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Republic vs. Autocracy

Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 1686-1697

Andrzej Sulima Kamiński

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This book is dedicated to Barbara, Marta, and Yanina.

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Preface

The idea of this book was born many years ago in Poland. Due to the political climate at the time, it was first planned as a monograph on seventeenth-century Polish-Russian diplomatic relations. Rare access to archival collections and my emigration to the United States allowed me to write the book in its present form, as a comparative study on Poland-Lithuania and Russia based on an analysis of the behavior and structure of both countries' diplomatic services.

I wish to thank the Polish Academy of Sciences, Pax Christi in Vienna, Columbia University, Georgetown University, and the National Endowment for the Humanities for their grants funding my research and writing of this book; my colleagues Omeljan Pritsak, Zbigniew Wójcik, Józef Gierowski, Aleksander Gieysztor, Marc Raeff, Leopold Haimson, and Robert Crummey for their comments on my manuscript; and my former students—now colleagues—Maria O. Pryshlak and Robert Scott for their critical reading and editing of the first drafts.

I am grateful to many archivists, especially those in Moscow, Cracow, Warsaw, London, Reading, and the Vatican for their help during my years of research, and to Robert De Lossa and the staff of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute for their editorial assistance.

A.S.K.
June 1993

Editorial Statement

The Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies publishes original scholarship, archival research, and conference proceedings for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, which was established in 1973 as an integral part of Harvard University.

Within the Series, we endeavor to use place-names in a form which reflects the language of the current political jurisdiction of the place, for example, L'viv instead of Lwów or L'vov, and Mahilëŭ instead of Mohyliv or Mogilev. When a place-name refers to a historical province or region that does not have an exact equivalent among contemporary states, then the historical form is preferred, for example, Moldavia when referring to the historical region, but Moldova when referring to the modern state, or Podolia when referring to the palatinate of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but Podillia when referring to the geographic region in contemporary Ukraine. Throughout, preference is given to English-language forms of long standing, for example Kiev, Odessa, Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna, Munich.

The presentation of personal names defies such an easy formula. Many of those mentioned within the present volume were of Ruthenian ethnic origin, but were born into, and spent their active lives in, a Polish-speaking milieu within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As a series dedicated to the encouragement and dissemination of Ukrainian studies, it is our mandate to promote a recognition of the Ruthenian element in the history of the Commonwealth. The term "Ruthenian" itself has varying meanings. At present, it often means simply "Ukrainian"; however, in the early-modern period it referred to a shared social, intellectual, and religious sphere that gave rise to modern Ukrainian and Belarusian culture, language, and identity. Since the Series is dedicated primarily to the Ukrainian part of this sphere, the names of all those considered Ruthenian are rendered in Ukrainian form, even though they may have been equally important to Belarusian history and culture.

Belarusian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian variants of place-names and personal names are given in the index as necessary.

Republic vs. Autocracy

Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 1686-1697

Introduction

The last two decades of the seventeenth century saw two critical moments in the struggle between Russia and Poland-Lithuania for control of Ukraine and, ultimately, predominance in Eastern Europe. The first was Poland's loss of East-Bank Ukraine and Kiev to Russia; the second was the election of a Saxon king of Poland. By this time, the Muscovite autocracy was growing steadily in strength, while its counterpart, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was sinking into a moribund state. Their rivalry was played out in an atmosphere of official *détente* and even cooperation against a common foe, the Ottoman Porte. Neither side perceived any significant change in its opponent. While today the historian can trace the transformation of Muscovy into the Russian Empire to the reigns of Aleksei Mikhailovich and his children Fedor, Sophia, and Peter I, the politicians of the time, in Moscow as in Warsaw and Vilnius, though sensing the importance of the struggle for Ukraine, were unaware that a fundamental change in the balance of forces was taking place.

Between 1686 and 1697, there was nothing on the order of the earlier "Time of Troubles" in Russia or the future battles on the Vistula to capture the attention of contemporary eyewitnesses. Russia simply confronted a test of strength in its campaigns against the Crimea, thereby gaining a first taste of what it would be like to be liberator of its Orthodox brethren in the Balkans. During this period, the autocracy was also learning new methods of diplomacy, thanks in no small part to the establishment—in Warsaw—of its first permanent foreign embassy. In consequence, Moscow also acquired its first serious experience in the conduct of policy in a state both monarchic and parliamentary.

For the historian, the period's absence of a sense of urgency, the calm before the storm, as it were, provides a unique opportunity to take the measure of these two rivals, endowed with such very different systems of political authority and such antithetical political cultures. It is not my aim to reconstruct all the diplomatic exchanges between the Kremlin and Wilanów during this period, but rather to provide a detailed comparison of the two rival diplomatic services. I also undertake to describe and compare, for the first time in the historical literature, the operation of the

Polish embassy in Moscow and that of the Russian embassy in Warsaw. In other words, my study is not so much a discussion of the actual course of diplomatic relations as an analysis of the diplomatic relationship and operation of diplomatic services of the two rival powers.

Relative strengths, plans, methods of operations, mutual perceptions, and the character of the individuals involved do emerge clearly, however, in the context of concrete actions. Therefore I have included chapters on some critical episodes in Polish-Russian relations. They focus specifically on the struggle of the two states for control of Ukraine (chapters 5 and 6), the related and complex question of control of the Black Sea coast (chapter 7), and, finally, the matter of the royal election in the Commonwealth following the death of King Jan III Sobieski (chapter 8)—the last is of special importance insofar as it reveals an absence of Russian involvement in the election, in contrast to the Kremlin's usual practice and in contradiction to much of the earlier literature on the subject. This passivity bears witness, I maintain, to the serious dependence of the Russian diplomatic machinery on the will and even caprice of the tsar, and to the Russians' failure to appreciate the shift—in their favor—that had come about in the relative positions of the two powers.

Poland-Lithuania's disregard of the growing Russian threat and Russia's proverbial aversion to and, paradoxically, fascination with its western neighbor are the prevailing motifs here. This may be surprising to the historian who knows the outcome of the Battle of Poltava (1709) or the Swedish decline marked by the Treaty of Nystadt (1721). Contemporaries, however, as late as Poltava itself, did not perceive any major shift of power, but continued to judge political realities from past historical perspectives. The latter suggested the ability of both states to overcome even severe setbacks in the longer run.

The Union of Lublin (1569) had marked the beginning of a new era in East Central Europe. It bound Poland and Lithuania together by a common parliament and reinforced the search for national unity on the elite level among Poles, Lithuanians, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians and Belorussians) by recourse to the myth of a common Sarmatian ancestry and the implementation of actual political equality. The earlier struggle over the dynastic inheritance of Kievan Rus' had been transformed into a struggle over the political and cultural shape of the entire region. The long-standing conflict of Lithuania (and later Poland-Lithuania) with the Russian state, dating back at least to the appearance of the armies of

Grand Prince Algirdas at the gates of Moscow in 1368, took on a new character—that of a civilizing mission reaching beyond the limits of such “normal” political rivalries as the Anglo-French or Franco-Austrian—yet was comparable to that between the Ottoman Porte and its Christian adversaries. The clash between a political culture based on the legacy of republican Rome and the Renaissance and one based on the legacy of the Golden Horde and imperial Byzantium was postponed, however, by the very real threat posed to both countries by the Islamic world, as the Ottoman Turks, in the second half of the seventeenth century, embarked on a new era of expansion, capturing Kam’ianets’-Podil’skyi in 1672, threatening Kiev in 1678, and finally laying siege to Vienna in 1683.

For Russia, the confrontation with the Porte was the continuation of a long-standing struggle for control of the richest soils in Europe—those of the Black Sea steppe, an area destined to remain, far into the eighteenth century, the domain of nomadic Tatars subject to the Crimean khan and his overlord, the Ottoman sultan. From the moment of its union with Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (1654), Moscow was drawn ever deeper into the conflict, as it strove to maintain its gains in Ukraine, a region most vulnerable to the Ottoman menace. Poland, too, armed with the experience of struggles with the Turks on the Danube in the fifteenth century and later over Moldavia, Podolia, and Ukraine, readily assumed the role of “bulwark of Christendom” against the Islamic onslaught.

To be sure, for Poland-Lithuania, the notion of defense against Asia involved not only the nomads of the steppe but also the Muscovites who had risen to power on the ruins of the Golden Horde. After all, the lands to the east of the Commonwealth, like those to the southeast, were ruled by princes unfettered by any parliament, church, or code of law; they were lands with no citizens, only subjects or even slaves. To the Poles, as indeed for all of Western Europe, Muscovy—with its political system, Mongol past, mass of Muslim subjects, and eastward political interests—seemed a part of the Orient. On the other hand, Russia was bound to Europe by Christianity, the Slavic Byzantine tradition, and the state’s ceaseless efforts to conquer the shores of the Baltic and claim the full inheritance of the Rurikid dynasty. Political practice may have linked the state to the Orient, but political theory returned it to the West by way first of Byzantium and then of Latinized Kiev and the models of well-ordered Protestant states. During the seventeenth century, particularly its latter half, European thinking and tastes were spread in Moscow by Ukrainians

and Belorussians educated in Kiev, Cracow, and Vilnius in the spirit of the Polish Renaissance and Baroque.

This westward opening by way of Poland-Lithuania, a standard policy of Muscovy's leading statesmen since the time of Vasili III, would abruptly halt with the coming to power of Peter I in 1689. Originally, that break had the character of a xenophobic Orthodox reaction, led by Peter's zealous partisan, Patriarch Ioakim. Later, under Peter's own leadership, the doors to the Sarmatian culture of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would be slammed shut once and for all. Henceforth, the Baltic would be the primary source of commercial contacts, and the world of European thought admitted to Petersburg would be that of Hobbes rather than Aristotle or Lipsius.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, despite the growing interest in European education among the elite, the Russian state continued to be decidedly different from the West in its everyday political and social life. Contemporary foreign political theorists characterized it as a tyranny. At the same time, the Polish-Lithuanian state, anything but a tyranny and still to be a serious actor in political, economic, and cultural terms, was viewed as a borderland, whose character would diverge increasingly from the West's due to the specific development of its political culture. In contrast to France and the Habsburg lands, Poland saw the growth rather than decline of control by its citizens and parliament over their ruler. Also growing was the autonomy of local authorities, who at times challenged not only the acts of the monarch but the decisions of Parliament. To put it another way, Poland-Lithuania was not a state with a strong constitutional order and a government founded on a parliament, but a state based on the ardent adherence of its citizens to a constitution and the power of county councils, which, supported by armed confederations, were capable of ruling not only alongside but even in opposition to the king and his ministers.¹

For Russia, Poland had been an outpost of Europe, and it continued to be so in the seventeenth century despite the fact that the political culture

¹ Hence the optimistic old Polish slogan that Poland "stands thanks to no government" and the equally venerable Polish observation that the state was doomed to collapse, due to that same lack of government. Hence, too, the various solutions along "policy-state" lines to bolster centralism and the state by increasing the authority of parliament, proposed by Łukasz Opaliński, Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro, and later, in the eighteenth century, Stanisław Karwicki, and Stanisław Konarski.

of Europe was diverging increasingly from the republican model flourishing in the Commonwealth. This fact would come to be understood in Russia only in the second half of the eighteenth century, when, along with Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, Petersburg came to view as an insolent anachronism a country more faithful to the ideals of Cincinnatus and Brutus than to those of Augustus and Justinian. For the time being, however, Poland-Lithuania was in Russian eyes, as it had been since the days of Ivan IV, the land of political asylum, the home of the Latin bugbear, and the embodiment of a rather vague political alternative, understood largely along the lines of the Lithuanian oligarchic model. It was also viewed as a serious rival in the struggle for the inheritance of Kievan Rus'. For Ivan IV and his successors the road to victory over the Commonwealth lay in the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian union. Indeed, Ivan, following in the footsteps of his father Vasili III, had sought the Lithuanian grand princely title more vigorously than he had the Polish throne. Aleksei Mikhailovich assumed the title of grand prince upon his brief capture and occupation of Vilnius in the 1650s. Even as late as the beginning of the eighteenth century, Peter I would conclude treaties with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that made no mention of Poland. However, the Polish-Lithuanian union, based more on a common political culture than on the institutions of a common parliament, was so strong that the rulers of Russia decided on the tactic of candidacy to the elective Polish throne as a means of obtaining Lithuania and Rus'. Such candidacies were a standard feature of both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the Polish-Lithuanian electors treated the prospect of a Rurikid or Romanov on the constitutional throne quite seriously, confident not only that they could easily defend their liberties against him but even that they would, as they had with the pagan Jagiełło two or three centuries before, manage to "Europeanize" him and bind his nation to them with the same ties of common political culture and common parliament.²

Some Polish kings, such as Sigismund Augustus, Sigismund III, and Władysław IV, had seen a solution to the Eastern conflict in the conquest

² For a most interesting treatment of the various "solutions" and plans for a union between Moscow, Vilnius, and Warsaw, see B. N. Floriiia, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia. Baltiiskii vopros v kontse XVI–nachale XVII veka* (Moscow, 1973); and, by the same author, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia i politicheskoe razvitie vostochnoi Evropy vo vtoroi polovine XVI–nachale XVII v.* (Moscow, 1978).

of the Muscovite throne and the creation of a great Slavic state that would be a serious challenge to both the Turks and the Swedes. Such notions gained a certain audience in Moscow, particularly in circles of the boyar elite, who had summoned Crown Prince Władysław to the throne in 1610 in return for promises of a share in the government. Polish forces entered the Kremlin, and virtually the whole land swore allegiance to the new ruler. But Władysław's father, Sigismund III, failed to keep his end of the bargain with the boyars: hungry for personal power he had no intention of granting even a limited constitution to Moscow. His Catholic fanaticism, moreover, collided head-on with the equal fanaticism of the Orthodox clergy. In fact, Muscovite society, deprived of hereditary rulers, learned to administer itself in this period of political and social upheaval. The Russian "Time of Troubles" sparked the spontaneous organization of social forces to defend the land against foreign invaders as well as against the revolutionary changes promoted by the Cossack armies. An enormous role was played in this process by the civil militias of certain provinces as well as by the *Zemskii sobor* (Assembly of the Land), an embryonic Russian parliament, which came together for the election of the new tsar.

The newly chosen ruler, Mikhail Romanov, ruled in association with the *Sobor*, which served to legitimize and strengthen his authority. However, Mikhail's son Aleksei, the father of Peter I, restored the absolutist character of tsarist rule. First the *Sobor* and then the Church lost their earlier influence, while the tsar proceeded to a modernization of the army and bureaucracy, a vast codification of law, and a program of economic protectionism designed to promote domestic manufacture. In these undertakings, he made use of specialists from all over Europe, but assigned a special place in the reform of the bureaucracy and the advancement of education and political thought to Belorussians and Ukrainians trained in Poland-Lithuania's Jesuit colleges or in the Orthodox Kievan Academy. Hence the upsurge of interest in Polish and West European culture and knowledge of the Polish and Latin languages in the second half of the seventeenth century.³

³ A. Brückner, *Dzieje kultury polskiej*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1958); A. Jabłonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska. Zarys historyczny na tle rozwoju ogólnego cywilizacji zachodniej na Rusi* (L'viv, 1938); A. Martel, *La langue polonaise dans les pays ruthenes: Ukraine et Russie Blanche 1569–1667* (Lille, 1938); A. Vishnevskii, *Kievskaia akademiia v pervoi polovine XVIII stoletia* (Kiev, 1903); S. I. Maslov, *Biblioteka Stefana Iavorskiego*

Neither Russia nor Poland-Lithuania was as yet capable of exploiting the internal situation of the other. Aleksei Mikhailovich, having temporarily conquered Lithuania by force in 1654–1660, recognized the need to tolerate Polish freedoms and did so quite successfully on paper, as witnessed by his grants of privilege to his new subjects. However, for those accustomed to Muscovite political practice, there was no place for the Polish right of resistance to authority and the participation of the nobility in the governing of the state: the autocracy could view them as nothing but revolt and desecration. It therefore is not surprising that even those Lithuanian nobles who originally supported the tsar were forced to turn against him in the end. Russian diplomats found it hard to view contacts with opponents of the king as perfectly legal, albeit viewed with displeasure by the Polish monarch. On the other hand, the Poles had passed up an opportunity to support the *Zemskii sobor* and made no serious effort later in the century to exploit the Kremlin's strong attraction to Polish culture. In the view of each side, the society of the other offered no potential allies. There were a few exceptions. The Russians knew how to assume the mantle of defenders of Orthodoxy, and the Poles countered by insisting upon their role as protectors of the Catholic community in Moscow and the handful of Catholics living near Smolensk.

The Kremlin's defense of Orthodoxy was a two-edged sword, however. The Orthodox hierarchy of Poland and Lithuania, fearing subordination to the patriarch of Moscow, who after 1684 was the superior of the metropolitan of Kiev, had turned once more toward union with Rome, thus opening the next chapter in the history of the Union of Brest

(Kiev, 1914); N. Petrov, "Kievskaiia akademiia vo vtoroi polovine XVII v.," *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* 9 (Kiev, 1895); R. Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej a literatura polska* (Cracow, 1966); A. I. Rogov, *Russko-pol'skie kul'turnye sviazi v èpokhu vozrozhdeniia* (Moscow, 1966); L. R. Lewitter, "Poland, the Ukraine and Russia in the Seventeenth Century," *Slavonic and East European Review* 27 (1948): 157–71; K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikoruskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'* (Kazan', 1914); *The Kiev Mohyla Academy. Commemorating the 350th Anniversary of its Founding (1632)*, ed. Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Ševčenko (Cambridge, MA, 1984) [= *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 1/2 (1984)]. The list of books and articles describing, analyzing, and referring to the cultural impact on seventeenth-century Moscow of the Commonwealth in general and Ukraine in particular is much longer. However, there is still a need for a study showing the numbers of people from Ukraine involved in the reform of the army and administration. In 1914 Kharlampovich already proved that in the first half of the eighteenth century 75 percent of all Russian bishoprics were occupied by former students of the Kiev-Mohyla Academy.

(concluded in 1596). The struggle against the Union, on the other hand, drew many monks, parish priests, and laymen closer to Moscow. Some even emigrated there. These people far outstripped their Muscovite colleagues in their education and knowledge of Catholicism and the West, while yielding nothing to them in their loyalty to Orthodoxy. With great effort, they introduced changes into the life of the Muscovite church and contributed to the modernization of the country. Nonetheless, the xenophobic zealots of Muscovite tradition suspected them of adherence to Rome and were quick to accuse them of heresy. Their activities would come to an abrupt end with the palace coup of 1689 that brought Peter to the throne. The pillar of Peter's faction, Patriarch Ioakim, a bitter enemy of modernization, succeeded in thwarting the work of Symeon Polots'kyi and other outstanding "Latin" reformers.

Ultimately, the future of Eastern Europe was decided by the struggle for Ukraine. Both Moscow and Warsaw, in their competition with one another and their common front against Islam, knew that the political support of the Cossacks was a matter of utmost importance. In this regard, Muscovite policy was incomparably more effective. (See chapters 5 and 6.) This was in large part due to the Commonwealth's preoccupation with short-term internal problems. Foreign policy questions were always viewed from the perspective of the strong rivalry between Parliament and public opinion on one side and royal authority supported by some ministers and the bureaucracy, on the other. Theoretically, Poles wanted a restoration of the most advantageous borders, a strengthening of the army, and the defeat of their enemies. In practice, however, strong armies and victorious wars could bolster the king's authority, and pacifism was therefore practiced if not preached. Pacifism in turn led to isolationism and ultimately paralyzed every reasonable foreign policy which could have strengthened the pro-Polish camp in Ukraine.

Today, it is easy to see that the struggle for Ukraine was a struggle for the political and cultural shape of Eastern Europe. For the nobility of the Polish-Lithuanian state, however, the matter was not so obvious. The Cossacks were the rivals in the colonization of the borderlands and threatened their domination over the serf labor force. What is more, from the end of the sixteenth century, the Cossack elite had been on the payroll of the Commonwealth and traditionally sought redress from the king for wrongs done to them by the aristocracy and bureaucracy. The Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising (1648) had very clear anti-aristocratic and pro-

absolutist tendencies. Obviously, if the uprising had succeeded, the Cossack elite, taking the place of the expelled nobility, would have been prepared to join Ukraine to Poland and Lithuania on terms of equality.

It is indeed a credit to the nobles of the Commonwealth that in the Union of Hadiach (1658) they had agreed to such a change in the structure of the state. That agreement had been sworn to by the king, the Parliament, and the Catholic primate in their own names and those of their successors. Unfortunately, however, as a result of momentary defeat and internal upheaval, the pro-Hadiach politicians in Ukraine had been forced out of power by pro-Muscovite ones. When Polish victories over Moscow offered an opportunity to renew the union, it had not been taken. Instead, there had been a return to a pre-Khmel'nyts'kyi policy, one whose bankruptcy had already been proven.⁴ Successive generations of the anti-Muscovite Cossack elite would come to embrace the Hadiach ideal, but they were dreamers in a political desert. The Poles of Sobieski's time knew how to lure the Cossack elite with slogans of freedom, calling on them "to throw off from the neck of a free people the yoke of tyrannical slavery,"⁵ but were unable to support these high-sounding words with any political action. They wanted no return to Hadiach, which had not only threatened them with the loss of the position they had hitherto enjoyed in Ukraine but also with the possibility of royal-Cossack collusion. Instead of Hadiach, they aimed at the total liquidation of the Cossack army and Cossack liberties, the kind of radical solution that had helped to spark the Khmel'nyts'ky Uprising and one that would be undertaken on the Russian side of the Dnieper only during the reign of Catherine II. The best political analyses of the situation and the best advice of the experts were never widely discussed in the Commonwealth. Cossack affairs were debated instead in the somewhat narrower forum of the Senate, the king's chamber, and the county assemblies of the Ukrainian provinces. The members of the Cossack elite were attracted by the system and the culture of "The

⁴ Zbigniew Wójcik, *Dzikie pola w ogniu* (Warsaw, 1957); A. Kamiński, "The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its Citizens," in *Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present*, ed. P. Potichnyi (Edmonton and Toronto, 1980) pp. 32–57; Frank Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).

⁵ Iosyf Shumlians'kyi to Ivan Mazepa, January 1690 in Nikolai G. Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia Petra Velikogo*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1854) p. 478.

Commonwealth of Two Nations,” but repelled by its chauvinism and a policy as changing as the sessions of the Parliament and county councils. Moscow repelled them by its rude control and autocratic arrogance, but it also won their approbation by its consistency and readiness to grant the privileges and control over peasants that the republican-minded nobility of the Commonwealth was unwilling to guarantee.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Commonwealth was living out the last moments of its international glory.⁶ True, the whole country had been overrun by hostile armies: those of the Cossacks (1648–1653), Muscovy (1654–1667), Sweden (1655–1660), Brandenburg (1656–1658), and Transylvania (1656–1658). Nonetheless, in the great Tyszkowice Confederation, a movement that drew its strength from the counties and provinces, the nobles had proved capable of defending themselves against foreign occupation and the planned partition of its state. Following peace negotiations, boundaries had remained untouched, except for those in the east. Here, however, important changes had taken place. The border had moved westward to the line of the Dnieper River; East-Bank Ukraine along with West-Bank Kiev had remained with Moscow as a result of the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667. This agreement had been concluded under external pressure. Ukraine was threatened by the Tatars and the Cossacks, once again allied under the leadership of Petro Doroshenko. All of southeast Europe found itself under renewed pressure from the Turks, who were strengthened by the reforms of the Köprülü family. Venice had met with disaster on Crete (1667) and Polish Kam’ianets’-Podil’s’kyi had fallen to the Turks along with Podolia and West-Bank Ukraine (1672). A few years later, Chyhyryn had been burned and the armies of Grand Vizir Kara Mustafa had threatened Kiev (1678). At the end of 1683 a Turkish army had marched against Vienna, just as in the days of Suleiman the Magnificent. There, however, the Islamic tide had been brought to a halt and forced into a hasty retreat. An important element in this great Christian victory was the attack of the Polish cavalry of Jan III Sobieski.

⁶ For the best treatment, based on extensive archival research, of Polish-Russian relations in the years 1660–1679, see Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* (Warsaw, 1959); idem, *Miedzy traktatem andruszowskim a wojna turecka. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667–1672* (Wrocław, 1968), and *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674–1679* (Wrocław, 1976). See also, L. S. Abetsedarskii, *Belorussia i Rossiia XVI–XVII vv.* (Minsk, 1978); A. N. Małtsev, *Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1974).

The victory at Vienna made an enormous impression in Eastern and Western Europe. It appeared that the moment had come to drive the Turks back to the far side of the Bosphorus. A Holy Alliance consisting of Austria, Poland, and Venice was formed (1684) to liberate the Christian peoples living under Turkish rule. But with the very first victories of the Alliance, quarrels began over control of the liberated territories. Particularly sharp was the rivalry between Austria and Poland, which revived their medieval rivalry over the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. Austria sought these lands in their entirety, while Poland laid claim to Moldavia and Wallachia and was unwilling to abandon all thought of Transylvania. Emperor Leopold I and Sobieski anticipated Islam's rapid total expulsion from Europe, and they began dreaming of the restoration of their control over the mouths of the Dnieper and Danube. Bulgaria and Greece remained to be divided up, as did the Crimea, which still ruled the Black Sea steppe.⁷

The victory at Vienna in 1683 made a powerful impression on Muscovite politicians, too, as it brought into question the peace treaty between Moscow and Bakhchesarai (1681). The impressive charge of Polish hussars down the slopes of the Kahlenberg onto the tents of Kara Mustafa must have reminded Moscow of the defeats it had once suffered at Polish hands at Klushino (1610), Konotip (1660), Khudniv (1660), and Polonka (1660). What is more, the Cossacks of West-Bank Ukraine, after a brief period of rule by the Moldavian hospodar (1681), now obeyed the Polish king and, together with the Poles, pressed on to Iași. It must have seemed to the Kremlin that an enormous change was taking place in the regional balance of power before its very eyes and without its participation. And thus it might have been, but for the strong resistance of the Turks and Tatars. The steam-roller of the Christian *reconquista* moved on down the Danube valley, but its movement was slow.

Under the circumstances Vienna and the Vatican began strenuous efforts to draw Moscow into the common action. The benefits for the Kremlin were obvious: it was to go into the steppe and conquer the Crimea. Nonetheless, the seasoned Russian diplomat Vasiliĭ Vasil'evich Golitsyn, who guided Russian policy during that period, demanded a high price for taking up arms against the Tatars; he informed the

⁷ Kazimierz Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią. Z dziejów polityki Jana III Sobieskiego 1687–1690* (Cracow, 1933), pp. 76–79.

Austrian, papal, and Polish envoys that he could not break Russia's treaty with the Tatar khan without first concluding a permanent peace with the Commonwealth to supersede the formally provisional one of Andrusovo. The Poles who had lost Smolensk, Chernihiv, and all of East-Bank Ukraine in the Truce of Andrusovo (1667), had also been forced by that agreement to cede Kiev to the Russians for what was understood to be a period of two years. Now they were loath, understandably, to see these provisions of the Truce rendered irrevocable. But Moscow refused to cooperate unless such a concession was made. Sobieski, interested in the possibility of annexing Moldavia to Poland or—what he would have preferred—placing it under the rule of his own son, decided to conclude the treaty. He obtained the cooperation of Parliament, which deluded itself with the idea that Moscow would relinquish some territorial gains in return for perpetual peace and cooperation against Islam. As a result, to the great joy of the Kremlin, the Treaty of Eternal Peace was concluded on Russian terms in 1686 by the ambassadors of the Commonwealth, Marcjan Ogiński and Krzysztof Grzymułtowski. Sobieski, shedding tears of sorrow, confirmed the agreement (1687). Parliament did not ratify it until 1710.⁸

After conclusion of the peace with Poland, Golitsyn organized a great expedition against the Crimea in 1687, in which Muscovite and Cossack forces approached Perekop. A lack of provisions, steppe fires, and the continual attacks of the Tatar cavalry forced them to turn back. Golitsyn did not yield, however. He built a great fortress with a permanent Muscovite garrison halfway between Kiev and the Crimea (1688) and began preparations for a new campaign.

In the meantime, the international situation changed drastically. In 1688, war broke out between the League of Augsburg and the France of Louis XIV. For Austria, this now meant a struggle on two fronts. The Turks, meanwhile, had not only stopped the advance of Austria's armies, but managed to regain Belgrade (1688). They regained Transylvania in 1690. French diplomacy spared no efforts to draw Poland away from the Holy Alliance, luring it with the prospect of a beneficial separate peace with the Turks. England and Holland, on the other hand, eager to see the

⁸ The text of the Treaty of Eternal Peace was included among the laws passed by the parliament of 1710. See *Volumina Legum. Prawa, konstytucje y przywileje Królestwa Polskiego, Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego y wszystkich prowincyi należących*, vol. 6, ed. J. Ohryzko (St. Petersburg, 1859), pp. 73–82.

full involvement of Austria's forces in the West, lent their efforts to bringing about peace between the Alliance and the Turks. The opening for Austria of a Western front as well as the threat of a Polish or Holy Alliance peace with the Ottomans forced Russian diplomacy to initiate its own secret contacts with the Crimea.

These Russian overtures coincided with the establishment of closer relations with Vienna, relations with an anti-Polish as well as anti-Turkish thrust. The Austrians were interested in exerting common pressure on Poland, both to keep it in the struggle against Turkey and to prevent it from going over to the French camp. Although concurring with Russia on the matter of Poland, the Austrians found themselves in sharp conflict with the Kremlin over the Balkans. This was, after all, a period in which the Ottomans' Orthodox subjects, seeing the crumbling of Turkish power and fearing the Catholics more than the Turks, called on the Orthodox tsar in Moscow for aid. Contacts with Moscow were sought not only by the ecclesiastics of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, not only by the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, but also by Imre Thököly, the Hungarian Protestant foe of the Habsburgs and ally of the Turks.⁹ These overtures offered a great opportunity to Moscow, ever growing in strength, but Russian diplomacy had to proceed here with great caution, lest it find itself isolated in the anti-Islamic struggle or faced with a repudiation of the favorable treaty with Poland-Lithuania, whose ratification by Parliament was to be, for many years, a central goal of Russian diplomacy.

For the historian, it seems clear that Russian policy developed according to long-range plans for the mastery of Ukraine, the modernization of the army, access to the Black Sea and the Baltic, and finally intervention, at least diplomatic, in the Balkans. These plans dissipated under the pressure of insufficient means, changes in the international situation, or changes on the throne. They did not depend at all on society. Changes on the throne, in particular, could evoke great changes in policy. The overthrow of Sophia's regency by her half-brother Peter in 1689 resulted

⁹ Visit to Moscow of the monk Issai, sent to the tsars by the Orthodox of the Balkans, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Moscow; hereafter TsGADA), fond 52, Relations with Greece, ms 11, pp. 2–48; Visit to Moscow by the Moldavian envoy Ivan Belevich, TsGADA, fond 68, Relations with Moldavia, ms 4, pp. 19–29. For the best work on Russian-Moldavian relations, see L. E. Semenova, *Russko-valashskie otnosheniia v kontse XVII–nachale XVIII vv.* (Moscow, 1969).

not only in a near-breach of relations with Austria and Poland, but also in a policy of indifference to the affairs of the Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth, for which Peter had a special distaste—all this at the risk of Russian interests in the royal election held a year after Sobieski's death in 1696. Such aberrations could not be prevented by Muscovite society, not even by the aristocracy and seasoned diplomats who were closest to Peter.

On the other hand, in Poland-Lithuania every long-range royal plan, such as the submission of the lands along the Danube or Sobieski's attempt to humiliate Brandenburg (1676), were either kept secret from Parliament or were the object of careful public scrutiny. Mindful of the royal pattern of secrecy, the szlachta was alert to the possibility that its kings would maneuver the Commonwealth into undesired international conflicts. Only a defensive war could induce Parliament to vote for increased taxes, but even then every effort was made to bring the conflict to a speedy end by mediated peace. The possibility of territorial gain never excited the noble citizenry of the Commonwealth. Their king's policy was viewed by Polish parliamentarians and county politicians as more suspect than the Kremlin's. For this reason, Sobieski, who knew his countrymen well, concentrated the whole of his military effort after Vienna on the conquest of Moldavia, not on the recovery of Kam'ianets'-Podil'skyi. Once Kam'ianets' had been regained, he realized, nothing would be able to force the Parliament to continue the war effort. Far into the eighteenth century, the free citizens of the Commonwealth would be unable to recognize the threat from abroad to their political system and to the sovereignty of their state. Their chief enemy, they believed, sat on the throne at home. They wanted that monarchic power to be tempered by Parliament, since they feared otherwise to open the door to tyranny. Objectively, the economic and human potentials of the Commonwealth in the seventeenth century were enormous. However, the possibility for their mobilization by the government was minimal: only foreign occupation of its vast territories could bring that about.

This was the situation—as the Commonwealth lived out its last moments of self-confidence, and while it still occupied, in Russian consciousness, a first-rank position—in which the shift in the balance of forces was taking place.

Russia, strengthened by the addition of Ukraine and modernized gently by Aleksei Mikhailovich and brutally by Peter I, was constantly gaining in power. Its decided primacy in Eastern Europe would become

apparent only at Poltava (1709), but thereafter the shadow of the bronze horseman would hang menacingly over Poland-Lithuania. The dynastic union of the Commonwealth with Saxony (1697) would preserve the appearance of political strength, delaying the final collapse, but also discouraging any decided efforts to defend or modernize the state.

When collapse came, the disproportionate strength between the Commonwealth and its absolutist neighbor would be so great that the nobility, having risen to defend itself in the Kościuszko Uprising (1794), witnessed the annihilation of its independence and the end of its constitution and parliamentary form of government. In place of the republican institutions and democratic political culture that had flourished on the broad territory extending from the Warta and Vistula to the Dvina and Dnieper, there would be the autocratic system of Muscovy. The beginnings of this process, played out on the Dnieper but directed from Moscow and Warsaw, are the subject at hand.

CHAPTER ONE

The East European Rivals

“The Poles believe that they can keep their type of government only because of God’s special protection to be the invincible bulwark of Europe against the Progress of the common Enemies of Christianity, the Turks and the Tatars.”

Bernard Connor
The History of Poland (1697)

“Moreover, I am certain that now is the time for our nation to begin the process of learning. Because precisely now, God, in His grace and charity has elevated a Slavic kingdom in Russia to such a level of glory, power, and might, as has never existed before in our nation’s past. The history of other nations demonstrate that when they attain the pinnacles of power and glory, learning and sciences begin to blossom.”

Juraj Križanić
(During his exile in Siberia, 1663–1666)

When in the second half of the seventeenth century Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth found themselves allied against the Ottoman Empire, their “détente” was an uneasy one. By the terms of the Truce of Andrusovo, the entire east bank of the Dnieper plus Kiev was ceded to Russia, with the provision that Kiev would be returned to the Commonwealth in two years. When the Poles then sought the return of Kiev, the Russians refused on the grounds that only their army could defend the city against the Turks.¹

A new stage in the cooperation between the two countries began after the conclusion of “Eternal Peace” in 1686. Encouraged by the weakening of the Ottoman Porte, both states undertook vigorous military operations, the Russians attacking the Crimea and the Poles penetrating deep into Moldavia.

¹ Zbigniew Wójcik, *Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667–1672* (Warsaw, 1968).

The Eternal Peace, like the Truce of Andrusovo before it, brought Russia into the war against Turkey and the Crimean Khanate, but it did not dispel the enmity between Warsaw and Moscow. Greatly distrusting its Polish-Lithuanian ally, Moscow rejected a proposal to unite their armies for a joint attack on the Crimea. The lack of military coordination encouraged Tatar attacks and prompted mutual recriminations regarding the sincerity of the war effort. Other factors combined to strain the détente to the breaking point: rivalry over Ukraine, Russian actions taken in defense of the Eastern Orthodox of Poland-Lithuania (who represented more than one-third of the Commonwealth's population), and Moscow's and Warsaw's respective secret contacts with the Crimea. Furthermore, the antithetical forms of government were a constant source of distrust.

The Commonwealth perceived Russia in much the same way as it did Persia or the Ottoman Empire—as a nation in which arbitrary rule rather than orderly government prevailed. Moreover, Polish and Lithuanian politicians demonstrated little interest in obtaining a better understanding of Russia, since their outlook was western. In contrast, Russia's attitude toward Poland-Lithuania was one of intense interest and involvement.² After all, Poland-Lithuania was the state which had long represented the West to Muscovy, and the Kremlin viewed Poland as a powerful historic enemy. While Poland's relations with other European countries rarely had any direct bearing on its relations with Russia, Russia's European contacts usually had strong anti-Polish undertones. Nonetheless, the nobility of the Commonwealth was far less wary of the activities of the Romanovs than of French and Austrian intrigues, aimed, allegedly, against its "golden freedom." Indeed, until the eighteenth century, Russian interference in Polish-Lithuanian internal affairs was negligible compared with that of France, Austria, the Papacy, or Prussia. It was, as has been noted, only the expansionist tendencies of the

² Foreigners often commented on Poles' contempt for nations ruled by an arbitrary system: see Bernard Connor, *The History of Poland in Several Letters to Persons of Quality, Giving an Account of the Ancient and Present State of the Kingdom. Historical, Political, Physical and Ecclesiastical*, vol. 1 (London, 1697), p. vi; or, W. G. Leibniz, *Wzorzec dowodów politycznych* (Wrocław, 1969), pp. 67, 113–14. For a seventeenth-century Polish perspective on the Commonwealth's place in Europe, see: J. Tazbir, *Rzeczpospolita i świat. Studia z dziejów kultury XVII wieku* (Wrocław, 1971), pp. 44–62; idem, "Stosunek do obcych w dobie baroku," in *Swojskość i cudziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej* (Warsaw, 1973) pp. 80–112.

Ottomans that led Poland-Lithuania to form an alliance with Russia.

To better understand the style and the focus of the two states' diplomatic relations, one must begin with an analysis of the two governments. That study inevitably calls for an investigation of the political goals of each and the limitations imposed upon them by existing laws, institutions, traditions, and historical perspectives.

The Commonwealth

In the late seventeenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a vast, multinational state comprising some 282,000 square miles, populated by eight million inhabitants. Poles, Ukrainians and Belorussians,³ Lithuanians, Germans, Jews, Armenians, and Tatars lived in the Commonwealth, each group employing its native language.⁴ Polish was the chief language used in Parliament (*Sejm*) and in matters of administration, while the courts of law employed (in addition to Polish and Latin) German, Ukrainian/Belorussian, and Armenian, depending upon the corporate privileges of the various ethnic groups. Considerable religious toleration characterized the Commonwealth during this period, and the faiths professed were almost as numerous and diverse as the languages spoken: Catholicism, Calvinism, Lutheranism, the Orthodox and Uniate branches of Eastern Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Nonetheless, despite the impact of the Reformation, Catholicism continued to be the predominant religion: under the constitution,⁵ the elected king of Poland had to be a Catholic, and only Catholic bishops held seats in the Senate. However, all members of the *szlachta* (nobility), which comprised roughly 10 percent of the population, had an equal right to participate in the political life of the nation, regardless of religious or national background. The political franchise was limited to

³ I use here the more contemporary terms "Ukrainian" and "Belorussian," and "Ukraine" instead of the historical terms "Ruthenians" and "Ruthenia," which were used in association with that group of East Slavs which gave rise to the later Ukrainians and Belorussians. I have, however, also used the term "Cossacks" to distinguish a specific legal and social category of the Ukrainian population.

⁴ B. Baranowski and St. Herbst, "Wielonarodowościowa Rzeczpospolita szlachecka," in *Historia Polski*, ed. H. Łowmiański, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Warsaw, 1957) pp. 416–17.

⁵ All parliamentary legislation was called the "constitution(s)." "Constitutions" thus dealt with questions as diverse as taxation or war, on the one hand, and the fiscal immunity of certain lands or the obligations of peasant tenants, on the other.

this group and did not extend to the balance of the population, consisting of a largely enserfed peasantry and burghers living in royal and privately controlled cities.

Parliament

The Commonwealth was created in the mid-sixteenth century when, under threat of Muscovite expansion, the dynastic union that had once bound Poland and Lithuania together was replaced by a definitive political merger, the Union of Lublin (1569).⁶ The union created a single political entity with a jointly elected sovereign and a common parliament (*Sejm*). From 1504 to 1573 the Polish szlachta launched a "Respect for Laws" movement that championed the election of the king by the entire nobility. It denied the king the right to sell or grant crown land, and it demanded political reforms in Lithuania that would benefit the szlachta, thereby curtailing the king's power and that of his ministers. By 1573 these reforms had been realized. The szlachta not only controlled political life at the county level, but had won the right to broad participation in the central government. That same year, Henry of Valois (later Henry III of France) became the first king to be elected by the entire rank and file of the szlachta. He was not crowned, however, until he had signed a covenant with the citizens of the Commonwealth. The covenant consisted of two parts. The first, a permanent section termed the Henrician Articles guaranteed the basic form of government as well as religious freedom and the civil rights and privileges of the politically enfranchised szlachta. The second part, known as the *Pacta conventa*, was drawn up specifically for each new king, who was contractually obligated to meet its terms or lose all claim to the allegiance of the szlachta.

Sovereignty was vested in the three "estates" of Parliament: the monarch, the Upper House or Senate (*Senat*), and the House of Deputies (*Izba poselska*, hereafter referred to as the Commons). Representatives

⁶ J. Maciszewski, "Społeczeństwo," in *Polska XVII wieku. Państwo, społeczeństwo, kultura*, ed. J. Tazbir (Warsaw, 1969), pp. 120–50; J. Tazbir, "Problemy wyznaniowe," in *Polska XVII wieku*, pp. 189–219; J. Gierowski, *Historia Polski 1453–1763* (Cracow, 1979), pp. 38–53, 92–116, 205–220; N. Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, vol. 1 (New York, 1982), pp. 201–255; Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, MA, 1985), pp. 5–36.

of both Houses were drawn only from the szlachta.⁷ The legislative power of the state was embodied in Parliament. The king was required by law to convene a six-week session of Parliament once every two years. During these sessions the Commons had the decisive voice in determining all matters under discussion and in formulating new laws and decrees. The king exercised the right of legislative initiative and also presided over meetings of the Senate, which had an essentially advisory role. Along with members of the Commons, senators also participated in parliamentary commissions set up to conduct investigations and to supervise the conduct of domestic and foreign affairs. These commissions continued to function even when Parliament was not in session.⁸

Members of the Commons numbered about 150 and were elected by the assembled szlachta of the territories (*ziemie*), counties (*powiaty*), and palatinates (*województwa*). In all, there were 84 electoral districts. The size of the districts did not determine the number of delegates to be sent to Parliament, but most districts generally sent two representatives. By law, members of the Commons were to be chosen from among candidates who owned land in a given electoral district. Although this provision was not always adhered to, only rarely did members of Parliament own less than one village. Upon election, these delegates were given a set of instructions by the county council, consisting of the district's responses to proposals made by the king and a second set of instructions concerning local issues. The delegates were responsible to their constituents for their actions in the Commons. By 1652, unanimity was necessary for the passage of all new laws, decrees, and constitutions. The principle of unanimity was embodied in the *liberum veto*, whereby a single member of the Commons could disrupt or invalidate the entire work of a given session by a negative vote. This potential for the paralysis of parliamentary operations, combined with the increasing power of the county councils throughout the seventeenth century, served

⁷ H. Olszewski, "Ustrój polityczny Rzeczypospolitej," in *Polska XVII wieku*, pp. 52–83.

⁸ The best study, in my opinion, of the Parliament (*Sejm*) was written by H. Olszewski, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej epoki oligarchii magnackiej* (Poznań, 1966). See also S. Kutrzeba, *Sejm walny dawnej Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej* (Warsaw, 1923); W. Czapliński, "Z problematyki sejmu polskiego w pierwszej połowie XVII w.," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 77, no. 1 (1970): 31–45; W. Czapliński and A. Filipczak-Kocur, "Udział senatorów w pracach sejmowych za Zygmunta III i Władysława IV," *Przegląd Historyczny* 59, no. 4 (1978): 665–75.

to strengthen the position of the county szlachta vis-à-vis the central government.⁹

The 150 members of the Senate were nominated by the king. Ministerial posts (two chancellors, two vice-chancellors, two treasurers, and four marshals), bishoprics, and the administrative offices of palatine (*wojewoda*) and castellan (Latin *castellanus*, Polish *kasztelan*) carried membership in the Senate. In practice, though not by law, such offices were held for life, and they conferred on those fortunate enough to hold them considerable political influence and generous remuneration. Advancement from lower to higher position within the Senate took place at the king's discretion. Through their careers in the Senate, *homines novi* could and often did become very wealthy and ensure that their sons would figure prominently in the political life of the nation.¹⁰

As members of a parliamentary "estate," senators participated in the legislative process. They influenced the opinions of other members of Parliament through their speeches on questions of state policy and, perhaps more importantly, took part in five parliamentary commissions responsible for such vital matters as controlling state finances and editing new statutes. When a given session of Parliament adjourned and urgent decisions had to be made before the next Parliament convened, senators were called upon to advise the king on necessary action. These meetings, known as *Senatus consilia*, were normally attended by ministers and also those senators designated by Parliament to reside with the king. At these conferences important aspects of foreign relations and military affairs were discussed and decided upon. This assumption of power by the *Senatus consilia* was opposed by the szlachta and often criticized at county councils and in parliamentary sessions.¹¹

⁹ Kutrzeba, *Sejm walny*; W. Czapliński, *O Polsce siedemnastowiecznej* (Warsaw, 1966); M. Pryshlak, "The Well-Ordered State in the Political Philosophy of the Polish Aristocracy" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1984), chap. 1; K. Matwijowski, *Pierwsze sejmy z czasów Jana III Sobieskiego* (Wrocław, 1976).

¹⁰ Kutrzeba, *Sejm walny*; W. Czapliński, *O Polsce siedemnastowiecznej*; J. Bardach et al., eds., *Historia państwa i prawa polskiego*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1978) pp. 106, 118, 231–32. For the best monographs presenting the careers of *homines novi*, see A. Kersten, *Stefan Czarniecki, 1599–1665* (Warsaw, 1963) and Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine*.

¹¹ For the membership of the Senate in 1569, see "Porządek Rady Koronnej, Polskiej y Litewskiej, iako już iedney Rzpltey, postanowiony przez króla I. M y Radę Koronną, w Lublinie na Seymie Walnym spółnym, roku P. 1569," *Volumina Legum*, vol. 2, ed.

The Polish-Lithuanian szlachta, it should be noted, expected their “older brothers,” as the senators were called, to behave like Roman *patres patriæ*, to live up to the examples of Cato, Scipio, and Fabius Maximus, and to defend the laws of the Commonwealth. When the senators did not, they were attacked for greed, factionalism, and the abuse of power.¹² The king, who acted as chairman of the Senate while Parliament was in session, shared legislative initiative with the Commons. He did not, however, have the right to veto, and sometimes even his strongest protests could not prevent Parliament from adopting particular legislation. The king’s influence on parliamentary debates and on the final written version of adopted constitutions far exceeded that granted him by law. Usually the monarch could count on the support of a group or several groups within the Commons. Often the speaker of the Commons (*marszałek poselski*), elected before each session, was one of his ardent supporters.¹³

Józafat Ohryzko (St. Petersburg, 1859), p. 93. Olszewski, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 217–56; W. Czapliński, “Senat za Władysława IV” in *Studia historyczne ku czci Stanisława Kutrzeby*, vol. 1 (Cracow, 1938), pp. 81–104. For a discussion of the Polish aristocrats’ strong interest in increasing the power of the Senate, see Pryshlak’s “Well-Ordered State,” pp. 74–75, 79–80, 174–200, 214–19. On wealth and politics of senators and high officials see: Stefan Ciara, *Senatorowie i dygnitarze koronni w drugiej połowie XVII wieku* (Wrocław, 1990).

¹² “The Senate of Poland is an Order of Nobles between the King and common Gentry established to rule and govern according to Law and to observe the conduct of the King: And moreover they are to apply themselves to study the public Good and the preservation of the Privileges of the People,” Bernard Connor, *The History of Poland*, vol. 2 (London, 1697), p. 34. The best example of the szlachta’s displeasure with the senators was provided by Jan Pasek, who wrote “More likely, I’d sooner uncover stepfathers inter patres patriæ, quorum machinationes have enfeebled the Commonwealth and brought it to the extreme of destitution, quorum iniuriis her fame sank in profundissimo Democriti puteo, whereas the army through its courage and manliness brought it out of so intolerable a labyrinth and restored its glory. We need to seek no further than the Swedish War for proof how much harm, how much havoc was wreaked upon the country! And who paved the way for the Swedish war? Mala consilia ordinis intermedii,” J. Pasek, *Memoirs of the Polish Baroque: The Writings of Jan Chryzostom Pasek*, ed. Catherine Leach (Berkeley, 1976) pp. 105–21, 212.

¹³ Olszewski, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 234–36. To safeguard the independence of chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commons, Parliament prescribed for them in 1678 a special text of an oath, see: “Iurament Urodzonego Marszałka Poselskiego y Urodzonych Deputatów do Konstytucyi,” in *Volumina Legum*, vol. 5, p. 267. See also: “O dawaniu konstytucyi do druku. Konstytucye Sejmu Walnego roku P. 1690,” in *Volumina Legum*, vol. 5, pp. 271–72.

The King and Executive Authority

If most of the legislative power was in the hands of the Commons, the king's control over the executive branch of government remained very strong throughout the existence of the Commonwealth. He was supreme commander of the army, head of the diplomatic service, *rex solus* of the free cities, and sole dispenser of all administrative and ceremonial positions on the county and central levels. In this last capacity, he not only appointed men to high office in the court, bureaucracy, army and church, but also to vacant seats in the Senate. Furthermore, he also had the right to grant leases to crown lands, which amounted to one-fourth of the territory of the Commonwealth. Clearly, he had enormous control over the economic and political advancement of members of the szlachta. The king's skillful use of his authority to dispense offices and lands gave him added influence over the state's vast group of administrators, bureaucrats, military officers, and clerics. Perhaps most important was the king's right to fill senatorial seats, for he generally strove to promote his own supporters, favoring politicians of modest, though of course noble, background. These *homines novi*, usually comprising about 30 to 40 percent of the senators, were much more dependent on the favor of the king than the scions of families who had occupied seats in the Senate for generations.¹⁴

Senators filled the top positions in the central and county administrations. Although dependent on the king for further advancement and favors, they could be dismissed from office only by action of the highest court, the Parliament. Since this happened rarely, the king had to persuade, not command, the senator to adhere to his policies. As long as his ministers did not oppose his wishes, he could count on their offices to execute his plans. In the event of ministerial opposition, however, he was virtually powerless. The following episode is illustrative of this point. During Sobieski's reign, the grand hetman of Lithuania, Krzysztof Pac, not only refused a royal order to open hostilities against Brandenburg,

¹⁴ Pryshlak, "Well-Ordered State," pp. 49–51, 66–71. See also Olszewski, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 127–67; W. Czapliński, *Władysław IV i jego czasy* (Warsaw, 1972); J. Gierowski, *Miedzy saskim absolutyzmem a złotą wolnością* (Wrocław, 1953); T. Zielińska, *Magnateria polska epoki saskiej* (Wrocław, 1977); A. Sucheni-Grabowska, "Badania nad elitą władzy w latach 1551–1562, in *Spółeczeństwo staropolskie*, ed. A. Wyczański (Wrocław, 1976) pp. 57–118.

but actually mobilized the Lithuanian army for battle against the Swedes, with whom Sobieski had signed an alliance against Brandenburg! The king, however, did not dare call Pac before Parliament, because his own decision for war with Brandenburg had been taken without parliamentary consent.¹⁵

Although such cases were rare, and the king was usually able to lead his ministers, all Polish kings of the seventeenth century counted some of their ministers among the ardent members of the opposition. Sobieski was opposed first by the powerful Pac family, and later by the Sapieha clan, which occupied the offices of grand hetman and treasurer of Lithuania. Try as he might, Sobieski was unable to break the mighty Sapiehas. In the late 1680s, however, he did manage to form a relatively cooperative cabinet composed of his relatives and friends. He effectively controlled the Crown army with the support of Stanisław Jabłonowski, and gained some leverage over the Sapiehas through his close associate, the field hetman of Lithuania, Bogusław Słuska, and through Karol and Stanisław Radziwiłł. Despite these connections, however, at the highest levels royal policy was formulated only after much maneuvering and compromising among the ministers, senators, and the court.¹⁶

Sobieski exercised strong control over the army and the diplomatic service, but his influence on the formulation of foreign policy as such was somewhat less effective due to the checks imposed by the Senate and Commons. On the local level, the implementation of constitutions and royal decrees depended on the cooperation of the local county szlachta, who collected the taxes and summoned the local militia in times of danger. In order to win their support for his fiscal and economic policies the king used the mediation of loyal senators, courtiers, army officers and, most importantly, bishops, palatines, and castellans. Senators, on the one hand, were under pressure to advocate the interests of their counties at court. On the other hand, their participation in debates on the highest matters of state compelled them to represent the interests of the whole nation to their constituents. This dual role could provoke praise or censure from either the king or the local szlachta.

¹⁵ Kazimierz Piwarski, "Polityka bałtycka Jana III w latach 1675–1690," in *Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Dra Wacława Sobieskiego*, vol. 1, ed. Oskar Halecki (Cracow, 1932); K. Matwijowski, *Pierwsze sejmy*, pp. 33–38.

¹⁶ Zbigniew Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski 1629–1696* (Warsaw, 1983), pp. 337–420.

Had he chosen to do so, the king could have become leader of the poor szlachta against the senators and the mighty landlords. Yet every king shied away from such a contingency, preferring instead to increase his power through cooperation with members of the Senate. The best opportunity for any Polish king to become a William of Orange or an Ivan the Terrible presented itself to Sobieski's predecessor. Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki was elected at a time of broad popular hostility toward the Senate.¹⁷ Even so, he had no taste for playing the poor szlachta off against the powerful. Sobieski, a much more accomplished politician and intelligent man, could not equal Wiśniowiecki's popularity. He came close only when, opposed by a mighty senatorial faction, he threatened to call a "parliament on horseback," i.e., to assemble the entire szlachta for an armed reckoning with internal enemies.¹⁸

The king retained considerable power *outside* government, however, as *rex solus* of the free cities and the peasants living on crown lands. Although he no longer was the symbol of the state for the szlachta, he retained that image among commoners.¹⁹ Thus, the position of the king as head of the executive branch of government was stronger than his position in the legislative branch. His control over the diplomatic service and his command over the army was effective, especially in wartime. He needed the cooperation of both senators and the county szlachta, and the greater the political distance between himself and the local szlachta, the more he relied on the Senate. Furthermore, the influence of the senators on the local administration was strengthened by the king's personally appointed bailiffs (*starosta*), who maintained law and order. Most of the bailiffs were in fact senators who readily used their bailiff appointment to further their own power.

The Judiciary

The king had lost his predominant position in the judiciary during the sixteenth century. In 1578 in Poland, and in 1583 in Lithuania, at the

¹⁷ Pasek, *Memoirs of the Polish Baroque*, pp. 211–16, 226–32.

¹⁸ *Diariusz Kołowania i Konfederacji pod Gołębkiem i Lublinem w 1672 r. wraz z Aktem Konfederacji*, ed. Adam Przyboś and Kazimierz Przyboś (Wrocław, 1972); K. Piwarski, *Miedzy Francją a Austrią. Z dziejów polityki Jana III Sobieskiego w latach 1687–1690* (Cracow, 1933), p. 46; Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, pp. 220–316.

¹⁹ Stanisław Kutrzeba, *Historia państwa i prawa* (Cracow, 1948), p. 74.

demand of the szlachta, high courts (tribunals) were established on the pretext of freeing the king from presiding over courts hampered by a backlog of several years' cases. Judges were elected yearly to the tribunals by the county szlachta, which led to avid competition among the great families. While the tribunals were influenced to some extent by the szlachta through the election of judges their decision were highly respected.²⁰

The court of appeals was the Parliamentary Court, composed of senators and members of the Commons and presided over by the king. It heard cases of *lèse majesté*, treason, embezzlement of funds by dignitaries, and certain other capital crimes. Under the new system the king retained a strong position because of his role in the Parliamentary Court and because of his continued right to pardon and to grant safe-conducts.²¹ Even so, this new system helped to change the very concept of justice, which came to be viewed in legal terms losing much of its older mystical, divine character.

Forma Mixta: The Commonwealth's Political Model

Strongly represented in the Senate were those—let us call them constitutionalists—who believed in strict adherence to the law and a strong central government with increased senatorial power. The mass of szlachta—let us call them republicans—viewed with skepticism this drive to strengthen the government. The szlachta did not believe that any institution of the central government, including the Commons, sufficiently represented their interests. They strongly adhered to the principle of county self-rule and to mass movements, confederacies, *rokosz* (confederacy directed against government), and the election of kings—all of which ensured them a direct role in governing the Commonwealth.²²

²⁰ Juliusz Bardach, ed., *Historia państwa i prawa Polski*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 153–54. “Rex regnat solus. Cur non regit omnia solus qui regit et regitur, rectius ille regitur senatus . . .” Jan Antoni Chrapowicki, *Diariusz*, ed. T. Wasilewski, vol. 1 (Poznań, 1978), p. 217. Senator Chrapowicki could not resist pointing out the importance of the Senate. See also: Pryshlak, “Well-Ordered State,” chap. 1.

²¹ Bardach, *Historia państwa*, p. 154; Olszewski, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 299–300; Pryshlak, “Well-Ordered State,” chap. 1.

²² The interpretation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth political system in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries as a *forma mixta*, under which the forces of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy were in constant conflict, is my own.

If the stronghold of constitutionalism was the Senate, the forum of direct republicanism was the county councils. Still, the councils were subject to pressure from the king's court, as well as from local senators and great landowning families. Thus in nearly every county the king had a party of supporters largely recruited from the families who had served the government for generations. The councils also had to reckon with the power of the local bishop, palatine, and castellan, who sometimes supported royal interests, sometimes opposed them. If there happened to be extensive latifundia belonging to a well-established family, its clientele also would have considerable clout in the council.

The influence of the king and senators on the county councils is reflected in the instructions drafted for county delegates to Parliament. Such instructions often showed support for the king's proposals. The involvement of the rich and powerful szlachta in the political life of the counties can also be gauged by the individuals sent to the Commons as deputies. At least one-third of every Commons was made up of scions of aristocratic families together with high-ranking *nouveaux-riches*. Nevertheless, the county councils were the only local institution that guaranteed the political security of all the landed szlachta. Thus, although the szlachta often allowed themselves to be courted by the more powerful,

Historiography generally indicates the deterioration of noble democracy by the end of the sixteenth century and the development thereafter of an oligarchy of magnates that thrived (particularly from the second half of the seventeenth century) in an atmosphere of anarchy. This interpretation depicts the political actors of the time as either proponents of a strong modern state, i.e., supporters of the king, or as selfish oligarchs who created their own states within the state while ostensibly presenting themselves as defenders of liberty and noble equality. Of course, the subtlety of the picture varies from one historian to the next, but even a brief list of titles of chapters and subtitles will prove my point, e.g.: *Historia Polski*, ed. H. Łowmiański, vol. 1, pt. 2; W. Konopczyński, *Dzieje Polski nowożytnej* (Warsaw, 1936); M. Bobrzyński, *Dzieje Polski* (Warsaw, 1968); J. Gierowski, *Historia Polski 1505–1764* (Warsaw, 1988); Olszewski, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej*. Some historians, however, were not happy with the "oligarchic" and/or "anarchic" interpretation. W. Czapliński stressed in numerous publications the strong and effective power of the king and the central government (at least until the middle of the seventeenth century). A. Kersten, too, pointed out that the magnates were often proponents of a strong government. J. Gierowski, on the other hand, followed the tradition of T. Korzon by emphasizing the independent character of broad segments of the szlachta. W. Czapliński, "Z problematyki," pp. 31–45; A. Kersten, "Problem władzy w Rzeczypospolitej czasu Wazów," in *O naprawę Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. J. Gierowski (Warsaw, 1965), pp. 22–36; Gierowski, *Historia Polski*. Here I refer to the works of my colleagues as sources of historical fact, not as sources of interpretation.

they did so only as long as there was no threat to their interests.²³

The king and the senators could exert strong pressure on the counties but they did not dare to propose any change in the political system that would undermine the role of the councils or diminish their importance vis-à-vis the central government. Throughout the history of the Commonwealth, the county szlachta perceived the royal court as a hotbed of conspiracy where the king, usually under the influence of his “wicked” foreign-born wife, plotted with a few senators against the republic. At the same time, the Commons was not seen as a sufficiently forceful defender of *libertas*. For one thing, it met only once every two years for six weeks; for another many of its members were more interested in the politics of the country as a whole than in the defense of local interests. In short, many of the delegates sent by the county councils to Parliament were perceived as potential supporters of the central government. And from the standpoint of the county councils, even the most republican centralized government, by virtue of its centralism, was anathema.

Thus it is not surprising that in the seventeenth century (and the first half of the eighteenth), county republicans were not much concerned about the survival of Parliament. In most European countries at that time, there was a similar atrophy of national representative bodies, a phenomenon customarily associated with the rise of absolute monarchies in France and Spain. (In Poland-Lithuania the szlachta would allow a situation to develop in which no parliament from 1736 to 1764 could conclude its work. Yet, at the same time, it would be prepared to defend the legal rights of the Commons by every means, even through civil war.) For the republicans, although the Commons had its limitations, it was the only national institution that attempted to defend county interests and block efforts by the king and Senate to usurp power.

²³ “Nothing proves the Equality of the Polish Gentry more than the Orders of their Great and Little Diets for all free born are by them divided into the Greater and Lesser or rather Richer and Poorer Nobility, yet have they all the same power in the Diets, and in making or breaking Constitutions, the Minor Gentry of every Province being superiour in Numbers keep by their votes and sometimes by their scymitars the greater sort in Awe,” Connor, *History of Poland*, vol. 2, pp. 103–104. The szlachta opposed the aristocrats in their attempts to elect a French candidate to the Polish throne in the elections of 1668, 1673, and 1697, because they believed that the French king intended to establish absolutism in Poland so as to gain a strong ally against Austria. A. Kamiński, “The Szlachta of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Their Government,” in *The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe*, ed. Ivo Banac and Paul Bushkovitch (New Haven, 1983), pp. 17–45.

It would be wrong to assume that clashes of this kind dominated everyday politics. On the contrary, the political climate was more often one of compromise than of confrontation. Compromise was usually achieved only after a test of strength, but it nevertheless prevailed in the county councils, the Parliament, the Senate, and the confederations. It demanded—and placed a premium on—the special skills of mediation. Every generation produced a few experienced senators and parliamentarians who would spend weeks bringing parties with seemingly immovable stances to the conference table and then to agreement.²⁴ Most Polish politicians on all levels of government excelled in the art of mediation, essential in a system based on a balance of power between antagonistic groups.

Such a system, a mixed form of government in which monarchy (the king), aristocracy (the Senate), and democracy (the Commons) sought to keep one another in check, was based on an ideal: the Poles hoped to prevent a tyranny of the monarchy, an oligarchy of the aristocracy, and an anarchy of the democracy. “With Aristotle they believe that such a mixed form of government—monarchy with aristocracy and democracy—is the best one,” Bernard Connor wrote in his *History of Poland* (1698). “They believe so in defense of their liberty, which is the most important thing to them. The slavery of Muskovites and Turks is proof to them that they behave wisely.”²⁵

Social and Political Life

As noted above, the szlachta represented the segment of the population, approximately 10 percent, that was equal before the law, participated in politics on both the county and national levels, and enjoyed certain inherent constitutional rights. Legal rights and the collective sense of themselves as the political nation united this otherwise heterogeneous group, which included people with vastly different economic interests and from different historical and cultural backgrounds.

²⁴ Adam Kysil, the hero of Frank Sysyn’s book, as well as Andrzej Załuski, bishop of Warmia, Stanisław Małachowski, bishop of Cracow, Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro, a noted parliamentarian, and Stanisław Szczuka were all known for their talents as mediators and negotiators.

²⁵ Connor, *History of Poland*, vol. 1, pp. v–vi. Consult also the memoirs of Pasek and Chrapowicki cited above.

Economically, the szlachta can be divided into the following groups. Owners of more than twenty villages could be considered “very wealthy,” owners of ten to twenty “wealthy,” and owners of six to ten “well-to-do.” Those with only one to five villages could be termed “middle” szlachta, and those holding less than one village, “poor.” Holders of small plots and the landless were at the bottom of this category. Since there was no law of primogeniture in the Commonwealth, the fortunes of a given family could vary considerably from one generation to the next.²⁶

Both the landless szlachta and those who possessed only small plots maintained a style of life quite similar to that of the peasantry, but their legal status was completely different. While they and the owners of parts of villages might live like peasants, unlike them they enjoyed full legal rights and had an opportunity for social mobility. Thus, these groups of szlachta knew, but were not doomed to, poverty. Their daughters might improve the lot of the family by marriage. Some landless szlachta and their sons served as administrators of estates or as courtiers for wealthier nobles. Still others found employment in the army, or, if they had been fortunate enough to receive an education through church or privately endowed scholarships, entered the state bureaucracy, the church, or the legal profession.²⁷

Owners of one to ten villages were a more stable group, though they, too, could suffer economic reversals. The rise and fall of this group tended to balance out. Division of property among heirs could radically alter a family’s position in one generation, but on the whole, the szlachta in this group were able to offer their children an education, a vital asset

²⁶ J. Maciszewski, *Szlachta polska i jej państwo* (Warsaw, 1969), pp. 20–21, 31–36, 54–56, 77; W. Urban, “Skład społeczny i ideologia sejmiku krakowskiego w latach 1572–1606,” *Przegląd Historyczny* 44 (1953): 309–333; W. Śladkowski, “Skład społeczny, wyznaniowy i ideologia sejmiku lubelskiego w latach 1572–1648,” *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska* (Lublin) 12 (1957): 129–52. W. Dworzaczek, “Wielkopolska reprezentacja sejmowa w latach 1572–1655,” *Roczniki Historyczne* 23 (1957): 281–309; A. Wyczański, *Uwarstwienie społeczne w Polsce XVI wieku* (Wrocław, 1977) pp. 9–69. H. Wisner, “Przedsejmowy sejmik nowogrodzki w latach 1607–1648,” *Przegląd Historyczny* 59, no. 4 (1978): 677–93. Emanuel Rostworowski recently argued the importance of the landed nobility’s control over their counties. He also pointed to the fact that the landed nobility constituted only a fraction of the entire estate, and made up not more than 1.25 percent of the population. E. Rostworowski, “Ilu było w Rzeczypospolitej obywateli szlachty?” *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 94, no. 3 (1988): 3–39.

²⁷ Maciszewski, *Szlachta polska*, pp. 139–55; K. Koźmian, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 1 (Wrocław, 1972), pp. 136–43.

which significantly enhanced their social standing through a variety of career possibilities.

The possessors of ten or more villages clearly were far more secure. They exerted a decided political influence in the counties and had the support of a steady clientele in their districts. They often sent their children abroad to study. Moreover, unlike the economically inferior *szlachta*, this stratum was not bound to the land and therefore was in a position to know life beyond a particular district.

Far greater privileges and opportunities for both high office and economic advancement awaited the wealthiest group of *szlachta*, the owners of twenty or more villages, a special subgroup known in historical literature as the "magnates."

It has become accepted practice in Polish historiography to treat the seventeenth century as the period in which the Commonwealth was ruled by magnates and to describe that rule as an oligarchy.²⁸ Although it is true that at that time a greater proportion of magnates than before held positions in the Senate, the court, the church, and the army, there is no evidence that they shared any group consciousness or were aware of their status as the elite. As a group, the magnates never attempted to monopolize power, or, more importantly, to institutionalize it. In short, they do not appear to have been a group that was either willing or able to wrest control of the government from the less affluent *szlachta*. In fact, as a group, the magnates failed to control even the Senate and were a definite minority in the Commons.

In dismissing so lightly such an amorphous group from those contending for power, one must hasten to introduce in its place a much smaller but more distinct and self-aware group, the aristocrats. Unfortunately, in Polish historiography both *bona fide* aristocrats (to be defined shortly) and owners of more than twenty villages are called magnates.²⁹ This muddles rather than clarifies any discussion of "oligarchic" rule, or of any other form of government in the Commonwealth. Since Polish law did not recognize any legal differences within the *szlachta*, it is up to the historian to devise a list, albeit an arbitrary one, of the aristocracy.

²⁸ Z. Kaczmarczyk, "Oligarchia magnacka w Polsce jako forma państwa," in *Pamiętnik z VIII Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Krakowie 14–17 września 1958 r. Referaty* (Warsaw, 1958), pp. 223–31. See also fn. 7, above.

²⁹ W. Czapliński and J. Długosz, *Życie codzienne magnaterii polskiej w XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1976), pp. 176–86, 198–212.

The list's accuracy depends on its conformity to the perceptions of contemporaries who had an acute sense of the importance of leading families. To date, the most accurate list of the Commonwealth aristocracy has been prepared by the distinguished historian Włodzimierz Dworzaczek.³⁰ He defines as "magnates" those families whose members maintained their wealth and a seat in the Senate for several generations, were linked through intermarriage, exercised influence throughout the entire state or at least one province, and were regarded by their contemporaries as belonging to the most illustrious families in the realm. In short, besides possessing wealth and power, one had to be born into the aristocracy. Applying these criteria, Dworzaczek lists only 79 aristocratic families for the period from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century. Only ten to twenty families on that list were politically influential in any twenty-five year period, and more often than not they shared ministerial posts and seats in the Senate with people outside their group.

In the opinion of the szlachta, an aristocrat reached the pinnacle of his career when he became a senator. Despite the fact that between 50 and 60 percent of senators were not from aristocratic families, the Senate was viewed as the stronghold of the aristocracy in government. There were good reasons for that view, but in the political reality other elements were at play. The Polish-Lithuanian aristocracy was not a closed hereditary group with any special rights. The Senate, in contrast to the English House of Lords or the Venetian Council, was open to any member of the szlachta judged fit by the king. Just as the aristocrats did not control the Senate, they were also not confined to it, and many young aristocrats were very active in the Commons. Rarely did the king elevate a young aristocrat to the Senate without past service in the Commons or in the army. Many young aristocrats began their political careers as members of the Commons, became familiar with this institution, and developed an attachment to it. In view of their presence in both houses of Parliament and their desire for a stronger centralized government, it is arguable that the aristocrats did not try to destroy Parliament but over the centuries actually sought to strengthen it. The majority of aristocrats who participated in the political life of the country, especially those educated in the popular tradition of neostoicism, favored an orderly republic with a

³⁰ W. Dworzaczek, *Genealogia* (Warsaw, 1959), pp. 4–7 and 11–12, and charts 93–183.

constitutional monarch, a decisive Parliament, and restrictions on the liberties of the county szlachta.

Clearly, the aristocracy had easier access than other members of the szlachta to the Commons, the Senate, illustrious positions at court, and high offices in the army and church. Just as clearly, many scions of aristocratic families lost out in competition for such high offices to members of economically less affluent szlachta families. For, despite the importance of connections and economic status in making a political career, personal qualities—and, above all, education—were indispensable, even for an aristocrat.³¹

As for local influence, within the territories of the Commonwealth different groups of szlachta controlled the political life of different counties. The key element in such control was the pattern of land ownership. For example, in counties where most of the land was split among a group of owners of one to ten villages, that group generally was predominant politically. In other counties where the szlachta were poor but numerous (as in Mazovia, where they constituted 20 percent of the population), local politics reflected the influence and interests of the small landowners.

Territorial Differences

The bulk of the counties in Crown territories was controlled by szlachta who were neither “economic magnates” nor aristocrats. A different situation existed, however, in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in Ukraine. By orders of the last hereditary Jagiellonian ruler in 1564 and 1566, and by decision of the Polish Parliament, the administrative structure of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was modeled on the Polish system. Many new counties were created, with power entrusted to the local szlachta. All legal differences between the aristocrats and szlachta were abolished, although former members of the Lithuanian Privy Council retained enormous political power, which they continued to wield for centuries. Members of a few families occupied the offices of chancellor, treasurer, and hetman for decade after decade. This *de facto* oligarchy in the Grand Duchy was periodically replaced by the

³¹ On the participation of aristocratic families in the Senate and the Commons during the seventeenth century, see Kamiński, “*Szlachta* of the Commonwealth,” p. 42, fn. 25.

de facto tyranny of one clan over the rest. These clans were the Radziwiłłs, the Chodkiewiczzes, the Pacs, and the Sapiehas.

During the periods when the Radziwiłł, Pac, or Sapieha clans were dominant,³² the politics of the Grand Duchy were more reminiscent of the age of the Viscontis, Sforzas, or Medicis than of the oligarchy of the Republic of Venice. The power of the Lithuanian clans, based on complete control of the administrative system, allowed them to control by legal or illegal means the entire political life of the Grand Duchy. Breaking the hold of such families generally required the combined forces of the Polish king and a powerful Lithuanian family which itself aspired to political superiority and was supported by large numbers of the terrorized szlachta.

Polish kings usually tried to keep the great lords of Lithuania in check by appointing members of competing families to high office. Such attempts often failed; consequently, from the second half of the seventeenth century, control of Lithuania passed from the hands of the Radziwiłłs to the Pacs, and subsequently to the Sapiehas. It took approximately 130 years after the Union of Lublin for the Lithuanian szlachta to win its struggle against the oligarchs and become a full-fledged partner in the political system. When this finally occurred at the end of the seventeenth century, the social composition of the Lithuanian szlachta was as diverse as the Crown's had been during the "Respect for Laws" movement, and its political program amounted to a complex blend of centralism and local autonomy. When the Sapiehas' power was broken after five years of bloody civil war (1696–1700), the centralists achieved complete legal equality vis-à-vis Poland and a greater degree of control over ministerial posts. At the same time, the county szlachta were able to increase the authority of the county councils by securing their right to decide matters hitherto exclusively within the purview of the Lithuanian central administration.³³

In the territory of Ukraine—that is, the palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, and Volhynia, incorporated into Poland in 1569—the szlachta constituted

³² K. Piwarski, "Opozycja litewska pod koniec XVII wieku," in *Pamiętnik z V Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Warszawie 1930*, vol. 1 (L'viv, 1932), pp. 259–77; Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, pp. 415–17, 493–507.

