German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective



Edited by
Hans-Joachim Torke
and
John-Paul Himka

The encounters between Germans and Ukrainians in the twentieth century have taken place primarily against the background of great violence. In the course of the world wars Germany twice occupied Ukraine, each time provoking both resistance and collaboration. This volume brings together the leading authorities in Ukrainian studies in North America, both historians and political scientists, and eminent German and Austrian scholars, experts in the history of Eastern Europe and German foreign policy, to explore the dramatic history of Ukrainian-German relations.

The German occupation of Ukraine during the First World War is the subject of two contributions: Peter Borowsky examines the aims of German policy in Ukraine from the perspective of the German military and diplomatic apparatus, while Jaroslaw Pelenski looks at the German occupation from the Ukrainian side, using the unpublished diary of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky to tease out the nuances of the relationship between the hetman and his German patrons. Four articles discuss key aspects of the Second World War: Ralf Bartoleit contributes a pioneering look at German agrarian policy in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine; Wolfdieter Bihl uses archival documentation to analyze the formation of the Waffen SS division Galizien/Halychyna, comprised of Ukrainian volunteers; Peter J. Potichnyj documents the attitude of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) toward the German military and occupation authorities; and Taras Hunczak discusses the relations between the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Germans in

(continued on back flap)

German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective

Edited by
Hans-Joachim Torke
and
John-Paul Himka

КІУС
CIUS

Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press
Edmonton 1994 Toronto

Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
T6G 2E8 CANADA

University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario
M5S 1A1 CANADA

ISBN 0-920862-91-8

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

German-Ukrainian relations in Historical perspective

Papers presented at an international conference held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Oct. 13-17, 1986 and organized by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-920862-91-8

1. Ukraine - Relations - Germany - Congresses.
2. Germany - Relations - Ukraine - Congresses.
I. Torke, Hans-Joachim. II. Himka, John-Paul, 1949-

DK508.57.G3G47 1993 327.4771043 C93-094927-7

Printed in Canada

Table of Contents

Preface

This volume contains fourteen articles that were originally presented as papers at an international conference devoted to the history of German-Ukrainian relations and held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 13-17 October 1986. The meeting was one in a series of similar conferences on Ukraine's relations with other ethnic groups or nations initiated and organized by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

The span of time covered in this volume extends from the early nineteenth century to our days. Since some time elapsed between the conference and the publication of this book, some authors dealing with recent events have updated their contributions either by corrections or by a postscript. But even without the updates none of the perspectives and statements formulated in 1986 was actually disproved by the later events of 1989-91 in Germany and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, most of the prophesies turned out to be surprisingly correct and refute the prejudice that historians cannot foresee the future. The majority of the papers, however, deal with World War II. Different aspects of the Ukrainian involvement in, or fight against, Nazi politics are treated in six articles. Another emphasis is on World War I and the short period of Ukrainian independence thereafter. All in all, this volume conveys the impression of multifarious connections between the two nations. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that inasmuch as the relations between Ukraine and Germany have not developed as normal relations between equal partners, they have not been, because of various restrictions in Soviet archives, adequately researched. Now that all limitations have been abolished there are ample opportunities for new approaches, and this book may therefore also serve as a stimulus for further research. It was one of the blissful results of the Garmisch conference that the turn-out of German Ukrainianists was unexpectedly high and that among them was a major proportion of younger people. Let us hope that the interest in Ukrainian history will constantly grow.

As the organizer of the Garmisch conference and one of the co-editors of this volume I would like to thank the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk for sponsoring the meeting. Acknowledgements should also be extended to Myroslav Yurkevich for shepherding the German texts through translation and all the texts through copy-editing, to Gus Fagan for translating the German texts into English, to

Linda Distad for copy-editing, to Peter Matilainen for technical assistance, and to Mark Baker, Steven Karp, Colin Neufeldt, and Nancy Slawski for editorial assistance.

Hans J. Torke, Berlin

An Episode from German-Ukrainian Scholarly Contacts: Dietrich Christoph von Rommel

Edgar Hösch

In his travel diary of 1789 Johann Gottfried Herder wrote of his "political dream" for a Ukrainian renaissance. The mild climate of that country, the richness of its soil, the happy disposition of its people, and their gift for music would give rise to a "civilized nation," a "new Greece."[1] Several decades later Tsar Alexander I established the first university on Ukrainian soil at Kharkiv. In 1805 lectures there began a new phase of educational activity that was full of promise.[2] V.N. Karazin (1773-1842), Ukrainian noble and confidant of the tsar, since 1802 had been attempting to win the Ukrainian nobility to support this ambitious project financially. Unfavourable circumstances, both internal and external, meant that his strong desire to see a Russian "Athens" arise in his homeland remained unfulfilled.[3] The new university at Kharkiv, however, soon became "one of the most important centres of national rebirth in Ukraine."[4]

Unlike previous academic establishments in this area (such as the Mohyla Academy in Kiev or the Kharkiv Collegium, which were concerned principally with the teaching of theology in Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine) the university in Kharkiv owed its academic orientation to the contemporary Western intellectual tradition.[5] Many of its native Ukrainian professors had been educated in Western Europe, for the chancellor, Count S. Potocki, had looked for suitable professorial candidates in Western Europe. When the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) declined an invitation, Goethe, in a "Promemoria" of 27 November 1803, recommended to Potocki the philosopher J.B. Schad.[6] Although Schad had many enemies and was forced to leave the country in 1816 after accusations of rationalist hostility to Christian belief, his lectures and publications were very influential in winning support for German idealist thinking, and especially for the work of Schelling.[7] Another influential academic was the classical philologist, Johann Christian Kroneberg, who was born in Moscow but educated at Halle and Jena. His seminars provoked a lot of attention and opposition within the Kharkiv romantic school, which had been formed in the thirties and forties around the great Slavist and ethnologist, Izmail Sreznevsky

(1812-80). In the spirit of Herder and the German Romantics, collecting popular traditions was considered a way to national self-discovery, while the recollections of the age of Cossack freedom gave new impetus to the poetic spirit of the new generation.[8]

In those early years there was a high proportion of Germans among the professors in all faculties who were recruited from abroad.[9] Many German travellers, visiting southern Russia in the forties and fifties, were impressed by the results of this educational project in what was considered, until then, a "barbarian" territory. They did not attempt to conceal a hint of national pride in their descriptions of the German model colonies in the southern region. Even such a critical observer as Baron von Haxthausen, who met "a number of excellent professors" during his visit to Kharkiv (he mentioned Lunin, Sreznevsky, Einbrod, and Struve), did not forget to mention that they had studied at German universities.[10] Johann Heinrich Blasius, the well-known zoologist from Braunschweig, had very high praise for Kharkiv University: "From the point of view of its achievements in the area of scientific study, apart from any other achievement, [it] compares advantageously with the other Russian universities that we have got to know."[11] He particularly praised the manner in which native students were prepared for university studies: "The preparation of students at *gymnasium* level distinguished itself from that carried out in other regions by its thoroughness."[12]

Blasius gave due honour to the influence of one German academic in Kharkiv, Dietrich Christoph von Rommel. One of the first professors there, he is of interest to historians generally, but in his particular personal circumstances he was somewhat of an exception during this period of early cultural and scientific contacts between Germans and Ukrainians. Three short years in his life as an academic link him with Ukraine. Although brief, this episode was important enough for the editor of the *Russkii biograficheskii slovar* to devote nine pages to an account of his life. That entry basically follows the account given in Rommel's own memoirs, published in a series edited by Friedrich Bülau under the general title, *Secret Stories and Mysterious People: A Collection of Amazing Stories Hidden or Forgotten*.[13] Rommel's brief apprenticeship in Ukraine was given a great deal of attention in this collection.[14]

Dietrich Christoph von Rommel was born on 17 April 1781 in Kassel, in the house of the metropolitan and first chaplain of the Unterneustadt community, later general director and chief court chaplain, Justus Philipp Rommel. He died in Kassel on 21 January 1859. In the history of German scholarship, his name is closely bound up with his homeland in Hesse. He was one of the founders of the Association of History and Regional Studies there, and produced a ten-volume *History of Hesse* which documented its history up to the early part of the eighteenth century.[15] (It is still considered one of the standard works on the history of the state of Hesse.) He became professor of history at the University

of Marburg and director of the Hesse court and state archives in Kassel. In 1828 he was elevated to the hereditary nobility and in 1854 was made state councillor.[16]

The budding theologian had initially rejected an offer to take up a position in Ukraine. Instead, he moved from Marburg to Göttingen, where he began to devote himself to the study of antiquity: "From the confined but tasteful world of antiquity his interests developed towards the general study of ethnology."[17] After he wrote an award-winning dissertation in 1802 on the subject of Abulfeda's Arabia, the road was open to a successful career in German academic life. He was awarded his doctorate from Göttingen in 1803 and, just one year later, he was given a post in Marburg where he took over the chair of rhetoric and Greek left vacant by Georg Friedrich Creuzer. He rejected the offer from Russia, made to him in 1803 by Meiners in the name of the tsar, in spite of the very attractive salary.[18] The offer from Kharkiv was renewed, and Rommel took the advice of his peers and academic friends when he decided, at the end of 1808, to get away from the "Napoleonic prison": "The wish, in the bloom of my youth, unmarried, healthy, and strong as I was, [was] to enter a sphere of activity that offered greater space and freedom. To be able to make some contribution to the spread of knowledge and culture in an as yet undeveloped country overcame my inherited love of the fatherland."[19] After a long and trying time (the formalities lasted until the middle of 1810), he was at last able to begin his journey to Ukraine.

In his assessment of the tasks awaiting him in the new milieu, Rommel was a child of his time. In the letters of encouragement from his intellectual mentors in Germany, Rommel's view of himself as a "carrier of culture" was strengthened. Johann von Müller, whose advice he had sought, wrote to him on 15 December 1808: "Southern Russia is a new world where the task is not so much the imparting of our literary or academic knowledge, but the instruction of the people in what is useful in history, in what is truly educational in the fine arts, in those things which are practical and of use to society....Kharkiv is a ten-day journey from Constantinople. With the changes that are imminent, there are many ways in which you could make yourself both useful and important."[20] In the style of the time, the move to Kharkiv became an educational journey. He visited the important university cities of northern Germany and met with the prominent academics within his field, before heading in the direction of the Russian border, via Prague, Brno, Cieszyn, and Lviv. He arrived in Kharkiv late in the evening on 17/27 January, after a particularly difficult ride through heavy snow. (He had come through Berdychiv, Kiev, Pereiaslav, and Lubni.[21])

The young professor adapted without difficulty to his new role:

> At first I was somewhat hesitant, as Johann von Müller had predicted I would be, finding myself in this new world still in its birth-pangs, just having come from the finest creations of northern Germany and having met such fine men

> as Pallas, Archenholz, Nicolai, Fichte, and many others in Braunschweig, Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Prague, and in other cities. But then, mindful of my poor and seemingly hopeless fatherland, which seemed to live on only in the steady Old-German spirit of the Electors in Prague, I plunged myself, in keeping with one of the principles enunciated by the incomparable Pestalozzi, into this world which would otherwise have devoured me.[22]

Years later, despite the advantage of distance when he wrote his account of the time in Kharkiv, Rommel's romantic image of Ukraine persisted. There are in his writings all the contemporary clichés about the land that "flowed with milk and honey"[23] and that set itself off from the otherwise grim reality of Russia by means of its pristine nature and its cheerful people. Small incidents on his journey to Kharkiv, as well as accidental encounters and experiences with the native people, convinced him of the distinction between the Little Russians and the Great Russians. In all areas that distinction was to the advantage of his newly adopted country, Ukraine. He praised the honesty and piety of the simple peasants and coachmen who, unlike the Russians, did not shamelessly exploit the weak position of the traveller. He had particular praise for the "very special hospitality which one finds everywhere in Ukraine." He was struck by the beautiful voices of the singers in church as well as by the well-formed facial structures and figures, especially among the Cossacks.[24] Rejection of everything that was Great Russian was an attitude that Rommel absorbed from his environment, but it was further strengthened by petty professional quarrels. Among his Russian colleagues he found, "apart from [Ivan] Rizhsky and the now retired but once influential Professor [Illia] Tymkovsky, no special talent." He noted among them all a "profound pretence and slyness,"[25] characteristics which could not be expected to lead to good relations.

In his personal life Rommel very quickly succumbed to the attractions of his new environment. He created for himself "a Little Russian Arcadia."[26] A rapidly arranged marriage with a young woman from the lower nobility brought him into the world of the local gentry whose patriotic sentiments and national lifestyle he made his own: "Margarethe and her sisters knew all the Little Russian songs, the beauty of which is to be found in the gentleness and naturalness of the language, in the original and mostly melancholic melody, and in the richness of their content: love, longing, nature, music, the glory and the battles of the beloved Cossacks."[27] Unlike many of his contemporaries whom fate brought for a brief time to the far-off Russian empire, Rommel attempted, during his stay in Ukraine, to get to know the people and be familiar with their history. Although the foreign professors lectured to their students in Latin, Rommel, because of his marriage and family connections, began earnestly to learn the local tongue.

The result of Rommel's historiographical efforts, an overview of Ukrainian history and contemporary conditions, was made accessible to a wider public when he wrote his memoirs covering the years in Kharkiv. He described them as "some learned observations concerning Little Russia" which he had put

together during his leisure hours in his "Kharkiv asylum."[28] With his particular points of emphasis and his own evaluations, these observations are an interesting example of German-Ukrainian contact, although their scholarly value may be limited. Rommel's image of Ukraine, like that of his contemporaries in the educated west, was determined to a large extent by the prevailing Cossack romanticism. Ukrainian history only really began for him in the middle of the seventeenth century when the "republican Cossacks" (between the Dnieper and the Don, between Great Russia, Poland, and the Crimea), secured their freedom and found in Khmelnytsky their charismatic symbolic figure. Kievan Rus' he considered part of Great Russian history: "The Little Russians developed as a separate group in language and customs only very gradually, receiving their Greek Orthodox rite from the Great Russian princes of Kiev, the oldest site of Slavic Christendom." The young independent state fell victim to Great Russian expansionism as Catherine II "brought the unruly Zaporozhians under control and sent them to the Don, destroyed the old military order of the Cossacks," and brought the whole border territory under Russian rule.[29]

As an outside observer he noticed among the Ukrainians a memory of and longing for the greatness of the past, a latent hostility to the Great Russians, and a continuing desire for freedom:

> The popular respect for the old capital city of Kiev and the inherited devotion to the old free Cossack lands have remained, setting them off from the proud Muscovite Great Russians; and whereas the Great Russians regard the Little Russians as half Tatar, the Little Russians regard themselves as genuine Slavs. From time to time a jealous spirit of independence is aroused in the hearts of the Ukrainian landed gentry.

The Little Russians were the "Swabians of the Russian empire, careless, child-like, naive, cheerful, lovers of games, dance, and music, skilful, and clever, so that one finds in this country not only the best coachmen and riders, but also the finest church choirs and the most skilful merchants and political figures." He compared their "ancient Slavic native dialect" with the German spoken in the Netherlands and expressed his satisfaction that the "bookish language of the Muscovites" had not yet overcome the "elegiac poesy of the people which had been one of the products of Tatar rule."[30]

This ideal picture of Ukrainian life was contrasted with the negative features of Muscovite Russia. He found in Ukraine "greater sympathy and heartfelt friendship" extended to foreigners. Family atmosphere in Ukraine was more natural and maternal than the patriarchal regimentation of Moscow. The art of cooking had achieved higher quality in Ukraine, while the national dress was similarly superior. On the negative side, he noted large-scale superstition and exaggerated piety. He was convinced that frequent fasting with subsequent overindulgence in food, too much eating of fish, "alongside a sedentary inactive lifestyle, the daily use of tea, and the much-loved steam bath, all contributed much to the high birth rate." As "deeply penetrating evils in this otherwise

blessed land" he mentioned, in addition to the great number of religious sects, the massive and unhealthy use of spirits, the "lack of a free and industrious class of peasants, the careless neglect of agriculture, forestry, and irrigation," and the lack of an adequate labour force to cultivate the rich arable land. In spite of all this he considered Ukraine to be among the happiest of lands, most blessed with the gifts of nature: "With the projected railway line from Moscow to Odessa a new epoch of trade through Constantinople will begin."[31]

His historical information was taken from the standard works of Ukrainian studies. He mentioned the works of Scherer, Engel, and Beauplan.[32] For his own period, he relied on his own observations. Scholarly curiosity led him on extended journeys during which he collected a large amount of ethnographic material. He made use of the unique opportunity to see for himself the homelands of "the Turks, Armenians, Tatars, and Caucasians and to gather information about this ancient classical region of the Black Sea."[33] After his return he made great use of this unique collection of knowledge. He was asked to contribute to the *General Encyclopedia of Science and Art*, edited by Ersch-Gruber, and supplied articles on Arabia, Armenia, the Caucasus, the Crimea, the Scythians, and the Sarmatians.[34] There were also articles on Ukraine, including a contribution on Bohdan Khmelnytsky, his son Yurii, and an article on Kharkiv.[35] His writings are important primary sources on the founding of the university in Kharkiv. His portraits of the other professors, including the Germans (Schmeifeld, Schad, Huth, Giese, Schnaubert, Dreyssig, Pilger, Lang, Reith, Nöldechen, Schweikard), the French, and the Russians, in spite of the obvious prejudice and palpable hostility towards the Russians, have great value since they come directly from an eyewitness.[36]

Although his sojourn in the academic life of Kharkiv was very brief, Rommel left some traces behind. He pointed with some pride to his "preparation of four Roman editions and one German chrestomathy, all of which were approved and introduced."[37] His attempts to ensure a new generation of qualified academics for the new university by means of a well-planned reform of secondary education in the area of South Russia served by Kharkiv University met with less success. His plans for a pedagogical institute and regulations which he prepared for the education of new teachers were recognized and accepted,[38] and after 1812 he was offered the post of director of the institute. However, his unpleasant experiences with the authorities led him, at the time of his departure, to have a less optimistic view of the future: "What pains me the most is the thought that, in spite of all the attempts by me and by my German colleagues to create a new and firm foundation for literary and humanistic education in the heart of Ukraine, the old Slavic barbarism will return and the intrigues of the Russians will destroy the seed that we have planted."[39]

The final period of his sojourn in the tsarist empire was overshadowed by unpleasant personal circumstances, particularly the imminent separation from his wife, which was the result of "important differences in nationality, religion, and temperament which only later came to the fore."[40] In 1814 he requested leave

from his teaching duties, and in July 1814, in the company of his wife, he moved to St. Petersburg. When his plans and hopes for a professorial post were not realized, he decided to return to Germany. His wife remained behind in St. Petersburg. In his account of his Ukrainian sojourn written in 1815, Rommel regarded this as just another episode in his life. He had "grateful memories of the hospitable manner in which he had been received in Russia," and he admitted that he "had acquired there two valuable things: an extension of my horizons and a greater attachment to my German fatherland."[41] Apart from this, it appears to have had no influence on his scholarly interests.

Notes

1. J.G. Herder, *Sämtliche Werke* (Berlin 1878), 4:402. For background, see Gerhard Ziegengeist, Helmut Grasshof, and Ulf Lehmann, "Herder und die slawischen Völker: Rezeption und Wirkungspotenz," in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Zur Herder-Rezeption in Ost- und Südosteuropa* (Berlin 1978), 1-28.

2. Klaus Meyer, "Die Entstehung der 'Universitätsfrage' in Russland: Zum Verhältnis von Universität, Staat und Gesellschaft zu Beginn des 19 Jahrhunderts," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 25 (1978):229-38.

3. J.T. Flynn, "V.N. Karazin, the Gentry and Kharkov University," *Slavic Review* 28 (1969):209-20.

4. Eduard Winter, *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine 955-1939* (Leipzig 1942), 140.

5. On the history of Kharkiv University see: D.I. Bagalei, *Opyt istorii Kharkovskogo universiteta*, 2 vols. (Kharkiv 1893-1904); M. Vetukhiv, "A Hundred and Fifty Years of Kharkiv University," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 5, no. 2-3 (16-17, 1956):1140-59. For a bibliography on the history of the university and its faculty see P.A. Zaionchkovskii, ed., *Spravochniki po istorii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii. Bibliograficheskii ukazatel*, 2nd ed. (Moscow 1978), 419-22.

6. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Briefe* (Weimar 1894), 16:358-63. Schad had been abbot of the Benedictine monastery at Banz and was active at the University of Jena after 1805. See Karl Klaus Walther, "Johann Baptist Schad in Russland," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, new series 40 (1992):340-65.

7. Winter, *Byzanz und Rom*, 140-2.

8. D. Chizhevsky, "The Influence of the Philosophy of Schelling (1775-1854) in the Ukraine," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 5, no. 2-3 (16-17, 1956):1128-39.

9. On academic activity in the early years, see A. Roslavskii-Petrovskii, "Ob uchenoi deiatelnosti Imperatorskago kharkovskago universiteta v pervoe desiatiletie ego sushchestvovaniia," *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia*, 1855, kn. 7, ch. LXXXVII, V. *Istoriia prosveshcheniia i grazhdanskago obrazovaniia*, 1-36 (on Rommel, see 21, 28, 32).

10. Freiherr August von Haxthausen, *Studien über die inneren Zustände, das Volksleben und insbesondere die ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands* (Hannover 1847), 2:129.

11. Johann Heinrich Blasius, *Reise im europäischen Russland in den Jahren 1840 und 1841*, part 2: *Reise im Süden* (Braunschweig 1844), 302. A similarly positive assessment was made by Alexander Petzholdt, *Reise im westlichen und südlichen europäischen Russland im Jahre 1855* (Gera 1860), 410-15.

12. Blasius, *Reise*, 302.

13. Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, "Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben und aus meiner Zeit," in Friedrich Bülau, ed., *Geheime Geschichten und rätselhafte Menschen: Sammlung verborgener und vergessener Merkwürdigkeiten*, 5 vols. (Leipzig 1854), 5:421-600.

14. Ibid., 5:485-588.

15. For the essential biographical data, as well as information on his academic career, see Arthur Wyss, *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (Leipzig 1889), 2:126-8; Wolfgang Lautemann, "Dietrich Christoph von Rommel (1781-1859): Historiker und Direktor des Hof- und Staatsarchives," in Ingebord Schnack, ed. *Lebensbilder aus Kurhessen und Waldeck 1830-1930* (Marburg 1958), 6:294-309.

16. B. Glasko, "Rommel, Khristofer Filippovich," *Russkii biograficheskii slovar* (repr. 1962), 17:66-75.

17. See Rommel's brief autobiographical note in Friedrich Wilhelm Strieder, *Grundlage zu einer Hessischen Gelehrten- und Schriftsteller-Geschichte von der Reformation bis 1806* (Marburg 1819), 17:405-11.

18. Ibid., 17:407-8. See also Glasko, "Rommel," 17:69.

19. Rommel, "Erinnerungen," 488.

20. Ibid., 491-2.

21. Ibid., 508-15, gives a detailed description of his winter journey through Ukraine.

22. Strieder, *Grundlage*, 17:408.

23. Rommel, "Erinnerungen," 562.

24. Ibid., 512, 514, 518, 522, 524, 534, 556.

25. Ibid., 525-6.

26. Ibid., 546.

27. "Margarethe Iwanowna von Tschernove [Margarita Ivanovna Chernova], daughter of a wealthy landowner from Vodolazke, forty versts from Kharkiv, was for three years my wife." (Rommel in Strieder, *Grundlage*, 17:409.) See also the longer description in Rommel, "Erinnerungen," 544ff., 551.

28. Rommel, "Erinnerungen," 553-62, esp. 553.

29. Ibid., 554, 556.

30. Ibid., 556.

31. Ibid., 557-62.
32. Ibid., 555 (note 1).
33. Strieder, *Grundlage*, 17:409.
34. Ibid., 17:411.
35. See the entry for "Chmelnitzky (Bogdan)" in J.S. Ersch and J.G. Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste*, 17:24-6; ibid., 17:26-7, for "Chmelnitzky (Georg)"; ibid., 17:169-70, for "Charkow."
36. Rommel, "Erinnerungen," 525-32.
37. Strieder, *Grundlage*, 17:409; Glasko, "Rommel," 75.
38. Glasko, "Rommel," 72; Rommel, "Erinnerungen," 519. The response of Baron Rozumovsky of 12 February 1812 is printed in Rommel, "Erinnerungen," 519-20.
39. Rommel, "Erinnerungen," 563.
40. Ibid., 545.
41. Ibid., 588.

German Colonists in Southern Ukraine up to the Repeal of the Colonial Statute

Detlef Brandes

In April 1798 Tsar Paul I sent "a reliable man," the Court Councillor Samuel Contenius, to New Russia (*Novorossiia*) to inspect the villages of the foreign settlers in that region, now southern Ukraine. His reports provide an overall picture of the situation of the so-called German colonies at the end of the eighteenth century. Contenius was to submit recommendations as to how the abuses in the administration of the colonies, which had spread during Paul's mother's reign, could be remedied, and how these settlers could be helped to establish themselves permanently.[1] The previous year the tsar had initiated a new policy towards the colonists by the formation of the Department of State Economy, Guardianship of Foreigners, and Rural Management (*Ekspeditsiia gosudarstvennogo khoziaistva, opekunstva inostrannykh i selskogo domovodstva*) in St. Petersburg and the re-establishment of a regional Office in Saratov. Paul had realized that the dissolution of the Office for the Guardianship of Foreigners and its Saratov branch, and the transferral of their functions to the provincial chambers (*gubernskie kazennye palaty*), which had taken place in 1782 as part of the reform of the *guberniia*, had proved a failure.[2] Paul had also placed the tax and repayments from the colonists who had settled in the 1760s at the Volga at the disposal of the new Department.[3] The tsar had also ordered that the New Russian colonists should at last receive what had been promised to them. This was particularly important if new German settlers were to be encouraged to come to southern Ukraine.

All this became the special responsibility of the supervisor Brigonzi, a new man appointed in September 1797.[4] It was on the basis of reports from Brigonzi that the tsar and the new Department had concluded that the deplorable state of affairs in the German colonies was mainly the fault of the former administration.[5] Contenius was to report on all the deficiencies he found, intercede on behalf of the interests of the "up to now defenceless settlers," ensure that their needs were satisfied, and protect them against abuses. He was to determine the precise extent of their debts to the state (they were expected to repay the costs

of settlement) and find out from them how much money and timber they had received. From the New Russian chamber he was to obtain evidence of its alleged services in kind and in money. Contenius was also to recommend how the colonists could repay their debts to the state without creating too great a burden for themselves. Any colonists who had not yet received the land allotted to them were to be given the appropriate amount of land. Any settlers who had neglected their farm or who had behaved improperly were to be deported from Russia, and their names were to be published in the newspapers.[6]

Contenius first inspected the Mennonite colonies. The first group of 228 families had left Gdańsk (Danzig) in 1788. The second group of 118 families had arrived between 1793 and 1796. They lived in eight colonies north and west of Khortytsia island on the Dnieper, as well as in two other villages (Schönwiese and Kronsgarten near Josefstal). Potemkin's successor, Baron Zubov, had wanted to settle two-thirds of the second group in Voznesenske, the capital of a new province he intended to establish. The newcomers had to wait until May 1797 before the new government finally decided to settle them near the Dnieper too.[7] In 1786 Potemkin had promised the delegates of the Mennonites that their fellow-believers would be exempted from paying tax for ten years and any obligation to perform military service forever; no troops were to be billeted in their colonies; each family was to receive 65 dessiatines (1 dessiatine equals 1.1 hectare) of land and a loan of 500 roubles, to be paid out over five months, as well as 120 pieces of timber and travelling and living expenses until the first harvest. Land tax was permanently fixed at 15 copecks per dessiatine.

Contenius praised the work habits and the strict moral code of the Mennonites. Because of the lack of water on the high-lying fields and because of the low price for grain, the settlers had taken up animal husbandry. In the first years they had lost 545 horses and 704 cattle through theft. In July 1797 each family owned, on average, 4 horses, 13 head of cattle, and 4 sheep, but 75 per cent of them still lacked houses with barns and more than 50 per cent of them did not possess a plough and harrow. They sold horses and cows, beef and mutton. Since they had difficulties disposing of the butter and cheese they produced in their own area, some Mennonites travelled to Kherson and further south to the Crimea. They were hoping for the activation of overseas trade. The Mennonites asked Contenius for a written guarantee of the privileges they had been promised and that the remaining money owed to them be paid. Apart from a first instalment of 100 roubles they had received no money during the first four months. Then the money had come to them in such dribs and drabs over an eight-year period that they had to spend it on their daily needs. But it was never enough to enable them to buy the basic equipment needed for farming.[8] These were the arguments they advanced when they petitioned the government to extend the original tax-free period over another ten years. They felt they owed what they had achieved to the better-off brethren who had helped the poorer ones

and also to the support they had received from their relatives in the home country.

Contenius considered that the colonists could only prosper if 150 families or so were moved to other areas where water was readily available, so that those who remained could take over the best land. The Department agreed and was willing to provide money for the purchase of private land. In 1802 Contenius bought land for this purpose in an adjoining area. The Department placed its trust in its own auditor rather than in the New Russian chamber, when it instructed the chamber to pay the Mennonites the 28,000 roubles it still owed to them.[9] In April 1800 they received from Paul I the long-promised charter which confirmed the special privileges of the Mennonites in addition to the rights of all foreign colonists.[10]

Next Contenius inspected the village of Josefstal. Ninety Lutheran families who had left Gdańsk in 1789 were sent to this village near Katerynoslav. Catherine II had instructed the governor of New Russia to give them half the loan and half the timber that had been offered to the Mennonites. In 1798 none of their houses had barns or other outhouses. On the advice of the New Russian chamber Catherine had decided that they did not need any further assistance from the state, since they were able to sell their produce in the capital city of the province at good prices.[11] The merchant who was to have built their houses went bankrupt before the work was completed. Although the settlers of Josefstal were to receive no additional payments, arrangements were made for their houses to be finished. Each family received 32.5 dessiatines of land, exactly half of what the Mennonites had been given. The tsar granted both the Mennonites and the colonists in Josefstal a five-year extension to their tax-free status. In addition, both groups were no longer required to repay their travelling expenses. Their debts to the state were to be settled over a period of ten years, rather than the three years Catherine had ordered.[12]

In 1794 Catherine had made a grant of land on the Dnieper south of Katerynoslav to forty-five families that had settled in Jamburg (province of St. Petersburg) in the 1760s. Contenius found them in great need, poorly dressed, and with few cattle. They had had to wait eighteen months for their houses to be finished; a large percentage of them had died of malnutrition; and the New Russian chamber had charged them exorbitant prices for their houses, cattle, and farming equipment. In the meantime the number of families had increased to fifty-seven, who owned only 27 horses and 369 head of cattle. The *Ekspeditsiia* decided that the settlers of Jamburg should only pay back the real value of what they had been delivered. Any family without an animal for working the land was given an ox. In a conflict with a neighbouring community of state peasants who claimed half of their land, the Department decided in favour of the settlers from Ingermanland.[13]

Of the 910 Lutherans who had left Gdańsk in 1786 for *Novorossiia*, Contenius found only 208 still alive. 155 of these Lutherans had been sent to a colony founded in 1781 by Swedes from the Baltic island of Dagö on the right bank of the lower Dnieper, since 84 per cent of the Swedish settlers had died due to the change of climate, malnutrition, and the lack of houses and other essentials. Only 33 per cent of the Gdańsk Lutherans were still alive, when Contenius visited the colony. In his opinion, the German settlers of the Swedish village were work-shy, and they possessed much fewer cattle than the Swedes and not a single plough. The remaining Gdańsk group had been sent on to Yelysavethrad and from there to Kherson and toward the Crimea. Most of the thirty-seven craftsmen that Contenius tracked down in Kherson and in the Crimea were barefoot, in rags, and hungry. They were barely making a living as day labourers. Potemkin had not kept his promise to find work for some of them in the state-owned cloth factory in Katerynoslav. A third group of the Lutherans from Gdańsk had been settled in a "German village" near Yelysavethrad and in the town itself; probably just over 50 per cent of the original settlers were still alive, as they had to quench their thirst with water from stinking pools. The *Ekspeditsiia* recommended that they be moved to a better location. Because of their poverty, they were not required to pay taxes for some time and were allowed to repay their debts, like the settlers from Jamburg, over a thirty-year period. The Gdańsk settlers living in the Swedish village were to pay a land tax of 5 copecks like the Swedes. In 1817 their land tax was raised to the same level as that paid by the state peasants.[14]

As a result of the reports of Contenius, the Department's belief was strengthened that the poor situation of the colonists was due in large part to "the poor administration of the previous authorities that had been responsible for them." The Department therefore recommended that as in Saratov a special office for immigrants be established in *Novorossiia* with the experienced Contenius in charge. The government approved that recommendation and the tsar gave his consent on the same day that he signed the charter for the Mennonites. The settlers of the Swedish village and of Jamburg as well as the Lutherans who had left Gdańsk in 1786 had been treated up to then as state peasants. In 1800 they were placed under the care of the newly created office. That office was instructed to expropriate land of those estate owners who had not settled the required number of peasants on their land (1 person to each 100 dessiatines within ten years), and thus to create a reserve of land for the new Mennonite settlers whom the government expected at that time to arrive soon.[15]

The Wave of Immigration during the Reign of Alexander I

Before Paul I could reap the benefits of his policy he was murdered (March 1801). In 1802 Contenius informed an influential elder from the Mennonite community in Gdańsk that, in view of the massive influx of peasants from the more densely populated areas of the Russian empire and of Bulgarians from the Ottoman empire, the Mennonites should hurry to come to New Russia in order to get good land while it was still available. They would be expected to get along with less credit than their predecessors. Experience showed, he wrote, that bigger families achieved prosperity more quickly than did small families. He also advised that they bring Spanish sheep with them if possible. A new law, he added, allowing state peasants, and among them colonists, to buy private land, might be of interest to the capitalists among the Mennonites. In the next three years 364 families arrived, in 1808-9 a further 99, and in 1819-20 254 families, all of whom were settled east of the Molochna river in the *guberniia* of Tavria.[16]

In 1803-4 some Swiss and large numbers of immigrants from southwest Germany, who were fleeing the French occupation and especially forced conscription, crossed the borders of tsarist Russia. Alexander I expressed the hope that they would be treated better than those who had arrived during his grandmother's reign, and that they would "lack in nothing."[17] According to the Russian recruiting officials, these immigrants included "good farmers and useful craftsmen" who would provide a good example for the "loafers from the neighbouring provinces."[18] They were given a subsistence allowance that was two times higher than the allowance received by a group of Bulgarian settlers that arrived at the same time. For the first winter the Germans and Swiss were to reside in refurbished barracks at Odessa, where they would be cared for medically and would have an opportunity to earn some money.[19]

However, the colonists came to Odessa not by sea, but by the land route, and they ended up in quarantine in completely overcrowded quarters in Dubosary. In one group the majority was sick on arrival and both the healthy and the sick had to spend weeks in small huts. They were finally crowded together in tents lacking all basic facilities. As the barracks in Odessa eventually filled up, the settlers were forced to live in small and stuffy rooms in Ovidiopil. They lacked clothing and footwear and were not provided with any for the cold winter. Approximately one sixth of the colonists died in the first two years after their arrival.[20] When the time came for them to leave their winter quarters, the officials were still discussing where the colonists should be settled.[21]

The governnent blamed the recruiting agents and accused them of signing up—against the orders of the government—single and poor people who did not even have enough money to pay for their journey. Due only to the characteristic

charity of Tsar Alexander, the minister of the interior wrote to one of the officers, these people were not turned back at the border.[22] Forty colonists had been attacked and robbed as they travelled on the Danube; only four of them claimed that they had lost more than 1,000 gulden. In contrast, of the 178 Mennonites who arrived around the same time in Khortytsia, one third of them had an initial capital sum of more than 1,000 gulden.[23] The Mennonites were granted land on the eastern side of the Molochna River and some of the German colonists received land on the western side, so that both groups could help each other.[24] A group of 247 Swiss were sent to the Crimea, where they founded a settlement in 1805 which they named Zürichtal.[25]

The settlement costs should have been met from the money collected in debt repayments from earlier influxes of settlers, but in May 1803 the repayments were by no means adequate to cover such costs. On the recommendation of Richelieu (governor general of *Novorossiia*) and Contenius, Alexander I agreed to limit the number of settlers. Alexander's ukase of 1804 also decreed that only competent farmers, specialists in wine-growing, in silk-culture, and in animal husbandry, especially in the raising of merino sheep, and also village craftsmen were to be allowed entry. They were granted 60 dessiatines of land, a credit of 300 roubles, and like their predecessors freedom from military service. Russian diplomats were permitted to grant only 200 passports per year, but Mennonites and Bulgarians were exempt from this rule. The vice-governors of the three provinces of *Novorossiia* were to provide information on land available for the further settlement of foreigners.[26] According to Richelieu, the Mennonites were amazing, the Bulgarians unbeatable, and the Germans unbearable. Without state support they would die of hunger.[27] Contenius suggested that those German colonists who had wasted their money or sold their cattle should receive corporal punishment or be forced to do public labour as a deterrent.[28]

The wars in Europe and resulting dislocation provided an opportunity for Russia to attract more colonists; thus in March 1809 the Council of Ministers decided to suspend the strict rules of 1804. "Honourable and good farmers" together with the craftsmen indispensable for the village economy would be welcomed in Russia, even if they were unable to pay their own travelling expenses. The quota was also lifted.[29] According to Richelieu, 621 German families came to *Novorossiia* between the end of 1808 and July 1810, and 474 of them were sent to the Molochna and 97 to the Crimea. When they arrived, they were shocked by the "poverty-stricken and mostly depressing conditions," in which their predecessors were living. Altogether, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, 6,082 colonist families (21,986 persons), settled in *Novorossiia*.[30] Richelieu invited 75 German craftsmen to establish businesses in Odessa, made loans available to them, and granted them tax-exemption for ten years too. This example was also followed by Tahanrih and Teodosiia.[31]

There were also German families who were sent to other provinces and immigrants from the Ottoman empire, mostly Bulgarians. For both groups of foreigners the *Ekspeditsiia* asked for 2.5 million roubles from the state treasury. In numerous letters Richelieu begged that money be transferred as soon as possible, in order to prevent starvation among the newcomers. The financial situation of the government was rather tight at that time, however, and a committee established by the government to limit spending wanted the settlement costs to be reduced to 500,000 roubles. The government finally agreed to cut the original amount only by 500,000 to 2 million roubles. It was impressed upon the poorer colonists that they would have to earn their living by working on the estates of Russian landowners or on the farms of their richer compatriots.[32] In spite of this, only 9 of the 29 colonies in the Odessa region managed to get through 1812 without government assistance. Alexander ordered that not another rouble was to be spent on foreign settlers, since settlers from within Russia herself cost only 2 per cent of the amount spent on foreigners.[33] German prisoners of war, who expressed the wish to stay in Russia, and Mennonites, who suffered from the war and from the flooding of the Vistula and therefore sought refuge in Russia, were to be given no money, but they were to receive a grant of land and tax-free status for ten years. They were expected to earn their living initially by working in the German colonies.[34]

In 1812 the government sent two auditors to southern Ukraine to investigate embezzlement and illegal spending by officials, to look at the economic condition of the colonies in the region, and to make recommendations for improvements and savings. Alexander I ordered "strict measures" to be taken against incompetent and lazy farmers. As in the Volga colonies in 1775, such farmers were to have their property confiscated or be made to perform public works.[35] The auditors received such a stream of complaints from the German colonists that Contenius called an assembly of the Molochna settlers, which rejected some of complaints as unfounded, but confirmed a number of the accusations: 1) instead of the promised 300 roubles they had received only a credit of 100 roubles which had been inadequate for the purchase of horses, carts, and ploughs; 2) settlers had had to work as day labourers to keep their heads above water, so they had been unable to devote themselves to their own land; 3) the supply of seed had been inadequate and had been delivered too late; 4) the new colonies were still without a mill so the settlers had to travel great distances to mill their grain; and, 5) in the hard winter of 1812-13 settlers had to eat the seed kept for sowing and had to use the straw from their roofs to feed their cattle.[36]

Contenius then set about examining the economic situation of each of the 417 new farmers. He compared the working capacity of the family members, the number of working animals, and the equipment of each farmer with the amount of seed he had sown in the last spring and autumn. Anyone he considered incompetent or lazy was sentenced to whipping, forced labour within or outside

the colony, or even the loss of the farm. Then Contenius travelled with the auditors to the Odessa colonies where he did the same. He reported that the cause of the desperate situation was the poor harvest of 1813 rather than the failure of the colonists. Many of them were sick because they had too little to eat or had been eating food unfit for human consumption.[37]

After the annexation of Bessarabia in 1812 the government relaxed its regulations once again. Southern Germans who had spent some years in the Duchy of Warsaw were granted land in the sparsely populated area of Budzhak, the southern part of Bessarabia.[38] Poor harvests and chiliastic prophecies in 1816-17 had persuaded some 10,000 persons to leave Württemberg and await the millennium in the Russian empire. On the lower Danube and in southern Ukraine, many succumbed to various illnesses. Of the survivors, 400 families went to Georgia while 300 families stayed in Bessarabia and *Novorossiia*.[39] In 1819 settlement of new colonists was terminated, but there were exceptions: Prussian Mennonites; followers of Ignatius Lindl from Bavaria and Württemberg, who established the settlement of Sarata in Bessarabia; Swiss wine-growers; and pietists from Württemberg as well as Germans from Baden.[40]

Most of the German settlers came from rural backgrounds; but, to give one example, only half of the pietists gave their profession as farmers, the other half registered as craftsmen. The latter were, on average, much poorer than the former, when they left Germany. Social differences, however, tended to be levelled, since most of the savings had been spent during the journey and in the winter quarters and since the New Russian Office for Foreign Settlers gave increased help to the needy.[41] Different groups of colonists were granted different amounts of land: Mennonites were given 65 dessiatines per family; German colonists arriving since 1803, 60 dessiatines; those in the Crimea, 20 dessiatines; those in Josefstal, 32.5 dessiatines; the Swedes and the settlers from Gdańsk, 15 dessiatines per male adult.[42] The Mennonites paid less tax per dessiatine than the other colonists: from 1812 to 1840, 33 per cent; from 1840 to 1850, 9 per cent; from 1869, 20 per cent.[43]

In 1813 there were 31 Mennonite villages in southern Ukraine, with 778 families (2,502 male). The other 3,539 German families (9,147 male) lived in 61 villages.[44] By 1830, the number of Mennonite, German, and Swiss colonists in southern Ukraine and Bessarabia had risen to 56,478 (male and female). They lived in 175 colonies. In 1852 this number had almost doubled to 104,959.[45] From the 1860s the numbers of German settlements increased through the foundation of "daughter" colonies. Of the 1.2 million dessiatines of land in German hands in southern Ukraine in 1878, 60 per cent belonged to the communities and the state respectively, while 40 per cent was privately owned.[46]

To deal with the influx of settlers in 1817, which was seen as a portent, a Committee for the Guardianship of the Colonists of South Russia was established in Chişinău, with offices in Katerynoslav, Odessa, and Chişinău. Thirteen years

later, the government believed that the administration could be simplified since the colonies were on a firm footing, state debts had been fixed and further immigration had been halted. Because of the excellent condition of most of the colonies, the regional offices could be closed down; the Committee was transferred to Odessa. The colonists were burdened with the costs of the maintainance of the Committee. The former Chief Guardian, General Inzov, protested in vain.[47]

Model Farmers?

The New Russian Foreigners Office, when it was set up, had been given the task of encouraging the colonists to play the role of model farmers. Grants of government money and privileges would only be justified if, in addition to the production of grain, the colonists engaged in and improved animal husbandry, gardening, wine-growing, and the breeding of silkworms.[48] The revisor Koeppen recommended not granting additional land to the colonists, as a way of forcing them to improve either their production methods or, alternatively, to move to the towns, where they could increase the number of craftsmen, "the middle class which, among us, is still so small."[49]

Merino sheep were distributed among the colonists in 1804 by Richelieu and in 1816 by Contenius. The majority of the colonists were not interested in raising fine-wool sheep, since the improvement of the stock of ordinary sheep by merino rams would take several years. The main problem, however, was that there were no markets in southern Ukraine for either fine wool or silk. Contenius therefore supported the establishment of a textile factory in the Mennonite colony Halbstadt (Tavria), in the hope that this would provide some incentive for the farmers to take up the production of fine wool.[50] The Foreigners Office agreed that if the Mennonites in Khortytsia were willing to co-operate with its plans, it would be satisfied with a yearly payment of 25 roubles from the colonists toward their debt to the state. The German farmers, however, allowed the distributed seeds and shoots to rot and the expensive merino sheep to mix freely with the rest of the herd. Therefore the German village and district offices were forced to set up communal plantations and sheep farms. In 1828 there were 95,000 mulberry trees, but the amount of silk delivered by the colonists was only 5.5 poods (1 pood equals 36 pounds).[51] In the 1820s sheep farming became very profitable because the textile factory in Katerynoslav paid good prices. That helped the colonists to get over the bad harvest of 1823-4. The growth in the number of fine-wool sheep, however, was very slow and varied from area to area.[52]

On the basis of the insurance figures of the Mennonites, the value of cattle in the colonist communities in 1812-13 was as follows: in Josefstal, 104 roubles; among the Germans west of the Molochna, 276 roubles; in the Mennonite community on the other side of the river, 690 roubles; among the Mennonites in Khortytsia, 480 roubles. Twenty-nine years later the value of the Khortytsia cattle

had risen to 2,250 roubles, those of the Molochna community to 1,695 roubles, those of the Mennonites on the other bank to 1,650 roubles, and those in Josefstal to only 126 roubles. The value of cattle owned by the families of the Liebental colonies (near Odessa) rose from 380 roubles in 1816 to 470 roubles in 1841. Of the total value of the animals owned by the Germans in 1812-13, horses made up 29-36 per cent, cattle 34-56 per cent, and sheep 0-19 per cent. By 1825 the proportions had changed radically. The value of sheep in the both Mennonite districts then constituted 54-59 per cent of the whole. In 1841 this figure had risen to 70-79 per cent.[53] Only the Liebenthal district was then an exception, with the cattle 46 per cent, horses 37 per cent, and sheep 17 per cent.[54]

In 1812-13 the Foreigners Office leased large holdings of land at low rates. Mennonites Johann Cornies and Claas Wiens received this land so that they could engage in large-scale cost-effective sheep farming. In the first twenty years, according to his own figures, Cornies brought in over 422,000 roubles.[55] In 1868 sheep farming was a big and successful business on the estates of the large landowners and large tenant farmers in the German colonies. Among the rest of the colonists, sheep farming accounted for only 8.5 per cent of their income. Due to land shortage the communities had to bring in a rule that each farmer could only drive a certain number of animals to the communal pastures.[56]

While the Mennonites of Khortytsia, living further from the export harbours, engaged mainly in animal husbandry, the settlers of Kherson and Tavria in 1814 concentrated on the production of grain.[57] In 1813 the Germans on both banks of the Molochna grew oats, barley, and rye, but the Mennonites produced three times more grain per head than the Lutheran and Catholic colonists.[58] Between 1813 and 1838, the proportion of wheat grown by the Molochna colonists grew from 16 to 36 per cent, while among the Mennonites it grew from 8 to 44 per cent. It was during this period that the Mennonites first used threshing machines and introduced a kind of four-field system.[59] The German farmers of southern Ukraine gradually adapted their farming to the steadily increasing wheat prices after 1847. With their horses they could transport their grain to the buyers faster than the non-German peasantry. In 1868 their income from the sale of wheat made up 89 per cent of their total income.[60] Between 1879 and 1900 the proportion of wheat in overall sowing sank from 72 to 54 per cent and the proportion of sheep in the villages and on the large estates sank to 26 per cent. The proportion of other animals increased: horses to 26 per cent, cattle to 39 per cent, and pigs to 9 per cent.[61] This tendency increased up to the time of the war. In 1911, in the *guberniia* of Katerynoslav, the proportion of the settlers' income which came trom the sale of wool was only 1.3 per cent, while the sale of meat accounted for 66 per cent of the overall income from animal husbandry.[62]

The central Russian government and the colonial authorities had hoped that the Germans would pass on their modern farming methods to their neighbours. The government made Johann Cornies, the chairman of the Agricultural Union of Molochna Mennonites, responsible for overseeing the settling of the Nogai Tatars. Under his direction, they built their houses in the Mennonite style, used Mennonite farming equipment, bred an improved variety of sheep, planted potatoes and laid out fruit and vegetable gardens.[63] Landless German colonists were sent into the Jewish colonies as village elders and model farmers.[64] The colonists had no difficulty in finding Russian and Ukrainian farm-hands and day labourers since they offered wages as much as 50-70 per cent above the average, although they also insisted on higher productivity.[65] On the estates of Cornies and his descendant, on average, 10-12 Ukrainians worked an apprenticeship for a number of years, at the end of which they were rewarded with a grant of 50 dessiatines of land in a neighbouring community.[66]

The Ukrainian peasants began to use horses in ploughing and to buy the bigger German carts, when the delivery of the mail by the peasant themselves had been abolished.[67] After the liberation of the serfs in 1861, they also began to buy ploughs and coaches from the Germans.[68] At the beginning of the twentieth century they began to use the German "bugger," a plough with several shares. The German workshops and factories of southern Ukraine produced not only good and relatively cheap commodities, but were also able to repair them.[69]

The Crisis of the Sixties

In the colonies of the Liebental district, during the early years of colonization, it was said that "whoever could read though with difficulty, scribble a few letters, and sing a few hymns was made a teacher, as long as he did not ask for more pay than a cowhand." As late as 1830, a leading colonial administrator considered 108 of the 116 teachers in the *guberniia* of Katerynoslav and Tavria unfit to teach, because they read only with difficulty and could barely write their own names.[70] The peasants were not too concerned about schooling. One pastor complained: "If the good God did not cover all the threshing places with snow, and freeze in the ploughs, then we would never get any of the children to school."[71] In the sixties many teachers demanded to be freed from the additional function of serving as village secretaries. They petitioned for the large classes to be divided and called for an improvement in the teaching of Russian, "especially since many are forced to earn their living outside the community." The Russian language, they recommended, should be taught by Russians.[72]

Since the colonists had large families and were not legally permitted to divide their farms, the landless population grew rapidly. In 1841 there were already more landless families among the Molochna Mennonites than farmers. Most of them preferred to rent land rather than work for their brother in the

family household, so 75 per cent of the Mennonites who lived outside their communities were leaseholders of land or mills.[73] Unofficially the Mennonites of Khortytsia divided their holdings in halves or quarters to provide for the younger families. In 1836-9 they were granted land for new settlements in Mariiupil district in the *guberniia* of Katerynoslav.[74] Some of the colonists moved to the towns of *Novorossiia*: the number of colonist families in Odessa grew from 90 in 1835 to 431 in 1848. There they had churches, schools, orphanages, a home for the aged, a hospital, and a newspaper.[75]

In 1817, the German colonies had received permission to levy charges for the establishment of welfare institutions on those who earned their living outside the community, although those landless persons also had to pay the taxes and an annual fee for a travel permit. Inzov had opposed the introduction of this unequal burden on the landless, which the rich farmers used as a means of forcing their poorer brethren to remain in their service. The ministry, however, shared the view of the Foreigners Office that this measure was merely a way of compensating for the fact that persons who worked outside the community did not have to pay the community taxes.[76]

When rental land became scarcer and therefore more and more expensive, while the price of wool sank, the *Odessaer Zeitung* compared the relation between the two classes in the villages to that between the nobility and serfs. While the German colonists on the Molochna were able to purchase land for ten daughter colonies with the proceeds from the communal sheep farm and the lease of the brewing licence, the once-model Mennonite farmers on the east of the Molochna remained deaf towards the need of their landless brethren. In 1863 the latter demanded the division and rental of the former communal sheep farm and the land owned by the closed-down textile factory. They demanded the creation of a community fund which could provide credit for the purchase of land to establish daughter colonies. In their opinion taxes should be levied on the basis of land ownership and not on each family. They also asked for the right to vote and be elected in their communities, a right hitherto restricted to landowners.[77] The Ministry of State Domains recommended that there be a change in the colonial statutes allowing the sale and the division of the original 60-5 dessiatine-shares into three parts, and it asked the communities to make their views known on this proposal.[78]

As the hearings of the Committee for the Guardianship of Colonists of South Russia did not bring any rapid changes, in 1865 an auditor was sent to southern Ukraine to look into the complaints of the colonists. He reported that the colonial administration, with its peculiar combination of administrative and judicial functions, was a remnant of a previous epoch. The colonists had learned the "local dialect," and he thought the only barrier to complete integration of the settlers was the special colonial administration itself. He thought that the colonists would lose nothing, since Alexander II had just reformed every aspect of the

administrative system. In the *zèmstva* (elective district and provincial assemblies) the colonists would strengthen the economically successful and well-to-do elements. Because of the huge increase in the population, two-thirds of the colonists had neither land nor voting rights, and an oligarchy of farmers was ruling over "a class without any rights." That oligarchy was not even controlled by the state inspectors, since they depended on the benevolence of the mayors when they had any wishes in financial matters. The Guardian Committee supported whatever the inspectors wanted. It had, for example, shielded the district elder of the Molochna Mennonites who had lined his own pocket and the pockets of his relatives and friends and had given preference to them when reserve land was distributed. The Committee was also slow and difficult to activate, so many of the colonists tried to circumvent it. Following the model of the Liebental district, a number of districts had asked for permission to establish savings banks to administer the money of the orphans and the purchase of new land, but the Committee had done nothing. In spite of three poor harvests, the auditor wrote that the colonists still deserved their reputation as model farmers: only the production of silk had been a failure because of a caterpillar disease which was also affecting other countries; the plantations had become proper forests from which the colonists could now use wood for purposes of building and making repairs; and their carts, wagons, and agricultural equipment were a major source of income.[79]

A poll organized by the ministry showed that the majority wanted to extend the right to vote to all houseowners, but not to tenants. They also thought it should be permissible to divide farms in half. In March 1866 a special commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs accepted these proposals and established committees on which landowners and landless would be equally represented to distribute the land of the former communal sheep farm and the remaining reserve land to the settlers at the rate of 12 dessiatines to each landless houseowner. In 1869 these shares were raised to 15 dessiatines, when the wide routes leading from the Crimean salt lakes to the north were narrowed.[80] The land rent, in keeping with its name, was collected on the basis of size of land holding and not equally from every household. As the landless could participate in the decisions of the communal assemblies since the reform, the colonies made a much stronger effort to acquire land for the landless.[81] To win over the mass of the colonists for the abolition of the privileges, the Ministry of State Domains decided to proceed carefully. In 1871 the colonies of southern Ukraine and the Volga were brought under the general administration, but maintained their communal establishments like the sheep farms as a source of communal income, the savings banks, and the special fire insurance. The colonists were also given the right to leave the Russian empire. Military service, scarcity of land, and poor harvests were a motivation for many colonists to emigrate. Through over-intensive farming and lack of manure the colonists had exhausted the soil.[82]

Conclusion

The brevity of the reign of Paul and the mass influx of colonists under Catherine II and Alexander I have obscured the fact that Paul corrected many of the mistakes in the policies of his mother and that he laid the foundation for the immigration policy of his son. He re-established the special administration; disbursed the money that had been promised to the settlers; gave the charter to the Mennonites; placed the Gdańsk settlers, the Swedes, and the settlers of Jamburg under the Foreigners Office for *Novorossiia*; and established a land reserve for future colonists. The policy of Alexander was characterized by a regular switch between inviting and discouraging settlers. The efforts by Russian diplomats to entice prosperous peasants while blocking the path of the poor was an unsuccessful policy, because economic need was the major cause of immigration. Alexander's settlement policy repeated the same mistakes that had been made in the eighteenth century, that is, settlers were brought in although quarters were not prepared for them and neither land nor money had been set aside for them.

Those settlers who had little knowledge of farming needed a long time to become self-sufficient, and even experienced farmers needed some years to become accustomed to the climate, the soil, and the dangers of the steppe: "It often happened in those early years that a wolf walked on to the roof of the small hut and looked down the chimney at the housewife preparing the evening meal for her absent husband."[83] On average, it took twenty years before the peasants could manage without assistance from the state and begin to pay their debts. The process was very uneven and there were great differences even between the two Mennonite communities. The Foreigners Office attempted to persuade or force the colonists to introduce new agricultural methods and new breeds into southern Ukraine. In the case of silk production this failed, but the introduction of merino sheep was a success and a number of forest plantations were established. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the Germans were no longer working according to the instructions of the colonial administration but in accordance with the needs of the market. Their obvious economic success had its dark side, however. The peasants had little interest in educating their children for other professions. When the land reserves had been used up, a class of landless peasants arose, which, in the case of the Mennonites, made up 66 per cent of the population in the 1860s. Unlike the rest of the colonists, the Mennonite communities on the Molochna were unable to resolve this conflict and the government had to come to the assistance of the poor. Finally, the government decided to abandon the special rights and the special administration as a means of integrating the Germans into the multinational society of southern Ukraine.

Notes

1. Resolution of the Department of State Economy, Guardianship of Foreigners, and Rural Management of 6 April 1798, Central State Historical Archives (Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv), 383/29/161. Hereinafter the department will simply be referred to as the Ekspeditsiia. The archives will be cited as TsGIA.
2. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov* (*PSZ*), XXIV, no. 17865f.
3. Ekspeditsiia to the Pravitelstvuiushchii Senat (hereinafter cited as Senat), 9 March 1800, TsGIA, 383/29/189.
4. Ukase of Paul I, 25 April 1797; Berdaev to the Finance Minister, 17 September 1797, TsGIA, 383/29/169.
5. Brigonzi to the Ekspeditsiia, 28 January 1798; the resolutions of the Ekspeditsiia, 17 March 1798 and 3 June 1798, TsGIA, 383/29/169.
6. Instruction of the Ekspeditsiia to Contenius, [6 April 1798], TsGIA, 383/29/162.
7. Berdaev to the Finance Minister, 17 September 1797, TsGIA, 383/29/189.
8. The same was true of building timber, which should have been waiting for them on their arrival. They had been promised two mills, but had been given none. In the meantime each colony had built a mill at its own expense.
9. They were also to be provided with the timber still owed to them. Correpondence between Contenius, Brigonzi, and the Ekspeditsiia, July-November 1798; submission from the Ekspeditsiia to the Senat, 16 December 1799; the decision of the Senat, [21 March 1800]; the approval of Paul I, 6 April 1800; TsGIA, 383/29/161. Report of Contenius to the Ekspeditsiia, 13 June 1802, TsGIA, 383/29/179.
10. The proposed charter and the agreement of Paul I, 6 April 1800, TsGIA, 383/29/179.
11. Catherine II to Kakhovskoi, 2 June 1792, TsGIA, 383/29/1137.
12. Report of Contenius to the Ekspeditsiia, 15 July 1798 and 22 May 1801, TsGIA, 383/29/162. Submission of the Ekspeditsiia, 16 December 1799; resolution of the Senat, 19 April 1800; approval of Paul I, 6 April 1800, TsGIA, 383/29/161. Foreigners Office to the Ekspeditsiia, 30 May 1813, TsGIA, 383/29/387. Resolution of the State Council, 17 November 1817, approved by the tsar, TsGIA, 383/29/387.
13. Report of Contenius to the Ekspeditsiia, 29 July 1798, TsGIA, 383/29/163.
14. Reports of Contenius from November 1798 to January 1799, TsGIA, 383/29/166; G. Pisarevskii, "Vyzov v Rossiiu kolonistov iz Dantsiga," *Russkaia mysl* 23, no. 9 (1902): 71-94. See also note 12 above.
15. See note 12 above. Contenius to the Ekspeditsiia, 30 January 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/184. Submissions of the Ekspeditsiia, [November 1807], TsGIA, 383/29/344.
16. Contenius to Kurakin, 28 August 1802; Contenius to Warkentin, 22 August 1802, TsGIA, 383/29/210. G. Pisarevskii, *Pereselenie prusskikh mennonitov v Rossiiu pri Aleksandre I* (Rostov 1917); E. Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v 1800-1825 gg.* (Moscow 1970), 127f.

17. Kochubei to Contenius, 5 October 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/191; Alexander I to Richelieu, 18 October 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/205.

18. Richelieu to Kochubei, 26 September 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/205.

19. Contenius to the Ekspeditsiia, 1 September 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/205; Contenius to the Ekspeditsiia, 17 October 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/261.

20. Richelieu to Kochubei, 28 March 1803 and 12 September 1803; Zverak to Kochubei, 18 September 1803; Brigonzi to the Ekspeditsiia, 10 September 1803; TsGIA, 383/29/191. Contenius to the Ekspeditsiia, 19 September 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/205. Contenius to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), 10 October 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/261. Kochubei to Richelieu, 15 April 1804, TsGIA, 383/29/255. Richelieu to Kochubei, 13 April 1804, TsGIA, 383/29/251. Contenius to Hablitz, 18 June 1805, TsGIA, 383/29/261. Contenius to Hablitz, 18 December 1805, TsGIA, 383/29/241.

21. Submission of the Ekspeditsiia, [November 1807], TsGIA, 383/29/344.

22. Kochubei to Escher, 24 September 1804, TsGIA, 383/29/195.

23. Richelieu to the MVD, 16 December 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/261; L.V. Malinovskii, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie kolonistskoi derevni v iuzhnoi Rossii v pervoi polovine XIX," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 109 (1983):180.

24. Contenius to Kochubei, 9 December 1804, TsGIA, 383/29/184.

25. Iakovlev to Kochubei, 1/13 October 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/191.

26. Hablitz to Kochubei, 3 May 1805, TsGIA, 383/29/202. Kochubei to Czartoryski, 3 March 1805, TsGIA, 383/29/251. *PSZ*, XXVII, no. 21163. Note of Dzhunkovskii, [before 10 February 1805], TsGIA, 383/29/251. Foreigners Office (Katerynoslav) to MVD/Economic Department, 14 February 1813, TsGIA, 383/29/895.

27. Richelieu to Kochubei, 17 October 1806, TsGIA, 383/29/251.

28. Contenius to the Ekspeditsiia, 2 April 1803, TsGIA, 383/29/199. Contenius to the MVD, 4 February 1805, TsGIA, 383/29/251.

29. Journal of the Committee of Ministers, 19 March 1809, TsGIA, 383/29/328.

30. Submission of the Ekspeditsiia, September 1809; Richelieu to the MVD, 25 April 1810, TsGIA, 383/29/342. Submission of the Ekspeditsiia, [April 1811], TsGIA, 383/29/362. *Unterhaltungsblatt für die deutschen Ansiedler im südlichen Russland* (1849):41ff.

31. Note of the Ekspeditsiia, March 1808; Journal of the Ekspeditsiia, 8 July 1809, TsGIA, 383/29/284. Fens to the MVD, 22 June 1804, TsGIA, 383/29/229.

32. Resolution of the Committee for the Reduction of Expenses in 1810; Richelieu to the MVD, 26 February, 25 March, 27 March, 25 April 1810, TsGIA, 383/29/342. Richelieu to the MVD, 10 November 1810; Submission of the *Eskpeditsiia*, January 1811, TsGIA, 383/29/362.

33. Journal of the Committee for the Reduction of Expenses in 1810, TsGIA 383/29/351. Richelieu to the MVD, 14 September 1812, TsGIA, 383/29/362.

34. New Russian Foreigners Office to the Department of State Economy, 25 July and 4 October 1812, TsGIA, 383/29/379. Kozobavlev to the Kherson Military Governor, 3 July 1812; Journal of the Finance Committee, 9 December 1812, TsGIA, 383/29/898. Contenius to Dzhunkovskii, 5 March 1814, TsGIA, 382/29/362.

35. Submission of the MVD confirmed by the tsar on 27 November 1811; Kozobavlev to Richelieu, 7 June 1813 and 31 July 1813; Submission of the Department of State Economy to the MVD, 19 August 1813, TsGIA, 383/29/362.

36. Richelieu to the MVD, 14 September 1812; Contenius to Richelieu, 9 August 1812; Foreigners Office to the Department of State Economy, 4 February 1813; Lashkarev to Dzhunkovskii, 20 May 1813, TsGIA, 383/29/381.

37. Contenius to Dzhunkovskii, 5 March 1813; Contenius to the MVD, 26 July 1813 and 30 July 1814, TsGIA, 383/29/362.

38. Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina*, 130f.

39. Georg Leibbrandt, *Die Auswanderung aus Schwaben nach Russland 1816-1823: Ein schwäbisches Zeit- und Charakterbild* (Stuttgart 1928), 130ff.

40. Submission of the MVD to the Council of Ministers, 26 March 1833, TsGIA, 383/29/964.

41. Malinovskii, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie," 181ff.

42. Foreigners Office to the MVD/Department of State Economy, 14 February 1813, TsGIA, 383/29/895.

43. TsGIA, 383/1/190.

44. See note 37 above.

45. Fadeev and Kirilov to the Department of State Economy, 13 May 1830, TsGIA, 383/29/964; P. Keppen, *Ob etnograficheskoi karte Evropeiskoi Rossii* (St. Petersburg 1852).

46. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 15 December 1878 and 20 March 1882.

47. Fadeev and Kirilov to the Department of State Economy, 13 May 1830; Resolution of the State Council, 7 November 1832, approved by the tsar on 9 December 1832; Submission of the MVD, 26 March 1833; Resolution of the State Council, 1 July 1833, approved by the tsar, TsGIA, 383/29/964. Inzov to the MVD, 13 November 1833; Resolutions of the State Council, 22 January 1834, confirmed by the tsar on 20 February 1834, TsGIA, 383/29/965.

48. Fadeev to the Department of State Economy, 13 May 1830, TsGIA, 383/29/964.

49. Koeppen to the MVD, 21 January 1838, TsGIA, 383/29/609.

50. Foreigners Office to the Department of State Economy, 26 May 1816; Contenius to the Foreigners Office, 31 July 1815, TsGIA, 383/29/390; "Otchet Fadeeva," *Krasnyi arkhiv*, no. 5 (1941):109; P.A. Mukhanov, "Obozrenie inostrannykh kolonii v Novorossiiskom krae," *Severnyi arkhiv* 8 (1823):127; Malinovskii, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie," 189.

51. Contenius to the Foreigners Office, 31 July 1815; Contenius to Dzhunkovskii, 13

August 1815; Contenius to the MVD, 23 June 1816; Contenius to the Department of State Economy, 3 November 1816; Lashkarev to the Department of State Economy, 30 April 1815, TsGIA, 383/29/390. *Unterhaltungsblatt* (1849):53; Malinovskii, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie," 190.

52. Malinovskii, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie," 187f.

53. By adopting the insurance sums of the Mennonites of 1851 Malinovskii introduced a good basis for comparison. See also *Vedomost o chisle nakhodiashchegosia v Molochanskikh koloniiakh skota*, 24 March 1813; Contenius to the MVD, 26 July 1813; Submission of Kozobavlev to Alexander, 13 October 1813, TsGIA, 383/29/381. Contenius to the MVD, 30 July 1814, TsGIA, 383/29/362. A. Klaus, *Nashi kolonii. Opyty i materialy po istorii i statistike inostrannoi kolonizatsii v Rossii* (St. Petersburg 1869), *Prilozheniia* 75; *Unterhaltungsblatt* (1849):55.

54. Malinovskii, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie," 188; J. Cornies, "O sostoianii khoziaistva v Molochanskikh Mennonitskikh koloniiakh," *Zhurnal Ministerstva Gosudarstvennych Imushchestv* 8, no. 2 (1843):74f.; "O polozhenii ovtsevodstva v Novorossiiskom krae, i o sredstvakh k ego podderzhanii," *Zhurnal MGI* 11 (1844), 2:267ff.; *Unterhaltungsblatt* (1848):25ff.

55. Foreigners Office to the Department of State Economy, 21 November 1814 and 26 September 1816, TsGIA, 383/29/895 resp. /390, TsGIA, 383/29/593. *Unterhaltungsblatt* (1847):25ff.

56. Malinovskii, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie," 189ff.

57. TsGIA, 383/29/503; "Statisticheskie svedeniia o inostrannykh poselentsev v Rossii," *Zhurnal MVD* 4 (1838), No. 28:50ff.

58. Malinovskii, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie," 192f.

59. Report by Koeppen, 1837, TsGIA, 383/29/609; *Unterhaltungsblatt* (1847):61; Malinovskii, "Ekonomicheskoe i sotsialnoe razvitie," 195.

60. Ernst Walter in *Novorossiiskii kalendar* (1851):391ff.; V.I. Mironov, *Khlebnye tseny v Rossii za dva stoletiia XVIII-XIX* (Leningrad 1985), 92ff.

61. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 27 October 1879, 28 September 1882, 30 August 1890, 5 August 1900, 26 August 1900.

62. *Zhivotnovodstvo v Ekaterinoslavskom gubernii po dannym obsledovaniia 1911 goda* (Katerynoslav 1912), 23.

63. *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii*, vol. 11, no. 2: *Tavricheskaia guberniia*, sost. generalnogo shtaba podpolkovnik Gersivanov (St. Petersburg 1849), 94f.; J. Cornies, "O sostoianii khoziaistva v Molchanskikh Menonitskikh koloniiakh v 1843 g.," *Zhurnal MGI* 11, no. 2 (1844):133.

64. *Unterhaltungsblatt* (1848):19ff.; A. Schmidt, *Materialy dlia geografii i statistiki Rossii*, sobrannye ofitserami generalnogo shtaba: *Khersonskaia guberniia* (St. Petersburg, 1863), 2:726f.

65. Ibid., 1:526ff.; *Voenno-statisticheskoe obozrenie Rossiiskoi imperii*, vol. 11, no. 1: *Khersonskaia gubernia* (St. Petersburg 1849), 122f.

66. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 9 August 1863.

67. Bauman, "Agronomicheskoe puteshestvie po Tavricheskoi i nekotorym chastiam Ekaterinoslavskoi i Khersonskoi gubernii v 1853 godu," *Zhurnal MGI* 53, no. 3 (1854):93ff.

68. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 14 August 1863, 20 September 1880, 29 May 1882.

69. V.P. Semonov-Tian-Shanskii, ed., *Rossiia. Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie nashego otechestva*, vol. 14: *Novorossiia i Krym* (St. Petersburg 1910), 275.

70. Fadeev to the Department of State Economy, 13 May 1830, TsGIA, 383/29/964.

71. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 9 February 1866.

72. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 28 February 1864, 9 August 1868, 10 March 1872.

73. Klaus, *Nashi kolonii*, prilozhenie 7.

74. Ibid., 225.

75. Ibid., 198f.

76. Foreigners Office to the Department of State Economy, 28 June 1817; Journal of the Council of Ministers, 19 November 1817; the State Council to the Department of State Economy, 6 September 1818; Resolution of Kozobavlev, 14 November 1818 and Resolution of the State Council of 15 January 1819, approved by the tsar on 24 February 1819, TsGIA, 383/29/896.

77. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 12 and 26 April 1863, 21 June 1863, 4 September 1863, 10 January 1864, 9 February 1866, 12 January 1869; Franz Isaac, *Die Molotschnaer Mennoniten: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte derselben* (Halbstadt 1908), 27ff.

78. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 9 February 1866.

79. Instruction of the MVD to Islavin, 19 July 1865; Islavin to Gerngros, 24 September 1865; Islavin to the Guardianship Committee, 11 September 1865; Islavin to the MVD, 26 October 1865, TsGIA, 381/8/3727. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 21 April 1864.

80. Submission by General Lieutenant Ropshe, 30 October 1866; Islavin to the Guardianship Committee, 11 September 1865; Islavin to the MVD, 26 October 1865; TsGIA, 381/8/3727. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 21 April 1864.

81. *Odessaer Zeitung*, 15 May 1869.

82. TsGIA, 385/1/190 and 1181/1/716; *Odessaer Zeitung*, 11 January 1874, 7 May 1875, 5 May 1879, 9 August 1880, 10 September 1880, 18 October 1884.

83. Ernst Walter, "Beschreibung des Molotschnaer Kolonistenbezirks," *Unterhaltungsblatt* (1849):52.

German Culture and the National Awakening in Western Ukraine before the Revolution of 1848

John-Paul Himka

German culture played an important part in the national revivals in East Central Europe.[1] The influence of Herder's writings on Czechs, Balts, and other East Europeans is well known, as is the collaboration of the South Slav awakeners Vuk Karadžić and Jernej Kopitar with Ranke, Jakob Grimm, and Goethe. German universities, particularly Jena and Halle for Protestants and Vienna for Catholics, had a formative influence on many of the East European awakeners. It was at Jena, for example, that Jan Kollár was inspired to write Slávy dcera. Pavel Jozef Šafárík also studied at Jena, and Karadžić received an honourary doctorate there. Many outstanding works of the Slavic awakeners appeared first in German, including Šafárík's history of Slavic languages and literature, František Palacký's history of the Czechs, and Anton Linhart's history of Carniola and the South Slavs. During the revolution of 1848, when the great Russian revolutionary Bakunin wanted to appeal to all Slavs, he published his manifesto in German (*Aufruf an die Slawen*).

The awakeners of Western Ukraine (Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia) were also affected by German culture, although Slavic influences were far more significant in their national revival—the Dnieper Ukrainians, their co-nationals in Russia; their neighbours and rivals, the Poles; Russian pan-Slavs and Slavists; and other Slav awakeners in Austria. German cultural influences figured only marginally in the activities of the most advanced representatives of the national revival, the "Ruthenian Triad" (*Ruska triitsia*). The Triad's leader, Markiian Shashkevych, for example, translated a number of literary and folkloric works, chiefly from Czech and Serbian. While he also translated some from Polish and Greek, not one was from German.[2]

In fact, German culture grew in prominence in Western Ukraine *after* the period of national awakening. One need only consider that some of the best West Ukrainian writers of the late nineteenth century wrote some of their works in German, including the Bukovynians Yurii Fedkovych and Olha Kobylianska, as well as the Galician Ivan Franko.[3] In the late nineteenth century German writers

also emerged from Western Ukraine, most notably Karl Emil Franzos and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, who developed Ukrainian themes in their works. Western Ukraine then became a cultural crossroads in which German and Ukrainian (and Russian, Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian) influences mingled most creatively.[4]

Nonetheless, German culture had a role in Western Ukraine before 1848. Indeed, the foundations of the national revival there were put in place by Austrian enlightened absolutism; the university in Vienna played an outstanding part in forming a national intelligentsia in Western Ukraine; and one West Ukrainian awakener, Yosyf Levytsky, was intimately involved with German culture.

The Impact of Austrian Enlightened Absolutism

The Habsburgs had been the rulers, theoretically, of some West Ukrainians ("Ruthenians") ever since 1526, when the Kingdom of Hungary, including the Ukrainian-inhabited region of Transcarpathia (Subcarpathia), was formally joined to the realm of the Austrian dynasty. Actually, Habsburg rule was only consolidated in Transcarpathia in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The Habsburgs acquired a much larger West Ukrainian territory in 1772, the "Red Rus'," better known as Galicia. Two years later, Austria extorted from the Turks a third Ukrainian territory, Bukovyna, which was formally incorporated into the Habsburg realm in 1787. Thus, in the eighteenth century, three areas inhabited by Ukrainians, with very disparate historical traditions, came under the Habsburg sceptre and were made into an identifiable historical region, Western Ukraine.

These Ukrainians who came under Habsburg rule had little social differentiation. The landed elite was Polish, Magyar or Romanian, and there was no Cossack stratum as there was in Russian-ruled Ukraine. The West Ukrainians were "priests and peasants," according to the Polish gentry, and for much of the eighteenth century, socially, the mass of the clergy was little removed from the peasantry. The task of integrating these West Ukrainians into the Habsburg Empire fell primarily to the great Austrian reformers, Maria Theresa (1740-80) and Joseph II (co-ruler from 1765; 1780-90). It was very propitious that Western Ukraine joined Austria precisely during the flourishing of its enlightened absolutism. Maria Theresa and Joseph II made major changes in the lives of these priests and peasants. For the latter, they issued legislation drastically reducing the number of days of corvée labour owed to the lords (they aimed, in fact, at complete abolition of feudal rents in labour); they also endowed the peasantry with important rights under the law, including the rights of property and of access to courts independent of the seigneur. The Ukrainian peasantry responded to the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II with a profound loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty, a full-blown "naive monarchism."

For the priests, the changes constituted even more of a turning point. The Habsburgs made the Ukrainian Greek rite equal to the Latin rite; freed the Ukrainian clergy from all feudal obligations; regularized and substantially raised its income; established the metropolis of Halych (1808); and gave the clergy a higher education. As a result of the latter reform, an educated stratum, the germ of a national intelligentsia, emerged for the first time in over a century in West Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church long remained grateful to Austria, and particularly to Maria Theresa and Joseph II, for the improvement in its status. That gratitude was evident in statements by Greek Catholic priests in the late nineteenth century,[5] as well as in the emotions of Ukrainian Greek Catholic pilgrims: "Lost deep in thought, we gazed at the coffins of Maria Theresa and her son Joseph, whose names are written in golden letters in [our] people's history."[6] Even as late as 1945, and among those clergy who supported Stalin's plan to dissolve the Union with Rome, the gratitude to Austria was still evident: "In Austria we had the benefit that our clergy, which the old Poland had deliberately kept in darkness and ignorance, acquired an education equal to that of the German Catholic clergy, which in that respect was the most advanced in the whole Catholic Church."[7]

To understand how major that transformation was, it is necessary to describe the state of education and educational institutions for the Ukrainian Greek Catholic clergy at the moment Galicia passed from Polish to Austrian rule.[8] There was only one seminary in Galicia for the preparation of Eastern-rite Catholic clergy, the Pontifical College of Lviv. It served both the Armenian and Ukrainian Uniate churches and could only accommodate a small number of students. In 1772, for example, the college had only eighteen students (nine Armenians and nine Ukrainians).[9] Since just fifteen years later the new Greek Catholic seminary in Lviv reached a peak of 400 students,[10] it is clear that proportionally very few Ukrainian priests of the pre-Austrian period had had the benefit of regular seminary training. In fact, the majority of priests had had to make do with the traditional *antiqua educatio*. What this involved is well illustrated by the practice of Porfyrii Vazhynsky, bishop of the Greek Catholic Chełm (Kholm) eparchy from 1790 until his death in 1804.[11] Bishop Vazhynsky himself was a very well-educated, sophisticated gentleman, yet he felt that the popular Greek Catholic religion, the religion of the villages and small towns, did not require an educated priesthood. He would ask village cantors two or three questions, as an examination, then send them to study, either for a year in Chełm or for half a year near Biała Podlaska. These studies emphasized rites and formulas rather than dogma and canon law. Then the bishop ordained and sent them out into their parishes.[12] So, before the Habsburg educational reforms: "There were...no educational institutions for the parish clergy, and only a few clergymen had the opportunity to study at the pontifical seminary in Lviv; for the rest, one had to be content until that time [1783] with the most primitive knowl-

edge....Up until that time bishops had to permit the ordination of candidates who hardly knew the main elements of the catechism."[13]

In 1774, two years after acquiring Galicia and in the same year as the occupation of Bukovyna, the Habsburgs founded the first of a series of crucial educational institutions that allowed Ukrainian Greek Catholic candidates for the priesthood to study in the imperial capital, Vienna. This was the "Barbareum," a Royal Greek Catholic General Seminary attached to St. Barbara's Church in Vienna. This new seminary accommodated forty-six students, of whom half were Ukrainian Greek Catholics (eleven from the eparchy of Mukachiv [Transcarpathia], and six each from the eparchies of Lviv and Przemyśl [Galicia]). Although the Barbareum was dissolved in 1784, a similar institution was established in 1803, the imperial seminary residence (*Convict*) for Greek Catholics. That residence had thirty Ukrainian students when it was dissolved in 1848. Thus, for most of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there were Ukrainian students being educated in Vienna.[14]

Although the Viennese institutions increased the number of educated Ukrainian clergy, this was not their principal significance and they could never have accomplished the task of educating the entire Ukrainian Greek Catholic clergy. The significance of the Viennese seminaries lay in the fact that they produced an intellectual elite who played a prominent part in the life of the church as well as in the national awakening. For instance, all the Greek Catholic metropolitans of Halych, from the moment of the metropolis' creation until as late as 1882, were alumni of the Viennese institutions. The first Galician historian of the Ukrainian church, Mykhailo Harasevych, was an alumnus, as was Ivan Snihursky, who came to Vienna as a student in 1804 and left in 1818 as the dean of its theology faculty. As bishop of Przemyśl (1818-47), Snihursky was outstanding among the Greek Catholic hierarchy for his efforts to promote education in the eparchy; and, alone among the Ukrainian bishops, he supported the national avant-garde, the Ruthenian Triad.[15] The Transcarpathian grammarians and scholars Ivan Fogarashii-Berezhanyn and Mykhailo Luchkai, the educator Mykhail Shchavnytsky, and bishops Hryhorii Tarkovych of Prešov (Priashiv) and Aleksei Povchii of Mukachiv all were products of Vienna.[16] Vienna also produced the prominent awakener Yosyf Levytsky, who published the first West Ukrainian grammar of the Ukrainian language and also translated works of Goethe and Schiller into Ukrainian.

The importance of Viennese education in the production of a national intellectual elite might also be reflected in the fact that only two of the three components of Western Ukraine, Galicia and Transcarpathia, experienced a national revival prior to the revolution of 1848. (However, the development of the highly politicized Polish and Hungarian national revivals may have been more decisive for Galicia and Transcarpathia than Viennese education.) The Ukrainians of Bukovyna, overwhelmingly Orthodox and therefore ineligible to

attend the Greek Catholic seminaries in Vienna, studied instead at a seminary in their native province, at first located in Suceava (1786) and then transferred to Chernivtsi (1789).[17] They alone, of the West Ukrainians, did not share in the pre-revolutionary national revival. The only national awakening in Bukovyna before 1848 was that of the Romanians. It was led by (perhaps one should even say "limited to") the Hormuzaki brothers, whose father had sent them to study in Vienna between 1831 and 1845. One of them, Eudoxius Hormuzaki, stayed on in Vienna, where he compiled a sixteen-volume documentary history of the Romanians.[18]

Vienna in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries can be likened to a power generator, which charged its residents from East Central Europe full of national energies.[19] It was there that the pre-revolutionary Greek cultural revival was primarily based, after Joseph II permitted the publication of books in Greek in 1783.[20] There, from 1808 until his death in 1844, Kopitar tried to establish "the main centre of Slav culture." Karadžić based his activities there from 1813 to 1864, and Jakob Grimm praised Karadžić's work there, which inspired Hungarian as well as West Ukrainian awakeners.[21] Those Slavic luminaries who did not live in Vienna visited it, including Josef Dobrovský, Ljudevit Gaj, P.I. Köppen, František Palacký, and Izmail Sreznevsky. At one party in Vienna in 1847, for example, guests included such prominent Slavs as František Rieger, several Trubetskois and Czartoryskis, the son of the Serbian prince Miloš Obrenović, the Russian cultural attaché in Vienna M.F. Raevsky, and Vuk Karadžić.[22]

Vienna's Ukrainians were full-fledged participants in this Slavic and East European ferment. Kopitar learned about the Ukrainian language from the Transcarpathian Ivan Olshavsky, pastor of St. Barbara's in 1804-13; from his successor, Ivan Snihursky; and from the linguist, educator, and awakener, Ivan Mohylnytsky (who spent some time in Vienna in 1816). The pastors of St. Barbara's were known for their scholarly interests, and the company they kept included not only Kopitar, but Karadžić and Jan Kollár. The seminarians at St. Barbara's came into frequent contact with other Slavic students, which quickened the Ukrainians' national consciousness, just as it did for Slovak students in Vienna.[23] The impact of Vienna did represent less a German cultural influence than a pan-Slavic or pan-East-Central-European influence which was merely nurtured in this capital of German cultural life, but it must not be forgotten that it was ultimately the German university and Germanophone cultural elite which attracted the multinational awakeners to the capital. Furthermore, the specifically German elements of a Viennese education left their mark on the awakeners.

If Vienna was the sun, then the provincial educational institutions were as so many satellites in its enlightening orbit. For Western Ukraine, the most important of these institutions was the general seminary established by Joseph II in Lviv in 1783: "the Ukrainians in Galicia...developed their language into a

literary language...in the general seminary."[24] Almost the entire work of the Ruthenian Triad took place there. Even in Lviv, however, the seminarians received a German education. Except for courses in theology (conducted in Latin) and courses in the short-lived Studium Ruthenum, lectures were delivered in German, just as they were at the other institutions established by the enlightened Habsburg monarchs in Lviv, the university and the gymnasium.[25] The seminarians also had to study the German language. Many textbooks were in German, and the two texts in Ukrainian (Slavonic) were translations of German authors commissioned by Joseph II. Many of the professors the seminarians encountered were German or of German culture, such as the Czech Ignatius Hanus, who influenced Ivan Vahylevych, one of the Ruthenian Triad.[26] In addition to the official German culture promoted by the seminary authorities, the seminarians read forbidden books in German such as the works of Schiller and Schelling, radical political tracts, and rationalist critiques of the Catholic religion. They also learned German drinking songs.[27] In sum, the enlightened Habsburg absolutists created a national intelligentsia in Western Ukraine by educating the clergy in German culture. The *sacerdotes antiquae educationis* were disappearing, which was at first regretted by the common people: "When the new priests came from the seminary, they now had a higher education and greater [material] demands, so that people did not become accustomed to them quickly, did not like them very much, and called them 'German priests' [*nimetski ksondzy*]."[28]

Paradigm of a Viennese Education

Father Yosyf Levytsky (1801-60) may be considered the paradigm of a Viennese education. Of all the West Ukrainian awakeners, he was the one most obviously influenced by and engaged in a dialogue with German culture. It is because Levytsky's activities were so strikingly connected with German culture that he was typical in the sense that he represented a high, extreme development—a concentration—of a tendency present in his society.[29] It was in Vienna in 1820, as a philosophy student, that Levytsky experienced an awakening of his national consciousness: "A feeling of nationality emerged, and a love for the Ruthenian language was resurrected."

He applied himself to the study of Church Slavonic and Ruthenian. That enthusiasm was shared by Kyrylo Blonsky, who arrived in Vienna to study in 1822. The two decided to work together on the development of the Ruthenian language. The fruit of their collaboration was a four-page booklet of verse printed by the Mechitarists in Vienna in 1822 and dedicated to "the student youth of the Sloveno-Ruthenian people."[30] The booklet opened with an eight-line verse in praise of the native language, its ancient roots, and independent status; it closed with a six-line moral admonition. Certainly Levytsky wrote the first, and possibly the second, of these short poems. The main part of the booklet,

however, was taken up by a longer poem, *Domoboliie prokliatykh*, which was a translation of a German religious work, *Das Heimweh der Verbannten*.[31] The translation can hardly be judged successful. Its language was stilted and artificial, for it was an amalgam of the West Ukrainian vernacular and Old Church Slavonic with many borrowings from Russian. As Volodymyr Kotsovsky observed: "Perhaps even the author himself would not have understood some of the words if he had not known the German original."

Before Levytsky returned to translating verse from the German, he made important progress in his knowledge of vernacular Ukrainian. His pastoral activity after he was ordained in 1825 brought him into close contact with the peasant vernacular, and in 1834 he published, at Bishop Snihursky's print shop in Przemyśl, the first "grammar of the Ruthenian or Little Russian language in Galicia."[32] That grammar displayed a firmer grasp of the essentials of the Ukrainian language, although in it Levytsky still did not differentiate sufficiently between Ukrainian proper and Church Slavonic. This blending of the vernacular and ecclesiastical language remained characteristic of Levytsky to his dying day. It was also characteristic that this first West Ukrainian grammar was published in the German language.[33] On the verso of the title page was a quotation from Friedrich Schlegel:

> The obligation to watch over the language should be most sacred in the eyes of those who stand highest in the society; for the more rank, and wealth, and consequence any individual possesses, the more has the nation a right to expect from this individual that he shall contribute to the utmost of his power to the preservation and cultivation of that which is hers. A nation whose language becomes rude and barbarous, must be on the brink of barbarism in regard to everything else.[34]

In addition to this unequivocal testimonial to the influence of German romantic nationalism on Levytsky's activities, the grammar also contains evidence that Levytsky was familiar with the work of the German Slavists. In his introduction (xxiii) Levytsky refers to "the German historians, such as Schlözer, Gebhardy, Hoppe, Engel, who treat the history of Galicia in their works...."[35] Finally, Levytsky not only published a grammar of the Ukrainian language in German, but in 1845 he published a grammar of the German language in Ukrainian.[36]

In the late 1830s Levytsky returned to German-Ukrainian verse translation. In 1837 he published one of his own Ukrainian poems in German translation,[37] and in the next year he began translations into Ukrainian of Goethe and Schiller. The language of these new translations was much more confident, supple, and independent of Russian influences than the translation of *Das Heimweh der Verbannten*, although later commentators have been less than satisfied with it.[38] The authors he chose represented more of a challenge to Levytsky's talent as well as better taste. Moreover, the translations were no longer of a strictly religious nature; in fact, at the time Levytsky published his translations (again at

Bishop Snihursky's press in Przemyśl), the works of both Goethe and Schiller were banned in the Greek Catholic seminary in Lviv.[39] The first of the translations was of Goethe's *Erlkönig*, which Levytsky rechristened *Bohynia* in Ukrainian. It came out in 1838 in the Polish magazine *Rozmaitości* (Lviv) and as a separate brochure.[40] This single translation from Goethe was followed in the next few years by a series of translations from Schiller, the first translations of this poet into Ukrainian: *Das Lied von der Glocke* in 1839; *Der Kampf mit dem Drachen* and *Die Bürgschaft* in 1842; and *Der Taucher*, *Der Gang nach dem Eisenhammer*, and *Der Handschuh* in 1844. A final translation in this series, of Schiller's *Der Ring des Polykrates*, was published posthumously in 1901.[41] Except for *Die Glocke*, all of Schiller's works that Levytsky translated were ballads Schiller had published in his *Musenalmanach* in 1798 and 1799.[42]

The final contribution Levytsky made to a German-Ukrainian cultural dialogue, in the period before 1848, was to initiate a discussion on West Ukrainian affairs in the pages of the *Jahrbücher für Slavische Literatur, Kunst und Wissenschaft*, which the Lusatian Sorb awakener J.P. Jordan published in Leipzig. In 1844 Levytsky published there a survey of Galician Ukrainian language and literature. After he argued for the independence of the Ukrainian language from Russian and Polish, Levytsky compared the situation of the language in the Russian and Austrian empires. Only in the latter, he concluded, "under the wings of the double-headed Austrian eagle," could Ukrainian develop into a literary language. He singled out for praise the Josephine policy of developing national languages: "Joseph II of blessed memory understood the profound idea that the Galician and Hungarian-Ruthenian people could be educated best, most easily, and most quickly in its native Ruthenian mother tongue."[43]

Levytsky then proceeded to a very polemical account of the development of Ukrainian literature in Galicia in the post-Josephine period. He either lauded or denounced individual writers and church dignitaries. Those whom Levytsky commended were the late-eighteenth-century bishop of Lviv Petro Biliansky, his own patron Bishop Snihursky, and the Ruthenian Triad (together with its associate, Mykola Ustyianovych). Since he was writing anonymously, he also lavished praise on "der ehrwürdige Vater Joseph Lewicki"[44] and listed all his published translations from German. Those whom he disparaged were the highest-ranking churchmen of the Lviv archeparchy and metropolis of Halych. He impugned the Ukrainian patriotism of Mykola Skorodynsky (Biliansky's successor as bishop of Lviv), Antonii Anhelovych (the first metropolitan of Halych), Mykhailo Levytsky (the reigning metropolitan), and many of the canons and dignitaries of the Lviv archeparchy. Levytsky also aimed a few jibes at someone very similar to himself, Yosyf Lozynsky, who was also a product of Viennese education (although he probably came to Vienna just as Levytsky was leaving), an ordinary pastor in the Przemyśl eparchy, and a prominent awakener with linguistic interests. Levytsky had already crossed swords with him in 1834, because Lozynsky (under Kopitar's influence) had advocated the use of the Latin alphabet

for the Ukrainian language.[45] Levytsky continued this polemic in his contribution to the *Jahrbücher*.

Levytsky's article provoked a heated response from Lozynsky in 1845. Lozynsky easily recognized Levytsky as the article's author and therefore, in addition to defending both the church hierarchy and himself, he denigrated Levytsky's accomplishments: "The anonymous author recounts the contributions of Yosyf Levytsky with scrupulous conscientiousness, even a number of things such as the *Domowolye* [sic], which deserve no mention at all; and he forgot to add that Levytsky's poetical works are written without talent."[46] Lozynsky held up to ridicule various passages of Levytsky's translations of Schiller and even claimed to find a mistranslation that betrayed a failure to understand the German original.

Levytsky defended himself and repeated his charges in 1846:

> If no attempt is made to translate distinguished foreign pieces into a language, in order thus to explore its power and conciseness, then [that language] will necessarily remain forever at the same level. The Haličer Russe [Lozynsky], however, might venture an attempt to do better than the passages he incorrectly cites of Yosyf Levytsky's translation of Schiller and himself translate [Schiller's ballad of 1797] *Die Kraniche des Ibykus* into Galician Ruthenian; then, as a master in this field, he will be able to offer an appropriate judgment.[47]

Lozynsky never took up that challenge, but the exchange between Levytsky and Lozynsky provoked Yakiv Holovatsky of the Ruthenian Triad to express his views in the *Jahrbücher*, also in 1846. His piece "on the condition of the Ruthenian people in Galicia" was the longest and most solid contribution to the discussion. He clearly sided with Levytsky and developed some of his themes. He too praised the policies of Joseph II, although unlike Levytsky he tried to take into account the Czechs' view of Joseph as a Germanizer.[48] The principal theme he borrowed from Levytsky, however, was condemnation of the church hierarchy for stifling the development of Ukrainian literature. His article's sensational frankness and superior polemical style made it an instant success in Ukrainian Galicia.[49] This discussion initiated by Levytsky opened up the West Ukrainian world to the German reading public. It is also significant that the censor would never have allowed this discussion to appear in a Galician publication. The existence, however, of a German Slavic journal permitted the discussion to take place and ideas to be aired.

Conclusion

Exposure to German culture through the educational reforms of the enlightened Austrian absolutists played a modest, but contributory, role in Western Ukraine's national awakening. It was the education of the clergy (and not the particular German component of this education) which made a critical difference to the Ukrainian national revival in the Habsburg Empire by creating a national intelligentsia. Indeed, the actual first effect of this higher education, particularly in the

Lviv general seminary, was not to Germanize, but to Polonize the clergy, at least linguistically.[50] It was in the process of differentiation from Polish culture that the dynamic Ruthenian Triad was formed in the 1830s. The awakening of a Ukrainian consciousness occurred earlier among the seminarians in Vienna (for example, Levytsky's "conversion" in 1820). In Vienna, Ukrainian students were removed from a Polish environment, were in the midst of a truly foreign people, were interacting with other Slavic students experiencing similar feelings, and were exposed to German romanticism, idealist philosophy, and scholarship. Hence they came more quickly to a realization of their national identity. In the particular case of Yosyf Levytsky, German cultural models and media were extremely important. When he wanted to develop his native tongue by translating foreign literature, he chose without exception German works. When he wanted to address the wider world of scholarship, as in his Ukrainian grammar, he addressed it in German. When he felt dirty linen had to be washed in public, he chose a German public. He read Schlegel, Schlözer, and Schiller, and he even wrote a German grammar for Ukrainian elementary schools so that the common people might have access to the German world. Although Levytsky can be considered a paradigm, and although other Ukrainian alumni of Vienna must have shared his cultural assumptions, he was exceptional in the way he interacted so perceptibly with German culture. The main impact of Vienna on the Ukrainians was not so much German as Slavic. Karadžić and Kopitar had more direct influence on the Ukrainian revival in Austria than Herder or Hegel.

Notes

1. The research for this paper was primarily conducted in Vienna in the summer of 1986. I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a grant that made this possible.

2. Markiian Shashkevych, *Tvory* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo khudozhnoi literatury "Dnipro," 1973).

3. See the bibliography in O.N. Moroz, *Ivan Franko. Seminarii* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo "Radianska shkola," 1966), 329-30. (The second edition of this valuable handbook [1977], is less complete than the first.) See also Leonid Rudnytzky, "The Image of Austria in the Works of Ivan Franko," in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ed. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 239-54.

4. See Amy Diana Colin, "An den Schnittpunkten der Traditionen—Deutsch in der Bukowina u.a.," *Neue Deutsche Hefte* 30, no. 4 (180) (1983):739-69. See also John-Paul Himka, "Comments on Manfred Turban, 'Roman Rosdolsky's Reconsideration of the Traditional Marxist Debate on the Schemes of Reproduction on New Methodological Grounds,'" in *Selected Contributions of Ukrainian Scholars to Economics*, ed. I.S. Koropecky (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1984), 143.

5. "We have the Union [with Rome] to thank for our education, enlightenment, and

the position we occupy in the educated world. On the basis that we were Catholics, the unforgettable Joseph II, in his ever-to-be-remembered patent, made our clergy equal with the [Roman] Catholic clergy, created a seminary for the education and preparation of our clergy, assigned our priests salaries, which were large at that time, from the church funds, and thus he opened the road to the position that we now occupy in the world." ([Ioann] Sh[ykh], "V spravi obriada," *Ruskii Sion* 8, no. 1 [1 (13) January 1878]:16.) "Ruthenian Catholics in general, and the Ruthenian clergy most of all, understand that Providence gave us the possibility for free national development only in Austria." (Ievhenii Hornytskyi [Eugen. Hornicki], "Stronnictwa ruskie w Galicyi a ruskie duchowieństwo," *Przegląd Powszechny*, tom XXVIII, nr. 84, r. 7, zesz. 12 [December 1890]:394.)

6. The pilgrims, on their way home from Rome in 1893, stopped in Vienna at the Capuchin church to pay their respects at the tombs of the enlightened Austrian monarchs. Vasylii Chernetskii, "Zhadky z podorozhy v Rym na iuvyleine torzhestvo Ieho Sviatosty papy Lva XIII. 1893. roku," *Dushpastyr* 9, no. 8 (30 April [11 May] 1895):213.

7. *Diiannia soboru Hreko-katolytskoi tserkvy u Lvovi 8-10 bereznia 1946* (Lviv: Vydannia Prezydii soboru, 1946), 21. (This passage was omitted from a Soviet reprint [Ivan Hvat, review of *Lvovskii tserkovnyi sobor. Dokumenty i materialy 1946-1981* (Moscow 1982), in *Suchasnist* 25, no. 1 (285) (January 1985):116].)

8. See especially, Dmytro Blažejovskyj, *Ukrainian and Armenian Pontifical Seminaries of Lviv (1665-1784)*, Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio I, vol. 29 (Rome: PP. Basiliani, 1975).

9. "Catalogo degli alunni, quali sono attualmente nel Collegio Pontificio di Leopoli in 9bre 1772," Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio della Nunziatura di Vienna, 78:26-26v.

10. Luigi Glinka, *Gregorio Jachymovyč-Metropolita di Halyč ed il suo tempo (1840-1865)*, 2nd ed., Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio I: Opera, 30 (Rome: PP. Basiliani, 1974), 32.

11. Much of the Chełm eparchy came under Austrian rule in 1795 and remained so until 1809; even after that date, some parts of the former Chełm eparchy (the regions of Sokal and Belz) remained in Austria until the collapse of the empire.

12. See "Ważyński (Porfiry)" by Jul[jan] B[łeszczyński], in *Encyklopedyja Powszechna*, 28 vols. (Warsaw: Nakład, druk i własność S. Orgelbranda księgarza i typografa, 1859-68).

13. Iuliian Pelesh [Julian Pelesz], *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, 2 vols. (Würzburg-Vienna: Leo Wörl, 1881), 2:612-13.

14. Willibald M. Plöchl, *St. Barbara zu Wien: Die Geschichte der griechisch-katholischen Kirche und Zentralpfarre St. Barbara*, Kirche und Recht, 13 (Vienna: Verlag Herder, 1975), 1:40-9; "Viden," M. Hornykevych, *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva. Slovnykova chastyna*, ed. Volodymyr Kubiiovych [Kubijovyč], Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka (Paris-New York: Molode zhyttia, 1955-); *Nacherk istorii unii ruskoi tserkvy z Rymom* (Lviv: Nakladom Komytetu iuvyleinoho, 1896), 88-90;

Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948*, Harvard Ukrainian Series (Cambridge, Mass.-London: Harvard University Press, 1978), 29.

15. John-Paul Himka, "The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Galicia, 1772-1918," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 3-4 (December 1984):430.

16. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity*, 29.

17. Robert A. Kann and Zdeněk V. David, *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918*, A History of East Central Europe, vol. 6 (Seattle-London: University of Washington Press, 1984), 288; D. Kvitkovskyi, T. Bryndzan, and A. Zhukovskyi, eds., *Bukovyna. Ii mynule i suchasne* (Paris-Philadelphia-Detroit: Zelena Bukovyna, 1956), 681-2.

18. Rudolf Wagner, ed., *Die Revolutionsjahre 1848/49 im Königreich Galizien-Lodomerien (einschliesslich Bukowina): Dokumente aus österreichischer Zeit* (Munich: Verlag "Der Südostdeutsche," 1983), 99, 100.

19. See Eduard Winter, "Wien als Mittelpunkt der Slawistik und der Einbruch des romantischen nationalen Denkens im Vormärz," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin*, Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, 17, no. 2 (1968):209-12; idem, *Romantismus, Restauration und Frühliberalismus im österreichischen Vormärz* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1968).

20. Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol. 1: *Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 176.

21. Duncan Wilson, *The Life and Times of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić 1787-1864: Literacy, Literature, and National Independence in Serbia* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1970), 82; Tamás Hofer, "The Creation of Ethnic Symbols from the Elements of Peasant Culture," in *Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe*, ed. Peter F. Sugar, Joint Committee on Eastern Europe Publication Series, 8 (Santa Barbara-Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1980), 108; Winter, *Romantismus*, 89-90, 97-8.

    Grimm's authority convinced the Ruthenian Triad to use Karadžić's Serb alphabet for their almanach *Zoria*. (Mykhailo Vozniak, *Iak probudylosia ukrainske narodnie zhyttia v Halychyni za Avstrii*, Biblioteka "Novoho chasu," 1 [Lviv: Z drukarni Vydavnychoi spilky "Dilo," 1924], 96.)

22. Lawrence D. Orton, *The Prague Slav Congress of 1848*, East European Monographs, 46 (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1978).

23. Vasyl Shchurat, "V. Kopitar i ep. Iv. Snihurskyi. Do istorii vydannia 'Glagolita Clozianus,'" *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 125 (1918):165-200; Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia: 1815-1849*, ed. Lawrence D. Orton (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 56; Plöchl, *St. Barbara zu Wien*, 155; Dmytrii Vintskovskii, *Hryhorii Iakhymovych i sovremennoie russkoie dvyzheniie. Ocherk* (Lviv: Izdaniie redaktsii hazety "Halytskaia Rus'," Iz tipohrafii Stavropyhiiskoho instytuta, 1892), 14; Kann and David, *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands*, 251.

24. Eduard Winter, *Der Josephinismus: Die Geschichte des österreichischen Reform-*

katholizismus 1740-1848 (Berlin: Rütten und Löning, 1962), 150. See also, Fritz Valjavec, *Der Josephinismus: Zur geistigen Entwicklung Österreichs im achtzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 2nd, rev. ed. (Munich: Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1945), 152.

25. Kozik, *Ukrainian National Movement*, 24-5; Glinka, *Gregorio Jachymovyč*, 21, 24. German was also the language of instruction at the gymnasium founded in Chernivtsi in 1808 and some courses were taught in German at the Bukovynian seminary. (Kann and David, *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands*, 289; *Bukovyna*, 682.)

26. Glinka, *Gregorio Jachymovyč*, 8, 25, 46; *Khrystiana Baumeistera slavnykh gorlytskykh uchylyshch upravytelia Nastavleniia Liubomudriia Nravouchytelnaho soderzhashchaia Liubomudriie praktycheskoie, vseobshcheie Pravo iestestvennoie, Ifiku i Polityku, s Latynskaho na Rossiiskii iazyk perevedenna ot Petra Lodiia v Unyversyteti Lvovskom Liubomudriia umozritelnaho i diistvytelnaho Kesarevo Tsarskaho Narodnaho Professora* (Lviv: Stavropyhiia, 1790), cited in Ivan Em. Levytskyi, "Halytsko-ruska bibliografiia za roky 1772-1800," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 52 (1903), no. 56; *Matfia Dannenmavra Bohosl. Doktora i Istorii Tserkovnyia v Universiteti Vindob., Profes. Publ. Ordin. Nastavleniia Istorii tserkovnyia IZ. Latinsky izdannaia, Feodorom zhe Zakhariasiievychom Istor. Tserkovnyia v Universiteti Lvovskom v Ruskom iazytsi Profesorom Publ. i Presvyterem Lvovskiia na Ruskii iazyk prevedennaia*, 2 parts (Lviv: Stavropyhiia, 1790), cited in Levytskyi, "Halytsko-ruska bibliografiia," no. 53-4. See also [Iosyf Levytskyi,] "Das Schicksal der gallizisch-russischen Sprache und Literatur," *Jahrbücher für Slavische Literatur, Kunst und Wissenschaft* 2, Heft 5 (1844):184.

27. Glinka, *Gregorio Jachymovyč*, 46, 53, 59; Anatol Vakhnianyn, "Pro zhytie pytomtsiv i dukhovenstva v litakh 1837 i 1838," *Ruslan* 12, no. 79 (5[18] April 1908):3; Vakhnianyn, "Pro zhytie pytomtsiv," 3.

28. Fylymon Tarnavsky, *Spohady. Rodynna khronika Tarnavskykh iak prychynok do istorii tserkovnykh, sviashchenytskykh, pobutovykh, ekonomichnykh i politychnykh vidnosyn u Halychyni v druhii polovyni XIX storichchia i v pershii dekadi XX storichchia*, ed. Anatol Mariia Bazylevych and Roman Ivan Danylevych (Toronto: Dobra knyzhka, 1981), 34-5.

29. Georg Lukács, *Studies in European Realism* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), esp. 6, 168-9.

30. *Uchashchemusia mladenchestvu naroda sloveno-ruskaho zhertvuiet soizdatel I.L.* (Vienna: U Ormianov, 1822), cited in Ivan Em. Levytskii, *Halytsko-ruskaia bybliohrafiia XIX-ho stolitiia s uvzhliadneniiem ruskykh izdanii poiavyvshykhsia v Uhorshchyni i Bukovyni (1801-1886)*, 2 vols. (Lviv: Stavropyhiiskii instytut, 1888-95), vol. 1, no. 62. The text of the booklet is reprinted in V. Kotsovskyi, "Prychynky do halytsko-ruskoi bybliohrafii pered 1848. rokom. III. 'Domoboliie prokliatykh,'" *Zoria* 7, no. 17 (1 [13] September 1886), 291-2.

    Blonsky's part in the collaboration was limited to paying for publication; Levytsky supplied the contents.

31. Unfortunately, my efforts to identify the German original of *Das Heimweh der Verbannten* did not succeed.

32. *Catalogus universi venerabilis cleri Dioeceseos Premisliensis graeco-catholicae pro anno Domini 1848* (Przemyśl: Impressum in Typographia Capituli rit. gr. cath. Premisliensis, n.d.), 109; *Grammatik der Ruthenischen oder Klein Russischen Sprache in Galizien von Joseph Lewicki* (Przemyśl: Gedruckt in der griech. kath. bischöflichen Buchdruckerei, 1834). Copies of the grammar are in the Austrian National Library (+43.H.261), University Library of Vienna (1834 I 128625), and British Library (1332.e.26).

33. The Bukovynian Ukrainian Teoktyst Blazhevych published in German a grammar of the *Romanian* language. (Blazhevych was spiritual director of Bukovyna's Orthodox seminary.) Theoktist Blażewicz, *Theoretisch-praktische Grammatik der dacoromanischen, das ist: der moldauischen oder wallachischen Sprache, nach ganz neuen Grundsätzen und einer leichtfasslichen Methode* (Lviv, Chernivtsi: Verlag von Eduard Winiarz, 1844). A copy is in the Austrian National Library (98.204-B).

34. Frederick Schlegel, *Lectures on the History of Literature, Ancient and Modern* (Edinburgh-London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1841), 266. On Schlegel, Vienna, and the East European national awakenings, see Winter, "Wien als Mittelpunkt," 209; idem, *Romantismus*, 61-2, 64, 68-9, 182-3.

35. Similarly, in the foreword to his Romanian grammar (iii-iv), Blazhevych referred to the "German-Wallachian grammars, such as those of Marki, Molnar and Clemens."

36. *Hrammatyka nimetskoho iazyka, dlia Studentiv pershoi i druhoi Kliassy, po shkolakh Triviialnykh i Parafiialnykh vo Korolestvakh Halytsii i Lodomerii, Derzhavi Avstriiskii piddannykh, ko vyhodi naroda halytsko-russkoho, napysal Iosyf Livytskii, sviashchennyk pry Tserkvy Shkolskoi* (Vienna: Izhdyveniiem ts.k. knyh shkilnykh Administratsii, 1845). Copies are in the University Library of Vienna (1845 I 225852) and the British Library (12962.aaa.32).

37. *Gedicht, welches zu Ehren dem Hochw. H. Iohann Snigurski, Bischof zu Przemyśl, Sambor und Sanok etc. am Tage des Namenstages...niederlegte, Aus dem Russinischen Originale ins Deutsche übersetzt* (Przemyśl 1837), cited in Levytskii, *Halytsko-ruskaia bybliohrafiia*, vol. 1, no. 165.

38. See the collection of scathing remarks by Mykhailo Maksymovych, Evzevii Cherkavsky, and Oleksander Sushko in Oleksander Sushko, "Dva nezvistni pereklady Ios. Levytskoho," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, rik X (1901), kn. IV, t. XLII, 5. Ivan Franko felt that Levytsky's translations were "untalented" (*bezdarni*). (Bohdan Havryshkiv, "Tvory Shillera na Ukraini," *Vitchyzna* 27, no. 11 [November 1959]: 125.) In his survey of Ukrainian literature, Oleksander Barvinsky mentioned Levytsky's translation as an illustration of "scholastic trends" opposed to the "straight road" indicated for Ukrainian literature by Markiian Shashkevych. (*Ohliad ukrainskoi literatury* [Lviv: Nakladom ts.k. Vydavnytstva shkilnykh knyzhok, Z drukarni Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka 1910], cli.) The interwar West Ukrainian encyclopedia characterized Levytsky as a "versifier (*virshun*) and translator into macaronic language." (*Ukrainska Zahalna Entsyklopediia. Knyha znannia v 3-okh tomakh*, ed. Ivan Rakovskyi [Lviv: "Ridna shkola," n.d.], s.v. "Levytskyi Iosyp.") According to the Soviet Ukrainian encyclopedia,

Levytsky translated Schiller and Goethe into "iazychiie," a derogatory term for forms of the West Ukrainian literary language that sought to compromise between historical and contemporary, ecclesiastical and vernacular language. (*Ukrainska Radianska Entsyklopediia* [Kiev: Akademiia nauk URSR, 1959-68], s.v. "Levytskyi Iosyf.") The émigré Ukrainian encyclopedia also refers to "iazychiie." (*Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva*, s.v. "Levytskyi Iosyp.")

39. Vozniak, *Iak probudylosia*, 119.

40. Levytskii, *Halytsko-ruskaia bybliohrafiia*, vol. 1, no. 180; *Erlkönig von Goethe ins klein-Russische übersetzt von Joseph Lewicki aus Sklo. Erlkenig Getoho pereveden na malo Russkii iazyk i nazvan Bohyneiu Iosyfom Livytskym zo Shkla* (Przemyśl: Gedruckt in der bischöflichen Buchdruckerei, 1838). There is a copy in the Austrian National Library (22078-B). Levytsky's translation of this work is not mentioned in D. Doroshenko, "Goethe-Übersetzungen in der ukrainischen Literatur," *Germanoslavica* 1, Heft 1-4 (1931-2):381-7.

41. Levytsky was the only Ukrainian translator of Schiller before 1848. The West Ukrainian newspaper *Zoria Halytskaia* accounted for seven of the eight translations that appeared in 1849-55. See the bibliography compiled by N.I. Stuchevska, "F. Shiller v ukrainskykh perekladakh," *Radianske literaturoznavstvo* 3, no. 6 (1959):149-54. The first translation into Ukrainian of a work by Goethe was made by the Dnieper Ukrainian Petro Hulak-Artemovsky. (Doroshenko, "Goethe-Übersetzungen," 382.)

    Das Lied von der Glocke: Zvin Shillera z Nimetskoho na iazyk Halytsko-Russkii pereveden Iosyfom Livytskym zo Shkla (Przemyśl 1839). A copy is in the Austrian National Library (78.Bb.217). *Der Kampf mit dem Drachen* and *Die Bürgschaft: Shillera Borba so smokom (Romanchyk) i Poruka (Balliada) s nimetskoho na iazyk Halytsko Russkii perevedeny Iosyfom Livytskym zi Shkla* (Przemyśl: V typohrafii Iepyskopskoi pry Soborn. Khr. Rozhd. Sv. Ioanna Krest., 1842), cited in Levytskii, *Halytsko-ruskaia bybliohrafiia*, vol. 1, no. 248. *Der Taucher, Der Gang nach dem Eisenhammer*, and *Der Handschuh: Shillera: Nurok abo vodolaz (Balliada), Khid do zaliznoi huty (Balliada), i Rukavychka (Kazka), s Nimetskoho iazyka na Halytsko-Russkii perevedenny, Iosyfom Livytskym zi Shkla* (Przemyśl: V Typografii Ieppskoi. pry Khrami Rozhdestva staho. Ioanna Krestytelia, 1844). A copy is in the Austrian National Library (78.Cc.117). *Der Ring des Polykrates*: Sushko, "Dva nezvistni pereklady," 7-9. The second of the "two unknown translations" that Sushko published was "Do zdorovia." Sushko implied that verse was also a translation from Schiller, but it is Levytsky's original composition. Levytsky's translation of *Der Ring des Polykrates* is missing from Stuchevska's bibliography.

42. Levytsky did not use the original, *Musenalmanach* edition of these ballads. This is evident from his translation of *Der Ring des Polykrates*; in the original edition Spartans attacked Samos, while in later editions (and Levytsky's translation) Cretans did.

43. [Iosyf Levytskyi], "Das Schicksal der gallizisch-russischen Sprache und Literature," *Jahrbücher für Slavische Literatur, Kunst und Wissenschaft* 2, Heft 5 (1844):183-5; Heft 6 (1844):206-10. The article was a translation of [Iosyf Levytskyi], "Dolia halytsko-russkoho iazyka," *Dennitsa. Jutrzeńka. Slovianskoe obozrenie. Przegląd Słowiański* (Warsaw) 2 (1843), 1:188-94, 2:39-45.

44. Levytskyi, "Das Schicksal," 6:209.

45. For the general background, see Paul R. Magocsi, "The Language Question as a Factor in the National Movement," in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism*, ed. Markovits and Sysyn, 220-38.

    Lozynsky was born in 1807 and ordained in 1831 (*Catalogus*, 25).

46. Iosyf Lozynskyi [Haličer-Russen], "Bemerkungen über den Artikel: 'Das Schicksal der gallizish-russischen Sprache und Literatur,'" *Jahrbücher für Slavische Literatur* 3, Heft 4 (1845):125-8, ("Nachwort der Redaction," 129).

47. Iosyf Levytskyi [anonymous], "Erwiderung auf die Bemerkungen über den Artikel: 'Schicksal der gallizisch-russischen Sprache und Literatur'," *Jahrbücher für Slavische Literatur* 4, Heft 4 (1846):183-6.

48. Iakiv Holovatskyi [Havryło Rusyn], "Zustände der Russinen in Galizien," *Jahrbücher für Slavische Literatur* 4, Heft 9-10 (1846):361-79, esp. 365, 372.

49. It appeared as a separate brochure in the same year as it was published in the *Jahrbücher für Slavische Literatur*. In one night the Lviv seminarians made a hundred handwritten copies of it to send out over Galicia. (Vozniak, *Iak probudylosia*, 116.)

50. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Himka, "The Greek Catholic Church," 435-7.

Ukrainians and Germans in Southern Ukraine, 1870s to 1914

Andreas Kappeler

The history of Ukrainian-German relations includes not only foreign policy, wars, and cultural influences, but also direct contacts among large sectors of ordinary people. This is true not only for the Austrian provinces of Galicia and Bukovyna, but also for those regions of the Russian empire where German settlers have lived since the end of the eighteenth century. Relations that had developed between Germans and Ukrainians at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century in that part of Ukraine under tsarist rule were, in my view, an important historical factor which influenced the often stormy conflicts that have existed between those two groups in the twentieth century. It is also a factor which has often been overlooked by historians.

Here I will limit myself to southern Ukraine, particularly the three *gubernii* (provinces) of *Novorossiia* (New Russia)—Katerynoslav, Kherson, and Tavria—where the largest number of Germans had settled. I will not deal with the other *gubernii* of Ukraine, where there were also large groups of Germans, such as Volhynia and Bessarabia. This study, therefore, does not take in the whole scope of direct contacts between Germans and Ukrainians in the Russian empire. By limiting myself to the area of "New Russia," which constitutes a distinct socio-economic area, I hope to give greater unity and cohesion to my account. We should be mindful, however, that a study of conditions in Volhynia might give quite different results.

In the three decades before World War I southern Ukraine became the most economically dynamic area within the empire. That was also the period in which national ideologies and movements began to develop significantly in the Russian empire. The whole question of German-Ukrainian relations in southern Ukraine at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century has never been, as far as I know, studied systematically.[1] Contemporary and later accounts either deal with the larger area or deal only with the German settlers there. Most German-language studies, carried out by the "Black Sea Germans," are characterized by a narrow local/regional or national perspective. Russian studies often have a strongly Russian nationalist orientation. Later studies from a more internationalist perspective lack detail about the specific problems of the ethnic

groups. Non-Soviet Ukrainians have shown little interest in this question. In addition to the one-sidedness of the studies, there is the problem of inadequate source material.[2] Until World War I Russian officialdom was concerned with estates (*sosloviia*) and paid little heed to the question of nationality. From the German side sources are scarce and must be used with care. There are practically no Ukrainian sources. Here I will first compare the socio-economic and socio-cultural situations of the Ukrainians and Germans in southern Ukraine. Against this background I will then try to give some account of relations between both groups as far as the source material will allow.

Demographic, Social, and Socio-cultural Structure

The census of 1897 provides data for a comparison of the demographic and social structures of the German and Ukrainian communities. Contemporary and later studies have pointed out the limited value of the first and only census taken in the Russian empire. It was inadequately prepared and executed; the whole of the material was not published; and the questions and answers, formulated in the pre-modern concepts of the tsarist empire, are not always useful for modern historians. For me, one problem is of particular relevance, namely the category of mother tongue used for ethnic classification. Obviously the number of persons who considered themselves Ukrainian was greater than the number of those classified under "Little Russian language."[3] In spite of this problem, the material of the 1897 census can give us insight into the socio-ethnic structure of the Russian empire if it is used critically, and it permits us to make broad comparisons between the different ethnic groups of the empire, which we would not be able to make if we relied only on other source material.

First, let us deal with the demographic situation at the end of the nineteenth century (Table 1). The Ukrainians were clearly numerically dominant. In the *guberniia* of Katerynoslav they were 68.9 per cent and in the *guberniia* of Kherson 53.5 per cent of the population. In Tavria, with 42.2 per cent, they were by far the strongest group, but only in the north, in the area near the border of the Katerynoslav *guberniia*, did they constitute the majority. In the Crimea they were behind the Tatars and the Russians. The Germans made up 3.8 per cent (Katerynoslav), 4.5 per cent (Kherson) and 5.4 per cent (Tavria) of the population. The greatest number of Germans was in the region of Perekop, on both sides of the narrow landmass linking the Crimean peninsula to the mainland, where they made up 22.8 per cent of the population. In the region of Yevpatoria in the northern Crimea they constituted 12 per cent. In both areas the Ukrainians made up less than 25 per cent of the population. In the Kherson *guberniia* the Germans were concentrated in the western part: over 10 per cent in the region of Odessa (28 per cent of the rural population), almost 10 per cent in the region

TABLE 1
LINGUISTIC GROUPS IN *NOVOROSSIIA* IN 1897

	Katerynoslav	%	Kherson	%	Tavria	%
Ukrainians	1,456,369	68.9	1,462,039	53.5	611,121	42.2
in cities	65,166	27.0	135,862	17.2	30,197	10.4
Germans	80,979	3.8	123,453	4.5	78,305	5.4
in cities	2,438	1.0	12,810	1.6	4,100	1.4
Russians	364,574	17.3	575,375	21.1	404,463	27.9
in cities	98,047	40.7	354,738	45.0	142,062	49.1
Jews	99,152	4.7	322,537	11.8	55,148	3.8
in cities	62,602	26.0	223,769	28.4	34,248	11.8
Tatars	187,943	13.0				
in cities	41,070	14.2				

SOURCE: *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g.*, vols. 13, 47, 41, table 13.

of Tyraspil. In both of those regions Ukrainians also had a lower than average representation. Apparently relatively high levels of German population corresponded with relatively low levels of Ukrainian population—an important consideration from the point of view of inter-ethnic contacts. However, in the northeast of Tavria *guberniia* and in the bordering southeast of Katerynoslav *guberniia* there were relatively large numbers of both Germans (5.2-7.8 per cent) and Ukrainians (46-82 per cent).[4] After Ukrainians, in all the *gubernii* Russians were the second largest group, while Jews were strongly represented in the *guberniia* of Kherson and the Tatars in the Crimea.

The urban populations of southern Ukraine present a rather different picture of ethnic divisions. In all *gubernii* Russians dominated with 40-49 per cent. In Katerynoslav they were followed by Ukrainians and then Jews, in Kherson by Jews and Ukrainians, and in Tavria by Tatars, Jews, and Ukrainians. In Odessa, the largest city of *Novorossiia*, Russians were 49 per cent, Jews 31 per cent, and Ukrainians only 9.4 per cent of the population.[5] The number of Germans among the urban population in all *gubernii* was low, although they made up as much as 2.5 per cent of the population of Odessa. On average, Ukrainians formed 18 per cent of the population of *Novorossiia*, mainly in the lower classes of the cities and small towns. The towns of southern Ukraine, therefore, with the exception of the Crimea, were predominantly Russian and Jewish. So, from the point of view of contacts between Ukrainians and Germans, they are of lesser significance.[6]

The degree of urbanization of Ukrainians and Germans in the three "New Russian" *gubernii* was thus relatively low. For Ukrainians the figure was 4.5-9.3 per cent (higher in Kherson) and for the Germans it was 3-10.4 per cent (also higher in Kherson). However, the average level of urbanization in southern Ukraine then was 21 per cent, making it one of the most highly urbanized regions of the Russian empire. Unlike the Jews and Russians, Germans and Ukrainians in southern Ukraine lived predominantly in the countryside. One would expect in a rural environment a less intensive inter-ethnic contact.

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGES OF DIFFERENT ESTATES IN THE VARIOUS LINGUISTIC GROUPS

	Ukrainians	Germans	Russians	Jews	Tatars
Gentry					
Katerynoslav	0.24	0.32	3.68	0.26	
Kherson	0.40	0.60	6.32	0.11	
Tavria	0.16	0.55	4.21	0.24	1.70
Merchants					
Katerynoslav	0.04	0.44	0.54	4.75	
Kherson	0.03	0.56	0.91	1.67	
Tavria	0.04	0.29	0.60	5.14	0.58
Meshchane					
Katerynoslav	3.51	5.40	16.05	77.06	
Kherson	15.47	4.15	35.35	87.94	
Tavria	4.91	5.09	24.71	90.06	22.49
Peasants					
Katerynoslav	95.76	81.21	77.06	9.17	
Kherson	83.19	89.13	51.16	9.05	
Tavria	94.41	86.94	67.15	3.68	75.42

SOURCE: *Perepis 1897 g.*, vols. 13, 47, 41, table 24.

The census material gives only indirect indications of the socio-ethnic stratification. The division into estates does not give an accurate picture of the social structure for this period. However, Table 2 shows that among both Ukrainians and Germans the peasantry was by far the largest estate: 95 per cent of Ukrainians in Katerynoslav and Tavria were peasants, with the corresponding figure for Germans between 81 and 89 per cent. This difference between the Germans and Ukrainians is largely due to the fact that in the division of the Germans into estates, those with foreign citizenship must be counted: in Katerynoslav this was 12.35 per cent, in Tavria 6.63 per cent, and in Kherson 4.39 per

cent. In any case, the percentage of peasants among the Germans of southern Ukraine was considerably higher than among Russians in this region.

Among the urban estates Germans and Ukrainians were far outnumbered by Russians and Jews. The number of *meshchane* (townsmen) among the Ukrainians and Germans was 4-5 per cent. The Ukrainians in Kherson were an exception, with an unusually high number of *meshchane*. At least half of these, however, were poor landless peasants, the "*desiatinshchiki*," who were *meshchane* only nominally, often of distant towns.[7] Among the higher urban estate of merchants, however, there were differences. There were 7-18 times more German merchants than there were Ukrainian, although there were considerably fewer German merchants than there were Russian, Jewish, or Tatar. Among both Germans and Ukrainians a considerable number of those who were reckoned among the urban classes lived in the countryside. Compared to the Russians, Germans and Ukrainians had a very small nobility. In *Novorossiia*, therefore, Germans and Ukrainians seem to have had a very similar social structure. In contrast to the Jews and Russians, they were found principally among the rural population and in the lower classes of the towns.

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED OCCUPATIONS AMONG GERMAN- AND UKRAINIAN-SPEAKERS, 1897

	Katerynoslav		Kherson		Tavria	
	Ukr	Ger	Ukr	Ger	Ukr	Ger
Agriculture	86.71	72.48	86.87	73.76	86.14	68.19
Servants/day labourers	3.27	4.07	3.97	3.42	3.46	4.54
Crafts/industry	4.28	16.16	3.53	12.52	2.91	17.10
Trade	0.92	0.91	0.55	1.58	0.74	1.40
Education/science	0.10	1.44	0.12	1.06	0.14	1.78

SOURCE: *Perepis 1897 g.*, vols. 13, 47, 41, table 22.

Table 3 gives additional information about social stratification with the representation according to occupational groups. The census, however, dealt with the various branches of production and not with social groups. So it is impossible to ascertain the number of German or Ukrainian workers or entrepreneurs.[8] Those involved in agriculture predominated in both ethnic groups. The figure for the Ukrainians (86-87 per cent) was significantly higher than that for the Germans (68-74 per cent), while the number of day labourers and servants was roughly the same. In the fields of trade and commerce the Germans were better represented, although the figure is still quite low, since trade in southern Ukraine was the domain of the Jews. There is a significant difference, however, in the figures for industry and manufacture: the percentage of Germans involved (12.5-

17 per cent) was much higher than the percentage of Ukrainians (2.9-4.3 per cent). The difference was even greater in the area of education and science, where the participation of the Germans was 10-14 times greater than that of the Ukrainians.

TABLE 4
EDUCATION LEVELS OF UKRAINIANS AND GERMANS OVER THE AGE OF TEN IN 1897 (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Katerynoslav		Kherson		Tavria	
	Ukr	Ger	Ukr	Ger	Ukr	Ger
Literacy						
male	35.01	87.77	34.57	85.73	44.34	93.04
female	5.49	81.16	8.42	84.69	9.15	91.81
total	20.43	85.93	21.79	85.19	27.66	92.44
urban population	38.50	85.15	35.70	85.07	49.71	86.25
rural population	19.19	89.18	18.14	85.24	26.19	92.87
More than elementary school						
male	0.46	1.81	0.40	3.69	0.38	2.07
female	0.27	0.81	0.20	2.09	0.26	1.29
total	0.36	1.31	0.30	2.90	0.32	1.68
urban population	3.71	17.41	1.46	18.48	2.13	14.64
rural population	0.18	0.46	0.15	0.50	0.20	0.77

SOURCE: *Perepis 1897 g.*, vols. 13, 47, 41, table 15.

The educational levels of both ethnic groups were correspondingly different (see Table 4). Among the Ukrainians of "New Russia" 20-28 per cent of those over ten years old were able to read, while the corresponding figure for the Germans was 85-92 per cent. This is higher than among the Jews (52-70 per cent) or the Russians (38-45 per cent). Among men and among town dwellers the differences were smaller. In fact, the Germans of southern Ukraine present an extraordinary picture, since the rural population had a higher literacy level than the urban population. Among women of both groups, the differences were very great. Very few Ukrainian women were literate, while among Germans the women had reached more or less the same level of literacy as the men.[9] Information about the number of people who had more than an elementary education (that is, those who had attended a middle school), allows us to make some rough estimation about the existence of an intelligentsia. Among the Ukrainians, especially in the rural population and among women, the figure was very low.

The percentage of educated Germans was higher, but only among the relatively small number of German-speaking urban dwellers was it above the social average. In the whole of "New Russia," the number of Germans who had middle or higher education was below that for the Russians (4.2-7.6 per cent) and the Jews (2.7-2.8 per cent).

On the basis of information supplied by the census on the Ukrainians and Germans in southern Ukraine, we can form a general conclusion. Both groups were mainly rural; were involved in agriculture; had a very low percentage of members who were nobles, were involved in trade and commerce, or had any form of middle or higher education. There was much less differentiation among them than among the Russians of the region. This was particularly true for the Ukrainians, since the number of Ukrainians in the nobility, in the intelligentsia, in industry, trade, or commerce was extremely low.[10] Among the Germans there was a somewhat stronger differentiation, indicated by the number of Germans who were merchants or were involved in industry and manufacture. Not only in relation to the Ukrainians, but in relation to all the other ethnic groups of the region, the Germans had a high level of literacy. As a literate and predominantly rural population they had many similarities with the Lutheran Latvians and Estonians who constituted the majority in the Baltic provinces of Russia. In southern Ukraine, dominated by the Eastern Slavs, the Germans constituted a Central European enclave.

Village Economics: Land Ownership and Agriculture

The preceding description of the German and Ukrainian rural population of southern Ukraine, according to estate and occupation (as "peasants with different levels of literacy") seems to present a degree of unity which is not confirmed by the socio-economic reality. Although the degree of social and economic differentiation among the Ukrainian and Russian peasantry may not have been very high, within the German-speaking rural population of Russia there was a tremendous economic differentiation not only vis-à-vis the Eastern Slavic peasantry, but also within the ethnic German community itself. One of the most important indicators for the economic situation of the Germans in southern Ukraine is the structure of land ownership. The official statistics vary a great deal as do both German- and Russian-language contemporary sources; moreover, the source material to which I have had access is incomplete and presents other problems which I cannot discuss in detail here.[11]

Land ownership in southern Ukraine at the turn of the century was determined by the heritage of serfdom to a much lesser extent than in the rest of Ukraine. The nobility possessed a smaller proportion of the land there than elsewhere in Ukraine (in Tavria 31 per cent, in Kherson 39 per cent, in Katerynoslav 42 per cent).[12] Aside from the nobility, the urban classes, particularly the merchants, controlled a significant proportion of private land (more than 20 per

cent in Kherson and Tavria). The amount of land owned by the peasants was also higher than in the rest of Ukraine. Whereas the average peasant allotment (*nadel*) in Ukraine was 6.5 dessiatines (1 dessiatine equals 1.1 hectares), in Kherson it was 7.8, in Katerynoslav 9.3, and in Tavria as much as 14.7 dessiatines.[13] The differences within the peasantry were significant, however. Whereas the peasants on private estates in Kherson *guberniia* had on average only 5 dessiatines, and in the Tavria *guberniia* 6.7 dessiatines, the large mass of poor peasants had fewer than 5 dessiatines, and the state peasants possessed on average 7.8-13.1 dessiatines. The one-time colonists (Greeks as well as Germans) had average holdings which were much larger (in Kherson 12.8 dessiatines, in Katerynoslav 27.5 dessiatines, and in Tavria 36.4 dessiatines). Among this latter group, it was the middle and rich peasants that were dominant.[14] In addition to their allotments the peasants of southern Ukraine had private holdings at the end of the nineteenth and in the early part of the twentieth century. In 1905 the amount of land in this category ranged from 28 per cent (Kherson) to 36 per cent (Tavria)—a much higher proportion than in the rest of Ukraine. The peasants of the southern steppe also leased more land than did the peasantry in the rest of the Russian empire.[15]

This limited amount of data for the period at the turn of the century allows us to conclude that the peasants in the recently colonized regions of southern Ukraine, especially in the *guberniia* of Tavria, had holdings of land which were on average much larger than in the rest of Ukraine. The distribution of land among the different categories of peasantry, however, was rather unequal. Whereas the average holdings among the former proprietary peasants were not significantly larger than in the rest of Ukraine, among the one-time colonists average holdings were much larger. Historical research has so far not paid much attention to the question whether the larger averages in southern Ukraine really reflected ownership patterns among the Ukrainian and Russian peasants or whether these averages were raised mainly by the larger holdings in the hands of the colonists. Although the available statistics are by no means consistent, they do permit one to conclude confidently that the Germans in *Novorossiia* in the period before World War I had average holdings of land which were very much larger than the holdings of the Russians and Ukrainians. Detlef Brandes mentions the following figures, based on official statistics, for German landholding in the three *gubernii* before the First World War: Kherson *guberniia*, 555,409 dessiatines (8.6 per cent of all land, with the Germans constituting 5.7 percent of the rural population); Katerynoslav *guberniia*, 568,817 dessiatines (10 per cent of all land, with the Germans constituting 4.2 per cent of the rural population); Tavria *guberniia*, 994,735 dessiatines (19 per cent of all land, with the Germans constituting 6.4 per cent of the rural population).[16]

In contemporary German and Russian sources, the figures for German land ownership in the provinces of "New Russia" are considerably higher. Edmund

Schmid estimated that German land ownership in the province of Kherson amounted to 956,000 dessiatines, and some Russian authors give even higher figures. For Katerynoslav, Schmid's estimate is 1 million dessiatines, and for Tavria, 1.35 million dessiatines.[17] This amounts to 3.3 million dessiatines (Brandes' figure, on the basis of official statistics, is 2.1 million dessiatines), at least 16 per cent of all land and at least 25 per cent of the total arable land of southern Ukraine, which would be comparable to the total holdings of the nobility.

Despite the weaknesses in the data available, it is clear that German land ownership in southern Ukraine, especially privately owned and leased land, was at a very high level, indeed much higher than the average level for Russians and Ukrainians. The highest concentration of German land was in the *guberniia* of Tavria where in one district the Germans owned as much as one third of all land. In two districts of Kherson German land ownership accounted for 27 and 16 per cent, while in two districts of Katerynoslav the portion of land in German possession was 18 per cent.[18] Even if those figures are exaggerated, it is nonetheless clear that such extraordinary levels of concentration of land ownership could not have been without consequence for relations between the Germans and the Ukrainians.

There were great regional variations in the average size of holding per German household. In Tavria and Katerynoslav holdings in the range of 25 to 100 dessiatines were most prominent.[19] The figure for Kherson, 55 dessiatines per farm (including leased land), is probably valid for the other provinces as well.[20] The average size of farm for the Eastern Slavs in Kherson was at most 10 dessiatines, so it is clear that the German peasants of southern Ukraine belonged largely to the class of rich peasants, who were socially quite removed from the Ukrainian poor and middle peasants.

How did the Germans come into possession of so much land? At the time of the initial colonization they were given larger allotments than those given to the Eastern Slavic peasants. As the German population grew, however, shortage of land became a problem. Unlike the Eastern Slavic peasants, the Germans did not carry out a periodic redistribution of land, nor was the land broken up at time of inheritance. Rather, the entire holding usually went to the youngest son, which created a problem of what to do about land for the other sons.[21] The entire community, as well as the individual farmers, established numerous "daughter colonies" from their own resources. Land was bought from a special fund established by the community, and German farmers saved for this purpose. Loans were also available at high interest to buy or lease land.[22] The specific form of land ownership, as well as the conscious accumulation of capital by individual farmers and the communities, created the necessary preconditions for the purchase and lease of additional farming land. These preconditions did not exist among the Ukrainian peasants.

The continuous acquisition of land by the German colonists throughout the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century is clear from contemporary sources. First the Germans bought or leased land from the nobility.[23] Of the 3 million dessiatines of land that the nobility in southern Ukraine sold or leased between 1877 and 1905, a significant portion of it went to the Germans.[24] In the *guberniia* of Tavria, a large proportion of Tatar land came into German hands when the Tatars emigrated after the Crimean war.[25] From the 1880s more and more complaints were heard that the Germans were buying up all the land; that land prices were constantly rising; and that the "Russian" peasants were being impoverished; and that the Germans, with their large supply of capital, were making it impossible for other interested parties to purchase land.[26] In spite of the Russian nationalist tone of many of these complaints, they were in fact quite serious for the whole "New Russian" region during this period. This extensive land acquisition by the Germans undoubtedly hindered the formation of a middle peasantry in southern Ukraine. Although the average size of land holdings in all the provinces of "New Russia," quite apart from those in German hands, was higher than elsewhere, it was really the southern periphery, where the nobility and Tatars were selling land, that possibilities for expansion existed, and it was precisely these possibilities that the Ukrainian peasants could not utilize sufficiently.

In spite of the social levelling effect of land purchases by German communities and individual farmers, in the sources there is a surprising number of references to poor and landless peasants in the German villages of southern Ukraine. In some German communities, and even in the whole district of Katerynoslav, as many as 50 per cent of the inhabitants were landless. Some of those landless and poor peasants, for example, among the Mennonites, tried to make a living as agricultural labourers or as workers in the German industrial enterprises.[27] This is one of the reasons for the high percentage of Germans working in manufacturing and industry at the time of the 1897 census. There are also accounts of social and political tensions in the German villages. In one village the poor and landless peasants even demanded the introduction of the Eastern Slavic practice of land redistribution.[28] The social and economic differentiation within the German village communities was much stronger than among the Ukrainians. This was an element of the Central European rural social structure which the German colonists brought with them to Ukraine, but which was not copied in the Ukrainian villages.

There were also numerous German rich peasants and estate owners with more than 1,000 dessiatines of land. For example, the 124 Mennonite landowners in Halbstadt owned, on average, more than 1,100 dessiatines each. The richest Germans owned latifundia of at least 10,000 dessiatines, especially in Tavria.[29] By far the richest German family in *Novorossiia*, and at the same time the richest and biggest landowner in the *guberniia* of Tavria, was the Falz-Fein family,

which had over 200,000 dessiatines of land, 750,000 sheep, a famous model farm, and a zoological garden.[30] The Falz-Fein family rose to the level of the nobility, and there is some question as to whether, at the beginning of the twentieth century, they were Russified. German authors often complained about rich Germans adapting to the nobility: "They speak neither Swabian nor Low German but a more or less distorted Russian. This alone they consider essential to being educated and a landlord."[31]

Southern Ukraine, in the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, had the highest rate of expansion (among all the regions of the Russian empire) of cultivable land and grain production. The largest surpluses of the whole of the European part of the Russian empire were produced in this region and were exported from the nearby Black Sea ports. During this period there was rapid growth in cultivation not only of wheat and barley but also of potatoes. Also, in spite of population growth, the land reserves of southern Ukraine were greater than elsewhere. The amount of grain harvested per head of population, and therefore the surpluses, was greater than anywhere else in the European part of the empire.[32] It is interesting to question to what extent the Germans, with their larger than average land holdings, participated in this sale and export of grain surpluses. I have found figures for harvests among different categories of population for the year 1912 in the *guberniia* of Kherson. The proportion of grain produced by the Germans is higher than the proportion of Germans in the population, but only in the production of corn, winter wheat, oats, and potatoes is the proportion produced by the Germans higher than the proportion of land in German ownership.[33] Contemporary accounts, as well as the official statistics for Kherson, confirm that the productivity of German agriculture, in spite of the increasing use of machinery, was not particularly high. The highest productivity was on agricultural land privately owned by the nobility and other big landowners. On land privately owned by the Germans, productivity was significantly lower, although it still ranked in second place,[34] and was higher than that of the Ukrainian peasantry. In the other two *gubernii* of southern Ukraine, the Germans owned even larger tracts of land and were able to aim for even higher surpluses. From these very limited figures we can conclude that the German farmers did not contribute the bulk of the Ukrainian grain export or the "New Russian" surplus which was so important to the whole Russian empire. This came primarily from the large estates of the nobility and the merchants, where productivity was higher and smaller amounts of grain were actually kept for home use. The contribution of German farmers to the grain export was, however, important, certainly more important than the contribution of the Russian or Ukrainian peasantry.

Thus, the Germans in southern Ukraine, although they were reckoned as part of the peasantry after 1871, were different from the Ukrainian peasantry in many important respects. The Germans had a much higher level of literacy, and among

them social, economic, and professional differentiation was much more pronounced. The most important factor, however, was their stronger economic position, manifested especially in the size of their land holdings relative to the land holdings of the Ukrainian peasantry. The majority of the one-time German colonists, who owned their own land, constituted a relatively well off middle and upper layer, in a way which was largely non-existent among the Ukrainian peasants. In this context, one wonders whether researchers, and particularly Marxist historians, take this adequately into account when they speak of capitalist tendencies in the rural economy of southern Ukraine, such as social and economic differentiation within the peasantry or increased use of farm machinery. Maybe this factor was something peculiar to the Germans.[35] In any case, we are justified in concluding that the German farmers of southern Ukraine, inasmuch as they hindered the acquisition of land by the rest of the peasantry, had an effect on the social mobility of the Ukrainian peasant. This role played by the Germans in the countryside was similar to the role played in the towns and cities by the Russians and Jews, who slowed down the process of urbanization among the Ukrainians. The existence of an ethnic group which is economically and socially in a stronger position, and which is culturally, linguistically, and religiously isolated, can hinder the social and economic rise of the native people, and create a fertile ground for the existence of social and inter-ethnic conflict.

