



Ethnicity and National Identity

*Demographic and Socioeconomic
Characteristics of Persons with Ukrainian
Mother Tongue in the United States*

Edited by Oleh Wolowyna

HARVARD UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
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The list of persons who made this project possible would be too long to enumerate. Special thanks are due to Mr. Athanas Milanych, former secretary of the Ukrainian Center for Social Research, Prof. Omeljan Pritsak, Director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, and specially Dr. Jean Kincade for her professional help and moral support. I also wish to thank all the authors for their willingness to revise the papers presented at the symposium, all the participants of the symposium, and the secretaries who spent endless hours typing the many revisions.

Foreword

AMERICA IS A nation of nations, a rich repository of diverse peoples and cultures. This is a study of the Ukrainians, one of the most research-neglected of America's many "nations." Although Ukrainians began their immigration to the United States over one hundred years ago and have since developed a dynamic and thriving community, they have remained a relatively unknown part of the American national fabric.

A major reason, of course, and one that has plagued the Ukrainian-American community until the present, is the problem of ethnonational classification. Ukraine has been occupied by foreign powers for most of modern history and did not exist as a formal nation-state until the Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed in 1917. Absorbed by Soviet Russia in 1920, Ukraine today is a nonindependent republic in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Ukrainian immigration to America began in the early 1870s with emigrants from that region of western Ukraine known as Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian Rus'). Dominated for most of its history by Hungarians, Carpatho-Ukraine was the least ethnonationally developed of Ukraine's provinces. It shared the rich religio-cultural heritage of the rest of Ukraine, but the Ukrainian revival then sweeping other provinces had barely touched this isolated region in the Carpathian Mountains. The masses remained what they had always been: deeply devoted to their religious traditions but oblivious of their national origins.

Late in the 1880s another group of immigrants from western Ukraine made their appearance on American shores. They came from Eastern Galicia, a section of Ukraine that had once been under Polish rule but later became part of Austria as a result of the Polish partition. Thanks largely to a relatively liberal Habsburg policy towards Ukrainian aspirations, eastern Galicia was by the late 1880s the most ethnonationally conscious region in Ukraine.

Both the Carpatho-Ukrainians and the Galician Ukrainians spoke languages which were more related to each other than to any other Slavic tongue; both were also "Uniate" or "Greek" Catholics as a result of the union with Rome which had been negotiated by a segment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church first in Galicia (1596) and later in Carpatho-Ukraine (1646). While

most early émigrés adopted a nominal derivative of “Rus’” (Ukraine’s ancient name) and called themselves “Rusyns” (“Ruthenians” in English), they were usually listed as “Hungarians” or “Austrians” by immigration officials. To further complicate the name game in America, some Ruthenians began to distinguish themselves as “Uhro-Rusyns” (Hungarian Rusyns). Others preferred to call themselves “Hutsuls,” “Lemkos,” or “Boykos,” their regional identities in Ukraine. Still others joined the Russian Orthodox Church in America and began to identify with the Russian national stream. It was not until 1915 that a sizable segment of the Ruthenian-American community started calling itself “Ukrainian.”

The identity problem was ameliorated somewhat after World War I when the first nationally conscious Ukrainian mass immigration arrived in America. But the classification question remained. Ukraine was now partitioned among four nations, and immigration officials generally labeled Ukrainians according to their nation of origin: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, or the U.S.S.R. Nor did the issue disappear after World War II when most Ukrainian ethnographic territories were incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Census data still included Ukrainians under the broad rubric of “U.S.S.R.” and in the minds of many American trained demographers, U.S.S.R. meant “Russia.” It was only when the Census Bureau began to ask about “mother tongue,” that “Ukrainian” began to appear in census data.

A second reason for the relative anonymity of Ukrainians in America is the fact that until very recently, they have been overlooked by American scholars. The first, and until now the last, attempt to analyze the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of Ukrainian Americans in the English language was a study entitled *Ukrainians in the United States*, written by Dr. Wasyl Halich. Published by the University of Chicago Press in 1937, it has remained the only statistical resource available on Ukrainian-American life. Forty-nine years later, we can only rejoice at the publication of a second such survey by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

There are many more reasons, of course, to welcome this carefully researched and scientifically compiled collection of statistical essays. For American scholars it opens a new, heretofore neglected area of legitimate social research. For the Ukrainian-American community, it offers a base of comparison between the data of the past, as presented by Halich, and of the future, as compiled by the 1970 census.

For those of us who have labored in the vineyard of Ukrainian organizational life for many years, this collection is both useful and timely. In one sense it represents a status report of our community. In another, more important sense, it provides us with data which, properly analyzed, can serve as a report card of our successes and failures in attempting to preserve the

unique ethnonational character of our community. No longer can we fantasize about ourselves; now we have data which can tell us where we are and where we appear to be headed.

Bearing in mind that we are dealing with a select sample—only those who listed “Ukrainian” as the major language in the parental home are included—and that the findings still need to be compared and interpreted to determine their full significance, enough data has been presented to suggest that Ukrainians will discover some “good news” and some “bad news” in these studies.

The good news is that: 1) Traditional Ukrainian family life appears to be surviving despite greater dispersion: there are fewer single-parent families and unrelated persons living together, and Ukrainian elderly are far more likely than other American elderly to live with relatives; 2) Ukrainians have the highest rate of home ownership among Eastern European groups; 3) the percentage of Ukrainians with a higher education is relatively large and trends among younger Ukrainians suggest that they will surpass the respective percentage of all U.S. whites; 4) Ukrainian women have a higher educational level than ever before and enjoy a higher income than their American counterparts.

The bad news is that: 1) Ukrainians tend to remain single more often, marry later, and start childbearing later than other Americans; 2) the fertility rate among Ukrainian women is somewhat lower than fertility rates among other American women; 3) Ukrainian males are less able to translate education and time worked into income than other American males.

Depending on one’s perspective, the fact that Ukrainian Americans—even those who grew up in households where Ukrainian was spoken—are becoming harder to distinguish as a group from other Americans, can be either good news or bad news.

What does all of this mean from the American perspective? The data which is most disconcerting is that despite a relatively high educational level among Ukrainian males, their income level is lower than that of the general U.S. white males. Two possible reasons suggest themselves. The first is that most of the male sample was educated in Europe and may have been either unwilling or unable to take the necessary compensatory steps to translate education into greater income. The other possibility is that there may have been historical discrimination against Ukrainian males by their American employers.

From the perspective of those Ukrainian Americans committed to the preservation of a unique Ukrainian heritage in a pluralistic American society, the data suggest two things: Ukrainian women can be expected—indeed encouraged—to play a more dynamic leadership role in the community; and the Ukrainian community has changed. It is better educated, enjoys more

socioeconomic benefits and, for better or for worse, is developing certain values and attitudes that are more of a reflection of American mainstream norms than the norms of our European-oriented organizational leadership. We can either ignore this reality or build on it. Every Ukrainian American reader is encouraged to read each of the studies carefully before deciding which it shall be.

Myron B. Kuropas
Supreme Vice-President
The Ukrainian National Association

Introduction

WHEN I WAS a graduate student in Sociology at Brown University, Athanas Milanych, the secretary of the Ukrainian Center for Social Research in New York, approached me with the question “How many persons of Ukrainian descent are there in the United States?” The question had come up during work on a statistical compendium on Ukrainians in the diaspora, one of the Center’s projects. I suggested then a more ambitious task; a study which would assess the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Ukrainian Americans, a topic which was in dire need of updating, because the latest comprehensive study was published nearly half a century ago.¹ The idea was enthusiastically embraced by Mr. Milanych, who secured financial help and through persistent encouragement and moral support became the main force behind the project.

The data used in the project are taken from the 1970 United States Census, which contains two questions related to the identification of Ukrainian Americans—place of birth for foreign-born and mother tongue. Because of historical reasons (see Bandera’s article in this book) information elicited by the first question is fraught with problems and was not used, except to determine nativity status (foreign- or U.S.-born). Thus our analysis is limited to persons who in 1970 declared Ukrainian as their mother tongue. This obviously defines only a subset of all U.S. residents of Ukrainian descent and presents some problems of interpretation, which are discussed below.

With financial help from the Ukrainian Center for Social Research and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, a special computer tape was created with a 2 percent representative sample of all persons who declared Ukrainian as their mother tongue, as well as of other Eastern European groups. Then I invited several social scientists to analyze these data and prepare papers on the different demographic and socioeconomic aspects of Ukrainian Americans. These were presented at a symposium held at Harvard University on November 11–12, 1977. Eleven papers were presented in three half-day sessions, with 20 official participants. Well-known scholars like Oscar Handlin and Stephan Thernstrom from Harvard University, Charles Keely from the Population Council, and Harold Abramson from the University of Connecticut, among others, participated as speakers, discussants,

or authors of papers. A selection of these papers, in revised form, has been collected in this volume.

We now turn to problems of measuring ethnicity and the limitations of the “mother tongue” question.

The Measurement of Ethnicity

The concept of ethnicity is difficult to define and difficult to measure. There is extensive theoretical literature on the topic,² and various types of questions have been tried in censuses and surveys. *Country of birth* serves only to identify foreign-born and is of very limited use for an ethnic group like Ukrainians (see Bandera’s article in this book). Ryder³ severely criticizes the question on *ethnic origin*, which has been used repeatedly in the Canadian census. The question on *ancestry* asked in the 1980 U.S. Census seems to have yielded more satisfactory results. Tests with this and other questions performed in the November 1979 Current Population Survey (CPS) showed that about 89 percent of the respondents in the survey listed one or more ancestries.

If data had been gathered by asking about foreign-birth or foreign languages, most respondents would have given answers which would not have permitted a classification by national origin or ethnicity. The innovative question of ancestry may be the most appropriate way to effectively gather data about this aspect of population composition.⁴

For example, CPS results show that out of the 525,000 persons of Ukrainian ancestry, only 9.0 percent were identified by birthplace, 26.7 by father’s birthplace, 21.6 mother’s birthplace, 14.7 by current language, and 39.5 percent by mother tongue.

The 1980 census data provide the opportunity for analyzing a more representative sample of Ukrainian Americans, and recently released basic statistics are presented in the next section. In the meantime, the 1970 Census mother tongue data serve as a useful benchmark for further studies. As the mother tongue question does not provide a representative sample of all persons of Ukrainian ancestry in the United States, it is important to point out some limitations of this definition.

The question in the 1970 Census reads “What language other than English was spoken in the person’s home when he/she was a child?” The possible answers singled out in the questionnaire were Spanish, French, German, other (specify), and only one answer was allowed.⁵ Not allowing more than one answer may have introduced some underestimation, and a similar effect was likely from not having Ukrainian listed explicitly as one of the possible answers.⁶

The main distortion in the mother tongue group is reflected in its age


structure. As Figure 1 shows, compared to all U.S. males, males with Ukrainian mother tongue included a very low proportion of children, very high proportions in the 45–49 age groups, and a somewhat higher proportion in ages 60 and over; a similar pattern was found for females. This highly irregular age structure is due to the characteristics of the language assimilation process and the history of immigration. In theory, practically all foreign-born and native-born of foreign parentage should be included in the mother tongue criteria. Thus one would expect the mother tongue group to provide a fairly good representation of the *first and second generations*. From this it follows that the descendants of immigrants who arrived before World War I are likely to be underrepresented in our data.

In practice, there are first and second generation persons who may have also been missed for a variety of reasons. Among the foreign-born, there may have been parents who for some reason did not speak Ukrainian with their children. This also applies to second generation Ukrainians; either by necessity or by choice, their parents may have chosen not to speak Ukrainian to their children. By the nature of the language assimilation process it is possible that within the same family some children belong to the mother tongue group, while others do not belong to it. This may happen if parents decide at some point to stop speaking Ukrainian at home. Then children born before that time belong to the mother tongue group, while children born after that time do not belong to it. Also, being part of the mother tongue group does not necessarily imply that the person speaks or even understands Ukrainian.

These restrictions of the mother tongue definition of ethnicity warrant caution when discussing results from these data. Most authors try to remind the reader occasionally that the data are not a representative sample of the whole Ukrainian-American group, but the reader should keep this constantly in mind. Although it is safe to assume that we are dealing with the characteristics of less assimilated Ukrainian Americans, it is also true that at least some of them are linguistically assimilated. Also, the underrepresentation of the third or higher generation should be kept in mind. The irregular age structure makes age standardization mandatory in all variables which may be related to age. Further caveats are presented in the various chapters in the discussion of specific results.⁷

Finally, a few words about the other linguistic groups used for comparison purposes. We chose all possible Eastern European groups, within the limitation of the 1970 Census data in the sample tapes. Some groups (White Russians, Romanians, Slovenians) were too small and were excluded from the analysis. Other groups were combined in order to increase the number of cases: Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Croatsians. Yiddish was selected because a very high proportion of Jewish immigrants to the United States

Figure 1. Age Distribution of U.S. and Ukrainian Mother Tongue MALES in the U.S., 1970.



Source: Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population: 1970. General Population Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-B1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1-263.

were from Eastern Europe; the small number of persons with Hebrew mother tongue was combined with the Yiddish group for the analysis. In many instances the Bureau of the Census grouped several responses under one code: for example, Serbian includes the answers Serbo-Croatian and Yugoslavian.⁸ Thus the linguistic groups selected do not represent all Eastern European groups, but they serve the objective of placing the Ukrainians in relation to most of the Eastern European groups in the United States.

Some Basic Results from the 1980 Census

The recent release of ancestry data from the 1980 census allows us to update some of the 1970 data analyzed in this book. The 1980 data are superior to the 1970 data in several ways. First, ethnicity was measured in terms of ancestry, which is a broader concept than mother tongue, and eliminates some of the problems mentioned above; second, multiple-ancestry answers were allowed and data are presented in terms of multiple and simple ancestry; third, the new question of language spoken at home was asked. The census ancestry question reads: "What is the person's ancestry? If uncertain about how to report ancestry, see instruction guide. (For example: Afro-American, English, French, German, Honduran, Hungarian, Irish, Jamaican, Korean, Lebanese, Mexican, Nigerian, Polish, Ukrainian, Venezuelan, etc.)." Part of the instructions to this question states:

Print the ancestry group with which the person identifies. Ancestry (or origin or descent) may be viewed as the nationality group, the lineage, or the country in which the person or person's parents or ancestors were born before their arrival in the United States. Persons who are of more than one origin and who cannot identify with a single group should print their multiple ancestry (for example, German-Irish) . . . (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1983:9)

There were 730,056 persons of Ukrainian ancestry in 1980 but only 381,084 persons, or 52.2 percent, claimed single Ukrainian ancestry, reflecting a high proportion of intermarriage among Ukrainians and their descendants. Although significantly higher than the mother tongue statistics from the 1970 census, the census figure is very likely an underestimate of all the Ukrainians and their descendants in the United States: some persons did not declare Ukrainian ancestry because of assimilation or lack of identity, and a certain proportion of persons classified under Russian ancestry are likely to be Ukrainians. For example, all persons answering "Rusyn" were coded Russian by the Bureau of the Census; also a certain proportion of the 8,485 who answered "Ruthenian" are likely to be Ukrainians. Nevertheless, the 1980 census figure is the most accurate estimate we have of all persons who identify with Ukrainian ancestry, and it provides a solid base for a detailed investigation of their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.⁹

In Table 1 we present the distribution of Ukrainians defined in terms of ancestry, mother tongue and language spoken at home. The ancestry and language figures are from the 1980 census, while mother tongue (language other than English spoken in the person's home when he/she was a child) was asked in the 1970 census.¹⁰ Although the 1970 and 1980 statistics are not exactly comparable, they can be taken as indicators of three stages of the language assimilation process. The percentage of persons of Ukrainian ancestry with non-Ukrainian mother tongue can be viewed as a measure of language loss in the parent's generation, while the percentage who do not speak Ukrainian in their home, among those with Ukrainian mother tongue, provides a measure of language loss for the current generation. With this interpretation we can say that 480,000 (730,000–250,000) Ukrainians, or 66.0 percent, already lost the language in their parent's generation (their mother tongue is not Ukrainian), and only 123,500 (17.0 percent) retained the language in their home.¹¹

Ukrainians are highly concentrated in certain regions of the United States. Almost half of them live in the Middle Atlantic division (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania), followed by the East North Central division (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin) with 20.0 percent. The Mountain division and the West North and East South Central divisions have the lowest proportion of Ukrainians, with 3.0 percent or less each, while the New England, Atlantic and Pacific divisions have about 8.0 percent each.

The distribution of language follows closely the distribution of mother tongue, indicating that the proportion who speak Ukrainian at home is similar to the proportion of those whose parents spoke Ukrainian at home. Differences with the ancestry distribution reflect differential degrees of language assimilation among the various divisions. Thus for divisions with large communities, such as Middle Atlantic (New York and Philadelphia) or East North Central (Chicago and Cleveland) the percentage speaking Ukrainian is higher than the national average, while for divisions with smaller communities the percentage speaking Ukrainian is lower.

As can be seen in Table 2, most Ukrainians are concentrated in only a few States. Almost 20.0 percent live in Pennsylvania, and the Middle Atlantic division includes almost half of all Ukrainians in the United States; by adding California, Michigan, Ohio and Illinois we obtain almost three-fourths of the total. At the other end of the distribution, 18 states—mostly in the South Central and North Central parts of the country—contain only two percent of all Ukrainians.

The distribution by ancestry varies somewhat from the distribution by mother tongue. For example, Pennsylvania has the largest number of Ukrainians by ancestry, 144,000, while New York has the largest number by mother tongue, 52,000; California, ranked third by ancestry, drops to seventh place by mother

Table 1. Distribution of Ukrainians in the United States According to Ancestry, Mother Tongue, and Language Spoken at Home, by Division: 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses.

Divisions ^a	Ancestry—1980			Mother Tongue—1970			Language—1980		
	Rank	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
TOTAL U.S.	—	730,056	100.0	249,351	100.0	123,548	100.0		
New England	5	49,763	6.8	15,957	6.4	8,096	6.7		
Middle Atlantic	1	352,291	48.3	134,584	54.0	64,860	52.5		
E. N. Central	2	147,360	20.2	60,348	24.2	31,541	25.5		
W. N. Central	6	21,720	3.0	7,865	3.2	3,139	2.5		
South Atlantic	4	61,728	8.5	10,633	4.3	6,822	5.5		
E. S. Central	9	5,184	0.7	552	0.2	202	0.2		
W. S. Central	8	12,319	1.7	1,899	0.8	825	0.7		
Mountain	7	16,618	2.3	3,477	1.4	2,030	1.6		
Pacific	3	63,073	8.6	14,036	5.6	6,033	4.9		

^aNew England: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut.

Middle Atlantic: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.

East North Central: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin.

West North Central: Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas.

South Atlantic: Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida.

East South Central: Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi.

West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas.

Mountain: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada.

Pacific: Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1973 and 1983.

Table 2. Distribution of Ukrainians in the United States according to Ancestry, Mother Tongue, and Language Spoken at Home, by State: 1970 and 1980 Censuses.

State	Ancestry—1980			Mother Tongue—1970			Language—1980		
	Number	Percent	Cumulative Percent	Number	Percent	Rank	Number	Percent	Rank
TOTAL US	730,056	100.0	—	249,351	100.0	—	123,548	100.0	—
Pennsylvania	143,862	19.7	19.7	49,398	19.8	2	21,118	17.1	2
New York	127,678	17.5	37.2	52,069	20.9	1	27,069	21.9	1
New Jersey	80,751	11.1	48.3	33,117	13.3	3	16,673	13.5	3
California	49,724	6.8	55.1	11,050	4.4	7	4,950	4.0	7
Michigan	47,189	6.5	61.6	18,217	7.3	5	8,728	7.1	5
Ohio	45,820	6.3	67.9	18,632	7.5	6	8,423	6.8	6
Illinois	40,987	5.6	73.5	19,773	7.9	4	12,244	9.9	4
Connecticut	25,229	3.5	77.0	9,655	3.9	8	4,939	4.0	8
Florida	25,227	3.5	80.5	3,311	1.3	9	2,824	2.3	9
Massachusetts	17,102	2.3	82.8	4,343	1.7	11	2,000	1.6	11
Maryland	13,975	1.9	84.7	3,559	1.4	10	2,116	1.7	10
Minnesota	9,522	1.3	86.0	4,884	2.0	12	1,780	1.4	12
Texas	8,636	1.2	87.2	1,036	0.4	21	576	0.5	21
Virginia	8,048	1.1	88.3	1,021	0.4	19	645	0.5	19
Washington	7,885	1.1	89.4	1,905	0.8	18	655	0.5	18
Indiana	6,779	0.9	90.3	1,846	0.7	14	1,063	0.9	14
Wisconsin	6,585	0.9	91.2	1,880	0.8	13	1,083	0.9	13
Arizona	5,447	0.7	91.9	1,030	0.4	16	762	0.6	16
Colorado	5,065	0.7	92.6	1,122	0.4	15	829	0.7	15
Missouri	4,648	0.6	93.2	952	0.4	23	397	0.3	23

Table 2. Distribution of Ukrainians in the United States according to Ancestry, Mother Tongue, and Language Spoken at Home, by State: 1970 and 1980 Censuses.

State	Ancestry—1980			Mother Tongue—1970			Language—1980		
	Number	Percent	Cumulative Percent	Number	Percent	Rank	Number	Percent	Rank
Delaware	4,394	0.6	93.8	1,319	0.5	20	627	0.5	0.5
Oregon	4,092	0.6	94.4	891	0.4	24	301	0.2	0.2
Rhode Island	3,585	0.5	94.9	1,355	0.5	17	720	0.6	0.6
North Dakota	3,212	0.4	95.3	1,138	0.5	22	470	0.4	0.4
North Carolina	2,766	0.4	95.7	401	0.2	29	134	0.1	0.1
Georgia	2,680	0.4	96.1	243	0.1	28	176	0.1	0.1
New Hampshire	2,078	0.3	96.4	359	0.1	26	254	0.2	0.2
West Virginia	1,970	0.3	96.7	423	0.2	33	122	0.1	0.1
Tennessee	1,913	0.3	97.0	164	0.1	41	57	—	—
Nevada	1,889	0.3	97.3	186	0.1	27	189	0.2	0.2
Kansas	1,651	0.2	97.5	204	0.1	30	131	0.1	0.1
Louisiana	1,616	0.2	97.7	305	0.1	35	95	0.1	0.1
South Carolina	1,560	0.2	97.9	158	0.1	44	53	—	—
Oklahoma	1,497	0.2	98.1	390	0.2	34	104	0.1	0.1
Montana	1,453	0.2	98.3	563	0.2	36	91	0.1	0.1
Kentucky	1,410	0.2	98.5	158	0.1	38	75	0.1	0.1
Nebraska	1,323	0.2	98.7	421	0.2	25	272	0.2	0.2
Alabama	1,218	0.2	98.9	133	0.1	43	53	—	—
Iowa	1,155	0.2	99.1	191	0.1	39	61	—	—
District of Columbia	1,108	0.2	99.3	198	0.1	32	125	0.1	0.1
New Mexico	1,035	0.1	99.4	183	0.1	40	59	—	—
Hawaii	926	0.1	99.5	120	—	46	48	—	—

Table 2. Distribution of Ukrainians in the United States according to Ancestry, Mother Tongue, and Language Spoken at Home, by State: 1970 and 1980 Censuses.

State	Ancestry—1980			Mother Tongue—1970			Language—1980		
	Number	Percent	Cumulative Percent	Number	Percent	Rank	Number	Percent	Rank
Maine	921	0.1	99.6	117	—	31	128	0.1	—
Vermont	848	0.1	99.7	128	0.1	42	55	—	—
Utah	762	0.1	99.8	191	0.1	47	44	—	—
Mississippi	643	0.1	99.8	97	—	51	17	—	—
Idaho	641	0.1	100.0	108	—	50	27	—	—
Arkansas	570	0.1	100.1	168	0.1	45	50	—	—
Alaska	446	0.1	100.2	70	—	37	79	0.1	—
Wyoming	326	—	—	94	—	48	29	—	—
South Dakota	208	—	—	75	—	49	28	—	—

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1973 and 1983.

tongue. This is due to the relationship between mother tongue assimilation and proximity to a large community. The pattern can be seen more clearly with the distribution of language spoken at home. Examples of states with higher ranking by language than by ancestry are Illinois, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, and Nebraska, while Texas, North Carolina, West Virginia and Alabama rank higher on ancestry than on language.

Another way of looking at the relationship between geographical distribution and language assimilation is to compare rankings by ancestry and percent speaking Ukrainian at home. This information is presented in the first three columns of Table 3 for the 12 most populous states. Illinois has the highest percent of persons of Ukrainian ancestry who speak the language at home—almost 30 percent. It is followed by New York with 21.2 percent, New Jersey, Connecticut, Minnesota, Michigan, and Ohio with 18 to 21 percent, Maryland and Pennsylvania with about 15 percent and, Massachusetts, Florida and California with 10 to 12 percent. These figures clearly illustrate that moving away from large communities increases the chances of language loss.

Table 3. Percent Speaking Ukrainian Language Among Persons of Ukrainian Ancestry (Single or Multiple Ancestry and of Single Ukrainian Ancestry) for the Twelve Most Populous States, 1980.

	Ancestry ^a	Language/ Ancestry		Single Ancestry ^b	Language/ Single Ancestry
	Number	Rank	Percent	Number	Percent
TOTAL U.S.	730,056	—	16.9	381,084	—
Pennsylvania	143,862	9	14.7	75,780	27.9
New York	127,678	2	21.2	71,248	38.0
New Jersey	80,751	3	20.6	43,266	38.5
California	49,724	12	10.0	26,391	18.8
Michigan	47,189	6	18.5	22,290	39.2
Ohio	45,820	7	18.3	23,127	36.4
Illinois	40,987	1	29.9	23,721	52.9
Connecticut	25,229	4	19.6	12,371	39.9
Florida	25,227	11	11.2	14,887	19.0
Massachusetts	17,102	10	11.7	8,465	23.6
Maryland	13,975	8	15.1	7,056	30.0
Minnesota	9,522	5	18.7	4,558	39.1

^aPersons who declared one or more ancestry (e.g. Ukrainian, Polish).

^bPersons who declared only Ukrainian ancestry.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1983.

We noted above that persons were allowed to report more than one ancestry in the census questionnaire, and that a large number of Ukrainians reported more than one ancestry; out of the 730,056 persons, 381,084, or slightly more than half reported a single Ukrainian ancestry. As can be seen in the last two columns of Table 3, this proportion is maintained in the 12 most populous states: about half of those reporting Ukrainian ancestry reported single Ukrainian ancestry in almost every state. Thus about half of all Ukrainians in the United States are descendants of mixed marriages, and this has important consequences for retention of the Ukrainian language in the home. If we take as base only those who reported single Ukrainian ancestry, the percent speaking the language at home is about twice as high for most states, compared to the percentage based on all Ukrainians.

Conclusion

The 1980 census of population provides valuable data on Ukrainians in the United States: number of persons who declared Ukrainian as their ancestry, how many of them are of single Ukrainian ancestry, and how many speak the language at home. Recently released statistics show that there are about 730,000 Ukrainians in the United States, slightly more than half of whom are of single Ukrainian ancestry, and about 123,500 speak the language at home. We hope that the analysis of 1970 census data presented in this book will serve as a basis and stimulus for further analyses of 1980 census data. Their richness allows us to capture a larger group than the mother tongue concept, to measure for the first time at the national level the important process of language assimilation and to determine time trends by comparisons with the 1970 results.

This book has many limitations, and by scientific standards it is rather superficial; this is by design. Our aim is to reach a wider, nonspecialized audience, present some basic results, and formulate questions for further studies. We hope that this pioneering work will stimulate further systematic research on Ukrainians in the United States, based on reliable statistics. Our current knowledge is fragmentary and often based on impressions rather than on fact. A more objective analysis will be of benefit both to the Ukrainian community in the United States and to scholars interested in the multifaceted mosaic of American society.

Oleh Wolowyna
Madison, Wisconsin,
June 1983

Notes

1. Wasyl Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937).
2. For a review see Wsevolod W. Isajiw, "Definitions of Ethnicity," *Ethnicity* 1, (1974):111–24, and Charles F. Keyes, "Towards a New Formulation of the Concept of Ethnic Groups," *Ethnicity* 3, (1976):202–13.
3. Norman B. Ryder, "The Interpretation of Origin Statistics," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 21, (1955):466–79.
4. Michael J. Levin and Reynolds Farley, "Ancestry of the United States Population," presented at the meeting of the Population Association of America, San Diego, California, April 30, 1982.
5. Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, Subject Report, Final Report PC(2)-1A. *National Origin and Language* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. x.
6. Both of these problems were corrected in the 1980 census.
7. Detailed 1980 census data will not have many of these problems as they are based on the broader concept of *ancestry* (see next section).
8. The linguistic groups as coded by the U.S. Bureau of the Census are: Polish (Polak); Czech (Bohemian, Maehriol, Mahrish, Moravian); Russian (Great Russian); Ukrainian (Cossackian, Little Russian); Ruthenian; Slavonian; Lithuanian (Jmond, Latvian, Lettish, Litvak); Croatian (also Gottcheer, Pliti); Serbian (Serbo-Croatian, Yugoslavian). Yiddish (Jewish). Bureau of the Census, *Public Use Samples of Basic Records from the 1970 Census. Description and Technical Documentation* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972).
9. Department of Commerce, *Ancestry of the Population by State: 1980*, Supplementary Report PC80-S1-10. (Washington: Bureau of the Census, 1983).
10. Department of Commerce, "Characteristics of the Population," *1970 U.S. Census of Population and Housing*, Vol. 1 (Washington: Bureau of the Census, 1972–1973).
11. Department of Commerce, *Preliminary Listing of Selected Languages Spoken by Persons 3 Years Old and Over by State: 1980*. Unpublished data (Washington: Bureau of the Census, 1982).

Demographic Profile

John P. Fulton

OVER ONE HUNDRED years have passed since Ukrainians first came to the United States in large numbers. Since 1870, this country has experienced two waves of Ukrainian immigration. The first and greater spanned the years 1870–1930 (Halich 1937:12–25). It began as a trickle in 1870, built substantially after 1880, and peaked in 1914, the beginning of World War I. Although the number of Ukrainian immigrants to the United States before 1899 is uncertain, it has been estimated as anywhere between 200,000 and 500,000 (Halich 1937:12–25). Between 1899 and 1930, almost 270,000 Ukrainians arrived (Halich 1937:153). (Halich considers this a conservative figure because not all Ukrainians were distinguished from other Russians and Austrians in United States immigration records.) The second wave was compressed between 1947 and 1955, when approximately 80,000 Ukrainian immigrants came to the United States following the disruptions of World War II (Kubijovyč 1963:1094).

The two waves are distinguishable not only on the basis of timing and mass, but also on the basis of socioeconomic characteristics. Ninety-eight percent of all first wave immigrants were farmers and unskilled laborers, while only 58 percent of all second wave immigrants fell into these categories. Less than one percent of all first wave immigrants were professionals, while more than 13 percent of second wave immigrants had achieved professional status (Fishman 1966:325). Thus Ukrainian Americans in 1970, while united by a common cultural heritage, are heterogeneous from the standpoint of immigration and socioeconomic history.

The 1970 United States Census as a Source of Information on Ukrainian Americans

What the 1970 United States Census can tell us about Ukrainian Americans today is restricted by the “mother tongue” question with which Ukrainian Americans were differentiated from other Americans. Respondents were asked if a language other than English had been spoken in a person’s parental home (Bureau of the Census 1973:x). Only if Ukrainian had been

been spoken in a person's parental home, i.e., indicated as a mother tongue, was he or she identified as a Ukrainian American.

The mother tongue question inadequately differentiates Ukrainian Americans from other Americans. Because Ukrainian Americans have experienced notable language assimilation in the United States, many people who could have claimed Ukrainian *descent* in 1970 could not claim Ukrainian *mother tongue*. Hence many, perhaps most, Americans who could have claimed Ukrainian descent were not differentiated from other Americans by the 1970 United States Census. Furthermore, since language assimilation increases with time, those Ukrainian Americans who did report Ukrainian as mother tongue are not a representative sample of all Ukrainian Americans, but instead overly represent those Ukrainian Americans whose families have been in the United States the least time. Hence, Ukrainian Americans with Ukrainian mother tongue in 1970 tend to overrepresent families who immigrated to the United States in the second wave. As described previously, this is a problem because of the substantial differences, notably socioeconomic ones, that separate the average first wave family from the average second wave family.

Nevertheless, information from the 1970 United States Census can be used to describe Ukrainian Americans today, if we are careful to separate that information on the basis of nativity and parentage. Fortunately, census information allows us to differentiate among Ukrainian Americans who are foreign-born, or first generation, native-born of foreign parentage, or second generation, and native-born of native parentage, or third and higher generations. Because of the time that has elapsed since the first wave of Ukrainian immigration to the United States, we can safely assume that most, except the eldest, first generation Ukrainian Americans come from second wave families. Using the same reasoning, we can safely assume that most Ukrainian Americans of second generation above the age of 25, and all Ukrainian Americans of third and higher generations, come from first wave families.

Separation by generation allows us to place appropriate weight on the representativeness of mother tongue Ukrainians vis-à-vis all Ukrainian Americans. We can safely assume that most first generation Ukrainian Americans could have listed Ukrainian as a mother tongue in 1970, with the exception of those whose families had lived for many years outside the Ukraine before immigrating to the United States. The same reasoning holds through the second generation. We can safely assume that most second generation Ukrainian Americans, whose parents were all foreign-born, and probably Ukraine-born, heard Ukrainian spoken in their parental homes. We cannot make this assumption for third and higher generation Ukrainian Americans. Hence, by differentiating census information by generation, we can be reasonably certain that information on first and second generation

mother tongue Ukrainian Americans adequately describes most Ukrainian Americans of those generations. Furthermore, this information can be linked to wave of immigration as outlined above. Unfortunately, information on third and higher generation mother tongue Ukrainian Americans, while suggestive, probably cannot be considered representative of all Ukrainian Americans of those generations. Ukrainian Americans of third and higher generations who can claim Ukrainian mother tongue may be quite different from those who cannot.