³³ J. Ochmański, *Historia Litwy* (Wrocław, 1967), pp. 106, 111–12, 131; J. Woliński, "Koekwacja praw na Litwie 1697," in *O naprawę Rzeczypospolitej XVI–XVII w.*, (Warsaw, 1965) pp. 189–92.

but one percent of the population. Moreover, a few aristocratic families controlled the counties. Consequently, though the owners of one to ten villages represented the main political force in the Cracow or Sandomierz palatinates, in Kiev the owners of even fifty villages did not feel secure, let alone politically important, without the friendship of one of the great lords. The latter, who included figures like Vyshnevets'kyi, Ostroz'kyi, Koniecpolski, Potocki, or Lubomirski, owned thousands of peasants and scores of towns and maintained private courts and armies. They usually allowed only members of their families or their clientele to represent their territory in Parliament. Thus, until 1648, the political system in Ukraine had been a *de facto* oligarchy. Then, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi led the Cossacks in the great social and political uprising against the Commonwealth. Now aristocratic power in Ukraine was challenged mainly by the militarily organized Cossacks, not by the county *szlachta*, as in Lithuania. Facing a strong social and political challenge from the Cossacks and peasants, the Ukrainian *szlachta* was given such a strong lesson in the need for class solidarity that it had no time for internal power struggles, at least not in West-Bank Ukraine.³⁴

Seventeenth-century Lobbyists

The *egzultanci*, dispossessed nobles expelled from the lands ceded to Russia in 1667, were a very visible and noisy group, particularly in the Commons, where they demanded reimbursement for their lost estates. They had the support of many aristocrats and senators who had themselves lost *latifundia* in the East, including members of the Vyshnevets'kyi, Radziwiłł, Sapieha, and Pac families. There was not a single session of Parliament at which the *egzultanci* failed to raise their cause, often using the tactic of filibuster amid threats to dissolve the Parliament. Between sessions they actively petitioned the senators, the king, and their "brothers" in county councils. In times of peace, when the *szlachta* wished to forget

³⁴ A. Kamiński, "The Cossack Experiment in *Szlachta* Democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: The Hadiach (*Hadziacz*) Union," in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1977): 178–97. On the Ukrainian *szlachta*, see: Viacheslav Lypyn'skyi, *Ukraina na perelomi, 1657–1659* (Vienna, 1920); F. Sysyn, "The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1684," in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 29–102; T. Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa szlachty ukraińskiej i kozaczyzny od schyłku XVI do połowy XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1985), pp. 56–146.

about the existence of enemies, the *egzultanci* were constant reminders of the Commonwealth's defeat. It is erroneous to assume, however, that they were the leaders of an active revanchist faction. They would have welcomed the chance to return to their home but they were also ready to accept a peace settlement between the Commonwealth and Russia if their financial demands were met.³⁵

The *egzultanci* were supported by the szlachta of the counties along the new border. There they had many friends and relatives with whom they now participated in county councils. The szlachta in the palatinates of Polatsk, Vitsebsk, Mstsislaŭ, and Minsk were interested in stabilizing the border through treaties and in regulating their quarrels with their Russian neighbors through the appointment of special border judges. Since these szlachta of the borderlands were well-acquainted with the realities of Russian life, the Commonwealth's best experts on Russian policy came from these areas.³⁶

The role of the three churches was far stronger. Their influence was exerted not only through their actions, but also through their silence or inactivity. The best example of the latter was the near-complete suspension of missionary work east of the Polish borders by the Catholic hierarchy and its lukewarm interest in the fate of Catholics living in Russia. The Catholic hierarchy of the seventeenth century was still engaged in the fight to recapture the souls lost to the Reformation, and concentrated its efforts on Protestant rather than Orthodox believers. Yet the Catholic church stood solidly behind the Uniate church, established in 1596 on the initiative of the majority of Orthodox prelates in the Commonwealth, who concluded a union with Rome while keeping their own Eastern rite. The bitter rivalry resulting from the split of Orthodoxy was a source of strength and ideological support for the Cossacks, the defenders of Orthodoxy, and caused Orthodox believers to look to them, and finally to the Kremlin for protection against the Uniates and Catholics. The tsarist government used the opportunity to defend its co-

³⁵ Jan Antoni Chrapowicki, author of the memoirs cited earlier, was himself a refugee from the province of Vitsebsk who initially backed peace with Russia but later renounced this position: *Diariusz*, pp. 33–34, 58–60. See also Wójcik, *Między traktatem andruszowskim*, pp. 26–27, 50–53, 90–91.

³⁶ Among them were Jerzy Dominik Dowmont, ambassador to Moscow; and Samiilo Rozhyts'kyi, secretary of the Russian chancellery; and courtiers used by Sobieski in his diplomatic relations with Russia: Ivan Okrasa, Khrystofor Syrut, and Jan Maliszewski.

religionists ardently and did not shrink from thinly veiled threats of war. Concurrently, it used Orthodox monasteries in the Commonwealth and Orthodox communities in towns and cities to transmit its propaganda.³⁷

The prelates of the Orthodox church in the late seventeenth century found it hard to avoid the choice between loyalty to the Commonwealth and commitment to the interests of their church. Because these interests were identified with the tsar-protector, especially after the Eternal Peace, many prelates opted to join the Uniates. Their parishioners followed less readily, but by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Uniate church would gain the upper hand in the once-Orthodox territories of the Commonwealth.³⁸

The Uniates were hated by the Orthodox, and examples of this hatred are manifest: the killing of Iosafat Kuntsevych during the uprising in Vitsebsk, the slaughter of Uniates by Cossacks during the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising, the Cossacks' insistence on the destruction of the Uniate church as a *sine qua non* for peace with Poland, and Peter I's personal participation in the murder of Uniate monks in Polatsk in 1705. Not surprisingly, the Uniates were the most vigilant among those interested in Poland's Russian policy, and always stood ready to warn of the danger posed by the Orthodox tsar. They did not, however, have a strong following among the szlachta, since converting Orthodox nobles chose the Calvinist or Catholic faiths rather than the Uniate. So the Uniate church maintained a plebeian character, and as such could exert influence only by calling on the Catholic bishops and papal nuncios to exercise caution regarding Russia.³⁹ It is ironic that the Uniate church,

³⁷ L. Bieńkowski, "Organizacja kościoła wschodniego w Polsce," in *Kościół w Polsce*, ed. J. Kłoczowski, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1969), pp. 781–1049; O. Halecki, *From Florence to Brest, 1439–1596* (Rome, 1958); Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine*, pp. 89–104.

³⁸ Bieńkowski, "Organizacja kościoła," pp. 857–59; F. I. Titov, ed., *Pamiętniki prawosławiia i russkoi narodnosti v zapadnoi Rossii*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1905), pp. 20–29. See also a report on the diminishing influence of Orthodoxy in Poland-Lithuania prepared by the bureaucrats of the Russian Department of Foreign Affairs, *Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov* (Moscow; hereafter TsGADA), fond 79 (Relations with Poland), ms 255.

³⁹ The most important study on the Russian government's policy toward the union is A. Deruga's *Piotr Wielki i unia kościelna* (Vilnius, 1936), pp. 1–160. Also important are A. Theiner, *Monuments historiques relatifs aux regnes d'Alexis Michaelovitch, Fedor III et Pierre le Grand, czars de Russie: Extraits des archives du Vatican et de Naples* (Rome, 1859), p. 412; and Bieńkowski, "Organizacja kościoła," pp. 867, 875–78, 895–96, 963.

once seen by the Cossacks as a traitor to the Ruthenian people, would be of such central importance to the great nineteenth-century Ukrainian nationalist movement, making clear the distinction between themselves, the Orthodox Russians, and the Catholic Poles.

If the Catholic church in general did not adopt any special policy toward Russia, Polish bishops, acting in accord with the general policy of the Vatican, did support Polish-Russian détente in the name of the “holy war” against the Ottoman Empire. They therefore refrained from actions irritating to the tsar, aside from their support of the Uniates. Only the Jesuits attempted to use the provisions of the Eternal Peace to the advantage of the Catholic church, seeking to gain access to Russia. The Jesuits had several goals: to provide religious services for Catholics in the tsar’s service; to initiate missionary work in Russia; and, probably most important to them, to open a new road to China. The Jesuits were thus among the most enthusiastic advocates of Polish-Russian cooperation and did their best to create a climate of support for the Eternal Peace. They were the first Western religious order to succeed in penetrating the Russian capital, but they were to be bitterly disappointed. Certain articles and conditions of the treaty notwithstanding, they never obtained permission to travel through Russia to China; they were expelled from Russia and their house in Moscow was closed down a mere three years after its establishment in 1686. Once promoters of Russian interests in Rome, Vienna, and Warsaw, they were now among the harshest critics of Russian “barbarism.” The Commonwealth’s participation in the Jesuit venture was substantial. Blame for the Jesuits’ proselytism among the Russians was placed on Sobieski, who had been successful in winning their initial entry into Russia.⁴⁰

The Russians were probably disturbed by news of Jesuit successes in China. “Now the Jesuits think that soon all the Chinese will be Catholic,”

⁴⁰ The Lithuanian Chancellor Ogiński asked Golitsyn to allow Jesuits to pass through Russia to Persia: TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1688, ms 3. The best monograph on the Jesuits in Russia is Joseph Sebes, *The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)* (Rome, 1961), pp. 95–100, 139. One can assume that the Russians were annoyed by the news of Jesuit successes in China. Nicolae Milescu Spătarul (known in Russian as Nikolai Gavrilovich Milesku [Spafarii]), the main translator in the Department of Foreign Affairs and envoy to China (1675–1679), commented on Jesuit missionary successes in China; see *Russia, Mongolia, China*, ed. by John Paddeley (London, 1919). See also the reference by Vincent Chen in his *Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (The Hague, 1966), p. 113; for information on Russian missionary work in China, see *ibid.*, pp. 112–20.

reported Nicolae Milescu Spătarul, envoy to China (1675–1679), “We, however, believe that with God’s help and the tsar’s good fortunes the Chinese will . . . adopt the Orthodox faith.”⁴¹ The Polish bishops, unlike the Vatican, were not easily tempted by the Kremlin’s supposed interest in a union with Rome, recognizing such signals for what they were—skillful political maneuvers aimed at winning the pope’s support. The Catholic hierarchy of the Commonwealth entertained no ambitious plans vis-à-vis the Orthodox East, and its policy was realistically tailored to the actual strength and domestic interest of Poland-Lithuania. It did not engage in any full-scale missionary work in Russia or make any strenuous efforts on behalf of the Catholics living there. On the other hand, the episcopate greatly resented Russian interference in Poland-Lithuania on behalf of the Orthodox church, and its support for the Uniates remained firm.

Finally, the traditional division of senators, court dignitaries, and top bureaucrats into supporters of either a “French” or an “Austrian” policy had some influence on Polish-Lithuanian relation with Russia. From the sixteenth century, a pro-French policy meant peace with the Turks and hostility toward Austria and her allies. From the mid-seventeenth century it also implied support for radical change toward a strong centralized government. On several occasions during the century, powerful groups of senators wanted to install a French candidate on the Polish-Lithuanian throne. Before he became king, Sobieski himself had been an ardent member of the pro-French faction, and was encouraged by his French wife, Maria Kazimiera, to act in the interests of Louis XIV. Sobieski’s father-in-law and his brother-in-law had served as diplomatic agents of the French king in Warsaw.⁴²

Sobieski’s pro-French attitude was weakened by the Turkish attack on Poland in 1672 and the subsequent Turkish occupation of Podolia and Kam’ianets’-Podil’skyi. Unsuccessful in mediating a peace between their Eastern allies (since the Turks refused to relinquish their gains), the

⁴¹ Chen, *Sino-Russian Relations*, p. 113.

⁴² Tadeusz Korzon, *Dola i niedola Jana Sobieskiego, 1629–1674*, vol. 3 (Cracow, 1898), pp. 216–80, 429–508; Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, pp. 104–24, 155–94, 281–82, 288, 362–63, 406–407, 411–13. Wójcik puts forth numerous arguments challenging Korzon’s critical analysis. This difference in interpretation attests to the continuing controversy between “republicans” (the Warsaw school) and “monarchists” (Cracow school) in Polish historiography. My own interpretation of Sobieski and the seventeenth-century Polish government and society leans more toward Korzon than toward Wójcik.

French could not prevent the complete reversal of Sobieski's policy. In 1683, a Polish-Austrian alliance was established, but the honeymoon was short, as both countries dreamed of controlling Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania.⁴³

Austria's military successes, the Habsburgs' unwillingness to accept Polish territorial claims, and general war-weariness provided France with a new opportunity to mediate between Istanbul and Warsaw. Obviously, the partisans of a French orientation were always ready to point to Polish-Lithuanian sacrifices for the cause of the Holy Alliance, particularly the ceding of East-Bank Ukraine and Smolensk to Russia. The pro-Austrian party, on the other hand, strengthened by the marriage of Sobieski's eldest son to the sister of the emperor's wife in 1691, defended the Eternal Peace and the continuation of the war with the Ottomans.⁴⁴

None of the special interest groups had a far-reaching, well-formulated policy toward Russia. Furthermore, in the last years of the seventeenth century relations with the Kremlin were not the center of attention of the county councils and parliaments. This explains why the king, his experts, and close associates had a virtually free hand in shaping Commonwealth policy toward Muscovy. However, as will be shown in chapters 6 and 7, that policy was badly calculated, clumsily executed, and actually resulted in a strengthening of the Russian hold on Ukraine.

Russia

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a vast state in the seventeenth century, but much smaller than Muscovy, which encompassed 5,900,000 square miles including sparsely inhabited Siberia. Russia had a population of some 15 million, nearly twice that of Poland, and was at least as ethnically diverse, including Russians, Ukrainians (known during that period as *Cherkasy* and later as *Malorussiane*), Tatars, Don Cossacks, Kalmyks, and various Turkic tribes. Most of the population lived in European Russia and professed Orthodoxy, but a great mass of conquered peoples, most of them Muslims, lived along the lower Volga, while

⁴³ Kazimierz Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią*, pp. 1–9, 113–28, 151–54; Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, pp. 315–18.

⁴⁴ Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, pp. 320–54.

small enclaves of Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists—mostly foreigners in Russian service—settled in and around Moscow and Arkhangel'sk. Jews were not allowed to settle in the realm of the tsar, and only the later partitions of Poland introduced them permanently into the Russian Empire. Roughly speaking, the population was divided into *sluzhilye liudi*, or servitors (sometimes treated by historians as the counterparts of the European nobility), who comprised about 1.5 percent of the total, and *tiaglye liudi*, or the “taxed people,” i.e., peasants and town dwellers. Within the relatively small group of servitors there were enormous differences in social and political standing, based in particular on where one served—in Moscow or in the provinces.⁴⁵

The Autocrat

This vast state was unified by the singular authority vested in the tsar. His authority far exceeded not only that of the elected king of Poland-Lithuania, but even the power wielded by the hereditary kings of Europe who claimed to rule by divine right. Since the tsar was both the supreme secular and spiritual leader, the slightest opposition to his will was regarded not only as treason but as sacrilege. It therefore followed that the tsar alone was capable of determining and administering justice, and that no subject could refuse to comply with an order either because it was unlawful or because it ran counter to custom. Custom and law did have some effect on the tsar, although certain rulers managed to overstep these bounds as demonstrated by Ivan IV and Peter I.

The power of the autocrat, which grew gradually throughout the seventeenth century, penetrated every aspect of life—custom, law, even the church. Michael Cherniavsky, who has explored the gradual transformation of the image of the rule from that of a saintly medieval prince to a tsar-god, notes that after the Time of Troubles (1604–1613), the tsar became identified with the state, and his office assumed an absolute and sacred character.⁴⁶ Just how sacred that office had become by the

⁴⁵ *Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma*, ed. N. M. Druzhinin (Moscow, 1955), pp. 321–28. On servitors, see S. B. Veselovskii, *Issledovaniia po istorii klassa sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev* (Moscow, 1969); Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago and London, 1971), pp. 48–74.

⁴⁶ Michael Cherniavsky, “The Old Believers and the New Religion,” in *The Structure of Russian History*, ed. M. Cherniavsky (New York, 1970), pp. 144–57. Marc Raeff, *Understanding Imperial Russia* (New York, 1984) pp. 4–6.

seventeenth century is evident from the outcome of a controversy between Patriarch Nikon and Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, in which the patriarch questioned the tsar's right to interfere in the affairs of the church. The patriarch received no support from a church council summoned to Moscow and attended by two Eastern patriarchs. The patriarchs extolled the tsar in all things spiritual and temporal, but did propose a compromise that would grant the tsar and the patriarch independence in their respective spheres. The tsar, however, continued to rule over both church and state, a point made most clearly by Peter I when he abolished the office of the patriarch.⁴⁷

When, at times, a particular tsar was incapable of ruling—either because he was too young or otherwise—key advisors exercised power, but always in the name of the tsar. The idea of autocracy was never challenged after the Time of Troubles. For this reason the glorification of the tsar's name and title assumed an importance unknown in the Western world. Although all European diplomats expressed veneration for their rulers, none was bound by the strict code of behavior imposed upon the tsar's servitors. Any mention to foreign envoys of crop failures, disastrous floods, or plagues was impossible, since it might compromise the tsar's name. This also applied to admission of military defeats or the failure to carry out the terms of a diplomatic agreement. As a result, Russian diplomats were frequently trapped into perpetuating lies that they knew might jeopardize the very mission with which they had been entrusted.⁴⁸ The sacred role of the tsar had been reinforced by the patriarchs of the Eastern Orthodox church. The tsar's position was similar to that of the Chinese emperor: he was the center of a closed universe, which included all of Orthodoxy.⁴⁹

Still, the sacrosanct position of the tsar did not put individual tsars beyond the reach of palace intrigues or above social and political struggles. Tsars were criticized, their ministers and favorites were murdered, and attempts were even made on the lives of the tsar and his

⁴⁷ James Cracraft, *The Church Reforms of Peter the Great* (Stanford, 1971) pp. 63–210. Cherniavsky, "Old Believers," pp. 140–88. N. F. Kapterev, *Patriarkh Nikon i Tsar' Aleksei Mikhailovich*, vols. 1–2 (Sergiev Posad, 1909–1912).

⁴⁸ See chapter 3 of this study. For interesting observations on the manipulation and perceptions of symbols of power in Russia, refer to Edward Keenan, "Muscovite Political Folkways," *Russian Review* 45 (1986): 128–45.

⁴⁹ On the position taken by the Chinese emperor, see Mark Mancal, *Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

family. For the populace, though, the tsar was always an object of worship, the dispenser of justice, and the master of their lives and destinies. The great social uprisings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries never challenged the idea of autocracy. The rebels either had their own pretender to the throne in their camp, or marched on Moscow to free the tsar-god from the influence of his reputedly wicked advisors.

The reverence accorded the tsar even shaped the opposition of some of the conservative Orthodox to the Nikonian liturgical reforms promoted by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. They found themselves challenging the tsar's authority, an unthinkable action for a true Orthodox Christian. These Old Believers resolved the dilemma by proclaiming the tsar to be the Antichrist, whose orders were those of the devil.⁵⁰ The radicalism of that move is particularly striking when compared to the Catholic church's resolution of similar dilemma in medieval times: it was content to anathematize the ruler and proclaim him a tyrant. Since the tsar-god occupied ultimately such an elevated and sublime role in the Russian state and society, the Old Believers' only option was as absolute—to make him into a tsar-satan.

Administration and Bureaucracy

Naturally, no tsar in the sixteenth or seventeenth century who so completely centralized legislative, executive, and judicial power in his own hands could exercise it without at least the compliance of traditional and newly created government institutions. To understand the administrative process in Russia one must examine the composition and responsibilities of such institutions as the Boyar Duma (the royal council), the *Zemskii sobor* (representative assembly), and *prikazy* (departments or ministries), and their relation to the ruler and to the inhabitants.

The oldest of them, the Boyar Duma, was rooted in early medieval times. It was comparable to a European royal council, and consisted of advisors chosen from among the tsar's top administrators and military leaders. The Boyar Duma of the seventeenth century dealt with all sorts of questions placed before it by the tsar, but its special and traditional responsibility was advice on foreign policy. Reports from Russian

⁵⁰ Cherniavsky, "Old Believers," pp. 149–59. See also Robert Crummey, *The Old Believers and the World of the Anti-Christ: The Vyg Community and the Russian State, 1694–1855* (Madison, 1970).

diplomats abroad were read in the Duma, and instructions drafted for them needed the Duma's approval. Negotiations with foreign nations were usually entrusted to Duma members. Appointment to the Duma was for life, but the tsar could and did dismiss members who displeased him. There were 150 members: *boyare*, *okol'nichie*, *dumnye dvoriane*, and *dumnye d'iaki*. The title *boyar* was awarded only to the most distinguished of the tsar's servitors, but the meaning or importance of the rank declined during the seventeenth century, as evidenced by the sharp increase in the number of servitors so honored. There were only 12 at the beginning of the century, 75 by the end. Still, the most trusted ministers, generals, and local governors were to be found among them. Immediately below the rank of *boyar* and aspiring to that position were the *okol'nichie*. Both groups consisted of members of old aristocratic families with blood ties to the royal dynasties of Rurik, Gediminas, and Romanov. They also included members of a few leading families descended from the servitors of medieval Muscovite princes, and some of the tsar's relatives through marriage. The *dumnye dvoriane* were distinguished Muscovite servitors who excelled in the army, in the ministries, or at court. Non-nobles were represented in the lowest Duma rank, that of the professional bureaucrats, usually numbering four, under the leadership of the head clerk in the Foreign Affairs Department. His office was comparable to that of the vice-chancellor of Poland-Lithuania.⁵¹

The system of ranks in the Boyar Duma, as in the entire Russian administration, army, and court, was known as *mestnichestvo*. It was based on blood ties, the accomplishments of one's forefathers in the tsars' service, and individual merit. It was similar to the ranking systems observed in most of Western Europe, but it differed, for example, from the Polish, Venetian, or Spanish custom in that it emphasized family standing above all, with relatively little emphasis placed on personal merit. In practice this had serious consequences. A man of modest family who was promoted to boyar and appointed to a high administrative or military post, despite his new position, would not have precedence over the scions of the old aristocratic families in the Duma, in court ceremonies, etc. This applied even to the tsar's father-in-law. What

⁵¹ Robert Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–1689* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 12–33. V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia дума drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1909).

is more, members of the old aristocracy refused to serve under such recently elevated *homines novi*. Accepting a position subordinate to such an upstart, according to *mestnichestvo*, belittled one's family and stained its service record. To avoid such service, various devices were employed, including feigned illness, self-inflicted wounds, and ultimately, simple refusal to carry out orders. The severe punishment meted out in the form of public reprimands, flogging, and banishment to Siberia was considered more acceptable than the dishonor which came from accepting the commands of someone whose predecessors were of lower rank than one's own. The conduct of war, peace negotiations, and the supervision of provincial administrators were accordingly made extremely difficult by bitter *mestnichestvo* disputes. The system was a nightmare on the Duma level, where it not only hampered all administrative and military activities, but also intensified the atomization of the servitors' estate. Under Ivan IV, *mestnichestvo* was suspended during important military campaigns. In 1682 it was abolished under Fedor.⁵²

It has been argued with some justification that autocracy had profited from the system's lack of cohesiveness, especially among the boyars; it has also been argued that *mestnichestvo* had slowed the process of modernization as human talents were squandered.⁵³ We should recall that the system had been abolished during the rule of Fedor, a very weak tsar, and the abolition had been prepared and executed by his advisors. Various solutions to *mestnichestvo* problem had been proposed, with Duma members supporting a plan which would have transformed the Duma into a senate with a ranking order based on ministerial posts. The abolition of *mestnichestvo* resulted in the establishment of a ranking system based on appointment to positions carrying certain privileges, a system that could have been important in introducing a sense of group solidarity. In effect, however, the reforms of Peter I would expand and formalize the new arrangement, allow greater social mobility for the provincial nobility and professional bureaucrats, and in the process break the increasing confidence of the top echelons of the nobility and maintain the divisions among the servitors.

⁵² S. O. Shmidt, "Mestnichestvo i absoliutizm (postanovka voprosa)," in *Absoliutizm v Rossii (XVII–XVIII v.)*, ed. N. M. Druzhinin (Moscow, 1964), pp. 168–205.

⁵³ For a very lucid account of the debate, see M. Ia. Volkov, "Ob otmene mestnichestva v Rossii," in *Istoriia SSSR* 22 (1977), no. 2: 53–67. See also idem, "O stanovlenii absoliutizma v Rossii," *Istoriia SSSR* 15 (1970), no. 1: 90–104.

The observation that the power of the Boyar Duma was undercut both by infighting and by its purely advisory rather than legislative role does not underestimate the boyars' control over other segments of society or the threat they posed to the tsar. They were the single most powerful, well organized, and best educated group in the country, and the only group that was conscious of itself as a political or potentially political force. It was the boyars who had taken over when there was an interregnum, and they had become extremely influential during the Time of Troubles when they attempted not only to safeguard their own interests, but to become co-rulers with the tsar.⁵⁴

The rise of another government institution, the *Zemskii sobor*, can be explained, at least in part, by the tsar's need to check the power of the boyars. The tsar played off other ranks of servitors against them, particularly the provincial nobility, who were threatened with the loss of their land to members of the Duma.⁵⁵ An assembly of representatives of the various social groups, the *Zemskii sobor* had been summoned by the tsar at irregular intervals during the second half of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries to discuss such issues as taxation, war, peace, and—in 1613—the election of a tsar. The *Zemskii sobor* had a somewhat ambiguous character in that it might be considered both an elected and an appointed body. At best it was a nascent parliamentary institution, but one that lacked the two most essential requirements for becoming a genuine parliament: first, no law guaranteed that the *Sobor* would be convened regularly; second, nothing obliged the tsar to adopt what a given *Sobor* had discussed, debated, and ultimately petitioned for as law.

After the Time of Troubles, the *Zemskii sobor* dealt with, as it were, “objective” problems of internal as well as foreign policy. The rise reflects two historical circumstances unprecedented in Russia before the seventeenth century: the crisis of legitimacy faced by the new Romanov dynasty in 1613 vis-à-vis the rest of Russian society after the demise of the Rurikids, and the new de facto political role played by a coalition of cities, Cossacks, and provincial nobility, which had risen in the power

⁵⁴ B. N. Floriia, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia i politicheskoe razvitie vostochnoi Evropy vo vtoroi polovine XVI–nachale XVII v.* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 274–85.

⁵⁵ On the servitors' struggle against the “strong men” of Moscow, refer to Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago and London, 1971), pp. 48–74.

vacuum of the Time of Troubles. In summoning the *Sobor* for advice on these problems, the tsars also sought to pacify the populace by allowing the most active social groups to air their grievances and appeal to them for redress (in most cases against the members of the Duma). On balance, it seems clear that the *Sobor* exerted a decided influence on the processes of government and on some of the legislation that was passed after it met. In 1648, when it was convened following severe popular uprisings, its deliberations had resulted in the revision of the entire code of law in the *Ulozhenie* of 1649.

The size and composition of the *Sobor* varied greatly. Considering the various elements of society represented—from the urban and rural areas, from the capital and the provinces, from the church and secular groups—the tsars had to heed some of its petitions. Yet in granting concessions to some groups, the tsars had actually increased their own power, by curtailing that of the Muscovite upper strata. In time, as the tsars faced less of a challenge from that quarter, they were able to dispense with the *Sobor* entirely. Still, in its day the *Sobor* had been an important advisory body, and it came closer to being a representative organization than any Russian institution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It did not become a truly representative body, one that might have been a force for social and political change, because local government in Russia was poorly developed: the *Sobor* lacked the backing of local constituents that could have enabled it to act more independently of the tsar's authority.⁵⁶

Of far greater importance in the daily workings of government were the numerous departments or ministries (*prikazy*) established in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They reflected the tendency toward a more centralized, modern type of government run by bureaucrats. The latter were influential servitors of non-noble origin (*d'iaki* and *podd'iachie*). The *prikazy* were responsible for administering a specific territory, such as Kazan', Siberia, or Malorossiiia; or for directing a government department, such as foreign affairs, the church, the guards, the treasury, the army, appointments to administrative posts, or land grants. There were also *prikazy* of an even more specific or limited nature, such as the Apothecary Department (*Aptekarskii prikaz*), which

⁵⁶ L. V. Cherepnin, "Zemskie sobory i utverzhdenie absoliutizma v Rossii," in *Absoliutizm v Rossii*, pp. 92–133; John Keep, "The Decline of the Zemsky Sobor," *Slavonic and East European Review* 36 (1957): pp. 100–122; idem, "The Muscovite Elite and the Approach to Pluralism," *Slavonic and East European Review* 48 (1970): 201–32.

was responsible for providing medicine to the tsar and his household; the Artillery Department (*Pushkarskii prikaz*); and the Department of Stables (*Koniushnia*). There were as many as seventy such departments, all staffed by scores of well-trained *d'iaki* and *podd'iachie* and headed by members of the Duma. When the tsar reached a decision, its implementation was entrusted to one or more *prikazy*.⁵⁷

Upon the tsar's decision to send an ambassador to Poland, for example, the Department of Foreign Affairs (*Posol'skii prikaz*) was charged with preparing the instructions and assigning the personnel for the mission. The Department of Guards was called upon to provide *strel'tsy* as guards for the diplomats. The Department of Church Affairs was asked to provide an Orthodox priest, while the Kazan' or Siberian Department was to supply the furs to be used by the diplomats in lieu of money.⁵⁸

Interdepartmental correspondence in seventeenth-century Russia occupied much of the bureaucrats' time, as attested to by the bulky archives, and the division of authority between the often competing heads of *prikazy* did not speed matters. To avoid interdepartmental rivalries and to concentrate administrative authority, the tsar's closest and most trusted advisors, often members of his family, were given the directorships of the most important departments. For example, from 1682 to 1689, Vasilii Golitsyn was head of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In addition, he headed three important military departments (the *Inozemnyi*, *Reitarskii*, and *Pushkarskii prikazy*) and the *Malorossiiskii prikaz*, which dealt with Ukrainian affairs. After the coup of 1689, Tikhon Streshnev, Boris Golitsyn, and Fedor Pushkin concentrated all of the most important departments in their own hands.⁵⁹

While this concentration of directorships in the hands of the tsar's "own" people safeguarded the centralization of the administration, the *prikaz* system also placed the work of the departments in the hands of professional bureaucrats. The tsar's advisors headed a number of *prikazy* each, and they hardly had the time (or the inclination) to involve themselves in the actual daily working of the departments. If a seasoned

⁵⁷ N. V. Ustiugov, "Èvoliutsiia prikaznogo stroia russkogo gosudarstva v XVII v.," in *Absoliutizm v Rossii*, pp. 134–67.

⁵⁸ Documents related to Voznitsyn's mission to Poland in 1688. TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, 1688, ms 4.

⁵⁹ Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, pp. 33, 54–58, 43, 199.

d'iak had to content himself with the second- or third-highest ranking position in a given department, his technical expertise and intimate knowledge of the department's personnel assured him a key role in its functioning. Directors were ordered by the tsar to seek the counsel of these highly placed commoners on all important matters. The smooth daily functioning of the Russian administrative system, which despite its rather cumbersome form was quite effective, was made possible by the efforts of these men, who had gained practical experience since adolescence through service in various *prikazy*.

A study of the names of these people, who served generation after generation, shows that they in fact comprised a hereditary bureaucracy. Those who excelled in their careers and advanced to the position of *d'iak* acquired considerable power and wealth. Altogether the *d'iaki* and *podd'iachie* numbered about a thousand, most of whom were based in Moscow, where they constituted one of the top strata of the government. In view of their social origin, however, as long as blood ties and the accomplishments of one's forefathers defined social standing, it is not at all surprising that they identified completely with the government itself rather than with the court nobility.⁶⁰

The directors of the most important *prikazy*, numbering between five and fifteen, comprised the "closest advisors" and were put in command of the army in time of war. Through them the tsar controlled the administration, the army, the guards, and the diplomats. To rule the provinces the tsar employed a second stratum of powerful dignitaries as palatines, through whom the *prikazy* worked outside of the capital. Appointed for three-year terms, the palatines concentrated enormous power in their hands: they were the supreme judicial, administrative, and military authorities in their particular provinces. The palatines of the most important provinces (e.g., Kiev, Novgorod, Arkhangel'sk, Smolensk) were chosen from among the most trusted and illustrious members of the Duma.⁶¹

The highest circle of administrators numbered at most between 20 and 30; there was a secondary circle of about 200 associates of department directors and palatines. Relatives of the tsar and aristocrats

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 164–68, 174. The most complete list of *d'iaki* and assistant *d'iaki* was compiled by S. B. Veselovskii, *D'iaki i podd'iachie XV–XVII vv.* (Moscow, 1975).

⁶¹ An examination of nominations to those posts and the men forming the dominant coterie proves this point.

predominated in both groups, and their effectiveness in policy making was to some degree indicative of their education and experience. Most of them probably lacked a formal education and did not study abroad, although usually they had private tutors during childhood. Some had been taught foreign languages, most often Polish and Latin, by teachers of Ukrainian, Polish, or Belorussian origin. Thanks to their teachers, the young members of the top echelons of the Russian elite were Westernized before the time of Peter I. Their training for high administrative position was practical, and the coaching of family members essential. Their world was vastly different from that of the provincial servitors. While it is true that the Miloslavskiis, Golitsyns, Sheremetevs, Matveevs, Prozorovskiis, and other top ranking families did not yet speak French and had not yet adopted the custom of spending their vacations in Paris, Baden, or Nice, they were nevertheless as far removed from the rest of society, by virtue of their Latin-Polish education, as their French-speaking progeny would be a century later.

The material base of the chief administrators was the generous remuneration from the tsar and the revenue from their possessions. They lived in fine style, often owning palaces in Moscow and the country. However, their economic position was not comparable to that of the Radziwiłłs, Potockis, Koniecpolskis, or Vyshnevets'kyis—in the seventeenth century the richest Russian owned a few thousand peasant households, an impressive amount, but still far less than the wealthy holdings of their opposite numbers in Poland-Lithuania.⁶²

Reforms and Modernization

The bureaucrats' loyal service to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich allowed them to undermine the Boyar Duma and to bring about the atrophy of the *Zemskii sobor*. With the decline of these two institutions the tsars were able to charge the bureaucracy with carrying out the reforms deemed beneficial to the state. This paralleled the situation in some of the European *Machtstaaten*, except that in Russia the distance between government and society had become so vast that the autocrat and the bureaucrat had uncontested control over the country. They were no

⁶² H. Wisner, *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita. Szkice z dziejów Polski szlacheckiej XVI–XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1978), pp. 237–38; Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, p. 115, table 2; Czapliński and Długosz, *Życie codzienne*, pp. 71–82.

longer challenged by demands from various social groups, but neither could they use their support for further modernization.⁶³

Given this situation, basic reforms were best introduced by staying as close to old forms and customs as possible and by avoiding unnecessary conflict. This is precisely what Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich attempted to do. Aleksei won Ukraine for Russia, extending his control over the Asiatic steppes and over Siberia. He made full use of Western expertise, and the numbers of Western officers in his army and Western specialists in his mines and factories were as large as they were to be under his son Peter. He not only imported technical innovations but opened the door to Western ideas, including political philosophy. Like Louis XIV, he enjoyed the reading of Agapetus,⁶⁴ which he found more amenable to his own autocratic tendencies than the more contemporary works of Jean Bodin or Justus Lipsius. But while Aleksei used and admired Westerners, he did not emulate them or their customs, out of respect for Russian sensitivities. He encouraged the influx of learned Ukrainians and, by conquering Kiev, brought within Russian boundaries people who were able to help in the task of modernization.

Aleksei's revitalization of mining and manufacturing, exploitation of raw materials, and internal and external trade, reminiscent of mercantilism, are clearly documented in the *Novotargovyi ustav*, the statute which gave protection to local merchants and entrepreneurs.⁶⁵ His reforms of

⁶³ This point was made most clearly by Marc Raeff in his monograph, *The Well-Ordered Police State* (New Haven, 1983), pp. 251–57; Keep, "Muscovite Elite," pp. 201–232; H. J. Torke, "Oligarchie in der Autokratie: Der Machtverfall der Bojarenduma im 17. Jahrhundert," in *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 24 (1978): 179–201.

⁶⁴ Ihor Ševčenko, "A Neglected Byzantine Source of Muscovite Political Ideology," in *Structure*, pp. 80–107; B. Uroff, "Grigorii Karpovich Kotoshikhin, On Russia in the Reign of Alexis Mikhailovich: An Annotated Translation," (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970); K. V. Bazylevich, *Denezhnaia reforma Alekseia Mikhailovicha i vosstanie v Moskve v 1662 g.* (Moscow, 1936); A. I. Sobolevskii, *Obrazovannost' Moskovskoi Rusi XV–XVII vekov*, (St. Petersburg, 1892); F. I. Kalinychev, *Pravovye voprosy voennoi organizatsii russkogo gosudarstva vtoroi poloviny XVII veka* (Moscow, 1954), pp. 45–47, 88–92, 100.

⁶⁵ G. Vernadsky, *The Tsardom of Moscow 1547–1682*, pt. 2 (New Haven and London, 1969), p. 724 [=his *A History of Russia*, vol. 5, pt. 2]; Raeff, *Understanding Imperial Russia*, pp. 6, 29–30; E. I. Zaozerskaia, "K istorii Tul'skoi oruzheinoi slobody," in *Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii* (Moscow, 1969) pp. 137–56; S. K. Bogoiavlenskii, "Vooruzhenie russkikh voisk v XVI–XVII vv.," *Istoricheskie zapiski* (Moscow) 4 (1938): 258–83; K. V. Bazylevich, "Novotargovyi ustav 1667 g.," in *Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR, Otdelenie obshchestvennykh nauk* 7 (Moscow, 1932): 589–622.

the army, his centralization of the administration, his attempts to bring people of modest social background to positions of power—all these accomplishments were impressive. His codification of laws formulated the new, absolute rule of his unchallenged autocracy and defined the new rights of servants of the throne, an achievement unmatched by any other tsar until Catherine II.

During the period of his reforms, which after all challenged the traditional role of the boyars and the church, Aleksei found support in his bureaucracy, his palace guards (*strel'tsy*), the court nobility, and the regiments of his “new army.”⁶⁶

As Russia consolidated power and sought to modernize itself, the tsars increasingly felt the need for educated and experienced administrators. To supplement the hereditary bureaucrats and the constantly changing corps of foreign advisors, the tsars forced aristocrats and court dignitaries to acquire administrative skills and technical knowledge. To these cadres the tsars, most notably Peter, entrusted their optimistic vision of a “new Russia,” embodied in hastily drafted *ukazy* (statutes) cascading down through the administrative chain of command—only to encounter the disappointment common to most draconian builders of utopias. The cameralistic language of a governing senate would not make Russia a *Rechtsstaat* in which governmental decrees were indeed implemented with the support of society. The tsars attempted to remedy this situation through more of the same administrative reforms, only to discover that even the best bureaucracy is unable to govern successfully without at least the partial cooperation of society.

Such cooperation existed in all other European countries, as it had in earlier times in Rus', through a system of institutions of self-government. The Bourbons, the Habsburgs, and other European kings and princes effectively limited these alternative centers of power, but never destroyed them completely. The success of the well-ordered police states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was rooted in the cooperation of their bureaucracies with these representative bodies. The Russian rulers, however, in their relentless pursuit of absolute power, succeeded in replacing representative bodies like the *Zemskii sobor* with their own administration and in subjecting the Orthodox church to their control.

⁶⁶ Raeff, *Understanding Imperial Russia*, pp. 57–105. See also Hellie, *Enserfment*, pp. 181–234.

But having accomplished this, they found themselves more the rulers of an administration than of a society.

To gain the support of part of the population in implementing their policies, the tsars felt compelled to enact limited self-rule, as Peter I would try to do in his abortive city self-government project. They also organized meetings with the representatives of society—Catherine II's Legislative Commission is a good example. These attempts were short-lived. After all, the tsars accepted and encouraged social initiatives only so long as they inspired, directed, and controlled them. In this situation, a diligent submissiveness, not initiative, was fostered. The government found it easier and safer to borrow institutional models, architecture, schools and curricula, experts and technology from the West than to accept the partnership of Russian society, or at least of the provincial nobility and burghers, in modernizing the country.⁶⁷

Social and Political Elite

The chief stratification among the Russian servitors (*sluzhilye liudi*) was according to the location in which one served, as well as noble or non-noble origin. These two conditions created an unbridgeable gulf in political and social status.⁶⁸ Muscovite servitors of both noble and non-noble birth were worlds apart from their provincial counterparts. They had a virtual monopoly on the high administrative posts in the government, the court, the army, and the diplomatic corps, so that essentially, as we have seen, they constituted a group of hereditary administrators. By contrast, provincial servitors consisted chiefly of landowners who were obliged to render military service. It is this group that is customarily designated "the Russian nobility." It was almost impossible for members of this group to overcome the barriers that separated them from the nobility listed in the Muscovite register.

In striking contrast to the *szlachta* of Poland-Lithuania, the Russian hereditary servitors made no claims of equality, and instead of developing even a semblance of equality among themselves, to say nothing of brotherhood, were meticulous observers of the table of ranks. The

⁶⁷ Raeff, *Well-Ordered Police State*, pp. 181–257.

⁶⁸ The differences between servitors in Moscow and those in the provinces are discussed by R. Hellie in *Enserfment*, pp. 24–25, 48–74.

system guaranteed them a place in the service, but it also erected practically insurmountable legal and social barriers between them.

Although all Russian servitors started their careers at a lower rank than that attained by their fathers it was the father's position and the family's standing which determined their point of entry into the service and the speed with which they rose through the ranks. Sons of the most illustrious boyars usually started as personal pages (*spal'niki*) to the tsar and members of his family; most children of Duma members and of court dignitaries entered service at the bottom as *zhil'tsy* or *striapchie*. While many sons of *zhil'tsy* or *striapchie* started and ended their careers in the same rank, the sons of Duma members usually rose fairly quickly to the rank of *stol'nik*. Numbering about a thousand, *stol'niki* exercised important functions in the administration, court, and army. From this group, whose members aspired to membership in the Duma, the tsar and the most powerful ministers sought collaborators and partners.⁶⁹

As administrators of the second echelon, the *stol'niki* were responsible in practice for the supervision of many local administrative posts. Their cooperation was essential for any attempt at modernization. They would be assigned that task by Peter after his study in the West. They included a handful of aristocrats, most of them sons of court dignitaries, and a few of the most able and fortunate servitors from the lower ranks. Some of the most prominent *d'iaki* were also promoted in this way and became hereditary nobles in the process. The great diversity among the *stol'niki* in origin, age, and career expectations worked against a sense of solidarity and reinforced their dependency on the tsar and his powerful ministers.⁷⁰

The *stol'niki* were probably the first group to feel threatened by the heavy reliance of the tsars (especially Aleksei Mikhailovich and Peter I) on foreign experts. Under Peter they would be the first group forced to acquire technical expertise in order to further their careers. Even then the court dignitaries as a whole did not feel threatened, since the tsar

⁶⁹ A very interesting list of the ranks of pre-Petrine Russia was compiled by a Jesuit missionary to Moscow: Georgius David, S.J., *Status Modernus Magnae Russiae Seu Moscoviae* (1690), ed. A. V. Florovsky (The Hague, 1965), pp. 79–81; Hellie, *Enserfment*, pp. 24–25; G. K. Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (St. Petersburg, 1906), pp. 27–38.

⁷⁰ M. M. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I. Materialy dlia bibliografii*, vol. 1 (Leningrad, 1940), pp. 365–67. See fn. 68, above. All the *d'iaki* sent to Poland-Lithuania as residents were nominated *stol'niki* and therefore elevated to the state of *dvoriane*; see also chap. 3.

increasingly needed more administrators for the task of modernization, and they were first in line for all nominations. The constant need for manpower and the growing number of positions in the army and bureaucracy alleviated competition among the bureaucracy, the traditional servitors, and the foreigners. The illustrious careers of many foreigners in the army and in the administration were galling to the provincial nobility, but their advance did not seriously hamper the chance of those court dignitaries willing to adopt new ways. There was a good deal of fraternization among the bureaucrats, the court dignitaries, and the most prominent foreign experts.

Proximity to the tsar and the to the ruling cliques gave the Muscovite servitors an enormous advantage over those who served in the provinces. This privileged status was most keenly felt on the issues of land and serfs. Indeed, the provincial nobility had no institution to represent and defend their interests, for the counties lacked any form of self-government. In peacetime, the counties were administered by Moscow bureaucrats and in time of war by commanders from Moscow. Denied control over local affairs, the provincial nobility was reduced to petitioning the very officials in the central government who were opposed to their interests. The *Zemskii sobor*, which had provided their only direct contact with the tsar, was moribund in the late seventeenth century. If their petitions for land grants were approved, this was not because of their collective strength, but because they constituted the bulk of the Russian army. Ironically, then, they profited by war, because only then could they enforce their demands. Their gains, however, were ephemeral, because neglect of their estates during periods of military service often led to economic reversals.⁷¹

The position of the provincial nobility was further undermined by its own divisiveness, largely engendered by two practices connected with rank. The first was historico-geographic: under the existing inflexible system, a servitor from Novgorod automatically had greater status than one from Tobol'sk. The second was economic: even within one province those members of the nobility descended from families of higher economic standing were given preference in the Table of Ranks.⁷² In social

⁷¹ Hellie, *Enserfment*, pp. 21–41. Torke, *Oligarchie in der Autokratie*, pp. 179–201.

⁷² A. A. Novosel'skii, "Feodal'noe zemlevladienie. Boiarsstvo, dvorianstvo i tserkov'," in *Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma XVII v.*, ed. A. A. Novosel'skii and N. V. Ustiugov (Moscow, 1955), pp. 140, 152–59; Hellie, *Enserfment*, pp. 21–25.

and economic terms, the provincial nobility were thus roughly equivalent to the county szlachta in Poland. The crucial difference was that with no self-government and consequently no means of representation, the Russian provincial nobility had no direct access to the administration. They would remain totally dependent upon highly placed Moscow servitors and bureaucrats until the Petrine reforms gave them an opportunity to acquire positions in the capital through service in the Guards' Regiments.

Powers Behind the Throne

Court Cliques

While Poland-Lithuania was hampered by the ineffectiveness of a central administration limited by the rights of its citizens, the Russian autocracy, ruling over a vast territory and a large population, left no room for the development of a civil society. In the Commonwealth, the state was treated as the servant of many quarrelsome masters, while in Russia it was conceived of as clay in the creative hands of the tsar.

In light of this description, it is futile to attempt to construct "parties" in Russia similar to those in Poland-Lithuania, which, it will be remembered, possessed defined political programs and constituencies. To understand shifts of power and changes in the political climate, however, it is useful to concentrate on the very small group of the tsar's top advisors, their clans, and court cliques. Powerful dignitaries were often associated with specific political and cultural programs (Sophia's government favored the Latinists; the Naryshkins supported the Orthodox traditionalists led by the patriarch). But such attachments were secondary to the automatic defense of the coterie per se, based on family ties and service connections. As long as one coterie was unable to secure control of a majority of important *prikazy*, there was room at the top of government for debate, criticism, and compromise.

Such was the situation after the second marriage of Aleksei Mikhailovich, which brought the Naryshkin family into contention with that of his first wife, a Miloslavskii. The tsar's powerful personality kept the rivalry of his competing in-laws in check. During the reign of his weak son Fedor Alekseevich, however, it escalated, resulting in two consecutive coups following that ruler's death: in 1682 the victory of the Miloslavskiis brought Sophia to power, and in 1689 the Naryshkins

overthrew her. It is important to remember that during Sophia's rule, the Naryshkins and their followers were still able to hold onto a few *prikazy*, which indicates that the tsarevna never got complete control of the government. On the other hand, after the successful coup of 1689, the Naryshkins gained control of most of the important *prikazy*, only to lose them shortly thereafter to Peter's personal friends. The changes in the leadership of the *prikazy* very clearly reflected the changes in ruling clans and cliques.⁷³

The Boyar Duma and the upper administration, as we saw above, were usually divided by rivalries between powerful boyar clans and among the tsar's advisors, not by specific issues of foreign policy. During the entire second half of the seventeenth century these rivalries revolved around the contest between the families of Aleksei Mikhailovich's two wives. The foreign policy of Tsarevna Sophia and Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn (1682–1689) was more active and daring than the passive and careful one of the Naryshkins (1689–1694), but this did not stem from different perceptions of Russia's neighbors or different ideological outlooks. Rather, it was the result of the Naryshkins' insecure domestic political position. The Miloslavskiis and Naryshkins both included Westernizers and conservatives, adherents of international involvement and isolationists. But, aside from Afanasii Lavrent'evich Ordin-Nashchokin, no politician seems to have risked his career to defend a clear and consistent foreign policy. Ordin-Nashchokin believed in the importance of the Baltic, as Peter did later, and therefore wanted to form a large anti-Swedish coalition. There was no question that the chief threats to Russia were Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, Turkey, and the Tatars, but there was a great debate as to which of them could prove a useful ally: Ordin-Nashchokin, Golitsyn, and Peter favored an alliance with Poland-Lithuania against Sweden and Turkey, while other statesmen and diplomats, like Artamon Matveev and Prokofii Voznitsyn, considered a war with Poland-Lithuania more advantageous. Foreign policy was usually not an issue by which the various interest groups at court defined themselves, although their basic attitudes toward Europe and modernization affected the country's diplomacy.⁷⁴

⁷³ N. V. Ustiugov, "Tsentral'noe upravlenie," in *Ocherkii istorii*, pp. 383–84; Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, pp. 92–98.

⁷⁴ E. Turtov, *Istoriia o kniaze Iakove Fedoroviche Dolgorukove* (Moscow, 1807), pp. 11–33; A. Malinovskii, *Biograficheskie svedeniia ob upravliaiushchikh v Rossii*

The Church

The influence of the Orthodox church on foreign policy was twofold, reflecting the split between the “traditionalists” and the “Latinists.” The hostility of the traditionalists, clergy and laity alike, toward modernization and Westernization made them proponents of isolationism. Their xenophobia was evident in the often repeated demands to close Russia to all non-Orthodox foreigners and to limit the “evil influence” of the Western experts by forcing them to reside in ghettos, separated from the Russians. The Latinists, all of them Orthodox, even if they were born and educated abroad, were men who had studied at the famous Kiev Mohyla Academy, at the universities of Cracow and Padua, or in Rome. They acted as the transmitters of Western learning and Renaissance political philosophy to Russia. Those who had studied at any of the Jesuit collegia in Poland-Lithuania no doubt had read not only Aristotle but also the famous theoretician of the modern state, Justus Lipsius. During their studies they were encouraged to discuss the responsibilities and obligations of government as well as the duties and legal rights of citizens. The Latinists were active within the Orthodox church, and through the church acted directly on a broad segment of the population. Though graduates of the Academy at Kiev were already to be found in Moscow in the first half of the seventeenth century, they began to play a vital role in Russian intellectual life only after the acquisition of Kiev by Aleksei Mikhailovich. Learned Ukrainian monks found employment in printing houses, in the administration of the church and state, and as tutors. In a very short time, many of them rose to become the abbots of monasteries and eventually, bishops and metropolitans. Because they were accused by the traditionalists of being under the “dangerous” influence of Rome, they came to be called Latinists. They utilized their learning on behalf of Orthodoxy in Russia, as well as in the territories of the Commonwealth, where they competed with the Catholic and Uniate churches for the souls

inostrannymi delami ministrakh (Moscow, 1812); Lenin Library, fond 256, ms 266, pp. 2–44; N. P. Pavlov-Sil'vanskii, “Prashchur Grafa L'va Tolstogo, Graf Petr Andreevich Tolstoi,” *Istoricheskii vestnik* (St. Petersburg), 1905 (May): 842–70; Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, pp. 14–21, 37–48, 88–94; L. Shchepotev, *Blizhznii boiarin Artamon Sergeevich Matveev kak krupnyi politicheskii deiatel' XVII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1906), pp. 35–37; C. B. O'Brien, “Russo-Polish Relations in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century,” in *American Contributions to the Seventh International Congress of Slavists*, ed. A. Cienciala, vol. 3 (The Hague, 1973), pp. 64–68.

of the Orthodox believers. Of equal importance to these Western Orthodox Christians and the Muscovite government was the strengthening through modernization and Westernization of the only independent Orthodox state; the Latinists' influence grew with the support of Aleksei Mikhailovich, Fedor Alekseevich (1678–82), and Sophia (1682–89).⁷⁵

Many of the Latinists were closely connected with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by birth, education, and culture. Their political philosophy had been formed there. While loyal to Orthodoxy and Russia, they could not but present their views and ideas in Polish-Latin form, and this led to a truly astonishing growth of Polish cultural influence in Russia. Neither before nor after was Polish influence so pervasive, so keenly felt there. Perhaps most striking was the spread of the Polish language and knowledge of Polish literature, with the example set by the tsar himself. Aleksei Mikhailovich ordered the famous Latinist Symeon Polots'kyi, author of many religious and political essays and poems, to teach his children Polish and Latin; his older sons learned to speak Polish fluently. Following the tsar's example, the court aristocracy, including the Golitsyns, Matveevs, and Sheremetevs, and members of the bureaucracy such as Vasilii Mikhailovich Tiapkin and Aleksei Vasil'evich Nikitin also educated their children in Polish and Latin. The libraries of the tsar and of his courtiers came to contain many books in Polish, and their palaces were adorned with portraits of the Polish kings. The genealogy of Polish aristocratic families became familiar to their Russian counterparts, and members of the Duma showed interest in the Polish-Lithuanian Senate. Moscow's first theatrical performances were due to the efforts of the Latinist Stepan Chyzhevs'kyi, an alumnus of a Polish Jesuit collegium who modeled the repertory on Polish presentations. Polish legal theory also found its way to Moscow. Bartłomiej Grocki's legal compendium on city self-government was translated and used by the town dwellers of East-Bank Ukraine in their petition for self-rule. Had Sophia stayed in power longer, the Russian

⁷⁵ S. Liubimov, "Bo'ba mezhdū predstaviteliami velikorusskogo i malorossiiskogo napravleniia v Velikorossii v kontse XVII i nachale XVIII vv.," in *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (hereafter *ZMNP*), 180 (August, 1875): 117–52; G. Mirkovich, "O shkolakh i prosveshchenii v patriarshem periode," in *ZMNP* 198 (July, 1878); G. Florovsky, *Puti russkogo bogoslaviia* (Paris, 1937) pp. 67–81; Vernadsky, *History*, pp. 711–40; C. Bickford O'Brien, *Russia under Two Tsars, 1682–1689: The Regency of Sophia Alekseevna* (Berkeley, 1952); S. P. Luppov, *Kniga v Rossii v XVII veke* (Leningrad, 1970), pp. 15–31, 53, 126–30, 196–98.

capital would have had its first university modeled on the Kievan Academy. This would have brought to a logical conclusion the modernization and Westernization based on Polish and Latin introduced by Aleksei Mikhailovich.⁷⁶

The Latinists found a forceful opponent in Patriarch Ioakim, the great enemy of all foreigners, even Orthodox ones. When the Latinists broached the idea of a university in Moscow patterned after the Kievan Academy, the patriarch repeated his desire to see Russia free of all foreigners and their sinful ways. The support of the Latinists by the sophisticated Golitsyn and by Sophia prompted the patriarch to side with Nataľia Kirillovna Naryshkina, mother of Peter I.⁷⁷

For Ioakim, the power struggle between the Miloslavskiis and the Naryshkins was over the future of Russia and her church. With his help the Naryshkins triumphed, and against their better judgment they acceded in part to his demand that measures be undertaken to control and terrorize the foreigners and the Latinists. The monk Sil'vestr Medvedev, leader of the Latinists, who had been groomed by Golitsyn and Sophia as the future patriarch, was executed. A few especially ardent and radical Protestant preachers were burned at the stake, and the Jesuits were expelled from Moscow. Russians were forbidden to live as servants in the houses of foreigners. Military cooperation with the Polish-Lithuanian army was criticized, and the plan to attack the Crimea was abandoned in order to remove Russian soldiers from spiritually dangerous contacts with Ukrainians and Poles. Ioakim's measures damaged relations with Austria and Poland and would infuriate the Westernizers in the company of Peter I. The patriarch's repeated pleas to the tsar and his mother to

⁷⁶ A. I. Sobolevskii, *Perevodnaia literatura Moskovskoi Rusi XIV–XVII vekov* (St. Petersburg, 1903), pp. 52–123, 144–45, 157–58, 160, 162, 172–74, 177–78. Sobolevskii noted that there was a drastic decline in translations from Polish during Peter's reign. A. I. Rogov, *Russko-pol'skie kul'turnye sviazi v èpokhu vozrozhdeniia* (Moscow, 1966); R. Łuźny, *Pisarze kręgu Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej a literatura polska* (Cracow, 1966), pp. 5–17, 126; L. R. Lewitter, "Poland, the Ukraine and Russia in the 17th Century," *Slavonic and East European Review* 27 (1948): 157–71.

⁷⁷ Sil'vestr Medvedev, "Vruchenie Blagovernoi i Khristoliubivoi velikoi Gosudaryne premudroi Tsarevne miloserdnoi Sofii Alekseevne privilegii na Akademiiu v leto ot sozdaniia mira 7193 g . . . ," in *Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika, sodержashchaia v sebe sobranie drevnostei rossiiskikh . . .*, ed. Nikolai Ivanovich Novikov, part 6 (Moscow, 1788), pp. 395–417; A. de la Neuville, *Relation curieuse et nouvelle de Moscovie* (The Hague, 1699), p. 109; P. Smirnov, *Ioakim, patriarch moskovskii* (Moscow, 1881) pp. 124–26, 224–35, 238.

expel all foreigners from Russian service angered Peter and contributed to his contempt for the church.⁷⁸

Ioakim's xenophobia and siege mentality have often been assessed by historians as pathological, but he correctly sensed the danger threatening his institution. As Georges Florovsky has pointed out, the Russian Orthodox church had forfeited its spirituality to the Old Believers,⁷⁹ and it may be added here that the Latinists had demonstrated its ignorance. The foreigners, with their "insidious advice," were leading the ranking boyars and the tsar himself out of the church at a time when it was divided and weak. In fighting "the West," personified by the Latinists and foreigners, the patriarch proved to Tsar Peter that he and his institution would be no help in the task of modernization. A few years after Ioakim's death, Peter would have the learned Latinist Stepan Iavors'kyi installed as locum tenens of the church, and put the whole institution under the control of his bureaucrats.⁸⁰ Ioakim's actions during the rivalry between the Miloslavskiis and the Naryshkins represented for many decades the last attempt of the Russian church to influence domestic and foreign policies. The failure of this attempt actually hastened the church's final submission to the tsar.

The Ukrainians

If the influence of the Orthodox church provides no surprises for the well-read student, the influence exerted by another special interest group, the Ukrainians, is far less well known. Such imposing churchmen as Stepan Iavors'kyi, Teofan Prokopovych, Symeon Polots'kyi, and Iepifanii Slavynets'kyi made their mark on Russian cultural and religious life, and they were often more effective than the regular representatives of the Cossack state in helping to shape Russian policy.⁸¹ They were

⁷⁸ P. Smirnov, *Ioakim, patriarch moskovskii*, pp. 108–145, 236–38; Cracraft, *Church Reforms*, pp. 97–126.

⁷⁹ Florovsky, *Puti russkogo bogosloviia*, pp. 63–67.

⁸⁰ Cracraft, *Church Reform*, pp. 160–65.

⁸¹ Lewitter, *Poland and Ukraine*, pp. 157–65; A. Jabłonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska* (Cracow, 1899–1900), pp. 165–73; S. I. Golubev, *Kievskaiia akademiia v kontse XVI i nachale XVIII v.* (Kiev, 1901); K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikoruskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'* (Kazan', 1914), pp. 250–488; F. B. Kormchyk, *Dukhovi vplyvy na Moskovshchynu v dobi Het'mans'koï Ukraïny* (New York, 1964), pp. 63–100; Raeff, *Understanding Imperial Russia*, pp. 18–24. See also above fn. 3.

part of the Ukrainian community living in Moscow, with close ties to the Kiev clergy and Cossack politicians in Ukraine. By virtue of their education, these men were employed as experts in the army, the bureaucracy, and the diplomatic service. Some relatives of the hetman and *starshyna* (military aristocracy) were kept in Moscow as hostages; others were unfortunate exiles who had lost in the political arena of Ukraine and now served the tsar in Russia. Thus, the best Ukrainian politician of the post-Khmel'nyts'kyi era, Hetman Petro Doroshenko, was appointed palatine of Viatka after losing the hetmanship.⁸² Most of these Ukrainians had emigrated to Russia in search of better positions. Teachers, clerics, printers, and bureaucrats, they were a powerful community in Moscow, and were reinforced by periodic visits of the hetman and his representatives. Aside from their technical expertise in the service of the church, administration, and army, their main contribution came from their combination of Orthodoxy and Westernization. Without the Ukrainians, the Russian course toward modernization would have been slower, notwithstanding Peter's Western travels and the importance of the Germans, Scots, and Dutch. No people in all of Russian history rivaled the industrious Ukrainians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in enhancing Russian power.

Some reasons for this paradox are presented in detail in chapter 5. Here we note that most Ukrainian statesmen, politicians, and intellectuals had resented the collapse of Khmel'nyts'kyi's state and its partition by Poland and Russia (1667). Because they were convinced Ukraine could be unified only through war, they often used their influence in Moscow to widen the split between Poland and Russia. Although suspected and watched carefully by the Muscovites, they were nevertheless often asked to provide information and to give their opinion on the situation in Poland, the Crimea, Turkey, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania.

Each hetman who headed the Ukrainian state and its Cossack army monitored those countries closely, and his information was used by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. The hetman's policy was, of course, of vital interest to Moscow. Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1687–1709) was wary of both Moscow and Warsaw, and while he felt at home in Poland, he had no intention of transferring the allegiance of a dependent Ukraine from Russia to the Commonwealth. However, he did not

⁸² S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, vol. 8 (Moscow, 1962), pp. 206–230.

support a decidedly pro-Russian orientation, and he believed that the Polish-Russian détente created favorable conditions for regaining territory along the lower Dnieper and in Moldavia. Mazepa's counsel during the period of Naryshkin rule kept the weakened détente alive. He argued against a separate peace with Turkey and for further participation in the war effort.⁸³

The views and opinions of the Ukrainians were transmitted through official channels and recorded in the *Malorossiiskii prikaz* (Ukrainian Department) archives. Harder to trace is the spread of those ideas through the Ukrainian community of Moscow, among co-workers and colleagues at gatherings, discussions, and the never-ending church processions. These Ukrainians were also in contact with the top two hundred administrators, and voiced their views to them. Thus, the Russians had access to good counsel in reaching decisions on Ukrainian matters. The government made the most favorable possible policy in its own interests while considering at least temporarily the desires of the Ukrainian "lobby." Although these Ukrainians often disagreed with the direction of Russian foreign policy and felt threatened by the Muscovite *d'iaki*, they realized that the Russian government listened to them, and they believed that they had influence. They knew themselves to be the weaker partner and the respected supplicant. They regarded Moscow, therefore, with a certain jealousy, although they enjoyed a better position in Moscow than in Warsaw, where their interests were represented by the hetman's envoys and by a few sons of the starshyna who were pages at the royal court. In Poland-Lithuania, Ukrainians were seen as mercenaries at best and as the tsar's fifth column at worst. Predictably, therefore, they had no permanent lobby in Poland, and their influence on the royal court, parliament, and the county councils was negligible.⁸⁴

Foreigners

Foreigners, the final special-interest group, were a well-established "minority" in seventeenth-century Moscow. They were treated as such,

⁸³ Mazepa to the tsars, January 1694, TsGADA, fond 123, Relations with the Crimea, 1692–1694, ms 1, pp. 264–88.

⁸⁴ On Ukrainians in Moscow, see fn. 81, above. There is no study of the Ukrainian "lobby" in Warsaw, but on the basis of archival materials and memoirs one can conclude that, despite personal contacts—particularly with the king—they did not influence the foreign policy of the Commonwealth.

and all of those who had not embraced the Orthodox faith had to reside far from Russians in a suburb, the “German Quarter,” which they turned into a typical Western city.⁸⁵ Most of them were experts recruited by the government for work in the army. A sizable group was involved in trade and industry. Still others found employment in the administration. They cultivated their own customs and married among themselves. They formed three rival religious communities—Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist—and religious affiliation played a greater role in the foreign colony than national origin. Sunday and holy day services drew people together and led to a strong sense of communal identity among members of each of the three Western faiths. Thus, for example, the Catholic Poles, Austrians, Italians, Scots, Germans, Moravians, and French were a closely knit group despite rivalries or even hostilities between their respective countries. The Russian authorities were more lenient toward the “heretical” Calvinists and Lutherans, who were allowed to build churches, while the traditionally “dangerous” Catholics were forced to meet privately for services.⁸⁶

These religious differences weakened the foreign community’s position vis-à-vis the Russian government. Moreover, the Russians insisted on treating problems relating to foreigners on a case-by-case basis, in order to prevent the establishment of legal precedents and the formation of groups united by common interest. The Kremlin often sought to ensure that foreigners would stay in Russia, even against their will if necessary. Thus, for example, they refused to release from service the eminent General Patrick Gordon, despite the personal intervention of James II, king of England, on behalf of his loyal supporter.⁸⁷ Short visits abroad by foreign experts were sometimes permitted, but the Kremlin

⁸⁵ I. Gamel’, *Anglichane v Rossii v XVI i XVII stoletiiakh*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1869); Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, pp. 367–456; A. A. Lappo-Danielevskii, “Inozemtsy v Rossii v tsarstvovanie Mikhaila Fedorovicha,” in *ZMNP* 241 (September, 1885): 66–106.

⁸⁶ David, *Status Modernus*, pp. 62–63; E. Shmurlo, “Russkie katoliki kontsa XVIII v.,” in *Zapiski Russkogo nauchnogo instituta v Belgrade* 3 (1932): 1–29; A. Brückner (A. Brikner), *Patrik Gordon i ego dnevnik* (St. Petersburg, 1878), pp. 124–37.

⁸⁷ Gordon to the Secretary of State (the Earl of Middletown), 17 September and 3 December 1689, and 7 and 25 January 1687, British Museum, ms 41, 842, pp. 148, 150, 152, 154. Patrick Gordon, *Tagebuch des Generals Patrick Gordon während seiner Kriegsdienste unter den Schweden und Polen 1655–1661, und seines Aufenthaltes in Russland 1661–1699*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1851), pp. 328–42.

attempted to ensure their “good behavior” and return by keeping their families in Russia. Nonetheless, many shipbuilders and officers were allowed to return home upon completion of their specific tasks; Europe received in this way varied reports about working conditions in Russia. Russian pay was known to be generous, the opportunities for rapid advancement excellent, and free exit upon termination of the contract was promised during recruitment. But disparities between expectations and reality and the difficulty of adapting to the autocratic manner of the boyars and the departmental *d'iaki* created tension between the foreigners and the Russians.

The Russian elite generally felt at ease in the company of “the guests,” but were painfully aware of criticism leveled at them. Commoners intuitively distrusted Westerners after being inculcated with religious depictions of devils dressed in Western garb—in paintings of the Last Judgment, for example. For the Russians who shared the fear of the unknown but “wily” and corrupt West, the presence of foreigners posed a dilemma. They wanted to acquire Western expertise, but their desire clashed with their innate feeling of moral superiority toward the “heretical” West. The ambiguities inherent in this situation reinforced the sense of danger associated with anything foreign. It was in such an atmosphere that Western experts observed the struggle for power within the Kremlin. They naturally supported those politicians who favored modernization and Westernization. And obviously, they felt safer during the rule of Sophia than they did during the revolts of the *strel'tsy* (1682, 1689) or at the beginning of the rule of the Naryshkins, when Patriarch Ioakim exercised such great influence. Peter’s growing involvement in the rule of Russia (after 1695) would fill the German Quarter, where the young tsar was a frequent guest, with joy. Very quickly and without regard to tradition, foreigners would be brought into Peter’s small circle of close advisors, and he would later allow them access to the court and to power through his new system of ranks. While the foreigners had previously been regarded as highly paid servants rather than as competitors for high positions, the new ranking systems would cause Russian servitors to feel threatened. The influx of foreigners into the upper echelons of government exacerbated a xenophobia that would manifest itself through a new-found attachment to “old Russian ways,” which were now defended not only by church traditionalists, but also by members of the court nobility and bureaucracy. Growing numbers of admirers of “old Russian ways” found Peter’s model and tempo of

modernization unacceptable. From this time on, the defense of tradition, tinged with nationalistic sentiments, against corruption of the West became part of Russia's political and cultural atmosphere. And from then on, criticism of the government in Russia took a moral rather than pragmatic form, a phenomenon perhaps best exemplified by the so-called "plot" of the tsar's only son, Aleksei Petrovich.⁸⁸

Although special interest groups in both states exercised some influence, none had decisive significance for the foreign policy of Warsaw and Moscow toward one another. The churches in both states were involved in domestic matters, and left the defense of their interests across state borders in the hands of the government. Landowners in the borderlands had no appreciable influence in the making of foreign policy on either side. While the Ukrainian lobby managed to exert a relatively greater degree of influence than other groups on Russian-Polish relations, thanks to its important role in the modernization of Russia and its access to the Kremlin elite, it was unable to overcome the arrangement made at Andrusovo and guaranteed by the Eternal Peace, for the partition of Ukraine. The religious differences among foreigners in Moscow prevented the consensus necessary for the advocacy of a given foreign policy, although individuals who found themselves in the circle of the tsar's advisors were able to influence the tsar's decisions. It is curious that no group actively representing trade interests made a strong appearance in either Poland-Lithuania or in Russia, despite the considerable development of commerce between them. Polish-Russian trade consisted mainly of Polish imports of Russian trade consisted mainly of Polish imports of Russian agricultural and forest products and the export of Polish and Western manufactures to Russia. Some sense of the dimensions of this trade may be drawn from the fact that the amount of furs exported to Poland-Lithuania was of the same magnitude as the amount shipped abroad at Arkhangel'sk. Merchant associations existed in both countries, and in view of the truly impressive volume of trade between the two nations, one could expect the associations to have taken

⁸⁸ A comprehensive treatment of foreigners in the Russian service has yet to be written. Information about religious and family ties can be gathered from either diaries (e.g., Gordon) or from the observations of foreign visitors (e.g., Korb, David). Dowmont's letters and the transcripts of his negotiations with officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs are a useful source of information on the life of the Catholic community in Moscow. See also F. I. Kalinychev, *Pravovye voprosy*, p. 117.

an active part in smoothing relations between Warsaw and Moscow and to have advocated moves that would further the development of commerce.

The Treaty of Eternal Peace (1686) explicitly stated that all merchants, with the exception of Polish-Lithuanian Jews, were to be allowed to travel freely and ply their trade on both sides of the border. The merchants of Smolensk were granted the important privilege of using the Dvina River route to Riga. Riga played the same vital role for northern Lithuania, Belorussia, and western Russia as Gdańsk did for Poland. The Smolensk merchants were free to use the river under the regulations and tariffs that applied to Commonwealth merchants. Merchants of both nations were also granted the right to conduct a transit trade. This opened the Persian market to the Poles and Lithuanians, and enabled the Russians to trade with Western Europe via land and sea routes through the Commonwealth.⁸⁹ Trade relations between the Commonwealth and Russia are not well researched, and virtually nothing has been written about the impact of the Treaty of 1686 on the volume of trade between the two countries. Nevertheless, diplomatic documents show that the merchants of both countries responded to the opportunity offered them by the Eternal Peace. Their activities were hampered by a lack of governmental protection in the Commonwealth, and by corruption, red tape, and the arbitrariness of customs officials in Russia. Both governments tried to untangle the red tape in order to promote the commercial activity they recognized as a potentially rich source of income. The types of complaints registered by merchants and government actions indicate that merchants did not act as a powerful lobby, but as supplicants interested in specific and limited concessions.⁹⁰ Until the reign of August II (1697–1732), economic relations between the Commonwealth and Russia were considered an important but far from decisive factor by policymakers in the Kremlin and in Warsaw.⁹¹

⁸⁹ *Volumina Legum*, vol. 6, p. 79.

⁹⁰ The Polish resident in Moscow was instructed by Sobieski to demand good treatment for merchants traveling to Russia from the Commonwealth. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240.

⁹¹ It is important, however, to note Sobieski's interest in gaining access to ports on the Black Sea in order to open up trade routes between the Baltic and the Black Seas. Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Nunziatura di Polonia, ms 107, pp. 187–88. On the plans of August II to develop the Baltic-Black Sea trade, see: J. Kalisch, "Sachsisch-polnische Plane zur Grundung einer See- und Handelskompanie am Ausgang des 17. Jh.," in *Um die Polnische Krone: Sachsen und Polen während des Nordischen Krieges, 1700–1721*,

Changing Mutual Perceptions

Since the late fifteenth century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had been under increasing pressure from Moscow, and Lithuania's inability to withstand that pressure on its own had been a chief cause for the conclusion of the union with Poland in 1569. Subsequently, the Poles had aided the Lithuanians in their attempt to halt the Kremlin's further westward expansion and to block its effort to gain access to the Baltic.⁹² Nonetheless, they were more interested in competing with the Swedes over the Baltic and with the Turks over Moldavia. For example, most of the Polish szlachta and substantial numbers of senators had opposed the Polish engagement initiated by Sigismund III Vasa in the Russian Time of Troubles (1604–1613). Even Crown Grand Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, who led his army into the Kremlin after a brilliant victory at Klushino (1610), had been an ardent critic of the Polish-Lithuanian intervention. He had seen good reason for the Polish advance to the east, and did not want to give the Muscovites any excuse for war with the Commonwealth. He had been, therefore, most pleased to open negotiations with a powerful group of boyars interested in placing Sigismund's son, Prince Władysław, on the Russian throne. Sigismund, the "scourge" of Polish history, had coveted the tsar's position for himself, but because of his inflexibility had lost the chance to introduce his dynasty and Polish constitutionalism into Russia. His intransigence had led to the election of the Romanovs, a dynasty whose members would remember that their imperial glory began with the Polish shadow still over the Kremlin and their kin languishing in Polish prisons.⁹³

The memory of Klushino and the Polish occupation of Moscow

ed. J. Gierowski and J. Kalisch (Berlin, 1962), p. 46; J. Staszewski, *O miejsce w Europie. Stosunki Polski i Saksonii z Francją na przełomie XVII i XVIII wieku* (Warsaw, 1973), pp. 128–32.

⁹² O. Halecki, *Dzieje unii jagiellońskiej* (Cracow, 1920); W. Sobieski, *Żółkiewski na Kremlu* (Cracow, 1920), pp. 12–21, 94; S. Żółkiewski, *Początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej* (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 146–55, 159–64, 167–92; J. Bardach, "Krewa i Lublin. Z problematyki unii polsko-litewskiej," in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 76 (1969): 583–616; Ochmański, *Historia Litwy*, pp. 102–114; Floriia, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia*, pp. 11–70; S. Gruszecki, "Idea unii polsko-rosyjskiej na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku," in *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 15 (1970): 89–98.

⁹³ Floriia, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia*, pp. 239–84; J. Maciszewski, *Polska a Moskwa, 1603–1618. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej* (Warsaw, 1968); Gruszecki, "Idea unii polsko-rosyjskiej," pp. 89–98.

remained strong in the Kremlin. The revanchist war of 1634, despite Russia's alliance with Gustavus Adolphus, had ended in a Polish-Lithuanian victory. Only the staggering triumphs of Khmel'nyts'kyi's Cossacks (1648, 1649, 1652) had given Moscow the chance to restore its position vis-à-vis the Commonwealth. The modernized armies of Aleksei Mikhailovich had launched an attack in 1654 and had succeeded in taking Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, and in occupying most of the Grand Duchy. The Poles had been unable to counterattack, since their own territory, along with the northern part of Lithuania, was undergoing a Swedish invasion. The Cossacks, the Swedes, and the Russians, aided by the Prussians and later by the Transylvanians, then controlled most of the territory of the Commonwealth and planned its partition. An enormous military effort by the county szlachta had led to the defeat of the Swedes and the Transylvanians; the Prussians, in return for concessions, changed sides. The Cossacks had been temporarily won over by promises of autonomy (the Union of Hadiach, 1659), and the Muscovites were forced out of the Grand Duchy. The war with Muscovy had been long (1654–1667) and had cost Poland Smolensk and East-Bank Ukraine, along with Kiev.⁹⁴

The miraculous survival of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth following the onslaught of so many enemies had reinforced the szlachta's belief in its ability to repulse any attacker. The belief that a free people is invincible, based on a reading of ancient history and on the new example provided by the Dutch, was immensely popular in Poland-Lithuania, and appeared for the time being to be proved right.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ W. Kochowski, *Lata potopu 1656–1657*, trans. and ed. L. Kukulski (Warsaw, 1966); Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, vol. 3, translated and edited by A. Przyboś and R. Żelewski (Warsaw, 1980); Chrapowicki, *Diariusz*, vol. 1-2; *Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy 1648–60. Publicystyka, eksorbitancje, projekty, memorialy*, edited by S. Ochmann-Staniszevska, vol. 1. (Wrocław, 1989); Karol Szajnocha, *Dwa lata dziejów naszych, 1646–1648* (L'viv, 1865); L. Kubala, *Wojna Brandenburska i Najazd Rakoczego w Roku 1656 i 1657* (L'viv and Moscow, n.d. [1910s]); idem, *Wojna Moskiewska w Roku 1654–1655* (Warsaw, 1910); idem, *Wojna Szwedzka w Roku 1655 i 1656* (Warsaw, 1913); idem, *Wojny Duńskie i Pokój Oliwski 1657–1660* (L'viv, 1922); Wójcik *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* (Warsaw, 1959); A. N. Mał'tsev, *Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1974); L. S. Abetsedarskii, *Belorussia i Rossia, XVI–XVII vv.* (Minsk, 1978); M. Horn, *Powinności wojenne Żydów w Rzeczypospolitej w XVI i XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1978).

⁹⁵ J. Tazbir, *Rzeczpospolita i świat*, pp. 11–22, 28–29, 108–113. Wisner, *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita*, pp. 230–35.