Direct Contacts

Dealing with the question of contacts between the two ethnic groups is complicated because neither the German nor the Russian literature of the period distinguishes between Ukrainians and Russians. (So when I speak of Ukrainians I do so because they made up the great majority of the population. In individual cases the sources do not make clear whether we are dealing with Russian or Ukrainian peasants.) All observers, however, are in agreement that there was very little contact between Ukrainians and Germans: "The Germans live completely isolated from the people who have shown them such great hospitality." Indeed, the Germans lived in closed communities where no outsiders were accepted.[36] The religious or confessional barrier was very strong, and the Mennonites in particular set themselves apart from the rest. The Germans were considered "unfriendly toward outsiders and without hospitality," and the circumstance that they spoke Russian poorly was always emphasized. Particular emphasis was put on the fact that linguistic, confessional, cultural, and economic differences made mixed marriages practically impossible: "It never happened that a young German lad married a Russian girl. The community would have expelled him."[37] Economic relations were also rare, since the Germans tended to buy or lease their land primarily from the nobility and they practically never leased their land to the Ukrainian peasants.[38] In the towns the Germans, of course, had more contact with other ethnic groups, but mainly with the Russians and Jews.

The only contact between Germans and Ukrainians in the countryside that is frequently mentioned in the sources is that between the rich German peasants and landowners and their "Russian" (actually mostly Ukrainian) servants and agricultural workers. Every colonist had at least one "Russian" boy as a servant and a girl as a maid. They remained with the German family until they married, at which time they had to return to their own village. In the summer, especially at harvest time, numerous Ukrainian and Russian peasants made their way to the German farms of *Novorossiia* to be taken on as workers or day labourers. The colonists preferred them to the poor Germans, because they worked better and did not have to be paid as much. It was also said that Ukrainian peasants preferred to work for the Germans, because they paid and treated them better than the Russian landowners.[39] Widely differing opinions were expressed about the relations between the German farmers and their Ukrainian servants and workers. It has been described as "kind and generous," with the workers sitting at the same table as the landlord. The Russian nationalists even complained that German was always spoken and they feared a germanization of the "Russians." Other sources, however, speak of the exploitation of the Ukrainians, and of German strictness with servants, who were often beaten.[40]

Ukrainians or Russians took on specific jobs in the German villages. For instance, a Ukrainian shoemaker would spend a week in a German household. German entrepreneurs hired numerous Ukrainian and Russian workers. In Khortytsia in 1911, for example, there were 1,744 Ukrainian workers employed by Mennonite Germans.[41] One particular example is interesting, for he was a worker whose name was prominent and whose case came to be considered to a certain extent symbolic of the relation between the Germans and Ukrainians in southern Ukraine. The district court in Kherson in 1900 and 1901 dealt with a complaint of a peasant from the *guberniia* of Kiev (Andrii Shevchenko, the nephew of Ukraine's national poet) against a member of the rich German family of Falz-Fein. Shevchenko's son had worked as an apprentice for the Falz-Fein family and had lost an arm in an accident. The father demanded a compensation payment of 4,800 roubles. The case dragged on for a long time because Shevchenko was unwilling to accept a payment of 1,000 roubles. Eventually the court ordered the Falz-Fein family to pay a yearly sum to the young Shevchenko of 225 roubles.[42]

Because of the differences in wealth and education, and also because the direct inter-ethnic contacts between groups largely took the form of a master-servant relationship, the Germans had a feeling of colonial superiority vis-à-vis the Ukrainians and Russians: "They would consider it an insult to be called Russians. They look down upon the Russian peasantry as poor, ignorant, lazy, and dishonest."[43] The Russian nationalist, Velitsyn, gave a similar account: "Their quiet and arbitrary manner is an expression of how much they consider themselves to be the masters. The German colonists frequently express their

contempt for all the Russians: 'the scoundrels, the Russian pigs' is what the German colonist says about his Russian workers."[44] The attitude of superiority was sometimes clearly expressed in the writings of the Germans themselves:

> The relationship was good: the relation of the rich to the poor, the charitable to the weak....The German was always the master, the Russian was in every respect very much his inferior....One couldn't expect much from the Russians, they could never be left alone, and one could never stimulate their unruly desires....[There were, however, in some of the villages] real criminal gangs...with whom it was impossible to have any kind of relationship. Here the German colonist had to adopt a different form of behaviour to keep things under control: here he had to be the master (*Herrenmensch*) who gave orders and expected to be obeyed; he forced obedience, when necessary, with the whip, the stick, or the fist.[45]

That this was no idle threat is evident in the writings of another author who gave an account of how the Germans took the law into their own hands in dealing with Ukrainian thieves.[46] This attitude of the Germans to the Slavic *Untermenschen* points unequivocally in the direction of the later racist policies of German National Socialism. There is, in fact, a personal continuity in that many of these Ukrainian Germans, as Ehrt, Stumpp, or Edmund Schmid, became supporters of National Socialism.[47]

The little evidence available for how the Ukrainian peasant viewed the Germans, most of it secondhand, confirms the fundamental colonial relationship: "He looks upon Germans almost as beings of a different world—as a wonderfully cunning and ingenious people, who have been endowed by providence with peculiar qualities not possessed by ordinary Orthodox humanity."[48] Russian and German authors give similar accounts: "These people think it strange when one says to them that the Germans are also subjects [of the tsar]...just as we Russians are....Their respect for the Germans was immense—'a German can do anything, we Russians just can't keep up with them.'" Frequently expressed was the view that the "Russians" were not hostile to the Germans, that they once even elected Germans as elders to the *volost* (smallest administrative unit of tsarist Russia): "The simple Russian is good natured...perhaps he envies the German, but in spite of everything he doesn't hate him as is often believed."[49]

Observers are not in agreement on whether the economically and culturally more advanced German colonists provided a model for their less developed Ukrainian neighbours or influenced their economic habits as the Russian regime had intended. Wallace thought not:

> To him [a Russian] it seems in the nature of things that Germans should live in large, clean, well-built houses, in the same way as it is in the nature of things that birds should build nests; and as it has probably never occurred to a human being to build a nest for himself and his family, so it never occurs to a Russian peasant to build a house on the German model. Germans are Germans and Russians are Russians—and there is nothing more to be said on the subject.[50]

Schmid confirms that those who entered German service, "who often for years worked more or less in the German style,...as soon as they returned to their own community [they] fell back into all the old Russian habits." Russian authors also considered the German influence on the "Russian" peasants insignificant.[51] There were quite a few Russian and German observers, however, who felt that German cultural and economic influence on the Ukrainians was very significant. Stumpp reported, from the *guberniia* of Tavria, that there the "Russian" peasants "imitated the Germans in everything, in house-building, in the organization of agriculture, in their economic methods, down to the smallest details." It was the Ukrainian servants who were the means of transmission for German influence. Some Russian nationalist authors were critical of the Germanizing influence on their "Russian" workers and peasants.[52]

Looking at things from the perspective of the 1919 civil war Schmid qualified his remark about the "good natured Russian": "But the Russian is also rough, bestially rough. He would rather steal and rob and would even murder for a few kopeks rather than work...and he robs and murders indifferently, be they Russians, Germans, anyone."[53] During the revolutionary period of 1905-6 there were numerous reports from the Baltic Germans about violent actions by Latvian and Estonian peasants against their property. While we should keep those in mind when we consider German reports on Ukrainian peasants, perhaps the most interesting thing is that there were very few such reports. Schmid himself emphasized that during the revolutionary period of 1905, the Germans "were able to ward off such attacks themselves without any great damage. In the areas where the Germans live there were very few such incidents."[54] This absence of any great protest movement of Ukrainian peasants against the German landowners is confirmed by all the sources (some of them from the period before the war, but most of them edited during the Soviet period). From 1902 Ukraine had been a centre of social revolutionary action among the peasants and it remained that way until 1914, but apparently in the "New Russian" provinces things had not developed in this way.[55] It was only during the revolutionary period of 1905-6 that there was any large-scale peasant movement in southern Ukraine.

As in all other areas of Ukraine this protest was directed first and foremost against the landowning nobility. In some regions estates of the nobility were plundered, but soon the protests were directed against all landowners, "tenant farmers, German colonists, peasants with privately owned land, and priests" or "against all private owners, leaseholders, and Jews."[56] The peasants forced the agricultural workers off the big landed estates, sometimes demanding that they be employed themselves at higher rates of pay or that private land be leased to them. Property was destroyed, estates were plundered, grass and grain were harvested and taken away, and the owners were driven out. Sources from the *guberniia* of Tavria and from the region of Odessa, where there were large concentrations of Germans, sometimes mention German landowners and tenant farmers. In September 1906 peasants demanded that they be given a large tract of land which belonged to two German communities. In December, in the region

of Melitopil, the farms of two Mennonites situated between two Ukrainian villages were plundered and the owners driven off.[57] I have not been able to find a single example, however, of a German colonist or landowner being killed by Ukrainian peasants. On the contrary, quite a few Ukrainians lost their lives at the hands of the landowners in those actions.[58] In only very few cases was there any kind of nationalist motivation. One such example comes from a contemporary survey conducted in the *guberniia* of Katerynoslav; one particular object of peasant protest was described as "the kulaks and the colonists who have bought up the lands of the *pany*" because "this land belongs to us." There is also a report from the region of Odessa that a priest preached a nationalist sermon, whereupon the peasants attacked the Jews and the Germans.[59]

It would seem, therefore, that the Germans were not a central object of Ukrainian peasant protest during the period of the first revolution. One reason for this was that the struggle for land was not as acute in the three provinces of southern Ukraine as it was elsewhere. At the same time, social conflicts were also less acute. Moreover, the German colonists lived on their land and were able to put up a common defence against any peasant attacks. They had bought their land and worked it themselves (with the help of Ukrainian and Russian hands), and in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasants this gave legitimacy to their possession, a legitimacy which the nobility (who did not live on their land) did not possess. Hence the peasants declared that the land of the nobility belonged to the peasants. The relationship of the Russian and Ukrainian nobility to the Germans of *Novorossiia* was one of economic co-operation and competition. The landowning nobility protested from time to time against the growth in German land ownership, but this did not stop them from selling their land to the Germans when the price was right.[60] The nobility also contributed to the Russian nationalist polemic against the Germans.[61]

To what extent was the Ukrainian nationalist movement, which was developing in the Russian empire after 1905, influenced by this polemic, and did it demonstrate any anti-German tendencies? There were plenty of opportunities for the Ukrainian nationalists to join in the Russian nationalist polemic against the Germans. Velitsyn reminded them that the Mennonite settlements at Khortytsia lay "in the heart of Little Russia...[and] where the ring of the hosts had gathered, the Germans were now making their plans to plant the German seed on this soil which had been watered with Russian blood." This idea was also expressed in a Ukrainian poem published in 1897 in the journal *Novoe slovo*. There the poet complained, in much the same way as Taras Shevchenko had a half century earlier, that the famous land of the Cossacks was walked over by German cows and turned over by German ploughs.[62]

The most prominent representative of the Ukrainian national movement to also play a role in the polemic against the Germans in *Novorossiia* was Serhii Shelukhyn, a judge from Odessa. His *German Colonization* was just one of many anti-German polemical writings published during World War I. His was distinct from the usual polemic of the Russian nationalists, however, because he empha-

sized that the ones to suffer most from the Germans, "who have taken the place of our own landowners," were the Ukrainian peasants.[63] In one of the few Ukrainian journals still allowed at that time, the Russian-language *Ukrainskaia zhizn*, a reviewer discussed this book in detail and praised it. She quoted Shelukhyn on German land ownership in Kherson and drew a justified, if perhaps exaggerated, conclusion: "The German colonization led to the impoverishment of the Ukrainians and contributed to their denationalization....[The Germans] have created for themselves a secure existence on the ruins of Ukrainian freedom." She attempted, in agreement with Shelukhyn, to lump together the German colonists with the reactionary Russian nationalist parties as the main enemy of the Ukrainians.[64] The fundamental dilemma of the Ukrainian nationalist movement was that its main enemies were the Russian nationalist movement and the Russian state, so it was impossible to join forces with them against the Germans. Shelukhyn experienced this himself. Rennikov praised him as "a fanatical opponent of the Germans," but then argued with him, because Rennikov opposed not only the Germans but also the Ukrainian movement.[65]

The Ukrainian peasants and the lower classes of the urban population tended to see their immediate enemy in the regional upper and middle layers (Poles, Jews, and Germans). The majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, however, fought against the autocracy, the Russian bureaucracy, and the nationalists, more in the tradition of the liberal Russian opposition. They were neither willing nor able to adopt the nationalism of their opponents and polemize, in common with the reactionary parties, against the Poles, Jews, and Germans. In the Ukrainian newspapers and journals from 1905 to 1914 that I have seen, the German colonists were seldom mentioned. When they were, the tone was not polemical. For instance M. Hekhter defended Germans against the accusation that they were conducting missions among the Ukrainian population.[66] Yevhen Chykalenko criticized neither the Jews nor the Germans in his diary. The editor of the only regularly appearing Ukrainian newspaper, he even sold some of his land to the Germans to help finance *Rada*. He met with Shelukhyn, who accused him of having pro-Jewish sentiments. Elsewhere he suggested that the Germans should be a model for the Ukrainian peasants: "The Germans are necessary because they can teach us how to live a human life, how to develop our awareness as humans. The Germans bring culture to the masses." He expressed the hope that the Ukrainians, thanks to the influence of the Germans, would become a nationally conscious people like the Czechs, Estonians, and Latvians.[67]

The hopes of Chykalenko, which somewhat idealized Ukrainian-German relations, were not fulfilled. However, relations between the Germans and Ukrainians in southern Ukraine during the last years of the tsarist empire were not without significance for Ukraine and the Ukrainians. Inter-ethnic contacts existed in the context of the basic model of well off, literate, German, middle and rich peasants, and illiterate, Ukrainian, poor peasants. In general, there were very few direct contacts. The German and Ukrainian villages were two distinct worlds, cut off from each other by religious, linguistic, cultural, and economic

barriers. Where relationships did exist, they were in the form of a colonial master-servant relationship, with the corresponding sense of superiority among the Germans and inferiority among the Ukrainians. In spite of this there were, up to the time of World War I, few conflicts between the Ukrainian peasants or intellectuals and the Germans in southern Ukraine. However, the root causes of what happened in the decades after 1914 were already visible, in the social and economic tensions in the countryside and in the racist ideology of superiority among the German colonists.

German colonization was significant for the history of southern Ukraine during the last decades of the tsarism. They constituted a colonial island in the midst of a largely undifferentiated Ukrainian peasantry. Their Central European agrarian culture and social structure, with its differentiation between well off farmers and landless peasants (who had to find other means of living), with its different religion, language, culture, and mentality, clearly set the Germans apart from the rest of the population. Their possession of greater capital made it possible for them to buy up a great deal of land, so they became major landowners. All of this hindered the social mobility of the Ukrainian peasantry and the formation of a rural Ukrainian middle stratum. The closed society of the Germans in the countryside constituted a barrier to the social rise of the Ukrainians. Thus far historical research has paid too little attention to the contribution of the Germans to the social and economic development of Ukraine. In estimating the average land holdings of the peasantry, and their social and economic differentiation, or capitalist tendencies in the "New Russian" countryside, the specific role of the Germans has seldom been taken into account adequately. This is true also for their contribution to the export of grain which was of such major importance for the economic development of the tsarist empire in its later phase. Here I have raised a number of questions and suggested a few hypotheses. Much research still needs to be done.

Notes

1. This contribution was written in 1986. Since then a number of important works on the Germans in southern Ukraine have appeared; I have not been able to incorporate their findings in full, but I have made some corrections to statistical data.

   Detlef Brandes, *Von den Zaren adoptiert. Die deutschen Kolonisten und die Balkansiedler in Neurussland und Bessarabien 1786-1914* (Munich-Vienna 1993). Detlef Brandes, "A Success Story: The German Colonists in New Russia and Bessarabia, 1787-1914," *Acta Slavica Japonia* 9 (1991), 32-46. Dietmar Neutatz, "Die 'deutsche Frage' in Süd- und Südwestrussland. Kolonisten im Spannungsfeld russischer und deutscher Politik 1861-1914" (PhD dissertation: University of Salzburg, 1990) (scheduled to be published as a book in 1993). L.V. Malinovskii, "Obshchina nemetskikh kolonistov v Rossii i ee regionalnye osobennosti v XIX-nachale XX veka," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1990, no. 2:175-82. I.M. Kulinych, "Nimetski kolonii na Ukraini (60-ti roky XVIII st.-1917 r.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1990, no. 9:18-30.

2. I was able to look at a number of contemporary sources and accounts while I was in Helsinki in June 1986. I would like to thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for its financial support which made this trip possible. I would also like to thank all those who assisted me in the Slavic Library in the University of Helsinki. This study was prepared as part of a project financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeindschaft under the title, "The Nationality Question in Late Tsarist Russia: An Assessment of the Census of 1897." For help assessing the statistical data I would like to thank Guido Hausmann. Cf. now: *Die Nationalitäten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897*, ed. H. Bauer, A. Kappeler, and B. Roth, vols. A-B (Stuttgart 1991).

3. See S.I. Bruk and V.M. Kabuzan, "Dinamika i etnicheskii sostav naseleniia Rosii v epokhu imperializma," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1980, no. 3:4-93. Here I designate those whose language was "Little Russian" as Ukrainian. The word "German" refers to all those whose language was German (Austrians, Swiss, et al.). For source criticism of the census, see *Die Nationalitäten*, vol. A.

4. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g.*, vols. 13, 41, 47, table 13.

5. For Odessa, see Patricia Herlihy, "The Ethnic Composition of the City of Odessa in the Nineteenth Century," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, (1977):53-78.

6. See Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (Oxford 1985), 1-29; idem, "The Social Structure of Ukraine at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," *East European Quarterly* 16 (1982):171-81.

7. Lev Padalka, "Desiatinshchiki Khersonskoi gubernii," *Kievskaia starina* (1895):324-45; Sergei Shelukhin, *Nemetskaia kolonizatsiia* (Odessa 1914), 8-22.

8. Kotelnikov, *Istoriia*, 77.

9. The level of elementary education in the German schools seems to have been quite modest. See A. Isaev, "Zametki o nemetskikh koloniiakh v Rossii," *Russkaia Mysl* 15 (1894), kn. XII, 87-112; Shelukhin, *Nemetskaia kolonizatsiia* 52f.; I. Stach, *Die deutschen Kolonien in Südrussland: Kulturgeschichtliche Studien und Bilder über das erste Jahrhundert ihres Bestehens* (Prischib 1904), 1:85-90; Conrad Keller, *Die deutschen Kolonien in Südrussland* (Odessa 1905), 1:98.

10. See also the figures given by Krawchenko, *Social and National Consciousness*, 1-25.

11. I used the following sources, though they are by no means complete:

    (1) The official statistics for 1905 for the three *gubernii* are reliable, but contain no information on the amount of land owned by different ethnic groups: *Statistika zemlevladeniia 1905 g.*, vyp. 14: *Ekaterinoslavskaia guberniia* (St. Petersburg 1906); vyp. 16: *Khersonskaia guberniia* (St. Petersburg 1906); vyp. 42: *Tavricheskaia guberniia* (St. Petersburg 1907). There are also regional *zemstvo* publications for the *gubernii* of Katerynoslav and Kherson for the years 1909 and 1912, with information about land ownership by the German colonists: *Obzor Ekaterinoslavskoi gubernii za 1909 god* (Katerynoslav 1910); *Statistiko-ekonomicheskii obzor Khersonskoi gubernii za 1912 god* (Kherson 1914). I was unable to find the corresponding material for the *guberniia* of Tavria.

(2) There is a whole series of figures for German land ownership in southern Ukraine in contemporary Russian works, but these have to be handled with care because they were all part of the Russian nationalist polemic against the Germans: A.A. Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii. Ocherki istoricheskago razvitiia i nastoiashchego polozheniia nemetskikh kolonii na iuge i vostoke Rossii* (St. Petersburg 1893); A.P. Liprandi [A. Volynets], *Germaniia v Rossii* (Kharkiv 1911); Shelukhin, *Nemetskaia kolonizatsiia*; A. Rennikov, *Zoloto Reina. O nemtsakh v Rossii* (Petrograd 1915); Iv. Iv. Sergeev, *Mirnoe zavoevanie Rossii nemtsami* (Petrograd 1917).

(3) There are data concerning land ownership in contemporary and later publications of the Black Sea Germans: Edmund Schmid, *Die deutschen Bauern in Südrussland* (Berlin 1917); idem, *Deutsche Kolonien im Schwarzmeergebiet Südrusslands* (Berlin 1919); Karl Stumpp, "Landbesitz der deutschen Kolonisten im Gouvernement Cherson," in *Heimatbuch der Deutschen aus Russland* (1956):81-3; A. M...r, "Die deutschen Kolonien in der Krim," in *Heimatbuch* (1960):34-7.

Among the problems, most data deal with administrative units or estates (*Stände*) and not with ethnic groups. Since it is not possible to distinguish between Russian and Ukrainian peasants, I must use the entire data to establish land ownership for the Ukrainian peasants. The vast majority of the peasants in these three *gubernii* were Ukrainian and there would have been no significant differences in the pattern of land ownership between Ukrainian and Russian peasants. Cf. now: Brandes, *Von den Zaren adoptiert*, 54-68.

12. Estimated in accordance with the statistical data cited in note 11 above. See also Stephan Rudnyc'kyj, *Ukraina: Land und Volk. Eine gemeinfassliche Landeskunde* (Vienna 1916), 287-9; F.E. Los, *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 rokiv na Ukraini* (Kiev 1955), 37f.; *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR* (Kiev 1983), 5:30; R. Weinstein, "Land Hunger and Nationalism in the Ukraine 1905-1917," *Journal of Economic History* 2 (1942):24-35.

13. *Rossiia. Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie nashego otechestva*, vol. 14: *Novorossiia i Krym* (St. Petersburg 1910), 245; Los, *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907*, 37f.; *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, 4:358-60.

14. Estimate on the basis of landownership statistics from 1905 (note 11 above).

15. Los, *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907*, 38; A.S. Nifontov, *Zernovoe proizvodstvo Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veke. Po materialam ezhegodnoi statistiki urozhaev Evropeiskoi Rossii* (Moscow 1974), 247-9, 281; *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, 4:360; M. Iavorskyi, *Ukraina v epokhu kapitalizmu*, vyp. 3: *V superechkakh imperiializmu* (Kharkiv 1925), 73; A.M. Anfimov, *Zemelnaia arenda v Rossii v nachale XX veka* (Moscow 1961), 65-70.

16. Brandes, *Von den Zaren adoptiert*, 64-8; cf. Neutatz, "Die 'deutsche Frage,'" 269-76.

17. Schmid, *Deutsche Kolonien*, 21; idem, *Die deutschen Bauern*, 46, 49 (the figures given by Schmid are about 200,000 dessiatines too high). See also Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 55; Liprandi, *Germaniia v Rossii*, 76; Rennikov, *Zoloto Reina*, 284, 332. Velitsyn (*Nemtsy v Rossii*, 55) and Rennikov (*Zoloto Reina*, 284, 332) both give lower figures.

18. Brandes, *Von den Zaren adoptiert*, 64.

19. Neutatz, "Die 'deutsche Frage,'" 278-83.

20. Stumpp, "Landbesitz der deutschen Kolonisten," 83.

21. J.V. Keussler, "Der Grundbesitz in den deutschen Kolonien Südrusslands," *Russische Revue* 23 (1883):385-436; K. Stumpp, *Die deutschen Kolonien im Schwarzmeergebiet, dem früheren Neu-(Süd-)Russland. Ein siedlungs- und wirtschaftsgeografischer Versuch* (Stuttgart 1922), 42; Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 17f.; Isaev, "Zametki," 94f.; A. Rusov, "Formy zemlevladeniia i zemlepolzovaniia na Ukraine," *Ukrainskii vestnik* (1906):284-94.

22. Keussler, "Der Grundbesitz," 426-8; Isaev, "Zametki," 101; P.M. Friesen, *Die altevangelische mennonitische Brüderschaft in Russland (1789-1910) im Rahmen der mennonitischen Gesamtgeschichte* (Halbstadt 1911), 675-89; Adolf Ehrt, *Das Mennonitentum in Russland von seiner Einwanderung bis zur Gegenwart* (Berlin-Leipzig 1931), 74-81.

23. Stumpp, "Landbesitz der deutschen Kolonisten," 83; Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 15 (example from the *guberniia* of Katerynoslav); *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii po Tavricheskoi gubernii*, vol. 1, vyp. 2; *Krestianskoe khoziaistvo v Melitopolskom uezde* (Moscow 1887), 63-5, 87; S.D. Bondar, *Sekta mennonitov v Rossii (v sviazi s istoriei nemetskoi kolonizatsii na iuge Rossii), Ocherk* (Petrograd 1916), 49-52; Liprandi, *Germaniia v Rossii*, 76; Rennikov, *Zoloto Reina*, 150, 164, 283, 285; Sergeev, *Mirnoe zavoevanie*, 59. See also I. Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen im Zarenreich: Zwei Jahrhunderte deutsch-russischer Kulturgemeinschaft* (Stuttgart 1986), 321-9.

24. *Statistiko-ekonomicheskii obzor Khersonskoi gubernii*, 3, 6-9; *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, 4:333f., 5:28; *Statistika zemlevladeniia*, 16:29.

25. Th. Eisenbraun, "Ausschnitte über die Ansiedlung, sowie über die wirtschliche und kulturelle Entwicklung und den Untergang der deutschen Siedlungen in der Krim," *Heimatbuch* (1960):5-31. The Germans also leased land from the Greeks. (Keller, *Die deutschen Kolonien*, 1:163.)

26. *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii*, 1/2:98f.; Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 21f.; Isaev, "Zametki," 106f.; Liprandi, *Germaniia v Rossii*, 76, 79. Anfimov mentions that in one region of the *guberniia* of Tavria, where the Germans, according to Schmid, owned more than 60 per cent of agricultural land, more than 45 per cent of the peasants had no land at all (*Zemelnaia arenda*, 68). Since the Ukrainians made up only 11.5 per cent of the population of this region, then the rest of the land must have been principally in the hands of Tatars and Russians.

27. *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii*, 1/2:72; Isaev, "Zametki," 95, 99f.; Keller, *Die deutschen Kolonien*, 2:113; Ehrt, *Das Mennonitentum*, 94; Bernhard Bartels, *Die deutschen Bauern in Russland einst und jetzt* (Moscow 1928), 34-42.

28. Isaev, "Zametki," 95; Keussler, "Der Grundbesitz," 414-26. A Mennonite wrote of "class hatred" within the communities (Friesen, *Die alt-evangelische mennonitische Brüderschaft*, 102, 408).

29. Bondar, *Sekta*, 65-6; Ehrt, *Das Mennonitentum*, 87f.; *Heimatbuch der Ostumsiedler* (1954):24.

30. A. Prinz, "Die Familie von Falz-Fein," *Heimatbuch* (1957):84-6; *Rossiia. Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie*, 239; Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 12; Iavorskyi, *Ukraina v epokhu kapitalizmu*, 3:63f.; O.I. Luhova, "Pro stanovyshche Ukrainu v period kapitalizmu," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1967, no. 3:15-25.

31. J. Stach, "Die weitere Entwicklung der Kolonien Huttertal und Johannesruh," *Jahrbuch des "Landwirt," Kalender für die deutschen Landwirte Russlands für das Jahr 1914* 2 (1914):124-31; Schmid, *Die deutschen Bauern*, 36.

32. Nifontov, *Zernovoe proizvodstvo*, 229, 251-3, 256f., 260-5, 267, 270-3, 282, 285f., 290-7; *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, 4:337f., 5:222; *Rossiia. Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie*, 272-89; N.A. Egiazarova, *Agrarnyi krizis kontsa XIX veka v Rossii* (Moscow 1959), 184; Weinstein, "Land Hunger," 28; Rudnyc'kyj, *Ukraina*, 251-94.

33. *Statistiko-ekonomicheskii obzor*, 24-5. Their highest proportion was in corn (15.7 per cent), winter wheat (12.4 per cent), and oats (12 per cent), while they had a much lower proportion of barley (8.9 per cent), summer wheat (7.6 per cent), and rye (6 per cent).

34. Ibid., 16f., 24f. Isaev ("Zametki") and Keller (*Die deutschen Kolonien*) have a lower opinion of the traditional, conservative methods of the German farmers.

35. Iavorskyi, *Ukraina v epokhu kapitalizmu*, 80, 86-8; Anfimov, *Zemelnaia arenda*, 65-70; *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, 4:343, 359-61, 5:28; Egiazarova, *Agrarnyi krizis*, 172f.

36. Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 1f.; Friedrich Matthäi, *Die deutschen Ansiedlungen in Russland* (Gera 1865), 69f.; D. Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia* (London-Paris-New York 1877), 370; Liprandi, *Germaniia v Rossii*, 16; Shelukhin, *Nemetskaia kolonizatsiia*, 45. Cf. for this section: Neutatz, "Die 'deutsche Frage,'" D.IV.

37. Keller, *Die deutschen Kolonien*, 1:123; Ehrt, *Das Mennonitentum*, 50; Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 8, 11, 182; Schmid, *Deutsche Kolonien*, 16; Wallace, *Russia*, 375f.; Isaev, "Zametki," 105; Shelukhin, *Nemetskaia kolonizatsiia*, 48; Walter Kuhn, "Die mennonitische Altkolonie Chortitza in der Ukraine," *Deutsche Monatshefte* 9, no. 13 (1942-3):161-99.

38. According to Schmid: "They didn't touch the land of the Russian peasants. Not because their holdings were too small but because they were careful not to apply their superior economic strength to those helpless and light-minded people." (*Deutsche Kolonien*, 14.)

39. Isaev, "Zametki," 93, 98; Schmid, *Die deutschen Bauern*, 34; idem, *Deutsche Kolonien*, 14f.; *Basyrmjanka—eine deutsche Gemeinde am Schwarzen Meer 1891-1940* (Ludwigsburg 1966), 90; Matthäi, *Die deutschen Ansiedlungen*, 74; Kuhn, "Die mennonitische Altkolonie," 186; Stumpp, "Die Schwaben Kolonien bei Berdjansk," *Heimatbuch* (1957):39-46; *Rossiia. Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie*, 336; *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, 4:361.; V. Borodaevskaia-Iasevich, "Ocherki iz istorii sektantskikh dvizhenii v Ekaterinoslavskoi gubernii," *Novoe slovo* 2, no. 4 (1897):215-55.

40. Schmid, *Deutsche Kolonien*, 15f.; Kuhn, "Die mennonitische Altkolonie," 186; Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 8f., 23; *Basyrmjanka*, 90f.

41. Kuhn, "Die mennonitische Altkolonie," 186; Velitsyn, "Zametki," 211; Ehrt, *Das Mennonitentum*, 91ff.; W. Hörmann, "Die deutsche Siedlung Bessabotowka im Donezbecken," *Heimatbuch* (1964):48f.

42. *Kievskaia starina* 20 (1901), LXII, otd. 2:16; LXXIII, otd. 2:164; LXXV, otd. 2. I doubt very much that the outcome of this particular case was typical.

43. Wallace, *Russia*, 375f.

44. Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 3, 10, 12; Rennikov, *Zoloto Reina*, 147.

45. Schmid, *Deutsche Kolonien*, 15f.

46. Kuhn, "Die mennonitische Altkolonie," 186.

47. Edmund Schmid, *Deutsche Siedlung im I., II., und III. Reich* (Munich 1933); Meir Buchsweiler, *Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des zweiten Weltkrieges—ein Fall doppelter Loyalität?* (Gerlingen 1984), 62, 78-80, 250-1.

48. Wallace, *Russia*, 370.

49. Isaev, "Zametki," 93, 107, 109; Schmid, *Deutsche Kolonien*, 15-6; Stach, "Die weitere Entwicklung," 129; *Basyrmjanka*, 90. P.M. Friesen gives an example of a *volost* court in the *guberniia* of Katerynoslav which consisted of "a Mennonite as president and two Little Russians as judges." (*Die alt-evangelische.*)

50. Wallace, *Russia*, 369f.

51. Schmid, *Deutsche Kolonien*, 15; Matthäi, *Die deutschen Ansiedlungen*, 70; Ehrt, *Das Mennonitentum*, 50; Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 20; Isaev, "Zametki," 105; Sergeev, *Mirnoe zavoevanie*, 68.

52. Stumpp, "Landbesitz der deutschen Kolonisten," 48f.; Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 24-8; Borodaevskaia-Iasevich, "Ocherki," 249; Rennikov, *Zoloto Reina*, 214, 216; Sergeev, *Mirnoe zavoevanie*, 65; Rusov, "Formy," 291f.; Rudnyc'kyj, *Ukraina*, 287.

53. Schmid, *Deutsche Kolonien*, 16.

    During the civil war there were quite a few manifestations of Ukrainian peasant protests against the German colonists and it would be interesting to know if this kind of social protest also took place before World War I. There were plenty of reasons for it, including economic and social inequality, unfair competition in the purchase of land, and economic dependence.

54. Schmid, *Die deutschen Bauern*, 33. Attacks on German property in the region of Odessa in 1905 are mentioned by Ph. Landeis, "Die Gemeinde Karlsruhe," *Heimatbuch* (1961):40-53.

55. *Agrarnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1905-1906 gg.*, part 1 (St. Petersburg 1908), 394-524, deals with the *gubernii* of *Novorossiia*; *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg. na Ukraine*, vols. 1-2 (Kiev 1955); Los, *Revoliutsiia*, 37ff.; *Revoliutsiina borotba trudiashchykh Ukrainy v 1905-1906 rr.* (Kiev 1980), 86-129; F.E. Los and O.H. Mykhaliuk, *Klasova borotba v ukrainskomu seli 1907-1914* (Kiev 1976); *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR*, 4:384-9, 451-6, 552-5, 5:112f., 129-32, 158-60, 271f. See also Weinstein, "Land Hunger," 31.

56. *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg.*, 2:169, 667, 694, 700; *Agrarnoe dvizhenie*, 455, 485, 487.

57. *Agrarnoe dvizhenie*, 414, 502; *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg.*, 1:700f. (Germans are also mentioned on 1:311, 319, 320f., 322, 666, and 2:168f., 171.)

58. *Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg.*, 666; Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen*, 373-5.

59. *Agrarnoe dvizhenie*, 456; *Iuzhnyia zapiski* 2, no. 46 (1905):31.

60. Stach, "Die weitere Entwicklung," 126.

61. This polemic, which began towards the end of the nineteenth century and reached its height at the time of World War I, is outside the subject for discussion in this article. See the works cited in note 12 above; Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen*, 420-523, esp. 427-39, 495-523; Neutatz, 'Die 'deutsche Frage.'"

62. Velitsyn, *Nemtsy v Rossii*, 3-10; Rennikov, *Zoloto Reina*, 313; Borodaevskaia-Iasevich, "Ocherki," 248.

63. Shelukhin, *Nemetskaia kolonizatsiia*; idem, *Zakon 14-go iiunia 1910 g. "Poseliane"-sobstvenniki (kolonisty)* (Odessa 1913); idem, "Ukraintsy, russkie, malorussy. Otkrytoe pismo g. Shulginu i ego edinomyshlennikam," *Ukrainskaia zhizn*, 1916, no. 7-8:60-81. For remarks on Shelukhyn see Mykola Kovalevskyi, *Pry dzherelakh borotby. Spomyny, vrazhennia, refleksii* (Innsbruck 1960), 115; Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen*, 561.

64. O. B-aja [Borodaevskaia-Iasevich?], "Nemetskoe zemlevladenie na Ukraine," *Ukrainskaia zhizn*, 1915, no. 10:25-34.

65. Rennikov, *Zoloto Reina*, 146, 190-2. In May 1917 the All-Russian Congress of Russia's Germans met in Odessa. Shelukhyn was charged with "misguided attacks on the German colonists" and the congress issued a statement that "the Germans in Russia reject the view that the attitude of S.P. Shelukhyn represents the attitude of the Ukrainian people." (Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen*, 546.)

66. *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 13, no. 50 (1910):159-72. See also Rusov, "Formy."

67. Ievhen Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk 1907-1917* (Lviv 1931), 50f., 73f., 89, 146.

Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky and Germany (1917-18) as Reflected in His Memoirs

Jaroslaw Pelenski

Introduction

The study of German-Ukrainian relations in the context of the Ukrainian revolution and the Ukrainian nation-building process (1917-21) was at its peak in the early 1970s. Then two substantive books, by Peter Borowsky and Oleh S. Fedyshyn, based on solid research into documentary evidence were published.[1] These books were an outgrowth of a major revisionist approach to imperial Germany's war aims in World War I, her expansionism, and the related question of modern imperialism. Fritz Fischer initiated this approach in his controversial but highly influential work, *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914-1918* (1961), and a host of his students and associates have continued along these lines. Fedyshyn, and particularly Borowsky, deserve to be credited with having explored most of the German documentation available to them at the time. However, in his discussion of German involvement in the overthrow of the Ukrainian Central Rada and Pavlo Skoropadsky's takeover of the Ukrainian government,[2] Fedyshyn observed that Ukrainian sources on these developments are disappointing: "The Hetman's personal papers have not yet been opened to researchers, and only carefully edited 'fragments' of his memoirs are available in print."[3]

Since the early 1970s, with a few exceptions, no one has made a significant contribution in this area. No substantial source materials have been made available, nor have any new conceptions been proposed. In order to advance the study of the problem, one must turn not only to unexplored documents, but also to unused primary sources such as memoirs, diaries, and correspondence. All of these, by revealing new data and insights, may be of crucial importance to the understanding of German-Ukrainian relations in this period. One such source, the memoirs of Pavlo Skoropadsky, is now available to the author of this article and will be used as its principal source.[4]

Description of Skoropadsky's Memoirs

The original manuscript of the memoirs, entitled "Vospominaniia: konets 1917 goda po dekabr 1918 goda" ("Memoirs: The End of 1917 through December 1918," hereinafter cited as "Memoirs"), is composed in Russian, in Pavlo Skoropadsky's own handwriting. It consists of 1,698 7" x 4.5" pages, including the corrections made by the author, subdivided into sixteen *tetradi* (hereinafter cited as Notebooks). Skoropadsky began the actual writing on 5 January 1919, in Berlin, three weeks after the fall of his Hetmanate (14 December 1918). The former date, which appears on the title page of the first Notebook of the "Memoirs," is confirmed by the entry dated 6 January 1918, in Skoropadsky's unpublished "Dnevniki" (Diary): "Yesterday [5 January] I began [writing] my memoirs. I shall describe the entire period of the Hetmanate, [including] events that preceded and followed it, [with the intent that] perhaps [my memoirs] will shed new light on the period of the revolution."[5]

The progress of writing the "Memoirs" can be reconstructed by the dates appearing on the title pages of some Notebooks, which are:

5 January 1919	Notebook I	pp. 1-87
23 January 1919	II	88-138
31 January 1919	III	139-90
	IV	191-238
	V	239-316
	VI	317-94
	VII	395-472
	VIII	473-534
	IX	535-686
	X	687-838
	XI	839-980
	XII	981-1122
	XIII	1123-1264
17 April 1919	XIV	1265-1423
	XV	1424-1582
2 May 1919	XVI	1583-1698

Notebook XVI is comprised of two parts: 1) the conclusion of the "Memoirs" (1583-1640), and 2) *Prilozheniia* (hereinafter cited as Appendices, though they are actually notes to appendices, 1641-98).

Skoropadsky concluded the "Memoirs" by 6 May 1919: "The [writing of the] *Dnevnik* [apparently *Vospominaniia*] has been concluded [*zakonchen*] and handed over to A. Maliarevsky."[6] The original untyped manuscript is referred to as the First Recension.[7] In his Diary under the entry for 4 April 1919 Skoropadsky stated that "Maliarevsky has found a lady, and my notes [*zapiski*] are

being transcribed [by her]."[8] The first twelve Notebooks of the "Memoirs" (1-1122) were typed in 1945-6 by Skoropadsky's wife, Aleksandra (née Durnovo). That text consists of 162 typed, legal-size, single-spaced, and consecutively numbered pages.[9] The entire manuscript of the "Memoirs," with the exception of the appendices, was typed on 456 double-spaced and irregularly numbered pages,[10] and edited by Pavlo Skoropadsky in his own handwriting sometime between 1920 and early 1922, apparently in connection with the preparation of the Ukrainian translation of a fragment of the "Memoirs" for publication in the journal *Khliborobska Ukraina*. This re-edited edition is hereinafter referred to as the Second Recension (1).[11] The fragment of the "Memoirs" that was translated into Ukrainian (with some significant textual and ideological adjustments) and subsequently published in *Khliborobska Ukraina* constitutes about 30 per cent of the entire manuscript.[12] The Second Recension (1) was standardized in the 1980s according to contemporary Russian orthography and retyped on 502 double-spaced, consecutively numbered pages. The second part of Notebook XVI (the appendices) has also been retyped and amounts to approximately twenty-five pages. In this study I shall utilize this text, the Second Recension (2) (cited hereinafter as SR2).

The "Memoirs" of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky represent one of the most interesting narrative sources for the history of the Ukrainian revolution and the role the Hetman played in it. Written in a candid manner immediately after the events of 1917-18, it records Skoropadsky's most important activities, first as commanding officer of the Thirty-fourth Corps of the Russian Imperial Armed Forces (renamed the First Ukrainian Corps after its Ukrainization), and subsequently as Hetman of Ukraine. In his "Memoirs" Skoropadsky openly admitted that he wished to provide an account of his experiences based on his own assessment of the conditions at that time. Anticipating a future scholarly audience, he wrote in the second paragraph of his "Memoirs": "It may happen that my notes will be of use to the future historian of the revolution. I wish to assure him that whatever I write will be truthful, that I shall report on the conditions as I have assessed them at a given time; whether my thinking was right or whether it was wrong, only the future will show."[13]

Skoropadsky's Relations with Germany

One of the traditional assumptions developed by Russian and Soviet scholars, as well as by the prevailing majority of Ukrainian socialist and nationalist authors, has been that Skoropadsky was pro-German and his regime was simply a creation of German military and political authorities.[14] The Hetman's unpublished "Memoirs," however, reveal that his attitudes toward Germany were quite different from those the majority of his critics attribute to him.

Pavlo Skoropadsky was a product of the Russian imperial system, in which he made a distinguished military career. During World War I he was committed

to Russian war aims and military objectives. From his perspective, imperial Germany was an enemy of imperial Russia in the sense that it was a competing military/political empire. At the time of Russia's last major war effort, the July 1917 offensive of A. Kerensky, Skoropadsky favoured the continuation of the war and maintenance of the army's combat morale. He did not believe that a German military victory was possible. Unlike a number of imperial Russia's military figures, who were actually silent admirers of a Prussian version of the German law-and-order regime (a regime based on a powerful military system and an efficient bureaucratic establishment), Skoropadsky had no intimate knowledge of Germany and had not developed a personal opinion of that country. At the same time, he had no particular attraction to any kind of Slavophilism or Pan-slavism, a predilection quite common in the contemporary Russian military establishment. Aside from the Russians and the Ukrainians, for whom he had an almost equal affection, he displayed no particular preference for any other nationality. Instead, he perceived the world in terms of social status and rank in aristocratic hierarchy, not ethno-cultural affiliation. He was a devout Orthodox Christian, a loyal subject of imperial Russia, and a patriot of both Russia and Ukraine. Prior to the beginning of the revolution his first loyalty was to the empire, the socio-political system of the *ancien régime*, and the military. His second loyalty was to an undefined historical/territorial concept (in the sense of *Landespatriotismus*) of the Cossack Ukraine of his ancestors. Several of these ancestors had played influential roles in Hetmanate Ukraine in the second half of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century. Most prominent among them was Ivan Skoropadsky (1646-1722), Hetman of Ukraine from 1709 to 1722.

In the published fragment of his "Memoirs" Skoropadsky observed that while he was contemplating a takeover of power in Ukraine in April 1918, he was concerned by the prospects of dealing with the Germans, precisely because of his lack of knowledge of Germany: "The establishing of a relationship with the Germans appeared rather difficult to me....Until that time [March-April 1918] I did not know the Germans under peaceful conditions. When I travelled before the war in England, France, and Germany, it was precisely in Germany that I had the fewest acquaintances....I knew no one from among the German politicians, the military, or the bureaucratic upper strata."[15]

Actual relations between Skoropadsky and Germany began in March and April 1918, when negotiations with the German military authorities led to the overthrow of the government of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the establishment of the Ukrainian state in the form of a Hetmanate on 29 April 1918. There are no hidden skeletons about these negotiations in the unpublished "Memoirs." The information it provides corresponds to that furnished in the published fragment as well as in German materials. However, the crucial 26-7 April 1918 meeting with General Wilhelm Groener,[16] Chief of Staff of the Army Group Eichhorn in Ukraine and the most influential German official in that country in

1918, is recorded in greater detail in the published fragment of the "Memoirs" than in the Russian original, which has only a vague summary of the exchanges.[17] The detailed information on Skoropadsky's objections at that meeting to three of the ten points in the co-operation programme—especially to point nine, concerning the acceptance of the Rada government's financial and monetary obligations—is also recorded in Groener's "Memoirs."[18]

In his dealings with German authorities and individuals after the coup d'état of 29 April 1918, Skoropadsky developed a more clearly defined view and even stereotypical opinions of German social and professional groups. His observations, especially those on the assassination of General Field Marshal Hermann von Eichhorn, Commander in Chief of German forces in Ukraine, are most revealing. Skoropadsky divided the Germans he knew into three classes. First, there was the military, whom he held in high regard and whose activities in Ukraine he characterized in positive terms, though at the same time he was critical of the overall negative impact of German military occupation of Ukraine. Indeed, with a few exceptions, he referred to Eichhorn, Groener, and their subordinates as highly competent, thinking, and responsible individuals who under the existing conditions wanted the best solutions for the German empire and Ukraine as well. According to his own understanding of the term, "They, and particularly Groener, were democrats."[19] Second, there were professional diplomats, whom he regarded as competent and who, in his judgment, adjusted their policies to the needs of the German Foreign Office, the German emperor, the Reichstag, and finally to the German Socialists. His characterizations of German professional diplomats such as Baron Philip Alfons Mumm von Schwartzenstein and Count Hans von Berchem are balanced but imbued with deprecating sarcasm.[20] Third, there were scholars and journalists, who ranked lowest of the three groups in his esteem, but somewhat higher than the German speculators who invaded Ukraine with the aim of profiteering:

> As far as scholars are concerned, I, who have been educated to hold German scholarship in high esteem, after having become more closely acquainted with them, was somewhat disappointed. I thought that, since they regarded themselves as scholars, it would be possible to expect from them more thoughtfulness and correct assessment of facts. Actually, I could notice nothing of the sort. There was only pursuit of cheap fame, use of demagogic means, theory, and great conceit.[21]

Skoropadsky's assessment of relations between Germany and the Ukrainian governments—that is, the Rada and his own Hetmanate—was in general quite balanced and realistic. After the fall of the Provisional Government in Russia, he was rather concerned with the Rada's interest in and attempts at concluding a separate treaty with imperial Germany. He was neither an advocate nor a convinced supporter of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which was concluded between the Central Powers and Ukraine on 9 February 1918. In his opinion, however, once

the treaty was in effect and German as well as Austrian troops entered Ukraine at the invitation of the Ukrainian government and with its consent, the treaty had to be honoured. He argued that realistically one could not expect Germany to drive Russian Bolshevik forces out of Ukraine, and provide Ukraine with at least minimal military assistance and concrete military protection, without equivalent reciprocity. It was obvious to him that, to fulfill that reciprocity, the Ukrainian government would have to provide what Germany and Austro-Hungary needed most, that is, food, raw materials, and perhaps manpower that could be used for labour. He was critical of the Rada government's method of dealing with the Germans following the German occupation of Ukraine:

> The relations between the Germans and the Ukrainian government of the Central Rada were completely abnormal. The Germans simply showed no respect for the government which had invited them and which, by making the invitation public, did not know how to extricate itself from the difficult situation and [to explain the situation] to the people whom it had taught not to obey anyone and not to sacrifice anything to the state. At the beginning the government gave assurances to everyone, including itself, that the Germans had come to provide assistance in driving out the Bolsheviks and would withdraw from Ukraine immediately [after carrying out that task] should the Ukrainian government require this. When the time came for the peasants to provide food for the German army, the government began to spread rumours among the population that the Germans allegedly had been invited by the landowners. When the Germans began to demand that the agreements be honoured, and the population understood that it would be necessary to supply grain for delivery to Germany, dissatisfaction with the government began to grow. The government began to use trickery against the Germans, attempting to circumvent the agreement and use every means to delay its execution. Friction began to develop between the Germans and the government, which out of fear retreated in the face of German demands, but only verbally, because in reality it ordered its subjects to delay its own instructions. The outraged Germans took the products by force and of their own volition, and the prestige of the government was declining abruptly. The economic devastation increased, the condition of agriculture was threatened, the sugar industry—the pride of Ukraine—was endangered by a shortage of sugar beets, which meant a lack of any production....The question arose as to what would happen next? The Germans were taking over power in the country by ever greater force and systematic means....I knew that Ukraine would soon become a colony.[22]

Skoropadsky assumed that his own orderly government would have a good chance to deal effectively with the German and Austrian authorities and to protect the population against the excesses which usually accompanied military occupation. It is well known from the history of his Hetmanate, however, that his expectations were not fulfilled, and he had to deal with the same reaction of the Ukrainian peasants to German economic policies in Ukraine as had the Rada government before him. He observed:

> German and especially Austrian policies were not capable of attracting the population of Ukraine. I often discussed this problem with General Groener and even proposed to him the establishment of a joint policy, according to which the German troops would be kept separated from the population, and our own authorities would deliver the products the German army needed. Evidently this was difficult to achieve, because our own authorities were not yet firmly established. Certain things could be accomplished, as far as the Germans were concerned, but nothing could be worked out with the Austrians, because they had simply legalized plundering, and all my negotiations with the Austrian representatives did not bring about any results. Bribery and fraud assumed colossal proportions.[23]

So Skoropadsky did not hide the negative aspects of his relations with German authorities and the difficulties his government had in its attempts to find reasonable compromises and to implement policies for surviving the German and Austrian occupation.

Relations between Skoropadsky and the Austro-Hungarian empire were strained during most of the Hetmanate period. His "Memoirs" contain a number of negative references to the policies of the Austrian imperial government and to its military authorities in Ukraine. In spite of the obvious fact that Austria-Hungary was the junior partner in the Central Powers' coalition, Skoropadsky was suspicious and condescending toward the Habsburg monarchy. In political terms, he was strongly opposed to the "Austrian solution" for Ukrainian statehood. This would have involved Austro-Hungarian annexation of some Ukrainian territories that had belonged to the former tsarist empire and creation of an autonomous or confederate Ukrainian state—or a formally independent Ukrainian state—that would be a satellite of the Habsburg monarchy. Therefore, he was especially concerned with the activities of Archduke Wilhelm von Habsburg (in Ukrainian circles referred to as Vasyl Vyshyvany, 1895-1951), son of Archduke Karl Stephan and nephew of Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary. Wilhelm von Habsburg had served as a colonel in the Galician volunteer legion, *Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi* (Ukrainian Host Riflemen), which was stationed in Ukraine in 1918. Skoropadsky was aware of the fact that some Ukrainian groups regarded him as a possible candidate for the future Ukrainian royal throne (apparently based on the historical royal precedents of Danylo and Yurii of Halych in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries respectively) or as a competitor and the Austrian candidate for the Hetmanate in Ukraine. Skoropadsky maintained that Ukrainian Uniates and the Vienna court conducted a large-scale campaign against him by "advancing the candidacy of Archduke Wilhelm von Habsburg for the Hetmanate, of a young man, who had well prepared himself for that role by having learned the Ukrainian language, by wearing a Ukrainian [embroidered] shirt, and by his behaviour, attracting to his side the Ukrainians of chauvinistic orientation."[24] Tensions between Austria and Skoropadsky were compounded by the Galician problems and the Hetman's critical, albeit respectful, attitude toward the Galician Ukrainians, their views of Ukrainian indepen-

dence, their concept of the Ukrainian nation, and the related problem of the Uniate church.

Ironically, German concern about the Austrian influence in Ukrainian affairs caused some practical difficulties for Skoropadsky. His appointment of Dmytro Doroshenko (1882-1951) to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs serves as a good case in point. According to Skoropadsky, the Germans objected to Doroshenko's nomination on the grounds of his "Austrophilism":

> I received a written communication, in which Groener requested that he [Doroshenko] should not be appointed. Apparently, he was informed about Doroshenko's pro-Austrian orientation. I do not know to what extent it is true. Nonetheless, Doroshenko most categorically rejected [the allegations]. He wrote the Germans a letter, personally visited them, and the incident was eventually resolved. He became a member of the cabinet, in the capacity of an Acting Minister, apparently with a probationary period.[25]

Between Germany and the Entente

Historical scholarship on the Ukrainian revolution traditionally has tended to treat German-Ukrainian relations during the period 1917-18 as static. Skoropadsky's "Memoirs" are particularly valuable in this respect, because they reveal that their author approached these relations from the dynamic and strategic perspective of a professional military officer. Beginning with the events of the July 1917 offensive (later the Bolshevik insurrection in Petrograd), and throughout his career as commanding officer of the First Ukrainian Corps and as Hetman, Skoropadsky was preoccupied with the possible outcome of the war (World War I). He repeatedly asked himself whether the Central Powers, specifically Germany, or the Entente would be the ultimate victor. He concluded on various occasions in his "Memoirs" that imperial Germany would be the loser in that war.

Scholars engaged in the study of Pavlo Skoropadsky's Hetmanate have been unaware of his preoccupation with the problem of who would be the ultimate victor in the war, because Skoropadsky's unpublished "Memoirs" were not available to them, and because his comments on that problem were deleted from the published fragment of the "Memoirs." The summary of Skoropadsky's conversation of mid-April 1918 (that is, before he assumed power) with the Russian general Abram Dragomirov concerning the latter's possible participation in the military preparation for the overthrow of the Rada government and his future service in the Skoropadsky government is especially revealing:

> I presented to him my point of view, but he disagreed with me decisively. First of all, he did not accept the existence of a Ukrainian movement, as such. Secondly, he was convinced that the Germans would be defeated and that one should therefore deal exclusively with the Entente, which would restore everything [the previous conditions] and save everyone. I attempted to convince him that I, too, did not believe in a German victory, but that I considered things now taking place in Ukraine as being little different from Bolshevism; in

> waiting for the Entente's victory much time would pass, and the situation required immediate attention. He remained committed to his views, and I to mine.[26]

After he assumed power as Hetman of Ukraine, Skoropadsky continued to adhere to his assessment for the possible outcome of the war, and he believed that only the most carefully balanced policy would be in his, and by implication Ukraine's, best interests: "In spite of Germany's military victories, I always believed that she could not be the victor, that sooner or later one would have to meet the representatives of the Entente. Therefore, I decided already on the first day [of my Hetmanate] to do everything possible to preserve effective neutrality."[27] The latter statement was omitted from the published fragment of the "Memoirs," where a greater emphasis was placed on the fact that the German army had protected Ukraine from external and internal destructive forces for the relatively low price of the export of a few dozen million poods (1 pood=16.38 kg) of grain in exchange for the necessary industrial products. Editing of the published fragment of the "Memoirs" is evident. At the time of its publication (1922-4), Skoropadsky, in his capacity as Hetman-in-exile, apparently wanted to keep the door open for possible working relations with the German authorities of the Weimar republic.

There is a similar assessment of the defeat and victory prospects in World War I in Skoropadsky's "Memoirs." These notes cover the Hetman's plans to organize a Ukrainian army, plans that constituted a continuation of a military programme developed during the period of the Central Rada. Skoropadsky candidly stated:

> At the outset, the prospects for organizing an army were not good. In this respect, I assume a considerable amount of responsibility. However, while trying to be objective, I do not consider myself to be at fault to the extent attributed to me by many individuals. I accept my own responsibility, as well as the responsibility of the Ministry of War and that of the entire High Command, for assuming that the Germans would hold out until late spring [1919], and that I would have ample time to form a real army, in accordance with the highest demands of martial art. We did not take into consideration that a revolution would take place in Germany, which would completely change the situation. I anticipated that the Germans could not be the victors and that they might be defeated. However, under the given circumstances, I expected that it would be in the interest of the Entente to provide us support, which would have restored the balance until the time when we would be able to stand on our own feet. This incorrect assessment [that Germany would be able to hold out until late in the spring of 1919] fundamentally influenced all our efforts.[28]

This statement shows Skoropadsky in the best light. As the person in charge of the government, he assumed full responsibility for its policies.

Expectation of a German defeat, but not of a revolution, was on the Hetman's mind when he travelled for a state visit to Germany in September 1918, which is described in detail in his "Memoirs."[29] On that occasion, an exchange

of views took place between Skoropadsky and Emperor Wilhelm II, who received the Hetman in his capacity as head of state and gave him an official luncheon. At the request of the German hosts, Skoropadsky's aide, Aleksander Paltov (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Hetmanate), suggested that Skoropadsky drink a toast to the victory of the German armies. The Hetman declined and drank a toast to the German people instead.[30] In the course of his conversation with the emperor, Skoropadsky expressed the opinion that the Russian tsar, Nicholas II, had abdicated prematurely, while his armies were still intact, and that a tsar could abdicate only when all means had been exhausted. That remark influenced the emperor, as one of Skoropadsky's most poignant statements in his "Memoirs" attests:

> Strangely enough, that particular remark has made a strong impression on the emperor's mind, because, as I was later informed in Kiev, the emperor, already in November, in the course of several days, argued that he had no right to abdicate and that the hetman also insisted upon it. Strange things happen in one's life! Would I have ever thought that one day I would play a role in the life of a German emperor, in spite of the fact that I have never had any relationships either with the emperor of Germany, or with Germany herself, except for the fact that I fought against her.[31]

This reveals, among other things, Skoropadsky's continued ideological commitment to the classical conception of the political and moral obligation of a monarch, and it exemplifies the theory of the irony of history.

Between Federalism and Independence

Closely related to Skoropadsky's assessment for the possible outcome of the war was his approach to the crucial problem of the future of Ukraine, either as an independent state or a state in federal relationship with Russia. Since 1920 historians have posed two principal questions: 1) What were the reasons behind Skoropadsky's decision to call for the formation of an all-Russian federation on 14 November 1918? 2) What were Skoropadsky's real views on the issue of Ukrainian independence during the Hetmanate and the period immediately following it (spring of 1919)?

It is evident from his "Memoirs" that Skoropadsky was firmly convinced that Germany, at least temporarily, was committed to a political programme favouring the creation of an independent Ukrainian state which, of course, would be a satellite country of the German empire. In the introduction to his "Memoirs" he specifically stated: "Independence [of Ukraine], to which we had to adhere strictly on account of the Germans, who adamantly insisted upon it, was never to me a matter of vital importance; however, I reasoned that even if that should be the case, the Germans would [eventually] change their policy in favour of the federation of Ukraine with Russia."[32] In the first half of March 1918, while he considered the possibility of taking power in Ukraine, Skoropadsky was quite concerned with German attitudes toward the question of Ukraine's independence:

"I was rather disturbed by the thought that the Germans are committed to an independent Ukraine, without any reservations."[33] (This important observation was also deleted from the published fragment of the "Memoirs.") Skoropadsky's conviction that Germany favoured an independent Ukraine was further reinforced by the fact that Emperor Wilhelm II referred to a Ukrainian "independent state" in the course of their luncheon meeting on 6 September 1918.[34] In another place in his "Memoirs" Skoropadsky frankly admitted that the Germans "insisted in the fall of 1918 on [Ukrainian] nationalization and greater Ukrainization of my government."[35]

Skoropadsky, on the other hand, was even more firmly convinced that the Allied Powers were strongly opposed to Ukraine's independence. He became particularly aware of this in the course of his exchange of views with the French Mission in Ukraine, and specifically with its chief, General George Tabouis (the French Commissioner with the government of the Ukrainian National Republic), in January of 1918.[36] Skoropadsky undertook this exchange of views with the aim of "stabilizing" the situation in Ukraine, a stabilization based on French support and the help of a military Ukrainian-Polish-Czech coalition. Then Skoropadsky was entertaining the idea of establishing a military dictatorship in Ukraine, but without immediately abolishing the Rada. Although negotiations were fruitless, Skoropadsky became aware that the French strongly resented the proclamation of Ukraine's independence on 22 January 1918. Also, immediately following that proclamation, the French explicitly told him that "the Entente would never recognize an independent Ukraine."[37] (The latter statement was also omitted from the published fragment of the "Memoirs.")

This attitude of France, the principal state representing the Allied Powers' policies in Ukraine, played a decisive role in Skoropadsky's choice of his political options for Ukraine in October and November of 1918. He had two options. The first was to take charge of the Ukrainian national movement by sponsoring and manipulating the Ukrainian National Congress, which was to convene on 17 November 1918. He would also make an exclusive alliance with all Ukrainian political forces, including the left, which he regarded as anarchistic and destructive. He was reluctant to choose this option because, among other things, he knew that the Ukrainian political groups, united in the Ukrainian National Union, were preparing an insurrection against him. The second was to prevent the convening of the Congress, to take charge of the Russian officer units (which at that time amounted to approximately 15,000 men in Kiev alone), and if necessary, to announce a mobilization of all loyalist officers.[38] That would mean embarking upon a policy that eventually would lead to some kind of federation of Ukraine with Russia.

Skoropadsky, of course, chose the second option. His decision was influenced to a great extent by the results of the exchange of views between Ivan Korostovets, his personal representative, and the representatives of the Entente in Jassy, Romania,[39] as well as by information provided to him by individuals acting as intermediaries between the Allied Powers and himself:

> At the same time I was visited by several individuals whom I trusted without reservation. (I consider revealing their names as premature.) Among them was one individual, who held a definitive position, and who, after having presented all the arguments, declared that the Entente, and particularly France, the principal state operating in Ukraine, categorically did not wish to engage in exchanges with the Ukrainian government as long as it was committed to independence. He stated, moreover, that only a federated Ukraine could count on having success [with the Entente], that in a few days an authorized representative of the Allied states would arrive who would enter into negotiations only if the Ukrainian government had a clearly formulated new course. That request coincided with my own views. I was convinced that the implementation of such a new course was premature, because two partners are needed for a federation, and Ukraine was only one of them. I took notice of the Entente's request.[40]

Skoropadsky's agents in Jassy confirmed the Allied position. When they arrived in Kiev on 10 or 11 November, they reported that a representative of the Ukrainian National Union had not even been received by the French. Furthermore, the Allies promised Skoropadsky military support, should he be willing to proclaim federation with Russia, a promise they never kept. It was also intimated to Skoropadsky that Émile Henno, the alleged plenipotentiary of the Entente powers in South Russia, would soon arrive in Kiev to implement the Entente's plans. In the final days of the Skoropadsky government, waiting for the arrival of Henno turned into a "waiting for Godot."

Skoropadsky chose the second option, apparently because, under the given circumstances, he considered it to be the most realistic. His assessment, that the Allied powers would not recognize Ukraine's independence, was confirmed by those powers' treatment of the government of the Ukrainian Directory. On the other hand, his expectations that the Allies would recognize his government cannot be regarded as quite realistic. The federalist conception, which the Allied powers promulgated, corresponded closely to Skoropadsky's own views as reflected in his "Memoirs." His charter of 14 November 1918,[41] calling for the formation of an all-Russian federation, was not issued exclusively under duress, as some of his followers maintained. In fact, it reflected the predominant elements of his political thinking during the period under consideration (1917-18). Skoropadsky's views on the federal relationship of Ukraine with Russia and on the possibility of Ukrainian independence, which he expressed in his "Memoirs" as well as in other unpublished materials, present a set of very interesting and important problems. Because of their complexity, however, these problems deserve a separate and exhaustive treatment.

Very soon after completing his "Memoirs"—in late 1919 and in 1920—Skoropadsky revised his views in favour of Ukraine's independence, evidently under the influence of Viacheslav Lypynsky[42] and his other followers, who were confirmed advocates of Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, he did not adjust the text of his "Memoirs" (even in their Second Recension) to correspond to his revised views; he did, however, refrain from publishing them.

Notes

1. Peter Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfragen)*, Historische Studien, vol. 416 (Lübeck-Hamburg 1970); Oleh S. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1918* (New Brunswick, N.J. 1971).

2. Pavlo Skoropadsky (1873-1945) was Hetman of the Ukrainian State from 29 April to 14 December 1918.

3. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East*, 139.

4. No substantive modern study on the Pavlo Skoropadsky Hetmanate or a biography of the Hetman is available. For an introduction to the problem and to the literature on the subject, see A. Maliarevskii, *P. Skoropadskii Getman vseia Ukrainy* (Kiev 1918), an official biography; D. Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy 1917-1923 rr.*, vol. 2: *Ukrainska Hetmanska Derzhava 1918 roku* (Uzhhorod 1930, New York 1954); O. Pritsak, *Rid Skoropadskykh. Istorychno-genealogichna studiia* (Lviv 1938); J.S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920* (Princeton 1952), esp. 143-207; Ie.M. Skliarenko, *Borotba trudiashchykh Ukrainy proty nimetsko-avstriiskykh okupantiv i hetmanshchyny* (Kiev 1960); Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918*; Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive*; T. Hunczak, "The Ukraine under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi," in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, ed. T. Hunczak (Cambridge, Mass. 1977), 61-81.

5. "Dnevniki P.P. Skoropadskogo," vol. I, notebook I, 1 January 1919-6 May 1919, 3. I wish to express my gratitude to Mrs. Helene Ott-Skoropadsky, the youngest daughter of the Hetman, for making the "Dnevniki" available to me.

6. Ibid., 15 (entry for 6 May 1919). It should be noted that in 1919 Skoropadsky used the terms "*vospominaniia*," "*dnevnik*," and "*zapiski*" interchangeably to denote his "Memoirs." Maliarevsky, Skoropadsky's appointee as Chief of the Press Bureau at the Hetman's headquarters, joined him later in exile, in Berlin.

7. Originally designated as such by the late Eugene Zyblikewycz (1895-1987), President of the W.K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute (EERI) in Philadelphia (1963-87), in collaboration with Jaroslaw Pelenski, President of EERI since 1987. The original manuscript of the "Memoirs" is preserved at the EERI Archive in Philadelphia.

8. "Dnevniki P.P. Skoropadskogo," vol. I, notebook I, 1 January 1919-6 May 1919, 14.

9. For the information on the typescript of the first twelve Notebooks of P. Skoropadsky's "Memoirs" I am obliged to Mrs. Helene Ott-Skoropadsky.

10. Probably by the person mentioned in the "Dnevniki" under the entry for 4 April 1919 (see above, note 8).

11. Designated as such by Eugene Zyblikewycz and Jaroslaw Pelenski. Eugene Zyblikewycz should be credited with having preserved the original manuscript of the "Memoirs," as well as its transcripts, and with having collected information on them.

12. "Uryvok zi 'Spomyniv' Hetmana Pavla Skoropadskoho" was published in Ukrainian translation in two parts: the first, under the subtitle "I-yi ukrainskyi Korpus," *Khliborobska Ukraina*, book IV, issues 7 and 8 (Vienna 1922-3), 3-40; the second, under the subtitle "Vid pochatku 1918-ho roku do proholoshennia Hetmanstva," ibid., book V (Vienna 1924-5), 31-92. The published excerpts of Skoropadsky's "Memoirs" have been recently published as a separate publication, entitled *Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi, Spomyny* (Kiev 1992).

13. Skoropadsky, "Memoirs," SR2, 1.

14. For two examples of such traditional assumptions, see Skliarenko, *Borotba*; Hunczak, "The Ukraine under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi."

15. *Khliborobska Ukraina*, book V (1924-5), 78.

16. There has been some confusion about the exact date of the decisive meeting between Groener and Skoropadsky. Fedyshyn offered 28 April 1918 (*Germany's Drive*, 142). Skoropadsky dated it 24 April. According to Wilhelm Groener, the meeting took place during the night of 26-7 April 1918 (*Lebenserinnerungen* [Göttingen 1957], 398-9). I accept Groener's dating. Although Groener's valuable diary of his Ukrainian experiences in 1918 has been available in an excellent scholarly edition (W. Baumgart, ed., *Von Brest-Litovsk zur deutschen Novemberrevolution* [Göttingen 1971], 259-451), it has not been adequately utilized.

17. *Khliborobska Ukraina*, book V (1924-5), 81-2; Skoropadsky, "Memoirs," SR2, 179-81.

18. Groener, *Lebenserinnerungen*, 398-9.

19. Skoropadsky, "Memoirs," SR2, 225-6, 363-5, esp. 364 on Groener. Skoropadsky presented himself as a "Tory democrat."

20. Ibid., 365-6. Mumm, the German ambassador in Kiev and one of the most distinguished career diplomats of imperial Germany, had served during the pre-war period as imperial Germany's envoy in Tokyo and Washington. Von Berchem had been Mumm's assistant in Ukraine in 1918 and chargé d'affaires in Kiev, following the latter's resignation in September 1918.

21. Ibid., 368.

22. *Khliborobska Ukraina*, book V (1924-5), 58.

23. Skoropadsky, "Memoirs," SR2, 250.

24. Ibid., 295, 352-3. Archduke Wilhelm von Habsburg (Vasyl Vyshyvany) remained a loyal "Ukrainophile" throughout his life who even wrote poems in Ukrainian. He was abducted by Soviet intelligence services in Vienna in 1948 and died as a political prisoner under suspicious circumstances in the Gulag in 1951.

25. Ibid., 207. Doroshenko did not provide an adequate explanation for Germany's objections to his appointment. He simply stated that from 20 May to 2 September 1918, he was in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from 2 September to 14 November 1918, he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. (*Istoriia Ukrainy 1917-1923 rr.*, 2:148.)

26. Skoropadsky, "Memoirs," SR2, 167-8.
27. Ibid., 177.
28. Ibid., 240-1.
29. Ibid., 409-28, esp. 410.
30. Ibid., 416-17.
31. Ibid., 417.
32. Ibid., 8.
33. Ibid., 151.
34. Ibid., 417.
35. Ibid., 447, 449-50.
36. *Khliborobska Ukraina*, book V (1924-5), 33-5.
37. Skoropadsky, "Memoirs," SR2, 104.
38. Ibid., 463-4.
39. Ibid., 460.
40. Ibid., 465.
41. For the Ukrainian text of the *Hramota*, see Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy 1917-1923 rr.*, 2:414-15. Fedyshyn has provided a convenient English translation (*Germany's Drive*, appendix G, 287-8).
42. Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882-1931)—a prominent figure in Ukrainian political life—was Ukrainian ambassador to Austria during Skoropadsky's Hetmanate and thereafter (1918-19) and a leader of the Hetmanite movement in the 1920s. He was the founder of the state school in Ukrainian historiography and political thought and author of a number of influential historical, political-theoretical, and ideological works.

