a product of common living, but a result of a process of self-awareness. Significantly, and in contrast to Quebec culture, ethnic culture is used to characterize the *allogènes*, people who are not entitled to the status of a nation.

Numerous attempts have been made to list the distinct attributes of a Quebec nation, though in the final analysis, these may be narrowed down to culture and territory:

Quebec is a nation . . . it has possessed for a long time . . . a territory, a language, a culture, institutions, a history, and, most of all, a collective will to live and a goal. The Francophone Quebecer is rooted in this nation by all the fibers of his being.³⁰

Despite this emphasis on culture, for all practical purposes the French language is used as the most tangible and symbolic characteristic of Quebec national uniqueness. The language is referred to as “. . . a way of life, a manner of conceiving one’s existence,”³¹ or as:

both dialogue and argument . . . language . . . is a real and concrete medium and not just a means of communication.³²

Finally, the French language has been said to be “the soul of the nation.”³³ These attempts at distinguishing the Quebec nation through the contrast with English-speaking Canada are reinforced by the peculiar status that the Quebec nation is said to have in North America:

The Quebec nation is neither entirely European nor North American. It is American by geography and destiny but not entirely by culture and values.³⁴

A complicating factor is the existence in Quebec of an Anglo-Celtic Canadian national minority whose nation, territory, and political institutions are found across the Quebec borders in Canada.³⁵ No reference is made to the existence of any other nation, indicating that no *allogène* ethnic community merits the status of “nation-ess.”

The ethnocentric formulation of a Quebec nation is juxtaposed to the

conceptualization that divorces ethnicity from nation.³⁶ Thus formulated, the Quebec nation is identified with a political community, a state, with a population dominated by the French Québécois (the founding people) and consisting of various other immigrants ranging alphabetically from the Anglo-Celts to the Ukrainians.³⁷ The inhabitants of the Quebec nation, perceived in these terms, are the citizens of a state, referred to as the “Quebec people.”³⁸ René Lévesque is attributed with the following quote which underlines a North American rather than a European concept of a nation:

A Quebecker is anyone who lives in Quebec, pays Quebec taxes and considers himself a Quebecker.³⁹

This non-nationalist formulation is not shared by all members of the Parti Québécois:

To be a Québécois, it is not sufficient to simply pay taxes, it is necessary to share collective aspirations which logically will soon culminate in our political sovereignty.⁴⁰

Difficulties with defining the Quebec nation or people have contributed toward confusion concerning ethnic groups in Quebec. On the one hand, it appears that the criteria for designating an ethnic group is self-identification; on the other hand, the entire Péquiste nationality policy is based on the premise that the Quebec government has sole monopoly of defining an ethnic minority and designating who belongs to which language group.⁴¹ This designation of who is whom is a necessary step in the dismantling of the anglophone community, an act of decolonization.⁴² The Péquiste nationality policy envisages three distinct ethnic categories. The Amerindians and Inuits are presented as a special entity, while the Quebec Anglo-Celts and the *allogènes* are identified as the main constituents of the illegitimate anglophone community.

Simplistic dialects are used in order to cover-up the harsh reality of the anticipated end-product of the Péquiste policy. On the one hand, the nationality policy elaborates on the past contribution of the ethnic groups toward the enrichment of a nebulous Quebec “national culture,” proclaimed to be a “common good” of all Québécois.⁴³ The ethnic groups are therefore invited to preserve and develop their cultural traits and languages. On the other hand, the existence of the ethnic groups is perceived as a threat, consequently the “flourishing” of ethnic cultures is to be tolerated provided it is accompanied by a more powerful

drive toward the “mutual enrichment” of ethnic cultures leading to their eventual “fusion” into the Québécois “common culture,” implicitly understood in this context to be French Québécois.⁴⁴ This repressive and assimilationist orientation, keystone of the Péquiste nationality policy, does not conform to the self-projected image of the PQ as a nationalistic party dedicated to the principles of self-determination of people. The effect of the nationality policy is to put the Quebec ethnic groups into the same position from which the PQ wishes to emancipate the French Québécois. Oddly enough, the policy does not even attempt to cope with the nature of this problem or the nature of the new Quebec society of multi-ethnic origin.

The first step in the eradication of the Quebec anglophone community involves a policy toward the Quebec Anglo-Celts. Initially, they are exalted as being “true Québécois,” the only “legitimate” anglophones and an “irreducible” component of the Quebec national heritage.⁴⁵ Since the PQ language policy officially rejects a unilingual French Quebec, the Anglo-Celts are allowed to preserve their language, way of life, and educational system. These rights, claims the PQ, are not constitutionally guaranteed, implying that they may be eliminated in the same way that Anglo-Celtic “acquired rights” were abolished.⁴⁶ The new language law recognizes article 93 of the BNA Act, for it guarantees the right of English schooling. At the same time, however, it places the English language on the same level as any other minority language:

Where this act does not require the use of the official language exclusively, the official language and another language may be used together.⁴⁷

It is hard to imagine this move as anything else but an act of vengeance for past injustices.

Even though English-language schooling is assured, the access to English schools is severely restricted to children of parents who had their elementary education in English in Quebec, or to children of parents who had an English education elsewhere but resided in Quebec before August 26, 1977, when Bill 101 became law.⁴⁸ English-speaking Canadians moving permanently to Quebec will not be allowed to send their children to English schools.⁴⁹ This policy would encapsulate the Quebec Anglo-Celts and their educational institutions, cut off potential demographic in-flow, and eventually eliminate by atrophy both the Anglo-Celts and their institutions. In this respect there is a hidden French unilingual bias in Bill 101.

It appears that the Lévesque government is not prepared to relax the

rules regarding entrance into Quebec English schools even to residents of provinces which might offer a full range of educational services in French to francophone minorities. The Quebec government recognizes only legal reciprocal language agreements between Quebec and other provinces as a basis for extending the scope of article 73 of Bill 101.⁵⁰

Finally, the Péquiste nationality policy unilaterally abolishes section 133 of the BNA Act, for according to article 7 of Bill 101:

French is the language of the legislation and the courts in Quebec.

Further restrictions of Anglo-Celtic rights are found in stipulations regarding legislative texts. All pieces of legislation are to be drafted, passed, and assented to in French. English versions are allowed, but they are not recognized as official.⁵¹

Even though the attitude toward the Anglo-Celts is the basis of the policy of dismantlement of the anglophone society, the Péquiste nationality policy is chiefly and primarily aimed at all the ethnic groups classified as the *allogènes*.⁵² The initial classification of the *allogènes* is substantially different from the Anglo-Celts. The former do not carry the negative connotation attributed to the latter, that is, they are not “colonials.” However, the *allogènes* are not “true Québécois” in the sense that they did not take part in Quebec nation-building. Contrary to the Anglo-Celts, the *allogènes* arrived when the Quebec nation is said to have been already constituted, consequently they have no right to “modify” it. All they can do is passively “join” it.⁵³ The nationality policy explicitly states that in contrast to the Anglo-Celts, who have certain privileges, the *allogènes* have neither rights nor privileges:

There could not... be any question of granting privileges to minority languages and cultures.

The *allogènes* are perceived as malleable individuals whose utility lies in the replenishment of the dwindling French-Québécois population. For this reason the granting of any privileges would be counter-productive, for it would endanger:

the integration of these groups in Quebec’s French-language society.⁵⁴

In addition, and this is ideologically significant, the *allogènes* have been the “collaborators” of the colonial Anglo-Celts, and are a threat to the very survival of French-Québécois “national language and cul-

ture.”⁵⁵ Given these ideological premises, the isolation of the *allogènes* from the Anglo-Celts and their absorption into the French-Québécois community is justified. Yet, as if anticipating criticism, the Périquiste nationality policy carefully enunciates that the *allogènes* must not be belittled, forcefully de-Anglicized, or brutally assimilated.⁵⁶ Being distinct from the Anglo-Celts, the *allogènes* are no longer to benefit from the extension of Anglo-Celtic right to English schooling which was granted by Bill 63. This policy serves both the purpose of undermining Anglo-Celtic institutions and the streaming of *allogènes* into French-language schools.

Once the nationality policy isolates the *allogènes*, it then placates them by pointing out that *allogène* languages have the same status as the English language.⁵⁷ Even though the federal idea of multiculturalism is rejected, similar paternalistic views are advocated.⁵⁸ Much is made of proposals to institute *allogène* radio and television programs and to subsidize the ethnic press as well as “cultural events of all kinds.”⁵⁹ In reality, this appears to be limited to Quebec Ministry of Immigration grants which are not aimed at the development of *allogène* communities but their absorption, for the granting is aimed exclusively at projects which foster “inter-ethnic comprehension” and which have the French Québécois public in mind.⁶⁰ This meagre policy is similar to the federal multicultural projects which also focus on “inter-ethnic comprehension.”⁶¹

The PQ government envisages token courses in the language, civilization, and history of the *allogènes*, to be taught in French public or Saturday schools, as well as courses for “certain illiterates and adult immigrants.”⁶² Finally, almost condescendingly, the *allogènes* are granted the right to use:

the language of their choice in their daily life . . . [except for] specific sectors as defined by the Charter.⁶³

This irreverent and annihilationist attitude reduces the *allogène* languages and cultures to the level of folklore, the Charter of the French Language having already established French predominance in all aspects of life. It is highly likely that once the *allogènes* are effectively divorced from the anglophone community, little will remain even of this tokenism and the main thrust of the nationality policy will concentrate on the selection and integration of future immigrants.⁶⁴

The PQ is evolving a specific nationality policy toward the Amerindians and Inuits. To them, the term “minorités autochtones” is applied, and they are not to be treated as ethnic minorities.⁶⁵ Contrary

to the Anglo-Celts who have no "acquired rights," and the *allogènes* who are declared to have no "distinct rights," the Amerindians and Inuits are given a status virtually separate from the Quebec nation.⁶⁶ Generally speaking, there is no detailed nationality policy toward these numerically small but politically sensitive people. For the moment there is hesitancy between encapsulation and self-determination, because Cree and Inuit languages of instruction are guaranteed by Bill 101.⁶⁷ The Charter does not guarantee the indigenous rights of the Amerindians and Inuits but does so in a territorial fashion, which appears to contravene the James Bay Treaty. The new language policy does mildly challenge the anglophone status of both peoples, but it in no way resembles the policy toward the *allogènes*.⁶⁸

Finally, it should be clear that the Péquiste policy toward francophone minorities is not well defined. There are a few references to the "repatriation" of Canadian francophones to Quebec, nebulous statements that advocate their "protection" but mostly suggest that the francophone minorities have been written off.⁶⁹

In conclusion, impressionistic evidence indicates that the short-range effect of the Péquiste nationality policy has been the erosion of the privileged status of the Anglo-Celts and the instilling, to some extent, of a minority attitude and certain isolation of both the Anglo-Celts and the *allogènes* from English-speaking Canada. In addition, the effect of the policy has been to encourage emigration and the realization that multi-ethnic anglophone Quebec is politically impotent and leaderless. It must be remembered that the PQ nationality policy follows Bill 22, which had already isolated and rendered fairly powerless the Anglo-Celts and the *allogènes*.⁷⁰ The present political impotency is reinforced by the lack of Anglo-Celtic and *allogène* participation in the cabinet, the Parti Québécois caucus, and among the top echelons of the Quebec civil service.⁷¹ This situation may lead to a defeatist attitude and encourage further emigration, which in a sense will simplify the minority problem. On the other hand, there is some evidence of a rather timid political organization among the multi-ethnic anglophones. Primarily oriented toward the forthcoming referendum, it is conceivable that both the Anglo-Celts and *allogènes* would organize themselves as effective pressure groups in Quebec City and influence the implementation of the government's nationality policy.⁷²

It is also conceivable that unanticipated problems may emerge in the middle- or long-range dismantlement of the anglophone community and the assimilation of the *allogènes*. The main stumbling block may reside in the reluctance of the French Québécois to accept "foreigners" and a like reluctance on the part of the *allogènes* to be viewed as cul-

turally interchangeable in an era of North American ethnic affirmation.⁷³ Should the reluctance to accept foreigners be combined with pressing socio-economic problems, it is conceivable that a new outburst of xenophobia would generate nationalistic demands which would stop nothing short of radical de-Anglicization and the establishment of a unilingual French Quebec. This development may occur in either a "sovereign and associated" or an independent Quebec.

The long-awaited White Paper on Cultural Development will most likely deal with the nationality policy and it may stir up a controversy similar to the one generated by the White Paper on Language and the Charter of the French Language.⁷⁴ Because of this and the increased concern of the cabinet with economic matters, especially unemployment, the detailed contents of the new White Paper have remained secret. In his inaugural address to the 1978 session of the Quebec legislature, Premier Lévesque has stretched the notion of "social peace" to include inter-ethnic relations. The Quebec government, he declared, now seeks to establish "harmonious and fraternal co-existence with all minority groups."⁷⁵ However, because the multi-ethnic anglophone community has expressed disagreement with the PQ nationality policy, it is unlikely that the Parti Québécois will change its intolerant attitude toward its detractors.⁷⁶

The Péquiste nationality policy may have attenuated stress, frustration, and the feeling of threat among the French Québécois, but it has simultaneously evoked stress, frustration, and a feeling of alienation among the Anglo-Celts and the *allogènes*. The irony of French-Québécois nationalism (like any nationalism) is that it is based on the faulty assumption that it is possible to establish a fairly homogeneous nation-state even if it is at the price of subjugating the non-French Québécois. French-Québécois nationalism effectively scraps the idea of a universal self-determination of people for it does not see that the argument for French Québécois self-determination, including the separation from Canada, may be analogous to Amerindian, Inuit, Anglo-Celtic, and *allogène* self-determination, including separation from Quebec.

NOTES

1. The idea of Quebec as a colony was most explicitly stated in the post-war period by Raymond Barbeau, who in 1957 created the Alliance Laurentien. A socialist twist was given to the same concept in 1959 by Raoul Roy and *La Revue Socialiste*. It was further developed by the *Parti-pris*, the *Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale*, and left-wing writers. All of this led to the conceptualization of a French-Québécois nation, which was said to be co-terminous with a colonized social class. R. Barbeau,

Le Québec bientôt unilingue? (Montréal, Les éditions de l'homme, 1961); R. Roy, "Propositions programmatiques de la Revue Socialiste," *La Revue Socialiste*, No. 1 (1959); R. Jones, *Community in Crisis; French Canadian Nationalism in Perspective* (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1972), 69-92; C. Gagnon, "Classe et conscience de la classe au Québec," *Socialisme 69*, No. 18 (juillet, août, sept. 1969), 60-75; P. Vallières, *Nègres blancs d'Amérique* (Montréal, Editions Parti-pris, 1969); *Quebec's Policy on the French Language* (Québec, l'Editeur officielle du Québec, 1977), 8, 49, 106.

- Literary works often portray well the colonial status of Quebec. See, e.g., F. A. Savard, *Menaud maître-draveur* (Montréal, Cercle du Livre de France, 1965); M. Tremblay, *Les Belles-Sœurs* (Montréal, Leméac, 1972).
2. The Gendron Report defines an *allogène* as "any person of origin other than British or French." *The Position of the French Language in Quebec Book III The Ethnic Groups* (Québec, Gouvernement du Québec, 1972), 2. (Cited hereafter as Gendron Report). The *allogènes* are not numerous. According to ethnic origin, they constituted 10.4 per cent of the Quebec population in 1971. According to mother tongue, the *allogènes* formed 6.2 per cent of the Quebec population in 1971 and 5.4 in 1976. For the 1976 census results, see *Le Devoir*, 3 sept. 1977.
 3. The fear of foreigners is a delicate subject, discussion of which is avoided in any society. Xenophobia is not an intrinsic French-Québécois phenomenon. For a discussion of Anglo-Canadian xenophobia, see R. Betcherman, *The Swastika and the Maple Leaf* (Toronto, Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1975); W. Stewart, *But Not in Canada* (Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1976).
 4. "Autour de nous des étrangers sont venus, qu'il nous plaît d'appeler des barbares; ils ont pris presque tout le pouvoir; ils ont acquis presque tout l'argent; mais au pays du Québec rien n'a changé." L. Hémon, *Maria Chapdelaine* (Montréal, Fides, 1949), 148; *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 106.
 5. P. Cappon, *Conflit entre les Néo-Canadiens et les francophones de Montréal* (Québec, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1974), 7, 33, 34, 35; F. Loranger, *Médium Saignant* (Ottawa, Leméac, 1970), 37-38, 48, 55-56, 59-61, 68, 87, 99-100. The virulence of the anti-*allogène* attack in *Médium Saignant* has been recently matched by the entertainer C. Landré, *The Montreal Star*, April 2, 1977.
 6. E. C. Hughes, *French Canada in Transition* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963), 215-16.
 7. D. Monière, *Le développement des idéologies au Québec* (Montréal, Editions Québec/Amérique, 1972), 270, 281.
 8. Gendron Report, 141; Stein, "Le rôle des Québécois non-francophones dans le débat actuel entre le Québec et le Canada," *Etudes Internationales*, VIII (juin 1977), 297-98.
 9. H. Guindon, "Two Cultures: An Essay on Nationalism, Class, and Ethnic tension" in R. H. Leach (ed.), *Contemporary Canada* (Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1967), 33-59; L. Racine and R. Denis, "La conjoncture politique québécoise depuis 1960," *Socialisme Québécois*, No. 21-22 (1971), 17-79.
 10. D. Monière, *Le développement des idéologies au Québec* (Montréal, Editions Québec/Amérique, 1977), 308ff.

11. A. Breton, "The Economics of Nationalism," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXXII (Aug. 1964), 383, 385ff; C. Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study," *Queen's Quarterly*, LXXII (Spring 1965), 152, 158, 168.
12. D. Posgate and K. McRoberts, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis* (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 104, 125, 130.
13. *Ibid.*, 133-35.
14. G. Racine, *La Presse*, 14 nov. 1970; W. Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power* (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 232. J. M. Pottie, "Le syndicalisme au Québec depuis 1960" in D. Ethier, J. M. Pottie, and J. Reynolds, *Les travailleurs contre l'Etat bourgeois* (Montréal, l'Aurore, 1975); L. M. Tremblay, *Idéologies de la CSN et de la FTQ: 1940-1970* (Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1972).
15. All demographic projections indicate a declining French-Québécois birth rate. However, it is difficult to see this as a threat to the very survival of the French Québécois. Alarmist and exaggerated nationalistic accounts have appeared in *Relations*, *Maintenant*, *Action Nationale*, and *Montréal-Matin*. They should be compared with the following academic studies: H. Charbonneau, J. Henripin, and J. Légaré, "L'avenir démographique des francophones au Québec et à Montréal en l'absence de politiques adéquates," *Revue de géographie de Montréal*, XXIV (1970), 199-202, first published in *Le Devoir*, 4 nov. 1969, which brought to light the demographic *allogène* problem; J. Henripin, *L'immigration et le déséquilibre linguistique* (Ottawa, Main-d'oeuvre et immigration, 1974). It is interesting to note that in 1977 Henripin revised his demographic forecast in favor of the French Québécois. *Le Devoir*, 16 juillet 1977. The announcement came in the middle of the Bill 1 debate, during which the Péquiste government relied on the idea of a demographic *allogène* threat. C. Laurin even established an *ad hoc* group, composed of two demographers, M. Baillargeon and C. Benjamin, who were to produce reports which would break up the Péquiste stand. Not surprisingly, Henripin was attacked for his revised forecast. See L. Duchesne and M. Termotte, *Le Devoir*, 8 août 1977.
16. Organizational members of the *Mouvement* are:
 - l'Alliance des professeurs de Montréal
 - l'Association québécoise des professeurs de français
 - la Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec
 - la Confédération des syndicats nationaux
 - la Fédération des travailleurs du Québec
 - le Mouvement national des québécois
 - la Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal
 - l'Union des producteurs agricoles
 The total individual membership was over 775,000.
17. Cappon, 124ff.
18. G. Caldwell, "English-Speaking Quebec in the Light of Its Reaction to Bill 22," paper presented at the American Northeastern Anthropological Association, Wesleyan University, March 27, 1976, 18; F. Dumont, *The Montreal Star*, Oct. 22, 1977.
19. Cappon, 35-37.
20. G. Bouthillier, "Le bill 22: les tenants et les aboutissants de l'action linguis-

- tique" in *La modernisation politique du Québec* (Montréal, Éditions du Boréal Express, 1976), 194-95.
21. F. Dumont, *La vigile du Québec* (Montréal, Hurtubis HMH Ltée, 1976), 76.
 22. The nationalist opposition to Bills 85 and 63 exemplifies well the anti-*allogène* attitude. For an example of the most nationalistic views expressed during the Bill 85 parliamentary debates, see le Conseil québécois de la légitimité nationale, *Journal des Débats*, 23 jan. 1969, 183-84, 187, 229-30; la Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal, *ibid.*, 4 fév. 1969, 428, 432; la Ligue d'action nationale, *ibid.*, 4 fév. 1969, 452, 460; le Mouvement pour l'intégration scolaire, *ibid.*, 4 fév. 1969, 460; la Fédération des sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec, *ibid.*, 4 fév. 1969, 476, 480; les Etats généraux du Canada français, *ibid.*, 15 jan. 1969, 97, 20 fév. 1969, 698-99; la Société culturelle québécoise, *ibid.*, 20 fév. 1969, 708.

The opposition to Bill 63 was even more violent. A "Circumstantial Opposition" was formed in the National Assembly, composed of René Lévesque, A. Flamand, J. Proulx, and Y. Michaud. All argued for stronger measures in order to force the *allogène* children into French-language schools. See *ibid.*, 30 oct. 1969, 344, 345-47, 4 nov. 1969, 3527, 3539, 3541. Outside the Assembly numerous student, teacher, professional, and nationalist organizations voiced their anti-*allogène* positions. The following organizations were the most vocal: le Club fleur-de-lys, la Confédération des syndicats nationaux, le Front du Québec français, la Corporation des enseignants du Québec, and numerous Saint-Jean-Baptiste societies, *L'Action, Le Devoir, Montréal-Matin*, 31 oct. 1969; le Front du Québec français, *Le Devoir*, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30 oct. 1969, 4, 6, 8, nov. 1969, *La Presse*, 10 nov. 1969; le Parti Québécois, *Le Devoir*, 10 nov. 1969. This extra-parliamentary opposition, with slogans such as "Le Québec aux Québécois," was perceived by the *allogènes* as xenophobic. *Le Soleil*, 1 nov. 1969.

- For an example of nationalist reaction to Bill 22 that was intertwined with anti-*allogène* statements, see la Ligue des droits de l'homme, *Journal des Débats*, 11 juin 1974, B-3253-54; l'Association québécoise des professeurs de français, *ibid.*, 12 juin 1974, B-3787-88; la Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, *ibid.*, 17 juin 1969, 3609; la Société nationale populaire du Québec, *ibid.*, 18 juin 1974, B-3754, B-3762; le Mouvement Québec français, *ibid.*, 18 juin 1974, B-3771; la Fédération des travailleurs du Québec, *ibid.*, 18 juin 1974, B-3883; la Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal, *ibid.*, 18 juin 1974, B-4115; l'Alliance des professeurs de Montréal, *ibid.*, 18 juin 1974, B-4125-27; la Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec, *ibid.*, 18 juin 1974, B-4217; le Club fleur-de-lys, *ibid.*, 18 juin 1974, 4294-95; le Mouvement national des québécois, *ibid.*, 18 juin 1974, B-4303-04, B-4306, le Regroupement régional de la capitale québécoise, *ibid.*, 3 juillet 1974, B-4624; la Société nationale des québécois du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, *ibid.*, 4 juillet 1974, B-4890; la Société nationale des québécois de l'Outaouais, *ibid.*, B-4960.
23. Bill 1 was withdrawn in July 1977 and replaced by an amended version, Bill 101. However, most of the controversial clauses were untouched. The major difference between Bill 1 and 101 was in the area of minority rights. Under the provisions of Bill 1, the legislation on the French language was exempt from a ban on discrimination based on race, color, sex, civil status,

religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, or social condition. This aspect of the nationality policy (art. 1972) was withdrawn from Bill 101.

One of the aims of this legislation is to decolonize Quebec, to emancipate the French Québécois, and to get rid of stress, frustration, and threat. The White Paper argues that "this chronic insecurity has bred legitimate feelings of distrust which if allowed to continue in the present context of inaction, would give rise to an incurable xenophobia." *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 107; see also 8, 49, 106.

24. For a detailed analysis of the nature of the party, its program, and actual policies once in power, compare V. Murray, *Le Parti Québécois: de la fondation à la prise de pouvoir* (Montréal, Hurtubise HMH Ltée, 1976) and P. Fournier, "Le Parti Québécois et les pouvoirs économiques," Communication présentée lors du colloque sur "Le Parti Québécois un an après," Université du Québec à Montréal, 10 nov. 1977.
25. *Ibid.*
26. The White Paper was allegedly edited by F. Dumont and G. Rocher. The White Paper will be followed by a second White Paper on cultural development, which will not deal exclusively with the arts, literature, music, and theatre, but will cover such diverse subjects as what is sold at a newsstand and the reasons the Québécois are heavy smokers.
27. *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 11-12. Several members of the PQ government have also identified xenophobia as a French-Québécois problem: see e.g., J. Couture, "C'est peut-être l'occasion de rappeler qu'il faudrait, au Québec, changer notre vocabulaire et notre attitude vis-à-vis de l'immigrant et des groupes ethniques. . . qu'on cherche vraiment à les considérer comme citoyens à part entière." *Journal des Débats*, 17 mai 1977, B-2793. At the first Parti Québécois convention after it assumed power, Lévesque urged the PQ delegates to avoid extremism and not to be xenophobic, that is, not to "... exclude the others who live among us." *The Montreal Star*, May 28, 1977. Beverly Smith, who for six months worked in Lévesque's office, identifies anti-*allogène* feelings among the Péquistes: "I intensely disliked the inelegant 'les Neo' used to refer to new Canadian immigrants, and especially the tone with which it was usually said." *The Gazette*, Oct. 15, 1977. Jean-Jacques Roy of the Société nationale populaire du Québec exemplifies the nationalist attitude toward the immigrant *allogènes*: "... nous avons beaucoup de Québécois d'origine étrangère..." "... un Québécois de tout origine, doit s'intercaler progressivement à la majorité francophone et francophile." Yet, the *allogène* is assumed to remain forever an immigrant: "Ce sont des immigrants. Ils n'ont que des droits d'immigrants, que nous leur donnons." "... si nous leur donnons tous la chance de faire ce qu'ils veulent faire, il est évident que, dans dix, quinze ans, on se ramassera avec une troisième nation." "... un immigrant dans un pays est toujours un immigrant." *Journal des Débats*, 14 juin 1977, CLF-205-6.
28. See art. C4.1, C4.2, and P9.1 of the party's program. Parti Québécois, *Le programme, l'action politique, les statuts et règlements* (1975 edition). For a brief analysis of this nationality policy, see Murray, *Le Parti Québécois*. It is astonishing to see one anglophone commentator make the following claim about the nationality policy: "En ce qui concerne la

- minorité, le PQ a toujours su prendre une position conforme à tout ce qu'il y a de plus noble dans la tradition occidentale et libérale." G. Caldwell, "Minorités et minorité au Québec," in *Premier Mandat; une prospective à court terme du gouvernement péquiste Tome II Le Culturel/la Politique* (Montréal, l'Aurore, 1977), 92.
29. M. McAndrew, press secretary to Laurin, admits ethnocentricism but divests it of a racial or ethnic connotation. It is simply a tendency to valorize (an undefined) nationality. *Maclean's Magazine*, June 27, 1977, 13.
 30. C. Laurin, *Journal des Débats*, 18 juillet 1977, 2186. Lévesque refers to the anglophones as Québécois but distinguishes them from the "Quebec nation." Only the French Québécois are to be identified with the Quebec nation. *Le Devoir*, 31 août 1977.
 31. *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 43; C. Laurin, "Les Principes d'une politique de la langue," communiqué de presse, 1 avril 1977; *Financial Post* Conference, press release, June 13, 1977.
 32. *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 29.
 33. J. Y. Morin, *Journal des Débats*, 26 juillet 1977, 2384.
 34. J. Y. Morin, "Québec, terre d'accueil," Discours aux québécois d'origine ukrainienne, Montréal, 19 mars 1977.
 35. P. Bourgault, the former leader of the RIN, points out that "La nation française habite le Québec; prolongement en Ontario et au Nouveau-Brunswick. La nation anglaise habite le Canada; prolongement au Québec." "Une certaine idée du Québec" in *Premier Mandat; une prospective à court terme du gouvernement péquiste*, II (Montréal, l'Aurore, 1977), 228. J. P. Charbonneau, Péquiste MNA, is contradictory. On the one hand, he refers to the existence of "... la nation canadienne-anglaise au Québec"; on the other hand, he states that "... on a le Canada, un État binational et polyculturel, et on a le Québec qui est un État mononational et polyculturel." *Journal des Débats*, 13 juin 1977, CLF-231-32, 55 juillet 1977, 2335. J. J. Roy of la Société nationale populaire du Québec and R. Barbeau of les Fils du Québec also admit the existence of two nations within Quebec. *Ibid.*, 14 juin 1977, CLF-202, CLF-232. M. Chapat of les Fils du Québec refuses to grant the Anglo-Celts a "nation" and a "founding people" status. There is only one nation and the French Québécois are the sole founding people of both Québec and Canada. "Les Anglais sont des occupants au Québec. ... La parti peuplée du Canada dans le temps, c'était Québec. Ce sont des occupants de notre pays, exactement comme Hitler a été... un occupant de la France. ..." *Ibid.*, 14 juin 1977, CLF-252. J. Alfred, a Péquiste MNA, is very ambiguous. At times he states that in Quebec "Nous sommes deux ethnies, deux nations"; in other circumstances he exclusively identifies Québécois with French Québécois, as well as with all of those who inhabit Quebec. *Ibid.*, 26 juillet 1977, 2397-99.
 36. McAndrew, *Maclean's Magazine*, June 27, 1977.
 37. René Lévesque, as premier-elect, referred to Quebec as a pluralistic society: "Il y a de la place chez nous et une place qui doit être non seulement juste mais également chaleureuse pour tous ceux qui habitent et qui aiment le Québec" *Le Devoir*, 17 nov. 1977; J. P. Charbonneau, Péquiste MNA, referred to Quebec as a "multicultural" and "polycultural" society. *Journal des Débats*, 14 juin 1977, CFL-253, 25 juillet 1977, 2335. Even the national-ist, R. Barbeau, admits to the multitude of languages in Quebec: "Nous

- sommes vraiment une mosaïque québécoise. . . ." *Ibid.*, 14 juin 1977, CLF-252. The Goldfarb poll indicates that the Quebec population perceives itself as multicultural and that it is possible for the foreign-born to become Québécois. *The Toronto Star*, May 14, 1977.
38. C. Morin has declared that "... all those who are on Quebec territory belong to the Quebec people." *The Montreal Star*, May 13, 1977; J. P. Charbonneau made a lengthy distinction between a "nation" and a "people." A "nation" is one ethnic community, while a people: "... celle que l'on retrouve d'ailleurs dans le projet de loi, ... désigne l'ensemble des gens vivant dans un même Etat. . . ." *Journal des Débats*, 25 juillet 1977, 2334. Laurin has claimed that the "Quebec people" refers to "... the majority of the French-speaking people but also to all other groups that form a million people." *The Montreal Star*, May 17, 1977, or "Le peuple québécois n'est pas composé que de francophones. Il comprend une majorité qui a le droit et le devoir de faire de la langue qu'elle parle depuis toujours la langue officielle et la langue commune, mais ce peuple comprend aussi les héritiers des peuples fondateurs, Inuit et Amérindien, et tous les groupes ethniques. . . ." *Journal des Débats*, 16 juin 1977, CLF-330. G. Bouthillier, a spokesman for the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal, has argued that "only French Québécois constitute the 'Quebec people,'" referring to the preamble of Bill 1 where it is clearly stated that "... the French language has always been the language of the Quebec people, that it is indeed, the very instrument by which they have articulated their identity." He then added: "Il est claire que ne 'sont' pas reconnus comme Québécois tous ces résidents qui forment eux aussi en quelque sorte, la toile de fond de notre société québécoise. . . ." True Québécois are of the ethnic majority, they are labelled as "citizens" while the Amerindians, *allogènes*, and Anglo-Celts are referred to as "residents." *Ibid.*, 16 juin 1977, CLF-324. This attitude of distinguishing Québécois according to ascriptive categories is labelled as discriminatory and racist by G. Caldwell, otherwise a PQ sympathizer, "Minorités . . . , 93.
39. *The Montreal Star*, May 14, 1977; C. Laurin, C. Morin, and R. Burns have made similar comments. *Ibid.*, May 3, 13, 17, 1977; however, it should be noted that these and other members of the Péquiste government have also contradicted themselves: R. Lévesque in *Le Devoir*, 31 août 1977; C. Laurin in *The Globe and Mail*, June 13, 1977, *Le Devoir*, 6 sept. 1977.
40. J. Alfred, Péquiste MNA, *Journal des Débats*, 26 juillet 1977, 2398.
41. *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 53. This premise of the Péquiste nationality policy was received with hostility at the August 1977 provincial premiers' conference in St. Andrews, N.B., but was endorsed by a similar conference in Montreal, Feb. 1977. The Montreal premiers' conference affirmed the right of each province to decide who is an anglophone or francophone and who has access to which schools. In effect, this conference sanctioned certain provisions of Bill 101. *The Montreal Star*, Feb. 24, 1978.
42. C. Laurin, *Journal des Débats*, 14 juin 1977, CLF-256; "Notes pour le discours prononcé par Monsieur Camille Laurin, Ministre d'Etat au Développement Culturel Lors du Colloque 'Frontières ethniques en devenir,'" 5 nov. 1977, 11-12 (hereafter "Frontières ethniques en devenir").
43. *Ibid.*, 3-7; confusingly, the enrichment of the Quebec culture by ethnic