The loss of East-Bank Ukraine was seen as the result of the Cossacks' ability to defend themselves and not as the result of Moscow's superiority. Reconsideration of the growing power of Muscovy would not occur until the end of the century, when Peter took Azov (1696). However, reports of that siege, conveyed by foreign experts involved there, emphasized Russian military clumsiness and attributed the victory to a great superiority in numbers. But Peter's great victory over the renowned Charles XII would alter the sense of security felt by the citizens of the Commonwealth. From that time on, the Poles would place great store in their union with Saxony (1697–1763).⁹⁶

The Russian perception of Poland and Lithuania underwent a more profound change. Until the real union of Poland and Lithuania in 1569, Russia had been successfully gathering the lands of old Kievan Rus' under Ivan IV. His confidence had led ultimately to an attack on the Baltic ports belonging to the Livonian Order, then the vassal state of the Polish Crown. His victories had speeded the Union of Lublin, which changed the balance of power in Europe and presented Muscovy with a powerful opponent. The immediate result for Ivan IV had been the loss of his only Baltic port at Narva-Jõesuu and a threat to his control of Smolensk and Novgorod. The war ended with the Treaty of Deulino (1582), favorable to the Commonwealth. The new political entity had proved its strength not only on the battlefield, but also during the dangerous and lengthy interregnum and the first free elections of a king (1573–74, 1575–76). The combined strength of Poland-Lithuania had then appeared so formidable that in order to neutralize it, the Boyar Duma had advised Tsar Fedor Ivanovich to put forward his candidacy for the Polish-Lithuanian throne after the death of King Stefan Batory in 1586. Russian ambassadors had been sent to Warsaw to entice Polish-Lithuanian voters with visions of future victories over Sweden and the Ottoman Porte.⁹⁷

The Poles and Lithuanians had been interested, but wanted the tsar to include Russia in the Commonwealth as a third partner. The tsar rejected

⁹⁶ J. Gierowski, *W cieniu Ligi północnej* (Cracow, 1978); J. Feldman, *Polska a sprawa wschodnia, 1709–1714* (Cracow, 1926); L. R. Lewitter, "Russia, Poland and the Baltic, 1697–1721," in *The Historical Journal* 11 (1968): 3–34.

⁹⁷ I. I. Lappo, *Velikoe kniazhestvo litovskoe za vremia ot zakliucheniia Liublinskoi unii do smerti Stefana Batoriia* (St. Petersburg, 1904); B. N. Floriia (B. Floria), "Magnateria litewska a Rosja w czasie drugiego bezkrólewia," in *Odrodzenie i Reformacja* 22 (1977); idem, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia*, pp. 93–119.

the proposition, but the opportunity to join the ranks of the privileged *szlachta* must have been appealing to many Russian servitors.

Successive national upheavals, as we have seen, had activated Russian society and invigorated the *Zemskii sobor*. We do not know to what extent, if any, the *Sobor* had been affected by examples set by other European representative bodies, or—of particular interest to our study—by the Polish-Lithuanian Parliament. There is evidence that Polish-Lithuanian concerns—the domestic situation in the *Rzeczpospolita*, for example—had often been discussed there. In any case, the records show continued support for the tsar's Polish-Lithuanian policy. Thus in 1617 the *Zemskii sobor* had supported Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich against Władysław; it had advised an attack on Poland-Lithuania in 1634; and the last great *Sobor* in 1653 had backed Aleksei Mikhailovich's bid for war with the Commonwealth over Ukraine.⁹⁸ The tsars had relied heavily on the *Sobor* in their policy toward Poland-Lithuania during these years, and it is ironic that the demise of this institution was assured by the military effort that it supported.

The disastrous wars of the first half of the seventeenth century and the memory of the Times of Troubles had caused Poland-Lithuania to be feared throughout Russia. However, through the capture of Vilnius, the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in 1654, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and thousands of his soldiers had lost their "Polish complex." Although Aleksei's dream of conquering Lithuania and all of Ukraine subsequently turned sour, he had nevertheless managed to take and keep Smolensk and Kiev. The stabilization of the new border became the chief objective of the Russian government's policy toward the Commonwealth for the following decades, and that is why the Eternal Peace of 1686 was hailed as an important diplomatic victory in Russia. But the continued vitality of the Union of Lublin would halt further Russian expansion in Ruthenian lands for the next century.

The generation of Russian servitors who had marched with Aleksei on Vilnius and Brest respected the strength of the Commonwealth but lost the fear which had been typical of their predecessors, who had lived in the Time of Troubles. The next generation, that of the last quarter of the century, reversed the trend, however. The Polish victory at Vienna

⁹⁸ Robert Crummey, *The Formation of Muscovy 1304–1613* (London, 1987), pp. 225–32; Cherepnin, *Zemskie sobory*, pp. 106–119, 121, 130–31.

(1683) had demonstrated the Commonwealth's power, and the intellectually attractive Polish culture continued to flourish in Russia. The sense of danger in official circles was heightened by the dispatches of the Russian ambassadors in Warsaw, who noted the confidence displayed by the Poles with regard to Russia. Polish plots to recapture Ukraine had been uncovered, and the revanchist sentiments of some dignitaries, such as Marcjan Ogiński, Great Chancellor of Lithuania, who wanted to take advantage of the Miloslavskii-Naryshkin rivalry to expand eastward, were well known. Even though the Russian ambassadors described the poor state of the Polish-Lithuanian army correctly and noted the prevailing aversion to war among the noble landowners, Russian politicians were preoccupied with the haughtiness displayed by the szlachta.⁹⁹ It took a few years of the closer contacts afforded by the exchange of ambassadors to reveal that the confidence of Poland-Lithuania was not based on the condition of their army, but was rooted in their conviction of the superiority of their political system. It was only after this discovery that the Russian politicians learned how to use the Commonwealth's political institutions to promote Russian interests. Peter I would be the first to use this approach, after Poltava (1709); Catherine II would master it.

⁹⁹ Note the Russian residents' opinions about the Polish nobility in chapter 3.

CHAPTER TWO

Professionals and Amateurs at the Game of Diplomacy

As the Turks became more threatening, Russia developed an unprecedented interest in foreign affairs. Forming an anti-Turkish entente with Poland had amounted to making common cause with the Holy Alliance, and an embassy in Warsaw was seen as a vital source of information. The first exchanges had been short-lived (1674–1676).¹ Now, with the Eternal Peace, Russia urgently needed intelligence about its new ally, and demanded reinstatement of the arrangement.

In the normal course of events, a Polish king could be expected to welcome opportunities to expand his ambassadorial contacts, whereas the *szlachta*, wary of foreign entanglements (unless they foresaw some immediate benefit to their estate), would oppose diplomatic overtures from any country. The king counted on his management of the diplomatic establishment to keep the upper hand in setting foreign policy, and the *szlachta* reflexively sought to deny their king any extension of his power. On this occasion, however, the king had strong reservations about reinstatement of a permanent residency in Moscow. Sobieski knew what he stood to lose: his ambassador could be virtually *incommunicado*—in effect a hostage there.

¹ The Russians took the initiative in arranging for an exchange of permanent diplomatic missions with Poland after the signing of the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667–1672* (Warsaw, 1968), pp. 186–87. An exchange of ambassadors ensued but the practice was soon discontinued. It was renewed once again after the Peace Treaty of 1686. Marcjan Ogiński to Stanisław Szczuka, April 21, 1687, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw; hereafter AGAD), Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 52, pp. 61–62. The best treatment of the seventeenth-century Russian diplomatic service is M. I. Belov, “Niderlandskii rezident v Moskve. Baron Iogann Keller i ego piś'ma” (Ph.D. diss., Leningrad, 1947), pp. 13–55. See also Ia. Gurliand, *Ivan Revon, komisarius i rezident* (Iaroslav, 1903). Lists of foreign diplomats in Moscow and Russian diplomats abroad are published in *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem Westfälischen Frieden*, ed. Ludwig Bittner and Lothar Gross, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1936).

In finally agreeing to reinstatement of the residencies, Sobieski demanded an exchange of military liaison officers, a prospect repugnant to the secretive Russians.² And, to counteract the isolation of his ambassador, he called for the establishment of a postal service to accelerate communications between the two countries.³ In the resultant compromise, Sobieski obtained the postal service: when his mail took three months to arrive he could charge Russia with failure to honor the agreement. Military liaisons were initiated, though Russian impediments would render them of little worth. The residencies were reestablished; they would be maintained through 1694 and 1697–1698 for the Polish residents in Moscow, and until the First Partition of Poland (1772) for the Russians in Warsaw.

The Commonwealth

Poland, unlike Russia, had long experience in European diplomacy. By the mid-sixteenth century the Polish king had residents (diplomats below the rank of ambassador) in many West European states. At home, the Poles received, in addition to the ambassadors from these capitals, special envoys from many countries, including Muscovy.

The foreign office was in the hands of a relatively small group of talented civil servants—often senators—who had broad responsibilities. These men and those who served under them were not, strictly speaking, career diplomats: last year's ambassador could shape this year's foreign policy—or serve in a capacity unrelated to foreign affairs. Although the staff was organized according to a strictly observed hierarchy, with clearly defined functions, the department on the whole was loosely structured, with relatively little emphasis on specialization.

² It was on the presentation of this condition that he obtained the consent of the Senate to renewed exchange. See also p. 89 below.

³ W. Czapliński, "Dyplomacja polska w latach 1605–1648," in *Polska służba dyplomatyczna XVI–XVIII w.*, ed. Z. Wójcik (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 250–56; Zbigniew Wójcik, "Organizacja dyplomacji w drugiej połowie XVII w.," in *ibid.*, pp. 360–61. See also K. Matwijowski, *Pierwsze sejmy z czasów Jana III Sobieskiego* (Wrocław, 1976), pp. 60–68, 80–83, 145–49, 175–85, 192–93, 235–38.

Chancelleries

In the Commonwealth, foreign relations were theoretically the responsibility of five ministers: the respective chancellors (*Kanclerzowie wielcy*) and vice-chancellors (*Podkanclerzowie*) of Poland and Lithuania, and the Crown grand hetman. The king directed and coordinated their work. Acting on his advice, they presented various diplomatic problems to Parliament and the *Senatus Consilium*, two institutions with considerable influence on the formulation of foreign policy. (For instance, all the major envoys responsible for concluding the treaties of Andrusovo and Eternal Peace were selected by Parliament.) Diplomatic instructions drafted by the chancellors were subject to thorough discussion in the Senate and the special Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Relations. If negotiations were prolonged, the ambassadors resorted to the king for additional instructions. Usually, the king then acted according to the counsel given by his ministers and senators, which was recorded and presented at the next session of Parliament. In general, ambassadors were chosen from among the aristocrats holding senatorial posts, and they were experienced administrators and good politicians. They traveled in the company of experts well versed in the language, culture and history of the country with which they were to negotiate.⁴

During the long intersessions between meetings of Parliament, control over foreign policy rested unquestionably with the kings. Although he usually adhered to the advice of his senators, he could conduct his own secret policy. Essential to both the king and Parliament was to secure the cooperation of the chancellors, the only ministers authorized to dispatch replies to the queries of foreign monarchs and diplomats. Parliament, on the one hand, expected the chancellors to behave as guardians of the law; the king, on the other hand, wanted them to endorse his own, often somewhat illegal, initiatives. Since many chancellors and vice-chancellors were of more humble origin than other ministers, and

⁴ A. Wyczański, "Polska służba dyplomatyczna w latach 1506–1530"; R. Żelewski, "Organizacja koronnej służby dyplomatycznej za Zygmunta Augusta"; S. Grzybowski, "Organizacja polskiej służby dyplomatycznej w latach 1573–1605"; W. Czapliński, "Dyplomacja polska"; Zbigniew Wójcik, "Organizacja dyplomacji"; all published in *Polska służba dyplomatyczna*. See also *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, ed. Marian Biskup, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1980), pp. 509–518, 573–81, 741–77; and *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, ed. Z. Wójcik, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1982) pp. 142–45, 270–73.

owed their office to a combination of extensive study, diligence, and the king's favor, they often acted as the most loyal servants of the crown.⁵

At times the Lords of the Seals backed some candidate's unsuccessful bid for the throne, and thereby lost the confidence of the newly elected king, who then endeavored to replace them with his own men. Yet in most instances at least one of the Lords of the Seals was a trusted associate of the monarch and issued important state documents under his own seal. Sometimes chancellors and vice-chancellors were selected not from among the most qualified professionals, but from powerful aristocratic families; for example, Sobieski appointed Dominik Radziwiłł, brother of his sister's late husband, Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł, as chancellor of Lithuania, and his own nephew, Karol Radziwiłł, as vice-chancellor of Lithuania. He was motivated by his desire to form a loyal faction in Lithuania strong enough, by virtue of the wealth and offices it held, to counteract the powerful Sapieha clan.⁶

In principle relations with Moscow were the responsibility of the Lithuanian Lords of the Seals, but Russian diplomats frequently conferred with the chancellor or vice-chancellor of Poland. Nevertheless, all official communications were sent to Moscow with the seal of Lithuania. Thus, in 1693, when neither of the Lithuania chancellors was present at court and an urgent message had to be sent to Russia, Sobieski, finding himself in a dilemma, tried to resolve the situation by having the seal of Lithuania counterfeited. His subterfuge led to a scandal that heightened Russian distrust of the Poles.⁷ The chancellor and vice-chancellor

⁵ Eight of the thirty-two Crown chancellors and vice-chancellors came from aristocratic families. Sobieski "inherited" many ministers from his predecessor, Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, but during his long reign eventually succeeded in filling the various ministerial posts with his own nominees.

⁶ Dominik Mikołaj Radziwiłł, vice-chancellor of Lithuania, 1681–1690 (succeeded Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł, who served from 1668 to 1680), and chancellor, 1690–1697; Karol Radziwiłł, vice-chancellor, 1690–1698, and later chancellor of Lithuania (he was nominated at the unusually young age of 21). See Dworzaczek, *Geneologia* (Warsaw, 1959), Table 164. On Sobieski's problems with the Sapiehas see Kazimierz Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią. Z dziejów polityki Jana III Sobieskiego w latach 1687–1690* (Cracow, 1933), pp. 14–15, 53, 97, 101.

⁷ The Russian diplomat Boris Mikhailovich Mikhailov became suspicious of the new seal applied to official letters addressed by Sobieski to the tsars. The secretary of the Russian expedition, one Samiilo Rozhytskyi, leaked the information that the new seal was a forgery of the official seal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and that it had been made by a Jew who acted on the orders of the king. The purpose of the seal was to enable

always kept the seals at hand, and were not authorized to affix them to any decrees, letters of appointment, or messages to foreign courts except by order of the king. Whenever one of the Lords of the Seals was absent from court, his colleagues handled current business.

Next in rank to the Lords of the Seals was the Great Secretary of the Crown and his Lithuanian counterpart, who were usually members of the clergy. They were legally guaranteed priority of succession should a position as Lord of the Seals become vacant, a fact that enhanced their standing while ensuring permanence and continuity in the functioning of the chancellery. The Great Secretaries kept records of the sessions of the *Senatus Consilium* and supervised the work of the chancellery. In addition, they participated in private conferences of the king and the senators, and prepared materials for their missions abroad. At least one of them was required to reside permanently at court.⁸

Next in the hierarchy of the chancellery came the respective *referendarii* of the Crown of Poland and of Lithuania.⁹ They were officials who collaborated closely with the king, and who, in the absence of the Great Secretaries, were responsible for recording sessions of the *Senatus Consilium*. As members of the chancellery, they and their assistants, the chancellery scribes, dealt with the Assessor's Tribunal.

Somewhat lower in the hierarchy than the *referendarii* were the regents, who were responsible for the performance of scribes charged with compiling documents ordered by senior officials. The remainder of the chancellery personnel was comprised of secretaries and scribes. Headed by the notaries, this personnel was responsible for entering

Sobieski to communicate with the tsars by letter during periods when his chancellors were absent. Mikhailov to the tsars, 23 December 23, 1693, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Moscow; hereafter TsGADA), fond 79, ms 243, pp. 946–48. The Russian diplomat related his reluctance to accept any of the king's letters carrying the new seal. We do not know the exact length of time during which the new seal was used. We do know, however, that the king was often without any senators, or even chancellors, in residence.

⁸ *Volumina Legum. Prawa, konstytucje y przywileje Królestwa Polskiego, Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego y wszystkich prowincyi należących*, ed. J. Ohryzko, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1859), p. 136; M. Kromer, *Polska czyli o położeniu ludności, obyczajach, urzędach i sprawach publicznych Królestwa Polskiego*, vol. 2, ed. R. Merchwiński (Olsztyn, 1977), p. 126; Żelewski, "Organizacja koronnej," pp. 83–84.

⁹ Georgius Schultz, an eighteenth-century specialist writing on the subject of the chancellery, observed that the "*referendarii non sunt tasenti*." *Commentarius de cancellariis Regni Poloniae* (Gdańsk [Dantisci], 1712), pp. 62–63.

copies of the more important documents of the Polish and Lithuanian chancelleries into separate record books, both the Crown's (in Warsaw) and Lithuania's (in Vilnius).¹⁰

Secretaries were classified as *actuales* or *titulares*. *Actuales* drafted official decrees, letters, instructions and the like, dictated by their superiors. *Titulares* were courtiers employed not only to perform the routine work of the chancellery, but also, on occasion, to fulfill diplomatic duties such as traveling with missions abroad, or caring for the everyday needs of foreign diplomats residing in Poland. One of these secretaries held the title of Secretary of the Russian Expedition, and was responsible for translating all documents received from Russia. Similar positions rarely existed for contact with other foreign countries. Such specialized skills became necessary in the case of Moscow because the chancelleries of both states used Polish and Russian in their correspondence, while, by contrast, all communications with Western nations were conducted in Latin, and could easily be handled by any of the regular secretaries.¹¹

A position in the chancellery opened the way to a career that could culminate in the high office of Lord of the Seal. Advancement depended on ability, education, and, of course, promotion by the king. Legal training was also an advantage. And insofar as some of the higher offices were reserved by law for the clergy, attractive opportunities were also available to able clerics.

Work at the chancellery prompted its staff to believe that all important decisions were made by the king and his court entourage, for the chancellery's control of the seals and archives, as well as its role in drafting all state documents, helped enhance the position of the central government and its dominant authority, the king. Moreover, access to the highest crown offices, and to the king himself, gave chancellery personnel both a taste of power and an intimate knowledge of state affairs. Being instruments of the state, chancellery officials inevitably became supporters of centralization and of the king's interests. Yet in family background and connections, these officials were szlachta, usually landowners active in the political life of their counties. They shared

¹⁰ Schultz, *Commentarius*; Kromer, *Polska*, pp. 127–28. See also Reinhold Heidenstein, *Cancellarius sive de dignitate et officio cancellarii Regni Poloniae* (Braniewo, 1610).

¹¹ Żelewski, "Organizacja dyplomacji," pp. 85–90.

the basic beliefs and interests of their class, yet at the same time promoted royal policies within their counties.

During meetings of county councils, chancellery officials and their relatives supported the king's policies. They staunchly backed the king whenever his exercise of authority conflicted with the wishes of the aristocrats and senators, and they did not hesitate to challenge even the most powerful lords and leaders of the opposition. Sometimes they deliberately interpreted the laws of the Commonwealth in the king's favor. Yet they regarded themselves first and foremost as citizens of the Commonwealth, and only then as loyal servants of the king. In 1688, when some of them confiscated the correspondence and papers of the deceased chancellor, Jan Wielopolski, they thought of themselves not as the king's henchmen, but as citizens compelled to break the laws of the Commonwealth in order to save it from aristocratic machinations.¹²

In addition to the chancelleries of the Crown and of Lithuania, there was also the chancellery of the grand hetman of the Crown, which conducted relations with Turkey, Moldavia, Wallachia, and the Crimea, and which was responsible for negotiations with the Cossacks. Obviously, when it came to matters of policy, the hetman, too, was subject to control by Parliament, which frequently delegated its own commissioners to conduct specific negotiations. The hetman offered the king his expertise on matters relating to Turkey and its vassals. Thus envoys assigned to Istanbul or Bakhchesarai received not only instructions from the chancellery of the Crown, but also additional information from the hetman, who maintained diplomatic correspondence with the Turkish pashas. There was also a time after the conclusion of the Eternal Peace

¹² An examination of the political activities of such men as Stefan Godlewski, Jan Gorzeński, Stanisław Karwicki, Kazimierz Ligęza, Jan Opacki, and Stanisław Szczuka shows that they contributed enormously to the smooth functioning of the executive branch, and aided the king greatly within Parliament. Their activities can be deduced from their correspondence. See Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią*, pp. 34–38, 43–44, 53, 85, 105. See also AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 24, pp. 92–93, 108, 117, 120–21, 180, 185, 352, 465, 694–96, 706, 709–712; ms 163a, vol. 25, pp. 368–69, 414; Biblioteka Muzeum im. Ks. Czartoryskich (Cracow; hereafter B. Czart.), ms 181 p. 632. Apparently Stanisław Szczuka was organizing a coordinated effort to promote the king's men for election to the Parliament of 1692; he was informed by his agents that "we have bought the support of part of the county councils and the rest we convinced after working hard on them." AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 22, p. 571. See also *ibid.*, pp. 569, 806. For a description of the pro-king "party," see also Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią*, pp. 34–38, 43–44, 53, 85, 105.

when Grand Crown Hetman Jan Stanisław Jabłonowski maintained contacts with the Russian military command; that lasted throughout the Crimean expedition. In addition, he corresponded with the Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa and exchanged military attachés with him.¹³

As an officer of the Crown, the grand crown hetman was subordinate to the king and to Parliament. Yet his responsibilities were so extensive that he unquestionably influenced Poland's foreign policy. Hetman Jabłonowski was in constant contact with Sobieski, informing him of new occurrences, implementing his policy toward Turkey and the Crimea, and fulfilling his instructions regarding the Cossacks. Although there were instances of friction between Sobieski and the grand crown hetman, they were minor and without impact on the basic policy of extending Polish influence in the Danubian duchies while retaining the option of a separate peace with Turkey.

The King's Control of Diplomacy

By supervising the chancelleries of the Crown, of Lithuania, and of the hetman of the Crown, Sobieski controlled most of the levers of foreign policy. What is more, he carried on his own secret diplomacy, assisted by trusted secretaries of his court. Sobieski's role in conducting relations with Russia can be evaluated by examining the daily routine of diplomatic activity. Here we can make good use of data excerpted from the dispatches of the Russian diplomat, Boris Mikhailovich Mikhailov, accredited to Warsaw from 1691 to 1696.

This information suggests that the king, when dealing with foreign diplomats, was able to circumvent the office of the chancellor by using senators or experts whom he completely trusted. For example, Marek Matczyński, a senator and palatine of Rus' (Ruthenia) and a close friend of Sobieski, enjoyed such a special position. Matczyński played a crucial part in shaping Sobieski's foreign policy. He monopolized contacts with Russian diplomats after the death in 1689 of Marcjan Ogiński, Chancellor of Lithuania: for instance, he had twenty-three long meetings with Mikhailov during the latter's five-year tenure in Warsaw, many more

¹³ Wójcik, "Organizacja dyplomacji," p. 270; see also Wójcik's highly critical review of W. Zakrzewski's *Dyplomacja hetmanów w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw and Poznań, 1976) in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 83 (1976): 929–33.

than did any other senator.¹⁴ The Russian residents regarded his views as highly significant. Moreover, he was thoroughly conversant with Cossack issues, understood Russian, and often interpreted statements by Russian diplomats for other senators. The extent of Sobieski's control of Poland's policy toward Russia was described by Prokofii Bogdanovich Voznitsyn, the first Russian resident to arrive in Poland after an interval of twelve years. He observed that the king dealt with all matters "in his private chambers,"¹⁵ and that he clearly selected Matczyński and Jabłonowski to be his principal advisors. (Ogiński was abroad for reasons of health.) Voznitsyn characterized Dominik Radziwiłł, the Chancellor of Lithuania, as a timid youngster having no views of his own ("nikovo dela v nem netu").¹⁶

Voznitsyn, like his successors Volkov and Mikhailov, frequently reported that the senators were afraid to meet with him for fear of incurring the king's wrath. Mikhailov noted that Chancellor Denhoff had canceled a meeting with him on Matczyński's advice, pleading ill health. According to the Russian residents, only Matczyński, Jabłonowski, the referendary Stanisław Szczuka, and the master of the royal kitchens Franciszek Gałęcki, participated in the secret conferences with the king during which policy toward Russia was formulated.¹⁷ Letters written by the Russian residents indicate that Sobieski managed to exert "secret" control over their official meetings with senators. He would sit behind a

¹⁴ During the years 1692–1696, Mikhailov met 23 times with Matczyński (17 of the meetings were initiated by the Russian diplomat); 11 times with the chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Dominik Radziwiłł; once with the vice-chancellor of Lithuania, Karol Radziwiłł; 7 times with Crown Chancellor Denhoff; and 5 times with Crown Hetman Jabłonowski. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242 and 243.

¹⁵ Voznitsyn to V. V. Golitsyn, 30 April 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 49.

¹⁶ Ibid. Voznitsyn, Volkov, and Mikhailov reported that Matczyński had a close relationship with the king and dominated meetings between Russian diplomats and Polish senators. See TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 14, 43–44, 53–60; ms 235, pp. 49, 86–90, 130; ms 238, p. 83; ms 242, pp. 105–107; ms 243, pp. 509–522, 587–90, 597–605.

¹⁷ In Voznitsyn's report to Golitsyn of 21 May 1688, he wrote that the senators liked him but kept their distance, afraid "chtoby kakoi bedy ne bylo." TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235 (1689), p. 77. Volkov wrote that the senators would not meet him without Sobieski's permission. See letter to Golitsyn, 21 June 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 229–31. Mikhailov wrote in July 1693 that Chancellor Denhoff agreed to grant him an audience, but then heeded the advice of Matczyński and Szczuka and refused to meet him, saying that he was ill. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 836. Secret contacts with the Cossacks were maintained during this period by Sobieski, Matczyński, Jabłonowski, Szczuka, and Gałęcki. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 231

curtain in an adjoining room and from time to time send Szczuka into the conference room to relate his instructions to Matczyński and the other senators.¹⁸

Szczuka was Sobieski's most devoted agent in the chancellery. Able, dynamic, with an excellent knowledge of Polish law, he had started his career as a legal counsel for the Crown Tribunal. With the help of a recommendation from his uncle, the abbot of Paradys and a staunch supporter of the king, he had entered the Crown chancellery and risen rapidly through the ranks. His loyal service and business acumen were such that his wealth soon equaled that of many senators. Furthermore, the king's good graces allowed him to marry into the Potocki family, one of the most aristocratic powerful clans in Little Poland. Although never the king's intimate, Szczuka became his trusted advisor on domestic policy. He was a master at negotiating with leaders of the opposition, had a broad following among the king's supporters in the provinces, and played an important political role in both the county councils and Parliament. Sobieski so valued him as a negotiator that he often relied on him in contacts with Russian diplomats in Poland.¹⁹

The position of the Orthodox bishop who played an important part in the king's Ukrainian policy, Iosyf Shumlians'kyi, was very different. Shumlians'kyi held the rank of Orthodox bishop of L'viv, but he also assumed some of the rights of the metropolitan of Kiev and even claimed that position for himself. His long-range plans were to restore the ancient Metropolitan See of Halych and to become the spiritual leader of the Orthodox church in the Commonwealth. Consequently, he opposed the Orthodox hierarchy of Moscow and secretly supported the Catholic church in Poland, thereby winning the backing of the king and the Catholic hierarchy. In short, he was a political chameleon, who at times seemed to forget which of his numerous guises was the real one and who habitually dealt with both sides. He collaborated with Sobieski in attempts to recover Ukraine, but he also proclaimed allegiance to the tsar and offered prayers for his health in the churches and monasteries under his control. Despite his efforts to please the tsar, Moscow never completely

¹⁸ Mikhailov to the tsars, 28 February 1694, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 1018–33.

¹⁹ For the most recent evaluation of the role played by Stanisław Szczuka during Sobieski's time see Zbigniew Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski 1629–1696* (Warsaw, 1983), pp. 295, 388, 407–408, 424, 426–27, 429, 440–41, 449–51, 456, 482–85.

trusted him, although the Russians did think that he might prove useful someday.²⁰

Shumlians'kyi was ordered by the king to maintain contact with the Orthodox hierarchy and the monasteries in Ukraine. Russian residents suspected—and with good reason—that Polish military intelligence was headed by Hetman Jabłonowski and ecclesiastical intelligence by Shumlians'kyi and his principal aides, Klyment Domoradz'kyi (archimandrite of Ovruch from 1694), his subordinate monks, and the monks of the Krekhiv monastery, particularly Fedir Ruds'kyi and Ivan Zaruda Khreptovych. Shumlians'kyi's political activities in Ukraine were directed by the king himself and were known only to the closest royal advisors.²¹

Aside from Jerzy Dominik Dowmont, the Polish resident in Moscow (1688–1694), officials who implemented the king's Russian policy were Samiilo Rozhyts'kyi, Ivan Okrasa, Khrystofor Syrut, Jan Maliszewski, Stefan Głoskowski, and Adam Sarnowski. Samiilo Rozhyts'kyi was Secretary of the Russian Expedition. His duties included translating messages from the tsars, drafting the king's letters to them, and maintaining contact with Russian residents in Poland. Sometimes he also acted as an interpreter for Polish senators attending conferences with the Russian residents. As a nobleman of the Orthodox faith, Rozhyts'kyi was a prime target for the Russians, who repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted to bribe him. Of the other officials mentioned, Ivan Okrasa, also of the Orthodox faith, and Navahrudak's master of the hunt, was particularly active in implementing the king's orders. He was chief of

²⁰ Mikhailov to the tsars, 16 June 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 177–81. Shumlians'kyi's political role is treated at length in chapter 6. The most detailed monograph on Shumlians'kyi was written by M. Andrusiak, *Józef Szumlański, pierwszy biskup unicki lwowski (1667–1708)* (L'viv, 1934). See also Dionizy Zubrzycki, *Kronika miasta Lwowa* (L'viv, 1844), pp. 436, 443, 447.

²¹ During the *strel'tsy* uprising in Moscow in 1682, Shumlians'kyi on Sobieski's orders, directed the monks Ivan Zarudny and Fedir Khreptovych to initiate a pro-Polish movement among the Cossacks and clergy. TsGADA, fond 79 (Relations with Poland, 1682), ms 9. Sobieski had used Shumlians'kyi in his previous contacts (1672, 1674–1675) with the Ukrainian hetman Doroshenko. See Jan Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec sprawy Ukrainy na przełomie XVII–XVIII w.* (Wrocław, 1963), pp. 21, 28; Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, pp. 206, 244, 304–305. For later contacts between Sobieski and Shumlians'kyi see Mikhailov's dispatches of 7 and 21 February and 18 April 1694, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 997–98, 1013, 1069. See also Hetman Jabłonowski to Szczuka, 27 July 1692, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163, vol. 22, p. 481.

liaison with the Russian residents, and as such communicated the king's decisions to them; he also secured Matczyński's responses to their queries. He met almost weekly with the Russians and he frequently traveled on missions to Moscow where his command of the Russian language and his skillful handling of discussions with the *d'iaki* and boyars (some of whom he knew intimately) proved invaluable. (During one such mission to Russia in 1691 Okrasa tried to arrange a clandestine meeting with the detained Tsarevna Sophia, but was arrested at the Novodevichii Monastery.) According to Sobieski, Okrasa would have made an excellent resident in Moscow, if he had a better education. He was so totally devoted to the king that the Russian diplomats never even attempted to bribe him.²²

Khrystofor Syrut, still another Orthodox nobleman, and Jan Myśliszewski, according to Voznitsyn a very loyal supporter of the king, were used as *pristavy* and secretaries, and couriers to important capitals. Stefan Głoskowski, captain of the Royal Guard, served thrice as a military envoy to the Russian army (1687, 1688, 1689). His reports proved vital in evaluating the strength and expertise of the Russian troops. Adam Sarnowski (whom Voznitsyn named "the Royal Postmaster") handled dispatches to and from Dowmont, first decoding those the resident sent from Moscow, and then coding and sending the instructions issued him in return by Sobieski.²³

In addition to all this personnel, Sobieski could rely on a number of intelligence agents in Ukraine, the Crimea, and Budjak. These included Vasyl' Iskryts'kyi, the son-in-law of the colonel of Myrhorod and therefore a man with good connections in the Cossack command; Captain Dubrawski, who often accompanied Zakharii Buinovs'kyi, an outstanding agent assigned to the Crimea and to Budjak who also led missions to

²² For a short biography of Dowmont see: Kazimierz Piwarski, "Jerzy Dominik Dowmont," in *Polski słownik biograficzny*, vol. 5 (Cracow, 1939) pp. 353–54. For information regarding his residency in Moscow see TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 2–1212, and fond 79 (Relations with Poland, 1687), ms 10. See also AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 45, vol. 2, and ms 162; AGAD, Archiwum koronne, Russian Division, ms 4, no. 108–118; B. Czart., ms 1376. Observations about Okrasa and Rozhyts'kyi are based primarily on the reports of Russian diplomats.

²³ Information on Sarnowski, Myśliszewski, and Syrut is based on the observations of Russian diplomats and references to them in Polish sources. Among the most important are TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 16–20, 77–79; ms 235, pp. 40, 46, 160; ms 238, pp. 53, 118; ms 243, pp. 93; B. Czart., ms 422, pp. 118–19, 155–56; AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 48, pp. 27–28.

Ukraine designed to “incite rebellion”;²⁴ Zachary Wisłocki; the merchant Kyriak Isaievych; the royal courtier Laner; and one Bonadowski, who had lived in the Crimea since 1674.²⁵

In 1692, Samuel Darewski, a nobleman who had served under several boyars, returned to Poland and entered the employ of Chancellor Dominik Radziwiłł. He proved to be a goldmine of information about the various factions among the Moscow boyars. The tales he told alarmed the Russian residents to such an extent that when he was proposed as a successor to Dowmont, the Russians took offense.²⁶ Samuel Szwejkowski, standard bearer of Navahrudak and a trusted royal courtier, was also considered by Sobieski as a successor to Dowmont. Having many relatives in Moscow, he was, according to the Russian residents, well versed in Moscow politics and able to carry out any task entrusted to him. In addition to these men, Sobieski benefited from the assistance of Józef Ładyński, who at times traveled to Moscow as a courier, even though he was not one of the trusted secretaries. Ładyński had relatives and friends in Russian ecclesiastical circles—his aunt was abbess of the Novodevichii Monastery and a friend was Metropolitan Simeon of Smolensk. When meeting with Russian residents he tended to assume an air of self-importance, criticizing decisions that had been taken without his advice. During his years of service he endeavored to influence the king’s policy towards Russia and sought a more active role than Sobieski granted him.²⁷

²⁴ TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 112, 190, 269, 338; ms 235, pp. 285, 354; ms 242, pp. 158, 231; ms 243, pp. 1235–36. AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 20, p. 323; vol. 24, pp. 294–95; ms 48, pp. 32–35. See also Kazimierz Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego. Dziennik i relacje z lat 1691–1696* (Wrocław, 1958), p. 128; Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 2–22, 109–110; Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, pp. 305–306.

²⁵ A Frenchman in Sobieski’s service named Laner also resided in the Crimea (1690–1696). He and Wisłocki were responsible for investigating the secret contacts between the Tatars and Moscow. Wisłocki’s contacts in Ukraine were also excellent as his brother was in service to Hetman Mazepa. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 175–76, 231; ms 243, pp. 231, 566, 1135, 1258.

²⁶ See Voznitsyn’s dispatches of 28 June 5 and July 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, pp. 97, 103, 211; and those of Nikitin during July and August, 1699, ms 252, pp. 490–91, 509–514. When Darewski wanted to return to Moscow as a resident in 1699, his anti-Russian sentiments alarmed the Russian resident Nikitin. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 490–91, 509–514. (August II sent him to Moscow in 1703.)

²⁷ In July 1692, Mikhailov listed all possible replacements for Dowmont, including Okrasa, Kandelgirs, Głębocki, and Szwejkowski; he was certain that Szwejkowski

Information about Russia was also passed on to the king by the Jesuits who resided in Moscow from 1687 to 1690. Some of them reached as far as Astrakhan', and two even traveled across Russia to Persia and back. Such Jesuits as Georgius David, Konrad Terpiłowski, Ignacy Zapolski, and Jean Schmidt were members of the Polish and Austrian Provinces of the Order, but there were also some Frenchmen, among them Antoine de Beauvollier and Philippe Avril, who wrote a book about Russia and dedicated it to Jabłonowski. They traveled on passports issued by Sobieski, and once in Moscow they sought the protection of Dowmont. After their return to Poland, they reported to the king on the situation in Muscovy.²⁸

The superiors of the Polish Province of Jesuits maintained contact with the Catholics living in the territories Poland had lost to Russia. It seems that the szlachta of Smolensk kept the king informed (through the intermediacy of the Jesuits) about the situation in their province and the political changes taking place in Muscovy.²⁹

The Polish border judges, chosen from the borderland szlachta, kept the court abreast of all changes taking place on the other side of the Dnieper. The office of border judge was established in 1667 under the Truce of Andrusovo, which specified that both sides were to appoint

would be selected by the king because of his excellent knowledge of Russia and his contacts in Moscow. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 223. Józef Ładyński (Ledyński) was, on quite a few occasions, indiscrete in his conversations with Russian residents, obviously seeking to discredit Dowmont and to present himself as a promoter of peace and cooperation between the Kremlin and Warsaw. Voznitsyn to V. V. Golitsyn, 6 April and 18 October 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, pp. 40, 170. See also Ładyński to Sobieski, 22 February 1689, AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie II, ms 25, pp. 153–54. See also Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki*, pp. 115, 129, 131.

²⁸ For information about the expulsion of the Jesuits from Moscow, see Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Nunziatura di Polonia, ms 109, p. 140. The Jesuits gave very critical opinions of Moscow to Emperor Leopold in Vienna. See the information of Archimandrite Issai from Vienna, TsGADA, fond 52 (Relations with Greece), ms 11, p. 260. The best treatment of the Jesuit episode in seventeenth-century Moscow is that of Joseph Sebes, *The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)* (Rome, 1961), pp. 95–101. Georgius David, one of the Jesuits expelled from Moscow, wrote an interesting account that was later edited by A. V. Florovsky, *Status Modernus Magnae Russiae seu Moscoviae* (The Hague, 1965).

²⁹ See the register of Mikhailov's activities, July 1692. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 215. For more on the news from Smolensk and Moscow (1693), see Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki*, pp. 56–58, 360. See also S. Zaleski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, vol. 4, (L'viv, 1905), pp. 1062, 1557.

judges responsible for jointly trying cases involving citizens of both nations. These judges were expected to administer swift justice (without the right of appeal) in cases of robbery or banditry, thereby defusing incidents likely to promote hostility between the two nations. The office of border judge ceased to function in 1676, but Parliament reactivated it in 1690.³⁰

Additional information about Russia was supplied by merchants. Russia, Turkey, and Poland customarily collected intelligence from commercial travelers. In Russia merchants were interrogated at length upon entering the country. The records of such interrogations, located in the archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, are valuable historical sources, since they reflect attitudes of the period. Apparently Polish officials from the chancelleries of the Crown and Lithuania did not conduct similar interrogations; nevertheless, merchants paying duty had to produce their documents and sometimes relate the details of their journey to the customs officer. Some merchants collected intelligence for payment and even undertook hazardous diplomatic assignments. References to information derived from merchants and to tasks assigned them in Ukraine, Budjak, and the Crimea can be found in the king's correspondence with Jabłonowski.³¹

Jabłonowski, Matczyński, and Sobieski got information from still another group of people—those Poles who managed to return home from Russia. This large group of paid informants included various tradesmen and professionals who had sought employment in Russia, as well as some poor Polish noblemen who had served the boyars as members of their military units. It also included jewelers and musicians who had sought positions with the Russian nobility and had eventually become reduced to serfs, but had managed to escape and return to

³⁰ Parliament appointed as judges Jan Galimski (standard bearer of Orsha), Teodor Łukomski (district judge of Vitsebsk), and Jan Zembocki (master of the hunt of Mstislaŭ. *Volumina Legum*, vol. 5, pp. 402–403; see also pp. 216, 368.

³¹ For example, a merchant from L'viv named Jan Rakielow (an Armenian engaged in trade with Moscow), acting as Sobieski's informant, tried to contact Mehmed Aga, an emissary from the Crimea to Moscow whose presence the Department of Foreign Affairs endeavored to keep secret. Rakielow and Dowmont's courtier, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, were arrested following their visit to Mehmed Aga in Moscow in July 1691. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 202, 256–59, 274. For the secret arrival of Mehmed Aga in Moscow, see TsGADA, fond 123 (Relations with the Crimea, 1691) ms 3. See also Sobieski to Dowmont, 18 June 1688, B. Czart., ms 422, p. 315.

Poland. Some returning prisoners-of-war, whom the tsar had forcibly retained (usually in Siberia) in violation of the Truce of Andrusovo also proved of service.³²

Sobieski's intelligence-gathering activities in the East extended as far as China. The Wilanów court was one of the few in seventeenth-century Europe not only to collect Chinese art, but also to seek information about China. The Jesuit Adam Kochański, a royal librarian and a learned man who corresponded with the philosopher Leibniz, was considered an authority on that country; his knowledge was based largely on information provided by Jesuit missionaries. Sobieski himself collected maps of various routes to China, and the considerable data he acquired on Russia and Siberia were probably gathered by Philippe Avril and Juraj Križanić. Thus the Poles were well aware of the border clashes on the Amur River: when the Russian diplomats, hoping to intimidate the Poles, emphasized the excellent relations between the Romanovs and the Habsburgs, Jabłonowski rejoined with a remark about military activities against the Russians along the Manchu on the eastern confines of Russia.³³

Sobieski's freedom to shape relations with Russia owed much to the

³² Adam Kamieński, "Dyaryusz więzienia moskiewskiego, miast i miejsc" in *Księga zbiorowa ofiarowana księdzu Franciszkowi* (Poznań, 1874) pp. 378–88; B. P. Polevoi, "Adam Kamenskii-Dluzhik v vostochnoi Sibiri i istochniki ego etnograficheskikh soobshchenii," in *Historia kontaktów polsko-rosyjskich w dziedzinie etnografii* (Wrocław, 1976), pp. 139–49; Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski*, p. 256; B. Tanner, "Opisanie puteshestvia pol'skogo posol'stva v Moskvu v 1678 godu," trans. and ed. I. Ivakin, *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* 158, no. 3 (1891): 96–97, 111. See also David, *Status Modernus*, pp. 9, 58–59, 89, etc. See Dowmont to the tsars (1688), TsGADA, fond 79 (Relations with Poland, 1688), ms 7, p. 11; Dowmont to Sobieski, 22 July 1688, AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie V, ms 73, no. 3252. In the summer of 1693 a group of German musicians previously engaged by Boris Petrovich Sheremetev in his private capella in Moscow came to Warsaw, and quickly became the source of many unfavorable stories about Russia. Mikhailov to the tsars, August, 1693, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 345.

³³ Philippe Avril, *Voyage en divers États d'Europe et d'Asie pour decouvrir un nouveau chemin à la Chine* (Paris, 1693); W. M. Drzewieniecki, "The Knowledge of China in XVII-century Poland as Reflected in the Correspondence between Leibnitz and Kochowski," *Polish Review* 12, no. 3 (1967): 53–66; L. Cyrzyk, *Polscy badacze Chin. Szkice z dziejów polskiej orientalistyki* (Warsaw, 1969) p. 58; A. H. Rowbutham, "The Jesuits at the Court of Peking," *Chinese Social and Political Sciences Review* (Beijing) 5, no. 4 (1919): 308–310. See the report of Jabłonowski's conversation with Volkov, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 360–63. In 1692, Polish intelligence informed Matczyński that there was an increase in the horse trade between the Volga Kalmyks and the Crimean Tatars. On the basis of this information the Polish senator challenged Russia's preparations to act against the Crimea. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 185–88.

inactivity of Parliament, whose only interest in Russia after the Eternal Peace was signed was the drafting of instructions for border judges in 1690 and 1697. The senators proved far more active, often discussing Poland's eastern policy during meetings called by the king. The most important of these meetings took place in 1687, when they urged Sobieski to sign the Eternal Peace. Sobieski had personally secured the attendance of a majority of the senators for the debate. He realized that his endorsement of the treaty, though inevitable under the circumstances, would be painful for the senators, and he did not wish to be charged by the opposition with arbitrarily abandoning part of the nation's territory.³⁴

The other important issue concerning relations with Muscovy that Sobieski submitted to the Senate between 1686 and his death in 1696 was also associated with the Treaty: the restoration of the residencies. Many senators believed that the benefits of an exchange were minimal, but Sobieski skillfully gained their consent on the grounds that he would press for military liaisons in return for reinstatement. Then he put pressure on Moscow for the liaisons by citing the senators' dissatisfaction with the exchange. If their terms were not met, negotiations on the issue would fail. Later, when he saw that Russia would not undertake aggressive action in the Crimea, he recalled his resident.

The *Senatus Consilium* was brought in whenever Sobieski preferred to avoid responsibility for decisions requiring parliamentary sanction, but day-to-day diplomatic operations he conducted through his secretaries. When he wished to overstep his authority and initiate foreign policy without consulting either Parliament or the *Senatus Consilium*, he was free to do so, since he enjoyed a virtual monopoly of information and had at his disposal a loyal staff of officials and secretaries. Consequently, the most vital decisions regarding Poland's eastern policy—to foment a Ukrainian insurrection, for example—were made secretly in the royal chambers.

The Russian residents were well aware of this state of affairs; hence they tried to follow the king in his travels throughout the country so as to be better informed of his actions. Sobieski generally spent five to six months of the year on his family estates at Iavoriv, Zhovkva, and Pomoriany in the palatinate of Rus'. These estates became centers of

³⁴ Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, p. 383. Refer to this work for further sources and literature.

diplomatic activity during the king's stay, drawing the Russian residents, as well as Austrian, papal, Venetian, and other diplomats to L'viv. Nearly every year envoys or messengers from the Crimea also came. Conversely, the number of senators in the king's entourage dwindled; sometimes weeks passed with none of the Lords of the Seals in attendance. Marek Matczyński was the only senator who consistently remained in the king's company.³⁵

The close proximity of the frontier gave the king daily contact with the army and the high command. During these periods Sobieski conferred with Jabłonowski and Lithuanian Field Hetman Słuska much more frequently than during his residency in Warsaw. The king assumed direct personal control over the activities of Jabłonowski's extensive intelligence network, and took advantage of his proximity to the Crimea for extended contact with the khan. He also received emissaries from Moldavia and Wallachia, and led highly secret negotiations with the Tatars, probing the chances for a separate peace with the Ottoman Empire. The decisions reached during the king's Ruthenian residency were dispatched to a few trusted senators, and courtiers and agents promoting Sobieski's plans were sent to Ukraine, the Don Cossacks, the Kalmyks, and the Crimea.

Sobieski used his constitutional authority in matters of foreign policy, overstepping its limits perhaps less effectively than the Vasa kings before him, but just as frequently. Such an arrangement resulted in confrontation between the executive and legislative branches. The conflict was dangerous to the king only in those instances when it created broad opposition to him, which usually happened only when the court initiated war. As long as the majority of the szlachta perceived the king as devoted to peace, or at least to a defensive war, he was given a free hand in the shaping of foreign policy. Since the szlachta was not nearly as interested in foreign policy as the senators, Sobieski could and did shape his policy toward Muscovy without serious opposition and with the help of an impressive network of diplomats and agents.

³⁵ Conclusion drawn from my analysis of records of meetings between the senators and the *Senatus Consilium*, and of the reports of the Russian residents in Poland. See AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 48; and TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, 235, 238, 242, 243, 251, 252. Voznitsyn to V. V. Golitsyn, 26 June and 19 July 1688, TsGADA, fond 79; ms 235, pp. 112–14, 130; Volkov to the tsars, 28 November and 9 December 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 276, 291; Mikhailov to the tsar, 26 May 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 140, 153; Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, pp. 397–99.

Russia

The Department of Foreign Affairs

The staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs, one of the oldest institutions of government in Russia, appears to have differed little from those of other tsarist bureaucracies, except that it had a more extensive knowledge of foreign languages and countries. In the course of their careers, *d'iaki* handled domestic as well as foreign matters, sometimes also serving in other departments.

All relations with foreign countries were the exclusive prerogative of the Department—all except those handled by the hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who had his own chancellery and maintained contacts with neighboring nations. However, this division of authority was a temporary arrangement, made after the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654, which stipulated that the hetman was to act in close cooperation with the Department.³⁶

The Department had been established in the sixteenth century under Ivan IV. Its first chief, Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovatyi, was not a boyar, but a well-educated *d'iak*. The Department continued to be headed by *d'iaki* throughout the century, and the senior *d'iak* participated in the debates of the boyar council. Its chiefs also became custodians of the great seal of state, and as such were described by foreigners as “chancellors.” They did not, however, perform the duties incumbent upon chiefs of the tsar’s central chancellery, an office that would not be established until the reign of Peter I. In the second half of the seventeenth century, control of the Department of Foreign Affairs, as well as custody of the great seal, shifted to the tsar’s favorites, or those of his administrators who headed a dominant coterie. This was a practice introduced under

³⁶ The best historical treatment of the Department of Foreign Affairs was published by S. A. Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze* (Moscow, 1906). For a good presentation of the Muscovite *d'iaki*, see Borivoj Plavsic, “Seventeenth-Century Chanceries and Their Staffs in Russian Officialdom,” in *The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth Century to the Twentieth Century*, ed. W. McKenzie Pintner and D. Rowney (Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), pp. 19–45. Excellent information on the work of Russian diplomats in the seventeenth century is included in M. Belov’s, “Niderlandskii rezident v Moskve. Baron Iogann Keller i ego pis'ma” (Ph.D. diss., Leningrad, 1947), manuscript in the Lenin Library, Moscow.

Fedor Ivanovich (when Boris Godunov became head of the Department and guardian of the great seal). Under Vasilii Shuiskii and the pretenders, the Department was headed by *d'iaki*, perhaps to give the tsar more control when his power was challenged. Aleksei Mikhailovich entrusted the position to his tutor and closest advisor, boyar Boris Ivanovich Morozov, who was followed by the distinguished politician Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin.

In 1654, following a successful attempt to gain real control over all the departments, Aleksei Mikhailovich established the Department of Secret Affairs (*Prikaz tainykh del*), which had jurisdiction over the other departments but functioned as an investigative body rather than as a central chancellery. It was a predecessor of the dreaded *Preobrazhenskii prikaz* of Peter I's time. After Aleksei had consolidated his grasp on the departments, the Department of Secret Affairs was closed. At the same time, management of foreign affairs was entrusted to the leader of the boyar faction closest to the throne. In this manner it came into the hands of the tsar's father-in-law, Il'ia Danilovich Miloslavskii, and was subsequently managed by the tsar's second guardian, Artamon Sergeevich Matveev.³⁷

Under Fedor Alekseevich, the authority of the department head increased. The post was assigned to Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn, a member of an aristocratic family who had been promoted because of his connections with the Miloslavskiis but enjoyed prestige among the boyars thanks to his abilities and his education. Golitsyn supported Sophia, but, unlike the *d'iak* Fedor Leont'evich Shaklovityi and the talented chamberlain Petr Andreevich Tolstoi was not wholly subservient to her.³⁸

Golitsyn's authority in the years 1682–1689 was comparable to that

³⁷ Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, pp. 25–37; A. Malinovskii, *Biograficheskie svedeniia ob upravliaiushchikh v Rossii inostrannymi delami ministrakh* (Moscow, 1812), Lenin Library, fond 256, ms 266, pp. 2–45.

³⁸ P. Shcherbal'skii, *Pravlenie tsarevny Sofii* (Moscow, 1856); N. P. Pavlov Sil'vanskii, "Prashchur Grafa L'va Tolstogo, Graf Petr Andreevich Tolstoi," *Istoricheskii vestnik* (St. Petersburg), May, 1905, pp. 842–44. See the letters of the Swedish diplomat in Moscow, Kristof von Kochen, to his government, September 1687 and February 1688, "Moskva v 1687–1688 gg.," trans. and ed. by K. A. Viskovatov *Russkaia starina* (St. Petersburg) 23 (1878): 122, 124. Also see the biography of Tolstoi's family in the Lenin Library in Moscow (manuscript), fond 64, ms 76, no. 5. The best work on the Russian elite is Robert O. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 40, 54, 56, 58, 82–106, 161–62.

of Boris Godunov during Fedor's lifetime. Their political ambitions differed, however, for Golitsyn had no designs on the throne either for himself or his son. His domestic and foreign policy was characterized by a vision far broader than that of the Miloslavskiis or the Naryshkins, who were intent mainly on concentrating power in their own hands. Nonetheless, his far-ranging political plans were frustrated by Sophia who considered him an able lieutenant but restricted his freedom to maneuver. Having scored his major achievement—the abolition of *mestnichestvo*—under Fedor, Golitsyn might have fared better as first minister to the sickly and weak Ivan, for under such a tsar he could have instituted reforms and increased the influence and authority of the boyar council.

At least three of the first ministers during the seventeenth century, Ordin-Nashchokin, Matveev, and Golitsyn, developed their own foreign policy programs. However, only Ordin-Nashchokin had a definite personnel policy for the Department and systematically implemented it. He introduced officials who would remain there for the rest of the century.³⁹ Neither Matveev nor Golitsyn tried to exert such influence, perhaps because they were unfamiliar with the bureaucratic establishment, for they dealt with it only through senior members, to whom they entrusted all decisions other than those involving high-level policy. Ordin-Nashchokin, on the other hand, had worked in the bureaucracy at the provincial level. He brought into the Department some of the young assistant *d'iaki* he had known in those days and guided their careers.

The Department was responsible for matters relating to certain border regiments, such as the Sumskii, the Kharkovskii, the Iziumskii, and the Alkhryiskii. It supervised all matters concerning foreign residents in the Russian Empire, the postal service, and the collection and translation of foreign newspapers. In the second half of the seventeenth century the staff of the Department numbered about one hundred people. Its work was efficiently organized, and young clerks had an opportunity to become acquainted with various aspects of its operation.⁴⁰

³⁹ It is evident from the short histories of their diplomatic careers provided by Belokurov that Ukraintsev, Bobynin, Pososhkov, Voznitsyn, Volkov, and Mikhailov were all brought to the Department of Foreign Affairs by Ordin-Nashchokin. R. Crummey suggests that Ordin-Nashchokin's introduction of new people into the Department derived from his conflict with the officials whom he wanted to replace. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, pp. 100–101.

⁴⁰ Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, pp. 36–58. The department supervised the collection

After Golitsyn's downfall in 1689 the Department was taken over by Emil'ian Ignat'evich Ukraintsev, who was aided by four assistant *d'iaki*. The chief *d'iak* controlled the Department, but each assistant *d'iak* had his own specific area of responsibility. For example, the Polish desk and correspondence with the Russian resident in Poland was usually handled by the *d'iak* slated to succeed him. All letters sent to the Warsaw resident and any letters connected with its business bore the assistant *d'iak*'s signature. Fiscal affairs were supervised by one of the other assistant *d'iaki*. It is not entirely clear to what extent the five senior *d'iaki* exercised collective control over policy, as there are no minutes of internal conferences. But since letters on specific subjects always bore the signature of one person, there was clearly a division of responsibility among the senior officials. Letters of diplomatic significance were usually signed by Ukraintsev himself. The coup of 1689 did not lead to any changes in the assignments of *d'iaki* or in the composition of the Department as a whole.

From the fragmentary information available on the *d'iaki* employed by the Department, one can draw some inferences about their social and educational backgrounds. Most came to the Department as young trainees, but a few were seasoned diplomats transferred from other departments. Young candidates, mostly from bureaucratic families, completed a three-year curriculum in Church Slavonic, Latin, and Greek at the Pechatnyi Dvor School. It is not known whether a knowledge of contemporary foreign languages was a factor in recruitment. The main requirements, aside from general intelligence, were good, clear handwriting and industriousness.

Usually there were a few unpaid trainees at the Department whose advancement depended on family connections and the recommendations of their immediate superiors. These trainees, after a probationary period, might begin their careers as junior assistant *d'iaki*. The senior assistant *d'iak* had the decisive voice in matters affecting personnel; in the period under review that post was held by Maksim Alekseev, head of the First Department. Through his selection, junior assistant *d'iaki*

of taxes and custom duties in that part of the country assigned to cover its expenses. A number of important offices were under its jurisdiction: the Department of Little Russia (*Malorossiiskii prikaz*), the Department of the Duchy of Smolensk, and the Department of Polish-Lithuanian Prisoners. Each of these had its own personnel, but was supervised by departmental *d'iaki*.

eventually were promoted to middle-grade assistant *d'iaki*, which meant they headed a desk. Subsequently they could move on to become senior assistant *d'iaki* and thus potential heads of whole divisions within the Department.⁴¹

Assistant *d'iaki* of middle rank were often attached as secretaries to minor diplomatic missions or to Russian residencies abroad. If their performance merited it, they might be promoted to senior assistant *d'iak* and division chief or appointed secretary to the envoys dispatched to a foreign court. Sometimes one would be entrusted with independent diplomatic missions of considerable political importance, but in such a position he would maintain a low profile. For instance, the senior assistant *d'iak* Aleksei Vasil'ev conducted the delicate negotiations in Vienna in 1689 which affected both Russian participation in discussions with Turkey and the Austrian-Russian alliance. Another senior assistant *d'iak*, Vasilii Aitemirev, was dispatched on a mission to the Crimea in 1692 with instructions to handle the preliminary peace negotiations.⁴²

Participation in foreign missions was apparently a prerequisite for advancement in a diplomatic career, and the most successful foreign missions led to promotion to the position of *d'iak*. Who selected the officials sent on these missions? Officially it was done by the tsar on the advice of the Boyar Duma, but the influence wielded by the head of the Department was important. Such eminent figures as Ordin-Nashchokin or Golitsyn probably were able to secure appointments for their own hand-picked candidates, but Ukraintsev's influence is less clear. When the tsar decided to send diplomats to the Crimea in 1692, the Department submitted a long list of candidates, from which the Duma picked Aitemirev. It is not known whether the choice was prompted by Ukraintsev. Since it was a difficult mission, which could have led either to glory or to imprisonment, and Aitemirev apparently undertook it with mixed feelings, one can only speculate as to whether he had actually

⁴¹ Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, pp. 50, 52, 132, 163–64; N. A. Baklanova, "Obstanovka moskovskikh prikazov v XVII v.," in *Trudy Gosudarstvennogo istoricheskogo muzeia* 3 (Moscow, 1926): 53–100; Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries," pp. 27–31.

⁴² *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Rimskoiu imperieiu*, vol. 5, 1661–1674 (St. Petersburg, 1858), pp. 370–79; Prokofii Voznitsyn, the proponent of an active anti-Turkish policy, was elevated to the position of *d'iak* in connection with his successful mission to Istanbul in 1681. I. E. Zabelin, "Posol'skie puteshestviia v Turtsiiu v XVII stoletii," in *Russkaia starina* 20 (1877): 14–22.

sought the assignment. The fact that he took one of his relatives along suggests that he hoped to succeed.⁴³

During our period the *d'iaki* were Vasilii Bobynin, Prokofii Bogdanovich Voznitsyn, Ivan Mikhailovich Volkov, Boris Mikhailovich Mikhailov, and Aleksei Vasil'evich Nikitin. Only full *d'iaki* were appointed as residents in Poland, which carried with it promotion to the court rank of chamberlain (*stol'nik*). All of the *d'iaki*, except for Bobynin, a fiscal expert, were assigned to Warsaw in turn, apparently according to their seniority in service (Ukraintsev, already *stol'nik* and *dumnyi d'iak*, remained in Moscow).

The careers of Voznitsyn and Ukraintsev illustrate the turns a *d'iak's* fortunes could take in the diplomatic service. In 1667 Voznitsyn had served as a senior assistant *d'iak* and head of the third chancellery. He had started his career in the Palace Department, from which he was transferred in 1677 to the Department of Foreign Affairs. He served on many foreign missions and was promoted in 1681 to full *d'iak*. Voznitsyn's career, like that of other officials, was dependent not only on his diplomat skills, but also on his connections to those who wielded political power. He was close to the Naryshkins and to Peter himself, and immediately after Peter's accession to the throne, he was appointed *dumnyi d'iak*, a title accorded only a few *d'iaki*, which provided him access to the Duma.⁴⁴

Like Voznitsyn, Ukraintsev started his career under Ordin-Nashchokin. His first mission to Poland, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands earned him recognition, and he was promoted to full *d'iak* in 1674. After successful missions to Poland, first with Ivan Ivanovich Chadaev and subsequently with Ivan Afanas'evich Pronchishchev, he was appointed *dumnyi d'iak* in 1681. Ukraintsev was not on the best terms with Golitsyn; in fact, he was considered a supporter of Peter, even though he did not belong to the young tsar's entourage but was associated with the

⁴³ "Otpravlenie v Krym Vasiliia Aitemireva," TsGADA, fond 123 (Relations with the Crimea, 1692–1695), ms 1, p. 261.

⁴⁴ Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, pp. 125–26. O. Makhatka, "Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii, Avstrii i Pol'shi v sviazi s antituretskoi voinoi v 1683–1699 gg." (Ph.D. diss., Leningrad, 1958; Lenin Library in Moscow), pp. 220, 225–30; M. M. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I. Materialy dlia bibliografii*, vol. 3 (Leningrad, 1946), pp. 342–45, 453; vol. 4 (Leningrad, 1948) pp. 62–70; vol. 5 (Leningrad, 1948) pp. 247–50, 291–92. When Peter I wanted to introduce Magdeburg law into Russia he instructed Voznitsyn in Vienna to gather all relevant information; Bogoslovskii, *Petr I*, vol. 3, pp. 248–49.

Naryshkins. Under the reign of Peter's mother, Natal'ia Kirillovna, and her brother Lev, as well as under the patriarch Ioakim, Ukraintsev wielded considerable influence, leaving an imprint on the style and, to some extent, the content of Russian foreign policy during that period. After Peter's accession, Ukraintsev's power declined, and he incurred several outbursts of imperial anger, despite intervention by his relative, Andrei Andreevich Vinius, a close friend of the young tsar. Eventually, he lost control over Russian foreign policy and was relegated to secondary duties.⁴⁵

The careers of other diplomats seem to have been unaffected by the coup of 1689. Staff changes would come with Peter's later reforms. The Department was still run largely by experienced men brought in by Ordin-Nashchokin. Neither Matveev nor Golitsyn seem to have interfered in the selection of staff, and Golitsyn's downfall did not precipitate the decline of any of them.⁴⁶

There were transfers of staff among various government offices, so that some diplomats in the Department of Foreign Affairs had started their careers in other departments. Nonetheless, young trainees who entered the service as junior assistant *d'iaki* were placed in situations in which they almost always became specialized, although the interaction between the various offices and the Department of Foreign Affairs prevented narrow specialization. Contact with foreign countries and with the leading political personalities of the day also tended to broaden the horizons of the Department's officials. In fact, they were the only Russians who had access to information about events both in Russia and abroad. Many of them had been in foreign countries and learned foreign languages. Service in the Department paved their way not only to

⁴⁵ Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, pp. 47, 50–51, 113–14, 123, 127. In his valuable diary, the secretary of the Austrian ambassador to Russia indicates that Ukraintsev lost power due to the hostility of one of the closest supporters of Peter, Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn. Ioahan G. Korb, *Diarium itineris in Moscoviam* (Vienna, 1701), pp. 25–26, 98; see also pp. 59, 70, 148, 261, 265. Andrzej Kamiński, "Zagadka rosyjskiej beczynności w trakcie bezkrólewia po śmierci Sobieskiego," in *Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka* 37, no. 3/4(1982): 391.

⁴⁶ V. S. Ikonnikov, "Blizhnii boiarin Afanasii Lavrent'evich Ordin Nashchokin, odin iz predshestvennikov petrovskoi reformy," in *Russkaia starina* 40 (1883): 17, 273–308. The stability of the bureaucratic positions of the *d'iaki* and assistant *d'iaki* is evident from their careers as presented by Belokurov. See also Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries," pp. 32–33, 44; C. Bickford O'Brien, "The Views of A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 17 (1969): 369–79.

positions of political influence, but to court rank, and some *d'iaki* were promoted to the position of chamberlain, which carried with it hereditary membership in the nobility. Despite these opportunities for upward mobility, most of the bureaucrats did not achieve such honors and ranks, so that their successors usually came from the same group of civil servants.

Wages paid the staff of the Department varied considerably. Trainees were unpaid; most junior clerks were paid three rubles annually; department heads received negligible salaries ranging from thirty-five to sixty-five rubles. These latter amounts, however, were augmented by an allocation of flour and other provisions that probably doubled their earnings.⁴⁷

The immediate supervision of work done by the personnel of the Department was the responsibility of the assistant *d'iaki*. In the seventeenth century five of them headed sections of the Department handling specific responsibilities. (Occasionally responsibilities between departments were shifted, but this was insignificant.) In addition to matters related directly to foreign affairs, some departments also handled domestic problems associated with foreign policy, as well as some matters having to do with the tsar's family.

The Place of Poland-Lithuania in Russian Foreign Policy

Every matter dealt with in the Department was recorded twice. All letters, complaints, petitions, foreign reports, and debriefings of persons arriving from abroad were copied, and comprehensive summaries were entered in the appropriate books. More important items, such as dispatches from diplomats, were entered *in extenso*. All material (instructions, diaries, dispatches, notes from diplomatic meetings, etc.) relating to specific negotiations with foreign powers, ambassadorial activities, or secret missions were grouped together. This method of organization, combining chronology and strict adherence to subject matter, made it possible for personnel to use archival records for diplomatic follow-up.

The staff used these data to compile books on specific subjects, the equivalent of "white papers." For example, they would prepare one book

⁴⁷ Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, pp. 131–36. Bureaucrats were well paid, but their main income came from bribes. Plavsic, "Seventeenth-Century Chanceries," 37–38.

about the persecution of the Orthodox population of Poland, and another recording Polish and Russian military operations between 1686 and 1694. Lists of prisoners in Russia were also compiled when required by the government.⁴⁸ The number of books prepared by the various chancelleries of the Department of Foreign Affairs was a reflection of the attention given to an issue. The size of the books also indicated the issue's importance; some books ran to 3,000 pages, others to only 200. A page count would provide a fair yardstick, but the absence of catalogues precludes such computation. Table 1 lists the number of books prepared by the various chancelleries up to 1699; these books reflect diplomatic

TABLE 1

Books on Foreign Countries Kept by Chancelleries of the
Department of Foreign Affairs for the Seventeenth Century⁴⁹

Country	Number of Books	Fond
Poland-Lithuania	256	79
Sweden	129	96
Crimean Khanate	90	123
Ukraine (<i>Malorossiiskii prikaz</i> from 1654)	80	124
Austria	49	32
Turkey	28	89
Denmark	24	53
England	20	35
France	15	93
Greece (and the Orthodox outside Russia)	12	52
Netherlands	12	50
Prussia	7	74
Moldavia and Wallachia	4	68

⁴⁸ TsGADA, fond 79, ms 216 (Polish hostile acts toward Russia, 1678–1683), mss 109 and 110 (Lists of Polish and Lithuanian prisoners-of-war released after 1687); ms 255 (Persecution of the Orthodox Population in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth); Relations with Poland, 1694, ms 7 (List of Russian Military Operations, 1684–1694).

⁴⁹ Computed on the basis of the manuscript catalogue prepared by Dmitrii Nikolaevich

activity for the entire seventeenth century. Table 2 focuses on the period from 1686 to 1699; it evaluates the main areas of interest during those years. The survey provided by the tables does not include all the chancelleries, but only the principal ones.

TABLE 2
Books on Foreign Countries Kept by Chancelleries of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, 1686–1699⁵⁰

Country	Number of Books	Fond
Poland-Lithuania	32	79
Ukraine (<i>Malorossiiskii prikaz</i> from 1654)	24	124
Austria	18	32
Sweden	8	96
Crimean Khanate	5	123
Greece (and the Orthodox outside Russia)	5	52
France	4	93
Netherlands	2	50
Prussia	2	74
Turkey	2	89
England	1	35
Denmark	1	53
Moldavia and Wallachia	1	68

From Table 1, it is evident that Russia’s primary focus in diplomatic relations during the seventeenth century was Poland-Lithuania. The considerable attention devoted to Sweden and the Crimean Khanate is not surprising; what is startling is that in comparison the number of books dealing with the Commonwealth is disproportionately large. Even

Bantysh-Kamenskii in 1783–1804 (TsGADA). The actual list of “Polish books” for the 17th century is 234, since 22 are devoted to Polish-Russian relations in the 16th century. I did not have access to Bantysh-Kamenskii’s catalogue of Ukrainian and Turkish white books; the actual number may be somewhat different than that cited here.

⁵⁰ Based on Bantysh-Kamenskii’s catalogue.

more amazing is the negligible number of books allotted to the Balkans (except, that is, for Turkey) since all were Orthodox territories and the heading "Greek Affairs" included all material relevant to people of the Orthodox faith living outside the boundaries of Russia.

When we compare table 2 to table 1, we see that in the late seventeenth century there was a dramatic increase in the intensity of Russia's concern with Austria, a decrease of involvement with the Crimea and Sweden, and no apparent change in the attention given to Western European countries. Intriguing, though understandable, is the large number of books devoted to Ukrainian affairs.

Given the number of books on Poland-Lithuania, we may conclude that most career diplomats had much more experience handling relations with Poland than they had with any other country. Inevitably, then, it became traditional in the Department to consider Polish affairs of primary importance to Russia. As a consequence, during the Northern War, when Peter I ordered a shift in focus to West European nations, many officials would find the leap difficult to make, obliging the tsar to bring new people into the diplomatic service.⁵¹

Yet, not even the most gifted Russian diplomats became true experts on foreign countries. The Department usually employed many non-Russians, and a peculiar and paradoxical phenomenon existed in the Russian foreign service: the most sensitive positions—those of translators (*perevodchiki*) and interpreters (*tolmachi*)—were entrusted almost exclusively to people of foreign birth, despite the manifest xenophobia that characterized Russian society and government at the time. Confidential messages sent by foreign envoys to the tsar, as well as items excerpted from the foreign press exclusively for him, were handled first by the translators and interpreters. Thus, they were privy to the most secret information—particularly the translators, who were of a higher order in the service and were allowed not only to interpret communiqués and other material, but to write the official versions of political documents.

The incongruity of the situation was best exemplified by the careers of two translators, Nicolae Milescu Spătarul and Symeon Ławrecki, men

⁵¹ Some of these diplomats studied or traveled through Western Europe in the company of or by order of Tsar Peter I. The most famous were Gregorii Fedorovich Dolgorukii, Vasilii Lukich Dolgorukii, Andrei Matveev, Petr Andreevich Tolstoi, and Petr Pavlovich Shafirov.

of obvious talent but dubious background. Miclescu Spătarul, a man who had been branded a traitor in his native Wallachia, became the chief translator for the Department, and so highly regarded that he was designated head of a diplomatic mission to China in 1675. Since he was also the person most informed about the Danubian principalities and the Orthodox population in Turkey, Aleksei Mikhailovich relied heavily on his information and expertise. In time Miclescu Spătarul became spokesman for Orthodox believers in the Ottoman Empire and tended to act as their unofficial ambassador to Moscow.⁵² By contrast, Ławrecki, a lapsed monk from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in an effort to make a clean break with his past, converted to Orthodoxy, a move that attracted considerable notice at the time. Whether his conversion signified to Russian officials that he had become alienated from his native country and possibly more loyal to Russia remains a matter of conjecture. Yet he was often assigned to one of the most sensitive positions in the Department—that of *pristav*, or guide and guardian for Polish diplomats in Moscow. That capacity, of course, gave Ławrecki an ideal opportunity to become a double agent (as, in fact, some translators and interpreters did). Nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest that he became one. Rather, this ex-Pole assigned to guard Polish diplomats seemed to perform his duties faithfully, using his understanding of his former countrymen to enlighten the tsar on how best to deal with them and those they represented.⁵³

The other translators and interpreters of the Department (in 1689 there were 39 altogether) were also foreigners by birth: Ukrainians, Poles, Dutchmen, Moldavians, Germans, Swedes, Englishmen, and Tatars. In addition to Russian, some worked with only one foreign language, others with two or three. As one might expect from the table of

⁵² David, *Status Modernus*, p. 20; Iu. Arsen'ev, *Novye dannye o sluzhbe Nikolaia Spafariia v Rossii (1671–1708)* (Moscow, 1900), pp. 23–30, 53–54; Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, p. 131; I. Cheban, "O vzaimnootnosheniiakh Moldavii s Moskovskim gosudarstvom v XV–XVIII vekakh," *Voprosy istorii* 2 (1945): 65; D. Ursul, *Filosofskie i obshchestvenno-politicheskie vzgliady N. G. Milesku Spafariia* (Chişinău [Kishinev], 1955), pp. 23–41, 60–61; P. P. Panaitescu, "Kul'turnye svyazi Rumynskikh gosudarstv s Rossiei v èpokhu reform Petra I-go. Novye dannye," *Romanoslavica* 2 (Bucharest, 1958): 236.

⁵³ Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, p. 131; TsGADA, fond 79 (Relations with Poland, 1698), ms 12, and ms 243 (Arrival in Moscow of the new Polish resident, Bokij). The best example of a successful double-agent was Leontii Gross, *pristav* and informer to the Dutch diplomat, Johann van Keller: Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident," pp. 123–25.

books indicating the main thrust of Russian foreign policy, the languages that predominated were Tatar, Latin, German, and Polish.

Latin was used extensively because correspondence with several courts, including China's, was carried out in that language. Use of Polish and German, of course, was justified by geopolitics; English, Swedish, and Dutch were confined to commercial use. The extensive knowledge of Tatar and Turkish by translators and interpreters indicates, as do the data on the books compiled by the Department, that the Crimea and the tribes of the steppes were among Russia's primary interests at this time. Further corroboration of the link between the languages that predominated in conducting foreign affairs and the countries on which the Department's staff concentrated its efforts is the paucity of books on the Balkans and the absence of translators familiar with the language of the South Slavs. Similarly, the negligible number of linguists fluent in Greek corresponds to the modest output of books compiled by the Department's Chancellery on Greek Affairs.

TABLE 3

Linguistic Skills of Translators and Interpreters
in the Department of Foreign Affairs⁵⁴

Language	Number of Translators
Tatar	8
Latin	7
German	5
Polish	4
Greek	3
Turkish (Ottoman)	2
Belorussian/Ukrainian	1
English	1
French	1
Hungarian	1
Kalmyk	1
Romanian	1
Swedish	1

⁵⁴ Compiled from Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, p. 131–32.

During the seventeenth century, the Department made no effort to train Russians as successors to its foreign-born translators and interpreters. Thus, translators and, to a lesser extent, interpreters (some of whom became translators after passing a special examination) constituted a unique group in the diplomatic service, one that worked closely with the ruling Russian elite, yet owed its status to knowledge of other nations gained abroad. One restriction imposed on them was that, despite achievement in diplomatic service, they could not rise to the rank of *d'iak*, at least not until a later date. (Under Peter I, for example, the translator Shafirov was promoted and reached the highest level attainable in state service.) But even during this earlier period, translators and interpreters accompanied *d'iaki* and other officials to peace conferences and there performed a vital function as linguistic experts. Perhaps they imbued Russian officials with some sense of the very different standards that prevailed in the outside world, which they translated into Russian terms. Some translators exerted special influence because they were writers and scholars of note. Milescu Spătarul, the foreign-born translator, was known not only for his mission to China, but for the detailed description he provided of the journey, including maps of the Siberian route to Beijing. Ławrecki, too, was known for his writings—on mineralogy, theology, and poetics. Lastly, Stepan Chyzhyns'kyi distinguished himself not only in the diplomatic service but also as a translator of numerous books and as director of the first theater in Moscow.⁵⁵

Our analysis of the chancelleries in existence during 1689, the number of volumes prepared by them, and the extent to which the various foreign languages were employed indicates the main thrust of Russian political, cultural and economic interests in the seventeenth century. Latin, German, and Polish were used predominantly by the chancelleries in this period. Similarly, the claim of strong Russian ties with Asia is supported by this analysis. The striking discrepancy in the volume of Russian contacts with Western Europe as compared to those with the Orthodox East is a valid barometer of Russian intellectual and political predilections in the period prior to the accession of Peter I.