Germany's Ukrainian Policy during World War I and the Revolution of 1918-19

Peter Borowsky

The peace treaty signed on 2 February 1918 between the Central Powers and Ukraine has long been interpreted as a "grain treaty" (*Brotfrieden*), as a treaty with the limited goal of securing for Germany and Austria-Hungary a supply of food and raw materials for the duration of the war. This interpretation gives it no wider significance or role in any long-term planning for the post-war order in the event of a victory by the Central Powers. This thesis is still defended in works by Winfried Baumgart and Oleh Fedyshyn.[1] In 1959-60 a debate took place between Fritz Fischer and Egmont Zechlin about German war goals in Eastern Europe and the attitude of the German Reich toward the non-Russian nationalities in the territory of the old Russian empire.[2] Here I wish to take up once again this question of the "grain treaty" and attempt to answer the question of whether Ukraine was simply a means to an end or whether it was an integral part of Germany's long-term policy in Eastern Europe during World War I.

Shortly after the outbreak of war, on 11 August 1914, State Secretary of the Foreign Office Gottlieb von Jagow, wrote in a memorandum to the German ambassador in Vienna:

> The promotion of insurgency seems to us to be extremely important not only in Poland but also in Ukraine: firstly, as a means of carrying on the war against Russia; secondly, because in the event of a successful outcome to the war, it would be useful to have a number of buffer states between Russia in the east and Germany and Austria-Hungary in the west, in order to reduce the pressure of the Russian colossus on Western Europe and to push Russia as far as possible to the east; thirdly, because from the Romanian point of view, the incorporation of Bessarabia into Romania would be useful and permanent only if it were protected on its eastern border by non-Russian states.[3]

In other words, right from the beginning of the war (not just after the Russian revolution), the leadership of the German Reich envisaged a definite role for Ukraine in the new order which would emerge from the victory of the Central Powers in Eastern Europe. Hence there was in the famous September Programme of Bethmann Hollweg: "Long-term security for the German Reich on its eastern

and western borders. To this end...Russia must be pushed back as far as possible from the German border and its rule over the non-Russian nationalities will have to be ended."[4]

The fact that a rollback of Russian power in the east was being considered at this time in the German Foreign Office and in the Reich Chancellery was due in part to the influence of a group of journalists and academics, most of whom were from the Baltic region, whose spokesmen were Theodor Schiemann and Paul Rohrbach. In 1897 Rohrbach had pointed out that the Ukrainian nationalist movement could be used to help destroy the tsarist empire, for "whoever has Kiev can impose their will on Russia."[5] Throughout the war Rohrbach and his friends continued promoting an independent Ukraine and the breakup of the tsarist empire into its component nationalities.[6] The German Foreign Office supported this as well as the efforts of Ukrainian nationalists to start an uprising in Ukraine against Russian rule.[7] Those attempts were unsuccessful, so we may ask whether the Central Powers would have been willing, in the interests of a separate peace with the tsarist regime, to renounce their aim of Ukrainian separation. Of course, exploring the possibility of a separate peace with Russia never reached the stage where the Ukrainian question could have become an issue.

When, during the course of the February revolution, Ukrainians first demanded their autonomy and later their independence, civilian and military leaders of the German Reich were immediately willing to support those demands, as they were willing to support the similar demands of other non-Russian nationalities.[8] Support for those nationalist movements had incredible propaganda value for the German Reich since German foreign policy was able to declare itself in tune with Wilson's proclaimed principle of self-determination. It also appeared to be a concession to the demands of the Petrograd soviet for a peace without annexations and reparations. The Reich was able to do this without in any way renouncing its expansionist goals. From the point of view of German domestic policy, there was also the advantage that the left liberals and social democrats in the Reichstag were bound to support it. This tactic of the German Chancellery and the Foreign Office met with opposition, however, from the military leadership and the German nationalists who demanded direct annexations. They failed to see that this flexible tactic of the Reich Chancellery was ultimately part of an expansionist strategy.

In the case of the difficult negotiations about the Chełm (Kholm) region, the Austro-Hungarians gave way because of their urgent need for food deliveries from Ukraine. Although for Austria-Hungary the peace treaty with Ukraine was in fact a "grain treaty," for the Germans it was something quite different. In the preliminary talks which prepared the way for the peace treaty with Ukraine, the issue of post-war goals was a constant theme. Germans were concerned with the creation of a Ukrainian rail network, the establishment of a Ukrainian issuing bank, and the construction of Ukrainian credit institutions. Similarly, in public reactions to the treaty, the discussion concerned not only immediate grain

deliveries, but also the longer-term weakening of Russia and self-determination for the nationalities.[9]

When Trotsky broke off negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and the Ukrainian delegation appealed to the German nation for assistance, preconditions existed for implementation of the German plan by military means.[10] In May 1918 the occupation of southern Ukraine by German and Austro-Hungarian troops was completed. At that time, there were about 500,000 German and 250,000 Austro-Hungarian troops in Ukraine.[11] In the wake of the troops the military, diplomatic, and economic officials came to Kiev to supervise the implementation of German policy. They were led by General Wilhelm Groener, Ambassador Baron Adolf Mumm von Schwartzenstein, and the Krupp director Otto Wiedfeldt as a representative of the German economic ministry (*Reichswirtschaftsamt*). Fortunately, Wiedfeldt wrote quite a large number of reports which give a very vivid picture both of the situation in Ukraine and of Germany's economic goals there.[12]

Conflict between the German representatives in Kiev and the Ukrainian Rada was inevitable. If the Rada was to maintain itself as the governing body of an independent Ukraine, then it had to begin a process of agrarian reform immediately. However, the breakup of large estates and distribution of the land among the small and landless peasants was, in the view of the German agricultural experts, a serious threat to grain production targets. German officials were also strongly opposed to any such radical attack on the rights to property.[13] As a result of these considerations General Hermann von Eichhorn, the commander-in-chief of German forces in Ukraine, issued an order on 6 April 1918 on the spring sowing of crops. That order went over the head of the Ukrainian government and was addressed directly to the people. They were called on not to hinder, but to support the landowners actively in the spring sowing. This open contempt for the authority of the government led to a harsh exchange of views between Ukrainian ministers and German military leaders. In spite of this, on 9 April 1918, Ukrainian authorities signed an agreement on the delivery of grain to the Central Powers, and on 23 April 1918 they signed an economic treaty which regulated the deliveries of food and raw materials. The servant had done his duty and could now be dismissed. On 29 April 1918, with the assistance of the German army of occupation, the Rada was overthrown and Pavlo Skoropadsky was made Hetman of Ukraine.[14]

The overthrow of the Rada and, in particular, the way in which this was brought about, led to serious conflict between diplomats and the military in Berlin. German representatives in Kiev of the Foreign Office and the Economic Ministry had already come to the conclusion that a new regime in Ukraine would be useful not only to ensure more effective delivery of grain, but also to promote Germany's long-term political goals in Eastern Europe. Ambassador Mumm was of the view that "the recognition of Ukraine and its successful separation from Russia would be more strongly guaranteed to the extent that the principles on which the new state was founded differed from those of the Bolsheviks who now

hold power in Russia."[15] The Rada had vainly attempted to assert its independence vis-à-vis its German "allies" and it had not shied away from conflict. The Skoropadsky government, however, which had been helped into power by the Germans, was more than willing to collaborate closely with the Central Powers.

On 28 April 1918 Skoropadsky put his signature to ten conditions which had been presented to him two days earlier by General Groener. The document began: "I declare that I am willing to lead the government in accordance with the following points and I expect in return from the German government that it will provide me with both military and economic support." Skoropadsky committed himself, among other things, to recognition of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, dissolution of the Rada, rejection of a constituent assembly, construction of a Ukrainian army under the authority of the German supreme command, dissolution of the land committees, maintenance of the landed estates up to a certain legal maximum size, and payment of reparations to the Central Powers for their military assistance.[16]

With the installation of Skoropadsky conflict between the civilian leaders of the German Reich and its military high command reached a new peak—military leaders were now demanding the overthrow of the Bolsheviks in Russia and German support for the Russian monarchy. Secretary of State Richard von Kühlmann, however, defended a different view:

> The greatest political success which Germany could achieve in this war is the disintegration of the Russian empire and the destruction of the ring that encircles Germany. The fundamental principle of German policy must be to maintain its freedom toward the east and to hinder the re-establishment of a strong Russia. Any German intervention, therefore, which is aimed at consolidating Russia is fundamentally in error.[17]

In a memorandum prepared on the basis of this policy, the Foreign Office presented its view a short time later:

> In Russia we have only one interest, namely promotion of the forces of disintegration, the long-term weakening of that country. This was also Bismarck's policy toward France in 1871 when he opposed the re-establishment of the French monarchy. Our policy must be the establishment of good relations with the newly formed independent states that are in the process of breaking away from Russia, in particular, Ukraine, Finland, and the new government in the Caucasus. It is there that we must anchor our influence and attempt to suppress any tendency toward federation with Russia.[18]

Germany's support for Lenin in Moscow and Skoropadsky in Kiev were only in apparent contradiction. In reality they were two sides of one coherent policy to weaken Russia through its division into two or more independent states which, because of their different social system, would be hostile to each other, thus making the re-establishment of the Russian empire an impossibility. At a meeting of the Crown Council in Spa on 2-3 July 1918, the Foreign Office was victorious with its argument against the military and it convinced the Kaiser that

the Bolsheviks were the only party in Russia that supported the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.[19] The Kaiser and the military, as well as the Foreign Office, were sceptical about the long-term viability of an independent Ukrainian national state. The alternative, however, was not restoration of the centrally ruled tsarist empire but creation of a Russian federation in which Ukraine would have a certain autonomy and freedom of movement.

Otto Wiedfeldt received new instructions in Berlin, and on 23 July 1918, gave this brief resumé of German economic goals in Ukraine:

> At least for the immediate future, Germany wants to see Ukraine an independent state; our economic policy is to be one which makes Ukraine useful for the German economy in the long run. Therefore Germany's position in Ukraine must be established strongly and quickly so that when the time comes for a Russian federation to be established, whether centred on Ukraine or on Russia, Germany will be able to use Ukraine as a bridgehead to obtain major economic influence in all of Greater Russia.[20]

Wiedfeldt began with the assumption, as did the Foreign Office and the Economic Ministry, that after the war Germany would be largely cut off from the world market and would be dependent to an even greater extent on Ukraine and Russia as suppliers of raw materials, additional markets, and investment areas. The Germans were therefore particularly interested in food supplies, railways, coal and heavy industry, and banks and credit institutions.

All contemporary observers and historians are in agreement that Ukrainian deliveries of food supplies to the Central Powers in 1918 fell far short of expectations. Up to the time of the withdrawal of German troops from Ukraine in December 1918, Germany received 61,349 tonnes of food supplies and Austria-Hungary received 57,965 tonnes. This was 8 per cent of what Ukraine had promised. It must be said, however, in spite of German disappointment, that these 1918 deliveries constituted about 33 per cent of all Germany's food imports. Ukraine was the only external supplier of grain; 76 per cent of Germany's imported sugar also came from Ukraine.[21] However, if the only point of the military presence was to guarantee grain supplies, then maintaining German troops in Ukraine, which cost 125 million marks per month, would have been economic and political nonsense, quite apart from the use to which these troops could have been put on the western front. The complex organizational work in connection with grain production and delivery, as well as attempts by German economic officials to have Skoropadsky introduce a Stolypin-type agrarian reform in Ukraine, all support the thesis that in this area the Germans were engaged in long-term planning and organization.

On 2 May 1918, immediately after the putsch that brought Skoropadsky to power, Otto Wiedfeldt wrote to the Secretary of State in the Reich's Economic Ministry: "The main question, therefore, for me is: what do we want from Ukraine, do we want to turn it into an economic colony—in that case we must absolutely get the railways into our own hands, even if its profitability is not

guaranteed." The Foreign Office was also clear about the economic, political, and military significance of the railways in Ukraine.[22] The problem, of course, was that the German Reich did not have the money to take over the Ukrainian railways. The only possibility was private investment. After long, drawn-out negotiations involving the Russian Syndicate, a German Syndicate for the Reconstruction of the Ukrainian Railway System was established on 10 July 1918. It included the Diskontogesellschaft, the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, and the banking houses of Warburg, Mendelssohn, and Lenz.[23] This syndicate joined with the Research Group for the Re-establishment of the Railway System in Ukraine (established the previous month by Russian-Ukrainian bankers), each contributed 50 per cent, and the new company was called the Ukrainian Railway Development Company (AG für die Entwicklung des Eisenbahnwesens in der Ukraine). This was the full extent of the involvement of private German capital in the Ukrainian railway in 1918.[24] These plans and projects, however, are important indications of the way in which Germany attempted to gain influence in an important economic sector in Ukraine.

Attempts to get German private capital to invest in Ukrainian coal and heavy industry met with a similar fate. The situation in the Ukrainian coal industry was so desperate that Germany not only received no coal from Ukraine but was forced to deliver some of its own coal to that country. The need to get the Ukrainian coal industry on its feet again, and the necessity for private capital investment, offered German capital a unique opportunity to gain a foothold in that industry, particularly since there was no competition from other foreign investors or creditors. As in the case of the railways, the German state showed more interest than private German capital did. Although Wiedfeldt and the other economic experts in Kiev continued to point out the importance of German investment and German loans to Ukrainian industry to establish a foothold for Germany in both Ukraine and Greater Russia, the German banks were cautious. In view of the unclear military situation they were unwilling to take any unnecessary risks.[25]

The withdrawal of Ukraine from the rouble zone was one of the most important of Germany's economic and political goals in Ukraine. According to Ambassador Mumm, on 17 May 1918, "the establishment of its own currency, independent of the rouble, is an essential aspect of the maintenance of Ukraine's separation from Russia."[26] In May 1918 German financial experts in Kiev, in co-operation with the Ukrainian government, introduced the new independent Ukrainian currency, although there were numerous financial, political, and technical difficulties involved with this decision. On 18 May 1918, the decision was made to establish a share-based issuing bank. Wiedfeldt called on German bankers to participate. Parallel to the creation of a Ukrainian currency and the founding of a Ukrainian central bank, Ukrainian branches of the big Russian banks were dissolved. The big German banks were offered a participatory role, but in spite of all the efforts of Wiedfeldt and the Reich's Economic Ministry, they were extremely reluctant to become involved.[27]

For private German capital Ukraine was a risky business, because its existence as an independent state depended on the outcome of the war. Banks and industrial entrepreneurs were willing to be involved only if they were protected by some kind of state guarantee. It was not the brevity of the period they had in which to operate but rather the inadequate supply of both public and private capital which led to the failure of German capital to achieve any significant penetration of the Ukrainian economy. It is highly questionable, even in the case of a victory by the Central Powers, whether Germany would have been in a position to raise enough capital for a large-scale intervention in the Ukrainian economy, or indeed in the economies of the other states on its borders. The only possible source of such capital would have been enormous reparation payments from a defeated France.

The privileged economic position of Germany in Ukraine was legally established in the economic treaty signed between Ukraine and the Central Powers on 10 September 1918.[28] This treaty was meant to remain in force until 30 June 1919. As well as regulating the delivery of food supplies to the Central Powers, it also contained a number of provisions for the more long-term future. Among these were agreements on rail transport costs and on the participation of German expert advisers in all organizations and institutions dealing with the production of grain and raw materials, the structure of the transport and banking system, and the reconstruction of industry. German delegates in the negotiating process had to give in on a number of issues, for the Ukrainians were well aware of the situation of the Germans on the western front after July 1918. They were well aware of the fact that the Germans could not risk provoking the fall of the Ukrainian government by making very heavy demands on them.[29]

In spite of military setbacks on the western front, German military leaders, in September 1918, did not consider transferring their troops from Ukraine. On the contrary, in view of the possible negative outcome of the war in that sector, it was even more important for Germany to maintain and strengthen its position in the east.[30] On 10 October 1918, after the German offer of armistice had been sent to Wilson, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Wilhelm Solf sent the German representatives in Kiev an outline of Germany's policy in Ukraine. According to this programme: "1. Ukraine as an independent state and our preferential position within that state must be maintained as far as possible. 2. The German-Ukrainian peace treaty will not be affected by the general peace treaty." The Hetman was to "ukrainize the government, undertake an agrarian reform, and base himself on the support of the Ukrainian National Union which is, in the meantime, functioning as a National Assembly."[31] Albert Südekum, a social democratic member of the Reichstag, had co-operated with the Foreign Office in sending this instruction because he had contacts with Ukrainian social democrats. He travelled to Kiev to convince the leaders of the Ukrainian National Union, among them Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, to co-operate with Skoropadsky.

At the same time, German diplomats in Kiev tried to persuade Skoropadsky to "ukrainize" his policies, since this was the only way independence for Ukraine and the existence of the Hetman's regime could be secured vis-à-vis the Entente. This was also the purpose of their advice to Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Doroshenko, to demand from Wilson that Ukraine be accepted as a member of the planned League of Nations, and to inform the Entente powers that the continued presence of German troops in Ukraine was essential for the security and independence of Ukraine.[32] This fundamental goal of German foreign policy in the east, the weakening of Russia, was not dropped by the government of Prince Max von Baden, which assumed office in Berlin at the beginning of October 1918. A Programme for the East, drawn up by Rudolf Nadolny on 5 November 1918, which the whole cabinet, including its social democratic members, approved the same day, stated: "As far as our eastern policy is concerned, our fundamental goal remains, within the framework of the Wilson points and the demands of the Entente, to decentralize Russia with the help of the nationality principle and to create for ourselves in the entire eastern territories as much political sympathy and freedom of movement as possible." To reach this goal, diplomatic relations with Bolshevik Russia were to be broken off (which happened the next day), and German troops were to remain in the occupied eastern territories as long as possible.[33]

The outbreak of the German revolution and the truce of 11 November 1918 made this policy irrelevant. The German delegation was forced to annul the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Erzberger was able to achieve one goal, however, namely, to have German troops remain in the east as long as the Allies considered their presence necessary to secure these territories from the Red Army. This seemed to the Germans to be an opportunity to rescue at least part of their policy in the east, inasmuch as German troops would take part, alongside the Allies, in the intervention against Bolshevik Russia. In Ukraine, however, this goal was undermined by the fact that the German army units were dissolving and the internal opposition to Skoropadsky was taking on even more militant forms. On 14 November 1918, the Ukrainian National Union announced an end to its co-operation with Skoropadsky and the open struggle against his regime began. The German Supreme Command and the German soldiers' council, both of which wanted an immediate and orderly withdrawal of the German army from Ukraine, declared themselves neutral in the internal Ukrainian conflict. The result was the overthrow of the Hetman and the assumption of power by the Directory on 14 December 1918.[34]

The remaining diplomatic representative of the German Reich in Kiev, Count Berchem, soon realized that it would be impossible to obtain from the new government a recognition and confirmation of earlier economic agreements or recognition of reparations for German military assistance. He concentrated, therefore, on organizing the withdrawal of German troops and preparing to wind up Germany's diplomatic and economic presence. It was his view that, with the withdrawal of German troops, Ukrainian independence was at an end, and

Ukraine would be an easy victory for the Bolsheviks.[35] On 10 January 1919 the German chargé d'affaires left Ukraine, on 15 January the German trade mission was closed down, and on 25 January the last German soldier left the Ukrainian capital. On 5 February Kiev was taken by the Red Army.

Throughout the Soviet-Ukrainian and Soviet-Polish war in 1919, German civilian and military leaders actively pursued every possible opportunity to support the Ukrainian government. The existence of an independent Ukraine as a counterweight to Poland was also in German interests. In the Prussian War Ministry and in the Foreign Office plans were discussed to provide Ukraine with weapons. These plans came to nothing owing to lack of money and transportation difficulties. At the beginning of December 1919, as Petliura began to negotiate a Polish-Ukrainian alliance with Piłsudski, the Foreign Office in Berlin realized that both the independence and anti-Polish orientation of Ukraine were about to disappear. They therefore gave up any attempt to remain in contact with the Directory.[36] Berlin gradually began to realize that Bolshevik rule in Russia was more firmly anchored and would last longer than they had at first thought possible. It was Bolshevik Russia, and not an independent Ukraine, which they now saw as the necessary counterweight against Poland.

Attempts of the German Foreign Office, even after the military defeat in the west and the outbreak of the November revolution in Germany, to rescue at least some part of their eastern policy undermines the thesis that Germany's policy in Ukraine in 1918 was no more than a short-term, improvised occupation policy, whose only goal was acquisition of Ukrainian food supplies and raw materials for the German war machine. It was this short-term, "grain-peace" policy which the German Supreme Command and the military representatives in Kiev supported, but the policy that won the day was the policy of the Foreign Office and the Reich's Economic Ministry which envisioned Ukraine as a goal in itself of German foreign policy in the east. The goal of this policy was the separation of Ukraine from Russia, as a means of weakening the Russian colossus in the long term. In addition to this, their aim was to anchor German influence in the economic sphere firmly, so that even in the case of an eventual federation of Ukraine and Russia the former would serve as a bridgehead for Germany's economic penetration of the whole of Greater Russia. The diplomats of the Foreign Office and the officials of the Reich's Economic Ministry assumed that a re-united Russia would be bourgeois/capitalist. This goal was somewhat illusory and unrealistic. It depended not only on the outcome of the war in the west but, even in the event of a German victory on that front, would probably have been unrealizable for lack of investment capital. It was also unrealistic, because in all of those plans, the reaction of the Russian and Ukrainian people was never once taken into account.

Notes

1. Winfried Baumgart, *Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918. Von Brest-Litovsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Vienna-Munich 1966); Oleh S. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1918* (New Brunswick, N.J. 1971).

2. Fritz Fischer, "Deutsche Kriegsziele, Revolutionierung und Separatfrieden im Osten 1914-1918," *Historische Zeitschrift* 188 (1959); E. Zechlin, "Friedensbestrebungen und Revolutionierungsversuche," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament*, 17 May 1961, 14 June 1961, 21 June 1961.

3. Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918*, 3d ed. (Düsseldorf 1964), 34.

4. Ibid., 116.

5. Paul Rohrbach, "Durch die Ukraine 1897," in Rohrbach, *Weltpolitisches Wanderbuch 1897-1915* (Leipzig 1917), 51.

6. Peter Borowsky, "Paul Rohrbach und die Ukraine," in *Deutschland in der Weltpolitik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. I. Geiss and B.J. Wendt (Düsseldorf 1973), 437-53.

7. Wolfdieter Bihl, "Österreich-Ungarn und der 'Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraina,'" in *Österreich und Europa, Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch* (Graz 1965), 505; idem, "Die Tätigkeit des ukrainischen Revolutionärs Mykola Zaliznjak," *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Osteuropas* (new series) 14 (1966):51ff.; Oleh Fedyshyn, "The Germans and the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, 1914-1917," in *The Ukraine 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, Mass. 1977), 305-22.

8. For developments in Ukraine in detail see John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton 1952); Oleg S. Pidhainy, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic* (Toronto-New York 1966); Wolodymyr Stojko, "Ukrainian National Aspirations and the Russian Provisional Government," in *The Ukraine*, ed. Hunczak, 4-32; Ihor Kamenetsky, "Hrushevsky and the Central Rada," in *The Ukraine*, ed. Hunczak, 33-60.

9. Peter Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfragen* (Lübeck-Hamburg 1970), 49-63.

10. "Protokoll der Kronratsitzung von 13.2.1918," in *Brest Litovsk*, ed. W. Baumgart and K. Repgen, Historische Texte, Bd. 6 (Göttingen 1969), 57ff.

11. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 67.

12. Ibid., 73-85.

13. Mumm to the Reich Chancellor, 11 April 1918, in Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 101.

14. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 97-116. See also Taras Hunczak, "The Ukraine under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi," in *The Ukraine*, ed. Hunczak, 61ff.

15. Mumm to the Reich Chancellor, 11 April 1918, in Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 101.

16. Ibid., 111.
17. Kühlmann (Bucharest) to the Foreign Office, 3 May 1918, in Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 125.
18. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 125ff.; Baumgart, *Deutsche Ostpolitik*, 73-5, 385-7.
19. *Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen von den Verhandlungen in Brest-Litowsk bis zum Abschluss des Rapallo Vertrages*, ed. Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR and Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR, vol. 1 (Berlin 1967), 674-84.
20. Wiedfeldt to the Reich's Economic Ministry, 22 July 1918, in Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 169.
21. Ibid., 190-4.
22. Ibid., 220-2.
23. Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht*, 761f.
24. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 228ff.
25. Ibid., 231-48.
26. Ibid., 204.
27. Ibid., 212-7.
28. Ibid., 248-63.
29. Wiedfeldt to the Reich's Economic Ministry, 18 July 1918, in ibid., 254.
30. Lindemann (Kiev) to the Foreign Office, 27 September 1918, in ibid., 269f.
31. Solf to Generalkonsul Thiel (Kiev), on 10 October 1918, in *Die deutsche Okkupation in der Ukraine. Geheimdokumente* (Strassburg 1937), 160. See also Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 274.
32. Ibid., 279. On Ukrainian attempts to establish contact with the Entente, see ibid., 282.
33. Peter Borowsky, "Die 'bolschewistische Gefahr' und die Ostpolitik der Volksbeauftragten in der Revolution 1918-1919," in *Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System*, ed. D. Stegmann, B.J. Wendt, and P. Witt (Bonn 1978), 390.
34. Kurt Fischer, *Deutsche Truppen und Entente-Intervention in Südrussland 1918/19* (Boppard 1973), 50-66; Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "The Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic," in *The Ukraine*, ed. Hunczak, 82-103.
35. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 286-9; Fischer, *Deutsche Truppen*, 72-5.
36. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 291f.

German Colonization Plans in Ukraine during World Wars I and II

Ihor Kamenetsky

German Intervention in Ukraine and the Idea of a Separate State for German Colonists

According to Germany's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1918, when the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed, over 2 million Germans lived in the former tsarist empire, and they owned about 10 million hectares of land.[1] Southern Ukraine represented the second largest concentration of German colonists in the tsarist empire, with about 700,000 settlers, who owned approximately 4.5 million hectares of land.[2] During negotiations in Brest-Litovsk in January and February of 1918, neither the German government nor the German minority in Ukraine submitted requests to the Ukrainian Central Rada government for safeguards of the rights of the German ethnic groups. It appeared superfluous to request such rights, for practically since the beginning of its existence the Rada government had an outstanding set of legal provisions protecting the rights of minorities. However, when, about a week after Ukraine signed the peace treaty with the Central Powers, it asked Germany for military assistance, German-Ukrainian relations began to grow more complicated.

The former Secretary of the German Colonial Office, Friedrich von Lindequist, and the spokesman of the German colonists in Ukraine, Minister Winkler, by the end of February and beginning of March 1918 came up with the idea to consolidate the scattered German colonies of Southern Ukraine on the Crimean peninsula and the adjacent coastal areas, and to transform these areas into a German protectorate. In principle, they received support for this project not only from the Pan-Germanic League but also from Emperor Wilhelm II, General Ludendorff, and General Max Hoffmann, all of whom had significant impact on German *Ostpolitik*.[3] One fact which contributed to this plan may be that the Ukrainian Central Rada government did not claim the Crimean peninsula as a part of Ukrainian territory, mainly because the Ukrainian population there did not represent a majority. The Crimea came under the German military government, and its ambiguous status provided the German authorities with an opportunity to

play off various political claims. Lindequist and Winkler, who thought the Crimea would be a good beginning for their resettlement schemes, did not encounter any opposition from the German authorities, so they called a meeting of 67 delegates who claimed to represent 200,000 German colonists living in the Kherson area (Southern Ukraine) and Bessarabia. On 9-10 April 1918, those delegates passed a resolution addressed to the German emperor and the German imperial government, asking that the German colonists of their areas be granted German citizenship and permitted to remain in the Black Sea coastal region, in order to form German strongholds. Were this not possible, they suggested as the alternative that German colonists be granted permission to return to Germany.[4]

Very few German colonists realized then that had the schemes sponsored by Lindequist and Ludendorff been implemented, they were to be used as pawns. With the outbreak of World War I and some German annexations in Eastern Europe, the Pan-Germanic idea of using German peasant settlements to consolidate conquests was accepted and partially implemented. This applied, for example, to the "*Grenzstreifen*" (boundary strip), which was supposed to separate the Russian part of Poland (Congress Poland, earmarked by Germany as a semi-independent state) from the Polish provinces incorporated into Germany. Some peasant settlements of German colonists were planned in Latvia and Estonia to help the German gentry there assert themselves. As a matter of fact, General Ludendorff considered the colonists in Ukraine as possible labour to be used in the colonization projects, in case the resettlement scheme in Ukraine should not succeed.

The most important factor that prevented implementation of plans to build ethnic German colonies in Southern Ukraine was the opposition to it raised by the German Foreign Office, which was faced with two concrete plans. The first one, presented by Lindequist, designated the Crimea and the adjacent Ukrainian province of Tavria as an area for the consolidated German colonies, not only for Southern Ukraine but also for the other areas of the former tsarist empire in which the Germans had settled. Theoretically, these two provinces were to be considered a part of Ukrainian territory, and Ukraine was to be won over to this idea by being given jurisdiction over Crimea, which was still under German military rule.[5] The second plan, which emerged on 13 June 1918, originated with General Ludendorff, chief of the general staff. He telegraphed directly to the state secretary of foreign affairs, Richard von Kühlmann, and presented his plan on behalf of the German Supreme Command. He supported Lindequist's proposal to make the Crimea and the province of Tavria a settlement area for the German colonists, but he insisted on a more ambitious political status for these two areas. He wanted them turned into an independent state to be associated with Ukraine on a federated basis. He thought the relationship between Ukraine and the proposed German state would be similar to that between the states of Prussia and Bavaria within the German federal system. Germany and her allies would be

assured of preferential economic treatment within this state, while the facilities of the harbour of Sevastopil would be accessible to them. Ludendorff's proposal did limit the categories of German colonists that would settle in the Crimean peninsula and Tavria to Germans living in Southern Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Bessarabia. On the other hand, it gave permission to any member of the German minority residing in the former Russian empire to return to Germany and be granted German citizenship.[6] In a conference of the representatives of the German government and the German Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (under the chairmanship of the emperor on 2 July 1918 in Spa), Ludendorff further qualified the use of the German colonists from Eastern Europe. According to him, they were supposed to be settled primarily in the *Grenzstreifen* established by him, rather than in Germany proper, and they must be willing to serve in the German armed forces.[7]

The German Foreign Office resisted Lindequist's and Ludendorff's schemes on two grounds, one related to practical politics and the other to a different concept of *Ostpolitik* for the future. Practically, the Foreign Office claimed that in order to succeed in the resettlement policy, it would have to start immediately to implement it while German occupation of the Ukrainian territory lasted. At that stage of the war, however, Germany did not have the necessary resources to enforce or administer a mass resettlement of the German colonists. Further, such a project could not count on the support of the Ukrainian government of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky and the government of the Russian Don Cossacks, which the German government tried to foster and make more popular. This concern is reflected in a report to Mumm, German ambassador to Ukraine, who wrote in his report to the Foreign Office: "I find the new plan of Lindequist politically troublesome. We cannot expect the Ukrainian state to accept a state within their state, along with our assurances that we favour a strong Ukrainian state."[8] Lindequist's and Ludendorff's projects also complicated the attempts of the Foreign Office to win over the pro-Entente-oriented Russian White Guards, whom they eventually wanted to be a substitute for the Bolsheviks in Russia.[9]

The Foreign Office's concept of *Ostpolitik*, as it crystallized in 1918, differed from the conception of an ethnic- and peasant-oriented foreign policy of Lindequist and Ludendorff. Rather it was based on the idea of free enterprise, and in the long run it aimed at control over Ukraine and Russia by economic and technological dominance. This emphasis is reflected in a position report of the German Foreign Office. It stated: "After all, it is closer to *our* interest to have colonists distributed throughout all of Russia, where they will count for us as political and economic factors, rather than to have them integrated in one particular place. This [last mentioned] idea creates some insurmountable difficulties." The Foreign Office also presented possible means for the protection of German minorities in Russia by supporting well-organized activities of the German colonists. The foreign governments under which the Germans lived were

supposed to be legally obliged to provide them with some concrete rights. Those rights would enable them to participate in the local government of their respective provinces, enjoy their freedom in choice of schools and churches, and have their representatives in national legislative bodies, as well as special commissioners in the executive branch to take care of their community. In turn, the foreign governments would consent to accept some German government representatives specializing in colonial affairs.[10]

On 2 July 1918, in the presence of Wilhelm II, an official conference took place between the German High Military Command (*Oberste Heeresleitung*) and government representatives who sided with the views of the German Foreign Office.[11] Wherever possible, each party tried to play down existing conflict. The chancellor, for instance, mentioned that recently a delegation of colonists had paid him a visit, but he emphasized that his attitude toward their cause was noncommittal. The only point on which a consensus was reached during the conference was that of the right of the colonists to return to their homeland and be entitled to German citizenship, on the condition, however, that they would serve in the German armed forces. Three days after the conference, on 5 July 1918, Freiherr von Gruenau notified the Foreign Office of the emperor's decision that the creation of a German colonist state in Russia would be impossible.

For the duration of the war, this announcement should have concluded the official confrontation between the German Foreign Office and the High Military Command on the creation of a colonist state in Crimea and in Tavria. Yet, the idea lived on, and work toward implementing it by other means and channels did not stop. On 11 July 1918, the chancellor received a letter from the Association of the German Settlement and Migration Office insisting on the rights of the German colonists in Ukraine: 1) German colonists should be returned to the fatherland or settled in the newly annexed territories; 2) German colonists should be entitled to move from their scattered settlements to one designated area in the Black Sea basin and to integrate their numbers; 3) the designated area must be large enough to accommodate German colonists from Siberia and the Volga lands, in case these settlers did not wish to return to Germany.[12] The letter was co-signed by twelve other German organizations, some of which were quite influential, such as the Pan-Germanic League, the Association of German Eastern Provinces, the Main Protestant Association for German Settlers and Immigrants, the Association for German Colonies, and the Caritas Association for Catholic Germany.

The identification of various German patriotic and charitable organizations with the fate of their ethnic kinsmen in Eastern Europe might be considered a sign of historical progress, for previously these organizations had been characterized by particularism and fragmentation. Unfortunately, however, their solidarity in ethnic terms was not matched by a compassion for those people who would be negatively affected by such a resettlement. At this point, we may wonder what

moral restraints would have arisen if the resettlement plans in Ukraine had been authorized. In 1918, an embryonic German-Ukrainian Society was created in Germany which advocated a policy of fairness to the Ukrainian state and the other nations that emerged from the ruins of the tsarist empire. In referring to that time, Dr. Paul Rohrbach, the Society's first president, recollected: "I wanted to give Crimea and the Black Sea fleet to Ukraine, and I fought against Winkler's and Lindequist's idea of establishing an ethnic German colony in Cherson and Tauria."[13]

Even though Dr. Rohrbach was not always a spokesman for democratic principles, he represented a school of thought in German politics that thought a free Eastern Europe was a prerequisite for Germany's security and well-being. This political orientation, however, was not very popular in Germany, and neither the end of World War I nor the peace treaty of Versailles contributed to its growth during the Weimar republic. Even though ethnic German solidarity increased after the defeat, such a development did not coincide with the enhancement of more liberal international relations. The average German citizen at that time felt much more inclined to follow the ethnocentric and expansionist ideas of Paul de Lagarde than those of moral universalism advocated by Woodrow Wilson.

Revival of Folkish Ideas and Their Impact on Nazi Colonization Plans in Ukraine

In the nineteenth century folkish (*völkisch*) ideology emerged as an attempt to neutralize the ill effects of modernization on the harmony and unity of the German people. The proponents of folkish ideas believed that a national discord had arisen because of class conflicts in an industrial society, political rivalry among the parties, and unemployment due to a dependence on world markets. They thought that such ills might be avoided by a properly balanced relationship among the individual, the community (*Gemeinschaft*), and the land. For them, a healthy society existed primarily in the ideal peasant community, in which each citizen was entitled to land and communion with the soil.[14] Such folkish concepts brought up the question of availability of land for such a nation, which was dramatized in a pseudo-scientific manner by Friedrich Ratzel, professor of political geography (1844-1904). In such works as *Political Geography* (1897) and *Anthropogeography* (1901), as well as in his essay on "Living Space" (*Lebensraum*, 1901), he asserted his influence as the founder of the geopolitical school. Within the context of his writings, he tried to demonstrate that the struggle for territorial expansion among the nations followed natural law, and therefore a nation's territorial gain was a sign of racial purity, vigour, and health. He also referred to a mystical, infusing spirit of the land that supposedly invigorated those peoples who inhabited it for a longer period of history.[15]

The folkish ideas which emerged from Professor Ratzel's geopolitical concepts were revived in the early 1920s by Dr. Karl Haushofer, a professor at the University of Munich who became the founder of the Institute of Geopolitics in 1924. He popularized his concepts in the *Journal of Geopolitics* by associating them more closely with the existential problems of common man. Haushofer also directed the German geopolitical expansion eastward. *Lebensraum* would affect the Eastern European nations located between Germany and the Soviet Union, so he thought the objectives of German *Lebensraum* should be achieved in co-operation with the USSR. Neither legal nor moral reasons were the basis of such consideration, but rather a certain measure of caution, for he felt that it would be extremely risky to become involved in an attack on states occupying "large spaces."[16] The call for additional land was most effectively dramatized by Hans Grimm, who presented the acquisition of land as Germany's "fate": "When a country is overcrowded, then the hour will come—and nothing can be done to avert it by means of our spiritual attitude—that, motivated by hunger, people will have to sweep across the frontiers or slaughter each other inside [their own], because they are humans. And both [of these options] mean war!"[17]

The various groups in the Weimar republic that were permeated by folkish thought differed from each other in many essential points, and were too removed from the mainstream of German national politics to succeed by themselves in implementing their programmes fully. Indirectly, however, they paved the way for acceptance of National Socialist ideas with their proliferation of the *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil) concept. The National Socialist movement promoted the folkish idea almost from the very beginning of its existence. However, the question of *Lebensraum*, and by what means and at whose expense it should be secured, was not decided immediately. Yet Hitler, prior to the outbreak of World War I, was influenced by the ideology of Pan-Germanism.[18] It was significant that he was associated with Rudolf Hess, who later became the second man in the Nazi party's hierarchy. When Hitler was confined to the Landsberg prison, where he worked on *Mein Kampf*, it was Hess, a most dedicated student of geopolitics, who introduced him to Haushofer's writings and then to Haushofer himself.[19] Haushofer's ideas were dominant when Hitler decided in the twenties that the *Lebensraum* ought to be sought in Eastern Europe, but the question remained: how an encounter with Russia could be successful. Haushofer's warning against an attack on "wide-open spaces," and his advice to seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union that might work out to mutual advantage, coincided with the German popular mood that did not favour involvement in a war within the near future. Yet, in view of his expansionist policy and ideology, Hitler did not think it feasible to reach a compromise solution with the Soviet Union.

A new tactical approach suggested by Alfred Rosenberg was useful in dealing with this dilemma. Rosenberg observed that neither the Soviet Union nor

the tsarist empire was a monolithic state, but rather a conglomerate of many small and large nations. They were held together by force, but ready to separate from Russia at any opportunity. On the basis of this analysis, he made the recommendation that Germany should appeal to the non-Russian nationalities' quest for freedom, arguing that such an appeal would reduce the force of Soviet resistance, and perhaps would also gain a measure of international support. The top Nazi leaders looked with favour upon such a device of divide and conquer as an attachment to the *Drang nach Osten* policy, and there is evidence that many of them referred positively to such tactics while they pursued their objectives in the east.[20]

Some works on this topic have created the mistaken impression that Rosenberg acted in opposition to Hitler and Himmler as he shaped his *Ostpolitik* objectives.[21] This applies specifically to the notion that Rosenberg acted on the basis of the principle of national self-determination and permanency by offering statehood to Ukraine, while Hitler and Himmler relied mainly on crude propaganda and force. In reality, however, there was not a substantial difference in their attitudes and actions regarding German *Lebensraum* and the German settlements in the east. Rosenberg's policy was quite opportunistic, insofar as he visualized the "New Order" in Eastern Europe. In his book, *Der Zukunftsweg der deutschen Aussenpolitik* (The Future Path of German Foreign Policy, 1927), for example, Rosenberg referred to the desirability of creating a Ukrainian state in association with Germany, in order to protect the planned German *Lebensraum* settlements in Poland and the Baltic states. In 1933, the year Hitler came to power and Rosenberg was appointed director of the newly created Foreign Policy Office of the Nazi party, Rosenberg reversed himself by suggesting to Hitler a partnership with Poland in a joint venture against the USSR. This partnership was to be made attractive to Poland by conceding to her expansion at the expense of Lithuania and Soviet Ukraine. According to Rosenberg's memo, such concessions should be made as long as Germany did not possess the means or power to revise the eastern borders of the Reich on her own terms.[22]

In April 1941, Hitler authorized Rosenberg to prepare administrative and political guidelines for the Soviet territories that were supposed to be conquered in the pending "Operation Barbarossa." In his plans, which he worked out prior to the assault on the Soviet Union that began on 22 June 1941, Rosenberg returned to some of the concepts which he had expressed in *Der Zukunftsweg der deutschen Aussenpolitik*. The Ukrainian national state was to be created as a buffer state to protect German settlements in Poland and the Baltic states against possible Russian expansionism from the east. That buffer was to be supplemented by a federated state of Caucasus and state of Turkestan, both of which were supposed to be created by Germany.[23] Rosenberg left open the question of the political nature of such states, the source of popular support, and the very principles on which they were to be built. He did not attempt to prepare modes

of political co-operation with the political centres or leaders of the nationalities that were to be granted statehood, nor did he apply to his schemes the generally accepted principles of national self-determination. On the contrary, he planned that the borders of the anticipated Ukrainian state were to be extended eastward artificially, to include considerable portions of ethnically Russian territories.[24] Thus, this Ukrainian state would not only have been driven into conflict with the Russian state by playing the unenviable role of imperialistic nation, but it would also be weakened internally by a hostile Russian minority.

Another example of Rosenberg's precarious statehood offer was his insistence on instant German colonization and militarization of the Crimean peninsula.[25] Among the reasons which he gave to justify this policy was his explanation that such devices were necessary to maintain German control over Ukraine. During the presence of German troops in Ukraine in 1918 similar proposals had been made by General Ludendorff. These, however, had been turned down by the imperial German government because they were inconsistent with the idea of co-existence with an independent Ukrainian state and with other states that might be created in the Don Cossack and Caucasus areas. Rosenberg was conscious of the fact that the Third Reich promoted a different attitude toward the political objectives in the east. This is especially evident in a statement he made about a year later:

> It must be seen that where we find the psychological factors, we should use them to our advantage, and in this way save our resources of power. In doing so, we can reach with slight use of power that which otherwise can be achieved only through hundreds of police battalions....We must form there [in the east] a German rule which should be both stern and just....If we follow these little things, we shall lead these peoples before they will notice that their national independence is not anticipated within the framework of our permanent policy.[26]

During the war, Hitler and Heinrich Himmler occasionally did refer to some schemes for the creation of non-Germanic states in the more generally designated *Lebensraum* area.[27] They were less elaborate than Rosenberg's, but in a similar way they designated these states for limited purposes and for a limited time. In essence, the ideological aspects of the colonization plans did not provide the Nazi leaders with much leeway for deviation. Himmler was the first high Nazi official whom Hitler entrusted with implementation of the *Lebensraum* policy, soon after Poland became a conquered country. On 7 October 1939, in addition to his several other powerful positions, Himmler assumed the office of Reich commissar for the strengthening of Germandom. As an enthusiastic former member of the *Artamanen* Society, he must have been elated by the power and resources at his disposal to implement the idea of eastward colonization—on a scale that the *Artamanen* could only have dreamed about.[28]

The first of Himmler's specifications for the Nazis' *Ostpolitik* in which Ukrainians were mentioned was his top-secret directive, "Reflections on the Treatment of the Peoples of Alien Races in the East," dated 28 November 1940. This directive seemed to have a general validity in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe, even though in the years 1939-41 it only applied to the western Polish provinces incorporated into the Reich and into the Generalgouvernement.[29] In pursuing the ultimate end of securing German settlement areas in the east, Himmler was conscious of Hitler's and Rosenberg's insistence on gaining territories that were "freed" from the alien peoples who inhabited them. As Reich commissar for the strengthening of Germandom, he soon showed some flexibility about admitting some persons to the Germanic race, finding it advisable and useful to "germanize" certain segments of an alien nation or some selected individuals, whose "good racial qualities" and "good character" could be established. Himmler referred to the advisability of screening Polish and Ukrainian school children and their parents for "promising cases" for possible germanization. This approach, even though somewhat contradictory to Hitler's and Rosenberg's writings, soon was accepted by them.

There was also a less accommodating factor in Himmler's racial policy. He believed that it would be impermissible to leave individuals of a better racial quality to an alien nationality which was contesting the Nazis' claim for *Lebensraum*. Accordingly, he declared that individuals endowed with good racial qualities who refused to be assimilated would have to be destroyed. Following such logic, those nations that were expelled from the German *Lebensraum* territory or were permitted to stay behind temporarily were to be deprived of their elite. Himmler wrote this about the non-German population in the Generalgouvernement:

> This population, as a people of labourers without leaders, will be at our disposal and will furnish Germany annually with migrant workers and workers for special tasks (roads, quarries, buildings); they themselves will have more to eat and more to live on than under the Polish regime, and even though they have no culture of their own, under a strict, consistent, and just leadership of the German people, they will be called upon to help work on Germany's everlasting cultural tasks and buildings, and, as far as the amount of heavy work is concerned, perhaps they will be the ones who will make the realization of these tasks possible.[30]

In Himmler's view, such a status was to be reserved for all "undesirable" nations found in the conquered territories in Eastern Europe, and accordingly he drafted his guidelines in a general form.

In the final analysis, however, the question of the actual territorial expansion of *Lebensraum* and priorities depended on Hitler. Beginning with "Operation Barbarossa," the first move in this connection came from Hitler himself, on 16 July 1941. In a conference with the Nazi leaders most involved in the planning, and later in the reshaping, of the conquered provinces of the USSR, he set forth

some concrete and binding proposals. He evaluated the first few weeks of the eastern campaign as a Blitzkrieg success, and he stated that creation of the self-governing political units suggested by Rosenberg would be unnecessary, and that as soon as possible *Lebensraum* measures would have to be applied with various degrees of intensity in the conquered eastern provinces. To dramatize the policy of rapid colonization, Hitler extended Himmler's authority over resettlement and security to the newly established administrative units in the east, and he placed the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine under the administration of the energetic but ruthless Gauleiter Erich Koch. Hitler also specified which of the conquered territories should be colonized first. Among those areas that most affected the Ukrainian population were East Galicia and Crimea, which were expected to be entirely settled by Germans and other nations within a span of thirty years, later shortened to twenty years.[31]

Himmler's "Major Plan for the East" (*Generalplan Ost*), which provided further details on colonization plans in Eastern Europe, theoretically was initiated in November 1941. By February 1942 this plan added the former Soviet Ukrainian provinces of Zhytomyr, Kamianets-Podilskyi, and part of the province of Vinnytsia to the territories that were to be entirely germanized within twenty years.[32] Ukraine was designated for massive German settlements, and was included in another one of Himmler's colonization plans that came to be known as the *Kegelbahn* (bowling alley) or *Perlenkette* (pearl-string) plan. This meant a colonization project that would apply along the most vital lines of communication. During a conference that took place in Hitler's headquarters and in the *Ostministerium*, that colonization device was finally accepted. Colonization was to proceed along the two main communication lines traversing the eastern *Lebensraum* from north to south and from west to east. So two new super highways and railway lines were to be built, one on the Cracow-Lviv-Zhytomyr-Kiev line and another on the Leningrad-Mahiliou-Kiev-Zhytomyr-Odessa line. Larger German settlements were to be created around strategically important cities and vital knots of communication in Ukraine.[33]

In the northeastern part of the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine, the towns of Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, and Rivne were selected as primary targets for German settlement. About 20,000 ethnic Germans were to be concentrated around an undesignated junction point in the vicinity of Mykolaiv. The towns of Dnipropetrovske, Kryvyi Rih, and Zaporizhzhia were to be surrounded by German settlements. Furthermore, it was agreed that in the Crimea, German settlements along the transportation arteries of this peninsula and around the major towns should be given first access to the massive settlements that were expected later.[34] Two other instances in which colonization plans affecting the Ukrainian population were expected to begin during the war were the Zamostia (Zamość) settlement project and the colonization of the Zbruch River frontier (between the District of Galicia and the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine). Extension of the Zamostia area settlement was supposed to mark the beginning of the establishment of a belt of German homesteads running along the Curzon line that would

separate ethnic Polish territory from Ukrainian territory. It would also isolate the remaining Polish population within the Generalgouvernement between two solid German walls in the east and the west. A similar belt was planned in the eastern part of the District of Galicia, which would separate the predominantly Ukrainian District of Galicia from the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine.[35]

Himmler succeeded in settling 10,000 ethnic Germans around his Field Headquarters in Hegewald, near Zhytomyr, and in the process seven Ukrainian villages had to be evacuated. According to Nazi authorities, German settlements in the Crimea were the most successful ones. By September 1943, the rural districts of Spat, Kambery, Mengelertschik, Eki-Basch, Kyabak, and Alabasch, as well as parts of the cities of Symferopil and Yevpatoria were inhabited by Germans who were administered by their own local government.[36] Extension of the Zamostia settlement between the years 1942 and 1944 proved a burdensome project, due to the unexpected resistance of the local population and increasing intervention by the Polish and Ukrainian resistance movements. Even though thousands of Polish peasants were moved away to accommodate this settlement (including the population of several Ukrainian villages in the vicinity of Hrubeshiv), the settlement did not increase beyond 25,000 people, thus falling behind its original target. By the beginning of 1944, the settlement was surrounded by an uneasy neighbourhood of 170,000 Poles and 26,000 Ukrainians, and the number of their raids on German settlers was increasing. In a letter to Himmler, dated 3 May 1944, Zörner, Governor of the District of Lublin where the Zamostia settlement was located, requested total liquidation of this project as a security liability.[37]

Conclusion

German colonization plans in Ukraine during World Wars I and II indicate two tendencies which, to a certain degree, have characterized political thinking since the end of the nineteenth century. One was essentially based on pluralistic values, acceptance of a free-market economy, limited objectives of national interest in terms of territorial acquisitions, and adherence to the basic rules of the Western state system. The other tendency, as an alternative, emerged as a growing concept of a folkish state which increasingly identified national interests with ethnic and racial considerations. While it deviated from the more universalistic, humane aspects of world politics, it gravitated toward Social Darwinism and the goal of an economic and military self-sufficiency by means of territorial expansion.

The arrival of German troops in Ukraine in 1918, following the Ukrainian government's request for help repulsing an invasion instigated by Soviet Russia, did put to the test the nature of German foreign policy in Eastern Europe. By utilizing its presence in the Ukrainian People's Republic, the German government not only had a chance to improve and accelerate delivery of urgently needed food and raw materials, but also to open the issue of the status and rights of the German minority in Ukraine. There were two main aspects to the question of

rights. One of these was an affirmation of civil liberties, cultural autonomy, and nationalized property rights—points on which no serious disagreements existed. The other, which had the support of some of the German colonists, as well some influential personages at the German High Military Command and such pressure groups as the Pan-Germanic League, was basically political. Insistence on a consolidated, exclusively German, colonial state in Crimea and the province of Tavria would have amounted to a state within Ukraine. That situation would have left the host country in uncertainty about further German territorial expansion, while exposing it to the possibility of constant pressure by the German government. Some more moderate circles of the German government and German pressure groups were taken aback by the growing resistance movement in Ukraine, and especially by the ruthless expropriation of food from the peasants, so they stopped the project proposal before it reached the negotiation state with the Ukrainian government. After the beginning of August 1918, however, strong pressure arose to reopen this case, and many peculiarities of this plan found their way into the Nazis' plans in the 1920s.

This brings up the question of continuity, as well as the consequences of racially determined colonization with a totalitarian touch in the twentieth century. When the idea of a German racial state in Ukraine first emerged in 1918, in spite of its manipulative character, it still provided the German colonist, as an individual, with the choice to participate in the project. Such an option was no longer available to the individual within Himmler's settlement consolidation schemes. Even though in theory the individual in the Third Reich was elevated in status, in reality he was no more than a replaceable building block of Hitler's "New Order." The same predetermined role of the individual was reserved for the "alien nations" situated within the path of German *Lebensraum.* In the colonization scheme of 1918, the racial colony in question was still presented as relatively limited in size and politically subordinated to the host country in Eastern Europe. As such, it had not represented a major concern or objective of the German government. By contrast, in the Nazi schemes, the colonization plans in Eastern Europe assumed fundamental importance, as the conquered eastern *Lebensraum* was expected to become the nucleus of a perfectly conditioned racial German society, the "New Order" of the Third Reich. In that sense, the difference between the colonization plans of World War I and World War II was not just a matter of population numbers or size of the conquered territory, it was a difference based on substance. Thus: "The planned New Order is something completely new. It will express the National Socialist philosophy of life. Therefore, it will influence all aspects of life. It will bring not only excellent social and economic results, but also cultural results and the creation of a new spiritual attitude."[38] Also: "Our gains in the west may add a measure of charm to our possessions and constitute a contribution to our general security, but our Eastern conquests are infinitely more precious, for they are the foundations of our very existence."[39]

In retrospect, German *Ostpolitik* in 1918 and World War II could be partially described as a belated version of the Western imperialism of the previous centuries. Paradoxically, it was an attempt to build a colonial empire in that part of Europe where modern nationalism was in the process of vigorous growth, and where empire-builders were likely to encounter increased resistance. While political pluralism in imperial Germany provided checks and balances on costly schemes in the east that were ideologically diffused, the Nazis' *Ostpolitik* was much more ideologically determined, monolithic, and totalitarian in its methods and objectives. The colonization plans and accompanying preparatory measures for *Lebensraum* were, in Hitler's case, not just marginal aspects of his programme, but its very essence, and because of their organic nature, they could not easily be reversed. Thus, the fall of the Third Reich as a result of military defeat, was the most reliable way to stop the full implementation of Hitler's "master plan" that would have imposed inhuman standards and regimentation, not only on the nations of Eastern Europe but also on the Germans themselves.

Notes

1. Auswärtiges Amt (AA), Bonn, Abteilung A, Politisches Archiv, *Russland*, no. 78, Bo. 8, "Die deutschen Kolonisten in Russland," A 24064, 6 June 1918, 2.
2. I.M. Kulinych, *Ukraina v zaharbnytskykh planakh nimetskoho imperializmu 1900-1914* (Kiev 1963), 191.
3. Max Hoffmann, *Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors Max Hoffmann* (Berlin 1930), 1:191; Peter Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfrage*, Historische Studien, 416 (Lübeck-Hamburg 1970), 141.
4. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik*, 142.
5. Auswärtiges Amt, "Die deutschen Kolonisten in Russland," 8 June 1918.
6. Mumm to the Foreign Office ("Top Secret"), ibid., AA 2627.
7. "Protokoll über die Besprechung der schwebenden politischen Fragen unter Vorsitz seiner Majestät zwischen den Vertretern der Reichsregierung und der OHL [Oberste Heeresleitung]," Spa, 2 July 1918, ibid., AA 3036.
8. Mumm to the Foreign Office, 17 June 1918, ibid., A 26007.
9. "U.J." at the Foreign Office to the Chancellor of the Reich, 5 July 1918, ibid., A 27845.
10. Ibid.
11. "Protokoll über die Besprechung."
12. Association for German Settlement and Migration (*Vereinigung für deutsche Siedlung und Wanderung*) to Hertlin, Chancellor of the Reich, 11 July 1918, ibid., AA 3036.

13. N.C. Meyer, "Germans in the Ukraine, 1918," *The American Slavic and East European Review* 9, no. 2 (April 1950).

14. See Paul de Lagarde, *Schriften für Deutschland* (Leipzig 1933), 142-8; Georg L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York 1981), 15-8, 21, 24; Julius Langbehn, *Rembrandt als Erzieher: Von einem Deutschen* (Leipzig 1922); Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: The Rise of the Nazi Ideology* (Berkeley 1961).

15. Mosse, *The Crisis*, 18; F. Hesse, "The Law of Growing Spaces," cited in Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics* (London 1942), 108.

16. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers*, 9-10.

17. Hans Grimm, *Volk ohne Raum* (Munich 1935), 1248. Grimm was a German writer from Southwest Africa, whose work *Volk ohne Raum* (People without Space) sold 265,000 copies and became a bestseller between 1926 and 1933.

    See also Dietrich Strothmann, *Nationalsozialistische Literaturpolitik* (Bonn 1968), 91; Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die deutsche Diktatur: Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des Nationalsozialismus* (Cologne-Berlin 1969), 156.

18. Werner Maser, *Die Frühgeschichte der N.S.D.A.P.: Hitlers Weg bis 1924* (Frankfurt a. Main 1965), 121, 123.

19. Frederick Sondern, Jr., "Hitler's Scientist," *Current History* (June 1941); A. Whitney Griswold, "Paving the Way for Hitler," *The Atlantic Monthly* (March 1941); Robert Cecil, *Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941* (New York 1975), 30-4; idem, *The Myth of the Master Race: Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology* (New York 1972), 163-5, 168-9.

20. International Military Tribunal, *The Trial of the Major War Criminals* (Nuremberg 1947), docs. 1058-P, 221-L, NO-1880. It should be noted that when I cite *The Trial*, I am not referring just to the published documents. Throughout this article I am referring to the original numbering system of *The Trial* pertaining to the documents originally located in the US Army depository of Captured Nazi Documents in Alexandria, Virginia. By 1960 these documents were transferred to the National Archives in Washington, DC. I have retained the original numbering system, as these documents were more inclusive than the published set cited above. For an explanation of the numbering system, see the introduction to *Trial of the Major War Criminals beofre the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg 14 November 1945—1 October 1946*, vol. 23 (Nuremberg 1949).

21. See Roman Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934-1945: Tatsachen europäischer Ostpolitik* (Munich 1956), 2:7-38.

22. American National Archives, Washington, DC, Microfilm no. T.81, roll 17, records of the NSDAP, flash I EA-250-d-18-20-I, Amt Osten, Materials on Poland and German-Polish Relations, 1933-1934. See also document PS-049, "Denkschrift: England und Deutschland. Skizze einer weltpolitischen Möglichkeit," in *Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs 1934/35 und 1939/40*, ed. Hans-Günther Seraphim (Munich 1964), 166.

23. *The Trial*, doc. 1058-PS.
24. Ibid., doc. 1057-PS.
25. Ibid., doc. 1028-PS.
26. Ibid., 39:414.
27. "Conversations with Hitler," 21 July 1940, and "Convocation of Generals," 30 March 1941, from Halder's diaries, cited in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Grundzüge der Politik und Strategie in Dokumenten* (Frankfurt a. Main 1965), 76, 110. See also Josef Ackermann, *Himmler als Ideologe* (Frankfurt 1970), 184-5.
28. The *Artamanen* were one of many populist movements in Germany during the 1920s with a radical programme committed to the German folkish idea. It was founded by Willibald Hentschel in 1923 who perceived its mission to be a commitment to the rural way of life infused with Germanic values and traditions. The *Artamanen* were aware that Germany did not have sufficient land to transform the nation into a peasant society and they hoped to remedy this problem by territorial expansion of Germany into Eastern Europe.
29. *The Trial*, doc. NO-1880.
30. Ibid., and doc. NO-3938. See also Adolf Hitler, *Hitlers zweites Buch: Ein Dokument aus dem Jahre 1928* (Stuttgart 1961), 78-9; Ackermann, *Himmler als Ideologe*, 292.
31. *The Trial*, doc. 221-L; H. Heiber, "Der Generalplan Ost," *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 6 (1958).
32. Heiber, "Der Generalplan Ost," 300.
33. *The Trial*, doc. NO-2703.
34. Ibid., and doc. NO-2278. See also Heiber, "Der Generalplan Ost."
35. *The Trial*, 29:605.
36. Ibid., doc. NO-4009.
37. The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, Ca., Archives, Zörner, Governor of the District of Lublin, to Himmler, 3 May 1944, "The Himmler File," 266.
38. American National Archives, Washington, D.C., Gruppenführer Greifelt, Chief, Main Office for the Strengthening of Germandom, TAGO Document, RDV/83, 19.
39. H.R. Trevor-Roper, *Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944* (New York 1953), 566. See also Ihor Kamenetsky, *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies* (New York 1961), 81-2.

Soviet Ukraine and Germany, 1920-39

Bohdan Krawchenko

Introduction

The study of the foreign relations of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has generated little intellectual interest, and Soviet Ukrainian-German relations are no exception. Neglected in Soviet scholarship, there is not a single Western study which deals with the republic's relations with another state. The little research that has been done on international questions has, by and large, focussed on Ukraine's standing, or lack thereof, in international law. There are, of course, compelling reasons for this state of affairs. Foremost among these is the fact that the conduct of external affairs of all union republics has been strictly centralized in Moscow. This was the case even when the Ukrainian republic was formally an independent state: "It is obvious that all understand that the Ukrainian SSR cannot have a foreign policy different from that of all other Soviet republics, in particular the policy of Russia."[1] With the establishment of the USSR in December 1922 the central government's role in this area grew.

Thus, one could argue, to focus on Ukraine's external relations is to be engaged in trivialities. It might be far more interesting and profitable to examine overall Soviet policy, but a case can be made for studying the foreign relations of the union republics. Each republic has a unique historical tradition, economic geography, and cultural history, so it would seem improbable for the central leadership not to take these into account and earmark individual republics for a special role in certain areas of Soviet foreign policy. Azerbaidzhan's distinctiveness would certainly be a factor in Soviet policy vis-à-vis Iran. Certainly Ukraine's situation has dictated a special role for the republic in the USSR's relations with a number of states, Germany in particular. Moreover, from an examination of other policy areas we know that despite centralization, republican autonomism is a factor in cultural, economic, and other aspects of domestic policy. So why should it not exercise some influence in international relations?

These are some of the concerns that will be addressed in this study of the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations. I have examined only Soviet sources, which is a serious drawback, since German archival material would undoubtedly yield much new information on the question. Those resources, however, were not

available to me. It should also be noted that because of the paucity of information, the theme of the impact of Ukrainian autonomism will be weakly developed here. Finally, the concept of "relations" will be understood here to mean not only formal state-to-state interchange, but also economic and cultural interaction. The latter two are particularly important to bear in mind, given the republic's limited mandate in the conduct of its diplomacy.

Soviet Ukraine and Germany before the Treaty of Rapallo

When the Bolsheviks surveyed their predicament in Ukraine in 1920, they saw a threatening situation. Ukraine was of decisive importance for the economic and military viability of Soviet Russia, but it was also the favourite target for foreign intervention and "counter-revolution":

> The Ukraina [sic] with its unlimited natural riches, its remarkable geographical position...has necessarily become an object of a strong concupiscence by all the imperialistic states. The day after the Brest peace had been signed the German imperialists threw their troops not into Soviet or Central Russia, not in the direction of Moscow or Petrograd, but into the Ukraina. Denikin...serving the aggressive plans of Anglo-French imperialism...after having taken Kharkov and Tsaritzin [sic] and having given the famous order to his troops to move on to Moscow...did not take the direct way to the chief capital of Russia. He turned in the direction of the Ukraina....Such is the power of attraction exercised by the Ukraina, such is the Ukrainian hypnosis taking hold of all the adversaries.[2]

With large Ukrainian partisan units still operating in Ukraine toward the end of 1920,[3] the Bolsheviks feared, even after the cessation of Soviet-Polish hostilities, that the government-in-exile of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) would use these beachheads to invite foreign assistance in the overthrow of the Kharkiv government. Since the UNR leadership was recognized as the legitimate representative of Ukraine by most Western states, Bolshevik alarm was not unfounded. Thus the first concern of Soviet diplomacy was to secure international diplomatic recognition of the government of the Ukrainian SSR and undermine the status of UNR representatives. The second concern of the Bolsheviks was to initiate economic relations with the capitalist West as quickly as possible. Domestically, the Bolshevik regime was in danger of collapsing; the whole economic and social fabric of society was disintegrating. Trade with the West was a precondition of economic recovery. Moreover, normalization of commercial relations with capitalist countries was also a way of breaking out of diplomatic isolation. In the minds of the Bolsheviks, access to Ukrainian goods was an attractive carrot to offer Western governments. Ukraine "played already before the war a colossal part in foreign trade, in the export of the chief articles of Russian commerce."[4]

In pursuit of both objectives, the Soviet regime, Lenin in particular, placed great hope in Germany. That country's sorry predicament after the Versailles treaty, argued Lenin at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920, was propelling it toward rapprochement with Soviet Russia.[5] German interest was focussed primarily on Ukraine's foodstuffs, coal, and other natural resources. However, unlike France and Britain, who "had not given up hope of overthrowing Soviet rule," Germany posed no immediate military threat.[6] Throughout 1920 the Bolsheviks expended great effort to secure German recognition of the government of the Ukrainian SSR. That was an acute question for the Bolsheviks, because the German government concluded a treaty with the Central Rada in 1918 and continued to recognize UNR delegates in Berlin as the official representatives of Ukraine. The Soviet position, as articulated by the Kharkiv government through Viktor Koppa, RSFSR plenipotentiary in Berlin, was that since Germany had established diplomatic relations with Ukraine during the period of the Central Rada and Pavlo Skoropadsky's rule, "there can be no discussion of the establishment of new relations between Ukraine and Germany. Ukraine had already been recognized by Germany." There was, however, a new government in Ukraine, which was of no concern to Germany since this was purely an internal matter.[7] Germany, influenced by the Entente's hostility toward the Bolsheviks, resisted de facto or de jure recognition of the Soviet Ukrainian government, but its resolve was put to the test during negotiations for the return of prisoners of war.

For the Bolsheviks, the large number of German prisoners on Ukrainian territory presented an opportunity to press the Germans to enter into direct relations with Kharkiv. The issue was raised during the Soviet Russian-German negotiations in the spring of 1920. German representatives at that session proposed a simple agreement with Russia covering only the return of POWs on Ukrainian soil. They did not accept the offer of direct contact with Soviet Ukrainian delegates. Thus the Ukrainian mission was refused permission to travel to Germany; even the Ukrainian Red Cross was denied this privilege. German prisoners were to be handed over to German authorities at the Russo-Ukrainian border. Such a stance was unacceptable to the Soviet side. Through Russian representatives, the Kharkiv government insisted that the Ukrainian department of the Soviet legation in Berlin be allowed independent representation and that Germany announce a formal break of diplomatic relations with the UNR. These were the preconditions for resolution of the POW issue.[8] Although the German government did not accede to most of these demands, by 23 April 1921 it did sign an agreement with Soviet Ukraine which extended the terms of the 19 April 1920 POW agreement with Russia to cover Ukraine as well. In addition, it provided for the establishment of special missions in Berlin and Kharkiv to oversee the implementation of this accord.[9] De facto recognition of Kharkiv was secured.

Trade relations between Germany and Ukraine did not develop until 1921 when, in the wake of the 16 March 1921 Anglo-Russian trade accord, Germany

signed a trade treaty with Russia. The most significant clause of the German-Russian agreement was not concerned with trade at all; it included a commitment by the German government to deal exclusively with Soviet authorities and break off all relations with any "white" émigré organization. That was the official end of the anti-Bolshevik crusade.[10] The political aspect of the agreement, however, did not include Ukraine, even though the accord did have an impact on economic relations with Ukraine. The accord enabled the Kharkiv government to send its representatives to Berlin, mainly to secure orders from private firms. Early in 1922 the Soviet Ukrainian government signed an agreement with the Berlin firm of Schroeder and Vogelsatz for the import of Ukrainian leather.[11] Trade figures for this period were not impressive because both countries had been devastated. In 1921 the USSR exported 1.3 million roubles worth of goods to Germany (in 1913 prices) and imported 42.6 million roubles from that country. The 1921-2 figures were 6.5 million (export) and 65.7 million (import).[12] A portent of future developments was the fact that in 1921, a famine year in Ukraine, the republic was exhorted to mobilize agricultural exports to Germany to facilitate trade. Indeed, in 1921-2, of the 6.5 million roubles worth of goods exported by the USSR, 77 per cent originated in Ukraine (mainly leather goods).[13] The real change in both political and commercial relations between Germany and Ukraine came in the wake of the Rapallo Treaty.

The Treaty of Rapallo

In April 1922 delegations from thirty-four states descended on Genoa for what was probably the most important international assembly since the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The Bolsheviks prepared carefully for the meeting (which lasted from 10 April to 19 May 1922), and adopted a most conciliatory tone. They offered economic concessions—repayment of pre-1914 tsarist debts, leases to various capitalist firms—in return for the resumption of normal economic ties and recognition of the "sovereignty and inviolability of the boundaries of the Soviet republics."[14] Although the Soviet Ukrainian government was not directly represented in Genoa, a member of the Russian delegation obtained full powers from the Central Executive Committee of the Kharkiv government to negotiate on Ukraine's behalf and conclude all necessary accords.[15] The Genoa Conference did not produce the expected results; however, it did provide an opportunity for the two pariahs of Europe—Germany and Soviet Russia—to come to an agreement. Soviet Russian and German representatives signed a treaty on 16 April 1922 in the neighbouring town of Rapallo, which proved to be a turning point in the foreign policies of both states, and the most conspicuous landmark in European diplomacy between Versailles (28 June 1919) and Locarno (1 December 1925).

The Treaty of Rapallo established the status and prestige of both parties, and staked out the claims of both to be restored to the select company of great powers. It provided for restoration of full diplomatic relations between the countries for the first time since 1918. Each state renounced its claims on the

other, which freed Germany from fear of Russian reparations and Soviet Russia from concern over German claims on property the Soviets had nationalized; the two states agreed to improve their trade relations on a "most-favoured nation" basis; and they concluded a secret military agreement that facilitated Germany's rearmament.[16]

Despite considerable Soviet pressure, however, Germany refused to extend the terms of the Rapallo Treaty to include Ukraine. This was a major blow to Soviet efforts to gain international acceptance of their control of the republic, but the immediate results of the Rapallo Treaty were not entirely negative for the Soviet Ukrainian government. A week after the treaty was signed, representatives of the Ukrainian SSR and Germany signed a protocol which established trade missions in each country's capital. Shortly thereafter, Kharkiv organized a thirty-three person commercial mission in Berlin, which was by far the most important foreign representation of the Ukrainian republic.[17] Trade figures soon gave evidence of its activities. From the autumn of 1922 to the end of 1923, 20 million roubles worth of Ukrainian grain reached the German market. In return, German banks extended 100 million marks worth of credit earmarked for agricultural development. Germany accounted for two-thirds of Ukraine's exports; and these exports represented over two-thirds of all Soviet exports to Germany.[18] This new commercial relationship can hardly be said to have benefitted the Ukrainian population, for in 1923-4, as in 1921-2, famine ravaged the republic's steppe regions, but from the point of view of the regime, there were "higher" interests at stake. Grain, Ukrainian grain in particular, was one of the few commodities the Bolsheviks had to offer Germany. Without it, the new Soviet Russian-German accord would have amounted to little, in economic terms at least.