Methodological Notes

In the description of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans, information is presented for the whole group and generation sub-groups. Additionally, analogous information is presented for the whole United States as a basis of comparison. Much of the information on mother tongue Ukrainian Americans is based on a sample of almost 5,000 1970 Census records. A sample may tend to distort description of the whole. Thus, in comparing information on mother tongue Ukrainian Americans with information on all Americans, we should not place great weight on the importance of small differences between groups. Small differences may be the result of sampling, as opposed to real differences between the populations sampled. This problem is aggravated when sample populations are broken into smaller groups for purposes of description and comparison. Thus, in the tables which follow certain figures have been deleted because they were based on insufficient cases to be considered reliable.

General Demographic Characteristics

It is possible to make a very rough estimate of the number of Americans of Ukrainian descent in 1970. Let us refer to Table 1.1. Based on church records, memberships in fraternal organizations, and "other manifestations of Ukrainian group life in this country," Chyz (1940, pp. 68–69) estimated the number of Ukrainian Americans in 1935 as 700,000. This number, which he considered a conservative estimate, includes all Ukrainian Americans of the first wave of immigration and their descendants.

If we assume that this population had approximately the same rate of natural increase as the whole United States population, the number of first wave immigrants and descendants in 1970 should have been about 1,068,000. Actually, as we shall see below, Ukrainian Americans may have had a lower rate of natural increase than the whole United States population. However, this bias was probably more than offset by intermarriage with non-Ukrainians, which increases the number of Americans of Ukrainian descent. As a matter of fact, unless intermarriage was insignificant, we should treat the 1970 estimate as conservative, especially as it is based on a figure for 1935 that was considered conservative.

Table 1.1. Estimates of the Number of Persons of Ukrainian Descent in the United States, 1935, 1950, and 1970, by Wave of Immigration, Number of Mother Tongue Ukrainians in the United States, 1970, and Estimates of the Percentage of Persons of Ukrainian Descent in the United States in 1970 Who Were Mother Tongue Ukrainians.

Year	Wave of Immigration				
	First	Second	Both		
	Descent (1)	Descent (2)	Descent (1) + (2) (3)	Mother Tongue (4)	Percentage (5)
1935	700,000 ^a	—	—	—	—
1950	828,000	80,000 ^b	908,000	—	—
1970	1,068,000	103,000	1,171,000	247,000	21

^aEstimate from: Chyz, Yaroslav J. *The Ukrainian Immigrants in the United States*. (Scranton, PA: The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association, 1940).

^bEstimate from: *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Volume II, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) p. 1094.

Around 1950 about 80,000 new Ukrainian immigrants landed in the United States. Making the same assumptions as above, the number of second wave immigrants and descendants in 1970 should have been about 103,000. Adding this to the first estimate, we get a total of 1,171,000. This is a very rough estimate. Nonetheless, the number of Americans who reported Ukrainian as mother tongue in 1970 was only about 247,000, or 21 percent of our 1970 estimate of the number of all Ukrainian Americans. Hence, we could speculate that a majority of Ukrainian Americans were not identified as such by the mother tongue question in the 1970 United States Census. The figures in Table 1.1 rough as they are, demonstrate the inadequacies of the mother tongue question for the purpose of identifying Ukrainian Americans in 1970.

Let us proceed to the age distributions presented in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. The age distributions of all mother tongue Ukrainian Americans in 1970, differentiated by sex, are quite different from the age distributions of the total United States population, differentiated by sex. The population of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans is older than the United States population.

For the sake of brevity, let us focus our attention on the male figures given in Table 1.2. While 30 percent of all United States males are less than age 15, less than 10 percent of the Ukrainian males are less than age 15. The first and second generation Ukrainian males are more concentrated than all United States males in the old adult ages, 45 through 59. This reflects two things. First, time has passed since both waves of immigration. Hence, immigrants and their children are old. Second, immigrants tend to be con-

centrated in the young adult ages. Thus, twenty years after the focal point of the second immigrant wave, 1950, the immigrants are concentrated in the old adult ages.

In contrast, third and higher generation mother tongue Ukrainians are concentrated in the young adult years. This pattern also reflects two things. First, because only 56 years had elapsed between the focal point of all Ukrainian immigration to the United States, 1914, and the 1970 census date, third and higher generations were relatively young. Second, third generation people, who are older than fourth and higher generation people, are more likely to have had Ukrainian as a mother tongue than fourth and higher generation people, because language assimilation increases with time. Hence, because of the greater loss of younger generations from the mother tongue population, we find an age distribution of third and higher generations with a notable lack of children under the age of 15. The alternative explanation

Table 1.2. Age Distribution of Males, in percent, 1970.

Age Group	United States Average	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
		All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
0-4	8.8	1.4	0.2	2.1	2.1
5-9	10.3	2.3	0.5	3.1	4.6
10-14	10.7	4.3	1.0	5.7	10.1
15-19	9.7	5.1	2.0	5.1	17.2
20-24	8.0	6.3	8.5	1.2	23.5
25-29	6.7	4.4	4.0	1.6	20.2
30-34	5.7	3.4	2.6	2.5	10.5
35-39	5.5	4.3	2.6	5.6	3.8
40-44	5.9	9.0	8.2	10.7	3.8
45-49	5.9	15.0	13.4	18.7	2.1
50-54	5.4	16.0	9.0	24.0	2.1
55-59	4.8	10.7	11.1	12.7	0.0
60-64	4.1	5.3	6.7	5.3	0.0
65-69	3.2	3.0	6.7	0.9	0.0
70-74	2.3	3.8	9.2	0.5	0.0
75+	3.0	5.7	14.3	0.3	0.0
Median Age	26.8	48.2	53.9	48.3	23.4

Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. General Population Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-B1. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972) p. 1-263.

for this age distribution, that the fertility of the third generation, now concentrated in the early childbearing years, is dramatically low, seems unlikely.

Sex ratios based on these age distributions are presented in Table 1.4. The age distribution of sex ratios for all mother tongue Ukrainian Americans is quite similar to the analogous distribution for the whole United States, when we allow for minor differences probably related to the sampling process previously mentioned. Nonetheless, we should note the substantial difference between the sex ratios of foreign-born Ukrainians, aged 50 to 59, and the analogous sex ratios for the whole United States. While the United States ratios are close to .9, indicating 9 males for every 10 females, the foreign born Ukrainian ratios exceed 1.3, indicating 13 males for every 10 females. This high ratio probably indicates that Ukrainian males were more likely to have joined the second wave of immigration than Ukrainian females. This

Table 1.3. Age Distribution of Females, in percent, 1970.

Age Group	United States Average	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
		All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
0-4	8.1	1.1	0.3	1.5	2.1
5-9	9.4	2.1	0.6	2.7	4.7
10-14	9.8	3.6	0.6	4.3	12.0
15-19	9.0	5.1	2.6	5.1	15.4
20-24	8.1	5.4	6.6	1.4	24.0
25-29	6.6	3.8	3.8	1.5	17.5
30-34	5.6	3.8	4.7	2.2	9.4
35-39	5.5	5.0	3.7	5.7	6.8
40-44	5.9	8.6	7.6	10.4	3.0
45-49	6.0	15.0	13.7	17.9	2.1
50-54	5.5	16.8	6.3	26.8	1.7
55-59	5.0	9.6	7.6	12.6	0.4
60-64	4.4	4.9	5.8	5.1	0.0
65-69	3.7	3.6	6.9	1.8	0.9
70-74	3.0	5.3	13.1	0.6	0.0
75+	4.5	6.3	16.1	0.4	0.0
Median Age	29.3	48.8	54.7	49.2	23.3

Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. General Population Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-B1. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972) p.1-263.

Table 1.4. Sex Ratios by Age, Male-to-Female, 1970.

Age Group	United States Average	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
		All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
0-4	1.04 ^b	1.14	a	a	a
5-9	1.04	1.00	a	1.03	a
10-14	1.04	1.11	a	1.19	a
15-19	1.02	.92	a	.90	1.14
20-24	.94	1.06	1.18	a	1.00
25-29	.97	1.04	.97	a	1.17
30-34	.96	.82	a	1.03	a
35-39	.95	.78	a	.88	a
40-44	.94	.96	1.00	.92	a
45-49	.93	.92	.90	.93	a
50-54	.93	.88	1.32	.80	a
55-59	.92	1.04	1.35	.91	a
60-64	.88	.98	1.07	.91	a
65-69	.81	.77	.90	a	a
70-74	.74	.66	.65	a	a
75+	.64	.81	.81	a	a

^aLess than 25 males or less than 25 females.

^bExample: 8,745,499 males/8,408,838 females = 1.04.

Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. General Population Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-B1. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972) p. 1-263.

in turn may reflect the fact that some Ukrainians in the second wave came from military units, predominantly male, interned by the Allies.

Socioeconomic Characteristics

Socioeconomic characteristics of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans are listed in Tables 1.5 through 1.7. Overall, mother tongue Ukrainian Americans are of approximately equal status to Americans as a whole, even after controlling for age and sex. Among mother tongue Ukrainian Americans, the highest status is enjoyed by the third and higher generations, whether in terms of education, occupation, or income. The first generation has the lowest status, according to all three indicators. It is especially interesting to note that the second generation of the first wave of immigration (excluding the second generation of the second wave on the basis of age) has a higher socioeconomic status than the first generation of the second wave of immigration according to all three indicators. Thus, although first wave im-

Table 1.5. Percentage of the Population with More than Eight Years of Education, by Age and Sex, 1970.

Sex and Age Group	Total United States	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
		All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
Males					
25-34	89	97	93	96	100
35-44	80	82	59	93	a
45-64	67	67	47	76	a
65+	39	22	22	a	a
Females					
25-34	90	99	96	100	100
35-44	85	86	63	96	a
45-64	71	64	43	72	a
65+	45	14	13	24	a

^aNumber of cases less than 25.
Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population 1970. Detailed Characteristics. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) p. 1-627.

Table 1.6. Percentage of Employed Persons, 16 Years Old and Over, in White Collar Occupations, by Sex, 1970.

Sex	Total United States	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
		All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
Male	40	35	27	37	49
Female	62	53	38	58	75

Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population 1970. Detailed Characteristics. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) pp. 1-725-1-731.

Table 1.7. Percentage of Families with Head Over Age 25 Whose Family Income Equals or Exceeds \$8000 per Year, 1970.

United States Average	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
	All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
59	64	54	72	77

Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) p. 1-873.

migrants had humbler beginnings than their second wave counterparts, their children were able to achieve enough upward mobility to exceed the status of second wave immigrants.

Mortality

Unfortunately, mortality figures are not generally kept on the basis of ethnicity. Nonetheless, borrowing from Kitagawa and Hauser’s (1973) work relating socioeconomic status and health, it is possible to estimate, very roughly, the mortality of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans relative to all Americans on the basis of socioeconomic status. Kitagawa and Hauser published mortality ratios for the United States population in 1960 by socioeconomic status. These ratios, which were controlled for the effects of sex and race, and broadly controlled for the effect of age, were computed by dividing the mortality rate of a particular socioeconomic subgroup by the mortality rate of all persons regardless of socioeconomic status.

If we assume that the 1960 United States mortality ratios by socioeconomic status, sex, race, and age are roughly applicable to the mother tongue Ukrainian-American population in 1970, we can use them to compute summary mortality ratios for that population and generation subgroups, thus:

$$MR^g = \frac{\sum_i mr_i \times P_i^g}{\sum_i P_i^g}.$$

where

- g = population or generation subgroups,
- i = socioeconomic, sex, race, and age category,
- mr_i = mortality ratio for category i from Kitagawa and Hauser,

p_i^s = the number of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans
in population (or subgroup) g, category i,
 MR^s = summary mortality ratio for population (or subgroup g).

For comparison, the summary ratio for the entire white United States population is 1.0. A ratio higher than 1.0 indicates mortality higher than that of the white United States population; a ratio lower than 1.0 indicates mortality lower than that of the white United States population. Mortality ratios for mother tongue Ukrainian Americans are listed in Table 1.8.

Overall, the mortality ratios of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans are quite close to 1.0. The first generation, which is lower in socioeconomic status than the second generation, has higher estimated mortality. Nonetheless, the highest mortality ratio for mother tongue Ukrainian Americans, that of the first generation females, is only 1.02.

These ratios are only very rough indicators of mortality. However, because of the relatively good socioeconomic standing of the mother tongue Ukrainian-American population, it is reasonable to conclude that its level of mortality is not substantially different, overall, than that of the white United States population as a whole.

Nuptiality

Mother tongue Ukrainian Americans as a group do not marry as quickly as all Americans, as demonstrated by the figures in Table 1.9, which are controlled for sex. Unfortunately, because of the small numbers in this table,

Table 1.8. Estimated Mortality Ratios of Persons 25 Years Old and Over, by Sex, 1970.

Sex	United States	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
		All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
Male	1.00	.97	1.00	.95	a
Female	1.00	.98	1.02	.95	a

^aInsufficient cases 25 years old and over.
Note: United States mortality ratios for white population, only. Ukrainian mortality ratios calculated on the basis of educational level.
Source: (of basic mortality ratios) Kitagawa, Evelyn M. and Hauser, Philip M. *Differential Mortality in the United States: A Study in Socioeconomic Epidemiology*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973)

Table 1.9. Persons Never Married, by Age and Sex, 1970.

		Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
Age Group	Total United States	All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
Males					
15-19	96	98	a	97	98
20-24	56	68	75	a	57
25-29	20	29	33	a	17
30-34	11	11	a	10	12
35-39	8	12	a	13	a
40-44	8	11	12	11	a
45-49	7	9	7	9	a
50-54	6	6	6	7	a
Females					
15-19	88	94	92	93	97
20-24	36	39	31	a	45
25-29	12	20	24	a	17
30-34	7	5	4	7	a
35-39	6	8	8	7	a
40-44	5	7	4	9	a
45-49	5	8	2	12	a
50-54	6	9	5	9	a

^aNumber of cases less than 25.
Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. Marital Status*. Final Report PC(2)-4C. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972) pp. 1-5.

the nuptiality picture by generation is blurred. Nevertheless, it appears that late marriage is especially characteristic of the first generation. This *may* suggest that second and higher generations are more likely to intermarry with non-Ukrainians than is the first generation. A greater willingness to intermarry provides a larger field of prospective spouses, and thus a greater probability of marriage before age 30.

Children Ever Born

Interestingly, even when we control for the effects of nuptiality, mother tongue Ukrainian-American women appear to have had lower fertility than all American women, as the figures in Table 1.10 illustrate. These figures for children ever born are controlled for age, nuptiality, and presence of husband. Again, it is the first generation which deviates most from the over-

Table 1.10. Children Ever Born per 1000 Women, Age 15 and Over, Married and Husband Present, by Age, 1970.

Age Group	United States Average	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
		All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
15-24	991	762	643	a	1000
25-34	2373	1897	1691	1949	2146
35-44	3148	2625	2152	2746	a
45-54	2752	2281	2159	2328	a
55+	2475	2259	2308	2198	a

^aNumber of cases less than 25.
Source: Bureau of the Census. *1970 Census of Population. Subject Reports. Women by Number of Children Ever Born. PC(2)-3A.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973).

all American pattern, although the second generation also deviates substantially from the overall American norm. Even the one figure for the third and higher generations, although closest to the analogous overall American figure, does not meet it. Of course, the overall American pattern reflects the post-World War II baby boom. Even if first generation mother tongue Ukrainian Americans had participated in the baby boom, the disruption of immigration probably would have taken its toll on the number of children ever born. This does not explain the figures for the second and third generations, however, which suggest a real difference in fertility between mother tongue Ukrainian-American women and American women as a whole. This fact, coupled with what little we have seen in regard to mother tongue Ukrainian-American mortality, suggests a lower rate of natural increase for this population than the population of the United States as a whole, as mentioned earlier.

Residence

Ukrainian-American residence patterns on the state level have changed over time. Referring to Table 1.11 we see that the first wave of immigrants settled heavily in Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey, with especially intense settlement in Pennsylvania. Their children, the second generation over age 25, although largely retaining the old settlement pattern, reduced the concentration of their residences, notably with regard to Pennsylvania. Thus, while 42 percent of the Ukrainian immigrants who came to the United States between 1899 and 1930 settled in the state, only 24 percent of the second generation remained. The third generation continued this tendency

Table 1.11. Residence of Mother Tongue Ukrainians in the United States, 1970, by Generation Group, and Residence of Ukrainian Immigrants to the United States, 1899–1930, at Time of Arrival, Percentage by State.

Mother Tongue Ukrainians 1970						
State	Immigrants 1899–1930	Native Born, Foreign Parentage Over Age 25	Native Born, Foreign Parentage Under Age 25	Native Born, Native Parentage	Foreign Born	All 1970
Pennsylvania	42	24	13	26	16	20
New York	23	20	21	19	20	24
New Jersey	11	16	10	11	9	13
Ohio	4	8	11	7	7	8
Illinois	4	5	15	3	11	8
Michigan	2	6	5	7	8	7
California	0	4	4	3	7	4
Other	14	17	21	24	22	19
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Halich, Wasył. *Ukrainians in the United States*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1937) pp. 150–153.

of geographical dispersion, as the percent living in states labelled “other” demonstrates. This percentage increased from 17 for the second generation (children of the first wave) to 25 for the third generation.

The second wave settled in a pattern reminiscent of the first wave, with decidedly less concentration in Pennsylvania. The children of second wave immigrants, the second generation less than 25 years of age (who for the most part probably still live with their parents), have a similar residence pattern.

Changes in residence pattern on the state level may reflect several things. Over the span of seventy years the geographical distribution of job opportunities no doubt has changed. Furthermore, in achieving upward socio-economic mobility, younger generation Ukrainian Americans have expanded the job opportunities open to them. This may help explain the shift away from Pennsylvania, where many unskilled first wave immigrants found employment in low-paying mining and manufacturing jobs. However, geographical dispersion was probably inevitable from the standpoint of assimilation, as well. The initial, intense concentration of settlement was undoubtedly related to the immigrants’ need to stick together in a strange

environment, while learning a new language and new occupational skills. Their children, who grew up with the new language as well as the old, and received a better education than their parents, had less need to remain in the old settlements, especially when opportunity beckoned elsewhere.

Geographical Mobility

Recent geographical mobility is covered in Tables 1.12 and 1.13. For both males and females, controlling for age, the United States population as a whole is more mobile than the population of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans. The differences per age group are less striking than the number of age groups over which this difference holds.

Looking more closely at the Ukrainian Americans, which is made somewhat difficult by small numbers, it is evident that the foreign-born are con-

Table 1.12. Percentage of Males Who Have Changed Residence within Five Years, by Age, 1970.

Age Group	Total United States	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
		All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
5-9	56	28	a	30	a
10-14	44	27	a	26	a
15-19	43	22	a	24	19
20-24	73	60	53	a	68
25-29	81	77	81	a	81
30-34	68	63	a	73	a
35-39	54	45	a	42	a
40-44	43	29	40	23	a
45-49	36	22	25	21	a
50-54	31	25	31	22	a
55-59	28	20	28	15	a
60-64	27	20	26	14	a
65-69	28	30	29	a	a
70-74	26	21	22	a	a
75-79	25	13	13	a	a
80-84	27	24	24	a	a
85+	33	a	a	a	a

^aNumber of cases less than 25.
Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) p. 1-601.

Table 1.13. Percentage of Females Who Have Changed Residence within Five Years, by Age, 1970.

Age Group	Total United States	Mother Tongue Ukrainians			
		All	Foreign Born	Native Born, Foreign Parentage	Native Born, Native Parentage
5-9	56	32	a	33	a
10-14	44	22	a	28	11
15-19	46	37	50	33	34
20-24	78	74	68	a	81
25-29	76	67	78	a	55
30-34	60	64	77	60	a
35-39	47	36	47	31	a
40-44	38	26	32	25	a
45-49	33	23	34	16	a
50-54	30	21	19	20	a
55-59	28	24	26	23	a
60-64	28	21	37	9	a
65-69	28	24	24	a	a
70-74	27	16	17	a	a
75-79	28	18	29	a	a
80-84	32	37	38	a	a
85+	37	a	a	a	a

^aNumber of cases less than 25.
Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. General Population Characteristics. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) p. 1-601.

siderably more mobile than the second generation. The first generation adheres more closely to the overall American mobility rates, but even in this case does not generally exceed them.

We may speculate that the population mother tongue Ukrainian Americans is generally more stable than the population of the United States as a whole, but that the process of settling into the new environment has elevated the geographical mobility of those who have immigrated in the recent past.

Summary

In sum, mother tongue Ukrainian Americans in 1970 are not very unlike their fellow Americans, although they display some distinctive demographic characteristics. The population with Ukrainian mother tongue tends to be older than the whole United States population, as a result of the timing of

immigration and the effect of language assimilation over time. Age-specific sex ratios of the population with Ukrainian mother tongue resemble those of the whole United States population except in a few age groups where Ukrainian males, because of a greater propensity than females to immigrate in the second wave, predominate. The socioeconomic status of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans is generally equivalent to that of all Americans taken together. In general, mother tongue Ukrainian Americans who have been in this country longer have achieved higher status. Because of a general lack of mortality data by ethnic groups, the mortality level of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans has been estimated on the basis of their socioeconomic status. Not surprisingly, therefore, their mortality level does not differ substantially from that of the whole United States population. Mother tongue Ukrainian Americans marry later than their fellow Americans, and even when this characteristic is controlled, have lower fertility. The residence pattern of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans varies by generation. The immigrants who first came to the United States were highly concentrated on the state level. Their descendants and followers of the second wave settled in a more dispersed pattern, probably as a result of changing job opportunities and socioeconomic status. Finally, mother tongue Ukrainian Americans appear more geographically sedentary than their fellow Americans. Even the newest arrivals, who may still be settling into the new environment and thus have greater geographical mobility than other Ukrainian Americans, appear more sedentary than their fellow Americans.

Unfortunately, census data did not allow a truly representative look at the Ukrainian-American community. Let us hope that future enumeration efforts pay greater attention to the differentiation of the ethnic groups.

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CHAPTER TWO

The Ukrainians Among Us

Volodimir N. Bandera

Identity and Worldwide Settlements

As a small and geographically dispersed ethnic community in the United States, Ukrainians are not well understood. According to the "mother-tongue" criterion in the 1970 census, they ranked twenty-first nationally, though seventh in Pennsylvania, eighth in New Jersey and ninth in New York. In the past, the nationality of these immigrants was often misrepresented because they came from regions under changing administrations of Austria, Hungary, the Russian Empire, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and only briefly, independent Ukraine itself. While in North America, their religious organizations, whether Eastern-rite Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant, experienced changes in their corporate designations and in the allegiance of the members. Moreover, as a result of the national upheaval at the turn of the century and the quest for independence since World War I, the mainstream of these Slavic people modified their name from Ruthenian (also Rusyn and Rusnak in their native tongue) to Ukrainian. Their worldwide dispersion due to past migrations is reflected in Table 2.1.

For the United States, the estimate of 730,056 is from the 1980 census, as measured by the question: what is the person's *ancestry*? (Department of Commerce, 1983). Ukrainian sources sometimes use an even broader definition of "Americans of Ukrainian descent" that encompasses some 1.25 million people; such a high figure is corroborated also by estimates of arriving immigrants and their descendants (see Fulton's article in this book). Not counted in the various estimates are the many Jews, Poles, Russians, and Germans who trace their ancestry to Ukraine but usually do not identify themselves with the Ukrainian nation.

Political realities in our century have impeded a normal interaction between the free Ukrainians abroad and their subjugated brethren in the homeland. But it is noteworthy that this ethnic minority in the United States, Canada, and the rest of the Western world has strived to preserve its heritage, to help the relatives left behind, and to support the struggle for national religious rights of Ukrainians in their land.

Table 2.1. Ukrainians in Various Countries of the World, around 1979.

Ukraine (excludes other nationalities)	36,449,000
USSR (Ukrainians outside UkrSSR)	5,898,000
North America	
Canada	581,000
United States	730,056
European countries	
Austria	5,000
Czechoslovakia	110,000
France	25,000
Germany	20,000
Poland	300,000
Romania	70,000
United Kingdom	15,000
Yugoslavia	51,000
Other	10,000
South America	
Argentina	220,000
Brazil	93,000
Paraguay	10,000
Uruguay	8,000
Australia	34,000
Total Ukrainian Population	44,629,056

Source: Data for Ukrainians in the USSR are for the census date January 17, 1979; see Tsentralne Statystychne Upravlinnia, URSR. *Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR v 1981 rotsi* (Kiev, 1982). Data for other Ukrainian settlements were estimated for the 1970s as detailed in Athanas Milanych, et al., *Ukrainski poselennia: dovidnyk* (New York, 1980). The Canadian statistic is for 1971. The figure for the U.S. is derived from the ancestry data in the 1980 census.

The standardized and impersonal details of the census, which are so painstakingly interpreted in the present study, need to be placed in their proper sociocultural context. Hence the purpose of this essay is to enhance the perception of Ukrainians as individuals, as small communities, and as an ethnic entity. This will be done by first reviewing their history, and then surveying their social structure in the 1970s. Many challenges have tested the commitment of Ukrainians to their cultural heritage and the struggle for national rights. The accomplishments of Ukrainians in their adopted homeland provide a lesson on how a tiny ethnic minority overcomes the pressures of the melting pot. Thus the fascinating questions that this essay addresses are why and how such an ethnic entity develops, how its structure in the new homeland relates to the land of origin, and how it manages to propagate certain human and social values that doubtlessly enrich our urban society.

One Century of Growth and Adaptation in the United States

Ukrainians today are proud that individuals with Ukrainian names left a mark in early American history. During the Civil War, General Basil Turchyn distinguished himself on the Union side. Another early settler was a romantic escapee from Tsarist persecution, an Orthodox priest from Kiev, Agapius Honcharenko, who arrived in America in 1865 and soon became a champion of the rights for Alaskan natives by publishing a periodical the *Alaska Herald*; characteristically, in the inaugural issue of his newspaper he included a poem by Ukraine's beloved bard Taras Shevchenko.

However, in order to understand the formation of the Ukrainian ethnic entity in the United States, we need to trace the fate of the subsequent thousands of immigrants and their accomplishments. There were three waves of substantial Ukrainian immigration to the United States, each differing in size, regional origin, and the reason for leaving the homeland.

During the so-called pioneer period, 1876–1914, about half a million immigrants arrived from the Transcarpathian district that was largely under Hungarian domination, and from Galicia, and Bukovina that were under Austrian administration. Driven out by the poverty in overpopulated agricultural lands, these immigrants were often recruited for the mines in the Pennsylvania anthracite coal region, and they sometimes started in menial jobs in such cities as New York, Newark, Philadelphia, and Cleveland. Although small Protestant groups from Eastern Ukraine established agricultural settlements in Virginia and North Dakota, they did not survive as ethnic entities.

Responding to immigrant petitions, the Catholic priest Ivan Voliansky was sent to Pennsylvania in 1884, and soon established parishes in Shenandoah and several neighboring towns. He and other religious leaders laid a foundation for a network of Byzantine Rite Catholic churches, along with educational, fraternal, cooperative, and publishing institutions to serve the special needs of the community.

In 1913, the Pope approved the establishment of a Ukrainian eparchy in the U.S. consisting of 106 Eastern-rite parishes; the following year, Monsignor Soter Ortynsky was appointed the first Ukrainian bishop. However, the early refusal of Roman Catholic bishops to acknowledge the autonomy of the Ruthenian/Ukrainian parishes, as well as disagreement among parishioners from diverse regions, promoted discords in the communities. Consequently, in 1924 Rome created another eparchy under Bishop Basil Takach for the Ruthenians from Transcarpathia. Moreover, some Uniate Catholic parishes became Orthodox.

In addition to the establishment of religious institutions, an important achievement of the early years was the formation of fraternal associations. These associations provided basic life insurance for the otherwise uninsur-

able immigrant laborers, and the accumulated dues also allowed the publication of periodicals and books, the support of reading rooms, and the promotion of intercommunity projects. Under the guidance of the priests and later of other educated leaders, these communities not only were influenced by, but also contributed to the rebirth of national consciousness in the quest for national rights in Ukraine. Although Ukrainians struggling for independence during World War I eventually suffered defeat, their brethren in the United States and Canada continued to preserve their religious heritage and to affirm a distinct ethnocultural identity.

The second phase of immigration and community development corresponds to the interwar years. During this period, new arrivals declined to about 40,000 because the immigration policies were less favorable to the Slavs. Community life showed considerable vitality in the observance of religious traditions, community dances and picnics, and cultural activities like lectures, amateur choirs, theater, and folk-dancing. Community life was stimulated by the arrival of several eminent leaders from Ukraine after the unsuccessful war of independence. Among them Dmytro Halychyn became president of the Ukrainian National Association; Vasyl Avramenko founded numerous folk-dance ensembles; Dr. Walter Galan developed The Ukrainian Savings and Loan Association in Philadelphia and, after World War II, headed the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee; and dedicated composers like Alexander Koshets, Mykhailo Hayworonsky, and Antin Rudnytsky propagated liturgical and choral music. Moreover, the presence of such distinguished scholars as Vladimir and Stephen Timoshenko (Stanford University), George Vernadsky (Yale), George Kistiakowsky (Harvard), and Alexander Granovsky (University of Minnesota) helped to establish a positive self-image among Ukrainians.

The sponsorship of the Ukrainian pavilion at the World's Fair in Chicago in 1933 was symbolic of the efforts of the younger generation to assert the Ukrainian presence in America and to represent the national aspirations of Ukrainians under foreign occupations. This sympathy for the homeland also expressed itself in political actions like the demonstrations against the Moscow-imposed famine in Ukraine in 1933. Furthermore, in order to enlighten the American people, the fraternal associations began to sponsor informative books in English, such as those by Professor Clarence A. Manning and William H. Chamberlin.

After World War II, Ukrainian Americans united their efforts to help the many thousands of forced laborers and refugees who refused to return to their homeland under Moscow's communist rule. The third wave of Ukrainian immigrants was admitted to the U.S. during 1949–1954 and numbered about 100,000 "Displaced Persons." Among them were many civic leaders, artists, and professionals. They stimulated the existing organizations and

formed new ones like the Ukrainian Engineers Association, several youth organizations, and sports clubs. A fair degree of coordination has been provided by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), which was formed in 1940 as an anti-Nazi and anti-Communist representative body. Under the long leadership of Professor George Dobriansky (who became the U.S. ambassador to the Bahamas in 1983), the UCCA has been promoting political actions such as the passage of Captive Nations Resolutions in Congress and the periodic proclamations of Ukrainian Independence Day in many states and cities. Symbolic of the drive for recognition and identity was the erection of a monument to Taras Shevchenko in Washington, D.C. in 1964. President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the festive crowd of over 100,000 and praised their love of freedom and the dream that the American "just and righteous order" will be attained one day in Ukraine.

During the past several decades when new emigration from Ukraine virtually ceased, Ukrainians in the diaspora found it increasingly difficult to retain their language, cultural traits, and spiritual ties with their land of origin. However, new workable forms of association, civic activity, and cultural expression are being introduced. For instance, modernized cultural and educational centers have been formed in such cities as Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, New York, Washington, and even the tiny North Port, Florida. New organizations that adopted modern American methods include Americans Against the Defamation of Ukrainians, Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine, Ukrainian Alumni Association in Detroit, Ukrainian American Bar Association, and the Ukrainian Information Bureau in Washington, D.C. Thus successful participatory institutions are now available to the younger generation that cannot speak Ukrainian. Moreover, there is by now a significant and growing stock of expertise and publications about Ukrainians as a subjugated nation and about their accomplishments in North America. Most notably the community spearheaded the establishment of the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University along with the appointment at the University of Prof. Omeljan Pritsak to the endowed Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi chair of Ukrainian history, and of Prof. George Grabowicz to the Chair of Ukrainian literature. Such achievements serve as beacons of orientation in Ukrainian affairs for Americans in general and for ethnic Ukrainians in particular.

In short, not only past achievements, but also ongoing developments suggest that the small ethnic entity of Ukrainians has a capacity to maintain the values and activities that enrich the fabric of American culture and society.

Church Institutions and Religious Affiliations in the 1970s

The fundamental unit of the church system is the parish, which typically owns its own church, a community hall, a priest's house, and, sometimes,

Table 2.2. Church Membership and Religious Affiliations of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in the U.S., mid-1970s.

Ukrainian Catholic Church (Archeparchy of Philadelphia)	285,000
Byzantine Rite Catholic Metropolitan Archdiocese (Pittsburgh)	263,000
Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA (South Bound Brook NJ)	90,000
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America, Ecumenical Patriarchate	30,000
Ukrainian Autocephalic Church in Exile	4,800
American Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church (Johnstown PA)	108,000
Ukrainian Baptist Communities and dispersed Protestants	50,000
Ukrainians dispersed in Roman Catholic parishes	100,000
Ukrainians and Ruthenians in other Orthodox churches	200,000

Source: Based on estimates as elaborated in V. N. Bandera, "Ukraiutsi v ZShA," in Athanas Milanych, et al., *Ukrainski poseleennia: dovidnyk*. (New York, 1980).

the facilities for all-day or Sunday school. Furthermore, the separate denominations indicated in Table 2.2 support their coordinating institutions, publishing facilities, seminars, and cemeteries.

The Ukrainian Catholic church consists of 199 parishes that are grouped into the eparchies of Philadelphia, Stamford and Chicago, each under its own bishop. The Archeparchy is headed by His Excellence Archbishop-Metropolitan Stephen Sulyk, who resides at the chancery in Philadelphia. The Archeparchy sustains St. Basil's High School and College, St. Joseph's Seminary which is affiliated with Catholic University in Washington, D.C., and Manor Junior College for women which is administered by the Basilian Sisters. The church sponsors an apartment complex for the elderly and an orphanage in Philadelphia, as well as several nursing homes. Ukrainian bishops in the United States and in other Western countries form a council and gather in periodic synods under Cardinal Liubachivsky who succeeded His Beatitude the late Cardinal Slipyi.