⁵⁵ A. I. Sobolevskii, *Perevodnaia literatura Moskovskoi Rusi XIV–XVII vekov* (St. Petersburg, 1902), pp. 110–18; Luppov, *Kniga v Rossii v XVII veke*, pp. 15–31, 126–30.

Gathering Information

Through its conquest of Ukraine, and its participation in the Holy Alliances' war against Turkey, Russia became involved in the problems of European politics. The Department of Foreign Affairs realized that wars, treaties, and changing alliances among European powers affected Russian interests, especially if relations among Poland, Sweden, Austria, and Turkey changed. Accordingly, the Department endeavored to collect as much information as possible in order to avoid being taken by surprise.

The main sources of intelligence were the reports of Russian diplomats traveling abroad, news published in the foreign press, and dispatches from correspondents in foreign countries. All these sources were thought inadequate, and it was deemed necessary to station permanent envoys in countries of vital interest to Moscow. The first permanent mission abroad was established in Warsaw in 1674, followed by embassies in The Hague, London, Berlin, Istanbul, Copenhagen, and Stockholm during the eighteenth century.⁵⁶

In the late seventeenth century Warsaw was the only foreign residence always manned by seasoned diplomats and headed by a *d'iak* who had been promoted to the rank of *stol'nik* on the eve of his Polish assignment. With the exception of great ambassadors, all Russian diplomats, as well as correspondents and emissaries sent to Vienna, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Italy, were instructed to maintain contact with the Russian ambassador in Warsaw. He had some degree of control over their activities, and in this special sense, too, Poland-Lithuania served as Russia's window on Europe. Warsaw was truly a hotbed of activity for the Russian mission, and daily contacts were maintained between Russian diplomats and those of Austria, Brandenburg, the Vatican, Venice, and at times the Crimea. Weekly visits with these legations kept the Russians informed about Europe, and they were particularly interested in reports on foreign armies and courts. The dispatches of Russian diplomats in Poland supplied Moscow not only with information about the Commonwealth, but also with the latest changes in Europe, news

⁵⁶ A. Popov, *Russkoe posol'stvo v Pol'she 1673–1677 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1854), pp. 21–258. Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident," pp. 1–9, 38, 113.

gleaned from the Polish and foreign press, copies of published manifests, descriptions of battles, calendars, and books. The residency in Warsaw was a mine of information for Moscow in the late 1680s and 1690s.⁵⁷

Information was also obtained through the reports of the palatine of Smolensk. He had responsibility for one of the most important sections of the frontier between Russia and the Commonwealth, and control over an intelligence network. The palatine's reports were sent monthly to the Department. With the establishment of the permanent embassy in Warsaw the importance of his reports declined. Nevertheless, his detailed descriptions of the situation in the borderlands and of the state of Orthodoxy in the Belorussian territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are of great interest.

The value of the dispatches sent to the Department by the Ukrainian hetman remained undiminished. He headed an excellent network of agents and correspondents in Moscow, Moldavia, Wallachia, the Crimea, and in West-Bank Ukraine. Ivan Mazepa (hetman 1687–1709) in particular had excellent contacts, because he had family and close friends in Polish Ukraine and exchanged military attachés with hetman Jan Stanisław Jabłonowski. Mazepa, born into the Polish szlachta, well-educated, and with an intimate knowledge of the court (he had been a secretary and courtier of Jan Kazimierz), knew and understood Polish politics better than anyone else in the tsar's service.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ The personalities of the various Russian diplomats will be discussed in chapter 4. Their experience unquestionably influenced changes in the Russian diplomatic practice. The most important of these changes was an increased independence in their contacts with Polish officials and foreign diplomats. Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident," pp. 94–95, 103–106. For more on the special position of Russian diplomats accredited in Poland vis-à-vis other Russian diplomats, agents, and spies, see tsars to Voznitsyn, 9 October 1688, TsGADA, fond 52 (Relations with Greece), ms 11, pp. 83–84; Voznitsyn to Golitsyn, 8 November 1688, and 3 January and 7 February 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, pp. 192, 243, 280; Volkov to Golitsyn, 17 May 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 20–21. See also a series of dispatches (1692) concerning the troubles of one of Hetman Mazepa's agents arrested in Poland and helped by Mikhailov; TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 143, 145–46, 191, 201, 210, 214, 223; ms 243, pp. 469, 522, 549, 555. Also see Nikitin to Peter I, 26 October 1696, and 8 October 1699, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 117, 438–39.

⁵⁸ M. I. [N. I.] Kostomarov, *Mazepa i mazepintsy*, in his *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 16 (St. Petersburg, 1905); O. Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba* (New York, 1960); T. Mackiv, *Prince Mazepa, Hetman of Ukraine in Contemporary English Publications, 1687–1709* (Chicago, 1969); W. Majewski, "Jan (Ivan) Mazepa," in *Polski słownik biograficzny*, vol. 20, pp. 294–99. Mazepa's influence on the course of

The Department also routinely collected the reports required of all those crossing the Russian border. Many of these reports, particularly those of Russian monks coming from the Ottoman Empire and of merchants coming from Europe, could have been of interest to Russian politicians, but they were buried among piles of material of little use to them, although now of interest to sociologists and anthropologists.

Almost mechanically, vast amounts of data were registered and compiled according to subject matter by the Department's various desks. A single source—for instance, the weekly report sent from Warsaw—could include scattered bits of political information, discourses, translations of Senate or Parliamentary records, press translations, and the information of spies. No digests, policy papers, summaries, or briefs were written, nor is there any evidence of interdivisional use of the data collected. It seems that the Duma, the tsar, and even the department chief relied for the most part on the written reports of ambassadors, while the *d'iak* responsible for Poland-Lithuania and his subordinates were expected to continue to collect information and to answer specific questions. Even the reports of ambassadors were useful only if the tsar was willing to listen to them. For example, Golitsyn was well acquainted with Poland, but Peter showed no interest in the wealth of information gathered by the Department. Under these circumstances, the multitude of minutiae compiled had no use.

Sobieski, for his part, continued to gather as much information as possible. In comparing the extensive, professional Department of Foreign Affairs with Sobieski's small group of experts, one finds it striking that Sobieski's group managed to discern so quickly the secret plans of foreign governments, to establish and maintain intelligence contacts, and to supply accurate and concise intelligence.

Traditionally, some very important diplomatic tasks were entrusted to people who were not employed in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Members of the Boyar Duma always led the great embassies sent to Poland-Lithuania or Sweden. Indeed, this was a privilege reserved for boyars of the most illustrious families. The requirements for leaders of

Russian foreign policy was particularly evident in 1694, when, on his advice, the Kremlin opted to extend hostilities with Turkey and mend relations with Poland. See the policy statement of Hetman Mazepa concerning relations with Poland and war with the Ottoman Porte, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 250, pp. 2–24, 29–33 and fond 123, Relations with the Crimea 1692–1694, ms 1, pp. 264–88.

missions to Persia and other countries were only slightly less stringent. When such political figures were involved in diplomatic assignments, the staff of the Department had to provide them with position papers, envoys' instructions, speeches, and summary replies to thousands of anticipated questions. In addition, Department personnel served as secretaries to major embassies.

As for the boyars who were brought in, little is known about the training they received. Most boyars in the second half of the seventeenth century were educated men, and the negotiations they conducted attest to a sound grasp of diplomatic problems and practice. Some of them had acquired a fairly extensive knowledge of the world from their reading, from the lessons they had received from private tutors, and through their contacts with foreigners. As well as receiving foreign visitors, they exerted an influence on the course of Russian foreign policy. Their knowledge of international affairs was generally considered adequate by diplomats visiting Moscow. Polish diplomats sometimes requested meetings with the boyars rather than with Ukraintsev when he was chief of the Department of Foreign Affairs. This preference, as far as we know, did not stem from animosity toward Ukraintsev, but rather from a desire to communicate the Polish position directly to a broader circle of boyars without going through the possibly distorting influence of the Department.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ For the best presentation of the boyars as servitors to the state, see Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors*, pp. 30–33, 38–44, 58–61, 135–36, 156–63. For a description of aristocratic privileges while in diplomatic service, see Grigorii Karpovich Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (St. Petersburg, 1840), pp. 32–33, 37–69. Aleksei Mikhailovich's interest in the Western education of his children made similar behavior fashionable among the Russian elite. Professor Crummey is right in observing that "a Dutch carbine or a German armoire does not make a man a European, any more than a Damascus sword makes him an Arab" (p. 159). We can assume that Belorussian, Polish, or Ukrainian teachers of boyar children, and Latin or Polish books read by members of the service elite, indicate cultural change in seventeenth-century Moscow. There are many reports by European diplomats, merchants, and travelers noting the ignorance and barbarism of Muscovites. On the other hand, let me quote from two learned men who were pleased by their intellectual contacts with the Muscovites: "the voevodas of this [Russian] nation are men learned in general knowledge and in the law, versed in philosophy and profound disputations," Paul of Aleppo, *The Travels of Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch*, vol. 1 (London, 1834), p. 234; "He [boyar Golovin] was an intelligent man, acute and experienced in negotiations and though he knew Latin he always used the interpreter who had been his teacher of that language," "Father Pereira's diary," ed. and trans. by J. Sebes, S.J., in *The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)* (Rome, 1961), p. 233.

The participation of members of the Boyar Duma in the conduct of Russian foreign policy was in some ways similar to the role of senators in the conduct of Commonwealth foreign policy. Both Duma and Senate were advisory boards to the ruler. Members of each institution served as architects of their government's foreign policy. Both groups were well informed about foreign affairs and often had contacts with foreign diplomats in the line of duty. In both countries, the most honorable and important embassies were reserved for them. The essential difference was that senators could actively oppose the policy of the king, while members of the Duma did not have that luxury and at best could only voice reservations. While on a diplomatic assignment, Duma members worked closely with the bureaucrats of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Senators, while making use of the services of the Polish and Lithuanian chancelleries, depended heavily on their secretaries and courtiers. In neither country did professional diplomats completely replace the aristocrats and top administrators who had always played an important role in the conduct of foreign relations. The traditionally authoritative diplomat-politician was now complemented by bureaucrats who were obedient servants of the government.



My reader may be struck by what appears to be a major discrepancy in coverage of the two nations' diplomatic services. Why the heavy emphasis on the machinery of diplomacy in Russia, on the functions of the *d'iaki* and their subordinates, the records and books they kept, the skills and personal backgrounds of the people employed as translators and interpreters? Why are these subjects scarcely touched upon in the Polish section, which concentrates largely on the actions of relatively small groups of people?

A study of the Polish chancelleries, their personnel and records, provides only part of the picture of the government's conduct of foreign affairs. Other information has to be gathered from a study of relations among the king, the Senate, the Commons, and the county councils. In many instances—those in which Parliament and the county councils were sufficiently informed about foreign policy to subject it to public debate—meetings were called and decisions made in response to the

needs of the moment, after soliciting the advice or consent of people from various government institutions. In other cases, when the king and his advisors attempted to operate independently of public opinion, an atmosphere of secrecy surrounded foreign policy decisions. Consequently, what matters most in assessing Poland's conduct of diplomatic relations are the personalities involved and the positions taken by the king and his advisors and by the rank-and-file county *szlachta*. Ultimately, it was the interaction of these people, and of the institutions they represented, that shaped Poland-Lithuania's approach to diplomatic relations.

In Russia, on the other hand, foreign policy deliberations were at all times highly secretive, and only the tsar had the power to make decisions. In the absence of instructions from him or one of his advisors, the intricate, well-organized machinery of the Department of Foreign Affairs either continued to operate through a kind of inertia, or, at times, ground to a standstill. This occurred in 1689, after Sophia and Golitsyn fell from power: for four months Russian diplomats in Poland ventured no explanation or interpretation of the event—that is, until they received an official version.⁶⁰

In fact, after the fall of Golitsyn much of the work of the Department—the compilation of hundreds of books, translations from numerous European newspapers, voluminous reports from agents in border cities, and a mass of information obtained from foreigners—would prove of little practical value, since it was not used to formulate a viable and consistent policy vis-à-vis Poland.

Nonetheless, in late seventeenth-century Russian diplomacy, the machinery of diplomacy was of primary importance, because direct involvement by the tsar in the formation of foreign policy appears to have been minimal. From 1682 to 1689, the government was controlled by Peter's half sister Sophia; she, in turn, entrusted the supervision of the Department of Foreign Affairs to Golitsyn, who acted in the names of the Tsars Ivan and Peter. After the coup d'état of 1689, the victorious Naryshkin clan (brothers and cousins of Peter's mother) failed to appoint

⁶⁰ Sobieski had been informed in October of the coup d'état of 1689. When he read Dowmont's report, "korolevskoe velichestvo pechalen byl mnogoe vremia tak chto malo ne zaplakal." But when he asked Volkov for an additional explanation, the Russian resident could only insist that as long as the change was done according to the tsars' wishes there was no reason for sorrow. Volkov's dispatches, November and December 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 265–66, 337–38.

a real statesman to head the Department. Instead, it was run by Ukraintsev, who promoted a passive, low-risk policy in foreign affairs that would help the Naryshkins consolidate their control of Russia.

In reviewing the work of the Russian and Polish diplomatic corps, it might seem that the Russians were more skilled, more effective. Indeed, in diplomatic negotiations Russian envoys were better able to illustrate their points through endless citations of historical precedent. But it is doubtful whether they were really more effective than their Polish counterparts. Apparently the Russian diplomatic service was hampered by the very features that made it so well-organized: specialized but limited functions, strict compliance with regulations, and a heavy reliance on tradition, all of which tended to stifle personal initiative and resourcefulness. A diplomat with any such qualities, in fact, posed a serious risk: personnel of the Russian diplomatic service were recruited from a lower social class (they were not members of the court nobility) and therefore advancement within the bureaucratic hierarchy—their only possibility of acquiring social status—hinged on the favor of superiors—sometimes that of the tsar himself. In a very different way, the Poles at times also found themselves hamstrung: by the loose organization and lack of specialization in their diplomatic service and above all by the constant clashes between Parliament, the senators, and the king over foreign policy issues, which tended to give conflicting cues to the diplomatic service.

The effectiveness of both services was undermined further by prolonged periods of mutual incomprehension. Despite a thorough knowledge of all documents relating to Polish affairs, and brief missions to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, representatives of the Russian diplomatic service found inscrutable the ideas and practices intrinsic to a Commonwealth. The debates held in Parliament and the county councils, the confederacies, the tradition of open opposition to the throne, and, needless to say, the existence of a free press—all these seemed to Russian diplomats *per se* suspect. They tried desperately to analyze Polish policy by concentrating on the actions of the king, whom, as we know, they persisted in regarding as a tsar, albeit an imperfect one whose powers were limited by the rights of Parliament and of the citizens at large. This approach failing, in their dispatches they discounted much of the information they had acquired. In doing so, particularly in resorting to epithets like “evil” and “perfidious liars” to characterize Polish diplomats, and “anarchy” to describe the Polish system, they reflected

their own uneasiness about relaying news of a country whose entire system seemed to them ambiguous and morally corrupt.⁶¹ Not until Catherine II's reign would Russian diplomats learn how to analyze Polish political life and how to use the most ardent defenders of republicanism to weaken the Commonwealth.

Polish officials, in turn, had difficulty understanding the Russian system, even though they were well versed in political theory and familiar with different forms of government. Their confusion is apparent in the fact that although they perceived Russia as a classic example of tyranny, they nonetheless—when in Moscow—tried to influence public opinion, to meet with a variety of government figures, and to make their viewpoints known. They did not limit their contacts to the Department of Foreign Affairs, and refused, as it were, to believe that it was an institution controlled by an omnipotent tsar. They sought instead to find some parallel to their Senate in the Duma, and to influence public opinion by consulting a broad range of bureaucrats. In doing so, they failed to comprehend the tsar's unique position in Russia. Having stripped their own king of divine authority, they did not grasp the idea that the tsar was, in the eyes of his subjects, a godlike figure whose rule had far-ranging *moral* as well as practical implications. Thus, they, too, failed sometimes to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and there were occasions on which, unable to fathom their Russian counterparts, they were duped by the most patent lies—lies the Russians were obliged to repeat but knew to be transparent. In short, what most characterized Russian-Polish diplomatic relations in the late seventeenth century was the tendency by diplomats of both states to perceive the behavior of their neighbor according to their own domestic political experience. This tendency flourished despite the voicing of oft-repeated attestations to an understanding of the basic differences between a state of free citizens and one of state servitors.

⁶¹ All the Russian residents reacted to seventeenth-century Poland-Lithuania with bewilderment and uneasiness. Popov, *Russkoe posol'stvo*, pp. 251–58. See also chapter 3. It is interesting to note that the freedom with which the szlachta spoke and their lack of servility, e.g., during elections of the king, were attributed to the effects of alcohol. The residents were convinced that only inebriates could act or speak as freely as the men of Poland-Lithuania. Tolstoi compared the republican inclinations and behavior of the szlachta with the tendencies of drunken cattle, and Peter I referred to the Commonwealth as a land of drunkards. Peter A. Tolstoi, *Travel Diary*, ed. M. J. Okenfuss (DeKalb, IL, 1987), pp. 37–38. Tsar Peter to A. Vinius, *Pis'ma i bumagi Petra Velikogo*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1887) p. 149. See also Korb, *Diarium*, pp. 76–77.

CHAPTER THREE

The Russian Residency in Poland

“Please free me from this damned residency or I may lose my mind and collapse both mentally and financially.”

Boris Mikhailovich Mikhailov

Russia displayed far more interest in Poland's policies than Poland did in Russia's. Muscovite politicians believed that the loss of Smolensk and Kiev might provoke some sort of retribution on the part of their neighbors. They feared that the Commonwealth might make a separate peace with Turkey, or even join forces with Turkey against Russia. Russian residents in Warsaw were thus charged to report even the most subtle intimations of a policy shift, as a possible advance warning.¹

In Poland-Lithuania, only devoted adherents of an anti-Turkish policy and supporters of friendly relations with Muscovy backed the decision to exchange ambassadors with Russia. Once the exchange had been reinstated, the Russians would have ample opportunity to study systematically the ways of West European diplomacy. They were aware that in matters of protocol the Poles expected them to follow the example of their Austrian, French, and Swedish colleagues. Sobieski urged the Russians to engage in similar independent negotiations, and also to meet with him privately apart from the public ceremonial audiences. The Kremlin refused, however, to alter its set ways and insisted instead on costly and time-consuming official visits at court, so that the Russian residents' personal contacts with Sobieski were limited to their official deliveries of letters from the tsar. This state of affairs did not improve their image as little more than honorific messengers. Vasilii Tiapkin and later Prokofii Voznitsyn (1684–1689) were both acutely aware how the

¹ Instructions for Prokofii Bogdanovich Voznitsyn, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Moscow; hereafter TsGADA), fond 79, ms 233; Instructions for Ivan Mikhailovich Volkov, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 236; Instructions for Boris Mikhailovich Mikhailov, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 241; Instructions for Aleksei Nikitin, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland in 1696, ms 4. For short biographies of the diplomats, see: S. A. Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze* (Moscow, 1906), pp. 53, 125–28.

rules imposed by Moscow were isolating them from the daily life of the royal court, and both tried to change the situation. Both wanted to work on the same footing as their West European colleagues and felt that they should have the authority to make at least minor decisions. They urged their government to grant them the flexibility needed to participate more actively in Polish domestic policies. Over the many years that the Warsaw residency was active, the Department of Foreign Affairs accumulated a long list of suggestions aimed at revising its antiquated regulations. While these suggestions were not acted upon until the time of Peter's personal rule, it should be remembered that many of the Petrine envoys learned the intricacies of diplomatic protocol and behavior while attached to the Polish desk at the Department of Foreign Affairs.²

Residents, Their Staffs, and Living Conditions

During the year 1687–1700, four Russians served as residents (second-rank ambassadors) to Poland: Prokofii Bogdanovich Voznitsyn (February 1688–May 1689), Ivan Mikhailovich Volkov (May 1689–summer 1691), Boris Mikhailovich Mikhailov (September 1691–spring 1696) and Aleksei Vasil'evich Nikitin (May 1696–1700). Three of the four residents had broad experience in international affairs: Voznitsyn had participated in missions to Austria, Turkey, and Venice in addition to his four missions to Poland (1671, 1673, 1674, and 1675); Volkov,

² Jan Myśliszewski informed Voznitsyn that the king would like to see him as often as possible and invited him to visit the court informally, as the residents of other countries did. Register of Voznitsyn's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 77–79. In light of this explicit invitation, Voznitsyn's lamentations to Golitsyn that he was treated differently from all the other residents and not allowed access to the king are either hypocritical or an attempt to change the official behavior of Russian diplomats abroad. Voznitsyn to V. V. Golitsyn, March 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 105. The Polish senators also expressed an interest in his power to act without detailed instructions from Moscow. The Poles were interested in getting quick responses from foreign diplomats regarding military actions and peace missions. Voznitsyn only repeated that he had been sent to inform the tsar and not to conduct negotiations. Voznitsyn's discussions with Polish senators, 29 February 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 39–44. The strictly informational character of the early Russian ambassadorial service was aptly described by Belov, who also observed that residency in Poland served to increase the diplomats' independence. M. I. Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident v Moskve. Baron Iogann Keller i ego pis'ma," (Ph.D. diss., Leningrad, 1947), pp. 44, 94–106. See also: A. N. Popov, *Russkoe posol'stvo v Pol'she 1673–1677 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1854), pp. 243–44.

who had visited Poland prior to his appointment as resident, had also traveled to Venice and Austria; Mikhailov had taken part in the peace negotiations at Andrusovo (1677). All the Russian residents could communicate in Polish without an interpreter, though only Nikitin was perfectly conversant and could write in the language. In addition, Nikitin, Mikhailov, and Voznitsyn knew Latin and understood French.³

The journey from Moscow to Warsaw took the Russian residents to Smolensk, where they had to stop to inform the Polish authorities across the border in Kadyn of their arrival and to request proper means of further transportation. When such means were not immediately available, some of the residents preferred to proceed “at their own expense” to Mahilëŭ, Minsk, or Vilnius. Many of them used this occasion to visit Orthodox monasteries en route and to deliver letters from the Kremlin reminding these Orthodox communities that the tsar was their protector. At the same time, they were able to collect information on recent political developments. They spoke with monks, merchants, soldiers, local officials, and any senators they might encounter along the way. Since they—in contrast to their counterparts in Russia—were not restricted from talking to whomever they wished, they usually arrived in Warsaw well-briefed on the current political situation.⁴

Once in Warsaw, the residents were provided with living quarters by either the Crown or the court marshal, usually in a house rented from a burgher.⁵ Such arrangements suited Voznitsyn and Nikitin, but displeased Volkov and Mikhailov, who complained that the quarters of the

³ The residents’ knowledge of languages can be deduced from their ability to participate in conversations and to report on them. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, 235, 238, 242, 243, 252.

⁴ Voznitsyn had no trouble because he was met on the border and thereafter escorted by Kazimierz Maskiewicz, who had been sent by Benedykt Sapieha, the treasurer of Lithuania, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, p. 10. When traveling in Poland, the Russian residents were most often escorted by Kazimierz Maskiewicz (Voznitsyn), Jan Lewiński (Volkov), Jan Wróblewski, Kazimierz Mokrzycki, Józef Zaleski (Mikhailov), and Jan Zakrzewski (Nikitin). It is therefore clear that escorts were not appointed ad hoc, but were chosen from among the “Russian experts” employed at court. Volkov to Golitsyn in two letters from Minsk and Warsaw in March and April of 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 2–4. Mikhailov did not get provisions on his arrival at the Polish border on 21 August 1691, but he was given an escort, Jan Wróblewski; TsGADA, f. 79, ms 242, pp. 3–8. Register of Nikitin’s activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, p. 15.

⁵ Register of Voznitsyn’s activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 9–26; Register of Mikhailov’s activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 3–36.

Polish resident Jerzy Dominik Dowmont in Moscow's ambassadorial palace were far more comfortable than those assigned to them in Warsaw.⁶

The personnel of the Russian mission to Poland was somewhat larger than that of other countries, a legacy of the times when ambassadors had arrived with sizable retinues. There were fifteen to thirty members of a resident's party, including the Russian merchants who usually accompanied them to Poland. Residents were usually assigned two assistant *d'iaki*, one of whom would report back to Moscow after the initial audience with the king, while the other would stay on as secretary of the chancery. In addition there were interpreters, officers, and servants.⁷ Despite repeated urging by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Patriarch Ioakim neglected to appoint a priest to the residents' entourage.⁸

Expenses for the residents' stay in Poland were covered by the Crown Treasury of Poland and the Treasury of Lithuania, with the former paying two-thirds of the expenses and the latter a third. Payment was in cash, though at times residents were given vouchers to be redeemed through the treasury. All financial matters were the domain of Franciszek Winkler, a secretary of the Crown Treasury.⁹

⁶ When in Warsaw, Voznitsyn resided at the home of Captain Barkiel on Leszno Street; Volkov obtained quarters on the same street. Mikhailov was accommodated at the Sapieha house on Warsaw's Old Square, while Nikitin rented a house in the Warsaw suburb of Praga. All housekeeping matters were handled by Polish officials, whose duties were the same as those of the Russian *pristavy*. Between 1687 and 1700, the men serving in this capacity were Jan Myśliszewski, Ivan Okrasa, and Kazimierz Skirut. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, p. 172, ms 238, p. 4 and ms 242, pp. 96–100.

⁷ Voznitsyn had assistant *d'iaki* and the translator Stepan Chyzhevskiy in his entourage of about twenty people. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 3–4, 28. Mikhailov was accompanied by (1) two assistant *d'iaki*, Afanasii Vasilev (later an informant for Dowmont) and Anisim Shchukin; 2) two courtiers, the chamberlain Prince Iakov Chegodaev and the cavalry captain Peter Johan Elanguzin. The number of servants was not listed, but a group of six soldiers and musketeers was provided. Register of Mikhailov's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 2–5, 87.

⁸ None of the Russian diplomats was accompanied by Orthodox priests from Moscow. Toward the end of his residency, Mikhailov hired an Orthodox priest from Lublin and installed him at his house in Warsaw. Orthodox nobility participated in Sunday services when visiting the capital for parliamentary sessions. Mikhailov's dispatches, 28 January 1695, TsGADA, fond 79, (Poland) ms 243, p. 1143. It seems that Bishop Simeon of Smolensk was asked to provide priests for residents in Poland, but he did not comply. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 4.

⁹ Residents received 12,000 Polish *złoty*s annually. Chancellor Ogiński to Sobieski, 4 June 1687, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw; hereafter AGAD), Archiwum

Volkov's notes concerning finances indicate that the treasuries of Poland and Lithuania adequately fulfilled their obligations towards the Russians. Indeed, compared with the problems Dowmont faced in Moscow, the Russians fared rather well in Warsaw. When the residents complained to their superiors, it was generally about the lack of funds for following the king to his estates in southeast Poland. The Poles refused to cover this expense on the grounds that Polish residents were forbidden to travel outside of Moscow. Long trips beyond Warsaw were covered by the Kremlin, which sent by special messenger the large sums of money needed.¹⁰

Residents also received additional money from Moscow for presents and bribes. Unlike the funds disbursed by the Polish treasury, those from Moscow came so irregularly that the residents often had to borrow money or sell their sables.¹¹ When the residents found themselves without financial resources, they could not carry out their instructions: in 1693, for example, Mikhailov did not attend a session of Parliament that took place in Harodna because he was not forwarded money to cover the costs of the trip to that city.¹²

Such financial problems not only impeded the residents' performance of their duties, but also affected the efficiency of the other members of the mission. In some cases, when residents remained in Poland longer than two years, staff members had to be sent home to Moscow or

Publiczne Potockich, ms 12, p. 417. See also the Register of Mikhailov's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 69, and ms 243, p. 653.

¹⁰ On 20 February 1693, Nikifor Ivanov arrived in Warsaw from Moscow with dispatches from the tsar and money for Mikhailov; TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 584–85. Mikhailov received additional funds on 24 July 1695 from Stefan Chasovnikov, a messenger sent expressly for that purpose; Mikhailov's dispatches, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 1218.

¹¹ Before their departure from Moscow all the ambassadors were given sable and other pelts to be used as gifts for dignitaries or rewards for services and information. When the supply was exhausted, the Department of Foreign Affairs usually complied with their requests for more, although with considerable delay due to the complicated procedure involved in securing new pelts. TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland in 1688, ms 4; Relations with Poland in 1689, ms 7; Relations with Poland in 1691, ms 4; Relations with Poland in 1696, ms 3. Sometimes the quality of the pelts was not the best. On one occasion, the postmaster of Warsaw, Kazimierz Bolstein returned two sable pelts offered to him by Mikhailov with a complaint about their shabbiness. Mikhailov's dispatches, 26 March 1693, TsGADA, fond 79, (Poland) ms 243, p. 611.

¹² Mikhailov's dispatches, February 1693, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 580.

Smolensk for lack of funds.¹³ Unpaid *strel'tsy* and servants often themselves decided to terminate their service by fleeing back to Russia or running away to seek employment elsewhere in Poland.

Of course, it is possible that the residents' constant grievances concerning money arose from a desire to enrich themselves while in the foreign service. Yet, if contemporary Polish reports are any indication, this probably was not the case, since Russian residents showed no signs of great wealth, and were reported to have unimpressive horses, carriages, and clothing.¹⁴

Faced with limited financial resources, Russian residents soon learned that the dishes sent to them by the king in conjunction with major religious holidays and royal celebrations played an important role in replenishing their depleted supplies of foodstuffs. All items received on such occasions were recorded, and a list was sent to the Department of Foreign Affairs. (These lists were compiled for the sake of comparison, that is, to ensure that both Moscow and Warsaw were spending equal amounts on gestures of hospitality.) These "dinners" were quite impressive. For instance, on 15 April 1693, Mikhailov received as part of his Easter greetings from the king a large kulich baked with berries and spices, a fifteen-bucket barrel of mead, sixteen buckets of beer, two pots (two gallons) of Hungarian wine and another two of table wine, two pots of "red" vodka, two pots of liqueur, half an ox, a pig, four sheep, six geese, ten capons, one hundred eggs, and fifty loaves of bread.¹⁵

One major expense not included in the budget drawn up by the Department of Foreign Affairs—yet burdensome for the residents—was the care and transportation of the residency's archives. These consisted of copies of reports sent to Moscow, a record of important events during each residency, a summary of incoming and outgoing correspondence, and copies of documents secured by clandestine means. Since much of the material gathered here was of a highly sensitive nature and in some cases even attested to Russia's acts of hostility against Poland, residents thought it important to protect these documents from theft or damage by the Poles. Safeguarding them was the main responsibility of the assistant

¹³ Mikhailov's dispatches, 23 December 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 551, 555.

¹⁴ The Diary of Kazimierz Sarnecki (16 February 1696) in K. Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego. Diariusz i relacje z lat 1691–1696* (Wrocław, 1958), p. 322.

¹⁵ Mikhailov's dispatches, May 1693, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 653.

d'iak; only he and the resident had access to the secret code used in corresponding with Moscow.¹⁶

Dispatches from the Residents

The residents' perception of the Commonwealth as reflected in their dispatches was similar to that of many Russian diplomats who had traveled before them to Poland-Lithuania. The reports they sent home were on the whole accurate, but their inside information on the king's plans often proved useless because they were routinely altered or rejected by Parliament. Thus Moscow was kept up to date with respect to the king's policies and was prepared to deal with them, but was often surprised by actual developments in political situations dictated by Parliament. The residents were very vague in their evaluations of that body, so much so that they even failed to comment on the statutes it ratified during their tenure in Poland-Lithuania.¹⁷ The residents knew that public opinion and the positions taken by county councils were important factors in the Commonwealth, but they clearly had difficulty analyzing them so as to predict their impact on the country's policy.

Not only the Commonwealth's foreign policy but also its military strategy and tactics were openly discussed and even frequently debated in the various county councils, in Parliament, and in the press. (A multitude of handbills, newsletters and pamphlets were often written on the issues surrounding the debates.) Bewildered by the openness of debate and unable to cope with the volume of conflicting views on military matters, the Russian residents either ignored the numerous viewpoints or assessed them only in passing, concentrating all the while on the king's position and that of his close collaborators. One can sympathize with them, for the outcome of each military campaign and battle waged by Poles and Lithuanians was interpreted differently by the various groups within the Commonwealth. For example, Sobieski's supporters heralded the Moldavian campaigns (1686, 1690) as victories, while his detractors decried them as abysmal failures. On the eve of

¹⁶ Register of Mikhailov's activities, January 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242 p. 109.

¹⁷ At best Russian residents secured for Moscow the minutes of parliamentary proceedings, not only without analysis but often without translation. TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland in 1688, ms 9; fond 79, Relations with Poland in 1690, mss 4 and 5; fond 79, Relations with Poland in 1699, ms 7.

those campaigns, senators close to Sobieski had informed the Russians that the Commonwealth was militarily well prepared to conduct them, while the king's opponents had on their part warned the residents that nothing would come of all the preparations. In the end, such conflicting information and interpretations, coupled with the Russians' inability to understand that disagreement with royal policy was permissible and legitimate in the Commonwealth, led residents to suspect the personal views offered them by senators, officials and senior military officers.¹⁸ The Russian diplomats' numerous dispatches convey the impression that sometimes—in spite of their rational knowledge that parliamentary opposition to the king did exist—the residents unconsciously suspected that they were the objects of a devious plot played out by all the Poles, orchestrated by the king, and designed to fool the Kremlin.

The first Russian resident in Poland, Vasilii Mikhailovich Tiapkin (1673–1677), was often perplexed by its political system. “There is no order here,” he wrote, “comparable with that which exists in Moscow, where the Tsar is like the sun. We obey only him, we fear only him and we serve no one but him . . . Here everyone is his own master, fearing no one—not the elected king, nor even his Maker.”¹⁹ Tiapkin evidently felt that the differences between the Commonwealth and Muscovy were rooted in the basically divergent approach of men in those states to God: the Russians venerated their Maker—and therefore His appointee on earth, the tsar, while the Poles refused God obedience and therefore disregarded their king, His representative. Implicit in Tiapkin's statement is his judgment of the Commonwealth as ungodly and of its citizens as immoral and blasphemous. His observations should not be dismissed as the aberration of an overly pious servant of the tsar; instead they should be viewed as the reflection of the age-old argument that absolutist states are superior to republican ones because they are truly

¹⁸ Voznitsyn expressed the mistrust well: “Khotia Poliaki govoriat chto u nas na Russi budto malo pravdy ia soviershenno priznaiu chto zdes' u nikh ei i znaku netu,” TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 243. Tiapkin wrote on the same topic in 1667: “It is very difficult to discern any truth here because these clever foxes use sweet and deceptive words.” A. Popov, *Russkoe posol'stvo*, p. 251.

¹⁹ Popov, *Russkoe posol'stvo*, p. 251. On Tiapkin's service, see, in addition to Popov, Belov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, pp. 38–44, 98–99; Z. Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674–1679* (Wrocław, 1976), pp. 32, 34–35, 83–85, 120, 143–49; R. O. Crummey, *Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–1689* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 42, 203.

legitimate, that is, they can trace the source and form of their government to the traditional ecclesiastical vision of an autocratic God ruling over His heavenly hierarchy.

Tiapkin obviously failed to comprehend that his Polish contemporaries agreed with Aristotle, Polybius, and Lipsius, among others, on the merits of a mixed form of government, or that they argued the “legitimacy” of their constitutional government on the basis of a different vision of Heaven. The sermons, religious hymns, paintings and poetry of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth depicted God as a kindly ruler reigning in perfect harmony with His heavenly senate, the Apostles and saints, and seeking to serve the welfare of His subjects. When His wrath was aroused by incorrigible sinners on earth, the saints interceded to soothe Him and to help avert any punishment that might befall the sinner. And just as each individual was believed to have a protector among the saints, so the Polish nobleman also maintained that the Blessed Virgin Mary was the patron of their *libertas*. Proclaimed officially as Queen of the Polish Crown, she was believed to act as the heavenly tribune of the people.²⁰

Clearly, the Polish ecclesiastical vision of God was that of a Supreme Authority who did not exercise His powers. Though it was argued that kings were God’s deputies on earth, the nobles of the Commonwealth never perceived their kings as having a power equal to that of the Heavenly King. Consequently, Polish kings found it difficult to define a role for themselves like that of the *Roi Soleil* or the tsar. Not only did their subjects not see themselves as satellites rotating around the person of the king, but they were so proud of their *libertas* that they abhorred the very idea.

For men like Tiapkin all this seemed to imply that the Commonwealth lacked the necessary basic order and harmony of good government and as a result was doomed to anarchy. They perceived the Commonwealth’s nobility as licentious and sinfully selfish. They could not understand that

²⁰ On the culture of the Polish szlachta, see S. Cynarski, “Sarmatyzm—ideologia i styl życia,” in *Polska XVII wieku. Państwo, społeczeństwo, kultura* (Warsaw, 1969), pp. 220–43; J. Tazbir, *Rzeczpospolita i świat. Studia z dziejów kultury XVII wieku* (Wrocław, 1971), pp. 110–15; idem, “Stosunek do obcych w dobie Baroku” in *Swojskość cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej* (Warsaw, 1973), pp. 80–112; H. Wisner, *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita. Szkice z dziejów Polski szlacheckiej XVI–XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1978), pp. 145–62; A. Zajaczkowski, *Główne elementy kultury szlacheckiej w Polsce. Ideologia a struktury społeczne* (Wrocław, 1961).

for the Polish apologists of the republican system, *libertas* was the greatest gift God had granted His Chosen Nation.²¹

The residents' main task was complicated by these problems of perception and comprehension. They were, after all, instructed to investigate whether the provisions of the Treaty of Eternal Peace were being observed by the Commonwealth and, in particular, whether the Poles had any plans for concluding a separate peace with Turkey or if they were, "God forbid," encouraging subversive activities among the Cossacks of the Sich and Don or among the Kalmyks residing on the Volga. Any actions constituting a threat to Russian interests were to be reported immediately.²² The Polish political system left even the well-informed outsider with plenty of room for serious error. When the residents were occasionally faced with attitudes plainly hostile to Russia, they recognized them and measured them against state policy as they understood it. For a true evaluation, they would have needed knowledge not only of the king's plans, but also those of his opposition. What is more, they lacked an understanding of public opinion and of the secret interaction of the various aristocrats and their coteries.

The four residents sent their reports to Moscow at regular intervals and at least every fortnight. The reports were eagerly awaited in Moscow. If they failed to arrive on time, the Department of Foreign Affairs demanded an explanation. Unlike Dowmont's dispatches to Warsaw, the reports sent by the Russian residents have been preserved in their entirety and comprise a vast accumulation of material. Mikhailov's reports and diaries alone total over two thousand pages and contain an impressive amount of information on Sobieski's policies.²³ What comes to the fore in these reports is the resident's amazing ability to penetrate the court and ferret out its secrets. On the other hand, there are enormous gaps in the subjects covered.

²¹ Bernard Connor, *The History of Poland in Several Letters to Persons of Quality, Giving an Account of the Present State of that Kingdom, Historical, Political, Physical and Ecclesiastical*, vol. 2 (London, 1698), p. 7. The love of *libertas* was a very essential part of the Sarmatian political culture of the Polish nobility. S. Cynarski, "Sarmatyzm," pp. 227–43.

²² See fn. 1, above.

²³ Instructions for Mikhailov, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland in 1691, ms 4; Relations with Poland in 1692, mss 3 and 4; Relations with Poland in 1693, mss 2 and 3; Relations with Poland in 1694, ms 2; Relations with Poland in 1695, ms 2 and 3; Mikhailov's dispatches, ms 243; Mikhailov's diary, ms 242.

Perhaps the most significant subject constantly ignored in the reports was the Commonwealth's constitutional system of government. The role of the Parliament and the county councils, the privileges held by the szlachta, the power of senators, the weaknesses and strengths of the king's position, the independence of the judicial system, the concept of rule by law, and the frequent appeals to the civic virtues of the citizenry were all omitted in the residents' reports or were referred to only by the words "anarchy," "selfishness," or "license." There was no attempt to move beyond these labels, although some residents were fully aware that the system somehow functioned. After all, the "anarchy-torn" Commonwealth had succeeded in achieving some incredible victories in the recent past. It had fended off the forces of Sweden, Brandenburg, Muscovy, Ukraine, and Transylvania. What is more, Sobieski's famous victory at Vienna (1683) had taken place a mere five years prior to Voznitsyn's appointment as resident. The obvious gaps in informing the Kremlin of the real state of political life are all the more surprising in the diaries of someone like Petr Andreevich Tolstoi, who had written a brilliant, accurate, and dispassionate description of early eighteenth-century Turkey, but when traveling through Poland confined himself to recording the condition of the roads, the number of brick buildings in the towns, the more notable churches, and the number of Jewish residents.²⁴

It would seem that the impact of *libertas* on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth—whether perceived as an illness, a threat, or a temptation—inhibited the Russian diplomats from writing about it. Moreover, descriptions of the Commonwealth's political system would have had to include an account of its republican institutions, which if not written with extreme care, could well have sounded subversive. Very rarely, casual remarks interjected in the reports indicate that the residents did indeed have some fundamental understanding of the realities of political life in the Commonwealth. For example, Mikhailov once noted in his report that Sobieski's plans were suspended because the county councils were still debating the issue. Volkov once unfavorably compared the Polish Senate to that of Venice. Voznitsyn on one occasion noted that

²⁴ Diary of Petr Andreevich Tolstoi, University of Kazan' Library, ms 4514, pp. 7–33. For an English translation, see: Max J. Okenfuss, *The Travel Diary of Peter Tolstoi* (DeKalb, IL, 1987), pp. 13–43.

Polish-Lithuanian aristocrats were using the poorer szlachta for their own selfish purposes, while pretending to support the principle of equality for all noblemen.

Rather than contribute more of these personal observations, the residents wrote very detailed descriptions of the court. Great effort was also put into describing various palaces, gardens, and triumphal arches, and into reviewing the plays performed at Jesuit theaters.²⁵ Still more was written about the alleged persecution of the Orthodox population by the Polish and Lithuanian Catholics, but such texts mostly centered on the various complaints of the Orthodox clergy and laity. There was no attempt to describe the situation of the Orthodox church in the Commonwealth,²⁶ or to explain the reasons for the sudden upsurge in conversions to the Uniate church after the metropolitan of Kiev had come under the control of the patriarch of Moscow in 1684. Also absent were any explanations for the close cultural links between Orthodox L'viv and Moldavia, or any account of the Orthodox system of schools. It is therefore not very surprising that matters of religion in general were not covered in the reports. Little was said about the Uniate church that went beyond a pejorative description of its hierarchs, and there were no references to the Lutheran or Catholic churches. Unconsciously reflecting the Commonwealth's atmosphere, the Russian residents seldom made mention of the religious affiliation of the people with whom they dealt. They failed to compile lists of the royal courtiers, officials, or members of Parliament who were of the Orthodox faith. They did, however, note—as if reciting what was expected of them—that occasionally they received support from people of the “Russian faith,” without ever giving concrete examples. The only Orthodox noblemen mentioned often in the dispatches were those who proved faithful to the Commonwealth and incorruptible—Okrasa and Buinovs'kyi, for example.²⁷

²⁵ Details about the king's attire for official audiences were given more space in the Russian diplomats' reports than was news about the debates of the szlachta local councils or Parliament meetings. Voznitsyn described triumphal arches and theater performances, and also commented on a concert given by the Vilnius orchestra for Sobieski. Register of Voznitsyn's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234.

²⁶ A manuscript compiling information about the fate of Orthodox Christians in Poland-Lithuania is, in fact, a summary of complaints, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 255, pp. 2–30.

²⁷ The Orthodox nobleman Iurii Popara as well as Vasyl' Krasyns'kyi and a certain

The Russian residents also had nothing to say about trade, even when it involved Russia. Obviously, they were not interested in the subject and the Kremlin had issued no instructions to them to take notice of such matters. They made no attempt to compare the commercial roles of Gdańsk and Arkhangel'sk, or to report any figures on grain, fur, or cattle exchanges. On two occasions, however, they did mention conflicts between the szlachta and the burghers, without a word about the legal status of the cities and the burghers.

Communications Problems

Although the residents were assigned liaison officers (Polish equivalents of the *pristavy*) responsible for conducting their relations with the court and chancery, any member of the opposition in Poland seeking direct access to foreign diplomats could approach them on his own.²⁸ The conversations that ensued on such occasions were not always rewarding.²⁹ Had the residents been permitted to defend their government's actions by pointing out the special circumstances behind them, the Poles would have found their behavior understandable. Instead, the Russians' stubborn disregard of any position straying from their instructions and their insistence "before God and the world" that the tsar always kept covenant often made a bad impression on all involved, all the more so since the Poles knew that the diplomats were repeating long-discredited versions of events. To prove its good will and fulfillment of the conditions of the peace, the Kremlin described its

Podil'skyi cooperated with the Russian residents and betrayed the Commonwealth. See fns. 43 and 51, below.

²⁸ During Sobieski's reign two consecutive grand hetmans of Lithuania—Kazimierz Pac (1663–1682) and Kazimierz Jan Sapieha (1682–1708)—led the opposition against the king and were in contact with the Russians. Hetman Sapieha and his brother Benedykt, the treasurer of Lithuania, declared on 24 April 1688, that they had the same enmity against Sobieski as the Pac family had had before them, and that like the Pac family they wanted tsarist support. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 62.

²⁹ Voznitsyn asked the Sapiehas many questions and promised to inform the Kremlin, but otherwise kept his distance. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 62. It is possible that the Russians' evasiveness toward the powerful Sapiehas was due not only to mistrust of that family's reliability, but also to a reluctance to offend Sobieski. At that time the Sapiehas had very good secret contacts with Vienna. K. Piwarski, *Miedzy Francją a Austrią. Z dziejów polityki Jana III Sobieskiego w latach 1687–1690* (Cracow, 1933), pp. 14–15, 41–42, 96–97.

military actions against the Tatars in 1690–1694 as heroic. But soon after, independent sources—Tatar prisoners-of-war, Cossacks, Muscovite merchants, and foreigners coming from Moscow—gave quite a different picture of the Russians' behavior. Instead of Homeric achievements, they reported military passivity relieved at best by border skirmishes. Faced with those accounts and accusations of deception, the Russian residents could only repeat what their instructions required them to say, thus precipitating anger and ridicule.³⁰

As long as the diplomats received frequent instructions and information from their government, they performed their duties fairly well, but when the Department failed to maintain contact with them, they fared poorly. Yet such breaks in communication were far from rare. Unhappy residents sometimes waited for months at a time for news from home. Their frustration was well captured by Tiapkin, who queried, "What is the use of this residency when I have to remain mute? Whatever they ask me I cannot answer because I do not have an answer and I cannot lie."³¹ Volkov reported similar frustrations just after the coup of 1689 in Russia. Summoned by Sobieski, who had just received news from Moscow, Volkov, who had had no news from the department for four months, was unable to answer any of the king's questions. Feeling harassed, Volkov found himself in the situation of having to ask the king whether or not the change in Moscow occurred "with the consent of the Tsars Peter and Ivan."³² When informed that Peter and Ivan were still tsars, he assured his Polish listeners that there was no cause for concern about the shift in power since it was "in keeping with the tsars' will."³³ Clearly, the explanation failed to inform Sobieski as to what he could expect from the leaders of the coup who had proved powerful enough not only to topple Sophia and Golitsyn, but to expel the Jesuits from Moscow.

³⁰ Many senators wanted to terminate the Russian residency once they realized that the Muscovite diplomats were completely bound by instructions and forbidden to act on their own initiative. Register of Voznitsyn's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 38–42.

³¹ Popov, *Russkoe posol'stvo*, p. 257.

³² On 26 October 1689, Ivan Okrasa, on behalf of King Sobieski, quizzed Volkov about changes in Moscow; TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, p. 266.

³³ Ibid.

Gathering Information

While personal contacts and conversations with the Polish political elite were problematic, the collection of information was made easier for the Russian residents because they were permitted to hire Polish citizens as secretaries, courtiers, or servants—a practice unheard of in Moscow. Besides the services provided by these people, and excluding official meetings with the king, senators, or royal delegates, the residents could rely on eight other sources for information.

Conversations with Officials

Polish officials often exchanged views with Russian residents as they would with their fellow countrymen, forgetting that the Russians were agents of a foreign government. Some Poles even took stands on issues about which they knew very little, provoked by “information” supplied them by the Russian residents. In one instance poor judgment in Russian-fed information nearly caused Dowmont to be recalled from Moscow. Apparently, the Russians had spread rumors that Dowmont was sabotaging the Polish-Russian treaty agreements. Polish nobles who supported Poland’s participation in the Holy Alliance and its good relations with Russia quickly reacted to these Russian-spread rumors by condemning the supposed actions of their king and his envoy in Moscow, and by asserting that as guardians of the Commonwealth they would not tolerate such misbehavior. Even the king’s supporters, who were defending his intentions, promised that the Polish resident in Moscow would be told to desist from such actions and that peace with Russia would be maintained.³⁴ Eventually most Polish officials realized that they had been duped, that the information they had received from the Russians was inaccurate, and that the accusation against Dowmont was false. But the harm had already been done. In their zealously, some of

³⁴ Sobieski informed Dowmont about the campaign against him in two letters written in April and May of 1688; Biblioteka Muzeum im. Ks. Czartoryskich (Cracow; hereafter B. Czart), ms 422, pp. 340, 370–73. See also: Voznitsyn’s dispatches, April, May, and June 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, pp. 62, 72, 76–77; Voznitsyn’s conversations with Hetman Jabłonowski, September and December 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, pp. 163, 197. Benedykt Sapieha communicated to Voznitsyn news of the Lithuanian army’s lack of preparedness, May 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 368.

these Polish senators had volunteered too much information to the Russians about the nature of Poland's immediate and long-term foreign policy priorities. (In the process some had lost the respect of the Russians. Such was the case with Dominik Radziwiłł, vice-chancellor of Lithuania, who was "deeply concerned" by Dowmont's behavior, and whom Voznitsyn later described as "cowardly and incapable of doing much of anything.")³⁵

Parliamentary Records, Newsletters and Polemical Literature

Although readily available to the Russian residents, these sources provided information that proved too difficult for the residents to analyze. Often copies were simply sent to Moscow and stored for possible further use.

The Lithuanian Opposition to the Court

During the second half of the seventeenth century the Lithuanian opposition to Sobieski had a tradition of maintaining close relations with the Kremlin. According to Voznitsyn, of all the members of this group Marcjan Ogiński, the grand chancellor of Lithuania, was the staunchest proponent of Moscow's interests.³⁶ Voznitsyn was somewhat less enthusiastic about the leaders of this opposition, i.e., the Sapiehas. For example, commenting on Lithuanian Grand Hetman Kazimierz Jan Sapieha, he wrote that his commitment to Russian interests did not equal that of his predecessor Michał Pac; as for Benedykt Sapieha, treasurer of Lithuania, he found him too volatile to be trusted.³⁷ In general, Voznitsyn mistrusted all the Sapiehas, judging them to be too weak for open confrontation with the king and therefore suspect of trying to reach some form of compromise with the royal court. Consequently, he questioned their motives and tended to react coolly to their overtures and promises of continuing the policies of Michał Pac, "who had also disagreed with

³⁵ Voznitsyn's dispatches, April 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 49.

³⁶ "K storone Tsarskogo Velichestva dobrozhelatel'nyi odin byl kancler litovskii i to zabolet i poekhal do Teplits"; Voznitsyn's Dispatches, April 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 49.

³⁷ Voznitsyn's dispatches, April, May, and June, 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, pp. 49–52, 62, 79.

the king and had found his main source of support to be the tsar, something they, too, hoped for by continuing to be the tsar's friends."³⁸

Indeed, the Sapiehas were using their contacts with Moscow as leverage in their own fight with the king. Thus, through the intermediacy of their own resident at Sobieski's court, Kazimierz Kałuszewski,³⁹ they supplied Volkov with information calculated to undermine Russian confidence in the king and to embroil him in conflict with Moscow. But above all they endeavored to frustrate royal plans for a separate peace with Turkey. Despite ample evidence of their collusion with the Russians, there is no indication that the Sapiehas went so far as to show the residents copies of secret letters to the king from the khan or of instructions issued to Polish diplomats abroad; nor is there any evidence that they divulged highly confidential information—an act that would have been considered treason by even the most lax Parliament.

Foreign Diplomats Stationed in Poland

All four Russian residents serving during this period maintained very close contact with Ambassador Hans Christoph Zierovsky, the Austrian resident, and with his colleague Georg von Schiemunsky. They reported all conversations with the Austrians in monthly and sometimes weekly letters to Moscow. According to these sources, the material passed on by the Austrians included rumors about Sobieski's negotiations with the Turks, reports of Polish contacts with French diplomats, and information about any plans by the opposition that might need Russian assistance and support.

Relations between representatives of Moscow and Vienna were generally very cordial, and remained so even in the face of such setbacks as, on the one hand, Moscow's expulsion of the Jesuits from its domain and of the offensive against the Tatars and, on the other hand, Austria's signing of a separate peace treaty with Turkey without consulting Russia. The Viennese representative even once proposed that the Russian resident join him in drawing up a secret agreement between their two countries

³⁸ Voznitsyn's dispatches, May 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 62. See also fns. 28 and 29.

³⁹ Volkov's dispatches, July 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, p. 107. Mikhailov's dispatches, November 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 509. Register of Mikhailov's activities, June and August 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 416, 779–80.

threatening military action if Sobieski left the anti-Turkish coalition.⁴⁰

Besides the Austrians, the Russian residents also approached papal nuncio Opisio Pallavicini and Girolamo Alberti, the long-time representative from Venice. Although their relations with the two men were courteous and beneficial—the Russian residents gathered information from them concerning European-Polish relations and politics—these contacts never took the form of a conspiracy against Poland.⁴¹

French, Prussian, Swedish, and Danish residents were not of prime interest to the Russians, who preferred instead to meet with representatives of the hospodar of Moldavia and Muntenia, since they had ample information to offer about Polish military actions in Moldavia and Polish contacts with the Tatars and Turks.⁴²

The Orthodox Community of L'viv

The Orthodox community in the Commonwealth offered the Russian residents many of the same benefits that the German Sloboda offered the Polish resident in Moscow. With its strong stauropegial fraternity and its printing offices producing books not only for the local population but for Ukraine and Moldavia, L'viv of that period was the main center of Ruthenian culture and learning. It offered the residents, who spent about five or six months of each year there, a familiar culture and comforting surroundings, in addition to the opportunity to establish contacts with various Orthodox diplomats (Moldavian and Wallachian), clerics from

⁴⁰ Practically all the dispatches sent by the Russian diplomats from Poland carried some information provided by the Austrians. Vienna lobbied particularly hard for Russian cooperation vis-à-vis Poland during the interregnum following the death of Sobieski (see chap. 8). At least one Austrian resident in Poland, von Schiemunsky, had to allay his Russian colleague's fears concerning Sobieski's contacts with the Tatars. Register of Mikhailov's activities, 20 July 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 235.

⁴¹ The Russian diplomats, with the sole exception of Voznitsyn, neither recorded changes of nuncios nor provided their names. In contrast to the papal nuncios, the French diplomats were described as evil. They were François Marquis de Bethune (1684–1692), Du Theil (1689–1690), Jean Baluze (1692), Robert Esneval (1692–1693), and Melchior de Polignac (1696–1697).

⁴² Contacts between Mikhailov and the Moldavian representative Diamandi Sluzari, who resided at Sobieski's court for fifteen years; Register of Mikhailov's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 174, 408. Mikhailov's dispatches, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 785. Contacts of the same diplomat with the Wallachian diplomat Iurița Totescu, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 1004, 1009–1010. In spite of the fact that the Swedish resident van der Fled, who had lived in Poland from 1667, proposed close cooperation,

Turkey traveling to attend religious services at the Orthodox church in L'viv, and merchants and members of the gentry.

For its part, the stauropegial fraternity felt threatened by the growth of the Uniate church and by the clandestine adherence to that church of Bishop Shumlians'kyi of L'viv; thus they considered the tsar its protector and welcomed his representatives. After all, the Russian residents were helpful in passing on the complaints of Orthodox citizens of the Commonwealth against the Catholics, as well as requests for the tsar's intervention on their behalf with the authorities in Warsaw.⁴³

Most of the members of the Orthodox community maintained purely social contacts with the Russian residents and remained faithful to the Commonwealth. While they may have expected the tsar to pressure the king into a more favorable policy toward the Orthodox, none of them ever suggested that Ukraine be ceded to Moscow and placed under the direct protectorate of the tsar. Yet some Orthodox citizens, feeling undeniably close to the Russian residents, did unwittingly reveal important information. Such information was given to the Russians during their stay in L'viv by the father-in-law of Zakharii Buinovs'kyi, the principal secret negotiator with the Crimean Tatars. The residents pursued Buinovs'kyi in the hopes of luring him into divulging some information concerning the negotiations. When this tactic failed, they decided to track his movements, going on the assumption that Buinovs'kyi's absence from L'viv meant that Polish-Tatar negotiations had resumed. They proceeded to monitor his whereabouts by befriending Buinovs'kyi's

Moscow did not advise that the relationship be continued, Mikhailov's dispatches, 4 June 1693, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 755–57

⁴³ The peace treaty of 1686 granted protection to the Orthodox population of the Commonwealth and to Catholics in Russia. From the numerous complaints filed by the Russian envoys in Poland, the Department of Foreign Affairs prepared a bulky manuscript citing all Polish breaches of that treaty. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 255. The most vehement denunciations of Bishop Shumlians'kyi were received on 25 June 1692 from Iurii Popara, an Orthodox nobleman. He was a native Greek who had made a successful career in Poland and was granted a patent of nobility. Popara, who had once served Sergei Artamonovich Matveev as a secret Polish agent, now decided to warn Moscow about Shumlians'kyi. He claimed that the bishop had secretly become a Uniate. He also delivered a list of churches and monasteries transferred from Orthodox to Uniate hands. Register of Mikhailov's activities, June 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 177–81. An anonymous Orthodox monk from L'viv advised Mikhailov to press for ratification of the 1686 treaty as the only way to legalize the protection offered the church under that same treaty, Mikhailov's dispatches, November 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 53.

father-in-law, who unwittingly provided them with information concerning his son-in-law's trips to the Crimea and Adrianople, and the purpose behind them—that is, negotiations with Moldavia or with Bakhchesarai.⁴⁴ However, try as they might, they were never able to get hold of the king's instructions to Buinovs'kyi or the latter's reports about his missions.

The Cossacks

After Moscow took possession of East-Bank Ukraine, the hetmans of the Ukrainian Cossacks became responsible for keeping the tsars abreast of developments in Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, the Crimea, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Obviously, the hetmans could and did use their reports to influence Moscow's foreign policy for their own benefit. Hetman Samoilovych, for example, used his reports to spread anti-Polish sentiment in Moscow, while his successor Mazepa preferred to advocate cooperation with Poland in fighting the Crimea and Turkey.

The personnel serving the Ukrainian hetmans were extremely well qualified to assess the East European situation; the Kremlin consequently often combined these Ukrainians with Russian diplomats or agents to form teams assigned to monitor Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania. Such combined teams were never used, however, within the territories of the Commonwealth, which indicates to what degree the Kremlin distrusted Ukrainians once they came into contact with the Poles. Some exchange of information between Russian residents and Cossacks traveling on official business to Poland did take place, but these were not routine. When they did occur, the exchanges often produced much valuable information for the Russians.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Register of Mikhailov's activities, July 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 197, 231. Mikhailov's dispatches, April 1694, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 1052.

⁴⁵ On Mazepa's foreign contacts, see O. Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba* (New York, 1960), pp. 41–64, 163–220. For a good, concise biography of Mazepa and a list of recent publications, see: Wiesław Majewski, "Jan (Ivan) Mazepa" in *Polski słownik biograficzny*, vol. 20 (Cracow, 1939–1946), pp. 294–99. Jan Wojnarowski, judge of Kiev Palatinate and Mazepa's brother-in-law, visited Mikhailov on 2 February 1692. Wojnarowski came with his four sons, all of whom were serving in the Polish army. The brother of Zachariasz Wisłocki, one of the best Polish agents and specialists in eastern policy, was employed in Mazepa's personal service. Register of Mikhailov's activities, TsGADA, fond 79. Ms 242, pp. 130–31, 231.

Hired agents

Agents working for the Russians were recruited from among the Orthodox and Catholic locals. Most of them were never exposed, and those who were, were never prosecuted or punished. During the period under discussion, the leading agent was Ivan Tarnavs'kyi, an Orthodox nobleman recruited by Voznitsyn. Tarnavs'kyi performed the official duties of a Polish translator and scribe for the Russian residents; his actual activities, however, were much broader. In addition to collecting official publications, such as royal instructions to the county councils and legislative documents and proclamations, Tarnavs'kyi also gathered information about Senate meetings and the views of various ministers. Furthermore, he cultivated acquaintances with royal courtiers, introducing them later to the Russian residents in the hope that such contacts would pay off. At times he even recruited new agents. As a member of the Polish nobility, Tarnavs'kyi had access to local county council meetings and participated in convivial conversations with many politicians and court attendants. As a result, he was able to garner valuable information for the Russians and helped them to comprehend changes in public opinion.⁴⁶

The royal court was well aware of Tarnavs'kyi's treachery. An angry and frustrated Ivan Okrasa referred to Tarnavs'kyi as an "s.o.b." and on occasion the royal dragoons threatened him with a thrashing. But Tarnavs'kyi was not distressed by this displeasure, nor did he worry about crossing the king. He had already made plans for a new career in Russia and had directed his sight toward that country. Once his term of service for Mikhailov was completed, Tarnavs'kyi left for Moscow. With recommendations from his Russian employers as well as a letter from his uncle, a prior at one of the Orthodox monasteries, he was greeted in Moscow with gifts of sable pelts and assigned the position of translator in the Department of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁷

The names of hired agents were rarely recorded. Often residents simply noted "I bought a letter written by Dowmont in code from one of Szczuka's secretaries,"⁴⁸ or "one of the secretaries sold me a copy of a

⁴⁶ Official papers concerning Ivan Tarnavs'kyi's visit to Moscow in 1695, TsGADA fond 52, Relations with Greece in 1695, ms 1.

⁴⁷ Ibid. See also TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 110.

⁴⁸ Mikhailov's dispatches, May 1693, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 710, 723.

letter from the Khan.”⁴⁹ Even the names of frequent contacts were seldom mentioned, except in cases where the information was so vital that the source had to be identified. Such was the case of a certain Podil’skyi, an Orthodox nobleman and king’s courtier, who first informed Volkov of Sobieski’s secret Ukrainian policy. Not only did Podil’skyi supply the Russians with the names of Polish agents sent to Ukraine and the Crimea, but he also furnished the dates of their departure. Moreover, Podil’skyi reported discussions at secret meetings attended only by the king, Matczyński, Shumlianskyi, Jabłonowski, and the queen. Since he was privy to such conversations, it is likely that Podil’skyi served at the royal court as the king’s personal attendant.⁵⁰ He remained active throughout the residency of Volkov and Mikhailov, which proves that the royal court remained unaware of his role.

Other known agents were Aleksandrowicz, a lieutenant in Hetman Jabłonowski’s hussar detachment who not only informed the Russian residents about Jabłonowski’s activities and political views, but also gave them excerpts from the hetman’s diary concerning the Moldavian expedition; and Vasyl’ Krasynskyi, a royal servant who maintained contact with the residents.⁵¹ While a small number of Sobieski’s courtiers were disloyal to him and the Commonwealth, Russians employed in Poland-Lithuania were not necessarily agents of the Kremlin. For example, Afanasii Trusmeiskii, a painter of frescoes in an Orthodox church in Vilnius, returned to Russia in 1688 without ever having spoken with Voznitsyn; another painter, Mikhail Semenov, employed at Sobieski’s court, supplied the residents only with such information as could easily have been obtained from other sources.⁵²

⁴⁹ Register of Mikhailov’s activities, July 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 193.

⁵⁰ Volkov’s dispatches, December 1689 and January 1690, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 337–38, 355–56.

⁵¹ Vasyl’ Krasynskyi was, like Podil’skyi, an Orthodox nobleman in Sobieski’s court. Also like Podil’skyi, he was rarely mentioned by name. The Russian residents usually referred to information as given to them by “Orthodox courtiers favorable to our side.” After the Solomon affair (see chap. 6), Podil’skyi is never mentioned again, whereas Krasynskyi’s name turns up until 1695. Register of Mikhailov’s activities, June 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 143, 148. Mikhailov’s dispatches, March–June 1693, May 1695, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 622–23, 653, 789, 1190–91. Register of Mikhailov’s activities, June 1696, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 30.

⁵² Voznitsyn’s diary, May 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, p. 171. Nikityn’s dispatches, June 1696, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 24, 30.

Eavesdropping

A peculiar but effective method employed by the Russians to gather information was to pretend ignorance of foreign languages. They frequently did so at official meetings with Polish senators. During these meetings the senators consulted one another in Latin, Italian or French. Sobieski, often hidden behind a curtain, also interjected his opinions, which were reported to the senators by Szczuka in Latin or Italian.

Since some of the Russian diplomats were multilingual, they understood full well what was being said but pretended ignorance. Only Volkov, who did not know even Latin, often complained about the badly-mannered Poles who switched to different languages in his presence. His frequent complaints did not make up for his superiors' disappointment at not being kept abreast of such veiled conversations.⁵³ Mikhailov, on the other hand, had a good command of languages and usually sat quietly through such sessions, listening discreetly to the various exchanges. He later reported all that he had heard, noting precisely what was said in Polish and what comments or private asides were added in Latin or Italian. It took some time, but the senators eventually realized that Mikhailov understood everything that was being said in Latin and therefore switched to Italian, making it more difficult but not impossible for him to understand. It should be noted that on one occasion Mikhailov even reported the content of a conversation between senators held entirely in French.⁵⁴

Mikhailov's assistant also perfected their eavesdropping technique. Especially adept was Prince Iakov Fedorovich Chegodaev, a descendant of a prominent Crimean Tatar family who accompanied Mikhailov to Poland with the state rank of chamberlain. Chegodaev overheard fragments of a conversation between the Tatar envoy Dervish Kazy and Poland's Hetman Jabłonowski in which they discussed the advantages of a joint attack against Moscow.⁵⁵ Later, acting on orders from

⁵³ Volkov's dispatches, October 1689, TsGADA, f. 79, ms 238, pp. 239–50.

⁵⁴ Mikhailov's dispatches, May 1693, March 1694, May 1695, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 733, 742–43, 1030, 1184.

⁵⁵ Mikhailov's dispatches, October 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 453–54. Dervish Kazy was very kind to Chegodaev, whose cousins were high-ranking dignitaries in the Crimea, Mikhailov's dispatches, October 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 493–96. Dowmont was stunned when he was asked by Ukraintsev to explain the secret

Mikhailov, Chegodaev established close contact with the Tatar envoy and succeeded in making him doubt Poland's ability to participate successfully in such an attack. Thanks to Chegodaev's efforts, Mikhailov was able to learn more about Sobieski's secret ties with the Crimea than had any of his predecessors.

Mikhailov also planted a good informant, Peter Johan Elanguzin, at the German-speaking court of Elizabeth of Neuburg, wife of Crown Prince Jakub Sobieski. Mikhailov instructed Elanguzin, a cavalry captain in the tsar's service, to establish contact with his countrymen in Warsaw and to frequent the court of Prince Jakub, so as to record the reports made by Austrian ambassador Kurtz, who had just returned from Russia (1691).⁵⁶

The Residents' Influence on Policy Makers in the Kremlin

The impact of Russian residents in Poland on Russian foreign policy in general and on relations with Poland-Lithuania in particular is uncertain because there is no information about how the Kremlin appraised their reports. Prokofii Bogdanovich Voznitsyn, who belonged to Peter I's inner circle of favorites,⁵⁷ had a good sense of the situation in Poland even though his term of residency was relatively brief. His reports were factual and to the point; he did not shy away from expressing his own opinions in them, but even suggested lines of further action. He fully appreciated the importance of the Orthodox community in Poland and believed that it could be developed into a pressure group that could steer Polish policy in a direction favorable to Moscow. He thus advocated closer cooperation between Moscow and the stauropegial fraternities.⁵⁸

conversations held in Tatar between Jabłonowski and Dervish Kazy; TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 148, 154–56.

⁵⁶ Register of Mikhailov's activities, November 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 47.

⁵⁷ M. M. Bogoslavskii, *Petr I. Materialy dlia bibliografii*, vol. 3 (Leningrad, 1946), pp. 342–45, 383–453. The Russians' difficult position at Karlovice vis-à-vis the Austrians and the Turks did not escape the attention of the English diplomats in Turkey and Vienna. Dispatches of Lord Thomas Paget and Sir Robert Sutton, 9 May 1698, 26 January 1699, Public Record Office (London) State papers (hereafter PRO, SP), fond 97 (Turkey), ms 21, pp. 16, 37, 45, 55. Robert Sutton's dispatches from Vienna, 15 February 1698, 30 January 1699, PRO, SP, fond 80 (Germany), ms 17, pp. 423, 455.

⁵⁸ Voznitsyn's dispatches, 6 August 1688, 6 September 1688, 7 December 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, pp. 130, 137, 203.

Voznitsyn's arguments on the importance of the Orthodox community beyond the confines of Russia applied beyond the Commonwealth. For example, he also maintained that Russia's entry into the Balkans could be facilitated by seeking the aid of the Orthodox population within the Ottoman empire. Clearly, like the Greek, Serbian, Wallachian, and Moldavian Orthodox church hierarchies, Voznitsyn feared the consequences of a Catholic liberation of Balkan Orthodox Christians from Turkish captivity. Echoes of his argument could be heard in the debates of the Karlovice Congress (1699) that ended the war with Turkey. He wanted to strengthen the Orthodox church in Poland-Lithuania and keep Bishop Shumlians'kyi of L'viv, who was then feuding with Iasyn's'kyi, the metropolitan of Kiev, within the Orthodox fold, away from the Uniate Catholic church.⁵⁹

Apart from his interest in stronger ties with the Orthodox community, Voznitsyn also advocated closer contacts with the Lithuanian opposition. Moreover, as noted, he was responsible for hiring Ivan Tarnavs'kyi. He established the channels of communication between the Russian residents in Poland and the Russian diplomats and secret agents on ad hoc missions to Central Europe.⁶⁰ Finally, he laid the ground rules of conduct for future residents to Poland, thus assuring them of the benefits and privileges that he had secured for himself. The most important of these was the right to accompany the king on his annual visit to southeastern Poland.

Voznitsyn's successor was Ivan Mikhailovich Volkov, probably the least successful Russian diplomat in Poland during the last years of the century. Volkov had a remarkable talent for antagonizing people. Dowmont considered him his personal enemy, Tarnavs'kyi saw him as his dishonest employer, Szczuka thought him an oaf, and Okrasa disliked talking with him. Volkov simply fitted the stereotype of a rude and barbarous Muscovite and continued to behave in Poland as he would

⁵⁹ Voznitsyn's dispatches, 5 August 1688, 16 September 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, pp. 130, 137.

⁶⁰ The superior position of Russian ambassadors in Warsaw over that of Russian diplomats and agents working in Central Europe is clear from the tsar's instructions to Voznitsyn. Tsar to Voznitsyn, 19 October 1688, TsGADA, fond 52, (Greece), ms 11, pp. 83–84. See also Voznitsyn's dispatches, 18 and 25 November 1688, 1 and 13 January and 17 February 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, pp. 182, 189, 206, 243, 280. On the hiring of Ivan Tarnavs'kyi, see Voznitsyn's register, 29 March 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, p. 113.

have in Russia. He talked to Polish senators and officials as if he expected them to understand and share the views of Muscovite bureaucracy. He insisted on monotonously repeating tales of great Russian victories which had never taken place.⁶¹ While he was convinced that he was serving his master perfectly, everyone around him regarded him as a clumsy and brazen liar.

Volkov's reports were much inferior to Voznitsyn's. Afraid to voice his own opinions, he never offered his advice on any subject. He even refrained from analyzing the conversations he reported, confining himself to verbatim accounts. To avoid any responsibility for his reports, he always noted that the information in them was hearsay and therefore unverifiable. According to him, all his sources—the royal court, the anti-royal opposition, the szlachta, the burghers, the Jews, the dragoons, the Orthodox monks, and the Cossacks—were liars.⁶² It must be noted, however, that Volkov's paranoia and jaundiced views were exceptional. Failing to understand the different customs and standards, Volkov felt totally alien in Poland. His misery and fear, and his hostility toward everything Polish, permeated the text and tone of his reports to the degree that the Commonwealth appeared as an enemy always plotting devious attacks on Russia. Anyone reading only Volkov's dispatches would have to conclude that Sobieski and the Polish nobility—indeed the entire nation—expended thought and effort on nothing other than scheming against the tsar and Russia.

Volkov's absurdly distorted picture of Poland-Lithuania is not particularly interesting in and of itself: what does merit attention is the response to it by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Clearly, the department and the Boyar Council did not base their policy decisions on Volkov's reports. Had they done so they would have disengaged from the war with Turkey and prepared for war with Poland. As it happened, the resident's dispatches did cause some concern in Moscow, but failed to provoke any drastic responses or policy shifts. In fact, a more balanced perspective on the international situation prevailed in Moscow, despite Volkov's dour diagnoses.

⁶¹ This tactic typically was in evidence during negotiations with the senators in October of 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 229–50.

⁶² Volkov suspected Podil'skyi of being a Polish *agent provocateur* sent to discredit Mazepa. Volkov's dispatches, 26 December 1689, 4 January 1690, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 337–38.

Of course, the inaccuracy of Volkov's reports from the Polish side is readily evident. For example, one only has to examine the records of Senate council meetings and count the number of times and in what context Russian issues were discussed there to see how unbalanced his accounts were. One can also count the number of contemporary publications concerned with Russian problems and the lines devoted to this subject in the broadsheets of the period. Finally, one can peruse the fairly substantial—and still extant—minutes of the local county councils to see how often, if ever, the Russian problem was debated among the citizens and put to the vote. All the findings of such investigations disprove the picture presented by Volkov. Had Volkov taken the information he was given by informers, or the rumors he had heard, and evaluated them against the general background of Commonwealth politics, he would have had a more realistic assessment of the weight of the Russian issue in Sobieski's foreign policy and in the agendas of Parliament and the *Senatus Consilium*.

Assessing the department's appraisal of Volkov and his reports, however, is difficult since we have no data to support it. What we do know is that Volkov's successor, Mikhailov, did not think highly of him, while the Naryshkins approved of him primarily because he uncovered news of a secret Polish mission to the Cossack hetman Mazepa and thus enabled the Russians to arrest the Polish agent sent by Sobieski to Ukraine.

Boris Mikhailovich Mikhailov, the third resident during this period, did not like Poles, but was not paranoid about them. Although his dispatches showed less independent opinion than Voznitsyn's, they were not confined to simple recording of data as Volkov's reports had been. Mikhailov allowed himself an occasional comment on an informant's credibility or on the accuracy of his information. Furthermore, he was more adept at forging personal relations than Volkov had been and was known to use humor to ease tensions during difficult negotiations. Though he never shied away from controversy, he seldom permitted differences of opinion to degenerate into personal animosity.

Mikhailov's accounts of conversations with the Polish diplomat Okrasa convey the sense of seasoned professionals dealing with one another with respect, perhaps even sympathy, but nevertheless aptly carrying out their orders. After a while, each knew what the other would say next. Nevertheless, each maintained a straight face throughout the game. On occasion, however, after they had leveled the usual charges

against each other and riposted with the proper rebuttals, Okrasa could no longer contain himself and would burst into laughter in answer to a particularly apt response by the Russian. Our record of the conversation breaks off at this point, probably because the Russian and Polish diplomats allowed themselves a friendly moment of unofficial conversation.⁶³ It is regrettable that Mikhailov's weekly reports do not reflect the humor and personal aspects of his stay in Poland—all the more since he seems never to have written his memoirs.