- groups is even to include the enrichment of the French language! *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 53.
44. "Frontiers ethnique en devenir," 6. *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 39, 40, 41. A letter sent to Lévesque and Laurin by 235 prominent French Québécois specifically underlined that the PQ nationality policy goes beyond the Francization objective by giving free rein to intolerance. *The Montreal Star*, June 4, 1977.
 45. *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 35–36. Significantly, F. Dumont is not convinced that Anglo-Celtic Québécois have now a distinct culture, though social engineering may produce one: "I'm convinced that there will be no specific English culture in this corner of America if this English culture is not Québécois." *The Montreal Star*, Oct. 22, 1977.
 46. For years, numerous nationalist groups have advocated a completely unilingual Quebec that would involve the abolition of all Anglo-Celtic institutions. Examples of pro-unilingual groups: le Mouvement pour l'unilinguisme français au Québec, la Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, la Société nationale populaire du Québec, etc. It appears that within the Parti Québécois, former RIN members have led the unilingual faction while Lévesque and Laurin have represented the moderates who are for the preservation of Quebec Anglo-Celtic institutions. *Le Devoir*, 26 fev. 1973; *Journal des Débats*, 7 juin 1977, CLF-64, 9 juin 1977, CLF-156, 14 juin 1977, CLF-198; *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 35, 36, 38, 71. During the whole debate on Bills 1 and 101, the pro-unilingual wing of the Parti Québécois has been conspicuous by its silence. This might indicate that a "party line" exists on this subject, for all suggestions for a unilingual Quebec that appeared during the parliamentary committee hearings were rejected by the Péquiste government. *Journal des Débats*, 14 juin 1977, CLF-256, CLF-259. The two extremist briefs submitted to the parliamentary committee, written by R. Roy and G. Brosseau, suggested, among other things, the forced assimilation of Anglo-Celts, the obligatory giving of French names to all new-born children, and the refusal of Quebec residency to anyone judged to be "non-assimilable." *Ibid.*, 14 juin 1977, CLF-254, CLF-259; see also R. Roy's *La Revue Indépendantiste*, No. 1-2 (printemps) 1977, 25 ff., and J.-M. Fleury, "Assimilons les Anglais!" *Québec Science* (oct. 1974), 5.
 47. Art. 89, Bill 101. Laurin explicitly stated that the Anglo-Celtic group "... se reconnaîtra et sera reconnu de plus en plus comme une minorité parmi d'autres..." "Frontiers ethniques en devenir," 12.
 48. Art. 73. In addition, the article stipulated that regardless of ethnic origin, a child is eligible to attend English-language school if enrolled in such a school before Aug. 26, 1977, or if older brothers or sisters attended such a school.
 49. Restrictions on foreign university students may also be an aspect of this policy. *The Gazette*, Feb. 21, 1978. G. Godin, Péquiste MNA, disagreed with the nationality policy, saying that any Canadian coming to Quebec should have the right to choose either English or French language schools. *The Montreal Star*, April 27, 1977.
 50. Art. 86. The idea of reciprocal agreements with Quebec on language rights was rejected by the nine premiers at both the St. Andrews, N.B. (Aug. 1977)

- and the Montreal (Feb. 1978) premiers' conferences. *The Montreal Star*, Feb. 24, 1978.
51. Art. 8, 9, 10. It should be noted that this feature of the Péquiste nationality policy was ruled unconstitutional by Chief Justice J. Duchênes of Quebec Superior Court on Jan. 24, 1978. The entire chapter III of Bill 101 was declared to be "complete nullity" because Quebec did not have the unilateral right to amend the BNA Act. *The Gazette*, Jan. 25, 1978. Lévesque declared that if portions of Bill 101 were declared unconstitutional then "the constitution is an ass and should be thrown out." The Péquiste government is currently appealing the Duchênes decision. *The Montreal Star*, Jan. 28, 1978.
 52. For a similar opinion, see A. Tremblay, the chief architect of the present-day Quebec education system: "It is the new Quebecker who is at the heart of the whole language problem." *The Montreal Star*, July 15, 1977.
 53. "Frontières ethniques en devenir," 12.
 54. *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 40.
 55. *Ibid.*, 39, 40, 41; J.-Y. Morin, *The Montreal Star*, March 28, 1977.
 56. C. Laurin, "On doit respecter les minorités, leur langue, leur culture. Face aux divers groupes culturels minoritaires, le Québec ne doit pas user seulement de tolérance. Comme une société vivante, il doit envisager les apports qui lui viennent de sa propre diversité comme un indispensable enrichissement." "Les Principes d'une politique de la langue," le Ministre d'Etat au Développement Culturel, 1 avril 1977, communiqué de presse; or "Les Québécois . . . tout en affirmant leur vouloir vivre commun, ils invitent les minorités qui composent ce peuple . . . à une première phase de définition de leur propre culture." C. Laurin, speech delivered to la Centrale des dirigeants des entreprises, 2 mai 1977. See also *Journal des Débats*, 16 juin 1977, CLF-301, 305; *Le Devoir*, 4 avril 1977.
 57. "Frontières ethniques en devenir," 9.
 58. The opposition to multiculturalism is not a Péquiste monopoly. All Quebec provincial parties have consistently opposed the federal multicultural policy on the grounds that it reduced the French Québécois to a status of an ethnic group. See R. Bourassa (Liberal), *Le Devoir*, 17 nov. 1971. R. Lévesque (PQ), C. Samson (Créditiste), G. Loubier (Union Nationale), *Le Soleil*, 18 nov. 1977; J. Couture, communiqué de presse, Cabinet du Ministre, Ministère de l'Immigration, 27 jan. 1977. Nationalist Quebec intellectuals have also been consistently opposed to multiculturalism: G. Rocher, "Les ambiguïtés d'un Canada bilingue et multiculturel," *Revue de l'Association Canadienne de l'éducation de la langue française*, I, (sept. 1972), 22-23; see also M. Champagne, "Québécois et Néo-Québécois," *Relations* (juillet-août 1974), 208-9; P.-E. Gosselin, "Le multiculturalism," *Vie Française*, XXVIII (mars-avril 1974), 169-71; *The Montreal Star*, April 2, 1977.
 59. "Frontières ethniques en devenir," 15; *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 90-91.
 60. "Frontières ethniques en devenir," 15-16. "Nouvelle politique de subvention du Ministère," Ministère de l'Immigration. Policy-making in this area is based on art. 4 of the Immigration Department Act, as amended by sec. 3 of Bill 63 (1968), R.S.Q.c. 68 and Bill 22 (1974), R.S.Q.c. 64.
 61. "Grants expenditures from multicultural projects program" (April 1-

- June 30, 1977), 7-9. Of the national projects, \$20,000 of a total of \$25,000 were allotted for "inter-ethnic comprehension." Of the regional projects, \$33,350 was spent in Quebec on inter-ethnic projects out of a total of \$61,022.
62. J.-Y. Morin claims that the Ministry of Education has allotted \$100,000 for this purpose. Research on the subject is in progress and pilot projects are to start in 1978-79. "Ministère de l'Éducation, Priorités 1977-78"; *The Montreal Star*, March 28, 1977, May 2, 1977; *La Presse*, 4 avril 1977. "Quebec, Terre d'Accueil," Discours aux québécois d'origine ukrainienne, Montreal, 19 mars 1977. There is a striking similarity between this idea and one of the 1967 resolutions of the Estates-General of French Canada: "Les Néo-Québécois, . . . ont droit au niveau primaire à des écoles ou à des classes publiques françaises avec enseignement de leur langue maternelle là où un nombre suffisant de parents le désirent." "Les Résolutions, les États Généraux du Canada Français," *l'Action Nationale*, LVII (fév. 1968), 193. Morin was the president of the Estates General of French Canada between 1966 and 1969. *Quebec's Policy on the French Language*, 90.
 63. *Ibid.*, 77.
 64. Under the new agreement, prospective immigrants would be screened by both Canadian and Quebec officials. If the applicant is rejected by Quebec, he would not be allowed to settle there. *The Montreal Star*, April 27, 1977, May 28, 31, 1977; *The Gazette*, Feb. 21, 1978.
 65. "Frontières ethniques en devenir," 11.
 66. C. Laurin, *Journal des Débats*, 19 juillet 1977, 2187.
 67. Art. 87, 88.
 68. Compare art. 88 and art. 52 in Bill 1.
 69. Murray, 114; J.-P. Charbonneau, Péquiste MNA, *Journal des Débats*, 16 juin 1977, CLF-305. The Lévesque government is apparently satisfied with the endorsement of statements that urge the other provinces to "do their best" in this area. *The Montreal Star*, Feb. 24, 1978. For dissatisfaction on the part of the Federation of Non-Quebec Francophones, see *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1978. R. Barbeau proposes an identical treatment be accorded to all minorities in Quebec. In fact, he suggests that ethnic minorities in Quebec should have the same rights that are given to the francophones in other Canadian provinces, *Journal des Débats*, 14 juin 1977. CLF-237, CLF-241.
 70. See M. B. Stein, "Bill 22 and the Non-Francophone Population in Quebec: A Case Study of Minority Attitudes on Language Legislation" in J. R. Mallea (ed.), *Quebec's Language Policies: Background and Response* (Quebec, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1977), 255-61.
 71. D. Payne, special assistant to the minister of state for cultural development, and D. Levine, advisor to the minister of state for economic development, are probably the highest placed anglophones in the Quebec government. *The Montreal Star*, Nov. 18, 1977. In addition, of the top 1,800 Quebec civil servants only 16 are anglophone. *Le Devoir*, 31 oct. 1977. Another area where the Anglo-Celts and the *allogènes* have some input is le Comité consultatif de l'immigration of the Ministry of Immigration. This committee was established in 1968 but its composition was substantially revamped by the March 16, 1977, Order-in-Council. Six of the 15 members are native Québécois, including one Anglo-Celt. The other nine are immigrant

allogènes. R. Serbyn, a Ukrainian Canadian, is one of the members of this committee. The principal task of this advisory committee concerns the integration of immigrants. For references to the nature and the role of this institution, see *The Montreal Star*, March 15, 1977, *Journal des Débats*, 17 mai 1977, B-2271, B-2793, B-2797.

72. S. McCall, the co-chairman of the Positive Action Committee, suggests the pressure group tactic as the only viable alternative for the multi-ethnic anglophone community. It is conceivable that both McCall and M. Stein tend to overlook the internal differences within the anglophone community. *The Montreal Star*, Feb. 25, 1978. Stein claims that "Il n'est donc pas tout à fait exagéré de référer aux anglophones au Québec et même aux immigrants non francophones comme une communauté unique relativement unifiée, avec des attitudes communes et des formes de comportement identiques largement distinctes de celles des francophones." M. Stein, "Le rôle des Québécois non francophones dans le débat actuel entre le Québec et le Canada," *Etudes Internationales*, VIII (juin 1977), 294.
73. G. Caldwell, "Assimilation and the Demographic Future of Quebec" in J. R. Mallea (ed.), 65. The literature on North American ethnic affirmation is voluminous. See M. Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York, Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1971).
74. Thomas, 14; *The Gazette*, March 1, 1978; *The Montreal Star*, March 2, 1978. Irwin Black, *The Montreal Star's* Quebec editor, points out that the reason why the White Paper is being delayed is that Lévesque's strategy is to avoid confrontation until the referendum. It is suggested that the paper is being "rewritten, retouched, softened, broadened, and toned down." *Ibid.*, March 4, 1978. It is conceivable that the Thomas story in the March 6 issue of *Maclean's* was based on the original version of the White Paper; see Thomas, 14-16.
75. *Le Devoir*, 22 fev. 1978.
76. Murray, 202; Fullerton, one-time advisor to Lévesque, contends that any "Dissent from Péquiste dogma only invites invectives and the impugning of motives." *The Montreal Star*, Feb. 18, 1978; Beverly Smith points out that "To many Péquistes, even French-speaking Quebecers who had made it in the business world and intellectuals and editorialists such as Claude Ryan who didn't necessarily 'buy' the PQ arguments were also viewed with contempt. They were considered traitors, 'Vendus.'" *The Gazette*, Oct. 15, 1977. In his speech to the Canadian Manufacturers Association, Laurin affirmed that Bill 1 "... a été reçu favorablement par les mouvements et les organismes qui représentent le peuple Québécois..." press release, May 2, 1977. The implication is that those who had reservations about the PQ language bill were not true representatives of the Quebec people.

Quebec's Ethnic Communities in the Wake of the Péquiste Electoral Victory

Roman Serbyn

When the Parti Québécois won the Quebec provincial elections on November 15, 1976, it brought to the fore a number of vital issues, not the least of which was the present status and future role of ethnocultural communities in Quebec society. It is the non-Anglo-Celtic and non-French elements of Quebec's population which have been the primary target of some of the first policies of the new government, especially in education. The underlying philosophy of the Péquiste government on the role of immigrants and ethnic groups in the future sovereign Quebec was explained yesterday by the Hon. Camille Laurin, Minister of State for Cultural Development. This official policy and the concrete measures taken to implement it have just been subjected to a critical analysis by Professor Myhul. This paper will, therefore, be limited to the discussion of the ethnic problem in Quebec as seen at the level of the ethnic groups themselves. Taking the ethnic communities as a starting point, I shall examine three topics: 1) the ethnic fact in Quebec; 2) expressing the ethnic fact; and 3) issues and attitudes.

The Ethnic Fact in Quebec

The 1971 Canadian census shows that the ethnic population of Quebec is relatively small and far below the Canadian average (see Table I at the end of this paper). Whereas 26.7 per cent of all residents of Canada are of neither British (Anglo-Celtic) nor French origin, only 10.4 per cent of the population of Quebec belongs to that category. All the provinces west of Quebec register higher percentages. Over 85 per cent or 542,000 of the 628,000 Quebecers of ethnic origin live in Montreal. Even then they are only about half of Toronto's ethnic

population and constitute only 20 per cent of Montreal's inhabitants, in contrast to Toronto's 40 per cent. The ethnic percentage in major prairie cities is even higher: Winnipeg 48.5, Edmonton 48.1, Saskatoon 48.9.

Numerically weak, the ethnic element in Quebec cannot be expected to achieve the same success as ethnic communities in the west, especially in endeavors where numbers count. Apart from several members of the Jewish community, there are few members of ethnic origin from Quebec in either the provincial or federal legislatures. Notwithstanding their small numbers, however, members of ethnic communities have been successful on an individual and community basis in various professional and business activities. Their achievements have been due, at least in part, to their strategic position between the Anglo-Celtic and French communities and their leaning toward the former.

Linguistically and culturally, ethnic groups in Quebec have tended to integrate, and eventually to assimilate, into the Anglo-Celtic milieu. The 1971 census shows that the rate of assimilation of ethnic population is about 50 per cent, varying from 40 to 60 per cent from province to province (see Table II). Quebec's ethnic communities have the highest percentage of language retention (59.1), mainly because of the recent influx of large numbers of Italian, Greek, and Portuguese immigrants. The same statistics also show that in Quebec 80.7 per cent gave French as their mother tongue and 13.1 per cent gave English. What the statistics do not show is that most of the remaining 6.2 per cent with "other" mother tongues usually know English better than French and are integrated into the Anglo-Celtic world. Until recently, immigrants and the ethnic communities which sprang from them were a source of demographic growth for the English-speaking communities and a menace to the francophone majority in Quebec. This situation is clearly seen in the Anglicized city of Montreal where the francophone community only makes up about 65 per cent of the population.

The trend toward English-language assimilation must be kept in mind when considering the attitudes of ethnic groups toward the French fact and the reaction of ethnic communities to current events in Quebec. In Quebec there are no unilingual ethnic communities. Ethnic communal life is mostly bilingual and bicultural, with English the other language, and often the sole common language. In many ethnic organizations, "ethnic" communal life would be impossible without English. The Jewish, Inuit, and Indian peoples are the most striking examples of this phenomenon. In the brief presented by the Jewish Congress to the parliamentary committee on the French language, and in the latest conflict between the Inuit people and the Government of Quebec over

Bill 101, both defended the use of the English language as essential for their survival as ethnic communities.

It should be noted that in terms of demographic arithmetic, combining the Anglo-Celtic and Anglo-ethnic groups doubles the anglophone proportion of the population and changes the French-English ratio from 9:1 to 4:1.

Although they have adopted a common language (English) without losing their ethnic identity, the ethnic communities in Quebec do not act as a genuine third force. The reasons for this can be found both in their meagre numbers and in the fact that they do not form a homogeneous and unified block (see Table III). Only two communities, the Italian, which in 1971 numbered 170,000, and the Jewish, with a figure of 115,000, can exert some weight as sizable collective units. About 10 middle-sized groups number 30-60,000 members each. The remaining nationalities are all below 15,000, many with only a few thousand. The various nationalities have their peculiar characteristics. Jews and Germans are very much assimilated into the anglophone milieu and integrated into the upper echelons of the Anglo-dominated economic life of Quebec. The large Italian population is closer to the francophone community, both culturally and economically, and Italians compete with Frenchmen for jobs and clash with them over the right to English-language education.

The larger communities have tended to be more dynamic. Jews, Italians, and Greeks have been more vocal than the others and their opinions have been more eagerly sought by the government and the media. Members of smaller communities have felt themselves too small to make much difference in what, to them, is essentially a struggle between the French and 'the English.' A significant factor in the present situation is that there has been no effort to unite the ethnic groups into one body and to provide them with an umbrella organization which would act as a spokesman for all. This role has not been assumed by the Federation of Ethnic Groups, which has the adherence of 18 ethnic communities. Nor have the larger communities sought to provide leadership for the other groups or even tried to influence their opinions.

The Ukrainian community is very small both in relation to other ethnic groups in Quebec and to the Ukrainian population in other provinces. The 20,325 Ukrainians in Quebec represent .3 per cent of the whole Quebec population and 3 per cent of the ethnic population (i.e., non-Anglo-Celtic, non-French) (see Table II). Ukrainians constitute 2.7 per cent of the total Canadian population and 10.1 per cent of the ethnic element. In Alberta Ukrainians form 8.3 per cent of the provincial population and 17.6 per cent of its ethnic inhabitants. In Saskatchewan

the figures are 9.3 per cent and 17.9 per cent, while practically every eighth Manitoban is Ukrainian and among the ethnics, Ukrainians are practically one in four. The Ukrainian community in Quebec is further weakened by a constant "braindrain" of the most dynamic and creative elements, who emigrate to other provinces of Canada or to the United States.¹ This ever-present migration was partly recovered by some influx from the other provinces. Today it is strictly unidirectional.

Like the other ethnic groups, most Ukrainians live in the Montreal area (18,045), where they form only .7 per cent of the city's population and 3.3. per cent of the city's ethnic inhabitants. This is far below Edmonton where every eighth person is of Ukrainian origin and more than a quarter of the ethnic population is of Ukrainian origin. For these reasons, Ukrainian Quebecers have not been able to provide the same leadership in the multicultural movement as they have elsewhere.

Expressing the Ethnic Fact in Quebec

The ethnic communities in Quebec have been slow in responding to the challenge of political and national transformation in Quebec, and their spokesmen have been reluctant to take firm stands on controversial issues or to express opinions in public. However, some information can be gathered from newspaper reports and representations to the government by spokesmen from ethnic organizations.

In early April 1977 the Lévesque government brought out its White Paper on language, which dealt primarily with the status of French and English in Quebec, but touched also on ethnic languages. The document expressed the government's intention to require most recent immigrants and all future newcomers to Quebec to send their children to French schools. It also accepted, in principle, active support for preserving and developing ethnic languages and cultures, and spelled out some of the means to achieve such a goal, including the teaching of ethnic language courses in the public school system.²

The majority of the ethnic population rejected the coercive measures found in the White Paper and demanded freedom for parents to choose the language of instruction for their children. The Italians and the Greeks, the most vociferous opponents of the Liberal government's Bill 22, which forced children of non-English parents to take language entrance examinations, were critical of the White Paper; so were the Jews. Some of the smaller and newer groups—the Portuguese, Haitians, Vietnamese, and Latin Americans—were more supportive, for their linguistic affinities with the French have meant closer association since their arrival.

What is remarkable in the newspaper reports on the ethnic response

to the White Paper is the exclusive preoccupation with the fate of the English language in Quebec. Notice of the government's promise to introduce ethnic languages into the public schools was rare. In their reaction to the White Paper ethnic spokesmen adopted the wider English-speaking milieu as their frame of reference, and acted as a pressure group for the Anglo-Celtic community. In the case of some of the better organized ethnic groups, this attitude stemmed from the fact that they did not need to rely on public schools to perpetuate their culture. Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, for example, have their own private schools. As a spokesman of the Greek community explained to *The Montreal Star* (April 2, 1977), Greeks could send their children to French-Greek schools which received 80 per cent funding from the government and assured a trilingual education for their children.

An even better occasion for the ethnic groups to show their reaction to recent events and to express their opinions on what should be the place of ethnic groups in Quebec presented itself on June 4-5, 1977, during a conference on "Quebec Immigration Ethnic Groups" organized by the Consultative Committee on Immigration. Every known ethnic and immigrant organization was invited to send two delegates. The response was overwhelming, as over 400 delegates registered. There were seven workshops on immigration and seven on ethnic communities. Three cabinet ministers were present at various moments (Lévesque, Laurin, and Couture). And yet the conference fell far short of the organizers' expectations. The delegates were not well prepared for discussions (only the black community presented a written brief), and some workshops attracted very few participants (the workshop on the economic life of ethnic groups had only three).

A third major occasion to be heard was during the public hearings on Bill 1 by the Standing Parliamentary Commission on Education, Cultural Affairs, and Communications. When Bill 1 appeared in print it met with general disapproval from the ethnic communities. Yet, when the time came to make official representation, of the 260 briefs submitted only 16 originated in the ethnic milieu. The native peoples sent in five, two came from private individuals, one from the Federation of Ethnic Groups, and one from an Immigrant Workers' Committee. The remaining seven briefs came from central organizations representing the Italians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Chinese, Blacks, and Franco Ontarians. Other groups either sent no briefs or they arrived too late. In general, the briefs accepted the principle of the supremacy of the French language, but sought freedom of choice in education and guarantees that the English language would be taught well in the French schools. They also objected to various restrictions on other languages

in business and advertising. The Jewish presentation was unique in that it was based completely on the argument of human rights. Only some of the briefs referred to the question of third languages and the preservation of ethnocultural communities.

Issues and Attitudes

For the purpose of analysis, I have divided the issues at stake in Quebec and the attitudes of ethnic groups toward them into six categories: a) the "political" question regarding Quebec's option of separation or federation; b) the "national" question concerned with the future of the French and English languages and the cultures they support; c) the "social" question touching on the future social order based on free enterprise or socialism; d) the problem of "economic" growth in general; e) the respect for human rights and "democratic" freedoms; and f) the "ethnic" question *per se*, dealing with the specific problems of ethnic communities.

a) *The political future of Quebec: separatism vs. federalism.* It can be safely stated that the overwhelming majority of Quebec's population which is neither French nor Anglo-Celtic is against the separation of Quebec. A poll taken by Sorecom for the "Sunday Morning Magazine" (CBC) in early April 1977 recorded 60 per cent of ethnic opinion against independence, with 40 per cent undecided; no one favored independence. The Anglo-Celts answered 82.1 per cent "against," 10.2 per cent "undecided," and 7.7 per cent "for"; the French gave 38.2 per cent for independence, 16.4 per cent were undecided, and 45.5 per cent were opposed. Ethnic groups oppose independence for a variety of reasons: fear of a declining economy, fear of losing contact with the rest of their respective communities in other parts of Canada, and fear of being drowned in a francophone sea. Although these fears are not often expressed publicly, the identification of ethnic Quebecers with Canada comes through in a variety of ways. For example, in the terminology used by ethnic groups in reference to themselves, one finds expressions like "Italian Canadian" and "Ukrainian Canadian," rather than "Italian Quebecer," etc.

Ethnic Quebecers generally are opposed to separatism, independence, or sovereignty—all considered by them to be synonymous. They do not accept, and seem even to be unaware of, the nuances these words have for many Franco Quebecers. While separation is taken to mean complete secession from Canada with the establishment of a totally independent state, some sophisticated francophones believe that sovereignty or independence can be accomplished without breaking the

economic ties with Canada. To some of them such limited sovereignty is an end in itself; to others it is only a step to complete separation. In either case they prefer to use the less noxious word "sovereignty" than the more pejorative and radical-sounding "separation."

A small minority within the ethnic groups does recognize Quebec's right to separation, but hopes that its aspirations will be satisfied within a revamped confederation. With certain guarantees for the English language, they would be ready to accept a special status for Quebec. Otherwise, many feel that if Quebec separated, they would probably have to leave the new state. In the next referendum, most would undoubtedly vote against separation, but some could be persuaded to support an intermediate position.

It is not easy for members of the ethnic groups to make a choice. They are often in conflict between what they consider to be their own best interests and the democratic rights of the francophone majority. This dilemma can be sensed when speaking with the nationally conscious Ukrainians, who champion the cause of Ukrainian independence within the Soviet (Russian) Empire. To them, Ukraine's right to the status of an independent country is analogous to the francophone aspirations in the Province of Quebec. At the same time, some fear that they would be unable to find a meaningful place for themselves in a Quebec separated from Canada. One Ukrainian informant indicated that in a referendum on Quebec's independence he would cast his vote for independence because this corresponded to the profound desire of most Quebecers; he would then pack his bags and leave because he was too old to adjust to a new Quebec society. This altruistic approach would probably be rejected by most as being impractical.

At this time, it is difficult to judge how many people would actually move out of Quebec.³ A Jewish spokesman informed me that most Jews could adapt to the new situation if the economy held up well. The people who would leave would be those who could receive better positions elsewhere or who could not learn French. An English-speaking Jewish lawyer whose French was weak would undoubtedly be under more pressure to leave than a storekeeper with the same linguistic qualifications because the mastery of language is more important in the first case than the second.

b) *The national question in Quebec: language and culture.* In the preface to its brief on Bill 1, the Canadian Jewish Congress stated:

The Jewish community believes that every encouragement must be given to the épanouissement of the French language and culture,

because this reflects the legitimate aspirations of the majority of our fellow citizens in the province.⁴

It further quoted a passage from its earlier stand on the Official Language Act (Bill 22): "The Jewish community is unanimous in its belief that the pre-eminent language of work and of communication of this province should be French." Other ethnic groups begin their statements on the language question in similar terms.

While bowing before the inevitable Francization of Quebec, ethnic groups try to save as much as they can of their "English heritage" and of the advantages which knowing English has given them in the past. The Jewish brief stated tersely that "the majority of the persons in our community have always enjoyed and continue to expect community services offered in the English language." The Greek representative before the parliamentary commission declared that "bilingualism (French-English) is indispensable to our épanouissement both individually and collectively"; "in order to have a successful career our children must speak equally French and English."⁵ Knowledge of English also assures greater mobility and increases the chances of finding an appropriate job outside Quebec.

English is defended by ethnic groups also because it has become a second (and for many, the more important) language within their own communities. As more and more members of an ethnic community lose their own native tongue, English becomes indispensable to them. Ideally, ethnic communities in Quebec strive to be trilingual and, as the Chinese brief stated, they hope that the Government of Quebec will help them in that respect.

c) *The future social order in Quebec: free enterprise or socialism.* The fear that Quebec is moving toward socialism is probably more widespread among nationalities coming from eastern Europe and countries under socialist rule. Although little is said publicly, many Ukrainians, for example, fear that Quebec will succumb to the evils of communism experienced earlier in Ukraine. Stories are extant about francophone tenants allegedly saying to their Ukrainian landlords that soon they will not have to pay rent for their lodgings. Quebec nationalism is seen as going hand-in-hand with socialism. A counterweight to this combination is federalism; a united Canada is less likely to go communist.

d) *The future of the Quebec economy.* Canadian unity is also seen as a guarantee against the disintegration of Quebec's economy. Almost

all see separatism followed inevitably by an economic decline, if not complete catastrophe. Ethnic Quebecers do not believe that Quebec could survive on its own. The province could not withstand the hostile reaction from the rest of Canada and the United States, and even if retaliatory measures were not forthcoming, Quebecers could not manage their economy by themselves.⁶ The present economic slowdown in Quebec is blamed on the Parti Québécois' language policy. The transfer of large companies out of Quebec, the migration of large numbers of Quebecers to English-speaking provinces, the fall of real estate values, and, finally, the high unemployment, are all considered results of Péquiste rule in Quebec.

e) *Human rights and democratic freedoms.* Article 172 of Bill 1 proposed to subordinate the Charter of Human Rights to the forthcoming Charter of the French Language in Quebec. For the first time a united opposition developed among the French, the Anglo-Celts, and the other ethnic groups, and the article did not appear in the new Act.

The argument of human rights and basic freedoms in a democratic society is invoked by all who champion freedom of choice between English and French schools for all citizens of Quebec. The government, on the other hand, insists on the right of the majority to take unpopular measures to defend its own survival. René Lévesque has admitted repeatedly his humiliation in legislating linguistic policy; he could not be sure whether all the measures proposed by the government were justified. But Péquiste leaders see no other alternatives in their pursuit of national sovereignty.

f) *The future of the ethnic communities.* Because of their integration into the English-speaking milieu, ethnic groups are affected by policies which are not aimed specifically at them. An example will suffice to illustrate how an ethnic community can be affected by policies meant to regulate the growth of the anglophone population. Let us consider the English schools. Preventing immigrants from going to English schools will reduce the English school population and force schools to dismiss superfluous teaching staff. The Ukrainian community, which provides many teachers for the English school system, will thus see individuals forced to leave Quebec in search of work elsewhere. Valuable members of the Ukrainian community will be lost.

The exodus of the ethnic element can be prevented by giving its members the opportunity to switch over to the French system. This idea was brought up during the symposium on ethnic communities;

participants urged Franco Quebecers to become more receptive to citizens of ethnic background and requested that government allow more time for the realization of its Francization policies.

It is conceivable that the old communities which have become Anglicized in the past will continue to maintain a bilingual (English-ethnic) existence, if they are not submerged by new immigrants. Communities which will receive new members will become Francized faster because the new arrivals will have to go to French schools.

The White Paper mentioned above promised to help ethnic communities preserve and develop their languages and cultures. It promised to introduce ethnic language courses into the public school system, to subsidize cultural activities, and to make the ethnic fact better known to Quebecers of other origins. Specific legislation in this domain is mooted for the fall of 1977. In the meantime, the ministry of education is preparing to launch pilot languages courses in 1978. Ethnic communities are awaiting the outcome of these projects with some distrust.

Ethnic communities, afraid of great changes and of the unknown, are apprehensive about the future. They fear xenophobia which often accompanies radical social and national upheavals. They fear discrimination in job allocation and promotion. They would like to see Quebec fulfil the promises expressed by various ministers and recorded by the White Paper in a domain which has come to be known in Canada as multiculturalism. The term itself is not used by the PQ spokesmen, nor does it appear in official documents; it is in disfavor in Quebec. But the ideas projected by "cultural pluralism" are very similar to "multiculturalism." In the past, however, most of the meagre funds allocated to ethnic or immigrant groups were tied to projects which had as their primary objective the integration of ethnic communities into francophone society. The new government, too, appears to judge each project's merit in terms of its potential for integration.⁷ This approach was criticized in the symposium on ethnic communities, and it was recommended that ethnic projects be judged solely as a means for developing ethnic cultures, not their utility for integration.

Conclusion

During the past 10 months, the ethnic groups in Quebec have lived through a trying period because, for historical and economic reasons, they have been drawn into the Anglo-Celtic economic and cultural milieu. They must now learn the French language and adjust to Quebec's new political realities. Many individuals are gradually coming around to this position.

The ethnic communities themselves are ready to go very far to meet

the demands of the French Quebecers. They are willing to accept the primacy of French speech in all spheres of Quebec life.⁸ They are ready to uphold Quebec's claims to greater provincial autonomy and may even agree to the demands for an associate-state status.⁹ But they are opposed to the complete separation of Quebec. They also demand guarantees for the possibility of trilingual existence. The safeguarding of the interests of Quebec's ethnic communities is as much a challenge to the Government of Quebec as is the exercise of the collective francophone rights to the ethnic communities.

NOTES

1. The Ukrainian community, like the other ethnic groups, is losing a large portion of the mobile age group (20-35). No statistical data on Ukrainian emigration from Quebec is available nor has any Ukrainian organization undertaken such a study. The Jewish Congress has launched a \$300,000 project to analyze the recent situation of Jews in Quebec. According to N. May, a Toronto lawyer, some 15,000 Jews, mostly in the under-35 age bracket, have left Quebec since the November 1976 election. *Le Devoir*, 1 mars 1978.
2. According to the "White Paper on Language," *The Montreal Star* (supplement), April 1977, the government promises to ensure:
 - (a) The teaching of languages and literatures other than French, as part of a school and university program, wherever the demand is sufficient to justify this.
 - (b) Instruction in their own language for certain illiterate adult immigrants.
 - (c) The means whereby minority cultures will be enabled to develop and become more widely known. A few such means are: a system of subsidies to the ethnic press and for cultural events of all kinds; minority representation in cultural organizations; Radio-Quebec programming which reflects the presence of various minority groups and contributes toward the preservation and enrichment of their respective heritages.
 - (d) Participation of Quebecers of various origins in Quebec's civil service.
3. If the federal finance minister, Jean Chrétien, is right, between 40,000 and 50,000 people left Quebec in the first nine months of 1977. What percentage can be attributed to ethnic groups is unknown. *Montreal Star*, Feb. 11, 1978.
4. Brief submitted by The Jewish Congress, Quebec Region, to the Commission on Education, Cultural Affairs, and Communications on Bill 1, Charter of the French Language in Quebec, June 2, 1977.
5. Assemblée nationale, *Journal des Débats*. Commissions parlementaires, 10 juin 1977, no. 120, 182.
6. These opinions are, of course, voiced more readily in private discussions than in public statements.
7. In the new guidelines to applicants for grants ("Nouvelle politique de sub-

vention du Ministère”) the ministry of immigration specifies that “Pour ce qui est des organismes dits ethniques, ils devront manifester leur désir de contribuer à l’intégration de leurs membres à la majorité.”

The annual report of the ministry of immigration mentions the activity of LAFE (Liaison avec les Groupes Ethniques), the department in charge of ethnic affairs under the general heading of “Adaptation et intégration des immigrants” [*sic*]. It further specifies that “L’objectif premier de la division ‘liaison avec les Groupes Ethniques’ est d’impliquer les différents groupes socio-culturel du Québec dans le processus d’intégration des citoyens d’origines ethniques.” To this end, \$300,000 was allocated but only \$125,000 given in grants to ethnic organizations as such; the rest was spent on French-Quebecer organizations which work with immigrants.