The Ruthenian Greek Catholic church is headed by Archbishop-Metropolitan Stephen Kocisko and consists of three eparchies. Formed by Rome as an autonomous entity in 1928, this church united primarily the immigrants from the Transcarpathian region. Today it also includes several predominantly Byzantine-rite Croatian and Hungarian parishes. The Archeparchy sustains a Catholic Byzantine Seminary of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Munhall, Pennsylvania. Without the infusion of newcomers and substantive interaction with their homeland in recent decades, the Ruthenian church communities today use the English language but practice the inherited Eastern church rites.

The Ukrainian Orthodox church consists of 92 parishes. It is headed by

His Eminence Metropolitan Mstyslav who resides at the Chancery and Cultural Center in South Bound Brook, New Jersey. This community is served by three bishops, ninety-nine priests, and nine deacons. New priests are being educated at the St. Sophia Seminary which is affiliated with Rutgers University. The Ukrainian Orthodox church sponsors Saturday schools, coordinates the work of lay societies, and publishes religious and historical materials. It should be noted that Metropolitan Mstyslav is also the head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church with branches in Western Europe, North America, Australia, and Latin America.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America was founded in 1928 by separating from the Catholics and now consists of 23 parishes.

The Ukrainian Evangelical Alliance is headed by Pastor Oleksa Harbuziuk. The Association typically consists of tightly knit small Baptist communities with a strong religious orientation. They have shown concern for their persecuted brethren in Soviet Ukraine.

At present, there is considerable good will and some interaction among the hierarchies of various Ukrainian demoninations.

Civic Institutions

In larger cities where there are several Ukrainian parishes and civic organizations, community life is usually coordinated by the local branch of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) or by a specially formed umbrella organization. At the national level, Ukrainians are being represented by the Executive Committee of the UCCA, which is elected at the convention of delegates every four years. Moreover, the task of representation is also performed by church hierarchs and the presidents of fraternal associations. In addition, major organizations of women, youth, and professionals elect their national officers who sometimes play the role of community leaders and spokesmen. Many national associations are further affiliated with their counterparts in Canada and other countries; for instance, the Ukrainian Women's League of America and corresponding societies in Western countries (Ukraine itself is excepted) form the World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations with headquarters in Philadelphia. Furthermore, through their representatives, Ukrainians in the United States participate in a world-wide association, The World Congress of Free Ukrianians, presently headquartered in Toronto.

Among the largest organizations are the fraternal associations: The Ukrainian National Association (87,300 members in 1978), The Ukrainian Fraternal Association (until recently called The Ukrainian Workingmen Association, 24,200 in 1978), Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics (19,000 in 1978), and Ukrainian National Aid (8,000 in 1970). These fraternal asso-

ciations not only offer basic life insurance, but also engage in publishing and sponsor cultural and recreational activities. There are also four Savings and Loan Associations and 28 Credit Unions with combined assets of over \$250 million.

Among the women's associations, most prominent are the Ukrainian National Women's League (3,700 members in 83 branches), the Women's Auxiliary of the Organization for the Defense of Four Freedoms of Ukraine, and United Ukrainian Orthodox Sisterhoods.

In many communities there are chapters of the following youth organizations: Plast (Ukrainian Scouts), Ukrainian Youth Association of America (SUMA), Organization of Democratic Ukrainian Youth (ODUM), League of Ukrainian Catholics, and Ukrainian Orthodox League. The local chapters pursue systematic training programs, and the national officers sponsor summer camps and similar projects. There are about twenty active University clubs and student societies: the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations of America (SUSTA) has to its credit the initiation of the very successful campaign for the establishment of Ukrainian studies at Harvard University.

Among the several politically oriented organizations with many local branches and summer resort facilities, there is the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODVU), and the Organization for the Defense of Four Freedoms of Ukraine (OOChSU). In the larger communities one may find both Republican and Democratic clubs, which promote voter involvement during elections. There are also professional societies that unite Ukrainian engineers, doctors, university professors, bibliographers, journalists, businessmen, philatelists, and teachers; most of them publish specialized journals or newsletters.

As can be seen, there is a great variety of civic and cultural organizations available to Ukrainians, who may belong to such organizations in or outside their own locality.

Education and Schools

Outside the tightly knit families, various forms of schooling play an important role in introducing the youngsters to the customs, history, language and culture of the Ukrainians. We can distinguish three types of schools. First of all, the set of Ukrainian Catholic schools in 1970 consisted of fifty-four parochial grade schools, six high schools, and two colleges, thus embracing about 16,000 students. Although the Ukrainian content in these schools varies widely, they try to offer a synthesis of general, religious, and ethnic education. A second set of schools consists of Saturday programs that place a stress on Ukrainian subjects and sometimes religion; in 1970 there were

over 50 such schools with approximately 3,700 students and 206 instructors. The third set includes the Sunday schools which concentrate on religious instruction and sometimes offer an introduction to Ukrainian language, singing, and history. About 80 percent of Ukrainian Orthodox parishes provide some form of schooling, and Baptist communities offer religious instruction and group singing.

In several cities it is now possible to receive high school and college credit on the basis of qualifying exams in the Ukrainian language. Although the public school system in Philadelphia has sometimes offered Ukrainian classes, such public encouragement of bilingual education is exceptional. However, Ukrainian language, literature, and history courses are now offered at some 20 colleges. Moreover, Harvard University not only offers regular programs in Ukrainian studies, but also enrolls 50 to 100 students in Ukrainian courses during the summer session.

Our survey of educational institutions would be incomplete without mentioning the role of several scholarly societies. Thus, both the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences maintain their libraries and offices in New York City, and their members have a special interest in Ukrainian and other Slavic studies. The Ukrainian Historical Association publishes the journal *Ukrainskyi Istoryk* (Ukrainian Historian) which includes materials on ethnic history. Initiated by Professor Alexander Granovsky, the Ukrainian American Collection at the Immigration History Research Center of the University of Minnesota contains valuable archival and published materials. Substantial Ukrainian holdings can also be found at Harvard, Columbia University, the University of Illinois, and the Hoover Institution. *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, a journal published by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, presents new scholarship on Ukrainian subjects.

Among the eminent American Slavists and Sovietologists are such scholars of Ukrainian background as: Yaroslav Bilinsky (University of Delaware), Basil Dmytryshyn (Portland State University), George Grabowicz (Harvard), Taras Hunczak (Rutgers University), Edward Kasinec (New York Public Library), Iwan Koropecykj (Temple University), John Reshetar (University of Washington), Ihor Ševčenko (Harvard), George Shevelov (Columbia University), Frank Sysyn (Harvard), Roman Szporluk (University of Michigan), and Lubomyr Wynar (Kent State University).

Press, Communications, and Publications

A variety of periodicals and radio programs have proved themselves essential in the development and maintenance of the Ukrainian ethnic community. Among the dailies, *Svoboda* and *Ameryka* have the widest distri-

bution; both of them offer English-language weeklies. The Ukrainian Fraternal Association sponsors Ukrainian and English editions of *Narodna Volya* and a richly illustrated monthly *Forum*. There are also specialized periodicals for children, religious groups, and major associations. The *Ukrainian Quarterly*, sponsored by the Ukrainian Congress Committee and edited by W. Dushnyk, contains valuable articles and commentaries on East European and Ukrainian subjects. The recently started monthly *Smoloskyp* is published in English in Washington and is devoted entirely to the struggle for human rights in Soviet Ukraine.

Radio has also been used extensively to provide both the entertainment and the essential information about community events. One can find Ukrainian radio hours in many cities. For instance, there are six such radio programs in Philadelphia alone. We might add that the Voice of America transmits in Ukrainian four hours each day and includes commentaries about Ukrainian life in the United States.

Folk and Fine Arts

Americans might encounter Ukrainian folk dancing, singing, embroidery, ceramics, and cuisine at public shows, TV programs, and in the press. Annual Ukrainian folk festivals can be enjoyed in Philadelphia (August and September) New York City (May), Pittsburgh (September), Los Angeles, Garden State Fair Grounds in New Jersey (June), Glen Spey, NY (July) and at other locations. Such festive occasions typically include performances by dance groups and vocal ensembles accompanied by the Ukrainian national instrument, the bandura, displays of folk artifacts, and serving of ethnic food like *varenyky* and *holubtsi*. Among the reputable performing ensembles we should include the Ukrainian Bandurist Chorus of Detroit, the Voloshky Dancers and Prometheus Choir of Philadelphia, and the Dumka Choir of New York.

Permanent museum exhibits include the Ukrainian Museum in New York City, the Ukrainian Folk Art Museum at Manor College in Philadelphia, the Ukrainian Gallery of Modern Art in Chicago, the Ukrainian Museum in Cleveland, and the Byzantine Metropolitan Museum in Munhall, Pennsylvania. In addition to collections pertaining to ethnic history, these museums display the typical forms of folk art like embroidery, pottery, woodcarving, and the magnificent and widely appreciated Easter eggs called *pysanky*.

Besides *pysanky*, another jewel of Ukrainian folk art that has been incorporated into American tradition is the delightful "Carol of the Bells" as arranged by Mykola Leontovych, which is widely performed during the Christmas season.

Ukrainians also promote the fine arts in their communities. They often

sponsor exhibits of paintings, arrange commemorative concerts, and present movies and live theater. Among the established painters and graphic artists are the late Jacques Hnizdovsky, Petro Mehyk, Mykhailo Moroz, Edward Kozak, Myroslava Lasowsky, and Andrij Maday. Many Ukrainian churches contain icons and paintings by accomplished artists like Petro Kholodny, Sviatoslav Hordynsky, Mykola Andrusiw, and Marko Zubar. In addition to the originator of cubism Alexander Archipenko (1887–1964), Ukrainian sculptors include George Bobritzky, Mykola Holodyk, and Alexander Hurenko. Ukrainian motifs and style have been assiduously cultivated by master of ceramics Yaroslava Gerulak, enamelist K. Szonk-Rusych, and sculptor-woodcarver Mykhailo Chereshniovsky.

The community takes special pride when American stars in the performing arts acknowledge their Ukrainian roots. Among them, we find John Hodiak, Mike Mazurki, Anna Sten, and Jack Palance in cinema; Andrij Dobriansky, Paul Plishka, and Martha Kokolska in opera; William Shust and Edward Evanko in theater and television; and Thomas Hrynkiw, Julianna Osinchuk, and Lydia Artymiw in instrumental music. An eminent cinematographer who has used Ukrainian themes is Slavko Nowytski, while Yaroslav Kulynych has tirelessly chronicled on film the Ukrainian community life in the diaspora.

Of great importance to Ukrainians is literature. The Ukrainian Writers Association Slovo includes members from several countries and is headed by Ostap Tarnawsky. Among its prominent members in the United States, we should mention Teodosii Osmachka (1895–1962), Evhen Malaniuk (1897–1968), and Bohdan Krawciw (1904–1975), Wasyl Barka, and Roman Zavadovych. The younger poets who came to the fore in the United States include Bohdan Boychuk, Bohdan Rubchak, Marta Tarnawska, and George Tarnawsky who writes largely in English. In her widely read books for children, Marie Halun-Bloch has used Ukrainian themes. Another renowned painter and author Yaroslava Surmach-Mills has illustrated a number of translated Ukrainian fairy tales.

Concluding Reflections

During one century in their adopted homeland in North America, Ukrainians have earned a reputation as hard-working, upright citizens. They tend to form tightly knit families and exert considerable effort to maintain their ethnic identity and institutions.

Overcoming the disadvantages shared by all Slavic immigrants, the Ukrainians have been readily accepted by Americans as desirable friends and neighbors. Many have attained personal success as professionals, scholars, businessmen, sportsmen, and public officials. The success of individ-

uals is important because it serves as a model for emulation and a proof that ethnic minority status does not stifle but often encourages the talented and the industrious. The community also appreciates when prominent Americans acknowledge their Ukrainian roots, show respect for the accomplishments, and support the efforts of this self-reliant minority.

However, the development and maintenance of community goals and institutions has proved to be no easy task for Ukrainians. To a considerable extent they have been motivated to preserve their religious and cultural heritage because of a sense of respect and obligation towards their deprived and oppressed brethren in Ukraine. But ethnic loyalty and support of community goals tend to diminish with each generation. Moreover, the mainstream of American society generally treats small ethnic groups with condescension or benign neglect. Hence, one can only admire the persistent development and adaptation of ethnic institutions toward forms of activity in accord with the needs and capabilities of new generations. Past experience suggests that the Ukrainian heritage in America will continue to be preserved and cultivated for the foreseeable future.

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Population Distribution and Internal Migration

Oleh Wolowyna and Mary Anne Salmon

A COUNTRY'S POPULATION distribution can be viewed in two ways—spatially (by location of settlements) and by size of settlement; in other words, distribution by regions or states, and by urban-rural or metropolitan-non-metropolitan areas. Ukrainians, like other immigrant groups, originally settled only in certain areas of the United States, mainly in selected north-eastern and north central states. Similar circumstances also determined to a great extent their degree of urbanization or, more specifically, settlement in cities with job opportunities. Both the size of place of residence and spatial distributions are likely to reflect the assimilation process of the ethnic group. It is expected that with time, immigrants and their descendants are likely not to emphasize proximity to a large ethnic community as an important factor determining choice of place of residence, and give more weight to quality of life and job opportunities.

This chapter is divided into two parts: population distribution and internal migration. We analyze distribution of Ukrainian Americans in terms of regions, states, and size of place (urban-rural, metropolitan-nonmetropolitan, and central city-noncentral city). There is further analysis by generation. Internal migration is discussed in terms of two measures; lifetime migration and recent migration. The former applies only to U.S.-born Ukrainians and is inferred by comparing state of birth with state of current residence; thus, lifetime migration measures interstate migration. Recent migration is defined by comparison with place of residence five years before the census date. We focus on two types of recent mobility; same state and different house (intrastate) and different state (interstate), and investigate the relationship of generation to these moves.

In what follows it is important to keep in mind the special characteristics of the data used. Ukrainians, as well as the other ethnic groups, are defined here by *mother tongue*, the language besides English spoken in the person's childhood home. This definition has the following implications: (1) The sample

is a subgroup of the ethnic group defined by ethnic origin and contains, in all likelihood, the least assimilated members of the group; (2) the third and higher generation (U.S. natives of U.S. native parentage) is severely under-represented; (3) there is an over-representation of older persons and an under-representation of children. The implications of these factors on inferences concerning population distribution and internal migration of Ukrainians in the United States should be kept in mind throughout this chapter.

Population Distribution

REGIONAL AND STATE DISTRIBUTION

Many factors determine the spatial distribution of a population—climate, geography, economy, and historical events; and, more often than not, the distribution over the territory is far from uniform. The population of the United States is a case in point. There is a high concentration of people in the Northeast and the easternmost states of the North Central region, as well as in Florida and California. The rest of the southern and midwestern states are fairly densely populated, but most of the western states have a very low population density.

The spatial distribution of ethnic groups is affected by a number of additional factors, which contribute to an even more uneven population distribution than that of the general population. Initially immigrant groups tended to settle in certain areas of the country, the location of which was determined by historical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors in the country of origin, as well as facilitating and constraining factors in the host country. The great majority of Ukrainians arrived in the United States between 1880 and 1914, while the immigration between the two World Wars was much smaller because of U.S. immigration restrictions imposed in 1921 and 1924. After the Second World War, there was a fairly large influx of displaced refugees. Ukrainians who came before the Second World War were mostly peasants who left their homeland as a result of harsh economic conditions caused by high population growth and shortage of agricultural land. Since hardly any uncultivated agricultural land was left in this country at the turn of the century, Ukrainians in the United States—unlike those who migrated to Canada and became farmers—were forced to take unskilled, low-paying jobs that did not require knowledge of the English language. The availability of such jobs was the main factor that determined the settlement patterns of Ukrainian immigrants in Pennsylvania mining towns, New England mill towns, and Eastern cities with large factories. The post-World War II immigrants gravitated to the major cities with large and well-established Ukrainian communities like New York, Philadelphia, or Chicago.¹

Initial settlement patterns have determined to a great extent the current

distribution of Ukrainians in the United States; with increased adaptation to the conditions of the country, however, a gradual process of dispersion away from the original centers of settlements has been taking place. Thus, over 83 percent of Ukrainians arriving in the United States between 1899 and 1930 reported destinations in the Northeast,² while in 1970 about 60 percent of Ukrainian Americans resided in that region.³ As Table 3.1 shows, the North Central region had the second highest proportion (about one-fourth), while the West and South had 7 and 5 percent, respectively.

The Northeast had the highest share of population for almost all linguistic groups, except for Serbo-Croatians and Czechoslovakians, who were more concentrated in the North Central region. The eight groups can be ordered according to a pattern of decreasing proportions in the Northeast and increasing proportions in the North Central regions; the Yiddish group had the highest proportion in the Northeast and the lowest in the North Central region, while the opposite was true for the Serbo-Croatians. The South and West claimed about one-quarter or less of the populations for the two groups. These differences in patterns of distribution are a function of the immigration history of each group, and a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Table 3.2 shows the distribution of Ukrainians relative to the total U.S. population as the ratio of the proportion of Ukrainians to the proportion of the total population in each region. Compared to the general population, Ukrainians were 2.5 times more likely to reside in the Northeast, while the proportion of Ukrainians in the Central region was similar to that in the total U.S. population. At the same time, Ukrainians were less than half as likely to reside in the West while the ratio of Ukrainians to Americans residing in the South was only 0.17.

An index of dissimilarity can summarize the concentration of a population in a given territory. Figure 3.1 presents indices of dissimilarity for the eight linguistic groups. The index was calculated by comparing the percentage distribution by state of each linguistic group within the respective U.S. distribution. The index can vary from 0 (indicating that the group has the same population distribution by states as the total U.S. population) to a maximum which depends on the number of categories (in our case, states) considered. Thus, the higher the index, the more different the group's distribution from the distribution of the total U.S. population. The value of the index can be interpreted as the percentage of the population of interest which would have to move to another state in order to achieve the same distribution as the comparison group.

The Russian group had the highest concentration, followed closely by Ukrainians and Yiddish; in each of these groups 46 percent or more of the population would have to move to another state in order to achieve the same

Table 3.1. Regional Distribution of the Total U.S. Population and Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups, 1970.

Population	Percentage by Region			Total	
	South	West	Northeast	N. Central	Percent
TOTAL U.S.	30.9	17.1	24.1	27.8	99.9
Yiddish ^a	10.6	10.3	66.5	12.7	100.1
Russian	8.7	19.6	53.8	17.9	100.0
Ukrainian	5.2	7.0	60.4	27.4	100.0
Lithuanian ^b	6.7	8.1	49.5	35.7	100.0
Hungarian	8.4	11.9	44.5	35.1	99.9
Polish	6.4	5.0	47.4	41.2	100.0
Serbo-Croatian	4.8	18.3	27.8	49.1	100.0
Czechoslovakian	12.5	8.2	36.1	43.3	100.1
					203,212,877
					1,593,993
					334,615
					249,359
					292,820
					447,497
					2,437,938
					239,455
					963,178

^aPublished data include only Yiddish Mother Tongue; however, in data from the Public Use Sample Tape, "Yiddish" also includes Hebrew Mother Tongue.

^bPublished data include only Lithuanian Mother Tongue; however, in data from the Public Use Sample Tape, "Lithuanian" also includes Latvian Mother Tongue.

Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population 1970: Detailed Characteristics*, PC(1)D1-PC(1)D52. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972). Table 142 in each volume.

Table 3.3. Population Distribution of Ukrainians by State, 1940 and 1970.

Ranking	1940			1970		
	State	Percent	Cumulative Percent	State	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	Pa.	32.0	32.0	N.Y.	20.9	20.9
2	N.Y.	23.3	55.3	Pa.	19.8	40.7
3	N.J.	9.4	64.7	N.J.	13.3	54.0
4	Mich.	8.9	73.6	Ill.	7.9	61.9
5	Ohio	8.3	81.9	Ohio	7.5	69.4
6	Ill.	4.1	86.0	Mich.	7.3	76.7
7	Conn.	2.9	88.9	Cal. (18) ^b	4.4	81.1
8	Mass.	2.2	91.1	Conn.	3.9	85.0
9	N.D. (18) ^a	1.4	92.5	Minn.	2.0	87.0
10	R.I. (16) ^a	1.3	93.8	Mass.	1.7	88.7
11	Minn.	1.2	95.0	Md.	1.4	90.1
12.5	Md.	0.6	95.6	Fla. (25) ^b	1.3	91.4
12.5	Mo.	0.6	96.2			
All other states		3.8	100.0		8.6	100.0
TOTAL PERCENT		100.0			100.0	
N		83,600			249,351	

^aRanking in 1970.
^bRanking in 1940.
Source: 1940. Bureau of the Census. *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940: Population, Nativity and Parentage of the White Population. Mother Tongue.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943). Table 2, pp. 14-22.
1970. Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics, PC(1)D1-PC(1)D52.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972). Table 142 in each volume.

Table 3.2. Distribution of Ukrainians by Region, Relative to Total Population, 1970.

	Region			
	South	West	Northeast	North Central
Percent of Ukrainians	5.2	7.0	60.4	27.4
Percent of Ukrainians divided by percent of total population	0.17	0.41	2.51	0.99

Source: Id.

distribution as the total U.S. population. The two groups with the lowest index of dissimilarity were the Serbo-Croatians and the Czechoslovakians, indicating a spatial distribution somewhat more similar to the U.S. one. Thus, compared to the other ethnic groups, Ukrainians had a relatively high population concentration.


Figure 3.2 shows the spatial distribution of Ukrainians. Most states had less than 1 percent of the total population and the bulk was concentrated in a few states. In 1970, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, accounted for more than half of all Ukrainians; 90 percent of the total lived in only 11 states.

The gradual dispersion of Ukrainians can be observed by comparing the 1940 and 1970 distributions by state in Table 3.3. The dispersion is reflected in less overall concentration and shifts in the population from states of original settlement to other states. In 1940 only two states were needed to account for more than half of the Ukrainian population, compared to three states in 1970. Pennsylvania had lost its primary position, falling from 32 to 20 percent of the total and from first to second place. States like North Dakota and Rhode Island lost ground, while states like California and Florida became more important in terms of the proportion of Ukrainians living in them.

DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO SIZE OF PLACE

Size of place of residence has important implications for a person's social and economic lifestyle; it affects occupation, income, level of education, social networks, and so on. For ethnic groups it may either hinder or encourage assimilation within the larger society. For example, in the United States, persons living in small cities or rural areas with no organized ethnic communities, are more likely to be susceptible to assimilation. In this section, we analyze distributions in terms of rural-urban, metropolitan-non-metropolitan, and central city-noncentral city.

Figure 3.1. Index of Dissimilarity of Distribution by State, for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups, 1970.



^aIncludes Hebrew mother tongue.

Source: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. General Population Characteristics*. Final report PC(1)-B1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1-263.

Although most Ukrainian immigrants came from rural areas, by economic necessity they settled in urban places. Table 3.4 shows that all Eastern European groups were much more urbanized than the total U.S. population. The most urbanized was the Yiddish group, with the Ukrainians occupying an intermediate position. The percentage of metropolitan residents followed very closely the percentage urban, indicating that for all groups most of the urban population actually lived in metropolitan areas. Roughly half of all persons living in metropolitan areas resided in the central cities of these areas. Compared to the total U.S. population, all linguistic groups were more urbanized and had a higher proportion living in central cities.

The high degree of urbanization of all linguistic groups is likely to be somewhat exaggerated, due to the characteristics of the mother-tongue sample. As pointed out previously, the sample excludes by definition persons

Figure 3.2. Distribution of Ukrainians by State, 1970.




Table 3.4. Residency: Percentage Urban, Metropolitan, and in Central Cities for the Total U.S. and Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups, 1970.

Population	Percent Urban ^a	Percent Metropolitan ^a	Percent in Central Cities ^a	N
TOTAL U.S.	73.5	68.6	31.4	203,212,877
Yiddish	98.4	96.1	60.6	2,489
Serbo-Croatian	88.4	91.6	42.2	2,388
Lithuanian	88.3	87.3	44.0	2,930
<i>Ukrainian</i>	<i>88.0</i>	<i>86.0</i>	<i>44.1</i>	<i>2,368</i>
Russian	87.7	88.1	47.2	3,109
Hungarian	87.7	83.9	38.3	2,254
Polish	86.8	86.3	44.1	2,387
Czechoslovakian	77.1	79.7	29.3	2,360

^aTo prevent possible identification of a person in the sample tapes, the Bureau of the Census does not identify the urban-rural, metropolitan-nonmetropolitan, and central city-noncentral city character of an area if this would single out areas with less than 250,000 inhabitants. In those cases, a missing value code was assigned. The percentage in Tables 3.4 and 3.6 were calculated using valid codes only in all three types of areas. Because the distribution of missing values is not random, the percentages presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.6 may be biased. However, it is reasonable to expect that the distribution of missing values does not vary significantly among the ethnic groups. Thus, although the absolute values of the percentages presented may be biased in some cases, comparisons within each column should not be significantly affected by this problem.

Sources: United States—Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970: Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, Part A: Number of Inhabitants*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972) Tables 17 and 19.

All ethnic groups—Fifteen Percent State Public Use Sample Tape, 1970 Census.

whose parents did not speak the ethnic languages when they were children, and in all likelihood these persons themselves do not speak the language. This would tend to underestimate seriously the third and higher generations (U.S.-born persons with U.S.-born parents). If it is true that successive generations tend to have urban-rural distributions more similar to the U.S. distribution, then the mother-tongue samples would have an upward bias in the proportion in urban areas. The available data does not allow us to verify this directly, but evidence on Ukrainians presented below tends to support the relationship between generation and urban-rural distribution.

The degree of urbanization of Ukrainians was fairly uniform in all four regions (see Table 3.5). The urban percentage was about 90 percent in all regions, while there were some regional variations in the percentages in metropolitan areas and in central cities. In all regions except the South, the

Table 3.5. Size of Place of Residence by Region for Ukrainians and the Total Population, 1970.

Region	Percentage					
	Urban ^a		Metropolitan ^a		Central City ^a	
	Ukrainian	U.S.	Ukrainian	U.S.	Ukrainian	U.S.
ENTIRE U.S.	87.7	73.5	84.6	68.6	43.8	31.4
South	89.0	64.6	74.2	56.1	39.4	28.5
West	89.7	82.9	91.6	78.6	44.0	32.2
North East	86.0	80.4	81.7	79.9	40.7	35.2
North Central	90.2	71.6	92.0	66.6	54.2	30.2

^aIn Table 3.5 persons with missing values for urban, metropolitan, or central city were given valid codes using the following allocation procedures: (a) proportional distribution among regions using the U.S. population of each region as weights; (b) within each region, uniform distribution in urban, metropolitan, and central city, using the U.S. proportions in these three types of areas as weights.

Source: United States — Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. General Social and Economic Characteristics*. Final Report PCC15-C1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972) Tables 85 and 107.

Ukrainians — Fifteen Percent State Public Use Sample Tape, 1970 Census.

urban population was, for all practical purposes, metropolitan. In the South, on the other hand, almost 5 percent of the urban population lived in non-metropolitan areas. In all regions except the North Central, about half of the metropolitan population lived in central cities, while for the North Central region the proportion was 60 percent, indicating that in the major cities of this region relatively fewer Ukrainians lived in suburbs.

Regional distributions of the metropolitan percentage in the central city mask important variations at the state level. As Table 3.6 indicates, in the 12 states which contain over 90 percent of all Ukrainians, the great majority of this group lived in metropolitan areas and the variation between states was not large. The proportion living in the central cities of the metropolitan areas, on the other hand, varied significantly from state to state. This variation depended to a large extent on the geographical location of cities in relation to state boundaries, as well as local housing conditions determining choice of place of residence. For example, while over 60 percent of those in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in New York State lived in central cities, less than a quarter of those in New Jersey did so. One reason for this difference is that although the central cities of New York and Philadelphia fall entirely within New York State and Pennsylvania, respectively, both have large suburbs in New Jersey. Many Ukrainians who orig-

inally settled in these central cities joined the flight to the suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s. As many of these moves were across state lines, this resulted in a higher proportion in noncentral cities for New Jersey, without a significant effect on the percentage in central cities in New York and Pennsylvania.

It is difficult to make a general statement about the degree of suburbanization of Ukrainians by state, because more than half the metropolitan residents lived outside of central cities in states as diverse as Massachusetts, Ohio, or California. The explanations are to be found at the city level. In the case of Michigan, for example, most of the Ukrainians lived in the Detroit SMSA, and the relatively low percentage living in the central city is likely related to Detroit's problems with crime and social unrest. The predominance of one city within a state may also have the opposite effect, as illustrated by Illinois. The high percentage of Ukrainians living in central cities in Illinois indicates a low degree of suburbanization of Ukrainians in Chicago, since 95 percent of all Ukrainians in Illinois lived in that SMSA. Chicago seems to exemplify a case where part of the community dug in its

Table 3.6. Percentage of Ukrainians in SMSAs and Central Cities, for the Twelve Most Populous States, 1970.

State	Ukrainian Population	Percent in SMSAs	Percent of SMSA Ukrainians in Central Cities
N.Y.	52,069	86.2	62.4
Pa.	49,398	86.3	49.5
N.J.	33,117	72.3	23.7
Ill.	19,773	96.8	71.6
Ohio	18,632	97.3	42.5
Mich.	18,217	93.8	47.7
Cal.	11,050	94.6	43.8
Conn.	9,655	a	51.9
Minn.	4,884	78.0	61.9
Mass.	4,343	83.3	48.6
Md.	3,559	a	38.6
Fla.	3,311	87.5	50.0

^aMissing values are very high.

Sources: Ukrainian population—Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. PC(1)D1-PC(1)D52. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972). Table 142 in each volume.

Percentage SMSA and Central City—Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. General Social and Economic Characteristics*. Final Report PCC15-C1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972). Tables 85 and 107.

heels in the original ethnic enclave and refused to move to the suburbs, in spite of problems in the central city.

DISTRIBUTION BY GENERATION

The gradual spatial dispersion documented above is clearly related to the successive generations of Ukrainians. With the passage of time, foreign-born Ukrainians and their descendants are likely to become more assimilated and thus use criteria similar to those used by all Americans to choose where they live. One can hypothesize that with increased duration of residence, proximity to an organized ethnic community as a criterion would be gradually overridden by job opportunities and factors related to quality of life. Specifically, it is hypothesized that each successive generation will show less regional concentration; will have relatively lower proportions in states and SMSAs with high concentrations of Ukrainians; and will have proportions urban, metropolitan, and in central cities more similar to the ones for the U.S. population.

Three generations can be identified with 1970 Census data: foreign-born (first generation), native-born with at least one foreign-born parent (second generation), and native-born of native parents (third or higher generation). Thus, we can look at the population distribution patterns of successive generations to test the proposed hypotheses. However, the relationships between generation and place of residence are likely to be weakened by the fact that the sample used is based on mother tongue rather than ethnic origin and, by definition, the less assimilated Ukrainian Americans of third or higher generation are underrepresented in the sample. Since the greater assimilation of successive generations is the hypothesized mechanism responsible for their increased dispersion, the population in this linguistic sample is probably less dispersed than one defined by national origin. This implies that if our data support the proposed hypotheses, the relationships for the whole ethnic group are likely to be even stronger.

The regional distribution of Ukrainians by generations presented in Table 3.7 provides only partial support for the first hypothesis. Only two regions follow the hypothesized pattern: the percentage in the North Central region decreases with generation and the percentage in the South increases with generation. The inconsistent pattern in the Northeast is probably because historically this region has offered attractive employment and education opportunities, while at the same time it has the largest ethnic communities. Therefore, both the attractions of better opportunities and a proximity to an ethnic community were concentrated in the same region. This coincidence allowed the younger generations the pursuit of better opportunities without having to move away from the original areas of settlement.

The pattern in the West is affected by the heterogeneity in the settlement

Table 3.7. Distribution of Ukrainians among Regions by Generation, 1970.

Region	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd + Generation	Total
	(foreign-born to foreign parents)	(native-born to one or more foreign-born parents)	(native-born to native parents)	
South	4.8	5.1	7.7	5.2
West	8.6	5.8	7.3	7.0
Northeast	54.5	64.6	61.3	60.4
North Central	32.1	24.5	23.7	27.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	96,635	130,054	22,662	249,351

Source: Cybriwsky and Tesla. *Ukrainians in the U.S. and Canada*, pp. 11-12.

of Ukrainians in such a large territory. California dominates the region with 63 percent of all Ukrainians in the region. Many post-World War II immigrants joined the massive migration to California in the 1950s and 1960s, and in 1970 more than half of all Ukrainians living in California were foreign-born. Thus, although the relationship between the region of residence and generations does not fully support the hypothesis of dispersion, in one case the attractiveness of the region may have counteracted the hypothesized relationship, while in the other the heterogeneity of the spatial unit tends to distort the relationship.

The argument that regions are too large and heterogeneous receives support in Table 3.8. In the ten states with the largest Ukrainian populations, five of which are in the Northeast, the proportion of third generation members was 94 percent of the proportion of first generation members. In other words, in states with large concentrations of Ukrainians, the proportion of persons in the third or higher generation was slightly smaller than the proportion of foreign-born. Whether this was due to ethnic cohesion or the opportunities available in these states is not discernible from demographic data. However, the hypothesis is strongly supported by the relative proportion of the first and third generation in states where the number of Ukrainians was small. Indeed, members of the third generation were 1.84 times more likely to live in the 30 states with the smallest Ukrainian populations than were members of the first generation, that is, the proportion of persons in the third or higher generation in these states, 7 percent, was 1.84 times greater than the proportion of first generation persons. There was little difference in the proportion of persons of first and second generation in all three categories of states, as Table 3.8 shows. The same pattern occurs among SMSAs with more than 250,000 inhabitants. Among the 15 SMSAs with the largest numbers of Ukrainians, the proportion of third or higher generation members constituted 91 percent of the first generation members. For the SMSAs with fewer Ukrainians, the proportion of the third generation relative to the first was higher as the proportion of Ukrainians in the SMSAs decreased.