Mikhailov often concluded his reports to Moscow with a summation of the views of Girolamo Alberti, the Venetian resident. Alberti, who had lived in Poland for over thirty years, was a man thoroughly familiar with the political scene and inclined to minimize rather than exaggerate the importance of the vagaries of public opinion among the nobility and the meanderings of royal policy. He maintained that no drastic changes affecting the Commonwealth's continued participation in the anti-Turkish coalition were forthcoming, that is, until the Poles seized Kam'ianets'. In all probability, Mikhailov cited Alberti's opinions because they closely resembled his own.⁶⁴

Mikhailov worked hard and well at his task. His most notable professional achievement was uncovering Sobieski's secret contacts with the Tatars. Yet, after five years in Warsaw, he began to complain that his personal affairs suffered in his absence, and that his wife—left alone in Russia—could not fend off the depredations of his landowning neighbors. Tired of his long stay, he sent numerous entreaties asking to be recalled.⁶⁵ To his dismay, his petitions were ignored. Apparently the Department of Foreign Affairs feared that if Russia pulled out its resident soon after Sobieski had recalled Dowmont to Warsaw the Poles might choose not to accredit his replacement and would terminate the reestablished exchange of diplomatic embassies. Once the Azov expeditions had rekindled Poland's interest in contacts with Russia, however, Moscow felt safe about recalling Mikhailov and did so.

⁶³ Register of Mikhailov's activities, 3 July 1691, 9 January 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 93, 184.

⁶⁴ Register of Mikhailov's activities, 24 July 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 234–35; Mikhailov's dispatches, 13 November and 3 December 1692, 26 April and 28 June 1695, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 523, 552, 1162, 1214.

⁶⁵ Mikhailov's dispatches, 14 May 1695, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 1203.

The man who followed Mikhailov as resident to Warsaw was Aleksei Vasil'evich Nikitin, a *d'iak* in the Department of Foreign Affairs who had military experience and held the rank of *stol'nik*. He actually looked forward to living in Poland and wanted his entire family to accompany him to Warsaw. The tsar's order precluded such an extravagance and only his sons were permitted to travel to the West. Upon their arrival, Nikitin enrolled them in a Jesuit college and was very proud of their education. He was particularly happy that his sons acquired oratorical skills and a good command of both Polish and Latin. Nikitin wrote to his superiors in Moscow that the Jesuit school was an ideal place for his sons to make contact with the children of Polish aristocrats and thereby secure confidential information. One can only add that in the thousands of pages of his reports there are only two instances when he offered information "gathered" by his sons, and that was altogether banal.⁶⁶

Nikitin modeled his way of life on that of Jerzy Dowmont and other foreign residents whom he had known in Moscow and Warsaw. Perfectly at ease among the Polish szlachta, he sought out their company, arranged frequent banquets in his house in Warsaw, and eagerly accepted invitations to various social events. While his predecessors kept a low profile, Nikitin worked at attracting attention to himself, going so far as to place cannons in front of his home and ordering that they be fired whenever there was news of a Russian victory.⁶⁷

Following the example set by Voznitsyn, Nikitin strongly supported cooperation with the Orthodox communities in the Commonwealth, and established a center for Orthodox life in Warsaw by installing an Orthodox chapel in his house where services were conducted by a monk invited from Kiev. The chapel was designed to attract Orthodox szlachta arriving in Warsaw for sessions of Parliament or on business. Yet the highlight of Nikitin's residency was his presence at the election of Sobieski's successor, and his active support of the new king, August, in his fight with the pro-French opposition.

⁶⁶ Nikitin's dispatches, 17 December 1696, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, p. 130. Nikitin's letters to Ukraintsev, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland in 1696, ms 4.

⁶⁷ Nikitin's dispatches, 10 September 1696, TsGADA, fond 79, MS 252, pp. 79–80.

Evaluation of the Russian Residents

The picture of Poland drawn by the residents in their dispatches fills thousands of pages, but, as we have seen, it is woefully incomplete. That is not to say that Dowmont's picture of Russia was much more comprehensive. Both sides presented fragmentary descriptions and failed to provide a broad background for the political events on which they focused their attention. Instead, the reports resembled news digests compiled over a period of years in which only disasters and tragic events are mentioned. Any evaluation of a decade based on such data would be depressing and wildly one-sided.

Diplomats from both countries were instructed to look for possible breaches of the Eternal Peace or other evidence of hostility. They carried out their task with commendable industry, reporting every conceivable instance of military inactivity, every sign of unfriendly action—but without reference to the motivation behind them or their significance for state policy. The uninformed reader could very well assume, on the basis of these reports, that the dominant features of relations between Russia and Poland-Lithuania were mutual hatred and pathological mistrust. Oddly enough, while they painted this grim vision, the residents themselves had a more balanced image of events. For instance, they never made any reference to such phenomena as the szlachta's limited interest in Russia, perhaps because no one ever asked them to do so. They were instructed merely to collect evidence of potential hostility, not to analyze life in the countries that accredited them. Trying to perform their task conscientiously, most of them flooded their respective capitals with news likely to cause the utmost alarm. Not only did they describe a constant climate of enmity, but they also reported on the possibilities of war-like action. Dowmont, for example, alerted Sobieski on several occasions to movements of Russian troops in the direction of the Polish border, as well as to the reinforcement of Russian garrisons at Smolensk and Kiev. Volkov, for his part, reported suspicious movements of Polish forces in the direction of Kiev. Had such dispatches been taken at face value, a war could have erupted between the two countries, or at least the alliance would have been abrogated.

Yet nothing like this took place, indicating that the apocalyptic vision of the Polish and Russian diplomats was coolly and accurately assessed by foreign-policy makers in both countries, who weighed the verity of

such reports against their own experience and against information coming in from other sources. The response also indicates that Moscow's Department of Foreign Affairs and the Boyar Council, as well as Sobieski, his advisors, the senators and Parliament were not given to panic and hasty decisions. They realized that the failures of the military in both Russia and Poland to take action against the Ottomans and the Crimea were not motivated by "evil" intentions, but rather by exhaustion. Whatever was written by Dowmont, Volkov, Mikhailov, or Nikitin, the men at Wilanów and the Kremlin knew that neither side was strong enough to initiate war on two fronts and that first the war with Turkey and the Tatars had to end.

As long as Turkey persisted in its designs on Ukraine, neither Moscow nor Warsaw was eager for hasty policy shifts. They confined themselves instead to persuasion, the occasional threat, and sporadic appeals to their allies' Christian spirit. Although on one or two occasions they resorted to shows of anger and force, neither side ever seriously interfered in the other's domestic feuds. They did, however, try to influence the local public and gain support from figures critical of their own governments.

The direct participation of Russian diplomats in Poland's political life was far more limited than that of the French and Austrian envoys, who were active in promoting and sometimes initiating political trends favorable to their own countries. The French and Austrian diplomats were successful because they bought the support of senators and officials and spent tens of thousands of ducats on support for their own candidates to the Polish throne. Polish-Russian relations offered no parallels to such tactics and lacked the dynamism and scale of the French and Habsburg political undertakings.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Austrian diplomats occasionally tried to secure more active Russian participation in Polish internal politics. The Austrians felt that a weak Poland-Lithuania would be in the best interests of all its neighbors and thus fostered internal discord. This position was outlined for Mikhailov with surprising frankness by the Austrian ambassador Chernin: "We would like to see in the future a prolongation of discord in Poland as it brings misfortune upon the Poles. If the Poles are unified they can easily saddle one hundred thousand of their brave men and pose a threat to anyone they choose." Register of Mikhailov's activities, March 1695, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 1156–57. On diplomatic duels between the Austrian and French envoys on Polish territory, see Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią*, pp. 8–31, 41–42, 76–85, 111–56. Piwarski supplies a lengthy description of the activities of the Austrian, French, Vatican, and Brandenburg diplomats and agents. Not once does he mention any of the Russian ambassadors. This

If Louis XIV's plans had hatched, Europe's boundaries would have been significantly altered. The schemes of Vienna, London, and even Istanbul were somewhat less ambitious, but could also have brought about extensive changes in the European situation. By comparison, the plans of Golitsyn, the Naryshkins, or Peter I (up to 1705) would not have involved any revision of the Polish-Russian frontier, but would have given Russia access to the Black and Baltic Seas. The realization of Sobieski's plans, on the other hand, would have extended Poland's borders to the Danube and would have included Ukraine. The political plans of the Polish szlachta were less expansive and did not go beyond the recapture of Kam'ianets'; the idea of seizing Kiev, Smolensk, or Riga remained in the realm of pleasant but unrealistic dreams.

The aggressive policies of Turkey in the second half of the seventeenth century, and of Sweden in the early years of the eighteenth century, compelled Poland and Russia to tolerate each other and to act in concert as allies. Their cooperation was reluctant, however, and toleration would eventually give way to mutual hostility. As the Eternal Peace continued to be enforced without victory for either side, the burden of pretending friendship and of exacting assistance became heavier. Political collaboration directed by expediency could never remove the profound distrust generated by the contrast between the political systems of both countries. The political realities of the moment were spelled out in the article and clauses of the treaties of alliance. The true mutual appraisals and feelings were to come to the surface in the letters, diaries, and dispatches written by the diplomatic residents stationed in both countries.

Polish Appraisals of the Russian Residents

Of the four residents, Voznitsyn was held in the highest esteem by Sobieski and the senators, probably due primarily to the political situation at the time of his residency. Poland at that time had high hopes for Russian participation in the war with Turkey. Golitsyn's first march in 1687 on the Perekop, the gathering of vast military supplies on the Dnieper, and the reinforcement of Ukrainian garrisons in 1688 all suggested that the Russians had serious intentions of conquering the

omission reflects not only his unfamiliarity with the Russian archives, but also the Russians' basic tactic of non-engagement in Poland's internal struggles.

Crimea. Although the Poles still resented the losses suffered under the stipulations of the Eternal Peace in 1686, they did not yet feel that their concessions to the Russians were futile. They therefore pursued contacts with Voznitsyn as a representative of an ally without whose aid Poland's chances of victory would be dimmer. Such hopes, however, did not last long. Golitsyn's downfall would paralyze Russia's military offensive for six years and deprive the Russian residents of the respect that they had enjoyed up to that time.⁶⁹ Thereafter they were for the most part shunned by the Poles, and their situation did not improve until Peter I undertook the successful Azov expeditions.

⁶⁹ Mikhailov was told to leave numerous times. The Poles decided to recall Dowmont and to send the Russian resident home. Mikhailov's diary, conversation with Jabłonowski, 15 May 1694; with Okrasa, 24 August 1694; with Rozhyts'kyi, 2 March 1695, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 1077, 1100, 1159–60.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Polish Residency in Moscow

“Two gentlemen were appointed to attend upon me, the one to see us furnished of victuals and that we lacked nothing of the emperor’s allowance, the other to see that we should not go out of the house nor suffer any man to come unto us.” So wrote Sir Thomas Randolph, Queen Elizabeth’s envoy to Moscow in 1568.¹ In the seventeenth century, little changed in Moscow’s reception of foreign diplomats.² In Russia, as in the Crimea and Turkey, ambassadors continued to be treated like honored captives, kept under constant surveillance.³ Polish diplomats who conducted negotiations with the Russians in Moscow noted that they were kept courteously but firmly in virtual imprisonment. The commander of the Russian *strel'tsy* guarding foreign diplomatic residences was instructed to ensure that the diplomat and his staff did not communicate with any Muscovite without special permission: “Russians and foreigners who visit diplomats or strike up conversations with his people are to be discreetly arrested.”⁴

This was true even for patriarchs of the Eastern church, who were greeted by officials and escorted to Moscow amidst pageantry, but were nevertheless kept under constant surveillance.⁵ It is no surprise, then,

¹ Sir Thomas Randolph, “A Mission to Muscovy,” in *A Rude and Barbarous Kingdom*, ed. L. E. Berry and R. O. Crummey (Madison, 1968), pp. 67–68. (Randolph’s account was first published in 1589.)

² M. I. Belov, “Niderlandskii rezident v Moskve. Baron Iogann Keller i ego pis'ma,” (Ph.D. dis., Leningrad 1947), pp. 54–58.

³ Bernard Tanner, “Opisanie puteshestviia pol'skogo posol'stva v Moskvu v 1678 godu,” trans. and ed. I. Ivakin, in *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* 158, no. 3 (1891): 49, 54, 72, 96–97; *ibid.*, Varia, pp. 191–200.

⁴ Cited after: Z. Wójcik, *Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667–1672* (Warsaw, 1968), p. 85, fn. 64.

⁵ “For they set guards over the Heads of the Clergy, and over the convents here, and examine all persons going into them, whether by day or night; and at all times they keep a strict watch, by looking through the crevices of the doors . . .” Paul of Aleppo, *The Travels of Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch*, vol. 1 (London, 1834), p. 264 (hereafter *Paul of Aleppo*).

that Orthodox monks coming to Moscow from Greece warned one another against any display of undue curiosity while visiting the empire of the Orthodox tsar. Anyone looking closely at fortifications or engaging in conversations with soldiers was, according to Paul of Aleppo, arrested, interrogated, and sent “to the land of darkness, where there is no escape, whence no return is granted, and where emancipation from slavery is unknown.”⁶

Such reports, though perhaps exaggerated, were not unfounded. Some foreign visitors to Moscow, including those with no intention of spying, had been deported to Siberia or to the monasteries close to the Arctic circle after incurring the displeasure of the tsar or of some political potentate. Rumors about the disappearances and the threat of penalties for any infraction of the rules set by the Department of Foreign Affairs frightened the foreigners, many of whom would have agreed with Paul of Aleppo that “life in Moscow is strict, so much so that no foreigner can endure its severity, for a man feels as if he were always in prison.”⁷

Supervision of foreigners, particularly diplomats, was conducted according to meticulous rules. The instructions of the Russian *pristavy* charged with meeting diplomats at the border and those of the officers of the *strel'tsy* guard attached to the diplomats in Moscow were identical: both were designed to prevent any intelligence-gathering by visitors. Even contact with aristocrats and ministers was prohibited, as if the government were acknowledging its distrust of its most distinguished servitors.⁸

⁶ *Paul of Aleppo*, vol. 1, p. 265. According to the monk from Antioch, “whenever they (the Russians) see any person, abandoned by his better fate, looking attentively at a cannon or examining a fort, they seize him on the spot and carry him away to Siberia; saying ‘You are surely a spy, Sir, introduced among us from the country of the Turks.’ The intent of all this is that they regulate the police and government of their State with the utmost nicety and severity . . . we were strictly guarded and observed . . . God deliver us from this constraint in which they hold us, and restore us to our beloved freedom!” [Quite a wish on the part of an Orthodox priest traveling to Russia from the Ottoman Empire—ASK]. *Paul of Aleppo*, vol. 1, pp. 265, 268, 364, 388; see also *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 409 and vol. 2 (London, 1836), pp. 45–46, 264, 277, 306–307.

⁷ *Paul of Aleppo*, vol. 1, p. 268.

⁸ The *pristav* “must take care that no one comes to the envoy or his company to inform them of anything or give them any letters or receive them, and he must be especially on guard when a Russian person or a foreigner visits the envoy’s quarters to catch these people as they leave, but in such a way so that neither the envoy nor his company know of it. He must also question those arrested to find out who they are and why they came, what they spoke of and what was answered; all this must be written down and brought

Supervision began at the Russian border, closed to all except those with entry or exit permits. In the case of Polish diplomats, arrivals were reported to the palatine of Smolensk, who checked the envoy's credentials and notified the Department of Foreign Affairs. In the meantime, the diplomat was brought to Smolensk by Russian transport. The Department of Foreign Affairs then set the time of his departure for Moscow, and provided him with an escort as well as means of transportation. The escort was commanded by an officer of the local nobility or a captain of the *strel'tsy*. The convoy proceeded toward Moscow at a rate dictated by the Department, which often either hastened or slowed the diplomat's progress. Delays were intended either to convey the impression that the mission was not eagerly awaited in the Kremlin, or to give Moscow time to conclude negotiations with the representatives of another nation.⁹ While the duration of the journey might vary, the rules prohibiting contact with the local population did not. The *pristav* commanding the convoy usually arranged night stopovers in isolated localities, often in tents set up in the woods. Stops also tended to be in small hamlets rather than cities or towns. The *pristav*'s duties included taking notes and making detailed reports about the diplomat and his staff, especially about any attempts to converse with the escort or passersby. The Department of Foreign Affairs always requested detailed reports of the questions asked by the envoy and of his comments about Russia and his own

with the person under arrest to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The envoy and his people must never be allowed to leave the court before the envoy has been granted an audience with the tsar and if the envoy or any of his people need anything, the *pristav* must buy it for them. The envoy and his company are not to approach anyone if they should have to go to town. If any one of the envoy's people has to buy something, he must be accompanied by a strong force of *strel'tsy* who must see to it that they do not speak with anyone on the street." Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Drevnix Aktov (Moscow; hereafter TsGADA) Relations with Poland, 1691, ms 6, pp. 26. Ukraintsev took Dowmont to task on 20 February 1693 for having visited the boyars. Records of Dowmont's conversations at the Department of Foreign Affairs, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 706; Records of Okrasa's conversations at the Department of Foreign Affairs, TsGADA, Relations with Poland, 1691, fond 79, ms 6, pp. 173–74.

⁹ The trip from Kadyn to Moscow usually took about two weeks. Ivan Okrasa was met at the border on 1 August 1691; he was allowed to leave Smolensk for Moscow on August 5 and arrived there on August 15. Two *pristavy*, the *stol'nik* Vladimir Iagonov and the *sotennyi strelets* Aleshko Borisov, were assigned on July 15, i.e., even before Okrasa arrived at Kadyn. "Dokład o poslanniku Okrase," TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, ms 6, 1691, pp. 146–55. See also: Z. Wójcik, *Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką*, pp. 82–83.

country or about the international situation.¹⁰ All this information helped the Kremlin to prepare itself for negotiations.

Once near the capital, the diplomat encountered a further delay while the Department prepared for his official entry into Moscow, which usually occasioned a spectacular display of Russian troops and wealth. In the capital, the diplomat was taken to his quarters, which were then ringed by a contingent of armed guards. The envoy and his staff were forbidden to leave this house or to receive anyone prior to the official presentation of their credentials at the tsar's court.¹¹ Only two members of an envoy's suite were permitted to go to the market to purchase provisions, and they were under strict orders not to engage in any conversation. These instructions were rigidly enforced by the *strel'tsy*, who accompanied the ambassador's servants on their shopping expeditions. After the envoy's audience with the tsar, the official prohibition on contacts with the local population was lifted, but even then the *strel'tsy* continued to follow the diplomat and his staff wherever they went.¹²

The *strel'tsy* performed their duties on foot, which caused them some problems whenever a diplomat left his residence in a carriage or on horseback. He could lose his guardians by proceeding at a brisk pace, and the panting *strel'tsy* had to question passersby on the direction the diplomatic carriage had taken. They usually traced their quarry to some distant suburb and then complained bitterly, blaming the diplomat for their discomfort.¹³

When the Department of Foreign Affairs wished to demonstrate to a

¹⁰ Instructions for Ivan Markovich Konishchev, *pristav* assigned to Ivan Okrasa, 15 August 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, 1691, ms 6, pp. 22–28. The “honor of the tsar” was understood in the broadest sense. Thus should a *pristav* dare to hint of an unsuccessful military action, a Moscow fire, riots, famine, or even a rise in the cost of living, he actually would have stained the honor of the tsar.

¹¹ Acting in accordance with this order, the *strel'tsy* watching over the Tatar envoy arrested Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Dowmont's courtier, and Jan Rakielów, an Armenian merchant, who had visited Tatars on 5 August 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 255–59.

¹² This was intended to prevent the diplomats from having contact with the locals rather than, as Kotoshikhin implied, to “protect them from the Russians.” G. K. Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. 76. See also fns. 5 and 8, above.

¹³ Ukraintsev read the complaints of the *strel'tsy* to Dowmont on 13 November 1691. Records of Dowmont's conversations at the Department of Foreign Affairs, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 363–64.

diplomat its displeasure with his country's policy, it would increase the size of the guard stationed at the gate to his residence or even in front of his entrance hall. In addition, the Department could order the arrest of all visitors even before they entered the embassy.¹⁴ Another clear sign of the tsar's disfavor was the omission of a diplomat from the list of those receiving the treats of the sovereign's "table" on major feast days and during imperial family celebrations. Even more devastating were cuts in the mission's rations of water and fuel.¹⁵

The frequent delays on various pretexts encountered by diplomats in their attempts to meet with the chief of the Department of Foreign Affairs, or even to obtain answers to their queries, often threatened to deprive their missions of any sense. To circumvent such behavior, Sobieski, disregarding the presence of his resident in Moscow, would sometimes dispatch a special messenger to Russia to request an answer to his earlier messages.¹⁶

¹⁴ The *strel'tsy* whom Dowmont accused of barring guests from his quarters explained that they were acting on orders from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Ukraintsev naturally denied any such orders ever having been issued and promised to investigate the matter. Records of Dowmont's conference with Ukraintsev, 21 February 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 109, 163–64. Dowmont's complaints that he was being cut off from contacts in Moscow induced Sobieski to tighten surveillance on Mikhailov. 12 January 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 97–98, 108–109. In May of 1691, surveillance on Mikhailov was increased in response to Dowmont's having been closely guarded; Mikhailov was subsequently notified that the action was of a retaliatory nature. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 171–72. Upon his return to the royal court in Poland, Dowmont observed that his life in Moscow had been worse than that of a prisoner kept in solitary confinement. Register of Mikhailov's activities, August 1694, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 1098–1100.

¹⁵ Dowmont complained several times about the lack of firewood and about non-working stoves; these grievances were submitted to the tsars and the Boyar Council. The stoves were subsequently repaired, and more wood was provided after the diplomat's servants, unable to tolerate the cold any longer, began to tear up floorboards and benches for firewood. Records of Dowmont's conversations with Ukraintsev, 26 February 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 78–80.

¹⁶ Dowmont filed a complaint with V. V. Golitsyn in 1688 after the latter refused to grant him an audience. TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, 1691, ms 6, p. 166; Sobieski to Dowmont, 15 July 1688, Biblioteka Muzeum im. Ks. Czartoryskich (Cracow; hereafter B.Czart.), ms 422, p. 355; Dowmont to Sobieski, 22 July 1688, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw; hereafter AGAD), Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie V, ms 73, no. 3252. Dowmont informed the king on 18 December 1688 that it would have been better to have a military attaché in the field with the Russian army than in Moscow, where "no one is given access to the Rulers," while important boyars participated in military campaigns. AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie V, ms 73, no. 3252. Sobieski informed the tsars by a letter sent on 24 May 1691 that Ivan Okrasa had been sent as a

The Department demanded that the Polish resident transmit to Warsaw only information received from its officials and only in accordance with the Kremlin's interpretations. Any information gathered through personal contacts or any interpretation of Russian policy that deviated from the official line was regarded as hostile to Russia. The Department deduced the character of the Polish resident's dispatches from the reports of its own resident in Warsaw. If the conclusions were not to the Department's liking, the Kremlin not only charged the diplomat with lying, but warned that his false and unfriendly reports from Russia could undermine the friendship and cooperation between the two states and possibly ("which God forbid") lead to war.¹⁷

The Department instructed its own envoys, of course, to collect information not only through official channels, but by all available means, including bribery. Moscow always wanted to know to what extent a government's official statements coincided with its secret plans. They could hardly expect Western diplomats to seek anything less. Nevertheless, they never admitted, even in private, that any statement they made on behalf of the tsar could be untrue, or even merely part of a political ploy. This would have been tantamount to conceding that the tsar was capable of lying or breaching covenants. Such dastardly behavior could only be expected of foreign courts and rulers. The strict observance of such "principles" resulted in situations which defied common sense. With respect to the treaty stipulation that each nation would lead campaigns against the Ottoman Porte and Tatars, the Russian never admitted undertaking only the defense of their own territory. The accounts of military campaigns in the years in which the Russian armies

special envoy to procure exact information on preparations for a military campaign, B. Czart., ms 183, p. 372. See also: Dowmont to Marcjan Ogiński, 24 March 1688, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 15, p. 542; Dowmont to Sobieski, 19 February and 4 May 1693, AGAD, Archiwum koronne, ms 54, nos. 108 and 113.

¹⁷ To Ukraintsev's suggestion that the Polish diplomat limit his accounts to the king to reports received from the Department of Foreign Affairs and stop including rumors circulating at the markets and inns, Dowmont replied "the voice of the people is the voice of God." Records of Dowmont's meetings with Ukraintsev, 26 December 1690, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 35–36. In June of 1688, Vasilii Golitsyn informed chancellor Ogiński that Dowmont was passing on mendacious information to the Polish side. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 213–14. Sobieski was getting signals from all sides regarding Moscow's dissatisfaction with Dowmont's performance. Sobieski to Dowmont, 17 April and May 1688, B. Czart. ms 422, pp. 336–37, 340. See also TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1691, ms 6, p. 165.

were inactive read like reports of the victories of Alexander the Great. There may have been a grain of substance to the accounts—some Don or Zaporozhian Cossacks may have been engaged in a skirmish with the Tatars, or a Tatar raid may have been repulsed. Of course, such incidents bore no resemblance to military campaigns. Yet no attempt to acknowledge or explain that fact was feasible if it required Moscow to admit the slightest failure to carry out the letter of the treaty.¹⁸ Whenever Sobieski admitted that he had been no more active in the field than the tsar, the Polish resident was told that his king had not lived up to his commitment, whereas the tsar's exploits would simultaneously be described in terms appropriate to Homer's *Iliad*. The *d'iaki* of the Department were themselves probably tired of the charade, but they had to continue it until the foreign diplomat had mastered their double-talk or found a way of dealing with them within the bounds set by their taboos. However, this ritualistic adherence to a perception of reality greatly diverging from observable fact lasted only until the next major policy shift. Then the Russians would acquire a new set of friends to whom they proffered equally ritualistic evidence of undying loyalty.

Since the glorification of the tsar's name was the dominant principle of Russian diplomacy, observed by all the staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the entire population of Russia, any deviation from it could be regarded as a major crime. At a time when all Europe knew that Peter I was besieging Azov or visiting the Netherlands, the Russian resident in Warsaw would staunchly assert that the tsar was, "as always," in Moscow.¹⁹ The rigid adherence of Russian diplomats to such rules created difficult situations, especially when they

¹⁸ Dowmont understood this quite well and did not pay any attention to official statements about the Russian government's military plans, Dowmont to Sobieski, 4 May 1693, AGAD, Archiwum koronne, ms 54, no. 113.

¹⁹ Following the Russian resident's audience with the Polish king on 7 May 1695, the Polish senators Dominik Radziwiłł, Marek Matczyński, Andrzej Kryspin, Marcin Oborski, Marcin Kański, and Marcin Borowski questioned Mikhailov as to the truth of reports that Tsar Peter himself was at Azov. The Russian replied that he had not been instructed to answer that question. Sobieski also inquired privately about Peter's part in the expedition; the resident reiterated that he could only discuss issues which the Department of Foreign Affairs had cleared with him. TsGADA, fond 79, MS 243, pp. 1180–84. Nikitin's conversation with Jan Kazimierz Sapieha, 26 May 1697; Nikitin's conversations with Sedlnitzky, the Austrian ambassador to Poland, 29 June 1697; Nikitin's conversation with August II, 1 October 1697; Register of Nikitin's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 200–202, 208–209, 320–21.

were dealing with persons unfamiliar with their special code. Diplomats of all nations may have used similar language, but there was a wide difference in flexibility. The old hands at the Department were not at all fazed when the other side displayed knowledge of the true facts, which they themselves knew quite well. They maintained their composure even when caught in outright lies. They knew perfectly well that Russia was not engaged in any major campaigns between 1690 and 1694, just as they knew when Peter was at Azov or visiting Western Europe. They realized that their diplomatic counterparts were also aware of these facts, and they conscientiously reported to the Boyar Council and the tsar the reactions of foreign diplomats to statements they knew to be untrue. They would not tolerate, however, any attempts by their foreign colleagues to make them admit the existence of their taboos, let alone into breaking them. Any Western diplomat who thought that he could establish a personal rapport with his Russian counterpart by indulging in a mild criticism of his own country was deeply in error. Such criticism, however temperate, became a weapon in the hands of the Russian diplomat, who never reciprocated with any candid comment about the policies of the tsar's empire.

The close surveillance of the envoy and his staff, the isolation of the diplomats from any contact with Russians (even boyars), the diplomatic office's monopoly in dealings with the ambassador, the ban on leaving Moscow—even to accompany the tsar—all contributed to preventing foreigners from securing any information about Russia. Russian diplomacy endeavored to discredit any foreign envoy who saw too quickly through the Kremlin's deceptions. He was charged with personal faults (drunkenness, lechery, dueling) or political ones (enemy of friendship between the monarchs, advocate of the war party, etc.). Oddly enough, such charges often gained credence in the diplomat's homeland.

The Polish-Lithuanian Ambassador to Moscow and his Staff

When Sobieski yielded to the Great Chancellor of Lithuania, Marcjan Ogiński, and agreed to reinstate the residency in Moscow, he also appointed the chancellor's candidate for resident, Jerzy Dominik Dowmont, chamberlain (an honorary local office) of Kaunas and a district judge in the palatinate of Trakai.

Dowmont had visited Moscow before, in the important post of secretary in the great embassy of Potocki in 1680. His rank at that time was

evidence of some association with the chancery of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, of a higher education, and of a degree of popularity among the Lithuanian nobility. Dowmont belonged to a well-connected landowning noble family which claimed descent from the “princes” of old pagan Lithuania. He was a kinsman of Ludwik Pociąg and the owner or renter of several villages. At the time of his mission to Moscow, he was in the prime of life, about forty years old, with a wife and children back at home.²⁰

Sobieski did not know Dowmont personally and apparently did not give him any special instructions or even summon him to court before his departure. The instructions received by Dowmont dealt exclusively with the proposed Polish-Russian campaign against the Tatars in 1688. The king expected Dowmont’s mission to last about half a year, and intended to decide whether to continue it on the basis of achievements during that time.²¹ Contrary to the king’s expectations (and Dowmont’s), however, Dowmont remained in Moscow for six years. Initially, his reports were addressed to Ogiński, but soon after his arrival in Moscow his activities passed under direct royal control. Sobieski came to regard highly Dowmont’s work in Moscow, and rewarded him with lucrative leases of royal estates.²²

The Polish resident reported his arrival at Kadyn on the Russian border on 11 November 1687, in a letter to Boris Vasil’evich Buturlin, palatine of Smolensk. The envoy came accompanied by sixteen courtiers of noble rank, whose names were listed in the letter, as well as by a chaplain, a physician, a tailor, four coachmen, two grooms, two cooks, and a pantry master. Among the retinue were two of his sons, Aleksander and Kazimierz.²³ Only two of the courtiers remained in his service throughout the ensuing six years. There is no record of how many died in

²⁰ Sobieski to Ogiński, 28 May and 11 July 1687, B. Czart., ms 422, pp. 107, 131–32. TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1680, ms 8. Kazimierz Piwarski, “Jerzy Dominik Dowmont,” in *Polski słownik biograficzny*, vol. 5 (Cracow, 1939), pp. 353–54.

²¹ Sobieski to Ogiński, 26 June 1687, B. Czart., ms 422, pp. 147–48.

²² Dowmont to Stanisław Szczuka, 29 April 1688, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 15, p. 1601. Sobieski to Dominik Radziwiłł, 19 April 1692. In a letter to the chancellor, the king noted that Dowmont had not asked for the villages given over to him, and added that he deserved them as “reward for his untiring services”; AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie II, ms. 25.

²³ TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1687, ms 10; see also Relations with Poland 1688, ms 6.

Russia, but it is known that Dowmont used them to transport goods between Poland and Russia. (He imported, among other things, Hungarian wine, mead from Kaunas, and, occasionally, items sought by his Russian friends).²⁴ Replacements of personnel took place during these annual trips and were made entirely at Dowmont's discretion. The ambassador's courtiers were devoted to him and ready to take risks in pursuit of their missions. The records of the Department offer evidence that none of them could be bribed, and only two of the servants (the cook and a manservant) later entered the service of Russian boyars.²⁵

Despite the system of supervision imposed by the Russians, Dowmont soon began sending reports to Poland that contradicted the assertions of Muscovite officials, notably with regard to the campaign of 1688. The alarmed chiefs of the Department accordingly took steps to discredit the resident in the eyes of the royal court, chancery, and the senators in Warsaw. On orders from the Kremlin, he was described by the Russian residents in Warsaw as uncouth and aggressive, a liar and a spreader of false rumors calculated to undermine the Polish-Russian alliance. Ogiński and Dominik Radziwiłł were inclined to give credence to these allegations, but Sobieski refused to do so. He regarded Dowmont's dispatches as highly accurate, but at the same time he came to the conclusion that the residency did nothing to facilitate military collaboration between Poland and Russia and even provided some pretext for friction. He therefore decided to liquidate the residency, using as an excuse the Russian charges leveled against his envoy. In recalling Dowmont, Sobieski asked that the Russian resident in Warsaw also be recalled. This demand shook the Kremlin: it responded with an abrupt about-face, dropped all complaints, and virtually begged the king to prolong the stay of his envoy.²⁶

²⁴ TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1688, ms 6, pp. 6–7, and fond 79, ms 240, p. 1193.

²⁵ TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 1193, 1200, 1211.

²⁶ "It would appear from all circumstances that Your Loyal Residence there is no longer at all necessary, take thus all measures according to protocol to ensure that you will be back for the next meeting of Parliament that God willing must be convened in December"; Sobieski to Dowmont, 13 August 1688, B. Czart, ms 422, p. 295; Golitsyn's letter to Ogiński, 7 June 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, pp. 213–16; Dowmont to Szczuka, 19 August 1688, AGAD Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 15, p. 1299; Report of Voznitsyn's conversations with chancellery staff members in Warsaw, June 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 234, p. 230. Matczyński proposed to Voznitsyn that the

The Polish resident was constantly at odds with his *pristavy*: Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Fedorovich Bashev and Captain Mikhail Fomin Krivtsov, as well as captains Nekrasov and Striunikov, the commanders of the *strel'tsy* guard at his residence. According to the complaints of the Department, Dowmont “abused” both *pristavy*, did not even greet Krivtsov, and threatened the captains with violence if they did not remove the *strel'tsy* from his house and cease to interfere with all visitors and peddlers.²⁷

Relations with Aristocrats and Bureaucrats

Dowmont had personal enemies among the Russians, but also some friends. His relations with Golitsyn, all-powerful “prime minister” until 1689, were tense and eventually hostile. Golitsyn was annoyed by his insistent demands for audiences and his criticism of Russian military plans and operations. For six months he refused to receive the Polish envoy, in an attempt to force Sobieski to replace Dowmont with someone “friendlier” to Russia.

Dowmont’s relations with the *d’iak* Emel’ian Ukraintsev, a member of the Boyar Duma who became chief of the Department of Foreign Affairs after Golitsyn’s fall, were no better. The policy conflicts between them culminated in personal enmity and the exchange of insults. There were periods when Ukraintsev simply refused to speak to Dowmont. At one point Dowmont stormed out of the Department in the midst of a conference, deeply shocking not only Ukraintsev but also the recording clerks, who were well accustomed to shouts, threats, and mutual accusations of falsehood, but thought it barbaric that he walked out without ceremonial proceedings.²⁸

The Polish diplomat enjoyed fairly proper relations with other senior officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs save for Ivan Volkov, his

residents be recalled so as to avoid escalating antagonisms between Moscow and Warsaw, Voznitsyn to Golitsyn, 7 June 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 88. Upon his return from Moscow, the nobleman Darewski, who served as a courtier to boyars, told Sobieski that Dowmont’s situation had improved immediately after the Polish side decided to terminate the residency. Voznitsyn to Golitsyn, 28 June 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 97.

²⁷ Records of Ivan Okrasa’s meeting with Ukraintsev, 14 September 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, 1691, ms 6, pp. 164–71.

²⁸ TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 1083.

opposite number in Warsaw (1689–1691), whom he charged with pocketing funds from the Polish-Lithuanian treasury and concealing the act from his superiors. Despite the testimony of Polish treasury officials, Volkov denied the charge, and the Department in Moscow took his side and refused to make up the difference to the Polish envoy. Unofficially, Ukraintsev's view was that even if the king of Poland had given Volkov more than the agreed-upon 12,500 *złotys* a year, the excess represented a royal gift, for which reason no like sum need be added to the Russian remittance to Dowmont.²⁹ Conflict with Volkov did not influence Dowmont's relations with Mikhailov, whom he visited at home on at least one occasion.

In spite of the official ban on any unauthorized contacts with even the most powerful boyars, Dowmont not only knew them but even had several friends—as well as personal enemies—among them. Aware of these contacts, the Department protested to Dowmont repeatedly and did what it could to impede them—but did not press the matter with Sobieski, knowing that such a move would lead to the imposition of similar restrictions on the Russian resident in Warsaw.

Dowmont's poor relations with the head of the *strel'tsy*, Ivan Borisovich Troekurov, were hardly surprising, given the continual strife between the envoy and his guards,³⁰ but his squabble with Peter the First's childhood companion, Andrei Artamonovich Matveev, had more trivial origins. It began, oddly enough, over a dog. Dowmont had brought to Moscow a "marvelously spotted pointer," which disappeared a few days after his arrival. The envoy's servants soon discovered the animal at Matveev's residence, and Dowmont sent a few staff members there to present his compliments and request the dog's return. Instead, the courtiers were driven out empty-handed. A number of scuffles ensued between the servitors of the two men. The dog was never returned.³¹

²⁹ Records of Dowmont's conversations at the Department of Foreign Affairs, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 42, 194, 246–47, 277, 329, 355, 694, 699, 702, 738, 745–46, 957. Dowmont to Sobieski, April 1689, B. Czart., ms 182, p. 614. Secretary of the Crown Treasury Szreiter to Dowmont, 17 December 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, 1688, ms 6, p. 377.

³⁰ Records of Okrasa's conversations at the Department of Foreign Affairs, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, ms 6, pp. 173–74.

³¹ "A letter of unpleasantries and grievances given to His Highness the Tsar's Department of Foreign Affairs by myself, the Ambassador and Resident of His Highness the King and Commonwealth," TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1688, ms 7, p. 11.

Similar, sometimes bloody, confrontations also occurred between Dowmont's staff and the servants of his other neighbors, Prince Khilkov and Prince Cherkasskii.³²

Of the boyars who became friends, or at least close acquaintances, the envoy's relations were best with Petr Ivanovich Prozorovskii, mentor of Tsar Ivan, and with Boris Petrovich Sheremetev, for whom Dowmont purchased harnesses in Poland. Dowmont also met socially with Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn, Lev Kirillovich Naryshkin, and Tikhon Nikitich Streshnev, prominent figures in Peter's circle. Each such contact was an opportunity to explain the motives behind Commonwealth policy and to present copies of Sobieski's official letters.³³

Dowmont met the young tsar Peter at General Patrick Gordon's house on a number of occasions, but the two did not become friends. His relations with the regent Sophia likewise remained limited despite the fact that shortly after his arrival he had been summoned at night to visit her in secret. That nothing came of this contact and the fact that Golitsyn remained unfriendly to Dowmont suggest that Sophia and her supporters did not plan to rely on Sobieski's assistance in their approaching struggle for power with the Naryshkins. The Naryshkins, however, hinted to the envoy that Kiev might be a reward for assistance in the elevation of Peter, but Dowmont made it quite clear that Poland-Lithuania wanted no involvement in the problems of the tsars' family. He believed prior to the palace coup of 1689 that there were not two, but three factions at the Moscow court: that of Sophia, officially promoting Ivan, but actually trying to secure the throne for herself; that of the Naryshkins, who supported Peter; and that of Ivan, the weakest of the three, but not to be confused with the group around Sophia.³⁴

Although his close ties to Prozorovskii might lead one to suspect that Dowmont had no special wish to see Peter emerge victorious, he remained strictly neutral and aloof from the events of the coup d'état of 1689.

³² Ibid.

³³ Records of Dowmont's conversations at the Department of Foreign Affairs, February 1693, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 706.

³⁴ Dowmont to Sobieski, 1688, AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie II, vol. 25, pp. 143–44. Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec sprawy Ukrainy na przełomie XVII–XVIII w.* (Wrocław, 1963), p. 31.

Sources of Information

Dowmont's very accurate dispatches provided Sobieski with important data on Moscow's strategic plans. The Polish king always knew in advance whether the projected Russian operations would be offensive as promised or defensive, where the main thrust would be directed, and where troops would be assembled. He knew the names of the Russian commanders and the approximate numerical strength of their troops. Dowmont's reports usually contradicted the statements of the Russian government. He informed his king as early as the spring of 1688 that the Russians would not renew their attack against the Perekop, as promised, but intended instead to build a fortress on the Samara River—this while Golitsyn was continually assuring him that the Russians' next attack in 1688 would be aimed against the Crimea. When the supposed great offensive against the Crimea in 1688 did not occur, the Polish king had been well forewarned.³⁵

Between 1690 and 1694, while the Department of Foreign Affairs was constantly promising to undertake further offensive operations against the common enemy, Dowmont regularly reported that "the Russians intend to conduct the next campaign along defensive lines," which meant simply that they intended to do nothing unless actually attacked. Obviously, the Polish resident could have secured such information only from high-ranking military officers, who also kept him well informed about troop strength, the actual outcome of military operations, and army morale. Dowmont's reports on palace feuds, gossip about the tsar's immediate entourage, and secret initiatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs were also extraordinarily accurate. On the whole, the information came from fellow Catholics, Polish expatriates among them, but some was also provided from Russian agents.

³⁵ Dowmont to Sobieski, April 1688, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 18, pp. 814–15. Other foreign diplomats residing in Moscow also knew that the Russians did not plan to attack the Crimea in 1688, but had decided to build a fortress on the Samara River. "Moskva v 1687–1688 gg." trans. and ed. K. A. Viskovatov [Dispatches of Kristof von Kochen, Swedish diplomat to Moscow, to J. I. Hastfer, November, 1688] *Russkaia starina* 23 (1878): 128.

Dowmont and the Catholic Community

The Catholic community in seventeenth-century Moscow included, in addition to the Poles and Lithuanians, a number of Scots, Austrians, Moravians, Italians, and Frenchmen. They were army officers, merchants, tutors, artisans, and musicians. Since the beginning of the century, Catholic priests had also been passing through Moscow on their way to and from Persia. Furthermore, in the course of the wars between Poland and Russia in mid-century, thousands of prisoners captured by the armies of Aleksei Mikhailovich were settled in Russia. Among them were Catholic priests and monks. During their captivity they said mass, administered the sacraments, and even tried to give some religious instruction. The kings of Poland, following the example of the tsars, sought to act on behalf of their co-religionists, declaring themselves the protectors of all Catholics in Russia.

In 1686, under the terms of the Eternal Peace, the tsars were granted the right to act as protectors of the Orthodox inhabitants of Poland-Lithuania while promising greater religious freedom to Catholics in Russia. In addition, free passage across Russia was to be granted to Catholic missionaries bound for Persia or China, provided they carried written endorsement of their mission from the king of Poland, recognized thus as protector of members of his faith in Russia.³⁶

Naturally enough, Dowmont assumed the role of official representative of Catholic interests in Russia. In this capacity, he soon plunged into the social and religious life of the Catholic community in Moscow, befriending such important co-religionists in the service of the tsars as Generals Patrick Gordon and Paul Menezies, and the Kremlin physician Gregory Carbonari.

From the moment the treaty was signed, its provisions concerning religious freedom became a source of constant mutual recrimination. The Russians protested against conversions from Orthodoxy to the Uniate church, while the Poles complained about Muscovite refusal to build a Catholic church in Moscow and about the hindrance of

³⁶ Georgius David S. J., *Status Modernus Magnae Russiae seu Moscoviae*, ed. A. V. Florovskii (The Hague, 1965), pp. 69–73; P. Pierling, *La Russie et la Saint-Siège*, vol. 4 (Paris, 1907), pp. 113–14. Paragraphs 9 and 28 of the “1688 Treaty of Eternal Peace,” in *Prawa, Konstytucje i Przywileje*, vol. 6 (Warsaw, 1739) pp. 153–54, 162; Joseph Sebes, *The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk 1689* (Rome, 1961), pp. 97–102.

missionaries on their way to China. At the time a massive movement away from the Orthodox church to the Uniate church was sweeping Poland. Even such ancient and powerful Orthodox dioceses as those of Przemyśl and L'viv were breaking away, as were numerous Orthodox monasteries. The defenders of the Orthodox faith naturally appealed to the tsar for aid, while the Poles emphatically denied the charges of coercion, reminding Moscow that while there were many Orthodox churches in Poland, there was not a single Catholic church in Russia.³⁷ The Russian government, while slow in carrying out its promise to permit the building of Catholic churches in Moscow and Smolensk or to allow missionaries to travel to China, closed an eye to the Catholic pastoral activity being carried on privately.

The Orthodox church itself, however, took a different stand. Its leaders deplored religious observances by and for foreigners, repeatedly warning the government that such activities might corrupt Russians and perhaps wean them away from the Orthodox faith. At times they advocated the expulsion of foreigners, at others, they merely asked the government to prohibit Russians from living in foreigners' homes (as servants). They argued that foreign specialists should be required to convert to the Orthodox faith before receiving commissions in the Russian army. They opposed the construction of any heretical houses of worship on Russian soil. The government generally turned a deaf ear to such pleas, at least to those concerned with the employment of foreigners in the administration and army. Nevertheless, at times of domestic strife among court factions, the dignitaries of the Orthodox church managed to impose serious restrictions on the religious freedom of foreigners.³⁸

³⁷ Letter from Smolensk, 31 July 1693, K. Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego. Dziennik i relacje z lat 1691–1696* (Wrocław, 1958), pp. 356–58; Report from the Moscow border, 30 March 1694, *ibid.*, p. 360.

³⁸ In January 1686, Kholmogory Archbishop Afanasii submitted a missive to the tsars requesting that Russians be forbidden to lodge in the homes of foreigners. The archbishop was convinced that Russians who had daily contact with foreigners tended to convert to their heresies. The tsars decreed that a register be kept of all Russians lodging with foreigners, that they be removed from their quarters, and that lodging with foreigners be forbidden in the future under pain of death. Foreign merchants, who suddenly found themselves without permanent servants, petitioned for the lifting of the restrictions which prevented them from carrying out their trade. The tsars responded favorably to their request, stipulating, however, that those Russians who were reported to be neglecting their religious practices or to be living decadently were to be forbidden to live with foreigners. TsGADA, fond 35, Relations with England 1686, ms 1, pp. 2–29.

They were particularly adamant in their opposition to a Catholic church in Moscow, even though two Calvinist churches and one Lutheran church already existed there. The advances made by the Catholic faith against the Orthodox in the territories of the Commonwealth heightened the vigilance of the Orthodox hierarchy at home. After the coup of 1689, it also led to a xenophobic backlash against the learned monks of the Kiev Academy, viewed as agents of the hated Latin heresy.³⁹

The support given by Sobieski to Jesuits trying to establish a land route to China did nothing to alleviate Orthodox suspicions. Jesuits in Moscow, under the protection of the king of Poland, were perceived as the forerunners of some major missionary action. (As a matter of fact, the Jesuit presence in Moscow was motivated primarily by their interest in opening a land route to China.⁴⁰ Of course, while stationed there they did not refrain entirely from missionary activities, but they did exercise considerable care in such efforts.) Sobieski sought to promote the entry of French, Polish, and Austrian Jesuits into Russia, and encouraged them to explore the China trail described and mapped out by the celebrated translator of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Milescu Spătarul.⁴¹

³⁹ P. Smirnov, *Ioakim, patriarkh moskovskii* (Moscow, 1881) pp. 127–53, 223–38; I. Kozlovskii, *Sil'vestr Medvedev* (Kiev, 1895); E. Shmurlo, "Russkie katoliki kontsa XVII v.," in *Zapiski Russkogo nauchnogo instituta v Belgrade* 3 (1932); A. Brückner (Brikner), *Patrik Gordon i ego dnevniki* (St. Petersburg, 1878), pp. 124–37; Pierling, *La Russie*, 4: 68–123. *Pis'ma i doneseniiia Iezuitov o Rossii kontsa XVII i nachala XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1904); D. Tolstoi, *Rimskii katolitsizm v Rossii* (St. Petersburg, 1876); D. Tsvetaev, *Iz istorii inostrannykh ispovedanii v Rossii v XVI i XVII vekakh* (Moscow, 1886). Ioakim's victory was short-lived, and the Greeks whom he had invited "pobezhdaet Kiev." Georges Florovsky, *Puti russkogo bogosloviiia* (Paris, 1937), p. 81. K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikoruskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'* (Kazan', 1914), pp. 250–456; L. R. Lewitter, "The Russo-Polish Treaty of 1686 and its Antecedents," *The Polish Review* 9, nos. 3–4 (1964): 7–8, 23–25; V. O. Èingorn, *Diplomatskie snosheniia moskovskogo pravitel'stva s pravoberezhnoi Malorossiei v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (Moscow, 1899).

⁴⁰ Sebes, *The Jesuits*, pp. 95–100, 139; Pierling, *La Russie*, 4: 79–114. Refer also to: *Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVII veke. Materialy i dokumenty (1686–1689)*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1972).

⁴¹ D. Ursul, *Filosofskie i obshchestvenno-politicheskie vzgliady N. G. Milesku Spafariia* (Chişinău [Kishinev], 1955), pp. 32–34. Reports of the Jesuits' successes in China did not go over well with the Russians. The most famous *perevodchik* in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Russian envoy to China, Nicolae Milescu Spătarul reported: "Now the Jesuits think that soon all the Chinese will be Catholics," but added that "we, however, believe that with God's help and the Tsar's happy fortune, the Chinese

Thanks to the intercession of Leopold I and Sobieski, a number of Jesuits were present in Moscow during the years 1684–1689. Jean Schmidt, a Jesuit of the Prussian province, who had come to Moscow together with Carlo-Maurizio Vota as part of the great Austrian mission, had been living in the capital since 1684 and remained there until his death in 1687. In that year Georgius David and Tobias Tichansky arrived in Moscow, sent by Leopold I with instructions to find their way to China, and Philippe Avril and Louis Barnabe traveled to Moscow by way of Persia and Astrakhan'. Golitsyn sent the Frenchmen to Poland and told them that he would let them through to China only if they submitted a written endorsement from Sobieski. The Polish king gave his support, but the Russian authorities nonetheless continued to refuse admission to the Jesuits. Russia, Poland, and Austria were, after all, in a state of war with the Turks, and France was regarded as the sultan's ally. The persistent Avril entered Russia pretending to be a Polish priest, but was soon expelled. Nonetheless, during his stay in Russia he managed to obtain the detailed map of the Siberian route to China prepared by Milescu Spătarul. He was also able to conduct a few interesting conversations with Vasilii Golitsyn and other Russian politicians.⁴²

The Jesuits were active in Moscow for only a short period (1684–1689), yet succeeded in stirring Russian opinion to an astonishing degree while making an important contribution to the life of the Catholic community there. Their ability to gain access to aristocrats and to establish good contacts with enlightened bureaucrats frightened Patriarch Ioakim, who swiftly ordered their expulsion after the coup of 1689. The Jesuits determined to resist the order, and Dowmont offered them shelter in his house. Though soon under siege, the envoy refused to be intimidated, agreeing to send the Jesuits to Poland only after being ordered to do so by Sobieski, who had obtained assurances from the

will . . . adopt the Orthodox Greek faith"; *Russia, Mongolia, China*, ed. John Baddeley (London, 1919), as cited in Vincent Chen, *Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (The Hague, 1966) p. 113. Milescu obtained valuable information from Ferdinand Verbiest, S.J., who had helped him in Beijing. Mark Mancal, *Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 77–78, 98–101. On Milescu's contacts with Jesuits in Moscow, see Georgius David, *Status Modernus*, p. 20.

⁴² Philippe Avril, S.J., *Voyage en divers États d'Europe et d'Asie pour decouvrir un nouveau chemin à la Chine* (Paris, 1693); Georgius David, *Status Modernus*, pp. 10–69; Pierling, *La Russie*, 4: 79–114. Ogiński to Golitsyn, 2 November 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, 1688, ms 3, p. 15.

Kremlin that a priest would be allowed to take the place of the expelled Jesuits.⁴³

Dowmont's defense of the Jesuits brought him closer to the Catholic community as a whole. The Catholics in Russian service were, like the Russians, forbidden to have unauthorized contacts with foreigners, but religious services were not banned. Thus, every Sunday, following mass, which was celebrated in a small chapel in the private home of the wealthy Tuscan merchant Francesco Guasconi, leading members of the Catholic community shared a meal and spent the rest of the day together. On such days, Dowmont occasionally remained as well, sometimes even staying the night, which provided the Department of Foreign Affairs with an opportunity to accuse him of immorality. The Catholic Scotsman Patrick Gordon makes in his diary no fewer than thirty references to meetings and conversations with Dowmont, and there were no doubt others.⁴⁴ General Gordon hints that he had read copies of Sobieski's letters to the tsar shown him by Dowmont. It appears that the Polish resident also attempted to secure, through Gordon's intermediacy, the support of Russian military leaders for more active Polish-Russian collaboration.⁴⁵

The cautious Scotsman avoided any open entanglement in politics, however, even though in the years 1687–1688 he had ample reason to join Dowmont in complaining of Russian perfidy, duplicity, and broken promises. The general was embittered by the rejection of his request for release from Russian service. Of course, like all the other foreign servitors in Moscow, Gordon had been solemnly assured that he would be free to leave upon resigning his commission. He quickly discovered, however, that an exit permit was out of the question. He could have tried to escape, but it would have meant the loss of all his possessions and the endangering of relatives and friends. James II of England also made efforts to free his ardent supporter, seeking to appoint him as England's resident in Moscow. The Russians did not reject the request outright, but postponed consideration of the matter until conclusion of the war with

⁴³ Dowmont was able to detain the Jesuit Terpiłowski in Moscow until July 1690. Patrick Gordon, *Tagebuch des Generals Patrick Gordon während seiner Kriegsdienste unter den Schweden und Polen 1655–1661, und seines Aufenthaltes in Russland 1661–1699*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1851), p. 287.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 206–436.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 212, 213, 222, 230, 234, 238, 240, 303, 307, 319, 328, 330–31, 342.

the Turks. Gordon's petition for a monopoly of the tobacco trade was likewise rebuffed. Sophia and Golitsyn agreed to only one of his requests, permitting his son Theodore to go to Poland to study at the Zamość Academy.⁴⁶ The Scotsman was understandably disgruntled and readily sided with Dowmont in his criticism of Muscovite ways.

Exchanges of visits, letters, and favors suggest an even greater degree of closeness with Dr. Carbonari and with General Menezies. On his departure from Russia, Dowmont tried unsuccessfully to smuggle out their friends Christopher Kohler and Ian Knock, both of whom were held in the service of the tsar against their will. The diplomat also attempted to import or smuggle into Russia an organ needed for the Catholic chapel but banned by the Orthodox as devilish. Carbonari shared with him not only the latest political gossip, but also lettuce and other vegetables raised in his herb garden in the Kremlin.⁴⁷

This is not to say that Patrick Gordon, Carbonari, Menezies, or Guasconi were agents of the Polish resident or sought to supply him secret intelligence to the detriment of Russia. They lived, however, in a situation in which any information at all was regarded as a state secret and meeting with a foreign diplomat involved serious risk. In a world in which everything is secret and everything is forbidden, the boundary between actual state secrets and harmless conversations is easily blurred. The very act of meeting Dowmont was already an infraction, so there was no reason to stop there. Besides, in the highly politicized atmosphere of Moscow in the years 1687–1689 everyone was closely following the conflict between Peter and Sophia, and the city was seething with gossip and rumors from the palace. Dowmont could not fail to hear revealing conversations: military men are in the habit of discussing past and future campaigns. Russians knew that these were forbidden subjects, and they would touch upon them only when drunk or with a clear sense of committing a serious offense. The foreigners living in Russia and serving the tsar, on the other hand, made a point of maintaining their own standards of behavior and ethics, even though they knew about the restrictive Russian rules and their enforcement. While working among

⁴⁶ Gordon to Secretary of State the Earl of Middletown, 17 September 1686, 3 December 1686, 7 and 25 January 1687, The British Museum, ms 41.842, pp. 148, 150, 152, 154. Gordon to Samuel Meverell, 16 September 1687, The British Museum, ms 41.842, p. 159. Gordon, *Tagebuch*, vol. 2, pp. 210, 329.

⁴⁷ Dowmont to Carbonari, 25 February 1694, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 1213–14.

Russians, they observed the rules, or at least pretended to do so. But in their own circles, in church, or in the foreign quarter in general, they emphasized all the more everything that set them apart from the Russians and their repressive political system.

The desire to manifest one's own independence in an alien environment and to give it expression by communicating freely with other foreigners, disregarding the Russian taboos, could also be observed among the children of the foreign residents, who sometimes embraced the Orthodox faith but retained linguistic and cultural ties with their country of origin. Some educated Russians had the same instinctive reaction: they sought to prove their intellectual equality by conversing with foreigners in Latin, enjoyed their ensuing surprise, and eagerly cut themselves off from their "un-European" countrymen.⁴⁸

Polish-Lithuanian Compatriots

In the aftermath of the 1654–55 Russian campaign against the Commonwealth, which resulted in the temporary occupation of the greater part of Lithuania and Belorussia by the tsar's troops, large numbers of the regions' inhabitants were deported to Muscovy. Only some were soldiers—others were merchants, artisans, and even peasants. From 1655, one section of the Moscow suburbs, known as the *Panskaia*, Lithuanian, or *Meshchanskaia* Quarter (*sloboda*) served to house these captives. Dowmont, whose first residence was in this district, reported to Marcjan Ogiński that it once comprised 3,000 houses.⁴⁹ Paul of Aleppo, who visited Russia in 1654–1655, referred to 300,000 prisoners and

⁴⁸ Foreigners were most comfortable in the company of Vasilii Vasil'evich Golitsyn, Andrei Borisovich Golitsyn, Boris Petrovich Sheremetev, and Andrei Andreevich Vinus. Of all the published diaries known to me, only those written by Paul of Aleppo and Thomas Pereira noted a high level of learning among Muscovite officials. The most laudatory statement came from Paul: "For the Muscovites are celebrated for their knowledge and philosophy, their subtlety, ingenuity and perspicacity, and for the profound questions with which they puzzle the learned, and put them to blush. God grant our Lord the Patriarch His assistance to compete with them and to all of us understanding and wisdom, that we may stand among them in honor and esteem!"; *Paul of Aleppo*, vol. 1, pp. 283–304.

⁴⁹ Dowmont to Ogiński, 14 October 1688, AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie II, ms 25, pp. 96–97; "Panska seu Polski Sloboda hanc incolunt Circassii et Poloni per varia bella eo abducti," Georgius David, *Status Modernus*, p. 89.

deportees from the Commonwealth who had been settled in Russia.⁵⁰ Large groups of prisoners of war were transported to Siberia and incorporated into the tsar's army there;⁵¹ the Chinese general Peng-tun, when writing to the defenders of the Albazin fortress on the Amur River, phrased his message not only in Manchu and Russian, but also in Polish.⁵²

Many of the prisoners returned home as a result of the Treaty of 1677, but others had attained a higher social position in Russia than they had enjoyed in the Commonwealth and so married and settled down there. Many of them continued to live in the *Meshchanskaia sloboda*, helping compatriots who came there of their own volition, lured by Muscovite promises of high salaries and excellent career opportunities. The Russians were eager to import teachers, soldiers, physicians, artisans, and domestic servants. Many well-educated plebeians as well as the sons of poor szlachta took the risky journey eastward in hope of a better life. The plebeians generally sought to pass themselves off as noblemen. These immigrants usually found places for themselves in the army or in the households of boyars. Members of the Muscovite elite during this period

⁵⁰ On his way from Ukraine to Muscovy, Paul of Aleppo saw "wagons filled with captives, brought by the Muscovites from the country of the Poles: there were only women and children in them—no men, these being all put to the sword on the scene of action"; vol. 1, p. 297. In his detailed study, A. N. Mał'tsev described Russia's policy toward the population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the Polish-Russian war of 1654–67. According to him, all those taken prisoner and transported to Russia were to remain there. Both Paul of Aleppo and Mał'tsev pointed out an enormous drop in the price of slaves after the taking of Smolensk and other Lithuanian territories. *Paul of Aleppo*, vol. 1, p. 339; Mał'tsev, *Rossia i Belorussia v seredine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 49, 147, 182–90. L. S. Abetsedarskii, *Belorussia i Rossia, XVI–XVII vv.* (Minsk, 1978), pp. 209–49.

⁵¹ "... great numbers of the Polish military and others, amounting to thousands, were settled by the Emperor in the Muscovite territory and stationed in the ranks of his army with regular pay," *Paul of Aleppo*, vol. 2, p. 237; A. Kamieński, "Dyaryusz więzienia moskiewskiego, miast i miejsc," in *Księga zbiorowa ofiarowana księdzu Franciszkowi Bażyńskiemu* (Poznań, 1874), pp. 378–88; S. A. Belokurov "O litsakh soslannykh v Tobol'sk za 1654–1662 gg.," in his *Iz dukhovnoi zhizni Moskovskogo obshchestva XVII v.* (Moscow, 1902), pp. 39–75; Mał'tsev, *Rossia i Belorussia*, p. 147; Abetsedarskii, *Belorussia*, p. 210; D. J. Rezun and I. P. Kamieniecki, "Polacy na Syberii v XVII wieku. Ludzie luzni w Kuznieckim Ostrogu," *Przegląd Historyczny* 78, no. 3 (1987): 395–410. A. I. Rogov, "Poł'skie khudozhniki v Moskve v. XVII v., ikh rol' i znachenie v razvitii rusko-poł'skikh kul'turnykh sviazei ètoi èpokhi," in *Przemiany w Polsce, Rosji na Ukrainie, Białorusi i Litwie, druga połowa XVII–pierwsza połowa XVIII w.*, ed. Juliusz Bardach (Wrocław, 1991), pp. 217–37.

⁵² Sebes, *Jesuits*, p. 69.

commonly employed not only Polish courtiers, but Polish tutors for their children. Such tutors were entrusted with instruction in the Latin and Polish languages, and often in rhetoric as well. By the end of the seventeenth century, there was hardly a boyar court without some Poles in its employ.⁵³

Not all the arrivals were pleased with their fate in Russia, however, and those who sought to return home discovered to their horror that it was much easier to travel eastward than to travel westward. The government would often refuse, on various pretexts, to grant an exit permit, and many of those who had entered into private service found themselves bound by contracts of indenture (*kabala*) which amounted to little more than slavery. Citizens of the Commonwealth thus trapped in Moscow often appealed for help to Polish diplomats in the capital, who could sometimes facilitate their departure. The author of the first ethnographic description of eastern Siberia, Adam Kamieński Dłużyk, who had served in the army of the tsar on the Amur River,⁵⁴ escaped to Poland in 1672; he had been in the entourage of ambassadors Jan Gmiński and Cyprian Brzostowski. A few years later, in 1678, Brzostowski and another envoy, Czartoryski, managed to smuggle out the nobleman Niewiejski, a fugitive from indentured service. Though placed in irons by his master during the diplomats' visit, Niewiejski had nonetheless managed to break free and appeared at the envoys' temporary

⁵³ Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze*, pp. 131–32. In his appeal to Sophia Alekseevna to open an academy, Medvedev indicates that many of his contemporaries hired private teachers of the Greek, Polish, and Latin languages. "Vruchenie Blagovernoi i Khristoliubivoi velikoi Gosudaryne premudroi Tsarevne miloserdnoi Sofii Alekseevne . . ." in *Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika*, vol. 6, ed. N. I. Novikov (Moscow, 1788), pp. 409 and 417.

⁵⁴ The editor of Kamieński Dłużyk's diary was mistaken in thinking that he spent only two years there. In reality, Kamieński Dłużyk spent twelve years in the region. Boris Polevoi, who found archival materials concerning Kamieński's exile in Siberia, provides adequate proof as to the length of his sojourn there. B. B. Polevoi, "Adam Kamienskii-Dluzhik v Vostochnoi Sibiri i istochniki ego etnograficheskikh soobshchenii," in *Historia kontaktów polsko-rosyjskich w dziedzinie etnografii* (Wrocław, 1976), pp. 139–49. See also: A. Kuczyński, *Syberyjskie szlaki* (Wrocław, 1972), pp. 20, 68–70, 75, 106, 116–41, 144; S. Kałużyński, "Najstarsza relacja z wędrówek po Syberii," in *Szkice z dziejów polskiej orientalistyki*, vol. 3 (Warsaw, 1969) pp. 67–82; J. Krzyżanowski, "Pierwszy nasz pamiętnik jeńca-syberaka," *Pamiętnikarstwo polskie* 1973, nos. 3–4, pp. 215–16. Polevoi noted the important role played by Polish prisoners of war in the exploration, description, and cartography of Siberia. Polevoi, "Adam Kamienskii," pp. 145, 148.

residence in Moscow, dragging his chains behind him. He recounted his sufferings as well as those of other Poles in Russia, but despite his story, about a dozen of Czartoryski's servants accepted offers of employment from Russian boyars. It is not known whether any of these shared Niewiejski's fate, but one must assume that the offers must have been generous for them to have ignored the experience of that unhappy nobleman.⁵⁵ Reports of brilliant careers and great rewards were balanced by grim tales of visitors enslaved, sent to distant Siberian garrisons, or denied payment for their work, but for those who knew Muscovy only at second-hand, it was tempting to believe the glittering promises of the Russian recruiters. As a result, Russian ambassador Chadaev was able to recruit several dozen specialists with little difficulty on his trip to Poland in 1687.

Many of those recruited by Chadaev were paid far less than had been promised and their "guaranteed" right of departure was nonexistent. Such was the experience of the goldsmith Balcer de Hensi (along with his family and assistants), Grzegorz Ostrowski, Gabriel Paszkiewicz, Bazyli Brzeski, Mateusz Czechowicz, and many others. All of them appealed to Dowmont, who attempted to help. The difficulty was that the Russians were turning a deaf ear not only to the envoy's interventions, but to Sobieski's. In the Muscovite view, these Polish citizens had made their decision with open eyes and now simply had to live with the consequences.⁵⁶ When appeals proved insufficient, Dowmont had recourse to bribery, smuggling, and recruitment into his own service. All of this helped make him a hero in the eyes of the local Polish community, whose members readily shared with him their knowledge of Russia and the secrets of their masters.

Foreign Diplomats and Russian Agents

Dowmont enjoyed good relations with the other foreign envoys in Moscow. These included Baron Johann van Keller, resident of the United Provinces of the Netherlands; Kristof von Kochen, the Swedish

⁵⁵ Tanner, *Opisanie puteshestviia*, pp. 96–97.

⁵⁶ Letter containing concerns and protestations written by Dowmont and given to the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1688, ms 7, p. 11; Dowmont to Sobieski, 22 July 1688, AGAD Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie V, ms 73, No. 3252.

commissioner; and the Austrian envoy, Johan Ignaz Kurtz, who was in Moscow for only a few months in 1691. The Swedish envoy was obviously eager to keep Russia at war with Turkey. The same was true of van Keller, who carried out his government's instructions first by spending years promoting an anti-Turkish Polish-Russian alliance and then by helping to maintain the best relations possible between Moscow and Warsaw. According to his reports, he met from time to time with his Polish colleague to discuss the political situation and was appraised of the content of some of Sobieski's letters to the tsars. In all probability, he warned Dowmont of secret Russian initiatives aimed at a separate peace with Turkey. These close ties with the Dutch resident were of crucial importance for the Polish envoy, as van Keller had little difficulty learning the secrets of the Department of Foreign Affairs: the departmental official assigned to him, "translator" Leontii Gross, was in fact his paid agent.⁵⁷

The Austrian envoy was likewise on excellent terms with Dowmont, who was aware of his efforts to promote a major Russian offensive in the Crimea and supported them wholeheartedly. It was for this reason that Dowmont took the risky step of visiting the Austrian immediately after the Austrian's arrival in Moscow and before his audience with the tsar, in open violation of the rules of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The *strel'tsy* guarding the Austrian residence tried to stop him, but Dowmont ignored their cries, knocked them over as he galloped past, and leaped over the barrier into the embassy compound.⁵⁸

We know the name of only one of Dowmont's paid Russian informers, Afanasii Vasil'ev, an assistant *d'iak* in the Department of Foreign Affairs. The two became acquainted in 1689, when Vasil'ev accompanied the Jesuits expelled from Russia to the Polish border. Dowmont joined the convoy for part of the way, and probably maintained relations with Vasil'ev thereafter. In 1691 Vasil'ev was sent to Warsaw, but after a

⁵⁷ *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder*, vol. 1, ed. L. Bittner and L. Grass (Berlin, 1936), pp. 361, 498, 161. See also M. I. Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident," pp. 63–65, 118–28 and others; S. A. Belokurov, "Spiski diplomaticheskikh lits russkikh za granitse i inostrannykh pri russkom dvore," in *Sbornik Moskovskogo glavnogo arkhiva Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1893), pp. 244–45; "Moskva v 1687–1688 gg.," pp. 122–29.

⁵⁸ Records of Dowmont's conversations at the Department of Foreign Affairs, 2 May 1691 (o.s.), TsGADA, fond 79, vol. 240, pp. 187–88; Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident," p. 123.

year Mikhailov, then resident, shipped him back to Moscow under *strel'tsy* escort. The Russian ambassador explained that "Afonka engaged in excessive drunkenness, and one could no longer trust him with the tsar's great affairs, as it was to be feared that he might commit some foolish or harmful act."⁵⁹ The disgraced Vasil'ev denied the charge, admitting to excessive drunkenness on only one occasion, and that at a reception held by the king for the Russian resident. However, the Smolensk *sotennyi strelets*, Aleshko Borisov, who escorted Vasil'ev, testified that he had been drunk in every tavern along the way. No credence was given to Vasil'ev's explanations, and he was dismissed from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, he eked out a living writing official letters for clients. He wrote one such letter for Dowmont in February 1693, which dealt with the alleged financial abuses of the *d'iak* Volkov. Since most of Dowmont's communications were in Polish, one written in Russian aroused the curiosity of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The assistant *d'iaki* were unanimous in ascribing its authorship to Vasil'ev. He was summoned to the Department in March and vigorously interrogated by Ukraintsev, who became convinced that Vasil'ev had served as Dowmont's informant since the Jesuits' expulsion. Vasil'ev was also charged with having sold Dowmont the code used by the Russians in diplomatic correspondence. He denied everything, but his protests were in vain: the matter was submitted to the tsar and the Boyar Duma, which handed down a sentence of flogging on a whipping horse, tantamount to a sentence of death. However, thanks to the intercession of the other assistant *d'iaki*, who gave their pledge that Vasil'ev would never visit the Polish resident or any of his aides again, the sentence was commuted to a whipping at the Department of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁰ The Department also changed its code.

Dowmont never mentions Vasil'ev by name in any of his reports, but that is not surprising, since he was generally very cautious about mentioning any of his informants directly. While he obviously used a code, he was aware that codes could be broken, and thus would describe the source of his information in such vague terms as "a highly placed person," "intimates of the court," "a person friendly to me and privy to local secrets." In this respect, he differed from his Russian colleagues,

⁵⁹ Mikhailov to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 21 February 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 750.

⁶⁰ Record of Vasil'ev's interrogations, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 248–52.

who, as we have seen (p.134), named agents when they felt it to be necessary.

Evaluation of the Polish Resident

Thus, even working within the hermetically sealed Russian system and barred from any but officially sanctioned sources of information, the Polish resident established a fairly extensive network of informants.⁶¹ At the same time, he managed, despite the obstacles placed in his way, to propagate the Polish viewpoint in Moscow and to spread news of Polish military and political initiatives. Golitsyn's efforts to get rid of him offer some measure of the success of his mission. Ukraintsev likewise regarded Dowmont as a serious adversary. Unofficially, he was held in wary esteem. The official complaints against him to Poland, however, presented him in the worst possible light: as an irresponsible individual who sent to Warsaw a concoction of wild tales and gossip gleaned from the marketplace and tavern, whose activities endangered the alliance and could even lead—"which God forbend"—to an outbreak of war between the two countries. What else, the *d'iaki* argued, could be expected from such a violent man, given to dueling and brawling and encouraging his servants to do likewise, a man who had treated the highest dignitaries of the Russian state with insolence and who, instead of spending the night at his own home, "went to places where he should not have been."⁶²

Dowmont, on the other hand, liked to present himself as a man going blind from overwork, condemned to a fruitless existence in a hostile environment. He pointed out the futility of prolonging the residency, which, in his view, was producing no positive results. He begged to be recalled to Poland, and his pleas were eventually heeded in 1693. (The Russians, though, refused to grant him a farewell audience until February 1694.)⁶³

⁶¹ Dowmont to Szczuka, 19 January 1691, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 18, p. 714; Dowmont to Sobieski, 18 December 1688, AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie V, ms 73, No. 3252; Dowmont to Dominik Radziwiłł, 12 August 1688, *ibid.*; Dowmont to Sobieski, 20 August 1693, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 162, vol. 1, p. 594.

⁶² Russian complaints about Dowmont's behavior were given in summarized form to Okrasa, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1691, ms 6, pp. 164–70. Accusations of stirring up war hysteria were especially strong in Golitsyn's letter to Sobieski of 12 August 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1688, ms 6, pp. 242–50.

⁶³ TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1691, ms 6, p. 166. Sobieski's letter

In closing down his mission, the Polish envoy had no sense of failure. He knew that Sobieski had appreciated his work. He was aware that his personal courage and strenuous efforts had even won him the grudging respect of his hosts. He had likewise come to have a better understanding of the Russians with whom he had dealt, and even though his relations with Ukraintsev had been quite tense, he called on him before his departure to apologize for the many harsh words he had spoken in their prolonged negotiations.

Reading the thousands of pages that record Dowmont's conversations with Golitsyn and Ukraintsev, one gathers that after a few months in Russia he adjusted his reactions to local standards. He no longer reacted to the patently false statements of Russian officials, accepting them as a ritualistic recitation of official tsarist policy rather than as an expression of their actual views. He realized that it was counterproductive to pin down evident falsehoods and that better results, or at least greater efficiency, could be achieved by a clear statement of one's own position and criticism of the Russian stand based on the letter rather than the spirit of the Treaty. Dowmont viewed his position in Moscow as that not only of a representative of his king, but also of a public servant and citizen of the Commonwealth. Highly critical of his country at home, as were all members of the *szlachta*, he was its proud champion abroad.

He did not overrate his own role or the importance of his mission. He was thorough and industrious in the performance of his duties, diligent and perceptive, but not creative or innovative. His capacity to analyze the Russian situation or to draw broader conclusions from his experience was rather limited. Yet few foreigners if any had a better knowledge of the workings of the Russian bureaucracy, particularly those of the Department of Foreign Affairs. No one had a better sense of the trends of opinion in Russian circles of the complex interplay of the palace cliques. It was, however, an expertise confined to the conventional interests of the Polish court and politically sophisticated observers. Dowmont failed to direct the attention of the king, the Senate, the Parliament, or Polish public opinion to problems beyond the traditional realm of diplomacy. He did not seem to be aware, for example, of the

recalling Dowmont back to Poland (11 May 1693) and the ensuing negotiations, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 832, 836–37, 917–18, 968–69, 987, 991.

crucial importance of the contest within the Orthodox church between the "Latinists" and the "Greeks." He was oblivious to the promise of ideological and possibly political change augured by Latinism, which carried with it a heavy dose of Polish cultural influence. He did not seem to realize the vast differences between the church and the clergy in Kiev and those in Moscow. In his reports he favored the Latinists merely because they endeavored to weaken the position of Patriarch Ioakim, who was hostile not only to the Poles but to all foreigners.

Another area largely overlooked by Dowmont was that of trade between Poland and Russia. He failed to perceive the new opportunities opened to Poland after the peace of 1686, which settled the matter of customs duties and the movement of merchants. We know that Mahilëŭ, almost totally destroyed in 1657, was being rebuilt during his residency and by 1700 would outgrow Minsk, Smolensk, and Brest. It reportedly comprised 20,000 houses and thrived on trade with Russia, which contributed to the prosperity of many other Lithuanian towns. The Polish resident, familiar with Russian conditions, could have recommended the establishment of a trading post in Moscow or could have pointed to the opportunities of the silk trade. If he had been at all cognizant of commercial problems, he could at least have sketched the economic situation of Russia, for example, as Poland's competitor in the export of agricultural products and timber to Western Europe. The closest he came to dealing with these matters was to report on the unjust taxation of Polish-Lithuanian merchants by Russian border officials, a constant source of friction between the two states. Moreover, he focused narrowly on Polish-Russian relations without presenting them in the broader context of Russian relations with China and the various peoples of the Caspian and Central Asian steppe.

