

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE SOVIET ANNEXATION OF WEST UKRAINE AND THE COLLECTIVIZATION
OF AGRICULTURE 1939-1941

by



David Roger Marples

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1980

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read,
and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Soviet
Annexation of West Ukraine and the Collectivisation of
Agriculture, 1939-1941" submitted by David R. Marples
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.

To my grandfather,

Roger Marples

ABSTRACT

Soviet social history lends itself to comparisons. The main characteristics of collectivization of agriculture in the Russian Republic were mirrored for example in East Ukraine. West Ukraine, however, was exceptional, since historically the bulk of its territories had remained outside the Russian sphere. This thesis examines the process of collectivization in the West Ukrainian areas annexed by the Soviet Union in September 1939 until the outbreak of the German-Soviet war on June 22, 1941.

I have attempted to elucidate the changes in rural life following the Soviet takeover, by looking at the social and ethnographic structure of the population in the pre-Soviet era, when these areas were under Polish and Roumanian rule. In addition, Chapter Two has been devoted to political movements in interwar Poland in order to investigate Soviet claims that there was a strong movement amongst the local Ukrainian population aimed at reunion with East Ukraine.

The complex social upheaval in the West Ukrainian village in 1940 has necessitated a detailed perusal of agriculture in the thirties in Volhynia, Galicia and Bukovyna. Land usage, distribution, agricultural production and the socio-economic position of the Ukrainian peasantry have been taken into consideration. This section concludes with an assessment of Ukrainian farming on the eve of the Soviet takeover.

The annexation and initial measures of the new rulers in West Ukraine are dealt with at some length. The thesis concerns the temporary organs of power, economic measures, and the "rural revolution" in the former Polish areas and the takeover of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna

following the ultimatum to the Roumanian government in June 1940. Chapter Six deals with the agricultural development of West Ukraine before collectivization was begun, paying particular attention to the first oblast party conferences of Spring 1940.

The main part of the work is contained in Chapter Seven, which concerns the collectivization of agriculture. This encompasses the formation of Machine-Tractor Stations and state farms, the first stages of collective farming, production results and collectivization from January to June 1941.

The successes and defects of socialized agriculture in West Ukraine are outlined. The Conclusion analyzes the reasoning behind the changes implemented in the villages and their close association with the precarious international climate which existed after the Soviet-German dismemberment of Poland.

Preface

The main aim of this dissertation is to investigate the changes in rural life in the western areas of Ukraine, incorporated into the Soviet Union after September 1939 and held until the German invasion of June 22, 1941. My emphasis is primarily on the collectivization of peasant farms. This encompasses the nature and extent of collective farm construction, social changes in the villages, results of collective farming and the overall situation on collective farms in June 1941. In order to assess the relative merits and defects of the *kolhosp*, this work examines at some length agriculture under Polish and Romanian rule in the Ukrainian areas.

Also, I have considered closely the official Soviet versions of this period of history. The Soviets claim, for example, that these territories were annexed on historical and ethnic grounds. Moreover, it is maintained that although the proximity of the German army necessitated rapid Soviet action in Eastern Poland in September 1939, the policy was, in reality, designed to satisfy the "age-old" desire of the Ukrainian people to be united in a single state and under one government, which in Soviet works was a Soviet government.

This viewpoint necessitates two preliminary inquiries. First, to what extent were the populations of the annexed regions Ukrainian in ethnic makeup? Secondly, was there a movement aimed at reuniting West Ukraine with Soviet Ukraine? Regarding the second question, it is essential to take into account the Soviet portrayal of the severe exploitation of the Ukrainian peasant by the Polish and Romanian "occupation regimes".

Consequently, this study concerns the population and ethnography of the West Ukrainian regions, the political movements of the thirties, the attitude of the Ukrainian peasants toward the Romanian and Polish governments and the socio-economic position of the peasant in the social structure of the community. The pre-Soviet period considers the size and distribution of landholdings, crop production and harvest yields and draught-animals.

The Soviet period investigates the mechanics of takeover in the Polish and Romanian regions, the initial land measures and the land reform. An analysis has been made of the initial progress in agriculture and the reaction of the Ukrainian farmers to Soviet rule in 1939-1940.

The major part of my work is devoted to the period of collectivization from January 1940 until June 1941. It has been possible to give detailed figures concerning the growth of collective farms by oblast. The final chapter also looks at the establishment of Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) and their provision with machinery. It examines the comparative harvests on collective and individual farms, labor-day incomes, animal production and the progress of collectivization prior to the outbreak of war.

There have been few reliable works on this period published in the Soviet Union. The difficulties experienced by the Soviets in West Ukraine have apparently precluded a dispassionate approach. However, the post-Stalin interpretations differ markedly from those of the Stalin period. These later works, written in the Khrushchev period denounce the defects engendered by the so-called "cult of personality" evoked by Stalin. Thus the Communist Party of West Ukraine, (Komunistychna Partiya Zakhidnoi Ukrainy, KPZU), dissolved on the orders of Stalin in 1938 has been rehabilitated with the help of these later writers.

Despite changing interpretations however, the value of Soviet works is by no means negative. The most useful for the purposes of this study has been V.L. Varetsky's *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR* (Kiev 1960)*. This contains several useful tables, culled from Soviet archives, many of which have been used in this study. Varetsky perceives that the dissolution of the KPZU was groundless, but on the other hand lauds party work in West Ukraine and the progress made in industry, education and agriculture.

The most eminent scholar of collectivization in West Ukraine is M.K. Ivasiuta, author of many works on the subject. In particular his doctoral thesis has become the standard work on the topic, entitled *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev 1962). (A Brief History of Collective Farm Construction in the western provinces of Ukraine). Once again the views expressed in this work are somewhat more reasoned than those of the Stalinist era, although they fail to give an objective portrayal of the resistance movement. Ivasiuta has also written an important regional study entitled *Narysy istorii kolektyvizatsii na Ternopil'shchyni* (Kiev 1958) (Brief History of Collectivization in Ternopil region).

My own study has been enhanced by two further Soviet publications. The twenty seven volume *Istoriia mist i cil Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev 1967-1973), (History of Towns and Villages of the Ukrainian SSR), of which nine volumes relate to the western regions, has enabled a detailed look at the

* (The Socialist Transformation in the western provinces of Ukraine).

various oblasts. Also, this entire study has been made possible by the publication of a collection of documents specifically on this topic, *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii sil's'koho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev 1976), (From the History of the Collectivization of Agriculture in the western provinces of Ukraine). Many of the documents in this collection has been taken from the oblast state archives and from regional newspapers, not available to western researchers. The collection is the most valuable source on this topic.

There have been no works published in English which have been concerned directly with collectivization in West Ukraine and few that have focussed on the period of Soviet rule prior to the German-Soviet war. The most useful reference work has been *Ukraine. A Concise Encyclopedia* (two volumes, University of Toronto Press 1963 and 1971), which contains several relevant articles. John A. Armstrong's *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite. A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York 1959) is based on unpublished Soviet dissertations, made available to scholars in the fifties, but closed thereafter. Thus Armstrong is able to supply interesting information on the party apparatus in West Ukraine and the former East Ukrainian career backgrounds of some of the personnel.

Most of the research for this thesis was carried out at the British Library in London and the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.. Several months were spent utilizing the source materials contained in the British Newspaper Library in London, the Centre of Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham and the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of Glasgow. It has been possible to conduct interviews within the Ukrainian communities on both sides of

the Atlantic and the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain was particularly helpful. The Polish sources were obtained at the Polish Library in London.

Acknowledgements

My interest in the history of Ukraine has developed gradually over a number of years and is unlikely to be satiated with this dissertation. The latter owes much to a number of scholars on both sides of the Atlantic, who have offered their ideas, advice and encouragement. In particular, I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Everett Jacobs of the University of Sheffield, England and Professor John A. Armstrong of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, U.S.A..

In commencing the research, I owed much to the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, especially to messieurs I. Fedak and I. Kuzma of the South Yorkshire branch. I have been grateful to Professor I.S. Koropecyk of Temple University, Philadelphia, U.S.A., for his unfailing kindness and support. My greatest debt however is to my supervisor, Professor Ivan L. Rudnytsky, who combines his knowledge and erudition with a rare degree of approachability and friendliness. Finally I would like to thank my parents, who have accepted my unusual interests and "exile" with such good grace.

Glossary of Terms

oblast	-	province
raion	-	county
povid	-	district
uezd	-	district
pomischyk	-	landowner
osadnyk	-	military settler
kulak	-	rich peasant
seredniak	-	middle peasant
bidniak	-	poor peasant
batrak	-	farmhand/hired labourer
kolhosp/artel	-	collective farm
radhosp	-	state farm
MTS	-	Machine-Tractor Station
filvark	-	Polish manor
UKSSR	-	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Kp(b)U	-	Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks)
TsK	-	Central Committee
komasatsii	-	consolidation of dispersed plots of land
RSUK	-	Ukrainian Cooperative Audit Union

Table of Contents

Chapter		Page
Abstract		
Preface		
Acknowledgements		
Glossary of Terms		
List of Tables		
Chapter One	Population and Ethnography	1
Chapter Two	The Political Question in Interwar Poland	9
	i) Legal Ukrainian Parties	9
	ii) The Communist Party of Western Ukraine	10
	iii) The Strike Protests	13
	iv) Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	18
	v) Official Governmental Measures 1932-1939	22
Chapter Three	Agriculture in Galicia and Volhynia in the	
	Interwar Period	29
	i) Characteristics of Agriculture Under	
	Polish Rule	29
	ii) Land Usage	35
	iii) Draught-Animals and Agricultural	
	Implements	37
	iv) The Polish Government and West Ukrainian	
	Agriculture, 1920-1939	40
	v) Agricultural Production under Polish Rule	42
	vi) Socio-Economic Position of the Ukrainian	
	Peasant Farmer on the Eve of the	
	Soviet Takeover	45

Chapter		Page
Chapter Four	The Annexation of Galicia and Volhynia	53
	i) Political Background and First Measures	53
	ii) The Temporary Organs of Power	54
	iii) The Elections of October 22, 1939	56
	iv) Economic Measures	60
	v) The Rural Revolution	62
Chapter Five	The Incorporation of Northern Bukovyna and the Khotyn, Akkerman and Izmail uezds of Bessarabia into the Ukrainian RSR	71
	i) Background and Takeover	71
	ii) Characteristics of Agriculture in the Pre-Soviet Period	73
	iii) Soviet Land Measures in Bukovyna, August-November 1940	76
Chapter Six	West Ukrainian Agriculture Before Collectivization	83
	i) Former Polish Areas	83
	ii) The Agricultural Development of Chernivtsi Oblast Prior to Collectiv- ization	88
Chapter Seven	The Collectivization of Agriculture	96
	i) The Beginnings	96
	ii) Formation of MTS and State Farms	99
	iii) First Step in Collectivization	104
	iv) West Ukrainian Overview in 1940	114
	v) The Start of Collectivization in Chernivtsi Oblast	114

Chapter	Page
vi) Production Results, 1940	119
vii) Collectivization from January to June, 1941	126
Conclusion	146
Bibliography	150

List of Tables

Table	Page
1 Population of Polish Ukraine by Mother-tongue 1930-1931	4
2 Nationalities in Polish Ukrainian Areas in 1931	5
3 Nationalities in Chernivtsi in 1930	6
4 Strikes in Poland, 1930-1937	15
5 Population According to Occupation in 1931	31
6 Land Tenure in Polish Ukraine in 1931	33
7 Holdings and Per-Centages of "Kulak" Farms in 1931	34
8 Land Tenure in Ternopil Voivodship (1931)	36
9 Sown Area of West Ukraine in 1936	38
10 Crop Yields 1931-1935. A Comparison of Ukrainian Regions of Poland and Roumania and Canada	44
11 Membership of Ukrainian Cooperative Societies, 1925-1935	48
12 The "Plebiscite Elections" in West Ukraine, October 22, 1939	59
13 Confiscation of Land in the Ex-Polish Ukraine, September-December 1939	64
14 Landholding in Chernivtsi and Khotyn on the Eve of the Soviet Takeover	75
15 The Plan of Preparation of Mass Cadres of Ternopil Oblast Land Section in 1940	85
16 Landholding of Peasant Farms of Lviv Oblast in April 1940	87
17 Livestock in Chernivtsi Oblast in January 1941	91
18 Fulfillment of Kolhosp Work in Burshtyn MTS, Stanislav Oblast, in 1940	101

Table	Page
19 Collectivization in Lviv Oblast in 1940	109
20 The Socialized Sector of West Ukrainian Agriculture at the End of 1940	115
21 Plan to Eliminate the Shortage of Cattle in the Raions of Chernivtsi Oblast, May 1941	118
22 Livestock on the Collective Farms of West Ukraine in 1940	124
23 Collectivization in Ternopil Raions in May 1941	129
24 The Collectivization of Peasant Farms in the Western, Chernivtsi and Izmail Oblasts of Ukraine on June 1, 1941	130

Chapter One - Population and Ethnography

After Poland's refusal to countenance an independent or autonomous Ukrainian state in Eastern Galicia after the First World War, the former voivodships of the Austrian Empire, Lviv (Lwów), Stanislav (Stanisławów) and Ternopil (Tarnopol) were incorporated into Poland. In addition, Volhynia, formerly part of the Russian Empire, became Volyn (Wołyń) voivodship. According to Molotov, the entire area annexed from Poland in 1939 constituted 88,000 square kilometres.¹ In the interwar period however, the area was considerably larger, since the Soviets did not take over all the western districts. Thus a later estimate of 110,900 square kilometres is closer to the truth.²

In 1921, the Lviv voivodship encompassed an area of 27,024 square kilometres with a population of around 2,718,014.³ However, the seven westernmost counties of the voivodship were not included in the Soviet Union and large areas in the counties of Lesko, Turka, Iaroslav, Rava-Ruska, Lubachiv, Sanok and Briaza remained outside Soviet jurisdiction. Consequently the area which was later divided into the Lviv oblast made up around 21,500 square kilometres.⁴

Stanislav voivodship in 1931 had an area of 16,894 square kilometres and an estimated population of 1,480,300 according to the Polish census. Ternopil had an area in 1931 of 16,240 square kilometres and a population of 1,428,520. Finally, the Volyn voivodship in 1931 totalled 35,754 square kilometres with a population of 2,085,600.⁵

The West Ukrainian areas possess certain distinct geographical characteristics. For example, approximately twenty five per cent of the entire area is covered by forest. In the west, the Carpathian Mountains occupy about forty per cent of the territory of Drohobych and fifty per

cent of that of Stanislav.⁶ Moreover, with the exception of the northern regions of Volyn, even in the interwar period, these were areas of very high population density, averaging eighty five people per square kilometre overall and exceeding one hundred in the forest steppe and Prykarpattia regions.⁷

The ethnic makeup of the Ukrainian population of interwar Poland is a subject of some controversy. Polish, Ukrainian and Soviet sources all give very different figures, with the former declaring high percentages of Poles and the two latter citing large Ukrainian majorities within these areas. Stepan Horak has pointed out that whereas the demographers of the Shevchenko Scientific Society have estimated that there were 5,698,000 Ukrainians living in the Polish territories in 1931, Polish statistics put the figure considerably lower at 4,441,600.⁸

It is not my intention to make a judgement concerning the relative merits of the two estimates. Both sets of figures agree on the basic points. For example, both Polish and Ukrainian statistics indicate that the Ukrainians constituted a majority of the total population in the Volyn, Stanislav, Lviv and Ternopil voivodships in 1931-1933. The Polish figure is 50.9 per cent⁹ and the Ukrainian 62.4 per cent,¹⁰ with the percentages for the Polish population 39.2 and 25.6 per cent respectively. Tables One and Two look at the ethnic content of the population by voivodship according to Polish and Ukrainian statistics.

Both sets of figures indicate large Ukrainian majorities in Volyn and Stanislav voivodships and substantial numbers of Poles in Lviv and Ternopil. The Polish government's policy of settling Polish colonists in these latter areas (see Chapter Three) may account for the high numbers

of Poles. However, the tables, although useful, conceal a vital point, namely that the ethnographic divide lay less between voivodships than between urban and rural areas. All figures show that whereas the Ukrainians predominated in the countryside, Poles and Jews made up the majority in all the major towns. As mentioned above, the Polish Ukrainian areas contained a particularly dense rural population, which made up 81.4 per cent of the total population of these regions, ranging from 87.8 per cent in Volyn to a low of twenty five per cent in the L'viv voivodship.¹¹

The areas incorporated from Romania in 1940 were the northern part of Bukovyna and the Khotyn, Akkerman and Ismail *uezds* of Besserabia. Ukrainians constituted a sizeable portion, although not the majority of the population of these areas. The area which was later to become the Chernivtsi oblast (northern Bukovyna plus the Khotyn *uezd* had a total area of 8,400 square kilometres and a relatively large population prior to the Soviet invasion of 875,000.¹² The city of Chernivtsi itself had an estimated population of 110,000 in 1930.¹³ Figures taken from the Romanian census of 1930 indicate the position of Ukrainians within the ethnographic makeup of the future Chernivtsi Oblast (see Table Three).

The Romanian figures reveal that the Ukrainians were the largest minority group in the Khotyn and northern Bukovyna regions. It should be mentioned however that Ukrainian scholars disagree strongly with these figures. Estimates drawn up by the well-known demographer Volodymyr Kubijovyc suggest that the Ukrainians made up 63.1 per cent of the total population in the Ukrainian areas in Romania.¹⁴ His figures though include parts of the autonomous Moldavian Republic in which Ukrainians were the majority race in early 1940.

Table One: Population of Polish Ukraine by Mother-tongue 1930-1931
in Thousands

<u>Voivodship</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Ukrs</u>	<u>Poles</u>	<u>Jews</u>
Volyn	2,085,6	1,429,3	346,6	205,5
		68.5%	16.6%	9.9%
Lviv	3,127,4	1,067,4	1,805,0	232,9
		34.1%	57.7%	7.5%
Stanislav	1,480,3	1,018,9	332,9	109,4
		68.9%	22.4%	7.4%
Ternopil	1,600,4	782,2	789,1	78,0
		45.5%	49.3%	4.9%

Source: Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland (Warsaw: Chief Bureau
of Statistics, 1938), pp. 22-23.

Table Two: Nationalities in Polish Ukrainian Areas in 1931 (thousands)

<u>Voivodship</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Ukrs</u>	<u>Poles</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Others</u>
Volyn	2,086	1,449	325	208	104
		69.4%	15.6%	10.0%	5.0%
L'viv	2,284	1,280	712	279	13
		56.0%	31.2%	12.2%	0.6%
Stanislav	1,480	1,083	240	140	17
		73.2%	16.2%	9.4%	1.2%
Ternopil	1,600	876	587	134	3
		54.7%	36.6%	8.4%	0.2%

Source: IV Ukrains'kyi statystychnyi richnyk 1936-1937

(Warsaw and L'viv, 1937), p. 15.

Table Three: Nationalities in Chernivtsi in 1930

	<u>Northern Bukovyna</u>	<u>Khotyn uezd</u>
Total	476,178	392,430
Ukrainians	213,762	163,267
	44.9%	41.6%
Romanians	136,184	137,348
	28.6%	35.0%
Jews	66,569	35,985
	14.0%	9.2%
Russians & Germans	33,453	53,776
	7.0%	13.7%

Source: Breviarul statistic al Romaniei, Vol. II

(Bucharest, 1939), p. 53.

Bessarabia also included the Izmail region, located in the South on the Danube delta and separated geographically from the rest of West Ukraine, with a total of 12,400 square kilometres and a population of 680,000 at the time of its incorporation into the Soviet Union.¹⁵

A recent study of Bessarabia by A. Grekul indicates that in the Izmail, Khotyn and Akkerman uezds combined, the nationality groups in percentages of the total population were as follows:

Ukrainians 25.4, Moldavians, 28.3, Russians 18.7, Others 27.4.¹⁶

However, in 1940, eight raions of the Autonomous Moldavian Republic were returned to the Soviet Union and these contained a substantial Ukrainian majority of 65.1 per cent.¹⁷ A final point concerning the Ukrainian regions of Romania is that with the exception of Chernivtsi, the major town, they were predominantly rural. The demographic position of the Ukrainian population resembled that of their compatriots in Poland, i.e. it constituted the bulk of the rural population, but was under-represented in the urban areas, which had a majority of Romanians and Jews.

In terms of numbers therefore, there is no reason to question the Soviet assertion that the areas annexed in 1939 were predominantly Ukrainian in their ethnic composition. In Poland, the numbers were large enough to constitute a major problem to the state. Yet the political problems did not derive from numbers alone. Thus it is necessary at this juncture to examine the political question in Galicia and Volhynia in the interwar period, to ascertain whether the Ukrainian political movements against the Polish government were seeking a reunion with the Ukrainian SSR and with the Soviet Union or rather independence or autonomy within the Polish State.

Bibliography to Chapter One

1. *Pravda* (Moscow) November 1, 1939.
2. Akademiia nauk URSS, Instytut ekonomiky; *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii ukrains'koi radians'koi sotsialistychnoi respubliky TII* (Kiev, 1952), p. 427. (referred to hereafter as *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii*).
3. J. Wasowicz & A. Zierhoffer editors; *Polska w cyfrach* (L'viv, 1927), p. 12.
4. *Polska w cyfrach*, p. 16 & ff.
5. *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland* (Warsaw: Chief Bureau of Statistics 1938), p. 12. (referred to hereafter as *CSYBP*).
6. *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii*, p. 435.
7. *Ibid*, p. 437.
8. Stepan Horak; *Poland and her National Minorities, 1919-1939* (New York, 1961), p. 84.
9. Figure derived from *CSYBP*, pp. 22-23.
10. Naukove tovarystvo im. T. Shevchenka u L'vovi; *IV Ukrains'kyi statystychnyi richnyk 1936-1937* (Warsaw-L'viv, 1937), p. 13.
11. *CSYBP*, p. 12 (per-centages deduced from figures given).
12. *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii*, pp. 536 and 541.
13. *Ibid*, p. 548.
14. *IV Ukrains'kyi statystychnyi richnyk*, p. 13.
15. *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii*, p. 416.
16. A. Grekul; *Rastsvet Moldavskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Natsii* (Kishinev, 1974), p.
17. *Ibid*.

Chapter Two: The Political Question in Interwar Poland

i) Legal Ukrainian Parties

The political position of the Ukrainian population in Poland has been the subject of considerable discussion amongst scholars. There is little doubt that after the Council of Ambassadors had recognized Polish authority over West Ukraine in March 1923, the Polish government treated these regions as an integral part of the Polish state. Galicia became known as "Eastern Little Poland" reflecting the chauvinistic outlook of the Polish leaders. Volyn as a former territory of the Russian Empire fared much worse, lacking the network of popular organizations, press and political parties which Galicia possessed.

I have divided the Ukrainian political response to Polish rule into three categories, namely the legal parties, the illegal pro-Soviet parties and the illegal nationalist parties. The former, which can be dealt with briefly, consisted of four main groups, the largest and most important of which was the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (*UNDO*). *UNDO* encompassed a wide section of the Ukrainian populace and was based around the newspaper *Dilo* and an official party organ *Svoboda*.¹

Relations between *UNDO* and the Polish government in the interwar period alternated from attempts at cooperation, such as the "normalization" policy of 1935, to the declaration of May 7, 1938 of its central committee that normalization had not achieved the desired results and that the Ukrainians required territorial autonomy within Poland.² A manifesto issued at this time condemned the forcible conversion of Ukrainians from the Greek Catholic (Uniate) to the Roman Catholic faith and attacked the Polish policy of discrimination against Ukrainians with regard to the acquisition of land, educational opportunities and employment in the

government.³ The politics of *UNDO* were essentially moderate and represented a genuine attempt on behalf of the Ukrainians to identify with the few democratic tendencies of the new state.

A second moderate party was the *Ukrainian People's Renewal (UNO)*, led by Hryhorii Khomyshyn, Bishop of Stanislav. *UNO* also made a determined effort to cooperate with the Polish authorities. Two anti-Polish parties were the *Front of National Unity*, a splinter group of *UNDO*, influential in Volyn and the *Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (USRP)*, which was generally confined to the Stanislav area. Both the above groups were strongly anti-Soviet. The *USRP* consisted mainly of small farmers and agricultural workers. Both *UNDO* and *USRP* were old parties, dating back to the 1890s.

As will be shown in later chapters, the tactics of the Polish government prevented the legal parties from wielding much influence in the Sejm. Correspondingly, it should also be emphasized that the legal parties lost their hold over the Ukrainian population in the late-thirties and no attempt was made to reorganize them after September 1939. As Poland became more authoritarian in the thirties, the efforts to respond by the legal, democratic processes were rendered more and more futile. Moreover, Polish terror against the recalcitrant Ukrainian citizens in Eastern Galicia increased as political relations with the Soviet Union worsened. The question arises of how strong was the pro-Soviet movement in the interwar period.

ii) The Communist Party of Western Ukraine

When discussing the annexation of West Ukraine in 1939, Soviet historiography gives a persuasive portrayal of a strong strike movement, accompanied by riots and demonstrations and demonstrations against the Polish regime, led by the *Communist Part of West Ukraine (KPZU)*. It is

claimed that this communist influence over the populace was maintained until July 1938, when Stalin made the crass blunder of ordering the *Komintern* to dissolve the *KPZU* and its parent organization, the *Communist Party of Poland (KPP)*, on the grounds that it had become infiltrated by Trotskyists. How much truth is there in this viewpoint?

The Communist Party of West Ukraine was founded in February 1919, although until 1923 it was known as the *Communist Party of Eastern Galicia*.⁴ In April 1919, the Galician communist bureau was created, attached to the Central Committee of the *Communist Party of Ukraine (KP(b)U)*. The bureau evolved into the Committee of the *Communist Party of Galicia and Northern Bukovyna*.⁵ In 1921, the *Communist Party of Eastern Galicia* became an autonomous regional organ of the *KPP*, although it kept up its close ties with the *KP(b)U*.⁶

Although autonomous, the *KPZU* was subject to the decisions of the Congresses and Conferences of the *KPP*, and in the interim period, to the decisions of the *KPP* central Committee.⁷ In between Congresses, the *KPZU* was permitted to organize its own Politburo and Secretariat and its various sections; agitation and propaganda, professions, rural, women, military and others.⁸ An illegal, underground party, its central organ was the newspaper *Nasha Pravda*, and it possessed several auxiliary mouthpieces, such as the newspapers *Zemlia i volia*, *Profesyni visti*, *Nove zhyttia*, *Selrob*, *Svitlo* and *Syla* and the journals *Nova kultura*, *Kultura* and *Osvita*.⁹

Clearly the *KPZU* possessed an intricate organizational framework and there is little doubt that in the twenties, it attracted considerable support from the Ukrainian community, especially in the Volyn region, with

its historical ties with Russia. Soviet historians frequently allude to the high degree of revolutionary activity in "red Volyn" and in particular the mass following of the peasant "movement" in 1924-1925.¹⁰ The overt front organization of the *KPZU*, named the Peasant-Worker Union (*Sel'rob*), was created in 1926 and reportedly had organizations in seventy districts by 1930.¹¹

In the twenties the politics of the *KPZU* were closely connected with those of the *KP(b)U* and it displayed especially warm support for the Shumsky faction, which advocated an acceleration of the Ukrainization program, then being implemented in Soviet Ukraine.¹² By 1927, the *KP(b)U* leaders, Skrypnyk, Chubar and Kaganovich had resolved to openly denounce Shumsky's position because of its overt anti-Russian implications. Further, by this time, Shumsky's line was considered a contravention of official party policy.