The trade agreement between Ukraine and Germany, however, did not mean full diplomatic recognition. Even though on 27 May 1922 an agreement establishing diplomatic courier services between Ukraine and Germany was signed, the large goal remained. Negotiations between Ukraine and Germany were lengthy—from May to November 1922. According to a Soviet Ukrainian source, the German government "used all sorts of cunning in its effort to delay the signing of the protocol: it demanded special accreditation from the Ukrainian representatives, then asked for a copy of the laws and of the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR allegedly to confirm the republic's sovereignty."[19] On 4 July 1922 the German representatives broke off negotiations over objections to a specific Ukrainian demand for a 400 million mark reparations payment for goods and valuables seized by Germany during its 1918 occupation of Ukraine. While Ukrainian representatives claimed that such reparations were perfectly in order, the German side maintained that the goods and valuables were obtained through a treaty with the then-legitimate government of Hetman Skoropadsky. While the Bolsheviks were prepared during the Rapallo negotiations to make the grand gesture of foregoing reparations connected with World War I, they claimed that the Ukrainian case was special, since it involved damages incurred after the

cessation of war.[20] Although this specific issue was not resolved, an agreement was signed on 5 November 1922, which extended the terms of the Rapallo Treaty to Ukraine. The second paragraph of the treaty left the door open to future negotiations between Germany and Ukraine to settle the 1918 claims. It appears that the German side was spurred to conclude this agreement after it became evident that France and Britain were preparing to send trade missions to Ukraine to establish commercial ties.[21]

The 5 November 1922 accord was hailed as a great victory for Soviet Ukrainian diplomacy and as a major blow to Ukrainian nationalists.[22] The treaty did represent a serious defeat to the UNR government-in-exile. During the negotiations the Kharkiv government insisted that a precondition of any agreement was the breaking of all official contact between the German government and the UNR's ambassador in Berlin, Roman Smal-Stotsky. The Kharkiv side even insisted on Smal-Stotsky's expulsion from Berlin. The German government agreed to both conditions, and it took the rather extraordinary step of having the police escort the UNR ambassador out of Berlin.[23] On the economic front, the German-Ukrainian Rapallo agreement ushered in a new era in trade. The consequences for cultural and scholarly exchange were also far-reaching.

Economic Ties after Rapallo

Historically, the economic relationship between Germany and the tsarist empire had been a close one. In the five years before World War I the annual trade turnover between the states was almost 1 billion roubles. The Russian empire imported 500 million roubles worth of goods from Germany on an annual basis (44 per cent of its total imports), and exported 450 million roubles worth of commodities (29 per cent of the total export figure). For Germany, the Russian market accounted for 10 per cent of all exports, and 14 per cent of all German imports originated in Russia. The Russian empire supplied Germany with almost the totality of its imported grain, as well as with large quantities of industrial raw materials.[24] Ukraine occupied a prominent place in the exports of the Russian empire. Between 1909 and 1911 Ukraine accounted for 26 per cent of all exports from the Russian empire. However, only 8 per cent of all the empire's imports found their way to Ukraine.[25] Such trade figures, as economists in Ukraine constantly stressed, represented colonial domination. This trade imbalance was a boon for the central Russian areas which received most of the imports paid for by Ukrainian exports. This was an economic pattern that the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow was prepared to maintain, and it actively pursued Ukrainian-German trade, at times at enormous cost to the Ukrainian population.

Germany was an important export market for Ukrainian goods. In 1913, for example, Ukraine exported 130 million poods of grain (1 pood=16.38 kg) to Germany. (In 1913, Ukraine accounted for 60 per cent of the Russian empire's iron ore exports.) In 1914-18 the Kryvyi Rih basin supplied 20 million poods of iron ore to metallurgical enterprises in Germany.[26] In the early 1920s, apart from agricultural commodities, Ukraine's greatest export potential lay in coal and

iron ore, but the coal and iron ore industries were very seriously damaged during the course of the 1917-20 revolution. To restore them, German expertise was needed. Not only did Germany have technical skills precisely in the main areas of Ukraine's industry, but German firms were acquainted with many of Ukraine's plants, because of their heavy investment there before the revolution.[27] Consequently, economic policy vis-à-vis Germany included not only the search for export markets, but also the import of machinery, and especially German expertise, to assist in Ukraine's industrial reconstruction.

After the Treaty of Rapallo, Soviet-German trade registered substantial increases. The trade turnover in 1922-3 was 82.2 million roubles. By 1927-8, on the eve of industrialization, the figure was 346.7 million roubles. In most years the USSR had a trade deficit with Germany (see Table 1). From 1921-2 until

TABLE 1
SOVIET-GERMAN TRADE, 1921-8
(IN MILLION ROUBLES IN 1913 PRICES)

	1921-2	1922-3	1923-4	1924-5	1925-6	1926-7	1927-8
total turnover	72.2	82.2	87.6	149.0	225.6	264.3	346.7
Soviet exports	6.5	34.0	52.1	68.5	87.5	137.6	151.8
Soviet imports	65.7	48.2	35.5	80.5	138.1	126.7	194.9

SOURCE: *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik 1918-1966* (Moscow 1967), table 1, 8-9.

1932, Germany occupied first place among Soviet trading partners. The only exception was 1923-5, years of crisis for German industry, during which time Britain emerged in first place by a small margin.[28] For Ukraine, by the second quarter of 1922, Germany had emerged as the republic's primary trading partner. In that quarter 60 per cent of Ukraine's exports went to Germany. In 1922-3 exports amounted to 12.5 million roubles (1913 prices) or 63 per cent of all Ukrainian exports (37 per cent of the total Soviet export figure).[29] In this period Ukraine had a positive trade balance with Germany. The trade surplus in 1922-3 was 1.2 million roubles and rose to 3 million by 1923-4. It appears that this surplus persisted into the second half of the decade as well.[30] From 1925 on, as Ukraine's economy recovered and its markets became more diversified, Germany still accounted for 40 per cent of the republic's exports.[31]

The structure of Ukraine's exports to Germany reveals a predominance of agricultural commodities (see Table 2). This was a major concern to Ukrainian economists and political leaders who, in the relatively liberal era of Ukrainization, attempted to correct Ukraine's underdeveloped industrial sector. This required direct access to external markets, which was impossible since foreign trade was monopolized by the Moscow apparatus.[32] However, the Ukrainian

TABLE 2
STRUCTURE OF UKRAINIAN EXPORTS TO GERMANY, 1926-8
(IN THOUSAND US DOLLARS)

	1926-7	1927-8
grains	452	2,180
livestock and poultry products	3,980	7,050
lumber	428	201
industrial raw materials	5,400	5,300
furs	300	700

SOURCE: *Komunist*, 14 September 1928.

leadership did argue for an increase in Ukraine's share of industrial imports, and especially for closer ties with Germany, in view of the republic's need for machinery for mines and metallurgical plants. Only 20 per cent of all German exports to the USSR were earmarked for Ukraine, so this process could not develop at the required pace and emerged, from time to time, as a subject of some debate between Kharkiv and Moscow.[33]

Ukrainian industry lacked access to credit facilities, which was the major factor limiting German involvement in the republic's economy.[34] As things stood, the German contribution to the rebuilding of Ukrainian industry during the 1920s was largely focussed in three major areas—*Donvuhillia* (Donbas coal mines), *Pivdenstal* (Kryvyi Rih iron ore), and *Dniprelstan* (Dnieper hydroelectric dam). German machinery was directed toward these projects, and they also received most of the German technical missions and specialists who worked in the republic.[35] Thus in 1926, *Donvuhillia* employed 30 German specialists and *Pivdenstal* employed 100.[36] On more than one occasion the press offered fulsome praise for the work of German experts. Reports from Kryvyi Rih spoke highly of German assistance "in the development of Kryvyi Rih's potential." In March 1928, *Visti* noted "the very important role of German specialists in the reconstruction of Donbas."[37] The latter comment was made two months before the "Shatynsky affair" or the "Don Mines Case," and it made the indictments read at the trial all the more absurd. (In May 1928 German engineers were arrested and put on trial for "counter-revolutionary sabotage." They were charged with "destroying the entire coal industry [through] malicious sabotage...by employing irrational methods, spending capital in a useless manner...[and] assisting interventionists."[38] These were transparent lies, whose main purpose was to signal an attack on "bourgeois specialists," as well as to find scapegoats for Soviet economic incompetence.) The "Shatynsky" incident only temporarily dampened Ukrainian-German economic relations, which flourished for another four years as industrialization was initiated. German assistance was essential, and

with orders worth 147 million roubles placed with German firms in 1928, both sides, "Shatynsky" notwithstanding, continued to do business.[39]

Cultural and Educational Ties during the 1920s

During the 1920s Germany was the most important cultural and educational influence from abroad.[40] This was the case in all fields—from mathematics, astronomy, and technical sciences, to the social sciences, humanities, and the arts. Most Ukrainian scientists studying abroad went to Germany. For example, in 1927-8, 95 per cent of the 223 Ukrainian scholars visiting foreign countries went to Germany. In the social sciences the percentage was even higher.[41] Ukrainian scholars and public figures frequently demanded unrestricted access to contact with foreign countries.[42] At stake was not only the advancement of scholarship and culture in Ukraine, but also the need to break out of the provincial mode long imposed on Ukraine by the centre. If much was done in this respect during the 1920s it was because of the People's Commissariat of Education (*Narkomos*), which was also the engine of ukrainization. *Narkomos*' efforts in Germany were particularly noteworthy.

In the spring of 1922 *Narkomos* established a mission in Berlin called *Zakordonna redaktsiina komisiia* (ZRK), with Ye.I. Kasianenko at its head. Its purpose was to establish ties with journal editors, publishers, educators, and scholars, as well as to supervise the purchase of literature and equipment for schools, technical colleges, and institutes in Ukraine. The mission's budget in 1924 was 500,000 gold roubles.[43] ZRK was Ukraine's cultural and educational voice abroad, a voice which made its presence felt in many spheres. Thus, for instance, when all-Soviet institutions were entering into cultural agreements with Germany, ZRK representatives complained that Ukraine's interests were not being met. ZRK representatives, for example, insisted that German films imported to Ukraine should be "dubbed only into Ukrainian."[44] ZRK also attempted to promote Ukrainian-language books in Germany and to organize broad educational and cultural exchanges. In 1928, when Professor Schmidt-Ott, head of the Association for the Study of Eastern Europe, visited Ukraine at *Narkomos*' behest, plans for the promotion of Ukrainian culture in Germany were discussed with great enthusiasm. Exhibits of Ukrainian books, systematic information in the German press about Ukrainian literature and scholarship, academic exchanges, German-language editions of works by Ukrainian authors, the establishment of a Ukrainian section of the Association, and the introduction of Ukrainian-language courses at German universities were among the points discussed during his visit.[45] ZRK also took a special interest in the German educational system. Its representatives were instructed by Kharkiv to study that system with a view to implementing some of the German features in Ukraine. ZRK entered into contact with a group of progressive educators led by the

Communist Edwin Herle, and eventually an association was formed called "Friends of Education in Soviet Ukraine."[46]

These cultural and educational ties, initiated by ZRK and other agencies when Ukrainization was reaching its apogee, started to decline in 1929-30, when the republic's scholarly and cultural institutions experienced the first of many purges and reorganizations. By the early 1930s, with both the USSR and Germany in the grip of totalitarianism, these ties were severed completely.

Relations during the 1930s

With the creation of the USSR on 30 December 1922, foreign affairs became the exclusive jurisdiction of the central government. Ukraine's interests were represented by a delegate to the collegium of the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. With this arrangement all treaties entered into by the USSR automatically became binding on the Ukrainian SSR. (It was only after World War II that Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was revived—on a union-republic basis.)

Early in the First Five-Year Plan it became apparent to the Soviet leadership that Western assistance on a large scale was essential for industrialization. In December 1928 a new German-Soviet protocol to facilitate trade was signed, which *Komunist* said would also bring much benefit to Ukraine's efforts to expand its heavy industry.[47] Data indicate that Soviet trade with Germany grew by leaps and bounds (see Table 3). For Germany, in the throes of depression, Soviet orders became the mainstay of many firms. Thus, in 1931 the USSR was the world's largest importer of German machinery. In certain critical areas, such as steam and gas turbines, almost all Soviet imports originated in Germany.[48] This capital equipment was paid for, in part, by the export of grain. In 1930, for example, grain accounted for more than 25 per cent of Soviet import earnings. Germany, the USSR's third-largest consumer of grain, received 800,000 tonnes in 1930 and 180,000 tonnes in 1933 (1932 figures are not available).[49] We have no data for Ukraine's foreign trade during the 1930s, but judging by the sharp increase in the number of foreign specialists working in Ukraine—from 830 in 1931 to 2,035 in 1932, the vast majority of whom were Germans[50]—Ukraine's heavy industry must have received substantial quantities of German equipment. This was paid for with Ukrainian grain. The ruthless requisition of that grain in 1932-3 resulted in the famine which claimed millions of lives. Although facts and figures have not been published, I.M. Kulinych's summary of Ukrainian trade with Germany in 1931-3 is revealing: "Ukrainian-German trade relations in this period became more active and broader. Ukrainian iron and manganese ore, grain products, livestock...were shipped to Germany in return for a wide assortment of equipment for new construction projects of the five-year plan, machinery, tools, chemical goods, and so forth."[51]

TABLE 3
SOVIET GERMAN TRADE, 1929-40
(IN MILLION ROUBLES, 1913 PRICES)

	Total Turnover	Soviet Exports	Soviet Imports
1929	321.3	168.7	152.6
1930	358.0	161.3	196.7
1931	423.4	101.4	332.0
1932	335.8	78.8	257.0
1933	183.3	67.2	116.1
1934	99.8	77.2	22.6
1935	68.8	51.8	17.0
1936	76.1	20.9	55.2
1937	52.2	18.2	34.0
1938	26.0	14.6	11.4
1939	20.0	10.5	9.5
1940	196.8	125.1	71.2

Source: *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik 1918-1966* (Moscow 1967), table 1, 9.

Cultural and educational ties were reduced to a minimum, as a result of the tightening grip of Stalinism in the USSR and the Nazification of institutions in Germany. After 1929, ties were largely limited to the Communist Party of Germany. The organization of the first "international socialist competition," which involved Odessa sailors and the Ruhr Young Communist League, was symptomatic of the new type of relationship which replaced those which developed earlier in the decade.[52] When Hitler rose to power and the German Communist party was persecuted, attention to Ukraine was focussed on the defence of German political prisoners. This campaign—organized largely by MODR (*Mizhnarodna orhanizatsiia dopomohy robitnykam)*—has been studied in great detail by Soviet Ukrainian historians.[53] Typical of these efforts was the 5,000 rouble donation made in 1934 by Nykopil miners to the families of political prisoners in Germany, and the sponsorship (*sheftsvo*) of twenty-six German prisons by the "toilers of Ukraine."[54]

While the official press expressed solidarity with the victims of Nazi terror, Ukraine's prisons were overflowing with individuals arrested on absurd charges of plotting with Germany to overthrow Soviet power. The first fully developed script was acted out at the show trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Spilka vyzvolennia Ukrainy*, SVU), an organization which existed only in the minds of the NKVD. During the trial, staid professors and cultural and religious figures were accused of plotting with Germany and Poland to bring about a military intervention. These culprits were said to be prepared to grant to Poland

Right-Bank Ukraine, whereas Germany was to get the Left Bank: "The program and tactics of the Ukrainian counter-revolution were agreed upon and directed simultaneously by Marshal Piłsudski and General Groener....Both these powers act hostilely to one another in their foreign policy," but were described as prepared for close friendship when it came to dividing Ukrainian spoils. Academician S. Yefremov and others were accused of organizing an "armed rising...which would serve as a pretext for the intervention by the neighbouring states....The years of 1930 and 1931 were the dates the counter-revolutionaries had in mind."[55] In subsequent purges, the same script was read in various permutations. Thus Ukrainian Communists such as Solodub, Shumsky, Maksymovych, and Bilenky were charged with forming a "Ukrainian Military Organization" which had infiltrated the management of collective farms and, financed by "Polish landlords and German fascists," was plotting the separation of Ukraine from the USSR. Similarly, members of the "Trotskyist Nationalist Terrorist Bloc" (such as Kotsiubynsky, Holubenko, Loginov, and Nyrchuk) were "planning to assist the bands of German and Polish fascist interventionists to occupy Ukraine."[56]

During the 1920s, the main threat to the unity of the USSR was perceived as coming from France, Britain, and their marionette, Poland. In the first half of the 1930s, Germany shared Poland's burden as the battering ram of imperialism, French imperialism in particular. This view of the international situation, which prevailed during the Comintern's "third period," had France "demanding the complete economic and political subjection of Germany....By this means the leading financial circles in France wish to create the possibility of bringing Germany into the anti-Soviet bloc." Hitler was accused of lack of patriotism, since he was "ready to sell the last remains of national independence" to the French imperialists. Assisting France in preparations for "the great war against the Soviet Union" was the United States. Germany was an unwilling victim, and Ukraine was to be among the main prizes of this conflict.[57] When Hitler came to power and "third period Stalinism" was replaced with "popular frontism," this analysis changed abruptly. Gone were references to France, Britain, and the United States as plotters of a new war. The Nazis were identified as the latest manifestation of German imperialism, whose age-old dream was the conquest of Ukraine: "German imperialism has advanced a program to tear Ukraine away from the USSR....It needs Ukrainian grain, Donbas coal, and Kryvyi Rih iron ore."[58] In 1936 the press carried a series of articles and reprints of documents chronicling the "plunderous character of Germany's march into Ukraine" in 1918.[59] The role of the "nationalist-fascist OUN" (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), financed by the Germans, was commented on at considerable length. With the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty in September 1939, all negative references to the Nazis, including their plans for Ukraine, vanished from the Soviet Ukrainian press.

Conclusion

When the Bolsheviks occupied Ukraine they inherited that country's international predicament. Their immediate concern was to secure international recognition of their seizure of Ukraine, and Germany, reluctantly at first, was prepared to grant it. As economic life recovered in both Ukraine and Germany, the complementary nature of the two economies resulted in important trade relations. Because the monopoly of foreign trade rested in Moscow's hands, trade relations between Ukraine and Germany did not always benefit Ukraine's population. Cultural and scholarly ties during the 1920s flourished in a period when Ukrainian national aspirations were tolerated and these aspirations also found institutional expression in the form of *Narkomos*. With Stalin's and Hitler's consolidation of power, these ties, which had offered such promise, were severed. Ukraine once again became an unwitting object of Great Power intrigue.

I could not here develop many aspects of Soviet Ukrainian-German relations, for there is simply not enough information in Soviet sources. Presumably German archival materials could fill in some of the gaps. However, I have attempted to present a broad and general overview of relations between two countries. The cultural dimension of those relations is an aspect which deserves to be explored in some detail. During the 1920s Germany, and in particular Berlin, served as an inspiration for iconoclasts and a constant international point of reference. For broad intellectual circles in Ukraine, the West was Germany. So, an examination of the cultural and intellectual history of the Soviet Ukrainian-German interface is perhaps the more appropriate approach to take in examining this issue, since Ukraine was a country with such a small voice in the conduct of its external affairs.

Notes

1. Interview with Khrystian Rakovsky in *Kommunist* (later *Komunist*), 22 July 1922.
2. Michael Pawlovitch, "The Ukraina as an Object of the International Counter-Revolution," *Communist International*, no. 11-12 (June-July 1920):2328.
3. For example, there were 15,000 partisans in the Oleksandrivske district, 7,000 near Kaniv, and 3,000 in the Zolotonosha region. (M.M. Popov, *Narys istorii Komunistychnoi partii [bilshovykiv] Ukrainy*, 5th ed. [Kharkiv 1931], 247.)
4. Pawlovitch, "The Ukraina," 2328.
5. V.I. Lenin, *Tvory*, 31:425-6.
6. Pawlovitch, "The Ukraina," 2329; *Kommunist*, 22 July 1922.
7. Document 158, *Ukrainska RSR na mizhnarodnii areni. Zbirnyk dokumentiv (1917-1923 rr.)* (Kiev 1966), 238.
8. *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit* (Kiev 1970), 123.

9. *Kommunist*, 14 May 1921; *Nasha pravda*, no. 5 (7 June 1921).
10. *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR* (Moscow 1960), 4:99-104; I.A. Roenko, *Sovetsko-germanskie otnosheniia (1921-1922)* (Leningrad 1965), 34.
11. I.M. Kulinych, *Ukrainsko-nimetski istorychni zviazky* (Kiev 1969), 113.
12. *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik 1918-1966* (Moscow 1967), 8, table 1.
13. *Kommunist*, 31 May 1921; *Visty vseukrainskoho tsentralnoho vykonavchoho komitetu*, 20 October 1925. (*Visti*...after 1929; hereinafter cited as *Visti*.)
14. *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, 4:445-8.
15. I.M. Kulinych, "Henuia-Rapallo i Radianska Ukraina," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1972, no. 5:129.
16. *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki*, 5:223-4; Edward Hallett Carr, *German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939* (Baltimore 1967), 48-67.
17. *Sovetsko-germanskie otnosheniia. Sbornik dokumentov*, 2 vols. (Moscow 1971), 1:461-2; A.O. Dzhedzhula, "Z istorii ukrainsko-nimetskykh ekonomichnykh vidnosyn (1920-1922 rr.)," *Visnyk Kyivskoho universytetu. Seriia istorii ta prava*, no. 7 (1965):17.
18. *Visti*, 20 October 1925; *Nasha pravda*, no. 27-8 (15 July 1922); Dzhedzhula, "Z istorii," 18; *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR*, 8, table 1.
19. *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit*, 148-9.
20. Kulinych, *Ukrainsko-nimetski istorychni zviazky*, 116.
21. Document 262, *Ukrainska RSR*, 522-5; *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit*, 150-1.
22. *Nasha pravda*, no. 45-6 (18 November 1922).
23. *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit*, 152. See also Kulinych, "Henuia-Rapallo," 130.
24. Kulinych, *Ukrainsko-nimetski istorychni zviazky*, 104.
25. I. Holdenberh, "Zovnishnia torhivlia Ukrainy za mynuli try roky i nashi zavdannia," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, 1928, no. 17:74.
26. Dzhedzhula, "Z istorii," 12.
27. P.V. Ol, *Inostrannie kapitaly v Rossii* (Petrograd 1922), 9.
28. *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR*, 8, table 1; *Visti*, 2 May 1924.
29. Dzhedzhula, "Z istorii," 18 and table 1.
30. *Ukraina. Statystychnyi spravochnyk* (Kharkiv 1925), 320, table 8; *Visti*, 11 March 1925; *Komunist*, 14 September 1928.
31. *Komunist*, 6 June 1925, 27 April 1928.
32. *Visti*, 14 February 1928, 20 October 1925 (interview with Zolotarev, delegate of the Republic to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade), 7 December 1925.

33. See Holdenberh, "Zovnishnia torhivlia Ukrainy," 76 (on decentralizing foreign trade); *Komunist*, 14 January 1926, 20 October 1927; *Visti*, 11 March 1925.
34. *Komunist*, 14 January 1928.
35. Ibid., 20 October 1927; *Visti*, 14 and 29 January 1926, 2 and 18 February 1927, 3 May 1927.
36. *Komunist*, 7 March 1926.
37. *Visti*, 29 November 1925, 19 March 1928.
38. "The Don Mines Case," *Communist International*, 1 July 1928, 282-3.
39. *Komunist*, 27 April 1928.
40. Ibid., 10 January 1929.
41. Kulinych, *Ukrainsko-nimetski istorychni zviazky*, 139-77.
42. M. Hrushevskyi, "Perspektyvy i vymohy ukrainskoi nauky. Kyivska sesiia Ukr. nauky," *Ukraina. Naukovyi dvokhmisiachnyk ukrainoznavstva*, 1925, bk. 1:8.
43. Ye.F. Bezrodnyi, "Z istorii mizhnarodnykh zviazkiv Radianskoi Ukrainy v haluzi osvity (1922-1928 rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1977, no. 3:87; Kulinych, *Ukrainsko-nimetski istorychni zviazky*, 178-9.
44. Kulinych, *Ukrainsko-nimetski istorychni zviazky*, 191.
45. *Visti*, 14 September 1928; *Komunist*, 16 September 1928.
46. The group issued a German-language periodical devoted to Ukraine's school system called *Die Proletarische Schule: Nachrichtenblatt der Freunde des Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens in der Sowjet-Ukraine*. See Kulinych, *Ukrainsko-nimetski istorychni zviazky*, 181-4.
47. *Komunist*, 22 December 1928.
48. Kulinych, *Ukrainsko-nimetski istorychni zviazky*, 135-6.
49. *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR*, 17 (table 5); 35 (table 8).
50. V.P. Bondar, "Internatsionalni zviazky robitnychoho klasu Ukrainy v 30-kh rokakh," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1968, no. 6:59.
51. Kulinych, *Ukrainsko nimetski istorychni zviazky*, 137.
52. *Komunist*, 10 October 1929.
53. See S.V. Kushynska, "Uchast hromadskosti Radianskoi Ukrainy v mizhnarodnomu rusi proty posylennia fashystskoi reaktsii v Nimechchyni," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1978, no. 1:75-82; Ye.M. Stukanov, "Internatsionalni zviazky trudiashchykh Donbasy iz 'soiuzom chervonykh frontovykiv' Nimechchyny," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1974, no. 6:68-72; I.M. Kulinych, "Z istorii ukrainsko-nimetskykh prohresyvnykh zviazkiv (1920-1945 rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1967, no. 3:26-36.
54. Kushynska, "Uchast hromadskosti Radianskoi Ukrainy," 78.

55. N. Skrypnyk, "The 'League for the Liberation of the Ukraine,'" *Communist International*, 1930, no. 6:74, 77, 78.

56. *Pravda*, 2 December 1933, 23 August 1936.

57. "Intervention against Manchuria and Preparations for the Great Anti-Soviet War," *Communist International*, 1941, no. 21:707, 708. See also, "Tanok na vulkani," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, 1930, no. 4:3-10.

58. M. Amelin, "Nitmetskyi fashyzm hotuie novi viiny," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, 1936, no. 4:16.

59. A. Vynohradova, "Rozhrom avstro-nimetskykh okupantiv," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, 1938, no. 1:56-84; see also "Nimetska okupatsiia Ukrainy v 1918 rotsi," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, 1936, no. 5:68-79, no. 9:70-9.

The New Agrarian Order in Ukraine, 1941-2: Sources and Considerations

Ralf Bartoleit

> For a narrative to be well founded, it isn't enough for that which it narrates to have actually happened.[1]

The Present State of Knowledge and Areas for Research

The literature on the history of the Third Reich has reached such proportions in recent decades that it is no longer possible to have a complete overview of it.[2] For reasons of both form and substance, one can make a very rough historical distinction between the pre-war and the war period.[3] This distinction is not entirely correct, however, either in terms of the events themselves or in terms of the results of research, because there are many problems that are not easily divided at 1939. In spite of the steadily growing number of studies dealing with the history of the Third Reich, the history of German agrarian policy in occupied Ukraine is still replete with unanswered questions. Thus, notwithstanding all the calls for a qualitative improvement in our knowledge of this era, it is clear that there are still some essential quantitative gaps that have to be filled.

It is incomprehensible, and in fact ought to be seen as a serious deficiency in historical research, that neither German agrarian policy in general nor German agrarian policy in Ukraine has been studied in a manner appropriate to its importance. This is all the more surprising in that German agrarian policy and the well-known myth of the "Ukrainian bread basket" really should be central to any account of that period. Ukraine was important to the ideological, political, and war-economy conceptions of the Third Reich. Ukraine was central; it was the "promised land" of all National Socialist expansionist goals in the Soviet Union; and it was Hitler's view that Ukraine was "perhaps the decisive issue of German foreign policy."[4]

An examination of German agrarian policy in Ukraine, therefore, could also make a more extensive contribution, within the framework of a general history of the Third Reich, to "a generally acceptable explanation of the causes of the Russian campaign,"[5] which has been lacking for quite some time. German policy

before 22 June 1941 and the events after the beginning of operation "Barbarossa," especially in Ukraine, suggest some conclusions about the intended goals. What is necessary, therefore, is to compare the goals of National Socialist ideology with National Socialist economic policy in Ukraine, in both theory and practice, in order to arrive at an assessment of the fundamental significance of the ideological and economic factors.

Within the context of German agrarian policy in Ukraine, the most important measure undertaken in the first year of the war (1941-2) was the introduction of the New Agrarian Order (*Neue Agrarordnung*) in February 1942. The goal of this New Agrarian Order was to secure agricultural deliveries for the Third Reich and to win the Ukrainian peasantry's support for German policy. The latter was to be achieved by means of dissolution of the *kolhosp* and *radhosp* (*kolkhoz* and *sovkhoz).* It was the announcement of the dissolution which was emphasized, and it is still a matter for research to determine the extent to which the New Agrarian Order actually involved any real dissolution of the Soviet system of large-scale agriculture. What is necessary is a new interpretation of the development of the policy-making process which preceded implementation of the New Agrarian Order in Ukraine, a new interpretation which goes beyond the framework of the events themselves.

Against the background of such considerations, the goals of previous research have been inadequate. Neither the works of "bourgeois" historians of the West nor Marxists of the East really give due consideration to the importance of Ukraine for the elite of the Third Reich. In the most comprehensive history of World War II published in West Germany by the Bureau for Research in Military History, the significance of agrarian policy in occupied Ukraine and, in particular, the *kolhosp* question (which stood at the centre of all discussions about food deliveries), is at least recognized. However, the circumstances which led to the introduction of the New Agrarian Order were treated in a peripheral manner.[6] No more recent Western publication goes into any greater detail on the question of the New Agrarian Order. Even when writers devote themselves to some particular aspect of German occupation policy in Ukraine or German agrarian policy, they are mainly interested in other specialized questions.[7] This disheartening state of affairs is made even worse by the fact that no historian in either the exile Ukrainian or the exile Polish communities has made any significant contribution to the study of German agrarian policy in Ukraine during World War II.

The only work which gives comprehensive information on German agrarian policy in Ukraine was produced more than thirty years ago, by Alexander Dallin. However, even in this study only a few sections deal with agrarian policy. It is all the more amazing that Dallin's fundamental conclusions are in keeping with the conclusions of modern research based on the archival material available now in Germany. His understanding of the issue of agrarian policy, however, is in need of improvement. His account of "what actually happened" has to be put into the framework of current historical/theoretical assumptions and research into the

history of the Third Reich. Within such a framework Dallin's work is valuable, but it can only serve as a point of departure for a re-evaluation.[8] Five years before Dallin's book was published, a work by Karl Brandt appeared, which today can be treated partially as a source, since it was written with the assistance of Otto Schiller, one of the officials responsible for German agrarian policy in Ukraine. The work of Reitlinger, published a little later, adds some detail to Dallin's work but its scholarship is inferior. Other works from the same period, produced around the Institute for Occupation Studies (*Institut für Besatzungsfragen*) in Tübingen, are inadequate, from the point of view of their limited goals and their source material compared to the work of Dallin or to what is possible today.[9]

Marxist historians in East Germany (GDR), in Poland, and in the Soviet Union have failed to produce any work even comparable to the limited amount achieved by the "bourgeois" historians. In the GDR there was a standard general history of World War II, but apart from a few succinct phrases about the failure of German agrarian policy on the *kolhosp* there is nothing.[10] One would have expected other GDR historians at least to begin to take up this question, but amazingly the whole question of the New Agrarian Order is treated as if it were of only minor significance.[11] Specialist works dealing with the agrarian question restrict themselves to the territory of the Reich.[12] The only Polish monograph dealing with the Ukrainian question in the Third Reich paid little attention to Germany's agrarian policy in Ukraine during World War II.[13] The main interest of Soviet historians was resistance to the occupation and the activities of the partisans. Only in one older work is the question of Germany's agrarian policy in Ukraine dealt with, but there is nothing new in it because of the limited source material used. There are some works that deal with German occupation policy in Russia and Ukraine, but they are unsatisfactory because of their general approach.[14]

Sources

The most important published source material for most of the history of the Third Reich, and therefore also for the study of German occupation policy in Ukraine, is from the Nuremberg trials. There are also other collections of documents.[15] However, I want to deal with the most important unpublished sources, which are in the Federal Archives in Koblenz, in the Federal Archives/Military Archives in Freiburg, and in the Political Archives of the Foreign Office in Bonn.

One important fact about the Federal Archives in Koblenz is that the documents of the civil administration in Ukraine (*Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, RKU), are incomplete and those that do exist are not very useful.[16] This material must be supplemented by the documents of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (*Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete*, RMO) and the series *Krieg*, of the Reich Chancellery (*Reichskanzlei*).[17] In the collection of the RMO, apart from the usual documents and accounts of activities in the RKU, there is

a large collection of memoranda which were produced right up to the end of the war. These memoranda present a differentiated picture of the goals and achievements of Germany's Ukrainian policy in World War II. Most of them were written after, and as a consequence of, the events of the first year of the war. However, they do permit us to draw conclusions about the first twelve months of German agrarian policy in Ukraine. Scattered material from the Finance Ministry, the Propaganda Ministry, and the Security Headquarters would provide an overall picture. (The collection of the Economics Ministry is of no importance here.) These large collections of the various ministries have been examined, but not from the point of view of determining Germany's agrarian policy in Ukraine during World War II. There are other smaller, individual collections which are of some use.[18]

The collection of the Federal Archives/Military Archives in Freiburg is indispensable, since what must be studied is not just that area of Ukraine which was under German civil administration (RKU), but rather German agrarian policy in the whole of occupied Ukraine. Particular attention must be paid to the conflict of interests between the civil and military administrations. For German planning and the state of knowledge about the economic situation in Ukraine before the attack on the Soviet Union, there are important records in the secret archives of the Bureau of Defence Economy and Armaments (*Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt*, WiRüAmt).[19] The most important collection in Freiburg is that of the Headquarters of the Economics Department East (*Wirtschaftsstab Ost*, WiStabOst), which includes the detailed war diary (*Kriegstagebuch*, KTB) of the leading agricultural group of the WiStabOst as well as the situation reports and activities reports of this group.[20] There is a general history of WiStabOst by Major General Nagel, whose personal records are also in the Freiburg collection.[21] This material is supplemented by the generally good records of the Economic Inspectorate South (*Wirtschaftsinspektion Süd*).

The remaining records of the Foreign Office representative in the German civil administration in Ukraine (RKU), von Saucken, are in the Political Archives of the Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA) in Bonn, but these records, like those of the RKU itself, are incomplete. Even if the records were more complete, there is no reason to believe that they would add anything important or informative, since the representative of the Foreign Office, because of his position, would not have been able to intervene in the decision-making process. Much more informative are the records of the Foreign Office representatives in the Army Supreme Command (*Armee-Oberkommando*, AOK). These representatives, like the AA representatives in the RKU, had been appointed because of the responsibility of the Foreign Office in the occupied Eastern territories. Among the Foreign Office representatives in the military command, some very quickly recognized the importance of economic issues and sent reports to Berlin. An important example of this is the records of the legation councillor K.G. von Pfleiderer. The Political Archives also contain the records of the Russia Committee (*Russland-Gremium*) and of the one-time German ambassador to Moscow,

Count W. von der Schulenburg. Although the *Russland-Gremium* never had decisive influence on German policy in the eastern territories, some of the observations of this Committee, especially in the early years of its existence, when it was fighting for some recognition and influence, are worth looking into, since the Committee represented a viewpoint outside the decision-making process.

There is therefore quite an adequate and comprehensive collection of source material which has yet to be properly used and evaluated on the question of German agrarian policy in Ukraine during World War II.

Theoretical Considerations and Initial Answers

It is not possible to analyse here satisfactorily the genesis, the implementation, and consequences of the New Agrarian Order.[22] What is possible is to present some preliminary considerations about integrating the New Agrarian Order within the overall framework of the history of the war against the Soviet Union. Both ideological/programmatic and economic factors are of decisive importance to making a judgment about the reasons for this war.[23] Is it possible, in this context, to separate the long-term goals of National Socialist ideology (*Lebensraum* in the East) from the short-term goals of the war economy (food deliveries to the Reich) in order to arrive at some well founded assumption about the priority of one set of goals over the other? It is of fundamental importance to the investigation of the history of the Third Reich to deal with these contrasting and conflicting sets of goals as they manifest themselves in the question of the New Agrarian Order.[24] I shall not impose any new assumptions about the priority of either ideology or economics. In view of the complexity of the material, this is not really possible.[25] I shall not hesitate, however, to restate and, where necessary, give greater emphasis to the ideological model in contrast to the economic explanation, which is the one currently finding greater favour among historical researchers.

A "pure" economic explanation of German agrarian policy in Ukraine, which ignored the more general theoretical aspects of the problem,[26] would be possible, but it would be unsatisfactory from the point of view of the general development of research into the history of National Socialism in Germany. What would be the advantage of such a "new" approach when it is clear that a comprehensive study of German agrarian policy in Ukraine between 1941 and 1945 would have to conclude, on the basis of everything we know already, that the whole notion of a "Ukrainian bread basket" was a myth that exploded? It is clear that grain exports from Ukraine to the Third Reich were very small in relation to Germany's need; that chaos among officials existed in Ukraine; that murderous atrocities were carried out; and that the entire German agrarian policy was, in the final analysis, a complete disaster.[27] It would be much more fruitful to approach the problem by looking at the relationship between the economic and the ideological.

At first sight, the New Agrarian Order appears to be a "subordination of the policy of occupation to German economic needs."[28] In other words, it appears to deny the continued significance of ideological/programmatic goals in the particular situation of the war. The New Agrarian Order was finally defined on 15 February 1942 and was proclaimed on 28 February 1942. Its goal was to maintain the form of large-scale agricultural units, such as already existed in the system of the *kolhosp* and *radhosp*, while at the same time persuading the Ukrainian peasantry that the Soviet collective economy would be eliminated and the land would be privatized. The *kolhospy* were renamed "community farms" (*Gemeinwirtschaften*) and were to be considered as a "transitional form." The small peasant plots could be enlarged by a minuscule amount. The next step, according to the plan, would be the creation of agricultural co-operatives (*Landbaugenossenschaften*) which would give the peasants greater freedom in the individual exploitation of the land, although common use of the land would still be retained. During the three years of German occupation, these agricultural co-operatives were the maximum concession made by the Germans and they accounted, at the end of the occupation, for not more than 10 per cent of the arable land. Individual peasant farms and privatization of the land were put off to some future time in which "the equipment and livestock necessary for individual peasant farming would once again be available."[29] Privatization in this sense did not take place on any significant scale.

In the existing literature on the New Agrarian Order these measures are portrayed as a de facto retention of the collective system.[30] One cannot deny such an interpretation. In response to the question why this was the case, the literature points to the importance of large-scale agriculture to secure the best possible harvest and delivery. Such an analysis supports the thesis of the dominance of military/economic pragmatism which disregards ideological plans or pushes them into the background. Such a thesis, however, is an oversimplification because it ignores the ideological limits of this primarily economic complex. A more extensive and subtle study of these limits has yet to be undertaken by historians. Beyond the statistical facts concerning the exploitation of Ukraine, it is essential to study the influence of ideological factors on economic decisions.

The ideological framework of the German economic order in Ukraine is made clear by Erich Koch's (*Reichskommissar* for Ukraine) veto of the New Agrarian Order in February 1942. Right from the beginning Koch emphasized that the "question of ownership" was "a decision which would have far-reaching consequences."[31] It was a problem from the point of view of Germany's plans for colonization. His attitude toward the New Agrarian Order makes it clear that the collective system was to be maintained not solely for economic reasons. One must assume, therefore, that ideological and economic factors were at least of equal importance. In view of the military situation, which would have demanded clear priorities, this emphasis on the ideological element calls for an interpretation which integrates the ideological factor and gives it due prominence. In demanding that the long-term colonization plans be taken into account, in a way

which limited economic decision-making, should we not see evidence of the secondary character of the economic measures relative to the ideological assumptions? Since the demands of the war economy made it essential to come to a clearer decision about long-term economic development, it is possible for us to come to some conclusions about the overall significance of the war against the Soviet Union. In such a process of interpretation, the ideological component seems to gain more and more weight as an indispensable condition.

In his own critique, Koch probably attributed too much practical significance to the theoretical plans for community farms and agricultural co-operatives, to be followed at some future date by privatization. He feared that, "for the sake of momentary advantage, long-term plans would be changed and undone."[32] However, the agrarian order worked out by Otto Schiller (former economic attaché at the German embassy in Moscow, and one of those primarily responsible for German agrarian policy in Ukraine after 1941), foresaw no tumultuous changes in property relations in Ukraine such as Koch feared. Koch's protests, however, throw a different light on the essential goals of the New Agrarian Order. His statements confirm the impression that, although other economic measures such as privatization (which would probably have been economically and politically more successful) were considered, they contradicted the ideological impetus of the German occupiers.[33] Is it not more likely, therefore, that this exploitative New Agrarian Order, although decked out in the form of economic arguments, was in reality the kind of plan Koch had in mind? Koch, after all, had argued continuously for an unconditional exploitation of Ukrainian agriculture and labour.[34] These considerations, which emphasize the significance of long-term programmatic goals, as opposed to short-term economic and military successes, need to be expanded and tested.[35]

It is precisely the negative economic facts, the unexhausted possibilities within the framework of the New Agrarian Order, that appear to confirm Hillgruber's thesis of a "racist-ideological war of destruction," a goal which took priority over every economic consideration even during the war. Nothing is altered by the fact that demands for economic successes in Ukraine became more radical as the war progressed.[36] Everywhere one finds the limitations within which economic decisions were made in Ukraine. One must assume that German decision-makers were well aware of the impossibility of large-scale grain deliveries from Ukraine. A study of the use of the occupied eastern territories stated in December 1941 that the goal in these territories, whatever the form of economic exploitation, consisted "above all else" in their "usefulness for colonization....The remarkable agricultural richness of Ukraine is something that existed before the World War of 1914. At one time, agricultural production in Ukraine was 52 per cent of all agricultural production in Russia. After 1930 it was 40 per cent and in recent years only 20 per cent of all grain produced came from Ukraine."[37] In view of this assessment of conditions in Ukraine, is it not likely that the New Agrarian Order really should be seen as a front behind which the Germans planned to carry out their long-term programmatic/ideological goals?

I would venture the thesis that economic successes for the New Agrarian Order were indeed welcomed, but that the real potential of this "new" economic order was deliberately not used to the full, because that would have contradicted the ideological plan. This would be the case precisely for the first phase of the war, when time and the political circumstances would have allowed a different course of action. The *Lebensraum* program was of much greater importance.[38] If this interpretation is pursued (not only in the case of the Holocaust, in which the rigid pursuit of ideological goals is most easily demonstrated) within the framework of economics, then one could expect from the study of German agrarian policy in Ukraine much more than "a contribution to a general synthetic theory of fascism."[39] Rather, very fundamental problems could be exemplified.

The extent to which these considerations of an interpretation of the New Agrarian Order and its goals could be confirmed by Hitler's own intentions is demonstrated by another statement:

> War Administration Chief [Hans Joachim] Riecke [State Secretary in the Ministry for Food and Agriculture as well as leading spokesman of the *Chefgruppe* Agriculture in WiStabOst] reported to the Führer on the presentation and outlined once more the criticisms of the Agrarian Order. It was the express order of the Führer that...in the implementation of the Agrarian Order, no future possibilities were to be blocked. The agricultural co-operatives, in their inner structures, should not be too strongly consolidated.[40]

This makes it clear that privatization was outside the programmatic plan, although economically and, in particular, politically, it would have been more effective for German policy in Ukraine. There are plenty of indications that privatization, in spite of all the possible problems it might involve, would have promised greater economic success.[41]

Economic interests were limited by the general ideological framework. The way the *kolhosp* question was handled in the New Agrarian Order throws important light on our general understanding of the Russian campaign. The history of the development of this New Agrarian Order needs more research. A comparison with World War I might help to counter the thesis that World War II was a matter of "decisions made in the shadow of an exceptional situation." It was not so much an *idée fixe*, as Hans Mommsen rather succinctly described it,[42] but rather certain conscious fixed ideas which determined the programmatic orientation of German foreign policy in Ukraine in World War II.

Notes

1. J. Rüsen, "Wie kann man Geschichte vernünftig schreiben?" in *Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte*, ed. J. Kocka and T. Nipperdey (Munich 1979), 328.
2. See K. Hildebrand, *Das Dritte Reich* (Munich-Vienna 1980).
3. See, for instance, A. Hillgruber, *Endlich genug über Nationalsozialismus und Zweiten Weltkrieg? Forschungsstand und Literatur* (Düsseldorf 1982).

4. H. Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier: Vollständig überarbeitete und erweiterte Neuausgabe* (Stuttgart 1977), 449; A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich 1933), 726. On the question of whether *Mein Kampf* ought to be considered the foundation for what happened later, see J. Thies, *Architekt der Weltherrschaft: Die Endziele Hitlers* (Düsseldorf 1976), 27f. See also the statements in G.L. Weinberg, ed., *Hitlers Zweites Buch: Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928* (Stuttgart 1961), 159.

5. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, vol. 4: *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion* (Stuttgart 1983), xiii.

6. Ibid., 154f., 955f.

7. I. Fleischhauer, *Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion*, Schriftenreihe der *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 46 (Stuttgart 1983), 174-84; M. Riedel, *Bergbau und Eisenhüttenindustrie in der Ukraine unter deutscher Besatzung (1941-1944)*, in Schriftenreihe der *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 21 (1973), 245-84; J.E. Farquharson, *The Plough and the Swastika: The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany 1928-1945*, SAGE Studies in 20th Century History, 5 (London 1970).

8. A. Dallin, *Deutsche Herrschaft in Russland 1941-1945: Eine Studie über Besatzungspolitik* (Düsseldorf 1958).

9. K. Brandt, *Management of Agriculture and Food in the German-Occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe: A Study of Military Government*, Germany's Agriculture and Food Policies in World War II, vol. 2 (Stanford 1953); G. Reitlinger, *Ein Haus auf Sand gebaut: Hitlers Gewaltpolitik in Russland 1941-1944* (Hamburg 1962); R. Gerber, *Staatliche Wirtschaftslenkung in den besetzten Ostgebieten während des Zweiten Weltkrieges unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der treuhänderischen Verwaltung von Unternehmern und der Ostgesellschaften*, Studien des Instituts für Besatzungsfragen, no. 17 (Tübingen 1959), hereinafter cited as Studien; R. Herzog, *Grundzüge der deutschen Besatzungsverwaltung in den ost- und südosteuropäischen Ländern während des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, Studien, no. 4 (Tübingen 1955).

10. W. Schumann and K. Dreschler, eds., *Vom Überfall auf die Sowjetunion bis zur Sowjetischen Gegenoffensive bei Stalingrad (Juni 1941 bis November 1942)*, Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg, vol. 2 (Cologne 1975), 442.

11. D. Eichholtz, *Geschichte der deutschen Kreigswirtschaft: 1941-1943*, vol. 2 (East Berlin 1985). There is no discussion of the New Agrarian Order or the question of the *kolhosp*. The whole question of agriculture in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union is limited to a few statistics. German agrarian policy is also not mentioned in idem, "Wirtschaftspolitik und Strategie des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus im Dnieper-Donez-Industriegebiet 1941-1943," *Militärgeschichte* 18 (1979):281-96. See also N. Müller, *Wehrmacht und Okkupation 1941-1944: Zur Rolle der Wehrmacht und ihrer Führungsorgane im Okkupationsregime des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus auf sowjetischem Territorium* (East Berlin 1971), 161-3. The statements made there are either a result of unfamiliarity with the records or they are simply false.

12. J. Lehmann, "Untersuchungen zur Agrarpolitik und Landwirtschaft im faschistischen Deutschland während des Zweiten Weltkrieges (1942-1945)" (Ph.D. diss., Rostock, 1977).

13. R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945)* (Warsaw 1972).

14. N.I. Sinitsyna and V. Tomin, "Proval agrarnoi politiki gitlerovtsev na okkupirovannoi territorii SSSR (1941-1944 gg.)," *Voprosy istorii*, 1965, no. 6:32-44. A shorter version of this appeared as "Das Scheitern der faschistischen Agrarpolitik in den okkupierten Gebieten der UdSSR (1941-1944)," *Sowjetwissenschaft: Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge*, (1966):1190-9.

    The best general summary, although it is more a report on the literature than a history, is L.V. Kondratenko, *Krakh ekonomicheskikh planov nemetsko-fashistkikh zakhvatchikov na Ukraine* (Kiev 1980). A more general account is N.M. Zagorulko and A. Iudenkov, *Krakh ekonomicheskikh planov fashistskoi Germanii na vremenno okkupirovannoi territorii SSSR* (Moscow 1970). See also *Ukrainska RSR u Velykii vitchyznianii viini Radianskoho Soiuzu 1941-1945 rr.*, 3 vols. (Kiev 1967), and *Nimetsko-fashystskyi okupatsiinyi rezhym na Ukraini. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev 1963).

15. International Military Tribunal, *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof*, 42 vols. (Nuremberg 1947-9). Worth mentioning here are the records of German foreign policy: *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*, Series D: *1937-1945* (Baden-Baden 1950ff.). Also the anthologies, *Anatomie des Krieges*, *Anatomie der Aggression*, and *Weltherrschaft im Visier* (East Berlin 1969-72).

16. See Bundesarchiv (cited hereinafter as BA), R 94 (Findbuch).

17. BA R 6 (RMO) and R 43 II (*Reichskanzlei*).

18. For instance, the "Berichte des Beauftragten des Reichskanzlei im OKW-Stab z.b.V. Albert Hoffmann aus den Reichskommissariaten Ostland, Weissrussland, Ukraine und dem GG." BA NS 6 (*Partei-Kanzlei der NSDAP*), 795.

19. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (cited hereinafter as BA-MA), RW 19, appendix 1.

20. BA-MA, RW 31/42-5, RW 31/302-3.

21. The "Nagel Study" was to be published by R.D. Müller of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Freiburg.

22. See Ralf Bartoleit, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik in den besetzten Gebieten der Ukraine vom Sommer 1941 bis zum Sommer 1942 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Einführung der 'Neuen Agrarordnung': Eine Studie über die strukturelle Durchsetzung nationalsozialistischer Programmatik" (M.A. diss.: University of Hamburg, 1987).

23. Hillgruber, in the context of ideological/programmatic factors, wrote of a "racist-ideological war of destruction...of a singular character." A. Hillgruber, "Noch einmal: Hitlers Wendung gegen die Sowjetunion 1940. Nicht (Militär-) 'Strategie oder Ideologie,' sondern 'Programm' und Weltkriegsstrategie," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 33, (1982):214-26; idem, "Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt und die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges—Situationsanalyse und Machtkalkül der

beiden Paktpartner," *Historische Zeitschrift* 230 (1980):339-61; idem, "Die 'Endlösung' und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus," in *Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte: Materialen zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches*, ed. M. Funke, Bonner Schriften zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 12 (Düsseldorf 1977), 94-114 (cited hereinafter as Funke, *Hitler*).

For economic factors see R.D. Müller, "Industrielle Interessenpolitik im Rahmen des 'Generalplans Ost'. Dokumente zum Einfluss von Wehrmacht, Industrie und SS auf die wirtschaftspolitische Zielsetzung für Hitlers Ostimperium," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 29 (1981):101-41; idem, "Die Rolle der Industrie in Hitlers Ostimperium," in *Militärgeschichte: Probleme—Thesen—Wege*, ed. M. Messerschmidt, Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte, vol. 25 (Stuttgart 1982), 383-406.

24. T. Mason, "Intention and Explanation: Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism," in *Der Führerstaat: Mythos und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches*, ed. G. Hirschfeld and L. Kettenacker, Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London, vol. 8 (Stuttgart 1981), 23-40.

25. See H. Sundhaussen, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens im nationalsozialistischem Grossraum 1941-1945: Das Scheitern einer nationalsozialistischen Ausbeutungsstrategie*, Studien zur Weltgeschichte, 23 (Stuttgart 1983), 12; K.H. Schlarp, *Wirtschaft und Besatzung in Serbien 1941-1944: Ein Beitrag zur nationalsozialistischen Wirtschaftspolitik in Südosteuropa*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, 25 (Stuttgart 1986), 6f.

26. Both Sundhaussen (*Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens*) and Schlarp (*Wirtschaft und Besatzung*) are very hesitant to enter into this controversy. For a different viewpoint, see W. Michalka, "Die nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik im Zeichen eines 'Konzeptionen-Pluralismus'—Fragestellungen und Forschungsaufgaben," in Funke, *Hitler*, 46-62.

27. These points are confirmed in Dallin, *Deutsche Herrschaft*; Reitlinger, *Ein Haus auf Sand gebaut*; Kondratenko, *Krakh ekonomicheskikh planov*; Sinitsyna and Tomin, "Proval agrarnoi politiki"; Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska*; and J.A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (New York 1955).

28. W. Długoborski, "Economic Policy of the Third Reich in Occupied and Dependent Countries 1938-1945: An Attempt at a Typology," *Studia Historiae Oeconomicae* 15 (1980):179-212.

29. Kriegstagebuch der Chefgruppe Landwirtschaft/WiStabOst v. 15.2.1942, BA-MA, RW 31/42b, 520; Lage- und Tätigkeitsberichte der Chefgruppe Landwirtschaft/WiStabOst v 5.3.1942, BA-MA, RW 31/302a, 112; Dallin, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 346, gives the date as 26.2.1942, which is incorrect.

30. See note 27 above.

31. Aktenvermerk RMfdbO (Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete) v. 3.2.1942, BA, R 6/71, 70.

32. Koch, Stellungnahme zur neuen Agrarordnung v. 5.2.1942, BA, R 6/71, 77.

33. See Schiller's response in Aktenvermerk RMfdbO v. 3.3.1942, BA, R 6/71, 70-5.

34. See Dallin, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 150.

35. See, for instance, the report of Leykauf, Inspector in Wirtschaftsinspektion Süd, of 2,12,1941, BA-MA, R 31/103, 8.

36. H.E. Volkmann, "Landwirtschaft und Ernährung in Hitlers Europa 1939-1945," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 35 (1984):9-74 (quotation on 28).

37. Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, "Nutzung der eroberten Gebiete durch das deutsche Volk" (December 1941), BA, R 6/602.

38. Cz. Madajczyk, "Die Besatzungssysteme der Achsenmächte: Versuch einer komparativen Analyse," *Studia Historiae Oeconomicae* 14 (1979):105-22.

39. W. Długoborski, "Einleitung: Faschismus, Besatzung und sozialer Wandel: Fragestellung und Typologie," *Zweiter Weltkrieg und sozialer Wandel. Achsenmächte und besetzte Länder* (Göttingen 1981), 11-61.

40. Besprechung Kriegsverwaltungchefs der Wirtschaftsinspektionen am 2. und 3. März 1942 in Berlin, BA-MA, RW 31/304.

41. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Vertreter des Auswärtigen Amtes beim Reichskommissar für die Ukraine, 1; KultPolGeh, 144, 154.

42. H. Mommsen, "Hitlers Stellung im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssytem," in Hirschfeld and Kettenacker, *Der Führerstaat*, 43-70; idem, "Nationalsozialismus oder Hitlerismus?" in *Persönlichkeit und Struktur in der Geschichte*, ed. Bosch (Düsseldorf 1977), 62-71.

Ukrainians in the Armed Forces of the Reich: The 14th *Waffen* Grenadier Division of the SS

Wolfdieter Bihl

Ukraine was one of the many areas of missed opportunity in the policy of the Third Reich. That was partly the result of Nazi racist conceptions of the Slavs. Any lexicon would have made clear to the Nazi leaders how the Slavic and the other Indo-European languages were related. Indeed, they would only have had to read their own theoretician on the "nordic races," Hans F.K. Günther, who indicated that the Slavs were a nordic people. It was only when they were in Ukraine that many German soldiers realized this. The *Reichskommissar* for Ukraine Erich Koch, who remained in that post right to the end, was a firm believer in the theory of inferior races (*Untermenschen*). Yet Koch's superior, *Reichsleiter* Alfred Rosenberg (the Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories), as well as a number of his co-workers in the ministry dealing with Ukraine, took a different view, if only for purely practical reasons. A more sensible approach was also taken by the *Generalkommissar* for the Crimea (the former Gauleiter of Vienna), Alfred Eduard Frauenfeld, as well as by the Governor of Galicia, the Austrian SS *Brigadeführer* Dr. Otto Gustav Wächter.

It was Hitler's view, as late as 16 July 1941, that "only Germans should carry weapons, not Slavs, Czechs, Cossacks, or Ukrainians."[1] However, the call for a "struggle against Bolshevism," and the belief that National Socialism was a lesser evil than Communism or Stalinism, led many Slavs to apply to join the armed forces of the German Reich, despite their experience of German occupation and German treatment of prisoners of war.[2] Among those who applied were Russians, Cossack units, White Russians, Ukrainians, Catholic Croatians, Muslim Bosnians, Slovenes, Serbs, Bulgarians, and even a small number of Poles (after October 1944).

What motivated some Ukrainians to enter service for the Reich was a frustrated nationalism. The Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Rada of 22 January 1918 had proclaimed Ukrainian independence from the Russian federation. In the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 9 February 1918, the Central Powers recognized the Ukrainian National Republic as an independent state; this event remained firmly

rooted in the awareness of the Ukrainian people.[3] On 29 April 1918, with German support, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky came to power. His regime was replaced by the Directory in November/December 1918, and Petliura established his dictatorship in February 1919, which lasted until 1921. During the years 1918-23, there also existed the Western Ukrainian National Republic.[4] The end of World War I led to the division of Ukrainian territory among the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. In 1929 a number of Ukrainian groups came together to found the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was led until May 1938 by Yevhen Konovalets.[5] His successor, Andrii Melnyk, continued the policy, initiated by Konovalets, of co-operation with the Germans. OUN propaganda was directed first and foremost at Ukrainians living in Poland.

German friendliness toward Ukrainian nationalism was, however, purely tactical and dependent on its concurrence with German foreign policy goals. On 15 March 1939, when Monsignor Avhustyn Voloshyn proclaimed the independence of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic, Berlin withheld its support because Hitler's alliance with Hungary was more important. The 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers organized by the *Sich* were unable to withstand the Hungarian attack. For the disappointed Ukrainians, however, Hitler's anti-Polish and anti-Soviet policy seemed to offer at least some long-term hope for the Ukrainian independence struggle. For the battle in Poland, the German *Abwehr* organized a Ukrainian legion which operated under the name of *Bergbauern-Hilfe* and was supposed to revolutionize Galicia. In September 1939, 600 soldiers of the *Bergbauern-Hilfe*, led by Roman Sushko, entered Galicia, but, with Hitler's delivery of Galicia to the Soviet Union, they had no role to play.[6] In December 1940, due to the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the *Abwehr* broke off its contacts with the Ukrainian nationalists.

In February 1940 there was a split inside OUN. The more radical elements followed Stepan Bandera, the more moderate elements remained with Melnyk. From then on there were two rival wings, OUN-B and OUN-M. OUN-B cadres continued to operate in the Reich and in the Generalgouvernement, in spite of the strain in German-Ukrainian relations. They operated officially as *Werkschutzgruppen* and units of the *Reichsarbeitdienst*. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 there was no longer any reason for German caution about Ukrainians. The *Abwehr* then created two legions, the Roland Legion (in Saubersdorf near Vienna) and the Nachtigall Legion (in Neuhammer, Silesia). Ukrainians saw in those units the core of a future Ukrainian army. Most members of both Legions were followers of OUN-B or had served in the *Sich* in Carpatho-Ukraine. The *Abwehr* made significant concessions to Ukrainian national feeling, such as permitting soldiers in the Roland Legion to wear uniforms similar to those worn by the Ukrainian Army in 1918-20 and exempting both Legions from swearing an oath of allegiance to Hitler. (They swore rather

to fight for "the freedom of Ukraine.") Under the leadership of Lieutenant Roman Shukhevych, who had as his adviser the German *Oberleutnant* Theodor Oberländer, 400-500 men of the *Nachtigall* Battalion entered Galicia in June 1941. On 30 June the German-Ukrainian troops reached Lviv. Shortly before its withdrawal, the Soviet NKVD had executed some 4,000 Ukrainian and Polish political prisoners.[7]

Both OUN-B and OUN-M tried to win satisfaction of their political demands from the Germans. Bandera sent a memorandum to Hitler on 23 June 1941 in which he argued for an independent Ukrainian national state. On 6 July 1941 the Melnyk wing sent to Hitler a proposal for the formation of an independent Ukrainian army and German-Ukrainian co-operation. Skoropadsky (who was then living in Berlin and actually had very little influence in Ukraine) offered to raise a Ukrainian army of two million men in return for limited autonomy for Ukraine. All such appeals, including one from Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky to Hitler in early February 1942, went unheeded. A sovereign Ukraine was not part of Hitler's plans. His goal was a colony based on the model of British India. The Ukrainian government established in Lviv on 30 June 1941 by the Bandera supporter Yaroslav Stetsko was dissolved and Western Ukraine (Galicia) was incorporated into the Generalgouvernement in July 1941. On 15 September 1941 the Germans arrested thousands of members of OUN-B and deported them to concentration camps and prisons.[8] These shortcomings and missed opportunities in Germany's Ukrainian policy in 1941 and later during the war were compounded by the astounding fact that many Ukrainians continued to place their hope in the Germans.[9]

In August 1941 the Roland and Nachtigall Legions were removed from the Eastern front and moved back to Germany. In spite of bitter feelings over the failure of their national aspirations, all but fourteen of the legionaries were prepared to sign up with the *Wehrmacht* for another year. (In Germany they could at least receive modern military training.) Both Legions then constituted a single unit and in March 1942 they were sent to Belarus to fight partisans. The volunteers in the Legion unit were completely disillusioned by German policy toward Ukraine and at the end of their period of service the entire unit refused to sign up again. On 1 October 1942 the unit was dissolved and activists among the officer corps were imprisoned in Lviv. (Captain Shukhevych succeeded in making his way through to the nationalist partisans.)

Reichskommissar Koch, who was in charge of Central and Eastern Ukraine, quickly succeeded in driving many Ukrainians into the enemy camp. OUN-M, which had hoped that evolutionary methods and major adaptations to the Germans would bring them around to its goal of a sovereign Ukrainian state, had assigned a large number of members to work as translators or in the local relief organizations. Until February 1942 the National Socialists put down even these modest beginnings of self-administration.[10] Anti-Communist Ukrainians were

not allowed to serve in their own militia but were forced to serve in the *Hilfspolizei* and in the *Schuma* (*Schutzmannschaft*) Battalions. *Schuma* Battalions 201 (*Roland/Nachtigall*) and 202-6 were formed in the Generalgouvernement in the years 1941-3; 207-12 were formed in 1944. In Eastern Ukraine the strength of the Ukrainian *Schutzmannschaft*, consisting of seventy battalions, stood at 35,000 men. In addition, in 1942-3 there were in *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine 15,665 Ukrainian *Schutzpolizei* and 55,094 Ukrainian Gendarmes.[11] Thousands deserted to the nationalist partisans because their consciences did not allow them to burn the villages of their own people and shoot unarmed civilians. Altogether there were about 250,000 Ukrainians who were members of the *Osttruppen* and the German auxiliary units. The greater part of them were (or were supposed to be) organized in the Ukrainian Liberation Army (UVV, *Ukrainske vyzvolne viisko*).[12] However, there was no such Ukrainian army under its own command. There was a constant flow of men from the UVV to the anti-communist partisans, who were organized in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA, *Ukrainska povstanska armiia*) under the leadership of Shukhevych (nom de guerre, Taras Chuprynka). There were actually desertions in both directions. The UPA was supported by OUN-B and fought against the Soviets, Germans, Poles, and sometimes OUN-M. Goebbels, on 26 April 1942, drew a negative picture of German *Ostpolitik*: "We have been too hard on the Russians and especially the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians and Russians can't be won over with the use of a truncheon."[13] An overhaul of the occupation regime was not attempted, however, in *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, but rather in Galicia, which was part of the Generalgouvernement. In Cracow there was a Ukrainian *Hauptausschuss* under Professor Volodymyr Kubiiovych, but it had few powers.

Wächter, the governor of the District of Galicia, showed some understanding for Ukrainian national ambitions. On 1 March 1943, a month after Stalingrad, he recommended to Himmler that Germany should make use of Ukrainian hatred for Bolshevism and build a military unit of Ukrainian volunteers. On 4 March 1943 Wächter presented Himmler with a draft of a proclamation, addressed to the Ukrainian population of Galicia, which promised improvement in German agrarian policy in Galicia.[14] Himmler replied on 28 March 1943 that he and Hitler agreed with the formation of a Ukrainian unit. That process was to involve two stages. First, there would be a declaration on land policy that all peasants who had delivered their quotas in 1941-2 and who had completed their sowing in 1943, would be made owners of their land. Second, there would be an appeal to Ukrainian youth to form a military unit. The division would have to be financed by the population of Galicia. Technical problems would be dealt with later. On 4 April 1943 Wächter discussed this issue with SS *Obergruppenführer* Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger, State Secretary in the Generalgouvernement. On 6 April 1943 he discussed it with the Head of the SS *Hauptamt* and Chief of the *Führungsstab Politik* in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories,

SS *Gruppenführer* Gottlob Berger.[15] Kubiiovych, in a letter to Wächter on 8 April 1943, declared his willingness to establish a Ukrainian division.[16]

On 14 April 1943, the Head of the *Ordnungspolizei*, SS *Oberstgruppenführer* Kurt Daluege, wrote to SS *Gruppenführer* Otto Winkelmann:

> I have spoken with the *Reichsführer* SS about the *Polizei-Schützen-Division.* The *Reichsführer* SS knows nothing about this Division and is not aware of its proper name. In this respect there is now a new Order which includes the following:
>
> A new front division is to be created by and for the *Waffen* SS, which will be made up of Greek Catholic Ukrainians from Galicia and which will probably be called the "Galician Division" since these Ukrainians are from Galicia. The other Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement, those from the Lublin area, are Greek Orthodox. These are to be used in the formation of police regiments with only a small German command. Under no circumstances are we to deploy national Ukrainian intellectual groups, i.e. Bandera. The *Reichsführer* SS forbids this explicitly. He remembers all too well what happened at the time of World War I, when the Germans attempted to establish an independent Ukraine, and the gratitude and recognition from leading circles in Ukraine, among them most of Bandera's men, was expressed by shooting German officers and men. With the help of SS *Gruppenführer* Berger as soon as possible data concerning the strength of both groups of Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement, in other words, the Greek Catholics (Galicia) and the Greek Orthodox (Lublin) should be made clear.[17]

Krüger, on 16 April 1943, sent Himmler a copy of the minutes of a meeting between Wächter and officials of the SS, the Police, and the Nazi party, held in Lviv on 12 April 1943.[18] On 15 April 1943 Daluege telephoned the orders from the *Reichsführer* SS:

> a) The formation of a "Volunteer Division Galicia" is exclusively the concern of the *Waffen* SS. The cadres necessary for this are to be recruited by the *Waffen* SS. The Division is to be deployed at the front.
>
> b) Ukrainians living in the Lublin District are to be used to establish police regiments. These regiments should be divided along the lines of religious belief, between Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox.
> It should be established to what extent such regiments can be formed. It is the task of the *Ordnungspolizei* to recruit the cadres for such regiments.

Berger informed Krüger that the *Waffen* SS lacked the necessary training personnel to establish a Galician Volunteer Division. Wächter thought the formation of police regiments in the Lublin District (using the forces of the *Ordnungspolizei* before the Galician Volunteer Division could be established), was not in keeping with the political goal as originally planned.

In order to understand the conceptions and line of thought of the Third Reich, and particularly Wächter, it is worth consulting the full report of a remarkable meeting which took place on 12 April 1943 (see Appendix 1, es-

pecially points 1, 7, and 10). That meeting took place in spite of the warning from Himmler's secretary, SS *Obersturmbannführer* Rudolf Brandt, that they should proceed cautiously.[19] Himmler's office informed Wächter on 16 April 1943 that the plans were to be maintained, but the *Reichsführer* had not yet established a date. On the same day and probably acting on Wächter's suggestion, Berger informed the *Reichsführer* SS that preparations for the formation of the Division were already under way.[20] Wächter had made such progress that by 20 April the Galician populace was expecting the appeal calling them to military service. To stop the recruitment drive for the Division then would only have strengthened the partisan bands and hostile propaganda. According to information supplied by Wächter, at least 10,000 men would be ready soon. Berger feared that the *Führungshauptamt* lacked the personnel and weapons necessary for training.

On 18 April 1943 the first meeting of the Ukrainian Military Board (*Wehrausschuss*, *Viiskova uprava*) was held. It consisted of two Germans (one of them Colonel Alfred Bisanz) and twelve Ukrainians. On 19 April Wächter urged Himmler to make the proclamation on 28 April.[21] On 28 April 1943 Wächter ceremoniously announced the formation of the new unit. He praised the behaviour of the whole population, especially the peasantry, and announced that Hitler had approved the formation of a "Galician" Division. Members of this Division and their families would have the same privileges as the Germans. Young men whose fathers had served in the Habsburg army would be given preferential treatment. The proclamation ended with an appeal to the people to fight Bolshevism for the country, the family, and for a new Europe.[22] The recruitment drive was supported by the Ukrainian Central Committee and OUN-M, which led a quasi-legal existence as a counterweight to OUN-B. Members of OUN-B rejected the formation of German support units, but, through their own supporters in such a division, they saw a chance of gaining access to German military and medical supplies.[23] The slogan "Fight Bolshevism" was attractive. The Ukrainian nation, deserted by the rest of Europe, saw itself as having to choose between the evils of Stalinism, which was increasing in strength, and National Socialism, which was on the defensive. Motivated by anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian sentiments, many decided in favour of a limited alliance with the Reich. For many, of course, there were other motives, such as the uncertain future, the fear of being deported to Germany to work, and a spirit of adventure.