The only sums given to ethnic cultural activities as such was the \$80,000 subsidy to evening and Saturday schools to ethnic groups as a whole. *Gouvernement du Québec, Ministère de l’Immigration. Rapport annuel 1976-1977* [Québec, 1978], 76, 80.

8. This idea was expressed by many participants at the June 1977 Symposium on Immigration and Ethnic Communities.
9. These were the writer’s own impressions when speaking with members of various ethnic communities.

TABLE I: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CANADIAN POPULATION
(Canadian Census, 1971)

	ETHNIC GROUPS						MOTHER TONGUE							
	Total A	%	British (Anglo-Celtic) B	% (B/A)	French C	% (C/A)	Other D	% (D/A)	English E	% (E/A)	French F	% (F/A)	Other G	% (G/A)
<i>Canada</i>	21,568,310	(100)	9,624,115	(44.6)	6,180,120	(28.7)	5,764,075	(26.7)	12,973,810	(60.1)	5,793,650	(26.9)	2,800,850	(13.0)
<i>Provinces</i>														
Quebec	6,027,765	(100)	640,045	(10.6)	4,759,360	(79.0)	628,360	(10.4)	789,185	(13.1)	4,867,250	(80.7)	371,330	(6.2)
Ontario	7,703,105	(100)	4,576,010	(59.4)	737,360	(9.6)	2,389,735	(31.0)	5,971,570	(77.5)	482,045	(6.3)	1,249,490	(16.2)
Manitoba	988,250	(100)	414,125	(41.9)	86,510	(8.8)	487,615	(49.3)	662,720	(61.1)	60,545	(6.1)	264,985	(21.8)
Saskatchewan	926,245	(100)	390,190	(42.1)	56,200	(6.1)	479,855	(51.8)	685,920	(74.1)	31,605	(3.4)	208,715	(22.5)
Alberta	1,627,875	(100)	761,665	(46.8)	94,665	(5.8)	771,545	(47.3)	1,263,935	(77.7)	46,500	(2.3)	317,440	(19.5)
British Columbia	2,184,620	(100)	1,265,455	(57.9)	96,550	(4.4)	822,615	(37.7)	1,807,255	(82.7)	38,035	(1.7)	339,330	(15.6)
<i>Metropolitan Area</i>														
Montreal	2,743,235	(100)	438,500	(16.0)	1,762,690	(64.0)	542,045	(20.0)	595,395	(21.7)	1,819,640	(66.3)	328,175	(12.0)
Toronto	2,628,130	(100)	1,495,300	(56.9)	91,975	(3.5)	1,040,855	(39.6)	1,940,735	(73.9)	45,570	(1.7)	641,740	(24.4)
Winnipeg	540,265	(100)	232,130	(43.0)	46,205	(8.5)	261,930	(48.5)	382,495	(70.8)	30,605	(5.7)	127,165	(23.5)
Saskatoon	126,565	(100)	58,210	(45.0)	6,415	(5.1)	61,940	(48.9)	100,175	(79.2)	2,755	(2.2)	23,515	(18.6)
Edmonton	495,915	(100)	221,625	(44.7)	35,755	(7.2)	238,535	(48.1)	377,305	(76.1)	18,210	(3.7)	100,190	(20.2)
Vancouver	1,082,350	(100)	633,825	(58.5)	42,870	(4.0)	405,655	(37.5)	881,885	(81.5)	18,430	(1.7)	182,040	(16.8)

TABLE II: UKRAINIANS IN CANADA
(Canadian Census, 1971)

	Total Canadian Population A	Total Ethnic Population B	Total Ethnic Mother Tongue C	Language Retention (C/B)	UKRAINIANS						
					At Ethnic Group D	% (D/A)	% (D/B)	Mother Tongue E	% (E/A)	% (E/B)	Language Retention (E/D)
<i>Canada</i>	21,568,310	5,764,075	2,800,850	(48.6)	580,660	(2.7)	(10.1)	309,855	(1.4)	(11.1)	(53.4)
<i>Provinces</i>											
Quebec	6,027,765	628,360	371,330	(59.1)	20,325	(.3)	(3.0)	11,390	(. 2)	(. 2)	(56.0)
Ontario	7,703,105	2,389,735	1,249,490	(52.3)	159,880	(2.1)	(6.7)	80,230	(1.0)	(6.4)	(50.2)
Manitoba	988,250	487,615	264,985	(54.3)	114,410	(11.6)	(23.5)	72,920	(7.4)	(27.5)	(63.7)
Saskatchewan	926,240	479,855	208,715	(43.5)	85,920	(9.3)	(17.9)	53,385	(5.8)	(25.6)	(62.1)
Alberta	1,627,875	771,545	317,440	(41.1)	135,510	(8.3)	(17.6)	70,900	(4.4)	(22.3)	(52.3)
British Columbia	2,184,620	822,615	339,330	(41.3)	60,145	(2.8)	(7.3)	20,055	(. 9)	(5.9)	(33.3)
<i>Metropolitan Areas</i>											
Montreal	2,743,210	542,045	328,175	(60.5)	18,045	(. 7)	(3.3)	10,460	(. 4)	(3.2)	(58.0)
Toronto	2,628,045	1,040,855	641,740	(61.7)	60,755	(2.3)	(5.8)	35,110	(1.3)	(5.5)	(57.8)
Winnipeg	540,265	261,930	127,165	(48.5)	64,305	(11.9)	(24.6)	37,780	(7.0)	(29.7)	(58.8)
Saskatoon	126,445	61,940	23,515	(38.0)	14,395	(11.4)	(23.2)	7,935	(6.3)	(33.7)	(55.1)
Edmonton	495,705	238,535	100,190	(42.0)	62,650	(12.6)	(26.3)	31,020	(6.3)	(31.0)	(49.5)
Vancouver	1,082,355	405,655	182,040	(44.9)	31,125	(2.3)	(7.7)	10,620	(1.0)	(5.8)	(34.1)

TABLE III: ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC GROUPS IN QUEBEC
(Canadian Census, 1971)

	Ethnic origin A	%	Mother, Tongue B	%	Language retention B/A	Some estimates for 1977*
<i>Total</i>	6,027,765	(100.0)	6,027,765	(100.0)		
French	4,759,360	(79.0)	4,867,250	(80.7)	(102.3)	
British (Anglo-Celtic)	640,045	(10.6)	789,185	(13.1)	(123.3)	
Other	628,360	(10.4)	371,330	(6.2)	(59.1)	
<i>Ethnic Groups</i>						
Italian	162,655	(2.8)	135,455	(2.2)	(79.8)	200,000
Jewish	115,990	(1.9)	21,340	(.4)	(18.4)	130,000
German	56,370	(.9)	31,025	(.5)	(55.0)	60,000
Greek	42,870	(.7)	38,970	(.6)	(90.9)	60,000
Native people	36,590	(.6)	21,055	—	(57.5)	40,000
Polish	23,970	—	15,480	—	(64.6)	25,000
Ukrainian	20,325	—	11,390	—	(56.0)	25,000
Portuguese	16,555	—	15,000	—	(90.6)	30,000
Dutch	12,590	—	4,660	—	(37.0)	15,000
Hungarian	12,570	—	12,605	—	(100.3)	15,000
Chinese	11,905	—	9,300	—	(78.1)	15,000
All others	108,970	—	55,050	—	(50.5)	

* Three "inter-ethnic" communities should be mentioned: *Arabic*, *Spanish* (of European and South American origin) and *Black*. Each community now numbers 40-50,000 members.

The Ukrainian Canadians in Social Transition

W. Roman Petryshyn

Introduction

The recent increased interest shown by social scientists in Canadian ethnicity has not yet reached the stage where studies allow for theoretical generalizations to be made about such groups as the Ukrainian Canadians. Consequently, the following paper will limit itself to describing some of the main social transitions which Ukrainian Canadians have experienced. Specifically, changes will be examined in place of birth, urbanization, occupational structure, education, income, penetration of Canadian elites, language, and religion. The analysis of social transitions will include comments on the entrance status of Ukrainian immigrants, the class position of Ukrainians in comparison to other ethnic groups, and the developing socio-political position of Ukrainian Canadians in Canadian society, particularly their participation in Canadian elites.

Social transition can only be understood in the context of the society within which a minority finds itself. The very fact that a minority exists as a minority for any extended historical period means that there is a structure and a dynamic in the over-all society which compels some groups of people to cluster together in pursuit of their own interests. If society as a whole were structured so as to fulfil the interests and needs of all its citizens, there would be no purpose for minorities to mobilize in defense of their interests. Bearing this in mind, the following analysis sets forth a profile of Ukrainian-Canadian social transition within the framework of a class and ethnically stratified Canadian society. Drawing on a variety of studies (notably Porter, 1965; Clement, 1975), the social transition of Ukrainian Canadians is seen as taking

place in a Canadian context in which, as in the past, Anglo-Canadian elites continue to dominate the major institutions of Canadian society.

Ukrainian Canadians, and Canadians generally, have experienced a relative improvement in their standard of living. Can one infer from this that the class and ethnic stratification of Canadian society has changed to allow for ethnic equality? Can Ukrainian Canadians now expect to be represented in the elites as well as in the middle and lowest sections of Canadian society? In seeking to answer these questions, comparisons will be drawn with the French-Canadian and Jewish-Canadian experiences. From this, we may see whether Ukrainians can expect, on a proportional basis, to enter various Canadian institutional elites (economic, civil service, media, and political) which collectively, by means of horizontal interconnections, form the Canadian ruling class.

The question of the social transition of Ukrainian Canadians also has a bearing on Ukrainian-Canadian identity. What have been the consequences of these transitions for such traditional indicators of Ukrainian-Canadian identity in Canada as language and religion? Has acceptance of the class and ethnic stratification system strengthened or weakened Ukrainian ethnic identity?

*From Immigrant to Native-born Ukrainian Canadians:
Their Place in Canadian Society*

Large immigrations and emigrations to and from Canada are a response to economic conditions. This popular movement can be seen as the result of a conjunction of economic "push" and "pull" factors. Cases of ethnic groups influenced by "push" factors were the Scottish crofters, the Irish fleeing the Potato Famine, and the Ukrainians escaping poverty caused by land shortages. The "pull" factor, or the attractiveness of immigration to Canada lies in Canada's ability to give immigrants relative upward economic and social mobility compared to the opportunities existing in their countries of origin. Evidence of Canada's success in attracting immigrants is witnessed by the fact that from 1861 to 1971 Canada received 10,009,000 immigrants. In 1971, 15.3 per cent of the Canadian population were foreign-born (Manpower and Immigration, 1977:4).

The nature of population movement in and out of Canada has corresponded to general economic conditions. The development of the Canadian west led to a massive immigration (4,574,000 immigrants) between 1901 and 1931. Immigration was restricted during the depression decade from 1931 to 1941 (150,000 immigrants, with even more persons emigrating), but has since been stimulated by the war and post-

war economic growth (3,583,000 immigrants from 1941 to 1971).

During the immigration period, 1946 to 1966, 59.9 per cent of the immigrants were western or northern European in origin, 21.1 per cent were southern European in origin, and 11.9 per cent eastern European in origin. During this period the remaining 7.1 per cent of immigrants came from other countries (Manpower and Immigration, 1977:4; Richmond, 1970:84).

The "push" and "pull" factors governing migration are not the same for all peoples. In the case of Ukrainian Canadians, immigration took place in three waves which differed from each other in social composition. Tesla in his 1976 article has shown that pre-World War I immigrants, numbering over 140,000, were mainly farmers and a small number of craftsmen. The second wave, from 1925 to 1930, numbered 68,000 and was more disposed to settling in urban centers. During this period of high Canadian immigration, 1901 to 1931, in which Ukrainians formed a significant part, Canada was transformed from a country characterized by small-scale craft production to one of large-scale machine production, requiring a surplus of cheap, low skilled, urban labor (Johnson, 1972: 169-70).

The third wave of immigrants to Canada consisted of about 38,000 Ukrainians, who at the end of World War II lived in Displaced Persons camps in western Europe. Of varied social strata, including professionals, they settled predominantly in the urban centers of eastern Canada in the years 1947 to 1952. Post-war immigrants to Canada found themselves in an economy which had been transformed during the war into a well-developed industrial system.

There has been no significant immigration of Ukrainians to Canada since that period, although a few hundred do arrive annually from various countries of Ukrainian settlement in the world, as well as from the Soviet Union.

In each period of Ukrainian emigration, selection processes were applied which gave Ukrainians a class and status entrance position above that of the Canadian Indian, Inuit, and Métis peoples, yet below that occupied by established Anglo-Canadian elites.

In general, the first two waves of Ukrainian immigrants were selected for their capacity to work on prairie farm lands in western Canada, although 15 per cent of the first wave were residents of cities by 1911, and over 30 per cent were urbanized before World War II. Ukrainian immigrants, as immigrants to Canada generally, were young adults, employable, and capable of competing within the farming and labor economy. With respect to the third wave of immigration, David Corbett (1957:171) has demonstrated that over one-half of the immigrants

during the period 1946 to 1951 went into laboring occupations; 7 per cent of the immigrants were professionals. The third Ukrainian immigration found a Canadian economy declining in the primary and goods producing industries, while increasing in the skilled and white collar occupations. Ukrainians, therefore, moved into work disliked by Canadians or into professions for which the number of trained Canadians was insufficient.

Ukrainian immigration to Canada took place within a pre-established socio-economic structure encompassing all Canadians. The process of recruitment and selection of the immigrants took place against an historical backdrop of pre-existing political and social relations. Thus, immigration to the Prairies occurred as a consequence of the failure of French Canadians and Anglo-Celts to settle there (Joy, 1972:24). So, too, Ukrainians and other immigrants filled the specific manpower requirements of the Canadian economy which existed at the end of World War II. In both cases, Ukrainians entered the economy in lower middle class positions. In all three immigrations, Ukrainian and other immigrant labor was imported primarily to satisfy the needs of the Canadian rural and urban economy and to fit into the socio-political norms of the host society.

Ukrainians found themselves in a social structure which was characterized by a system of ethnic stratification. This stratification emerged when Europeans first established their military, economic, and social dominance over the native peoples. The Canadian ethnic hierarchy was further strengthened by the class relationships which emerged as a consequence of the British conquest in 1759.

Canadian immigration, especially before World War I, was governed by popular, pseudo-scientific racial theories of Spencerian social darwinism, wherein development of the British Empire was taken as evidence of innate British racial superiority.

As a consequence of such beliefs, Canadian immigration policy was biased in favor of Anglo-Celtic northern European immigrants, in preference to eastern and southern Europeans. The object was not to "pollute British blood" by mixing Britons with what were perceived to be inferior races or peoples. According to this belief system, less desirable occupations were meant for less desirable people. Inevitably, there emerged a reciprocal relationship between class and ethnicity. In this situation, the dominant ethnic group used the notion of biological purity to help defend its dominant class position. This was particularly true in the colony of Canada where strong loyalty to Britain was seen to be essential for developing a traditional conservative society with a strong trading relationship to Britain, both of which were

counterposed to the economic expansionism and liberalism of the United States (Grant, 1970:33).

The class characteristics of Ukrainian Canadians will be discussed in two parts: the early period of immigrant settlement, and the later period where Ukrainians are a Canadian-born ethnic group.

During the first period "entrance status," or the initial conditions under which immigrant groups enter a new society, may have caused a disproportional distribution in undesirable jobs because of the absence of language fluency, education, and a lack of capital resources (Yuzyk, 1953:53-66). Is this originally low entrance status still affecting Ukrainian Canadians?

If one examines the last five censuses for the birthplace of Ukrainian Canadians, it is evident from Table I that the conversion from an immigrant to a Canadian ethnic group is all but complete.

Table 1. Percentage of Ukrainian Canadians Born in Canada, 1931 to 1971

	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971
Percentage	57.0	65.2	69.6	76.7	81.7

Source: Adapted from Tesla (1976:508, Table 9).

Thus in 1971, 82 per cent of Ukrainians in Canada were Canadian-born. The remaining 18 per cent of Ukrainians born outside Canada comprised only 104,518 of the 580,660 ethnic Ukrainian Canadians recorded by the 1971 census.

As a result of this transition, the effects of immigrant entrance status should now have only a marginal effect on Ukrainian occupational structure. Today, one could reasonably expect Ukrainian-Canadian occupational structure—which was originally heavily biased toward agriculture, construction, and primary industries—to approximate the Canadian mean in occupation, income, and education, unless there exist ethnic impediments to equal mobility. Where ethnic groups tend to be located in particular occupations for successive generations, it can be said that ethnic affiliation is correlated with social class. If this is the case ethnic affiliation could prove to be an important factor in the persistence of Canadian class barriers.

Some Class Characteristics¹ of Ukrainians in Canada's Class and Ethnic Stratification System: Occupation, Education, Income

There are two ways to measure structural assimilation or integration

into all class categories in order to see whether all ethnic groups are proportionately represented: first, by examining the rank order of all Canadian ethnic groups, and secondly, by examining the representation of ethnic groups in institutional elites.

In applying both of these analyses, one condition should be stipulated. It should be understood that in using ethnicity as an independent variable for purposes of rank ordering, related variables which have an effect on that ranking (i.e., changes in occupational structure of the society, religious differences, value differences, differing rates of urbanization) have not been held constant.

Occupation. Porter (1965:79–80) showed that in 1931, of Canadian-born citizens in three occupational groupings—agricultural, professional and financial, and primary and unskilled labor—eastern Europeans were over-represented in agriculture and in the primary and unskilled occupations. In this latter category the Canadian mean was 17.7 per cent of the labor force, whereas the eastern European mean, as can be seen from Table 2, was 30.1 per cent, placing them in the bottom third of the rank order, above Italians, other central Europeans, and native Indians.

Table 2. Comparison of Ethnic Groups in Primary and Unskilled Occupations, 1931

	Percentage of Ethnic Group in Primary and Unskilled Occupations
Jews	3.2
German	12.4
Dutch	12.5
Irish	12.8
Scottish	12.9
English	13.3
Scandinavian	19.1
French	21.0
Asian	27.9
Eastern European	30.1
Italian	43.8
Other Central European	53.5
Native Indian	63.0

Source: Adapted from Porter (1965:562, Appendix I, Table I).

Conversely, in 1931, eastern European males were under-represented in the professional and financial occupations. These were over-represented by Jews, Scots, English, and Irish. From this listing, Porter established a rank order of Canadian-born ethnic groups by occupational status for 1931; the Jewish and British (Anglo-Celtic) groups ranked first, followed by the Scandinavians, eastern Europeans, Italians, Japanese, other central Europeans, Chinese, and native Indians.

By 1951, all ethnic groups had a smaller number of their members in agriculture, since the proportion of the total agricultural labor force declined from 34 to 20 per cent between 1931 and 1951. Within this general decline, the English became more under-represented while the eastern Europeans and Scandinavians became more over-represented (*ibid.*, 1965:83). In the primary and unskilled occupations, as well as in the professional and financial occupations, the eastern Europeans maintained their rank order position (*ibid.*, 1965:84).

This result is confirmed by Blishen's 1941 study, published in 1958, which ranked occupations on a scale combining average years of schooling and average income. The variables of education and earnings confirmed the previous findings—that people of Anglo-Celtic and Jewish origin were over-represented and Asians, Russians, Scandinavians, and French were under-represented in these two categories. Even more significantly under-represented were the following (in order): Germans, other Europeans, Italians, Poles, Ukrainians, Indians, and Eskimos. On Blishen's scale of income and education in 1951, Ukrainians ranked second from the bottom on a list of all Canadian ethnic groups.

By 1961, the relative positions of the various groups had changed very little. In general the Anglo-Celtic, Jewish, and Asian ethnic groups improved their position on the professional and financial level (Porter, 1965:86). While eastern Europeans had improved their position in the professional, financial, and clerical occupations, they continued to be under-represented in the same occupations.

This improvement in occupations, however, should not be confused with representation in positions of power, since, as will be shown shortly, except for the Anglo-Celts, "other ethnics" are heavily under-represented in Canada's corporate institutions. In general it may be said that the rank ordering of ethnic groups has changed little from 1931 to 1961. However, there has been an alteration of the nature of occupations in the Canadian economy. There has been a growth of the labor force in the clerical and service sector, and a diminution of the labor force in agriculture and the primary and unskilled industries (see Table 3).

Within this general Canadian ethnic ranking, let us now focus on some social transition studies of Ukrainian Canadians. First, a number

Table 3. Selected Ethnic Origins and Occupational Classes, Male Labor Force, 1931, 1951, 1961:
Over- and Under-Representation in Occupation by Ethnic Group

	Percentage Over- and Under-Representation								
	1931		1951		1961				
	British (Anglo- Celtic)	Indian and Eastern European	Indian and Eskimo	British (Anglo- Celtic)	Eastern European	Indian and Eskimo	British (Anglo- Celtic)	Eastern European	Indian and Eskimo
Professional and financial	+1.6	- 3.9	- 4.5	+1.6	- 2.9	- 5.2	+2.0	-1.2	- 7.5
Clerical	+1.5	- 3.4	- 3.7	+1.6	- 2.9	- 5.2	+1.3	-1.7	- 5.9
Personal service	-.3	- 1.1	- 3.1	-.3	+ .6	-.9	+ .9	+ .9	+ 1.3
Primary and unskilled	-4.6	+12.4	+45.3	-2.2	+ 2.3	+47.0	-2.3	+0.0	+34.7
Agriculture	-3.0	+14.5	- 4.9	-3.2	+11.2	- 7.8	-1.5	+6.9	+ 6.9
All others	+4.8	-18.5	-29.1	+2.5	- 8.4	-28.2	+1.4	-4.9	-29.5

Source: Adapted from Porter (1965:87, Table I).

of demographic characteristics specific to Ukrainian Canadians might be pointed out.

Ukrainian population distribution was originally skewed in a geographical area of prairie settlement in a belt from southeastern Manitoba to the Peace River area in Alberta. As Table 4 shows, the distribution of the Ukrainian population has since extended west to British Columbia (increase from 1.1 per cent to 10.4 per cent) and east into Ontario (10.9 per cent to 27.5 per cent) in the period 1931 to 1971. Canadian industrialization has meant large shifts of population from the Prairie and Maritime regions to central Canada and British Columbia, as well as migration from rural to urban centres. In the Ukrainian case out-migration has taken place at the expense of the Ukrainian populations in Manitoba (32.7 to 19.7 per cent) and Saskatchewan (28.2 to 14.8 per cent).

Table 4. Distribution of Ukrainian Population by Provinces
in Percentage from the Total of Ukrainians, 1931 to 1971

Province	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971
Maritime Provinces	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Quebec	1.9	2.5	3.3	3.5	3.5
Ontario	10.9	15.7	23.8	27.0	27.5
Manitoba	32.7	29.3	25.0	22.3	19.7
Saskatchewan	28.2	26.1	19.8	16.6	14.8
Alberta	24.8	23.5	22.0	22.4	23.3
British Columbia	1.1	2.6	5.7	7.5	10.4
Yukon and North-west Territories	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.4
Canada	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Tesla (1976:505, Table 5).

As Table 5 shows, Ukrainians have mirrored the general Canadian rural-urban distribution pattern. From 1931 to 1971, 75 per cent of the Ukrainians became urban residents, narrowing the distance between themselves and the Canadian mean on rural residency from a 31.2 per cent differential to 1.2 per cent. Today, Ukrainians are close to mirroring the Canadian norm with respect to location of residence.

However, neither one of the foregoing two social processes means that Ukrainians are now similarly distributed in the occupational structure. For example, although barely 5.94 per cent of all Canadians are farmers, 11.65 per cent of Ukrainians in 1971 were farmers, indicating

Table 5. Comparison of Ukrainian Canadian and Over-all Canadian Rural-Urban Distribution, 1931-1971, in Percentages.

	Percentage of Ukrainian Canadian Population		Percentage of Canadian Population		Differential Percentage
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Rural Residence
1931	29.5	70.5	53.7	39.3	31.2
1941	33.9	66.1	54.3	45.7	20.4
1951	50.3	49.7	61.6	38.4	11.3
1961	65.2	34.8	69.6	30.4	4.4
1971	75.0	25.0	76.2	23.8	1.2

Source: Adapted from Tesla (1976:505, Table 6).

an over-representation ratio of 1.96 to 1.0 for Ukrainians-to-Canadians in this occupational category.

In a study of Ukrainian-Canadian occupational structure, 1941 to 1961, Isajiw and Hartmann (1969) noted that during the decade 1951 to 1961 Ukrainians, for the first time, began to leave occupations of lower status in the primary and unskilled sector (agriculture, logging, fishing, hunting, trapping, mining) for occupations ranked higher on the status scale (clerical work, laboring, manufacturing, service work). Such occupations offered a higher standard of living and prestige but required more education. As Table 6 shows, representation in laboring occupations decreased substantially and reached the point of equal or under-representation. Meanwhile representation of Ukrainian Canadians in manufacturing remained constant or decreased and representation in the sales, professional, and managerial categories increased.

In comparison to the general Canadian population, this movement of Ukrainians into such areas as management, service and recreation, and professional and technical sectors occurred at a rate faster than that of Canadian society as a whole (Isajiw and Hartmann, 1969: 1,102). Conversely, during the period 1951 to 1971 Ukrainians were leaving some occupations faster than the Canadian labor force average. This applied particularly to farming and the transport and communications fields.

Changes in Ukrainian-Canadian occupational structure can also be demonstrated by comparing the percentage of change occurring within occupational categories for Ukrainians over a thirty-year period, as is done in Table 7. In 1941, 54.63 per cent of Ukrainian working males were in agriculture. This percentage decreased to 30.24 in 1951, 21.09 in 1961, and 11.65 in 1971 (Tesla, 1976:49). Although Ukrainians are

Table 6. Ukrainian and Total Labor Force by Groups of Occupations, in Percentages, 1951 to 1971

	1951		1961		1971	
	Ukrainian	Canadian	Ukrainian	Canadian	Ukrainian	Canadian
Managerial	4.43	7.70	5.83	8.32	2.95	4.31
Professional and technical	3.37	7.12	6.55	9.71	10.44	12.67
Clerical	6.80	10.70	11.07	12.88	14.80	15.92
Sales	4.11	6.44	4.66	6.34	8.36	9.46
Service and recreation	9.94	9.77	12.60	12.30	12.86	11.24
Transport and communication	7.22	7.81	4.98	6.60	3.73	3.92
Farming	30.24	15.70	21.09	10.02	11.65	5.94
Logging	0.88	1.91	0.46	1.21	0.43	0.78
Mining	1.84	1.25	1.25	1.00	0.87	0.69
Craftsman	16.77	17.09	24.03	24.10	17.27	17.67
Construction	4.53	5.66	—	—	6.48	6.59
Other and not stated	8.85	9.87	7.48	8.06	10.16	10.81
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total number of Occupations	164,893	5,286,153	191,680	6,471,850	265,720	8,626,925

Source: Tesla (1976:49, Table 30).

still over-represented, since only 5.94 per cent of the Canadian population is agricultural, the trend is heading toward the Canadian mean. Although under-represented in the professions, the trend for Ukrainians is to approach the Canadian mean.

Table 7. Ukrainian-Canadian Percentage Occupational Change Over Three Census Periods

	Percentage Change		
	1941-51	1951-61	1961-71
Agriculture	-19.31	-12.34	- 9.44
Fishing, hunting, trapping	- 0.07	- 0.03	—
Logging	- 0.43	- 0.46	- 0.03
Mining and quarrying	- 0.63	- 0.55	—
Labor	+ 1.29	- 3.59	—
Construction	+ 2.32	—	—
Manufacturing	+ 4.51	—	—
Service	+ 1.63	+ 1.90	+ 0.26
Clerical	+ 2.08	+ 2.51	+ 3.73
Finance	+ 0.19	—	—
Professional	+ 1.08	+ 3.25	+ 3.89
Managerial	—	+ 2.51	- 2.88

Source: Columns 1 and 2 adapted from Isajiw and Hartmann (1969: 1, 109-10); column 3 adapted from Tesla (1976:49, Table 30).

Education. Concurrent with occupational restructuring of the Ukrainian community, an improvement has occurred in the educational achievement of Ukrainian Canadians. In 1971, 8.8 per cent of the Ukrainian-Canadian population, 20-34 years old, had a university degree compared to 2.9 per cent of that same age group in 1961 (Tesla, 1976:44). However, as in the case of occupational restructuring, this improvement among Ukrainian Canadians can only be understood if it is compared with a rank ordering of educational achievement among Canadian ethnic groups generally. In 1971 in Canada as a whole, 4.1 per cent of the students (246,320) attended university for a first degree. Table 8 lists in rank order percentages of ethnic groups with some university attendance in 1971. Although the rank for Ukrainians attending university appears to be relatively high, the hierarchy of three levels of ethnic stratification previously described appears to hold constant. Ukrainians have improved their position in university attendance during the last decade, but they have done so while remaining

Table 8. Rank Order of Major Ethnic Groups with Some University Attendance, 1971

	Percentage
Jewish	13.2
Asian	9.1
Polish	5.8
Ukrainian	5.7
Scandinavian	5.3
British (Anglo-Celtic)	4.7
German	4.1
Dutch	3.3
Italian	3.3
French	2.5

Source: Krawchenko (1977:63).

within the middle level of the ethnic stratification system of Canadian society as a whole.

Income. The above relationship holds for a final criterion of class, namely income. Results of a study by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, demonstrated in Table 9, show that in 1961, Jews ranked first in income followed by the Anglo-Celts and the Germans. The Ukrainians, French, and Italians were at the bottom of the income scale, followed by Indian and Inuit incomes, which were not reported.

Table 9. Rank Order of Average Income of Male Labor Force by Ethnic Origin, 1961

	Index	Average income in dollars
Canadian average	100.0	4,414
Jewish	166.9	4,846
British (Anglo-Celtic)	109.8	4,852
German	103.1	4,207
Other	98.2	4,153
Ukrainian	86.8	4,128
French	85.8	3,872
Italian	81.0	3,575

Source: Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, (1969:40).

A recent analysis based on the 1971 census indicates that the rank order position of Ukrainian-Canadian income has actually fallen below that of the Italians and French since 1961, giving the Ukrainian ethnic group the lowest income of any group in Canada, except for the Indians and Inuit (Isajiw, 1977).

The foregoing discussion has examined a variety of class characteristics of Ukrainians in Canadian society. Statistics have been presented on occupation distribution, educational attainment, and income in rank order comparison with other Canadian ethnic groups.

It may be contended that these statistics reflect the influence of a series of intervening factors such as immigrant entrance status, regional patterns of settlement, varying language abilities, and discrimination. However, in the case of the Ukrainians, the processes of urbanization and geographic mobility appear to indicate that Ukrainians today are affected by social processes to the same extent as are other Canadians. The fact that 82 per cent are Canadian-born would seem to confirm such a generalization.

Despite this apparent similarity, the rank ordering of Ukrainian Canadians according to class characteristics confirms our initial thesis that Ukrainian Canadians entered Canadian society in a middle position in Canada's system of ethnic stratification, and have remained in that position. For Ukrainian Canadians, their class position—above native peoples but below those groups which are over-represented in the elites of Canadian society—has historically coincided with their ethnicity. In a Canadian society originally structured around “preferential” and “non-preferential” groups, being Ukrainian Canadian has meant an over-representation in the less desirable jobs in society, having less education and less income. That some of these factors continue to exist, and that Ukrainian Canadians have not dispersed throughout the entire Canadian class structure, is a consequence of the nature of Canada's class structure which has impeded full integration.

Political and Social Relationships of Ukrainians to the Elites and Cultural Norms of Canadian Society

In addition to the use of ranking to measure whether structural assimilation is occurring equally for all ethnic groups, a second method which may be used to establish class discrimination is to examine the elites of institutional hierarchies in order to determine the degree of representation Canadians with origins other than Anglo-Celtic have in key societal elite structures—economic, bureaucratic, media, and political.

Economic elite. Porter (1965) examined the economic, bureaucratic, media, and political elites of Canadian society. In a case study of 760 individuals, he demonstrated that in 1951 Canadians of Anglo-Celtic origin made up less than one-half of the Canadian population, yet constituted 92.3 per cent of the Canadian economic elite. Although the French Canadians made up about one-third of the population, they constituted only 6.7 per cent (51 persons) of the same elite. In 1951, "other" ethnic groups, about one-fifth of the population, represented 1 per cent of the elite. The latter represented mainly Jews (.78 per cent), who qualified as a consequence of various family industries and not because of any significant integration onto the boards of directors of banks, insurance companies, or big corporations. The Jewish case demonstrates that there can be over-representation of an ethnic group in education and the professions (see Tables 2, 8, 9), accompanied by under-representation in the corporate world.

That the economic elite can have an under-representation of non-Anglo-Celtic groups is demonstrated by the case of French Canadians. After the conquest in 1759, the British elite, in an international trading relationship with Britain, dominated commerce (Guindon, 1968). The absence of trans-Atlantic trade between France and French Canada effectively restricted the possibility of French-Canadian competition with the British in North America. Consequently, Tulchinsky's study (1972) on Montreal found few French Canadians working in commerce from 1837 to 1853. Instead, the French tended to concentrate in the medical and legal professions. In a later period, Acheson's study (1973) of the industrial elite in Canada between 1885 and 1910, showed that French Canadians comprised only 7 per cent of this elite in 1885, dropping to 6 per cent in 1910, at a time when they represented 29 per cent of the population.

Porter's study in 1951 confirmed that, during 200 years of British-French history, the process of economic discrimination on the basis of ethnic restriction helped to maintain class hierarchies. Canada became a society structured around the conquest of the French, with the British conquerors reserving the benefits and advantages in the new society for themselves. Immigration added ethnic diversity to the scene, and in doing so diversified—but did not alter—this structured societal ethnic hierarchy in which class and ethnicity were correlated. Control of the economic sector in Quebec has remained in the hands of British descendants to this day, because of their cultural advantage over the French Canadians in raising capital, first from imperial Britain, and since 1920 from international capital investors in the United States.

The current situation in the Canadian economic elite has been investi-

gated by Wallace Clement (1975), who has demonstrated that in 1971 only 8.4 per cent (65 people) of the Canadian economic elite were French. Comparing this statistic with Porter's finding of 6.7 per cent in 1951 in Table 10, it is clear that there has been an over-all French increase of only 1.7 per cent (14 persons) in the Canadian economic elite over the past 20 years. This figure has also been confirmed with respect to French penetration of leading positions in middle range and smaller corporations. Presthus (1973:56) checked 12,741 names of executives from 2,400 companies listed in the 1971 *Directory of Directors* in Canada and found only 9.48 per cent to be French Canadian.