However, the *KPZU* under its leader Turiansky, refused to renounce Shumsky, with the result that on February 28, 1927, the *Komintern* expelled the *KPZU* leaders from their membership. Although Shumsky recanted his position in April 1930, the pressure on the *KPZU* from the leaders in Kiev continued. In 1933, Kaganovich accused the *KPZU* leadership of Ukrainian nationalism and treachery and there were further purges of the membership.¹³ The culmination point was the dissolution of the *KPP* and the *KPZU* by the *Komintern* in July 1938.

This decision has been much criticized by post-Stalin Soviet historians.¹⁴ The latter claim that the revolutionary movement had effectively been beheaded at the worst possible moment, i.e. with the emergence of militarist Nazi Germany. This statement does not stand up to

close analysis. 1938 marked the end of a long campaign against the *KPZU*, directed against its alleged nationalist, separatist and "Trotskyist tendencies". An anonymous article published in the journal *Bolshevik* comments that in the conditions of the cult of personality and under a constant stigma, the *KPP* and *KPZU* "could not utilize in full their revolutionary traditions".¹⁵

After 1928, the *KPZU* declined as a force in West Ukrainian politics. This is exemplified by the following figures. In Volyn, where the *KPZU* had always been at its strongest, membership at the start of 1938 was 3,375, or 0.16 per cent of the total population.¹⁶ By mid-1938, the numbers had fallen to 2,361.¹⁷ The myth of strong *KPZU* activity in the thirties has been upheld, on the one hand by Soviet accounts seeking to justify annexation and on the other by fearful Polish contemporaries, who attributed every form of minority discontent to communist influence, inspired by the hostile power to the east.

iii) The Strike Protests

Despite the eclipse of the *KPP* and *KPZU*, the number of strikes in interwar Poland was surpassed only in the much more advanced capitalist countries, Britain and U.S.A.. Table Four illustrates the situation in the thirties. It is evident from the Table that the peak of the strikes occurred in 1936, after which the number of strikers fell by 110,000 over the following year. Before discussing the state of affairs in the Ukrainian regions, it should be stressed that as a Power dependent upon investment by the capitalist countries of the West, particularly France, Poland was very heavily hit by the World economic crisis of the early thirties. Thus the high numbers of strikes to some extent reflect a general economic hardship rather than dissatisfaction with the regime.

In general however, it is possible to distinguish between peasant protests, usually for higher wages and better work conditions and urban demonstrations, commonly focussed around the May-Day parade. The latter were often political in content, but do not represent the peasant response to the economic situation. Instead they should be seen in their historical setting, closely linked with the rise of Fascism in Europe and the repercussions of the Civil War in Spain. It is necessary to look first at these urban protests, in order to discern their aims and content.

1936 saw the creation of an anti-Fascist Popular Front, an attempt to emulate similar organizations arising in Western Europe, especially in France and Spain. In Lviv in May 1936 an Anti-Fascist Congress of Writers was held, in which members of the Ukrainian intellectual left such as Stepan Tudor and Iaroslav Halan were present, although in a decorative role.¹⁸ On May 27, the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs accused the Front of pro-Soviet sentiments for demanding the legalization of the *KPP*.¹⁹ The Front was in fact formed on the instructions of the VII Congress of the *Komintern*, which took place in July and August 1935, but there is little evidence even from the Soviet side, to suggest that it was a lasting success.

In Lviv on April 14, 1936, a march of unemployed workers ended in a bloody encounter with police. One of the marchers, Kozak, was shot by the nearby coffee-mill owner, who fired in response to a hail of stones in his direction.²⁰ The resultant funeral turned into a massive demonstration of 100,000 people and again ended in a skirmish with police after which 1,500 were arrested and seventy people reportedly interned at the Bereza Kartuska concentration camp in Polissia.²¹ Although this was an emotional

Table Four: Strikes in Poland, 1930-1937

<u>Year</u>	<u>Strikes</u>	<u>Enterprises Encompassed</u>	<u>No. of Strikers</u>	<u>Man-Days Lost</u>
1930	312	1,185	48,000	273,000
1931	357	1,154	107,000	601,000
1932	504	6,219	314,000	2,101,000
1933	631	7,282	343,000	3,829,000
1934	946	9,416	369,000	2,356,000
1935	1,165	11,631	450,000	2,008,000
1936	2,056	22,016	675,000	3,950,000
1937	2,078	25,242	565,000	3,315,000

Source: V.L. Varets'ky; *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR (v dovoiennyi period)* (Kiev, 1960), p. 64.

event, it was essentially economic in content, i.e. a protest against unemployment. It was neither pro-Soviet nor directed toward the overthrow of the government.

Soviet historians lay great emphasis on the May-Day parades, noting for example that in 1936, such marches could attract 50,000 people in Lviv, 15,000 in Boryslav, 10,000 in Stanislav, 7,000 in Stryi, 5,000 in Drohobych and 3,000 in Skhidnytsia.²² Yet not only is too much stress laid on what after all, was only an annual parade, but also most Soviet accounts leave the reader to assume that the marches were of a political, thereby a pro-Soviet nature. This was not the case.

Confidential reports of the Polish police reveal the diversity of political viewpoints amongst the marchers. For example, in Lviv a police report on the May-Day celebrations in 1938 outlines in some detail the various speeches given by members of the demonstration. Whilst one speaker vowed to struggle "under the red banner for final victory", the next promised a struggle "against the red mob", portraying the total diversity of opinions.²³ After the speeches, the pro-communist demonstrators were attacked by right-wing students of Lviv polytechnic, with a smoke-bomb and firecrackers.²⁴

One does not encounter similar confusion amongst the Ukrainian peasant actions, because they were almost always aimed at specific demands, namely increasing wages and raising the market prices of agricultural products. The latter subject will be dealt with in the next chapter, let it suffice to say that it created a severe problem for the peasant economy in the thirties. To look at some of the protests in detail, Spring 1935 saw a major strike of peasants in the village of Kozyrshchyna,

Dubno district in Volyn, with 5,000 participants.²⁵ In the following year in Volyn, 250 villages were encompassed by strikers with 300,000 peasants taking part.²⁶

At the time of the 1936 Spring-sowing work, there went on strike 12,000 agricultural workers and day-laborers on sixty estates of twenty five districts of Eastern Galicia. The strikes were for higher wages and the peasant requests were eventually satisfied.²⁷ A similar action, also successful, occurred on landowner estates in Rohatyn and Rudkiv districts of Stanislaw and Lviv voivodships respectively.²⁸ One report states that in the Rudkiv district, in the village Onstriv Tulyholovy, eight were killed and over thirty wounded in skirmishes with the police.²⁹

From August 31 to October 21, 1936, a peasant strike boycott took place in Volyn, embracing 250 villages of Kovel, Sarny, Volodymyr, Liuboml and Lutsk districts.³⁰ Over 10,000 people reportedly participated in the strike, which occurred when peasants refused to bring their agricultural products to market because of the discriminatory low prices.³¹ Simultaneously, in the Ternopil voivodship took place a strike of agricultural workers on the landowner estates of Borshchiv district, in the village Shmarikivchyky of Chortkiv district and the village Kotsiubyntsi of Kopychyntsi district.³² In Ternopil throughout 1936, police arrested sixteen arsonists of grain and forests on landowner estates, four arsonists of churches, seventy two arsonists of "kulak farms" and forty five arsonists of farms owner by Polish settlers.³³

In 1937, the strikes enveloped several areas of Ternopil, including Buchach, Pidhaitsi, Zboriv and Skalat, and once again were aimed at increasing the prices of agricultural products.³⁴ In Lviv, there were strikes in twelve districts and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the

voivodship reported thirty one peasants killed and sixty wounded in clashes with police.³⁵ Polish statistics recorded in the southern region, which included the Lviv, Krakiv, Stanislav and Ternopil voivodships, number the "anti-state actions", which were predominantly by peasants, as follows: 6,095 in 1935, 6,532 in 1936 and 7,058 in 1937.³⁶

Two points can be put forward to summarize the so-called "strike movement" of the thirties. First, it is undeniable that the actions outlined indicate a profound discontent with the status quo. Secondly however, the connections between peasant actions and those of the larger urban demonstrations were minimal. The events described were not organized or politically-motivated movements, but rather a spontaneous protest against a harsh and unsympathetic Polish overlordship. The protests were dispersed and leaderless, a response to the difficult economic situation.

Finally, it is worth re-emphasizing that after 1928, the *KPZU* had lost its influence over the Ukrainian masses. The thirties were the period of emergent nationalism throughout Europe with attacks on the democratic and parliamentary processes. West Ukraine was no exception to this general phenomenon. On the contrary, as a repressed minority within the Polish state, the Ukrainian community was particularly attracted to a nationalist ethic, which strived for independent ethnic states and looked to Nazi Germany as the force of the future. Ukrainian politics of the interwar era cannot be explained without examining the development of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*OUN*).

iv) Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

The *OUN* owed its origins to two distinct events. The first was an increase in organized Ukrainian military activity brought about by

the Second World War. The *Sichovi Striltsi* unit which had operated in East Ukraine during the First World War and later supported the *Central Rada*, sought an outlet for its activities after the fall of the short-lived Ukrainian government. The consequence was the formation in Galicia of an illegal military unit, the Ukrainian Military Organization (*Ukrains'ka viis'ka orhanizatsiia UVO*), led by the former commander of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, Colonel Evhen Konovalets. This took the form of an underground army and included members of diverse party allegiances. *UVO* aimed at an armed struggle for an independent Ukrainian state.

The second event was the growth of the ideas of integral nationalism in Galicia, in particular the viewpoints of Dmytro Dontsov. The latter was a prominent publicist, literary critic and political thinker who had emigrated from Ukraine in 1908. His program, as outlined at the Second All-Student Congress of 1913, in Lviv, foresaw a Ukrainian nationalistic struggle, and evoked the romantic concept of heroism and the more practical one of separation from Russia. In 1914, Dontsov led the *Union for the Liberation of Ukraine* for a brief period. During the war years, he operated from the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Berlin. Dontsov had a crucial influence over the development of the *Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth (SUNM)* in Galicia.³⁷

Two other groups were represented in the early nationalist movement, namely the *Group of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth*, operating in Prague and the *Legion of Ukrainian Nationalists* in Podiebrad. At a conference in Berlin, these groups united with *SUNM*, which in turn, at the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Vienna in late-January and early-

February 1929, merged with *UVO* to form the *OUN*. Konovalets became the leader and remained so until his assassination in Rotterdam in May 1938. Other prominent leaders included Stsiborsky, Andriievsky, Kostariv and Martynets.³⁸

The *OUN* was a political movement which elevated the nation to supreme importance. A cohesive blend of youth and experience under Konovalets, it operated on a leadership principle, strict discipline and employed terrorist actions against the Polish occupants of Ukraine from 1929 to 1939. It stood for private ownership of the land and free enterprise and private ownership of industry and trade. The rank-and-file members were young, predominantly students, sons of priests and village youth. The atmosphere within the organization has been described as one of "fanatic patriotism".

The *OUN* possessed several press organs, the vast majority of which were deemed illegal by the Polish government. The official mouthpiece of the leadership (*Provid*) was the monthly *Rozbudova Natsii*, published in Prague. In West Ukraine were circulated the *Biuletyn Kraiwoi Ekzekutyvy OUN* and the youth organ *Iunak*. Also in Galicia at various times came out papers such as *Nash klych* and *Nash front* (weeklies prohibited by the government in 1933-1934, *Ridnyi Grunt*, *Visti* and *Holos Natsii*.³⁹ In Lviv were also issued two journals for students, namely *Studentskyi shliakh* and *Studentskyi visnyk*.⁴⁰

In the decade prior to the Soviet takeover, the *OUN* carried out frequent attacks on the Polish occupants. After the burning of Polish *Filvarks* in the Summer of 1930 by *OUN* members, the Polish authorities dispatched military and police units into the villages to carry out the so-called "pacification". The pacification was reportedly at its most

severe in Zbarazh, Berezhany, Ternopil, Pidhaitsi, Zboriv, Berbka, Rohatyn, Stanislav, Lviv, Iavoriv, Sokal and Sambir.⁴¹ It resulted in the most brutal attacks on the Ukrainian populace, indiscriminately and without any attempt to discover the perpetrators of the arsons.

As the *OUN* encompassed the bulk of the politically-oriented Ukrainian youth, the number of terrorist actions increased. In September 1933 the so-called "school action" took place, directed against the polonization of Ukrainian schools. The following year, an *OUN* member Matseiko assassinated the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, B. Pieracki, who had been responsible for organizing the "pacification". Other victims of assassination included the *Sejm* deputy Holowko, and the director of a school department in Lviv, Sobinski.

The Polish reaction was to hold a series of trials against *OUN* members and in 1934 to 1936, the Polish police made a serious endeavor to destroy the *OUN* by eliminating its leaders. It is clear however that persecution only made martyrs of the *OUN* leaders and the old cadres were replaced by new ones. It did nonetheless lead directly to a rift in 1940 between the old military caste, who by this time were mainly operating outside Ukraine and the younger terrorist faction in Galicia.⁴² In West Ukraine, the youthful image was maintained by Bandera, Rebet, Kordiuk, Holovinsky and others.

The *OUN* featured prominently in the attempt to set up an independent Ukrainian state in Carpatho-Ukraine in March, 1939 and was directly responsible for the formation of the Carpathian *Sich*, organized to combat the invading Hungarians. It is estimated that over 4,000 Ukrainians lost their lives as a result of this unequal battle.⁴³ Moreover, amongst the dead were the prominent *OUN* leaders M. Kolodzinsky, Z. Kossak and

S. Hynylevych.⁴⁴ Contemporary newspapers record the trials of Galicians, punished for attempting to cross the border into Carpatho-Ukraine and the Polish authorities handed out sentences ranging from seven months to two years for offenders.⁴⁵

Despite the collapse of the Voloshyn government in Khust, the unsuccessful attempt to set up an independent Ukrainian state and the loss of several leaders, the incident only enhanced the prestige of the *OUN*. It had shown that the *OUN* was prepared to fight for its ideals. The organization maintained close ties with Germany, regardless of the fact that Hungary had occupied Carpatho-Ukraine with the express permission of Hitler. It had become evident that Germany was the only country which could act as a political catalyst to Ukrainian aspirations for independence.

In the late-thirties, Polish repression of overt Ukrainian nationalism was extended to cultural organizations, particularly in the Galician regions. In 1937 for example, the authorities closed one branch organization and thirty seven reading rooms of *Prosvita*.⁴⁶ In the following year, 104 reading rooms were closed.⁴⁷ In the Lviv voivodship, it was reported on April 23, 1939 that the village headman in Peremyshliany had stopped the activities of all Ukrainian establishments in Zadvir'ie, Ianchyn, Dusaniv, Kozelnyky, Hulkiv and Podusilna for their "anti-state activities" which constituted a "threat to public security".⁴⁸

v) Official Governmental Measures 1932-1939

In the 1930s, the Polish government took several constitutional steps which increased the bitterness between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia and severely curtailed the hitherto existing democratic rights of citizens of the Polish state. In 1932 for example, a new Penal Code was issued, which gave wide powers to administrative and legal organs

to punish anti-state agitators.⁴⁹ This was followed in March 1933 by a new local government law which reduced the power of the local village headman and turned the local self-government organs into advisory bodies.⁵⁰ This law signified that in future, local appointments could only be made from the county level and the county concillors had to be Polish speakers.⁵¹

By a decree of June 18, 1934, the concentration camp was organized at Bereza Kartuska and in the following year, over seventy five per cent of the political prisoners interned there were Ukrainians, predominantly from Volyn.⁵² Perhaps the most crucial measure however was the new Constitution, introduced on April 24, 1935, which gave more power to the President and the Council of Ministers at the expense of parliament and reduced the number of M.P.s. The President was permitted to appoint one third of his Senators, to dismiss the Cabinet at will and to choose two possible successors to succeed him.⁵³ Further the administration had complete control over the nomination of electoral candidates, making elections somewhat meaningless. The result of this Constitution, which was geared to the needs of Pilsudski, was a massive boycott of the 1935 elections to the Sejm. In West Ukraine, the total turnout was 45.9 per cent.⁵⁴ In Prykarpattia, 27.5 per cent went to the polls in Boryslav, 18 per cent in Drohobych and only 12.5 per cent in Stebnyk.⁵⁵

It is possible to make two points from this examination of political life in Poland in the interwar period. First, the Polish government and its Ukrainian minority were on a virtual war-footing throughout the period. As Poland became increasingly autocratic, persecution was stepped up. The period of "normalization" between the government and UNDO in 1935 failed to bring about a rapprochement. Instead the hostilities continued up to the German attack on Poland in September 1939. UNDO lost

support amongst the Ukrainian population with its attempt to compromise.

Secondly, the thirties saw the rise of the OUN as the leading Ukrainian party, with a mass following. After the demise of the KPZU, the OUN was the only party which possessed the organization and structure to go underground and survive Soviet rule. On the other hand, the KPZU was purged of its leaders at a time when it might have helped pave the way for the Red Army. In political terms, there is no doubting the deep dissatisfaction with Polish overlordship within the Ukrainian community. However, there is little evidence of any pro-soviet sentiment in the thirties. The Poles were the main foe, but the Ukrainians did not look to the East for their salvation.

Bibliography to Chapter Two

1. *Ukraine. A Concise Encyclopedia* (Vol. I, Toronto, 1963), p. 838.
2. Antony Polonsky; *Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939*, (Oxford, 1972), pp. 458-460.
3. R.L. Buell; *Poland: Key to Europe* (New York, 1939), p. 270.
4. "Za pravilnoe osveshchenie istorii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Zapadnoi Ukrainy", *Kommunist* No. 10, (1963), 37-48. (referred to hereafter as "Za pravilnoe").
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid*, p. 40.
7. I.M. Halushko: "(KPZU). Orhanizator i kerivnyk revoliutsyino-vyzvol'noi borot'by trudiashchykh Zakhidnoi Ukrainy", *Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal*, No. 2, 1969, 18.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, p. 86.
11. "Za pravilnoe", 42.
12. For a lucid discussion of this, see Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957* (New York, 1962), pp. 140-142.
13. "Za pravilnoe", p. 45.
14. See for example V.M. Terletsky; *Rady deputativ trudiashchykh Ukrains'koi RSR v period zavershenia budivnytstva sotsializmu (1938-1958 rr)* (Kiev, 1966), p. 83.
15. "Za pravilnoe", 46.
16. I.K. Vasiuta: *Selianskyi rukh na zakhidnyi ukraïny v 1919-1939 rr* (Lviv, 1971), p. 213.

17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.* p. 190.
19. *Ibid.* p. 191.
20. *Pid praporom zhovtnia. Vplyv velykoi zhovtnevoi sotsialistychnoi revoliutsiinoho rukhu v zakhidnyi Ukraini (1929-1939 rr). Dokumenty i materialy* (Lviv, 1966), No. 128, April 15, 1936.
21. V.I. Tverdokhlib, "Po stvorennia iedynoho antyfasystskoho frontu v zakhidnyi ukraini (1934-1939 rr), *Ukrainskyi istorichnyi zhurnal*, No. 1, (1967), 66.
22. I.K. Vasiuta, p. 190.
23. Akademiia nauk URSR. Instytut suspil'nykh nauk. L'vivs'kyi oblasnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv, *Z istorii revoliutsiinoho rukhu u L'vovi 1917-1939. Dokumenty i materialy* (Kiev, 1957), No. 403, May 1938.
24. *Ibid.*
25. S.H. Maksymov, "Komunisty Volyni-orhanizatory borot'by trudiashchych proty zahrozy viiny, na zakhyst SRSR (1929-veresen' 1939), *Ukrains'kyi istorichnyi zhurnal* No. 9, (1967), 66.
26. *Ibid.* p. 67.
27. Vasiuta, p. 192.
28. *Ibid.* p. 193.
29. M.K. Ivasiuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), p. 37.
30. Vasiuta, p. 195.
31. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 37.
32. *Ibid.* p. 38.
33. Vasiuta, p. 196.

34. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 38.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Vasiuta, p. 209.
37. See *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva* (Paris, 1955), t2, p. 575.
38. *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, t5, p. 1863.
39. *Ibid.* p. 1864 and Petro Mirchuk, *Narys istorii OUN* (Munich, 1968), t1, p. 477.
40. *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, t5, p. 1864.
41. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 34.
42. For a full account of the rift in the OUN, see:
John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (2nd ed. New York, 1963), pp. 53-63.
43. Vasyl Markus, "Carpatho-Ukraine Under Hungarian Occupation (1939-1944), *Ukrainian Quarterly*, No. 3, 1954, 252.
44. *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, t5, p. 1864.
45. *Meta* (newspaper, L'viv), May 21, 1939.
46. *Ibid.* June 18, 1939.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.* April 23, 1939.
49. See Vasiuta, p. 165.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopedia*, Volume 1, (University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 843.
52. Vasiuta, p. 166.
53. See Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 69.

54. V.I. Tverdokhlib, p. 65.

55. *Ibid.*

Chapter Three: Agriculture in Galicia and Volhynia in the Interwar Period

In discussing agriculture, some initial explanation of terms is necessary. In Soviet accounts, one comes across such terms as *pomishchyyk* (landowner), *kulak* (Ukrainian -*kurkul*) (rich peasant), *seredniak* (middle peasant) and *bidniak* (poor peasant). Scholars of Soviet agriculture have used a variety of ways to determine these categories and several have come to the conclusion that the definition often depended upon the political attitude or consciousness of the peasant and his willingness to join a collective farm.

Yet emotive responses are not always possible to deduce. Further, it is dubious methodology which uses the factor of employing hired labor or loaning out implements to define a *kulak*. My definition rests on the only certain criteria, namely the sizes of the farms and the land norms introduced by the Land Reform Act of West Ukraine on March 24, 1941. Consequently, farms of under five hectares correspond to the category of *bidniak*, those with five to ten hectares fall into the *seredniak* group, from ten to fifty hectares signifies a *kulak* farm and over fifty represents the landowner caste. Future use of these Soviet terms will be on this basis.

i) Characteristics of Agriculture Under Polish Rule

We have already stressed the high proportion of rural dwellers amongst the Ukraininan population of interwar Poland. In terms of occupation, the vast majority worked in agriculture. Table Five indicates that the number of agricultural workers in Volyn and Eastern Galicia was considerably higher than the Polish average. Correspondingly, industrial

development in these areas lagged behind that in the rest of Poland. The result was overpopulation of the rural regions. Although surplus agricultural populations were a common feature in interwar Central Europe, those in Galicia were exceptionally high. Thus whereas the surplus population in Polish agriculture in 1930 was 51.3 per cent, in the Lviv, Cracow, Stanislav and Ternopil regions, the figure was 62.1 per cent.¹ (Figures based on European average per capita level).

Agriculture between the wars was characterized by large estates and so-called *filwarks* and a vast quantity of very small farms. In addition the church owned considerable land. Before examining the individual voivodships, one can make several points about the general situation of land tenure in Polish Ukraine. In 1921, there were 4,218 landowner estates of over one hundred hectares in size, or 0.4 per cent of the total number of farms, owning 47 per cent of the total landed property.² Simultaneously, 438,255 peasant farms of under two hectares possessed only ten per cent of the total land.³

In the Prykarpattia region, there was an average of 0.9 hectares of land per peasant farm, and in West Ukraine (excluding Chernivtsi), approximately sixteen per cent of peasant *dvirs* were landless and sixty per cent of *bidniak* and *seredniak* farms had only one or two hectares of land.⁴ In Lviv alone, sixty five per cent of peasant farms could not subsist from their own land.⁵ The so-called "proletarian farms" of under two hectares and the "semi-proletarian farms" of two to five hectares, making up 81.1 per cent of the total farms, had twenty five per cent of the land area after Poland occupied West Ukraine.⁶

At the same time, the group of *seredniak* farms of five to ten hectares made up 13.9 per cent of the total number of farms and held 15.5

Table Five: Population According to Occupation in 1931

(in per-centages of the total population)

<u>Voivodship</u>	<u>Agriculture</u>	<u>Industry</u>	<u>Commerce</u>	<u>Communics</u>
Poland	60.6	19.4	6.1	3.6
Volyn	79.4	8.5	4.8	1.7
Lviv	68.6	11.9	6.2	3.0
Stanislav	74.7	11.1	4.4	2.5
Ternopil	79.6	8.1	4.5	1.4

Source: *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland* (Warsaw, Chief
Bureau of Statistics, 1938), pp. 32-34.

per cent of the total land at an average farm dimension of 6.9 hectares.⁷ Table Six gives an overall picture of land tenure on peasant and landlord farms and on state, church and monastery lands in 1931. The Table demonstrates the preponderance of large landowning.

Moreover, the *pomishchyky* also represented a form of ethnic exploitation in that most of them were Polish. In 1921 for example, 81.5 per cent of *pomishchyky* in West Ukraine were Polish, 7.07 per cent were Ukrainian, 5.0 per cent were Jewish and 3.8 per cent were Russian.⁸ Only in Volyn was there a sizeable stratum (17.6 per cent) of Ukrainian landowners.⁹ It should also be noted that all the Russian landowners resided in the Volyn regions, a reminder of Russian Imperial rule here.

The number of *kulak* farms in West Ukraine remained small despite the various attempts of the Polish government to create a more prosperous peasant strata. A Soviet historian has estimated that in 1921 and 1931, *kulaks* made up about four per cent of peasant farms and possessed over twenty per cent of the total land.¹⁰ However, this figure is exaggerated. Table Seven illustrates the number of *kulak* farms, utilizing the Polish 1931 census and calculating farms of ten to fifty hectares in size. The Table reveals a clear distinction between *Kulak* landholding in Volyn, which is fairly typical of interwar Poland and the other Ukrainian voivodships, where the farms were generally much smaller.