The first officer of the General Staff of the Division (from January 1944), Major Wolf-Dietrich Heike, summarized what this meant for the Ukrainians: "1) Not simply a nameless participation in the military struggle, but a modest entrance into the political sphere, perhaps into the European or even world sphere of politics; 2) The creation of the core of an eventual Ukrainian national army; 3) The creation of a military school for Ukrainian youth which would teach them discipline and obedience; and 4) Official Ukrainian entrance to the struggle against Bolshevism."[24] In fact, they hoped for even more: some alleviation of the German occupation regime; more official positions for Ukrainians;

economic and scientific advantages; freedom of the press; and amnesty for Ukrainian prisoners of war and political prisoners.

Berger informed Himmler on 3 June 1943 that 80,000 had volunteered for the "Volunteer Legion Galicia" of the *Waffen* SS,[25] of whom some 50,000 had been provisionally admitted. Of those 50,000, 13,000 had been examined and half of them had been declared fit for active service. Consequently, there would be 25,000 (minimum height 1.65 meters) who would be fit to enter the unit. Surplus volunteers would form Police Regiments 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Galician SS. (In 1944 some of them were incorporated into the Division.) It is important to note that entry into these units—that bore those ominous letters "SS"—was not, for the Ukrainian volunteer, synonymous with support for National Socialism.

The name of the Division was a source of much confusion. In the consultation on 12 April 1943, Wächter had proposed "SS Volunteer Division Galicia" or "Volunteer Division Galicia." In Daluege's telegram to Winkelmann (14 April 1943) he called it the "Galician Division." In Himmler's order, transmitted by Daluege on 15 April, it was called "Volunteer Division Galicia." In Berger's telegram to Himmler (16 April), it was "Division Galicia." In his proclamation of 28 April, Wächter called it the "SS Riflemen's Division Galicia." A tablet of May 1943 bore the name "Volunteer SS Riflemen's Division Galicia."[26] In Berger's letter to Himmler (3 June 1943), there was both "Volunteer Legion Galicia" and "Legion Galicia." In the deployment order from the SS Headquarters, on 30 July 1943, it was referred to as "SS Volunteer Division Galicia."[27] In Wächter's letter to Himmler on the same day, it was called the "SS Riflemen's Division Galicia."[28] The order from the SS *Führungshauptamt* on 22 September 1943 concerning reorganization spoke of the "SS Volunteer Division Galicia."[29] An order from the SS *Führungshauptamt* on 22 October 1943 added the number 14: "14th Galicia Volunteer Division." In contemporary documents, some dealing with the visit of Himmler to the Division on 16 May 1944, the form "Galician SS Volunteer Infantry Division" was used.[30] We also find "14th Galician SS Volunteer Infantry Division."[31] On 12 November 1944, the Liaison Officer of the SS to the High Command of the Army officially noted the change of name to the one long desired by Wächter and the Ukrainians: "14th *Waffen* Grenadier Division of the SS (Ukrainian No. 1)." On 15 January 1945 this was the form apparently in use.[32] The order probably did not reach the troops, because General Pavlo Shandruk, on 19 April 1945, was still pressing the Divisional Commander, Fritz Freitag, to implement the name change. The appropriate order from the Divisional Headquarters was not issued until 27 April 1945, the day on which the Division was handed over to the Ukrainian National Army.[33]

The deployment order from SS Headquarters, on 30 July 1943, named the Commander of the Division as SS *Brigadeführer* and *Generalmajor* of the *Waffen* SS, Walter Schimana. (He served until 19 November 1943; his post was taken over by SS *Oberführer* Freitag until 27 April 1945.) In that deployment

order the language of the unit (*Kommandosprache*) was designated as "Galician," the language of command (*Befehlssprache*) as German. According to Heike, both were German. That order also established the form of oath: "I swear by God this sacred oath that in the struggle against Bolshevism I will give unconditional obedience to the Supreme Commander of the German *Wehrmacht*, Adolf Hitler, and that, as a courageous soldier, I will always be prepared to give my life for this oath."[34] Bender and Taylor have a photo of Ukrainian volunteers taking the oath to Hitler. (They swore on the German war banner and on the Ukrainian national emblem [trident on a gold and light blue background].) The photo must have been taken after the battle of Brody in 1944.[35] From 1 July 1943 Ukrainian officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), as well as medical personnel, were recruited.

The most important posts, however, were filled by Germans—one of the main complaints of the Ukrainians up to 1945. The German divisional commander (an ex-police officer, as were many of the German personnel) and many German officers and NCOs both rejected and lacked understanding of the Ukrainian mentality and aspirations. (Major Heike was an exception.) They also did not perceive the political consequences of their lack of understanding. Wächter and Colonel Bisanz (of the Ukrainian Military Board) attempted to be fair. The spokesman for the Ukrainian officers of the Division (and Liaison Officer to the Ukrainian Military Board and the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow), was Captain (*Waffen-Hauptsturmführer*) Dmytro Paliiv. The mass of the Ukrainian officers had served in the Habsburg army and later in the Ukrainian Galician army. Some of them had served in the tsarist army and later in the army of the Ukrainian National Republic. A few had done service in the Polish army and a few in the Soviet army. The officers of the Polish and Soviet army were young, the officers of the Habsburg army were on average too old (45-55 years). The officers and NCOs of the Division were largely German, the troops were Ukrainian. The Ukrainians had hoped for a Ukrainian Division headed by Ukrainian officers.

The Division had at its disposal nine Greek Catholic field chaplains, among them Professor Vasyl Laba.[36] Metropolitan Sheptytsky, according to Heike, was a friend and benefactor of the Division.[37] One might wonder why the leader of the church gave his blessing to co-operation with the regime, moreover under the symbol of the SS. Sources show that, after 1942, he no longer believed in a German victory; that in 1943 he made contact with the Poles in an attempt to overcome Polish-Ukrainian hostility; and that, in a pastoral letter of 21 November 1942, he denounced the murder of the Jews. In September 1943 Sheptytsky confided to a French expert on Eastern Europe who collaborated with the German foreign ministry, Dr. Frédéric, that formation of a Ukrainian army was a necessity. If the German defeats continue, he said, and if they are followed by a period of anarchy and chaos, then the Ukrainians would be fortunate to have their own national army to maintain order until the Soviet troops arrived. In spite of his loyal co-operation with the Reich, Sheptytsky was convinced that defeat

was inevitable. He believed that the Anglo-Americans would achieve the upper hand in the West for a short time only, since the final victory of Bolshevism was certain and it would undoubtedly rule the whole world. In response to Frédéric's question whether he still hoped to be rescued by the Germans, Sheptytsky replied that Germany was worse than Bolshevism, because National Socialism held greater attraction for the masses and had greater power over the youth than did Bolshevism. In this exchange Sheptytsky once more condemned the murder of the Jews.[38]

The more conscious among the soldiers may have felt it degrading that Ukrainians had to call themselves *Waffen* Grenadiers and not SS Grenadiers (*Waffen-Hauptsturmführer* and not SS *Hauptsturmführer*, and so on). According to the rules of the Personal Staff of the *Reichsführer* SS (1943-4), there were three sections of the *Waffen* SS: 1) Germans (*Deutsche*) and Germanics (*Germanen*) who were eligible to become members of the order and whose examination had described them as fit for active service in the SS (their title would be SS, followed by tactical reference and name, for instance, SS Tank Division "Das Reich"); 2) Germans and Germanics not fit for the SS order, whose examination had described them as fit for active service in the army (in this case the official name would be SS Volunteer, followed by the tactical reference and name, for instance, SS Volunteer Infantry Division "Prince Eugen"); 3) Non-Germans and non-Germanics, regardless of the outcome of examination (the official name would be *Waffen*, followed by tactical reference, SS and name, for instance, *Waffen* Mountain Division SS "Skanderbeg" [Albanian No. 1]).[39] The Ukrainians belonged to the third category.

As non-German units, Ukrainians wore on their right collar patch not the letters "SS" but a golden heraldic lion of the Galician king, Lev Danylovych (1264-1301) (after an initial period in which the collar patches were black, that is, without insignia). All ranks wore on a shield on their right or left shoulder the insignia of Galicia (a golden lion and three crowns against a light blue background). After the name was changed in November 1944, it became theoretically possible to replace the Galician lion on the collar patch with the Ukrainian trident of Volodymyr the Great (980-1015). During the period of transition to the Ukrainian National Army, after 25 April 1945, a metal cockade with the Ukrainian trident was worn on the cap; the Galician lion on the collar patch was replaced by the Ukrainian trident; and the shoulder shield remained unchanged. The Ukrainian National Army also had an arm shield with the Ukrainian trident (on yellow-blue). The Ukrainian *Schuma* Battalions of the Generalgouvernement wore the trident on a yellow-blue cockade.[40]

In order to protect the Division from the virus of all-Ukrainian nationalism, Himmler, on 14 July 1943, sent an order forbidding company commanders, in the context of the "Galician" Division, to speak of a Ukrainian Division or of a Ukrainian nation. Heike confirmed on a number of occasions, however, that, apart from this question, Himmler was a benefactor of the Division.[41] In a letter to Himmler on 30 July 1943, Wächter strongly rejected the order of 14 July.[42]

It must be said, however, that it was Wächter himself who was the "discoverer" of the name "Galicia" (see Appendix 2 for Wächter's letter in its entirety). Himmler wrote Wächter on 11 August 1943 that there should be no sanctions against the use of the word "Ukrainian." He stuck to his position that the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Galicia had been responsible for anti-German unrest in Ukraine, Volhynia, and Galicia. On 4 September 1943 Wächter attempted to rebut some of these charges by saying that the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Galicia had behaved peacefully.[43] Wächter, who did not succeed in having the order changed, then wrote a letter to Himmler on 3 May 1944, in which he recognized some of the mistakes of the Nazi leadership.[44]

The German retreat had had a bad influence on the morale of the Ukrainians, but the Galician Division succeeded at least in preventing many from going over to the nationalist cause (UPA). The hatred they felt for Moscow, the Western orientation, and nationalist feeling prevented a greater decline in Ukrainian morale.

Governor General Dr. Hans Frank, at a mass Nazi party rally on 1 August 1942 in the Opera House in Lviv, had proclaimed: "We are a *Herrenvolk*!" But on 21 June 1943, while on an inspection tour, he said: "*Herrenvolk*...this expression must be forbidden." Nonetheless, on 23 July 1943, in conversation with members of the leadership of the Reich's youth organization, Frank said: "The Ukrainians should remain subjects of the German Reich and not become allies." But then on 14 January 1944 Frank, speaking with Kubiiovych, referred to the "outstanding contributions of the Ukrainian population."[45] On 6 February 1944, Frank visited Hitler in Berlin:

> The Führer then turned to the Ukrainian problem. Here I was able to point to the successes of our Ukrainian policy. I told him that in Galicia we had a Ukrainian population that was absolutely loyal and secure and that, as the results of the harvest had shown, they were zealous in carrying out their duties. I pointed to the volunteers in the Ukrainian SS Division and mentioned that the Ukrainians had enthusiastically supported the Governor General's course. The Führer said that he recognized this and pointed to the example of the old Austria, where the Ruthenians, although a despised and not very valued ethnic group, had been willing to allow themselves to be used as an anti-Polish element.
>
> I took the opportunity to point out that it would be necessary, after the imminent and expected re-conquest of Ukraine, to incorporate into the Generalgouvernement that part of the one-time Polish Republic which was adjacent to Galicia, in particular the district of Volhynia. My justification for this was the fact that it was here that one found those large expanses of thinly populated rich soil which were lacking in the Generalgouvernement. The Führer listened to this with great interest and said: "Yes, that is right, this territory should belong to the Generalgouvernement so as to numerically increase the Ukrainian population.[46]

At a meeting of the Governor General and leaders of departments, held in Cracow on 16 February 1944, Wächter explained:

> The population, especially the broad mass of the peasants, are so far still anti-Bolshevik. If the Bolsheviks succeed in continuing to spread their propaganda and if they manage to establish a liberation army in Ukraine, then it could not be ruled out that they would gain influence rapidly. The national Ukrainian youth want to march. German propaganda must have a consistent line. Many Ukrainians who are sympathetic to the Reich are saying to the German leadership: "Give us a chance; show that you are serious about us and give us perhaps self-administration such as exists in Estonia." The situation is ripe and calling out for political measures. The Ukrainians are vacillating and it is necessary to make a gesture, to take the wind out of the sails of the nationalist Ukrainian youth and involve them actively in the service of German interests.
>
> The German political line with respect to the Ukrainians has gone wrong. A German radio broadcast from Königsberg has ended its Ukrainian program with the call: "Hail Free Ukraine." If this call had been made by a Ukrainian in Lviv, he would have been arrested. This total confusion in the official line is unacceptable....If the Germans do not soon develop a consistent and positive attitude to Ukraine then the consequences will be bad.
>
> The only firm foundation is the SS Riflemen's Division Galicia. A section of active Ukrainian youth, who had wanted to march, has been won over to the German side. There are still many Ukrainians who are convinced that they have no future with Joseph Stalin, and these views have been encouraged by the Germans....In deploying the first units of this Volunteer SS Division Galicia, the political aspect [should] be given the decisive weight. This military formation has more of a propaganda than a military value; it is poorly armed, has no heavy weaponry, etc. Everything depends on how they manage in their first deployment. The political element should not be neglected.[47]

While still being trained, in February 1944, the Galician Division had to put together a fighting unit to be deployed against the partisans.[48] In a speech in Cracow on 15 February 1944 on the issue of security, the Head of the SS and the police in the Generalgouvernement, SS *Obergruppenführer* Wilhelm Koppe (who was also State Secretary for the security services), spoke out against use of the Galician Division "in this area": "Up to now the experience with the regiments of this Division has not been good."[49] Koppe emphasized also that there was a great risk involved in arming Ukrainian and Polish police. On 12 May 1944 Wächter told Frank and other officials of the Generalgouvernement that the Commander of the Galician Division was perfectly satisfied with his troops.[50] Among the young people, he said, for the first time there was developing something like a European consciousness. At a government session in Cracow on 7 July 1944, President Ohlenbusch expressed the view that the Ukrainian population had carried out its duties and that voluntary applications for the labour units as well as for the military were very impressive. Wächter said that the Poles were more susceptible to Bolshevism than the Ukrainians. In Galicia more than 120,000 men had been registered: 73,000 had been assigned

to trench building and a number had been used in road construction; 18,000 had been sent to the Reich; and some 20,000 had volunteered for the *Wehrmacht* or for the *Waffen* SS. Young Ukrainians between the ages of fifteen and eighteen would be used as anti-aircraft auxiliaries in the Reich.[51] The last sentence points to an agreement reached on 25 March 1944 (between the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the *Reichsführung* SS/SS *Hauptamt*, the Supreme Command of the *Luftwaffe*, and the leaders of the youth movement) to establish SS Auxiliaries (*Helfer*) (SS *Luftwaffe* Auxiliaries). At the beginning these were placed at the disposal of the *Luftwaffe*. Later they were used by the *Waffen* SS. Between March and 24 September 1944, 5,933 Ukrainian SS Auxiliaries were deployed. The Galician Division received 250 Ukrainian SS Auxiliaries who had been given eight weeks of training. The SS Auxiliaries from Galicia and from *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine wore blue and yellow armbands and as a cockade they wore the Galician lion or the Ukrainian trident. It was not until the order from the Reich's Interior Ministry of 7 June 1944 concerning the "Means of identification of Eastern workers in the labour units" that the general badge for Eastern workers, which they had thought was discriminatory, was replaced by national badges for the individual nationalities (Ukrainian: blue and yellow with a trident).[52]

At the end of June 1944 the Galician Division, with 15,299 men, was sent to the front. Its first great battle was its last. On 19-20 July 1944 the Division was encircled near Brody and was practically wiped out. They defended themselves courageously in a very difficult situation, when the inexperienced Division was suddenly confronted by experienced Soviet troops. German troops had already withdrawn. The three infantry regiments of the Division had only two battalions each. On the Soviet side there were 20 armoured divisions and 10 reserve divisions, 1,800 tanks, and air support. On the German side there were 15.5 divisions, 2 reserve divisions, 40-50 tanks, and almost no air support. Of the 11,000 who were encircled, about 3,000 made it through to the German lines and 1,000 fought their way through to the UPA.[53] In accordance with Himmler's wish, the survivors and the 8,000 men of the reserve regiments were used to re-establish the Division. The men of the Galician police regiments had already joined the Division in the spring/summer of 1944.[54] At the beginning of October 1944 the Division was ordered to move to Slovakia, where some of them were used to put down the uprising.[55] Their training continued. At the end of December 1944 a fighting unit was deployed against the Red Army in southern Slovakia. On 21 January 1945 they were ordered to move to southern Styria. Parts of the Division were used in the fight against the partisans. The feeling of solidarity in the Division remained strong in spite of the many crises. Between autumn 1943 and February 1945 only 600 men deserted, less than 3 per cent.[56]

Meanwhile the Germans had been forced out of Ukraine, so for the first time there was co-operation between the *Wehrmacht* and the UPA (which at its peak had 200,000 men). Bandera was released from the concentration camp at the end of September 1944. The *Jagdverband Ost* (under Otto Skorzeny) made contact

with the UPA, but it was too late for a German-Ukrainian pincer movement against the Red Army. The SS *Hauptamt* attempted to form the volunteers fighting on the German side into national committees. As a gesture to Vlasov, Himmler had refused to set up a Ukrainian Committee. Dr. Fritz Arlt, the head of the section dealing with Eastern volunteers at the SS *Hauptamt*, eventually succeeded in getting the Ukrainian General Shandruk to lead a Ukrainian National Committee. Shandruk, who refused to be subordinate to Vlasov, was supported by Bandera, but OUN-M did not intervene. It was much too late when, in March 1945, the government of the German Reich recognized the National Committee.[57]

On 20 March 1945 the Galician Division received an order to hand over their weapons and equipment to be used in the formation of German units. In a situation report on the night of 23-4 March, Hitler expressed his scepticism concerning the Division.[58] Contradictory orders followed one another (for example, the Division was to become the "10th *Luftwaffe* Parachute Division," and it was not required to give up its weapons).[59] On 31 March 1945 the German Army South gave the order that the Division was to be sent to the front immediately under the 2nd Army. From the 2nd Army they were placed under the control of the 1st Cavalry Corps. From 1 April the Division was engaged in fighting the Red Army in the region Gleichenberg-Feldbach. In the middle of April 2,500 soldiers of the *Luftwaffe*, not trained for the infantry, were incorporated into the Division.[60] In mid-April 1945 the Division was placed under the 4th SS Tank Corps (the 6th Army). On 27 April 1945 Freitag handed over command of the Division to Shandruk, who was leader of the Ukrainian National Committee and appointed by President-in-exile Andrii Livytsky to be "Supreme Commander of the Army and Fleet of the Ukrainian Republic."[61] Shandruk took over the Division as the "1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army" and appointed General Mykhailo Krat as Divisional Commander (until 8 May 1945).

Between 25 and 30 April Shandruk had the Division take an oath to the Ukrainian nation. The German personnel involved also had to swear: "I will always and everywhere fight for my Ukrainian homeland with weapons in hand under the Ukrainian national flag." The numbers for the Division were:[62]

	Officers	NCOs	Troops	Total
31/12/1943	256	449	11,929	12,634
30/06/1944	346	1,131	13,822	15,299
20/09/1944	261	673	11,967	12,901
01/03/1945				14,000

A second division of the Ukrainian National Army, which was being trained at the end of the war, suffered 60 per cent losses in battle with the Red Army. Of the 250,000 Ukrainian volunteers, Shandruk had only 35-38,000 men under his

command. The forces of the National Army were spread out all over Europe. The 281st Reserve Regiment was stationed in Denmark and two guard units were stationed in Holland.[63]

Between 8 and 10 May 1945 the Division surrendered to the British and the Americans at Tamsweg and Radstadt.[64] Freitag killed himself. Shandruk was able to convince the British that his men, as Galicians, were more Polish than Russian, so they were spared forced repatriation to the Soviet Union. They had fought for so long to be recognized by the Germans as Ukrainians and not as Galicians, but their lives were saved by the fact that for so long they had been called Galicians. As a "Polish unit" they were interned by the British in Rimini.

Appendix 1

Minutes

On Monday, 12 April 1943, a meeting took place to discuss the proposals for the establishment of a Division drawn from the Ukrainian inhabitants of Galicia. Those taking part were:

Governor SS *Brigadeführer* Dr. Wächter
General Lieutenant of Police Pfeffer-Wildenbruch
Office Chief Bauer
Representative of the SS and Police, SS *Brigadeführer* and Major General of Police Stroop
First Lieutenant Wenerer
Major Degener
SS *Sturmbannführer* Sielaff
Colonel Bisanz, Head of Department for Local Population and Welfare
Party Member Töscher, Deputy Chief of the Propaganda Division
Dr. Neumann, Head of the Presidial Office.

The following proposals were put forward for the approval of the *Reichsführer* SS:

1) *Division name.*

Governor Wächter proposed that the Division be named "SS Volunteer Division Galicia" or "Volunteer Division Galicia." For political-psychological reasons he did not want the word "Police" to be included in the name. The lowest service rank should be "Grenadier," since the Division is meant to be a Grenadier Division.

2) *Uniform.*

The uniform proposed was the one worn by police divisions before the introduction of the SS insignia (field grey with guard braids). These uniforms would guarantee an orderly appearance and were readily available. The national emblem of the police should be used. As special insignia—as in other European volunteer corps—a shield should be worn on the right shoulder. The shield should contain a Galician coat of arms, which is part of the Ukrainian tradition of this country, but under no circumstances should it be a symbol of all-Ukrainian national aspirations.

3) *Equipment.*

Uniform as in 2. Weapons to be in keeping with the normal plan for a Grenadier Division. The number of horses to depend on how many can be had from the countryside; the same applies to wagons and harness. It is clear, however, that the large number of military recruitment drives on both the Soviet Russian and on the German side has taken its toll on the availability of horses.

The horses are, in any case, only suitable for light haulage. The availability of horses is estimated as 2-3,000 at most. Harnesses can be produced in this country if the departments dealing with leather put aside a portion of deliveries from the *Wehrmacht* for this purpose.

Because of the Ukrainians' special love for music, it is important to establish a music section.

4) *Accommodation.*

One must distinguish between the accommodation of the Division itself (training camp) and the quartering of the reserves in barracks. The reserves can be billeted in the barracks of the district towns. The Division itself should perhaps be quartered in the Galician military training grounds. The construction of military training areas will have to be expanded for this purpose, the precise extent to be established later, and new barracks will have to be erected in the district towns.

5) *Funds.*

The personal and material costs will have to be borne by the *Ordnungspolizei*, but only as it pertains to the period of military service itself. All preparatory measures, advertising, recruitment, and induction will have to be paid for by the district.

6) *Training period.*

In view of the particular features of the human material involved it will be necessary to have a longer training period than would normally be the case with a German or Germanic formation.

7) *Officer corps.*

As soon as possible the majority of officers and NCOs should be Ukrainians. According to a rough reckoning, the following should be available for that purpose:

a) about 300 Ukrainian officers of the Habsburg army;
b) about 100 Ukrainian officers from the erstwhile Polish army;
c) an indeterminable number of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who have served in the Polish army but who, for political reasons, did not reach officer rank; they should be made officers after three months at the front and four months officer training;
d) officers of the erstwhile Ukrainian army. Most of them will also have served in the Habsburg army.

The former Austrian officers will, as a rule, be too old for use at the front. It is proposed that they should be used in the reserves, since, for political reasons, we cannot do without the active co-operation of these elements. The officer corps of the front troops will have to come from the younger generation.

With respect to rank, it is proposed that the rank of each individual should be the same as the rank previously held in whatever army. This applies also—to the extent that appropriate papers are available—to the Ukrainian Liberation

Army. If, as is to be expected, a number of those accepted at a certain rank prove themselves incapable of carrying out the duties of that rank, they are to be dismissed. Under no circumstances should anyone be reduced in rank. Six hundred officers will be needed to begin with.

Fifty doctors and twenty veterinary surgeons will also be needed. There will be no upper age limit for officers.

8) *Non-commissioned officers.*

Around 2,000 NCOs will be needed. Recently trained NCOs of the old Polish army are available in much larger numbers than officers. There will also be no difficulty in finding appropriate material among the troops. For the position of so-called sergeants, one should look to the older NCOs of the former Austrian army. They are competent in both languages and have all the necessary experience in matters of office work.

9) *Staff personnel.*

Major Degener explained that the following were available as staff personnel: 300 NCOs from the Netherlands and 300 NCOs from Oranienburg as well as, for the Galician Police Regiment, a Staff Battalion which was currently en route to Lublin. A convoy of sixty-two motor vehicles was also available for use in the preparation of the camp and the provision of food.

10) *Troops.*

The recruitment drive should be a big success. In view of the poor quality, especially from a racial viewpoint, of the human material here, it will be necessary to recruit elements from race groups three and four.[65] Minimum height will also have to be reduced to 1.65 meters. All those born between 1908 and 1925 will be able to volunteer. For those who have already done military service the period will be extended to 1901. The same age limitations will apply for NCOs. Wages, taking family size into account, will be as for Germans. Exact figures, where appropriate, will be given in the recruitment advertising.

11) *Form of oath.*

The oath will be in the form already in use for volunteer units.

12) *Pastoral care.*

Because of the strong religious attachment of the Galician Ukrainians, especially to the Greek Catholic Church, special attention will be paid to the recruitment of field chaplains.

13) *Recruitment and time-scale.*

Materials to be used in the recruitment drive include:

a) An appeal. This has already been presented to the *Reichsführer* SS for approval. The approval of other agencies is, given the nature of the matter, unnecessary.

b) A colour poster.

c) A leaflet with information on welfare, wages, goals of the division.

d) The Military Board, membership of which will include all officers of the former Austrian army or of the former Ukrainian army, as well as representatives of the Ukrainian Central Committee. The advertising activity will be in its hands.

It will send representatives to the regional and land leadership bodies with whom it will carry out the recruitment drive in the districts and regions.

e) Of course, all other propaganda materials available will be used, such as radio and newspapers.

The recruitment drive itself, in order to facilitate the work of the Inspection Commission of the SS and of the police, should be divided into a pre-examination and the examination proper. For purposes of the pre-examination an organ shall be established known as the "Recruiting Commission." It will be made up of the land or regional commanders, a police officer, and a representative of the Military Board. The decision as to whom should be granted a preliminary acceptance shall be made by the police officer. The preliminary acceptance notice will instruct the individual to appear before an Admissions Commission which will take the final decision. It is this Commission which will carry out the proper examination; between these two events there should elapse a period of from eight to ten days. The preliminary acceptance notice will ensure that the individual is not called into service elsewhere.

The sequence of events is planned more or less as follows:

24 April. Ceremony in Lviv, official initiation of the action. Those present should include the district commanders, the land commissars, representatives of the *Wehrmacht*, the police and other district units, of the Military Board, of the Ukrainian Central Committee, and of the Greek Catholic hierarchy.

28 April. At this point Colonel Bisanz should have completed the organization of the Military Board and its subordinate organs.

29 April. On this day every district commander should hold an assembly of officials to initiate the recruitment drive in his district. At the same time, the propaganda material brought from Lviv will be distributed.

1 May. The various Recruiting Commissions can begin their activity. A week later the Admissions Commissions can begin their work. We can initially establish six such commissions.

15 May. On this day, according to the information of General Lieutenant Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, the cadres should be ready to receive their first volunteers.

To increase the forces further, consideration was given to a recruitment drive among the now excluded construction units.

In every case the principle of voluntary service must be maintained.

14) The staff which deals with the general organizational questions that arise in the formation of this division will be placed under the control of the chief of the police and SS of the District of Galicia. It should be replaced later by a Commander of Replenishment Units (*Ergänzungseinheiten*). Special attention should be paid to the formation of these Replenishment Units since, as experience shows, any delay in this area can often create problems.

Dr. Wächter

Appendix 2

Subject: SS Riflemen's Division Galicia.

Reichsführer!

Following my presentation in March, you, *Reichsführer*, issued an order establishing the Galician SS Volunteer Division.

Acting on your orders, and in accordance with your basic guidelines, I have made the necessary technical and, in particular, political preparations, and I feel, therefore, that I also bear some of the responsibility for the continuation of this work, all the more so since the formation of this Division is of extraordinary importance from the point of view of the attitude of the population and the overall political situation in Galicia.

In view of this responsibility, and because I do not have the opportunity to make a personal presentation, may I be permitted to draw to your attention in writing the following considerations: in the various training camps where, at present, the Galician SS Volunteers are being trained, an order has been given that the Volunteers are to be referred to as "Galicians" and under no circumstances are they to be referred to with a title that includes the word "Ukrainian." I feel that I must bring the following considerations to your attention:

1) "Galicia" is a state-district and regional concept, but not an ethnic concept (*Volkstumsbegriff*). In Galicia, in addition to a few Germans, there are millions of Ukrainians and Poles. Ukrainians and Poles are completely different, both from the point of view of language and ethnicity. There are strong contrasts between them and they have contrasting attitudes to the Reich. It cannot be our task to blend the Poles and Ukrainians together into "Galicians." Such a development would not be in our interests since we want to prevent any tendencies toward pan-Slavism. One cannot ignore the consequences of such a development, both territorially and ethnically.

2) The fact of the existence of a Ukrainian nationality (*Volkstum*) was already recognized in the Generalgouvernement in 1939-40, in other words, before the formation of the District of Galicia. Since that time we have "Ukrainian committees," "Ukrainian delegations," a "Ukrainian police," "Ukrainian newspapers," etc., all officially established and recognized by the German authorities. Even in the official gazette of the Generalgouvernement an ethnic distinction is made between the Poles and "Ukrainians."

3) I would also like to point out that all of the literature published in the Reich dealing with the Eastern question, including the book of Franz Obermeyer, *Die Ukraine, Land der schwarzen Erde*, first published in 1942 and very popular here, describes the Galician Ukrainian population quite clearly as "Ukrainians."

4) When an appeal is directed at both the Ukrainian and Polish population, it is my custom, and that of my colleagues, to refer to them collectively as "inhabitants of Galicia." If, in an appeal, I wish to speak specifically to the Poles

or to the Ukrainians, then I must refer to the particular nationality with its own proper name, all the more so since, as I explained in point 2, there exist here institutions which permit no other nomenclature.

Since the time of the formation of the Volunteer Division, which is open only to the Ukrainians of Galicia and not to the Poles, I have spoken, in view of your order, of "Galician Ukrainians.". . .

5) The question as to whether the "Galician Ukrainians" should be called "Ruthenians," as used to be the case sometimes in the old monarchy, can only be answered in the negative.

The name "Ruthenian" has not been used since 1918. "Ruthenian" means "friend of Russia"[66] and was used in the Polish period to refer to those small number of Galician groups that were sympathetic to Russia. This name is passionately rejected by the Galician Ukrainians. In this war in particular it is not possible to re-introduce this name.

6) To refer to the Galician Ukrainians as *Galizianer* or *Galizier* alone is incorrect and also, I am convinced, politically wrong. To refer to them in this manner would clearly indicate to them our intention to denationalize them but it would not actually achieve this goal.

Precisely in this war, when the strong revolutionary idea of Bolshevism can only be combatted with a strong national idea, any such attempt to neutralize them would only serve to diminish their anti-Bolshevik activity.

7) In the District of Galicia up to now, as distinct from many of the other Eastern occupied territories, it has been possible to win over the population to genuinely co-operate in the interests of the Reich. What was decisive in this respect was our decent and fair treatment of the population and the consistent maintenance of a political line which kept the people's trust in the German leadership.

This was made easier by the 150 years of Austrian, i.e. European, presence in the history of this territory and by the fact that the older generation is clearly Western-oriented. Broad layers of the Polish and, in particular, the Ukrainian population were able to be won over to an anti-Bolshevik line. Among the Ukrainians this was facilitated by their strong anti-Red, anti-Muscovite national sentiment.

I, along with my colleagues, have constantly and carefully attempted to guide these national tendencies in the direction of anti-Bolshevism, bringing thereby increasing benefits to the Reich. By means of further gradual educational work, the undoubtedly existing national consciousness should be developed in the direction of a special Galician-Ukrainian regional (*landsmannschaftliches*) consciousness, in other words, in the direction of a new Reich consciousness. Among sections of the older generation such a consciousness still exists, but among the youth, during the past twenty-five years of Polish and Bolshevik rule, this consciousness has been lost.

This national consciousness cannot now, in my view, be simply turned off by means of orders from above. I am worried, rather, that measures such as these

will only antagonize the good-willed and positive people and achieve the opposite of what we want.

From the point of view of nationality (*volkstumsmässig*), the volunteers are "Ukrainians," with a Ukrainian language and a strong culturally self-willed nationality. Any man who is ready to fight not only against Bolshevism but also for his own nation would react very negatively to such a measure.

8) That this way of dealing with the issue is correct can be seen from the fact that the SS and police leaflet appealing to the population in the District of Galicia to take part in the struggle against the Kovpak bands was explicitly addressed to the "Ukrainians." And this was a leaflet in the drafting of which I had no personal role.

Any other way of handling this delicate problem among the troops and in the homeland of the volunteers could only have a disruptive influence on these volunteers who are, as I emphasize once more, very sensitive about the issue of nationality.

I am also convinced that the negative experiences with other foreign nationalist bands are rooted in the fact that the treatment of the local population in its homeland is quite diffrent from the treatment of the nationalist forces.

9) This question is an extremely important one at the present moment. The present general political and military situation of the Reich puts extraordinary pressure on our relations with the foreign nationals in the German-controlled territories. In Galicia we have the additional problem that the unrest in Volhynia and Lublin is having an increasing effect here. The passage of the Kovpak bands through five districts and their three-week presence in Galicia created a serious crisis of confidence in the authority of the Reich. We are making an intensive effort now to rebuild that authority, especially in view of the need to have a good harvest and to maintain the lines to the front. It is also, however, decisive in this regard to maintain the confidence of the population in the justice of German measures, the strict adherence to explanations offered, and respect for their ethnic individuality.

If, *Reichsführer*, on this issue of the SS Division, you adopt an attitude to those people which clearly indicates to them our intention to denationalize them, a people who, as I have always emphasized, exhibit considerable political vitality, then they will feel that their trust has been abused and they will desert us. Treat them differently, however, and they will be true and reliable soldiers.

Such an attitude would, in any case, be pointless. We National Socialists know from our own struggle that where a strong nationality (*Volkstum*) exists, its national identity (*Volkstum*) cannot simply be taken away, and in the case of Galicia we are dealing with a healthy and strong peasantry (*Bauerntum*).

In the interests of gaining some 10,000 reliable SS men and in the interest of maintaining in Galicia a political course expedient for the Reich, I beseech you, *Reichsführer*, to give serious consideration to my proposals.

Galicia, in view of the increasingly active co-operation of large layers of the non-German population in the pursuit of the goals of the Reich, can become a

starting point from which we can begin to reverse what, in my view, is a daily increasing disintegration in the East. If we suffer a reversal here too, then one of our most promising developments will come to nothing.

With a view to the situation in the Reich, and convinced that the key to victory or defeat lies now, as it always did, in the East and in the Reich's Eastern policy, I beseech you, *Reichsführer*, to give sympathetic consideration to my views.

Heil Hitler!
Your obedient servant
Wächter

Notes

1. Hans Werner Neulen, *An deutscher Seite: Internationale Freiwillige von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS* (Munich 1985), 11.

2. Ibid., 211-37, 246-52, 297-322, 334-52; Gerhard Otto Grassmann, *Die deutsche Besatzungsgesetzgebung während des 2 Weltkrieges*, Studien des Instituts für Besatzungsfragen, no. 14 (Tübingen 1958), 21-4; Christian Streit, *Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945*, Studien zur Zeitgeschichte, no. 13 (Stuttgart 1980); Alfred Streim, *Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im "Fall Barbarossa,"* Motive Texte Materialien, no. 13 (Heidelberg-Karlsruhe 1981); Hans Roschmann, *Gutachten zur Behandlung und zu den Verlusten sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener in deutscher Hand von 1941-1945 und zur Bewertung der Beweiskraft des sogenannten "Dokument NOKW 2125" (Nachweisung des Verbleibs der sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen nach dem Stande vom 1.5.1944)*, Veröffentlichungen der Zeitgeschichtlichen Forschungstelle, 1 (Ingolstadt 1982); Wolodymyr Kosyk, ed., *Die ukrainische Frage: Dokumente 1934-1944* (Munich 1985).

3. Introduction by Paul R. Magocsi, *Texts of the Ukraine "Peace" with Maps*, Revolution and Nationalism in the Modern World, no. 3 (Cleveland 1981).

4. Stefan Horak, *Ukraine in der internationalen Politik 1917-1953: Verträge, Abkommen, Deklarationen, Noten und Interventionen* (Munich 1957).

5. Basil Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division Galicia," *American Slavic and East European Review* 15 (1956):1-10; Roman Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934-1945: Tatsachen europäischer Ostpolitik. Ein Vorbericht*, 2 vols. (Munich 1958); Hans-Joachim Neufeldt, Jürgen Huck, and Georg Tessin, eds., *Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei 1936-1945*, Schriften des Bundesarchivs, no. 3 (Koblenz 1957); Rudolf Absolon, *Wehrgesetz und Wehrdienst 1935-1945: Das Personalwesen in der Wehrmacht*, Schriften des Bundesarchivs, no. 5 (Boppard am Rhein 1960), 216-22; Kurt-G. Klietmann, *Die Waffen-SS: Eine Dokumentation* (Osnabrück 1965), 193-7; George Stein, *The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939-1945* (Ithaca-London 1966), 185-7; Georg Tessin, *Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945* (Frankfurt am M. 1967), 3:313-14; John A. Armstrong, "Collaborationism in World War Two: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Modern*

History 40 (1968):396-410; O. Horbatsch, "Ukrainians in Foreign Armies during World War Two," *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia* (Toronto 1971), 2:1086-9; David Littlejohn, *The Patriotic Traitors: A History of Collaborators in German-Occupied Europe, 1940-1945* (London 1972), 291-334; Wolf-Dietrich Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit: Die Geschichte der Ukrainischen Division 1943-1945* (Dorheim/H 1973); Roger James Bender and Hugh Page Taylor, eds., *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, vol. 4 (San Jose 1975), 7-57; [Hans Frank,] *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945*, ed. Werner Präg and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, no. 20 (Stuttgart 1975); Paul R. Magocsi, *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographical Guide* (Toronto-Buffalo-London 1983), 205-16; Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, 306-14; Hansjakob Stehle, "Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime," in *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, ed. Paul R. Magocsi (Edmonton 1989), 125-39; idem, "Der Lemberger Metropolit Šeptyćkyj und die nationalsozialistische Politik in der Ukraine," *Vierteljahrhefte für Zeitgeschichte* 34 (1986):407-25; Yury Boshyk, ed., *History and its Aftermath: A Symposium* (Edmonton 1986), 61-104.

6. Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, 306f.
7. The soldiers of *Nachtigall* were probably not participants in the subsequent pogrom (in which some Ukrainians did take part) against the Jewish population of Lviv. (Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, 307f.)
8. Ibid., 308f.
9. Wolfdieter Bihl, "Die Ukraine im Zweiten Weltkrieg," *Österreichische Osthefte* 27 (1985):396f. The persistent hope in the Germans of many Ukrainians was discussed at the conference held at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 1985.
10. Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, 309.
11. Georg Tessin, "Die Stäbe und Truppeneinheiten der Ordnungspolizei," in Neufeldt, Huck, and Tessin, *Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei 1936-1945*, 53, 64f., 106.
12. Littlejohn, *The Patriotic Traitors*, 328.
13. Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, 310.
14. Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division Galicia," 3.
15. Ibid., 4.
16. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 17f.
17. Private archives of Taras Hunczak.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.; Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division Galicia," 4f.; Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 17.
20. Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division Galicia," 5; private archives of Taras Hunczak.

21. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 18; Frank, *Das Diensttagebuch*, 695; Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division Galicia," 5.

22. Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division Galicia," 6; Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 19.

23. Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, 311.

24. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 17.

25. Private archives of Taras Hunczak; Wolfdieter Bihl, "Zur Rechtsstellung der Waffen SS," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 16 (1966):379-85.

26. Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 8, 19, 20.

27. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 246f., 251.

28. Private archives of Taras Hunczak.

29. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 252.

30. Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 8, 9 (note 6), 28f., 31 (note 67).

31. Tessin, "Die Stäbe und Truppeneinheiten der Ordnungspolizei," 313.

32. Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 8, 40f.; G. Tessin, "Die Stäbe und Truppeneinheiten der Ordnungspolizei," 314.

33. Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 10 (note 8), 42f.

34. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 50, 247.

35. Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 57; Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 136.

36. Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 24-6, 29f.; Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 37-50.

37. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 54.

38. Stehle, "Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime," 125-39.

39. Klietmann, *Die Waffen-SS: Eine Dokumentation*, 471f.

40. Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 50-6.

41. Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division Galicia," 7; Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 34, 69, 113; Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 27.

42. Private archives of Taras Hunczak; Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division Galicia," 7f.; Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 27.

43. Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division Galicia," 8.

44. Ibid., 9.

45. Frank, *Das Diensttagebuch*, 534, 696, 708, 770.
46. Ibid., 786.
47. Ibid., 800.
48. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 57-61.
49. Frank, *Das Diensttagebuch*, 828.
50. Ibid., 848.
51. Ibid., 877, 879.
52. Klietmann, *Die Waffen-SS: Eine Dokumentation*, 461-3. The national symbols for the armbands of the SS Auxiliaries are in the Appendix to "Völkische Ostpolitik des Reiches," *Die Aktion: Kampfblatt für das neue Europa* 5 (June 1944):206, 208-9.
53. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 82-113; Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 33-6.
54. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 63; Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 47f.
55. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 140-66; Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 38-41.
56. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 167-93.
57. Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, 312f.
58. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 195; Helmut Heiber, ed., *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, no. 10 (Stuttgart 1962), 938-42.
59. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 196-203.
60. Ibid., 207-18.
61. Littlejohn, *The Patriotic Traitors*, 328.
62. Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, 313; Bender and Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen SS*, 48.
63. Littlejohn, *The Patriotic Traitors*, 329; Neulen, *An deutscher Seite*, 314.
64. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit*, 233-40.
65. On the question of "racial groups," see Heinz Höhne, *Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf: Die Geschichte der SS* (Gütersloh 1967), 137; Bernd Wegner, *Hitlers politische Soldaten: Die Waffen SS 1933-1945: Studien zu Leitbild, Struktur und Funktion einer nationalsozialistischen Elite*, Sammlung Schöningh zur Geschichte und Gegenwart (Paderborn 1982), 135f.
66. During the Austrian period it was used not only for the Russophile groups, but was, in fact, the official name for all Ukrainians until 1918. (Wolfdieter Bihl, "Einige Aspekte der österreichisch-ungarischen Ruthenenpolitik 1914-1918," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 14 [1966]:541f.)

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the German Authorities

Peter J. Potichnyj

Ukrainians participated in World War II in impressive numbers. They fought in the Soviet Red Army, the Polish Army, the Polish army in exile (after 1939), Czechoslovak armed units in exile (both in the West and in the East), the Romanian, Hungarian, Canadian, and United States armies, as well as in German forces, various undergrounds in the Balkans, the French underground, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).[1] Although the historical record of events in Ukraine during World War II is reasonably clear, the Ukrainian struggle against the Nazis (1941-4) is not yet fully documented or understood. There are whole areas which have not been properly studied, for example, alleged organized Ukrainian collaboration in the destruction of Jews.[2] However, there is no paucity of materials. On the contrary, there are Soviet sources, and those of their allies in Eastern Europe, Ukrainian nationalist sources, and, of course, a great quantity and diversity of German documents and materials. Finally, Hungarian and Romanian sources, though not readily available, should not be forgotten. One major source which has become available is *Litopys UPA* (The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), of which twenty-one volumes have been published thus far. It contains a rich collection of documents, memoirs, and journalistic pieces indispensable to historians of that period. Especially valuable here are volumes 6, 7, and 21 which contain selections from German sources.[3]

My task is not to offer a general survey of the literature on the UPA, but rather to throw some light on its attitude toward the German authorities. In presenting my generalizations I will rely mostly on Ukrainian underground sources, with which I am well acquainted because of my involvement with *Litopys UPA*. Their general reliability I do not question, unlike many other writers in this field. The three volumes of German sources should be considered merely a beginning. More work needs to be done, especially in the area of German occupation policies and "Bandenbekämpfung."[4] I will touch on a number of points, some of them rather controversial, such as the origins of the UPA, its anti-German activities, and its relations with the German allies and non-German nationalities within the German armed forces.[5] I will not attempt to cover the anti-Soviet struggle which lasted well into the 1950s, the Polish-Ukrainian war which went on from 1942 to 1948, or the Jewish question,

although all of these factors are important for our understanding of the total picture. (A huge literature on the subject of Polish-Ukrainian conflict exists; the Poles, in addition to propagandistic literature, produced valuable historical accounts.)[6]

Origins of the UPA

The Soviet view is nicely summarized by V. Cherednychenko. According to him, all Ukrainian nationalists—Bulba-Borovets, Melnyk, Bandera, Petliura, and Skoropadsky—were doing their utmost to collaborate with the Nazis and at all times were loyal and dependable instruments in Nazi hands.[7] The Germans, unlike the Soviets, had very little reason to represent the Ukrainian underground as a homogeneous movement in the service of some foreign power. They knew better and, moreover, there was no particular political advantage to labelling it in its entirety as Communist-led or Communist-inspired, but in individual cases German propaganda did attempt to do that.[8] As early as 22 May 1942, the German *Sicherheitspolizei* began to write about the *Widerstandsbewegung* (resistance movement) in Ukraine. Their reports mentioned three groups in particular—*Bandera-Bewegung, Melnyk-Bewegung,* and *Poliska Sitsch.*[9] On the whole, these German reports tended to explain the origin of the UPA as an outcome of the activity of both factions of OUN or of Taras Bulba-Borovets. Very little was written, at least initially, about the reaction of the Ukrainian populace to the harsh occupation policies. Later this fact was mentioned with greater frequency. German intelligence reports seemed to be well informed, although, especially in the latter stages of the war, they were not free from some wishful thinking and sensational rumours.[10]

The Ukrainian view, represented by the largest number of sources, lacks unanimity on the beginnings of the UPA. Many Ukrainian writers, some of whom played a leading role in the underground, thought the origin of the UPA was in a conscious, systematic effort of OUN to lead the Ukrainian people in the struggle to national freedom and independence.[11] John A. Armstrong recognized the input of OUN into anti-German activities, but he also raised the question of German repression in response to Red partisans as a contributing factor in the growth of the UPA:

> The drastic reprisals carried out in Western Volhynia and Polissia injured the patriotic Ukrainian peasantry as frequently as they did Communist sympathizers. Consequently, the Ukrainian police were reluctant to take part in such repression of their own compatriots, and especially in the brutal conscription for the *Ostarbeiter* program. The only alternative was desertion; in the fall thousands joined the forest refugees from burned villages and forced labor drives....The command of OUN-B in Galicia was reluctant to destroy its grip on the legal forces and risk a campaign of open resistance to the Germans at this time; but when they saw that the police units they dominated were breaking up anyway, and were in danger of passing over to the Communist guerrillas,

> they decided to begin a large-scale partisan movement. This step was taken in late November; by the early part of 1943 the activity of the Bandera groups was already considerable.[12]

Colonel Omeliusik, Chief of Operations of the UPA in Volhynia, described the situation in similar words:

> Relations between the German administration and the Ukrainian population were becoming increasingly tense virtually from day to day. Food requisitions (*kontingenty*) were becoming harsher; labourers for Germany were being recruited with police help; the brutality of the German administration was insulting the national dignity of every Ukrainian. The annihilation of the entire Jewish population in the most bestial manner in the summer of 1942 had shown what the Germans were capable of. Among the peaceful inhabitants there were stirrings for self-defence. And when underground nationalist organizations began to consider broadening armed resistance, the population accepted this news with enthusiasm and there were indeed few who still entertained any doubts about the expediency of this movement.[13]

The most telling description of the situation in Volhynia is contained in a letter from Vasyl Makar to his brother Volodymyr on 2 August 1943:

> We had to begin the insurrectionary action...and it was not too early as some say but almost too late. We had to do it for two reasons. First, territory was slipping out of our hands, because all kinds of small *otamany* like Bulba-Borovets began to multiply, and the Red partisans were inundating the terrain....Second, even before we began our action, the Germans began to destroy the villages on a massive scale....Consequently many of the people ran to the forests and began to wander on their own. Robbery began, others joined the Communist partisans, Bulba etc. Thus we had to organizationally encompass these people in the forests....There is a third reason, moral character. People began to say: "Where is the leadership? Why doesn't it issue orders to fight the Germans?"[14]

Thus it is apparent that the spontaneity of resistance to German occupation actually forced the OUN leadership to move against the Germans and Red partisans. The Third Conference of OUN-SD (the name of OUN-B then) on 17-21 February 1943, decided on a mass armed struggle. The armed units were to be known as the Ukrainian Liberation Army (*Ukrainska Vyzvolna Armiia*). This proposal by M. Lebed was rejected by the Conference.[15] The name UPA, which came into being with Taras Bulba-Borovets, became so popular that it could not be easily changed. In order to avoid total chaos, the name UPA was adopted by OUN-B which then began to impose its organizational framework on the situation that had developed largely spontaneously.[16] In view of this evidence, I must question the proposition advanced by Armstrong that "the premature development, in Volhynia, of *large-scale* nationalist partisan formations reduced the ability of the potent nationalist underground in Galicia to lead persistent opposition to Soviet reoccupation."[17]

Armed Struggle

Symbols are important in any armed struggle, including Ukrainian nationalist resistance against the Germans. In this respect the proclamation of Ukrainian independence on 30 June 1941 is of crucial importance. Historians may quibble whether this was an act of "collaboration" or a tactical reversal of collaboration, an expression of political far-sightedness or a hastily prepared action by OUN-B in order to present the Germans with a fait accompli. The fact is that it led to severe German repression, which forced OUN-B underground and eventually into armed resistance. The "Lviv Act" was generally received by Ukrainians with enthusiasm, and it provided legitimacy for the military activities of the UPA. It is only necessary to look through the pages of the numerous Ukrainian underground publications in the years 1942-5 to ascertain the extent of Ukrainian opposition to German forces of occupation. They are full of reports of ambushes, skirmishes with the German police and army units, and various actions against individual representatives of the German occupation administration.[18]

The underground writings of this period fully reflected the conditions of the struggle. They exposed the criminal policy of the Nazis toward Ukraine and neighbouring countries. They discussed the hostile attitude of the Ukrainian population to the occupiers. They indicated the need to develop proper countermeasures against the forcible conscription of young people for work in Germany and advised how best to resist the enemy. These writings, which are full of optimism, expressed the belief that in the cataclysmic confrontation of the two brands of imperialism, Nazi and Soviet, both would perish and that all subject peoples of Europe and Asia, including the Ukrainians, would win a free and independent existence in their sovereign states. Among the most important political writers of this period were O. Brodovy, Ya. Busel, I.M. Kovalenko, Nastasyn (Very Rev. Dr. Ivan Hrynokh), Ya.V. Borovych (V. Mudry), M.V. Radovych, V.M. Vyrovy, O.S. Sadovy (M. Prokop), A.S. Borysenko (Rostyslav Voloshyn), O.I. Stepaniv (Omelian Logush), I.V. Dibrova, and Yu.M. Moriak (Mykhailo Palidovych), as well as Eastern Ukrainians such as Z. Luhova, H.S. Klekit, B.M. Ulasenko, and Yu.M. Khersonets. A leading role was played by D. Maivsky, who as editor-in-chief of *Ideia i chyn*,[19] the official organ of OUN-B, launched a powerful critique of Nazi and Soviet imperialism. These writers rejected the political model of one-party dictatorship and began to put forward the conception of Ukrainian nationalism as a revolutionary force that would lead the struggle against both totalitarian powers. Ukraine was to rely primarily on her own forces, but these would be linked with the revolutionary strivings of other subject peoples. The nationalists' previous distaste for the socialist and populist leaders of 1917-20 gave way to a recognition of the fundamental continuity of their struggle with the national revolution of that period.[20]

These debates culminated in the convocation of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of OUN-B in August 1943 and creation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR) in July 1944. Then OUN adopted a collegial leadership and accepted a significant element of pluralism into its programme;

the UPA was recognized as a military formation representing the whole Ukrainian people; and the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council was constituted as a non-partisan representative body co-ordinating the liberation struggle.[21] This reorientation did not come easily. The debate between proponents of centralism and pluralism raged for many years and resulted in the split of the Bandera faction of OUN in the post-war emigration.[22] In Ukraine, however, the pluralist current triumphed, and beginning in 1944 a new group of highly talented and dedicated political writers began to assert itself in underground publications. Their writings represented the "culmination of the development of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology toward greater emphasis on economic and social welfare, and upon securing individual rights."[23] The fact that the Ukrainian underground was able to fight well into the 1950s to a large measure depended on the persuasiveness of their message.

Conflicts with Non-German Forces

The anti-German struggle was not limited simply to actions against the German occupation authorities. A great deal of effort was expended on trying to neutralize German allies in Ukraine, including the Hungarians, Romanians, Italians, and various non-German nationalities in units attached to German forces. A series of appeals by the UPA Supreme Command in 1943 was directed mainly at the soldiers of various support units composed of former prisoners of war from various nations in the USSR.[24] All appeals were written in the Russian language (except for one directed at Belarusians which was in Ukrainian) and had certain features in common. They provided brief information about the struggle waged by Ukrainians; offered comparisons between Soviet and German imperialism with an emphasis on totalitarianism and its practices in both countries; and urged readers either to join the UPA or to establish underground organizations on their national territory. Some appeals mentioned the existence of non-Ukrainian units in the UPA, stating that in time they would return to their own countries.[25]

In line with this policy, the First Conference of Captive Nations of Eastern Europe and Asia took place on 21-2 November 1943, and was attended by thirty-nine delegates who represented eighteen nationalities of the USSR. The non-Ukrainian members were mainly delegates from the separate ethnic units attached to the UPA.[26] The resolutions of the conference characterized the war between the USSR and Germany as a typical imperialist struggle. They called for the establishment of a revolutionary committee to prepare for a simultaneous revolution on all territories of the USSR and noted the need for contacts with the Western allies. They also called for preservation, if at all possible, of the non-German units attached to German forces and their eventual inclusion in the UPA and for the speedy organization of non-Ukrainians already in the UPA into their own national units.[27] This policy of the UPA proved quite successful and brought to its side or neutralized quite a number of the non-German units. (German reactions to this activity of the Ukrainian underground require further research.)

No less interesting, and perhaps more important, was the attempt of the UPA to establish contact with the Hungarian and Romanian armies in Ukraine. (Italian units were viewed primarily as easy sources of needed weapons and, because they were not used against the population or to fight the underground, they were largely left alone.) The most successful talks involved the Hungarians. These contacts began in the summer of 1943 in Volhynia, where the local UPA units were able to establish communication with the Hungarian Command Headquarters and conclude a non-aggression pact which later was extended to all Hungarian forces in Ukraine.[28] On the basis of these local contacts a broader agreement was concluded in November-December 1943, when a three-man delegation under the leadership of Myron Lutsky travelled to Budapest at the invitation of the Hungarians.[29] A similar agreement was attempted with the Romanians. In the spring of 1944 a delegation composed of Rev. Dr. Ivan Hrynokh, Lev Shankovsky, Mykola Duzhy, and "Richka" (Stefanyshyn?) travelled to Chişinău for talks with the representatives of the Romanian government. After three days of conversations, the Romanians demanded the UPA representatives declare that Northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia belonged to Romania. Since they had no instructions to engage in such negotiations, the three days of conversations ended only in the non-aggression agreement.[30]

It is not clear whether German intelligence knew anything about these negotiations, although they were aware of a certain degree of mutual tolerance in relations between the UPA and the Hungarian army.[31] This question can be answered only after further research in German archives.

Contacts with the Germans

In view of such very strong anti-German activity it would seem superfluous to raise the question of contacts between the UPA and the Germans. However, because the UPA is quite often represented as the military arm of OUN, the stigma of OUN's collaboration with the Germans, prior to June 1941, is transferred to the UPA. Moreover, this has been done even for the years 1943-4, when the UPA carried on very intensive military and political campaigns against the Germans. In fact, the Supreme Command of the UPA always acted on the principle that negotiations with the enemy should be avoided, if they could be considered harmful to Ukrainian interests. This applied to the USSR as well as to Germany.

The UPA Command, in very trying circumstances, continued to regard the Germans as enemies. Even though local tactical requirements dictated the need for some co-operation with the Germans, such arrangements were rare and clearly forbidden. Whenever such orders were disobeyed, the offending individuals had to answer for their actions before the military tribunal. The reason for such stringency was the fear that even local co-operation might "compromise the UPA in the eyes of the Ukrainian population, against whom the Germans used inhuman terror, and in the eyes of the Allies...[especially, since] the Bolsheviks with all the means at their disposal were loudly proclaiming that the UPA was

co-operating with the Germans."[32] In three recorded cases when UPA commanders disobeyed these orders, two were court-martialled, condemned to death, and executed, while the third did not share their fate because he managed to escape.[33]

Although firm documentary evidence is lacking, there are fascinating hints in German documents that a specific plan for contacts with the UPA had been worked out and that attempts were made to implement it. In January 1944 German intelligence reports began to emphasize that although no political contacts with the Ukrainian underground were possible, military co-operation with the aim of weakening the Soviet forces should be attempted.[34] According to various Soviet sources a very important meeting between a representative of the Ukrainian underground and the Germans took place in Lviv in January 1944. Then Rev. Dr. Ivan Hrynokh met with *Hauptsturmführer* Pappe in order to co-ordinate anti-Soviet activities.[35] Mr. Lebed, who confirmed that such a meeting actually did take place, disagrees with Cherednychenko on the date of the meeting and the contents of the conversation.[36] Mr. Lebed further stated that the underground leadership was quite aware that the Germans were planning to set up their own guerrilla operations behind Soviet lines. With that in mind, the Germans dropped a group of parachutists, organized from Ukrainian labourers in Germany, behind the front lines. The underground also knew that the Germans wanted to utilize the UPA for their own purposes. Nothing much came of that plan. The parachutists were disarmed by the UPA and the arms caches, which were being prepared by Germans for their own people, eventually ended up in the hands of the UPA.[37]

Almost all German intelligence reports stressed that the UPA would prefer not to fight the *Wehrmacht*, but it was very hostile to German occupation authorities and the police. This was an open secret because many underground publications and propaganda leaflets stressed this point as well.[38] Still, in many instances clashing with the *Wehrmacht* was unavoidable and UPA units were being deployed against it, quite often successfully. There were, of course, also some instances of mutual toleration and even co-operation. The best example of that is the reconnaissance raid of *Hauptmann* Kirn, from 6 October to 7 November 1944, behind the Soviet front. It must have been cleared with the UPA Command, because it took place when such contacts received approval from high German officials.[39] A number of reports indicate that the UPA was ready and willing to receive military and medical supplies, as long as no strings were attached, and that a special Liaison Staff was created for the purpose of negotiating with the *Wehrmacht*.[40]

It is also clear that sometime in August 1944, a temporary agreement on contacts and non-aggression was concluded with an unnamed UPA representative; that some weapons were transferred to the UPA; and that central discussions were held with the UPA Liaison Staff. At this time an inventory of various armaments for possible transfer to the UPA was also made.[41] Locally, however, German commanders were still forbidden to discuss any political issues or to

assist the UPA with weapons. At the same time (mid-August 1944), a special instruction was issued for German troops which indicated the need to behave well toward the population and prohibited use of the term *Banden* for UPA units.[42]

The most important move came in September 1944, when the Germans were no longer occupying Ukrainian territory. The "Aufnahme einer Verbindung mit den Ukrainischen Partisanen" of 18 September stated that because of the departure of the German civilian administration from Ukraine, no obstacle remained for establishment of links with Ukrainian insurgents, and thus the SS-*Reichsführer* gave his permission for such contacts to take place. It may very well be that the Kirn mission was a direct outcome of this change of policy.[43] In the political sphere, however, there were no noticeable changes whatsoever. SS-*Obersturmbannführer* Witiska's report to Lt. General Müller in Berlin (dated 17 December 1944 and based on the UHVR leaflets), stated unequivocally that "the Ukrainian resistance movement's hostility to Germany remains unabated" and that Ukrainians accused German occupation authorities of co-operating with Soviet officials against the Ukrainian population. A day later he reported that the UPA was very negative toward Gen. Vlasov and that it distrusted German plans for Eastern Europe.[44] The same conclusion was reached in the evaluation of the Ukrainian movement by the Supreme Air Command of 22 January 1945 and repeated in the report of 24 February 1945.[45]

The clearest possible position of the Ukrainian underground on German plans for the East is contained in the UHVR leaflet entitled, "Germany's So-called New Ostpolitik and Our Attitude toward It," which rejected any co-operation with the Germans under the leadership of Vlasov. The writer indicated that Ukrainians had opposed both German and Soviet imperialism and had established the UPA, which had grown to become a major revolutionary factor in the East; and that the Ukrainian people, along with other Eastern nations, were battling all forms of imperialism. Thus they rejected all German and Vlasovite plans and any other imperialistic plans.[46]

Conclusion

My rather sketchy review of the UPA under German occupation challenges a number of popular and widely accepted propositions. I assert that the UPA came into being rather spontaneously, in brutal and very complex conditions of foreign occupation, and that its rapid growth forced the OUN leadership to impose an organizational framework on this movement. Accusations that emanated primarily from OUN-M (which were subsequently accepted by some scholars), that OUN-B from the very beginning and very unwisely forced large numbers of people into the forest to enhance its power, cannot be accepted without serious reservations. The vacillations and procrastinations of OUN-B on its road to armed resistance require further study and explanation.

The origins of the UPA, and its very close ties with the people, gave it a tremendous psychological strength and motivation. That, in combination with the

complex political situation of the period, did not allow UPA leadership much room to manoeuvre, especially in the area of highly charged German-Ukrainian relations. Hostility against German occupation authorities was such that no meaningful political arrangements could easily be worked out with the Germans. (It should also be emphasized that the German side was rather hostile to propositions of this sort.) Such contact as did develop between the UPA and the non-German support units, or with German allies such as Hungarians and Romanians, was designed to neutralize these forces. In the final analysis, these contacts can be characterized only as strong anti-German moves.

Contacts between the UPA and the *Wehrmacht*, which developed in the last few months of German presence on Ukrainian territory, were rather sporadic and tactical in nature. They were never completely free of the obstacles which arose from the inability of both sides to overcome political problems. In view of this, I must conclude that the charge of collaboration which has been levelled at the UPA seems spurious and constitutes the biggest challenge to all who want to approach this complex question with an open mind.

Notes

1. Peter J. Potichnyj, "Ukrainians in World War II Military Formations: An Overview," in *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath—A Symposium*, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton: CIUS, 1986), 61-6.

2. For a general review of Jewish-Ukrainian relations see H. Aster and P.J. Potichnyj, eds., *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1988); H. Aster and P.J. Potichnyj, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes* (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1983); Taras Hunczak, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations," in *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath*, 39-57; see also P.J. Potichnyj, ed., *Litopys UPA*, vol. 21 (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1991), 92-3, 108-12, 115-17.

3. Ye. Shtendera and P.J. Potichnyj, eds., *Litopys UPA*, 21 vols. (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1976-92).

   With the opening of the former Soviet archives a wealth of new information has become available which needs to be carefully studied. The Central State Archives of Public Organizations of Ukraine, in *fond* 1 (Central Committee Communist Party [B] Ukraine), *opys* 23, part 1 (Special Sector—Secret Section, for the Years 1941-6), contain the following documents:

   No. 115: Rozvidzvedennia operatyvnoi hrupy NKVD URSR pro diialnist ukrainskykh natsionalistiv na terytorii, okupovanii nimetsko-fashystskymy zaharbnykamy vid 19.IX.1942 r.

   No. 124: Rozvidzvedennia sekretariu TsK KP(b)U Khrushchovu pro stan v okupovanii Vinnytskii oblasti i proiavy natsionalistychnoho rukhu. Veresen 1942 r.

   No. 523: Spetsialni povidomlennia do TsK KP(b)U pro diialnist ukrainskykh natsionalistiv vid 15.IV.1942 do 7.II.1943 r.; Pro instruktsiiu heneral-feldmarshala Rundshteta, shchodo natsionalistychnykh uhrupovan na Ukraini; Pro postachannia zbroi dlia OUN cherez Balkany.

No. 528: Materialy pro aktsii nimtsiv proty prybichnykiv Bandery u pivdennii Bilorusii. Berezen 1943.

No. 530: Spetspovidomlennia Khrushchovu pro diialnist ukrainskykh natsionalistiv na 30 veresnia 1943; Pro perehovory natsionalistiv z nimtsiamy v m. Sarnakh 5-6 serpnia 1943 r.; Pro rukh ozbroienoi hrupy "Zalizniaka" vid 28.IX.1943 r.; Pro bazuvannia formuvan T. Bulby-Borovtsia.

No. 534: Dopovid nachalnyka bezpeky i okhoronnoi sluzhby pry SS m. Kharkova za period z 23.VII.1942 do 23.VIII.1942 r., 4-yi rozdil "OUN Bandery". Navodiatsia opysy 4-kh lystivok OUN(B) rozvishanykh u Kharkovi.

No. 585: Dopovidna zapyska do Ts KP(b)U Khrushchovu, vid 20 veresnia 1943 r. pro bazuvannia, ozbroiennia i stan formuvan UPA i UNRA; Pro politychni orhanizatsii i hazety, shcho spivpratsiuvaly z Bulboiu, ta pro ahenturu OUN v radianskykh partyzanskykh zahonakh i pro ahenturu NKVD v OUN.

No. 685: Spetspovidomlennia NKHB i NKVD pro stan u m. Vinnytsia i oblasti, pro ahitatsiiu OUN u rehioni.

No. 688: Rozvidzvedennia Khrushchovu pro stan u m. Poltavi, pro natsionalistychni proiavy u rehioni.

No. 703: Lysty do Stalina za pidpysom Khrushchova pro stan u Rivenskii i Volynskii oblastiakh za berezen 1944 r., v iakykh daietsia kharakterystyka OUN, UPA i podaiutsia propozytsii shchodo ikh poboriuvannia.

No. 892: Dopovidna zapyska Khrushchovu pro vzaiemovidnosyny mizh polskym i ukrainskym naselenniam ta pro boi UPA z polskymy formuvanniamy.

No. 915: Kopii nakaziv Klyma Savura pro vstanovlennia administratsii i po zemelnomu pytanniu v Ukraini, veresen 1943 r.

No. 920: Plan likvidatsii formuvan UPA, diiuchykh u Zhytomyrskii, Rivenskii i Kamianets-Podilskii oblastiakh, berezen 1944 r.

No. 926: Dopovidni zapysky do TsK KP(b)U pro diialnist OUN, UPA za liutyi-hruden 1944 r.; Dopovid Khrushchovu pro utvorennia UHVR, veresen 1944 r.; Zvit Berii Stalinu, Molotovu i Khrushchovu pro khid borotby NKVD z OUN, UPA za 1944 r.

In the Archives of the Security Service of Ukraine (*Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrainy*) a number of interesting documents relevant for our theme have been discovered, such as:

Original German documents with Russian translations (from the first half of 1944) about the skirmishes of German police with the UPA, reports about negotiations of German administration officials and *Wehrmacht* officers with the representatives of the Ukrainian underground.

In the Central State Archives of Higher Organs of State Power and Government, *fond* 3833 (Krai Provid of OUN in Western Ukraine), *opysy* 1, 2, and 3, there are some 438 cases pertinent to our concerns, such as:

The proclamation of the Ukrainian state (30 June 1941, Lviv), the activities of the Ukrainian State Administration, and so on; reports about the activities of OUN groups sent to Eastern Ukraine; documents about arrests by the Germans of members of the Ukrainian State Administration and of the OUN leadership; materials of the Organizational Section of OUN; orders of Klym Savur for 1943; personnel records of UPA soldiers for 1943-4; instructions of the Krai Provid of OUN and the UPA High Command; proclamations of the UPA, 1943-5; samples of documents and seals prepared by the UPA; OUN and UPA publications; instruc-

tions of the UPA High Command on how to organize self-defence and security services (August 1942-October 1944); and documents on the organization, military tactics, communication, medical services, and training and education of the UPA.

4. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); idem, ed., *Soviet Partisans in World War II* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Ihor Kamenetsky, *Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956); Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981).

5. I deal with the UPA organized by the OUN-Bandera faction (OUN-B). The UPA of Bulba-Borovets and the underground units of the OUN-Melnyk faction (OUN-M) are not dealt with here.

6. A.B. Szcześniak and W. Szota, *Droga do nikąd* (Warsaw: MON, 1973); R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce Trzeciej Rzeszy* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1972); Ia. Pelenskyi, "Ukraina v polskii opozytsiinii publitsystytsi," *Vidnova*, no. 4 (1985-6):5-21; J. Lewandowski, "Polish Historical Writing on Polish-Ukrainian Relations during World War Two," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton: CIUS, 1980), 231-46; John Basarab, "Post-War Writings in Poland on Polish-Ukrainian Relations, 1945-1975," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, 247-70; Y. Shtendera, "In Search of Understanding: The Ukrainian and Polish Underground Movements, 1945 to 1947—Cooperation between the UPA and the WiN," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, 271-94; E. Shtendera, "Badania nad dziejami UPA w PRL," *Suchasnist* (Polish issue), 125-44; P.J. Potichnyj, "Akcja Wisła—The Code-name for Suffering" (Kurelek Memorial Lecture, 1987, University of Toronto).

7. V. Cherednychenko, *Anatomiia zrady* (Kiev: Politvydav Ukrainy, 1978), 148. According to him, the Ukrainian nationalists' struggle against the Germans was simply a ruse to involve the people in anti-Soviet activities. This line was developed very early in the Soviet-German war and is still used by Soviet scholars and propagandists. See, for example, this statement on Gen. Kovpak's unsuccessful attempt to set up bases in the Carpathians: "The fascist command was feverishly looking for a solution. And the Banderites once again came to help. In the Carpathians, to where we were moving, the nationalists on instructions of their bosses, the fascists, began to create the Galician variant of the UPA—the so-called Ukrainian People's Self-Defence (UNS)." (V.O. Voitsekhovych, *Partyzany idut na zakhid* [Kiev: Politvydav Ukrainy, 1982], 131.)

8. R. Hryva, "Hovoryla nebizhechka do samoi smerty," *Litopys UPA*, 2:63-6. In some Ukrainian-language publications in Volhynia (*Ukrainskyi dobrovolets*, *Klych)* the Germans did cast broad hints that the Ukrainian underground was doing the work of the Comintern: ibid., 2:63; "Höre, Ukrainisches Volk!" in *Das Dritte Reich und die ukrainische Frage: Dokumente 1939-1944*, ed. W. Kosyk (Munich 1985), 206-7; "Ukrainer in den Wäldern!" in ibid., 208-9.

9. "Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten," nos. 4, 10-12, 14-18, 30, 46, 55 (May 1942-March, May 1943), *Litopys UPA*, 6:44-70, 75-9.