Table 10. Proportion of Ethnic Representation in the Economic Elite, 1951, 1971

	Percentage of economic elite		Percentage of Canadian population	
	1951	1972	1951	1971
Anglo-Celtic	92.3	86.2	47.9	44.8
French	6.7	8.4	30.8	29.6
Others	1.0	5.4	21.3	26.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number in sample	760	775		

Source: Clement (1975:232).

Note: When these proportions are standardized to 1.00 for population growth the index is as follows:

	1951	1972
Anglo-Celtic	1.93	1.93
French	0.22	0.29
Others	0.05	0.20

During the last 20 years, the number of "other" ethnic groups in the Canadian economic elite has increased from 1 to 5.4 per cent, or from approximately eight to 42 persons in a sample of 775. In view of the fact that "other" ethnics constituted 26.7 per cent of the population in 1971, those of other than Anglo-Celtic or French origin were highly under-represented in the Canadian economic elite. Of the 5.4 per cent who were represented, 4.1 per cent (32 persons) were Jewish Canadians, and only 10 came from the remaining groups. Of the people listed by Peter Newman in *The Canadian Establishment*, the writer knows only one person, Mr. Bill Teron, to be of Ukrainian-Canadian origin.

Bureaucratic elite. With reference to the bureaucratic elite, in a sample of 202 senior civil servants in 1951, Porter found that only 13.4 per cent (27 persons) were French Canadians. At that time French Canadians constituted 30.83 per cent of the population. Consistent with the previous pattern, Porter (1965:442) concluded that "Other ethnic groups in Canada, with the exception of Jews, are scarcely represented at all in the higher bureaucracy."

In 1961, the origins of the federal public service were 58.6 per cent Anglo-Celtic, 24.0 per cent French, and 17.4 per cent "other" (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, IV, 1969:273, Table A-29). The average income of civil servants of non-Anglo-Celt and non-French origin was slightly below the income of civil servants of French origin. Both French and "other" origin civil servants had significantly lower incomes than their counterparts of Anglo-Celtic origin. Significantly, although Ukrainians made up 2.96 per cent of the work force, in 1961 they constituted 1.0 per cent of civil service managers, the top category *ibid.*, 1969:277, Table A-37).

Media elite. Regarding the 1951 media elite, Porter (1965:486) wrote:

The ownership group in their selection of personnel to run their newspapers and periodicals have to concern themselves not only with technical competence, but also with ideological acceptability which means sharing the attitudes and values of the owner. Thus the image of Canada, in as much as the mass media contribute to that image, is created by the British charter group as represented by the upper class owning group or the successful middle class journalist. Minority groups participate scarcely at all in the creation of this image. Even in the west, where minority groups are more concentrated than elsewhere, there is no representation at the top of the mass media operations.

In a study of the Canadian media elite in 1971, Clement (1975:334) showed that the media elite was broken down as follows: 81.9 per cent Anglo-Celtic, 13.3 French, and 4.8 "other," 2.9 per cent being Jews. This figure is below even the 5.4 per cent of "others" in the economic elite, and is far below the 26.7 per cent of the total "other" ethnics in Canada in 1971. Without corporate capital and without a regional language base such as exists in Quebec, there seems little chance that non-Anglo-Celt and non-French ethnic groups will penetrate the private media field.

Political elites. March's study (1967) has shown that during the period 1867 to 1964 there were 97 members of Parliament elected to the House of Commons from non-Anglo-Celtic and non-French ethnic origins. As Table 11 shows, the number of candidates of "other" ethnic groups has been increasing steadily since World War II. In the 1965 general election they comprised 15 per cent of all candidates.

Table 11. Percentage of "Other" Ethnic Candidates
in Federal Elections

1949	5.9
1953	9.8
1957	10.7
1963	13.9
1965	14.6

Source: March (1968: II, 18).

Although the percentage of candidates of "other" ethnic groups running for office has been increasing, the number of "other" ethnics in the Canadian political elite is still relatively low. Porter's (1965:389, 441) political elite study of 156 cases from 1940 to 1960 showed that 75 per cent were of Anglo-Celtic origin, 21.7 of French origin, and only 3.2 from "other" minority groups. Olsen's study (Clement, 1975:234) has demonstrated that these figures have not changed much between 1961 and 1973. In 1973, for example, French Canadians comprised 24.7 per cent of the political elite. From these figures, it is evident that, although "other" ethnics have not yet reached political elite participation in proportion to their size of the population, the political system appears to have responded more to the ethnic changes in society than have either the bureaucratic, media, or economic systems. Yuzyk (1977:322) has shown that during the period 1904 to 1975, Ukrainian Canadians have attained one lieutenant-governor, four senators, one federal cabinet minister, and 17 provincial cabinet ministers or speakers.

Culture assimilation to Canadian norms. Ukrainian immigration to Canada has meant that Ukrainians entered into a class system that had been ethnically stratified before their arrival, and that they entered it at the middle layer, where they have remained.

To achieve occupational mobility, the majority of Ukrainian Canadians have accepted Anglo-Canadian norms which dominate public society. A middle class view prevails and the majority have turned

toward Anglo-Canadian elite norms, imitating them in order to be accepted as equals (assuming this would occur).²

But, as Clement (1975:239) concludes:

Ethnic representation in the economic elite satisfies neither of the two 'official' models of Canadian society—'biculturalism' and 'multiculturalism.' Neither in the 1951 or 1972 economic elite was there anything close to approaching the proportions required to say there was sufficient French representation for the bicultural model; nor was there sufficient 'third' ethnic participation for the multicultural model. The conclusion must be that the economic elite is characterized by Anglo dominance in both periods.

Most Ukrainian Canadians cooperated with this Anglo dominance of their society and, after the period of immigrant settlement, responded socially so as to conform to the cultural norms imposed on them. These norms were necessary for survival, and eventually became prestigious because they were the norms of "public society"—of the state and the wealthy. Indeed, many of the social processes in which Ukrainian Canadians participated, such as urbanization, also meant taking on the behavior and values of Anglo-Canadian urban culture.

Data on two important identity indicators—language assimilation and religious affiliation—is given below to demonstrate how this imposition of, and conformity to, Anglo-Canadian culture has affected the Ukrainians to 1971.

Ukrainian language assimilation. In the first decades of Ukrainian settlement in Canada not only Ukrainians spoke Ukrainian. Many non-Ukrainians, especially eastern European immigrants, assimilated into the Ukrainian language group. The predominately rural environment slowed the pace of language assimilation, as well as the rate of exogamy. Correlated with the move into the cities and with upward occupational mobility, the rate of language assimilation increased rapidly, particularly among young people. As is shown in Table 12, today Ukrainian as a "mother tongue" (the language a person first speaks in childhood and still understands) is a characteristic of those primarily over 45 years old.

An even more current indicator of the state of Ukrainian is its use as a functional language in the home. For the first time, the 1971 census asked: "What is the language presently being used most frequently by the person in his or her home?" Results shown in Table 13 indicate that 132,606 Ukrainian Canadians used Ukrainian at home. This repre-

Table 12. Use of Ukrainian as Mother Tongue by Age, 1951, 1971

Age group	Percentage	
	1951	1971
0-9	60.8	20.7
10-19	84.8	29.8
20-29	91.1	37.3
30-39	94.6	58.0
40-49	104.9*	72.8
50-59	108.3	79.7
60-69	108.5	91.5
70 and over	108.9	94.3

Source: Adapted from Tesla (1976:514, Table 17).

* Percentages over 100 indicate non-Ukrainians using Ukrainian as their mother tongue

sented 22.8 per cent of the Ukrainian-Canadian population in 1971. The use of Ukrainian varied from province to province and was highest in Quebec (37.5 per cent) and lowest in the further extremities of Canada: British Columbia (7.2 per cent), the Yukon and Northwest Territories (3.6 per cent), and the Maritime provinces (5.3 per cent). In Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan about 27 per cent of Ukrainians used the language in their homes. In Alberta the percentage was 18.

Table 13. Percentage of Ukrainian Canadians Speaking Ukrainian at Home by Provinces, 1971.

	Total number of Ukrainian Canadians	Home Ukrainian Speakers' Number	Percentage
Maritimes	3,215	170	5.3
Quebec	20,325	7,622	37.5
Ontario	159,880	41,889	26.2
Manitoba	114,410	31,119	27.2
Saskatchewan	85,920	22,768	26.5
Alberta	135,510	24,663	18.2
British Columbia	60,145	4,330	7.2
Yukon and N.W.T.	1,245	45	3.6
Canada	580,660	132,606	22.8

Source: Adapted from Tesla (1976:515, Table 19).

These percentages are even lower when statistics on language speakers are controlled for birth place—those who are Canadian-born and those who are immigrants. Immigrants comprised 70,000 of the Ukrainian-speaking population. Of those Ukrainians born in Canada, only 13.2 per cent (62,600) spoke Ukrainian at home.³

Religious denomination assimilation. The 1971 census asked, "What is your religion?" This does not imply church attendance. On arrival in Canada approximately 85 per cent of Ukrainians were Ukrainian Greek Catholic, 15 per cent belonged to the Ukrainian Orthodox denomination, while others were few in number.

Table 14 shows comparative statistics for the religious affiliation of Ukrainians in Canada from 1931 to 1971. The Ukrainian Catholic Church affiliation has fallen from 58 per cent to 32 per cent. The Greek Orthodox Church affiliation has held fairly steady, falling only from 25 per cent to 20 per cent.

Former adherents of these churches have gone into the United Church (1.6 to 13.9 per cent), a growth of 12.3 per cent; the Anglican Church (0.3 to 4.6 per cent), a growth of 4.3 per cent; and the Roman Catholic Church (11.5 to 15.3 per cent), a growth of 3.8 per cent. There has also been a small growth of Ukrainians in the Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Baptist churches.

Table 14. Religious Denominations of the Ukrainian Population in Canada, 1931 to 1971 in Percentages Based on Total.

Religious Denomination	1931	1941	Percentages		
			1951	1961	1971
Ukrainian Catholic	58.0	50.0	41.7	33.3	32.1
Greek Orthodox	24.6	29.1	28.1	25.2	20.1
Roman Catholic	11.5	12.3	14.3	16.8	15.3
United	1.6	3.0	7.1	12.6	13.9
Anglican	0.3	1.0	2.6	4.0	4.6
Presbyterian	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.3
Lutheran	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.4	1.8
Baptist	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.4
Other	2.1	2.2	3.2	4.2	9.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total population	225,113	305,929	395,043	473,337	580,660

Source: Adapted from Tesla (1976:516, Table 22).

That the United and Anglican churches attract Ukrainians may result from the fact that the Anglican Church (with 25.5 per cent of the economic elite and only 14.7 per cent of the population) is over-represented in the economic elite, followed closely by the United Church (17.6 per cent) (Porter, 1965:290). A similar over-representation of both religions exists in the bureaucratic and political elites. Ukrainian Canadians are conforming to the culture and values held by Canada's ruling elites and dominant class.

Conclusion

Canadian society, from its inception, has been a class and ethnically stratified society. Historically, those in the Canadian elites of the dominant class have followed policies and practices which reinforced their ethnic control of the public sector. This situation, clearly evident in Quebec, is basically stable, not having altered substantially in the last 200 years. Within a general framework of Anglo-Celt-French-Indian-Inuit ethnic stratification, Ukrainians have passed through a phase of immigration and today are almost wholly a Canadian-born ethnic group. If Ukrainian Canadians are not equally represented in all sectors of Canadian society, this is due mainly to the character of Canadian society, not to any immigrant status effect.

Ukrainians entered the Canadian ethnic stratification system in the middle, below those in power, but above indigenous native peoples. While in the middle position, because of changes in the structure of the Canadian economy, Ukrainian Canadians have experienced some occupational mobility and are similar to other Canadians in such areas of social development as degree of urbanization and migration.

However, these changes do not mean that Ukrainians will eventually penetrate the Canadian power structure, notably the economic, political, bureaucratic, and media elites. The class and ethnic stratification barriers in Canada work against such penetration. Indeed, the historical experience in Canada of the Jewish and French cases indicates the great difficulty of equal integration of Canadian minorities into the power elites which manage Canadian society.

The dominance of Anglo Canadians in the elites of Canada's class structure has resulted in Ukrainian Canadians conforming to Anglo-Canadian cultural norms in "public society." Consequently, assimilation has profoundly affected such basic elements of Ukrainian identity as language use and religious affiliation.

Inevitably the class and ethnic structure of Canadian society and the historical middle class position of Ukrainian Canadians has defined the manner in which Ukrainians have behaved politically in Canadian

society. For example, when the policy of multiculturalism was announced, the class position of Ukrainians influenced both their response to this policy, and the strategies Ukrainians contributed to the multicultural movement. Limits to Ukrainian politics emerged because, from their position in the class hierarchy, Ukrainian Canadians had difficulty perceiving and identifying with the motivations of both the upper classes, from which they had been excluded, and the lower classes, who suffer an oppression which Ukrainians have striven to escape.

If Ukrainians are to continue to create, lead, and make substantive a multicultural movement aimed at establishing equal treatment for Canadians of all ethnic backgrounds, then they must make the class and ethnic stratification of Canadian society their principal concern, forming appropriate social and political alliances which have the potential of altering the inequalities in the current social structures of Canadian society. Without such an orientation, it would appear that the transitions herein described will continue their present assimilatory trends.

NOTES

1. "The most commonly used objective criteria of class are income, occupation, property ownership, and education, all of which are ways of expressing objective economic differences among members of the society. . . . Income, education, and occupation as indices of class correlate highly" (Porter, 1965:10).
2. Ukrainian-Canadian history is rich with organizations and individuals who struggled against the Anglo-Canadian hierarchy which controlled Canada's wealth and whose elites established societal cultural norms. For recent treatments of this question, see H. Potrebenko, *No Streets of Gold* (Vancouver, New Star Books, 1977) and M. Kostash, *All of Baba's Children* (Edmonton, Hurtig Publishers, 1977).
3. It is the writer's contention that the use of Ukrainian is diminishing because it has been made irrelevant in the public sector and particularly in the work world. Reversal of language assimilation requires the creation of work situations where a Ukrainian-speaking population could speak its own language as a normal function of "public society."

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The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community*

Bohdan Bociurkiw

Introduction

The term “multiculturalism”—a recent addition to the Canadian political vocabulary—has been used with reference to at least three interrelated phenomena which should be treated as analytically distinct. *First*, multiculturalism denotes Canada’s *demographic reality*, many ethnocultural groups interacting and integrating to varying degrees (mostly around a loose pattern of Anglo-American cultural values), a changing ethnocultural “mosaic” embracing groups large (Anglo-Celtic and French “co-pluralities”) and small (German, Italian, Ukrainian, Dutch, Polish, Jewish, etc.), groups indigenous (Canadian Indians and Inuit) and those from other parts of the world, which over the past four centuries have come to Canada as conquerors, traders, settlers, refugees, and immigrants. Differences over the policy of multiculturalism have undoubtedly been rooted, directly or indirectly, in differing perceptions of this demographic fact and conflicting assessments as to the capacity of the non-Anglo-Celtic and non-French invisible ethnic minorities to survive beyond the initial few generations as distinct, viable linguistic-cultural groups in conditions of territorial dispersal, assimilatory pressures from society at large, and rising rates of intermarriage with other Canadians. To recall the late Dr. Watson

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Kirkconnell's analogy, it is the extent to which Canada's ethnocultural minorities are viewed as drifting "icebergs" progressively melting away in the warm gulf streams of the two "founding races."¹

Secondly, multiculturalism stands for a relatively recent and not very systematically articulated *ideology* giving expression to the *belief* in the relative stability of Canada's demographic "mosaic." It is based on the twin *assumptions* that the country's ethnocultural minorities may be rendered essentially "unmeltable" through conscious social engineering, and that Canada's national identity, unity, and cultural wealth can only benefit from the moral and material public support of ethnocultural pluralism. More immediately, the crystallization of multiculturalism as ideology has been enhanced by the still continuing national debate about the nature of Canadian identity and the equitable division of political power between the so-called charter groups—a debate which has generated widespread fears among the 'non-charter Canadians' that the ongoing readjustment of political power between the Anglo-Celtic and French groups would leave the other groups behind in a position of arrested upward mobility, as second or third-class Canadians.

The opponents of multiculturalism have argued that only by assimilating into either "charter" culture or "nation" (something held to be sociologically "inevitable") would "ethnics" attain "real" equality of opportunity and socio-economic advancement with other Canadians.² Rejecting this proposition, adherents of the multicultural ideology have argued that (a) such a sacrifice of ethnocultural distinctiveness to personal upward mobility would be too great a price to pay in terms of the loss to Canada of unique spiritual and cultural values brought to this country by different ethnic groups; (b) that such a *quid pro quo* is fundamentally undemocratic and destructive of human dignity; (c) that the "melting" of "ethnics" will ultimately benefit only the Anglo-Celtic group and leave the French Canadians in the position of a diminishing minority; and (d) that linguistic-cultural assimilation would not necessarily guarantee access to the narrowing apex of Canada's power pyramid for the "homogenized" Canadians of "non-charter" descent.³

Thirdly, multiculturalism denotes recent *federal and provincial policies* and programs designed, on the one hand, to allay the above-mentioned fears on the part of "third groups," and, on the other hand, to reapportion symbolic and material policy reactions in response to the felt or assumed political power of ethnocultural minorities, particularly in terms of public support for the maintenance and development of the groups' cultural and, in part, linguistic heritages.⁴ The lasting contribution of Senator Paul Yuzyk to the development and

eventual governmental recognition of the concept of multiculturalism was to provide—in his 1964 maiden speech in the Senate—the first exposition of these three dimensions of multiculturalism, and to instil this concept into the public consciousness of Canadians.⁵

Without totally ignoring the other two dimensions of multiculturalism, this paper will focus on the federal policy of multiculturalism, from its inception until the spring of 1977. It shall examine the Ukrainian-Canadian contribution to the genesis, the formulation, and implementation of the policy as well as Ukrainian-Canadian responses—positive and negative—to multiculturalism programs, with a view to assessing the effectiveness of Ukrainian influence and pressure on the application and development of multicultural policy in line with the articulated needs of the Ukrainian-Canadian community.

Special attention will be accorded 1) to the interrelationship between the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), several Ukrainian organizations—particularly the Ukrainian Canadian University Students' Union (SUSK) and the Ukrainian Professional and Business Federation—the Ukrainian press, and some important individual Ukrainian opinion leaders, as well as the self-designated “progressive” camp represented by the pro-communist Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC); and 2) to the individuals and institutions involved in drafting, making, and implementing the multiculturalism policy.

This paper has drawn upon a large variety of sources, including governmental and private group documents, institutional and individual records, the press, correspondence, and interviews. Needless to say, a topic of such immediacy and political sensitivity involving institutional and individual interests and reputations is not well suited for systematic and dispassionate scholarly research; some aspects of the problem are still shrouded in bureaucratic secrecy and many important sources remain inaccessible. Accordingly, until one is able to examine *all* the relevant government documents, the records of all Ukrainian organizations and public figures involved, and hopefully interview the principal policy-makers and administrators on the government side—until then, much that follows will have to remain incomplete, tentative and, in part, speculative.

Ukrainians and the Genesis of an Ideology of Multiculturalism

Though smaller numerically than the Germans and, more recently, the Italians among Canada's ethnic minorities, Ukrainian Canadians have undoubtedly played the leading role in the development and dissemination of the ideas and policy demands that eventually crystallized into the policy of multiculturalism. This role was rooted undoubtedly

in their historical aversion to assimilation, as well as in political causes underlying much of Ukrainian emigration from the Old Country, a strong sense of collective responsibility for the preservation of the group's ethnocultural values in Canada while these values were being suppressed by the alien rulers of Ukraine, the lasting commitment of Ukrainian churches to the preservation of the national cultural-linguistic heritage, the group's highly developed capacity for grass-roots organization, and the nature of Ukrainian settlement in the Prairie provinces. Considering the virtual cessation of Ukrainian immigration to Canada since the early 1950s, Ukrainian Canadians have shown a remarkable capacity for ethnocultural survival despite societal pressures for assimilation, as illustrated by successive Canadian census returns.⁶

While some of the beliefs and propositions underlying the "ideology" of multiculturalism (if not the term itself) have long been current among Ukrainian Canadians and some other ethnic groups, it was only during the 1960s that this "ideology" crystallized, acquired grass-roots support among ethnic groups, and began to attract the attention of the politicians, the media, and scholars. The principal catalyst in this process was, of course, the national debate about the nature of Canadian society, Anglo-French relations, and the role of the third groups in the country's development—a collective soul-searching epitomized by the creation in July 1963 of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (hereafter the B & B Commission). The inclusion into this body of two commissioners of Ukrainian and Polish origin⁷ attested to the government's recognition of the importance of "other groups" in the ensuing national debate.

One of the most immediate factors which helped not only francophone Canadians but Ukrainians and other smaller groups to reassert their rights during the last decade and a half was the regionalization of the major federal parties' support and a succession of minority governments in Ottawa (1962–68, 1972–74). An absolute dependence on Quebec seats by successive Liberal governments immensely strengthened the French-Canadian voice in Ottawa; at the same time, minority-based governments and the opposition were compelled to pay much greater attention to the ethnic vote, which, they felt, could significantly affect their political destinies during the next federal election, especially in the Prairie provinces and in the Oshawa-Toronto-Hamilton area. But there were other, larger influences involved which made Canadians, in general, more receptive to the idea of multiculturalism and its policy-level application. These influences came with the changing cultural climate in the Western world—noticeable first among the young genera-

tion since the early 1960s: a growing distrust of authority and a questioning of established structures, values, and norms; greater toleration of non-conformity; more appreciation of ethnocultural diversity; the realization that being different or being a member of a minority did not imply being wrong or inferior. There was also a deepening awareness of racial, social, and economic inequality, discrimination and prejudice, a growing concern for human rights, individual and group rights, combined with greater intolerance of social, legal, and institutional restraints on freedom. One could observe also a deepening disenchantment with a sophisticated, urban, mass-produced culture, a disenchantment which combined with a new appreciation of the simple way of life in communion with one's natural environment—as exemplified in the new popularity of folk culture, including ethnic culture. The combined effect of these changes in social outlook was to undermine the traditional pressures for conformity with Anglo-American or homogenized Canadian models and to embolden the minorities to demonstrate their diverse heritage, values, and demands. Slogans ranging from “It's fun to be Ukrainian” to “Ukrainian power,” which gained popularity among young members of the Ukrainian community, were only illustrations of the changing attitudes toward one's own ethnicity.

One cannot also overemphasize the impact of the growing Franco-Canadian nationalism on the rise of ethnic consciousness among Ukrainian Canadians and other minorities; not only did it stimulate Ukrainian demands for cultural-linguistic guarantees roughly similar to those being offered to the less numerous French communities in the west, but it also contributed to the coalescence of different ethnic organizations into an embryonic *ad hoc* coalition (the so-called third force) that could potentially affect the changing balance of power between the country's two main groups.

The body of beliefs initially espoused by Ukrainian and other ethnic minority spokesmen could be reduced to the following propositions: (1) in one, united, and independent Canada, Canadians should enjoy effective equality in political and socio-economic rights, irrespective of their ethnic origin, religion, mother tongue, etc.; (2) all ethnic groups, from the Anglo-Celtic and French to the smallest ones, contribute to the Canadian cultural mosaic, and their cultural activities should be given moral and material support by the state in proportion to the group's willingness to survive; (3) within the linguistic provisions of the BNA Act, English should be the *lingua franca* of all Canadians, but the teaching of, and in, ancestral languages, and their social use, should be encouraged and supported from public funds wherever there

is effective demand for them; (4) publicly-supported media should devote appropriate time and resources to ethnic language programs and to the culture and art of minority groups; (5) all levels of government should actively combat discrimination and prejudice directed against ethnic groups.⁸ The lasting popularity won by John Diefenbaker among Ukrainian Canadians, especially in the prairies, has probably been due more to his affinity with such an ideology and his articulation of some of the above propositions than to his symbolic endorsements of Ukraine's right to independence.⁹

Ottawa's Adoption of a Multiculturalism Policy

In tracing the genesis of the federal multiculturalism policy, one needs to show the principal factors that led the national government to substitute it for biculturalism as recommended by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Secondly, it would be important to show the Ukrainian influences which eventually helped to shape that policy.

In his address on "Multiculturalism in Canada," presented to an international conference in Gaithersburg, Md., in February 1975, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, the then parliamentary secretary to the minister responsible for multiculturalism,¹⁰ identified several factors which, in his opinion, led to the evolution of a multicultural policy:

"The principal single factor" was the setting up of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism—"a title later regretted." The categorical rejection of the idea of "biculturalism" by minority spokesmen undoubtedly influenced the commission's recommendations in the fourth volume of its report. The second development that contributed to the acceptance of the multicultural policy was the establishment, in November 1964, of the Canadian Folk Arts Council which, apart from revealing to Canadians the country's cultural diversity, was also concerned with the "cultural, social, community, and political aspects of multiculturalism." It resulted in a country-wide "folk-arts movement":

By 1967, all ten Canadian provinces had their own provincial councils within the parent body and by this time the organization had a membership of 50 councils, with over 75,000 people involved in its various activities.

Ukrainian Canadians have played an important role in the establishment and subsequent development and activities of the Council, both at the centre and in the prairies. Another "event on the road to multiculturalism" was the celebration of Canada's Centennial in 1967,

including the holding of "Expo '67" in Montreal, which "gave Canadians a new perspective of other [and each other's] cultures," with the Canadian Folk Arts Council coordinating 100 major festivals across the country.

Fourthly, according to Mark MacGuigan, the "Thinkers' Conference on Cultural Rights,"¹¹ convened in Toronto in December 1968 by Senator Paul Yuzyk and his Cultural Rights Committee, with support from the federal and Ontario governments and several inter-ethnic organizations, "contributed significantly towards the development and ultimate formulation of a multiculturalism policy." The conference "unequivocally rejected the concept of biculturalism" as incompatible with the ideal of a 'just society' and called for the government's "official recognition of the multicultural character of Canada" and a corresponding reorientation of the media and of public funding of culture and education. Significantly, while rejecting a proposal for a "federation of ethnic societies," the conference recommended that the "Canadian Cultural Rights Committee" continue its work and assist the government in "establishing a meaningful representative advisory body" that would articulate to policy-makers the "needs and interests of Canada's ethnic groups." Its organizer was Senator Yuzyk, the conference chairman was Leon Kossar, and among the speakers were Professor Walter Tarnopolsky and the late Rostislav Choulguine; several other Ukrainian Canadians played crucial roles in the conference. They were joined by prominent members of 19 other ethnocultural groups and the meeting attracted the participation and support of a number of important anglophone and francophone public figures. Federal policy-makers could hardly overlook the event. Finally, the 1970-71 hearings and report of Parliament's Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada, which recommended in favor of multiculturalism, "were perhaps the final influence on the Government."¹² Once again, one would have to note the contribution of Senator Yuzyk as a committee member, and of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and other Ukrainian organizations which presented briefs.¹³

At least one additional factor which undoubtedly influenced the federal adoption of the multicultural policy was the initiative taken, or about to be taken, by some provincial governments in the west, most notably the announcement of a multicultural policy by Alberta's Social Credit government under the leadership of Harry Strom in July 1971.

The Ukrainian Response to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism

The catalytic effect of the B & B Commission compelled Ukrainians

and other ethnic groups to re-think their role in Canadian society in response to the Commission's terms of reference, which spoke of two 'founding nations' and "bilingualism and biculturalism," condemning (or so it appeared) other ethnic groups to an inferior, 'non-founding' status and their cultures to eventual submersion in one of two 'official cultures.' By 1965, the discussion of multiculturalism had moved to the pages of a learned journal published by the Canadian Association of Slavists.¹⁴ Simultaneously, in mid-1965, Slavists at the University of Alberta organized the First National Conference on Canadian Slavs in Banff, which concluded with the formation of an Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs. This initiative, spearheaded by academics of Ukrainian descent, marked an important step in the development and coordination of Canadian ethnic studies.¹⁵

Among the briefs submitted to the B & B Commission by various ethnocultural organizations, the largest share came from the Ukrainian-Canadian community.¹⁶ Although there were some variations in the recommendations advanced by non-communist Ukrainian organizers, there was a general consensus among Ukrainians that Canada should be recognized as a multicultural nation and that the government should support the efforts of all ethnocultural groups to maintain and develop their cultural-linguistic heritage. While the brief submitted by Alberta's UCC appeared to be more receptive to official bilingualism than that of the national UCC, it argued for the recognition and support at the *provincial* level of multiple bilingualism, combining English (or French, in Quebec) with the respective ethnic mother tongue.¹⁷ The national executive of the UCC took a more restrictive view of official bilingualism (largely in line with the existing constitutional provisions), arguing for English as the only nation-wide official language. Significantly, the brief proposed that the future of Quebec within confederation, including the option of secession from Canada, should be settled in a referendum by the citizens of Quebec. The UCC called for the establishment of a federal ministry of culture which "would recognize and give unlimited support to all the cultures of the Canadian multicultural society and...care for preservation and growth of the Canadian languages and multilingual literature." At the same time, the Committee recommended the establishment of "a permanent non-governmental inter-ethnic advisory body on the basis of the different Dominion-wide ethnic representations" and demanded the introduction in the media of programs dealing with different ethnic cultures, as well as programs in languages other than English and French.¹⁸ The UCC voice in the B & B debate was greatly enhanced by its meeting, early in October 1965, with Premier Jean Lesage, which led to an agreement on recipro-

cal support of educational demands, calling for the establishment of French language schools for French minorities outside Quebec and the introduction of minority languages as subjects from the earliest grades wherever there was sufficient demand for them.¹⁹

A very different position during the B & B Commission hearings was taken by the AUUC. Echoing the political line adopted by the Communist Party of Canada, it and the pro-communist "Canadian Council of National Groups"²⁰ employed Stalin's "definition" of a nation to declare Canada a country of "two nations." While the AUUC urged the application to Quebec of the Leninist "solution" of the nationality problem in terms of an unlimited "right to national self-determination, including separation," it took a stand against separation as harmful to the interests of the Quebec people. Only within this dualistic framework did the AUUC recommend governmental support of minority cultures, including the opening of the CBC to "cultural expressions of the national groups."²¹

The publication in 1967 of the first volume of the B & B Commission Report dealing with the status of official languages, provided the Ukrainian commissioner, Professor Rudnyckyj, with an opportunity to register his dissenting statement, which argued for the official recognition of the other most widely used Canadian languages as "regional languages" in the areas of greatest concentration of the given linguistic minority.²²

The UCC reacted to the recommendations of the first volume with a White Book released early in 1968 to coincide with the Constitutional Conference in Ottawa. In its widely distributed document, it demanded constitutional guarantees for Ukrainian and other minority language rights in the revised constitution.²³

The long-awaited fourth volume of the Royal Commission's report on "The Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic Groups," which was tabled in Parliament on April 15, 1970, evoked a mixed reaction from the Ukrainian community. The views of the UCC were communicated to the government at a meeting on July 1 of the Committee's national executive in Winnipeg, attended by Robert Stanbury, Minister of State responsible for citizenship, Bernard Ostry, assistant under-secretary of state, and other officials of the Department of the Secretary of State. The UCC vice-president, H. J. Syrnick, generally supported the Commission's recommendations, which "when and if implemented, will in a large measure meet the expectations" of the Ukrainian community. But the Committee was greatly disappointed by the Commission's insistence on Canada being a "bicultural nation." While accepting the provisions of the Official Languages Act, the Ukrainian

community—stated the UCC vice-president—considered the Ukrainian language and other languages of Canada’s ethnic groups as “Canadian languages” which should be so recognized. Another of the Committee’s spokesmen, Dr. Isidore Hlynka, reiterated the UCC White Paper’s criticism of the divisive and discriminatory implications of the Official Languages Act, attacking the proposed bilingual districts as exercises in “racial and political gerrymandering”:

If . . . bilingual English/French districts are established by constitutional provisions, we must insist that wherever the Ukrainian population in such districts reaches 10 per cent or more, analogous constitutional rights should be accorded to the Ukrainian language.²⁴

According to a governmental assessment, “of all the ethnic groups, the Ukrainian press has shown the most sustained interest in Volume Four.”²⁵ While there was much praise both for the Royal Commission’s assessment of the significance of the “other ethnic groups” and for its recommendations (accepted *in toto* by all Ukrainian periodicals in Canada), all but pro-communist papers rejected the concept of official biculturalism. There was also repeated criticism of the report as “assimilatory in nature” and as not going far enough in its recommendations, especially in not recommending the use of federal tax funds to support ethnic schools and the press. In the words of Edmon-ton’s *Ukrainski visti* (Ukrainian News):

The Federal Government cannot completely ignore the cultural aspirations of the third element at the time when it gives generous support from public funds to the French Canadians for the cultivation of French culture, especially when all citizens of Canada contribute to the government treasury. The French Canadians themselves, if they have a proper long-term policy, should realize that it is in their interest to support the cultural aspirations of the third element, because if these other ethnic groups assimilate into the Anglophone group, the proportional relationship between the English-speaking and French-speaking population will [change] considerably in favor of the English-speaking group.²⁶

The strongest criticism of the Royal Commission’s report came from SUSK and its paper, *Student*, which ridiculed the Ukrainian-Canadian establishment for its “gratitude complex” when dealing with the authorities.²⁷ Condemning what it called the Commission’s pro-

posed “double melting pot for Canada’s cultural community,” SUSK reaffirmed its support for Commissioner Rudnycky’s separate proposal of “regional languages” and demanded governmental funding of ethnic community development activities:

We want a community development program. The federal government should initiate programs where ethnic community leaders could receive training and resources for community development. Furthermore, as with the French communities, we, too, need sustaining grants to strengthen our community secretariats and improve the quality and variety of services performed by our organizations in community building and citizenship.²⁸

During 1970, SUSK mounted a concerted campaign to mobilize grassroots support, especially among the young and unorganized second- and third-generation Ukrainian Canadians, for the policy of multiculturalism, and to stimulate other ethnic groups to articulate their demands. With encouragement and support from the Department of the Secretary of State, it engaged some of its members as field workers and animators in different Ukrainian communities across Canada to organize a series of multicultural conferences, mostly at university campuses, to help focus public attention on the aspirations and demands of Canada’s Ukrainian and other minority groups for governmental recognition and realization of their cultural-linguistic and social rights.²⁹ In his 1972 paper on the “precarious situation” of Ukrainian Canadians, Professor Manoly Lupul of the University of Alberta evaluated highly the contribution of this “new and vibrant force” in spearheading an impressive assault on Ottawa:

The work of the students cannot be praised sufficiently. They had mastered some of the concepts and techniques of student power, two of which stood out: (1) the concept of community development to help the individual regain his dignity as a person; and (2) an audacity towards the powerful which even the latter could not help but admire, if for no other reason than that it was refreshing after years of dealing with the sycophantic national executive of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee in Winnipeg.³⁰

Federal Adoption of the Multiculturalism Policy

It seems that between 1968 and 1970, the prime minister and at least some of his senior colleagues reached the conclusion that general acceptance of the Official Languages Act and the far-reaching con-

cessions to the French-speaking Canadians would be facilitated, especially among the so-called third groups, by the formal abandonment of the “bicultural” formula that had evoked such sharp criticism from ethnic groups during the B & B Commission hearings. Already in October 1968, without waiting for the Commission’s fourth volume, Mr. Trudeau, while debating the Official Languages Bill in the Commons, stated his belief “in two official languages and in a pluralist society, not merely as a political necessity but as an enrichment.”³¹ Despite continuing opposition—primarily from Quebec, the public service establishment, and the media—the policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” was officially unveiled by the prime minister on October 8, 1971, in connection with the tabling in the Commons of the government’s response to the fourth volume of the Royal Commission’s report. Proceeding from the position that “cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity” and that “a policy of multiculturalism must be a policy for all Canadians,” the government statement outlined four fundamental principles of the new policy that went beyond the recommendations of Book IV:

The Government of Canada will support all of Canada’s cultures and will seek to assist, resources permitting, the development of those cultural groups which have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop, a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, as well as a clear need for assistance. . . . The Government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society. . . . The Government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity. . . . The Government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada’s official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society.³²

Leaders of the three Opposition parties endorsed the new policy. A day later, Mr. Trudeau personally reiterated the new policy and its six programs to the Tenth Ukrainian Canadian Congress in Winnipeg—a sequence which may have reflected the vanguard role played by the Ukrainian-Canadian community in lobbying for Ottawa’s adoption of the policy. Only time would tell, however, whether Ottawa’s ideology of multiculturalism was that for which the Ukrainians and other ethnic groups had fought.