In Lviv voivodship, 300 *pomishchyky* and 7,000 *kulak* farms constituting about three per cent of the total number of households, had in their utilization thirty nine per cent of the land area.¹¹ At the same time, over 25,000 farms were landless and 33,000 had less than one hectare of land.¹² In the Drohobych region in the same voivodship, 187,357 peasant farms possessed 747,038 hectares of land, i.e. about 4.4 hectares per

Table Six: Land Tenure in Polish Ukraine in 1931

<u>Groups</u>	<u>No. of Farms</u>	<u>Area (thous ha.)</u>	<u>% of Total Area</u>
Peasant	1,175,449	4,401,7	49.0
Pomishchyky	2,194	2,064,6	23.4
State and Communal Lands	-----	2,223,1	24.2
Churches/Monasteries	-----	300,8	3.4
Total	-----	8,990,2	100.0

Source: V.L. Varets'ky, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR* (Kiev, 1960), p. 47.

Table Seven: Holdings and Per-Centages of "Kulak" Farms in 1931

<u>Voivodship</u>	<u>Agricultural Holdings</u> (thousands)	<u>Per-Centage of</u> <u>10-50 ha Holdings</u>
Poland	309,2	10.5
Volyn	23,0	8.2
L'viv	4,9	1.4
Stanislav	2,4	1.3
Ternopil	3,9	2.0

Source: *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland*, p. 63.

farm or 0.9 hectares per head of peasant population.¹³

In the area which would make up the future Rivne oblast, the situation was slightly different in that the average size of a peasant farm was 5.2 hectares. Yet the *pomishchyky* were again predominant, making up 0.2 per cent of the farms whilst having in their possession thirty five per cent of the land.¹⁴ Of 245,506 farms in Volyn in 1931 (territory of future oblast), 69.3 per cent had less than five hectares of land, whilst 1,160 *pomishchyk* and *kulak* farms owned 782,000 hectares of land.¹⁵ In Stanislav, out of 1,392,000 hectares of land, landlords, *kulaks* and churches had 69.3 per cent of the total area, whilst *bidniak* and *seredniak* farms (94 per cent) owned 30.7 per cent of the land.¹⁶

Land tenure in the Ternopil voivodship is illustrated in Table Eight. Again, the land tenure system is unbalanced. In terms of farm size, the *bidniak-seredniak* category of farms made up 96.7 per cent of the total farms, the *kulak* stratum was very small and land ownership was dominated by huge *pomishchyky* estates. In Ternopil, in this period, there were 143 such estates exceeding 1,000 hectares.¹⁷

ii) Land Usage

The land structure of West Ukraine differs from that of East Ukraine in its low per-centage of arable area and relatively high per-centages of meadows, pastures and forest. The exception to this general phenomenon is Ternopil region, which possesses one of the highest proportions of arable land in the present-day Republic. 79.3 per cent of the total land in Ternopil voivodship was utilized for agriculture, of which 66.8 per cent was arable land, 16.4 per cent forest, six per cent meadows and 3.7 per cent pasture.¹⁸

Table Eight: Land Tenure in Ternopil Voivodship (1931)

<u>Farm Size</u> (ha)	<u>Total Farms</u>	<u>% of General Number</u>	<u>Total Area</u> (ha)
under 1	69,910	27.7	38,364
1-2	69,031	28.5	106,500
2-3	39,267	15.6	99,236
3-4	24,272	8.7	84,702
4-5	14,938	5.9	67,040
5-10	25,967	10.3	180,924
10-20	5,585	2.2	71,898
20-50	1,183	0.5	35,174
50-100	382	0.2	27,058
100-200	191	0.1	28,288
200-1000	644	0.2	313,781
over 1000	143	0.1	242,036
Total	251,513	100.0	1,295,002

Source: M.K. Ivasiuta, *Narys istorii kolektyvizatsii na Ternopil'shchyni*
(Kiev, 1958), p. 7.

The other voivodships did not possess such expansive areas of agricultural land. In contrast, Stanislav, Lviv and Volyn voivodships all possessed large areas of forest. In Stanislav, forests occupied 34.8 per cent of the total land area, in Volyn the figure was 23.2 and in Lviv 24.8 per cent.¹⁹ Thus in addition to the peasants' shortage of land, a high proportion of the land available was unfit for agriculture. As a result, potatoes often became the staple crop of the Ukrainian peasant farmer.

In the interwar period, West Ukrainian agriculture was dominated by grain farming, particularly in the voivodships of Volyn and Ternopil. Wheat and rye were the main crops, with the latter prevailing in the Lviv region. In the mountain areas of Drohobych, the main crop was oats.²⁰ Table Nine overleaf portrays the sown area of the four voivodships in per-centages of the individual crops. The total sown area in West Ukraine under Poland from 1928 to 1937 averaged 4,218,000 hectares out of a Polish total of 16,850,000 hectares, or almost twenty five per cent.²¹

iii) Draught-Animals and Agricultural Implements

Soviet agricultural specialists, when comparing life for the Ukrainian farmer under the pre-Soviet and Soviet regimes constantly stress the peasants' lack of draught-animals agricultural implements in the former period. One qualification should be made initially before examining these factors. This is that the primary problem of the West Ukrainian farmer was the shortage of land, rather than the lack of animals or machinery to farm it. Nevertheless, even the smallest of farms could benefit from having a horse or a cow.

The shortage of livestock were indeed acute. The 1927 census reveals that in West Ukraine 457,900 farms were horseless, 273,400 possessed

Table Nine: Sown Area of West Ukraine in 1936 (in per-centages)

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Volyn</u>	<u>L'viv</u>	<u>Stanislav</u>	<u>Ternopil</u>
Wheat	17.4	16.0	15.8	21.8
Rye	27.7	22.2	19.9	19.0
Barley	9.5	6.9	5.5	11.3
Oats	14.0	20.8	14.8	10.6
Buckwheat	5.7	1.2	0.7	4.6
Maize	0.1	0.2	8.1	3.5
Total Grain	75.8	68.6	65.7	73.1
Potatoes	12.2	17.6	19.9	14.5
Industrial	2.7	1.9	2.0	1.6
Fodder Crops	7.9	11.1	11.0	9.0

Source: *IV Ukrains'kyi statystychnyi richnyk (1936-1937)*, p. 71.

a single horse and 280,500 had two horses.²² In terms of per-centages of the total number of farms, this signified that 70.7 per cent were either horseless or owned a single horse. Moreover, even this figure is deflated, bearing in mind that the landed estates were well endowed with livestock. For example, in Rivne region, 416 farms of over fifty hectares in size possessed 5,333 horses and 1,724 oxen, or 12,8 and 4,1 per farm respectively.²³ 145,835 farms of under five hectares owned 22,581 horses and 11,764 oxen, or 0,15 and 0,08 per farm respectively.²⁴

In Volyn voivodship, the situation was marginally better than in the southern voivodships. For every one hundred residents there were 17,7 horses, 36.2 cattle, 26,6 pigs and ten sheep.²⁵ In Stanislav voivodship, it is reported that fifty nine per cent of peasant farms had no horses and 21.2 per cent had no cows.²⁶ In Ternopil in 1927, 46.5 per cent of peasant farms were horseless and 27.3 per cent had one horse, 18.3 per cent did not own a cow and 63.4 per cent had a single cow.²⁷ Regarding the animals on agricultural land, Lviv and Stanislav voivodships suffered from the most acute lack of horses and Stanislav was the most poorly endowed with cattle.²⁸

The agricultural tools used by West Ukrainian farmers were quite primitive. They relied on the plough, the scythe, the wooden harrow, sickle and beater to carry out their work. The shortage of more sophisticated equipment is shown by the fact that in the area which later constituted the Lviv oblast, one harvester serviced 2,243 hectares of grain sowing, there was one seeder for every 668 hectares, one threshing machine per 4,382 hectares and one grain-cleaner for every 8,819 hectares of sown area.²⁹

In the same region, 231,079 peasant farms had 99,389 ploughs, 7,659 cultivators and 2,359 iron harrows.³⁰ 131,641 farms did not possess a plough and grain was sown ninety per cent by hand.³¹ The collection of grain reportedly took from 200 to 240 days. In Rivne region, on the eve of the Soviet takeover, only six tractors and 154 grain-cleaners were operating.³² A similar situation existed in the other areas of Polish-ruled Ukraine.

We have seen from the above figures the plight of the Ukrainian farmer in interwar Galicia and Volyn. It is evident that there was a stark contrast between the predominantly Polish landowners with their huge estates and the populous Ukrainian peasantry, subsisting on their minute plots of land. Two questions arise. First, what were the attitudes and policies of the Polish government towards this difficult situation for the Ukrainian farmer? Secondly, was the latter offered any incentive to improve his position? Had he any alternative to an agricultural occupation without adequate land or the proper means with which to cultivate it?

iv) The Polish Government and West Ukrainian Agriculture, 1920-1939

In the period of Polish rule in West Ukraine, the government issued three main laws appertaining to agricultural settlement. First, a law of December 1920 stated that the unoccupied areas of the eastern regions were to be distributed amongst the demobilized soldiers of the Polish Army.³³ Secondly, the Land Reform Act of 1925 led to a further allotment of Ukrainian lands amongst settlers and military colonists (*osadnyks*) and to two key features of Polish rule, namely the parcelling of portions of landowners' estates and to *komasatsii*, the attempt to consolidate dispersed plots into a single holding. Thirdly, a law of July 1936 declared that a

belt of land thirty kilometres from the Soviet border was directly subject to state authority and to confiscation by the state should security reasons demand it.³⁴

It seems that these laws served a dual purpose. On the one hand they could provide substantial Polish settlements amidst the large Ukrainian population, giving the regime more stability in the eastern regions. On the other, the law of 1920 was a direct sequel to the Polish-Soviet war which had ended without a victory for either side. Consequently, the *osadnyky* were to provide some security in the event of a renewed Soviet threat. Further, the law of 1936 can only be satisfactorily explained by the fear of a Soviet attack. On both counts, the Ukrainian peasant was the one to suffer as his land was confiscated without compensation.

Although the laws of 1920 and 1925 were also directed against the *pomishchyky*, large landownership remained very strong in the Ukrainian areas. Thus in West and Central Poland, landowners' farms were restricted to 180 hectares in size, whereas in the eastern districts, the maximum norms were raised to 300 to 400 hectares.³⁵ Land prices were doubled and were discriminatory with regard to the Ukrainian areas. Estimates of the Polish Chief Bureau of Statistics indicate that whereas the price of wheat and beet land was 1,800 zloty per hectare in Bialystok and 1,020 in Vilno, Novogrodek and Polissia, in Cracow and L'viv the price was 3,970 zlotys and in Stanislaw and Ternopil, 3,430 zlotys per hectare.³⁶

Such high prices put the land beyond reach for the poorer strata of peasants. Those who did buy land incurred debts, which they could only repay by personal labor. A Soviet source claims that the peasants often had to work up to one hundred days a year to pay off these debts.³⁷ The reforms benefitted new settlers. A Western scholar states that from 1926

to 1929, 560,000 hectares of land occupied by Ukrainian farmers were confiscated and handed over to settlers and military colonists.³⁸

From 1919 to 1937 in the four Ukrainian voivodships were parcelled 665,200 hectares of *pomishchyk* land, from which 327,300 hectares were in Volyn, 112,900 in L'viv, 171,400 in Ternopil and 55,600 hectares in Stanislav.³⁹ Thus most of the *osadnyk* farms were constructed in the strategically important Volyn voivodship, near the Soviet Russian border. After parcelling in Volyn, 7,047 *osadnyk* farms were created, each with from ten to fifty hectares of land.⁴⁰ In Ternopil in 1934, there were 4,976 such farms with over 80,000 hectares of land.⁴¹ There were smaller numbers of settlers in L'viv and Stanislav.

A major problem in pre-Soviet Ukrainian agriculture was the practice of land division on a hereditary basis. As lands were divided amongst the sons of a family, the farms became progressively smaller. A second consequence was that a single farmer often possessed five to ten plots of land at great distances apart. In the thirties, the government, with the active cooperation of local Ukrainian economic organizations, such as *Silsky Hospodar* made some efforts to consolidate these holdings.

Soviet sources criticize the *komasatsii*, on the grounds that the newly-created farms confiscated lands from small peasant farmers. In 1936 in Polish Ukraine, 717,803 hectares of strips were liquidated from 131,235 farms.⁴² It is evident that the Polish authorities were trying to leave the power of the landlords intact. The land measures whittled away at his estate without seriously affecting his position. On the other hand, little support was offered to the Ukrainian peasants.

v) Agricultural Production under Polish Rule

How did the Ukrainian areas compare with the rest of Poland in terms

of productivity? One way to ascertain this is to compare the harvest returns of the various crops for the four voivodships and relate them to the Polish average. Here however there are some obvious problems. Was the crop yield evaluated before or after the harvesting? Could some of the grain have been destroyed by frost? Yet these deficiencies of assessment apply equally to all areas and can thus be a reasonably good indicator of the worth of the harvest.

The figures in the Ukrainian regions over the 1928 to 1937 period fell below the Polish average for virtually every category of crops. Whereas the average figure, in centners per hectare for the wheat harvest in Poland was 11.8, Volyn registered 11.3, L'viv 9.6, Stanislaw 10.2, and Ternopil 10.4.⁴³ Rye, the most widely cultivated crop in L'viv, was harvested at only 9.7 centners per hectare, compared to the Polish average of 11.2.⁴⁴ The average potato harvest in Poland in this period was a relatively low 117 centners per hectare, but in the Volyn, L'viv, Stanislaw and Ternopil voivodships, the average was 106.5 centners per hectare.⁴⁵

Two points should be borne in mind here. First, although the yields appear to be relatively low, they compare quite favorably with large agricultural countries, such as Canada and, interestingly, with the Ukrainian territories of Romania. This is highlighted in Table Ten. Secondly however, yields do not take into account the social structure of a population, alternative means of subsistence and the density of the population. Since Canada was sparsely populated, the yields do not imply a low level of consumption. However, in West Ukraine, overpopulation in the rural regions, accompanied by low crop yields, few implements and lack of state help left the Ukrainian community in serious difficulty.

Western Europe, also densely populated, achieved much higher yields

Table Ten: Crop Yields 1931-1935. A Comparison of Ukrainian Regions
of Poland and Romania and Canada (centners per hectare)

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Polish Ukraine</u>	<u>Romanian Ukraine</u>	<u>Canada</u>
Wheat	9.8	7.2	9.1
Rye	10.3	7.1	8.2
Barley	10.8	6.7	10.6
Oats	10.1	8.9	10.2
Maize	9.9	10.2	24.2
Potatoes	102	111	96

Source: *IV Ukrains'kyi statystychnyi richnyk (1936-1937)*, p. 98.

than Poland, thanks to the employment of machinery, fertilizer and more intensive cultivation of the land. In the United Kingdom for example, wheat was harvested at 20.6, barley at 20.6, oats at 19.8 and potatoes at 159.7 centners per hectare.⁴⁶ Moreover, in England and Wales, only five per cent of the population was dependent upon agriculture, compared to sixty per cent in Poland.⁴⁷ In this respect however, Poland was typical of the countries of southern and eastern Europe. The situation could only have been improved by developing industry and thereby deploying manpower to the urban areas.

vi) Socio-Economic Position of the Ukrainian Peasant Farmer on the Eve of the Soviet Takeover

The Ukrainian farmer, unable to support himself and his family on his small farm was often obliged to hire himself out for labor. His indebtedness was increasing. A Soviet source calculates that in 1926-1927, the average debts of peasant farms in Poland and West Ukraine stood at 103 per cent of their income and that by 1929-1930, they had risen to 328 per cent.⁴⁸ The land tax was particularly severe as the poorer peasants paid twice the tariffs per hectare paid by the landed estates of over 2,000 hectares.⁴⁹

A further burden was the low price-tages put on agricultural products. At the time of the economic crisis of 1929-1933, agricultural prices fell by sixty two per cent, whilst prices on industrial goods decreased by only twenty one per cent.⁵⁰ Looking at the index of optimum prices for agricultural products and taking 1928 as one hundred, in Poland the prices had dropped to 43.8 per cent of the 1928 level by 1935 and even in March 1938, had risen to only forty eight per cent.⁵¹ In the United States, taking 1926 at one hundred, prices in March 1939 had decreased by 34.2

per cent from the 1926 level.

Thus from 1929 to 1935, the purchasing power of the peasant was suffering a constant decline. In monetary terms, his total gross income per annum averaged about 120 zloty.⁵³ Out of this total, from twenty to fifty zloty would be needed for forage, to buy a simple horse plough would cost sixty to one hundred zloty and for a single horse 400 to 600 zloty.⁵⁴ The annual income was thus inadequate. In 1931, 62,050 farms in West Ukraine employed hired labor, or 5.9 per cent of the total number.⁵⁵ 28,085 of these were located in the Stanislaw and Drohobych regions, and only 1,526 in Volyn and Rivne.⁵⁶

The high level of rural unemployment caused the rise of several groups of agricultural workers, which the landed estates could use as forms of cheap labor. Amongst these were the "day-laborers" and the seasonal workers employed from April to October. Others were paid for their services with a hut, a small plot of land and a pasture area for a cow. This peasant stratum was known as the "deputatist".⁵⁷ The large numbers of agricultural workers, often nomadic, also eroded any bargaining power the peasants might have possessed in conditions of a labor shortage.

The years 1925 to 1938 saw an average of over 26,000 people a year emigrating from Volyn, L'viv, Stanislaw and Ternopil voivodships.⁵⁸ It is estimated that during this period 70,764 people emigrated from Volyn, 34,875 from Stanislaw, 80,145 from Ternopil and 158,358 from L'viv.⁵⁹ However, restrictive immigration policies in North America and the lack of financial resources resulted in about half of the emigrants returning to their native land.⁶⁰

The aforementioned chauvinistic policies of the Polish government antagonized the Ukrainian population and welded it together politically.

One consequence was the widespread development of the Ukrainian cooperative societies, created prior to the Second World War. The central body of the cooperatives was the Ukrainian Cooperative Audit Union (*RSUK*), with divisional organizations such as the *Masłosoiz* for retailers of dairy products, *Centrosoiz* and *Narodna Torhivla* for retail trade and the *Centrobank* for cooperative credit societies.⁶¹

By all accounts, these societies were very well organized and found an enthusiastic response amongst the native population. Development was rapid. Whereas in 1925 there were in operation a total of 1,029 Ukrainian cooperative societies, by 1935 there were 3,013, from which 1,972 were societies of agricultural trade.⁶² Table Eleven highlights the growth of cooperative membership in cooperatives of the first degree, the county Unions and the Audit Union, according to Ukrainian statistics.

The Table reveals that by 1935, the Ukrainian cooperative societies had over half a million members. This figure applies only to Galicia, because the *RSUK* did not encompass Volhynia and Polissia which possessed their own central unions. By Soviet estimates, in 1937 these cooperatives (*RSUK*) had a trade turnover of 159 million zloty and profits amounting to 1,246,000 zloty.⁶³ This study will not analyze the economic practices of the *RSUK*. For our purposes, its significance lies in its role of catalyzing the Ukrainian people into running their own affairs.

The cooperative movement suggests a tendency towards the pooling of resources, towards a self-run community. On the eve of the Soviet invasion, the Ukrainian peasantry under Polish rule had shown a deep hostility to Polish occupation. They had protested by means of strikes, arson and assassinations of Polish officials. They had developed strong nationalistic tendencies as the influence of *OUN* spread throughout West Ukraine.

Table Eleven: Membership of Ukrainian Cooperative Societies, 1925-1935

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Members</u>	<u>In Coops. of First Degree</u>	<u>In County Unions</u>	<u>In Audit Union</u>
1925	158,087	150,635	805	6,647
1926	197,709	190,438	1,081	6,190
1927	237,867	230,000	1,495	6,372
1928	270,744	262,876	1,304	6,564
1929	328,229	319,674	1,861	6,694
1930	369,555	360,563	2,317	6,675
1931	395,206	386,000	2,404	6,802
1932	404,311	395,008	2,231	7,072
1933	448,239	438,872	2,137	7,230
1934	492,069	482,286	2,253	7,530
1935	541,508	531,688	2,237	7,583

Source: *IV Ukrains'jyi statystychnyi richnyk*, p. 186.

Economically they were amongst the most depressed social strata of interwar Europe, being forced to sell their own labor at cheap prices and receiving little aid from the government. In such conditions, the invasion from the East was not altogether an unwelcome event.

Bibliography to Chapter Three

1. Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1945), p. 64.
2. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 14.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok sil's'koho hospodarstva Ukrain's'koi RSR, tII 1938-1966* (Kiev, 1968), p. 78.
5. I.K. Vasiuta, "Ahrarne perenaselennia na zakhidnykh ukraini v 20kh-30kh rokakh XXst." *Ukrainskyi istorichnyi zhurnal* No. 11, 1971, 51.
6. *Istoriia selianstva Ukrain's'koi RSR, t2*, (Kiev, 1967), p. 233.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Varets'ky p. 44.
9. *Ibid.*
10. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 16.
11. "From the report account of L'viv obkom KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference concerning the situation of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940, in *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii sil's'koho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1976), p. 115. (hereafter referred to as *Z ist.*)
12. *Ibid.*
13. "From the report account of Drohobych obkom KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference concerning the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 27, 1940, *Z ist.* p. 126.
14. "From the report account of Rivne obkom KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference concerning the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940 *Z ist.* p. 121.

15. *Volynska Oblast (Istoriia Mist i Sil Ukrainskoi RSR*, Kiev, 1970), pp. 24-25.
16. *Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (Istoriia Mist i Sil)* (Kiev, 1971), p. 27.
17. M.K. Ivasiuta, *Narys istorii kolektyvizatsii na Ternopilshchyni* (Kiev, 1958), p. 8.
18. *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland*, p. 67.
19. *Ibid.*
20. See *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii*, p.
21. Added from *CSYBP*, p. 73.
22. *Varets'ky*, p. 49.
23. *Z ist*, p. 121.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *IV Ukrainskyi statystychnyi richnyk*, p. 80.
26. *Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast*, p. 27.
27. *Ternopils'ka Oblast (Istoriia Mist i Sil)* (Kiev, 1973), p. 39.
28. *Ukrainskyi statystychnyi richnyk*, p. 80.
29. *Z ist*, pp. 115-121.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Pravdu ne zdolaty: trudiashchi zakhidnykh oblastei URSS v borotbi proty ukrainskykh burzhuaiznykh natsionalistiv u roky sotsialistychnykh peretvoren* (Lviv, 1974), p. 12.
34. See Horak, p. 153.
35. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, p. 79.
36. *CSYBP*, p. 71.
37. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, p. 81.

38. Horak, p. 153.
39. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 17.
40. *Volynska Oblast*, p. 24.
41. M.K. Ivasiuta (1958), p. 11.
42. I.K. Vasiuta, p. 161.
43. *CSYBP*, p. 73.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.* pp. 79-80.
47. Moore, p. 26.
48. *Istoriia selianstva*, p. 234.
49. *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, p. 82.
50. *Ibid.*
51. I.I. Goldshtein, *Agrarnoe otnosheniia v bivshei Polshe, zapadnoi Ukraine i zapadnoi Belorussii* (Moscow, 1940), p. 247.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Pravda*, October 14, 1939.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Varetsky, p. 48.
56. *Ibid.*
57. See Moore, p. 224.
58. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 21.
59. *Ibid.*
60. I.K. Vasiuta, p. 160.
61. See Horak, p. 154.
62. *IV Ukrainskyi statystychni richnyk*, p. 185.
63. I.K. Vasiuta, p. 163.

Chapter Four: The Annexation of Galicia and Volhynia

i) Political Background and First Measures

The Soviet invasion was a direct result of the Nazi-Soviet pact and cannot be viewed in isolation from the German attack on Western Poland on September 1, 1939. Molotov's speech on the radio on September 17, stressed the danger which the Polish collapse posed to the Soviet state and stated the necessity of protecting the "consanguinous Ukrainians and Belorussians who reside in Poland".¹ The initial premise for the occupation of these areas was that Poland had ceased to exist and thus West Ukraine and West Belorussia had been left to their fate. Consequently, the population required protection against Nazi Germany.

This "protection" was something of a facade. The Commander of the Ukrainian Front, S. Tymoshenko dropped leaflets from airplanes to the local population of these areas on September 17, which declared that the Red Army was invading also in order to rid them of the oppressive Polish landowners.² Similarly, the soldiers of the Red Army, in this case predominantly Ukrainians, were informed by political commissars that they were entering Eastern Poland as liberators, rather than conquerors.³

In West Ukraine, the ethnic unity between Tymoshenko's troops and the native population was emphasized from the first. Khrushchev, as First Secretary of Ukraine, crossed the border alongside Tymoshenko and East Ukrainian newspapers were sent into West Ukraine.⁴ Members of the party and government who were to administer the occupied territories also arrived with the Red Army.⁵ Such careful preparations for future rule suggest that the invasion was little more than a military parade.

It is evident however, that there was at least some resistance.

Red Army casualties on the Ukrainian Front totalled 1,850, including 491 dead, which was twice the casualty rate of the Belorussian Front.⁶ A member of the invading Army has commented that after encountering no resistance on the first day (September 17), there was stubborn resistance from Polish forces at the approach to a large town, which took two days to repulse.⁷ It seems likely that the town in question was Ternopil, where resistance is reported to have been stubborn.⁸

As West Ukraine came under Soviet occupation, both Polish and Ukrainian associations were dissolved and their leaders arrested. The Polish administrative machinery was disbanded at once. UNDO ceased to exist as a party *Prosvita*, *Ridna Shkola* and the Ukrainian sports association were forced to cease their activities.⁹ The Church enjoyed a brief respite. Despite these measures, eyewitnesses have stated that the general feeling was one of sympathy for the troops, not least because they were badly clothed and often close to starvation.¹⁰

ii) The Temporary Organs of Power

Soviet sources maintain that even prior to the entry of the Red Army, the local population, upon the collapse of the Polish state, had begun to form the "Provisional Administrations" in the towns and the "Peasant Committees" in the villages. This is extremely unlikely. The decline of communist influence in West Ukraine has already been shown. It is possible however that after Germany's attack on Western Poland, NKVD representatives were smuggled over the border, in an attempt to prepare the local population for the Red Army invasion.