On the other hand, Dowmont was a keen-eyed observer and never lacked for common sense. Hence his cool reception to the Naryshkins' hint about the possible return to Poland of Kiev in exchange for assistance in elevating Peter to the throne. He saw no practical advantage in the proposition, which he interpreted as evidence of the intensity of the struggle for power. He took into account the state of war between Poland and Turkey, which also had claims to the east bank of the Dnieper. Finally, if the palace feuds degenerated into civil war, Poland would have a fair chance of recapturing her lost territories without the consent of the Naryshkins. An entanglement in dubious negotiations was likely to provide the Russians with proof that the king of Poland

was merely waiting for an opportune moment to break the Eternal Peace.⁶⁴

Dowmont's cool-headed analysis of the Naryshkin proposal speaks well for him. He was not a statesman or a prominent politician. He was on the whole a fairly typical member of the Polish szlachta, the source of the Commonwealth's strength, but also a source of its weakness, given the narrow focus of their interests and their overly optimistic desire to serve the interests of the Commonwealth abroad, yet restore and maintain the blessed state of peace.

⁶⁴ Dowmont to Sobieski, 1688, AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie II, ms 25, p. 144. Sobieski may have thought that Natal'ia Naryshkina and her clan might part with Ukraine in exchange for his help in securing the throne for Peter. J. Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej*, p. 31 (the Zadiński mentioned there is actually Ładyński).

CHAPTER FIVE

The Ukrainian Paradox

“From the moment we came within sight of the Monastery of the Caves, its cupolas glittering in the distance, and the first scent reached us of these glowering lands, our souls thrilled with gladness and exultation, our hearts expanded, and we overflowed in thanksgiving to the Lord our God. During these two years in Moscow a padlock had been set on our hearts, and we were going out of our minds; for in these countries no foreigner can feel free or cheerful . . . Though he become sovereign of the whole territory, his mind would always be in turmoil, his heart full of anxiety. The country of the Cossacks, on the contrary, was like our own country to us, and its inhabitants were to us boon companions, fellows like ourselves.”

Paul of Aleppo

The Travels of Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch

The social and political structure of the semiautonomous Cossack state was closer to that of the Commonwealth than to Russian autocracy. The Cossack *starshyna* (military aristocracy) enjoyed in Ukraine a position similar to that of the *szlachta* in Poland, and consciously copied the latter's way of life. Inspired by Western thought and artistic forms, the culture of Ukraine was particularly influenced by Polish culture. Yet, despite these affinities, when the Ukrainian elite failed to gain national independence and was forced to accept foreign domination, it chose Russia over Poland.¹

¹ The historical literature on seventeenth-century Ukraine is large in volume and diverse in interpretation. The fundamental studies include: M. Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, new ed., 10 vols. (New York, 1954–58); M. I. [N. I.] Kostomarov, *Ruina and Mazepa i Mazepintsy*, vols. 6 and 16 in his *Sobranie sochinenii* (St. Petersburg, 1903–1905); V. Lypyns'kyi (W. Lipiński), *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Kiev and Cracow, 1912); V. A. Miakotin, *Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII vv.*, vol. 1 (Prague, 1924–26); S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, books 6 and 7 (Moscow, 1961 and 1962). This collection has been enriched by the monographs of J. Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec sprawy Ukrainy na przełomie XVII–XVIII w.* (Wrocław, 1963); V. A. Diadychenko, *Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu livoberezhnoi Ukraïny kintsia XVII stolittia* (hereafter cited as *Narysy*) (Kiev, 1959); Z. Wójcik, *Dzikie pola w ogniu* (Warsaw, 1957); O. Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan*

The rejection of the Commonwealth by the starshyna cannot be explained simply by invoking "the eternal desire of Russians and Ukrainians for reunification" or the "angelic" naïveté of the Ukrainians up against the "diabolical" character of Russian diplomacy. Attempts (quite popular in historiography) to explain the choice of Russia by suggesting that the masses pressured the pro-Polish starshyna to serve Russia loyally do not, needless to say, withstand close scrutiny. The dilemma can be resolved only by examining the concrete political moves made by Poland and Russia, and the reactions to them within Ukrainian society.

The Ukrainian lands, once the cradle of the powerful Kievan Rus' state, were under continuous foreign domination after the mid-thirteenth century. The Tatars were replaced as overlords by the Lithuanians (1363), who in turn were replaced by the Poles (1569). Following incorporation into Poland in that year, the Ukrainian nobility enjoyed all the rights and privileges of the Commonwealth szlachta and underwent a slow process of Polonization.² Ukrainian oligarchs, such as the Vyshnevets'kyi and Ostroz'kyi families, shared control over the political life of the territory with a few Polish newcomers, such as the Koniecpolski and Potocki families, who were granted vast latifundia. The townsmen were free and exercised various degrees of control over municipal administration, usually through the Orthodox burghers. An abundance of fertile land and minimal service obligations attracted migration from the north and west, but the process of colonization was slowed by constant, devastating Tatar raids.³

Mazepa ta ioho doba (New York, 1960) [=Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka (hereafter ZNTSh), vol. 170]; L. Okinshevych, *Znachne viiskove tovarystvo v Ukraïni-Het'manshchyni v XVII–XVIII st.* (Munich, 1948) [=ZNTSh, vol. 157]; A. Martel, *La langue polonaise dans le pays ruthenes: Ukraine et Russie Blanche, 1569–1667* (Lille, 1938); F. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985). For additional titles consult D. Doroshenko, "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography" and O. Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Historiography, 1917–1953," in *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, vol. 5–6 (New York, 1957).

² J. Pelenski, "The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Lands of Old Rus' into Crown Poland (1569): Socio-Material Interest and Ideology—A Re-examination," in *American Contributions to the Seventh International Congress of Slavists*, Warsaw, 21–27 August 1973, vol. 3, ed. A. Cienciala (The Hague, 1973), pp. 19–52; and O. Halecki, *Przyłączenie Podlasia, Wołyń i Kijowszczyzny do Korony w roku 1569* (Cracow, 1915).

³ M. Horn, "Chronologia i zasięg najazdów tatarskich w latach 1600–1647," in *Materiały do Historii Wojskowości*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Warsaw, 1962), pp. 3–71; *Historia*

The once-dominant Orthodox church had to tolerate the incursion of Catholicism, especially after the incorporation into Poland. In the previously established Catholic bishopric of Kiev, many new churches were built, monasteries and schools founded, and an active program of missionary work launched by the Jesuits. The position of the Orthodox church was further undermined by numerous conversions to Catholicism, especially among members of the *szlachta*. Finally, in 1596, the majority of the Orthodox hierarchy broke away and established the Uniate church. Known as the Union of Brest, this act of submission to papal authority led to the temporary (1596–1634) outlawing of the Orthodox hierarchy and the threatened confiscation of its possessions. It obliged opponents of the Union, entrenched in many Orthodox monasteries, to search desperately for support. They found it first in the Orthodox aristocracy (e.g., the Ostrozkyis) and later in the Cossacks who had challenged the power of the aristocracy in the Ukrainian lands since the late sixteenth century.⁴

The Cossacks

The Turkic term *quzzaq* was recorded by Polish chroniclers as early as the fourteenth century. It was a name given not to an ethnic community, but to brigands, the hired guards of caravans, or bands of adventurers living outside the structure of society. Whole settlements of Cossacks appeared on the borderlands between the nomadic steppe and the Russian and Ukrainian agriculturalists. The inability of Poland-Lithuania to protect its borders against the Tatars led to the formation of a special substratum of the population composed of free men dwelling in the

chana Islam Gereja III, ed. and trans Z. Abrahamowicz (Warsaw, 1971); Z. Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674–1679* (Wrocław, 1976), pp. 5–92; O. M. Apanovych, *Zaporiz'ka Sich u borot'bi proty turets'ko-tatars'koï ahresii, 50–70 roky XVII st.* (Kiev, 1961).

⁴ On the Orthodox church and its fate in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, see: A. Amman, *Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte* (Vienna, 1950); J. Woliński, *Polska i kościół prawosławny* (L'viv, 1936); L. Bieńkowski, "Organizacja kościoła wschodniego w Polsce," in *Kościół w Polsce*, ed. J. Kłoczowski, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1969), pp. 781–1049; E. Kaminskyi, *De potestate metropolitaram Kioviensium-Haliciensium (a. 1569–1805)* (Rome, 1969); E. Golubinskii, *Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1901–1904); O. Halecki, *From Florence to Brest, 1439–1569* (Rome, 1958); Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine*, pp. 26–36.

borderland strongholds. In peacetime, the Cossacks were perceived by the szlachta—and rightly so—as challenging the existing social order, establishing a refuge for peasants, and competing in the process of colonization. But in time of war enmities were forgotten, since only the Cossacks could be quickly mobilized for the defense of local territory. While war was their forte, they also engaged in cattle raising, fishing, the salt trade, and crafts.

During the sixteenth century, groups of Cossacks established permanent settlements on islands of the lower Dnieper, an area that became known as the Zaporozhian Sich. When engaged in military expeditions, they organized themselves in regiments commanded by elected leaders, or hetmans. Their military usefulness was formally recognized by the Polish king, Sigismund Augustus, who introduced a Cossack division as a permanent part of the Polish army in 1572. From that time on, Cossacks were divided by the Poles into two categories: the registered Cossacks, that is, those paid by the Crown treasury and protected by the king; and the non-registered Cossacks, who felt they were treated unjustly as outcasts. The latter demanded the same treatment accorded their registered “brothers,” and often took employment in the private armies of powerful local lords, or chose the free but insecure life of the Sich.⁵

Parliament increased the number of registered Cossacks in wartime and decreased it in peacetime, a practice that had an adverse effect on Cossack relations with the Commonwealth. Discharged Cossacks usually rebelled and were able to inspire and lead peasants and burghers, enlisting masses of villagers and townsmen in their support. Polish-Lithuanian wars with Sweden (1601–1609, 1626–1629), Russia (1610–1619), and Turkey (1620–1621) raised the size of the Cossack army to 20,000 men. Attempts to reduce the number to 6,000 led to uprisings which were put down only after a series of prolonged and bloody civil wars (1625, 1629–1630, 1635, 1637–1638). During these uprisings the Cossacks were promoted by the Orthodox clergy as defenders of the faith, while the broad masses of the peasantry saw them as allies against the landowners. The Cossacks saw themselves as a knightly class

⁵ Wójcik, *Dzikie pola w ogniu*; V. Golubutskii, *Zaporozhskoe kozachestvo* (Kiev, 1957); W. Tomkiewicz, “O składzie społecznym i etnicznym kozaczyzny ukrainnej na przełomie XVI–XVII wieku,” in *Przegląd Historyczny* 37 (1948): 249–60.

deserving special rights and privileges similar to the szlachta's. They bolstered their argument for special status by claiming hereditary links to the knights of Kievan princes in medieval times. On numerous occasions they submitted their demands to Parliament, but their requests were denied; instead, in 1638 Parliament reduced the role of the 6,000 registered Cossacks to that of auxiliary troops under Polish command, while all other Cossacks were made serfs.⁶

In response to this policy, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, having proclaimed himself hetman, organized a number of disparate forces in the extraordinary uprising of 1648—extraordinary because it became the first decisive victory over Poland in 60 years of Cossack uprisings. As a result a semi-autonomous state was established, comprising the southeastern provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Khmel'nyts'kyi rallied Cossacks, the Orthodox hierarchy, the peasantry, the burghers, and even Tatars. He seized lands belonging to the Polish Crown, the Catholic church, the lords, and all the squires who refused to join in the uprising. These lands were distributed among the Cossack starshyna or kept by the hetman. The administration of Ukraine was entrusted to regimental commanders. Cities retained their former rights, but now had to pay taxes to the Cossack military government. Peasants remained bound by feudal obligations, but in reality their situation was improved because the new regime was unable to impose a feudal order, especially since the peasants had joined in fighting the Polish oligarchs. As the Cossack government consolidated its power, however, serf obligations were gradually enforced.

After the initial success of his uprising against Poland-Lithuania, Khmel'nyts'kyi realized that his forces would need help to withstand Commonwealth retaliation. Therefore he turned first to Turkey, and, when that overture failed, to Russia. In 1654 he placed himself and his state under the protection of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich by signing the Pereiaslav Treaty, a move which precipitated war between Poland and Russia. It was as a result of this long and devastating war (1654–1667) that Ukraine was partitioned: Muscovy held Kiev and the east bank of the Dnieper, and Poland held the west bank. It was this partition of

⁶ "Ordynacja wojska Zaporowskiego Regestrowego w służbie Rzpltej będącego," in *Volumina Legum. Prawa, konstytucje y przywileie Królestwa Polskiego, Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego y wszystkich prowincyi należących*, vol. 3, ed. Józafat Ohryzko (St. Petersburg, 1859), p. 440.

Ukraine, the basis of the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667), that was recognized as permanent by the Eternal Peace Treaty of 1686.⁷

Polish Influence

The Cossack ascendancy in Ukraine had accelerated the growth of their elite. Cossack regimental leaders quickly acquired considerable wealth and power and formed a new class, fairly accessible to "new men," that enjoyed economic and political rights equivalent to those of the Commonwealth's szlachta. Cossack leaders, many of whom were of szlachta descent or ennobled by virtue of their military service, replaced lords in the new Ukrainian social structure and endeavored to secure their rights as landed gentry: control over the estates they had seized or purchased, and a decisive voice in the government. Notwithstanding their political contacts with Turkey or Moscow, the Cossack starshyna adopted the style of the Polish szlachta, whose dominant characteristic was a sense of personal dignity. Cossack discourse was full of references to "rights," "lawful privileges," "freedoms," and "charters," terms which were part of the political rhetoric of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Children of the starshyna and szlachta attended schools with the same curriculum, read the same books, and attached the same importance to genealogy and family crests. Furthermore, just as the Polish szlachta had endeavored, successfully, to restrict the king's prerogatives, so, too, their Cossack counterparts worked toward limiting the hetman's power and securing for themselves a measure of control over the Zaporozhian military forces. From the moment that the elite took over the role of the Polish nobility in Ukraine, it entered into conflict with both the hetman and the rank-and-file Cossacks, and was forced to search for means of consolidating and perpetuating its social position.

The hetman, who usually attempted to change his elective office into a hereditary one, embodied the monarchical component of Ukraine. He ruled by securing all important army posts for his adherents, thereby

⁷ I. Kryp'iakevych, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* (Kiev, 1954); Kostomarov, *Ruina*; Z. Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* (Warsaw, 1959); idem, *Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667–1672* (Warsaw, 1968); idem, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674–1679* (Wrocław, 1976); C. Bickford O'Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine* (Berkeley, 1963).

building a powerful clientele. The rank and file of the Cossack army, on the other hand, vigorously defended direct republicanism. Constitutionalism with strong oligarchic overtones was characteristic of the starshyna. However, in attempting to increase his power, the hetman increased the ranks of the starshyna at the same time through new appointments. The starshyna, though capable of removing a hetman, could not function without one due to the military character of their state organization. Therefore, paradoxically, the hetman and the starshyna, promoters and defenders of Ukrainian independence in the second half of the seventeenth century, found themselves locked in permanent conflict—another element in the decision to secure outside help.

Ultimately it was Moscow that offered a resolution, while Warsaw tried to reimpose the conditions existing in Ukraine prior to the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising. The failure of the Polish szlachta to strike a deal with their Ukrainian counterparts and the ability of Muscovite diplomats to exploit the strife between hetman and starshyna reveal more of the practical capabilities of both systems than does the study of their inner structures and ideological messages. Whatever may be said of the advantages of a mixed form of government over the stifling atmosphere of autocracy, it is apparent that the tsar was much more successful than the Commonwealth in winning support in Ukraine.

Poland's failure was due in part to the fact that the Commonwealth allowed the king to shape its Ukrainian policy. Sobieski, like his predecessor, saw in the Cossacks a useful tool for increasing his royal power, so instead of encouraging their merger with the Commonwealth szlachta he tried to keep them as a separate estate. At the same time neither the szlachta in general nor Parliament in particular was concerned with the intricacies of the Ukrainian social and political situation. In the opinion of most szlachta, the Cossacks were merely commoners aspiring to political equality, armed troublemakers unworthy of acceptance into the noble brotherhood. In short, they were a menace. Anti-Cossack propaganda, particularly strong during Khmel'nyts'kyi's uprising, blinded the szlachta to the realities of Ukrainian life and to the similarities between themselves and the starshyna, although a number of contemporary Polish writers and politicians had noted the birth of a new Cossack nation in Ukraine and urged the szlachta to reexamine Poland's eastern policy.⁸

⁸ Samuel Twardowski, *Wojna domowa z Kozaki i Tatary* (Kalisz, 1681), p. 265. Sobieski to Bishop Małachowski, 23 January and 13 March 1671, *Pisma do wieku i*

Initially (1658–1659), Parliament had agreed to accept Ukraine as a new, third partner in the Commonwealth, co-equal with Poland and Lithuania, but it had done so reluctantly and only briefly before reverting to its previous policy of domination. But rule over Ukraine without the strong support of even a part of its population had proved impossible for the Commonwealth, which did not possess a powerful standing army. The starshyna, which had been interested in establishing a political system in Ukraine like that of the rest of Poland, proved too weak to control the internal situation during a time of competition for power between the hetman and the rank and file of the Cossack army.⁹

Role of the Clergy

The hierarchy of the Orthodox church, which was highly instrumental in formulating Cossack demands, offered some degree of support to the starshyna. Since 1480 the Orthodox hierarchy in the territories of Poland-Lithuania had been headed by the metropolitan of Kiev, who recognized the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. After 1596, when most Orthodox prelates in the Commonwealth concluded a church union with Rome, the Orthodox church suffered from the pressures of the newly created Uniate church, which enjoyed the support of the Polish king and the Catholic clergy. Despite strong religious friction with the Uniates, the Orthodox hierarchy, as we have seen, did not welcome tsarist rule in Ukraine and refused—for the time being—to recognize the authority of the patriarch of Moscow, trying instead to maintain political ties with the

spraw Jana Sobieskiego, ed. F. Kluczycki, pt. 1 (Cracow, 1880), pp. 618–19, 631 [= *Akta historyczne do objaśnienia rzeczy polskich służące*, vol. 2, pt. 1]. On national consciousness in Ukraine, see F. Sysyn, "Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 3/4 (1985): 393–423.

⁹ With the exception of Khmel'nyts'kyi, not one seventeenth-century Cossack hetman remained in office until his natural death; all were murdered, executed, or removed from office. The death of Briukhovets'kyi and the banishment of Mnohohrishnyi and Samoilovych were orchestrated by the Cossack starshyna: *Litopys samovydtisia*, ed. Ia. I. Dzira (Kiev, 1971), pp. 105, 106–107, 112–13, 118, 144. See also: L. Okinshevych, "Heneral'na starshyna na livoberezhnii Ukraïni XVII–XVIII st.," in *Pratsi Komisii dlia vyuchuvannia istorii zakhidnorus'koho ta ukrains'koho prava*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1926); idem, *Znachne viiskove tovarystvo v Ukraïni Het'manshchyni XVII–XVIII st.* (Munich 1948) [= *ZNTSh*, vol. 157]. On the education of the Cossack elite, see: G. Gajecy, "The Kiev Mohyla Academy and the Hetmanate," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 1/2 (1984): 81–92.

Polish Commonwealth, and religious ones with Constantinople.

This policy was not the result of a lack of fervor, for of all the existing Orthodox hierarchies, the Ukrainian clergy was probably the one most aware of the threat posed by Catholicism. It simply felt capable of winning the battle for spiritual leadership over the Orthodox population living in the Commonwealth. The great reform of the Ukrainian church undertaken by Peter Mohyla in the first half of the seventeenth century began to bear fruit. The Kiev Academy which he founded became one of the foremost centers of contemporary Orthodox scholarship. The Kiev Academy had a nearly identical curriculum as the Jesuit colleges and used the same textbooks, except for those on subjects of a strictly theological nature. The Ukrainian students at the Kiev Academy, like their Polish counterparts, learned poetry, rhetoric, dialectics, physics, and logic, and they benefitted from the academy's library, which comprised a rich collection of works written in Polish. Thus the Kiev Academy became a propagator of Western, "Latin" culture in Ukraine. Although the teaching of art, literature, architecture, and law imparted cultural values typical of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the academy was also open to the intellectual and artistic influences of Greece, Moldavia, and Moscow.¹⁰

Many of the graduates of the Kievan Academy won important positions within the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox church or found employment in the Russian army and bureaucracy. In Moscow, Ukrainian and Belorussian priests, scholars, writers, and bureaucrats exerted significant influence on education and culture, but they offered an image of society whose political culture was contrary to the autocratic model. By promoting Western ideas and Western ways, conquered Kiev soon became a Trojan horse within the Russian Empire.¹¹

¹⁰ A. Jabłonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska* (Cracow, 1899–1900), pp. 165–73; S. I. Golubev, *Kievskaja akademija v kontse XVI i nachale XVII v.* (Kiev, 1901); R. Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej a literatura polska* (Cracow, 1966); L. R. Lewitter, "Poland, the Ukraine and Russia in the Seventeenth Century," in *Slavonic and East European Review* 27 (1948): 157–71; J. Cracraft, "Theology at the Kiev Academy during its Golden Age," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 1/2 (1984): 71–80.

¹¹ L. R. Lewitter, "The Russo-Polish Treaty of 1686 and its Antecedents," *Polish Review* 9, no. 3/4 (New York, 1964): 7. See also K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorosiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'* (Kazan', 1914), pp. 250–488; Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu*, pp. 105–109; F. B. Kormchyk, *Dukhovi vplyvy na Moskovshchynu v dobi*

At first, both the tsar and the patriarch were eager to bring the Kiev scholars to Moscow. Even Symeon Polots'kyi, the tutor of the tsar's children, with his Aristotelian views on the nature of tyranny,¹² did not immediately call forth any alarming associations in the minds of Aleksei Mikhailovich and his advisors. However, eventually Patriarch Ioakim began to suspect the Kiev scholars of "Latin" tendencies and banned all books printed in Ukraine. Yet the governments of Fedor (1676–1682) and Sophia (1682–1689), despite strong opposition from the patriarch, favored the "Latinists." The downfall of Sophia's government brought about the trial and execution of Sil'vestr Medvedev, the leader of the "Latinist" movement, but by this time "Ukrainian learning" was already firmly entrenched in Russia and by the end of the seventeenth century clergymen trained in Kiev would assume control of the Russian church. They would do so simply by becoming servants of the new tsar, who was fighting to subordinate the church to secular authority by means of administrative reforms.¹³

In East-Bank Ukraine the Kievan monks did not immediately accept subservience to Moscow. Men such as Peter Mohyla, Syl'vester Kosov, and Stefan Iavors'kyi, deeply imbued with the notion of a szlachta republic, were unable to perceive any practical benefits from recognizing the autocratic tsar as an ideal, God-chosen ruler. Certainly they were willing to respect a secular authority, but like the Catholic clergy of the Commonwealth, they could not accept a supreme state authority capable of jailing them without a trial, sending them into exile, confining them to a monastery, or sentencing them to flogging. They believed in the right to appeal administrative decisions either before the appropriate court, the assembly of noble brethren in a local council, or Parliament when it

Het'mans'koï Ukraïny (New York, 1964), pp. 63–100; V. Èingorn, *O snosheniiakh malorossiiskogo dukhovenstva s Moskovskim pravitel'stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (Moscow, 1899).

¹² "Kto es' tsar' i kto es' tiran, khoshcheshi li znati / Aristotelia knigi potshchisia chitati . . . / Tsar' poddanym pribytkov ishchet i zhelaet / Tiran poki pri zhitii vsiako ishchet sebe / O gradzhdanstei nimalo pechalen potrebe." Symeon Polots'kyi, cited after A. S. Demin, "Russkie p'sesy 1670-kh godov i pridvorna kultura," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 27 (1972): 276.

¹³ P. Smirnov, *Ioakim, patriarkh moskovskii* (Moscow, 1881), pp. 108–145; S. P. Lapunov, *Kniga v Rossii v XVII veke* (Leningrad, 1970), pp. 15–20, 31, 53, 126; Georges Florovsky, *Puti russkogo bogosloviia* (Paris, 1937), pp. 52, 55, 75–81.

was in session. Their outlook clashed dramatically with the practices current in Muscovy, and the satisfaction of belonging to the dominant faith or of being free from the pressure of Catholicism was insufficient compensation for the trauma the Orthodox experienced. Eventually, however, when the see of the Kiev metropolitan became subject to the control of the Muscovite patriarch (1686), and as career advancement came to depend on the display of subservience to the tsar, Kiev graduates would slowly become obedient servants of autocracy.¹⁴

Despite their growing dependency on the Muscovite autocrat, the Kiev "Latinists" were an important force in the political life of Ukraine, and their support was sought by both hetman and starshyna. Just as the hierarchy found itself falling more and more under the control of Moscow, so the Cossack hetmans found themselves becoming increasingly dependent on the tsar for support in their quest for a dominant position.

The Union of Hadiach

This quest was representative of the general political tendency among Cossack military leaders, but it was not the only tendency. Khmel'nyts'kyi's immediate successor, Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, had attempted to reconcile his interests as hetman with those of the starshyna. The terms of the compromise can be read in the text of the Union of Hadiach (1658), concluded between the Cossacks and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The treaty had provided for the establishment of the Grand Duchy of Rus', comprising the provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv; it was to have its own administration, treasury, army, and judiciary. According to the treaty 100 members of the starshyna from each regiment were to be ennobled and granted the same privileges as the szlachta. The Cossack hetman was automatically to become the palatine of Kiev, a position which ensured him a seat in the Senate. He was also permitted to maintain a force of 10,000 mercenaries, a privilege which even the kings of Poland did not enjoy. Finally, the hetman and the higher-ranking Cossack military leaders were to receive large grants of crown lands, and were to retain all feudal rights over the peasants on their estates. The agreement also protected the interests of the Orthodox

¹⁴ J. Cracraft, *The Church Reforms of Peter the Great* (Stanford, 1971), p. 58 and passim.

hierarchy: the metropolitan of Kiev and five bishops were to be admitted to the Senate, and the Orthodox faith was to be guaranteed special privileges throughout the Commonwealth.¹⁵

The Hadiach Union was ratified by the Polish Parliament, the hetman, the Cossack elders, and the Orthodox hierarchy. However, it was never implemented, due to the opposition of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and others among the Ukrainian population, who feared the return of *szlachta* rule. The vast majority of the rank-and-file Cossacks feared they might become, at best, an intermediary class between the nobility and the serfs, for their upward mobility would be greatly hindered, if not precluded. They believed that all authority wielded by the Zaporozhian army would pass into the hands of the ennobled *starshyna* and the hetman, who would command both the Zaporozhian Cossacks and a force of private mercenaries.¹⁶

Sponsored by the privileged members of Ukrainian society, the Hadiach agreement had been rejected by the non-privileged. The Zaporozhian Sich, which represented the model "Cossack way of life," was particularly opposed to the Hadiach concept or, for that matter, any centralist concept. A kind of republic—one with a hierarchy under its elected hetman—the Zaporozhian Sich continued its traditional existence as a military community of equals, governed along democratic lines. Having no territorial aspirations, its primary concern was the "professional" status of the Cossacks as free-lance soldiers. While the Sich was willing to offer its military services for hire, it absolutely refused to obey orders that might conflict with its interests. Although it had sided with Khmel'nyts'kyi and had contributed to his success, the Sich did not participate in his state-building efforts and challenged his authority. Its experience with Khmel'nyts'kyi caused the Sich to distrust all Cossack hetmans, especially those collaborating with Poland or Russia and capable of endangering the freedoms they enjoyed.¹⁷

Throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century, hetmans, Orthodox churchmen, and the *starshyna* remained dedicated to the idea of

¹⁵ For the text of the Hadiach Treaty, see: *Volumina Legum*, vol. 4, pp. 297–300. S. Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz w 300-lecie ugody hadzieckiej* (Paris, 1960).

¹⁶ A. Kamiński, "The Cossack Experiment in *Szlachta* Democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: The Hadiach (*Hadziacz*) Union," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1977): 185–93.

¹⁷ Briukhovets'kyi was the only hetman who was popular with the Sich: *Litopys samovydtisia*, pp. 87–100, 105–106; Diadychenko, *Narysy*, p. 136.

reconstructing a Cossack state under the leadership of a hetman and the Cossack elite. Their program was to some extent inspired by the Hadiach agreement; it included the notion of a Grand Duchy of Rus' and it assigned an important position to both the Orthodox church and the Kiev Academy. Yet, it went a step further than the Hadiach treaty, for its goal was the incorporation of all territories inhabited by the Ruthenians into the new duchy. All of these aims were forcefully advanced by the most prominent Ukrainian political leader after Khmel'nyts'kyi, Petro Doroshenko, who also endorsed Metropolitan Iosyf Tukaľ'skyi's proposal to establish a patriarchate of Kiev and thus emancipate the Ukrainian church from Constantinople and elevate its status to that of the Russian Orthodox church.¹⁸

The strength of Ukrainian national aspirations had been recognized by Turkey, which, upon entering the war over Ukraine in 1672, had proposed the creation of a Sarmatian duchy, a principality to exist under Turkey's protection. Following an unsuccessful attempt to create such a duchy, Ottoman politicians would decide to resolve the Cossack problem by implementing inversely Khmel'nyts'kyi's idea of a union between Kiev and Iași. In 1682 Gheorghe Duca, hospodar of Moldavia, would be appointed hetman of the Cossacks.¹⁹ His one-year rule over a part of Ukraine would thwart Doroshenko's ambitious political designs for a large Cossack state. Nevertheless, the idea of such a state would live on, although it was never realized because of the lack of Cossack unity and the intervention of foreign rulers.

The partition of Ukraine (1667) and the bitter fraternal rivalry there prompted historians to label all of this period extending through most of the second half of the seventeenth century as "the Ruin,"²⁰ an apt term for the fate of the Ukrainian state, but one inapplicable to the economic

¹⁸ *Litopys samovydtsia*, pp. 98–122; Kostomarov, *Ruina*, pp. 122–23, 130–31, 144–47, 166–95, 275–83, 406–432; Wójcik, *Miedzy traktatem*, pp. 12–19, 59–63, 173–78, 183–87, 247–49, 252–54, 280, 284–99, and 301.

¹⁹ Ion Neculce, *Letopișetul țării Moldovei, 1662–1743*, ed. Iorgu Iordan (Bucharest, 1955), pp. 153–58; A. D. Xenopol, *Istorie diu Dacia Traiana* (Bucharest, 1929), pp. 260–63; *Istoricheskie sviazi narodov SSSR i Rumynii v XV–nachale XVIII v. Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 3, ed. Ia. S. Grosul (Moscow, 1970), p. 351, fn. 41.

²⁰ Kostomarov did not sympathize with the starshyna or the hetmans, and he idealized the Sich. He maintained that "the republican system is undeniably the best and most desirable, but it must be accompanied by that which is best in humanity . . . if those qualities are absent, the republican system leads to ruin." Cited by D. Doroshenko, "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography," p. 143.

and cultural situation of Ukraine at that time.²¹ The economic and cultural vitality experienced there during the so-called Ruin far exceeded any developments during the previous decades. This was particularly true of "Russian" or East-Bank Ukraine, where the starshyna were numerous, self-assured, affluent, well-educated, and strong enough to base their position in society on hereditary rights rather than the tsar's grace.²²

The Commonwealth and Ukraine

Cultural affinity with the Polish szlachta, family and business contacts with the Commonwealth, and even a common dislike of Russian autocracy all failed to bring about a Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement during the second half of the seventeenth century. While urging the Cossacks of the East Bank to break away from tyrannical Moscow, the Polish Commonwealth itself undermined collaboration with the Cossacks by failing to respect their way of life on the West Bank. Whatever the Cossack colonels on the East Bank thought of Moscow's despotism, they still enjoyed a political and social position much better than that of their counterparts on the West Bank. The same was true for the Orthodox prelates who, though subordinate to the patriarch of Moscow and suspected of "Latinism," did not have to endure the political supremacy of the Catholic church.

The Polish lack of interest in reviving the Hadiach agreement was typical of the szlachta's attitude toward the Cossacks, which persisted despite the fact most Polish politicians would have agreed with Samuel Pufendorf's observation in 1652: "If the Poles cannot win over the Cossacks again by fair means, and should these [Cossacks] submit

²¹ M. E. Slabchenko, *Organizatsiia khoziaistva Getmanshchyny ot Khmelnishchyny do mirovoi voyny*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1922); Diadychenko, *Narysy*, pp. 37–101; Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa*, pp. 65–147; G. Gajecy, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).

²² Bishop Mefodii to Hetman Briukhovets'kyi, 1688, in Dmitrii Nikolaevich Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki Malorossiiskoi istorii*, ch. 1 (1649–1687) (Moscow, 1858), pp. 196–208; Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich to the Zaporozhian Host, 17 July 1667 (explaining the reason for the Treaty of Andrusovo with Poland), *ibid.*, pp. 180–83; Briukhovets'kyi to the Cossack regiment and population of Novhorod, 20 February 1668 *ibid.*, p. 184; the Tsar to the Zaporozhian Host, 30 September 1668, *ibid.*, pp. 187–90; Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski*, pp. 15–63, 217–19, 224–26. Gajecy, "Kiev Mohyla Academy," pp. 81–92.

themselves to the Muscovites or the Turks . . . then Poland has got an incurable ulcer on that side.”²³ But the Polish leaders’ interpretation of what constituted “fair means” was different from the Cossacks’. Furthermore, dealings with the Cossacks were the domain of the king, and the szlachta were apprehensive of the monarch having Cossack colonels under his command. Szlachta from Sieradz, Łęczyca, Poznań, or the other western lands showed no great concern for the Cossack problem in Parliament; they were primarily interested in regional issues and in the general direction of foreign policy and gave little attention to specific and complex situations such as that of the Cossacks in Ukraine. Sporadically, the republican opposition protested against the king’s contacts with the Cossacks; the king sometimes raised the subject himself in parliamentary debate, usually when funds were needed for the payment of Cossack troops.²⁴

Poland’s policy on the West Bank was certainly not guided by the Hadiach concept. Debates on the Cossacks prompted by the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising, the Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654), and the pro-Turkish orientation of Doroshenko had failed to produce a coherent Polish policy, although many Polish nobles would have agreed with the poet Samuel Twardowski that “not only were the Cossacks ennobled by their deeds of valor, but so were our ancestors raised to nobility by the blood they shed.”²⁵ Such sentiments were not, however, translated into political action. As the influential senator and prominent political writer Łukasz Opaliński noted, the war against the Cossack was fought not in the interests of the state, but for the benefit of a few Ukrainian oligarchs. Clearly, Opaliński was familiar with the Ukrainian situation, but his arguments brought no change in Poland’s Cossack policy.²⁶

Responsibility for such a state of affairs can be placed, to a great extent, on Sobieski who, both before and after he became king, kept

²³ “An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe (1697),” cited after L. Lewitter, “Russo-Polish Treaty,” p. 3.

²⁴ The County Council of the Łęczyca palatinate discussed the Ukrainian problem on merely four occasions and only in general terms. See: L. Włodarczyk, *Sejmik łęczycki* (Łódź, 1968). Lack of interest in Ukrainian matters was typical for noblemen from the western and central territories of the Commonwealth, and existed despite the fact that newspapers provided good coverage of Ukrainian affairs. See: Jabłonowski to Kątski, 1687, Biblioteka Muzeum im. Ks. Czartoryskich (Cracow; hereafter B. Czart.), ms 181, p. 871.

²⁵ Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, pp. 264–65.

careful watch over the Ukrainian situation but was uninterested in initiating a new policy toward the Cossacks. During his long reign as king (1674–1696), Sobieski never proposed any broad plan for a Cossack policy, despite the fact that he was more familiar with the problems of Ukraine than any of his predecessors, knew the country well, and seemed to understand the changes taking place there. His views toward Ukraine underwent an important change. When the young Sobieski received news of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's victory over the Polish forces in 1648; according to his tutor he regarded it as more depressing than the death of King Władysław IV a week earlier. It seemed incredible and intolerable to him that the Commonwealth should be bested in battle by its plebeian subjects.²⁷

But Sobieski expressed quite a different view in 1671, when he wrote that the Cossacks "are not peasants, but a nation apart. They have discarded . . . coarseness, tyranny, drunkenness, and barbarous ways."²⁸ He also was well aware that, despite the division of Ukraine, the Cossacks preserved a strong sense of unity. He noted that the low-country Cossacks (the Zaporozhian Sich) "concern themselves with the slightest complaint of the people here [in the Kiev and Bratslav regions]. They don't like the fortresses we build at all. They say about [the temporary agreement reached at Ostroh] that since it does not give satisfaction to the Cossacks, everything has to be revised—they are all Cossacks of the same persuasion and birds of a feather."²⁹

A year later, on the eve of the Turkish attack on Poland, he favored offering Ukraine even more independence than that promised in the Hadiach Union, thus securing Ukraine as a powerful ally against Turkey and Russia. But he was pragmatic, with no broad plan for a political agreement. "We should humor them for the time being," he wrote. "Have the Commission offer them prospects of favors, and not drive them all to desperation [because] they control Ukraine and our property."³⁰

²⁶ Ł. Opaliński, "Coś nowego," in his *Pisma zebrane*, ed. Stanisław Grzeszczuk (Warsaw, 1959), p. 277.

²⁷ "Dziennik Sebastiana Gawareckiego" in *Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego* (hereafter *Pisma do wieku*), part 1, ed. F. Kluczycki (Cracow, 1880), p. 129.

²⁸ Sobieski to the bishop of Cracow, Jan Małachowski, 16 March 1671, in *Pisma do wieku*, part 1, p. 631.

²⁹ Sobieski to Andrzej Olszowski, 12 October 1671, in *Pisma do wieku*, part 1, p. 700.

³⁰ Sobieski to Jan Małachowski, 23 January 1671, in *Pisma do wieku*, part 1, p. 618.

As one of the great landlords in Ukraine, Sobieski wanted to “humor” the Cossacks “for the time being,” and as king he wanted to use them for the defense of the Commonwealth and perhaps also in his own interests. This “humoring” led to provisional measures intended to yield the Cossacks no more than what they could extort at a particular time.

Even fragmentary concessions to the Cossacks placed Sobieski in conflict with the szlachta of the southeastern region of the Commonwealth, though they won him some degree of popularity in Ukraine. Yet he stopped short of advancing a political program which might antagonize the noble lords. Sobieski’s policy was spurred by his recapture of a part of West-Bank Ukraine from the Turks in 1675. Cossack regiments had been installed under royal orders in the strongholds and towns of the West Bank, causing friction with the local szlachta and their bailiffs. The Cossacks had sought the support of the king, as well as that of the local population, which was ever ready to profit from a conflict between the Cossacks and the szlachta. The king was not alone in trying to use the Cossack troops for his own ends, for the big landowners also sought Cossack assistance in collecting tax arrears or in waging local feuds. Thus Sobieski tried to follow the tsar’s example in turning the Cossacks into an instrument of his own policies, but he could not offer them as much as the tsar did, nor did he have a monopoly on contact with the Cossack forces.³¹

Sobieski wanted to protect the country against Tatar incursion by placing Cossack garrisons in forts along the rivers Dniester and Boh, but he could locate them only on unleased crown estates because of conflicts with the szlachta whenever the garrisons were established on leased latifundia. The king’s plan to place Cossack forces along the river Dniester was frustrated by irresolvable disputes with private landowners or lessees. The landowners viewed the Cossack troops, reorganized under royal direction, as a potential threat to their ownership of the land, particularly as the Cossacks had the support of the local Orthodox clergy and the rural population. Some Cossack colonels, emboldened by the support of the local populace and by contacts with the Zaporozhian Sich and the leadership of East-Bank Ukraine, tried to seize control of border

³¹ Sobieski Votum, 19 February 1672, in *Pisma do wieku*, part 1, pp. 854–63. On Sobieski’s Cossack policy, see also: Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 13–106; Wójcik, *Miedzy traktatem*, pp. 249–54; Sobieski to Jabłonowski, 2 August 1687, and Sobieski to Palii, 4 August 1687, in B. Czart., ms 422, pp. 174, 181, 183.

districts without the authorization of the Commonwealth. Colonels Semen Palii and Vasyl' Iskryts'kyi were among those who used such tactics. Not only were they unchallenged, but their participation in the war against Turkey was so important that the king decreed that all taxes collected in the southeastern section of the province of Kiev be allocated for the upkeep of Cossack troops.³²

In 1685, when Sobieski was mounting his campaign against Moldavia, he secured Parliament's endorsement for his policy, calculated to attract Cossacks to the service of the Polish Crown by confirming earlier Cossack charters and privileges, as well as permitting the stationing of Cossack troops on crown estates.³³ The latter provision applied mainly to the southern and southeastern sections of the provinces of Kiev and Bratslav. It was intended to attract the Cossacks from the East Bank and had a good chance of accomplishing that goal. Russia had been at peace with Turkey since 1681, and in the meantime stratification within the Cossack army precluded social mobility. In many Cossack regiments there were seasoned soldiers who had been unable to secure promotion to the office class or to acquire land. An opportunity for well-paid service under Sobieski and his Cossack hetman, coupled with the prospect of land grants on the West Bank, could induce such men to cross the Dnieper in search of advancement. The East-Bank peasantry was also inclined to migrate to the West Bank, following the Cossacks in search of better conditions. Enlistment in the royal army of the Commonwealth held appeal for the Don Cossacks, the Sich, and even the Volga Kalmyks. Some of the Cossacks joining the Polish forces did not contemplate a permanent move to the West Bank, but others wanted to settle there, where vacant land was still available.³⁴

As the Cossacks grew more numerous on the West Bank, their relations with the local szlachta became strained. In 1687 Stefan Piaseczyński, the palatine of Smolensk, tried to develop his land hold-

³² Francesco Bonesana to Cardinal Cybo, 7 July 1688, in Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Nunziatura di Polonia, ms 107, p. 249; Sobieski to Matczyński, 14 April 1687, B. Czart., ms 422, pp. 64–65; Hetman Hryshko Ivanovych to Sobieski, March 1689, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw; hereafter AGAD), Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie V, ms 122, no. 5660; Matczyński to Szczuka, 14 February 1691, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 18, pp. 640–46.

³³ Laws passed by Parliament in 1685, in *Prawa, Konstytucje i Przywileje*, vol. 5 (Warsaw, 1738), p. 718.

³⁴ *Litopys samovydstsia*, pp. 138–40. See also fn. 31.

ings in the palatinate of Kiev, “but the Cossacks in these parts, who usurp dominion there as though they had conquered our country, offered such resistance that it is hardly possible for any of us to go there, and it is to be expected that the recruitment of more of these people may make for worse difficulties.”³⁵ There were tensions when Cossack troops were stationed in areas regarded by other Cossacks as their own. These areas, hitherto largely undeveloped but now reviving thanks to security from Tatar raids, also attracted the return of former landowners who had fled the Tatars.

The stage was set for a conflict. At first the Cossacks had the advantage. The king regarded them as indispensable for resisting the Tatars and took a tolerant view of their settlement, even appointing as Cossack commanders men capable of protecting their soldiers against the powerful landlords. Sobieski favored the Cossack hetman Hryshko Ivanovych, who kept out the Polish lessees of crown lands in the Bratslav region, threatening them with the anger of Ukraine. Sobieski also promoted the initiatives of the Cossack colonel Semen Palii, who managed to settle the Khvastiv district and then turned against Hryshko, seizing control of all the West-Bank Cossacks.³⁶

Palii needed help to hold onto the rich territories he controlled in the Kiev and Bratslav areas, to which some Polish lords held title. He could hardly rely on the king of Poland in this instance, so he turned on several occasions to the tsar of Russia. He was willing to recognize the authority of the hetman of the East Bank, Ivan Mazepa (1689–1709), and to accept the rank of colonel of Cossack troops under the tsar, which would give him the rights enjoyed by the landowning colonels of the East Bank. On several occasions Moscow enlisted this outstanding Cossack in its service, without claiming the territories under the control of his regiment. Palii, on his part, did not regard himself as a mere mercenary.

³⁵ Stefan Piaseczyński to the Crown Chancellery, *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi pri Kievskom voennom, podol'skom i volynskom gubernatore* (Kiev, 1859), vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 365–66.

³⁶ Marek Matczyński to Stanisław Szczuka, 12 February 1691, AGAD, Archiwum Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 18, pp. 733–43; Hetman Jabłonowski to Jan Sobieski, 21 December 1689, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie, II, vol. 25, pp. 315–16; Hryshko Ivanovych, General Judge of the Zaporozhian Host, to Jan Sobieski, 29 December 1688 and 21 March 1689, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie, V, vol. 122, No. 5660; Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 73–77, 81–82, 85.

Rather he perceived himself as the master of a vast area which he wanted to place not only under the sovereignty of the tsar, but also under the control of Mazepa—a man, like all his predecessors, dedicated to the idea of the union of Ukraine.³⁷

Mazepa favored Palii's concept, but Moscow refused to accept the offer, in view of its treaty with Poland. Nevertheless, it maintained cautious contacts with Palii, paying him for fighting the Tatars and for his eagerness to become a subject of Moscow. Unable to secure the tsar's endorsement of his rule over the Khvastiv region, Palii alternately begged the king's favor, turned to the anti-royal opposition, and participated in the feuds among various factions of the Polish szlachta. He also kept in close touch with the Zaporozhian Sich, and he did not exclude the options of siding with the Tatars or of seeking asylum in Russian-held Ukraine. Although he was the embodiment of the pre-1648 Cossack, he refused to accept Polish proposals based on concepts antedating the Khmel'nytsky Uprising and the Hadiach Union. His independent actions were largely responsible for shaping public opinion in the Commonwealth with respect to Ukraine. They caused many members of the szlachta to hark back to ideas current before the Khmel'nytsky era, such as the elimination of the Cossacks as a political force.³⁸

As long as Poland remained at war with Turkey, Cossack troops were sorely needed for the country's defense, and in 1685 Parliament readily endorsed the king's policy of strengthening this force by resolving that "in recognition of the loyal service of the Zaporozhian Cossacks certain lands be assigned in Ukraine for their settlement."³⁹ But as soon as the war ended, in 1699, so, too, would the need to "humor the Cossacks," and Parliament would promptly dissolve the Cossack army.⁴⁰

³⁷ H. I. Serhienko, "Semen Palii," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, vol. 1 (1960); W. Majewski, "Semen Palii," *Polski słownik biograficzny*, vol. 25 (Wrocław, 1980), pp. 72–82. Francesco Bonesana to the Vatican (1688), Archivio Segreto Vaticano (Vatican City), Nunziatura di Polonia, ms 109, p. 143; Sobieski to Jabłonowski, 23 June 1687, B. Czart., ms 422, p. 146.

³⁸ J. Jańczak, "Powstanie Paleja," *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Historia* 3 (Warsaw and Wrocław, 1960); For Palii's contacts with the Russian officials, see the dispatches of the voevoda of Kiev, Luka Dolgorukii, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Moscow; hereafter TsGADA), Malorossiiskie dela, fond 123, Relations of 1692, ms 25.

³⁹ Cited after Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji*, p. 37.

⁴⁰ "Zwinienie Kozaków w Kijowskim y Braclawskim Woiewództwach. Konstytucye Seymu Warszawskiego, 1699" *Volumina Legum*, vol. 6, p. 34.

The attitude of the szlachta, though characterized by some historians as shortsighted and oblivious of the wider aspects of Poland's international relations, was perhaps more understandable than that of Sobieski and the senators supporting him. After all, many policy issues are decided on the basis of domestic interests, even in democratic nations today. Statesmen concerned with long-range national policy goals often seek support in vain for plans involving war, increased taxes, or the strengthening of the executive. Only initiatives clearly in favor of the personal interests of the electorate can count on popular acceptance. Faced in 1648 by what was perceived as a major plebeian rebellion which threatened the Commonwealth with the loss of Ukraine and could precipitate peasant uprisings in Poland, the szlachta had agreed to a military effort and fiscal sacrifices. It had even been willing to consent to the establishment of a Grand Duchy of Rus', to concessions to the Cossack forces, and to the incorporation of the starshyna into the Polish nobility. However, in the long run the szlachta refused to accept the Cossacks' presence, continuing to regard them as a socially alien element directly serving the king.

Stanisław Bieniewski, the palatine of Chernihiv and an expert on the Cossacks, was of the opinion that Poland's Ukrainian policy could determine the future of the Commonwealth: "The tsar's final intent," he argued in 1675, "is to become monarch of all the Russian tribes."⁴¹ Bieniewski did not underestimate the *perfidia septentrionis*, and he wanted the Cossacks to serve as a shield against it. Yet this former chief negotiator of the Hadiach agreement sought in 1675 to gain the support of the Cossacks by offering them a pittance: autonomy on a small stretch of territory around the Dniester River, without the expulsion of noble landowners from the region.⁴² This concession hardly compared to the privileges enjoyed by the Cossacks on the East Bank.

⁴¹ Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji*, p. 37.

⁴² The policy paper that Bieniewski presented to Sobieski was carefully analyzed by Zbigniew Wójcik in his *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji*, pp. 37–42. The necessity of resolving the Cossack problem was clear to Krzysztof Grzymułtowski, a negotiator of the Eternal Peace Treaty and a member of the anti-Sobieski opposition. See his speech in the *Senatus Consilium*, 19 May 1687, B. Czart., ms 181, pp. 669–74.

Muscovy and Ukraine

The achievements of the governments of Fedor, Sophia, and Peter I in Ukraine stood in striking contrast to Sobieski's failure there. The consolidation of Moscow's control over the Cossacks along the Dnieper River was not due to any uncommonly farsighted policy or—as some historians have suggested—to diabolic perfidy. A comparison of the terms of the pacts of Pereiaslav (1653 and 1659), Baturyn (1663), Moscow (1665), Hlukhiv (1669), Konotip (1672), Pereiaslav (1674), and Kolomak (1687) shows a gradual tightening of Moscow's grip. It is worth noting, however, that the Russian politicians always took into account the current strength of the Cossacks, the hetman's degree of control and popularity, the solidarity of the Cossack upper class, the relations of the hetman and his entourage with the Orthodox hierarchy, and opinion trends among the army, the burghers, and the clergy.

Prior to each agreement with the Cossacks, Moscow carefully investigated the offers already made them by Poland and Turkey. As a result, the terms offered by the Russians were always calculated to find some measure of popular support. Furthermore, while expanding the tsar's control over the Cossack army and the Kiev church, these agreements secured at the same time the social and political positions of the hetman, the Cossack leadership, and the Cossacks in general. Well aware of the differences between Kiev and Moscow, the Kremlin avoided moves which might meet with strong resistance from the hetman or provoke a rebellion of the Cossacks and common people.

The decision to extend the tsar's protection to Khmel'nyts'kyi was made five years after the outbreak of the Cossack rebellion. Some of Aleksei Mikhailovich's advisors were of the opinion that it might be advisable to trade Kiev for Poland's assistance against Sweden. The fact that Russia nevertheless held onto Kiev and the East Bank was due largely to the influence wielded by Ukrainian politicians in Moscow in the second half of the seventeenth century. These politicians feared Poland's return to Ukraine, lest it bring back the pre-1648 situation, and consequently promoted anti-Polish policies at the tsar's court. Yet they also wanted to avoid the tsar's undue interference in the control of the Cossack army and Ukraine.

The tsarist diplomats skillfully exploited such fears. In concluding the Truce of Andrusovo, negotiating its extension, and finally before signing the Treaty of Eternal Peace, the Russians had invariably consulted with

the hetman and his entourage, and considered at least some of their requests. Hetman Samoilovych, opposed to the ideas of an eternal peace between Poland and Russia, managed to persuade the Department of Foreign Affairs that the Sich should be placed under the sole protection of the tsar.⁴³

The tsar's authority over Ukraine had been further strengthened by the establishment of Russian garrisons in Kiev, Nizhyn, Pereiaslav, and Chernihiv. In 1666, there had also been attempts to restrict the prerogatives of the Cossack administration, and to place the collection of taxes in the hands of tsarist officials. The great uprising had frustrated these plans, but the garrisons in the main strongholds were maintained. Only the most trusted boyars had been appointed palatines in the Ukrainian region; the Cossack hetmans and other leaders had been placed under the surveillance of numerous spies.⁴⁴

It was well known in Ukraine that any attempt at interference with the tsar's policies could result in arrest, deportation, or even death. The Cossacks realized that the Kremlin cared little for their ancient rights and privileges and was ready to sacrifice even its most devoted servants in order to hold on to the Dnieper. No one had any illusions as to the value of the tsar's promises or the permanence of his favors. It was known that Doroshenko, after he crossed over to the Russian side, had been summoned to Moscow and, though treated well and even appointed palatine of Viatka, had been removed from all contact with Cossack affairs. Nor did anyone forget how Samoilovych, who had so staunchly supported the Russian side in the turbulent events of 1682, was sent into exile as soon as his presence became an impediment to the tsar's policy.

⁴³ For information on Russian relations with the Cossacks and Doroshenko in 1675, see TsGADA, fond 79, ms 177. For negotiations between the Russian government and Samoilovych before the conclusion of the Eternal Peace Treaty with Poland, see TsGADA, fond 79, ms 220, 221. Consult also A. Iakovliv, *Dohovir Het'mana Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z Moskovskim tsarem Oleksiiem Mykhailovychem 1654 r.* (New York, 1954); idem, *Ukrainsko-moskovs'ki dohovory XVII–XVIII st.* (Warsaw, 1934). See also: C. Bickford O'Brien "The Views of A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin," in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 17 (1969): 357–79; Kostomarov, *Ruina*, p. 128; Wójcik, *Między traktatem*, pp. 164–67, 171.

⁴⁴ Dispatches of the palatine of Kiev, Luka Dolgorukii, regarding his meetings with Palii, TsGADA, Malorossiiskie dela, fond 123, Relations of 1692, ms 25. *Litopys samovydtisia*, pp. 99–100; Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki*, pp. 154–56. The works of Solov'ev and Kostomarov are still the most useful materials on Russian-Ukrainian relations in the second half of the seventeenth century.

Although there was discontent with the removal of the Sich from the hetman's control and with Russian indifference to the Palii proposals, the Cossacks still preferred the protection of the Orthodox tsar to that of the Catholic Commonwealth. The hetman, the Cossack leaders, and the Orthodox hierarchy perceived the Russian politicians as onerous, rigid partners, holding Ukraine under de facto tsarist autocracy, which was often petty, devious, and cruel, but which treated the Cossacks as a serious political force rather than as an object of favors in time of war and of indifference when the danger was over. Moscow knew the Cossacks' strength and treated them according to its estimate of their effectiveness.

No wonder that the Russian politicians chuckled when Polish dreams of a return to the East Bank were mentioned. For once not overestimating the strength of the Poles, they reminded them that the entire Polish army had fewer men than the tsar kept in his forts in Ukraine, and even he had problems with the Cossacks. Such observations, although somewhat exaggerated, were significant, for they indicated that the Moscow government knew in the second half of the seventeenth century that the tsar's dominion over the East Bank depended ultimately on force of arms. Evidently, too, the Russians believed that the Poles, in the event that they managed to seize the East Bank, could not count on the Cossacks unless their military strength gave the Cossacks no choice. No agreement of the Hadiach type would suffice.⁴⁵

Moscow's policy toward Ukraine was based on its experience with the khanates of the Volga and the Don Cossacks. Control of Ukraine was perceived by the Russian government as one of its most important tasks. A whole department (*Malorossiiskii prikaz*) was created to monitor relations with Ukraine, and a serious effort was made to treat the hetman and the Ukrainian elite with respect. In striking contrast to the Poles, the Russians never allowed themselves to forget that the Cossacks were a nation apart, and they never took their position in Ukraine for granted.

In the course of three generations the Russians, using different strategies with each group, succeeded in winning over the Ukrainian clergy, the hetman, and even the starshyna. For example, they allowed the clergy a leading role in Russian church life; they supported the hetmans

⁴⁵ N. G. Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia Petra Velikogo*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1858), pp. 190–218.

in their conflicts with the rest of Ukrainian society; and they allowed the starshyna the illusion of a szlachta-type democracy under the tsar's autocratic rule. Russian control was based on military garrisons, but at the same time the government sought the support of the current hetman and was ever ready to support him in his disputes with the starshyna. No attempt was made to introduce Russian landowning nobility to East-Bank Ukraine, but close watch was kept over all Polish contacts with the Cossacks.



Sobieski, the Senate, and Parliament, apparently oblivious of this situation, formulated a Cossack policy without regard for its repercussions on the East Bank. They had paid little attention to the successive agreements between the Cossacks and Moscow. While contemplating the conquest of the whole of Ukraine, the king failed to give any thought to preparing a program more attractive to the Zaporozhian army than that offered by the tsar. It simply never occurred to Sobieski, the senators, or the szlachta that anyone could prefer “Muscovite tyranny” to the “sweet freedom” of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Polish political program for the East Bank was confined, under Sobieski, to urging Hetman Mazepa to “throw off the yoke of slavery.”⁴⁶ It was an inspiring appeal, but one unlikely to persuade even Mazepa, nicknamed by his enemies “the Pole,” or the landowning starshyna—not while the East-Bank Cossacks enjoyed more privileges under tsarist tyranny than their brothers on the West Bank did within the Commonwealth, so boastful of its freedoms.

⁴⁶ Shumlianskyi to Mazepa, January 1690, in Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia*, vol. 2, p. 478. Krzysztof Grzymułtowski, a senator and diplomat, believed that the only way Poland and Russia could control Ukraine was by military force, never through any sort of agreement, even such that fell far short of granting Ukraine statehood. See: Grzymułtowski to Golitsyn, 3 January 1687, Bibl. Czart., ms 181, p. 630. See also: Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji*, pp. 211–29.

CHAPTER SIX

The Solomon Affair

The differences between Polish and Russian policy toward Ukraine as well as their differing perceptions of Cossack society were clearly highlighted by the so-called Solomon affair in 1689–1690. The monk Solomon represented himself as the confidant of the new Cossack hetman, Ivan Mazepa, who—he alleged—wanted to free himself from Muscovite tutelage with Sobieski's aid. The Polish king was interested in the proposition and sought to establish secret contacts with Mazepa. These, however, met with failure. Sobieski's emissary was arrested and sent to Moscow. An outraged Kremlin demanded an explanation. Russian-Polish cooperation against the Tatars came to a halt. The affair led to hostile shows of military strength along the Dnieper. Mazepa's loyalty to Moscow helped defuse the situation, as did the concealment of the episode obtained by Sobieski. The prestige of Poland and its king was nonetheless tarnished in Kiev as in Moscow. What is more, Polish-Russian antagonisms stiffened the Turkish and Tatar stance toward both countries.

The Solomon Affair continues to be the subject of sharply contradictory interpretations to this day. The argument centers on the identification of those behind Solomon. According to some historians, Solomon was indeed working for Mazepa; according to others he was the agent of Mazepa's Cossack enemies, supporters of the former hetman Ivan Samoilovych. In my view, neither of these interpretations is convincing.

Many aspects of the episode remain obscure: we often have little more than Solomon's testimony to rely upon, with only partial corroboration from other sources. The chronology of the monk's sojourn in Poland is likewise not fully known. He crossed the Polish-Russian frontier somewhere in the Smolensk region, probably in July and no later than August 1689. He traveled at a leisurely pace, enjoying the hospitality of a number of Orthodox monasteries. He stayed for a time at the monastery of Mahilëŭ, but his behavior—notably his drinking habits—led his host, Abbot Khomentovs'kyi, to reexamine his letters of introduction, ostensibly issued by the monastery of Chernihiv. Concluding

that they were forgeries and that Solomon was nothing more than an adventurer and rogue given to telling wild tales when in his cups, Khomentov'skyi had the visitor locked in a cell.¹ It is not clear just how long Solomon remained there, but it is noteworthy that he later referred to the abbot with respect, perhaps because the latter was the only man in Poland to see through his lies. Solomon regained his freedom by swearing that he was carrying secret letters from Hetman Mazepa to the king of Poland and the Orthodox bishop of L'viv, Iosyf Shumlians'kyi. When shown the letters, the abbot let Solomon go, even though he still had his doubts.

At this point, instead of heading directly for L'viv, Solomon—perhaps fearing pursuit—traveled by way of Orsha to Minsk, whence he began proceeding slowly in the direction of L'viv. On reaching that city, he was informed at the Cathedral of St. George that Bishop Shumlians'kyi had left the city for the monastery of Perehyns'k, some 60 miles to the south. When he told them that he carried important letters to the bishop from Russia, the monks in L'viv supplied him with horses and a guide. Upon his arrival in Perehyns'k, Solomon was received at once by Shumlians'kyi,² who had recently been in contact with Moscow, petitioning the tsar to help him become metropolitan of Kiev and promising in return to recognize the authority of the patriarch of Moscow.³ Perhaps believing that Solomon bore some kind of secret instructions concerning these plans, he perused the letters eagerly. While they had no direct bearing on his earlier exchanges with Moscow, they did seem to offer an alternate road to the metropolitanate of Kiev through the adoption of an active anti-Russian posture. The letters, addressed to him, to Sobieski, and to Polish Crown Hetman Jabłonowski, were signed by Hetman Mazepa and bore the seal of the Zaporozhian Host. Their content was astonishing—no less than an offer by the Cossack hetman to place the entire East Bank of Ukraine and the Zaporozhian army under the king of

¹ Adam Darowski, "Intryga Salomonka," in his *Szkice historyczne*. Serja pierwsza (St. Petersburg, 1894) p. 214

² Ibid.

³ Visit to Moscow of Shumlians'kyi's messenger, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Moscow; hereafter TsGADA) Relations with Poland in 1689, fond 79, ms 2; see also M. Andrusiak, *Józef Szumlański, pierwszy biskup unicki lwowski (1667–1708)* (L'viv, 1934), p. 97; K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'* (Kazan', 1914), pp. 239–41.

Poland. Shumlians'kyi, who probably now envisioned himself replacing Hedeon Chetvertyns'kyi—his personal enemy and a tool in the hands of Moscow—as metropolitan of Kiev, left Solomon in the care of the monks of Perehyns'k and hastened with the letters to Sobieski, who was in Zhovkva. The king instructed Shumlians'kyi to introduce Solomon to Crown Hetman Jabłonowski, who was then in L'viv on military matters, and then to bring him to Zhovkva.⁴

In the meantime Solomon had fallen ill, and Sobieski sent his personal physician to Perehyns'k to treat him. Toward the end of October, Solomon was well enough to meet with Jabłonowski in L'viv. Shumlians'kyi then took him to the monastery of Krekhiv, whose monks often served Sobieski as messengers or agents in Ukraine. There he was instructed to discard his monastic attire, so as not to attract the attention of Volkov, then Russian resident in Poland. He was summoned to an audience with the king and queen on November 4, the same day as a long-awaited dispatch from Dowmont arrived at court reporting in detail the downfall of Sophia and Golitsyn.⁵ The coup had been accomplished without any great upheaval, dashing any hopes Sobieski may have had for a civil war in Russia. No longer could he hope to obtain Ukraine—or at least Kiev—from the Naryshkins in exchange for his support.⁶

In light of the changed situation, the king and Jabłonowski considered Mazepa's letters with special interest. At first glance it seemed there might still be hope of reestablishing a Polish presence in Kiev and East-Bank Ukraine. Closer examination, however, aroused the suspicions of the king and the hetman, who were experts in Ukrainian affairs and personally acquainted with Mazepa. In their judgment, the letters did not reflect his style. Moreover, they were composed "hastily and without regard for secrecy." In fact, the only thing that appeared to be genuine was the seal of the Zaporozhian Host.⁷

⁴ Solomon's report in Warsaw, 13 May 1690, as cited in Darowski, "Intryga," pp. 214–15.

⁵ Volkov's dispatches, November and December 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 265–66, 337–38.

⁶ J. Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec sprawy Ukrainy na przełomie XVII–XVIII w.* (Wrocław, 1963), p. 31.

⁷ Volkov's dispatches, 26 December 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 337–38. Sobieski belatedly expressed, in a letter to Iskryts'kyi of 6 May 1690, his doubts as to the authenticity of the papers brought by Solomon. N. Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia Petra Velikogo*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1854), pp. 482–85.

Solomon was now in danger of being thrown into a dungeon, but he was saved by chance. Just before the monk's arrival, Sobieski had received warm greetings from one of Mazepa's closest collaborators, the Kiev colonel Konstantyn Solonyna, along with a mission from the Zaporozhian Sich asking for the protection of the Polish Crown.⁸ There could be no doubt about the authenticity of this mission of 100 Cossacks led by the well-known colonels Prokop Lazuka and Vasyl' Zabila. These signs of Cossack interest in the Commonwealth, coinciding with the setback of the coup d'état in Moscow, tempted the king to consider the offer contained in Solomon's letters, even though he knew they had not been written in Mazepa's hand. He and his advisors were inclined to accept Solomon's claim to be Mazepa's envoy, but he chose to act cautiously and decided not to entrust the monk with potentially compromising letters. The monk was given gifts and a letter issued by the royal chancery stating that he had visited Poland to seek alms and was now returning home. He was sent back to Kiev on 1 January 1690. Royal courtiers escorted him as far as Brody, whence he was to proceed on his own.⁹

Solomon did not continue eastward, however, but went north instead, to Brest, where he enjoyed the hospitality of the local monasteries for some six weeks. After this he returned to the monastery in Krekhiv, bringing with him a new set of "letters from Mazepa," expressing the hetman's disappointment over the king's failure to urge the Cossacks to come over to the Polish side.¹⁰ At Krekhiv, however, Solomon learned that Sobieski had instructed Bishop Shumlians'kyi to send a letter to Mazepa, applauding his intentions; the letter had been carried by Klyment

⁸ Volkov's dispatches, 26 December 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, p. 238. Sobieski's contacts with the Sich should not have come as a great surprise to Moscow. After all, Voznitsyn had been alerting V. V. Golitsyn about the congenial relations between the Sich Cossacks and the king of Poland as early as 1688. Voznitsyn's dispatches, 23 December 1688, fond 79, ms 235, p. 211. The Vatican had been informed of the close contacts between Sobieski and the Sich in expectation of additional subsidies for the Cossack forces. Archivio Segreto Vaticano (Vatican City), Nunziatura di Polonia, ms 107, p. 249. Sobieski was especially interested in cultivating good relations with the head of the Sich Cossacks, Ivan Sirko. Sobieski to Radziwiłł, 21 November 1679; E. Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria romanilor*, Suplementul II, vol. 1 (Bucharest, 1883), p. 123.

⁹ Volkov to the Department of Foreign Affairs, January 1690, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, p. 355.

¹⁰ Darowski, "Intryga," p. 216.

Domoradz'kyi, a monk of the monastery of Krekhiv. The monks at Krekhiv were surprised to see Solomon returning alone rather than in Domoradz'kyi's company.

The new "letters from Mazepa" were forwarded to the king in Warsaw, where Parliament was in session. Sobieski had ordered Solomon held at Krekhiv, but the monk, evidently believing that time was against him, escaped and came to Warsaw. Increasingly suspicious, Sobieski had guards stationed at the monk's quarters. Still, Solomon was not under arrest and moved freely about Warsaw, spending most of his time in taverns. At an audience with the king, he tried to account for the detention of Domoradz'kyi in Kiev by invoking Mazepa's alleged need to feign loyalty to the tsar until he had a clear declaration of Polish support. He also asked to be sent to Ukraine with a royal proclamation to the Cossacks, but Sobieski was reluctant to take any hasty steps as long as Domoradz'kyi's fate remained unknown. Trying to prod the king into action, Solomon composed a new set of "letters from Mazepa" in March 1690, which he claimed had been brought in by a servant of the Chernihiv colonel Lyzohub, a friend of the hetman and general flag-bearer of the Zaporozhian Host. The letters explained that Domoradz'kyi had been detained for fear of the Russians, and reiterated the Cossacks' readiness to serve the Polish Crown. The writer—allegedly Mazepa—asked for a prompt reply, asserting that as soon as Solomon arrived with a royal proclamation the Cossacks, in alliance with the Tatars, would launch an attack on the Russians. He further requested that Sobieski send reinforcements to Kiev.¹¹

Solomon wrote the "letters from Mazepa" to Sobieski and Shumlians'kyi himself, but another, purportedly from Lyzohub to him, he dictated to a former student of the L'viv seminary named Marets'kyi, tutor to the children in the house where Solomon was staying. Although paid well for his help, Marets'kyi immediately informed his Orthodox employer, who in turn passed the message on to the king. Solomon was clapped in irons, his letters and seals were confiscated, and he was subjected to repeated interrogations. He was held at first in the jail at the Casimir Palace in Warsaw but was later transferred to Zhovkva, the seat

¹¹ Copies of Solomon's letters were provided to the Russian diplomats by Ivan Okrasa, acting in accordance with Sobieski's instructions. TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1690, ms 6, pp. 96–104. The originals of the letters were lost. N. G. Ustrialov published them in his *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia*, vol. 2, pp. 479–82.

of the Sobieski family, where he was again interrogated and was shown to representatives of Mazepa.¹²

In the meantime, Domoradz'kyi was in even worse trouble. He had crossed the Polish-Russian border without incident, arriving at the hetman's seat in Baturyn toward the end of January 1690. There, he delivered Bishop Shumlians'kyi's letter thanking the hetman for his message and urging him to send his representatives to the Polish Parliament. One passage urged Mazepa to "start the good work and throw off the yoke of slavery from the neck of a free nation."¹³ He also handed over a letter in the king's name urging the hetman to have confidence in the words of Domoradz'kyi and those of Colonel Vasyl' Iskryts'kyi. (Iskryts'kyi had been sent earlier, in October or November, to convey the king's congratulations to Mazepa on his warm reception in Moscow.) Domoradz'kyi's arrival with a letter urging the Cossacks to rise up against the Russians, coming so soon after the confirmation of Mazepa by the Naryshkin clique and in the midst of his efforts to assure Tsars Peter and Ivan of Ukrainian loyalty, must have seemed very peculiar to the hetman. He placed Domoradz'kyi under arrest and later sent him to Moscow along with a copy of Shumlians'kyi's letter.

At about the same time, the Kremlin received reports from Volkov describing the appearance of Solomon at the royal court and the arrival of the mission from the Zaporozhian Sich. Domoradz'kyi was questioned under torture about the role of the king and Jabłonowski in the "Solomon conspiracy." Mazepa in turn was instructed to do his utmost to prevent contacts between the Zaporozhians and Sobieski and to arrest the members of the Sich delegation on their return from Poland. In case Solomon should return to Ukraine, a warrant for his arrest was issued, with a description supplied by Volkov: "this monk is of medium height, with a narrow, white face. He has a red, wedge-shaped beard, is about 40 years old, and has long moustaches."¹⁴

At the same time (June 1690), the Russians demanded an explanation from Sobieski, who replied that the scoundrel Solomon, who had tried to disrupt his friendship with the tsars, was already in jail. The tsars wanted

¹² M. I. [N. I.] Kostomarov, *Mazepa i mazepintsy*, in his *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 16 (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 419–20. Darowski, "Intryga," pp. 217–18.

¹³ Text in Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia*, vol. 2, pp. 478–79.

¹⁴ Volkov's dispatches, coded message, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, p. 355. Kostomarov, *Mazepa i mazepintsy*, pp. 419–23.

Solomon sent to Moscow for a confrontation with Domoradz'kyi, but Sobieski proposed an exchange of testimonies and prisoners instead. The Russians refused and insisted on a confrontation between the two prisoners. To allay suspicion that he had breached the terms of the Eternal Peace, which expressly prohibited its signatories from having any contact with the Cossacks of the other side, Sobieski finally agreed.¹⁵

In August 1691, Ivan Okrasa was dispatched from Warsaw to Moscow. He took Solomon with him as far as Mahilëŭ, where he left him to wait for an eventual exchange with Domoradz'kyi.¹⁶ Arriving in Moscow, Okrasa discussed plans for future Polish-Russian military activities against the Tatars and suggested that the whole Solomon Affair simply be forgotten.¹⁷ It seems that Sobieski was afraid that the Russians might bring it into the open before the Polish Parliament. The request was granted, but, with Shumlans'kyi's letter and Domoradz'kyi's testimony, it constituted one more link in the chain of evidence against the king of Poland.¹⁸

¹⁵ Minutes of Dowmont's talks with Ukraintsev, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 72–75, 103–108, 185, 191.

¹⁶ "In the same year (1690), there appeared in the Kingdom of Poland certain counterfeited letters with false tsarist seals, which aroused hostility between the king and tsar. Their writer, as it was revealed in Poland, was a certain monk Solomon, in whose possession the seal was discovered. The accursed criminal after being brought to Mahilëŭ was held for a long period in the castle and then sent to the tsar, where he confessed his guilt and was executed. Because of this affair, the innocent Domoradz'kyi suffered, but was then brought back from Moscow by the king and rewarded fittingly out of his mercy." "Khronika belorusskogo goroda Mogileva," in *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (hereafter *Chteniia*), ed. A. Trubnitskii, (1877), p. 31. Sobieski wanted to have Solomon exchanged for Domoradz'kyi on the border. The Russians demanded that Solomon be sent to Moscow for a confrontation with Domoradz'kyi. Minutes of Dowmont's talks with Ukraintsev, October 1691, February 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 322, 330, 369, 407, 422–23, 430, 447–48, 456.

¹⁷ Negotiations of Ivan Okrasa with Ivan Chadaev and Emel'ian Ukraintsev, 13 September 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1691, no. 6, pp. 91, 118–24. Mikhailov was informed by Józef Ładnicki that Sobieski was sending Okrasa to deal expressly with the Solomon affair since the king trusted him completely. Register of Mikhailov's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, p. 26. Okrasa's written instructions directed him to secure military cooperation against the Tatars. The most confidential matter in the mission was not even mentioned in his official documents. Biblioteka Muzeum im. Ks. Czartoryskich (Cracow; hereafter B. Czart.), ms 183, p. 372; Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw; hereafter AGAD), Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie II, ms 1781.

¹⁸ The Kremlin maintained pressure on Sobieski with demands to send Shumlans'kyi to

Three of Sobieski's actions in dealing with the Solomon Affair furnished the Russians with incontestable "proofs" of Polish violation of the Eternal Peace: the king's contact with Mazepa; his attempt, through Shumlians'kyi, to urge the hetman to "throw off the yoke of slavery"; and his failure to arrest Solomon as soon as he appeared at the Polish court with his letters. Assurances that the "yoke of slavery" referred to the Tatars and that the king had never taken Solomon seriously were unconvincing in light of the evidence in the possession of the Department of Foreign Affairs.¹⁹

The subsequent fate of Solomon and Domoradz'kyi illustrates the respective attitudes of Poland and Moscow toward the incident. Domoradz'kyi was released from prison in Moscow in 1692 and sent to Warsaw. For his sufferings, he was rewarded with promotion to the position of archimandrite of Ovruch. In the king's opinion, Domoradz'kyi, albeit a nobleman, had suffered under torture and had behaved in exemplary fashion, providing no information beyond that which the Russians already knew from the Shumlians'kyi letter.²⁰

Solomon, characterized by the Russians as a scoundrel and a baptized Jew, received quite different treatment. Immediately upon his extradition to Moscow in 1692, he was interrogated under torture and confronted with Domoradz'kyi.

No record of Solomon's confessions under torture is known to exist. I found no record of his testimony in the archives of the Polish chancery or the Russian Department of Foreign Affairs. It is known, however, that the Department informed Mazepa in the spring of 1692 that the investigation had been concluded. He was also told that Solomon, when asked

Moscow in order to clarify the Solomon affair. Minutes of Dowmont's talks with Ukraintsev, TsGADA, fond 70, June 1692, ms 240, pp. 533–34. In addition, the Naryshkin family did not release Domoradz'kyi until May 1693, disregarding Sobieski's requests and their own previous promises. Minutes of Dowmont's talks with Ukraintsev, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 667, 800–801.