The initial reaction of the UCC and the Ukrainian press to Mr. Trudeau’s announcement was nearly uniformly positive, though there

was a consensus that, just as in the case of the recommendations of Book IV, the announced policy did not go far enough and was not specific enough to meet fully the articulated needs of the Ukrainian-Canadian community. The Tenth Congress adopted several resolutions in response to the government's policy announcement: it welcomed the new policy but called for the inscription in a new Canadian constitution of "positive constitutional guarantees of linguistic and cultural rights for all Canadian citizens," and not just those of Anglo-Celtic and French ancestry. The federal government was urged "to establish liaison for continuing consultations with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee with the aim of assisting in an effective implementation of this policy." At the same time, the UCC was instructed to "set up a special committee to study the assumptions and implications of the Multiculturalism policy and provide within the shortest time possible the response of the Ukrainian community to the Federal Government."³³

Among the discordant voices was that of the pro-communist AUUC, which criticized the government for failing to recognize the "two nations" concept of Canada and for abandoning a "bicultural" policy, though the Association welcomed cultural concessions to national minorities and the anti-discriminatory orientation of the new policy.³⁴ By far the strongest criticism of the multicultural policy appeared in *Student*. In his article entitled, "Multiculturalism & Ukrainianism: Middle Class Sellout," Yury Boshyk assaulted what he called a "middle class sell-out" (presumably to Canada's ruling class) "by some leaders both in youth and other organizations." Behind the rhetoric of Herbert Marcuse and the sociology of John Porter's *Vertical Mosaic*, there was much bitterness (but also a sharp analytical sense) and genuine concern about the credibility of the new policy and its ultimate effects on the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Noting all the qualifying clauses and a "tone of paternal condescension" in the prime minister's policy announcement, Boshyk posed the question: "Multiculturalism for how long and for whom?"

Ukrainians, it seems, feel they will benefit enormously from such a policy, but the truth of the matter is that Trudeau's program denies the fundamental tenet of multiculturalism. For the fact is that multiculturalism will remain the official identity of Canada for as long as the ethno-cultural groups involved can "exhibit a desire for survival and development."³⁵ Thus, we, as Ukrainians, as a viable entity, have been relegated to the status of a voluntary organization. Having made no definite commitment to guaranteeing

the existence of ethno-cultural groups in Canada, Trudeau has decided to wait patiently until we die out. . . . The fact remains that unlike the Federal Government's definitive commitment to French Canadian linguistic and cultural demands, Trudeau and his cohorts have given us a temporary stop-gap measure in the hope that we will soon solve his problem.

The Ukrainian community leadership, observed Boshyk, has been woefully unprepared to face "the challenge of our continuing survival," and was likely to be further divided and corrupted by "external financial assistance."

Their only vision of Canadian society was one in which every Ukrainian would be given the opportunity to "make it" in all fields of endeavour without dragging the chains of social prejudice and minority group stigmatization. In itself, this objective can be considered noble and positive, but when linked to the more essential problems of our society, it begins to sound ethnocentric and static. At the same time, the leadership . . . also wishes the potential careerist to actively maintain his ethnocultural ties, despite the fact that in our present Canadian society upward mobility and minority group allegiance are mutually exclusive variables to the building of one's career . . . does not multiculturalism by strengthening ethnic group maintenance, solidify and perpetuate the inequality of opportunity?³⁶

Boshyk's article, though not representative of the current position of SUSK, was nevertheless symptomatic of the process of student disenchantment with, and alienation from, the Ukrainian-Canadian "establishment" epitomized by the UCC. Eventually this disillusionment led some of the most articulate and dedicated students to seek an explanation of the community's shortcomings and alternative directions in a variety of neo-Marxist doctrines.³⁷ The growing tendency of the student activists to work for Ukrainian causes "outside the structures" of the Ukrainian community and the government would to a noticeable degree impoverish Ukrainian organizations and, despite the rhetoric of confrontation, weaken the influence of the Ukrainian student movement both on the much needed restructuring and re-orientation of the Ukrainian-Canadian community and on the makers and administrators of the multicultural policy in Ottawa.³⁸ But some of the questions, if not conclusions, posed by the student critics of Ottawa's multicultural policy were soon to be echoed by "mainstream"

Ukrainian spokesmen, as the realization of the government's new policy seemed to bog down in the face of opposition, bureaucratic indifference, and political indecision.

Two months after Mr. Trudeau's policy declaration, Edmonton's *Ukrainski visti* editorialized:

Again and again Prime Minister Trudeau has declared that he supports the multiculturalism program, but it remains unknown who will start realizing it. . . . Quebec's opposition to multiculturalism strengthens indecisiveness in Ottawa where, even without it, they prefer to procrastinate. The Government of Prime Minister Trudeau has not stated how much money it is prepared to offer for the multiculturalism program. . . . So far, one cannot see any multiculturalism in the CBC, not even interest in this matter. . . . After a good start there still is no action. Multiculturalism must not turn into multiverbosity.³⁹

The Implementation of the New Policy, 1972-74

The Secretary of State answered the critics by announcing, in January 1972, that three million dollars would be made available for the period ending March 31, 1973, to help finance the federal government's policy on multiculturalism, with more than one million earmarked for grants for various projects proposed by ethnocultural groups. By June 30, 1972, \$452,890 from the latter sum had been spent on 127 grants, of which 20, totalling \$48,582, had been awarded to the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Over one-half of the total allocation had gone to meet administrative expenses, and the remainder was being applied to four other programs: (a) a research program, involving in particular a massive survey project exploring non-official language maintenance patterns among 10 major ethnic groups in Canada's five largest urban centres;⁴⁰ (b) the preparation of a series of ethnic histories; (c) the planning of a Canadian ethnic studies program;⁴¹ and (d) the teaching of the two official languages to immigrants. Additional funds were allocated for multicultural programs to four federal cultural agencies, including the National Museum of Man, the National Film Board, the National Library, and the Public Archives. A notable absence among the agencies was, of course, the CBC. The coordination of all the activities implementing multicultural policy was placed under an Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee chaired by the assistant under secretary of state (Dr. Bernard Ostry), while the Citizens' Cultures Program (the present Multiculturalism Directorate) within the Citizenship Branch in the Secretary of State Department was entrusted with the day-to-day

administration of the five multicultural programs.⁴² Despite structural changes and budgetary fluctuations over the years to come—including the subsequent replacement of a minister without portfolio responsible for citizenship⁴³ with a minister of state responsible for multiculturalism, as well as the addition of a national consultative council⁴⁴ and an academic advisory committee⁴⁵—the above administrative framework became possibly the most stable element in the federal implementation of multiculturalism.

The Ukrainian response to the initial steps taken by Ottawa to implement the new policy was not uniform. The UCC leadership in Winnipeg sought to influence the federal agencies involved in multiculturalism through direct negotiations in late March 1972 and subsequently announced what it considered to be a “mutual consensus” on a number of issues (including, incredibly, the protection of the Ukrainian language by the Commissioner of Official Languages and the possibility of introducing Ukrainian-language programs on the CBC).⁴⁶ Other Ukrainian spokesmen, most notably the Winnipeg *Ukrainskyi holos* (Ukrainian Voice), SUSK, and the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Federation, criticized the government for what they felt were grossly inadequate resources allocated to the multicultural programs. Speaking in Toronto in early September 1972, Stanley W. Frolick, the national president of the Federation, charged that:

... in the matter of implementation of this policy and particularly, in the funding of the means intended to accomplish its implementation, there is very little than mere tokenism. No one will be content with a mere crumb. The sense of outrage and the feeling of injustice can only be heightened by disparate governmental action in promoting French language and culture in the parts of Canada outside Quebec, and in implementing its announced policy of multiculturalism.⁴⁷

The setback suffered by the Liberal Party in elections in the fall of 1972, especially in the west, left the government with a mere plurality of seats in the Commons. This may have been more effective than Ukrainian criticism in persuading the federal government to grant more resources and greater political visibility to its multicultural policy. In November 1972, Dr. Stanley Haidasz of Toronto, a Polish-Canadian MP popular with the Ukrainians and other ethnic groups, was appointed minister of state responsible for multiculturalism, though without a separate department or budget. The budget for multicultural programs within the Department of the Secretary of State and several federal

cultural agencies was tripled to nearly eight million dollars for the 1973-74 fiscal year, with nearly as much allocated again for 1974-75.⁴⁸

Ukrainian response to Dr. Haidasz's appointment was uniformly favorable, though there was widespread criticism of the government for not moving all multicultural programs to a separate multiculturalism department with a staff and budget of its own⁴⁹—a criticism which apparently was not entirely based on a knowledge of intricate jurisdictional problems, bureaucratic structures, and budgeting procedures in the federal government. Under the new minister, cultural grants to Ukrainian organizations more than doubled, from the 1972-73 total of nearly \$127,000 (10.9 per cent of all multicultural grants to ethnic organizations) to almost \$270,000 (9.1 per cent) during 1973-74.⁵⁰ While most grant recipients could now be expected to muffle their criticism of the federal policy, Ukrainian students—protesting both a dramatic decline in their Opportunities For Youth grants and Ottawa's lack of action in the area of third language teaching—formed, during 1973, students' action committees which turned to mass protest petitions and other publicity-attracting methods to register their disenchantment with the scope and direction of the multiculturalism program.⁵¹ But the major source of irritation for the Ukrainian and other ethnic minorities became the continuing refusal of the CBC to accept the B & B Commission's recommendations with regard to broadcasting in the so-called unofficial languages. Not only did the CBC openly ignore the spirit of the federal multicultural policy, but in 1973-74 it proceeded to eliminate multilingual broadcasts in Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Alberta through its purchase of three private radio stations serving, in part, local ethnocultural minorities.⁵² The incapacity or unwillingness of the government to bring the CBC in line with its multicultural policy could not but sow skepticism among Ukrainians about the real depth of Ottawa's commitment to multiculturalism; it also harmed relations between the French and other non-Anglo-Celtic groups in the west. Commenting on the CBC purchase of the St. Boniface radio station, a February 1973 article in *Holos* asked:

Why cannot the CBC carry on the excellent, considerate, and neighborly policy developed by the Franco-Manitoban management? Why close the door on 50 per cent of the people in Manitoba, people who pay the salaries of the CBC? What has happened to the pious political pronouncement that Canada is a multicultural nation?⁵³

In desperation SUSK called upon its membership in March 1973 to

“withold a part of their federal income taxes in support of its campaign to change the broadcasting policy of the C.B.C.”⁵⁴

The appointment, in May 1973, of the 101-member Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM) did not meet the expectations of the Ukrainian-Canadian leadership who, along with spokesmen for other ethnic minorities, were hoping that the long-promised advisory council would consist of individuals delegated by central ethnic organizations to provide the latter with direct and continuous access to the federal government.⁵⁵ Though the seven Ukrainian members appointed to the Council, including one executive member (Dr. Lupul), included some of the most prominent Ukrainian-Canadian figures, Ukrainian critics were quick to note the absence in the CCCM of any Opposition party members.⁵⁶ On the occasion of the first annual meeting of the council in October 1973, Senator Yuzyk charged that the Ottawa authorities used the meeting to frustrate his plans to convene a second Thinkers’ Conference for the purpose of reviewing progress in the realization of the principles of multiculturalism.⁵⁷ The fact that he could not now rally behind him some of the main participants in the 1968 Thinkers’ Conference attested to the effect of the multicultural policy in dividing and weakening the incipient “third force.”

Meanwhile, Ukrainian supporters of multiculturalism were busy, along with like-minded minority elements within the official Opposition ranks, in strengthening the Conservative voice in Parliament and in public life as an instrument of positive criticism of the government’s multicultural policy. The appointment of Dr. Paul Yewchuk as the Opposition’s multiculturalism critic in the Commons and Senator Yuzyk’s continuing efforts in the Upper House were instrumental in prying out of the government factual information about its implementation of multiculturalism and in subjecting the policy-makers and administrators to critical public scrutiny, though the media itself took little notice. A background paper on multiculturalism prepared for the March 1974 general meeting of the Progressive Conservative Party in Ottawa went much further than anything the government was prepared to offer in this area; but when it came to the actual adoption of this document as part of the PC platform, the party failed to endorse its ambitious proposals, presumably due to actual or feared French-Canadian reaction to the proposed “inclusive multicultural policy.”⁵⁸

As the country prepared for another election following the government’s defeat in the Commons, in June 1974 the UCC issued a “pre-election statement” for the benefit of all candidates, which reiterated the Ukrainian position on multiculturalism:

... the UCC wishes to impress upon all concerned the importance of supporting full implementation of the multicultural policy of the Canadian Government in consultation with representatives of various ethnic groups. In particular, the UCC insists on the need for immediate implementation of the major recommendations of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism: that assistance be provided for the teaching of third languages in public and private schools according to the viability and request of particular ethnic groups, and that cultural and other contributions of each ethnic group in Canada be appropriately presented in public school teaching. The UCC also considers it the immediate responsibility of the Government media, particularly the CBC radio and television, the National Film Board and Information Canada, to play a major role in the implementation of the multicultural program, including the use of languages as stated above.

The value of the contribution of various cultures in Canada required the maintenance and development of each culture as a separate entity within its own community. Otherwise the cultures would be destroyed if moulded together in so-called "multicultural centres," a type of melting pot proposed by the government. The UCC supported the principle of two working languages in the federal government, if the principle were implemented only to the extent that it was practically necessary according to the population of each region.⁵⁹

Hopes and Anxieties: Mr. Munro in Charge of Multicultural Policy, 1974-77

The July 1974 election, which gave the Liberals a safe majority in the Commons, clearly showed that in the areas of greatest concentration of Ukrainian voters the Conservatives were able to retain their strength; only in Toronto and some other Ontario ridings did the so-called ethnic vote help to elect Liberal candidates.

The cabinet's decision to add political responsibility for multiculturalism to Mr. Munro's time-consuming labor portfolio—rather than to continue with a separate minister of state for this policy area—did not resolve Ukrainian anxieties that multiculturalism would be relegated to an even lower priority than before.⁶⁰ The Winnipeg *Kanadiiskyi farmer* (Canadian Farmer) (October 28) agreed with *Głos Polski* (Polish Voice) (October 10) that "the lack of comment from Ottawa about multiculturalism would lead one to assume that the policy was finished, or at least that for the time being it would be up in the air."

The minister's address to the Eleventh Ukrainian Canadian Congress

in Winnipeg on October 12, 1974, did much, however, to dispel such anxieties and to generate new hopes for a more vigorous implementation of multicultural policy by Ottawa. *Holos* (October 30) and other Ukrainian observers found Mr. Munro frank, sympathetic, and positive, though they remained skeptical about the degree of commitment to multiculturalism by the Department of the Secretary of State, where the administration of multicultural programs remained.

The first annual report of the CCCM submitted to the government early in 1975⁶¹ found a highly positive reaction among the Ukrainian-Canadian community, which noted with satisfaction that it gave the highest priority to "the retention of language and culture." *Holos* (January 29, February 2) gave its strong endorsement to the proposed establishment of the post of an assistant deputy minister under the minister responsible for multiculturalism, who would be solely responsible for multicultural programs, because "ever since the inception of the multicultural program, lack of proper administrative apparatus has been one of the most glaring faults." The paper also fully supported the recommendation that funding for multicultural programs would be directed through recognized agencies such as the Folk Arts Council and ethnocultural organizations:

Lack of such a policy has only compounded confusion in the administration of the multicultural program. As a result, awarding of grants appeared to be too strongly influenced by effective lobbying and by who-knows-whom, rather than by the intrinsic value of the project itself and its relevance to the ethnocultural community.

The policy recommendations presented to Prime Minister Trudeau by the UCC at their Winnipeg meeting on September 12, 1975, were along similar lines. Of the CCCM's 25 main recommendations, the UCC selected three as being "of greater urgency and interest":

- (1) Appointment of a Deputy or Assistant Deputy Minister with his own budget and staff to administer the multicultural program under the Minister Responsible for Multiculturalism, a restructuring which would add prestige and a sense of permanence to the program.
- (2) Federal government support for Ukrainian language instruction centres [supplementary schools] at a suggested annual rate of \$50 per student, to supplement the provincial and Ukrainian community funds.
- (3) Reduction of postal rates for the ethnic press.⁶²

Among the other recommendations submitted to Mr. Trudeau, the UCC called for the PM's "good offices" in changing the CBC's stand on multilingual broadcasts, to have "multilingual programs . . . introduced on a regional basis on the CBC television," along with those employing one of the official languages and Ukrainian or some other minority languages. The Committee also requested that the CBC appoint a vice-president to assume exclusive responsibility for the "development and implementation of multicultural and multilingual broadcasting."⁶³ Noting that the federal multicultural program should give "priority to long range creative projects rather than satisfying a multitude of case to case applications," the UCC stated that its projected plans for the development of Ukrainian performing arts centres, youth centres, libraries, archives and museums, and research centres would require initially at least ten million dollars; to meet these costs, the Committee requested a special federal assistance grant of 3.5 million dollars which, it hoped, would be matched by similar amounts from provincial grants and the Ukrainian community.⁶⁴ The October 5 meeting with Mr. Munro to discuss the above proposals served only to reinforce the Committee's optimism.⁶⁵

Ironically, as the UCC leadership was congratulating itself in press releases on the success of its negotiations with the federal government, it seemed that Ottawa's entire multicultural policy was about to enter a new era. By the end of the summer of 1975, pressures for a major reevaluation of the entire multicultural policy that had been building up for some time within the Liberal caucus and in the inner circles of government, led to an internal policy review that aimed to shift significantly the government's emphasis from support of ethnic cultures to intercultural understanding and the overcoming of inequalities and discrimination, and to redirect federal grants from the larger, well-established groups, to smaller communities, "visible minorities," and immigrant groups.⁶⁶ Though intimations of the on-going soul-searching in Ottawa were given by Mr. Munro on several prior occasions, including his address on October 11 to the Ukrainian National Federation convention in Montreal, it was not until the publication in the *Globe & Mail* of William Johnson's interview with the minister on November 26, 1975, that Ukrainian-Canadian leaders suddenly realized that the entire multicultural policy could be in jeopardy. The response was an avalanche of angry protests and bitter editorials which descended upon Ottawa from Ukrainian and other ethnic communities, which made it politically necessary for the minister and even the prime minister to reassure the most vocal ethnocultural communities about the government's continued commitment to multiculturalism.⁶⁷ Paradoxically,

though long-standing opponents of multiculturalism may have had much to do with the multicultural policy review, it seems that it was also instigated by recommendations from the CCCM, demands from the UCC and other ethnic organizations, as well as by Mr. Munro's genuine concern about devising more effective ways of implementing multiculturalism within the limitations imposed by higher policy priorities.⁶⁸

Neither ministerial explanations nor the Second Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism as State Policy, which met in Ottawa in February 1976, could dispel anxieties on the part of the Ukrainian-Canadian community as to the future of multiculturalism.⁶⁹ The government's procrastination with the announcement of the "new" multicultural policy could not but suggest the lack of a cabinet consensus on the matter. Perhaps illustrative of the changing standing of multicultural programs among governmental priorities were the changes in the annual estimates of the Multiculturalism Directorate within the Secretary of State Department. From the peak establishment of 41 full-time positions ("man years") during the three fiscal years from April 1973 to March 1976, the Directorate's staff allocation declined to only 33 positions for the next two fiscal years; the multicultural project grants budget, which amounted to two million dollars during each of the four fiscal years prior to April 1977, was almost halved in the 1977-78 estimates.⁷⁰ No less disturbing was the continuing failure of the Multiculturalism Directorate, at least since April 1975, to spend sizable portions of its operational and grants allocations—lapsed funds which in the last two fiscal years had added up to nearly one and one-half million dollars unspent for the purposes of multicultural programs. By far the worst in this respect was the record of the Public Archives, which in the last two fiscal years managed to spend only \$366,000 of its \$881,000 operational budget earmarked for multiculturalism (especially Ethnic Archives).⁷¹

The September 1976 cabinet reshuffle, which initially omitted any references to Mr. Munro's continued responsibility for multiculturalism, and the failure of the October 1976 Speech from the Throne to mention explicitly the government's multiculturalism policy, caused widespread concern. The UCC wrote in November to Mr. Munro requesting that the government "reaffirm, in the House of Commons or at such other suitable national forum, the continuation and expansion of the multicultural policy, including the implementation of the recommendations of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism."⁷²

The impasse over the future content and direction of Ottawa's multicultural programs was seemingly broken by the November 15 election

results in Quebec, which could not but bring under critical public scrutiny the federal government's past policies designed to frustrate the separatist alternative through concessions to the French language and culture in Canada, concessions which were expected to make French Canadians feel at home anywhere in Canada. Whatever transpired in the inner councils of government, by the end of the year—with the controversial multicultural policy review seemingly confined to oblivion—the minister of labor responsible for multiculturalism was able to reassure the UCC that multicultural programs would be given "increased attention," while important personnel changes being made in the Department of the Secretary of State were expected to affect positively both the Department's relationship with the CCCM and the general implementation of the multicultural programs.⁷³ Illustrative of the new emphasis on multicultural programs was the addition of more than one million dollars in the 1977-78 estimates to the hitherto miniscule allocation for the minority-languages teaching aids program, which under the new designation of a Cultural Enrichment Program could aid ethnic supplementary schools, textbook production, and teacher improvement.⁷⁴

As Mr. Munro's stewardship over multicultural policy drew to a sudden end by the spring of 1977, many of the problems and demands raised by the Ukrainian-Canadian community with respect to the fundamental orientation and the degree of the federal government's commitment to multiculturalism remained unresolved.

The Outstanding Issues

Outstanding among the problems have been (1) the nagging uncertainty as to the permanence, scope, and depth of the federal government's commitment to the multicultural policy, (2) the continuing refusal of the CRTC and the CBC (and not only these agencies) to accept the principle of multiculturalism, especially its multilingual implications,⁷⁵ and (3) the failure of the government to provide structures and channels which would allow Ukrainian and other ethnic groups to generate effective and continuous advice relating to policies affecting the maintenance and development of their cultures and languages.

The resolution of these major problems does not entirely depend on the federal government, and no number of logical arguments or appeals to fundamental principles would move the policy-makers to take the desired action until and unless sufficient political pressure and support—positive and negative—were brought into the political marketplace. It is here, in terms of mobilizing and rationally applying their political resources in the federal arena, that Ukrainian Canadians have been

less than successful. The most effective access to political decision-makers is, of course, through political participation, through the parties that hold political power (as can be illustrated by the recent Ukrainian experience in Alberta). As long as all or most Ukrainian MPs populate only the Opposition benches in the Commons and as long as MPs representing Ukrainian voters are selected at random—it is impossible to expect a federal government dependent so much on French-Canadian votes to risk undermining some of its vital political support for the sake of logical consistency or abstract principles of justice. Nor have Ukrainian-Canadian leaders done their best to build bridges to French Canada, to dispel many misconceptions, biases, and anxieties underlying opposition to multiculturalism. As has been stated again and again by those responsible for the implementation of the multicultural policy, one has to treat the policy as inseparable from and interdependent with official bilingualism. One should also keep in mind the old verity that in unity there is strength, and, on crucial issues, Ottawa needs to be confronted with not only a united Ukrainian “front,” but with a broad consensus of many ethnic groups. Isolationist demands such as the “boomerang” on multicultural centres thrown in 1976 at Mr. Munro by the UCC⁷⁶ have been of as little help as projects or demands based on faulty factual data or inadequate knowledge of the relevant laws and regulations.

The oligarchical structure of the UCC, ill-suited to inject new blood or fresh ideas, with its continuing difficulty in reaching and mobilizing the majority of Ukrainian Canadians outside its member organizations, its perennial failure to attract adequate financial support from the now reasonably prosperous Ukrainian community, and its timid stance in confronting the powerful, have been some other major reasons behind the less than adequate Ukrainian influence on Ottawa’s policies.

The Ukrainian-Canadian leaders still need to master some of the up-to-date lobbying techniques employed by Canada’s most effective interest groups. Until the UCC has established its permanent, responsible, and dignified presence in the nation’s capital, no amount of telephoning, cabling, or jetting between Winnipeg and Ottawa will enable the Committee to monitor and anticipate political developments and to intervene forcefully at the right place and at the right time to affect decisions which influence the interests of the Ukrainian-Canadian community. As far as one can determine Ottawa’s perception of the Ukrainian-Canadian community, it seems to be regarded as second only to the Jewish group both in terms of its effective organizational infrastructure and in striking a successful balance between integration into Canadian society and retention of a viable ethnocultural identity.

The manifest dynamism of Ukrainian Canadians, their concern for the retention of their language and culture, as well as their support for the multiculturalism policy, have placed Ukrainians ahead of much larger German and Italian groups as the leading spokesmen and promoters of the policy. Whatever politicians may think of the representativeness or political resources of the UCC, they could not have missed the fact that the government's major Non-Official Languages Study, made public in 1975, identified Ukrainians, as Table 1 shows, as the strongest supporters of multiculturalism among the Canadian-born population of the 10 largest ethnic groups.⁷⁷ Neither has this study left any doubt about the overwhelming support given during the survey to the preservation and transmission of the Ukrainian language and culture by Canadian-born Ukrainians. One can thus conclude on an optimistic note that, as far as multicultural policy is concerned, Ukrainian Canadians are certain to keep up their pressure, hopefully in more and more effective ways, for a definite and continuous commitment from the federal government to what should not be a conditional or temporary political concession, but the birthright of all Canadians.

NOTES

1. Quoted in J. Slogan, "Bicultural and Bilingual Patterns Among Ethnic Groups in Canada and the Accelerating Trends of Assimilation," *Ukrainian Canadian Review* (1972-73), 13-14.
2. The classic argument along these lines appears in J. Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965).
3. See A. J. Semotiuk, "Multiculturalism: A Three-Dimensional Approach to Canada" (1971), mimeo.; M. R. Lupul, "Bilingualism and Multiculturalism: What Do The Ukrainians Want and Why?" *Svoboda* (Liberty), Nov. 20, 26, Dec. 4, 1971.
4. See e.g., the federal government's response to Book IV of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, tabled in the House of Commons on Oct. 8, 1971, by the prime minister, and a press release by the Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for Remarks by the Prime Minister to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Winnipeg, Manitoba, October 9, 1971."
5. See "Canada: A Multicultural Nation" in P. Yuzyk, *For A Better Canada* (Toronto, Ukrainian National Association, 1973), 21-48.
6. Ukrainian Canadians, 395,043 in 1951, increased by 11.9 per cent to 473,337 in 1961, and by 12.2 per cent to 580,660 in 1971; however, during the same period, the percentage of those claiming Ukrainian as their mother tongue declined from 79.5 in 1951, to 64.4 in 1961, and 48.9 in 1971.
7. Professor J. B. Rudnycky, University of Manitoba, and Professor P. Wyczynski, University of Ottawa.

Table 1. Attitudes of Urban Ukrainians Toward the Multiculturalism Policy

	Agree Strongly		Agree Somewhat		Uncertain		Disagree Somewhat		Strongly Disagree	
	Ukrainians	All 10 Groups	Ukrainians	All 10 Groups	Ukrainians	All 10 Groups	Ukrainians	All 10 Groups	Ukrainians	All 10 Groups
1st (immigrant) Generation	54.6	44.0	23.5	25.1	15.5	14.0	1.0	14.0	5.5	6.6
Second Generation	45.2	40.5	28.2	28.9	9.4	10.0	6.4	9.5	10.7	11.0
Third Generation	37.5	26.5	26.8	38.0	16.1	13.1	10.7	12.3	7.8	7.8
Older Families	N.A.	26.6	N.A.	31.2	N.A.	12.7	N.A.	12.5	N.A.	17.0
Total		41.3		27.2		13.1		9.3		7.8

Source: Adapted from K. G. O'Bryan, J. G. Reitz, O. M. Kuplowska, *Non-Official Languages: A Study in Canadian Multiculturalism* (Ottawa, Supply and Services, 1975), 154-55.