This is not to say that the generational distribution was similar for all cities with large Ukrainian populations. Just in the six SMSAs with the largest number of Ukrainians, there were several different patterns. In the New York, Detroit, and Cleveland SMSAs—ranked first, fourth, and sixth, respectively—the ratio of third to first generation falls between 70 and 80 percent. In Chicago, the third most populous SMSA, this pattern was even stronger, with the third generation only a third as likely to live there as the first generation. On the other hand, the two large Pennsylvania SMSAs—Philadelphia, ranked second, and Pittsburgh, ranked fifth—showed the opposite patterns. Members of the third generation were more likely to live in

Table 3.8. Distribution of Ukrainians by Rank of State and SMSA of Residence, and Generation, 1970.

	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd + Generation	3rd + to 1st, ratio
	(foreign-born to foreign parents)	(native-born to one or more foreign-born parents)	(native-born to native parents)	
Rank of State of Residence:				
1-10	88.8	89.5	83.8	0.94
11-20	7.4	7.1	9.2	1.24
21 or more	3.8	3.4	7.0	1.84
Rank of SMSA of Residence:				
1-15	75.1	72.9	68.4	0.91
16-30	13.2	14.4	14.5	1.10
31 or more	11.7	12.7	17.1	1.46

Source: Cybriwsky and Tesla. *Ukrainians in the U.S. and Canada*, pp. 11-12.

these cities than those of the first generation.

If we look at large SMSAs with small Ukrainian populations, outside the 12 most populous states, the pattern of greater third generation representation was fairly consistent. One exception was Phoenix, possibly because of its role as a retirement community and the large proportion over 65 years old in the first generation. The third generation was only three-fourths as large as the first generation in Phoenix, but it was 25 percent larger in Denver, 33 percent larger in Portland, and 1.5 times as large in Houston.

Size of place dispersion was also influenced by generation in the direction consistent with our hypothesis. As Table 3.9 indicates, with each generation, Ukrainians were less likely to live in urban areas, in SMSAs, and in central cities. Third generation Ukrainians were still more urban and metropolitan than the general population, but they were less likely than the general population to live in central cities.

The spatial distribution of Ukrainians in 1970 supports the hypotheses that later generations have tended to move away from their original areas of settlement, and that they are moving toward a residential pattern more similar to the national pattern. By using the census questions on state of birth and place of residence five years ago, we can further investigate this hypothesis in terms of lifetime and recent migration patterns.

Internal Migration

The 1970 Census data allow us to measure two types of migration, lifetime migration and recent migration. The former is deduced by comparing place of birth with current place of residence (country of birth if foreign-born or state of birth if United States-born); the latter is based on place of residence as of 1965. As only migration within the United States is addressed here, lifetime migration will be analyzed for United States natives only. Recent migration estimates are based on state of residence in 1965 and apply to both foreign and United States-born, and one can differentiate between interstate moves and moves within the same state. Considering that the proportion of migrants in a population is usually not high, a detailed analysis of interstate migration streams is limited by the sample size; for the same reason the investigation of characteristics of migrants is seriously constrained. Thus by necessity some of the results in this section, especially the ones on interstate migration streams, will be tentative.

LIFETIME MIGRATION

Americans are a highly mobile people; in 1970 more than a quarter of all native-born Americans were living outside their state of birth.⁴ In comparison, most American-born Eastern Europeans had a lower proportion of life-

Table 3.9. Percentage Distribution of Ukrainians in Urban, Metropolitan, and Central City Areas by Generation, 1970.				
	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd + Generation	
	(foreign-born to foreign parents)	(native-born to one or more foreign-born parents)	(native-born to native parents)	Total
Urban	90.9	87.0	81.4	88.0
Metropolitan	91.1	83.9	77.5	86.0
Central Cities	55.8	38.5	29.2	44.1
Source: Fifteen Percent State Public Use Sample Tape, 1970 Census.				

time interstate migrants (Table 3.10). Only the Hungarians had a slightly higher percentage of migrants, while American-born Ukrainians, with 22.4 percent, had the third lowest level of migration, after the Polish and Czechoslovakian.

Although lifetime migration of American-born Ukrainians has been at a relatively low level, it has worked to disperse the population from its original places of settlement in the direction we have noted in comparing the 1940 and 1970 current residence state distributions. Evidence is provided by comparing the distribution of state of birth and state of current residence. In 1970, American-born Ukrainians were found in 41 states and the District of Columbia while the list of states of birth for the same group contained only 35 states and the District. The states of current residence not listed as states of birth were mainly in the South—Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Mississippi, but Maine and Nevada were also included. This dispersion trend parallels the general southward and westward movements of the national population. To mention a few specific examples: only 1 percent of all United States-born Ukrainians were born in California, although in 1970, California residents constituted 3.5 percent of American-born Ukrainians. Similarly, the percentage born in and residing in Florida jumped from 0.13 to over 1.0 in 1970, respectively. Some Ukrainians were born in West Virginia, but none resided there in 1970. The percentage living in Pennsylvania and North Dakota in 1970 was significantly smaller than the percentage born there.

Table 3.10. Percent Lifetime Interstate Migration for Total Native Population and Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups, 1970.

Population	Percent Lifetime ^a Interstate Migration	N ^b
U.S. Native Born	26.7	193,454,051
Hungarian	27.7	1,445
Yiddish	26.1	1,806
Lithuanian-Latvian	24.7	1,994
Russian	24.4	1,680
Serbo-Croatian	23.5	1,480
<i>Ukrainian</i>	22.4	1,497
Czechoslovakian	19.9	1,953
Polish	17.3	1,934

^a Age-standardized using the total native-born U.S. population as a base.

^b Excluding persons born abroad or with state of birth unreported.

Sources: U.S.—Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population 1970: Subject Report: Final Report PC(2)-2A: State of Birth*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 10. All ethnic groups—Fifteen Percent State Public Use Sample Tape, 1970 Census.

The correlation of state of birth to state of current residence suggests some of the major migration streams for American-born Ukrainians. Consistent with the fact that Pennsylvania had the largest proportion of Ukrainians in the past, over one third of the group was born in the state, but only about 20 percent of American-born Ukrainians lived there in 1970. More of those who left went to New York and New Jersey (8.8 percent and 8.0 percent, respectively); while Ohio, California, and Maryland were also major states of attraction with more than 2 percent each. Four states other than Pennsylvania served as birth place to more than 5 percent of the sample—New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Illinois—and more than three quarters of Ukrainians born there remained in their state by 1970. Major streams out of New York were 6.6 percent to New Jersey, 3.6 percent to Connecticut, and 2 percent to California. The losses to New Jersey and Connecticut probably reflected to a great extent the suburbanization of New York City Ukrainians, so that only the New York to California stream represents unambiguous, long-distance migration. Migration out of New Jersey had a pattern similar to New York: about 85 percent of those born in New Jersey were still there in 1970, 5 percent moved to New York, and about 2 percent each to Pennsylvania and California. Again the streams to New York and Pennsylvania probably consisted mainly of movements within the metropolitan areas of New York City and Philadelphia, rather than long-distance migration.

Other streams worthy of mention are: exchanges between Ohio and Illinois, from Ohio and Illinois to Michigan and California, from Ohio to Florida, and from Illinois to Minnesota. However, given the small number of migrants in each of these streams, these findings should be taken with caution. The general conclusion about interstate lifetime migration of American-born Ukrainians is that it has followed patterns similar to those of the total U.S. population, with some peculiarities determined by the location of the major settlements.

RECENT MIGRATION

Comparing residence in 1970 to reported residence in 1965 gives us a picture of more recent migration, and allows us to include the foreign-born Ukrainians in our comparisons.⁵ We find that Ukrainians continue to be less mobile than the general population. More than 40 percent of all Americans moved at least once between 1965 and 1970. About 32 percent moved to a different house within the same state, and an additional 8.6 percent moved to a different state. The comparable age-standardized percentages for those with Ukrainian mother tongue were 26.7 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively.

As Table 3.11 indicates, Ukrainians are not only less mobile than the

Table 3.11. Percent Intra- and Interstate Movers During 1965–1970, for Total U.S. Residents and Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups Aged Five Years or Over, 1970.


Population	Age-Standardized Percentage ^a		N
	Different House, Same State	Different State	
U.S. Total	31.7	8.6	186,094,822
Hungarian	32.0	8.4	4,496
Yiddish	32.5	8.3	4,995
Lithuanian	26.8	8.4	5,824
Russian	30.9	9.2	6,373
Serbo-Croatian	27.9	6.3	4,665
Ukrainian	26.7	5.8	4,885
Czechoslovakian	26.1	6.7	4,665
Polish	28.5	6.2	4,805

^a Age standardized using the total U.S. population aged 5 years or older as base.
Sources: United States—Burea of the Census. *Census of Population 1970: Detailed Characteristics*, PC(1)D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972) Table 196.
All ethnic groups—Fifteen Percent State and County Group Public Use Sample Tapes, 1970 Census.

general population, but also less so than other Eastern European groups. They have the second lowest percentage of within-state moves and the lowest percentage of interstate moves. It is impossible to determine from the data available the reasons for such a low level of mobility among Ukrainians. Possible contributing factors may be their relatively low level of education and high proportion of home owners, both characteristics which have been observed to inhibit mobility.⁶ Certainly other factors would merit investigation given more appropriate data.

Figure 3.3 illustrates that Ukrainians are less mobile than the general population, regardless of age. There are only two exceptions to this: (1) The percentage of within-state movers is slightly higher for Ukrainians in the 30–34 age group; (2) Ukrainians are more likely than the general population to move when they reach retirement age, the 65–69 age group: this is observed both for moves within states and interstate migration. The difference with the U.S. population in the first exception is small and may be due to sampling errors, although the later age at marriage⁷ observed among Ukrainians may contribute to a higher proportion of moves at a somewhat later age.⁸ The higher level of mobility of Ukrainians around the retirement age

Figure 3.3. Percent Within-State Movers and Interstate Migrants by 5-year Age Groups, During 1965-1970, for Ukrainian and Total U.S. Population Aged Five Years or Over.



Sources: United States—Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970: Detailed Characteristics*, PC(1)D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972) Table 196.

All ethnic groups—Fifteen percent State and County Group Public Use Sample Tapes, 1970 Census.

seems to be a real phenomenon. It appears that after retirement, Ukrainians tend more often than the general population to change houses within the same area of residence or to move to retirement states like Florida.

In recent migration, as in lifetime interstate migration, several major streams are among the three states which house the majority of Ukrainians—New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Other large streams are also among states with large Ukrainian populations: from New York to Florida and California; from Pennsylvania to Ohio, Maryland, California, and Florida; from Illinois to California and Minnesota; and from Connecticut to Florida.⁹

The relatively high rate of postretirement migration among Ukrainians may contribute to Florida's prominence as a destination in these streams. However, the general population was also moving to Florida in large numbers during this period, at a somewhat higher rate than Ukrainians. By contrast,

the continuing movement to California among Ukrainians during this period was somewhat larger than for the general population: 9.1 percent of all Californians in 1970 had moved to that state in the preceding five years,¹⁰ compared to 9.6 percent of the Ukrainians in California. Western movers in the general population were drawn to Wyoming, Colorado, Nevada, Alaska, and Hawaii, which did not seem to be particularly attractive destinations to Ukrainians.

THE ROLE OF GENERATION IN MIGRATION

We have seen that dispersion from the historical centers of Ukrainian settlement is a slow process because Ukrainians are less mobile than the general public, and a substantial amount of the migration that does occur is among the states already having large Ukrainian populations. But what of our hypothesis that the major impetus to dispersion comes from the greater willingness of later generations to move away from these centers of Ukrainian population?

To pursue this hypothesis further, we have divided lifetime migrants into two categories: those born in states with a high concentration of Ukrainians (the eight most populous states comprising 85 percent of all Ukrainians) and migrants born in other states.¹¹

Almost 12 percent of third generation Ukrainians born in the high concentration states were living in states with low concentrations by 1970. On the other hand, only 6.4 percent of the second generation Ukrainians born in the high concentration states had made such a move. Thus, the odds were 1.8 to 1 that a Ukrainian born in a state with high concentration and moving to one with a low concentration would have American-born rather than foreign-born parents. This is not attributable to age differences between the generations, as the same relationship was found for all age groups.

The pattern found in lifetime migration is even stronger when recent (1965–1970) migrants are compared over the range of three generations. Eight percent of third generation Ukrainians who were living in the high concentration states in 1965 had moved to low concentration states by 1970, as compared to only 2 percent of the first generation. This means that the odds were 4 to 1 that a move which contributed to linguistic group dispersion over that five-year period was made by a third generation rather than a first generation Ukrainian, and the relationship persisted across practically all age groups. Thus migration data confirm what has been found when analyzing the relationship between population distribution and generation. Although somewhat slower than other Eastern European groups, Ukrainians have steadily moved away from their original places of settlement in pursuit of better opportunities, while being less and less constrained by the proximity to large ethnic communities.

Summary

Ukrainian Americans are very unevenly distributed over the U.S. territory: more than half of them live in the Northeast and about one fourth in the North Central regions; the South and West have only 12 percent of the total group. New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey have the highest concentrations of Ukrainians, totalling over 50 percent of the group; other states in decreasing order of importance are: Ohio, Michigan, California, and Connecticut. Compared to other Eastern European groups, Ukrainians have a high overall concentration, together with the Russian and Yiddish groups.

Like members of other Eastern European linguistic groups, Ukrainians are highly urbanized, live mostly in metropolitan areas, and a high proportion of them live in the central cities of these metropolitan areas. There are small regional variations in the proportion of urban and metropolitan residents; only the South has a somewhat lower proportion of metropolitan residents. The proportion living in suburbs varies by cities; Chicago and Detroit are examples of low and high degrees of suburbanization, respectively.

Ukrainians migrate less than the other ethnic groups; their levels of recent migration (1965–1970) are the lowest among the eight Eastern European linguistic groups, both for moves within the state of residence and for moves across state lines. The proportion of recent (1965–1970) Ukrainian migrants is lower than for all U.S. migrants at all ages, with the exception of the 30–34 and 64–69 age groups. It seems that after retirement, Ukrainians tend to move more than the respective general population.

As Ukrainians become more removed from the immigration experience, they tend to move away from their original places of settlement and become somewhat less urbanized. Comparing first and second with third or later generations, the latter are more likely to reside in or to move to states which do not have large concentrations of Ukrainians. It is clear that with successive generations proximity to a large Ukrainian community is becoming less of a factor in determining choice of place of residence.

It is important to reiterate the fact that these results apply only to persons who declared Ukrainian as their mother tongue, and not to all Ukrainians and their descendants. For this larger group it is expected that their population distribution would be somewhat more dispersed, and less metropolitan and urban. The hypothesized population dispersion with successive generations is expected to be supported even more with a sample that includes the linguistically assimilated members of the ethnic group.

Notes

1. For more details on the Ukrainian immigration to the United States see Magocsi (1980) and the references cited there.
2. Annual reports of the Commissioner of Immigration, 1899–1930; state of destination as given by immigrants at ports of entry; Halich, 1937:150.
3. All references to region in this chapter refer to the four regions defined by the Bureau of the Census: Northeast—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; North Central—Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; South—all states south of the Northeast and North Central Regions; West—all states west of the North Central and southern states, including Alaska and Hawaii.
4. The measure of lifetime migration underestimates the actual level of migration because those people who moved away from their state of birth and returned before the time of the census appear not to have moved at all. In addition, multiple moves in a person's lifetime are not taken into account. However, the relative levels of mobility among the groups should be little affected by this.
5. The five-year question also underestimates the true level of migration by counting as immobile people who leave and return to their place of 1965 residence, and by missing multiple moves by the same people within the five year period.
6. See chapters on socioeconomic and housing characteristics in this book.
7. See the chapter on nuptiality and fertility in this book.
8. See Table 325 in Bureau of the Census (1973), *Detailed Characteristics*.
9. The states designated as having high Ukrainian concentrations were the eight with at least 4 percent of the Ukrainian population in 1970—New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, California, and Connecticut. Because we are concerned with *origin* in states of dense population, the use of those states with high concentration in 1970 is not strictly appropriate from a theoretical point of view. However, since seven of the eight were also among the eight most heavily Ukrainian states in 1940, and the eight most heavily reported destinations among arriving immigrants 1899–1930, their inclusion is completely appropriate. California was not a historic center of concentration, but we believe that its inclusion is also appropriate. In considering lifetime migration, only 16 people in the sample were born in California so that their effect will not be severe. Further, the rise of California as an important center of Ukrainian population had occurred before 1965 so that exclusion of California from the states of high concentration would compromise the recent migration figures much more than its inclusion would compromise the lifetime migration question.
10. See footnote 8.
11. See footnote 9.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Fertility and Marital Status

Jean E. Kincade

A MAJOR CONCERN of ethnic group members is survival of the group. Survival is threatened mainly by assimilation. Therefore, extent of marriage, marital dissolution, intermarriage, and family size are important survival issues, since the family functions as a major vehicle for the socialization of group norms and provides a link between the individual and the community. This paper examines the extent of marriage and fertility of Ukrainians and makes comparisons with other Eastern European ethnic groups and the total United States population. Implications for ethnic group survival are explored in light of the findings.

The nature of the data used for the analysis could affect the conclusions drawn. Ukrainians, as well as the other ethnic groups, have been defined in terms of the language spoken in the home when growing up. Because of the narrowness of this definition, not everyone who might be considered to belong to an ethnic group has been included in the sample. Thus, this sample represents a subgroup of the larger ethnic group and is probably made up of the least assimilated members of the ethnic group. The first and second generations and older people are overrepresented in the sample while younger people and third and higher generations are underrepresented. Throughout the paper, the implications of this for marital status and fertility must be kept in mind.

Marital Status

Some of the basic processes of social life are the formation and dissolution of families through marriage, separation, divorce and remarriage. Factors related to the history of the ethnic group may produce variations in marital status distribution from one ethnic group to another. For example, immigration waves, particularly earlier ones, usually have contained a large proportion of young, single men who came to the country in search of land and work. Single women, however, were less likely to immigrate alone. Although less pronounced than in the past, pressure to marry within the ethnic

group is still strong since intermarriage may dilute ethnic cultural content, with implications for the maintenance of a distinct ethnic group (Kephart, 1977; Wakil, 1976; Kobrin and Goldscheider, 1978). When the community pressure to marry within the ethnic group is strong, a marriage pool of eligible candidates becomes important. If these pressures to intermarry are effective among Ukrainians and if an imbalance of men and women exists particularly at ages when most are marrying, it might be expected that Ukrainians would marry later and that a larger proportion would remain single.

Since age is related to marital status and the average age of the linguistic groups, as defined here, tends to be older than the U.S. population, the distributions of marital status have been standardized for age using the total U.S. population for 1970 as the standard (see Table 4.1). In general, none of the differences among linguistic groups or between the linguistic groups and the U.S. population are large; however, overall, somewhat smaller percentages of both Ukrainian males and females are married, and larger percentages are single. Among the linguistic groups, Ukrainians rank third for marital status and, except for presently married females, lower percentages of Ukrainians are married and higher percentages are single than in the total U.S. population.

The differences between Ukrainians and the total U.S. population become more pronounced when the percentages of all those ever married are compared (see Table 4.2). With the exception of the 65 and older age group and the 30–34 year age group for women, the percentage of Ukrainians who never married exceeded the U.S. average. This is particularly noticeable among the younger age groups and reflects an older age at first marriage of Ukrainians (see Table 4.3). Ukrainian men on the average marry 1.5 years later than the U.S. population as a whole and Ukrainian women marry 0.2 years later. This is also found to be the case for Ukrainians in Canada (Wolowyna, 1980). Not only do Ukrainians marry later than the U.S. population but also, with the exception of Yiddish men and Yiddish and Lithuanian women, they marry at an older age, on the average, than the other linguistic groups.

One possible reason for the later age at first marriage for Ukrainians is lack of a marriage pool of eligible candidates. That is, when pressure to marry within the ethnic group is strong, the question of availability of equal numbers of men and women of appropriate age becomes important. The sex ratio statistic is a measure of the number of men per hundred women in a population. Thus the closer the sex ratio is to 100, the more equal the numbers of men and women. The sex ratio of single Ukrainians aged 20–24 is 187, compared with 142 for the single U.S. population. This is only a rough approximation of the pool of eligible marriage candidates since it does not

Table 4.1. Percent Distribution of Marital Status by Sex for Linguistic Groups Standardized* by Age and Total U.S. Population, 1970.

Linguistic Group and Sex	Marital Status			
	Presently Married	Widowed	Separated / Divorced	Never Married
Males				
Polish	64.6	3.2	3.4	28.7
Czechoslovakian	64.3	3.6	2.6	39.5
Russian	62.1	4.0	3.3	30.5
<i>Ukrainian</i>	62.7	2.6	2.9	31.8
Lithuanian	61.2	3.4	2.9	32.5
Hungarian	66.4	2.9	3.2	27.5
Serbo-Croatian	64.2	2.5	2.9	30.3
Yiddish**	64.6	2.5	1.9	31.0
TOTAL U.S. POPULATION	64.2	3.0	4.2	28.6
				71,485,878
Females				
Polish	60.4	13.4	4.1	22.1
Czechoslovakian	61.9	12.7	3.9	21.5
Russian	58.7	13.5	5.0	22.8
<i>Ukrainian</i>	59.0	12.7	4.3	24.0
Lithuanian	56.7	13.7	3.3	26.4
Hungarian	61.0	13.1	4.0	21.9
Serbo-Croatian	59.7	14.1	4.1	22.1
Yiddish	60.1	9.8	4.7	25.4
TOTAL U.S. POPULATION	59.0	12.3	6.1	22.6
				77,920,094

*U.S. Population 1970 used as a standard

**Also includes Hebrew mother tongue

Source: Bureau of the Census. *1970 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population*, United States Summary (1973). Table 204, pp. 640-641; and 1970 United States Census Public Use Sample Tapes.

Table 4.2. Percent Distribution of Ever-Married—Ukrainians and Total U.S. Population, by Age and Sex, 1970.

Sex and Age	Percentage Ever Married	
	Ukrainians	Total U.S. Population
<i>Males</i>		
14–19 years	2.8	3.6
20–24	31.8	44.5
25–29	70.9	80.4
30–34	88.7	89.3
35–39	88.1	91.8
40–44	89.3	92.5
45–49	91.5	93.4
50–54	93.7	93.8
55–59	90.6	93.6
60–64	91.2	93.4
65 and older	94.9	91.9
All Ages	81.0	77.4
<i>Females</i>		
14–19 years	5.4	10.0
20–24	61.4	63.7
25–29	79.8	87.8
30–34	94.9	92.6
35–39	92.2	94.1
40–44	92.8	94.6
45–49	91.7	94.7
50–54	91.2	94.3
55–59	93.1	93.5
60–64	91.3	92.8
65 and older	98.0	92.5
All Ages	85.5	71.4

Source: Bureau of the Census. *1970 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population*, United States Summary (1973). Table 204, pp. 640–641; and 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample Tapes.

take into consideration the geographical distribution of men and women. Nevertheless, it points to less balance of eligible men and women among Ukrainians than among the U.S. population at the age when most people are marrying. This in conjunction with pressure to intermarry may be caus-

Table 4.3. Mean Age at First Marriage by Sex for the Linguistic Groups and the Total U.S. Population, 1970.

Linguistic Group	Mean Age at First Marriage	
	Males	Females
Polish	22.2	21.1
Czechoslovakian	22.5	20.6
Russian	22.8	21.5
<i>Ukrainian</i>	25.0	21.7
Lithuanian	24.3	22.9
Hungarian	23.0	21.9
Serbo-Croatian	23.7	21.0
Yiddish	25.7	23.1
TOTAL U.S. POPULATION	23.5	21.5

Source: Bureau of the Census. *1970 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population*. United States Summary (1973). Table 204, pp. 640–641; and 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample Tapes.

ing more Ukrainians to remain single. These effects are probably stronger in this sample, which includes the least linguistically assimilated Ukrainians. Since late age at marriage and high rates of celibacy in a group result in lower overall fertility (to be addressed in the next section), they may have implications for the survival of the group.

Fertility

OVERVIEW

Survival of an ethnic group as a discrete entity has always been a concern for members of the group. An ethnic group can lose membership not only through mortality but also through assimilation. Since the family is the major vehicle for the socialization of group norms, it is essential that group members, particularly those least assimilated, reproduce themselves—in other words, have a completed family size of at least 2 children.

The percentage distributions of the number of children ever born to ever-married Ukrainian women are presented in Table 4.4 and compared with those of ever-married U.S. women. In the youngest age group Ukrainians have larger percentages of childless women and women with only one child than U.S. women, while larger percentages of U.S. women have large families. Similarly in the age group 30–49 years, larger percentages of Ukrainian women are childless or have 1 or 2 children than U.S. women, while the opposite is true for larger family sizes. Among women 50 years and older, there are fewer childless Ukrainian women than U.S. women but even

Table 4.4. Percentage Distribution of Children Ever Born for Ever-Married Ukrainian and U.S. Women by Age, 1970.

Linguistic Group and Age	Children Ever Born						Total Number
	0	1	2	3-4	5-6	7+	
Ukrainians							
15-29 years	32.9	31.8	22.0	12.7	0.6	0.0	173
30-49	10.6	16.1	30.6	33.9	6.2	2.6	771
50 and over	11.5	19.4	28.7	28.8	8.2	3.4	1,127
All ages	13.0	19.2	28.8	29.4	6.8	2.8	2,071
Total U.S. Population							
15-29 years	27.6	28.8	24.9	16.0	2.3	0.4	12,270,379
30-49	8.8	12.0	24.8	36.8	12.1	5.5	22,222,798
50 and older	17.2	18.2	23.4	25.2	9.1	6.9	25,098,264
All ages	16.2	18.1	24.2	27.7	8.8	5.1	59,591,441

Source: Bureau of the Census. *1970 Census of Population: Women by Number of Children Ever Born* (1973). PC (2)-Series, Tables 2 and 3, p. 8 and 11; and, 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample Tapes.

in this age group, family sizes of 1 to 3 children are more common among Ukrainians than among U.S. women, larger percentages of whom have families of 4 or more. Thus it appears that a larger percentage of Ukrainian women have smaller family sizes than do U.S. women.

In comparison to other linguistic groups, the Ukrainians are not consistently the lowest or highest in terms of family size at any age group. The most consistent findings are for the Yiddish, Czechoslovakian, and Polish linguistic groups. For every age group except 15-29 years, the Yiddish-speaking have larger percentages of two-child families than any other linguistic group or than the total U.S. population. In that age group (15-29 years), however, they have higher percentages with no children or with one child than do the other linguistic groups. The opposite appears to be true for Czechoslovakian and Polish groups of all ages; that is, among these groups there are lower percentages of women with small families and higher percentages with very large families.

These findings indicate that Ukrainian women start their families later and have fewer children overall but eventually do have at least one child. This is further confirmed by looking at the mean number of children ever born (completed family size) and the percent of childless women aged 45-54 (Table 4.5). The completed family size of Ukrainians is smaller than that of the U.S. population but intermediate among the ethnic groups, although

Table 4.5. Completed Fertility* and Percentage Childless for Ever-Married Women in Linguistic Groups and Total U.S. Population, 1970.**

Linguistic Group	Completed Fertility	Percentage Childless
Polish	2.45	11.1
Czechoslovakian	2.49	12.1
Russian	2.09	14.8
Ukrainian	2.23	11.7
Lithuanian	2.22	12.5
Hungarian	2.28	11.5
Serbo-Croatian	2.28	12.7
Yiddish	2.09	8.4
TOTAL U.S. POPULATION	2.71	12.3

*Mean number of children ever born to ever married women 45–54 years of age.
**Percentage of childless ever married women 45–54 years of age.
Source: Bureau of the Census. *1970 Census of Population: Women by Number of Children Ever Born* (1973), PC (2)-Series, Tables 2 and 3, pp. 8 and 11; and, 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample Tapes.

some of the differences are large. Similarly, among Ukrainian women there is a somewhat lower percentage of childless than among U.S. women, but this percentage is intermediate among the ethnic groups. Thus, despite a somewhat later age at marriage than is seen in the U.S. population as a whole, Ukrainian women in this sample have a completed family size of just over two children. Since this is probably the least assimilated segment of the Ukrainian ethnic group, the chance that ethnic values and norms will be passed along to the next generation is good. Even here, however, some assimilation of the offspring is likely to occur, further jeopardizing the survival of the group.

FURTHER INTERPRETATION OF FAMILY SIZE DIFFERENCES

Variations in the family size of racial and ethnic groups in the United States have been documented. Two competing hypotheses have been presented in order to explain fertility differentials, the minority status hypothesis and the social characteristics hypothesis (Bean and Marcum, 1978). The social characteristics hypothesis attributes variations in fertility between ethnic and racial groups and the majority population to differences in socioeconomic composition. According to this view, if the distribution of the socioeconomic characteristics of the members of the ethnic group were comparable to those of the majority population, observed differences in fertility would disappear.

Goldscheider and Uhlenberg (1969) present a competing minority status hypothesis, according to which socioeconomic differences provide only a partial explanation of fertility differences and minority status *per se* operates as an independent factor influencing fertility. Minority couples become assimilated on some dimensions (e.g., education) but not on others (e.g., primary group attachments). This discrepancy in the degree to which different types of assimilation occur places minority couples in marginal positions, thus producing insecurities. To counteract these insecurities, minority couples limit childbearing. This effect is presumed to operate most strongly among minority couples who are sufficiently socioeconomically assimilated to experience this kind of insecurity, that is, among higher-status couples.

When the fertility of Ukrainian women is compared with that of women in the total U.S. population, it might be expected that if, after controlling for such factors as education, Ukrainian fertility approaches that of U.S. women, this would lend support to the social characteristics hypothesis. However, if after controls are introduced, the fertility differences are maintained or become more pronounced (particularly among the highly educated), this would lend support to the minority status hypothesis.

Mean number of children ever born provides a convenient summary measure with which to make comparisons and explore the two hypotheses. For all age groups the mean number of children ever born to Ukrainians is lower than that of U.S. women (see Table 4.6). This is also true of four other linguistic groups: Russians, Lithuanians, Hungarians and Yiddish-speaking. Ukrainians in the youngest age group have lower numbers of children ever born than do all other linguistic groups except for the Russians and Yiddish-speaking. At older ages, however, their fertility is intermediate among the linguistic groups (fourth lowest in the 30–49 group and fifth lowest in the 50 and older group). Overall, the fertility of the linguistic groups tends to be lower than that of the total U.S. population.

Even when a control is introduced for education (see Table 4.7), the differences between the family size of Ukrainians and the U.S. norms do not disappear. (These differences are also maintained for the Russians and Yiddish-speaking). In fact, the difference between the mean number of children of Ukrainians and the mean for the U.S. population increases in all but four instances (women aged 15–29, with 9–12 years or more than 12 years of education; women 50 and older, with 9–12 years of education; and women 30–49 years of age with more than 12 years of education). This tends to support the minority status hypothesis rather than the social characteristics hypothesis. However, the greatest differences between Ukrainian and U.S. fertility rates are in the less well-educated rather than the more well-educated groups, which would not be predicted by the minority status hypothesis. In terms of mean number of children ever born in all educational and age groups,

Table 4.6. Mean Number of Children Ever Born for Ever-Married Women in Linguistic Groups and Total U.S. Population by Age, 1970.

	15-29 years			30-49 years			50 and over			ALL AGES		
	Mean	Number		Mean	Number		Mean	Number		Mean	Number	
Polish	1.46	227		2.64	727		2.82	1,165		2.61	2,119	
Czechoslovakian	1.49	171		2.84	704		2.74	1,284		2.67	2,159	
Russian	1.20	169		2.30	805		2.30	1,976		2.23	2,950	
<i>Ukranian</i>	<i>1.20</i>	<i>173</i>		<i>2.43</i>	<i>771</i>		<i>2.45</i>	<i>1,127</i>		<i>2.34</i>	<i>2,071</i>	
Lithuanian	1.22	183		2.49	785		2.19	1,714		2.21	2,682	
Hungarian	1.40	160		2.56	643		2.30	1,180		2.31	1,983	
Serbo-Croatian	1.38	200		2.38	801		2.67	945		2.42	1,946	
Yiddish	1.00	138		2.28	636		2.00	1,422		2.02	2,196	
TOTAL U.S. POPULATION	1.46	12,270,379		2.97	22,222,798		2.59	25,098,264		2.20	59,591,441	

Source: Bureau of the Census. *1970 Census of Population: Women by Number of Children Ever Born* (1973), PC (2)-Series, Tables 2 and 3, pp. 8 and 11; and, 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample Tapes.

Table 4.7. Mean Number of Children Ever Born for Ever-Married Ukrainian and U.S. Women by Age and Education, 1970.

Age and Education	Mean Number of Children Ever Born			
	Ukrainians		Total U.S. Population	
	Mean	Number	Mean	Number
8 years or less				
15–29 years	1.60	5	2.44	90
30–49	2.51	146	3.73	330
50 and older	2.76	650	3.15	998
ALL AGES	2.71	801	3.24	1,418
9–12 years				
15–29 years	1.39	96	1.60	844
30–49	2.44	516	3.03	1,449
50 and older	2.10	399	2.17	1,108
ALL AGES	2.21	1,011	2.39	3,401
More than 12 years				
15–29 years	0.92	72	0.96	288
30–49	2.29	109	2.82	443
50 and older	1.72	78	2.02	341
ALL AGES	1.74	259	2.06	1,072

Source: 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample Tapes.