In Volyn, a Red Guard was reportedly created before the Red Army arrived in Lutsk, Liuboml, Volodymyr Volynsk and Kovel, which on September 17, disarmed the Polish police forces.¹¹ By September 18, revolutionary

committees and armed units had been set up in Stanislav, Kolomiia, Sniatyn and Kosiv raions of the Stanislav voivodship, in Liuboml, Kolko and Olytsa of Volyn and in Brody, Zolochiv, Kamiansts-Buzkyi of Lviv and Ternopil voivodships.¹² The tasks of these "revkoms" were to organize a workers' guard and a peasant militia, to take public property under their protection, to drive out the landlords and to prepare a welcome for their Soviet "liberators".¹³

After the occupation of the capital of West Ukraine, Lviv, on September 20, the Soviets could concentrate on establishing the temporary administrative organs, namely the Provisional Administrations in the towns and the Peasant Committees in the villages. These were "elected" at meetings in towns and villages and averaged eight to ten members, or more depending on the size of the population. They were made up primarily of Red Army personnel, and party and Soviet workers.¹⁴

The predominance of the urban over the rural organs of power is very clear. The Peasant Committees were elected subject to the approval of the Provisional Administrations.¹⁵ The principal organs of authority in the first weeks were the Provisional Administrations in the four major towns of Lviv, Lutsk, Stanislav and Ternopil. In turn however, the whole new order was under the direct supervision of the Army of the First Ukrainian Front and its Commander, Tymoshenko. The latter approved the creation of the Peasant Committees on September 29 and on October 3, the Military Council of the Front sanctioned the Provisional Administrations of the Volyn, Lviv, Stanislav and Ternopil regions.¹⁶

The temporary system was divided into five main spheres; the *oblast* Provisional Administrations within the borders of the voivodships; the

Provisional Administrations of the towns and districts; the district and *volost* congresses of Peasant Committees convened by the Provisional Administrations; the Peasant Committees of the *volosts* and the Peasant Committees of the villages.¹⁷ Order was maintained by the parallel organizations to this general structure, namely the Workers Guard and the Peasant Militia.¹⁸

The various administrations were set up rapidly in the early days of October. In Rivne, in the area which was to make up the future oblast, there were in operation five district Provisional Administrations, fifty one *volost* and 1,203 Peasant Committees encompassing 7,500 people.¹⁹ In Stanislav, on the territory of the former voivodship, was created an oblast Provisional Administration under M.V. Hrulenko, ten district and 119 *volost* Administrations and 915 Peasant Committees.²⁰

As its mouthpiece, the chief Provisional Administration based in Lviv, used the newspaper *Vilna Ukraina*, which prior to October 1, was distributed free amongst the population.²¹ In each main region, newspapers were issued almost immediately upon occupation. For example, in Stanislav on September 23, the first issue of *Radianska Ukraina* was published.²² *Vilne zhyttia* circulated in the Ternopil region from October 3.²³ The Volyn oblast newspaper *Vilna Pratsia* came out in Lutsk for the first time on September 25, alongside the youth paper, *Moloda Hvardiia*.²⁴

iii) The Elections of October 22, 1939

The purpose of this elaborate, indeed chaotic, network of administration soon became apparent. On October 4, 1939, the Lviv Provisional Administration sent an appeal to the Provisional Administrations of Ternopil, Stanislav and Lutsk, suggesting that an assembly be convoked to determine the question of who should rule West Ukraine.²⁵ A committee

was set up in Lviv to organize the elections, which were fixed for October 22. Simultaneously, an Electoral Register appeared, reportedly issued by the Soviets without prior consultation with the local population.²⁶

The main committee for organizing the elections contained two prominent Soviet citizens, General F.M. Ieremenko and S.M. Horbatienko.²⁷ At the request of the West Ukraine election committee, two special representatives of the Soviet government, A.I. Kornichuk and the President of the Ukrainian RSR Supreme Soviet, M.S. Hrechukha were sent to Lviv to supervise the elections.²⁸ The party organs attracted an estimated total of 51,725 agitators for propaganda work towards the elections, including 40,000 from the local population.²⁹

An appeal to the electors on October 19 declared that the elections would take place on the basis of general, equal and direct voting rights, with a secret ballot, and that all citizens of West Ukraine had the right to elect and be elected as members of the Ukrainian Peoples Assembly.³⁰ However, the elections were conducted on a much more rigorous basis than this address would suggest. All attempts to set up alternative candidates to those of the "official" communist party and non-party bloc were thwarted and the candidates in question arrested.³¹

Interviewees have described the rigid control of the Red Army over the elections. Army units divided the streets into groups of ten, and made one particular household responsible for ensuring that the other nine went to the polling station.³² The voting process itself was facilitated by declaring election day a holiday and by providing a vodka and bread reception at the polling station.³³ Army units conveyed invalids and elderly people to the stations by truck or car.³⁴ The sheer speed of the process thwarted attempts at coordinated opposition. In just over

two weeks, electoral registers had been drawn up and 2,242 electoral districts organized, with 11,967 polling booths.³⁵

Elections took place with one candidate elected from each raion to the People's Assembly. The results are illustrated in Table Twelve. Altogether were elected 1,484 deputies, including 402 workers, 819 peasants and 234 representatives of the "toiling intelligentsia".³⁶ In terms of nationality, the results show the uprooting of the Polish residents. In Stanislav, where Poles had constituted about twenty two per cent of the pre-Soviet population, only four out of 313 candidates were Poles.³⁷ In Lviv, which had contained the largest pre-Soviet Polish population, Ukrainians made up 92.2 per cent of those elected, Jews 4.3 per cent and Poles a mere 2.9 per cent.³⁸

On October 27, 1939, the People's Assembly of West Ukraine issued a Declaration which "carried out the unanimous will of the liberated people" and proclaimed the establishment of Soviet power on all territories of West Ukraine.³⁹ Two days later, the Assembly issued a second proclamation, asking the All-Union Supreme Soviet to receive West Ukraine into the Ukrainian RSR and thus complete the act of reunion of the Ukrainian people in one state.⁴⁰

A Law of the Supreme Soviet decided "to satisfy the request of the People's Assembly of West Ukraine" and to include West Ukraine within the Soviet Union.⁴¹ This was followed up two weeks later by a Law to include West Ukraine in the Ukrainian Republic, which resolved to "welcome in every possible way the historical decision of the All-Union Supreme Soviet of November 1".⁴² The whole process took only twenty four days following the elections. As a result, western historians have commented

Table Twelve: The "Plebiscite Elections" in West Ukraine, October 22, 1939

<u>Oblast & Town</u>	<u>% of Electors Who Voted</u>	<u>% Who Voted For Candidates</u>
Lviv oblast	91.59	88.30
Lviv	95.68	93.48
Ternopil oblast	88.03	92.53
Ternopil	93.32	96.36
Stanislav oblast	96.13	93.20
Stanislav	92.72	94.21
Volyn oblast	95.44	90.62
Luts'k	91.49	95.53

Source: V.L. Varetsky, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia*, p. 132.

that the "plebiscite" was a formality organized in order to give some semblance of legality to the annexation.

There is much truth in this. The "elections" were essentially a Red Army run operation; which ruled out any possibility of an unfavorable vote. Moreover, the electoral process in a situation of military occupation was repeated only once, during the following Summer when Lithuania was occupied. However, the high election turn-out was not an invention of *Pravda*, as some critics have maintained, voting was compulsory and the population was in no position to resist.

iv) Economic Measures

When the Provisional Administrations had been set up, various sections were created in them for running the country, such as industry, food and trade.⁴³ The USSR People's Commissariat of Trade sent 10,800 tons of salt, seventeen waggons of matches, 1,500 tons of kerosene and thirty six waggons of makhorka into the towns and villages of West Ukraine.⁴⁴ In addition, commercial workers were dispatched into the larger towns to organize trade operations.⁴⁵ By October 3, 1939, the food section of the Provisional Administration had opened seventeen restaurants for the unemployed and refugees.⁴⁶

It is clear however, that it was the Soviet civil servants and dignitaries who derived the most immediate benefit from the invasion. The zloty-rouble exchange rate was placed on an equal level, although formerly the ratio had been about twelve roubles to one zloty. The soldiers were unable to resist using this newly-acquired purchasing power in the provision-filled shops.⁴⁷ Initially, the existing system of trade was respected and it was established that all shops and cooperatives had to work

constantly.⁴⁸

In the first days of occupation, there was widespread speculation. Thus the new rulers declared that prices for industrial and agricultural products must not exceed those of the pre-Soviet period.⁴⁹ Owners of bakeries were prohibited from selling bread directly from the bakery and were only allowed to sell through shops.⁵⁰ A Law of December 11, 1939, nationalized shops and ten days later, the zloty was finally taken out of circulation and all bank deposits in this currency were requisitioned.⁵¹

The problem of unemployment was resolved by the twin expedients of nationalization and the enforced removal of excess personnel. Industry was nationalized and an eight hour working day instituted.⁵² Nationalization of banks however was not completed until March 16, 1940.⁵³ In addition to deportations, which will be discussed later, 19,677 people were sent to work in oblasts of East Ukraine and simultaneously 116,756 roubles were donated in aid to the unemployed.⁵⁴ Sixty eight per cent of those transferred eastward went to enterprises and oil industries of the Donbas.⁵⁵

By February 1940, unemployment in Lviv oblast had been liquidated and in due course, 17,000 workers arrived from the Russian Republic for work in the Lviv enterprises.⁵⁶ From 1939 to 1941, the per-centage of workers and employees in West Ukraine increased from 18.6 to 29.2, with Lviv as the principal urban centre.⁵⁷ Yet the increase in urban population can in no way be compared with the dramatic upheaval that took place in the West Ukrainian countryside in the second half of 1939.

v) The Rural Revolution

The invasion of the Red Army was the signal for an all-out attack on Polish landholding. The Polish landowners were the first victims of the Soviet takeover, although it is difficult to ascertain how many fled to Romania and how many were taken into custody by the Soviet authorities. In the Ternopil region, the Peasant Committees began dividing up landowner and monastery land in the first days of occupation.⁵⁸ Distribution began on a large-scale at the end of September and beginning of October 1939.⁵⁹

On October 28, 1939, the West Ukrainian People's Assembly formally announced the confiscation of the land of the "*pomishchyky*, monasteries and great state bureaucrat".⁶⁰ This land was confiscated and transferred to the control of the Peasant Committees.⁶¹ The latter decided which peasants merited land, what should be done with the lands of the state officials and had, in theory, the sole right to distribute the lands of West Ukraine until the area was officially incorporated into the Soviet Union.⁶²

Looking briefly at individual regions, in Stanislav from November 17 to December 1, 1939, the Peasant Committees distributed amongst the landless and land-hungry peasants 143,920 hectares of former landlord and monastery land, 4,733 horses, 7,796 cows and 31,942 centners of grain.⁶³ In Volyn, 292,900 hectares of land were initially expropriated from landlords, monasteries, military settlers and state officials.⁶⁴ The Peasant Committees allotted 153,000 hectares of this land to the poorer peasants.⁶⁵

In Lviv, 107,100 hectares of land were divided amongst 16,675 *batrak*, 33,648 *bidniak* and 6,878 *seredniak* farms.⁶⁶ The poorer peasant

farms in eight districts of Lviv received directly from the estates of the former landowners, 11,970 head of cattle, 2,971 horses and 1,847 pigs.⁶⁷ By the end of 1939, in West Ukraine, a total of 2,753,000 hectares of land had been confiscated from the landlords, *kulaks* and monasteries, which was 29.9 per cent of the total land of these oblasts.⁶⁸ Table Thirteen illustrates land confiscation in the individual oblasts.

The Soviet government also donated to the *bidniak* stratum of farms about 90,000 horses, 2,000 oxen, 86,000 cattle, 19,000 pigs and 32,000 sheep, which had been expropriated from landowner estates.⁶⁹ Thirty five per cent of *bidniak* farms were exempted from paying taxes and further, *bidniak* farms were awarded a long-term loan of 9,265,000 roubles to purchase around 40,000 cows.⁷⁰ By the end of 1939, 474,000 landless and land-hungry peasants had received over 1,136,000 hectares of *pomishchyk* land, over 84,000 horses, 1,600 oxen, 76,000 cows, 14,000 pigs and 27,200 sheep.⁷¹

It is possible to make some qualifications about this wholesale land distribution after the Soviet takeover. First, the worst sufferers were, inevitably, the great Polish landowners, who were arrested if they had remained and awaited deportation to the east. Until the end of the year, the churches, military settlers and especially the *kulak* stratum of peasants, were essentially left alone.⁷² Moreover, it is clear that in certain regions, the poorer peasantry gained very little at first from the change of rule. In Drohobych, for example, one of the poorest areas in terms of land supply, 99,050 farms received a total of 90,000 hectares of land, or 0.9 hectares per farm.⁷³

In contrast, in Volyn, 59,778 farms received 159,000 hectares of land, or 2.6 hectares per farm and in Ternopil, where the density of

Table Thirteen: Confiscation of Land in the Ex-Polish Ukraine,
September-December 1939

<u>Region</u>	<u>Hectares Confiscated</u> (thousands)	<u>Per-Cent of Total</u> <u>Land Area</u>
Volyn	390	20.5
Drohobych	400	40.0
Lviv	430	37.5
Rivne	580	30.0
Stanislav	415	29.0
Ternopil	303	22.5
Total	2,518	30.0

Source: *Sotsialistychna perebudova*, p. 88.

population rivalled that of Drohobych, 102,140 peasant farms received 315,000 hectares of land, or over three hectares per farm.⁷⁴ One can only surmise the reasons for the apparent discrepancies in land allotment, but it is possible that the Soviet authorities retained the borderland areas, in fear of a German invasion from the West.

The early months of Soviet rule witnessed a partial transformation in land tenure. The land was distributed firstly to farms with little or no land and secondly, to those with land under the norm for individual use, i.e. seven hectares.⁷⁵ There was no attempt to issue a land reform act which related specifically to the conditions of West Ukraine, and Soviet policy towards the Ukrainian peasants in 1939 was relatively lenient when compared to the drastic measures applied in East Ukraine a decade earlier.

The Poles, in contrast, were treated harshly. Almost totally disenfranchised, approximately 1.5 million were deported in three waves in February, April and June 1940.⁷⁶ The first deportees were from West Ukraine and the others were reportedly refugees fleeing from the Germans.⁷⁷ Poles were excluded from administrative positions and ceased to play a role in their former territories. An *Ukaz* of December 4, 1939, formalized the abolition of the old Polish voivodships and created six new oblasts, namely Volyn, Drohobych, Lviv, Rivne, Stanislav and Ternopil.⁷⁸ This decree finalized the annexation. The first months had seen Galicia and Volhynia become Ukrainianized. Sovietization was to follow.

Bibliography to Chapter Four

1. B.M.Babyi, *Vozziednannia zakhidnoi ukraïny z ukrains'koiu RSR* (Kiev, 1954), p. 55.
2. H. Vashchenko, "'Vyzvolennia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny Bolshevykamy'" *Ukrainian Review*, No. 1, (1954), 66.
3. G.I. Antonov, "The March into Poland. September 1939." in B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Red Army* (New York, 1956), p. 73.
4. John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York, 1959), p. 107.
5. Antonov, p. 75.
6. *Pravda*, November 1, 1939.
7. Antonov, p. 74.
8. See for example *Izvestiia*, September 25, 1939.
9. *Interview A*.
10. *Interview B*.
11. *Torzhestvo istorichnoi spravedlyvosti* (L'viv, 1968), p. 570.
12. M.K. Ivasiuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1962), p. 40.
13. *Ibid*.
14. *Torzhestvo istorichnoi*, p. 575.
15. V.M. Terletsky, *Rady deputativ trudishchykh Ukrains'koi RSR v period zavershennia budivnytstva sotsializmu (1938-1958rr)*, (Kiev, 1966), p. 85.
16. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 40.
17. Terletsky, pp. 85-86.
18. *Ibid*.
19. *Torzhestvo istorichnoi*, p. 575.

20. *Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (Istoriia Mist i Sil Ukrainskoi RSR)*
(Kiev, 1971), p. 31.
21. *Narysy istorii Lvova* (Lviv, 1956), p. 291.
22. *Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast*, p. 31.
23. *Ternopilska Oblast (Istoriia Mist i Sil Ukrainskoi RSR)*, (Kiev, 1973), p. 45.
24. *Narysy istorii Volynskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii*,
(Kiev, 1968), p. 42.
25. *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, T2 (Kiev, 1953), p. 472.
26. See B. Kusnierz, *Stalin and the Poles*, (London, 1949), p. 52.
27. R. Umiastowski, *Russia and the Polish Republic 1918-1941*,
(London, 1945), p. 224.
28. *Ibid.*
29. M.P. Teslenko, "Do istorii partiinoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh
oblastiakh Ukrainy" *Ukrainskyi istorychnoi zhurnal*, No. 10,
(1969), 44.
30. *Radianska Ternopil'shchyna 1939-1958* (L'viv, 1971), Document 16.
31. Umiastowski, p. 224.
32. *Interview A.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. Kusnierz, p. 52.
36. M.K. Ivasiuta, *Narys istorii kolektyvizatsii na Ternopil'shchyni*
(Kiev, 1958), pp. 31-32.
37. Umiastowski, p. 227.
38. *Narys istorii Lvivskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii* (Lviv,
1969), p. 70.

39. "Declaration of the Peoples Assembly of West Ukraine concerning state power in West Ukraine", October 27, 1939, in *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1976), p. 17. (referred to hereafter as *Z ist.*)
40. "Declaration of the Peoples Assembly of West Ukraine concerning the inclusion of West Ukraine in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic", October 27, 1939, *Z ist.*, pp. 18-20.
41. "Law of the Supreme Soviet SRSR concerning the inclusion of West Ukraine in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics following its reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic", November 1, 1939, *Z ist.*, pp. 21-22.
42. "Law of the Supreme Soviet URSR concerning the acceptance of West Ukraine in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic", November 15, 1939, *Z ist.*, p. 22.
43. *Narysy istorii Lvova*, p. 294.
44. *Pravda*, October 10, 1939.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Narysy istorii Lvova*, p. 294.
47. Antonov, p. 74.
48. *Narysy istorii Lvova*, p. 294.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. Umiastowski, p. 241.
52. *Narysy istorii Lvova*, p. 295.
53. *Pravda*, March 16, 1940.
54. *Narys istorii Lvivskoi*, p. 72.

55. *Narysy istorii Lvova*, p. 296.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Rozkvit ekonomiky zakhidnykh oblastei URSR (1939-1964rr)*, (Lviv, 1964), p. 28.
58. M.K. Ivasiuta (1958), p. 35.
59. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 41.
60. "Declaration of the Peoples Assembly of West Ukraine concerning the confiscation of pomishchyk lands", October 28, 1939, *Z ist.*, pp. 20-21.
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Ibid.*
63. "Decision of the bureau of Stanislav obkom KP(b)U concerning the results of the work and tasks of the Peasant Committees", December 23, 1939, *Z ist.*, pp. 94-95.
64. *Volynska Oblast (Istoriia Mist i Sil Ukrain's'koi RSR)*, (Kiev, 1970), p. 34.
65. *Ibid.*
66. "From the information of Lviv obkom KP(b)U concerning mass party work and the state of agriculture in the oblast", Not before December 20, 1939, *Z ist.*, pp. 91-93.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok sil'skoho hospodarstva Ukrain's'koi RSR, t2 1938-1966*, (Kiev, 1968), p. 88.
69. *Ibid.* p. 89.
70. *Ibid.*
71. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 46.
72. M.K. Ivasiuta (1958), p. 37.

73. V.L. Varetsky, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSS*, (Kiev, 1960), p. 223.
74. *Ibid.*
75. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 46.
76. Zygmunt Sobieski, "Reminiscences from Lwów, 1939-1946", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, No. 6, (1947), 354.
77. *Ibid.*
78. "Ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet SRSR concerning the creation of the Volyn, Drohobych, Lviv, Rivne, Stanislav, and Ternopil oblasts in the Ukrainian RSR", December 4, 1939, *Z ist.*, p. 23.

Chapter Five: The Incorporation of Northern Bukovyna and the Khotyn,

Akkerman and Izmail uezds of Bessarabia into the Ukrainian RSR

i) Background and Takeover

The Soviet Union had never been reconciled to Romania's seizure of Bessarabia in 1918, at a time when the very existence of the new Soviet state was at stake. Following the Nazi-Soviet pact Stalin and Molotov decided to incorporate Bessarabia as soon as possible. In addition, they also laid claim to Northern Bukovyna, which possessed a large Ukrainian population, but which had never historically belonged to the old Russian Empire. This was seen by the Soviets as a necessary compensation for the "damage perpetrated" by Romania upon the USSR and the population of Bessarabia.¹

On June 26, 1940, the Soviet government sent a note to the government of Romania, demanding the return of Bessarabia and the surrender of Northern Bukovyna to the Soviet Union.² The note requested a reply on the following day. The response was too vague for the Soviet leaders. Thus the Romanian ambassador in Moscow, P. Davidenko, was approached and interviewed, and according to Soviet reports, explained that the reply of his government signified its consent to Soviet wishes.³

A second note to the Romanian government on June 27 ordered that within a period of four days, commencing June 28, Romanian troops were to evacuate the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna.⁴ The Soviet Army was to occupy the key towns of Chernivtsi, Kisinev and Akkerman. To ensure a speedy removal of the Romanian Army and Romanian institutions from these areas, a committee of four representatives (two Soviet and two Romanian) was to be nominated to resolve any problems arising.⁵

The whole affair was kept secret from the Soviet people until the

occupation actually took place. *Pravda*, which had given no previous coverage of the Bessarabian question, suddenly announced on June 29, that at two o'clock, the Soviet Army had crossed the Romanian border.⁶ It was reported that a tank unit and Red Army convoys had advanced into the towns of Chernivtsi, Khotyn, Soroki, Beltsy, Kishinev, Bendery and Akkerman and that no "incidents" had occurred.⁷ The operation appears to have been much smoother than that in Eastern Poland nine months earlier.

As mentioned earlier, there were no plebiscite elections in these newly-annexed areas. Instead, Soviet Ukrainian party personnel were transferred from the ex-Polish areas to the Chernivtsi district, which was to form a separate oblast. Thus on July 4, 1940, the TsK KP(b)U approved the composition of the Chernivtsi district committee of the KP(b)U.⁸ The First Secretary was I.S. Hrushetsky, who had been Second Secretary of Stanislav oblast committee and the Third Secretary was V.T. Ocheretiany who had been in charge of Ternopil Provisional Administration.⁹

Also in early July, the Chernivtsi district executive committee was established which on July 5 approved the composition of town and village Soviets.¹⁰ Urban production was placed in the hands of workers' committees, which were set up in all the factories and jurisdiction over land matters, in particular over *pomishchyyk* and *kulak* farms was handed over to the village Soviets. In this month, Ukrainians made up 94.2 per cent of the membership of the latter bodies and all five members of the Presidium of Chernivtsi town Soviet.¹¹

On August 2, 1940, the VII Session of the All-Union Supreme Soviet divided the areas annexed from Romania as follows. The Moldavian Autonomous Republic, formed on October 12, 1924, as a component part of the Ukrainian SSR included in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.¹²

Into the new Republic went the town Kishinev, which became the capital and six *uezds* of Bessarabia, namely Beltsy, Bendery, Kagul, Kishinev, Orgeev and Soroky.¹³ It also included the town Tiraspol and six raions from the Moldavian ASSR; Grigoriopol, Dubossar, Kamena, Rybnitsky, Slobodzei and Tiraspol.¹⁴ The Moldavian SSR constituted an area of 33,480 square kilometres¹⁵ and a population of 2.7 million, seventy per cent of whom were Moldavians.¹⁶

This same Law also included Northern Bukovyna and the Khotyn, Akkerman and Izmail *uezds* of Bessarabia within the Ukrainian Republic. On August 7, 1940, the Soviet Constitution was amended to include two new oblasts named Akkerman and Chernivtsi within the Ukrainian Republic.¹⁷ The latter was composed of Northern Bukovyna and the Khotyn *uezd* of Bessarabia, and consisted of fourteen raions. The Akkerman oblast was renamed the Izmail oblast in December 1940. In 1954 it was incorporated into the Odessa oblast.