¹⁹ Okrasa's negotiations, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, no. 6, pp. 118–24.

²⁰ K. Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego. Dziennik i relacje z lat 1691–1696* (Wrocław, 1958), p. 71. Mikhailov warned Moscow that Domoradz'kyi had been made the head of a monastery close to Kiev in order to direct anti-Russian actions from there. Mikhailov's dispatches, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, p. 1070. The Sapiehas, who opposed Sobieski, were disappointed that the affair was covered up. They had wanted Domoradz'kyi released publicly into the hands of Parliament, in order to discover who had been guilty of actions that could have led to the disruption of the Eternal Peace. Mikhailov's dispatches, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 243, pp. 779–80.

under torture for the names of his co-conspirators, had mentioned only one—Mykhailo Samoilovych, nephew of Ivan Samoilovych, former hetman and at one time colonel of Hadiach. However, as a senior Russian official recorded in his diary at the time, “Samoilovych admitted nothing in the course of investigation. He was cleansed by blood and deported [to Siberia]. The monk who informed on him was beheaded in the Cossack town of Baturyn.”²¹ Solomon was indeed sent to die in Baturyn. Mazepa presented him to the Cossacks, along with the evidence received from Moscow. After checking the letters and seals, as well as the information collected by Mazepa’s representatives in Zhovkva, they determined unanimously that Solomon must have had more numerous associates. The monk swore that he had told everything he knew under torture by fire in Moscow. Mazepa asked the Russians for Mykhailo Samoilovych’s head and tried to implicate all his enemies—Leontii Polubotok, Danylo Apostol, Iurii Chetvertynskyi, and Dmytro Raicha—in the affair. Moscow, however, refused to hand over Samoilovych, and demanded the speedy execution of Solomon.²²

Thus, on the Russian side the conspiracy was concluded with the blame placed on an adventurer monk and some suspicion aroused about the role of a former Cossack colonel. A conspiracy with such minor players contrasts strikingly with the involvement on the Polish side of the king, the Crown hetman, and the Orthodox bishop of L’viv.

Not all the historians studying the “Solomon conspiracy” have accepted Moscow’s interpretation of the episode. Their doubts have been raised largely by the disparity between the great scope of the concept and the lowly rank of those involved in carrying it out. Various attempts have been made to uncover the true instigators of the plot, although I would contend that none of the theories to date provides a satisfactory explanation.

Let us begin by noting the sources available for our investigation. They are: the letters of “Mazepa” to Sobieski, Shumlianskyi, and Solomon, unquestionably forged by the latter in March 1690; two reports of Ivan Volkov, the Russian resident in Warsaw, dated December 1689 and January 1690; Shumlianskyi’s letter to Mazepa; two letters from Sobieski to Vasyl’ Iskrytskyi; the testimony taken from Solomon

²¹ I. A. Zhelabuzhskii, *Zapiski Zhelabuzhskogo s 1682 po 2 iulia 1709* (St. Petersburg, 1840), p. 26.

²² O. Ohloblyn, *Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba* (New York, 1960), pp. 169–70.

while he was in the custody of the Polish authorities; Solomon's diary and the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs to Mazepa on the subject of Solomon. Additional information can be gleaned from the minutes of the conversations of Okrasa and Dowmont with Emel'ian Ukraintsev of the Department of Foreign Affairs on the subject of Domoradz'kyi and Solomon; letters of the tsar to Jan Sobieski; notes of a conversation between the Russian diplomat Boris Mikhailov and Bishop Shumlians'kyi, Sobieski, Okrasa, Szczuka, and Jabłonowski containing references to the Solomon affair; and a few very laconic notes of diaristic character dating from the years 1690 to 1693.

The letters from "Mazepa" brought by Solomon from Russia as well as those written later in Brest are missing. The Russians had demanded to see them, but Sobieski and his diplomats insisted that they had been lost. Before sharing the Department of Foreign Affairs' suspicions of the king's duplicity, we should recall that even more important documents had been known to disappear from the royal chancery. The content of the letters is known through allusions to them in Sobieski's letter to Iskryts'kyi, the testimony of Solomon, the extant "Mazepa" letters to Sobieski and Shumlians'kyi and Volkov's reports.

Out of all of these sources, Solomon's testimony in Warsaw provides the most valuable clues to the identity of the real authors of the plot. Although not actually tortured, the monk was being held in dungeon in heavy chains and was threatened with far worse unless he told the truth. He stated that he had been sent to Poland by Vasilii Golitsyn, possibly with the knowledge of Sophia, and in concert with the ex-hetman, Ivan Samoilovych, living in exile in Nizhnyi Novgorod.

Volkov's reports on the matter are also significant, as they partly corroborate Solomon's testimony. Volkov had learned about Solomon's mission by the end of December 1689 as well as about the conversations taking place between the king, Shumlians'kyi, Jabłonowski, Stanisław Szczuka, and Franciszek Gałęcki. His informant was a royal courtier named Podil's'kyi. The latter told Volkov not only about Solomon but also about the arrival of the envoys from the Zaporozhian Sich. He also informed the Russian diplomat that while both the king and Jabłonowski had their doubts as to Mazepa's authorship of the letters, the seals were certainly genuine.²³

²³ Volkov's dispatches, January 1690, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, p. 355.

Volkov ordered the assistant *d'iak* Paiusov and his own secretary, Ivan Tarnavs'kyi, to track the monk down. Since Solomon led a rather extravagant life, Volkov's men soon located him in Zhovkva, but the monk fled when he saw them. He evidently knew Paiusov, at least by sight, for the latter informed Volkov that he knew Solomon to be of the Donskoi Monastery, rather than the Simonovskii Monastery, as he had claimed to the royal court. Volkov did not question any Poles about Solomon, choosing to await instructions from Moscow before undertaking such a step. He suspected that the whole plot had been concocted by some Polish group in the hope of driving a wedge between Mazepa and the tsars.²⁴ His reports and those of his successor, Mikhailov, throw some light on the reactions of the Polish court, particularly those of Sobieski himself to the further development of the affair. They also hint at plans by Sobieski's enemies to use the episode against the king.

Nikolai Ustrialov, in the mid-nineteenth century, was the first historian to make use of most of these sources. On the basis of the "Mazepa" letters written by Solomon in Warsaw, Sobieski's correspondence with Iskryts'kyi, and Shumlians'kyi's letter to Mazepa, he came to the conclusion that Solomon was in fact just what he professed to be, an emissary of the Cossack hetman: in 1689, he argued, Mazepa was already contemplating a break with Moscow and the acceptance of a Polish protectorate. In fact, none of the sources Ustrialov used support this theory, which was inspired chiefly by his low opinion of Mazepa, whom he regarded as a renegade ever ready to betray his benefactors and friends. Mazepa's guilt in the Solomon affair was proved, in his eyes, by the fact that the Cossack hetman went over to Charles XII in 1708. The notion of Mazepa as "at heart a Pole" induced Ustrialov to treat the letters written by Solomon in Mazepa's name as authentic letters from the hetman. Some of the passages that he introduced to historiography are still quoted, notably Mazepa's alleged statement that he had begun an affair so secret that "he does not want even his shirt to know about it."²⁵ Ustrialov dismissed the misfortunes of Domoradz'kyi and Sobieski's letter to Iskryts'kyi as part of a smokescreen thrown up by the Poles to protect their ally, Mazepa. According to this interpretation, the intrigue worked to the advantage of the Poles, who thereby outwitted the boyars of

²⁴ Volkov's dispatches, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, p. 337.

²⁵ Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia* vol. 2, p. 200.

Moscow and saved the “miserable” Mazepa, whose true colors did not become known until Poltava.²⁶

In 1889, Sergei Mikhailovich Solov'ev adopted a more cautious line. He studied the sources with his customary thoroughness, then came up with an interpretation that echoed the explanation offered by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, Solov'ev's study is more useful than Ustrialov's, for it makes full use of the documents from the departmental archives. He also drew attention to Mazepa's efforts to accuse his enemies of involvement, noting that the Russian diplomats had concentrated their investigation on Solomon alone.²⁷

At the turn of the century, Mykola Ivanovych Kostomarov, an authority on the history of Ukraine, conducted his own meticulous examination of the extant sources. He pointed to a number of obscure and contradictory statements, arguing that these precluded any definitive verdict. Nonetheless, he adhered to the view that the instigators of the intrigue should be sought among Mazepa's enemies.²⁸

Support for such an interpretation was offered by Adam Darowski in 1905. He uncovered papers of Stanisław Szczuka containing, among other items, a record of Solomon's interrogation and the diary Solomon kept during his stay in Poland. On the basis of this evidence, he rejected Ustrialov's theory of Mazepa's guilt, pointing instead to the hetman's enemies as authors of the plot.²⁹

Almost a century has passed since this last study, yet no one had advanced any new interpretations of the plot. Scholars have simply adopted either the Ustrialov or the Darowski position, failing to take note of a significant statement made by Solomon himself. In the course of his interrogation at the Casimir Palace in Warsaw on 16 May 1690, the monk provided a detailed account of his life story. He told his questioners about his birth in Brody, a small town in the Polish-Lithuanian

²⁶ Ibid., 196–218. Despite its blatant methodological errors, Ustrialov's theory still has its supporters, particularly among historians who believe that Mazepa's later anti-Russian posture was the best confirmation of his involvement in the Solomon plot. See V. E. Shutoi, *Bor'ba narodnykh mass protiv nashestviia armii Karla XII* (Leningrad, 1958), pp. 63–65; Perdenia, *Stanowisko*, p. 110.

²⁷ S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, book 7, vol. 14 (Moscow, 1962), pp. 487–91, 501–505.

²⁸ Kostomarov, *Mazepa i mazepintsy*, pp. 418–22.

²⁹ Darowski, “Intryga,” pp. 195–235. (This is by far the fullest treatment of the Solomon affair.)

Commonwealth, about his service under Doroshenko, about his long Turkish captivity, and about his escape and enrollment in a monastery, first on the East Bank and then in Moscow. He also mentioned his contacts with the Golitsyns, explaining the origin of his trip to Poland with the forged letters in the following way:

“When later the elder Golitsyn went to war and left behind his son Aleksei Vasil’evich, he wrote to him from Kalanchak and asked him to send me to Samoilovych with some letters. Hence the young Golitsyn sent me from the capital in May of last year to Nizhnyi Novgorod where Samoilovych was staying, and gave me some letters for him, but I did not know what was in them, for they were written in the Muscovite fashion. Young Golitsyn instructed me thus: “After coming back from there, you will go to Poland, particularly to the people you know there and then to the king, with certain letters you will be given there, and you will observe whether the Poles will be eager for these letters and for Mazepa’s friendship. Will they be pleased with the letters? What response will they make? Samoilovych will tell you how to act.” So Samoilovych, on Golitsyn’s order, told me to compose and write letters supposedly from Mazepa to His Majesty and Father Shumlians’kyi, which I did in his presence. Then he gave me a false seal with which I sealed them. He also told me to take the seal with me, in case further letters had to be composed.”³⁰

During the next interrogation, Solomon—now in heavy shackles—was asked whether Sophia had had any part in his mission. He replied that he did not know whether she was aware of it. At the same time, he stated that Vasilii Golitsyn had said only, but in public, that he would dispatch him to Poland sometime in the future. The interrogators then asked him why he had twice concocted letters in Poland on his own. His reply was brief and free of the usual verbiage, but it clarified many of the inconsistencies of the whole affair. Solomon said that he had written the letters because “I wanted to draw His Majesty into giving me a letter.”³¹ In light of the instructions Solomon claimed to have from the younger Golitsyn, this can only refer to a letter intended for Mazepa which the monk planned to divert to Moscow.

There are many contradictions in Solomon’s story. His testimony is

³⁰ Text of Solomon’s Warsaw confession, May 1696, in Darowski, “Intryga,” pp. 217–19.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 223–24.

not consistent with his diary, and he was given to embellishments calculated to enhance his importance, as well as to outright lies.

Historians studying the affair have generally ignored the statement quoted above and have also overlooked other vital evidence—Solomon's own actions. The statement establishes that Solomon's objective was obtaining written proof of a Polish breach of the Eternal Peace; Solomon's actions rule out the possibility that he served either Mazepa or Mazepa's enemies.

A royal letter or proclamation would have been useless to Mazepa and of little use to his enemies, who were interested in compromising him, not the king of Poland. Had Mazepa been considering the idea of seeking Polish support or of forming a Cossack-Polish-Tatar coalition against Moscow, he surely would not have dispatched letters under his own seal openly discussing the subject. Nor would he have been likely to entrust such a mission to a man unfamiliar to Sobieski's circle of Eastern experts. Mazepa had friends and relatives in Poland and enjoyed close contacts with a number of monks there, whom he sometimes sent on confidential missions. Had Mazepa put out feelers to Poland, he surely would have arranged for his emissary to have private talks with Jabłonowski, Iskryts'kyi, or Wisłocki. The very fact that the overtures were made in official and highly compromising letters with an official seal places their authorship in serious doubt. Indeed, Volkov reported to Moscow that Sobieski and his advisors had grave misgivings about the authenticity of the letters and their bearer.³²

Had Solomon been Mazepa's envoy, he would have returned to Ukraine in January 1690, after receiving a cautious response from the king, and Mazepa would have conducted secret negotiations through Iskryts'kyi or Domoradz'kyi. No genuine agent of Mazepa would have composed spurious letters on his behalf rather than return to Baturyn for further instructions. Solomon realized this, and therefore pretended to be heading in that direction. This behavior, and the fact that Solomon made his appearance with official letters bearing seemingly genuine seals, rules out Ustrialov's theory.

Solomon's behavior likewise excludes the hypothesis that he was an agent of Mazepa's Cossack enemies. His actions were consistent with

³² Volkov's dispatches, December 1689, January 1690, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 337, 355.

that alternative only until he learned about Domoradz'kyi's mission. A genuine agent of Mazepa's enemies would have immediately advised them of the Domoradz'kyi's mission and fled. Mazepa's enemies could then have accused the Cossack hetman of contacts with Domoradz'kyi. The fact that Solomon stayed behind and maintained contact with the king would in such a case have seriously endangered his Cossack employers, since he might be expected to reveal their identity under torture.

Had he been employed by either Mazepa or his enemies, Solomon should have dropped out of sight no later than mid-February 1690. If he stayed longer because he might obtain documentary evidence against Sobieski, it must have been on Golitsyn's behalf.

This, I believe, is the real story: Golitsyn promises Solomon promotion to the rank of archimandrite—or even bishop—if he succeeds in obtaining a compromising letter from Sobieski to the Cossacks. The ostensible aim is to destroy Mazepa for plotting against Golitsyn with Boris Petrovich Sheremetev. Solomon sees through this ruse, realizing that the king of Poland, not the Cossack hetman, is the target.

Even after Domoradz'kyi's arrest, Solomon hopes to obtain the incriminating document. He has not fared badly at the hand of the king and his entourage, who seem to believe him and to be attentive to his views on major policy issues. Cooler as time passes without word from Domoradz'kyi, they still seem to credit the monk's explanations. Solomon knows the risk he is running, but since he has freedom of movement and believes himself as yet unsuspected, success—or at least impunity—seems possible.

Solomon knows, by the beginning of November if not earlier, of the downfall of Sophia's government and the dismissal of his sponsor. Though the game need not be over—the Kremlin's new masters should welcome the document he seeks—the risks have multiplied. There may still be time to abandon the venture and retreat back to monastic life.

Ambition overwhelms caution. Solomon's life has been obscure, if turbulent. Expecting no second shot at wealth and power, Solomon plays out the game in which he is a pawn. He loses: only torture and death await him now.

The Department of Foreign Affairs portrays Solomon as a petty adventurer acting in conjunction with a retired Cossack colonel. Solomon is forbidden, probably under threat of further torture, to repeat his confession in Baturyn. Beheading Solomon and exiling Mykhailo

Samoilovych to Siberia, the Department washes its hands of the affair and at the same time appears to be demonstrating good faith, especially in light of Sobieski's refusal to execute Domoradz'kyi. Ironically, when Sobieski rewards Domoradz'kyi and promotes him to Archimandrite, Solomon's mission is posthumously completed. To all surface appearances, Moscow has executed the man who endangered Polish-Russian détente, while Sobieski has bestowed honors and high office on his opposite number. As Golitsyn had planned from the outset, an agent chosen for his expendability has been sacrificed. The deniability essential to such a hazardous operation has been so astutely arranged that all observers of what history will call "the conspiracy of the monk Solomon"—even its victims—pin responsibility on individuals outside the Kremlin.

Sobieski's disloyalty toward Russia and his intent to breach the treaty had been clearly demonstrated. To understand why Golitsyn might have sought such a demonstration, we must consider some basic features of the international situation at that time. Golitsyn's campaign against the Crimea between 1687 and 1689 had strengthened Russia's position in the Cossack country along the Dnieper. The powerful fortress of Novobogoroditsa, erected on the Samara River in 1688, was a visible symbol of the Russian presence, serving both as a base for further operations against the Tatars and as an outpost from which to monitor the activities of the Cossacks. The consolidation of Russia's hold on the region made it easier for the autocracy to ward off Polish attempts to recapture Kiev and the East Bank of the Dnieper.³³

The Crimean expeditions also made it clear, however, that the conquest of the peninsula would require years of sustained military and fiscal efforts, and could be assured of success only if all members of the Holy Alliance simultaneously increased their pressure on the Ottoman Empire. Golitsyn feared that if Austria became further embroiled in the war with France (which had begun in 1688), the court at Vienna might well seek peace with Istanbul. He was also aware of the Turkish interest in peace and of the peace overtures that Poland had extended. Hence, while holding onto Kiev, bolstering his position along the line of the

³³ "Moskva v 1687–1688," trans. and ed. K. A. Viskovatov [Dispatches of Kristof von Kochen, Swedish diplomat to Moscow, to J. I. Hastfer, November 1688] *Russkaia starina* 23 (1878): 123; M. I. Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident v Moskve. Baron Iogann Keller i ego pis'ma." (PhD. diss., Leningrad, 1947), pp. 382–84, 397–400.

Samara River, and continuing efforts to take the Perekop, Golitsyn nonetheless left the door open for possible negotiations with Turkey and the Crimea.

Since such a *volte-face* would have exposed him to charges of violating the Eternal Peace with Poland-Lithuania, Golitsyn stood to benefit from a situation in which Poland rather than Moscow appeared guilty of violating the terms of the recently concluded treaty. Of course, Golitsyn knew that Sobieski was trying to conclude a treaty with the Ottomans that would permit the return of Kam'ianets'-Podil'skyi and the acquisition of Moldavia by the Commonwealth.³⁴ In 1688 the king seriously considered abandoning the alliance and signing a separate peace. But this would not have been enough for Golitsyn, who, I suggest, undertook a provocative action aimed at proving the Polish king's bad faith.

It may appear astounding at first that the shaper of Russian foreign policy attached such importance to securing evidence of Polish violations of the Eternal Peace. One might expect that Golitsyn already knew enough of Sobieski's contacts with the Tatars and the Cossacks to extend his own separate negotiations with the Crimea. Nor did a Russian statesman have to demonstrate Polish "perfidy" to anyone in the Kremlin, for whom it had long been an article of faith. Nor was Golitsyn answerable to any legislative body. Efforts to obtain written documentary proof of Polish "treachery" might seem particularly puzzling to those who believe that statesmen act merely to protect the interests of their state. *Raison d'état* has been used to justify political actions from time immemorial, and Golitsyn's era was no exception. In Poland, for example, the king, senators, parliamentary deputies, and rank-and-file szlachta assembled in various local gatherings typically argued the merits of a policy in terms of its service to the national interest, i.e., the defense of "Freedom, Fatherland, and Commonwealth."

In Russia, however, a simple rationalization of pragmatic policies on grounds of national interest was not enough. Policy was based there, as everywhere, on a careful evaluation of the situation and its implications,

³⁴ When Golitsyn returned from the 1689 campaign against the Crimea, it was rumored in Moscow that he had started peace negotiations with the Tatars. Dowmont wrote Sobieski that Golitsyn was negotiating with Murza ibn Shulesh. 12 July 1689, B. Czart., MS 189, p. 664. K. Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią. Z dziejów polityki Jana III Sobieskiego 1687–1690* (Cracow, 1933), pp. 76–85, 114–28.

but national interest could not be openly cited as the motive, for fear of compromising the image of the tsar. "National interest" in seventeenth-century Russia was synonymous with the monarch's personal interest, yet the monarch could not justify his political actions—particularly in the field of foreign affairs—purely in such terms. The autocrat, after all, was deemed to be the embodiment of justice, truth, and goodness. Whatever he did was inspired by higher motives. This is why, if expedience dictated the breaking of a solemn covenant sworn to by the tsar, such a morally questionable act required proof that course of action was obligatory because of the treachery of the other side.

Accordingly, whenever the Department of Foreign Affairs contemplated reneging on a treaty, it had to justify such an action not on grounds of national interest, but by proving some prior violation of the *status quo* by the other side. This was not a reflection of some particularly devious aspect of the Muscovite character, but rather of a perceived need to keep the tsar's name unstained. To that end, the Department meticulously documented even the most insignificant slights and offenses—both real and imagined—encountered in dealing with their nations. In some cases a special book of offenses was compiled; in 1693 the tsars ordered a compendium of Poland's infractions of the Eternal Peace.³⁵ Whenever the autocrat decided to cancel a treaty—or break his word in any way—the Department was ready with detailed evidence that he had been betrayed or insulted by the other side and hence, despite his Christian forbearance, had no choice but to act in self-defense.

Every change in policy had to be backed up by such a moral justification of the tsar's position. Once it had been proclaimed, any criticism of the official line, any questioning of its effectiveness, any attempt to find a compromise, even any attention to the arguments of the other side was transformed into a hostile and immoral act that demeaned the name of the tsar. As we have seen, Russian diplomats were not permitted to use any arguments other than those officially declared approved as adding luster to the tsar's name. They remained the only valid rationales for policy, at least until the next shift.

The course of the Solomon Affair and the reactions it evoked in Warsaw and Moscow shed some light on the political climate of the

³⁵ TsGADA, fond 79, ms 222 (Polish wrongdoings in the northern border region from 1667 to 1685), ms 248 (same as above, 1678–91), ms 255 (Polish persecution of the Orthodox faith).

period as well as on the methods then employed by diplomats and adventurers. They also contribute to an understanding of the diplomatic skills of Sobieski and his advisors, as well as of the effectiveness of the Russian intelligence network in Poland. The episode demonstrates the broad possibilities for political initiative that lay in Sobieski's hands, enabling him to involve the country in a war without consulting the Senate, much less Parliament. It also indicates, however, that such abuse of royal prerogatives could expose the king to blackmail not only by his political opponents at home, but even by a foreign court. Finally, the development of the affair reflects the views of the Cossack problem held by the royal court on one hand and the Boyar Council on the other. In short, the conspiracy of the monk Solomon offers a fascinating opportunity to take a close look at the political thinking and political techniques that were prevalent during this period.

Several questions remain to be answered. What was the role of Mazepa? Would Golitsyn have considered him expendable if Sobieski had exposed Solomon? Why did Sobieski decide to send Domoradz'kyi to Mazepa, despite misgivings? Why was Shumlians'kyi involved? And what prompted the choice of the obscure monk Solomon for the leading part?

Sobieski's behavior seems to have been reckless from the point of view of Polish-Russian relations, for he contemplated an action that could have renewed war with Russia over Ukraine. To take such a risk prior to termination of the Turkish war, and without consulting the Senate or Parliament, was hazardous to the country and to the king. Yet Sobieski held some useful cards in this game and played them, exploiting the Solomon plot against the Kremlin. We do not have the first set of letters, allegedly from Mazepa, which Solomon claimed to have written under the direction of Mykhailo Samoilovych, but we may assume that they were phrased more convincingly than those composed by Solomon himself, which are still extant. Yet we know—thanks to Podil's'kyi's report to Volkov—that even these original letters failed to convince the king and Jabłonowski. To call "Mazepa's" bluff, Sobieski urged the hetman to declare his intentions to Parliament. Nevertheless, he moved several military units toward Kiev and Jabłonowski dropped some remarks about "paying Moscow back" for its hostile acts toward Poland. After Domoradz'kyi's arrest, and the reemergence of Solomon in L'viv and Warsaw, no one in the king's entourage took the monk seriously. Sobieski, however, pretended even as late as February to treat Solomon

as Mazepa's emissary. It was surely a deliberate move calculated to use Solomon and his spurious letters as a means of frustrating the Russian plans for a separate peace with the Tatars. Copies of the Solomon letters were sent to the Tatars for that very purpose.³⁶

The moment was propitious. Austria was reported to be negotiating with the Turks; Sobieski had learned of Golitsyn's attempts to secure an agreement with the Tatars and hoped to foil them by sending copies of the Solomon letters to the Crimea, where the anti-Russian tendencies among the Cossacks of the Sich and the East Bank were well known. If the Cossack hetman actually broke away from the Russians in concert with Poland, the situation would revert to that of 1657–1660, and the Tatars would be in a position to break the Russian hold over Ukraine. This reversal of alliances failed to materialize, largely because the Turks did not accept the king's conditions and because the Polish Parliament—in session at the time of Solomon's arrest—voted to continue the war with Turkey. Nevertheless, as a result of the Solomon Affair, the Russian-Tatar talks were slowed down in 1690, while those between Poland and the Crimea gained momentum. Sobieski at least succeeded in frustrating the Russian-Tatar agreement, though it meant facing Moscow's charges of violating the treaty between Poland and Russia.³⁷

While I have established Golitsyn's general motives to my own satisfaction, his intentions regarding Mazepa are less clear. The Cossack hetman was not privy to the plot in which he was involved. The first set of letters ostensibly sent by him were composed by Samoilovych, an enemy intent on revenge. If the former hetman was an active participant in such a highly secretive intrigue, one would assume close ties between him and Golitsyn. We know that the opposite was true. It seems rather that Golitsyn was preparing Samoilovych to play the role of scapegoat in case Sobieski should act prudently and arrest Solomon. On the other hand, in the event of any hostile Polish actions or suspicious behavior on Mazepa's part, Ivan Samoilovych as a declared and proved enemy of Poland could have been useful.³⁸ He also could prove useful should

³⁶ Upon entering into peace negotiations with the Tatars through a Moldavian intermediary, Emel'ian Ukraintsev asked that they not believe the various false information from Poland, citing the case in 1690 when Sobieski had shown the khan's emissary the letters brought by Solomon. TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, p. 6, 65–66.

³⁷ Głoskowski to Sobieski, 17 July 1689, AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie II, ms 25, pp. 223–24. See also note 33.

³⁸ The decisive role of the starshyna in the downfall of Samoilovych was described by

there be serious peace talks with the Crimea, as he had always been a vocal advocate of a common Russian-Tatar stance against Poland.

Every change of Ukrainian hetmans, even when done without Moscow's direct consent (as in the case of Mnohohrishnyi in 1672), led to an increase in the tsar's authority in Ukraine. Every new hetman had to sign an agreement with Moscow more submissive than his predecessor's. If Mazepa had fallen as a result of the Solomon affair, Ukraine would have seen the installation of a still more subservient hetman. This might even have been the scenario planned by Golitsyn. At the same time, he could have foreseen that it would be to Mazepa's advantage if he immediately arrested Sobieski's emissary and sent the letters he had received to Moscow—as in fact he did.

Golitsyn's fall left several political actions in progress that continued by sheer momentum, even though the new leaders of Russian foreign policy inclined to a more cautious course. We can only guess what Golitsyn's reaction would have been had he received Volkov's reports. In any event, the Solomon affair constituted a serious threat to Mazepa's position. He must have learned from his friends in Poland that Solomon had implicated Golitsyn during his interrogation in Zhovkva, and he was no doubt greatly relieved when the hitherto all-powerful minister was sent into exile. Had there been no palace coup in 1689, Mazepa might have been the one heading for Siberia.

Bishop Shumlians'kyi's role in the intrigue was less convoluted. Golitsyn was aware of the bishop's ambition. He also knew that Shumlians'kyi collaborated with Sobieski in his dealings with the Cossacks and that the Orthodox monks under his authority were active in urging the population of the East Bank to return to Polish suzerainty. (When Hedeon Chetvertyns'kyi had been made metropolitan of Kiev in 1684 after recognizing the supremacy of Moscow rather than Constantinople, an arrangement soon reinforced by the Eternal Peace of 1686, Sobieski had named Shumlians'kyi administrator of the Kiev metropolitanate. This move obviously aimed at preventing the direct interference of the Muscovite patriarch in the affairs of the Orthodox church in Poland-

the author of the *Litopys samovydtisia*, ed. O. Levyts'kyi (Kiev, 1878), pp. 168–71. See also Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident," pp. 364–65, and Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa*, pp. 24–31. According to Belov, the Dutch diplomat van Keller thought that Golitsyn was actually trying to save Samoilovych: "Niderlandskii rezident," p. 364. Andrusiak believed that Golitsyn had sent Solomon to Poland in order to compromise Mazepa and to restore his friend Samoilovych: Andrusiak, *Józef Szumlański*, pp. 157–58.

Lithuania.) Unable to secure Sobieski's strong support for his claim to the position of metropolitan, Shumlians'kyi tried to gain the Polish king's full confidence by secretly joining the Uniate church and with that counterinsurance also sought the support of the tsar. In 1689 he asked Patriarch Ioakim on his own behalf, as well as that of the bishops of Przemyśl and Luts'k, to reestablish the metropolitanate of Halych under the direct ecclesiastical authority of Moscow. The year before, Shumlians'kyi had declared his loyalty to Moscow, to Prokofii Voznitsyn, the Russian resident. However, that had not been the first of his contacts with Russian diplomats—they had begun in 1675, when Shumlians'kyi asked the tsar's approval of his appointment as metropolitan of Kiev after Iosyf Tukał's'kyi's death. Since that time, he had not ceased to seek the leadership of the Orthodox population of Kiev. The Russians, though aware of Shumlians'kyi's role in 1682 and his secret affiliation with the Union, continued their contacts with him.³⁹ His political ambition and his longstanding contacts with the Kremlin were, I believe, exploited by Golitsyn, who counted on the bishop's personal interests to draw him into Solomon's enterprise. And, indeed, that was just what happened.

When the Russians secured the "Mazepa" letters and Domoradz'kyi's testimony, they called on Sobieski to punish the culprits severely, and specifically to execute the L'viv prelate. The Poles shrugged off such demands, pointing out that the king of Poland could not imprison or punish even the poorest nobleman, much less a bishop. Shumlians'kyi did not take the matter lightly; he knew, of course, that he would not be beheaded, but he was afraid that he might be made a scapegoat if the matter were brought up before Parliament.⁴⁰ Whatever most szlachta

³⁹ Voznitsyn reported that Shumlians'kyi was favorably inclined toward the tsars, always remembering their names in his prayers. Voznitsyn to V. V. Golitsyn, 16 September 1688, TsGADA, f. 79, ms 235, p. 137. Volkov informed Moscow immediately after his arrival in Poland that, according to Shumlians'kyi, Sobieski, was attempting to conclude peace with Turkey with the help of the French. Volkov to V. V. Golitsyn, TsGADA, f. 79, ms 238, p. 128. See also Andrusiak, *Józef Szumlański*, pp. 73–105; W. Bieńkowski, "Organizacja kościoła wschodniego w Polsce," in *Kościół w Polsce*, ed. J. Kłoczowski, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1969) pp. 853–58.

⁴⁰ Ukraintsev wanted Shumlians'kyi "removed from this world." Conversations with Dowmont, 22 February 1691, TsGADA, f. 79, ms 240, pp. 103–104). On another occasion, he referred to Shumlians'kyi as a "treacherous man and a liar . . . an enemy of God and a brother to the devil," *ibid.*, p. 331. As late as August 1693, Mikhailov was demanding "the blood of Shumlians'kyi" from the Polish Senators: Mikhailov's dispatches, TsGADA, f. 79, ms 243, p. 776.

thought about Moscow, they were sure to support the opposition to Sobieski if Moscow could demonstrate that the Orthodox bishop of L'viv had participated—on the king's orders—in an action likely to precipitate war with Russia before the conflict with Turkey had ended. The population of the eastern provinces was alarmed by reports of Russian preparations for war, including the dispatch of several *strel'tsy* regiments to Smolensk and the establishment of a blockade along the Dnieper.⁴¹ These hostile moves and the abatement of Russian activity against the Turks were largely a reaction to the designs of Sobieski and Shumlians'kyi on Ukraine.⁴²

The bishop was all the more uneasy when he learned of Sobieski's displeasure with him. By this time, thanks to Dowmont's reports, the king had learned of Shumlians'kyi's contacts with the tsars. He knew that the bishop's emissaries to the Kremlin had been there as recently as that summer. Dowmont had also reported that the Department of Foreign Affairs knew not only about the secret debates of the Polish Senate, but even about the king's private talks with his advisors. In the light of such intelligence, Shumlians'kyi's behavior at the time of Solomon's visit appeared highly suspicious. When asked to explain, Shumlians'kyi swore that he had revealed no secrets and that he was not privy to the king's

⁴¹ Dowmont, in a conversation with Ukraintsev on 26 December 1690, reported "that a rumor had spread in Moscow through all the ranks . . . that war had been declared against Poland, and that the military people had been ordered to assemble around Smolensk and Kiev; it sometimes happens that the voice of the people is the voice of God, and so he wants to write about this to the king and let him know of it, since all Moscow is speaking of it, and in the marketplaces and squares only he [the Polish resident] does not want to believe in it, for nothing was said to him about it in the Department of Foreign Affairs," TsGADA, f. 79, ms 240, p. 35. Ukraintsev admitted, in the course of their next meeting, [26 January 1691] that the borders had indeed been sealed, but attributed this to the necessity to keep army provisioning expenses low and to avoid price increases due to merchants hoarding their grain in order to sell it at inflated prices. TsGADA, f. 79, ms 240, pp. 75–76. Mikhailov also reported to Moscow the fear in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of an impending attack by the tsars' armies. September 1691, TsGADA, f. 79, ms 242, p. 16. It was also feared that the Muscovites might make an anti-Polish alliance with the Crimea. Bishop Stanisław Małachowski of Cracow, a confidant of Sobieski, wrote of the concern that "these *fideifragi* neighbors of ours want to attack us not only through the Lithuanian Principality but also from Kiev." Małachowski to Stanisław Szczucka, 18 February 1691, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 18, p. 1227.

⁴² "Various people write from Warsaw that Moscow has set upon me . . . they would like me to be beaten with the knout." I. Shumlians'kyi to Franciszek Gałęcki, 12 April 1691, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 18, p. 1197. See also Andrusiak, *Józef Szumlański*, pp. 164–68.

counsel. He also rejected as untrue any allegation that he had sought to “abandon my beloved and free Fatherland, in which I and my ancestors were born and have our roots, to choose slavery instead.”⁴³ He added that the king was free to put the entire blame on him, and that he would defend himself in Parliament, arguing that he had urged Mazepa to throw off the Tatar, not the Russian, “yoke of slavery.” There was no parliamentary investigation, however, and Shumlians’kyi never had to use these weak alibis.⁴⁴

The bishop nevertheless realized that he had blundered in his handling of the affair, incurring the king’s suspicions and the tsars’ wrath. He tried to exonerate himself in Moscow with explanations and advice that justified Sobieski’s misgivings. Shumlians’kyi may not have wished to exchange his “beloved and free Fatherland” for “Muscovite tyranny,” but he certainly did not want to figure on the tsars’ list of enemies. Whether motivated by his desire to be metropolitan of Kiev, or by caution lest the Cossacks come to rule over Ukraine, the wily churchman played all sides in his political game. A member of the Polish gentry, he was one of the “brothers” at its local meetings; with Doroshenko, he was a Cossack; among the Catholics, he was one of them; and among the Orthodox he was a faithful son of the Greek faith. Throughout, only his determination to advance his own and his family’s fortunes remained constant.

Shumlians’kyi was aware of the political value of the metropolitanate of Kiev, and urged the kings of Poland to recover Kiev or establish their own metropolitanate at Halych. True, to play safe, he had secretly joined the Uniate church, but the Orthodox church was his trump card, still influential in the Commonwealth and decisive in Ukraine. After all, he had sought the miter of Kiev since 1675, mindful of Tukał’s’kyi’s dreams of elevating it to a patriarchate.⁴⁵

Shumlians’kyi wanted the entire former metropolitan see of Kiev united under his authority and possibly under Polish sovereignty. Yet he

⁴³ Shumlians’kyi to Gałęcki, see fn. 42.

⁴⁴ He was not much believed in Warsaw, and on instruction from Sobieski, Dowmont informed Ukraintsev that “the evil and perverse man who sent Klymko to the hetman, Iosyf Shumlians’kyi, lies on both sides, sometimes doing services to His Majesty the Tsar and other times giving counsel to His Royal Majesty, and he is treacherous in all things. There is nothing in him but enmity.” TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 330–31.

⁴⁵ Andrusiak, *Józef Szumlański*, pp. 73–110, 149–56.

was not another Tukał's'kyi, ready to promote his ideas at the cost of his own position and influence. He was given to a multitude of contradictory compromises. Soon after Solomon's head had rolled in Baturyn, Shumlians'kyi sought a secret meeting with the Russian resident, Boris Mikhailov. The tsar's diplomat, well aware of the bishop's recent activity against his sovereign, avoided his advances, in the meantime requesting instructions from the Department of Foreign Affairs. The reply was slow in coming and Shumlians'kyi was so insistent that Mikhailov finally agreed to a secret meeting.⁴⁶

Faced by the tsars' envoy, Shumlians'kyi was not a free son of his beloved Fatherland but a helpless pawn in the king's hands. He explained that he had agreed to participate in the deplorable Solomon intrigue and to dispatch Domoradz'kyi only under the strictest orders from the king. He cited the notorious wiles of Sobieski, adept at outwitting the great of this world, to say nothing of a simple priest far removed from secular concerns. The king was the sole culprit, and if Shumlians'kyi had sinned, it was only in obedience to his monarch.⁴⁷

Mikhailov pretended that he was hearing the story for the first time. He had been responsible for handling Volkov's reports at the Department and was thoroughly familiar with the Solomon Affair. He not only feigned ignorance, but questioned the truth of Shumlians'kyi's assertions, defending Sobieski's good name and the terms of the Eternal Peace in feigned disbelief that the king would dare violate them. He even hinted that Shumlians'kyi was making up the story in order to sow dissension between the two allied nations. This ploy compelled Shumlians'kyi to be very specific in describing the king's role in an episode that seemed closed. Thus the Department gained new evidence of Polish "perfidy."

After Shumlians'kyi had completed his indictment of Sobieski and Jabłonowski, Mikhailov—still pretending that he did not quite believe the story—casually asked how the bishop proposed to atone for his sin against the tsars. Pleased that the conversation was turning to the subject of clearing his record, Shumlians'kyi eagerly assumed the role of a Russian agent informing Moscow about the best ways of protecting its interests in the Commonwealth. He pointed out that the Eternal Peace

⁴⁶ Register of Mikhailov's activities, May 1692, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 242, pp. 376–90.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 378–80.

had not been ratified by Parliament, stressing that the Commonwealth was not bound by the pledges of its kings. Russia consequently could not be sure of its possession of Kiev and the East Bank until Parliament had confirmed the treaty and incorporated it into its constitution. He advised the Russian resident to press for ratification, using as an excuse the affair that had demonstrated the king's bad faith.⁴⁸

Furthermore, though himself a secret convert to the Uniate church, he complained about the pressure exerted by the king, the bishops, and many senators to convert the Orthodox to that faith. Such an apostolate was intended to weaken the tsars' influence in the Commonwealth, he explained; Moscow should firmly defend the Orthodox subjects of the Polish Crown, who knew the tsar as their only champion. He almost went so far as to suggest that the tsar was their natural sovereign, and added that the tsar could intervene in Poland only as long as the Orthodox faith survived there.⁴⁹

Mikhailov made a detailed record of the conversation and sent it to Moscow, but received no instructions on how to deal with the bishop. Moscow dropped its accusations against Shumlians'kyi, but the Russian residents in Poland did not use his services, and Moscow received his emissaries less frequently. In the meantime, the volatile bishop became more deeply involved with the Catholics, trying to bring the strong stauropegial religious fraternity of L'viv over to their side. The fraternity's members began to send messages to the tsars accusing Shumlians'kyi of promoting the Uniate church. His drive for the metropolitanate of Kiev was slowed down, his standing with Sobieski was damaged, and even his relations with his diocese deteriorated.⁵⁰

What were the reasons for the selection of Solomon as the purported envoy of Mazepa? We have already pointed out why the hetman himself would not have used him, but Golitsyn's situation was quite different. He wanted someone with a Ukrainian background, but without ties to the Cossack leaders' factions or to the local Orthodox clergy. He also needed a man he could easily disown should he be arrested in Poland. Solomon fit the part. He could be regarded as a subject of the Polish

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 384–88. Shumlians'kyi suggested that the Poles wanted to attack Muscovy and were simply waiting for an opportune moment.

⁴⁹ Ibid. See also Andrusiak, *Józef Szumlański*, pp. 166–67.

⁵⁰ Volkov's dispatches, December 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 337–38, 343–48. Refer also to fn. 44.

crown by virtue of his birth in Brody, and he knew the West Bank and its language from his youth. His turbulent past and the fact that he held no official position in Russia would allow Golitsyn to deny any connection with him.⁵¹ If Sobieski were to arrest Solomon and demand explanations from Golitsyn, the latter could easily reject as slanderous any suggestion that he had dispatched the monk, and could blame the whole affair on the enemies of the Polish-Russian alliance, notably those, like Solomon, from the Polish side of the border.

Furthermore, Golitsyn must have known Solomon well enough to appreciate his intelligence, his gall, and his talent for gaining the confidence of others. He must have appreciated Solomon's eloquence and his gifts as an actor. His estimate turned out to be correct, for despite Sobieski's and Jabłonowski's misgivings, Solomon managed to induce them to send Domoradz'kyi on his ill-fated mission.

It is not clear whether the *d'iaki* of the Department of Foreign Affairs were really unaware of the plot before it broke into the open. After all, someone must have known about Solomon's mission to Samoilovych. Besides, Volkov's behavior in the matter was rather odd. After receiving from Podil's'kyi the news of Solomon's arrival with letters from "Mazepa," Volkov warned his informant against an adventurer trying to cause a split between the king and the tsars, hinting that the purpose of the mission was to discredit Mazepa and that it was probably engineered by the Poles. Yet the Russian envoy failed to ask senators of his acquaintance about the affair, nor did he lodge a protest. His reaction to the arrival of the delegation from the Zaporozhian Cossacks was quite different—he protested against their reception by Sobieski, invoking the terms of the treaty.⁵² Could Volkov's restraint on the Solomon affair have been due to the fact that although he was officially presumed to know nothing about it, he actually had some notion of its origin? Perhaps that was why he judged it more prudent to avoid any involvement without specific orders from Moscow.

One of the puzzling items is a reference to Podil's'kyi in the letter ostensibly written to Solomon by Mazepa, the one Solomon dictated to the tutor. There "Mazepa" wrote that he had instructed Lyzohub's

⁵¹ Ukraintsev reminded Dowmont that Solomon, as a man born in Brody, was a subject of the king. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 184–85.

⁵² Volkov's dispatches, December 1690, January 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 337–38, 355–56.

servant to hand over to Podil's'kyi all the letters for Solomon if the latter was not available at the time. The allusion to Podil's'kyi in a letter which Solomon intended to show to the king could have been quite damaging. Probably Solomon had learned that Podil's'kyi had fingered him to Volkov and was taking revenge by naming him as a Russian agent, as in fact Podil's'kyi was. Podil's'kyi's subsequent fate is unknown, but it would appear that he continued to serve the Russian residents for a modest remuneration.⁵³

Why did Poland fail to charge Golitsyn with instigating the whole affair? Especially after the minister's downfall, it would have been easy to accuse him, yet Sobieski did not do so. He evidently found it more advantageous to take the blame than to start a public debate which would bring to light not only the Kremlin's double game, but also his own hasty and unlawful meddling in Ukraine, which could have led to war with Russia.

The Solomon intrigue exposed Sobieski's intentions toward Ukraine. The ease with which he allowed himself to be drawn into actions which promised the return of Ukraine indicate the extent of his hostility toward Moscow. It also indicates the importance given to Cossack strength. Very good relations with the Zaporozhian Sich were not enough to challenge the Russian position on the Dnieper. But with the involvement of Mazepa, the dream of a Polish return to Kiev might have been realized. The absence of any discussion of the conditions under which a Cossack state might join the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is striking. It was apparently taken for granted that Cossack fervor to shed the Muscovite yoke of slavery was sufficient reason for the hetman's actions. In the final analysis, the readiness with which Sobieski undertook anti-Russian contacts with the hetman shows that he saw Moscow as a far-from-insurmountable obstacle to his Ukrainian ambitions. He was ready to welcome a Cossack uprising under almost any circumstances, dreaming, no doubt, that Mazepa might be the next Khmel'nyts'kyi, destined to unite his people against Russia as the "Ukrainian Moses" had united them against Poland.

⁵³ In his letter to Shumlians'kyi (the one dictated to Marets'kyi), "Mazepa" wrote that he had instructed his servant to leave the letters with Podil's'kyi if he could not find Solomon. He also ordered Solomon to extract all of Podil's'kyi's secrets: Copy of the letters written by Solomon and brought to Moscow by Okrasa. TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1691, ms 6, pp. 105–106.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Allure of a Separate Peace

While Russian diplomats were charging the Poles with violations of the Eternal Peace Treaty, they themselves were negotiating with the Turks and Tatars for a separate peace. In accelerating the efforts begun by Golitsyn to achieve such a peace, they nevertheless did not lose sight of their need to collect evidence of Sobieski's duplicity. In their talks with the Moldavian diplomat who acted as intermediary, the Russians asked the Tatars for the originals of any letters written on the king's orders and sent by one of his ministers that demonstrated Polish violation of the treaty. They explained that such letters would enable His Majesty the Tsar to prove to the world the treacherous behavior of the Poles, thus justifying the necessity of a peace treaty with the Crimea. Requests for the letters occupied much time during the negotiations, and were among the official conditions presented to the khan; the Russians were even prepared to accept a status quo settlement with the Tatars, provided they received them.¹

The content of these messages was not vital to the Russians, since they knew that Sobieski was in close contact with the Tatars. If they had required motives for a policy shift, they had them in ample supply; they even had copies of some of the letters. What was important was that the originals would serve as incontrovertible evidence of the moral basis of the tsar's decision.

Despite the genuine military feats of the Austrian, Venetian, Polish, Cossack, and Russian armies, the Ottoman Porte and the Tatars were not crumbling. The great expedition against the Crimea had failed to result in its conquest. The Holy Alliance and the brilliant victory of Vienna had not led to a change in the political situation of the Balkans. The Polish hero of Vienna and "savior of Christendom" was not even able to take back Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi from the Turks. The threat of Polish domination of the Danubian principalities began to wither away after the

¹ Records of the Belevich mission, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Moscow; hereafter TsGADA), fond 68, Relations with Moldavia, ms 4, pp. 34–36.

unsuccessful sieges of Kam'ianets' and the worsening political crisis in Poland, where Parliament, weary of the royal couple's French sympathies, was not eager to provide money and armies for a more aggressive war.²

The Ottoman Porte, which had been ready to make considerable territorial concessions, now prepared for renewed hostilities in response to the dramatic change in the international situation when Louis XIV took up arms against Emperor Leopold I and his allies England and the Netherlands. England and the Netherlands put pressure on the Habsburgs to conclude a peace treaty with the Turks so that they could engage all their forces against France. Faced with war on two fronts, Austria was inclined to seek peace with the Turks, provided it could maintain its influence in Transylvania and keep the part of Hungary it had seized. It paid little attention to the interests of Venice, Poland, and Russia. As a consequence Austria's allies were also looking for separate peace agreements favorable to them.³

Their endeavors—especially Poland's—were assisted by French diplomats. In Istanbul the efforts to arrange a Polish-Turkish peace proved fruitless: the Turks overcame the shock of their defeat at Vienna when the Poles proved less than invincible in the Moldavian campaigns and in the sieges of Kam'ianets'. The Turks had concluded that the khan of the Tatars could cope with the Poles and the Russians without their help. In such circumstances, Sobieski's demand for the return of Moldavia seemed excessive, and the French diplomats could secure only a promise of a peace agreement limited to the return of Podolia and ruined Kam'ianets'.⁴

² Lord Chandos, the English ambassador to Turkey, informed his government in 1687 that the Turkish ministers were not particularly worried about military actions undertaken by Poles and Russians. Chandos to Secretary of State, April 1687, Public Record Office (London; hereafter PRO), State Papers (hereafter SP) Turkey, ms 97, vol. 20, p. 64. The best treatment of Sobieski's foreign policy at the time is K. Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią. Z dziejów polityki Jana III Sobieskiego w latach 1687–1690* (Cracow, 1933), pp. 74–121. See also C. Chowaniec, "Z dziejów powiedeńskiej polityki Jana III," in *Przegląd Współczesny* 89 (1929): 330–40.

³ After getting news of the beginning of the French-Austrian war, Sobieski instructed Dowmont to inform Golitsyn that Austria might opt for a quick peace settlement. He added that, "We have reason to fear that we and their Graces the tsars may be forgotten during those negotiations." Sobieski to Dowmont, 18 October 1688, Biblioteka Muzeum im Ks. Czartoryskich (Cracow; hereafter B. Czart.), ms 422, pp. 311–12. At the Kremlin, the possibility of a peace was treated very seriously. Dowmont to Sobieski, 7 April and 14 April 1689, B. Czart., ms 182, pp. 613, 623–24.

⁴ Lord Pagett to Lord Nottingham, 20 July 1690, PRO, SP Germany, 80. W.

Such terms were unacceptable to Sobieski, who turned again to Austria. Austria had long shared Russia's concern about Sobieski's interest in a separate peace, particularly one arranged by French and Tatar intermediaries. Golitsyn had been keenly aware of the danger to Russia of remaining alone to face the Crimea and the Turks. Alarmed by the outbreak of war in the West, he had manifested anti-French sentiments in the hope that Austria would continue the war against Turkey—a war which had provided Russia since 1688 with a chance to enter the Balkans. His major military effort in 1689 had been calculated to revive pressure on Austria.⁵

Vasilii Golitsyn had suspected not only the Poles but the Austrians, too, of preparing a peace and disregarding Russian interests. While urging the court of Vienna to persevere in the war, he had asked the Dutch to use their influence with Austria to ensure that if a peace with Turkey were concluded instead, Russian interests would not be overlooked. He had also made some overtures to France with the help of Danish diplomats.⁶ For a year he had wavered between continuing the war and concluding a separate peace, but on the whole he had bided his time, awaiting an opportune moment to carry out the second alternative.

The Ottomans and the Moldavian "Third Turk"

Golitsyn's successors, the Naryshkins, concentrated on stabilizing their domestic position and withdrew from active military ventures. They were alarmed by the revanchist plans Sobieski had revealed in the course of the Solomon Affair. Hetman Mazepa, whose conduct at the time of the Solomon Affair had strengthened his position, was instructed

Konopczyński, *Polska a Turcja 1683–1792* (Warsaw, 1936) pp. 13, 15, 23; Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią*, pp. 123–24, 129. Miron Costin, "Letopișetul țării Moldovei," in his *Opere*, ed. P. Panaitescu (Bucharest, 1965), p. 66; I. Moga, "Rivalitatea Polono-Austriacă și Orientarea politică a țărilor Române la sfârșitul secolului XVII," in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională*, vol. 6 (Cluj, 1936), pp. 317–400.

⁵ M. I. Belov, "K istorii diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii Rossii vo vremia krymskikh pokhodov (1686–1689)," *Uchenye zapiski Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* 14 (1949): 178–79.

⁶ M. I. Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident v Moskve. Baron Iogann Keller i ego pis'ma" (Ph.D. diss., Leningrad, 1947), p. 385. When Golitsyn returned from the 1689 campaign against the Crimea, it was rumored in Moscow that he had started peace negotiations with the Tatars. Dowmont wrote Sobieski that Golitsyn was negotiating with Murza ibn Sulesh, 12 July 1689, B. Czart., ms 189, p. 664.

to extend discreet peace feelers to the Tatars.⁷ At the same time, the Department of Foreign Affairs sent an emissary to Constantin Cantemir, hospodar of Moldavia, asking him to mediate between the tsar and the Turkish sultan and his vassal, the Tatar khan. This delicate mission to Moldavia was entrusted to a monk, the deacon Foma.⁸ He left Moscow in February 1690, and arrived in Iași in March, where he was warmly welcomed by Cantemir.

The fate of Moldavia had been uncertain since the battle of Vienna. Cantemir's predecessor, Gheorghe Duca, had for a short period (1681–1683) held the rank of Cossack hetman of Ukraine, which had given him authority over a part of the territories between the Dniester, Boh, and Dnieper. When Duca was taken prisoner by the Poles in 1683, the Cossacks under Stepan Kunyts'kyi, one of Duca's deputies, had passed over to the Polish side, since they had no strong attachment to Moldavia. With help from Poland, Kunyts'kyi had tried over the following year to seize Moldavia and also the territories of the Budjak Horde. But the Moldavians had failed to support him and the Polish-Cossack forces had been pushed out by the Tatars.

The Poles, however, had made substantial gains in 1686, when Sobieski himself led Polish and Lithuanian armies deep into Moldavia, taking over the whole northern part of the country. The Commonwealth had prepared no plans to incorporate it, and seemed to have had no clear-cut political mission. Thus its military presence in Moldavia could not be represented as anything but simple conquest.

Although Stefan Petriceicu, once hospodar, had been living in Poland since 1672, when he had been ousted by the Turks for siding with the Poles, he was not involved in the Polish *reconquista* of Moldavia. This pretender to the Moldavian throne and his supporters opted for a vassal relationship with Poland, under which the hospodar would be appointed by the king and would sit in the Commonwealth's Senate as the most senior member. Under such a plan, Moldavia would also pay substantial taxes to the Polish-Lithuanian treasury and supply military forces in time of war. Such a relationship would have amounted to transferring to the Polish-Lithuanian state the prerogatives previously enjoyed by Turkey.

⁷ Mazepa sent his special messenger Batyr-Cherkes to the Tatar khan. TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, p. 65.

⁸ Ibid.

Some of the great Moldavian aristocrats, many of them educated in Poland, favored a union with Poland similar to the Lublin Union with Lithuania. Moldavia would retain, as Lithuania had, its own separate administration, judiciary, army and treasury, while Moldavian aristocrats would join the ranks of the Polish szlachta. Under such an arrangement the new province of the Commonwealth would in effect have been ruled by these men, while lesser lords would have held influence over their counties.⁹

Although a decision regarding union or incorporation of Moldavia with Poland-Lithuania was obviously crucial in securing the support of at least part of the population, the Polish Parliament considered neither of these possibilities. Its failure to proclaim a political plan for Moldavia underscored the element of simple conquest and deprived Sobieski of backing in that country. At home, the suspicion that Sobieski intended to gain the Moldavian throne for his son Jakub agitated the szlachta. Whatever the king's long-range ambition was, he placed the administration of the conquered territory under the Moldavian nobleman Turkul, who was a captain in the Polish army.¹⁰

Cantemir had reason to be glad that Sobieski was not accompanied by Petriceicu, who might have provided a focal point for the aristocratic Moldavian opposition, but he realized that nonetheless Polish troops in northern Moldavia threatened his reign. He was not in a position to resist the Polish pressure single-handedly and had to rely on Tatar and Turkish assistance.¹¹ Turkish forces were concentrated along the Danube so as to resist the Austrians, hence Cantemir could count only on Tatar

⁹ "Desideria in punkta hospodara Petryczeyka, bojarów i obywatelów ziemie woloskiej (1689)," Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw; hereafter AGAD), Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 47, vol. 2, pp. 91–92, 93–98. Costin, *Opere*, pp. 10–14; I. Moga, "Rivalitatea Polono-Austriaca," pp. 317–18.

¹⁰ Sobieski's proclamation to the citizens of northern Moldavia, 21 June 1687, in Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria romanilor*, Suplementul II, vol. 3 (Bucharest, 1895) p. 166. For Sobieski's contacts with the Moldavians and his military plans, see Archivio Segreto Vaticano (Vatican City), Nunziatura di Polonia, ms 107, pp. 187–88. See also Z. Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski 1629–1696* (Warsaw, 1983), pp. 355, 380–84. Ion Neculce, *Letopișetul țării Moldovei, 1662–1743* ed. Iorgu Iordan (Bucharest, 1959), pp. 96–99. I. Moga, "Rivalitatea Polono-Austriaca," pp. 318–19.

¹¹ Cantemir's plans are reflected in his actions, especially in the role he played as intermediary between Turkey and Russia. Records of the Belevich mission, TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4. See also: Information from Moldavia, 9 April 1689, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 16, pp. 79–80.

support, which was unavailing during Russian offensives in the Crimea. Anxious to see the release of the khan's forces for action against Poland, he aimed at a return to the situation which had prevailed under the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Bakhchesarai of 1681. To that end, he tried to encourage suspicion and hostility between Poland and Russia and between the Poles and Tatars: Cantemir's emissaries occasionally alleged that the Poles planned to attack Kiev and advised the Russians that the Poles had revealed to the Tatars the tsar's secret strategic plans. In light of such allegations, the Poles had been blamed for the failure of Golitsyn's expeditions.

This disinformation campaign was orchestrated by the Moldavian resident in Poland, Diamandi Sluzari, who had been posted there since 1674 and was thoroughly familiar with the political scene. The Moldavians collected intelligence in Poland and propagated reports passed on to them from Iași through the intermediary of the Orthodox fraternity attached to the Church of the Dormition of the Most Holy Theotokos, built in L'viv with the support of the Moldavian hospodars. The church was known in the late seventeenth century as "Wallachian," since Moldavia was known in Poland as Wallachia at the time. The stauropegial fraternity of L'viv had many longstanding ties with Moldavia. In addition to commercial relations between the fraternity members and the Danubian duchies, there were strong cultural bonds. In cooperation with the fraternity, the hospodars published books in L'viv which circulated in the Commonwealth and beyond. The Orthodox in Moldavia, L'viv, and Kiev shared the same cultural values, and close relations existed between Suceava, Iași, Kiev, and L'viv.¹²

Cantemir exploited these bonds for his political purposes. Besides promoting a separate peace between Moscow and Turkey, he relied on Austria to frustrate any designs Poland might have had on his duchy. Vienna's refusal to relinquish its claim to Moldavia angered Sobieski and the Polish Senate. Cantemir, observing Austria expanding in Transylvania and reaching toward Bucharest, did not want to be left within the Polish sphere of influence and maintained fairly close relations with Vienna. He even offered to recognize the sovereignty of the

¹² Volkov's dispatches, July 1689, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 238, pp. 111–13. See also: Hurmuzaki, *Suplementul II*, vol. 1, pp. 205, 207–211, 213–14, 220–21, 254–56, 317, 457, 537, and vol. 2, p. 173.

Habsburgs in exchange for their recognition of his hereditary rights to the Moldavian throne. Such proposals stiffened Vienna's position on Moldavia and contributed to tensions within the Holy Alliance, which was exactly what Cantemir wanted.¹³

In 1689, under pressure from Vienna, the hospodar of Wallachia, Serban Cantacusino, sought Russian protection against the uninvited Catholic liberators. Cantemir had no part in such designs, in which he saw no profit for himself, for he was afraid that if the Russians marched to the Danube, they might acquiesce to a Polish occupation of all Moldavia. As a loyal ally of the Ottoman Porte, he informed Istanbul of the political and military situation in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia, and of the behavior of Cantacusino and his successor Constantine Brancovianu, warning the Turks about their contacts with Vienna. The Turks had no more devoted vassal in the Balkans than the hospodar of Moldavia. Cantemir was reported to have said on several occasions that even if the Turks were defeated and only two of them survived, he would still be on their side.¹⁴ Yet this "third Turk" had some political plans which did not wholly coincide with the Porte's: like his predecessors, he was concerned about the Turkish control of Kam'ianets'.

Under the terms of the Truce of Buchach (1672), which had left Podolia and West-Bank Ukraine to Turkey, there were Turkish dependencies not only to the southeast, but also to the north of Moldavia. The Dniester was becoming a Turkish river—a situation which did not augur well for a continuation of Moldavia's semi-autonomous status. The Janissary garrison in Kam'ianets' in particular caused Cantemir much concern. Since 1684 Kam'ianets' had been surrounded by Polish strongholds and settlements, placing it in a state of permanent siege. Nearby the Poles had built the forts of the Holy Trinity, where a strong garrison remained year round.

Kam'ianets' was well fortified, but required supplies of food, fodder, and ammunition. The Turkish resolve to hold it automatically turned

¹³ O. Brüner, "Österreich und die Walachei während des Türkenkrieges von 1683–1699," in *Mitteilung der Österreichischen Institut für Geschichtsforschung* 44 (1931): 290–318; Piwarski, *Między Francją a Austrią*, pp. 76–79; L. E. Semenova, *Russko-valashskie otnosheniia v kontse XVII—nachale XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1969), pp. 78–79.

¹⁴ Neculce, *Letopișetul țării*, pp. 98–99. Cantemir's nickname, "the Third Turk," was also used by Polish sources, see AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163a, vol. 22, pp. 515–18.

the surrounding area into a war zone. Charged with bringing in the supplies—mostly from Moldavia, as were the several thousand carts, horses, and drivers that carried them—the Tatars mounted 10,000 to 20,000 men for convoy. The reinforcement of the Janissary garrison under Tatar protection contributed to the further devastation of Moldavia by attracting Polish attacks.

If Cantemir ever wished the Poles success, it was surely when they launched an assault on Kam'ianets'. He did not want to participate in the provisioning of the fortress, and he did not welcome the annual passage of Tatar troops through his territory. He consequently did not wish the Turks to keep their outpost in Podolia, although he preferred not to see it in Polish hands either, and proposed placing it instead under "neutral" Moldavian control. The "third Turk" obviously could hardly advance such an idea in Istanbul, but he thought that it could be proposed by the Russians, grateful for his peacemaking efforts. Furthermore, he hoped that a separate peace might be followed by a Polish-Russian war, which would exhaust the Poles to such an extent that Sobieski could no longer threaten Moldavia. He also contemplated winning for himself territories from the Dniester and Boh to the lower Dnieper.

These were ambitious plans, or rather dreams, beyond the grasp of the ruler of a small portion of a devastated country. Cantemir must have welcomed Turkey's political stabilization late in 1689, as well as its mobilization of a vast army. When Russia sent Foma on his mission early in 1690, Cantemir was delighted to play the part of mediator between the Kremlin and Istanbul. He received Foma cordially and dispatched him with an escort to the grand vizir's camp at Adrianople.

Foma remained in Adrianople until October 1690, waiting for a response from the Turks. He found the mood at Turkish headquarters militant.¹⁵ The new vizir, Oglu Köprülü, the younger brother of the renowned Ahmed, was known for his belligerence and his intelligence. An English diplomat reported that he was popular and considered just,

¹⁵ Foma was sent back to Moscow with Belevich: TsGADA, fond 68 (Relations with Moldavia) ms 4, p. 1. It is important to note that during the same time Foma was delayed in Adrianople, the Tatars made a serious attempt to conclude a separate peace treaty with Poland. Their envoy proposed the restoration of the *ante bellum* borders along with the destruction of the fortifications at Kam'ianets'-Podil'skyi. Acting in accord with the decisions made by the parliament, the senators and the king rejected the Tatar offer. Bonesana to Vatican, 27 April and 31 May 1690, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Nunziatura di Polonia, ms 109, pp. 138, 186.

but warned his government that, though a faithful Muslim, he “believed the French more than the Koran.”¹⁶ Toward the end of 1689 the Turks had scored their first successes, notably when the Tatars invaded Transylvania and ravaged the country, ousting the Austrian troops. The Tatar forces, which reached the Danube under their khan, helped the Turks to hold back an Austrian expedition trying to seize Bosnia.¹⁷

The year 1690 was even more favorable to the Turks. That summer William Lord Trumbull, the English ambassador, concluded that offers to mediate would be futile, as they would accomplish nothing and merely bolster Turkish self-confidence.¹⁸ Events seemed to confirm his judgment. The Turks received considerable support from the Tatars, since, true to Foma’s assurances, Russia was mounting no offensive operations against the Crimean Khanate. Imre Thököly, appointed duke of Transylvania by the sultan, attacked Transylvania at the head of an army of Tatars and Moldavian and Wallachian mercenaries, pushing out the Austrian forces and capturing their commander-in-chief, General Hesler. In the meantime the grand vizir’s army took Niš and Vidin, then Belgrade.¹⁹ Hungary lay open to the victorious vizir, and Tatar raiders reached Buda, spreading destruction on the way. Panic broke out in Vienna and many wanted to leave the city.

Both the Turks and outside observers gave the Tatars much credit for these victories. In the opinion of the English diplomat mediating on behalf of his government between Austria and Turkey, peace could be attained only if the Russians tied up the Tatar army in the Crimea, or if

¹⁶ Diary of William Trumbull during his residence in Istanbul (1688–1689), October 1689, Berkshire Record Office, Trumbull Add, ms 99 (manuscript without pagination); Trumbull to the Secretary of State, 6 November 1689, PRO, SP Turkey, ms 97, vol. 20, p. 151.

¹⁷ Trumbull to the Secretary of State, 16 May and 11 July 1689; Thomas Coke to his cousin, 1 June 1689; Trumbull to the Secretary of State, 19 August, 12 September, 31 October, 6 and 21 November, 9 December 1689, PRO, SP Turkey, ms 97, vol. 20, pp. 133–34, 136–37, 141–42, 143–44, 149–50, 155–56, 159; Diary of William Trumbull, October–November 1689, Berkshire Record Office, Trumbull Add, ms 99.

¹⁸ Trumbull to the Secretary of State, 1 July 1690, PRO, SP Turkey, ms 97, vol. 20, p. 167; Trumbull to the Earl of Nottingham, 31 October 1690, pp. 170–71.

¹⁹ Lord Pagett to the Secretary of State, 3 September 1690, 19 October 1690, PRO, SP Turkey, ms 80, vol. 17, pp. 91, 105. Francesco Bonesana to the Vatican, 4 May 1690, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Nunziatura di Polonia, ms 109, p. 140; J. Sękowski, *Collectanea z dziejopisów Tureckich rzeczy do Historii Polskiej służących*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1825), p. 189.

the Turks' self-confidence were shaken by mutinies in their army or Western victories.²⁰

Since the Turks were not contemplating peace negotiations with Austria before recapturing the territories they had lost in previous years, the Austrians had more than ever to rely on help for their allies. They received it from Sobieski, who attacked a Tatar convoy carrying supplies to Kam'ianets' in the spring and carried out a diversionary action in Moldavia in the fall that helped the prince of Baden's operations in Transylvania.²¹ Sobieski's assistance was significant; to have been decisive, his forces would have had to hold back the Tatars at the Dnieper. Accordingly, messages asking for intensified military action went to Moscow from Warsaw and Vienna. The grand vizir decided to forestall any Russian move by tentatively accepting Foma's offer, withholding a final commitment to talks until he could consult with the khan. The two determined that since Russia had made no important territorial gains, the peace could be negotiated on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*. Sobieski's terms, demanding not only the return of Podolia, but also Moldavia, were too steep.

The grand vizir delegated to the khan the right to negotiate with Russia, and authorized Cantemir to carry on preliminary talks in coordination with him. The khan addressed to the tsars a brief letter reminding them that they were the ones to break the peace they had pledged, but by the will of God they had won no victories. He noted that Golitsyn had expressed a wish to renew the peace. Consequently, the Crimea was inclined to consider their request favorably, and to restore peace on the basis of the 1681 treaty. He invited the tsar's envoys to come to him, guaranteeing their safety.²²

²⁰ William Hussey to Lord Nottingham, 30 April 1691, PRO SP Turkey, ms 80, vol. 17, p. 199.

²¹ Crown Field Hetman Potocki to Szczuka, 25 August 1690, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163, vol. 2, p. 157; Jabłonowski to Szczuka, 11 September 1690, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163, vol. 1, pp. 245–46; Małachowski, Bishop of Cracow, to Szczuka, 29 December 1690, AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich, ms 163, vol. 2, pp. 197–98; Trumbull to the Earl of Nottingham, 31 October 1690, PRO, SP Turkey, ms 97, vol. 20, pp. 169–71.

²² Records of the Belevich mission, TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, pp. 11–21.

The Belevich Mission to Moscow

Cantemir transmitted the khan's letter to Moscow, but he added comments designed to tone it down. He pointed out that the Turks and Tatars were peacefully inclined and that Russia might be able to secure some concessions. He entrusted the delivery of the khan's message and the subsequent negotiations at the Department of Foreign Affairs to a seasoned diplomat, Ivan Belevich, who had handled a similar mission to Moscow in 1679–1680. The hospodar dispatched him from Iași on 10 November 1690, after the Turkish victories on the Danube and in Transylvania.²³ It was a psychologically propitious moment, and Cantemir expected that the Russians would be in a conciliatory mood.

The hospodar instructed his envoy to play up the danger of a separate peace between Poland-Lithuania and the Tatars, warning the Russians against a Polish attempt to take back Kiev. Belevich was supposed to convey the impression that the Turks and Tatars were determined to seek peace—with Poland or with Russia. Cantemir was taking credit for directing them toward the Kremlin, and presenting the peace overtures as his own achievement. He was acting on the assumption that the news of the Turkish military successes and the threat of a separate peace between Poland and the Turks would induce the Russians to accept the khan's letter as a basis for negotiations, which would include clauses concerning his control over the region between the rivers Dniester and Dnieper, as well as Kam'ianets'.²⁴

Belevich journeyed to Baturyn across West-Bank Ukraine, a hazardous route because Hetman Stanisław Jabłonowski—who had good intelligence sources at Cantemir's court and knew about Foma's and Belevich's mission—had ordered the commanding officer of Nemyriv to seize Moldavian emissaries. Belevich, traveling in a group of six, managed to evade pursuit by the Polish detachments, and reported to Mazepa on November 25. After a short rest, he proceeded to Moscow, arriving on December 23. He was very well received; after setting himself up in a suburban residence, he was immediately supplied with several carts of firewood, fish, pepper, spices, and onions, as well as

²³ Ibid., pp. 27–29. On Belevich's previous mission to Moscow, see TsGADA, fond 68, ms 3, pp. 10–12.

²⁴ Records of the Belevich mission, TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, pp. 22–24, 62.

some casks of beer, vodka, and mead. He was also given money from the fund for foreign diplomats. An audience with the tsars was scheduled for 18 January 1691, and conversations at the Department of Foreign Affairs began within two days of his arrival.²⁵

These diplomatic courtesies did not, however, temper the customary vigilance of the Russian authorities. Steps were taken to isolate Belevich and his staff from outside contacts. The house in which the Moldavians resided was surrounded by *strel'tsy* whose commanding officer, Captain Dmitrii Obrasimov, was ordered to keep visitors out and to require strict abstinence among his subordinates, as it was feared that drunken *strel'tsy* might engage the Moldavian envoy's staff in conversation. Of course, such precautions were routine with the Department, but the instructions to Obrasimov to monitor carefully the conversations between Belevich and the Department's interpreters was a special measure, intended to keep Belevich from acquiring any information about the situation in Russia. The complete isolation of the foreign diplomats from the local population required a considerable effort, as the meticulous instructions issued to Obrasimov demonstrate. Belevich and his entourage were confined to their residence and forbidden contact with anyone except the officials of the Department.²⁶ They were also forbidden to talk with members of the guard.²⁷

Although we have no reason to doubt that Obrasimov carried out his orders conscientiously, Belevich's servants, who found their master parsimonious, left his employment and were hired by a boyar, Mikhail Georg'evich Romodanovskii. The isolation of the foreigners was evidently not as effective as the Russians wished, since the Moldavians managed to find new employment so easily. Oddly enough, when the Department learned about the servants' defection, it did not seem to realize that it revealed a breakdown of its security measures, but concentrated instead on the problem of whether the servants should be interned or allowed to remain in private Russian employ. No action was taken against Obrasimov or his *strel'tsy*. It would seem that the Russian bureaucracy attached more importance to the formulation of rules and prohibitions than to their actual implementation.²⁸

²⁵ Ibid., p. 1–8, 50.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 6–11.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁸ See the report of 30 January 1690 by Romashko Leont'ev, Belevich's servant, to the

Given the notorious discrepancy between the letter of the regulations and the facts of everyday life, it was obvious that the Belevich mission could not remain secret forever. The Department, while surrounding Belevich with *strel'tsy* and distrusting its own interpreters, asked him to represent himself as Cantemir's servant, seeking alms for religious purposes. It was a paradoxical instruction, since the Moldavian was not allowed any unofficial contacts in Moscow, but the Department believed that Dowmont would soon learn of Belevich's presence and that it should be explained away in the hope of allaying suspicion.²⁹

Emel'ian Ukraintsev held his first conference with Belevich at the Department on 3 January 1691.³⁰ After greetings and introductory courtesies, Belevich turned to his task, pointing out the danger of a possible Polish-Tatar peace and expressing satisfaction with the Foma mission. "If Foma had not arrived," he said, "the Turks would surely have concluded a peace with Poland, but his visit pleased the Turks and Tatars, who preferred a peace with Muscovy, and they had postponed consideration of a peace with Poland until they received a reply from Moscow."³¹ But a treaty should be concluded promptly, he argued, as otherwise the same offer would be made to Sobieski, with Kam'ianets' and half of Moldavia as inducements. He pointed out that after recovering their losses of 1672, the Poles would not remain idle, but would try with Tatar help to get back their own losses around Kiev.³² The description of Ukraine and Kiev as "Poland's own" could hardly have pleased the Moscow *d'iaki* who were present, but they did not restrain Belevich's rhetoric, as he urged them to conclude a peace treaty that would enable the Turks to turn a deaf ear to Sobieski's proposals.

As was expected of him, the Moldavian diplomat pointed out that Turkish power was on the rise and that the grand vizir had recovered Niš,

Department of Foreign Affairs on some of the servants that had fled (i.e., Kalinka, Aleshko, Iakushko) in Reports of the Belevich mission, TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, pp. 87–92.

²⁹ Dowmont was indeed well aware of Belevich's mission, and on 17 January 1691 he demanded an explanation from Ukraintsev. Ukraintsev lied about the purpose of the Moldavian visitor, telling Dowmont that Belevich was simply a pious Orthodox man seeking alms. Minutes of Dowmont's conversations with Ukraintsev, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 50–51.

³⁰ Records of the Belevich mission, TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, pp. 19–37.

³¹ Ibid., p. 20.

³² Ibid., p. 24.

Belgrade, and many other towns and provinces. The Tatars, together with Thőkőly, had taken advantage of the hatred of the people of Transylvania toward the Austrians and pushed them out of that country, defeating the prince of Baden's army. Clearly, Belevich told the Russians, the moment for leaving the camp of the Ottoman Porte's enemies was opportune, especially as such a move would shift to the Poles the brunt of the fighting in the northern section of the front. After concluding his pragmatic argument, Belevich appealed to Orthodox solidarity, painting a lurid picture of the persecution of the Orthodox church—churches and monasteries destroyed, forced conversions to the Uniate church—in the part of his country under Sobieski's occupation.³³

In his response Ukraintsev ignored the matter of the Orthodox church. Instead, he asked why Moscow had to wait for almost a year for a reply to the peace proposals transmitted by Foma. If the Turks and Tatars valued peace with the tsars so highly, he inquired, why had they sent peace missions to Sobieski rather than to Moscow?³⁴ Belevich had little to say on this point, so he confined himself to asserting that the Turks wanted to break the Polish-Russian alliance and that they preferred a peace with the tsars to one with Sobieski. He also attempted to demonstrate Polish duplicity and enmity toward Russia, insinuating that the Polish representative at the khan's court during the Russian campaign against the Crimea, Captain Dubrawski, had assured the Tatars that they could use all their forces against the Russians, since the Polish king would not attack them. Cantemir had been advised of that situation by the khan, who told him that there would be no Polish actions in Moldavia while the Russians were attacking the Crimea. Belevich argued that treaties with an ally as faithless as the Poles need not be honored and added that the hospodar would try to persuade the khan to discontinue the annual collection of gifts (a euphemism for tribute) from Russia.