Ukrainians continue to be intermediate among the linguistic groups.

Variations in fertility can also be examined while controlling for generation (see Table 4.8). Women are defined as first generation if they were born outside the United States, second generation if they were born in the United States but one or both parents were born outside the United States, and third or subsequent generation if both the women and their parents were born in the United States. As with education, when a control is introduced for generation, differences in fertility between the Ukrainians and the U.S. women are maintained, except in the third generation, 15–29 age group. (These differences are also maintained for the Yiddish, Lithuanians and Russians except for those 50 and older in the third generation).

Even though the differences between Ukrainian and U.S. fertility are maintained they are generally reduced when generation is controlled (this is not the case when education is controlled). This occurs because there are larger proportions of Ukrainians in the first and second generation and fertility at the younger age group in these two generations is lower than that

Table 4.8. Mean Number of Children Ever Born for Ever-Married Ukrainian and U.S. Women by Age and Generation, 1970.

Age and Generation	Mean Number of Children Ever Born			
	Ukrainians		Total U.S. Population	
	Mean	Number	Mean	Number
First Generation				
15–29 years	0.95	75	1.48	40
30–49	2.18	282	2.69	159
50 and older	2.78	540	2.81	269
ALL AGES	2.44	897	2.66	468
Second Generation				
15–29 years	1.00	31	1.83	60
30–49	2.56	442	2.90	324
50 and older	2.16	582	2.30	473
ALL AGES	2.29	1,055	2.49	857
Third or Higher Generation				
15–29 years	1.57	67	1.50	1,123
30–49	2.79	47	3.17	1,752
50 and older	2.00	5	2.62	1,768
ALL AGES	2.07	119	2.56	4,643

Source: 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample Tapes.

for comparable groups in the U.S. population. In other words, fertility among young Ukrainians in the third generation is higher than among Ukrainians in the first and second generations and is more similar to that of the U.S. population as a whole. Consequently, there appears to be a relatively small group of young third generation Ukrainians who have maintained their ethnic identity yet have somewhat higher fertility than non-assimilated first and second generation Ukrainians.

Summary and Conclusions

Ukrainians tend to marry later, start childbearing later and remain single more often than the U.S. average. The later age at marriage and larger proportion who remain single (particularly among males) may reflect the fact that there is pressure not to marry outside the ethnic group, along with a fairly small pool of single women of comparable age with strong ethnic ties. The differences between the Ukrainians and the U.S. population would

probably be less pronounced for a more assimilated group.

In spite of late age at marriage, delayed childbearing and generally small family size, it appears that most ever married women eventually have at least one child. Also, although very large family sizes are less common than in the U.S. population, completed family size is on the average 2.23 children.

Overall Ukrainian fertility is somewhat lower than fertility of U.S. women. These differences are not only maintained but in general become even more pronounced when educational differences are controlled, which fact lends some support to the minority status hypothesis. Generation appears to be more of a factor in fertility than is education. When generation is controlled, although U.S.-Ukrainian differences in fertility do not disappear, they are reduced. The fertility behavior of younger Ukrainians in the third generation appears to approach that of the U.S. population and thus is higher than that of Ukrainians in comparable age groups in the first and second generation.

These findings can be viewed in the light of physical survival of the Ukrainians as a group. The fertility level is slightly above replacement, yet both men and women are somewhat more likely to remain single than those in the U.S. population. In addition, assimilation of some offspring of this group will occur. One subgroup, the young third generation, has a fertility level similar to that of their counterparts in the United States population. This is a relatively small subgroup, however, and thus has little effect on the fertility of the whole group. Before definitive conclusions about the larger Ukrainian ethnic group can be reached, information is needed concerning the linguistically assimilated who, nevertheless, define themselves as ethnic Ukrainians.

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CHAPTER FIVE

*Family Structure and Family Extension**

Frances E. Goldscheider

The Problem of Family Change

Social modernization theories have described a decline in the power of family ties, particularly extended family ties, over political, economic, and some social aspects of life. Many dimensions of family life are implicated in these theories, most of which have been difficult to assess because of lack of data. One dimension of "the decline of the extended family," however, has received much recent study. Household data, based on listings from many parts of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and earlier, together with census data from more recent periods, have made it possible to examine patterns of household structure. One dimension of the salience of extended family was assumed to be residence, so that groups, periods, or areas where extended family relationships operated more powerfully would be characterized by large and complex households. However, the general conclusions from recent research is that households extended beyond the nuclear family were not common, (P. Laslett 1971; Levy 1965), and that variations in the size of the households primarily reflect variations in fertility as it affects directly the number of children present in the household (Burch 1970). The implications of these findings for theories of family structure and change are not yet clear. Some feel that household patterns are relatively unimportant, and that living together is not a necessary condition for family influence. A distinction is made between the "family of residence" and the "family of interaction," and it is argued that the latter, as indicated by the contents of wills, marriage settlements, and other family arrangements, is where evidence for the decline in the influence of extended family will be found (Berkner 1975). Others take the household evidence more seriously, and argue not only that there has been no "decline," but that the quality and importance of family ties may even be increasing (B. Laslett 1973). Yet interestingly, even as the point was being widely made and accepted that household structure was relatively invariant, based on both cross-national

and historical data through the 1950s, rapid and extensive shifts in household composition were underway in the most "modern" areas, the United States (Kobrin 1976) and Western Europe (Hecht 1976). Increases in divorce and separation were leading to greater proportions of households headed by women, which has been taken by some as an indicator of family disorganization (Moynihan 1965). Further, household size began shrinking rapidly, due less to immediate declines in fertility than to increases in the proportion of very small (particularly one-person) households. This last is a phenomenon that is related to the question of family extension, since persons in one-person households would otherwise ordinarily have extended the families of their relatives, and its analysis suggests that we have not until recently been asking the sorts of questions necessary to reveal that extended residential patterns have in fact declined.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on these two phenomena, the female-headed household and family extension, and to assess their possible significance through a comparison between the household and family structure in 1970 of persons who grew up in a home where Ukrainian was spoken and that for the total United States population. The Ukrainian group is one which has come to the United States fairly recently from Eastern Europe, a region which has been characterized as having larger and more complex households than Western Europe (Berkner 1973). As a fairly recently arrived group (most are first or second generation), it seems likely that there will be evidence of greater family extension among them than for the U.S. total. Other Eastern European language groups will also be compared to test this general assumption.

The data on Ukrainian Americans are drawn from two 1/100 Public Use Samples of the 1970 U.S. Census of Population yielding two percent of persons who listed Ukrainian as the language spoken in their home when they were growing up (4947 cases). Two major questions will be addressed with these data: First, what is the distribution of household types for the Ukrainian-American subpopulation, and how does it differ from the United States total? Second, is there any evidence of greater family extension among Ukrainian Americans?

Type of Household

The information in this section has been assembled to address the question of differential household type.¹ "Household type" in U.S. census data is a concept based on the sex, marital, and family status of the head of the household. Three basic types are distinguished: the primary family head whose spouse is present (husband-wife households); the primary family head with no spouse present ("other" male or female family heads); and household

heads with no family members living with them (primary individuals) which are mostly one-person households.

The first question to be addressed focuses on the proportion of households headed by women. Considerable concern has been expressed over the growth in female-headed households, since they tend to be in low income brackets, and often include young children. Data in Table 5.1 indicate that households headed by Ukrainians are less likely to be headed by women than are all U.S. households, but the difference, standardized for age, is not great—21 percent for the United States total and 19 percent for Ukrainians. Differences are least for younger women, and increase somewhat with age, so that among household heads age 65 and older, 40 percent are female among the total U.S. population, compared to 37 percent for mother-tongue Ukrainian Americans.

More detailed aspects of household structure are also presented in Table 5.1, holding sex of head constant. The greatest similarities appear for males. For both groups, the vast majority of household heads are married and Ukrainian-American men are about equally likely to be heads of husband-wife households as are total U.S. males. This is also the case for each of the age groups. However, somewhat greater differences appear in the more marginal categories. While for both groups, primary individuals (heads of household living alone or with nonrelatives) are more common than are heads of "other," i.e. not husband-wife, families, Ukrainian male household heads are less likely to be primary individuals, and more likely to be "other" family heads. These differences increase with age, so that whereas the distributions are identical for males age 14–34 for the two groups, at the oldest ages differences are somewhat more pronounced. Reasons for this pattern of difference are not immediately apparent, although it is clear that unmarried male Ukrainian household heads are more likely to have family responsibilities than are unmarried males in the general population.

Greater variation characterizes female heads. While overall, there are no differences between the proportions of female household heads who are heads of families and those who are primary individuals, this is the result of very different age patterns of female household type between Ukrainian-American and all American women. At younger ages (below age 45), Ukrainian household heads are much more likely to be primary individuals than is the case for the U.S. total; at the older ages (45 and over) it is the U.S. total where a greater share of primary individuals is found. This suggests strongly that younger female household heads among young Ukrainian Americans are probably not so frequently responsible for young children. Part of the explanation for these varying age patterns of female-headed household types is that Ukrainian-American women evidently marry at a later age than the U.S. average (see previous chapter) and thus begin families later. The young

Table 5.1. Household Heads by Sex, Ethnicity, and Age of Head by Type of Household, 1970.									
Ethnicity and Age	Proportion Female	Male				Female			
		Husband Wife	Other Male Family Head	Primary Individual	Total	Female Family Head	Primary Individual	Total	
Total									
U.S. Total	21.0	87.5	3.3	9.2	100	41.4	58.6	100	
Ukrainian ^a	18.7	88.3	4.1	7.5	100	41.8	58.2	100	
(Ukrainian <i>n</i>)					(1973)			(437)	
14-34									
U.S. Total	14.3	87.9	2.9	9.2	100	59.4	40.6	100	
Ukrainian	13.8	87.9	2.9	9.2	100	27.5	72.5	100	
(Ukrainian <i>n</i>)					(206)			(33)	
35-44									
U.S. Total	13.0	91.4	3.1	5.5	100	75.4	24.6	100	
Ukrainian	12.0	90.1	4.5	5.2	100	69.2	30.8	100	
(Ukrainian <i>n</i>)					(288)			(39)	
45-64									
U.S. Total	19.5	89.1	3.5	7.5	100	43.1	56.9	100	
Ukrainian	17.3	90.0	4.2	5.8	100	46.2	53.8	100	
(Ukrainian <i>n</i>)					(1052)			(221)	
65+									
U.S. Total	40.1	77.3	4.7	18.0	100	20.7	79.3	100	
Ukrainian	36.9	77.8	5.7	16.5	100	32.0	68.0	100	
(Ukrainian <i>n</i>)					(247)			(144)	

^aStandardized on the U.S. age composition of household heads
Source: Bureau of the Census 1973a, Table 1

female heads for Ukrainian-American women, then, are persons who have left their parental household but have not yet married, while for the U.S. total, they are more likely to be separated and divorced (or unmarried mothers). Older female heads, similarly, are widowed and divorced women whose children have already left the household, among the U.S. total, while Ukrainian-American women may have more frequently been left widowed before the children are grown. These differences are similar to those that characterize change over time for women in recent U.S. history. Between 1940 and 1970, female family heads have become substantially younger, on average, as marriages become more likely to end by divorce and less likely to end by widowhood (Kobrin 1973).

To examine the question of the presence of children more directly, Table 5.2 presents information on children present in the household for two broad age groups of female family heads. These data suggest even more strongly that children in mother-tongue Ukrainian households are less likely not to have two parents, since Ukrainian female headed families are less likely to include children. Whereas only 15 percent of female family heads aged 35–44 in the total U.S. group had no children of their own present, 37 percent

Table 5.2. Female Family Heads by Number of Own Children^a Aged Less than 18 by Ethnicity and Age, 1970.

Number of Children Under Age 18 and Age of Head	U.S. Total	U.S. White	Ukrainian
35–44			
TOTAL	100	100	100 (n = 27)
0	15	15	37
1	25	27	26
2	23	25	18
3+	37	33	19
Never Married	9	7	15
45–64			
TOTAL	100	100	100 (n = 102)
0	62	63	68
1	22	23	20
2	6	9	8
3+	9	5	5
Never Married	10	11	21

^a“related children” for Ukrainians
Source: U.S. total and U.S. white: Bureau of the Census 1973a, Table 6.

of Ukrainian female-headed families were families made up only of adults. Further, this is an underestimate of the true differences, since some of the "related children" living with these Ukrainian-American women may be the children of other members of the household. Differences are smaller in the older age group (45–64) but in the same direction. Since much of the concern over the growth of female-headed households has been focused on black families (Moynihan 1965), comparable information that is restricted to the white population of the United States is also presented. Although some differences between total U.S. and total white groups appear, these are primarily in the proportions of families with several young children; none of the difference between Ukrainian-American and total female family heads in the proportion with no children is reduced by restricting the comparison to whites. Table 5.2 also shows that at least some of the difference in presence of children between the two groups relates to differing patterns of marriage and to differing patterns of family structure among the never-married. Whereas only 9 to 10 percent of total U.S. female family heads were never married, between 15 and 21 percent of Ukrainian women heads of households were still single. Overall, then, the "modern" deviation from the nuclear family form, the one-parent family, is as yet relatively rare among Ukrainian Americans.

Family Extension

An equally important question that can be investigated using household and family data relates to the prevalence of family extension, the "traditional" deviation from the nuclear family. Is there evidence that a greater proportion of Ukrainian-American families contain non-nuclear relatives (family members beyond a husband, wife, and their minor children)? Data in Table 5.3 are presented in response to the question being asked in this fashion. The analysis is restricted to husband-wife families at this point, since it is these about whom discussion of traditional family extension is normally focused.

The data show very little difference between U.S. total and Ukrainian-American figures in proportions of nuclear husband-wife families. There is no difference, standardized for age; for husbands of age below 35, in fact, U.S. families seem somewhat less nuclear, while, overall, for families with older heads, Ukrainian Americans have a slightly higher proportion of extended family arrangements. But the differences are very small. It is possible that family extension is more frequent at these stages of the life cycle when the density of children is least, the early married and empty nest stages, so that differences in family extension could be blurred by possible fertility differences. The data in the last two columns of Table 5.3 bear on this issue,

Table 5.3. Husband-Wife Families by Ethnicity, Age and Presence of Own Children^a below Age 18 and Other Relatives, 1970.

Ethnicity and Age of Head	Total	Nuclear			Non-Nuclear		
		Total	No Children	Children	Total	No Children	Children
Total							
U.S. total ^a	100	92	40	52	8	4	4
Ukrainian ⁿ	100 (1579)	92	40	52	8	3	5
14-24							
U.S. total	100	96	44	52	4	1	3
Ukrainian ⁿ	100 (45)	98	51	47	2	0	2
25-34							
U.S. total	100	95	16	79	5	1	4
Ukrainian ⁿ	100 (136)	98	27	71	2	1	1
35-44							
U.S. total	100	93	11	82	7	1	6
Ukrainian ⁿ	100 (260)	90	11	79	10	3	7
45-64							
U.S. total	100	90	53	37	10	6	4
Ukrainian ⁿ	100 (946)	91	46	45	9	3	6
65+							
U.S. total	100	92	90	3	8	7	1
Ukrainian ⁿ	100 (192)	90	87	3	10	6	4

^a“related children” for Ukrainians
^bStandardized on U.S. age distribution of household heads
Source: U.S. total: Bureau of the Census 1973a, Table 29

Table 5.4. Family Status by Ethnicity and Age, 1970.				
Age and Family Status	Males		Females	
	U.S. Total	Ukrainian	U.S. Total	Ukrainian
Total, 18+ ^a	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Family heads ^b	72.0	72.3	70.3	70.2
Family members ^c	13.6	17.1	13.6	17.0
Unrelated individuals	14.4	10.6	16.0	12.8
Family members as a percentage of all non-family heads	49	62	46	57
Total, 18-24	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Family heads ^b	27.3	23.4	44.6	41.5
Family members ^c	46.2	57.3	38.5	41.0
Unrelated individuals	26.5	19.3	16.9	17.6
Family members as a percentage of all non-family heads	64	75	70	70
Total, 25-44	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Family heads ^b	81.9	82.9	87.9	87.1
Family members ^c	8.5	10.4	6.7	8.0
Unrelated individuals	9.6	6.6	5.4	4.9
Family members as a percentage of all non-family heads	47	61	55	62

but seem to suggest that there is little relationship between the presence of children and non-nuclear relatives. However, Ukrainians seem to have somewhat more complex households, particularly at older ages.

This approach to the issue of family extension is very difficult to interpret. When two groups record the same proportions of nuclear households, it may be that one group has fewer potentially extending relatives, but is including a higher proportion of them into existing families. This issue is clearly a problem when comparing two populations with very different levels of fertility and mortality. Under conditions of low survivorship, all older relatives might be incorporated into families and yet high proportions for the society will be nuclear. While large mortality differentials probably do not characterize these two populations, immigration might have had very much the same effect. If, because of differential migration, Ukrainian-American families have fewer potentially extending relatives present in the United States,

Table 5.4. Continued

Age and Family Status	Males		Females	
	U.S. Total	Ukrainian	U.S. Total	Ukrainian
Total, 45 – 64	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Family heads ^b	86.2	88.8	79.8	82.2
Family members ^c	3.9	4.5	6.0	6.6
Unrelated individuals	9.9	6.8	14.2	11.2
Family members as a percentage of all non-family heads	28	40	30	37
Total, 65 +	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Family heads ^b	71.3	70.2	42.0	42.2
Family members ^c	7.0	11.2	16.7	30.3
Unrelated individuals	21.7	18.6	41.4	27.3
Family members as a percentage of all non-family heads	24	38	29	52

^aStandardized on U.S. age distribution

^bIncludes all primary family heads and wives of primary family heads

^cAll persons living neither as unrelated individuals nor as family heads. Includes a small number of secondary family members.

Source: U.S. total: Bureau of the Census 1973b, Table 2

they may register very high nuclear proportions while at the same time be more likely to include those other relatives who are in this country.²

The best way to examine this issue is to look not at households but at individuals and ask: Of those adults who are not themselves family heads (and thus eligible to extend the family of a relative), what proportion lives with relatives? Seen in this light, the recent rapid increase in persons living alone or with non-relatives represents a decline in family extension with respect to unmarried adults. Table 5.4 presents data on this point for 1970. In this table, individuals have been classified into three categories: family heads, including wives; persons living as relatives of the head; and unrelated individuals, who include heads of one-person households and others living as either a non-relative of the household head, or outside of households altogether in group quarters. Looking at the age standardized distribution for the total population age 18 and over, very similar proportions are family

heads.³ Ukrainian Americans of both sexes, however, are more likely to be living as family members than is the total group, and less likely to be living as unrelated individuals. To focus attention on this contrast, an additional ratio has been calculated: family members as a percentage of non-family heads. Less than half the adults 18 or over who are eligible to be extended family members, i.e., neither head nor spouse, are doing so for the U.S. total, whereas about 60 percent of Ukrainians are living with family. Differences of some magnitude occur for every age and sex category except for the youngest women (age 18–24), with the sharpest differences at the oldest age level (65 and over). The oldest Ukrainian-American men are more than 50 percent more likely to be living with family than is the case for the U.S. total (38 percent compared to 24 percent); Ukrainian-American women of that age are nearly 80 percent more likely to be family members (52 percent and 29 percent). These data suggest that, when the question of family extension is addressed from an individual perspective, the Ukrainian-American family system appears to be based clearly on family extension, despite a lack of sharp differences shown earlier in the proportions of families that actually include non-nuclear relatives. Persons eligible to extend families are more likely to live with relatives among these mother-tongue Ukrainian Americans, while for the total population they are much more likely to be living alone or with non-relatives.

We can explore this issue further by identifying the relatives with whom Ukrainian Americans tend to settle. It would be reasonable to guess that Ukrainian families include both close and distant relatives while the total United States pattern is restricted to close relatives. Table 5.5 allows a look at which persons become other family or household members, and provides a surprising answer. There were no differences between the two groups in the proportion who were children of the head, nor in the non-related boarder, lodger, and servant categories (data not presented), so these groups have been included in the third category of "other relative or non-relative." Also included in this category are relatives more distant either lineally or collaterally, and differences did appear for this type which are reflected in the larger category. Without getting too involved in these complexities, however, the implications of Table 5.5 can be simply stated: the "extras" in Ukrainian-American families are close relatives—parents or siblings of the household head or spouse—while for the U.S. total a greater proportion are more distant relatives. This is true for both age groups 25–44 and 45–64; the oldest age group (65 and over) has a shortage of siblings. Evidently those who are not family heads in the U.S. total not only prefer to live alone, but when they live with relatives, they reside with relatively distant relatives rather than with their children or siblings. This may be a reflection of the lower fertility of the total U.S. group, who thus are less likely to have sib-

Table 5.5. Other Household Members by Ethnicity, Age, and Type. 1970.

Age and Relationship to Head	U.S. Total	Ukrainian Total
25-44		
Total	100.0	100.0
Parent	2.8	4.8
Sibling	28.9	47.6
Other relative or non-relative	68.3	47.6
45-64	(n = 83)	(n = 24)
Total	100.0	100.0
Parent	27.5	30.1
Sibling	36.2	45.8
Other relative or non-relative	36.3	24.1
65+	(n = 163)	(n = 152)
Total	100.0	100.0
Parent	63.4	84.7
Sibling	18.0	6.1
Other relative or non-relative	18.6	9.2

Source: U.S. total: Bureau of the Census 1973b, Table 2.

lings or children with whom to live. On the other hand, it may be that to the extent that the decline in household size represents greater preference for independence and privacy, this may be harder to maintain among close relatives than with more distant kin.

Discussion and Implications

It seems clear, then, that the Ukrainian-American family system shows fewer "modern" elements than the general American pattern, avoiding as it does single-parent families, while including relatively high proportions of extending relatives. Two questions seem relevant to our understanding of this phenomenon. The first relates to whether the Ukrainian pattern is unique, or whether it really typifies a more general "pre-nuclear" type. It was argued earlier that family extension was relatively more characteristic of eastern than western Europe. To what extent, then, does the Ukrainian pattern of high extension characterize other mother-tongue groups of eastern European origin in the United States? Data are presented in Table 5.6 on family ex-

Table 5.6. Percentage of Family Members among Potential Extending Relatives by Age and Mother Tongue, 1970 and for the Total U.S., 1940 and 1970.

	Total	Age		
	25 + *	25-44	45-64	65 +
U.S. Total				
1940	53	67	42	50
1970	36	51	29	27
Mother-tongue, 1970				
Yiddish	31	41	29	28
Russian	—	—**	29	24
Polish	41	55	34	33
Ukrainian	48	61	39	44

* = rectangular standardization

** = less than 50 cases

Sources: U.S. totals: Bureau of the Census, 1943, 1973b.

tension patterns for three other eastern European groups, the Russian, Polish, and Yiddish mother-tongue populations. The second question arising in a family change/assimilation analysis is how long these differences can be expected to persist. The family system is generally thought to be a highly conservative institution within society, changing but slowly over time. Data on these mother-tongue groups are only available for 1970, so we cannot see whether any convergence has taken place between Ukrainians and the general United States pattern in the twentieth century, and if so, with what speed. However, data over time for the U.S. total are available, and if they suggest that change on these dimensions can be rapid, this would imply that assimilation might well also proceed quickly. To examine this issue, Table 5.6 shows, in addition to the data on eastern European origin groups in 1970, figures on family extension for the U.S. total in both 1940 and 1970.

Comparing mother-tongue Ukrainians with other eastern European groups suggests that variations in the extent of family extension is great even among subgroups within this culture area. Poles resemble Ukrainians in their relatively high level of family extension, but both the Yiddish and Russian mother-tongue groups reach or exceed the levels of non-family living observed for the U.S. total population. While the Polish group is most similar to the Ukrainian speakers, it differs in two ways. Overall, the Polish level of family extension is lower, about halving the difference previously shown between the total U.S. and the Ukrainian mother-tongue subpopulation. In

addition, the age patterns differ. Whereas for the Poles, the proportion living among relatives declines continuously with age, for the Ukrainians the decrease only occurs between ages 25–44 and 45–64, with those over 65 showing an increase in family extension. This suggests that elderly Ukrainians are particularly unusual in their living arrangements, and are disproportionately included in the families of their relatives. This pattern is quite distinctive, in that it occurs in no other eastern European language group, nor among the total U.S. population. This age pattern, and the very low level of family extension among the Yiddish and Russian mother-tongue subpopulation are unexpected, and deserve closer analysis.

Although the levels of family extension for Yiddish and Russian mother-tongue groups seem low in comparison to the total in 1970, overall the drop in family living between 1940 and 1970 is greater than the largest of the differences among these groups. The Ukrainians at every age are less extended than was the case for the total U.S. as recently as 1940. The variation over time is greater than the ethnic variation, even in a period as short as 30 years. This suggests that family change on this dimension, at least, can be extremely rapid, and there is thus little reason to expect assimilation to be slow. Theories of change for immigrant ethnic groups seldom take into account the complexity that the receiving society may itself be experiencing rapid change, but this is clearly the case here.

Notes

*The author acknowledges with gratitude the resources and data made available by the Population Studies and Training Center of Brown University and by the Ukrainian Center for Social Research.

1. The household analysis is based on the 2233 households headed by a mother-tongue Ukrainian.
2. This argument is presented in greater detail in Kobrin 1976, and Berkner 1977.
3. This may be the result of an overestimate of household headship rates among mother-tongue Ukrainians. A detailed examination of household headship rates suggests that in many cases, most clearly for married men but suggestively for other categories, rates are higher than have ever been recorded for the U.S. totals, which themselves have risen dramatically in recent decades. It is very possible that persons who are not heads are more likely to have their mother-tongue status in a predominantly non-mother-tongue Ukrainian household misclassified than are household heads, resulting in differential underenumeration and an inflation of household headship rates.

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Socioeconomic Characteristics

Oleh Wolowyna

THERE ARE FEW comprehensive studies based on reliable statistics on Ukrainians in the United States dealing with social and economic characteristics. Probably the two most complete along these lines are by Bachinskyi (1914) and Halich (1937). To our knowledge, no study on the socioeconomic characteristics of Ukrainians in the U.S. has been published in the last three decades. There have been a variety of studies at local or state levels, but none at the national level. The main reason for this dearth is lack of data. Because Ukrainians constitute less than 1 percent of the total U.S. population, even large national surveys yield very few cases, precluding any analysis of Ukrainians as a separate group (Greeley 1974).

Although questions such as “mother tongue” have been asked in several U.S. censuses, very few tabulations have been published with data on Ukrainians. The availability of 1970 census sample tapes containing full census records of a representative sample of individuals allows us to produce almost any kind of tabulation, as well as perform multivariate analyses. It is important to note that the subpopulation identified by Ukrainian mother tongue does not represent all persons of Ukrainian ancestry living in the United States. Especially underrepresented are the third and higher generations, because persons whose parents did not speak Ukrainian at home are excluded by definition. Thus one can assume that the data to be presented apply to the less assimilated sector of Ukrainian Americans in the United States.

Three dimensions of a person’s socioeconomic status are included: education, occupation, and income. Education is discussed first because it usually comes first in a person’s life cycle—most people finish their formal education before they join the labor force on a full-time basis. The instances of individuals not completing their education before joining the labor force full-time are relatively few. Thus, in a causal sequence, level of education usually affects a person’s first full-time occupation, which in turn determines subsequent occupations. After a separate discussion of occupation and income, the relationships of occupation and education with income are explored.

Education

Education is measured here by number of years of schooling completed. Comparisons are made with other Eastern European groups and the total U.S. white population; blacks and Hispanics are excluded because of their significantly lower socioeconomic status. In order to obtain some idea about the dynamics of assimilation of Ukrainians, the educational level and current enrollment levels of the whole group are compared with those of U.S.-born Ukrainians. First, we consider males and females separately, and then make male-female comparisons.

Ukrainian immigrants have been severely handicapped in terms of education. American immigration records reveal that about 50 percent of immigrants arriving in the early 1900s were illiterate (Jenks and Lauck 1913, p. 142). This illiteracy was the result of Russian and Austrian government educational policies towards Ukrainians and the extreme poverty in rural areas. The level of education of later immigrants, especially after World War II, improved significantly but still remained at a relatively low level in comparison with the U.S. population. Thus, when analyzing the current level of education of Ukrainian Americans, this initial handicap should be taken into account.

As table 6.1 indicates, Ukrainian males aged 25 years or over had a relatively low level of education, compared to males in the other linguistic groups. A median of 10.5 indicates that half of them had 10.5 or less years of schooling, that is, had not finished high school. This level was significantly lower than the 12.1 for all U.S. whites, and ranked the Ukrainian males third lowest, after Poles and Serbo-Croatians. When only U.S.-born Ukrainian males were considered, the median years of schooling increased from 10.5 to 11.1 years. This is a significant improvement equalled only by the Serbo-Croatians and the Yiddish; all other groups showed hardly any difference between the whole group and the U.S.-born only. However, the U.S.-born Ukrainian males still had, on the average, a full year less education than U.S. white males.

Figure 6.1 gives further insight on the educational level of the eight linguistic groups and represents the percentages of males with zero and with 13 or more years of education. Ukrainian males had one of the highest percentages with no education, 3.8. There was a wide variation in the percentage with no years of schooling among the linguistic groups, from about 4 percent among Russians, Serbo-Croatians, and Ukrainians, to slightly under 1 percent among Hungarians and Czechoslovakians. These variations may reflect in part the educational situation in the countries of origin at the turn of the century, the time when the bulk of the immigrants arrived in the United States. The percentage of males with college educations also varied

Table 6.1. Median Years of Schooling Completed for MALES 25 Years and Older, for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups and Total White U.S. Population, 1970.

Linguistic Group	Median Years of Schooling ^a		Difference (2) - (1)
	Total Group (1)	U.S. Born (2)	
U.S. White	12.1	—	—
Yiddish ^b	12.7	13.2	0.5
Russian	11.3	11.3	0.0
Lithuanian-Latvian	11.2	11.2	0.0
Hungarian	11.1	11.0	-0.1
Czechoslovakian	10.8	10.9	0.1
Ukrainian	10.5	11.1	0.6
Serbo-Croatian	10.3	10.9	0.6
Polish	10.1	10.3	0.2

^a Age-standardized using total white U.S. population.
^b In all tables and graphs, Yiddish includes Hebrew mother tongue.
Sources: Linguistic groups: Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.
U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 199.

significantly from group to group. Almost half of Yiddish males aged 25 or more had at least 13 years of schooling. Ukrainians, together with Hungarians, had the fourth highest percentage, 27.6, while Polish males had the lowest percentage, 18.6.

The low median level of schooling of Ukrainian males was mainly because of the high percentage of men with little or no education: 9.3 percent of Ukrainian males had less than five years of schooling, while the respective percentage for all U.S. white males was 4.9 (see Table 6.2). For U.S.-born Ukrainian males, this percentage was extremely low, 1.9. Surprisingly, the percentage of U.S.-born males with seven or more years of schooling was lower than for all Ukrainian males. Overall, educational upgrading among U.S.-born Ukrainian males had the following characteristics: a very significant reduction at the lower levels, a substantial increase at the high school level, and a slight decrease in the proportions with college education.

Table 6.3 further illustrates the rapid pace of educational upgrading among Ukrainian males. Current enrollment levels in different age groups can be taken as indicators of future levels of schooling of the younger generations. In order to illustrate the relative position of Ukrainians better, we present the respective figures for all U.S. whites, Yiddish, and Polish males, the

Table 6.2. Years of Schooling Completed and Median Years of Schooling Completed, for All and U.S. Born Ukrainians and Total White U.S. MALES 25 Years and Over, 1970.

Years of Schooling Completed	Percentages ^a		
	All Ukrainians ^a	U.S. Born Ukrainians ^a	Total U.S. White
None	3.8	1.1	1.4
1–4	5.5	0.8	3.5
5–8	22.6	24.1	23.0
9–11	15.0	26.8	18.2
12	25.5	31.6	28.5
13–16	18.2	17.3	18.4
17+	9.1	8.5	7.2
TOTAL N	1,909	1,109	46,527,222
Median	10.5	11.1	12.1

^a All percentages and medians are age-standardized using total U.S. white population; thus percentages do not add up to 100.0.

Sources: Ukrainians: Fifteen Percent State and County Group Public Use Sample Tapes.
U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 199.

Table 6.3. Percentage Enrolled by Level of School, for MALES of Selected Eastern European Linguistic Groups and Total White U.S. Population, 1970.

Level of School and Age Group	Percentage of Males Enrolled			
	Yiddish	Ukrainian	Polish	U.S. White
Nursery-Kindergarten (3–5)	52.9	34.4	18.2	26.1
Elementary (6–13)	88.2	95.9	90.6	92.3
High School (14–17)	88.4	80.0	86.0	76.6
College (18–21)	66.2	47.8	41.1	35.2
5+ Years of College (22–34)	13.1	7.3	4.5	4.1
Not Enrolled ^a (3–34)	33.5	37.7	44.7	43.4


^a Age-standardized using U.S. white population.
Sources: Linguistic groups: Fifteen Percent State and County Group Public Use Sample Tapes.
U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 197.

two linguistic groups having, respectively, the highest and lowest levels of school enrollment among the eight Eastern European groups considered.

With two exceptions, Ukrainians occupied an intermediate position between the Yiddish and Poles: the percentage in elementary school was lower for the Yiddish, and the percentage in high school for the Polish was higher than the respective percentages for Ukrainian males. At all levels, Ukrainian males had a higher enrollment than all U.S. white males; of special importance are the higher percentages of enrollment at the college and graduate levels. If these trends continue, U.S.-born Ukrainian males will in the near future surpass the educational level of all U.S. white males.