On August 15, an *Ukaz* of the All-Union Supreme Soviet nationalized banks, heavy industry, railways and land.¹⁸ On the same day a conference of the newly-founded Chernivtsi oblast committee of the party issued a protocol to organize a daily newspaper in the town of Chernivtsi.¹⁹ This was entitled *Radianska Bukovyna*, and was published in a six-page format with a circulation of 30,000 copies.²⁰ Once again the process of formal incorporation of territories by the Soviets had been completed in a very short time period.

ii) Characteristics of Agriculture in the Pre-Soviet Period

Landholding in the Ukrainian regions under Romanian rule was similar to that of the Galician territories in its inequitable distribution

amongst landowners and peasants. Table Fourteen highlights land tenure in the Chernivtsi and Khotyn districts. In Bukovyna in the thirties, 9.9 per cent of peasant farms were landless²¹ and over fifty per cent of peasant farms were obliged to rent land from the *pomishchyky*, the kulaks and the churches.²² 68.7 per cent of farms had under two hectares of land.²³ 3,229 *pomishchyk* and kulak farms, constituting 1.4 per cent of the total number of farms, possessed 16.5 per cent of the land area.²⁴

In the entire region of Bessarabia before 1940, it has been estimated that 7.3 per cent of peasant farms were landless and 38.1 per cent possessed under three hectares of land.²⁵ This land was subject to wide dispersal, with strips often far removed from each other.²⁶ In the Izmail region, for which little documentation is available, it is reported that at the time of annexation, there were 7,396 landless peasant farms and about 20,000 in need of land.²⁷

Over 20,000 peasant farms in Northern Bukovyna had no livestock, 118,000 were horseless and 80,000 did not possess a cow (or 8.9, 52.9 and 35.9 per cent respectively).²⁸ The shortage of cows was at its most acute in the counties of Chernivtsi, Kelmentsky, Zastavniv and Sadahur, where over fifty per cent of the total farms were without cows.²⁹ Land cultivation was by means of wooden implements and these were in short supply; one iron plough served twelve hectares of land, one winnower 500 hectares and one seeder 850 hectares of land.³⁰

The productivity of crops of the Ukrainian areas under Romanian rule was relatively low, although the yields in Bukovyna were generally higher than those in Bessarabia. From 1932 to 1936 in Bukovyna, in terms of centners per hectare, the yields were as follows: wheat 10.0, maize 10.4, barley 11.0, rye 13.1, oats 10.4, and potatoes 129.³¹ In Bessarabia

Table Fourteen: Landholding in Chernivtsi and Khotyn on the Eve of the Soviet Takeover (in hectares)

	<u>Chernivtsi</u>	<u>Khotyn</u>
Total Land	490,169	346,173
Peasants	392,212	305,960
Pomishchyky	72,584	17,621
Church	16,804	1,432
Others	8,569	21,160

Land Distribution (Nos. of Farms)

	<u>Chernivtsi</u>	<u>Khotyn</u>	<u>Total</u>
Landless	8,700	13,410	22,110
0-1 hecs	42,277	36,234	78,511
1-2 hecs	24,090	29,654	53,744
2-5 hecs	28,454	25,090	53,544
5-10 hecs	3,387	8,204	11,591
over 10 hecs	1,021	2,208	3,229
Total	107,929	114,800	222,729

Source: "Information of Chernivtsi oblast land section concerning Land-utilization in the oblast", September 9, 1940, in *Radianska Bukovyna 1940-1945, dokumenty i materialy* (Kiev, 1967), p. 52.

over the same period, the wheat yield was 8.0, maize 10.9, barley 10.3, rye 10.4, oats 9.4 and potatoes only sixty centners per hectare.³²

Maize was the chief crop of these peasants.³³

iii) Soviet Land Measures in Bukovyna, August-November 1940

The Soviet land measures in Bukovyna were implemented even more thoroughly than in Galicia and Volhynia a year earlier. Less than two weeks after the invasion of the Red Army (July 11), a resolution of the Council of the heads and secretaries of the Chernivtsi executive committees and rural and urban Soviets declared that within three days, the lands of the *pomishchyky* and the churches were to be expropriated.³⁴ The land confiscated was to be distributed amongst the landless and land-needy farms by July 15-17 at the latest.³⁵

In the Chernivtsi oblast, 235,000 hectares of land were initially confiscated from the great landowners.³⁶ 60,000 landless and land-needy Bukovynian peasants received from the state about 134,000 hectares of this land, and in addition, 6,000 horses, 1,700 cattle, 5,395 sheep, 2,773 residential buildings and 2,770 farm buildings.³⁷ On August 16, 1940, an *Ukaz* of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet SRSR formally nationalized all lands on the territory of Northern Bukovyna, retroactive to June 28, 1940.³⁸

On August 22, the UkSSR Council of Peoples Commissars issued a decision "Concerning taxation on peasant farms of Chernivtsi and Akkerman oblasts". This freed all peasant farms of these areas from tax arrears and encouraged peasants to join collective farms by reducing the agricultural tax on such farms by twenty five per cent and eliminating the agricultural tax on small livestock of collective farms.³⁹ Also, the decision established an income tax on farms, scaled according to earnings,

which was imposed on all farms with a taxable assessment income exceeding 1,000 roubles per annum.⁴⁰

The areas annexed from Romania and incorporated into the Ukrainian Republic were subjected to land reform on September 26. This declared that the maximum land norm per peasant household was to be twenty hectares in the Akkerman and Izmail districts, ten hectares in Chernivtsi and Storozhyntsi and seven hectares in Khotyn.⁴¹ All surplus lands were to be transferred into a fund for distribution amongst land-needy peasants.⁴² The village Soviets were to carry out both the confiscation of land over the established norm and the allotment of these lands to the poorer peasants.⁴³

The nationalization of land was implemented rapidly. On November 20, the Chernivtsi land-regulation authorities announced that 175,000 hectares of land had been nationalized, including 90,200 hectares from *pomishchyky* and 18,200 hectares from the church.⁴⁴ Of this land, 79,600 hectares, or forty five per cent was allotted to the *bidniak* peasantry.⁴⁵ The following month Hrushetsky declared that the Soviets had nationalized 191,074 hectares of *pomishchyky*, church, official and *kulak* lands.⁴⁶ The average dimensions of a peasant farm in Chernivtsi had thereby been raised to 2.5 hectares.⁴⁷

It is possible to distinguish certain features concerning Soviet agricultural policies in the newly-annexed areas. It was mentioned earlier that the Soviet land measures were implemented very rigorously. The Romanian Ukrainian territories were politically more reliable and economically less valuable than Galicia and Volhynia. As a result, Soviet policy was more ruthless and clearcut. In contrast to the ex-Polish regions, in the Romanian areas, a land reform was instituted within two

months and *kulak* landholding attacked from the outset. The poorer peasants benefitted in terms of land procurement, but it should be noted that most of the nationalized land remained in the hands of the Soviet state.

Bibliography for Chapter Five

1. Partarkhiv Chernivets'koho obkomu komunistychnoi partii ukrainy, Chernivetskyi oblasnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv: *Radianska Bukovyna 1940-1945, Dokumenty i materialy*, (Kiev, 1967), (referred to hereafter as *Rad Buk*: "Note of the Soviet government to the government of Romania about the return of Bessarabia and the transfer of Northern Bukovyna to the Soviet Union" June 26, 1940, *Rad. Buk.* pp. 11-12.
2. *Ibid.*
3. "Note of the Soviet government to the government of Romania about regulating the transfer of Northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia to the Soviet Union", June 27, 1940, *Rad. Buk.* p. 12.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Pravda*, June 29, 1940.
7. *Ibid.*
8. "From the decision of the TsK KP(b)U 'Concerning the composition of district committees of the KP(b)U of Soviet Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovyna'", July 4, 1940, *Rad. Buk.* p. 15.
9. John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, (New York, 1959), p. 113.
10. *Torzhestvo istorychnoi spravedlyvosti*, (Lviv, 1968), p. 591.
11. "From the information of Chernivtsi district KP(b)U TsK KP(b)U about the establishment of Soviet power in Northern Bukovyna and the commencing of work of party and Soviet organs", Not before 22 and no later than 30 July 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 26-32.
12. A. Repida, *Obrazovanie Moldavskoi ASSR*, (Kishinev, 1974), p. 149.

13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. Prezidiumul sovetului suprem Al RSS Moldovenesht: *RSS Moldoveniaske-ymptsire administrativ-teritoriale*, (Kishinev, 1968), p. 148.
16. A.M. Lazarev, *Vossoedinenie Moldavskogo narode v edinoe sovetskoe gosudarstvo*, (Kishinev, 1965), p. 63.
17. "From Law about changes and supplements to Articles 13, 23 and 48 of the Soviet Constitution", August 7, 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 34-35.
18. *Istoriia selianstva URSR*, T2 (Kiev, 1967), p. 270.
19. "From Protocol No. 15 of the conference of Chernivtsi oblast committee KP(b)U", August 15, 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 39-40.
20. *Ibid.*
21. "Report of Chernivtsi oblast land section concerning the state of land-use in the oblast", September 9, 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 52-53.
22. A.O. Ianiuk, "Zdiisnennia leninskoho kooperatyvnoho planu na Bukovyni", *Ukrainkyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 7, (1972), 63.
23. *Pravda*, July 30, 1940.
24. *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 52-53.
25. G.S. Entelis, *Preobrazovanie sotsialno-klassovoi struktury selskogo naselenia*. (Na materialakh Moldavskoi SSR), (Kishinev, 1974), p. 48.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Pravda*, December 2, 1940.
28. I.M. Krawchenko, "Sostialistychna perebudova ekonomiky radianskoi Bukovyny", *Uk. ist. zh.*, No. 8, (1967), 12.

29. "Information of Chernivtsi oblast executive committee and oblast committee KP(b)U to the Peoples Commissariat URSR and the TsK KP(b)U concerning the lack of cows of the mass of *bidniak* peasant farms of the oblast", No earlier than November 11, no later than December 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 65-66.
30. Ianiuk, p. 63.
31. Naukove tovarystvo im. T. Shevchenka u Lvovi, *IV Ukrains'kyi statystychnyi richnyk. 1936-1937*, (Warsaw-Lviv, 1937), p. 84.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Akademiia nauk URSR. Instytut ekonomiky, *Narysy ekonomichnoi heohrafii ukrainskoi radianskoi sotsialistychnoi respubliky*, (Kiev, 1952), p. 545.
34. "Resolution of the Council of heads and secretaries of *volost* executive committees, rural and urban Soviets about the distribution of *pomishchyyk* and church lands amongst the landless and land-needy peasants of Chernivtsi district", July 11, 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 18-20.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Torzhestvo istorychnoi spravedlyvosti*, p. 603.
37. *Istoriia selianstva*, p. 270.
38. "Ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet SRSR concerning nationalization of land on the territory of Northern Bukovyna", August 15, 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, p. 37.
39. "Decision of the Peoples Commissariat URSR 'Concerning taxes from peasant farms of Chernivtsi and Akkerman oblasts'", August 22, 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, pp 40-42.
40. *Ibid.*

41. "Decision of the Peoples Commissariat URSR and TsK KP(b)U about the establishment of maximum norms of land-use per peasant household in Akkerman and Chernivtsi oblasts", September 26, 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 57-58.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. "Report of Chernivtsi oblast land-regulation authorities about the nationalization of the lands of the great landowners", November 20, 1940, *Rad. Buk.*, p. 68.
45. *Ibid.*
46. "From the report of the Secretary of Chernivtsi oblast committee KP(b)U I.S. Hrushetsky at the meeting of oblast party *aktiv* about the state of agriculture in the oblast", December 11, 1940, in *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR*, (Kiev, 1976), pp. 142-143.
47. *Ibid.*

Chapter Six: West Ukrainian Agriculture Before Collectivization

i) Former Polish Areas

After the initial redistribution of land in late-1939, West Ukrainian agriculture was subjected to Soviet organization and planning. On January 15, 1940, the Ukrainian Council of Peoples Commissars divided the oblast land sections into eight departments, namely: an agricultural institute, which included a mechanization sector and an organization department; a planning and finance department; an institute of land regulation and improvement; a sector for selecting and preparing cadres; a veterinary institute; a livestock raising institute; a department of accounting and business institute.¹

The Plan for the 1940 harvest was announced on February 4, and was to be passed down to the raions by February 15.² It stated that the sown area under grain in 1940 was to be 4,048,000 hectares, of which Spring crops were to make up 2,457,000 hectares and Winter crops 1,592,100 hectares.³ *Bidniak* farms were to be given aid in repairing agricultural machinery and implements and leaflets explaining the more complex processes of agrotechnology were to be distributed by February 25.⁴

The Soviets assigned, 1.2 million roubles from the State budget for the development of the economy of West Ukraine in 1940.⁵ In addition, thirty million roubles were set aside for agricultural needs in the localities and forty million roubles for the organization of Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) and the mechanization of agriculture.⁶ At the same time, a register of peasant property was compiled, derived from several independent surveys, the purpose of which seems to have been to evaluate *kulak* holdings.⁷

At the start of 1940, it is evident that land tenure had been substantially, although not totally, transformed. In Lviv oblast, from the data of eight *povits*, 59.5 per cent of the total farms now possessed two to seven hectares of land.⁸ In January, the peasants of Lviv had begun to sow both the Winter fields and, despite the proximity of the German-Polish war, considerable sections of former *pomishchyky* land.⁹ An oblast conference of peasants on February 20 declared that the peasants must sow 317,274 hectares of land in the Spring and over 350,000 hectares in the Autumn.¹⁰

The early months of 1940 saw a large-scale development of mechanization and the preparation of mass cadres for agriculture. Table Fifteen illustrates preparation of cadres in Ternopil oblast. In Ternopil, on January 27, 1940, the oblast committee bureau submitted for approval the establishment of a technical school for the mechanization of agriculture, a fruit technical school at Zalishchyky and a zooveterinary school at Iazlovetsk in Zoloty Potik raion.¹¹ Two schools were founded at Chortkiv and Kremenetsk in order to prepare 400 cadres per annum.¹²

In April, there took place the Ternopil oblast party conference, which provided the first detailed look at the agricultural situation, by means of reports issued by the oblast committees. (The growth of collective farms as highlighted at these conferences will be dealt with in Chapter Seven). From Drohobych, it was reported that by April 27, the peasants had received 86,365 hectares of *pomishchyk*, church and monastery land, and 20,000 hectares formerly occupied by military settlers.¹³ *Pomishchyk* landholding had been liquidated and the size of the average *kulak* farm had been reduced from 18.5 to 15.0 hectares.¹⁴

From Lviv on April 23, it was stated that the oblast possessed 231,079

Table Fifteen: The Plan of Preparation of Mass Cadres of Ternopil

Oblast Land Section in 1940

<u>Funded Courses</u>	<u>No. Prepared</u>	<u>Place of Instruction</u>
Tractorist preparation	200	Iazlovets School
" "	200	Kremets Mech. School
" "	240	Chortkiv Mech. School
" "	160	" " "
Combiner preparation	160	Ternopil Mech. School
Brigadiers of tractor brigades	120	Kremenets Mech. School
Retraining of tractor mechanics	40	Ternopil Tech. School
Motorists and machinists	380	Ternopil Tech. Iazlovets School, Kremenets Mech. School
Approved specialists of market garden crops	15	Oblast land section
Requalifying zootechnicians	55	Iazlovets zoovet. tech.
Seminar of zoovet techs. for pedigree matters	13	Oblast land section
Seminar of zoovet techs on horse-breeding	13	" " "
Grooms	26	Derzhstan
Instructors of bee-keeping	38	Zbaraz RZV
Seminar for retaining agronomists	38	Oblast land section
" " " "	22	" " "
Approved grain crop agronomists	28	" " "
Seminar of goodesists	28	" " "
Seminar of forest protection	325	" " "
Veterinary seminar	80	" " "
Total	2,101	

Source: "Decision of the bureau of Ternopil oblast committee KP(b)U and the oblast executive committee 'Concerning agricultural schools and the preparation of mass agricultural cadres in the oblast'", January 27, 1940, in *Radianska Ternopilshchyna 1939-1958. Dokumenty i materialy*, (Lviv, 1971), No. 40.

peasant farms, which occupied 800,150 hectares of land, or approximately 3.5 hectares per farm.¹⁵ The distribution of land in Lviv oblast is portrayed in Table Sixteen. Of the 617,334 hectares of arable land in the oblast, it was planned to sow in 1940, 421,080 hectares with grain, 14,859 hectares with technical crops, 131,838 hectares with vegetables, 10,600 hectares of orchards and 5,184 hectares of ponds.¹⁶

The "toiling peasants" of Lviv had reportedly received from the Soviet government 134,655 hectares of land, 8,920 cows, 1,509 heifers, 5,084 horses, 150 oxen, 1,058 pigs, 880 sheep and 10,000 centners of grain and potatoes.¹⁷ Nevertheless, there were still 80,000 horseless farms in Lviv oblast in April 1940.¹⁸ The oblast committee also noted that less than ten per cent of the cattle were of pedigree stock.¹⁹ The report mentioned that there had been established an agricultural institute in the village of Dubliany and a veterinary institute in the city of Lviv.²⁰

At the Rivne oblast party conference, the First Secretary Behma reported that the Soviets had nationalized 233,481 hectares of agricultural land, 4,807 horses, 5,432 cows, 3,661 pigs, 2,545 sheep and 1,795 other animals.²¹ The poorer stratum of peasant farms had received 90,548 hectares of land, 2,998 horses, 4,918 cows, 2,515 pigs and 1,234 sheep.²² The number of agricultural specialists over the six months of Soviet rule had been increased from 146 to 242, with the latter figure including eighty nine agronomists, forty veterinary surgeons and thirty nine geodesists.²³

In Ternopil, the Soviets had nationalized 363,889 hectares of land, from which 111,211 peasant farms were allotted a total of 200,000 hectares.²⁴ From the former landlord estates were transferred to peasant farms

Table Sixteen: Landholding of Peasant Farms of Lviv Oblast in April 1940

<u>Grps. ha.</u>	<u>No. of Farms</u>	<u>% of Total Farms</u>	<u>Land Area</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Av.Per Farm</u>
0.5-2	79,010	34.2	95,339	11.9	1,21
2-5	110,752	47.9	358,826	45.0	3,24
5-10	34,292	14.8	234,401	29.3	6,84
10-15	4,877	2.1	59,783	7.5	12,26
15-20	2,090	0.9	45,565	5.7	21,8
50 and over	58	0.02	5,176	0.6	
Total	231,079	100.0	800,150	100.0	3,46

Source: "From the report account of Lviv obkom KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference concerning the situation of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940, in *Z ist.*, p. 115.

11,229 horses, 11,062 cows, 1,222 oxen, 3,367 sheep and 5,223 pigs.²⁵

For the 1940 Spring sowing campaign, the oblast committee envisaged a total sown area of 658,600 hectares, of which 652,061 hectares would be in the peasant sector and 6,539 hectares under the cultivation of state farms (see Chapter Seven).²⁶

There are no documents available concerning the first oblast party conference in Volyn. Later reports however indicate similar attempts to prepare cadres for agriculture. By September 5, the Trostianets school had prepared fifty six veterinary surgeons, thirty two zootechnicians and thirty five book-keepers.²⁷ It was expected that by June 1, 1941, the Buzhan agricultural school would have prepared 824 tractorists, brigadiers of tractor brigades, chauffeurs, combine-drivers and their assistants.²⁸ The Soviet government assigned a total of 5,119,800 roubles for the development of the economy of the Volyn oblast in 1940.²⁹

It is clear that the Soviet government had very carefully planned out the 1940 agricultural year in the western oblasts. The reports of the party conferences reveal the close control exercised by the party over agriculture. Two further steps were required to effect the change from a backward agricultural area into a more developed and advanced region in the eyes of the Soviets. First, the area required an input of agricultural machinery from outside West Ukraine and production of the same in the urban centres. Secondly, according to Stalinist doctrine, agriculture could not progress whilst the bulk of the peasantry remained on small individual farms.

ii) The Agricultural Development of Chernivtsi Oblast Prior to Collectivization

Soviet policy towards the newly-acquired Chernivtsi region in the

Fall of 1940 was a combination of restrained benevolence and strict enforcement of land distribution and communal farming. From the oblast budget, only 612,000 roubles were allocated for agricultural needs in the second half of 1940.³⁰ Also the oblast branch of *Silhosp Postachannia* received for sale to the poorer peasants, 500 straw cutters, 200 winnowers and seventeen threshing machines.³¹ By the end of the year, the peasants had received 49,819 hectares of *pomishchyyk* land, 1,177 head of cattle, 790 horses and 5,394 sheep.³²

The Chernivtsi oblast possessed a total land area at the end of 1940, of 752,700 hectares, which included 371,847 hectares of arable land, 184,308 hectares of forest and 60,643 hectares of pasture.³³ The ownership of this land during this period was divided as follows: peasants 72.1 per cent, state forests 22.4 per cent and state farms 3.2 per cent.³⁴ There were 175,229 peasant farms in Chernivtsi oblast which remained poorly endowed with land; sixty per cent possessed less than two hectares of land per farm (compared to the established maximum norm of seven to ten hectares).³⁵ On average, each peasant farm was about three hectares in size.

On December 11, First Secretary Hrushetsky presented a report to a meeting of the oblast party *aktiv*. He announced that the Plan of Autumn sowing had been fulfilled by 103 per cent and with an increase of 27,000 hectares in grain sown.³⁶ However, the Hertsaiv, Chernivtsi rural and Novoselytsk raions were singled out for their "backwardness" in terms of raion committee guidance of agriculture and undue attention towards increasing the area under plough.³⁷ To overcome such difficulties, 16,987 joint-work or pooling groups had been created in the oblast.³⁸ A month later, this figure had increased to over 19,000.³⁹

The provision of peasant farms with livestock in the oblast is illustrated in Table Seventeen. Despite the distribution of livestock, formerly owned by the great landowners, amongst the peasants, in January 1941, forty five per cent of all farms did not possess a cow and 44.3 per cent owned just one cow, 69.3 per cent of peasant farms did not own a horse and 28.4 per cent had a single horse.⁴⁰ In six months, Soviet rulers, having driven out the former landowners, had done little to alleviate either the inadequate supply of land, or the lack of livestock amongst peasant farms.

The shortage of livestock was not offset by the provision of agricultural machinery. Indeed the latter was in short supply prior to the commencement of collectivization. On January 1, 1941, the 175,000 peasant farms had in their utilization 53,193 horse ploughs, 1,233 cultivators, 1,283 seeding machines, 5,454 winnowers and a mere 129 tractors.⁴¹ Peasants were encouraged to pool their resources, thereby preparing the way for the formation of collective farms in the Spring of 1941.

A report of the agricultural section of the Chernivtsi oblast committee issued on January 25, 1941, revealed the preparation of agricultural cadres and specialists. Scientific research stations had been opened, a school for tractorists had been established, attended by 205 people and a school to prepare zoo technicians, veterinary surgeons and accountants, attended by 120 people.⁴² For the care of animals, fourteen raion veterinary hospitals had been organized alongside fourteen veterinary sections in the villages and an urban veterinary hospital.⁴³

Table Seventeen: Livestock in Chernivtsi Oblast in January 1941

<u>Livestock</u>	<u>Total No.</u>	<u>Average No. per Peasant Farm</u>
Horses	85,507	0.5
Cattle	211,197	1.2
Oxen	2,404	0.01
Young Animals	94,776	0.54
Pigs	131,846	0.75
Sheep	265,909	1.5
Poultry	891,660	5.1

Source: "From reports concerning the state of the economy in Chernivtsi oblast", January 1, 1941, *Rad. Buk.*, p. 97.

One can conclude with the assertion that the peasants of Chernivtsi oblast benefitted little from the first six months of Soviet rule. No effort was made to win the sympathy of the peasants with offers of substantial amounts of land, livestock or machinery. Moreover, few efforts were made to persuade the poorer peasants to actually form collective farms in this period. The agricultural section head, Putyi, noted in passing that by January 20, fifteen initiative groups had been created as the prelude to forming a *kolhosp*.⁴⁴ In contrast, Izmail oblast reportedly had forty one collective farms by early December 1940.⁴⁵ Chernivtsi in early 1941 was a neglected region within Soviet Ukraine.

Bibliography to Chapter Six

1. "Decision of the Council of Peoples Commissars URSR about the structure and staff of oblast and raion land sections of the western oblasts URSR", January 15, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 24.
2. "Decision of the Council of Peoples Commissars URSR and the TsK KP(b)U about the approval of the Plan of agricultural work for the western oblasts URSR in 1940", February 4, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 24-26.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 47.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Milena Rudnytska ed., *Zakhidnia Ukraina pid bolshevykamy*, IX. 1939 - VI. 1941, (New York, 1958), p. 317.
8. *Pravda*, January 9, 1940.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Pravda*, February 20, 1940.
11. "Decision of the bureau of Ternopil obkom KP(b)U and the oblast executive committee 'Concerning agricultural schools and the preparation of mass agricultural cadres in the oblast'", January 27, 1940, *Rad. Tern.*, No. 40.
12. *Ibid.*
13. "From the report account of Drohobych obkom KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference concerning the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 27, 1940, *Z ist.*, 126-128.
14. *Ibid.*

15. "From the report account of Lviv obkom KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference concerning the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 115-121.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Pravda*, April 4, 1940.
19. "From the report account of Lviv obkom".
20. *Ibid.*
21. "From the report account of Rivne obkom KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference concerning the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 121-125.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. "From the report account of Ternopil obkom KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference concerning the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 111-113.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Kolhospnyk Ukraini* (Newspaper, Kiev), September 5, 1940.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Narysy istorii Volynskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii*, (Kiev, 1968), p. 60.
30. A.O. Ianiuk, "Zdyisnennia leninskoho kooperatyvnoho planu na Bukovyni", *Uk. ist.*, *zh.*, No. 7, (1972), 64.
31. *Ibid.*

32. "Report of the agricultural section of Chernivtsi obkom KP(b)U concerning the results of the 1940 agricultural year", January 25, 1941, *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 122-127.
33. "From reports concerning the state of the economy of Chernivtsi oblast", Not before January 1, not after January 29, 1941, *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 92-98.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. "From the report of the Secretary of Chernivtsi obkom KP(b)U I.S. Hrushetsky at the meeting of the oblast party *aktiv* concerning the state of agriculture in the oblast", December 11, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 142-143.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. Ianiuk, p. 64.
40. *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 92-98.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Rad. Buk.*, pp. 122-127.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Rad. Buk.*, p. 127.

Chapter Seven: The Collectivization of Agriculture

i) The Beginnings

Why did the peasants of West Ukraine join collective farms? A typical Soviet explanation taken from the Lviv oblast newspaper *Vilna Ukraina, (Free Ukraine)* emphasizes the spontaneity and basic democracy of the collective movement:-

- The *bidniak* peasants of the village Honiatychi in Shchyrets raion have often debated the question of how best to cultivate and sow the land given to them by the Soviet authorities, and always unanimously reach this conclusion; in order to end poverty, once and for all, we must unite in a collective farm.¹ -

The rationale behind collectivization as a means to overcome poverty was that the small peasant farms were unable to utilize the more advanced machinery and techniques available to the larger Soviet farms. Increased mechanization thus signifies increased efficiency.

In contrast to the above quotation, any eyewitness, located in Drohobych, maintains that "not a single village in West Ukraine voluntarily joined a *kolhosp*".² Soviet and emigre reports tend to clash head-on in this matter and the truth is difficult to deduce. What is clear however is that collectivization could not have been introduced into West Ukraine without the intensive preparatory propaganda campaign on the part of the Soviet authorities, a campaign which began in September 1939, with an article in the same *Vilna Ukraina* illustrating the benefits of collectivization, entitled "Happily and joyfully live the peasants of Soviet Ukraine".³

The newspapers were at the forefront of the propaganda campaign and publicized the discussions concerning collective farm construction,

and the formation of initiative groups in the various oblasts. In an article entitled "Astray from the *kolhosp* path", the Rivne oblast newspaper *Chervonyi Prapor* criticized the leaders of Mezhyrytsky raion for not helping the initiative groups to create collective farms.⁴ Also in the first months of Soviet rule, about one million books and brochures, including the classics of Marxism-Leninism, materials of the All-Union XVIII Congress and the eleventh edition of Stalin's "Questions of Leninism" were sent to West Ukraine and West Belorussia.⁵

Before embarking on the path of collectivization, it was necessary for the Soviets to raise the number of party members and sympathizers in the western oblasts. Initially, the new rulers were represented by a tiny minority of helpers in the rural areas. In Ternopil after annexation, there were twenty to thirty communists in the oblast, a figure which had increased to 1,000 by mid-December.⁶ In Stanislav, in February 1940, it was reported in the press that many new agitators in Zhabie and Tlumach had no reports from the raion committees and "do not know where to start".⁷

Of the 1,434 communists working in Lviv oblast in October and November 1939, 631 were operating in industry and transport and 272 in economic work.⁸ A Western source notes that in December 1940, the number of communists in the village Soviets of West Ukraine amounted to less than two per cent of total members.⁹ Nevertheless, communist representation increased steadily, and by April 1940, there were reportedly over 16,000 communists in the party organizations of West Ukraine.¹⁰ In Lviv in December, over 10,000 people from the local population had been attracted into leading Soviet and economic work.¹¹

Propaganda work tended to focus on certain basic issues, for example, on the elections to the Peoples Assembly of West Ukraine in October 1939 and the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and UkSSR of March 1940. Thus for the former, 13,575 agitators worked in the Stanislav region and 15,297 in the Volyn region.¹² In the villages at the end of 1940, were operating 1,176 primary party organizations and 189 raion organizations.¹³

However, most of the primary party organizations were very small. For example, of 319 primary party organizations operating in Drohobych on January 1, 1941, seventy had less than five communists, 109 had from six to ten, and sixty nine possessed from eleven to fifteen communists.¹⁴ The situation was similar in other oblasts of West Ukraine. The implications are quite clear; prior to the Second World War, the Soviet authorities did not succeed in building up a strong party network in the rural areas of West Ukraine. This factor was to have an adverse effect upon the rate of collectivization.