Ukraintsev made no reference to the tribute, but asked why the Turks—if they were as powerful and victorious as Belevich claimed—were ready to conclude a peace treaty. He also inquired about the domestic situation in Turkey, with its changes of vizirs and military mutinies, and about Imre Thőkőly and his contacts with the Polish court. Belevich explained that the Ottoman Porte would not undertake peace

³³ Ibid., pp. 27–33.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 33–34.

negotiations with Emperor Leopold I and his allies without prior consultation with France. The mutinies in the Turkish army had ended, he said, and the new sultan was popular. It was the vizir, beloved and respected by all, who had endeavored to halt the Polish invasion of Moldavia by feigning interest in a separate peace with Poland. Thőkőly, on the other hand, did have frequent contacts with Sobieski.³⁵

Thőkőly's name came up because Cantemir had enclosed with his own letter one from Thőkőly describing the internal situation in Turkey and promising loyalty to the tsars. Belevich said that Cantemir's son-in-law was attached to Thőkőly, in command of some Moldavian army units. He further hinted that the tsars could be served not only by his own hospodar, Cantemir, but also by Thőkőly, the famous duke of Transylvania.³⁶ Ukraintsev did not take up the subject, and the first conference was terminated, to be resumed on 8 January 1691.

The second meeting was held at the Kremlin, in the office of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As before, Belevich was brought there by Dmitrii Obrasimov in a sleigh of the tsar's court, escorted by mounted *strel'tsy*. In the course of that meeting, Ukraintsev asked for the preconditions of the proposed negotiations with the Tatars, including time and place, but Belevich could not enlighten him on these points and asked to be sent back promptly with a message of general consent to negotiations. He did not miss the chance of repeating his earlier warnings against the Poles. He reminded Ukraintsev of the French efforts to secure a separate peace between Poland and the Tatars, which would release Sobieski's forces to join the war against the Habsburgs.

Belevich went so far in charging the Commonwealth with anti-Russian and even anti-Austrian designs that he detracted from the weight of his warnings about the recapture of Kiev by a vengeful Sobieski. The Poles, whom Belevich had earlier described as militarily weak in the eyes of the Turks and Tatars, were suddenly pictured as an awesome power ready to take back Ukraine and attack the Habsburg empire at the same time. Quick to see the discrepancy, Ukraintsev

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 35–36.

³⁶ Thőkőly to the tsars, 10 November 1690, TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, pp. 25–257. The tsars decided not to send him a letter, but instead asked Cantemir to thank him in their name for helping to promote peace between Moscow and Istanbul. TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, p. 64. The French supported Thőkőly's princely aspirations to the throne of Transylvania. Diary of William Trumbull, Berkshire Record Office, Trumbull Add, ms 99.

ordered an assistant *d'iak* to read aloud the testimony of Tatar prisoners who had taken part in raids against Poland before being captured by the Russians. Their statements contradicted the impression of Polish-Tatar détente projected by Belevich.

Ukraintsev also inquired about reports that the Turkish treasury was depleted. Belevich admitted that Turkey's fiscal situation was poor, citing the minting of copper currency as evidence. He added that Tatar incursions into Poland were for the purpose of taking civilian captives to be sold in the slave markets of the East—a practice which infuriated the *szlachta*, who demanded to know why Sobieski, if he had an understanding with the khan, could not guarantee security.³⁷ It was a remark calculated to emphasize the king's motives for seeking peace with the Tatars.

Ukraintsev concluded the meeting with a question about the impact of the Russian expeditions against the Crimea. The response was lyrical: as the tsar's army marched into the Crimea, "Christian hearts beat faster," while "the Tatars trembled in fear."³⁸ When the Muscovites retreated, the Turks rejoiced and "tears filled the eyes of the Orthodox people."³⁹ So as not to end his conference on a tearful note, Belevich added that the Tatars "thought nothing of the Poles"—his recurring theme.⁴⁰

After the meeting, Ukraintsev prepared a lengthy report, which was submitted to the tsars and the Boyar Council on the following day. The unaccustomed speed of the action on Cantemir's proposals proved that interest in the continuation of peace talks was keen. No record of the debate in the Council is available, but it obviously resolved to seek peace and prepared arguments against Polish charges of starting separate negotiations in violation of the Eternal Peace between Warsaw and Moscow. On the day after the Boyar Council debate, the tsars issued two ukases. The Department of Foreign Affairs was instructed to prepare the peace terms and to compile a 300-page book listing all Poland's violations of the Eternal Peace. The peace terms were ready and approved by 22 January 1691.⁴¹

³⁷ Records of the Belevich mission, TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, pp. 47–49.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37–44.

Belevich was summoned next day for a special audience with the tsars. There, he was instructed to return promptly to the hospodar and to carry out Ukraintsev's orders faithfully, endeavoring to conduct the peace negotiations as successfully as he had done in 1679. He was also given a letter from the tsars to Cantemir. After the audience, Ukraintsev presented Belevich with the Russian peace conditions, set out in thirteen points, intended as Cantemir's guidelines in his peace talks. The tsars also asked Cantemir to send Belevich, "dear to their hearts," to the khan.⁴²

The peace was to be based, according to the Kremlin, on the situation that had existed since 1686. In addition to the Russians' demand for the Cossack lands between the rivers Dniester and Dnieper they asked for the abolition of the annual "gifts" collected by the Crimea. If their proposals were ignored, they warned, they were ready to make a major military effort and mount an expedition against the Crimea. The warning, however, was relatively mild and almost lost in the rhetoric expressing an ardent desire for peace, or at least an informal cease-fire. Significantly, restraint of military action was conditional not upon the acceptance of the peace terms, but on the continuation of talks.

The Russian diplomats evidently resented having been overlooked when earlier peace overtures had been made, but they were eager to secure permanent contacts with the Crimea. They also attached considerable importance to obtaining from the Tatars tangible evidence of Sobieski's violations of the Eternal Peace. They assured Cantemir that they had sent Mazepa's agent Batyr-Cherkes to the Crimea and the monk Foma to Moldavia not out of fear, but because of "the numerous evil deeds of the king of Poland, who tried to harm the tsars by inciting rebellion in Ukraine and plotting with the khan."⁴³ They asked Cantemir to point out to the khan that the tsars had broken the peace with the sultan and the Crimea under the influence of urgings by Poland and Austria, but after having perceived the duplicity of the Poles, they were "seeking a way of breaking their ties with them."⁴⁴

Cantemir was reminded that the Poles would surely endeavor to disrupt Russian-Tatar negotiations by means of various forgeries. The

⁴² Ibid., pp. 55–72.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 67.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 66–67.

tsars recalled that the delay in the initiation of the talks between Moscow and the Tatars was due precisely to the forged Solomon letters, which Sobieski had sent to the khan as genuine, causing the Tatars to doubt Mazepa's loyalty to Russia and consequently to postpone a reply to the offers brought by Foma. The tsars urged the Tatar envoys to come to Moscow with the assurance that they would be allowed to return to the Crimea unharmed even if no treaty should be concluded. They promised that they would hold their forces on the border as soon as they received news that the Tatar envoys were on their way and would order them to march on Ochakiv, the forts along the Dnieper, or the Crimea only if their message were totally ignored.⁴⁵

Upon hearing the instructions, Belevich made his obeisance to the tsars, but he could not refrain from adding a few remarks. He suggested that the matter of the Russian "gifts" should be left in abeyance for the time being, as withholding them might strike the khan as simply "indecent": the subject could better be broached with the khan's representative when they came to Moscow. Belevich decided to make no reference to the lands between the Dnieper and Dniester, coveted by Cantemir, but he asked the tsars to suggest to the khan in the course of their talks that Kam'ianets' be given to Cantemir, or—if that proved unacceptable—that the fortress be razed. He also promised on the hospodar's behalf to secure the Polish letters requested by the Russians and to send to the tsars some letters compromising the Poles that were already in Cantemir's possession.⁴⁶

Ukraintsev was to consider these observations and prepare the final version of his instructions. After a few days he again summoned Belevich to the Department and repeated to him the instructions, unchanged. He also stressed the urgency of the mission. In accordance with the orders of the tsars and the Boyar Duma, he presented Belevich with 120 rubles in cash and sables worth 100 rubles. It was a sizable gift, reflecting the importance attached by the Russians to the hospodar's offer of mediation. Two days later Belevich left Moscow and only a week later arrived in Baturyn, where he was promptly received by Mazepa. Carrying out Ukraintsev's orders, Belevich told the hetman about the tsars' instruction to Cantemir and the conversations he held in Moscow.⁴⁷ By

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 56–67.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 67–68.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 70–71, 76, 85, 85a.

disclosing these matters to Mazepa, Ukraintsev was dispelling any lingering doubts about his loyalty. Belevich could see for himself that Mazepa was privy to the innermost secrets of Russian foreign policy and enjoyed the confidence and respect of the Kremlin, untarnished by the Solomon Affair.

Mazepa endeavored to devise for Belevich a route back to Iași that would minimize the risk of capture by the Poles or hostile Zaporozhian Cossacks. He decided to send him via Bendery, protected by a large convoy headed by Vasyl' Polianka. The convoy left Baturyn on January 30, and on February 22 Mazepa informed the tsars that the Moldavian envoy had crossed the river Boh.⁴⁸

After receiving the tsars' letter and Belevich's report, Cantemir dispatched Belevich to the grand vizir, who expressed his satisfaction with Moscow's peaceful intentions and charged the khan with continuing the negotiations. Cantemir had achieved his main goal—to prevent Polish-Turkish peace talks.⁴⁹

Following Belevich's visit, the Russians decided to send one of Mazepa's men as their own emissary to the Crimea. Mazepa entrusted the mission to Tymofii Radych, a member of his chancery. Radych was well received by the khan, though the Tatar did not accept in full the Russian conditions. Since the tsars had indicated that the commencement of negotiations alone would guarantee the Crimea against Russian attack, Mehmed Aga was sent to Moscow toward the end of March 1691 as the khan's envoy, carrying his master's response to the Russian proposals brought by Radych. At the same time, the khan marched from the Crimea to the Budjak region at the head of a substantial army, and Radych was dispatched to the grand vizir's camp.⁵⁰

The Russian peace initiative was obviously welcomed both in the Crimea and at Adrianople. To ensure a favorable atmosphere for the

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 103–106, 119–20.

⁴⁹ Information was transmitted by Mark Konstantinov, 8 May 1690, TsGADA, fond 52, Relations with Greece, 1690, ms 1, pp. 183–84.

⁵⁰ Records of the Belevich mission, TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, p. 108. Radych left Baturyn for Zaporozhe and then the Crimea in February 1691. Records of the Belevich mission, TsGADA, fond 68, ms 4, pp. 117–18. See also the tsars to Khan Sadat Girei, March 9, 1691, Register of the diplomatic mission of assistant *D'iak* Vasilii Aitemirov to the Crimea, TsGADA, fond 123, Relations with the Crimea, ms 1, pp. 26–29, 31–32; "Dva doklada o primirenii Pol'shi, Rossii i Tsesariia s Turetskim Sultanom i s Krymskim Khanom," TsGADA, fond 79, ms 250, p. 26. Belov, "Niderlandskii rezident," pp. 386–88.

forthcoming negotiations, on 2 June 1691 the tsars ordered all Russian field commanders and Mazepa to suspend all military operations. The tsars were living up to their promise, and even though the khan's letter and the conditions transmitted by Mehmed Aga were not to their liking, they abstained from any military action. This was a major achievement for Tatar diplomacy: the remaining months of 1691 brought with them several serious military expeditions organized by the Austrian emperor and the Polish king. The Austrians managed to push Thóköly out of Transylvania, while Sobieski reached Iași and forced Cantemir to beat a hasty retreat. Sobieski could not hold all of Moldavia and eventually withdrew to Poland, mainly under pressure from the Tatars. Nevertheless, Polish garrisons continued to hold Suceava and Neamț in the north. It was clear that the Polish and Austrian forces would have scored far greater successes if the Tatar army had been tied up by the Russians.

Dowmont and Ukraintsev: Strained Meetings in Moscow

Toward the end of 1690, the Polish resident in Moscow was reporting a total freeze in Russian military activities. Dowmont also reported the arrival in Moscow of the Belevich mission, which he knew about almost immediately. When the Polish diplomat tried to determine the purpose of the mission, Ukraintsev calmly lied to him, asserting that Moscow received only ecclesiastical and lay pilgrims from Moldavia in search of alms, never any diplomats.⁵¹ The atmosphere of Dowmont's meeting with Ukraintsev on 26 January 1691 was tense. Dowmont, guided by the king's letter, described vividly the great Turkish victories in the previous campaign and urged the Russians to attack the Turkish forts along the Dnieper or in the Crimea. He read the king's appeal to let past mutual suspicions be forgotten for the sake of a fraternal march against the common enemy, warning that if Poland and Russia failed to stem the Turkish advances, they might both fall prey to the Ottoman Empire. He also insisted on the king's innocence in the matter of the Solomon Affair. But his pleas for military assistance and his less than wholly convincing explanations, of the Solomon intrigue failed to move Ukraintsev: he responded by accusing the Poles of plans for the recapture of Ukraine,

⁵¹ Minutes of Dowmont's conversations with Ukraintsev, 27 January 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 50–51.

made no reference to any joint military action, and even attacked Poland for alleged persecution of its Orthodox population.⁵²

Such a tirade prompted Dowmont to ask whether—God forbid—the tsars might be contemplating war against Poland. Already, at a previous meeting on 26 December 1690, the Polish resident had expressed his concern about rumors circulating in Moscow of an impending war, which were supported to some degree by the closing of the border to merchants and a ban on sales of wheat to Poland. Ukraintsev's assurances to the effect that no war was planned by anyone terminated the conference.

At his next meeting with Ukraintsev, Dowmont again requested a reply to the king's letters concerning joint military action. When Ukraintsev told him to inform Sobieski that the tsars' forces were ready for combat, Dowmont replied that he was well aware of the fighting readiness of the tsars' army, but the king wanted to know when the troops would be assembled, who would be in command, and what the direction of their march would be. In response, as at the earlier meeting, Dowmont was treated to a diatribe on the persecution of the Orthodox population, which this time included a veiled threat of war. "Religion is a matter of the utmost importance for all nations," said Ukraintsev, "and it has been the cause of broken treaties, disputes, and bloodshed between Poland and Russia."⁵³ To avoid such consequences, he suggested that the persecution of the Orthodox population be stopped and the war-monger bishop Shumlians'kyi be "removed from this world, so that he can do no more harm."⁵⁴ Thus, instead of discussing a joint campaign, the Russian diplomat reverted to the Solomon Affair.

Dowmont could hardly discuss war plans when his opponent proved, on the evidence of the Shumlians'kyi letter and Domoradz'kyi's testimony, that his king had been planning to recover the East Bank and Kiev from Russia. After a period of silence, which discreetly signaled that he was not prepared to argue the Russian charges, he promised to write to the king about Shumlians'kyi, asking in the meantime for the implementation of the terms of Eternal Peace and preparations for a military

⁵² Minutes of Dowmont's conversations with Ukraintsev, 3 March 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 67–74.

⁵³ Minutes of Dowmont's conversations with Ukraintsev, TsGADA, f. 79, ms 240, p. 103.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

campaign. Ukraintsev, however, held his ground and concluded the meeting by stating that the Shumlians'kyi matter was important and could endanger the friendship between the two nations, but that the tsars would overlook it if Solomon were delivered to them and Shumlians'kyi were punished.⁵⁵

The Boyar Council, informed of the king's questions toward the end of January, decided to reply to them "in accordance with the terms of Eternal Peace."⁵⁶ The assistant *d'iaki* of the Department were busy preparing transcripts from the treaty dealing with military cooperation; they also compiled a whole book of Russian and Polish military actions between 1686 and 1690. On the basis of these data, Ukraintsev composed two different versions of a reply to Sobieski's letters. The first promised to send troops against the enemy "wherever it may be expedient,"⁵⁷ and the second stated that it was too late to march to the Crimea and that the tsars would consequently confine themselves to acting "where the Lord might allow."⁵⁸ The message added that the king should be content with such a posture, for when the tsars' armies had mounted major expeditions against the Crimea (1687 and 1689), the Polish army had remained idle.

After studying the data on the previous military activities of both parties to the treaty, the Boyar Council decided to address to Sobieski a message modeled on the second version, which meant that the Russians would confine themselves to strictly defensive actions. The decision was communicated to Dowmont on 21 February 1691. Ukraintsev added some verbal comments that exacerbated the tone of the answer. He said detailed strategic plans could not be presented to the king because—as had been the case in the past—Hetman Jabłonowski or some other evil person might pass them on to the Tatars.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Minutes of Dowmont's conversations with Ukraintsev, 3 February 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 104–109.

⁵⁶ Tsars ordered and boyars advised. 31 January 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 78.

⁵⁷ Minutes of Dowmont's conversations with Ukraintsev, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 116.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ The boyars' advice was to limit the military use of the Russian armies to defensive activities: TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 118; Minutes of Dowmont's conversations with Ukraintsev, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 128.

In the meantime the court at Warsaw was accumulating evidence of the progress of the peace talks between Russia and the Tatars. Dowmont's reports and those of Jabłonowski's intelligence agents placed in doubt Russia's continued participation in the war. Russian indignation over the Solomon Affair manifested itself not only in peace negotiations with the Crimea, but also in the closing of the Polish-Russian border, a strengthening of the Smolensk garrison, and increased pressure in the matter of the treatment of the Orthodox population. Polish and West European newspapers published reports about contacts between the tsars and the khan, as well as rumors about an approaching war between Poland and Russia.

Seriously concerned, Sobieski appealed to Emperor Leopold with a view to exerting joint pressure on Moscow. Early in the year, Dowmont had informed the Department of Foreign Affairs about the forthcoming marriage of Jakub Sobieski, the king's son, to a sister of Emperor Leopold's wife. He mentioned at the same time the emperor's promise to send troops to Moldavia for a joint action under Sobieski's command. Volkov took note of the turn in Polish-Austrian relations, highlighted by the marriage of Sobieski's eldest son to a relative of the emperor. The common Polish-Austrian front was emphasized in 1690 by the sending to Moscow of separate missions by Ignaz Kurtz and Ivan Okrasa, who appealed on behalf of the emperor and king for military action against the Turks and Tatars.⁶⁰

Prior to the missions' arrival in Moscow, Sobieski had on several occasions expressed concern over the concentration of *strel'tsy* units in Smolensk, the closing of the border, and rumors of impending war. In the course of his meetings with Ukraintsev in February, March, April, May, and June, Dowmont requested on the king's behalf additional information on the movements of Russian troops, but he was invariably told that the tsars had already revealed their plans and the subject was closed. Sobieski nevertheless persisted in demanding military action, asking the tsars to fulfill the terms of the alliance instead of merely defending their frontiers. He complained that Crimean forces, unrestrained by the tsars,

⁶⁰ Sobieski to the tsars, 14 December 1690, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 136–39. Dowmont boasted about Jakub Sobieski's impending marriage and Polish-Austrian military cooperation. 26 January and 21 February 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 77, 102.

were ravaging and looting the eastern provinces of the Commonwealth.⁶¹ He pointed out that “by remaining in the Bilhorod forts and in Samara, the tsars’ army offers no help and does not divert the Tatars.”⁶² His pleas went unheeded, for in March Mehmed Aga was on his way to Moscow, and in June, true to their promise, the tsars issued orders suspending military operations.

Dowmont heard almost immediately about the arrival of the khan’s envoy and demanded an explanation. At a meeting on June 20 with Ukraintsev, he said that Moscow was full of rumors about the secret arrival of a Tatar envoy sent to negotiate a peace treaty. Ukraintsev denied that any Tatar envoy had been sent from the Crimea to Moscow, adding that if a Tatar diplomat had arrived in Russia, there would have been no reason to conceal his presence, since Tatar diplomats had visited Sobieski quite openly. “The voice of the people is God’s voice. Moscow rumors often prove true,” Dowmont responded—and departed.⁶³

He brought up Mehmed Aga again on his next visit, on July 6, asking the reason for his presence in Moscow. Dowmont also complained that his correspondence, as well as that of the Austrian resident, Kurtz, was delivered without the diplomatic pouch containing messages from their respective courts. On this occasion, Ukraintsev again denied the presence of Mehmed Aga. A week later, however, he informed Dowmont that an envoy from the Crimea was indeed on his way, for the purpose of negotiating an exchange of prisoners and starting peace talks. He said that the tsars were holding him back in Ukraine for the time being, but that even if they were to receive him, the Eternal Peace would not be violated. Dowmont promised to transmit this information to the king, but he added a query: where exactly in Ukraine was the Tatar envoy stationed, if he could visit Tsar Peter so easily in the Moscow suburb of Preobrazhenskoe?⁶⁴

⁶¹ Minutes of Dowmont’s conversations with Ukraintsev, 26 December 1690, 26 January, 21 February, 3 and 26 March, 5 April, 12 May, 25 May, 20 June, 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 35–36, 99–102, 129–30, 151–55, 165–66, 186, 196, 204–206.

⁶² Minutes of Dowmont’s conversations with Ukraintsev, 20 June 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 206.

⁶³ Minutes of Dowmont’s conversations with Ukraintsev, 20 June 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, p. 209.

⁶⁴ Minutes of Dowmont’s conversations with Ukraintsev, 6 July 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 210–18.

In July, Dowmont inquired several times about the Tatar envoy's mission and was informed again that he had come for the purpose of a prisoner exchange, and that the tsars would take no steps toward peace without the knowledge of the king of Poland. Dowmont then dispatched members of his staff to make contact with Mehmed Aga's entourage. They were arrested by *strel'tsy* and released several days later with official reproaches, but at long last Ukraintsev transmitted to Dowmont a brief summary of the khan's letter. The summary stated that the tsars had broken the peace, but that Golitsyn had expressed during his last expedition a wish to renew it, which the khan was willing to consider. Ukraintsev reiterated that the tsars would never conclude a peace without the knowledge and participation of the king of Poland.⁶⁵

In the end, however, the Russians were restrained from concluding a peace agreement not by loyalty to their Polish ally, but rather by the tough Tatar conditions. The khan refused to consider the Russian suggestion that Moscow's "gifts" should be discontinued, as they constituted an important source of revenue for the Crimean court and its senior officials. He even rejected the proposed exchange of prisoners, suggesting instead that the tsars should ransom the Russians then in Tatar hands. It was an understandable position, in view of the fact that there were far fewer Tatar prisoners in Russia than Russian ones in the Crimea. The terms offered by the Tatars were similar to those of the earlier Treaty of Bakhchesarai, and the Department of Foreign Affairs was consequently inclined to hold back, awaiting news of the Danubian and Moldavian campaign in the hope that Austrian and Polish victories might make the Tatars more amenable.⁶⁶

Most of the developments in the fall of 1691 were indeed favorable to the anti-Turkish coalition. Transylvania was recaptured and strongly garrisoned with Austrian troops, and the Turkish forces were defeated on the Danube. But the Austrian casualties were also heavy. The emperor

⁶⁵ Minutes of Dowmont's conversations with Ukraintsev, 6 and 13 July, 7 and 16 August, 11 September 1691, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 218–19, 226, 253–54, 274, 283. Interrogation of Dowmont's courtiers, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 256–59. Summary of the khan's letter to the tsars, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 240, pp. 284–85. See also: Register of Aitemirov, TsGADA, fond 123, Relations with the Crimea, ms 1, pp. 16, 23–32.

⁶⁶ "Dva doklada," TsGADA, fond 79, ms 250, pp. 26–28. Mazepa to the Tatar minister of state, July 1691, TsGADA, fond 123, Relations with Crimea, 1691–1694, ms 1, pp. 145–50.

authorized the commander-in-chief of the Danubian army, Prince Ludwig of Baden, to initiate peace talks, and the ambassadors of Poland and Venice were summoned to his camp to participate in the forthcoming negotiations. Sobieski urged the Russians to send a representative also, but the Department of Foreign Affairs replied that it had entrusted the peace negotiations to the king of Poland and had no intention of sending its own envoy to join in the talks. Yet the terms given by the Russians for the Polish diplomats to present to the Turks were tougher than those they had offered directly to the khan. It was clear that if a general peace treaty were concluded, Russia could either charge the king with disloyalty for championing its interest inadequately, or secure through the pressure of the allies a separate peace more favorable than the one that the Tatars had offered previously.⁶⁷

Despite continued allegations of mistreatment of the Orthodox population in Poland, there was some relaxation of tension between Warsaw and Moscow. A separate peace, which had seemed so easily attainable at the time of the Belevich visit, was now viewed as just one of several political options.

The fact that the Tatars were considering such a treaty, even on less than acceptable terms, was welcomed by the Naryshkins, for it put an end to a period during which Turkey and the Crimea seemed to be willing to conclude a peace treaty with Austria and Poland while ignoring Russia. Following Golitsyn's first contacts with the Tatars in Foma's mission, and especially the Belevich visit, the Department of Foreign Affairs had gained some freedom of maneuver between war and peace, using its separate contacts with the Crimea as a means of pressuring its allies. The khan rather than the tsars was the beneficiary, since he could play Warsaw and Moscow against each other. The Tatar envoys to Poland promised 100,000 men for an attack against the tsar, but they were ready to offer the same hundred thousand in Moscow against Poland. In each case the offer was conditional upon the acceptance of their peace terms, which included the usual demand for tribute. The Russians hoped that the Tatars might turn more conciliatory if they suffered reverses on other

⁶⁷ The Russians' most important conditions for peace directed to the Tatars were: termination of annual "gifts," an exchange of prisoners, and access to the Black Sea for the Cossacks. At the same time, they wanted Sobieski to demand on their behalf the expulsion of the Tatars from the Crimea and Azov. "Dva doklada," TsGADA, fond 79, ms 250, pp. 6, 12.

fronts, and they accordingly confined themselves to defensive operations and carried on peace talks at the same time.

In the years 1692–1694, Poland and Russia would continue to monitor each other's contacts with the Tatars and compete for a separate peace. At the same time, they could not dispense with their own alliance, since even while peace talks were in progress, Tatar detachments were systematically looting both Polish and Russian territories, taking prisoners for their slave markets or for ransom.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Tsar Peter I and the Election of August II

Influenced by Sergei Mikhailovich Solov'ev's magisterial study of this period,¹ most historians of Russia treat the outcome of the Polish election of 1696–1697 as evidence of Russia's growing influence on the Commonwealth. Attributing to young Tsar Peter foresight, daring, and adroitness in conducting diplomacy, they credit him with orchestrating the election of Frederick August, elector of Saxony, to the Polish throne, and thereby laying the foundation for future cooperation between Poland and Russia. For most scholars of Poland, the election constitutes a great watershed in Polish history, since for them, too, it heralds not only the beginning of Russia's successful manipulation of Polish-Lithuanian politics, but also the decline of the Commonwealth's international status.²

A perusal of archival material yields evidence to the contrary. Rather than being the decisive factor, Russian diplomacy proved unusually inactive during the election and had little to do with its outcome. Indifferent to events during the election, Peter became involved in the Polish situation *after* Frederick August was elected, and only then became a fervid champion of the new king, energetically working to help the elector secure his position in the Commonwealth. Furthermore, on the basis of an assessment of Poland's diplomatic and cultural exchanges at the time, one can argue that, rather than undermine the Commonwealth's international security, the ascension of Frederick August to the Polish throne helped to bolster it.

¹ S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, vol. 14 (Moscow, 1964). Lewitter pointed out that Solov'ev was careful—in comparison with the historians Golikov and Koroluk—in his assessment of the Russian influence on the election results. L. R. Lewitter, "Peter the Great and the Polish Election of 1697," *Cambridge Historical Journal* 12 (1956): 127–28.

² W. Konopczyński, *Dzieje Polski nowożytnej* (Warsaw, 1936), pp. 327–29; W. D. Koroluk (V. D. Koroliuk), "Izbranie Avgusta II na pol'skii prestol i russkaia diplomatia," in *Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedeniia* 3 (Moscow, 1951); K. Piwarski, "Das Interregnum 1696–1697 in Polen und die politische Lage in Europa," in *Um die Polnische Krone*, ed. J. Kalisch and J. Gierowski (Berlin, 1962); and Lewitter, "Peter the Great."

Proof for such arguments can be found, I maintain, in an examination of the events surrounding the election of 1696–97, with special attention to Peter's position during the Polish interregnum, his involvement in strengthening Frederick August's position after the election, and the impact of his actions on Russian diplomatic relations with Poland-Lithuania.

Although the Polish throne had been elective by law since the fourteenth century, the right of election was at first limited to a small group of the highest ecclesiastical and secular dignitaries. After a dynastic union between Poland and Lithuania was formed in 1385, with the marriage of Grand Duke Jagiełło of Lithuania to Queen Jadwiga of Poland, the "Lords of the Crown," eager to maintain the union of the two countries, automatically chose the successive hereditary rulers of Lithuania as kings of Poland. The first open election took place as a result of the death of the last hereditary grand duke of Lithuania and king of Poland, Sigismund Augustus, in 1573. At that time all of the Poland-Lithuanian nobility was enfranchised, regardless of religious affiliation, ethnic background, education, or wealth. Even landless szlachta could vote.

Commonwealth elections were by direct vote, and participation in them was considered not only a right but a civic duty. Attendance at electoral conventions was high, usually exceeding tens of thousands of voters. The szlachta, armed and mounted in military formation, assembled under the banners of their counties on a field near Warsaw. In the center of this field, large tents for the senators and the county delegates were pitched. There, foreign envoys promoting their candidates addressed the Polish leaders. The progress of the debate was relayed immediately to the surrounding throngs of voters.³

Never predetermined, each Polish royal election aroused keen interest and strong passions, not only at the Polish court and among the Polish electorate, but also at other European courts. During the seventeenth century, France and Austria competed for influence in Polish elections; the Vatican, Turkey, Russia, and Prussia all endeavored to sway the outcome. The ruling houses of France, Austria, Sweden, the German

³ J. Bardach, *Historia państwa i prawa polskiego*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 220–22. For a lively description of the election, see Michel de Bizardière, *Histoire de la scission ou division arrivée en Pologne* (Paris, 1699), and *Dzieje Jana III Sobieskiego*, ed. L. Rogólski (Warsaw, 1847).

principalities, Transylvania, and Russia all offered candidates for the Polish throne.

At first glance, it seems unthinkable that the Sarmatian szlachta, so ardently attached to *libertas*, would consider putting a Muscovite autocrat on the Polish throne. Yet, the Russian candidacy was seriously considered during sixteenth- and seventeenth-century elections. This only shows how strong and self-assured the szlachta felt vis-à-vis their elected monarchs. Support for the Russian candidacy was also inspired by the example of Jagiełło's election in 1385. That king had been a hereditary ruler of Lithuania and a heathen, yet he had not destroyed the political institutions of Poland. Some members of the szlachta took this to be proof that if a "barbarian" Lithuanian prince could be subdued and civilized by Poland's rule of law, then the same would happen to the Russian tsar. They argued that not only would the Polish constitution and laws be eventually extended to Muscovy, but that once the tsar had secured his position as king of Poland, he would elevate his subjects from their status of slaves to that of free citizens of the newly enlarged state. Furthermore, they pointed out, the combined power of Poland, Lithuania, and Russia could successfully combat Turkish aggression in the south, and Swedish incursions from the north.⁴ The idea of a Russian candidate also appealed to the Polish clergy, who hoped for the opening of new and vast opportunities for missionary work in the east and for generous land grants on those territories.

The tsar's candidacy for the Polish throne never gained any substantial support in the seventeenth century, yet it was taken seriously enough to elicit objections from the supporters of other candidates. The philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, who wrote an extensive work aimed at winning the votes of the szlachta for Philip Wilhelm, elector of the Palatinate, argued forcefully against the tsar, whom he believed capable of destroying the Poles' liberties. He warned that a union of Poland and Russia would create a state of such size that all its neighbors would realize that a power capable of menacing Europe was arising:

⁴ The best treatment of Russian policy during the Polish interregnums of 1562–63, 1574–76, and 1587 and of the social and political standing of the "Russian party" in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was written by Boris Floria, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia i politicheskoe razvitie vostochnoi Evropy vo vtoroi polovine XVI–nachale XVII v.* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 46–118, 141–216, 286–90. See also K. Tyszkowski, "Plany unii polsko-moskiewskiej na przełomie XVI i XVII w.," *Przegląd Współczesny* 24 (1928).

Even the Turks would be alarmed by such a development. Every nation will do its utmost to prevent the establishment of such an empire and we shall be swamped by barbarian tribes unleashed against us. We shall become a battlefield on which all former enemies will meet: Turkey against the Muscovites, the Greeks against the Catholics, and the whole of Europe against the Barbarians.⁵

He harkened back repeatedly to the issue of Muscovy's tyrannical government:

The rulers of Moscow have always aroused fear among Christian leaders and all sensible people by holding their subjects in slavery and demanding total obedience. It is another Turkey, almost equal in power to that country, and surpassing it in barbarity, tenacity, and hatred toward its adversaries.⁶

It is significant that the German philosopher's work was considered one of the mildest attacks on the tsar's candidacy to appear at the time.

By the time Sobieski became king, placing a tsar on the Polish throne was no longer considered an option by the szlachta, but Russian politicians still closely monitored the Polish elections in the hope of influencing the outcome, or at least of thwarting the machinations of Russia's enemies. As Sobieski's health declined after his last Moldavian campaign (1690), the szlachta scrutinized all possible candidates for the throne. Thus prepared to serve the tsar's interests, they found themselves waiting in vain for orders. Before discussing this peculiar situation, let us review the events of the interregnum of 1696–1697.

Sobieski's health had begun to deteriorate rapidly in 1695. His kidneys were failing and he was compelled to remain in the Wilanów palace for treatment. In the spring of 1696 his physicians had advised the king against journeying to his beloved Ukrainian estates. By that time, he was confined to his bed and unable to move without assistance.⁷ His interest in state affairs was slowly ebbing.

⁵ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Wzorzec dowodów politycznych* (Wrocław, 1969), p. 114. Leibniz wrote his treatise under the pen name Georgius Ulicovius Lithuanus.

⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

⁷ Kazimierz Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego. Diariusz i relacje z lat 1691–1696* (Wrocław, 1958), pp. 313–15, 341, 343–45; Z. Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski 1629–*

The Austrian and French diplomats did not wait for the king's death to seek support for their candidates. Foreign diplomats concentrated their efforts on winning over senators, court officials, and members of the leading aristocratic families. They hoped to use them to gain access to the counties and thus secure the support of the rank and file *szlachta*. The French ambassador Melchior Polignac counted on the support of all the provinces and counties whose senators had promised to back the French candidate.⁸ Such expectations had little meaning, since the diplomats could hardly campaign openly while the king was alive. Moreover, their perspective was often distorted by the fact that their sole connection with the masses of voters was through the senators which limited their awareness of the antipathy that most of the *szlachta* felt toward senators who dealt secretly with foreign agents. They also tended to forget that the county representatives were fully capable of electing a candidate of their own—one not considered during the pre-election campaigns conducted by the senators and aristocrats—as occurred in the case of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1668–1673). Enraged by the deals many aristocrats and senators were making with foreign powers, the *szlachta* had decided at that time to reject all foreign candidates and instead elected the young, inexperienced son of the Polish-Cossack war hero, Jarema Wiśniowiecki.⁹ Stung by their electoral defeat, the pro-French party considered having the new king dethroned,¹⁰ but had to forsake these plans in the fact of the king's great popularity with the county politicians. The growth of anti-senatorial sentiments frightened the great lords of the Crown and Lithuania, and spurred them to prepare carefully for the next election, which came in 1673, when Poland was at war with Turkey. During that election the crown was once again offered to a domestic candidate, Jan Sobieski, who refused to be anyone's puppet in the 23 years of his reign.

Now, when news of Sobieski's deteriorating health reached Paris, the French decided that their candidate for the Polish throne would be Prince

1696 (Warsaw, 1983), pp. 507–508. W. Ziembicki, *Zdrowie i niezdrowie Jana Sobieskiego* (Poznań, 1931).

⁸ de Bizardière, *Histoire de la scission*, pp. 9–20.

⁹ A. Kamiński, "The *Szlachta* of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and their Government," in *The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe*, ed. Ivo Banac and Paul Bushkovitch (New Haven, 1983), pp. 33–35.

¹⁰ Wójcik, *Jan Sobieski*, pp. 314–75.

François-Louis Bourbon de Conti, a relative of Louis XIV. The French adherents in Poland were by that time very influential, for they counted among their ranks Cardinal Michał Radziejowski, primate of Poland, the powerful Sapieha and Lubomirski clans, and various senators and high officials.¹¹

The Austrian diplomats, alarmed by the pro-French party's good showing, were busy bolstering the electoral chances of Jakub Sobieski, the eldest son of the ailing king and brother-in-law of their emperor, Leopold I. On the surface his chances seemed good, since the Polish electorate always gave favorable treatment to the sons of their kings. But Jakub lacked charisma and was seen as a puppet of Vienna. Moreover, he was considered volatile, ephemeral, and inept. The king himself displayed a certain coolness toward his eldest son, while Sobieski's wife, Marysieńka, promoted the candidacy of her younger sons, Aleksander and Konstanty.¹²

Sobieski's death on 26 July 1696 accelerated the electoral struggle. The French candidate gained additional hope for a successful outcome when his supporter Cardinal Radziejowski assumed the official position of *interrex*. In response, the Austrian court actively sought papal, Venetian, Russian, and other foreign support for Jakub Sobieski. The Austrians warned their Russian colleagues that the late king had been Russia's ally in name only—that in fact he had supported France. They also warned that Conti's election could result in a Polish attack on Russia with the aim of recapturing Smolensk and Kiev. If elected, they said, Conti would probably strengthen the Commonwealth's system of government, making the country a menace to its neighbors. To avert all these dangers, they proposed a joint action in favor of Jakub. In Vienna, Chancellor Kinsky discussed the matter with Koz'ma Nikitich Nefimov, and a similar conversation was held in Warsaw between the Austrian resident Zierovsky and Aleksei Nikitin.¹³

¹¹ de Bizardière, *Histoire de la scission*, pp. 15–27.

¹² K. Piwarski, *Królewicz Jakub Sobieski w Oławie* (Cracow, 1939), pp. 18–19. Nikitin's dispatches, October–November 1696, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Moscow; hereafter TsGADA), fond 79, ms 252, pp. 33, 34, 113–23, 135, 144, 161–62.

¹³ Nikitin's dispatches (1696), TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 56–179. Dispatches from Nefimov in Vienna (1696) in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* (St. Petersburg, 1867), pp. 67–79, 90–97, 163–65, 187–89, 192, 371–74, 380, 383–87, 431–38, 448. Nefimov was well acquainted with politics at

Both Russian diplomats at once alerted the Department of Foreign Affairs and asked for instructions, but none were forthcoming. Finally, in the beginning of 1697, Peter ordered his diplomats to assure the Austrians of his approval of Jakub Sobieski's candidacy, but did not instruct them to take concrete action.¹⁴ As a result, Nikitin was left to rely on his own judgment throughout the interregnum, a frustrating and uncomfortable situation for him. He knew of the dangers to Russia presented by the candidacies of both Conti and the Swedish crown prince.¹⁵ (This Swedish candidacy amounted to little more than rumor, there being no real Swedish party in Poland.) He was aware of the secret agreements that the senators were making with other foreign powers and of their efforts to build strong support bases for their candidates in the counties. Yet Nikitin could do nothing to combat this. He was not in a position to influence the senators or to form his own group of adherents. He also was unable to join the Austrian ambassador in opposing the French candidate. When foreign diplomats inquired about the tsar's position with respect to the election, Nikitin had no answer. He was reduced to being a passive observer of the events.

Russian diplomats adopted this unaccustomed passivity unwillingly. Ukraintsev, acting as head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, devoted considerable attention to relations with Poland and kept the young tsar informed about them during his Azov campaign. He also asked for instructions so often that Peter, bombarded with requests and news from Poland, concluded that Ukraintsev was exaggerating the importance of the Commonwealth instead of concentrating on what Peter considered important, namely, relations with Austria. Although Peter knew of Sobieski's death, on 26 July 1696 he wrote to his confidant, Andrei Andreevich Vinius:

I am very angry with your brother-in-law [Ukraintsev] who tells me about minor Polish matters but forgets the Empire, despite our hopes for a treaty

the Vienna court because of his contacts with a translator from the imperial chancellery by the name of A. Stille (Szwejkowski), who was selling information to the Russian diplomats. TsGADA, fond 32 (Relations with Austria, 1690), ms 5.

¹⁴ Instructions for Nefimov, November 1696, in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii*, pp. 372–73. Nikitin informed the Austrian diplomats about the tsar's support for Jakub Sobieski only in April of 1697. TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, p. 176.

¹⁵ Nikitin's dispatches, June–October 1696, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 27–117.

of alliance . . . Tell him that what he fails to write on paper will be written by me on his hide.¹⁶

After this threat, the attention of Ukraintsev and the entire Department of Foreign Affairs was of course focused on Vienna, while Polish affairs were pushed aside. It would seem that Ukraintsev, anxious to avoid reproaches or a whipping (which he did not escape anyway), tried not to annoy the tsar with references to Poland or news from Warsaw.

Peter's neglect of the Polish election defies rational explanation. Underlying this blind spot was longstanding fear and hostility toward everything Sarmatian, associated since childhood with his deepest insecurities. During the heyday of the Miloslavskiis and the bloody palace intrigues of Sophia, Polish was spoken by the very people who were Peter's most deadly competitors for power, and he learned to consider the Latinists of the Commonwealth his enemies. While the older children of Aleksei Mikhailovich had been introduced to Europe through the Latin and Polish education provided by the Ukrainians, Peter's horizons were broadened by his Protestant friends. Thus, even before Peter began to borrow the Protestant trappings of modernization, he had closed the door on the Latinists and the Poles as alien and threatening to him. Peter's childhood fears of "Polishness," which he associated with his enemies, were perhaps reinforced by stories about the Time of Troubles, as well as by his "German" company. This bias so strongly colored Peter's perception that it led him to redefine the very basis of the modernization program initiated by his father.

The modernization on the Polish-Lithuanian model begun by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich had been accepted and deemed natural by the upper strata of servitors before the end of his reign. The Commonwealth's power was declining, but its culture and political theory had never been more attractive to its neighbors.¹⁷ This cultural and political appeal

¹⁶ Peter I to Andrei Vinus, 25 July 1696, in *Pis'ma i bumagi Petra Velikogo*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1887), pp. 89–90. Vinus defended Ukraintsev and tried, in vain, to convince Peter that he should engage Russian diplomacy in support of Jakub Sobieski. Vinus to Peter, *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, pp. 590–92.

¹⁷ A. Brückner, "Wpływy polskie na Litwie i Słowiańszczyźnie wschodniej," in *Polska w kulturze powszechnej*, vol. 1, ed. F. Koneczny (Cracow, 1918), pp. 165–67. L. R. Lewitter, "Peter the Great, Poland and the Westernization of Russia," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 19 (October, 1958); J. Tazbir, *Rzeczpospolita i świat. Studia z dziejów kultury XVII wieku* (Wrocław, 1971), pp. 63–78; L. S. Abetsedarskii, *Belorussia i Rossiia XVI–XVII vv.* (Minsk, 1978), pp. 209–246; A. I. Rogov, *Russko-pol'skie kul'turnye*

introduced strong ideological overtones into Polish-Russian relations, which were either unclear or considered innocuous by Aleksei, Fedor, and Sophia. When Peter, however, chose to break with Aleksei's already well-established course of modernization and to halt the dreaded Polish influence in the Kremlin, he kindled feelings of alienation even among the court nobility and his own family.

Peter continued to modernize but quickened the tempo and shifted from the Polish-Latin-Catholic orientation to a German-Dutch-Swedish-Protestant one. Historians usually argue the greater usefulness of the Protestant model,¹⁸ disregarding the tsar-reformer's counterproductive obsession with form; they consider it rational that Peter broke violently with the tradition followed by his father, older brother, and sister. However, there was nothing rational in frustrating the efforts of the modernizing Latinists and once more offending the traditionalists. Was it really "historically necessary" to choose the so-called Protestant model as a *conditio sine qua non* of technological progress, and as the only means of access to the theory of the modern state?

It is generally known that both Aleksei Mikhailovich and Peter recruited experts and borrowed technology from Catholic and Protestant countries alike. It is also known that Peter was awed by the West, and in particular by the Protestant countries he visited, whether as guest or as conqueror. Prevailing arguments hold that the political theory and practice of the France of Louis XIV and of the Holy Roman Empire of Leopold I had less to offer the Russian tsar than well-ordered Dutch republicanism, English or Swedish monarchical constitutionalism, or the *Rechtstaaten* of Brandenburg, Saxony, and other Protestant principalities. If one accepts these arguments, one is still obliged to admit that the last thing Peter was willing to do was to limit his autocratic power for whatever reason. While he admired the enterprising English, their Parliament was totally alien to him. Through his unsuccessful *Ratusha* reforms, he hoped to create flourishing cities such as those in Holland, and instituted the Dutch office of *borgermeister*. His collegial reforms revealed the strong influence of Swedish cameralism, but without instilling the spirit of compromise and collegiality needed for their smooth operation.¹⁹

sviazi v èpokhu vozrozhdeniia (Moscow, 1966), pp. 259–306.

¹⁸ Lewitter argues the point very astutely in his "Peter the Great Poland, and the Westernization of Russia" (fn. 17).

¹⁹ M. Raeff, *Understanding Imperial Russia* (New York, 1984), pp. 35–111.

It has also been argued, with reason, that Peter was fond of the idea of service to the state by ruler and citizen alike, that he attempted to modernize his state by transforming it into a *Machtstaat*, and finally that his search for a theory of the modern state led him inevitably to the Protestant West. One must remember, however, that the ideas of one of the greatest theorists of the modern state, Justus Lipsius, proved equally useful to Catholic and Protestant princes.²⁰ Lipsius was also quite popular among the constitutionalists in Poland, such as Łukasz Opaliński and Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro, and Fredro's development of Lipsius' theory was of sufficient interest to catch the attention of such rulers as the enlightened despot Frederick the Great and the reformer Leopold II. Both encouraged the publication of Fredro's works in their capitals.²¹ The new political ideology that Peter encountered in the Protestant West and North was thus as well known and accessible to his Catholic neighbors, even though it was not fully implemented there.

Peter easily could have commanded his Latinist modernizers, like it or not, to read and re-read Catholic and Protestant theorists like Machiavelli, Bodin, Grotius, Modrzewski, Lipsius, Opaliński, Hobbes, and Fredro, and to formulate an "Orthodox" version of the *Machstaat* theory. He did not. Instead, he insisted on the direct borrowing of various new institutions, as in the case of the *Ratusha* reforms, the collegia, senate, etc., as well as the language of bureaucracy from the Protestant West, in spite of the possibility that insistence on foreign form would retard the very modernization he so desperately sought.

It seems that Peter, due to his contacts with Protestant friends, viewed Sarmatian-Latin influence as a Trojan Horse created by the Commonwealth. Even if the Latinists were ready to serve their illustrious master loyally and obediently, they were the product of a state in which legality and individual rights were evident in politics and praised even in monarchist political theory (i.e., Modrzewski). Polish political essays, poetry, translations of Grocki's compendium on city self-government,

²⁰ G. Östreich, *Geist und Gestalt des frühmodernen Staates* (Berlin, 1969); M. Pryshlak, "The Well-Ordered State in the Political Philosophy of the Polish Aristocracy" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1984), pp. 223–26.

²¹ M. Pryshlak, "Forma mixta as a Political Ideal of a Polish Magnate," *Polish Review* 26, no. 3 (1981); Pryshlak, "Well-Ordered State," pp. 144–48. H. Barycz, *Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro wobec zagadnień wychowawczych* (Cracow, 1948), pp. 28, 31–32, 37, 79, 83, 95, 99.

and the presence of Polish nationals in Moscow provided a model of personal and civil rights which was anathema to a Russian autocrat. In mid-century, Juraj Križanić, a keen observer and well-trained political theorist, had been struck by the quick spread from Poland via Ukraine to Muscovy of that “deadly illness,” as he characterized liberty.²² The danger of that “sickness” was recognized at the end of the century by the young tsar and by some of his advisors. The tsar’s emotional anti-Polish outbursts, as well as the introduction of Protestant forms, put an end to the golden age of Polish influence in Russia. However, the influence ended not because of its uselessness in the great task of modernization, but because of the feeling of danger it provoked in Peter. In many instances, the same acute fear of Poland-Lithuania was evident among the Kremlin’s courtiers and bureaucrats.

By turning a deaf ear to news of the Polish interregnum and denying it any significance in his own perception, Peter perhaps hoped to reduce its political importance in reality. He was able, therefore, to remain unmoved when the Austrians begged him to support their candidate, and when Nikitin warned him of the adverse consequences of the succession of a Frenchman or a Swede to the Polish throne. After his victory at Azov in 1696, instead of turning his attention to Warsaw, Peter began preparations for his great journey abroad.

Peter’s bizarre behavior changed dramatically soon after he had crossed the Russian border on his way to Riga. During a meal at a wayside inn, the tsar overheard a conversation in the course of which a Swedish nobleman expressed the opinion that the king of Sweden or his son stood the best chances of being elected to the Polish throne. This casual remark had a tremendous impact on Peter. It made him realize that Ukraintsev was not alone in taking a keen interest in Polish affairs, but that these were obviously of concern to others. He immediately dispatched letters to Vinius in Moscow, urging him to use all means available to counteract the Swedish candidacy.²³ He also sent to Warsaw Undersecretary Nikifor Ivanov, a member of the great embassy then on its way to Western Europe in which Peter himself was to participate incognito. Ivanov was instructed to collect all relevant information. Most of the questions Ivanov was supposed to ask in Poland already had

²² Juraj Križanić, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1891), pp. 7–11.

²³ Peter to Vinius, April 1697, *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, p. 146.

been answered at length in Nikitin's extensive reports.²⁴ Obviously, Peter had not seen these reports, and was not even aware of their existence, for the Department of Foreign Affairs was too frightened to send him either copies or summaries.

The tsar's sudden interest in the election came as a pleasant surprise to Nikitin,²⁵ but coming as late as it did, there was no time to take any effective action. To make matters worse, on June 25, two days before the election, the tsar sent a letter to Warsaw demanding that Radziejowski, the Senate, and the entire szlachta reject Prince Conti's candidacy.²⁶ The letter had the tone of an ultimatum and departed from the diplomatic convention that such messages be in support of candidates, not in opposition to any particular contender.

Arriving on the eve of the election, Peter's letter could hardly have influenced the outcome to his advantage. It was rather perceived as an insult to Polish national pride and provoked a strong counter-reaction. It arrived too late for Nikitin to present the Russian position to the public, or even to read it at an official audience before Parliament. Peter's delay and his abrupt decision to come forth with support for Jakub Sobieski did more to help than to hurt the Conti candidacy. There is no evidence of any French supporters' shifting allegiance because of the letter, but much to indicate that Radziejowski and the Sapiehas suffered as a result.

Radziejowski had, in fact, as recently as March of 1697, inquired of Nikitin as to Peter's intentions regarding the election, particularly whether he would send a delegation to present his choice of a candidate. Similarly, the Sapiehas, who had offered their services to Moscow, sent a messenger to the tsar asking that he pass through Vilnius on his journey and meet with them, or else meet with a group of Poles on his way to Riga or the Crown territories, in order to discuss the situation. Peter ignored Radziejowski's inquiries and the Sapiehas' proposals. Small

²⁴ Instructions for Nikifor Ivanov, May 1697, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, 1697, ms 5, p. 6.

²⁵ Not until 30 May 1697, did Peter order Nikitin to send him information about the Polish situation. Peter to Nikitin, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, 1697, ms 5, p. 5.

²⁶ Peter to Radziejowski, the Senate, and the whole Commonwealth, 30 June 1697, in *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, pp. 163–65. The tsar's letter was delivered to Nikitin when the majority of the senators had already left for the fields of Wola, where elections were traditionally held. Nikitin's dispatches, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 235–37.

wonder, then, that both Radziejowski and the Sapiehas reacted with hostility to the tsar's memorandum.²⁷

In evaluating Russian diplomacy during the interregnum, one should remember that, with the exception of the Sapiehas, no senator or leading member of any electoral faction went out of his way to contact Moscow. Nikitin was not sought out by the backers of any candidate. Nor was he at the meeting during which the diplomats from Dresden, Vienna, and Berlin decided to support Frederick August, elector of Saxony. It is apparent, then, that the well-established belief that Peter I determined the outcome of the Polish election of 1697 is unfounded.

When the day of the election arrived (27 June 1697), it became evident that Conti had not won the hearts of the entire electorate. His rival, Frederick August, managed to gain the support of all those who had earlier sided with Jakub Sobieski. Though Conti failed to secure a clear majority, his party proclaimed him victorious while the rest of the electorate nominated the elector of Saxony. The longest election campaign in Poland's history ended with the election of Conti on June 27 and of Frederick August on the next day. As was the case with the elections of 1576 and 1586, when two candidates had also been elected, the outcome was to be decided by force of arms. The supporters of both candidates assembled their forces and urged their respective claimants to arrive in Poland as soon as possible at the head of their armies. Both sides sought support at home and recognition abroad.²⁸

Frederick August entered Poland at the head of an army of several thousand, and reached Cracow on 31 July 1697. His backers had already secured control of the cathedral at the Wawel Castle in Cracow, the coronation site for Polish kings. Frederick August was crowned King August II of Poland on September 13.

Prince Conti reached the shores of Poland on September 25, only to find that the city of Gdańsk had declared itself for August and refused him entrance to the harbor. The French squadron dropped anchor at

²⁷ Nikitin's dispatches, May–June 1697, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 199–202, 242, 260. See also: Vozhnitsyn to Golitsyn, 17 May 1688, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 235, p. 61.

²⁸ "Dyaryusz prawdziwy bo bez imienia autora wszystkich rzeczy i dziejów, które w Polsce się działy od śmierci Jana III aż do obrania Augusta II," ed. Leon Rogalski, in *Dzieje Jana III Sobieskiego* (Warsaw, 1847), pp. 402–499; also Kazimierz Piwarski, "Das Interregnum 1696–97 in Polen," pp. 9–44; W. D. Koroluk, *Polska i Rosja a wojna północna* (Warsaw, 1954), pp. 24–28.

Oliwa near Gdańsk, where Conti waited for the forces that were to support his claim to the throne. The troops that arrived were far from adequate for a major action. As Conti was trying to recruit more troops, August gained additional support for his claim to the throne and was ready to push for a confrontation. On November 9, a combined army of several thousand Saxon and Polish troops attacked the small pro-French contingent gathered at Oliwa and dispersed it, taking many prisoners. Conti fled to his ship and soon departed for France. His supporters, an organized confederacy, negotiated at length with August, demanding blanket pardon and confirmation of all political offices they held. These conditions were accepted several months later, and August's position on the throne of Poland was secure.²⁹

Moscow did play a role in helping August win his struggle with the Conti faction. Peter exerted strong pressure in favor of August by affording him diplomatic support at several European courts and by threatening his opponents with military intervention. Nikitin, acting on the tsar's orders, informed the elector's party in August of 1697 that an army under the command of boyar Mikhail Georg'evich Romodanovskii was ready to intervene on its behalf.³⁰ On 13 October 1697 the Saxon diplomat at the Hague, Christoph Dietrich Bose, received an order from Peter placing Romodanovskii under August's command.³¹

²⁹ The most recent and well-documented study of August's victory over Conti was written by J. Wojtasik, "Walka Augusta II z obozem prymasowsko-kontystowskim w pierwszym roku panowania (1697–1698)," in *Przegląd Historyczny* 60 (1969): 24–42. See also: "Diariusz negocjacji posłów od Rzeczypospolitej do króla Augusta," Biblioteka Muzeum im Ks. Czartoryskich (Cracow; hereafter B. Czart.), ms 2518, p. 219, and ms 2265, no. 8876; "Dyaryusz zjazdu łeczyckiego," B. Czart., ms 192, pp. 41–52; "Dyaryusz Jana Stanisława Jabłonowskiego," in *Kronika Rodzinna* (n.p., 1888–1889), pp. 490–92, 523; Kazimierz Jarochoński, *Dzieje panowania Augusta II od śmierci Jana III do chwili wstąpienia Karola XII na ziemie Polskie* (Poznań, 1856), pp. 119–61.

³⁰ Peter to Christian of Denmark, 26 July 1697, in *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, pp. 183–84; Peter to the City Council of Gdańsk, 13 September 1697, in *Pis'ma i bumagi*, vol. 1, pp. 191–93; Nikitin's Dispatches, October 1697, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 341–44. At the beginning of his reign, August was expecting an attack by the Cossack detachments under the command of Palii, who had excellent relations with the Sapieha family. See Nikitin to the tsar, 29 August 1697, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland, 1697, ms 6, p. 212.

³¹ J. Staszewski, "Rokowanie Krzysztofa D. Bose z wielkim poselstwem jesienią 1697 r.," in *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Mikołaja Kopernika* 24, Historia III (Toruń, 1967): 80–92. See also M. M. Bogoslovskii, *Petr I. Materialy dlia bibliografii*, vol. 2 (Leningrad, 1941), pp. 166–69, 186–89, 214–22.

The Romodanovskii detachment, totaling 2,659 *strel'tsy* and a few thousand cavalry, was stationed in the vicinity of Smolensk. The troops' morale was low and the Russian general was not eager to take offensive action.³² However, his prospective opponent, Lithuanian Grand Hetman Kazimierz Jan Sapieha, was not in a much better position. Although Sapieha fielded a stronger and more confident army than Romodanovskii, Conti's Lithuanian supporters were facing strong opposition at home. The power of the Sapiehas, who virtually controlled Lithuania's army, treasury, and important administrative and judicial posts, rested on de facto tyranny. With the support of the aristocratic Ogiński and Radziwiłł families, themselves deposed from their former influential positions, they countered the opposition of the county politicians.³³

Even before the election, the leaders of the anti-Sapieha movement had begun to prepare for a decisive confrontation.³⁴ Their "republican" program, calling for the "equalization" of rights and aimed at ending oligarchy in Lithuania, was gaining not only the support of the Grand Duchy szlachta, but also that of Parliament.³⁵ Since the Sapiehas were not inclined to yield power peacefully, the controversy was heading for civil war. Matters were brought to a head by the election. The "republican party" of Lithuania not only backed August, but resorted to arms to prevent Jan Sapieha from sending his army to aid Conti after the Frenchmen had landed near Gdańsk. In addition, detachments of armed gentry were forming in the counties—under the cover of regular units commanded by Field Hetman Bogusław Słuszką and with the approval of local officials—in readiness for a confrontation with the Sapiehas.³⁶

³² N. Ustrialov, *Istoriia tsarstvovaniia Petra Velikogo*, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1858), pp. 153–65.

³³ Kazimierz Piwarski, "Opozycja litewska pod koniec XVII w.," in *Pamiętniki z V Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Warszawie 1930*, vol. 1 (L'viv, 1931), pp. 259–77; J. Narbutt, *Dzieje wewnętrzne narodu litewskiego od czasów panowania Jana Sobieskiego i Augusta II* (Vilnius, 1843), pp. 105–113.

³⁴ Piwarski, "Opozycja litewska," pp. 259–77.

³⁵ "Approbatio coæquationis jurium W. X Litew. z Koroną Polską" (laws passed by Parliament in 1697), in *Volumina Legum. Prawa, konstytucje y przywileje Królestwa Polskiego, Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego y wszystkich prowincji należących*, ed. Józafat Ohryzko, vol. 6 (Petersburg, 1860), pp. 12; M. Handelsman, "Zamach stanu Augusta II," in his *Studia historyczne* (Warsaw, 1911), pp. 220–28.

³⁶ Jabłonowski, "Dyaryusz," p. 492; M. Komaszewski, *Księża Contiego niefortunna wyprawa po koronę Sobieskiego* (Warsaw, 1971), pp. 122–27.

As soon as August had received the tsar's message placing Romodanovskii's detachment under his command, Lithuanian Field Hetman Słuska asked the new monarch to summon that force. Since the request came prior to the decisive battle with the Conti forces, August acquiesced. The royal chancellery sent Hetman Słuska both the tsar's order and a letter from the king requesting that Romodanovskii obey the king and dispatch his regiments to Lithuania, placing them at the disposition of the royal commissioners: Ludwik Pociej, chamberlain of Brest, and the royal colonels Marcin Wołłowicz, standard bearer of Mstsislaŭ, and Stefan Goliński, chamberlain of Mstsislaŭ.³⁷

The king's letter and the tsar's order were carried to Smolensk by Jan Stanisław Bokij, auxiliary judge of Trakai and an active member of the anti-Sapieha party. His diplomatic mission was to secure a prompt Russian military intervention, and to inform Peter officially that August II had been elected to the Polish throne.

Bokij reached Smolensk on 19 November 1697. After being granted permission by Petr Samoilovich Saltykov, palatine of Smolensk, the king's envoy proceeded to Romodanovskii's headquarters at Velikie Luki. There he asked Romodanovskii to begin operations immediately. On 18 December, Bokij departed for Moscow.³⁸

Romodanovskii responded to the request rather quickly. On 24 December 1697 he ordered his troops to move in the direction of the river Dvina and ordered 10 squadrons of his cavalry to march to Lithuania under the command of the Lithuanian emissary Ludwik Pociej.³⁹ With the Russian army on the move, the hopes of Lithuania's republicans for the extirpation of the hated Sapiehas seemed about to be fulfilled. They were bitterly disappointed, however, for upon hearing that the Sapiehas had made peace with August, Romodanovskii halted his advance. The Polish king, now safely ensconced on the throne, curtly informed Romodanovskii that his military assistance would no longer be needed.⁴⁰

³⁷ Register of Bokij's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 253, p. 6; Nikitin's Dispatches to the tsar, October 1697, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1697, ms 6, p. 208.

³⁸ Register of Bokij's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 253, pp. 2–24.

³⁹ Pociej to Romodanovskii, 24 December 1697; Romodanovskii to Pociej (no date), and Romodanovskii to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 23 January 1697, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 253, pp. 53–54, 56–58, 59–60.

⁴⁰ Nikitin's dispatches, May–June 1698, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 398–99, 402–403.

These events did not stop Bokij, then the Polish resident in Moscow, from trying to persuade the Russians to attack the Sapiehas on the grounds that they were Conti's secret allies. His pleas were ignored, however, and he was sent back to Lithuania.⁴¹ Peter was not inclined to interfere in the Commonwealth's internal civil strife as protector of Lithuania's *szlachta*—a role his father probably would have relished. Rather, he counted on establishing warm relations with August to prevent the French candidate from regaining the throne.

After meeting August in Rava-Ruska (August 1698), Peter began to regard him as a close personal friend. August's accession was not yet confirmed by all of the Commonwealth, and Peter had recently been shaken by a *strel'tsy* revolt, crushed only at the very gates of Moscow by armies loyal to him. Each thinking his throne was on shaky grounds, the two energetic young rulers plotted against their own and each other's subjects as readily as against their neighbors. Not that either was pessimistic about the future—both dreamed of reshaping the map of Europe. August had risen through the ranks of German principedom to become king of Poland-Lithuania, and had behind him the rich experience of leading imperial forces against the Turks. After decisively seizing his throne, Peter had earned fame with his victory at Azov. The young tsar dreamed of fulfilling the ambition of Ivan IV and of his father Aleksei Mikhailovich for access to the Baltic through Narva-Jõesuu in Estonia. August hoped to regain Livonia (present-day Latvia) with the city of Riga, key to all Dnieper trade, nominally for the Commonwealth but secretly for the house of Wettin, of which he was scion. Aware of the economic potential of linking the Baltic and Black seas, he envisioned a crown-chartered company that would take the Persian-Turkish silk trade out of the hands of the Mediterranean countries.

To the regret of both rulers, war with Turkey was ending. Peter had hoped to gain the Crimea from the war, and August had seen a last chance to win Moldavia. The year before Rava, Peter had been in Vienna begging the Austrians to continue the war, but Austria wanted peace with Turkey in order to wage war against France. Venice, too, was ready for peace with the Turks.

⁴¹ Register of Bokij's activities, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 253, pp. 31–60. Peter did not like Bokij and on several occasions publicly displayed his disfavor. Ioahan G. Korb, *Diarium itineris in Moscoviam* (Vienna, 1701), pp. 83–91, 99, 101.

Unable to take advantage of the war, which would end the next year, the rulers meeting at Rava planned actions against Sweden, sure of obtaining the support of Denmark, Sweden's traditional enemy.⁴²

August and Peter, the first rulers of Russia and Poland-Lithuania ever to meet, were also the first to form secret personal understandings directed not only against other countries but also against their own and each other's subjects. As a direct consequence, Peter would turn a deaf ear to Lithuanian republicans seeking his help against the Sapiehas—a chance to involve himself in the internal affairs of the Commonwealth. He was similarly reluctant to take under his sovereignty the Cossack leader Semen Palii, who led an uprising in 1699 and proposed to give Russia control of much of West-Bank Ukraine. Passing up an opportunity for effortless gain, Peter did not oppose Palii's military advances, but flatly refused to take any territory. August, on his part, had no place in his schemes for renewing Sobieski's failed attempt to mobilize the East-Bank Cossacks against Russia.

After Rava, Russia spoke to Poland-Lithuania with two different voices. As resident, Nikitin maintained his official relations with king and senators, mostly presenting complaints about the treatment of the Orthodox. Important matters were handled between the two monarchs, with the help of Saxon diplomats and personal friends of the tsar unconnected with the Department of Foreign Affairs. After Dowmont's departure and the short residency of Bokij, the Commonwealth did not have—and did not want—its own resident in Moscow, creating a vacuum for August to fill with his own Saxon diplomats, who were novices in Russian affairs.

At the time of the election Peter behaved as if the Commonwealth were unimportant. After establishing personal ties with August, he treated the Commonwealth as no more than dead weight on his promising Saxon friend. Railing at his boyars, he declared them all unworthy of the love he felt toward the Polish king, yet he made the resident Bokij the butt of public anti-Polish tirades.⁴³ One might say that Peter allayed his

⁴² L. R. Lewitter, "Russia, Poland and the Baltic, 1697–1721," in *The Historical Journal* 11 (1968): 3–13; Jacek Staszewski, *O miejsce w Europie. Stosunki Polski i Saksonii z Francją na przełomie XVII i XVIII wieku* (Warsaw, 1973), pp. 167–71. August maintained contact with the tsar through the Saxon general Karlowitz, TsGADA, fond 79, Relations with Poland 1698, ms 8, pp. 1–10.

⁴³ Nikitin's dispatches, November 1697, June 1698, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 358, 408–409, 476–81.

fears of the land of parliamentarianism and rebellious citizens by supporting a ruler who promised to back him against his subjects, a ruler who planned to replace Polish-Lithuanian "anarchy" with centralized rule. Abandoning available channels of influencing the Commonwealth's internal politics, Peter chose a policy which, if successful, would drastically change the Polish political system. As we know, the partition of Poland would come only years later, after Russia had developed the ability to use Commonwealth institutions to paralyze any attempt to strengthen the state. As he began his rule, Peter was far from understanding the need for such a policy.

Peter's refusal to recognize the nature and importance of the Commonwealth as a political entity would prove disastrous at the time of the Northern War (1700–1721). Against the expectations of the young schemers at Rava, the Swedish armies not only defeated the Russians and the Saxons, but penetrated deep into Saxony and, in 1706, forced August to abdicate the Polish throne. The only allies to whom Peter could then turn were the citizens of Poland-Lithuania, who were fighting the Swedish armies. Unable to impose a puppet king on the Commonwealth, Peter was obliged to secure its support in an alliance. Only thus would he learn to deal with a republic. After Poltava (1709) and his successful mediation between August and his rebellious subjects (the Confederacy of Tarnobrzeg; 1714–1717), Peter's longstanding fears of the Commonwealth would abate, but he was never to rid himself of his disapproval and hostility toward it.⁴⁴ Even later, the Commonwealth and its democracy would evoke the same fears in the Kremlin that had once crippled Peter. Still, basic Russian policy would change its objective, no longer concentrating on the king, but treating him as one factor in the Commonwealth.

Just as Peter's mistrust of all things Polish blinded him to potential political gains, in the late nineties his faith in his personal friendship with August had led him into political danger. Although August maintained

⁴⁴ J. Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec sprawy Ukrainy na przełomie XVII–XVIII wieku*, (Cracow, 1963) pp. 248, 252–54; A. Kamiński, *Konfederacja sandomierska wobec Rosji w okresie poaltransztadskim, 1706–1709* (Wrocław, 1969), pp. 40, 106–109, 120, 128–30, 134–35, 144; L. R. Lewitter, "Poland, Russia and the Treaty of Vienna of 5 January, 1719," in *The Historical Journal* 13 (1970): 3–30; J. Gierowski, *W cieniu Ligi północnej* (Cracow, 1978), pp. 26–34, 50–93, 137. For an absorbing analysis of Peter I's dreams, refer to: J. Cracraft, "Some Dreams of Peter the Great, A Biographical Note," in *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 8, no. 2 (1974): 187.

active contacts with the young tsar, he did not attempt to coordinate his political plans with Peter's. He actively sought Russia's support in the campaign against Turkey in 1698, but he also worked simultaneously toward concluding an alliance with France.⁴⁵ Had August succeeded, Peter would have had good reason to regret his cavalier behavior prior to the election. August's pro-French plans were all the more dangerous since his close supporters in Poland—Jan Jerzy Przebendowski, Gałęcki, Jabłonowski, and Szczuka—were very much interested in working toward regaining Ukraine. Przebendowski, the king's most trusted advisor, did not hide his distaste for a Polish-Russian rapprochement.⁴⁶ What prevented Poland-Lithuania from adopting an anti-Russian policy was its unsuccessful Moldavian campaign (1698), Prussia's attack on the Polish town of Elbląg that same year, and a bloody civil war in Lithuania between the Sapiehas and their enemies (1698–1700), all of which left the Commonwealth paralyzed. Despite Poland's setbacks, and even with the growth of Russia's power at the time of the Northern War, neither Peter nor his successors would gain effective control over events in Poland-Lithuania so long as the Commonwealth was connected by personal union with Saxony (1697–1706, 1710–1763).

Even though Peter's Polish policy from 1697 to 1700 seemed uneven and futile, the young tsar did, in general, give Russian foreign policy an active and aggressive character that had been lacking since the times of Ivan IV, and introduce sweeping changes in the character and composition of the Russian diplomatic corps. The Poles were quick to assess the young tsar's energy, perseverance, and determination. His Azov campaign made them nervous and gave additional fuel to anxious reflections over the future of a Commonwealth deprived by Russia of Smolensk and Kiev. Despite all this uneasiness, however, the szlachta was no more inclined to forsake its ideal of a golden peace and to face the growing danger of an increasingly powerful Russia.

⁴⁵ Staszewski, *O miejsce w Europie*, pp. 118–80.

⁴⁶ Nikitin's dispatches, November 1697, TsGADA, fond 79, ms 252, pp. 358–60.

Conclusion

In the seventeenth century the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia were agrarian countries importing industrial goods and exporting agricultural products. In both countries most of the population were peasants living under the domination of landlords and the state, burdened with duties and obligations that were steadily increasing. The process of urbanization was slow and most cities were under the control of the *szlachta* and the Crown (Poland) or the state (Russia).

Both states bordered on the most fertile lands in Europe, the steppes of the Black Sea, then the domain of nomads—the Tatars, Nogays, and Kalmyks. Both expended great effort to colonize these territories, and used the services of new, strong, and autonomous military communities of Cossacks. Indispensable to both Russia and Poland-Lithuania in times of war with Turkey, the overlord of the steppes and their common enemy, the Cossacks proved to be a dangerous source of social discontent and unrest during times of peace. For Poland-Lithuania, the full impact of the Dnieper Cossacks came during the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, which shook the very foundations of the Commonwealth and led to the loss of the Ukrainian territories. From the moment of its founding in 1648, Cossack Ukraine became the focal point of East European politics and controversies, and it remained so until the second half of the eighteenth century. For Russia, the threat came from the Don Cossacks during the Time of Troubles and from the uprisings of Stenka Razin and Emel'ian Pugachev.

Both Poland-Lithuania and Russia lacked navies and unrestricted access to the sea. (The Commonwealth's principal port city, Gdańsk, had won considerable autonomy, while Russia's port of Arkhangel'sk was accessible only in summer.) What is more, both felt threatened by Swedish expansionism and efforts to control the Baltic trade routes.

During the seventeenth century, both states experienced great crises—Russia, the Time of Troubles (1604–1613) and Poland, the Deluge (1654–1660). Their survival was due in large part to the broad segments of their populations that mobilized to counter the danger and defend the state.

In the seventeenth century both states were also faced with the necessity of modernizing their armies, improving their tax systems, intensifying the exploitation of their resources, reviving their econo-

mies, and tightening their state administrations. Both recruited thousands of specialists in pursuit of these ends.

At this point similarities between the two countries end. The differences are striking, especially in the structure of their governments, social institutions, and political cultures. In Russia, the autocratic tsar symbolized order, justice, salvation, and the state. In Poland-Lithuania, *libertas* in conjunction with law was considered the guiding principle. While absolutism triumphed in Russia, at the expense of the *Zemskii sobor* and the Orthodox church, in Poland-Lithuania the county councils and the Commons were gaining decisive control over legislation and successfully defeating all attempts to strengthen royal prerogatives. Unlike the Russian landlords and state administrators, who were humble servitors of the tsars, the Polish szlachta and statesmen felt themselves to be citizens worthy, inheritors of Rome's republican legacy.

By the late seventeenth century, then, we can observe in both countries a complete loss of the equilibrium between government and society that is necessary for the proper functioning of a well-ordered state. In Russia, government lacked the grassroots social institutions that could have helped implement reforms. In Poland-Lithuania, social institutions were so strong that government had no chance to impose its own political program.

In this study I have surveyed the reluctant cooperation between Russian autocracy and the Polish-Lithuanian noble republic in the years when the balance of power was shifting in favor of Russia. Once it gained Ukraine, Russia began to build its empire. The shift came at a time when the Commonwealth's economic and human potentials were greater than Russia's. Moscow, however, had a crucial edge over the Commonwealth in its ability to mobilize human resources. While the Polish-Lithuanian government found it nearly impossible to tap such resources, the Russian tsars needed only to issue an order, and inertia or not, mismanagement or not, armies were formed, manufactures started, and new cities created.

While the balance of power was shifting steadily in Russia's favor, the Commonwealth's county politicians expended most of their energy on monitoring their king. In the name of preserving the "golden peace," they rejected their king's active international policies and forsook their own interests in Ukraine. This great disparity between the king's aggressive policies and the pacifism of the county szlachta was unfathomable to the Russian government.

Historians studying the Commonwealth of this period may well be puzzled by the enormous divergence between policy and perception. Although the importance of Ukraine was perceived and well understood, state policy meandered between the adventurousness of the king and the stubborn passivity of the szlachta. In short, the utopian political philosophy of the Commonwealth's citizens blinded them to danger and distorted their view of neighboring states. This led to the postponement of tax increases, army expansion, and greater centralization of government—all seen as unnecessary burdens.

The extraordinary political myopia and self-delusion displayed by the Commonwealth's free society must be taken into consideration when analyzing the failure of Polish foreign policy. Of course, Russia, too, suffered from bad judgments. Russian diplomats saw enemies in all their neighbors, and were suspicious of all offers of friendship. While Polish citizens shielded themselves from unpleasant realities by basking in optimism, the politics of the Kremlin were rooted in pessimism. *Status statui lupus est* could well have been its slogan. It is not surprising that, in such a situation, military and financial effort was extracted from Russian society against real and imaginary dangers. Polish-Lithuanian statesmen, so proud of their rights, were not ready for such sacrifices—at least not so long as they did not see an enemy crossing their borders.

That Russians knew how to make compromises and how best to use conquered peoples is evidenced by their Ukrainian policies. Meanwhile the Commonwealth's citizens readily forgot that for foreign elites the attractiveness of their state lay in the guarantee of equal rights and benefits. Thus they lost their last chance at strengthening their relations with the Cossacks. Once shifted, the balance of power was never again restored. Steadily, the Russian shadow grew over Eastern Europe.

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*Note that where necessary, equivalent forms have been given for personal- and place-names. *U* = Ukrainian; *Br* = Belarusian; *P* = Polish; *R* = Russian; *T* = Turkish.

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
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