8. See e.g., the recommendations in the "Brief presented to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Headquarters," Oct. 1, 1964.
9. The most significant expression was his speech to the United Nations Assembly, New York, Sept. 26, 1960.
10. M. MacGuigan, "Multiculturalism in Canada," address to the Inaugural Conference of the Society for Intercultural Education, Training and Research, Gaithersburg, Maryland, Feb. 19, 1975.
11. Canadian Cultural Rights Committee, *Concern... A Conference to Study Canada's Multicultural Patterns in the Sixties*, Dec. 13-15, 1968, Toronto. [Proceedings] (Ottawa, 1969).
12. According to M. MacGuigan, who served as chairman of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, "although the Committee's final report was not presented until March 1972, its recommendations in favor of multiculturalism were generally known by the fall of 1971."
13. See e.g., "Presentation of Views to Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Canadian Constitution" by the UCC, Sept. 10, 1970; also P. Yuzyk's Senate address, April 25, 1972, "The New Canadian Constitution and the Rights of Ethnic Groups" in *For a Better Canada*, 157-76.
14. Volume VII (1965) of *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (23-60) carried an abbreviated version of Senator Yuzyk's maiden speech in the Senate, followed by critical comments by Professors Rose, Pech, Bosnitch, Bociurkiw, Simpson, Ignatieff, and Skilling, as well as the senator's reply; appended also was the brief submitted in June 1964 to the B & B Commission by the Canadian Association of Slavists.
15. For the proceedings, see R. C. Elwood (ed.), *Slavs in Canada*, I (Edmonton, 1966). At the Fourth National Conference on Canadian Slavs in Ottawa in May 1971, the Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs transformed itself into the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association.
16. A total of 37 Ukrainian briefs were submitted to the B & B Commission (see Public Archives, "Ukrainian," RG33, Series 80, B & B Commission Briefs).
17. See the UCC brief, Edmonton branch, submitted in July 1964, 3-7.
18. See the UCC national brief presented to the Commission on Oct. 1, 1964.
19. See the UCC executive director's report in 1968 to the Ninth Ukrainian Canadian Congress (1965-68), 1-2 (in Ukrainian).
20. The Canadian Council of National Groups embraced the AUUC and 11 other similar pro-communist ethnic organizations, including the Society of Carpatho-Russian Canadians.
21. Submission by the national executive committee of the AUUC to the B & B Commission (June 1964); see also the "Position Paper" for the AUUC delegates to the Manitoba Mosaic Congress, Oct. 13-17, 1970; the AUUC "Submission of Views to the Heritage Ontario Congress," June 2-4, 1972, Toronto; and W. Harasym's submission to the AUUC national committee seminar (July 2-7, 1973) entitled "Ethnic Groups and the National Question in Canada."
22. "Separate Statement" in Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism

- and Biculturalism, Book I, *The Official Languages* (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1967), 155–69.
23. Ninth Ukrainian Canadian Congress, "Program, Reports, Addresses" (Winnipeg, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1968), 4.
 24. "Remarks and opinions on B & B Report Volume IV, expressed at the meeting of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee held in Winnipeg on July 1, 1970."
 25. Ethnic Participation Section, Citizenship Branch, Department of the Secretary of State, "Ethnic Press Reaction to the Publication of the Fourth Volume of the B & B Report," July 16, 1970, 6.
 26. Cited in *ibid.*, 7. The most comprehensive analysis of Book IV appeared in a series of articles in Winnipeg's *Ukrainskyi holos* (Ukrainian Voice), May 13 to July 8, 1970.
 27. See SUSK "Statement on Multiculturalism and on the Fourth Volume of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bi-Culturalism, September March 1970; "IVth Volume and Ethnic Suppression, University of Alberta, Ukrainian Students' Club—Position Paper on the IVth Volume," *ibid.* Dec. 1970.
 28. SUSK, "Statement on Multiculturalism . . . , Sept. 4, 1970."
 29. "Unfortunately," reported the president of SUSK, B. Krawchenko, "some [people] in the Federal Government have not reacted favorably to the discussion. We know, for a fact, that someone from the Federal Government phoned an executive of one newspaper and asked him not to run a study where I, as a spokesman for our Union, demanded Ottawa support for minority cultural development" (*ibid.*).
 30. M. R. Lupul, "Ukrainian Canadians, Their Precarious Situation Today," *Ukrainian Canadian Review* (1972–73), 7–8.
 31. *Commons Debates*, 1968, col. 1481.
 32. *Ibid.*, 1971, col. 8581.
 33. 10th Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Oct. 11, 1971, "Resolution on the multicultural policy of the Federal Government."
 34. AUUC, "Submission of Views to the Heritage Ontario Congress, June 2–4, 1972 Toronto, Ontario."
 35. Boshyk misquoted the prime minister, who stated in the House on Oct. 8, 1971, that the government "will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop, a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance. . . ."
 36. Y. Boshyk, "Multiculturalism & Ukrainianism: Middle Class Sellout," *Student*, Nov. 1971, Jan. 1972.
 37. See *Student*, 1971–77 *passim*, as well as a neo-Marxist Ukrainian student journal, *Meta*, which began publication in Toronto in 1975.
 38. Despite its growing concern with the human rights struggle in the Soviet Ukraine, *Student* continued to pay a great deal of critical attention to the ups and downs of the federal multicultural policy. See e.g., an excellent essay by M. Kowalsky, "Towards a Political Sociology of Multiculturalism" May 1973, and the Dec. 1975 issue, largely devoted to a critique of Ottawa's handling of multiculturalism and the continuing refusal of the CRTC and the CBC to broadcast programs in minority languages.
 39. "Bahatokulturnist, opozytsiia i Zvolikannia" (Multiculturalism, Opposi-

- tion, and Procrastination), *Ukrainski visti*, Dec. 9, 1971.
40. The project, entrusted to three Toronto academics, K. G. O'Bryan, J. G. Reitz, and O. Kuplowska, was published as the *Non-Official Languages: A Study in Canadian Multiculturalism* (Ottawa, Supply and Services, 1975). Another major project, initially entitled "Majority Attitudes Study," was contracted out by the Department of the Secretary of State to several social scientists at Queen's and McGill, who examined the attitudes of the Anglo-Celtic and French groups to each other and toward minority ethnic groups in Canada. See J. W. Berry, R. Kalin, D. M. Taylor, *Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada* (Ottawa, Supply and Services, 1977).
 41. By the end of 1972, a Canadian Ethnic Studies Advisory Committee (CESAC) was established by the Department of the Secretary of State.
 42. Letter from B. Ostry to P. Yuzyk, Aug. 3, 1972.
 43. The post was held by Robert Stanbury (1969-1971) and Martin O'Connell (1971-1972).
 44. The creation of the CCCM was announced in Edmonton by the Hon. Stanley Haidasz on May 17, 1973.
 45. The creation of the CESAC was officially announced on March 28, 1974.
 46. Department of the Secretary of State, "Ukrainian Canadian Press Analysis Service for the Month of May, 1972," 1.
 47. S. W. Frolick, "Ethnicity: Its Genesis, Characteristics, and Role," *Ukrainian Canadian Review* (1972-73), 38.
 48. Department of the Secretary of State, Multicultural Grants, Fiscal Years 1972-73, 1973-74.
 49. *Senate Debates*, 1975, 866.
 50. Department of the Secretary of State, Multicultural Grants, Fiscal Years 1972-73, 1973-74.
 51. Letter from L. Lys and B. Zerebecky of the Student Multicultural Action Committee (SMAC) to S. J. Kalba, UCC executive director, May 26, 1972; Ukrainian-language communique of the SMAC (undated); and the SMAC's "Petition to the Saskatchewan Association on Human Rights," including guidelines for gathering signatures for the above petition and writing letters to local MPs.
 52. See a statement on the "CBC Language Policy," Ottawa, Feb. 7, 1973; transcript of the CRTC hearing to approve the CBC application to take-over the CKSB station in St. Boniface, Manitoba (Montreal, Feb. 19, 1973); Secretary of State, J. H. Faulkner's letter to Rev. S. Izyk, director of the Ukrainian program at CKSB, Feb. 28, 1973; and "Response of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee on the CBC Language Policy," March 19, 1973.
 53. Quoted in Department of the Secretary of State, "Ukrainian Canadian Press Analysis Service," Feb. 1973, 2.
 54. Press release by SUSK president, A. Semotiuk, March 26, 1973; the initiative was largely ignored by the English-language media. See also "Aktisia proty 'CBC'" (Anti-CBC Action), *Student*, May 1973.
 55. *Ukrainskyi holos*, Oct. 17, 1973.
 56. See news release of the Minister of State Responsible for Multiculturalism, "The Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism," May 17, 1973.
 57. "Multiculturalism: An Historical Perspective," remarks by Sen. P. Yuzyk

- to the First Biennial Conference on Multiculturalism, Ottawa, Oct. 1973.
58. See "Multiculturalism," a background paper for discussion purposes at the general meeting of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, March 17-19, 1974.
 59. UCC, "Pre-election Statement," June 1974.
 60. Mr. Munro assumed political responsibility for multiculturalism in Aug. 1974.
 61. *First Annual Report of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism*, (Ottawa, Supply and Services, 1975).
 62. UCC, Winnipeg, "Multicultural Policy Recommendations" [Sept. 12, 1975], 1-2.
 63. UCC, Winnipeg, "Multicultural and Multilingual Radio and Television Programming [Recommendations]," [Sept. 12, 1975], 1-2.
 64. UCC, Winnipeg, "Federal Assistance Grants for Ukrainian Canadian Cultural Centres," [Sept. 12, 1975], 1-2.
 65. UCC, Winnipeg, "Minister of Multiculturalism John Munro meets with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee," Oct. 7, 1975.
 66. A "task force" under Jameson Bond had been set up within the Department of the Secretary of State to review the multicultural policy.
 67. See the news release by the UCC, Winnipeg, Dec. 3, 1975, and summary of the Ukrainian newspapers' responses to the proposed changes in Ottawa's multicultural policy in the Department of the Secretary of State, "Ukrainian Canadian Press Analysis Service," Dec. 1975, Jan. 1976. The sharpest criticism of Ottawa's treatment of multiculturalism was written by Marijka Hurko, "Multiculturalism: Back to the Harbuz Patch," *Student*, Dec. 1975; see also the exchange in the Commons on Nov. 28, 1975, between D. Orlikow and J. Munro, *Commons Debates*, 1975, col. 9542; "Address of Welcome to Prime Minister Trudeau at Edmonton, 20 November 1975, by William T. Pidruchney, President, Edmonton Branch, Ukrainian Canadian Committee"; and "Text of an Address Delivered by the Honourable John Munro, Minister of Labour and Minister Responsible for Multiculturalism in Canada, at a Meeting with the Ukrainian Community Held at St. John's Institute on Saturday, December 13, 1975." A transcript of questions and responses at the above meeting was reproduced by Edmonton's UCC branch and a report of the meeting appeared in the *Edmonton Journal*, Dec. 15, 1975.
 68. See "Notes for an Address by the Honorable John Munro in Response to the First Annual Report of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism," Ottawa, June 20, 1975.
 69. See Department of the Secretary of State, *Second National Conference on Multiculturalism as State Policy* (Ottawa, Supply and Services, 1976), as well as William Johnson's report, "Multicultural Policy Not Ready for Release," *Globe & Mail*, Feb. 14, 1976.
 70. [Secretary of State], "Multiculturalism Directorate, Resource Review Sheet (Main Estimates)," 24-40; Canada, Estimates for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1977, 24-41.
 71. "Expenditures for Multiculturalism for Senate Committee on M[ain] E[stimates] 1977-78 (Sen. Yuzyk). Draft" [July 1977]. See "Cultural Agencies—Multiculturalism Budgets."
 72. Letter from the UCC to J. Munro, Nov. 14, 1976.

73. Letter from J. Munro to S. Radchuk, president, UCC, Dec. 29, 1976.
74. See Minister Responsible for Multiculturalism, "Cultural Enrichment Policy Announced," news release, June 17, 1977.
75. No single "multicultural issue" has generated so much bitterness and distrust in interchanges between Ukrainian organizations and the federal authorities prior to the spring of 1977 as the prolonged and futile attempts to have some Ukrainian language programs introduced on the CBC in areas of high Ukrainian-Canadian concentration. For the most recent Ukrainian position on this issue, see UCC, "Multilingual Television Broadcasting. Position of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee on Multilingualism and Multiculturalism as Elements of Canadian Broadcasting, in Response to Public Notice CRTC 1977-38, Winnipeg, May 30, 1977."
76. See "Maintaining Canada Multicultural," position [paper] adopted by the UCC, Feb. 7, 1977, calling upon the federal government to "cease all forms of publicity and financial support to multicultural centres and similar programs which attempt to integrate and intermix the development of various cultures and therefore contribute to the disintegration of the ethno-cultural communities." Mr. Munro's reply to the UCC president, S. Radchuk, received on April 20, 1977, criticized the Committee's "most regrettable decision" as based on "misconceptions" concerning the government's multicultural policy.
77. K. G. O'Bryan *et al.*, 345-50. NOL survey respondents were asked to comment on the following statement: "Canada is officially bilingual, but it is not officially bicultural. Instead, Canada has many cultural and ethnic groups, and the Federal Government says that it will help all of these groups in their efforts to keep their own cultural characteristics and heritages" (p. 345). However, when asked whether they were aware of the *policy* on multiculturalism, only 22.3 per cent of respondents said "yes," while about the same number of other respondents had only a vague knowledge of it (*ibid.*).

Banquet Address

Keith Spicer

I will try to make my address uninteresting, and certainly not provocative. I am very grateful for the kind remarks Senator [Paul] Yuzyk made about me in Ukrainian; you were far too flattering. Just one more thing in my preamble. Obviously we are going to clear the decks emotionally here--set a proper civilized climate. I just want to welcome all the ladies who have taken time out of their busy and stimulating schedules to come and join all these profs. Welcome to the ladies and to hell with the profs. I just had 45 minutes with two of the most exciting and dedicated Ukrainian specialists in Canada, Senator Yuzyk and Dr. Lupul—poetry and prose stepping on my toes. So I hope you do not consider me as a bilingual freak but as an instant expert on Ukrainian affairs.

The only thing that bothers me about my place in the chronology of this conference is that last night you had Dr. Laurin, a specialist on Quebec and unilingual affairs, and now you have the bilingual freak. Sorry, I am not counterattacking for Friday night and this is not planned as a rebuttal of any kind, because I have great esteem for Dr. Laurin. We read and quote the same reports, it is just that he quotes certain passages and I quote certain others. As a matter of fact, I have to confess to a certain complicity, because I had the pleasure of taking down a little coffee and soda water with him last night just after his presentation. There is not going to be any stabbing in the back. He has left now and I really do think that he has made a dignified and honest presentation of the Parti Québécois view. It is not precisely mine, but I find many elements of dignity and decency in their point of view.

But I also find that, as all politicians (and I guess I was a quasi-poli-

tician until a few weeks ago), you really have to play to the gallery you are addressing. The elements of the Parti Québécois policies that are developed in *Le Jour* and presented to the French-speakers in Quebec are not quite the same that were emphasized here. I said this to Dr. Laurin and told him I was going to repeat it this evening. I said I had great empathy for him. I knew how it was because when I was doing my number as commissioner of languages, I felt the dilemma: even though I wanted to say the same thing, I did not want to do the forked-tongue routine. The dilemma was to play Joan of Arc and Bobby Gimby at the same time. The French wanted me to kick the hell out of the English. "Come on, get up there and defend our rights; you are not bashing away at the English enough. You are finking out on us." And the English would say: "Listen, don't tell us those stories, don't try to make us feel guilty. Tell us what you are going to do for our kids." And necessarily you ended up taking the easy way out after a few attempts at presenting the Children's Crusade on the French network and the Joan of Arc number on the English network. Getting creamed by both sides, you would switch and take the elements each audience wanted to hear because their ears were plugged to the other side. So, any teasing that I make about Dr. Laurin's remarks is in the context of immense sympathy for the terribly difficult job he has, and, in the context of that, I think he did a very honest job, a very courageous one. I do not know of anybody who could have had the strength of character and sheer physical health to hang in there. The mental health (his being a psychiatrist) you can, of course, understand, and he did a fine job. In fact, I think if I could do one-tenth of the handholding with you that he did last night, I would be most impressive.

I will do a pseudo-Cartesian exposé on you in three parts. First of all (and this will be very chronological)—past, present, and future—something like Ebenezer Scrooge's visit. The past would be the record, the balance sheet of bilingualism, if you wish, and here is where I am going to differ with Dr. Laurin because I think he hinted that it was not quite a triumphant success; and then I think we might talk about the political strategy of the next three years, the science fiction part; and then the next 50 years and that is really wild. It is going to be something like the Space Odyssey 2001. Fifty years sounds like a hell of a long time, but it is pretty well the lifetime of your children, so think about it in those terms.

To begin with the last 10 years of language reform in Canada, we all know that this was really kicked off in 1960 with the quiet revolution and the Bilingual Commission in 1963, the creation of the Official Languages Act in 1969, and the creation of my previous little sinecure

in 1970. Throughout all of this we had a creative tension which has been sometimes uncreative between the two language groups. Indeed, the two main language groups and the other language groups, whether they were indigenous or of other origin, have come to life so that language has become some kind of pathological obsession with Canadians. It really is—I remember how boring an issue it was when I took over the job in 1970. In our daily press review there were sometimes one and a half articles. Now I see 60 articles a day coming from my former office. I suppose we are falling into the trap of one of Dr. Laurin's clients who was reminded of sex by everything. Everything now reminds us of language. If you talk about wheat, there is a language element to it; if it is pipelines, the language problem is there too somewhere. And this is a good thing for language commissioners and ex-language commissioners, but it is a wonderful thing, in fact, for institutes of Ukrainian studies. I am sure it is better than the winter works program. I say this very affectionately, for I am sort of off on the same circuit.

However, to come down to earth just for 30 seconds, it is important to realize that the language change has represented a deep and fundamental historic reform in Canada, which in about 20 years has changed the face of the country and the values that we attach to language. Even though some of us still kick and scream, even though we still have interesting fights in the Chinese mode, remember the old Chinese antiquity slogan, when they would condemn their enemies to live in very interesting times. Well, we live in very interesting times in great part because of language. Language has ceased being boring and has become an interesting subject, and that means trouble because people are finally taking it seriously. They realize that language is the expression of individual and collective dignity, and for those who care about these two forms of dignity, ours are times for reflection and creativity.

However scary the last 10 years might be for the country and for us as individuals, my reading of them is that Canadian history will judge our generation as the most courageous one. Instead of exporting the issue of language hangups, the terrible fratricidal tensions that characterized Canada for so long; instead of pawning them off on our children, we faced them. We took them in hand and tried to come to terms with them. We did not do it brilliantly but we did it honestly, and by "we" I mean everybody—you, the bureaucrats, and all the political parties. We did not flee it; we faced the Official Languages Act and before that the Bilingual Commission. We faced the need for a multicultural policy which Senator Yuzyk was instrumental in getting created and Dr. Lupul has continued to press for and our generation has said: "All right, it is time that we considered languages as opportunities rather

than a pain in the neck.” And that to me is the cosmic turnaround we had to make, because until our generation and the last seven or 10 years, we have always ignored language or considered it a marginal issue, believing we really did not have to take it into account because the English were supreme and the master race. To hell with the others; they could speak English and survive or go back to France, as my mother still says.

We are now beyond that, however. As much as it can tear some of your guts out—that is, if you do not like English-French bilingualism or the Official Languages Act, I think most of you have come to a stage of constructive fatalism, and indeed it seems you have gone beyond that and have seen that if we can obtain respect for the 26 per cent of the Canadian population that speaks French, there is a fighting chance that we can obtain respect for the 1 or 2 or 3 per cent that speaks German, Ukrainian, Italian or whatever. But I do not really like numbers. We are talking in terms of Canadian practical rights, and you have to do that in the long run. If there is any hope of protecting the rights of people attached to Ukrainian language and culture, it is in forming a distinctive alliance with the francophones, because the French-speakers’ very existence and aspirations have led to the principle of cultural pluralism in Canada. Without them, we would have had another melting pot of the American mode, and since we have gone into some kind of mosaic—well, at least we kid ourselves into believing in a mosaic—when we look for the underpinning of that mosaic, we find it exists only because there was one-quarter of the Canadian population here for about 400 years that spoke French and intended to breathe, live, and die in French. Because of the French-speakers, there is (with all its faults) a certain climate of tolerance for Ukrainian, German, Italian, and other languages. If the French were not here, I am convinced it would have been very difficult to introduce a multicultural policy.

I think strategists in Ottawa should remember that there is no natural antagonism between multiculturalism and bilingualism. These words are of the kind that cause ferocious debates between those who get hung up on numbers and difficulties of consolidating five languages with two or whatever. But if you look at the underlying principle of diversity, it is because we had a basic English-French diversity that I think our society tolerated and ended up encouraging multiplicity. I think that is the underlying theme that led to the multicultural policy, which I totally approve of.

So, not even to take issue with Dr. Laurin but to quote the good side that he was not able to quote last night (and he gave a very good cata-

logue of the bad side), I will take the good side of language reform. Essentially, what has happened in Ottawa in the last eight years since the Official Languages Act was passed is that the federal administration—the 150 agencies and departments—has finally managed to give French-speakers and English-speakers (those Canadians, whatever their ethnic or blood background, who use either French or English as their vehicle of general language dialogue in Canada) the opportunity to be served by federal institutions in the language in which they are taxed.

And that is bilingualism. That is the beginning and the end of it, unless you are a civil servant who is given the opportunity on company time and company expense to learn a second world language as one of the favored 15 per cent who need to know a second language. The reason behind that is to add another dimension of personal freedom—the right to work in the language that you are taxed in if you are a civil servant. That is what is meant by that terrible expression “institutional bilingualism.” Abstractions never worked in a democracy and that is why, even at this late date, we have people suffering in Vancouver and Halifax from the “Strasbourg goose syndrome,” dismal fear of having things rammed down their throat. Even if it is caviar, we feel that it is rammed down our throat. If we look at the Official Languages Act and see what it means and what has been done, as apart from the mythology which results strictly from the pitiful explaining job that I and others did, it simply means that you have the right to be served in the language you are taxed in, and, if you end up as a civil servant, that you can work in the language in which you are least efficient. Well, there you are. It is not so bad if you put it in those terms.

Another aspect of institutional reform has been that there has been (this will not turn you on as much as it would some French-speakers) radical progress in the promotion of French-speakers in all categories of the civil service. It is not quite a French takeover, but it means that we no longer can speak of an English colonial regime; it means that the French-speakers are now in a slightly less unfavored position. The figures would bore you to tears, but they are in the area of 86 per cent progress in the scientific and professional category, 72 per cent in the engineering categories, and 21 per cent in the diplomatic executive category. These are not bad figures over the period of the last five years. This is certainly not the kind of marginal, laughable progress that some of our friends in the Parti Québécois would like you to believe. And I only say that with the greatest affection for them, because they have been quoting my report. If you look at the record, the good and the bad, the good, if I may give you a very impressionistic point of view,

is about 80 per cent. That is not a bad report card for what all four parties, all the government departments, have done and you as public opinion have put up with, in spite of all the anger, doubt, and reticence you undoubtedly felt, some of which I share myself despite being "in the trough."

The other aspect of the language reform which is rarely talked about, because the feds have a perverse talent for putting their worst foot forward, is the development of second languages in the elementary schools. This is not so much the case in Quebec because there you are already taught a second language from Grade V on, and it is still the only province, even under Bill 101, where every high school kid has to learn the two languages, even with the so-called unilingual policy they have. But because the federal government, backed by all four parties, has spent \$700,000,000 on education in the provinces, we have had a 26 per cent rise in children learning French at the elementary level. That, however, is not the whole story. Quality also matters. French immersion was the inspiration of the excellent Ukrainian immersion program in Edmonton. Because the research done in Montreal and Ottawa proved that you could make a radical breakthrough on the basis of Dr. Penfield's theories, you can start the kid at four or six, and through the little switch in his mind he can switch from one language to another till the age of seven with no difficulty and actually expand certain aspects of his intelligence to handle cognitive recognition more effectively.

The third aspect which Senator Yuzyk readily pointed out was section 38 of the Official Languages Act which covered the third languages, the unofficial languages. I will tell you quite frankly that at the time it was passed, it was pretty well regarded as a sop to the ethnics, as a way of quietening those troublesome people who were fighting against bilingualism. I do not mean that in the cynical sense. I mean only that it was all that could be achieved at that time. Timing in politics is an important substance. I just want to tell you what we did with that article, a sleeper article in the Official Languages Act. Out of the total officer staff of 20, I had from the very beginning four people who were of recent immigrant background. All spoke their mother tongues—German, Ukrainian, Chinese—and I specifically asked all these people, who were very close to me and still are, to explore from the very beginning how far we could carry this so-called sop. Within six days I went to talk to the Ethnic Press Federation in Toronto. Dr. Kirschbaum was the president that year and his daughter, who took me down, was on our staff, saying you better go down before he hits you. So I went down and said: "Look, I am completely new; I want to know

how you feel about this article. My feeling about it is that they are not giving you very much, but I will do everything I can to carry it as far as we can." And they told me with great heroism—there must have been 12 different language groups represented—that: "We know the law, we are realistic, we appreciate your coming to see us first." It was the first speech I made, so to speak, and I was advised not to worry, but to do the best I could with the two languages and if they succeeded then all others would benefit. I was greatly encouraged by that.

Four months later I went to Winnipeg to a Ukrainian-Canadian conference and I was lucky enough to run into Dr. Kalba, who remains a dear friend to this day. Dr. Kalba was a precious advisor to me, and he was kind enough to organize a visit in which I took a few slings and arrows, but encountered basically a sympathetic reception because we explained what the law was. We printed up (this was not meant to be patronizing symbolism in any way but we wanted to make sure that we were telegraphing our feelings of dignity to all the language groups, especially in the beginning) a little sheet in English, French, and Ukrainian with the text of section 38 and our interpretation of it. And our interpretation was that, although this article only says that nothing in the Official Languages Act can be used to harm other languages, we will interpret that to mean that all languages are of equal dignity in human terms, even though in legal terms in Canada, for strictly practical reasons of number (the 26 per cent of French), there are only two official languages.

We wanted it to be known that we consider all languages to be equal in dignity. Some politicians were not entirely pleased with this rather poetic extrapolation, but it seemed to me that there was no other way of getting any kind of consistency. There was a little difficulty at times but I thought that it was a very direct way of treating the issue, and over the years we had a chance to go to bat for the Ukrainian language not on a thousand occasions (perhaps six), but they were important. In our first census year (1971), for example, Dr. Rudnyckyj lodged a very embarrassing complaint which allowed us to test the Act's boundaries. We found that there had been no use of the Official Languages Act to harm the Ukrainian language. In this census there was strictly the application of an objective mathematical formula. Ukrainian language was on the census form, I think as the language spoken in the home. The first four languages appeared in terms of numbers, space limitations, we were told, necessitating the census change. Ukrainian language was placed under "other." We investigated the complaint and found that the Act had not been used; at the very least we found that there was no sinister plot.

But when you are dealing with the protection of language rights, you cannot win every argument. As a citizen you should have a right to a clear explanation of why you perceive you are getting a bad deal. Nonetheless, I cannot honestly say that we protected the Ukrainian language or advanced it in Canada, but we made darn sure that the Official Languages Act never harmed it. It is not much, but it is a little more than Parliament asked us to do. I did take section 38 seriously and there are people in my former office who still do. The new commissioner is a fine man whom I have known for many years. Mr. Yalden, I am sure, will continue that policy. The people who advised me in those days are now (I hope you will be relieved by this) running the multicultural program. My old friend, Orest Kruhlik (he and I were colleagues at university), was once my chief advisor and now he is in charge of the whole multicultural program. Miss Eriks is also in the same program. These two people, colleagues of mine, are doing a remarkable job in working with great intelligence and devotion on your behalf, so I hope that, in spite of setbacks and inevitable discouragement, you realize that the multicultural program is not a fraud. I know the people enough to know that they would resign if they thought that they were being used as pawns or patsies.

So much, then, for the little balance sheet on language reform. Let us go on to the second part of the talk in which I would like to concentrate on the next three years of the constitutional crisis. I think in the next three years we should not expect any kind of definitive solutions or any kind of political serenity. Without being an alarmist, I think we are going to have at least three years of ideological and patriotic chaos, a series of referenda and counter-referenda, and elections and counter-elections, which will contradict each other and lead to a final impasse, whose moment will be the threshold of your own impatience with the nonsense of politicians. I do not mean to knock the men who are in place there now. As I see it, there is an air of great tragedy about what is happening and the whole political generation that is in place, that is stuck, that is caught in the horns of this dilemma, stuck with the referendum debate, is a prisoner of its own mythologies and promises, and I do not mean mythologies in a dishonest sense. Politicians have to create myths to simplify, to explain in images that will make a country clear to its own people, and so I expect three years of lies and intoxication on both sides, Quebec and Ottawa. I say that with the utmost sympathy because I just do not see any other way. Lies is a strong word, but I think we are going to find colorations of the truth which get to resemble the rainbow because of selective quoting (of which we have

already heard something), the organizing of statistics, timing, and various countermoves.

All this reminds us that we are dealing with a kind of bad cowboy movie, a shoot-out at Dawson City with René Lévesque and Pierre Trudeau, old personal adversaries in one way or another, although I am sure that they respect each other underneath. Each one of them represents polarized images of Canada and they have to go to the end of their logic. This will be very brutal. The polarization of ideas is going to tend to simplify and deform the ideas, and I expect that those of us on the sidelines will be the objects of parallel intoxication. We will be victims for seduction by both sides, if I may mix the imagery, and we had one such seduction last night. I do not consider myself a seducer by any means, but someone will be sent from Ottawa who will seduce you, I hope. The fact is that the politicians are dealing with an ideological war that will simplify and sloganeer and therefore deform. So in terms of clear, honest, academic, intellectual debate—since we are at a university—I do not expect that we are going to have a great deal of candor. We will have a lot of interest, excitement, and great fear, but also a great opportunity, for the time being, for the next three years or so, for ideological chaos in which truth becomes the first victim.

Beyond these three years of counter-dealing referenda and elections, which will prove one week the popularity of Mr. Lévesque and the following week the popularity of Mr. Trudeau (or the weakness of another party or whatever), I suspect that we are going to get very impatient and say: "Look fellows, would you please lay off. We are getting tired of the referenda and the elections. You haven't proved anything. The poker game, the big poker game in the sky, has to end someday and we would like round two to begin." Then phase two, the Kennedy round of nation-building, if you like, will have to begin, and I sense we are probably going to need some radical new thinking on both sides. The people that I have in mind are already to some extent in the wings. The public on both sides, as it becomes impatient, will churn up people: the moderate fanatics on both sides, who believe deeply in the dignity of French in Quebec, on the one hand, and deeply in the unity of Canada, on the other, but who are not so fanatical that they would destroy any possibility of a civilized dialogue by following their theses. So what I suspect we are going to see in about three or four years at most will be the coming forward of a second round, a new generation of political people, men and women, particularly women, who will be utterly committed to the principles in which they believe, but not utterly committed to the platform or the magic formulas for

which their own parties have stood, whether it is a constitutional status quo or the Parti Québécois' magic formula and sovereignty. You run into these people at many of the congresses and conventions which take place every week, indeed every night, on national unity. If you play your cards right, you can dine out nine times a week on national unity alone!

I know this conference is not specifically on that issue, and I am not making fun of the cottage industry, but it is true that for the first time since November we have immense and general concern for the future of our country. In all these places, after *pâté de fois* and cognac or whatever they serve you, you run into people, ostensibly very committed Québécois or very deep federalists, who are saying, "Look, our politicians are saying all kinds of horrendous things and I have got to go along with them for now or get excommunicated." And it has happened. You have seen people slapped down for pointing out unpleasant realities. So, they keep down as long as we are in a pre-referendum period. I think the moderates on both sides are going to have to remain closet moderates. That is the only way that things are going to work for now.

I suggest that any of you who are going to some of these conferences or have other ways of contacting people in Quebec, and who feel strongly about your own dignity, should do everything you can to keep the doors open with them in spite of all the horrendous deformations of the truth that are going to occur in this ideological war. In the end, the radical reconstruction of the country that will have to occur will have to be based on a whole network of interpersonal trust. There will have to be people on both sides who trust individuals on the other side and who are willing to become vulnerable because of that, willing to be burned with their own people because of it. We are going to be like the movie "High Noon," in which John Wayne plays both characters, minus Gary Cooper. We are going to be needing some new script writers in about three years. I hope they are working already and that some new actors will come forward when the present political generation has burned itself out to some extent with the rather futile series of referenda and elections. Those new actors will cry out, "Enough!" They will be willing to go extremely far back to first principles and these, we suspect, will be individual liberty, peace, and the equal dignity of the two language groups. If this leads us, in plumbing terms, to something like associate states or a truly radical confederation with the right to secession, I would not be surprised. I am not predicting, I am not even advocating, but if there were two associate states the Quebec one would be quite different from the predominantly English-speaking one, and this brings me back to the general theme of multiculturalism. If it did

come to that radical alternative then we would have to review the situation in a totally new perspective, because with associate status we will have rejected the principle of cultural dualism within the English Canada of that time. We would then have to be a little bit worried about the future of the other languages.

That is why in the beginning, without trying to give sermons or lessons to anybody, I encouraged people who had already made this point. Both Senator Yuzyk and Dr. Lupul have argued on various occasions that the Ukrainian-speaking community and the French-speaking community are natural allies. I hope that I am not taking this too far from the truth. That is the way I also feel because I sense that on both sides, the Ukrainian and the French, this is rarely perceived. Many of your Ukrainian-speaking elite know it very well, but so often I hear from the so-called ethnic politicians that they are fed up with bilingualism. "We don't want it; why are they giving everything to the French." I say, "Look fellows, don't flail away at your best allies, people who are breaking the ground on your behalf, because if the French fail, it is going to be very hard for you." I know that that takes a little lead in thinking for some people, but I truly believe this. If you get down to the bedrock issue, which is the respect in society for cultural pluralism, if the French can make it, then there will be some hope for the other language groups. As for the special status of Quebec, this is an issue which will still have to be faced if there were a radical restructuring in the form of associate states. If the English Canadians end up so annoyed and so anti-French as to reject the principles of cultural pluralism and go for a kind of frantic melting pot, then there would be real problems for multiculturalism and that is why I would advocate now that those of you who have not really pressed this issue in those terms listen to your leaders who are saying that your best allies are the French-speakers—in this province that means the Franco Albertans—and that you should be teaming up with the French-speakers outside Quebec, who have a very strong national federation now. Instead of fighting each other, in fact you should get together to defend the principle of linguistic pluralism to help the French people obtain a status which is national coast to coast because of their numbers. If they break that kind of ground, as Claude Ryan was saying, there will be security and dignity for the Ukrainian language, at least as a regional language.

That is political realism of the first order for the politicians and thinkers in the Ukrainian-speaking community who see further than the local antagonisms, and the local angers, and the perfectly understandable slogans about why they are being made into second-class citizens. Well, you are not; this is definitely not so. If French is respected then

you have the hope of being respected and that is why I have always supported multiculturalism and felt it to be perfectly in concert with the bilingual policies with which I have been associated.

If we are going to have any kind of Canada, it will be a Canada of diversity whose cherished myth and value is tolerance. It may seem laughable because we have missed it and betrayed it so often, but it is the only way. As Daniel Johnson would say, there must be equality or independence, and that equality can extend to the Ukrainian people as well in different terms. But equal dignity can be there and that is why I would ask you to meditate a little about this spontaneous alliance with the French-speaking minorities and also the new group called the Canadian Parents for French, who are the English moderates and stand together for the principle of tolerance in the most lucid, realistic terms.

You can stand together on the principle of cultural pluralism and linguistic tolerance, and then we will end up together with the only kind of Canada that is worth having: a distinctive and civilized Canada, a Canada of equal dignity—in other words, a Canadian Canada.

Multiculturalism—The Basic Issues

Walter S. Tarnopolsky

I face this afternoon's assignment with considerable trepidation. We have had at least four excellent papers, and the question I ask myself is what more can I add to the words and thoughts that were communicated, particularly yesterday. Moreover, I have been speaking on the topic of human rights and multiculturalism over the last 11 years and, quite frankly, I cannot think of anything new to say. In some ways, I have not changed my mind since the first time I started speaking on this topic in 1965–66. But I do apologize to those of you who have heard some of the things I have said before for the extent to which I might bore you or might sound repetitious. I do promise you, however, that this will be my last statement on the subject for a couple of years, so you will not have to face it again.

By way of preface, let me deal with three preliminary points. The first is obviously the most important and overshadows everything else, and that is the matter of national unity and language rights. Perhaps I could illustrate the whole subject and what seems to me to be its character in Canada today through two stories. The first I cannot claim as my own because I first heard it from Mr. Peter Savaryn of Edmonton. You may have heard of the older couple who had finally saved up enough money for a trip to Europe by ship. The husband had gone to sleep. Suddenly his wife, in a panic, shook him, and said, "Staryi, staryi, vstavai. Korabel topytsia. (Old man, old man, wake up! The ship is sinking.)" He replied with some irritation: "Stara, to ne nash korabel. (Old lady, it's not our ship)." I think quite frankly that this is the view of many Canadians. But it *is* our ship that might be sinking, and it *is* our duty to do as much about it as we can.

The second really is a kind of quote that again is not mine—it belongs to some European actress who, when asked about love and how she compared Europe and North America, replied “In North America you talk about it; in Europe we do not talk about it, we do it.” The same is true where languages are concerned. We talk about them, but no one does very much to learn them despite the efforts of various governments. And it is time we did!

The most obvious issue we have to face is whether or not there is going to be a Canada. I for one feel that if Quebec were to get its independence there would be no prospect for many, many years (if ever) of an economic union. Being a transplanted westerner, I still think like a Saskatchewanian and to me it is very difficult to see what possible economic benefits western Canada could get from continued association with a country that would at that stage be formed in central Canada. I do not see any prospect for some kind of sovereignty-association if Quebec were to get its independence. Furthermore, I think that if Quebec were to become independent the pressures on Quebec economically and culturally would be far greater than they are now.

On the other hand, I think that in our case there is no room for complacency because, although I feel that once the “idea” of this country is broken there will be no desire for economic association, we will nonetheless be in a position where the economically more powerful countries of the world can exploit us all. Any foreign industrialist is not going to worry about language, but about the best deal he can get, and we are going to be underbidding each other for the best possible deal. In the end, it is not going to matter very much whether we become part of the United States or whether we remain a Puerto Rican semi-independent colony. I think the same thing awaits us.