Although weak in numbers, the so-called "agit-prop" workers carried out an intensive campaign of work. With every urban and raion committee were created party cabinets, in which were given lectures on Marxist-Leninist theory.¹⁵ In Lviv, 497 lectures were delivered in the party cabinets up to April 15, 1940, and in Drohobych, 312.¹⁶ In the oblast and urban committees, lecture groups were formed and within the sections of peoples' education, lecture bureaus, which disseminated propaganda.¹⁷ The number of lectures given increased at election time.

In place of the former cultural organizations of West Ukrainian villages, such as the *Prosvita* reading rooms, were set up Soviet models; houses of culture, red corners, clubs and reading huts. By the start

of 1940, all major libraries had been nationalized and East Ukrainian libraries dispatched supplies of books to the newly-annexed areas. Thus in January 1940, the libraries of Lviv oblast received over 22,000 books from Odessa oblast and the libraries of Vinnychchyna assumed "patronage" over those of Ternopil oblast.¹⁸ West Ukrainian culture was gradually converted to the Soviet model.

ii) Formation of MTS and State Farms

The organization of Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) took place in the Spring and Summer of 1940, when the drive towards collective farms was being initiated. By March 12, 127 qualified workers, including senior agronomists, senior mechanics and book-keepers had been sent into West Ukraine by the Peoples Commissariat of Land Affairs, in order to work in the future MTS.¹⁹ On March 25, the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars announced the proposed formation of one hundred MTS in West Ukraine, of which eighteen were to be in Volyn, ten in Drohobych, sixteen in Rivne, twenty in Lviv, fourteen in Stanislav and twenty two in Ternopil oblasts.²⁰

This decision instructed the Peoples Commissariat of Land Affairs (NKZ) to obtain for the MTS, 600 U-2 tractors, one hundred STZ-NATI tractors, 150 beet harvesters, one hundred five-rake ploughs and 600 tractor-hoeing ploughs.²¹ The NKZ was further directed to send to the MTS, one hundred MTS directors, one hundred deputy directors for political work, one hundred book-keepers, one hundred mechanics, one hundred agronomists, seven hundred tractor drivers and two hundred brigadiers of tractor brigades.²² The MTS received agricultural machinery from former *pomishchyyk* and other nationalized farms.²³

On June 4, a second decision stipulated the organization of

another seventy four MTS, to be divided as follows: Volyn twelve, Drohobych seven, Rivne fourteen, Lviv fourteen, Stanislav eleven and Ternopil sixteen.²⁴ The number of MTS in each oblast then corresponded approximately to the number of raions. In the regions annexed from Romania, the MTS were formally founded on December 18, 1940, when it was resolved that forty MTS should be established by February 1, 1941, from which twenty seven were to be in Izmail and thirteen in Chernivtsi oblast.²⁵

Consequently, a total of 214 MTS were to be set up on West Ukrainian territories by Spring 1941. They were to service newly-founded *kolhosps* and individual farms by means of planned ploughing and threshing of grain. In 1940, the MTS of Ternopil oblast reportedly aided 42,362 individual peasant farms by ploughing 135,267 hectares of land.²⁶ The thirty four MTS of Lviv oblast serviced 40,000 *bidniak-seredniak* farms over the course of the year.²⁷ Table Eighteen illustrates the work of the Burshtyn MTS in Stanislav oblast in 1940.

The MTS represented the so-called "advanced techniques" of Soviet agriculture as opposed to the primitive agricultural conditions under Polish and Romanian rule. Nevertheless, the organization of MTS was far from satisfactory. In December 1940, the head of the Ukrainian Council of Peoples Commissars, L. Korniets, pointed out that the plan of tractor work had been fulfilled by only seventy seven per cent, in Stanislav by 63.6 per cent and in Rivne by 66.4 per cent.²⁸ The proposed six workshops for major repairs had not been set up in good time and only ninety eight per cent of the 174 MTS had constructed workshops of current repair.²⁹

Table Eighteen: Fulfillment of Kolhosp Work in Burshtyn MTS,
Stanislav Oblast in 1940

	<u>Plan</u>	<u>Fulfillment</u>	<u>Per Centage</u>
Spring Ploughing	117	141	120
Ploughing under Winter Corn	160	349	218
Cultivation under Winter Corn		210	210
Autumn Ploughing	100	365	365
Threshing	260	264	101

Source: "From the decision of the buro of Burshtyn raion committee
 KP(b)U of Stanislav Oblast concerning the work of Burshtyn
 MTS", January 17, 1941, *Z ist.*, p. 152.

Further, the plan of preparation of tractor drivers in 1940 in West Ukraine had been fulfilled by only 74.6 per cent and conscription in instruction schools by 71.2 per cent.³⁰ An emigre source claims that the methods used for ploughing the black soil of West Ukraine were applied indiscriminately to the western regions, with the result that the tractorists ploughed so deeply that they destroyed the topsoil.³¹ It is evident that the application of Soviet techniques in West Ukraine entailed several problems, although owing to the shortage of native specialists, this was essentially a formative period for the newly-established MTS.

State farms were organized on former landlord estates, with each farm specializing in a particular branch of agriculture. On April 9, 1940, *Pravda* announced that forty nine state farms were being created in West Ukraine and West Belorussia.³² In West Ukraine, eighteen farms were to specialize in meat and dairy products, four in horse breeding, two in meat and one in seed crops.³³ A report by Korniiets on September 17 however stated that only six state farms had been set up in West Ukraine by this date.³⁴

On January 27, 1941, six state farms had been created in Drohobych oblast, one for beets and five for animal husbandry, the latter possessing 3,908 cattle, 667 pigs and 819 horses.³⁵ Nine farms were being organized in Rivne at this time, including two for animals, two for beets, two for horses and three for market garden products.³⁶ These were located on former *pomishchyk* estates in Tuchne, Morochniv, Verbivtsi, Mlyniv, Dubno, Kostopil, Derazhnian and Rivne raions, encompassing 9,531 hectares of land.³⁷

In Ternopil oblast, a decision to create state farms was issued as early as January 29, 1940. This envisaged an animal farm in the village of Bilokernytsia, in Kremenets'k raion, a beet farm in the village of Laskivtsi in Budzaniv raion and a grain farm on the former German colony of Bekerdorf, in Pidhaitsi raion.³⁸ To provide these farms with draught animals, the decision ordered the transfer from the *filvarks* (manors) of thirty horses and fifty oxen to the Bilokernytsia farm, fifty horses and fifty oxen to the one at Laskivtsi and 120 horses to the Bekerdorf farm.³⁹

In the former Romanian areas, twelve state farms had reportedly been organized by October 22, 1940, with a total sown area of 30,000 hectares.⁴⁰ In Chernivtsi, Hrushetsky announced that nine state farms had been established by December 11.⁴¹ On March 19, 1941, a total of seventeen state farms had been created in Chernivtsi and Izmail oblasts.⁴² Other sources cite a total of twenty four state farms.⁴³ It is possible that several state farms were disbanded within a few months due to lack of stability.

Thus in the former Polish Ukraine, the addition of reported figures for the numbers of state farms in individual oblasts gives a total of fifty two for the 1940-1941 period. Yet an anti-Soviet source states that only twenty *radhosps* were actually set up prior to the German invasion and that these were grossly inefficient, so that in the Spring of 1941, many were liquidated and the state was obliged to pay off huge deficits for the others.⁴⁴ Given the discrepancies in Soviet figures, it is possible to assume that the total of fifty two represented some very optimistic paper work. However, as will be shown, the state farms were much better provided for than the first *kolhosps*.

iii) First Steps in Collectivization

Collectivization in West Ukraine was not undertaken until the Spring of 1940 (although a few scattered farms were set up before that time). It was preceded by the visits of numerous delegations to the oblasts of East Ukraine and to the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow.⁴⁵ In turn, delegations from the Russian Republic, Kazakhstan and Georgia visited West Ukraine prior to collectivization.⁴⁶ Political educators were sent from village to village, encouraging the formation of collective farms in each parish in which church lands had not been divided.⁴⁷ Lands of nearby peasants were partially transferred to the prospective *kolhosps*, whether or not they had expressed a desire to join.⁴⁸

The first collective farms were founded in January 1940, in the villages of Ukhovetsk, in Kovel raion, Volyn oblast and Smordva, in Mlynivtsi raion, Rivne oblast.⁴⁹ In the former region, 315 out of 630 farms in the village area had presented appeals to join the *kolhosp*, but amongst them were reportedly *kulaks* and former police agents.⁵⁰ By February, another *kolhosp* was created in Volyn, in the village Brishcho, of Lutsk raion.⁵¹ These early collective farms were encouraged to attend the Republican Council of *Peredovyks* (activists) of Agriculture, held on February 8 and 9, by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party apparatus.⁵²

The end of February saw the establishment of collective farms throughout West Ukraine. In Rivne, new artels arose in the villages Koritno of Kozin raion and Pechaliv of Kostopil raion and in Ternopil oblast, in the village Kalaharivka, of Hrymaliv raion.⁵³ In Lviv oblast, a *kolhosp* was organized in the village Dobriany of Horodok raion, in Stanislaw, in the village Bukivna of Tlumach raion and in Drohobych,

in the village Bolekhivtsi, of Drohobych raion.⁵⁴ By the Spring of 1940, there were about one hundred *kolhosps* on the territory of West Ukraine. It is necessary to look at the process in its early stages in the various oblasts.

Drohobych Oblast

The progress made in collectivizing Drohobych was discussed at the first oblast party conference, held in April 1940. At this time, thirty one collective farms had been set up, encompassing 1,534 peasant households with 5,686 people.⁵⁶ The *kolhosps* possessed 7,409 hectares of land, or about 240 hectares per farm, which included 4,019 hectares formerly owned by military settlers and German colonists.⁵⁷ From the *osadnyk* farms had been transferred 509 cattle, 151 calves, 167 pigs and sixty eight sheep and a farm for animal husbandry had been organized on each *kolhosp*.⁵⁸ 625 horses had been collectivized and 366 more were to be sent to the artels.⁵⁹

Although the conference praised the efforts made, the oblast committee made reference to sabotage and counter-revolutionary agitation undertaken by remnants of the "enemy" against the new farms. In particular, in the village Kalnykiv of Mostyska raion, twenty six farms had applied to join the *kolhosp* and then withdrawn, and this occurred also in Zhuravnyky and Medynychi raions.⁶⁰ Thus, many of the new farms may have lacked stability and subsequently have been disbanded.

Further, the number of collective farms in the oblast increased very slowly. On May 15, forty *kolhosps* had been organized,⁶¹ yet by August 23, the figure had risen only to forty five.⁶² The oblast committee First Secretary, I.N. Tkach, reported on December 15 that the

oblast had fifty six *kolhosps*, embracing about 3,000 peasant farms.⁶³ Finally, on January 25, 1941, eighty seven collective farms had been established, sixty six of which possessed farms for the development of various branches of animal husbandry.⁶⁴

The situation on the artel "Voroshilov", located in the village Horodovychi of Zhyriv raion, was described in a farming newspaper by one A. Bondarenko. On September 5, 1940, all 194 farms of the village were united in the artel, which had 420 hectares of arable land, thirty two hectares of meadows, thirty two hectares of forest and seventy nine hectares of pasture land.⁶⁵ The *kolhosp* had three animal farms; for dairy, with 110 cows, for pigs, with twenty two sows and for sheep, with eighty four head.⁶⁶ The farm possessed eighty eight horses and eleven foals.⁶⁷

"Voroshilov" may have been an exemplary *kolhosp*, since the problem farms rarely made the pages of a nationally read newspaper. Nevertheless, it was in some respects typical of a 1940 collective farm in Drohobych, being small in size and possessing a bare minimum of animals. In terms of farms collectivized in 1940, Drohobych was the most backward oblast in West Ukraine.

Lviv Oblast

In Lviv oblast, the first collective farms were founded early in 1940, in the villages of Dobriany and Zavydovych in Horodok raion, Rohizno in Iavoriv raion, Lopushna in Bibrka raion, Poltva in Hlyniany raion and Mistky in Sokal raion.⁶⁸ On March 7, about ten *kolhosps* had been created and thirty initiative groups had expressed a desire to join the new farms.⁶⁹ By April 5, the figure had risen to twenty four

collective farms, with initiative groups operating in fifty villages.⁷⁰

The situation on one of the new artels was described in a report by I.M. Nauholnyko, chairman of the *kolhosp* in the village of Lopushna mentioned above. Of the 196 farmers in the village, 167 had joined the collective farm, the others apparently were willing to join, but they were declared to be *kulaks* and thus their applications had been rejected.⁷¹ The farm possessed 950 hectares of land, 120 horses, eighty three ploughs, 146 harrows, two seeders, seven cultivators and received forty five cows and seven sows, as a donation from the state.⁷²

"*Kulak* opposition" manifested itself in some villages where leadership over the *kolhosps* was reported to be weak. For example, in the villages Ohliadiv of Lopatyn raion and Mistysky of Sokal raion, "*kulak*" elements "wormed their way" into positions of leadership and carried out "hostile agitation", with the result that the peasants left the *kolshosp*s en-mass.⁷³ The First Secretary of the oblast, Hryshchuk, demanded that one of the *raikom* secretaries from each area be assigned to the respective farms, in order to supervise the Spring-sowing campaign.⁷⁴

On April 20, at the time of the oblast party conference, Lviv had thirty one collective farms, with 3,162 peasant farms and seventy two initiative groups which had received appeals from 4,123 farms wanting to join a *kolhosp*.⁷⁵ Data was collected from twenty of the *kolhosps* which showed the following picture. 2,101 peasant households had about 7,000 hectares of collectivized land and 1,074 horses.⁷⁶ There were fourteen cattle farms with 832 cows, ten pig farms with 235 pigs and the state had transferred to the artels twenty five seeding machines and 1,574 centners of sowing material.⁷⁷

Table Nineteen illustrates the progress made in collectivizing Lviv oblast in 1940. The figures suggest a gradual, but definite movement of Lviv peasants towards collective farms. Yet by the end of the year, only 1.6 per cent of all peasant farms in the oblast had joined *kolhosps*. Moreover, many of these were unstable. On June 28, the buro of the oblast committee examined the question "Concerning the organizational-economic strengthening of collective farms in the oblast", which pointed out the good performances and weaknesses of particular *kolhosps*.⁷⁸

The buro noted that on the collective farms "1 Travnia" and "S. M. Kirov" of Zhovka raion and "T.H. Shevchenko" of Sokal raion, no production and financial plans had been drawn up, the account of the work of the collective farmers had not been compiled and the *kolhosp* leaders had failed to strengthen "toiling discipline".⁷⁹ Attempts were made to increase animal husbandry, since Lviv, like neighboring Drohobych oblast, suffered from a shortage of livestock. By November, thirty two artels out of seventy one had three animal farms and sixteen possessed two animal farms.⁸⁰

Rivne Oblast

In Rivne, collectivization was begun relatively late in the year. On April 23, 1940, the First Secretary of the oblast committee, V. Behma, announced at the party conference on the formation of seventeen *kolhosps*, uniting 1,119 peasant farms.⁸¹ They had in their utilization 7,889 hectares of land, 830 horses, 454 cattle and a potential sown area of 3313.2 hectares.⁸² By November 30, seventy nine collective farms had been created, which was 2.2 per cent of all peasant farms.⁸³

Table Nineteen: Collectivization in Lviv Oblast in 1940

<u>Month</u>	<u>Artels</u>	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Land in ha.</u>
February	4	256	1,583
March	28	2,371	13,553
April	43	3,399	19,896
May	46	3,501	20,791
June	48	3,641	22,025
July	50	3,676	22,344
August	57	3,905	23,421
September	68	4,276	25,581
October	71	4,381	26,044
November	71	4,381	26,044
December	76	4,843	27,188

Source: Milena Rudnytska ed., *Zakhidna Ukraina pid bolshevykamy*,
(New York, 1958), p. 333.

Stanislav Oblast

The First Secretary of Stanislav oblast committee, I.S. Hrushetsky, declared on March 13, 1940, that the *obkom* had decided to support the petitions of peasants to join collective farms in the villages Bukivna of Tlumach raion, Stetseva of Sniatyn raion and Strilche of Horodenka raion.⁸⁴ Committee members Ievtushenko and Onishchenko were to dispatch reliable "comrades" into these villages to give practical aid to the peasants.⁸⁵ The control and organization of the said villages was given to the raion secretaries and heads of executive committees.⁸⁶

The collective farm at Bukivna was set up two days later, and consisted of 189 farms with 461 able-bodied men,⁸⁷ which was over half the total residents of the village.⁸⁸ Seven of the best peasant activists were "elected" to the *kolhosp* governing board and K.M. Iakymovych was nominated collective farm chairman.⁸⁹ The farm, called "17 Veresnia", possessed 660 morgues of land, 111 horses, eighty five ploughs, 115 harrows and eighty five carts.⁹⁰ It thus began with a marked deficiency in animals and agricultural implements.

Over the course of the year, there took place a slow growth of collective farming. At the April oblast party conference, Hrulenko stated that twenty four *kolhosps* had been created.⁹¹ On September 17, 1940, the newspaper *Stalinska Pravda* stated that fifty two collective farms and one hundred initiative groups had been organized in Stanislav oblast.⁹² By the end of the year, the number had risen to seventy three, thus showing a threefold increase over the eight month period.⁹³ Nonetheless, this was only three per cent of all peasant farms.

The newspaper *Chervonyi Prapor* published a report of the chairman of the *kolhosp* "Stalin" of the village Hory-Dobrovidka in Kolomyia raion, which perhaps portrays a typical collective farm of Stanislav in the Fall of 1940. Founded on April 4, "Stalin" united 128 *bidniak* and *seredniak* peasant farms.⁹⁴ Although at first the artel had "practically no livestock", the chairman Petro Antoniv reported proudly that it now had eighty six horses, sixteen cows and ten pigs.⁹⁵ The 145 hectares of Winter crops were cultivated with the aid of four seeding machines, four cultivators and one reaper.⁹⁶

Ternopil Oblast

In Ternopil, peasant farmers were encouraged to "stand boldly for the *kolhosp* road" and to engage in socialist competition with Odessa oblast, at the First Council of Agricultural Workers, which took place on February 21 and 22, 1940.⁹⁷ The first farms were founded in mid-March in the villages Kuriany of Berezhany raion, Marianivka of Mykulyntsi raion, Koshliaky of Novosilka raion, Trostianets of Ust-Zelenets raion and Husiatyn and Vilkhivchyk of Husiatyn raion.⁹⁸ The six artels were set up to "satisfy" a total of 591 peasant petitions.⁹⁹

The report of oblast First Secretary Kompanets to the party conference on April 23, revealed that forty five *kolhosps* had been set up, which united 3,905 peasant households and possessed 10,103 hectares of land and 8,325 able-bodied persons.¹⁰⁰ The farms owned 2,003 horses, 1,776 cattle, 712 pigs and 282 sheep.¹⁰¹ Despite this progress, certain defects were outlined, such as the inadequate leadership in Borshchiv raion and the subsequent mass exit of *kolhosp* peasants and the failure to scrutinize appeals in Birky Velykii raion, which had resulted in the admission of *kulak* farmers.¹⁰²

Over the course of the 1940 year, the state gave considerable aid to the newly-founded collective farms in Ternopil. The artels received, mainly from former *pomishchyk* estates, 1,009 residential houses, 1,167 other buildings, 375 mills, 140 pig sties, 340 cowsheds and 310 corn depositories.¹⁰³ The state allocated a further 234,000 roubles of credit for farm construction and transferred to the collectives 1,570 horses, 3,240 cattle, 900 pigs and 1,440 sheep.¹⁰⁴ In addition, courses and seminars were organized to instruct 240 leading *kolhosp* workers, 900 tractorists and 5,000 other specialists.¹⁰⁵

At the end of 1940, eighty six *kolhosps* had been organized in Ternopil oblast, with 6,699 peasant farms and encompassing 35,191 hectares of land.¹⁰⁶ 126 initiative groups had also been formed and had presented 3,259 appeals of peasants to join the collective farms.¹⁰⁷ Within the collective farms had been created ninety five farms for dairy products, eighty eight pig farms, seventy seven sheep farms and forty five poultry farms.¹⁰⁸ The respective animal farms possessed 5,262 cattle, 4,695 pigs and 5,362 sheep.¹⁰⁹

The numbers of cattle in the oblast had been increased following a decision of the executive committee and the *obkom* buro of October 17. This assigned the various raions 900,000 roubles of credit, with which to purchase 4,000 head of cattle in 1950.¹¹⁰ The credit was calculated at fifty per cent of the value of the cattle and the peasants were given three years to pay back the loan.¹¹¹ The aim of the decision was to try and liquidate "cowlessness", since like the other West Ukrainian provinces, Ternopil was very short of livestock.

Volyn Oblast

Soviet reports suggest that far more progress was made in Volyn than in the other oblasts. As noted earlier, the first collective farm established in West Ukraine was in Volyn, in the village of Ukhovetsk, in Kovel raion. The number of collective farms reportedly rose from thirty at the time of the XV Party Congress (KP(b)U) in May¹¹² to eighty eight on September 5.¹¹³ At the end of the year, one Soviet source speaks of 189 collective farms in Volyn, a figure which was more than double that of its nearest rival Ternopil, six per cent of all peasant farms and almost one-third of all collective farms in West Ukraine at that time.¹¹⁴

Yet these figures are open to question. A more recent Soviet source states that there were only forty two *kolhosps* in Volyn by the end of 1940.¹¹⁵ This would then be the lowest total in West Ukraine. Moreover, it is evident that there was substantial opposition to the collective farm movement. Reports speak of the "acute class struggle" and the fact that "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" were spreading anti-Soviet rumors and intimidating the peasants.¹¹⁶ Certain local party organizations, on the other hand, were violating the "Leninist doctrine of voluntariness" and were forcing reluctant peasants to join collective farms.¹¹⁷

On September 28, a decision was issued "Concerning mistakes permitted by the local party organizations of Rivne and Volyn oblasts", which spoke of the inadequate supervision by oblast committees and violations of the Statute of the Agricultural Artel.¹¹⁸ A Plenum of the oblast committee was held on October 26 and this remarked that in may artels, brigades and teams had still not been created and wages had been

levelled off, irrespective of the amount of work carried out.¹¹⁹ One must treat with some caution the Soviet claims of successes in Volyn during this first experiment in the technique of collectivization.

iv) West Ukrainian Overview in 1940

The state of collective farming and the establishment of state farms and MTS at the end of 1940, is illustrated in Table Twenty. The total of 556 *kolhosps* is not accepted by all Soviet authorities. M.K. Ivasiuta, writing in 1962, puts the figure much lower at 276 *kolhosps*, uniting 21,300 farms.¹²⁰ Ivasiuta's figure may discount collective farms that were disbanded. The party conferences, the XV Party Congress and the various Plenums held in West Ukraine in 1940 all stress that stronger leadership is required in order to consolidate the collective farms.

The deficiencies in livestock and agricultural implements will be dealt with at a later point. The West Ukrainian farms were also lacking in agricultural personnel. At the close of the year, Volyn possessed ninety eight agronomists, forty eight zoo technicians and thirty three veterinary assistants and Ternopil 195 agronomists, thirty five zoo technicians, seventy five veterinary surgeons and ninety five veterinary assistants.¹²¹ When one considers that Volyn's agrarian population numbered about 875,000 and that of Ternopil 880,000, then the lack of personnel is immediately evident.

v) The Start of Collectivization in Chernivtsi Oblast

In Chernivtsi, the collectivization movement did not begin until early 1941. Since the region was not annexed until June 1940, it is conceivable that the Soviet leaders decided to postpone the formation of collective farms until the Spring sowing campaign of 1941. This

Table Twenty: The Socialized Sector of West Ukrainian Agriculture
at the End of 1940

<u>Oblast</u>	<u>Collective Farms</u>	<u>MTS</u>	<u>State Farms</u>
Rivne	84	30	8
Volyn	186	30	10
Ternopil	85	38	8
Lviv	74	34	10
Stanislav	69	25	11
Drohobych	58	17	12
Total	556	174	59

Source: V.L. Varetsky, *Sotsialistychna peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR*, (Kiev, 1960), p. 253.

would give the new rulers six months to prepare the groundwork and to carry out propaganda amongst Chernivtsi peasants. As a result, Chernivtsi lagged well behind the other areas of West Ukraine and even in 1941, collectivization made very slow progress.

On January 18, 1941, the oblast committee issued an explanatory report concerning the preparation towards *kolhosp* farming. Nine out of fourteen raions had set up a total of nineteen initiative groups, encompassing 212 peasant farms.¹²² The committee had received 667 applications to join a *kolhosp*, including eighty five from *seredniak* farmers.¹²³ From these, 250 were received from farmers of Sekurian raion, approximately one hundred from Khotyn raion and eighty four from Kelmenetsk raion.¹²⁴

The latter region was the site of the first collective farm in Chernivtsi. Founded on January 28, it consisted of fifty five households with 110 able-bodied workers and had in its possession 122 hectares of land and seventeen horses.¹²⁵ The governing body of the *kolhosp* was made up of five peasants, three of whom were *bidniaks* and two *seredniaks*.¹²⁶ On February 10, there were ten *kolhosps* in operation, of which five were in Sekurian, four in Kelmenetsk and one in Chernivtsi raion.¹²⁷

In Khotyn raion, in April 1941, following the formation of thirteen initiative groups and 746 appeals, six *kolhosps* had been organized with 430 farms and 1,142 hectares of land.¹²⁸ In the oblast as a whole, there were now sixty two collective farms, embracing 4,640 peasant farms and 13,464 hectares of land.¹²⁹ From the "non-toilers" had been transferred to the *kolhosps* 184 cows and 323 oxen and in

addition, the state had provided 5,600 centners of seed-loan and 930,000 roubles in long-term credit for the purchase of draught animals.¹³⁰

The Plenum of April 15 discussed certain "defects" of collective farms in the region, which were almost identical to those indicated in Galicia and Volhynia. Some party organizations had paid insufficient attention to the question of preparing leadership cadres, with the result that on artels such as "28 Chervnia" in Sekurian raion, hostile elements had managed to infiltrate.¹³¹ The raion committees, executive committees, the oblast land committee and the directors of the MTS were ordered to make a systematic study of every *kolhosp*, and to provide them with strong leadership.¹³²

On May 13, the oblast executive committee and *obkom* buro approved a decision to allot two million roubles of credit to collective farmers and individual peasants for the purchase of 9,100 head of cattle.¹³³ Seventy five per cent of the cows were to be bought by October 1, 1941 and the shortage of cows was to be liquidated completely by November 1.¹³⁴ The division of purchasing obligations between individual raions is illustrated in Table Twenty One. The peasants were given three years to pay back the credit, but the outbreak of war prevented the implementation of this decision.