10. They wrote about UPA's contacts with the British, the Canadian army being composed largely of Ukrainians, the British influence on the political concepts of the Ukrainian underground, and Stalin's plan in 1943 to make Stepan Bandera a member of the Soviet Ukrainian government. (*Litopys UPA*, 6:103, 131; 7:81.)

11. Among them, M. Lebed, *UPA: Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia* (Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946); Yurii Tys-Krokhmaliuk, *UPA Warfare in Ukraine: Strategical, Tactical and Organizational Problems of Ukrainian Resistance in World War II* (New York: Society of Veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1972), 225. This point of view is prevalent in Ukraine where a large number of newspaper articles appeared in connection with the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the UPA.

12. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 147-8.

13. Col. M. Omeliusik, "UPA na Volyni v 1943 rotsi," *Litopys UPA*, 1:22. See also H. Levenko, "Narys istorii borotby Ukrainskoi Povstanskoi Armii (UPA)," ibid., 1:44-5; "Pivnichno-zakhidni ukrainski zemli: zbroina samooborona ukrainskoho narodu," ibid., 5:15-32.

14. Vasyl Makar, "Do pochatkiv UPA—Lyst z Volyni," *Litopys UPA*, 2:43-4. Both brothers were members of the OUN-B underground. See also A.S. Borysenko (R. Voloshyn), "Na shliakhakh zbroinoi borotby: UPA," ibid., 2:19-25; Ia. Iasenko, "Vsenarodnii rukh zbroinoi samooborony ukrainskoho naselennia Volyni i Polissia," ibid., 2:26-33; Vadym (Volodymyr Makar), "Iz dii vsenarodnoi samooborony na Volyni i Polissi," ibid., 2:34-41.

15. My interview with Mr. Lebed.

16. Borovets later adopted a new name for his forces (UNRA), but by that time he did not enjoy much support among the population. A rather interesting idea on the beginning of the UPA in Volhynia is offered by Yaroslav Haivas, then a member of OUN-M. (Now he writes in OUN-B publications.) According to him, "the fact that the underground network of OUN was created under Polish rule and with the coming of the Red Army in September 1939 meant it actually spread even more, and unlike in Galicia [it] avoided damaging blows from the Bolsheviks, which fact was also important. The Bolshevik [security] organs were simply unaware that Volhynia and Polissia, two or three years before the war, in many respects caught up and in some ways overtook Galicia in the construction of the underground system." (Ia. Haivas, "Doba velykoho perelomu," *Vyzvolnyi shliakh* 38, no. 10 [451] [October 1985]:1180-1.)

17. John A. Armstrong, in "Symposium (Ukrainians in World War II: Views and Points)," *Nationalities Papers* 10, no. 1 (Spring 1982):8.

18. For example: *Vilna Ukraina* 1, no. 8 (1943); *Za samostiinu Ukrainu* 3, no. 9 (1943); *Visti* 1, no. 1-3 (1943); *Do zbroi* 1, no. 102 (1943); *Litopys UPA* (October 1943); *Visti informatsiinoi sluzhby* 1, no. 1 (April 1944); *Samostiinyk* 1, no. 1 (December 1943); *Ideia i chyn* 2, no. 5 (1943). See "Z khroniky podii na ukrainskykh zemliakh—rik 1943," *Zbirka No. 1*; "Visti z oserednikh, skhidnikh i pivdennykh ukrainskykh zemel—1943-1944," *Zbirka No. 2*; "Dii UPA v 1943 rotsi" (all reprinted in *Litopys UPA*, 2). See also documents 63-5, *Litopys UPA*, 6:172-9.

19. D. Maivsky was responsible for the first issue of *Ideia i chyn*. Issues 2-6 and part of 7 were edited by M. Prokop. (M. Prokop to the author, 7 October 1986.)

20. See, for example, O. Brodovy, "On the Genesis of the Ukrainian-German War of 1941-4," in *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943-1951*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera (Edmonton: CIUS, 1986); I.M. Kovalenko, "The Aims and Methods of German Imperialist Policy on Occupied Territory," ibid.; Ia.V. Borovych, "Ukraine and Poland," ibid.; U. Kuzhil, "The Paths of Russian Imperialism," ibid.; P. Duma, "The Bolshevik Democratization of Europe," ibid.; Iarlan, "The Spectre of Fascism," ibid; and *Litopys UPA*, 8:180-202.

    Many other articles, broadsheets, and leaflets appeared to rally the Ukrainians against the German forces of occupation. Some of them were reproduced by the Germans. See documents no. 12 (63-4), 24 (88), 51 (141), 63 (172-6), ibid., 6; documents no. 53 (171), 54 (177-85), 58 (195), ibid., 7.

21. "Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 21-5 August 1943," in *The Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground*, 333-53; "What is the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Fighting for?" (August 1943), in ibid., 377-81; "Platform of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council," ibid., 359-64; "Provisional Organization of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council," in ibid., 365-76; and *Litopys UPA*, 8:27-33. See also documents no. 14 (44-9), 30 (91-104), 43 (149-53), *Litopys UPA*, 7; ibid., 8:27-48, 61-161; ibid., 9:367-416; ibid., 10:60-73, 297-8, 330-2.

22. R. Krychevskyi (R. Ilnytzkyj), *Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv v Ukraini, orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv zakordonom i ZCh OUN* (New York 1962).

23. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 163.

24. These appeals were addressed to Azeris, Armenians, Belarusians, Georgians, Volga Tatars, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmen, Bashkirs, Cherkess, Kabardinians, Ossetians, Chechens, Adiges, Lezgins, Ingush, and Russians. (*Litopys UPA*, 1:175-204.)

25. Ibid. The existence of such units was known to the Germans (see documents no. 25-6, ibid., 6:93-5; document 54, ibid., 7:183).

26. Document no. 8, ibid., 7:22-7.

27. "Persha konferentsiia ponevolenykh narodiv skhodu Evropy i Azii," ibid., 1:205-25; "Vidozva pershoi konferentsii," ibid., 1:226-9; ibid., 7:24-6.

28. Captain Andrii Dolnytskyi, "Dohovir pro nenapad mizh UPA i Uhorskoiu Armiieiu," ibid., 5:33-67.

29. Other members of the delegation were Ye. Vretsiona and Rev. Dr. I. Hrynokh. See Ivan Hrynokh, "Sorok rokiv tomu v Budapeshti," *Suchasnist*, no. 6 (June 1985):96-107, nos. 7-8 (July-August 1985):188-96. Captain Dolnytskyi incorrectly gives the members of the delegation as V. Mudryi, Ostap Lutsky, and Ye. Vretsiona.

30. Hrynokh, "Sorok rokiv tomu v Budapeshti," 96; Lev Shankovskyi, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN* (Munich: Ukrainskyi samostiinyk, 1958); M. Prokop, "Ukrainski samostiinytski politychni syly v Druhii svitovii viini," *Suchasnist*, no. 11 (November 1985):60. Exchanged memoranda and the journal of the meeting are in the archives of ZP UHVR in New York City.

31. Documents 29 (103), 37 (116), 54 (148-9), *Litopys UPA*, 6.

32. S. Novytskyi, "U zmahanniakh za voliu volynskoi zemli," ibid., 5:191-2.

33. The two who were executed were company commander "Orel" in the raion of Kaminka Strumylova in Lviv oblast, and battalion commander Porfyrii Antoniuk ("Sosenko") in Volodymyr county in Volhynia. (Lebed, *UPA*, 73-4; Novytskyi, "U zmahanniakh," 192.) The third case involved battalion commander "Maks" (Maksym Skorupsky) (interview with M. Lebed, 31 August 1986). Mr. Skorupsky admitted that he engaged in negotiations with the Germans and succeeded in obtaining from them some 300 rifles, 6 heavy machine guns, several light machine guns, and 100,000 rounds of ammunition. Although he denied it, he may have cooperated with the Germans in front-line actions against the Soviets. He stated that he was expressly forbidden to engage in joint actions against the Soviets. In May of 1944, with action against him pending, he deserted. (Maksym Skorupskyi, *U nastupakh i vidstupakh: Spohady* [Chicago 1961], 231, 238-9, 244-5, 255.)

34. Documents no. 31 (110-1), 33 (112-3), 35 (114), 36 (115), 38 (117), 39 (118), 40 (119-20), 43 (123), *Litopys UPA*, 6.

35. Cherednychenko, *Anatomiia zrady*, 174-5.

36. Mr. M. Lebed said that the initiative for the talks did come from the Germans and that the underground seized upon this opportunity to negotiate the release of imprisoned OUN leaders, such as Bandera, Stetsko, and Lopatynsky, as well as the wife and daughter of Lebed (who were discovered and arrested by the Germans in early 1944). Because of this, he felt that the meeting must have taken place later than January 1944. He also stated that after the war Dr. Liubomyr Ortynsky traced Pappe to a place near Hamburg where he worked as a fireman and received from him confirmation of these conversations. Lebed also indicated that Rev. Dr. Hrynokh was empowered by the underground leadership to continue such conversations over several meetings that took place in various places in Galicia (interview with Lebed, August 1986). See also Hrynokh, "Sorok rokiv tomu."

37. Interview with Lebed, 31 August 1986.

38. Documents 54, 54a, 54b, 55 (144-58), *Litopys UPA*, 6; documents 1 (11), 3 (13-4), 32 (106-11), 36-7 (115-21), 43 (149-53), 53 (171-6), 56 (187-8), ibid., 7. Skorupsky stated that this was policy in the UPA: "To fight without any mercy against the [Nazi] party members, SD, and Gestapo. To be tolerant to the *Wehrmacht*. Not to attack individual soldiers who were captured, and to exchange higher officers for political prisoners. To disarm ordinary soldiers and noncoms, and then to release them allowing them to return home....This decision had good results and fully justified itself in practice." (Skorupskyi, *U nastupakh i vidstupakh*, 218.)

39. Documents no. 9 (27-8), 32 (106-11), *Litopys UPA*, 7.

40. Ibid., 6:180-1.

41. Ibid., 7:13-15.

42. Document no. 2 (11-12), ibid.

43. Document no. 9 (27-8), ibid.

44. Documents no. 36 and no. 37 (115-21), ibid.
45. Document no. 43 (149-53), 56 (187-8), ibid.
46. Document no. 53 (171-6), ibid.

OUN-German Relations, 1941-5

Taras Hunczak

The German invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941 brought about a moment of deliverance in the view of the Ukrainians and particularly the OUN. Finally, they thought, the archenemy of the Ukrainian nation would be destroyed, thus creating an opportunity for the Ukrainian people to re-establish a sovereign Ukrainian state. That objective overshadowed all other considerations.[1]

In their preparation for the forthcoming confrontation between the USSR and Nazi Germany, both factions of OUN faced the future with hope, but also with a sense of foreboding. They did not know Hitler's plans to reshape the political geography of Eastern Europe. There were, of course, those in the leadership of OUN who were encouraged by Alfred Rosenberg's plans to partition the USSR into independent states, a plan in which Ukraine was given a rather prominent place.[2] However, nagging doubt and uncertainty about the ultimate decision of Hitler's government drove the Ukrainians, particularly the Bandera faction of OUN, to prepare for some independent action, which could be characterized as a policy of accomplished facts. A landmark in this activity was the Proclamation by Yaroslav Stetsko, on 30 June 1941, which announced the re-establishment of an independent Ukrainian state.[3] (Although the original plan called for the proclamation to be made in Kiev, Stetsko did it in Lviv, since he did not know the future position of the Germans.)

By this act, on the very day that the German army entered Lviv, the OUN (under the leadership of Stepan Bandera), forced the German authorities to show their hand. Indeed, the promises and hints of satisfaction of Ukrainian political aspirations in some distant future were confronted with an unexpected political reality. This audacious act of the OUN-B was a complete surprise to the German authorities, for whom it had all the characteristics of an attempted coup d'état. They hastened, therefore, to dampen Ukrainian enthusiasm for this unexpected turn of events, and pressured the OUN-B leadership to liquidate the newly created government of Stetsko. Refusal of the OUN to accede to German demands brought about the first confrontation between OUN-B and German authorities, a development that set the stage for German-OUN-B relations for the duration of the war.

The OUN's position, stated by Bandera during an interrogation on 3 July 1941, was that in the absence of any other organized Ukrainian political entity, OUN acted on behalf of the Ukrainian nation when it proclaimed establishment

of a Ukrainian state. Undersecretary of State Ernst Kundt countered that in the territories conquered by the German army, authority to decide the status of those territories belonged to Hitler alone. Bandera disagreed with that and maintained that the right to decide about Ukrainian lands belonged to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Furthermore, Bandera stated that in making his decision, he did not seek approval from the German authorities, but relied exclusively on the mandate which he received from Ukrainians.[4] The lines were thus clearly drawn and the positions of both parties were irreconcilable. German plans for Eastern Europe precluded establishing an independent Ukrainian state, while OUN could not compromise on this issue without losing the very purpose for its existence. In its memorandum to the German authorities (14 August 1941), OUN-B stated unequivocally that it could not reject the Proclamation of 30 June without rejecting its entire revolutionary tradition, whose central aim always was the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state.[5]

The OUN-B thus crossed its Rubicon in the very first days of the German-Soviet war. To be sure, the leadership of OUN-B did not know that the act of proclaiming Ukrainian statehood would place them in an adversarial position vis-à-vis the Germans. They were hoping for at least tacit German agreement with what had transpired in Lviv; however, the reaction proved that they were wrong. Unable to attain their objectives by persuasion and pressure, the Germans turned to radical means to paralyse the activities of OUN-B. The *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD) put Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko under house arrest in Berlin for two months, then sent them, on 15 September 1941, to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.[6] After the arrest of Bandera and Stetsko, representatives of German military intelligence—Hans Koch, Werner Markert, Ernst von und zu Euckern, and an unidentified major—invited Mykola Lebed for talks, during which they asked that Lebed, as Bandera's deputy, abrogate the Proclamation of the Ukrainian state. As a reward they offered to hand over to OUN-B the administration of Galicia. His rejection of their proposal terminated the discussion, and he was told that his safe-conduct was good for only eight hours.[7]

In September German security forces organized a dragnet which ensnared hundreds of Bandera's followers. German authorities continued their arrests of the rank and file of OUN membership for the duration of the war, but particularly in 1942 and 1943. Most of those arrested were sent to concentration camps; others were executed.[8] These measures taken by the German security police, however, did not succeed in changing the political stance of OUN-B. As early as 6 and 7 July 1941, OUN organized large public gatherings where Ivan Klymiv-Legenda (OUN-B leader for Western Ukraine) and Mykola Lebed (leader of the entire OUN-B after Bandera and Stetsko were arrested) called upon the people to support the principle of Ukrainian independence and criticized German policies toward Ukraine.[9] Three days later (10 July 1941), the leadership of OUN-B held its meeting, where even the possibility of an uprising against the

Germans was discussed. The idea was rejected as unrealistic until the Ukrainian population was prepared, organizationally and psychologically. The gathering decided to reorganize OUN-B in order to undertake intensive preparations for an armed struggle against Germany. Roman Ilnytzkyj commented that this was the first resolution the OUN-B directed against Nazi Germany.[10]

At this juncture, the leadership of the Melnyk faction of OUN thought that OUN-B acted somewhat prematurely by proclaiming the re-establishment of a Ukrainian state in Lviv. They, of course, had an even loftier plan—to proclaim the re-establishment of a Ukrainian state in its capital, Kiev. In the meantime, the leadership of OUN-M probably took some satisfaction from the misfortunes of their rivals, OUN-B. To maintain good relations with the Germans, OUN-M made a declaration of loyalty to the German authorities, represented by Professor Hans Koch. OUN-B refused to follow suit without German clarification of their stand on the future of Ukraine and without the release of Bandera from German imprisonment.[11] OUN-B paid a heavy price for its stance. The first victims (besides those already arrested) were the Nachtigall and Roland battalions, which were organized by OUN-B. The leadership of OUN had invested great hope in them. One of their most obvious advantages was the contact with the German army, something OUN-B took great care to cultivate.[12] Afraid that these essentially political units, which were controlled by OUN-B, might rebel, the German command withdrew them from the front lines and ultimately merged them into a new formation, the *Schutzmannschaft* Battalion No. 201.[13]

These disappointments with the German authorities notwithstanding, OUN-B continued to implement its programme with dedication and self-sacrifice. Certainly one of the most ambitious programmes undertaken by both factions of the OUN was to organize and send expeditionary groups (*pokhidni hrupy*) into Eastern Ukraine (on the heels of the German army), whose task was to raise the level of national consciousness, help revive civic life, open schools, publish newspapers, and organize cells of the OUN underground organization.[14] Despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles, these 750-1,200 young men and women for the most part reached their destinations and played the role expected of them. Many paid with their lives for this activity, among them such leading members of OUN-B as Dmytro Myron-Orlyk and Mykola Lemyk.[15]

While in the beginning the Germans paid greater attention to the activities of OUN-B, which they considered more dangerous to their policies in Ukraine, it was inevitable that they would also undertake repressive measures against OUN-M, whose programme, like that of OUN-B, called for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state. This Berlin ordered the local authorities to prevent at all costs.[16] The local authorities seem to have read that instruction to mean that any expression of national sentiment with political overtones should be suppressed. Thus, after commemorative ceremonies at Bazar which attracted thousands of people, the German police instituted an inquiry which led to the

arrest and execution of some twenty OUN-M members. Among them was one member of the executive body of the organization.[17]

OUN-M suffered its greatest losses, in terms of leadership, in Kiev, where it concentrated its main efforts. Although OUN-M did not proclaim a Ukrainian state, it did succeed in organizing a Ukrainian National Council, headed by Professor Mykola Velychkivsky, which it hoped would develop into a representative political institution in Eastern Ukraine. The repressive measures of the German security police against the various members of the National Council, including the arrest of Professor Velychkivsky, brought this body to a speedy end.[18] However, in the short period of its existence, the Ukrainian National Council drafted a memorandum which was sent to Hitler on 14 January 1942. This carefully worded document recorded the disappointments of the Ukrainian people with German rule, and also betrayed OUN-M's sense of frustration with German policies.[19]

These frustrations were based on some bitter experiences the OUN-M had had since November 1941. On 12 December 1941 the Security Police seized the highly successful newspaper *Ukrainske slovo* and arrested such leading OUN-M members as Oleh Kandyba, Ivan Rohach, Yaroslav Chemerynsky, and Petro Oliinyk.[20] After these arrests *Ukrainske slovo* was discontinued. In February 1942 the Gestapo dealt a death blow to the literary circle which published *Litavry*, whose guiding spirit was the poet Olena Teliha. They were arrested, and some forty persons were executed.[21] The height of German repressive policy toward Ukrainian nationalists was reached when the Einsatzkommando C/5 issued an instruction to its branch offices (25 November 1941) ordering that all the functionaries of the Bandera movement be liquidated, because they were preparing an uprising whose objective was to establish an independent Ukrainian state.[22]

Despite a certain ambivalence at the top of the Melnyk organization, the rank and file of OUN (who were exposed to the brutal methods of German security police in the territories occupied by the German army) called a conference at Pochaiv on 24-5 May 1942. According to Yaroslav Haivas, a participant, the gathering condemned German colonial exploitation of Ukraine and adopted the position that OUN-M should actively fight against German rule, because (next to the Bolsheviks) Hitler's Germany was Ukraine's worst enemy.[23] The position taken by the conference determined the basic policy of OUN-M for the duration of the war. The Bandera faction of OUN crossed that bridge much earlier. On 10 July 1941, according to Mykola Lebed, OUN-B decided to go underground. The first important gathering of the organization which took place under the new conditions of German occupation was the First Conference (September 1941). There OUN-B restated its political objectives and emphasized the need to publish materials which would raise the population's political awareness. Particular emphasis was placed on propaganda which would unmask

German plans for the exploitation and colonization of Ukraine. This propaganda was viewed as preparation for an active struggle against the Germans.[24]

The decisions reached at that Conference amounted to a declaration of war against Germany. Taking this position was not an easy matter, as the masses still tended to view the Germans as liberators from the Soviet nightmare. To declare that the Germans were enemies of the Ukrainian people without at least some preparation was risky at best. Besides, there were even some members of OUN who thought that the violent German measures against Ukrainian patriots represented only passing phenomena. They thought that ultimately the Germans would come to their senses and that Ukrainians would be able to reach some satisfactory arrangement with them. Viewed from this perspective, the leadership of OUN-B exhibited a principled resolve.

As the German authorities escalated their repressive policy against OUN, the Ukrainian response, particularly that of OUN-B, was to enhance its position by mobilizing wider circles of Ukrainian society. With that purpose in mind OUN-B held its Second Conference in April 1942. As one of the first items on its agenda, the Congress addressed the question of Ukrainian political aspirations. As was to be expected, the Congress stated unequivocally that the objective of the OUN-B was to establish a sovereign Ukrainian state. The war was being fought in the interest of imperialist states—Germany and the USSR—so the Conference stated: "As an [alternative] to the Bolshevik ideology of internationalism and the German vision of the 'New Europe,' we propose an international concept of a just national, political, [and] economic reconstruction of Europe based on the principle of free national states under the slogan 'Freedom for the Nations and for the Individual.'"[25] The Conference also considered at some length the economic and human exploitation of Ukraine: "We consider that German 'land reform' in Ukraine is only the political...manoeuvre of a conqueror....German land reform is not in the best interest of Ukrainian peasants or the Ukrainian nation because of its exploitative nature. Its practical objective is to squeeze out from Ukraine as much grain and labour as possible."[26]

The decisions of the conferences were disseminated in various underground publications in the form of journals, bulletins, and leaflets. The vigorous propaganda of both factions of OUN against Germany was carefully registered by the German security authorities.[27] Some German reports extensively quoted the more interesting articles. Thus, for example, in one of the brochures published by OUN-B, the author said: "Germany, which pretends to be an ally and liberator, does not wish to see Ukraine united and independent, she does not wish that a Ukrainian state exist, she wants to turn Ukraine into her colony and the Ukrainian people into...slaves."[28] An article which appeared in Bulletin no. 4 (an OUN-B publication) called for opposition of the Ukrainian population to the German authorities. It also maintained "that Communism and Fascism are rather similar in their basic objectives, they differ only in their tactics."[29] The German

intelligence report of 27 November 1942 concluded that the leaflets of the Bandera faction were inflammatory, because they called for the assassination of Germans, particularly the security police.[30]

The Ukrainian underground literature of the period makes it quite clear that after 15 September 1941 OUN-B considered the German authorities enemies of Ukrainian political aspirations, oppressors and exploiters of the Ukrainian people. This perception of the German authorities was clearly stated in the resolutions of the Third Conference of OUN-B (17-21 February 1943). The previously stated position was reiterated in greater detail. It said that Bolsheviks and Nazis fought an imperialist war whose goal was "complete enslavement of nations and individuals....Ukraine found herself at this moment between...two hostile imperialists—Moscow and Berlin, who equally consider her [Ukraine] as an object of colonialism."[31] That anti-German stance was echoed particularly in the resolution of the Third Extraordinary Congress of OUN-B, which was held in August 1943. That Congress, which stands as à landmark of the Ukrainian resistance movement, also spoke rather specifically about the "Hitlerite programme of enslavement and [its] brutal colonial methods," which placed the entire Ukrainian nation in a most difficult position.[32] The German authorities recognized the inimical nature of the Ukrainian national underground movement, and for that reason their police reports, after 1941, introduced the expression *Die ukrainische Widerstandsbewegung* (the Ukrainian resistance movement).

From the foregoing it is obvious that since September 1941 OUN-B was conducting a persistent anti-Nazi campaign, which affected not only its members but Ukrainian society as a whole. This, of course, was not merely a war of words; it was a necessary period of psychological and organizational preparation for open resistance against German rule. To be sure, the arbitrary and brutal behaviour of the German authorities played into the hands of OUN, by convincing the desperate population that their only hope (except for the Bolshevik alternative) lay in joining OUN, in order to participate actively in the national resistance movement. These were the conditions that set the stage for the emergence of an open armed resistance movement as an extension of the underground activity of OUN-B. It was OUN-B which provided the necessary support organization for recruitment, supplies, logistics, and intelligence for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Furthermore, it provided a vital link between the UPA and the Ukrainian population. Hence, OUN was a vibrant force which played a most important role in the Ukrainian resistance movement against the German occupation.

Notes

1. The primacy of a Ukrainian independent state is absolutely unmistakable in the political programmes of both the Bandera faction (OUN-B) and the Melnyk faction (OUN-M). Thus, for example, the very first sentence of the resolutions of the

Second Grand Assembly of OUN (April 1941), stated: "The idea of a Sovereign... Ukrainian State became the basis of the Ukrainian world view." (*OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv, konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby 1929-1955 rr.* [1955], 24; German Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, R43II/1500.) In their memorandum to the German authorities (14 April 1941) the OUN under the leadership of Colonel Andrii Melnyk stated: "The goal of the...[OUN] is the re-establishment of an independent, sovereign Ukrainian state." (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, NS43/41.)

2. For a comprehensive account of Hitler's plans for Eastern Europe, see Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies* (London 1957); also: Ihor Kamenetsky, *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies* (New York 1961).

3. German security police understood the Ukrainian goals quite well. This is reflected in the report of 3 July 1941, which stated: "Through the proclamation of a Ukrainian republic [and] through the organization of a militia the Ukrainian nationalists under the leadership of Bandera try to present the German authorities with accomplished facts." (Bundesarchiv, R58/214, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, nr. 11 [58].)

4. Personal archive, NSDAP nr. 51, "Niederschrift über die Rücksprache mit Mitgliedern des ukrainischen Nationalkomitees und Stepan Bandera vom 3.7.1941." An abbreviated version of this document is in Wolodymyr Kosyk, ed., *Das Dritte Reich und die ukrainische Frage: Dokumente 1934-1944* (Munich 1985), 67-70.

5. The National Archives, Washington, D.C., T120/2532. The Ukrainian translation of this document is in Taras Hunczak and Roman Solchanyk, eds., *Ukrainska suspilno-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti: dokumenty i materialy* (New York 1983), 3:35-43.

6. For the German reaction to the establishment of a Ukrainian government and the arrests that followed, see Roman Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934-1945* (Munich 1956), 2:186-8. See also Bundesarchiv, R58/214, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, nr. 11 (3-4).

7. Unpublished memoirs of Mykola Lebed, 94.

8. For a partial record of OUN-B members arrested during the period 1941-3, see Bundesarchiv, R58/223, Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten nr. 41; National Archives, Washington, DC, T175/279, T175/146. Members of OUN were not only killed in jails and concentration camps, some were executed in public. The Archive of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council has several *Bekanntmachungen* which provide full information about members of OUN or UPA (The Ukrainian Insurgent Army) who were executed.

9. Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine*, 2:192.

10. Ibid., 194.

11. Bundesarchiv, R58/214, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, nr. 23 (173).

12. See Mykola Lebed, "Do zviazkiv OUN z nimetskym viiskom," *Suchasna Ukraina* (Munich), 12 and 26 June 1960.

13. The immediate cause of the German decision to terminate the activities of Roland

and Nachtigall was the protest of Roman Shukhevych (OUN's political leader in Nachtigall), against the arrest of the OUN-B leaders. For a comprehensive treatment of the two units, see *Druzhyny ukrainskykh natsionalistiv u 1941-1942 rokakh* (Munich 1953); Liubomyr Ortynskyi, "Druzhyny ukrainskykh natsionalistiv (DUN)," *Visti bratstva kolyshnikh voiakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA*, no. 6-7 (20-1) (1952).

14. The most comprehensive study of the subject is Lev Shankovskyi, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN* (Munich 1958). For memoirs of some of the participants, see Zinovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (Munich 1952); Evhen Stakhiv, "Kryvyi Rih v 1941-1943 rr.," *Suchasna Ukraina*, 22 January 1956; idem, "Natsionalno-politychne zhyttia Donbasu v 1941-1943 rr. na osnovi osobystykh sposterezhen," *Suchasna Ukraina*, 9 September 1956.

15. The figure of 750-1,200 was given by Mykola Lebed, who was organizer of the expeditionary groups. See Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine*, 2:144; Bundesarchiv R58/223, Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, nr. 37 (64).

16. The command of the German 17th Army repeated those orders: "Ukrainian efforts at independence in the sense of a Ukrainian national state and establishment of a Ukrainian army are to be prevented in the area of operations." (The National Archives, Washington, DC, T312/674/8308426.)

17. *OUN u viini* (Information Section of the OUN), 69-72.

18. Iaroslav Haivas, "Na zakrutakh istori: staietsia neperedbachene," in *Nepohasnyi ohon viry*, ed. Zynovii Knysh (Paris 1974), 269-70.

19. Bundesarchiv, R43II/1504, and the National Archives, Washington, DC, T454/92/000715. A Ukrainian translation is in Hunczak and Solchanyk, *Ukrainska suspilno-politychna dumka*, 3:44-7.

20. *OUN u viini*, 73.

21. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (Littleton, Colo. 1980), 106-16.

22. *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg 1949), 39:265, 269-70; Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine*, 2:338-9; Yury Boshyk, ed., *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath* (Edmonton 1986), 175.

23. Knysh, *Nepohasnyi ohon viry*, 272; Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 128.

24. Mykola Lebed, *UPA: Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia* (Presove biuro UHVR, 1946), 16-7.

25. *OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv*, 61-3.

26. Ibid., 67; Lebed, *UPA*, 18.

27. Bundesarchiv, R58/698, Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, nr. 14 (83), nr. 17 (174-5), nr. 18 (183, 193-5).

28. Bundesarchiv, R58/223, Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, nr. 37 (64).

29. The National Archives, Washington, DC, T175/17/2520098-2520105.

30. The National Archives, Washington, DC, T175/279/5490778.
31. *OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv*, 75-89.
32. Ibid., 90-103.

Ukraine: Colony or Partner?

John A. Armstrong

I

Over any considerable period of time, the relationship between two nations is governed by both geopolitical and ideological considerations. In some relationships (such as Britain and Malta), the geopolitical situation predominated, while in others (Britain and New Zealand), ideological considerations deriving from intimate cultural connections have dominated. The relationship between Ukraine and Germany during the first half of the twentieth century was much more complicated and involved an intricate web of ideological and geopolitical considerations. Because contemporary concepts of international relations constituted a pervasive ideology, German-Ukrainian interaction was generally considered to derive entirely from "objective" geopolitical factors. From today's standpoint, that generalization can hardly be accepted. Consequently, it will be necessary to look briefly not only at the dominant domestic ideologies of German and Ukrainian decision makers, but also at the hidden agenda which such widespread international ideologies, notably Social Darwinism, imposed on the two nations.

The first half of the twentieth century is the only period when relations between Ukrainians and Germans constituted a major force, both for the destinies of the two nations and for European politics in general. The period can be even more precisely delimited—from 1917 to 1944. During the centuries preceding and the decades following World War II the existence of a strong, apparently unassailable, Russian polity dominating Ukraine prevented direct German-Ukrainian relations from exerting a major force in the European system. To be sure, the potential of the interaction was apparent to percipient observers at an early date. Now the objective in examining the early twentieth century is, for most of us, to try to throw some light on what the future course of Ukrainian-German relations may be. Here I am concerned not with the foreign policy of one of the two nations, but with the effect of geopolitics and ideology on both. Hence, contrary to many other approaches, in this essay I will endeavour to see Ukraine as a national complex affected by considerations comparable to—though not identical with—those affecting the Germans.

II

Throughout the 1917-44 period observers were fascinated by the geopolitical potential of Ukrainian territory.[1] During the interwar decades, especially, British, French, and American writers appeared to be almost as influenced by this potential as were political writers in East and Central Europe. The axiom of a Ukrainian fulcrum for the competing levers of European power politics was widely accepted. Retrospective scrutiny of policies and goals in both world wars suggests that this view was, nevertheless, exaggerated. *Short-range* policy goals in the Ukrainian-German interaction can be treated almost entirely from the German perspective. Those goals were predominantly economic and strategic. Although Ukrainian reaction to German policies was far from passive, fragile Ukrainian political and economic organizations could not develop to the point at which they could act as partners of the German military machines. The main German objective, even after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, was occupation of Ukraine to obtain raw materials and food for the Central Powers.[2] This is reflected in Ludendorff's sober initial assessment (before he embraced his own version of Social Darwinism) that the utility of the occupied territories reflected certain priorities: "First order and quiet had to be secured behind the army. The land had to support itself and contribute to the maintenance of the army and the home country and furthermore be made useful for the equipping of the troops and for our war economy."[3] From the Austrian side, General Arthur Arz von Stauffenburg was convinced that his Berlin ally regarded Ukraine as the special object of its exploitation and a staging area on the road to Baghdad, but Vienna's own policy was even shorter-range: to obtain food for its starving cities and prevent a reunification of the Russian empire.[4]

Whether these military objectives should be characterized as a determination to treat Ukraine as a colony is another matter. A primary concern was graphically expressed by the German second-in-command in Ukraine, General Wilhelm Groener: "What is the Ukrainian government? A nebulous illusion. And the State? Chaos....Beyond the reach of our bayonets this artificially put together government exerts no power."[5] Consequently, Groener resisted efforts of the Auswärtiges Amt to take a longer-range view of Ukrainian-German interaction. There are parallels wherever wartime authorities confront a very difficult situation in occupied territories (such as at the end of World War II in the impatient demand of British and American commanders for a free hand on the territory of shaky allies like Belgium and Greece). Often insistence on drastic action is followed (months or even years later, when strategic interests have shifted) by military demands for withdrawal from those territories to take on other assignments. In the Ukrainian case, German commanders, moved primarily by short-range strategic objectives, might have quickly abandoned Ukraine if the theatre of operations had shifted elsewhere.

This is especially likely because the actual contribution of Ukraine to the German war effort was much lower than anticipated. It is true that tens of thousands of tons of grain squeezed from the Ukrainian peasants averted starvation and chaos in Austria. The broader Prussian-German objectives in World War I did not attain even that limited fulfillment. In principle, the timber and mineral resources of Ukraine should have eased strained German supplies; in fact, German authorities had to ship coal *into* the Donbas to maintain minimal activity.[6] Economic achievements of the World-War-II occupation were not much higher. Ruthless confiscation failed to produce much food. Efforts to exploit Ukrainian industrial and energy resources were still less successful. Pit props for coal mining were obtained (with great difficulty due to partisan interference) from the northern forests, but most coal went to domestic Ukrainian uses. Only procurement of Nykopil manganese was relatively successful and vital for the German war effort.

The Ukrainian territory constituted, of course, an indispensable transit area to the battle fronts. This limited utility was quite different from the image of a *Tor zur Weltmacht* (Gate to World Power).[7] Superficially, the position of military commanders in World War II differed from the earlier occupation because Nazi totalitarianism required them to express their objectives in more ideological terms. In addition, some military officers and most occupation officials were influenced by the fanatical ideological climate to express their short-range objectives in a more ruthless manner—hence Field Marshal von Reichenau's order for draconian treatment of Ukrainian peasants who merely failed to oppose the partisans.[8] In the final analysis, military concern with achieving victory, or at least a compromise peace, made officers on the spot concentrate on economic and strategic objectives rather than dreams of colonization.

In sum, short-range military goals implied that German military authorities would treat Ukraine as an object, not necessarily as a colony. Since Ukrainian organizations were not in a position in either war to become real partners in the short-run economic exploitation the military demanded, they were shunted aside and there were no German efforts to enhance Ukrainian organizational capacity. One result was widespread passive resistance to German exactions. Up to 1917, Ukrainian elites had usually co-operated unenthusiastically with the tsarist and provisional governments. After 1917, these elites confronted the very difficult choice of aiding the German war effort or siding with the Soviets. The quandary was far more acute during World War II, but in both instances notable bodies of articulate Ukrainians did side with the Bolsheviks, and therefore directly opposed the Germans. Most of the Ukrainian leaders who refused to assist the Soviet system nevertheless resisted the German mobilization effort at times, but reluctantly returned to co-operation with the German military when the only alternative appeared to be complete Communist Russian victory.

The history of elites in small nations caught between conflicting great powers demonstrates that a bitter dilemma always arises—as witness the position of the Romanian and Greek regimes in World War I, Belgium and Scandinavia prior to World War II, and many "non-aligned" countries today. For Ukrainian elites the dilemma was made even crueler by the fact that the choice had to be made under harsh military occupation. What made the psychological as well as the physical wounds of German occupation immensely more painful was the dominant ideological current of the early twentieth century.

III

More than half a century ago William Langer demonstrated, in his masterful two volumes on *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, that the style of world politics drastically changed during the 1890s, because the new doctrine of Social Darwinism invaded the international sphere. Space precludes analysis of this pervasive yet vague notion, but two quotations from key German leaders will suggest its flavour. Shortly after World War I began, Wilhelm II asserted that "either the Prussian-German-Germanic world view (*Weltanschauung*)—Justice, Freedom, Honour, and Morals—will be respected, or the Anglo-Saxon world view will triumph, and that means sinking into the worship of Mammon. In this struggle one world view is bound to be destroyed."[9] Admiral von Tirpitz put the matter in less high-flown terms: "The war has developed into a life and death struggle between two world philosophies—German and Anglo-American. The question is whether we must sink down and become mere manure for others (*Völkerdünger*)."[10] It should be emphasized that even more sweeping expressions of the "struggle for survival of the fittest" can be found in the writings of Americans, French, and British. For example, shortly after the war started one could read in the prominent London periodical *Nineteenth Century* that: "efficiency in war, or rather efficiency for war is God's test of a nation's soul. By that test it stands or by that it falls."[11]

Still, a variety of factors and, above all, Germany's physical and intellectual isolation, combined to make Social Darwinism appear more evident to German elites during World War I. Mastery of East Central Europe became the "test" of the German soul. Georg von Wedel, German ambassador to Vienna, wrote: "If the Ukraine, the Baltic Provinces, Finland, etc., really fall away from Russia permanently...then what is left of Russia is simply a Great Siberia. If Russia is reborn, our descendants will probably have to fight a second Punic War."[12] Along with this negative goal of eliminating a major competitor in the ruthless struggle for survival, German spokesmen became more preoccupied, as the war became more costly, with postwar objectives: "If we succeed in having troops in Ukraine after conclusion of peace, the economic side would be very valu-

able."[13] Together with the presumed riches of Ukraine itself, control of the region promised access to sources farther east. In other words, the short-range objective of providing economic and strategic assets to fight the war had become a long-range goal of acquiring permanent assets to aid Germany in the incessant struggle for survival. Such a perception of Germany's inescapable requirement for expansion at the expense of other nations in the international arena logically implied that the short-run military exploitation of Ukraine must be perpetuated by colonization in times of nominal peace.

These implications continued to affect German schemes to regain a dominant position in Europe which it lost in 1918.[14] Ukraine as a colony remained central to German expansionist planning, as some Ukrainian émigré leaders (especially those who sought to collaborate with France and Poland) fully understood. For most émigré leaders, however, the actuality of mass deprivation and starvation in Soviet Ukraine outweighed the fear of future German colonization. A major reason why suspicions of German domination were relegated to a secondary level of Ukrainian consciousness was the émigré leadership's realization that German elites—unlike themselves—possessed two plausible alternatives to expansion and direct colonization in East Europe. The first, which was popular in German intellectual circles of the 1920s before the Locarno system collapsed, envisaged a conservative European union, at least at the economic level. Such a development might have held much promise for Ukrainians. In the actual conditions of the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, implications of European unity were remote and uncertain. Far more evident in its effects on Ukraine was Germany's choice of the alternative—close alliance with Russia.

A conservative alliance with tsarist Russia had, of course, been the cornerstone of Prussia-Germany's foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century. That had intermittently attracted governing elites of the Austrian branch of the German nation as well. For the Austrians, the "Ukrainian card," on the other hand, was primarily part of the Dual Monarchy's domestic policy of balancing ethnic elements, rather than a way to weaken the Russian empire. Much later, as Austrian officers with earlier Ukrainian experience were assigned positions in Third Reich occupation forces, the old Galician connections were conducive to more sympathetic emphasis on the Ukrainian factor. For Weimar Germany (and even some Nazi circles) the Prussian preference for an alliance with Russian central authorities against the Western powers persisted as a hindrance to German support of "separatist" forces in the USSR. As long as this tendency prevailed, national Ukrainian leaders found little room for manoeuvre in Berlin.

Increasingly, however, as extreme nationalist, and subsequently National Socialist, elements came to dominance in Berlin, the Russian alternative ceased to appear as a traditional alliance of equal great powers and became instead a neo-Machiavellian scheme for subjugating all Slavs by manipulating Moscow.

Superficially, the basis for a Bolshevik-German alliance appeared to exist, for Stalin's 1925 analysis of the global dichotomy strangely echoed Wilhelm II's:

> Two basic but opposed centres of attraction are created and at the same time two directions of currents to those centres throughout the whole world: Anglo-America for the bourgeois states and the Soviet Union for the workers of the west and the revolutionists of the east. Anglo-America attracts with its wealth. The Soviet Union attracts through its revolutionary experience.[15]

By that time Stalin had tacitly adopted the position argued by Trotsky at the Brest-Litovsk conference, that "separatism" was only a ploy for revival of reactionary Russian centralism, which Germany should fear more than Communist "federalism."[16]

Perhaps these vague Bolshevik overtures were designed to play on the illusions, common in German technocratic and business circles, that a Bolshevik regime could provide the vehicle for German talent to create a semi-colonial sphere of penetration and development throughout the new USSR. During the mid-1920s, influential bank and industrial circles proposed, in a memorandum to the Reich government, to regard Russia "as an undeveloped colony" which only German penetration could fructify.[17] These ideas contained an unmistakable suggestion that Slavs were generally inferior, that a "plasticity" in the identity of the Eastern peoples kept them from attaining the clear, strong consciousness the Germans had. As early as 1916 a wartime correspondent wrote:

> They have little changed over the centuries. For them it [national identity] is much less a matter of clear consciousness than of unclear feelings....There can be no thought of the cultural superiority of the Russians. But the Russians were the first to work out unmistakable [national] characteristics. However, in fact the different ethnic groups (*Stämme*) greatly overlap, and in general it is scarcely possible to set definite boundaries.[18]

Fourteen years later an address to the Weimar Reichstag hinted at the same susceptibility of "undeveloped" East Europeans to "manipulation": "There live peoples who are favourable toward us as we toward them, who live far from the sea, who are not industrialized but agriculturally developed....There is Europe's *Lebensraum*."[19]

Under different circumstances, such condescension might have moved in harmless, even benevolent directions. In Hitler's unsophisticated mind, the vague doctrine of Social Darwinism combined with the notion of "Eastern" inferiority and the chimera of immense, exploitable wealth. For him, the concept of East Europe, especially Ukraine, as a German sphere of exploitation and basis for world power, became an overriding political objective, which he tenaciously maintained throughout various tactical shifts. In an apparent indiscretion, he prematurely advanced the idea in his speech of 12 September 1936: "If we had at our disposal the incalculable wealth and stores of raw materials of the Ural mountains and the unending fertile plains of the Ukraine to be exploited under

National-Socialist leadership, then we would produce, and our German people would swim in plenty."[20] Five years later, at the start of his invasion of the USSR, Hitler's fixation was demonstrated by his insistence, contrary to all military science, that conquest of the resources of Ukraine and the Caucasus have a higher priority than strategic positions which would eliminate Soviet military power.[21] This priority permeated the entire German occupation. For a relatively well-trained *Ostministerium* official like Otto Bräutigam, the vision of German world power through expansion in East Europe meant that Ukraine must become a "colonial land for settlement and economic exploitation."[22] Even for "moderate" Nazis, such attitudes, based on the belief that Ukrainians were incapable of self-government, became almost ineradicable.

For Ukrainian elites, the learning experience under German occupation in World War II was different, but traumatic. In June 1941, the newly appointed Ukrainian mayor of Lviv telegraphed Hitler: "As the Free Ukrainian People it is our duty to make our contribution to the New Order of Europe along with our friends the German people."[23] At a less formal level, innumerable spontaneous expressions of attachment to the German cause appeared. However, within months, the brutal exploitation of *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* under East Prussian Gauleiter Erich Koch (who had been an early proponent of German expansion in Ukraine) turned Ukrainian elites and masses alike against the colonial occupation regime.[24] Considering the harshness of German rule and the monstrosity of its poorly concealed aims, any other Ukrainian reaction would have been fatuous.[25] Yet Ukrainian concern that the struggle between Berlin and Moscow not end with a complete Soviet victory was realistic. Consequently, Ukrainian leaders' efforts, puny as they appear in retrospect, to exert some influence on the military balance reflected a real national interest. Unfortunately, many Ukrainian proclamations and tactics reinforced German prejudices about "Slavic immaturity." The *Akt* of 30 June 1941, in which the Bandera faction precipitately proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state, alarmed sober officers of Austrian background like Hans Koch, who genuinely feared for the safety of their Ukrainian associates as well as for their own positions. Subsequent fratricidal conflicts within the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists disgusted relatively sympathetic Germans.

Partly because of these fiascos, Ukrainian efforts to evolve a more balanced program in 1943—particularly the assertion that Ukraine was in a position to act as natural leader of East European nations—did not impress German observers as much as they should have.[26] Instead, stereotypes of Slavic fanaticism and inefficiency were confirmed. Thus SS *Obergruppenführer* Gottlob Berger reported to Himmler (10 June 1944) that Stepan Bandera was so convinced of an Anglo-American victory (followed by Western assistance to Ukrainian nationalists) that he had not even considered the possibility of a Soviet-German separate peace. Berger concluded that Bandera was an "adroit, ardent Slav, intent on his own ideas, hating Great Russians as well as Germans, useful but dangerous."[27] Military liaison officers in actual contact with Ukrainian guerrillas

(UPA) at this late stage of World War II had a distinctly less stereotyped view, but the purely tactical co-operation which followed was kept at arm's length. In any case, it was much too late for Germany to play the Russian card, to acquire a Ukrainian ally, or to hold a Ukrainian colony.

IV

This brief, schematic analysis of the historical record is intended to be the starting point, not the conclusion, of the theme—"Ukraine: Colony or Partner?" In neither world war, despite nominally complete German control of Ukraine for many months, did the Reich extract major economic advantages from it. In the last four decades, both economic theory and world opinion have emphatically moved away from autarky as a method to achieve long-range economic goals. One of the great accomplishments of the post-war period has been the triumph of liberal economics at the international level as well as in countries like the German Federal Republic. Both raw materials and labour are attainable through normal exchange relations. Markets, if not quite as open, have been sufficient for highly industrialized powers to attain undreamed-of standards of living. There are, therefore, no evident economic reasons why the German nation as a whole needs Ukraine, although the GDR fragment derives some advantage from Ukrainian raw materials and energy resources. Nor is it conceivable that a German nation would be able or willing to pursue the distant geopolitical strategies that would require using Ukraine as a *place d'armes*. After all, a nation with a declining demographic base and an eastern frontier on the Oder is unlikely ever again to deploy military forces on the Black Sea coast.

Another fundamental change has radically altered the climate of Ukrainian-German interaction. Social Darwinism has almost vanished as a motivating force in international relations, especially in Europe. Generally speaking, neither national elites nor nation-states believe that they must expand through force to demonstrate fitness to survive as independent entities. Consequently, international relations is not always perceived as a zero-sum game. Like individuals in other contexts, national leaders remain suspicious, manoeuvre for advantages for the units with which they are identified, and take excessive pride in them, but most leaders are aware that the survival, and even the economic well-being, of their national bases depend on a wide variety of factors, including chance, demography, cultural advances, industriousness—and co-operation. This *return* to a moderate version of national self-interest (for it was the Social Darwinist zero-sum world view which was the aberration) is most apparent in West Europe, with its prime organizational form the European Community. If a break-up of the Soviet empire occurs, the other German states—Austria and Switzerland—will probably be integrated into the European Community, as the majority of Germans already are.

Whether the East European nations which survive the demise of the USSR would associate with the Community directly or as part of an East European federation is impossible to forecast, but recent precedents in West Europe may be suggestive. Some Ukrainian nationalist spokesmen resent a comparison between a post-Communist polity in the present Soviet Union and the post-Franco Spanish polity, but the parallels are interesting. As long as the authoritarian Franco regime lasted, the distinctive non-Castilian nations of the Spanish polity were denied autonomy. Facing such national oppression, many of their leaders urged complete independence. Since the establishment of parliamentary democracy in Spain, Basque nationalists have remained intransigent and lost most support they had outside the Iberian peninsula, especially in France. Conceded a very broad autonomy, the much larger and historically more important Catalan nation has pressed rapidly for complete cultural nationhood, including legal establishment of the native language. Most immigrants from other parts of the peninsula have accepted instruction in Catalan for their children, and Catalan "irredentas" in Valencia and the Balearic Islands have been reintegrated through language and cultural symbols. Within the Spanish economy, now a sub-division of the European Community, the dynamic Catalan industrial and mercantile population enjoys immense advantages. At the same time, Spanish adherence to the broader European economic sphere (especially its French element which is historically and culturally closer to Catalonia than to Castile) acts as a guarantee that political power cannot be used to reverse Catalan autonomy and economic dynamism.

That this model might apply to a post-Soviet relationship between Ukraine and Russia is highly speculative, but it is hard to see how the comparison can be insulting to thoughtful Ukrainians with a true "European vocation." If Ukraine were to retain a special relation to Russia and other East European nations, the institutional supports of the European Community—strong economic ties, a nascent parliament, firm judicial precedents—would constitute essential guarantees against political manipulation by the larger Russian nation. Less formally, intimate cultural and economic ties of Ukraine with specific national units of the Community would be indispensable for Ukraine to fulfill its destiny as a leader of smaller East European nations. What some Ukrainian leaders sought in the mockery of a "European New Order" proclaimed by Hitler in 1941, might become a reality in the true community of a union of equals.

The climate of Social Darwinist thinking which produced the German drive for colonial domination precluded any genuine European association. For example, even German military circles during the Weimar period sharply opposed Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe plan, as did the Soviet regime.[28] Indeed, a major reason why the Reichswehr circles were suspicious of Pan-Europe was that it precluded a Prussian-Bolshevik alignment. Today, the acid test of Germans' acceptance of a European vocation—which most have passed brilliantly so far—is their attachment to Europe at the cost of an "Eastern option," which would imply alliance with Moscow regardless of the nature of its

regime. Surely it is in the interest of all Ukrainian national leaders to make sure that the Germans never fail this test.

Whatever lingering memories of German occupation persist may induce leaders of a self-determined Ukraine to balance partnership with the German nations by equally close, though qualitatively different, associations with other European Community members. Ukrainian elites might well prefer to balance their necessarily close partnership with Germans in economic and cultural affairs by forming other European partnerships in the sensitive spheres of law and administration. Historical precedents for states modernizing their government apparatus by drawing on distant rather than neighbouring powers are plentiful, from medieval Hungary through early modern Prussia (the customs *Régie*) to Pahlavi Iran. Ukrainian reliance on French and British partnerships in sensitive governmental spheres should, therefore, be neither humiliating for native Ukrainians nor insulting to Germans.

In discussing the future of Ukrainian-German interaction, one necessarily plunges into speculation. Yet some speculation is necessary (if grounded in the facts of earlier history), in order to grasp the parameters of a relationship which can never again be that of occupier to colony. Germans must not merely accept but welcome this change, whereas Ukrainians must recognize their inexperience as a new governing elite while they explore a wide range of special relationships with the European powers. Only in that manner can both nations, if ever the oppressive weight of a decadent Soviet system is lifted, enter together upon their most promising vocation—to build, in the words of one of the greatest Europeans, a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."

Postscript

The pages above (apart from certain editorial changes) were completed in late 1986. At that time few, if any, observers anticipated rapid achievement of Ukrainian independence such as occurred five years later. Nevertheless, in 1986 it seemed important to anticipate the parameters of extensive freedom of action for Ukraine. In the relatively narrow context of German-Ukrainian relations, the seven years since 1986 have produced striking changes. Only one and a half years before Ukraine became independent, Germany attained its goal of national unity, thereby becoming the strongest power of Europe, and second or third in the entire world. Germany's influence on the emerging group of independent East European states has been even stronger than the world ranking implies, for Germany alone has contributed more economic aid to the group (including Russia) than all other Western states combined. On the other hand, heavy domestic commitments, together with relatively slight military strength and marked diplomatic hesitancy, restricted German influence.

For Ukrainians, this limitation presents advantages: Ukraine obtains its share of German aid without incurring severe risks of German dominance. The Kiev government and private Ukrainian organizations can draw on a wide range of West European and North American advice and encouragement (accompanied by

modest material assistance), thereby avoiding dependence on any single outside power. At the same time, European Community disunity, often approaching disarray, implies that Ukraine cannot rely (as this writer once envisaged) on EC guarantees. The horrifying events in Yugoslavia have simultaneously revealed a failure of will and policy for all Europe. (It should, however, be noted that in 1991 Germany initiated formal recognition of nations seeking independence from Yugoslavia and that during 1992 independent Ukraine contributed to peace-keeping forces there.) Reflecting on the Yugoslav debacle, Ukrainians might well recall advice (by the author of "Mazeppa") during a similar stalemate of European policy:

> Trust not for freedom to the Franks—
> They have a king who buys and sells;
> In native swords and native ranks,
> The only hope of courage dwells....
>
> ("Don Juan," Canto III, xiv)

Byron's advice accords fully with the heavy emphasis among twentieth-century Ukrainian nationalists on acquiring armed forces, so tragically inadequate during two world wars. At the same time one may hope that Ukrainian leadership will recognize that, apart from the symbolic satisfaction provided by an independent military establishment, no single European state can really assure its own security.

This is not the place to analyse present Ukrainian policy-making and administration. Evidently both require much development and certain fundamental transformations (especially in economic guidance) that so far have been slow in appearing. Drawing on Western models and advice (as envisaged above) is still indispensable. But resolute Ukrainian rejection of revived Social Darwinist prescriptions for "ethnic cleansing," like that pursued in Germany during the middle years of the twentieth century and emulated in Yugoslavia at the end of the century, is encouraging. So are the surprisingly cordial relations with contemporary Russia. No one can guarantee that regimes in Moscow will remain pacific. If, however, Kiev demonstrates that it has done its best to maintain cooperative relationships between equals, the Ukrainian government will have excellent chances, in a crisis, of retaining the loyalty of its citizens regardless of their ethnic origins. In the long run, such solidarity can provide the surest guarantee that Ukraine will never again be colonized by any outside power. Beyond this very general—but fundamental—conclusion, the outside observer can neither urge nor prophesy.

Notes

1. The historical discussion in Sections II and III appears substantially (although with minor changes) in my contribution, "Ukrainian-German Relations: Background and Prospects," to the *Festschrift* for Edward C. Thaden.

2. Winfried Baumgart, *Deutsche Ostpolitik, 1918* (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1966), 369.
3. Erich Ludendorff, *Kriegführung und Politik*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Mittler, 1922), 146.
4. Baumgart, *Deutsche Ostpolitik*, 123.
5. Ibid., 124.
6. Ibid., 369.
7. Rolf-Dieter Müller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht: Die Bedeutung der Sowjetunion für die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Rüstungpolitik zwischen den Weltkriegen* (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1984).
8. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 148-9.
9. Martin Kitchen, *The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918* (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 204.
10. Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1967), 432.
11. H.W. Koch, ed., *The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 343.
12. Fischer, *Germany's Aims*, 500.
13. Report to Ober-Ost, 16 November 1918, quoted in Müller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht*, 17.
14. Ibid., 238.
15. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 7:281-2.
16. United States, Department of State, *Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918), 135.
17. Müller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht*, 59.
18. Paul Michaelis, *Kurland und Litauen in deutscher Hand* (Berlin-Steglitz: Würtz, [1916?]), 193.
19. Müller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht*, 235.
20. Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia* (London: Oxford, 1949), 2:58.
21. Müller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht*, 348.
22. Ibid., 347.
23. U.S. National Archives, Geheime Feldpolizei Gruppe 711, 454 Sicherungsdivision, Microfilm T 315, Roll 2215.
24. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 101ff.
25. As early as May 1939, in *Der Stürmer* there was a demand that millions of "superfluous" East Europeans die in order to provide agricultural surpluses to render Germany and Europe blockade-proof. (Müller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht*, 238.)

26. Text of the Third Conference of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 17-21 February 1943, in *Za samostiinu Ukrainu*, no. 9.

27. U.S. National Archives, Reichsführer SS, Chef des SS Hauptamtes, CD SS HA 7, BE/Steg VI-Tgb, No. 189/44, Microfilm T 175, Roll 125.

28. Müller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht*, 174.

Germany, Western Europe, and Ukraine after World War II

Yaroslav Bilinsky

Primarily, this essay will document bilateral relations between the two Germanys and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic after World War II; secondarily, it will cover relations between the United Kingdom and Ukraine, and France and the Ukrainian republic.[1] Critics might object that such an essay on bilateral relations is an exercise in futility, for whatever the Soviet constitution may promise, the Ukrainian SSR is only a unit of a highly centralized state. No matter what her role in the United Nations may be, Ukraine is not an independent state under international law. It is, therefore, natural that it is easier to obtain data on the foreign trade of Luxembourg and Liechtenstein than on that of Ukraine, and that in recent volumes of *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft* there have been numerous articles on Hungary's economy, but none on Ukraine's. Potentially Ukraine, which is roughly the size of France and has a similarly large population, is much more significant than any of the West European mini-states and most of the East European socialist countries. The Romans would have aptly summarized the present Ukrainian situation in two words: *vae victis* [woe to the vanquished]! We can, however, take the long view and deal with "potentialities" rather than "realities," because we all know—rationally or intuitively—that in the course of a century, a half-century, or perhaps even sooner, the political realities are bound to change. So to deal with potentialities is to look ahead, far ahead.

Relations with Germany are particularly interesting, because the German nation has suffered the problem of political division and German scholars have had long experience in East European studies. In his preface (*Geleitwort*) to the first issue of the new series of *Osteuropa*, Hermann Dietrich, former Reichsminister and in 1951 President of the German Association for the Study of Eastern Europe (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde*), wrote:

> Never in modern history has the world known as little about events in Eastern Europe and particularly in Russia [*Russland*] as today. Never has the necessity been more urgent to know much about them. As a consequence of its geographic location and its close ties with the Slavic world, the German people has made a more serious and more intensive effort than any other to gain insight into Eastern Europe and its peoples.[2]

It would be possible to debate whether the first two sentences still applied a generation later, and whether the word *Russland* should have been replaced with the more precise term *Sowjetunion*, but the last sentence on the German contribution to East European studies is absolutely true.

The legal basis for bilateral relations between foreign countries and the Ukrainian SSR was laid in the amendment of 1 February 1944 to the 1936 Soviet constitution, which allowed the establishment of foreign ministries in the individual republics.[3] Under the rule of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (hereinafter CPU) Petro Shelest (July 1963 to May 1972), and to a lesser extent, under the rule of his predecessor as CPU First Secretary, Mykola Pidhorny (Nikolai Podgorny; December 1957 to June 1963), the Ukrainian elite had become more self-assertive, both in internal and external affairs. Under Shelest, a trilingual propaganda brochure was issued in an edition of 2,000, but even Shelest's anonymous author had to be careful not to claim too much:

> By means of the law [constitutional amendment] of 1 February 1944 the general principle had been established: each [Soviet] Union republic could enter into direct relations with foreign states. The concrete paths [of the amendment's implementation] are chosen by each republic according to her judgment: those relations can be implemented by means of bilateral diplomatic relations, the exchange of diplomatic and consular representations, by means of international organizations and multilateral agreements, or by either means. As far as Ukraine is concerned, the all-Union system of diplomatic and consular representations effectively protects the interests of the republic in this or that country.[4]

Shortly after World War II the United Kingdom attempted to utilize that amendment and establish direct diplomatic relations with the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR. In a pithy written exchange, almost three years later, between Major Tufton Beamish, MP, and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Kenneth G. Younger, the initiative was described:

> *Major Beamish* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what efforts have been made to establish diplomatic relations with the Ukraine and Byelorussia, both members of the United Nations. . . .
> *Mr. Younger*: In August, 1947, His Majesty['s] Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow requested the Soviet government to transmit to the Government of the Ukraine a proposal that this country and the Ukraine should exchange diplomatic representatives. As no answer was ever received from the Ukrainian Government, it did not seem worth while approaching the Byelorussian Government with a similar proposal. . . .[5]

From other sources it appears that the British Ministry's Counselor in Moscow—probably the very same *chargé d'affaires* mentioned in Mr. Younger's reply—did follow up the proposal with a personal visit to the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kiev. It was probably that trip which incited the USSR Supreme Soviet to pass a law in December 1947 prohibiting any Soviet officials from contacting any foreign diplomats except through the channels of

the USSR Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, according to Mr. Younger, of the British Foreign Office, by 1950 Soviet authorities forbade Western diplomats to travel to Western Ukraine and Western Belarus without special permission (which made some sense, because anti-Soviet guerrillas were still active in Western Ukraine) and they included both capitals, Kiev and Minsk, in the forbidden Western "security zones" (which was utter nonsense).[6]

Why did the British do it? They have never been as close to Ukraine as, for instance, the French or the Germans. Also, in August 1947 Europe was being torn apart. (In July 1947 Molotov and his large delegation of experts left the Paris conference on the new Marshall Plan in protest. In October 1947 Zhdanov re-established the notorious Comintern, renamed the Cominform.) However, in 1947 the British government under Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin was staunchly anti-Soviet. It almost looked as if the British initiative was designed to embarrass Stalin, who had been responsible for the 1944 amendment, and to undercut the Soviet Ukrainian public attacks on the United Kingdom in the UN. (The Ukrainian SSR had been elected to the first UN Security Council in 1946). Stalin replied to the British proposal by ordering the Ukrainians in Kiev to ignore the British request and by declaring Kiev and Minsk off limits to Western diplomats.

Nearly twelve years later British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, accompanied by Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, visited Kiev during their state visit to the Soviet Union (21 February-3 March 1959). It was in the middle of Khrushchev's first Berlin crisis, and Macmillan initiated the visit because, "in Churchill's tradition, he always liked to take the role of mediator between East and West."[7] In the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, Macmillan and Lloyd were officially received not by the top leader, CPU First Secretary Pidhorny, but by Ukrainian SSR Prime Minister ("Chairman of the Council of Ministers") Nykyfor T. Kalchenko. Though Kalchenko ranked second in Soviet political protocol, ostensibly he was Macmillan's equal, and he also happened to be a very old and very close associate of Khrushchev. Kalchenko was accompanied by L.Kh. Palamarchuk, the Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian SSR. On the day of his arrival in Kiev, Macmillan also paid a courtesy visit to Demian S. Korotchenko, Ukraine's titular president ("Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR's Supreme Soviet"). Korotchenko, too, was a very close associate of Khrushchev, and of more senior political standing than Kalchenko.

Macmillan's three days in Kiev was not an unalloyed pleasure. Before he took off for the Ukrainian capital, Khrushchev insulted him twice. First, while sensitive secret talks with the British delegation were proceeding, Khrushchev gave an election speech in which he attacked Macmillan indirectly: "he criticized in harsh terms Eisenhower and Dulles...about Adenauer he was brutally offensive."[8] Second, Khrushchev promised that he would accompany Macmillan to Kiev and Leningrad, which would have been an act of unusual courtesy, but then he developed a diplomatic toothache. To exacerbate matters, on the day of Macmillan's arrival in Kiev, Khrushchev's most senior associate in the Party

Presidium (Politburo), Anastas Mikoian, gave another election speech in Rostov, in which he attacked Macmillan's "tough line" directly and implied that Macmillan was doing the bidding of his Western Allies.

Thus Macmillan's visit to Kiev carried more than just a whiff of diplomatic scandal, of which his Ukrainian hosts were innocent. Kalchenko tried to save the situation by using the phrase "peace through negotiation" in his airport welcoming speech. Macmillan seized upon it with enthusiasm and expanded on it in his reply. Journalist Michael Frayn denounced Macmillan's reception in Kiev in an ironic commentary: "Once upon a time the Soviet authorities used to seize any foreigner they caught committing the crime of being foreign and pack him off to forced labour in Siberia. Now it seems the regime is liberalised and they just condemn him to forced sightseeing in Kiev." Frayn was particularly incensed that Macmillan was hauled off to inspect a nearby collective farm and taken to an Exhibition of the Advanced Achievements in the National Economy of Ukraine, and subjected to a barrage of production statistics at both. Frayn also made an ironic comment on Palamarchuk, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, who dutifully toured the *kolhosp* with the British guests: "and how on earth does he fill his day in the normal course of events?"[9]

Prime Minister Macmillan, who initially was under terrible strain, came to enjoy the milder climate of Kiev and, above all, the "large crowds...[who] seemed interested" (and who had undoubtedly been organized by Kalchenko and Pidhorny). A politician's politician, Macmillan started "working" the friendly crowds by saying a few words in Russian. (It may not have been deliberate, but Macmillan did not utter a single Ukrainian word in Ukraine.) Macmillan was very much impressed with Kiev, "a city of outstanding interest and beauty."[10] However, despite the best efforts of Kalchenko and his subordinates, Macmillan was not taken in by Soviet Ukrainian agriculture and industry. In his memoirs he commented that agriculture was not sufficiently mechanized, and in one of his formal speeches in Kiev he gently chided his hosts for having forgotten that Britain was co-operating in "some aspects" of Ukrainian industrial expansion: "He mentioned specifically the fact that a British consortium was supplying £12,500,000 ($35,000,000) worth of equipment toward the construction of a tire factory at Dnepropetrovsk, which is to become one of the largest in Europe."[11]

It was impossible for me to reconstruct with any degree of precision the foreign trade between the postwar Ukrainian SSR and the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, quite apart from the even more difficult task of accounting for large-scale West European investments in Ukraine. The data are too few, too scattered, and, above all, too old. I have looked at old Shelest-era estimates of the Ukrainian SSR's share in the total Soviet foreign trade turnover, which are more easily available than estimates of the separate shares of imports and exports. Those estimates—by Soviet Ukrainian scholars—of Ukraine's share in the total turnover of Soviet foreign trade, range from a low of 18.2 per cent to as high as 30 per cent.[12] For the sake of simplicity, I have estimated the Ukrainian SSR's share in the total Soviet foreign trade turnover at 20 per cent. We

know that in 1966 Ukraine sent 77 per cent of her total exports to socialist countries and only 14 per cent to capitalist countries.[13] Also, in 1968 Ukraine was leading in total Soviet exports of certain goods—100 per cent of all Soviet natural gas exports, 94 per cent of all iron ore exports, 73 per cent of all exported coal mining equipment, and 72 per cent of all pig iron.[14] Despite Macmillan's public correction in 1959, Ukrainian trade with the United Kingdom eight years later was relatively small, at a little over $100 million for total turnover (an estimated 20 per cent of the announced $517 million total turnover with the USSR as a whole).[15]

In 1967, trade between France and Ukrainian SSR amounted to only 66 per cent of United Kingdom-Ukrainian SSR trade ($68 million).[16] Nonetheless, General de Gaulle's visit to Kiev in 1966, as part of his state visit to the Soviet Union (20 June to 1 July 1966), was interesting in several respects. First, unlike Prime Minister Macmillan, President de Gaulle was given first-class treatment throughout his trip. His main Soviet hosts—Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Pidhorny—did not embarrass de Gaulle by making open references to West German revanchism or American imperialism while he was in the USSR. In Kiev, where he was accompanied by Prime Minister Kosygin, he was received by the full republican "troika"—Petro Shelest (First Secretary, CPU), Volodymyr Shcherbytsky (Ukrainian SSR Prime Minister), and Korotchenko (President of the Republic). There were no harried visits to propaganda collective farms or industrial exhibitions as there had been for Macmillan. De Gaulle's main public function in Kiev was the solemn laying of a wreath at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier. De Gaulle had withdrawn France from the integrated structure of NATO in 1966, which explains the cordial reception by all Soviet officials.

Second, de Gaulle's visit was interesting because, despite the meticulous preparation for his trip to Kiev, both by his officials and *Le Monde* (which gave President de Gaulle's Soviet trip very extensive, semi-official coverage), his stay in Kiev was only half a day (28 June 1966). While in Kiev, President de Gaulle studiously avoided giving any aid and comfort not only to Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists," but to more self-assertive autonomists as well. He took a pro-Russian position. At the official reception in Kiev given by Korotchenko, de Gaulle succinctly mentioned "the ties and affinities between Ukraine and France," as symbolized by Anne (1024-75), daughter of Ukrainian prince Yaroslav the Wise, who married the French king Henry I and bore him a son who later became the French king Philippe I. De Gaulle also paid tribute to the heroism of Ukrainian Soviet soldiers during World War II, and praised the local Ukrainian population for showing their sympathy toward French NCOs who were imprisoned in a special penal camp for prisoners of war in Rava Ruska. He also paid tribute to "the primordial role which the city of Kiev and Ukraine had played in the difficult and dramatic formation of great Russia."[17] *Le Monde*'s eminent diplomatic correspondent, André Fontaine, believed that Kiev was worth more than a brief stopover, and implicitly he chided President de Gaulle for passing through the Ukrainian capital so quickly. More explicitly than Michael

Frayn of the *Manchester Guardian*, Fontaine remarked on Kiev being a non-Russian city: "This was no longer Russia, [which was] always well behaved and restrained [*bien sage*], but Central Europe: a little bit like Vienna, a little bit like the Balkans, with its fantasy and its exuberance."[18]

We can assume that President de Gaulle had been exceedingly well briefed on the political situation in Kiev, not just on Queen Anne of France and the penal camp of Rava Ruska. On the day of de Gaulle's visit to Kiev, Bernard Féron published a masterly analysis of "Kiev, the Mother of Russian Cities." The title, however, was somewhat misleading, because Féron gave a summary of Ukrainian history, including that country's struggle for independence and for greater internal autonomy within the Soviet Union. It was complete with names and dates—Mykola Skrypnyk, who committed suicide in 1933; Panas Liubchenko, the Prime Minister of Ukraine who killed himself in 1937; Stanislav Kosior, CPU First Secretary, who had been charged with battling separatism in the party, failed, and was purged and subsequently executed; and disgraced CPU First Secretary L.G. Melnikov, who was fired in June 1953 for pursuing a policy of Russification with excessive zeal. Féron said that apparently Ukrainian nationalism still had not been completely overcome, since Moscow's press kept hinting that it had survived all the trials and tribulations.[19]

As a matter of simple courtesy, Féron's piece on the political importance of Kiev had probably been submitted to President de Gaulle well in advance of its publication. Yet de Gaulle painstakingly distanced himself from declaring any sympathy for Ukrainian political aspirations: "Then, as if he wanted to cut short any speculation about his sentiments with regard to 'bourgeois nationalism,' [General de Gaulle] reminded [his audience] that his visit to Kiev 'was one of those which he was making in the Soviet Union,' and he expressed his satisfaction at finding himself here in the company of Mr. Kosygin. He concluded, in Russian: 'Long live Ukraine! Long live the Soviet people!'"[20] On his arrival in Moscow (20 June 1966), de Gaulle replied to Ukrainian-born Soviet President Pidhorny in Russian: "Through me, the French people salute the great Soviet people. Long live Russia!" De Gaulle also professed to find in Russia prosperity, power, and "a fullness of peaceful ardour."[21] Fontaine observed somewhat critically that on his Soviet trip de Gaulle substituted the word Russia for the more precise term Soviet Union, thus helping to legitimize the Soviet regime in the eyes of many patriotic Russians.[22] Conversely, Soviet Ukrainian autonomists, like Shelest (who lost his position in 1972) and his predecessor Pidhorny (who was removed from all his Moscow positions by June 1977), could derive no comfort from de Gaulle's visit to Kiev, because the French president rejected their aspirations.