I have to say further that I agree with what Professor Bociurkiw said yesterday, that is, that if Quebec should become independent, the prospect of the rest of Canada remaining a multicultural country is not very high. There would be a backlash against such a policy. And I think that that backlash would come not only from the Anglo-Celtic majority, but also from a high percentage of the people not of Anglo-Celtic descent. Everyone’s first concern is Canada, and if pluralism and diversity lead to the break-up of the country, there is not much prospect for a sympathetic approach to the cultural rights of anybody else. Thus, to me, the prospect of Quebec independence is disastrous.

On the other hand, I think we have to keep in mind that we must recognize the rights of the people of Quebec to self-determination—and this for a number of reasons. In the first place, it is now recognized international law in the so-called International Bill of Rights, which

is composed of a number of documents. The two most important of these, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both recognize in Article I that the first right of a people is the right to self-determination—the right to determine freely their own economic and political destinies. Therefore since Canada has ratified these covenants, there is no question but that we have bound ourselves by international law to recognize the right of self-determination. Obviously, once one recognizes the right of self-determination, this right has to be available to everybody, or it is not really a right.

Perhaps more important is the constitutional argument that comes up time and again. Actually, it is not so much the constitutional argument that is important, but the fact that it is irrelevant that makes it important. It really does not matter whether our constitution does or does not recognize the right to secession. I think that a number of scholars place far too much emphasis on that, because the fact is that in the end the main question is what one can do. The courts can declare a certain act to be illegal or unconstitutional, but such a declaration has to be enforced. When our courts proclaim a law to be thus or so, they know it can be enforced. But what could be done to enforce a court decision that secession by Quebec is illegal? We might try economic sanctions as have Britain and the rest of the world against Rhodesia, but you know how successful that has been. And Quebec is much larger and wealthier than Rhodesia. Another alternative would be to move troops. I would hope that this is unthinkable. In any case, I believe it would be impossible in today's world. I have no doubt that if Quebec were to proclaim its independence, it would have the sympathy of a large number of French-speaking countries in the world, including France. That has been obvious since 1967 and General de Gaulle's speech. Therefore, although I think that from a humanistic point of view we should consider it unthinkable, even if we had fools who were prepared to go ahead and move troops, I do not think they would get away with it. Moreover, even if they should get away with it for a while, it would still result in the destruction of Canada. Certainly we would have war for many years to come at a tremendous cost, and we are already in a situation of economic crisis.

And so, what I am suggesting is that we must proclaim that Quebecers have the right to self-determination and then go on to convince them that their decision should be to remain within Canada. Last night, Dr. Laurin made an analogy to our sentiments for the self-determination of Ukrainians, and I agree that there is some similarity. We are not going to determine whether some day Ukrainians will be independent,

or in a federation, or whatever. All we can demand is the right of self-determination for all peoples, and amongst these the Ukrainians will make their own determination of what their future is going to be. Our duty *vis-à-vis* Quebec is to take the approach of not saying to them that secession is illegal; rather, we must proclaim their right to self-determination and join that with an invitation to stay with us. We must not follow the stupid action taken by the president of the Canadian Bar Association to put people in embarrassing situations. One does not demand every day of one's spouse to proclaim his or her love. Similarly, one does not ask others to continually proclaim and affirm their allegiance. One gives them options. One illustrates what is possible in a humanistic world, and then one hopes that they are convinced of the benefits of unity. So, I think that above all else, we are going to have to take a much more liberal attitude to the question of self-determination of Quebecers, and renew our efforts to try to keep them a part of this country.

Obviously, and this ties in with multiculturalism, one of the contentious issues is the matter of language. I have in my pocket a little wrapper which I brought back from Switzerland. It is a wrapper for Zwieback, on which you are told in four different languages how good Zwieback is. Yet in Canada we have people talking about the federal government cramming French down their throats; and about how expensive it is because we might have to see labelling in more than one language. It is just too stupid to contemplate that people who have 11 television channels could object because the twelfth one might turn out to be in French; or that people cannot turn a cornflakes box around to read the English side but rather complain because they cannot stand to see the French side. One could go on and on, but there really is not enough time. We are the ones, those of us who have had some kind of association with different kinds of backgrounds, who must be amongst the first to recognize the need for *at least* the two official languages to be provided across the land. We (the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and some of our other organizations) should have been among the first to come out for the wider use of French during the air traffic controllers' controversy last June. We should have been among the first to object to any closing of French schools. It is you in the west who will largely determine whether or not we can somehow convince the Quebecers to stay. There is much that can be done in Ontario, but for Ontario unity with Quebec is absolutely vital economically. For you in the west that economic union is not as important. But I would have thought that for a number of reasons, some of which I shall discuss in a moment, it is important to all of us to preserve the country.

My second point, before coming to “the basic issues,” is that whatever claims there are in Canada for justice, whether based upon some “charter peoples” or “two founding peoples” assertion or upon some concept of moral or natural rights, the claims of our native peoples must come first. It does not matter whether one talks about the people who came here first, or whether one talks about the people who are at the moment in the position of least equality with others—the claims of our native peoples must come first—above those of any people regardless of ethnic origin. What we have to do, as far as the native peoples are concerned, is not only to try to bring them to a position of equal opportunity with the rest of us, but to recognize that their desire—which has been repeatedly expressed by them—to live their social and community lives in their own way and in dignity, is of paramount importance in Canada.

The third point that I would like to make by way of a preface to my remarks (my preface may be longer than my main remarks) is that this country was, still is, and I think can continue to be, one of the most humane of societies. There was much that was wrong. If you go through the history books and read some of the old laws, you will realize that there was a tremendous amount of discrimination in this country. We enslaved both the black and Indian peoples. Later, the oriental peoples were terribly discriminated against. Even some more recent European immigrations, including our own, faced much discrimination although less serious than that faced by others. On the other hand, there was always obviously a strong enough humanitarian current among the dominant Anglo-Celtic group to overcome discrimination eventually. In some ways it has never been as bad as it has been and still is in other countries, and we have reached the stage in Canada today where every province has a Human Rights Commission and now, as of this summer, we have one at the federal level as well. There is no other country in the world that has as complete a coverage of anti-discrimination laws and commissions to administer them. Whether they will be totally successful is another matter, but the will is there.

So, as bad as some of the past practices have been, and as horrible as some relations are still today, I would say that this is, has been, and will continue to be one of the most humane societies in the world. It is true, as Mr. Petryshyn pointed out yesterday, based on the studies of John Porter and others, that Canada is still a very “vertical mosaic.” There is no doubt about that. But in a way, it is not quite as vertical as it is in some countries, and perhaps not as rigid. One does have to recognize that the dominant group in our economic elite and media elite, and to quite an extent the political elite, is still the Anglo-Celtic

group. But this group has been here longer than most other people. What is quite important as well, is that this group did receive a tremendous amount of outside help, quite early. In a new country, being able to bring capital with you is a great advantage over all who come with no such resources. And so, considering the time of arrival, and considering the matter of outside help, we do have a society that is more vertical than we would like, but there is hope that it can be changed.

What I am suggesting in all of this is that we should acknowledge that the country we have at this stage is due in part to the humanity of a large majority of Anglo-Celtic peoples. It is due in part, also, to the presence of the French-speaking Canadians. Quite clearly, the British victory over a Roman Catholic, French-speaking population, granted equality of rights and of citizenship, meant that Canada would be pluralistic. Obviously, with the arrival of the third group, by which I mean all people in the non-Anglo-Celtic, non-French categories, politicians saw in time how Canada could be enriched by the efforts of all three elements.

Finally, let me dwell on a point which is frequently misunderstood. I do not think that anyone who speaks about a multicultural society wants to do away with any institutions which are presently part of our way of life. We are all in favor of the parliamentary system. We all accept the primacy of the common law. I think that there is no question that we were luckier than most countries in having that kind of inheritance. Obviously we are not going to do away with that. Changes there may be, changes there are even in the mother of Parliaments. But that does not mean that one wishes in any way to repudiate the British heritage in the country.

There is one institution, however, that must go, and that is the crown. Both for the sake of keeping Quebec in Canada and for the sake of the just and egalitarian society that I think is our aim, Canada will become a republic within the Commonwealth. I think that the problem with the monarchy is that there is really only one justification for it, and that is that it is a symbol of unity. The overwhelming majority of Quebecers are embarrassed by toasts to the Queen at every formal dinner and by the singing of "God Save The Queen." And so am I. Secondly, the monarchy in England is tied to the established Church of England, tied to the whole structure of the lords temporal and spiritual in Parliament. It is in fact a class institution and, as such, has no place in this country. Obviously, and I know I need not spend too much time on this, it is quite possible to have a republic without adopting the American presidential system. Many Commonwealth countries which are republics have retained the parliamentary system.

The three points I have discussed—national unity and the language issue, the position of our native peoples, and the building of the kind of humane society that can be even more humane—induced the federal government to proclaim its policy on multiculturalism. “A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework,” announced the prime minister, “commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians.” He also said, and I keep repeating it at every opportunity: “National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one’s own individual identity.”

That to me seems the basic issue in multiculturalism. To implement this policy requires three, possibly four things, and I will deal with these in turn. First, multiculturalism is based on the recognition of reality. Second, it is based upon the desire to maintain and create a just and pluralistic society. Third, it has its place in the perpetuation of unity in this country. And the fourth possible one is that, even if all of this were not so, we should wish it to be so.

I made reference earlier to the fact that I believe the claims of the native peoples to be above those of everybody else, at least until their living standards are equal to those of all other Canadians. One of the main claims of the native peoples is to be able to preserve their own way of life—their own culture. To be honest in our responsibilities to them, then, we are already talking of an additional culture, or *more than two*, and thus this cannot be merely a *bi-cultural* country. Second, regardless of the rate of intermarriage and assimilation, there continue to be large numbers of people, even among the Anglo-Celtic group, particularly the Scots, who share a way of life in common with some Canadians, which way of life is different from that of other Canadians. With respect to their preferences in the fine arts, in folklore, or in popular culture, their retention of religious and feast day practices, their deeply held personal beliefs and personal ways of life—the way one welcomes one’s children into the world, the way one raises them, the way one marries them, the way one buries them—in all of these ways, we have people who are following different cultural patterns. And this will continue to be so for a long time to come—perhaps even forever. Further, I do not think that we should be misled by the superficial common appearances of people. In the West, as in eastern Europe, as in the developing countries, young people listen to the same music and dress the same way. That does not mean, however, that they are the same underneath. We should not be misled by the superficial appearance of people all over the world. There are, therefore, as I have said, all these important fundamental ways in which there are large numbers

of people in Canada who continue to pursue a way of life and to assert cultural preferences which are different from those of other people. People today are becoming conscious of their "roots" all over the world. Reaching back for one's ancestral heritage to try to find out a little bit more about one's self is a world-wide phenomenon.

On this point a question was raised yesterday about whether multiculturalism was really no more than voluntary association. I think that is an irrelevant question. To me this is the kind of question that Stalin asked about the pope—how many troops does the pope have? You know that that was not the important question, but rather: how much influence does the pope have? how many supporters? how many adherents all over the world? If one turns to political life, how many people vote in an election? Certainly not everybody. If we consider civic elections, it is usually less than half. How many people are active in political parties? How many people turn out to nominate the candidates? And yet it is those very few people who pick our members of Parliament, and ultimately our prime ministers. Do we talk about total commitment to everybody? Everyone has to pay taxes. How many people would have paid if they did not have to? This business of how many adherents we have, how many members we have, is as unimportant as it would be to ask the chairman of the Conservative Party or the Liberal Party of Alberta: how many members have you in your party as related to the whole population. The fact that in any kind of association, any kind of society, whether private or public, there will always be the workers, the activists, and the other people who have other interests and give them priority, does not mean that the others do not have some sympathy for, and involvement in, what the activists and leaders are doing. And so, although I do not think we can forget the point that Mr. Petryshyn raised yesterday, it is not crucial. How we involve the people who have somewhat less interest is important, but for many—perhaps most—it will never go beyond folkloric matters or the fine arts, and we should reconcile ourselves to that fact in building the society we would like to see emerge.

In summing up, what I am suggesting is that Canada will be a country of many cultures for many years to come, and that if we draft a constitution, we would draft it for the present. Hopefully, it will last for a hundred years, but we do not aim at what society might be a hundred years from now. Similarly, if one is adopting an official policy for the country, one adopts it for now, and for the foreseeable future. We do not look to see whether 100 years from now people will have forgotten many of the languages that they have preserved until now. We are build-

ing for today, and for the next 10, 15, 20 years, and today this is a country of many cultures and languages.

The second reason for the adoption of the official policy of multiculturalism was because of our commitment to a pluralistic society. I cannot see how one can speak of the possibility of achieving equality of opportunity if homogeneity is required. I do not go around wearing a T-shirt saying, "Kiss me, I'm Ukrainian," but no matter where I go, once people hear my name, they want to know where I am from. When my children grew up in Saskatchewan, which is a truly pluralistic society, nobody ever asked them what their name meant, or what its origin was. But from the day they arrived in Toronto they were asked that question, as they are today. At one time or another all of us will be asked that question unless we change our names. Is that the price of equality of opportunity? If it is, it means that one has to repudiate one's ancestral heritage, and that is too high a price to pay because somewhere along the line that takes away a little bit of one's dignity, because somehow, perhaps not every day, one is made to recognize that one has somehow repudiated one's parents. And that is not the basis on which you can build equality of opportunity.

The other thing that has come up in this country (although it has been with us for quite a while because black people came with the first settlers) is that increasingly in recent years we have had immigration from the Third World, and so we cannot get homogeneity of color. The United States found that out. We have got to recognize that there are people in this society that are different, and they will want to live differently. Therefore, if we are talking of equality of opportunity, we are not talking about an equality based upon a homogeneous population, but rather an equality of opportunity despite the fact that many groups of individuals will remain different.

Moreover, if in this land we are to overcome the vertical mosaic that you heard about yesterday, it is very necessary that power be shared. About some of the elites mentioned yesterday—the economic elite for example—we cannot do much in the short run. There may be some way to get in quickly—some people marry into wealth—but otherwise the economic elite takes a great deal of time to change. But there are the elites that can be changed and they are mostly in public institutions.

The federal public service and the provincial public services are still far too homogeneously staffed from the major Anglo-Celtic group, and somewhat less so from the French group, but very little from the others. One of the answers one always gets is that this is a result of selection on the basis of merit. Well, those of you who are at universities, or have teaching positions, or have had to assess someone on merit,

know that it is a question of how you stack up the points. What do you give credit for? If you do not give credit to an individual for the fact that that individual might know an additional language besides English or French, or that that individual might know both official languages, not just one, such an individual will miss merit points. If you do not award merit for the fact that that individual has a greater knowledge than others about certain societies, both within Canada and outside, then obviously such an individual will lose out in a competition. It all depends on what you give credit for. And clearly enough credit has not been given by our government recruiters for the fact that there are individuals that can speak more than one language, nor that they might understand minority cultures a little better than others because they are a part of one. Our public service recruitment criteria have to change.

In addition, we have to encourage what is called affirmative action. The new federal Human Rights Act, as well as most of the provincial codes, have provisions for affirmative action. Let me emphasize, because there is a great deal of misunderstanding on this point, that affirmative action does not mean portioning out positions according to an exact quota. It does not mean that we take exact proportions of the population and then divide the openings by some formula. Affirmative action means that one deliberately encourages recruitment among such groups as disadvantaged or under-represented people. One might even, because of the particular circumstances, lower educational requirements, because the score of these people in other fields may be higher. If one is talking about a social worker or a probation officer in northern Canada or in the hinterland, where in the last 200 years we have pushed our native peoples, surely the fact that the individual knows how to speak the language, understands the society, understands the problems, is more important than whether that person has a Grade VII or Grade XII diploma. We will have to work at the provincial level and at the federal level in order to start changing the bureaucratic elite.

Let me turn to the third basic factor which I think was important in the adoption of the policy of multiculturalism, namely, national unity. We have to recognize with respect to Quebec, as with the rest of society, that we must not only be tolerant of each other, but we should have joy in the fact that we are different. In other words, we must not merely tolerate the desire of Quebecers or anyone else to live their own way, we should be happy that we have a society in which there is this kind of richness, this kind of pluralism, with all the advantages that it gives us in a world of international trade, of multinational corporations, of multilateral relations. In addition, it makes our own communities more interesting. Let me give just one illustration. Before World War II,

and into the late forties Toronto was, as it remains today, a very civilized city. But you all know that Toronto was known as "grey" Toronto. Today, however, Toronto is exciting and interesting in addition to being civilized, and it is exciting largely because of the fact that in 1956 the Hungarians came in large groups and brought with them the kind of European civilized café society that made parts of Toronto interesting. Toronto is interesting because it has a large Italian population which gives it a dimension that was not present before. It is interesting because of the other people who have come in from eastern Europe, the West Indies, and so on. This is the kind of enrichment from which Canada has benefited immeasurably. That is why I say that what we must do is not merely tolerate each other, despite the differences, but be grateful that we have all these differences to make up the country as we want it.

Finally, I said that there is a fourth point to consider, and that is that even if it were not so, we should wish it to be so. We have an obligation to the world to show that it is possible to live with consciousness of ethnicity, consciousness of differences in language, religion, nationality, or culture in one society, not just in peace and tolerance, but in love as well. We owe it to the world to do this. If we fail, it is going to be the failure of one of the most important experiments in the world, and there will be less hope for the rest.

Moreover, just to add this at the end, I think another reason we should wish to have such a pluralistic society is our own need for regaining economic prosperity. I think it is obviously clear that a country which is now facing balance-of-payments problems, a dollar that is slipping, an inability to sell our goods abroad, is still trying to go all over the world in a kind of reverse of Mr. Spicer's reference to the Strasbourg goose, trying to shove its goods down other peoples' throats in the English language. The Japanese, the Germans, the businessmen of the world who are prospering today, learned long ago that you have got to know the language of the people to whom you are trying to sell. You have got to understand them, have a knowledge of their culture and what their needs are, what their particularities are. But we in Canada, with all the opportunities we have had to develop our heritage, only homogenize and discourage language retention. How many of our salesmen who go abroad to sell our goods, create more jobs, can go to any country in Europe or Asia or Latin America and sell the goods in the language of those people? Not very many! We conduct our foreign policy largely in English, with a little bit of French here and there. We do our peace-keeping in English and in French when we associate with soldiers from Yugoslavia and Poland. Would it not make more sense to have some soldiers who could speak the Polish and Serbo-Croatian

languages, or whatever we would have needed? It just does not make economic sense, any more than it makes moral sense, to lose the heritage that we have. And so, I suggest to you that this must remain a country of many languages and many cultures. Even if it were not so, we should wish it to be so.

Canada's Options in a Time of Political Crisis and Their Implications for Multiculturalism

Manoly R. Lupul

This paper will canvass Canada's political options at this critical time with the emphasis on language and culture rather than economics. This follows naturally from the title with its pointed reference to multiculturalism. Economics is important, but the view that culture and economics are mutually exclusive and that the crisis is economic rather than cultural or linguistic is rejected. Language remains the basic issue, in the short run at least, for it is *the* key to economic power in all parts of Canada, and the economic issue is not helped by minimizing the issue of language. Language is certainly of major importance to the Parti Québécois government as shown by its legislation since November 15.

It appears that Canada today has three possible political options. The first is separatism; the second is the status quo, which for lack of a better term shall be referred to as cooperative federalism or Trudeau Liberalism but which shall include all political parties, for in matters of language and culture the Opposition parties have not developed distinctive positions of their own; and the third is regional federalism, the writer's own preference.

The first—separatism—is not a viable alternative and its implications for multiculturalism need not be developed. Separatism, notwithstanding the rhetoric, is little more than rhetoric. *The Province of Quebec is an integral part or region of Canada and its fate is tied up inextricably with the fate of Canada's other regions.* All regions of Canada even now are very much under the pressure of Anglo-American influences. Without Quebec, the pressure would intensify with disastrous consequences for all regions of Canada, including Quebec. With Quebec gone, the need to cultivate diversity, the need to think in

minority terms would disappear everywhere in Canada. Minorities outside Quebec could not stem the tide of Anglo-Americanization alone. The traditional concern of ethnocultural minorities, in particular, would be swamped by a multitude of economic and political survival interests. The ethnocultural minorities themselves would not necessarily disappear; nor would Canada's multicultural reality. Both would simply be pushed far into the background, and language and culture as matters of public or state policy would quickly give way to an irrational but highly understandable embittered opposition. "Such issues," it would be said, "were responsible for the breakup of Canada, with all of its attending uncertainties. It was Quebec which made them public issues; with Quebec gone, they should return to their original home—the private sphere."

The wholehearted commitment or necessity to live life wholly in terms of Anglo-American values would mean only one language—English—with devastating results for all other languages and lifestyles, including French and the lifestyle of the Province of Quebec. Whether it would mean an immediate rush into the arms of the United States or just an inevitable drift toward the American embrace is problematic. Without Quebec, the other regions of Canada would not necessarily join the United States; there are other alternatives, especially west of the Ottawa valley. What is certain is that other regions would become even more Anglo-American than they already are and Quebec would *not* escape. On the contrary, the Anglo-American pressures, which are basically unilingual and which impinge heavily from the south on Quebec already, would be reinforced and strengthened by embittered neighbors on the east and west, who would gradually suffocate Quebec through a single-minded pursuit of cultural and linguistic homogeneity.

Quebec, in short, would in the end be drowned in the anglophone sea of the North American continent. *This is the great unspoken truth in the Province of Quebec which renders separatism inoperative.* It would, however, be unwise to conclude that Quebec's separatists are bluffing, if for no other reason than that such language is inflammatory and hides the basic fact that Quebec has legitimate grievances which have been patronized by numerous forces, the most important being Quebec's own powerful Anglo-Celtic (British) minority. But Quebec's separatists are no fools; they do not wish to commit cultural and linguistic suicide. As men and women who feel their ethnicity more deeply than any other group in Canada, they are undoubtedly appalled by the revival in recent years of surface ethnicity (the peasant look, it is sometimes called!). Unlike the other week-end ethnics, they are for real; because they have a concentrated demographic base, their ethnicity is

a full-blown way of life with everything from daily newspapers to rock and roll sung in French. They feel their survival threatened by a large, unilingual Anglo-American population, and they wish only to be understood and helped to avoid being *driven* to separatism, the last suicidal step. Separatism is the only weapon they have left to bring the rest of Canada to its senses. Royal commissions and language and culture policies initiated by Ottawa (which few have taken seriously) will no longer suffice. The talk of socialism and the PQ's own language legislation help to show that the new regime means business. But the operative word is leverage, not bluff, and here the PQ government is behaving no differently than any other provincial government. Other governments, not feeling themselves as threatened, merely do not invoke the ultimate weapon, separation. Moreover, it is very doubtful whether any other ethnocultural group with Quebec's demographic base, its long history, and fear for its cultural integrity would really behave differently than the desperately serious separatists. Take the equally desperate Ukrainian Canadians, for example. Given the Russification policies of the tsars, intensified by the Soviets, it is quite conceivable that, under similar circumstances and with a comparable power base, Ukrainian Canadians might have agitated for separation much earlier and even more intensively than today's separatists. Canada's political crisis, then, will undoubtedly be a dramatic cliff-hanger, but the separatists must be understood—and the first step is to appreciate that they cannot afford to take the final step and deliberately push their neighbors still further into the Anglo-American sea. Theirs is not a plateau far above the sea; they live on an island whose base is constantly washed by that steadily rising sea.

Having shown that the aspirations of the separatists must be respected rather than feared, let us turn to the second political option—the status quo, cooperative federalism, or Trudeau Liberalism—and see how developments since the introduction in 1971 of the policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework”¹ have been anything but encouraging. On both counts—bilingualism and multiculturalism—the status quo, which, it must be stressed, is more than a Liberal status quo, for all parties in Parliament have supported it, has been found wanting.

With bilingualism, first, the orientation has been wrong from the outset, as events since November 15 have finally shown. Canada's problem of language and culture has always been rooted in the Province of Quebec, and more specifically in the Anglo-Celtic minority, which even today after 17 years of almost endless discussion, agitation, and even violence is still only 33.68 per cent bilingual.² Does this not demon-

strate a conqueror's mentality? What greater affront can a minority of 10.62 per cent show than to insist that the French majority of 78.95 per cent speak to it in the minority's language?³ The role of Quebec's unilingual English-speaking minority in Canada's crisis of culture has been seriously overlooked. English as the main language of communication in Montreal and French as the secondary language—the language of the work rooms but not the board rooms, the language of the gardener, the waiter, the miner, and the fisherman but seldom that of the better homes, restaurants, hotels, and universities—has had both economic and cultural consequences which the separatists have been able to exploit and are now determined to end. Unilingual English in the bosom of French-English bilingualism is assimilationist, for communication of necessity must be in English. *Yet had all the anglophones of Quebec become bilingual, the French Canadians could then have remained unilingual French or become bilingual French-English without fear of being spoken to in English most of the time.* The solitude between the English- and French-speaking parts of Canada is inevitable given the size of the country; the solitude between the English- and French-speaking parts of Quebec is unforgivable given the size and well-known concerns of the francophone majority, who in the main have occupied the positions of servants in their own home.

But in what way is Ottawa to blame? Instead of embarking upon a massive program of language immersion to make adults and children in places like Westmount fluently bilingual, Ottawa concentrated on the federal civil service and on preaching the gospel of English-French bilingualism from coast to coast,⁴ as if either were at the heart of the problem. Left largely to their own voluntary whims, the unilingual Anglo-American minority of Quebec—rich, powerful, and urbane—became the natural model for Quebec's few venturesome immigrants, whose linguistic preference for English at a time of declining French-Canadian birth rates has provoked a whole decade of bewilderment, acrimony, and ill-feeling. Yet all Prime Minister Trudeau had to do was to draw for his constituents a lesson from his own electoral success. He was prime minister of Canada because he was acceptable to Quebec, which could speak to him in its own language. Quebecers felt comfortable with his government and through the Official Languages Act numerous opportunities were opened to them in that government and its administrative agencies. The shoe only pinched at home where a stubborn, well-entrenched minority ruled through a language which denied economic power to the majority and encouraged immigrants

and their children to join the ranks of those who held the linguistic keys to that power.

The prime minister's failure to press Quebec's anglophones, who admire him and respect his views, into becoming bilingual has cost the country much. It is probably unfair to attribute that failure to political exigencies alone, especially as no other political party in Ottawa has yet taken the same anglophones to task for not embracing bilingualism *en masse*. But because the Liberals have enjoyed anglophone support and have been in the best position to influence them, one can conclude that, in failing to deal with Quebec's cultural problem at its core, the Liberal government has been directly responsible for a separatist government, which by espousing unilingualism may increase the use of French among anglophones and, paradoxically enough, make bilingualism work in Quebec.

The Liberals, however, have not only mishandled bilingualism, they have also mismanaged multiculturalism. They adopted a policy of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" in response to the fourth volume of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and for this they deserve much credit. With practically the entire Establishment, intellectual and otherwise, espousing either biculturalism or worse, the decision, though a compromise, took a lot of courage. Unfortunately, however, once announced, the government gave the policy scant attention. Evidence of this can be seen in its failure to explain the nature of the compromise at the heart of the policy: namely, if all Canadians accepted English and French as the languages of communication ("Their use by *all* of the citizens of Canada will continue to be promoted and encouraged," read the document tabled in the House⁵), all other languages would be important for cultural purposes. The compromise appeared clear enough on the surface, but what languages would Canadians from coast to coast be encouraged to learn? Some have embraced multilingualism as a natural corollary;⁶ others have rejected the policy for the same implied multilingualism.⁷ Today confusion reigns as some in the government would use multiculturalism to help hold the nation together and others see it as one of the country's most divisive factors.⁸

This is not, of course, the place for a detailed discussion of how well the multicultural policy has been implemented. It is enough to note that its profile in cabinet has not been high. Unlike bilingualism, which is a well-known special concern of the prime minister himself, multiculturalism has had to make its own way even though, as part of a single policy, it is supposedly the other side of the bilingual coin. It is no secret

that multiculturalism has not been palatable to the Province of Quebec, the power base of the present government, and this goes a long way to explain its low profile. It does not help when the policy is administered by a minister whose relationship to the secretary of state is imprecise⁹ or when the portfolio is occupied by individuals with little stature in the Commons or, where the stature exists, the minister is much too busy to give the various programs the attention they deserve. It is truly a pleasure to acknowledge that no man tried harder to make the policy work than the Hon. John Munro, Minister of Labor, when he had the time; but that unfortunately was not very often.

As for the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, of which the writer has been an executive member for four years, it does not help that members, in the main, are political appointees. Moreover, the fact that Canadians of the first or immigrant generation predominate not only reinforces the image which some have that multiculturalism is largely an immigrant adjustment policy, but ensures that the criticism, if any, will be mild and the demands modest. Most first-generation Canadians are not, after all, long on their knowledge of Canadian history and even the most perceptive are frequently handicapped by language. In their insecurity, critical comment is all too often blurred by repeated professions of loyalty.

At this time, one cannot say that the Council has really made that much difference. The recommendations of its first report, submitted to the government in May 1974 and subsequently embellished in a glossy publication complete with readable preambles,¹⁰ received no response until January 1977.¹¹ Toward the crucial, comprehensive language recommendations the cabinet, as might have been expected from its large French contingent basically committed to a dualistic Canada, took what can be described as 'the church-basement' approach and came up with a "Cultural Enrichment Program" worth \$1.2 million¹² to bolster the teaching of languages in the private vernacular schools with periodic classes, even though experience has shown that such schools are only suitable for children who already speak a second language and that effective language learning for unilingual children requires daily immersion classes. Education is a provincial responsibility, the Council members were informed; the federal government did not wish to tread where it lacked jurisdiction. That this did not prevent the Department of the Secretary of State from spending \$160 million in 1976-77 alone for French and English language education in the same provincial schools was conveniently ignored.¹³

Further evidence that the present federal government does not take multiculturalism seriously was provided in December 1976 when two

so-called ethnic senators, Messrs. P. Rizzuto and J. Ewasew, of Italian and Ukrainian descent respectively, were appointed, neither of whom was known to the community he was ostensibly to represent. The gaffe was covered up somewhat by the appointment in April of Mr. Peter Bosa, a well-known Italian Canadian from Toronto who is also chairman of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism. The prime minister is either surrounded by poorly informed advisors moved solely by political concerns or is himself convinced that effective, visible spokesmen for multiculturalism should be as few as possible. To be assured repeatedly that his commitment to multiculturalism is as firm as ever is no longer sufficient to counter the growing evidence that the real implications of Trudeau Liberalism for multiculturalism are to coopt the so-called 'ethnics' with find-sounding slogans while rendering the implementation of multiculturalism as innocuous as possible.

Perhaps the ultimate expression of the low esteem in which the present government holds multiculturalism was demonstrated very recently—on July 21, 1977—in an amazing vote in the Commons during debate on the new Immigration Act.¹⁴ In December the executive of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, in Mr. Munro's presence, recommended unanimously that the Immigration Bill, referred to it by the minister, be amended by adding "multicultural" to the description of Canada as a federal and bilingual country. Mr. Munro was pleased with the suggested change, but not so apparently the cabinet, for it was not included in the Immigration Bill. When Mr. Andrew Brewin, the NDP member, proposed its inclusion, his amendment was defeated by the very government which had officially declared Canada to be a multicultural country. Moreover (and quite unbelievably) the new minister responsible for multiculturalism, the Hon. Joseph Guay, voted against the multicultural amendment! He did not absent himself as did Mr. Munro, who understood well why the change was needed. Opposition to multiculturalism in the civil service has also not diminished, and the low morale within the Multiculturalism Directorate does not augur well for the future. As with bilingualism, multiculturalism appears to have run its course with the Trudeau government. Both are poorly understood, and multiculturalism and bilingualism today are complementary parts of a single policy only in the mismanagement which both must endure.

It is time, then, to deal seriously with the political crisis emanating from unresolved language and culture issues. Separatism is a suicidal cop-out which can bring no one any good; cooperative federalism has shown itself to be a Liberal stratagem for holding on to office. The country is hardly more bilingual now than it was 10 years ago¹⁵ and its

multicultural reality, though recognized, is only slightly more respected than it was 10 years ago. There has been far too much talk about bilingualism and far too little about multiculturalism. The result is a red-neck backlash against the first and indifference toward the second. Another political approach is needed if Canada is to survive, and that approach is regional federalism. The fact may not impress many politicians, but when the approach was outlined to the conference organized by the Thunder Bay Multicultural Association last April,¹⁶ it was so well received that the two separatist spokesmen from Quebec, a professor from Laval University and a member of the provincial National Assembly, finding little with which to disagree, set aside their prepared texts and ad libbed their abbreviated remarks. It was nice to have Canada's fundamental heterogeneity emphasized; it was also nice to be told that in their very differences lay the key to the survival of Canada's peoples as a nation, once the magnitude of those differences was fully appreciated.

Do you know, for example, that the 5,764,075 so-called 'others' outnumber¹⁷ the entire population of seven provinces, the Atlantic and Prairie provinces combined (5,599,625), and that the 1,317,200 German Canadians are more numerous than the total population of provinces such as Saskatchewan (926,245), Manitoba (988,250), and Nova Scotia (788,960)? There are more Ukrainians in Canada (580,660) than individuals of all origins in Newfoundland (522,100), and even the Hungarians (131,890) are more numerous and the Yugoslavs (104,950) almost as numerous as the 111,640 Prince Edward Islanders. *Is it necessary for all these people to establish their own ethnocultural enclaves before their cultural and linguistic aspirations are truly respected and encouraged?* Almost a million (932,845) have origins—Native Indian, Eskimo, Chinese, Japanese, East and West Indian, Negro, Syrian-Lebanese, and Jewish—which have on occasion proven troublesome. The past decade has raised the expectations of ethnocultural groups; in their frustration they could prove troublesome again.