The animal husbandry department of Chernivtsi oblast land section published a report on the animal situation on June 1, 1941. 138 animal farms had been established on *kolhosps*, including forty three dairy, twenty seven pig, twenty nine sheep and twenty nine poultry farms.¹³⁵ The sixty two *kolhosps* possessed 732 cattle, 418 pigs and 1,142 sheep.¹³⁶ Twenty seven artels had constructed one animal farm and seventeen had two, five had three and seventeen *kolhosps* had four farms, the latter

Table Twenty One: Plan to Eliminate the Shortage of Cattle in
the Raions of Chernivtsi Oblast, May 1941

<u>Raion</u>	<u>Cattle to be Purchased</u>	<u>Credit Allowance</u> (thous. rbs)
Vyzhnytsky	600	150,6
Vaskivtsi	500	115,0
Hlybotsk	350	87,5
Hertsaiiv	400	88,0
Zastavniv	700	142,8
Chernivtsi Rural	300	63,6
Kitsman	600	123,6
Kelmenetsk	1,700	374,0
Putyl	150	37,5
Novoselytska	800	164,0
Sadahur	600	126,0
Storozhyntsi	300	64,0
Sekurian	1,400	316,4
Khotyn	700	147,0
Total	9,100	2,000,0

Source: "Decision of Chernivtsi oblast executive committee and the *obkom* buro KP(b)U concerning the liquidation of the shortage of cattle of collective farmers and individual peasant farms", May 13, 1941, *Radianska Bukovyna 1940-1945*, (Kiev, 1967), No. 98, p. 158.

including all collective farms in Storozhyntsi, Chernivtsi and Sadahur raions.¹³⁷

This same report included an elucidatory comparison of collective and individual farms. It showed, for example, that whereas the *kolhosps* had removed the problem of the total absence (although not a shortage) of livestock, in the peasant sector, 30.8 per cent of farms had no livestock, forty five per cent had no cows and sixty per cent had neither sheep nor pigs.¹³⁸ Comparative production results will be discussed at a later time. Nevertheless, it seems clear that if there were difficulties to be encountered on the *kolhosp*, life on the individual farm remained extremely harsh.

vi) Production Results, 1940

The Plan for agricultural work in West Ukraine for the 1940 year was outlined in a decision of the Ukrainian Council of Peoples Commissars and the Communist Party on February 4, 1940. This approved a Plan to sow 4,048,500 hectares of grain and a Plan to cultivate 2,457,000 hectares of Spring crops.¹³⁹ From the latter total, 1,422,000 hectares were to be devoted to Spring grain, 108,200 hectares to technical crops, 648,700 hectares to potatoes and 166,400 hectares to fodder crops.¹⁴⁰

The Plan also gave instructions for the organization of the Spring-sowing campaign. The Peoples Commissariat of Land Affairs and the oblast and raion executive committees were to organize aid to *bidniak* farms in repairing agricultural implements and were instructed to popularize agricultural techniques in agrarian communities, clubs and meetings of peasants.¹⁴¹ The Plan however did not specify harvest returns, nor did it offer, as in the following year, extra payment in-

centives for good harvests.

Since the collectivization process, in theory at least, foresaw the voluntary movement of peasants towards collective farms, the Plan could not project the distribution of sown area between individual and collective farms. On the collective farms in 1940, 70,8000 hectares were under harvest, of which 52,600 hectares were under grain crops (divided equally between Spring and Winter grain), 6,000 hectares were under fodder crops, 9,200 hectares under vegetables and 2,200 hectares under technical crops.¹⁴² At the same time, the sown area on state farms totalled 40,600 hectares, of which 25,500 hectares were devoted to grain crops.¹⁴³

In West Ukraine (excluding Chernivtsi), the collective farms reportedly achieved an average grain yield of eleven centners per hectare, including a wheat yield of 11.8.¹⁴⁴ Sugar beets were harvested at 173.1 and potatoes at 99.3 centners per hectare.¹⁴⁵ These figures can be compared favorably to the Republican average. In 1940, the Ukrainian RSR received a total grain harvest on collective farms of 12.6 centners per hectare, a harvest of sugar beets at 157 and a potato harvest of ninety two centners per hectare.¹⁴⁶

Approximately 150 *kolhosps* participated in the 1940 harvest in West Ukraine. The best results were attained in Ternopil oblast, where twenty eight out of thirty seven artels received a total harvest return (all crops) of over twelve centners per hectare.¹⁴⁷ In contrast, in Drohobych oblast, fourteen out of twenty eight artels cultivated a total harvest of under ten centners per hectare and in Stanislav, nine out of sixteen received less than twelve centners per hectare.¹⁴⁸ Soviet sources comment on the poor weather conditions in Drohobych,¹⁴⁹ but these had

little effect in Lviv, where harvests were much higher.

In Drohobych, the average grain harvest was said to be three to four centners per hectare higher than on individual farms.¹⁵⁰ Further, some Soviet sources state that collective farm production in the oblast enabled a labor-day payment average of four kilograms of grain, five kilograms of potatoes, one rouble and twenty seven kopecks, four and one half kilograms of straw and two kilograms of hay.¹⁵¹ A report from Zhydachiv raion suggests a somewhat lesser hand out and notes also that the plan for MTS aid had not been carried out and that Autumn ploughing had been fulfilled by only eighty three per cent.¹⁵²

Lviv oblast achieved a labor-day payment for each collective farmer of 3.8 kilograms of grain, 2.7 kilograms of potatoes and about two roubles.¹⁵³ The highest grain harvest in the oblast was obtained on the artels "Chervonyi prykordonnyk" in Rava-Ruska raion, which received a grain harvest of 16.2 centners per hectare over an area of ninety one hectares and "Lenin" of Horodok raion, which had a harvest of 14.5 centners per hectare over a 227 hectare area.¹⁵⁴ The oblast had completed its grain obligations to the state in good time.¹⁵⁵

Labor-day payments in Rivne were substantially higher than in the Galician regions. Each collective farmer received an average in 1940 of; five kilograms of grain, 5.2 kilograms of potatoes, 6.2 kilograms of straw and a cash payment of six roubles and fifty one kopecks.¹⁵⁶ Out of 4,263 able-bodied collective farmers, 1,550 had worked up to 200 labor-days by October 1, 614 up to 300 and thirty seven, over 300.¹⁵⁷ In Volyn, the oblast average per labor-day was 4.2 kilograms of grain and it is claimed that each *kolhosp* household received an average of thirteen

centners of grain per hectare.¹⁵⁸

In Stanislav, the average grain harvest on collective farms in 1940 was 11.3 centners per hectare, compared to ten centners per hectare on individual farms.¹⁵⁹ For each labor-day was distributed on average 3.7 kilograms of grain, almost six kilograms of potatoes, about ten kilograms of hay and in cash, one rouble and eighty kopecks.¹⁶⁰ As one of the regions with a low harvest, the collective farmers in the oblast received smaller incomes than their neighbors in Lviv and Volhynia.

Thanks to the work of Soviet scholars in the region, there is more data available about Ternopil oblast than the other regions of West Ukraine. Here, four collective farms were approved as candidates to the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition, due to their outstanding performances in the 1940 harvest campaign. These were the *Kolhosp* of the village Muzhyliv in Pidhaitsi raion, that of the village Iarchivtsi in Zhoriv raion, "Lenin" of the village Husiatyn in Husiatyn raion and "Vilne zhyttia" of the village Brykun, in Shumiach raion.¹⁶¹

The latter artel may serve as an example of a "model artel". It achieved a harvest of 13.7 centners per hectare over an area of 667 hectares, including 152 hectares of barley at 17.4 centners and 152 hectares of rye at 16.8 centners per hectare.¹⁶² There had been constructed three animal farms; for cattle, with forty seven head, for sheep, with ten head and for pigs, with thirty three heads.¹⁶² The labor-day wages on "Vilne zhyttia" averaged five kilograms of grain, one kilogram of potatoes, 3.6 kilograms of straw and three roubles and thirty five kopecks in cash.¹⁶⁴

In the oblast as a whole in 1940, the *kolhosps* received a harvest of grain crops at 13.2, sugar beets at 215 and potatoes at 139 centners per hectare, figures which were well above the West Ukrainian average.¹⁶⁵ These totals were surpassed by three raions, which all achieved a grain harvest over fourteen centners per hectare, namely Zboriv, Katerburzko and Shuniach.¹⁶⁶ It is claimed that the artels received much higher harvests than the individual farms.¹⁶⁷

In 1940, sixty two *kolhosps* of Ternopil received profits totalling 4,060,856 roubles.¹⁶⁸ Collective farms averaged per labor day, five kilograms of grain, 4.2 kilograms of potatoes, 6.9 kilograms of straw and 1.64 roubles.¹⁶⁹ The oblast obligations to the state had been fulfilled and carried out ahead of time in Hlybochetsk, Pidhaitsi, Berezhany, Lanivtsi and Pidvolochyska raions.¹⁷⁰ Soviet reports thus have painted a glorified picture of the first year of collective farm production in Ternopil. Yet it should be emphasized that such successes were achieved at a time when collectivization stood at less than two per cent of total farms.

In terms of provision with livestock, a move to a collective farm would probably have benefitted a poor peasant farmer of West Ukraine. However, the state farms were assigned as the chief beneficiaries of the distribution of livestock. Thus in 1940, whereas the *kolhosps* possessed on average 41.8 horses, 33.7 cows, 17.6 pigs and 22.3 sheet, the state farms had 393 horses, 643 cows, 235 pigs and 105.4 sheep.¹⁷¹ The Soviet rulers evidently preferred to favor the larger and more stable state farms rather than the weaker *kolhosps*.

Livestock on the *kolhosps* for individual oblasts is portrayed in Table Twenty Two. If one formulates the results in terms of livestock

Table Twenty Two: Livestock on the Collective Farms of West Ukraine
in 1940

<u>Oblast</u>	<u>Horses</u>	<u>Cattle</u>	<u>Sheep/Pigs</u>
Rivne	2,760	2,193	2,559
Volyn	8,170	3,838	2,804
Ternopil	5,056	4,671	7,866
Lviv	3,040	4,017	5,632
Stanislav	2,286	1,091	656
Drohobych	1,931	2,921	4,662
Total	23,243	18,731	22,179

Source: V.L. Varetsky, *Sotsialistychna peretvorennia*, p. 256.

per able-bodied collective farmer, the severe shortages become clear. Amongst one hundred collective farmers, Ternopil had thirteen horses, Volyn twelve, Lviv and Rivne six, Drohobych five and Stanislav four. Cattle ownership revealed similar figures, although in Volyn the figure declined to six cows for every hundred farmers. For pigs and sheep, using the same basis, Ternopil possessed twenty, Drohobych thirteen, Lviv seven, Rivne five, Volyn four and Stanislav just one.

These figures were considerably lower than the livestock ownership of the West Ukrainian farmer under Polish rule, so much lamented in Soviet works. This may have been due to the fact that having expropriated the livestock of the *pomishchyky* and military settlers, the state decided to retain the animals or put them on state farms until the new artels became stronger, or in Soviet terminology "organizationally consolidated". On the other hand, eyewitnesses have claimed that it merely indicated the unwillingness of the West Ukrainian farmer to collectivize the animals he had painstakingly reared.¹⁷⁴

The shortage of draught animals was not compensated for by the acquisition of agricultural machinery. Ternopil oblast was rather better provided for than the other provinces, yet the figures generally show low totals. On January 1, 1941, in the socialist sector of West Ukrainian agriculture, there were in operation 1,860 tractors, 1,039 hoeing ploughs, 1,572 ploughs, 940 cultivators, 709 seeding machines, 173 automatic machines and a mere twelve combines.¹⁷⁵ Again, it seems that most of the machinery was donated first to the state farms.

The successes achieved on a few *kolhosps*, most notably in Ternopil, should not distract one from this bleak general picture. The former *bidniak* farmer had fewer animals than before he joined his collective farm.

It is true that the *kolhosps* produced higher harvests than the individual farms. However the primary role of the collective farms was to produce surplus grain for state requirements, whereas the individual farmer worked only for subsistence. Much of the expropriated land, animals and machinery never found their way to the newly-formed artels, so that the incentives to join such farms were few in number.

vii) Collectivization from January to June, 1941

The most rapid period of collectivization in West Ukraine in the 1939-1941 period took place between the Winter of 1940 and Spring 1941, particularly in February and March. The Soviet explanation for this is that the *seredniak* stratum had begun to join the collective farms.¹⁷⁶ It seems also that, as in Chernivtsi, the *kolhosp* campaign was stepped up before the fields were sown for the Spring. Farms established at this time would be more stable, since the peasants would be dependent upon the harvest.

In Volyn, collectivization was carried out at an unprecedented pace. At the time of the oblast committee Plenum on April 11, the number of collective farms had increased from 187 at the start of the year, to 616, united 38,015 peasant farms.¹⁷⁷ *Kolhosps* had been created in every village of Berestechkiv, Holobsk, Torchyn, Ustyluzk and Shatsk raions.¹⁷⁸ In these, and in Kovel, Olytsk and Mariiev raions, collectivization of peasant farms had reached thirty one to fifty per cent of the total.¹⁷⁹ Sixteen *kolhosps* of Volyn were nominated as candidates to the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition.¹⁸⁰

In Drohobych on January 1, 1941, there were sixty six artels in operation. By February 1, the number had increased to 141, and on March 5, it reached 201.¹⁸¹ On April 10, the oblast possessed 318 *kolhosps*

with over 14,000 farms, which was 7.1 per cent of the total number.¹⁸² In neighboring Stanislav, it was reported that on March 16, there were 234 *kolhosps*, as compared to sixty nine at the end of 1940.¹⁸³ In the raions of Horodenka, Zabolotiv and Chernelytsia, there was a collective farm in every village.¹⁸⁴ By May 31, the raions Horodenka, Stanislav, Burshtyn and Obertyn had villages which were fully collectivized and eighteen to thirty four per cent of peasant farms were collectivized.¹⁸⁵

At the Plenum of the KP(b)U in April, the head of the land section for Lviv oblast, Maiboroda, reported that 240 *kolhosps* had been organized, uniting 13,975 farms and having in their utilization 62,374 hectares of land.¹⁸⁶ Ten collective farms, one state farm, two MTS, five dairy farms and eleven *peredovik* (progressive) collective farmers were named as candidates to the All-Union Agriculture Exhibition.¹⁸⁷ Seventy one of the artels in Lviv were served by MTS, which had carried out 36,274 hectares of conditional ploughing in the Spring of 1941.¹⁸⁸

In Rivne oblast, on April 10, there had been created 465 artels, as compared to seventy nine at the beginning of the year.¹⁸⁹ These united 28,129 peasant farms, including 7,916 *seredniak* farms, encompassing 13.4 per cent of the total farms and fifteen per cent of the oblast land area.¹⁹⁰ Sources indicate the successes of collective farms in the raions Dubno, Kozyn, Mizotsk and Ostroz, which achieved a labor-day payment of five kilograms of grain and three to five roubles in cash.¹⁹¹ However Rivne lagged behind Volyn in farms collectivized.

By Spring 1941 in Ternopil oblast, 529 *kolhosps* united 46,402 peasant farms, with a total land area of 173,840 hectares.¹⁹² Table Twenty Three illustrates the course of collectivization in selected

raions of the oblast in May 1941. The villages Brykun, Onyshkivtsi, Rokhmaniv and Kordyshiv in Shumsk raion and the villages Tsebriv, Chrystyliv and Hliadky in Hlubichok Velykyi raion were already fully collectivized.¹⁹³ However, sources note the "raids" of "kulaks" and "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" against the *kolhosps* in Zbarazh, Zalozhtsiv and Zboriv raions.¹⁹⁴

Moreover, a Plenum decision dated May 13, 1941 pointed out several defects in the oblast agricultural work. In Terebovlia, Kopychyntsi and Zolotnyky raions, inadequate attention had been given to the timely and qualitative composition of production plans; the raion committees of Podchaievychi, Pidvolochyska and Novosilka had not carried out political and educational work amongst collective farmers and had not consolidated the new artels; not all *kolhosp* brigades had been secured with teams and certain teams had been created only from women.¹⁹⁵

The Plenum observed also that whereas Vyshnivchy, Katerburzk Husiatyn, Zbarazh and Strusiv raions had sown seventy one to eighty per cent of the planned Spring crops by May 10, other raions had fallen well behind.¹⁹⁶ In Kremenetsk, Kozliv, Monastyrska and Pidhaitsi raions, due to insufficient utilization of MTS tractors and draught animals, sowing had been delayed and the plan of Spring crops in these raions had been fulfilled by only thirty nine to forty two per cent.¹⁹⁷ It should be stressed that such defects were evident in other oblasts at this time.

The state of collectivization of agriculture on the eve of the German-Soviet war (including Chernivtsi and Izmail regions), is shown in Table Twenty Four. 2,866 *kolhosps* united 205,137 farms, which was 12.8 per cent of the total number and 14.9 per cent of all arable land. It can be seen that the highest rates of collectivization were in Izmail oblast. However, conditions here were quite dissimilar to other regions

Table Twenty Three: Collectivization in Ternopil Raions in May 1941

<u>Raion</u>	<u>Kolhosps Orgzd.</u>	<u>Per-Centage of Total</u>	<u>Land Per-Centage</u>
Velykobochoetsk	25	40	44
Shumsk	24	33.1	43.2
Mykulyntsi	18	39	35.7
Berezhany	8	5.5	5.5
Buchatsk	10	4.6	5.8
Zalozhtsiv	9	5.5	6.7

Source: V.L. Varetsky, *Sotsialistychna peretvorennia*, p. 260.

Table Twenty Four: The Collectivization of Peasant Farms in the
Western, Chernivtsi and Izmail Oblasts of Ukraine
on June 1, 1941

<u>Oblast</u>	<u>No. kols</u>	<u>Total Farms in Them</u>	<u>% Coll.</u>	<u>Total Land (arable,hecs)</u>	<u>% Coll.</u>
Volyn	663	40,994	21.5	167,213	22.3
Ternopil	529	46,525	14.8	183,856	18.0
Rivne	471	28,349	13.4	103,126	15.0
Stanislav	295	24,740	12.8	51,972	10.8
Lviv	296	16,451	8.1	48,760	8.2
Drohobych	335	15,459	7.8	38,037	8.0
Chernivtsi	62	4,676	2.7	13,000	3.4
Izmail	215	27,943	23.2	190,863	24.2
Total	2,866	205,137	12.8	796,827	14.9

Source: *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozyvtok silskoho*
hospodarstva Ukrainzkoï RSR, II (Kiev, 1966), p. 93.

of West Ukraine.

Izmail oblast was geographically separated from Galicia and Volhynia and collectivization had been facilitated by the emigration of a large number of German colonists in September and October, 1940.¹⁹⁸ By March 20, 1941, some ten months after annexation, there were already 132 collective farms in the oblast, uniting about 9,000 farms, and the process occurred in a relatively smooth fashion, due to the lack of a developed national consciousness among the local population.¹⁹⁹

Further, although the highest figures in the former Polish Ukraine were achieved in Volyn, the farms in Ternopil and Stanislav were much larger than those in the north. Ternopil artels had the most arable land. The Table suggests substantial progress towards collectivized agriculture on the eve of the German invasion. Such high per-centages were not achieved again until late-1949. Approximately half the villages of West Ukraine now possessed a collective farm. On the former estates of great landowners and monasteries, huge state farms were being constructed. The structure of village society had been transformed.

However, these "successes" have to be qualified. It has been shown that many of the artels were weakly organized and slow to follow the complex bureaucratic procedures and instructions which arrived constantly from the oblast and raion committees. They were constructed hastily, often forcibly (even according to Soviet reports) and were lacking in draught-animals, animal husbandry and advanced machinery. The 2,866 artels were served by 214 MTS, which also aided the non-collectivized peasants in cultivating the land.

Soviet accounts invariably refer to "kulak" and "bourgeois nationalist" opposition to the collective farms. How serious was this

resistance? It seems clear that the *kolhosps* represented an alien institution to the West Ukrainian peasant, who had grown accustomed to a closely-knit self-run community under Polish rule. However, the collective farms only rarely met with any organized resistance. The OUN had gone underground during Soviet rule and limited itself to passive resistance. Ukrainian nationalists awaited the German invasion from the West. In turn, the mass of the peasantry, having endured six months of appeasement and then a year of Sovietization would welcome the Germans with open arms. In itself, this is a revealing indicator of the unpopularity of collectivization.

Bibliography to Chapter Seven

1. "Information of the newspaper *Vilna Ukraina* about the movement to the collective farm of peasants of the village Honiatychi, in Shchretsk raion, Lviv oblast", February 29, 1940, in *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainskoi RSR*, (Kiev, 1976), p. 101, (Hereafter referred to as *Z ist.*).
2. Interview, I.R. Fedak.
3. M.K. Ivasiuta, *Narysy istorii kolhospnehe budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR*, (Kiev, 1962), p. 53.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
5. *Visti.*, November 16, 1939.
6. M.K. Ivasiuta, *Narysy istorii kolektyvizatsii na Ternopilshchyni*, (Kiev, 1958), p. 39.
7. *Komunist*, February 9, 1940.
8. M.P. Teslenko, "Do istorii partiinoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainy", *Ukrainskyi istorichnyi zhurnal*, 10, (1969), 44-48.
9. John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, (New York, 1959), p. 115.
10. M.K. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 49.
11. Teslenko (1969), p. 47.
12. I.I. Kosharny, *U suziri sotsialistychnoi kultury. Kulturne budivnytstvo v vozziednanykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR (1939-1958rr)*, (Lviv, 1975), p. 37.

13. M.P. Teslenko, "Orhanizatsyino-partyina robota v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Urkrainy (1939-1941rr)", *Uk. ist. zh.* 9, (1975), 68.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
15. Teslenko (1969), p. 47.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Kosharny, p. 39.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.
19. *Pravda*, March 13, 1940, p. 1.
20. "Decision of the Council of Peoples Commissars UkSSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine about the organization of MTS in the western oblasts of Ukraine", March 25, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 26-29.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. "Decision of the Council of Peoples Commissars UkSSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine about the organization of 74 state Machine-Tractor Stations in the western oblasts of Ukraine", June 4, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 30-31.
25. "Decision of the Council of Peoples Commissars URSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine about the organization of Machine-Tractor Stations in Chernivtsi and Izmail oblasts", December 18, 1940, in *Radianska Bukovyna*, (Kiev, 1967), p. 83. Hereafter referred to as *Rad. Buk.*
26. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 47.
27. *Ibid.*

28. "Decision of the Council of Peoples Commissars UkSSR about the fulfillment of the decision of the All-Union Council and Communist Party from 16 March, 1940, 'Concerning the organization of MTS in West Ukraine'", December 24, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 39-42.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. Milena Rudnytska ed., *Zakhidnia Ukraina pid bolshevykamy*, (New York, 1958), p. 327.
32. *Pravda*, April 9, 1940, p. 4.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Kolhospnyk Ukrainy*, September 17, 1940.
35. "From an article about the great social changes in the villages of Drohobych oblast in the first years of Soviet rule", January 27, 1941, *Z ist.*, pp. 153-155.
36. "From the report account of Rivne *obkom* KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference about the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 121-125.
37. *Ibid.*
38. "Decision of the buro of Ternopil *obkom* KP(b)U and the oblast executive committee about the creation in the oblast of horse centres, state farms and MTS", January 29, 1940, in *Radianska Ternopilshchyna*, (Lviv, 1971), Document 41.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Kolhospnyk Ukrainy*, October 22, 1940.

41. "From the report of the Secretary of Chernivtsi *obkom* KP(b)U I.S. Hrushetsky at the meeting of the oblast party *aktiv* about the state of agriculture in the oblast", December 11, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 142-143.
42. *Pravda*, March 19, 1941.
43. See *Kolhospnyk Ukrainy*, October 22, 1940 and *Pravda*, March 20, 1941.
44. Milena Rudnytska, p. 329.
45. *Pravdu ne zdolaty*, (Lviv, 1974), p. 26.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Interview*, I.R. Fedak.
48. *Ibid.*
49. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 50.
50. "From the speech of the chairman of the kolhosp in the village Ukhovetsk, Kovel raion, Volyn oblast, M.A. Vasiuta, at the republican council of activists of agriculture about the organization of the *kolhosp*", February 10, 1940, *Z ist.*, pp. 96-97.
51. *Narysy istorii Volynskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii*, (Kiev, 1968), p. 61.
52. Ivasiuta, (1962), p. 50.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva* II, (Kiev, 1968), p. 92.
56. "From the report account of Drohobych *obkom* KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference about the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 27, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 127.