The relative educational position of all Ukrainian females was similar to that of Ukrainian males. With a median of 9.8 years of schooling, they were

Figure 6.1. Percent^a with No Schooling and with 13 or More Years of Schooling, for MALES 25 Years and Over, for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups and Total White Male U.S. Population, 1970.



^aAge-standardized using total U.S. white male population.

^bIncludes Hebrew mother tongue.

Sources: Linguistic groups: Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.

U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973). Table 199.

slightly above Poles and Serbo-Croatians, and considerably below the 12.1 median for all U.S. white females (Table 6.4). Although U.S.-born Ukrainian females have made significant improvements, their median of 10.6 was still quite below the respective U.S. level. One reason for this was the very high proportion of Ukrainian females with little or no education—6.6 percent had zero years of schooling, compared to only 1.4 percent for all U.S. white females (Figure 6.2). The extreme disadvantage of Ukrainian females is further illustrated by the fact that they had the highest percentage with no schooling among linguistic groups. The position of Ukrainian females in terms of college education was somewhat better; with 13.8 percent, they occupied the fourth place among the eight linguistic groups. As was the case for males, the Yiddish had the highest and Poles the lowest percentages of females with 13 or more years of schooling.

The most significant change among U.S.-born Ukrainian females, compared to all American females, was the decrease in the proportion with little or no education (less than five years of schooling) from 13.3 to 4.6 percent (see Table 6.5). However, this decrease was not large enough to equal the 4.1 percent for U.S. females. As was the case with males, the upgrading among U.S.-born Ukrainian females was mainly at the high school level.

Table 6.4. Median Years of Schooling Completed for FEMALES 25 Years and Older for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups and Total White U.S. Population, 1970.


Linguistic Group	Median Years of Schooling ^a		
	Total Group (1)	U.S.-Born (2)	Difference (2) - (1)
U.S. White	12.1	—	—
Yiddish	11.4	11.9	0.5
Russian	11.0	11.1	0.1
Lithuanian-Latvian	10.5	10.8	0.3
Hungarian	10.4	10.8	0.4
Czechoslovakian	10.3	10.5	0.2
Ukrainian	9.8	10.6	0.8
Serbo-Croatian	9.7	10.7	1.0
Polish	9.7	10.0	0.3

^a Age-standardized using total white U.S. population.

Sources: Linguistic groups: Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.

U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 199.

Figure 6.2. Percent^a with No Schooling and with 13 or More Years of Schooling, for FEMALES 25 Years and Over, for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups and Total White Female U.S. Population, 1970.



^aAge-standardized using total U.S. white female population.
^bIncludes Hebrew mother tongue.
Sources: Linguistic groups: Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.
U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973). Table 199.

Current enrollment figures (Table 6.6) further document the educational upgrading of successive generations among Ukrainian females. Compared to U.S. whites, the Yiddish, and Poles, they had the highest enrollment at the elementary, high school, and college levels, and had almost achieved the national level of enrollment at the graduate level. Similar to Ukrainian males, if these enrollment trends continue, Ukrainian females will surpass in the near future the national educational level.

Table 6.7 summarizes male-female comparisons among Ukrainians. Both for the whole group and for the U.S. born, males had on the average higher levels of schooling than females. The proportions of U.S.-born females with

Table 6.5. Years of Schooling Completed and Median Years of Schooling Completed, for All and U.S.-Born Ukrainians and U.S. White FEMALES 25 Years and Over, 1970.

Years of Schooling Completed	Percentages ^a		
	All Ukrainians ^a	U.S.-Born Ukrainians ^a	Total U.S. White
None	6.6	2.6	1.4
1-4	6.7	2.0	2.7
5-8	26.7	25.1	21.4
9-11	15.9	18.4	19.4
12	34.3	39.4	35.5
13-16	11.3	11.1	16.7
17+	2.5	1.9	2.8
TOTAL N	2,134	1,254	51,718,413
Median	9.8	10.6	12.1

^a All percentages and medians are age-standardized using total U.S. white population; thus percentages do not add up to 100.0

Sources: Ukrainians: Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Samples Tapes.

U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 199.

Table 6.6. Percentage Enrolled by Level of School, for FEMALES of Selected Eastern European Linguistic Groups and U.S. White Population, 1970.

Level of School and Age Group	Percentage of Females Enrolled			
	Yiddish	Ukrainian	Polish	U.S. White
Nursery-Kindergarten (3-5)	50.0	41.2	19.0	26.2
Elementary (6-13)	91.7	94.3	93.0	92.7
High School (14-17)	86.2	90.5	75.5	79.7
College (18-21)	45.2	45.5	32.2	28.8
5+ Years of College (22-34)	7.0	1.4	1.1	1.5
Not enrolled ^a (3-34)	40.2	43.6	50.7	48.2

^a Age-standardized using U.S. white population.

Sources: Linguistic groups: Fifteen Percent State and County Group Public Use Sample Tapes.

U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 197.

Table 6.7. Years of Schooling Completed and Median Years of Schooling Completed, for All and U.S.-Born Ukrainians, by Sex, 1970.

Years of Schooling Completed	Percentages			
	Whole Group		U.S.-Born	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
None	3.8	6.6	1.1	2.6
1-4	5.5	6.7	0.8	2.0
5-8	27.6	26.7	24.1	25.1
9-11	15.0	15.9	26.8	18.4
12	25.5	34.3	31.6	39.4
13-16	18.2	11.3	17.3	11.1
17+	9.1	2.5	8.5	1.9
Median	10.5	9.8	11.1	10.6

Note: All percentages and medians are age-standardized using U.S. white population; thus percentages in each column do not add up to 100.0.

Sources: Ukrainians: Fifteen Percent State and County Group Public Use Sample Tapes. U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 199.

no education was still higher than for U.S.-born males, because of the originally very high percentage of illiterate females, but current enrollment figures presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.6 indicate that this difference is rapidly decreasing. Females are more likely to finish high school, but are still lagging behind males at the college level. Especially at the graduate level, the proportion of females is much lower than the proportion of males, and current enrollment figures do not show evidence that this difference will disappear in the near future.

Occupation

The occupational distribution of early Ukrainian immigrants was heavily concentrated in certain categories. According to U.S. immigration statistics, records for 1899-1910 showed that 98.0 percent of all persons with an occupation could be accounted for by three categories: farmers (44.0), laborers (37.0), and private household workers (17.0) (U.S. Senate 1944). After the Second World War the change in the character of the immigration stream was reflected in the occupational distribution of immigrants. A survey of adult Ukrainian refugees in the occupational zones in Germany in 1948 revealed the following occupational distribution: professionals, 13.8


percent, merchants and bankers, 2.5 percent; skilled workers, 25.4 percent; unskilled and semi-skilled workers, 15.8 percent; and farm workers, 42.6 percent (Mudrij 1954:119–20). Considering the occupational distribution of both earlier and more recent Ukrainian immigrants, significant changes had to occur before the occupational distribution of Ukrainian immigrants and their descendants could resemble the distribution of U.S. white population.

The Bureau of the Census classifies occupations in great detail, using a three-digit code. Given the descriptive character of this study, only the first digit will be used to define the occupational categories (Bureau of the Census 1972:100-10).¹ These categories are quite broad and encompass a great variety of occupations. For example, the category professionals encompasses from highly specialized physicians to registered nurses, occupations which are very different in terms of status, prestige, or income; thus, when comparing populations, the large variation of occupations within each category should be kept in mind. For example, two populations with the same proportion of persons in an occupational category can have a very different occupational distribution within that category. The order in which the categories are presented in the tables does not imply a ranking along a certain dimension like status, for example. In general, occupations in the professional and managerial categories will have a relatively high status, but it is difficult to postulate a ranking among categories like laborers, farmers, and service workers.

Figure 6.3 illustrates the relative position of Ukrainian males in the categories of professionals and managers. The Yiddish group had the highest percentage among males in the labor force aged 16 or more years, with almost 50 percent in these two categories. The respective percentage for Ukrainian males was 20, being the lowest after Polish and slightly below the 22 percent for all U.S. white males. Another indicator of occupational structure of a group is the percentage of workers who are self-employed. This distribution has a pattern very similar to the one for professionals and managers, only at a lower level. About one third of Yiddish males were self-employed, followed by the Russians;² Ukrainian males, together with Polish males, had the lowest percentage of self-employed workers.

Figure 6.4 shows the percentages of professionals and managers and self-employed workers among females. The relative distribution of professionals and managers was similar to the one for males: the Yiddish had the highest percentage, Ukrainians occupied the second last place after the Poles, and with 13.6 percent were somewhat below the 14.7 percent for U.S. white females. The percentage of self-employed female workers was very similar for all groups except the Yiddish. Ukrainian females occupied the third last position, together with Czechoslovakians, and were only 0.5 percent below

Figure 6.3. Percent ^a of Professional Workers, Managers and Administrators and Self-Employed Workers Among Employed MALES Aged 16 and Over, for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups and Total U.S. White Population, 1970.




^a Age-standardized using U.S. white population.
^b Includes Hebrew mother tongue.
Sources: Linguistic Groups: Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.
U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report. PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 225.

the level for U.S. white females. In sum, in terms of occupation the relative position of both Ukrainian males and females was undoubtedly low.

Table 6.8 contains more detailed information on occupation for Ukrainians. Among males, craftsmen and operatives accounted for about half the group; the categories of professionals and service workers were also large,

Figure 6.4. Percent^a of Professional Workers, Managers, and Administrators and Self-Employed Workers Among Employed FEMALES Aged 16 and Over, for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups and Total U.S. White Population, 1970.



^a Age-standardized using U.S. white population.

^b Includes Hebrew mother tongue.

Sources: Linguistic Groups: Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.
U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 225.

while there were hardly any private household workers or farm-related workers. Compared to U.S. white males, Ukrainian males were slightly under-represented in professional occupations, and more significantly under-represented as managers, salesmen, and farmers; the over-represented categories were craftsmen, operatives, and service workers. Comparing all with U.S.-born Ukrainian males, there has been some increase in the percentage

Table 6.8. Percentage Distribution by Occupation Category of Employed Males and Females Age 16 or Older, for All and U.S.-Born Ukrainians and Total U.S. White Population, 1970.

Occupational Categories	Males			Females		
	All Ukrainians	U.S.-Born Ukrainians	U.S. White Population	All Ukrainians	U.S.-Born Ukrainians	U.S. White Population
Professional	14.2	15.0	15.1	10.8	11.6	16.3
Managerial	7.2	8.5	12.0	3.0	3.5	4.0
Sales	4.7	5.5	7.4	7.4	8.8	8.0
Clerical	7.7	9.1	7.6	30.6	35.6	36.8
Crafts	23.8	24.9	21.8	2.4	2.5	1.8
Operative	24.4	22.7	18.6	24.1	21.9	14.0
Labor	6.0	5.1	5.7	1.0	0.9	0.9
Farm	1.4	1.4	4.5	0.6	0.4	0.7
Service	10.5	7.7	7.3	18.3	13.2	15.3
Household	0.1	0.0	— ^a	1.8	1.7	2.1
TOTAL	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.9
N	1,954	1,207	43,115,750	1,593	1,030	25,375,301

^aLess than 0.1 percent.

Sources: Linguistic groups: Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.

U.S. population: Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics*. Final Report PC(1)-D1. United States Summary. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973) Table 225.

of professionals, managers, sales, and clerical categories, and some decrease in operatives, laborers, and service workers.

Ukrainian females were significantly underrepresented in the professionals category, but only slightly underrepresented as managers, sales workers, and clerical workers, compared to U.S. white females. There were significantly more operatives and service workers among Ukrainian females while the percentages among the other occupation categories were similar. U.S.-born Ukrainian females had made some progress in the four top categories, while experiencing declines in the operatives and service workers categories.

In sum, the occupational distribution of Ukrainian males and females was biased toward blue-collar occupations, but U.S.-born Ukrainians had made some progress in upgrading their occupational status. In relative terms, although the percentage of professionals among Ukrainian females was still low, it was closer to parity with U.S. white females in the categories of managers, sales, and clerical workers. Ukrainian women had moved out of the service workers category although they were still highly concentrated among operatives. Ukrainian men, on the other hand, were still underrepresented in all white occupations except professionals, and were still above the national average in the main blue-collar occupations.

Income

It is well-known that income is determined not only by one's own socioeconomic characteristics, but also by those of one's parents.³ In particular, father's education and occupation strongly affect his children's education and occupation, which in turn are directly linked to personal income. Unfortunately, this intergenerational analysis of income is not possible with census data. The analysis will be limited to a description of total personal earnings of Ukrainian Americans in 1969, followed by an exploratory analysis of the relationships among income, occupation, and education, controlling for some factors like marital status, nativity (foreign- or U.S.-born), age, and others. Total family income will also be presented.

As Table 6.9 shows, half of all Ukrainian males aged 14 years or more who had some income in 1969, made, on the average, less than \$6,200 (median income) that year. This is the lowest median income among the eight Eastern European linguistic groups, and \$500 below the median for U.S. white males, \$6,700. In fact, all linguistic groups with the exception of the Yiddish had the same or lower average income than U.S. whites. Most linguistic groups experienced some improvement in income among their U.S.-born males, but this was minimal for Ukrainians—only \$100.

Figure 6.5 and Table 6.10 provide more detailed information on the income of Ukrainian-American males. The first observation from Figure 6.5

Table 6.9. Median Total Income for MALES Age 14 or Older with Income,^a for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups and U.S. White Population, 1969.


Linguistic Group	Median Total Income ^a		
	Total Group (1)	U.S.-Born (2)	Difference (2) – (1)
U.S. White	\$6,700	—	—
Yiddish	8,200	\$8,800	\$600
Russian	6,600	6,800	200
Lithuanian-Latvian	6,600	6,700	100
Hungarian	6,700	7,100	400
Czechoslovakian	6,300	6,300	000
<i>Ukrainian</i>	6,200	6,300	100
Serbo-Croatian	6,600	7,200	600
Polish	6,400	6,400	000

^a Age-standardized using the distribution of the white male population of the United States. Sources: Combined Fifteen Percent State and County Group Public Use Sample Tapes. U.S. White males (for age standardization): Bureau of the Census. *Census of the Population: 1970. General Population Characteristics*. United States Summary (1973) Table 50.

is that income of Ukrainian males was more concentrated around the modal category \$5,000–\$9,000 than respective income of U.S. white males. Ukrainians had lower percentages in the lower income categories and higher percentages in the upper income categories, with the exception of the category \$15,000 or more for all Ukrainian males. In other words, compared to U.S. whites, the proportion of Ukrainian males with low income was smaller, most of them were in the \$5,000–\$14,999 income bracket (64 percent), and their proportion in the \$15,000 or more category was slightly lower. Comparing all Ukrainian males with U.S.-born Ukrainian males, we observe a shift to the right for the U.S.-born, that is, lower percentages in the low income categories and higher percentages in the upper income categories.

Considering that age is related to income and that there are significant differences in age distribution among the three populations figure 6.5 presents, it is important to look at income distribution by age. For all Ukrainian males, younger persons had higher and older persons had slightly lower median income than respective U.S. white males (Table 6.10). The income of U.S.-born Ukrainian males, on the other hand, was higher than the income of the U.S. white males for all age groups except the youngest one, 14–24. Thus, a more detailed analysis shows that in comparison with U.S.

Figure 6.5. Income of MALES Age 14 or Older with Income, for All Ukrainians, U.S.-Born Ukrainians, and U.S. Whites, 1969.



Sources: Ukrainians: Fifteen Percent Public Use Sample Tapes.
U.S. Population: Combined Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.

Table 6.10. Median Income for MALES Age 14 or Older with Income, by Age, for All and U.S.-Born Ukrainians and U.S. White Population, 1969.

Age	Median Income		
	All Ukrainians	U.S.-Born Ukrainians	U.S. Whites
For All Ages	\$6,200 ^a	\$6,300 ^a	\$6,700
14-24	2,400	1,600	1,700
25-39	9,000	9,100	8,200
40-64	8,500	9,000	8,600
65 or more	2,300	3,100	2,600

^a Age standardized using the distribution of the total white male population of the United States.

Source: Ukrainians: Fifteen Percent State Public Use Sample Tape.
U.S. population: Combined Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.

white males, Ukrainian males were not as disadvantaged as would seem to be indicated by the median income shown in Table 6.9. However, in relation to the other Eastern European groups, their position was rather low; data not presented here show that both in terms of income distribution and median income by age, Ukrainian males did not rank high in relation to the other groups.

The relative income of Ukrainian females was much higher than that of males. Their median income, \$3,000, was significantly higher than that of all U.S. white females, \$2,700 (Table 6.11). Also, their position in comparison to the other linguistic groups was quite good; together with Russians they had the second highest median income after Lithuanian-Latvians. The lower income of U.S.-born Ukrainian females compared to all Ukrainian females is surprising, but the more detailed analyses presented below seem to confirm this.


Figure 6.6 shows the income distribution of all U.S.-born Ukrainian females and U.S. white females. A first observation is that all three subpopulations had similar income distribution patterns, although there were some differences. Compared to U.S. white females, Ukrainian females had somewhat lower proportions in the lower income categories, higher proportions in the \$5,000–\$9,999 category and similar proportions in the two other income categories. These differences were more accentuated for U.S.-born

Table 6.11. Median Total Income for FEMALES Age 14 or Older with Income, Age Standardized,^a for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups and U.S. White Population, 1969.

Linguistic Group	Median Total Income		
	Total Group (1)	U.S.-Born (2)	Difference (2) - (1)
U.S. White	\$2,100	—	—
Yiddish	2,700	\$2,900	\$200
Russian	3,000	3,100	100
Lithuanian-Latvian	3,200	3,100	100
Hungarian	2,900	3,000	100
Czechoslovakian	2,600	2,700	100
<i>Ukrainian</i>	3,000	2,700	300
Serbo-Croatian	2,800	3,000	200
Polish	2,700	2,700	000

^a Age standardized using the distribution of the white, female population of the United States.
Source: Combined Fifteen Percent State and County Group Public Use Sample Tapes.

Figure 6.6. Income of FEMALES Age 14 or Older with Income, for All Ukrainians, U.S.-Born Ukrainians, and U.S. Whites, 1969.



Sources: Ukrainians: Fifteen Percent Public Use Sample Tapes.
U.S. Population: Combined Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.

Ukrainian females who, compared to all Ukrainian females, had smaller proportions in low income and higher proportions in middle and upper income categories. This apparently better income position of U.S.-born Ukrainian females seems to be contradicted by the income distribution by age in Table 6.12. For all age groups median income of U.S.-born females was lower than median income of all females. This unexpected finding is confirmed by multivariate analysis presented below: even when taking into account possible differences between the two groups in terms of age, education, marital status, and so on, being born outside the U.S. is being translated into somewhat higher income.

Whether U.S.- or foreign-born, Ukrainian females had higher income than U.S. white females, at all age groups except 65 or older. Their relative position among other linguistic groups was also very good, in contrast to the low position of Ukrainian males. Thus, we have the surprising result that in terms of income, Ukrainian females had a much better relative po-

Table 6.12. Median Income for FEMALES Age 14 or Older with Income, Age for All and U.S.-Born Ukrainians and U.S. Whites, 1969.

Age	Median Income		
	All Ukrainians	U.S.-Born Ukrainians	U.S. White
For All Ages	\$3,000 ^a	\$2,700 ^a	2,100
14 – 24	2,000	1,700	1,200
25 – 39	4,000	3,300	2,800
40 – 64	3,900	3,800	3,500
65 or more	1,100	900	1,200

^a Age standardized using the distribution of the total white female population of the United States.

Sources: Ukrainians: Fifteen Percent State Public Use Sample Tape.

U.S. population: Combined Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.

sition than Ukrainian males, both in comparison to U.S. whites and other Eastern European females.

Discussion

Both in terms of education and occupation, the position of Ukrainian males and females was relatively low, in comparison to their respective U.S. white populations as well as to the other Eastern European linguistic groups. The relatively low educational and occupational position of Ukrainians may come as a surprise to some members of the community, but is consistent with the extremely disadvantaged position of Ukrainian immigrants at the time of migration. Data for U.S.-born Ukrainians and school enrollment statistics show great progress has been made and if these trends continue, Ukrainians are likely to achieve educational and occupational parity with the U.S. white population in the near future. An unexpected result was the difference in personal income between Ukrainian males and females. The relative position of males was quite low, both in comparison with U.S. whites and other Eastern European groups, while the income level of females was above the U.S. level and ranked quite high among the other Eastern European groups. A detailed analysis of this finding would be outside the scope of this chapter and would require more extensive data than that provided by the census. In what follows, we shall present analyses of the relationship of income with occupation and education, and provide some clues as to why the position of Ukrainians is so low in comparison to the other linguistic groups, and why Ukrainian females have a relatively higher income level. Comparisons

of median family income will shed some light on this problem.

Since the ten occupational categories used are quite broad and encompass a variety of occupations, one possible reason for the relatively low income of Ukrainian males is that within each category they may be more concentrated in the lower paying occupations. By the same token, the better income position of Ukrainian females may be due to a higher concentration of females in the higher paying positions within each of the ten occupation categories.

Both hypotheses find support in Table 6.13, which presents median income within each occupation category for Ukrainians and U.S. whites, as well as the relative position of Ukrainians among other European groups within each of these categories. Although Ukrainian males had higher median income than U.S. white males in all categories except professional and managerial, their ranking among the other linguistic groups was low. Ukrainian females, on the other hand, had higher median income than U.S. white females in all occupational categories except sales, but their relative position among the other linguistic groups was much better than that of males. Of special note is their much higher income in the professional and managerial categories, and their second place among the eight linguistic groups in the professional category.

Although these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the different income positions of Ukrainian males and females may be caused by a higher concentration in lower and higher paying jobs within each occupational category respectively, other explanations are possible. One alternative is that within similar occupations, Ukrainian males tend to have relatively lower earnings, while Ukrainian females tend to have higher earnings compared to the other Eastern European groups. This hypothesis receives some support in the next analysis. Unfortunately, census data do not permit us to determine which explanation is more plausible. All we can conclude is that the relative income position of Ukrainian males and females, compared to respective U.S. white and Eastern European populations is maintained within each of the ten occupation groups.

The next analysis explores the relationship between education and income, using a linear regression model. This model assumes that education, as well as other factors, are linearly related to income. In order to assess the independent effect of education on one's income, it is important to control for other factors that may be related to education and may also affect income. The question we seek to answer is: On the average, how many dollars does one year of education contribute to a person's income? The importance of isolating the effect of education on income from the effect of other factors can be exemplified with the factor of age. Age is related both to education and to income: Before retirement age, older persons tend to have higher

Table 6.13. Median Income for Persons Age 16 or Older, by Ten Occupational Categories and Sex, for Ukrainians and U.S. White Population, 1969.

Occupational Categories	Males			Females		
	Ukrainians	Rank ^a	U.S. White	Ukrainians	Rank ^a	U.S. White
Professional	\$11,400	6	\$12,000	\$7,600	2	\$6,400
Managerial	11,100	6	11,100	6,500	5.5	5,300
Sales	10,500	4	10,000	3,000	3.5	3,100
Clerical	8,200	7.5	8,100	5,100	5	4,500
Crafts	9,000	8	8,800	5,100	5	4,100
Operative	8,100	5	7,500	4,300	3	3,600
Labor	7,200	5	6,600	4,000	4	4,900
Farm	b	c	4,900	b	c	500
Service	7,500	3	6,900	3,300	3	2,900
Household	b	c	9,400	b	c	1,500

^aRanking among the eight Eastern European linguistic groups.
^bMedian income for these occupational categories is unreliable, as there are fewer than 10 cases in them.
^cRanking not possible.

Source: Ukrainian: 15 Percent State Public Use Sample Tape.
U.S. population: Combined 15 Percent County Group Public Use Sample Tapes.

^aRanking among the eight Eastern European linguistic groups.

^bMedian income for these occupational categories is unreliable, as there are fewer than 10 cases in them.

^cRanking not possible.

Source: Ukrainian: 15 Percent State Public Use Sample Tape.

U.S. population: Combined 15 Percent County Group Public Use Sample Tapes.

income than younger ones. The statistical model of linear regression allows us to estimate a coefficient that measures the effect of one year of schooling on a person's income, independently of the person's age. Likewise, the coefficient for age estimates the effect of an additional year of age, independently of the number of years of schooling completed.

Many factors affect a person's income, but our choice is limited by the data available in the census. We chose the following factors for the regression equation: education (in years of schooling completed), age (in years), marital status (currently married or not), geographical residence (in a southern state or not), number of weeks worked in 1969,⁴ and nativity (foreign- or U.S.-born). Table 6.14 gives results from the regression analysis for three variables: education, weeks worked, and marital status. This choice was guided by their relevance to the question being addressed and because most of the regression coefficients for the other factors were statistically insignificant.⁵

Results in the first panel of Table 6.14 show that the education regression coefficient for Ukrainian males was \$446, the lowest coefficient among all linguistic groups. This means that, on the average, one year of schooling was worth \$446 of income for Ukrainian males, independent of the effect of all other factors included in the question. This result shows that Ukrainian males were not able to translate their education into income as well as males from the other groups; Yiddish males, for example, were able to earn almost three times as much for each year of schooling.

The inability of Ukrainian males to translate level of education efficiently into income is also reflected in the results for the variable weeks worked. The respective regression coefficient for Ukrainian males is also the lowest among the eight Eastern European groups.⁶ This means that if, for example, we were to take at random one Ukrainian and one Pole with both having worked the same number of weeks during 1969, the Pole would be able to translate this time worked into twice as much money as the Ukrainian ($\$1,162 / \$579 = 2.0$).

The marital status results are not directly related to the question addressed, and are presented here as a sideline illustrating another peculiarity of Ukrainian males. The positive signs of the marital status coefficients indicate that for males, the fact of being currently married translates into additional income. The gain for Ukrainian males, \$1,399, was also the lowest among all groups, as in the case of the other two variables, while the Yiddish had the highest coefficients. In other words, the status of being married resulted in less average gain in income for Ukrainian males than for males of each of the other groups. The same analysis showed that for Ukrainian males, age and residence had little effect on income. The only other factor that had a significant effect on income was nativity: being foreign-born resulted in

Table 6.14. Selected Regression Coefficients for Total Personal Income for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups,^a Age 25–64, by Sex, 1969.

Males

Linguistic Group	Marital Status	Rank	Education	Rank	Weeks Worked	Rank	R ² adj.
Yiddish	\$5,130	1	\$1,296	1	\$1,239	1	16.7
Russian	1,931	5	873	3	978	5	17.1
Lithuanian-Latvian	1,970	3	551	5	902	6	15.0
Hungarian	1,804	6	920	2	989	4	19.0
Czechoslovakian	1,935	4	703	4	782	7	17.3
Ukrainian	1,399	8	446	8	579	8	13.2
Serbo-Croatian	1,695	7	475	7	1,204	2	18.1
Polish	2,198	2	540	6	1,162	3	12.4

Females

Linguistic Group	Marital Status	Rank	Education	Rank	Weeks Worked	Rank	Children < 18 yrs.	Rank	R ² adj.
Yiddish	\$-173	3	\$511	2	\$878	2	\$-208 ^b	3	22.3
Russian	-956	7	465	3	997	1	-138 ^b	2	29.6
Lithuanian-Latvian	-162	2	302	4	822	5	-411	7	27.9
Hungarian	-961 ^b	8	541 ^b	1	839	4	-579 ^b	8	22.9
Czechoslovakian	-459 ^b	5	239 ^b	5	882 ^b	3	-100 ^b	1	13.0
Ukrainian	-124	1	216	6	684	7	-247	4	31.9
Serbo-Croatian	-438	4	209	7	712	6	-381	6	28.6
Polish	-606	6	206	8	636	8	-285	5	19.1

^aThe regression coefficients are from a regression with total personal income in 1969 as the dependent variable and the following independent variables: nativity, region of residence, marital status, education, number of weeks worked in 1969, and age (and number of recorded children under 18 in the household). The regression coefficients in dollars. See the text for a more detailed explanation.

^bNot significant at the .05 level; all other coefficients are significant at the .01 level.

an average additional income of \$768 per year. Education, weeks worked, and marital status had the lowest effect on income among all the linguistic groups. If these results are correct, the implication is that, even if Ukrainian males were to achieve the same level of education as say, Yiddish males, and even if they were to work the same number of weeks, they still would not be able to attain the same income level as the Yiddish. This interpretation assumes, of course, that if Ukrainian males were to achieve as high a level of education as Yiddish, their ability to translate the education into income would remain the same, which may not be the case. Nevertheless, the current situation seems to indicate that Ukrainian males for some reason do not translate characteristics like education into income as efficiently as other men.

Table 6.14 presents a similar analysis for females in the second panel. An additional variable is included in the model: number of related children under age 18 in the household, because the presence of children may affect women's labor participation level, and thus income.⁷ The effects of education and weeks worked for Ukrainian females was low, but they were not the lowest among the linguistic groups, as was the case for males. Thus females fared somewhat better than males in converting certain characteristics into income. Being currently married and the presence of children in the home both had a negative effect on income; these women had on the average lower income than women not currently married or who lived in households without children under 18 years. The loss of income for being married was the lowest among Ukrainian women, \$124, while it was the highest for Hungarians, \$961. Presence of children in household, on the other hand, had an intermediate effect on income among Ukrainian women, \$247, while the highest and lowest coefficients were \$479 and \$100, for Hungarian and Czechoslovakian women, respectively.

Another possible explanation of the difference in relative income between Ukrainian males and females is suggested when comparing total family income.⁸ Table 6.15 presents median total family income for all U.S. whites and for the eight Eastern European linguistic groups, both foreign- and U.S.-born persons. Surprisingly, in terms of family income Ukrainians ranked second, after Yiddish, with \$11,000, and more than \$1,000 above the median for all U.S. whites. It is also interesting to note that all linguistic groups, with the exception of Czechoslovakians, had median family income above the national average. Median family income for the U.S. born subgroup was higher for all linguistic groups and the increase varied between \$300 and \$1,400, with \$500 for Ukrainians.

These results suggest that perhaps there is a household income strategy operating among Ukrainians: The lower average income of males is compensated by the higher income of females, resulting in a relatively high fam-

Table 6.15. Median Family Income for Eight Eastern European Linguistic Groups and U.S. White Population, 1969.

Linguistic Group	Total Group (1)	U.S.-Born (2)	Difference (2) – (1)
U.S. White	9,880	—	—
Yiddish	12,700	14,100	1,400
Russian	10,000	11,300	1,300
Lithuanian-Latvian	10,900	11,200	300
Hungarian	10,700	11,300	600
Czechoslovakian	9,600	10,000	400
Ukrainian	11,000	11,500	500
Serbo-Croatian	10,600	11,400	800
Polish	10,400	10,900	500

Sources: Ukrainians: Fifteen Percent State Public Use Sample Tape.
U.S. population: Combined Fifteen Percent State and County Public Use Sample Tapes.

ily income. It is impossible to determine with the present data if this is a conscious strategy and, if so, through what mechanisms it operates.

On the other hand, we have seen that there is among Ukrainians a male/female differential in terms of how education and weeks worked are translated into income: additional time worked and education yield relatively higher income for females than for males. Being married, on the other hand, results in less income among Ukrainian males compared to males from the other linguistic groups, while for Ukrainian females the loss in income due to being married and presence of children in the household is less than among females of the other linguistic groups.

These results suggest an interesting household income dynamics among Ukrainians, mediated by differential male/female earnings, which seems to be related to differences in sociological and psychological characteristics between Ukrainian males and females. It would be tempting to hypothesize that these results suggest that Ukrainian females are more achievement-oriented than Ukrainian males, but this would be premature. Census data do not have the information necessary to pursue this issue, and a special survey would be needed.

Summary

Ukrainian males and females had, on the average, a low level of education even when only U.S.-born persons were considered, because a high percentage of older Ukrainians had none or only a few years of schooling. A

more detailed analysis showed that the percentage of Ukrainians with higher education was actually quite high, especially among the U.S.-born. Data on current school enrollments showed that younger cohorts of Ukrainians had made significant progress and that if present trends continue they will surpass in education both the U.S. white population and at least some of the other Eastern European groups. In terms of occupation, Ukrainians still had an overrepresentation in blue collar occupations and underrepresentation in white collar occupation, compared to the total population, but U.S.-born Ukrainians had an occupational distribution more similar to that of U.S. white males and females.

The average income of Ukrainian males was the lowest among all groups. A more detailed analysis shows that the median income did not reflect accurately their position vis-à-vis the U.S. males. Compared to U.S. white males, U.S.-born Ukrainian males had higher income in practically all age categories, and their income distribution reflected a better position than was apparent from the median value. However, income of Ukrainian males was relatively low in comparison to the other linguistic groups. Ukrainian females, on the other hand, had a much better income position, especially when it was estimated by occupational categories. Their income in the professional and managerial categories was significantly higher than the respective incomes for U.S. white females, and their ranking in the professional category was second among all the linguistic groups. Multivariate analysis showed that, in relation to the other Eastern European groups, Ukrainian males were the least able to translate education and time worked into income, while Ukrainian females did slightly better in this regard. Another possible contributing factor to the relatively high income of Ukrainian females was that their income was the least affected if they were married and they had a moderate loss in income if there were children under 18 in the household.

In sum, the position of Ukrainian Americans in the stratification system of American society is not the best. Successive generations have made significant progress in terms of education, while the upgrading in terms of occupation seems to be moving more slowly. The income variable is more complex: Ukrainian males fair badly in comparison with the other linguistic groups, while the position of females is much better.