The percentage of 'other' peoples has steadily increased from 12.25 in 1901 to 26.73 in 1971 and the growth will undoubtedly continue. The percentage is highest in western Canada with 51.50 in Saskatchewan, 49.97 in Manitoba, 47.40 in Alberta, and 37.70 in British Columbia, but even Ontario can point to a respectable 31.16 per cent.¹⁸ From the western Canadian standpoint at least, such facts simply cannot be overlooked in any meaningful discussion of Canada's options in a time of political crisis. Nor can equally meaningful discussions of language and culture policies exclude any of Canada's many peoples. *The basic premise of regional federalism where language and culture are con-*

cerned is that neither bilingualism nor multiculturalism will amount to much until both are seen as umbrellas embracing the whole country with the application of each varying specifically from region to region according to how the people themselves perceive their needs.

In this context, bilingualism, outside the Province of Quebec, refers to all languages other than English. On the prairies, for example, French is a second language, but so is Polish, German, Ukrainian, or Cree, as are numerous other bilingual combinations. To those who automatically associate bilingualism with English and French, this can be a very controversial definition. But the question which Canadians who favor a bilingual Canada must finally answer is whether they really want a bilingual Canada. If they do, then, to the writer, bilingualism from coast to coast narrowly defined as English and French is unrealistic and, if insisted upon further, will spell the death of bilingualism itself.

The writer welcomes the concept of a bilingual Canada; it follows naturally from the fact that Canada is a land of many immigrants and their descendents. How pleasant it would be if it were generally understood that a Canadian today is someone who (unlike the essentially unilingual American) is likely to be able to speak more than one language: perhaps English and French, but not necessarily English and French. What a boost that would give to Canada's distinctive identity as a nation! How pleasant it would also be if Canadians finally realized that in a land of minorities all minorities stand or fall together. Nor does the very important Official Languages Act change the situation, for the Act does not make the French minority an official minority, nor does it make French an official language of communication without restriction:

The English and French languages are the official languages of Canada for all purposes of the Parliament and Government of Canada, and possess and enjoy equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all the institutions of the Parliament and Government of Canada.¹⁹

Thus the Official Languages Act recognizes French as a language of communication within the federal government and the agencies of the federal administration. The Act gives French Canadians the opportunity to communicate with the federal government in French from coast to coast. Of necessity, outside Quebec and Acadia in New Brunswick, all other communication will have to be in English most of the time. This is not a reason for rejoicing, but facts cannot be ignored. If the French had settled the prairies and British Columbia in greater

numbers in the nineteenth century, the situation today would be very different, and there would be no room to speak of other bilingual combinations. But whose fault is it that French Canadians preferred New England to western Canada? Demographic realities simply cannot be ignored or dismissed. We have done that for far too long in the Province of Quebec by making English—the language of the minority—a major unwritten condition for socio-economic advancement and we all know the bitterness this has caused. We do not need more bitterness in Canada. Yet that is just what we will get if we grant that individuals can be bilingual in different ways but regard French-speaking Canadians who speak English and English-speaking Canadians who speak French as 'official' bilingual persons.

To those fond of simple solutions, this approach to language is most disconcerting. Regional federalism recognizes French to be the language of communication in Quebec and in Acadia in New Brunswick, with English the language of communication in the rest of Canada. To insist on more is to move toward entrenching one particular bilingual combination in regions where the nascent linguistic ability of countless individuals demands a broader approach for the good of the individual and in the best interests of bilingualism itself. One could, of course, advocate trilingualism to make multiculturalism work. But trilingualism *in all parts* is realistically not a viable alternative in a large country such as Canada, where individuals historically have had a hard time to master and retain two languages, let alone three.

What are some of the implications of regional federalism for the Province of Quebec? The first, and most important, is the recognition of the primacy of French and the absolute necessity that all who live or settle in Quebec speak French well. This will mean that those who have spoken only English in Quebec, in some cases for generations, must now become bilingual. This will encourage French-speaking Canadians in Quebec to embrace bilingualism also, for it has been clear for a long time that Quebecers like the PQ are not really opposed to bilingualism (the leaders are all bilingual). What they dislike is *one-way bilingualism* in Quebec, where they alone have to speak two languages to accommodate the unilingual English-speaking residents of Westmount and similar areas. What they want is reciprocal bilingualism where such residents can be spoken to in French to guarantee its viability. As long as the future status of French in Quebec is not absolutely secure, the *bilingual* preachers of independence cannot openly favor bilingualism, for in Quebec French confined to the French is a French without a future on the English-speaking continent. In the matter of bilingualism, then, there can be no choice where Quebec is concerned—

it must be French-English bilingualism for *everyone* with the English-speakers and the immigrants and their children speaking to the French in French, just as on the Prairies the French-speakers and the immigrants and their children now speak to 'the English' in English.

The implication for immigrants and their children in Quebec is, then clear—they must know French because they live in Quebec. They must also know English because they live in North America and, if possible, their mother tongue because they live in a multicultural country.²⁰ They must, in short, strive for trilingualism. It follows that in centres like St. Léonard the fuss over language during the past decade has been stupid and would not, in fact, have happened if the Anglo-Celtic minority had shown the necessary leadership and provided the appropriate bilingual model. *Until the basis for bilingualism is properly laid in Quebec, one can expect little but rancor on the language question in that province with sad reverberations for the rest of Canada. And the proper basis is not to deny English to anyone but to insist that all learn French and English to the point of fluency.* Parenthetically, also, any Quebec government which makes it more difficult for French and other children to learn English dooms its people largely to a provincial existence, incapable even of serving Canada in its bilingual capital or through its bilingual federal agencies, or indeed of joining the present Quebec elite who are unabashedly bilingual. The emergence of a small bilingual privileged class is the real danger behind the current unilingual French thrust of the PQ government, should it be driven to extremes by a privileged and stubborn unilingual English-speaking minority with much economic power. To deny thousands of young PQ supporters the upward social mobility which English bestows on the North American continent would be the supreme tragedy of the PQ's language orientation, but here again it is not the PQ nor the rest of Canada which holds the keys, but the 10.62 per cent of Quebec's population which is of Anglo-Celtic background.

Needless to say, the above is not an open invitation to institutionalize French in regional jurisdictions outside Quebec. Just as the French in Quebec and Acadia cannot afford to place English before French, so in regions like the Prairie provinces or Ontario, the ethnocultural groups descended from non-Anglo-Celtic and non-French ancestors cannot afford to place French ahead of their ancestral tongue as a second language. This is particularly true of the native peoples, the Ukrainians, and the Baltic peoples who share predicaments comparable to the French in Canada—the native peoples because they are the indigenous peoples and have no ancestral cultures overseas; and the Ukrainians and Baltic peoples because their cultures and languages

overseas are subjected to direct and indirect processes of Russification behind the high walls of the Soviet border. Nor should the French assume that groups traditionally indifferent toward their ancestral languages and cultures past the second generation are their natural allies. Such groups usually exemplify a pronounced sentiment in favor of Canadianism 'pure and simple,' accompanied by an equally pronounced impatience with all who are characterized derisively as hyphenated Canadians, and it should not be hard to see how this approach could be turned against the French Canadians themselves.

A good example of regional federalism in action where language and culture are concerned is the English-Ukrainian bilingual immersion program in several Edmonton schools. The program builds on the federal principle of bilingualism made explicit through the Official Languages Act, while ensuring the linguistic and cultural aspirations of a group of people who outnumber the French in the prairie region. In Vancouver, with its large oriental and German-speaking minorities, the linguistic combinations would differ from those in Thunder Bay, where the Finnish Canadians are very numerous, or from those in Toronto, where Italian, Portuguese, Greek, and Baltic Canadians are also numerous enough to aspire to the bilingual classes which they could never hope to establish in some other regions of the country. Moreover, just as Edmonton through the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies is gradually becoming the resource centre for Ukrainian language education in Canada with a co-ordinative role which minimizes duplication, so Vancouver, Thunder Bay, and Toronto could perform a similar function for other groups.

Nor would this endanger national unity. On the contrary, I should think that freedom from "linguicide" (the death of a language which if allowed to go far enough leads to the disintegration of a culture and to the eventual disappearance of a people) would be one of the strongest links binding Canadians together. Linguistic freedom for the individual in today's world is, after all, rare and a country which offers such freedom is a good country, worth holding together with all the might we possess. Moreover, it is my sincere belief that a Canada which offers such linguistic freedom will have the enduring love of all its citizens (including the French in Quebec), and that it need never fear for its unity because the people's feeling of security will be the cement which will keep it together simply because it is a good place in which to live.

All of which brings us back finally to where we began. The worst thing the French Canadians, whether in Quebec or elsewhere, could attempt to do is to 'go it alone,' either as separatists in Quebec or as simple dualists in the rest of Canada. Just as Quebec's Anglos must learn

French and then share their economic power if they want separation to die, and Quebec's immigrants and their children must become trilingual if they wish to retain and develop their ancestral ways while remaining economically functional, so the French in Quebec must not manoeuvre themselves into an isolated position, into a kind of bastion or fortress in which they try to withstand the Anglo-American pressures of the continent alone. The siege mentality which is already detectable will only grow worse, with the resulting ethnocentricism breeding policies which smack of authoritarianism in government and even totalitarianism as a way of life. The PQ's recent contention that the government must control television programming for French to survive is a case in point.

Nor would it be wise for the French and Acadians outside Quebec to seek privileged status as founding peoples or official minorities. The terminology is offensive to people descended from pioneers with the status of founders in previously unsettled regions so prevalent in a country as large as Canada. The terminology, moreover, needlessly alienates the very people who, in their longstanding demonstrated concern over language and culture issues, are potentially the francophones' greatest allies. The French and the minorities who really care about making majority-minority relations more just in Canada should embrace regional federalism wholeheartedly as the only viable alternative to separatism, which the Québécois themselves can ill afford and the rest of the country does not want. *Regional federalism, with its liberalized approach to bilingualism, is the natural correlate of multiculturalism, and the three taken together are, to the writer, the only viable alternative to separatism.* They alone foster that genuine respect for linguistic and cultural differences which is needed to ensure respect for the primacy of French in Quebec on the part of English-speaking Canadians in *all* regions of Canada.

In conclusion, then, the integrity of French culture must be secured in Quebec. Only then will Quebec's French Canadians come to appreciate that other bilingual combinations so prevalent west of the Ottawa valley only strengthen the principle of bilingualism and make it easier for French-speaking minorities outside Quebec to survive. And survive they must, for to confine the French fact to Quebec would be to deprive it of the support inherent outside Quebec in French, Ukrainian, Italian, German, and other bilingual Canadians whose different languages and customs reinforce one another and legitimize the very difference which is Quebec itself, just as Quebec's difference encourages others to be different. This respect for differences only regional federalism can provide, for only it advocates multiculturalism within a broadened

bilingual framework. Governments, the mass media, and the schools must, then, give all three the attention they deserve. This attention, where multiculturalism is concerned, must encompass more than the study of pioneers, for a living multiculturalism involves more than heritage or history. It takes in language and attitudes as well, and there is not much room for optimism where Canadians, especially those outside Quebec, are concerned. Their opposition to second-language learning is as deep as their dislike of ethnicity and everything associated with it. Governments, the mass media, and the schools—the three basic educational agencies—have failed to reflect Canada's multicultural reality in the past. Whether Canada's educational institutions—in the broadest sense of that term—can 're-tool' rapidly enough to explain the significance of regional federalism, a living multiculturalism, and a liberalized bilingualism in the current debate over national unity is, in the writer's view, the most important issue before the Canadian people today. To date, unfortunately, there is little evidence that they have even grasped the challenge, and with time of the essence tomorrow just might well be too late.

NOTES

1. The policy is outlined in *House of Commons Debates*, 1971, cols. 8545-46, 8580-85.
2. Calculations based on *1971 Census of Canada: Population Language by Ethnic Groups*, Bulletin 1.4-8.
3. Calculations based on *1971 Census of Canada: Population Ethnic Groups*, Bulletin 1.3-2, p. 2-1.
4. Despite the federal government's repeated denials that English-French bilingualism from coast to coast is its goal, a better indication of its intentions may be gleaned from its extensive programs to teach French and English, particularly to the young. For recent denials and programs to promote the learning of English and French by all Canadians, see *A National Understanding; The Official Languages of Canada* (Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada, 1977), 46, 51, 61-63, 68.
5. *House of Commons Debates*, 1971, col. 8581.
6. Among the foremost in this category are the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League and its organ *Ukrainskyi holos* (Ukrainian Voice).
7. See the remarks of Monique Bégin, M.P. and the paper by G. Rocher, "Multiculturalism: The Doubts of a Francophone" in *Multiculturalism As State Policy; Second Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism* (Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada, 1976), 4-5, 47-53.
8. The sources cannot be revealed, but they are reliable.
9. In the Order-in-Council, the Hon. J. P. Guay is designated as "a Minister of State, to assist the Secretary of State of Canada in the carrying out of

- the latter's responsibilities in respect of the policies and programmes related to Multiculturalism." *Canada Gazette*, III, Part II, May 11, 1977.
10. *First Annual Report of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism* (Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada, 1976).
 11. "Notes for an Address by the Honourable John Munro, Minister Responsible for Multiculturalism, in Response to Recommendations Submitted by the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism," Edmonton, Alberta, Jan. 29, 1977.
 12. "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Joseph P. Guay, P.C., M.P., Minister of State for Multiculturalism, to the National Meeting of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism," Vancouver, British Columbia, June 18, 1977. The sum, not disclosed, was recently revealed in Edmonton: *Edmonton Journal*, Aug. 26, 1977.
 13. The source cannot be disclosed, but it is reliable.
 14. *House of Commons Debates*, 1977, col. 7901.
 15. In 1961, 12.2 per cent of the Canadian population spoke both English and French; by 1971 the percentage had risen slightly to 13.4. *1971 Census of Canada: Population Official Language and Language Most Often Spoken at Home*, Bulletin 1.3-5.
 16. M. R. Lupul, "The Role of Government in Multiculturalism," unpublished paper.
 17. All population statistics are based on *1971 Census of Canada: Population Ethnic Groups*, Bulletin 1.3-2.
 18. Derived from the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book IV, *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups* (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1970), 247-66, and the federal government's "Green Paper," *Immigration and Population Statistics* (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1974), 11-12.
 19. *Statutes of Canada*, 17-18 Eliz. II, s.2 (1968-69) (second session).
 20. The writer first presented this view to the Quebec regional members of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism in Montreal on July 18, 1973, in an unpublished paper entitled "Multiculturalism: Myth or Reality?" It was surprisingly well received.

Panel Discussion: The Search for Consensus

Dr. Lupul:

In opening the last session of the conference, I would remind you of my opening remarks. It may be a bit much to aspire to a consensus, but I think it is legitimate to attempt to arrive at one. I would therefore like to begin by inviting Mr. Petryshyn, who presented a very good analysis yesterday of the social situation of Ukrainians in Canada, but indicated he would reserve comment as to its impact on multiculturalism to a later time. He did state that multiculturalism to date had been used largely by the upper middle class for their own personal gain, and perhaps he will now tell us what he meant.

Mr. Petryshyn:

I have a few written comments that I would like to present wherein I discuss two aspects of the problem of multiculturalism; first, the principles of multiculturalism, and secondly, short- and long-term strategies. What I would like to do is to offer another definition of multiculturalism, one on which I will base my comments. First, multiculturalism, to me, is a movement against stereotyping and ethnocentrism, particularly in public life, with priority attention given to publicly funded agencies. By stereotyping, I mean oversimplified and distorted definitions of the world in order to differentiate groups in such a way as to reduce contact among them and thereby defend privileged positions in the ethnic stratification system. By ethnocentrism, I mean the erection of subjective group boundaries and the creation of an ideology which encourages a group to consider its culture as superior to that of other groups, who are then treated with suspicion and hos-

tility. This is the opposite of what may be called positive ethnicity or an appreciation of the real socio-economic differences within and among groups, which are treated objectively, without recourse to ideology. Multiculturalism recognized the ethnocultural reality of individuals and groups in today's Canada. It made cultural pluralism legitimate; no public, social, or political sanction or penalty could be attached to the act of being oneself, for not compromising one's ethnic identity. Where the public sector supported Canadian culture, it would do so equally for all.

I think I should make a few comments about the nature of ethnicity itself. Within ethnicity, as within all social facts, are elements of dynamic change. Ethnicity is not a permanent feature of human behavior; very often in ideology, especially nationalist ideology, there is a conception that one's origin is unchangeable. In the case of Ukraine, for example, the Rus' was Ukrainian, the Ukrainian of feudal times was Ukrainian, and that Ukrainian is the same Ukrainian we have today. It is an unchangeable phenomenon. In my view, this is simply not true, and we could discuss cases in history of change of language, of change of ethnicity, of change of economic structure during the various periods to show that the concept "Ukrainian" is really a very modern concept, one that perhaps emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and is a contemporary, certainly not an historical, social phenomenon. Just as biological groups in reaction to various kinds of stress—physical, economic, political, social, or psychological—in-breed and out-breed, creating statistically identifiable sub-populations which occasionally give rise to totally new groups (for example, the ethnogenesis of the Canadian Métis, a community unknown to history until there was a mating of Indians and the Scots, English, and French), similarly, there is also a disappearance of biological groups. Cultural identities, too, are historical products, are identifiable by the greater frequency and reproduction which occurs under the influence of internal and external conditions, conditions which are mediated by people, by men and women. As with biological changes, cultural identities, too, are in a state of continual flux. I stress this point because one speaker yesterday made two comments bearing on principles which in my mind are quite erroneous. First, the suggestion that ethnic groups are voluntary, the equivalent of a Rotary Club, demonstrates a fundamental misconception about ethnicity. Ethnicity is a sub-population of people grouped around actual or assumed social-cultural criteria such as nationality, religion, and, most important, a sense of common ancestry or peoplehood. This latter notion, common ancestry, is complex, and has at least three features: it has a biological descent feature—you cannot choose your

parents; secondly, there is a sense of ancestral heritage in various cultural and social institutions—you cannot control the language you are born into, you cannot control the language you are first socialized into; and thirdly, ancestral heritage means attachment to an ancestral homeland or possession of a national consciousness. Now, every ethnic group has a variety or combination of these features; some groups stress religion and have a religious ethnicity, other groups stress nationality and have a national ethnicity. This varies with changing conditions. Ethnicity is the social reproduction of a collective identity from generation to generation. It is not like joining the Rotary Club. This is not to say that people individually cannot leave or join an ethnic group. People do leave, but the social and historical fact is not the product of an individual's will or individual decision.

A second principle I would like to offer is what I consider an error in analysis; namely, that there is somehow a natural order to societies and also that societies are necessarily stratified. Such a position of natural order leads one to the mistaken belief that there is no difference between a society like India, which is stratified on the basis of caste, and Britain, which is stratified on the basis of class. There is a fundamental difference between a society with religiously controlled social strata and one with economically controlled social strata. There are fundamental differences between feudal societies governed by kings and modern societies governed by corporate elites. The notion of some kind of natural order means that one fails to understand that man himself creates history while interacting with the potential of socio-economic, technological, and other social structures. To accept a contrary position is to throw up one's hands and to leave the creation of history to fate or to spirits.

Having presented a definition of multiculturalism and a brief comment on the world view which, I believe, accompanies it, I want to say something about the long-term strategies which, I believe, this panel should accept. First, like the rest of society, the Ukrainian community is divided into classes, resulting in at least two kinds of groups: the upwardly mobile (those aspiring to elite positions) and the working people. Ukrainian-Canadian lifestyles are considerably different within each group, and their interpretation of heritage as a meaningful phenomenon is very different. Culture is understood differently by people who can afford to understand culture in a different way. We must understand that the majority of Ukrainian Canadians are working people for whom culture must satisfy their recreational, social, and pleasure needs. It is popular culture, and if that means festivals such as those at Dauphin or Vegreville, then they must be fully supported by the entire Ukrainian-

Canadian community. Popularized, understood, developed, they must not be snickered at, they must not be demeaned. Class divisions within the Ukrainian community must be resisted because we find ourselves in a broad social context which establishes much more effective political and cultural norms by Anglo Canadians who control our society and therefore the structure of our society.

In terms of long-range strategies, my second point is that we must understand that there is a difference between the public and private sectors. I noted yesterday that, in my view, a number of political defeats suffered by Ukrainians during World War I forced us out of the public into the private sector. We lost the school question, and were discriminated against in the extreme, one consequence of which was withdrawal into the privately funded community; Ukrainian life went underground. For 60 years we have been denied our share of the public sector in education, in cultural development, and on various boards which control social decisions. My view is that it is the public sector we are fighting for as a step toward making Canadian society a more just society.

This is not to say that I imagine in Canada a situation such as that in Singapore, for example, which actually duplicates four identical educational systems. I am not arguing for full internationalization of the public structure; as a minority, we cannot take that position. We are after all an ethnic group, though being in diaspora does distinguish some of us. But we are not a national entity in Canada. Within the Ukrainian community because of class divisions, there are two irreconcilable polarities of opinion, the traditionalists and the modernizers. Traditionalists are conservatives who have an essentially pessimistic world view, who seek to remain private, who cooperate with the system of ethnic stratification, and who wish to preserve (rather than to develop) their ethnic identity through private institutions which they fund themselves. Modernizers, on the other hand, wish equal access for their ethnicity in public institutions. They are optimists with respect to changing ethnic stratification and therefore challenge it; they seek to develop their ethnic identity, institutions, and culture rather than to preserve it. This polarity of views exists also in society generally and is represented there, as in the Ukrainian community, by leaderships. In general, those leaders most closely identified at any given time with the dominant view of society as a whole will be dominant inside the private ethnic community. I do not think the rise of a critical new leadership in the Ukrainian community is an accident at a time when ethnocultural issues are being debated in society as a whole.

Two or three more points about long-term objectives. First, I agree completely with Professor Tarnopolsky that Ukrainians must defend

the principle of self-determination, particularly in Anglo Canada, where Ukrainians should try to mediate among Anglo Canadians who have perhaps a tendency to violate democratic norms and to prevent democratic rights from being exercised in Quebec. It is an old saying that democratic rights are indivisible; if they are taken away from Canadians in Quebec they will be taken away from us too. When they are taken away from native Indians, they are also taken away from us. And that applies equally to the working-class population. Finally, I think it is very important, in the long run, that we have a position on chauvinism inside the Ukrainian community. Just as I am opposed to chauvinism in Canadian society, I am equally concerned that we not allow people with chauvinistic views to dominate the formation of political opinion inside the Ukrainian community.

With respect to short-term programs we can, of course, get into a pretty wide-ranging debate on priorities. My own preference is to stress the importance of media. I think we should do all we can to penetrate the CBC so as to have our views expressed there. I agree with Senator Yuzyk's contention that multiculturalism will only happen in Canada if ethnic power is built up. One can talk hypothetically, theoretically, but we must build up ethnic power in a real way, through alliances with people with whom we have common interests—the Italian community in Toronto, for example, with respect to television. Contacts between us and the French and Jewish communities, the Indians and the blacks, must be built because it is in our own direct and immediate interest. I have argued on other occasions that it is important for us to have input into immigration policy. I think it is scandalous that approximately 50 Soviet immigrants a year who enter Canada illegally are deported without the Ukrainian community being consulted. I also think governments should create a whole series of institutions—non-profit corporations, for example—which would stimulate culture in a professional way. I see no reason why we have no Ukrainian professional theatre in Canada; no professional people in the media; why we cannot have a Ukrainian-Canadian professional dance company; and so on. Within these short-term programs there is the overriding factor of our own capacity. Our demands must be made in conjunction with our ability to take advantage of the programs we request.

Professor Tarnopolsky:

I totally agree with Mr. Petryshyn's analysis and I think I should add two other aspects which in my opinion are found in Canadian society because they are closely intertwined with liberal ideology, which preceded capitalism. First of all, the idea that ethnicity will wither away

with economic development is an assumption of Canadian society, an assumption which is very hard to fight. Another assumption is that ethnic groups and the individuals they influence are malleable creatures, *tabula rasa* who can be easily moved from one society to another. These are assumptions which are usually ignored yet they are part of Canadian society and are incompatible with multiculturalism. Multiculturalism also, in my opinion, is rather confused about the extent to which it is a collectivist or individualist notion.

One thing that I think is often forgotten by Canadians outside of Quebec is that Mr. Trudeau's approach emphasizes individual language rights, while all three parties in Quebec—the Liberals, Union Nationale, and PQ—emphasize collective rights. Quebec's Liberal Party disagrees with bilingualism and multiculturalism. All three political parties in Quebec have for years been opposed to multiculturalism; it is not only the PQ. You should read Bourassa's statement a few years back, which is much stronger than René Lévesque's rejection. That is something we tend to forget.

I suppose the final point is that we in English-speaking Canada also tend to forget that separatism has become an internal Quebec issue. It is no longer a Canadian issue. Quebec intellectuals do not perceive it as a Canadian issue; it is their issue. And this is very hard to accept. Consequently it undermines the whole idea of multiculturalism. There are very, very few anti-separatists in Quebec society. They may rally around the editor of *Le Devoir*, Claude Ryan, but I think we have to realize that for Quebec intellectuals of all three parties separatism is an internal Quebec issue, a non-Canadian issue. At this point, I really disagree with Dr. Lupul's analysis.

Dr. Serbyn:

I would like to address myself to three points: multiculturalism, the French pre-eminence in Quebec, and separatism. I think that one of the points on which there can be a consensus among Ukrainians and other ethnic groups is that we should strive to have multiculturalism or cultural pluralism accepted for Canada and Quebec irrespective of what happens to Canadian unity in the future. In other words, it is a value for us whether Canada stays united, remains a federation, enters into associated status with Quebec, or Quebec separates. What happens should not in any way undermine the principle that the collective rights of smaller ethnic groups in this country should be safeguarded in the future. I should also like to see Ukrainians and members of other ethnic groups who discuss the question of Canada's future use the above as their frame of reference, as their starting point, and not enter into the

discussion from the point of view of the English-speaker, as inevitably happens in Quebec. I think we should also insist in Quebec and in the rest of Canada on safeguarding the achievements of our democratic system. In other words, I think it is partly because we have democracy in Canada that the debate so far has been constructive, and to me it is very important that this state of democracy continue. It comes before everything else, as does the point that the rights of minorities must be safeguarded in Quebec and in Canada.

Finally, on the issue of separatism I fully agree that we should support unequivocally the principle of self-determination for Quebec. It is the people of Quebec who will have to decide what they want for themselves in the future—whether to stay within confederation, and in what form, or to opt out of confederation. I do not think that this necessarily implies that Ukrainians and other ethnic groups should support Quebec as it is or favor Quebec's separating. This raises a related point. I do not wish to be accused of taking a Leninist position. I think that Lenin's theory on self-determination is completely different and that the application of his theory is also different. Even if Lenin's theory did favor self-determination in the terms presented by Dziuba and some other people and Lenin simply betrayed his own theory or his successors betrayed it, the betrayal would not undermine his theory. The theory would remain valid and could still be used. In other words, the fact that Lenin used it does not mean it is bad, but I would contend that Lenin's theory is not what it is reputed to be today. Precisely what Lenin opposed was any intermediary position between complete independence and an almost complete unitary state. Before the revolution, Lenin rejected federalism, any idea for an associated state, precisely because he wanted a unitary state. He made it categorical that the other option was complete separation and built in a series of theoretical principles and took several political measures to prevent the nationalities from opting out. So I would content that absolutely nothing in Lenin's theory can help us in dealing with the problem in Canada. As far as I am personally concerned, the best solution for the ethnic groups in Canada would be some kind of intermediary solution, an associated state for Quebec where Quebecers feel they are "*maître chez nous*," that there are sufficient advantages and benefits from a union with the rest of Canada for them to remain. Now, the terms of that union will have to be spelled out and revised from time to time, but I think it is possible to achieve this. I disagree that associated state status is the first step to the inevitable separation of Quebec. It could be if, again, Quebecers find that they still are not "*maître chez nous*" with the new system or if the disadvantages are still not too great. However, I think there

are enough advantages for Quebec to be associated with Canada in a close union to come to this type of intermediary solution. Finally, I think that ethnic groups, and Ukrainians in particular, have been sitting on the fence for far too long at this critical point in our history. We have not been willing to get involved in politics honestly. In other words, I do not think we should be ashamed to point out that there is a big conflict among us, that perhaps our views or principles do not always coincide with either our personal interests or our interests as an ethnic group or community. I think if we presented this honestly to the Canadian people, and to the people of Quebec, we would find understanding among them. I think we should make an effort to become involved. We will not be blamed so much for disagreements that we have among ourselves or with others, but we will lose out if we just sit on the fence.

Professor Tarnopolsky:

One should, I suppose, make some response and I think on the whole we all agree with the fact that it is important for us to support the principle of self-determination and hopefully a continuing dialogue and appropriate adjustment to make it obvious that people can choose. But this time I want to return to a point stressed by Mr. Petryshyn, even though I do not think there is time to discuss it much today. It may very well be a subject to be discussed more thoroughly in the future. I do not agree with Mr. Petryshyn's class approach to society which I think permeates his whole analysis. I do not deny that classes exist, but I think frankly that this approach to social analysis can be emphasized too much. I happen to have a sister who is married to a farmer and a brother who is a miner and I am an academic. Our views are very different, our lifestyles are very different, and I have totally different interests from the point of view of entertainment or reading than they do. But from the point of view of, let us say, who has what influence in society, I do not know whether theirs might not be greater than mine, at least partly. From the point of view of what they want for their children they might be very different from me. But I think the class approach is too simplistic, even though unfortunately I do not think we have the time to go into the matter today. It is certainly something worth pursuing. Are there really differences in the interests of people who are rural, people who are manual workers, people who are white collar workers, and does the difference come out in such things as their interest in culture? I am not convinced of that. I merely want to raise the point, in case you think that silence means consent. At some future occasion, I would like to debate the issue; it is one we should look at in the future because I really wonder what effect, if any, class differences

have on policy formation in the Ukrainian-Canadian community. I think our group is too young to have a rigidly stratified class system.

Further on the question of separatism, I think that clearly separatism is felt by Quebecers to be an internal matter, and I agree with them to the extent that all kinds of proposals are made for a referendum right across Canada. On the other hand, it should also be realized that not just any kind of proposal can be adopted on the inside. The PQ, I think, has made the assumption that their aim to sever the association is an internal matter, which has to be accepted by the other side. Well, I do not think it has to be accepted; it can be rejected and so the fundamental basis upon which they are building is wrong. The decision may well be made in Quebec, but it is one which obviously will be greatly affected by what goes on in the rest of the country, by the response in the rest of the country to whatever moves Quebec might make. I think we are clearly in an age where the present constitution will not be acceptable to Quebec. I happen to be a supporter of constitutional change because I think associate status, constitutionally, will be extremely difficult on federal members in the legislature in fields which have the most sensitive status. Suppose, for example, that Quebec had total jurisdiction over communications and other provinces chose otherwise. Quebec's special status would make it very difficult for Quebec's members of Parliament to participate on the basis of equality. On the other hand, it seems quite obvious (certainly as far as most people in Quebec are concerned) that there is going to have to be some devolution, a term popular in the United Kingdom. It will, I think, have to be offered to all the provinces and the big question of what they choose and the question of what is involved is one that will have to be faced.

Dr. Lupul:

Many points have been raised which could be pursued if time permitted. However it is already 5:30 p.m. and it is time to try to summarize by indicating some points upon which fairly definite agreement seems to exist.

First, we as a group—we who are commonly understood to be in the forefront of the multicultural movement—have to give much thought to the meaning which multiculturalism has for us as individuals. I do not think we have really given very much thought to that matter, particularly to the relationship of the language question to multiculturalism. How serious are we really about the close relationship between language and culture, which we so often articulate and make out to be so important? The French in Canada certainly have no doubts on the

subject and so I think it really is time we came to grips with it too, even if it means meeting again in smaller seminar sessions or having organizations hold even more conferences on the subject. As tired as some of you may be of discussions about multiculturalism, I think you have to realize that you are really under the gun, that your bluff is really being called on the relationship between language and culture. I do not think we can simply afford to banter such statements about because they can too easily be interpreted as being merely anti-French talk if we are not prepared to work for language programs which result in fluency, not just status.

Another point that comes through clearly at this conference is that self-determination for Quebec is a very important matter, even if in the long run we do not know exactly what that means nor what form it will take. I personally am not prepared to pursue the subject further at this time because so many variables are involved, but self-determination as a goal for Quebec is a point which is generally accepted.

I think another point related to the first which has emerged may be put as a question: Are we really in the national unity debate for real or are we merely observers, like spectators at a bullfight? I think you know who, in this case, is the bull and who the bullfighter. I am very disturbed by comments which are often made (not fortunately here), but the consensus may be emerging among some of you: "Really I wish they would stop the debate, I wish the talking would stop. You know, I am so tired of the whole thing." If this is how you really feel, the people to whom we have listened have indicated the dangers of that attitude for us—that is, if you really care.

Finally, I think that in this conference may be found the possible seeds for the next conference on the whole question of the Ukrainian-Canadian community's social structure.

I think a consensus has emerged that socio-economic opportunities in our society are closely related to the whole question of multiculturalism. I think I detect a general consensus that socio-economic opportunities in Canada need to be liberalized considerably, if multiculturalism is, in fact, to be given the kind of respect and favor that people ascribe to it.

Finally, would it be too much to say that in many respects multiculturalism lives or dies through events such as this conference? Whether people attend, the age of those who attend, how involved they are in the deliberations is a test of the Institute's relevance and of multiculturalism's viability, of which the Institute itself is a concrete manifestation.

**Other publications in the
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
“Alberta Library in Ukrainian-Canadian Studies”**

Frances Swyripa, *Ukrainian Canadians: A Survey of Their Portrayal in English-Language Works* (Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 1978).

The survey highlights the changing place of Ukrainians in Canadian society. The author examines works from the early articles and reports by members of the host society who were concerned that the Ukrainian immigrants and their children be assimilated as quickly as possible into the mainstream of British-Canadian life. Also examined are theses by students of Ukrainian-Canadian background who reflect the maturity of a community, whose members have become a highly visible and articulate minority in recent years.

The author discusses a variety of works chronologically: government reports, theses, novels, magazine articles, and works by educationalists and churchmen, to show changes in areas of concentration and dominant themes and variations in emphases and interpretations. Since the war, research into Ukrainian-Canadian development has been conducted from historical, sociological, demographic, and philological perspectives and these are all examined. The book concludes with a bibliography of consulted sources, supplemented by biographical sketches of those authors on whom information is available, and a note on existing Ukrainian-Canadian bibliographies.

Demographic Map of Ukrainians and French in Canada, 1971.

Cartography

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