As for the two Germanys, the Ukrainian SSR had longer and closer economic, cultural, and political relations with the German Democratic Republic (DDR). In 1967 Ukraine had an estimated turnover of $565 million with the DDR.[23] The sizable trade between the DDR, the USSR in general, and the Ukrainian SSR in particular, shows that the technological content of the DDR's

exports to the Soviet Union was much higher than that of the DDR's imports from the USSR—in the early 1970s almost two-thirds of the goods imported by the Soviet Union from East Germany consisted of machines and industrial equipment, whereas only 19.7 per cent of the goods imported by the DDR from the USSR were. Then the DDR filled over 90 per cent of her need for crude oil, iron ore, cotton, and lumber, 100 per cent of her need for natural gas, and more than 80 per cent of her need for pig iron through imports from the USSR.[24] Obviously, Ukraine could not supply the crude oil and cotton, but she did furnish much of the iron ore and pig iron, and—in 1968—*all* of the natural gas.

I.M. Kulinych has described the strong points of Ukrainian foreign trade: "The increase of the relative share of Ukraine in the export of the USSR is caused, apart from her rich natural resources, by her convenient geographical position vis-à-vis the European socialist countries, by a dense railway net, and by the existence of first-rate sea and river ports."[25] Nevertheless, some of the transactions carry a whiff of the trade typical of a developing country. Practically all the iron ore imported by the DDR came from the Kryvyi Rih basin in Ukraine. In return, East Germans helped Ukrainians develop new ore extraction and steel rolling techniques, and the DDR furnished the necessary precision machinery. East Germany also furnished "Abus" cranes for the port of Odessa, equipment for food processing and light industry, diesel engines, tramway cars, mobile power generating machinery, optical goods, and consumer goods such as clothes and shoes. In return, besides coal, iron ore, and similar raw materials, the Ukrainian SSR exported to the DDR certain specialized machinery.[26] (Unconfirmed information has it that the DDR's consul in Kiev, like his diplomatic colleagues from other socialist countries, was directly accredited to the government of the Ukrainian SSR through the Ukrainian SSR's Foreign Ministry.)

In the field of scientific and technological co-operation, there were two mutually beneficial relationships worth mentioning here. Since 1959 the Physics Department of Kiev University has been sending its students for advanced training to the University of Jena and the K. Zeiss and O. Schott optical works. As well, the Paton Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (probably the most famous technological institute in Ukraine) co-operated with the Leipzig and the Halle Central Welding Institute to develop bigger and better welding apparatus.[27] Culturally, the closest institutional relations have been between Kiev and Leipzig universities. Since 1956, on a somewhat informal basis, and 7 June 1963, in a specific agreement, the two universities have co-operated in faculty exchanges, in participation in joint scholarly conferences and symposia, in joint research and publications, in provision of manufacturing experience for their students, and in exchanges of student construction brigades.[28]

Among the more permanent cultural events was the publication in 1951 of an "almost complete" German translation of Shevchenko's *Kobzar*, which had been done in 1940 by a group of German émigré poets.[29] Another noteworthy cultural event was the joint publication in 1963 (by the Department of the

History of German-Slavic Relations of the East German Academy of Sciences and Soviet Ukrainian Franko scholars) of the first "almost complete" collection of Ivan Franko's works that had originally been written in German. To a large degree, that publication appeared thanks to academician Eduard Winter, who was very much interested in developing direct cultural ties between the DDR and the Ukrainian SSR.[30] Winter's co-author of the introductory article in the Franko collection was Dr. Peter Kirchner, a well-known East German Ukrainianist. (Kirchner has reportedly been working on a history of Ukrainian literature.)

Politically, from 1969 until October 1971, CPU First Secretary Petro Shelest showed the Federal Republic of Germany a harder line than Brezhnev himself, who was then negotiating with Chancellor Willy Brandt. Shelest's hard line in turn brought him closer to Walter Ulbricht of the DDR. It became so bad that Moscow's *Pravda* began to tone down Shelest's attacks on Bonn. Also, in May 1971, before the signing of the key four-power agreement on West Berlin, Ulbricht was forced to resign his Secretaryship of the East German Socialist Unity Party. In October 1971, Shelest was sent to East Berlin at the head of a low-level USSR Supreme Soviet delegation, ostensibly to help celebrate the DDR's twenty-second anniversary, but actually to repent the error of his ways. Shelest's official speech in East Berlin differed so much from his usual addresses that it must have been forced upon him. Shelest made a courtesy call on Ulbricht, who had been demoted to Chairman of the East German Council of State (*Staatsrat*). Ulbricht then praised Shelest, among other things, for his personal contribution to East German-Soviet relations. The Ulbricht-Shelest entente cordiale, which probably helped overall relations between the DDR and the Ukrainian republic, did not continue very long. In May 1972 Shelest was dismissed from his office in Ukraine.[31]

Given the superior resources of the Federal Republic of Germany, one might have assumed that the Federal Republic's relations with the Ukrainian SSR would have been more intensive than those of the DDR, even allowing for delay in the establishment of those ties. Yet in 1967, the estimated foreign trade turnover between the Federal Republic and Ukraine was only $93 million.[32] In 1979-83, the German Federal Republic *may* have become the *second most important* trading partner of the Ukrainian SSR, after East Germany. Nevertheless, my admittedly impressionistic evidence indicates that, at least in the late 1970s and early 1980s, most of the West German grand economic projects were outside Ukraine. To be sure, in 1968 all the natural gas imported by West Germany from the Soviet Union came from Ukraine, but in the 1980s the sources of natural gas were much further east. The grand West German-aided metallurgical project of Starii Oskol is located not far from Ukraine (in the area of Kursk), but is nevertheless in the Russian SFSR.[33] The synthetic fibers plant in Svietlahorsk constructed by West German workers is located in Belarus. Unlike Kulinych, I have not been able to identify any large-scale West German investment projects in Ukraine, with the possible exception of harbour improvements in Odessa.[34] This is not to say that there were no West German techni-

cians and engineers active in the Ukrainian SSR. I was told that Hungarians were supposed to finish a sector of an oil pipeline in Ukraine, but they quietly subcontracted the job to a West German engineering firm.

In the autumn of 1974 Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited Kiev on an official trip to the Soviet Union. In 1983 his successor, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, visited Kiev. Those two visits, and the curious intermezzo of Aleksandr Shelepin's courtesy visit to the Federal Republic in 1975, shed some light on the position of Ukraine in the symbolic policy of the Federal Republic. The invitation for the visit by Federal Chancellor Schmidt had been extended to Schmidt's predecessor in office, Willy Brandt, during Brezhnev's first visit to Bonn in May 1973. In Kiev, Chancellor Schmidt talked to Ukrainian SSR Prime Minister Oleksander Liashko (the Soviet Ukrainian leader directly responsible for economic administration). The subject matter of their conversation was not disclosed.[35] A private source told me that Chancellor Schmidt was moved by his visit to Kiev and that he showed understanding and sympathy for the Ukrainians who had suffered under German occupation in World War II, but he did not dramatize his sympathy (as Brandt had done during his visit to Warsaw in 1972). To judge from public sources, however, the visit to Kiev appeared to have little intrinsic value to Chancellor Schmidt. When negotiations on West Berlin threatened to become bogged down, Chancellor Schmidt advised his Soviet hosts that he would be prepared to forego his planned visit to Kiev to have more time for negotiations in Moscow.[36] So, barring any serious talks with Ukrainian SSR Prime Minister Liashko, the republic played the minor role of a diplomatic bargaining chip in Soviet-West German negotiations.

Aleksandr Shelepin's brief courtesy visit, as Chairman of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, to the headquarters of the West German Federation of Trade Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, DGB) on 29 January 1975, with its conspiratorial overtones (Shelepin flew in on a special plane, which landed on a remote landing strip of Düsseldorf airport) and its small hostile demonstration, was a distinctly unpleasant episode in West German-Soviet relations. It was directly related to the position of Ukrainian refugees in West Germany, and indirectly to the Ukrainian SSR. In January 1975 Shelepin was still a full member of the CPSU Politburo, but had a somewhat controversial political past which included involvement in the murder of Ukrainian political émigrés (Lev Rebet and Stepan Bandera) in Germany.[37] In 1968 the head of the DGB, Rosenberg, had invited Shelepin to visit him in the Federal Republic. Shelepin, according to the brief *New York Times* account, "cancelled a 1970 visit to Bavaria when the Munich district attorney issued a summons against him in connection with the murder charge."

The way for the 1975 visit was better prepared. The Federal Minister of Justice, Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel, issued to all the West German state administrations (*Länderjustizverwaltungen*) a binding opinion that Shelepin was immune from prosecution by the individual state authorities. Conservative politicians and two conservative newspapers pounced. Dr. Jaeger, the spokesman (*Sprecher*) of

the CSU Group from Bavaria, publicly called the renewed invitation by Rosenberg's successor at the DGB, Heinz Oskar Vetter, "a piece of arrogance and a scandal," according to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. That newspaper, in an editorial, also attacked West German trade unions for being overly eager to maintain good relations with Soviet trade unions and forgetting Lenin's policy of undermining West European trade unions from within. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* gave full coverage to the Ukrainian exile angle, even though it misspelled the first victim's name as Rbet. *Die Welt*, on the other hand, played that down (the assassin's name was mentioned, but not Rebet and Bandera, who became two anonymous Ukrainian exiles). *Die Welt* did bring in the criticism of US labour leader George Meany, who was identified as a true friend of Germany and defender of the freedom of West Berlin. Meany's criticism of the "constant flirting" between the DGB and the Soviet trade unions was paraphrased. Reading between the lines of *Die Welt*'s coverage, it becomes apparent that occasionally the political activity of Ukrainian exiles in West Germany and the Soviet response to that activity (in the case of Rebet and Bandera, brutal assassination on German soil) have become rather controversial issues in West German official circles. The repeated invitations to Shelepin by the DGB may have been in bad taste, as Dr. Jaeger of the Bavarian CSU hastened to point out. The Shelepin visit obviously cast a brief shadow on Soviet-West German and Soviet Ukrainian-West German co-operation.[38]

In all fairness, the DGB and their friends in the SDP-FDP government in Bonn were the victims of a double provocation, which probably originated in the highest circles in Moscow, not in Kiev. First, by allowing Shelepin to fly to Düsseldorf for half a day Brezhnev created more than a day's worth of political controversy between the conservatives, who tended to be critical of détente, and the socialists and trade unionists who were acting as its champions. (From 31 March to 2 April 1975, the tragicomedy of a Shelepin courtesy visit was replayed in the United Kingdom, with similar results.) Second, by exposing Shelepin to public controversy abroad, Brezhnev (who was not one of his friends) was preparing the way for Shelepin's expulsion from the Politburo in April 1975. As regrettable as it was, the two anti-Soviet Ukrainian victims, the German trade unions, and the Federal Minister of Justice were all used as objects in Brezhnev's political intrigue.

Federal Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow and Kiev in early July 1983 was exceedingly well organized, and unlike Dr. Schmidt, Dr. Kohl did not give any impression that he would cancel his trip to Kiev to have more time to negotiate in Moscow. I have reconstructed Chancellor Kohl's visit to Kiev on the basis of public coverage in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and *Die Welt*, as well as a private source. From that I have concluded that Chancellor Kohl had a definite political and diplomatic interest in going to Kiev. He wanted to talk at length with Ukrainian party leader and veteran CPSU Politburo member Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, who normally was not in Moscow. Kohl's visit to Moscow came mid-way during Andropov's fifteen-month interreg-

num as CPSU Secretary General, and since Dr. Kohl was one of the first Western leaders to notice how much Andropov's health had deteriorated, I assume he wanted to talk to as many high-ranking Soviet politicians as possible to find out what was going to happen in the Kremlin. One correspondent hinted that Shcherbytsky interested Chancellor Kohl because the Ukrainian party leader "was being counted as one of the more flexible members of the Soviet leadership."[39] According to the detailed, semiofficial coverage by the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, "Kiev had been chosen [by the Chancellor] for his visit because that 1,500-year-old European city had particularly suffered during the war."[40] Chancellor Kohl also laid a wreath at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Kiev, and, unlike de Gaulle, he visited the Paton Institute for Electric Welding of the Ukrainian SSR's Academy of Sciences.

He is publicly said to have discussed economic questions with both CPU First Secretary Shcherbytsky and Prime Minister Liashko.[41] During his dinner speech in Kiev, the Chancellor eulogized Ukraine's contribution to the history of Europe. More concretely, at the same dinner the Vice President of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences said to Staatssekretär Schreckenberger that there existed many fine opportunities for Bonn to help construct lumber mills in Ukraine and be paid in Ukrainian lumber.[42] However, I still think that the real point of Chancellor Kohl's visit to Kiev was to talk Soviet politics with Shcherbytsky, first, because Kohl's staff briefing on Shcherbytsky was superbly thorough,[43] and second, because Kohl repeatedly attempted to sound out Shcherbytsky on the future of Soviet politics. When Kohl tried to steer the conversation toward more sensitive political questions, however, Shcherbytsky waxed enthusiastic about the beauty of hunting wild beasts. Liashko seconded Shcherbytsky. Shcherbytsky probably was somewhat boring and uncommunicative, because he realized that his new political friend in the Kremlin, Andropov, was dying, and that his old political enemy, Chernenko, was scheduled to succeed Andropov.

Altogether, we could perhaps say that Kohl's visit to Kiev was more significant than Schmidt's, but because of the unsettled political situation in the Soviet Union in mid-1983, and because of Kohl's resolve to honour Schmidt's commitment on the deployment of US nuclear intermediate-range missiles, the visit was relatively inconclusive. Kohl's Foreign Minister Genscher made a most interesting follow-up visit in July 1986. Among other projects, the Federal Republic was planning to establish a Consulate General in Kiev, balanced by the establishment of a Soviet Consulate General in Munich. (So far, the USSR has a Consulate General in Hamburg and the Federal Republic has one in Leningrad.) Claus Gennrich interpreted this as a move to satisfy the desire for prestige of the Bavarian Free State.[44] It is quite possible, however, that the intended move had other objectives, since Kiev is a politically sensitive regional city and the capital of the not quite provincial Ukrainian SSR.

Culturally, a strong interest in things Ukrainian in postwar West Germany is apparent in West German scholarly journals.[45] I have also tried to learn about institutional ties between West German universities and universities in the

Ukrainian SSR, only to find that it is a sensitive subject. A Ukrainian-born linguist complained that there was only one full-time lecturer in the Ukrainian language employed at a West German university—Magister Antokhiv at the University of Munich. Linguistic exchanges with the Soviet Union were practically dominated by MAPRIAL (*Mezhdunarodnaia Assotsiatsiia Prepodavatelei Russkogo Iazyka i Literatury*, the International Association of Teachers of the Russian Language and Literature) which favoured Russianists. Ukrainian was taught as an optional subject by Soviet Ukrainian professors who were willing to teach it. Furthermore, the Russian-language textbooks sponsored by MAPRIAL had a certain Russian imperial slant. A pleasant, if anecdotal account of scientific co-operation between the University of Göttingen and an unnamed Soviet Ukrainian institute was written up in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: "Göttingen archaeologist Renate Rolle, together with Soviet archaeologists, was working to uncover the contents of the necropolis of Chertomlyk near Nykopil in Southern Ukraine."[46] In the 1960s, two East German archaeologists helped in the uncovering of the ancient city of Olvia in Ukraine.[47]

A rather interesting means of cultural relations is the programme on Radio Kiev broadcast in German, which was inaugurated on 3 May 1966. In the fall of 1985 it consisted of two broadcasts (5:00-5:30 pm and 10:00-10:30 pm) seven days a week. These programmes present news, political commentaries, travelogues, and songs. Two features of those programmes are unusual and probably attractive. First, the programmes are broadcast simultaneously over three or four different frequencies. Second, Kiev Radio Station tries to involve its listeners by offering quizzes, travel prizes, honourary diplomas for regular listeners, and a special fan club.[48]

Another way cultural relations are encouraged is with direct ties between cities in the Federal Republic and cities in the Ukrainian SSR. Since 1975 a number of West German cities have had informal agreements with Soviet "partner" or "twin" cities. On 10 November 1985, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution calling for the establishment of more city partnerships with West German cities. On the Soviet side, the process is co-ordinated by the Central Federation of Soviet Friendship Societies (SSOD) in Moscow. On the German side it is formally co-ordinated by the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Gesellschaften Bundesrepublik Deutschland - UdSSR E.V.* (ARGE) in Dortmund, and more informally by the Alliance of German Cities (Deutscher Städtetag), with expert advice from the West German Foreign Office and its embassy in the USSR. A joint 1978 West German-Soviet publication in honour of Brezhnev's second visit to the Federal Republic shows, however, that among the grand industrial projects, as well as among city partnerships, the Ukrainian SSR has been passed by. While there were city partnerships between Dortmund and Rostov, Tbilisi and Saarbrücken, Kiel and Tallinn, and Hamburg and Leningrad, no city in Ukraine had been included.[49]

In 1986 the Ukrainian SSR finally improved its relations with the Federal Republic. First, two different events involving the Ukrainian republic were

included in an official plan of West German-Soviet cultural co-operation for the years 1986-7; second, in May 1986 the West German city of Oberhausen signed a partnership agreement with the Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia; third, there have been official contacts between the city of Munich and the city of Kiev. The official plan of cultural collaboration for 1986-7 between German and Soviet societies signed by Dr. Dietrich Sperling (Member of the Bundestag and president of ARGE), and Evgenii Ivanov (Evgenij Iwanow, vice-president of SSOD in Mainz) on 28 May 1986 contains dozens of projects. Two of them involve the Ukrainian SSR: 2-11 November 1986 there were to be "Soviet Days with the Ukrainian SSR" in the northern German state of Schleswig-Holstein;[50] in 1986-7, under the sponsorship of the Federal Republic-USSR Society in Bavaria and a group of Bavarian associations of former Nazi prisoners (ARGE bayerischer Verfolgtenverbände), a public exhibition was to be held in Kiev on the theme "Resistance and Repression in Bavaria, 1933-45." To this end, relations between the Society Federal Republic-USSR and the Ukrainian SSR Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries was to be strengthened.[51]

The establishment, on 20 May 1986, of a formal partnership between the cities of Oberhausen, in the Federal Republic, and Zaporizhzhia, in the Ukrainian SSR, is a textbook example of farsighted Soviet foreign policy. At the same time, it is possible that in the long run the partnership will be mutually beneficial. Oberhausen, the "cradle of industry in the Ruhr Valley," with 225,611 inhabitants in 1986, is a city of declining steel works.[52] Zaporizhzhia is larger (850,000 inhabitants in 1986). It has two major steel works (also subject to decline), besides machine building, electronics, chemical, and other factories. However, as early as 1973, two steel workers (Dmytro Halushka of the "Dniprospetsstal" works in Zaporizhzhia and Alexander Pierog of the "Hüttenwerk Oberhausen") participated in a "steel smelting for [international] friendship" (Freundschaftsschmelze) in Oberhausen. In 1983 the action was repeated in Zaporizhzhia (by Pierog and Volodymyr Malynovsky). In September 1985 a delegation from Oberhausen headed by Mayor van den Mond visited Zaporizhzhia.

In mid-May 1986 a Zaporizhzhia delegation under Mayor (Chairman of the Executive Committee of the City Soviet) Valentyn Yalansky visited Oberhausen, where the partnership agreement of 20 May 1986 was signed. That agreement, whose two official languages are German and Russian, refers to Zaporizhzhia only as Zaporizhzhia, USSR, and the Ukrainian SSR is not mentioned in any way, shape, or form.[53] The three most important provisions of the six-point agreement are:

1. The cities of Oberhausen and Zaporizhzhia [hereby] solemnly establish a partnership.
2. It is their joint firm will to link the citizens of both cities in a friendly way through close and multiple contacts and thereby to contribute to mutual understanding among the peoples and to an assured and stable peace.

> 3. On the basis of reciprocity and balance, the two cities obligate themselves to develop their relations in the fields of culture, economy, sports, and municipal affairs as intensively as possible. Particular attention should be accorded to contacts between young people of the two cities.[54]

Speeches given when the agreement was signed acknowledged the foreign policy interest of both the German hosts and their Soviet guests. Oberhausen Mayor van den Mond talked about building bridges from country to country, from city to city, and from human being to human being. He also hinted that he was interested in counterbalancing the existing partnership with the English city of Middlesbrough. Zaporizhzhia Mayor Yalansky spoke in vague diplomatic niceties.[55] Terekhov, Deputy-Ambassador (Gesandter) of the USSR Embassy in Bonn, openly disclosed the interests of the Soviet Union in concluding that agreement: "We are convinced that the establishment of relations between Zaporizhzhia and Oberhausen will serve the good cause of the rapprochement between our countries. The partner cities constitute a great power. They can do much to strengthen the peace and security in our common European house."[56] One correspondent was mildly critical of Terekhov's speech, calling it "very political." He also detailed Terekhov's anti-American criticisms.[57]

Immediately after the agreement was signed, a factory council of a German steel workers' union donated 6,000 German Marks to help organize a youth exchange between the cities. From 29 March to 1 April 1987 there was the First German-Soviet Congress of Partner-Cities in Saarbrücken, in which official delegations from both Oberhausen and Zaporizhzhia participated. Following the congress, the Zaporizhzhia delegation travelled to Oberhausen to "discuss opportunities for a deepening of the partnership relations." In September 1987 a group of twenty young persons from Oberhausen were to go to Zaporizhzhia according to an existing youth exchange. Their particular objective would be "to clarify questions about a further broadening of individual contacts between members of various youth groups."[58]

What about contacts between the more important cities of Munich and Kiev? In 1985 the mayor of Kiev invited the mayor of Munich (Kronawitter, a member of the SPD) to visit Kiev; the visit took place very successfully in April 1986. In February 1987 a top-ranking, three-man delegation from Kiev visited Munich in return. That delegation included Valentyn Zhursky (Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Kiev Municipal Soviet, in short, the mayor of Kiev), the First Secretary of the Kiev City Party Committee (who, according to Soviet but not German protocol, outranked Zhursky), and the head of the Kiev City Division for Foreign Relations. Both Kronawitter's visit to Kiev in 1986 and Zhursky's visit to Munich in 1987 were said to have "served the deepening of relations and the furtherance of co-operation between Munich and Kiev."[59] The Soviet Ukrainian side is evidently interested in furthering the relationship with Munich. After the Congress of German-Soviet Partner Cities in Saarbrücken, one of Zhursky's deputies visited Munich for five days (1-5 April 1987).

In general, establishment of a partnership agreement between Munich and Kiev would be a major achievement for Kiev and Moscow. The entire Soviet-West German city partnership programme, though not an original idea (there have been partnerships with British and French cities for many more years), has been energetically advanced at the highest level in Moscow. There have been German critics of the programme, however, who have indicated that partnerships were always established with German cities in which the municipal administration was in the hands of Social Democrats. Furthermore, despite the professed emphasis on youth exchange, the Soviets have sent mostly very young school children and older people, not the adolescents in whom the Germans were more interested.

Finally, I would like to refer in some detail to a very painful, but enlightening episode. It involves skilled German workers who, under contract with the West German firm Uhde, were building an artificial fiber plant in the Belarusian city of Svietlahorsk, about 200 km southeast of Minsk. In the early morning hours of 26 April 1986 (Saturday), there was a horrible nuclear explosion 130 km to the south, in Chernobyl, Ukrainian SSR. (The Chernobyl nuclear reactor was definitely under the jurisdiction of certain ministries in Moscow, not Kiev, and so probably was construction of the textile fibre plant in Svietlahorsk—hence my comments pertain to the central Soviet way of doing things.) As late as Tuesday noon (29 April) the son of a German technician in Svietlahorsk burst into his teacher's office exclaiming that a Soviet nuclear plant had blown up. This was confirmed by an adult member of the construction crew. Apparently with the permission of Uhde, the decision was made to evacuate the women and children to West Germany the next day (Wednesday, 30 April) and the rest of the German crew the day after (Thursday, 1 May). The only reliable source of information for the Germans in Svietlahorsk was the West German radio (*Die deutsche Welle*). As late as 29 April, Soviet television passed the deadly Chernobyl explosion off with two meaningless sentences.

The Soviet authorities let the women and children go, but tried to detain the workers and engineers. First, they proposed that each one of them sign a declaration that they were leaving the construction site of their own volition and that they gave up in perpetuity any rights to sue Soviet authorities for any alleged damages. This the prudent Germans refused to do. Then, the Soviets played out a tragicomedy, which kept the German crew in Svietlahorsk for another three and a half hours on Thursday. They were all driven to Svietlahorsk hospital, where a doctor, using an old Geiger counter, perfunctorily examined each worker. His Geiger counter did not register anything at all, so he signed "a clean bill of health" for each member of the crew. After a four-hour trip to Minsk airport, an exceedingly thorough customs examination, and a night flight to Vienna, the Svietlahorsk Germans were re-examined by an Austrian team of nuclear technicians. Then the needles on the Austrian Geiger counters went almost off the scale. About 50 per cent of the German crew were told to take a warm shower, put on jogging suits lent to them by the Austrian Red Cross, and bundle their

own clothes into plastic bags. On Saturday morning (3 May), the Austrians put the Svietlahorsk Germans onto special buses which took them to Karlsruhe. There they were examined again by West German nuclear specialists. Then and only then were they allowed to go home.

What struck me in the interview a German correspondent had with teacher Karl-Heinz Klinger was that within a week the West German construction crew learned what is still terra incognita to many professional Sovietologists—that the Soviet Union and Austria/West Germany handle critical events with crucial differences. Mr. Klinger noted most perceptively that both on Wednesday, when the women and children were being evacuated, and on Thursday, when the men left, their "Russian" fellow-workers were sunning themselves on the rooftops. As the buses with the evacuees left, the Soviet workers were literally looking down on their German colleagues as a group of frightened madmen. It was a poignant lesson in technical co-operation with the Soviet Union, albeit one learned at great risk and expense.[60]

In conclusion, the following points should be emphasized. There is a broad legal and slim institutional base for direct bilateral relations between Western states and the Ukrainian SSR. The Soviet constitutional amendment of 1 February 1944 was not repealed when Brezhnev's constitution was adopted in October 1977, so the republic's foreign ministry still exists, though it may not be the busiest government office in Kiev. Since 1947 Soviet policy, of course, has been to isolate Ukraine from direct relations with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, in order to present Ukraine as nothing more than a well-integrated constituent of the USSR. How this policy has been received by the Soviet Ukrainian elites is a fascinating question. In the mid-1970s a report that Soviet Ukrainian circles in Kiev resented Ukraine's exclusion from the Helsinki process made the rounds among American diplomats (neither Belarus nor Ukraine signed the Helsinki Act of 1975).

Given all those negative developments, it is tempting to fall into despair and to quote the elegiac comment of Czech poet Milan Kundera: "Over the past five decades forty million Ukrainians have been quietly vanishing from the world without the world paying heed."[61] People may have been vanishing, but so has such elementary information as foreign trade statistics. However, I have also shown that the world has indeed been paying heed. Cultural relations apart (for good will is easy to find in the field of international cultural co-operation), four Western leaders have seen fit to visit Kiev. Nobody forced Prime Minister Macmillan to go to Kiev—he did it in pursuit of British national interests. President de Gaulle was exceedingly well briefed on Kiev's past and present. That, on balance, he chose to speak more about Russia than Ukraine is regrettable, but he did choose Kiev as one of the cities on his extended visit of state, which was welcome. Both Chancellor Schmidt and Chancellor Kohl paid a visit to the capital of the Ukrainian republic, and both tried to have businesslike talks with Soviet Ukrainian officials. It seems to me that all these statesmen have realized, both rationally and intuitively, that relations with Ukraine should be

cultivated over the long haul. History may ultimately show that I may have been too pessimistic in speaking of potentialities, not realities. Relations with Ukraine today may already be classified as "semi-realities."

Postscript, January 1993

When I wrote in the spring of 1987 about the division of Germany and the potentiality or, at best, semi-reality of a more self-assertive Ukraine, I did not foresee the double blessing of 1990-1: after the collapse of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989, Germany became reunified on 3 October 1990; and after the abortive putsch of 18-21 August 1991, the Soviet Union came crashing down. The immediate cause for the disestablishment of the Soviet Union was the overwhelming (90 per cent) popular vote on 1 December 1991 confirming the independence of Ukraine (proclaimed 24 August 1991), with Supreme Council Chairman Leonid M. Kravchuk being simultaneously elected president by a vote of 62 per cent on the first ballot. An understanding editor has allowed me to add to my original contribution instead of insisting that I rewrite it from top to bottom.

Given the overwhelming vote for Ukrainian independence, which implied the support of ethnic Russians and Jews in Ukraine and, hence, political stability; given the diplomatic skill shown a week later (8 December 1991) by President Kravchuk in signing, together with President Boris N. Yeltsin of Russia and Chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Council Stanislau S. Shushkevich, the Treaty of Minsk on the creation of a loose Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which agreement effectively foreclosed USSR President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's long-repeated attempts to sign another union treaty and forced his resignation on 25 December 1991; and also given that the Ukrainian government promises to forego the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union—the recognition of independent Ukraine by West European powers was prompt. The first of those to recognize Ukraine was Germany, on 26 December 1991.[62] Both France and the United Kingdom recognized Ukraine a few days later, on 31 December 1991.[63] For comparison, it is worth mentioning that of the Western states the first to recognize Ukraine was Canada, within a few days of the referendum. The United States recognized independent Ukraine on the day of Gorbachev's resignation, 25 December 1991.[64] In their delay, the three West European states may have followed the lead of Washington, or they may have simply let the dust settle on the formal demise of the Soviet Union, which occurred on 26 December 1991.

The appointment of permanent diplomatic representatives took a few months, a reasonable time under the circumstances. A major point of this article has been that the Ukrainian SSR's relations with Germany were more intensive than those with the United Kingdom and France. This is confirmed by the diplomacy of independent Ukraine: among the first Ukrainian ambassadors to be nominated, on 6 March 1992, was Ivan M. Piskovy, the ambassador-designate to the Federal Republic of Germany.[65] Before being appointed ambassador, Piskovy had been

a counsellor at the Soviet embassy in Bonn and was then made Ukrainian chargé d'affaires.[66] Germany anticipated the exchange of ambassadors by almost one month; on 7 February 1992, H.E. Hennecke Graf von Bassewitz was promoted from consul general to ambassador to Ukraine.[67] The ambassador to the United Kingdom, former Deputy Prime Minister Serhii V. Komisarenko, was appointed 14 May 1992, or two months after the appointment of the ambassador to Bonn.[68] The United Kingdom had promoted Consul-General David Gladstone chargé d'affaires with rank of ambassador immediately upon recognition, 1 January 1992. Mr. S.N.P. Hemans was appointed ambassador and took office in early June 1992, replacing Mr. Gladstone.[69] The Ukrainian ambassador to France is Yurii M. Kochubei, who was nominated shortly after June 1992.[70] (His French counterpart, the ambassador in Kiev, was H.E. Hugues Pernet, who had been promoted to that position from that of consul on 1 April 1992.)[71]

In the first half of 1992, President Kravchuk made a 24-hour state visit to Germany (3-4 February 1992) and a two-day state visit to France (16-17 June 1992), only to mention the European countries with which I am concerned. Both state visits were successful in different ways, even though they elicited critical and, in the German case, even hostile commentary in some papers. For whatever reason, whether by coincidence or by design (and if by design, then whose?), President Kravchuk's state visits to Bonn and Paris practically overlapped with President Yeltsin's visits to Washington, which were covered better by the German and French press.

Significantly, President Kravchuk went to Bonn first, after giving a major and very enlightening interview to the German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel*, which was featured prominently and, on balance, sympathetically.[72] There were a few semi-contentious issues in the talks between German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, German Finance Minister Theo Waigel, and President Kravchuk. The talks did not lead to the conclusion of a formal treaty. Chancellor Kohl tactfully mentioned the German interest in Ukraine keeping her promise to abolish nuclear weapons and voiced German concerns over a possible emigration of nuclear armaments experts. Finance Minister Waigel took issue with the then declared Ukrainian policy not to repay the Ukrainian share of the old Soviet debt via Moscow, but only independently (by the end of 1992 Ukraine had satisfied that last German concern). But on the whole, President Kravchuk's first major state visit to Bonn was very successful and obtained good media coverage thanks to the president's offer to resettle a sizeable portion of ethnic Germans in Ukraine.[73]

Briefly, the issue of ethnic or Volga Germans settling in Ukraine is as follows. In 1939 there were approximately 1.4 million ethnic Germans living in the entire USSR.[74] There was also a Volga German Autonomous Republic within the Russian SFSR. Only a minority of ethnic Germans, however, lived in Ukraine (over 400,000). With the outbreak of the war, the Volga German republic was liquidated and the Volga Germans were deported to Central Asia and Siberia, and most of the Ukrainian Germans were also deported, "many" being shot immediately.[75] In 1992, approximately two million ethnic Germans

were still left in the CIS, but only 40-50,000 in Ukraine.[76] The leaders of the CIS's German community as well as the German government in Bonn want the Volga German Autonomous Republic restored both as a matter of political justice and also to prevent the otherwise inevitable Russification of the Germans. By creating a situation in which the ethnic Germans feel at home, their leaders in the CIS and the German government hope that most of them will stay in Russia and other CIS republics and will not apply for quick mass immigration into Germany, when Germany faces the double task of integrating the population of the former (East) German Democratic Republic and admitting hundreds of thousands of non-German refugees seeking asylum from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. But for the sake of their children and grandchildren, the overwhelming majority of CIS ethnic Germans—an estimated 80-90 per cent—want to move to Germany, and as many as 150,000 have succeeded in doing so, even if this is not in the present interest of Germany, Russia, and Ukraine.[77]

It is not clear whether President Kravchuk's decision to accept as many German settlers as possible and give them good land in the south of Ukraine (the area of original German settlements) would have been made anyway, or whether the plan was suggested by President Yeltsin's initial floundering on the German resettlement issue, which made a bad impression in Germany and beyond.[78] Ukraine has a strategic interest in political justice and in pre-empting a possible colonization of the relatively underpopulated south by Russian peasants. For whatever reason, once the Ukrainian government decided to make the ethnic Germans a good offer, it proceeded in a well organized fashion, with all deliberate speed, which was not lost on its new interlocutors in Bonn. Already on 23 January 1992 President Kravchuk decreed the establishment of a German-Ukrainian Fund, as suggested both by the Ukrainian Supreme Council's Committee on Nationalities and the Ukrainian-German Association *Wiedergeburt*. The Fund was given an immediate allotment of 5 million karbovantsi (roubles) from the Ukrainian ministry of finance. The presidential decree was motivated in the most general way possible, as a rectification of the deformations that had occurred in the sphere of Soviet nationality policy, i.e., as a measure of political justice toward the deportees, including the Germans.[79] By November 1992, the Ukrainian government allotted to German resettlement 500 million roubles.[80] Even more importantly, to attract the Germans, in early February 1992 in the East Ukrainian industrial city of Sumy, the local authorities opened a branch of *Wiedergeburt* and gave the organization rooms in which the children of the small German colony could be taught German history and culture.[81] By November 1992 some 500 German refugees (or 100 families) from Central Asia were welcomed in Zaporizhzhia, an industrial city in south-central Ukraine, and efforts were undertaken to accept more in the agricultural provinces in the south.[82] It does not hurt that Ukrainian aid to ethnic Germans in turn attracts humanitarian and financial aid from the German government.

But before going into those details, a few brief remarks on Ukrainian-French relations are in order. Unlike the state visit to Germany, that to France, on 16-17

June 1992, lasted two full days and was crowned with a formal treaty of entente and co-operation, signed by President François Mitterrand and President Kravchuk. Paris, pointed out President Mitterrand during an impressive signing ceremony, thus became the first foreign capital with which Ukraine concluded a comprehensive international treaty. Ukraine also completed the process of adhering to the Helsinki Conference (the CSCE) by becoming the fifty-second signatory to the Charter of Paris.[83] France, with her successful, accident-free nuclear power industry, can undoubtedly offer Ukraine much needed technical expertise, even though this, judging from the coverage in the left-of-centre *Le Monde*, was not a major point of President Kravchuk's visit to Paris. In general, *Le Monde*'s coverage was somewhat parsimonious, especially when compared with the very extensive and sympathetic reporting on President Yeltsin's visit to Washington. In the United States, Yeltsin laid the groundwork for the admittedly very ambitious START II Treaty.[84] In any case, *Le Monde*'s correspondent politely registered her dissatisfaction that President Krawchuk did not wax more enthusiastic about START II; deftly pointed out the growing opposition to the Ukrainian government's policy of abolishing nuclear arms (by quoting verbatim an unnamed Ukrainian journalist who at Kravchuk's press conference in Paris called such a policy precipitous in view of the continuing Russian menace); expressed annoyance that President Kravchuk turned aside questions about Russian claims to the Crimea; openly hinted that the political opposition to then Prime Minister Vitalii Fokin was more substantial than President Kravchuk wanted to admit in Paris; and, last but not least, more discreetly intimated that the Ukrainian president's talk before French businessmen had not gone well (they were unaccustomed to hear references to Russian imperialism and they were also concerned about getting the old loans to the USSR repaid).[85] To conclude, on a formal level, Ukrainian relations with France are good. The same can be said of Ukrainian relations with the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, the relations with Germany are more substantial.

In this postscript it is impossible to disaggregate fully the German statistics on trade with and economic and humanitarian aid to the CIS in order to show the precise position of Ukraine. But we can make some informed estimates. According to UN statistics on foreign trade, in 1989, the last year for which I have data, *Western* Germany imported from the USSR $4.6 billion (US dollars) worth of goods, which constituted only 1.7 per cent of total *West* German imports (for 1987, the corresponding import figures were $4.0 billion or 1.8 per cent). In 1989, West Germany exported to the USSR $6.1 billion worth of goods or 1.8 per cent of the total (the corresponding export figures in 1987 being $4.4 billion or 1.5 per cent).[86] In 1987, the last year for which I have detailed figures, *Eastern* Germany had with the USSR a total foreign-trade *turnover* of 68.5 billion transferable "*Valuta marks*" or as much as 42.2 per cent of the total foreign trade turnover.[87] We would, therefore, expect that with German reunification the ex-USSR or CIS share in German foreign trade would increase

when compared with the West German trade and, together with it, the share of Ukraine would increase.

This is precisely what happened. According to a facsimile communication from the German embassy in Washington: "At the beginning of the year 1992, the Federal Government had established a ceiling of 5 billion German marks (DM) for advancement of exports to the CIS [by means of so-called *Hermes-bürgschaften* or federal export insurance guarantees]. Out of this total, exports to Ukraine were issued guarantees totalling DM 458 million. *The exports in question were almost exclusively deliveries from the NBL*" (Neue Bundesländer, i.e., former East Germany; emphasis added). In addition, inasmuch as the Ukrainian government has promised to observe the old Soviet-German treaty on the protection of foreign investments, the German Federal Government has accepted three capital investment projects in Ukraine totalling DM 33 million. Five additional applications totalling DM 22 million were under consideration at the end of 1992.[88] To interpret these amounts we must bear in mind that if the total amount of federal exporters' guarantees has been exhausted, which is probable, given the demand for high-quality German exports, the Ukrainian share is only less than one tenth of the total German federal export aid to the CIS in 1992.

Export guarantees are the most interesting form of aid because they presuppose a previous Ukrainian agreement with a German exporter and imply economic motivation, but other forms of aid should also be mentioned. For instance, on 26 March 1992 a total of DM 2.4 million in medical drugs were sent to Ukraine as part of federal humanitarian aid, apparently administered by the German Foreign Office.[89] Acceptance of ethnic German settlers entails federal German aid, which is partly administered by the German Foreign Office (as, for instance, subsidies for the equipment of 7 kindergartens in Ukraine out of a total of 225 in the CIS, 5 subsidies for secondary school equipment in Ukraine out of a CIS total of 549, and 2 subsidies for Ukrainian universities compared with a total of 30 for the CIS) and partly by the German Ministry of the Interior (such as subsidies for seven German meeting places or community centres in Ukraine in Dobrooleksandrivka, Maikop, Dnipropetrovske, Zaporizhzhia, Kiev, Odessa, and Nove Selo). Unfortunately, no DM figures are given in the document.[90] But from Guly's *Izvestiia* article we know that in mid-October 1992, Ukrainian authorities were promised by the German government DM 53 million "toward providing jobs for the [ethnic German] migrants, for which German firms will build small plants and factories in Ukraine and supply office machines and other equipment."[91] Somewhat contentious are the as yet unspecified share of Ukraine in the DM 1 billion compensation which Germany promised to pay to the victims of Nazi terror in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine during World War II[92] and, above all, the Ukrainian share in the DM 7.8 billion earmarked by Germany for the construction of apartments for troops relocated from East Germany after reunification. The original plans in 1990 called for 17 of the 33 troop settlements to be built in Ukraine, 8 in Belarus, and only 8 in Russia.[93] Those original plans

have been drastically revised, with Russia receiving the lion's share of the German troop relocation aid. To my knowledge, only two troop settlements have been built in Ukraine (one in Stara Konstantynivka near Kiev and one in Kryvyi Rih), one was built in Belarus, with the rest to be built in Russia.[94] To the extent that a number of ex-Soviet troops have been repatriated to Ukraine, the Ukrainian government might want to claim more German troop relocation funds.

Last but not least, state visits apart, it is long established political, commercial, and human ties that will determine German policy toward Ukraine over the long haul. It would be unrealistic on the Ukrainians' part to hope to overcome quickly the *entente cordiale* that has emerged between Chancellor Kohl and then President Gorbachev in the process of German reunification. This cordial relationship has been largely inherited by President Yeltsin, especially given the long tradition of Russo-German cooperation, the fact that Russia and Germany are now the two strongest powers on the European Continent, and also that the Ukrainian economic performance in 1992 has been disappointing. But as the Ukrainian economy picks up, some of the less attractive features in Moscow cannot escape the attention of German diplomats and politicians: for example, the relative political instability together with a disappointing economic performance, particularly as contrasted with the hopes attached to Acting Prime Minister Gaidar, who, against President Yeltsin's will, was forced out of office in December 1992.

I have already commented on the established commercial ties between East German and Ukrainian firms which in 1992 have brought economic aid to Ukraine. I would also suggest that by grasping the issue of ethnic Germans President Kravchuk has destroyed the Russian monopoly in that area. Furthermore, in the long run, partnerships among German and Ukrainian cities—those semi-official ties of the 1980s—acquire a new importance for building German-Ukrainian relations from the grass-roots up.

On 6 October 1989 the Bavarian capital of Munich concluded a formal agreement with its partner city Kiev. In the original document Kiev was already designated as capital of Ukraine, with USSR only in parentheses, not capital of the Ukrainian SSR. The two cities agreed to encourage, to the greatest possible extent, mutual relations in the fields of municipal government, culture, economy, and sports, with an emphasis on contacts between young people.[95] According to a Munich city official, the agreement has been successful in advancing official contacts, public health, culture, labour and the economy, and international teachers' and pupils' exchange, in sports and social relations.[96] Most interesting and significant has been a byproduct of the relations between Kiev and Munich in the field of humanitarian aid. Its significance lies in the fact that part of the German humanitarian aid to Ukraine is channelled not through the federal government but through cities and semi-private associations. For instance, the Munich district office of the *Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund* or ASB (Association of First Aid Workers) donated to Kiev a specially equipped minibus for the transportation of the handicapped, to match a similar vehicle donated by the Bavarian

state government. The city of Munich helps converted defence plants in Kiev to produce German-designed wheelchairs and the ASB is training in Munich Ukrainian mechanics to equip minibuses for the transportation of the handicapped, whose needs had traditionally been ignored in the old Soviet Union.[97]

An official of Oberhausen, the partner city of Zaporizhzhia, has drawn my attention to the "continued intensification" of the ties between the cities in the fields of youth, cultural, sport, political, and economic exchanges. On the other hand, Oberhausen businessmen were not able to initiate concrete exchanges of goods between firms in Zaporizhzhia and Oberhausen, as desired by their counterparts in Zaporizhzhia. The differences inherent in the two economic systems and the legal uncertainty for Western investors were too great and the comparability of the goods produced in the two cities was too little.[98] An interesting sidelight from the Third Congress of Partner-Cities of the FRG and the USSR, which was held in Germany in 1991, is that not only Munich and Oberhausen but nine other German cities had established official relations with cities in Ukraine.[99]

To conclude, the picture of Ukrainian-West European and, especially, Ukrainian-German relations since 1 December 1991 is a mixed one. Correct and prompt recognition by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom and two state visits by President Kravchuk, to Bonn and then to Paris, are on the positive side. On the negative side are: concerns whether Ukraine would really forego nuclear arms, concerns about Ukraine repaying its share of the old Soviet debt, and concerns about Ukrainian economic reforms and political stability. Perhaps we should simply admit that Rome was not built in one day. Nor was Kiev. But at least the foundation for a solid relationship with united Germany has been laid, quickly and skilfully.

Notes

1. This essay was originally written in 1987; I have added a postscript dated January 1993. I would like to thank the following persons and institutions for their help with written information and oral counsel: Mr. Klaus Habrechtsmeier, Leiter des Büros des Rates, Stadt Oberhausen, Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Dr. Götz Hillig, Forschungsstelle für Vergleichende Erziehungswissenschaften, Makarenko Referat, Marburg/Lahn; Professor Oleksa Horbatsch; Mr. Hans-Joachim Lehmann; Oberverwaltungsrat Lindemeir, Protocol Office of the Direktorium, Landeshauptstadt Munich; Professor Bohdan Osadczuk; publisher, *Darmstädter Echo*; Stadtdirektor Riedl, Landeshauptstadt Munich; Mrs. Helga M. Schmid, Press Secretary, German Embassy in Washington; Mme. Anita Turak, Documentation Centre of the Press and Information Service, French Embassy in Washington; Dr. Heinrich Vogel, Direktor, Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, Cologne; Mr. Yaroslav Voitko, Scientific Advisor, Ukrainian Embassy in Washington; Ms. Fiona Watts, Press Division, British Embassy in Washington; and participants at the 1986 Garmisch-Partenkirchen Conference. Simultaneously, I absolve them all of responsibility for any shortcomings that might remain in the final text.

2. Hermann Dietrich, "Geleitwort," *Osteuropa* 1, no. 1 (October 1951).
3. Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 265-78.
4. *Ukraina na mizhnarodnii areni: Ukraine on the International Scene: L'Ukraine dans l'arène internationale* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1968), 54 (translated from the Ukrainian by Y.B.).
5. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 5th ser., 472, 13 March 1950, *annex*, 28.
6. US Assistant Secretary of State Jack K. McFall to US Senator H. Alexander Smith, 26 June 1952, in US, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearing on H. Con. Res. 58: Favoring Extension of Diplomatic Relations with the Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia*, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 15 July 1953, 77. See also Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic*, 268, 380 (note 29).
7. Nigel Fisher, *Harold Macmillan: A Biography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), 212.
8. Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm 1956-59* (London: Macmillan, 1971), 605 (vol. 4 of Macmillan's memoirs).
9. Michael Frayn, "Mr. Macmillan under Fire: Statistics at Point-Blank Range," *Manchester Guardian*, 28 February 1959, 1.
10. Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, 620-1. On Macmillan greeting the Kiev crowds in Russian, see Fisher, *Harold Macmillan*, 214.
11. Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, 620; Osgood Caruthers, "Macmillan Asks Wide Negotiation by East and West," *New York Times*, 28 February 1959, 3.
12. A.V. Agaev, as cited by James W. Gillula, "Input-Output Analysis," in *The Ukraine within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet*, ed. I.S. Koropeckyj (New York: Praeger, 1977), 218. See also the sophisticated disaggregated analysis by V.N. Bandera, "External and Intra-Union Trade and Capital Transfers," in ibid., 235-67; Iu.S. Holubushyn and V.I. Ivanytskyi, "Zovnishnia torhivlia," in *Entsyklopediia Narodnoho Hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR*, ed. S.H. Iampolskyi (Kiev 1970), 2:142; V. Serheiev, as cited by Z. Lew Melnyk, "Regional Contribution to Capital Formation in the USSR: The Case of the Ukrainian Republic," in *The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective*, ed. V.N. Bandera and Z.L. Melnyk (New York: Praeger, 1973), 119; Rozenko, as cited in Melnyk, "Regional Contribution to Capital Formation in the USSR," 119.
13. Holubushyn and Ivanytskyi, "Zovnishnia torhivlia," *Entsyklopediia Narodnoho Hospodarstva*, 142.
14. Table 2 in D.Ia. Vovko, "Zovnishni ekonomichni zviazky," *Entsyklopediia Narodnoho Hospodarstva*, 2:141.
15. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1970-1971* (New York: UN, 1973), 782.
16. Ibid., 224.

17. Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages; vers le terme, janvier 1966-avril 1969* (Paris: Plon, 1970), 5:51.

18. André Fontaine, "Après l'acceuil chaleureux de Kiev le général de Gaulle visite Volgograd, l'ancienne Stalingrad," *Le Monde*, 29 June 1966, 1.

19. Bernard Féron, "Kiev, la mère de villes russes," *Le Monde*, 29 June 1966, 2.

20. Fontaine, "Après l'acceuil," 1.

21. De Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, 5:40-1.

22. For instance, in Leningrad he said: "Russia, today's Soviet Union." (André Fontaine, "Fin du séjour du général de Gaulle en U.R.S.S.," *Le Monde*, 1 July 1966, 4.)

23. United Nations, *Yearbook of International Trade*, 250.

24. Ivan M. Kulinych, *Nimetska demokratychna respublika v spivdruzhnosti krain sotsializmu* (Kiev: "Naukova dumka," 1976), 83, 85, 86, hereinafter cited as Kulinych (1976).

25. Ivan M. Kulinych, *Ekonomichni ta kulturni zviazky Ukrainskoi RSR z nimetskoiu demokratychnoiu respublikoiu (1949-1965)* (Kiev: "Naukova dumka," 1966), 52, hereinafter cited as Kulinych (1966).

26. Ibid., 53-4.

27. Ibid., 61, 87-8; Kulinych (1976), 97.

28. Kulinych (1976), 114. There were at least six other institutional ties with East German universities and institutes of technology. (Kulinych [1966], 88-9.)

29. Kulinych (1966), 78-9. E. Weinert and A. Kurella were among those involved. Why eleven years passed before their translation was published is an intriguing question. A partial explanation is that 1951 was a Shevchenko anniversary year (90 years after his death).

30. Ibid., 79.

31. Grey Hodnett, "The Views of Petro Shelest," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US* 14 (1978-80):226-34; Gerhard Wettig, *Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp: The Soviet Union, East Germany and the German Problem 1965-72* (London: C. Hurst, 1975), 55-6, 91. Very blunt in his account of Shelest's obstructionism is Helmut Allardt (former West German Ambassador to the USSR), *Moskauer Tagebuch: Beobachtungen, Notizen, Erlebnisse* (Düsseldorf-Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1975), 381. Very restrained was Christian Düvel, "The Soviet Conservative 'Press Brain Trust' Changes its Line on the Moscow-Bonn Treaty," CRD 27/71 (25 January 1971), 7, in *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* 15, no. 3. Dr. Düvel did not mention Shelest by name. See also Shelest's censored swan song (*Neues Deutschland*, 7 October 1971, 3), and account of his meeting with Ulbricht (*Neues Deutschland*, 12 October 1971, 2).

32. United Nations, *Yearbook of International Trade*, 254.

33. *Die Welt*, 2-3 July 1983, 1. Federal Chancellor Kohl wanted to visit it on his first

official trip to the Soviet Union (July 1983), but his Soviet hosts would not allow that. They pleaded transportation and hotel problems.

34. Craig R. Whitney, "Bonn Ends Soviet Talks Satisfied on Trade Deal," *New York Times*, 1 November 1974, 61.

35. "Abkommen in Moskau soll Wirtschaftskooperation erleichtern," *Die Welt*, 1 November 1974, 1.

36. "Einigung über Erdgas und Kredite, Wortwechsel über Berlin, 2,3 Mrd. DM," *Die Welt*, 30 October 1974, 2; Christopher Wren, "Schmidt Talks on Berlin Slow," *New York Times*, 30 October 1974, 3; idem, "Soviet Thaw Seen on West Berlin," *New York Times*, 31 October 1974, 7. Faced with such a highly publicized and abrupt change in the itinerary, the Soviet negotiators promised some concessions (which turned out to be minimal) in order to fly Chancellor Schmidt to Kiev on schedule.

37. Under Khrushchev, from December 1958 (when he succeeded General Ivan Serov) until November 1961 (when he was promoted to CPSU Secretary), Shelepin headed the KGB. In 1957 and again in 1959, a KGB-trained assassin, Bohdan Stashynsky, used a KGB-made poison gun in Munich to kill two prominent Ukrainian exile leaders—Lev Rebet and Stepan Bandera. The assassin was decorated for his deeds by Shelepin personally, but in 1961, wracked by pangs of conscience, he defected to West German authorities and confessed. For this the highest West German court, the *Bundesgerichtshof* in Karlsruhe, sentenced him to a prison term on 19 October 1962. Shelepin was directly responsible at least for the assassination of Bandera.

38. Laurie Johnston, "Notes on People," *New York Times*, 31 January 1975, 28; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 January 1975, 2, and 31 January 1975, 3 (DPA/Reuter despatch) and 10 (editorial "Scheljepin und Vetter"); Walter Gunzel, "Wenn Scheljepin an den Rhein reist," *Die Welt*, 30 January 1975, 4; Ernst U. Fromm, "Mit 56 der Jüngste Mann im Politburo," *Die Welt*, 31 January 1975, 1, 3; direct quotations in text from Johnston, *New York Times*, 31 January 1975; Vogel's opinion from *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31 January 1975, 3 ("national interests of the Federal Republic were opposed to an initiation of legal proceedings against Shelepin"); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* editorial against DGB, 31 January 1975, 10; Rebet's name misspelled, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 January 1975, 2; Ernest Fromm, "2 Exil-Ukrainer," *Die Welt*, 31 January 1975, 3; Gunzel, "Wenn Scheljepin," *Die Welt*, for Meany's criticism.

39. *Die Welt*, 8 July 1983, 8.

40. C.G., "Kohl bekräftigt noch einmal den Friedenswillen der Deutschen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 July 1983, 2.

41. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8 July 1983, 1.

42. C.G., "Kohl bekräftigt," 2.

43. When Shcherbytsky launched his obligatory tirade about West Germany becoming a danger to peace in Europe, Kohl deftly undercut Shcherbytsky by pointing out that his brother had been killed in World War II, as had Shcherbytsky's, and that like Shcherbytsky's son in the Soviet Army, Kohl's son was then fulfilling his

military obligation in the *Bundeswehr*. On a purely human basis, the two tall politicians appear to have gotten on well. Ibid., 1.

44. Claus Gennrich, "Genscher wirft die Angel aus," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23 July 1986, 10.

45. See *Osteuropa* and *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*.

46. Harald Steinert, "Zwischen Kampftraining und Kosmetik: Bewaffnete Amazonen waren nicht nur Mythenwesen/Archäologische Funde in der Sowjetunion," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 August 1986.

47. Kulinych (1966), 59.

48. *Radio Kiew: 20 Jahre deutschsprachiger Sendedienst* [1985].

49. Helmut Schmidt, Leonid Brezhnev [Breschnew], et al., *Zwischenbilanz zur Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Sowjetunion* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, [1978]), 145-59.

50. For this purpose, two members of the Federal Republic-USSR Society in Schleswig-Holstein travelled to Moscow and Kiev on 6-11 April 1986 to prepare "The Ukrainian Days in Schleswig-Holstein and other cities of northern Germany." In return, a delegation of two persons from the Ukrainian Friendship Society were scheduled to travel to Schleswig-Holstein in November 1986, for seven days.

51. *Plan der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Gesellschaften Bundesrepublik Deutschland-Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken e.V. und den Regionalgesellschaften Bundesrepublik Deutschland-Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken und dem Verband sowjetischer Gesellschaften für Freundschaft und kulturelle Beziehungen mit dem Ausland (SSOD), Gesellschaft Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken-Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Jahre 1986/87*, 4, 7, 9, 10, 12.

52. *Oberhausen '86: Zahlen, Daten, Fakten* (Oberhausen: Press Office); "Thyssen Niederrhein AG ist am 30. September tot," *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 May 1986.

    In 1986 its municipal council was politically dominated by 36 SPD deputies, compared with 19 CDU deputies and 4 council members belonging to the "coloured list" (*Bunte Liste*). One of the latter, Mr. Dirk Paasch, is a member of the DKP, the German Communist Party. His Honour Friedhelm van den Mond, the Mayor (*Oberbürgermeister*) of Oberhausen, is a member of the SPD, as is his second deputy (*Bürgermeister*). His first deputy belongs to the CDU.

53. Whereas the official agreement was in Russian, not Ukrainian, and the visual model of Zaporizhzhia's industrial production given to Oberhausen was in Russian, too, the official crest of the city given by Mayor Yalansky to his new partner bore an inscription in Ukrainian ("Zaporizhzhia"). The crest also contained a stylized Cossack sabre, an allusion to the famous Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossack Host or *Sich*. The German newspaper accounts did refer to Zaporizhzhia as a Ukrainian city.

54. *Vereinbarung zwischen der Stadt Oberhausen, Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der*

Stadt Saporoshje, Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken, supplied by the City of Oberhausen.

55. "Brücken schlagen von Land zu Land, von Stadt zu Stadt," *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 May 1986.

56. Rolf Weihrauch, "Jalanskij und van den Mond: Schnell mit Leben erfüllen. Erste Gruppen im Frühling in Saporoshje?" *Neue Ruhr Zeitung*, 22 May 1986.

57. "Brücken schlagen von Land zu Land."

58. Mr. Klaus Habrechtsmeier, Head of the Bureau of the Municipal Council, City of Oberhausen, to Y. Bilinsky, 31 March 1987.

59. Stadtdirektor Riedl, City of Munich, to Y. Bilinsky, 26 August 1986, 7 April 1987.

60. Ulrike Olf, Gross-Rohrheim, "Information nur von der deutschen Welle: Lehrer erlebte sowjetischen Reaktorunfall aus 130 Kilometer Entfernung mit," *Darmstädter Echo*, 6 May 1986.

61. As quoted in Adrian Karatnycky, "The Ukrainian Option: Forty Million People Waiting to be Used," *The American Spectator*, August 1986, 15.

62. Telephone communication from Mrs. Helga M. Schmid, Press Secretary, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, 5 January 1993.

63. Telephone communications from Mme. Anita Turak, Documentation Centre of the Press and Information Service, French Embassy in Washington, 8 January 1993, and Ms. Fiona Watts, Press Division, British Embassy in Washington, 8 January 1993.

64. Telephone communication from Mr. Yaroslav Voitko, Scientific Advisor, Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, 5 January 1993.

65. See President Kravchuk's decree (*ukaz*) no. 135 of 6 March 1992: "Pro pryznachennia Nadzvychainoho i Povnovazhnoho Posla Ukrainy u Federatyvnii Respublitsi Nimechchyna," in Zahalnyi viddil administratsii Prezydenta Ukrainy, *Zbirnyk ukaziv Prezydenta Ukrainy: hruden 1991 roku—berezen 1992 roku* (Kiev 1992), 98. Source courtesy of Mr. Bohdan Yasinski, European Division, The US Library of Congress. On the same day President Kravchuk appointed Academician Oleh M. Bilorus ambassador to the United States and Roman M. Lubkivsky ambassador to what was then the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. See decrees no. 133 and 131, ibid., 97, 96.

66. For identification, see "Kohl sagt Krawtschuk Hilfe beim Neubau zu: Partnerschaft angestrebt/Ukrainische Botschaft in Bonn," *Die Welt*, 5 February 1992, 1.

67. Telephone communication from Mrs. Helga M. Schmid, Press Secretary, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, 5 January 1993.

68. See President Kravchuk's decree no. 293 of 14 May 1992: "Pro pryznachennia Nadzvychainoho i Povnovazhnoho Posla Ukrainy v Spoluchenomu Korolivstvi Velykobrytanii i Pivnichnoi Irlandii," *Zbirnyk ukaziv Prezydenta Ukrainy: kviten—cherven 1992 roku* (Kiev 1992), 124.

69. Telephone communication from Ms. Fiona Watts, Press Division, British Embassy in Washington, 8 January 1993; also, Ms. Watt's facsimile message of 19 January 1993.

70. Telephone communication from Mr. Yaroslav Voitko, Scientific Advisor, Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, 5 January 1993.

71. Telephone communication from Mme. Anita Turak, Documentation Centre of the Press and Information Service, French Embassy in Washington, 8 January 1993. According to a more recent facsimile communication from Mme. Turak (22 January 1993), "Ambassador Hugues Pernet has just left Kiev for Moscow. The new French Ambassador in Kiev will be Mr. Michel Peissik."

72. Kravchuk's interview with *Spiegel* editors Jörg R. Mettke, Fritjöf Meyer, and Olaf Inlau, "'Habt keine Angst vor uns': Der ukrainische Präsident Leonid Makarowitsch Krawtschuk über seinen neuen Staat," *Der Spiegel*, 3 February 1992, 155-63; the interview was preceded by a biographical article: "Biegsamer Mensch: Einem KP-Wendehals verdankt der zweitgrösste Staat Europas die Unabhängigkeit," ibid., 154-5.

73. See the sympathetic coverage of the visit in the right-of-centre *Die Welt*: "Ukraine bietet Deutschen Heimat," 3 February 1992, 1; "Schon früher Deutsche in der Ukraine: Wechselvolle Beziehungen, aber keine dauerhafte Feindschaft," 3 February 1992, 10; "Kohl sagt Krawtschuk"; Manfred Rowold, "Ukraine weckt Hoffnung bei den Deutschen: Der Rechtsanspruch auf die Wolgarepublik aber bleibt," 6 February 1992, 5. Objective brief news reports, from various wire-services, appeared in the left-of-centre *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich): "Ukraine will eigene Währung," 3 February 1992; "Ukraine bietet Ansiedlung von Russlanddeutschen an," 3 February 1992, 2; "Krawtschuk: Deutsche in der Ukraine ansiedeln," 5 February 1992, 2. On 4 February 1992 (on page 4) the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* weighed in with a hostile editorial of its own: "Unbequemer Gast aus Kiew," which stated that President Kravchuk had acquired in Bonn the reputation of being unreliable (the colloquially pejorative term *unsicherer Kantonist* was used) because he had attempted to withdraw from the CIS promise of common payment of the Soviet foreign debt, and he was also accused—falsely, in my view—of being too vague in his offer of German resettlement in Ukraine. (According to my personal observations in Munich in the spring of 1988, reinforced by conversations with the local Ukrainian community, that paper had never been friendly to Ukraine.)

74. See Table 55 in Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva 1946), 138.

75. Rowold, "Ukraine weckt Hoffnung"; "Schon früher Deutsche."

76. Rowold, "Ukraine weckt Hoffnung"; "Krawtschuk: Deutsche in der Ukraine ansiedeln."

77. Percentage estimate by Heinrich Arnold, a member of the Executive Board of the Ukrainian-German Association *Wiedergeburt*, in Rowold, "Ukraine weckt Hoffnung." The conflict of interests has also been confirmed in a private conversation that I have had with a German official.

78. Essentially, President Yeltsin promised in November 1991 to restore the Volga German Autonomous Republic in an area extending from Volgograd. Later he had to withdraw the promise temporarily because of the opposition of local Russian officials and offered to resettle the Germans "on 8,000 redundant square kilometres of former missile-testing ground," which *The Economist* termed "the final insult." ("Auf Widersehen, Kazakhstan," 7 March 1992, box on p. 52). By mid-December 1992, more suitable lands for the restoration of the Volga German republic were agreed upon. On the general problem of the ethnic Germans, see also Anthony Hyman, "Refugees and Citizens: The Case of the Volga Germans," *The World Today* 48, no. 3 (March 1992):41-3.

79. "Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy no. 51: 'Pro utvorennia Ukrainsko-nimetskoho fondu,'" *Zbirnyk ukaziv Prezydenta Ukrainy: hruden 1991 roku—berezen 1992 roku*, 45-6.

80. Yury Guly, "Ukraine Accepts First 500 Resettled Germans," *Izvestiia*, 3 November 1992, 1, cited in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 44, no. 44:26.

81. Rowold, "Ukraine weckt Hoffnung."

82. See Zaporizhzhia in "Newsbriefs on Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 27 December 1992, 2. Also Guly, "Ukraine Accepts": "Realizing that the stream of refugees will increase, local bodies of power, together with branches of the Ukrainian-German Foundation, are hurriedly buying up trailers to be used as temporary housing. At the same time, in six provinces where Germans used to live, a search for specific places for them to settle is proceeding at full speed, documentation for future farmsteads is being drawn up, and estimates are being calculated. Construction of 12 permanent residential settlements for the migrants has already begun in Nikolayevsk, Kherson and Odessa Provinces."

83. Sophie Shihab, "La visite en France de M. Leonid Kravtchouk: Paris consacre l'ancrage européen de l'Ukraine," *Le Monde*, 19 June 1992, 22.

84. Besides Ms. Shihab's politely critical report, with an accompanying box "Kiev en quête d'investissements," *Le Monde* printed only an AFP/AP "preview" of the visit, 17 June 1992, 6. Shihab's article and the box were printed on *Le Monde*'s last page, customarily reserved for the latest events.

85. All points, except the last, in "La visite en France"; last point in box "Kiev en quête d'investissements."

86. United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, *1989 International Trade Statistics Yearbook: [1989] Annuaire statistique du commerce international*, vol. 1: *Trade by Country* (New York: United Nations, 1991), 328.

87. German Democratic Republic, Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1988 der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1988), 33:242. Percentage calculated by the author.

88. Facsimile communication from Mrs. W. Schäfer, Press Department, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, 8 January 1993.

89. Ibid.

90. Germany, Ministry of the Interior, Press Section release of 30 January 1992: *Der Bundesminister des Innern teilt mit: Bonn, den 30. Januar 1992: Die Hilfsmassnahmen der Bundesregierung für die Russlanddeutschen beginnen zu greifen: Deutsche Landkreise in Russland halten Russlanddeutsche in ihrer heutigen Heimat.* Document supplied by Herr Habrechtsmeier, Chief of Bureau, Municipal Council, City of Oberhausen, Germany, 24 November 1992.

91. Guly, "Ukraine Accepts."

92. Referred to in "Kohl: Die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen von ungelösten Problemen entlastet: Vorzeitiger Truppenabzug/Schuldendienst ausgesetzt/Mehrere Abkommen/Russlanddeutsche," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 December 1992.

93. Karl Feldmeyer, "Die halbe Armee ist weg: Der Abzug der russischen Truppen aus Deutschland verläuft vereinbarungsgemäss," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 August 1992; also Elfie Siegl, "Alexej fühlt sich wie zwischen Himmel und Erde: Die Wohnsiedlung für zurückgekehrte Soldaten aus Ostdeutschland liegt im Kriegsgebiet," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 December 1992, 6.

94. Siegl, "Alexej."

95. See *Uhoda mizh stolytseiu Ukrainy mistom Kyiv (SRSR) i stolytseiu Bavarii mistom Miunkhenom (FRN): Vereinbarung zwischen der Landeshaupstadt München (BRD) und der Stadt Kiew (UdSSR).* Photograph of the original agreement supplied to me by Herr Oberverwaltungsrat Lindemeir, Protokollabteilung, Direktorium, Landeshauptstadt München, 9 December 1992.

96. Ibid.

97. Mechthild Ostendorf, "Hilfe für Behinderte in der Ukraine: Die Partnerschaft zwischen München und Kiew steht nicht nur auf dem Papier," *ASB Magazin: Zeitschrift des Arbeiter-Samariter-Bundes Deutschland e.V.*, no. 4 (December 1992):17. Xerox supplied by Mr. Hans-Joachim Lehmann, Vellmar, Germany.

98. Letter from Mr. Klaus Habrechtsmeier, Chief, Bureau of Municipal Council, City of Oberhausen, Germany, 24 November 1992.

99. They were: Baryshivka—Pullach (near Munich); Donetske—Bochum; Kharkiv—Berlin; Lviv—Freiburg; Odessa—Regensburg; Poltava—Leinfelden, Echterdingen and Filderstadt; Sumy—Celle; Symferopil (Crimea)—Heidelberg; Yevpatoria (Crimea)—Ludwigsburg. See the official list of 67 participating (at that time) Soviet cities, courtesy of Mr. Habrechtsmeier. Whoever drafted the list placed Kiev in *Russland* (Russia), however, and the Russian city of Orel in Ukraine.

Index

1941-5. Linking the articles on the two world wars is Ihor Kamenetsky's study of German colonization plans during both.

But the book is not limited to the themes of war and occupation. Cultural relations in the early nineteenth century form the subject of articles by Edgar Hösch and John-Paul Himka. Ethnic German communities in Ukraine from the end of the eighteenth century to the First World War are surveyed by Detlef Brandes and Andreas Kappeler. Diplomatic relations between Germany and Ukraine from 1920 through 1992 are studied by Bohdan Krawchenko and Yaroslav Bilinsky. And the "grand old man" of Ukrainian studies in the West, John A. Armstrong, offers an incisive essay, ranging over the past, present and future of the Ukrainian-German relationship, entitled: "Ukraine: Colony or Partner?"

This is the fourth installment in a series of volumes on Ukraine and its neighbours published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Previous volumes have dealt with Jewish-, Polish- and Russian-Ukrainian relations.

HANS-JOACHIM TORKE is Professor of Russian and East European History at the Free University of Berlin.

JOHN-PAUL HIMKA is Professor of East European History at the University of Alberta.

Cover design by Jars Balan. Front cover art by Maurice Levesque.

U

GENERALGOUVERNEMENT
ГЕНЕРАЛЬНЕ ГУБЕРНАТОРСТВО
(GENERALNE GUBERNATORSTWO)

KENNKARTE
РОЗПІЗНАВЧА КАРТА
(KARTA ROZPOZNAWCZA)

ЄРЛЬКЄ́НЇГЪ

гє́того переведе́нъ

на

ма́ло Ро́сскїй язы́къ

к назва́нъ

БОГИ́НЄЮ

ІО́҂НФОМЪ ЛѢВИ́ЦКИМЪ

30 Шкла́.

1838.