Notes

1. The ten categories are: professional, technical, and kindred workers; managers and administrators, except farm; salesworkers; clerical and kindred workers; craftsmen and kindred workers; operatives and transport equipment operatives; laborers, except farm; farmers, farm managers, laborers, and foremen; service workers excluding private household; private household workers.
2. The Russian group is likely to include a certain percentage of Jews.
3. See, for example, Featherman and Hauser 1978, and the literature cited therein.
4. This variable has been coded thus: 0 = 0–13 weeks or less, 1 = 14–26 weeks, 2 = 27–39 weeks, 3 = 40–47 weeks, 4 = 48–49 weeks, 5 = 50–52 weeks.
5. Estimates of regression coefficients are subject to sampling error and their true value lies somewhere between a minimum and a maximum value. If this interval is narrow, then the estimated value is close to the true value and we can interpret the estimated value as if it were the true value. If, on the other hand, the interval between the maximum and minimum possible value is large, then the probability that the estimated value is close to the true value is very small, and the estimated regression coefficient is of very limited use.
6. Note that number of weeks is not the unit used. See note 4 *supra*.
7. As this variable refers to the household, not the woman, it is possible that all children under 18 may be of more than one mother, or that their mother does not live in the household. For cultural reasons the second possibility is unlikely among Eastern European families. The number of cases with the first possibility is probably small, seeing that only women aged 25–64 years were selected.
8. Family income was calculated using *persons* as units, as the data tape does not permit identification of all family members. The same procedure was used to estimate family income for U.S. whites, in order to produce consistent results. This procedure is likely to underestimate the family income level, but the relative differences among the groups are not likely to be affected.

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Residential and Housing Characteristics

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THIS PAPER FOCUSES on residential and housing characteristics of Ukrainian Americans and other Eastern European mother tongue language groups in the United States. The extent of similarities or differences among these groups, as well as between the Eastern European language groups and the general U.S. population are of interest for several reasons. First, it is more or less conventional in studies of ethnic/racial groups to examine residential characteristics as indicators of their relative status within the larger society. In the perspective of what may be called the classical "assimilation model," the degree of social and economic success on the one hand, and acceptance on the other, of sociocultural groups may be grouped by the degree to which they approximate the characteristics and behavior of the larger society. A considerable body of literature has been accumulated promulgating the notion that residential characteristics are among the most sensitive and informative indicators of degree of assimilation. An equally compelling motivation for examining residential and housing characteristics is the opportunity it provides to explore some of the implications of distinctive patterns and characteristics of these groups as observed in other papers in the present collection. For example, it was noted in the paper by Wolowyna and Salmon that the Eastern European mother tongue groups tend to be concentrated geographically in a small number of states and are heavily concentrated in metropolitan areas. On the other hand, the paper by Wolowyna reveals that these groups compare favorably with the general U.S. population in terms of economic characteristics. Among the questions that arise in connection with these patterns are: How do the distinctive distributional patterns of Eastern European mother tongue groups affect the types of housing they occupy; do the types of housing occupied by these groups reflect their relative economic status; and do Eastern European mother tongue groups sacrifice housing quality in favor of proximity to centers of Eastern European culture in the United States, or are they able to combine locational

preferences with housing accommodations commensurate with their economic status within the larger society? The present paper explores these and related issues.

We begin by reviewing patterns of residential distribution for the Ukrainian and other Eastern European mother tongue groups in the United States to provide a basis for interpretation of the data on housing characteristics. The findings with respect to housing characteristics are divided into three sections—national comparisons, place of residence variations, and generational variations. Ukrainians are compared with respect to selected characteristics to several relevant contrast groups: the Polish and Yiddish mother tongue groups, an aggregate of other Eastern European language groups (labelled throughout as “Other Eastern European”), and the general U.S. population appropriate for the geographic unit under consideration. Comparisons among the various contrast groups form the basis of the analysis. The 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample Tapes and published 1970 Census Statistics are the sources of data for the analysis. The distinction between “mother tongue” and “ethnic” populations noted previously in the present volume should be kept in mind throughout.

Geographic Considerations

Our first question concerns the extent to which the language groups of interest are concentrated geographically, since this is likely to have an important impact on the type of housing available. As a crude index of concentration, we first examine the distinction of each population by state of residence.¹ As shown in Table 7.1, each of the Eastern European language groups was much more concentrated than the total U.S. population. While it requires the accumulation of the population of nine states to account for one-half of the total U.S. population, half of the Ukrainian mother tongue population is concentrated in only three states. Only the Yiddish mother tongue group is more concentrated. Here we find that two states together contain half or more of the population. For the Polish and all other Eastern European language groups combined, it requires four and five states respectively to account for at least half of the population. To pursue this issue further, we find it requires twenty states to account for at least three fourths of the total U.S. population, but for both the Ukrainian and Yiddish language groups at least three fourths of the population is concentrated in only six states, which is less than one third of the states required for the total population. The other language groups are less concentrated than the Ukrainians and Yiddish, but they are also much more concentrated than the total U.S. population.

Viewing these data somewhat differently, we present in the last two col-

Table 7.1. Number of States Required to Account for One Half and Three Fourths of Populations of Selected Language Groups and the General U.S. Population by State of Residence, 1970.

Language Group	No. of States containing $\frac{1}{2}$ of Population	No. of States containing $\frac{3}{4}$ of Population	Proportion of Population in Most Populous:	
			Five States	Ten States
Total U.S.	9	20	37	55
Ukrainian	3	6	69	90
Polish	4	8	61	85
Yiddish	2	6	72	89
Other Eastern European	5	9	55	78

Source: 1970 Census Public Use Tape. 15 percent State Sample.

umns of Table 7.1 the proportion of each linguistic group that is found in the five and ten most populous states containing each of the groups. Clearly, each of the language groups is much more concentrated by state of residence than the total population. Here too it is evident that the Ukrainians and Yiddish are the most highly concentrated among the Eastern European language groups. The Ukrainians tend to be concentrated disproportionately in New York and Pennsylvania and to a much lesser extent in New Jersey (data not shown). The two top states account for four out of every ten in this language group, but the Ukrainians are not nearly as concentrated as the Yiddish. Among the latter, 44 percent are located in the state of New York, which is more than double the concentration of any other group and more than four times as concentrated as the U.S. population.

While the Polish and other Eastern European language groups are also disproportionately located in New York, the degree of concentration is much less marked. Whereas Ukrainians are largely concentrated in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, the Yiddish are found largely in New York and to a much lesser extent in California. Apart from the concentration in New York, the Polish and other language groups tend also to be concentrated in Pennsylvania and in the midwestern states of Illinois, Michigan and Ohio. It is obvious that all of the Eastern European language groups tend to cluster in a few, and for the most part the same, states.

As shown in Table 7.2, all four of the language groups are disproportionately concentrated in urban and metropolitan areas, but the concentration is particularly marked for the Yiddish group. While all of the East Europeans are more concentrated in central cities than the general population, only the

Table 7.2. Percent Distribution of Selected Eastern European Language Groups and Total U.S. Population by Place of Residence, 1970.

Place of Residence	Ukrainian	Polish	Yiddish	Other Eastern European	Total U.S. (in millions)
N	2083	5484	4073	5292	203.3
Urban	88	87	98	86	73.5
Rural	12	13	2	14	26.5
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100	100.0
N	2368	6320	4148	6168	203.3
Metropolitan	86	87	96	85	68.6
Nonmetropolitan	14	13	4	15	31.4
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100	100.0
N	2355	6257	4398	5669	202.9
Central City	44.1	42.2	60.4	38.1	31.3
Non-central City	55.9	57.8	39.6	61.9	68.7
TOTAL PERCENT	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Language Groups: 1970 Census Public Use Tapes, Fifteen Percent State Sample
Total U.S.: Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, Part A. Number of Inhabitants.*

Yiddish have a distinct majority living in central cities. Clearly, the East European language groups are more likely than the general population in the United States to live in or near the larger urban areas. The low proportion living in rural areas is worthy of note. Except for the Yiddish group, the Ukrainians are less likely than the other language groups or the general population to live in rural areas and more likely to live in central cities. While the differences observed in Table 7.2 are not sizable across language groups, they differ substantially from the general population. To summarize, it is apparent from these data that the Eastern European mother tongue groups of interest are largely urban populations with high proportions residing in central cities, and are very concentrated in a handful of states. These patterns provide the context with which the data provided below on housing characteristics are to be interpreted.

Housing Characteristics

Tables 7.3 and 7.4 display the results of comparisons of selected housing characteristics of Ukrainian Americans with other Eastern European language groups and with the general U.S. population on a national basis. Looking first at the data on structural and occupancy characteristics, several impor-

tant differences are evident. Perhaps the most striking of the differences is with respect to home tenure as shown in Table 7.3. While the Eastern European language groups as a whole (with the exception of the Yiddish) are more likely to own their homes than the general U.S. population, it is the Ukrainians who have the highest proportion of homeowners, their rate exceeding the national average by nearly 25 percent. Somewhat surprisingly, however, this is not reflected in a higher proportion of Ukrainians in single-family detached units where each of the Eastern European groups, once again with the exception of the Yiddish, approximate the national average. The Ukrainians are, however, more likely to reside in single-family attached units than either the other language groups or the general population, the proportion being more than double the national average. This is, no doubt, due to their concentration in the State of Pennsylvania where, according to 1970 Census statistics, nearly 20 percent of the population resided in this type of unit. While there is a slight tendency for the Eastern European language groups (in contrast with the general U.S. population) to reside in two- or four-family structures, it is primarily the Yiddish group that exhibits a distinctive pattern with respect to size of structure. The proportion of Yiddish living in multiple family units with five or more families exceeds the national average by a factor of nearly three. This, too, is no doubt due to the unique distribution of the Yiddish language group, of whom, over 40 percent lived in the state of New York where more than one third of the population resided in units with five or more families in 1970.

With respect to age of structure, the data in Table 7.3 suggest a pattern similar to that described above. The Eastern European language groups as a whole, with the exception of the Yiddish, tend to approximate the national average in terms of the age of the structures in which they reside. They are, however, somewhat more likely to reside in units built prior to 1939, and slightly less likely to reside in more recently constructed units. Slightly more than one half of Ukrainians resided in structures built prior to World War II and another one third in units built between 1940 and 1959. The Yiddish, on the other hand, tend to be overrepresented in structures built in 1960 or later, particularly in comparison with Ukrainians and Poles, and are substantially underrepresented in the older (built prior to 1940) structures.

Also evident in Table 7.3 is the fact that each of the Eastern European language groups occupied structures which were larger than (or in the case of the Yiddish, equal to) the national average in terms of numbers of rooms, with the Ukrainians having the highest median number of rooms. This, no doubt, reflects the fact that they are more likely to live in older single family units than the general population. Worthy of note, however, is the fact that the Eastern European groups, except for the Yiddish, are underrepresented both in the largest units (8 or more rooms) and the smallest. Once again,

Table 7.3. Percentage Distributions of Selected Housing Characteristics for Selected Eastern European Language Groups and the Total U.S. Population.

Characteristics	Ukrainian	Polish	Yiddish	Other Eastern European	Total U.S. (in millions)
N	4878	6268	4364	5848	68.679
Home Tenure					
Owned	78	75	47	77	63
Cooperative	1	1	6	1	
Rented	21	25	47	26	37
Units in Structure					
One-family detached	61	64	37	67	66
One-family attached	8	4	6	3	3
2-4 family	19	22	15	17	13
5-19 family	7	5	11	6	15
20 or more family	5	4	33	6	
Mobile home	1	1	-	1	3
Year Structure Built					
1965 or later	9	9	14	10	13
1960-1964	10	9	17	11	12
1950-1959	22	23	29	24	21
1940-1949	10	10	11	12	13
1939 or earlier	51	49	30	44	41
Number of Rooms					
3 or less rooms	8	7	23	11	17
4-5 rooms	41	46	34	43	66
6-7 rooms	42	38	30	37	
8 or more rooms	9	9	13	9	17
MEDIAN	5.5	5.4	5.0	5.3	5.0
Persons per Room					
.50 or less	43	44	47	47	50
.51 to .75	28	26	33	27	23
.76 to 1.00	22	22	15	19	19
1.01 or more	7	8	5	7	8
MEDIAN	.56	.57	.52	.53	.51

Note: Some percentages do not add up to 100.0 due to rounding error.

Sources: Language Groups: 1970 Census Public Use Tapes, Fifteen Percent SMSA and County Group Sample.

Total U.S.: Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Housing, Vol. 1, Housing Characteristics for States, Cities, and Counties, Part 1, United States Summary*.

the Yiddish stand out from the other language groups in that a substantially higher proportion reside in units with three or fewer rooms. It will be recalled that this group tended also to live in the newer multiple unit structures.

Despite the tendency of the Eastern European language groups to reside in units which are on the average larger than those of the general population, these groups do not differ significantly from the U.S. population in number of persons per room, a measure of household density. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 7.3, while each of the language groups of interest is characterized by higher median number of persons per room than the general U.S. population, the differences are quite small in magnitude, but nevertheless sufficient in size to offset the somewhat larger structures occupied by the Eastern European language groups. This would seem to imply some combination of larger nuclear and/or extended family structures.

In Table 7.4 we shift attention from structural-occupancy aspects of housing to financial-cost characteristics. Looking first at the value of owner-occupied units, we find that each of the language groups of interest is less likely than the general population to occupy the lower valued homes, particularly those valued at less than \$10,000. On the other hand, neither do they show a tendency toward residency in the most expensive homes, tending rather to be disproportionately concentrated in homes in the \$20,000 to \$43,000 category. The proportion of the Eastern European mother tongue groups owning homes in this category is substantially larger than the national average, but very similar among the various language groups. Worthy of note, however, is the very high proportion of Yiddish that own the most expensive homes. While the other Eastern European language groups approximate the national average in the proportion living in the most expensive homes, the Yiddish exceed the national average by more than a four-fold difference. While it is obvious that the Yiddish group is much less likely to be homeowners, it would seem that when they do own, they purchase the highest-priced homes. The median value of 31.4 thousand exceeds the national average of 17.0 by 85 percent. While the Ukrainians are more likely to own and also are more likely to purchase homes above average value for the country as a whole, they exceed the national average by a more modest 14 percent in median value.

One should view these data with caution, however, since they in all probability reflect substantial differences in housing values by region, given that the language groups of interest here tend to live in areas of the U.S. where housing costs are likely to be substantially above the national average. Thus, their housing quality may not exceed the national average by as much as the data in Table 7.4 imply. The heavy concentration of the language groups of interest in a small number of states, and particularly the concentration of the Yiddish group in New York, may account for much of the variation in

Table 7.4. Percentage Distributions and Medians for Selected Measures of Housing Cost for Selected Eastern European Language Groups and Total U.S. Population, 1970.

Characteristics	Ukrainian	Polish	Yiddish	Other	Total U.S.
Value of property					
N	2979	2689	1917	3688	39.885 ^a
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under \$10,000	15	15	1	12	22
\$10,000–14,999	17	18	7	15	20
\$15,000–19,999	20	22	11	20	20
\$20,000–34,999	39	37	41	38	29
\$35,000 or more	9	8	41	13	9
MEDIAN VALUE	\$19,310	\$19,129	\$31,388	\$20,743	\$17,000
Monthly rental^b					
N	953	1072	2243	1672	23.564 ^a
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Less than \$50	5	4	1	3	6
\$50–99	41	37	19	31	35
\$100–149	32	38	30	35	32
\$150–199	17	16	27	21	15
\$200 and over	5	6	24	10	6
MEDIAN RENTAL	\$ 106	\$ 112	\$ 149	\$ 123	\$ 108

^ain millions. Figures shown are for occupied units only
^bGross Monthly Rent
Sources: Language Groups: 1970 Census Public Use Tapes, Fifteen Percent SMSA and Country Group Sample.
Total U.S.: Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Housing, Vol. 1, Housing Characteristics for States, Cities, and Counties, Part 1, United States Summary.*

value of housing noted. On a national basis, however, each of the Eastern European language groups (with the exception of the Yiddish) tend to occupy houses of roughly comparable value, and these homes have median values substantially above the average norm.

Quite a different picture emerges when we focus on renters. Here we find that each of the language groups approximate the national average in terms of distribution of gross monthly rentals. There is, however, a slight tendency for the Ukrainians to be overrepresented in the lowest rental categories. Again we find that the Yiddish stand out from the other groups, being disproportionately represented in the most expensive rental units. They exceed the national average by four-fold in the higher rental categories, that is, \$200

or more per month. Why the Ukrainians who rent should be concentrated at the lower end of the scale while the owners are overrepresented at the middle to high end is, however, not readily apparent from these data. While this is speculative, it might be hypothesized that since Ukrainians tend disproportionately to live in attached single houses, it may be that the total structure is purchased by the parental family and the adjoining structures are rented to other adult family residents at a rental below the regular market value.

Given the nature of the income differentials among the Eastern European language groups and the general population characteristics observed in an earlier paper in the present volume, it would seem imperative to take such differentials into account in interpreting the differences in property value and gross monthly rent among these groups which we have noted above. The data presented in Table 7.5 address this issue. The top panel provides data on the distribution and median of the ratio of property value to income.² Overall, these data suggest only trivial differences among the various comparison groups. Among the Eastern European language groups, the Ukrainians and Poles have median ratios (1.7 and 1.8 respectively) which fall slightly below the national average (1.9), while the Yiddish and "other" group fall slightly above the national norm. The fact that the value-income ratio for the Yiddish does not differ significantly from the other groups once again, given the significantly higher median value of property noted above for this group, suggests once again their unique position among the Eastern European language groups.

Somewhat larger differences are observable for the measure of gross rent as a proportion of income.³ Here, the proportion of each of the Eastern European language groups with monthly rents of less than 20 percent of their incomes exceeds the national norm, with the differences for the Ukrainian and the Polish groups being substantial. While the median proportions for the Yiddish and the "other" group approximate the national average, the median for the Ukrainian and Polish language groups falls below the national average by about 25 percent. Combining this with the finding above that these groups had the lowest median gross monthly rents among the Eastern European groups, it would seem that for reasons that are not clear these two groups choose to reside in lower priced rental units (that is, among those who rent). These data suggest that the reasons for this may have a non-economic component; perhaps, as noted above, this may be due to the practice of renting out a part of the structure to other family members at below regular market value.

Several clear patterns emerge from the national comparisons presented in Tables 7.3 through 7.5. Most apparent is a distinction between the Yiddish

Table 7.5. Percentage Distribution of Housing Costs Relative to Income for Selected Eastern European Language Groups and the Total U.S. Population, 1970.

Income Related to Value and Gross Rent	Ukrainian	Polish	Yiddish	Other Eastern European	Total U.S. (in millions)
Ratio of value of property to income					
N	2979	2689	1917	3688	39.885
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Less than 1.0	17	17	13	15	} 58
1.0 to 1.9	47	44	41	42	
2.0 to 2.9	21	23	25	23	21
3.0 and above	15	16	20	21	21
MEDIAN	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.0	1.9
Gross rent as a percentage of income					
N	953	1072	2243	1672	23.564
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Less than 10	22	19	13	16	} 48
10 to 19	42	42	39	39	
20 to 24	11	11	12	12	13
25 to 34	10	10	12	13	14
35 and above	16	17	23	20	25
MEDIAN	15.1	15.2	19.8	19.4	20.8

Sources: Language Groups: 1970 Census Public Use Tapes, Fifteen Percent SMSA and County Group Sample.

Total U.S.: Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Housing, Vol. 1, Housing Characteristics for States, Cities, and Counties, Part I, United States Summary*.

and the other Eastern European groups. While fewer Yiddish are homeowners and are much more likely to live in large multiple-unit structures, they tend to live in newer structures with property values and monthly rents which far exceed those of the other Eastern European groups and the general population. Clear differences between the other language groups of interest and the general population also emerge from these data. The Eastern European linguistic groups are more likely than the general population to be homeowners and reside in somewhat larger units in somewhat older structures. Property values for each of these groups exceed the national norm, as do gross monthly rents, except for the Ukrainians, who appear to be something of an anomaly in these data. While we cannot resolve this issue

with the data at hand, it is suggested that this reflects differential patterns of family organization and patterns of relationships between generations with respect to housing.

Variations by Place of Residence

An important unresolved question in the patterns observed above concerns the extent to which these patterns may be reflecting the rather distinctive geographic residential distribution of these groups in comparison to the general population. It will be recalled from data presented earlier that each of the Eastern European language groups are much more likely than the general population to reside in urban and metropolitan areas and in central cities. It will also be recalled that each of the groups tends to concentrate in a few states relative to the total U.S. population. Accordingly, we next direct our attention to the comparison of the language groups of interest and the general population within residential location categories and within the states in which these groups tend to be most heavily concentrated. In these comparisons, we have limited our attention to three characteristics—home tenure, number of persons per room, and value of property.

It is apparent in examining Table 7.6 that many, if not most, of the patterns observed in the national comparisons are unaltered when controls for place of residence are applied. Looking first at the home ownership data in the top panel of Table 7.6, it may be observed that for the Ukrainians and the other Eastern European groups, the percent of homeowners exceeds the national average in each of the place of residence categories by a nontrivial and, interestingly, more or less constant amount. In each place of residence category, the specific comparisons among these three comparison groups show the Ukrainians to have the highest proportion of homeowners. When we focus on the Yiddish, it is apparent that the relatively low proportion of homeowners observed earlier for this group reflects the tendency for urban, metropolitan, and central city Yiddish to rent rather than own their residences. On the other hand, the Yiddish living in nonmetropolitan and suburban areas approximate the national average for proportion of homeowners, while those residing in rural areas exceed the national average by a considerable margin. They also exceed the other Eastern European language groups, but by a lesser amount.

With respect to number of persons per room, the results of the comparisons in Table 7.6 are also similar to those observed in the earlier comparisons. The Ukrainians exceed the national average in each of the place-of-residence-specific comparisons, although once again the magnitude of the differences is modest. Those in the "other" group, also approximate the national average in each of the place of residence categories. The Yiddish,

Table 7.6. Percentage Distribution of Selected Housing Characteristics for Eastern European Language Groups and the Total U.S. Population by Place of Residence, 1970.

Characteristics	Ukrainian	Yiddish	Other Eastern European	Total U.S. (in millions)
Percent Homeowners				
N	2404	2512	3893	68.679
Urban	76	47	69	58
Rural	88	89	86	76
Metropolitan	77	46	69	60
Nonmetropolitan	86	71	81	70
Central City	71	38	58	48
Non-Central City	83	67	80	70
Median Persons per Room				
N	2083	2450	3314	68.679
Urban	.56	.53	.54	.50
Rural	.57	.44	.51	.53
Metropolitan	.57	.53	.54	.54
Nonmetropolitan	.53	.40	.48	.48
Central City	.60	.55	.53	.50
Non-Central City	.54	.48	.53	.52
Median Property Value				
N	1295	950	1824	39.885^a
Urban	\$20,470	27,010	21,629	18,100
Rural	\$19,018	33,570	18,890	12,600
Metropolitan	\$20,395	38,030	22,630	19,000
Nonmetropolitan	\$19,563	35,465	18,125	12,100
Central City	\$17,358	37,300	19,258	16,400
Non-Central City	\$23,710	41,405	23,420	20,700

^aFigures are for occupied units only.

Sources: Language Groups: 1970 Census Public Use Tapes, Fifteen Percent State Samples.

Total U.S.: Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Housing, Vol. 1, Housing Characteristics for States, Cities, and Counties, Part I, United States Summary*.

on the other hand, who in the aggregate were observed to approximate closely the national average with respect to household density, exhibit the greatest variability across place of residence categories. In all but the urban and central city categories, the Yiddish fall below the national average, and substantially so in the rural and nonmetropolitan categories. It will be recalled, however, that relatively few Yiddish live in rural and nonmetropolitan areas. Hence, the fact that in the aggregate the Yiddish approximate closely the national average reflects their disproportionate concentration in urban areas and central cities, where they exceed the national average in terms of household density.

Turning next to value of property, it may be observed in Table 7.6 that each of the categories of Eastern European language groups examined exceed the national median in each of the place of residence categories and in several cases, most notably in rural and nonmetropolitan areas, by a substantial margin. Once again, the Yiddish stand out from the other comparison groups. In all comparisons with the exception of urban areas, their median property values are more than double the national average, with the median in rural and nonmetropolitan areas being triple the national norm. It is clear from these data that the rural and nonmetropolitan Yiddish population is a very select group.

Also of interest in comparing Ukrainians with the "other" group is the fact that Ukrainians have slightly higher median property values in rural, nonmetropolitan and suburban areas, while the opposite is true in urban and metropolitan areas and central cities. This would seem to suggest some selectivity by degree of urbanization. It is worthy of note, further, that the central city/suburbs property values differential is larger for Ukrainians than for the other comparison groups, both in absolute and relative terms. Further tabulations (not shown) reveal that this differential among Ukrainians is also reflected in various structural characteristics. To illustrate, seventy-seven percent of suburban residences are single-family detached units versus forty-one percent of the central residences, forty-one percent of suburban structures were built prior to 1940 versus sixty-four percent in central cities, and a median number of rooms of 5.6 for suburban units versus 5.3 for central city units.

It will be recalled that the Ukrainian language group, as is also the case for the other Eastern European language groups, are disproportionately concentrated in several states. Here, we limit our attention to the six states with the heaviest concentration of Ukrainian Americans: three in the Northeast (New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) and three in the Midwest (Michigan, Ohio, and Illinois). The sample population of these six states accounts for 86 percent of the total Ukrainian sample in the Public Use Sample of

which 63 percent reside in the three states in the Northeast and 23 percent in the Midwest.

It has been noted by Wolowyna and Salmon⁴ that even when attention is limited to the states in which Ukrainians and the Eastern European language groups generally are concentrated, these groups are substantially more concentrated in urban areas and central cities, the latter being the case more so for the midwest states of interest than the northeastern states. Despite this, as is revealed in Table 7.7, Ukrainians are much more likely to be homeowners than the general population in each of the states considered here with the differentials being somewhat greater in three northeastern states than in the Midwest. Worthy of note is the very high proportion of Ukrainians who own their homes (nearly 92 percent) in the states of Michigan and Ohio. Interestingly, while the lowest home ownership rate among Ukrainian state populations is observed in the state of New York, Ukrainians exceed the state norm by a greater amount (in excess of 18 percent) in New York than in any other state.

The data on number of persons per room also reveal substantial differences, particularly in the midwestern states; differences greater than those observed in the national and place-of-residence-specific comparisons presented earlier. In the Northeast, household densities for Ukrainians exceed the state averages in each of the three states, but by modest amounts. In the Midwest, these differences are uniformly larger than in the Northeast, with the density ratio differential being nearly 31 percent in the state of Ohio. These differences probably reflect the tendency for Ukrainians to reside in urban areas and central cities, the latter factor likely being responsible for the large differential in the Midwest. In Illinois in particular, the high density ratio for Ukrainians is likely due to the heavy concentration of Ukrainians in central cities (Ukrainians exceed the state norm by nearly 90 percent) and most notably in the Chicago area.

Of considerable interest in Table 7.7 are the data on median property values for Ukrainians and the general populations of the six states of interest. In contrast to earlier observations in which the Ukrainians, and in fact each of the Eastern European language groups examined, were found to have higher median property values than the general population, Table 7.7 reveals that this is the case in only three of the six states examined here. In the Northeast, the median for Ukrainians exceeds the state norm only in New Jersey, and falls substantially below the state norm in New York. It will be recalled that the differential in terms of proportions owning homes was the greatest in New York. While Ukrainians own homes in greater proportions than the general population of this state, they tend to own less expensive homes.

Table 7.7. Distribution of Selected Housing Characteristics for the Ukrainian Language Group and Total State Populations for Six Selected States, 1970.

State	Percentage of Homeowners		Median Persons Per Room		Median Property Value	
	Ukrainian	Total State Population	Ukrainian	Total State Population	Ukrainian	Total State Population
Northeast	75.1	56.6	.54	.50	\$17,687	\$18,946
New York	65.6	47.3	.55	.53	19,087	22,500
New Jersey	74.6	60.9	.54	.46	24,722	23,400
Pennsylvania	85.3	68.8	.51	.46	12,566	13,600
Midwest	86.7	66.5	.63	.51	19,952	18,242
Michigan	91.9	74.4	.59	.51	18,869	19,800
Ohio	91.9	67.7	.63	.48	19,922	17,500
Illinois	77.0	59.4	.65	.52	22,500	17,600

Sources: Language Groups: 1970 Census Public Use Tapes, Fifteen Percent SMSA and County Group Sample.
State Populations: Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Housing*, Vol. 1, *Housing Characteristics for States, Cities, and Counties* (Separate publications for each state).

A somewhat different pattern is evident in the three midwestern states. Here, only in Michigan does the median value of property for the Ukrainian language group fall below the state median. Worthy of note here is the very high median property value of Ukrainians in the state of Illinois, the median for Ukrainians exceeding the state average by nearly 28 percent.

It is apparent from these data that the property value differentials noted in the earlier national comparisons were reflecting the fact that the Ukrainians are heavily concentrated in states in which the median property value exceeds the national norm by a considerable margin, for the within-state comparisons reviewed here reveal that property values for this group in the aggregate approximate very closely those of the general population of these states.

*Generational Variations*⁵

One would expect that both place of residence and housing characteristics would vary by generational status if for no other reason than that generational status also reflects large age differences. Of primary interest here, however, is the extent to which observed differences reflect the operation of an assimilation process. Contrary to expectations, there are only slight differences in the distribution by residential status among the three generational groups with the third generation tending to be only slightly less concentrated in the ten most populous states than the earlier generations. While the differences are not large, the pattern is consistent (Table 7.8). The only sizeable increase (from 16 percent to 26 percent) occurs in the proportion of the third generation living in Pennsylvania. On the other hand, there is a substantial decrease in the proportion of third generation Ukrainians living in both New Jersey and Illinois. Smaller declines are noted for California also, while slight increases occurred in Connecticut, Maryland and Minnesota. Overall, the major pattern seems to be one of stability of distribution from one generation to the next. Even among the third generation Ukrainians, a substantial majority continues to be concentrated in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. These conclusions should be qualified, however, by the fact that only specific states are considered here. When regions are considered as the unit of analysis, somewhat more marked, although by no means dramatic, shifts are observable.⁶

Viewing type of place of residence, we do find substantial shifts by generations, as shown in Table 7.9. In short, the third generation Ukrainians are much less concentrated in urban, metropolitan, or central city areas. The shift to rural and nonmetropolitan areas is sizeable but the major change has been the marked movement away from central cities where the proportion declined from 40 percent among the first generation to only 23 percent of

Table 7.8. Percentage Distribution of Ukrainians Living in Ten Most Populous States, by Generation, 1970.

State of Residence	Total	U.S.-Born, U.S. Parents	U.S.-Born, Foreign- Parents	Foreign-Born, Foreign Parents
N		453	2561	1864
New York	20	19	20	20
Pennsylvania	20	26	21	16
New Jersey	13	11	16	9
Illinois	8	3	6	11
Ohio	8	7	9	7
Michigan	7	7	6	8
California	5	3	3	7
Connecticut	5	6	4	4
Maryland	2	4	1	2
Minnesota	2	4	2	2
TOTAL PERCENT	88	85	89	88

Source: 1970 Census Public Use Sample Tapes, fifteen Percent State Sample.

Table 7.9. Percentage Distribution of Ukrainians by Place of Residence, 1970.

Place of Residence	U.S.-Born, U.S. Parents	U.S.-Born, Foreign Parents	Foreign-Born, Foreign Parents
N	453	2561	1864
Urban	79.6	84.9	88.8
Rural	20.4	15.1	11.2
Metropolitan	81.6	83.2	88.0
Nonmetropolitan	18.4	16.8	12.0
Central City	23.3	30.8	40.4
Non-Central City	76.7	69.2	59.6

Source: 1970 Census Public Use Sample Tapes, Fifteen Percent State Sample.

the third generation. Apparently a sizeable proportion of the Ukrainians have joined the so-called flight from central cities along with other whites. At any rate, the third generation is much less concentrated residentially than earlier generations. While the third generation is still more concentrated in both urban (79.6 percent vs. 73.5 percent) and metropolitan (81.6 percent vs. 68.6 percent) areas than the general population, they are much less con-

centrated in central cities (31.3 percent vs. 23.3 percent). The second generation approximates the national average in central cities (30.8), while the first generation has a substantially larger proportion in cities (40.4 percent) than the general population. Thus, it is evident that significant changes are underway in where Ukrainians live.

It is the second generation Ukrainians who are most likely to own their own homes and to live in single-family detached structures. As shown in Table 7.10, the proportion of homeowners is lowest in the third generation. However, this group is most likely to live in the newer structures. By way of contrast, the first generation is the least likely to live in single-family units and tends to occupy the older housing units. The higher rental rate of third generation Ukrainians is consistent with the higher proportion living in multiple units. No doubt many third generation Ukrainians are in the early stages of the life cycle and they are likely to become homeowners in the future. In fact, if homeownership rates for each generation are standardized using the age distribution of the first generation as the standard, the third

Table 7.10. Percentage Distribution of Selected Housing Characteristics for Ukrainians, by Generation, 1970.

Characteristics	U.S.-Born, U.S. Parents	U.S.-Born, Foreign Parents	Foreign-Born, Foreign Parents
N	453	2561	1864
Home Tenure			
Own	68.4	82.1	75.6
Cooperative	0.2	0.5	0.8
Rent	31.3	17.5	23.6
Units in Structure			
1 family detached	62.7	70.9	56.6
1 family attached	7.8	8.0	9.8
2 family	17.6	12.2	16.6
3-4 family	4.8	4.3	7.2
5-9 family	3.6	2.8	6.3
10 or more family	3.6	1.9	3.6
Year Structure Built			
1965 or later	11.5	7.0	8.4
1960-1964	14.3	9.6	7.6
1950-1959	19.4	25.6	16.7
1940-1949	9.3	10.3	10.0
1939 or earlier	45.5	47.6	57.3

Source: 1970 Census Public Use Sample Tapes, Fifteen Percent State Sample.

generation sample population exhibits higher rates of homeownership (82.5 percent) than do first and second generation Ukrainians (75.6 and 80.1 percent respectively).