57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
61. *Pravda*, May 15, 1940.
62. *Kolhospnyk Ukrainy*, August 23, 1940.
63. *Pravda*, December 15, 1940.
64. "From an article about the great social changes in the villages of Drohobych oblast in the first years of Soviet power", January 27, 1941, *Z ist.*, p. 154.
65. *Kolhospnyk Ukrainy*, August 5, 1940.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Narys istorii Lvivskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii*, (Lviv, 1969), p. 103.
69. *Pravda*, March 7, 1940.
70. *Narys istorii Lvivskoi*, p. 103.
71. "From the speech of the chairman of the *kolhosp* of the village Lopushna in Birbka raion, Lviv oblast, I.M. Nauholnyk at the first oblast council of collective farm chairmen about the creation of the *kolhosp* and preparation for Spring sowing", March 27, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 108.
72. *Ibid.*

73. "From the decision of the buro of the Lviv *obkom* KP(b)U about the work of the newly-created *kolhosps* in the oblast", April 8, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 109.
74. *Ibid.*
75. "From the report account of Lviv *obkom* KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference about the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 117.
76. *Ibid.*
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Narys istorii Lvivskoi*, p. 106.
79. *Ibid.*
80. "From the decision of the Plenum of Lviv *obkom* KP(b)U about the organizational-economic strenthening of the *kolhosps* in the oblast", November 15, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 138.
81. "From the report account of Rivne *obkom* KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference about the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 125.
82. *Ibid.*
83. "From the resolution of the November Plenum of the Central Committee KP(b)U about the work of Lviv and Rivne *obkoms* KP(b)U", November 30, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 33.
84. "Decision of the buro of Stanislav *obkom* KP(b)U about the creation of collective farms in the oblast", March 13, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 103.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *Ibid.*

87. "Information of the newspaper *Radianska Ukraina* about the organization of the *kolhosp* in the village Bukivnia, of Tlumatsk raion, Stanislav oblast", March 16, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 105.
88. *Pravda*, March 18, 1940.
89. *Z ist.*, p. 105.
90. *Ibid.*
91. *Pravda*, April 25, 1940.
92. "Information of the newspaper *Stalinska Pravda* about the organization of collective farms and initiative groups in Stanislav oblast", September 17, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 133.
93. *Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (Istoriia mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR)*, (Kiev, 1971), p. 33.
94. "Information of the newspaper *Chervonyi Prapor* about the results of the first collective farm harvests in the artel of the village Hory-Dobrovidka, of Kolomiia raion, Stanislav oblast", September 17, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 134.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*
97. Ivasiuta (1958), p. 43.
98. "Decision of Ternopil oblast executive committee and the buro of the *obkom* KP(b)U about the organization of collective farms in the oblast", March 13, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 104.
99. *Ibid.*
100. "From the report account of Ternopil *obkom* KP(b)U at the first oblast party conference about the state of agriculture in the oblast", April 23, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 112.
101. *Ibid.*

102. *Ibid.*
103. Ivasiuta (1958), p. 46.
104. *Ibid.*
105. *Istoriia selianstva URSR*, 2, (Kiev, 1967), p. 271.
106. "From the speech of deputy M.V. Slon at the first session of Ternopil oblast Soviet of deputies of toilers about achievements in the development of the economy and culture of the oblast after sixteen months of Soviet rule", January 10, 1941, *Radianska Ternopilshchyna*, (Lviv, 1971), Document 54.
107. *Ibid.*
108. Ivasiuta (1958), p. 47.
109. *Ibid.*
110. "Decision of Ternopil oblast executive committee and the buro of the *Obkom* KP(b)U about liquidating the lack of cows on collective farm households and *bidniak* peasant farms of the oblast", October 17, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 137.
111. *Ibid.*
112. *Pravda*, May 15, 1940.
113. *Kolhospnyk Ukrainy*, September 5, 1940.
114. *Narysy istorii Volynskoi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii*, (Kiev, 1968), p. 61.
115. *Volynska Oblast (Istoriia mist i sil)*, (Kiev, 1970), p. 35.
116. *Narysy istorii Volynskoi*, p. 61.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
119. *Ibid.*
120. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 55.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
122. "Information of Chernivtsi *obkom* KP(b)U about the preparation work for the collectivization of agriculture in the oblast", January 18, 1941, *Radianska Bukovyna*, p. 110.
123. *Ibid.*
124. *Ibid.*
125. "Report of Chernivtsi oblast executive committee about the economic factors of the first *kolhosp* organized in Chernivtsi oblast", not before January 29, no later than February 1, 1941, *Radianska Bukovyna*, p. 134.
126. *Ibid.*
127. A.O. Ianiuk, "Zdyisnennia leninskoho kooperatyvnoho planu na Bukovyni", *Uk. ist. zh.* 7, (1972), 65.
128. "From the information of Khotyn *raikom* KP(b)U to Chernivtsi *obkom* KP(b)U about the organization of collective farms in the raion", April 14, 1941, *Rad. Buk.*, p. 152.
129. "Decision of the Plenum of Chernivtsi *obkom* KP(b)U about the organizational-economic strengthening of the oblast *kolhosps*", April 15, 1941, *Rad. Buk.*, p. 153.
130. *Ibid.*
131. *Ibid.*
132. *Ibid.*
133. "Decision of Chernivtsi oblast executive committee and the *obkom* buro about the liquidation of cowless households amongst collective farmers and *bidniak* peasant farms in the oblast", May 13, 1941, *Rad. Buk.*, p. 158.
134. *Ibid.*

135. "Account of the animal husbandry department of Chernivtsi oblast land section to the *obkom* KP(b)U about the state of animal husbandry in the oblast", June 1, 1941, *Rad. Buk.*, p. 159.
136. *Ibid.*
137. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 161
139. "Decision of the Council of Peoples Commissars URSR and the Central Committee KP(b)U about the approval of the Plan of agricultural work for the western oblasts URSR in 1940", February 4, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 24.
140. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
141. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.
142. V.L. Varetsky, *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR*, (Kiev, 1960), p. 254.
143. *Ibid.*
144. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 60.
145. *Ibid.*
146. *Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR v 1964 rotsi*, (Kiev, 1965), pp. 252-254.
147. Varetsky, p. 254.
148. *Ibid.*
149. *Radianska Drohobychchyna*, (Drohobych, 1957), p. 112.
150. *Z ist.*, p. 154.
151. *Ibid.*
152. "Decision of the party meeting of Zhydachiv raion, Drohobych oblast about the preparation for Spring sowing and the progress of collectivization in the raion", February 17, 1941, *Z ist.*, p. 159.

153. *Narys istorii Lvivskoi*, p. 109.
154. *Ibid.*
155. *Z ist.*, p. 138.
156. "Decision of the buro of Rivne *obkom* KP(b)U about the results of the collective farms in the oblast after their first year of existence", November 18, 1940, *Z ist.*, p. 139.
157. *Ibid.*
158. *Narysy istorii Volynskoi*, p. 62.
159. *Pravda*, December 11, 1940.
160. *Ibid.*
161. "Decision of Ternopil oblast executive committee about the approval of candidates to the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition", October 28, 1940, *Rad. Tern.*, Document 52.
162. *Ibid.*
163. *Ibid.*
164. *Ibid.*
165. "From the decision of the Plenum of Ternopil *obkom* KP(b)U about the results of agricultural work in the *kolhosps* of the oblast in 1940", February 10, 1941, *Z ist.*, p. 156.
166. *Ibid.*
167. *Ivasiuta* (1958), p. 47.
168. *Rad. Tern.*, Document 54.
169. *Ibid.*
170. *Z ist.*, p. 157.
171. Figures added from Varetsky, p. 256.
172. Varetsky, p. 259.
173. *Ibid.*

174. *Interview*, I. Kuzma.
175. Varetsky, p. 253.
176. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
177. *Narysy istorii Volynskoi*, p. 63.
178. Ivasiuta (1962), p. 66.
179. *Ibid.*
180. *Narysy istorii Volynskoi*, p. 64.
181. *Radianska Drobychchyna*, p. 114.
182. *Ibid.*
183. *Pravda*, March 17, 1941.
184. *Ibid.*
185. "From the report of the Secretary of Stanislav *obkom* KP(b)U M.V. Hrulenko at the Plenum of the *obkom* KP(b)U about collectivization of agriculture and state aid to collective farms in the oblast", May 31, 1941, *Z ist.*, p. 169.
186. "From the decision of the Plenum of Lviv *obkom* KP(b)U about the organizational-economic strengthening of *kolhosps* in the oblast", April 3, 1941, *Z ist.*, p. 163.
187. *Narys istorii Lvivskoi*, p. 110.
188. *Z ist.*, p. 163.
189. Varetsky, p. 260.
190. *Ibid.*
191. T.I. Mykhailiuta, M.M. Tiurenkov, "Pro pershi sotsialistychni peretvorennia na Rovenshchyni (1939-1941rr)", *Uk. ist. zh.*, 3, (1973), 109.
192. Ivasiuta (1958), p. 48.
193. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

194. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
195. "From the decision of the Plenum of Ternopil *obkom* KP(b)U about the progress of Spring agricultural work in the oblast", May 13, 1941, *Rad. Tern.*, Document 57.
196. *Ibid.*
197. *Ibid.*
198. *Odessa Oblast (Istoriia Mist i Sil)*, (Kiev, 1969), p. 187.
199. *Pravda*, March 20, 1941.

Conclusion

This study of collectivization in West Ukraine prior to the outbreak of the Second World War does not offer a clear indication of the superiority of collective over individual farming. In fact, a precise comparison is rendered almost impossible, since one lacks a suitable basis from which to apply some factors constant to both systems. There can be little doubt that the West Ukrainian farmer was producing more grain per capita under Soviet rule. However, he had now made the transition from subsistence agriculture to a supplier of goods to the newly-established Soviet state.

Collectivization in West Ukraine possessed several features common to the introduction of the process in Russia and East Ukraine in the late twenties. For example, Soviet accounts admit that some coercion was involved, that the movement to the *kolhosps* was not altogether voluntary. Further, the accounts of "*Kulak*" and "bourgeois nationalist" opposition are almost identical. How seriously should one treat these depictions of frantic and hostile resistance on the part of the "class enemy"?

First, it should be stressed that similarities in implementation aside, organized opposition in West Ukraine was negligible in comparison with that of other Soviet regions in 1929-1930. The OUN was quite content to await the forthcoming German invasion, rather than risk a futile encounter against formidable odds. Moreover, the so-called "*kulak*" strata in West Ukraine was exceptionally small, since the indigenous Ukrainian population did not occupy the dominant position in the countryside at the time of the Soviet invasion. Thus if one is to accept allegations of a class struggle in the West Ukrainian village in 1939-1941, one must look toward the middle (*seredniak*) peasant.

Secondly however, collectivization did proceed at a slower rate than the Soviets would have wished. Also many of the new farms were shortly disbanded or "subverted from within". This can be explained partly by a traditional peasant preference for a private farm, with its accompanying suspicion of any new or modern process and partly by the westward outlook of the Galician peasant, nurtured under Austrian rule. Galicia, from the late nineteenth century had manifested a much greater degree of national consciousness than East Ukraine and this was heightened, rather than subdued, by Polish rule.

Initially, the Red Army was welcomed by the West Ukrainian peasants, since it signified the death knoll of the hated Polish suzerainty. In turn, after a tentative six months of Soviet rule, it became patently clear that an authoritarian regime had been replaced by a totalitarian one. This became evident through the process of collectivization. However, in West Ukraine, as opposed to other newly-annexed Soviet regions, the social upheaval contained a unique twist: although the upper strata in rural society, for example the Polish *pomishchyky* and military colonists, were expropriated, most of the land animals and agricultural tools remained in state hands.

It is possible to argue that the semi-feudal conditions of land tenure in the Polish and Romanian ruled Ukraine necessitated a longer transitional period before land reform was implemented. This however is unlikely, Soviet strategy is rarely marked by an excess of patience. Instead, one should view the rural changes in West Ukraine as being directed towards the stabilization of Soviet control, i.e. it was political, rather than economic or ideological motives which dominated the thinking of the Soviet authorities.

In the 1939-1941 period, the Soviet regime was preoccupied almost solely with the defence of its western borderlands. In these circumstances,

the transformation of West Ukraine cannot be compared with that of other regions in peacetime. In fact the term "collectivization" is something of a misnomer, since the movement was initiated in order to facilitate Soviet control over potentially recalcitrant villages, rather than to increase agricultural production or to "liberate" the Ukrainian peasant from dependence on a Polish landlord, and grant him some degree of self-rule.

One should see the formation of socialized agriculture in this light. Both the MTS and state farms were first and foremost instruments of state power. Once the peasant came to rely on the MTS for machinery or horses, he had subjected himself to Soviet control. Consequently, it was a matter of secondary importance whether the West Ukrainians were "happy and joyful" under Soviet rule. To Stalin and Khrushchev, the needs of their new Soviet citizens paled beside the security of the Soviet state.

Why then do Soviet works concentrate on the successes of collective farming in this region and highlight production results, land division and distribution of expropriated livestock? The reasons for this are quite clear. First there is the need to justify the dramatic social revolution which occurred in only eighteen months of rule. Thus even the calculated march into another sovereign state was heavily camouflaged behind an ideological facade, namely the alleged wish to bring about the reunification of the historical Ukrainian state and to free Ukrainians from Polish tyranny.

Secondly, Soviet writers have tried to utilize the advantages of hindsight with regard to collectivizing the western areas of Ukraine. The prolonged seven year war between the Red Army and the Ukrainian nationalist forces from 1944-1950, which involved fierce resistance to collectivization compelled Soviet historians to give a careful assessment

of the events of 1939-1941. The prewar period became the starting point for a process which was brought to completion in 1951. The German invasion therefore is portrayed as an interruption of the spontaneous movement of West Ukrainian farms to the *kolhosps*. In the same way, the "bourgeois nationalists" of 1939-1941 reportedly joined the Germans and continued to fight against the Soviet liberation in 1944-1945.

The truth is somewhat different. Yet one is left with a dilemma. This dissertation has shown that in West Ukraine, collectivization did not bring any notable benefits for the peasant and my assumption from this has been that the motives behind its imposition were primarily political. Is one then to assert that under normal circumstances the main rationale behind collectivization is the improvement of the economic life of the peasant? Such a viewpoint would receive many dissenters. Perhaps it is safer to state that economic or ideological motives cannot be discounted totally in any general analysis of this process.

In closing, one should note an additional point concerning the collectivization process in West Ukraine, as compared to the eastern regions. During the First Five Year Plan, the changes in agriculture were needed in order to ensure that the rapidly expanding industrial workforce obtained a constant supply of food. Yet in West Ukraine, industrialization made little progress before June 1941. Without an industrial proletariat, there was little need for a *kolhosp* to maintain food supplies. However, the Soviet regime initially had little authority or recognition in the rural areas and hence it was necessary to centralize the agricultural system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I Primary Sources

Akademiia nauk URSS. Instytut suspilnykh nauk. Lvivskii oblasnii derzhavnyi arkhiv, *Z istorii revoliutsiinoho u Lvovi. Dokumenty i materialy* (Kiev, 1957).

Gosudarstvennyi plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva na 1941 god (Moscow, 1941).

Holovne arkhivne upravlinnia pry radi ministriv URSS, *Z istorii kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy RSR. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev, 1976).

Partarkhiv Chernivetskoho obkomu Komunistychnoi Partii Ukrainy.

Chernivetskii oblasnii derzhavnyi arkhiv, *Radianska Bukovyna 1940-1945. Dokumenty i materialy* (Kiev, 1967).

Partynii arkhiv Lvivskoi oblasti, *Sotsialistychna kultura Lvivshchyni. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv (1939-1962)* (Lviv, 1964).

Pid praporom zhovtnia. Vplyv velykoi zhovtnevoi sotsialistychnoi revoliutsii na pidnesennia revoliutsiinoho rukhu v zakhidnii Ukraini (1929-1939rr). *Dokumenty i materialy* (Lviv, 1966).

Radianska Ternopilshchyna 1939-1958). Dokumenty i materialy (Lviv, 1971).

II Newspapers

Kolhospnyk Ukrainy (Kiev), November 1939-October 1940.

Komunist (Kiev), February 1940.

Meta (Lviv), January-August 1939.

Pravda (Moscow), November 1939-May 1941.

Visti (Kiev), November 1939-August 1940.

III Statistics

Akademiia nauk URSS, *Rada po vyvchenniu produktyvnykh syl URSS* (Kiev, 1954).

- Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland* (1938) (Warsaw: Chief Bureau of Statistics, 1938).
- Horak, Bohuslav ed., *The Year-Book of the Czechoslovak Republic 1929* (Prague, 1929).
- Narodne gospodarstvo Volynskoi oblasti* (Lviv, 1958).
- Naukove tovarystvo im. T. Shevchenka u Lvovi, *IV Ukrainskyi statystychnyi richnyk 1936-1937* (Warsaw-Lviv, 1937).
- Roumania: Institut Central de Statistica, *Breviarul Statistic al Romaniei*, Vol. II (Bucharest, 1939).
- Roumania: Institut Central de Statistica, *Buletinul statistic al Romaniei* (Bucharest, 1939).
- Shevchenko Scientific Society, *Studii z polia suspilnykh nauk i statystyky IV* (Lviv, 1927).
- Statystychne upravlinnia Ivano-Frankivskoi oblasti, *Narodne gospodarstvo Ivano-Frankivskoi oblasti v 1967 rotsi* (Lviv, 1968).
- Wasowicz, J. and Zierhoffer, A., ed., *Polska w cyfrach* (Lviv, 1927).
- IV Secondary Sources (in Ukrainian and Russian)
- Akademiia nauk URSR. Instytut ekonomiky, *Narysy ekonomichnoi neohrafiï Ukrainskoi radianskoi sotsialistychnoi respubliky II* (Kiev, 1952).
- Akademiia nauk Ukrainskoi RSR. Instytut suspilnykh nauk, *Sotsialni peretvorennia u radianskomu seli* (Kiev, 1976).
- Almanakh Stanyslavivskoi zemli. Zbirnyk materialiv do istorii Stanyslavova i Stanyslavivshchyny* (New York, 1975).
- Baybi, B.M., *Vozziednannia zakhidnoi Ukrainy z Ukrainskoïu RSR* (Kiev, 1954).
- Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (Moscow, 1951).
- Brysiakin S.K., and Sytnik, M.K., *Torzhestvo istoricheskoi spravedlivosti* (Kishinev, 1969).

Dolnik, A., *Bessarabiia pod vlastiu Ruminskykh boyar (1918-1940gg)* (Moscow, 1945).

Entelis, G.S., *Preobrazovanie sotsialno-klassovoi struktury selskogo naseleniia (na materialakh Moldavskoi SSR)* (Kishinev, 1974).

Goldshtein, I.I., *Agrarnoi otnosheniia v bivshei Polshe, zapadnoi Ukraine i zapadnoi Belorussii* (Moscow, 1940).

Grekul, A., *Rastsvet Moldavskoi sotsialisticheskoi natsii* (Kishinev, 1974).

Istoriia selianstva URSR II (Kiev, 1967).

Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR (Kiev, 1953).

Ivasiuta, M.K., *Narys istorii kolektyvizatsii na Ternopilshchyni* (Kiev, 1958).

Ivasiuta, M.K., *Narysy istorii kolhospnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1962).

Kedryn, Ivan, *Zhyttia, - podii, - liudy. Spomyny i komentari* (New York, 1976).

Kosharny, I.I., *U suziri sotsialistychnoi kultury. Kulturne budivnytstvo v vozziednanykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR (1939-1958rr)* (Lviv, 1975).

Kuts, M.T., *Pytannia kolhospnoho budivnytstva na Ukraini 1929-1941rr* (Lviv, 1965).

Lazarev, A.M., *Vossoedinenie Moldavskogo naroda v edinoe sovetskoe gosudarstvo* (Kishinev, 1965).

Makukh, Ivan, *Na narodnyi sluzhbi* (Detroit, 1958).

Narys istorii Lvivskoi oblasnoi partyinoi orhanizatsii (Lviv, 1969).

Narysy istorii Volynskoi oblasnoi partinoi orhanizatsii (Kiev, 1968).

Narysy istorii Zakarpatskoi oblasnoi partyinoi orhanizatsii I 1918-1945rr (Uzhhorod, 1968).

Prezidiumul sovetului suprem ALRSS Moldovenesht, *RSS Moldoveniaske-ymypertsire administrativ-teritoriale* (Kishinev, 1968).

Pardu ne zdolaty. Trudiashchi zakhidnykh oblastei URSS v borotby proty Ukrainskykh burzhuaznykh natsionalistiv u roky sotsialistychnykh peretvoren (Lviv, 1974).

Radianska Drohobychchyna (Drohobych, 1957).

Repida, A., *Obrazovanie Moldavskoi ASSR* (Kishinev, 1974).

Rozkvit ekonomiky zakhidnykh oblastei URSS (1939-1964rr) (Lviv, 1964).

Rudnytska, Milena, *Zakhidnia Ukraina pid bolshevymy, IX. 39-VI. 41* (New York, 1958).

Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR II, 1938-1966, (Kiev, 1968).

Stsiborsky, Mykola, *Zemelne pytannia* (Paris, 1939).

Torzhestvo istorychnoi spravedlyvosti (Lviv, 1968).

Tsibko, O.H., *Revoliutsiino-vyzvolna borotbs trudiashchykh zakhidnoi ukrainy za vozziednannia z URSS, 1934-1939rr* (Lviv, 1963).

Varetsky, V.L., *Sotsialistychni peretvorennia u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSS* (Kiev, 1960).

Vasiuta, I.K., *Selianskii rukh na zakhidni Ukrainy v 1919-1939rr* (Lviv, 1971).

Zamlynsky, V., *Shliakh chornoï zrazy* (Lviv, 1969).

Mist i Sil Collection

Istoriia Mist i Sil Ukrainskoi RSR.

Chernivetska Oblast (Kiev, 1969).

Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (Kiev, 1971).

Lvivska Oblast (Kiev, 1968)

Odesa Oblast (Kiev, 1969)

Rovenska Oblast (Kiev, 1973).

Ternopil'ska Oblast (Kiev, 1973).

V Secondary Sources (in English)

Allen, W.E.D., *The Ukraine. A History* (Cambridge, 1942).

Armstrong, John A., *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York, 1959).

Armstrong, John A., *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1963).

Bessarabia, *Facts and Comments Concerning Bessarabia 1812-1940* (London, 1941).

Boswell, A. Bruce, *Eastern Poland* (New York, 1943).

Buell, R.L., *Poland: Key to Europe* (New York, 1939).

Chamberlin, W.H., *The Ukraine. A Submerged Nation* (New York, 1944).

Felinski, M., *Les Ukrainiens dans la pologne restauree* (Warsaw, 1931).

Galeski, Boguslaw, *Basic Concepts of Rural Sociology* (Manchester, 1972).

Godden, G.M., *Poland: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* (London, 1940).

Horak, Stepan, *Poland and her National Minorities, 1919-1939* (New York, 1961)

Kerner, R.J. ed., *Czechoslovakia. Twenty Years of Independence*
(London ?, 1940).

Kubijovyc, V., *Western Ukraine within Poland, 1920-1939* (Chicago, 1963).

Kusnierz, B., *Stalin and the Poles* (London, 1949).

Moore, Wilbert, E., *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe*
(Geneva, 1945).

Polonsky, Antony, *Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939* (Oxford, 1972).

Roberts, Henry L., *Rumania. Political Problems of an Agrarian State*
(New Haven, 1951).

Rose, W.J., *Poland* (London, 1939).

Rothschild, Joseph, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*
(Seattle and London, 1974).

Sharp, Samuel L., *Poland. White Eagle on a Red Field* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).

Skrzypek, Stanislaw, *The Problem of Eastern Galicia* (London, 1948).

Sullivant, R.S., *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957* (New York, 1962).

Tiltman, H. Hessel, *Peasant Europe* (London, 1934).

Ukraine. A Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. I, (Toronto, 1963).

Umiastowski, R., *Russia and the Polish Republic 1918-1941* (London, 1945).

Wanklyn, Harriet, *Czechoslovakia* (London, 1954).

Wielhorski, W., *The Importance of the Polish Eastern Provinces for the Polish Republic* (Glasgow, 1944).

VI Articles (in Ukrainian and Russian)

Halushko, I.M., "(KPZU). Orhanizator i kerivnyk revoliutsyino-vyzvolnoi borotby trudiashchych zakhidnoi Ukrainy" *Ukrainskyi istorichnyi zhurnal* 2, (1969), 12-21.

Ianiuk, A.O., "Zdyisnennia leninskoho kooperatyvnoho planu na Bukovyni" *Uk. ist. zh.* 7, (1972), 62-68.

Ivasiuta, M.K., "Vozziednannia zakhidnoi ukrainy v iedynyi Ukrainskii sotsialistychnii derzhavi i pershi uspihy sotsialistychnoho budivnytstva u Lvovi (1939-1941rr) in *Narysy istorii Lvova* (Lviv, 1956), pp. 290-308.

Kravchenko, I.M., "Sotsialistychna perebudova ekonomiky radiasnkoï Bukovyny" *Uk. ist. zh.* 8, (1967), 11-18.

Maksymov, S.H., "Komunisty Volyni - orhanizatory borotby trudiashchych proty zahrozy viiny, na zakhyst SRS (1929-veresen 1939) *Uk. ist. zh.* 9, (1967), 64-70.

Mykhailuta, T.I., Tiurenkov, M.M.?, "Pro pershi peretvorennia na Rovenshchyni (1939-1941rr)" *Uk. ist. zh.* 3, (1973), 105-109.

Pochapsky, A.M., "Pohresyvna presa zakhidnoi ukrainy v borotbi proty natsionalistychnoi falsyfikatsii natsionalnoho pytannia v 20-30 kh rokakh XXst." *Uk. ist. zh.* 9, (1965), 82-88.

Shiichuk, V.O., "Diialnist trudiashchykh zakhidnykh oblastei URSS u mistevykh radakh (1939-1941rr)" *Uk. ist. zh.* 11, (1974), 75-77.

Teslenko, M.P., "Do istorii partyinoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainy" *Uk. ist. zh.* 10, (1969), 44-48.

Teslenko, M.O., "Orhanizatsyino-partyina robota v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainy (1939-1941rr)" *Uk. ist. zh.* 9, (1975), 68-72.

Trerdokhlib, V.I., "Po stvorennia iedynoho antyfasystskoho frontu v Zakhidnykh Ukraini (1934-1939rr)" *Uk. ist. zh.* 1, (1967) 63-69.

Vashchenko, H., "'Vyzvolennia' Zakhidnoi Ukrainy Bolsherykamy" *Ukrainian Review*, 1, (1954), 67-

Vasiuta, I.K., "Ahrarne perenaselennia na zakhidnykh Ukraini v 20 kh.-30kh. rokakh XXst." *Uk. ist. zh.* 11, (1971), 50-58.

"Za pravilnoi osvishcheni istorii Kommunisticheskoi Partii Zapadnoi Ukrainy" *Kommunist*, 10, (1963), 37-48.

Zamlynsky, V.O., "Z istorii oboronoo-Masovoi roboty v zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSS (1940-cheren 1941)" *Uk. ist. zh.* 5, (1976), 64-68.

VII Articles in English

Antonov, G.I., "The March into Poland. September 1939" in Hart, B.H. Liddell ed., *The Red Army* (New York, 1956), 73-78.

Armstrong, J.A., "The Westward Expansion of the USSR", *Ukrainian Quarterly*, 2, (1977), 134-143.

Bilinsky, Y., "The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine" *Draft of paper delivered at the University of Michigan*, May 1970.

Horak, Stepan, M., "Byelorussian and Ukrainian Peasants in Poland"

Ukrainian Review, 3, (1977), 23-38.

Sobieski, Zygmunt, "Reminiscences from Lwów, 1934-1946" *Journal of*

Central European Affairs, 6, (1947), 351-374.