The value of owner-occupied property differs by generational status with the third generation owning the most expensive homes and paying the highest rentals. These data are shown in Table 7.11. Clearly, each succeeding generation pays more for housing. No doubt this reflects the age of the structure occupied, as well as inflated values over time and the year of purchase. The younger generations also occupy larger units, but the relative differences in size are less than the differences in value if we make the assumption that owner-occupied units are the same size as all occupied units. Under this assumption the size of units occupied by the third and the first generation differs by less than 8 percent (5.7 vs. 5.3 rooms), while values of the units

Table 7.11. Percentage Distribution and Median Values of Property, Rentals, and Number of Rooms for Ukrainians, by Generation, 1970.

Characteristics	U.S.-Born, U.S. Parents	U.S.-Born, Foreign Parents	Foreign-Born, Foreign Parents
N	453	2561	1864
Value of Property			
Less than \$10,000	10.8	13.5	18.7
\$10,000–14,999	17.6	16.7	18.5
\$15,000–19,999	19.6	21.0	19.5
\$20,000–34,999	44.6	39.5	34.5
\$35,000 and over	7.2	9.3	8.8
Median	\$20,424	19,708	18,300
Gross Monthly Rent			
Less than \$50	3.8	5.8	5.2
\$50–99	26.9	43.6	44.3
\$100–149	34.6	32.3	31.2
\$150–199	29.2	13.4	14.9
\$200 and over	5.4	4.9	4.4
Median	\$126	101	101
Number of Rooms			
1–3 Rooms	6.3	5.5	11.1
4–5 Rooms	39.3	39.5	43.5
6–7 Rooms	41.8	44.8	37.6
8 Rooms or more	12.6	10.2	7.7
Median	5.7	5.7	5.3

Source: 1970 Census Public Use Sample Tape, fifteen Percent State Sample.

differ by nearly 12 percent (\$20,400 vs. 18,300). However, even first generation Ukrainians who own the least costly homes occupy structures that are considerably above the national average. The difference is particularly marked for the third generation where the value of homes owned exceeds the national average by more than 20 percent. Rentals for this group also exceed the national average by nearly as much. Apparently the Ukrainians as a group, and the third generation in particular, occupy better quality housing than the general population.

At this point it seems appropriate to examine the generational groups with income as a control, since this is likely to have an important impact on where people live as well as on the type and quality of housing occupied. Turning to Table 7.12, it is obvious that place of residence does vary by income and the same pattern of difference tends to be found within each generational group. However, the differences are not always large. While the higher income⁷ groups are disproportionately concentrated in urban areas, they are not as concentrated in metropolitan areas. In point of fact, for the second and third generations, both income groups tend to be distributed similarly among metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. Among the first generation there is a slight tendency for the higher income groups to be over-represented in metropolitan areas, but even the lower income groups are more concentrated in metropolitan areas than either the second or third generation, regardless of income. Within income groups there is a tendency for the third generation to be less concentrated in urban and in metropolitan areas.

Quite a different pattern emerges by income groups when we look at the proportion living in central cities. While no differences are found among the high income group by generation, there is a substantial and consistent decline among the lower income groups in the proportion living in central cities, ranging from a high of 44 percent of the first to a low of only 20 percent for the third generation. While we find the expected pattern of a lower proportion of the higher income groups in central cities for both the first and second generation the opposite is found for the third generation. We can only speculate as to why the low-income third generation would have such a low proportion living in central cities. One plausible hypothesis is that this is due to the unusually high proportion of third generation residents living in rural areas who are concentrated in the lower income groups.

As shown in Table 7.13, the low-income third generation residents also have a much lower homeownership rate than any other group but even this rate is equal to the national average. This group, along with low-income first generation residents, are least likely to live in single-family detached units, and are more likely to live in two-family structures or single-family attached units. To a lesser extent both groups are also over-represented in the larger multiple structures.

Table 7.12. Percentage Distribution of Place of Residence for Ukrainians, by Generation and Income, 1970.									
Place of Residence	Total		U.S.-Born, U.S. Parents		U.S.-Born, Foreign Parents		Foreign-Born, Foreign Parents		
	Low ^a	High ^a	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	
Urban	84.3	89.4	75.3	87.3	84.3	86.3	86.9	94.4	
Rural	15.7	10.6	24.7	12.7	15.7	13.7	13.1	5.6	
Metropolitan	84.2	86.7	82.2	82.0	82.6	84.6	86.9	91.2	
Nonmetropolitan	15.8	13.3	17.8	18.0	17.4	15.4	13.1	8.8	
Central City	35.6	28.4	20.4	30.9	33.1	25.6	43.6	30.8	
Non-Central City	64.4	71.6	79.6	69.1	66.9	74.4	56.4	69.2	

^a See definition in text, footnote 7.
Source: 1970 Census Public Use Tapes, fifteen Percent State Sample.

Table 7.13. Percent Distribution of Selected Housing Characteristics for Ukrainians, by Generation and Income, 1970.

Characteristics	Total		U.S.-Born, U.S. Parents		U.S.-Born, Foreign Parents		Foreign-Born, Foreign Parents	
	Low ^a	High ^a	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Home tenure								
Own	74.2	87.9	63.1	85.2	79.0	89.9	72.6	86.0
Cooperative	0.5	0.6	0.3	—	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.7
Rent	25.3	11.5	36.6	14.8	20.7	9.4	26.6	13.3
Units in structure								
1 family detached	59.7	77.1	56.8	79.5	66.4	81.7	52.5	69.9
1 family attached	9.6	5.9	9.4	3.6	8.9	5.9	10.9	6.2
2 family	16.1	10.1	20.5	8.9	13.9	7.9	17.4	13.8
3-4 family	6.2	3.9	5.2	3.6	5.0	2.5	7.5	6.2
5-9 family	5.0	1.8	4.2	1.8	3.5	1.1	7.3	3.0
10 or more family	3.4	1.1	3.9	2.7	2.2	0.9	4.3	1.0
Year structure built								
1965 or later	7.5	10.5	10.1	14.8	6.1	9.4	7.8	10.5
1960-1964	8.9	11.5	10.7	25.2	9.2	10.6	7.5	8.2
1950-1959	19.4	28.8	20.8	15.7	22.3	34.1	14.7	23.3
1940-1949	10.0	9.5	10.4	6.1	10.3	10.0	9.9	10.0
1939 or earlier	54.4	39.6	47.9	38.3	52.2	36.0	60.1	48.0

^aSee definition in text: footnote 7.

Source: 1970 Census Public Use Tapes, fifteen Percent State Sample.

Table 7.14. Percentage Distribution and Median Values of Property, Rentals, and Number of Rooms for Ukrainians, by Generation and Income, 1970.

Characteristics	Total		U.S.-Born, U.S. Parents		U.S.-Born, Foreign Parents		Foreign-Born, Foreign Parents	
	Low ^a	High ^a	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Value of property								
Under \$10,000	20.2	3.5	15.5	2.2	18.5	3.4	24.8	4.1
\$10,000–14,999	20.8	9.5	25.4	3.4	20.3	9.7	21.2	11.9
\$15,000–19,999	21.1	19.0	18.7	21.6	22.6	17.9	19.8	18.6
\$20,000–34,999	31.9	52.1	35.4	61.4	33.4	51.4	27.4	51.5
\$35,000 or over	5.9	15.9	5.0	11.4	5.2	17.4	6.7	13.9
Median Value	\$17,142	24,503	17,153	25,555	17,386	24,320	16,189	24,461
Monthly rental								
Less than \$50	5.6	2.1	4.5	—	6.3	3.4	5.8	1.8
\$50–99	43.8	23.4	28.8	11.8	46.9	23.7	46.7	27.3
\$100–149	32.8	27.7	36.0	29.4	33.0	30.5	32.1	27.3
\$150–199	15.2	25.5	26.1	47.1	12.5	18.6	13.3	25.5
\$200 or more	2.6	21.3	4.5	11.8	1.3	23.7	2.1	18.1
Median Rent	\$101	144	123	159	97	137	97	138
Number of rooms								
3 or less	9.6	2.3	8.0	0.9	7.0	1.7	13.4	3.1
4–5 Rooms	45.4	30.2	45.3	21.8	43.3	30.1	46.8	32.8
6–7 Rooms	38.0	51.7	39.0	50.5	42.0	52.1	33.5	52.0
8 or more	7.0	15.9	7.8	26.9	7.7	16.1	6.4	12.1
Median	5.32	6.01	5.38	6.43	5.48	6.02	5.10	5.90

^a See definition in text: footnote 7.
Source: 1970 Census Public Use Sample Tapes, fifteen Percent State Sample.

Ownership rates are substantially larger for the higher income groups, with little variation observable by generation. The higher income groups tend, however, to live in the newer structures, with particularly marked income differences observable among the third generation residents. Generational differences in terms of age of housing are larger and more consistent for the low than for the high income groups, whereas at the high income level it is only the first generation that is concentrated in the older units. At the low income level, the proportion in older housing ranges from a low of 48 percent for the third generation to a high of 60 percent for the first generation. While each of these proportions exceeds the national average, even the higher income groups differ only slightly from the national average.

As one would expect, the value of property, as well as the amount paid in rent, varies directly by income. In Table 7.14 we find that the same pattern holds for each generation, but only slight differences within income groups are found among generations. Clearly, income is much more important in terms of the amount devoted to housing than is generational status. It is only the third generation, at both income levels, which pays disproportionately higher rentals.

Size of unit varies by income within each generational group. At the higher income level, size of unit ranges from a low of 5.9 rooms for the first generation to a high of 6.4 rooms for the third generation. But this pattern does not hold at lower incomes. In each generation more than half of the lower-income groups live in units with five rooms or less, but at the higher income two thirds or more at each generation live in structures with six or more rooms. More than three out of four in the third generation live in these larger structures.

Summary

A central issue explored in this paper was the extent to which the housing characteristics of Ukrainian Americans reflected their distinctive geographic distribution on the one hand and their economic status on the other. While preferences for proximity to centers of Eastern European culture are clear from the data presented on residential distribution, these preferences were not reflected in the occupancy-structural characteristics of housing at the national level. Over all, Ukrainians and other Eastern European groups, with the exception of the Yiddish, tend to approximate the national norm with respect to most characteristics. However, a substantially higher proportion of Ukrainians are homeowners than for the nation as a whole, even when place of residence is held constant. In addition, mean property values for Ukrainian homeowners exceeded the national average by a nontrivial margin as did the other Eastern European mother tongue groups examined.

It was in these two characteristics, percentage of homeowners and property value, that the largest differences were observed in the national comparisons.

Further investigation, in the form of state-specific comparisons revealed, however, that some of the conclusions derived from the national comparisons were in fact reflecting the concentration of Ukrainians and other Eastern European linguistic groups in a small number of states, in the northeastern and midwestern regions of the United States. While higher proportions of Ukrainians were observed to own their homes in comparison with the state populations examined, they were also observed to have somewhat higher household densities and, in contrast to the national comparisons, to own properties with higher median values than the reference population in only three of the six states examined.

While some geographical dispersion was noted among successive generations of Ukrainians, third generation Ukrainians remain concentrated in a small number of states. Third generation Ukrainians tend to be more dispersed with respect to place of residence than by state of residence, most notably in terms of proportions residing in central cities. The third generation fares relatively better than either of the previous generations on virtually every characteristic considered. When age of head of household is controlled, higher rates of homeownership are observed for the third generation, in part reflecting their greater tendency to reside in suburban, non-metropolitan and rural areas. Controlling for income does not alter the patterns of differences among generations noted above.

It may be concluded that Ukrainians, and the Eastern European linguistic groups generally, fare well relative to the general U.S. population. While proximity to centers of Eastern European culture is clearly an important aspect of residential location, such preferences do not appear to be incompatible with high-quality housing.

Notes

1. For a more detailed analysis of the population distribution of these language groups see the paper by Wolowyna and Salmon in this volume.
2. Total annual family income or income of primary individuals.
3. See note 2.
4. Chapter 3 *supra*.
5. Generations are defined as follows: First generation—foreign-born; second generation—native-born with one or more foreign-born parents; third generation—native-born of native-born parents.
6. See Chapter 3 *supra*.
7. Income is defined here as in footnote 2. High and low incomes were defined as reported incomes that exceed or are less than the mean for the Ukrainian sample respectively.

Sociological Implications of the Demographic Characteristics

Charles B. Keely

TO DISCUSS THE sociological implications of the information profiling Ukrainian Americans in the preceding chapters requires some guiding principles. The underlying question, and probably the most important implication to be discussed, is the future of Ukrainian Americans as a group. Barring a large-scale movement of Ukrainians in the near future (an event which would create a quite different set of circumstances), what can one expect will happen to Ukrainian Americans in the next two decades?

Ethnic group survival is of key importance to many groups. To provide insight, however, requires discussion of questions of definition and measurement. Such discussions are usually not so interesting as the ethnography and history of groups; yet, lack of attention to them frequently leads to mistaking pious generalizations and wishful thinking for profound insight.

Definition and measurement are intertwined. The preceding chapters rely on characteristics of Ukrainians identified by mother tongue from the 1970 census. Each author in turn has noted the limitations of such an operational definition imposed by data availability. The U.S. population census of 1980 provides an alternative measure, a self-identification of ethnicity. (In reality, the ethnic identity of each member of the household is made by whoever fills out the questionnaire in those households in the sample that received the long form, or detailed census form.) Data from the 1980 census based on ethnic identity will not necessarily be superior to information based on mother tongue. It will be different. Ethnicity surely includes a self-selection component, but there is also an "objective" content. Being from a Ukrainian (or Mexican or Italian) cultural environment, sometimes with a non-English mother tongue, may well affect aspirations, behavior, and achievement regardless of whether one identifies with the ethnic group.

The data presented and analyzed in the previous chapters uses such an "objective" measure, whether Ukrainian (or the other Eastern European lan-

guages used for comparison) was spoken in the parental home. This measure yields quite a narrow definition. As Fulton points out, this definition leads to study of a group that is not representative of Ukrainian Americans. It leaves open to discussion the "real" size of the ethnic group. The "real" size presupposes a "correct" definition. Is descent operative? If so, is descent in the male or female line or both required?

A second aspect of this definitional/methodological discussion that underlies the presentation of data and discussion in all the papers is the assumption that resembling the native born or the whole enumerated population of the United States is the way to estimate integration or assimilation. Doing well as a group on measures of educational or occupational attainment, especially if a group is doing better than similar groups, is taken as a positive sign. It indicates achievement and either the absence or overcoming of discrimination. Intermarriage, on the other hand, can be a threat. If a group eventually is for all intents and purposes indistinguishable from the general population in education, income, fertility, residence, and marriage patterns, in what sense is it anything more than a statistical category? Is there some incompatibility between wanting a group to "measure up" to the behavior and achievement of the whole population, on the one hand, and the retention of a strong and viable identity and culture, including language maintenance, on the other hand?

The basic implication of the studies reported in this book is that the question of survival cannot be answered. The reason it is not answered is that each reader will bring his or her own ideas of what ethnicity is, what is essential to a group's survival, and what is to be regarded positively or negatively. In short, the question of ethnic survival rests on the definition of ethnic group and opinion about whether group measures and comparisons, given their abstract nature as summary measures incorporating a wide variety of individual experiences, really get to the heart of the matter. The empirical data can shed light on what has and is happening but data do not answer questions that require values and commitments to goals and actions.

The empirical studies of Ukrainian Americans presented above do focus on what, by almost any standard, would be the core group, the major recruitment pool, for an ethnic group. Those who grew up in a home where Ukrainian was spoken provide a testing ground. Even within this category, however, the existence of various waves of immigrants presents problems of interpretation. The motivations and characteristics of these waves and their children born in the United States mean that even the mother tongue criterion includes people whose integration into American society represents quite different experiences. Nevertheless, the reality of Ukrainian Americans includes this variety and if they are to be one ethnic group, then in some senses they will indeed share a common fate.

If there is one general conclusion that emerges from these papers, it is that Ukrainian Americans resemble the U.S. population and the longer they are here, and the later the generation, the closer the resemblance is. This is not to say there are no exceptions to this rule. Each of the authors, if anything, is quite sensitive to whatever differences do exist, as is only quite natural in comparative studies such as these. This convergence with the whole U.S. population on the measures discussed in the previous chapters is also not surprising, even within the confines of the mother tongue group. It is in accord with other groups' experiences, and, one should remember, took place during a time of quite rapid behavioral changes in the United States that began to be reflected in the 1970 census. These changes include the expansion of educational opportunity, changes in the economic structure, new opportunities for women in the labor force, the decline in fertility, changes in household structure, the dynamics of housing changes in cities and suburbs, the shifts of population to the Sun Belt. All Americans were caught up in changes that profoundly affected economic, educational, residential, and other indicators of behavior and achievement. Far from being left behind, the Ukrainian Americans in these samples did quite well for themselves on achievement measures.

Language assimilation has been almost inexorable in the United States despite the efforts of many groups to counter it. Even with the current concern over bilingualism of Spanish speakers, the requirement of English for achievement in school and in the work place and being surrounded by English language electronic media require an even greater effort at language retention than in the past, especially across generations. This leads to a reasonable conclusion that the core ethnic group (mother tongue definition) will, if anything, grow smaller in time. Fertility, as Fulton points out, has been lower than overall U.S. fertility. There is no reason to believe that fertility of mother tongue Ukrainian Americans will ever be significantly above the general population. What is most probable is that it will be quite similar. This means below-replacement fertility. This, combined with language assimilation, means that certainly Ukrainian Americans as defined by mother tongue will probably decrease. Those of Ukrainian-American descent may continue to increase as a group for a while, but the dynamics of fertility spell eventual leveling off and decline. The nature of the ethnic group, if maintained, will differ from the past. No new infusions from abroad, the absence of an environment conducive to passing on the language, the very size of the group due to fertility mean the ethnic group must adapt in order to survive as anything more meaningful than a statistical category.

The household structures described by Goldscheider and the residential and housing patterns described by Magnani and Zimmer do indicate some bases for maintaining an ethnic identity built on family relationships. Residential clustering and extended family tendencies help maintain proximity

to Ukrainian culture. United States patterns in these areas are changing rapidly and one cannot assume Ukrainian patterns of 1970 will persist. The 1970 census may reflect a slight lag in the household and residential patterns of the mother tongue group which, it will be remembered, is older than the U.S. population and probably more set in its ways.

The other factor that may help preserve Ukrainian-American culture and identity is religion. The preservation of identification with the Eastern Orthodox church or the Byzantine Rite of the Catholic church provides a focus for the maintenance of the culture in ways which are more difficult for Protestant or Roman Catholic nationality groups. Most nationality-based Protestant congregations (e.g., German or Swedish Lutherans) have passed away into the broader religious denominations. Roman Catholicism in the United States has also pursued a policy of phasing out ethnic parishes, although recent immigration has resulted in the rise of special language ministries to immigrant Catholics. The national traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy and the place of non-Roman rites in Catholicism are a different story, as anyone knows who has the slightest acquaintance with the history of Orthodoxy and the Byzantine rites in the United States. Even the internal split between Orthodox Christians and Byzantine-rite Catholics among Ukrainian Americans, despite occasional friction and bitter memories, is the source of unity in their common goal of maintenance of religious traditions in the American environment. The ecumenical movement should, if anything, strengthen those bonds among adherents of non-Western European traditions of Christianity.

Another bond, which like language but unlike religion, may lessen over time is concern for political issues regarding the Ukraine. This concern has been and, to a greater or lesser extent, still is an important bond for the Ukrainian diaspora in Europe and North America. For some, especially among the older generation, it is an overriding concern. Without new infusions this too will probably lessen. This by no means will result in its total loss. It will become more latent but could be mobilized by political developments in the Soviet Union. Its centrality and vitality cannot be taken for granted.

In sum, Ukrainian Americans, even those who grew up in households in which Ukrainian was spoken, are becoming harder to distinguish as a group from other Americans if one relies on demographic and socioeconomic measures. This does not mean Ukrainian Americans are on a list of endangered ethnic groups as some may fear. It does mean that survival is not ensured. It does mean that the bases for survival are changing. It does mean that the nature of identity and the meaning of that identity will probably shift. Perhaps the greatest resource for continuity is something not measured by United States censuses or religious affiliation. Ukrainians have in their religious traditions what is, among other things, a valuable resource for handing on culture and identity and for continuing Ukrainian-American identity as a core and valued possession of one part of the American mosaic.

Sociological Implications of the Socioeconomic Characteristics

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IMPLICATIONS OF OBSERVED socioeconomic characteristics of an ethnic group can be discussed in terms of at least two general dimensions, that of social status and that of identity. Thus, we can ask the question as to whether the social status of the group as a whole improved significantly over the period of time since the arrival of the first immigrants. Assessing this change of ethnic status of the group will give us a picture of the group's adjustment and integration, or lack of it, to the vertical structure of society, i.e., its system of distribution of social, economic and political resources and rewards. Secondly, we can ask what this adjustment and integration have meant or will mean in the future for the group's retention of its identity or, alternatively, its assimilation into the identity frame of the general society. Here only an attempt will be made to answer these questions for the Ukrainians in the United States.

The data on occupation, education, and income provide us with the basic indicators of ethnic status, but occupation is central in this regard. The change of the ethnic status of a group can thus be assessed in terms of three departure points, the group's entrance status, the position of the group at the period of measurement in relation to its entrance status, and the comparative position of the group at the time of measurement vis-à-vis other ethnic groups and the society at large.

Entrance status refers to the type of jobs that the waves of immigrants of the group in question have been funnelled into upon arrival into the host society.¹ It should be noted that the criterion base is the de facto occupations after arrival, regardless of occupational or educational backgrounds of the immigrants or the financial resources which they might have brought with them.

The entrance status of Ukrainians in the United States was pretty much at the bottom of the occupational ladder. Most of the first immigrants found jobs as laborers in coal mines and steel and other factories, primarily in

Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York.² These were the jobs for which at the turn of the century busy shipping companies scouted for workers abroad. Ukrainian immigrants at that time predominantly had been peasant farmers. But unlike in Canada only a minority went into farming in the United States. The post-World War II wave of Ukrainian immigrants had a much higher socioeconomic background; over one quarter had higher education, and about a third had professional, managerial or higher-level clerical background. Yet even these entered the structure close to the bottom levels, many experiencing occupational downward mobility.³

For the group as a whole the upward shift in status in the period since the group's entrance status, covering at least three of four generations, has been rather substantial. As Wolowyna's analysis shows,⁴ only about 6 percent of all Ukrainians worked as laborers in 1970 and about 24 percent as operatives, probably mostly skilled and semiskilled. At the turn of the century, probably about 90 percent were laborers or unskilled and by 1930 still over 80 percent were either laborers or semiskilled industrial workers.⁵ We can presume that the generational upward shift is even larger than the 1970 census data on Ukrainians show, since the third or subsequent generations are most probably little represented in the mother tongue sample.

Wolowyna's figures, however, show that in relation to other comparable ethnic groups, the occupational and the income status of Ukrainians was not very high (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4 and Tables 6.14 and 6.15). Of the seven other ethnic groups studied, only the Polish had a slightly lower percentage of professional, managerial and administrative male workers; and together with the Poles, Ukrainians had the smallest percentages of self-employed workers. This was also below the percentages in both categories for all the male U.S. white workers, though the difference was small.

Yet, in regard to post-secondary education, Ukrainian males — though not females — were in the middle or higher levels as compared with the other groups and significantly higher than all U.S. white males. Yet again, Wolowyna finds that Ukrainian males were unable to translate their education into income as well as males from other groups: For each additional year of schooling Yiddish males were able to earn almost three times as much as Ukrainian males. How can this be explained and what are the implications of this?

It is very possible that the figure on higher education has been specially buttressed by the first generation post-World War II immigrants who for historical reasons concentrated among themselves a rather large proportion of people with higher education. Wolowyna's data show that in all socioeconomic characteristics, except for higher education, the Ukrainians born in the United States were higher on the status ladder than those born outside of the States. This indirectly confirms the findings of the Philadelphia study

referred to earlier which showed a downward mobility for the post-World War II immigrants, especially in terms of translating the immigrant's education into appropriate types of jobs.

There might have been a number of reasons for this. Many of the postwar immigrants with higher education did not know the English language well enough to find employment commensurate with their education or former occupation. Furthermore, much of the education obtained in Europe was not aligned with the type of training required by many American companies or institutions, and there were no publicly sponsored programs for immigrants at that time which would have allowed them to upgrade their former training.

Similarly, in the absence of an effective immigrant employment-finding system Ukrainians, like most immigrants, turned to their own community networks for employment information and employment opportunities. Those networks, however, have not been either extensive or able to accommodate appropriately higher educational levels of qualifications. Thus to get any employment at all, many postwar immigrants had to take jobs below their training level. Economic security for them meant a reduction of occupational status and related social prestige.

The question as to why Ukrainian males remain at the bottom of the ethnic stratification ladder in regard to professional and self-employed occupations still remains unanswered. It is also not easy to answer because of the lack of detailed data. Yet it is a basic question because the occupational status of an ethnic group is not only the key to its present place in the structure of society, but also an indicator of the route the group may follow in the future if it preserves its identity. Only the male occupational participation is considered here because at least up to 1970 the male labor market can be assumed to be a simpler and more stable indicator of ethnic stratification.

It may be useful to note here that in the Canadian labor force, Ukrainian males have also shown a lower participation in the professional and higher level business occupations than have a number of other, comparable, ethnic groups.⁶ It is possible that the dynamics in both cases are the same or similar.

We can assume that a subpopulation viewed as a group moves into higher occupational strata in a cumulative, stage-by-stage manner. That is, a significant number of people move into a higher occupational stratum if there already has been a significant number of people in the preceding stratum. Here the reference is to broader strata: lower working class, higher working class, lower middle class, higher middle class, and so on. Thus, a significant number of sons move into higher middle class occupations if there already has been a significant number of their fathers in lower middle class occupations. Applying this assumption, we can say that the generational mobility of those ethnic groups whose entrance status was lower will be slower than

the mobility of those groups whose entrance status was higher. In other words, all other things being equal, low entrance status tends to slow down generational upward mobility. It places an ethnic group in a position from which it must catch up with those ethnic groups whose entrance status was higher. As was pointed out previously, the entrance status of both large waves of Ukrainian immigrants in the United States was at the bottom of the occupational stratification ladder. The Poles, in the past, have been similar in this regard. But all of the other groups examined by Wolowyna have entered the U.S. occupational structure at a higher level, often as a result of a more continuous wave of immigration that could immediately benefit from the changes taking place in the economic structure of society, particularly in the 1960s.

Entrance status is only one possible variable and one should not over-emphasize it. Other variables also should be sought. What is particularly interesting is the lower participation in the self-employed occupations, as compared with other ethnic groups. A similar pattern appears also in Canadian data.⁷ It should be remembered that since the Canadian census data on ethnic origin prior to 1981 was based on ancestral background, it better represents all generations. It is therefore possible that the same explanation of this lower participation may apply in both cases.

A significant factor may be the Ukrainian ethnic community structure itself. Ivan Light in a study of ethnic enterprise in America has attempted to explain why Blacks in the United States have had difficulty in developing business enterprises, whereas the Chinese were able to do it much better, even though both had poor beginnings. His answer was that the Chinese have a structure of community relationships that favors economic interdependence. It values networks of quid pro quo relationships and includes organizations or associations upon which individuals or families can rely for economic betterment and for assistance in business ventures.⁸ The same can be said of a number of other ethnic community structures.

The Ukrainian community structure, however, has not been economically oriented. Traditionally, it has had very few institutions or organizations aimed at assisting individual economic betterment. The two main types of such organizations, the fraternal-insurance companies and the credit unions, have aimed not at business development but at personal loans or mortgages for homes. Business development has been a minor part of their operations. Virtually all other institutions and organizations in the Ukrainian community have been aimed at cultural preservation and maintenance of ethnic identity.

Another factor may be social-psychological. The Canadian census has shown that the majority of Ukrainian self-employed persons have been engaged in such businesses as real estate, hotels and motels, general stores, grocery stores, and the like, all apparently low-risk businesses.⁹ One of course would

have to obtain comparable American data before drawing conclusions, but it is possible that Ukrainians shy away from taking high risks. There is a historical basis for this in the social structure developed in Ukraine in which individual ventures were often punished rather than rewarded. The subordinate position of the Ukrainian community as a whole throughout long historical periods may be at the root of this attitude. To this one should add also another possible legacy of the structure of the Ukrainian society, from which the immigrants came. Traditionally, commercial business jobs did not enjoy high prestige in Ukrainian villages and urban communities. In the village high prestige was enjoyed by the priest and the teacher; in the city, by people with university education. It is possible that these values have been transmitted to the second or even third generations and have influenced occupational choice, when such was available, and might have negatively influenced any large scale push into business.

In attempting to give a summary picture of the place Ukrainians as a group have come to occupy in the vertical structure of American society, the Canadian data may again be a good comparative starting point. The Canadian census data, over a period of three decades, made it possible to identify three patterns of ethnic occupational mobility.¹⁰ In the absence of similar data for the United States, it may be useful to modify these patterns for the American scene. We can hypothesize that in the past there have been three major stages in the process of change of the occupational structure of those ethnic groups in America whose entrance status has been low. The first is a stage of social mobility within the working class to the point of strong representation in the skilled working-class occupations, even though there is still overrepresentation in the unskilled laboring sector. In this stage the middle-class involvement is small and only a few members of the group are in the upper middle-class or higher.

The second stage is one of solid establishment of the group in the lower middle-class occupations, underrepresentation in the lower laboring sector, still heavy participation in the skilled, upper working-class sector but without overrepresentation in it. At the same time an elite upper middle-class emerges, underrepresented in these occupations, but already a group rather than an individual phenomenon.

The third stage involves establishing the group solidly in the middle class as a whole. This means not only a representation in the lower middle class which is at least equal to that of the society as a whole, but also an either equal or higher representation in the upper middle-class. Representation in the skilled manufacturing sector may continue to exist, but in proportion to the total labor force of the given group it involves a smaller number of people than in the other, higher sectors. In some groups it may virtually disappear.

The sociological significance of these three stages lies in that each stage represents a different kind of relationship of the ethnic group to the total society. The first stage is that of immigrant adjustment to society as a whole—that is, finding solutions to the problem of having a job after immigration, of cultural adjustment or assimilation, including learning and internalizing the American value complex, such as the values of social mobility.

The second stage represents a move for equal participation in the structure of society that can be characterized as a struggle for better-paying, better-status jobs as a means of ensuring one's "rightful" place in the total society. The problem of equality or equal rights is the predominant issue.

The third stage is of a different nature. It can be characterized as reaching for the rights of the "establishment." Becoming increasingly overrepresented in the professional, managerial and similar occupations, an ethnic group becomes able to gain a measure of influence or power, meaningful not only within its own ethnic boundaries but within society as a whole. In this stage a significant number of members of the group come to occupy what can be called strategic occupations and in this sense the group comes to be a part of the establishment.

Using this model we can say that, as a group, Ukrainians are now in the second stage in the process of their ethnic status change. They are beginning to move as the other comparable ethnic groups whose entrance status was higher than theirs, but with whom they gradually are catching up. Education, in particular, is a very important dynamic force in this process.

Here logically arises the second of the basic questions posed in the beginning as to the implications of the observed socioeconomic characteristics. That is, if Ukrainians have become or are becoming more and more integrated into the structure of American society, can we presume that they will retain their identity? Many have argued that assimilation in the United States is precisely the result of moving upwardly on the socioeconomic ladder. Particularly, it could be said that the move from the second to the third stage may necessitate removal from involvement in any ethnicity.

The problem with these assumptions is that until today they have not been systematically, adequately and critically examined even in the sociological literature. It is not that there have been no studies of ethnic groups or the socioeconomic changes taking place among them, although there have been extremely few studies of such groups as the Ukrainians; rather, the empirical studies very often contain fatal preconceptions and assumptions. Thus, for example, it often has been assumed that ethnicity refers to particularistic attachments, whereas the "modern" world is universalistic. The implication in this is that those who made it to the top of the modern world have no particularistic group attachments. By the same token, the "establishment" has often been perceived to be non-ethnic. Here again, the problem derives

from uncritical use of the dichotomy of "ethnic" and "non-ethnic," lack of appropriate distinctions as to types of ethnic group, difficulties in conceptualizing ethnic identity, and a number of other theoretical and consequently empirical problems.

The process of assimilation and ethnic identity retention are not necessarily completely exclusive. Many people assimilate in some respects and retain an ethnic identity in other respects. Thus, one may not be able to speak an ethnic language at all, yet have a strong subjective feeling of commitment to the ethnic group. Or one may have few feelings of commitment, yet be attached to certain patterns of behavior or customs.

Furthermore, many students of contemporary ethnicity have observed patterns of regained interest in ethnic background by those who in most respects have been assimilated into the American society.¹¹ A pattern of "ethnic rediscovery" often takes place among the third or subsequent generations. What is most significant in regard to the stages of ethnic group integration into the American social system is that the process of change of an ethnic group's occupational structure itself, while on the one hand leading towards greater integration, on the other hand, can also produce an increased group awareness and define the boundaries of identity more sharply. Thus the move from the first to the second stage by American Blacks has been accompanied by a heightened awareness of Black identity. The same can be said of Native Americans. Other groups have shown an increased self-awareness in their progress from the second to the third stage. The Irish and the Jews may be an example of this.

The increased self-awareness accompanying these processes of change does not mean a decrease of the common identity as Americans. On the contrary, it appears that the change is defined by the groups themselves as an expression of common American identity, as an application of the American values of insistence on one's rights and active effectiveness.

It is a peculiar characteristic of the American sociocultural system, that while allowing diverse ethnicities to maintain their communities freely within the larger society, it has produced a relatively high degree of socioeconomic integration on its upward social road; yet, while insisting on "melting" into one cultural whole, it has produced ethnic rediscoveries and thus has continued the diversity of its ethnic identity. This process has provided individuals with a kind of choice—to forget or to rediscover their ancestral background. Over the generations they have been doing both. It is in this context one has to see the future of Ukrainians in the United States.

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